BHY
CR 2006/37 (translation)
Monday 24 April 2006 at 10 a.m.
CR 2006/37 (traduction)
Lundi 24 avril 2006 à 10 heures - 2 -
10 The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. You have the floor, Professor Stern.
SM sRN:
W HEN THE 1996 JUDGMENT WAS HANDED DOWN ,THE RESPONDENT HAD TO BE REGARDED
AS A M EMBER OF THE UNITED N ATIONS
1. Madam President, Members of the Court, let me remind you at the outset that our
opponents put forward two reasons which each of itself ought in their view necessarily to lead your
Court to deny that it has jurisdiction, though you ha ve twice asserted that it has: primafacie in
1993, reaffirmed in 1996 in a decision carrying the final authores judicata and before the
admission of the FRY as a new Member of the United Nations; and further confirmed in your
decision of 2003 after the FRY’s admission as a new Member of the United Nations. In support of
its request to you to review your decision, Se rbia and Montenegro adduces two reasons, each of
which is claimed to be sufficient to bar your jurisdiction: these two reasons are either that the FRY
is not a Member of the United Nations, or that it is not party to the Genocide Convention.
2. It now falls to me to show you that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, today Serbia and
Montenegro, which ⎯ and I hope I have convinced you of this⎯ was party to the Genocide
Convention in 1993, was also to be considered, on the same date, a Member of the United Nations.
Assuming a decision were to be takende novo today, which, let us be clear, and thanks to the
principle of res judicata, is not the situation we are in but the situation which I am nevertheless
considering in the alternative, I shall therefore analyse the positi on of the FRY in relation to the
United Nations in 1993.
3. I am well aware that in theLegality cases you held thain the circumstances of the
case ⎯ let me emphasize this ⎯ and only in the circumstances of the case , the situation obtaining
from 1992 to 2000 could not be regarded as equivalent to the status of Member. But those were
different cases, even if during these oraeadings one sometimes found oneself wondering
whether counsel for the Respondent had not got the wrong case. Taking only the argument on
jurisdiction by Messrs.Djeric, Varady and Zimmermann, the casesLegality are cited twice as
often as the case before us here, with which we should be exclusively concerned; more - 3 -
1
11 specifically, the cases on Legality are cited 34 times , whereas the various decisions in the present
proceedings are referred to only 15 times 2!
4. In respect of the present proceedings betw een ourselves and Serbia, I shall endeavour to
show you that there was in fact a State exercising many of the prerogatives of a Member of the
United Nations from 1992 to 2000. We well kno w that international law sometimes rests on
fictions, but we also know the important, the central role played in it by effectivité, in particular
when that effectivité does not run counter to the law. When a succession process is in progress, it
therefore frequently happens that one of the States becomes the continuator of the predecessor State
in international organizations: this was the case of India at the time of partition. It was more
recently the case of Russia, the continuator State of the USSR, it was also the claim of the FRY
which, as I shall endeavour to show you, subsisted until another legal solution, favoured by the
international community, and above all by the other States of the former Yugoslavia, was adopted
in November 2000.
5. However, while a State’s participation in a treaty depends on its desire manifested in the
appropriate forms, as I have had occasion to indicate, matters are much more complex when it
comes to the status of member of an international organization, which status must be considered on
a case-by-case basis 3, as the General Assembly’s Sixth Co mmittee indicated when the problem of
the succession of a United Nations Member State fi rst arose. The Sixth Committee first pointed
out that the continuator State could remain a Member of the United Nations since the successor
State had to request its admission, adding that: “[b]eyond that, each case must be judged according
to its merits” 4. Although this position concerned the partition of the Indian Empire into two States,
1See CR 2006/13, p. 2, para. 2.3; p. 3, para. 2.5; p. 4, paras. 2.6 and 2.9; p. 6, paras. 2.13, 2.15 and 2.16; p. 8,
paras.2.21 and 2.22; p. 9, paras. 2.23 and 2.24; p. 10, paras. 2.26 and 2.28 (Djeć). See also CR 2006/13, p. 13,
para. 3.9; p. 17, para. 3.23; p. 18, para. 3.27; p. 21, para. 3.38; p. 48, para. 1.36; p. 51, para. 1.46; p. 547;para. 1.
p.57, paras. 5.9-5.11; p. 58, para. 5.15 (Varady). See lastly CR 2006/13, p. 29, para. 4.2; p. 30, paras. 4.3 and 4.8;
p. 34, paras. 4.22-4.24; p. 35, para. 4.25; p. 36, para. 4.33; p. 37, para. 4.36; p. 40, para. 4.45 (Zimmermann).
2
See CR 2006/13, p. 5, para. 2.13 (Djeri ć). See also CR 2006/13, pp.11-12, paras. 3.2-3.3; p. 13, para. 3.7;
p. 14, para. 3.10; p. 24, para. 3.48; p. 27, para. 3.58; p. 28, para. 3.61; p. 49, para. 1.39; p. 58, para. 5.13 (Varady). See
lastly CR2006/13, p. 32, para. 4.15; p. 33, para. 4.21; p. 35, para. 4.28; p. 36, para. 4.32; p. 37, para. 4.35
(Zimmermann).
3
Emphasis added.
4United Nations, doc. A/CN.4/149, 6 October 1947. - 4 -
the same approach was also adopted very recently by the ICTY with respect to the FRY, when it
stated that:
12 “[t]he proper approach to the issue of the FRY membership of the United Nations in
the period between 1992 and 2000 is not one that proceeds on aa priori, doctrinaire
assumption... As the FRY membership was neither terminated nor suspended by
General Assembly resolution47/1, it is mo re appropriate to make a determination of
its United Nations5membership in that pe riod on an empirical, functional and
case-by-case basis.”
It seems to me that this case-by-case examination is all the more necessary in the present
proceedings in view of the FRY’s sui generis situation from 1992 to 2000. I will endeavour to
explain exactly what this phrase means in law, for that is clearly not self-evident, as you yourselves
stated in the Legality cases:
“It must be stated that this qualification of the position of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia as ‘sui generis’, which the Court employed to describe the situation
during this period of 1992 to 2000, is not a prescriptive term from which certain
defined legal consequences accrue; it is merely descriptive...” ( Legality of Use of
Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Preliminary Objections , Judgment of
15 December 2004, para. 74.)
It is this sui generis situation which I shall now address, and I shall demonstrate that:
A BODY OF CONCORDANT EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE FRY WAS A M EMBER OF THE
U NITED NATIONS AS THE EFFECTIVE CONTINUATOR STATE FROM 1992 TO 2000
6. With respect to the FRY’s status in the United Nations, we know that a battle raged
regarding the characterization of the status of the State now accused before you of acts of genocide,
and that the battle is not yet over, as shown by the discussions in this Court. Before beginning my
legal analysis of the situation, I therefore feel it would be helpful briefly to remind you of:
The political positions adopted in United Nations and diplomatic circles
7. It is well known that the FRY wished to be the one and only continuator State; the other
States of the former Yugoslavia felt that all States should be considered, on a similar footing, as
successor States. The insistence of the four othe r States that emerged from the former Yugoslavia
in refusing the FRY the status of continuator State stems from the fact that they wanted all States
involved in the succession process to be treated equa lly, as regards both their status at the United
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinovic, Dragoljub Ojdanic, Nikola Sainovic , case No.IT-99-37-PT, Decision
on Motion Challenging Jurisdiction, 6 May 2003, para. 38. - 5 -
Nations and the sharing ou t of the assets of the Socialist Fede ral Republic of Yugoslavia. This
13 position was thus based on political considerations and was certainly not the product of any legal
analysis. These two versions, these two “narratives”, were presented with great lucidity by
Professor Varady 6. They are well known. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia thus asserted that it
was the continuator State of the SFRY and, as su ch, could remain a Member of the United Nations,
without requesting admission; the four other States involved in the Yugoslav succession process
claimed on the contrary that no State had continue d the former Yugoslavia’s legal personality and
that there were thus five successors who were to be treated equally, which implied, among other
things, that they should all five go through United Nations admission procedure.
8. The international community asked the FRY to agree to be treated like the other States of
the former Yugoslavia. And we know that, following the régime change in Belgrade, the FRY did
eventually agree to become a successor like the others from 2000, when, like the other successor
States of the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and He rzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia and Slovenia, it requested admission to the United Nations. We know that its flag
was raised at the United Nations on 1 November 2000.
9. But this political dispute –– which I have only briefly touched on as it is so well known ––
could not change the institutional reality. Howeve r, before describing that reality, I should like,
with your permission Members of the Court, to recall the position adopted by the FRY in this Court
on the question of its membership of the United Nations, since –– as I stressed in my presentation
on the Genocide Convention –– statements before your Court have considerable legal significance.
Serbia and Montenegro’s legal position that it was a Member of the United Nations,
as presented in its Memorial on the Legality case
10. It seems appropriate to begin this analysis of the FRY’s status in the United Nations by
letting counsel for Serbia and Montenegro speak for themselves, as they seem better than I at
destroying the argument which they are now putting forward. Following the example of my
14 opponents, I shall cite the Legality cases, or more precisely the views expressed by the FRY in its
Memorial filed on 5January2000 in those procee dings, from which I shall quote some extracts,
6CR 2006/12, pp. 47-48, paras. 1.32-1.34 (Varady). - 6 -
beginning with the evocative and unambiguous heading: “The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a
Member State of the United Nations”. Serbia and Montenegro follows this by quoting the analyses
of its status in the United Nations made by two of the permanent members of the Security Council,
then cites the ICJ Yearbook. I shall read out these extracts. First, the view expressed by
Mr. Vorontsov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, who states:
“The decision to suspend the participation of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in the work of the General Asse mbly will in no way affect the possibility
of participation by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the work of other organs of
the United Nations, in particular the S ecurity Council... (Security Council,
Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3116th Meeting, S/PV.3116, 19 September 1992,
4-5)” (Legality of Use of Force, Memorial, para. 31.1.)
Then the Permanent Representative of the People’s Republic of China, Mr. Li Daoyu, is quoted:
“The resolution just adopted does not mean the expulsion of Yugoslavia from
the United Nations. The name-plate ‘Yugoslavia’ will be kept in the General
Assembly hall... The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will continue to issue its
documents in the United Nations.” (Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of
the 3116th Meeting, S/PV.3116, 19 September 1992, pp.14-15) ( Legality of Use of
Force, Memorial, para. 31.2.)
There follows a reference to the Court’s Yearbook ⎯ “the I.C.J. Yearbook informs that Yugoslavia
is one among the 185 member States of the United Nations on 31July1997” ( Legality of Use of
Force, Memorial, para.3.1.17). The dialectical mindset of counsel for the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia is then displayed in the following hi ghly pertinent observation taken from the same
Memorial, which Bosnia can but endorse:
“Indeed, on 28April1993, the Security Council adopted resolution821(1993)
by which it recommended to the General Assembly to decide that the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia shall not participat e in the work of the Economic and Social
Council. The General Assembly accepted the recommendation by its
resolution 47/229. If Yugoslavia’s membership in the Organization was terminated or
suspended by resolution 47/1, there would be no need for a new resolution excluding
Yugoslavia from the work of the Economic and Social Council.” ( Legality of Use of
Force, Memorial, para. 3.1.5.)
These are highly pertinent, helpful arguments. But we are well aware that it is not for the State
concerned legally to determine its status as Memb er of the Organization, which is a matter for the
15 Organization itself. However, in our case it should be noted that by not excluding the FRY the
United Nations had in fact accepted that status. - 7 -
The full and complete participation of the FRY as a Member of the
United Nations from 27 April 1992 to 22 September 1992
11. It should certainly not be overlooked that, for the first six months of its existence ⎯ and
it is often said that the first months of life are decisive for the futur⎯ the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia was an undisputed Member of the United Nations, exercising all the prerogatives of
such a Member State. I venture to note this fact, which is sometimes forgotten when the
chronology of the changes in the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is reviewed. For
example, on 22May1992 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was part of the consensus on the
admission of Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia as Members of the United Nations. Similarly, it of
course voted against resolution47/1 concerning its own status in the United Nations, under the
name of Yugoslavia. This shows that nothing, no legal obstacle, barred the FRY, as continuator
State, from continuing the status of the predecessor State. It was only six months later that
sanctions “internal” to the Organization were adopted, sanctions which are clearly not unconnected
with the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Let me simply underline the fact that, while sanctions
may be imposed which deprive a member State of certain of the prerogatives it exercises as a
member State of an international organization, that is an irrefutable sign that the State concerned is
indeed a member of the organization. Need I add that, over and above these internal sanctions, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia wa s also the object of sanctions under Chapter VII throughout the
period of ethnic cleansing and that it has never be en argued that those sanctions were aimed at a
State not a Member of the United Nations? I will now clarify the scope and significance of those
internal sanctions.
16 The FRY was a Member of the United Nations with fewer rights in the
General Assembly from 22 September [1992] onwards
1. The legal positions taken by the two principal organs of the United Nations
12. I shall only take up the essence of the resolutions adopted on the FRY’s status within the
United Nations because you are well acquainted with them. Even though this Court, curiously,
does not apparently wish to accord these resolutions the significance they deserve (case concerning
Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
15December 2004, para.67), they nevertheless, in my view, provide a strong indication of the - 8 -
actual situation in the United Nations at th e time. It all began, of course, with Security Council
resolution 777 (1992), dated 19 September 1992, in which:
“SeceCriyncil,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
cannot continue automatically the member ship of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in th e United Nations; and therefore recommends to the
General Assembly that it decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not
participate in the work of the General Asse mbly.” (United Nations, doc.S/RES/777
(1992), 19 September 1992, para. 1.)
