Audience publique tenue le lundi 19 septembre 2016, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Abraham, président, en l'affaire relative à la Délimitation maritime dans l'océan Indien

Corrigé
Corrected

CR 2016/10

International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice

THE HAGUE LA HAYE

YEAR 2016

Public sitting

held on Monday 19 September 2016, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,

President Abraham presiding,

in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean
(Somalia v. Kenya)

Preliminary Objections

____________________

VERBATIM RECORD
____________________

ANNÉE 2016

Audience publique

tenue le lundi 19 septembre 2016, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,

sous la présidence de M. Abraham, président,

en l’affaire relative à la Délimitation maritime dans l’océan Indien
(Somalie c. Kenya)

Exceptions préliminaires

________________

COMPTE RENDU
________________ - 2 -

Present: President Abraham
Vice-President Yusuf

Judges Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue

Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Robinson
Crawford
Gevorgian
Judge ad hoc Guillaume

Registrar Couvreur

 - 3 -

Présents : M. Abraham, président
M. Yusuf, vice-président

MM. Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Mmes Xue
Donoghue

M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
MM. Bhandari
Robinson
Crawford
Gevorgian, juges
M. Guillaume, juge ad hoc

M. Couvreur, greffier

 - 4 -

The Government of Somalia is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Ali Said Faqi, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Somalia to the Kingdom of
Belgium,

as Co-Agent;

Ms Mona Al-Sharmani, Attorney-at-Law, Senior Legal Adviser to the President of the Federal
Republic of Somalia,

as Deputy-Agent;

Mr. Paul S. Reichler, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the United States
Supreme Court and the District of Columbia,

Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, former Member
and former Chairman of the International Law Commission, member of the Institut de droit
international,

Mr. Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of International Law at University College London, Barrister
at Matrix Chambers, London,

as Counsel and Advocates;

Mr. Lawrence H. Martin, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the United
States Supreme Court, the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,

Ms Alina Miron, Professor of International Law at the University of Angers,

Mr. Edward Craven, Barrister at Matrix Chambers, London,

Mr. Nicholas M. Renzler, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of
Columbia and the State of New York,

as Counsel;

Ms Lea Main-Klingst, Matrix Chambers, London,

as Junior Counsel;

Mr. Mohamed Omar, Senior Adviser to the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia,

Mr. Ahmed Ali Dahir, Attorney-General of the Federal Republic of Somalia,

H.E. Mr. Yusuf Garaad Omar, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic

of Somalia to the United Nations, New York,

Admiral Farah Ahmed Omar, former Admiral of the Somali Navy and the Chairman of Research
Institute for Ocean Affairs, Mogadishu, - 5 -

Mr. Daud Awes, Spokesperson of the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia,

Mr. Abubakar Mohamed Abubakar, Director, Maritime Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

as Advisers;

Ms Kathryn Kalinowski, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington, DC,

Ms Nancy Lopez, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington, DC,

as Assistants. - 6 -

Le Gouvernement de la Somalie est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Ali Said Faqi, ambassadeur de la République fédérale de Somalie auprès du Royaume
de Belgique,

comme coagent ;

Mme Mona Al-Sharmani, avocate, conseillère juridique principale auprès du président de la
République fédérale de Somalie,

comme agent adjoint ;

M. Paul S. Reichler, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux de la Cour suprême
des Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,

M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, ancien membre et
ancien président de la Commission du droit international, membre de l’Institut de droit
international,

M. Philippe Sands, Q.C., professeur de droit international au University College de Londres,
avocat, Matrix Chambers (Londres),

comme conseils et avocats ;

M. Lawrence H. Martin, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux de la Cour
suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, du district de Columbia et du Commonwealth du
Massachusetts,

Mme Alina Miron, professeur de droit international à l’Université d’Angers,

M. Edward Craven, avocat, Matrix Chambers (Londres),

M. Nicholas M. Renzler, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et de l’Etat de New York,

comme conseils ;

Mme Lea Main-Klingst, Matrix Chambers (Londres),

comme conseil auxiliaire ;

M. Mohamed Omar, conseiller principal auprès du président de la République fédérale de Somalie,

M. Ahmed Ali Dahir, Attorney-General de la République fédérale de Somalie,

S. Exc. M. l’ambassadeur Yusuf Garaad Omar, représentant permanent de la République fédérale
de Somalie auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies (New York),

Amiral Farah Ahmed Omar, ancien amiral de la marine somalienne et président de l’Institut de
recherche sur les affaires maritimes de Mogadiscio, - 7 -

M. Daud Awes, porte-parole du président de la République fédérale de Somalie,

M. Abubakar Mohamed Abubakar, directeur des affaires maritimes au ministère des affaires
étrangères,

comme conseillers ;

Mme Kathryn Kalinowski, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington,

Mme Nancy Lopez, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington,

comme assistants. - 8 -

The Government of Kenya is represented by:

Professor Githu Muigai, E.G.H., S.C., Attorney-General of the Republic of Kenya,

as Agent;

H.E. Ms Rose Makena Muchiri, Ambassador of the Republic of Kenya to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,

as Co-Agent;

Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., member of the English Bar, Emeritus Professor of International Law,
University of Oxford, member of the Institut de droit international,

Mr. Payam Akhavan, LL.M. S.J.D. (Harvard), Professor of International Law, McGill University,
member of the State Bar of New York and of the Law Society of Upper Canada, member of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration,

Mr. Mathias Forteau, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, Member of

the International Law Commission,

Mr. Alan Boyle, Professor of International Law at the University of Edinburgh, member of the
English Bar,

Mr. Karim A. A. Khan, Q.C., member of the English Bar,

as Counsel and Advocates;

Ms Amy Sander, member of the English Bar,

Ms Philippa Webb, Reader in Public International Law, King’s College, London, member of the
English Bar and of the New York Bar,

Mr. Eirik Bjorge, Shaw Foundation Junior Research Fellow in Law at the University of Oxford,

as Counsel;

Hon. Senator Amos Wako, Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights,

Hon. Samuel Chepkonga, Chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs,

Ms Juster Nkoroi, E.B.S., Head, Kenya International Boundaries Office,

Mr. Michael Guchayo Gikuhi, Director, Kenya International Boundaries Office,

Ms Njeri Wachira, Head, International Law Division, Office of the Attorney-General and
Department of Justice,

Ms Stella Munyi, Director, Legal Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Ms Stella Orina, Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Rotiken Kaitikei, Foreign Service Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, - 9 -

Le Gouvernement du Kenya est représenté par :

M. Githu Muigai, professeur, E.G.H., S.C., Attorney General de la République du Kenya,

comme agent ;

S. Exc. Mme Rose Makena Muchiri, ambassadeur de la République du Kenya auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas,

comme coagent ;

M. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, professeur émérite de droit
international à l’Université d’Oxford, membre de l’Institut de droit international,

M. Payam Akhavan, LL.M., S.J.D (Harvard), professeur de droit international à
l’Université McGill, membre du barreau de l’Etat de New York et du barreau du Haut-Canada,
membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,

M. Mathias Forteau, professeur à l’Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre de la

Commission du droit international,

M. Alan Boyle, professeur de droit international à l’Université d’Edimbourg, membre du barreau
d’Angleterre,

M. Karim A. A. Khan, Q.C., membre du barreau d’Angleterre,

comme conseils et avocats ;

Mme Amy Sander, membre du barreau d’Angleterre,

Mme Philippa Webb, chargée d’enseignement maître de conférences en droit international public
au King’s College (Londres), membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du barreau de New York,

M. Eirik Bjorge, assistant de recherche en droit à la Fondation Shaw de l’Université d’Oxford,

comme conseils ;

M. Amos Wako, sénateur, président de la commission permanente du Sénat chargée des affaires
juridiques et des droits de l’homme,

M. Samuel Chepkonga, président de la commission parlementaire de la justice et des affaires
juridiques,

Mme Juster Nkoroi, E.B.S., chef du service des frontières internationales du Kenya,

M. Michael Guchayo Gikuhi, directeur au service des frontières internationales du Kenya,

Mme Njeri Wachira, directrice de la division du droit international, bureau de l’Attorney General et
ministère de la justice,

Mme Stella Munyi, directrice de la division juridique, ministère des affaires étrangères,

Mme Stella Orina, directrice ajointe, ministère des affaires étrangères,

M. Rotiken Kaitikei, diplomate, ministère des affaires étrangères, - 10 -

Ms Pauline Mcharo, Senior Principal State Counsel, Office of the Attorney-General and
Department of Justice,

Ms Wanjiku Wakogi, Governance Adviser, Office of the Attorney-General and Department of
Justice,

Mr. Samuel Kaumba, State Counsel, Office of the Attorney-General and Department of Justice,

Mr. Hudson Andambi, Minstry of Energy,

as Advisers. - 11 -

Mme Pauline Mcharo, Senior Principal State Counsel, bureau de l’Attorney General et ministère
de la justice,

Mme Wanjiku Wakogi, conseillère en gouvernance, bureau de l’Attorney General et ministère de
la justice,

M. Samuel Kaumba, State Counsel, bureau de l’Attorney General et ministère de la justice,

M. Hudson Andambi, ministère de l’énergie,

comme conseillers. - 12 -

Le PRESIDENT : L’audience est ouverte.

La Cour se réunit aujourd’hui pour entendre les Parties en leurs plaidoiries sur les exceptions

préliminaires soulevées par le Kenya dans l’affaire relative à la Délimitation maritime dans

l’océan Indien (Somalie c. Kenya).

La Cour ne comptant sur le siège aucun juge de nationalité kenyane, le Kenya s’est prévalu

du droit que lui confère le paragraphe 2 de l’article 31 du Statut de procéder à la désignation d’un

juge ad hoc en l’affaire : il a désigné M. Gilbert Guillaume.

L’article 20 du Statut dispose que «[t]out membre de la Cour doit, avant d’entrer en fonction,

prendre l’engagement solennel d’exercer ses attributions en pleine impartialité et en toute

conscience». En vertu du paragraphe 6 de l’article 31 du Statut, cette disposition s’applique

également aux juges ad hoc. Bien que M. Guillaume ait déjà exercé les fonctions de juge ad hoc et

qu’il ait fait une déclaration solennelle dans des affaires précédentes, le paragraphe 3 de l’article 8

du Règlement requiert qu’il fasse une nouvelle déclaration en la présente espèce.

Avant de l’inviter à faire sa déclaration solennelle, je dirai d’abord quelques mots de la

carrière et des qualifications de M. Guillaume.

M. Gilbert Guillaume, de nationalité française, est licencié en droit et diplômé d’études

supérieures d’économie politique et de science économique de l’Université de Paris ; il est aussi

diplômé de l’Institut d’études politiques de Paris et ancien élève de l’Ecole nationale

d’administration. M. Guillaume est bien connu de la Cour, puisqu’il en a été membre de 1987

à 2005, et président du 6 février 2000 au 5 février 2003.

Avant de devenir membre de la Cour, M. Guillaume avait déjà à son actif une longue et

brillante carrière, tant de magistrat que de haut fonctionnaire. Il a ainsi été membre du Conseil

d’Etat français et en est maintenant membre honoraire. Il a notamment exercé les fonctions de

représentant de la France au comité juridique de l’Organisation de l’aviation civile internationale et

assuré la présidence de ce comité de 1971 à 1975. M. Guillaume a par ailleurs été directeur des

affaires juridiques au ministère français des affaires étrangères. Il a en outre été agent de la France

devant la Cour de justice des communautés européennes et la Cour européenne des droits de

l’homme. - 13 -

M. Guillaume a exercé plusieurs fois les fonctions de juge ad hoc à la Cour internationale de

Justice. Membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage depuis 1980, il a siégé en tant qu’arbitre dans

plusieurs affaires. Il est aussi arbitre au centre international pour le règlement des différends

relatifs aux investissements, et a assuré à de nombreuses reprises le rôle de président de divers

tribunaux arbitraux. Il est membre de l’Institut de France (Académie des sciences morales et

politiques), membre de l’Institut de droit international, dont il a été le vice-président, et l’auteur de

nombreux ouvrages consacrés à un large éventail d’aspects du droit international. Il a par ailleurs

enseigné à l’Académie de droit international de La Haye.

J’invite maintenant M. Guillaume à prendre l’engagement solennel prescrit par l’article 20

du Statut et demande à toutes les personnes présentes à l’audience de bien vouloir se lever.

M. GUILLAUME :

«Je déclare solennellement que je remplirai mes devoirs et exercerai mes
attributions de juge en toute honnêteté et dévouement, en pleine et parfaite impartialité

et en toute conscience.»

LE PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie. Veuillez vous asseoir. La Cour prend acte de la

déclaration solennelle faite par M. Guillaume et déclare celui-ci dûment installé en qualité de

juge ad hoc en l’affaire relative à la Délimitation maritime dans l’océan Indien (Somalie c. Kenya).

*

I shall now recall the principal procedural steps in the case.

On 28 August 2014, the Federal Republic of Somalia instituted proceedings against the

Republic of Kenya concerning a dispute in relation to

“the establishment of the single maritime boundary between Somalia and Kenya in the

Indian Ocean delimiting the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone . . . and
continental shelf, including the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles”.

In order to found the jurisdiction of the Court, Somalia invokes the declarations made,

pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, by Somalia on 11 April 1963 and

by Kenya on 19 April 1965. - 14 -

By an Order of 16 October 2014, the President fixed 13 July 2015 as the time-limit for the

filing of the Memorial of Somalia and 27 May 2016 for the filing of the Counter-Memorial of

Kenya. Somalia filed its Memorial within the time-limit so prescribed.

On 7 October 2015, within the time-limit set by Article 79, paragraph 1, of the Rules of

Court, Kenya raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and to the admissibility

of the Application. Consequently, by an Order of 9 October 2015, the Court, noting that, by virtue

of Article 79, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, the proceedings on the merits were suspended,

and taking account of Practice Direction V, fixed 5 February 2016 as the time-limit for the

presentation by Somalia of a written statement of its observations and submissions on the

preliminary objections raised by Kenya. Somalia filed such a statement within the time-limit so

prescribed, and the case thus became ready for hearing in respect of the preliminary objections.

*

Pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 2, of its Rules, the Court decided, after ascertaining the

views of the Parties, that copies of the pleadings and documents annexed would be made accessible

to the public on the opening of the oral proceedings. Further, in accordance with the Court’s

practice, all of these documents will be placed on the Court’s website from today.

*

I note the presence at the hearings of the Agents, counsel and advocates of the two Parties.

In accordance with the arrangements on the organization of the procedure decided by the Court, the

hearings will comprise a first and second round of oral argument. The first round of oral argument

will open today and close tomorrow, on Tuesday 20 September. Each Party will have one session

of three hours. The second round of oral argument will begin on Wednesday 21 September and

conclude on Friday 23 September. Each Party will have one session of one-and-a-half hours.

*

I now give the floor to The Honourable Mr. Githu Muigai, Agent of the Republic of Kenya.

Your Excellency, you have the floor. - 15 -

Mr. MUIGAI:

1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court. It is my very great honour and

privilege to appear before you as Agent for the Republic of Kenya in this hearing of Preliminary

Objections. My name is Githu Muigai and I serve as the Attorney-General of Kenya. I am

accompanied today by Her Excellency Mrs. Rose Makena Muchiri, Co-Agent and Ambassador of

Kenya to the Kingdom of The Netherlands, by Ms Juster Nkoroi, Director of the International

Boundaries Office of Kenya, and by other officials and representatives of my Government. We

greet you and express our deepest respect and consideration for the Court.

2. I also take this opportunity to greet the Honourable Agent of the Federal Republic of

Somalia and other members of the Somali delegation. We extend to you our neighbourly

friendship and goodwill.

3. Mr. President, this is the first time that Kenya appears before the International Court of

Justice. It is important an occasion for my country. Kenya holds this institution, the principal

judicial organ of the United Nations, in the highest regard. Kenya’s position that this Court is not

competent in the present case is not a retreat from its respect for international law. On the contrary,

it is a reflection of Kenya’s insistence that agreements must be performed in good faith. As is clear

from its Optional Clause Declaration under Article 36 (2) of the Statute, Kenya has not consented

to the Court’s jurisdiction over disputes in regard to which it has agreed to another method of

settlement. In this instance, it is the Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) of 7 April 2009 that

sets out the agreed procedure for settlements of the dispute that Somalia has brought before the

Court. Furthermore, Part XV of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which

binds Somalia and Kenya alike, is yet another agreed procedure for the settlement of the dispute.

