Traduction

BHY

CR 2006/43 (traduction)

CR 2006/43 (translation)

Lundi 8 mai 2006 à 10 heures

Monday 8 May 2006 at 10 a.m. - 2 -

10 Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. Monsieur Obradović, vous avez la parole.

OBMR. ADOVI Ć : Je vous remercie, Madame le président.

U N SCHEMA

Introduction

1. Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour, dans le cadre de notre exposé final des faits et

du droit, je souhaiterais ce matin attirer votre attention sur une demande particulière de l’Etat

demandeur, qui est souvent revenue au cours de ces plaidoiries. C’est la demande selon laquelle

l’intention génocide doit être déduite d’un certain schéma («pattern») obéissant à un comportement

criminel.

2. Au début des plaidoiries du demandeur, M. Fr anck a invité la Cour à «tirer de certaines

constantes ⎯de certains ensembles de faits obéissant à un même schéma ⎯ les conclusions

1
qu’imposent la logique ou l’expérience, quand bien même il n’en existe pas de preuves directes» .

Au second tour, le demandeur a en partie modi fié sa position, affirmant avoir «des preuves

2
confirmant directement l’intention génocide de hauts responsables serbes» . Aucune preuve de ce

genre, cependant, n’a été produite devant la C our. Nous n’avons pas eu non plus d’éléments

sérieux confirmant l’existence d’un plan génocide. Pourtant, le demandeur continue d’inviter la

Cour à faire des déductions à partir d’un «schéma» de comportement criminel. Cette demande est

devenue sa «stratégie de sortie» ⎯ à la fois un moyen et un but.

3. Il n’est pas courant en fait, dans la jurisp rudence, que l’intention, en tant qu’élément du

crime soit démontrée par des preuves directes; elle est plus généralement déduite «des faits, des

3
circonstances concrètes ou d’une ligne de conduite délibérée» [traduction du Greffe] . Mais

l’existence de l’intention génocide n’est pas la seule chose qui puisse être déduite d’un ensemble de

faits obéissant à un même schéma. Par exemple, l’existence d’une «attaque généralisée ou

1
CR 2006/3, p. 24, par. 15 (Franck).
2 CR 2006/33, p. 36, par. 2 (Franck).

3 TPIY, Le procureur c. Radoslav Brdjanin , affaire nIT-99-36-T, Chambre de première instance,
1 septembre 2004, par. 704. - 3 -

systématique lancée contre toute population civile» , en tant qu’élément du crime contre

l’humanité, est également très souvent déduite d es faits, des circonstances concrètes ou d’une ligne

11 de conduite délibérée. Le demandeur ne s’est pas do nnée la peine de d’aider la Cour en expliquant

la différence entre un schéma dont on peut déduire l’existence du crime de génocide et un schéma

dont on ne peut raisonnablement déduire que l’ex istence de crimes contre l’humanité. Selon le

demandeur, le seul schéma existant en l’espèce, est le «schéma génocide», et chacun des actes des

Serbes pendant le conflit en Bosnie-Herzégovine, sans exception s’inscrit sans ce schéma.

4. Madame le président, ma tâche aujour d’hui consiste à prouver que le schéma de

comportement criminel décrit par le demandeur en l’espèce ne permet pas de déduire

raisonnablement l’existence du crime de génocide.

Schéma et crime de génocide

5. Un schéma de comportement criminel, susceptible de constituer l’ actus reus du crime de

génocide, n’est pas un élément nécessaire de ce crim e. Ni la convention sur le génocide ni les

textes fondamentaux des tribunaux pénaux internatio naux ne mentionnent un «schéma». Ce terme

apparaît pour la première fois da ns les «Eléments des crimes», l’un des documents fondamentaux

de la Cour pénale internationa le, mais dans une acception entièrement différente de celle que le

demandeur tente d’imposer en l’espèce. L’article 6 des Eléments des crimes de la CPI dresse la

liste des éléments requis pour établir cha que acte génocide. Par exemple, l’alinéa a) de cet article

définit comme suit les quatre éléments cumulatifs du génocide par meurtre :

«1.L’auteur a tué une ou plusieurs personnes.

2 Cette personne ou ces personnes appartenaient à un groupe national, ethnique,
racial ou religieux particulier.

3. L’auteur avait l’intention de détruire , en tout ou en partie, ce groupe national,

ethnique, racial ou religieux, comme tel.

4. Le comportement s’est inscrit dans le cadre d’une série («pattern») manifeste de

comportements analogues dirigés c5ntre ce groupe, ou pouvait en lui-même
produire une telle destruction.»

4
Statut de Rome de la Cour pénale internationale, art. 7, par. 1.
5Cour pénale internationale, El éments des crimes, Nations Unidoc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000); les
italiques sont de nous. - 4 -

6. Ainsi, selon le point 4 de l’alinéa a) de l’article 6 des «Eléments des crimes» de la CPI,

qui définit deux éléments alternatifs, il est clair qu’un génocide peut être commis par exemple dans

un camp isolé, si l’intention de l’auteur (ou pl utôt l’intention commune des auteurs qui ont des

pouvoirs dans le camp) est de détrui re un groupe, au moins partiellement, et si le comportement

peut en lui-même avoir une incidence sur cette destruction. Dans le cas d’un camp isolé, cela

12 signifie que les détenus devraient représenter une partie raisonnablem ent importante du groupe

concerné. Lorsque le comportement de l’auteur ne peut pas lui-même aboutir à la destruction

d’une partie importante d’un groupe donné, il doit s’insérer dans un schéma manifeste d’activités

criminelles semblables dirigées contre les memb res du même groupe. En pareil cas, l’auteur

partage l’intention génocide avec de nombreux autres individus auteurs d’actes semblables.

Toutefois, dans les deux cas prévus par la disposition susmentionnée (point 4), l’élément moral est

indispensable: il faut que chaque auteur ait l’ intention de commettre le crime de génocide (telle

que cette intention est décrite au point 3).

7. Mais le demandeur réclame en l’espèce autr e chose, à savoir que l’intention génocide soit

déduite d’un ensemble d’actes criminels divers. Ainsi que, M. Franck a déclaré :

«Que des actes de meurtre, de torture, de viol, de déplacement forcé, bien que
prouvés, séparément, permettent de déga ger, lorsqu’ils sont pris de manière
cumulative dans le contexte de poursuites pénales multiples à l’encontre d’individus,

une sorte de système ou de «structure». C’est ce terrible schéma qui, en fin de
compte, transforme de manière implacable une série de crimes ordinaires en un
génocide général. C’est cette accumulation de crimes isolés ⎯ cette effrayante

répétition d’actes mauvais ⎯ qui au bout du compte émerge, 6e façon tout à fait
éclatante, comme une sorte de super crime de génocide.»

8. Cette approche n’est pas compatible avec le droit pénal international en vigueur. Un

schéma constitué d’une série de «crimes ordinaires» ne peut pas être simplement transformé en

crime de génocide: celui-ci ne peut pas être la somme d’activités criminelles aléatoires, mais un

crime spécifique, avec un élément moral spécifique. Si des «crimes ordinaires» n’ont pas été

commis avec l’intention requise, comment pourraient-ils en s’additionnant constituer l’intention du

crime «suprême» de génocide qui, nous dit-on devrait, être déduit des éléments existants de tous les

crimes individuels? Ce rais onnement ne serait pas seulement illogique, il serait impossible.

6
CR 2006/5, p. 19, par. 34 (Franck); voir également CR 26, p. 46, par. 50 (Franck) et CR 2006/7, p.31,
par. 112 (Stern). - 5 -

L’existence d’un schéma ne peut être utile à la Cour que pour discerner l’intention lorsqu’elle ne se

déduit pas facilement des preuves directes. Comme nous l’avons déjà dit, chaque auteur du crime

de génocide doit être animé du dolus specialis de perpétrer ce crime. Mais l’intention de tous les

auteurs ou de certains d’entre eux ne peut pas être établie à partir de la simple «accumulation de

crimes isolés» , qui ont déjà été qualifiés par le Tribunal pénal international de crimes autres que

celui de génocide.

9. Il n’existe aucun jugement du TPIY contenan t une telle conclusion. M.Franck le sait

13 bien, et c’est pour cela qu’il soutient que cette conclusion sort du champ de compétence des

tribunaux internationaux . Le défendeur n’est pas d’accord avec cette affirmation et je vais

maintenant montrer que le TPIY a examiné très sérieusement la question de l’existence d’un

schéma criminel, mais a conclu que ce schéma, dans les circonstances, ne pouvait pas prouver le

crime de génocide.

10. Le premier exemple est tiré de l’affaire Le procureur c. Radoslav Brdjanin. Le jugement

rendu par le TPIY dans cette affaire le 1 erseptembre 2004 se lit comme suit :

«Si le caractère général et la grande ampleur des atrocités commises constituent

la preuve d’une campagne de persécution, la Chambre de première instance est d’avis
que, compte tenu des circonstances de l’espèce, il n’est pas possible d’en conclure que
la condition de l’intention spéciale requi se pour établir le crime de génocide est
9
satisfaite.»

11. Le TPIY est parvenu à la même conc lusion dans son jugement sur l’affaire Le procureur

c. Milomir Stakic, daté du 31 juillet 2003 :

«La Chambre de première instance a passé ses constatations en revue…et il
s’en dégage un ensemble d’atrocités dont les Musulmans de la municipalité de
Prijedor ont été victimes en 1992, et qui ont été établies au-delà de tout doute

raisonnable. Toutefois, pour pouvoir conclu re que Milomir Stakic a pris part à ces
actes en tant que coauteur d’un génocide, la Chambre de première instance doit être

convaincue qu’il était animé de l’ intention requise . Donc, la question capitale à
laquelle la Chambre doit répondre est celle de savoir si l’accusé avait l’ intention
spécifique voulue, celle-ci étant l’élément constitutif essentiel de ce crime.» 10

7
CR 2006/5, p. 19, par. 34 (Franck).
8Ibid.

9TPIY, Le procureur c. Radoslav Brdjanin , affaire n IT-99-36-T, Chambre de pr emière instance, jugement,
1 septembre 2004, par. 984; les italiques sont de nous.

10TPIY, Le procureur c. Milomir Stakic , affaire n IT-97-24-T, Chambre de pr emière instance, jugement,
31 juillet 2003, par. 546. - 6 -

12. Il ressort clairement de ces deux affair es qu’il ne peut être suppléé à l’insuffisance des

preuves produites par l’Etat demandeur par des déductions tirées d’un schéma de crimes qui ne

sont pas le génocide.

13. Au second tour de plaidoiries, le demandeur , dans le cadre de sa stratégie de sortie, a

exposé une nouvelle thèse, à savoir qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une affaire «concernant la culpabilité, ou le

degré de culpabilité, d’auteurs individuels de te ls actes», et qu’il doit y avoir d’importantes

11
différences entre la preuve de la responsabilité i ndividuelle et celle de la responsabilité d’un Etat .

Cela signifierait, selon le demandeur, que l’in tention génocide d’un gouvernement ou de certains

hauts responsables d’un Etat pourrait être déduite du comportement criminel de nombreux auteurs

individuels même si ces auteurs n’avaient pas eux-mêmes d’intention génocide.

14 14. Madame le président, cette approche non plus n’est pas logique. Comment l’Etat peut-il

être responsable du crime de génocide si aucun au teur individuel n’avait une intention génocide ?

Ce critère de preuve requis pour les responsab les du gouvernement ne devrait pas être moins

exigeant que celui qui s’applique aux criminels «ordinaires».

15. L’exemple des deux accusés que je viens de c iter nous est très utile ici. Ce n’étaient pas

des criminels ordinaires. M. Brdjanin était le chef de la cellule de crise de la région autonome de la

Krajina. Il s’agit d’une vaste zone de la Republika Srpska qui compte de nombreuses municipalités

où des crimes notoires ont été commis. M. Stakic était le chef de la cellule de crise de la

municipalité de Prijedor, où il y avait six camps de détention. Ces deux personnes n’ont pas été

accusées d’avoir elle-même commis des crimes. Toutes deux ont été accusées, en raison du rôle

majeur qu’elles ont joué dans le crime de génocide sur le territoire sur lequel elles exerçaient leurs

pouvoirs. Dans les deux cas, le TPIY a conclu à l’existence d’un schéma de comportement

criminel, mais pas d’un génocide. C’est la rais on pour laquelle MM.Brdjanin et Stakic ont été

acquittés du crime de génocide.

16. Madame le président, le seul sch éma qui puisse avoir une importance pour

l’établissement des faits de la cause serait un schéma composé d’atrocités commises à une échelle

11
CR 2006/33, p. 38, par. 8 (Franck). - 7 -

massive et ayant eu un effet destructeur pour les fondations mêmes d’un groupe donné . Le

demandeur cependant n’a pas réussi à produire une quelconque preuve d’un tel schéma.

Schéma allégué de meurtres en masse

17. Il serait utile, à ce stade, de rappeler une fo is de plus à la Cour le faux schéma que le

demandeur a créé de toutes pièces dans ses écritures en exagérant le nombre des victimes des

meurtres de masse, ce qui a complètement modifié l’image générale du conflit en

Bosnie-Herzégovine. Ainsi, le demandeur a prét endu que deux mille cinq cents hommes avaient

été tués pendant l’attaque de Zvornik, qui a duré deux jours 12. Il a affirmé que mille personnes

13
avaient été tuées dans un seul village (Hambarine) et, de même, que cinquante à soixante

personnes sont mortes chaque jour dans le camp de Trnopolje 14. Ces allégations horribles devaient

rappeler à la Cour les camps de concentration n azis, ou le génocide notoire commis au Rwanda.
15

Leur but était de créer l’impression d’un schéma de meurtres en masse susceptible de mettre en

péril les fondements mêmes d’un groupe.

18. Au cours du premier tour de plaidoiries, nous avons cependant clairement démontré que

le demandeur exagérait beaucoup le nombre des vict imes de crimes de gue rre dans la ville de

Zvornik, de même qu’à Bijeljina, Brcko ou Kozarac, dans le village de Hambarine, dans les lieux

15
de détention d’Omarska, de Ke raterm, de Trnopolje et de Luka . Le demandeur ne pouvait pas

contester ou minimiser nos arguments, il n’en a nié aucun, et même l’agent adjoint de la

16
Bosnie-Herzégovine les a admis et a prudemment présenté des excuses pour les erreurs commises

dans la présentation des faits 17. Le défendeur s’en félicite.

19. Nous devons cependant souligner que l es allégations inexactes du demandeur ont été

nombreuses et qu’on les trouve tout au long des pièces de procédure. A titre d’exemple

supplémentaire, je pourrais c hoisir une nouvelle municipalités ⎯cette fois-ci ce pourrait être

Bratunac ⎯et rappeler à la Cour que le demandeur a prétendu dans sa réplique que six à

12Réplique, chap. V, p. 100, par. 64.

13Ibid., p. 85, par. 22.
14
Ibid., p. 210, par. 330.
15
CR 2006/11, p. 22, par. 22-36.
16CR 2006/33, p. 45, par. 4 (Van den Biesen).

17CR 2006/30, p. 30, par. 2 (Van den Biesen). - 8 -

septcentshommes musulmans ont été conduits par les forces serbes à l’école primaire

Vuk Karadzic le 10 mai 1992 : «La plupart d’entre eux furent tués par balles mais un jour jusqu’à

18
cent cinquante personnes auraient été passées à tabac jusqu’à ce que mort s’ensuive.»

