Traduction

GC

CR 2006/53 (translation)

CR 2006/53 (traduction)

Friday 1 December 2006 at 10 a.m.

Vendredi 1 décembre 2006 à 10 heures - 2 -

8 Le PRESIDENT: Veuillez vous asseoir. L'audience est ouverte. La Cour est réunie

aujourd'hui pour entendre la République de Guinée en son second tour de plaidoiries.

Je crois que c'est à M. Forteau que je dois maintenant donner la parole.

Mr. FORTEAU: Thank you, Madam President.

I.THE FACTS

1. Madam President, Members of the Court, the Republic of Guinea will respond today to

the second round of oral arguments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in five stages: I shall

begin by recalling the facts dividing the Parties before Mr.Jean-MarcThouvenin reverts to the

question of the exhaustion of local remedies, Mr .Sam Wordsworth to Mr.Diallo’s rights, and

Mr. Alain Pellet to the protection by substitution of Mr. Diallo’s companies. Finally, the Agent for

Guinea will present the Applicant’s submissions.

2. Madam President, in my presentation of the f acts I shall develop two points in turn: in

response to Mr.Kalala, I shall first say a few words about Mr.Diallo’s companies, which will

enable me to react to the new document produced on Wednesday by the Congo and also to respond

to the question asked on Tuesday by Judge Bennouna; I shall then go back over the circumstances

in which Mr. Diallo was expelled from Zairean territory.

I. Mr. Diallo’s companies

A. Africom and Africom-Zaire

3. Regarding the first point, Mr.Kalala kept us in suspense on Wednesday afternoon by

affirming that he had proof that Mr. Diallo had, according to him, “tried to manipulate” the Court

by making himself out to be an associate of Africo m, which apparently he never was. Mr. Kalala

1
stated that he had found the articles of association of that company , which were then transmitted

to the applicant State via the Registry of the Court 2.

1
CR 2006/52, pp. 28-29, paras. 50-51.
Letter from the Registry dated 29 November 2006. - 3 -

9 4. Mr.Diallo is indeed, according to the articles of association of the company “Africom”

traced by the Congo, neither associate (associé) nor even managing director (gérant) of that

company. But there is nothin g very surprising about that, fo r the company, incorporated on

24 March 1988, has no link with that of Mr. Diallo:

⎯ their names are admittedly very close, “Africom-Zaire” in one case and “Africom” in the other,

which is liable to cause confusion;

⎯ but the domiciles of the corporate headquart ers of the two companies are not the same 3, any

4
more than are their respective entr y numbers in the Companies Registry , or again their

managing directors (gérants) . Many official documents issued by the Zairean authorities

recognize Mr. Diallo to be the Managing Director (gérant) of Africom-Zaire 5, while it was one

6
Ronald Cazier who was appointed Managing Director (gérant) of the other company Africom ;

⎯ furthermore, the corporate objects of the two companies also differ. Pursuant to Article3 of

the articles of association of the company f ound by the respondent State, its “chief purpose

shall be the sale of spare parts for vehicles, lifting material, machines” and “other mechanical

equipment” [translation by the Registry] , which was never the commercial activity of

Mr. Diallo’s company;

⎯ the date of incorporation of “Africom” found by the Respondent ought to have alerted our

opponents to the fact that it could not be Afri com-Zaire. On 24March1988, Africom-Zaire

had already been long in existence and active. It was established in 1974. In 1979 it took part

in the incorporation, in the presence of a notary, of Mr.Diallo’s other company,

7
Africontainers . In 1983 it concluded its first contr acts with the Zairean State, which was to

give rise to the listing paper affair, of which I developed the (painful) intricacies last Tuesday 8;

3
MG, BookII, Ann.1 (Articles of Asso ciation of Africontainers and Notarial Act, 18September 1979, p.1);
document transmitted by the Registry on 29 November 2006, Articles of Association of “Africom, SPRL”.
4
Ibid.
5
See, for example, MG, BookII, Ann. 130 (Judgment of the Kinshasa/Gombe Tribunal de Grande Instance ,
24August1993, p.1), or OG, Ann.16 (Letter No.431 of 28January 1989 from the Procureur Général (Prosecutor
General) at the Court of Appeal of Kinshasa to Mr. Diallo).
6
Document transmitted by the Registry on 29 November, Articles of Association of “Africom, SPRL”.
7MG, Book II, Ann. 1 (Articles of Association of Africontainers and Notarial Act, 18 September 1979).

8CR 2006/51, pp. 19-20, paras. 14-19. - 4 -

10 by 1November1975, Africom-Zaire had also co ncluded its first lease agreement with the

company PLZ 9. All these particulars are in the folder;

⎯ it is true that Guinea has so far been unable to find the articles of association of Africom-Zaire,

for one thing because it is not Mr.Diallo but Gu inea that is the appli cant in the present case

and, for another, because its national was expelle d from Zairean territory, which is where, as it

happens, the relevant documents are (according to some evidence on file, the Articles of

Association of Africom-Zaire are in the Registry of the Kinshasa/Gombe Tribunal de Grande

10
Instance) ;

⎯ yet the actual existence of the company and of its articles of association is beyond dispute: in

its submissions delivered on 11January1995 in the Africom-Zaire v. PLZ case, the Ministère

Public (Public Prosecutor) before the Supreme Cour t of Justice had occasion to observe that

the articles of association of Africom-Zaire, represented by Mr.Diallo in the case “date[d]

from 22 August 1974” [translation by the Registry] and had been the subject of a

“re-registration” “dated 17 March 1980”, having due regard, specified the Ministère Public, to

11
“what the law prescribes” .

5. Africom-Zaire — Mr. Diallo’s Africom — was therefore in existence well before 1988,

and it existed quite lawfully. Another Africom comp any has, it is true, since come into being but

that is completely beyond the scope of the case with which we are concerned.

B. The question of single-shareholder private limited companies

6. These comments on Mr.Diallo’s companies give me an opportunity to reply to the

question raised on Tuesday by JudgeBennouna a bout the possibility of incorporating, under

12
Zairean law, a single-shareholder private limited company . According to its current

information— and Guinea will not fail, in keeping with the Court’s comments 13, to amplify its

9MG, Book II, Ann. 130 (Judgmen t of the Kinshasa/Gombe Tribunal de Grande Instance, 24 August 1993), p. 7
of the Judgment.
10
MG, Book II, Ann. 146 (Submissions of the Ministère Public (Public Prosecutor) in the appeal on points of law
against appeal court judgment RCA 17244, 11 January 1995), pp. 2-3.
11
Ibid.
12CR 2006/51, p. 62.

13See letter from the Registry of 28 November 2006. - 5 -

reply between now and 6 December should fresh particulars be meanwhile brought to its notice —

11 Guinea considers that Mr. Kalala is probably not wrong in saying that Congolese legislation does

14
not authorize the incorporation of a private limited company by one single individual . I must

nevertheless add the following comments.

7. First of all, I would point out that in the AMT v. Zaire case brought before ICSID in 1993,

the Zairean State expressly put forward the idea that a foreign investor could, on his own, set up a

private limited company under Zairean law. The case involved a Zairean SPRL, SINZA, in which

a foreign company, AMT, had a majority holding. In support of its allegation, which was rejected

by the tribunal, that AMT had no legal standing in the case, the Zairean State considered that the

fact of AMT’s participation in the capital of SINZA did not suffice to give it that legal standing, a

solution— the Zairean State explained— whic h would also have held good even had AMT

incorporated the company while holding 100 per cent of its capital stock 15. The very fact that the

Zairean State put forward such a hypothesis without deeming it legally unworkable under its

domestic law is noteworthy since it suggests that the impossibility affirmed by Mr.Kalala on

Wednesday is not as absolute as all that.

8. As such, the fact of not being able to create a one-person company in no prevents a

company from nevertheless becoming one-person subsequently. Those are two different issues. It

all depends, regarding the second point, not on the rules of incorporation but on the rules applicable

in the case of the dissolution and striking off of the company. Now the Decree of 6March1951

establishing Zaire’s trade register does not mention the possibility of a company’s becoming

one-person as a case necessitating its removal from the trade register 16, when inclusion in the

17
register, I emphasize, “holds a presumption of trader status” [translation by the Registry].

12 9. In the present case, Africontainers has in any event never been a one-person company,

either at the time of its establishment or sin ce, which does not prevent Mr.Diallo from holding,

1CR 2006/52, p. 9, para. 8.
15
ARB/93/1, award of 21 February 1997, ILM, 1997, p. 2, para. 1.05 (ii), and p. 19, para. 5.11.
1Reproduced in Kalongo Mbikayi, Code civil et commercial congolais (mis à jour au 31 mars 1997) , Centre de

recherches et de diffusion juridiques, Kinshasa, 1997, pp. 378-379, Art. 29.
1Ibid., p. 371, Art. 3. - 6 -

indirectly, 100percent of the capital stock. As to Africom-Zaire, while it became one-person in

the late 1970s, it was set up in 1974 contractually.

10. I may add that the existence of these two companies, including the very special

configuration of their capital, centralized in Mr. Diallo’s hands, has never been disputed by the

persons who might have had an interest in doing so , and particularly their contractual partners, the

Zairean State included. The Ministère Public (Public Prosecutor) before the Supreme Court of

Justice, called upon in 1995 to examine the articl es of association of Africom and Africontainers,

moreover expressly confirmed, on each occasion, the validity of the filing of the articles of

18
association, and of that of their amending instruments .

11. This being so, suffice it to take note of this situation, which compels recognition as a fact

in international law ( Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Merits, Judgment No.7,

1926, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 7 , p. 19). The Democratic Republic of the Congo has for that matter

done no different. For it has acknowledged in its preliminary objections, without going back on

this in its oral arguments, the existence of tho se two companies on the one hand and, on the other,

the fact that, following the particular allocation of their capital since 1980, Mr.Diallo thus

“became, de facto, the sole managing director of those two companies incorporated under the laws

of Zaire” 19.