4. Kenya’s history is shaped profoundly by the belief that respect for international

commitments is the basis for peaceful and friendly relations. Kenya gained independence from

colonial rule on 12 December 1963. The day after its independence Kenya became a founding

member of the Organization of African Unity, the predecessor to the African Union. Two days

later, Kenya became a member of the United Nations. In 1967, it became a founding member of

the East African Community. - 16 -

5. It was in 1965, shortly after its independence, that Kenya made a declaration under

Article 36 (2) of the Court’s Statute, recognizing its compulsory jurisdiction, subject to

reservations.

6. Today, Kenya is a stable multi-ethnic democracy, an increasingly prosperous nation

recognized for its leadership role both at the United Nations and the African Union. This includes

Kenya’s long-standing support for the Government and the people of Somalia. Since the collapse

of the Somali State in 1991, Kenya has provided humanitarian relief for almost half a million

Somali refugees. Kenya also provided a safe haven in Nairobi for the Somali Transitional Federal

Government, from its establishment in 2004 until improved security conditions allowed for its

gradual return, in the beginning of 2007. In fact, Kenya played a decisive role in defeating

Al-Shabaab forces and capturing Mogadishu. It has made significant contributions to both the

civilian and military components of the United Nations mandated African Union Mission in

Somalia. Hundreds of Kenyan soldiers have lost their lives defending the Somali Government.

They and their families have paid the ultimate price so that our neighbours can live in peace. What

is more, hundreds of Kenyan civilians have been the victims of Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks in

retaliation for Kenya’s support of the Somali Government. Just to give one example, in

April 2015, 150 students were killed and 700 held hostage at Garissa University College. The

United Nations and the African Union have recognized Kenya’s “huge” and “extraordinary”

sacrifice .

7. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is against this background that

Somalia’s accusation of bad faith against Kenya should be assessed. Somalia would have the Court

believe that, during all these years, Kenya has been scheming to take advantage of its neighbour, to

steal its sea and oil. Such accusations are absurd, and they are hurtful. They are unfair and

disrespectful to a government and people that have sacrificed so much in support of Somalia.

8. Mr. President, it is common ground that Kenya has exercised uncontested jurisdiction in

this maritime area since it proclaimed its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 1979. In fact, the

EEZ boundary was an extension of the territorial sea boundary that reflected prior colonial practice.

Kenya Preliminary Objections (POK), para. 15. - 17 -

During the course of this dispute, Kenya has caused no prejudice to Somalia’s legal rights. As a

matter of fact, Kenya limited itself to transitory exploratory activities, and even those are now

suspended. It is not in dispute either that Kenya faces a very real security threat by reason of

Al-Shabaab weapons smuggling and infiltration at sea. Nor is it in dispute that Somalia has no

maritime enforcement capacity, and will have none in the foreseeable future. Indeed, for the past

several years, the Kenyan navy has incurred significant costs in patrolling this maritime area under

an African Union mandate, with the endorsement of the United Nations Security Council. It must

continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

9. In order to allay any concerns that Somalia may still have, Kenya has, by a diplomatic

note dated 25 May 2016, invited Somalia to enter into “provisional arrangements of a practical

nature” pending an agreement on the maritime boundary, in accordance with Articles 74 (3) and

83 (3) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Somalia’s response

recognizes that Kenya’s measures are consistent with “all obligations under the Convention”.

10. This maritime boundary delimitation is not as straightforward as Somalia suggests. A

full and final settlement will have to contain several important elements that call for a negotiated

agreement; that call for recognition of the long-standing modus vivendi between the Parties; that

call for time, until Somalia achieves greater stability. That is exactly what the MOU provides — a

gradual, negotiated settlement. To say that the MOU is irrelevant because two technical-level

meetings four months apart in 2014 have exhausted negotiations is in plain contradiction with both

Somalia’s obligations under the MOU and the obvious reality of the situation.

11. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court. There is a Swahili proverb that “the

person who helps you in need is truly your friend”. Kenya has been a true friend of Somalia

throughout its years of need. Kenya remains a friend of Somalia. All that Kenya asserts is that

agreements must be performed in good faith; Somalia cannot repudiate its obligations and then

portray itself as a victim of Kenya.

12. The MOU sets out the agreed procedure for settling this dispute. It must be followed.

And in the very unlikely event that its procedure fails to produce a negotiated settlement, then

Part XV procedures under the UNCLOS would then come into operation. That, too, is an agreed

procedure other than recourse to the Court. That, too, falls squarely within Kenya’s reservations to - 18 -

the Court’s jurisdiction. These are the agreed methods of settlement, and we respectfully submit

that the Court declare that Somalia’s case falls outside its jurisdiction.

13. Mr. President, Kenya’s first round of oral pleadings this morning will commence with an

opening speech by Professor Akhavan, who will set forth an outline of Kenya’s case. He will be

followed by Karim Khan Q.C. who will address the legal validity of the MOU. Following the

break, Professor Mathias Forteau will present the terms of the MOU under the law of treaties and

explain why it constitutes an agreement on a method of settlement of the maritime dispute.

Ambassador Makena Muchiri will then explain why the Parties have not exhausted negotiations.

She will be followed by Professor Alan Boyle who will address why, in addition to the MOU, the

procedures under the UNCLOS are the applicable method of settlement of the maritime boundary

dispute. And, finally, Professor Lowe Q.C. will conclude Kenya’s first round of oral pleadings by

explaining why both the MOU and UNCLOS procedures fall squarely within Kenya’s reservation

and thus exclude the Court’s jurisdiction.

14. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court. That concludes the Agent’s remarks.

And I would now like you to please call Professor Akhavan to the podium. I thank you.

Le PRESIDENT: Merci, Excellence. Je donne la parole à M. le professeur Akhavan.

Mr. AKHAVAN:

O VERVIEW OF K ENYA S PRELIMINARY O BJECTIONS

I. Introduction

1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court. I am honoured to appear before you

today on behalf of Kenya.

2. I will be providing an overview of Kenya’s preliminary objections. My colleagues will

then elaborate on the specific issues in turn.

3. The only question before the Court is whether the maritime boundary dispute between

Kenya and Somalia falls within its jurisdiction. Kenya respectfully submits that it does not. - 19 -

4. Kenya’s optional clause declaration, which you may find at tab 4 of your folders,

categorically excludes [slide 1]: “Disputes in regard to which the parties to the dispute have agreed

2
or shall agree to have recourse to some other method or methods of settlement.”

5. This is exactly the kind of reservation the Court had in mind in the Land and Maritime

Boundary case. It observed that:

“States remain free to insert into their optional declaration accepting the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court a reservation excluding from the latter those
disputes for which the parties involved have agreed or subsequently agree to resort to
3
an alternative method of peaceful settlement.”

6. The meaning of Kenya’s reservation is absolutely clear. In Certain Phosphate Lands in

Nauru, the Court interpreted an identical reservation in Australia’s optional clause declaration. It

4
held that it applies to any “agreed procedure other than recourse to the Court” . The agreed

procedure, however, does not have to specifically exclude the Court. It excludes jurisdiction

simply because it falls within the reservation. A distinguished publicist explains, in regard to the

United Kingdom’s identical reservation, that it is an application of “the relationship between

parallel commitments to dispute settlement . . . giving priority to the specific . . . over the general” . 5

Put differently, the reservation covers any procedural lex specialis applicable to the dispute.

7. The Court has confirmed that optional clause reservations “should be interpreted in a

6
manner compatible with the effect sought by the reserving State” . The clear effect sought by

Kenya is to exclude all disputes with an “agreed procedure other than recourse to the Court”. The

Court must give strict effect to that intention in determining the scope of its jurisdiction.

8. In regard to the maritime boundary dispute between Kenya and Somalia, there are in fact

two agreed procedures. The first is the MOU of 7 April 2009. It states clearly that the Parties shall

agree on delimitation by negotiation and that they shall do so after review of their respective

2
Kenya’s Optional Clause Reservation under Art. 36 (2) ICJ Statute, 531 United Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS)
113 (1965).
3
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 303, para. 56.
4Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.

Reports 1992, p. 247, para. 11; Preliminary Objections of Kenya (POK), para. 145.
5M. Wood, “The United Kingdom’s Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court” in
O. K. Fauchald, H. Jakhelln, and A. Syse (eds.), Festschrift Carl August Fleischer, Scandinavian University Press, 2006,
621, 637; POK, para. 143.

6Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 455,
para. 52. - 20 -

submissions by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The second is the

UNCLOS Part XV procedures, which make specific provision for delimitation disputes. These two

agreed procedures, whether separately or in combination, fall squarely within Kenya’s reservation.

They both categorically exclude the Court’s jurisdiction. The case before you is as simple as that.

II. Legal Validity of the MOU

9. Somalia has pursued a strategy that is best described as “MOU avoidance”. It has done

everything possible to rid itself of what it apparently considers to be a legal obstacle to its new

strategy on maritime delimitation. First, shortly before filing its Application in August 2014,

Somalia submitted a letter dated 4 February 2014 to the United Nations Secretary-General. It

withdrew its prior consent to Kenya’s CLCS submission. It maintained that the “no objection”

obligation was not legally binding because the MOU was “null and void”. In particular, Somalia

alleged that Minister Warsame, who signed the MOU for Somalia, did not have full powers. That

allegation was not true. In fact, Somalia has now produced the Minister’s letter of authorization in
7
its Written Statement . That false argument has now been abandoned by Somalia.

10. Second, Somalia withdrew its CLCS objection just one week before its Memorial was

submitted, and then tried to downplay the legal effect of the MOU in its Memorial. It suggested

that its legal validity was uncertain. It set forth all the paragraphs of the MOU, with the notable

exception of the final paragraph, which stated that it entered into force upon signature. It also

ignored the significance of the registration and publication of the MOU in accordance with

Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. Somalia further ignored the fact that its own

Prime Minister had specifically confirmed its validity in writing to the United Nations on at least

two occasions .8

11. Third, Somalia still complains in its Written Statement that the MOU required

parliamentary ratification under its Transitional Federal Charter. But it does not argue that the

MOU is invalid because of an alleged defect under Somalia’s internal law.

Written Statement of Somalia (WSS), para. 2.26 and WSS, Ann. 21.

POK, paras. 58-59; Memorial of Somalia (MS), Ann. 66, p. 8; POK, paras. 68-69; and MS, Ann. 37. - 21 -

12. What is more significant is that the 1 August 2009 parliamentary vote rejecting the MOU

in fact makes no mention of the Transitional Federal Charter. Kenya has produced the verbatim

9
record of those deliberations . Somalia does not dispute its authenticity. Whether in fact or in law,

this argument has no merit whatsoever.

13. Somalia’s conduct has been such that even Norway  which was in fact supporting

Somalia with its CLCS submission and establishment of an EEZ  complained to the

United Nations that Somalia’s actions were “creating doubt as to [its] capability . . . to enter into

10
legally binding international commitments” . Norway expressed its hope that it would be possible

to “find a way to affirm the legally binding nature of the MOU” . 11

III. The MOU Method of Settlement

14. Now that Kenya has invoked the MOU before the Court, Somalia appreciates that it

cannot credibly challenge its validity. Instead, it has now shifted its “MOU avoidance” strategy by

arguing that the penultimate paragraph on the method of settlement is without any legal effect.

Somalia’s new theory is that irrespective of the MOU’s legal validity, that particular paragraph is

merely “spare” and descriptive” ; that it should simply be ignored by the Court.

15. The text of that paragraph, however, is absolutely clear. It is at tab 5 of your folders. It

reads as follows [slide 2]:

“The delimitation of maritime boundaries in the areas under dispute, including

the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, shall be agreed
between the two coastal States on the basis of international law after the Commission

has concluded its examination of the separate submissions made by each of the two
coastal States and made its recommendations to two coastal States concerning the
establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.” 14

16. First, the terms refer in the plural to [slide 3] “delimitation of maritime boundaries in the

areas under dispute” . Then it specifically clarifies that this is [slide 4] “including the delimitation

9POK, Anns. 23 and 46.

10POK, Ann. 4.

11POK, Ann. 4.
12
WSS, para. 3.24.
13WSS, para. 3.28.

14Memorandum of Understanding Kenya  Somalia, 2599 UNTS 35 (2009), p. 38.

15Ibid. - 22 -

of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles” . Thus, its scope is clearly not limited to the

outer shelf as Somalia claims. It indicates the exact opposite. The MOU was prepared under the

supervision of the Norwegian Ambassador Longva, a distinguished international jurist who sadly

passed away in 2013. It was drafted precisely and meticulously. It refers to all “areas in dispute”.

17. Second, the terms provide that delimitation [slide 5] “shall be agreed between the two

coastal States on the basis of international law” . The term is “shall”. It is not “should”. It is a

legal undertaking, a binding obligation, not merely to negotiate in good faith, but to do so with a

view to concluding an agreement. In North Sea Continental Shelf, which is at tab 6 of your folders,

the Court interpreted the less exacting terms “shall be determined by agreement” under Article 6 of

the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf as follows [slide 6]:

“[T]he parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to
arriving at an agreement, and not merely to go through a formal process of negotiation

as a sort of prior condition for the automatic application of a certain method of
delimitation in the absence of agreement; they are under an obligation so to conduct
themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, which will not be the case when
either of them insists upon its own position without contemplating any modification of
18
it . . .” .

In Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, the Court confirmed that such an obligation requires the parties to “find

19
an agreed solution within the co-operative context of the [applicable] Treaty” .

18. Third, the terms of the MOU provide that a delimitation agreement shall be completed

[slide 7]:

“after the Commission has concluded its examination of the separate submissions
made by each of the two coastal States and made its recommendations to two coastal

States concerning the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond
200 nautical miles.” 20

Contrary to what Somalia claims, this does not mean that the parties cannot negotiate prior to

CLCS review. That would be absurd. The parties may negotiate prior to the CLCS

16
Memorandum of Understanding Kenya  Somalia, 2599 UNTS 35 (2009), p. 38.
17Ibid.

18North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v. Denmark/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 47,
para. 85 (a).
19
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 78, para. 142.
20
Memorandum of Understanding Kenya Somalia, see supra note 14. - 23 -

recommendations: but they may finalize an agreement only after delineation of the outer limits of

the shelf.

19. It is remarkable that Somalia does not produce the text of this paragraph of the MOU

until page 75 of its Written Statement . It spends the vast majority of its pleading arguing that the

MOU was only concerned with delineation of the outer shelf and nothing else. By Somalia’s

inverted logic, this exclusive purpose renders the impugned paragraph redundant. The actual text

of the MOU somehow evaporates in the intense light of a contrived context. That cannot be right.

22
20. The Court has made it clear that “interpretation must be based above all upon the text” .

In other words, “[i]f the relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their

23
context, that is an end of the matter” . There is no ambiguity here as to the meaning of “shall be

agreed . . . after the Commission has concluded its examination . . . and made its

recommendations”. That is the end of the matter. No amount of creative lawyering can change its

obvious meaning.

21. But let us imagine that there was some ambiguity in the text, that the paragraph was in

fact vague and capable of competing interpretations. What would happen then? Would the

ambiguity be resolved by depriving the text of legal effect? Surely not. Somalia curiously invokes

the effet utile principle in an attempt to nullify Kenya’s reservation; but it completely disregards

that same principle in respect of the MOU. The principle of effectiveness is clear: “[I]f more than

one interpretation is possible, the preference should be given to the one which does not have as an

effect to wholly or partially deprive a term, sentence or article of any legal meaning and thus of any

24
practical impact.” The phrase “shall be agreed” after CLCS review is neither “spare” nor

“descriptive”. It must be given legal effect; it is a binding obligation.

22. It should be emphasized that Somalia admits that the penultimate paragraph does in fact

prescribe a method of settlement. Its only contention is that “negotiations are one among other

21
WSS, para. 3.23.
22Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1994, p. 22, para. 41. Also:
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 18, para. 33; Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v.
Belgium), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), p. 318, para. 100.

23Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 8. Also: Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1991, p. 69, para. 48.
24
R. Kolb, The Law of Treaties (2016), Edward Elgar, pp. 154–55. - 24 -

25
possible methods” of dispute settlement and that the MOU does not specifically exclude recourse

to the Court. But that argument is inapposite. First, if the parties agree to a method of settlement,

then they must perform their obligations in good faith. That alone renders Somalia’s case

inadmissible. Second, even if this paragraph of the MOU does not exclude recourse to the Court, it

still falls within Kenya’s reservation. All that is required is an “agreed procedure other than

recourse to the Court”; there is no additional requirement that it specifically exclude the Court. If

the parties had to agree to exclude the Court, then Kenya’s reservation would be redundant.

IV. Negotiations have not been exhausted

23. Somalia goes to great lengths to suggest that if the Court does not exercise jurisdiction,

the Parties will never be able to conclude an agreement on delimitation. It maintains that they have

exhausted negotiations based on just two technical meetings four months apart that were held

immediately prior to the filing of Somalia’s Application in 2014. Somalia’s theory of deadlock

does not withstand scrutiny.

24. First, under the MOU, the Parties agreed to conclude a delimitation agreement only after

CLCS review. This is a precondition to move to the next stage of the agreed procedure. It is a

binding obligation. Somalia claims that this requirement is illogical because it will be a decade
26
before the CLCS considers its submission . But it is not unusual for boundary agreements to be

finalized over several years. Furthermore, Somalia’s submission is likely to be considered earlier

than anticipated. It should be recalled that Kenya’s submission was initially scheduled for 2022 but

came in the queue for 2014, eight years earlier. Somalia may similarly jump the queue. There are

objections to several earlier submissions, and the CLCS is expediting its working procedures.

Contrary to Somalia’s suggestions, CLCS review is not an insurmountable obstacle. In any case,

the Parties were mindful of the time required for CLCS review when they concluded the MOU.

Somalia cannot now argue that this condition would deprive the MOU of its effect.

25. Second, the obligation to negotiate in good faith with a view to concluding an agreement

is an exacting obligation. It is not satisfied by merely convening two technical meetings four

2WSS, para. 3.72.

2WSS, para. 3.67. - 25 -

months apart. Maritime boundary agreements are a time-consuming process. What parties cannot

agree on today, they may agree on tomorrow. The circumstances are even more complex in the

context of bilateral relations between the parties. Somalia is still in the midst of a fragile

post-conflict transition. Kenya has publicly noted its concern that maritime security in the area

27
“continues to pose an existential threat to Kenya and the other countries within the region” . This

includes continued maritime enforcement against Al-Shabaab terrorists in the disputed maritime

areas where Kenya has exercised prolonged and uncontested jurisdiction.

26. Third, Kenya called for the negotiations in 2014 because of Somalia’s breach and

repudiation of the MOU. Somalia had objected to Kenya’s CLCS submission in February 2014.

The Parties held their first meeting in March 2014. Kenya proposed to discuss the MOU. Somalia

refused. Kenya wished to discuss the matter again at the second meeting in July 2014. Again,

Somalia refused. This was hardly a proper negotiation of the maritime boundary.

27. Fourth, it is apparent that, by 2014, Somalia had already prepared to file its Application

before the Court. The proceedings were initiated in August 2014, in the same week that the Parties

had scheduled their third meeting. As the Court has emphasized, the Parties cannot merely “go

through a formal process of negotiation as a sort of prior condition for the automatic application of

a certain method of delimitation in the absence of agreement” . There must be meaningful

negotiations, not rigid insistence on a particular method of delimitation, which is exactly what

Somalia did. In fact, on 6 June 2013, the Somali Council of Ministers had rejected any

“discussions on maritime demarcation or limitations on the continental shelf” with Kenya . It 29

would appear that Somalia was going through the motions just to get before the Court. Against this

background, it cannot be said that the Parties have exhausted negotiations.

V. UNCLOS Part XV Procedures

28. Mr. President, even if the Parties had never concluded the MOU, the dispute would still

fall outside of the Court’s jurisdiction. This case concerns UNCLOS, and the agreed procedure for

2Statement by Kenyan Delegation at the 26th meeting of States Parties to the UNCLOS, New York,
23 June 2016, available at https://www.un.int/kenya/statements_speeches/kenyas-statement-26th-meet…-
un-convention-law-sea-unclos.

2North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, see supra, note 18.
29
POK, para. 90. - 26 -

delimitation under UNCLOS is Part XV. Apart from the MOU, Part XV is the applicable

procedural lex specialis between Kenya and Somalia. It, too, falls squarely within Kenya’s

reservation.

29. Somalia’s only argument is that the Court’s jurisdiction applies “in lieu of” Part XV

procedures because the “matching” optional clause declarations of Kenya and Somalia constitute

an agreement within the meaning of Article 282 . This argument is fundamentally flawed. The

two declarations are clearly not “matching”. Kenya has a reservation concerning agreed

procedures other than the Court. Somalia does not. Part XV is clearly an agreed procedure other

than the Court. It falls squarely within Kenya’s reservation.

30. It is remarkable that Somalia argues in fact that Part XV is incorporated into the MOU.

It maintains that the term “shall be agreed” merely “restates the basic principle articulated in

Articles 74 (1) and 83 (1) of UNCLOS, according to which the delimitation of maritime boundaries

shall be effected by agreement” . Paragraph (2) of those two provisions provides in identical

terms that “[i]f no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time the States

concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV”. If Somalia’s interpretation of

the MOU is correct, then Part XV would apply, to the exclusion of the Court’s jurisdiction.

31. Nonetheless, Article 280 of Part XV still provides that the parties may agree to settle a

dispute “by any peaceful means of their choice”. Thus, the MOU applies even under Part XV. In

fact, Article 281 (1) clarifies that the procedures apply only “where no settlement has been reached

by recourse to such means and the agreement between the parties does not exclude any further

procedure”. Furthermore, Article 281 (2) specifically provides that “[i]f the parties have also

agreed on a time-limit, paragraph 1 applies only upon the expiration of that time-limit”. In this

case, CLCS review is a time-limit. Part XV is not applicable prior to its expiration. Even after

CLCS review, the next step under Part XV is to “exchange views regarding its settlement by

negotiation or other peaceful means” in accordance with Article 283.

32. Somalia has invoked the optional clause declarations under Article 36 (2) of the Court’s

Statute as the sole basis for jurisdiction. Neither Kenya nor Somalia has made a declaration under

3WSS, para. 3.82.

3WSS, para. 3.72. - 27 -

Article 287 (1) (b) of Part XV recognizing the Court as the method of settlement. Thus, the

UNCLOS procedures are a method of settlement other than recourse to the Court. They exclude

the Court’s jurisdiction.

VI. Kenya’s good faith

33. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court. As I have explained, Kenya’s

Preliminary Objections are based on the straightforward application of its reservation in light of

both the MOU and UNCLOS Part XV. The Court needs only to apply basic principles of treaty

interpretation to arrive at the conclusion that this dispute falls outside of its jurisdiction.

34. Nonetheless, Kenya will briefly address some of the unfortunate accusations of bad faith

that have been made by Somalia. Presumably these are intended to persuade the Court to decide in

Somalia’s favour in disregard of the applicable law. In particular, Somalia has gone to

considerable lengths to suggest that Kenya is a bad neighbour that has suddenly claimed an unjust

maritime boundary in 2005, and is now seeking to establish a fait accompli so it can immediately

exploit offshore oil resources in the disputed areas. This is simply not true. It does not even

remotely reflect reality.

35. First, the maritime boundary at the parallel of latitude in the EEZ was established in

1979, and not in 2005 as Somalia suggests. It was in 1979 that Kenya first proclaimed its EEZ and
32
began exercising jurisdiction based on that boundary . The text of the Presidential Proclamation

of 28 February 1979 is set out as Annex 19 to Somalia’s Memorial. Prior to the MOU in 2009,

33
Somalia never disputed this boundary . In fact, the EEZ boundary was the extension of an

uncontested Anglo-Italian territorial sea boundary from the colonial period.

36. Second, Kenya’s exploratory activities in the disputed areas have been only of a

transitory character. They are well within the range of activities that, as the Court indicated in the

Aegean Sea case, cause no irreparable prejudice to the rights of other States . In fact, even these

transitory activities have been temporarily suspended, and Kenya has invited Somalia to negotiate

3POK, para. 18 citing Somalia’s Memorial, Ann. 19.

3POK, para. 18.
34
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Interim Protection, Order of 11 September 1976, I.C.J.
Reports 1976, p. 3; http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/62/6219.pdf. - 28 -

“provisional arrangements of a practical nature” pursuant to Articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of

UNCLOS. As the Agent indicated, Somalia now recognizes that Kenya’s conduct is consistent

with “all obligations under the Convention”. There is no imminent threat to its interests. Oil has

yet to be discovered, let alone exploited. Even if it were discovered tomorrow, production would

be at least a decade away.

37. In this light, there is no basis for Somalia’s alarmist accusations against Kenya — and

most certainly no justification for the accusation that it is an unjust nation taking advantage of its

neighbour. This is especially unbecoming given the extraordinary sacrifices that Kenya has made

in solidarity with the Government and people of Somalia.

VII. Conclusion

38. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court. The 2009 MOU opened the way for

future cooperation. It was one of the first agreements between Kenya and the new Somali

Government. Somalia’s breach and repudiation of the MOU, its objection to Kenya’s CLCS

submission, its unwillingness to negotiate in good faith, its initiation of proceedings before the

Court in disregard of the agreed procedure, its false accusations and alarmist tone; these will not

resolve the complex issues that must be negotiated between the Parties during Somalia’s

still-fragile transition. Disregard for international commitments will do nothing to further friendly

relations among these two neighbouring African nations.

39. The MOU and Part XV are the agreed procedures for settlement of the maritime dispute

between the Parties. They both fall squarely within Kenya’s reservation, and thus the dispute is

outside of the Court’s jurisdiction.

40. Mr. President, distinguished members of the Court. That concludes my presentation. I

would now ask that you invite Mr. Karim Khan Q.C. to the podium.

LE PRESIDENT: Merci, Monsieur le professeur. Je donne à présent la parole à

M. Karim Khan. - 29 -

Mr. KHAN:

L EGAL VALIDITY OF THE M EMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I. Introduction

1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court. It is an honour to appear before you,

on behalf of the Republic of Kenya.

2. I will address the legal validity of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), and in

particular Somalia’s attempts to declare the MOU “null and void” in 2014 just a few months before

it filed its Application before the Court. Somalia has now abandoned its claim of nullity but seeks

instead to deprive the terms of the MOU of any legal effect.

II. The Facts of the Conclusion and Entry into Force of the MOU

3. Mr. President, the MOU was initiated by Somalia, and drafted and reviewed pursuant to

35
the advice of a respected Norwegian diplomat . Prior to its signature, the MOU was approved by

the President of Somalia, by the Prime Minister of Somalia and by Somalia’s Council of

36
Ministers . The references to the evidence will appear in the footnotes to the transcripts of my

speech.

4. The Minister of National Planning and International Cooperation was authorized by the

Prime Minister to sign the MOU on behalf of the Somali Government . On 7 April 2009, he and

the Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, duly authorized by their respective Governments, signed

the MOU at a formal ceremony in Nairobi. The MOU expressly stated that it would enter into

force upon its signature .

5. The subsequent conduct of the parties was entirely consistent with the validity of the

MOU. On 8 April 2009, the day after the signing ceremony, the Somali Prime Minister expressly

confirmed its validity  and indeed reproduced the MOU in full and enclosed a copy of the signed

35
Preliminary Objections of the Republic of Kenya (hereinafter POK), paras. 32-25, 43.
3POK, para. 38.
37
POK, paras. 38-39.
38
POK, para. 55. See Memorial of Somalia (MS) at Ann. 6. - 30 -

instrument  in Somalia’s submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf

39
(“CLCS”) .

6. Two months later, on 11 June 2009, in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations

Charter, the MOU was formally registered with the United Nations Secretariat . A Certificate of

Registration was issued by the UN Secretariat and the MOU was published in the United Nations

Treaty Series and the Law of the Sea Bulletin . It is evident from the United Nations rules that a

treaty cannot be registered unless it is in force . 43

7. The MOU was subsequently confirmed in a letter by the Somali Prime Minister to the

United Nations Secretary-General on 19 August 2009, after the Somali Parliament’s vote on

1 August 2009 to reject the MOU . In that letter, Somalia specifically referred to and reproduced

45
the relevant paragraph of the MOU that it now contends to be without legal effect .

8. Mr. President, Somalia included the MOU in Annex 6 to its Memorial with a cover page

stating “Entry into force: 7 April 2009, by signature”. Somalia chose the following title for the

Annex: “MOU . . . entered into force 7 April 2009”. In Volume II of Somalia’s Memorial, the

MOU is included in a section of the annexes entitled “Treaties and agreements”. There can be no

doubt that Somalia now admits that the MOU is legally binding, and that the provision on the

method of dispute settlement is also legally binding.

III. Somalia’s Changing Case on MOU Validity

9. Mr. President, I now turn to Somalia’s changing case on the validity of the MOU. It is

significant that Somalia did not deny that the MOU is a treaty. Kenya agrees: the MOU is indeed

a treaty. It is an agreement concluded in writing and governed by international law. and As such,

46
the principle pacta sunt servanda applies .

39POK, paras. 58-59. Somalia’s Memorial MS, Ann. 66, p. 8.
40
POK, para. 64 and Ann. 17.
41
Memorial of Somalia (MS), Ann. 6.
42
POK, Ann. 18.
43B. Simma et al., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., 2012, pp. 2098-2099.

44POK, para. 68.

45POK, para. 69 and MS, Ann. 37.
46
Article 26, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. - 31 -

10. Prior to these proceedings, in its 4 February 2014 letter to the United Nations

Secretary-General, objecting to Kenya’s CLCS submission, Somalia claimed that the MOU was
47
“null and void” . It requested, unsuccessfully, the withdrawal of the MOU from the new

United Nations Register of treaties. Somalia argued that the Minister who signed the treaty did not

have full powers. That contention was false. Somalia now admits that its Minister did in fact have

full powers. Indeed, it has now produced the letter of authorization from the Somali PrimeMinister

48
in its written pleadings . Somalia’s argument on nullity has been rightfully abandoned.

11. Somalia also claimed that the Minister had orally communicated the requirement of

ratification to Kenya at the time of signature. There is no record of any such statement. The MOU

expressly provides that it shall enter into force upon signature. It is remarkable that Somalia’s

Memorial reproduced every paragraph of the MOU except that provision. Somalia now admits that

49
the MOU entered into force upon signature . The previous contention that ratification was

necessary before the MOU entered into force has been similarly abandoned.

12. Instead, Somalia now asserts that although the MOU did in fact enter into force upon

signature, it was contrary to Somali internal law. It claims that the MOU was rejected by a

parliamentary vote on 1 August 2009 because it was inconsistent with the Somali Transitional

Federal Charter, which it asserts required ratification of all international agreements. That

argument is both irrelevant and wrong, both as a matter of fact and law. Internal law is, of course,

not a ground for violation of international obligations, as is made clear by Article 27 of the Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties. Somalia, in fact, does not claim that the MOU is invalid as a

result of alleged inconsistency with the Transitional Federal Charter. It does not invoke the narrow

exception in Article 46 of the Vienna Convention, the criteria for which would not have been

satisfied in any event. Norway referred to Article 46 in its 17 August 2011 letter to the

United Nations Secretariat and rejected its application. It stated that “Norway considers both

Somalia and Kenya to remain bound by the provisions of the MOU” . 50

47
MS, Ann. 42.
4Written Statement of Somalia on Kenya’s Preliminary Objections (WSS), para. 2.26 and Ann. 21.

4WSS, para. 2.81.
50
POK, paras. 81-2, Ann. 4. - 32 -

13. As noted by the Tribunal in the Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989

(Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal):

“[a]s for the practice of international courts and arbitral tribunals, there was no
precedent of a treaty being declared null and void because one of the contracting
51
States had violated its own internal law in signing it” .

14. But what is most significant is that the Somali Parliament never invoked the Transitional

Federal Charter in its vote on the MOU. Kenya has produced the verbatim record of the debate in

52
the Somali Parliament . Somalia does not dispute either the authenticity or the accuracy of these

records. Nothing whatsoever in that debate refers to the Transitional Federal Charter.

