Traduction

BHY

CR 2006/14 (translation)

CR 2006/14 (traduction)

Thursday 9 March 2006 at 3 p.m.

Jeudi 9 mars 2006 à 15 heures - 2 -

10 The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Professor Stojanović, you have the floor.

STOr.JANOVI Ć: Thank you, Madam President. In my address, I shall first provide an

historical account of the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to show that it was no

“tsunami”, but a conflict which had been simmeri ng for several decades prio r to the outbreak of

armed hostilities.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE ARMED CONFLICT IN BOSNIA AND H ERZEGOVINA

Part One

Historical synopsis of the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina

1. Madam President, Members of the International Court of Justice, I should like first to

express my respect for this Court, a respect whic h I shall display and demonstrate throughout these

proceedings. As the Agent of my country ⎯ Serbia and Montenegro ⎯ it falls to me to argue for

the defence in the case concerning the Application of the Conven tion on the Prevention and

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide , brought by Bosnia and Herz egovina. Before I begin, I

should like to emphasize that I am motivated and guided not only by my emotions, but also by my

reason. It is in fact my reason that tells me that my country is terribly offended by the Application,

which alleges its responsibility for the most serious crime of modern civilization.

I shall begin my address today, before the Court, with the following hypothesis, emphasizing

that this hypothesis is based on my convictions and my reasoning: no person and no evidence can

prove that Serbia and Montenegro had the intention of destroying the Muslim people of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, either during the 1992-1995 war or at any time in the history of the relations between

these two peoples in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

2. It is not at all my intention to fatigue you with a detailed account of the historical events of

the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Rather,shall seek to rebut the allegations contained in

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Applicati on, which go back in history to the first half of the nineteenth

century, and the sole purpose of which is to prove that the Serbian people have harboured

genocidal designs against the Muslims both in the past and today. - 3 -

11 I shall not now delve into history in order to find evidence, since it is a well-known fact that,

once hostilities had broken out, all the parties involved looked for grounds for its continuation, as a

way of endorsing and justifying the conflict. At the same time, they avoided mentioning events

which testified to co-operation and friendship. Unfortunately, there can be no relationship, whether

between individuals or between social groups, in which there are not lengthy or brief periods of

conflict. However, it cannot be denied that the historical continuity of a certain type of relationship

has some bearing on the current state of relations. On the other hand, it cannot be the cause of

current events. History does not repeat itself, a nd changes in human relations are possible at all

times.

I should like to emphasize that, in the research re lating to the history of a conflict (while it is

still ongoing), negative events are always accentuated. In this way, history is blatantly used as a

form of war propaganda.

3. Lastly, I should like to say that I do not believe that history was the underlying cause of

the hostilities in Yugoslavia and of the hostilities betw een Serbs and Muslims in the tragic war of

1992-1995. History could probably provide some e xplanations for barbaric conduct in conflicts,

which usually have rational aims. However, it so happens that military conflicts are usually

accompanied by pathological social behaviour: crimes of all kinds, which are punishable by

modern legal process, and the planners and perpet rators of which are necessarily prosecuted and

brought before national or international courts.

4. Hostilities broke out in Yugoslavia because of the adversaries’ different perceptions of

their interests. Those perceptions were false in their rational assessment of the circumstances,

interests and instruments for the achievement of their aims, since today’s international community

rules out the use of instruments of force in order to realize particular interests. For this reason,

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s contention in its Ap plication that this conflict derives from the

long-standing notion of the creation of a Greater Se rbia, is totally false. Similarly, the 1844

Garasanin Plan is described in the Application as a document confirming the motive for the

12 commission of genocide by the Serbs in the inter-e thnic war of 1992-1995. According to Bosnia’s

Application, the current State of Serbia and Montenegro must take responsibility for all this. - 4 -

5. According to the Application, “[t]he Respondent’s concept of the ‘Greater Serbia’ is based

on the ‘Nacertanije (Plan)’ published by the Se rbian priest Garasanin in 1844” (Application,

para.24). First of all, it must be emphasized th at IlijaGarasanin was never a Serbian priest, but

was the Minister of Internal Affairs in the Prin cipality of Serbia (later, he was to become the

Minister for Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister). This error was corrected later in the Memorial of

the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (para.2.3.1.2) and in the Reply

(Chap.4). Secondly, this plan was published not in 1844 but in 1906: which proves that it was

known only to the elite of the Serbian Government and was considered a high-level State secret.

6. However, the Applicant seeks to demonstrate that the idea of a Greater Serbia has existed

and been kept alive uninterruptedly from 1844 to th e present day and that it was the ultimate goal

of the Serbs during the war in Bosnia and Herzeg ovina. In the same paragraph, the Applicant

states: “[m]ore recently, this plan to create a ‘G reater Serbia’ was forthrightly articulated in a

‘Memorandum’ published by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in Belgrade in 1984”.

This error concerning the date (not 1984, but 198 6) was corrected in the Memorial, but another

mistake was made. I quote: “This memorandum, signed by approximately 200prominent

Belgrade intellectuals . . .”.

7. In all the documents supplied to the C ourt by Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a

substantial number of material errors (concerning th e facts). The truth is that the Memorandum in

question was not signed by anyone ⎯ not even by its authors. It was published as an article in the

press, in unfinished form ⎯ in fact, a journalist found it and pub lished it in a Belgrade magazine.

Not only was this text never signed, but no sectio n of our Academy of Sciences and Arts ever

recognized it as a document of that institution.

8. What can immediately be said about that document is the following:

(A)it was immediately condemned by the State and by the Serbian Communist Party, one of whose

senior officials was Slobodan Milosevic;

13 (B)the document makes no mention whatsoever of th e creation of a Greater Serbia, but lays stress

on the reorganization of Yugoslavia in accordance with the principles of communist central

planning set out in the first Constitution of 1946, adding ideas for self-management from the

1963 Constitution; - 5 -

(C)given these characteristics of the Memora ndum, it had no influence on the development of

political pluralism and democratic oppositio n from 1989 onwards. No party political

programme in Serbia contains ideas expounded in the Memorandum;

(D)it is deeply offensive to the great majority of politically aware Serbian intellectuals and citizens

to say that the Memorandum, drafted by a small group of members of the Serbian Academy of

Sciences and Arts, inspired and motivated the de mocratic revival in Serbia after the fall of

communism in Europe.

9. Contrary to the opinion expressed by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and by

some historians (see M. Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo , Columbia

University Press, 1998, pp.222-223), we are of the opinion that the Memorandum does not

represent some form of plan relied on by Milosevic. However, the Memorandum contributed to the

growth of fear for the fate of the Serbian people. But it was not a call for ethnic cleansing, still less

for genocide. The Memorandum was not a documen t explaining the causes of the Yugoslav crisis

and it did not propose concrete solutions. It was not a plan but a mere literary lament (see S.P.

Ramet, Balkan Babel, Westview Press, 1996, p. 200).

10. The Academy’s Memorandum did not stir the national and political awareness of the

Serbian people. However, Garasanin’s plan (Nacertanije) of 1844 no doubt penetrated the national

consciousness of the Serbian people. Its impact w as felt in Serbia up to the First World War when

the plan was implemented under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This explains the

determination of the Serbian people to support the policy of their Government in the Balkan War

and in the Great War. It should be noted that this awareness was widespread among the Serbs who

remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. Thus, at the time of the Great War, a large

number of volunteers in the Serbian army came from these countries (more than 100,000 Serbian

14 volunteers on the Thessalonika front in 1916-1918 came from regions that were not part of the

Serbian State).

11. The plan, as devised by Garasanin in 1844, had no special or novel significance for the

Balkans or for the Europe of that time. I will not waste your time, Madam President, Members of

the Court, in demonstrating this argument with a description of the programmes for the liberation

and integration of European pe oples in the process of establishmen t of European nation States in - 6 -

the nineteenth century. All the peoples of the Balkans and central Europe had their own national

plans for the creation and establishment of natio n States with the largest possible territorial

expanse. Such plans were to be found in German y, in Italy and in other countries as well. They

were premised on the destruction of existing empire s, and this sometimes led to wars, especially if

the intended goals could not be achieved by diplom atic means. The Balkans were by no means the

exception in this overall process in Europe.

12. Moreover, the Balkan peninsula was not so named until the first half of the nineteenth

century. Up to that point in time, the region w as known as South-East Europe (its name dating as

far back as the Middle Ages) and subsequently, in the seventeenth century , as European Turkey.

However, it was more precisely in the nineteenth century (and this continued until the Great War)

that the stereotypical phrase “powder keg of Europe ” was applied to the Balkans. That stereotype

is still with us. It is not difficult to observe that, from 1800 to 1945 in western Europe, there were

16 wars and two prolonged conflicts (in Ireland and the Basque country), not counting the colonial

wars in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In the Balkans, on the other hand, this period saw eight

insurrections and wars as well as a prolonged conflict between the Serbs and the Albanians.

