BHY
CR 2006/7 (translation)
CR 2006/7 (traduction)
Thursday 2 March 2006 at 3 p.m.
Jeudi 2 mars 2006 à 15 heures - 2 -
10 The PRESIDENT: Please be seated.
Ms STERN: Madam President, Members of the Court, having this morning set out the facts
regarding rape and sexual violence, I shall now be gin the second part of my presentation and show
the Court that rape and sexual violence are act s prohibited under ArticleII of the Genocide
Convention.
II. RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE ARE ACTS PROHIBITED UNDER
ARTICLE II OF THE G ENOCIDE C ONVENTION
39. Although acts of sexual violence are not expressly included in the acts constituting
genocide listed in ArticleII of the Genocide Conve ntion, they can nevertheless be brought within
the scope of each of the listed categories. The sp ecified categories of act have been drafted in
sufficiently generic and broad terms to be capable of encompassing all the forms of genocide that
the human imagination might be capable of devising. We know that for the actus reus of the crime
of genocide to be established, it suffices that the acts committed fall within the scope of just one of
the categories listed in the Genocide Convention. So we will see that rapes and acts of sexual
violence, which all come within the category of acts prohibited by ArticleII (b) and (c) of the
Genocide Convention, may also fall within one or other of the three further categories of act
covered by Article II, depending on the circumstances in which they were committed. First of all it
is undeniable that:
In the present case all the rapes and acts of sexual violence are acts of genocide
under Article II (b) of the Genocide Convention, in that they are acts
causing serious bodily or mental harm
40. On several occasions the United Nations General Assembly has made a point of stressing
1
the “extraordinary suffering” endured by the victims of rape and sexual violence. It is beyond
dispute from the point of view of ArticleII (b) of the Convention that rapes and acts of sexual
violence have the most significant repercussions , for it is difficult to see how it could be
1See inter alia United Nations documents, doc. A/RES/48/143, “Rape and abuse of women in the areas of armed
conflict in the former Yugoslavia”, 5 January 1994, Preamble, para. 14; doc. A/RES/50/192, “Rape and abuse of women
in the areas of armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia”, 23 February 1996, para. 8. - 3 -
11 disputed ⎯ except of course by denying that the acts ever took place ⎯ that these are the very
quintessence of serious bodily or mental harm.
41. Serious bodily harm means any form of bodily injury or any act that harms the physical
state of the victim, any act that entails certain phy sical injuries. In the case of rapes or acts of
sexual violence it needs to be stressed that one of the primary and immediate effects of the rape is
first of all intense physical pain, sometimes bor dering on real physical “agony”. Of course, over
and above the immediate physical pain felt by the victim, rape may in certain cases have physical
after-effects, may be accompanied by major, even irremediable, gynaecological problems that may
cause sterility. Again it goes without saying that acts of mutilation of the genital organs are
2
capable of “causing great suffering or serious injury to body and health” , which, I think, calls for
no further comment. It also goes without saying that the physical suffering caused by rapes and
acts of physical violence is associated with incalculable mental and psychological suffering.
42. Although of course serious mental harm relates to non-physical attacks, it is apparent
that it continues far beyond the perpetration of th e rape or act of sexual violence. Reflecting the
perpetrator’s profound contempt for the victim ⎯ as a serious attack on the victim’s dignity ⎯
rapes and acts of sexual violence are in eff ect acts intended to humiliate and dehumanize the
victim, in that they affect the victim in the core of his or her being. As GeneralDallaire put it:
“Massacres kill the body. Rape kills the soul.” 3
43. The psychological effects of rape and other forms of sexual attack have been specifically
analysed in the report of the United Nations Commission of Experts in the following terms:
12 “Rape and other forms of sexual assault ha rm not only the body of the victim.
The more significant harm is the feeling of total loss of control over the most intimate
and personal decisions and bodily functions . This loss of control infringes on the
victim’s human dignity and is what makes rape and sexual assault such an effective
means of ‘ethnic cleansing’.” 4
2
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadi ć alias “Dule ”, case No. IT-94-1-T, TriChamber, Judgement, 7 May 1997,
para. 243.
Examination-in chief of Brent Beardsley, Former Aid to the Force Commander, General Roméo Dallaire, United
Nations Peace-keeping mission in Rwanda, Bagasora, Kabiligi, Nt abakuze, Nsengiyumva (ICTR-98-41-T), Trial
transcript of 3 February 2004, cited by K. Askin “Gender Cr imes Jurisprudence in the ICTR. Positive Developments”,
Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2005, p. 1008.
United Nations, Final report of the Commission of E xperts established pursuant to Security Council
resolution 780 (1992), doc. S/1994/674/Add. 2, Vol. V, 28 December 1994, “Rape and sexual attacks”, p. 12, para. 25. - 4 -
44. The mental suffering that follows rape s and acts of sexual violence has important
traumatic consequences ⎯ generally expressed as “Rape Trauma Symptom” ⎯ which may
continue throughout the life of the victim, whether as a state of permanent distress, insomnia,
incessant nightmares, depression, phobias or even di sorders leading victims to refuse any sexual
relationship. Such distress is perhaps most ex treme when the woman falls pregnant following the
rape. Such a pregnancy in these circumstances creates a terrible dilemma for the victim: she is torn
between a mother’s instinctive desire to keep her child and the wish to seek an abortion or, if it is
medically too late for an abortion, to abandon her ch ild: this is a choice as dramatically painful as
“Sophie’s Choice” 5, which no woman in the world would ever wish to face. A study which Bosnia
and Herzegovina cited in its Reply 6by doctors from a gynaecological clinic in Zagreb which took
in raped Bosnian women emphasized this prof ound traumatism when it described how these
women lived through their pregnancies:
“at the end of almost every session, the pregnant women in the present study group
asked for help in ridding themselves of the ‘u nnatural body’. They called the fetus ‘a
thing’. They wished that they had a tumour instead of a baby, because a tumour could
be removed easily.” 7
“A tumour rather than a baby”: it is almost impossible for me to speak these words, and yet a
woman managed to speak them not so long ago. .. There are many who rightly stress this
unspeakable aspect of the mental suffering th at originates from sexual violence: Amnesty
13 International has spoken of a “wound to the soul” , and a French historian has described rape, in a
9
work entitled L’histoire du viol , as “mental murder”.
45. These psychological consequences are partic ularly severe within Muslim society, where
the reputation of women has a meaningful place in the reputation of the family. Over and above
the humiliation and the suffering of the victim, it is the entire community th at is disgraced. These
5
William Styron, Sophie’s Choice, Random House, 1994.
6
Reply of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 23 April 1998, Chapter 7, para. 147.
7Dragica Kozaric-Kovacic et al., “Rape, Torture and Traumatization of Bosnian and Croatian Women:
Psychological Sequelae”, Amer. J. Orthopsychiat., Vol. 65, No. 3, July 1995, pp. 431-432 (Reply, Annex 78).
8“Amnesty International dénonce les vi ols qui se poursuivent en BosniLe Monde, 23 January 1993, p. 3
(Reply, Annex 86).
9Georges Vigarello, Histoire immédiate, Paris, 1998. - 5 -
issues have been illustrated by the ICTR in a way that cannot be bettered, in a case in which it is
emphasized, and I quote:
“the harm caused [a rape] need not bring a bout death but causes handicap such that
the individu10 will be unable to be a socially useful unit or a socially existent unit of
the group” .
46. Do I need to stress, Madam President, after what I have just stated, that it is indisputable
that rapes and acts of sexual violence fall within the terms of the phrase “causing serious bodily or
mental harm”, the head of genocide set out in ArticleII (b) of the Convention. The initiative in
expressly stating this obvious fact came from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; in
the celebrated Akayesu case, the first in which a charge of genocide was upheld by an international
tribunal, and a landmark in the development of the law, inasmuch as the court held that the concept
of serious bodily or mental harm encompassed ⎯ without being limited thereto ⎯ “acts of torture,
be they bodily or mental, inhumane or degrading treatment, persecution” 11. As regards rapes and
acts of sexual violence, the Tribunal emphasized that these acts:
14 “constitute genocide in the same way as an y other act as long as they were committed
with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as
such. Indeed, rape and sexual violence certainly constitute infliction of serious bodily
and mental harm on the victims and are even, according to the Chamber, one of the
worst ways of inflicting harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily and mental
12
harm.”
47. The subsequent jurisprudence of intern ational criminal tribunals has consistently
followed this approach, expressly citing acts of se xual violence and rape in their indictments under
the head of “serious bodily and mental harm” 13. Recent confirmation can be found in the
1ICTR, Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana , ICTR-95-1. Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
21 May 1999, para. 107; emphasis added.
1ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgement, 2 September 1998,
para. 504; Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana , ICTR-95-1, Trial Chamber II, Judgement,
21May1999, para. 110; Prosecutor v. Georges Andersen Nderubumwe Rutaganda , ICTR-96-3-T, Trial Chamber I,
Judgement, 6 December 1999, para. 51; Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, ICTR-96-13, Trial Chamber I, Judgement and
Sentence, 27 January 2000, para. 156; Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, ICTR-95-1A-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgement,
7June 2001, para. 59; Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza , case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Chamber III, Judgement and
Sentence, 15 May 2003, paras. 320-321; Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli, case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Trial Chamber II,
Judgement and Sentence, 1 December 2003, para. 815; Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, case No. ICTR-2001-64-T,
Trial Chamber III, Judgement, 17 June 2004, para. 291.
12
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu , ICTR-96-94-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgement, 2 September 1998,
para. 731.
13
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, cases No. IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, Review
of the Indictments pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules ofProcedure and Evidence, 11 July 1996, para. 93. See ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić alias “Pavo”, Hazim Delic, Esad L andzo alias “Zenga” (“Celebici”), case
No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber II quater, Judgement, 16 November 1998, para. 486. - 6 -
jurisprudence of the ICTY, more particularly in the Krstić case , in which the Tribunal held that
“inhuman treatment, torture, rape, sexual abu se... are among the acts which may cause serious
bodily or mental injury” 15.
48. In view of the preceding considerations it is difficult to see how it could be denied that
the rape of a Bosnian Muslim woman amounts to “serious bodily and mental harm” inflicted on a
member of the group of Bosnian Muslims, or that acts of sexual violence committed against
non-Serb men amount to “serious bodily and mental harm” inflicted on a member of the group of
Bosnian non-Serbs. It is an obvious fact. This serious bodily and mental harm is all the more
grave because it is, so to speak, unending, as demons trated by the touching testimony of a survivor
of the Rwandan genocide, which can be read in a very moving book entitled SurVivantes, from
which I will read a passage:
“These victims are subjected to an unbear able paradox: they owe their survival
to a rape. In most cases the killers had fi rst massacred their families before their eyes,
before abusing them and then sparing them. A paradox and a shocking piece of
stagecraft: the killers let them live so that they would endure... a hell worse than
death... So that [and the worst is I believe it] so that survival would be worth
nothing to them . . . They held out during the genocide . . . They held out to survive
that horror and now, having held out for ten years, they are in a state of living death.
They are dying. That is precisely the power of genocide: a horror at the time, but
15 also a horror afterwards. It is not the end of a genocide that completes the genocide,
because inwardly there is never an end to a genocide. There is just an end to the
killings, massacre16 prosecutions [which is obviously essential] but there is no end to
the destruction.” [Translation by the Registry.]
In the present case all the rapes and acts of sexual violence are acts of genocide under
Article II (c) of the Genocide Convention (deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part)
49. Thus, although it is impossible to deny that acts of sexual violence fall within the
provisions of Article II (b) of the Genocide Convention, it is also quite obvious that in the present
case all the rapes and acts of sexual violen ce are acts of genocide under ArticleII (c) of the said
14
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krsti ć, case No. IT-98-33, Trial Chambr I, Judgement, 2 August, 2001,
para. 513.
15
Ibid., para. 513.
16Esther Majawayo and Souad Belhaddad, SurVivantes. Rwanda Histoire d’un génocide , éd. de l’aube, poche
essai, 2004, p. 197; emphasis added. - 7 -
Convention, which refers to the deliberate inflic tion on the group of “conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”.
50. I would explain first that this phrase means “methods of destruction by which the
perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group, but which, ultimately, seek their
17
physical destruction” . Thus what it is intended to cover ar e methods of destruction that act upon
members of the group not immediately but graduall y, and which are therefore inevitably far more
insidious.
51. Rape may thus be regarded as a condition of life calculated to bring about the physical
destruction of a group. As was expressly held by the ICTR:
“[i]t is the view of the Trial Chamber that . . . the conditions of life envisaged include
rape, the starving of a group of people, reducing required medical services below a
minimum, and withholding sufficient living accommodation for a reasonable period,
18
provided the above would lead to the destruction of the group in whole or in part” .
52. The ICTY, too, in the amended indictment issued by the Prosecutor on 11 October 2002
against General Ratko Mladić, stated that the latter is accused of complicity in genocide for having,
by his acts and omissions, participated in a joint criminal enterprise aimed at a form of partial
16 destruction of the Bosnian Muslims, which was effected, inter alia, by:
“the subjecting of Bosnian Muslims to conditions of life calculated to bring about their
physical destruction, namely through cruel and inhumane treatment, including torture,
physical and psychological abuse, sexual violence . . .” 19.
It is thus clear that sexual violence is include d among the conditions of life calculated to bring
about the physical destruction of a group.
53. This point deserves more detailed explanati on. First of all, we must keep in mind the
fact already emphasized, that the consequences of rape and sexual violence go far beyond the
damage caused to the physical and mental integrit y of the victim, and have a more general scope.
1ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu , ICTR-96-94-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgement, 2September1998,
para. 505; Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema , ICTR-96-13, Trial Chamber I, Judge ment and Sentence, 27January2000,
para. 157; Prosecutor v. Georges Andersen Nderubumwe Rutaganda , ICTR-96-3-T, Trial Ch amber I, Judgement,
6 December 1999, para. 52.
1ICTR, Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana , ICTR-95-1, Trial ChamberII, Judgement,
21 May 1999, para. 116; emphasis added.
1ICTY, Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, case No. IT-95-5/18-1, Amended Indictment, 11 October 2002, para. 34 (c);
emphasis added. - 8 -
Over and above the individual, it is thus the latter’ s entire family that is targeted, and beyond the
family, the group as a whole because the entire structure of the society is challenged.
By particularly targeting women, rape and sexual violence, given the disastrous effects on
their victims, to which I referred this morning, destroy the symbolic pillar of the group, the
foundation on which rests the entire structure of family and social life. In this regard, one can only
endorse the words of RaphaëlLemkin, who consid ered that genocide was established in cases
involving a “co-ordinated plan aiming at the destructi on of essential foundations of the life of
20
national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” . The destruction of
essential foundations of the life of national groups.
54. By attacking the symbolic line of descent on which the group is based, i.e. the power of
women to create life, rape and sexual violence undermine ⎯ in cases of refusal by female victims
of rape to procreate or the physical impossib ility for them to have children after being raped ⎯ the
17 aptitude and physical ability of the group to repr oduce and renew itself, as was expertly explained
by a French sociologist, Ms Véronique Nahoum-Grappe, in a passage I shall now read out:
“attempting to hurt someone is also an intellectual exercise: touching a sensitive spot
involves knowing the sacred core of the victim’s culture. In most cases, however,
what families and communities hold most dear are the outward indicators of the line of
descent, pointing either towards the past.. . or towards the future (children, female
sexuality...). These indicators are thus ideal targets for crimes of desecration . A
crime of desecration can therefore be defined as an attempt to interfere with blood ties
at the point where the desecrator believes them to be manifested. ” 21. [Translation by
the Registry.]
Even though this desire to desecrate was doubtless not consciously present in the minds of
the perpetrators of sexual violence, at least in tho se terms, it has to be considered that, by attacking
the symbolic bedrock of the group, i.e. the woman as the vector of life, since she alone is able to
give life, rape and sexual violence do in fact subj ect the group to conditions of life that eventually
bring about its destruction.
20
R. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe , Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944,
p. 79; emphasis added.
2V. Nahoum-Grappe, “ Purifier le lien de filiation. Lesols systématiques en ex-Yougoslavie, 1991-1995 ”
[Purifying the line of descent. Systemat ic rape in the former Yugoslavia, 1991-1995] , Esprit, December 1996, p.152;
emphasis added. - 9 -
In the present case, certain acts of rape and sexual violence are acts of genocide under
Article II (a) of the Genocide Convention (killing members of the group)
55. Rape and sexual violence may constitute killing within the meaning of the Genocide
Convention, in several ways.
56. Situations where rape and sexual violen ce are followed by killing are common. Death
may in the first place be the irremediable and dir ect consequence of the victim’s resistance to her
aggressor, who “avenges” her refusal by deliberately killing her; such a cas e was recorded by the
United Nations Commission of Experts in its repor t, which states: “[c]aptors have killed women
who resisted being raped, often in front of other prisoners” 22. If such resistance to rape may occur
directly in a relationship between victim and aggr essor, it may also take other forms. Thus, a
man’s refusal to obey an order by Serbian soldiers to rape a girl also led to his death. This example
18 was reported in the Stakić case concerning rape and sexual violence in the Omarska camp, and was
corroborated in identical terms by the ICTY in the Brdanin case 23, where the following account
was given:
“[o]ne incident of sexual abuse occurred in the ‘White House’ [Omarska camp
compound] on 26 June 1992. The guards tried to force Mehmedalija Sarajlic to rape a
girl. He begged: ‘Don’t make me do it. Sh e could be my daughter. I am a man in
advanced age.’ The soldiers replied: ‘W ell, try to use the finger.’ There was a
scream and beatings, and then everything wa s silent. A minute or two later, a guard
came into the room and asked for two strong men who went to fetch the body of
Mehmedalija Sarajlic. His dead body was later seen near the ‘White House’.” 24
57. Death may also result, through a direct cause-effect relationship, of course, from the very
scale of the physical violence suffered by the victim , which will be all the more intense in cases of
repeated gang rape of the type described above and may therefore result in the death of the victim.
The brutality of the abuse inflicted, as for exam ple in the case of mutilation of the genitals, may
also lead directly to the death of the victim. I shall not go over this point again here, as an account
has already been given to the Court.
58. Death may also, of course, be caused by the suicide of the victim after suffering rape and
sexual violence. There are many reports of wo men who committed suicide because they could not
22
United Nations, Commission of Experts, Final Report, S/1994/674, 28 December 1994, p. 55, para. 230.
2ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin, case No. IT-99-36-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, 1 September 2004,
para. 516.
2ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milomir Staki ć, case No.IT-97-24-T, Trial ChamberII, Judgement, 31July2003,
para. 236. - 10 -
stand the thought of the sexual violence they had undergone and felt incapable of carrying the
burden of the humiliation and shame attaching to ra pe. In this connection, one can only fully
endorse the view expressed by the ICTY in the Stakic case, which I have already mentioned,
namely that “[f]or a woman, rape is by far the ultimate offence, sometimes even worse than death
25
because it brings shame on her” . It should be borne in mind that this concept of shame is
particularly prominent in the psychology of Mus lims, for whom family honour is above all based
on the unsullied reputation of women, on chastity. As is succinctly observed by the author
Nawal El Saadawi in a work entitled The Hidden Face of Eve. Women in the Arab World , for the
Muslim community:
19 “A man’s honour is safe as long as the fema le members of his family keep their
hymen intact. It is more closely related to the behaviour of the woman in the family,
than to his own behaviour . . . At the root of this . . . situation lies the fact that sexual
experience in the life of a man is a source of pride and a symbol of virility; whereas
sexual experience in the life of woman is a source of shame and a symbol of
degradation.” 26
59. Rather than face the disgrace of a rape, a Muslim woman may sometimes prefer to take
her own life. Thus, to give only one exam ple among others, the most recent report by
Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki on the human rights situation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, in
connection with the fall of Srebrenica, expressly re ferred to the suicide of a 14-year old girl who
27
had been raped by Serbian soldiers .
60. All these elements clearly indicate that ra pe, if it does not itself constitute murder, may
nevertheless be the underlying cause of the death of the rape victim, with which it is inextricably
linked by a direct cause-effect relationship. But there is more, Madam President, Members of the
Court.
25
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milomir Staki ć, case No.IT-97-24-T, Trial ChamberII, Judgement, 31July2003,
para. 803.
2Nawal El Saadawi, The Hidden Face of Eve. Women in the Arab World, Boston, Beacon Press, 1982, p. 31.
2United Nations, Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by
Mr.Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Co mmission on Human Rights, E/ CN.4/1996/9, 22August 1995,
para. 45, p. 10. - 11 -
In the present case, some instances of rape and sexual violence are acts of genocide under
Article II (d) of the Genocide Convention (measures intended
to prevent births within the group)
61. According to the jurisprudence of the in ternational criminal tribunals, measures intended
to prevent births within the group include ⎯ as stated in the Akayesu case ⎯ “sexual mutilation,
the practice of sterilization, forced birth cont rol, separation of the sexes and prohibition of
28
marriages” .
62. As symbols of contempt for the women of a group and of “possession” of them, rape and
sexual violence can undeniably ⎯ you will agree ⎯ be included among “measures intended to
prevent births”, which may result from a variety of factors.
20 63. First, it goes without saying that the forced separation of male and female Muslims in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, as systematically practised when various municipalities were occupied by
the Serb forces, and as already described at length, in all probability entailed a decline in the birth
rate of the group, given the lack of physical cont act over many months. This outcome had already
been described at an earlier period by Raphaël Lemk in, in the following terms, in his analysis of
German policy towards the Jews: “[t]he birthrate of the undesired group is being further decreased
29
as a result of the separation of males from females by deporting them” .
64. However, this situation may be perpetua ted well beyond the period of separation. Nor
need we dwell on the fact that rape and sexual violence are likely to give rise to a reduction in
sexual relations over a very long period of time, owing to the fact that a Bosnian Muslim woman or
girl who has been raped will either be rejected by her husband or will not find a husband, or again
that a man who has been subjected to terrible sexual violence will no longer seek to approach a
woman and start a family.
65. Secondly, the wounds and physical handicaps inflicted on a victim of rape and physical
violence, and the fact that women frequently su ffer gynaecological problems as a result of sexual
violence, even to the extent of becoming infe rtile, obviously also prevent reproduction by the
members of the group; and the same is true for certain types of sexual mutilation suffered by men.
28ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu , case NoI.CTR-96-4-T, Trial ChambeIr, Judgement,
2 September 1998, para. 507; Prosecutor v. Georges Andersen Nderubumwe Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3-T, Trial Chamber I,
Judgement, 6 December 1999, para. 53; Musema, Trial Chamber I, Judgement and Sentence, 27 January 2000, para. 158.
29R. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe , Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944,
p. 84, Reply, Ann. 84. - 12 -
66. While the measures intended to prevent births within the group may be physical
measures, they may also be of a mental nature. Thus, the psychological trauma produced in the
victims of rape and sexual violence may lead to their no longer wising to have children, thereby
affecting generation replacement. This particular aspect was highlighted by the ICTR in the
Akayesu case:
“rape can be a measure intended to preven t births when the person raped refuses
21 subsequently to procreate, in the same way that members of a group can be led,
30
through threats or trauma, not to procreate” .
67. All these elements undeniably affect the no rmal reproductive cycle and, in the long run,
impair generation replacement and may thus lead to the physical destruction of the group.
In the present case, certain acts of rape and sexual violence are acts of genocide under
Article II (e) of the Genocide Convention in that they involved the forcible transfer
of children of the group to another group
68. While rape and sexual violence may undeni ably be characterized as “acts of destructive
rape”, these being the acts I have for the most pa rt described up to now; they may also, in some
cases, take on another dimension, commonly refe rred to as “procreative rape”, the purpose of
which is to induce a forced pregnancy with a view to modifying the ethnic composition of a
population. Allow me at this point to refer to the remarks of the French sociologist cited above:
“[t]he practice of ethnic cleansing is aimed at eliminating the other person not only in
space, but also in time, past and future.... It seeks not only his death, but his
‘eradication’, thus making it impossible for him to appear again . . . The rapist seeks
to dislodge, eradicate and reconceive in his own image the alternative seed. The
defilement of rape aims not at the death of the other person, which is too easy, but at
undoing his birth . . . at recommencing his conception by replacing the other collective
‘genome’ by one’s own . . . The term ‘eradication’ is pertinent: it is in fact the roots
that are the object of the fundamental cle ansing known as rape. They will not grow
again because an alternative graft has been implanted in the matrix .” 31 [Translation
by the Registry.]
69. The Court will doubtless have noted that a reference to roots was also made yesterday by
Laura Dauban, when she said that, after destroying a mosque, the Serbs went so far as to dig up and
remove the very foundations. As regards forced pregnancies, it may be noted that, in patriarchal
30
Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu , case No.ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgement, 2September1998,
para. 508.
3Véronique Nahoum-Grappe, “ Purifier le lien de filiation. Les viols systématiques en ex-Yougoslavie,
1991-1995” [Purifying the line of descent. Systema tic rape in the former Yugoslavia, 1991-1995] , Esprit,
December 1996, pp. 157-158, Reply, Ann. 87, emphasis added. - 13 -
societies, it is the male line that is of decisive importance for establishing the descent of the child,
and that only the father’s ethnicity is therefor e taken into account. This specific feature of
patriarchal societies was recognized by the ICTR, which emphasized that:
22 “[i]n patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is determined by the identity
of the father, an example of a measure intended to prevent births within a group is the
case where, during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately impregnated by a
man of another group, with the intent to have her give birth to a child who will
32
consequently not belong to its mother’s group” .
I shall not enter here into an ethnological debate, being a jurist, not an ethnologist, and I shall not
therefore express an opinion on whether or not th e Muslim society of Bosnia is a patriarchal
society. Allow me merely to say, Members of the Court, that, regardless of the elementary
structures of a society, what matters most is the expressed intention of the person seeking through
his seed to give a new line of descent to the unbor n child, rather than the medical and scientific
realities.
70. Be that as it may, as Bosnia and Her zegovina has shown in its Reply, numerous
international reports have mentioned these for ced pregnancies, which the Respondent, in its
33
Rejoinder, nevertheless still questions . Needless to say, for the same reasons, as I have already
explained, it is difficult to give a precise estimat e of the actual number of acts of rape and sexual
violence, it is also extremely difficult to estab lish the number of forced pregnancies given the
proven inadequacy of relevant testimony and the conspiracy of silence surrounding the birth of
these children, who are covered with opprobrium from the time of their birth.
71. For example, Special Rapporteur Mazowiecki reported a substantial increase in abortions
34
in 1992 . Here again, whatever the figures may be, they are certainly underestimated given the
lack of direct testimony, the clandestine abortions performed outside hospita ls and the clandestine
confinements followed by abandonment of the child.
32
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu , case NoI.CTR-96-4-T, Trial ChambeIr, Judgement,
2 September 1998, para. 507.
33Rejoinder of Serbia and Montenegro, 22 February 1999, para. 3.3.5.23.
34United Nation, Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by
Mr.Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to Commission
resolution1992/S-1/1 of 14August 1992, Doc.E/CN.4/1993/50, 10 February 1993, Ann. II, p. 66, para. 9 and p. 67,
paras. 14-16. - 14 -
72. Forced pregnancies certainly occupy an important place in the genocidal policy of ethnic
cleansing implemented by the Serbian forces. Allow me at this point to refer once again to the
35
Kunarac case, where the ICTY recounts the following fact, which was confirmed on appeal :
23 “Kunarac also knew that Muslim women were specifically targeted, as he
himself took several of them to his men and raped some of them himself... While
raping FWS-183, the accused... told her that she should enjoy being ‘fucked by a
Serb’. After he and another soldier had finished... Kunarac laughed at her and
added that she would now carry a Serb baby and would not know who the father
would be.” 36
This destructive intent carried into the actua l group itself, and today confirmed by an ICTY
judgment, had already been referred to by Bosnia in its Reply, which noted that the Commission of
Experts had established that a Muslim woman had b een raped almost daily for six months by three
or four soldiers, who told her that “she would gi ve birth to a chetnik boy who would kill Muslims
37
when he grew up” .
