Traduction

Non-Corrigé Traduction
Uncorrected lTranslation

CR 98/13 (traduction)

CR 98/13 (translation)

Lundi 15juin 1998
Monday 15June 1998. . .
Le PRESIDENT :Veuillezvous asseoir. Jedonne la parole audistinguéagent del'Espagne.
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Mr. PASTOR RIDRUEJO: Mr. President,Members of the Court.

1.The subject-matterof the dispute: the questionof title

1.In the light of the renewed efforts by counsel for Canada to circumvent or redefine the

subject-matter of the dispute, we are obliged to point out, oncein, that this case does not

concern the question of the conservation and management of fishery resources in the NAFO

Regulatory Area. That is what Canada would like, but we have made it abundantly clear to the

Courtthat what we areattacking, both in the Application and in the Memorial,anada's lackof

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entitlement to act against ships flying the flag of another State on the high seas. That is the

subject-matter of the dispute. Naturally, it entails the inapplicability of Canadian domestic

legislation to Spanish and other vessels on the high seas. It also entails Our demand for

compensation for darnagecaused by the unlawfulacts of Canada.

In any event, theres no doubtthat, in proceedingsbefore the Court, it is not the respondent

State, in this case Canada,whichfinesthe subject-matter ofthe dispute. It is the Applicant, in

this case Spain, which enjoys that right andthat privilege.

2. However, as regards the principal subject,the Agent of Canada stated in his presentation

on 11Junethat: "it isabundantlyclearthat the principal subjectis a mattergoingto the merits and
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not tojurisdiction" (CR 9817,p.17, para. 41).

No,that is notthe case. We cannot agreewith the Respondent. It is clear that the question

of Canada's lackof entitlementto takeaction onthe highasagainst foreign shipsdoes, it istrue,

pertain to the merits of the dispute, but it also pertains to the question ofthe Court'sjurisdiction.

If, as Spaincontends,the dispute doesnot relateto measures for the conservationandmanagement

of fish stocks in the NAFO RegulatoryArea, butto Canada'slack of "title" to take action on the

high seas against ships flying the flag of another State, it is indisputably not covered by its

reservationto the acceptance of theCourt'sjurisdiction. Thatthe first main argument of Spain

which 1had announced in my presentation on 9 June. -3-

3. Canada has also argued that, as the reservation to its declaration of acceptance of the
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Court'sjurisdiction is drafted in very broad terms, the question of title is covered by it and is not

subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.

Spain,for itspart, firmlyconvincedthatthat isnot the case. It isobviousthat the question

of entitlement to take action on the high against ships flying the flag of another State is a

preliminary issue, andamental premise, and that as such it is not covered by the Canadian

reservation to the jurisdiction of the Court. It cannot be connected to a question as specific as

fisheries conservationand managementmeasures on the high seas, and the enforcement of such

measures. If Canadahad wishedto exclude fromthejurisdiction of the Court any disputerelating

to its entitlement to take action on the highgainst ships flying the flag of another State, it

should have done so explicitly.

4. Let me illustratethis argumentwith an exarnpletaken fromthe lawrelating to outerspace,

and in particular the legal régimeapplicable to the moon.

We al1know that international lawgives States no sovereign title or right of appropriation

on the moon. Thatmuch is çlear from the general international law, as set out in the Treaty of

27 January 1967on principles governingthe activitiesof States in the explorationand useof outer

space, includingthe moon and othercelestial bodies. But that is also the case for the high seas,

accordingto the principiesof generalinternationallaw setforth inthe 1982Conventiononthe Law

of theSea.

Let usnow supposethat a Stateexcludesfrom its unilateral declarationof acceptanceof the

Court'sjurisdiction disputeswhich couldarisemeasuresforthe conservationand management

of thenatural resources of the moon, and the enforcement of such measures. Would such a

reservationremovefromthejurisdictionofthe Courta disputerelatingto aquestionas fundamental

as State sovereignîyover a certain area of the moon? -4-

The answeris undoubtedlyno, asthisquestion - thequestionof sovereigtitloranyother

formofjurisdiction over the moon - would in fact be a premise,a preliminaryissuewitha status ,

quiteseparate fiom measures for the conservation and management of its natural resources.
. .
II. Requirement that anyoptionaldeclaration of recognition of yourjurisdiction
O1 O should bein conformitywith your Statute
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5. Any reservationwhosemeaningandscopeareentirelysubjecttotheexclusiveappreciation

ofthedeclarant Statepreventsthe Courtfi-omexercising itsownjurisdiction. Forthat reasonalone,

it is accepted by yourjurisprudence, as by the most eminent legal writers, thateservation

is inconsistent with youratute. 1shallnot here elaborate on this fundamental point,which will

be taken up by my colleague Professor Dupuy in a little while.

m. The use of force

6. In orderto showthatthe Courthasjurisdiction inthis case, 1hadalsoput fohard another

mainargument in my oral pleadings on 11June.

Act C-29 and Act C-8 amendingthe Criminal Code of Canada providefor the use of force

againstforeign shipson the highas, andevenfor causingthe death, undercertaincircumstances,

of the persons on boardsuch ships. 1had also said that such behaviour was at variance with

international law,der which the declarationsestablishingthejurisdiction of the Court must be

interpreted. It is clear that the use of force is not covered by the Canadian reservation(CR 9119,

pp. 16-17).

1 note that no counsel for Canada has taken issue with this argument, at least not head-on.

7. In addition,in replyto the discussionof this matterat greater lengthby counselfor Spain,

the Agent of Canada informedyou in his oral arguments that:

"the enforcementmeasuresthat were applied to tEsta ian in noway be regarded
as a use of force in relations between States in the sensereferred to in the Charter of
the United Nations" (CR 98111,p. 18,para. 45).

8. Following the efforts by counsel forCanada to conceal the actual importanceof the use

of forceby the Canadian patrol boats, counselfor Spain will be obliged to show the Court in due -5-

coursethat the forceused on 9 March 1995againsttheEstaw ias contraryto internationallaw. The

same applies to the severe harassmentof other Spanish boats somedays later. They will show in

particularthat Ourline of argumentdoes not relateexclusivelyto the use of force in these specific

cases. Itconcernsmoregenerallythe use of forceprovidedfor inActs C-29and C-8 amendingthe

* 01 1 Criminal Code, which Canada enacted without international authority. As my colleague
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Professor SanchezRodriguez has already demonstratedto the Court, thecombined effect ofthese

laws makes it possible to apply against a person subject to arrest, even on the high seas, in the

NAFO Regulatory Area, a level of force capable of causing death or grievous bodily harm.

9. It isue that, in its oral arguments,Canadaattemptedto minimizethe importanceof these

provisions,assertingthat they applyto fisheries"onlyincidentally"andthattheir "mainpurposehas .

nothing to do with fisheries" (CR 98/12, p. 9, para. 47). The fact remains,however, that Canada

has admitted that itsriminal Code is applicable in the NAFO RegulatoryArea.

1swhat is involved in that case, as the Agent of Canada asserted in his oral arguments of

11 June, ameans of enforcement"ofconservationand management measureswhich are absolutely

standard in State practice"? (CR8111, p. 18, para.45).

We do not think so. There is no doubt that the death of a person attempting to escape the

action of aCanadian authority in the NAFO Regulatory Area, carried out in such circumstances

without internationalauthority,isnota standardmeasurenderthe legalrégimerelatingtofisheries.

10.In any event, as counsel for Spain will explain, the military coercion prohibited by

international law is not confined to armed aggression. The use of forceans the use of armed

coercionby one Stateagainst another,whether inrespect of territory, individualsorectsplaced

under the sovereigntyor exclusivejurisdiction of the latter State. The most traditional definition

of the use of force on the high seas confirms the above definition. It is contrary to the United

Nations Charter, and cannot therefore be covered by a legal interpretation of the Canadian

reservation. -6-

IV. The questionof the persistenceor continuedexistenceof the dispute

11.1 now turn to a subject which will be dealt with in detail by my colleague,

Professor Remiro Brotons.

In Chapter IV of the Counter-Memorial, Canadabluntly maintainedthat the Agreement of

20 April 1995 between the European Union and Canada had settled al1 aspects of the

0 1 2 Spanish-Canadian dispute. Thus, in itsconclusions(para. 230),Canadatold us that: "Thematters

in dispute between Canada and Spain have been settled.The Spanish Application is now

without object."

However, in his oral arguments,the Agent of Canadacriticizedthe "inordinateimportance"
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(CR 98111,p. 21, para. 56)that we have giventhis subject. Headdedthat: "the questionto which

these proceedingsaredevotedis the Court'sjurisd...iWhetherthe dispute has beensettled,

as Canada believes, or persists, as Spain contends, is immaterial for the the present

proceedings" (ibid.,para. 59).

Mr. President, Membersof the Court, it is with pleasurethat we observethat Canada seems

thus to have dropped its allegations concerningthe disappearanceof the object of its dispute with

Spain.

V. Links betweenthe meritsof the disputeand the jurisdictionof the Court
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12.In the oral argumentsof its Agent andcounsel,while dwelling at length on substantive

matters,Canada oncegainheld against Spainthe factthatOurcontentionsaddressedthe substance

of the dispute to a considerable extent.

13.In any event, Canada appearsto forget that paragraph 7 of Article 79 of the Rules of

Courtenablesthe Court to declare that a preliminaryobjectionto itsjurisdiction doesnot possess,

inthe circumstancesof the case, a preliminarycharacter. In other words, it may, at itsdiscretion,

combineconsiderationof the objectionwith consideration ofthe merits of the case, as ithas

on several occasions. If we mention this possibility, itis in order to remind Canada of the close -7-

linksthat may exist betweenthe merits of a dispute and thejurisdiction of the Court. Those links

aremanifest in this case.

14.In this connection, 1would also observethat Canada has not disputedthe validity of the

argument which 1raised inmy presentation of9 June, concerningthe yardstick of the existenceof

reasonable links, withina case, between the substance of the dispute and the jurisdiction of the

Court. In this case,1repeat, the links in question are three in number.

First,theterms oftheCanadianreservationtothejurisdiction oftheCourtcontain substantive

definitions.

Second,the need for Spainto define,forthe Court,the real subject-matterof the disputealso

calls for substantive reasoning.

Third,the rebuttal of Chapter 1of the CanadianCounter-Mernorialalso requires this type of

reasoning.

1repeat, this argument has not beenrebutted by counsel for Canada.

Professor Dupuywill inanycasecomebacktotheanalysisofyourjurisprudence inthis area.

VI. The accusation of excess in the Spanish oral arguments

15. Inhis addresson 11.June,the Agent of Canadaventured to deplore "theextremeswhich

have beena feature of the Spanisharguments"(CR 98111,p. 9, para. 6). We assume that Canada

is here referring to hypothetical verbal excesses or concepts, excesses which, if they actually

occurred,would count for littlewhen comparedwith the inspectionby its patrolboats, onthe high

seas, of a ship flying the Spanishflag, and the harassment of other vessels flying the sarne flag.

16. However,we are no longershockedby the vocabularyused aboutus by Canada,both in

its Counter-Memorialand in its oral arguments. Of course,Canada is fully at liberty to choose to

use such terms. However, and in conclusion,1ask myselfthe following question in this regard:

Would not Canada have also employed expressionsof indignation in the event - and 1

emphasize, in the event - that a Spanish patrol boator that of another State had inspected a ship

flying theCanadian flag on the high seas? -8-

Mr. President,Members of the Court, 1shall read out my submissionsat the end of Ouroral

arguments.

That concludes my statement and 1thank you for your kind attention.

Mr. President, 1 would ask you to give the floor to my colleague, Professor Sanchez

Rodriguez. Thank you.

+ O14 Le PRESIDENT : Merci beaucoup. Je donne la parole a Monsieur Sanchez.
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Mr. SANCHEZRODMGUEZ: Mr. President, Membersof the Court. The task that fallsto

me here this morningrequires me, once again,to refer to the facts. Giventhe short time available w

to me, 1am sure that you will understand my proceeding straightto the specific points 1consider

most important. 1shall, moreover, do so as briefly as possible, so that there can be no possibility

of theatricality or dramatization.

1. You will al1no doubt be surprised by the first point, at this stage in the proceedings,as

itinvolves going back to the full text of paragraph 2 of the Canadian declaration of 1994, so

frequently cited by the other Party butnever considered as a whole.

The intentionisto afirrn, onceagain,thatany interpretation oftheCanadianreservationmust

take account of al1the terms used in the declaration, of the full text of the latter. On the other

hand, Ouropponentscontinue stubbornlyto refer to it as littleas possible andmaintain an eloquent j

silence. Theclearest exarnpleis to be found in the painstakingand systematicanalysis carriedout

by the Canadian counsel in these proceedings last Thursday(CR 98111,pp. 36-43, paras. 44-59).

Not a word about statements as important as the one that Canada "accepts as compulsoryipso

facto. . .thejurisdiction ofthe InternationalCourt ofJustice . . over all disputes arisingafrer

thepresent declarationwithregardtosituationsorfacts subsequenttothisdeclaration,otherthan";

well, 1 shall talk to you today about situations and facts. No allusion to the very interesting

paragraph (c, which explains, for example,that the Canadianlegislation of 1994is not coveredby

its wording because that legislation, "by international law", does not fa11"exclusively within the - 9-

jurisdiction of Canada". Indeed, if the 1994 legislation did not fall within the purview of

internationallaw,the newparagraph (4 wouldbetotallysuperfluousas it wouldconstitutea matter

comingundertheexclusivejurïsdictionof Canadaandwouldthereforebecoveredbyparagraph (c).

Consequently,if it comes under internationallaw,paragraph (4 must be interpretedin accordance

with the said international law.

Members of the Court, allowme to ask you this question: did you hem, on Thursday and

Friday last, a single explanation, a single word fiom the Canadian delegation concerning its

declaration,apartfrom paragraph (4 thereof? Spainconsidersthat atruncated interpretationwhich

is confined to the text of paragraph (4, separate fiom the full text of the declaration, is utterly

unacceptable because it is inadequateand incomplete.

2. The second pointthat 1would like to take up right away is directly connectedto the first.

Our colleaguesinthe other Party layconstant stress,in everypossibleway, on paragaph (4 of the

declaration,thatisto say, on the reservation,the crux of the dispute. In substance,they are merely

pursuing a manoeuvre which has already been denounced by the Agent of Spain in his first

statement (CR 9819,pp. 14 and 15, para. 4): they are seeking to redefine or circumvent the

subject-matterof the dispute. Inwhatway? Byattemptingto convincethe Members ofthis Court

that thetrue subject of the dispute lies in the reservation,and is not the one described by Spain.

Far be it fiom me to remind the Members of this Courtthat it is the Applicantwho establishesthe

subject-matter,even if thatis notto the likingof the Respondent; however, itnever lies with the

latterto take the place of the Applicant in the definitionof the subject-matterof the dispute. The

subject is the one described by Spain, not the one suggested by Canada because it is more to its

liking and offers it better possïbilitiesof defence.