13. The figures clearly show that the inhabitants of the Balkans can be neither proud nor

regretful that they are “the powder keg of Euro pe”. What has happened, however, is that in

western Europe, for more than 60years now, ther e have been no military conflicts (leaving aside

the colonial wars waged by certain European countri es, albeit outside Europe). This is due to the

fact that, among the countries constantly at war in times past, one now finds a very high level of

co-operation and even integration. In the Balkan s, on the other hand, during the last decade of the

twentieth century, we witnessed four wars between peoples who had lived in peace since 1945.

15 14. The question which now has to be addressed is the following: wh y in the Balkans did

conflict not cease for ever 60years ago, as it did in western Europe? No one would deny the

appalling nature of the conflicts in the Balkans. Ho wever, the fact that the equally dreadful past in

Europe, which the people of Europe have been able to overcome and put aside, should teach those

seeking peace in the Balkans that they should not at tempt to dig up the past, for all that they will

generally find is what suits current political require ments. What has to be done is to analyse the

existing situation in the Balkans and ask why this problem does not exist elsewhere in Europe. It is - 7 -

clear at once that in the Balkan s there still exist very powerful sentiments of intransigence and

religious intolerance, as well as ultra-nationalist proj ects supported by certain political elites. It is

only by keeping in mind this image of the Balkan s that it is possible to explain not only recent

wars, but also the pathological bestiality and a ggression which have marked those wars. It is

precisely because of these forms of animosity, that the parties to the conflicts have not been able to

find a peaceful solution to their opposing interests. Consequently, the solutions to their problems

have had to be found and implemented by the great powers and the international community.

Naturally, those solutions are based on current rules of international law. It is only by determining,

in the light of international law, the respons ibility of those who conceived and implemented

political decisions and by working on the process of reconciliation that a peaceful and final solution

to latent conflict in the Balkans can be achieved.

The international community, and in particular the great powers, contribute far more to the

solution of the Balkan problem by supporting plan s for reconciliation rather than by employing

force. We in the Balkans absolu tely have to call a halt to this vicious circle of vengeance and

counter-vengeance for past crimes, and learn and build mutual respect and confidence. Continuing

to refuse any form of dignity to one’s opponents, continuing to misrepresent their history, culture

and political and religious institutions, cannot be expected to achieve reconciliation. For this

reason, I ask the Court to reject the defamatory account of the contemporary history of the Serb

people; such defamation is apparent in all of t hose claims of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which it

stresses a line of continuity between the Garasanin plan and the tragic events which occurred.

16 However, the Garasanin plan must be viewed in the context in which it was written, and it has no

connection with the events of the late twentieth century. Misrepresenting the Garasanin plan

contributes nothing to reconciliation of the Balkan peoples. Moreover, the Serb people and State

never contemplated destroying the Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina or elsewhere.

15. In 1985, David Mackenzie, a well-know n American expert on Serbian and Russian

history, published a book entitled Ilija Garasanin: Balkan Bismark (East European Monographs,

Boulder, Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York). Mackenzie’s comparison is

perhaps not appropriate, but it can encourage us to think. This is certainly the best book published

on Garasanin; the reason for this is simple: th e American author had the opportunity to conduct - 8 -

research in all of the relevant European ar chives and thus had access to all the necessary

documents, whereas this possibility was not open to Serb historians. Mackenzie has published a

large number of books on Russian and Serb history, of which one of the best known is his doctoral

thesis, Serbian-Russian Relations 1875-1878 (Col umbia University), published under the title The

Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism 1875-1878 (Cornell University Press, 1967).

16. The Garasanin plan (Nacertanije) was a proposal for Serbia’s foreign policy, which saw

the light of day in the nineteenth century, in wh ich the final aim of that policy was formulated:

liberation and union of all of the southern Slavs. Achievement of this plan required that Serbia as a

State achieve greater political power, for this (politi cal power) is the decisive factor in the political

arena. The introduction to the plan includes the fo llowing: “Serbia must realise that she is still

small, that she cannot remain so, and that she ca n achieve her future only in alliance with other

surrounding peoples.” (Mackenzie, 1985, p. 42.)

17. Serbia commenced its struggle for nationa l liberation from Ottoman rule in 1804; in

1813 the country was reoccupied by the Ottomans. In 1815 the Serbs rose up again. From then on,

Serbia had the status of vassal principality within the Ottoman Empire, a status which it retained

until 1878. In 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, Serbia was recognized as an independent State.

18. In 1844, the Principality of Serbis alread y had elements of an independent State, for the

Ottoman Empire was at that time no longer able to control its vassal regions. I should mention here

17 that, already in 1807, Serbia had established its own political system: a Constitution, an

educational system, a university. Later, in 1844, it also introduced a Civil Code. Thus, Serbia had

already begun at this time to detach itself, fro m the political, legal and social standpoint, from the

political and State system of the Ottoman Empire.

19. It was in this historical and social c ontext that Serb political thinkers planned the

country’s future. It was indeed at that time that the pan-Slav movement (equivalent of the

pan-Germanic movement) was born. That movement inspired the southern Slavs and helped them

articulate their ideas on the union of all of the southern Slavs within a common State. Thus, the

Serbs and Croats, intellectually and politically supported by the Czechs and Poles (who also wished

to liberate themselves from their occupying empire s) reached the level of political conscience - 9 -

necessary in order to initiate the struggle for liberat ion and integration. That integration included

the Serbs, the Croats, the Slovenes and the Bulgars.

20. Ilja Garasanin conceived his plan on the basis of political realities: he understood that

the Serbs first needed to free themselves from Ottoman rule. That was achievable, for the Ottoman

Empire was by then in a very enfeebled state. However, in 1848, when revolution broke out in

Hungary, the Serbs and the Croats, in fightin g against the Hungarians, chose to struggle together

for freedom and union. The Hungarian revoluti on of 1848 caused Garasanin to enlarge the scope

of his national interests: he also included an alliance with the leaders of the Croat national

movement, reinforcing “the idea of Yugoslavism”. That idea had, solely for realistic political

reasons, been neglected in his 1844 plan. I stre ss that Garasanin did not confine himself to

theoretical writings on the future of Serbia, but in fact attempted to realize his political aims over a

vast area by establishing clandestine agencies a nd schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and

Bulgaria. As a diplomat, he contributed to the birth of the military and political alliance of the

Balkan States (Greece and Montenegro) which wa s preparing for war with the Ottoman Empire.

That alliance was achieved in 1868. That same year Garasanin signed an agreement with the

revolutionary committees in Bulgaria and Romani a who were planning insurrection in Bulgaria,

and union between Bulgaria and Serbia once Bulgaria had been liberated from Ottoman rule.

18 21. During the period when the Balkan a lliance was being formed, Garasanin wrote the

following to the Croat Bishop Strossmayer in a letter of 1867:

“The Serbian and Croatian nationalities are one ⎯ the Yugoslav (Slavic)
nationality: religion is not to interfere in the least bit in national affairs: the state is

the only basis of nationality; religion divides us and separates us into three parts (i.e.
Orthodox Christianity; Roman Catholicism, Islam), but it can never be the principle of
our unification into one state; it is our nationality, which is the same, that counts; in
the state all churches are equal.” (Dusan Batakovic, The Balkan Piedmont: Serbia and

Yugoslav question, Belgrade, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1992, 3.)

22. Garasanin’s plan was essentially and above all a form of pan-Slav programme. Thus it

was not an exclusively Serb programme. The great er part of the text was drafted by the Czech

advisor, Frantisek Zach, who had been sent to Belg rade by the Polish Prince Czartoryski, then in

exile in Paris (following the disastrous Polish uprising of 1830). Garasanin made certain important

changes to the text: he watered down anti-Russi an sentiment and revised the programme for the - 10 -

union of the southern Slavs by conceiving of Serbia as the Piedmont of the southern Slavs, focus

for a union of all the southern Slav peoples. He insisted, however, that each people should retain

its identity and independence (see Audrey Helfent Budding, Expert Report, ICTY, 3).