73. Another reported fact, namely that, over a nd above forced pregnancies, for purely ethnic
reasons, pregnant Muslim women were detained in the camps until they were no longer capable of
being aborted, is further evidence of the desire to modify the composition of the Muslim national
group in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by increasing the birth rate of purportedly non-Muslim children.
74. Thus, in the indictment of Karadži ć and Mladi ć, pursuant to Rule61, the ICTY
recognized this practice when it stated: “Some camp s were specially devoted to rape, with the aim
of forcing the birth of Serbian offspring, the women often being interned until it was too late for
them to undergo an abortion ... It would seem that the aim of many rapes was enforced
impregnation.” 38
75. Forced pregnancies may thus also ser ve the purpose of a change in the ethnic
composition of the target group, inasmuch as they lead to the expansion, by violent means, of one
group (Serb) to the detriment of another (Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims). It can therefore be
35
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic , cases Nos.IT-96-23 and
IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 12 June 2002, pp. 82-84, paras. 238-246.
3ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic , cases Nos.IT-96-23 and
IT-96-23/1, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, 22 February 2001, para. 583.
3Reply of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 23 April 1998, Chap. 7, para. 176.
3ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, cases Nos. IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, Review
of the indictments pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 11 July 1996, para. 64; emphasis added. - 15 -
said that these forced pregnancies result in the forced transfer of the unborn children of the group to
another group.
39
24 76. While Serbia and Montenegro contends in this regard, in its Rejoinder , that a child born
of a forced pregnancy could not in any circumst ances be considered a Serb and accepted in the
Serbian community, Bosnia and Herzegovina wishes for its part to affirm that the child in question
could also not be considered a genuine Muslim within the Muslim community of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Therefore, even if the fate of th ese “children of shame” remains uncertain and it is
likely, in some cases, that they were abandoned by their biological mothers, the fact remains, in
both this and the contrary case, that they could certainly not be considered as belonging to the
Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and would not be brought up in that group.
77. Finally, it is apparent that certain cases of rape against Muslim women in Bosnia and
Herzegovina aimed at causing forced procr eation may be contemplated as measures openly
intended ⎯ even if that intention does not necessarily produce an effect ⎯ to ensure the transfer of
unborn children from one group to another. Accord ingly, these forced pregnancies clearly form
part of the policy of genocidal ethnic cleansing of the Muslim group in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I
would add that, even if the Court does not accept this analysis of what I have characterized as a
“transfer of children from one group to another” ⎯ a transfer of unborn children from one group to
another ⎯ the fact remains that what c ounts is the stated intention. That stated intention must
always be clearly distinguished from the actual rea lization of the intent hidden behind this practice
of forced pregnancy, which was clearly a genocidal intent, an intention to destroy the target group
in whole or in part.
*
* *
78. As I said at the beginning of this addr ess, although sexual violence is not mentioned in
Article II, there is no denying that it can be pr osecuted under each of the categories referred to in
39
Rejoinder of Serbia and Montenegro, 22 February 19993.3.5.23. - 16 -
25 the Convention. This was, moreover, the finding made by the ICTY in the Furundzija case, where
the Tribunal stated that, according to the context in which it took place, a rape could be prosecuted
as genocide. Let me read out an important extract from that decision:
“Rape is explicitly provided for in Article5 of the Statute of the International
Tribunal as a crime against humanity. Rape may also amount to a grave breach of the
Geneva Conventions, a violation of the laws or customs of war or an act of genocide,
if the requisite elements are met, and may be prosecuted accordingly.” 40
79. While rape may be considered a crime against humanity, it may also ⎯ as we have just
heard ⎯ be considered an act of genocide. Of course, in order to be considered an act of genocide,
it must be accompanied by the intention to destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group in
whole or in part. It is the existence of this intention which Bosnia and Herzegovina will now seek
to demonstrate to the Court.
III. RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE WERE COMMITTED WITH GENOCIDAL INTENT
80. Madam President, Members of the Court, before demonstrati ng how rape and sexual
violence committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina may be characterized as acts of genocide, I should
like briefly to seek to get to the heart of this concept, with which we all claim familiarity. My
colleague Tom Franck gave you this morning what I might call an insider’s description of the
concept of genocide, as interpreted by the two ad hoc tribunals. Following in his footsteps, I for
my part shall pursue the quest for a definition from an outsider’s perspective, so to speak, in order
to differentiate it from concepts other than genocide.
The concept of genocide
81. Before being able to grasp any concept, it is frequently essential to compare it with
related concepts, in order to pinpoint its specific fe atures, to find its true essence. This is the
method I shall follow by briefly comparing the c oncept of genocide with war crimes and crimes
against humanity. First, the distinction between a war crime and an act of genocide is an important
one, since those who deny the specific facts of what happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina
26 frequently say, “yes, it is true that rapes took place, but these are only war crimes that occur in all
40
Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija , case No.IT-95-17/1-T10, Trial Ch amber II, Judgement, 10 December 1998,
para. 172; emphasis added. - 17 -
wars”. The distinction between a crime against humanity and an act of genocide is also particularly
revealing and necessary to our case, since, while the two concepts share certain characteristics ⎯
which is a very important point ⎯ the one, the concept of genocide, cannot however be reduced to
the level of the other, that of a crime against humanity.
The distinction between a war crime and genocide: in our case, the rapes and sexual violence
were not “mere” war crimes, but acts of genocide
82. As Article I of the Genocide Convention reminds us, genocide may be committed in time
of peace or in time of war. The acts of sexual violence, which I have addressed at some length,
were committed in time of war. And there ma y thus be a strong temp tation to “downgrade”
them ⎯ if I dare so put it ⎯ to war crimes. What I would, however, forcefully recall here before
this Court is the fact that an armed conflict, the fact that there was a war going on between Serbia
and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina ⎯ as Bosnia’s Deputy Agent in particular has
explained to you at length ⎯ did not mean that that no genocide was committed. The Respondent
has indeed sought to take this point, arguing that this was a war, not genocide. Thus in its
Rejoinder, for example, the Respondent states:
“The various accounts... of military activities by JNA units [the Court will
doubtless, have noted incidentally that the Respondent thus recognizes the
involvement of the Yugoslav army in th e events which took place in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, confining itself to discussing whether those events should be
characterized as ‘war or genocide’]... relate to episodes in a civil war and nothing
more. The numerous documents advanced by the Bosnian Government in this section
of the Reply contain no evidence of genocidal intent... As the documents make
clear, they are concerned exclusively with ‘combat activities’.” 41
83. A combat perhaps, Madam President, Me mbers of the Court, but a combat whose
ultimate purpose was the total or partial elimin ation of Bosnian Muslims from the territories
claimed by Serbia and Montenegro, a combat wh ich made intensive use, as one of its weapons,
precisely of sexual violence. When, in the Kunarac case, the ICTY sought to ascertain the intent
underlying all these acts of sexual violence, it speci fically described it as “the intention to
27 42
overcome the Muslims in any possible ways, including through criminal means” . The “intention
to overcome” is simply another way of saying the intention to destroy, in whole or in part. Thus, to
41
Rejoinder of Serbia and Montenegro, para. 3.2.3.39.
42ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic cases IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1,
Trial Chamber II, Judgement, 22 February 2001, para. 582. - 18 -
take but one example concerning one of the thr ee accused, Kunarac, it was acknowledged that the
rapes were clearly an integral part of the strategy of ethnic cleansing:
“Dragoljub Kunarac also knew that Muslim women were specifically targeted,
as he himself took several of them to his men and raped some of them himself. In the
course of one of these rapes, he expressed , with verbal and physical aggression, his
view that the rapes against the Muslim wo men were one of the many ways in which
43
the Serbs could assert their superiority and victory over the Muslims . . .”
One of the many ways of asserting superiority and victory over the Muslims, we know all too well
what that means: victory could only be the disappearance of the Muslims as a group from the
territories coveted by Serbia.
84. This need to draw a clear distinction between a war crime and genocide, between rape
characterized ⎯ if I dare say so ⎯ as a “mere” war crime and rape characterized as an act of
genocide, because of a different subjective intention, even if, objectively, it is the same individuals
who are the victims, has been confirmed both by the ICTR and by the ICTY.
85. Right from the first case heard by the ICTR, the much-cited Akayesu case, the ICTR
made it clear that, even if some of the Tutsis massacred belonged to th e RPF (Rwandan Patriotic
Forces), who were at war with the Hutu authorities, it was not because of the military conflict that
they were killed, but because of their membership of the Tutsi ethnic group:
“Clearly, the victims were not chosen as individuals but, indeed, because they
belonged to the said group; and hence th e victims were members of this group
selected as such... Clearly therefore, the massacres which occurred in Rwanda in
1994 had a specific objective, namely the extermination of the Tutsi, who were
targeted especially because of their Tutsi origin and not because they were RPF
44
fighters.”
86. This fact of the separate existence, in relation to the conflict, of a policy of ethnic
cleansing which could be characterized as genocide was recognized, in the clearest possible terms,
28 in the decision on review of the indictments against Karadzi ć and Mladić rendered on 11 July 1996
pursuant to Article61 (on the very same day, so long ago, that the International Court of Justice
rejected all of the preliminary objections raised by the State then calling itself the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro):
43
Ibid., para. 583.
4Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu , ICTR-96-4-T, Trial ChamberI, Judgement, 2September 1998,
paras. 124-125. - 19 -
“Lastly, the Trial Chamber considers it important to mention an inherent aspect
of the policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina, confirming the
conclusions of the reports of the first Special Rapporteur of the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, Mr.Tadeusz Mazowiecki...: ‘ ethnic cleansing ’
indeed seems to be not a by-45oduct of the war initiated by the SDS and its military
allies, but rather its aim’.”
87. In other judgments too, the ICTY has stat ed that, just because there was a war going on,
that did not preclude the commission of other crimes such as crimes against humanity or acts of
genocide. Thus, in the judgment of the trial chamber in Kunarac and Others, this clear distinction
is made:
“ It is irrelevant that the Serb agg ression also pursued military goals and the
objective of territorial gain, because the criteria of ‘armed conflict’ and ‘attack upon a
civilian population’ are not synonymous. If one is of the opinion that such an element
does form part of the general requirements of crimes against humanity, the policy
behind the Serb attack was to gain total supremacy over the Muslims in the area and
finally a homogeneous region. To this end, that policy also encompassed expulsion
through terror . . .”6
It goes without saying that rape constituted a pa rticularly effective way of spreading terror,
and was thus a favoured weapon in the policy of ethnic cleansing. It is equally clear that the fact
that rapes and acts of sexual violence are very fre quently committed in times of war, and can thus
be characterized as war crimes, does not mean that in the case before us today those rapes and acts
of sexual violence cannot be characterized, given the circumstances in which they were committed,
as crimes against humanity or acts of genocide. We have now reached the second distinction
which I wish to discuss with you.
29 The distinction between crimes against humanity and acts of genocide: in the present case,
rape and sexual violence are not “merely” crimes against humanity,
they are also acts of genocide
88. To clarify the elements of a crime agai nst humanity, I would ask you to spend a moment
with me on the Nikolić case. The indictment against Nikoli ć sets out the necessary elements in
order for an act to be characterized as a crime against humanity:
“First, the crimes must be directed at a civilian population, specifically
identified as a group by the perpetrators of those acts. Secondly, the crimes must, to a
certain extent, be organized and systematic. Although they need not be related to a
45
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzić and Ratko Mladić, cases Nos. IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, Review
of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 11 July 1996, para. 64; emphasis added.
4ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dagoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic , cases Nos. IT-96-23 and
IT-96-23/1, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, 22 February 2001, para. 579. - 20 -
policy established at State level, in the c onventional sense of the term, they cannot be
the work of isolated individuals alone. Lastly, the crimes, considered as a whole, must
be of a certain scale and gravity.” 47
89. Thus it is clear from this passage that thr ee elements are necessary in order for an act to
be characterized as a crime against humanity:
it must be intentionally aimed at a civilian popul ation identified as a group by the perpetrators of
those acts;
it must be organized or systematic; and
it must be of a certain gravity.
90. However, as you know, genocide must also include these three elements: it must be
intentionally aimed at a civilian population identifie d as a group by the perpetrators of the acts; it
must be organized or systematic; it must be of a certain gravity. But that is not enough; in order
for the acts to constitute genocide, there must also be a specific intention, “the specific intent to
destroy a group without which, however atrocious the act... it cannot be characterized as
genocide” 48. This was what StephanGlaser meant when he wrote that genocide could be seen as
49
“an aggravated or special case of a crime against humanity” , as, in a sense, an extreme form of
30 crime against humanity. It was by virtue of this specific intent, which distinguishes genocide from
other crimes, that the ICTR held in the Kambanda case that genocide was the “crime of crimes” 50.
In other words, while there is no rigid boundary between crimes against humanity and genocide,
rather a sort of continuum, genocide nonetheless ⎯ to cite the language of the ICTY in the Stakic
case ⎯ constitutes “a unique crime where special em phasis is placed on the specific intent. The
47
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, case No. 94-2-R61, 20 October 1995, para. 26.
48
Observation of the Representative of the Federative Republic of Brasil during the preparatory proceedings on
the Genocide Convention, in United Nations doc., Procee dings of the 6th Committee of the United Nations General
Assembly, 21 September to 10 December, Official Documents of the General Assembly, p. 109.