13. This recommendation was followed by the General Assembly, which, as we well know,
on 22September 1992 adopted its resolution47/1, the relevant part of which repeats the Security
Council text, and I shall therefore not reread it.
14. It may be noted that this resolution refers neither to Article5 of the Charter, on
suspension of a State, nor to Article 6, on expuls ion of a State. It appears however, from the legal
standpoint, that the suspension of certain prerogativ es of a State does indeed fall within Article5,
because one who can do more can do less, and if the General Assembly can suspend a State, that is
to say suspend it from the exercise of its prerog atives within the United Nations, then it can
obviously suspend the exercise of just some of them. Let us note, however, and I think this
important, that the suspension of certain prerogatives of a Member means a fortiori that the State in
question is indeed a Member of the United Nations.
17 15. Now, to see this resolution from a political viewpoint, I would like to underscore that, in
saying that the FRY did not “automatically” continue the membership of the SFRY, the Security
Council and General Assembly left the door open, I believe, to the possibility of accepting such
continuity if the political circumstances were to make such a move acceptable to a majority of
States, and most importantly among them the four SFRY successor States, which were opposed to
such a course. As controversy arose as to th e meaning of this United Nations resolution, its
consequences were spelled out by the Legal Department of the United Nations. - 9 -
2. The legal position taken by the Director of the Legal Department of the United Nations
16. The Under-Secretary-General for Legal A ffairs, Legal Counsel of the United Nations,
addressed a letter on 29 September 1992 to the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and of Croatia, in which he stated that the “considered view of the United
Nations Secretariat regarding the practical conse quences of the adoption by the General Assembly
of [the] resolution” was as follows:
“[T]he only practical consequence that the resolution draws is that the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not participate in the work of
the General Assembly . . .
On the other hand, the resolution neither terminates nor suspends Yugoslavia’s
membership in the Organization... The resolution does not take away the right of
Yugoslavia to participate in the work of organs other than Assembly bodies . The
admission to the United Nations of a new Yugoslavia under Article4 of the Charter
will terminate the situation created by resolution 47/1.”7
17. Two important points are to be noted here. The United Nations made it clear first that
this was neither a suspension nor an expulsion and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
therefore remained a Member, but also, secondly, that it remained a Member with reduced
prerogatives. In other words, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s institutional position was not
altered, even though its functional prerogatives were.
18. We know that initially those prerogatives were cut back only in respect of the General
Assembly: a debate took place moreover on the sc ope of this interdiction, the FRY being of the
18 view that it was not prevented thereby from partic ipating in sessions of the General Assembly and
in meetings of Assembly committees, the United Natio ns deciding to the contrary that it applied to
the work of the General Assembly and of its subsidiary bodies, like conferences and meetings held
by the General Assembly. It is obvious that these exchanges could not have taken place had the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia not been a Member of the United Nations.
19. A number of other aspects of this position warrant analysis: the text clearly shows that
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was permitted to take the place, or occupy the seat, of the
former Yugoslavia, whose seat, name and missions subsisted, until it agreed to sit as the new
Yugoslavia: in other words, as the Director of the Legal Department tells us, the admission of the
7United Nations, doc. A/47/485, 30 September 1992; emphasis added. - 10 -
new Yugoslavia would terminate the membership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as the
former Yugoslavia, because from then on it would sit as the new Yugoslavia.
20. Mr. Varady seeks to interpret this letter from the Legal Director in a way which would
render it meaningless. He says in effect that we do not know what entity is being referred to in the
statement that the resolution does not terminate membership 8. And he thus exploits the possible
ambiguity in the reference to Yugoslavia. He therefore suggests that the United Nations could have
maintained the membership status of the SFRY, a State which, as we well know, had been replaced
lock, stock, and barrel, if I might say so, by the FRY. This is obviously a clever construction, but it
does not stand up to rigorous analysis. True, it is sa id that the resolution “neither terminates...
Yugoslavia’s membership”. But that means the FRY. One need only read on in the text. If we
pursue our reading of the legal opinion, we see that the resolution does not take away Yugoslavia’s
right to participate in the work of the General As sembly. Who could claim that this refers to a
State other than the FRY, in respect of which the resolution had just been adopted? How can it be
imagined that the United Nations, having maintained the hypothetical member status of the SFRY,
would adopt a resolution to prohibit equally hypot hetical representatives of a hypothetical SFRY
19 from participating in sessions of the General As sembly? No, Mr. Varady, the Yugoslavia referred
to here can only be the FRY.
21. I would also like to note, Madam President, Members of the Court, that it was while this
initial situation prevailed ⎯ a situation not completely identical with that obtaining in 1999, when
the Federal Republic’s power s were further curtailed ⎯ when the prerogatives of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia had been restricted only in relation to the General Assembly, that Bosnia
and Herzegovina filed its Application on 20March1993. Thus, I cannot concur with Mr.Djeric
when he says that “the situation that obtained in 1999 was completely identical to the situation that
9
obtained in 1993” . In reality, the sanctions were increas ed after the filing of the Application,
because, as I am going to explain, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was barred from further
participation in the work of ECOSOC, which was a serious curtailment of its prerogatives, given
the number of subsidiary bodies of that principal organ.
CR 2006/13, p. 22, para. 3.41 (Varady).
CR 2006/13, p. 16, para. 2.22. - 11 -
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a Member with even more limited
rights in respect of ECOSOC from 28 April 1993 onwards
22. A little later, the prerogatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were further limited,
but, as our opponents correctly pointed out in their Memorial, if resolution47/1 had in fact
terminated Yugoslavia’s membership in the Orga nization, it would not have been necessary to
adopt this new resolution.
23. A further step was therefore taken in curt ailing the functional prerogatives of the FRY on
10
28 April 1993, with the adoption of Security Council resolution 821 (1993) and, on the same day,
the adoption of General Assembly resolution 47/229, whereby these two organs thus decided “that
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mo ntenegro) shall not participate in the work of
11
the Economic and Social Council” . But once again, I repeat, the limitation of a State’s rights is
part of a process of supervision, if I may use that term, but supervision within the Organization, not
with a view to expulsion.
20 United Nations practice
24. What these various resolutions I have just mentioned tell us is that the situation of
continuation which obtained was not what a majority of Members wanted. But that did not prevent
the actual situation of continuation from subs isting. Evidence of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia’s membership is so abundant that I would not know which elements to single out, but I
will give you the most significant examples. United Nations practice shows that, while the opinion
of States which was manifested in the resolution more or less favoured the position of the four
successor States which rejected the status of co ntinuator, the practice very much supported the
stance of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, this st ance as to continuity. It was this complexity
which characterized what you have called a sui generis position. Before I flesh out this expression,
please allow me, Members of the Cour t, to note that if the FRY had not been a Member, it is
difficult to see how such a sui generis position could have been used: this expression seems to me
in and of itself, inherently, to imply that a special relationship, a sui generis relationship, existed
with the United Nations, even if not all of the effects of this position were felt.
1United Nations, doc. S/RES/821 (1993), 28 April 1993.
1United Nations, doc. A/RES/47/229 (1993), 28 April 1993. - 12 -
The procedure whereby the FRY replaced the SFRY
First a few words about the procedure whereby the FRY replaced the SFRY, which is one
illustration of continuity.
25. It should be observed that the FRY clearly manifested the intent to hold itself out as the
continuator, including in the procedures by which it so informed the UnitedNations. Two
documents were sent to the United Nations: a le tter dated 6May1992 containing a Note Verbale
in which it was stated that “the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is transformed into the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of the Republic of Serb ia and the Republic of
Montenegro”. This letter was sent under the lette rhead of the “Permanent Mission of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”; it was sent to the Secretary-General, who was asked to circulate
12
it as a document of the GeneralAssembly, which he did . Another letter, with identical content
but under the letterhead of the “Mission of the Fe deral Republic of Yugoslavia”, was sent by the
21 individual representing the SFRY to the President of the Security Council, who was asked to
13
circulate it as a General Assembly document, which he also did . In effect:
Circulation of official documents was never suspended
26. We know that it is, in principle, a priv ilege, barring special circumstances, of United
Nations Members to be able to circulate official documents. It is important to note that the
documents emanating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia continued to be circulated, even
when it was no longer allowed to participate in th e work of the General Assembly or of ECOSOC.
They were signed by various dignitaries in the name of the Permanent Mission of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. Thus, in a letter dated 27December 2001 from the Secretary-General to
the President of the GeneralAssembly, the former stated: “From 27April 1992 to
1November 2000, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. .. availed itself of the
right of the former Yugoslavia, as a Member State, to circulate communications as official
14
documents of the United Nations.” Does the Respondent maintain that these documents never
existed? Or that it would be necessary to dec onstruct the past, as it invites the Court to do in
1United Nations, doc. A/46/915, 7 May 1992.
1United Nations, doc. S/23877, 5 May 1992.
14
United Nations, doc. A/56/767, letter dated 27 December 2001, sent to the President of the GeneralAssembly
by the Secretary-General, 9 January 2002, para. 7. - 13 -
respect of its jurisdiction, by “privatizing” all documents circulated in its name? I do not think that
is a realistic solution.
The Mission to the United Nations was also maintained
27. From 1992, the Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at the address of the
former mission of the SFRY, appeared on the list of missions to the United Nations. The other
countries resulting from the process of Yugoslav su ccession protested against this clear sign that
the FRY was a Member State of the United Nations 1. I wish however to note that Bosnia, while
protesting against this inclusion of the FRY Mission in the Blue Book of Permanent Missions ,
stated that it was because the FRY was “manifestly not a Member State in good standing”; it did
not say “is not a Member”; I think this is important. Not to be a Member in good standing, that is
22 what the Court called, in more learned terms, a sui generis position, that is to say the position of a
Member which cannot exercise certain powers, these measures having been taken to put pressure
on it, to force it to respect the rules regarding the maintenance of peace, non-intervention, and
respect for human rights and humanitarian law.
Institutional participation was largely maintained
28. We all know that, even though it was unable to exercise its prerogatives ⎯ particularly
its right to vote in the General Assembly ⎯ not all links with the General Assembly were broken.
For example, the nameplate of Yugoslavia remained in place in the Assembly Hall.
29. Above all, however, it continued to participate in the work of the other organs. Its
relations with the Security Council were not broken. The FRY was entitled to address the Security
Council under a special procedure, authorizing the representative of the FRY not only to attend
formal meetings, but even to take the floor at such meetings. Over the first three years, FRY
representatives thus received 13invitations: 11invitations to address the Security Council
(13November 1992, 19February 1993, 19April 1993, 29June 1993, 14February 1994, 21April
1994, 27 April 1994, 23 September 1994, 30 September 1994, 8 November 1994, 12 January 1995)
and two invitations to sit at the Security Council table during meetings on 17 April 1993, at which
15See, for example, United Nations, doc. A/47/566, doc. S/24694, 21 October 1992. - 14 -
it was precisely the situation in Bosnia an d Herzegovina which was discussed, and on
9August1993, at which there was discussion of the issue of CSCE missions to Kosovo, Sanjak
and Vojvodina. This unique special procedure, under which invitations could be extended to FRY
representatives, seems to me to provide a perfec t illustration of the potential scope of the term sui
generis.
30. However, relations with the Court were not affected either. In particular, the FRY was
included in the absolute majority necessary to elect the Members of the Court, as is made clear in
Mr. Shabtai Rosenne’s book.
“Here the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council
adopted a series of resolutions having the effect of preventing the former Yugoslavia
from participating in the work of differen t organs of the United Nations. The Court
was not included amongst those named organs . One effect of this relevance to the
affairs of the Court was that during that period of suspension, Yugoslavia was
23 included in the ‘absolute majority’ required in the General Assembly for the election
of Members of the Court although it was prevented from participating in that vote.” 16
31. It is easy to see the significance of this partial suspension of certain functional privileges,
which nevertheless left all institutional links intact. It is important to understand clearly the reasons
for the decisions taken by the United Nations in respect of the FRY, which were in any case not
intended to authorize it to disregard its obligation s vis-à-vis the United Nations: on the contrary,
the limitation on some of its rights was intended to compel it to comply with its obligations. From
this point of view, it is perfectly possible to appr oach the right of access to the Court in different
ways: it may be regarded as a positive dimension of jus standi, or as the right to answer for one’s
acts before the Court, which is the negative aspect of jus standi. Professor Tom Franck has already
had occasion to stress this lack of symmetry between rights and obligations. And then, last but not
least, the FRY continued to contribute to the budget.
Participation in the budget
32. It is also important to emphasize that, on 8 January 1993, that is to say, early in the first
year after Yugoslavia had ceased to exist, the Secretary-General informed the chargé d’affaires of
the FRY that it was liable for certain unpaid contributions of the SFRY. What is interesting is that
16
S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920-200Vol. II, Jurisdiction, 4th edition,
Leiden/Boston, 2006, p. 606. See also S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920-2005, Vol. I,
The Court and the United Nations, 4th edition, Leiden/Boston, 2006, p. 374. - 15 -
the FRY was asked to pay, as continuator, amoun ts owed by the SFRY, less the amounts owed by
the successor States, which now became contributors in their own right.