20. La source de cette allégation incroyable est le rapport final de la commission d’experts

des NationsUnies, fondé sur le «Rapport du 3ju in1992 sur les destructions de guerre, les

violations des droits de l’homme et les crim es contre l’humanité en Bosnie-Herzégovine» produit

par une organisation non gouvernementale de Sarajevo dénommée «World Campaign Save the

19
Humanity» . Il est très difficile aujourd’hui de trouver des renseignements concernant cette ONG,

ainsi que la source de l’information.

21. En revanche, le procureur du TPIY a accusé Slobodan Milosevic du meurtre «d’au moins

quatorze non-Serbes» à Bratunac du 10 au 16mai1992 20. Cette allégation fait partie de l’acte

16 d’accusation censé récapituler tous les crimes commis en Bosnie-Herzégovine par les forces serbes

et qui, de l’avis du procureur, peuvent être pr ouvés au-delà de tout doute raisonnable. Aucun

jugement ou acte d’accusation du TPIY ne consta te ou n’allègue que cent cinquante personnes ont

été battues à mort en une seule journée, à Bratunac ou ailleurs.

22. Le demandeur a vivement protesté pa rce que nous avions utilisé un raisonnement a

contrario, et l’agent adjoint de la Bosnie-Herzégovi ne a déclaré: «le fait qu’une chambre de

première instance ait conclu qu’un nombre «X » de personnes avaient été tuées dans un camp «Y»

ne signifie pas que le nombre de personnes effect ivement tuées dans ce camp ne sera jamais

supérieur à «X»» 21.

23. Madame le président, nous en convenons. Nul ne conteste que le nombre de victimes à

Bratunac puisse malheureusement être plus élevé. Toutefois, les conclusions factuelles que nous

tirons de cet exemple sont les suivantes :

18
Réplique, chap. V, p. 107, par. 86.
19Rapport final de la commission d’experts des Nations Unies, annexe III.A, par. 381-383 (bibliothèque du Palais

de la Paix).
20 TPIY, Le procureur cS.lobodan Milosevic , affaire n oIT-02-54-T, acte d’accusation modifié
(Bosnie-Herzégovine), 21 avril 2004, tableau B, par. 5.

21CR 2006/33, p. 58, par. 45 (Van den Biesen); voir également CR 2006/30, p. 26, par. 38 (Van den Biesen). - 9 -

Premièrement, nous ne contestons pas le fait que de graves crimes ont été commis par les

forces serbes lors de la prise de la ville de Brat unac, et une fois de plus, j’exprime les plus vifs

remords pour ces crimes au nom des citoyens et du Gouvernement de Serbie-et-Monténégro.

Deuxièmement, c’est un fait que le procureur du TPIY a accusé M.Milosevic du meurtre

d’au moins quatorze non-Serbes. Cette accusation n’a pas été confirmée par un jugement dans

cette affaire.

Troisièmement, que cette accusation soit fondée ou non, il n’existe aucune preuve qu’une

quinzième victime ait été tuée durant la prise de Bratunac. Et cela, c’est un fait.

Quatrièmement, il est évident que l’allégation du demandeur relative au nombre des victimes

était inexacte et très exagérée.

Cinquièmement, cela signifie que la source de la preuve, citée correctement par le demandeur

dans ce cas, n’est ni crédible ni fiable.

Sixièmement, rien ne prouve l’existence d’un schéma de génocide à Bratunac. Le demandeur

n’a pas prouvé que les crimes commis dans cette ville l’ont été contre un nombre de victimes tel

qu’il pourrait démontrer l’existence de l’intention de dé truire un groupe particulier, en tout ou en

partie, c’est-à-dire dans sa partie substantielle. On ne peut pas, à un schéma de destruction de cette

nature substituer purement et simplement une sé rie de crimes multiples mais isolés, qui ne

constitue pas un génocide.

17 Absence de preuve d’un schéma de crimes commis
avec une intention génocide

24. C’est sans doute la valeur probatoire douteuse des sources qu’il a utilisées dans ses

pièces écrites qui a finalement convaincu le de mandeur d’éviter, quoique partiellement, «une

bataille de chiffres» dans ses plaidoiries. Je dis «partiellement», parce que le conseil du

demandeur, Mme Karagiannakis, n’a pas pu éviter citer des chiffres en relation avec les victimes

serbes de la région de Srebrenica 2. Le demandeur a accusé le défendeur de se livrer à un «jeu de

chiffres», mais Mme Karagiannakis a fait exactement la même chose.

22
CR 2006/32, p. 45, par. 14 (Karagiannakis). - 10 -

25. Examinons cependant le type de schéma présenté en l’espèce par le demandeur. Nous

avons vu un schéma de prise des municipalités de la partie orientale de la Bosnie en 1992. Mais il

n’existe pas de preuve de la destruction physique d’ une partie substantielle de tel ou tel groupe

dans cette région.

26. On nous a ensuite présenté un schéma de différents crimes de guerre commis sur un

territoire qui se trouvait sous le contrôle de l’armé e de la Republika Srpska. Là encore, rien ne

prouve qu’une partie substantielle d’un groupe ait été éliminée, et même les représentants de la

Bosnie-Herzégovine, au cours de leurs plaidoiries, ont manifestement essayé d’éluder la question.

Voyons comment Mme Karagiannakis a décrit ce schéma sans citer de chiffres. Elle a déclaré:

«Un nombre incalculable de civils musulmans ont été tués au cours de ces attaques» (dans la

municipalité de Prijedor) 23. Décrivant la situation du camp d’Omarska et les crimes qui y avaient

été commis, Mme Karagiannakis a souligné: «les détenus étaient sévèrement battus. Ils étaient

torturés. Ils étaient tués» 24. Il ne fait aucun doute que les prisonniers du camp d’Omarska ont été

victimes de tortures mais, en l’espèce, pour des raisons juridiques, il faut nous demander combien

d’entre eux ont été tués, et s’ils représentaient une partie substantielle d’un groupe. «Beaucoup [de

détenus] étaient appelés à l’extérieur et n’étai ent plus revus», a expliqué Mme Karagiannakis 2.

Cela ne ressemble-t-il pas au jeu du chiffre caché ?

27. Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, le nombre des victimes peut être un facteur très

important dans la preuve de l’ intention génocide. Selon la Commission du droit international, «le

crime de génocide, par sa nature mê me, implique de détruire au mo ins une partie substantielle du

26
18 groupe visé» . Comment un tribunal raisonnable pourrait- il déterminer ce qu’est une partie

substantielle d’un groupe donné san s connaître au moins le nombre approximatif des victimes?

Dans le rapport de la sous-commi ssion sur le génocide, le rapporte ur spécial, M. Whitaker, avait

déclaré que «l’expression «une partie» semblera it indiquer un nombre assez élevé par rapport à

l’effectif total du groupe, ou encore une fr action importante de ce groupe, telle que ses

23
CR 2006/5, p. 34, par. 44 (Karagiannakis); les italiques sont de nous.
24
Ibid., p. 36, par. 52 (Karagiannakis).
25 Ibid., par. 53; les italiques sont de nous.

26 Rapport de la Commission du droit inte rnational sur les travaux de sa 48 session, 6 mai-26 juillet 1996, p. 89;
les italiques sont de nous. - 11 -

27
dirigeants» . Ce sont à la fois la proportion par rap port à l’ensemble du groupe et le nombre total

de victimes qui sont pertinents. Cela a ét é confirmé dans le jugement du Tribunal pénal

international pour le Rwanda par l’applica tion du critère de pertinence dans l’affaire Kayishema et

28
Ruzindana , ainsi que dans le jugement du TPIY sur le demande d’acquittement présentée en

29
l’affaire Sikirica et consorts .

28. Un autre conseil du demandeur, MmeStern, a tenté de démontrer que «l’intention de

détruire le groupe peut se déduire de la gravité et du caractère massif des viols et des violences

30
sexuelles commis à l’égard des membres du groupe des Musulmans de Bosnie» .

29. Il est bien évident que «le caractère massif» est on ne peut plus quantitatif. Voyons donc

comment le demandeur a essayé de décrire ce caractère massif sans mentionner exactement les

faits :

«Plus précisément, les viols et les violences sexuelles ont principalement été

dirigés contre les femmes, … et il est bi en évident qu’elles ne peuvent qu’être
considérées comme une composante importa nte et une «partie substantielle» du

groupe des Musulmans de Bosnie tant pa rce que, quantitativement, elles constituent
une forte quotité du groupe, les femmes sont la moitié du monde, portent la moitié du
ciel.»31

30. Le défendeur peut admettre que les femm es représentaient effectivement une bonne part

du groupe des Musulmans de Bosnie, mais il ne peut laisser dire que toutes les femmes

musulmanes ont été victimes de viols et de violences sexuelles. Le demandeur n’a présenté aucune

preuve solide du caractère massif de ces crimes. L’estimation douteuse que le rapporteur spécial de

la Commission des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies avait formulée pendant la guerre dans son

19 rapport du 1f 0évrie1r993 32 a déjà été réfutée avec succès par notre conseil,

33
Mme Fauveau-Ivanovic . Nous pouvons donc conclure que le prétendu caractère massif des viols

27
M. Whitaker, Nations Unies, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, p. 16, par. 29.
28TPIR, Le procureur c. Kayishema & Ruzindana , affaire n ICTR-95-1-T, jugement, 21 mai 1999, par.93;
http://69.94.11.53/default.htm.

29TPIY, Le procureur c. Sikirica et consorts , affaire n IT-95-8, jugement relatif sur le demande d’acquittement,
3 septembre 2001, par. 72; www.un.org/icty/sikirica/judgement/index.htm.

30CR 2006/7, traduction du sous-titre de la page 37 (Stern); les italiques sont de nous.

31Ibid., p. 38, par. 103 (Stern).
32
Nations Unies, rapport sur la situation des droits de l’homme dans le territoire de l’ex-Yougoslavie, soumis par
M.Tadeusz Mazowiecki, rapporteur spécial de la Commission des droits de l’homme, doc.E/CN.4/1993/50,
10 février 1993, annexe II.
33
CR 2006/20, p. 16-17, par. 12-20 (Fauveau-Ivanovic). - 12 -

et des violences sexuelles n’a pas été prouvé et que, dès lors, l’intention de détruire le groupe des

femmes bosniaques par des actes de viol et de violence sexuelle ne peut se déduire de ces

allégations non prouvées.

31. Qui plus est, le demandeur a invoqué l’ existence d’un réseau de lieux de détention

quadrillant tout le territoire de la Republika Srps ka, encore que le défende ur ne puisse accepter le

chiffre de «cinq cent vingt camps et centres de détention contrôlés par les Serbes [qui] ont été

34
organisés dans une cinquantaine de municipalités» . Un tel fait doit être démontré par des

recherches d’expert sérieuses qui se basent sur une enquête menée directement sur les lieux, des

témoignages et des preuves matérielles. Il n’est pas acceptable d’affirmer que tel nombre de lieux

de détention existait en Republika Srpska en se basant uniquement sur le témoignage d’un seul

témoin 3. D’après le graphique qui a été produit à la demande du Gouvernement de la Bosnie et

qui a été présenté dans ce prétoire, cinquante-huit camps auraient existé dans la seule municipalité

36
de Prijedor . Cette affirmation incroyable ne figurait pas dans le jugement que le TPIY a rendu en

l’affaire Stakic, dans lequel seuls six lieux de détention sont recensés et décrits pour Prijedor 37.

32. D’après les allégations formulées par le procureur du TPIY dans l’acte d’accusation

Milosevic, la plupart de ces lieux de détention n’ont p as existé plus de trois mois. Seuls neuf

centres de détention existaient en Republika Srpska après 1992, à savoir :

38
⎯ le centre de détention de Batkovici, à Bijeljina , qui a existé pendant trois ans; aucune

allégation du TPIY faisant état de meurtres commis là-bas;

⎯ le centre de police de Cajnice 39, qui a existé pendant deux mois en 1993; aucune allégation du

TPIY faisait état de meurtres liés à ce centre;

40
20 ⎯ la prison de Spreca à Doboj , qui a existé jusqu’en février 1993; aucune allégation de meurtres

⎯ là encore;

34
CR 2006/2, p. 43, par. 49 (Van den Biesen).
35
CR 2006/5, p. 23, par. 6, note 35 (Karagiannakis).
36Ibid., par. 7-8.

37TPIY, Le procureur c.Milomir Stakic , affaire n 97-24-T, Chambre de prem ière instance, jugement,
31juillet2003, «I. Factual Findings» [conclusions factuelles ], part. E. 2, «Detention Facilities in the Prijedor
Municipalities» [lieux de détention dans les municipalités de Prijedor] [traduction du Greffe].

38Ibid., annexe C-3.

39Ibid., annexe C-11.
40
Ibid., annexe C-12. - 13 -

⎯ le camp de Bosanka à Doboj , qui a existé jusqu’en juin 1993; aucune allégation de meurtres;

42
⎯ le camp de Seslija à Doboj , qui a existé en 1993; aucune allégation de meurtres;

43
⎯ la prison de Foca , qui a existé pendant plus de deux ans et dans laquelle des massacres

auraient été commis en 1992 44;

45
⎯ le centre de Rasadnik, à Rogatica , qui a existé jusqu’en juin 1993; aucune allégation de

meurtres;

⎯ le vieil hôtel de Sanski Most 46, qui a existé pendant quatre jours en 1995, et

⎯ le centre d’Uzamnica, dans l’ancienne caserne de Visegrad 47, qui a existé pendant plus de deux

ans, sans aucune allégation de meurtres d’après l’acte d’accusation que le TPIY a établi dans

l’affaire Milosevic.

33. Madame le président, la plupart des centr es de détention que les Serbes contrôlaient en

Bosnie-Herzégovine en 1992 n’ont pas existé suffisamment longtemps pour entraîner la destruction

physique des prisonniers. Ils ont cependant ex isté suffisamment longtemps pour entraîner la

destruction physique d’une partie substantielle du groupe visé par des exécutions, si tant est que les

Serbes de Bosnie en aient eu l’intention.

34. Bien qu’il ait invoqué l’existence d’un réseau constitué de nombreux lieux de détention

en Republika Srpska, le demandeur n’a produit aucu ne preuve de crimes qui auraient été commis

en ces lieux dans l’intention de détr uire une partie substantielle du groupe visé. Jusqu’ici, le TPIY

n’a déclaré personne coupable d’un génocide qui aurait été commis dans des camps ou dans des

centres de détention de Republika Srpska.

41 TPIY, Le procureur c.Milomir Stakic , affaire n 97-24-T, Chambre de prem ière instance, jugement,

31juillet2003, «I. Factual Findings» [conclusions factuelles ], part. E. 2, «Detention Facilities in the Prijedor
Municipalities» [lieux de détention dans les municipalités de Prijedor].
42
Ibid.
43 Ibid., annexe C-13.

44 Ibid., annexe B-8.

45 Ibid., annexe C-19.
46
Ibid., annexe C-20.
47
Ibid., annexe C-22. - 14 -

Certains faits témoignent clairement de l’inexistence du schéma génocide

35. Madame le président, permettez-moi main tenant d’établir certains faits qui montrent

clairement qu’il n’existait aucun schéma génocid e en Bosnie-Herzégovine lors du conflit armé

de 1992-1995.