49
S. Glaser, Droit international penal conventionnel , Brussels, Bruylant, 1970,.09, cited by
N.Ruhashyankiko, Special Rapporteur, in Study on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ,
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discri mination and Protection of Minorities, United Nations doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/416,
4 July 1978, para. 393.
50
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda , case No.IT-97-23-S, Trial Cham berI, Judgement and Sentence,
4 September 1998, para. 16; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Omar Serushago, case No. ICTR-98-39-5, Sentence, 5 February 1999,
para. 15. See more recently the use of this expression in th e partially dissenting opinion of Judge Wald appended to the
Judgement in Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, IT-95-10, Trial Chamber I, Judgement, 14 December 1999, para 2, and by the
ICTY itself in Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, 31 July 2003, para. 502. - 21 -
51
crime is, in fact characterized and di stinguished by a ‘surplus’ of intent” : the intention “to
destroy”, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”. Thus over and
above the facts, we have to show that, behind th e acts described to you in the course of this week,
there lay this specific intent.
The elements of genocidal intent: the sexual violence must be committed with
intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such
The sexual violence must be committed with intent to destroy
91. I would begin by making the point, as my colleague Tom Franck explained this morning,
that the destruction of a group may be accomplished in different ways. The notion of “destruction”
certainly is to be understood primarily in the sense of acts of physical and biological destruction.
But let us not forget that the concept is wider. The notion of destruction is not confined to the
murder of members of the group, but also includ es other types of act committed with intent to
destroy the viability of the group, and of course foremost among these are rape and sexual
52
31 violence . It is in fact clear that rape and sexua l violence can constitute a means of biological
destruction of the group in the long term. We fully endorse what the ICTR said in this regard in the
Akayesu case:
“these rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their
families and their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of the process of
destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi wo men and specifically contributing to their
53
destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole.”
92. In the same way, what Bosnia and Herzegovina seeks of this Court is recognition that the
acts of sexual violence were an integral part of the process of destruction of the group of Bosnian
Muslims, known as ethnic cleansing. However, the sexual violence must also be carried out with
the intent of destroying a group.
51ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, case No.IT-97-24-T, Trial Cham ber II, Judgement, 31 July 2003,
para. 520.
52See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević, Dragan Jokić, case No.IT-02-60-T, Judgement 17January 2005,
para. 666, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, case No. IT-98-33, Trial Chamber I, Judgement, 2 August 2001, para. 580.
53ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu , ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgement, 2September1998,
para. 731; Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana , ICTR-95-1, Trial ChamberII, Judgement,
21 May 1999, para. 95; Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema , ICTR-96-13, Trial ChamberI, Judgement and Sentence,
27 January 2000, para. 933. (Emphasis added.) - 22 -
The sexual violence must be carried out with the intent of destroying a group
93. We know that the Genocide Convention does not protect all groups, being confined to
national, ethnical, racial or religious groups. Th ese groups are not clearly defined. The approach
generally adopted by the jurisprudence in order to determine whether victims belong to a particular
group is based on a subjective criterion. As the Court emphasized in the Jelisić case 54: “It is the
stigmatization of a group as a distinct national, ethnical or racial unit by the community which
allows it to be determined whether a targeted population constitutes a national, ethnical or racial
group in the eyes of the alleged perpetrators.” Bu t I would also draw the Court’s attention to a
distinction made in this same case, where it was pointed out that the stigmatization of a group
targeted by a policy of genocide could be made in two distinct ways, that is, on the basis either of
positive or of negative criteria:
“A ‘positive approach’ w ould consist of the perpetrators of the crime
distinguishing a group by the characteristics which they deem to be particular to a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group. A ‘negative approach’ would consist of
identifying individual as not being part of the group to which the perpetrators of the
crime consider that they themselves belong and which to them displays specific
32 national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics. Thereby, all individuals thus
rejected would, by exclusion, make up a distinct group. The Trial Chamber . . . deems
that it is consonant with the object and purpose of the Convention to consider that its
provisions also protect groups defined by exclusion where they have been stigmatized
55
by the perpetrators of the act in this way.”
94. In the present case, there is no need for us to dwell at length on the fact that, even if all
non-Serbs were targeted, the group most targeted by the various criminal acts has expressly been
56
identified by the ICTY, many times over, as the “national group of Bosnian Muslims” .
The sexual violence must target the group as such
95. I shall not revisit this point at length, as we already addressed it this morning. I will
simply add that it is therefore necessary that the group should have been targeted as such, that is to
54ICTY, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisi ć, case No.IT-95-10, Trial Chambe rI, Judgement, 14 December 1999,
para. 70; Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, case No.IT-98-33, Trial ChamberI, Judgement, 2August 2001, para.557;
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, 21 May 1999,
para. 98.
55ICTY, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisi ć, case No.IT-95-10, Trial Chamber I, Judgement, 14December 1999,
para. 71.
56ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krsti ć, case No.IT-98-33, Trial ChamberI, Judgement, 2August 2001,
para.560; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, case No.IT-98-33-A, Appeals Ch amber, Judgement, 19April 2004,
para.591. See also, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, case No.IT-95-10, Trial Chamber I, Judgement, 14December 1999,
para. 72. - 23 -
57
say because of its specific char acteristics as a distinct entity . The ICTR also referred to this
element in the Akayesu case, in the following terms:
“The perpetration of the act charge d therefore extends beyond its actual
commission, for example, the murder of a pa rticular individual, for the realisation of
an ulterior motive, which is to destroy, in whole or part, the group of which the
individual is just one element.” 58
Thus, if the aim of the perpetrators of genocide is to destroy the group in whole or in part by
attacking a victim, it is not in fact the victim that is attacked, but the group itself; at the end of the
59
day, it is the targeted group which constitutes the “ultimate” victim of the genocide.
33 The sexual violence must be aimed at destroying the group in whole or in part
96. It is accepted that the destruction sought need not necessarily concern the totality of the
group, but may, as we well know, be aimed at the destruction of the group in part. The question
then arises what is the proportion of the group wh ich may be so defined. While no quantitative
threshold is required, internati onal criminal courts have consis tently held, however, that it is
necessary that the acts in question sh ould at least have been aimed at a “substantial” part of the
group 60, in such a way that the destruction envisag ed affects the whole group in its entirety ⎯ in
full. This criterion of “substantiality” covers diffe rent aspects. First, it may be thought that a part
of the group is “substantial” inasmuch as it re presents, in quantitative terms, a considerable
proportion of the group in question. Secondly, a pa rt of the group may be considered “substantial”
because, this time in qualitative terms, it includes the most representative members of the targeted
community. The fact that a specific part of the group is emblematic of the group as a whole, or that
it is essential to its continuation or to its survival ⎯ as women are ⎯ means that this may be
57
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milomir Staki ć, case No.IT-97-24-T, Judgement Trial ChamberII, 31July 2003,
para. 52l; Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, case, No.IT-95-10, Trial ChamberI, Judgement, 14December 1999, para.79;
Prosecutor v. Slobodan Miloševi ć, case No.IT-02-54-T, Trial Chamber I, Decision on Motion for Judgement of
Acquittal, 16 June 2004, para. 123.
58
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial ChamberI, Judgement, 2September 1998,
para. 522.
59
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Sikirica, Damir Dosen, Dragan Kolundzija (Sikirica et al.) , case No.IT-95-8,
Decision on Defence Motions for Judgement of Acquittal, 3 September 2001, para. 89.
60
See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, case No. IT-95-10, Trial ChamberI, Judgement, 14December 1999,
para. 82 and ICTY, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeals Ch amber, Judgement, 5July 2001,
para.72. For the jurisprudence of the ICTR in this sense, seProsecutor v. Clément Kayishema and ObedRuzindana ,
case No.ICTR-95-1, Trial ChamberII, Judgement, 21 May 1999, para.97; Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, case
No.ICTR-95-1A-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgement, 7 June 2001, para.64; Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, case
No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement and Sentence, Trial Chamber III, 15 May 2003, para. 316. - 24 -
regarded as a substantial part of the group. Ho wever, there is a further point, emphasized by the
ICTY, when it stated that the eradication of a part of the group could also apply to the eradication
of a group within a specific geographical area. Thus, the Tribunal carried out an analysis in
geographical terms, concluding that a substantial part of the group can mean a part of the group
situated within a defined geographical area:
“[t]he Trial Chamber notes that it is accepte d that genocide may be perpetrated in a
limited geographic zone... The Trial Chamber adopted a similar position in its
Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Article 61 filed in the Nikoli ć case. In this case,
the Trial Chamber deemed that it was po ssible to base the charge of genocide on
events which occurred only in the region of Vlasenica. In view of the object and goal
34 of the Convention and the subject and sub sequent interpretation thereof, the Trial
Chamber thus finds that international cust om admits the characterization of genocide
even when the exterminatory intent only extends to a limited geographic zone.” 61
This approach, Madam President, Members of the Court, appears to me to be crucial in this case. It
was moreover applied in spectacular fashion in the Krstić case, where it was decided that an act of
genocide had been committed solely against the “Muslims of Srebrenica or the Muslims of eastern
62
Bosnia” . I have thus very briefly summarized the elem ents of genocidal intent. But how is that
intent, so essential to the establishment of geno cide, to be proved? I think it is time,
Madam President, for me to stop. I will continue after the break.
The PRESIDENT: Yes, Professor Stern. We will rise for ten minutes.
The Court adjourned from 4.15 to 4.25 p.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated.
Ms STERN: Madam President, Members of th e Court. I ended my presentation in the first
part of this afternoon’s session with the question whether the necessary intent to establish genocide
was present and, in particular, the question of how it was to be proved. This is what I shall now
address.
61
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisi ć, case No. IT-95-10, Trial ChambrI, Judgement, 14December 1999,
para. 83.
6ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krsti ć, case No.IT-98-33, Trial ChamberI, Judgement, 2August 2001,
para. 560; Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 23. - 25 -
Proof of the genocidal intent underlying the acts of sexual violence: a bundle of indices
97. As the ICTR itself admitted in the Akayesu case, intent is “a mental factor which is
63
difficult, even impossible, to determine” . In practice, it can be readily understood that proof of
genocidal intent is extremely difficult to estab lish. Few perpetrators of genocide, with the
exception of Hitler, announce to the world their in tention to destroy a specific group. While the
criterion of intent cannot be purely and simply presumed 64, in the absence of which genocide would
35 lose its specific character, and evidence of intent must be provided, it is however accepted, in
accordance with an established line of jurispruden ce, that such evidence may become apparent
from the combined effect of a certain number of elements ⎯ from the factual circumstances of the
65
crime ⎯ and that it may therefore be said that intent may be deduced from a bundle of
concordant indices.
98. The indices enabling genocidal intent to be established beyond all possible dispute have
been identified in numerous decisions or judgments , both of the ICTY and of the ICTR; we have
cited many of them in our Rejoinder, but I w ill not re-cite them now. I will confine myself to
quoting here a recent judgment of the ICTY, whic h summarizes in substance the combination of
elements establishing the existence of a specific inte nt to commit the crime of genocide. Thus, in
the Jelisić case, the ICTY held that proof of specific intent:
“may, in the absence of direct e xplicit evidence, be inferred from a number of facts
and circumstances, such as the general context, the perpetration of other culpable acts
systematically directed against the same group, the scale of atrocities committed, the
systematic targeting of victims on account of their membership of a particular group,
or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts 66.
6ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu , case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial ChamberI, Judgement,
2September1998, para.523. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic , case No.IT-95-10, Trial Chamber I,
Judgement, 14 December 1999, para. 101.
6ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu , case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Tr ial Chamber I, Judgement,
2 September 1998; para. 521; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisi ć, case No. IT-95-10, Trial ChamberI, Judgement,
14 December 1999, para. 78.
6ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu , case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Tr ial Chamber I, Judgement,
2 September 1998, paras. 523-524; Prosecutor v. Georges Andersen Nderubumwe Rutaganda, case No. ICTR-96-3-T,
Trial Chamber I, Judgement, 6December 1999, para.525; Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, case No. ICTR-96-13, Trial
ChamberI, Judgement and Sentence, 27Januar y 2000, paras.166-167. For the ICTY, see Prosecutor v.
Radovan Karadzić and Ratko Mladić, cases Nos.IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, Review of the Indictment Pursuant to
Article61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 11July 1996, paras.94-95; Prosecutor v. DuskoSikirica,
Damir Dosen, Dragan Kolundzija (Sikirica et al), case No.IT-95-8, Decision on De fence Motions for Judgement of
Acquittal, 3 September 2001, para.61; Prosecutor v. RadislavKrsti ć, case No.IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber,
Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 34.
6ICTY, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 5 July 2001, para. 47.
See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, case No. IT-95-10, Trial Chamber I, Judgment, 14 December 1999, para. 73. - 26 -
99. We therefore need to focus on the evid ence in the cases of rape and sexual violence
committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina which will enable us to show that they were indeed part of a
general intent to destroy, in part, the group of Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina as such.
A genocidal intent did indeed underlie the rape and sexual violence
The genocidal intent in this case was not totally “unspoken”
100. As I just said, those who commit genocid e seldom state their intention the way Hitler
did. However, while we do not have at our disposal any ⎯ if you will ⎯ “official” text
36 announcing the genocide of the Bosnian Muslims, it should be noted that there is always within a
group someone who speaks out, who dares call things by their true name ⎯ even unspeakable
things. In the group of Serb leaders who conceived and organized this genocide, that is to say those
who conceived the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the one who spoke out was
Karadžić; but he was only saying out loud what othe rs were thinking. Thus it was Karadži ć who,
before the Bosnian Parliament, announced that all resistance to Serb domination would lead “the
67
Muslim people to their annihilation” . That is what it was, the ultimate aim of everything that
happened in Bosnia. However, this was still merely the language of threat, not of prediction. The
intention to destroy the group of Bosnian non-Serb s was expressed still more clearly, by Karadži ć
again, in the telephone conversation referred to by the Deputy Agent on the first day of the
hearings, which left no room for doubt as to the inten tions of the Serb leaders: “in just a couple of
days, Sarajevo will be gone and there will be 500,000 dead, in one month Muslims will be
68
annihilated” . This intention to destroy the group of n on-Serbs, and in particular the Muslims of
Bosnia, did not remain confined to leading figures, but circulated among the Serbs. I would first
observe that all of the leading individuals had the same intent, even if they did not all say so as
clearly. I would remind you ⎯ and we have already cited it a number of times ⎯ of another
telephone call where Miloševi ć himself said, “don’t stand in Karadži ć’s way”; in other words,
6Speech of Radovan Karadži ć to the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14 October 1991, cited in ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Slobodan Miloševi ć, case No.IT-02-54-T, Trial ChamberDecision on Motion for a Judgement of
Acquittal, 16 June 2004, para. 241.
6ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No.IT-02-54-T, Trial ChamberI, Decision on Motion for a
Judgement of Acquittal , 16 June 2004, para.241, Ex.613, tab.89 (int ercepted communication with Momcilo Mandic,
13 October 1991). - 27 -
himself endorsing the latter’s quite explicit genocid al intent. But as I have just said, this
destructive intent did not remain confined to th e upper echelons: it spread through the Serbs, as is
apparent from the following passage from the decision on review of the indictments of Karadži ć
and Mladić pursuant to Article 61:
“The atmosphere of discrimination and hostility towards non-Serbs, imposed on
the entire region by the Serb l eaders, was well known at Kozara ć. After Prijedor had
been taken, but before the attack on Kozara ć, the Serbs could often be 69ard on the
37 police radio speaking of... the need to destroy these ‘Balijas’.” (Balijas was a
pejorative term for Muslims.)
101. There are, however, any number of other factors that attest beyond all doubt to the
genocidal intent of using rape and sexual violence that ⎯ I say now and repeat and can never say
and repeat often enough ⎯ played such a central role in ethnic cleansing. There can be no doubt
that an organized system of rape and sexual violence existed, following a set pattern ⎯ a pattern of
rape. We will now rapidly outline the major features of this overall pattern.
The intent to destroy the group can be deduced from the severity and extensiveness of the
rapes and sexual violence carried out against members of the Bosnian Muslim population
102. Need I catalogue once again the widespr ead and extensive nature of the rapes and
sexual violence carried out throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as I highlighted at
the beginning of our presentation this morning? The rapes and sexual violence perpetrated in
Bosnia and Herzegovina were anything but spor adic, isolated incidents committed in the chaos
resulting from an armed conflict. To demonstrate the degree of organization, we would refer you
to the review of the indictments pursuant to Ru le61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
concerning Karadžić and Mladić, which emphasized the predominant role of mass rape and sexual
violence as an indication of intent to commit genocide.
“certain methods used for implementing the project of ethnic cleansing appear to
reveal an aggravated intent as, for exampl e, the massive scale of the effect of the
destruction. The number of the victims selected alone on account of their membership
in a group leads one to the conclusion that in tent to destroy the group, at least in part,
was present. Furthermore, the specific natu re of some of the means used to achieve
the objective of ethnic cleansing tends to underscore that the perpetration of the acts is
designed to reach the very foun dations of the group or what is considered as such.
69
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić et Ratko Mladić, cases Nos. IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, Review of
Indictment Pursuant to Article 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 11 July 1996, para. 154; emphasis added. - 28 -
The systematic rape of women, to which materials submitted to the Trial Chamber
70
attests, is in some cases intended to transmit a new ethnic identity to the child.”
However, this intent to destroy the group can also be deduced from the choice of victims of rape
and sexual violence.
38
The intent to destroy the group can be deduced from the choice of the victims
of rape and sexual violence
103. If the genocidal intent is in fact not always easy to infer, it is incontestably revealed, as
far as the present case is concerned, by the choice of victims. Here again, the fact borne out by a
great many international reports, corroborated by equally numerous rulings by the ICTY, that rape
and sexual violence were systematically and almost exclusively ⎯ we are obliged to say “almost”
in view of the odd isolated incidents of ra pe and sexual violence concerning Serbian women ⎯
71
perpetrated upon non-Serb groups , upon non-Serb men, children a nd women and, in particular,
upon the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina 72. This fact undeniably indicates the discriminatory
nature of these crimes. To be more precise, rape and sexual violence were primarily perpetrated
upon women and, as I have already said a number of times, it is clear that women must be viewed
as a sizeable proportion and “substantial” pa rt of the Muslim population of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, because, quantitatively, they make up a large percentage of the group: half the world,
holding up half of the sky. Moreover, as I have already said, in qualitative terms, they form a
symbolic, representative part of the group targeted. The genocidal intent is particularly apparent
when the women raped and humiliated belonged to the intelligentsia, as wa s highlighted by the
woman held at the Omarska camp in the short video footage you saw yesterday. Sexual violence
towards women is an integral part of a policy of genocide, since it targets the group as a whole and,
in this respect, we can only concur, once again, w ith the findings of the ICTR in relation to Tutsi
women in the Akayesu case, which can just as easily be applied to the women of the Muslim
population of Bosnia and Herzegovina; I quote:
70
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, case No. IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, Review of
the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 11 July 1996.
71ICTY, Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvocka, Milojica Kos, MlaRadic, Zoran Zigic and Dragoljub Prcac , case
No.IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement of Trial Chamber I, 2 November 2001 ( Kvocka et al. “Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje
camps”), para. 197.
72Ibid. para. 197. - 29 -
“This sexualized representation of ethn ic identity graphically illustrates that
Tutsi women were subjected to sexual violence because they were Tutsi. Sexual
39 violence was a step in the process of destruction of the Tutsi group ⎯ destruction of
73
the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself.”
I therefore assert before this Court that the sexual violence perpetrated upon the non-Serb women
of Bosnia and, notably, upon Muslim women, wa s a step in the process of destruction of the
group’s spirit, of its will to live and of its life itsel f. However, there are still other elements in this
bundle of indices which highlight the genocidal intent. I believe that, on our argument, the intent to
destroy the group can also be deduced from the la ck of preventive measures or punishment for acts
of rape and sexual violence.
The intent to destroy the group can also be deduced from the lack of preventive measures
or punishment for acts of rape and sexual violence
104. There is no need to repeat the fact, wi dely attested to by the numerous extracts from
ICTY proceedings that I have read, that the leader ship did not prevent these rapes, nor did they do
anything to punish those committing them. May I simply remind you that the lack of preventive
measures has been established by the ICTY, which highlighted the involvement and ready
toleration of incidents of rape and sexual violence by the commander of one of the detention
camps, Dragan Nikolić. According to the ICTY:
“The Accused abused his personal position of power especially vis-à-vis the
female detainees of Susica camp. He pers onally removed and retu rned women of all
ages from the hangar, handing them over to men whom he knew would sexually abuse
or rape them.” 74
105. Worse still, there were even orders to commit rape, orders to carry out sexual
violence ⎯ as shown by the findings in the Kunarać Judgment, in which the ICTY indicated that
75
“FWS-48 stated that some soldiers told her that they were ordered to rape their victims” and again
in the sentence handed down by the ICTY in the Todorović case, who was the head of the police in
Bosanski Samac, which cites the following incidents:
73
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu , case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement of Trial Chamber I,
2 September 1998, para. 732.
7ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikoli ć, case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgement of Trial Chamber II,
18 December 2003, para. 194.
7ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dagoljub Kunara ć, Radomir Kova ć and Zoran Vukovi ć, case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1,
Judgement of Trial Chamber II, 22 February 2001, para. 39. - 30 -
“Witness A described how he was take n to the police station in Bosanski
Samac, where Stevan Todorovic began to beat him and kick him in the genital area.
40 Witness A was then taken over to another ma n and ordered by Stevan Todorovic to
‘bite into his penis’.”6
106. Furthermore, it is, once again, unnecessary to emphasize the total impunity accorded to
those who committed acts of rape and sexual violence. However, I would also like to remind you
that the intention to destroy the group can also be deduced from the findings of the ICTY, and this
is an extremely important point.
The intent to destroy the group can be deduced from the findings of the ICTY
107. Although the ICTY has rarely upheld charges of genocide, the genocidal intent becomes
apparent from an overview of the events in Bosn ia and Herzegovina, such as only the Court can
possess.
108. Please allow me, in this respect, to return to the analysis of the Kunarać case with
which I began my presentation. In that case, it seem s to me clear that the ICTY referred explicitly
to the intent to cause serious harm to the group as such . It is important at this point to quote an
extract from the ICTY’s conclusions: “The Tria l Chamber is satisfied that the crimes committed
77
by all three accused were part of the attack against the Muslim civilian population . . .”
109. The ICTY did not, however, stop there and it continued its analysis as follows:
“Likewise, judging by their individual conduct as charged and proved on the
evidence before the Trial Chamber, they we re aware that there was an attack on the
Muslim civilian population going on, and th ey willingly took an active part in it.
Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zo ran Vukovic mistreated Muslim girls and
women, and only Muslim girls and women, because they were Muslims. They
therefore fully embraced the ethnicity-b ased aggression of the Serbs against the
Muslim civilians, and all their criminal actions were clearly part of 78d had the effect
of perpetuating the attack against the Muslim civilian population.”
110. The intent to target the Muslim population of Bosnia as a group, a necessary
precondition for the establishment of the existence of a crime against humanity, has therefore been
proven. I would emphasize that the ICTY found that there was intent to cause harm to the civilian
41 population and, more particularly, to cause harm to a particular group among the civilian
7ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorovi ć, case No. IT-95-9/1-S, Sentencing Judgement of the Trial Chamber I,
31 July 2001, para. 38.
77
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dagoljub Kunara ć, Radomir Kova ć and Zoran Vukovi ć, case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1,
Judgement of Trial Chamber II, 22 February 2001, para. 592.
7Ibid, para. 592; ICTY emphasis. - 31 -
population, thereby identifying the criteria of a discriminatory crime against humanity, a crime
very close to that of genocide.
111. This Court consequently needs only to go one step further in the face of this
accumulation of crimes against humanity attributable ⎯ as will be amply demonstrated in the days
ahead by my colleagues Alain Pellet and Luigi Condorelli ⎯ to one and the same State. And this
step consists in showing that, by that very accumulation, these discriminatory crimes against
humanity constitute genocide.
112. The possibility of inferring genocidal intent from the repeated occurrence of acts which,
in themselves, do not constitute genocide, was accepted in th e 11July1996 review of the
indictments concerning Karadžić and Mladić. According to the ICTY:
“The intent which is peculiar to the crime of genocide need not be clearly
expressed. As this trial chamber noted in the above mentioned Nikolić case, the intent
may be inferred from a certain number of facts such as the general political doctrine
which gave rise to the acts possibly covered by the definition in Article4, or the
repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts.” 79
This last point, Madam President, Members of the Co urt, is of vital importance. Although it is not
my role to broach the arguments of our adversaries, I feel obliged to refute in advance what I can
already hear them arguing in order to preclude this Court from recognizing that there has been
genocide. They will seek in this particular instan ce to rely on the extensive case law of the ICTY,
which has produced numerous convictions for crim es against humanity in respect of rape and
80
sexual violence; but, in proceedings subsequent to the indictment stage , such acts of sexual
violence have never been characterized as genocide, a charge that has yet to be upheld in the
Tribunal’s judgments. Such an argument is clearly misconceived and, applying the jurisprudence
that I have just cited, this Court ⎯ and possibly only this Court ⎯ confronted by repeated acts of
sexual violence following the same pattern, whic h, taken separately, have already been
characterized as crimes against humanity, can, taken as a whole, readily be brought within the
category of crimes of genocide. Let us not forg et that the underlying substantive elements of a
42
crime against humanity are the same as those of the crime of genocide and that the difference ⎯ in
79
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, case No. IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, Review of
the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 11 July 1996, para. 94.
8ICTY, Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladi ć, case No. IT-95-5/18-I, Amended Indi ctment, 11 October 202, para.34b;
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Amended Indictment, 21 April 2004, para. 32c. - 32 -
the case of a crime of a discriminatory nature ⎯ between the necessary intent for a crime against
humanity and the intent to commit genocide is infinitesimal.
113. This notion ⎯ in itself perfectly straightforward, but sometimes ignored like so many
straightforward matters ⎯ that an accumulation of crimes against humanity can result in genocide
has already been voiced by the International Law Commission in its comments on “Breaches
consisting of composite acts”, in its 2001 “Dra ft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts”.
“While composite acts are made up of a series of actions or omissions defined
in aggregate as wrongful, this does not exclude the possibility that every single act in
the series could be wrongful in accordance with another obligation. For example, the
wrongful act of genocide is generally made up of a series of acts which are themselves
internationally wrongful [meaning crimes against humanity or other crimes] . . .” 81
114. It is thus only by keeping in mind the plan, and widespread, systematic policy, for
genocidal ethnic cleansing carried out by Serbia a nd Montenegro that it is possible to conclude
that ⎯ like the forced transfer of populations, like the murder of Bosnia’s Muslims ⎯ these acts of
rape and sexual violence constituted a key element in the implementation of this plan, the overall
aim of which was definitively to expel the non-Serb inhabitants from the territory of a future Serb
State in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, these acts were committed, in light of the bundle of
concordant indices that I have just outlined, with th e intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the
non-Serb population and, in particular, the group of Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
*
* *
115. Long considered as a form of physical release for soldiers and regarded as inevitable
within the context of armed conflict, rape and se xual violence have for long been relegated to the
status of “anonymous and invisible” acts. The direct criminalization of rape and sexual violence as
43 crimes against humanity in the statutes of th e international criminal tribunals constituted a
significant advance in the manifestation of in ternational repugnance and condemnation for these
81
Comments by the ILC on Article 15 “Breach consisting of a composite act” in “Draft Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Comments”, 2001, p. 149, para. 9. - 33 -
abhorrent acts. But it is not enough. It is in your awareness of the need for all crimes to be
identified and recognized in order for the current process of reconciliation to be completed that
history expects more of you, Madam President, Member s of the Court. It expects the law to take a
further new, but necessary, step forward.