15. Mr. President, it is important to note that those parliamentary deliberations were, in any

event, based on deliberate disinformation. This deliberate disinformation was apparently spread by

the terrorist group, Al-Shabaab, who claimed that, by concluding the MOU, the Somali
53
Government was “selling the sea” to Kenya . It was, in the words of Somalia’s own

Minister Warsame, a campaign of “slandering, defaming, and false accusation” . It had nothing to

do with procedural requirements or any asserted provision of the Transitional Federal Charter.

16. Somalia has dropped its earlier assertions because the legal validity of the MOU is now a

matter before the Court. Somalia realizes that it cannot seriously claim that it is “null and void”.

Instead, it seeks to obtain the same result by claiming that, even if it were legally valid, its

provisions have no legal meaning. It argues that the carefully drafted terms of the MOU are merely

“spare” and “descriptive”. This is part of a consistent pattern by which Somalia seeks to evade its

obligations under the MOU. First, Somalia objected to Kenya’s CLCS submission. Now it

repudiates the agreement on the method of settlement. In fact, Somalia withdrew its CLCS

objection only a week before submitting its Memorial. Now that it has finally complied with its

obligations on the first part of the MOU, it attempts to ignore its obligations in the second part.

The agreement on “no objection” was the first step towards finalization of a maritime boundary

agreement after CLCS review. The two parts are inseparable.

51
Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal, Award, 31 July 1989, 83 International Law Reports (ILR) 1, para. 55.
5POK, Anns. 23 and 46.

5POK, para. 65.
54
POK, para. 87. - 33 -

17. Finally, Somalia suggests that it had nothing to do with the drafting of the MOU and it

did not know what it was signing. It states that “Somalia had virtually no input in negotiating and

drafting of the MOU” . It is not in dispute that Norway prepared the draft on Somalia’s behalf,

and that it was drafted with precision and expertise by Ambassador Longva, a renowned

Norwegian diplomat and jurist who served as the Legal Adviser in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

for 47 years, until his death in 2013. Every letter, every digit, every typographical error, in the

MOU was reviewed prior to finalization of the draft. There was nothing random about its terms.

Furthermore, it is not in dispute that Somalia benefited from the opinion and approval of an

eminent Somali jurist before signing the MOU 56. Somalia cannot claim now that the MOU was not

a proper legally binding agreement.

IV. Conclusion

18. Mr. President, Somalia has gone to great lengths in its strategy of “MOU avoidance”.

First, it challenged the MOU’s validity, arguing that Minister Warsame did not have full powers.

Then it argued that there was a requirement of ratification by the Parliament. Those arguments

have now been rightfully abandoned, because they are entirely baseless. Now, in these

proceedings, Somalia argues that the MOU is legally valid, but that its provisions are devoid of

legal meaning. That cannot be right. The MOU is a legally binding agreement on the method of

settlement of the maritime boundary dispute between the Parties, and as my colleague

Professor Forteau will explain, its provisions must be given full legal effect.

19. Mr. President, Members of the Court, that concludes my submissions. Mr. President, I

am in your hands. I would ask that either we adjourn now and that, after the break,

Professor Forteau continue the submissions of the Republic of Kenya or, with your leave, he can

continue them now.

5WSS, para. 1.36.

5POK, paras. 32-25, 43. - 34 -

Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur Khan. Je crois que c’est le moment adéquat pour une

pause de 10 minutes. L’audience est suspendue.

L’audience est suspendue de 11 h 10 à 11 h 25.

Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. L’audience est rouverte. La parole est à M. le

professeur Forteau.

M. FORTEAU : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président.

LE MÉMORANDUM D ’ACCORD DE 2009 CONSTITUE UN ACCORD PAR LEQUEL LES P ARTIES ONT
CONVENU D ’AVOIR RECOURS À UN MODE DE RÈGLEMENT AUTRE QUE LA C OUR
INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

I. Introduction

1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, c’est un honneur renouvelé de

me présenter à cette barre aujourd’hui. Monsieur le président, comme mon collègue et ami le

professeur Akhavan l’a rappelé un peu plus tôt ce matin, le Kenya a exclu de la compétence de la

Cour «les différends au sujet desquels les Parties en cause auraient convenu ou conviendraient

d’avoir recours à un autre mode ou à d’autres modes de règlement» . 57 Cette formule est

particulièrement extensive ; elle vise tout autre mode de règlement dont les Parties auraient

convenu.

2. En ce qui concerne le présent différend, il ne fait aucun doute qu’un tel accord existe

aujourd’hui entre les Parties. Le 7 avril 2009, le Kenya et la Somalie ont conclu un mémorandum

d’accord qui prévoit le recours à une procédure autre que la Cour internationale de Justice pour la

délimitation de leurs frontières maritimes. Les termes de cet accord sont parfaitement clairs à cet

égard et ne peuvent prêter à aucune discussion.

II. Le sens du mémorandum d’accord de 2009 est parfaitement clair

3. Vous trouverez une copie de cet accord à l’onglet n 5 du dossier des juges. Cet accord

s’articule en trois parties, qui sont agencées de manière parfaitement cohérente :

57
Déclaration du Kenya en vertu du paragraphe 2 de l’article 36, en date du 12 avril 1965, Recueil des traités des
Nations Unies, vol. 531, p. 113, par. 1. - 35 -

i) dans le premier paragraphe substantiel de l’accord, les Parties constatent tout d’abord

qu’un différend les oppose en ce qui concerne la délimitation du plateau continental ;

ii) dans les trois paragraphes qui suivent, les Parties prennent ensuite des engagements en ce

qui concerne la délinéation. Les deux Parties s’y engagent à ne pas faire objection à ce

que la Commission des limites du plateau continental examine leurs demandes respectives.

Dans le dernier de ces trois paragraphes, les Parties précisent notamment que les

recommandations qu’adoptera la Commission seront sans préjudice de la délimitation

«future» (donc, postérieure auxdites recommandations) de leurs frontières maritimes ;

iii) enfin, dans le cinquième et avant-dernier paragraphe de l’accord, celui qui intéresse

directement la présente affaire, les Parties contractent un engagement relatif, non plus à la

délinéation, mais cette fois-ci à la délimitation. Ce paragraphe dispose que

«The delimitation of maritime boundaries in the areas under dispute, including

the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, shall be agreed
between the two coastal States on the basis of international law after the Commission
has concluded its examination of the separate submissions made by each of the two
coastal States and made its recommendations to two coastal States concerning the
establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.» 58

4. Le sens du mémorandum d’accord de 2009 est par conséquent clair et net :

i) il prévoit, en ce qui concerne «the areas [au pluriel] under dispute», que la délimitation des

frontières maritimes (toujours au pluriel) «shall be agreed between the two coastal States».

Cela signifie que les Parties se sont engagées à procéder à la délimitation par le biais de

négociations, et non en faisant recours à une juridiction internationale ;

ii) l’accord de 2009 précise par ailleurs que cette délimitation devra faire l’objet d’un accord

seulement après que la Commission des limites du plateau continental aura achevé

l’examen des communications de chacun des deux Etats côtiers et après qu’elle aura

formulé ses recommandations. Les Parties n’ont donc pas entendu procéder, aujourd’hui,

à cette délimitation par la voie judiciaire.

5. Dans son exposé écrit, la Somalie a admis que «negotiations are the most natural way for
59
States to settle their maritime boundary disputes» et elle a par ailleurs reconnu que l’accord de

58Exceptions préliminaires du Kenya (EPK), annexe 1 ; mémoire de la Somalie (MS), vol. III, annexe 6.

59Exposé écrit de la Somalie (EES), par. 3.72. - 36 -

60
2009 constitue un «agreement to negotiate» . Je rappelle par ailleurs que cet accord de négocier

est assorti d’une condition temporelle  il faut attendre les recommandations de la Commission

avant de finaliser les négociations. Il résulte ainsi tant de l’accord que de l’interprétation qu’en

donne la Somalie que la compétence de la Cour, telle que délimitée par la déclaration du Kenya, est

exclue en la présente affaire.

6. La Somalie ajoute toutefois que les négociations ne sont pas le seul mode de règlement

61
des différends en droit international . C’est vrai, mais là n’est pas la question. Le fait est qu’en

concluant le mémorandum d’accord, le Kenya et la Somalie ont convenu de régler leur différend

par la voie de négociations et ont convenu que l’accord sur la délimitation interviendrait seulement

après les recommandations de la Commission des limites du plateau continental. Les Parties n’ont

nullement convenu en revanche de demander, maintenant, à une juridiction internationale de

procéder à cette délimitation à leur place.

7. Reniant le principe pacta sunt servanda, la Somalie cherche aujourd’hui à priver l’accord

de 2009 de tout effet juridique. Elle déploie à cette fin une double stratégie.

8. La première stratégie consiste à déformer la position du Kenya et à déformer le texte de

l’accord. Selon la Somalie, il ne serait pas possible de prétendre que les Parties auraient décidé

d’attendre les recommandations de la Commission avant de négocier leurs frontières maritimes, car

62
il se trouve qu’elles auraient déjà entamé des négociations . Ni le mémorandum d’accord ni le

Kenya ne disent cependant que les Parties sont empêchées de commencer dès maintenant les

négociations. Ce que prévoit, explicitement et clairement, l’accord de 2009, c’est que la

délimitation que les Parties doivent négocier devra être agréée après lesdites

recommandations  «agréée», et non pas décidée par une cour internationale.

9. La deuxième stratégie déployée par la Somalie pour échapper aux termes clairs du

mémorandum d’accord consiste à le réviser sous couvert d’interprétation, faisant fi du principe

60
EES, par. 1.44.
61EES, par. 3.72.

62Voir ibid., par. 3.32-3.33 et 4.15. - 37 -

selon lequel la Cour ne peut pas réviser les traités . La Somalie affirme ainsi, contre toute raison,

que l’avant-dernier paragraphe de l’accord de 2009 ne ferait que répéter les articles 74, par. 1,

et 83, par. 1, de la convention sur le droit de la mer et n’aurait donc qu’une portée descriptive

d’obligations préexistantes sans être créateur d’obligations nouvelles . Avec tout le respect que je

dois à mes contradicteurs, Monsieur le président, c’est là une interprétation parfaitement absurde.

Les articles 74 et 83 de la convention sur le droit de la mer énoncent que la délimitation «est

effectuée par voie d’accord conformément au droit international afin d’aboutir à une solution

équitable». Nulle mention n’y est faite de la Commission des limites. L’accord de 2009 prévoit

quant à lui que la délimitation «shall be agreed» par les Parties «after» les recommandations de la

Commission des limites. Cette formulation ne laisse pas de doute quant au fait que l’on est bien en

présence ici, d’une part, d’un accord créateur d’obligations précises, d’autre part, d’un accord

instituant une procédure particulière qui va au-delà de ce que prévoient les articles 74 et 83 de la

convention de Montego Bay.

10. Dans ces circonstances, il est plutôt surprenant de lire sous la plume somalienne que

l’exception préliminaire du Kenya ne reposerait sur aucune base textuelle . Il se trouve que le

texte de l’accord de 2009 est dénué de toute ambiguïté ; il ne dit pas que la délimitation doit ou

peut être opérée aujourd’hui par une juridiction internationale ; l’accord prévoit, de manière à la

fois catégorique et précise, que la délimitation doit faire l’objet i) d’un accord ; ii) après les

recommandations de la Commission des limites. Comme la Somalie l’a reconnu, il s’agit là d’un

engagement de négocier, lequel est assorti par ailleurs d’une condition temporelle. Compte tenu de

cette formulation claire et précise, la Cour doit s’en tenir au principe énoncé dans l’affaire du Golfe

du Maine : «le recours à une délimitation par voie arbitrale ou judiciaire n’est en dernière analyse

qu’un succédané au règlement direct et amiable entre les parties» ; en conséquence, lorsque les

Parties «ont choisi de se réserver pour une éventuelle négociation directe aux fins d’un accord la

63 Voir commission du droit international (CDI), Guide de la pratique sur les réserves aux traités,
A/66/10/Add.1, directive 4.7.1, commentaire, p. 576, par. 6 («La Cour internationale de Justice a également souligné que
l’interprétation d’un traité ne peut pas aboutir à sa modification. Comme elle l’a rappelé dans son avis consultatif
concernant l’Interprétation des traités de paix conclus avec la Bulgarie, la Hongrie et la Roumanie : «La Cour est
appelée à interpréter les traités, non à les réviser») ; voir également ibid., directive 1.2, commentaire, p. 76, par. 18.

64Voir EES, par. 3.26-3.28 et 3.53.
65
Voir EES, par. 1.8. - 38 -

détermination du tracé de la ligne de délimitation», la Cour doit donner effet à cet accord, à défaut

66
de quoi «elle dépasserait sa compétence» . Il ne fait pas de doute dans notre affaire que le Kenya

et la Somalie ont choisi en 2009 «de se réserver pour une négociation directe» la délimitation

maritime.

11. Pour échapper aux termes clairs de l’accord de 2009, la Somalie avance l’idée que le

texte de l’accord ne serait pas déterminant dans la mesure où la règle d’interprétation des traités

reflétée à l’article 31 de la convention de Vienne de 1969 formerait une «seule règle, étroitement

intégrée» qui fait référence, non seulement au texte, mais aussi au contexte et à l’objet et au but du

traité . Le fait toutefois que l’article 31 soit porteur d’une telle règle n’autorise certainement pas la

Somalie à invoquer contre le texte de l’accord de 2009 son objet, son but ou son contexte et cela

n’autorise pas davantage à ne pas tenir compte du texte du traité.

12. Le droit international est clairement fixé au contraire dans le sens, d’une part, que

«[l]’interprétation doit être fondée avant tout sur le texte du traité lui-même» , d’autre part, que

lorsque le texte d’un traité est clair, il n’y a pas lieu de poursuivre plus avant le processus

d’interprétation. En 1966, la Commission du droit international a souligné que «les parties sont

présumées avoir l’intention qui ressort du sens ordinaire des termes qu’elles utilisent» et elle a

rappelé que votre jurisprudence

«comporte de nombreuses décisions d’où l’on est en droit de conclure que la Cour
considère l’interprétation des traités par référence au texte comme une règle établie de
droit international. En particulier, rappelait la Commission du droit international, la

Cour a ma69tes fois souligné qu’il n’est pas du rôle de l’interprétation de réviser les
traités» .

La Cour permanente avait déjà décidé en son temps que, «placée en présence d’un texte dont la

clarté ne laisse rien à désirer, elle est tenue de l’appliquer tel qu’il est», ce que votre Cour a

66 Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du Maine (Canada/Etats-Unis d’Amérique),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 266, par. 22-23.
67
EES, par. 3.12-3.13, citant le projet d’articles de la CDI de 1966 sur le droit des traités.
68 Différend territorial (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Tchad), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1994, p. 22, par. 41 ;
Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahreïn (Qatar c. Bahreïn), compétence et recevabilité,

arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1995, p. 18, par. 33 ; Ile de Kasikili/Sedudu (Botswana/Namibie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II),
p. 1060, par. 20 ; Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Serbie-et-Monténégro c. Belgique), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2004 (I), p. 318, par. 100.
69 Projet d’articles sur le droit des traités, Annuaire de la CDI, vol. II, p. 240, par. 11 et 12 du commentaire de
l’article 27. - 39 -

70
réaffirmé en 1994, notamment . Votre Cour avait déjà confirmé en 1950 que «[s]i les mots

pertinents, lorsqu’on leur attribue leur signification naturelle et ordinaire, ont un sens dans leur

71
contexte, l’examen doit s’arrêter là» . Votre Cour a de nouveau réaffirmé en 2007 que, lorsque le

sens d’un traité «ressort clairement d[e s]es termes», «il n’est pas nécessaire d[e l’]interpréter plus

72
avant» .

13. Dans le cas présent, on ne voit pas comment l’accord de 2009 pourrait être interprété

comme ayant autorisé votre saisine en 2014 ; les termes de l’accord sont clairs : la délimitation doit

faire l’objet d’un accord (et non pas d’un arrêt), après (et non pas avant) que la Commission des

limites aura approuvé ses recommandations.