36. Premièrement, pendant le conflit bosniaque, les pa tients non serbes ont été normalement
21
os
et convenablement soignés dans tous les hôpitaux de Republika Srpska. Les annexes n 53 et 53A

au contre-mémoire contiennent d es informations sur des patients de nationalité non serbe qui ont

été soignés entre1992 et1995 dans des centres médicaux des municipalités de Prijedor, Brcko,

Sokolac, Doboj, Modrica, Bosansk a Gradiska, Kasin Do, Bijeljina et Banja Luka, avec des listes

indiquant le nom et l’âge des intéressés, le dia gnostic établi et le service dans lequel ils ont été

48
soignés . Le demandeur n’a contesté ni ces documents, ni les faits dont ils font état. Selon ces

informations, ce sont treize mille cinq cents Musu lmans et Croates en tout qui ont été soignés

49
en1993 dans la clinique et dans le centr e hospitalier de Banja Luka, en Republika Srpska . Où

était alors le schéma génocide ?

37. A ce stade, il me semble utile de rappeler à la Cour ce que Mme Ferida Hasanovic a écrit

dans la lettre qu’elle a adressée le 8 février 1993 à son enfant Emina, qui était hospitalisé au centre

médical de Zvornik. «Emina, mon enfant, ta mère est ici avec ton frère Faruk. Nous avons appris

que tu étais dans un hôpital et que tu vas bien, ce qui nous réjouit. Tu nous manques énormément

50
et nous espérons te revoir bientôt ainsi que ta parente Merima.» Madame le président, il ne s’agit

pas d’une déclaration de témoin douteuse qui a été signée par le juge d’instruction du tribunal de

Zvornik 5; c’est le message qu’une mère a rédigé de sa propre main sur le formulaire officiel de la

Croix-Rouge, dix mois après la prise de la muni cipalité de Zvornik. Le défendeur sait gré au

demandeur des efforts qu’il a faits pour découvrir la falsification de deux documents signés par

M. Eric sous le titre de juge d’instruction du tri bunal de Zvornik, puis soumis en tant qu’annexes à

notre contre-mémoire. Nos déplor ons cette erreur. Il n’en reste pas moins que, au deuxième tour

48Contre-mémoire, annexes au chapitre I, vol. III et IV.
49
Ibid., p. 58, par. 1.3.3.13.
50
Ibid., annexes au chapitre I, vol. II, annexe n° 46, p. 437-439.
51CR 2006/30, p. 21-24, par. 24-33 (Van den Biesen, «Y a-t-il tromperie ?»). - 15 -

de ces plaidoiries, le demandeur n’a contesté à aucun moment notre affirmation selon laquelle le

prétendu massacre des enfants musulmans de l’hôpital de Zvornik n’a jamais eu lieu . 52

38. Deuxièmement, le demandeur n’a pas expliqué comment un prétendu schéma génocide

pouvait se déduire du fait que les réfugiés de Srebre nica et de Zepa, qui avaient combattu dans la

e
22 28 division de l’armée bosniaque, se sont enfuis en République de Serbie après la chute de ces

enclaves et qu’ils ont été bien traités sur le territoire du défendeur. Mon confrère

53
VladimirCvetkovic a décrit la manière dont les intéressés avaient été traités , ce que

54
M. Vladimir Milicevic a pleinement confirmé dans son témoignage . Or, ce ne sont pas les seuls

réfugiés musulmans qui aient gagné le territoir e de la Serbie-et-Monténégro. Avec notre

contre-mémoire, nous avons soumis des preuves démontrant que, e 1993,

trente-quatremilleMusulmans ont trouvé refuge en Serbie-et-Monténégro, chiffre qui est passé à

trente-sixmille en1994. M.Cvetkovic s’est reporté à ces documents dans son exposé du

15 mars 2006 5, et ces derniers n’ont jamais été contestés par le demandeur.

39. La même chose s’est produite dans le cas des réfugiés de Cazinska Krajina ⎯ «l’Etat de

Fikret Abdic» ⎯, après leur défaite dans la guerre intr amusulmane. L’ouvrage de la CIA intitulé

Balkan Battlegrounds : A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, renferme les

informations suivantes:

«Le 21 août, juste quelques heures ap rès qu’Abdic eut refusé la reddition
inconditionnelle exigée par le Gouvernement de Bosnie, les troupes de l’armée de
Bosnie envahirent Velika Kladusa. Le Gouvernement de Bosnie annonça que,

pendant une période de trois jours, tous l es anciens rebelles seraient amnistiés, mais
des centaines de soldats d’Abdic abandonnère nt leurs armes pour rejoindre la colonne
massive de dix mille réfugiés ou plus qui fuyait Velika Kladusa pour gagner les
56
secteurs tenus par les Serbes en Croatie voisine.»

Ces dix mille réfugiés, ou plus, qui ont trouvé refuge sur le territoire tenu par les Serbes étaient eux

aussi des Musulmans. Où étaient alors les crimes reproduits selon le même schéma dans l’intention

de détruire le groupe dit «non serbe» ?

52CR 2006/12, p. 24-26, par. 12-18 (Obradovic).
53
CR 2006/20, p. 49-51, par. 48-52 (Cvetkovic).
54CR 2006/28 (Milicevic).

55CR 2006/20, p. 46-47, par. 41 (Cvetkovic).

56CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995 [Les champs de bataille
des Balkans: histoire militaire du conflit yougoslave], chap.63, «The Western Theater» [Le théâtre occidental],
p. 246 (bibliothèque du Palais de la Paix). - 16 -

40. Troisièmement, je tiens à revenir sur un événement qui n’a pas été suffisamment

développé dans les plaidoiries et arguments précédents . Il s’agit de la chute de Zepa, la zone de

sécurité de l’ONU, qui a eu lieu dans les jours qu i ont suivi la chute de Srebrenica, en1995.

Chacun sait aujourd’hui que plusieurs milliers de victimes de Srebrenica ont été tuées après la

chute de cette enclave. Quiconque a-t-il jamais entendu parler de meurtres à Zepa ?

41. Les combats pour cette enclave ont presque duré jusqu’à la fin de juillet 1995. Voyons
23

comment l’ouvrage de la CIA dépeint les jours qui ont suivi la chute de l’enclave de Zepa :

«Le 26juillet, l’évacuation des milliers de civils de Zepa commença
véritablement, ceux-ci étant transportés vers la localité de Kladanj, qui était tenue par

les Musulmans, dans des autocars serbes à bord desquels se trouvaient des soldats de
la force de maintien de la paix des NationsUnies… Pas moins de trois mille des
Musulmans de Zepa ⎯ sans armes pour la plupart ⎯ se cachaient dans les collines et

dans les villages situés au nord de la ville mais, sans nourriture, armes ou
ravitaillement, ils ne constituaient pas une menace alarmante. Le corps de la Drina de
la VRS se contenta de maîtriser ce problème mineur avec une garnison d’unités de

second rang et retira l’essentiel de ses troupes d’assaut pour les envoyer renforcer des
secteurs plus importants; les habitants de la ville étaient livrés aux exigences de la

forêt. Plusieurs centaines de ces hommes choisirent finalement de s’infiltrer en
Serbie, tandis que les autres parvinrent à regagner le territoire tenu par le
gouvernement ou furent découverts et capturés par les Serbes de Bosnie.» 57

42. Or, aucune des décisions du TPIY ne fait état du moindre meurtre commis contre la

population de Zepa, bien que l’enclave ait été prise par des forces serbes. Les milliers de

Musulmans qui ont été déportés de Zepa n’ont vi siblement pas été considérés comme des victimes

du crime de génocide, alors que les milliers de Musulmans déportés de Srebrenica ont été

58
considérés ainsi, d’après le paragraphe 31 de l’arrêt que le TPIY a rendu dans l’affaire Krstic .

43. Pourquoi les Serbes de Bosnie auraient-ils eu l’intention de détruire les Musulmans de

Srebrenica, mais non ceux de Zepa? Existe-t- il la moindre différence entre ces deux groupes?

Non, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, tous étai ent des Musulmans de l’est de la Bosnie, ce que

personne ne conteste. Force est d’ en conclure que les deux décisions 59dans lesquelles le TPIY a

conclu qu’un génocide avait été commis à Srebrenica montrent que ce massacre était un événement

57CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-19[Les champs de bataille
des Balkans : histoire militaire du conflit y ougoslave], chap. 86, «The Demise of Zepa ⎯ A Second Safe Area Falls» [la
chute de Zepa ⎯ une deuxième zone de sécurité tombe], p. 359-360; les italiques sont de nous.

58TPIY, Le procureur c. Radislav Krstic, affaire n IT-98-33, Chambre d’appel, arrêt, 19 avril 2004, par. 31.

59TPIY, Le procureur c. Radislav Krstic , affaire n IT-98-33, Chambre de prem ière instance, jugement,
2août2001; Chambre d’appel, arrê t, 19avril2004; voir également Le procureur c. Blagojevic et Jokic , affaire
n IT-02-60, Chambre de première instance, jugement, 17 janvier 2005. - 17 -

isolé qui s’était produit dans une zone géographique très limitée et qui n’avait aucun lien avec le

contexte historique des événements intervenus dans la région plus vaste de l’est de la Bosnie. C’est

seulement dans ces conditions que le Tribunal pouv ait conclure qu’une part ie substantielle du

groupe musulman de Srebrenica (personnes tuées et survivants confondus) avait été victime d’un

génocide ⎯encore que le défendeur n’accepte pas une telle interprétation, qui tend selon nous à

interpréter de manière trop large la définition du crime de génocide qui est énoncée dans la

convention de 1948 sur le génocide.

24 44. Madame le président, j’espère que cette émin ente Cour mesure toute la difficulté de la

position morale dans laquelle les représentants de la Serbie-et-Monténégro se trouvent en l’espèce,

et qui a été si souvent attaquée par les représentants de l’Etat demandeur. Il est toujours plus aisé

d’être sur le banc de l’accusation pour déno ncer quelque chose de manifestement illicite et,

naturellement, de tenter de conférer aux crimes co mmis la qualification juridique la plus grave.

Nous ne cherchons d’ailleurs pas à nier que d es crimes graves ont bel et bien été commis; nous

voulons simplement nous borner à démontrer que ces crimes ne présentent pas les éléments

constitutifs du crime qui nous occupe ici ⎯ le génocide.

Le génocide prétendument commis sur le territoire du défendeur

45. L’incapacité du demandeur à démontre r l’existence d’un schéma génocide devient

encore plus évidente lorsqu’on examine la situation qui régnait en Serbie-et-Monténégro pendant le

conflit en Bosnie-Herzégovine.

46. Au premier tour, mon confrère M.Cv etkovic a examiné les allégations du demandeur

voulant qu’un génocide ait été perpétré sur le terri toire de la Serbie-et-Monténégro. Bien que

l’argument du génocide sur le territoire du défendeur fasse partie de ses pièces de procédure, le

demandeur s’est complètement désintéressé de cette question lors de son premier tour de

plaidoiries, et il n’a rien fait pour étayer les allégations formulées dans ses écritures. Au deuxième

tour, l’agent adjoint du demandeur n’a abordé que brièvement cette question, en déclarant que nous

avions représenté faussement le sort des Musu lmans du Sandžac et en renvoyant à deux rapports

d’organisations non gouvernemental es pour conforter sa thèse 60. Ce renvoi apparaît certes dans

60
CR 2006/30, p. 27, par. 40 (Van den Biesen). - 18 -

une note de bas de page et n’est assorti d’aucune au tre explication, mais le défendeur répondra tout

de même à ces nouvelles allégations.

47. Le premier rapport invoqué par le dema ndeur a trait à la région de Bukovica, au

Monténégro. Cette région, dont Pljevlja est la v ille la plus importante, est la région jouxtant le

territoire de la Bosnie-Herzégovine qui, à l’époque de la guerre, était sous le contrôle des Serbes de

Bosnie. Nul ne conteste que quelques incidents à motivation ethnique se soient produits dans la

région de Bukovica, mais le demandeur n’a donné aucune preuve attestant que les autorités du

défendeur avaient orchestré les incidents en question, ou même qu’elles les avaient reconnus par la

suite. Au contraire, le rapport dont le demandeur s’est réclamé démontre clairement que tant les

25 autorités de la République du Monténégro que ce lles de la République fé dérale de Yougoslavie

tentaient alors de mettre un terme aux incidents et aux tensions ethniques dans la région, tentatives

qui finirent par réussir. Les mesures prises par les autorités consistaient notamment à désarmer les

unités paramilitaires qui étaient présentes dans la région et à traduire en justice les principaux

criminels.

48. Le second rapport que M. van den Biesen a invoqué nous donne un très bon exemple de

la manière dont le demandeur se sert des éléments de preuve. Ce rapport d’Amnesty International

concerne deux crimes ⎯généralement appelés les crimes de Sjeverin et de Strpce ⎯ qui ont

effectivement eu lieu. Toutefois, il ressort tr ès nettement du rapport que ces crimes n’ont pas été

commis sur le territoire de la Serbie-et-Montén égro, mais qu’ils l’ont ét é sur le territoire de

Bosnie-Herzégovine qui était aux mains des Serb es de Bosnie. En outre, ce rapport que le

demandeur a invoqué comme preuve montre que les autorités de la Serbie-et-Monténégro ont pris

des mesures pour enquêter sur ces crimes et pour en punir les auteurs; il montre que l’échec initial

de ces mesures était dû au refus des dirigeants de la Republika Srpska de coopérer avec le

défendeur, mais que les mesures en question se sont finalement traduites par des verdicts contre les

auteurs des deux crimes. Vous trouverez un aperçu plus complet de ces mesures dans le rapport

que l’OSCE a établi en2003 sur les procès pour cr imes de guerre qui ont eu lieu devant les

juridictions de Serbie-et-Monténégro 6.

61
Voir le rapport de la mission de l’OSCE en Serbie-et-Monténégro intitulé War Crimes Before Domestic Courts,
qui peut être consulté [en anglais] à l’adresse suivante : www.osce.org/documents/fry/2003/11/1156_en.pdf. - 19 -

49. Cette absence du moindre élément constitutif du crime de génocide qui aurait été

perpétré contre la population musulmane sur le territoire du défendeur démontre clairement que les

autorités de la Serbie-et-Monténégro ne pouvaient pas avoir d’intention génocide à l’encontre de

cette même population musulmane sur le territoire de la Bosnie-Herzégovine.

50. Mon éminent confrère M.Pellet a toutef ois reconnu, fût-ce avec quelques réserves, que

la population musulmane présente sur le territoire de la Serbie-et-Monténégro avait été traitée

correctement, mais il poursuivit en expliquant que nous avions mal compris les termes de

l’articleII de la convention. D’après M.Pellet, l’intention de détruire le groupe comme tel ne

signifie pas que les auteurs du génocide veulent détruire le groupe dans sa totalité, où que ses

membres se trouvent, mais que l’intention génocide peut être limitée à une partie de ce groupe et au

62
territoire dans lequel se trouve cette partie du groupe .

