Traduction

CO

CR 2005/3 (traduction)

CR 2005/3 (translation)

Mardi 12 avril 2005 à 10 heures

Tuesday 12 April 2005 at 10 a.m. - 2 -

8 The PRESIDENT: The sitting is open. I give the floor first to Professor Salmon.

Mr. SALMON: Mr. President, Members of the Court,

U GANDA ’S LITIGATION STRATEGY

1. Before addressing the debate on the merits , the Democratic Republic of the Congo would

draw the attention of the Court to certain singular features of our opponents’ written pleadings. As

in every case before the Court, the parties put forward arguments of fact and law in support of their

positions. There is, however, a further form of argument to which our opponents have had ample

recourse, that is to say, the rhetorical one. By appealing to extrajudicial values or employing

rhetorical devices, Uganda seeks to make the Court receptive to its position. However, we feel it

may be instructive to subject this approach to closer scrutiny, and see how it really operates. To

this end, I shall divide my presentation into two pa rts: first, Uganda’s reliance upon extrajudicial

values or fictions, and then its use of rhetorical devices and the pitfalls of such discourse.

I. Uganda’s reliance upon extrajudicial values or fictions

2. The Court will by now have seen through our opponents’ litigation strategy. What they

are seeking to do is covertly to impose upon the Court the following images.

First image: Uganda the gentle lamb

3. Uganda presents an idealized image of itself as an open and tolerant State. According to

its Counter-Memorial, it is “an African-led state that had overthrown a horrible dictatorship and

established a broad-based, non-sectarian government that was tolerant and inclusive of all political,

religious and ethnic forces in the country” 1. The Respondent then magnanimously offers the

9
Congo advice on how to reduce internal conflict through “good governance” (that fashionable
2
buzzword), national dialogue and involvement of civil society ⎯ another fashionable notion.

4. A pretty picture, but one difficult to accept at face value. The Court will doubtless be

asking itself how it is that a State so concerned with good governance and, of course, dialogue with

1
CMU, p. 11, para. 16.
2
Ibid., p. 44, para. 55 and p. 51, para. 56. - 3 -

civil society, was based until very recently on a one-party system 3and has succeeded in provoking

a quite extraordinary number of insurgent movements, of which our opponents themselves have

provided an impressive list: Allied Democrat ic Forces (ADF), Former Uganda National

Army(FUNA), Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Uganda Rescue Front II (UNFR II), West Nile

Bank Front (WNBF) and National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) 4. Even after the

Parties had filed their written pleadings , a new insurgent group was established by ⎯ ironically ⎯

officers of the Ugandan army of occupation in the eastern Congo: the Peoples’ Redemption Army.

5. We are bound also to ask ourselves why, for so many years, and indeed right up to the

present time, Uganda has been unable to bring these lost sheep back into its welcoming fold. On

our opponents’ own admission, insurgents ha ve been active on Ugandan territory since

January1986 (when President Museveni came to power) and ⎯ it is important to stress this ⎯

even at a time when relations with the Congo’s successive governments were excellent, or when

Ugandan troops were occupying a substantial part of Congolese territory. This shows that

responsibility for the situation lies not with the Congo ⎯ as our opponents imply ⎯ but with the

Ugandan Government itself, which stubbornly refuses to open political dialogue with its numerous

opposition movements and seeks, with singular lack of credibility, to lay the blame on external

scapegoats.

Second image: Uganda the innocent victim

10 6. The image which Uganda gently whispers to us is that of innocent victim. We are asked

to accept the following scenario: Uganda as victim of a plot, of an aggressive triple alliance

between the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Su dan and Ugandan rebels assisted or controlled

by Kinshasa. That is said to justify Ug anda’s “modest” presence on Congolese territory ⎯ in

exercise, of course, of its right of self-defence.

Uganda shows itself here to be a master of the art of understatement. According to its

Counter-Memorial:

3
“Uganda is one of the few fifty-four Commonwealthmember countries with a single party system of
governance”, The Monitor, Kampala October 14, 2003, http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200310150103.html.
4
Ibid., p. 1, para. 4. - 4 -

“The Ugandan forces present in the te rritory of the DRC are confined to a

limited number of specific locations with the purpose of disarming and demobilizing
anti-Uganda insurgen.t..sand controlling military airfields and lines of
communication, which would otherwise be av ailable for the deployment of Sudanese
military equipment and logistical support to the anti-Uganda insurgents.” 5

Oh, how prettily this is put!

7. Quite apart from the fact that there is no evidence whatever of Sudanese involvement

before the Ugandan attack, one is baffled as to why, in order to secure the border area in the

Ruwenzori Mountains ⎯ which, I would remind you, are in fact adjacent to the Rwandan

frontier ⎯ it was necessary for the Ugandan army to conquer a huge swathe of Congolese territory

as far as Gbadolite? That city lies 1,120km from the Ugandan border. It is almost as if the

Netherlands, in order to secure its southern boundary , occupied Belgium, France and part of Spain

as far as Barcelona. In these circumstances, the argument of a threat to security ⎯ still

unproven ⎯ looks very much like a mere pretext.

Third image: Uganda the apostle of peace

8. A third image which Uganda seeks to present of itself is that of apostle of peace. Thus,

according to the Respondent, the presence of its troops on Congolese soil for five years is

explicable by reason of their role as peacekeeper s in the eastern Congo, of benefactors of the

Congolese people, of trustees of the country’s natural resources in the best interests of the

Congolese people. Uganda as “Salvation Army”, or provider of humanitarian assistance. Its

11 presence is claimed to be justified by some sort of international mandate deriving from resolutions

of international conferences, as well as by the consent of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

9. Professor Olivier Corten will deal with Uga nda’s first justification, based on a so-called

consent deriving from various international agreements. Let us simply point out, at this stage, that

this argument ignores the Security Council’s clear condemnation of Uganda ’s invasion and of its
6
instruction to the Respondent to withdraw from the territory . It is also at odds with the successive

commitments undertaken by Uganda itself sin ce September 1998, which it has deliberately

5
CMU, p. 178, para. 325.
6See Statement by the President of the Security C ouncil of 31August 1998, SPRST 1998/26, MDRC, Ann.14;
Statement by the President of the Security Council of 11December1998, SPRST 1998/36, MDRC, Ann.15; Security

Council resolutions 1234 (1999) of 9 April 1999 and 1304 (2000) of 16 June 2000. - 5 -

violated. I have evoked these points here. It will be for ProfessorKlein to show what we are to

think of Uganda’s peacekeeping role in the Ituri.

It is bad enough that Uganda seeks to misrepresent fiction as reality; still worse are the

rhetorical devices employed in the course of that exercise.

II. Uganda’s rhetorical devices and the pitfalls of such discourse

10. The DRC would now like to illustrate the sy stematic use by Uganda of certain rhetorical

devices, mainly designed to discredit its opponent, to distort the reality by misrepresentations and

to sidestep the judicial debate.

Discrediting the opponent

11. Among the devices used to discredit the oppone nt, what first springs to the eye is the

general arrogance of the discourse, with its erudite tone and sermonizing on the “dos and don’ts” of

international procedure. The Respondent th us accuses the DRC of “eccentricities” or of

“procedural anomalies” in its pleadings, but its allegations are not based on any provisions of the

7 8
Statute or Rules of Court . It speaks of “the claimant State as an ineffective appearing State” .

12 A similar arrogance ⎯ in this case, the arrogance of the jackboot ⎯ can be found when

Uganda refers to the use of force. “Ugandan fo rces succeeded in occupying all the key airfields

and river ports that served as gateways to eastern Congo and the Uganda border.” 9 Or again:

“Uganda pursued the only action possible... Between 16 and 20September 1998, she sent her

10
troops into Congo to drive the Sudanese out.” Such a style leaves one speechless. Quia nominor

leo.

To some extent, it is an arrogance that ve rges on the comical. According to Uganda’s

Rejoinder: “the calls by various DRC officials for Uganda to withdraw her troops was itself a

11
hostile act that threatened Uganda’s security” . I am not making this up! So much for Uganda’s

idea of a “threat”!

7CMU, Chaps. VII and VIII.

8Ibid., p. 107.
9
Ibid, p. 43, para. 54.
10RU, pp. 40-41, para. 88.

11Ibid., p. 47, para. 101. - 6 -

12. Another noteworthy device is the characterization as an established fact of the

opponent’s alleged breach of the rules of judicial debate. Uganda thus repeatedly claims in its most

recent pleadings that the Congo failed to address certain arguments 12, whereas the Congo did so

13
systematically in its Reply . One can appreciate that Uganda was not satisfied with the

responses ⎯ even though they were substantiated ⎯ but to deny the very existence of a response

from the Congo goes much further, indeed too far: using unfair means in order to discredit the

14
opponent .

In the same way, Uganda makes great play of an alleged lack of rigour in the evidence

presented by the DRC, but, as will be seen a little later, it does not exhibit the same scruples when

it comes to its own evidence. For example, it asserts that a witness statement produced by the DRC

13 is “unreliable” because it emanates from Colonel Ebamba of the Congolese armed forces 15, but has

16
no hesitation in itself using affidavits prepared by its own officials for the purposes of the case .

T1h3e. defamatory description of the DRC’s judiciary is, quite frankly, unacceptable. I

quote: “plagued by corruption and lack of fu nding, resources and personnel, the Congolese courts

17
are not, and have never been, impartial dispensers of justice” . Is that really the way to express

oneself in documents submitted to this Court?

Misrepresentation

14. Misrepresentation is another device to which our opponents are parti
al. It includes the

technique of attributing to the Congo an attitude that it did not adopt ; for example, when it claims

that the Congo accepted statements by Uganda in its pleadings and thus gave its acquiescence,

whereas the statements in question were firmly disputed in every case, in particular those

1“failure to contest critical evidence presented by Uganda”, ibid., p. 21, para. 58.
13
RDRC, pp. 179-192, paras. 3.68-3.94; pp. 355-368, paras. 6.16-6.47; and pp. 370-375, paras. 6.54-6.64.
14
See the DRC’s response in AWODRC, p. 34, para. 1.46, 4.
1RU, p. 306, para. 662.

1See CMU, Anns. 31 and 60.

1RU, p. 328, para. 708. - 7 -

18
concerning the alleged collusion with Sudan : this method is systematically used by the

Respondent. Uganda even goes as far as claiming that the DRC did not respond to an argument

when 130 pages of the Reply have been devoted to refuting it 19. It is somewhat childish, and will

not escape the vigilance of the Court, for Uganda repeatedly to distort or ignore the pleadings of its

opponent, which has clearly and methodically responded to its arguments: The DRC cannot but

protest at this technique, which verges on falsification.

15. Uganda makes frequent use of distorted and fallacious references to do cuments: thus,

20
14 with respect to the Protocol of 27April 1998 , Uganda presents this text as “formalising the

invitation and committing the armed forces of both countries to jointly combat the anti-Uganda

21
insurgents in Congolese territory and secure the border region” .

But what does that Protocol actually say? “The two parties recogni zed the existence of

enemy groups which operate on either side of th e common border. Consequently, the two armies

22
agreed to co-operate in order to insure security and peace along the common border.”

This is clearly not quite the same thing.

16. The evidentiary techniques employed in Uganda’s pleadings are hardly conducive to

revealing the truth.

⎯ Uganda constantly repeats claims or allega tions without providing the slightest tangible

evidence for them, in particular with respect to the presence of Sudanese troops in the DRC or

23
to an alleged plot with that State in order to destabilize Uganda . That recurrent allegation in

Uganda’s argument is never once substantiated. Uganda refers to protests made to Kinshasa

about an alleged visit by PresidentKabila to Khartoum for that purpose, but it is unable to

24
provide evidence of them . The Respondent cites a document produced by the Congo which

18
“None of these facts are now in dispute” (RU, p. 5, para . 17); “the DRC has now admitted either directly or by
failure to contest” (ibid., pp. 21-23, para. 59); “all of th e above is expressly admitted by the Reply or uncontested by the
Reply. It must now be taken as facts” ( ibid., p.25, para. 60); “the Reply concedes” ( ibid., p. 34, para. 75); “the Reply
acknowledges” (ibid., pp.34-35, para.76); “As the admitt ed and uncontested facts now show” ( ibid., p.35, para. 77);
“none of these facts is denied in the Reply” (ibid., p. 38, para. 81); “DRC concedes” (ibid., pp. 39-40, para. 85).
19
See references in Congo’s Additional Observations, p. 35, para. 1.48
20
CMU, Ann.19.
21
Ibid., p. 23, para. 31.
2Ibid., Ann.19.

2RU, p. 119, para. 277.
24
CMU, p. 30, para. 39. - 8 -

envisages the hypothesis that such a visit could have taken place; but that inconclusive

document certainly provides no indication that an y such visit could have been motivated by

25
aggressive intentions .