14. De ce point de vue, le principe de l’effet utile commande de tirer les conséquences des

engagements pris dans l’accord de 2009. Votre Cour a eu l’occasion de réitérer en 2011 «le

principe bien établi d’interprétation des traités selon lequel il faut conférer aux mots un effet utile».

Dans l’affaire Géorgie c. Russie, vous avez appliqué ce principe à une condition limitant

l’applicabilité d’une clause compromissoire, ce qui vous a conduit à vous déclarer incompétents

dans l’affaire en cause . La même solution doit prévaloir en l’espèce : l’effet utile qu’il convient

de donner au mémorandum d’accord de 2009 et à l’engagement de négocier qu’il contient vous

conduira nécessairement à vous déclarer incompétents pour connaître de la requête somalienne

de 2014.

15. Nul doute que dans les prochains jours la Somalie, à court d’arguments, accusera le

Kenya de faire preuve de fétichisme textuel, et qu’elle tentera de vous convaincre, comme elle s’y

est déjà efforcée dans son exposé écrit, que l’intention réelle des Parties ne serait pas celle qui

résulte en réalité du texte de l’accord et qu’il conviendrait par conséquent de ne pas tenir compte et

70 Acquisition de la nationalité polonaise, avis consultatif, 1923, C.P.J.I. série B n 7, p. 20 ; Différend territorial
(Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Tchad), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1994, p. 25, par. 51.

71 Compétence de l’Assemblée générale pour l’admission d’un Etat aux Nations Unies, avis consultatif,
C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 8 ; rappelé dans Sentence arbitrale du 31 juillet 1989 (Guinée-Bissau c. Sénégal), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1991, p. 69, par. 48.

72 Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 861, par. 88 (voir également p. 863, par. 97) ; voir également dans le même sens PCA Case
No. 2013-19, The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China, sentence du 12 juillet 2016, par. 698
(«These provisions are unequivocal and require no further interpretation.»)

73 Application de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale
(Géorgie c. Fédération de Russie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (I), p. 125 et suiv., par. 132 et
suiv. - 40 -

même de faire abstraction de ce texte. En droit et pour les raisons que je viens de rappeler, c’est là

une position indéfendable, car le texte de l’accord fait droit entre les Parties. Mais quand bien

même il serait possible de ne pas tenir compte du texte de l’accord, les arguments mis en avant par

la Somalie pour discréditer celui-ci sont de toute manière, et pour surplus de droit, privés de tout

fondement. Permettez-moi, Monsieur le président, de les examiner maintenant tour à tour en

commençant par l’objet et le but du mémorandum d’accord de 2009.

III. L’objet et le but du mémorandum d’accord de 2009

16. Dans son exposé écrit, la Somalie s’efforce de neutraliser l’avant-dernier paragraphe du

mémorandum d’accord en estimant tout d’abord qu’il ne serait pas compatible avec l’objet et le but

de cet accord. Un tel argument n’est de toute évidence pas conforme aux règles d’interprétation ;

on ne peut pas invoquer en effet les prétendus objet et but d’un traité pour retirer du traité une

disposition qui y figure expressément. C’est pourtant ce que vous demande de faire la Somalie.

17. La Somalie prétend à cet effet et en premier lieu que l’objet et le but de l’accord de 2009

seraient exclusivement relatifs à la délinéation et plus précisément à la non-objection de chaque

partie à l’examen par la Commission des limites des demandes de l’autre partie, ce que refléterait

74
l’intitulé du mémorandum d’accord . La Somalie prétend en déduire que l’accord de 2009 aurait
75
donc «nothing to do with the delimitation of any aspect of the Parties’ maritime boundary» .

Voilà un argument pour le moins surprenant ! Il ne suffit pas d’invoquer en effet l’objet et le but

d’un traité pour se débarrasser, comme le fait la Somalie, d’une clause qui figure dans le traité. Par

définition, l’objet et le but d’un traité est quelque chose de plus restreint que l’ensemble des

dispositions du traité  faute de quoi toute réserve à un traité serait par définition illicite ! En

l’espèce, quel que soit l’objet ou le but du traité ou son intitulé, il n’en demeure pas moins que

l’accord de 2009 contient une disposition consacrée à la délimitation, à laquelle il faut par

conséquent donner effet.

18. La Somalie affirme en second lieu que, quand bien même l’accord de 2009 porterait

aussi sur la délimitation, il ne concernerait toutefois que le plateau continental au-delà de

74EES, par. 1.7, 1.11 in fine, 1.16, 2.5-2.30, 2.91, 3.10, 3.20-3.21, 3.63 et 3.65.

75Ibid., par. 3.69. - 41 -

200 milles marins et que par conséquent, il ne s’appliquerait pas, à tout le moins, aux autres

espaces maritimes . Cette affirmation entre de nouveau en collision frontale avec le texte de

l’accord qui vise expressément «[t]he delimitation of maritime boundaries [au pluriel] in the areas

[de nouveau au pluriel] under dispute, [avant de préciser] including [donc : entre autres, et pas

exclusivement] the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles». L’accord

de 2009 s’applique à ce titre à l’ensemble des espaces maritimes et pas seulement au plateau

continental au-delà de 200 milles marins.

19. Je précise d’ailleurs à ce titre que la Somalie sollicite de la Cour le tracé d’une ligne

77
unique de délimitation, couvrant tous les espaces maritimes . Or, en application du principe

rappelé dans l’affaire Qatar c. Bahreïn, chaque segment d’une ligne unique de délimitation doit

être tracé en tenant compte du fait qu’il s’agit de «tracer une limite maritime unique qui soit valable

aussi à d’autres fins» . Toute ligne unique de délimitation est constituée de ce fait d’une somme

de délimitations indivisibles et interdépendantes, ou, pour reprendre les termes de votre Cour, elle

79
constitue une «délimitation polyvalente» . Dans ces conditions, la délimitation maritime globale

dépend de la délimitation du plateau continental. Dès lors, en admettant comme le soutient la

Somalie que l’accord de 2009 ne porterait que sur la délimitation du plateau continental

(quod non), cela ne changerait strictement rien au fait que cet accord produirait tout de même un

effet sur l’ensemble de la délimitation maritime.

20. Quoi qu’il en soit, il se trouve que, contrairement à ce qu’affirme la Somalie, l’accord

de 2009 ne se limite pas au plateau continental. Il vise explicitement dans le paragraphe consacré à

la délimitation les «areas under dispute» et les «maritime boundaries». L’usage de ce double

pluriel est dénué de toute ambiguïté, en particulier quand on sait avec quel soin l’accord a été

rédigé et approuvé, comme cela a été rappelé un peu plus tôt ce matin . Ce double pluriel signifie

76EES, par. 1.20 ; par. 3.68.
77
Requête introductive d’instance (RS), par. 2, 36 et 37 ; MS, par. 1.1 ; EES, par. 1.
78
Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahreïn (Qatar c. Bahreïn), fond, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 93, par. 174 ; confirmé par Différend territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras
dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 739-740, par. 265.
79 Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du Maine (Canada/Etats-Unis d’Amérique),

arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 327, par. 194.
80Voir EPK, par. 31 et par. 43, ainsi que les annexes 9 et 10 ; EES, par. 1.34. - 42 -

que l’ensemble de la délimitation maritime est concernée par l’avant-dernier paragraphe de

l’accord de 2009. Certes, on pourrait s’interroger sur les raisons pour lesquelles les Parties ont fait

usage de ces expressions générales («areas under dispute», «maritime boundaries») plutôt que

d’employer les expressions plus techniques de mer territoriale, zone économique exclusive et

plateau continental. On trouvera un élément de réponse dans le fait que, lorsque l’accord de 2009 a

été préparé et adopté, les revendications somaliennes étaient affectées d’une grande confusion

technique et juridique puisqu’elles semblaient assimiler mer territoriale et zone économique

exclusive. Depuis la loi somalienne de 1972 sur la mer territoriale en effet, qui était encore en

vigueur en 2009, la Somalie revendiquait une mer territoriale, non pas de 12, mais de 200 milles

marins ! Cette revendication ne reposait bien entendu sur aucun fondement juridique, comme la

82
Norvège eut l’occasion de le relever dans une lettre d’août 2011 .

21. La Somalie affirme en troisième lieu que, si l’on devait admettre que l’accord de 2009

concerne la délimitation, cet accord serait alors «entièrement illogique» car il serait «absurde» de

procéder à la délinéation avant la délimitation . De nouveau, ceci n’est pas un argument : on ne

peut pas rayer d’un trait de plume une disposition d’un accord au simple prétexte qu’elle serait

illogique. Et de toute manière, il n’y a absolument rien d’illogique dans le fait de conditionner la

délimitation à la délinéation préalable.

22. Le Kenya prend certes note de l’arrêt rendu par votre Cour le 17 mars dernier. Dans cet

arrêt, vous avez jugé, en tout cas au stade des exceptions préliminaires, que «la délimitation du

plateau continental au-delà de 200 milles marins peut s’effectuer indépendamment de la

recommandation de la Commission» . Certains ne manqueront pas de relever que cette décision

semble constituer un revirement de jurisprudence par rapport à votre arrêt de 2007 dans

l’affaire Nicaragua c. Honduras, arrêt rendu quelques mois avant que le Kenya et la Somalie

concluent l’accord de 2009. Dans votre arrêt de 2007, vous aviez jugé que «toute prétention

relative à des droits sur le plateau continental au-delà de 200 milles doit être … examinée par la

81Voir EPK, par. 20 et par. 86.

82Ibid., annexe 4, p. 23.
83
EES, par. 3.24-3.25 ; voir aussi ibid., par. 1.21-1.23 ; 3.66-3.67 ; 3.70.
84Question de la délimitation du plateau continental entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie au-delà de 200 milles

marins de la côte nicaraguayenne (Nicaragua c. Colombie), arrêt, 17 mars 2016, par. 114. - 43 -

85
Commission des limites du plateau continental constituée en vertu de ce traité» . Quoi qu’il en

soit du bien-fondé de votre nouvel arrêt de mars 2016, point sur lequel le Kenya n’estime pas

nécessaire de prendre position dans la présente instance, il ne fait aucun doute que votre décision

de mars 2016 n’interdit pas à des Etats de convenir de commencer par la délinéation avant de

passer à la délimitation. De fait, les Etats sont parfaitement libres de retenir cette manière de

procéder, ce que plusieurs Etats ont fait, comme cela ressort des annexes produites par la

Somalie . La Somalie elle-même d’ailleurs a proposé au Yémen, en 2009, et à la Tanzanie, en

87
2014, de suivre cette procédure (à savoir délinéer avant de délimiter) . La Somalie est donc mal

venue à qualifier aujourd’hui cette procédure d’illogique.

23. Loin d’être illogique, cette procédure est, à dire vrai, plus logique que la solution inverse,

88
comme certains membres de la Cour l’ont relevé en mars dernier . Délimiter suppose en effet de

déterminer d’abord les prétentions au titre de chaque partie (c’est-à-dire leur aire d’étendue vers le

89
large), comme le reconnaît la Somalie , et la détermination préalable des zones pertinentes aux

fins de la délimitation est à son tour indispensable pour pouvoir appliquer ensuite le test de

l’absence de disproportion en vue d’arriver à une solution équitable pour l’ensemble des zones en

90
litige . Cela vaut à plus forte raison lorsque c’est une ligne unique de délimitation qui est

revendiquée. Il n’est donc pas surprenant que le Kenya et la Somalie aient conclu l’accord de 2009

par lequel ils ont convenu que la délimitation se fera par voie d’accord  après et non pas

avant  les recommandations de la Commission des limites. L’accord de 2009, son objet et son

but, sont à cet égard cohérents de bout en bout : les Parties se sont d’abord donné les moyens

d’obtenir les recommandations de la Commission des limites en convenant de ne pas bloquer

85
Différend territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua
c. Honduras), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 759, par. 319 ; voir également à cet égard B Kunoy, «The Delimitation of
an Indicative Area of Overlapping Entitlement to the Outer Continental Shelf», BYBIL (2013), vol. 83, p. 61-81.
86
Voir EES, annexe 28, p. 4152-4153 (décision d’avril 2009 de la France, l’Irlande, l’Espagne et le
Royaume-Uni).
87 Voir MS, vol. III, respectivement annexe 66, d’une part, et annexes 49 et 70, d’autre part.

88 Question de la délimitation du plateau continental entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie au-delà de 200 milles
marins de la côte nicaraguayenne (Nicaragua c. Colombie), arrêt, 17 mars 2016, opinion individuelle du juge Owada,
par. 23 ; déclaration du juge Gaja ; et déclaration du juge Bhandari (passim).

89 Voir EES, par. 3.10 : «Failure to meet that deadline would have meant losing their potential entitlement to a
continental shelf beyond 200 M.» ; voir également ibid., annexe 28, en particulier p. 4140 et 4142.

90 EPK, par. 47. Voir également l’article de B. Kunoy, op. cit. - 44 -

l’action de la Commission, pour mieux décider ensuite que la délimitation aurait lieu après

réception de ces recommandations et sur la base de celles-ci.

IV. La pratique ultérieure des Parties

24. L’analyse de la pratique ultérieure des Parties conduit à la même conclusion. Là encore,

les efforts déployés par la Somalie pour supprimer de l’accord de 2009 son avant-dernier

paragraphe se révèlent aussi vains qu’artificiels.

25. La Somalie invoque tout d’abord le fait que dans certains documents soumis par les

Parties à la Commission des limites, l’avant-dernier paragraphe de l’accord de 2009 n’est pas cité.

Il faudrait y voir la preuve que les Parties auraient renoncé à cette partie de l’accord . Dans la91

mesure cependant où la Commission n’est pas concernée par la délimitation mais seulement par la

délinéation, on ne voit pas pourquoi les Parties auraient dû systématiquement se prévaloir devant

elle de l’avant-dernier paragraphe de l’accord de 2009. Et au demeurant, il se trouve que le Kenya

92
s’en est bel et bien prévalu devant la Commission .

26. Plus fondamentalement, avant que la Cour soit saisie, le Kenya n’avait eu aucune raison

d’invoquer à son profit l’avant-dernier paragraphe de l’accord de 2009. Le Kenya estimait en effet,

en toute bonne foi, que la Somalie respecterait l’accord qu’elle a conclu. Dans la lettre envoyée par

la Somalie au Kenya 48 heures seulement avant la saisine de votre Cour, la Somalie avait d’ailleurs

rappelé son accord à la poursuite des négociations sans informer du tout le Kenya de son intention

93
de saisir la Cour dans les quelques heures qui allaient suivre . Ce n’est qu’à partir du moment où

la Somalie a violé l’avant-dernier paragraphe de l’accord de 2009 en vous saisissant que le Kenya a

dû se prévaloir de la procédure agréée dans cet accord, ce qu’il a fait en soumettant une exception

préliminaire.

27. La Somalie affirme ensuite, en s’appuyant à cet effet sur un document interne somalien,

94
qu’en 2014 le Kenya aurait lui-même soulevé la possibilité de soumettre le différend à l’arbitrage .

Ces propos prêtés par la Somalie au ministre kényan des affaires étrangères sont cependant,

91
EES, par. 2.28-2.29, 3.30-3.31.
92Voir EPK, annexes 24 et 44.
93
Voir MS, vol. III, annexe 47.
94
EES, par. 2.69. - 45 -

Monsieur le président, étrangers à la vérité, comme l’établit la déclaration dudit ministre

communiquée par le Kenya à la Cour le 27 mai dernier.

28. La Somalie déclare enfin que «Kenya’s statement that «at the appropriate time, a

mechanism will be established to finalize the maritime boundary negotiations» means that it did not
95
then consider that any such mechanism yet existed» . On peine à comprendre en quoi cette

citation viendrait au soutien de la thèse somalienne. Cette déclaration du Kenya confirme au

contraire l’avant-dernier paragraphe de l’accord de 2009. L’accord de 2009, encore une fois,

n’interdit pas aux Parties de commencer à négocier avant de recevoir les recommandations de la

Commission des limites. La procédure qu’il impose est d’attendre ces recommandations avant de

trouver un accord sur la délimitation. Cela supposera nécessairement d’établir, au moment

opportun, un mécanisme pour finaliser les négociations. Tel est le sens évident des propos du

Kenya cités par la Somalie.