3. The third point relates to one of the favourite subjects of Ouropponents: the text of the

reservation. 1 wonder therefore what has become of the new category created in the

Counter-Memorial, the category of "enforcement measures". Last Thursday and Friday, my

Canadian colleagues made no referenceto it. But they also remained scrupulously silent on the -10-

term "enforcement"; is this a word that theyke or not? Even Professor Weil adroitly suggests

that this thorny problem shouldbe excluded. Indeed, he tells us "thatthe measures in dispute are

measuresof conservationandmanagementof the resourcesofthe sea" (CR 98/12, p. 44, para. 49)

and he adds that "the question is exclusively whether or not the dispute brought beforethe Court

by Spain arisesout of, or concerns,conservationand managementmeasurestaken by Canadawith

respect to vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area" (CR 98/12, pp. 46-47, para. 55). Why

does Ourdistinguishedopponent make this assertion? Becausehe has suddenlychangedthe rules

of the garne.
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Up until itsstatement last Friday,the use of force againstfishingboats on the high seaswas w
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defined by Canadaas "enforcementmeasures", butnow this is nolonger so. One of the Canadian

counseleven spoketo us onThursdayabout "measures"and "coercivemeasures"(CR 98111,p. 42,

. para. 57),an expression which is not used in the Canadian reservation.
The following day,

Professor Weil told us that: "Boarding a vessel, and inspecting and seizing its cargo, is a

managementandconservationmeasure" (CR 98/12,p. 33,para. 18),while a few momentslaterhe

slipped in the term "enforcementmeasures" (CR 98/12, p. 39, para. 31) and referred precisely to

the use of force against ships on the high. This calculatedarnbiguityrequiresthe Court to be

givenan explanation. It isessentialfor Canadato take a stand,onceand for all,andtell uswhether

the use of force is a management measure, a conservation measure,an enforcementmeasure,the W

enforcement of a management and conservation measure, al1of the above or none of the above.

1sthe use of forcecovered by the Canadian reservation? Where is it mentioned? Or is it simply

not contained in the terms of the reservation and is the other Party doing everything possible to

conceal that fact?

4. The fourthpoint also conceals an obvious element. Pleaseexcuse me but, in view of the

silencesof theopposingParty,the patent facts must be highlighted. 1have listenedcarefilly to my

Canadian colleaguesand 1have hardly heard any mention from them of the high seas. They try

as much as possibleto avoid referring to the fact that the Canadianlegislation applies to the high - 11 -

seas. And they prefer to speak of the NAFO Area or the area beyond the 200-mile limit. It is a

way for them offudgingthe issue(CR 98111,pp. 11,16-17,40,46,58, etc.)! SinceOuropponents

do not do so, it fallsto me to remind youthat the theatre of theanactions is in factthe high

seas, and that the law applicable to this case is that which governs the high seas. It is not the

noms relating to the exclusive economiczone and still lessthose concerningthe territorial sea or

other areas underStatesovereigntyorjurisdiction that interestus, butthosewhich concemthe high

In this context,OurCanadian colleagueshave no hesitation in quite naturallyapplyingto the

high seas the legalrégime of nationalareas in an attempttojusti@ certain coercive powers ofthe

Stateagainst foreignfishing vessels. Furthemore, they denythat Canadahas extendedits national

O'1 7 jurisdiction or that it has created a new, supplementaryspace adjacentto the exclusive economic

zone. Two Canadiancounsel (CR 98111,p. 59, para. 35; CR 98/12, p. 33, para..19)also do not

hesitate to assert that the measures taken by Canada against Spanish ships on the high seas are

consistent with Article 73 of the 1982 Conventionon the Law of theSea.

Quite frankly,Members of the Court, theCanadianposition on this point is almost insolent.

They altogether naturally recognize that the measures provided for in the 1982 United Nations

Convention for the exclusive economic zone are applied on the high seas, while denying that

Canada has extended itsjurisdiction to the highas. On the one hand, they implicitly recognize

this extension ofjurisdictionince they justi@ and explain the application of Canadian criminal

legislation,the mostterritorialized of al1national legislations,on the high seas. On the other, it is

alarmingthattheymake suchan incompletereadingoftheConvention,forgettingArticles 86to 89,

92, 110, 111, 116, 118 and '1 19, in addition to the obligation of CO-operationof Article 63,

paragraph 2, for straddling stocks. It comes as no surprise that Canada has not ratified the 1982

Convention, but this does not prevent the Articles mentioned from already reflecting noms of

customary international law. Canada has extendeditsjurisdiction without formally establishing a

new area, as implicitly acknowledged by Minister Tobin (Memoriai of Spain, Annexes, Vol. 1, p. 172; Counter-Memorialof Canada,Anns, p. 365), but by increasing itsjurisdiction materially

and in actual fact. My eminent French colleaguecannot confinehimselfto the strictest formalism

by arguing that Canada has not established a zone formally. Such legal formalism wouldbe the

very negationof law;but he knows the law and knows it very well. Fitzmauricewas right and

his 1973affirmation validates the Spanish views.

Finally, thehighashave disappearednotonlyto a great extent fromthe nautical chartsbut

also fiom the arguments of the opposing Party.

5. Thefiftpoint refers to the inclusion of Spanish andPortuguese ships in the Canadian

Regulations of 1995. Our opponents have tried to justiQ this inclusion by using professedly
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conservationistarguments which are insulting to my country andOurIberianneighbour and, what

is more, are false. Our colleagues now accuseus of overfishing and of breachingNAFO

0 1 8 (CR 98111,p. 47, para. 75) and what is surprisingbecause Spain had exhausted the entire
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quotaforthe European Union (CR98111,p. 60,para. 39). 1wish to emphasize,Mr. President,that

this quite new accusation, which incidentally is not backed by any documentary evidence, is in

flagrantcontradictionwiththe recognition,inparagraph 4e CanadianCounter-Memorial,that

at the time of the facts the Spanishcatches fell short of the quota limit set bythe European Union.

Al1this of course was in 1995. Nevertheless a year earlier, in 1994,on the occasion of

parliarnentarybates, the Parliamentary Secretaryto the Minister of Fisheriesand Oceans stwted

inthe House of Commonsthat the dangercamefiom flagsof convenience,particularlyof Panama,

Honduras,Belizeand SierraLeone(CanadaGazette,Part III, Tuesday 12July 1994,p. 1316,copy

in section of the file presented by Spain last Monday and of which the Membersof the Court

have a copy). Thesame day, Minister Tobin statedin the Senatethat "Spainand Portugal, indeed,

livewithinNAFOquotas. SpainandPortugal participatefullyas NAFO memberStates",although

somePortuguese- and not Spanish- vesselswere describedas pirate vesselsbecausethey flew

flags of convenienceof Panama, Honduras or Sierra Leone (Memorial of Spain,Annexes, Vol.

p. 470 of Senate Debates and p. 278 of 1).. - 13 -

If Spainwas fishing lawfullyin theNAFO Area in 1994(accordingto MinisterTobin), how

can Our colleagues of the opposing Party assert today that in 1995 Spain suddenly became a

dangerouspredatoryandpiratecountry? Inthisrespect,theword "pirate"has,in"Tobinian"jargon,

a meaning at odds with what international law regards as pirate vessels. The only possible

conclusionisthatthe assertion ofCanada iscompletelywrong,accordingto itsownstatements,and

that the mentionof Spain andPortugal in connectionwith pirate vessels isite inadmissible and

unjustifiable.

6. Let us now go on directly to point six. Let us now enter a terrain to the liking of

opponents, the field of conservationist ecology, of protection of the species, of environmental

concerns. In other words, a politically correctterrain. The Agent of Canada even complains that

Spain does not recognize this (CR 98111,pp. 9-10,paras. 9 and 10). In this regard,the opposing

019
Party comes before the Court as a respectable country concerned about stocksAbout stocks or

about its stocks? Spain, on the other hand, is made out to be a public danger for the species.

Canada even suggests the existence of a kind of state of environmental necessity or of also

environmentalpreventive self-defence (CR 98111,pp. 46-48, paras.72-77).

Nothing of al1that is true. In the first place, because the one to have depletedthe bulk of

the straddling stocks in question is in fact Canada itself, as it implicitly acknowledges in its

Counter-Mernorial.

ForChapter 1ofthatdocument(Counter-MemorialofCanada,pp. 9 et seq.,paras. 17et seq.)

is based on the image of a countrypresentingitselfas the championof environmentalconservation

"forthe world" (ibid., p.6,para. 29). On the other hand, it at the same time acknowledgesthat

inthe early 1990sits own fishermenwere guilty of depredationin "almost al1of the commercially

significant groundfish stocks entirely within its 200-mile zone" and that "the conservation crisis

continues" still today (ibid., p. 9, para. 17).

However,to protect the halibut in its decline, since it is a straddling stock,overfishing has

to be eliminated beyondthe 200-mile limit (ibid.,p. 19,para.),even though a few pages earlier - 14-

the opposing Party had no hesitation in assertingthat a mere "10% [ofthe stock]. lies beyond

Canada's 200-milefishing zone"! Continuingthis reasoning it fùrther asserts that: "Dueto the

biologicalunity of straddlingstocks, overfishing thembeyondthe 200-mile limitwill also deplete

themwithin thezone undernationaljurisdiction"(ibid.,p. 11,para. 19). Thismeansthatthosewho

fish 10per centofthe stockcontributeto thedepletionofthe remaining 90 percentunderCanadian

jurisdiction. After all, Canada has no qualms about accusing Spainof depletion and depredation

of resourcesduring the period from the early 1990s up to the fateful year of 1994 whereas the

Spanishfleet was fishing solelyoutsidethe 200-mile limit! Canada lays al1the responsibilityon

Spain (10 per cent of the stock in four years) and rules out its own (90 per cent throughout the
1

period). It has to be seen to be believed.

020 We must be gratefülto the opposingPaw for its sincerity when it finally acknowledgesthe
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efforts made to maintain "'Canada'sability to protect the [its] stocks'beyondthe 200-mile zone"

(p.46, para. 108, repeated on p. 71, para. 185).

In the second place, its assertions concerning the NAFO quotas are also incorrect and

inadmissible. Canadamust proveits assertionsor refrain fromakingthem; for Spainhasalways

respected the catch limits legally establishedwithin the NAFO system.

As regards the suggestion of a hitherto unheard of preventive self-defence, or of a

consewationist stateof necessity,said infactto be circumstancesprecludingwrongfulness,that has w

nothing to do with Articles 33 and 34 of the draft of the International Law Commission,as the

Court had occasion toSayin its Judgment in the GabEikovo-NagvmarosProject case. Questions

of conservationof marine specieshave in fact been studiedy the InternationalLaw Commission

and it is interestingto note that in the case concerningHunting ofFur Seals in theBering Sea, the i

Agent of the British Governent denied "thata State had the right in time of peace to do on the

high seas, as an act of 'self-defence'or 'self-preservation',whatever it might conceive to be

necessaryto protectits propertyor its interests". And the Tribunalof Arbitration borehim outand:

"did not, therefore, allow itself to be influencedby the argumentthat there was a danger of
the seals beingmassacredby Canadiansealers; it viewed the American measuresas action taken primarily for the purpose of protecting the economic interests of a United States
industryagainstcompetitionfroma foreign industryby givingit an impermissiblemonopoly
totake fur-sealsincertainareasofmaritime spacewhichmustremain accessibleto everyone"
(YearbookoftheInternational LawCommission, 1980,Vol. II, Pari 1,p. 28forthe quotation

and pp. 26 et seq. for a full analysis of the two cases mentioned).

7. The pointthat 1now go onto concernsthe facts,the factswhich actually took place. The

mutilation of the facts practised by Our opponents is striking when they refer to the fishing

incidents. Those incidentsoccupya mere halfdozen or so lines intheir oral arguments(CR 98111,

p. 9, para. 7 and p. 48, para. 76) and, what is more, the account is inaccurate. According to

Canada, al1that happenedwas the inspection and seizure of the Estai. That is al].

Thefacts were actuallymore complexand more brutal. Tobegin with,the Agent of Canada
,L 31 1
asserted in his statement that: "The oniy firing that took place was a waming shot across the

vesselqsbows" (CR 9811 1,p. 19,para. 47). That is untrue. The "NoteVerbale fromthe Canadian

Depariment of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to the Embassy of Spain in Ottawaqq of

10 March 1995beliesthewordsof the Agent of Canadaby statingthat: "TheCanadianpatrol boat

was therefore obliged,after obtainingthe necessary authorizations,to resort to firingfour waming

shots"(Memorialof Spain,Annexes, Vol. 1,Ann. 9, p. 45,EnglishinApplicationof Spain,Ann. 4,

p. 25).

But this is only a detail. Between 17 March and the month of June 1995, six Spanish

warships(the vessels Vigia,Serviola, Centinela,Atalaya, MahbnandLas Palmas) were sentto the

area in question.Suchmobilizationwas commensuratewith the protection due to Spanishfishing

vessels exposedto harassment froma pack of several Canadian patrol boats engaged in fisheries

lawenforcement. Thispresenceof warshipsof both countriesinthe high seasareawhere the facts

occurredimplied an imminent and realdanger of armed conflict on a scale that cannot exactly be

called minor.

Furthermore,between 17and31 March 1995severalCanadianpatrol boatsharassed andhad

recourseto force against other Spanish fishing vessels in the samearea. In particular,the fishing

vessels Monte Agudo,Freiremar Uno,JoséAntonioNores, Verdel,Arosas andMayi Cuatro were -16 -

subjected to various measures of surveillance, inspectionand harassment by different Canadian

patrol boats. As for it,the Spanishvesse1Pescamaro Uno,afteranextremelydangerousmanoeuvre

by the Canadian patrol boat Leonard J. Cowley, had its trawl warps sliced through, with the

subsequentloss of itsntire gear and a deadly risk to the seamenon deck at the time. Too much

is too much, gentlemen counsel of Canada!

Mr. President, Members of the Court, you mustake account of the fact that these serious

incidentstook place in very difficult weather conditions,with windsof 80 knots, in a snow storm

and with waves of over 14metres. In most cases, theCanadianpatrol boats did not respect the

InternationalRegulationsforPreventingCollisionsat Seaand the Conventionforthe SafetyofLife I

0 2 2 at Sea (Memorial of Spain,Annexes, Vol. 1,Ann. 5, pp. 7-12),without forgetiingthe provisions
-
of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, many of which are binding on

Canada under customary law.

In short, without seeking to dramatize the matter, we must emphasize the complexity and

extent of the fishing conflictin the periodin question. Therewasa serious, imminent and real risk

of losses of human life and of ships. Therefore the Canadian assertion that the incident simply

involved the inspection and seizure of the Estai seemsto be very far fiom reality. The facts are

there and the Court must have theertainty of their gravity and of the fact that a serious armed

conflict could have broken out.

8. Finally,we shall go onto the decisivequestion of thedianCriminalCode. Counsel

of the opposing Party expressedsurprise atveral Spanish assertions relatingto the use of force

and toCanadian penal measures. Leavingaside the 1995UnitedNations StraddlingStocks [and

Highly Migratory Species] Agreement,for it is not relevant since neither Spain nor Canada is a

contractingState, he givesus an almost idyllicpicture of the amendment introducedby Act C-8to

Section25 of the Canadian Criminal Code. The idea is said to be to limit the use of force to

serious cases in situations of self-defence,or Iégitimedéfense,buthe expresslyacknowledgesthat

it permits the so-called peaceicers to use force to cause death orserious bodilyhm in certain - 17-

circumstances; forthe purposeof courseofprotecting humanlifeandonlyexceptionally,not every

day (CR 98/12, p. 9, para. 48). Let us see whether the facts tally with such a favourably

reductionistdiagnosis. Clearly, Spainknowsthe problemof unconstitutionalityof Canadianpenal

legislation,for itrunscounterto theadianCharter of RightsandFreedoms, whichis significant

initself (CommonsDebates, 14 February 1994, p. 1312,section 2 of the file presented by Spain

on 8 June last).

IntheHouseofCommons,Mr. Dhaliwal,ParliamentarySecretarytotheMinisterofFisheries

andOceans,expressly acknowledgedtheapplicationto fishingvesselsonthe highseasof Canadian

penal legislation permitting the causing of death or serious bodily hm. He even added the

extravagant assertion that that would be corroborated by international practice as to the use of
-.