23. Garasanin clearly indicated in his plan that it should include union with the Bosnian

Muslims within a single State. However, alt hough his primary aim was liberation of the Serbs

from Ottoman rule, the plan expressed no animos ity towards the Bosnian Muslims, who, as

members of the Turkish army, actively participat ed in putting down the Serb uprisings of 1804,

1813 and 1875. In Bosnia and Herzegovina itself, the Serbs organized several uprisings against

Ottoman rule. The Bosnian Muslims sided with the Turks. That is a historical fact which can in no

way assist us in understanding the events of 199 2 to 1995 on the territory of Bosnia and

Herzegovina. I stress that the Serb-Muslim conflicts of the nineteenth century culminated in the

great Serb uprising of 1875-1878. That insurrec tion sparked off the Eastern crisis, marked by the

Serb and Russian wars (1876-1878), which were ended by the peace terms signed at the Congress

of Berlin in 1878. That Congress ratified the occupation of Bosnia a nd Herzegovina by the

Austro-Hungarian Empire, proclaimed the independence of Serbia and Montenegro and created the

19 Principality of Bulgaria as a sort of vassal State within the Ottoman Empire.

24. In its Application (para. 9), the Applicant states: “In Bosnia, the human rights of all were

respected centuries before the Univ ersal Declaration of Human Rights came into being.” My aim

is not now to dispute this thesis, since it would be pointless to try to show that human rights were

respected within the Ottoman Empire. I shall, however, cite a brief analysis from the book by

RobertJ. Donia and JohnV.A.FineJr, Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Tradition Betrayed (Columbia

University Press, New York, 1994, 63): “Most important is the large number of local

administrations than it was the case in many other Ottoman provinces. Moreover, many of these

locals succeeded in building up large estates. Thus many Christians found themselves serfs on

Muslim estates.”

25. With the decline of central authority with in the Ottoman Empire, the local Muslim rulers

exploited the Christian population in an increasingly cruel manner.

26. The quotation from Bosnia’s Application wh ich I have just cited cannot be accepted, for

the historical facts show that, once Bosnia and Herzegovina had been occupied by the - 11 -

Austro-Hungarian monarchy in 1878, the process of reconciliation between Serbs and Muslims had

a very clear aim: resistance to the Austro-Hunga rian occupation. Thousands of Muslims left

Bosnia and Herzegovina following that occupation. The occupation also downgraded the status of

Serbs, since it made their political struggle for assimilation with Serbia far more difficult: they

were now confronted by a State far more powe rful and better organized than the dying Ottoman

Empire. The Muslim and Serb nationalist political organizations thus began to collaborate in order

to prepare uprisings. That collaboration lasted un til 1912, when the victory of the Serbs and their

allies (Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro) in the Balkan War gave powerful impetus to the revolt

against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. However, the Muslims did not support that revolt, for

they had no interest in being absorbed into Se rbia. The same goes for the Croats, who did not

support the Serb uprising of 1875-1878, fearing th at Bosnia and Herzegovina might unite with

Serbia and Montenegro if the uprising succeeded.

20 27. After the Congress of Berlin an exclusivel y national policy prevailed in Serbia, because

Serbia chose alliance with the Austro-Hungarian mo narchy. The ideas in the Garasanin plan were

abandoned by the Serbian Government, so that foreign policy and trade were directed mainly

towards Austro-Hungary. On the other hand, as fro m 1885 Serbia began to devote attention to its

own economic and cultural development, with excellent results. A modern-type multi-party system

developed in Serbia under the new Constitution of 1888, which introduced democratic suffrage to

Serbia based on the 1830 Belgian model. Ho wever, a new young king, AleksandarObrenovic,

acceded to the throne of Serbia; he abolished the democratic constitution and introduced absolute

power. Thus progress in Serbia was checked. From that time until 1903 Serbia had practically no

foreign policy goals and Garasanin’s ideas were forgotten. In 1903 a group of Serbian officers put

an end to King Aleksandar Obrenovic’s reign by assassinating him.

28. The 1903 coup marked a turning-point in Se rbia’s foreign policy: this was when Serbia

broke free from its submission to Austro-Hungary and set a course for political, economic and

cultural prosperity. The 1888 Constitution was restored and the Government became answerable to

Parliament. At the same ti me new trends in foreign policy separated the country from

Austro-Hungary and brought it politically, economically and culturally closer to the Triple Entente

powers, namely France, England and Russia. So it was no mere chance that the Garasanin plan - 12 -

was published in 1906: Serbia no longer wanted to conceal its policy of uniting all the southern

Slavs, a policy that was injurious to Austro-H ungary. The same year Austro-Hungary started the

“customs war” against Serbia, because the latte r had shown that it intended to free itself from

economic dependence. France and England helped Serbia at the time by allowing it to export its

products to European markets via Thessaloniki. This obviously gave Serbia’s economic

development an enormous boost.

29. Publication of the plan (Nacertanije) coincided in time with the political organization of

forces in Europe into two blocs, which in 1914 was to cause the Great War. Serbia immediately

21 aligned itself with the Triple Entente forces, because the goals of the Garasanin plan ran counter to

the interests of Austro-Hungary. Of course the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was against the union

of the southern Slavs.

30. After defeating Turkey in 1912 (with its allies, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro),

Serbia doubled its territory. It became renowned in the Yugoslav region.

31. Rejoicing in this renown, Serbia went to war in 1914. Right at the beginning of the war

the Parliament of the Kingdom of Serbia proclaim ed Serbia’s political goals: essentially the union

of the southern Slavs. The First World War ended in a great victory for America, England and

France. Serbia’s major contribution to that victory, in particular in action on the Thessaloniki front

where its army fought alongside French and British armies, should not be forgotten. The Kingdom

of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed on 1 December 1918. This proclamation was in

accordance with the right of self-determination for peoples introduced by President Wilson in 1917,

when the United States entered the war. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy was completely broken

up, and new States were created: Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Russia, which was a

member of the Entente, ceased to exist during th e Bolshevik revolution and the Soviet Union was

born. Thus the Garasanin plan of 1844 was rea lized in 1918. Unlike Bismarck, Garasanin was

unable to see his plan for union implemented, because he had died 44 years earlier.

32. Realization of the Garasanin plan was ratified by international law at the Versailles Peace

Conference in 1919. It would therefore be unthi nkable to try Serbia now for an alleged genocide

the groundwork for which was laid in the Garasa nin plan, because that plan was implemented

thanks to international ratification proclaimed at the Versailles Peace Conference. This ratification - 13 -

was in accordance with the princi ple of self-determination of peoples after the break-up of the

European empires.

33. It should now be stressed that the prot ection of Muslims as a “religious minority” was

proclaimed at that conference in Versailles. Article10 of that Agreement [Treaty between the

Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State], signed at

22 Saint-Germain-en-Laye on 10 September 1919 provi des that: “The Serb-Croat-Slovene State

agrees to grant to the Musulmans in the matter of family law and personal status provisions suitable

for regulating these matters in accordance with Musulman usage.”

34. The creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 marked the full implementation of the national

programme devised by Garasanin. I repeat that this plan contains no element that might provoke

persecution, ethnic cleansing or extermination of a people living in the territories affected by the

plan. The idea of a Yugoslav State was approved by the Serbian intellectual and political elite

because the ethnic structure of the region was such that creating ethnically pure States would be

impossible. Between the two world wars the Serbian political elite was convinced that the creation

of individual ethnic States would involve casualties, and therefore never considered the idea.

35. Nationalistic trends in the creation of the plan for territorial enlargement of Serbia were

present in the nineteenth century , but these ideas were in accord ance with ideas current in the

whole of Europe. The Serb nationalist programme in the nineteenth century matched the process of

national State creation in the whole of Europe. As such it was quite legitimate at the time, from the

point of view both of the ideas that it contained and of its tools, including the approval of wars,

which at that time was a legitimate way of achieving national goals and liberating people who were

living in part under Turkish or Austro-Hungarian occupation.

36. In any case I have just said, but now repeat: that the national programme set out in the

Garasanin plan contained no idea that could be in terpreted as a call or incitement to persecution or

ethnic cleansing, still less the destruction of a people.Quite the contrary; this plan envisaged the

union of various ethnic and religious groups in a multi-ethnic State.

37. The proof of this is the way in which th e Serbian army controlled the territories of the

future Yugoslav State in the final operations of th e First World War. The Serbian army never used

violence in the territories that it controlled. Furthermore, that army took some - 14 -

60,000 Austro-Hungarian soldiers prisoner in 1914 a nd 1915, all of whom were treated according

to the rules of international la w. These soldiers were freed by the Austro-German troops who

occupied Serbia late in 1915.

23 38. Moreover, major population movements took place everywhere in the Balkans, outside

the new Yugoslav State, after the Balkan war of 1912 and also after the Great War, precisely to

avoid potential future conflicts.

39. In her testimony before the ICTY Audrey Budding said:

“certainly I would not want to make any claim for an identity of motives between
Serbian politicians of the middle or late ni neteenth century and Serbian politicians of
the late twentieth century. I think that the historical situations are very different and
on the whole I would be more comfortable discussing each situation by itself.” (ICTY,

Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, 24 July 2003, pp. 24868 and 24869.)

40. The stance taken by Audrey Budding refers to the analysis of war events in Bosnia and

Herzegovina in 1992-1995. At the same time this means that we suggest that the International

Court of Justice should reject as without founda tion the statement by Bosnia and Herzegovina

(Reply, Chap. 4, Sec. 1, para. 4) that “such a political programme [the nineteenth century national

programme] can easily be used as part of a political propaganda campaign supporting the idea of an

ethnically pure State”. I think that up to no w I have submitted enough arguments to enable the

International Court of Justice to reject the accusati on that the nineteenth century idea of a “Greater

Serbia” was used to create propaganda and by its nature amounted to genocide, namely that it was

an incitement to criminal acts of genocide.