⎯ Our opponents refer to evidence that has allegedl y disappeared: the Ugandan Ambassador in

Kinshasa is said to have left on the Embassy premises, on his departure in August 1998, certain

documents dating back several years and proving PresidentMobutu’s implication in a plot to

have PresidentMuseveni assassinated 26. It is curious, to say the least, that an experienced

diplomat could have left behind such evidence, and even more curious that he would have been

imprudent enough not to safeguard it by earlier tran smitting it to his capital. It is even more

15 surprising that this diplomat, who participated in the drafting of the Ugandan

27
Counter-Memorial, only recalled those facts at the Rejoinder stage .

⎯ Uganda cites documents that supposedly prove an attack by the Democratic Republic of the

Congo on the Bwindi National Park or against Fo rt Portal. In reality, those documents, which

emanate from the Ugandan security services and which were drawn up ex post facto at the time

when the pleadings were being drafted, do not even mention the Congo as being responsible

28
for these attacks .

⎯ A Ugandan document relies on the statements of a witness arrested in May 2000 who describes

air-drops that allegedly took place in November 2000. However, the same document indicates

that this witness had been taken prisoner by the UPDF troops on 17 May 2000. The air-drops

thus took place while he was in prison. I am sure the Court will agree that his capacity to

29
testify about this demonstrates exceptional gifts or clairvoyance .

Evasion

17. The device of evasion has been used in various forms.

2AWODRC, p. 44-45, para. 1.64.
26
RU, p. 322, para. 695 and Ann. 87, para. 9 and 14.
27
See AWODRC, p. 24, para. 1.35 and RU, Ann. 87, para. 26 and AWODRC, pp. 96-97, p. 2.52.
2RDRC, pp. 470-372, paras. 6.52 to 6.58; AWODRC, p. 46, para. 1.68.

2RDRC, pp. 373-374, paras. 6.60-6.62. - 9 -

First, when Uganda explicitly refuses to address certain of its opponent’s arguments. Among

many examples, we would cite the argument con cerning the law applicable to the pillaging of

natural resources in the Congo 30.

18. A more subtle form is the technique of underlining, in which Uganda has become highly

skilled. The idea is to reproduce texts in whic h only those points on which it seeks to base its

arguments are highlighted, with other essential aspects of the text being ignored. Thus the passages

which make reference ⎯ albeit often in vague terms ⎯ to Uganda’s “security concerns” are

extensively underlined. However, in that connec tion, Uganda carefully avoided drawing attention

16 to passages which imposed on Ugan da an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of its troops

from the territory of the Congo 31.

19. The Respondent is also not averse to the circular argument. A typical example of this

can be found in the claim that the tank seized by the Democratic Republic of the Congo near

Kinshasa could not have belonged to the Ugandan army because that army did not take part in the

32
attack on Kitona , or that the DRC “cannot demonstrate that Uganda invaded the DRC in

33
August 1998 when, in fact, this did not happen” . Most convincing!

20. Another device is the one-sided presentation of certain claims. Thus, with respect to

security concerns, these are presented as being specifi c to Uganda, whereas, according to the texts,

they are shared by both Parties. The text of the 27April1998 Protocol indicates that insurgent

groups, hostile both to the DRC and Uganda, were operating on bot h sides of the border. The

34
Protocol was thus synallagmatic in nature .

21. Uganda is also skilled in the art of completely changing position when caught in the act

35
of making false claims. Thus, after denying it supported the MLC in its Counter-Memorial , it

36
was obliged to acknowledge this fully in its Rejoinder .

30RU, para. 512.

31See for example CMU, pp. 45-46, paras.58 and 59; ibid., p.165, para.301, p.166, para.303 and p.167,
para. 304.
32
RU, p. 61, para. 143.
33
RU, pp. 49-50, para. 107.
34See CMU, pp. 186-187, para. 338.

35CMU, pp. 91-92, para. 143.

36RU, pp. 80 et seq., paras. 180 and 185. - 10 -

22. These few examples, Mr. President, Members of the Court, will serve ⎯ should that be

necessary ⎯ to sharpen the critical sense for which this Bench is famous when faced with

intemperate pleading.

23. In the presentations which will follow, the Democratic Republic of Congo will do its best

to avoid similar pitfalls.

I would like to thank the Court for its kind attention. I would now kindly ask you,

Mr. President, to give the floor to Professor Philippe Sands.

Le PRESIDENT: Je vous reme rcie, Monsieur Salmon. Je donne à présent la parole à

M. Sands.

17
M.SANDS: Je vous remercie. Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour,

c’est un honneur pour moi que de comparaître aujour d’hui devant vous au nom de la République

démocratique du Congo.

Q UESTIONS DE PREUVES

1. Je vais ce matin examiner quelques points gé néraux ayant trait à la nature et à la portée

des éléments de preuve invoqués par la RDC à l’ap pui de sa cause, et je vais devoir soulever une

question cruciale pour toutes les cours de justice : comment prouver des faits ? En préparant cette

plaidoirie, j’ai eu maintes occasions de me remé morer le propos que m’a tenu sir Robert Jennings,

mon tout premier professeur de droit internatio nal, quand j’ai sollicité ses conseils sur la

préparation d’un dossier. La règle d’or, m’a-t-il répondu, c’est de ne jamais — jamais — perdre de

vue les faits. Et d’ajouter, avec ce pétillement malicieux du regard que je revois encore : «Et de les

présenter aussi simplement que possible.»

2. On aurait en l’espèce le plus grand mal à perdre de vue les faits car ces derniers sont à

présent parfaitement connus. Nous re viendrons un peu plus tard et aussi demain sur des questions

de preuve plus précises, en rapport avec chacun d es trois principaux griefs que la RDC formule à

l’encontre de l’Ouganda, qu’elle accuse d’avoir, premièrement, illéga lement recouru à la force et

occupé de larges parties du territoire de la RDC, deuxièmement, commis des violations

systématiques et massives des droits fondament aux de l’homme et, troisièmement, manqué aux - 11 -

obligations qui lui incombaient en n’empêchant pas le pillage de l’ or, de diamants et des autres

ressources naturelles de la RDC. Ce matin, je m’en tiendrai à certaines questions plus générales

soulevées dans le cadre de la procédure écrite.

3. Pour nous, les éléments de preuve soumis à la Cour établissent amplement les faits sur

lesquels se fonde la RDC. Dans son contre-m émoire, l’Ouganda a qualifié d’«excentricité» la

37
manière dont la RDC traite la question des preuves . Dans sa réplique, la RDC a répondu en

quatre points à cette allégation, soutenant 1) que les objections formulées par l’Ouganda à

l’encontre de la méthodologie suivie par la RDC en matière de preuves sont dépourvues de

fondement; 2)que les éléments de preuve produits par la RDC satisfont, par leur nature et leur

qualité, aux prescriptions du Statut, du Règlement et de la pratique de la Cour; 3) que le critère de

preuve que devait remplir la RDC était de tenir pour faits pertinents ceux qui présentaient un degré

18
de «certitude raisonnable»; et 4) que les moyens pro duits ont consisté à fournir à la Cour les faits

pertinents répondant à ce critère 38. La Cour aura peut-être relevé que, dans sa duplique, l’Ouganda

s’est abstenu de répondre aux arguments concrets et précis de la RDC, préférant se contenter de

renouveler son allégation initiale 3.

4. La Cour aura relevé également la parc imonie dont fait quant à lui montre l’Ouganda en

matière de preuves. L’Ouganda invoque, dans ses écritures, des extraits pour le moins choisis des

retranscriptions des auditions organisées dans le cadre de l’enquête de sa propre commission, la

commission Porter. Mais, nous le savons mainte nant, ce matériau sur lequel se fonde l’Ouganda

est sélectif et, en ce sens à tout le moins, spécieux — nous y reviendrons. Ce qui est frappant, c’est

que l’Ouganda n’a pas éprouvé le besoin de transmettre à la Cour le rapport final de la commission

Porter, qui a été communiqué à son gouvernement en janvier2003 et au Secrétaire général des

NationsUnies peu de temps après. Nonobstant l’ article50 du Règlement de la Cour qui fait

obligation aux parties de joindre en annexe «t ous documents pertinents produits à l’appui des

thèses» d’une partie, ce n’est pas l’Ouganda, mais la RDC qui a soumis ce rapport à la Cour — la

RDC qui a dû solliciter la version intégrale des transcriptions et annexes établies par la commission

37CMO, deuxième partie, p. 76 et suiv.
38
Voir par exemple RRDC, par. 1.69.
39Voir par exemple DO, par. 45 et suiv. - 12 -

Porter que l’Ouganda a fournies à l’Organisati on des NationsUnies mais pas à son «organe

judiciaire principal». Six mois durant, l’Ouganda les a gardées par-devers lui, ne donnant

d’informations ni à la Cour ni à la République démocratique du Congo. Entre-temps, il en a fourni

au compte-gouttes, dans ses écritures, quelques extraits dont il ne pouvait cependant méconnaître le

caractère spécieux ou incomplet au regard du rapport final de la commission Porter. Et c’est la

RDC qui a dû verser au dossier de la Cour certains de ces nouveaux do cuments. Dans ces

conditions, la Cour voudra bien, je l’espère, me pardonner de trouver pour le moins piquant

d’entendre l’Ouganda taxer d’«excentricité» l’attitude que la RDC adopte à l’égard des éléments de

preuve et affirmer que le demandeur ne s’est pas acquitté de la charge lui incombant en la matière.

5. Néanmoins, la démarche de l’Ouganda da ns ses écritures mérite une certaine attention.

Elle fournit l’occasion de s’assurer que les moyens qui vous ont été soumis répondent bien à deux

questions fondamentales qui se posent : quels faits in combe-t-il à la RDC d’établir à ce stade de la

procédure et comment ces faits doivent-ils être établis? L’argumentation de l’Ouganda revient

finalement à reprocher un double manqueme nt à la RDC, laquelle aurait omis, premièrement, de

19 produire des «éléments de preuve destinés à établir un rapport d’imputabilité entre l’Etat défendeur

et la conduite présumée délictuelle» et, deuxièmement, de présenter des éléments de preuve précis

40
attestant «un quelconque préjudice causé pa r la conduite de l’Etat défendeur» . En d’autres

termes, l’Ouganda affirme que les moyens produ its n’établissent pas suffisamment que les actes

dont la RDC lui fait grief lui sont imputables ni qu’il y a eu préjudice. La Cour verra bien, je

l’espère, quelle est ici la démarche de l’Ouganda : l’Ouganda ne prétend pas ici que les éléments de

preuve ne suffisent pas à établir que les faits allégués ⎯ ou certains d’entre eux ⎯ se sont produits.

L’Ouganda semble même avoir admis désormais qu e, par exemple, la présence des forces armées

ougandaises sur le territoire de la RDC est amplem ent avérée, affirmant maintenant que ce point

n’est pas controversé. L’Ouganda ne conteste pas davantage que certains outrages à la personne

ont bien été commis, ni que certaines ressources naturelles d’une grande valeur ont quitté le

territoire occupé de la RDC pour aboutir sur le si en : ce n’est pas là ce que plaide l’Ouganda. Ce

que fait valoir l’Ouganda en ce qui concerne les preuves, c’est fondamentalement qu’il n’a pas été

40
CMO, p. 77, par. 103. - 13 -

démontré que les actes allégués sont imputables à l’Ouganda; c’est ce que l’on pourrait appeler

«l’argument de l’imputabilité».

I. EN GUISE D ’INTRODUCTION

6. Avant d’aborder au fond le différend qui semble opposer les Parties, je voudrais formuler

trois observations générales concernant les éléments de preuve produits devant la Cour.

Ma 7. première observation est la suivante: il ne faut pas oublier que, tout au long de la

procédure écrite, le Gouvernement de la RDC n’avait accès à aucune des régions occupées par

l’Ouganda. C’est-à-dire qu’il n’avait pas accès aux régions mêmes où furent commises les

violations pour y recueillir les preuves de première main que l’Ouganda l’accuse de ne pas s’être

procurées. Impossible, par exemple, de se rendr e dans les mines pour déterminer les quantités

exactes de ressources naturelles, notamment de diamants et d’or, sorties illégalement du territoire

de la RDC sous les yeux, sinon sous le contrôle, des forces ougandaises. Impossible aussi de

rencontrer des victimes individuelles à même de fournir des témoignages de première main — sous

forme de dépositions — attestant certaines des atrocités perpétrées. Pendant toute cette phase de la

procédure écrite, la RDC n’a pu faire autrement que de se fonder essentiellement, encore que non

20 exclusivement, sur des sources de seconde main, précisément parce que l’Ouganda exerçait le

contrôle exclusif du territoire en question. Ce que dit la Cour en l’affaire du Détroit de Corfou

présente à cet égard une pertinence toute particulière :

«Du fait de ce contrôle exclusif, l’ Etat victime d’une violation du droit

international se trouve souvent dans l’impossibilité de faire la preuve directe des faits
d’où découlerait la responsabilité. Il doit lui être permis de recourir plus largement
aux présomptions de faits, aux i ndices ou preuves circonstancielles (circumstantial
evidence).» 41

Ma 8. deuxième observation liminaire et générale est tout aussi importante. Elle a trait à la

phase de la procédure dans laque lle nous nous trouvons actuellement. La réparation que la RDC

cherche à obtenir est de nature déclaratoire ⎯faire admettre que l’Ouganda a violé des règles

coutumières et conventionnelles relatives à l’emploi de la force, à l’exploitation des ressources

naturelles et à la protection des droits fondament aux de l’homme et du droit humanitaire. Cette

phase de la procédure s’apparente à celle qu’a c onclue l’arrêt du 27juin1986 en l’affaire des

41
C.I.J. Recueil 1949, p. 4. - 14 -

Activités militaires et paramilitaires , une affaire qu’affectionnent, j’en suis sûr, MM.Brownlie et

42
Reichler . La RDC a amplement expliqué qu’elle ne cherche pas, à ce stade, à obtenir les

réparations précises ⎯réparations ou indemnités ⎯ qu’appellent ces violations de certaines

normes. Pareilles mesures pourraient faire l’objet d’une phase ultérieure de la procédure, puisque,

en l’absence d’accord entre les Par ties, c’est justement une phase ulté rieure qui serait réservée à la

détermination des formes et du montant de toute réparation qui pourrait être exigée 4. En

conséquence, les faits que la RDC doit établir à ce stade-ci ne s’étendent pas à la preuve du

préjudice exact qu’elle a subi ni à la portée de la réparation à laquelle elle a droit. C’est

ultérieurement que la RDC serait appelée à faire la preuve des pertes encourues à la suite, par

exemple, de l’occupation illicite. Aussi, quand l’Ou ganda soutient que la RDC n’a pas fourni de

preuve précise des dommages dus au comportement de l’Ouganda —qu’il s’agisse d’actes ou

d’omissions — l’argumentation est infondée. L’Ouganda est à côté de la question.