12. Let us suppose incidentally— but here I am only speculating— that the fact that

Mr.Diallo is the only shareholder of his two companies is a ground for their dissolution under

Congolese law, and let us further suppose that you have the power to dissolve both companies,

what would happen? Their dissolution would entail the transmission of all their property to their

sole associate, Mr. Diallo, a Guinean national. This would bring us back, via another route, to the

solution of the De Leon case, referred to by Mr. Alain Pellet last Tuesday in support of protection

20
13 by substitution . Hence, whatever end of the issue we start from, the outcome is always the same.

18
MG, Book II, Ann. 146 (Submissions of the Ministère Public (Public Prosecutor) in the appeal on points of law
against appeal court judgmen t RCA 17244, 11 January 1995), pp. 2-3; MG, BookII, Ann.149 (Submissions of the
Ministère Public (Public Prosecutor) in the appeal on points of law against appeal court judgment RCA17229,
20 April 1995), pp. 2-3.
19
POC, p. 11, para. 1.06.
2CR 2006/51, p. 49, para. 26. - 7 -

13. Now that this has been clarified, Mada m President, I come to the second point in my

statement, on the conditions under which Mr. Diallo was expelled from Zairean territory.

II. The conditions under which Mr. Diallo was expelled from Zairean territory

14. Before I come to the actual expulsion I have to say by way of introduction that as

Mr. Kalala began his pleadings on Wednesday he expressly stated that he would “confine himself

to identifying the points of fact and law on which th e two States continue to differ and to refuting

Guinea’s argument on each of those points” 21. But Mr.Kalala has kept completely silent on two

points of fact in particular that the Congo does not seem able to dispute:

⎯ first of all, at no time has Mr. Kalala returned to the arguments that I had raised last Tuesday

about the assessment by Mr. Diallo of his companies’ claims;

⎯ I searched in vain in the record of the hearings in the Congo’s second round of pleadings: the

word “detention” was not mentioned once by the Respondent. Nothing whatever was said,

either about the arbitrary arrest and detention in 1988 or in 1995-1996, still less about their

clearly excessive duration.

15. My opponent focused solely on the expul sion, which according to him was completely

“lawful” 22. Here we come to a substantive matter, which it is not yet for the Parties to discuss in all

its aspects. However, Mr. Kalala’s assertions cannot be left unanswe red, and that is why I in turn

will focus on this issue.

16. The lawfulness of the expulsion under Zairean law must be assessed from several angles.

17. First of all, were the conditions of competence, form and procedure respected?

Obviously not:

23
14 ⎯ Article15 of the 1983Legislative Or der concerning immigration control requires an Order,

signed by the President of the Republic; here we are dealing with a decree, signed by the

24
Prime Minister ;

21
CR 2006/52, p. 17, para. 1.
22CR 2006/52, p. 18, para. 2.

23POC, Ann7 . 3; judges’ folder for the first round, tab No. (Legislative Order N. 3-033 of
12 September 1983 concerning immigration control).

24POC, Ann. 75 (Decree No. 0043 dated 31 October 1995 expel ling Mr. Diallo from the territory of the Republic
of Zaire). - 8 -

⎯ Article16 of the 1983Legislative Order requires that the National Immigration Board be

consulted prior to deportation and that this consultation be men tioned in the expulsion order;

here we have an expulsion order which refers to no such consultation, unlike, for example, the

expulsion orders of 22February1995 and 20September1996 served on a large number of

foreign nationals (84 in one case, 24 in the other). Both these orders expressly state, and in

relation to all the 108 persons concerned: “having regard to the favourable recommendation by

25
the National Immigration Board” . The fact that there is no such statement anywhere in the

expulsion order on Mr. Diallo confirms that the Zairean authorities were suspiciously eager to

penalize him;

⎯ lastly, the 1983 Legislative Order makes a clear distinction between the concept, and the

26
system, of deportation and of refusal of entry ; and yet Mr.Diallo was the subject of an

expulsion order, implemented, curiously enough, by a refusal-of-entry order. Mr.Kalala

conceded on Tuesday that there was a problem in this connection, referring to an “error” by the

27
immigration officer . An error perhaps, but an error that was perhaps intentional, because it

was not without legal consequences, particularly with regard to the remedies available (or not

available in this case) to Mr. Diallo. As my learned friend Mr. Jean-Marc Thouvenin observed

last Tuesday, Article 13 of the 1983 Legislative Order expressly provides that refusals of entry

28
“shall not be subject to appeal” .

15 18. Was the requirement that reasons be given for the expulsion order then met? Clearly not:

the expulsion order contains only the bare fact, wi th no other information or reference to any

specific document whatever: “Having regard to the personal file of the person identified in

Article 1 below, whose presence and conduct have breached and continue to breach Zairean public

order, particularly in economic, financial and monetary matters”. This is what is commonly called

standard grounds in administrative law, equivale nt to no grounds at all, which is extremely

awkward in view of the serious nature of the measures.

25POC, Ann. 76 (Decrees providing for the deportation of aliens).
26
POC, Ann. 73; judges’ folder for the first round, tab No. 3 (Arts. 13 and 15).
27
CR 2006/52, p. 18, para. 5.
28CR 2006/51, pp. 57-58, para. 28. - 9 -

19. The explanation given by Mr. Kalala on this point is highly revealing, as regards the lack

of any valid grounds for expulsion. In his view , “the Congolese authorities could not in a legal

29
document specify all the individual acts of which Mr.Diallo was accused” . Allow me to make

two comments on this:

⎯ in purely legal terms Mr.Kalala’s argument comes down to this: when it is too easy to state

the grounds because there is too much evidence, th ere is apparently no longer any need to state

the grounds. This position is frankly absurd. In addition, it amounts to an admission, of which

Guinea takes note, that there are no grounds whatever in the expulsion order;

⎯ on the facts now, the idea that the Congo could rely in detail, on “individual acts” against

Mr.Diallo is utterly without foundation, becau se the Congo has never produced the slightest

evidence in support of its serious accusations ag ainst Mr.Diallo. The Respondent may well

rely, for the first time please note, on the existence of “regular reports” from “DRC special

30
services”, which “had had Mr.Diallo under surveillance for several months” ; it would still

be necessary to flesh out these accusations, which the Congo has never been in a position to do.

20. This lack of grounds for the order doubtless explains why Mr. Kalala again refers to the

letter dated 30 November 1995 whereby Mr. Diallo al erted several important foreign figures to the

fate of his companies. Mr.Kalala did admit th at this letter post-dates the expulsion order of

31October. However, essentially he said was th at what counted was not the decree but its

16 implementation by the refusal-of-entry order of 31 January 1996. But if I am not mistaken what set

the whole procedure in motion was the expulsion or der, which assuredly could not have been the

reason for events which took place subsequent to it.

21. Be this as it may, simple remarks like tho se made by Mr. Diallo in that letter cannot be

regarded as “an act prejudicial to Congolese public order” justify
ing expulsion 31, as Mr. Kalala felt

able to say last Wednesday. To substantiate his assertions, he took a recent case concerning

France 32, where “an Algerian Muslim cleric” has recentl y been expelled. Yet the facts of the two

29CR 2006/52, p. 19, para. 6.
30
CR 2006/52, p. 20, para. 10.
31
Ibid.
32CR 2006/52, p. 19, para. 7. - 10 -

cases ⎯ and I will take good care not to pass legal judgment one way or the other on the conduct

of the French State ⎯ are completely different. The pers on concerned was not expelled for mere

“statements”, as Mr. Kalala asserts, and he was not expelled without being able to avail himself of

fundamental legal guarantees that Mr. Diallo has never enjoyed:

⎯ the person concerned was able to request, as a matter of urgency, the postponement of his

expulsion before the (juge des référés) (judge hearing urgent applications), then the Conseil

d’Etat, ruled on his case;

⎯ and in this case the expulsion order was confirmed by the judge on the basis of notes from the

intelligence services establishing the individual’s links with terrorist organisations, intelligence

notes that “were discussed in connection with the written statement in the presence of both

33
parties” . In contrast Mr.Diallo has never had this opportunity, any more than Guinea has

today, because the Congo has failed to produce any document, however insignificant, in

support of its accusations or to put Mr. Diallo in a position to dispute them at the proper time.

22. Let me stress on the latter point that on Wednesday the Respondent admitted, through

Mr.Kalala, that at the time of his detention following the approval of the order Mr.Diallo knew

nothing of this “expulsion order against him” 34. This confirms once more the arbitrary nature of

17 the detention and the impossibility of exhausting any remedy whatever against measures of which

Mr. Diallo had not even been informed.

23. Lastly, on Wednesday Mr. Kalala welcomed the fact that the Zairean authorities had not

acted in haste 35. The refusal-of-entry measure only took effect three months after the expulsion

order. Yet this does not mean that the Zairean authorities did nothing throughout this period.

Where was Mr.Diallo between the approval of the expulsion and the refusal-of-entry orders? In

prison, where he was rotting in a cell under conditions contrary to international standards and

particularly in breach of the 1983 Order, whic h prohibited any detenti on beyond an absolute

33
Conseil d’Etat, 4 October 2004, No. 266948, Ministre de l’intérieur, de la s écurité intérieure et des libertés
locales c. M. Bouziane (www.legifrance.gouv.fr).
34
CR 2006/52, pp. 19-20, para. 10.
3CR 2006/52, p. 18, para. 4. - 11 -

maximum of eight days . I will close there, Madam President, because the Congo clearly does not

wish to hear about that detention, or the one in 1988.

Madam President, Members of the Court, I have now reached the end of my statement, and

thank you sincerely for your attention. Madam Pr esident, I would be grateful if you would now

give the floor to Mr. Jean-Marc Thouvenin.