29. Pour en terminer avec la pratique ultérieure des Parties et l’argument de la Somalie selon

lequel les Parties auraient prétendument renoncé à l’avant-dernier paragraphe de l’accord de 2009,

je relèverai en tout état de cause que la Somalie néglige de citer plusieurs documents — dont les

références figurent en note de bas de page de ma plaidoirie — qui attestent qu’après la conclusion

de l’accord de 2009, les deux Parties ont expressément invoqué à plusieurs reprises la procédure
96
agréée dans son avant-dernier paragraphe .

V. Le contexte de conclusion du mémorandum d’accord de 2009

30. J’en viens enfin, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, au contexte

de conclusion de l’accord de 2009, contexte que la Somalie sollicite, à nouveau abusivement, afin

d’effacer l’avant-dernier paragraphe de l’accord.

31. Je rappellerai d’abord sur ce point que, selon vos propres termes,

«il est généralement reconnu que l’examen de[s] circonstances [dans lesquelles un
traité est conclu] ne constitue pas autre chose qu’un moyen complémentaire

d’interprétation, auquel on a recours seulement lorsque le sens du texte est ambigu ou
obscur ou lorsque l’interprétation conduirait manifestement à un résultat

95EES, par. 2.33-2.36 ; 3.34-3.47 ; voir aussi par. 2.43 et plus largement 2.37-2.76.

96Voir EPK, par. 68-69 ; ibid., par. 107 et annexe 24, p. 107 ; MS, vol. III, annexe 50 (dernière page du
document) et annexe 61, par. 95, p. 20-21; voir également ibid., annexe 66, par. 6. - 46 -

manifestement absurde ou déraisonnable» , ce qui, encore une fois, n’est pas le cas en

l’espèce, tant le texte de l’accord de 2009 est limpide.

32. Je soulignerai ensuite, et en tout état de cause, que la Somalie n’a apporté aucun élément

au soutien de l’affirmation selon laquelle le contexte de conclusion de l’accord devrait vous

conduire à priver de tout effet son avant-dernier paragraphe. La Somalie se contente d’affirmer que

si ce paragraphe se voyait donner effet, il retarderait indûment la délimitation maritime qui, selon la

98
Somalie, devrait être fixée de toute urgence . Autrement dit, la Somalie vous demande de ne pas

tenir compte du traité conclu en 2009 et de la procédure qu’il prévoit au seul motif qu’il existerait

un besoin urgent de délimiter.

33. Cela constitue, une nouvelle fois, un argument dénué de tout fondement en droit : un

besoin, quelle qu’en soit l’urgence, ne peut pas priver d’effet un traité en vigueur. Mais l’argument

est également privé de tout fondement sur le terrain des faits. L’examen attentif des circonstances

de conclusion de l’accord de 2009 montre en effet que lorsque cet accord a été conclu, la

délimitation maritime n’était absolument pas une priorité pour la Somalie. Bien au contraire et de

son propre aveu, la Somalie n’était pas prête, et n’était pas disposée, en 2009 à entrer en

99
négociations sur la délimitation maritime . Ceci était vrai en 2009 ; ce l’était encore quatre ans

plus tard, en juin 2013, date à laquelle la Somalie réitéra qu’elle estimait avoir droit à une mer

territoriale de 200 milles marins et annonça officiellement, comme une brutale fin de non-recevoir,

qu’elle n’estimait pas «opportun» d’ouvrir avec qui que ce soit des discussions sur la délimitation

maritime . La Somalie est-elle bien crédible, dans ces circonstances, à affirmer que lorsqu’elle

vous a saisis un an plus tard seulement, en août 2014, il existait désormais une extrême urgence à

délimiter par la voie judiciaire ? Si les circonstances de conclusion de l’accord de 2009 révèlent

quelque chose, c’est que la Somalie était, de son propre aveu, en 2009 et toujours en 2013, dans un

processus fragile de rétablissement des structures étatiques et qu’elle n’était ni en mesure, ni même

désireuse de procéder alors à la délimitation maritime.

97 Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras; Nicaragua (intervenant)), arrêt,

C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 584, par. 376.
98EES, par. 3.66.
99
Voir ibid., par. 1-32.1-33 ; 2.8-2.11 ; 2.40 ; 3.58-3.59.
100
Voir EPK, annexes 33, 34, 35 et 36. - 47 -

34. Ce contexte donne tout son sens à l’accord de 2009. En 2009, les Parties considéraient

qu’il n’y avait pas d’urgence à délimiter, tout au contraire. En revanche, le délai était sur le point

d’expirer pour la soumission des demandes à la Commission des limites du plateau continental.

Cela explique que les Parties se soient entendues pour donner la priorité à la délinéation et pour

attendre celle-ci avant de procéder à la délimitation. C’est ce que stipule, clairement, encore une

fois, l’avant-dernier paragraphe de l’accord de 2009.

VI. Conclusion

35. En conclusion, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, il ne fait aucun

doute que vous n’avez pas compétence en la présente affaire. En avril 2009, le Kenya et la Somalie

ont conclu un accord dont l’avant-dernier paragraphe stipule, avec clarté, que la délimitation des

frontières maritimes dans les zones en litige se fera par voie d’accord après que la Commission des

limites du plateau continental aura adressé ses recommandations aux deux Etats. Dans la mesure

où un jugement de la Cour n’est pas un accord et dans la mesure où «après» ne veut pas dire

«avant», il est manifeste qu’il existe un accord par lequel les Parties ont convenu de recourir à un

mode de règlement autre que la Cour internationale de Justice. La conclusion s’impose donc

d’elle-même : la Cour n’a pas compétence pour connaître de la requête introductive d’instance

déposée par la Somalie en août 2014.

36. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie très vivement

de votre attention et je vous serais reconnaissant, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir donner la

parole maintenant à S. Exc. Mme Makena Muchiri. Je vous remercie.

Le PRESIDENT : Merci, M. le professeur. Je donne la parole à S. Exc. Mme l’ambassadeur

Makena Muchiri.

Ms MUCHIRI:

N EGOTIATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN EXHAUSTED BETWEEN THE PARTIES

I. Introduction

1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is an honour and privilege to appear

before you. I will be addressing Somalia’s assertion that negotiations have been exhausted. - 48 -

2. As Professor Forteau explained, the MOU requires a negotiated agreement on a final

maritime delimitation following a Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (“CLCS”)

review of the Parties’ submissions. Negotiation is the agreed procedure; it is a legal obligation.

Somalia claims that negotiations are futile. This argument misses the point. For the purpose of the

Court’s jurisdiction, the sole issue is whether the Parties have agreed to a procedure other than

recourse to the Court; but in any case, Somalia’s assertion that negotiations have been exhausted is

not true. The facts demonstrate that the Parties held only two technical level meetings in 2014;

that these were initiated by Kenya to address Somalia’s breach of the MOU; and that maritime

delimitation was discussed only in the most preliminary way, without any structure or detail. The

facts also demonstrate that Somalia did not seriously pursue negotiations, and seemingly went

through the motions only so it could get before the Court.

3. Maritime boundary delimitations are complex. Even where the Court has jurisdiction,

Parties engage in prolonged negotiations before seeking judicial settlement. It is difficult to say

how long negotiations must continue before they can be said to have been exhausted. But among

the maritime boundary disputes decided by this Court, the period of prior negotiations has typically
101
been around 20 years . Two preliminary technical meetings just four months apart is clearly not a

reasonable period. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Parties have exhausted

negotiations, when they have not even started proper discussions.

II. The 2014 technical level meetings

4. Mr. President, allow me to take you through the details of these two meetings.

5. Prior to the negotiations in 2014, the Foreign Ministers of Kenya and Somalia had agreed,

in a Joint Statement of 31 May 2013, that meetings should be held to discuss “a framework of

modalities for embarking on maritime demarcation” linked to “implementation” of the MOU . 102

Thus, the purpose of discussions at that stage was merely procedural  to structure negotiations

10In Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), the Parties
negotiated for 26 years and 10 months before coming to the ICJ; in Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger), 41 years; in
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger), 36 years.

10POK, para. 88. - 49 -

through a preliminary exchange of views based on the MOU. The primary purpose was not to hold

substantive negotiations on the maritime boundary.

6. Because this reference to the MOU resulted in heated controversy, on the of 6 June 2013

the Somali Council of Ministers rejected any “discussions on maritime demarcation or limitations

on the continental shelf” with Kenya . So what prompted the first meeting a few months later?

7. Somalia does not dispute that Kenya initiated the first meeting. The question is why it did

so? The answer is clear. It was because of Somalia’s letter of 4 February 2014 to the

United Nations, repudiating the MOU and objecting to Kenya’s CLCS submission. The purpose of

the meeting in March 2014, just one month after that letter, was to persuade Somalia to comply

with the MOU by withdrawing its objection. The CLCS was scheduled to consider Kenya’s

104
submission in September 2014 . Compliance with the MOU was an urgent matter for Kenya.

Somalia claims there is no evidence that the meeting was for the purposes of discussing the MOU.

Should there be any doubt, Kenya has submitted in evidence of an internal contemporaneous letter

dated 12 February 2014 from the Head of the Legal and Host Country Affairs Directorate of the

Kenyan Ministry for Foreign Affairs addressed to the Cabinet Secretary. That document may be

found at tab 11 of the judges’ folder. This letter is dated just a week after Somalia’s objection. It

states that, although the Parties granted each other “no objection” under the MOU, Somalia has

“written to the United Nations Secretary-General . . . formally objecting to consideration of

Kenya’s submission by the Commission”. The letter concludes: “It is therefore imperative that

diplomatic and bilateral consultations be initiated at the highest level of Government as soon as

possible to resolve the situation to ensure that the submissions are considered in 2014 without

undue delay”. It is clear that Kenya initiated the meeting to discuss the MOU.

8. Mr. President, the Parties agreed on 21 March 2014 that the meetings would only be at the

“technical level” . It may be recalled that Somalia had refused to negotiate at all. Thus, this first

meeting was in the nature of a confidence-building process. This meeting was held a few days later

on 26 and 27 March 2014. Consistent with its primary concern, Kenya proposed an agenda that

103
POK, para. 90.
10POK, para. 91.
105
POK, para. 98. - 50 -

106
prioritized discussion of the MOU . The record of that first meeting is clear. Somalia refused to

even discuss the MOU; it demanded that any mention of the MOU be removed from the agenda . 107

In a spirit of compromise, Kenya agreed to postpone this discussion to a second technical level

meeting to be held in June 2014. In other words, Somalia refused to even discuss the primary issue

for which Kenya had initiated that meeting.

9. Two significant events occurred between the first and the second technical meetings.

First, on 31 March 2014, just days after the first meeting, the CLCS stated that “it was not in a

position to proceed with the establishment of a sub-commission at that time” . This was a major

setback for Kenya, given the cost and effort it had expended in preparing its submissions. At the

June 2014 meeting of the UNCLOS States parties, Kenya’s representative had emphasized that

“any slight delay in considering a country’s submissions results in huge human and material costs

used to ensure that the country maintains her ability to defend the submission” . 109

10. Second, on 21 July 2014, Somalia made its own submission to the CLCS at the very

session in which it blocked consideration of Kenya’s submission. Kenya responded by holding a

second meeting to encourage Somalia’s compliance with the “no objection” agreement under

the MOU.

11. Mr. President, this second meeting took place on 28 and 29 July 2014, just four months

after the first meeting. It may be recalled that Somalia requested Kenya’s internal

contemporaneous record of this meeting, which Kenya has provided . Those two new documents

may be found at tab 12 of the judges’ folder. They fully support Kenya’s case that this meeting

was not a proper negotiation of the maritime boundary. The meeting brief dated 8 August 2014

records that Kenya requested time to respond to Somalia’s presentation on the maritime boundary.

10POK, Ann. 31.
107
POK, Anns. 31 and 24.
108
POK, para. 103.
10POK, para. 104.

11Joint Report of the Government of the Republic of Kenya and the Federal Republic of Somalia on the
Kenya-Somalia Maritime Boundary Meeting held on 28-29 July 2014 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, Nairobi, Kenya and Brief on a meeting between the Governments of the Republic of Kenya and the Federal
Republic of Somalia on the Maritime Boundary held on 28-29 July 2014, Nairobi, Kenya dated 8 August 2014. - 51 -

111
It had not come prepared to focus on the merits of the dispute . Both delegations “agreed that in

order to move forward, the meetings needed to be structured” with agreed principles to guide

negotiations .112 This plainly contradicts Somalia’s contention that negotiations had been

exhausted. There was not even a discussion on structure or basic guidelines.

12. The Parties agreed to reconvene for a third technical level meeting to be held less than

a month later, on 25 and 26 August 2014. Nothing had changed in the meantime. Kenya remained

focused on its CLCS submission that was provisionally scheduled for the 35th session of the CLCS

in the very same month. Kenyan internal documents demonstrate that the purpose of the third

meeting was “to discuss [a] maritime boundary including lifting of objection by Somalia on MOU

granting no objection to consideration of Kenya’s submission” . 113

13. Kenya had a clear interest in having this third meeting . It wanted to resolve the

MOU issue. But the Kenyan delegation had valid security concerns about attending a meeting in

Mogadishu at that time. This is recorded in the meeting brief dated 8 August 2014 . The Kenyan 115

national intelligence service made an assessment and advised on 23 August 2014 that “due to the

volatile security situation in Mogadishu, it is not advisable for such high powered delegation to

visit the country” . It is not difficult to understand why they came to that conclusion . There 117

was a specific risk to the Kenyan delegation because of the extreme anger in Somalia against the

MOU, resulting from inflammatory Al-Shabaab rumours that Kenya had conspired to steal Somali

waters. The Kenyan delegation genuinely feared that they could be harmed if people in Mogadishu

became aware of their presence. Somalia’s suggestion that Kenya simply failed to show up is

grossly misleading. In fact, it is a pretext. Somalia had already decided to go to the Court.

111
Brief on a meeting between the Governments of the Republic of Kenya and the Federal Republic of Somalia on
the Maritime Boundary held on 28-29 July 2014, Nairobi, Kenya dated 8 August 2014, p. 2, top of the page.
112
Ibid., p. 2.
113POK, Anns. 40 and 41.

114POK, Anns. 40 and 41.

115Brief on a meeting between the Governments of the Republic of Kenya and the Federal Republic of Somalia on
the Maritime Boundary held on 28-29 July 2014, Nairobi, Kenya dated 8 August 2014, p. 2, bottom of the page (Kenya
seeking guidance on the venue for the next meeting).

116POK, Ann. 40.
117
See, e.g., the June 2016 Al-Shabaab car bomb attack on the Ambassador Hotel in Mogadishu where 10 people
dead and 50 were wounded: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36430306. - 52 -

14. Mr. President, Annex 47 to Somalia’s Memorial is a letter from Somalia to Kenya dated

26 August 2014, just two days before its Application was filed. It confirms that both Parties had

agreed to an “additional round of discussions”. It expresses Somalia’s “strong commitment to

amicably resolving the pending maritime boundary dispute”. It makes no mention that Somalia

would come before the Court within 48 hours. That course of conduct might even be described as

deception. It is certainly not a commitment to negotiate in good faith.

15. It is reasonable to conclude that Somalia had been preparing for this case well in advance

of filing its Application on 28 August 2014. It is reasonable to conclude that it was simply going

through the motions of appearing to negotiate, while it refused to discuss the legal validity of

the MOU or the withdrawal of its CLCS objection.

16. Mr. President, I must also draw attention to Somalia’s assertion that at the second

meeting in July 2014, the Kenyan Foreign Minister stated that, “if no agreement could be reached”

the Parties “might resort to international arbitration” . Somalia makes much of this alleged

119
statement, as if it constitutes Kenya’s consent to arbitration .

17. The alleged statement is set out in a report to the file, found in Somalia’s Annex 4. It is

dated 5 August 2014, just a few days before the filing of the Application. Its co-author is

Somalia’s Co-Agent in this case. It is curious that an internal note for the file for the Somali

Government is drafted in English rather than Somali.