M9a. troisième observation d’ordre général a trait à la thèse de «l’imputabilité» que

l’Ouganda défend. L’Ouganda part du prin cipe que, pour établir que sa responsabilité

internationale se trouve engagée, la RDC devrait prouver, dans les faits, que les actes allégués sont

21 imputables à l’Ouganda, au sens où celui-ci au rait donné l’ordre de les commettre. Mais

l’Ouganda ⎯je le dis avec tout le respect qui lui est dû ⎯ se méprend. La question de

l’imputabilité porte à la fois sur des élém ents de fait et des éléments de droit ⎯M. Salmon y

reviendra en temps voulu. Pour l’heure, je m’ emploierai à illustrer mon propos en prenant pour

exemple le pillage des ressources naturelles, mais je tiens à ajouter que la même démonstration

vaut pour les violations massives et systématiques des droits fondamentaux de l’homme commises

sous le regard même de l’Ouga nda. Les règles pertinentes de droit international n’imposent pas à

la RDC d’établir que l’Ouganda a ordonné d’exploiter certaines ressources naturelles de RDC et de

les sortir de son territoire. Ainsi que je l’expliquerai mercredi après-midi, le droit ⎯ et en

particulier le règlement de LaHaye de 1907— fait expressément obligation à la puissance

occupante de n’autoriser l’exploitation des ressource s naturelles du pays occ upé qu’au bénéfice de

42
C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 3.
43 Voir Activités militaires et pamilitaires au Nicaragua et contre clui-ci (Nicaragua c.Etats-Unis

d’Amérique), ordonnance du 18 novembre 1987, C.I.J. Recueil 1987, p. 188. - 15 -

celui-ci. De sorte qu’il suffit à la RDC, pour faire admettre sa thèse sur la question donnée en

exemple, de prouver :

1) que l’Ouganda a occupé son territoire;

2) que pendant cette occupation, des individus investis d’une part de l’autorité ougandaise,

notamment le général Kazini, chef de l’armée ougandaise, se sont livrés, ou ont assisté, à

l’exploitation illégale de ressources congolaises; et

3) que les autorités ougandaises se sont abstenues d’intervenir, au mépris de la diligence due par

elles, pour mettre un terme aux pillages commis par des membres de leurs forces armées, par

des armées rebelles ou par des tiers.

10. Je me permets de dire qu’à notre avis , les moyens soumis à la Cour prouvent sans

l’ombre d’un doute la véracité de ces trois pr opositions. A nouveau, en ce qui concerne les

ressources naturelles, les rapports du groupe d’e xperts de l’Organisation des NationsUnies sur

l’exploitation illégale des ressources naturelles de la République démocratique du Congo, groupe

constitué par le Secrétaire général à la demande du Conseil de sécurité, fournissent des preuves

incontournables à l’appui des faits invoqués par la RDC. Aucun doute raisonnable n’est permis à

cet égard. Le rapport de la commission judiciaire d’enquête mise en place par l’Ouganda lui-même

⎯ la commission Porter ⎯, lequel a été publié après la clôture de la procédure
écrite et diffusé sur

Internet, prouve irréfutablement que les plus hauts responsables de l’armée ougandaise présente sur

22 le territoire de la République dé mocratique du Congo se livraient intensément à cette exploitation

illégale44. D'après la commission Porter, ces conclusions s'appuyaient sur des preuves solides.

11. Il pourrait être utile de s’arrêter un inst ant sur la manière dont fu t conduite l’enquête en

question. La commission fut établie en mai 2001 po ur enquêter sur les allégations contenues dans

les premiers rapports de l’ONU. Elle comptait trois membres éminents et bénéficiait du concours

du premier procureur d’Etat ougandais et d’un con seil principal; elle était présidée par le juge

DavidPorter. La commission recueillit de très nombreuses preuves sur une période de dix-huit

mois et acheva son enquête en janvier2003. E lle s’est appuyée sur des dépositions, de hauts

44Par exemple, la commission Porter examine dans le détail les allégations à l’encontre du chef de l’état-major

ougandais en RDC et constate qu’elles s ont «solidement fondées sur des éléments de preuve», p. 202. A la page 198 de
son rapport, elle indique entre autres qu’il y a accord sur le fait que «des officiers, y compris de rang très élevé, et des
soldats des UPDF se sont conduits de façon malséante en République démocratique du Congo». - 16 -

responsables notamment, faites sous serment, ce qui leur confère une autorité particulière. Il

convient à cet égard de rappeler que, dans son arrêt de1984 en l’affaire Nicaragua, la Cour a

indiqué que les déclarations émanant de ha uts responsables «possèdent une valeur probante

particulière lorsqu’elles reconnaissent des faits ou des comportements défavorables à l’Etat que

représente celui qui les a formulées. Elles s’analysen t alors en une sorte d’aveu.» Ce point de vue

était exprimé au sujet de personnalités politiques, mais vaut assurément pour les hauts responsables

militaires, tels le généra l de brigade Kazini et certains de ses collègues, et les responsables

judiciaires, tels le juge Porter et ses collègues.

12. L’on peut dès lors s’interroger sur l’effet qu’ont, devant la Cour, les conclusions de la

commission Porter sur les faits. Selon nous, cet effet est assimilable à celui des conclusions de

même nature rendues par une juridiction nationale: sans être contraignant en tant que tel, il est

revêtu d’une grande autorité. Il impose à l’Ouga nda de réfuter les faits, une tâche dont celui-ci n’a

pas même entrepris de chercher à s’acquitter. Donc l’Ouganda mérite certes tout notre respect pour

avoir ouvert cette enquête mais il ne saurait en suite se soustraire aux conséquences qui en

découlent. Du point de vue des faits, ce rappor t Porter est extrêmement préjudiciable à la cause

que l’Ouganda défend devant la C our. C’est peut-être la raison pour laquelle l’Ouganda aurait

préféré que la Cour n’ait pas accès au rapport ni aux moyens soumis à la commission – et puis-je

indiquer combien je regrette que la RDC, conforméme nt à la pratique de la Cour, n’ait pu produire

qu’un infime échantillon des milliers de pages de preuves communiquées à la commission Porter et

consultables sur les divers CD-Roms que l’Ouganda a finalement fournis au Greffe. Bien sûr, la
23

Cour n’est pas une juridiction pénale et elle a par conséquent forcément une autre façon de traiter la

question des preuves.

13. Le rapport Porter est accablant en ce qui concerne la conduite de certains hauts

responsables des forces de défense du peuple ougandais (UPDF), dont le général de brigade Kazini.

N’oublions pas que ce dernier était le chef de l’état-major des UPDF directement responsables de

l’opération «Safe Haven» en République démocratique du Congo. Après la publication du rapport,

le général de brigade Kazini fut «limogé» 45. Le rapport met également en cause le général

45
Rapport final du groupe d’experts, 23 octobre 2003, p. 23, par. 71. - 17 -

Salim Saleh ⎯demi-frère du président Museveni ⎯ et sa femme Jovial Akandwanaho pour leurs

déplacements par voie aérienne à destination et en provenance de la RDC et pour contrebande de

diamants. Le rapport Porter conclut que les pillages ne sont pas imputables au président Museveni.

Mais ils ont eu lieu et, aux fins d’établir la r esponsabilité étatique de l’ Ouganda, cette conclusion

particulière n’est pas pertinente. Le fait est que ce comportement fut celui «de personnes investies

de l’autorité gouvernementale» 46et relève manifestement de la règle exprimée à l’article7 du

projet d’articles de la CDI sur la responsabilité de l’Etat. Ainsi que l’expliquera demain

M.Salmon, peu importe que, par leurs actes, cer tains membres des UPDF aient abusé de leur

autorité ou enfreint les ordres, si tant est qu’ils l’aient fait.

II.L A PRATIQUE DE LA C OUR EN MATIÈRE DE PREUVE

14. J’aborde à présent trois points plus concrets ayant trait aux éléments de preuve présentés

à la Cour. Quels principes en matière d’établi ssement des preuves la Cour doit-elle appliquer

lorsqu’elle analyse les arguments de la RDC et les moyens de défense que l’Ouganda fait valoir ?

15. En établissant ses pièces de procédure, la République démocratique du Congo a pris soin

de s’inspirer de la pratique c onstante de la Cour qui est étab lie de longue date ainsi que de

l’instruction de procédure III. La République démocratique du Congo n’a pas demandé — pas plus

qu’elle ne demande aujourd’hui — de dérogation quelconque à ces rè gles ni à cette pratique. Le

point de départ, cela va sans dire, est l’article 52 du Statut de la Cour, qui fait obligation aux parties

estant devant elle de produire les «preuves et témoi gnages» sur lesquels elles se fondent. En vertu

de l’article49 du Règlement de la Cour, les pièces de procédure doivent contenir «un exposé des

faits sur lesquels la demande est fondée», et l’artic le50 prévoit que soient joints en annexe «tous

24 documents pertinents produits à l’appui des thès es formulées dans cette pièce». L’Ouganda, selon

nous, ne prétend pas que la RDC n’a pas satisfait à ces conditions formelles. Les allégations de

l’Ouganda portent sur trois autres questions : la char ge de la preuve, le critère d’établissement des

preuves, enfin le caractère concluant et la force probante des éléments de preuve présentés par la

République démocratique du Congo.

46
Petrolane, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran (1991), 27, Iran-USCTR 64, p. 92 [traduction du Greffe]. - 18 -

16. S’agissant de la charge de la preuve, dans sa pratique, la Cour a systématiquement suivi

le principe général qui est que la charge de la preuve d’un fait incombe à la partie qui invoque

celui-ci 47. Les Parties semblent être d’accord sur ce point.

17. Mais de toute évidence, ce n’est là qu’un aspect de la question, lequel n’est pas non plus

nécessairement décisif. La Cour reconnaît depuis longtemps qu’elle est en droit de prendre en

considération des faits qui sont pa rfaitement connus : ce fut le cas, par exemple, dans l’affaire des

48
Pêcheries . Et, dans l’affaire relative au Personnel diplomatique et consulaire des Etats-Unis à

Téhéran, la Cour s’est appuyée sur d es faits qu’elle considérait «[ pour la plupart] de notoriété

publique et [qui avaient] été largement évoqu és dans la presse mondiale ainsi que dans des

49
émissions de radiodiffusion et de télévision de l’Iran et d’ailleurs» . De plus, ainsi que le

jugeLauterpacht l’a déclaré succinctement dans son opinion relative à la décision rendue sur la

demande en indication de mesures conservatoires en l’affaire Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie :

«Nombreux sont les systèmes juridiques qui connaissent l’institution du constat judiciaire. Les

juridictions ne peuvent refuser, ni ne refusent, de voir les faits qui s’imposent à elles.» 50

18. Dans les situations où les faits sont gé néralement connus, voire de notoriété publique, ce

51
qui importe, c’est «la concordance générale des moyens de preuve» ainsi que la Cour l’a reconnu

dans ses arrêts de 1980 et de 1986 52. Lorsque les faits sont parfaitement connus — comme en

l’espèce — c’est à l’Ouganda de prouver qu’ils sont inexacts. Or l’Ouganda n’a pas même fait la

moindre ébauche de démonstration en ce sens. Et nous disons que l’Ouganda n’est pas en mesure

de s’engager dans cette voie, en particulier parce qu’il a refusé de sa propre initiative de soumettre

à la Cour la plupart des annexes les plus pertinentes, notamment celles du rapport de la commission

Porter. L’Ouganda ne peut tout simplement pas supprimer des moyens de preuve en les mettant de

côté. Il ne peut écarter, par exemple, les décl arations du président du Conseil de sécurité quand

47 Temple de Préah Vihéar, fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 15-16.

48 Pêcheries, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1951. p. 138-139.

49 C.I.J. Recueil 1980, p. 9, par. 12. Voir aussi C.I.J. Mémoires, p. 192 et suiv., 329 et suiv. pour cette affaire. La
Cour s’est également fondée sur ce passage en l’affaire des Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre
celui-ci, C.I.J Recueil 1986, p. 40-41, par. 63.

