Traduction

BHY

CR 2006/11 (translation)

CR 2006/11 (traduction)

Tuesday 7 March 2006 at 10 a.m.

Mardi 7 mars 2006 à 10 heures - 2 -

10 Le PRÉSIDENT: Veuillez vous asseoir. M onsieur Condorelli, on ne vous a pas entendu

hier soir, vous avez maintenant la parole.

Mr. CONDORELLI: Thank you very much, Ma dam President. Madam President, Members

of the Court:

T HE R ESPONDENT HAS ACKNOWLEDGED ITS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR GENOCIDE

1. Last week the Deputy Agent of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Phon van den Biesen, presented

some terrible images, showing several members of the paramilitary unit of the Serb police, the

Scorpions, as, with revolting cynicism, they murder ed Bosnian Muslim prisoners near Srebrenica.

I would remind you that the Scorpions were a special unit of the Serbian police, under the authority

of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs, ceated, trained and armed by the latter: in brief,

undeniably organs of the State. When these imag es were transmitted by a Belgrade television

channel on 2 June 2005, they provoked huge emoti on among the public within the country, as well

as various statements by a number of leading political figures. From all sides there was a call for

proper punishment of those concerned; and ind eed the murderers were rapidly identified and

arrested (though not, incredibly, their commander): they are currently awaiting trial.

2. On 15 June 2005, the Council of Minist ers of Serbia and Montenegro, supreme

government organ of the federal State, adopted an official declaration which made headlines in all

the country’s media. The Council of Ministers, expressing popular feeling, solemnly condemned

the “crimes committed against Bosnian prisoners of war and civilians in Srebrenica in 1995”. That

document, Members of the Court, is in your folder for today.

3. The statement contains an important paragraph; so much so that I am going to cite it word

for word and carefully comment on it. Here is wh at it says [in a French translation which I regard

as faithful]:

11 “Those who committed the killings in Srebrenica, as well as those who ordered
and organized that massacre represented neither Serbia nor Montenegro, but an

undemocratic regime of terror and death, against whom the great majority of citizens
of Serbia and Montenegro put up the strongest resistance.

Our condemnation of crimes in Srebrenica does not end with the direct
perpetrators. We demand the criminal responsibility of all who committed war

crimes, organized them or ordered them, and not only in Srebrenica. - 3 -

Criminals must not be heroes. Any protection of the war criminals, for
whatever reason, is also a crime.”

4. Madam President, those are fine words. Those are noble words: they do honour to the

country represented by our distinguished colleagues on the other side of the Bar. Those words go

in the right direction: that is to say, toward s the full recognition of the Respondent’s responsibility

for genocide so needed by the martyred people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the Agent of

Bosnia and Herzegovina told you a week ago, the future of relations between the two countries

before you today can never be a peaceful and frie ndly one unless it is based on truth. However,

those words are not sufficient ⎯ and indeed come very late ⎯ in light of the enormity of the crime

of genocide perpetrated by the “undemocratic régi me of terror and death” which then governed

Serbia and Montenegro. It is for that reason, in order that those “sufficient words” be said, and that

actions from now on effectively match those words, th at we appear before this Court in the firm

belief that you will be able to find the right words.

5. Madam President, Members of the Court, th e statement from which I have just quoted is

not only of great importance in moral and political terms. It also has clear legal consequences,

which I wish to highlight now, using it to complete what we have said regarding attributibility of

the genocide to the Respondent.

6. What the Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro forcefully condemns is, as you

have just heard, the “massacre” (that is the wo rd used) of Srebrenica. Those condemned are not

just the “perpetrators”, the killers, but above all those who “ordered and organized” that massacre:

those who represented (again I quote) the “undemocr atic régime of terror and death” which then

governed the State, a régime which is explicitly described as not representing the citizens of Serbia

and Montenegro.

7. Clearly, the fact that the then Government is criticized as non-representative is central to a

12 firm condemnation in political and ideological terms, but cannot imply ⎯ how indeed could it? ⎯

any denial of the fact that this was the Government in power in the FRY at the time of the offences,

a Government enjoying international recogn ition, a Government whose actions, under the

universally recognized principle of State continuity notwithstanding changes of régime, remain acts

of the State which continue to engage its intern ational responsibility. Do I need to remind you of - 4 -

1
that locus classicus in international law, the Tinoco Award , and of the doctrinal source from which

the Arbitrator drew his inspiration, namely tho se well-chosen and still very pertinent words of the

celebrated authority, John Basset Moore, who 100 years ago wrote the following:

“Changes in the government or the inte rnal policy of a state do not as a rule

affect his position in international law. A monarchy may be transformed into a
republic or a republic into a monarchy; absolute principles may be substituted for
constitutional, or the reverse; but, though the government changes, the nation
2
remains, with rights and obligations unimpaired . . .”

8. In brief, to recognize the responsibility of the government in power in Belgrade during the

first half of the 1980s for the Srebrenica ma ssacre means recognizing the responsibility of the

Yugoslav State, just as today’s democratic Germ any and Italy continue to bear international

responsibility for the extremely serious crimes committed before and during the Second World War

by the Nazi and fascist régimes then in power in those countries.

9. It is necessary, Madam President, to analyse carefully the legal force and effects of that

recognition for purposes of settlement of the present dispute. The first observation called for is that

Bosnia and Herzegovina is not relying in any sense in this regard on the principle enshrined by the

International Law Commission in Article 11 of its Articles on international responsibility of States.

That Article deals with conduct which, under the principles governing attribution, was not

attributable to the State when it occurred, but becomes subsequently so attributable because, ex post

facto, the State “acknowledges and adopts” (this is the phrase used) that conduct “as its own”. That

has nothing to do with the present situation before us: Bosnia and Herzegovina attaches weight to

the statement cited not as a “cause” of attribution of the acts to which it refers, but as evidence,
13

decisive evidence, of such attribution.

10. In its Judgment of 19December last in the case between the Congo and Uganda, this

Court considered the probative value of statements emanating from the organs of a State. You told

us that the Court “will give particular attention to reliable evidence acknowledging facts or conduct

3
unfavourable to the State represented by the person making them . . .” .

1
Aguilar-Armory and Royal Bank of Canada Claims ( Tinoco case), Award of 12January 1922, RIAA Vol.1,
p. 376.
2Digest of International Law, Vol. I, Washington, 1908, p. 249.

3Armed Activities on the Territory of th e Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of
19 December 2005, para. 61 - 5 -

11. That is a classic proposition, restated by the Court with express reference by way of

precedent to its 1986Judgment in the Nicaragua case, where it had indeed further developed its

reasoning regarding the probative force of “statements by representatives of States, sometimes at

the highest political level” (which is, incidentally, certainly so in our case). In that case this Court

held that:

“statements of this kind, emanating from high-ranking official political figures,

sometimes indeed of the highest rank, are of particular probative value when they
acknowledge facts or conduct unfavourable to the State represented by the person who
made them. They may then be construed as a form of admission.” 4

12. A little further, still in the same 1986 Judg ment, the Court stated, in even more explicit

terms, what statements of this kind can show:

“Among the legal effects which such declar ations may have is that they may be
regarded as evidence of the truth of facts, as evidence that such facts are attributable to
the State the authorities of which are the aut hors of these declarations, and, to a lesser
5
degree, as evidence for the legal qualification of these facts.”

13. The Court then applied these propositions to the case before it. It found that the

declaration by the United States in question (invo king self-defence as alleged justification for its

acts involving use of force against Nicaragua) did not state or list the precise facts and thus could

14 not be taken as a form of “general admission”, although it was certainly “a recognition as to the

imputability of some of the activities complained of” . 6

14. Members of the Court, in the present case the declaration by the Council of Ministers of

Serbia and Montenegro on which I am in process of commenting is certainly, in view of its terms,

too general to be regarded as acknowledgment of th e attributability to the respondent State of all

the crimes committed against the non-Serbs of Bo snia and Herzegovina during the years of the

genocide, even if it does indeed mention crimes other than those committed at Srebrenica: it

cannot therefore be regarded as a “general admissi on” in the matter, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

does not so claim. On the other hand, the decl aration is quite precise regarding the Srebrenica

massacre of 1995, which it expressly admits to have been an act of the State, since it recognizes

4
Military and Paramilitary Activitiesin and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Provisional Measures, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 41, para. 64.
5
Ibid., p. 43, para. 71.
6Ibid., p. 45, para. 74. - 6 -

that it was the Government of the Yugoslav State at that time which organized it, ordered it and had

it executed. We are therefore justified, Members of the Court, in requesting this Court to adjudge

and declare that the 2005 declaration by the Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro can be

regarded, in the Court’s words, as a “form of admission” and ⎯ again in your words ⎯ as having

decisive probative force regarding the attributability to the Yugoslav State of the Srebrenica

massacre.

15. I would, however, make a further obser vation. The Srebrenica massacre cannot be

correctly assessed out of the context in which it occurred, and in light of which its true significance

becomes apparent. Thus the systematic liquidation over just a few days of thousand upon thousand

of prisoners, carried out by means of a large- scale military operation which undoubtedly required

the most complex planning and organization, represents, as it were, the culmination of the

genocidal campaign aimed at ethnically “purifyi ng” part of the territory of Bosnia and

Herzegovina. Srebrenica is in fact the final episode , and certainly one of the most terrifying: the

climax of a single criminal enterprise, product of a single design and carried out by means of a

series of actions of various organs, structures and groups spread over tim e. Acknowledgment of

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavi a’s responsibility for Srebrenica, final link in the chain, thus
15

inevitably implies acknowledgment of responsib ility for the genocide of which Srebrenica

constituted an integral element.

16. However, let us return to the text of th e declaration. It is true that it describes the

1995massacre as a “war crime”, and not as genocid e. But that in no way weakens the probative

force of this document: the Court had indeed indi cated in 1986 that statements of this kind can be
7
regarded, “to a lesser degree, as evidence for the legal qualification” of the facts . That is

self-evident: jura novit curia. In other words, the facts must be proved to the International Court

whereas the Court’s task is to st ate the law. “Tell me the facts, and I will tell you the law,” as the

Romans used to say: this classic adage is partic ularly applicable, as we all know, to international

proceedings. The facts of Srebrenica, the cold -blooded massacre of some 8,000 men guilty of not

being Serbs, have been established before this Court by conclusive ev idence: evidence which

7
Ibid., p. 43, para. 71. - 7 -

indeed has already persuaded the Criminal Tribuna l for the former Yugoslavia to characterize it as

8
genocide . The attributability of these crimes to the FRY has already been conclusively

established, confirming and rendering irrefutable their acknowledgment by the State and engaging

its responsibility. It is now for the Court to d ecide whether or not these acts attributable to the

Respondent are to be legally characterized ⎯ on the basis of the 1948 Convention ⎯ as elements

of the crime of genocide, as the Applicant believes it has shown.

17. Madam President, that concludes the first part of my presentation. With your permission

I shall now continue on a quite different subject, namely the Respondent’s breach of its obligations

to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. Thank you.

16
T HE R ESPONDENT ’S BREACH OF THE OBLIGATIONS TO PREVENT
AND PUNISH THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE

1. Introduction

1. Madam President, Members of the Court, the first of the obligations imposed on all States,

including of course both Serbia and Monten egro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, by the

1948Convention is the obligation to prevent a nd punish genocide, a “crime under international

law”. This obligation is expressed in very general and, as it were, introductory terms in Article I,

which closely follows the wording of the title of the Convention. Later provisions, in Articles IV

to VIII, add a whole series of specific details and clarifications essential to its implementation.

However, these further provisions focus primarily on punishment, while rules on prevention are

scantly developed.

2. It is true, however, that no precise bounda ry can be established between prevention and

punishment. First, it is well known that a well-or ganized system of enforcement, capable of

imposing penalties proportionate to the seriousness of offences, plays a very important preventive

role; and secondly, effective prevention calls for the punishment of any acts preparatory to

8
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krsti ć, case No.IT-98-33-A, Appeals Char, Judgement, 19April2004, pp.3-17,
paras.5-38 and Trial ChamberI, Judgent, 2 August 2001, paras.539-599; ICTY,Prosecutor v. Blagojević, case
No. IT-02-60-T, Trial ChamberI, Sec. A, 17 Januar y 2005, pp. 235-248, paras. 638-677. See also, ICTY, Prosecutor v.
Karadžić and Mladić, cases Nos.IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, Review of Indictments Pursuant to Article61 of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Trial Chamber, Decsion of 11July 1996, pp.59-61, paras.92-95 and case
No.IT-02-54-T, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Applion for Judgement of Acquittal, 16June2004, paras.246
and 288. - 8 -

genocide (such as conspiracy to commit genocide or attempted genocide, etc.), or again acts

constituting incitement to commit genocide. In other words, the punishment of most of the

so-called “ancillary” acts identified in Article III of the Convention, which were addressed

yesterday by my friend and colleague AlainPellet, plays a definite, though obviously

non-exhaustive, role in the area of prevention.