26 51. Malgré tout le respect que nous devons à nos éminents contradicteurs, c’est eux qui n’ont

rien compris ici. La Serbie-et-Monténégro n’a jamais prétendu que l’intention génocide devait être

dirigée contre le groupe dans sa totalité. La question posée était en revanche de savoir quelle partie

du groupe serait le plus probablement prise pour ci ble de l’intention génocide, si cette dernière

existait. Voici ce que la Chambre d’appel a déclaré dans son arrêt en l’affaire Krstic : «L’intention

de détruire dont l’auteur du génocide est an imé sera toujours limitée par les possibilités qui

s’offrent à lui.»63

52. Madame le président, la présente affaire est engagée contre la Serbie-et-Monténégro, et

l’intention génocide qui doit être établie ou, d’après le demandeur, déduite est l’intention génocide

des représentants du Gouvernement de la Serbie-et-Monténégro. Aux termes du demandeur :

«Le but ultime du président de la Serbie et de ses complices serbes de la RFSY,

y compris les dirigeants serbes bosniaques, était de créer la Grande Serbie. Le projet
d’un Etat homogène, ethniquement pur, form ulé dans un contexte de populations
mêlées envisageait nécessairement l’exclusion des ethnies non serbes.» 64

53. Je crois que les Parties s’accordent sur le fait que, si le projet de «Grande Serbie» avait

existé, il aurait indubitablement inclus la Serbie proprement dite, qui aurait constitué sa partie la

62CR 2006/31, p. 23, par. 35 (Pellet).
63
TPIY, Le procureur c. Radislav Krstic, Chambre d’appel, arrêt, 19 avril 2004, par. 13.
64CR 2006/4, p. 10, par. 2 (Karagiannakis). - 20 -

plus importante. Je pense qu’elles devraient également s’accorder sur le fait de savoir si les

autorités de la Serbie-et-Monténégro avaient le plein monopole du pouvoir sur leur territoire, ce qui

signifie que la possibilité de commettre un génocide s’offraien t à elles, si elles avaient voulu en

commettre un. Et pourtant, Madame le président, nous n’avons absolument aucune preuve que le

moindre crime grave ait été commis sur le territoire de la Serbie-et-Monténégro contre la

population musulmane comme telle, entre1992 et1995, et, de toute façon, au cune preuve que le

moindre crime ait été commis au vu et au su des au torités de la Serbie-et-Monténégro, ou avec leur

consentement.

Conclusion

54. Au terme de cette plaidoirie, ma conclusion est la suivante :

a) de nombreux crimes ordinaires et isolés, même lorsqu’on y voit un schéma criminel, ne peuvent

pas être simplement transformés en génocide, crime qui est constitué par des éléments bien

précis;

27 b) aux fins juridiques qui nous occupent ici, un seul schéma compte ⎯un schéma constitué par

des crimes massifs qui puisse avoir un effet destruct eur sur une partie substantielle, c’est-à-dire

assez large, du groupe visé;

c) le demandeur n’est pas parvenu à démontrer l’existence d’un tel schéma en l’espèce.

R EPONSE A LA QUESTION POSEE PAR LE JUGE SIMMA

LE 5MAI 2006

55. Madame le président, permettez-moi d’aborder à présent un autre point: la question

posée par le juge Simma en rapport avec les sec tions caviardées du document du Conseil suprême

de la défense de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie.

56. Je voudrais tout d’abord remercier M. le juge Simma pour sa question, qui reflète bien la

profonde préoccupation qui est la sienne et cellde la Cour pour une bonne administration de la

justice. Cette question est des plus concrètes eje ne voudrais pas perdre du temps à répéter les

arguments procéduraux que nous avons à juste titre soulevésdans la correspondance que nous

avons eue à ce propos avec la Cour, concernant la demande, fort tardive, faite par le demandeur en

vue de la production d’un nombre énorme de documents (voir la lettre de l’agent de la - 21 -

Serbie-et-Monténégro datée du 16 janvier, ains i que ma lettre datée du 31 janvier 2006). Ces

arguments sont à présent bien connus de la Cour. La question du juge Simma nous amène

directement au contenu des parties caviard ées des comptes rendus et procès-verbaux du

commandement suprême de notre pays.

57. Madame le président, il est notoire que les documents émanant des organes militaires

suprêmes sont, dans n’importe quel pays du monde, considérés comme strictement confidentiels, et

qu’aucun Etat ne saurait être disposé à rendre fac ilement accessibles au public de tels documents.

Le procureur du TPIY n’en ayant pas moins demandé au défendeur la production de ces

documents, une solution a dû être trouvée en vue de cette production. C’est ainsi que, après une

procédure juridique particulièrement longue et sensible qui s’est déroulée en 2003 en

Serbie-et-Monténégro, le conseil national de coopération avec le TPIY mis en place en

Serbie-et-Monténégro a pu communiquer au bureau du procureur du TPIY tous les documents du

Conseil suprême de la défense présents dans les archives pour la période comprise entre 1992

et1999. Au même moment, le conseil nationa l de coopération, conformément à une décision

confidentielle du Conseil des ministres de Serbie-et-Monténégro, demandait à la Chambre du TPIY

chargée de l’affaire Le procureur c. Slobodan Milosevic d’ordonner, pour certaines parties de ces

28 documents, les mesures de protection prévues aux articles 54 bis F) et I) du Règlement de

procédure et de preuve du TPIY.

58. La troisième Chambre de première instance du TPIY a reconnu l’intérêt de sécurité

nationale de la Serbie-et-Monténégro à l’égard de ces documents et a ordonné un certain nombre de

mesures de protection. Une telle procédure n’est pas rare devant le TPIY. Ainsi, les Etats-Unis, le

Royaume-Uni et le Canada ont-ils tous invoqué d es intérêts de sécurité nationale dans l’affaire Le

procureur c. Milutinovic et consorts (décision relative à la requête de Dragoljub Ojdanic aux fins

de délivrance d’ordonnances contraigna ntes en application de l’article 54 bis du Règlement,

17 novembre 2005, par. 33).

59. Madame le président, sauf tout le respect qu’ils portent à cette honorable juridiction, les

représentants de la Serbie-et-Monténégro ne s ont pas habilités à l’heure actuelle à débattre du

contenu des sections caviardées des documents du Conseil suprême de la défense (CSD), et ce pour

deux raisons majeures : - 22 -

1) par une décision confidentielle du Conseil des ministres de Serbie-et-Monténégro, les sections

caviardées ont été classées comme secret militaire par le Conseil suprême de la défense, en tant

que leur divulgation porterait atteinte à des in térêts de sécurité nationale. Modifier cette

décision exigerait un temps considérable ainsi que la mise en Œuvre d’une procédure juridique

complexe;

2) à l’heure actuelle, les sections caviardées des documents du CSD font l’objet de mesures de

protection imposées par l’ordonnance du TPIY, ordonnance à laquelle nous sommes tenus de

nous conformer. En effet, l’article 77, paragraphe A-2 du Règlement de procédure et de preuve

du TPIY comporte une disposition aux termes de laquelle le fait de divulguer «des informations

relatives à ces procédures en violant en conna issance de cause une ordonnance d’une chambre»

constitue un acte d’outrage au Tribunal, susceptible de constituer un délit à part entière.

60. Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, aucune déduction négative ne saurait être tirée de la

non-production alléguée des éléments de preuve requis par le demandeur (CR2006/3, p.26-27,

par. 19-22 et CR 2006/33, p. 40, par. 13 (Franck)), et ce pour les raisons suivantes :

1) votre Cour n’a pas demandé à l’Etat défendeur de produire ces documents;

2) le demandeur n’a pas soumis sa requête de produc tion de documents en temps utiles . Il a au

contraire affirmé que l’affaire était en état et a demandé à plusieurs reprises à la Cour

d’organiser sans délai des audiences. Aujourd’ hui, cette requête soumise par le demandeur

29 semble plutôt conçue pour excuser la rareté de s éléments de preuve dont il dispose et comme

une nouvelle tentative de transférer la charge de la preuve vers le défendeur.

61. Lors de notre intervention consacrée aux rapports entre l’armée yougoslave et l’armée de

la Republika Srpska, nous avons définitivement précisé un certain nombre de points qui, selon le

demandeur, faisaient partie des passages non communiqués des documents du CSD.

62. Par ailleurs, les accusations du demande ur selon lesquelles les sections caviardées des

documents du CSD permettraient en réalité de connaître la position du G ouvernement yougoslave

vis-à-vis des massacres de Srebrenica et Markale (CR 2006/30, p. 20, par. 19 (Van den Biesen)) se

trouvent réfutées par les éléments de preuve présenté s devant la Cour par le demandeur lui-même.

Le général sir Richard Dannatt a en effet témoigné dans la présente espèce en tant qu’expert

proposé par le demandeur. Or le général Dannatt a également été expert du procureur du TPIY - 23 -

dans l’affaire de Srebrenica. Il a déclaré que le témoignage qu’il fournissait devant votre Cour

s’appuyait sur «un grand nombre de documents» ( CR2006/23, p.15). L’examen de ce témoin a

été mené par Mme Joanna Korner qui, en tant qu’ancien premier substitut du procureur du TPIY,

est particulièrement susceptible d’avoir une bi en meilleure connaissance que quiconque d’entre

nous du contenu des sections caviardées des docum ents du CSD. Elle ne pouvait bien sûr

directement interroger le témoin-expert sur les docum ents faisant l’objet de mesures de protection.

Mais, lorsqu’il a été demandé au général Dannatt de donner son avis d’expert à partir de la

connaissance qu’il pouvait avoir d’un grand nom bre de documents, qu’a-t-il répondu? A-t-il

confirmé que l’armée de la Republika Srpska opérait sous le contrôle et les instructions spécifiques

des autorités de Belgrade? Ou encore a-t-il confirmé qu’il avait eu connaissance d’éléments

prouvant que des ordres avaient été directement émis par Belgrade ? Non.

63. Madame le président, les archives du bureau du procureur du TPIY comportent plus

d’unmillion de documents. Plusieurs des conse ils du demandeur en la présente espèce sont

d’anciens hauts fonctionnaires du bureau du procureu r du TPIY. De toute évidence, le demandeur

s’est appuyé sur leur expérience passée et, à partir de cette expérience, a retenu les vingt-trois

documents les plus importants pour appuyer le témoignage de son expert militaire ⎯ vingt-trois sur

un million. Mais cela n’a rien changé au résultat : il n’y a jamais eu d’ordres émanant de Belgrade,

aucun contrôle exercé par Belgrade.

64. Nous rappelons par ailleurs que la Serbie -et-Monténégro a, à ce jour, soumis des milliers

de documents confidentiels au bureau du procureur du TPIY. Les documents produits par la

Serbie-et-Monténégro comportent les comptes rendus sténographiques du conseil de coordination

30 des positions en matière de politique générale. L’une des séances de ce conseil, tenue le

9janvier1993, a été analysée en détail par le demandeur (CR 2006/7, p.55, par.66 (Vanden

Biesen)). Les notes relatives à cette séance ont également été produites par la

Serbie-et-Monténégro. Rien dans ce document n’a été noirci, bien que RadovanKaradzic et

Ratko Mladic aient assisté à cette séance et aient pris part à la discussion. Et pourtant, rien dans ce

document ne permet de conclure à un quelconque contrôle opéré par Belgrade ou à une quelconque

intention génocide. - 24 -

65. Madame le président, voilà qui conclut ma dernière plaidoirie en l’espèce. Cela aura été

pour moi un grand honneur, en même temps qu’une lourde tâche. Je voudrais vous remercier pour

votre aimable attention et vous demande de bien vouloir donner la pa role à notre conseil et avocat,

Mme Fauveau-Ivanovic. Merci.

Le PRESIDENT: Merci Monsieur Obradovi ć. Je donne maintenant la parole à

M eFauveau-Ivanovic.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Obradovi ć. I now give the floor to

Maître Fauveau-Ivanović.

FMUsVEAU-IVANOVI Ć: Thank you, Madam President.

G ENOCIDE

L EGAL A RGUMENTS

Madam President, Members of the Court, bothparties now concur on the definition of the

acts which can constitute genocide indicated in Article II of the Genocide Convention and we agree

that this list is exhaustive. The two sides also now concur regarding the interpretation of Article III

of the Genocide Convention, except with respect to complicity in genocide. Nevertheless, certain

significant differences of opinion remain on th e interpretation of the Genocide Convention and on

the legal meaning of certain terms which it is ve ry important to address in order to understand the

crime of genocide. We will present our legal argu ments this morning covering the notions which

are still at issue between the parties. We will be gin by analysing the notion of the protected group

before addressing requisite intent for the crime of genocide, along with the standard of proof, and

finally we will present our arguments on complicity.

I. Definition of the group

1. In its final submissions, the Applicant claims that:

31 “Serbia and Montenegro, through its organs or entities under its control, has
violated its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide by intentionally destroying in part the non-Serb national, ethnical - 25 -

or religious group within, but not limited to, the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
65
including in particular the Muslim population . . .”

2. From a legal perspective, there are two major problems with that submission. First, the

group targeted is not sufficien tly well defined as such, since, according to the Applicant’s

allegation, that group consists of the non-Serbs, thus an admixture of all the individuals living in

BosniaandHerzegovina except the Serbs, but mo re particularly the Muslim population, which

accounts for only a part of the non-Serb population. Second, the intent to destroy concerned only a

part of the non-Serb population, but the Applican t failed to specify which part of the group was

targeted. The Applicant did not even impose geogr aphical limits on its claim, affirming that the

intent to destroy concerned the group in Bosnia a nd Herzegovina, but not limited to the territory of

Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3. We will endeavour initially to analyse the definition of the group protected by the

Genocide Convention in order to demonstrate th at the community supposedly targeted, the

non-Serb population, does not correspond to the definition of a national, ethnical, racial or religious

group as provided for by the Genocide Convention. We will then examine more particularly how

the targeted part of the group is determined.

(a) The notion of the protected group

4. We agree with the Applicant that genocide is not a crime perpetrated upon individuals or

States, but upon groups determined by their race, nationality, ethnicity or religion. The list of

groups protected contained in ArticleII of th e Genocide Convention is exhaustive and groups

defined on the basis of other criteria, such as politi cal or economic factors, do not come within the

terms of the Convention and are afforded no protection by it.

5. We also concur with the Applicant that the victims of genocide are not targeted for what

66
they do but for what they are. It is not the individuals’ acts which matter, but their identities,

32 although their acts are of significance in determin ing whether genocide has occurred, as genocide

cannot be found if the individuals were indeed targeted because of th eir acts. When some

individuals within a protected group, engaged in ce rtain activities, fall vic tim to criminal acts,

65
CR 2006/37, p. 59, para. 1.
66
CR 2006/32, p. 20, para. 6-7. - 26 -

while other individuals within the same group, bu t not engaged in the same activities, do not, it

appears clear that the individuals have not been targ eted for who they are, that is the members of a

group, but for what they do, their military or political activities for example. That was exactly what

happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That does not mean that no crimes were committed, but it

does mean that genocide was not committed.

6. In this context, the Applicant’s denial of the significance of the aid and support provided

67
by the Bosnian Serbs to the Muslims of the Bihac pocket is unsustainable . The aid provided to

the Muslims who supported Fikret Abdic dem onstrates that the Serbs had no intention of

destroying the Muslim population. Fikret Abdic, a Bosnian Muslim, had a similar vision of Bosnia

and Herzegovina to the Serbs; he implemente d policies which suited the Bosnian Serbs and the

Bosnian Serbs supported him, irrespective of the fact that he was a member of the Bosnian Muslim

population. The Applicant disputed our conten tion that the Muslims of Bihac pocket allied

themselves with the Serbs and claimed that, on the contrary, the Serbs allied themselves with those

68
Muslims . This distinction is, however, of little importance: irrespective of who allied themselves

with whom, the fact remains that the Muslims s upporting Fikret Abdic and the Bosnian Serbs were

allies and fought together against the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

7. The Applicant even claims that the Serb s used the Bihac Muslims as an instrument of

destruction 69. Of course, the Applicant did not provid e any evidence to support that claim and nor

could it have done. Such evidence could not exist, as the claim is not based on the facts. Finally,

aware that its allegations did not correspond to reality, the Applicant endeavoured to extricate itself

33 from its complicated and groundless analysis by claiming that genocide can be geographically

70
limited , doubtless with a view to excluding the Bihac region from the genocidal intent that it

contends existed.