33. Here again, I think that our opponents’ arguments help our cause. Thus they
emphasized, in their Memorial on Legality of 5 January 2000, to which I have already referred, that
they were assuming responsibility for all the financial obligations of a Member State. I could cite a
number of extracts from that Memorial, but I shall take only one. In a Note of 25 September 1996,
it is stated that “in the extremely difficult financial situation the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has
made a payment to the amount of... as its contribution to the budget for 1996. (Ann. No.174,
p. 490)” (Legality of Use of Force , Memorial, paras. 3.1.7, 3.1.14, 3.1.15.). And such Notes were
sent every year.
24 34. This is the right moment, Madam President, to answer the important question asked by
Judge Tomka, which was worded as follows:
“On 28 February 2006, counsel for Bosn ia and Herzegovina stated that ‘[l]a
Yougoslavie est demeurée Membre des Nations Unies’. In a letter dated
9August2005 from the Permanent Representative of the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia, and the chargés d’affaires ad interim of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro and Slovenia, addressed to the
Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations for Management, all these five States,
including the Applicant, stated that ‘[t]he Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that came
into existence on 27April 1992 became a United Nations Member not earlier than
1 November 2000. The State is presently known as Serbia and Montenegro.’ I would
welcome any explanation of, or comment on, the latter statement Bosnia and
Herzegovina might wish to make.” 17
35. Your question, Judge, relates to the co nsistency of the positions taken by Bosnia and
Herzegovina. It is true that Alain Pellet stated: “Yugoslavia has remained a Member of the United
Nations” 1. It is true that I, too, have just supported this contention. Moreover, it cannot be denied
that the chargé d’affaires of Bosnia, who was one of the signatories of the letter, indicated that
“[t]he Federal Republic of Yugoslav.i.a .became...Member not earlier than
19
1 November . . .” .
1CR 2006/29, p. 21.
18
CR 2006/3, p. 19, para. 20 (Pellet).
1Letter dated 9 August 2005 from the Permanent Representative of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
and the Chargés d’affaires a.i. of Bosnia and HerzegovCroatia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Slovenia addressed to
the Under-Secretary-General for Management, reproduced in AnnexIV to the report of the Secretary-General, United
Nations, doc. A/60/140, 16 September 2005,. 17-19; p. 17. - 16 -
36. In order to respond to the question asked, I should like first of all to make clear what was
the object and purpose of that letter. It has to be placed in its United Nations context, which was
one of discussions concerning the outstanding assessed contributions payable by the five States of
the former Yugoslavia. In other words, there was no question of principle, merely a question of
money. The only issue for the five successor States was to avoid paying the outstanding assessed
contributions owed by either the SFRY or the FRY. What could be more simple than to say that,
from 1992 to 2000, Yugoslavia (the SFRY) no longe r existed, and therefore that no member State
was its continuator and, as a result, that no one wa s liable for arrears. As the letter indicates, “the
25 common position of the five successor States on th is issue has been that the unpaid assessed
20
contributions of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should be written off” .
37. As grounds for their position, the five States relied on an indisputable fact, namely that
the former FRY, under the name of Serbia an d Montenegro, was admitted as a new Member on
1November. But this common position cannot and could not alter the “sui generis” situation in
which the State in question found itself, in relation to the United Nations, prior to the
above-mentioned date: that situation, in fact, depended not on what the five States thought, but on
the Organization. And the five States were quite entitled to express their views on this subject by
making the following observation, in the same document moreover, although this is merely ⎯ as
they state explicitly ⎯ an opinion: “[w]e... believe that the unauthorized participation of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in United Nati ons sessions cannot be the basis for assessed
contributions to be paid by the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” 21. This opinion is,
however, incorrect: as a matter of fact, the assertion that the FRY’s participation in United Nations
sessions between 1992 and 2000 was “unauthorized” is mistaken, since, quite to the contrary ⎯ as
I have just expl ained in detail ⎯ its participation had in fact been maintained by decision of the
competent United Nations organs.
2Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, doc. A/60/140, 16 September 2005, Ann. IV, p. 18.
21
Letter dated 9 August 2005 from the Permanent Representative of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
and the Chargés d’affaires a.i. of Bosnia and HerzegovCroatia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Slovenia addressed to
the Under-Secretary-General for Management, reproduced in Annex IV to the report of the Secretary-General, United
Nations, doc. A/60/140, 16 September 2005, p. 17. - 17 -
38. It seems to us, moreover, that the report of the Secretary-General, to which the letter we
are discussing is annexed, supports the argument that the FRY was to be considered a Member of
the United Nations. Thus, the following passage is highly significant:
“From 27 April 1992 . . . until 27 October 2000, when its President submitted to
the Secretary-General an application for the admission of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia to membership in the United Nations, the Government of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia claimed that it constituted the Government of the Member
State that was the former Yugoslavia. This claim was advanced on the explicit basis
that the State that was formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
continued to exist, that that State therefore continued to be a Member of the United
Nations, that the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia continued the personality under
international law of the Socialist FedeRepublic of Yugoslavia, that the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia was th erefore a State Member of the United Nations and that
26 the Federal Republic was, in consequence, the same person of international law, and
so the same Member State, as the former Yugoslavia.”
39. The Secretary-General thus cites the assertion by the FRY of its continued participation,
and the effective reality of such continued partic ipation, in the activities of the Organization, in
order to draw a number of conclusions in respect of financial matters. It is difficult to see why this
status of continuator, which involved full participation in bodies other than those from which the
FRY had been excluded, should not apply in relation to the Court. And it is therefore difficult to
see on what basis it could be held that, in 1993, it was excluded from being a party to the Statute.
40. I hope, Judge, that I have helped to answer some of the points raised by your question to
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
THE FRY’ S ADMISSION TO THE U NITED N ATIONS AS A SUCCESSOR STATE DOES NOT
CHANGE THE FACT THAT IT REMAINED A M EMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS
IN THE ROLE OF CONTINUATOR STATE FROM 1992TO 2000
41. We are all familiar with the distinction be tween continuator States and successor States,
and I shall therefore not dwell on this point. Allow me merely to recall a few definitions.
42. When a succession occurs, the crucial ques tion is whether the State that emerges from
the process, which, like Baudelaire’s dream lover, is neither exactly the same one, nor exactly a
different one, should be considered as rather the one or rather the other. When a State that emerges
from a succession process is to be considerede same as the predecessor State, we speak of a
continuator State, but when it is to be regarded as different, we speak of a successor State.
22
Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, doc. A/60/140, 16 September 2005, p. 2, para. 6. - 18 -
43. Thus, when there is continuation, this means that the State retains its previous identity,
that there is only a single subject of international law , subject to certain changes. If there is a
continuation–– thus, in appearan ce, an identity of status–– the legal consequences, those not in
dispute, are maintenance of the obligations of the “original” State, with a possible adjustment of
the rules applicable to it.
44. When a succession takes place, this means that, in place of the original State, there is a
new State, and the succession implies therefore the existence of at least two subjects of
international law, concerning which the problem arises of the transmission of rights and duties
from one to the other.
45. Irrespective of their complexity, succession processes should be capable of producing
only straightforward outcomes: in the event of dissolution, that is, disappearance of the
27 predecessor State, there should be no continuator and only successors: in the event of
non-disappearance of the predecessor State, ther e should be a continuator and one or more
successors. However, the reality is multifaceted: there have been situations where two States have
been considered as continuators; and there have been even more complex cases where certain
States have been considered simultaneously as continuators in respect of some of their rights, and
assuccessorsinrespectofothers. Letmepr ovide examples of both these situations. First,
situations in which two States have been consider ed as continuators: this was, for example, the
interpretation given to the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which gave rise to
continuation by two States, Austria–– even if , as we know, Austria refused to ratify this
continuator status, outside the peace treaty –– an d Hungary; hence the title of continuator applied
to each of the States under the Treaties of St .Germain(1919) and Trianon(1920). Mention may
also be made of the very specific succession process to which the five States that emerged from the
former Yugoslavia were made subject at the IMF and the World Bank, where all five were
considered as continuators, without being required to go through the admission procedure. But
there have been even more complex cases: some States have been considered simultaneously as
continuators in respect of some of their rights and obligations, and as successors in respect of
others. - 19 -
46. For example, the Netherlands, at the time of its separation from Belgium, was regarded
as the successor State with respect to treaties and the continuator State in regard to colonial
administration. Similarly, Austria accepted the co ntinuation of the USSR by Russia in terms of its
membership of the United Nations and other organi zations, but not with respect to bilateral and
multilateral treaties. While different characteriza tions can coexist simultaneously, they can also
replace each other over time.
47. It is in effect perfectly acceptable, in a given historical situation, to adopt a sequential
analysis, which would make it possible to regard the FRY as the continuator State until 2000 and a
successor State thereafter . Such a situation would not be entirely unprecedented, at least in the
reverse sequence, despite the fact that this would appear more improbable. We only have to think
of the succession process that led to the break- up of the USSR. During the dissolution of the
USSR, although the international community, for ob vious reasons, finally attributed the status of
28 continuator to Russia, it is no less obvious that, initially, the demise of the USSR had been duly
recognized and confirmed by those principally involved and by the other successor States. The
sequence was thus successor State/State recognize d as continuator State, although there was no
change in Russia’s identity.
48. To recapitulate the process: following the announcement in the Minsk Agreement of
8 December 1991 that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist as a subject of international law and as
a political reality, a number of members of the international community reacted immediately by
declaring their recognition of Russia’s independence, thereby demonstrating that a new State had
23 24 25
emerged. This was true of Norway , Sweden and Finland inter alia.
49. Switzerland did the same thing, announcing in a press conference on 23 December 1991
the decision of the Federal Council to recognize 12 States to have come out of the USSR; thus
12 new States were recognized, reflecting a typicalprocess of succession without a continuator.
23According to Izvestia of 17 December 1991 and K. Bühler, State Succession and Membership in International
Organizations, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2001, p. 161, note 719.
24According to Izvestia of 19 December 1991.
25
According to Izvestia of 20 December 1991 and K. Bühler, op. cit., p. 161, note 719. - 20 -
50. This was also the attitude of the United States. It unreservedly accepted the demise of
the USSR. George Bush greeted the emergence of the independent States with the words: “New,
independent nations have emerged out of the wreckage of the Soviet empire.”
51. The position of the United States was regu larly reiterated in subsequent declarations by
the United States administration, which referred to the “dissolution of the USSR” and to the
existence of “12 new independent States”. In par ticular, the United States presented its diplomats’
credentials to the Russian Federation 26, a prime illustration that it was regarded as a new State.
Thus, what I wanted to show you was that, initia lly, Russia was seen as a successor State.
However, subsequently, it is cl ear that Russia was regarded by all as a continuator State.
Switzerland, moreover, expressly noted this change of characterization in a declaration in
27
29 January 1994, stating: “The Russian Federation is now recognized as the “continuator” State.”
52. The transition to continuator from successo r State went almost unnoticed, as it occurred
rapidly. Russia was regarded as the continuator of the Soviet Union shortly after the disappearance
of the USSR had been recognized. Despite the s hort timescale, there was nonetheless a change of
legal status.
53. The same is true of Yugoslavia, except that the transformation was from continuator to
successor and the timescale for the replacement of one status by the other was, of course,
considerably longer. Thus we can conclude that , in the case of Yugoslavia, the sequence was the
opposite to that for Russia, since the FRY initially claimed to be the continuator State and was
accepted as such, before accepting, after a certain date, the status of successor State that the
international community wanted it to adopt: th e sequence was thus continuator State/State
recognized as successor State.
54. The issue before the Court is, in reality, particularly complex— especially as the FRY
did nothing for eight years in order to simplify it— since it concerns three players or, to be
absolutely precise, two, one of which changed status over time: there was the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, the first player, and the second, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which
2Declaration by John F.W. Rogers, Under Secretary for Management, New US Embassies in the Former Soviet
Union, Washington DC, 25 February 1992, in US Department of State Dispatch, 9 March 1992, vol. 3, No. 10.
27
Extract from Pratique suisse 1993, No. 6.1, also featured in the published version of the previously cited pilot
project, document CH/6, pp. 322-323, italics in original, inverted commas added. - 21 -
was successively viewed as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/continuator from 1April1992 to
1 November 2000 and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/successor from 1 November 2000. The
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia remained a Member of the United Nations, only its status changed:
as continuator from 1992 to 2000 and as successor since 2000.
55. The notion that there was no incompatibility in the same State having differing statuses
over a period of time was upheld by the ICTY in a decision of 6 May 2003 in the Milutinovic case:
30 “[t]he somewhat untidy situation in which the FRY was barred from participating in
the work of the General Assembly, without any termination or suspension of its
membership of the Organisation, could only be resolved by the formal admission of
the FRY to United Nations membership... But that formal admission does not
necessarily mean, and does not in fact mean that the FRY was not a member of th28
United Nations for certain purposes in the period between 1992 and 2000.”
56. In other words, the Fe deral Republic of Yugoslavia viewed itself initially as a
continuator State, that is to say: of its own free will, it opted to assume all the rights and obligations
of the SFRY, including — and I insist upon this— the wrongf ul acts committed by that State.
Subsequently, from November 2000, the FRY became th e successor State, as it is now; that is to
say, a State having, by its claim to continuity, assumed throughout the entire period of ethnic
cleansing responsibility for everything that had occurred before 27 April, and a State having
inherited under its new name and in its new geogra phical conformation all of the atrocities referred
to before this Court. Put differently, the fact of its successor status had no retroactive effect, but
followed on from its having assumed responsibility as continuator for all that had gone before.
57. Madam President, Members of the Court, this analysis is the only one that makes it
possible to avoid a legal vacuum and is faithful to the reality, the reality that the FRY was thus,
initially, a continuator of the SFRY, but then de cided to apply for United Nations membership for
purely political reasons.