3. Thus, prevention means that every State must adopt “appropriate and necessary means” (I

would prefer to say: all appropriate and necessary means) to “protect populations from genocide,

war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against human ity”: I am using the language in which the

World Summit of last September couched what it proclaimed as the “responsibility to protect” . A

responsibility which ⎯ as the document I am citing indicates ⎯ is borne by each State but also by

17 the “international community, through the United Nations”. I would point out that, by proclaiming

the responsibility to protect, it was intended to provide a solemn response ⎯ albeit one which quite

clearly was inherently inadequate, though nonetheless significant ⎯ to the concerns forcefully

10
expressed by the Secretary-General in his millennium report , regarding the international

community’s capacity to prevent future grave and massive violations of human rights of the kind

committed in Rwanda and Srebrenica. In othe r words, the genocide against the non-Serbs of

Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the major tragic events which continue to drive the international

community to find more suitable ways of preventin g the repetition of extremely serious crimes of

this kind.

All4. ⎯ I repeat, all ⎯ the obligations in respect of prevention and punishment of the crime

of genocide laid down in the 1948Convention have been seriously breached by the Respondent

and, as regards punishment, continue to be breached even today: my purpose in this address will

be to demonstrate that point. On the other hand, I shall be analysing neither the role envisaged for

the United Nations by Article VIII of the 1948 Co nvention, in connection with the prevention and

punishment of genocide, nor the role actually pl ayed and still played by the United Nations in

relation to the genocide perpetrated in Bosnia and He rzegovina. I shall, of course, also be careful

9
Final document of the meeting of Heads of State anGovernment at the United Nations General Assembly,
September 2005, United Nations doc. A/60/L.1, 20 September 2005, paras. 138 and 139.
1Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, doc. A/54/1, 1999. - 9 -

not to broach the vexed question of human itarian intervention as a means of halting ⎯ where

necessary, by force ⎯ a genocide already under way. The reason for this choice is obvious:

whatever the response may be to the question whether or not the United Nations (and the

international community in general) adequately fulfilled its “responsibility to protect” the martyred

people of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the present case, and how it should react in the future to

possible new cases of genocide, the international responsibility of Serbia and Montenegro remains

fully engaged, following the violation of the obligations set out in the 1948 Convention, including

the obligation to prevent and punish.

5. Closing this parenthesis, I shall now address the violations of Article I of the Convention.

Madam President, we have reached the final day of the first round of oral argument by Bosnia and

Herzegovina; you might therefore find it surprisi ng that the Applicant should wait until this late

18 hour to come forward with its point of view on a subject of such pivotal importance under the

Convention. However, it is of course the scale of gravity of the wrongful acts committed by Serbia

and Montenegro which has dictated the sequence in which we have laid out our arguments, since it

goes without saying that the violations of Article I, though obviously serious, are considerably less

so in relation to the actual crime of genocide pe rpetrated by the FRY. But it is now time to

complete our argument by dealing with the actual obligation of prevention and punishment.

2. The scope ratione loci of the obligations to prevent and punish genocide

6. At the outset, however, Madam President, mention should be made of the conclusion

drawn by your Court in its 1996 Judgment (on the preliminary objections) in the instant case,

concerning the scope ratione loci of the obligations set forth in the 1948 Convention. In response

to one of the preliminary objections raised by the Respondent, the Court began by noting that only

one provision of the Convention contains a territori al reference, namely Article VI, which confines

itself to providing that persons charged with any of the acts prohibited by the Convention “shall be

tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed...”.

Your Court went on once again to emphasize forcefu lly the particular nature of the rights and

obligations enshrined in the Convention, characterizing them as rights and obligations erga omnes - 10 -

11
(the time was not yet ripe for you to use the words “jus cogens”, as you did a month ago) ; and

relying on this argument, the Court noted “that the obligation each State thus has to prevent and to

12
punish the crime of genocide is not territorially limited by the Convention” .

7. Allow me, Madam President, to make so me brief comments, based on your own case law,

concerning the significance and effects of the princi ple that the Court thus recognized: this is

essential to the further train of my remarks.

8. The first precedent, a very classical one, which I should like to invoke is the

1971Advisory Opinion on the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia , in which your

Court held:

19 “The fact that South Africa no longer has any title to administer the Territory
does not release it from its obligations and responsibilities under international law
towards other States in respect of the ex ercise of its powers in relation to this

Territory. Physical control of a territory, and not sovereignty 13 legitimacy of title, is
the basis of State liability for acts affecting other States.”

9. The proposition that any State, when it has under its jurisdiction ⎯ whether legally or

illegally ⎯ a territory which is not its own and exerci ses State functions there, is required to

comply with the international rules relevant to the functions exercised, is confirmed by copious

jurisprudence concerning human rights in particular. Thus, in the Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004

(Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory) , your

Court concerned itself with the instruments with which Israel must comply beyond its frontiers,

specifically in occupied territory; and it obser ved, in connection with the 1966 International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that

“while the jurisdiction of States is primar ily territorial, it may sometimes be exercised
outside the national territory. Considering the object and purpose of the...

Covenant . . . it would seem natural that, even when such is the case14States parties to
the Covenant should be bound to comply with its provisions.”

11
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Rwanda), Judgment of 3 February 2006, para. 64.
12
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 616, para. 31.
13Legal Consequences for States of th e Continued Presence of South Afri ca in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 54, para.118.

14Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory , Advisory Opinion ,
p. 179, para. 109. - 11 -

10. And the Court, after noting the practice of the Human Rights Committee on the question,

draws the following conclusion: “the... Covenant ... is applicable in respect of acts done by a

State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory” 15. According to the Court, the

16 17
same rule applies to the International Cove nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights , and

the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.

11. As was already mentioned by ProfessorPelle t, the rich jurisprudence of the European

Court of Human Rights has developed along similar lines. In this connection, I shall confine

myself to citing the summary of that Court’s jurisprudence set out in the Banković Judgment of

2001 18; the European Court held that the European Convention on Human Rights has
20

extraterritorial effect when a State

“through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a
consequence of military occupation or thr ough the consent, invitation or acquiescence
of the Government of that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers

normally to be exercised by that Government”.

12. Madam President, I see not the slightest impediment to considering that such a

conclusion is all the more necessarily applicable to the Genocide Convention, in view of that

Convention’s object and purpose, on which the Court has laid such great stress. The lack of

territorial limitations on the obligation to prev ent and punish the crime of genocide, which you

highlighted in 1996, means therefore that a State party to the Convention must discharge this

obligation even outside its sphere of territorial sovereignty, when it exercises ⎯ whether legally or

illegally ⎯ effective control over a territory outside its borders by assuming prerogatives of public

authority in that territory. The genocide agai nst the non-Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina was

perpetrated while the Respondent undeniably exerci sed its authority over the territory concerned,

first legally by way of territorial sovereignty, and subsequently illegally following Bosnia and

Herzegovina’s accession to independence. As we have seen, the degree of this control, whether

exercised directly (by means of its own de jure institutional apparatus) or in some respects

1Ibid., p. 180, para. 111.
16
Ibid., para. 112.
17
Ibid., p. 181, para. 113.
1Case concerning Banković and others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States , Application No.52207/99,
Decision, 12 December 2001, para. 71. - 12 -

indirectly (by means of entities totally dependent on it), was certainly sufficient throughout the

years of genocide to trigger the application of Article I of the 1948 Convention.

3. The Respondent’s breach of the obligation of prevention

13. Madam President, Members of the Court, following these necessary preliminary points, I

now turn to the obligation of prevention. As Alain Pellet noted on Friday of last week, it is

extremely easy to demonstrate Serbia and Montenegro ’s breaches of this obligation: the very fact

that genocide was perpetrated, and that it e ngages the international responsibility of the

Respondent, logically proves by the same token that the latter did not discharge its obligation of

prevention. However, this finding is supported not only by logic. By that I mean that an

examination of the facts reveals clear evidence of the total failure to take preventive measures on

21 the part of the competent authorities, whether the FRY or Republika Srpska, and this despite urgent

appeals from all quarters, despite the resoluti ons of the Security Council and the General

Assembly, despite your Court’s Orders of 8 April and 13 September 1993.

14. It is true that the domestic legislati on required by ArticleV of the Convention for the

implementation at national level of the rules of the Convention does exist in the respondent State

and does ⎯ it has to be acknowledged ⎯ certainly provide in abstracto for effective criminal

penalties capable of being applied against persons guilty of genocide or preparatory acts, acts of

incitement, etc. The same could even be said also of measures aimed at bringing the domestic law

of the Respondent into line with the principles and rules of international humanitarian law: Serbia

and Montenegro uses this argument in its written pleadings 1, and it is in no way contested by

Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, the ar gument strongly emphasized by Bosnia is that

nothing was done to implement this legislation, and that no serious measure of prevention was

adopted by the competent public authorities. Madam President, the Respondent’s persistent silence

on these matters is impressive: our opponents ha ve been unable to cite a single significant

document to show that the chain of command was concerned about compliance with the principles

of humanitarian law and that it demanded such compliance from its subordinates, whether in the

19
Rejoinder, p. 568, para. 3.2.2.3. - 13 -

highest reaches of civilian and military leadership or at the grass roots of units operating on the

ground.

15. The absence of serious measures of preven tion could only inspire in the rank and file

perpetrators of genocide a feeling that crimes against the non-Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina

would not be punished, as was noted by a number of international reports and certain judgments of

the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 20. In reality, far from being

prevented, perpetration of the crimes in question was on the contrary advocated and encouraged as

an instrument of ethnic cleansing. The indirect, but highly revealing, evidence of this includes the

promotion within the Yugoslav army of officers in the army of Republika Srpska who were

responsible for military operations culminating in massacres like that of Srebrenica in 1995: the
22

oral pleadings of Bosnia and Herzegovina ha ve provided well documented information on this

subject 21.

16. As we know, the lack of punishment encourag es crime. This is clearly shown by certain

episodes that have already been described in these pleadings. For example, we have already

referred more than once to the confession by a sen ior official of Republika Srpska, Biljana Plasvić,

who testified to the ICTY that although she had i ndeed been aware of alle gations of inhuman and

cruel treatment inflicted on non-Serbs, she had refu sed to believe them and to pursue enquiries: “I

22
refused to accept them or even to investigate”, she admitted . It goes without saying that such an

attitude is the direct opposite of that which s hould be cultivated by the authorities in order to

prevent the commission of crimes.

17. Another highly significant example was c ited by my colleague, LauraDauban, last

23
week . This was the massacre of 7 May 1992, perpetrated at Crkvina by State security operatives

of the FRY, who had murdered 16 civilians held in detention. In the Simić Judgment of 2003, the

ICTY found it proven that a meeting had been held in Belgrade two days later, in the offices of the

Federal Secretariat for National Defence, at whic h high-level officers had been informed of this

20CR 2006/7, p. 41, para. 112.
21
CR 2006/8, p. 39.
22
See above, footnote 11.
23CR 2006/6, p. 10. - 14 -

massacre; but no measures were taken, no reprimands addressed to the perpetrators. From then on,

therefore, all concerned knew very well that no ri sk of punishment would be incurred in the event

that extremely serious crimes of the same nature were committed in the future.

18. Members of the Court, a long list of similar episodes could be compiled, demonstrating a

total lack of preventive measures. I think, though, that it will be enough if I conclude by dwelling

for a moment on the episode which best exemplifi es the climate of total impunity which prevailed

at all levels, with regard to the genocide against the non-Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is

the testimony of General Clark in the Milošovi ć case, which the Deputy Agent of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Phon van den Biesen, referred to last Friday 24. General Clark explained to the
23

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia that he had had a conversation with

Slobodan Milošović, during which he had asked why th e latter had allowed General Mladi ć to kill

so many people at Srebrenica. The reply, as you heard, Members of the Court, was: “Well,

General Clark, I told him not to do it but he didn’t li sten to me.” This is a reply which throws light

on at least three things: first, at the very leasthe President of Serbia knew in advance what was

going to happen at Srebrenica; secondly, he took no steps to prevent General Mladi ć from

perpetrating one of the most terrible massacr es of the post-Second World War era, other ⎯ if it is

to be believed ⎯ than giving vague advice; thirdly, once the massacre had been carried out,

neither PresidentMilošovi ć nor any other authority took any steps whatsoever to censure the

conduct of GeneralMladi ć or to punish him. On the contrary, General Mladi ć’s career was not

jeopardized in any way by the events at Srebrenica.