8. Regarding the protected group, the Applican t admits that the group has to be a national,

ethnical, racial or religious group 7. However, it did not specify which group was targeted on the

67Ibid., pp. 20-22, para. 7.

68Ibid., p. 22, para. 7.
69
Ibid.
70Ibid., p. 21, para. 7.

71Ibid., p. 23, para. 8. - 27 -

basis of those criteria, claiming in its final submissions that genoci de was committed upon the

national, ethnical or religious group of the non-Serbs, including in particular the Muslim

population.

9. The non-Serbs do not possess the characteristics required for them to be characterized as a

national, religious or ethnical group, as they comp rise individuals of diverse nations, ethnic groups

and religions.

(b) Criteria determining the group

10. In it oral arguments, the Applicant claimed that the group can be defined either on the

basis of positive criteria as the group of Bosnian Muslims and the group of Bosnian Croats or using

negative criteria as the group of non-Serbs 7. And the Applicant itself admitted that the positive

and negative approaches do not produce the same results, as the group of non-Serbs, according to

the Applicant’s claim, includes at least the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats 73, implying, of

necessity, that the group comprises other individuals as well.

11. Thus the Applicant has shown by its own arguments that the non-Serb population does

not constitute a stable and well-defined group, as it includes the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian

Croats, but also all the other individuals of dive rse ethnicities, nationalities and religions living in

Bosnia and Herzegovina, whom the Applicant has no t once mentioned. We could cite, by way of

example, the Jews, the Roma and the Yugoslavs. We have heard no allegations concerning them in

the Applicant’s oral arguments nor seen any in its written pleadings. Although we cannot know

whether these communities are included in the group that the Applicant defines as the non-Serbs, it

34 claims, without providing any evidence that “[e]verything that was non-Serb had to disappear from

the territories coveted . . .”4. It is well known that a large Jewish community lived in Bosnia and

Herzegovina. The Applicant has never claimed that any criminal acts were perpetrated against this

community. And it could not do so: the Serbs were not at war with the Jews and no crimes were

committed against the Jews. There was no Serb in tent to destroy a group. The Serbs had no

intention to destroy any of the groups living in Bo snia and Herzegovina, but they were at war with

7Ibid., para. 9.
73
Ibid.
7Ibid., p. 23, para. 9. - 28 -

certain political groups which were organised on an ethnic basis. Crimes were committed during

that war, but the crimes did not constitute genocide.

12. The Applicant also claims that the Bosnia n Croats were targeted by acts of genocide as

well, but to a lesser degree . What a curious notion! Genocide is not characterized by a numerical

threshold of criminal acts, it is characterized by and consists of the existence of genocidal intent. If

the requisite intent exists, the criminal act constitu tes genocide; if it does not, the criminal act,

irrespective of its atrocity or scale, does not c onstitute genocide. It is impossible to understand

what the “lesser degree” of genocide claimed by the Applicant means.

13. Moreover, in most of its presentations, the Applicant has not referred to the Bosnian

76
Croats. The Croats were not mentioned once in the oral arguments concerning sexual violence ,

Srebrenica 77 or Sarajevo .8

14. Thus it would appear that the group targeted has not been defined in an appropriate way,

so as to enable it to be determined, in accordan ce with the Genocide Convention, on the basis of

national, ethnical or religious criteria.

15. We share the Applicant’s view that th e concepts of nation, race and religion are

imprecise and that no generally and internationa lly accepted definition exists. Nevertheless,

international jurisprudence has fixed the common pr inciples applicable to all four categories of

35 groups which must be met for a group to be charact erized as a protected group within the terms of

the Genocide Convention. Thus the Trial Ch amber of the Rwanda Tribunal held in the Akayesu

case that: “[t]herefore, a common criterion in the f our types of groups protected by the Genocide

Convention is that membership in such groups wo uld seem to be normally not challengeable by its

members, who belong to it automatically, by birt h, in a continuous and often irremediable

manner” 79.

16. The established common criterion is theref ore undisputable membership of the group,

independent of the individual’s own will.

75Ibid.

76CR2006/6, CR 2006/7 and CR 2006/33.
77
CR 2006/32, pp. 40-69.
78CR 2006/4.

79ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, 2 September 1998, para. 511. - 29 -

17. We do not dispute that diverse approaches to defining groups are possible in theory and,

as the Applicant stated, these appr oaches can include subjective and objective criteria and positive

and negative criteria or a mixture of them all.

18. However, it is also accepted that the group must be identified within the context in which

it exists, relative to the case concerned and on a on a case-by-case basis . 80

19. We do not therefore deny that the merits of all the approaches ⎯ subjective, objective,

positive and negative ⎯ can be assessed from a theoretical standpoint. However, the result

obtained must be a group clearly defined by its national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics,

which appears impossible using negative criteria and has certainly not been achieved in the present

case. The non-Serb group within the context of Bosnian society is composed of a number of

national, ethnical and religious groups and the Applicant itself admits that there are at least two

such groups. Consequently, the non-Serb population cannot be considered to be a group possessing

distinctive national, ethnical or religious characteristics.

(i) The objective approach and the subjective approach

20. Before entering into an analysis of th e negative approach, we should like to express

agreement with the Applicant concerning the subj ective approach. Indeed , as the Applicant has

81
36 already said, international jurisprudence has given consideration to the subjective approach .

However, we should like to make it clear that international courts ha ve generally adopted a

combined approach, concluding that the subjective approach is not sufficient in itself to identify the

group. Thus, in addition to the cases cited by th e Applicant in which a combined subjective and

objective approach was adopted, it may be recalled that the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

held in the Brdjanin case that:

“In accordance with the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, the relevant protected

group may be identified by means of the subjective criterion of the stigmatisation of
the group, notably by the perpetrators of the crime, on the basis of its perceived
national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics. In some instances, the victim may
82
perceive himself or herself to belong to the aforesaid group.”

80
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, case No.IT-98-33-T, Judgement, 2 August 2004, para. 557 and ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin, case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, 1 September 2004, para. 684.
81
CR 2006/32, pp. 27-29, paras. 17-23.
82ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin, case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, 1 September 2004, para. 683. - 30 -

However, in the same case, Trial Chamber II held that the determination of the group has to be

made on the basis of different criteria and, in particular, by combining objective and subjective

criteria.

“The correct determination of the rele vant protected group has to be made on a
case-by-case basis, consulting both objective and subjective criteria. This is so
because subjective criteria alone may not be sufficient to determine the group targeted
83
for destruction and protected by the Genocide Convention” .

21. Moreover, the Tribunal for Rwanda held in the Rutaganda case that: “a subjective

definition alone is not enough to determine vict im groups as for provided for in the Genocide

Convention” . The Tribunal for Rwanda also held, in the Musema case, that: “subjective

85
definition alone is not enough” . And in the Semanza case, Trial Chamber I of the Tribunal for

Rwanda concluded that: “the de termination of whether a group can be defined as a target group

ought to be assessed... by reference to the objective particulars of a given social or historical

context, and by the subjective perception of the perpetrators” 86.

22. Although the Tribunal for Rwanda accepted a combination of the objective and

37 subjective approaches in most of its cases, in some cases it also adopted the objective approach

alone. Thus, in the Bagilishema case, Trial Chamber I held that each of the concepts of national,

ethnical, racial and religious groups must be assessed in the light of a particular political, social,

historical and cultural context, and it concluded th at membership of the group must be an objective

87
feature of the society in question .

23. Consequently, international jurisprude nce authorizes the subjective approach in

combination with the objective approach, but it also sometimes adopts the objective approach

alone.

8Ibid., para. 684.
84
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda , case No.ICTR-96-3-T, Judgement,
6 December 1999, paras. 56–57.
85
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgement, 27 January 2000, para. 162.
8ICTR, Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement, 15 May 2003, para. 317.

8ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgement, 7 June 2001, para. 65. - 31 -

(ii) The positive approach and the negative approach

24. The approach may be subjective or objec tive, but it still does not permit the group to be

defined in a negative manner. In the Stakic case, the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal for the

former Yugoslavia concluded:

“whether or not a group is subjectively defi ned is not relevant to whether a group is
defined in a positive or a negative way.. . Consequently when a target group is
defined in a negative manner (for example non-Serbs), whether the composition of the

group is identified on the basis of objective criteria, or a combination of objective and
subjective criteria, is immaterial as the group would not be protected under the
Genocide Convention.” 88

25. Admittedly, the first judgment that made a finding of genocide, which was delivered in

89
1999 by the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Jelisic case , accepted the negative

approach, but this was a purely theoretical consid eration since the Prosecutor, in the relevant

indictment in the case, determined the target group by means of positive criteria. In the Jelisic

case, the Prosecutor alleged that the target group was the group of Bosnian Muslims 90. In addition,

although the first decision of the Tribunal for th e former Yugoslavia recognized the negative

approach in theory, recent decisions of the Tribunal, including those of the Appeals Chamber, have

completely rejected it.

26. Thus, in the Stakic case, the Trial Chamber of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

held:

38 “Article 4 of the Statute protects national, ethnical, racial or religious groups.
In cases where more than one group is target ed, it is not appropriate to define the
group in general terms, as, for example, ‘non-Serbs’. In this respect, the Trial

Chamber does not agree with the ‘negative approach’ taken by the Trial Chamber in
Jelisić:

A ‘negative approach’ would consist of identifying individuals as
not being part of the group to which the perpetrators of the crime consider
that they themselves belong and which to them displays specific national,

ethnical, racial or religious characteristics. Thereby, all individuals thus
rejected would, by exclusion, make up a distinct group.

Conversely, a targeted group may be distinguishable on more than one basis and the
elements of genocide must be consider ed in relation to each group separately, e.g.
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.” 91

88ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgement, 22 March 2006, para. 26.

89ICTY, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgement, 14 December 1999.
90
Ibid., Amended Indictment, 19 October 1998.
91ICTY Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement, 31 July 2003, para. 512. - 32 -

27. The approach adopted by the Trial Chamber in the Stakic case was subsequently

accepted by Trial Chamber II in the Brdjanin case, which stated:

“In addition, the Trial Chamber agrees w ith the Stakic Trial Chamber that, ‘[i]n
cases where more than one group is targeted, it is not appropriate to define the group

in general terms, as for example, “non-Serb s”’. It follows that the Trial Chamber
disagrees with the possibility of identif ying the relevant group by exclusion, i.e.: on
the basis of ‘negative criteria’.” 92

28. Moreover, Trial Chamber II of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia held in the

Brdjanin case, like Trial Chamber II in the Stakic case: “Moreover, where more than one group is

targeted, the elements of the crime of genocide must be considered in relation to each group

93
separately.”

29. The findings of the Trial Chamber in the Stakic case were upheld by the Appeals

Chamber of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which held that:

“Article 4 of the Tribunal’s Statute defines genocide as one of several acts
‘committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such’. The term ‘as such’ has great significance, for it shows that

the offence requires intent to destroy a collection of people who have a particular
group identity. Yet when a person targets i ndividuals because they lack a particular
national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristic, the intent is not to destroy

particular groups with particular identities as such, but simply to destroy individuals 94
because they lack certain national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics.”

30. The Appeals Chamber found support for its position in Raphaël Lemkin’s definitions of

39
the crime of genocide as the physical destruction of a nation or an ethnic group. According to

Raphaël Lemkin, the crime of genocide is intended to signify a co-ordinated plan of different

95
actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups .

31. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

concluded that: “genocide was originally conceived of as the destruction of a race, tribe, nation, or

other group with a particular positive identity ⎯ not as the destruction of various people lacking a

distinct identity” 96.

9ICTY Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin, case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, 1 September 2004, para. 685.
93
Ibid., para. 686.
94
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgement, 22 March 2006, para. 20.
9Raphal Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation ⎯ Analysis of Government ⎯ Proposals
for redress, Washington D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944, p. 79.

9ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgement, 22 March 2006, para. 21. - 33 -

32. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia founded its

97
reasoning on the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention, which show that the crime

of genocide was conceived of to signify crimes di rected against groups that may be characterized

as stable, constituted in a permanent fashion, and membership of which is determined by birth. All

other groups, which are unstable, and which indi viduals may join through voluntary commitment,

such as political and economic groups, were expressly excluded from the framework of the

Genocide Convention, and are not considered to be protected by the Convention.

33. Finally, the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, on the basis of

the Genocide Convention and the travaux préparatoires , definitively abandoned the negative

approach to determination of the group, accepted as one of the theoretically acceptable criteria in

the Jelisic case, which was moreover the one and only case cited by the Applicant in support of its

argument that the negative approach was permitted. The Appeals Chamber gave ample reasons for

its finding, holding that:

“The drafting history of the Genocide Convention, whose second article is

repeated verbatim in Article 4 (2) of the Tribunal’s Statute, shows that the Genocide
Convention was meant to incorporate th is understanding of the term genocide ⎯ an
understanding incompatible with the negative definition of target groups . . . members

of the Sixth Committee declined to include destruction of political groups within the
definition of genocide, accepting the position of countries that wanted the Convention
to protect only ‘definite groups distinguished from other groups by certain well

established’, immutable criteria. Given th at negatively defined groups lack specific
40 characteristics, defining groups by referen ce to a negative would run counter to the
intent of the Genocide Convention’s drafters.” 98

34. The Appeals Chamber also took into consideration developments in international law and

international criminal law, but it held that the or iginal concept of a protected group, as defined in

the Genocide Convention, has not changed. In fact, the Economic and Social Council of the United

Nations observed in its study on the prevention a nd punishment of the crime of genocide that:

“genocide should generally be regarded as a crime committed against a group of individuals

permanently possessing certain common features” 99. And the Economic and Social Council

97
United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly , Third session, Sixth Committee, Summary Records,
21 September-10 December 1948.
98
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgement, 22 March 2006, para. 22.
9Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishme nt of the Crime of Genocide, UNECOSOC, Commission
on Human Rights, United Nations, doc. E/CH.4/Sub.2/416, 4 July 1978, para. 56. - 34 -

concluded that the Genocide Convention protects, for example, a group comprised of persons of a

100
common national origin or any religious community united by a single spiritual ideal .

35. The group alleged to have been targeted in the Brdjanin and Stakic cases was the

non-Serb group, allegedly consis ting, among others, of Bosnian Mu slims and Croats. The group

alleged to have been targeted in these cases of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was the same

as the group said to have been targeted in the inst ant case. The Chambers of the Tribunal for the

former Yugoslavia, including the Appeals Chamber, held that non-Serbs do not constitute a group

protected under the terms of the Genocide Convention, and that it would be appropriate to consider

the groups said to have been targeted as two di fferent and separate national, ethnic and religious

groups: the group of Bosnian Muslims and the grou p of Bosnian Croats. The final conclusion of

the Appeals Chamber for the former Yugoslavia ca lls for no commentary, it is crystal clear. The

Appeals Chamber concluded: “As previously explained, unlike positively defined groups,

101
negatively defined groups have no unique distinguishing characteristics that could be destroyed.”