41. A discussion of historical conspiracies to commit genocide is of no assistance whatever

in seeking to identify the causes of the conflict at th e end of the twentieth century. Consequently it

contributes nothing to national reconciliation of the pa rties to the conflict, which is the goal after

any inter-ethnic conflict, including those before the courts.

The period between the two world wars

42. The end of the First World War saw the success of Ilija Garasanin’s national programme,

its realization in practical terms. Afterwards the main aim of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s foreign

policy was to protect the country against external threats by maintaining the alliance with the forces - 15 -

that had created the Versailles system after the First World War. The Versailles system was in

itself under threat from “revisionist” countries (mainly those defeated in the war).

24 43. The Soviet Union was among the countries th at conducted a revisionist policy relative to

the system set up by the Peace of Versailles. Soviet ideology regarded the Great War as

imperialist, and consequently the Peace of Versailles was also regarded as an imperialist peace. In

accordance with this ideological position, the Soviet Union’s foreign policy opposed the creation of

the Yugoslav State, which was seen as imperia list because of purported Serb hegemony over the

other Yugoslav peoples. Whether there was Serb hegemony within the Yugoslav Kingdom is

highly debatable. As I do not regard this issue as relevant to these proceedings, I will not return to

it again.

44. What I do consider relevant, in order to show that there was no continuity between

Ilija Garasanin’s plan of 1844 and the Yugoslav Kingdom’s foreign policy in 1919-1941 on the one

hand, and the policy of Slobodan Milosevic’s régime (1990-2000) on the other, is the policy of the

Yugoslav communist party, which was implementi ng directives from the Communist International

(Comintern) managed by the Soviet communist party. I find this important because

SlobodanMilosevic was a communist, who came to power in Serbia in 1990 as leader of the

communist party., in proving

45. Even at the first Comintern congress in 1919, the creation of the Yugoslav State was

regarded as the result of an imperialist war, not as the consequence of a secular trend by the

Yugoslav peoples. In that year of 1919 the Comintern condemned the creation of the Yugoslav

State, without having any evidence that the hegemony of the “Greater Serbia” had been established

in Yugoslavia.

46. The resolution on the Yugoslav national question was passed at the fifth Comintern

congress in July 1924. This resolution gave the Yugoslav communist party the task of working for

the destruction of Yugoslavia as a State. This resolution stated:

“1. Yugoslavia is a multinational country . The Serb bourgeoisie that exercises

hegemony over it represents only 39% of the Yugoslav population. The other peoples
that represent the great majority are more or less subject to a regime of national
oppression and a policy of denationalisation is operated against them.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 16 -

3. The duty of the Yugoslav communist party is to carry on a constant struggle
against national oppression and in support of the self-determination of peoples,
striving constantly to protect itself from the influence of the bourgeoisie and to put
25
those peoples in touch with the working-cl ass struggle against the bourgeoisie and the
capitalists.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7. The general principle of the right of self-determination must be based on the
separation of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia from Yugoslavia and on the creation of
independent States.” (Historical Archives of the Yugoslav Communist Party, II,
pp. 420-421.) [Translation by the Registry]

47. The Comintern even set up a committee on the Yugoslav national question. This was

discussed in March 1925 during a Comintern session, atte nded by Stalin in person. He insisted on

the inclusion in the Yugoslav communist party’ s national programme of a paragraph on nations’

right to self-determination and eventual independence (op. cit., p. 333).

48. After numerous discussions on the nati onal question within the Comintern and in

Yugoslav communist party cells, the national polic y was finally adopted at the fourth Yugoslav

communist party congress, held in Dresden in Oc tober 1928 (Palmiro Togliatti, the leader of the

Italian communist party, was present at this ses sion). It was there that the Yugoslav communist

party’s programme for the struggle against the Se rb bourgeoisie, its hegemony and its military

monarchy was defined (op. cit., p. 162). In order to achieve this end, the Yugoslav State had to be

destroyed and separate national states created: Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Slovenia.

The Hungarian and Albanian minorities were also to be granted the right to self-determination, it

being proposed that they rejoin their mother States, Hungary and Albania.

49. The basis for an understanding of this Comintern policy can be found in the thesis that

Yugoslavia was a product of the imperialist war, cr eated as part of the Peace of Versailles, which

was itself imperialist in nature. The Comintern did not feel threatened by the Yugoslav Kingdom’s

anticommunist régime, because the situation in other neighbouring countries was no different. The

Comintern did not relish the fact that Yugoslavia had been a member of the Entente alliance, which

had organized military interventions against the Sovi et Union just after the Bolshevik revolution.

The Soviet Union feared a fresh intervention by these countries against the Bolshevik régime.

26 Thus the Comintern executive committee stated the following at its tenth meeting in 1929: “There

is going to be a war against the Soviet Union, under pressure from English and French imperialism. - 17 -

To this end, the English and Fren ch imperialists are working to create an anti-Soviet bloc in the

Balkans.” (Pesic Desanka, Les Communistes yougoslaves et la question nationale , Rad, Belgrade,

1983, p. 253.) [Translated by the Registry]

50. The change in Comintern policy at the seventh congress in 1935 was the main evidence

confirming that the Comintern positions cited a bove resulted from the Soviet Union’s obsessive

fear of foreign intervention. That year the S oviet Union and France signed a mutual aid agreement

in the face of the obvious danger represented by Hitler’s Germany. The danger from Hitlerite

fascism became obvious in 1935, so all forces had to be united against it. This was how the

“imperialist creation of Versailles” that was Yugoslavia became a friendly country. The Comintern

therefore decided at that congress that the Yugos lav communist party must protect Yugoslavia.

The latter accepted these directives, and decided at its fifth congress in 1940 that Yugoslavia must

be saved. The Montenegrin and Macedonian nations were proclaimed at this congress, and the

structure of the future socialist Yugoslav federation was announced.

51. The Serbian communists unfailingly carried out the directives from the Comintern and

the Yugoslav communist party, with the result that documents and books written by Serbian

communists are full of condemnations of Serbian bourgeois hegemony. All the Serbian national

programmes from the nineteenth century onwards were condemned by the Yugoslav and Serbian

communist parties and regarded as hostile, imperialist and bourgeois.

52. The Yugoslav communist party, like the Se rbian communist party, came to power at the

end of the Second World War, following the victory of the partisans, aided by the Red Army, in the

civil war waged in parallel with the war against fascism. Yugoslavia was transformed into a

federal republic under communist domination. The 1945 Yugoslav Constitution was simply a

replica of the Soviet Constitution.

53. Regrettably, the crimes committed during the civil and inter-ethnic war were punished by

the victors on an “eye-for-an-eye” basis. In prac tice this amounted to large-scale executions of

27 prisoners from the defeated forces and of civilia ns who supported them politically. Inter-ethnic

conflicts were repressed by the silence imposed under these conditions of “revolutionary terror”

(here I am using communist jargon). Instead of national reconciliation on the basis of open - 18 -

discussions among fellow citizens, hatred was repressed, only waiting for the right time to burst

forth.

54. The Serbian communist party severely p unished any attempt at political expression or

discussion of certain problems relating to multi-ethnic conflicts during the civil war. At that time

and until the 1980s, historians and critics did not da re to express opinions different from those set

out in the communist party programme.

55. Since a federal State cannot function without a democratic decision making process, that

process became the prerogative of party committees completely dominated by Tito. This system

could survive during Tito’s lifetime, but after hi s death in 1980 the dismemberment of the country

began.

56. Slobodan Milosevic came on the scene less than ten years after Tito’s death. Since Tito,

who chose the high officials himself, no longer existed, Milosevic had to struggle in order to rise to

power.

57. He used populist methods to achieve his ends. The long-standing political crisis in

Kosovo, and the constant Serb migrations from Ko sovo into central Serbia were the initial stimuli

for Milosevic’s populism. He wanted to safegua rd a Yugoslavia in which he would become the

new Tito. Since his ideas were not accepted by ot her political elites, he turned to the mobilization

of Serb nationalism. This was not difficult, give n the economic crisis in Yugoslavia in the 1980s

and the nationalistic climate in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

58. It is clear from this account of the histor y of Serbia and Yugoslavia that Milosevic could

not have been the heir to the Garasanin plan, which dealt with the liberation of peoples and the

union of all the southern Slavs.

Madam President, I have completed the first part of the historical summary of the conflicts in

Bosnia and Herzegovina. May we take a break, if possible, after which I will continue with a

description of the political conflict prior to the outbreak of the war in Bosnia.