-6- cl2 3 detemnt force at sea against foreignvessels(ibid., p. 1316). Deputy Bernier,for his part, recalled

that the application was going to take place outside the 200-mile limit in waters [not] under

Canadianjurisdiction, namelyonthe highseas(ibid., p. 1317). DeputyCumminssaidthat, inview

of the permission given "peaceofficers" to use weapons, there would sooner or later be deaths

(ibid., p. 1318). Deputy Benoît Sauvageaustated, in respectof the Concordia, ase1flyingthe

flagof the United States,that the use offorce on the high seaswould not solveany problem(ibid.,

p. 1325). And several deputiesreferredto Canada'slackof legaltitle to legislateon the high seas

concerning foreign vessels (ibid., pp. 1325and 1333).

The basic conclusionsof this debateare:first, Canada has no legaltitle to extend its penal

legislationtothe higheas; second,the useof force at seacarriesan obvious riskof lossof human

life; third, the Canadian parliamentariansdid not perceivethe application of criminal law onthe

high seas as an exceptional hypothesis, as the opposing Party is trying to present it, without

self-defencebeingabletojustiSr, in termsof internationallaw,the recourseto forceagainstforeign

fishing vessels beyond the 200-mile limit.

Our Canadian opponent, making an altogether logical effort to minimize the impact of his

country'spenal legislation,makes somesurprising assertions: that its main purpose has nothingto -18 -
do with fisheries (CR 98/12,p. 9, para.14put the followingquestionto him: 1sit applied, in

certain circumstances, to foreign vessels on the highyes or no? He goes on imperturbably

to statethat the arnendmentsto Section 25ofthe CriminalCode are intended to protecthuman life

(CR 98/12, p. 9, para.),giventhat the previous legislation wastoopermissive regardingtheuse

of force (CR 98/12, p. 9, para. 49). This approach leavesus perplexed. What kind offe

can one protect by firing on foreign fishingvessels in non-Canadianmaritime areas? Or does Our

opponent maintain that it is a Canadian maritime area? A yes-or-noanswer is required.

In connectionwiththis,wecan emphasizean assertioncommonto OurCanadiancolleagues.

The Agent of Canada said that what was involvedwere "conservationand management measures
#
which are absolutely standard in State practice" (CR 98111, p. 18, para. 45); the second counsel

also slipped in the contentionthat suchenforcement"measures"asCanadianofficersmay adopton
024
the high seas are normal and customary practice (CR 98111, p. 42,para. 58); Ourthird opponent

makes a fine point that it is common knowledgeand common sense - that arrests at sea of

foreignvessels requiretheuseof force andthatthey arepermittedArticle 22, paragraph 1 @,

of the 1995United Nations Straddling Stocks[andHighly MigratorySpecies]Agreement,without

any heed for the fact that theAgreementt in force and is not binding onany State(CR 98111,

p. 59,paras. 35 and 36). ThestratagemoftheopposingrîyisfinallycrownedbyMr. Weil,who,

after asserting that the Canadian Act of 1994says "nothing about Statejurisdiction overareas of
-
the high seas" (CR 98/12, p. 30, para. IO), immediately contradicts himself by stating that the

measures adopted during the incidents constitute "a... common and traditional" in this

connection(CR 98/12,p. 33,para.9),andthatthey are "eminentlytraditionalmeasuresofthe law

of the sea" (CR 98/12, p. 39, para. 33). But are you really sure that this is tmly the case on the
L
high seas?

This set of assertionsslippedinto lastweek'sCanadianstatementsis extremelyserious. They

presuppose a real recognitionof theerialextension of Canadianjurisdiction to the high seas.

The point is that there can be no countenancingthe application of national lawsto foreignvessels - 19-

in a non-"nationalized"area. Can Ourdistinguishedcolleaguesexplainwherethis practice is,even

if customary, traditional or well-known, that permits the use of force on the high seas against

foreign vessels, inefiance of the restrictive provisions imposed by Articles 110 and 111 of the

1982UnitedNations Convention onthe Law of the Sea? What is the originof these so usual and

common practices of which you al1 tell us? What Ourcolleagues are doing, quite simply, is

extending the powers of inspection of States over the maritime areas under their jurisdiction or

sovereigntyto the high seas. On the high seas there is no practice of inspection such as that you

mention which does not contravene international law.

Mr. President, Membersof the Court, 1am going to conclude my statement. It was a great

- - responsibilityand a great honourfor me to defendthe interestsof my countrybeforeyou. 1 should

like to thank you very sincerelyfor the attention and courtesyof al1Membersof the Court during

the hearings. Thank you verymuch.

Mr. President, 1would ask you kindly to give the floorto my colleague,Professor Remiro

Brotons.

Le PRESIDENT :Merci, Monsieur Sanchez. Je donne la parole à Monsieur Remiro.

Mr. REMIRO BROTONS: Mr. President,Membersof the Court,

1. Persistence of the dispute

1. LastThursday,we heardthe Agentof Canada Say: "Whetherthe disputehas been settled,

as Canada believes, or persists, as Spain contends, is immaterial for the purposes of the present

proceedings". He went onto Say: "it was quite deliberatelyandin fullawarenessof the facts that

Canada limited its objection to the question of the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the

reservation". Canada, the Agent concluded, "had no intention,and does not intend today, to base

its objectionto thejurisdiction of the Court on anythingbutthe reservation. It is on this problem,

and no other that the Court is called upon to nile". (CR 98111, pp. 21-22, paras. 56-62.) - 20-

2. Spaintherefore considersthat,without prejudiceto the statutory dutywhichtheCourt has

to ver@ whether there is indeed a dispute betweenStates in orderto exercise its function,Canada

has abandonedthe claimsof inadmissibility,asthe claimthat the Applicationmerelycalls for

a declaratoryjudgment.

II. The disputebrought before the Court by Spain does not concern the
conservation and managementof fisheries; these come under the
jurisdictionof the European Community.

3.Sinceit focusesits oppositionto thejurisdiction of the Court on the last-mentionedof its

of its positions,that containedin subpara(4aof paragraph 2 of its Declaration,Canadanow

finds itself in a tricky situation. Spaincontends that, as a sovereign State, it is not a direct party

to any disputewith Canadaon the conservationandmanagementof fisheries, a matteroverwhich
O 2 6
-
jurisdiction has been fully transferredto the European Community by its member States. The

dispute between Spain and Canada is of a different nature, asmay berom the object of the

Application. However, if the dispute is different in nature, it has no place in the Canadian

reservation. If there is a dispute, the Court hasjurisdiction (CR 9819, p.43, paras. 10-11).

4. Counsel for Canada,in coveringthis problem, understoodthis full well, but whenit came

to a reply,he found onlyepithets not arguments; worse, he was obliged to resort to simplification

and made elementary errors of law. A brief look back at the arguments set forth by Spain in the

1
first round oforal argumentsis sufficientto convinceus of this (CR 9819,pp. 41-45, paras. 6-16).

Nevertheless, let us clarify a few points.

5. First,there arevarious categoriesofjurisdiction, someof which,suchasjurisdiction over

fisheries, have been fully transferred to the Community, whereas others remainnational

jurisdiction exclusively. Thisis sufficientlyillustrated bythe declaration onthejurisdictionof the

EuropeanCommunityconcerning al1mattersgovemedbytheAgreementon StraddlingFishStocks.

This declarationwas madeby the Communityandby each of its member States in application of

Article 47 of the Agreement.

6. The declaration stexpressis verbis: "The Community recalls that its member States have transferred to it their
powers with regardto the conservationand management of theliving resourcesof the
sea. Consequently,in this field, it for the Communityto adoptthe relevant rules and
regulations (whichare appliedby the memberStates) and it falls within its powers to

institute externalactivitieswiththird Statesorcompetent organizations. Thesepowers
apply to waterscoming undernationaljurisdiction for fisheriespurposes,as wellas to
the highseas"(para. 5; emphasis added). [Translation bytheRegistry.]

7. The Canada-EuropeanCommunity Agreement of April 1995 is based on this exclusive

jurisdiction. The Agreementon StraddlingFish Stocks is,on the other hand,a joint agreement,one

to which the Community andthe member States intheir sovereign right must al1be parties, since

it also covers powers belonging to the States. In that respect, the above declaration States:

"the measures relating to the exercise of the jurisdiction of the flag State over its
vessels onthehighseas,particularlyprovisionsconcerninginteraliathetakingcontrol
of or abandoning control of fishing vessels by States other than the flag State, and
international cooperation with regardto the enforcement and recovery of control of
their vessels,fa1withinthejurisdiction ofmemberStates inlinewith Communitylaw"

(para. 7, subparagraph 2:).[Translation byTheRegistry.]

8. The Community and al1 the member States al1 agree that the facts behind Spain's

Application havegiven rise to disputes with both the Community and with Spain.

9. The diplomaticnotes of 12May 1994and 10March 1995,reproduced in the Memorial

of Spain, are particularly explicit in this regard (cf.Memorial of Spain, Ann. 18, Vol. 1,p. 301;

Ann. 11,Vol. 1,p. 53). The latternote afirrns thatthe arrest of a vesse1in internationalwaters by

a Statewhich isnotthe flag Stateis a "seriousbreachof internationallaw [which]goes far beyond

the question of fisheries conservation. The arrest is a lawless act against the sovereignty of a

member State of European Community".

10.Despite errors in the dates, these notes were also referred to by Counsel for Canada as

beingnotes from theCommunity(CR 98/12,pp. 53-55,para. 75 etc.). Yet, as he knowsfull well,

these notes are from the Community and ifs memberStates. Moreover, they arejoint notes,

precisely because they concem powers which belong partly to the Community and partly to the

States. The adoptionof joint positions is typical of the inter-governmental cooperation between member States of the European Union in matters which have not been transferred to the

Community .

11. Further,the factthat the above-mentionednotesof protestechothe Spanishnotesintheir

conceptis hardly surprising. Are coordination andconsistencyto be penalized? Contraryto what

Counsel for Canada advances, the two series of notes show that the Community and its member

States are awareof the existence of specific,distinct disputes, one of which is between Spain and

Canada.

12. Seekingto withdraw fromthat position, Counselfor Canadastated that "it is impossible

toisolate a dispute relating to matters of general international law, and more particularly State

jurisdiction, from a disputerelating to rneasuresfor the conservationandmanagementofthe living
r O 2 8

resources of the sea" (CR 98/12, pp. 57-58, para. 89).

13. Thisargument,whichannihilatesthesovereignrightsofmemberStatesthe'community

deriving from their flag, appears worthless; 1shall merely recall what the Court said in the case

concerning United StatesDiplornaticand ConsularStag in Tehran. The Court statedin its

Order of 15December 1979- that

"noprovisionoftheStatuteorRulescontemplatesthatthe Court shoulddeclinetotake
cognizance of one aspect of a dispute merely because that disputehas other aspects"

(1C.J.Reports1980, p. 19,para. 36).

"Were the Court", it isd in the Judgment of 24May 1980 in the same case,

"contrary to itsettled jurisprudence, to adopt such a view, it would impose a
far-reachingand unwarranted restrictionupontheroleofthe Courtinpeaceful solution
of internationaldisputes" (ibid, p. 20, para. 37).

14. Lastly,Counsel for Canada(CR 98/12, pp. 57-58, para. 89)believed that he had found

the argumentwhich, for him, "irremediablycondemnsthe Spanish theoryofthe two disputes". He

thought he had found it in the fact that Canada would have had no need the reservation

introduced in its declaration of 10 May 1994in order to exempt disputes with the European - 23 -

Community from the jurisdiction of the Court, since the Community, which,as you know, isnot

a State, has no capacity to act before the Court.

15. 1am sorryto spoilthe pleasureof my illustrious colleagueon the Canadiansidebecause

on the high seas adjacent to Canada'seconomiczone, the Spaniards(and the Portuguese) are not

the only so-called "pirates". There are also vessels which fly the respectable flags of other States

which are, or mighteyparties to the optional clause system. In 1994,the Canadian provisions

were directed at them and not at the Spaniards,asbe seen from the parliamentary debates.

16.Mr. President, Members of the Court, had Canada been convinced of the worth of its

arguments, it would havechallenged the locus standi of Spainbefore the Court. However, ithas

not yet dared to do so and, finding itself out of ammunition, it is now obliged to launch puffs of

smoke.
. .
III The object of the application is the not the subject-matter of Canada's reservation
- - () 2 9
17.According to Canada, the Court is called upon to give a ruling on the objection to the

Court'sjurisdiction based onthe reservationcontained in subparagraphf paragraph2 of its

declaration, and on no other.

18. Thiscrystal-clearassertion allowsusto note that the Respondent has no wishto reply to

points relating to the object ofthe SpanishApplication. In fact, Mr. President, it is as if Canada

had transfomed its argument on mootness, or lack of object,making it no longer a ground for

inadmissibility but indeed a ground for lack ofjurisdiction. Canada now appears to be satisfied

with saying that there is no longer any objectsince the only object which counts is the

subject-matter of its reservation as Canada itself it.

19.Barricaded behind its reservation,Canada wishes to have the object of the application

identified withthe subject-matterof the reservation;is with the aim of replacingthe debate

on the title ofjurisdiction and the use of forcebya another kindof debate, onthe conservationand

management of fisheries. - 24 -

20. Spain deeply regrets that Canada has not yet undertaken to renouncethe use of force

againstvessels flyinga foreignflag onthe highseas, andparticularlythose flyingthe Spanishflag.
1

Quitethe reverse! Pursuantto a specious interpretationoftheNew YorkAgreementon Straddling

Fish Stocks, Bill C-27 confirms the most unacceptable provisions of the legislation in force,

imposing a jurisdiction for which the Respondent hasno title. Bill C-27 violates the New York

Agreement, which Canada claims to have instigated, (CR 98111, p. 11, para.en before its

entry into force.

IV. Jurisdiction: Principles

21. There is one revealing fact onjurisdiction. The Agent of the Respondent requeststhe

Court to adjudicate on Canada's reservation(CR 98111,p. 22, para. 62), that and nothing more.

Counsel for the opposite Party asserted, wrongly in my view, that Spain accused Canada of

interpretingthe reservationas a separatepleading withoutoffering proof of this (CR 98111,p. 52,

para. 9). Here is proof the Agent'svery words. The Agent requests the Court to adjudicate on
- 0 3 @
thereservation. Wewould considerthat, onthis point,theCourtmust adjudicateon the declaration

of which the reservation forms part.

22.Under these circumstances, it appears to me wise of Spain to have recalled that

reservations must be givenhe most restrictive scope permitted within the general rule of
J
interpretationof internationallegal texts (CR 9819, p.58, para. 11). Canada seeks to do the

opposite.

Mr. President, still have some comments to make but, in view of the time, perhaps you

would wish totake a break now?

Le PRESIDENT. Merci beaucoup. L'audience sera levéependant 15minutes.

L'audienceest suspendue de11.15à 11.30

Le PRESIDENT. Veuillez vous asseoir. ProfesseurRemiro, vous avez la parole. Mr. REMIROBROTONS: Mr. President,Membersof theCourt, as I wassayingbeforethe

break, resewations must be given the most limited scope permitted by their interpretation in

accordance with the general rule of interpretationof internationallegal texts.

23. Counselfor Canadahas attackedthisprinciple,aprincipleof soundcommonsense,using

thewell-knowndeviceof splittingit intwo,thus discardingthe partwhich givesit its full meaning.