4. The Respondent’s breach of the obligation to punish

19. Article VI of the Convention stipulates that persons accused of genocide or ancillary acts

must be tried “by a competent tribunal of the Stat e in the territory of which the act was committed,

or by such international penal tribunal as may ha ve jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting

Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction”. There is, therefore, under the 1948 Convention,

a two-tiered system of punishment: national and international. Relative to the latter, it is clear that

the creation in 1993 of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia marked the

24
CR 2006/8, p. 48, para. 33. - 15 -

realization, as far as the territory of the form er Yugoslavia was concerned, of what in 1948 had

been a mere hypothesis, or even a wish. Consequently, the punishment of genocide through the

ICTY must be regarded as being fully in line with the provisions of Article VI of the Convention.

20. Nevertheless, one point needs to be made in this respect. The existence of this Tribunal

and its jurisdiction for the punishment of genocid e in no way absolves the States resulting from the

break-up of the former Yugoslavia of their duty under the 1948 Convention to punish persons who

committed genocide or other acts proscribed by Artic le III through their national legal systems. In

other words, the ICTY cannot be used by Serbia and Montenegro as an alibi or an attenuating

circumstance for its breaches of the obligation to punish as stipulated by the 1948 Convention.
24

21. However, Madam President, Members of the Court, sadly enough, we are bound to note

that no prosecutions have ever been brought in Se rbia and Montenegro against anyone responsible

25
for the crime of genocide or ancillary acts against the non-Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina . Yet

this genocide most definitely took place, it is certainly not a fabrication by Bosnia and

Herzegovina! The ICTY has, moreover, already est ablished this a number of times, at least as far

as the events of 1995 in Srebrenica are concerned. The fact that there have been no prosecutions

for genocide in the Respondent’s courts is theref ore in itself evidence of a serious breach of the

1948 Convention.

22. As for the argument that the Respondent seeks to draw from the language of Article VI,

namely that the obligation to prosecute those r esponsible for genocide falls exclusively upon the

State in whose territory the genocide was committed ⎯ and hence on Bosnia and Herzegovina but

not on Serbia ⎯ it is without merit, for at least two reasons.

23. First, as I indicated earlier, the territoryin which the genocide wa s perpetrated was, at

that crucial time, under the effective control of the FRY. For the purposes of punishment, the

territory should consequently be assimilated to th at of the Respondent, thereby activating Serbia

and Montenegro’s obligation to bring before its own courts the persons accused of the genocide

committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

25
On the prosecution of international crimeSerbia and Montenegro since 1995 see OSCE ⎯ Mission to
Serbia and Montenegro, War Crimes before Domestic Courts, Belgrade, 2003, pp. 10-14. - 16 -

24. Second, the “ancillary” acts, such as the c onspiracy to commit genocide, incitement to

and complicity in the crime were undoubtedly committed in the Respondent’s territory strictu

sensu. Hence there is an obligation to punish those responsible.

25. Madam President, there can be no doubt th at the Respondent has most definitely not

fulfilled its obligation to punish, as enshrined in the 1948Convention. Nor, for that matter ⎯ it

must be said ⎯ has it fulfilled satisfactorily its obligation to punish the other “core crimes”, that is

to say the war crimes and crimes against human ity committed by its agents in Bosnia and

Herzegovina between 1991 and 1995, as has been not ed countless times by, for example, the

Human Rights Committee, the OSCE, the President and Chief Prosecutor of the International
25

Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, etc. It is true, however, that the issue of the

punishment of these other international crimes, th at is to say the war crimes and crimes against

humanity, does not fall within your Court’s juri sdiction, since they are not covered by the

1948Convention. It is nevertheless worth q uoting the assessment made in 2004 by the Human

Rights Committee regarding Serbia and Montenegro , because this assessment in fact encompasses

all of the serious breaches of human rights, including genocide. The Committee reported:

“The Committee is concerned at the pe rsistence of impunity for serious human
rights violations, both before and after the changes of October 2000. Although the
Committee appreciates the declared policy of the State party to carry out

investigations and to prosecute perpetrators of past human rights violations, it regrets
the scarcity of serious investigations leading to prosecutions and sentences
commensurate with the gravity of the crimes committed.” 26

26. As for the other means of fulfilling its obliga tion to punish genocide, that is to say full

co-operation with the ICTY, we only have to read , Madam President, the re ports submitted to the

Security Council each year by the President and Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY to see that this

co-operation, having been practically non-existent up to the end of the millennium, has nonetheless

remained reluctant, tardy and incomplete, notably with respect to genocide, despite the appreciable

improvement resulting from the Respondent’s 11 Ap ril 2002 Federal Law on co-operation with the

ICTY. Very recent confirmation of this attitude comes from the conclusions of the Council of the

European Union, which, at its 27-28 February 20 06 meeting on the Western Balkans, “noted with

26
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Co mmittee: Serbia and Montenegro, United Nations,
CCPR/CO/81/SEMO (2004). - 17 -

concern recent comments by ICTY Chief Pr osecutor Carla del Ponte about Serbia and

27
Montenegro’s unsatisfactory cooperation with ICTY” . Admittedly, Slobodan Miloševi ć was sent

for trial: it was a brave act to hand him over to the international criminal justice system. But what

I take the liberty of calling the “Mladi ć scandal” unfortunately continues, as indeed does the

26 “Karadžić scandal”: these two individuals enjoy the protection of the leadership of Republika

Srpska, which refuses to comply with the justifie d requests of the international community and of

the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but they also enjoy the Respondent’s protection. With

respect to GeneralMladi ć, the Supreme Defence Council of Serbia and Montenegro just recently,

on 1February last, released the findings of an investigation which established that, until

January 2002, Ratko Mladić had been able to live in various military establishments in Serbia, and

that he continued to benefit from the protection of certain elements within Serbia and Montenegro’s

military.

27. Madam President, Members of the Court, I believe that I have shown you that the

Respondent has, first, seriously breached the obligation to prevent genocide set out in the

1948Convention and, second, has seriously breached and continues to breach the obligation to

punish genocide as required by the same Convention.

28. Madam President, Members of the Court, I have finished my presentation. I respectfully

ask you, Madam President, to give the floor now to Professor Pellet.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Condorelli. I now call Professor Pellet.

Mr. PELLET: Madam President, Members of the Court,

T HE CONSEQUENCES OF THE R ESPONDENT ’S INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

1. The days these hearings opened, on 27February, the Vice-Prime Minister of Serbia and

Montenegro declared: “This is not about the truth, this is about $100 billion of war reparations. I

think that this is all playing with fire.”8 Mr.Labus, with all due respect, is doubly wrong. The

case before you concerns first and foremost a question of truth ⎯ the truth owed to the victims of

27
Council of the European Union, Council conclusioon the Western Balkans, 2712th External Relations
council meeting, Brussels, 27 and 28 February 2006.
2International Herald Tribune, 28 February 2006, p. 3. - 18 -

the genocide perpetrated against the non-Serb pop ulations of Bosnia a nd Herzegovina and, in

particular, but not exclusively, against the Muslims who were unfortunate enough to have lived, for

generations in many cases, in areas which the Serb leadership had decided to “cleanse” and render

ethnically pure; an incontrovertible truth, in judi cial terms, which is owed to the survivors whose
27

parents, children, sisters or brothers have disa ppeared, to those who were tortured, to the women

who were raped, to the men who were victims of sexual abuse, to the hundreds of thousands ⎯ the

millions ⎯ of those forced into exile, traumatized by the brutality of their expulsion, the

confiscation of their property, and who do not da re return to their homes in spite of the

Dayton-Paris Agreements and the demands of the international community 29.

2. Mr. Labus is wrong also because what Bosn ia and Herzegovina is demanding is not war

reparations but reparation for the injury to the vic tims of the genocide and to the Applicant, strictly

commensurate with the link that can be established between the violation ⎯ or violations ⎯ of the

Convention and the injury in question. This injury has not been quantified and we, on this side of

the Court at least, are unable to assess it and have never attempted to do so. For this reason,

Madam President, Bosnia and Herzegovina has c onsistently requested the Court, in accordance

with its customary practice 30, to determine the amount of compensation due in this regard in a

31
subsequent phase of the proceedings .

3. Moreover, Bosnia and Herzegovina will not approach the Court again on this matter

unless it proves necessary to do so. And it is by no means inevitable that this will be the case. As

our Agent will explain to you with more author ity than myself when he concludes our second

round of argument, in April, the Bosnian side, which is motivated by no spirit of revenge or profit,

29
Cf. S/RES/1016 (1995), 21September1995, para.7; S/RES/1031 (1995), 15December1995, para.8;
S/RES/1034 (1995), 2D1ecembe1r995, para4.-5; S/RES/1088 (1996), 1D2ecembe1r996, par1.1;
S/RES/1174 (1998), 15 June 1998, Preamble; S/RES/1247 (1999), 12 June 1999, id.; S/RES/1423 (2002), 12 July 2002,
id.; S/RES/1491 (2003), 11July2003, id.; S/RES/1575 (2004), 22November2004, id.; S/RES/1639 (2005),
21 November 2005, id.; see also A/RES/57/10, 16December2002; A/RES/55/24, 15January 2001; A/RES/53/35,
30 November 1998; A/RES/50/193, 11 March 1996.
30
See for example, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports1949, p. 26;
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974 , p. 204; United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 46;
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1986, pp.142-143 and 149; and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, paras.260-261 and 344. See also Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) ,
I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 81, para. 151.

3See Memorial, p. 294, para. 7; Reply, p. 972, para. 2.7. - 19 -

has the intention, once the legal principles have been accepted, to begin constructive negotiations

with its neighbour, Serbia and Montenegro, with a view to determining what further action

(including financial action) should be taken on the judgment you are to render. It is only if these

28 negotiations fail within a reasonable period of time, which could be set at one year, that Bosnia and

Herzegovina would return to the Court with a re quest that it determine the amount of appropriate

compensation, in accordance with the principles of international law.

4. This could only be done on two conditions. First, such future negotiations have no serious

chance of succeeding unless the two Parties undert ake them in a spirit of open-mindedness and

good faith 32. And without wishing to reopen disputes that we hope lie in the past, it has to be said

that the persistent delaying tactics of our opp onents in the present proceedings constitute an

33
unfortunate precedent . I am thinking in particular, Mada m President, of the unkept promises

made in the letter from the Minister for Foreign A ffairs of Serbia and Montenegro to the President

of the Court, dated 18 January 2001, holding out hope of “the way for finding an amicable solution

to all outstanding controversies” after “a care ful review of Yugoslavia’s position in our cases

pending before the International Court of Justice”. As you know, nothing, strictly nothing, has

happened that could lead Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina to discontinue their proceedings. We

can only hope that the situation will change in the future ⎯ our opponents’ oral pleadings, starting

on Wednesday, will perhaps provide signs of hope along these lines ⎯ and the effect of your

judgment, Members of the Court, can greatly contribute to that objective.

5. The second condition, Madam President, as I said before, is that your judgment should

clearly lay down both the principle of the Res pondent’s responsibility and the legal consequences

to be drawn therefrom, so that the negotiations between the Parties regarding implementation of the

judgment may be based on solid and unequivocal fou ndations. It is for that reason that we thought

it helpful to return to the subject of the conse quences of Serbia and M ontenegro’s responsibility,

which will be declared in your judgment. I sha ll do so relatively briefly, since Bosnia and

Herzegovina has set out those consequences with some precision in its written pleadings 34and the

32
Cf. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of
19 December 2005, para. 261.
33
See the summary of the proceedings in CR 2006/2 (27 Feb. 2006), pp. 22-26, paras. 17-30.
3See Memorial, p. 294, Submissions, paras. 5-7; Reply, Part IV, pp. 867-889. - 20 -

Respondent did not see fit to respond thereto ⎯ no doubt because it does not dispute them on

principle since, mutatis mutandis , the submissions it had itself presented to the Court in its

29 counter-claims, which it has now aban doned, were very similar, in terms of principle, to those of

35
Bosnia and Herzegovina .

6. However, three general observations can be made:

1. genocide, defined as a “crime” by the 1948 Conv ention, constitutes a serious violation of an

obligation arising from a peremptory norm of ge neral international law, and this could have

implications for the consequences of its perpetration;

2. in concrete terms, this doubtless raises more difficult issues ⎯ the violations of the Convention

attributable to the Respondent, which we have attempted to recapitulate and document as fully

as possible, are varied and, in some cases, have specific consequences; lastly,

3. I wish to draw particular attention to an “i ncidental” violation, if I may use that term, from

which Bosnia and Herzegovina also asks the C ourt to draw consequences: the Respondent’s

failure to implement the provisional measures ordered on two occasions in 1993.

7. That will be my final point. Before that, I shall go back over the question of the reparation

due to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the other consequences of the judgment you are to render,

Members of the Court.