28 The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Mr. Stojanović.

SMTr.JANOVI Ć: Thank you, Madam. I shall continue my statement with an analysis of

the political conflict before war broke out in Yugoslavia. - 19 -

Second part

The political conflict before war broke out in Yugoslavia

59. The political conflicts which preceded th e military conflicts shaped different political

perceptions in the minds of the opposing parties. The question which arises is: what were the

contexts in which those perceptions developed and how can we define them?

60. Given my view that the source of the c onflicts in Yugoslavia is not to be found in

historical developments or in ethnic and religious hatred and intolerance, but instead that the latter

followed from the atrocities committed in th e 1992-1995 war, I shall carefully analyse,

MadamPresident, Members of the Court, events from an era in history which helped lay the

psychological groundwork for the war. It is a known fact that, failing psychological preparation,

military preparation for war is virtually impossible, particularly in modern times when inter-State

military conflicts see involvement not only of professional armies (as was the case during the

Middle Ages) but entire peoples.

61. This era is the period of the Second World War in Yugoslavia, in other words the period

1941-1945. This period is a matter of history but the protagonists in these events, even though the

events themselves have become history, are s till alive, these events are more than history ⎯ this is

memory, real-life experience. The Hitlerite occupation of Yugoslavia was of course not carried out

in accordance with international law. In effect , the occupation restructured Yugoslavia: a new

State was created, the Independent State of Croatia, which encompassed not only Croatia itself but

29 also Bosnia and Herzegovina. The State thus created was not merely illegal, it was also, by its very

nature, plans and acts, a monstrosity.

62. Slavko Kvaternik, a senior official of the fascist State of Croatia during the Second

World War, explained on a radio programme on 10 April 1941, the very day on which the

Independent State of Croatia was proclaimed, that “a pure Croatia would be built by forcing

onethird of the Serbs to leave Croatia, one thir d to convert to Catholicism and one third to be

exterminated . . .” On the subject of this statement, the Encyclopaedia of European Nations has the

following to say: “The enormity of such crim inal behaviour shocked even the conscience of

German commanders, but Pavelic ha d Hitler’s personal support for su ch actions which resulted in

the loss of the lives of hundreds of thousands of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.” - 20 -

(Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations , Europe, 1995, p.91, Entry: Croatia, Encyclopaedia

Britannica 1991, Macropedia, Vol. 29, p. 1111.) Othe rs have commented on the events in Croatia

during the Second World War as follows:

“A Croatian Crusade of revenge and d estruction directed against the Orthodox

Serbs erupted, the crusade that belongs among the most brutal mass murders
undertaken in the entire history of the worl d... When the leaders of the Ustashi
movement claim that they have slit the th roats of a million Serbs (including children,
women and old people), that is, in my opinion, a boastful exaggeration. On the basis

of the reports that were submitted to me, I estimate the number of defenceless murder
victims to be three quarters of a million.” (Dr. Herman Neubacher, Sonderaufrsg
sudost 1940-45, Berichteines fligenden Diplomaten, Gottingen, 1956, 18, 31.)

Thus, “only 750,000 Serbs” were murdered in the Independent State of Croatia, including

Bosnia and Herzegovina! It may indeed be c oncluded that the monstrous scheme to eliminate

one third of the Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia was carried out.

63. Unfortunately, after the Second World Wa r, those most responsible for these heinous

crimes were not tried and punished, while indivi duals bearing lesser responsibility were executed

(except for those who successfully fled to countries offering asylum to Nazi criminals). In this

connection, we do not at this time have consiste nt official figures from reliable sources as to the

exact number of victims of the genocide committed by the Independent State of Croatia régime (the

Ustashis, I believe you are familiar with the term). The widely varying and conflicting figures are

used by nationalist groups and organizations and were advanced and discussed at their initial

conferences in former Yugoslavia.

30 64. Aside from the number of victims, the eff ects of the atrocious Ustashi crimes were also

felt in Serbia. During the occupation, Serbia accepted several hundred thou sand refugees. I shall

recall here the existence of the infamous Jase novac concentration camp, built on the banks of the

river Sava and without doubt the most horrendous concentration camp in the Independent State of

Croatia. During four years of war, the waters of the Sava ran red with blood, and corpses from the

Independent State of Croatia washed up on the ba nks and islands of the Sava, along its course all

the way down to its confluence with the Danube in Belgrade.

65. These unprecedented crimes have naturally re mained etched in the memory of the Serb

people in Bosnia and Herzegovina a nd in Croatia. However, it must not be forgotten that a period

of peace began after the Second World War, lasting more than 45 years. The general feeling is that - 21 -

reconciliation was conceived during that peace. This reconciliation cannot be explained by the

“revolutionary terror” of the communist régime. I would stress here that it was also motivated by

the fact that many Croats and particularly Mu slims actively participated in the guerrilla war

mounted by the communist party against the fascist forces. The friendships forged during the war

were supported by the internationalist policy of the communist régime. Thus, neighbouring

peoples established good relations. This was to be seen particularly among young people and

explains a great number of inter-ethnic marriag es in Bosnia and Herzegovina (30percent).

Moreover, religious tolerance was supported by the general policy of the atheistic communist

régime. Quite simply, the children of communist party members were not baptized in places of

worship and, accordingly, grew up without any feeling of attachment to a religious group.

66. However, once the economic crisis struck (in 1980, the year of Tito’s death), the conflict

between the federal units in Y ugoslavia began. A few months after Tito’s death, in 1981,

Yugoslavia suffered a debt crisis: Yugoslavia’s debt to foreign creditors amounted to $19.3 billion

at that time (Susan L. Woodword, Balkan Tragedy, The Brookings Institution, WashingtonD.C.,

1995, p. 28). The economic impoverishment of the country brought to the fore the material

interests of individuals, local communities and federal units (nations). Conflicts between

individuals in respect of their material status easily mutate, in mixed ethnic-religious surroundings,

into conflicts which are political and religious in nature, even though political and religious

affiliation does not influence the material status of the individuals. As citizens grow impoverished,
31

and at the same time unemployment rises and workers (above all, the unskilled) are laid off, certain

criteria for hiring and dismissing people develop, criteria which are no longer solely economic but

are tied to kinship, religion and ethnicity. Thus begins the split between those in the “in group” and

those in the “out group” in the sociological sense. Differences in the de velopment of the federal

units linked the position of the individual to th e position of the Republic, which was linked to the

ethnic-national factor. Given that the political and constitutional systems were designed to

establish equilibrium among the federal units, in the face of a single decision-making authority, and

that Tito alone possessed that authority (which is natural in the communist system), political

authority died with Tito. Without Marshal Tito’s authority, the Yugoslav communist system could

no longer function. - 22 -

Yugoslavia’s constitutional and political system

67. The constitutional and political system established between 1967 and 1971 through a

number of amendments to the Yugoslav Constituti on was in fact the product of political pressure

exerted by centrifugal forces insisting on decentraliz ation of the State. However, the amendments

did not effect decentralization of the central decision-making process to the benefit of local

self-determination, through the federal units. Th e Federation alone was decentralized, while the

federal units remained centralized, along the lines of the model dating back to 1963. Moreover, the

way in which decentralization was carried out show s that it resulted in the creation of a system

which was to lead to the disintegration of the Stat e and not to the decentralization of authority in

the State.

68. The amendments to the 1963 Constitution, which were adopted in the period between

1967 and 1971, transformed Yugoslavia into a pure confederation, lacking any functional

instrument promoting integration. The following points demonstrate this:

(a) The hierarchical principle was abolished, with the result that the federal authority could not

directly implement its laws. Under cons titutional law theory, a State incapable of

implementing its laws in its territory is not a State. The authorities in the Republics still

co-existed with their communist parties, those pa rties not being confederated at republic level.

32 In effect, the communist party was federalized only at the level of Yugoslavia itself. If a

locality did not wish to implement a law of the Republic, it was necessary for the communist

party committee responsible for that locality to put pressure on it and even for the local

Chairman to be replaced. In any event, the law had to be imposed.

(b) Amendment XXXV introduced the requirement of unanimity in the decision-making process at

the federal level. This applied to all im portant economic and political questions. The

unanimity requirement (veto) undoubtedly blocked the decision-making process, because many

decisions could not be taken in a timely manner. Failing to take a decision is also a decision,

which could be imposed by any of the participan ts in the decision-making process. All this

helped to create an atmosphere in which self-interest replaced the general interest. It should be

mentioned here that there was no such require ment of unanimity in past examples of

confederations. - 23 -

(c) In such a system the federal units became sove reign in their international economic relations,

with the result that each maintained a foreign-tr ade balance of payments. It is impossible to

maintain both autonomy in international economi c relations and a common internal market at

the same time. The differences in the development of the Republics in Yugoslavia led to strong

competition among them and, as there was no customs régime, the Republics covertly closed

their markets to goods from the other Republics. Internal interdependence among the federal

units could call for one of them to produce excl usively for the internal market (for example,

that was the case for food). If it agreed to do so, it would be without foreign currency and

would therefore be unable to meet its interna tional financial obligati ons. If it nevertheless

exported its products, these would no longer be found on the internal market. That is indeed

what happened in Yugoslavia, where one unit ex ported certain products and another had to

import them at the same time. This reinfor ced the process creating autarkic units within

Yugoslavia. There was another important factor in this process: international contracts could

not be signed without full consent from all federa l units. However, contracts thus signed were

33 implemented by the federal units, not by the fede ral authority which had formally signed them.