50 Application de la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, mesures
conservatoires, ordonnance du 13 septembre 1993, C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p. 423, par. 42.

51 Ibid., par. 43.
52 o
Supra. n 13, C.I.J. Recueil 1980, p. 10, par. 13 et C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 41, par. 63. - 19 -

25 celui-ci dit que le Conseil considère que les combats livrés à Kisangani enmai2000 violent les

résolutions du Conseil de sécurité 53. Il ne peut écarter les résolutions par lesquelles le Conseil de

sécurité établit le lien entre l’occupation par l’O uganda et «l’exploitation illégale des ressources

naturelles de la République démocratique du Congo», cette résolution-là soul ignant que le retrait

des troupes ougandaises s’impose pour «mettre fin au pillage des ressources naturelles de la

République démocratique du Congo» 54. L’Ouganda a tout simplement fait abstraction de ces

points. Et nous avons hâte d’entendre bientô t les explications de l’Ouganda sur la masse

d’éléments nouveaux désormais accessibles dont la Cour est à présent saisie —lesquels émanent

principalement de l’Ouganda lui-même.

19. S’agissant du critère d’établissement de la preuve, la RDC considère qu’elle a

pleinement adopté la démarche appropriée et que les éléments de preuve sur le squels elle fonde ses

arguments de fait répondent manifestement au critè re requis. Contrairement à ce que l’Ouganda

affirme dans ses pièces écrites, les Parties ne se mblent pas être en désaccord sur la démarche à

suivre. En particulier, sur le fait que les juridictions internationales ne sont pas liées par ces «règles

strictes» appliquées par les juridictions nationales et qui, aux dires du juge Fitzmaurice, «ne

conviennent pas à des litiges entre gouvernements» 55. La Cour a fait preuve de souplesse dans sa

démarche. Dans l’affaire El Salvador/Honduras, la Chambre de la Cour a estimé que, faute de

nombreux éléments de preuve dans un sens comme dans l’autre, le critère à retenir était celui de la

56
probabilité la plus forte que l’on détermine «en pesant les probabilités» . Dans l’affaire du Détroit

de Corfou, la Cour dit que la «preuve pourra résu lter de présomptions de fait à condition que

57
celles-ci ne laissent place à aucun doute raisonnable.» Et en l’absence de toute preuve

documentaire directe, le juge Fitzmaurice a es timé pouvoir se fonder sur ce qu’il a appelé une

«conjecture raisonnable, qui est justifiée par les faits dont on a connaissance et dont le bien-fondé

paraît probable» en donnant effet à «une présomption très raisonnable quant à la manière dont les

53Déclaration du président du Conseil de sécurité, 5 mai 2000, S/PRST/2000/15.

54Résolution 1457 (2003) du Conseil de sécurité, par. 2 et 5, onglet 19 du dossier de plaidoiries.
55
Barcelona Traction (opinion individuelle du juge Fitzmaurice), C.I.J. Recueil 1970, p. 98, par. 58.
56El Salvador/Honduras, arrêt du 11 septembre 1992, C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 506, par. 248.

57C.I.J. Recueil 1949, p 18. - 20 -

choses ont dû se passer» . En l’espèce, nous sommes d’avis qu’il est inutile d’avoir recours à une

quelconque notion de «conjecture ra isonnable»: les moyens de preuve présentés devant la

commission Porter, les décisions du Conseil de sécurité et les documents dont disposaient les

groupes de travail de l’Organisation des Nations Unies ainsi que les nombreux autres documents

que la RDC a soumis à la Cour sont autant d’éléments dont la valeur probante est considérablement

plus forte que celle de ladite conjecture.

20. L’Ouganda affirme en outre que la RDC cherche à éviter l’application du critère de
26
59
preuve prescrit par la Cour . Toutefois, dans ses pièces écrites, l’Ouganda paraît incapable de

citer la moindre prétention de cette nature de la part de la RDC. Je tiens à être absolument clair sur

ce point : la RDC a bel et bien voulu appliquer le critère retenu par la Cour dans sa pratique. Elle

ne vise aucun autre critère, que le niveau en soit plus faible ou plus élevé, que celui qui a été adopté

auparavant.

21. S’agissant de la nature des éléments de preuve , la Cour reconnaît depuis longtemps

qu’une partie est habilitée à se fonder sur des preuves tant directes qu’indirectes. Quant à la

recevabilité et à l’effet des «moyens de preuve indirecte», la Cour a répondu à la question en

l’affaire du Détroit de Corfou dans les termes suivants :

«[L]es moyens de preuve indirecte sont admis dans tous les systèmes de droit et
leur usage est sanctionné par la jurisprudence internationale. On doit les considérer
comme particulièrement probants quand ils s’appuient sur une série de faits qui
60
s’enchaînent et qui conduisent logiquement à une même conclusion.»

22. Depuis ce premier arrêt, qui établissait le principe selon lequel des moyens de preuve

indirecte sont susceptibles d’être employés et revêtus d’une force probante particulière lorsqu’ils

s’appuient sur une série de faits qui s’enchaîne nt et qui conduisent logiquement à une même

conclusion, la Cour a exprimé, à maintes reprises , ses vues sur la nature des «moyens de preuve

indirecte» qu’elle juge acceptables. La Cour a au ssi exprimé ses vues au sujet de la force probante

et du caractère concluant qu’il y a lieu de conférer à des éléments de types divers. Je pense avoir

déjà appelé votre attentio n sur l’affaire relative au Personnel diplomatique et consulaire des

58Supra n 19, C.I.J Recueil 1970, p. 98, par. 58.
59
Duplique de l’Ouganda, p. 19, par. 49.
60C.I.J. Recueil 1949, p. 18. - 21 -

Etats-Unis à Téhéran, dans laquelle la Cour mentionnait plusieurs documen ts qu’elle considérait

«d’une cohérence et d’une concordance totales en ce qui concerne les principaux faits et

61
circonstances» . Et j’ai aussi appelé votre attention sur la décision rendue en l’affa
ire des Activités

62
militaires et paramilitaires .

23. En l’espèce, bien entendu, la RDC est en mesure de se fonder sur beaucoup plus

d’éléments encore. Les preuves émanent de sour ces multiples et sont entièrement concordantes.

La RDC s’appuie sur des éléments documentaires et des preuves directes, dont des dépositions

écrites et des témoignages de militaires ougandais et d’autres catégories de personnel. La Cour

dispose à présent de bien davantage d’éléments de preuve émanant de la commission Porter. Ainsi

que M eTshibangu l’a démontré, vu ces preuves directes, l’argument de l’Ouganda consistant à dire

que ses troupes seraient entrées en RDC postérieu rement au 11 septembre 1998 s’effondre comme

27 un château de cartes : M. Kavuma et d’autres pers onnes ont confirmé devant la commission Porter

63
qu’elles y sont entrées beaucoup plus tôt, au début d’août 1998 .

24. Dans les éléments de preuve figurent des résolutions et d’autres décisions d’organisations

internationales (dont des rapports) —émanant en particulier du Conseil de sécurité de

l’Organisation des NationsUnies— ainsi que des rapports établis par des organisations

nongouvernementales indépendantes. Il n’y a rien d’ original dans la démarche de la RDC. La

Cour s’est appuyée par le passé sur des preuves relevant de toutes ces catégories. Elle a déclaré

expressément que, «pour parvenir à la vérité . . . e lle peut . . . prendre acte des propos tenus par les

représentants des Parties ... ainsi que des résolutions adoptées ou discutées par ces

64
organisations» . Et la Cour a confirmé, ainsi que je l’ ai dit, que des déclarations émanant de

personnalités politiques officielles de haut rang possèdent une va
leur probante particulière

65
lorsqu’elles reconnaissent des faits ou des comportements défavorables à l’Etat . Cette citation, à

61 o
Supra n 13, p. 10, par. 13.
62
C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 40, par. 63.
63Procès-verbaux des auditions de la commission ouga ndaise d’enquête Porter, déposition du général Kazini,

p. 128, reproduite sous l’onglet 11 du dossier de plaidoiries.
64Activités militaires et paramilitaires, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 44, par. 72.

65Ibid., p. 41, par. 64. - 22 -

notre avis, s’applique exactement aux éléments dont nous disposons par l’intermédiaire de la

66
commission Porter .

III. CONCLUSIONS

25. Pour conclure, Monsieur le président, Ma dame et Messieurs de la Cour, les faits sur

lesquels la RDC s’appuie et fonde ses demandes sont, pour la plupart, désormais de notoriété

publique. Les preuves et autres éléments par lesque ls la RDC étaie ses affirmations de fait sont

recevables et satisfont pleinement aux conditions pr escrites par le Règlement et par la pratique de

la Cour. La prétention en sens contraire de l’O uganda est dénuée de substa nce ou de fondement.

Les éléments présentés à la Cour ne laissent plan er aucun doute raisonnable sur les motivations de

l’invasion illicite de l’Ouganda, sur la responsabilité qui lui incombe dans la violation systématique

et massive des droits fondamentaux de la pe rsonne humaine et sur l’exploitation illicite et

généralisée des ressources naturelles de la RDC.

26. En revanche, ce qui laisse planer un doute sérieux, c’est la question de savoir si, dans sa

demande reconventionnelle, l’Ouganda a satisfait aux critères applicables en matière de preuve. Et

la comparaison entre la démarche adoptée en matière de preuve par la RDC dans son

28 argumentation et celle qui transparaît dans les él éments versés au dossier à l’appui des demandes

reconventionnelles est riche d’enseignements. L’argumentation de l’Ouganda repose entièrement

sur ses propres documents internes ⎯trois documents seulement ⎯ et n’est fondée sur aucun

élément émanant de sources indépendantes, tel que rapports de l’ONU par exemple, articles de

presse ou dépositions de témoins. La comparai son fait apparaître un abîme entre les deux

démarches.

27. A cet égard, en guise de conclusion, M onsieur le président, la RDC a constaté la

présence au sein de la délégation ougandaise du ministre de la défense et de l’inspecteur général de

la police de la République de l’Ouganda, et nous relevons que l’un et l’autre sont censés faire partie

des conseils et avocats puisque la Cour a décidé de ne pas les autoriser à comparaître en qualité de

témoins. Il va de soi que l’Ouganda est entièrement libre de conférer à toute personne de son choix

66République de l’Ouganda, Livre blanc du Gouvernement relatif aurapport de la commission judiciaire
d’enquête sur l’exploitation illégale des re ssources naturelles et autres formes de richesse en République démocratique

du Congo, 2003, p. 13-14, reproduit sous l’onglet 20 du dossier de plaidoiries. - 23 -

la qualité de conseil ou d’avocat. Toutefois, l es arguments susceptibles d’être présentés par ces

deux personnes devront être considérés comme présentés à ce titre, c’est-à-dire comme des

arguments et des conclusions de caractère juridique. Quelle que soit leur nature, les déclarations de

ces deux personnes ne sauraient nullement être considérées comme des avis d’expert ni comme des

éléments de preuve à l’appui d’une des questi ons soumises à la Cour. A défaut de pouvoir

procéder à un contre-interrogatoire, ce serait, à not re avis, une excentricité que d’adopter une autre

démarche et cela inciterait la RDC, à son grand regret, à soulever une objection officielle.

28. Monsieur le président, ici s’achève mon exposé sur cet aspect de l’affaire, et je vous prie

de bien vouloir appeler à la barre M. le professeur Corten.

Le PRESIDENT: Je vous remercie, MonsieurSands. Je donne à présent la parole à

M. Corten.

Mr. CORTEN:

N O BASIS FOR THE SELF DEFENCE ARGUMENT

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, please allow me first to express the great honour

which I feel in appearing once again before the worl d’s highest court. This feeling is all the more

sincere in that, in allowing me to plead on its be half in this case, the Congo is at the same time

giving me the opportunity to defend one of the most basic rules of international law, the prohibition

on the use of force. One of the issues at stake in this case is the defence of this principle, which

Uganda seeks quite simply to strip of all meaning through its unjustifiable reliance on two

arguments: that of self-defence and that of the a lleged consent of the Congolese authorities. The

29 consent argument will be addressed tomorrow morn ing. Thus, only the first, the self-defence

argument, will be dealt with today.

2. What is Uganda’s argument in this respec t? If the Respondent’s pleadings are to be

believed, the invasion of the Congo was justified by the serious threat to Uganda resulting from the

outbreak of civil war in the Congo. The Sudanese authorities allegedly took advantage of this civil

war, which began in early August 1998, in order to make use of Congolese territory and to pose a

serious threat to Uganda, all supposedly with the co-operation of Ugandan rebel forces and - 24 -

Congolese Government authorities. Uganda argues that in mid-September it therefore had no other

choice but in turn to deploy its army in the Congo to ward off any threat to its security.