I. The reparation due to Bosnia and Herzegovina

8. It is doubtless unnecessary, Madam President, to dwell on the general principles

applicable ⎯ especially since, let me repeat, the Respondent did not challenge them when they

were set out in some detail in the written pleadings of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Besides, they are

well known and uncontroversial. It is therefore sufficient to recall that:

1. the basic principle, enunciated by the PCIJ in the Factory at Chorzów case, “is that reparation

must, as far as possible, wipe out all the con sequences of the illegal act and re-establish the

situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act has not been committed” 3;

35
See Counter-Memorial, p. 1085, paras. 4-6; Rejoinder, p. 665, paras. 4-6.
3Factory at Chorzów, Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47. - 21 -

this basic principle is incorporated in Article 31 of the 2001 Articles of the International Law

Commission;

30 2. pursuant to the provisions of Article 34 of tho se same Articles, “[f]ull reparation for the injury

caused by the internationally wrongful act shall ta ke the form of restitution, compensation and

satisfaction . . .”;

3. inasmuch as making restitution means “to re-est ablish the situation which existed before the

37
wrongful act was committed” ⎯ this being a quotation from the ILC ⎯ it constitutes a prime

means of reparation, since it is, by definition, the one best suited to effectively ensuring full

38
redress for the injury sustained ;

4. however, to the extent that restitutio in integrum proves materially impossible or “out of all

proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation” 3, reparation may

take the form of compensation involving “payme nt of a sum corresponding to the value which

a restitution in kind would bear” 40;

5. and lastly, “[t]he State responsible for an inte rnationally wrongful act is under an obligation to

give satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by

restitution or compensation” 41.

1. Restitutio in integrum

9. In principle, as the ILC stresses in its commentaries to the Articles on State

Responsibility, “[r]estitution, as the first of the form s of reparation, is of particular importance

where the obligation breached... arises unde r a peremptory norm of international law” 42. And

37Article 35 of the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.

38Cf. para.(3) of the Commentary to Article35 of the a bove-mentioned ILC Articles, report of the International
Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third Session, 23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001, A/56/10, p. 257 (and
James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility , Cambridge University Press,

January 2002).
39Articles of the International Law Commission, Art. 35 (b).

40Factory at Chorzów, Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47.

41Articles of the International Law Commission, Article 37, para. 1.
42
Commentary on Article 35 of the Inte rnational Law Commission’s articles, para.(6), (ILC Report on the work
of its Fifty-third Session, 23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001, A/56/10, p. 241 and J. Crawford, op. cit.). See also
para. (3) of the Commentary, ibid., pp. 238-239 and J. Crawford, op. cit.). - 22 -

genocide, as well as the other acts enumerated in Article III of the 1948 Convention, undoubtedly

falls within this category.

31 10. In the present case, however, recourse to this form of redress is precluded by apparently

insurmountable objections:

⎯ in the first place, the physical injury and psyc hological trauma caused to the victims are not ⎯

except, perhaps, in very rare instances as regards the former ⎯ amenable to restitutio in

integrum: the dead cannot be resuscitated, the limbs of amputees and the dignity of male and

female rape victims cannot be restored; human pain and suffering cannot be effaced by legal

awards;

⎯ secondly, as regards damage to property, some pr operty could no doubt be returned: movable

property stolen by the Serbian armed forces and pa ramilitaries, for example; but it is virtually

impossible to prove that such property is in their possession; as regards the rehabilitation of

immovable property, whether religious or cu ltural, public or private, that has been

systematically damaged in the context of the po licy of terror devised by the authorities of the

FRY and implemented by their organs or under th eir control, two factors militate against their

restitution: on the one hand, the facts date back more than ten years now and, fortunately, the

rehabilitation of these properties has largel y been effected under the auspices of the

Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina; more over, the properties are situated in Bosnian

territory and the Applicant does not wish its terri torial sovereignty to be violated, even in

execution of a judgment of the International Court of Justice.

11. Hence, out of necessity ⎯ essentially ⎯ Bosnia and Herzegovina has narrowly opted 43

not to ask you, Members of the Court, to decide that Serbia and Montenegro is under an obligation

to provide restitutio in integrum.

12. For want of restitution, we must therefore turn to compensation.

4See Article 43 (b) of the ILC Articles and the Commentary on that provision (para. 6) (ILC Report on the work
of its Fifty-third Session, 23April-1June andly-10August 2001, A/56/10, pp.304-305, and J.Crawford,op. cit.;

see also para. (11) of the Commentary on Article 35 (ibid., p. 243, and J. Crawford, ibid.). - 23 -

2. Compensation

13. As I said earlier, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not asking the Court to set the amount of

compensation. Indeed, neither this august body, Members of the Court, nor we ourselves have the

necessary information for that pur pose, not even for the purpose of putting forward some idea of

32 the amount. Bosnia and Herzegovina is convinced that this task lends itself more readily to

diplomatic negotiation in good faith, rather than judicial debate, if only because this is undoubtedly

a matter for experts rather than jurists ⎯ provided, however (though these are important

conditions), as I also said before, that the negotiatio n is not too protracted and that it can be based

on a judgment which clearly establishes the applicable legal principles.

14. It seems to us that these should consis t, on the one hand, of an enumeration of

compensable injuries and, on the other, of an indication of the principles applicable to the

calculation of compensation. Bosnia and Her zegovina, for its part, considers that, for both

purposes, the rules contained in the relevant pr ovisions of the ILC articles on State Responsibility

for Internationally Wrongful Acts, although they have not been incorporated in any formal

convention, reflect the generally applicable rules on the subject and certainly constitute a necessary

starting point.

15. As far as compensable injuries are concerned, these comprise both material and moral

44
damage suffered by nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina having been victims of genocide ,

which, in both cases, is “financially assessable.. .including [in the case of the former] loss of

45
profits insofar as it is established” and material injury suffered by territorial and other public

entities as well to the State of Bosnia and Herze govina itself as a result of acts of genocide.

Without being exhaustive, the list includes:

⎯ injury to natural persons caused by the acts enumerated in ArticleII of the Convention,

including the pretium doloris for survivors and dependants of those who were murdered;

⎯ material losses sustained by natural or legal pe rsons, whether public or private, as a result of

the genocidal acts to which they were subject ed (destruction or confiscation of their assets

under the policy of terror which constituted an essential component of the genocide for which

44
Cf. ILC Articles, Art. 31, para. 2.
45
ILC Articles, Art. 36, para. 2. - 24 -

Serbia and Montenegro is responsible, systematic destruction of public, cultural or religious

33 buildings belonging to the groups targeted by the Respondent’s genocidal policy, particularly

mosques and Catholic churches, etc.); and

⎯ the collective injury suffered as a result of the ge nocide (costs arising from the flow of Muslim

and Croatian refugees fleeing “ethnically cleansed ” areas and from the provision of facilities

for them, costs incurred by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in receiving them and

attempting to ease their suffering, including main tenance grants, and the costs of efforts to

oppose the policy of ethnic cleansing conducted by the Respondent on Bosnian territory).

16. There is no need to linger over the princi ples applicable to compensation in the present

case (although Bosnia and Herzegovina respectfully requ ests you to refer to them formally in your

judgment, Members of the Court, so that the Par ties may rely on them in their future negotiations

or, if those negotiations were to fail, in the phase of the present case which will be devoted to an

assessment of injury). Those principles are known and should not really present any particular

problems in this case. It is true that a serious violation of a norm of jus cogens is involved but,

after lengthy deliberations 46, the ILC chose not to hold that this could result in an entitlement to

punitive damages and no such provision is made in Articles 40 and 41, which deal with violations
47
of this kind . Bosnia and Herzegovina therefore respec tfully requests you, Members of the Court,

to indicate the classic basic principles applicab le for the guidance of the Parties in the

implementation of your Judgment. These need in fact be only very general principles, provided

that they enable Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro to negotiate on a sound basis,

in accordance with the fundamental rules of the law of responsibility. With this in mind, it would

be essential for the Court to specify that the co mpensation owed by the Respondent should cover

all financially assessable damage caused by the genocide perpetrated against the non-Serb

populations, particularly the Muslims, of Bosnia an d Herzegovina. I would add that, if the Parties
34

reach an agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina woul d not be opposed to payment on an instalment

46
Yearbook of the International Law Commission , 2000, Vol.1, 2650th-2653rd meeting, 2-8 Aug.2000,
pp. 323-340 and 344-363; 2661st meeting, 16 Aug. 2000, pp. 409-410, paras. 55-76.
47See para. 4 of the commentary on Art. 4 of the ILC Arti cles, ILC Report on the work of its Fifty-third Session,
23 Apr.-1 June and 2 July-10 Aug. 2001, doc.A/56/10, p.85; J.Crawford, op. cit. See also the introduction by
J. Crawford in the same work. - 25 -

basis (which should be reasonable in the light of the amount ultimately agreed), provided that these

were made subject to some form of guarantee.

17. There remains, however, an ancillary prob lem, but one which I wish to raise, Madam

President, even though we consider it to be margin al and, as Luigi Condorelli and myself stressed

yesterday, it only relates to our subsidiary argument, namely the problem of how the compensation

is to be calculated if, as we neither hope and nor believe, you should find that the Respondent is not

the principal perpetrator, but an accomplice to ge nocide. As we consider this outcome to be

unlikely, I shall confine myself to some brief remarks in “telegraphic” form as it were:

1. it is certainly true that, in principle, a Stat e is responsible under international law only for its

own acts;

2. this rule is not, however, absolute and in the Corfu Channel case, for example, the United

Kingdom succeeded in having Albania ordered to pay it the full amount of the compensation

that was due, even though Albania was not r esponsible for the damage, to which it had

contributed only by its negligence 48;

3. in addition, in the instant case, account should cer tainly be taken of the peremptory nature of

the source of the breached obligation; the sa me fundamental reasons which militate against

49
consideration being given to any circumstance precluding wrongfulness lead to the view that

a State cannot take shelter behind the fact that it was “only” the accomplice to a genocide

committed by non-State entities in order to abso lve itself of a share of responsibility;

moreover,

4. as is stated by the author of a well-known work on the international law of responsibility:

“many strong cases of ‘aid and assistance’ will be primarily classifiable as instances of

joint responsibility and it is only in the more marginal cases that a separate category of
delict is called for... [T]he supply of combat units, vehicles, equipment, and
personnel for assisting an aggressor, would constitute a joint responsibility.” 50

35 The same must certainly be true of genocide.

48
See Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, pp.17-18 and 22-23
and Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Assessment of Amount of Comp ensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1949, p. 250.
49
See CR 2006/8, p. 21-22, paras. 31-35; see also CR 2006/10, para. 55.
50Ian Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations ⎯ State Responsibility, Part 1, OUP, 1983, p. 191. - 26 -

3. Satisfaction

18. You will perhaps have noticed, Madam President, that I left out two types of injury when

I listed the kinds of damage for which reparation can be made via compensation:

⎯ moral injuries caused to the applicant State; and

⎯ injuries under two separate heads of responsib ility: incitement to commit genocide and

conspiracy to commit genocide, to say nothing of the consequences of the breaches of

obligations to prevent and punish genocide.

19. This is because, to tell the truth, none of these lend themselves to pecuniary appraisal.

Thus, the reparation sought by Bosnia and Herze govina in respect of these various breaches of the

1948 Convention attributable to the Respondent does not take the form of compensation. As I said

at the beginning of my statement, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not motivated, contrary to the

intentions ascribed to it by some in Serbia and M ontenegro, by any “lure of gain”. Moreover, in

accordance with that spirit, and notwithstanding the gravity of the violation of its rights under the

1948 Convention, Bosnia and Herzegovina is for going any request that you grant it “damages

reflecting the gravity of this infring ement”, as it suggested in its Reply 5. And there is a legal

reason for this: when the Reply was drafted, in early 1998, the ILC had just commenced the

second reading of its draft Articles on State Res ponsibility. The first draft, adopted in 1996,

provided that the injured State could obtain “in cases of gross infringement of the rights of the

injured State, damages reflecting the gravity of the infringement” 52. But, in the Articles it adopted

53
on second reading in 2001, the ILC ⎯ deliberately ⎯ omitted this form of satisfaction and would

even appear to have ruled it out, taking the view that it was, in a sense, punitive damages, which, as
36

I said a little while ago, are not acceptable under contemporary international law.

20. Of course, this does not however mean that Serbia and Montenegro is free of any

obligation to provide satisfaction to Bosnia and He rzegovina in other forms. Given the judicial

context of the present case, the most natural mode of satisfaction, that which springs to mind

51
Pp . 874-875, paras. 11-12.
5Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1993, Art. 10, para. 2 (c), of the draft, p. 76.

