Non-Corrigé Traduction
Uncorrected Translation
RU
CR 2008/18 (traduction)
CR 2008/18 (translation)
Mardi 2 septembre 2008 à 10 heures
Tuesday 2 September 2008 at 10 a.m. - 2 -
10 Le PRESIDENT: Veuillez vous asseoir. L’audience est ouverte. La Cour se réunit
aujourd’hui pour entendre les Parties en le urs plaidoiries dans l’affaire relative à la Délimitation
maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine).
Je voudrais indiquer tout d’abord que le jugeSimma s’est, en vertu du paragraphe2 de
l’article 17 du Statut, récusé en l’affaire.
Je voudrais également indiquer que le juge Pa rra-Aranguren, pour des raisons qu’il m’a fait
connaître, n’est pas en mesure de siéger aujourd’hui.
La Cour ne comptant sur son siège aucun j uge de la nationalité des Parties, chacune
d’elles a usé de la faculté qui lui est conférée par le paragraphe2 de l’article31 du Statut de
désigner un juge ad hoc. La Roumanie a désigné M.Jean-PierreCot et l’Ukraine a désigné
M. Bernard H. Oxman.
L’article 20 du Statut dispose que «[t]out membre de la Cour doit, avant d’entrer en fonction,
en séance publique, prendre l’engagement solennel d’ exercer ses attributions en pleine impartialité
et en toute conscience». En vertu du paragra phe6 de l’article31 du Statut, cette disposition
s’applique également aux juges ad hoc.
Avant d’inviter chacun des juges ad hoc à faire leur déclaration solennelle, je dirai d’abord,
selon l’usage, quelques mots de leur carrière et de leurs qualifications.
M.Jean-PierreCot, de nationalité française, est membre du Tribunal international pour le
droit de la mer. Il est également professeur émér ite à l’Université Paris-I (Panthéon-Sorbonne) et
chercheur associé au Centre de droit internationa l de l’Université libre de Bruxelles. Entre1981
et 1982, il a exercé les fonctions de ministre char gé de la coopération et du développement au sein
du Gouvernement français. Pendant plusieurs années, M.Cot a été membre du Parlement
européen, au sein duquel il a exercé d’éminentes f onctions, notamment celle de président de la
Commission des budgets et de vice-président du Parlement européen. M.Cot a plaidé devant la
Cour en qualité de conseil et avocat dans un certain nombre d’affaires, notamment l’affaire du
Différend frontalier (Burkina Faso/République du Mali) , l’affaire du Différend territorial
(Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Tchad) , l’affaire relative à l’ Ile de Kasikili/Sedudu
(Botswana/Namibie), l’affaire relative à la Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le - 3 -
Nigéria (Cameroun c.Nigéria) et l’affaire relative à la Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et
11 Pulau Sipadan (Indonésie/Malaisie). M.Cot est l’auteur de nombreuses publications dans le
domaine du droit international, du droit européen et des sciences politiques. Il est président de la
Société française pour le droit international.
M. Bernard H. Oxman, de nationalité américaine, est professeur à la faculté de droit de
l’Université de Miami et directeur du programme de droit de l’océan et des côtes. Il est également
corédacteur en chef de l’ American Journal of International Law . M. Oxman a occupé le poste de
conseiller juridique adjoint pour les océans, l’environnement et les affaires scientifiques au bureau
du conseiller juridique du département d’Etat des Etats-Unis. Il a été le représentant et le
vice-président de la délégation des Etats-Unis à la troisième conférence des NationsUnies sur le
droit de la mer. M. Oxman a été nommé juge ad hoc au Tribunal international pour le droit de la
mer et membre du tribunal arbitral constitué conf ormément à l’annexeV II de la convention des
NationsUnies sur le droit de la mer, aux fins d’examiner un différend opposant la Malaisie et
Singapour. Il a également exercé la fonction d’ex pert juridique du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis
d’Amérique devant la Cour en l’affaire relative à la Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la
région du golfe du Maine. M. Oxman est l’auteur de nombr eux ouvrages dans divers domaines du
droit international, en particulier le droit international de la mer.
Conformément à l’ordre de préséance défini au paragraphe 3 de l’article 7 du Règlement de
la Cour, j’inviterai tout d’abord M. Cot à faire la déclaration solennelle prescrite par le Statut et je
demanderai à toutes les personnes présentes à l’audience de bien vouloir se lever.
M. COT : Thank you, Madam President.
«I solemnly declare that I will perform my duties and exercise my powers as
judge honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously.»
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie. J’inviterai maintenant M. Oxman à faire la déclaration
solennelle prescrite par le Statut.
M. OXMAN : Je vous remercie, Madame le président.
«Je déclare solennellement que je remplirai mes devoirs et exercerai mes
attributions de juge en tout honneur et dévouement, en pleine et parfaite impartialité et
en toute conscience.» - 4 -
12 Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie. Veuillez vous asseoir. Je prends acte des déclarations
solennelles faites par MM.Cot et Oxman et dé clare ceux-ci dûment installés en qualité de
juges ad hoc en l’affaire relative à la Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine).
*
Je rappellerai à présent les principales étapes de la procédure en l’espèce.
Le 16 septembre 2004, la Roumaine a déposé au Greffe de la Cour une requête introductive
d’instance datée du 13septembre2004 contre l’Ukra ine, au sujet de la délimitation du plateau
continental et de leurs zones économiques exclusives respectives dans la mer Noire.
Dans sa requête, la Roumanie, a invoqué, p our fonder la compétence de la Cour, les
dispositions de l’alinéa h) de l’article4 de l’accord additi onnel conclu par l’échange de lettres
du2juin1997 entre les ministres des affaires étra ngères de la Roumanie et de l’Ukraine. Cet
accord additionnel a été conclu par référence à l’ article2 du traité de bon voisinage et de
coopération entre la Roumanie et l’Ukraine, signé le 2 juin 1997. Les deux instruments sont entrés
en vigueur le 22 octobre 1997.
Conformément au paragraphe2 de l’article 40 du Statut, le greffier a immédiatement
communiqué au Gouvernement ukrainien une copi e certifiée conforme de la requête; en
application du paragraphe3 de ce même article, il en a également informé tous les Etats admis à
ester devant la Cour.
Suivant les instructions données par la Cour en vertu de l’article43 de son Règlement, le
greffier a adressé les notifications prévues au paragraphe 1 de l’article 63 du Statut de la Cour aux
Etats parties à la convention des NationsUnies su r le droit de la mer du 10décembre1982. Le
greffier a en outre adressé la notification prévue au paragraphe 2 de l’article 43 du Règlement de la
Cour, tel qu’adopté le 29 septembre 2005, à la Communauté européenne, qui est aussi partie à cette
convention, en priant cette organisation de lu i faire savoir si elle entendait présenter des
observations écrites en vertu de la disposition précitée. En réponse, la Communauté européenne a
informé le greffier qu’elle n’avait pas l’intention de présenter des observations en l’espèce. - 5 -
13 Par ordonnance en date du 19novembre2004, la Cour a fixé au 19août2005 et au
19mai2006, respectivement, les dates d’expiration des délais pour le dépôt du mémoire de la
Roumanie et du contre-mémoire de l’Ukraine ; ces pièces ont été dûment déposées dans le délai
ainsi prescrit.
Par ordonnance en date du 30 juin 2006, la Cour a autorisé la présentation d’une réplique par
la Roumanie et d’une duplique par l’Ukraine, et fixé au 22décembre2006 et 15juillet2007 les
dates d’expiration des délais pour le dépôt de ces pièces. La réplique de la Roumanie a été déposée
dans les délais ainsi prescrits. Par ordonnance en date du 8juin2007, la Cour, à la demande de
l’Ukraine, a reporté au 6juillet2007 la date d’e xpiration du délai pour le dé pôt de la duplique.
L’Ukraine a dûment déposé sa duplique dans le délai ainsi prorogé.
Le 23août2007, l’agent de la Roumanie a fait part à la Cour du souhait de son
gouvernement de produire un document nouveau confor mément à l’article56 du Règlement de la
Cour et a fourni certaines explications à l’appui de sa demande. Dans sa réponse, l’agent de
l’Ukraine a indiqué que son gouvernement s’opposa it à la production de ce nouveau document, au
motif que la Roumanie n’avait pas «agi conformé ment à l’instruction de procédureIX». Vu
l’absence de consentement de l’Ukraine, le gre ffier, sur instruction de la Cour, a demandé au
Gouvernement roumain, le 10décembre2007, de préciser les raisons pour lesquelles il estimait
nécessaire de produire ce nouveau document. Le Gouvernement roumain a dûment présenté le
18décembre2007 le supplément d’explications re quis. Le 23janvier2008, les Parties ont été
informées que la Cour, en vertu du paragraphe2 de l’article 56 de son Règlement, et après avoir
examiné les vues des Parties, av ait décidé d’autoriser le Gouvernement roumain à produire le
nouveau document.
*
Conformément au paragraphe2 de l’article 53 de son Règlement, la Cour, après s’être
renseignée auprès des Parties, a décidé de rendre accessibles au public, à l’ouverture de la - 6 -
procédure orale, des exemplaires des pièces de procédure et documents annexés. En outre,
14 conformément à la pratique de la Cour, l’ensemble de ces documents, sans leurs annexes, sera
placé dès aujourd’hui sur le site Internet de la Cour.
*
Je constate la présence à l’audience des agents , conseils et avocats des deux Parties.
Conformément aux dispositions rela tives à l’organisation de la pro cédure arrêtées par la Cour, les
audiences comprendront un premier et un second tours de plaidoiries. Conformément au
paragraphe 1 de l’article 60 du Règlement de la Cour, les exposés oraux seront aussi succincts qu
e
possible.
*
Le premier tour de plaidoiries débute aujourd’hui et se terminera le
vendredi 12 septembre 2008. Le second tour de plai doiries s’ouvrira le lundi 15 septembre 2008 et
s’achèvera le vendredi 19 septembre 2008.
*
La Roumanie, qui est l’Etat demandeur en l’ affaire, sera entendue la première. Je donne à
présent la parole à S. Exc. M. Bogdan Aurescu, agent de la Roumanie.
AMUr. ESCU:
I. Introduction
1. Madam President, Members of the Court, it is a great honour and a real privilege for me to
represent my country before you as Agent of Romania.
2. First, because it gives me an opportunity respectfully pay tribute to the International
Court of Justice, the prestigious principal judicial organ of the United Nations, and to all its judges,
15
representing as they do the principal judicialsystems of the world with professionalism and
integrity. - 7 -
3. Second, because ⎯ for Romania ⎯ strict respect for international law represents the very
basis, the nub of our foreign policy. For a European country the size of Romania, international law
is the most effective instrument for finding eq uitable solutions in international disputes.
Meanwhile, this Court devotes itself to the effectiv e and enlightened application of international
law with a view to establishing international lawfulness and public order on a lasting basis.
4. This guiding principle of my country’s foreign policy is rooted in Romania’s contribution
to the development of international law and international justice. Among others, the Romanian
School of International Law has provided a judge to the Permanent Court of International Justice
throughout its lifetime ⎯ DemetreNegulesco, who wrote with great scientific authority on
advisory opinions, as well as one of the originators of the concept of international criminal law and
of the International Criminal Court ⎯ VespasienPella, to mention only two. To these may be
added the contribution of NicolaeTitulesco, fo rmer Minister for Foreign Affairs and twice
President of the League of Nations Assembly, who was one of the authors of the definition of
aggression in the 1933 London Conventions (the “Titulesco-Litvinov” Conventions), and the
visionary instigator of the concept of the “spir ituality of borders” (which heralded the Schengen
principles) and of regional inte rnational organizations. As regards the law of the sea, the travaux
préparatoires of the Montego Bay Convention of 1982 t estify to the substantial contribution by
Romania, the letter and spirit of its proposals ha ving been broadly adopted by the text of the
1
Convention, including in its Article 121 on the Régime of Islands, and above all in its paragraph 3 .
5. I am particularly conscious of this privilege ⎯ also and thirdly ⎯ because it is the first
time Romania has appeared before your dis tinguished Court in a contentious case. In
September2004, when Romania seised the Court of this case of maritime delimitation in the
16 Black Sea, my country placed its entire trust in your distinguished Court to settle this dispute justly
and impartially, basing itself on all the wealth of its case law on the subject. For Romania, this
case law represents an absolute guarantee of a solu tion which is equitable and fully complies with
the law. Madam President, we are inspired by this same trust today.
MR, pp. 85-90, paras. 8.8-8.16. - 8 -
6. Members of the Court, in the opinion of Romania 2, this case is not a very complex one.
This view is based on the fact that there are no territorial claims between the Parties and the
geographical context is not excessively complicated by exceptional circumstances ⎯ the presence
of Serpents’ Island in the area for delimitation apart. At the same time, it must be borne in mind
that the first part of the maritime boundary be tween Romania’s continental shelf and exclusive
economic zone, on the one hand, and the area having a radius of 12 nautical miles around Serpents’
Island, on the other hand , has already been established by the agreements concluded between
Romania and the Soviet Union. These agreements are still in force between the Parties before you.
The 1997 bilateral agreements then established the delimitation principles applicable for drawing
the remainder of the delimitation line ⎯ principles fully complying with the rules already
implemented by this Court when it ruled on other maritime delimitation cases. It is on the basis of
all these facts and the consolidated jurisprudence of this Court, as well as the substantial practice of
States in this area, that Romania regards the mar itime delimitation in the Black Sea as not a very
complicated case.
7. But “not very complicated” does not mean “si mple”. As I always tell my students in the
Faculty of Law in Bucharest, there are no simple cases before this Court. But comparing the
Court’s task in this case with other far more complicated cases ⎯ for example, Cameroon v.
Nigeria or Qatar v. Bahrain, to quote just two examples ⎯ it is easy to see why Romania considers
that our maritime delimitation case is not a very complicated one. Hence, I cannot share the
position of our opponents who, in the Counter-Memorial, have asserted that the impossibility for
3
17 the two Parties to reach a negotiated solution t estifies to the complex nature of the present case .
Madam President, Members of the Court, if international law had been accepted and implemented
by our opponents during the negotiations, this Court ⎯ there is no doubt ⎯ would never have been
seised of this case. Romania has always based its positions and proposals throughout the long
negotiation process on international maritime deli mitation law and on the rules of delimitation ⎯
as developed and implemented above all by this Court in its now settled case law 4.
2MR, p. 9, para. 1.10.
3
CMU, p. 33, para. 4.1.
4MR, p. 47-48, para. 4.44; Ann., MR 25. - 9 -
The bilateral negotiations and the positions of Romania and Ukraine. The originality of the
delimitation “method” proposed by Ukraine during the negotiations and before the Court
8. Negotiations between Romania and the Soviet Union on the delimitation of the continental
shelf and its exclusive economic zones in the Black Sea took place over a period of 20 years, in ten
sessions, between 1967 and 1987. Th ere was no concrete result, given the divergent positions of
the two countries on the key elements of the delimitation process 5.
9. The negotiations between Romania and Ukra ine on the problem of the delimitation of the
continental shelf and its exclusive economic zones took place after the proclamation of
independence by Ukraine, and also in the contex t of the negotiations for the conclusion of the
Treaty on Relations of Co-operation and Good Neighbourliness (the “Treaty on Relations”), signed
in Constanta on 2June 1997 6. An Additional Agreement was conc luded at the same time as this
Treaty, the same day, by an exchange of letters between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the
two States 7. Under the provisions of the Treaty on Relations and the Additional Agreement,
following the entry into force of these two instruments, 24 negotiation sessions and ten sessions of
8
experts were held between 1998 and 2004, before Romania brought this case before the Court .
18 10. Romania’s position during these 34negotia tion sessions was based on the principles of
maritime delimitation agreed by the two Parties in Article 4 of the Additional Agreement, which ⎯
I repeat ⎯ fully comply with the practice of States a nd international jurisprudence, in particular
that of the Court. This is why Romania suggest ed that, as a starting-point, the delimitation should
take an equidistance or median line between the relevant adjacent or opposite coasts of the two
States, subsequently adjusting that line if need be, taking account of the relevant circumstances of
9
the area for delimitation , including the presence of Serpents’ Island in this area. The equitableness
of the line was to be verified by the “proportionality” test, as practiced in international
jurisprudence. This method has consistently been proposed by Romania during the negotiations, as
MR, p. 43, para. 4.27-4.28; MR, Chap. 5; MR, Anns. 28-31.
6
UNTS, Vol. 2159, p. 26 (Ann. MR 1). See MR, p. 43, para. 4.29. See also CMU, Ann. 22.
7
Ibid., p. 48 (letter from Romania), p. 54 (corresponding letter from Ukraine) (Ann. MR 2).
MR, p. 47, para. 4.41.