3. This argument was already refuted yesterday morning from a purely factual point of view.

My colleague and friend, Maître Tshibangu Ka lala, showed you that, far from being the

consequence of the outbreak of war in the Congo, Uganda’s military intervention was one of its

constituent elements. As we have seen, this military intervention did not commence in

mid-September 1998, in other words, nearly six week s after the start of the conflict. Rather, the

intervention was one of the elements marking the outbreak of the conflict, as it had already begun

in the first days of August, with Operation “S afe Haven”, conducted jointly by the Ugandan army

and Congolese irregular forces. That operation ⎯ Operation Safe Haven ⎯ the starting date of

which is placed by the Ugandan military at 7 August 1998, cannot, logically speaking, be described

as an act of self-defence in response to events which in fact occurred later. The same is true of

Uganda’s participation in the Kitona airborne operation, which, as we also saw yesterday, began on

4August. Uganda’s self-defence argument does not therefore stand up to scrutiny in the light of

the factual chronology, as Maître Tshibangu Kalala showed you yesterday.

4. The point of the statement which the C ongo will now devote to self-defence is to show

that the argument is unfounded not only in fact but also in law. This is true, as we shall see, if we

look to the actual date at which Uganda’s interven tion began, in early August 1998, and even if we

accept, strictly on a hypothetical basis, Uganda’s view that the relevant date was in mid-September.

30 5. From the legal poin of view, the Democra tic Republic of the Congo must first point out

the very peculiar conception of self-defence seen in the Respondent’s pleadings. According to

Uganda, it reacted in “self-defence” in respon se not to armed aggression but rather to mere

“security concerns” in respect of its border with the Congo. This conception is found throughout

Uganda’s pleadings, according to which:

⎯ Uganda had an “inherent right to self-defence against grievous and imminent threats to her

security” 67, the action it took having therefore been “vital to Uganda’s security” ; 68

67
RU, p. 9, para. 28; see also ibid., p. 5, para. 16; p. 40, p. 81, para. 183; p. 49, para. ibid., p. 7,
para. 23; p. 35, heading B and para. 78; p. 75, para. 169.
6Ibid., p. 46, para. 100. - 25 -

⎯ elsewhere in the pleadings we learn that th e Ugandan army began occupying airfields in

eastern and north-eastern Congo “to prevent the DRC and Sudan from using them to attack

Uganda” 69: to prevent an attack, therefore, not to respond to one;

⎯ finally, to cite a last example, but there ar e others, the sole objective underlying Uganda’s

action was allegedly that of protecting Uganda against “the threat posed to her security by the

DRC’s military alliance with her most dangerous enemies” 70: self-defence in response to a

threat ⎯ not to an armed attack, as stated in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

6. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this line of argument calls upon doctrines which one

would have thought to be matters of the past, such as “self-help”, “vital interests”, and even

“Lebensraum”; it completely distorts the contemporary conception of self-defence and, indirectly,

the entire system prohibiting the use of force est ablished by the United Nations Charter. The

Congo will first show you ⎯ and this will be the object of my statement this morning ⎯ that

Uganda has never been the victim of an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article51 of the

31 Charter, and that this - ⎯ not the existence of mere “security concerns” ⎯ is clearly the condition

on which self-defence may be invoked. My colleag ue Professor Pierre Klein will then show that,

in any case, the invasion of the Congo and its subs equent occupation cannot be considered to be

“necessary and proportionate” actions, as international law requires self-defence measures to be.

Uganda has never established that it has been the victim of an armed attack ascribable to the

Congo

7. Uganda has never established that it has been the victim of an armed attack ascribable to

the Congo. And it would indeed be very difficult for it to do so. Unlike Uganda, the Congo has

never entered onto its neighbour’s territory or, a fortiori, occupied it. As I have already pointed

out, Uganda nevertheless accuses the Congolese authorities of having hatched a plot with Ugandan

irregular forces and Sudan to destabilize the Ugandan State. It was for the purpose of eradicating

this “grievous and imminent threat ”, in the words of the Rejoinder, that the Ugandan army is said

to have reacted by invading and then occupying the Congo.

69
Ibid., p. 78, para. 175; see also ibid., p. 80, para. 179.
70
Ibid., para. 84, para. 192. - 26 -

8. The Congo has already responded at length to these allegations in its written pleadings 71,

to which I refer the Court, but I would like to lay stress on the following four elements, which will

constitute four parts of my statement:

⎯ first, Uganda has not demonstrated involvement by the Democratic Republic of the Congo in

even one armed attack; nor has it demonstrated the Congo’s involvement in the organization,

functioning or activities of irregular forces;

⎯ secondly, Uganda has accordingly not demonstrated that it was first the victim of a prior armed

attack, within the meaning Article 51 of the United Nations Charter;

⎯ thirdly, Uganda cannot show that it was the victim of a plot between the Congo and Sudan,

allegedly justifying a form of “preventive action” on its part;

⎯ finally, and in a fourth section, we will see that this is all confirmed by the conduct of Uganda

itself, which clearly did not, in tempore non suspecto , consider itself to be in a situation of

self-defence.

32 I. Uganda has failed to demonstrate significant involvement by the Democratic Republic
of the Congo in a single armed attack or in the organization, functioning or

activities of irregular forces

9. First, Uganda has failed to demonstrate significant involvement by the Congo in a single

armed attack or in the organization, functioning or activities of irregular forces. This fact can first

be ascertained for the period prior to the start of Uganda’s aggression, that is, the period preceding

August 1998. But it is also the case, as we shall se e, for the period immediately after this critical

date; that is what we shall see subsequently.

A. The absence of evidence of the Congo’s in volvement in attacks carried out by Ugandan

rebels before the beginning of August 1998

10. Let us first consider the period prior to August1998, the only period which is really

relevant in this case, since Uganda is obviously required to show that, at the date of its intervention,

it was already a victim of armed attack. In its Counter-Memorial, Uganda levelled very serious

accusations against the Congo. According to the Respondent, several attacks on it had been carried

71
MDRC, pp.198-205, paras.5.05-5. 24; RDRC, pp.147-204, paras. 3.04-3.115; AWODRC, pp.2-45,
paras. 1.01-1.65, especially pp. 28-45, paras. 1.41-1.65. - 27 -

72
out under “the direction and control” of the Congolese Government and through Ugandan rebels .

These extravagant claims are not to be found in its Rejoinder. Even though it previously claimed

that the Congo was directing the attacks, Uganda now confines itself to accusing the Congo of

“involvement” or “direct participation” 73 in certain armed actions. More generally, it even asserts

that the Congo maintained certain “ties” with Ugandan rebel groups, without specifying the exact

nature of those ties.

11. This softening of Uganda’s argument can be explained very simply by the total absence

of any evidence which could support its position. For, in truth, it is clear that not only did the

Congo not direct or control any armed attack against Uganda, it was not even involved in any. But

what exactly are the attacks which the Congo might have carried out against its neighbour,

provoking a response by Uganda in August1998? Uganda’s Counter-Memorial cites two: these

were military actions carried out against Kichwa mba on 8June1998 and then against Kasese on
33

1August of that year. But the Counter-Memorial offers no evidence of any involvement

whatsoever of the Congo in these attacks. The existing sources, including Ugandan ones, do not

name the Congo, but only the ADF ⎯ Alliance of Democratic Forces, a Ugandan rebel group ⎯ as

74
responsible for these attacks . There is absolutely no indication whatsoever that Congolese

authorities, soldiers or agents took part in pr eparing or carrying out these two actions. This no

doubt explains why Uganda fails even to refe r to the Kichwamba and Kasese attacks in its

Rejoinder 75. At this stage in the proceedings, it can therefore be said that Uganda has implicitly

admitted its inability to demonstrate the Congo’s involvement ⎯ and I stress “involvement”,

without there even being any question of direction or control ⎯ in any armed attack against it

before the month of August 1998, when the Ugandan invasion and occupation began.

12. More generally, can Uganda show that the Congo supported or was involved in any way

in the activities of rebel groups? Despite all its efforts, the Respondent has failed to do so. By

72CMU, paras. 5, 40 and 389.
73
RU, p. 308, para. 666
74
RDRC, p. 189, para. 3.90 and pp. 365-368, paras. 6.38-6.47.
75AWODRC, p. 29, paras. 1.42-1.43. - 28 -

contrast, the Congo has shown in its written pleadings 76 that, even while it was itself confronted

with serious security problems, the Congolese Gove rnment in 1997 and 1998 carried on an active

fight against the Ugandan rebels, and did so in close co-operation with the Ugandan authorities.

Far from being passive or negligent, the Congo th us fought, as far as its circumstances permitted,

against all the irregular forces making use of its territory7.

13. True, this co-operation came to a halt with the start of the aggress
ion in early

August1998. But that does not mean that the Congo suddenly began to support the Ugandan

rebels, as Uganda claims. Thus, I come to an examination of the period beginning in August 1998

and ending on 11 September of that year.

34 B. The absence of evidence of the Congo’s invol vement in attacks ca rried out by Ugandan
rebels between the beginning of August and 11 September 1998

14. Mr. President, Members of the Court, as I said when beginning this presentation, the

chronology is obviously crucial in questions of self-defence. Confronted by the clear lack of

evidence in support of its argument, Uganda does not dare make a real claim that it was in a

situation of self-defence in early August1998. According to the Respondent, it was only on

11 September 1998, as we saw yesterday, that the threat took on such a degree of seriousness that it

justified the response. This argument by Uga nda thus requires a showing both that Uganda’s

intervention only began on 11September and that , during the month of August1998 or at the

beginning of September, Uganda had been the vic tim of a prior armed attack on the part of the

Congo.

15. As for the first of these elements, Maître Tshibangu Kalala showed yesterday morning

that the Ugandan army did in fact invade the Congo in early August 1998, not in mid-September.

We therefore have before us two separate facts: first, Uganda invaded the Congo at the beginning

of August 1998 and, second, as we have just seen, Uganda cannot show that it was the victim at

that date of any attack on the part of the Congo. These two facts suffice thoroughly to discredit the

self-defence claim and, in fact, the Democratic Republic of the Congo could virtually stop here.

76
RDRC, pp.150 et seq; AWODRC, pp.38-42, paras.1.53-1.60; RDRC, p.189, para . 3.90 and pp. 365-368,
paras. 6.38-6.47; AWODRC, pp. 29-34, paras. 1.44-1.46.
7RDRC, pp. 158-166, paras. 3.26-3.43. - 29 -

16. But, in any event, even if we hypothesize ⎯ and this is only an hypothesis ⎯ that

Uganda did not invade the Congo until mid-Septem ber, it must be noted that Uganda produces no

documentary evidence showing any Congolese milita ry attack against it, or any significant

involvement of the Congo in the functioning or activities of rebel groups at that date. Thus, no

78
more so in mid-September than in early August 1998 .

17. Uganda would moreover have great difficulty in proving a Congolese attack or threat

against it in early August or September1998. It must be recalled that the Congolese authorities

during that period were no longer in control of the parts of Congolese territory occupied by the

aggressor forces. You need only refer to the map appearing behind me to realize this. Roughly

35 speaking, the area with red hatch marks is th e Congolese territory occupied by Uganda in

September 1998. It would simply have been impo ssible at that time to furnish significant support

to the irregular forces operating in this zone. Even if they had wished to do so, for reasons which

Uganda has never really brought out, the Congolese authorities could not have assisted the armed

forces then operating in the north-eastern Congo.

18. Finally, the Congo does not deny that, unbeknownst to it and against its wishes, some

Ugandan rebels might have entered or taken refuge at various times in parts of its territory. The

thesis of Congolese support for these rebels has, on the other hand, never been proved by Uganda.

The difficulties experienced by the State authorities, Congolese as well as Ugandan, in asserting

control over the border area moreover rule out any contention as to a lack of vigilance or a failure

to exercise due diligence. Accordingly, Uganda cannot claim to have been acting in self-defence in

August 1998 or even in September of that year; this brings me to the second point of my statement,

which will be devoted to consideration of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Mr. President, before I elaborate on this poi nt, you may perhaps deem it appropriate to

suspend the proceedings for a few minutes for the break.

78
RDRC, pp. 370-375, paras. 6.51-6.64; AWODRC, pp. 64-66, paras. 1.98-1.101. - 30 -

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Corten.

It is now time to have a break of ten minutes, after which you will continue your statement.

The Court adjourned from 11.20 to 11.30 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated.

Professor Corten, please continue.

Mr. CORTEN: Thank you, Mr. President.

II. In the circumstances, Uganda has not demonstrated that it was the victim of prior armed
attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter

19. Thank you. Mr. President, not content with exaggerating or falsifying the facts in order

to bring them to within the definition of aggression, Uganda also seeks to lower the level of legal

36 requirement by attempting to equate “armed atta ck”, within the meaning of Article51 of the

Charter, with any hostile act, or indeed any tolera nce for the perpetration of such acts. As there

was no such tolerance, as we have just seen, th e discussion could stop there. The Congo, however,

feels itself bound to respond to the arguments developed on this point by the respondent State, so

seriously do they undermine existing legal categories.