58. That in no way implies that the new status as a successor State which it finally chose to
adopt has any retroactive effect going back to the date when the FRY was established. You already
said that in 2003, and you confirmed it in 2004. In your 2004 Judgment, you held inter alia: “its
admission to the United Nations did not have, and c ould not have had, the effect of dating back to
2ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinovic, Dragoljub Ojdanic, Nikola Sainovic , case No.IT-99-37-PT, Decision
on Motion Challenging Jurisdiction, 6 May 2003, para. 42. - 22 -
the time when the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia broke up and disappeared” (Legality of
the Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Preliminary Objections , Judgment of
15 December 2004, para. 78).
59. Thus in that Judgment you emphasized the la ck of retroactive effect of admission to the
United Nations, but, in practice, the refusal of retroac tivity as applied in that case has left us with a
legal vacuum: rejecting retroactivity amounted to saying not that the previous situation could be
characterized differently, but that it could not be characterized at all. There was no retroactive
31 effect, but therefore no new characterization. If we assume, correctly, that successor status cannot
be applied retroactively, we arrive at no status at all, and everything continues as if nothing had
happened, as if nothing had occurred between 1992 and 2000, as if the FRY had not existed. In
other words, I believe, as was so clearl y stated in a separate opinion in the Legality cases, that the
resolution admitting the FRY as a new Member of the United Nations “necessarily clarifies the
29
legal situation thereafter” , the emphasis being on thereafter, highlighting the fact that the
previous situation can obviously not be clarified by an act aimed at the future.
60. I will not try to hide, as I come to the end of this presentation, that what I have attempted
to show you does not correspond with the view ta ken in other proceedings, but those were indeed
other proceedings, as Alain Pellet has already pointed out to you. It remains for the Court to
address certain possible contradictions: those that exist already, and which we cannot and— I
believe— must not deny, and those that Serbia and Montenegro is asking you to add. In my
opinion, Madam President, Members of the Court, the key points that the Court has to bear in mind
in addressing these contradictions are the res judicata principle, the principle of consistency within
the same case — for I believe it is more important for decisions to be consistent within a given case
than between two different cases ⎯ the principle of non-retroactivity and what I will call the
principle of respect for the legitimate expectations which its previous decisions have for so long
engendered among the Bosnian people.
29
Separate opinion of Judge Higgins appended to the Judgments in the case concerningLegality of Use of
Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 15 December 2004, para. 18 [emphasis
in the original]. - 23 -
61. “We do not shirk our responsibilities” 30said Mr. Stojanovi ć, the Agent for Serbia and
Montenegro, so convincingly and sincerely in his opening speech, before adding shortly afterwards
that he had great confidence in the Court’s sense of justice3. Members of the Court, Bosnia and
Herzegovina also has great confidence in the Court’s sense of justice in this key case involving the
responsibility of a State for genocide. Thank you.
32 The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Stern.
Ms STERN: Please can you call Mr. Alain Pellet now.
The PRESIDENT: Yes. I call Professor Pellet to the Bar.
Mr. PELLET: Thank you very much, Madam President.
JURISDICTION OF THE C OURT
5. RECAPITULATION OF BOSNIA ’S ARGUMENT ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
T HE RIGHT TO A DECISION
1. Madam President, Members of the Court, it falls to me, as our second round of oral
argument nears its close, to recapitulate the pr incipal elements of the position of Bosnia and
Herzegovina regarding the jurisdiction of the Court, just as, at the opening of this second round, I
attempted to present a summary of its argument on the merits 3. However, I have to say that, while
it is normal, at the close of lengthy proceedings, to present an overview of a party’s arguments on
the merits, by the same token it is unusual ⎯ almost surreal ⎯ to be obliged to undertake such an
exercise in relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to pass judgment upon a case which has been on
its docket for 13years–– and which, moreover, resulted in a judgment, precisely on the issue of
jurisdiction, some ten years back.
2. Thirteen years . . .; ten years . . . These two figures suffice to highlight one of the crucial
aspects of this case in terms of procedure: the ti me factor. The second key element in issue is that
30CR 2006/12, para. 24 (Stojanović).
31
Ibid., para. 30.
32
CR 2006/31, pp. 10-44. - 24 -
which I addressed at some length last Friday: the various problems of “coherence”–– or
“consistency”, for it seems to me that the English word provides an additional nuance. It is around
these two themes that I shall attempt to summarize the terms in which the two most important
issues in relation to jurisprudence are posed in this case. To do so, I sha ll certainly be obliged to
repeat in part what ThomasFranck, BrigitteSt ern and myself have already said, but I hope,
Members of the Court, that you will forgive me: I shall endeavour to add certain elements and,
above all, it seems to me that this overview will make more clearly apparent the very consistency
33
of our position, and to show that certain apparent inconsistencies in what the Court has held are in
fact explicable, at least in part, by the passage of time.
I. (In)consistencies
3. Madam President, I should again like to take as my starting point the leitmotif of
Professor Varady: “This is a most complicated and truly unorthodox case.” 33 I am not sure that the
complexity of the issues of jurisdiction–– whic h are our opponents refer to, with a remarkable
sense of litotes, as “procedural issues”–– are as great as they claim. But in any event, if there is
complexity on this point –– and I am not speaking of the merits, which seem to be more tragic than
complex ⎯ it stems (and stems solely) from the extraordinary variability in the Respondent’s
position, which initially led the Court to regard that State as a Member of the United Nations,
because it so claimed, only to be persuaded subse quently that this was not the case (at least at the
critical date), for it had–– finally!–– accepted that it was not what it claimed to be: the
continuation of the former Yugoslavia.
4. According to what our opponents have told us, the script of this purported complexity can,
I believe, be broken down into five acts:
⎯ ActI:1992–– The “criminalized régime” of Milosevi ć (the expression is that used by
34
Professor Stojanović, Agent of Serbia and Montenegro ) declares that the FRY is the sole
continuator of the former Yugoslavia.
3Cf. CR 2006/12, p. 56, para. 1.46. See also CR 2006/12, p. 45, para. 1.2; p.46, para. 1.7; p. 48, para. 1.13;
p. 49, para. 1.17; p. 51, paras. 1.23 and 1.26 (Varady); CR 2006/13, p. 23, para. 3.18; p. 60, para. 5.2. See also p. 36,
para. 4.5 (Zimmermann).
34
CR 2006/12, p. 12, para. 11. - 25 -
⎯ Act II: 1996 –– This claim results in great uncertainty and legal difficulties, which lead the
Court to adopt its Judgment of 11July1996, in which it recognizes that it has jurisdiction on
the basis of this declaration, of an erroneous assumption.
⎯ ActIII: 2000–– Reversal of the situation: having rid itself of the “last communist régime in
Europe, which had caused its own people much pain” 3–– these are again
Professor Stojanović’s words –– and which alone was responsible for the crimes committed in
34 Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in particular, for the “great crime” committed at Srebrenica 3, the
“new Yugoslavia” requests admission to the United Nations, and is so admitted.
⎯ Act IV: 2003/2004 –– Serbia and Montenegro requests the Court to address the consequences
of this new situation with varying fortunes, for this fourth act falls into two separate scenes: in
the first, the ICJ, in its Judgment of 3February2003, dismisses the request for revision of its
1996Judgment; but the following year the Judgments handed down on 15December2004 in
the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force find that between 1992and 2000 the FRY was
not a Member of the United Nations and had no access to the Court.
⎯ Act V: 2006 –– The epilogue, which we are writing together.
5. If it were not for the tragic context of th ese episodes, this, Members of the Court, would
be the second-rate plot of a courtroom series which owes much to the imagination of the
scriptwriters, but lacks legal credibility and is based on too many mistaken assumptions or
half-truths:
⎯ in the first place, the characters are poorly drawn: while Serbia and Montenegro is
undoubtedly not the “continuator” of the former Yugoslavia (the SFRY, the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia), it is certainly the continuator of the FRY;
⎯ it can therefore neither be acquitted of the latter’ s crimes nor released from the legal situation
created by the FRY in the context of the present proceedings; furthermore,
⎯ the inclusion of ActIV, Scene2, in the play is unacceptable: the 2004Judgment is from a
different script; so much so that, if we view the facts from a continuous perspective, without
3CR 2006/12, p. 12, para. 10 (Stojanović). See also p. 13, paras. 14-15.
36
See http://www.info.gov.yu/saveznavlada/detailjis.php ?strid=699; document reproduced in the judges’ folder
of 6 March 2006. - 26 -
this scene, which belongs to a different play, we find them to have a consistency of which the
scenario skilfully devised by Respondent’s counsel seeks to deprive them.
If you will allow me, Madam President, I will re -address these three points, but with a more
restrained use of imagery.
1. The hypothesis of continuity
6. By formal declaration, adopted on the very day, 27April1992, that the FRY was
proclaimed, the State undertook to “strictly abide by all the commitments that the Socialist Federal
35 Republic of Yugoslavia assumed internationally” (Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996(II) , p.610, para. 17). It c onfirmed this undertaking in
an official Note addressed that same da y to the United Nations Secretary-General (ibid.), which
Brigitte Stern read out to us just now. It was on the basis of that undertaking, and on that basis
alone, that, in 1996, the Court held that the Respondent was “party to the Genocide Convention”,
after noting that this had not been contested (ibid.).
7. To this, our opponents respond with what is in reality just one argument, notwithstanding
the learned speech of ProfessorZimmerman, which addresses a whole range of other issues 37.
However, those other issues can be of only secondary interest ⎯ that is, if we ignore the
1996 Judgment, which is surely inconceivable, even if, in a concern to respond completely to all of
the points raised by the Respondent, MsStern fo llowed him onto this terra in. The Respondent’s
key argument is the following: “Today it is evident that the 1996 Judgment on preliminary
objections was based on an erroneous assumption ⎯ the Respondent did not remain bound by
38
Article IX of the Genocide Convention.” “Today” . . . Yes indeed, and I shall return to this when
I come to the time factor; but at the time ⎯ in 1996? Matters were then far from “evident”; this is
a point on which both sides in this case agree: Yugoslavia claimed continuity and, as
39
ProfessorVarady puts it so appositely: “This was wrong but not implausible.” And what
Professor Stern has just said confirms this. In other words, it might have been possible that the
3CR 2006/13, pp. 35-59.
3Ibid., p. 24, Sect. 4.
39
Ibid., p. 30. para. 3.46. - 27 -
wind would change and that the international community ⎯ which had never taken any measure to
expel or suspend Yugoslavia from the United Nations ⎯ would resign itself to that country’s being
reintegrated into the Organization with full rights , for it was also perfectly possible that the other
successor States of the former Yugoslavia (the SFRY) would recognize the status of continuator
that it enjoyed in practice; as Brigitte Stern has also just shown us, this was what the members of
36 the former Soviet Union had done in the case of the Russian Federation, through the Alma-Ata
Agreement of 21December1991, in relation to its status as a permanent member of the Security
Council.
8. For its part, the Court had no reason to substitute itself for the international community
and for the political organs of the United Nations, which had confined themselves to a
half-measure, without ever taking a binding legal decision dismissing outright the claim of the FRY
to be the continuator of the SFRY. A nd the Court had still less reason to do so ⎯ as it expressly
notes in its 1996 Judgment ⎯ since Yugoslavia’s participation in the 1948 Convention had not
been contested before it ( Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 610. para. 17).
9. Professor Zimmerman affects to be surprised at this: “outside this Great Hall of Justice
Bosnia and Herzegovina has consistently taken the position that there was only one way for the
FRY to become a contracting party to human rights treaties ⎯ namely by specific notifications of
40
succession” . This is certainly true: Bosnia and Her zegovina has always taken the view that the
FRY was only one successor among others to the former Yugoslavia; it has never concealed this
and has always publicly maintained that the Responde nt was subject to the same rules as the four
other successor States, and it continues to believe this ⎯ as Professor Stern has just recalled.
However, it was clearly not for Bosnia and Herzegovina to raise a preliminary objection to its own
Application ⎯ in particular since, if the Respondent had done so, it believed that it could certainly
raise arguments in reply: that the FRY was not the continuator of the former Yugoslavia was one
thing, but that it was by the same token not part y to the Genocide Convention was quite another.
40Ibid., p. 57, para. 4.92. - 28 -
However, as the Respondent remained silent, Bosnia and Herzegovina had no reason to raise the
issue itself, or to put forward arguments ca pable, in its view, of settling the issue;
Professor Thomas Franck has made a clear showing on this point: by its silence, the FRY raised an
estoppel, and the Respondent cannot come to you today to complain of the Applicant’s silence,
which it had itself induced; there was no reason for the Applicant to e xpress itself on an issue
which its opponent had not raised.
37 10. The same reasoning applies to the FRY’s participation in the United Nations Charter and
in the Statute of the Court:
⎯ Yugoslavia had undertaken to abide by all the prior commitments of the SFRY;
⎯ the Charter and the Statute annexed thereto undeniably formed part of those undertakings;
⎯ nor did the Respondent, which regarded itself as having remained a Member of the United
Nations, raise the issue, and the Applicant certainly had no reason to do so, particularly since in
practice, as my colleague and friend Brigitte Stern has just shown you, Yugoslavia had been
neither expelled nor suspended, and continued to enjoy certain rights within the Organization;
⎯ quite logically, the Court drew the necessary conclusion and refrained from ruling on an issue
which did not need to be addressed ⎯ whether it took the view that Bosnia and Herzegovina
had implicitly accepted that the FRY was still a Member of the United Nations,
notwithstanding its own political campaign for the complete cessation of the latter’s
participation in the Organization (which was ef fectively a way of admitting that the FRY had
not ceased to be a Member); or whether it cons idered that the issues of participation in the
Convention on the one hand, and in the Organization on the other, were not necessarily linked;
or whether ⎯ and this is the most likely ⎯ the Court was persuaded that such participation ⎯
effective but limited ⎯ sufficed to establish the jus standi of the Respondent before it.