Le PRESIDENT: Je vous remercie, M.Fo rteau. J'appelle maintenant à la barre

M.Thouvenin. Il peut être utile de préciser à ce stade que la Cour poursuivra la séance ce matin

sans observer de pause.

M. THOUVENIN : Je vous remercie, Madame le président.

II. EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES

1. Madam President, Members of the Cour t, the arguments presented by the Congo in

support of its second preliminary objection call for clarification on four points, which I will deal

with in turn.

18 I. Mr. Diallo’s expulsion prevented his companies from pursuing local remedies

2. The DRC has disputed Guinea’s contention that Mr.Diallo’s companies have been

prevented from pursuing local remedies because of the expulsion of their manager (gérant) 37. In

the view of the Congo, Mr.Diallo’s fate must certainly not be confused with that of his

companies 38.

3. There is no fundamental disagreement betw een the Parties on the distinction between the

legal personalities of Mr.Diallo and of his companies, but it will doubtless not have escaped the

Congo that prevention from pursuing remedies is a matter of fact. On this ground it would be

erroneous to think that the law necessarily governs the fact.

3CR 2006/51, para. 28 (Forteau).
37
CR 2006/52, pp. 21-22, paras. 15 and 19 (Kalala).
3CR 2006/52, p. 21, para. 18 (Kalala). - 12 -

4. And yet in fact it is not Guinea but Zaire that has confused Mr. Diallo the gérant associé

with his companies. Moreover, despite the rather embarrassed explanations by the Congo 39, the

chronology of events from October 1995 to January 1996 shows that the sole cause of Mr. Diallo’s

expulsion lay in the legal actions he was bringing on behalf of his companies.

5. However, my opponent is trying to convince us that there was no confusion in the mind of

the then government because, rather than expe lling Mr.Diallo, Zaire could just as well have

expropriated his companies or prohibited them from engaging in certain activities; that, in his

40
view, would have been the “best solution” . But it is too late for such advice: rightly or wrongly,

but in any event unlawfully, the Zaire of 1995-1996 took the view that the best solution was to

arrest, detain and subsequently expel Mr. Diallo.

6. Moreover, it is still a matter of fact that Mr.Diallo’s companies were prevented from

pursuing local remedies, having no manager on the spot to run their business in their interest. It

can still be asserted that, in law, Mr.Diallo’s companies could still do many things after the

41
expulsion of their manager (gérant), but three facts show that this could not have been the case:

19 ⎯ firstly, and Mr.Wordsworth will return to this point shortly, no manager (gérant) other than

Mr. Diallo was appointed merely by virtue of th e letter dated 12 February 1996 by a lawyer to

42
an employee of Africontainers . But even if that had been the case, it would have changed

nothing.

⎯ because secondly, the manager (gérant) of Africontainers had been deprived of his freedom

and expelled although he was bri nging legal actions as part of his duties as manager. In such

circumstances no-one could be called upon to take over so dangerous a managerial post. The

possible successor might perhaps have bought supplie s or traded; but he would have had good

reason to think that he was “manifestly precluded from pursuing local remedies” 43 on behalf of

39CR 2006/52, pp. 19-20, paras. 9-10 (Kalala).

40CR 2006/52, p. 22, para. 20 (Kalala).
41
CR 2006/52, p. 21, para. 18 (Kalala).
42CR 2006/52, pp. 21-22, para. 19 (Kalala) and MG, Ann. 201.

43Report of the ILC, Fifty-eighth Session (2006), Supplement No. 10 (A.61/10), Art. 15, d), p. 79. - 13 -

the companies. Subsequently, “in all the circumstances of the case it would be manifestly

44
unreasonable to expect compliance with the rule” .

⎯ moreover and thirdly, it is significant that no fresh legal action had been brought by

Mr. Diallo’s companies after his expulsion, althou gh the exercise, by Guinea, of its diplomatic

protection before the Court dates from the end of1998. As I have already stated 45, although

between 1996 and 1998 negotiations with representa tives of Africontainers were conducted on

Gécamines’ initiative, they were under the control of the Guinean Embassy in Zaire. I was not

contradicted on this point during the hearings last Wednesday, and I conclude from this that

after his expulsion, the manager (gérant) of Africontainers was certainly prevented from

exhausting local remedies on behalf of his companies

II. The absence of reasonably available local remedies against arbitrary arrest and expulsion

7. After eight years of proceedings the DRC has shown itself to be incapable of instancing so

much as a single real remedy that would have been available to Mr. Diallo. Guinea has noted that

at Wednesday’s hearing:

20 ⎯ firstly, Congo did not dispute that the “remedy” against expulsion on which it had first thought

that it could base its argument is not a remedy within the meaning of the exhaustion-of-local

remedies rule; what it is is an extra-legal pro cedure that may be characterized as an appeal to

the indulgence of the governmental authorities;

⎯ secondly, the Congo has also not alleged that there is another type of remedy against refusal of

entry: on the contrary, it has admitted, by its silence, that under Article 13 of Legislative Order

No. 83-033 dated 12 September 1983 concerning immigration “[such] refusal of entry shall not

be subject to appeal” 46;

⎯ thirdly, nothing was said either on possible remedi es that would have enabled Mr.Diallo to

claim compensation for the damage he had su ffered in 1988 and 1996 as a result of his

arbitrary detention.

44Report of the ILC, Fifty-eighth Session (2006), Supplement No. 10 (A.61/10), Art. 15, p. 83, para. 11.
45
CR 2006/51, pp. 56-57, para. 24 (Thouvenin).
46Ann. EP 73; emphasis added. - 14 -

8. Guinea deduces from this that there were no reasonably available local remedies enabling

Mr. Diallo to assert his rights.

III. The absence of reasonably available remed ies against government interference in legal

proceedings brought by Mr. Diallo’s companies

9. Yet Mr.Diallo’s fate does not much inte rest the DRC, which prefers to focus on his

47
companies and their claims and to gloss over the government interference raised by Guinea

during Tuesday’s hearing 48. I will briefly restate the facts:

⎯ On 3 July 1995 the Kinshasa Tribunal de grande instance ordered Shell to pay Africontainers

49 50
13 million dollars . In August the enforceability of this judgment was confirmed on appeal .

I will return to this.

51
⎯ On 13September, following Zaire Shell’s application to the government , execution of the

judgment was stayed, on the orders of the Vice-Mini ster of Justice and K eeper of the Seals.

21 The order was given on the Zaire Shell cell-phone, i.e. by way of its portable telephone, as

52
reported by the bailiff who was in the process of seizing Zaire Shell’s property .

⎯ On 28 September, however, the Minister of Justice, this time by letter, asked the First President

of the Court of Appeal to make arrangements for the enforcement of the decision, regarded as

free from “any manifest error of judgment” 53. On 6 October, then 9 October, a bailiff therefore

proceeded to seize property belonging to Shell, in particular company accounts and office

equipment. Africontainers was going to recover the rights recognized by the court.

⎯ But on 13October, the First President of the Kinshasa-Gombe Appeal Court wrote to the

Minister of Justice stating that he had “the honour to inform [him] that pursuant to [his] verbal

instructions received this morning, he ha[d] immediately revoked the seizure of the property of

Zaire Shell in the case between it and Africontainers . . .” 54.

47CR 2006/52, pp. 21-22, para. 19 (Kalala).
48
CR 2006/51, pp. 22-23, paras. 24-27 (Forteau).
49
MG, Ann. 153.
50
POC, Ann. 65.
51MG, Ann. 166.

52MG, Ann. 171.

53MG, Ann. 170 [sic]; should be Ann. 177.
54
MG, Ann. 177 [sic]. - 15 -

10. Madam President, it has been said in this Court that: “The Congolese Government does

not have the power to command judges to decide c ases one way or another; nor does it ever do

55
so.” I note for my part that a letter from the First President of the Kinshasa/Gombe Appeal Court

shows that, in the Africontainers v. Zaire Shell case, that is exactly what happened.

11. All in all, this case is characterized by:

(i) twofold interference, first in the form of an order issued by telephone by the Deputy

Minister of Justice to cease the seizure of property and second, in the form of verbal

instructions given to the First President of the Kinshasa/Gombe Appeal Court; it also

reveals

(ii) a total lack of legal supervision of ac tion by the Government, its orders having always

been issued verbally without any legal basis or justification in the former instance and, in

22 the latter, in flagrant contradiction with the ministerial letter of 28 September recognizing

the absence of any clear miscarriage of justice against Zaire Shell.

12. Above all, the instances of government interference had the effect of completely

56
contradicting the decision of the Kinshasa/Go mbe Appeal Court, which, on 24 August 1995 , had

dismissed the application for suspension of execution of the judgment filed by Zaire Shell and, on

57
13 September 1995 , upheld the immediate enforceability of the judgment of the Tribunal de

Grande Instance favourable to Africontainers.

13. Guinea notes that, on the question whether Mr. Diallo’s companies could have appealed

against the State and challenged such interferen ce with a reasonable chan ce of success, the Congo

provides no answer. Hence, here again, there were “no reasonably available local remedies”, to

58
echo the wording of draft Article 15 (a) of the ILC draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection .

IV. Inadequate judicial protection of Mr. Diallo and his companies

14. The final point it falls to me to address concerns the inadequacy of the Zairean judicial

protection system with respect to Mr. Diallo and his companies.

55CR 2006/52, p. 26, para. 38 (Kalala).
56
POC, Vol. II, Ann. 65.
57MG, Book II, Ann. 170.

58ILC Report, Fifty-eighth Session, 2006, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10), Art. 15 (a), p. 78. - 16 -

15. Regarding the problem of the excessive le ngth of the proceedings, the Parties are agreed

on one fact: two proceedings instituted by Mr. Diallo’s companies were following their “normal

59
course” — that is the expression to be found in an exchange of letters dated 2002— nearly ten

years after they had been brought.