5On this point, see the discussion within the Commission, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2000,
Vol.1, 2635th meeting, 9June 2000, p. 180, para.14; 2638th meeting, 12July2000, pp.201-210. See also para.8 of
the commentary to Art.37, report of the ILC on the wo rk of its Fifty-third Session, 23April-1June and
2 July-10 August 2001, doc. A/56/10, p. 268. - 27 -

immediately, also the most common in such circumstances 5, is obviously a formal declaration by

this Court that Serbia and Montenegro has breached its obligations under ArticlesI to V ⎯

inclusive ⎯ of the Convention. This is also what Bosnia and Herzegovina asked of you in its

55
Reply and what it continues to request you to decide in this regard ⎯ yet with a slight nuance. In

its submissions, Bosnia and Herzegovina stated th at it was asking you to adjudge and declare that

the Respondent not only had violated, but also was continuing to violate, those provisions. As we

have said repeatedly during these hearings, this last request does not correspond with reality

today ⎯ except, but this is an important point, in respect of the obligation to punish, which, as we

are sorry to observe ⎯ Luigi Condorelli has just spoken to you about this ⎯ is still today largely

ignored by the Respondent.

21. Members of the Court, in its Reply Bosn ia and Herzegovina also asked you, under the

heading “satisfaction”, to decide that the Res pondent must in fact punish the individuals

responsible for genocide and the other acts listed in Article III of the Convention, including those at

the most senior levels, and to that end must co- operate with the International Criminal Tribunal for

the former Yugoslavia. It is still asking this of you as well but ⎯ even though this might be

nothing more than an academic point, without any real practical significance (although rigorous

classifications are always useful for lawyers) ⎯ it seems to me that these requests lie more within

the ambit of the other consequences of Serbia a nd Montenegro’s responsibility. I wonder, Madam

President, if this would not be a good time for the break.

37 The PRESIDENT: Yes, I think it might be, Professor Pellet. The Court will rise for

10 minutes.

The Court adjourned from 11.15 to 11.25 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated.

54
See para.6 of the Commentary to Art.37 of the ILC Artic les, report of the ILC on the work of its Fifty-third
Session, 23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001, doc. A/56/10, pp. 266-267; J. Crawford, op. cit., pp. 280-281.
55P. 874, para. 9; Submissions, p. 972, paras. 7.1-7.4. - 28 -

Mr. PELLET: Madam President, before the break I said that I would, after speaking about

reparation in the strict sense, address the ot her consequences of Serbia and Montenegro’s

responsibility.

II. Other consequences of Serbia and Montenegro’s responsibility

R22s.ponsibility ⎯ that is to say, the whole set of consequences deriving from an

internationally wrongful act 56 ⎯ is not reflected solely in an ob ligation to make reparation, even

though it is too often reduced to that. Thus, th e ILC Articles on State Responsibility, even before

referring to reparation, lay down, in two brief Artic les, three other principles under which the State

responsible for an internationally wrongful act is required:

⎯ to perform the obligation breached 5;

⎯ to cease the internationally wrongful act if it is continuing 5; and

59
⎯ “to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require”

(although I for one am rather tempted to see these as merely a form of satisfaction).

1. Cessation of the violation of the obligation to punish

23. As I said just a few moments ago, Madam President, Serbia and Montenegro has by now

ceased to violate the 1948Convention and it app ears unnecessary to dwell on the obligation to

cease the violations giving rise to its responsibility in the present case or to point out that it is still

38 under a duty to perform it ⎯ except to note in passing that, while it claimed to accede to the

Convention on 6 March 2001 60, it has always been, and continues to be, bound by its conventional

obligations.

24. All the same, as I have said as well, although the Respondent has by now ceased most of

its breaches of the Convention, there is one, as Lu igi Condorelli has just shown, which it continues

56
See Roberto Ago, “Third Report on State Responsibility”, Yearbook of the International Law Commission ,
1971, Vol. II, Part One, p. 208, para. 36; see also Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1975, Vol. II, p. 178.
5Art. 29.

5Art. 30 (a).

5Art. 30 (b).
60
Note of the Secretary-General, doc. LA 41 TR/221/1 (4-1), 21 March 2001. See also Application for Revision
of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and
Herzegovina), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, pp. 24-25, para. 52. - 29 -

to commit: it is failing to perform, or practically failing ⎯ in any event its performance is very

incomplete ⎯ its obligation to punish, despite the form al commitment entered into by it in this

respect under ArticleI and the provisions of ArticlesIV to VI. Accordingly, Bosnia and

Herzegovina continues to request the Court to find that Serbia and Montenegro not only has

violated, but continues to violate, the Convention by failing to comply with its obligation to punish

the acts of genocide and the other acts listed in Article III (b), (c), (d) and (e) and to penalize their

perpetrators.

25. This judicial declaration is all the more urgent, since, as ProfessorCondorelli has

explained, Serbia and Montenegro has to date proved unreceptive to the pressing, repeated calls

61
made by United Nations organs, the Security Council in particular . As the Court has stated:

“A binding determination made by a competent organ of the United Nations to
the effect that a situation is illegal cannot remain without consequence. Once the
Court is faced with such a situation, it woul d be failing in the discharge of its judicial

functions if it did not declare that there is an obligation, especially upon Members of
the United Nations, to bring that situation to an end.” 62

2. The guarantees of non-repetition incumbent upon Serbia and Montenegro

26. The second issue which arises, Madam President, in respect of these “other

consequences” is that of the assurances and guarantees of non-repetition which it is incumbent

39 upon the Respondent to offer and, in the present ci rcumstances, upon the Court to order. You,

Members of the Court, undoubtedly have the jurisdiction to do so. In the LaGrand case, you held:

“that a dispute regarding the appropriate remedies for the violation of the Convention
alleged by Germany is a dispute that arises out of the interpretati on or application of
the Convention and thus is within the Court' s jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction exists

over a dispute on a particular matter, no sep arate basis for jurisdiction is required by
the Court to consider the remedies a pa rty has requested for the breach of the
obligation (Factory at Chorzów, P.C.I.J., SeriesA, No.9 , p.22). Consequently, the
Court has jurisdiction in the present case with respect to the fourth submission of
63
Germany.

The same is obviously true in the present case.

61
See S/PRST/2004/28, 4 July 2004; S/RES/1534 (2004), 26 March 2004, para.1; S/RES/1503 (2003),
28August003, para.; S/PRST/2002/39, 18 Decemb er 2002; S/RES/1207 (1998), 17November1998;
S/PRST/1996/23, 8May 1996. See also A/RES/57/10, 16 December 2002. See also the most recent report to the
Security Council by the ICTY Prosecutor, S/PV.5328 (15 December 2005), p. 12.
62
Legal Consequences for States of th e Continued Presence of South Afri ca in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 54, para. 117.
6LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 485, para. 48. - 30 -

27. As the ILC explains, these assurances and guarantees “serve a preventive function and

may be described as a positive reinforcement of future performance” . “They are most commonly

sought when the injured State has reason to believe that the mere restoration of the pre-existing

situation does not protect it satisfactorily” 65. In the present case, Bosnia and Herzegovina

unfortunately has reason so to believe and, given the importance of the obligations in issue and the

gravity of their violation, guarantees are most assuredly imperative.

28. Bosnia and Herzegovina does not deny that the current Serbian-Montenegrin régime is

democratic in character. It is sensitive to th e expressions of partial, belated repentance by the

leaders now in power in Belgrade, of which Luigi Condorelli analysed an example early this

morning. The fact remains that serious threats s till exist and that recent events cannot fail to cause

concern as to whether movements in Serbia a nd Montenegro calling for genocide have truly

disappeared. Just a few examples, Madam President, if you would allow me:

⎯ the Socialist Party and the Serbian Radical Party together polled some 25 per cent of the vote in

the most recent elections; they are led de facto by Milošević and Šešelj respectively, from their

prison cells;

40 ⎯ on 17 May 2005 a well-established student association (“Nomokanon”) held a debate at the law

faculty of Belgrade on the subject “the trut h about Srebrenica”; this so-called debate

showed ⎯ according to a BBC report ⎯ that “no crime at all took place and that the victims

were soldiers of the Muslim army sacrificed by Alija Izetbegovi ć to provoke a foreign military

66
intervention” ⎯ that, Madam President, is called revisionism;

⎯ one more, final, example, a very recent one (but we could unfortunately provide many

more) ⎯ I am sorry, that was not the BBC just now ⎯: “About 10,000 Serbian Radical Party

(SRS) supporters rallied in the Serb capital chanting slogans and carrying pictures of

67
General Mladić” ⎯ that happened on 26February last; Mladi ć is wanted by the ICTY for

64
Para.1 of the Commentary to Article30 (Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its
Fifty-third Session, 23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001, A/56/10, p. 216 and J. Crawford, op. cit., p. 235).
65
Para. 9 of the same Commentary (ibid., p. 219 and J. Crawford, ibid., p. 237).
66
http://cm.greekhelsinki.gr/index.php?sec=194&cid=684 ⎯ website visited on 6 March 2006.
6http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4749420.stm, website visited on 6 March 2006. - 31 -

68
genocide; since 1998 he has lived in Belgrade , where he received his military pay in the

normal way at least until 2002 69and his pension until 2005; th e Serbian authorities refuse to

surrender him to the Tribunal.

29. The fact that the Serbian authorities are not arresting the key players in the atrocities

committed in the dark years of genocide hard ly augurs well for strict compliance with the

Convention in the future.

30. Similarly, the Respondent’s delaying tacti cs before this Court, its haughty disregard of

the Orders indicating provisional measures in 1993 ⎯ disregard to which I shall return in a

moment, its constant denial of your jurisdiction in defiance of the principle of res judicata, do not

really reassure the Bosnian authorities as to its commitment to the “purely humanitarian and

civilizing purpose” of the Convention and to the “high purposes which are [its] raison d’être 70.

31. If there is a case in which guarantees of non-repetition are essential, it is surely the one

which concerns us, owing both to the importance of the obligations in issue and the persistent risks

that they will not be fulfilled by the Respondent.

41 32. That said, Madam President, it has to be recognized that, whenever the subject of

assurances and guarantees of non-repetition comes up, lawyers wonder what they really consist of,

as they are more a matter, at least in the current case, of a state of mind and a political context ⎯

especially since there is no very solid precedent.

⎯ In the LaGrand case, the Court considered that the unde rtaking given by the United States to

carry on with its vast educational programme concerning consular rights of foreigners met

71
“Germany’s request for a general assurance of non-repetition” , but, in respect of the more

specific assurances sought by Germany, the Co urt went no further than rather general

considerations, stating: “The choice of means must be left to the United States.” 72

6CR 2006/8 (Pellet), p. 19, para. 26.
69
See Le Monde , 30 December 2005, http://www.le monde.fr/web/imprimer_element/
0,40-0@2-3214,50-725750,0.html, website visited on 5 March 2006.
70
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion,
I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23.
7LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 513, para. 124.

7Ibid., p. 514, para. 125. - 32 -

⎯ In the Avena case, the Court confined itself to stating that what it had said in the LaGrand

Judgment remained applicable and was sufficient to meet a similar request by Mexico . 73

⎯ Finally, in its recent Judgment of 19 December 2005, the Court expressed its view that:

“the commitments assumed by Uganda under the Tripartite Agreement must be

regarded as meeting the DRC’s request for specific guarantees and assurances of
non-repetition. The Court expects and dema nds that the Parties will respect and
adhere to their obligations under that Agreement and under ge neral international
74
law.”

33. This jurisprudence, sparse though it may be, does nevertheless provide some guidance.

If Serbia and Montenegro were, in the course of the coming hearings, to offer formal assurances

that it undertakes, for the future, fully to resp ect the obligations arising under the Convention,

Bosnia and Herzegovina would ask you, Members of the Court, to place that on record in very firm

terms, of which the Judgment of last December o ffers a striking example. If such is not the case,

Bosnia and Herzegovina will de fer to the Court to find the wording apt to encourage the

42 Respondent to fulfil its obligation to offer ge nuine guarantees of non-repetition of any violation

whatsoever of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

III. The Respondent’s non-compliance with the Orders indicating provisional measures

34. We have still not completed, Madam Presi dent, the long list of obligations incumbent

upon Serbia and Montenegro in the present case, and with which it did not comply. There is a

further matter: the Respondent did not fulfil the obligations imposed upon it by this Court in the

75
two Orders indicating provisional measures , thereby once again engaging its international

responsibility.

35. I would like to make it clear, Members of the Court, that in asking you to rule on this

matter, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not seeking to extend your jurisdiction beyond that accorded to

7Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004 ,

p. 69, para. 150.
7Armed Activities on the Terr itory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the v. Uganda), Judgment of
19 December 2005, para. 257.

7Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Request for the Indicati on of Provisional Measur es, Order of 8April1993 ,
I.C.J Reports 1993, p. 3 and ibid., Order of 13 September 1993, I.C.J Reports 1993, p. 325. - 33 -

you by the 1948 Convention, or to obtain more than its due pursuant to the general principles of

State responsibility in international law that I have shown to apply to breaches of the Convention . 76

36. This request is in line with the Court’s approach in its Judgment in the LaGrand case,

where it held that the submissions relative to non-compliance with provisional measures concerned

77
“the issues arising directly out of the dis pute between the two parties before the Court” . At the

time, the Court reaffirmed:

“what it said in its Judgment in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, where it declared that
in order to consider the dispute in all its aspects, it may also deal with a submission

that "is one based on facts subsequent to the filing of the Application, but arising
directly out of the question which is the subj ect-matter of that Application. As such it
falls within the scope of the Court's jurisdiction...” ( Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal

Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974 , p.203,
para. 72.) Where the Court has jurisdiction to decide a case, it also has jurisdiction to
deal with submissions requesting it to determine that an order indicating measures

which seeks to preserve the rights of the Parties to this dispute has not been complied
with.” 78

43 37. In the present instance, the Respondent fa iled to comply with its obligations under the

1993Orders, whose measures were undoubtedly of a binding nature. The issue of the legal

consequences of those breaches must therefore be addressed.

1. The breach by the Respondent of the binding measures indicated by the 1993 Orders
79
38. Madam President, as we know, since the LaGrand Judgment of 2001 in any event,

provisional measures indicated by the Court pursuant to Article 41 of its Statute are binding ⎯ or

in any case can be ⎯ on the party or parties to which they are addressed. In the present case, the

Court indicated such measures on two occasions in 1993. In both instances, the Court adopted or

reiterated a measure addressed to both Parties and two others specifically intended for the

Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia alone.

7CR 2006/8, p. 27, para. 48.
77
LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J Reports 2001, p. 483, para. 45.
78
Ibid., p. 484, para 46.
7Ibid., p. 466. - 34 -

39. Those measures were legally binding. In the LaGrand case, the Court categorically

stated, in paragraph109 of its Judgment, that “orders on provisional measures under Article41

80
have binding effect” . Those indicated in 1993 were no exception.

40. In its initial Order, of 8 April 1993, the Court, unanimously, decided that

“[t]he Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
should immediately, in pursuance of its undertaking in the Convention on the

Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9December1948, take 81l
measures within its power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide” .

More specifically, and by 13 votes to one, the Court further stated that:

“[t]he Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
should in particular ensure that any military , paramilitary or irregular armed units

which may be directed or supported by it, as well as any organizations and persons
44 which may be subject to its control, direc tion or influence, do not commit any acts of
genocide, of conspiracy to commit genocid e, of direct and public incitement to

commit genocide, or of complicity in genocide, whether directed against the Muslim
population of Bosnia and Herzegovina or against any other national, ethnical, racial or
religious group” .82

The Court further requested both Parties, using more traditional language, to avoid doing anything

to aggravate or extend the dispute, or render its solution more difficult. 83

41. The very firm language used by the Cour t showed that this was no mere exhortation.

The Yugoslav Government “ should immediately . . . take all measures within its power to prevent

commission of the crime of genocide”; it “ should in particular ensure” that none of the acts

punishable under Article III of the Convention is committed “against the Muslim population . . . or

against any other national, ethnical, racial or religious group”. These were, Madam President, very

specific measures, as to which there can be no doubt of their binding effect.

42. The Respondent blithely ignored them ⎯ just as it ignored the requests (possibly not

per se binding) addressed by the President of the Court to the Parties on 5August1993, calling

80
LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001 , p.506, para.109. See also
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria; Equitorial Guinea intervening),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 453, para. 321, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, para. 263.
81
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Request for the Indicati on of Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993 ,
I.C.J Reports 1993, p. 24, para. 52 A (1) (emphasis added).
82
Ibid., p. 24, para. 52 A (2) (emphasis added).
83Ibid., p. 24, paras. 52 A (1) and 52 A (2) (emphasis added). - 35 -

84
upon them to comply with the measures indicated in April which, he stressed, “still apply” . This

is not simply our assertion, nor a mere inferen ce from the evidence submitted to the Court by

Bosnia and Herzegovina in its written and oral pl eadings. In effect the second Order made in the

same case on 13 September 1993 ⎯ the only time this has happened in the history of the Court ⎯

simply reaffirmed, by very large majorities ( 14votes to one or 13votes to two), the measures

85
previously indicated ; nevertheless, it constitutes, precisely because it was simply a reaffirmation,

manifest evidence of the non-compliance of Serbia and Montenegro with the initial Order.

43. Moreover, the reasoning of the 13 September 1993 Order dispels all doubt that the Court

45 was convinced of this fact. After noting that additional provisional measures can be requested only

if they apply to “new circumstances such as to justify their being examined”, the Court concluded

that “this condition should be regarded as satisfied” 86. However, in the Court’s opinion “the

present perilous situation demand[ed], not an indication of provisional measures additional to those

indicated by the Court'sOrder of 8April1993. .. but immediate and effective implementation of

87
those measures” . It explained its position as follows:

“since the Order of 8 April 1993 was made, and despite that Order, and despite many
resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations, great suffering and loss of

life has been sustained by the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina in circumstances
which shock the conscience of mankind and flagrantly conflict with moral law and the
spirit and aims of the United Nations” . 88

The Court further stated:

“the grave risk which the Court then apprehende d of action being taken which may
aggravate or extend the existing dispute over the prevention and punishment of the
crime of genocide, or render it more difficult of solution, has been deepened by the

persistence of conflicts on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the commission of
heinous acts in the course of those conflicts” . 89

Finally, the Court stressed that:

84
See Application of the Conven tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of
13 September 1993, I.C.J Reports 1993, p. 334, para. 10.
85
Ibid., pp. 349-350, para. 61.
86
Ibid., p. 337, para. 22.
87Ibid., p. 349, para. 59.

88Ibid., p. 348, para. 52 (emphasis added).

89Ibid., p. 348, para. 53, (emphasis added). - 36 -

“while taking into account, inter alia, the replies of the two Parties to a question put to

them at the hearings as to what steps had been taken by them ‘to ensure compliance
with the Court’s Order of 8April1993’, [it] is not satisfied that all that might have
been done has been done to prevent comm ission of the crime of genocide in the

territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to en sure that no action is taken which may
aggravate or extend the existing dispute or render it more difficult of solution” . 90

44. The Respondent will undoubtedly object that it is not cited by name in these findings.

True, but it was in the measures issued in April. And the Court rejected from the outset a request

by the FRY aimed at “a more specific indicati on of measures addressed to Bosnia-Herzegovina”,

which it felt was unnecessary, given, it stressed , the circumstances “as they now present

themselves” . It was therefore Yugoslavia’s non-compliance with its obligations under the April
46

Order that prompted the Court to reiterate the meas ures that it had instructed the former to take:

damning evidence that the initial Order had not been acted upon.

45. Unfortunately, Madam President, this had no effect. No measures were, of course, taken

to ensure compliance with the Court’s Orders. Th e facts that we have presented to you over recent

days speak for themselves, and it would be of little purpose for me to list the instances that prove

that Serbia and Montenegro never took the Court’s “indication seriously into account” 92. It is up to

you, therefore, Members of the Court, to recognize this and to address:

2. The consequences of breaches of the provisional measures

46. There can be no doubt that the Respondent’s non-compliance with the measures

indicated by the Court on two separate occasions constitutes an internationally wrongful act,

distinct from the others that engage its internati onal responsibility in the present case. It gives rise

to a sort of “incidental” responsibility, which cl early cannot be subsumed in that resulting from the

multiple breaches of the Convention, but is closel y bound up with that primary responsibility, thus

raising difficult issues as to its precise nature ⎯ if nothing else under the principle of non bis in

idem.

47. Madam President, the cessation or resumption of the violation are not matters which I

will address: in any event, the obligations upon the Respondent will have lapsed after your final

90
Ibid., p. 349, para. 57.
91Ibid., p. 347, para. 46.

92Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 144, para. 289, quoted in the Order of 13 September 1993, I.C.J Reports 1993 , p. 349,
para. 58. - 37 -

judgment, as is implied by paragraph2 of Artic le41 of the Statute and as you held in your

93
Judgment in the Avena case . This applies a fortiori to assurances and guarantees of

non-repetition.

48. With respect to compensation, in the LaGrand case the Court clearly accepted that this

possibility existed, since it indicated that it would have taken a number of factors into

94
“consideration had Germany’s submission included a claim for indemnification” ⎯ which it did

not. Moreover, compensation for the responsibility resulting from non-compliance by a party with
47

measures under an Order indicating provisional meas ures would seem to require that the measures

concerned be highly specific and involve something additional to the obligations whose breach is

the subject-matter of the dispute. However, this was not what the Court did in its 1993Orders:

rather, the Court firmly reminded the FRY of its obligations under the 1948Convention. In this

respect, the breaches of obligations resulting from the Orders cannot in truth be readily

distinguished from the breaches of the Convention itself, and any indemnification for them would

be redundant in view of the compensation due to Bosnia and Herzegovina for the breaches of the

latter. The non bis in idem principle clearly argues against this.

49. The same considerations apply to res titution: it is difficult to see what possible

“restitution” there could be: the harm has been done; even this Court does not possess the key to a

time machine. That only leaves satisfaction ⎯ which in itself would be enough, but it again raises

the issue of the form which it would take.

50. In the only two cases in which the Court has upheld a submission concerning

non-compliance with an Order indicating provisio nal measures, it confined itself to a simple

declaration to this effect ⎯ although the declaration was included in the operative part of the

95
Judgment .

51. The Respondent’s conduct certainly requires a clear finding on your part, and this is an

opportunity, not just to reaffirm the importance of the provisional measures indicated by the Court,

93
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) , Judgment of 31March2004,
para. 152.
94
LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 508, para. 116.
9Ibid., p. 516, para. 128.5. See also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, para. 345.7. - 38 -

and their binding effect, but also to establish beyond all doubt that Serbia and Montenegro did not

comply with the measures that you addressed to it on two separate occasions.

52. This is particularly important in the pr esent case, since, as the Court emphasized in its

initial Order of 8April1993 96 and repeated in that of 13September of the same year 97, citing

48 General Assembly resolution 96 (I) on “the Crime of Genocide” of 11 December 1946: “the crime

of genocide ‘shocks the conscience of mankind, r esults in great losses to humanity... and is

98
contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations’” .

53. That is also, Members of the Court, the real reason why Bosnia and Herzegovina

requests you to go beyond a mere declaration and to demonstrate the gravity of the Respondent’s

conduct by the award of what, at first reading in 1996, Article 45 of the ILC Draft Articles on State

Responsibility termed “symbolic damages”. Ar ticle37 of the final version of 2001 was less

specific, and no longer referred to this possibility as such, providing only that “[s]atisfaction may

consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another

appropriate modality”, among which the commentary mentions “the award of symbolic damages

99
for non-pecuniary injury” , of which it provides some examples.

54. It goes without saying, Madam President, that Bosnia and Herzegovina will leave it

entirely to the discretion of the Court to determine the level of symbolic damages.

55. The reason that we propose this to you, Memb ers of the Court, is largely self-evident. In

our opinion, when the Court informs a State, in firm terms, that it has to comply with one of the

most fundamental, the most imperative and sacred obligations ⎯ possibly the most important in all

of contemporary international law: the prohibi tion of genocide; when it indicates concrete

measures which that State must take, and the State concerned not only does nothing ⎯ nothing

whatever ⎯ to comply with its obligations, but continu es to perpetrate genocide, the Court has no

96I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 23, para. 49.

97Ibid., p. 348, para. 51.
98
See also Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23 or Application of the Convention on the Pre vention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996,
p. 616, para. 31 and Armed Activities on the Te rritory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Conv. Uganda)
Judgment of 19 December 2005, para. 64.

99Paragraph 5 of the Commentary (Report of the In ternational Law Commissi on, Fifty-third session
23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001, A/56/10, p. 265 and Crawford, op. cit.). - 39 -

option but to address the conseque nces of the scale of the breac⎯ albeit in a purely symbolic

manner ⎯ rather than to respond simply as it would to any “ordinary” internationally wrongful act.

56. Madam President, a breach of internati onal law by a State is always deplorable ⎯ but to

commit genocide, to take no steps to prevent it, to in cite it, to make plans to that end and to refrain

49
from prosecuting the individuals guilty of the crime, is a different matter; it is the gravest of grave

breaches. This clearly has to be borne in mind when addressing the consequences of the resultant

responsibility. Bosnia and Herzegovina is convinced that you will do just that.

Members of the Court, I thank you very mu ch for your attention. And I ask you, Madam

President, to give the floor to my highly respect ed colleague and friend, Professor Thomas Franck.

Thank you very much, Madam President.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Pellet. I call Professor Franck.

Le PRESIDENT : Je remercie M. Pellet. Je donne la parole à M. Franck.

M. FRANCK : Merci beaucoup, Madame le président.

L’ IMPORTANCE QUE CONSERVENT LES DECISIONS PRISES PAR LA COUR INTERNATIONALE
DE J USTICE EN VERTU DE L ’ARTICLE IX DE LA CONVENTION SUR LE GENOCIDE

1. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, nous avons fait faire à la Cour un parcours très

long et très pénible à travers les faits sur lesquels repose notre thèse, à savoir que la Bosnie, au

cours de la période critique qui a immédiatem ent suivi son accession à l’indépendance et son

admission à l’ONU, a été victime d’un génocide brutal.