Ibid., pp. 47-48, para. 4.44. - 10 -
illustrated by the diplomatic correspondence sent to Ukraine, and which is included in Annex 25 of
the Memorial 10.
11. However, the official Ukrainian pos ition during the negotiations was based on a
somewhat original delimitation method, which is now being illustrated on the screen.
[Slide 1: the delimitation “method” proposed by Ukraine during the negotiations with Romania (on
the basis of CMU, figure 9-1)]
12. In accordance with this method, co mmunicated to Romania by diplomatic
correspondence, included in the annexes to the Memorial 11, the delimitation line should have been
calculated as the “average” of two other previously determined lines. These were a line equidistant
between Romania’s mainland and the coast of Serpents’ Island, then a small segment of the coast
of the Crimean peninsula ⎯ on the screen, you can see the “Ukrainian” equidistance line ⎯ and a
line determined on the basis of the “proportionality” method. How should that line be drawn? This
remains a mystery, not just a legal one but a ma thematical and a geographi cal one too. As under
tabI-1 in the judges’ folder, you can now see on the screen the “average” final line proposed by
Ukraine. This method suffered from a serious logical contradiction. To begin with, in drawing the
19 equidistance line, Ukraine consider ed the coast of Serpents’ Island and a fragment of the Crimean
coast as relevant. However, later ⎯ when the “proportionality line” had to be drawn, Ukraine
included the mainland Ukrainian coast as a whole, including the sectors situated north of Serpents’
Island ⎯ despite the fact that, according to the approach first used, the mainland coast of Ukraine
(with the exception of part of the coast of the Crimea) was not relevant to the purposes of the
delimitation .12
13. Madam President, intrinsically contradictory as it is, the Ukrainian method manifestly
failed to respect the delimitation principles laid down by the Additional Agreement, and accepted
as mandatory by the two States in 1997, despite Uk raine’s efforts to present its position during the
13
negotiations differently, “cosmetically”, in the Counter-Memorial .
10
For example, the Note Verbale of 24January 2002 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, MR, Ann. 25.
11
For example, the Note Verbale of 29 May 2002 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine to the Embassy
of Romania in Kiev, MR, Ann. 26.
12MR, p. 48, para. 4.45.
13See CMU, pp. 233-234, para. 9.10. - 11 -
14. Hence, although the Additional Agreement refers, in its Article4 (a), to the principle
stated in Article121 of the United Nations Conve ntion on the Law of the Sea “as applied in the
practice of States and in international jurisprude nce”, Ukraine has insist ed on Serpents’ Island
being treated on an equal footing with Romania’s mainland territory, even if, according to the
well-established practice of States, and laid down by a number of decisions of this Court and
arbitral tribunals, this maritime feature should be disregarded, at least in the first stage of the
delimitation process, in view of its geographical position and natural characteristics 14.
15. At the same time, the Ukrainian method was based on an erroneous application of the
principle laid down by Article4 (b) of the Additional Agreement, according to which the Parties
were to use “the principle of the equidistan ce line in areas submitted to delimitation where the
coasts are adjacent and the principle of the median line in areas where the coasts are opposite”, for
Ukraine’s adjacent mainland coast was disregarded in drawing the delimitation line. At the same
20 time, the Ukrainian method did not envisage any median line between the opposite coasts of the
two countries, thus ignoring the second part of the above-mentioned rule.
16. What is more, alt hough, in its Article4 (c), the Additional Agreement lays down the
application of the “principle of equity and the method of proportionality, as they are applied in the
practice of States and in the decisions of inte rnational courts”, the Ukrainian proposal meant
granting proportionality an unprecedented role, by regarding it as an independent delimitation
method 15.
17. The Ukrainian method also disregards Article4 (e), which lays down “the principle of
taking into consideration the special circumstances of the zone submitted to delimitation”, since ⎯
according to this method, Serpents’ Island has been denied the character of a relevant circumstance
which it does possess in the zone submitted to delimitation.
18. Furthermore, the line claimed by Ukraine was not consistent with the proces-verbaux
concluded between Romania and the Soviet Uni on since 1949, which are recognized by Ukraine,
(and by Romania) as agreements in force between the two States. These Agreements clearly fix the
maritime boundary along the 12-nautical-mile arc drawn around Serpents’ Island . 16
14MR, p. 49, para. 4.47.
15
Ibid.
16MR, p. 49, para. 4.48. - 12 -
19. Only in 2006, in the Counter-Memorial, did Ukraine ⎯ perhaps conscious of just how
unusual the method previously suggested was, decide to radically alter its view, by appearing to
accept the method, well known in doctrine, Stat e practice and international jurisprudence ⎯
“equidistance/median line ⎯ relevant or special circumstances”. But this acceptance,
MadamPresident, is only apparent . For Ukraine’s “new” position is based on a distortion of the
rules laid down in the maritime delimitation, in an attempt to justify the same delimitation line ⎯
the same profoundly inequitable result sought by Ukraine during the negotiations.
[Slide 2: the delimitation “method” proposed by Uk raine before the Court (on the basis of CMU,
figure 9-3)]
21 20. In accordance with Ukraine’s written pleadi ngs, the delimitation “m ust” principally be
made between a tiny part of the already minuscule coast of Serpents’ Island and a reduced part of
the Crimean coast, and the coast of Romania 17, disregarding the mainland Ukrainian coast adjacent
to the Romanian coast. Ukraine actually propo ses the drawing of a provisional equidistance line
using 3 (three!) allegedly relevant points on the southern coast of Serpents’ Island ⎯ a coast of
18
some 310 m, the distances between these points being some 240 and 70 m ⎯ and only one point
19
on the Crimean coast . The adjustment of the resulting provisional line “must”, according to
Ukraine, be effected by shifting it in order to take into consideration ⎯ here I am quoting
Ukraine’s Counter-Memorial ⎯ “the broad geographical framework of the area and in
particular . . . the marked disparity of coastal lengths”. You can now see on the screen as well as
under tab I-2 in the judges’ folder, the delimitati on line proposed by Ukraine. Using what method,
for what scientific reason does Ukraine propose this shifting of the provisional line? ⎯ this
remains a mystery, for Ukraine barely explains it, just as it provided no justification of its positions
during the previous negotiations with Romania. At the same time, Serpents’ Island, although
accorded an importance ⎯ which it does not have ⎯ and although artificially and contrary to all
evidence incorporated into the Ukrainian coast, of which it does not form part geographically ⎯
Serpents’ Island, as I was saying, is nevertheless de nied the character of relevant circumstance in
1See CMU, Chap. 7, pp. 235-239, paras. 9.15-9.29.
18
See CMU, P. 22, fig. 3-6.
19
See RU, p. 90, para. 5.4 and fig. 5-1.
2CMU, p. 238, para. 9.26. - 13 -
the zone submitted to delimitation 21. These are only a handful of examples among others of the
erroneous argument put forward by Ukraine regardi ng the application of the “equidistance/median
line ⎯ relevant or special circumstances”. But this argument will be further taken apart in
Romania’s oral argument.
[Slide 3: comparison of the delimitation “met hods” proposed by Ukraine during the negotiations
with Romania and before the Court, and delimitation lines which coincide]
22 21. The coincidence between the delimita tion line proposed by Ukraine during the
negotiations ⎯ which is the result of a highly debata ble “method” lacking any scientific basis ⎯
and the line claimed before this Court can eas ily be ascertained on the slide now being shown on
the screen and which is under tab I-3 in your folders. This coincidence ⎯ which is no accident ⎯
very clearly establishes the erroneous nature of the line drawn and the application of the “method”
proposed by Ukraine to the Court.
22. Members of the Court, bearing in mind Ukraine’s conduct during the negotiations, allow
me, if you will, to conclude here that it is not the sophisticated nature of this case, but rather
Ukraine’s failure to comply with the rules of maritime delimitation and the provisions of the
agreements in force between Romania and Ukraine which resulted in the failure of the bilateral
negotiations. If these relevant rules had been accepted, complied with and applied by our
neighbours during the negotiations, they would have resulted in a viable and equitable negotiated
solution to the delimitation problem.
The inequitable effects of the unlawful seizure of Serpents’ Island by the USSR
23. Madam President, it is now time for me to present various important aspects of the
context in which the former Soviet Union illic itly obtained Serpents’ Island in 1948. When
Romania gained its independence, the Berlin Treaty of 1878 confirmed Serpents’ Island as
sovereign Romanian territory ⎯ which it remained for 70 years until 1948. From that date, it was
occupied by the Soviet Union for some 43years (being transformed into a military outpost under
22
the direct control of the central military authorities in Moscow) , until the independence of
Ukraine.
21
See, for example, RU, pp. 95-96, paras. 5.25-5.27.
22
MR, p. 24, para. 3.11. - 14 -
24. The transfer of Serpents’ Island to the Soviet Union in 1948 ran counter to the provisions
23
of the 1947 Treaty of Peace between the A llied and Associated Powers and Romania , and also
contrary to international law in force at the time. The Peace Treaty did not contemplate any
transfer of Serpents’ Island to the Soviet Union. Its Article 1 (1) (“Frontiers”) laid down that “[t]he
23 frontiers of Roumania... shall be those whic h existed on January1, 1941...”, on which date
Serpents’ Island was without any doubt a soverei gn Romanian territory. Article1(2) laid down
that “[t]he Soviet-Roumanian frontier is thus fixed in accordance with the Soviet-Roumanian
24
agreement of June 28, 1940 . . .” .
25. The so-called “Soviet-Roumanian Agreement” of 1940 was not a true agreement. As
25
reputed historians have pointed out , this name in fact conceals a unilateral Soviet instrument
requiring the evacuation of certain Romanian territories ⎯ an ultimatum which was never accepted
by Romania 2.
26. But in any event, the text of the ultimatum did not include any reference whatever to
Serpents’ Island (or to various ri ver islands in the Danube, which were also seized by the USSR).
This means that Article1 of the peace treaty did not lay down any transfer of Serpents’ Island to
27
the Soviet Union: under the peace treaty, that territory came under Romanian sovereignty .
27. In February 1948, Serpents’ Island was unlawfully seized by the Soviet Union under an
unfair treaty ⎯ the Protocol laying down the line of the national boundary between the Soviet
28
Union and what was already the People’s Republic of Romania , which was not ratified by the
Romanian Parliament. When this document was signed, as a result of the geopolitical changes of
29
the post-war period, Romania was unable to oppose this territorial cession . For Soviet troops had
already been occupying Romania since 8August 1944 and a communist government had already
been installed by Moscow since March 1945. The Prot ocol was also at variance with the Treaty of
23
UNTS, Vol. 42, p. 3.
24
MR, PP. 28-29, paras. 3.26-3.27.
25
MR, pp. 28-29, paras. 3.26-3.27.
2MR, pp. 27-38, paras. 3.20-3.22 and Anns. 7, 8, 9.
2MR, Ann. 9.
2MR, p.29, para.3.28 and Ann.11. See also Ann.12 , including the Procès-Verbal of Delivery-Reception of
Serpents’ Island of 23 May 1948.
29
RR, pp. 320-321, paras. A24-A26. - 15 -
Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance , which was signed between the two countries and
24 entered into force the same day (4February 1948), in Moscow, and whose Article5 laid down
“mutual respect of their . . . sovereignty” and, w hose Article 2 (2) laid down that “[t]he application
30
[of this] treaty will be in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter” .
[Slide 4: area lost by Romania following the arbitrary fixing of the maritime boundary in 1949 ⎯
sketch based on figure 8 “Maritime areas in front of the Romanian and Soviet coasts”, included on
page 52 of the Memorial (judges’ folder, tab I-4)]
28. The seizure of Serpents’ Island directly influenced the establishment of the maritime
boundary between Romania and the USSR, which w as fixed in a manner arbitrary and inequitable
31 2
for Romania . The unlawful transfer of this rock 0.17 km , together with the arbitrary delimitation
of the last sector in the river boundary on the Danube ⎯ which disregarded Romania’s legitimate
interests ⎯ led to the loss by Romania of major mar itime areas and the establishment of an unfair
maritime boundary. They also resulted in the attr ibution of a Soviet maritime area of 12nautical
miles around Serpents’ Island, but of a Romanian area limited to 9nautical miles between the
baseline and the 12-nautical-mile boundary around Se rpents’ Island. The arbitrary “method” used
2
to fix the maritime boundary has of itself inflicte d on Romania the loss of an area of some 70 km .
This situation can easily be seen on figure8 in the Memorial, now being projected on the screen
and under tab I-4 of your folders, which illustrat es how the illicit allocation to the Soviet Union of
the river island of Limba, some 10km 2, as well as Serpents’ Island, have noticeably affected the
position of the river and maritime boundary.
[Slide 5: area lost by Romania in violation of the rules of international law in 1948 and 1949
(judges’ folder, tab I-5)]
29. You can now see on the screen (and under tab I-5 in your folders), purely for the sake of
illustration and comparison, how the delimitati on of the maritime boundary should have been
effected if, in 1948, the peace treaty had been r espected and if, in 1949, the river boundary had
been drawn in compliance with the rule of th e main navigable channel, whereas the maritime
boundary would have been fixed according to the equidistance rule. The difference between the
30
UNTS, Vol. 48, p. 199.
31MR, p.29, paras.3.26-3.30 and pp.51-53, paras.5.2-54 (see also figure8 “the maritime areas facing the
Romanian and Soviet coasts”, p. 52 of the MR); RR, pp. 313-314, para. A3. - 16 -
situation imposed on Romania and the solution resp ecting the peace treaty and international law is
an area of over 1,600 sq km.
25 30. Madam President, Members of the Court, Romania is not asking the Court, in these
proceedings, to annul these earlier arrangements, d espite the highly debatable circumstances of
their adoption. On the contrary, the 1997 Treaty on Relations and the Additional Agreement
clearly show how Romania views its role and res ponsibilities in the Europe of today. Romania is
not seeking, as Ukraine suggests, “compensatory justice” 32. However, Romania asserts that the
arbitrary acts perpetrated in 1948 and 1949 ⎯ the unlawful seizure of Serpents’ Island by the
Soviet Union and its inequitable effects (the unjus tified attribution to that territory of maritime
areas larger than those attributed to Romania, wit hout there being any justification for this in the
particularities of this maritime feature) ⎯ cannot, in any event, constitute a basis for further
33
prejudicing Romania’s territorial rights.
31. Madam President, an equitable and l asting solution in the present case would be
incompatible with the increase and extension of these inequitable effects. Such a solution cannot
disregard these historical and political circumstan ces. Nor can such a solution disregard the
significance of the special agreement of 1997, when the Treaty on Relations was concluded.
The special agreement between Romania and Ukraine of 1997
32. Madam President, the context and significance of the conclusion of the Treaty on
Relations, in 1997, is aptly shown by a document which Ukraine chose to include in Annex 22 of
its Counter-Memorial. This document, published in Romania’s Moniteur Officiel 34, is a record of a
public hearing organized in the Romanian Senate on 4December1995, during which the
Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs replied to a question put by a senator on “solving the
delicate problem of Serpents’ Island”.
33. In his reply (the relevant part of whic h is found in the judges’ folder, tab I-6), the
Minister set out the present state of the nego tiations with a view to the conclusion of the
32
For example, CMU, p. 37, para. 4.16.
33
See, for example, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria:
Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 448, para. 307.
3Moniteur Officiel of Romania, No. 227, part 2 (parliamentary debates), 14 December 1995. - 17 -
1997 Treaty on Relations. He begins by recalling the historical context in which the former Soviet
26 Union unlawfully seized Serpents’ Island. He th en states: “During the negotiations for the
conclusion of the basic political treaty [the Treat y on Relations], Ukraine pointed out... that
Ukraine ⎯ as legal successor of the former USSR ⎯ did not plan to discuss the status of the
Island” 35. By “the status” it was referring to appurtenance of Serpents’ Island ⎯ and the Minister
states the Ukrainian position “which is and should be considered Ukrainian soil and an integral part
of the national territory of the Ukraine” 36. He went on to explain:
“In all the discussions we have had on this question ⎯ and let me say again that
they are part of the file of our negotiations with Ukraine ⎯ we were [particularly]
concerned with the fact that... althou gh Serpents’ Island has no economic value of
itself ⎯ as you know, it is made up of hard rock which does not even support
vegetation, [and] has no water, it can have extremely important economic
consequences for Romania and Ukraine, in view of the impact it may have on the
delimitation of the territorial sea, the [continental] shelf and the exclusive economic
zone between Romania and Ukraine, in a geographical area where, according to recent
surveys, there may be sizable oil and gas reserves.” 37
34. The Minister went on ⎯ and this also deserves to be quoted: “During the negotiations,
we sought to distinguish between the two questions which make up this problem: the former being
bound up with the determination of the legal status of Serpents’ Island ⎯ as I was saying, we could
38
debate this problem at length . . .”