18. What is troubling, however, is that the Kenyan Foreign Minister in fact never made such

a statement. Kenya has submitted as new evidence a statement by the Honourable Minister

Dr. Amina Mohamed. She states as follows: “I did not ever make the statement that is attributed
120
to me in that Report to the File”, which is at tab 13 . In regard to this statement, Somalia

11Written Statement of Somalia on Kenya’s Preliminary Objections (WSS), para. 2.69, Ann. 4.
119
WSS, para. 1.19. Its Written Statement argues that: “Kenya itself even raised the possibility of submitting the
dispute to binding international arbitration: a suggestion flatly at odds with the position it now advances before the
Court.”
120
Statement by the Cabinet Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade on Claims of Resorting
to International Arbitration with regard to the Kenya/Somalia Maritime Boundary Dispute, 5 May 2016. - 53 -

requested Kenya’s internal contemporaneous record of that meeting. That record, at tab 12, makes

121
no mention whatsoever of arbitration .

III. The potential for meaningful negotiations remains

19. Mr. President, it is against this background, that Somalia claims “deadlock has been

reached” and that negotiations “have proven futile” . But the record shows that these were not

meaningful negotiations. This Court has clarified that the Parties are “not merely to go through a

formal process of negotiation . . . they are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the

123
negotiations are meaningful” .

20. In fact, it is difficult to think of any maritime delimitation that was resolved in just

four months; let alone a complex delimitation that requires sensitive bilateral negotiations on

serious political and security concerns.

21. Mr. President, the facts are clear. Somalia refused to discuss the MOU. It refused to

withdraw its objection. It insisted upon its equidistance position. It litigated its case. It rushed

through a formal process to get before the Court; and it did so during a fragile transitional period

when hundreds of Kenyan soldiers and civilians were being killed because of Al-Shabaab terrorist

attacks; it did so at a time when Al-Shabaab was infiltrating Kenya from the sea through the same

disputed maritime areas, over which Kenya had exercised uncontested jurisdiction for many years.

Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Parties ever entered into proper negotiations,

let alone exhausted them.

22. Mr. President, the art of compromise requires time. It cannot begin and end with the

position that “what is mine is mine, and what is yours is negotiable”! When reason prevails, what

the Parties cannot agree to today, they may agree to tomorrow. That is especially true given the

evolving situation in Somalia.

12Joint Report of the Government of the Republic of Kenya and the Federal Republic of Somalia on the
Kenya-Somalia Maritime Boundary Meeting held on 28-29 July 2014 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, Nairobi, Kenya and Brief on a meeting between the Governments of the Republic of Kenya and the Federal
Republic of Somalia on the Maritime Boundary held on 28-29 July 2014, Nairobi, Kenya dated 8 August 2014.
122
WSS, para. 3.89.
12North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of

Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 47, para. 85 (a). - 54 -

23. Mr. President and Members of the Court, that concludes my presentation. I would now

ask that you call Professor Boyle to the podium. Thank you.

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Excellence. Je donne la parole à M. le

professeur Boyle.

Mr. BOYLE:

UNCLOS P ART XV CONSTITUTES AN AGREEMENT ON ANOTHER
METHOD OF SETTLEMENT

I. Introduction

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is an honour to appear before you on behalf of the

Republic of Kenya. My colleagues have argued that the 2009 Memorandum of Understanding

(“MOU”) envisages a procedure for settling this dispute that is within the terms of the reservation

to Kenya’s Article 36 (2) declaration. If you agree, the case will fall outside Kenya’s acceptance of

the Court’s jurisdiction, and what I have to say this morning about Part XV of UNCLOS will be

irrelevant.

2. But even if the MOU did not exist, or even if you reject our MOU argument, this Court

would still have no jurisdiction over this case, because, as my colleagues have pointed out, Part XV

of UNCLOS also comes within the terms of Kenya’s Optional Clause reservation. Thus, neither

Article 36 (2) of the Statute, nor Article 282 of UNCLOS, provides this Court with a basis for

jurisdiction in this case. Because Somalia does rely to some extent on Article 282, I will dispose of

it first.

II. Article 282 of UNCLOS does not Confer Jurisdiction on the Court

3. Somalia has brought its case under Article 36 (2) of the Statute, and it is therefore Kenya’s

Optional Clause declaration, not Part XV of UNCLOS, that determines whether the Court has

jurisdiction. Somalia’s Written Statement accepts that “Part XV . . . sets out the principles and the
124
procedures applicable to dispute settlement under this Convention” . As I will explain in a few

moments’ time, Part XV is therefore an “agreed procedure” for settling UNCLOS disputes. But

12Written Statement of Somalia on Kenya’s Preliminary Objections (WSS), para. 3.50. - 55 -

Somalia goes on to claim that, under Article 282, “the agreement to submit disputes to the Court

that results from the Parties’ matching declarations under Article 36 (2) of the Statute has priority

over the procedures established in Part XV of UNCLOS” . That is why I have to deal first with

Article 282.

4. But there is a fatal flaw in Somalia’s Article 282 argument. There is in fact no “matching”

of the declarations made by Kenya and Somalia under Article 36 (2). There is thus no agreement to

submit UNCLOS disputes to this Court within the terms of that Article. As you will recall,

Kenya’s Optional Clause declaration provides that the Court shall not have jurisdiction over

“disputes in regard to which the parties to the dispute have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to

some other method or methods of settlement”. We would say that Part XV of UNCLOS manifestly

provides agreed methods for the settlement of maritime boundary disputes and it is thus necessarily

within the terms of the reservation excludes the Court’s jurisdiction under the Optional Clause.

5. You will find the text of Article 282 of UNCLOS at tab 15 in your folders. The key point

is that if  but only if  the parties “have agreed through a general, regional or bilateral

agreement or otherwise” to submit UNCLOS disputes “to a procedure that entails a binding

decision, that procedure shall apply in lieu of the procedure provided for [in Part XV], unless the

126
parties to the dispute otherwise agree” . But there is no such agreement in this case  there is no

matching Optional Clause declarations, there is no compromis, there are no Article 287

declarations opting for the ICJ under UNCLOS Part XV. And without any of these kinds of

agreement, Article 282 simply cannot apply to this case. It cannot give you jurisdiction unless

there is some agreement.

6. It may be helpful to refer the Court to the only case in which Article 282 has been

considered and has conferred jurisdiction on another non-UNCLOS tribunal. That was in the

Mox Plant case where the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) concluded that as a matter of

European Union (“EU”) law that court had exclusive jurisdiction over an UNCLOS dispute

between two EU member States and it went on to conclude that in accordance with Article 282 of

UNCLOS this binding procedure, that is a reference to the ECJ, applied in lieu of Annex VII

12WSS, paras. 3.82-86.

12UNCLOS, Art. 282, 1833 United Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS) 3 (1982). - 56 -

127
arbitration . And the parties to the case were thus obliged to terminate the arbitration they had

already commenced . But that is nothing like our case. Kenya has not accepted the International

Court’s compulsory jurisdiction for UNCLOS disputes. Its position is not remotely comparable to

that of Ireland and the U.K.

7. At the risk of over-egging the pudding, just suppose that two imaginary States have indeed

made identical declarations under Article 36 (2) of the Statute agreeing to submit all disputes

concerning interpretation or application of treaties to the ICJ. Would Article 282 apply? Yes. In

such a case both parties will have agreed to a procedure that entails a binding decision, of

course . Article 282 would then ensure that these Optional Clause declarations prevail over any

130
alternative UNCLOS Part XV procedure .

8. But Mr. President, Members of the Court, that conclusion requires both Parties to make

optional clause declarations in the same terms. And that is the vital point that Somalia ignores. Of

course the problem is that Kenya has expressly excluded the Court’s jurisdiction from its

Article 36 (2) jurisdiction where the dispute falls within any other agreed procedure, and that

includes the procedures set out in Part XV of UNCLOS or UNCLOS dispute.

9. For that reason, the Optional Clause declarations of the parties in the present case do not

and cannot constitute an agreement to submit this dispute to binding settlement within the terms of

127Commission v. Ireland, E.C.J. Case C-459/03 (30 May 2006), para. 125: “It follows from Article 282 of the
Convention that, as it provides for procedures resulting in binding decisions in respect of the resolution of disputes

between Member States, the system for the resolution of disputes set out in the EC Treaty must in principle take
precedence over that contained in Part XV of the Convention.”
128The Annex VII arbitrators suspended proceedings until the ECJ had given its decision: see Mox Plant Case

(Ireland v. United Kingdom), P.C.A, Order No 3: Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits (24 June 2003);
P.C.A, Order No 6: Termination of Proceedings (6 June 2008).
129Statute of the I.C.J., Articles 59 and 60. See also: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 392, para. 60,

where the Court characterized overlapping optional clause declarations as “a series of bilateral engagements with other
States accepting the same obligation of compulsory jurisdiction, in which the conditions, reservations, and time-limit
clauses are taken into consideration.”; Rights of Passage over Indian territory (Portugal v. India), Preliminary
Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1957, p. 146 (“The contractual relation between the Parties and the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court resulting therefrom are established, ‘ipso facto and without special agreement’.”); Land and Maritime
Boundary Case (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 275, para. 25 (it establishes a
“consensual bond . . .”); Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Canada), I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 432, para. 46.

130See also Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 61,
paras. 20-22, where a bilateral agreement conferred jurisdiction on the ICJ, although both parties had accepted Annex VII
arbitration for the purposes of Part XV of UNCLOS. - 57 -

Article 282. Whatever Somalia may claim , the conditions stated in Article 282 are not met in

this case.

10. Now Somalia tries to evade this obvious problem by arguing that the Court has never

found that it lacks jurisdiction on the basis of a reservation in favour of other methods of dispute

settlement . Well that may be so, but the Court has never had to address this question in the

context of Part XV of UNCLOS. And as Professor Akhavan has explained, it would be

inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the words used in the Optional Clause reservation and

with the intention of the party making the reservation to argue that this Court somehow retains

jurisdiction under Article 282, notwithstanding the express and obvious terms of Kenya’s

133
reservation .

11. Moreover, Somalia’s view is not shared by other States parties to UNCLOS. The

United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Honduras have all made the same Optional Clause

reservation as Kenya, but they each wanted UNCLOS disputes to be heard by the ICJ. That was

their favourite forum. And for that reason each of them thought it necessary to make a declaration

134
under Article 287 of UNCLOS expressly accepting the Court’s jurisdiction . Now it is obvious

that these States concluded that their Optional Clause declarations, with the reservation, would not

prevail over Part XV of UNCLOS, which of course is precisely Kenya’s argument, unless they also

made the declarations provided for in Article 287. Now I don’t need to point out, but I will, that

Somalia and Kenya have made no such declarations under Article 287.

12. So to conclude on Article 282, the important question is whether the Optional Clause

declarations of both Parties provide for the Court to have jurisdiction, otherwise the dispute

remains within UNCLOS Part XV procedures. Article 282 cannot reverse an Optional Clause

131
WSS, paras. 3.83 and 3.86.
13WSS, para. 3.3. But see the Court’s contrary view in Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 240 [POK, para. 145].

13Anglo Iranian Oil Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), I.C.J. Reports 1952, pp. 93, 104; Aegean Sea Case
(Turkey v. Greece), I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 29, para. 69; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Canada), I.C.J. Reports
1998, p. 454, para. 48.

13United Kingdom Article 36 (2) reservation: “(i) any dispute which the United Kingdom has agreed with the
other Party or Parties thereto to settle by some other method of peaceful settlement”; Netherlands Article 36 (2)
reservation: “with the exception of disputes in respect of which the parties, excluding the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice, may have agreed to have recourse to some other method of pacific settlement.”; Honduras Article 36 (2)
reservation: “(a) Disputes in respect of which the parties have agreed or may agree to resort to other means for the
pacific settlement of disputes.” - 58 -

declaration that expressly excludes the Court’s jurisdiction in respect of disputes subject to

procedures under other treaties, including UNCLOS. Article 282 does not in such cases confer

jurisdiction on this Court. Somalia has misread both Kenya’s Optional Clause declaration and

misapplied Article 282.

III. UNCLOS Part XV constitutes an agreement on a method of settlement

for the purposes of Kenya’s Article 36 (2) declaration

13. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I can now return to my broader point, that

regardless of the MOU, UNCLOS Part XV constitutes another agreement on methods of settlement

for the purposes of Kenya’s Article 36 (2) declaration. On that basis also, the Court has no

jurisdiction over the dispute.

14. Somalia has, of course, initiated a maritime boundary case. Both States are parties to

135
UNCLOS, and that treaty is what this Court would apply in any decision on the merits . Somalia

136 137
has invoked in its pleadings Articles 15, 74, 76, and 83 . It also refers to Articles 2 to 14 . The

dispute necessarily involves interpretation and application of these provisions of UNCLOS. On

138
this point both Parties agree .

15. But if there are no matching Optional Clause declarations, and if Article 282 does not

establish your jurisdiction, then it follows that there is an obligation to settle this dispute according

to Part XV, as stipulated in UNCLOS Article 286.

16. Somalia’s Written Statement addresses this issue in just four pages in Section II (B). It

139
places some reliance on the Electricity Company of Sofia case as authority for the following

proposition that: “Part XV of the Convention has no effect on the prior agreement between

Somalia and Kenya to confer jurisdiction on this Court resulting from their matching Optional

Clause declarations.” 140 But that case is wholly irrelevant to this dispute. It involved Optional

1351982 UNCLOS, Article 293.

136Memorial of Somalia (MS), paras. 5.9; 5.22; 6.7; 6.10; 7.5; 7.39.
137
MS, paras. 5.7-5.13.
138MS, para. 7.39; Application Instituting Proceedings (28 Aug. 2014), para. 33; WSS, para. 3.86. Paragraph 33

of the Application states: “Somalia bases its claim on UNCLOS; specifically Articles 15, 74, and 83, governing the
delimitation of the territorial sea, continental shelf and EEZ.”
139Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, Judgment, 1939, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 77, p. 76.

140WSS, para. 3.81. - 59 -

Clause declarations that were broader in scope than the compromissory clause contained in a

bilateral treaty between the parties. It did not involve an Optional Clause declaration expressly

restricting the Court’s jurisdiction in favour of other agreed procedures. Faced with two bases of

general jurisdiction, one under Optional Clause declarations, and one under a bilateral treaty, the

Court simply concluded that the narrower basis in the treaty did not by implication exclude the

broader acceptance of jurisdiction in the declarations. The two bases of jurisdiction co-existed.

But that is nothing like this case. Here, unlike Bulgaria, Kenya has specifically excluded from your

jurisdiction disputes in respect of which other procedures have been agreed. In those

circumstances the only possible basis of compulsory jurisdiction for an UNCLOS dispute involving

Kenya is UNCLOS Part XV, not Article 36 (2) of the Court’s Statute.

17. Somalia expressly admits that Part XV of UNCLOS provides procedures for the

settlement of maritime boundary disputes. It makes the argument that those are not applicable

141
procedures only by reference to Article 282  I have already explained why Article 282 is

inapplicable. Both States are bound by Part XV. There are therefore agreed procedures other than

recourse to the Court, so the exclusion in Kenya’s Optional Clause declaration is applicable to this

dispute. But it may be helpful to the Court if I very briefly summarize those procedures which

would be applicable under UNCLOS Part XV.

18. Section 1 of Part XV sets out the general régime for UNCLOS disputes. Article 279

requires the Parties to “seek a solution by the means indicated in Article 33, paragraph 1 of the

UN Charter”. Those means include negotiation, as envisaged in the MOU.

19. Article 280 reiterates that nothing in Part XV impairs the right of the parties “to agree at

any time to settle a dispute . . . by any peaceful means of their own choice”. Negotiation, as

envisaged in the 2009 MOU, is again one of those means . 142

20. If the parties have agreed on a non-binding procedure, such as negotiation, Article 281

gives that procedure priority over UNCLOS Part XV dispute settlement. On that basis, in our

view, even under UNCLOS, the MOU would prevail. Only if there is no settlement within an

14WSS, paras. 3.80-86.
142
Nordquist, Rosenne and Sohn (eds.), UNCLOS 1982: A Commentary (Nijhoff, 1989), Vol. V, p. 20:
“Article 280 is intended to make it as clear as possible that the parties to the dispute are complete masters of the
procedure to be used to settle it.” - 60 -

agreed time-limit may either party then revert to other procedures listed in section 2 of Part XV.