36. Moreover, in the present case, the so-calle d group of non-Serbs is not defined at all, as

the Applicant itself claimed that the group include d at least the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian

41 Croats 102. This form of words even suggests that the group includes other nations, ethnic groups

and religions not specified by the Applicant. As the Applicant does not include in the alleged

group of non-Serbs all persons who obviously cannot be considered as Serbs, and who should

therefore logically belong to the community of non-Serbs, no criterion exists whereby the non-Serb

population could be properly determined as a group within the meaning of the Genocide

Convention.

Madam President, would this be an appropriate time for the break?

(c) Determination of the “in part” group

37. In its final submissions, the Applicant st ated that Serbia and Montenegro intended to

destroy the non-Serb group in part within, but not limited to, the territory of Bosnia and

10Ibid., para. 78.
101
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgement, 22 March 2006, para. 23.
10CR 2006/32, p. 23, para. 9. - 35 -

103
Herzegovina . To be honest with the Applicant, we do acknowledge that in its oral pleadings it

said that genocide was allegedly perpetrated in a particular territory 104, which it characterized as the

area of Bosnia and Herzegovina which the Belgra de and Pale authorities intended to detach from

105
Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to incorporate it into Yugoslavia . Apart from the fact that no

such areas exist, the Belgrade authorities never having wished to detach part of Bosnia and

Herzegovina’s territory from it, that allegation does not define the territories where the genocide

was supposedly committed.

38. The Applicant’s oral pleadings do not pr ovide any clarification of its submissions and

what the term “in part” means remains comp letely unknown. We do not know whether the

Applicant sought to allege that the intention to d estroy the non-Serb group in part was aimed at the

42 non-Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of a whole consisting of all non-Serbs everywhere in

the world or whether, by the expression “in part”, the Applicant meant part of the non-Serb

population living in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

39. However, before determining the meaning of the in part group, it must be said that it is

extremely difficult, not to say impossible, to speak of the destruction of part of the group when the

group itself is not defined.

40. It is well established that the part of the group concerned must be a substantial part of the

group. Hence, the Trial Chamber of the Tribunal for Rwanda found in the Kayishema case that:

“‘in part’ requires the intention to destroy a consid erable number of individuals who are part of the

group. Individuals must be targeted due to their membership of the group to satisfy this

106
definition.” This definition was accepted and refined by the Trial Chambers of the Tribunal for

Rwanda in the Bagilishema and Semanza cases, which found that the intention to destroy must at

107
least be directed at a substantial part of the group .

103
CR 2006/37, p. 59.
104
CR 2006/31, p. 32, para. 58.3.
105Ibid., p. 24, para. 35.

106ICTR, Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana , case No.ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement,
21 May 1999, para. 97.

107ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema , case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgement, 7 June 2001, para.54 and
Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement, 15 May 2003, para. 316. - 36 -

41. Scholarly writers also require the part concerned by the intention to destroy to be

substantial. For example, Raphaël Lemkin explaine d that: “the destruction in part must be of a

108
substantial nature so as to affect the entirety” . Nehemiah Robinson reiterated this view, stating

that the perpetrator of the genocide must have th e intention to destroy a substantial number of the

individuals constituting the target group. Justifying his position, Nehemiah Robinson stressed that

the act must be directed at the destruction of the group, for such was the aim of the Genocide

109
Convention . Whereas Benjamin Whitaker wrote: “‘In part’ would seem to imply a reasonably

significant number, relative to the total of the group as a whole, or else a significant section of a

group, such as its leadership.” 110

43 42. The case law of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has also established criteria for

determining the part of the group which may be considered substantial under the Genocide

Convention. The Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia thus held:

“The determination of when the targeted part is substantial enough to meet this
requirement may involve a number of cons iderations. The numeric size of the
targeted part of the group is the necessar y and important starting point, though not in

all cases the ending point of the inquiry. The number of individuals targeted should be
evaluated not only in absolute terms, but also in relation to the overall size of the
entire group. In addition to the numeric size of the targeted portion, its prominence

within the group can be a useful considera tion. If a specific part of the group is
emblematic of the overall group, or is es sential to its survival, that may support a
111
finding that the part qualifies as substantial within the meaning of Article 4.”

43. Since in the present case the group as such is not defined, it is not possible to assess who

forms a substantial part of it. Furthermore, the Applicant does not offer much help as regards

determining which part of the group is targeted. Consequently, both the group as such and the part

of the group supposedly targeted remained completely undefined.

44. Also, in the Brdjanin case, the Trial Chamber of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

considered that: “the intent to destroy a group, even if only in part, means seeking to destroy a

distinct part of the group as opposed to an accumulation of isolated individuals within it” 112. This

108Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Cmmittee, Historical Series, 1976, p.370, quoted by
William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 2000, p. 238.
109
Nehemia Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary, 1960, p. 63.
110
Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and P unishment of the Crime of Genocide,
United Nations, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, para. 29.
111ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Krstic, case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 12.

112ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin, case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, 1September 2004, para. 700. - 37 -

conclusion is not specific to the Brdjanin case, since the Trial Chamber in the Krstic case reached

the same conclusion, finding that the perpetrator of the genocide must consider part of the group

113
which he wishes to destroy as a distinct entity, which must be eliminated as such . In the present

case, it is impossible to define the distinct part of the group supposedly targeted.

45. The case law of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has accepted that genocide aimed

at destroying the group in part can be perpet rated within a geographically limited territory 11.

However, the Appeals Chamber noted that: “The intent to destroy formed by a perpetrator of

genocide will always be limited by the opportunity pr esented to him. While this factor alone will

44 not indicate whether the targeted group is substantial, it can ⎯ in combination with other factors ⎯

115
inform the analysis.”

46. It therefore clearly appears that genocidal intent may be inferred from the opportunity

available to the perpetrator for carryi ng out his or her intentions. In the Krstic case, the Appeals

Chamber found:

“the ambit of the genocidal enterprise in this case was limite d to the area of

Srebrenica. While the authority of the VRS Main Staff extended throughout Bosnia,
the authority of the Bosnian Serb forces ch arged with the take-over of Srebrenica did
not extend beyond the Central Podrinje region. From the perspective of the Bosnian

Serb forces alleged to have had genocidal intent in this case, the Muslims of
Srebrenica were the only part of the Bosnian Muslim group within their area of
control.” 116

47. Furthermore, although the International Law Commission accepted that genocide may be

committed without being directed against the tota lity of the group throughout the world, it would

seem that its position is not favourable to the possi bility of committing genocide in a very limited

territory. For example, the International Law Commission wrote in the commentary on the Draft

Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind that:

“the intention must be to destroy a group in whole or in part. It is not necessary to
intend to achieve the complete annihilation of a group from every corner of the globe.

Nonetheless the crime of genocide by its very nature 117uires the intention to destroy
at least a substantial part of a particular group.”

113ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Krstic, case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, 2 August 2001, para. 590.
114
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin, case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, 1 September 2004, para. 703.
115
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Krstic, case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 13.
116Ibid., para. 17.

117Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with commentaries, International Law
Commission, Yearbook 1996, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 46. - 38 -

48. This conclusion explains th at geographically limited genocide must be considered in the

context of the opportunity actually available to th e perpetrator for commission of the crime. Thus

geographically limited genocide would be acceptable so lely if the perpetrator had control over a

limited territory and did not have the possibility to extend his or her misdeeds beyond that territory.

49. In this connection, it must also be emphasized that this interpretation is certainly the only

possible interpretation when the genocide is limi ted to a restricted territory, as the notion of

geographically limited genocide is not unanimously accepted. A ccordingly, the Trial Chamber

held in the Stakic case:

45 “In construing the phrase ‘destruction of a group in part’, the Trial Chamber

with some hesitancy follows the jurisp rudence of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda
Tribunals which permits a characterisation of genocide even when the specific intent
extends only to a limited geographical area, such as a municipality. The Trial

Chamber is aware that th118approach might distort the definition of genocide if it is not
applied with caution.”

Scholarly writers have also expressed reservations about genocide perpetrated in a geographically

limited area. Professor William Schabas has written:

“Although the concept of genocide on a limited geographic scale seems

perfectly compatible with the object and purpose of the convention, it does raise
questions relating to the plan or policy issue. Localized genocide may tend to suggest
the absence of a plan or policy on a national level, and while it may result in

convictions of low-level officials within the municipality or region, it may also create
a presumption that the crime was not in fact organized on a larger scale.” 119

50. The reasoning of the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the

Krstic case might therefore be acceptable, with the conclusion that the local Serb authorities

intended to destroy the Muslims in Srebrenica, but subject to the qualification that the intention was

theirs, and solely theirs, as only their inte ntion could be deduced from acts limited to a

geographically restricted territory, which was the only territory over which those forces had

control. However, as ProfessorWilliamSchabas said , this argument directly militates against the

existence of genocidal intent at the national level and, therefore, at the level of a State.

51. The Applicant has not determined the prot ected group, since it described it by reference

to negative criteria and with no geographical limit, which would mean that all non-Serbs were the

118
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement, 31 July 2003, para. 523.
11W. Schabas, “Was genocide committed in Bosnia and He rzegovina? First Judgements of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Form er Yugoslavia”, (November 2001) Fordham International Law Journal , p.23,
paras. 42-43. - 39 -

group concerned. Furthermore, even confining ourselves to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the non-Serb

population still remains too complex and lacking in any distinctive characteristic which would

permit it to be defined as a group within the terms of the Genocide Convention.

52. As the group has not been defined in accordance with the criteria laid down by the

Genocide Convention, it is impossible to determine its substantial part, which is needed if we are to

deduce the genocidal intent aimed at the destructi on of the group in part. Also, the Applicant has

provided no criterion which might assist us in determining the part of the group targeted.

46
II. Genocidal intent and the standard of proof in establishing State responsibility

1. The Genocide Convention places upon States the obligation to prevent and punish the

crime of genocide. It also prohibits the commission of the crime of genocide. The obligations to

prevent and punish genocide are State obliga tions and breaches of them are to be assessed

according to the general principles applicable to State responsibility. My colleague, Professor

Brownlie, has presented our main arguments with respect to State responsibility. Today we will

submit alternative arguments concerning only State responsibility for breaches of Articles II and III

of the Genocide Convention.

(a) State responsibility and genocidal intent

2. We have reached agreement with the A pplicant on the nature of State responsibility,

which must be assessed in accord ance with the principles of the international responsibility of

States, as it does not correspond to criminal responsib ility. We also concur with the Applicant that

120
the law applicable in the present case is the Genocide Convention . The Genocide Convention is

an international treaty and as such places upon Stat e Parties obligations which, if breached, engage

the State’s international responsibility. Howeve r, the Genocide Convention is also a document

containing legal rules defining a crime ⎯ in international crime, which can only be established by

applying the principles and rules of criminal law.

3. Whereas the Genocide Convention is a treaty and breaches of it may engage State

responsibility, the crime of genocide must first be found pursuant to the rules of international

120
CR 2006/32, p. 12, para. 10. - 40 -

criminal law, according to which genocide must by committed by an individual. The State

becomes responsible only if genocide is committ ed by an individual capable of engaging the

State’s responsibility. In its commentaries on the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for

Internationally Wrongful Acts, the International Law Commission stated:

“The State is a real organized entity, a le gal person with full authority to act under
international law. But to recognize this is not to deny the elementary fact that the

47 State cannot act of itself. An ‘act of State’ must involve some actions or omission by
a human being or group: ‘States can act only by and through their agents and
representatives.’” 121

4. Moreover, the text of Article IV of th e Genocide Convention implies that genocide can

only be committed by individuals, since it states th at: “[p]ersons committing genocide or any of

the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally

responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals”. Thus the Genocide Convention

expressly stipulates that individuals shall be an swerable for genocide, including those persons

capable of engaging State responsibility. The Conve ntion does not suggest in any way that States

themselves can commit genocide.

5. In accordance with the general rule of th e international responsibility of States, the only

conduct that can be attributed to the State is that of its organs or of persons acting under the control

of those organs 12. In its presentation of 20April2006, the Applicant stated that: “in the full

meaning of the term, genocide is an internati onal crime which not only engages the criminal

responsibility of the individuals committing it but also that of the State to which the acts committed

by individuals, acting de jure or de facto on its behalf, may be ascribed” 123. And the Applicant

further stated: “it is for violation of the prohibition of genocide that the Respondent is

internationally responsible, since the acts cons tituting that genocide were committed by its agents

124
or organs” .

6. Consequently, the condition sine qua non for establishing State responsibility would

appear to be the prior establishment of the indi vidual responsibility of a perpetrator engaging the

12Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries, 2001, p. 71.
122
Ibid., p. 80.
123
CR 2006/33, p. 31, para. 44.
12CR 2006/34, p. 22, para. 27. - 41 -

State’s responsibility. State responsibility would be subject to the rules of general responsibility

applying to the international responsibility of States, but initially, before that, the crime of genocide

would have to be established according to the rul es of criminal law and the individual perpetrator

identified.

7. According to the Genocide Convention, specific intent to destroy in whole or in part a

national, ethnical, racial or religious group must be found, and no crime can be characterized as

genocide without such specific intent. In its Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for

48 Internationally Wrongful Acts, the International Law Commission noted that: “[g]enocide is not

committed until there has been an accumulation of acts of killing, causing harm, etc., committed

with the relevant intent, so as to satisfy the definition in Article II”25.

8. In its presentation of 18 April last, the Applicant stated that “[t]he genocidal acts

enumerated in Article II of the 1948 Convention must not be confused with genocide as a global

126
internationally wrongful act which may e ngage the responsibility of a State party” . We would

like to stress that the Genocide Convention does not provide for two concepts of genocide: one in

which individuals are answerable in criminal pr oceedings according to the rules of criminal law

and another in which State responsibility can be incurred according to the customary rules of the

international responsibility of States. For the crim e of genocide, an international crime, there is

only one definition, which is laid down by the Genocide Convention, and its commission can in

certain cases engage State responsibility.

9. Thus a State cannot be responsible for breaches of Articles II and III of the Genocide

Convention unless the requisite intent can be estab lished on the part of its organs and agents, who

will ultimately always be individuals. In its Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for

Internationally Wrongful Acts, the International Law Commission stated:

“Whether there has been a breach of a rule may depend on the intention or
knowledge of relevant State organs or agen ts... For example, Article II of the
Genocide Convention states that: ‘In the present Convention, genocide means any of

the following acts committed w ith intent to destroy in whole or in part a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group...’ Whether responsibility is objective or

125
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries, 2001, p. 147.
126
CR 2006/31, p. 32, para. 58.1. - 42 -

subjective in this sense depends on the circumstances including the content of the

primary obligation in question.” 127

The primary obligation at issue is clearly that provided for by the Genocide Convention,

according to which specific intent must be found.

10. The Applicant recognizes that any act must be accompanied by genocidal intent in order

to constitute genocide, but is of the opinion that geno cidal intent does not have to exist in all of the

49 direct perpetrators, who could commit the acts wit hout being motivated by such intent. We do not

believe it necessary to engage in a debate as to whether the direct perpetrator of the acts

constituting genocide needs to have genocidal intent 128, since the intent of that person would only

be relevant if the perpetrator falls within th e category of persons capable of engaging the

responsibility of the State. However, we would stress that the direct intent of the person capable of

engaging the responsibility of the State, irrespective of whether he/she is the direct perpetrator, or

the person who devised, planned and prepared genocidal acts, must be found beyond all reasonable

doubt. Moreover, if the person capable of engaging State responsibility is not the direct perpetrator

of the crime, the link between that person and the individuals who directly committed the crime

would have to be established in order to find that the criminal acts were carried out in execution of

the genocidal intent of the person capable of engaging State responsibility. And only if all those

conditions were met, could the r esponsibility of the State be incurred. In the present case, the

Applicant has shown nothing of the sort.