35. Referring to the legal status, the Minister again emphasized the question of the
sovereignty of Serpents’ Island. Focusing on the second aspect of the problem, he continued: “and
the second question, is how far this island ⎯ notwithstanding the determination of its status ⎯ can
and should influence the delimitations of the terr itorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and the
39
continental shelf” .
36. And the Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs concluded: “as you well know, this
40
question represents one of the main obstacles to the finalization of the treaty [on relations]” .
3Translation by the Registry.
3Ibid.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.; emphasis added.
3Ibid.; emphasis added.
4Ibid. - 18 -
27 37. It is quite clear, Madam President, as show n in no uncertain terms by this annex to the
Ukrainian Counter-Memorial, that, during the wrangling over the Treaty on Relations, the two
States had been negotiating a complex territorial problem (lato sensu) : the question of the
delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone and, in that context , the
meaning of the appurtenance of Serpents’ Island to Ukraine, as a consequence of its unlawful
transfer to the former Soviet Union in 1948 ⎯ intimately bound up with the problem of its possible
influence in the delimitation process. The negotiation “package” regarding Serpents’ Island thus
consisted of the two interrelated sub-problems I have just mentioned.
38. Madam President, the text, of the 1997 Treaty on Relations, and particularly of its
Additional Agreement precisely reflects this “package” and the agreement reached on the two
intricately linked sub-problems of which it consis ted. Thus, despite the highly debatable way in
which the former Soviet Union acquire d Serpents’ Island in 1948, Romania ⎯ fully aware of its
responsibilities in Europe and the need to preserve order and stability in the region ⎯ for the first
time, formally confirmed in writing in these trea ties that this maritime feature belonged to
Ukraine 41. At the same time, and in parallel, in th e same Additional Agreement, Article4 lays
42
down the applicable principles in the maritime delimitation, agreed upon between the two Parties .
In practical terms, the fact that Romania forma lly confirmed that Serpen ts’ Island belonged to
Ukraine coincides with, and corresponds to, the insistence by Romania on an equitable outcome of
the maritime delimitation, in view, firstly, of the provisions of Article121 (on the Régime of
43
Islands) of the 1982 Convention . There is a close and direct link between, on the one hand , the
express acceptance by Romania of the territorial status quo and, on the other hand , the delimitation
44
principles laid down by the Additional Agreement for reaching an equitable solution .
28 39. It should also be pointed out that, when the Additional Agreement was signed and
entered into force, Ukraine was fully aware of the declaration made by Romania on the occasion of
the signature and ratification of the Montego Bay Convention 45.
4MR, p. 40, para. 4.24 ; p. 44, para. 4.34; p. 59, paras. 5.16, 5.18.
4MR, pp. 44-45, para. 4.35..
43
Ibid.
44
MR, p. 59, para. 5.18.
4MR, pp. 91-94, paras. 8.20-8.30. - 19 -
[Slide 6: paragraph3 of the Declaration of Romania on the signature (10December1982) and
ratification (17 December 1996) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea]
40. Let me recall the relevant passage in this declaration, now being shown on the screen and
also included under tab I-7 in the judges’ folder:
“Romania states that, according to the requirements of equity as [resulting]
from Articles74 and 83 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the uninhabited
islands without economic life can in no way affect the delimitation of the maritime
spaces belonging to the mainland coasts of the coastal States.”
This declaration reiterated five and a half months before the signature of the Treaty on Relations
with Ukraine, during the negotiation process of that treaty, without a shadow of a doubt related to
Serpents’ Island.
41. Hence, Ukraine’s agreement that the reference to Article121 constitutes one of the
principles applicable to the present delimitation–– the first –– clearly establishes that Ukraine
accepted the applicability, to th e present delimitation, of the third paragraph of Article121, as
interpreted by the declaration of Romania 46. Ukraine made no negative comment or objection
either in 1999, on the filing of its instrument of ratification of the Montego Bay Convention, or in
1997, on the signature or entry into force of the A dditional Agreement, or in 1996, on the filing of
the Romanian instrument of ratification of the Montego Bay Convention, nor prior to that.
42. The agreement on this “package” and on its scope and meaning were both confirmed by
official Romanian public statements.
47
29 43. For example, in a press article (the relevant paragraphs may be found in the judges’
folder under tab I-8), the acting Romanian Minist er for Foreign Affairs in 1997, who initialled the
Treaty on Relations and signed the Additional Agreement, wrote the following:
“In realizing that, for the young Ukrainian State now detached from the USSR,
the territorial adjustments were inacceptable because they could trigger a domino
effect, particularly as the Russian-Ukrainian boundary was still in dispute, Romania
has disregarded the problem of the validity of Ukraine’s rights over Serpents’ Island.
The result has been the following agreement : Romania has recognized the de facto
situation in accepting that the island con cerned belonged to Ukraine, but only as
successor to the USSR (the question of th e validity of the original title remaining
open); Ukraine, in exchange for the freezing of the territorial dispute, has implicitly
46
MR, pp. 94-95, para. 8.34.
4“Romania’s Friendship or the Popul ation of the Serpents’ IslanNine O’Clock, No. 3724, 17 July 2006,
http://www.nineoclock.ro/archive_index.php?page=detalii&categorie=polit… - 20 -
agreed not to use the Island in the deli mitation of the continental shelf and has
undertaken not to place any offensive military equipment on the island either.”
44. The Minister added:
“The delimitation of the [continental] shelf has been entrusted to the
International Court in The Hague, so that th e Kiev authorities are able to assert that
they have not ceded anything, but have simp ly complied with an impartial judgment.
In the drafting of that judgment, there would appear to be no reason to take Serpents’
Island into account, given that it is uninhabited and not open to economic
exploitation.”
45. In light of the foregoing, it is quite clear, Members of the Court, that, in 1997, by the
Additional Agreement to the Treaty on Relations, Ukraine accepted that the only role Serpents’
Island may play in the delimitation of the mar itime spaces of Romania and Ukraine is that
determined by Article 121 (3) of the Montego Bay Convention.
Conclusions
46. Madam President, allow me, if you will–– before setting out the schedule of Romania’s
oral pleadings –– to draw some conclusions which strike me as important.
(a) First –– the delimitation method proposed by Ukra ine in its written pleadings filed in this case
in no way corresponds to a genuine, sincere acceptance of the method enshrined by you for the
purpose of reaching an equitable result–– “equi distance/median line–– relevant or special
30 circumstances”. In fact, its application, as conceived by Ukraine, would result in a distortion of
this method in order, in a totally artificial wa y, to reach the same profoundly unjust result
sought by Ukraine during the negotiations prior to this case being referred to the Court.
(b) Secondly, it is beyond any doubt that the transfer of Serpents’ Island to the Soviet Union
in 1948 was an unlawful act, which has already produced inequitable effects to the detriment of
Romania and the benefit of the Soviet Union and, after it gained independence, to the benefit of
Ukraine, its successor. These inequitable eff ects are quantifiable: over 1,600sqkm of
maritime areas which should belong to Romani a in accordance with the normal application of
the rules and principles of international law.
(c) Thirdly, the Treaty on Relations and the A dditional Agreement enshrine a legal agreement
reached between Romania and Ukraine in 1997, this “package” includi ng the acceptance by
Ukraine of the applicability, in the delimitation of the continental shelf and excusive economic - 21 -
zones, of Article 121 (3) of the Convention on th e Law of the Sea, as interpreted by Romania
when signing and ratifying it. This means that the two countries before you agreed in 1997 that
Serpents’ Island could receive no other effect, in addition to the effects –– which I repeat were
inequitable –– already produced by it on the delimitation of the territorial sea between the two
Parties.
(d) Hence, an equitable solution to the delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic
zones would be incompatible with the increase and extension of these inequitable effects and
cannot disregard the content of the 1997 Agreement.
47. Madam President, Members of the Court, you will find a schedule of Romania’s oral
pleadings for today and the following days at the beginning of your folders.
48. With your permission, Madam President , ProfessorPellet will follow me to analyse
questions relating to the jurisdiction of the Court and the law applicable to the present case. My
colleague, CosminDinescu, co-Agent of Romani a, will then go on to describe the geographical
context of the dispute and also treaty practice in the maritime delimitations already effected
between the other neighbouring countries in th is half-enclosed sea, the Black Sea.
ProfessorCrawford will then present the relevant coasts for the purposes of delimitation, the
relations between them and the relevant zone for the delimitation.
31 49. Tomorrow morning and on Thursday, our pr esentations will focus on the delimitation of
the maritime areas of the two States in the part of the zone submitted for delimitation adjoining
Serpents’ Island, and also on the role of this maritime feature in the delimitation process.
ProfessorCrawford will show that in 1949, the Soviet Union and Romania agreed on a maritime
boundary between these two States following the 12 -nautical-mile arc around Serpents’ Island––
an agreement confirmed by a number of other bilateral agreements in force, by many maps
included in treaties binding on the two Parties to th e dispute and by a number of other maps. I will
present the factual situation of Serpents’ Island and my colleagues, ProfessorsPellet and Lowe,
will show that this small rock, ge ographically isolated in the zone submitted for delimitation, must
be semi-enclaved–– in accordance with the genera l principle of delimitation, requiring that an
equitable solution to the dispute be found, and al so in accordance with the specific principle laid
down by Article121 (3) of the Convention of the Law of the Sea–– each of these two reasons - 22 -
being sufficient in itself to justify the solution. I shall then speak again in order to establish, in the
guise of a postscript, that Ukraine’s recent efforts to transform this rock are completely futile.
50. Two presentations will then be devoted, on Friday morning, to refuting Ukraine’s
argument on “effectivités”–– oil and fishing activiti es. Mr.DanielMüller will remind us of the
law applicable to effectivités in maritime delimitations in cases of this type and Mr.Dinescu will
apply these legal rules to the facts alleged by Ukraine.
51. Finally, in its last two oral pleadings, Romania will justify the delimitation line to be
drawn, in accordance with our submissions to the Court (a task which will fall to
Professor Crawford) and Professor Lowe will show the e quitable nature of this line, in light of the
circumstances of this case.
52. Madam President, Members of the C ourt, thank you for your attention.
Madam President may I ask you to give the floor to Mr. Pellet.
Le PRESIDENT: Je remercie l’agent de la Roumanie pour sa présentation et je donne à
présent la parole au professor Pellet.
32 PELr.LET:
II. Jurisdiction and applicable law
Madame la présidente (I say “Madame la” because you kindly informed me that you have no
48
objection to the use of the feminine form of address in French ; and a présidente is, to my mind,
every bit as good as a président . . .).
So1. Madame la présidente, Members of the Court, litigants who appear before you often
begin by virtuously undertaking to comply strictly with the instruction contained in Article60 of
your Rules, which requires them to refrain from going over “the whole ground covered by the
pleadings”— but they then proceed to recapitula te most of “the facts and arguments these
contain”. I must admit that I have also erred in this regard; but I shall not do so today. The
exchanges of written pleadings have completed mo st of the groundwork, so to speak, on the two
48
CR 2006/8, p. 30. - 23 -
related but separate points on which I propose to comment this morning: the scope of your
jurisdiction in the present case, on the one hand, and the applicable law, on the other.
2. The diminishing number of pages devoted to these two issues in the course of the
proceedings reflects if not a convergence of views, at least some measure of clarification of the
Parties’ arguments concerning them:
49
⎯ the Romanian Memorial devoted 68 pages to the two issues;
⎯ the Counter-Memorial 50, 27;
51 52
⎯ the Reply and the Rejoinder a dozen pages each.
Such figures are admittedly somewhat misleading inasmuch as the problems that Romania
addressed under those headings in its Memorial we re “watered down” to some extent in other
chapters during the course of the proceedings. And that is one reason why it is necessary to revert
33 to them in order to identify as clearly as possi ble the points of agreement and disagreement on,
first, the jurisdiction of the Court and, second, the applicable law.
I.T HE JURISDICTION OF THE C OURT
3. Although Ukraine has never challenged the principle of the Court’s jurisdiction, it has
endeavoured to limit its scope. It states in both its Rejoinder and its Counter-Memorial that you
derive your jurisdiction in the present case, Members of the Court, from Article4 (h) of the
Additional Agreement constituted by the exchange of letters of 2 June 1997, 53 and it recognizes
54
that the two (or three) “conditions” or “preconditions” — it matters little which! — on which this
provision makes the jurisdiction of the Court depende nt have been fulfilled. It follows that the
Court has jurisdiction.
4. Similarly, the points of disagreement between the Parties do not relate to the principle of
your jurisdiction but to its scope. Ukraine d escribes them in somewh at esoteric terms in
paragraph 2.1 of its Rejoinder; they are allegedly due to:
4MR, pp. 5-9 and 73-128.
5CMU, pp. 7-13 and 147-168.
51
RR, pp. 1-7 and 10-14.
52
RU, pp. 5-17.
5CMU, pp. 7-8. paras. 2.1-2.8; RU, p. 5, para. 2.2.
5See CMU, p. 8, para. 2.5. - 24 -
“(i)Romania’s adherence to its unjustified claim that there exists an agreed
all-purpose maritime boundary extending around the south of Serpents’
Island to a point approximately due east of that Island, and
(ii) Romania’s refusal to have regard to the actual terms in 55ich the Parties
agreed that their dispute should be referred to the Court.”
5. It is probably preferable to addr ess the second of these two objections first ⎯ it is clearer
than the first one and, unlike the latter, actually relates to jurisdiction. Moreover, the response to
the second objection will influence the response to be made to the first; it will lead us to conclude
(while adhering strictly for the time being to the question of the Court’s jurisdiction) that there is
nothing to prevent one from establishing a “mixed” boundary (i.e., one between a territorial sea, on
the one hand, and a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, on the other).
34 A. The scope of Article 4 (h) of the Additional Agreement
6. Arti4cle (h) of the 1997 Additional Agreement reads as follows — in the English translation
published in the United Nations Treaty Series:
“If these negotiations shall not determine the conclusion of the
above-mentioned agreement [for the mar itime boundary] in a reasonable period of
time, but not later than 2 years since their initiation, the Government of Romania and
the Government of Ukraine have agreed that the problem of delimitation of the
continental shelf and the exclusive econom ic zones shall be solved by the UN
International Court of Justice, at the request of any of the parties, provided that the
Treaty on the regime of the State border between Romania and Ukraine has entered
into force. However, should the Internationa l Court of Justice consider that the delay
of the entering into force of the Treaty on the regime of the State border is the result of
the other Party’s fault, it may examine the request concerning the delimitation of the
continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones before the entry into force of this
Treaty.” 56
Significantly, Ukraine refrains in both its Counte r-Memorial and its Rejoinder from citing the text
of the above clause. This was not an innocent oversight.
7. The Ukrainian Party’s whole line of argument in this regard is based on a premise founded
on an interpretation that is clearly unwarranted by the wording of the clause: “The line to be drawn
”57
by the Court shall be a line dividing exclusively areas of continental shelf and EEZ :
“the boundary must be such that on each side of the boundary line there needs to be a
continental shelf and an EEZ over which Ukra ine, on its side of the boundary, and
Romania on its side of the boundary, has its own sovereign rights; the boundary to be
55RU, p. 5, para. 2.1.
56
UNTS, Vol. 2159, p. 51 (I-37743); translation supplied by the Government of Romania.
57CMU, p. 11, para. 2.17; emphasis added. - 25 -
delimited by the Court is thus, by virtue of the language in which their consent to the
Court’s jurisdiction is expressed58a boundary running between the Parties’ respective
continental shelves and EEZs” .
But this is not what Article 4 (h) of the 1997 Additional Agreement says: the words or expressions
“exclusively” or “between the Parties”, which form the core of the Ukrainian argument, are not to
be found in Article 4 (h). The task that the Parties have entr usted to the Court consists in solving
the problem of delimitation of their exclusive economic zones and their continental shelf— and
that’s it, full stop. This in no way implies that there must perforce be a continental shelf or an
exclusive economic zone on both sides, on each side, of the line. The assertion that “[n]o mention
is made of boundaries involving the territorial sea of either State, and such boundaries are therefore
59
35 excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction” simply begs the question— self-serving is an apt
description.
8. Furthermore, this arbitrary and untenable interpretation of Article4 (h) of the
1997Additional Agreement proposed by the Ukrainian Party overlooks the context of the clause,
which flows from Article2, paragraph2, of the Treaty on Relations of Co-operation and Good
Neighbourliness (the “Treaty on Relations”) betwee n Romania and Ukraine signed the same day.