20. The disagreement between the Parties may be summarized as follows. For the Congo,

pursuant to Article3 (g) of the definition of aggression contained in General Assembly

resolution 3314, an armed attack implies the sending of an irregular force or, at the very least, the

“substantial involvement” of a Stat e in the activities of such forces 79. For Uganda, on the other

hand, a mere “conspiracy” between a State and irre gular forces would be equivalent to a grievous
80
and imminent threat to its security, a threat which would confer on it a right of self-defence . I

refer the Court to the written pleadings for the deta ils of the respective arguments. At this stage,

the Congo will respond to the Ugandan thesis on four points.

21. First, the Congo is astonished at the fero city with which Uganda attacks the case law of

the International Court of Justice in an attempt to substitute therefor what it itself calls an

79
MDRC, pp. 200-203, paras. 5.11-5.17, RDRC, pp. 206-229, paras. 3.118-3.158.
8CMU, pp. 180-216, paras. 329-368; RU, pp. 116-119, paras. 268-276. - 31 -

81
“alternative approach” . In its Nicaragua Judgment, the Court stressed the need to maintain a

distinction between cases of armed attack and “other less grave forms” of the use of force 82. This

distinction remains fully valid today, and the Court reaffirmed it once again, as you know, in 2003,

83
in the Oil Platforms case . It is necessary in the present case to maintain the distinction between

the situation of a State which massively supports armed groups, including by deliberately allowing

them access to its territory, and a case of mere negligence, such as would enable groups of this type

to act against a third State. On ly the first hypothesis could be characterized as an “armed attack”

within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter, thus justifying a unilateral response. Although the

second engages the international responsibility of the State concerned, it constitutes no more than a

“breach of the peace”, enabling the Security Council to take action pursuant to Chapter VII of the
37

Charter, without, however, creating an entitlement to a unilateral response based on self-defence.

In the instant case, neither the first nor the sec ond hypothesis is in any event applicable, as the

Congo neither instituted nor tolerated the activities of Ugandan rebel forces.

22. Secondly, the Congo maintains that its lega l position is shared by the great majority, or

84
indeed all, of legal writers . None of the authors cited by Uganda claims, however, that ill-defined

notions of negligence, conspiracy or tolerance would, as such, be equivalent to an “armed attack”

within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter. At best, some consider that massive logistical and

military support by a State for a group of irregul ars could, even in the absence of substantial

involvement in an attack, be equivalent to an armed attack. Once again, however, this hypothesis is

far from being applicable in the present case. The Congolese State has never provided massive

logistical and military support to Ugandan irregular forces.

23. Thirdly, the Congo considers that the practice of States, particularly of the States directly

concerned, is a relevant factor to be taken into account in the context of this case. In this

connection, mention should be made of the communiqués by the States of Southern 85, Central 86

8Ibid., p. 202, para. 350; RU, p. 116, para. 268.
82
I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 101, para. 191.
83
I.C.J. Reports 2003, Judgment of 6 November 2003, p. 186, para. 51.
8RDRC, p. 212, para. 3.130 and Ian Brownlie “International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands”, ICLQ,
1958, p. 731.

8MDRC, Anns. 118 and 119.

8Ibid., Ann. 61. - 32 -

87 88
and East Africa, as well as those of the OAU . Mr. President, Members of the Court, you will

find the texts of those communiqués in the Congol ese pleadings, as referenced in the footnotes to

this presentation. You will note that the co mmuniqués denounce the aggression suffered by the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, reaffirm the independence and territorial integrity of the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, and call for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory

of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is in fact the Congo, not Uganda, which is considered

to be the State under attack. It is thus in r eality the Congo, not Uganda, which is generally

considered to be in a situation of self-defence.

38 24. This brings me to a fourth and final point , which is perhaps the most decisive one. As

we all know, the Security Council has been given si gnificant powers to determine that an act of

89
aggression has been committed and, more broa dly, to assess situations of self-defence . In the

present case, however, the Security Council very cl early rejected the Ugandan claims, while on the

contrary recognizing that the Democratic Republic of the Congo was in a situation of self-defence.

The extracts from the relevant resolutions are to be found in your judges’ folder under tab 21. In its

resolution 1234, adopted on 9 April 1999, the Council

“Recalling the inherent right of i ndividual or collective self-defence in
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Deplores the continuing fighting and the presence of forces of foreign States in

the Democratic Republic of the Congo in a manner inconsistent with the principles of
the Charter of the United Nations, and calls upon those States to bring to an end the
presence of these uninvited forces and to take immediate steps to that end.” 90

In that resolution, the Security Council rec ognizes the right of self-defence, and the Congo’s

entitlement thereto is clearly recognized. The C ouncil deplores the behaviour of “foreign States”

and of “uninvited” forces, these being the terms it uses. And it is indeed Uganda, inter alia, which

is being referred to here; if any doubt remained , it was definitively dispelled by the adoption of

87Ibid., Ann. 62.
88
Ibid., Anns. 49, 51.
89
Resolution 3314 of the United Nations General Assembly, Article 2 of the annexed definition.
90MDRC, Ann. 1. - 33 -

resolution1304 of 16June2000, which confirms that “Uganda and Rwanda. .. have violated the

sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo” 91.

25. Through these resolutions, which have been repeatedly reiterated by the Security

92
Council , the latter exercised its prerogatives by rec ognizing the Congo’s right of self-defence.

39 These resolutions were formally accepted by Uganda 93. Finally, it may be considered that they

settle the legal debate concerning self-defence in this case. There is no possible reason for the

Court to call in question the factual and legal assessments made on a number of occasions by the

Security Council.

26. This conclusion ⎯ and this brings me to the third part of my presentation ⎯ cannot be

impugned by claims concerning an alleged alliance between the Congo and Sudan, which, again

according to Uganda, justified its preventive military action.

III. Uganda has not demonstrated the existence of a plot between the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan such as would

justify its preventive military action

27. The thesis of a plot between the Congo and Sudan comes up regularly in the Ugandan

written pleadings. According to Uganda, PresidentKa bila is said to have hatched this plot in the

course of a trip (according to th e Counter-Memorial) or three trips (according to the Rejoinder) to

Khartoum, in May1998 (according to the Counter-Memorial), or in June, August or

September1998 (according to the Rejoinder) 94. The inconsistencies of this scenario, which was

clearly concocted for the purposes of these proceedings, have already been denounced in the

95
Congolese pleadings . At this late stage in the proceedings, Uganda has provided not even a shred

of evidence that a plot was hatched against it by the Congolese and Sudanese authorities, a plot

9Ibid.
92
Resolutions 1258 of 6August1999 (first preambular paragraph), 1273 of 5November1999 (first preambular
paragraph), 1279 of 30November1999 (first preambular paragraph), 1291 of 24February2000 (first preambular
paragraph), 1304 of 16June2000 (first preambular para graph), 1316 of 23August2000 (first preambular paragraph),
1323 of 13 October 2000 (first preambular paragraph), 1332 of 14 December 2000 (first preambular paragraph), 1341 of
22 February 2001 (first preambular paragraph), 1355 of 15 June 2001 (first preambular paragraph), 1399 of 19 mars 2002
(first preambular paragraph), 1417 of 14June2002 (first preambular paragraph), 1445 of 4December2002 (first

preambular paragraph), 1457 of 24January2003 (first pream bular paragraph), 1468 of 20March2003 (first preambular
paragraph), 1484 of 30 May 2003, and 1493 of 28 July 2003 (first preambular paragraph); statement of the President of
24 June 1999 (S/PRST/1999/17).
93
CMU, p. 151, para. 270.
9Ibid., pp. 30-31, paras. 38-39; RU, pp. 35-36, paras. 79-80.

9RDRC, pp. 179-182, paras. 3.70-3.71; AWODRC, pp. 42 -45, paras. 1.61-1.65. - 34 -

which allegedly motivated the invasion and subsequent occupation of the Congo from the

beginning of August 1998.

28. Uganda further claims that, around the end of August1998, Sudanese armed forces

began deploying on Congolese territory, at the re quest of the Government of the Democratic

Republic of the Congo. It was due to the fear that those forces might take possession of certain

airports in the north and east of the Congo that th e Ugandan army is said to have been prompted to

96
intervene on a preventive basis, in mi d-September1998, in Congolese territory . Mr.President,

Members of the Court, this second version of the co nspiracy theory is no more convincing than the

first one.

40 A. The lack of evidence of an alliance between the DRC and Sudan

29. In the first place, this theory is also not supported by any evidence. When it suffered the

external aggression which began in early August 1998, the Congo officially called on other States

of the region for help, invoking its right of collective self-defence, in accordance with existing

international law. The States concerned are well known, and have moreover been involved in

every phase of the subsequent peace process. They are the States of Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe

and, to a more limited degree and over a more limited period of time, Chad. The Congolese

Government, on the other hand, did not call on Sudan to support or defend it. That is why Sudan,

unlike the other States I have just mentioned, was not associated with the Lusaka ceasefire

Agreement or with any other instrument of this t ype. The Ugandan allegations are barely credible

and, in fact, the respondent State has not even been capable of demonstrating that a single Sudanese

soldier was present in the Congo, any more than it h as been capable of demonstrating that it took a

single one of such soldiers prisoner.

30. This brings me to a second remark, whic h again relates to the chronology of events.

Uganda’s attack on the Congo began early in August1998. From that date, the Congolese

Government was entitled to request and receive s upport from other States. Uganda is therefore

particularly ill-advised to accuse it of an act which has not only not been proven but, even if it

were, would make absolutely no difference to the legal situation. By what right can Uganda not

96
RU, p. 78, para. 175. - 35 -

only invade the Congo but also deny it the right to defend itself, including by calling on other

States for help in repelling the aggression?

31. Uganda replies that its military interven tion began only in mid-September, i.e. after

Sudanese troops entered Congolese territory. Howeve r, even if this version of the facts was

established as true ⎯ which is in no way the case, as I have just pointed out ⎯ that would make

absolutely no difference in legal terms. Under international law, there was nothing to prevent the

Congo from authorizing Sudanese troops to enter its territory in time of peace or in time of war.

Uganda cannot claim to have been injured, still less to have been attacked, by the mere presence of

Sudanese troops on Congolese territory. Its self-d efence arguments could only be accepted if it

41 was established that armed attacks were carried out by Sudan with the participation of the

Congolese authorities, or with their help or assistance. But Uganda ⎯ as we have seen ⎯ fails to

demonstrate the existence of any attack of this kind.

B. The Ugandan doctrine of “preventive action” is at variance with Article 51 of the Charter

32. On this point, the Congo can only wonder at the tenor of Uganda’s legal argument.

According to the respondent State, it was prompted to intervene not in order to repel an armed

Sudanese or Congolese attack, but to avoid the risk that such an attack might occur. Again,

according to the Ugandan pleadings, if it was nece ssary to seize all the lo calities in the north and

east of the Congo, it was to prevent or deter a possible attack by the Sudanese army against

Uganda. I began this presentation by citing several passages from the Ug andan pleadings, which

refer inter alia to an operation designed to “ prevent the DRC and Sudan from using the [airfields]

to attack Uganda” 97. Uganda goes so far as to claim ⎯ and again I am quoting from its

Rejoinder ⎯ that the Congolese authorities’ calls for a withdrawal of the Ugandan troops “was

itself a hostile act that threatened Ugandan security” 98 and that it could not tolerate the presence of

99
Sudanese troops at airfields “that could be used to bomb Ugandan targets”. Further on, Uganda

again confirms that it was a question of “ preventing eastern Congo from being used as a base for

9RU, p. 78, para. 175; emphasis added by the DRC.
98
RU, p. 47, para. 101.
9RU, p. 40, para. 86; emphasis added by the DRC. - 36 -

attacks against her”. 100 Even if it dares not espouse them as such, Uganda thus seems to be

endorsing the theories of “preventive”, or “pre-emptive”, action, the avowed purpose of which is to

make radical changes to the rules of the United Nations Charter.

33. Uganda’s arguments serve precisely to dem onstrate the excesses to which this type of

doctrine can lead. According to Uganda, its ac tion was designed to prevent the Sudanese army

from using the airfields against it, and this is sa id to have justified the seizure of towns with

airfields such as Bunia, Beni, Isiro, Buta, Bumba, Lisala and Gbadolite. These localities are shown
42

on the map projected behind me, a map which you will find in your judges’ folders under tab 22.

Mr. President, Members of the Court, Uganda has, however, never demonstrated that an attack had

been carried out, was on the point of being carried out, or was even planned against it, from any of

these localities. Uganda acknowledges, moreover, that no Sudanese troops were present in those

towns, when it states that it had “no alternative but to deploy more troops to Eastern Congo and to

gain control of the strategic airfields a nd river ports in Northern and Eastern Congo before the

Sudanese/Chadians/FAC and other a llied forces could occupy them”. 101 Uganda even resorts to

producing a map justifying its invasion through the seizure of “strategic airfields in the DRC from

which Uganda was “vulnerable to attack” in August-September 1998” 102. You can check the exact

title of this map by looking behind me or by consulting your judges’ folder under tab23. These

airfields were thus effectively attacked and o ccupied because they would have made Uganda

“vulnerable to attack”; “vulnerable to attack”, I am not making this up, these are the actual words

used by Uganda to present its map.