It issaid that Spain argues for the most restrictive scope permitted of reservations, namely a

restrictive interpretationof them (CR8111,p. 52, paras. 6and9). This isnottrue. Spainsupports

themost limitedscopepermitted inthe contextof obsewing ofthegeneral ruleof interpretationlaid

down in Article 31of the Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties. Mr. President,Members of

the Court, beware of selective quotations.

24. Counsel for Canada, a different speaker this time, echoing a view expounded in the
031
Counter-Memorial,spokeofthegenericcharacterof measuresofconservationandmanagementand

their inexhaustiblebility to evolve(CR 98111,p. 39, para. 52). "A generic category",it was said

in the Counter-Memorial:

"is never limited to the known exarnplesit contains. No one would tell a naturalist
that a newly discovered speciesis not a mammal, a fish or an insect becauseno such
specimenhadever beenencountered". (Counter-MemorialofCanada,p. 40,para. 91 .)

Thatis me, oncondition,naturally,that it isnot claimedthat amammal is an insectorthat a insect

is a fish. If not, the categories would be as arbitrary as those found in the Celestial Empire of

Voluntary Knowledge,the Chinese encyclopedia which made a distinction between animals

accordingtoaclassificationbeginningwiththosebelongingtotheEmperorandfinishingwith those

which,from afm, look likejlies. On the other hand, clearly, generic terms may be adapted to

circumstances. However, in the presentcase, lessthan oneyear elapsed betweenthe deposit ofthe

new Canadian declaration and the facts which prompted the Application. The evolution of the

meaning of terms is one thing, their volatility is another. My colleague KeithHighet will come

back to this point. - 26 -

25. Counsel for Canada, a third speaker,proposed a reservationwhich 1would describe as

"highlypolluting". Oncoming into contactwithit,any manifestationofjurisdiction would become

sterile. The Canadian reservation is a black hole in the firmament of the optional clause, an

optional clause which must be respected- so it is repeated endlessly (CR 98111. pp. 12-13,

para. 22)- if a cataclysmin the systemis to be avoided. Fortunately,the Court has not let itself

be influenced bysuch dire predictions in the past.

26. The time for common sense has come. The subject-matter of the debate concerning

jurisdiction is notjust thereservation advancedbythe Respondentbutthe Respondent's declaration

of acceptanceof the Court'sjurisdiction in its entireS. My colleague, Mr. SanchezRodriguez,has
*
already spoken on this point.

27. Counsel forCanadahas soughtto disregardthe main pillar of Spain'sargument, premise

of Spain'sline of reasoning, namely the existence of a properly deposited declaration, claiming

instead that Spain advocatesthe existence of a general rule of consent to the jurisdiction of the

Court (CR 98111,pp. 52,para.7). Counselhasneither read properly, nor heard properly. A State

is freeto deposit a declarationof acceptanceto the Court'sjurisdiction,but, should itdo so, it must
- - 0 32

consider- this is a question of consistency and good faith that its objective, in making

reservations, is to have the least possible effect on the scope of the jurisdiction which has in

principlebeen accepted. Al1this whilst,of course,abiding bythe general rule of the interpretat*on

of international legaltexts. It is in thismannerthatthe declaration,includingreservations,achieves

its "effetutile".

28. Twenty yearsago, Counsel for Greeceargued the sarnepoint brilliantly, in terms which

we canonlyapplaud. Hereviewed the questionofinterpretationofreservationsandasked: "should

such interpretationbe extensiveor restrictive? Extensive interpretation ofthe reservationamounts

to restrictive interpretation of jurisdiction, and restrictive interpretation of the reservation is

extensiveinterpretationofjurisdiction". He answeredhis ownquestion, notingthat itseemedmore

correct to Saythat the interpretation "shouldbe strict, that is to Saythat it should be directed to - 27 -

givingeffectto the exclusionby Greeceof certain disputes, andto the whole of that exclusion,but

to nothing butthat exclusion .. To extendthat exclusion beyondwhat is necessarily impliedby

it would be to compromisethe role of the resolution of conflicts, the importance of which has

recently been emphasizedby several members of the Court" (AegeanSea Continental Shelfcase,

I.C.J. Pleadings, pp. 392-393)1am sure that Mr. Weil will not denythis point of view today.

29. International law is the normative frame of reference for the interpretation of Canada's

declaration,as it wouldbefor any otherdeclaration. Inthat sense,the JudgrnentintheAegeanSea

case is an unarnbiguous precedentI.C.J.Reports 1978, pp. 31-32, paras. 74-76). The Judgment,

which concerns the interpretation ofa reservation to the jurisdiction of the Court contained in a

treaty, apparently caughtthe Respondent'sfancy. Indeed,the Respondentrepeatedly relies on this

Judgment,despitethe - unjustifie- criticismitvoiceswith regardtotheanalogy betweenthese

reservations and those of the declarations, for the purposes of interpretation (CR'98111,p. 31

et seq., para. 28 et seq.; p., para. 8).

30. During first round of oral arguments, Spain advanced reasons,reasons which were not

contradictedby the Respondent,fortakingtheNAFO systemas the practicalfiame of referencefor

interpreting Canada's reservation (CR 98/10, p. 12, para. 28). Canada has not established any

special meaning for the terms of its reservation. It has not denouncedthe NAFO Convention. It
. .
. 33 expressly referred to the Convention in order to determinethe scope of its territorial application.
- - U
Therefore,the conceptofconservationandmanagementmeasuresfor fisheriesand the enforcement

of such measures can only be'NAFO concepts. Moreover,let us recall that at the time Act C-29

was enacted, Canada did not claim that it wished to divest NAFO of its powers to adopt

conservation and managementmeasures; on the contrary, itclaimed to become, unilaterally,the

champion of the Organizationin a area beyond itsjurisdiction.

31. Within the NAFO system, we must establish, in the frarneworkof the declaration,the

ordinary meaning of the terms of the reservation, in good faith, whilst awaiting its objectiveand

itspurpose. This is what meets the true, objective, legally material intention of the declarant. - 28-

Seekingits intentionin the travauxpréparatoiresor in the circumstances surroundingthe deposit

of the declaration serves toirmthe interpretationdeducedfrom the applicationof the general

rule or to eliminate doubts in the event of any ambiguousness; however it cannot become

superimposedonthe conclusionarrivedat, unlessthe conclusionis absurd. Thisiswhat the settled

jurisprudence of the Court says.

32. In the present case, the Respondent endeavours to place the generalnd certain

circumstancessurrounding the deposit of the declaration on theooting for the purposes of

interpretingthe reservation (CR 98111,p. 14,para. 27). We knowabout the parliamentarydebate

on Act C-29, whichtook place after the declaration had been deposited and which,of course,the
*

reservation does not mention. However, and this must be emphasized,we do not knowanything

at al1about the travauxpréparatoiresof the declaration of 10May 1994.

33. This said, Spain considers that, within the framework of international law and more

particularly within that of NAFO, the natural meaning of the terms used in Canada'sreservation,

evenif their meaning is generic,s not and cannot includeunder measures of conservationand

management the object of an application concerning the legal title of a State to exercise its

jurisdiction over vessels flying the flag of another State on the highace, a concept and

a term which the Respondent has little time for.

34. Moreover, it is obvious thate title is a logicalprerequisite to any measure in thJ

internationalorder, it is impossiblefor a dispute concerningthe title to be envisagedas a dispute

arisingoutoforconcerningameasurefor theconservationandmanagementof fisheries. 1wonder

0 3 4 if itwas for that reasonthat counselfor Canada,in one speech,slidtowards usingmore favourable

linkingverbs, for example, that used in the reservation to the declaration of Greece which refers

to disputeselatingtu ... (CR 98/12, p. 49,para. 64; see also CR 98111, p. 19,para. 48).

35. Canada has repeated ad nauseam that Act C-29 was not intended to extend Canada's

jurisdiction buttotake urgent measureson a provisional basis(CR 98111,p. 11,para. 18and p. 16,

para. 37). If Canada had no intention to extend its jurisdiction, how did it hope to put the - 29 -

provisionsof Act C-29 into effect? In reality, thisjurisdiction hasbeen exercised in an improper,

coercivemanner, Act C-29 is still in force and the Acts proposedto replace it are still wrongful

fromthe point ofviewof internationallaw. The lawenforcementprocess remainsin place, asdoes

the threat it constitutes.

36. Moreover Spain has laid emphasis on the differences between subparagraph (4 of

paragraph 2 of the declarationof 10May 1994and the same subparagraph ofthe same paragraph

of the declaration of 7 April 1970. These differences are wholly concIusive(CR 98/10, p. 12,

para. 26). In 1970, when Canada wished to exclude "disputes arising out of or concerning

jurisdiction or rights claimed or exercised by Canada" (I.C.J. Yearbook 1970-1971, No. 25,

pp. 50-51) in relation tothe conservation,management and use ofthe biological resourcesof the

sea in maritime zones adjacent to the Canadian coastline, it did so expressly.

37. Had it wished in 1994to exclude from thejurisdiction ofthe Court the conductwhich

it nowdenounces, Canada should have framed its reservation differently; however, it chose a

minimalistform of wording in order to allay the suspicions of bothits domestic parliamentarians

and of itspartners on the international stage. Counsel for Canada told us with subtletythat the

1994reservation "describesthe mattersat issue morespecz~cally,and more concretely"than did

the 1970reservation(CR 98/12, p. 21,para. 91). That isthe leastonecan Say,bearinginmindthat

in 1970the Govemment of Canada considered that its reservations involvedonly "limitedand

clearlydefined exceptions"(ILM, cit., p. 612). Canada had the 1970declaration in front of it but

deliberately put it to oneside. It must surely regret that now, in view of its present situation.

Howeverit is alreadytoo late and Canadacannot arguethat thejudges shouldalter or complement

the terms of the declaration by interpreting it.

38. Althoughtheparliarnentarydeclarationsare not lackingincontradictoryelements,itmay
- -
beassertedthat the intentionoftheCanadianGovernmentindefendingBill C-29 inParliamentwas

primarilyto combat, within the NAFO Regulatory Area, the activities of vessels fiying flags of

convenienceand the activities of piratevessels (whicharetoday ghostships, having vanishedfrom -30 -

the Canadian statements). It istrue that, ifwe examinethe actualterms used,Canada'sreservation

affectsl1vesselsfishingwithinthe NAFORegulatoryArea, oncondition,obviously,thatthere are

disputes relating to measures for the conservationand management of fisheries. Yet ifthe words

went beyond the intention, Canada should in any event reply to the expectationsthey aroused in

third parties of good faith. The least that can be said about the message of the Canadian

Government's parliamentary statementsis that they were arnbiguous anddeceptive (andnot only

for Spain), appearingto restrict the application of its legislation to "piratevessels".

V. Conclusion

39. In the course ofthe hearings Canada has shownthat it lackswillingnessto actbeforethe

Court but that it has given itsconsent thereto; it is Spain which istoday entitled to rely on the

declaration of 10 May 1994,including subparagraph (4 of paragraph2, in order to contend that

the Court hasjurisdiction inthis case. Declarations,liketreaties, arenotscraps ofpaper andStates

cannot and must not jettison so easily the obligations which they took the risk of undertaking.

Counsel for Canada has complained that the respondent's conductwas described as "barbarous"

(CR 98/12, p. 38, para. 29). How else could it be described? Al1in all, it was perhapsnot such

a bad description, the barbarians had their moments of glory. They put an end to the Roman

Empire and plungedus into darkness for centuries.
rl
Mr. President,Membersof the Court,this bringsme to the endof my statement. Thankyou'

foryour kind attention. Mr. President,1requestyou togive the floorto mycolleagueKeithHighet.

Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie, MonsieurRemiro. Je donne la parole à M. Highet.
036

M. HIGHET : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président. Madame,Messieurs de la Cour.

Introduction

1. En écoutantla réponse duCanada la semainedernière,nous avonsétésurpris d'entendre

que ses représentantsestimaient que la présenteaffaire étaitsimple. Nous ne pensons pas qu'il - 31 -

s'agissed'une affaire facile. Elle est loin d'être sans objet,ien que le conseil du Canada

semblepenser que «la cause est entendue)),nousne pouvons êtred'accordavec lui.

2. Notre opinion est probablement partagéepar des membres de la Cour. Il y a des

arguments complexes, certaines zones grises, et des questions délicatesde compréhensionet

d'appréciation.Des questions comme cela ne peuventêtre évacuée comme «faciles»à trancher.

3. Ma tâche aujourd'huiest donc de me penchersur certaines des principales questions qui

posentproblèmesurlesquellesleCanadaaappelél'attentionrelativement àlaposition del'Espagne

sur l'interprétation. Nous espérons que cela sutilà la Cour. J'expliqueraiensuite comment,

pour nous, il faut se pencher sur ces questions etondre. Après quoi,j'exposerai de nouveau

.
et confirmerai l'argumentaire del'Espagne en ce qui concerne l'interprétation de laréserve

canadienne.

4. Monsieur le président,je dois d'abord faireune observation procédurale mineure.

L'Espagne a assurément accepté, enmai 1995, l'ordonnance dans laquelle la Cour a décidé

d'entendreles Parties. Elle ne soulèveen aucune manièrela questiond'unpoint de vue négatifau

stadeactuel, mais fait observer que l'ordredes plaidoirieset les positionsrelatives des Parties ne

peuventque donner l'impressionque l'Espagneaffirmequelque chose, et que le Canada y répond

enposition défensive.En fait, c'estle contrairequiestvr:c'estleCanadaqui doit être considéré

commeaffirmant quelquechose- c'est-à-dire quesa réserveexclut lacompétencedela Cour -

et l'Espagnequi s'efforced'établirquelquechosedenégatif- c'est-à-dire quecette réserven'exclut

pas la compétencede la Cour.

5. Bien que lanotion de ((chargede la preuve))ne soit guèrepertinenteen l'occurrence,il est

néanmoins impossible,dans un procès - comme nous le savons tous -, de faire disparaître la

((chargede la persuasion)),oude la faire peser également comme la rosée dumatin - sur les

. - deuxParties. Il faut donc s'efforcerde garder constammenà l'esprit que c'estCanada qui a la

(13 7 chargede la persuasionence qui concernesaréserve. C'eslte Canadaqui essaied'établirune large
- -
dérogation à un engagement plusvaste qu'ila pris en ce qui concerne la compétence dela Cour. - 32 -

Réponses auxcritiquesdu Canada

6. Il semble y avoir cinq domaines principaux dans lesquels le Canada voit des difficultés

dans la position de l'Espagne.

La réserveest inutile

7. Premièrement,le Canada se plaint que notre interprétationde sa réserveprive celle-ci de

toute signification et la rend absurde. La réserve figurantau paragraphe2, ad),prévoit

expressément l'applicatide «mesures de gestion et de conservation))dans des zones qui par

définitionfont partie de lahautemer. Le conseil du Canadanous demandecommentnouspouvons

prétendre queles mesures de conservation et de gestion ne peuvent par définitionêtreappliquées

en hautemer sans égalementconclureque la réservecanadiennene peut s'appliàrien du tout'

8.La réponse estque l'intentionsubjectivedu Canada ne correspondpas nécessairementaux

prescriptions objectives du droit international. Si ces prescriptions indiquent que les actes qui

entraventla libertédes mers ne peuventjamais être légitimementconsidéréscodes ((mesures

de conservationet de gestion)),il endécouleque laréservecanadienneestpro tanto.Elle n'a

pas abouti aurésultatqu'ellevisaitour la simple raison que les mots qu'elle utilisene peuvent

êtreutilisésdans ce contexte de manière compatibleavec le droit international.