Pursuant to the latter provision, the parties “shall settle the problem of the delimitation of their
60
continental shelf and economic exclusive zones in the Black Sea” . The problem. It is plainly a
matter of finding a global solution to the “problem of the delimitation of their continental shelf and
economic exclusive zones in the Black Sea”; a nd, as it happens, the solution involves a judgment
by your distinguished Court, which should put an end to the dispute as a whole; in so doing, you
should not and cannot refrain from adjudicating on the pretext that, in the process of adopting a
position, you might have to take a stand, collate rally, on issues pertaining to other maritime (or
indeed terrestrial) zones.
[Slide 1: figure RR1, the boundary of the co ntinental shelf between France and the United
Kingdom (RR, p. 4)]
9. Ukraine believes that it is justified in invo king the position of the Arbitral Tribunal in its
1977 judgment in the Continental Shelf of the Mer d’Iroise case in support of its argument.
5RU, p. 10, para. 2.10; emphasis added, “between” in italics in the text.
59
RU, p. 5, para. 2.2; emphasis added; see also RU, p. 10, para. 2.9.
6UNTS, Vol. 2159, p. 37 (I-37743); emphasis added. - 26 -
Although it expatiates at length on this award, the argument serves no purpose because, to begin
with, the clause in the Arbitration Agreement est ablishing the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in the case
was couched in very different terms from that estab lishing the Court’s jurisdiction in our case. It
read as follows:
“The Court is requested to decide, in accordance with the rules of international
law applicable in the matter as between the Parties, the following question:
What is the course of the boundary (or boundaries) between the portions of the
continental shelf appertaining to the Unite d Kingdom and the Channel Islands and to
the French Republic, respectively, westward of 30 minutes west of the Greenwich
meridian as far as the 1,000 metre isobath?” 61
36 10. This wording, Madam President, ma y be legitimately invoked in support of the
interpretation that Ukraine is seeking to impose in the present instance: given that it involves a
delimitation of the portions of the continental shelf appertaining respectively to the two litigant
States, I readily admit that this may be interpreted as implying that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
dealing with the case was lim ited to the course of a boundary “running between the Parties’
respective continental shelves” 62. Again, however, our arbitration clause is not couched in those
terms and Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on Re lations shows clearly that its scope is broader.
Moreover, the 1977 award emphasizes the very special geographical circumstances pertaining to
“the narrow waters situated between the Cha nnel Islands and the coasts of Normandy and
63
Brittany” . And it was “having regard to the geograp hical circumstances, the precise formulation
of its competence in Article 2 (1) of the Arbitrati on Agreement and the replies of the Parties to the
64
Court’s questions regarding the problem of its competence in the Channel Islands region” that the
Arbitral Tribunal decided that it lacked jurisdiction in respect of that zone. Furthermore, it did not
hesitate to determine the outer boundary of the te rritorial waters, while being perfectly well aware
that this delimitation would constitute a mixed boundary (between the territorial sea of the islands,
on the one hand, and the continental shelf of the French Republic, on the other) 65.
[End of slide 1]
6Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement signed at Paris on 10 July 1975, RIAA, Vol. XVIII, p. 132.
6RU, p. 10, para. 2.10
63
RIAA, Vol. XVIII, pp. 152-153, para. 21.
6Ibid.
6See RR, pp. 2-3, para. 1.7, and RR, figure RR1, p. 4. - 27 -
11. Admittedly, and the Parties agree on this point 66, the Court has not been assigned
jurisdiction to establish a delimitation line between their respective territorial seas. That was done
by the Romanian-Soviet procès-verbal of 27 September 1949 67 and confirmed by the Act of
26 December 1954 68, the Treaty on the Border Regime of 27 February 1961 69 and the
70 71
37 procès-verbaux relating to demarcation of 20 August 1963 and 4 September 1974 . In turn,
Article2, paragraph2, of the Treaty of 2 June 1997 on Relations of Good Neighbourliness 72 and
Article1 of the Treaty of 17 June 2003 on the Border Regime 73 reaffirm the validity of these
agreements and the resulting course of the boundary between the territorial seas of the two States.
12. As noted by the Permanent Court in its Opinion on the Interpretation of the Treaty of
Lausanne, “the very nature of a frontier and of any convention designed to establish frontiers
between two countries imports that a frontier must constitute a definite boundary throughout its
length” and it is therefore “natural that any Article designed to fix a frontier should, if possible, be
so interpreted that the result of the application of its provisions in their entirety should be the
establishment of a precise, complete and definitive frontier” ( Interpretation of Article3,
Paragraph2, of the Treaty of Lausanne, Advisory Opinion, 1925 , P.C.I.J., Series B, No.12 ,
p. 20) 74. And that is precisely the aim of Article 2, paragraph 2, of the 1997 Treaty on Relations of
75
Good Neighbourliness, the terms of which I have cited : to find a complete and definitive solution
to the “problem of delimitation” of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones. This
aim would not be achieved if the Court were to fa ll in with Ukraine’s line of argument and decline
66
See MR, p.131, para. 9.3; CMU, p.9, para. 2.11, and p. 10, para. 2.15; RR, p.62, para. 4.7, and RU, p.5,
para. 2.2, and p. 6, para. 2.4.
67
MR, Vol. III, Ann. 13; see also the procès-verbal of border sign No. 1438 and the procès-verbal of border sign
No. 1439, ibid., Anns. 14 and 15.
68
Ibid., Ann. 17.
69
Ibid., Ann. 18.
70Ibid., Anns. 19 and 20.
71Ibid., Anns. 21 and 22.
72Ibid., Ann. 2.
73
Ibid., Ann. 3.
74
See also Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 34; or the
separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen
(Denmark v. Norway), I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 209.
75
See supra, para. 8. - 28 -
jurisdiction to determine, if necessary, a “mix ed” boundary in the area surrounding Serpents’
Island.
13. As it is “the problem of delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic
zones” that has to be solved, Article4 (h) of the 1997 Additional Agreement, read in context, not
only does not rule out, but actually implies that the Court should take the delimitation of the
territorial sea into account should it prove necessary for the accomplishment of its task. The task in
question is perfectly compatible with the possibility of a “mixed” boundary.
38 B. The jurisdiction of the Court to establish a “mixed” boundary
14. In addressing this problem, which the Pa rties have referred to you pursuant to an
arbitration agreement, you will be required, Members of the Court, to rule on the existence— or
otherwise: I refer here solely to jurisdiction — of a pre-existing maritime delimitation which could
presumably have related, on the one hand, to a maritime zone around Serpents’ Island claimed by
the USSR, and, on the other, to a different type of marine area, as quite frequently occurs, a fact
which the two Parties also recognize 76.
[Slide 2 : Figure illustrating the “problem” (territorial sea v. continental shelf/EEZ)]
15. In other words, the Court obviously cannot, in the present case, disregard the Parties’
agreement on the delimitation of the territorial sea, if only because point F, fixed by the
2003 Border Régime Treaty, cons titutes the endpoint of the boundary and hence the starting-point
for the delimitation line that you have been re quested to establish. Moreover, Romania and
Ukraine agree in this regard 7. In addition, however, and this is where the two Parties do not agree,
you cannot, Members of the Court, go back on a pre-existing delimitation on the pretext that it
appertains, on the one hand (on the Ukrainian side), to the territorial sea (o f Serpents’ Island) and,
on the other (on the Romanian side), to the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone.
Once again, you are requested to solve “the problem of delimitation of the continental shelf and the
exclusive economic zones”, but as this delimitation concerns the Romanian continental shelf and
exclusive economic zone between pointF and pointX, there is obviously a “problem of
76
See RR, pp. 5-6, paras. 1.12-1.13; RU, p. 7, para. 2.5.
77See MR, p. 82, para. 7.19, and p. 131, para. 9.3; CMU, p. 252, para. 11.1 (v), p. 257 (Submissions); RR, p. 62,
para. 4.7, or p. 289, para. 8.40; RU, p. 149 (conclusions), para. 9.3 (ii) or p. 6, para. 2.4. - 29 -
delimitation of the continental shelf” on which the Parties hold conflicting views and on which the
Court not only can but must deliver a ruling pursuant to the arbitration clause of Article 4 (h) of the
Additional Agreement.
16. Furthermore, Ukraine, not content with distorting the text of the clause (by asserting that
it stated something which it did not, as becomes clea r on first reading), also felt the need to play
another trick, which involved claiming that the Par ties could not “have fixed” the external limit of
39 the waters around Serpents’ Island in 1949 because th e Court is being asked to solve “the problem
of delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones”:
“the Romanian thesis results in a bounda ry running between, on the one hand,
Romania’s continental shelf and EEC and, on the other hand, Ukraine’s territorial sea,
and not, as required by the Parties’ agreement to the Court’s jurisdiction between two
78
sets of continental shelves and EEZs” .
But apart from the fact that the arbitration clause of Article4 (h) says nothing of the kind, this
reasoning is flawed by a manifest non sequitur and a reversal of the logical order.
[End of slide 2]
17. As summarized in the table in the judges’ folder under tab II-3, Ukraine bases its position
on the erroneous assumption, contradict ed by the wording of Article4 (h), that the Court has
jurisdiction (and has jurisdiction only) to delimit the respective continenta l shelves and exclusive
economic zones of the Parties; therefore it cannot take into account an agreement delimiting the
territorial sea and the continental shelf and any such agreement is null and void. This reasoning, if
reasoning is the correct term, is based on a flawed premise with respect to the meaning of the
clause conferring jurisdiction on the Court. It wrongly infers that the Court should not give effect
to an agreement reached between the Parties because the agreement in question fails to settle the
dispute laid before it!
[Slide 3: Maritime delimitation between H onduras and Nicaragua pursuant to the Court’s
Judgment of 8 October 2007]
18. It is relatively clear, Madam President, that the agreement reached between the Parties on
the delimitation of what today undoubtedly constitu tes the territorial sea of Serpents’ Island does
not fully settle the dispute between Romania and Uk raine — if it did, we would not be here! But
78
RU, p. 10, para. 2.11. - 30 -
that does not warrant a ruling to the effect that the Parties were unable to agree in 1949 on what I
have called a “mixed boundary” — a notion regarding which, it may be noted in passing, Ukraine
has also contradicted itself, inasmuch as, having apparently conceded that there are precedents for
maritime boundaries separating different categories of areas 79, it asserts, in reply to the Romanian
argument, that
40 “such an argument would be inconsistent with Articles 55 and 76 of UNCLOS, both
of which define those maritime zones as being beyond the territorial sea, and the
shelf’s outer boundary cannot therefore follo w the same line as the boundary of the
80
territorial sea” .
19. Notwithstanding the Ukrainian Party’s curi ous convictions, this is in fact extremely
common — as attested by the precedents described, by way of example, in our Reply 81. Indeed it
is inevitable when an island belonging to a State A is located on the continental shelf of a State
B — and the application of Article 121 of the Montego Bay Convention furthermore renders such a
result inevitable in such circumstances, regardless of whether the island falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 3. An example may be found in the not so distant past: take, for instance, the Territorial
and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and H onduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v.
Honduras), a case in which the single line established by the Court is certainly “mixed” in some
portions of its course (see the Judgment of 8 October 2007, paras. 299-305 and 320).
[End of slide 3]
20. Moreover, even if we concede — solely for the sake of discussion — that the Court lacks
jurisdiction to rule on such a “mixed” boundary, the implication of such a lack of jurisdiction
would obviously not be — contrary to Ukraine’s claim — that such a boundary does not exist but
that the Court could not issue a ruling on its course, which is completely different. In an attempt to
evade this conclusion, despite its apparent inevita bility, Ukraine has to resort to another artifice 82,
which is illustrated in schematic form under tab II-5 of your files:
1. the Parties agree that the Court has jurisdiction to delimit the respective continental shelves and
exclusive economic zones of the two States; and
79See RU, p. 7, paras. 2.5-2.6.
80
RU, p. 11, para. 2.1; emphasis in the original text.
81
RR, pp. 5-6, para. 1.13.
82See RU, p. 10, para. 2.10, and p. 11, para. 2.12. - 31 -
2. they agree that the delimitation should start from point F;
therefore, Ukraine continues, therefore,
41 3. the maritime zones situated beyond point F around Serpents’ Island are necessarily the
continental shelves and exclusive economic zones of the two States.
21. But the “therefore” is entirely unwarrant ed, Madam President. The delimitation line to
be decided by the Court should indeed start from point F because the problem of delimitation of the
continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones which has given rise to the dispute referred to
your distinguished Court begins beyond that point . But there is no cause and effect relationship
between the Parties’ agreement on the starting-point for the delimitation and the necessarily
non-territorial character of the waters located on e ither side of the future line. The Parties’
agreement on point F means just one thing: that they request the Court to rule on any limit that
might affect the continental shelf or the exclusive economic zone beyond that point; and that is all
it means. But Ukraine again pr oceeds to beg the question by co ntending that the Parties’
agreement “to confer jurisdiction on the Court.. . must be such that, starting from the agreed
terminal point of their territorial sea boundary, each Party has some zones of continental shelf and
EEZ immediately to the east and south of that agreed terminal point” 83. Why “must” it be so? A
mystery. Why is it not sufficient for the continental shelf or exclusive economic zone of just one of
the Parties to be involved? Another mystery.
22. This robust Ukrainian contention is, in fact , contradicted both by the context in the light
of which the arbitration clause of Article 4 ( h) should be interpreted and by its drafting history and
the negotiations conducted by the Parties on that basis before referring the matter to the Court.
23. With regard to the context, may I draw your attention, Madam President, to
subparagraph (d) of the same Article, which states:
“(d) The principle according to which neither of the Contracting Parties shall contest
the sovereignty of the other Contracting Party over any part of its territory
adjacent to the zone submitted to delimitation.”
83
RU, p. 11, para. 2.12. - 32 -
To my mind, this shows that the Parties were certainly not ruling out the possibility that the
delimitation would affect the continental shelf or exclusive economic zone of one of the Parties
adjacent to the other’s territorial sea.
42 24. Similarly, the “subsequent practice in the application of the treaty” 84, especially the
positions adopted during the negotiations conducted between 1998 and 2004, of which
Mr.Aurescu has just spoken, make it clear th at the Parties intended to proceed with the
delimitation of the entire maritime zone located beyond pointF, without ruling out the possibility
that this could result in a boundary between the te rritorial sea of Serpents’ Island, on the one hand,
and Romania’s continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, on the other. In any case, as it
is clearly the zone located beyond 12 nautical mi les that the Court is called upon to delimit, the
problem is certainly one of “delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic
zones”, in respect of which Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of 2 June 1997 and Article 4 (h) of
the Additional Agreement of the same date clearly confer jurisdiction on the Court.
25. To sum up, Madam President:
⎯ the Court has jurisdiction to rule on the whole of the Application from Romania;
⎯ the line it is called upon to delimit must, as agreed by the Parties, begin at Point F, which
marks the endpoint of the line separating th e respective territorial seas of Romania and
Ukraine;
⎯ beyond that, there is nothing to prevent the single line to be determined by the Court from
being mixed and thus possibly, for a certain di stance, separating the territorial sea of Ukraine
(around Serpents’ Island) from the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of Romania.
Madame la présidente, j’en aurai pour enco re un peu plus de quinze minutes. Voulez-vous
que je continue ou préféreriez-vous que nous nous arrêtions maintenant pour la «sacro-sainte»
pause café ?
84
See Article 31, para. 3 (b), of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. - 33 -
Le PRESIDENT : Et bien, la pause café est «sacro-sainte» mais les délais ne le sont pas. Et
puisque de toute façon nous serons un peu en retard, la Cour va se retirer brièvement.
L’audience est suspendue de 11 h 50.
Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. Monsieur Pellet.
PELr.LET:
43 II. THE APPLICABLE LAW
85
26. Madam President, as I said at the outset , one of the two arguments that Ukraine has
invoked in support of its efforts to limit the Court’ s jurisdiction does not actually relate to your
jurisdiction but to the applicable law, since the Ukrainian Party is seeking to prevent you from
applying the agreement (or rather the agreements) whereby the Parties (and in the case of Ukraine
its predecessor, the Soviet Union) established th e boundary of their respective maritime zones
beyond pointF. I shall briefly examine this argume nt, while at the same time raising some more
general queries about the nature of these instru ments which, according to our opponents, are not
delimitation agreements within the meaning of Articles74 and 83 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea — although they acknowledge their status as treaties binding on
the Parties. I shall then take up my next poi nt, which is not the meaning and content of the
principles set forth by the Parties in Article4 of the 1997 Additional Agreement but the role that
those principles should play in resolving this case.