2. Nous nous sommes d’abord efforcés de démontrer que ces événements indéniables

s’étaient produits grâce au concours actif des autrités de Belgrade, le gouvernement d’un Etat

voisin. Nous avons ensuite développé les élémen ts qui prouvent l’imputabilité de ces faits à ce

gouvernement.

3. Nous avons invité la Cour à examiner nos preuves, en tena nt compte de la crédibilité de

leurs sources, notamment celles provenant d es organes principaux de l’ONU et de leurs

rapporteurs, du Secrétaire général et des décisions du TPIY. Lorsque le défendeur s’est obstiné à

retenir des éléments de preuve ou à ne les comm uniquer au TPIY qu’à la condition qu’ils ne soient - 40 -

pas divulgués dans le cadre de la présente instan ce, nous vous avons priés d’en tirer les seules

conclusions possibles ⎯d’autant plus que les passages supprimés semblent avoir trait aux

discussions sur les modalités du soutien et de l’aide apportés à la Republika Srpska, son

gouvernement, son économie et son armée.

4. Nous avons établi le fondement juridique de la responsabilité du défendeur pour génocide,

entente en vue de commettre un génocide et co mplicité de génocide, et démontré que, en ne

prévenant pas et en ne réprimant pas ces actes, et en ne traduisant pas devant le TPIY les personnes

mises en accusation, il avait également engagé sa responsabilité.

50 5. Nous avons démontré que les Etats parties à la convention sur le génocide voulaient créer,

et ont effectivement créé, un moyen de remédier à l’avenir à toute résurgence de ce fléau qu’est le

génocide. C’est ce qu’ils ont fait en rédigeant l’ articleIX de la conve ntion, qui prévoit de

soumettre ces différends à la Cour.

6. Le Gouvernement de la Bosnie, au nom des centaines de milliers d’habitants tués, torturés,

violés et déplacés à jamais, n’a-t-il pas mérité le dr oit de présenter la requête visée à l’article IX ?

Et l’articleIX ne précise-t-il pas que la Cour répondra à cette requête et ce, en se prononçant sur

«la responsabilité d’un Etat en matière de génocide» ?

7. La réponse à ces questions ne devrait pas dépasser nos capacités d’interprétation des

traités.

8. Le droit évolue cependant, et la conventi on sur le génocide a presque cinquante-cinq ans.

Beaucoup d’eau a coulé sous les ponts. Alors qu’ on le pensait définitivement éliminé de la

panoplie des moyens dont dispose l’homme pour faire le mal, le génocide revient comme

instrument délibéré de mise en Œuvre d’une politique : au Rwanda, en Croatie et, eh bien oui, en

Bosnie.

9. Vous êtes donc saisis d’un «différend» que vous êtes invités à trancher en vous

prononçant sur les responsabilités.

10. Et pourtant, certains voudront peut-être s outenir que cette responsabilité a perdu de son

importance en raison des faits nouv eaux survenus depuis l’entrée en vigueur de la convention,

notamment l’événement capital que constitue la cr éation de juridictions pénales chargées de

réprimer certains crimes internationaux commis pa r des individus, dont le génocide. Maintenant - 41 -

qu’existent les Tribunaux pénaux in ternationaux pour l’ex-Yougoslavi e et le Rwanda et la Cour

pénale internationale, chacune de ces juridictions disposant de pouvoirs étendus d’enquête et de

poursuite, est-il vraiment toujours utile et nécessaire que la Cour internationa le de Justice joue le

rôle que lui a confié l’articleIX de la conven tion sur le génocide en matière d’établissement des

responsabilités ? C’est là, au fond, une question de politique juridique, ou judiciaire.

11. C’est cette même question que deux juges de la Cour ont soulevée en 1996, au cours de

la phase de la présente instance consacrée aux ex ceptions préliminaires et, par égard pour eux et

pour tous les autres qui pourraient se poser la mê me question, il nous faut consacrer quelques-uns

des derniers instants du premier tour de nos plaidoiries à essayer d’y répondre.

51 12. Dans une déclaration commune join te à l’arrêt rendu en 1996 par la Cour,

MM. les juges Shi et Vereshchetin se sont penchés sur la création et le rôle du TPIY et de la CPI,

ainsi que sur les répercussions de ces éléments nouveaux sur la présente affaire. Voici ce qu’ils ont

notamment dit :

«La détermination de la communauté inte rnationale à voir les individus auteurs
d’actes de génocide traduits en justice, quelle que soit leur origine ethnique ou la
position qu’ils occupent, montre la meilleure manière d’envisager la question.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Donc, à notre avis, la Cour interna tionale de Justice n’est peut-être pas

l’instance appropriée pour s100rononcer sur les griefs formulés par la Partie requérante
en la présente instance…»

13. Quant aux raisons pour lesquelles la Cour ne serait peut-être plus la juridiction

appropriée, les deux juges citaient un article publié peu auparavant par sirHartley Shawcross, qui

avait été le procureur général britannique aux pro cès des criminels de guerre de Nuremberg. Dans

cet article, auquel les deux juges adhéraient, ce dern ier exprimait ainsi son opinion : «[i]l ne peut y

avoir de réconciliation tant que la culpabilité individuelle pour les crimes horribles commis au

cours des dernières années ne remplacera pas la théorie pernicieuse de la responsabilité collective

qui nourrit tant de haines raciales». MM. Shi et Vereshchetin, dans leur déclaration commune,

semblent donc envisager la possibilité que la Bosnie souhaite, par la présente instance, que la Cour

100
Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine
c. Serbie-et-Monténégro), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 632. - 42 -

établisse la «responsabilité collective» du défende ur et, de ce fait, la culpabilité collective du

peuple serbe.

14. Il nous faut consacrer quelques minutes à l’examen de ces idées, même si elles

n’émanent pas de la majorité des juges. La C our, en assumant la responsabilité qui lui incombe en

vertu de l’article IX d’établir la «responsabilité» d’un Etat pour génocide, risque-t-elle de perpétuer

l’idée de «culpabilité collective» ?

15. A vrai dire, ce sont deux questions c onnexes de politique juridique qu’il nous faut

examiner: la première est de savoir si une in stance devant la Cour ferait double emploi avec les

instances devant le TPIY et la seconde, de savoir si l’instance que nous avons introduite risque de

perpétuer l’idée d’une culpabilité co llective. La première question ⎯ y a-t-il double emploi entre

les fonctions de la Cour et celles du TPIY ? ⎯ a déjà été abordée par M. Pellet vendredi dernier.

16. Il est tout à fait clair que les rédacteurs de la convention sur le génocide entendaient

prévoir à la fois des sanctions pour les individus qui participent à une entreprise de génocide et la

responsabilité de l’Etat qui affecte les structures et ressources de la nation à cette entreprise. Les

52 articlesIV, V et VI de la convention établissen t les modalités de sanction des individus auteurs

d’un génocide, tandis que l’articleIX prévoit para llèlement de quelle manière la CIJ pourra se

prononcer sur la responsabilité des Etats. De toute évidence, les rédacteurs estimaient que les deux

recours étaient distincts, qu’ils ne faisaient pas double emploi et qu’ils étaient tous deux nécessaires

à la mise en place d’un dispositif efficace permettant de débarrasser le monde de ce fléau qu’est le

génocide.

17. Mais la création d’un dispositif internati onal permettant de statuer sur la responsabilité

pénale des individus réduit-il d’une quelconque manière l’importance du rôle dévolu à la Cour pour

statuer sur la responsabilité des Etats en matière de génocide ? Non : ce n’est que la concrétisation

de l’éventualité prévue par l’article VI de la convention, à savoir la création d’une «cour criminelle

internationale» pour juger les «personnes», au lieu que celles-ci soient jugées «devant les tribunaux

compétents de l’Etat sur le territoire duquel l’acte a été commis». C’est donc plutôt la compétence

des tribunaux pénaux nationaux que la convention projetait de compléter ou de remplacer grâce à

la nouvelle cour criminelle internationale, s’ agissant de juger les individus; elle n’avait - 43 -

certainement pas prévu d’effet comparable sur la compétence de la Cour, ni sur l’importance du

rôle de celle-ci, s’agissant de statuer sur la responsabilité des Etats.
101
18. Cela ne semble pas clair à la Partie adverse qui, dans sa duplique , nous défie de «citer

les dispositions de la convention sur le génocide envisageant l’Etat en tant qu’auteur de génocide».

Il semble donc bien que la Cour a toujours un rô le important à jouer : expliquer, non seulement au

défendeur, mais aussi aux gouvern ements du monde entier, qu’il existe bel et bien une

responsabilité de l’Etat pour génocide et que, en outre, la convention donne à la Cour les pouvoirs

nécessaires ⎯des pouvoirs qu’elle exercera ⎯ pour déterminer si un Etat a engagé sa

responsabilité pour violation de la convention.

19. La seconde question est de savoir si statue r sur cette responsabilité de l’Etat équivaut à

établir une «culpabilité collective».

20. La réponse est un «non» catégorique.

21. Nous admettons que faire porter à un peuple entier, à la population d’un Etat, la

responsabilité de faits dont ce de rnier est l’auteur reviendrai t à appuyer l’idée décriée de

«culpabilité collective». Nous nous félicitons de la naissance d’un corps de règles en matière de

droits de l’homme qui reconnaissent que les droits des individus sont distincts de ceux de l’Etat,

voire parfois opposés à ceux-ci. Nous constatons et saluons l’apparition d’un système parallèle de

responsabilité juridique personnelle. Et nous soulignons que, en c es temps modernes où droits et

53 obligations sont individuels, il n’est pas ju stifiable de rejeter sur toute la cité ⎯ sur l’ensemble des

citoyens ⎯ la responsabilité des méfaits commis soit par des individus, soit par un gouvernement

criminel.

22. Il est évident que nous n’essayons pas de ressusciter l’idée désuète de culpabilité

collective, de responsabilité de tous les Serbes. Nous reconnaissons volontiers que cette notion de

culpabilité collective n’est que le résidu décrié d’un âge où les indi vidus ne se distinguaient pas

juridiquement de leur souverain ⎯ le roi ou l’Etat ⎯ ou n’en étaient que les serfs. Mais il est tout

aussi évident que, même en cette ère nouvelle où les droits et les responsabilités sont individuels,

l’Etat n’a pas cessé d’exister. Il existe, il agit et il doit rendre des comptes. Quand l’Etat commet

101
22 février 1999, p. 644, par. 4.1.1.2. - 44 -

les pires méfaits, on ne saurait lui permettre de s’exonérer de sa responsabilité en punissant

quelques dirigeants. Comme le souligne l’ouvrage Oppenheim’s International Law,

«les faits illicites dont des individus sont l es auteurs en tant qu’agents de l’Etat
constituent des délits qui engagent de manière distincte la responsabilité du
commettant et celle de l’agent. Ces faits sont directement, et pas seulement

indirectement, imputables à l’Etat qui les a autorisés ou permis, ou qui n’a pris de
mesures raisonnables pour les empêcher ou les réprimer.» 102 [Traduction du Greffe.]

Il y a donc la responsabilité de l’Etat pour fait de génocide et, en même temps mais séparément, sa

responsabilité pour manquement aux «obligations pr éventives et répressives de l’Etat…dont la

violation … engage directement la responsabilité de l’Etat» 10.

23. Ainsi le droit international moderne opère-t-il une distinction entre les actes criminels

d’une personne ⎯qu’elle soit premier ministre, commandant d’opérations sur le terrain, gardien

dans un camp de prisonniers ou chef d’une milice privée ⎯ et le manquement d’un Etat à ses

obligations juridiques envers d’autres Etats. Bien que, dans les deux cas, les griefs puissent émaner

des mêmes faits, ils impliquent la violation d’obl igations entièrement distinctes. Et dans les

circonstances spécifiques du génocide, il doit aussi y avoir des actions distinctes pour la mise en

jeu des deux types de responsabilité.

24. Dans le droit qui constitue le fondement de notre affaire, il ne saurait par conséquent être

question ni de culpabilité collective, ni de double incrimination.

25. Pourtant, au-delà de ces questions juridi ques quelque peu techniques, il en est une autre

de plus grande portée, de nature morale ou politique, sur laquelle je suis convaincu que votre Cour

voudra se pencher dans sa quête d’équité dans sa jurisprudence.

54 26. Est-il juste qu’un Etat tout entier soit tenu pour responsable des actes ordonnés par ses

dirigeants et exécutés par ses institutions ?

27. Si vous concluez que le défendeur a eff ectivement commis un génocide, le fait de tenir

ainsi un Etat pour responsable ne risque-t-il pas d’ imposer la charge de la réparation à l’ensemble

de ses citoyens, qu’ils aient ou non soutenu ou toléré les actes d’un régime qui a été renversé

depuis lors ?