34. Mr.President, Members of the Court, in light of the Respondent’s argument, there is

only one question Congo needs to ask: why did the Ugandan army stop when it had already got so

far? Why did the UPDF not attack all the localities shown on this map, which you will find as

No.24 in your judges’ folders? Bumba, Lisala, Gbadolite, but al so Lubumbashi, Kolwezi or...

Kinshasa, all have fully operational airports wh ich, still according to the doctrine of preventive

action as defended by Uganda, could constitute a “ser ious risk” to Uganda’s security, making that

10RU, p. 80, para. 178; emphasis added by the DRC.
101
CMU, p. 41, para. 52.
10RU, p. 80 bis; emphasis added by the DRC. - 37 -

country “vulnerable to attack”. So these towns could allegedly have been attacked “before” hostile

forces could use them!

35. Mr.President, Members of the Court, until proof of the contrary, Article51 of the

43 Charter has not been amended, and the doctr ine of “preventive” or “pre-emptive” action ⎯ the

name is not important ⎯ has not been accepted in internati onal law. Self-defence always

presupposes an “armed attack”, as the Court again reaffirmed in two decisions delivered

103 104
respectively in 2003 in a contentious case and, in 2004, in an advisory case , decisions which

the Democratic Republic of the Congo is today ask ing the Court to confirm. Uganda is bound to

show that it has been the victim of a prior armed attack by the Congo. It is not enough for it to

assert that it felt threatened or that it was, to quote its own words one last time, “vulnerable to

attack”.

36. Furthermore, and lastly, Congo even has every reason to doubt that Uganda genuinely

felt threatened by Sudan. In October1998, it was Sudan, not Uganda, which seised the Security

Council to complain of aggression by armed Ugandan forces. Thus it was Sudan, not Uganda,

which invoked its right of self-defence and threatened to exercise it 105. And what was Uganda’s

reaction? The Ugandan Minister for Foreign Affairs replied on the subject of a possible

counter-attack by Sudan, and I quote: “In my view that is an empty threat, and [Sudan] has no

106
capacity to do it.” This is, to say the least, very hard to square with the fear of a “grave and

imminent threat” scenario today being peddled by Uganda.

IV. The baselessness of the self-defence argument is confirmed by the conduct of

Uganda itself, which was very late in invoking it

37. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in th e fourth and last section of my statement this

morning, I should like to ask a question which perfectly illustrates the weakness of Uganda’s

argument. What does a State suffering an attack do? This simple question may be met with an

equally simple reply. An aggressed State imme diately protests, and demands that the aggressor

10Case concerning Oil Platforms, Judgment of 6 November 2003, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 186, para. 51.
104
Case concerning Legal Consequences of the Construction oa Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory ,
Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, para. 139.
105
IRIN 516, 5 October 1998, RDRC, Ann. 108.
10IRIN 518, 7 October 1998, RDRC, Ann. 108. - 38 -

44 State cease the aggression. The aggressed State then invokes its right of self-defence and, in

accordance with Article51 of the Charter, reports the matter to the Security Council, asking it to

take appropriate measures pursuant to Chapter VII.

38. This is precisely the strategy pursued by the Congo, like other aggressed States before it

and others since. Since the beginning of August 1998, Congo has accused Uganda of aggression,

including in the United Nations, and has asked it to put an end to it 107. The Congo immediately

exercises its right of self-defence and seises the Secu rity Council with a request for it to act. The

Council, as I have reminded you, then recognizes the Congo’s right of self-defence.

39. Let us now consider the conduct of Uganda, which today claims that it suffered an armed

attack in August 1998, a few weeks earlier, or in the month of September. Uganda has not accused

the Congo of aggression. It has not, for example, asked it to cease launching attacks, to withdraw

from its territory, or to cease its involvement in th e activities of any irregular force. When itself

accused of aggression at the beginning of August 1998, its first reaction is to deny all involvement

108
in the conflict . Uganda does not then write to the S ecurity Council requesting it to take action

pursuant to Article51 of the Charter. Not un til September would Uganda start to criticize the

Congo, yet without ever accusing it of aggression. The legal basis then relied on by Ugandan

officials to justify their forces’ presence on Congol ese territory was not self-defence, but rather the

109
prevention of a “genocide”, or vague “security concerns” , which thus having nothing to do with

self-defence. In March1999, in other words ove r sixmonths after the event, a senior Ugandan

official for the first time mentions Article51 of th e Charter. But this was in fact to justify the

support given by Uganda to the forces of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, at a time, in 1997, when they were

battling the official Government of Zaire, and not to explain its position in the conflict which broke

45 out in August1998 110. It was indeed only in the contex t of the present proceedings that the

self-defence argument would for the first time be clearly and explicitly invoked by the Respondent.

10RDRC, pp. 173-174, para. 3.58 and MDRC, Ann. 27.
108
RDRC, pp. 174-178, paras. 3.58-3.67.
109
RDRC, Ann. 16.
11CMU, Ann. 42, pp. 14-17. - 39 -

40. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the facts here speak for themselves. Uganda has

never behaved like an aggressed State, and for a very simple reason. Not only did it neither feel,

nor actually was, attacked but it knew perfectly well that it was the aggressor. This clearly explains

why it first chose to deny any involvement in the conflict, hoping that the result would be the rapid

overthrow of the Congolese Government. Only when this position was no longer tenable did it

little by little and willy-nilly cobble together the scenario of “self-defence”, soon embellished with

the theory of a plot. A scenario which, as we ha ve seen, has never convinced anyone, certainly not

the United Nations Security Council, which, as we have also seen, ruled to the precise opposite

effect.

41. Uganda is, to say the least, embarrassed by this aspect of the case. It therefore pretends

not to grasp its implications, stating in its Rejoinder that its persistent silence ⎯ which it thus does

not deny ⎯ cannot be equated with “acquiescence” in the armed attack, of which it suddenly

111
claims to have been the victim . But at this stage in the argument, Congo does not seek to rely

on any claim of acquiescence. It simply notes that, as stated by the Court in the Nicaragua case

when dealing with a similar i ssue, the Respondent’s conduct “har dly conforms with the latter’s

avowed conviction that it was ac ting in the context of collectiv e self-defence as consecrated by

112
Article 51 of the Charter” .

42. Lastly, Mr. President, Uganda’s conduct is, if anything, proof of its belief that, north-east

Congo constitutes a sort of “hinterland”, into which it feels able to move when and how it chooses.

In April 2003, when the withdrawal of the Ugandan troops was finally announced after almost five

years of continuous occupation, the Ugandan Minister for Foreign Affairs declared ⎯ officially ⎯

46 that “removal of troops from the DRC will not mean we shall not go back there to defend our

113
security” . A statement which says much about Uganda’s concept of “self-defence” and takes us

back to an era we hoped was past, where self-prote ction permitted any State to attack another as

and when it chose and felt able to do so.

11RU, p. 115, para. 264.
112
I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 121, para. 235.
11AFP, 17 April 2003. - 40 -

43. Mr. President, Members of the Court, tha nk you for your kind attention. May I ask you

to give the floor to Professor Pierre Klein, so that he may continue the argument of the Democratic

Republic of the Congo by showing you that the conditions of necessity and proportionality required

in order to justify a claim of self-defence are not met in this case.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Corten. I now give the floor to

Professor Pierre Klein.

KMLr.IN:

T HE CONDITIONS OF NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY FOR SELF DEFENCE ARE NOT MET

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, let me say before anything else how sensible I am of

the very great honour of appearing for the first time before the Court in plenary session. I am also

anxious to express my thanks to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for honouring me with its

confidence in the present dispute, which raises issu es of very great importance in both legal and

human terms. As the Court has just heard, Uganda is claiming to have exercised a right to self-

defence in invading and subsequently occupyin g Congolese territory for nearly five years, to

respond to what it describes as “security concerns”. A short while ago my colleague Olivier Corten

explained that there is nothing to show that Uga nda was the victim of an “armed attack” by Congo

within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. I for my part will explain to

47 the Court that the Respondent is also still incapable of proving that it has met the other conditions

to which international customary law submits the exercise of the right of self-defence.

2. In its opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons the Court clearly

stated:

“The submission of the exercise of the right of self-defence to the conditions of
necessity and proportionality is a rule of cu stomary international law. As the Court
stated in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against

Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (I.C.J. Reports 1986 , p.94,
para.176): ‘there is a specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only
measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a
rule well established in customary interna tional law’. This dual condition applies
114
equally to Article 51 of the Charter, whatever the means of force employed.”

114
I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 245, para. 41. See, to the same effect, the dissenting opinion of Judge Rosalyn Higgins,
ibidem, p. 583. - 41 -

The close relationship between the actual con cept of self-defence and the two conditions of

necessity and proportionality was brought out very clearly by Roberto Ago in his last report on the

responsibility of States. Allow me to cite it also:

“the requirements of the ‘necessity’ and ‘p roportionality’ of the action taken in self-

defence can simply be described as two sid es of the same coin. Self-defence will be
valid as a circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of the conduct of the State only if
that State was unable to achieve the desired result by different conduct, involving
115
either no use of armed force at all or merely its use on a lesser scale.”

3. In our case Uganda could have adopted c onduct other than the invasion and subsequent

occupation of a very substantial part of Congolese territory for five years, an invasion and

occupation which in addition were accompanied by numerous cases of looting and atrocities. To

be specific, Uganda has observed neither th e condition of necessity nor the condition of

proportionality required by international customary law. I will deal with these two criteria in

succession, starting with the requirement of necessity.

I. Uganda has not observed the condition of necessity

4. First and foremost, the meaning of the te rm “necessity” should be borne in mind in order

to be able to assess the conduct of Uganda w ith regard to this first requirement. The Robert

48 dictionary defines “ nécessité” as follows: “caractère nécessaire d’une chose, d’une action ”, and

defines “nécessaire” in the following way: “se dit d’une condition, d’un moyen dont la présence ou

l’action rend seule possible une fin ou un effet ”. Cornu’s Vocabulaire juridique dictionary defines

the term “nécessaire” as “ce qui est impérieusement dicté par les circonstances ” 116. The meaning

of the term in English is identical. According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, “necessary”

means “1. Required to be done, achieved, or present; needed. 2. Inevitable: a necessary

117
consequence” . All these definitions, like the decision of the Court cited above, have one feature

in common: the exclusive, imperious, indispensable nature of the condition of necessity. It must be

stressed in this connection that international la w allows a State claiming to have had recourse to

force in self-defence very limited room for manoeuvre when a decision on the necessary nature of

11YILC, 1980, Vol. II, Part 1, p. 67, para. 120.
116
6th edition, PUF, Paris 1987, p. 549.
1110th edition, OUP, 1999, p. 953. - 42 -

such use of force is in issue. The Court stated this very clearly in the Oil Platforms case, when it

stressed that “the requirement of international law that measures taken avowedly in self-defence

must have been necessary for that purpose is strict and objective, leaving no room for any “measure

of discretion” 11.

4. The conduct of Uganda falls far short of th is standard. Even assuming that Uganda really

felt threatened in August and September1998, in no sense would this fear make the invasion and

subsequent occupation of Congolese territory an exclusive or indispensable response to the alleged

attack. It is clear that the Respondent allowe d its objectives to remain uncertain and failed to

exhaust peaceful means of settling its dispute with the Congo before resorting to force.

A. Uganda has allowed the objectives of its military intervention to remain uncertain

5. First of all the criterion of necessity implies – and this has not been disputed by Uganda –

that the aim of self-defence is to “repel an a ttack and to prevent it from succeeding and nothing

49 else” 119. By definition, necessity can be envisaged onl y in relation to a specific objective, and in

accordance with Article 51 of the Charter that objective can only be a response to an “armed

attack”.

6. In order to circumvent this requirement, Uganda has allowed the objectives of its action to

remain uncertain.. As Congo has demonstrated in its written pleadings, with quotations in support,

the Ugandan authorities themselves have put forw ard various justifications that go far beyond a

120
response to an armed attack . In substance they claimed th at the reasons for their armed

intervention in the Congo were the restoration or maintenance of security in the region and, in the

121
actual words of President Museveni, “the prevention of genocide” .

7. The first of these objectives goes far beyond a response to an “armed attack” within the

meaning of international law. According to Uganda’s pleadings, its objective was extended to

dealing with its “security concerns”, a notion that was clearly taken in a very broad sense. Thus

the Respondent states that “[a]gainst the perceive d threat of increased destabilization of Uganda

118I.C.J. Reports 2003, Judgment of 6 November 2003, para. 73.
119
YILC, 1980, Vol. II, Part 1, p. 67, para. 67.
120
RRDC, pp. 232-235, paras. 3.162-3.164.
121RRDC, Ann. 16. - 43 -

especially by Sudan using Congolese territory as it had previously done, Uganda deployed

122
additional forces to counter this threat” . Here we are witnessing a semantic shift away from the

fundamental concepts of positive international law. On this view, necessity is no longer linked to

the objective of responding to an armed attack but to a far vaguer one: the prevention of a threat .