A. The legal nature of the 1949-1974 agreements and of the 1997 Additional Agreement
27. I shall not dwell on the first point, Madam President, since my colleague and very dear
friend James Crawford will address it at greater le ngth tomorrow when he presents the part of our
argument concerning the first sector of the mar itime boundary between the two States. At this
stage, suffice it to note:
85
See supra, para. 5. - 34 -
1. that the Parties concur in the view that the Romanian-Soviet procès-verbaux of 1949, 1963 and
1974 that I mentioned earlier 86 and the Additional Agreement comprising the exchange of
87
letters of 2 June 1997 are treaties which are legally binding on the Parties ; and
2. that Ukraine refuses to accord these instruments the status of agreements in force of the type
referred to in paragraphs4 of Article74 and Article83 respectively of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea 8.
44 28. Here again the Ukrainian Party does not base its argument on the text of the provisions in
question— which it does not cite, it has a pe nchant for not citing— but on its own “free
interpretation”. Yet contrary to what our opponents write (and they write it “within quotes”), these
two paragraphs do not refer (nor do the three pr eceding paragraphs of Articles74 and 83) to the
89
agreements “delimiting the continental shelf/EEZ ”) but to the agreements in force concerning
“questions relating to the delimitation of the exclus ive economic zone” (or “the continental shelf”);
these questions must therefore be settled “in acco rdance with the provisions of that agreement”.
And if the provisions clearly relate to delimita tion agreements, in the prescribed form, it follows
from the very text of the two paragraphs that I have just cited that they re fer not only to agreements
entailing a full delimitation but to any agreement th at has an impact on questions relating to the
delimitation of such marine areas. This is obviously the case for all the instruments concerning
which Ukraine is seeking a quarrel for quarrelling’s sake.
29. Incidentally — and to repeat myself yet ag ain — I confess that I have some difficulty in
seeing the point of this quarrel — even from the standpoint of our opponents. The question as to
whether or not the agreements — which are recogni zed by the Ukrainian Party as having the status
of legally binding treaties for both itself and Romani a — fall into the category of those referred to
in Article74, paragraph4, and Article83, paragraph4, of the Montego Bay Convention is of no
consequence; they are binding on the Parties, and it is for this Court to ensure their application.
[Slide 4: the 1949 delimitation]
86See supra, para. 11.
87
See MR, p. 78, para. 7.10, and pp. 80-81, paras. 7.15-7.16; CMU, p. 154, para. 6.23; RR, p. 11, para. 2.4; and
RU, p. 13, para. 2.17, or p. 149, para. 6.11.
88
See CMU, pp. 154-155, paras. 6.24-6.26; and RU, p. 13, paras. 2.18-2.19.
89RU, p. 13, para. 2.18; emphasis added. - 35 -
30. I should add that, whatever the other Party may have written on the subject, it seems
somewhat unreasonable to deny these instruments the status of delimitation agreements. It is clear
in any case that they delimited, at least, the Parti es’ respective territorial seas. But I wish to draw
your attention, Madam President, to an enigma — one to which we shall revert in due course: why
on earth did the Parties feel the need to extend the limit of their maritime territories beyond the
45 endpoint of Romania’s territorial sea — which was, at the time, 6 nautical miles? Beyond point A,
which you may now view on the screen, we are ob viously no longer talking about a delimitation
between the territorial seas of two States, and it is very hard to see what legal title Romania might
have invoked in support of the determination of point 1439 or the extension of the line around
Serpents’ Island— or even what it stood to ga in through these operations unless it was to obtain
assurances from the Soviet Union that it had no claim beyond that limit. Indeed I may note in
passing that this is how the transaction was understood by Romania, as very clearly shown by the
statements by successive Romanian heads of delegation during the b ilateral delimitation
negotiations with the Soviet Union, which are reproduced in our Memorial 90. To cite just one of
these statements, the last one, dating from 1987:
“according to its features, Serpents’ Island cannot have its [continental] shelf and
[exclusive economic] zone. But we do not ignore it... [t]he delimitation proposal
respects the bilateral Romanian-Soviet unders tandings regarding Serpents’ Island. It
will continue to have maritime boundary wa ters of 12 miles, together with the
accompanying soil and subsoil.” 91
31. I shall say nothing further on this poi nt for the time being, but it confirms, if
confirmation were needed, that the Court certa inly cannot disregard these agreements, whose
impact on the delimitation that it is called upon to establish is self-evident — whether or not they
should be regarded as “agreements under Article74.4 or Article83.4”, a point which is of no
importance whatsoever beyond the gates of academia.
[End of slide 5]
90
MR, pp. 55-59, paras. 5.12-5.17.
91
Minutes of the 1987 Romanian-Soviet negotiations, MR, Ann. 31. - 36 -
B. The role of the principles agreed upon in Article 4 of the 1997 Additional Agreement
32. Madam President, the Ukrainian Party’s argum ent regarding the role to be played in the
present case by the principles agreed upon in Article 4 of the 1997 Additional Agreement is no less
baffling and raises, to some extent, similar problems.
33. Ukraine plainly cannot deny that these five principles are laid down in the 1997
46 exchange of letters, but it denies their relevance and asserts, Members of the Court, that you cannot
92
apply them “as such” . The alleged reason for this ostracism is that the “chapeau” to Article 4 of
the 1997 Additional Agreement reads as follows:
“The Government of Ukraine and the Government of Romania shall conduct
negotiations on the Agreement on Delimita tion of the Continental Shelf and the
Exclusive Economic Zones of both States in the Black Sea on the basis of the
following principles and procedures:”
It follows, according to Ukraine, that:
“the five principles [listed in Article4] which were then set out were agreed as ‘the
basis’ on which the Parties ‘shall conduct negotiations’.
The Parties did not agree that those principles should apply also as part of the
compromise for the reference of their dispute to the Court in the event that the
negotiations were not successful.” 93
34. What a curious rhetorical posture, Madam President! In a single clause, two States
agree, on the one hand, on five principles to be applied in their negotiations with a view to reaching
agreement on the delimitation of their respective continental shelf and exclusive economic zones
and, on the other, on the conditions governing referra l of their dispute to the Court— it is worth
repeating: all of this is set out in the same Article of the Additional Agreement. And these
principles are supposed to be applicable only to th e diplomatic negotiations between the two States
and may not be invoked for the purpose of settlement of the dispute by your distinguished Court?
This can’t be serious! If the Parties had intended to impose such limits on the relevance of the
“principles and procedures” set out in Article 4, they would undoubtedly have said so clearly; and
they would have included a specific clause to that effect in their Agreement. But it contains no
such clause.
92
RU, p. 16, para. 2.29; see also CMU, p. 153, para. 6.20.
93
RU, p. 14, paras. 2.23-2.24. - 37 -
35. While the judicial settlement of disputes is admittedly a different form of settlement from
94
negotiations , it is nonetheless an extension of the former, its “continuation by other means”. And
this is even more patently true in the case before us inasmuch as Article 4 (h) states it explicitly and
47 in no uncertain terms. As Ambassador Rosenne has written, “[l]itigation is a phase in the unfolding
of a political drama” 95. Whatever our opponents may think, and as stated by the Permanent Court
which you cite in your Judgments on the Continental Shelf and the Gulf of Maine
“[a]s the Permanent Court of International Justice said in its Order of 19 August 1929
in the case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex , the judicial
settlement of international disputes ‘is simply an alternative to the direct and friendly
settlement of such disputes between the parties’ ( P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 22, at p.13)”
(North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Re public of Germany/Denmark) (Federal
Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment , I.C.J. Reports 1969, p.47, para.87;
see also Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Canada/United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 266, para. 22),
it being understood that the word succédané used in the original French version of the Permanent
Court’s decision is perhaps more apposite than its English translation “alternative”. In everyday
usage and according to the Dictionnaire de l’Académie française , the term succédané is used to
96
refer to “[a]ny product which is derived from another one and may, if need be, replace it” .
36. In executing its task, the Court cannot but apply “as such” the principles that the Parties
decided, on the basis of an agreement, to a pply for the purpose of negotiating the delimitation
agreement, to which your judgment will be the succédané, the “alternative”. With all the ensuing
consequences for their interpretation— which should comply with the “general rule of
interpretation” of treaty law and the order of priority that the Parties have assigned to them.
37. Incidentally, this is not the first time that Parties have specified the principles and rules
that they would like to have applied in the arbitr ation clause providing for referral to the Court.
They did so, to mention only a few examples, in a number of boundary delimitation cases resulting
from decolonization, in which the arbitration agr eements explicitly provided for application of the
uti possidetis principle (Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger) , Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p.96,
para.2, and p.108, para.23); in the case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island, for example, the
94
See RU, p. 15, para. 2.27.
95
Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-200, Vol. I:The Court and the
United Nations, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2006, p. 3.
96Eighth edition, digital version, internet site: http://atilf.atilf.fr/academie.htm. - 38 -
Court was requested to rule, in particular, on the basis of a treaty explicitly mentioned in the
arbitration agreement ( Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) , Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1999 (II), p.1053, para.11; see also p.1102, para.93; see also Land, Island and Maritime
Frontier Dispute (ElSalvador/Honduras; Nicaragua (intervening)) , Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
48
1992, pp.357-358, para.3, and p.386, para.40). This is in no way inappropriate and, as
emphasized by the Court in the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, “[w]hile the Court is, of
course, bound to have regard to all the legal sources specified in Article38, paragraph1, of the
Statute of the Court in determining the relevant principles and rules applicable to the delimitation,
it is also bound, in accordance with paragraph1 ( a) of the Article, to apply the provisions of the
Special Agreement” ( Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) , Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1982, p. 37, para. 23).
38. These provisions, which constitute special norms in relation to those of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or to the general principles of maritime delimitation
law, must be applied as a matter of priority. But it certainly does not follow that particular clauses
are irrelevant in the present case when it comes to interpreting or supplementing the application of
the principles set forth in Article 4 (h) of the 1997 Additional Agreement. This becomes even more
obvious when one considers that, as Ukraine grudgingly concedes (at least on paper), these
principles largely (though not literally) reflect tho se which are applicable— in other words those
of the 1997 Agreement — pursuant to general international law.
39. Before closing, Madam President, I s hould like to point out once again that when
Ukraine refers solely to the delimitation princi ples laid down in the Additional Agreement, it
deliberately overlooks the fact that this instrument is not the only bilateral treaty of relevance for
the purpose of settling the delimitation issue. The Ukrainian Party again “forgets” the Treaty of
Good Neighbourliness (or the “Treaty on Relations”), of which I propose to cite again Article2,
paragraph 2. Once again, this stipulates that the parties “shall settle the problem of the delimitation
of their continental shelf and of econom ic exclusive zones in the Black Sea on the basis of the
principles and procedures agreed upon by an exchange of letters... ” 9. No distinction is made
97
UNTS, Vol. 2159, p. 37 (I-37743); emphasis added. - 39 -
anywhere between, on the one hand, the negotiations and, on the other hand, the other procedures
49 to which the Parties might have recourse to solve the problem of delimitation; there is no reference
anywhere, either explicit or implicit, to any rm of limitation of the applicability of these
principles to the context of diplomatic negotiations . On the contrary, it seems quite clear that the
principles in question must constitute the basis fo r the solution to the delimitation problem to be
worked out either by the Parties themselves oby the Court— as stipulated in the Additional
Agreement.
40. Members of the Court, I thank you for your attention and I would request you,
MadamPresident, to give the floor to Mr.Co smin Dinescu, who will present the geographical
context of the case and review existing delimitati on agreements in the Black Sea. Thank you very
much.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur Pellet. J’appelle le coagent de la Roumanie, M. Dinescu.
MIr.ESCU:
III.THE G EOGRAPHICAL C ONTEXT
Thank you very much, Madam President.
1. Madam President, Members of the Court, it is a great honour for me to appear before you
as representative of my country, Romania, in the case concerniMaritime Delimitation in the
Black Sea. The honour is all the greater as this, Madam President, is my first appearance before the
Court.
2. My task today is to describe to you the general geographical context of the dispute
between Romania and Ukraine which has been referred to you ⎯ that is to say to describe the
geographical setting of the dispute and, in this context, the existing delimitation agreements in the
region. Given that these are factual aspects, my t ask might appear a rather easy, if not somewhat
dry, one; however, the two Parties’ differing interpretations of these aspects make this both a
necessary and a more interesting exercise. - 40 -
The geographical description of the region
[Slide 1: the geographical context of the dispute: the Black Sea (judges’ folder, tab III-1)]
50 3. Madam President, Members of the Court, Romania and Ukraine are among the six States
bordering the Black Sea, a semi-enclosed sea in south-eastern Europe. The Black Sea
communicates with the Mediterranean Sea through th e Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits. With a
98
surface area of some 420,300 sq km (462,500 sq km counting the Sea of Azov to the north-east) ,
it is a small sea.
4. The two Parties concur on these points. They also concur that there are no areas of high
seas in the Black Sea 99; thus, ultimately, all its waters lie entirely within the jurisdiction of the six
littoral States.
5. A depiction of the Black Sea appears on th e screen and can also be found in your folders
under tab III-1; the coastlines of Romania and Uk raine can clearly be seen bordering the western
basin of the Black Sea; the maritime area whic h the Court is being asked to delimit lies in the
northern part of this basin.
6. The boundary between the two countries in the area bordering the Black Sea runs
generally east-west and lies along the northernmost ma in branch of the Danube delta: the Chilia.
As a riverine boundary, it follows the twists and turn s of the river and ends in the sea in the small
Musura channel.
7. Taken as a whole, the coastlines of the two countries from the endpoint of the boundary
between Romania and Bulgaria (Vama Veche) to th e southernmost point of the Crimean peninsula
(Cape Sarych) delimit a maritime area representing roughly half of the western basin of the Black
Sea. The extremities of this basin are represented, as I just said, by the endpoint of the Bulgaria-
Romania boundary (Vama Veche) and Cape Sarych, which also marks the point of transition to the
eastern basin of the Black Sea.
[End of slide 1]
[Slide 2: the western basin of the Black Sea with the main geographical elements and the relevant
and non-relevant coasts (tab III-2)]
98
MR, p. 14, para. 2.1; CMU, p. 13, para. 3.2.
9MR, p. 14, para. 2.2; CMU, p. 13, para. 3.3. - 41 -
8. The coasts of the two countries do not form a straight line: there are numerous inflection
51 points, where the direction of the coast changes significantly. In their written pleadings the two
Parties have expressed conflicting views on the number of segments best reflecting the coastal
100
geography for purposes of determining the relevant coasts and, accordingly, the relevant area for
the delimitation.
9. One look at the map of the Black Sea’s w estern basin is enough to identify the salient
geographical features: the Sacalin peninsula, the Sulina dyke, the northernmost point of the
Danube delta, the Dniestr and Dniepr estuaries, Yarholyt and Karkinit bays, and Capes Tarkhankut,
Khersones and Sarych. I shall describe the most important of these features.
[End of slide 2]
[Slide 3: satellite photo of the Sacalin peninsula]
10. The Sacalin peninsula lies in the south-eastern part of the Danube delta. As you can now
observe on the screen, and at tab III-3 of your folder s, this is a sand spit extending south-westward
for some 12km from the mouth of the Saint George branch. The present peninsula was initially
made up of two sandy islands, Big Sacalin and L ittle Sacalin, which, in a natural evolutionary
process lasting some 100 years and characterized by permanent sedimentary deposits, came to form
a single islet which ultimately attached itself to the shore, resulting in the existence of a peninsula
with a surface area of 3.5 sq km. Sacalin is one of the relevant points for Romania’s baselines, and
has been notified as such to the United Nations Secretariat 101.
[End of slide 3]
[Slide 4: satellite photo of the Sulina dyke]
11. The second noteworthy point in the Danube delta is the Sulina dyke (tabIII-4, judges’
folder). The dyke is located north of Sacalin, at the mouth of the Sulina branch; construction of it
52 started in 1856, with a view to protecting the mouth of the navigable branch from the risk of silting
up from alluvial deposits and to ensuring the sm ooth operation of the port of Sulina. Increasing
quantities of alluvium required enlargement of th e dyke on several occasions, the most recent such
100
CMU, pp.16-17, paras.3.16-3.19, p.25, para.3.49; RR,pp.16-19, paras.3.6-3.12; RU, p.68, para.4.11,
pp. 79-81, paras. 4.51-4.56.
10RR, Ann. RR 3; see also
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/ROM_1990_Ac… - 42 -
work having been carried out in 1980. As can now be seen on the screen, there are in fact two
parallel dykes, which create a navigable channel providing access to the port and the Sulina branch.
A lighthouse is located towards the eastern end, on a small sandy islet with a surface area of
3.3 hectares, a small islet adjacent to the dyke. In front of the dyke, two buoys mark the entrance to
the Sulina channel. Thus, this is a system of permanent harbour works, extending seaward for
7.5 km. Immediately to the north of the dyke li es a sandy island, of 60 hectares, formed about ten
years ago and continuing to grow. The Romani a-Ukraine maritime boundary established in 1949
crosses this island and has therefore become a land boundary in the sector containing this new
island feature. The eastern end of this island is situated on nearly the same meridian as the most
seaward point of the Sulina dyke, which is also one of the points notified by Romania to the United
Nations Secretariat as relevant points in defining the baselines for the Romanian coast 102.