16. That is an excessively long period, but my opponent explained during Wednesday’s

hearing that: “as [they] are civil and commercial cases decided at the appellate level, the filing

60
with the Supreme Court of an appeal for them to be quashed does not stay their execution” ,

which, according to him, would mean that “Mr. Diallo and his companies cannot complain of any

61
23 so-called unreasonable slowness of domestic proceedings in the DRC” . But, apart from the fact

that the suspensive or other character of a pow er in no way justifies the unreasonable length of

proceedings, the reality is quite different from that depicted by my opponent: while it is true that

the filing of appeals against the appeal judgments that have been unfavourable to Africontainers

and Africom-Zaire were not suspensive, the eff ects of the only appeal judgment favourable to

Africontainers were arbitrarily suspended by government interference.

17. However that may be, the question has arisen before the Court of what stage the appeal

proceedings instituted in the Africom-Zaire v. PLZ and Africontainers v. Fina cases are at.

Somewhat surrealistically, the Congo claims to know nothing of this, saying that: “[t]he DRC has

not been informed of the outcome of these proceedings between two private commercial

companies” 62. But it is clear that if the DRC was not info rmed of the outcome of the lawsuit, it is

quite simply because there has been no outcome. All the same, we are not talking about decisions

of some district court but of those of the Supr eme Court of Justice, whose decisions, which are

obviously public and few in number, form ⎯ in common with those of all supreme courts ⎯ the

country’s most observed and commented case law. It is clearly inconceivable that a State like the

DRC could be unaware of the judicial decisions handed down by its highest court.

18. In any event, it is noteworthy that:

5POC, Vol. II, Ann. 47.
60
CR 2006/52, p. 27, para. 44 (Kalala).
61
Ibid.
6CR 2006/50, p. 32-33, para. 65 (Kalala); see also p. 21, para. 24 (Kalala). - 17 -

⎯ first, the file submitted to the Court by the Congo contains material showing that, in 2002, the

appeals were still pending;

⎯ second, the material in question was obtained in only two days by the Congo;

⎯ third, the Congolese State did not see fit to update the file that it it
self submitted to the Court.

19. In this context, it seems reasonable to consider that the failure by the Congo to produce

documentation equivalent to that it produced in 2002, in the annexes to its preliminary objections,

63
according to which the proceedings were following their “normal course” , must be taken to mean

24 that the situation is still the same today: matters are still following their “normal course” and are

still pending.

20. I now come to my final argument, MadamPresident: even supposing that, as has been

said here, the Congolese courts are among the world’s swiftest, Guinea has shown the vanity of the

remedies which, the DRC asserts, should have been exhausted. It has furthermore been

acknowledged, on Wednesday, that while the Con golese Government does not intervene in all

64 65
judicial decisions , it does intervene nevertheless . Most certainly. And that happened in a

completely arbitrary manner to MrD . iallo’s companies, as I have just said and as

66
Mr. Mathias Forteau said on Tuesday , without being challenged on this by the Congo. I find it

hard to see, Madam President, how the rarity of th e occurrence, if such it proved to be, could have

the slightest consequence in our case since, as it happens, this case is one of those in which the

Government’s interference is established. Peac e may sometimes take precedence over justice, it

has been said in this Court, as though to suggest th at interference in the Africontainers cases is

grounded in this notion. But, apart from the seeming absurdity of the suggestion that

Africontainers could have threatened peace, this in any event shows that for that company, as for

Africom-Zaire and Mr. Diallo, no justice could be dispensed in Zaire.

21. I thank you, Madam President, Members of the Court, for your attention and I would ask

you, Madam President, to give the floor to Mr. Wordsworth.

63POC, Vol. II, Ann. 47.
64
CR 2006/52, p. 25, para. 35 (Kalala).
65
CR 2006/52, pp. 25-26, para. 36 (Kalala).
66CR 2006/51, pp. 19-20, paras. 16-18, and pp. 22-25, paras. 26-29. - 18 -

Le PRESIDENT: Je vous remercie, M.T houvenin. Je donne maintenant la parole à

M. Wordsworth.

25 M. WORDSWORTH :

III. LE DROIT DE LA G UINÉE D ’EXERCER SA PROTECTION DIPLOMATIQUE AU SUJET DE LA
DÉTENTION ET DE L ’EXPULSION ARBITRAIRES DE M . DIALLO ,AINSI QUE
DE SES DROITS EN TANT QU ’ACTIONNAIRE

1. Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour, il m’incombe d’examiner brièvement les

conclusions formulées au secondtour par M.Mazyambo concernant l’existence ou non de droits

d’actionnaires pertinents en la présente affaire.

2. Une remarque préliminaire évidente s’impose cependant :

a) Au paragraphe 3.30 2) de son mémoire, la Guinée a déclaré :

«l’emprisonnement sans procès, sans interroga toire, sans formalité, sans accès ni aux
avocats ni au personnel de l’ambassade de la République de Guinée était illicite et

engage dès lors la responsabilité de la RDC ⎯que ce soit en ce qui concerne les
mauvais traitements infligés à M.Diallo, sans égard à ses droits les plus
fondamentaux, ou pour ce qui est de la viola tion du paragraphe 1 de l’article 36 de la

convention de Vienne sur les relations consulaires».

b) Dans les paragraphes suivants, la Guinée a mi s l’accent sur l’expulsion, soutenant que celle-ci

avait été «arbitraire et illicite», que les prescripti ons de l’article 13 du pacte international relatif

aux droits civils et politiques, auxquels les deux Etats sont Parties, n’avaient pas été respectées,

que «M. Diallo a[vait] dû quitter le Zaïre … san s aucun effet personnel, abandonnant sur place

tous ses biens, mobiliers ou immobiliers», que «M. Di allo a[vait] été traité en criminel», et que

«la façon dont l’expulsion a[vait] été conduite , tout comme l’expulsion elle-même, était

67
illicite» .

3. Il n’aura pas échappé à la Cour que, lors de son second tour de plaidoirie, la RDC n’a, une

fois encore, rien dit sur le droit de la Guinée à exercer sa protection diplom atique au sujet de la

détention et de l’expulsion illicites dont aurait été victime M. Diallo, ni sur les droits que la Guinée

tient de l’alinéa b) du paragraphe1 de l’article36 de la convention de Vienne sur les relations

consulaires68 (voir les affaires LaGrand (Allemagne cE . tats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt,

67
MG, par. 3.32-3.34.
68Recueil des traités des Nations Unies , vol.596, p.261. La convention est entrée en vigueur pour la RDC le
14 août 1976, et pour la Guinée le 30 juin 1988. - 19 -

C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p4 .92 par7.; Avena et autres ressortissants mexicains (Mexique

c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2004 , par. 49 et suiv.). Dans l’un et l’autre cas, le

26 fait que soit invoquée une violation du droit en questi on suffit, en soi, à indiquer que la présente

affaire doit se poursuivre et être jugée au fond. Et ce point n’est contesté d’aucune manière.

4. J’en viens aux conclusions de M.Mazy ambo concernant les droits des actionnaires.

Commençons par les points de convergence, les quels sont nombreux. M.Mazyambo n’a pas

contesté ce que j’ai dit au sujet de la nature tr ès particulière et hybride de la «société privée à

responsabilité limitée», la SPRL ; il convient que les droits de M. Diallo en tant qu’actionnaire sont

bien ceux établis par la législation de la RDC 69 et que ses droits pertinents en tant qu’actionnaire

sont énumérés aux articles51, 65, 67, 68, 71, 75 et79 du décret de1887 sur les sociétés

70
commerciales, texte sur lequel j’ai appelé l’attention de la Cour lors du premier tour . Il en résulte

qu’il n’y a dès lors que deuxpoints de désaccord pour ce qui concerne la nature et l’étendue des

droits pertinents :

a)premièrement, M.Mazyambo considère que l’article78 du décret de1887, auquel j’ai

71
également fait référence lors du premier tour, ne crée pas de droit pour les actionnaires ;

b) deuxièmement, il a également défendu la thèse selon laquelle le droit de surveillance prévu aux

articles 71 et 75 n’était pas applicable, dans la mesure où ces articles visent la surveillance de la

gérance de la société et que M. Diallo était déjà le gérant de ses deux SPRL 72.

5. Je vais traiter ces deux points l’un après l’autre.

6. Tout d’abord, l’article78, lequel dispose : «The general meeting of shareholders shall

have the widest powers to perform or ratify act s concerning the company...» M.Mazyambo n’a

pas expliqué pourquoi ce texte ne créerait pas de droits pour les actionnaires. Ainsi que

M. Makela ⎯ dont il n’a pas été contesté qu’il faisait autorité dans le domaine du droit de la

RDC ⎯ l’explique, au sujet de l’article 78 :

«Shareholders function as a collective body in the general meeting, which is the
supreme organ of the company. It tak es decisions lying outside the scope of

69 CR 2006/52, p. 10, par. 5.

70 CR 2006/52, p. 10-11, par. 7.
71
CR 2006/51, p. 33, point i).
72 CR 2006/52, p. 11. - 20 -

day-to-day management of company affairs. It has the authority, inter alia, to pass

judgment on management of 73mpany affairs and to grant a quitus (discharge) to the
managers and auditors.»

27 7. Cette «compétence» indique l’existence d’ un droit et, en l’occurrence, d’un droit très

important. Il est vrai, et cela ressort égalemen t du commentaire de M. Makela, qu’il s’agit là d’un

droit pour les actionnaires qui agissent collectivement au sein d’une assemblée générale, mais c’est

néanmoins un droit dont chaque actionnaire tire un bénéfice proportionnel à sa participation dans la

société. Aux termes de l’article 51 du décret de 1887 : «Each share confers an equal entitlement in

the exercise of members’ prerogatives…» Chaque actionnaire bénéficie d’«an equal right» dans

l’exercice d’un droit tel que celui qui est prévu à l’article78, mais celui-ci est proportionnel au

pourcentage de parts qu’il détient dans la société. Dans le cas de M.Diallo, il s’agissait bien sûr

d’une participation, directe ou indirecte, de 100 %.