11. We are bound also to take note of the comment of the International Law Commission,

which observed in its Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind:

“The definition of the crime of genocid e requires a degree of knowledge of the
ultimate objective of the criminal conduct ra ther than knowledge of every detail of a

comprehensive plan or policy of genocide . A subordinate is presumed to know the
intention of his superiors when he recei ves orders to commit the prohibited acts
against individuals who belong to a particular group .. . A soldier who is ordered to

go from house to house and kill only persons who are members of a particular
group... cannot be unaware of the destruc tive effect of his criminal conduct on the
group itself.”129

127
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Inrnationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries, 2001,
pp. 69-70.
128
CR 2006/31, pp. 26-27, para. 44.
12Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with commentaries, International Law
Commission, Yearbook 1996, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 45. - 43 -

The International Law Commission’s analysis is highly logical. The direct perpetrators could

hardly claim not to be aware of the intent unde rlying the orders they received in the event of

genocide, as, although it is rarely expressed explicitl y, genocidal intent, when it exists, is obvious

and it is difficult to claim that it was unknown.

12. The Applicant claims that it must be assumed that the State intended to achieve the result

130
attained and that the State must conseque ntly be fully accountable for that outcome . We have

50 demonstrated that genocide did not take place, but beyond that, we cannot accept the argument that

the State can be assumed responsible where no in tent has been established on the part of the

individual alleged to have committed genocide and capable of engaging the State’s responsibility.

(b) Deducing genocidal intent from circumstantial evidence

13. As the Applicant has provided no direct evid ence of the intent of the persons capable of

engaging the responsibility of the State in the pr esent case, it has endeavoured to deduce intent

from circumstantial evidence and notably that of a plan , project or pattern of conduct, that is to say

from the number and nature of the crimes. Howe ver, genocidal intent cannot be deduced from the

circumstantial evidence presented by the Applicant. That is only logical, as no such intent ever

existed and the criminal acts perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not constitute genocide.

(i) The lack of a plan

14. The existence of a plan is not a legal ingr edient of genocide, but the existence of such a

plan can help to establish the specific intent required for the crime of genocide 131. According to the

Applicant, the main evidence of such a plan was the strategic goals of the Bosnian Serbs approved

on 12May1992 at a session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

However, those strategic goals harboured no genocidal intent, as we demonstrated in our

presentation of Thursday last. Moreover, the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has assessed

132
those strategic goals in a number of cases . We will not repeat the findings of the Tribunal as we

130
CR 2006/33, p. 40, para. 12.
13ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 225.

13ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, case No.IT-97-24-T, Judgement , 31 July 2003, para. 41; Prosecutor v.
Radoslav Brdjanin, case No.IT-99-36-T, Judgement, 1September2004, para.981; Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, case
No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement, 5 December 2003, paras. 725-729; Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, case No.IT-98-33-T,
Judgement, 2 August 2001, para. 562. - 44 -

presented them last week, but we would stress once again that the Tribunal has not been able to

deduce genocidal intent from the strategic goals of the Bosnian Se rbs. True, this Court is not

bound by the findings of the Tribunal, but a number of conclusions can be drawn from them.

51 15. The Applicant would no doubt say that the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia did not

have the full picture, which is in effect what it claimed: “The ICTY with jurisdiction over

individual crimes, but not State responsibility, had no reason to discern that pattern or to name the

perpetrator, the mastermind of the pattern, b ecause that mastermind was not an individual but a

133
State” . We cannot share in this analysis of the wo rk of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,

because the Tribunal considers the political context and weighs the evidence, which does not relate

exclusively to the individual responsibility of the accused. This is particularly so in those cases

where the defendants are charged with complicity a nd the intent of the principal perpetrator must

be proved if the crime is to be properly characterized.

16. The Tribunal has rarely tried the direct perpetrators of the alleged crimes; most

individuals tried by the Tribunal have been senior political and military figures whose

responsibility could not be established in the absence of a clear view of the overall context of the

war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus in the Stakic case the Tribunal stated: “The Trial Chamber

has considered whether anyone else on a horizontal level in the Municipality of Prijedor had the

dolus specialis for genocide by killing members of the Muslim group but concludes that there is no

134
compelling evidence to this effect.”

And the Tribunal also found:

“Having heard all the evidence, the Tr ial Chamber finds that it has not been

provided with the necessary insight into th e state of mind of alleged perpetrators
acting on a higher level in the political structur e than Dr. Stakic to enable it to draw
the inference that those perpetrators had the specific genocidal intent.” 135

It is thus clear that the Trial Chamber in the Stakic case did not confine itself to establishing the

personal intent of the accused; it also assessed the intent which may have been harboured by others

in the political hierarchy of Republika Srpska. After weighing all of the evidence concerning not

13CR 2006/33, p. 39, para. 10.
134
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement, 31 July 2003, para. 555.
13Ibid., para. 547. - 45 -

only the accused but also any other individual whom the accused may have aided or assisted, the

Trial Chamber concluded: “In order for Dr. Stak ic to be held responsible for complicity in

52 genocide, it must be proved that genocide in fact occurred. On the basis of the evidence presented

in this case, the Trial Chamber has not fo und beyond a reasonable doubt that genocide was

136
committed in Prijedor.”

17. Just as in the Stakic case, the Trial Chamber in the Brdjanin case considered all the

evidence adduced, which in the latter case concerned an entire region of 16 municipalities, and

found:

“Although the factors raised by the Pr osecution have been examined on an
individual basis, the Trial Chamber finds that, even if they were taken together, they
do not allow the Trial Chamber to legitimately draw the inference that the underlying

offences were committed with the specific inte nt required for the crime of genocide.
On the basis of the evidence presented in this case, the Trial Chamber has not found
beyond reasonable doubt that genocide was committed in the relevant
ARK municipalities.” 137

18. Although the Applicant in principle reje cts the findings of the Tribunal for the former

Yugoslavia, it nevertheless argues that General Kr stic’s and Colonel Blagoj evic’s convictions by

the Tribunal can engage Serbia a nd Montenegro’s responsibility. Without wishing to go into the

issue of the imputability to Serbia and Montenegro of acts committed by officers in the Republika

Srpska army, which was discussed by our counsel and advocate Professor Brownlie, I must observe

that a legal analysis of the findings concer ning the responsibility of General Krstic and

Colonel Blagojevic, as determined by the Tribunal, does not support the Applicant’s argument.

19. First, as found by the Tribunal for the fo rmer Yugoslavia, neither General Krstic nor

Colonel Blagojevic had genocidal intent. They were convicted on the basis not of the Genocide

Convention but of the Statute of the Tribunal, specifically Article7 of the Statute, for aiding and

abetting, a form of joint action in the commission of the crime which is not recognized by the

Genocide Convention. Secondly, while the Tribun al did assess whether individuals other than the

accused had genocidal intent, in neither of these cas es did it find any such intent on the part of an

individual whose actions could engage Serbia and Montenegro’s responsibility. In the Blagojevic

53
case, the Trial Chamber cautiously concluded that the Bosnian Serb forces, an amorphous entity

13ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement, 31 July 2003, para. 561.
137
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin, case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, 1 September 2004, para. 989. - 46 -

and one which in any case did not belong to the St ate of Serbia and Montenegro, intended to

138
destroy the Muslim population of Srebrenica . As for the Krstic case, both the Trial Chamber and

the Appeals Chamber carried out a detailed analysis in respect of the person who might have had

genocidal intent; that led them to draw a great number of contradictory conclusions.

20. Thus, in the Krstic case, the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s conclusion

that certain members of the headquarters staff of the Republika Srpska army had genocidal intent,

finding: “The Trial Chamber ⎯ as the best assessor of the evidence presented at trial ⎯ was

entitled to conclude that the evidence of the transfer supported its finding that some members of the

VRS Main Staff intended to destroy the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica.” 139 However, the Appeals

Chamber held that:

“the ambit of the genocidal enterprise in this case was limite d to the area of

Srebrenica. While the authority of the VRS Main Staff extended throughout Bosnia,
the authority of the Bosnian Serb forces ch arged with the take-over of Srebrenica did
not extend beyond the Central Podrinje region. From the perspective of the Bosnian

Serb forces alleged to have had genocidal intent in this case, the Muslims of
Srebrenica were the only part of the Bosnian Muslim group within their area of
control.”140

These two conclusions are not only contradictory, th ey are mutually exclusive. According to the

first conclusion, members of the headquarters st aff of the Republika Srpska army had genocidal

intent, while, according to the second, the genocidal intent was harboured by those Bosnian Serb

forces whose control was limited to the Muslims of Srebrenica. As the Appeals Chamber itself

admits, the headquarters staff of the Republika Srps ka army controlled all the territory of Bosnia

and Herzegovina which was under Bosnian Serb control; accordingly, members of the

headquarters staff of the Republika Srpska army are obviously ruled out as members of the group

of individuals who might have had the intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims on the territory

limited to Srebrenica.

54 21. Further, the Applicant is wrong in its assertion that the individuals convicted of

complicity in genocide in the Krstic and Blagojevic cases acted as part of a criminal enterprise to

13ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic, case no.IT-02-60-T, J udgement, 17 January 2005,
para. 677.
139
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Krstic, case no. IT-98-33-A, Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 33.
14Ibid., para. 17. - 47 -

destroy, in whole or in part, the group to wh ich the victims belonged. This contention is a

distortion of the judgments handed down by the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Krstic

and Blagojevic cases. In fact, the Tribunal has never f ound that there was a criminal enterprise

aimed at the total or partial destruction of a group. In the Krstic case, the Appeals Chamber

overturned General Krstic ’s conviction by the Trial Chamber for participation in a criminal

141
enterprise to commit genocide and held that the aim of the cr iminal enterprise was the forcible

transfer of civilians142, a crime against humanity. In the Blagojevic case the Trial Chamber did not

find that Colonel Blagojevic had participated in a criminal enterprise, not even an enterprise aimed

at forcible transfer, while there was no consideration at all in the Blagojevic case of the criminal

143
enterprise to commit genocide alleged by the Applicant .

22. To be sure, a State’s responsibility is not limited to acts of genocide committed by

individuals capable of engaging the State’s responsibi lity who have been convicted of that offence.

However, where the perpetrators, the individuals, have not been convicted, the Court must, before

assessing the responsibility of the State, establish the personal responsibility of the individuals

capable of engaging the State’s responsibility. While the trial and conviction of the perpetrators of

the genocide is not required, it is on the other hand necessary to identify them and establish their

responsibility, because the State is answerable onl y for those acts of genocide committed with the

specific intent required by the Genocide C onvention by persons capable of engaging its

responsibility, whose specific intent must first be established.

55
(ii) Genocidal intent cannot be deduced from the pattern of criminal conduct or the
number of crimes

23. With regard to the pattern and number of crimes, the Applicant claims that the number of

crimes, as well as their systematic and discrimin atory nature, demonstrat es a pattern of conduct

from which genocidal intent can be deduced. We ca nnot accept that claim. First, the crimes were

committed in a war setting. The war would not, of course, excuse genocide if it had occurred, but

it raises the question of the intent of those who committed these crimes, as it undoubtedly offers an

141
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Krstic, case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgement, 19 April 2004, paras. 143 and 237.
142
Ibid., para. 151.
14ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic , case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement, 17January 2005,
paras. 714 and 705. - 48 -

alternative explanation for the crimes perpetrated. Second, and more importantly, the pattern of

conduct and the crimes committed do not demonstrate their genocidal nature. The adding together

of a series of crimes, irrespective of their gravity, cannot ever amount to genocide unless there is

genocidal intent, and that did not exist and so could not be proved.

24. The crimes alleged by the Applicant could be common-law offences, violations of the

laws and customs of war or crimes against humanity. There are certain similarities between

genocide and crimes against humanity. The Applicant has stated a number of times that the crimes

were committed on a large scale, in a systematic manner and with discriminatory intent. That is of

no help whatsoever in terms of establishing ge nocidal intent, as crimes against humanity, and

especially persecution and extermination, also have these characteristics.

25. In Article 18 of its Draft Code of Crim es against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the

International Law Commission defined crimes ag ainst humanity as acts: “committed in a

systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed by a Government or by any

organization or group” 144.

26. Hence, according to international law cr imes against humanity have to be committed on

a large scale or in a systematic manner. Moreover, they have to be directed by a Government, an

organization or a group, thereby demonstrati ng their organized and coordinated nature.

56 Furthermore, the International Law Commission explained that the expression “in a systematic

manner” meant crimes committed repeatedly or co ntinually, pursuant to a preconceived plan or

policy, while “on a large scale” implies a multiplicit y of victims. Consequently, the expression “in

a systematic manner” excludes crimes committed at random or in an indiscriminate manner, while

“on a large scale” rules out isolated acts, wh ich do not therefore constitute crimes against

humanity 145.

27. For the ad hoc tribunals, crimes against humanity do not have to be directed by a State or

organization. Nevertheless, the International Crim inal Court clearly stated in its Elements of

Crime:

144
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with commentaries, International Law
Commission, Yearbook 1996, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 47.
145
Ibid. - 49 -

“It is understood that ‘policy to commit such an attack’ requires that the State or

organization actively promote or encourag e such an attack against a civilian
population. A policy which has a civilian population as the object of the attack would
be implemented by State or organizational ac tion. Such a policy may, in exceptional

circumstances, be implemented by a deliberate failure to take action, which is
consciously aimed at encouraging such att ack. The existence of such a policy cannot
be inferred solely from the absence of governmental or organizational action.” 146

28. However, all international courts requi re that crimes against humanity must be

committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale. In the Kayishema case, the Trial Chamber

defined the meaning of those terms in internationa l criminal law, holding that: “[a] widespread

attack is one that is directed against a multiplicity of victims. A systematic attack means an attack

carried out pursuant to a preconceived policy or plan. Either of those conditions will serve to

exclude isolated or random inhumane acts committed for purely personal reasons.” 147

29. Consequently, in order to be characteri zed as crimes against humanity, the criminal acts

concerned must be carried out in a systematic manner and on a large scale. And those are precisely

the characteristics from which the Applicant seeks to infer genocidal intent. But genocidal intent

cannot be deduced from those characteristics— th e systematic manner and large scale of the

crimes — as those same characteristics are constitu ent elements of crimes against humanity, which

are, in any case, extremely serious internationa l crimes. Within that context, it is worth
57

emphasizing that the International Criminal Court said with respect to crimes against humanity in

its Elements of Crimes that: “crimes against hum anity as defined in Article 7 are among the most

148
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole” .

30. Furthermore, the crime against humanity of persecution is traditionally regarded as an

offence close to that of genocide, since both cr imes require discriminat ory intent. However,

whereas in genocide the victim of the crime is the group, the victims of persecution are individuals,

but individuals targeted on particular grounds, inter alia, their membership of a group which has

been targeted. Discriminatory intent is theref ore necessary for persecution as well. And as the

International Law Commission so rightly observed in its Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace

and Security of Mankind, the crime of persecution applies “to acts of persecution which lacked the

146
International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, ICC-ASP 1/3, p. 116.
147
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana , case No.ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement,
21 May 1999, para. 123.
14International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, ICC-ASP 1/3, p. 116. - 50 -

specific intent required for the crime of genocide” 149. Thus, Madam President, Members of the

Court, genocidal intent cannot be deduced from acts capable of constituting genocide accompanied

by discriminatory intent, as those same acts w ith the same intent constitute crimes against

humanity.