11. In any case two things are certain, Madam President:
⎯ first, quite legitimately, the Court ruled only on the objections actually raised by the
41
Respondent; on this point both Parties are in agreement ;
4CR 2006/13, p. 40, para. 4.22 (Zimmermann). - 29 -
⎯ secondly, the Court saw no need to raise other objections proprio motu, although there can be
42
no doubt ⎯ and this is another point on which the Parties agree ⎯ that it must “always be
satisfied that it has jurisdiction, and must if necessary go into that matter proprio motu ”
(Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1972, p. 52,
para. 13). The Court did not consider it necessary to have recourse to this inherent power.
38 12. This is particularly noteworthy in that the Court was perfectly well aware of the situation,
to which it had referred in its Order of 8 April 1993 indicating provisional measures (Application of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Provisional Measures, Order of
8 April 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993 , pp.12-14, paras.16-18). Moreover, Bosnia and Herzegovina
had itself addressed the issue of whether or not there was continuity between the SFRY and the
43
FRY in its Memorial , and JudgeKre ća included a lengthy discussion of the matter in his
dissenting opinion of 1996 (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II) , pp. 658 et seq., paras. 91-98); he would certainly not have failed to draw
the attention of his colleagues to these problems in deliberation. Quite clearly, the Court refused to
get involved in a discussion of the issue; but that does not mean to say that it was unaware of it.
Here again, Mr.Varady shows that he is in agreement: “Yes, the problem ⎯or at least a part of
the problem ⎯ was indeed known from the outset.” But he adds: “But the solution was not
known.” 44
13. Madam President, the Court undoubtedly has immense resources available to it, but it
does not possess powers of divination. It could rule only on the basis of the situation as it existed
at the time when it rendered its Judgment, having listened to the adversarial debate between the
Parties. And that Judgment, rendered in full kn owledge of the situation, is crystal clear: by
thirteen votes to two, the Court “finds that, on th e basis of Article IX of the Convention . . ., it has
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute”.
4CR 2006/12, p. 57, para. 1.48 (Varady); CR 2006/13, p. 20, para. 3.5 and p. 60, para.5.1 (Varady);
CR 2006/35, p. 57, para. 8 (Pellet).
4Pp. 160-162, paras. 4.2.2.11-4.2.2.15.
44
CR 2006/13, p. 20-21, para. 3.8. - 30 -
2. The Respondent must assume the consequences of its positions
14. Madam President, whether with respect to the merits or to procedural issues, the
Respondent is quick to find excuses. It is as if the virtues of the current Government should wipe
away the outrages of the previous régime, whose conduct before the Court should in no way be
binding on Serbia and Montenegro ⎯ an argument with echoes of that (on the merits), according to
which the criminal liability of the leaders responsible for the genocide should exonerate Serbia and
Montenegro from the FRY’s international responsibility.
39 15. Madam President, I understand the current le aders’ desire to break with this dark past,
but refusing to assume responsibility for it is not necessarily the most commendable way to achieve
that. And in any event, on the international le vel such refusal conflic ts with at least two
45
fundamental principles: that of State continuity and that of good faith, capable of expression in a
vast array of Latin maxims ⎯allegans contraria non audiendus est ; venire contra factum
proprium non potest , etc. ⎯, maxims which, with some nuances, all convey the same idea, as
JudgeAlfaro showed so very well in his separate opinion in the Temple case (Temple of Preah
Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 40), cited by Professor Franck last Friday 4: you
cannot blow hot and cold; adopt a particular course of action and then disavow it ⎯ at least when
it has led one or more States ⎯ or the Court itself ⎯ to draw the inferences from it; in that case,
we can, in the international sphere, speak of estoppel, without having to concern ourselves with the
technical niceties developed on this subject by certain systems of municipal law.
16. I need not go back over this in great detail and I think that, at this point, it will suffice to
draw your attention, Members of the Court, once again to the main actions taken by the Respondent
which run foul of these principles:
⎯ Above all, there is the “legal posture” I just spoke of. Until 2000, the FRY claimed to be the
continuator of the former Yugoslavia. This found expression in that deafening silence in
respect of its jus standi, which it did not contest before you ⎯ a silence which precluded any
4See the arbitral decision of 18 October 1923, Great Britain v. Costa Rica, Tinoco, United Nations, RIAA, Vol. I,
p.369 or of 31March1926, United States and Mexico Claims Commission, Hopkins,United Nations, RIAA, Vol.IV,
p. 41.
46
CR 2006/36, pp. 32-33, paras. 22-24. - 31 -
adversarial debate on this point during consideration of its preliminary objections, and which
led you to accept jurisdiction in your 1996 Judgment.
⎯ And what is more, Madam President, this goes even further: because it continuously acted like
a Member of the UnitedNations and like a party to the Genocide Convention between 1992
and 2000, whether it was one or not, the Respondent is today estopped from taking the
opposing position in respect of that period and in the framework of this case: it liked to think
of itself as a party to your Statute; you based your decisions on its claims, implicitly as to the
40 Statute, explicitly as to the Convention. It must be deemed to have been a party to these
instruments: in any case within the limits ratione materiae , ratione temporis and ratione
personae which I have just described.
⎯ Furthermore, the Respondent obviously cannot take advantage of its many procedural
manipulations, which created great and undue de lay in the examination of the case on the
merits ⎯ I shall return to this in a few moments ⎯ to defeat Bosnia and Herzegovina by an
objection that would amount to a sort of “special bonus” for delaying tactics.
17. Serbia and Montenegro must assume the consequences of the behaviour of the State it
has continuously been since 27April1992. That State committed genocide against the non-Serbs
of Bosnia and Herzegovina; it remains responsible for that notwithstanding the change of régime
which occurred in 2000. Likewise, as for its access to the Court, that State announced that it was
bound by the undertakings of its predecessor ⎯ even if it later retracted that position, it must
assume the consequences of it ⎯ at any rate for the period during which that “legal undertaking”
(Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974 , p.267, para.43) was
maintained.
18. According to the scenario improvised by Serbia and Montenegro, the entire legal
structure supporting the Court’s finding of ju risdiction in 1996 collapsed with Serbia and
Montenegro’s admission to the United Nations on 1 November 2000. As of that date,
“it has become evident that the a ssumption on which the 1996 Judgment on
preliminary objections was based is an erroneous one. It has also become evident that
the information accessible to the Court at the time when it decided on jurisdiction was
imperfect, ambiguous, and did not allow definitive conclusions.” 47
4CR 2006/13, p. 19, para. 3.3 (Varady). - 32 -
19. That is as may be, Madam President, but that assumption, that hypothèse, who created it?
The ambiguity and imperfection of that information, who was responsible for it? The FRY and it
alone. It cannot now rely on its attitude to ask y ou, Members of the Court, to reverse your firm
decision, which was founded, in the most explicit terms, on its own position. What is more, in
truth this involved much more than a mere problem of information: it was the situation itself that,
in your own words, was “not free from legal difficulties” ( Application of the Convention on the
41
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro)), Provisional Measures, Order of 8April1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993 ,
p. 14, para. 18); and this was as a result of “the sui generis position which the FRY found itself in
vis-à-vis the United Nations over the period 1992 to 2000” ( Application for Revision of the
Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary
Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and Herzegovina), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003 , p.31,
para.71). But putting an end to that situatio n, and thereby to the difficulties it engendered,
depended solely on the FRY itself.
Madam President, I have quite a few minutes left. Perhaps this would be a good time for the
break.
The PRESIDENT: You could break now or yo u could continue. I see there are a couple
more paragraphs until an entirely new section. I would say continue until you come to the entirely
new section.
Mr. PELLET: Thank you very much.
3. The 2004 Judgments in the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force have no bearing on
this case
20. Yes, indeed, the President is right, and I will be brief. The problem was framed in very
different terms in the cases relating to Legality of Use of Force . When you delivered your
Judgment, on 15December2004, the die was cast: the Respondent had at last agreed to do what
the United Nations, the whole world, had been asking it to do for more than eight years, and it
submitted its candidature as a successor State ⎯ among others, like the four others ⎯ to the former - 33 -
Yugoslavia. And it was on the basis of this new situation ⎯ resulting, I repeat, from an initiative
by the FRY alone and depending only on the FRY ⎯ that the Court, in its eight Judgments in 2004,
pronounced in favour of a solution different from that adopted eight years earlier.
42 21. As I said on Friday, the successive positions taken by the Court are no doubt less
48
contradictory than they might appear :
⎯ in both cases, its decision had regard to the situation that was known to it on the date of the
Judgment;
⎯ in both cases, it relied on the position taken by the FRY, in the first cas e, and by Serbia and
Montenegro, in the second ⎯ but it was the same State on that date ⎯ and it based itself on the
concordance of the views of that State, duri ng the proceedings, with the other Party or
parties ⎯ Bosnia and Herzegovina (Applicant) in the instant case, the eight Member States of
NATO (Respondents) in the other.
22. This does not necessarily point to any inconsistency ⎯ even if the similarity in the
method followed produces different outcomes. There can in any event be no question of one case
being “contaminated” by the other: just as there could be no question of the 2003Judgment on
revision “possessing any force of res judicata” in relation to the cases concerning Legality of Use
of Force (Judgment of 15December2004, para.80), so the Judgments rendered in those cases
cannot constitute res judicata in the context of the present case. And even though there is
undoubtedly a clash of jurisprudence, this is quite clearly mitigated by the fact that the parties to
the two sets of cases are not the same and, pe rhaps more particularly , because the respective
judgments concerning them were rendered at different points in time. It is here, Madam President,
that the influence of the “time factor” takes on its full significance, and this will lead me to the
second part of my presentation; but I believe that the same “time factor” this time leads us to the
coffee break.
The PRESIDENT: Yes. Thank you, Professor. And now we come to the coffee break.
The Court adjourned from 11.35 to 11.50 a.m.
4See CR 2006/36, p. 22, paras. 55-58. - 34 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Yes, Professor Pellet.
43 Mr. PELLET: Thank you very much, Madam President.
II. The time factor
23. Once again, there would appear to be three crucial points:
⎯ first, the importance, in all the relevant decisions, of the lapse of time and the change of
circumstances;
⎯ secondly, what may be called “the need to stop the judicial clock”, which confirms, if that were
necessary,
⎯ Bosnia and Herzegovina’s right to a decision on the merits of the case which it placed before
you 13 years ago.
1. The consideration given to the lapse of time in all the relevant decisions
24. Madam President, I have said this many ti mes before, but I think it is an essential point:
the Court does not pass judgment in an ideal, platonic world; its judgments are delivered at a given
point in time, in specific circumstances, in the li ght of the information available to it about those
circumstances and at that point in time. It is a striking fact, that in all the decisions which, for one
reason or another, are important to this case, it has shown itself to be particularly sensitive to this
aspect of its work:
⎯ this is implicitly true of the Orders for the in dication of provisional measures, in which, while
taking decisions binding on the parties ⎯ but reversible ⎯ the Court is taking only prima facie
decisions, particularly with respect to jurisdiction and admissibility;
⎯ it is true of the 1996Judgment, which those of 2003 and 2004 interpret in the light of the
situation obtaining “at the time when that Judgment was given” (Application for Revision of the
Judgment of 11July1996 in the Case concerning Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia),
Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and Herzegovina), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2003, p.31, para.70; see also Legality of Use of Force , Judgment of 15December2004,
para. 73); - 35 -
⎯ this is also true of the 2003Judgment on Revision, which begins by recounting the
“background to the case with a vi ew to providing the context for the contentions of the FRY”
44 (Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and Herzegovina),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003 , p.14, para.24), and presents the “contextual background”
(ibid., p. 26, para. 54), while stressing the fact that this description relates to “the FRY’s special
situation that existed between September 1992 and November 2000” (ibid., p. 22, para. 45).
25. The Court’s approach was no di fferent in the cases relating to Legality of Use of Force .
It is even striking that, in its Orders on the requ est for the indication of provisional measures of
2 June 1999, the Court confirmed, in relation to the basis of its jurisdiction under Article IX of the
Genocide Convention, the position it had taken in 1996 in the instant case; thus, notwithstanding
that some of the respondent States had disputed the fact that Yugoslavia was a Member of the
United Nations and entitled to have access to the Court ( Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v.
Belgium), Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p.135, para.31), it
stated:
“it is not disputed that both Yugoslavia and Belgium are parties to the Genocide
Convention without reservation; and whereas Article IX of the Convention
accordingly appears to constitute a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might
be founded to the extent that the subject-matter of the dispute relates to ‘the
interpretation, application or fulfilment’ of the Convention, including disputes
‘relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts
enumerated in Article III’ of the said Convention” (ibid., p. 137, para. 37).