8. J’en viens ensuite au droit de surveillance et de contrôle régi par les articles71 et75 du

décret de 1887, au sujet duquel M. Mazyambo a d éclaré : M. Diallo «was unable to exercise … the

right of oversight of the two companies»; «[t]his instrument shows that the…oversight is

oversight of the management. [S]uch oversight cannot be entrusted to an individual who is already

gérant.» 74 Ceci appelle quatre réponses :

a) premièrement, cela revient à ignorer le libellé de l’article 75. Cet artic le définit le contenu du

droit de surveillance de l’actionnaire prévu à l’artic le71, et dispose: «The auditors’ job is to

oversee and check, without any limitation, all actions taken by management, all corporate

operations and the register of associés.» La surveillance des actes accomplis par la gérance est

certes évoquée, mais qu’en est-il du droit de surveiller et de contrôler toutes les opérations de la

société et le registre des associés ? Ces droits sont beaucoup, beaucoup plus étendus que ne le

dit M.Mazyambo— ils ne coïncident pas stri ctement avec ceux d’un associé agissant en tant

qu’associé gérant ;

b) deuxièmement, par principe, pourquoi le gérant ne pourrait-il pas également exercer la fonction

de surveillance? Le décret de1887 prévoit e xpressément des situations dans lesquelles une

personne — de toute évidence le gérant associé, dont le statut est non seulement reconnu mais

73
Roger Makela Massamba, Droit des affaires⎯ Cadre juridique de la vie des affaires au Zaïre ,
Cadicec/De Boecke Université, 1996, p. 303.
74CR 2006/52, p. 11, par. 8. - 21 -

protégé par l’article 67 —, peut remplir deux fonctions en même temps. J’insiste sur le fait que

je parle là d’une SPRL, société qui présente des caractéristiques très particulières. Le gérant

gère la société; l’associé, qui est l’actionnaire ma joritaire, dispose, quant à lui, de tous les

28 pouvoirs de l’assemblée générale, y compris ceux d’effectuer ou de ratifier des actes relatifs à la

société, et même de révoquer le gérant pour juste motif. Cependant, rien de tout cela ne signifie

qu’il serait interdit de détenir le droit d’exercer en même temps ces différentes fonctions ;

c) troisièmement, il y a également un point d’ordre formel, puisque M.Mazyambo a semblé

donner à entendre que la Guinée soutenait que M. Diallo était en fait «commissaire», au sens

des articles 71 et 75. Ce n’est pas ce que nous soutenons ; ce que nous disons, conformément à

75
l’article 71 et également à l’article 19 du statut d’Africontainers , c’est que M. Diallo s’est vu

conférer tous les droits et pouvoirs de surve illance et de contrôle qui auraient été ceux du

«commissaire» au sein d’une société plus importante. Dès lors que ses sociétés comptaient

moins de cinq«associés», et aux termes du statut d’Africontainers, M.Diallo, en tant

qu’«associé», et non en tant qu’«actionnaire», jouissait des dr oits de surveillance et de

contrôle — il s’agit là de droits d’actionnaires ;

d) enfin, s’agissant des faits avancés par la RDC, M. Diallo n’était plus, dans la réalité, le «gérant»

d’Africontainers après son expulsion. M. Kala la a indiqué que, dans les deux semaines qui ont

suivi cette expulsion, comme l’atteste une lettre du 12février996 des avocats

76
d’Africontainers, un nouveau «gérant» avait été désigné en la personne de M.Kanza . Par

conséquent, s’agissant des faits avancés par la RDC, l’argument de M. Mazyambo ne tient tout

simplement pas.

9. Quoi qu’il en soit, la version des faits que donne M eKalala ne résiste tout simplement pas

à l’examen :

a) Si, dans la lettre du 12 février, M. Kanza est bel et bien qualifié de «gérant» 77, absolument rien

ne donne à penser qu’une assemblée générale extraordinaire, conforme aux prescriptions de

l’article 65, de même qu’à celles, particulières, de l’article 67, ait d’une manière ou d’une autre

75MG, annexe 1.
76
CR 2006/52, p. 22, par. 19.
77MG, annexe 201. - 22 -

été tenue et ait fait l’objet d’un procès-verbal notarié avant le 12 février ⎯ rappelons, bien sûr,

que M. Diallo venait alors tout juste d’être e xpulsé et rappelons aussi que l’assemblée générale

devrait s’être tenue en RDC, un point sur lequel les deux Parties s’accordent. Il ne s’agissait

pas juste pour M.Diallo de signer un bout de papier, comme la RDC affecte de le croire, de

manière inexplicable. Il convient en outre de se pencher sur l’annexe à la lettre du 12 février : il

s’agit d’une sommation en paiement, datée du 5 février 1996, dans laquelle c’est bien M. Diallo

78
29 qui est désigné comme l’«administrateur-gérant» , et, dans les documents ultérieurs, M. Kanza

79
n’est plus jamais présenté comme «géran t» mais comme «directeur d’exploitation» ⎯ terme

qui pourrait se traduire par «production manager», en anglais, et qui, en tout état de cause,

recouvre des fonctions très différentes de celles de «gérant».

b) Par ailleurs, M. Diallo, dans les lettres qu’il envoyait en RDC depuis la Guinée, faisait suivre sa

signature de la mention «PDG» (président-directeur général) d’Africontainers ⎯ autrement dit,

bien entendu, «gérant» de cette société 80. Et ⎯ s’il est encore besoin de preuves à cet égard ⎯

dans la décision en date du 20juin2002 ren due par la cour d’appel de Kinshasa-Gombe,

81
M.Diallo est désigné en tant qu’«associé-gérant» d’Africontainers . M.Diallo était donc, et

est resté, à tous les moments pertinents, le «gérant» d’Africontainers.

10. J’en viens maintenant au dernier argument de M.Mazyambo sur les droits des

actionnaires ⎯un argument qui porte sur les faits. M. Mazyambo soutient que M.Diallo n’a en

tout état de cause subi aucune atteinte à ses droits du fait de son expulsion. En bref, il affirme que

les droits des actionnaires pouvaient être exercés par délégation de pouvoirs, que M. Diallo pouvait

continuer d’exercer ses droits depuis l’étranger gr âce aux moyens de communication modernes, et

82
que l’état de dénuement de M. Diallo n’a pas été prouvé .

11. Ces affirmations ne répondent à aucun des points que j’ai traités lors du premier tour.

Certes, M. Diallo aurait pu désigner un autre «gérant», mais il avait le droit de nommer le «gérant»

de son choix, autrement dit lui-même, et il ava it droit aux protections spéciales garanties par

78MG, annexe 201, deuxième page.

79MG, annexe 213, quatrième page.
80
MG, annexe 219.
81EPC, annexe 64, quatrième page.

82CR 2006/52, p. 12, par. 10. - 23 -

l’article 67. Et, quoi qu’il en soit, comment aurait- il alors, depuis la Guinée, exercé en particulier

les droits de surveillance et de contrôle que lui conféraient les articles 71 et 75 ? Soyons réalistes :

comment pouvait-il convoquer (voir article83 du décret de1887) les assemblées générales de ses

sociétés, y prendre part et voter depuis la Guinée ? Rappelons de nouveau qu’il n’est pas contesté

que les assemblées devaient se tenir en RDC. Comment pouvait-il s’occuper de la procédure

judiciaire qui se déroulait, de ses conteneurs, du recouvrement de créances, reconnues, sur des

entités publiques qui refusaient de s’acquitter de leurs dettes et ne l’ont du reste jamais fait? Si

toutes ces tâches pouvaient aisément être menées à bien depuis la Guinée, pourquoi ne l’ont-elles

pas été ? Un inventaire des avoirs de la société Africontainers à la date de l’expulsion a été joint au

83
30 mémoire de la Guinée . Pourquoi a-t-on purement et simplement laissé ces biens, dont plus de

84
cent conteneurs, se détériorer ?

12. En réalité, la position dans laquelle M. Diallo s’est soudainement trouvé est très similaire

de celle de M. Biloune dans l’affaire Biloune v. Ghana. M. Biloune a lui aussi été arrêté, détenu et

expulsé, ce qui a placé sa société, la MDCL, dans l’incapacité de mener à terme la construction

d’un complexe hôtelier, le projet ayant échoué du fait d’une ingérence du conseil municipal local.

Dans cette affaire, le tribunal ⎯et il s’agit d’un important tribunal, puisqu’il était présidé par le

juge Schwebel ⎯ n’a pas estimé que, pour résoudre ses problèmes, M. Biloune n’avait qu’à céder

la place à un gérant local, tenter de mener le projet à son terme et éviter ainsi une expropriation. Le

tribunal a, bien évidemment, plutôt mis l’accent sur les conséquences effectives de l’expulsion du

personnage principal de la société, et dit ceci :

«Par leurs effets conjugués, l’ordre d’arrêter les travaux, la démolition,
l’assignation à comparaître, l’arrestation, la détention, l’obligation de faire des

déclarations de biens et l’expulsion de M.Biloune du pays, avec interdiction d’y
revenir, ont eu pour résultat la cessation irrémédiable des travaux. Compte tenu du
rôle central joué par M. Biloune dans la promotion, le financement et la gestion de la

MDCL, son exp85sion du pays a de fait emp êché celle-ci de poursuivre l’exécution de
son projet.» [Traduction du Greffe.]