31. The Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, moreover,

enumerates in Article 18 a number of acts whic h constitute crimes against humanity, among them,

in subparagraph (e) “persecution on political, racial, religious or ethnic grounds”, which is also a

crime in the Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and in the Statute of the International Criminal Court.

However the Draft Code prepared by the Inte rnational Law Commission contains, along with

persecution, another crime against humanity for wh ich discriminatory intent must be shown.

Subparagraph (f) of Article18 of the Draft Code defines that crime against humanity as

“institutionalized discrimination on racial, ethnic or religious grounds in volving the violation of

fundamental human rights and freedoms and resulti ng in seriously disadvantaging a part of the

population”.

58 32. The crime set out in Article18 (f) of the International Law Commission’s Draft Code

goes beyond mere discrimination against individu als and concerns a part of the population,

bringing it even closer to the notion of genocide, which targets a group. Beyond the fact that it

targets part of the population and must be committed with discriminatory intent, the crime must

also be carried out in a systematic manner or on a large scale, and be organized by a Government,

organization or group. The criminal act can only be characterized as a crime against humanity if all

of those criteria are met and it will remain a crim e against humanity as its perpetrators lack the

specific intent required for the crime of genocide, wh ich is the destruction in whole or in part of a

national, ethnical, racial and religious group.

33. Persecution is generally accepted as being the crime which has the most in common with

genocide, but certain other crimes against humanity can easily be mistaken for genocide. Those

crimes can, in effect, only be distinguished from ge nocide by the lack of genocidal intent, whereas

the material acts constituting them are identical to those capable of constituting genocide.

149
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with commentaries, International Law
Commission, Yearbook 1996, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 49. - 51 -

34. Thus the International Law Commission described the crime against humanity of

extermination in the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind as: “a crime

which is by its very nature directed against a gro up of individuals . . . involves an element of mass

destruction . . . is closely related to the crime of genocide” 150.

35. In the Vasiljevic case, Trial Chamber I of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

accepted the opinion of the International Law Commission and held that:

“[e]xtermination covers situations in whic h a group of individuals who do not share
any common characteristics are killed. It al so covers situations where some members

of a group are killed while others are spared. Extermination refers to killing on a vast
scale. It is directed towards members of a collection of individuals; the method used
to carry out the killing is irrelevant; know ledge of the vast murderous enterprise is
151
required.”

Moreover, Trial Chamber I did not just expl ain the constituent elements of the crime of

extermination, but also highlighted the difference between genocide and extermination, holding:

59 “This Trial Chamber concludes from the material which it has reviewed that criminal

responsibility for “extermination” only attaches to those individuals responsible for a
large number of deaths, even if their part therein was remote or indirect.
Responsibility for one or for a limited number of such killings is insufficient. The

Trial Chamber also concludes that the act of extermination must be collective in
nature rather than directed towards singled out individuals. However, contrary to
genocide the offender need not have intended to destroy the group or part of the group
152
to which the victims belong.”

36. And the Rwanda Tribunal’s Trial Chambe r 2 defined the constituent elements of the

crime of extermination in the Kayishema trial thus:

“The actor participates in the mass killing of others or in the creation of

conditions of life that lead to the mass killing of others, through his act(s) or
omission(s); having intended the killing, or being reckless, or grossly negligent as to
whether the killing would result and; being aware that his act(s) or omission(s) forms

part of a mass killing event; where his act(s) or omission(s) forms part of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political,
ethnic, racial or religious grounds.” 153

37. Consequently, the criminal acts, pattern of conduct and plan would have been the same

for extermination as for genocide, the only factor distinguishing the one from the other being

150Ibid., p. 48.
151
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevic, case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgement, 29 November 2002, para. 224.
152Ibid. para. 227.

153ICTR, Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana , case No.ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement,
21 May 1999, para. 144. - 52 -

genocidal intent, which has to be shown as such. It cannot be deduced from the material act alone,

or from the plan or project, all of which, without genocidal intent, are evidence only to crimes

against humanity.

38. Genocidal intent is clearly the only el ement distinguishing the crime of genocide from

other offences constituting crimes against humanity. In the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace

and Security of Mankind, the International Law Commission stated:

“The definition of the crime of genocide requires a specific intent which is the
distinguishing characteristic of this partic ular crime under international law. The

prohibited acts enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (e) are by their very nature
conscious, intentional or volitional acts whic h an individual could not usually commit
without knowing that certain consequences we re likely to result. These are not the

type of acts that would normally occur by accident or even as a result of mere
negligence... The definition of this crime requires a particular state of mind or a
specific intent with respect to the overall consequences of the prohibited act. As

indicated in the opening clause of Article 17, an individual incurs responsibility for the
crime of genocide only when one of the prohi bited acts is ‘committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such’.” 154

60 39. Consequently, the specific intent required for genocide, irrespective of individual or State

international responsibility, can never be inferred simply from the fact that acts constituting the

actus reus of the crime of genocide have been committed. Specific intent is the constituent element

of genocide which must be shown and the burden of proof is upon the Applicant, who has not been

able to demonstrate it quite simply because genocidal intent never existed.

III. Complicity in genocide

1. I now come to the last part of my statem ent, which deals with the question of complicity

in genocide. The Applicant asserted in its oral argument on 18 April 2006 that our respective

interpretations of the acts listed in Article III of the Genocide Convention were not significantly

different. While we can agree with the Applicant as to most of the forms of commission of the

crime of genocide set out in Article III of the Genocide Convention, it would however appear that

we do not interpret complicity in genocide in th e way described by the Applicant in its oral

statements 155.

154
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with commentaries, International Law
Commission, Yearbook 1996, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 44.
155
CR 2006/31, p. 39, para. 75. - 53 -

2. We obviously acknowledge that the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has convicted

two Bosnian Serbs of aiding and abetting genocide (la complicité du genocide) under Article 7.1 of

the Tribunal’s Statute, which refers specifically to aiding and abetting in conjunction with Article 4

of the Tribunal’s Statute, which incorporates the text of Articles II and III of the Genocide

Convention. We acknowledge too that the Tribun al for the former Yugoslavia has held that

persons furnishing aid and assistance can be convi cted of aiding and abetting genocide without

having genocidal intent. However, we do not belie ve that this conclusion is legally correct;

moreover, it is definitely not founded on the Genocide Convention, which requires genocidal intent

for all forms of commission, including complicity in genocide. The category of aiding and abetting

genocide (l’aide et l’assistance à la commission du genocide) was established exclusively on the

61 basis of the Tribunal’s Statute, specifically Article 7.1 thereof, which applies to the individual

responsibility of those tried by the Tribunal. This category is alien to the Genocide Convention.

3. The Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal fo r the former Yugoslavia moreover acknowledged

in the Krstic case: “Krsti ć’s responsibility is accurately characterized as aiding and abetting

genocide under Article 7 (1) of the Statute, not as complicity in genocide under Article 4 (3) (e)” 156.

Article 4.3 (e) of the Tribunal’s Statute is identical with Article III (e) of the Genocide Convention,

which defines complicity in genocide. The Tr ibunal has thus established a difference between

complicity in genocide (la complicité dans le genocide) , determined by the Genocide Convention,

and aiding and abetting genocide (la complicité du genocide) , which, as interpreted by the

Tribunal, has been provided for by the Tribunal’s Statute, notably Article 7.1.

4. The distinction is an important one becau se complicity in genocide requires the specific

intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. On the

other hand, aiding and abetting genocide does not re quire such intent, but only the knowledge that

the principal perpetrator of the crime has genocidal intent. Thus, a person, a natural person, may be

convicted of aiding and abetting genocide, for having participated in the crime of genocide, without

having had genocidal intent, which, under the Genocide Convention, is an element of genocide and

is required for complicity in genocide.

156
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Krstic, case No. IT-98-36-A, Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 138. - 54 -

5. The Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal fo r the former Yugoslavia has recognized that

complicity in genocide, as contemplated in the Ge nocide Convention, requires the intent to destroy

a protected group, as it found in the Krstic case that: “Article 4 of the Statute is most naturally read

to suggest that Article 4(2)’s requirement that a perpetrator of genocide possess the requisite

‘intent to destroy’ a protected group applies to all of the prohibited acts enumerated in Article 4 (3),

157
including complicity in genocide.” The Appeals Chamber added: “the same analysis applies to

the relationship between Article II of the Genocide Convention, which contains the requirement of
62

specific intent, and the Convention’s Article III, wh ich lists the proscribed acts, including that of

complicity” 15.

6. A distinction between complicity in genocide and aiding and abetting genocide has been

drawn by the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavi a, but the Genocide Convention recognizes only

complicity in genocide, as set out in Article III (e) of the Genocide Convention. Aiding and

abetting genocide, as recognized by the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, cannot be extended to

State responsibility because the Genocide Convention does not recognize it.

Th7e. travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention clearly show that genocide and all

the forms in which it may be committed that are set out in Article III of the Genocide Convention

require dolus specialis, which as an element of the crime of genocide must be specifically proved.

The Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia noted moreover in the Krstic case:

“There is also evidence that the drafters of the Genocide Convention in tended the charge of

complicity in genocide to require a showing of genocidal intent.” 159 In fact, the United Kingdom’s

representative on the Sixth Committee of the Genera l Assembly proposed to include the word

“deliberate” in the text of the Convention before the term “complicity”, explaining that it was

important to specify that complicity had to be de liberate, because in some legal systems complicity

was punishable without any need for the requisite in tent to have been proved. However, in the

view of representatives of a number of States this clarification was superfluous because there had

never been any doubt as to complicity being inte ntional in nature. The United Kingdom ultimately

157
Ibid., para. 142.
158
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Krstic , case No.IT-98-36-A, Judgeme nt, 19 April 2004, para.142,
footnote 245.
15Ibid., para. 142. - 55 -

withdrew its proposal, as it had been clarified that complicity in genocide had to be deliberate,

160
intentional, in order to punishable .

8. Thus, there can be no remaining uncertainty as to the fact that aiding and abetting

genocide is nothing but a construct of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia by means of which it

63 was able to convict General Krstic even though it had concluded that he lacked genocidal intent.

This Court is not the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and we do not

intend to examine the lawfulness of the Tribuna l’s findings, but under no circumstances can that

construct be applied in these pr oceedings, which are founded uniquely and exclusively on the

Genocide Convention, which, for its part, requires specific genocidal intent as an element of all

forms in which the crime of genocide can be co mmitted, as set out in Article III of the Genocide

Convention, including complicity.

9. The Applicant has tried in its oral argu ment to draw the same distinction between

complicity in genocide (la complicité dans le genocide) , founded on the Genocide Convention, and

aiding and abetting genocide (la complicité du genocide) , supposedly founded on general rules of

international responsibility of States, asserting that: “This second form of complicity is not legally

based upon the precise wording of Article III (e) of the Convention, but upon the general principles

161
of international law on State responsibility.”

10. The Applicant does not say so explicitly but it would appear that this form of aiding and

abetting is based on the rule of customary interna tional law put forward in Article 16 of the draft

articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, which reads:

“A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:

(a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally
wrongful act; and

162
(b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.”

11. We can indeed understand why the Applican t has avoided citing this Article. The draft

articles provide that the aid or assistance must be fu rnished to a State. That would not be true in

16United Nations, doc. A/C.6/236 and corr. 1; doc. A/C.6/SR.87.
161
CR 2006/31, p. 40, para. 77.
16Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries, 2001, p. 155. - 56 -

this case because the Applicant itself alleges that the principal perpetrator in this case was

163
Republika Srpska, which is not a subject of international law . Further, the International Law

Commission requires that the State furnishing the aid and assistance must know that the aid and

64 assistance are meant to facilitate an internationall y wrongful act and must intend to facilitate the

commission of the wrongful act. In its commentary to the draft articles on Responsibility of States

for internationally wrongful acts, the International Law Commission says:

“the aid or assistance must be given with a view to facilitating the commission of the
wrongful act, and must actually do so. This limits the application of article 16 to those

cases where the aid or assistance given is clearly linked to the subsequent wrongful
conduct. A State is not responsible for aid or assistance under article 16 unless the
relevant State organ intended, by the ai d or assistance given, to facilitate the

occurrence of the wrongful conduct and the internationally wrongful conduct is
actually committed by the aided or assisted State.”

Accordingly, the general principles of State responsibility do not relieve the Applicant of its

obligation to prove a particular intent on the part of the State and this intent has never been proved

in the present case. It could not be proved because it never existed.

12. Moreover and most importantly, the dr aft articles on Responsibility of States for

internationally wrongful acts provide in Article 55 that the articles, which in effect codify the

general principles of State responsibility, do not a pply where a special rule governs the question of

responsibility. Draft Article 55 provides:

“These articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the
existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the
international responsibility of a State are gove rned by special rules of international
164
law.”

Article 55 of the draft articles on Responsibility of States applies to all aspects of State

responsibility, including the content of that responsib ility. Consequently, if a special international

rule requires specific intent in order for there to be a violation of the inte rnational obligation, the

international responsibility of the State can only be incurred where the rule is violated with the

requisite specific intent. The International Law Commission has observed in its commentary to the

draft articles:

163
CR 2006/31, p. 40, para. 75.
164
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries, 2001, p. 356. - 57 -

“Article 55 provides that the Articles do not apply where and to the extent that
the conditions for the existence of an in ternationally wrongful act or its legal

65 consequences are determined by special rul 165es of international law. It reflects the
maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali.”

The Genocide Convention is the primary rule in th is case, it contains the applicable law and it

contains a special rule concerning complicity in ge nocide. Thus, whether or not there has been a

violation of obligations laid down in the Genoc ide Convention must be determined in accordance

with the provisions of the Convention, including the issue of complicity.

13. Genocidal intent must therefore be proved in order for a State to be held responsible for

violations of ArticlesII andIII of the Genocide Convention. And, as a State cannot directly

commit a wrongful act but does so through its organs, which in all cases are ultimately natural

persons, the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious

group, as such, on the part of an individual capab le of causing the State’s responsibility to be

incurred must be proved if the State is to be held answerable for violations of Article II and III of

the Genocide Convention.

Conclusions

1. Madam President, Members of the Court, ge nocide is often called the crime of crimes and

it is the supreme crime, the negation of humanity it self, but it is not the only serious international

crime. Crimes against humanity are very grave, systematic, large-scale international crimes.

Genocidal intent is the only element on the basis of which the crime of genocide can be

distinguished from other crimes against humanity.

2. Genocidal intent is an element of the crime of genocide which must be proved in order for

an individual to be held responsible for the crime of genocide. Such intent must also be proved if a

State is to be held answerable for violations of the Genocide Convention. The Applicant has failed

to demonstrate genocidal intent on the part of persons capable of causing the State’s responsibility

to be incurred. The Applicant has been unable to prove such intent because it never existed.

3. Neither Serbia and Montenegro nor the Bosn ian Serbs intended to destroy in whole or in

part a national, ethnical, racial or religious gr oup. Genocide cannot be committed without such
66

intent and it was not committed in Bosnia and Herz egovina. The facts show the truth about what

165
Ibid. - 58 -

happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina : a bloody, fratricidal civil war. Crimes were committed but

genocide was not.

Madam President, that ends my statement.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Maître Fauveau-Ivanović.

The Court now rises, and the session will resume at 3 o’clock this afternoon.

The Court rose at 12.55 p.m.

___________