All of this, Madam President, took place before the FRY’s admission to the United Nations. On
the other hand, in its 2004 Judgments, adopted four years after this event, the Court took full
account of this new situation ⎯ of “such a turnaround of the relevant perspective” 49, to use
Professor Varady’s phrase:
“the situation that the Court now faces in relation to Se rbia and Montenegro is
manifestly different from that which it faced in 1999. If, at that time, the Court had
had to determine definitively the status of the Applicant vis-à-vis the United Nations,
its task of giving such a determination would have been complicated by the legal
situation, which was shrouded in uncertainties relating to that status. However, from
the vantage point from which the Court now looks at the legal situation, and in light of
4CR 2006/13, p. 60, para. 5.2 (Varady). See also p. 20, para. 3.6. - 36 -
the legal consequences of the new developm ent since 1November2000, the Court is
led to the conclusion that Serbia and Mo ntenegro was not a Member of the United
45 Nations, and in that capacity a State party to the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, at the time of filing its Applicati on to institute the present proceedings before
the Court on 29April1999.” ( Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v.
Belgium), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 15 December 2004, para. 79;
emphasis added.)
26. Why, then, should the same causes not produce the same effects; and why, just as
between 1999 and 2004 the Court was led to adopt two completely different positions on account
of the change in circumstances that took place in 2000, should the same not apply in our case;
why, in 2006, should you not adopt a position contrary to the one you adopted in 1996?
2. The need to stop the judicial clock
27. A few moments ago, Madam President, I referred to “the need to stop the judicial clock”.
And it is here that we have to do so.
28. For there is a huge, immense, difference be tween the two cases: in those relating to the
Legality of Use of Force , the Court’s findings in 1999 were prima facie, in an Order for the
indication of provisional measures which was not res judicata. Matters are quite different in the
case between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro: the 1996Judgment is
res judicata. I shall not revisit this ⎯ having covered it at sufficient length both on 28February
50
and last Friday but I would nevertheless like to say a few words on the meaning and implications
of this fundamental principle which, moreover, is not the only principle to be considered ⎯ not the
sole principle applicable in this case.
2ri.ciopfle res judicata is fully enshrined in and firmly supported by the
jurisprudence of the Court (see Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Assessment of
Amount of Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949 , p.248; Appeal Relating to the
Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1972 , p.56,
para. 18; Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the Case concerning Land
and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary
Objections (Nigeria v. Cameroon), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1999(I) , p.31, para.16). And it is
5CR 2006/3, p. 14, para. 9 and pp. 15-16, paras. 12-14 (Pellet); CR 2006/36, pp. 3-15, paras. 33-36 (Pellet). - 37 -
46 supported by the same considerations as thos e which underlie Articles59, 60 and 61 of your
Statute, Members of the Court ⎯ three provisions which are obviously relevant in our case:
⎯ Article59: because it establishes both the bindi ng force of your judgments and their relative
value; among other things, this explains why Serbia and Montenegro is bound, no matter what,
by the 1996Judgment, but also why the solution in the 2004Judgments cannot be transposed
to our case;
⎯ Article60: because, the ju dgment being “definitive and without appeal”, it cannot be
challenged by any of the parties, nor by the Court itself, which a priori condemns the
Respondent’s efforts to failure;
⎯ lastly Article61: because, in a particularly restrictive way, it lays down the conditions for
escaping the rule in the previous Article; this can only be through the procedure for revision,
which may only be sought, subject to strict time-limits, as a result of the discovery of a new
fact, itself narrowly defined. You found that these conditions were not met by your Judgment
of 3February 2003; the 1996Judgment is therefore not “revisable” ⎯ unless the Respondent
now intends to call for revision of the decision refusing revision (anything is possible . . .).
30. These statutory rules do not discourage our intrepid opponents: “the Court must always
be satisfied that it has jurisdiction . . . if necessary even proprio motu . . .”This is true of course,
52
Madam President. But as I showed on Friday , this principle is not an abstract rule authorizing the
Court to revisit a final decision whenever it choos es. It must be applied in the context of the
Statute ⎯ your supreme rule, Members of the Court ⎯ and must be employed in conjunction with
the general principles governing your Court. I am certain that, if one were to review your old
Judgments (and even, perhaps, some not so old), it would not be difficult to find some which would
prove debatable or quite simply wrong, because, since their delivery, “perspectives” have changed;
new facts have surfaced, which wo uld necessarily call for the adoption of different reasoning and
produce different outcomes. However, I shall not engage in this exercise ⎯ intellectually
stimulating as it would doubtless be and which mi ght perhaps be suggested to students in the
47 Rousseau, Telders or Jessup Moot Court Competition , but which could only be a simulated one, a
51CR 2006/12, p. 57, para. 1.48 (Varady); CR 2006/13, p. 20, para. 3.5 and p. 60, para. 5.1 (Varady).
52CR 2006/35, pp. 57-62, paras. 8-17 (Pellet). - 38 -
moot case. Obviously this does not fall within th e scope of your high judicial functions, any more
than does the revision of a judgment which has become final on grounds other than the ⎯ sole ⎯
one envisaged in Article 61 of the Statute of the Court, which you cannot rewrite. The Court must
be satisfied that it has jurisdiction: the 1996 Judgment gave it the opportunity to do so; it cannot,
today, call into question its own authority.
31. Unlike Penelope (or even skilled craftsmen), no judicial body can do its work twice over:
all the principles and rules I have referred to preclude this ⎯ and for a sound and excellent reason:
53
ut sit finis litium.
3. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s right to a decision on the merits
32. Of course, Madam President this first, negative conclusion — that nobody has the power,
neither the Respondent, nor the Applicant nor the Court itself, to challenge the 1996 Judgment—
leads to a further, positive, conclusion: “Having established its jurisdiction under Article IX of the
Genocide Convention, and having concluded that the Application is admissible, the Court may” —
and I would say “must”— “now proceed to consider the merits of the case on that basis”
(Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1996 (II), p. 622, para. 46).
33. This, Members of the Court, was what you ruled ten years ago. This very long
timeframe ⎯ indeed far too long! ⎯ is largely attributable to the delaying tactics and procedural
skills of our opponents then as now, since in this respect nothing has changed: we have not felt the
winds of change blowing since the end of the Milosevi ć régime; the same iron will lies behind the
velvet words (the only change). Our opponents’ aim is to prevent, or at least delay as long as
possible, a judgment on the merits.
34. I would just like to make two final observations, Madam President, if I may.
48 35. The first concerns the length of the proceedings themselves. Irrespective of where the
blame lies, it is largely excessive and ⎯ I have checked this point ⎯ unfortunately constitutes a
5Cf. CR 2006/36, p.22, para.55, Note74. I apologize to the Court and to Serbia and Montenegro for having
attributed to L. Brant a quotation which is in fact taken from an article by Charles De Visscher (“La chose jugée devant la
Cour internationale de La Haye”, RBDI, 1965, p. 5). - 39 -
record in the history of this Court, a record previously held by the Maritime Delimitation and
Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain) case— lasting nine years
and seven months (Application of 8 July 1991, Judgment of 16 March 2001, I.C.J. Reports 2001 ,
p.40)— unless we take together the “two” cases concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) — totalling nine years and eleven months, with the
initial Application of 23 September 1958 discontinued on 23 January 1961 (two years and
fourmonths), followed by the second App lication of 19 June 1962 and Judgment of
5 February 1970 (seven years and seven months, I.C.J. Reports 1970 , p.3). This is closely
followed in terms of duration by the eight years and six months that were required to settle the case
concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.
Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening) (Application of 29 March 1994, Judgment of
10 October 2002, I.C.J. Reports 2002 , p.303), which, it is true, was also marked by numerous
incidental proceedings. I am not simply citing th ese figures for the fun of it, Madam President.
We felt it necessary to mention them in order to emphasize the fact that the present case has
considerably exceeded these unfortunate examples, with the Application filed on 20 March 1993
and oral argument commencing on 27 February 2006 , i.e., 12years and 11 months later, with, of
course, no idea of when the Judgment on the me rits will be handed down ; and moreover, these
hearings have not been given over entirely to the merits of the case, since the Respondent has, for
the fifth time, pleaded the Court’s lack of jurisdiction.
36. The Respondent bears by far the greatest responsibility for this lamentable state of
affairs. It cannot, however, be allowed to benefit from this situation: nullus commodum capere de
sua injuria propria (the fundamental principles of good faith are always expressed in Latin
maxims) 54.
37. Moreover, Madam President, there is little point in apportioning responsibility. The facts
are there: the Application was filed in March 1993; the preliminary objections raised by the
Respondent were rejected by the Court in July 1996 — ten years ago. The Rejoinder was filed at
the Registry of the Court on 22 February 1999, over seven years ago— and some 20 months
5See R. Kolb, “La maxime nemo ex propria turpitudine commodum capere potest (nul ne peut profiter de son
propre tort) en droit international public”,RDBI 2000, pp. 84-136 - 40 -
49 before the “change in perspective”, of which the Respondent makes so much, and upon which it
bases itself in asking you to revise your 1996 ruling. By any standard of ju stice, it is before that
event that we have to place ourselves in order to assess the Respondent’s claims regarding the
jurisdiction of the Court ⎯ if it felt itself compelled to consider these once more. There is no
reason why Bosnia and Herzegovina should be a victim of the quite excessive tardiness of the
proceedings, irrespective of where the blame lies; in any event, the blame does not lie with the
Applicant.
38. Let me add, Madam President, despite th e substantial questions of principle resulting
from these delays, that, in our opinion, is not the key point: the key point, of course, is for justice
to be done, which it most definitely would not be if you were to reverse your decision on
jurisdiction. You settled this point ten ye ars ago, with all the final authority of res judicata, and
there is no principle or rule of law or of equity which would justify your revisiting the matter, in
defiance of the clear terms of your Statute. Nor, moreover, were you to do so, would that cause
you to go back on the findings that you made at the time. We are certain, Members of the Court,
that you will not be tempted by the easy solution of an about-turn on jurisdiction which the
Respondent is asking of you ⎯ for that is precisely what it would be. As for the passage of time,
that cannot justify the shirking by the Court of it s fundamental duty in this emblematic and tragic
case ⎯ the duty to dispense justice by settling th e dispute submitted to it in accordance with
international law.
The Deputy Agent and Agent of Bosnia and Herzegovina are more capable than I am of
expressing the confidence placed in your forthcoming decision by the country which has bestowed
on us the signal honour of representing it before you. I would therefore be grateful,
MadamPresident, if you could kindly give them the floor in turn. For my part, I thank you,
Members of the Court, for your attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Pellet. I now call Mr. van den Biesen. - 41 -
M. van den BIESEN :
50
O BSERVATIONS FINALES GÉNÉRALES
Génocide
1. Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour, que dire de plus? Après plus de cinquante
heures de présentation de nos arguments à la Cour , après les milliers de pages de preuves écrites, y
compris leurs annexes, après les images que nous avons montrées à la Cour ? «Pas grand-chose»,
telle est probablement la réponse à cette question. Si nous n’avons pas réussi à convaincre dans
nos plaidoiries antérieures, ce n’est certainem ent pas maintenant, au cours de la dernière
demi-heure, que nous y parviendrons.
2. A l’évidence, l’avantage d’avoir dû plaider en l’espèce pendant si longtemps a été que
nous avons pu nous pencher sur un nombre considérable de détails, et dans le même temps montrer
à la Cour, qui n’est pas une juridiction pénale, que c’est le tableau d’ensemble qui ressort du
dossier qui est important au moment où elle do it établir la responsabilité d’un Etat dans un
génocide.
3. Ce n’est pas ce que telle ou telle personne avait à l’esprit qui est important: c’est de la
politique de l’Etat concerné que ressortent les para mètres nécessaires à l’évaluation de l’intention.
Mais la politique de l’Etat n’est pas suffisante en elle-même pour que nous puissions parvenir à une
conclusion: ce sont les faits, tels qu’ils se sont produits sur le terrain, c’est l’exécution de cette
politique, qui font ressortir les paramètres permetta nt de bien comprendre ce qui était au cŒur de
cette politique.
4. En ce qui concerne les faits tels qu’ils se sont déroulés sur le terrain, ce n’est pas le
nombre précis de victimes dans tel ou tel endroit, le nombre précis de femmes violées dans tel ou
tel camp qui nous fournissent les paramètres à partir desquels juger de ce qui s’est passé, c’est la
nature répétitive de ces actes, les circonstances dans lesquelles ils ont été commis, la façon dont ils
ont été perpétrés et, en fin de compte, l’ensemble des faits tels qu’ils se sont produits.
5. Ce ne sont pas les circonstances précises de la destruction de telle ou telle mosquée dans
une ville donnée qui sont importantes, c’est l’ampl eur géographique et la nature systématique de
ces destructions, lesquelles font ressortir une autre série de paramètres. - 42 -
6. La même observation s’applique aux déplacements internes: ce n’est pas tel ou tel
mouvement d’une population donnée expulsée d’une certaine zone ou à une certaine date qui est
décisif, mais l’ensemble des transferts forcés ⎯provoqués par des meurtres, la terreur, la faim et
les viols⎯ de presque toute la population non serbe, c’ est-à-dire des Bosniaques et des Croates de
51 Bosnie, contraints de quitter en très peu de temps 70% du territoire de la Bosnie. Tel est l’autre
fondement indispensable à l’évaluation juridique à laquelle nous invitons la Cour à procéder.
7. Ce ne sont pas les quantités précises d’éq uipement militaire fournies par Belgrade aux
Serbes de Bosnie, tel ou tel jour ou dans telle ou telle zone, qui sont importants, mais le flux
permanent de ces équipements tout au long des années 1992, 1993, 1994 et 1995, et l’ampleur de
ce flux, car ce sont eux qui rendent le mieux co mpte du rôle indispensable et prédominant de
Belgrade.