Consequently, the ties between the federal units were weakened, with the result that they ran up

unchecked and uncheckable foreign debt. In short, nobody in the Yugoslavia of the 1980s

knew who owed how much to whom.

69. After the 1971 amendments to the Cons titution, Yugoslavia started down the path

leading to disintegration of the State. That happe ned in all areas of social life. The market broke

down, as did the energy, transport and communications systems. Similarly, political life,

educational life and cultural life collapsed. Lastly, the communist party, which had by default (as I

have already said) been the main force for cohesion, disintegrated. I would remind you that one of

the communist party’s functions during Tito’s lifet ime had been to resolve deadlock by taking

decisions which the State government could not take. When the communist party disintegrated, the

Yugoslav National Army remained the only truly Yugoslav institution. Thus, Yugoslavia, as a

State, faced enormous peril, which included very hazardous means of resolving political conflicts.

The constitutional reforms of 1971 may be regarded as the beginning of the political crisis in

Yugoslavia. - 24 -

Economic factors in the political conflicts

70. Political authority in communist systems plays a very important role in an individual’s

life and his or her social position. That is one con sequence of the fact that the State holds the vast

share of social property and directly decides how that property is to be distributed. Thus, eruption

of an economic crisis necessarily triggers political crisis in which opposition arises to those alleged

to be responsible for the economic crisis, poverty and unemployment. Very often, politicians stir

up public opinion against an external enemy because they (politicians) can thereby deny their own

responsibility for economic collapse.

71. In Yugoslavia, blaming someone else mean t accusing another republic in the Federation,

claiming that it was harming “our development”. Given that the federal units in Yugoslavia were

created along ethnic-national lines, this meant that, in fact, the accusations and attacks were made
34

against the nations in question. Since the nations were intermingled in all the republics (except

Slovenia), conflicts arose within the federal units as well. Given that Bosnia and Herzegovina was

(and still is today) a three-nation republic, it became the focus for conflict in the region. Naturally,

the Serbs and Croats sought support from their “brothers and fellows” in Serbia and Croatia.

72. One need only read the press or view th e televised broadcasts of the time in Serbia,

Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to grasp that this was indeed the overture to war propaganda.

The media contain analyses of “economic exploitati on” of one nation by another. There is often

talk of political aggression encouraged by nati onalism. Moreover, a new mythology is born, a

mythology steeped in nationalist stereotypes.

73. The different levels of economic developm ent in the republics were not the result of an

intentional process. The economically underd eveloped republics however believed that these

differences were the product of the selfishness of the developed republics, which should give them

economic aid. I would point out that Yugosla via’s existence depended for years on economic

support from abroad. These differences propelle d the developed Yugoslav republics towards

secession. But secessionist tendencies had other consequences: particularly, opposition to

secession arose in the ethnic-national communities which did not want to be cut off from their

mother republics. That was the case of the Serbs in Croatia, as well as the Serbs and Croats in

Bosnia and Herzegovina. - 25 -

74. The economic situation deteriorated without interruption in the 1980s. According to

Susan Woodward:

“By 1985-1986 the preconditio ns of a revolutionary s ituation were apparent.
One million people were officially registered as unemployed. The increasing rates of
unemployment were above 20per cent in a ll republics except Slovenia and Croatia.

Inflation was at 50 per cent a year and climbing . . . Allocation decisions increasingly
became stark questions of survival.. . Economic polarization led to social
polarization.” (S. L. Woodward, op. cit., p. 73.)

35 75. The economic situation is undoubtedly worse today in all the old republics of the former

Yugoslavia (except Slovenia) than it was in the 1980s . For example, in Serbia alone there are now

one million unemployed. However, political tens ion has clearly lessened and we can therefore

expect the start of the reconciliation process inst ead of new conflicts and wars. The economic

crisis of the 1980s laid the groundwork for the conflict between the political elites of the Yugoslav

republics, for the great anxiety and uneasiness felt by the lowest levels of society.

76. After the Second World War, Yugoslavia unde rwent very rapid urbanization: in 1945,

73 per cent of the population was engaged in farming, while the percentage had fallen to 19.9 at the

start of the economic crisis. The great majority of industrial workers came from the countryside.

The State therefore considered that laying off wo rkers was the only way to save them socially,

because they could return to the countryside and wo rk there for the rest of their lives. However,

many areas in the ethnically diverse republics were completely unsuitable for agriculture. Thus, in

Croatia, the underdeveloped areas unsuited for agricu lture were inhabited for the most part by

Serbs (Krajina) and the result was that their re turn to these unproductive regions worsened their

poverty. This poverty was the cause of their nationalist and political reaction. Thus the political

conflict affected the lowest levels of the population in this part of Croatia.

77. The political situation worsened and th e federal Government w as unable to take any

decisions under the then political system. Resolv ing economic problems was left to the republics

because each of them had its own positions and per ceptions in respect of th e ways to resolve the

problems connected with the crisis. It is understandable that the most developed republics

(Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia without Kosovo) had differing political interests and conflicting

political goals. The political goals of Croatia a nd Slovenia were oriented towards secession, while

Serbia’s political objective was to restructur e Yugoslavia’s constitutional and political system - 26 -

through its transformation into a federation. This political goal of Serbia was motivated above all

by the fact that the secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina would have the following result: more

36 than two million Serbs outside of Serbia. This problem was not simply tied to the nationalist

concept “one nation in one State”, it was also ba sed on the fear (reinforced by the events of the

Second World War) that Serbia would be flooded w ith refugees. A large number of refugees was

expected not only because of the atmosphere of into lerance towards Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia

and Herzegovina but also because of the great econom ic advantage they would enjoy in Serbia, as

compared with the regions of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina where Serbs lived.

78. The fact that the Yugoslav republics decided to resolve their economic problems

independently of each other initiated the political resolution of those problems. Thus, economic

nationalism seeped into the nationalist rhetoric which then dominated the media in all the republics.

This rhetoric strengthened participation by nationalist forces in political life.

The international factors contributing to political conflicts

79. According to Susan Woodward, “In fact, however the Yugoslav conflict is inseparable

from international change and interdependence and it is not confined to the Balkans but is part of a

more widespread phenomenon of political disintegration.” (S.L. Woodward, op. cit., p. 3.)

80. For 40 years, Yugoslavia occupied a special position in the international relations arena:

following its emergence from Soviet dependence in 1948, it had taken up a neutral position

between the two blocs. Thus, it acted as a buffer z one in the geostrategic constellation shaped by

the two blocs. This gave it a privileged positio n and a special status, supported by the United

States and Western Europe. The Soviet Union’s degree of acceptance of this arrangement

depended on fluctuations in relati ons between the two sides. Yugoslavia received a great deal of

support from the Third World because of its role in the Non-Aligned Movement, and all of these

circumstances contributed to its international security and internal development.

81. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism in Europe, Yugoslavia’s

special position changed. It began to lose th e support of major world Powers, which were no

longer interested in Yugoslavia as a buffer between the two blocs or in its non-alignment policy,

37 since the option of joining either bloc was no longer available. The two blocs no longer confronted - 27 -

each other. The establishment of Yugoslav ia in 1918 served the interests of the Entente Powers,

and its existence between 1950 and 1990 served the interests of the two blocs. However, following

the disappearance of the latter, the great Powers’ interests were limited to purely pragmatic matters;

if Yugoslavia wished to survive, that was its intern al affair. All that mattered from the standpoint

of the main factors affecting in ternational relations was that its existence or break-up should not

threaten peace in south-east Europe or elsewhere. The great Powers had always feared local wars

only when they could be implicated and threatened by them.

82. Yugoslavia enjoyed a special relationshi p with the European Community under a trade

agreement concluded in 1970. I emphasize th at the agreement dated from 1970, which was

20 years before the countries of Eastern Europe ⎯ now members of the European Union ⎯ signed

similar agreements. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Yugoslavia was of no further political and

economic interest to the European Community.

83. During the period of political and economic crisis in Yugoslavia, the International

Monetary Fund was the entity most committed to resolving the country’s economic and political

problems. At the beginning of 1987, the Yugoslav communist party tabled 30 amendments in the

federal Parliament to the 406 Articles of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. The deteriorating

economic situation in the country was exacerbate d by the huge trade deficit. The federal

Government’s proposal of reforms to forestall national bankruptcy was blocked by the negative

reaction of the Slovene and Croatia n delegation in the federal Parlia ment. Thus the reforms could

not even be initiated.