9. En outre, la doctrine de l'effet utile n'exigepas de la Cour qu'ellecomble une lacune ou
w
corrigeune erreur. Ceci est particulièrementvrai, Monsieurle président, lEtat a formulé

une réservepour répondre des préoccupationsinternes,en oubliant quec'estle droitinternational

et non son droit interne qui doit régirerprétationde la portéeet du sens des mots utilisés.

10.Permettez-moi une fois de plus d'exposer mesdistingués collèàquelques «si» de

plus. Supposonsqu'unEtat X a fait uneréserveexcluant«lesdifférendsdécoultetout incident

dans sa zone économique exclusive»,et que cet Etat a aussi promulguéuneone économique

'voiM. Willis,pointCR,98/12,p12-1par.59-67. exclusive))de 500milles marins. Si un incidentse produit en àequelque 350 milles des côtes
, O 38
. -
de 1'EtatX, cet Etat sera-t-il prpar sa réserve oune le sera-t-il ?as

11. La Cour devrait décidersi elle doit ou non remplacer, aunom del'effetutile, la «zone»

non existante de 500 milles par la ((hautemer». Une telle substitution reviendrait néanàoins

greffer sur la réserveun contenu qui aurait été étrr l'intention de1'Etatdéclarant.

12. En la présenteespèce, il y a un autre problème. Le Canada a visé la «zone de

réglementationde IIOPANO»- c'est-à-direlahaute mer. Mais le Canadaa fait plus qu'identifier

(à tort) un endroit. Il a aussi précisé la des actes qui seraient couverts par la réserve,sous

une rubrique non existante. Les actes que le Canada cherche protégern'existent pas en droit

international.

13. En bref,on ne peut rendreeffectif ce qui, en droit,est ineffectif. Ceci n'est pascontraire

au principe de I'effectiet ne va pas non plusl'encontre del'effetutile. Depuis le début,il n'y

ajamais eu aucun «effet»à rendre «utile». L'absenced'utilité del'effetincombe au Canada, pas

à l'Espagne. L'obligatide fournirune interprétation uàila lumièredesnormes contemporaines

du droit internationalestla charge du Canada, et non de laCour. L'incohérenceétaitlà depuis

le début.

14. On peut aussi répondre quedu point de vue du Canada, il y a bien un effet utile. Le

Canada a la possibilitéd'opter pour des mesures de conservation et de gestion de nature non

coercitive, en demandantaux bateauxse trouvantdans la zone de réglementation deI'OPANOde

se conformer dans cettezone aux règles deconservationet de gestion qu'ilestime pouvoir édicter

afin d'éliminerla surpêche. Ainsi qujee l'aifait valoir lors de ma premièreplaidoirie, le Canada

a déjàbénéficié d'uneffet utile puisqu'il lui a étépossible de soulever une exceptioà la

compétencesansque cette exceptionsoit écartéeinlimine. C'estpeut-êtrelà un effet utile un peu

bancal,mais de l'avisde l'Espagne,il s'agit, permettez-moi l'expr,'uneréserve trèsbancale.

Ici encore, il n'incombeni l'Espagneni à la Cour de réparerce qui est fondamentalement une -34 -

erreur juridique qui fera àasavoir une formulation incorrecte par le Canada de sa propre

réserve,dans le feu de la discussion concernantle projet de loi C-94 en mai 1994.

, 0 39 La réservecouvrirait toutes les éventualités
-
15. Le second argumentavancépar le Canada (M. Willis)conàidemander àl'Espagne

d'expliquercomment la promulgation dela loi canadienne et l'exercice éventuel paron

pouvoir, envisagéen 1994,pourrait constituerun différend«autre» qu'undifférend tombantsous

le coup de la réserve. Ily a deux réponses.

16. Tout d'abord, s'agissant de l'incidentconcernant l'Estai, quoique le différendentre

l'Espagneet le Canadaau sujet de l'exercicede sonpouvoir par 1'Etatpuisseêtcommesidéré W

découlant de l'applicationet de l'exécutionde «mesures» dans la zone de réglementationde

I'OPANO, ou comme concernant cette application et exécution,ces mesures n'ontàrlat

conservation etla gestion qu'aux yeuxdu Canada. En droit international, il ne s'agitni de

((conservationet gestion)),ni de «mesures».

17.La seconderéponseseraitque l'incidentde l'Estaiestné del'applicloi,au sujet

de laquelle il existaitmanifestementdéjàun différend avantl'incident. Ces questionsauraientfort

bienpu faire l'objetd'unecontestationdevant la Cour de la part de l'Espagneaque lesme

autorités canadiennesaient agiencontre del'Estai ou d'autres bateaux. Et d'ailleurs,il ressort
-
du dossier que l'Espagne a vigoureusement protesté contrele fait qu'au débutde mars 1995,

c'est-à-dire avant l'incident,il avait éue la réglementationviserait aussi l'Espagneet le

Portugal.

18. Dèslors, ces questions se seraienttrouvées releverdu cadle l'acceptationde

lacompétenceparleCanadaetn'auraient éexcluesde cettecompétenceparaucuneréserve.Elles

auraientde toute évidencedonnélieun ((différejuridique))concernant«b)tout point de droit

international))au sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article36 du Statut. - 35 -

19.En outre,Monsieurleprésident, mêmsei la questionde l'Estaiétaitaujourd'hui«réglée»,

l'Espagnepourraitmaintenirsoninstancedevant la Cour. L'Espagneauraitqualitépouragiren son

proprenom; un ((différend)s)ubsisterait;un ((pointde droitintemational»,au sens du paragraphe 2

de l'article36 du Statut,resteràrésoudre;et l'onserait enprésencede l'unde ces ((différenqui

s'élèveraientprèsla date de la présente déclaration,u sujet de situations ou de faits postérieurs

à ladite déclaration)), dontil est question au paragraphe2 de la déclaration faite par leCanada le

10 mai 1994 en vertu de la clause facultative.

20. Pourtant, le Canada maintient que même sile différend ne découlpeas ficariseoutof»)

des mesures de conservationet de gestion prises par le Canada il les concerne («concerns»)et

par conséquenttombe sous le coup de la réserve. (M. Hankey, CR 98111, p. 36-37, par45.)
. .

040 21.La réponseessentielleà cela est que ledifférendn'apastrait auxmesuresde conservation
. -
et de gestion, nià leur exécution,et que par conséquent,il ne peut ni en ((découlen),ni les

((concemen).Nous avonsdéclaré d'emblée qu'iln'estpasquestionde poissonsdanscette affaire -

du moins pas pourl'instant. Nul ne parle ici du flétandu Groenland. Le débatne porte pas sur la

taille des poissons,sur la largeur,la taille ou la longueur desfilets, ni sur levolume maximumdes

prisesautorisées.Le différend netouche àaucun aspect desmesures de conservationet de gestion

si minutieusementdécritespar leconseil du Canada, dont l'exposéétaitintéressantmais tout fait

hors sujet.

22. C'esttout le contraire ces mesures - qu'il s'agissedes actions abusives des autorités

canadiennes,oude la réglementation, oumêmedesdispositionstechniquesde laloi elle-même -

ne spécifientnullement,ni ne mentionnent,ni mêmene comportent quoique ce soit qui pourrait

évoquerlespoints sur lesquelsporteeffectivementle différend.Dans son libellé,la réglementation

ne revendiquenullement le pouvoird'agiren haute mer. La loine proclamepas la souverainetédu

Canada sur la haute mer. Ni Ïa loi, ni les règlementsnefont même mentionde la «hautemer».

Partout, la zoneviséeest désignéepar un euphémisme,l'expression((zonede réglementation de

l'OPANO». - 36 -

23. Enfin de compte, Monsieurleprésident,le dlflérend,dans cetteaflaire,porte sur le bien-

fondé de l'exercicepar un Etat de son pouvoir, et non sur des points de détailconcernant la

conservationet la gestiondesressourceshalieutiques.11atraià larevendicationfondamentalepar

leCanada d'unecompétenceextra-territorialequi luia permisde promulguer cetteloiet de prendre

la position que l'onsait. Le différendporte sur la loi elle-même,sur les principeset les normes

généralementreconnus en matièrede non-ingérence,de respect dela souverainetédesautres Etats,

d'observationdesrèglesdudroit international, de reconnaissancedesrègles internationalesrelatives

à la liberté desmerset de respect dudroit internationalence qui concernele reàolaforce dans

des cas autres que la légitimedéfense.

Les arguments quant au fond empiéteraientsur lesarguments quant à la compétence

24. 11n'estpas nécessaire des'attardersur le troisièmepoint, selon lequelles questions de

fond empiéteraient sur celle dela compétence:l'argumentation de l'Espagne obligerailta Couà

examiner l'affairequant au fond pourdéterminersila réserveest ou non applicable. Et ceci, nous

dit-on, est en contradictionavec l'objectifmêmedes exceptionspréliminairesacompétence,qui

est d'éviterqu'uneaffaire soit examinée aufond alors que la compétence n'estpas établie.
. .

041 25. Il est avancé que cela créeune situation paradoxale, puisque l'Espagne pourrait
- -
«I'emporten)sur la question de l'exceptionpréliminairepuis, après examen plusapprofondiquant
1
au fond, «perdre» dans la mesure où la Cour pourrait être amenée à retenir l'argumentation

fondamentale du Canada. On est en présenced'unraisonnementcirculaire pernicieuxet pervers,

affirme le Canada. Mon collègue,M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, exposera tout à l'heureà la Cour

comment, dès les années20, cette objection étaitperçue comme mauvais artifice.

26. On peut évidemmentrépondre brièvemenà t cela que l'exceptiondu Canadaest ratione

materiae etqu'ellecomportedoncce«risque» pardéfinition-un risque quasimentinévitableainsi

queje l'aisoulignéla semaine dernière.

27. En outre, les procéduresde la Cour sont toàtfait adéquatespour protégerles intérêts

des parties. Il est toujours loisibàe la Cour de déciderqu'une exception «n'apas dans les -37 -

circonstancesde I'espèceun caractèreexclusivementpréliminaiet qu'elle pourra par conséquent

êtretranchéleorsde l'examenau fond2. Vouslesavez,cela s'estencoreproduitlasemainedernière

puisque dans sonarrêtsur lesexceptionspréliminairesrelativesl'affairede laFrontière terrestre

et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria,opposant le Camerounau Nigéria, laCour a conclu

que la huitièmeexception préliminairedu Nigéria ne présentait pas(dansles circonstances de

l'espèceun caractèreexclusivementpréliminaire^^

La définition restrictive

28. Monquatrièmepointportesur la définitionrestrictive. LeCanadaformule une objection

connexe :selonl'interprétatique l'Espagnedonnede la réserve,celle-ci ne s'appliquerait qu'aux

mesures ((conformesau droit international)) Willis, CR 98/12,point b), p. 11-17, par.55-78).

29. A cela nous répondonsque nous ne disons pas que certaines mesures ne peuventêtre

incluses que si elles sont ((acceptables))en droit international. La question dont il s'agit,c'est

qu'elles ne peuvent constituer des(mesures de conservation et de gestion)) que si elles sont

reconnues comme telles par le droit international et la pratique et c'est alorset alors seulement

qu'ellessont incluses.Le Canada omet la démarcheessentielle, celle de la définition.

30. Le fait est qu'ilne pouvait pasy avoir là des «mesures» du genre requis, sauf selon la

façon de voir du Canada.

0 4 2 Le fil sans fin
-
31.Le cinquièmepointporte surce que l'onpourrait qualifierde fil sans fin. Autrementdit,

si l'interprétatdonnéede ladéclaration duCanadapar l'Espagneétaitexacte,toute réserveserait

une sorte de fil sans fin et les litiges seraient interminables.

'~eglementde laCour,a.9, par.7.

3~rrêdtu 11jui1998 (textedactylogra),. 55, par.117. - 38 -

32. Mon ami M. Prosper Weil a présenté la métaphore charmand teunebaguette magique(a

magic and)^ que l'Espagnepeut brandir au-dessus detoute réserve connuepour fairedisparaître

cette réserve5, rien qu'ensurimposant ou extrapolant des allégations de violationsde normes

internationales par dessus les termes de son libellé exprès. On ne peut pas, nous dit-on, pour

tourner les termes clairs d'uneréserve telle que celledu Canada, verser notre vieux vin dans une

bouteille plus grande, plus récente,et y apposer uneétiquettenouvelle6.

33. Selon mon ami M. Weil, là réside l'essence mêm de notrecause - «le coeur même de

la thèse espagnole»'. Il ajoute que ce que l'Espagnene reconnaît pas, c'est((l'unité fondamentale

entre les données concrètes d'une question soumise aux juges et les règlesde droit qui lui sont
I
applicables)).

34.On nousinvite àrappelerdesaffairesantérieures,danslesquelleslaCour ouseschambres

n'ontpas estiménécessaire des'assurerde leurcompétencepourexamineret appliquerdesprincipes

de droit international dépourvus detout lien, par exemple avec les délimitationsmaritimes,

notamment l'estoppel et l'acquiescement,ou d'autres principes et règles du droit international

généralt,els que le droit internationalduterritoire, lesrèglesdes effectivitésou de l'utipossidetis,

les règles del'interprétationdes traités et la règlequi interdit l'emploide la force.

043,. 35.M. Weilinfêre decesexemplesune«unitéessentielle,fondamentale,entrela compétence

pour connaître d'undifférenddonnéet la compétence pourfaire applicationdes principeset règles 3

fussent-ils de portéeplus vaste, gouvernantce différend...))'

4CR 98/12,p. 43,par.45.

5«~ufirait-i..de constaterqu'undiffkrend ainsi exclude la compktencede la Couren raisonde son objet met encause
des normesde portkeplus large, applicaàld'autreschapitresdu droit international, po, ar un coup debaguette
. .
magique, la Cour se trouve investiede la compktence pouren connaîtrebid p.,3,par.45.)

6CR 98/12,p. 34-37,par.21-27.

'«L'~s~a~nesoutient que la rkservecanadienne, qui intàla Courde se prononcersur les mesures canadiennesde
gestionet de conservationet sur leur exécution, n'interditourde se prononcersur le respectou la violation par
le Canada desnormes qui dkterminentla lickitéinternationalede ces mesures, en particulierle principede la libertéde
la haute mer et le principe de i'interdiction du recoursrce. C'estcela coeur mêmede la thèse espagnole.»
(CR 98/12,p. 40,par.35;les italiquessont de moi.)

'~bid p.42, par43. - 39 -

36. Cependant ce qu'a peut-être oublié mon ami, c'est qu'il ne suffit pas d'établirune

distinctionentre; i) lesprincipesjuridiques utiliséspour analyser et apprécierlesquestionsde droit

international; et ii) les règlesjuridiquesde fond appliquéespour déciderde l'issuede différends.

Les questions litigieuses évaluées et interprétép ear l'applicationdes principes ne sont pas les

mêmes que les différendd sans lesquelson appliquedes règlesrigoureusespour décider s'iy l a ou

non une violation de ces règles. Telle estla clé.

37. De plus, les réclamationsdel'Espagnerelatives à l'emploide laforce, à la souveraineté

et àl'absencede titre pour exercer lajuridiction en haute mer nefont pas que répéterou formuler

de nouveau des ((règlesde droit))applicablesg. Ce sont des réclamationsfondées sur les règlesde

fond dudroit de lamer etdu droit international généraelt non des réclamationsfondéessul re droit

en matière «de conservationet de gestion)).

autodestruction»

38. Un dernierpointmentionnépar leconseilduCanada,c'estqu'uneréserve,sielles'attache

à une question, soustraitcette question entotaliàlacompétencedela Cour. C'estcommelarègle

d'exclusion des élémentsde preuve viciés devantles juridictions fédérales desEtats-Unis : la

doctrine connue sous lenom de «fniit of the poisoned treen.