8. De même, ce qui montre la véritable nature du défendeur, ce n’est pas seulement le fait
que la JNA ait laissé derrière elle une partie de ses hommes lorsqu’elle s’est «retirée», mais aussi le
fait qu’on lui ait fait changer de casquette pour créer l’armée des Serbes de Bosnie et que plus de
mille huit cents officiers de l’armée yougoslave aient continué à servir dans cette armée tout en
étant payés, administrés et promus par Belgrade.
9. De même encore, ce n’est pas la partic ipation accessoire d’un dirigeant paramilitaire venu
de Belgrade qui est importante, mais la présence permanente et récurrente des Arkan, Šešelj,
Legija, Bozović, Bérets verts, Scorpions et autres, tous ag issant sous la responsabilité de Belgrade,
preuve de ce qui se passait réellement.
10. Ce n’est pas un seul et unique char de la JNA sur une colline de Sarajevo, mais le
déploiement massif par la JNA de troupes et d’équi pements tout autour de la ville qui dépeint le
mieux la situation telle qu’elle était alors. De même, ce qui permet de se faire une idée de
l’ensemble de la situation et de l’apprécier au plus près, c’est l’apparition de chars, le 6 juillet 1995,
descendant des collines autour de Srebrenica, chars qui avaient ét é donnés par la JNA aux Serbes
de Bosnie et conservés par eux pendant leurs quatre années d’utilisation intensive, l’entretien et les
pièces de rechange étant fournis par l’armée yougoslave.
11. Enfin, et même si cette liste n’est pas exha ustive, ce qui dépeint le mieux la situation, ce
n’est pas non plus le fait que Belgrade apportait une aide en échangeant des marks contre des - 43 -
dinars, mais la subordination à la Banque nationale de Yougoslavie de la totalité de la communauté
monétaire réunissant les trois entités serbes, dont la Republika Srpska.
12. Aucun de ces aspects ne saurait en lui-même suffire à la Cour pour faire droit aux
conclusions finales de la Bosnie dans cette affaire; en revanche, pris conjointement, ils constituent
assurément un fondement solide permettant de conclure qu’il y a effectivement eu génocide et que
Belgrade a effectivement été impliquée dans ce gé nocide, y jouant un rôle si prédominant qu’elle
devrait en être tenue directement responsable.
52 13. Tout cela vient s’ajouter, bien entendu, au fait que Belgrade devrait manifestement être
tenue directement responsable de ne pas avoir empêché ce qui s’est passé, et de ne pas avoir pris
les sanctions qui s’imposaient.
La charge de la preuve
14. Madame le président, en faisant tenir à la Cour tous les documents que nous avons
soumis au cours de ce procès, nous avons de toute évidence respecté notre obligation d’étayer notre
argumentation par des preuves. Les éléments de preuve que nous vous avons présentés sont à notre
avis suffisants pour que la Cour rende le jugement que nous lui avons demandé.
15. Cela est d’autant plus vrai que nous avons de toute façon produit suffisamment de
documents pour transférer la charge de la preuve au défendeur. Dans notre mémoire, nous avons
55
rappelé la jurisprudence pertin ente relative au déplacement de la charge de la preuve . Et dans
notre réplique, nous l’avons de nouveau rappelée, plus en détail, tout en répondant à la réaction du
défendeur dans son contre-mémoire 56.
16. Le défendeur n’a pas semblé prêt à agir en conséquence. Il n’ a pas utilisé son premier
tour de plaidoiries pour produire des preuves cont raires, et encore moins des preuves contraires
convaincantes. Cette évaluation, Madame le président, est finale, en ce sens que ⎯ comme nous
l’avons déjà souligné 57 ⎯ il est certainement trop tard pour que le défendeur commence à présent à
produire des preuves au cours de son deuxième tour de plaidoiries, puisque ce tour-là est le dernier.
55Mémoire, par. 5.3.3.3, 5.3.3.7-5.3.3.8 et 5.3.3.10.
56Réplique, p. 37-41, par. 12-22.
57
CR 2006/2, p. 21, par. 13 (Van den Biesen); CR 2006/30, p. 21-22, par. 24-25 (Van den Biesen). - 44 -
Ce manque de preuves soumises par le défend eur dessert à l’évidence la position de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro.
Les déclarations de Belgrade
17. Faute de preuves, nous aurons entendu un grand nombre de démentis répétitifs ⎯ du
type de ceux que l’on nous a présentés tout au long de cette procédure, notamment dans les
écritures du défendeur. A cet égard, nous n’ avons guère été en mesure de discerner une
quelconque différence entre la Be lgrade d’avant octobre 2000 et la Belgrade d’après cette même
date.
18. De plus, bien que les propos tenus ici, dans la grande salle de justice, par le défendeur se
soient certes caractérisés par un ton nettement pl us modéré, plus modéré en tout cas que celui que
nous avons connu au cours de plaidoiries antérieu res dans cette affaire, dès que l’on passe les
portes de cette grande salle de justice, le manque de respect semble constituer l’approche
53 prédominante du défendeur. Le vice-premier mi nistre de la Serbie déclare carrément que la
motivation de la Bosnie dans cette affaire n’est pas la recher che de la vérité mais l’argent 58. Le
témoin Mićunović a déclaré, à l’extérieur de la grande salle de justice, que la demande de la Bosnie
relevait «de la pure propagande» 5. Ce type d’observation est fréquent dans les médias serbes, mais
aucun de ces commentaires publics, aucun non plus de ceux des dirigeants politiques, ne contient
ne serait-ce même que le début d’une reconnaissance du rôle de la Serbie-et-Monténégro.
19. Manifestement, tout cela n’est pas vrai ment fait pour donner crédit à l’image que les
représentants du défendeur ont tenté de créer en déclarant: «at no point do we seek to deny the
60
sufferings of the victims, which we cannot forget and have no wish to forget» . On voit bien là
que des propos qui expriment effectivement une certai ne sollicitude ne sont pas suffisants, dans la
mesure où ils peuvent être immédiatement démentis par d’autres mots qui expriment le contraire.
58B92, 27 février 2006, «The Last Moment for Mladi ć in The Hague». Invité : Miroljub Labus, premier ministre
adjoint de la Serbie, texte disponible à l’URL www.b92.net/info/emisije/kaziprst.php?yyyy=2006&mm=
02&nav_id=189914.
59
B92, 10 avril 2006, « Mi ćunović About the Application: Chances 50:50», disponible à l’URL
www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=04&dd=10&nav_category=64&…; texte en
anglais sur www.b92.net/english/news/index.php?&dd=10&mm=04&yyyy=2006&nav_category=…;
order=priority&style=headlines.
60
CR 2006/12, p. 12, par. 9 (Stojanović). - 45 -
Cela montre aussi que des propos aimables ne suffisent pas s’ils ne s’accompagnent pas d’une
approche plus modérée sur le fond.
20. Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour, M.Stojanovi ć avait effectivement parlé,
61
dans le passé, d’organisations criminelles liées aux institutions de l’Etat , mais sans préciser quelle
sorte d’organisations, quelle sorte d’institutions de l’ Etat et quelle sorte de crimes étaient alors en
jeu. Cela ne semble donc pas nous aider beaucoup non plus. En fait, seul le conseil des ministres
du défendeur a établi un lien entre le régime de Milosevic et les crimes commis en Bosnie, à savoir
le massacre de Srebrenica, en déclarant le 15 juin 2005 dans un document officiel rendu public :
«Ceux qui ont accompli les tueries à Sr ebrenica et ceux qui ont ordonné et
organisé le massacre ne représentaient ni la Serbie ni le Monténégro, mais un régime
antidémocratique de terreur et de mort, cont re lequel la grande majorité des citoyens
de Serbie-et-Monténégro ont opposé la plus forte résistance.» 62
54 21. Cette déclaration est importante en tant qu e déclaration contraire aux intérêts de l’Etat
dont elle émane, et elle laisse aussi la place à un peu d’espoir. Mais Madame le président, si le
Conseil des ministres a établi un lien entre le régime de Milosevic et le massacre de Srebrenica,
l’heure est venue de l’admettre, pa s de le nier; c’est l’heure de la franchise, non celle de jouer à
cache-cache; l’heure de faire face à la justice, et no n de la perturber. En fa it, il n’est pas trop tard
pour que, lors de son deuxième tour de plaidoiries , le défendeur prenne toutes ses responsabilités.
Toute position que prendra ici, en public, le défendeu r sera examinée de près à Sarajevo et jugée à
l’échelle de sa volonté et de sa disposition à rech ercher véritablement la réconciliation, une échelle
sur laquelle les démentis sont situés tout en bas et l’admission des faits tout en haut.
22. Nous savons qu’en Serbie-et-Monténégro nombreux sont ceux qui invitent instamment
leur gouvernement à prendre une telle position, à a dopter cette approche tournée vers l’avenir en
abandonnant la vieille tactique des démentis.
Opposition
23. Madame le président, voilà qui nous amène à faire quelques observations au sujet de
l’opposition en Serbie-et-Monténégro, plus particu lièrement celle qui s’es t élevée contre les
autorités de la RFY pendant les années pertinentes pour notre affaire.
61CR 2006/12, p. 13-14, par. 15-16.
62CR 2006/11, p. 11, par. 3 (Condorelli). - 46 -
24. Nous avons entendu M. Mi ćunović nous parler de l’importance de l’opposition
démocratique et de la façon dont cette opposition contestait la guerre. Après avoir écouté avec soin
ce qu’il a dit et avoir relu la transcription de sa déclaration, nous sommes parvenus à la conclusion
que s’opposer à la guerre signifiait s’opposer à ce que la RFSY soit engagée dans une guerre en
Croatie. Cela n’a jamais signifié ⎯ telle est notre conclusion ⎯ s’opposer à ce que la RFY soit
engagée dans une guerre en Bosnie. Mi ćunović n’a rien dit de tel. Au contraire, il a expliqué
qu’au Parlement, tous les partis étaient d’accord avec le Gouvernement de Belgrade quant au fait
que c’était à la Republika Srpska de mettre fin à la guerre en Bosnie et que c’était elle qui devait
accepter le plan Vance-Owen 6. Pourquoi? Selon Mi ćunović, parce que les sanctions pesaient
trop lourdement sur la RFY. Il n’a fait men tion d’aucune opposition à l’engagement de la RFY
dans une guerre en Bosnie, encore moins dans un génocide.
25. Nous avons effectué des recherches pour vérifier si le témoignage de M.Mi ćunović
55
reflétait bien la situation telle qu’elle se présenta it à l’époque pertinente, et nous sommes au regret
de devoir conclure que tel est bien le cas. Les di rigeants de l’opposition de l’époque ne se sont pas
exprimés contre l’engagement de Belgrade dans un nettoyage ethnique en Bosnie-Herzégovine et
n’ont pas fermement invité Miloševic à démissionne r suite à de tels agissements. L’opposition se
préoccupait essentiellement de la situation économiq ue désespérée de la RFY, mais ne semble pas
s’être inquiétée de tout l’argent que la RFY dépensait pour le nettoyage ethnique en
Bosnie-Herzégovine et pour la création de la Grande Serbie.
26. En fait nous n’avons trouvé qu’une seule déclaration susceptible d’être interprétée ainsi,
celle faite le 10 juin 1993 par M. Stojanovi ć, aujourd’hui agent du défendeur. M. Stojanovi ć avait
affirmé :
«La Serbie va préserver non seulement le communisme mais aussi ce qui en
découle ⎯ la création de frontières solides pour l’Etat national, donc, si possible, de la
Grande Serbie. Et dans sa volonté de créer cet Etat, elle était déjà prête à recourir à la
force. Armer le peuple serbe en Croatie et en Bosnie-Herzégovine a été très révélateur
de ces intentions. Ce fut là une énor me erreur politique [dit M.Stojanovi ć
en 1993] ⎯ car lorsque le peuple est armé il n’y a plus de contrôle politique sur la
force armée.» 64
63CR 2006/29, p. 16 (Mićunović).
64Interview de M. Radoslav Stojanović par Momir Djoković, «Povratak vrednostima Srbije» [Retour aux valeurs
serbes], Spona, 10 juin 1993. - 47 -
C’est cela Madame le président, qui semble cons tituer la véritable opposition à la politique de
Miloševic. M.Stojanovi ć confirme ici que l’on a bien armé le peuple serbe en Croatie et en
Bosnie, et que cela prouve on ne peut mieux l’in tention de créer une Grande Serbie. Plus avant
dans son interview, sa position perd petit à petit des caractéristiques qui le plaçaient dans
l’opposition, mais de toutes façons cette intervie w montre qu’il était opposé à ce que la Serbie
distribue des armes et à ce qu’elle se prépare à recourir à la force pour créer une Grande Serbie. Là
encore, c’est le seul signe clair d’opposition à la politique de Miloševic ⎯ politique qui avait pour
but, comme cela a été confirmé, de créer une Grande Serbie.
27. Si notre évaluation est erronée, il est temps, là encore, de nous corriger et de nous
démontrer l’ampleur réelle de l’opposition à cette époque, et, plus important encore, maintenant
que cette même opposition est au gouvernement, de reconnaître les faits et non plus de les nier.
56 La Cour n’est pas un parapluie
28. M. Varady a déclaré le 8mars que dans son pays «beaucoup de choses doivent encore
être changées ou rectifiées» 65. Nous ne pouvons qu’être d’accord et comme nous venons juste de le
faire remarquer, le défendeur peut bien sûr utilis er son second tour de plaidoiries pour décrire
certains des changements auxquels il serait urgent de procéder dans sa position au regard du «legs
criminel de l’ère Milosević», comme l’a appelé le témoin Mihajlović le 27 mars 2006 66.