84. The International Monetary Fund a nd the World Bank then proposed a sweeping

overhaul of the political and economic system in Yugoslavia. To be more precise, these two

international financial institutions made the granting of new loans c onditional on constitutional

reforms designed to strengthen federal authority and introduce majority voting for decision making

at the Yugoslav National Bank. They felt that these changes would establish monetary discipline

and promote debt repayments (S.L. Woodward, op. cit., p. 82).

38 85. In light of these proposals, the federal Government tabled a proposal in the federal

Parliament. The proposal contained a list of regula tions on the role of the communist party in the

decision-making process at federal level. Howeve r, during that same year, 1987, two further - 28 -

proposals for constitutional reforms were tabled in the Parliament: a Slovene proposal to transform

Yugoslavia into a confederation and a Serbian pr oposal (supported by some other republics) on a

federalist structure for Yugoslavia.

86. The negotiations conducted within the fe deral Parliament had only one aim: not to

achieve an agreement, since that would require unanimity. Thus, in the absence of international

support, Yugoslavia’s disintegration began. The federalization of the communist party also

contributed to the process of disintegration, si nce decision-making powers were transferred to the

organs of the party in the individual republics. At the same time, in Slovenia and Croatia, the

Yugoslav National Army came under attack. The Yugoslav National Army was the largest

beneficiary of funds from the federal budget and th e only truly Yugoslav institution that served the

defence of the country. Towards the end of 1987, the Slovene delegation a nd part of the Croatian

delegation left the federal Parliament as they no longer wished to contribute to the federal budget.

The Yugoslav National Army was left in the hands of the non-developed republics and of Serbia,

which had to take over its financing. The nascent political conflicts were thus channelled into the

dangerous path of military conflict.

Increased political conflict

87. Paradoxically, increased political conflict in this situation was reflected in the

establishment of political parties under the “dem ocratization” process resulting from the fall of

communism in Eastern Europe. Thus, in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, political parties

were formed on an ethno-national basis, reflecting th e fact that inter-ethnic relations were the most

important factor in the political conflict. Sin ce political relations were based on religious and

ethnic differences, rather than on the clash of political ideas and programmes for the organization

of the State, the interests of the ethno-nationa l groups became the driving force in political

relations.

39 88. The formation of political groups along et hno-national lines results in the horizontal

stratification of society, since ethno-national communities group together in territorial units and

define their own boundaries. This was the peri od when the ethno-national communities in Croatia

and Bosnia and Herzegovina formed themselv es into territorial groups, thereby masking - 29 -

socio-economic problems. Poverty was offset by a feeling of belonging to the group and its

territory.

89. Political territorialization may lead to processes of collaboration or conflict between

nations divided along territorial lines. However, if this occurs within a State, the process is a

consequence of conflict, since collaboration wo uld preclude ethno-national territorialization.

Political territorialization on an ethno-national basis was confined to 25 per cent of the territory of

the Croatian republic, even though 50 per cent of Se rbs in Croatia lived in Croat towns. These

Serbs in Croat towns preferred to emigrate to Serbia rather than move to the economically deprived

areas that were under the political control of the Serbs in Croatia.

90. The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was different, as it was not possible to delimit

territories populated by homogeneous ethno-nationa l groups. All the towns of Bosnia and

Herzegovina (Sarajevo and the others) had et hnically mixed populations. In rural areas,

ethno-national territorialization was possible in relatively mono-ethnic villages. The grouping

together of villages on an ethno-national basis is clearly apparent from an analysis of wartime

operations between 1992 and 1995.

91. It was the democratic elections which made military conflict inevitable. This is

paradoxical but true, I believe. It would be paradoxical if one overlooked the fact that the

ethno-national parties were the main players in th ese elections. They thus amounted to national

referenda rather than democratic elections. Moreov er, the political crisis resulted in a nationalistic

approach to resolving the crisis. This was clear ly the reason why the elections were won by the

leaders of nationalist parties in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. Thus the republics

voted for war leaders, with the result that it woul d not be long before the banners of war were

unfurled and Yugoslavia sank into the abyss of inter-ethnic conflict.

40 92. The ethno-national conflict was the con sequence of differences in the aims of the

nationalist parties. Those of Croatia had th eir sights set on Croatian independence. The

nationalism of the Serbs in Serbia and the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia consisted of a desire to keep

Yugoslavia intact. Rightly or wrongly, Serbs clung to the idea, in their national consciousness, that

they had created Yugoslavia, that they ha d made many sacrifices for Yugoslavia during the

twoworld wars, and that they should therefore saf eguard the country. The Croats in Bosnia and - 30 -

Herzegovina were integrated into Croat nationalist parties which reflected their identity, their sense

of belonging to the Croat nation and their right to be integrated into the Croat State.

93. The Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina had a dual identity. They were Serbs and they

were therefore in favour of preserving Yugoslavia. If the others did not give their consent, the

Serbs would choose to integrate their territories in to Serbia, while retaining a certain amount of

federal autonomy.

94. Once the military conflict started, Milosevic could clearly see that he had no majority

support from the people in Serbia, either for remaini ng in power or for his war policy, the aims of

which were illusory.

95. It is interesting to note that, despite a ve ritable explosion of nationalist ideas, the parties

that came to power did not obtain an absolute majority of votes in Serbia and Croatia in 1990. The

party of Franjo Tudjman, the Croatian Democra tic Union (HDZ), received 47.5percent of the

votes in Croatia’s April 1990 elections. In Serbia , Milosevic’s socialist party (SPS), which was in

fact the remodelled communist party, received 42.5 per cent of the vote. Despite losses due to vote

rigging and despite low funding, the opposition parties in Serbia received 57.5 per cent of the vote.

However, the electoral systems in Serbia and Croatia enabled the Croatian Democratic Union in the

Croatian Parliament and the socialist party in the Se rbian Parliament to take two thirds of the seats

in the National Assembly.

96. The first democratic elections in the So cialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina took

place on 18 and 19 November 1990. The results were published in Official Journal No. 42/1190 of

Bosnia and Herzegovina on 19 December 1990. The seats in the Parliament were distributed as

follows: 86 seats for the SPA (Muslim party), 72 seats for the SPS (Serbian party) and 44 seats for

the HDZ (Croatian party). This distribution refl ected the population structure of the country. The

41 three national parties accounted for 202 seats out of a total of 240 seats in the Parliament of Bosnia

and Herzegovina.

97. The Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina can be said to have had two main political aims,

which were, in essence, to retain an ethnically fe deralized Bosnia and Herzegovina in Yugoslavia,

or alternatively, if the Muslims and Croats opposed that aim, to integrate the territories inhabited by

Serbs into Serbia. In the latter case, Bosnia and Herzegovina would cease to exist as such, because - 31 -

the Croats planned to incorporate the territories with a majority Croatian population into Croatia.

This was moreover the subject of the negotiations between Milosevic and Tudjman, the Croatian

leader, and of the high-level discussions among gove rnment leaders in Croatia. The Croatian

President Franjo Tudjman, in a discussion with representatives of the HDZ party of Bosnia and

Herzegovina (27 December 1991 in Zagreb), made the following remarks:

“Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be considered as something eternal. The
survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an au tonomous State, even if it were possible,
would be at variance with the interests of the Croatian people. It makes it impossible

for the Croatian State to achieve its normal territorial aspirations and jeopardizes the
existence of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Transcripts on the
division of Bosnia, op. cit., 75.)

98. The negotiations between Milosevic and Tudjman, which took place at Karadjordjevo ⎯

a hunting resort favoured by Tito ⎯ in 1991, and which concerned the division of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, clearly demonstrated that the Serbs and the Croats laid claim to parts of the territories

of Bosnia and Herzegovina which they wished to incorporate in Serbia or Croatia, which is why the

Serbs and the Croats attempted to occupy those territories by military force.

99. How did the Muslims stand in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina and its political

organization, given its multi-ethnic structure? The history of the Muslims contains no indication of

national projects for the future of their State. Until 1875, the Muslims lived as privileged subjects

of the Ottoman Empire. They had an interest in th e survival of that empire and in its control over

Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, following the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the

Austro-Hungarian monarchy in 1878, the Mus lims accepted Austro-Hungarian rule, putting up

resistance at times, but also collaborating therein. Once Bosnia and Herzegovina became a part of

42 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918), the Muslims colla borated with the Serbian political elite and

formed no projects hostile to Yugoslavia. It shoul d be noted that, after the Second World War and

despite the fact that a section of the Muslim population had collaborated with the Ustashi r égime

that ruled Bosnia and Herzegovina during th e Second World War, those Muslims who had

contributed to the struggle against fascism were rewarded with senior positions in the communist

party and the Government.