39. Ainsi M. Weil a-t-il déclaré: «dèslors que le différendse rapporte à l'objetdéfini par

la réserve,il est exclude la compétencedela Cour quelle que soit la nature ou la portée derègles

dont la violation est alléguéepar I'Etat demandeur))". Tel est l'effet que mon collègue

M. Remiro Brotons a qualifié de «trou noin) de la compétence. Selon les termes de

M. Weil : «[d]èslorsquel'Espagneadmetqueledifférendserapporteaussiaux mesuresdegestion

et de conservation prises par le Canada, elle admet qu'ilest couvert par la réserve))".

W. Weil,ibid., p. 41, par.38.

1°Ibid.,p. 44, par.48.

"Ibid., p. 28-29,par.5. -40 -

40. Il existepeut-êun moyen devenir à boutdecettedifficult:faireuneautredistinction,

cettefois entre les faits quidonnentàlundifférendet les règlesde droitinternationalappliquées

pourle résoudre. S'iln'ya qu'une seulesériede faits etun seul différend,alors une réserveefficace

faitobstacleàson examen. S'ily a plusieursséries defaits, detelle sorteque l'onpuissediscerner

plusqu'unseul différend autonome,comment en ce casl'examend'un différendpeut-ilêtrebloqué

par une réserve qui s'applique seulementl'autr?

41. Par exemple laréclamationde l'Espagnerelatiàel'exerciceillicite de pouvoirs en haute

mer par le Canada n'est pas unsimple moyen de tourner une réservequi serait sans cela fatale

la cause de l'Espagne. Ce n'est pasune manièrede demander àla Cour d'examinerles mêmes
-
points litigieux sous des appellations différentes.un droit que l'oninvoque de façontouà

fait indépendanteen vertu du droit international en soulevant des questionsjuridiques d'ordre

générailndépendantes des activités spécifiquedsu Canada qui se rapportente qu'ilconsidère

comme ses efforts «de conservation et de gestion)).

42. Cette réclamationne se rapporte pas, en fait, «aussi aux mesures de gestion et de

conservation prisespar le Canada)),car cela placerait les deux motifs d'action prèssur le

mêmeplan. Tout cela dépenddonc de ce que l'on entendpar le mot «aussi», ou le mot«also».

43. Si, par «aussi», M. Weil veut dire que l'undes différendsest effectivementideàtique

l'autre,alors ildoitavoir raison. Mais il s'agitlà d'unepétitionde principe. Si,par «aussi»,on vIut

dire que le deuxième différend peut accessoiremet u de surcroîtêtredécritcomme comportant

«aussi» des élémentsdu premier et si tous les élémentsdu second ne sont pas inclus dans le

premier,il y a doncmanifestementdesélémentsqun ie sontpasviciés,quine sontpasaspirésdans

le trou noir du fait que la requête est«autodestmctri~e»'~.

44. Pour qu'elles s'autodétruisenti,l faut que les demandesaient la même poet soient

identiques. Si leuridentitén'est qu'acceset que l'une puisseconserversonautonomiesansêtre

«viciée»par l'autre,nous échappons alors l'autodestructionet la Cour a compétence.

I2lbip.2,,par5. Analyse de la thèsedu Canada

45. La lignede défenseadoptéepar leCanada,telle qu'elleressort de tous les exposés deses

conseils,faitessentiellementappella subjectivitéet nonpaàl'objectividansl'interprétatiodes

0 4 5 réserves. Elle se borne ainsàdéfinir lesmesures de conservation et de gestion par rapport aux

((intentions))du Canada, «par leur objet)par le butpoursuivi par le Canada,plutôt que par les

moyens employés.

46. LaformulationemployéepaM r . Weil,((différendsdéfinispreurobjet)),estintéressante.

Elle semble certainement mener àde nombreuxraisonnements circulaires potentiellementvains.

L'idée avancée dans ldaéfinitiontéléologiqueu'ildonne des différendsexclus" est intéressante,

mais illusoire. L'intention d'ungouvernementpeut certes être très importante pour déterminer le

sens de mots ambigusdans une réserve,mais elle ne saurait opérer requalification dela nature et

du genre de différendsque cette réservevise.

47. L'intention peutêtre erroneu elle peutreposer surde mauvais élémentsd'appréciation.

11est possible d'identifieri'«objet»d'un différend. On peut seservir de l'objectif quevise un

gouvernementenrédigeantune réservepourcernerou préciser i'«objet»contre lequelon veutfaire

jouer la réserve, maisce n'est pas lamêmeidée.

48. Les mesuresen cause n'étaientpas desmesures «de conservation et de gestion)). Elles

n'ontpas étéprisesdansunterritoirerelevantde lacompétenceduCanada ni auCanadamêmes ,auf

pour ce qui est de l'adoption dela loi. Les mesuresprises contreaiPontété en hautmer dans

une zone ne relevant pasde la compétencedu Canada. Elles ontétéprises sur le pont d'unnavire

battant pavillonespagnol. Elles ne sejustifiaient en vertu d'aucunir14.Lors de ma dernière

intervention,j'ai formulé certaines observationsau sujet de l'accusationde résistancetorité

portéecontre le capitaine de l'Estai. Comment on a pu porter pareille accusation me dépasse

complètement. Plutôt que d'être une action cohérentedu gouvernement ou de constituer des

"lbid.,43,par.44.

I4Cf. . HankeCR 98111,p.37-40par46-53; MWillis,ibid.54-57,par18-29. -42 -

«mesures»prises par le gouvernement, les agissementsconcernant l'Estaiconstituaient au regard

du droitdes actes de brigandageinjustifiésen haute mer. Ce n'étaiedes actesémanantd'une

autorité étatique.

49.Leurclassementdans lacatégoriedesmesures«deconservationet degestion))ne dépend

dèslorspasdes «buts» poursuivispar le Canada,mais des «moyens»que celui-cia choisis. Sinon,

une loi restreignant les importationsd'acier,par exemple, pour la fabrication d'hameçons pourrait

êtreconsidéréceomme entrantdanslechampd'applicationde laréservepuisqu'elleconcerneraitles

mesures de conservation et de gestion des ressources halieutiquesprises par le Canada.

50. L'analyse téléologique adoptépeour détexminerla teneur de la ré-erl'«objet»du
046 w

différendou le genre de différend- ne déterminepas nécessairementla natureréelle dudifférend

lui-même. Dansla présente affaire, les Parties s'oppt anifestement la foissur la teneurde

la clause de réserveainsi que sur la nature du différendqueeut soumettreà la compétence

de la Cour. On ne fait pas progresser la résolutconflit en définissantles moyens par lafin.

Les précédents

51. Monsieur le président, l'analyse développear le Canada est aussi curieusement en

contradiction avec les précédenapplicables qui, curieusement aussi, appu-enet ne sapent

pas- la thèsede l'Espagne.

IrJ
52.L'affairede 1'Anglo-IranianOil Co.a été rappelée fréquemmànt otreattention". Que.

nous apprend-elle Elle nous apprend en fait que le sens de la réserve del'Irandevait êtredicté

par I'intentiondu Majlis telle qu'elles'était expàl'époque. Et dès lors que le sens de la

réserveen l'espècedoit être dicpar l'intention duGouvernement du Canada, mais que cette

appréciationdoit se faire en mai 1994 et non pas en mars 1995.

"VoiM. Hankey,ibid.,p. 30-31,par.23-27. -43 -

53. Le conseil.du Canada nous a aussi reproché d'avoir«laiss[é]pratiquement de côté))

l'affairedu Plateau continental de la mer Egée16.Et on nous a obligeamment fourniun excellent

résumé d'une partie mais pas de l'ensemble- du raisonnement suivi par la Cour dans cette

affaire1'.Tirant laleçonde cetteremontrance gentimentadministrée,nous nous sommesprécipités

sur lesrecueils et nous avons relu avec grande attention I'affairedu Plateau contlaemerl de

Egéeetnous avonsdécouvert, ànotrejoie eà notresurprise,que l'élémectentralduraisonnement

de laCour - lacléde voûte de sonanalys- sembleavoir échappé àl'attentionde nos collègues

canadiens. Cetarrêt appuieprécisément la thèsee l'Espagne. Et en voici les raisons.

54. L'élémenc tlédu raisonnement de la Cour au sujet de la réserve dela Grèàel'Acte

générasle fondait sur le fait qu'elle reconnaissait quele droit internationalrégissaitl'interprétation

destermes employésdanscetteréserveet l'amenaiàconclureque«lerégimeterritorial..d'unEtat
O 471

riveraincomprendipsojure lesdroitsd'explorationetd'exploitationduplateau continentalqu'il tient

du droitinternati~nal))'~. Or si le droit intertemporel peut élargirla portée d'unobjet concret,

commeles droitsterritoriaux de la Grèce, dufaitde son extension ultérieureauxterres submergées

situées aularge des côtes, il ne saurait transformerun objet donné(la conservation et la gestion)

en un autre(i'abusde droit en.haute mer).

55.Nous pourrionsajouter ici qu'ilest possibled'adapterI'affairedu Plateau continental de

la merEgée à la situationqui nousoccupe d'unemanière intéressaet riche d'enseignements. La

Cour se rappellera que la réserve) de la Grèceexcluait «les différends ayant traitau statut

territorial de la Grèce)).

56.Imaginonsqu'unEtat Xvoisinait envahilaGrèceetquecelle-ciait introduit une instance

en vertu de'Actegénéradle 1928. L'EtatX pourrait-ilalors invoquer(par voie de réciprocitél)a

réservede la Grèce?

l6VoirM. Hankey,ibid.,p. 31, par.28.

''voir M.Hankey,ibid.,p. 31-32, par.28-33;voir aussiibid.,p. 37, par.45; et p. 40, par.52;M. Willis, p. 52, par.8.

's~lateaucontinentalde la mer Egét,.I.J.Recueil1978,p. 36, par.86;les italiquessontde moi. - 44 -

57. L'EtatX soutiendrait que cette invasionne peut donner lieuà l'introduction d'aucune

instance parce qu'elle a eu lieuur «le territoire grec» et parce que certains des droits de 1'Etat

envahisseur- notre hypothèsese situe évidemmentavant 1945 - (par soumission ouconquête)

seraient des droits «ayanttrait au statutterritorial de la Grèce)).Le différend oule motif d'action

aurait«aussi»- pour dire comme mon ami Prosper Weil - trait au statutterritorial de la Grèce.

58.Et pour paraphraser ses propos dans ce contexte hypothétiqu:«[d]èslors que la Grèce

admet que le différendse rapporte aussi))-etj'insiste sur lemot «auss-» «au statutterritorial

de [la] Grèce affectépar les actions de'EtatX, elle admet qu'ilest couvert par laréserve»19.

Nouvel exposé de la thèse espagnole

1. L'idée selon laquellela réclamation liée spécifiquemen àtl'arraisonnementde l'Estain'est
que l'unedes réclamations de l'Espagne à l'encontredu Canadaest au coeur dela thèse
espagnole

59.Les réclamations del'Espagneliées à l'atteinteabusivà sa souverainetéen haute mer,

. . à l'emploi dela force dans les eaux internationales et, de manière généralà, l'exerciced'une

. - 048 autoritégouvernementaleen haute merne sontpassimplementfondées surlaviolationde principes

juridiques généraux susceptibls'entrerenjeu lorsqu'il s'agit d'appretrd'analyserdesquestions

juridiques, mais elles ont pour origine la violation de règlesjuridiquesde fond.

60.Lesréclamationsdel'Espagnequi n'ontpastrait àlagestionou à laconservationreposent

sur des normes et des règlesde fond, comme le droit de la mer, ledroit de la responsabilitédes

Etats, et lesrègles concernantla non-intervention,la non-ingérenceet l'emploide la force dans les

eaux internationales.

2. La réservecanadienne n'aaucuneréalité ouvaliditéobjective endroitinternationalet elle
ne devraitpas être considéré perla Cour comme ayant pour effetde faire obstacle à la
requête de l'Espagne,sauf si on lui reconnaît une telleréalitéou validité

61. Enconséquence,la«réservesurla conservation))n'exclutrien, parce qu'elle netrouvepas

à s'appliquer. 11est déplacé,de la part du Canada, de demander que son intention subjective

I9Ibi, . 28-29,p5.. -45 -

s'imposeà la Cour. L'intentionsubjectivepeut êtreimportante,si ce n'est décisiv,our ce qui est

de la question de l'objetet du but d'uneréservedans «l'esprit» de1'Etatdéclarant. Mais suivre

l'argument du Canada jusqu'à permettre que cette intention subjective s'impose- en ce qui

concerne à la fois l'interprétatde la motivationet l'identificationou la validation de l'objet-

serait forceà l'extrême la jurisprudence de la Cour et violer le paragraphe 6 de l'article36 du

Statut. Si ((l'intentionet le but» peuvent se confondre avec «la portée et l'autorité)), tout

raisonnementconcernantl'interprétationdevientcirculaire. La compétencedelacompétenceserait

remplacée par l'intentiode l'intention.

62. Ainsi, c'estau regard du droit internationalqu'ily a lieu d'examineret d'interpréterla

réservecanadienne 2 4, particulièrements'agissantde sujetsaussi délicats quelerecourà la force

et le fait de se réserverla libertédes mers. C'est ce que confirme pleinement l'arrêrtendu dans

l'affaire duPlateaucontinental dela merEgée(Grècec. Turquie)où laCour a dit, ily ajuste vingt

ans:«Ledifférenda trait àladéterminationdeszonesdeplateaucontinentalsur lesquelleslaGrèce

et la Turquie sont respectivementhabilitées exercer les droits souverains consacrésar le droit

international.'O

63. C'est la seule option qui s'offrà la Cour aux termes de son Statut, dont l'article38

disposeen sonpremierparagrapheque «lamission [delaCour]est de régler conformémena tudroit

international lesdifférendsqui lui sont soumis)). En l'espèce, la législation natieanadienne,

. . dont la loi C-29, d'aprèslaquelle le Canada peut exercer un pouvoir réglementaire à l'égard de
049

navires étrangersen hautemer, ne saurait l'emporter ou primersur la règle traditionnellede droit

international qui consacre la liberté de la haute mer. Une règle d'interprétation

canadienne - comme une règlede droit interne de conflit de lois - ne saurait pas davantage

s'appliquerpourfaireéchec àlarègleinternationaled'interprétation qpirévoitl'applicatiodudroit

internationalet non celle du droit canadien.

20Plateacontinental dela merEgée(Grècec. Turq,C.I.J.Recueil1978,p. 35, par.85. Lesdroitsconsacrés. -46 -

64.Pour l'interprétatiode la réservecanadienneen applicationdu droit international, ilest

indifférentque le Canadaait omis au paragraphe2 4 l'expression((d'aprle droit international)),

alors qu'ellefigure au paragraphe c) de sa déclarationd'acceptationde lajuridiction obligatoire

de la Cour, mais l'oncomprend aisémentla raison d'une telleomission. L'introduction de cette

expressiondans le paragraphe2 4 aurait été manifestementabsurde.Cela aurait exposéle talon

d'Achillede la réservecanadienneaux flèches deParis.