29. Ces changements ou rectifications auxquels il sera it urgent de procéder devraient
également s’appliquer à l’attitude du défendeur en vers la Cour. Ses antécédents à cet égard,
Madame le président, ne sont pas de ceux dont un Etat peut être fier.
30. Nous avons vu de quelle façon le défende ur avait purement et simplement ignoré les
ordres de la Cour en 1993, comme si ceux-ci ne va laient même pas le papier sur lequel ils avaient
été imprimés. Nous avons vu comment il s’était engagé, avec le membre serbe de Bosnie de la
présidence bosniaque, dans des machinations visant ⎯en agiotant pour faire nommer un nouvel
agent bosniaque ⎯ à faire croire à la Cour que la Bosn ie avait retiré sa demande; comment le
défendeur avait su appeler la Cour à l’aide, lors que l’OTAN bombardait la République fédérale de
65CR 2006/12. p. 58, par. 1.52.
66CR 2006/27, p. 23. - 48 -
Yougoslavie. Nous avons vu comment il avait men acé la Cour, dans notre affaire, d’appeler à la
barre quatre cents témoins à l’appui de ses dema ndes reconventionnelles, une approche dont il
savait pertinemment, en la prop osant, qu’elle allait complèteme nt désorganiser le mode de
fonctionnement de la Cour. Enfin, nous avons vu , comme M. Franck l’a fait remarquer le 7 mars,
que M. Varady avait expliqué dans un article publié dans un magazine serbe, une semaine avant le
prononcé des jugements dans les affaires de l’OTAN , que l’une de ses tactiques, dans ces affaires,
avait été dès le début de perdre sur la question de la compétence pour pouvoir sortir indemne de
67
l’affaire bosniaque en invoquant ce même point technique de la compétence . Nous nous poserons
à jamais la question de savoir ce que la Cour aurait décidé dans les affaires de l’OTAN si
M.Varady n’avait pas réservé ce tte révélation à un magazine mais avait clairement admis que
c’était cette approche-là qu’il avait utilisée devant la Cour lors de ses plaidoiries dans les affaires
de l’OTAN.
31. Madame le président, la Cour est bien év idemment ici pour protéger les Etats, ceux dont
les droits sont menacés, mais elle n’est en rien une sorte de parapluie dont on ne peut tout à coup se
servir lorsque le temps se gâte mais que l’on peut facilement laisser de côté si l’on pense que l’on
peut s’en passer sans problème.
57 32. Il sera difficile d’accepter qu’une approc he de type «parapluie» soit récompensée aux
dépens d’un Etat qui a saisi la Cour de bonne foi et s’est lancé dans treize années de procédure afin
d’obtenir la protection dont il a été déclaré qu’il y avait droit.
Observations finales
33. Madame le président, il est clair que la Bosnie-Herzégovine a placé sa foi en la Cour,
mais elle n’est pas la seule à l’avoir fait. Lors du soixantième anniversaire de la Cour, il y a moins
de deux semaines, le Secrétaire général de l’ Organisation des NationsUnies a rappelé comment,
lors du sommet mondial de2005, les chefs d’ Etat et de gouvernement avaient expressément
reconnu l’importance de la Cour et la valeur de son Œuvre. M. Kofi Annan a ensuite ajouté ⎯ et je
suis désolé de ne pas avoir la magie de sa voix chaleureuse :
67CR 2006/11, p. 56, par. 38. - 49 -
«Ces éloges sont à la mesure du dynami sme de la Cour. Aujourd’hui plus que
jamais, les Etats Membres de l’ONU se tournent vers elle, non seulement pour régler
des différends concernant leurs frontières terrestres ou maritimes, ou pour se plaindre
de la violation de traités, mais aussi pour des questions de 68nocide et d’emploi de la
force. De ce fait, la Cour n’a jamais été aussi sollicitée.»
34. En effet, Madame le président, la Cour est peut-être encore pl us sollicitée dans cette
seule affaire que dans celles qui l’ont précédée, tant sont nombreux ceux qui sont concernés par son
issue. Comme nous l’avons déjà dit, la prés ente affaire est pour la Bosnie-Herzégovine une
question de justice. Une issue favorable est esse ntielle à la réconciliation; il s’agit d’une étape
importante vers une paix véritable qui, assurément, deviendra plus tangible lorsque justice aura été
rendue aux yeux de tous. C’est pour cela que, manifestement, tous les citoyens de
Bosnie-Herzégovine, qu’ils soient bosniaques, croates de Bosnie ou serbes de Bosnie, sont
directement concernés par l’issue de la présente a ffaire. Par ailleurs, une issue favorable satisfera
les victimes survivantes de la campagne de nettoyage ethnique, d’abord et avant tout sur le plan
moral et peut-être aussi, à plus ou moins long terme, sur le plan matériel.
35. La convention sur le génocide est née de l’idée qu’il n’y aurait «plus jamais ça». La
Bosnie est bien consciente que les faits de l’espè ce n’atteignent pas l’ampleur inconcevable de la
Shoah. Mais ce n’est pas seulement contre un au tre holocauste que la convention vise à protéger
des groupes définis sur une base ethnique et religieuse. «Plus jamais ça», cela doit s’appliquer
58 aussi à ce qui est survenu en Bosnie-Herzégovine. Il faut que l’on entende et que l’on comprenne
cela d’un bout à l’autre des Balkans. Peut- on trouver meilleur moyen qu’un message envoyé sous
le sceau de la Cour internationale de Justice ?
36. Madame le président, je vous remercie, vous-même et les membres de la Cour, de votre
attention; nous souhaiterions que vous donniez la pa role à l’agent de la Bosnie-Herzégovine pour
qu’il donne lecture des conclusions finales.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur van den Biesen. Je donne la parole à M. Softi ć, l’agent
de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, pour qu’il donne lecture des conclusions finales.
68
Allocution du Secrétaire général à l’occasion de la célébration du soixantième anniversaire de la Cour
internationale de Justice, La Ha ye, le 12 avril 200:6disponible à l’adresse Internet suivant:e
http://www.icj-cij.org/60/speeches/csp_annan.htm. - 50 -
SM F.TI Ć : Merci.
1. Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour, avant de donner lecture des conclusions
finales de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, je tiens à faire quelques observations.
2. Nous nous sommes efforcés de donner à la Cour une idée aussi complète que possible du
génocide qui a été commis contre la population non serbe de Bosnie-Herzégovine. Après toutes
ces semaines de plaidoiries, je n’ai plus à dire à la Cour combien ce génocide fut, et reste encore,
un énorme fardeau pesant sur les épaules de la Bosnie-Herzégovine et de ses citoyens nonserbes.
Pour l’instant, je préfère vous exprimer notre re connaissance pour cette charge qu’ont représentée
toutes ces semaines d’audiences pour chacun des membres de la Cour, une charge qui ne
disparaîtra certainement pas le jour où se term ineront les plaidoiries. Nous vous savons gré de
l’attention sans faille que vous avez prêtée à nos plaidoiries sur les points de fait et de droit et nous
apprécions à sa juste valeur tout ce temps que la Cour a bien voulu consacrer à l’examen de notre
affaire. Nous vous en remercions.
3. Nous remercions également le greffier et, ce faisant, les hommes et les femmes, moins
visibles, du Greffe et du département de l’informat ion de la Cour, qui se sont montrés d’une telle
serviabilité, d’un si grand secours et nous ont ma nifesté tant de cordialité, même lorsque nous ne
leur donnions aucune raison de le faire. De la même manière, nous remercions aussi les interprètes
qui ont si bien fait leur travail, surtout lorsque nos collègues francophones parlaient à la vitesse de
la lumière. Nous félicitions la Cour d’avoir en son sein ce trésor que sont tous ces gens
dévoués ⎯y compris tous les autres membres du personnel ⎯ qui oeuvrent pour la cause de la
justice.
59 4. Comme nous l’avons indiqué tout au long de la présente instance, nous avons confiance en
la Cour. Nous sommes convaincus qu’elle parviendra à une conclusion sans équivoque qui non
seulement sera conforme au principe de légalité, mais aussi fera justice à la Bosnie-Herzégovine.
5. Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour , à présent, je donnerai pour terminer lecture
des conclusions finales du demandeur. - 51 -
La Bosnie-Herzégovine prie la Cour internationale de Justice de dire et juger :
1. Que la Serbie-et-Monténégr o, par le truchement de ses organes ou d’entités sous son
contrôle, a violé les obligations qui lui incombent en vertu de la convention pour la prévention et la
répression du crime de génocide, en détruisant en partie et de façon intentionnelle le groupe
national, ethnique ou religieux non serbe, notamment mais non exclusivement, sur le territoire de la
République de Bosnie-Herzégovine, en particulier la population musulmane, par les actes suivants :
⎯ meurtre de membres du groupe;
⎯ atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique ou mentale de membres du groupe;
⎯ soumission intentionnelle du groupe à des conditions d’existence devant entraîner sa
destruction physique totale ou partielle;
⎯ mesures visant à entraver les naissances au sein du groupe;
⎯ transfert forcé d’enfants du groupe à un autre groupe;
2. A titre subsidiaire :
i)que la Serbie-et-Monténégro a violé les obligations qui lui incombent en vertu de la
convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide en se rendant
coupable de complicité dans le génocide tel que défini au paragraphe 1 ci-dessus; et/ou
ii)que la Serbie-et-Monténégro a violé les obligations qui lui incombent en vertu de la
convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide en apportant aide et
soutien à des individus, des groupes et des en tités commettant des actes de génocide tels
que définis au paragraphe 1 ci-dessus;
3. Que la Serbie-et-Monténégro a violé les ob ligations qui lui incombent en vertu de la
convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide en se rendant coupable
d’entente en vue de commettre le génocide et d’incitation à commettre le génocide tel que défini au
paragraphe 1 ci-dessus;
60 4. Que la Serbie-et-Monténégro a violé les ob ligations qui lui incombent en vertu de la
convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide en manquant à son obligation
de prévenir le génocide; - 52 -
5. Que la Serbie-et-Monténégro a violé et continue de violer les obligations qui lui
incombent en vertu de la conventi on pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide en
manquant et en continuant à manquer à son obligation de punir les actes de génocide ou autres
actes prohibés par la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide et en
manquant et en continuant à manquer à son obli gation de transférer au Tribunal pénal pour
l’ex-Yougoslavie les personnes accusées de génocide ou d’autres actes prohibés par la convention
et de coopérer pleinement avec ledit Tribunal;
6. Que les violations du droit international exposées dans les conclusions 1 à 5 constituent
des actes illicites attribuables à la Serbie-e t-Monténégro qui engagent sa responsabilité
internationale et, en conséquence,
a)que la Serbie-et-Monténégro doit immédi atement prendre des me sures efficaces pour
s’acquitter pleinement de l’obligation qui lui in combe, en vertu de la convention pour la
prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, de punir les actes de génocide ou autres actes
prohibés par la convention, de transférer au Tribunal pénal pour l’ex-Yougoslavie les personnes
accusées de génocide ou d’autres actes prohibés par la convention et de coopérer pleinement
avec ledit Tribunal;
b) que la Serbie-et-Monténégro doit réparer les conséquences de ses actes internationalement
illicites et que, par suite de la responsabilité internationale encourue à ra ison des violations
susmentionnées de la convention pour la préventi on et la répression du crime de génocide, est
tenue de payer à la Bosnie-Herzégovine, et cette dernière est fondée à recevoir, en son nom
propre et comme parens patriae, pleine réparation pour le préjudice et les pertes causés. Que,
en particulier, la réparation doit couvrir tout préjudice financièrement évaluable correspondant :
i) au préjudice causé à des personnes physiques par les actes énumérés à l’article III de la
convention, y compris le préjudice moral subi par les victimes, leurs héritiers ou leurs
ayants droit survivants et les personnes dont elles ont la charge;
ii) au préjudice matériel causé aux biens de personnes physiques ou morales, publiques ou
privées, par les actes énumérés à l’article III de la convention; - 53 -
61 iii)au préjudice matériel subi par la Bosnie-Herzégovine à raison des dépenses
raisonnablement encourues pour réparer ou atténuer le préjudice découlant des actes
énumérés à l’article III de la convention;
c) que la nature, la forme et le montant de la ré paration seront déterminés par la Cour, au cas où
les Parties ne pourraient se mettre d’accord à cesujet dans l’année suivant le prononcé de l’arrêt
de la Cour, et que celle-ci réserve à cet effet la suite de la procédure;
d) que la Serbie-et-Monténégro est tenue de fournir des garanties et assurances spécifiques de
non-répétition des faits illicites qui lui sont reproché s, les formes de ces garanties et assurances
devant être déterminées par la Cour;
7. Qu’en ne respectant pas les ordonnances en indication de mesures conservatoires rendues
par la Cour le 8 avril 1993 et le 13 septembre 1993, la Serbie-et-Monténégro a violé les obligations
internationales qui sont les siennes et est tenue de verser à la Bosnie-Herzégovine, à raison de cette
dernière violation, une indemnisation symbolique dont le montant sera déterminé par la Cour.
Merci.
Le PRESIDENT: Merci beaucoup, Monsieur Softi ć. La Cour prend acte des conclusions
finales dont vous avez donné lecture au nom de la Bosnie-Herzégovine.
Ainsi s’achève le second tour des plaidoiries de la Bosnie-Herzégovine. La Cour se réunira
une nouvelle fois le mardi 2 mai 2006 à 10 heures pour le début du second tour des plaidoiries de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro. L’audience est à présent levée.
L’audience est levée à 12 h 50.
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Traduction