[End of slide 4]
[Repeat slide 2]
12. Let us move northwards and take a look at the Ukrainian coast. It first runs from south to
north, then turns towards the nor theast and gradually ceases to be in a relationship of adjacency
with the Romanian coast. The “turning point” is the Dniestr estuary, which resembles a bay with
an area of 373.6sqkm. and an average width of 7km. The endpoint of the southern bank of the
estuary, which Romania has called “pointS”, marks a north-eastward shift in the direction of the
coast, a shift which will become even more pronoun ced at a point to the north of Odessa. After
that point the coast turns eastward before finally beginning to descend towards the southeast, where
the coast line is broken up by bays such as the Dnie pr estuary, Yarholyt and Karkinit. The last of
these, for example, has a mouth of 32.3 nautical miles and a surface area of 3,300 sq km.
53 13. The southern extremity of the bay of Karkinit is Cape Tarkhankut, on the Crimean
peninsula. This bay ⎯ the bay of Karkinit ⎯ separates the Crimea from the rest of the mainland in
the north-western basin of the Black Sea. The west coast of the Crimea generally runs
north-west/south-east, and has the noteworthy featur e of Cape Tarkhankut, which projects into the
sea for a distance of 27.6 km and thus significantly distorts the general direction of the coast.
102
RR, Ann. RR 3; see also
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/ROM_1990_Ac… - 43 -
14. This coast of the Crimea stands in an op posite relationship to the Romanian coast. This
relationship ceases at the southernmost point of th e peninsula, Cape Sarych, which also marks the
limit of the western basin of the Black Sea.
15. This description of the coasts shows th at the three sectors of the Ukrainian coast
103
identified by our opponents in their written pleadings are nothing but an over-simplification and
an unacceptable refashioning of the regional geogr aphy. These points will be addressed in detail
by Mr. James Crawford following my statement.
16. For the time being, it is sufficient to point out that the various segments of the two
countries’ coasts bear various relationships with one another:
⎯ firstly, some coastal segments are continuations of each other: you see these in red on the
screen;
⎯ secondly, some segments are opposite each other ⎯ in blue on the illustration;
⎯ finally, there are Ukrainian segments which bear no relation to the area to be delimited ⎯ they
appear in mauve on the screen.
The consequence of this is wholly obvious: ther e are coasts which are relevant for the delimitation
in this case and there are others which are not; further, the relationships between the relevant
coasts ⎯ that is to say adjacent to each other in some cases and opposite each other in others ⎯
require a sectorial approach to the delimitation. He re again, James Crawford will go into detail in
the next statement.
[End of slide 2]
[Slide 5: the Black Sea and its western basin]
54 17. In the north-western basin of the Black S ea, we discern an isolated, microscopic point:
this is Serpents’ Island, a maritime feature clo se to the adjacent coasts of Romania and Ukraine,
lying some 20 nautical miles from those coasts and having an area of 0.17 sq km. Why have I said,
“we discern”? Because the island is so tiny as to be invisible at the scale used in the sketch maps
which have just been shown. As now shown on the screen, in order to be able to see the island ⎯
let us say ⎯ normally, the scale must be increased by a factor of more than 400. If the same scale
103
CMU, pp. 16-17, paras. 3.16-3.19; RU, sketch-map 4-4. - 44 -
is used for both Serpents’ Island and the mariti me basin surrounding it, the island is no longer
visible, it disappears. This rock, lending itself to neither human habitation nor real economic life,
has been one of the main protagonists in the two countries’ written pleadings 104and, for better or
worse, will no doubt continue to play such a role in the coming days. I shall not go into a detailed
description of it, but shall however once again st ress the obvious fact shown by the image on the
screen: a tiny, isolated feature opposite the adjacent mainland coasts of the two countries.
[End of slide 5]
[Slide 6: Geomorphological characteristics of the Black Sea ⎯ excerpt from the study
Catastrophic Flooding of the Black Sea, Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences, Vol. 31,
2003, p52.5-554, also available at h ttp ://www.geo.edu.ro/sgr/mod/downloads/
PDF/Ryan-AnRevEPS-2003.pdf]
18. From the geological and geomorphological standpoint, the bed of the Black Sea
represents a single mass 105, the continental shelf being continuous in nature. In the north-western
basin, the continental shelf extends further in the west, off the adjacent Romanian and Ukrainian
coasts, and the north, where the “descent” towards the continental slope is gradual, while in the
east, off the Crimean coast, the continental slope is much more abrupt. This is now shown on the
screen; the image also appears in your files under tab III-5. The line indicating the beginning of the
continental slope is clearly visible; up to this lin e there is the single geological continental shelf,
which is the natural extension of both Romanian territory and mainland Ukrainian territory. Thus,
55 geological factors are not relevant in our case. The two Parties concur on this: neither has invoked
these factors in its written pleadings.
[End of slide 6]
Delimitation practice in the Black Sea
[Slide 7: existing delimitation agreements in the Black Sea]
19. The waters of the Black Sea have not been fully delimited among the littoral States.
However, a true delimitation practice has developed and manifests itself in agreements presently in
force between Bulgaria and Turkey, Ukraine a nd Turkey, Russia and Turkey and Georgia and
104
See, e.g., MR, Chap. 10; CMU, Chap. 3, sect. 2 A (ii), Chap. 7, sect. 3, Chap. 9, sect. 2 B; RR, Chap. 5; RU,
Chap. 4, sect. 2 C.
105
MR, p. 15, para. 2.6. - 45 -
106
Turkey . The delimitation lines established by th ese agreements are shown on the figure now
appearing on the screen.
20. It will be noted that, in the western basin of the Black Sea, which the present case
concerns, the southern half has been delimited, while the maritime areas in the north between
Romania and its neighbours –– that is Ukraine, Turkey and Bulgaria –– are yet to be delimited.
[End of slide 7]
[Slide 8: existing delimitation agreements in the western basin of the Black Sea]
21. A depiction of the existing delimitations in the western basin of the Black Sea now
appears on the screen, as well as in your files unde r tab III-6. These are the delimitations agreed
between Ukraine (the USSR at the time) and Tu rkey in 1978 and between Bulgaria and Turkey
in 1997. It will be noted that the agreement concluded in 1978 between the USSR and Turkey only
covered the continental shelf, but, further to Turkey’s proclamation of an exclusive economic zone,
the two countries agreed that the delimitation line of the continental shelf would also serve as the
line of delimitation between their exclusive economic zones.
56 22. In their written pleadings, the two Parties have exhaustively described the consequences
of these agreements 107. The descriptions generally accord with each other, and I shall not go over
them; I am however going to point out those nuances between the two positions which appear to
have the greatest relevance for our case.
23. The lines defined by these two agreements to delimit the exclusive economic zones and
the continental shelf are based on simplified equidistance; although Ukraine’s position is not very
108
clear on this point , it does not openly dispute it; moreover, this conclusion, which clearly
106Agreement between the Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Turkey on Determination of the Boundary in
the Mouth Area of the Rezovska/Mutludere River and Delimita tion of the Maritime Areas between the two States in the
Black Sea, 4December1997, UNTS, Vol.2087, pp.6-9 (I-36204); Protocol between the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Republic of Turkey concerning the Establishment of the Maritime
Boundary between Soviet and Turkish Territori al Waters in the Black Sea, 17April1973, UNTS, Vol. 990, p. 206
(I-14475); Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the Republic of Turkey and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Black Sea, 23June1978, UNTS, Vol.1247, p.142 (I-20344); Exchange of Notes
constituting an Agreement between the Government of the Re public of Turkey and the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on th e Delimitation of the Exclusiv e Economic Zone of the Two Countries in the Black Sea,
23 December 1986 and 6 February 1987, UNTS, Vol.1460, p.136 (I-24690); see also CMU, Vol.5, Ann.111 (in
English).
107MR, pp. 63-67, paras. 6.6-6.20; CMU, pp. 224-228, paras. 8.82-8.94.
108CMU, p. 224, para. 8.82. - 46 -
follows from the maps themselves, is confirmed by expert analysts ⎯ such as Charney and
Alexander in their reports on the two agreements in question 109.
24. The lines of delimitation established by the two agreements end with provisionally
defined segments, the definitive course of which is to depend on subsequent discussions. Article 1
of the USSR-Turkey agreement provides that the line delimiting the continental shelf between the
two countries has been defined as far as a point which Romania has called “pointK”; the
agreement further provides that the line of delim itation may be extended beyond point K as far as
another point, which Romania has called “point L”. The agreement also provides in respect of the
delimitation in the sector between the two points men tioned: “The Parties have agreed that [this]
question... shall be settled later, in the cour se of subsequent negotiations, to be held at a
convenient time” 110.
25. A similar provision is found in Article 4 of the agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey,
which defines the line of delimitation as far as a point identified as pointP10 and provides in
respect of the course of the final segment of that line (between pointP10 and the preceding
point,P9) that “the Parties have agreed that such a drawing will be finalized later at subsequent
negotiations which will be held at a suitable time” 111.
57 26. The two provisional segments are clearly visible on the screen: segment K-L from the
USSR-Turkey agreement and segment P9-P10 from the Bulgaria-Turkey agreement.
27. Points 10 and L are virtually the same 112; they represent the tri-point equidistant from
113
Ukraine (the USSR at the time), Turkey and Ro mania, a point lying 111 miles from their coasts .
Even though Ukraine would appear to disagree with this conclusion 114, the reason is obvious why
the Soviet Union and Turkey decided that a segment ending at a point lying equidistant from the
109
International Maritime Boundaries , Vol.II, edited by Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M.Alexander,
Martinus Nijhoff publishers, 1996, p. 1695; ibid., Vol. IV, 2002, p. 2874.
110
UNTS, Vol. 1247, p. 143.
111
UNTS, Vol. 2087, p. 8.
11MR, p. 66, para. 6.16.
11International Maritime Boundaries , Vol.II, edited by Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M.Alexander,
Martinus Nijhoff publishers, 1996, p. 1694.
11CMU, p. 226, para. 8.87. - 47 -
two countries and Romania would be provisional: the two parties thought that Romania might
have valid claims in the area in question and they did not wish to prejudice its interests.
28. The Bulgaria-Turkey example is analogous : Point9 under the agreement between the
two countries coincides with the tri-point equidistant from Bulgaria, Turkey and Romania ⎯ that
point lies at a distance of approximately 110 miles from the three coasts. It should be noted that the
closest point on the Ukrainian coast is 125 miles away. Thus, it is obvious that the two contracting
parties wished to avoid prejudicing the interests of third parties and that they had Romania in mind;
incidentally, this conclusion is supported by the analysts, such as Charney and Smith, who state in
the report on the Bulgaria-Turkey agreement: “The seaward limit of this maritime boundary would
end at a tripoint between Bulgaria, Turkey and Romania. Until such time as the three reach
115*
agreement on this point, the Bulgaria-Turkey terminal point will remain undefined.”
29. Aside from the aspects I have just addressed , the two Parties are in agreement that the
other delimitation agreements al ready concluded in the Black S ea have a certain impact on the
present case. The main point of agreement is that, as shown by these agreements themselves, and
by the settled practice of the Court, the delimita tion between Romania and Ukraine must not affect
the rights of third States.
30. But, beyond this point, there are still differences on other questions.
[End of slide 8]
58 [Repeat slide 7]
31. First, there is disagreement on a factual matter: Ukraine disputes Romania’s conclusion
that “[n]o major consideration was given to other factors related to the relevant coasts of the parties
116
(such as their geographical configuration or eventual disproportion between them)” when the
delimitation lines were drawn on the basis of the equidistance principle. Ukraine’s disagreement is
117
already announced in the Counter-Memorial and expressed more “vociferously” in the
115
International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. IV, Martinus Nijhoff publishers, 2002, p. 2875.
*[« Cette frontière maritime se prolongerait vers le large jusqu’à un point triple entre la Bulgarie, la Turquie et la
Roumanie. Tant que ces trois parties ne seront pas parvenues à un accord sur celui-ci, le point terminal de la frontière
entre la Bulgarie et la Turquie restera indéterminé».] [Traduction par le Greffe.]
116
MR, pp. 69-70, para. 6.24.
11CMU, p. 43, para. 4.34. - 48 -
118 119
Rejoinder , where our opponents call Romania’s position “dubious” and see it as “another
attempt by Romania to develop an argument that the Court should ignore the geography of the
120
relevant area” .
32. Ukraine’s vehement insistence is difficult to understand in the light of one simple fact:
the truth is that the Turkish coast is, for example, 3.9times longer than the Bulgarian, and, while
the Turkish and Soviet coasts were comparable in length at the time, the Turkish coast is now 3.3
and 3.63times the length of, respectively, the Russian and Georgian coasts. This is therefore
simply the geographical reality.
33. But the main points of discord relate to the consequences of the existing geographical
situation: the Black Sea’s nature as a semi-enclosed sea and its rather small size, together with the
agreed solutions established in the delimitation agreements in force, constitute a relevant
circumstance which must be taken into account in the delimitation process for Romania’s and
121
Ukraine’s maritime areas . This relevant circumstance results from a two-fold limitation:
⎯ to ensure that delimitation solutions are not inequitable, there must be consistency among the
delimitation methods used — the use in new deli mitations of methods greatly at variance with
59 those already used is very likely to lead to inequitable results incompatible with existing
delimitations;
and
⎯ Ukraine’s proposed method of delimitation refashions the geography of the area to be
delimited, resulting in a proposed line of deli mitation which is profoundly inequitable for
122
Romania .
34. Ukraine takes issue with these Romanian arguments and denies that any relevant
circumstance results from the combination of the Black Sea’s characteristic as a small,
semi-enclosed sea and the delimitation agreements in force in the Black Sea 123. We shall return to
this in the next few days when we discuss the other aspects of relevance for the delimitation.
11RU, pp. 101-102, paras. 6.17, 6.18.
11RU, pp. 101-102, para. 6.18.
120
RU, p. 101, para. 6.17.
121
MR, pp. 69-72, paras. 6.21-6.34; RR, pp. 202-205, paras. 6.42-6.50.
12MR, pp. 69-72, paras. 6.21-6.34; RR, pp. 202-205, paras. 6.42-6.50.
12CMU, pp. 43-47, paras. 4.33-4.50; RU, pp. 98-107, paras. 6.4-6.34. - 49 -
35. Madam President, Members of the Court, I shall bring my statement to a close now, not
however without setting out my conclusion: subj ect to the presence of the rocky feature called
“Serpents’ Island”, the geographic area to be delimited, like the Black Sea in its entirety
incidentally, raises no specific problems complicating your task. The straightforward solutions
established in the delimitation ag reements previously concluded ⎯ and straightforward solutions
are the most enduring ⎯ are the proof of this.
[End of slide 7]
36. I thank you for your attention and ask you, Madam President, to give the floor to
Mr.James Crawford, who will deal with the relevant coasts and the relevant area for the
delimitation.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur Dinescu. J’appelle maintenant à la barre M. Crawford.
CRMA. WFORD
IV. L ES CÔTES ET LA ZONE PERTINENTES
Introduction
1. Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour , on peut faire confiance à M.Pellet lorsqu’il
affirme qu’une plaidoirie sera longue. Aujourd’hui, toutefois, la mienne sera relativement brève.
60 Ma première tâche, dans le cadre de ce premier t our de plaidoiries, sera d’analyser les côtes et la
zone pertinentes aux fins de cette délimita tion, en répondant tout particulièrement à
l’argumentation développée au chap itre4 de la duplique de l’Ukraine. Je voudrais remercier
Simon Olleson pour l’assistance qu’il m’a prêtée en vue de la préparation, entre autres, du présent
exposé.
o
[Projection n1: délimitations existantes dans la mer Noire.]
2. Mon collègue Cosmin Dinescu a mentionné les accords de délimitation existants qui
impliquent des Etats tiers. Vous constaterez que, hormis quelques variations mineures, il s’agit à
chaque fois de frontières fondées sur le prin cipe de l’équidistance par rapport aux côtes
continentales. Les négociations entre la Roumanie et la Bulgarie concernant la délimitation de
leurs zones maritimes en mer Noire se poursuiven t, mais je sais que les deux parties sont - 50 -
convenues, en principe, d’utiliser la méthode fondée sur l’équidistance/les circonstances
pertinentes, et ont déjà tracé une ligne d’équidi stance provisoire. Un coup d’Œil à la carte, qui
figure sous l’ongletIV-1 du dossier de plaidoiri es, permet de constate r qu’aucune circonstance
majeure n’impose de s’écarter radicalement de la mé thode de l’équidistance aux fins d’obtenir une
délimitation équitable entre les Parties en présence.
o
[Fin de la projection n 1.]