116. It expects, as Bosnia and Herzegovina h as endeavoured to show you, that rape and
sexual violence, over and above their characterization as the war crimes or crimes against humanity
which they undoubtedly are, can also finally, depending upon the circumstances in which they were
committed, be recognized by this Court as character izable as acts of genocide. Such circumstances
undoubtedly obtain in the present case.
117. Having come to the end of this presenta tion, Bosnia and Herzegovina hopes to have,
first, demonstrated to the Court to a sufficient degree that rape and sexual violence can fall within
the terms of all of the categories of substantive acts constituting acts of genocide.
118. Bosnia and Herzegovina further hopes, secondly, to have shown the Court that, far from
being isolated or opportunistic acts, the rapes and sexual violence perpetrated on a massive and
systematic basis throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina were an integral part of the
policy of widespread, systematic, genocidal ethnic cleansing ⎯ a policy which could only have
been implemented at the highest levels of State ⎯ and that they served the ultimate aim of
destroying, in whole or in part, the group of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina residing in the
territory coveted by Serbian forces, with a view to the establishment of a Greater Serb State. It is
for this reason that Bosnia and Herzegovina c ontends that ethnic cleansing, as conducted on its
territory, notably by way of a policy of widespread rape and sexual violence, is indistinguishable
from genocide: the ethnic cleansing carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, notably by means of
rape and sexual violence, was genocide.
119. Bosnia and Herzegovina accordingly respect fully invites the Court to characterize the
acts of rape and sexual violence perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina upon the non-Serb
44 population and, more particularly, upon the Muslim s of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as what they in
fact were: acts of genocide, for which primar y responsibility lies with the State, Serbia and
Montenegro ⎯ a responsibility which must, of course, co exist with the establishment of individual
criminal responsibility, but cannot simply be subs umed within the latter. We consider that only - 34 -
recognition of the responsibility of Serbia and Montenegro in the present case would, over and
above its symbolic value, be legally capable of fulfilling the Court’s role as “the instance capable
82
of repairing the tears in the social fabric” , to quote the elegant and apt words of a French thinker.
Thank you, Madam President, Members of the Court, and I ask you to give the floor to my
colleague, Tom Franck.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Madame Stern. Vous avez la parole, Monsieur Franck.
M. FRANCK : Je vous remercie, Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour.
L A QUALIFICATION DES FAITS FACE AU DROIT DU GENOCIDE
1. Vous serez soulagés, tout comme moi, d’en être à notre dernier exposé de ce tour qui porte
sur les faits et sur le droit relatif au génocide poprement dit. Jusqu’ici, nous avons en quelque
sorte suivi deux pistes parallèles dans notre démons tration. La première piste est consacrée aux
faits. Nous vous avons donné des preuves de ce qui s’était produit pendant les années sombres
d’une guerre imposée à la Bosnie par un gouvernement qui, à Belgrade, voulait absolument dépecer
le pays et établir les frontières d’une Grande Serbie dont la population nonserbe aura «d’une
manière ou d’une autre», pour reprendre les termes de Mme Plavšić, été «éliminée», pour reprendre
ceux de M. Karadžić [traduction du Greffe].
2. Ces faits que nous vous avons présentés ne re lèvent pas de la rumeur publique ni de la
conjecture. S’ils ont été invoqués dans ce prétoi re, c’est essentiellement et seulement après être
déjà passés par un processus sérieux de vérification. J’entends par là que ces faits sont constatés
dans des résolutions de l’Asse mblée générale ou du Conseil de sécurité de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies ⎯ ce qui donne à penser que les faits ont été signalés par des Etats informés par leur
45 représentants dans les zones où le conflit est en cours ⎯, et que ces résolutions ont été adoptées
(généralement à une majorité écrasante ⎯ parfois à l’unanimité) après avoir été examinées de très
près par les ministères des affaires étrangères des Etats membres. Il peut également s’agir de faits
dont il est rendu compte à certains organes de l’Or ganisation par des experts qui les ont établis
après enquête approfondie, souvent menée sur les lieux, et après avoir interrogé des victimes et des
82
P. Bouretz, speech at the inaugural session of the 1991-1992 Legal philosophy seminar held at the Institut des
Hautes Etudes sur la Justice, 4 November 1991. - 35 -
témoins. Puis il y a les faits qui ont été passés au crible par le Tribunal pénal international pour
l’ex-Yougoslavie. Ce sont des faits qui ont résisté à la rigoureuse épreuve d’un système
contradictoire «musclé» et qui ont satisfait au critère de la preuve au-delà de tout doute raisonnable.
A l’occasion, nous avons présenté des dépositions faites devant le Tribunal pénal, certaines à
différents stades d’une procédure encore pendante. Nous nous sommes efforcés de vous signaler
ces dépositions-là dont la fiabilité n’est peut-être pas totale.
3. Voilà donc nos «témoins» en ce qui concer ne les faits. Et ils sont si éminents, ces
«témoins», si crédibles et si unanimes que nous n’avons guère besoin d’ajouter quoi que ce soit en
citant personnellement des témoins oculaires ou des victimes à la barre.
4. La seconde de nos deux pistes, à ce stade de nos plaidoiries, a consisté à présenter le droit
du génocide: ce qu’ont écrit les auteurs de la conven tion, quelle intention ils avaient et ce que la
justice en a manifestement fait par la suite en interprétant le texte ⎯je pense ici à la Cour
internationale de Justice, au Tribunal pénal in ternational pour l’ex-Yougoslavie et au Tribunal
pénal international pour le Rwanda. Ces juridi ctions ont reçu spécialement compétence pour
appliquer et pour interpréter la convention sur le génocide, bien trop souvent face à de nouvelles
atteintes précises et inqualifiables à la mission civilisatrice de cette dernière.
5. Donc, nous avons suivi ces deux pistes: les fa its et le droit. Les faits et le droit se
rapportant à quoi? Ce que nous avons simpleme nt tenté de montrer clairement, dans cette
première partie de nos plaidoiries, en passant les fa its et le droit en revue, c’est qu’un génocide a
été commis en Bosnie. Dans la partie suivante de notre démonstration, nous nous efforcerons de
montrer tout aussi clairement que ce génocide est imputable au défendeur.
6. Mais, avant tout, nous devons nous assure r que les faits que nous avons présentés sont
bien considérés comme étant de ceux qui, très précisément, imposent de conclure qu’un
génocide ⎯au sens du droit applicable ⎯a bel et bien eu lieu en Bosnie. Pour ce faire,
permettez-moi de vous rappeler brièvement les faits déjà exposés et de le faire tout particulièrement
dans le contexte des dispositions du droit applicab le qui qualifient cette sorte d’actes de génocide.
Nous espérons pouvoir ainsi rapprocher nos de ux pistes, démontrant par là de manière
46 rigoureusement limpide que le droit du génocide, tel qu’il est défini, a été honteusement bafoué par
les actes terribles dont nous savons qu’ils ont été perpétrés. - 36 -
L’intention : les actes ont été commis dans l’intention de détruire une communauté
7. Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, j’ouvre tout d’abord une brève parenthèse sur l’intention
de détruire une communauté. Vous en avez déjà longuement entendu parler ⎯ plus que de besoin,
pensez-vous peut-être ⎯ mais permettez-nous d’y reveni r une dernière fois, nous sommes
condamnés à nous répéter par l es dénégations que le défendeur n’a cessé de nous opposer durant
ces treizeannées de procédure. Nous avons montré que les meurtres, les tortures, les viols, les
destructions de biens religieux et culturels et le s actes de nettoyage ethnique ne constituaient pas
des événements isolés dans ce que d’aucuns ont pu qualifier ironiquement d’énième guerre des
Balkans. Au contraire : tous ces actes s’inscrivaien t dans le cadre d’une stratégie plus ambitieuse,
proclamée publiquement par les autorités serbes, une politique tendant à réunir «tous les Serbes
dans un seul Etat». Il ne s’agissait pas d’une simple aspiration, mais de la bannière d’une
campagne militaire soigneusement préparée et carac térisée par une férocité jamais vue en Europe
depuis la fin de la seconde guerre mondiale. P our réunir «tous les Serbes dans un seul Etat», il
fallait au préalable chasser tous les non-Serbes, t out simplement et par n’importe quel moyen, du
83
territoire destiné à constituer la Grande Serbie . Il s’ensuit que, lorsque ce nettoyage ethnique a
pris la forme qu’on lui connaît ⎯ meurtre généralisé, viols, tortures et destruction de communautés
entières ⎯, c’était là une conséquence délibérée de moyens sciemment choisis pour réaliser un
objectif minutieusement planifié et voulu. Les massacres et les déplacements massifs qui ont
commencé en 1991 n’étaient pas des moyens accessoires tendant vers un but : c’était le but même
qu’envisageait M. Karadžić lorsque, le 14 octobre, il proféra publiquement ses menaces sur le coût
d’une éventuelle indépendance de la Bosnie : ce coût était l’anéantissement 84.
8. Ce qui suivit la reconnaissance de l’indé pendance de la Bosnie, ce fut la mise en Œuvre
méthodique d’une stratégie faisant appel à l’occupation des villes non serbes et à la destruction des
85
communautés qui y vivaient ou, sinon, la «Vukovarisation» des localités nonserbes qui ne se
laisseraient pas soumettre ⎯une guerre éclair, un «blitzkrie g», destiné à les transformer
47 essentiellement en cimetières habités. Ce système fut reproduit de multiple fois jusqu’à atteindre
83
Voir CR 2006/2 (Van den Biesen), «Vue d’ensemble du génocide» (première partie), et les sources citées.
84Ibid.
85Le sens de cette notion est expliqué très clairnt dans la décision rendue par le TPIY en l’affaBabić,
affaire nIT-03-72-S, Chambre de première instance, jugement du 29 juillet 2004, par. 10-27. - 37 -
son paroxysme avec le siège, le nettoyage ethnique et les tueries de Srebrenica, et jusqu’à ce
qu’enfin, l’épuration des zones convoitées pour constituer la Grande Serbie fut achevée.
9. Dans les secteurs que les forces serbes pur ent occuper, cette politique consista notamment
à «décapiter» délibérément les élites de la communa uté nonserbe: c’est-à-dire à les arrêter, à les
86
placer dans des camps de concentration et, bien souvent, à les exécuter . Mais ce ne furent pas les
élites nonserbes qui, à elle seules, subirent le gr os de ce carnage. Environ centmille personnes
furent tuées, souvent exécutées. Cent à deux cent mille subirent des tortures, des viols et des
brutalités dans des camps d’internement. Plus de deux millions de personnes furent chassées de
chez elles et déplacées à l’intérieur du territoire : la moitié de la population totale de la Bosnie 87. Il
s’agissait de la mise à exécution délibérée d’un plan impitoyable. Il s’agissait de tueries, de
tortures, de viols et de destructions délibér ées visant à détruire en tout ou en partie les
communautés qui faisaient obstacle à la construction démographique de la Grande Serbie.
10. Mme Biljana Plavši ć, dans les faits qu’elle a admis devant le TPIY, a reconnu cette
intention de manière très claire. Elle a déclaré que le but des Serbes était
«de faire en sorte que l’objectif de la sép aration ethnique par la force soit réalisé si
aucune solution négociée n’était trouvée. Ces préparatifs consistaient notamment à
armer de vastes pans de la population serbe de Bosnie en collaboration avec, entre
autres, la JNA [l’armée de Belgrade], le mi nistère de l’intérieur (MUP) de Serbie et
des paramilitaires serbes…» [Traduction du Greffe.]
88
L’«objectif de la séparation ethnique» devait être réalisé ⎯ et je cite ⎯ «par la force» . Ce sont là
encore les propos de MmePlavši ć. Nous avons vu par quoi ce recours délibéré à la force s’était
soldé: un génocide, la «route d’enfer» dont M. Karadži ć avait parlé dans ses menaces publiques
d’octobre 1991 89. Permettez-moi d’insister sur le mot te rrible qu’il avait utilisé. Il n’avait pas
parlé de «défaite», mais d’«anéantissement». Quand le but du recours à la force n’est pas
simplement la victoire, mais l’anéantissement du vaincu, alors l’intention motivant ce recours à la
force n’est pas simplement de l’emporter, l’intention est de détruire. Cette sorte d’appel aux armes,
c’est l’ordre de commettre un génocide.
86
Ibid.
87
Ibid.
88TPIY, Le procureur c. Plavšić, affaire n IT-00-39 et 40-PT, par. 11.
89Repris et cité dans l’exposé intitulé «Vue d’ ensemble du génocide» (deuxième partie), CR2006/2
(Van den Biesen). - 38 -
48 11. Dans l’affaire Brdjanin, le TPIY a été appelé à examiner cette politique d’anéantissement
90
planifié, et il a constaté qu’e lle était dramatiquement réelle . Dans son exposé de lundi, mon
confrère M.PhonvandenBiesen vous a minutie usement présenté certaines des preuves qui
confortent la conclusion du TPI Y quand ce dernier dit que la campagne militaire serbe a
délibérément adopté des tactiques visant à détruire les communautés nonserbes de Bosnie qui
faisaient obstacle à la constitution d’une Grande Serbie exclusivement serbe. Force est d’en
conclure que cette débauche de tu eries, de viols et de destructions n’était pas une conséquence
fortuite de la stratégie militaire et politique serbe mais constituait au contraire une fin en soi, c’était
le but même de cette stratégie.
Le meurtre de membres du groupe ou l’atteinte grave à leur intégrité
physique ou mentale doivent être qualifiés d’actes de génocide
12. La convention sur le génocide indique clai rement que tout meurtre perpétré en vue de
détruire une communauté en tout ou en partie constitue un génocide.