3. Mêmesi la Cour devait estimer que la réservetrouve à s'appliquer, elle ne saurait
s'appliqueren l'espècepuisque l'actionà l'originede l'incidentde l'Estai ne se justifie en
vertu d'aucun pouvoir

65.L'incident apu,auxyeux du Canada, découlerde «l'exécution de telles mesures)),mais *

il n'enest ainsi qu'en droit canadien.l n'en va pas de mêmeen droit international. Au plan

international,le Canada a agi sans en avoir le pouvoir. Lorsque lesagentsde la forcepublique ont

arraisonnéi'Estai,ils l'ontfait sans en avoir le pouvoir. Quandils sontmontàbord de l'Estai,

ils I'ontfait sans en avoir le pouvoir. Quandils ont arle capitaineet l'équipage,ils I'ontfait

sans en avoir le pouvoir. Quandils ont détourné'Estaivers St John's,ils I'ontfait sans en avoir

le pouvoir

66. Ces actions, quine sejustifient en vertu d'aucunpouvoir reconnuen droit international,

peuvent ouont pu sembleraux responsablespolitiquescanadiensdes mesures valables «de gestion

et de conservation», maiselles ne l'étaientque d'aprèsle droit canadienet aux yeux du Canada et W

de son opinion publique. Elles continuent de l'êtreaujourd'hui,comme la Cour l'a entendu à

maintesreprises. Il n'endemeurepas moinsqu'ellesnesauraientconstituerdes ((mesuresde gestion

et de conservation))au regarddu droit international et de la pratique internationale.

4. En outre, dans le différend quil'oppose au Canada, l'Espagne aau moins trois autres

réclamations àfairevaloir :extensionillicitede la compétencenationalesur la haute mer,
emploiillicite de la force et violation de la souveraineté espagnen haute mer ,

67.Chacunedecestroisréclamationsestindépendantedesréclamationsportan etxpressément

sur l'incidentde'Estaiet surl'applicationspécifiqueauxnaviresespagnolsse trouvantdanslazone -47 -

OPANOde la loi de 1994modifiant la loi sur la protection des pêchescôtièreset ses règlements

d'application.

68. Ces trois réclamationsse rapportenttoutàsun différendqui existait avant I'incidentde
O50
l'Estai et qui demeurerait,même sil'incident del'Estai était«régou résolud'unemanière ou

d'uneautre.

69. Aucune de ces trois réclamationsne résulted'uncontournementde la réserveou de la

superposition de principes générauxqui pourraient se retrouver dans de nombreux différends,

commele principede la ((bonnefoi» ou celui selon lequelpacta suntservanda. Ce sontdes règles

d'application defond quisontenjeu :lesrèglestiréesdudroitde lamerqui présidentauxdécisions

dans ce domaine et les normesjuridiques relativesla non-intervention,a la non-ingérenceet au

respect de la souveraineté.

70.Ce sontdes motifsd'action,Monsieurleprésident, qui sonindépendantesde l'application

au cas particulier de ce que le Canada considèrecomme de simples ((mesuresde gestion et de

conservation))ou la simple ((exécution))deces mesures.

71. Mon intervention,la semaine dernière,était consacréeaux questiod'interprétatiode

la clause facultative du Canada. Je me suis efforcéde démontrerque notre affaire est loin d'être

simple et qu'elle n'est pas sans objet; que la réserved) du Canada doit êtreinterprétée en

appliquant lesnormesdudroitinternationaldemême qu'entenantcomptedes((intentions))déclarées

du Canada; quele Canadadoit assumer la responsabilitédu fait que l'effetutile de la réserven'est

pas aussi large qu'ill'auraitsouhaité;que laréserveauraitpu êtrerédde manièreà atteindreles

objectifsdu Canada tels qu'onnous les a présenté;t que l'affairen'empiète pas davantagesur le

fond qu'onne pouvait s'yattendre s'agissant d'uneréserve dece type.

72. Plus important encore,j'ai cheràhexpliquera la Couren quoi cette affaire ne se limite

pas a une simplequestion«de gestion et de conservation))et en quoielle comporte certainsmotifs

d'actionimportants, qui échappent auchamp d'applicationde la réserve,etl'égarddesquelles la

Cour est et devrait se déclarercompétente. -48 -

73. Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs de la Cour,ces conclusions, d'aprèsmoi,

n'ontpas étréfutées en quoi qee soit parlesargumentsen défensepréseavec talentparnos

amis de la Partie adverse. En examinant les arguments complexes et vigoureux avancéspar le

Canada la semaine dernière eten y répondantnous avonsconfortésdans la conviction quela

thèse del'Espagneest bien fondée.

Monsieurleprésident,je voudraisvousremercier, ainsique lesMembresde la Cour, de votre

attention et vous prie de bien vouloir appeler à la barre mon ami et collègue,

M. Pierre-Marieupuy.

051 Le PRESIDENT :Merci, M. Highet. Je donne la paroàM. Dupuy.

Mr. DUPUY:

1. "In acceptingthe jurisdiction of the Court, Govemments arefree to limit itSjurisdiction

in a drastic manner. As asult there may be little lefi in the acceptancewhich is subjectto the

jurisdiction of the Court. Thisthe Governments,rusteesof the interestsentrustedto them, are

fully entitledto do. Their rightto append reservationswhichare not inconsistentwith the Statute

is no longer in question. Butthe question whether that littlethat is le3 is or is notsubject to the

jurisdiction of theCourtstbe determined by theCourtitseg Any conditions or reservations

which purportto deprivethe Court of that powerare contraryto an expressprovision ofthe Sta-ute

andtotheverynotion,embodiedinArticle 36,paragraph 6,ofconfermentof obligatoryjurisdiction

upon the C~urt."~'

2. It was in these terms, Mr. President,Members of the Court, that Sir HerschLauterpacht

expressed himself in his separate opinion (separate, not dissenting)appended to the Judgmentof

the Court in the case of the NorwegianLoans. The citation is1oagree, but it says it all, or

almost all! i

21
CaseconcemingCertainNorwegianLoans,Judgmentof6 July1957,I.C.J.Reports1957,p. 46,emphasisadded. - 49 -

In particular it confirms the corpusjuris applicable to declarations of recognition of your

jurisdiction, ofwhich 1 hadthe honour to recapitulatethe main elements inmy oral argumentbefore

you last Wednesda?: the principle of consent to jurisdiction; the character sui generis of

declarations; the need to seek out and identify the precise intention of the declarant at the time

when the declaration was made; the integrity of the declaration; the importance to be attached to

the principle of good faith; the application "by analogy" of treaty law; and, finally, the

unavoidableobligation of respect for the provisions of the Statute and ofthe Charter.

3. You will have notedthatnot one ofthe distinguished counsel of Canada calledthis corpus

juris into question last week. Al1 of the rules evoked by Spain were implicitly recognized as

applicable and in some cases reiterated, as Mr. Hankey did in his speech before you on Thursday

moming23.

However, at the same time, our opponents' oral arguments taken as a whole eloquently

demonstratedthatCanada remainsmore attachedthan ever to the notion ofabsolutefi.eedomon the

part of the declarant, as1analyzed it before you the other day. Her talented counsel repeated it to

us often enough: what counts is the purpose of the measures, as established by Canadaz4.

If we allow Canada to decide for herself, on the sole basis of her own domestic ld5,

whether an action comes within the scope of "conservation and management measures", the right

to determine the lawfulness of those measures and of their enforcement would inevitably escape

your jurisdiction.

4. The central question in this second round of oral argument is the following: How does

Canadareconcile this radicalposition with the at least implicitacceptancethat her declaration

mustrespectyour Statuteand hence the Charterof the UnitedNations?

UC~98/10, pp.36-56; for therequirementthatthe declaration te compatiblewith theStatute,see more
particularparas.19-22and33-37.

13CR98111,pp.24 etseq.

"CR 98/12,p. 32, para 16.

ZSCR98111, pp.56-57,para.27. - 50 -

5.1 had the honourto remind you lastweek of the consistencyof yourjurisprudence in this

regard. A moment ago 1cited to you the words of Sir Hersch on this subject.

No one in this courtroom doubts that Canada had in mind "fisheries conservation and

1
management measures" when she adoptedher new declaration. But thatraises two questions.

First, inviewofthemannerinwhichshe fonnulated this declaration,of whichthereservation

is but a part, and having regardalso to the way in which her political leaders expressedthemselves

at the time,can you allow yourself to rely solely on this statement in order to hold that this

premeditatedcourseof action by Canadaescapesyourjurisdiction? Thiswill be the subjectof the

first part of my speech.

Can you then, in view of the circumstancesand manner in which the Estaiwas seized and

other Spanish fishing vessels harassedringthe same period, acceptthat the construction which

05 3 Canada places on "conservationand managementmeasures" allows you to uphold herreservation

without derogating from the Charter itself? That will be the subject of the secondand final part

of my speech.

1. The CanadianStrategyand its Legal Implications

6. Last Thursday Mr. Hankey told you that the principles governing the interpretation of

optional clauses had been set out by the Court in two cases, your Judgment in the case of the

w
Anglo-IranianCo. and that given in the AegeanSea case26.He left out quite a numberof others,

but we won'twony about that! These two cases are indeed important,as we ourselveshad been

the first to point out2',andthey are importantfor the reasonswhich he himself gave,at leastas far

as the first two of those reasons are concerned, since they came from the Court itself, while the

third one was "home-grown": those cases show that a declaration under Article 36, paragraph 2,

must, on the one hand,be construed in accordancewith the ordinary andreasonable meaningof its

2 6 ~98/11,pp30-33paras. 2et seq.

Memorial,p. 78,para.62 [p. 58 in the Englishtranslation].p. 45, para. 18; p. 47, para.24; Spanish - 51 -

terms, sothat the "objectified"intention - as he put it - may beascertainedfiom the text itself;

at the sametime they illustratethe rule wherebythe search for this intentionmay be illuminated

by an examinationofthe historical and politicalcircumstanceswhich obtainedat the timewhenthe

declarationwas forrn~lated~~.

Canada invokesthisjurisprudence in pursuit of a strategywhich 1 am not so much goingto

challenge hereas to analyse. It will be for the Court to draw from my analysis such conclusions

as it considers appropriate.

A. The elements of the Canadian strategy:

7. While claimingto applythe criteriaoftheAnglo-lranianCo., andAegeanSeacases,over

which they will not be the first to have bumt their fingers, our opponentsallow the purposeof the

"conservation and management measures" to override ail other considerations. However, the

distinguished counsel of Canadaapply to this notion a treatrnent somewhatalong the linesof that

which theJivaro tribeusedto mete out to theheadsof their enemies: as everyoneknows, firstthey

severed them fiom the body, then they shrank them down to the chosen size.
. .
Our opponents concemthemselves only with the content of the reservation, without regard

for that of their own declaration; without regard,moreover, for the large number of statements

made at the time by their own Govemment; they concentrate their efforts on the object of the

reservation without conceming themselves with whether or not it coincides with that of the

Application filed with you by Spain.

8. Thus, playing, as it were, the Jivaro witch-doctor,one of Canada'scounsel tells us: "the

phrase 'conservation and management' covertshe whole range of measures taken by Stateswith

28SeNote 6, supra. - 52 -

respect to the living resources of the seaWz9a,nd, again, that "the geographical area where these

measures apply will, of course, varyM30.

However, neither Mr. Hankey, any more than Mr. Willis before him, places the reservation

in the context of theCanadian declaration "as a whole", notwithstandingthat one of them had

affirmed his faith in the integrity of declarations,of which reservationsare but a pad', while the

other told us that the principlethat reservations shouldbe interpretedrestrictivelyderivesfrom the

misconceptionthat the Court'sjurisdictionisthe generalrule fromwhich the reservationconstitutes

an exception32.

This is a serious error of interpretationand runs precisely counterto the principle of the
w

integrity of the declaration.

The formal recognition of jurisdiction is not a general principle but a specific undertaking.

It is specificto theCanadian declaration,the first paragraph of which readsas follows: "Canada

accepts as compulsory ipso facto and without special convention . . .the jurisdiction of the

International Court of Justice. . .over al1disputes arising after the present declaration."

If the integrity of the declaration is to be respected,then the reservation mustbe interpreted
055

by reference to the obligation in relationto which it derives its meaning, and notby reference to

general internationallaw,which merelyprovidesthat the declarant's consent musthave beenfreely

gi~en~~.

9. Furthermore, not one of the counsel of Canada dared mention- still less dispute the

fact- that the Minister of Fisheries, and still more so his colleague at Foreign Affairs, had

2 9 ~98/11, p. 38, para.48.

301bipd.39, para.1.

3'~bip dp26-28p,aras.10-14.

32C~98111, p.52,para7.

33Seeoralpleadingof Mr.Dupuy. CR98/10,pp.47-48,para.24. - 53 -

deliberately emphasized, in order to alleviate the concern and scruples of their Members of

Parliament, the distinction between "piratevessels" and vesselsof member States of NAFO.

Thus, in a deliberately"clean"versionthe CanadianGovemment sanitized itsintentionsand

al1we learn of this from Mr. Willis' speech, wherehe reliesthis time on the text of the Canadian

legislation itself, is that it applies to al1ve~sels~~.

10.However, last weekwe were treated to a new attemptto reducethe legal scope of your

right of intervention. On Friday morning Professor Weil toldyou:

"When a State attaches to its declaration of acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court a reservationexcluding disputeson a certainsubject,on that

ground alone,necessarilyand automaticaily,it rejectsthe Court'sjurisdictionto apply
the principles and rules which would have govemedthe dispute had it not been
exempted fromthejurisdiction ofthe Court - eventhough the fieldof applicationof
such principles and rules is wider than the specific subject-matter of the disputes
concerned. "35

11. This statement must be quietly but firmly challenged. Contrary to appearances, it

contributes nothing to a solution of the problem of law beforethe Court - that of the legal rules

governing its determination of its own jurisdiction - but on the contrary helps to obscure it.

Moreover,its authorproduced it solelyon his own authority,without beingableto find supportfor

it either in jurisprudence or in the doctrine.

It derives from a truncated conception of the manner in which the International Court

proceeds. Just as this latter is the sole arbiter of its ownjurisdiction, in the sarneway it is in no

way limited with regard to the legal meanswhich it may employin orderto confirm or deny such

jurisdiction. It is free to choose for itself, fiom the sourcesset out in Article 38, the rules of law

which it considers appropriate to this operation.

12.We must notconfusethe procedural andsubstantiverules applicabletothe determination

ofjurisdiction with those to which the Court may have recourse in order to rule on the merits. It

is one thing to apply the Statute or the provisions of the Charter in order to determine whether a

34CR98/12, p. 21, para.94.

35CR98/12, p. 43, para.44. - 54 -

reservation may be invoked, quite another to examine subsequently- for exarnple- the

substantivequestion of the jurisdiction of a State over vessels flying its flag.

But, in both cases,theCourt hasabsolutefreedom in itschoiceoftherules of lawapplicable.

Moreover,the Court has itself made itlear that the determination ofits ownjurisdiction must be

govemed by certain substantiverules of law.Thus, in the case conceming the Right of Passage

over IndianTerritorythis Court stated:

"In order to decide whether, as maintained by the Govemment of India, the
Third Condition appended by Portugal isinvalid, and whether such invalidity entails
the invalidity oftheDeclarationinwhich it is contained,the Court mustdeterminethe
meaning and the effect of the ThirdCondition by referenceto its actual wording and
applicableprinciples of la14."~~
I
These are principles which the Court itself derives, on its own determination, notonly from the

Statute but also fiom the Charter.

13.Furthermore,the need for a declarationof recognitionofjurisdiction to complywith the

Charter may lead the Court,even at thejurisdiction stage, to undertakea preliminary examination

of the substantiveles which it may be calledupon to apply in the eventthat the case reachesthe

merits stage. Obviously,therecan beno questionof the Court being subjectto any estoppelin this

regard.