83
MG, annexe 199.
84
OG, annexes 31-33.
85 Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd v.Ghana In vestments Centre and th e Government of Ghana,
95 ILR 183, 209. - 24 -

13. Or, il en va précisément de même ici: co mpte tenu du rôle central joué par M.Diallo

dans la promotion, le financement et la gesti on de ses deux sociétés, son expulsion de RDC a de

fait empêché celles-ci de poursuivre leurs activité s, y compris celle consistant à recouvrer des

créances alléguées ou reconnues. Dans les circons tances de l’espèce, cela revenait à violer les

droits de M. Diallo en tant qu’actionnaire. Et j’ai mis l’accent sur les droits de M. Diallo, mais que

dire de ses obligations en tant que gérant et que surveillant, aux termes des articles71 et75?

Comment était-il supposé s’acquitter de ces obligations depuis la Guinée? Outre la gestion des

affaires courantes, il lui fallait établir des ra pports annuels, des inventaires annuels, des états

financiers annuels ⎯ toutes tâches ne pouvant être menées à bien depuis la Guinée, notamment si

l’on tient compte de l’état de dénuement de M. Diallo.

86
14. Se référant à l’affaire El Triunfo , M.Mazyambo a soutenu qu’il était nécessaire

d’établir du point de vue des faits l’existence d’une violation telle que le remplacement

d’administrateurs, la convocation d’assemblées gé nérales sans que les actionnaires majoritaires en

31 soient avertis, ou le refus de laisser consulter certains documents de la société 8. Cette affirmation

appelle trois observations :

a) Premièrement, ce n’est pas là, bien entendu, l’avis exprimé par la Chambre en l’affaire ELSI :

ainsi que je l’ai relevé mardi, celle-ci a en e ffet estimé qu’il pouvait y avoir violation des droits

de contrôler et de gérer, droits qui sont tr ès semblables aux droits des actionnaires admis en

l’espèce, lorsque l’acte incriminé était une réquisition des avoirs de l’entreprise (Elettronica

Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1989, p. 15, par. 70). Dans cette affaire, il n’était, par

exemple, nullement question de remplacement d’administrateurs.

b) Deuxièmement, se pose la question de savoir si, dans les exemples que M. Mazyambo emprunte

à l’affaire El Triunfo , il existe une différence de nature ou si la différence est simplement

question d’échelle. M.Diallo a de fait été em pêché d’exercer ses droits de surveillance, de

contrôle et de gestion ⎯ qu’il n’ait pas été effectivement remplacé par un nouvel administrateur

désigné par l’Etat ne change rien au fond. La différence réside simplement en ce que, lorsque

l’Etat intervient et nomme bel et bien un nouve l administrateur — un remplaçant —, l’atteinte

86
RSA, vol. XV, p. 474-475.
87
CR 2006/52, p. 12, par. 11. - 25 -

causée aux droits des actionna ires n’en est que plus flagrante du point de vue des faits. De

même, que M. Diallo n’ait pu consulter les documen ts de la société parce qu’il ne lui était plus

du tout possible d’entrer sur le territoire du pays, et non parce que, bien que toujours sur

celui-ci, il était tenu à l’écart des bureaux de la société, ne change rien, fondamentalement.

c) Troisièmement, M. Mazyambo n’a rien dit de l’intention, bien que celle-ci soit mentionnée dans

les motivations de la décision rendue en l’affaire El Triunfo, le tribunal ayant mis l’accent sur

l’existence d’une «intrigue» visant notamment à «évi ncer la direction et prendre le contrôle des

88
intérêts américains» [traduction du Greffe] —on se croirait dans du Shakespeare! Si une

mesure en particulier est motivée par l’intention d’ entraver les droits de contrôle et de gestion

des actionnaires, il y aura à l’év idence nécessairement atteinte a ux droits des actionnaires, et

c’est précisément ce que soutient la Guinée. Si ce qu’elle dit est exact, et si l’intention était bel

et bien d’empêcher M. Diallo d’exercer ses droits de contrôle, de surveillance et de gestion des

deux sociétés, il y a au moins autant atteinte aux droits des actionnaires que dans les exemples

évoqués par la RDC.

32 15. Mais ces questions, une fois de plus, relèvent toutes du fond. M. Mazyambo a affirmé :

“The poverty of Mr. Diallo alleged by Guinea to explain the impossibility at such action [et il fait

ici référence à l’impossibilité pour M.Diallo de continuer de contrôler ses sociétés depuis la

Guinée] has not been proven; it cannot therefore be accepted.” 89 Elle n’a pas été prouvée, et doit

donc être écartée, nous dit-on. Mais cette manière de voir ne saurait être la bonne. Il n’appartient

pas à la Guinée de prouver ses arguments sur le fond au stade des exceptions préliminaires ; si tel

était le cas, cette phase, bien entendu, ne serait en rien préliminaire; de plus, la procédure serait

très différente et nous ne pourrions envisager d’être de retour chez nous avant l’heure du déjeuner

dès le premier vendredi.

16. Par ailleurs, je note que M.Mazyambo ch erche à gagner sur les deux tableaux, car il

poursuit : “[o]n the other hand, it can plausibly ⎯ ‘plausibly’ ⎯ be asserted that Mr. Diallo made a

fortune”, avant de conclure : “[i]t is therefore clea r that the arrest and expulsion of Mr. Diallo have

88
RSA, vol. XV, p. 474.
89CR 2006/52, p. 12, par. 10. - 26 -

not infringed his personal rights recognized by Congolese legislation.”Ainsi, il est allégué que la

Guinée doit prouver ses affirmations, tandis que la RDC pourrait s’en tenir au seuil du plausible.

Bien évidemment, cette manière de voir ne saurait être sanctionnée par la Cour. Si je peux me

permettre de recourir à une formulation familière , il va de soi que «ce qui vaut pour l’un doit

évidemment valoir pour l’autre».

17. Comme je l’ai indiqué lors du premier tour, tout ce qu’il faut démontrer, c’est l’existence

de droits des actionnaires, et que ces droits n’ont pas été respectésais du moins existe-t-il un

autre terrain d’entente entre les Parties. La RDC admet à présent l’existence des droits des

actionnaires affirmés par la Guinée, hormis ceux énoncés à l’article 78 ; il subsistait une divergence

de vues quant à l’application des articles71 et75, mais j’espère l’avoir aplanie. La véritable

question restant à régler porte sur les faits ⎯ il s’agit de savoir si les droits invoqués ont été violés.

Mais c’est là une question que la Cour ne peut bien évidemment trancher à ce stade.

Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour, voici qui clôt ma plaidoirie et je vous remercie

de votre attention. Madame le président — et je dois dire que ce «le» heurte mon oreille —, puis-je

vous prier d’appeler à la barre M. Pellet ?

33 Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur Wordsworth. Monsieur Pellet, vous avez la parole.

M. PELLET : Je vous remercie, Madame le préside nt. La prudence imposerait peut-être aux

conseils francophones de vous appeler «Madam President» même en français !

IV.P ROTECTION BY GUINEA OF M R. DIALLO IN HIS CAPACITY AS SHAREHOLDER IN
C ONGOLESE COMPANIES FOR THE INJURY SUFFERED BY THOSE COMPANIES

1. MadamPresident, Members of the Court, before the Agent of the Republic of Guinea

reads out his country’s final submissions, I prop ose to reply to the arguments put forward by

Mr.Mazyambo at Wednesday’s hearing regarding th e diplomatic protection of Mr.Diallo in his

capacity as a shareholder of officially Congolese companies for the injury suffered by them.

2. On this point — “protection by substitution” — Mr. Mazyambo, in a very clear and sober

presentation, followed the outline that I had adopt ed myself on Tuesday and endeavoured to show

90
CR 2006/52, p. 12, par. 10-11.
91CR 2006/51, p. 36, par. 29 b). - 27 -

that, on the one hand, such protection was not ad mitted by positive intern ational law and, on the

other — and I quote the words he used since I do not recognize our argument in his formulation —

“[n]o particular circumstance permits the application of equity in the present case” 92. I will now

follow this approach myself, while making clear at the outset that, although it could, it is probably

not essential for the Court to take an overall positi on on the scope of the rule of protection by

substitution (in law and not simply in equity); rather, it need only note that, in view of the

particular circumstances of the present case, this fo rm of protection can be applied in its narrowest

sense.

I. The exception of protection by substitution

3. Madam President, having made these points, I will again start by asking whether or not the

national State of the sole shareholder of a co mpany having the nationality of the Respondent can

exercise its protection over that person with r espect to the injury suffe red by his company.

According to the Congo, which took particular care not to mention Article 11 (b) of the ILC’s draft

34 Articles, although it addresses this issue, “neither the Court’s jurisprudence nor State practice

93
[would appear to] recognize[] the possibility of diplomatic protection by substitution” .

4. First, the Court’s jurisprudence. To support his assertion, Mr.Mazyambo quoted

paragraph93 of the1970 Barcelona Traction Judgment— but this paragraph cannot be taken in

isolation (in any case, not without the one immediately before it— paragraph92; I.C.J. Reports

1970, p.48, para.92). My opponent also menti oned extracts from the positions taken by two

judges in their separate opinions (CR 2006/52, paras. 16-17).

5. There can be no doubt:

⎯ first, that the judges in 1970 were divided over the place in positive law of protection by

substitution; and

⎯ second, that the “theory” elaborated in paragraph92, “to the effect that the State of the

shareholders has a right of diplomatic prot ection when the State whose responsibility is

92
CR 2006/52, p. 16, Head 2.
93
Ibid., p. 13, para. 14 (Mazyambo). - 28 -

invoked is the national State of the company” (I.C.J. Reports 1970 , p.48, para.92), reflected

94
the opinion of the majority of the Members of the Court .