[Projection no 2 : le bassin nord-ouest de la mer Noire.]
3. Ainsi, de manière générale, la zone per tinente en l’espèce est le bassin nord-ouest de la
mer Noire, représentée ici à l’écran et sous l’onglet IV-2, du cap Sarych vers l’ouest. En suivant la
côte vers l’ouest et le nord, on voit que celle-ci fa it saillie au niveau du cap Chersonèse, en face de
Sébastopol, puis longe le golfe de Kalamitska, jus qu’au cap de Tarkhankut, point le plus à l’ouest
de la péninsule de Crimée. Elle s’infléchit ensuite très brutalement sur une trajectoire nord-est vers
l’intérieur du golfe de Karkinitska, d’une profondeur d’environ 110 kilomètres. Elle s’infléchit de
nouveau brusquement vers l’ouest, direction qu’elle suit sur près de 145 kilomètres jusqu’au golfe
de Yahorlytska, s’orientant ensuite vers le nord jusqu’au bras de mer du Dniepr, puis légèrement
vers le sud-ouest jusqu’à la ville d’Odessa. A quelque 40 kilomètres au sud-ouest de celle-ci se
trouve le bras de mer du Dniestr; de là, le littoral suit une direction d’orientation générale
sud-ouest jusqu’au delta du Danube où, immédiat ement au nord de l’embouchure de Sulina, passe
la frontière entre les deux Etats. Au sud de la frontière terrestre, il s’oriente plus ou moins plein
sud jusqu’à l’embouchure de Saint-George et à la péninsule de Sacalin, où il prend une trajectoire
sud-ouest, puis sud, qu’il suit, au-delà de la ville de Constan ţa, jusqu’à la frontière bulgare, au sud
de Vama Veche.
4. Je voudrais faire une dernière remarque d’ordre géographique, en ce qui concerne la mer
Noire et son caractère de mer semi-fermée. Si, d’est en ouest, la mer Noire atteint plus de
640 milles ⎯et par «milles», j’entends «milles marins» ⎯ de large, elle est pour l’essentiel bien
61 plus étroite du nord vers le s ud. Seuls 143milles séparent le cap Sarych de la côte turque
immédiatement au sud, soit une distance bien moindre de celle ⎯ 174 milles ⎯ qui sépare
l’extrémité du canal roumain de Sulina du fond du go lfe de Karkinitska, du côté de la péninsule de
Crimée. En conséquence, chaque partie de la mer Noire, sans exception, se trouve à moins de - 51 -
200milles d’au moins deux, généralement trois, et jusqu’à quatre Etats côtiers. Ainsi Sébastopol
⎯cette ville illustre ⎯ se trouve-t-elle à environ 230milles de la Roumanie comme de la
Bulgarie, et moins loin encore de la Turquie. En conséquence, les zones associées à chaque paire
de côtes se faisant face se chevauchent. Ce qui, dans un contexte de côtes sans vis-à-vis et de haute
mer s’étendant sans limite, pourrait être cons idéré comme un droit reconnu à certains espaces
maritimes ne s’applique, en réalité, à aucun des Etats de la mer Noire.
[Fin de la projection no 2.]
I. Définition des côtes et zones pertinentes : observations liminaires
5. Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour, il m’incombe à présent de définir les côtes et
les zones pertinentes ⎯ tâche non plus simplement géographique, mais juridique. Permettez-moi à
cet égard de formuler quatre observations liminaires.
6. Ma première observation est que la méthode de délimitation la plus courante consiste à
partir de la ligne d’équidistan ce calculée à partir de points répondant aux critères voulus situés sur
les côtes des parties et à se demander ensuite si cette ligne provisoire doit être ajustée. La valeur de
cette approche a été expressément reconnue par l es Parties dans l’accord additionnel de1997, qui
pose, à l’alinéa b) de son paragraphe4, «le principe de la ligne d’équidistance dans les zones à
délimiter lorsque les côtes sont adjacentes et le principe de la ligne médiane lorsque les côtes se
font face» [«[t]he principle of the equidistance line in areas submitted to delimitation where the
coasts are adjacent and the principle of the median line in areas where the coasts are opposite»].
7. Certes, dans le dernier a rrêt rendu par la Cour dans une a ffaire relative à la délimitation,
l’affaire Nicaragua c. Honduras , vous avez retenu non pas une ligne d’équidistance provisoire,
mais une bissectrice. C’est ainsi que vous avez pu prendre en compte, aux fins de la délimitation,
les côtes continentales dans les circonstances particulières de cette affaire. Vous avez
expressément indiqué que vous n’entendiez pas re venir sur la manière de faire habituelle
(Nicaragua c. Honduras, arrêt du 8 octobre 2007, par. 281). En outre, comme vous l’avez rappelé,
ni l’une ni l’autre des Parties n’avait à titre princi pal argué en faveur de la construction d’une ligne
d’équidistance provisoire (ibid., arrêt du 8 octobre 2007, par. 275, 281).
o
62 [Projection n 3 : lignes de délimitation et lignes d’équidistance revendiquées par les Parties.] - 52 -
8. Vous voyez maintenant apparaître à l’écran, ainsi que sous l’ongletIV-3, une vue
d’ensemble de la zone à délimiter, représentant les lignes revendiquées par les Parties. Je ferai
maintenant apparaître deux lignes d’équidistance provisoires. La première est la ligne
d’équidistance/médiane établie sur la base de tous les points retenus par l’Ukraine. La seconde est
la ligne d’équidistance/médiane tracée par rapport a ux côtes continentales, qui fait abstraction de
l’île des Serpents ⎯ bien que j’aie évidemment laissé la ma rge extérieure de la zone des 12 milles
marins convenue par les Parties en1949, un suje t sur lequel je reviendrai demain matin. La
seconde est calculée à partir de points de base situés sur les côtes adjacentes des Parties; elle se
prolonge jusqu’à ce que nous avons appelé le point T, qui est le tripoint entre les points de base
situés sur les côtes adjacentes des Pa rties et celui se trouvant sur la côte ukrainienne faisant face à
la Roumanie, au niveau du cap Tarkhankut. Au tripoint, ou point T, la ligne d’équidistance tracée à
partir des côtes adjacentes s’infléchit et devient une ligne médiane calculée à partir de points situés
sur les côtes de la Roumanie et de l’Ukraine (péninsule de Crimée) qui se font face, jusqu’à
l’endroit où elle rejoint les espaces maritimes relevant d’un Etat tiers ⎯ la Turquie ⎯, au sud. J’ai
mentionné le point T; pour que la Cour ne nous croie pas atteints d’une crise d’exubérance
alphabétique, j’ai fait figurer sous l’onglet IV-4 du dossier de plaidoiries une carte représentant les
divers points auxquels, à des fins de commodité, nous avons associé une lettre de l’alphabet.
9. En la présente espèce, l’utilisation qu’i l convient de faire de l’île des Serpents est
éminemment controversée. Mais il y a souvent lie u de ne pas tenir compte des très petites îles et
des rochers lorsqu’on trace la ligne médiane ou la ligne d’équidistance provisoire; comme mon
collègue M.Pellet le montrera cette semaine, l’emplacement et les caractéristiques de l’île des
Serpents sont tels qu’il convient de ne pas tenir compte de cette formation aux fins de l’élaboration
de la ligne d’équidistance/médiane provisoire . Indépendamment de cela, ainsi que je le
démontrerai demain, l’effet qu’il convient d’accorder à l’île des Serpents est régi par les
procès-verbaux de1949 et des accords ultérieurs , qui le circonscrivent à une zone de 12milles
marins. Et, tout à fait indépendamment de l’un et l’ autre de ces points, l’île des Serpents, ainsi que
le démontreront MM. Aurescu et Lowe, est en tout état de cause un rocher au sens du paragraphe 3
de l’article 121 de la convention de 1982, ne générant aucun droit à un plateau continental ou à une - 53 -
zone économique exclusive. Ainsi la ligne d’é quidistance/médiane provisoire d’où il convient de
partir ⎯ une ligne d’équidistance/médiane tracée par rapport aux côtes continentales ⎯ apparaît à
présent à l’écran. Je motiverai le choix des points de base retenus aux fins de la construction de
cette ligne dans les jours qui suivront.
o
[Fin de la projection n 3.]
63 10. La troisième observation liminaire que je voudrais faire est que, si les points de base d’où
sera tracée la ligne d’équidistance médiane proviso ire sont situés sur les côtes pertinentes, ces
points ne déterminent pas pour autant la longueur de ces dernières. Dans certaines parties de ses
o
écritures, l’Ukraine semble partir du principe invers e, mais elle fait fausse route. [Projection n 4 :
représentation schématique de côtes de même longueur se faisant face] Selon la configuration des
côtes, les points de base utilisés aux fins de cons truire la ligne peuvent être très rapprochés ou
relativement éloignés; pour autant, les côtes per tinentes ne changent pas, ainsi qu’il ressort du
schéma projeté maintenant à l’écran. Ici, j’ai représenté les points de base, sur des côtes de même
longueur se faisant face, qui détermineront le tracé de la ligne médiane provisoire. Les points de
base de la côte de l’EtatR sont relativement rapprochés; dans le cas de la configuration côtière,
différente, de l’Etat U, ces points sont plus distants l’un de l’autre. Et néanmoins, nul ne prétendra
que les côtes pertinentes n’ont pas la même longueur ou que, en ce qui concerne l’EtatR, la côte
pertinente se limite au segment compris entre les points R1 et R2.
o
[Fin de la projection n 4.]
11. De fait, pour tracer la ligne provisoire d’équidistance établie sur la base de tous les points
qu’elle a retenus, l’Ukraine, dans ses écritures, n’a utilisé qu’un point de base sur la côte criméenne
faisant face à la Roumanie, à savoir le point situé sur le capChersonèse (contre-mémoire de
l’Ukraine (CMU), par.7.90-7.91; voir égalemen t les figures CMU7-1 et CMU9-1; duplique de
l’Ukraine (DU), par. 5.4 et figure DU 5-1). Elle n’en a pas moins considéré comme pertinente la
totalité de la côte faisant face à la Roumanie, ce qui, au moins en ce qui concerne la côte située
entre le cap Sarych et cap Tarkhankut, est relativement raisonnable.
12. La quatrième observation liminaire est que, pour définir la côte et la zone pertinentes, il
faut faire preuve de perspicacité et de juge ment. Comme l’a dit la Cour, dans l’affaire Nicaragua
c. Honduras, «[l]a détermination de la géographie côtière pertinente nécessite une appréciation - 54 -
réfléchie de la géographie côtière réelle» ( Nicaragua c.Honduras , arrêt du 8octobre1997,
par.289; les italiques sont de nous) [«[i]dentifying the relevant coastal geography calls for the
exercise of judgment in assessing the actual coastal geography»]. Le caractère approximatif de
l’exercice est inévitable ; il est du reste acceptable si l’on prend en compte les fins auxquelles il est
légitime, ou non, d’utiliser les longueurs côtières. D’un côté, une nette disproportion entre les
longueurs des côtes pertinentes peut militer en faveur de l’ajustement de la ligne d’équidistance ou
de la ligne médiane provisoire. De l’autre, les longueurs des côtes pertinentes ne doivent pas être
64 prises en compte aux fins d’établir une formule ou un rapport déterminant la répartition entre les
Parties les espaces pertinents. Comme l’a dit la Cour dans l’affaire Jan Mayen, «la prise en compte
de la disparité de longueurs des côtes ne signifi e pas une application directe et mathématique du
rapport entre les longueurs des façades côtières du Groenland oriental et de Jan Mayen»
(Délimitation maritime dans la région située en tre le Groenland et Jan Mayen (Danemark
c. Norvège), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p.69, par.39) [«taking account of the disparity of coastal
lengths does not mean a direct and mathematical application of the relationship between the length
of the coastal front of eastern Greenland and that of Jan Mayen»].
13. De la même façon, il n’est pas légitim e de présenter la zone pertinente comme un
ensemble non attribué qu’il convien drait de répartir entre les Parties sur la base de telle ou telle
formule. De fait, les cours et tribunaux font parfois l’économie de la question de la zone pertinente
dès lors que, la délimitation permettant d’aboutir à un résultat globalement équitable, il ne leur
reste rien à ajouter.
II. La pratique des cours et des tribunaux
14. Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour, je vais maintenant analyser la jurisprudence
consacrée à la question. Ce faisant, je consid èrerai essentiellement les décisions de la Cour
elle-même, qui constituent une référence pour les tribunaux ad hoc.
[Projection no 5 : les côtes pertinentes ou dénuées de pertinence dans l’affaire Tunisie/Libye]
15. Dans l’affaire Tunisie/Libye, la Cour a fait état de la nécessité d’identifier les côtes des
Etats voisins qui étaient «limitrophes ou [faisaient] face» à celles des Etats parties — je cite :
«Les seules zones qui puissent intervenir dans la décision sur les prétentions de
la Libye et de la Tunisie au plateau continental bordant leurs côtes respectives sont - 55 -
celles qui peuvent être considérées comme étant au large, soit de la côte tunisienne,
soit de la côte libyenne. Prises ensemble elles représentent la région à prendre en
compte pour la décision. La zone litigieuse où les prétentions s’
entrecroisent est la
partie de cette région globale qui peut être considérée comme étant à la fois au large
de la côte libyenne et au large de la côte tunisienne.» (Plateau continental
(Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe libyenne), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 61, par. 74.)
[«The only areas which can be relevant for the determination of the claims of
Libya and Tunisia to the continental shelf in front of their respective coasts are those
which can be considered as lying either o ff the Tunisian or off the Libyan coast.
These areas form together the area which is relevant to the decision of the dispute.
The area in dispute, where one claim encroaches on the other, is that part of this whole
area which can be considered as lying both o ff the Libyan coast and off the Tunisian
coast.»]
65 Cependant, certaines côtes, bien qu’elles puissent donner droit à des fonds marins, ne seront pas
considérées comme pertinentes aux fins de la délimitation, comme la Cour l’a ensuite précisé :
«Néanmoins, pour délimiter le plateau entre les Parties il n’y a pas à tenir
compte de la totalité des côtes de chac une d’elles; tout segment du littoral d’une
Partie dont, en raison de sa situation gé ographique, le prolongement ne pourrait
rencontrer celui du littoral de l’autre Partie est à écarter de la suite du présent examen.
Les cartes mettent en évidence, sur la côte de chacune des deux Parties, l’existence
d’un point au-delà duquel ladite côte ne pe ut plus avoir de lien avec les côtes de
l’autre Partie aux fins de la délimitation des fonds marins. Au-delà de ce point, les
fonds marins au large de la côte ne pe uvent donc pas constituer une zone de
chevauchement des extensions du territoire des deux Parties et, de ce fait, n’ont aucun
rôle à jouer dans la délimitation.» (Ibid., p. 61-62, par. 75.)
[«Nevertheless, for the purpose of shel f delimitation between the Parties, it is
not the whole of the coast of each Part y which can be taken into account; the
submarine extension of any part of the coast of one Party which, because of its
geographic situation, cannot overlap with the extension of the coast of the other, is to
be excluded from further consideration by the Court. It is clear from the map that
there comes a point on the coast of each of the two Parties beyond which the coast in
question no longer has a relationship with th e coast of the other Party relevant for
submarine delimitation.»]
Compte tenu des faits qui étaient alors en jeu, dans cette affaire Tunisie/Libye, la Cour avait statué
que les points pertinents étaient Ras Kaboudia, sur la côte tunisienne, et Ras Tajoura sur la côte
libyenne ( ibid., p.62, par.75). Comme vous pouvez le constater sur la carte figurant sous
l’ongletIV-6, ces deux points ne marquaient aucune inflexion majeure de la côte: le choix de
Ras Kaboudia et de Rad Tajoura ne coulait pas vrai ment de source du point de vue géographique.
Mais au-delà de ces points, a ajouté la Cour, le littoral de l’une des Parties «ne p[ouvait] plus avoir
de lien avec les côtes de l’autre Partie aux fins de la délimitation des fonds marins» [«no longer has
a relationship with the coast of the other Party relevant for submarine delimitation»], ce en dépit du
fait que les points situés au-delà des points choisis se trouvaien
t à bien moins de 200milles du - 56 -
point terminal de la frontière terrestre sur la cô te. Vous pouvez le voir sur la carte à l’écran, sur
laquelle nous avons tracé des arcs à 200 milles de Misratah et du cap Bon : les arcs s’entrecroisent,
mais ces points de base et les côtes d’en face n’ont pas été jugés pertinents.