102 e o
Oppenheim’s International Law, 9 éd., p. 501, n 13.
103Ibid., p. 502, par. 145. - 45 -

28. Pour répondre à cette question, il importe une fois de plus de souligner qu’en jugeant

l’Etat responsable, vous ne conclu riez aucunement à la culpabilité collective de tout un peuple. A

l’évidence, il y avait des Serbes qui comprenaient l’énormité de ce qui se faisait en leur nom, et qui

s’opposaient au régime de Belgrade. Mais co mme l’a souligné M.MichaelWalzer, l’éminent

philosophe de Princeton, même si «l’on ne peut pas dire que chaque citoyen est à l’origine de tout

ce que fait l’Etat», il n’en demeure pas moins que «chacun peut à bon droit être appelé à en

répondre». Comme il l’explique,

«la citoyenneté est un destin commun, et personne, pas même les opposants [au

régime] … ne peut échapper aux effets d’un mauvais régime, de dirigeants ambitieux
ou fanatiques, ou d’un nationalisme exacer bé. Mais, si hommes et femmes doivent
accepter ce destin, ils peuvent parfois le fa ire en bonne conscience, car acceptation ne
veut pas dire responsabilité individuelle. La répartition des coûts n’a rien à voir avec
104
celle de la culpabilité.»

29. Lorsque l’Etat lèse un citoyen, ce citoyen, s’il vit dans un Etat de droit, peut avoir droit à

réparation, même si le préjudice est le fait d’un seul individu (par exemple un policier malhonnête),

et tous les citoyens, tous les contribuables doivent assumer, non pas la culpabilité, mais la

responsabilité de procéder aux réparati ons appropriées et de réaffirmer la primauté du droit. Il en

va de même pour la primauté du droit entre Etats : tous les citoyens d’un Etat qui a mal agi doivent

être invités à contribuer aux réparations dues à la victime et à la réaffirm ation de la primauté du

droit. La citoyenneté implique de nombreux privilèges, mais au ssi des devoirs; c’est un destin

commun. Elle implique non pas une culpabilité collective mais, assu rément, une acceptation

commune de la responsabilité.

30. La répartition des coûts, et non celle de la culpabilité: c’est de cela qu’il s’agit en

l’espèce. Il est à la fois équitable et conforme au droit que les citoyens d’un Etat qui en lèse

gravement un autre aient à supporter au moins une part importante du coût des réparations et de

l’indemnisation des victimes. Par «coûts», je n’en tends pas seulement les ré parations financières,

mais aussi, et surtout, le rétablissement de la vérité historique. Lorsque quelqu’un a mal agi et s’en

repend, il lui coûte une bonne part de sa fierté nationale de dire : «Oui, ces choses terribles ont été

55 faites au nom de notre nation et nous le regr ettons profondément; nous offrons nos condoléances

104
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 1977, p. 297. - 46 -

aux familles des victimes et nous souhaitons aider à panser les plaies que nous avons infligées, car

nous avons vraiment tourné la page.»

31. Ce partage de la charge que représentent les réparations aux victimes est en lui-même

une raison suffisante pour ne pas abandonner la noti on de la responsabilité de l’Etat, laquelle crée

un droit de la victime à obtenir davantage qu’ un haussement d’épaules navré accompagné d’une

remarque du type : «ainsi va la vie dans les Balkans». Le dro it qui impose cette responsabilité de

l’Etat est un complément utile, voire essentiel, des actions pénales contre les individus, et le partage

de la responsabilité qu’il impose aux récalcitr ants est un élément ess entiel du processus de

«cicatrisation» des plaies.

32. Il existe cependant une autre raison de ne pas laisser tomber en désuétude la

responsabilité de l’Etat.

33. Nous avons relevé dans une partie précéd ente de nos plaidoiries que la Cour, dans son

avis consultatif de 1951 relatif aux réserves à la convention sur le génocide, avait fait observer que

cette convention, plus encore que tout autre tr aité, avait été adoptée dans un but «purement humain

et civilisateur». En d’autres termes, la convention a une fonction d’exhortation. Ce «but

civilisateur» consiste à faire savoir à toute pe rsonne, où qu’elle se trouve, qu’elle ne saurait

échapper à sa responsabilité pour le mal qui a été fait à d’autres personnes en son nom. En ce sens,

le rôle assigné à la CIJ par la convention sur le génocide est essentiel pour éviter l’effet secondaire

nocif et non intentionnel qu’aurait le dé veloppement de la responsabilité pénale individuelle. Cet

effet est décrit comme suit par M. Mark Drumbl :

«[L]e choix délibéré, par les institutions de la justice pénale internationale, de
condamner sélectivement une poignée d’in dividus … oblitère … l’implication des
[citoyens] ordinaires … d’où des failles dans la distribution des peines, dans la mesure
où seules quelques personnes reçoivent leur juste châtiment, alors que de nombreux et
105
puissants Etats et organisations échappent à toute responsabilité.»

Votre Cour doit nous prémunir contre semblable régression.

34. En matière de génocide, responsabilité de l’Etat ne signifie pas culpabilité collective,

mais obligation de l’Etat concerné de prendre sa part dans la réparation des conséquences de sa

violation du droit international. Cette responsab ilité commande que le peuple de l’Etat victime et

105MarkA.Drumbl, «Sands: From Nüremberg to The Hague» (notes bibliographiques), 103 Mich L.Rev1295

(2005). - 47 -

56 le peuple de l’Etat agresseur travaillent ensemb le à réparer les dommages, qu’ils prouvent leur

volonté nouvelle de collaborer, rec onstruire, reconstituer. La déci sion rendue au fond par la Cour

permanente de Justice interna tionale dans l’affaire de l’ Usine de Chorzów 106 vous a déjà été

rappelée : «la réparation doit, autant que possible, effacer toutes les conséquences de l’acte illicite

et rétablir l’état qui aurait vraisemblablement existé si ledit acte n’avait pas été commis».

35. Seule une volonté commune «d’effacer toutes les conséquences de l’acte illicite»

permettra d’inaugurer une nouvelle ère dans les Balkans. Votre Cour peut encourager le

développement de cette volonté commune.

36. Et puis il faut bien penser à l’avenir. En fonction de la façon dont la Cour va trancher

dans cette affaire, sa décision peut jouer plusieurs rôles «civilisateurs» importants. Elle peut inciter

les citoyens, partout dans le monde, à manifester le courage de s’opposer aux activités criminelles

de leurs gouvernements.

37. En disant le droit, la Cour peut proclamer que la tolérance ou la complicité d’une nation à

l’égard d’un comportement mani festement illicite ne peut pas s’expier par la punition d’une

poignée de dirigeants notoires. Elle peut garantir que les réparations ⎯et pas seulement

financières ⎯ qui permettront de reconstruire ce qui a été illicitement détruit sont réellement

partagées et ne pèsent pas exclusivement sur des victimes déjà meurtries et sanglantes.

38. Mais ce repentir, cette vision responsable et humaine d’un nouvel avenir sont très

éloignés de ce que nous avons vu dans les plaidoi ries de notre adversaire. Le défendeur espère

qu’un point technique lui perme ttra d’échapper à toute acceptation de responsabilité, à son devoir

de participer à la réparation des conséquences du génocide en Bosnie. M.Varady, récemment

encore agent de la Serbie-et-Monténégro dans les instances engagées par son pays contre les Etats

membres de l’OTAN, a d éclaré à ses compatriotes serbes, ce dont leurs médias se sont fait l’écho,

que son but, dans ces autres affaires, son «principal objectif stratégique», avait été de «transformer

la responsabilité collective en responsabilité individuelle» 107. Il entendait par là qu’en plaidant

devant vous dans les affaires contre l’OTAN, il espérait faire en sorte que son pays ne soit pas tenu

pour responsable, dans la présente espèce, du gé nocide commis en Bosnie, que l’Etat puisse

106
Usine de Chorzów, fond, arrêt n° 13, 1928, C.P.J.I. série A n° 17, p. 47.
107
12/NIN/9, décembre 2004. - 48 -

échapper à sa responsabilité, et que le prix à payer, le cas échéant, le soit par les individus jugés

pour crimes devant un autre tribunal. Si telle était effectivement l’issue de cette affaire ⎯ que

l’Etat ne puisse pas être tenu pour responsab le des actes abominabl es de ses dirigeants ⎯, cela

reviendrait à vider littéralement de sa substance la convention sur le génocide et à nous rendre tous

encore plus vulnérables.

57 39. Quelle triste conséquence ce serait là! Nous invitons respectueusement votre Cour à

indiquer clairement que tel n’était pas le sens des décisions rendues dans les affaires relatives à

l’OTAN.

40. D’importants progrès ont été accomplis avec l’adoption de la notion fonctionnelle de

responsabilité pénale personnelle, mi se en Œuvre par une institution judiciaire internationale

légitime. Cette évolution nous a encouragés dans l’espoir que notre génération avait fait

d’importants pas en avant pour sortir d’un passé très noir. Pour citer le j uge TheodorMeron, du

TPIY, qui s’exprimait en qualité de président de ce Tribunal,

«Ceux qui, juste après la seconde guerre mondiale et l’holocauste, ont rédigé la
convention pour la préventi on et la répression du crime de génocide, étaient animés
par la volonté de garantir que l’horreur du meurtre délibéré et massif, organisé par

l’Etat, d’un groupe de personnes choisies excl usivement en108ison de leur identité ne
se reproduise plus jamais dans l’histoire de l’humanité.» [Traduction du Greffe.]

41. Quel marché de dupes nous aurions conc lu si, pour faire reconnaître la responsabilité

pénale d’individus, nous avions sacr ifié la notion de responsabilité de l’Etat. Et quelle conception

erronée des exigences de la justice !

42. Dans le droit international moderne, le citoyen n’appartient plus à l’Etat : c’est l’Etat qui

appartient, collectivement, aux citoyens. Certains d’entre vous ont joué un rôle moteur dans cette

révolution juridique. Jouissant maintenant des pr ivilèges de ce nouveau statut, les citoyens qui

composent l’Etat moderne doivent accepter de bon gr é leur part de la responsabilité de l’Etat, et

non être encouragés à s’y soustraire. Nous fais ons appel à la Cour pour qu’elle dissipe toute

confusion qui risquerait de subsister entre la responsabilité de l’Etat et la notion de culpabilité

collective. Juger le défendeur responsable du gé nocide, ce n’est absolument pas affirmer que les

citoyens de la Serbie-et-Monténégro en partagent tous la culpabilité. Ce n’est bien évidemment pas

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le cas. Mais leur Etat n’en a pas moins délibérément dirigé, aidé, formé, armé, vêtu, payé et inspiré

ceux qui ont commis le génocide. Un grand nombr e de ces citoyens n’a aucune part dans la

culpabilité de ce crime, mais tous partagent la responsabilité de reconnaître l’énormité de ce qui a

été commis en leur nom et de réparer.

43. Cette affaire offre à la Cour une occasion unique de remplir la «mission civilisatrice» de

la convention.

44. Il est essentiel que la Cour assume le rôle important que lui confère l’articleIX de la

convention sur le génocide. Qu’elle pèse les pr euves. Qu’elle détermine les responsabilités.

58 Qu’elle enseigne aux nations et redonne espoir au x victimes. C’est un rôle qu’aucune autre

institution internationale ne peut jouer et la seule autre possibilité est le cycle récurrent du sang et

de la vengeance, qui ne nous est que trop familier.

45. Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour, voilà qui clôt notre premier tour de

plaidoiries. Nous nous sommes essentiellement cen trés sur les faits et sur le schéma selon lequel

s’ordonnent les faits dont nous avons eu connai ssance depuis notre réplique. Nous avons essayé

d’éviter de parler à nouveau des faits déjà prouvés dans nos plaidoiries antérieures, mais nous vous

invitons instamment à en tenir compte, car ils obéissent essentiellement à ce schéma global qui

vous a été présenté. Nous n’avons pas abordé en détail la question de votre compétence, puisque la

Cour s’est exprimée sans ambigüité sur cette qu estion en relation avec notre affaire. Nous

comptons que vous considérerez les éléments de votre décision de 2003 sur la demande en revision

comme res judicata. Nous aurons certainement à dire en plus après avoir entendu les plaidoiries du

défendeur, sur ce point-là sans doute et sur d’au tres questions, qui commenceront demain. La

Bosnie vous remercie vivement de lui avoir donné la possibilité de plaider devant vous de façon si

détaillée.

Le PRESIDENT: Merci, M. Franck. Voilà qui nous amène à la fin du premier tour de

plaidoiries de la Bosnie-Herzégovine. La Cour siégera à 10heures demain pour le début du

premier tour de plaidoiries de la Serbie-et-Monténégro. L’audience est levée.

L’audience est levée à 12 h 50.

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