Thisapplies inparticular,in the present case,to the Court'spowerto rule on a coastal State's

title to legislate over the highs, or on the unlawful use of coercive force on those same high -

seas. As Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice put it:

"le fait qu'un tribunal, lorsqu'ilexamine la question de la compétence, ne peutse
prononcerou statuersur des questionsrelevantdu fond, neveutnaturellementpas dire
qu'ilne peut en connaître lorsqu'ilest essentiel qu'ilagisse ainsi pour déciderde la
c~mpétence"~'.[Translationby the Registry..]

36Caseconcerningthe Right of Passage over Indian Territoty, Preliminaty Objections, Judgrnent of
26 November1957I.C.J.Reports1957, pp. 125-153,at 142.
37SiGeraldFiîzmauri, heLaw andProcedureof theIntermtionalCourtofJus1986,Vol. II,p. 450. 14. It is also to deal with this type of case precisely, when there is a particular degree of
-
interminglingbetweenmerits andjurisdiction, that the Courtgave itself the possibilityof declaring

that an objectiondoes not have an exclusively preliminarycharacter. However, ours is not such

an extreme case. Rather, we are in a situation illustrating another remark by

Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, whena question ofjurisdiction hasdirect links withthe merits: "ifinsuch

cases the [iribunal] declinesjurisdiction there is the dangerit rnayhavedoneso by referenceto

pleadings whichIack complet en es^' In t.isway, the Courthasto make an initialappraisalofthe

validity either of the declaration itself,or, as is the case here, simply of the admissibility of the

interpretation given of it by the declarant under substantiverules, whose full use it will discover

atthe merits stage. An illustrationof this proceduremay be found, for example,in the Interhandel

15. But letus alsohear whatthePermanentCourtofInternationalJusticesaid in itsJudgment

No. 6, when consideringthe objectionto itsjurisdiction raised by Poland in the case conceming

Certain GermanInterests in PoIish UpperSilesia:

"In the circumstances ... the Court cannot in its decision on this objection in

any way prejudge its future decision on the merits. On the other hand, however, the
Court cannoton this groundalone declare itself incompetent; for, were it to do so, it
would become possible fora Partyto make an objectionto the jurisdiction - which
could not be dealt with without recourseto argumentstaken from the merits - have
the effect of precluding further proceedings simply be raising it in Iiminelitis; this

would be quite inadmi~sible."~~

And the Permanent Court added:

"TheCourt,therefore,forthe purposesof the decisionfor which itisnow asked,
considers that it must proceed to the enquiry above referred to, even if this enquiry

involves touching upon subjects belonging to the merits of the case; it is, however,
to be clearlyunderstoodthat nothing whichthe Courtsaysin the presentjudgment can

38H. auterpacht,TheDevelopmentofInternationalLawby theInternationalCourt,rev.ed.,1958,p. 113,quoted
bySir GeraldFitzmauric,p.cit.,. 450.

391.C.. eports1959,p. 24.

40JudgmenNt o. 6, P.C.I.J.,A,rNo. 6, p. 15. be regarded as restricting its entire freedom to estimate the value of any arguments
advanced by either side on the same subjects duringthe proceedingsonthe me rit^."^'

Sincethis importantmatterof links betweenrulesofjurisdiction and substantiveruleswhich
058
may be invoked at the jurisdictional stageas been considered,1now tum to the implications of
,

the Canadian strategy.

B. The implications of the Canadian strategy

16.ThepositionreiteratedagainbydistinguishedcounselofCanada lastweekthateverything

definedas a "conservationand managementmeasure" by Canada itself inevitablyfalls withinthe

scope of its reservation and, byirtue of this, therefore falls outside your jurisdiction hasa very
V
simpleimplication. The upshotof it isthat it givesthe declaranttotal power overyourjurisdiction.

In reality,the readingof Canada's reservationwhich it proposes youshouldollowpresupposesthe

followingaddition: "Conservationand management measuresare measures which are defined as

such by the Canadian Government."

In this, youwill no doubt have recognizedan almost literaltransposition of the reservation

Francewished to invokeagainstNorway in 1957,the very reservation which yourCourt rejected.

It is one of those reservationswhich are said to be "automatic",because they leavethe appraisal

of their substantive scopeto the sole discretion of theirors,or "theyoperateinsucha wayas

to leaveno scintiIlaofjurisdiction to the Court')to use the words of Sir Robert Jennings, which Irr

1 referredto the other day42

17.The fact that the scope of the reservation, precisely, has varied over time since it was

made is al1the more reason,Canada claims, to subjectthe Courtto Canada'sown appraisal of the

reservation. In 1994,Canadaadopted a declaration qualifiedby subparagraph (4. Application of

4'Ibid.,pp. 15-16.

"Seeoral argumentof Mr. P.-M.Dupuy,CR 98/10, pp. 46-47,paras.25-27. - 57 -

theAnglo-Iranian + Aegean Seatest enablesusto refer not onlytothe literaltext ofthe reservation

but also to the parliamentarydebates having given rise to its adoption43.

As 1have already said,this couldraise a legitimateexpectationby Spainthat it was not the

subject of the Canadian revision of its legi~lation~s,ince a clear distinction was drawn therein

betweenpirate vessels and.others. Not until3 March the followingyear did a new regulation add

Spanish and Portuguesevessels to those covered by the legislation.

18. As Mr. Williswas sayingto you the otherday, legislationis nothingwithout regulations

and vice-versa45. The substantive scope of the legislation thus changed between the time of its

adoptionand that ofthe regulatory complementappliedto it. However,in the meantime,the actual

text of the declarationhad not beenmodified.

Accordingto Canada,there is nothing wrongin these successiveextensionsof the authority

of itslegislation,and its reservation must adaptto the fluctuationsof its intentions,since it is solely

from those intentionsthat itderives. You,theJudgesofthisdistinguishedCourt,must remainsilent

and accept without a word this "elastic" recognitionof your Court!

19. Then, as the third stage in this Canadianoperation, a few days later, the Estai is seized

and other Spanish vessels threatened, their netsut, even thoughthey were not in breach of the

NAFOlegislation. Once again,what this meansis resigning oneselfwilly nilly to the exclusion of

yourjurisdiction, by this specles of declarant monarch,in whom Canada recognizes itself. This

monarchcommandsyou to respectthe diktatof his exclusionof yourjurisdiction, measuredbythe

soleyardstick of his sovereignwill.

20. So for my part, 1shall merely echo yourown words by replying with a quotation from

your Judgment of 1953, in the Nottebohmcase:

43Seeoralargumentof Mr.P.- M. Dupuy,CR98/10,pp.46-47, paras.25-27.

"Oralargumentof Mr.P.-M.Dupuy,CR98/10,pp.47-49, paras.28-31.

45CR 98111,pp.56-57. "Any State which has proclaimed its adherence to the optional clause cannot
reserve to itselfthe power to make its opinion on thejurisdiction ofthe Court prevail
once the Court has been seised of the case: any finding on jurisdiction falls
exclusively withinthe power of the Court. In this regard,no governmentcan impose
itspoint ofview on the Court." [Translationby the Registry.] (Emphasis added.)

O60 Any oppositeconclusion would,as 1think1havesufficientlyemphasized,be contrarytoyour

Statute,to its Article 36,paragraph 6. Moreover, SirPercy Spenderalso certainlysharedthis view

himself, when he stated:

"Anobligationto recognizethejurisdiction ofthe Court, the existence orxtent
of which obligation in respect to any particular dispute is a matter which can be
deterrnined by the State concemed, is not a legal obligationat all."46

Mr. President,1now corneto the second aspect, whichthis time concemsthe questionas to
1

whether the modalities of the measures actually taken by Canada can genuinely fa11within its .

reservation, the nature of the facts allegedly coveredby the Canadian reservation. Thispart will

be shorter than the previous one.

II. The natureof the facts allegedly coveredby the Canadianreservation

21. Last Friday,eminent counsel of Canadastronglydeplored Spain'sinsistence on the fact

that the fisheries "conservation and management measures" cannot include the use of force4',

becausethat wouldallowaninterpretationoftheCanadianreservationincompatiblewith theUnited

NationsCharter - thatwasourargument- and,moreparticularly,withitsArticle 2,paragraph4.
J

Seemingly ill-informedof the precisenatureofthe measures actuallytakenonthe high seasagainst

Spanishvessels by the State he is defending,that counsel saw themas unwarranted dramatization

on Ourpart, taking the form, he said, of a real "verbalbludge~ning". is evidence on this point

raisesproblems of fact,a point alreadyadequatelydealtwithbyProfessor SiinchezRodriguez. But

it also raises question of law, as follows: first, what is the legal definition ofthe use of force in

46~eparatopinioninInterhandelcase,PreliminaryObjectiom,Judgmentof21 March1959,I.C.J. Reports 1959,
pp. 55-56.

47C~98/12,pp. 33-34,para 30.

481bid. - 60 -

which wouldformpart of the subsequentstage,the oneconcerned,precisely,withthe meritsof our

case, in the Englishense of the term.

For the time being, the specifically legal reply is as follows: the question ofthe appraisal
4
of the "reasonable"or proportionate character ofthe use of force leads us to the question of its

regulation on the high seas. Only legally authorizeduse can be balanced. However,the fact is
062
preciselythat the conditions in which Canada,on the high seas, usedforce against Spanishvessels

cannot be acceptedas part of the interpretationof its reservation.

B. Regulation of the use of force on the high seas

24. The use of force is strictly regulated on the high seas and on a very solid basis of W

customary law. It presupposes that the possession ofa legal title is established with the greatest

precision and1would summarize what it means by saying simply: no police without a title, in

internationalspaces,whether onthe seaor in the air. Sono right touseforce either. Furthermore,

as regards this force which we are told is included in the composition of the English term

"enforcement':we are not told that it in no way forms part of the official French term which

translates it and which, in the reservation, is "exécution".

Remainingwithin the lawof the highseas, Gilbert Gidel tells usthat "byan age-oldcustom,

warships have theright to recognizethe identity and nationality ofate vesselsthey encounter.
w
But this right doesnot go beyondsimple'recognition"'". No trace here of the use of armed force.

25. The cases in which the new Law of the Sea - in this respect very faithful to the old

one - contemplatesthe seizureof a vesse1or an aircraft on the high seas, are Article 105of the

Montego Bay Convention, which is supplemented by Article 110, relating to the right of visit.

Withoutexplicitlymentioningthe use of coercion,the former, and perhaps evenboth of them,an

be presumed toimplicitlyaccept it. But towhom do thesetwo Articlesactuallyapply? The latter
.
to vessels without nationality,-orboth Articles - to "pirate" vessels!

5'G.Gidel,Le droit internationalpublicde la mer, Vol.I, p.289. - 61 -

Goodness me, havewe not already encountered thisterm somewhere? "Piratevessels"! that

sounds familiar! 1sit not precisely on this categorythat Mr. Ouellet originally said he wished to

unleash the wrath of hisfisheries police patrol boatsin their packs52?

O63 But doesthis not mean that, even morethan Mr. Tobin perhaps, he was very well-versed in

law of the seamatters? Without wishingto make unfoundedinsinuations,1now better understand

why, to mollifi the scruples or the outright opposition of the Canadian Members of Parliament,

whose opposingcounsel so cautiouslyavoided addressingyoulast week,the two ministers should

have spoken onlyof "pirate vessels" in order to designatetheir target.

26. Where"pirate vessels" are concerned,the customary law of the sea no doubt authorizes

the use of force on the high seas. But only where they are concemed. .So there is a serious

problem. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Fisheries used this expression

notwithstandingthe fact that the relative imprecision of theircommentsbarely concealedtheir full

awareness that neither NAFO third State vessels, nor, a fortiori, vessels flying the flags of its

member States, corresponded to the definition given by the law of the sea. There are only two

alternatives: either, as one must always suppose to begin with, Mr. Ouellet - and through his

voice Canada - were in goodfaith when they intimated,onmaking thereservation,that it referred

onlyto pirate vessels, in which case Spain'slegitimateexpectation continuedto be infavour of its

securiv. Or else by using this term accordingto the admittedly very precise usageof the law of

the sea, Mr. Tobinwas seekingto deceivehis public,whichonce againbrings us faceto face with

the problem of good faith, which we discussed at such length the other day that everybody, the

Court, Spain andCanada included, agreedto recognizethe application to the interpretationof the

declarationsestablishingyourjurisdiction; theualAnglo-Iranian Co.,andAegean Seatext, asyou

will recall, militated in favour of placing the text of the reservation back in the context of its

adoption!

S2~emorialof Spain,p. 72, para.112.

53SeeoralargumentoMI. P..-M.Dupuy,CR98/10, pp.41-42,paras.15-andpp.45-49, paras.24-31. Conclusion

27. At the end ofthis oral argument,1realize that the actualuse ofmilitarycoercion against
h

Spanish vessels, whichCanada claims escapes your knowledge, cannot be interpreted as falling

withinthe legallyrelevantinterpretationofthe Canadiandeclaration. Anyotherdecisionwouldbe

toadoptan interpretationwhich,the other day,1termedcontra Cartam,incompatiblewiththeterms

-64
of the Charter. The Charteris an inescapable datum,as is your Statute. But youwould only need

to find that there is incompatibilitywith one of these, for exarnpleunder Article 36, paragraph 6,

or with other, under Article 2, paragraph 4, to reject not the validity of the reservation, which we

have never called for, but the strictly unilateral interpretation Canada makes of it. w

28. As you will have realized, throughoutthis oral phase of our pleadings, my colleagues,

likeme, have soughtto base ourselvesonthe most settled,the mostancient,case-lawand the most

. firmly-established principles. In this case at least, there is no question of leadingyou along the

unknown paths of 1 know not what "relative normativity", so disparaged by counsel of Our

opponents,forwhom1havethe greatestrespect,recognitionandfriendship. Thisis simplyamatter

of calmly inviting you,inconformity withthe most firmly-establishedrulesand principles, not to

renounce the exercise of yourjudicial function.

Mr. President,Membersof the Court,1thankyou for your kindattentionthroughoutthis oral

argument. May 1ask you to give the floor to the Agent of Spain.

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur Dupuy. Je donne la parole à l'agentde

l'Espagne.

Mr. PASTOR RIDRUEJO: Thank,you, Mr. President.
>

At the endof ouroralarguments,weonce again seethat Canada has abandonedits allegation

thatthe dispute betweenitself and Spainhas becomemoot. At least, it appearsto have understood

that it cannot be asserted that the SpanishApplication, having no further purpose for the future, - 63 -

merely amountedto a request fora declaratoryjudgment. Nor doesit Say- a factwe note - that

the agreement between the European Union and Canada has extinguishedthe present dispute.

Spain's final conclusionsare therefore as follows:

We noted at the outsetthat the subject-matterof the dispute is Canada'slack of title to act

on the high seasagainst vesselsflying the Spanish flag,the fact that Canadian fisheries legislation

cannot be invokedagainst Spain,and reparation for the wrongful acts perpetratedagainst Spanish

vessels. These matters are not included in Canada's resewationto thejurisdiction of the Court.

We also noted that Canada cannot claim to subordinatethe application of its resewation to

the sole criterion of its national legislation and its own appraisal without disregarding the

jurisdiction you holdunder Article 36, paragraph 6, of your Statute.

Lastly, we noted that the use of force in arresting tEstai and in harassing other Spanish

vesselson the high seas, as well as the use of force contemplatedin Canadian Bills C-29 and C-8,

can also not be included in the Canadian reservation, because it contravenesthe provisions of the

Charter.

For al1 the above reasons, we would ask the Court to adjudge and declare that it has

jurisdiction in this case.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Le PRESIDENT :Je vousremercie beaucoup. LaCour seréunirade nouveau mercredi à 10

heures.

L'audience est levée à 13 h 15.