6. While it is true that two judges, Morelli and PadillaNervo ( ibid., pp.240-241;

pp.257-259) appended separate opi nions in which they criticized, de lege ferenda, the exception

made by the Court, the views of Judge Ammoun ( ibid., p. 318), which Guinea generously included

95
in this school of thought in its Written Observations of 7 July 2003 , appear on closer reading to

be more akin to the opposite view, like the opi nions of Judges Fitzmaurice, Jessup and Tanaka

(I.C.J. Reports 1970, pp. 71-75, paras. 13-20; pp. 191-193, paras. 51-52; and p. 134; see also the

separate opinion of JudgeWellington Koo appended to the 1964Judgment, Barcelona Traction

96
(Preliminary Objections), I.C.J. Reports 1964, p. 58, para. 20) , which, moreover, were similar to

the Spanish Government’s position on this poi nt (see the above-mentioned separate opinion of

Judge Tanaka, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 134). In addition, the silence of the other judges on a point

35
which had visibly given rise to lengthy deliberati on must probably be construed as tacit agreement

with the position reflected in the Judgment.

7. In any case, the question is not so much how many judges supported one or other of the

interpretations as assessing the validity of the ar guments advanced in support of the respective

positions. JudgePadillaNervo’s approach was purely ideological and was based upon an exposé

of the supposed infringements of sovereignty which would ensue from the exception to the rule on

the lack of legal standing of the shareholders’ national State, portrayed as an instrument of

subordination “to the private interests of foreign corporations” ( ibid., p.259)— a view which

hardly tallies with the circumstances of our case: Guinea cannot really be suspected of acting as

the instrument of international capital, etc.; and it is hard to see why the protection of shareholders

(which, as everyone agrees, can only be exercise d in extremely exceptional cases) would be more

of an infringement of sovereignty that the protection of the foreign companies themselves. I would

add that Judge Padilla Nervo acknowledged that, although first following similar lines, the practice

of the United States of America and the United Kingdom— important figures in this respect—

94
Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law , 9thed., VolI., Longman,
London/New York, 1996, p. 520 (note 14).
95
WObsG, p. 47, para. 2.03,
9See MG, pp. 93-96, paras. 4.53-4.96 or WObsG, p. 47, paras. 2.45-2.46. - 29 -

then contradicted his position ( ibid., p.258) and that he even queried whether there really was “a

predominant Belgian interest” among the shareholders of Barcelona Traction ( ibid., p. 265).

Meanwhile, JudgeMorelli used rather circular reasoning, arguing as he did essentially that

accepting the exception would amount to acknowledging direct protection of shareholders...

which is prohibited by international law (see in particular ibid., p. 241, para. 12): this is precisely

what needs to be shown.

8. The majority-opinion judges, meanwhile, insisted on the recognition of this rule by

custom (which was particularly striking in the case of JudgeJessup, who criticized the rule while

nevertheless considering that it was “widely accepted” ( ibid., pp.191-193, para.51-52 and the

abundant scholarly opinion cited)). As Paulde Visscher wrote in his course at the 1961Hague

Academy (thus well before the two Barcelona Traction Judgments were delivered), expressing an

opinion which JudgeFitzmaurice adopted and quoted in full ( ibid., p.73, para.14 and p.75,

para.19): when a company is of the same na tionality as the State committing an internationally

wrongful act,

36 “its personality is no longer anything but a fi ction void of all meaning, in which there
can be seen nothing but a bundle of individual rights.” 97

“In that case, an international tribunal, not being bound by internal law criteria,
‘pierces the corporate veil’, as it is said, [but ] it would be more accurate to say that it
registers the absence of all effective personality, of any effectual intermediary between
98
the shareholders and the rights infringed.”

As stated by JudgeGros in the separ ate opinion which he appended to the Barcelona Traction

Judgment: “In the present matter one must seek to ascertain what is reasonable both on the legal

plane and on the plane of economic realities.” (I.C.J. Reports 1970, separate opinion of Judge Gros,

p. 279, para. 20).

9. These, Madam President, are the considerations that inspire arbitral jurisprudence in the

nineteenthcentury and in the first part of th e twentieth, to which Mr.Mazyambo subsequently

referred 99. Since on this point our opponent simply re ferred to the DRC’s Preliminary Objections,

97
“La protection diplomatique des personnes morales”, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy 1961, Vol. 102,
p. 465.
98
Ibid., p.477. See also J.MervynJ ones, “Claims on Behalf of Nationals Who Are Shareholders in Foreign
Companies”, BYBIL, Vol. 26, 1949, p. 236.
9CR 2006/52, p. 15, para. 20. - 30 -

may I in turn, Madam President, Members of the Court, draw your attention to the passages in the

Memorial 100and Observations 101of Guinea, in which we have demonstrated the relevance and

scope of this jurisprudence, which indisputably accepts protection by substitution.

10. Just one more word on an aspect to whic h the Congo seems to attach some importance:

it is not correct that in these cases 102“the arbitrators based themse lves on an arbitral agreement

which allowed them to adjudicate without limiting themselves to the application of positive . . . law

and also... contained a clear waiver by the respondent State of any objection preventing the

103
tribunal from ruling on the merits” . Last Tuesday I gave the example of the Shufeldt case, in

which the arbitral tribunal very clearly gave its ruling in law, and although the arbitration

agreement conferring jurisdiction on it was sile nt on the question of the representation of the

104
37 shareholders of a national company . The same is apparent, for example, on reading the

agreement setting up the tribunal which gave its ruling in the case concerning the Salvador

105
Commercial Company .

11. MadamPresident, it must be acknowledged th at in the jurisprudence the old decisions

are relatively as plentiful as the crop of recent decisions (after 1970) is meagre. But there is a

reason for this: more and more today, share holders not only have rights recognized that are

substantial but also rights of direct action at the international level: the issue that concerns us is

resolved in this way. Clearly this substan tially reduces the frequency of the application of

diplomatic protection in cases of this kind; as to protection by legal proceedings before the Court,

in situations where there is no ICSID clause or e quivalent, the Court would still have to be seised

on the basis of Article 36 of its Statute; this is not very frequent. The aim of bilateral investment

treaties and ICSID cases also explains why this practice is relevant to us: the same basic

100
MG, pp. 84-90, paras. 4.30-4.44.
10OG, pp. 48-52, paras. 2.49-2.56.

10See also the Judgment of the Chamber of the ICJ in the ELSI case, in the light of the interpretation given in the
dissenting opinion by Judge Schwebel (I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 94) and, on the same lines, the commentary by the ILC on
Art.11 of the draft Articles on diplomatic protection, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,

Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10), Report of the Internatio nal Law Commission, Fi fty-eighth Session
(2006), para. 11 of the commentary.
10CR 2006/52, p. 15, para. 20 (Mazyambo).

10CR 2006/51, p. 40, para. 7.

10Protocol dated 19December1901 between the United States of America and the Republic of Salvador, RIIA,
Vol. II, pp. 459-461. - 31 -

consideration underpins both institutions (diplomatic protection and di rect action by shareholders):

foreign shareholders in a national company of a State that has committed an internationally

wrongful act cannot be left without any hope of protection. The justification for protection by

substitution disappears in all cases in which they enjoy a right of acti on; by contrast, the necessity

for it appears even more pressing when there is no such right.

12. It would be regrettable a nd paradoxical for the World Court to go against a trend that is

so clearly established and to make the principle of non-protection more rigid by going back, a third

of a century later, on the “theory” of substitution favourably received by the majority in 1970. I

would add that the exception to the general principle (which no one challenges) that it is impossible

to protect shareholders is still more acceptable in the context of diplomatic protection than in the

context of a bilateral investment treaty, because in the former case (diplomatic protection) one can

38 rely on the “filter” of the State which, in the exer cise of its discretionary power, will be able to

decide whether protection of the shareholder is lawf ul or not in the light of the facts of the case,

whereas in the case of BITs (bilateral investment treaties) the shareholder is the sole judge of

whether seising a court is appropriate.

13. Quite naturally, Madam President, this prom pts me to say a few words on the particular

circumstances of the case, which compellingly call for the exception, i.e., protection by

substitution, to be applied.

II. The particular circumstances of the case compellingly call for
application of the rule of protection by substitution

14. However, I wish to state very firmly at the outset that Guinea is not asking the Court “to

106
apply equity”, as Mr.Mazyambo would have us believe , but to declare its Application

admissible on the basis of a legal rule that itsel f accords with equitable considerations, which is

quite different. Further, contrary to the allegations by the Congo, which itself is invoking equity in

an attempt to prevent the protection by substitution rule from being applied 107, there is no reason,

equitable or other, why this rule should not be applied in the present case ⎯ quite the contrary.

106
CR 2006/52, p. 16, paras. 22 or 23.
107
Cf. POC, pp. 90-101, paras. 2.85-2.105. - 32 -

15. My kind opponent displays consummate elliptical skill when broaching this subject.

True, he summarizes the arguments of Guinea 108, but his only response to them is three brief

assertions, which he does not seek to support further and on each of which in turn I am going to say

a few words:

1. “the legal identity of private limited liability companies is different from that of their

109
(associés)” ; I have never claimed the contrary — besides, if that were not so, the question of

diplomatic protection by substitution would not arise; on the other hand, I have emphasized

that they are companies of a very special kind, different from the limited companies, which are

the only ones involved in the BT case, and characterized by a considerable intuitu personae

39 element 110; this is reflected, for example, in a crucial element that I emphasized on Tuesday 111

and of which Mr.Mazyambo takes no account: the fact that the shares are not transferable,

which considerably accentuates the intuitu personae character of these companies, very

different in this respect from limited companie s; in this case, the “personalization” of the

company is even invasive because of the dual status of sole managing director (gérant) and sole

associate (associé) (directly or indirectly) of Mr.Diallo— it being understood that if

Congolese law should really be interpreted as ruling out the transformation of a company

incorporated between two or more individuals into a one-person company, the corporative veil

would disappear and, as a result, the tota l confusion of assets and personalities between

Mr. Diallo and Africom-Zaire would be establishe d. And then there would be no further need

for protection by substitution;

2. “The liability of the partners (associés) of private limited liability companies does not exceed

the level of their capital contribution. Nothing in Congolese law indicates the contrary”,

112
Mr.Mazyambo told us ; that is not quite accurate: for Congolese law contemplates the

108CR 2006/52, p. 16, para. 22.
109
CR 2006/52, p. 16, para. 24.
110
CR 2006/51, p. 48, paras. 24-25.
111Ibid., para. 25.