16. En fait, la Tunisie—par la voix de sir Robert Jennings—avait demandé à la Cour de
124
tenir compte de l’intégralité de sa côte orientale, en remontant jusqu’au cap Bon . Toutefois,
n’en déplaise à sir RobertJennings, la Cour n’a attaché de pertinence qu’au segment de la côte
66 tunisienne situé au sud de Ras Kaboudia. Deux observations peuvent être formulées ici: la
première est que, certes, le secteu r de la côte situé au nord de Ras Kaboudia, dont la Cour a écarté
la pertinence, donnait sur la zone à délimiter et sa projection chevauchait au moins en partie celle
de la côte libyenne pertinente, mais il était distant de la zone en cause. D’autres portions de la côte
tunisienne, qui se projetaient également dans la zone à délimiter, étaient bien plus proches et
produisaient beaucoup plus d’effet. La seconde ob servation est que, à la différence de la côte
orientale tunisienne du golfe de Gabès remontant jusqu’à Ras Kaboudia — qui fut jugée pertinente
en dépit du changement radical de direction observa ble au sud du golfe —, la côte ukrainienne qui
nous intéresse ici, après Odessa, est fort éloignée de la zone à délimiter et la ligne d’équidistance ne
125
chevauche sa projection nulle part. Pour résumer, il s’agit non pas d’amputer le littoral , mais de
déterminer quelles côtes et quelles zones sont pertinentes pour procéder concrètement à la
délimitation.
17. Dans sa duplique, l’Ukraine argue que la Cour «a considéré la totalité de la côte
tunisienne bordant le golfe de Gabès comme per tinente pour la délimitation, sans se demander si
cette côte pouvait être considérée comme strict ement opposée ou adjacente à la côte libyenne» 126.
Il est vrai que la Cour a estimé que ce segment de la côte tunisienne était pertinent. Toutefois, elle
a déclaré que la côte du golfe de Gabès, ju squ’à Ras Kaboudia au nord, demeurait dans son
ensemble adjacente à la côte libyenne. Pour citer la Cour : «Ce changement de direction peut être
124Voir, par exemple, Plateau continental (Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe libyenne), mémoire de la Tunisie,
27 mai 1980, par. 8.29 (C.I.J.Mémoires, Plateau continenta l (Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe libyenne) , vol. I, p. 182-183) et
figures9.10, 9.12 et 9.13 (ibid., p.194 et 196). Voir également les plaidoiries de sirJennings pour la Tunisie du
16septembre1981, suivant le sous-titre «Les côtes» (C.I.J.Mémoires, Plateau contin ental (Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne), vol. IV, p. 411-415).
125
Voir DU, par. 4.8-4.20, et le titre du chapitre 4, sect. 2.A.
126Voir DU, par. 4.23. - 57 -
considéré comme modifiant la situation de contiguïté des deux Etats, même s’il ne va pas, de toute
évidence, jusqu’à en faire, en dr oit, des Etats se faisant face.» [«The change in direction may be
said to modify the situation of lateral adjacency of the two States, even though it clearly does not
go so far as to place them in a position of legally opposite States.»] (C.I.J. Recueil 1982 , p.63,
par.78.) Les Etats concernés conservaient ains i une relation générale d’adjacence. La zone
pertinente aux fins de la délimitation correspond donc à celle où se chevauchent les extensions ou
prolongements sous la mer des côtes de chaque Partie — soit de Ras Kaboudia à Ras Tajoura dans
l’affaire Tunisie/Libye. Si la Cour a statué en ce sens, c’est, contrairement à ce qu’indique
127
l’Ukraine , non pas parce que la côte tunisienne située au nord de Ras Kaboudia et la côte
67 libyenne à l’est de Ras Tajoura faisaient face à des Etats tiers, mais parce que, au-delà de ces
points, le littoral de l’une des Parties «ne p[ouvait] plus avoir de lien avec les côtes de l’autre Partie
aux fins de la délimitation des fonds marins» (Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe libyenne , p.61-62,
par. 75).
[Fin de la projection n o5.]
[Projection n o6 : les côtes pertinentes ou dénuées de pertinence dans l’affaire Libye/Malte]
18. J’en viens à l’affaire du Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte) . Il
s’agissait dans cette affaire-là de côtes qui se fa isaient face, mais une approche similaire a été
adoptée (C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 49-50, par. 67). La Cour a déclaré que :
«Du côte libyen, Ras Ajdir, point d’abouti ssement de la frontière terrestre avec
la Tunisie, doit à l’évidence constituer le poi nt de départ ; le méridien 15°°10'E qui,
selon la Cour, définit les limites de la zone dans laquelle l’arrêt peut s’appliquer,
coupe la côte libyenne non loin de Ras Zarrouk…» (Ibid., p. 50, par. 68.)
[«On the Libyan side, Ras Ajdir, the terminus of the frontier with Tunisia, must
clearly be the starting point; the meridian 15°10' E which has been found by the Court
to define the limits of the area in which th e Judgment can operate crosses the coast of
Libya not far from Ras Zarruq . . .»]
La Cour a donc conclu que la côte libyenne pertinente correspondait au segment compris entre Ras
Ajdir et Ras Zarrouk, excluant tout segment situé à l’est de ce dernier point (la carte projetée a été
versée au dossier de plaidoiries sous l’ongletIV-7). En ce qui concerne Malte, la Cour a jugé
pertinente la côte qui apparaît à l’ écran, en excluant l’île de Filfla (ibid.). Vous pouvez voir un
agrandissement des côtes pertinentes, sans la ligne droite reliant Gozo et Malte. La Cour a mis
127
DU, par. 4.24. - 58 -
particulièrement l’accent sur la configuration de la Méditerranée, une mer semi-fermée, et sur
l’incidence de ce facteur sur les relations côtières (ibid., p. 40, par. 47 ; p. 42, par. 53).
19. Dans sa duplique, l’Ukraine n’est reve nue ni sur notre analyse de l’affaire Libye/Malte,
ni sur les arguments avancés dans notre réplique 128.
o
[Fin de la projection n 6.]
[Projection n o 7 : les côtes pertinentes ou dénuées de pertinence dans l’affaire du Golfe du Maine.]
129
20. A l’inverse, l’affaire du Golfe du Maine est longuement examinée dans les écritures .
L’intérêt de ce précédent tient non pas à la distinction opérée par les Et ats-Unis entre côtes
«principales» et côtes «secondaires», mais à la manière dont la Chambre a traité la côte canadienne
bordant la baie de Fundy ( Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du Maine
68 (Canada/Etats-Unis d’Amérique), C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 335-336, par. 221). Les points de la côte
de la baie de Fundy qui n’ont pas été jugés pertinents pour la délimitation sont illustrés à l’écran, et
sous l’onglet IV-8 du dossier de plaidoiries. Vous verrez aisément que les deux portions de la côte
de la baie de Fundy que la Chambre a déclaré es pertinentes ont manifestement une double relation
d’adjacence et d’opposition, la côte des Etats-Unis passant dans le voisinage de la frontière
terrestre entre le Maine et le Nouveau-Brunswick, qui apparaît en vert à l’écran.
21. La situation géographique en l’espèce est tr ès différente. Les deux segments pertinents
des côtes canadiennes ne sont pas simplement en relation d’adjacence et en relation d’opposition
avec la côte des Etat-Unis mais elles sont aussi en étroite proximité avec celle-ci. La solution
consistant à ne pas tenir compte de ces de ux segments serait revenue à refaçonner de façon
130
inacceptable la géographie de la région . En revanche, en l’espèce, les portions de la côte
ukrainienne situées au nord du point S et du cap Ta rkhankut se trouvent bien plus éloignées de la
zone pertinente. En outre, ces portions n’ont aucu n rapport avec la côte roumaine, elles n’y sont
pas adjacentes et n’y font pas face. Pour ces raisons, elles ne peuvent être considérées comme
faisant partie de la côte pertinente aux fins de la présente délimitation 131.
128RR, par. 3.60.
129
Voir RR, par. 3.55-3.58.
130RR, par. 3.58.
131RR, par. 3.59. - 59 -
22. Dans sa duplique 13, l’Ukraine présente à nouveau l’argument selon lequel nous
cherchons à établir une hiérarchie entre les différentes côtes. Dans l’affaire du Golfe du Maine, les
Etats-Unis ont effectivement cherché à introduire une telle hiérarchie, en différenciant les côtes
suivant la longueur sur laquelle elles suivaient la direction générale de l’ensemble de la côte
(C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 298 et 318, par. 108 et 170) ; cette te ntative a été à juste titre rejetée par la
Chambre (ibid., p. 298, par. 109). La Roumanie a une position différente, consistant simplement à
dire que, compte tenu de la conf iguration géographique de la zone , les segments de la côte de
l’Ukraine ne sont pas tous pertinents. Et cel a ne tient pas à un quelconque classement des côtes
selon qu’elles sont primaires ou secondaires mais aux principes que la Cour a pris en considération
pour parvenir à une délimitation équitable, en particulier la relation d’adjacence ou d’opposition
133
entre les côtes des Parties et ce que j’appellerai la proximité relative des côtes en question par
rapport à la zone à délimiter.
o
69 [Fin de la projection n 7.]
Madame le président, il est treize heures. Il me faudrait à peu près sept minutes.
Le PRESIDENT : Poursuivez s’il vous plaît.
M. CRAWFORD : Je vous remercie. Ma plaidoirie de demain sera ainsi plus courte.
[Projection n o 8 : côtes pertinentes/non pertinentes dans l’affaire Jan Mayen.]
23. L’affaire suivante est celle de Jan Mayen : on peut en voir la configuration côtière sous
l’onglet IV-9 du dossier de plaidoiries. Il s’agissait d’une délimitation entre des côtes se faisant
face qui présentaient des longueurs très différent es. La Cour a défini comme pertinentes les côtes
situées entre les pointsE et F sur Jan Mayen et entre les pointsG et H au Groenland
(C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p. 68, par. 67). Aux points H et G, la côte du Groenland change de direction,
même si, en particulier au point G, ce changeme nt n’est pas très prononcé. Les espaces maritimes
situés au sud et au nord de ces points n’étaient pas considérés comme pertinents. Les espaces
situés au large de ces points n’étaient pas considérés comme pertinents.
132
Voir DU, par. 4.25-4.27.
133Voir RR, par. 3.31-3.46. - 60 -
24. L’Ukraine fait valoir dans sa duplique que le raisonnement suivi par la Cour dans
l’affaire Jan Mayen vient étayer la proposition selon laquelle toute la côte de l’Ukraine orientée au
sud est pertinente en l’espèce 134. Comment parvient-elle précisément à cela, l’Ukraine ne le dit
pas : Jan Mayen était une affaire simple et évidente où les côtes se faisaient face, sans rien
présenter qui ressemblât à la configuration comple xe des côtes ukrainiennes situées au nord de la
zone à délimiter.
25. En outre, si l’on utilise la technique de l’Ukraine consistant à tracer des arcs de
200 milles marins, la longueur de la côte située immédiatement au sud du point G au Groenland se
projetterait sur une partie au moins de la zone pertinente située entre le Groenland et Jan Mayen ;
néanmoins, la Cour a jugé que seule la côte située au nord du pointG était pertinente.
Manifestement, l’importance des côtes se trouvant au sud du point G était éclipsée par le segment
de côte au nord de ce point, lequel segment était bien plus proche de la zone à délimiter.
o
[Fin de la projection n 8.]
[Projection n o9 : côtes pertinentes/non pertinentes dans l’affaire Nicaragua c. Honduras.]
26. Considérons ensuite la décision la plus r écente de la Cour en matière de délimitation,
dans l’affaire Nicaragua c.Honduras . Dans cette affaire, les circonstances étaient telles que la
Cour à choisir la méthode de la bissectrice. Comme vous pouvez le voir sous l’ongletIV-10 du
70 dossier de plaidoiries, la frontière terrestre représentée par le fleuve ⎯comme vous vous en
souviendrez bien évidemment ⎯ avance dans la mer au-delà de la côte et les directions générales
des deux côtes s’infléchissent très nettement de pa rt et d’autre à l’ouest. Les façades côtières
devaient être suffisamment longues pour former la base d’une bissectrice, sans représenter de
manière erronée la géographie côtière au voisinage immédiat : selon les propres termes de la Cour,
il était nécessaire de déterminer «une façade côtière suffisamment longue pour rendre compte
correctement de la configuration côtière de la zone en litige» (Nicaragua c.Honduras , arrêt du
8octobre2007, par.298). L’important, pour la présente instance, est que vous avez rejeté
l’argument du Nicaragua selon lequel il fallait utiliser la totalité de la façade côtière des parties.
Vous l’avez formulé ainsi :
134
Voir DU, par. 4.31-4.32. - 61 -
«La première proposition du Nicaragua, c onsistant à considérer la façade
côtière… amputerait le Honduras d’une portion importante de territoire au nord de
cette ligne et accorderait ainsi un poids considérable à une partie du territoire
hondurien très éloignée de la zone à délimiter .» ( Nicaragua c. Honduras , arrêt du
8 octobre 2007, par. 295 ; les italiques sont de nous.)
[«Nicaragua’s primary proposal for th e coastal fronts... would cut off a
significant portion of Honduran territory falling north of [the] line and thus would give
significant weight to Honduran territory that is far removed from the area to be
delimited.»]
A cet égard, vous avez accordé la préférence à la configuration côtière locale par rapport à la
configuration côtière régionale et donné davantage de poids aux portions de la côte qui étaient plus
proches de la zone à délimiter qu’à celles qui en étaient plus éloignées.
o
[Fin de la projection n 9.]
III. Conclusions à tirer de la jurisprudence
27. Compte tenu de ce qui précède, je proposer ais quelques conclusions au sujet des côtes et
des zones pertinentes. Elles sont au nombre de cinq :
1) Premièrement, une question de délimitation ne peut se poser que dans le cas où les côtes sont
adjacentes ou se font face. Cette conclusion découl e de ce que la Cour a indiqué dans l’affaire
du Plateau continental (Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe libyenne) : «il n’y a pas à tenir compte de la
totalité des côtes de chacune d’elles ; tout segment du littoral d’une Partie dont, en raison de sa
situation géographique, le prolongement ne pourrait rencontrer celui du littoral de l’autre Partie
est à écarter de la suite du présent examen» ( C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 61, par. 75) [«it is not the
whole of the coast of each Party which can be taken into account; the submarine extension of
any part of the coast of one Party which, becau se of its geographic situation, cannot overlap
with the extension of the coast of the other, is to be excluded from further consideration by the
Court»].
72 2) Deuxièmement, on ne saurait déterminer l es longueurs côtières de manière mécanique, en
considérant des points qui, s’ils étaient les seuls au monde, pourraient générer des titres
opposés. Il faut examiner la situation côtière rée lle en tenant compte de la véritable étendue de
la zone à délimiter. Les côtes qui sont, selon vos propres termes, «très éloignée[s] de la zone à
délimiter» (Nicaragua c. Honduras, arrêt du 8 octobre 2007, par. 295) [«far removed from the - 62 -
area to be delimited»] ne sauraient être per tinentes dans une telle affaire, et cela est
particulièrement vrai dans le cas d’une mer semi-fermée.
3) Troisièmement, une côte est donc pertinente aux fins d’une délimitation a) s’il s’agit d’une côte
opposée ou adjacente à la côte adverse de l’autre Etat et b) si, dans les circonstances réelles de
l’affaire, elle peut générer un titre se chevauchan t avec celui que génèrerait la côte de l’autre
Etat. Ces côtes comprennent les points de base qui produisent la ligne d’équidistance provisoire
mais ne se réduisent pas aux côtes intermédiaires entre les points de base.
4) Quatrièmement, une côte, même si elle pouva it, en théorie, générer un titre maritime se
chevauchant avec celui que produit la côte de l’ autre Etat, ne sera pas jugée pertinente si
d’autres portions de côte incontestablement per tinentes sont situées relativement plus près de
telle manière qu’elles constituent la principale source de titre. C’est ce que j’ai appelé le
principe de proximité.
5) Cinquièmement, des zones seront pertinentes si elles constituent des projections des côtes
pertinentes dans la région où doit être effect uée la délimitation et s’il est tenu compte des
espaces maritimes dans lesquels la délimitation doit avoir lieu ; peu importe à cet égard qu’elles
relèvent ou non de la zone où se chevauchent les prétentions des parties.
Madame le président, ces cinq principes mainte nant exposés, je pense que le moment est
venu de lever la séance. Avec votre permission, je reviendrai demain matin pour appliquer ces
conclusions aux côtes et aux zones du secteur ouest de la mer Noire.
Je vous remercie, Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur Crawford. Ceci met un terme à notre première matinée
de plaidoiries au nom de la Roumanie et la Cour se réunira de nouveau à dix heures demain matin.
L’audience est levée.
L’audience est levée à 13 h 5.
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