And then finally in section 1, Article 282 gives priority to agreements to refer a dispute to an

alternative binding procedure, but, as I have already explained, there is no such agreement in this

case.

21. If section 1 procedures do not exhaust the dispute, then section 2 comes into play and it

does provide for compulsory binding procedures. Article 286 is imperative. It makes submission

of such a dispute to UNCLOS compulsory procedures mandatory: “any dispute . . . shall be

submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under

this section”.

22. The court or tribunal having jurisdiction will be one of the four listed in Article 287. It is

open to the parties to make a declaration choosing one or other. But if the parties have made no

such declaration under Article 287, or if their declarations do not match, then the key point set out

in Article 287 (3) is that “both Parties are deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with

Annex VII to the Convention” . 143

23. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Part XV of UNCLOS clearly sets out a

comprehensive dispute settlement régime that covers the present dispute. It clearly falls within the

reservation to Kenya’s Optional Clause declaration. It does not confer jurisdiction on the Court in

the present case.

24. Before concluding, I will deal very briefly with a number of Somalia’s claims concerning

the MOU where it says that Kenya’s reading of the MOU is “incompatible with . . . the

144
Convention” .

25. First, Somalia says that binding resolution of disputes is the “default rule” under

145
section 2 of Part XV , but for all the reasons I have just set out, it is completely clear that Part XV

cannot be a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction in this case. Section 2 of Part XV would give this

Court compulsory jurisdiction only if both Parties to the dispute had made Article 287 declarations

designating the ICJ as their chosen forum under that Article. They have not done so.

14South China Sea Arbitration: Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Philippines v. China), P.C.A. 2016,
para. 109; 1982 UNCLOS, Article 287 (3).

14WSS, paras. 3.48 and 3.53.
145
WSS, para. 3.50. - 61 -

26. Somalia then claims that UNCLOS “favours the speedy resolution of disputes, through

binding decisions, and only permits exclusion of judicial recourse when the States concerned

clearly and unambiguously so agree” . But, It then accepts that Article 281 allows the parties to

147
opt out of binding procedures , but it argues that the penultimate paragraph of the MOU does not

exclude binding settlement. It is, they say, merely “a reaffirmation of . . . Articles 74 (1)

148
and 83 (1)” .

27. But this is to stand Article 281 on its head. The MOU does not need to exclude resort to

binding compulsory settlement in order to give priority to an agreement to negotiate a boundary.

The express terms of Article 281 are sufficient in themselves for that purpose.

28. Third, Article 281 (2) of UNCLOS provides that “[i]f the parties have also agreed on a

time-limit”, Part XV binding procedures apply “only upon the expiration of that time-limit”. Well,

Mr. President, as has already been explained, we have not passed the time-limit which requires the

CLCS to review and make recommendations.

29. Finally, there is the point that Ambassador Makena has made in relation to those further

negotiations, whether under Articles 74 or 83, or 283. Further negotiations envisaged by all of

those Articles simply have not taken place as yet . 149

30. So, invoking Part XV to reinterpret the MOU gets Somalia nowhere. On the contrary, it

tells us that this Court lacks jurisdiction. The fundamental point is quite simple. An agreement to

settle a boundary by negotiation after the CLCS has made its recommendations is plainly not an

agreement to refer a dispute to this court for immediate binding settlement. Frankly, nothing more

need be said.

31. Mr. President, let me conclude. The Parties are in agreement that Part XV procedures

are a method of dispute settlement under UNCLOS. As such, they necessarily fall within Kenya’s

146
WSS, para. 3.53.
147WSS, para. 3.51: “It is true that Article 281 permits States to agree to opt out of procedures entailing a binding

decision. That is only true, however, if the agreement excludes any further procedure beyond that agreed by the parties.
Moreover, an agreement opting out of procedures entailing a binding decision must contain a clear statement to that
effect.”
148WSS, para. 3.53.

149UNCLOS, Articles 74 (2) and 83 (2); South China Sea Arbitration: Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility
(Philippines v. China) P.C.A. 2016, paras. 344-352; North Sea Continental Shelf, (Federal Republic of Germany v.
Denmark/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp. 46-48, paras. 83-87; Fisheries Jurisdiction
(United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp. 31-32, paras. 73-75. - 62 -

Optional Clause reservation. Somalia’s only argument to the contrary is their “matching”

declarations under Article 36 (2). But there are in fact no “matching” declarations for all the

reasons we have set out. In those circumstances, there is no compulsory jurisdiction for Article 282

to affirm. Somalia’s attempt to reinterpret the MOU does not help. Even if we disregard the MOU

entirely, however, the fundamental point of my speech to you this morning has been that UNCLOS

Part XV provides  of itself  a clear and compelling reason for upholding Kenya’s Optional

Clause reservation by dismissing this case.

32. Mr. President, I would now ask you to invite Professor Lowe to the podium.

Le PRESIDENT : Merci. Je donne à présent la parole au professeur Lowe. Monsieur le

professeur, étant donné que les représentants du Kenya n’ont pu commencer à s’exprimer ce matin

que quelques minutes après le début de la présente audience, vous pourrez si vous le souhaitez et si

vous en avez besoin, déborder un peu au-delà de 13 heures. Vous devriez être à même de terminer

votre présentation autour de 13 h 05, n’est-ce pas ?

Mr. LOWE :

K ENYA ’SA RTICLE 36 (2) RESERVATION

I. Introduction

1. Thank you very much, Mr. President. I think it will be perfectly adequate to do that. I

should say that it is a privilege to appear before you and the Members of the Court and an honour

to have been entrusted with this part of the presentation of Kenya’s pleadings. I shall, however, for

the benefit of the translators drop one or two of the less necessary paragraphs of my speech as I go

through. My task is to close Kenya’s submissions and summarize the reasons why Somalia’s

Application falls squarely within Kenya’s reservation to its declaration accepting the jurisdiction of

the Court, so that there is no mutual consent to the jurisdiction of the Court and the case must be

dismissed. - 63 -

2. As the Court observed in the Spain v. Canada Fisheries Jurisdiction case: States make

reservations for a variety of reasons, and they are entitled to rely upon them and to have the Court

apply them irrespective of arguments over the merits of the case . 150

3. The Court said in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case that it is for each State, in formulating its

declaration, to decide upon the limits that it places upon its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the

Court. It said “[t]his jurisdiction only exists within the limits within which it has been accepted”,

and

“[c]onditions or reservations . . . do not by their terms derogate from a wider
acceptance already given. Rather, they operate to define the parameters of the State’s
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. There is thus no reason to
151
interpret them restrictively.”

II. Kenya’s declaration under Article 36 (2) of the Court’s Statute

4. Well, Kenya’s declaration under Article 36 (2) was made on 19 April 1965, a quarter of a

century before Kenya became bound by UNCLOS and by the 2009 MOU. [Slide 1]. The material

part of the declaration reads as follows:

“[t]he Government of the Republic of Kenya . . . accepts . . . as compulsory ipso facto
and without special Agreement, and on the basis and condition of reciprocity, the

jurisdiction over all disputes arising after 12th December, 1963, with regard to
situations or facts subsequent to that date, other than:

1. Disputes in regard to which the parties to the dispute have agreed or shall152
agree to have recourse to some other method or methods of settlement; . . .”

5. Well, Kenya’s reservation puts no limits on the methods to which the disputing Parties

may agree to have recourse, and is in that respect strikingly wider in its scope than the example of a
153
declaration set out in paragraph 29 of the Court’s Handbook on jurisdiction . One might say, in

the terms of Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, that the reservation excludes from the

Court’s jurisdiction disputes in regard to which the parties to the dispute have agreed or shall agree

15Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998,
pp. 455-456, paras. 54-56.

15Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 453,
para. 44.
152
Kenya’s Optional Clause Reservation under Art. 36 (2) of the ICJ Statute, 531 United Nations, Treaty Series
(UNTS) 113 (1965)
15ICJ, Handbook on accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: model clauses and

templates, p. 12/39. - 64 -

to have recourse to negotiation, or enquiry, or mediation, or conciliation, or arbitration, or judicial

settlement in a court other than the ICJ, or by resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or by any

other peaceful means of their own choice.

6. Well, The plain meaning of Kenya’s reservation is that if Kenya and Somalia have agreed

to have recourse to some other method or methods of settling the dispute over their maritime

boundaries, that agreement engages the reservation, and this Court, with respect, does not have

jurisdiction to settle that dispute.

7. Kenya says that there are two such agreements binding Kenya and Somalia.

III. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) of 7 April 2009

8. The first is the MOU of 7 April 2009. Professor Forteau and Mr. Khan took you through

that instrument. It is a written text, registered with the United Nations as a treaty. It was not made

subject to ratification or any other formalities. It entered into force immediately upon signature. It

has not been terminated in accordance with the Law of Treaties. It was and is legally binding. And

Somalia’s retrospective attempts to cancel its effect have no legal basis.

9. Somalia has retreated from its argument that the MOU has no legal force and the

disagreement now appears to be over the question whether it is an agreement “to have recourse to

some other method or methods” of settling the dispute over their maritime boundaries, within the

meaning of Kenya’s reservation.

10. Well, The term “method or methods” bears its ordinary meaning. Dictionary definitions

of the term “method” in English refer to a procedure or process for achieving something, a way of

approaching or going about some particular task. That is not controversial. The term “method” is

used in the context of international law interchangeably with the terms “mode” or “means” or

“procedure” for settling a dispute. And you will see that, for example, in the Handbook on the

Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Between States, prepared by the United Nations in 1992 . 154

11. And the “method” prescribed by the MOU is, as a first step, the reference to the

United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf  the “CLCS”  followed by

the making of recommendations by the CLCS on the outer limits of the continental shelf area to be

15http://www.un.org/law/books/HandbookOnPSD.pdf. See, e.g., paras. 135, 140-143, for examples of the
interchangeable use of these terms. - 65 -

delimited between the two States, and then followed by negotiation between the two States leading

to an agreed maritime boundary. [Slide 2].

“[D]elimitation of maritime boundaries in the areas under dispute . . . shall be
agreed between the two States on the basis of international law after the Commission
has concluded its examination of the separate submissions made by each of the two
coastal States and made its recommendations . . .” 155

The statement leaves no room for uncertainty as to its meaning.

12. That is not to say that there can be no discussions relating to maritime boundaries before

the CLCS issues its decision. Indeed, there have been such discussions. But the agreed procedure

is that the actual negotiation of the agreed boundary must come after the CLCS has made its

recommendations in respect of the claims made by Kenya and by Somalia.

13. And you will notice that emphatic temporal aspect  the duty to wait until after the

CLCS recommendation before finalizing the agreed boundary  is as an integral part of the agreed

procedure.

14. Well, Somalia accepts in its Written Statement that the negotiation of a boundary is a

“method” of dispute settlement. It says, in paragraph 3.72, that “[n]egotiations are one among

other possible methods” .156

15. Somalia’s argument is that it is not the exclusive method of dispute settlement. But

Professor Akhavan explained that what is important for Kenya’s reservation is not that Kenya and

Somalia agreed to an exclusive method of dispute settlement but that they agreed to “some other

method or methods”  a method or methods other than recourse to this Court.

16. Professor Akhavan also dealt with the argument that this only leaves some of the

maritime boundaries beyond the Court’s jurisdiction. He explained that the MOU was drawn up on

behalf of Somalia, in the context of Kenyan concerns about security and law enforcement along the

maritime boundary in the territorial sea and in the contiguous zone as well as in the continental

shelf and EEZ. The concern was with all maritime zones, from the seashore out as far as the outer

limits of continental shelf jurisdiction. And that is the concern that the MOU addressed. It refers

to “areas” in dispute in the plural, and to maritime “boundaries”, in the plural.

15Memorandum of Understanding Kenya–Somalia (MOU), 2599 UNTS 35 (2009), p. 38.

15Written Statement of Somalia on Kenya’s Preliminary Objections (WSS), 5 Feb. 2016, para. 3.72. - 66 -

17. What more can be said? The MOU is an agreement on a method of settlement for the

settlement of the dispute over the delimitation of maritime boundaries between Kenya and Somalia.

CLCS makes its recommendation. Then Kenya and Somalia finalize their negotiations over

boundaries, and that agreed method falls squarely within the terms of Kenya’s reservation, and

Somalia’s Application is therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Court. Kenya has not accepted the

Court’s jurisdiction over this dispute and, with respect, submits that the Court cannot decide this

dispute.

IV. UNCLOS Part XV

18. The second agreement between Kenya and Somalia is the United Nations Convention on

the Law of the Sea.

19. Even if the MOU did not exist, Somalia and Kenya are both bound by UNCLOS.

Professor Boyle explained the relevant UNCLOS provisions. Disputes concerning maritime

boundaries are subject to the mandatory dispute settlement procedures of UNCLOS Part XV, in

accordance with UNCLOS Articles 279 and 286. This dispute is accordingly one “in regard to

which the parties to the dispute have agreed … to have recourse to some other method or methods

of settlement”  the UNCLOS Part XV methods  to use the words of Kenya’s reservation again.

20. UNCLOS Article 280 says that States Parties may agree on means for settling disputes;

and Article 281 says that if they have agreed on methods of dispute settlement, then UNCLOS

Part XV applies only if the agreed methods do not produce a settlement and the agreement does not

exclude any further procedure.

21. Article 282 of UNCLOS says that if the parties to a dispute agree upon a procedure

entailing a binding decision, that procedure applies in lieu of UNCLOS Part XV, and Somalia

suggests that the Parties have somehow “agreed” to refer cases to the ICJ: but as Professor Boyle

explained Somalia and Kenya have not “agreed”: they do not have “convergent Optional Clause

157
declarations” .

22. So the logic is inescapable. The MOU either is such an agreement on the settlement of

the dispute between the Parties, or it is not. If, as Kenya says, it is such an agreement, then it must

15WSS, 5 Feb. 2016, para. 3.75. - 67 -

be followed; and the MOU puts the dispute outside the Court’s jurisdiction because of Kenya’s

reservation, consistently with UNCLOS Articles 280 and 281.

23. If, on the other hand, the MOU is not an agreement within the terms of UNCLOS

Articles 280 and 281, then the MOU can be no impediment to the application of UNCLOS

Part XV. The UNCLOS Part XV procedures, agreed and binding between Kenya and Somalia,

would accordingly be applicable to this dispute, and UNCLOS would put the dispute outside this

Court’s jurisdiction because of the terms of Kenya’s reservation to its ICJ declaration.

Professor Boyle explained that UNCLOS Article 286 is mandatory. It says that any

unresolved dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention shall be

submitted to “the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under [section 2 of UNCLOS Part XV]”.

24. Kenya and Somalia could have given jurisdiction to the ICJ for this purpose, making it

the “relevant court”, if both of them had made a declaration to that effect under UNCLOS

Article 287. But both Kenya and Somalia have chosen not to give this Court jurisdiction over such

disputes under UNCLOS Part XV, but to allow such disputes to go to other fora.

25. They have agreed to have recourse to a method of settlement other than recourse to this

Court because UNCLOS Part XV falls squarely within the terms of Kenya’s reservation to the

Court’s jurisdiction.

V. Conclusion

26. So, in conclusion, the result is either, as Kenya says, the jurisdiction of this Court is

excluded by the procedure agreed in the MOU or, if for some reason that were not the case, the

jurisdiction of the Court would be excluded by the procedure agreed in UNCLOS Part XV.

Mr. President, Members of the Court, the need for this hearing has arisen only because Somalia, in

its Application, ignored the terms of the agreements that it had made for the settlement of maritime

boundary disputes with Kenya. But Somalia has no right to ignore those terms. Kenya may, and

does, rely upon the terms of its declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction, and Kenya will

follow the procedure that has been agreed for the settlement of this dispute; and that procedure is

one that Somalia has already agreed will operate outside the doors of this Court. - 68 -

27. Mr. President, unless there is anything else with which I can assist the Court, that brings

my submission and Kenya’s submissions in this first round to a close.

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le professeur. Voilà en effet qui met un terme

au premier tour de plaidoiries du Kenya. La Cour se réunira de nouveau demain mardi à 10 heures

pour entendre la Somalie en son premier tour de plaidoiries.

L’audience est levée à 13 h 5.

___________