112CR 2006/52, p. 17, para. 25. - 33 -

unlimited liability of the founders of a privat e limited liability company in some special

113
cases ; and now, last but not least;

3. It is asserted that Congolese legislation makes no distinction between commercial companies of

114
the same kind incorporated under Congolese law by nationals and those set up by foreigners ;

115
I showed on Tuesday that this is not so and I refer in particular to the Ordonnance-loi of

24April1966, which makes entry in the trade register for foreigners, foreign companies and

116
certain Zairean companies subject to financial guarantees ; I am also referring to Article 3 of

117
the special law on commerce of 5January 1973 ; whether they be called “foreign national”

40 or “national foreign”, companies controlled by foreigners do not enjoy in Zaire, and now in the

Congo, the same treatment as those whose capital is in the hands of Congolese.

16. Furthermore, I recall that Mr. Diallo had no choice: he had to incorporate his companies

in Zaire and submit them to Zairean law, however disadvantageous and discriminatory it was, since

118
otherwise he would purely and simply have been unable to do business in that country .

Mr.Mazyambo has in no way disputed this but has drawn no conclusions from this point of

agreement between the Parties. Yet there is one inescapable one: the principle of protection by

substitution must be applied a fortiori since the incorporation of the companies in question in Zaire

“was required by it as a precondition for doing business there 119. That is the hardest core of the

rule, of the case in which its implementation is the most unquestionable — and unquestioned, since

120
even the International Law Commission acknowle dges this, while it has with much hesitation

adopted a particularly restrictive conception of it. MadamPresident, not only is diplomatic

protection by substitution of the foreign shareholde rs of a company having the nationality of the

11See Articles 103 and 106 of the Decree of 27 February 1887, judges’ folder, tab 4.

11CR 2006/52, p. 16, para. 23.
115
See CR 2006/51, pp. 47-48, para. 23.
116
See judges’ folder, tab 5.
117
See judges’ folder, tab 6.
11See CR 2006/51, pp. 46-47, paras. 20-21.

11Article 11 of the ILC draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection.
120
Cf. CR 2006/51, p. 46, para. 20 (Pellet). - 34 -

responsible State possible in all cases, but this possi bility must materialize in particular when the

121
incorporation of the company in that State is required by it — as in the present case.

17. Once more, MadamPresident, Guinea is not calling for equity against the law; it is

merely asking you that the law be “applied reasonably” ( Barcelona Traction, Light and Power

company, Limited, Judgment, I.C.J.Reports 1970 , p.49, para.93). This is because, as Jessup

wrote, the possibility of protection by substitution

“seems to be based largely on equitable considerations and the result is so reasonable
[that] it has been accepted in State practice . . . The equities [those underlying the rule
of positive law which permits such protecti on, not those contradicting or correcting a

contrary practice] are particularly striki ng when the respondent State admits foreign
investment only on condition that the investors form a corporation under its law.”
(Ibid., separate opinion of Judge Jessup, pp. 191-192.) 122

41 Everything, MadamPresident, Members of the Co urt, the law and equity, the requirements of

justice and the particular circumstances of the case, everything conspires to your acceptance that

Guinea is acting to protect the rights of Mr.Diallo for the damage he has suffered directly, as a

person and as shareholder, but also, in the latter capacity, for the damage suffered by

Africom-Zaire and Africontainers.

18. Madam President, I do not believe it useful to summarize all of the Republic of Guinea’s

arguments. You have listened to them, Madam President, Members of the Court, patiently and

attentively, and it is for you to weigh them ag ainst the arguments presented to you by the

Democratic Republic of the Congo. I would simply like in a few sentences to underline, one last

time, what we think is crucial.

19. First of all: the Congo has repeatedly “acted as if” the protection of Mr.Diallo’s

“property rights” was Guinea’s sole concern and ecl ipsed or subsumed, as it were, any concern for

123
Mr.Diallo’s human, consular or other rights ⎯ to such an extent that Guinea’s claims are

described in the submissions read out the day be fore yesterday by the Agent of the Democratic

Republic of the Congo as seeking “essentially to secure reparation for injury suffered on account of

121
See the ILC commentary on Article11 of the draft Articles on Diplomatic ProtectOfficial Records of the
General Assembly, Sixty-fi rst Session, SupplementNo.1(A/61/10), Report of the International Law Commission,
Fifty-eighth Session (2006), para. 12 of commentary.
122

12See, for example, POC, p.44, para s. 1.59-1.60, CR 2006/50, pp. 42-43, paras.96-99 (Kalala); p.52, para.33
(Mazyambo), CR2006/52, p.12, para .11 (Mazyambo); see also the DRC’ s submissions, CR2006/52, p.30,(1)
(Masangu-Mwanza). - 35 -

the violation of rights” of Mr.Diallo’s companies 124. Self-evidently, that is not true: Guinea is

requesting first and foremost that the mistreatment suffered by Mr. Diallo, as a human being ⎯ his

arrests and arbitrary expulsion, in all instances pursuant to unreasoned decisions ⎯ be judicially

acknowledged and give rise, as such, to reparatio n. It is simply because the Congo has not

contested the admissibility of the Application on this point that we have not thought it worthwhile

to focus on this in our oral argument. Insofar as th ere is any need to do so, I shall formally repeat

that condemnation by the Court, with all the ensuin g legal consequences, of the arbitrary arrest and

the expulsion of Guinea’s national, of the conditions under which he was detained and expelled and

of the refusal to afford Mr. Diallo the benefit of the provisions of the 1963 Vienna Convention on

42
Consular Relations ⎯ all of that remains one of the essentia l objectives of the Republic of Guinea,

as seen in the first paragraph of the submissions at the end of the Memorial 12.

20. It is true as well ⎯ but one in no way precludes the other ⎯ that these serious incidents

were also the source of the injuries suffered by Mr.Diallo and his companies: it was because he

had been arrested and expelled that he was prevented from enjoying his rights as associé and that

those companies were unable to exercise their rights and in turn suffered grave injuries justifying

the protection by substitution which I have just discussed. And it is also ⎯ at any rate in part, there

being other reasons as well ⎯ because he had been arrested and e xpelled under conditions known

to us all that Mr. Diallo was unable completely to exhaust local remedies, for which the DRC, with

very bad grace, now criticizes him.

21. Madam President, this concludes the oral argument of the Republic of Guinea, whose

submissions will now be presented by its Agent, Mr.MohamedCamara, pursuant to Article60,

paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court. For my part , it remains for me to thank you, Madam President,

Members of the Court, most sincerely for your attention.

Le PRESIDENT: Je vous remercie, M. Pellet. Je donne à présent la parole à l'agent de la

République de Guinée, M. Mohamed Camara, pour présenter les conclusions finales.

124
CR 2006/52, p. 30, (1); emphasis added.
12MG, p. 108, para. 5.1, (1). - 36 -

Mr. CAMARA: Thank you.

V.S UBMISSIONS OF THE R EPUBLIC OF G UINEA

1. Madam President, Members of the Court, befo re I read out the formal submissions of the

Republic of Guinea, please allow me to give voice to the confidence felt by my country as it awaits

the judgment you will render on the preliminary obj ections which the Democratic Republic of the

Congo has seen fit to raise in an attempt to hinder the exercise of your jurisdiction. We are

convinced that you will reject them for the reasons⎯ legal reasons ⎯ which our counsel and

advocates have explained here before you and for those which are set out in our Observations. In

doing so, not only will you have adjudicated the cas e but you will have done justice by allowing

43 my country, in the merits phase, to set out the serious abuses and iniquities which Mr. Diallo was

arbitrarily made to suffer in violation of international law.

2. I take this opportunity to thank Guinea’s courtroom team, including Messrs. Daniel Müller

and Luke Vidal, who have not taken the floor before you but who have devoted themselves behind

the scenes to tasks which have on occasion been thankless. My si ncere thanks also go to the

interpreters, to the Registrar and to the entire Registry staff and, of course, to yourselves,

Madam President, Members of the Court, who have lent us a patient and attentive ear.

3. I shall now read out the submissions of the Republic of Guinea:

For the reasons set out in its Observations of 7 July 2003 and in oral argument, the Republic

of Guinea kindly requests the Court:

(1) to reject the Preliminary Objections raised by the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

(2) to declare the Application of the Republic of Guinea admissible; and

(3) to fix time-limits for the further proceedings.

Thank you very much, Madam President.

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, M. Camara. La Cour prend acte des conclusions finales

dont vous venez de donner lecture au nom de la Rép ublique de Guinée, tout comme elle a pris acte

le mercredi des conclusions finales de la République démocratique du Congo. - 37 -

Ceci nous amène à la fin de cette semaine d’audiences consacrées aux plaidoiries orales des

Parties. Je tiens à adresser mes remerciements aux représentants des deux Parties pour l’assistance

qu’ils ont apportée à la Cour par leurs exposés oraux au cours de ces audiences.

Je leur souhaite un bon retour da ns leurs pays respectifs et, c onformément à la pratique, je

prierai les agents de bien vouloir rester à la dis position de la Cour. Sous cette réserve, je déclare

close la présente procédure orale.

La Cour va maintenant se retirer pour délib érer. Les agents des Parties seront avisés en

temps utile de la date à laquelle la Cour rendra son arrêt.

La Cour n’étant saisie d’aucune autre question aujourd’hui, la séance est levée.

L’audience est levée à 11 h 40.

___________