13. Ces quatre derniers jours, vous nous avez entendu donner longuement les preuves du
massacre délibéré des communautés non serbes de Bosnie. Ce massacre, comme nous venons juste
de tenter de le démontrer, a été commis dans l’intention de détruire les communautés en question,
intention qui a été proclamée par les dirigeants serbes et reconnue par les juges du TPIY. Nous ne
doutons pas que vous la reconnaîtrez vous aussi.
14. Cette reconnaissance peut se baser sur les pr oclamations des autorités serbes. Toutefois,
elle peut également se fonder sur l’ampleur même et sur le caractère systém atique des meurtres et
des tortures. Dans l’affaire Plavšić, le Tribunal a reconnu que, dans un des secteurs de la Bosnie
que les Serbes avaient décidé de «nettoyer» , au moins cinquante mille personnes ont été
massacrées, que huit cent cinquante villages ont été ⎯et je cite le Tribunal ⎯ «complètement
dévastés» [traduction du Greffe] et qu’il a été créé quatre cent huit lieux de détention, dans
91
lesquels étaient infligés de «grav es sévices physiques et psychologiques» [traduction du Greffe].
Nous vous avons déjà rappelé les conclusions détaillées qui ont été formulées en l’affaire Krstić,
49
90 o er
TPIY, Le procureur c. Brdjanin, affaire n IT-99-36-T, 1 septembre 2004, par. 104-114.
91TPIY, Le procureur c. Plavši ć, affaire n IT-00-39 et 40-PT, exposé des faits du plaidoyer de culpabilité,
30 septembre 2002, par. 41 et 45. - 39 -
dans laquelle le TPIY, conclu ant qu’un génocide avait été commis, a décrit l’élimination
systématique des hommes et des jeunes garçons de Bosnie . 92
15. Dans cette affaire, la Chambre du TPIY a rendu une conclusion que la Cour ne devrait
pas manquer de faire sienne. Elle a déclaré que «l ’intention de détruire, en tout ou en partie, un
groupe comme tel doit transparaître dans l’acte criminel lui-même» car «le but … transparaî[t] dans
93
l’acte criminel lui-même» . Pardonnez-moi de me répéter, ma is cette conclusion juridique me
semble revêtir une grande importance. En d’autr es termes, si une partie entreprend de tuer la
moitié des membres d’une communauté, l’intention des tueurs est on ne peut plus évidente. Le fait
de tuer tant de monde, de manière si méthodique , trahit l’intention génocide des tueurs. Notre
thèse est que, de par l’ampleur de la tuerie, ces me urtres trahissent de manière flagrante l’intention
criminelle de ceux qui les ont perpétrés. La Chambre d’appel du TPIY l’a exprimé ainsi : elle a dit
que «l’ampleur des meurtres» autorisait le Tribuna l à conclure à l’«intention génocidaire» de leurs
94
auteurs .
16. Il est également clair que, lorsque la mo itié du groupe visé par les meurtres est le groupe
des hommes en âge de procréer, il est normal ⎯ et peut-être même obligatoire ⎯ d’en déduire que
les auteurs des meurtres avaient l’intention délibér ée de détruire la capacité du groupe touché à se
perpétuer sur le plan biologique. C’est ce qui a permis au TPIY de déduire, dans
l’affaire Blagojević, que l’intention des tueurs allait au-delà du simple meurtre pour viser
délibérément la destruction du groupe en tant que tel. Aux termes des juges,
«les forces serbes de Bosnie non seulement savaient que le meurtre des hommes
conjugué au déplacement forcé des femm es, des enfants et des personnes âgées
entraînerait inéluctablement la disparition physique de la population musulmane de
Srebrenica, en Bosnie, mais elles visaient aussi manifestement, par ces actes, à
95
éliminer physiquement ce groupe» [traduction du Greffe].
17. Voilà pour les meurtres (qui sont en fait des exécutions), tels qu’ils ont été constatés à
Srebrenica. Mais les auteurs du génocide ne se sont nullement contentés de tuer. Ils avaient
d’autres cordes à leur arc, leur sp écialité étant d’infliger une mort lente par des milliers d’entailles.
92 o
TPIY, Le procureur c. Radislav Krstić, affaire n IT-98-33-T, jugement, 2 août 2001, par. 549.
93Ibid., par. 549.
94TPIY, Le procureur c. Radislav Krsti ć, affaire n IT-98-33-A, arrêt de la Chambre d’appel, 19avril2004,
par. 27.
95TPIY, Le procureur c. Blagojević, affaire n IT-02-60-T, jugement, 17 janvier 2005, par. 677. - 40 -
A cet égard, le siège de Sarajevo qui a duré trois ans constitue l’archétype. Il nous fournit une base
factuelle amplement suffisante pour conclure que, lorsque les exécutions n’ étaient pas possibles
parce que les Serbes ne contrôlaient pas le lieu où vivaient encore les victimes désignées, une
terrible guerre d’usure s’engageait. Il s’agissait d’une politique délibérée consistant à infliger des
sévices physiques inqualifiables aux civils de Bosnie qui refusaient de se rendre. Le nombre
épouvantable de bombardements aveugles, jour ap rès jour, nuit après nuit, démontre amplement
50
l’existence d’une intention préméditée de détrui re les communautés musulmane et croate par ⎯ je
cite l’alinéa c) de l’articleII de la c onvention sur le génocide ⎯ une «[s]oumission intentionnelle
du groupe à des conditions d’existence devant entraîner sa destruction physique totale ou partielle».
18. Mardi, mon confrère M.Phon van den Bie sen vous a décrit le siège de Sarajevo dans
toute sa brutalité. Sarajevo était une ville charma nte et paisible qui s’était attiré l’admiration
générale en accueillant avec succès les jeux olym piques d’hiver et, surtout, en faisant régner un
climat sociopolitique de compromis au sein d’une population remarquablement plurielle. Nous
avons porté à votre attent ion tous les cas où des civils musulm ans ont été délibérément pris pour
cible ⎯par exemple, lors du bombardement des pers onnes faisant la queue pour acheter du pain
devant le point de distribution de la rue Vasa Miškin, et lors des bombardements de l’hôpital civil,
de la célèbre bibliothèque de Vijecnica et du marché de Markale, celui-ci ayant coûté la vie à plus
de soixante civils et fait bien plus de blessés encore ⎯, des faits qui sont également constatés dans
le rapport du rapporteur spécial de la Commissi on des droits de l’homme des NationsUnies,
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, qui est allé en juger par lui-même et a dénoncé «ce qui para[issait] être une
tentative délibérée pour terroriser la population». Il a indiqué que des tireurs isolés s’en prenaient à
des civils innocents et que l’hôpital civil «a [vait] été délibérément bombardé à plusieurs
reprises» 9.
19. Tout cela s’inscrivait dans le cadre d’une stratégie délibérée, que résume bien l’ordre
sans nuances émanant du général serbe Mladi ć: «Visez les Musulmans.» 97 [Traduction du
Greffe.] Dans la ville, pour servir cet objectif génocide, environ dix mille personnes furent tuées et
96
Voir les références données en bas de page dans la plaidoirie du 28 février 2006 de M. van den Biesen, intitulée
«Le siège de Sarajevo», CR 2006/4.
97
Ibid. - 41 -
98
plus de vingt mille civils furent blessés . Dans l’affaire Galić, la Chambre du TPIY a conclu que
le défendeur, le généralGali ć, en sa qualité de commandant des forces serbes, avait illicitement
semé la terreur dans la population civile par des actes délibérés de violence, dont des violations des
lois et coutumes de la guerre et des crimes contre l’humanité 99. Mais Galić n’était que l’instrument
d’une politique. Cette politique avait été défini e par ceux qui, en novembre 1992, l’avaient promu
au rang de général. De qui s’agit-il ? Des dirigean ts de Belgrade, naturellement. Et leur politique
51
générale, dont le siège de Saraje vo n’est qu’une illustration parmi ta nt d’autres, était de commettre
un génocide.
20. L’existence avérée de camps d’emprisonnement mis en place par les Serbes pour les
communautés non serbes témoigne, elle aussi, de cette politique. Dans ces camps, comme l’a
démontré ma collègue Magda Karagiannakis dans sa plaidoirie, les Musulmans étaient
systématiquement détenus dans des conditions inhumai nes, roués de coups, torturés, violés et tués.
Si l’on considère cela comme des actes gratuits co mmis par certains chefs et gardes de camps, il
s’agit de crimes atroces, mais si l’on considère que ces actes s’inscrivent dans le cadre d’un plan
d’ensemble visant à détruire en totalité ou en partie les communautés qu’il fallait, d’une manière ou
d’une autre, éliminer d’une Grande Serbie désormais pure, il s’agit d’un génocide.
21. S’il y a des faits qui sont établis et dont la Cour doit dresser le constat, ce sont bien les
conditions qui régnaient dans ces camps de l’horreur. Elles ont été constatées dans des résolutions
du Conseil de sécurité, largement relatées dans la presse mondiale et les médias yougoslaves
eux-mêmes en ont fait état 100. Dans trente-sept municipalités à peine dont le TPIY a examiné la
situation, il y avait quatrecenthuit centres de dé tention où des Musulmans et d’autres personnes
non serbes étaient détenus et systématiquement soumis aux sévices physiques et psychologiques les
plus atroces 10.
22. Le TPIY a constaté qu’il y avait des éléments étayant l’accusation selon laquelle
98
Ibid.
99
Ibid.
100CR 2006/5 (Karagiannakis), «Les camps».
101TPIY, Le procureur c. Biljana, Plavsi ć, affaires nsIT-00-39 et 40/1, jugement portant condamnation,
27 février 2003, par. 45. - 42 -
«les prisonniers étaient en règle générale, détenus dans des locaux surpeuplés, dans de
mauvaises conditions d’hygiène, avec très peu d’eau ou de vivres à leur disposition [et
que] beaucoup ont été tués ou furent victimes de violences physiques ou
psychologiques extrêmement graves, notamment des passages à tabac, des tortures ou
des viols» 10.
La même Chambre de première instance a égalem ent jugé qu’il existait des éléments prouvant que
ces détentions illicites s’inscrivaient dans le cadre du plan des dirigeants serbes visant à créer «un
103
territoire dominé par les Serbes coûte que coûte» . Dans un autre jugement du TPIY, celui rendu
en l’affaire Nikolić, si abondamment citée, le Tribunal a dit qu’il régnait «un climat de terreur dans
104
le camp» . D’un camp à l’autre, le TPIY a pu consta ter qu’il était justifié de dire que les
prisonniers étaient détenus dans des conditions at roces et, en particulier, étaient régulièrement
105
victimes de passages à tabac, de viols et de meurtres .
52 23. Ma collègue MmeKaragiannakis a passé en revue devant vous, en étudiant un camp
après l’autre, ces faits épouvantab les dont l’existence est avérée, et je ne vais pas y revenir. Ce
qu’il faut garder en mémoire, c’est qu’il s’ag issait non pas d’une simple succession de brutalités
commises aveuglément, mais de violences systématiques, délibérées et organisées, de la
soumission de communautés entières à des «conditio ns d’existence devant entraîner [leur]
destruction physique totale ou partielle». Ces at rocités délibérées doivent être considérées non pas
isolément mais dans le cadre d’un système appliqué à l’ensemble du territoire de la Bosnie sous
contrôle serbe, se caractérisant par des traitements cruels, un système qui doit lui-même être
considéré comme s’inscrivant dans le cadre d’un plan général consistant à tuer, torturer, violer et
détruire systématiquement. Il s’agissait d’un système manifestement conçu pour détruire toutes les
communautés qui, pour les Serbes, faisaient obst acle à la constitution d’une Grande Serbie sans
Musulmans ni Croates. Il n’y a qu’un mot pour qualifier ce plan : le génocide. Les noms des lieux
où des crimes innommables comme ceux-ci ont été commis au nom de la purification ethnique
⎯Susica, KPDom, Prijedor, Omarska, Trnoplje, Manjaca, Bosanski Šamac, Luka ⎯ porteront à
jamais le sceau de l’infamie. Ces noms appellent la reconnaissance et le repentir. Car lorsque des
102 o
TPIY, Le procureur c. Momcilo Krajisnik, affaire n IT-00-39-T, jugement relatif à la demande d’acquittement
formulée par la défense au titre de l’article 98bis du Règlement, 19 août 2005, p. 17 118 des CR.
103
Ibid., p. 17 131 des CR.
104TPIY, Le procureur c. Dragan Nikoli ć, affaire n IT-94-2-S, jugement portant condamnation,
18 décembre 2003, par. 67.
10CR 2006/5 (Karagiannakis), «Les camps». - 43 -
crimes aussi abominables ne sont pas reconnus, ils vont souvent suppurer avant d’éclater en cris de
vengeance.
24. Parmi les modalités d’appli cation de cette politique de génoc ide, nous avons souligné le
rôle central et terrible du viol. Ma collègue, Mm eBrigitteStern, vient de passer en revue devant
vous aujourd’hui dans sa plaidoirie les éléments prouvant ce qui a été accompli, par qui et dans
quelle intention. Je n’essaierai pas de minimiser ces événements horribles en tentant de les résumer
pour en faire état une nouvelle fois.
25. Voici en revanche ce qu’il y a lieu de r éaffirmer: ce que vous a relaté MmeStern, ce
n’est pas un récit à caractère pornographique d’act es isolés commis par des individus dépravés.
Non: on peut trouver des histoires comme celles-là dans la presse à sensation de la plupart des
pays. Ce dont Mme Stern a fait état devant vous, c’est de viols systématiques s’inscrivant dans le
cadre d’une politique délibérée . Il s’agit d’une tout autre question puisque, comme l’a fait
observer le TPIY, ce recours massif aux violences se xuelles mérite une attention particulière parmi
les méthodes du nettoyage ethnique, en raison de leur caractère systématique et de la gravité des
106
souffrances infligées aux populations civiles . Mme Stern a qualifié cela de véritable politique de
violences sexuelles, politique qui était partie inté grante, peut-être même partie essentielle, du
nettoyage ethnique de nature génocide qui visa it la population non serbe et en particulier
musulmane de Bosnie.