100. However, with the onset of the 1967-1971 crisis and the amendments to the

Constitution in 1963 (which gave Muslims the st atus of the sixth nation in Yugoslavia), the - 32 -

political behaviour of the Muslim elites changed. In 1970, Alija Izetbegovic, with his colleagues

and collaborators, published the Islamic Declaration, in which he specified the political goals of the

Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that declaration, Alija Izetbegovic wrote:

“The first and the most important of these conclusions is definitely the one

about the incompatibility of Islam and non-Islamic systems. There can be no peace or
coexistence between the ‘Islamic faith’ and ‘non-Islamic’ social and political
institutions... Claiming for itself the right to regulate its own world, Islam clearly
rules out any right or possibility of action of any foreign ideology on its turf.”

(Preliminary Objections, p. 25, para. 1.6.5.)

101. The group led by Alija Izetbegovic recei ved a multi-year prison sentence in Titoist

Yugoslavia. The Izetbegovic text in itself should not have resulted in prosecution in a democratic

State. The fact that it was shows that it was cons idered a threat to Yugoslav society. At the time

when the multi-ethnic crisis erupted in Yugoslavi a (in the 1990s), AlijaIzetbegovic was elected

President of the Muslim political party (SDA), and in that capacity he became President of Bosnia

and Herzegovina in the first “democratic” elections. Of course, Mr. Izetbegovic was able to revise

his views on the multi-ethnic and multi-religious orga nization of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But he

was equally in a position to revert to the views e xpressed in the Islamic Declaration. There is no

doubt, however, that the Bosnian Serbs were deeply troubled by his past. Even if that had not been

the case, those who wished to spread ethnic ha tred found an excellent rationale for their

propaganda in the Islamic Declaration.

102. In his party’s political programme, Mr. Izetbegovic insisted on a sovereign and integral

Bosnia and Herzegovina with no regionalization or federalization along ethnic lines. All this made

43 it difficult to find a peaceful solution to the conf lict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mr. Izetbegovic

was so obsessed with his conception of a soverei gn Bosnia and Herzegovina that he stated at a

session of Parliament (27 February 1991): “I would sacrifice peace for a sovereign

Bosnia-Herzegovina, but I would not sacrifice its sovereignty for peace.” This statement worsened

the relations between the national groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because they all had different

programmes (Preliminary Objections, p. 41, para. 1.8.8).

103. Madam President, Members of the Court, I have up to now presented a reasonably clear

summary of the developments in the Yugoslav crisis which gave rise to the military conflicts. That

summary is certainly incomplete, as a book coul d be written on each element of the summary - 33 -

(indeed, many books have already been published on this subject). I have attempted to describe

objectively and in broad outline the development of th e crisis which led up to the tragic events in

Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

104. The “war” in Slovenia was the foreword and the war in Croatia was the preface to the

tragedies of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The forces that were prepared to take up arms

showed their colours during the first military cl ashes in Croatia towards the end of March 1991 at

Plitvice and around the beginning of May 1991 at Bo rovo Selo near Vukovar. On one side, there

was the Croatian police force, on the other the Se rbian rebels. In both instances, the Yugoslav

National Army (JNA), in its capacity as a legitimate armed force, acted to separate the antagonists.

This state of affairs did not last long, as the JNA was converted into a Serbian army. The third part

of this statement will show how that conversion was effected.

105. Europe and the world were divided when the conflict first erupted: Germany, Austria,

Denmark and Italy supported Slovenia and Croatia in their intention of seceding from Yugoslavia.

The United States, France, the United Kingdom, Sp ain and Greece were initially in favour of

maintaining the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. The European Community, in its Declaration of

26 March 1991, expressed concern about the developing situation in Yugoslavia and appealed to all

the parties to refrain from the use of force: “A united and democratic Yugoslavia has the best

chance of being harmoniously integrated into the new Europe.” (J.P. Maury, La Constitution

européenne, PUF, Paris, 1996, p.250.) Two senior officials of the European Community,

44
Mr.Delors and Mr. Santer, visited Belgrade on 29 and 30 May 1991 and expressed their support

for the maintenance of Yugoslavia’s territorial in tegrity. They offered Yugoslavia an association

agreement if it remained united. Moreover, Mr. De lors promised a grant of $4.5 billion, on behalf

of the European Community, to be used for politi cal reforms, democratization and development of

a market economy, provided that Yugoslavia in troduced a centralized financial management

system (S.L. Woodward, op. cit., p. 160). Just a few days before Slovenia’s accession to political

independence, the United States Secretary of St ate visited Belgrade. During his visit, he

emphasized his support for the continued existence of Yugoslavia. He stated that the United States

would not recognize Slovenia and Croatia if they seceded unilaterally, as that would be an unlawful

act (S.L. Woodward, op. cit., p. 161). However, he stressed th at no change in the borders could be - 34 -

effected by force since, if force were used, th e United States might review its position regarding

non-recognition of any unilateral secession.

106. The use of force in Slovenia by the Yugoslav National Army as a result of the unilateral

secession of 25June 1991 was deliberately aborted. However, the survival of Yugoslavia was

under threat. The Yugoslav National Army’s wi thdrawal from Slovenia, in the wake of an

agreement reached in mid-July of the same year, signalled de facto recognition of Slovenia’s

secession.

107. At the same time, the secession of Croatia served to worsen the political conflict,

especially in those regions of Croatia where the Se rb rebels were determin ed to remain within

Yugoslavia. The European Community disputed th e legitimacy of the use of force in Croatia.

However, the Yugoslav National Army was still a legitimate military force in Yugoslavia and

Croatia was still a part of Yugosla via. Nevertheless, the European Community insisted that a

commission (the Badinter Commission) prepare a report. It also insisted on introducing new

sanctions if the military conflicts did not cease by 1September 1991. The first sanctions against

the federal Yugoslav Government were imposed on 5 July 1991: economic aid (which should have

amounted to $1billion) was cut and an embargo was imposed on Yugoslav arms imports

(S.L. Woodward, op. cit., p. 161). At the same time, the European Community decided to organize

45 a conference on Yugoslavia with a view to resolvin g the conflicts peacefully. It also set up the

arbitration commission chaired by Mr. Badinter which was to issue a legal opinion on the situation

in Yugoslavia.

108. The conference on Yugoslavia was held in September 1991 in The Hague under the

chairmanship of LordCarrington. The establishmen t of a standing conference, to be tasked with

finding solutions to provide a way out of the war, wa s proposed at that gathering. From that time

and until December 1991, the Eur opean Community’s involvement in the Yugoslav crisis was

limited to Lord Carrington’s diplomatic mission.

109. After several failed efforts to end the military clashes in Croatia, the United Nations

Security Council, on the initiative of Hungary, Canada and Austria, decided to take up the question

of the Yugoslav crisis. At its meeting on 25September 1991, the Security Council, under

Chapter7 of the United Nations Charter, adopted resolution713, in which it characterized the - 35 -

fighting in Yugoslavia as “a threat to internati onal peace and security”. The resolution established

an embargo on the importation of weapons into Yugoslavia. The Security Council authorized

Mr.Cyrus Vance, an American diplomat, to in itiate negotiations with a view to ending the

hostilities. The United Nations decided to form a peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR) with the task

of separating the warring factions.

110. In view of the fact that the internal borders between the federal units of Yugoslavia

were recognized as international frontiers, it now became necessary to recognize the new States so

that Yugoslavia would cease to exist. At the sa me time, the European Community decided to

recognize the secessionist States. Such recognition was to be given by the end of January 1992 at

the latest. The recognition of Slovenia and Croatia did not contribute to the outbreak of war in

those republics. However, it was made conditional on the negotiations regarding frontiers. French

President FrançoisMitterrand, on 14July 1991, proposed a review of the borders between the

Yugoslav republics as the price to be paid for their secession. One year later, Mr.Mitterrand

expressed regret that his proposal had not been accepted (J.P. Maury, op. cit., p. 255).

46 111. The recognition of Slovenia and Croatia did not lead to war, but it was a major

contributory factor to the outbreak of war in Bo snia and Herzegovina following the recognition of

Bosnia and Herzegovina.

112. Madam President, Members of the Court, I believe that the following conclusions can

be drawn from my statement:

(a) the hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina have no historical roots;

(b) inter-ethnic hatred was not the cause of the hostilities;

(c) never in Serbian history has there been a policy or plan to exterminate non-Serbs;

(d) there has never been a policy or plan for th e demarcation of ethnic borders through ethnic

expulsions;

(e) the hostilities were triggered by the serious politi cal and economic crisis which had led to the

break-up of Yugoslavia;

(f) the disintegration of Yugoslavia resulted in the adoption of policies linked to the occupation of

“its own” ethnic territories;

(g) the war in Yugoslavia was a territorial war. - 36 -

Thank you, Madam President.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Stojanovi ć. The Court will now rise and will sit

again at 10 o’clock tomorrow morning.

The Court rose at 5.55 p.m.

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