ProfessorCorten has just cited other statements of this kind which demonstrate the extent of

Uganda’s adherence to the doctrines of “preventive”, or “pre-emptive”, action, seeking not to repel

an attack but to remove a “threat” whose limits remain largely undefined. It is clear that in our case

Uganda has sought to assume regional police and peacekeeping powers, without ever having been

authorized to do so by the Security Council. Th is is conduct which, whatever view one might take

of it in other respects, is far from corresponding to the institution of self-defence as it exists in

present-day international law.

50 8. The same applies a fortiori to the purported “right of humanitarian intervention” which

President Museveni appeared to evoke at one point when he claimed that Uganda’s objective was

“the prevention of genocide” in the region, an objective which, putting it mildly, hardly sits well

with the grave violations of humanitarian law of which the Ugandan forces themselves have been

guilty, as the Democratic Republic of Congo will dem onstrate in detail tomorrow. In any event, it

is an objective which has absolutely nothing to do with a response to an armed attack, the essential

characteristic of self-defence.

B. Uganda failed to exhaust peaceful means before having recourse to force

9. Let us assume for the moment, for the sake of argument, that Uganda’s objective was

simply to respond to an armed attack. According to the work of the International Law Commission

on State Responsibility, the condition of necessity requi red by international law in order to justify

the exercise of the right of self-defence also presupposes that there is an “extremely urgent

situation [which] obviously leaves no means for requesting other bodies, including the Security

Council, to undertake the necessary defensive action” 123. In his comments on that requirement,

122
UCM, pp. 40-41.
12Roberto Ago, addendum to the Eighth Report on State ResponsibiliYILC, 1980, Vol.II, PartOne, p.70,
para. 123. - 44 -

Roberto Ago pointed out that the condition of necess ity was fulfilled when the state concerned had

124
exhausted all other means before having recourse to force .

10. In its pleadings, Uganda did not once call those legal criteria into question. However, it

never went to the Security Council, either be fore or during the invasion and occupation of the

Congo, to explain the situation of extreme peril that it was supposedly facing. Neither did Uganda

request the Security Council to take any necessary or urgent measures to ensure the maintenance of

peace and security along its common border with the Congo. Nor did it ask the Security Council to

authorize the Ugandan State to send its troops into th at area in order to curb the activities of hostile

armed groups operating therein, or to prevent the genocide which was purportedly about to be

committed there.

51 11. Nor, at regional level, did the Respondent refer the matter in timely fashion to regional

African organizations such as the OAU or the SADC. Nor did it bring the case before the Heads of

State in the region during the numerous informal su mmits that took place at the time. Uganda thus

failed to use the appropriate forums to seek a p eaceful solution to its security concerns, whereas,

had it failed in such an initiative, it might then ha ve been entitled to use force against the Congo as

a last resort ⎯ assuming, once again, that aggression was established.

12. Lastly, on a bilateral level, Uganda faile d to contact the Congolese authorities in order to

register its complaints and propose solutions w ith a view to strengthening security along the

common border. As Uganda has abundantly emphasi zed in other contexts, there was indeed, since

the conclusion of the 27April1998 agreemen t, a legal framework in which any remaining

problems of security “along the common border”, to use the very terms of that agreement, could be

addressed.

13. In its pleadings 12, the Respondent itself admits that it made no formal protest against the

Democratic Republic of the Congo before October 1998. That is to say ⎯ on its own admission ⎯

after it had launched its military intervention in Congolese territory. Furthermore Uganda does not

claim to have called upon any regional organization or the Security Council to complain of the

124
Ibid., p. 69, para. 120.
125
Ibid., p. 121-122, para. 282-284. - 45 -

“armed attack” of which it now claims to have been the victim and to request that appropriate

measures be taken to put an end to that situation.

14. In these circumstances, there is no doubt that the condition of necessity was not respected

by Uganda.

15. The Respondent replies that, in order to assess that condition of necessity, one has to take

126
into account a whole series of circumstances that prevailed at the time , but that is precisely what

the Congo has done. And when the circumstances of the material time are taken into account, it

can be seen very clearly that unilateral recourse to force was certainly not a necessary measure of

52 self-defence in August, or even September, 1998. Perhaps Uganda could have explained its refusal

to exhaust peaceful remedies by the fact that it was the victim of a sudden attack, which would

have left it no choice of means or time for deliber ation, to use a well-known form of words. But,

on the contrary, the Respondent does not complain of any attack of that kind, but of some vague

threat to its security which had develope d over a period of months or even years 12. In these

circumstances, it is obvious that the Ugandan au thorities were perfectly capable of using peaceful

means to settle their dispute with the Democra tic Republic of the Congo before envisaging the

military option.

16. In the light of all these elements, it is clear that Uganda’s objectives in invading and

occupying the Congo were certainly not to repel a ny armed attack by the Congo. Nor has Uganda

succeeded in proving that it was obliged to act ur gently or that its military measures against the

Congo were the only possible ones. It follows that the invasion and occupation of a very

significant area of Congolese territory by the Respo ndent do not fall within the framework of self-

defence and are contrary to international law. This is especially true, in as much as the military

action taken by Uganda was paten tly disproportionate in relation to the circumstances of the case,

which brings me to the second condition that our opponents have failed to satisfy.

126
Ibid., p. 121-122, para. 282-284.
12CMU, Vol. 1, pp. 25-43. - 46 -

II.UGANDA DID NOT RESPECT THE CONDITION OF PROPORTIONALITY

17. Unlike necessity, the criterion of proportio nality is more flexible. It establishes a

relationship between two elements whereby the exte nt of the reaction can be measured against the

gravity of the event which it is intended to counter . However, it must be said that, in the total

absence of an armed attack launched from the Congo, any “counter measure” by Uganda could

only be disproportionate. If propor tionality is applicable in the case of vague threats, the very

concept of proportionality disappears; it loses all meaning. Any counter-measure whatsoever may

become appropriate to deal with an undefined threat. Thus the requirement of proportionality

inherently precludes any extension of the concept of self-defence to pre-emptive action; otherwise,

it would simply be subsumed in arbitrary notions of characterization. I will return briefly to that

point at the end of this statement. But I would fi rst like to address the point that the extent of the

53 occupation of the Congolese territory by Uganda was totally disproportionate, as well as the fact

that Uganda’s support for a number of Congol ese insurgent groups patently fell outside the

framework of a proportionate counter-measure of self-defence.

A. The extent of the occupation of Congolese territory was totally di sproportionate to the

alleged objective of response to an armed attack

18. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I wish to draw your attention to this map. To the

north-east of the Congo, you can see here ⎯ where the marker is positioned ⎯ is the border zone

between Uganda and the Congo, where security probl ems have long existed. Then, coloured in

red, is the zone representing the areas of Congol ese territory occupied by the Ugandan army. A

simple comparison of the extent of those two zones probably requires no comment. However, I

would like to emphasize two points at this stage.

19. First, the depth of the advance of the Ugandan army inside Congolese territory. As you

will see illustrated in your judges’ folder under tab 25, Uganda sent its troops to invade and occupy

the towns of Kisangani, located 650 km from the border, Bumba and Lisala, respectively 900 and

1050 km from the border, Gbadolite, 1120 km from the border, Libenge, 1350 km from the border,

Mobenzene, 1420 km from the border, as well as ⎯ the most extreme case ⎯ the town of Kitona,

attacked by Ugandan airborne forces in early A ugust 1998 and located as far as 2160 km from the

Ugandan border. There is probably no need to emph asize further the fact that military actions of - 47 -

such scope, carried out by Uganda so far from its western border, are patently disproportionate to

the Respondent’s alleged objective of repelling an alleged threat “along its common border”.

20. Secondly, the extent of the Congolese territory occupied by the Ugandan Army. On this

subject, as we already stated yesterday, Uganda has shown surprising modesty in admitting that it

only occupied, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, an area corresponding roughly to the size

of Germany 128⎯ which, I am sure you will agree, is already quite significant in itself. In reality,

54 the territory occupied by Uganda in the Congo, as is clearly shown on another map, to be found in

the judges’ folders under tab 26, represents almost one third of the entire area of Western Europe.

The occupied territory extends over three Congol ese provinces and covers a surface area of some

900,000square km, about 22 times the size of the Neth erlands or twice the size of Germany. In

these circumstances, where is the proportionality between the use of force by Uganda and the

aggression of which it was purportedly the vic tim? There are, moreover, further grounds

demonstrating such absence of proportionality. Th us we could cite the massive damage caused by

the invasion and occupation of the Congo to th e Congolese Armed Forces and to the Country’s

civil infrastructure. How can it be claimed that there is the slightest sense of proportion between

that very substantial damage and what was a llegedly suffered by the UPDF forces or Ugandan

infrastructure as a result of armed actions purportedly carried out on Ugandan territory by insurgent

groups coming from the Democratic Republic of the Congo? That total absence of proportionality

is very clearly displayed in the support given by Uganda to a number of Congolese insurgent

groups.

B. The support for Congolese rebel groups clearly fell outside the framework of a
proportionate counter-measure of self-defence.

21. In order to assess the necessity and proportionality of the military action undertaken by

Uganda in the Congo, we must certainly not forget the support given by the Respondent to a

number of Congolese rebel groups. This was the case in particular of the MLC (Movement for the

Liberation of the Congo), whose clearly declared objective was to overthrow the regime of

President Kabila or, failing that, to obtain a cha nge in the constitutional order in the Democratic

128
RU, Vol. 1, p. 8, para. 26 and p. 87, para. 199. - 48 -

Republic of the Congo. As my colleague Maître Tshibangu Kalala had occasion to recall

yesterday, Uganda, after long denying its role in the creation and operation of such rebel

movements, was finally obliged to acknowledge it. The Court will judge whether it can be

regarded as a “necessary and proportionate” measure of self-defence for a Member State of the

United Nations to create and support, by all possibl e means, a number of insurgent groups with a

view to changing the constitutional order in anothe r State. For the Democratic Republic of the

55 Congo, it quite simply amounted to intervention in its internal affairs, which is strictly prohibited

by contemporary international law and which bears no relation to the exercise of a purported right

of self-defence.

Lastly, I would like briefly to return to the point that, if self-defence may be invoked on a

pre-emptive basis, as Uganda seems at times to cl aim, then the notion of proportionality becomes

totally meaningless.

C. The requirement of proportionality of self-def ence would lose all meaning if the notion of
pre-emptive armed action were accepted

22. On this point, one cannot but stress once again the danger of includ
ing the threat of a

possible armed attack among circumstances capable of justifying the exercise of the right of

self-defence. What would then become of the condition of proporti onality? Should the

proportionality of the counter-measure be gauged in relation to the subjective sentiment of the State

which considers itself threatened? Would that not open the door to all kinds of abuse, giving States

freedom to decide on military intervention wherever they see fit in order to counter a threat that

they alone would be in a position to define? Such broadening of the rule would lead to an virtually

limitless anarchy, since the strongest would always be able to allege the existence of a threat

coming from the weakest and consider that they had taken “necessary and proportionate” military

counter-measures against that threat. The best evid ence of the risks of such disorder can precisely

be found in Uganda’s action in the Congo. The R espondent took advantage of the collapse of the

Congolese army and armed forces and of the weakness of the Congolese State after the fall of

Marshal Mobutu’s régime in order to invade and o ccupy the Congo for almost five years, whilst at

the same time committing extensive pillaging and numerous atrocities there. And all under cover

of an alleged right of preventive or pre-emptive self-defence. - 49 -

23. Mr. President, Members of the Court, to c onclude my statement, I would like to observe

that the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as a Member State of the United Nations, is profoundly

attached to respect for the rule s of international law governing fri endly relations between States.

The Congo has never undertaken any armed attack against Uganda, either directly nor indirectly, as

my colleague OlivierCorten has shown this morn ing. In these circumstances, the invasion and

56 prolonged occupation of Congolese territory, toge ther with other hostile acts perpetrated by

Uganda against the Democratic Republic of the Co ngo, on the pretext of repelling a non-existent

armed attack, cannot be justified by the exercise of any right of self-defence. That is particularly

so, in that those acts in any event fail to meet the conditions of necessity and proportionality that

are required for self-defence to be validly invoked.

It is doubtless because Uganda is well aw are of the weakness of its arguments on

self-defence that it has also sought to jus tify its military presence in the Congo by a second

argument: the purported existence of consent by the Congolese authorities.

Professor Olivier Corten will return tomorrow morn ing to that second argument and will show that

it is totally unfounded. For now, this statement brings to an end today’s oral presentation by the

Democratic Republic of the Congo. I would like to thank the Court for its attention.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Klein.

Indeed, this brings to a close this morning’s hearings. The Court will resume the hearings

tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock.

The sitting is closed.

The Court rose at 1 p.m.

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