53 26. Le rapporteur spécial de l’Organisation des NationsUnies, M.Mazowiecki, a indiqué
que les enquêtes qu’il avait menées portaient à c onclure que les viols étaient commis «sur une
107
grande échelle» . En l’affaire Brdjanin, le TPIY a confirmé que les viols commis visaient
108
délibérément des victimes choisies uniquement parce qu’elles étaient musulmanes . Lorsque l’on
associe les faits attestant du recours méthodique, d’un camp à l’autre et d’une ville à l’autre, au viol
institutionnalisé, au fait également établi que les femmes victimes étaient violées en raison de leur
10TPIY, Le procureur c. Rodovan Karadžić et Ratko Mladić, affaires n IT-95-5-R61 et IT-95-18-R61, examen
des actes d’accusation dans le cadre de l’article61 du Règlement de procéduret de preuve, 11 juillet 1996, par.64;
document examiné dans la plaidoirie de Brigitte Stern, «Les viols, les faits et le droit», 2 mars 2006.
10Nations Unies, doc. A/48/92, annexe II, «Rapport de l’ équipe d’experts chargés d’enquêter sur les allégations
de viols dans l’ex-Yougoslavie sur la mission qu’elle a effectuée dans ce pays du 12 au 23 janvier 1993», p. 72, par. 30 et
p. 79, par. 66.
10TPIY, Le procureur c. Radoslav Brdjanin, affaire n IT-99-36-T, jugement, 1 septembre 2004, par. 518. - 44 -
religion et de leur origine ethnique et que l’intention des violeurs était de détruire, par un moyen ou
par un autre, la communauté à laquelle les victimes appartenaient, il ne s’agit assurément plus de
simple dépravation, mais de génocide. Le viol, comme Mme Stern l’a de toute évidence démontré,
n’était pas le seul objectif des violeurs. Il s’agi ssait plutôt d’un moyen permettant de détruire, en
totalité ou en partie, la communauté au sein de laque lle les victimes avaient été choisies. Le viol
était le moyen mais l’intention était de détruire.
27. Toutefois, ce n’étaient pas seulement les corps que détruisait ce déchaînement de folie
génocide, c’était aussi l’esprit : un esprit profondé ment ancré dans les institutions intellectuelles et
religieuses musulmanes, dont beaucoup sont d’un âg e vénérable et d’une incomparable beauté. Ce
sont non seulement les mosquées, mais aussi les églises catholiques qui ont été systématiquement
détruites, car les Serbes ont voulu couper les raci nes des deuxreligions dans les secteurs qu’ils
avaient décidé de purifier des éléments non serbes et d’intégrer à la Grande Serbie.
28. Ma collègue Laura Dauban a montré que ces destructions ont été délibérées afin que les
Musulmans ne reviennent jamais. Elle a cité Ja n Boeles, représentant des Pays-Bas au sein d’une
mission de surveillance de la Communauté europé enne qui disait qu’il s’agissait du meurtre de
109
l’identité culturelle d’un peuple . La Chambre de jugement en l’affaire Brdjanin, a-t-elle
souligné, avait conclu «que les dévastations étaient ciblées, contrôlées et délibérées» 11. La plupart
de ces destructions n’avaient rien à voir avec les co mbats entre les groupes; au contraire, elles se
rattachaient manifestement au plan de génocide. Elles ont eu lieu après la défaite des communautés
non serbes plutôt que pendant les combats: Al adza, cette magnifique mosquée de marbre
remontant à1555, avec ses superbes fresques et son architecture monumentale, qui était protégée
111
54 par l’UNESCO, fut non pas détruite à c oups de roquette, mais dynamitée et rasée . Le TPIY a
constaté, en l’affaire Kunarac, que cet événement s’était produit «bien après la fin des combats,
112
alors que les Serbes contrôlaient entièrement la ville» .
109CR 2006/5 (Dauban), «Les biens culturels».
110
Ibid.
111
Ibid.
112Ibid. - 45 -
29. Le pillage de l’héritage culturel a été ac compli avec la même férocité lorsqu’il visait les
instituts supérieurs d’apprentissage et d’étude. Lors de sa plaidoirie, MmeDauban a déjà attiré
votre attention sur la destruction de l’Institut d’ études orientales de Sarajevo en mai1992. Si la
collection inestimable de milliers de livres d’hist oire, de philosophie et de poésie arabe, turque,
perse et bosniaque ainsi qu’environ deux cent mille autres manuscrits ont été détruits, ce n’est pas
parce que les Serbes qui assiégeaient la ville ont mis à profit sans discernement une puissance de
feu supérieure, mais parce que ces Œuvres ont été soigneusement prises pour cible. Vous avez vu
des images de cet acte de vandalisme et l’un de nos experts que nous allons faire déposer,
M. Riedlmayer, vous en dira davantage sur le sujet.
30. Le problème se résume donc à ceci: à l’arri ère-plan de tous nos moyens de fait et de
droit se pose la même question : pourquoi ces femmes ont-elles été les victimes d’un comportement
systématique qui s’écarte autant des règles unive rselles de la décence? Pourquoi une région
civilisée du monde est-elle tombée dans une telle barbarie? Les femmes ont été violées, les
hommes et les jeunes garçons tués, les mosquées et les églises catholiques dynamitées, les grandes
institutions islamiques ⎯musées, écoles et bibliothèques ⎯ ont été prises pour cibles, tout cela
dans le même but : détruire, en totalité ou en partie, les groupes, communautés, et confessions qui
faisaient obstacle. Les Serbes ont nettoyé le pays comme les cupides «barons du bois» rasaient
généralement les grandes forêts, en défrichant, en incendiant, en tranchant dans le vif, sans jamais
se soucier du passé, ni du présent, ni de l’avenir.
31. L’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, exprimant ce que le monde consterné savait, a
fait état de «souffrances extraord inaires» causées à la population victime de ce déchaînement de
113
viols et d’autres crimes . Pourtant, ce n’est qu’une partie de ce qu’ont vécu ces victimes. Et que
dire des innombrables autres victimes : les femmes, les hommes et les garçons de Srebrenica ainsi
que les victimes des deux sexes et de tout âge mise s au supplice et tuées dans ces camps barbares ?
Elles ont toutes subi, elles aussi, des souffrances excessives et, dans bien des cas, mortelles. Il
incombe à la Cour de donner la qualification juridique qui convient à leurs «souffrances
113
Nations Unies, doc. A/RES/48/143, préambule, 5 janvier 1994. - 46 -
55 extraordinaires». Cette qualification juridique, Mada me et Messieurs de la Cour, gardiens de la
conscience de l’humanité, cette qualification juridique ne peut être que le génocide.
32. Nous ne pouvons pas faire marche arrièr e. Nous ne pouvons pas ressouder ce qui a été
irrémédiablement brisé, qu’il s’agisse de la vie ou de l’âme des victimes, ou de leurs relations avec
des voisins qui en sont venus à les tuer, à les to rturer et à les violer. La seule chose que nous
puissions faire, c’est refuser de contribuer à fausser les événements qui se sont réellement produits,
refuser de tolérer que ce compte rendu soit fau ssé, car connaître ces événements, c’est poser les
premiers jalons d’une frontière solide entre civili sation et barbarie. Mais ce compte rendu, pour
qu’il soit exact, ne saurait énumérer simplement une masse de faits et d’actes commis au hasard. Si
nous voulons avoir un tableau de la réalité qui ne soit pas faussé, si nous voulons savoir ce qu’un
monde civilisé ne peut pas tolérer et ne tolérera p as, il faut dresser la liste complète de ces faits et
actes. Et c’est seulement ici, en cette enceinte, que cette liste complète peut être établie. Et lorsque
vous, les juges, procéderez à l’étab lissement de cette liste, il apparaîtr a très vite que sur cette terre
dévastée, dans cette Bosnie victime de ces massacr es, ces tortures, ces viols et ces destructions
planifiés, s’est précisément produit le type de calamité que la convention sur le génocide visait à
prévenir et à réprimer.
Ce système de l’horreur permet de conclure à l’existence d’un génocide
délibéré et planifié
33. Examinons un instant ce système de l’horreur qui permet de conclure à l’existence d’un
génocide délibéré et planifié. Autrement dit, a rrêtons-nous un instant pour examiner encore une
fois la question des conclusions à en tirer. La ré action que suscite l’examen de tous ces faits est un
mélange d’horreur et d’ennui.
34. D’abord, une réaction d’horreur, en raison de la nature des faits. Des hommes et de
jeunes garçons ⎯ des civils ⎯ à qui on ordonne de s’agenouille r, souvent sur la berge d’une
rivière, avant de leur tirer par derrière dans la tête, ou à qui on dit de sauter d’un pont dans une
rivière pour leur tirer dessus pendant leur chute. Des centaines de camps, peuplés de civils, de
centaines de milliers de civils qui sont forcés de vi vre avec la faim, la crasse, qui sont roués de
coups, violés, puis, souvent, assassinés. La gorge tranchée, la poitrine écrasée, le crâne ouvert à
coups de tuyaux de fer. La même chose, partout, dès que les Serbes prenaient le contrôle, quand ils - 47 -
commençaient à exécuter leur plan de serbisation en se débarrassant ⎯par un moyen ou par un
autre ⎯ de tous les autres.
35. Ensuite, malgré nous, ces atrocités suscite nt aussi chez nous l’ennui car elles furent
toujours les mêmes, toujours les mêmes, partout. Le mal s’était banalisé: il y avait le
56 bombardement des civils, des mosquées, des march és, des bibliothèques et des musées. Puis,
l’occupation. La séparation des hommes et des ga rçons d’un côté et des femmes et des filles de
l’autre, et le départ vers les centaines de camps. Ensuite venaient les démolisseurs, qui rasaient les
mosquées, pour paver les décombres afin de s’assurer qu’il n’en reste aucune trace. Les
bibliothèques, l’Institut étaient incendiés. Ces images ne vous rappellent-elles pas ⎯ comme je
crains bien qu’elles me rappellent ⎯ les synagogues incendiées de Berlin et de Francfort après la
nuit de cristal? Un nouveau parc de stationne ment vient ensuite rempla cer l’espace vide de sa
mosquée détruite. De nouveaux noms: «la cité des Serbes», au lieu de Fo ča, le nom historique.
Vient aussi le meurtre des notables susceptibles de soutenir leur groupe : le clergé, les intellectuels,
les médecins, les journalistes. Puis c’est l’assassinat collectif des hommes en âge de procréer. Et
c’est le viol des femmes qui doit les empêcher, socialement, psychologiquement et physiquement,
d’avoir des enfants.
36. Horrible et ennuyeuse, donc, cette répétiti on d’actes d’une cruauté suprême et d’une
banalité paralysante. A quoi rime-t-elle ? Que prouve-t-elle en droit ?
37. La réponse n’est que trop évid ente. Cela prouve qu’il y avait un système. Cela prouve
que ce sont exactement les mêmes événements qui ont été répétés indéfiniment : ici, là, partout, les
soldats serbes arrivaient, conquéraient ou, pire, quand la conquête n’était pas possible, ils faisaient
le siège. Un esprit normal conclut nécessairement que cette répétition inlassable, dans le même
ordre, selon les mêmes modalités, des meurtres, des act es de torture et des situations de nature à
rendre la vie impossible, l’esprit normal conclut que tout cela ne pouvait pas relever d’un sadisme
simple et aveugle. Il ne s’agissait pas d’un étonnant concours de circonstances atroces et
diaboliques.
38. Non: Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour, nous vous avons infligé l’exposé de
tous ces faits et événements monstrueux, effroyables ⎯ et nous sommes conscients du malaise que
vous éprouvez ⎯ car vous conclurez inévitablement, vous aussi, à l’existence d’un système. Et s’il - 48 -
y avait là un système, c’est qu’il y avait un plan . Et l’exécution de ce plan était nécessairement
intentionnelle.
39. L’intention. Nous voici donc dans le vi f du sujet. Nous avons passé en revue devant
vous la jurisprudence des Tribunaux pour l’ex-You goslavie et le Rwanda, lesquels, bien qu’ils
examinent leurs affaires au cas par cas, une instance après l’autre, n’en sont pas moins parvenus à
en tirer une seule et même conclusion dont la lo gique est implacable. Cette conclusion est que les
meurtres, les actes de torture, les déplacements fo rcés, les viols, la terreur suscitée pour inciter à
fuir, que tous ces méfaits ont été délibérément perpétr és dans l’intention de dé truire, en totalité ou
en partie, des groupes qui étaient dynamiques sur les plans ethnique et religieux, des groupes qui se
définissaient par leur confession, leur race ou leur origine ethnique.
57 40. Oui, ce qui est fait est fait. Mais si vous vous refusez à retenir la qualification de
génocide, renonçant ainsi à défendre une frontière précieuse qui sépare la civilisation qui est fragile
des crises apparemment chroniques de la barbarie, qu’est-ce qui fera échec à la prochaine crise et à
la suivante ? Nous sommes tout à fait conscients de la difficulté de la s ituation dans laquelle nous
vous avons placés, vous les juges. Car votre déci sion en l’occurrence et ses modalités vont avoir
des répercussions extraordinaires : sur l’humanité tout entière, sur le droit, ainsi que sur les espoirs
et la foi que les peuples du monde entier ont placés en la Cour.
41. Nous espérons que vous avez trouvé notre dé marche utile qui a consisté à vous exposer
le droit et les faits d’une manière pratique et méthodique; nous vous remercions de votre infinie
courtoisie et attention.
Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour, ainsi s’achèvent nos plaidoiries d’aujourd’hui.
C’est avec gratitude que nous vous rendons les minutes supplémentaires que nous vous avons
dérobées le premier jour et nous vous remercions.
Le PRESIDENT: Monsieur Franck, je vous reme rcie. L’audience est à présent levée; elle
reprendra demain à 10 heures.
La séance est levée à 17 h 55.
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Traduction