Non corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2011/17
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2011
Public sitting
held on Monday 12 September 2011, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada presiding,
in the case concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State
(Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2011
Audience publique
tenue le lundi 12 septembre 2011, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
en l’affaire relative aux Immunités juridictionnelles de l’Etat
(Allemagne c. Italie ; Grèce (intervenant))
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presdenkta
Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Judge ad hoc Gaja
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
viceMpra,ident
KoMroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Crinçade
Yusuf
Greenwood
XuMe mes
Dojnogshue,
jugeGaja,. ad hoc
Cgoffrerr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is represented by:
H.E.MsSusanne Wasum-Rainer, Ambassador, Di rector-General for Legal Affairs and Legal
Adviser, Federal Foreign Office,
H.E.Mr.Heinz-Peter Behr, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
Mr.ChristianTomuschat, former Member and Ch airman of the International Law Commission,
Professor emeritus of Public International Law at the Humboldt University of Berlin,
as Agents;
Mr. Andrea Gattini, Professor of Public International Law at the University of Padua,
Mr. Robert Kolb, Professor of Public International Law at the University of Geneva,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Guido Hildner, Head of the Public International Law Division, Federal Foreign Office,
Mr. Götz Schmidt-Bremme, Head of the Internati onal Civil, Trade and Tax Law Division, Federal
Foreign Office,
Mr.FelixNeumann, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr. Gregor Schotten, Federal Foreign Office,
Mr.Klaus Keller, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
MsSusanneAchilles, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Donate Arz von Straussenburg, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Kingdom
of the Netherlands,
as Advisers;
Ms Fiona Kaltenborn,
as Assistant. - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la République fédérale d’Allemagne est représenté par :
S. Exc. Mme Susanne Wasum-Rainer, ambassadeur, directeur général des affaires juridiques et
conseiller juridique du ministère fédéral des affaires étrangères,
S. Exc. M. Heinz-Peter Behr, ambassadeur de la République fédérale d’Allemagne auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Christian Tomuschat, ancien membre et président de la Commission du droit international,
professeur émérite de droit international public à l’Université Humboldt de Berlin,
comme agents ;
M. Andrea Gattini, professeur de droit international public à l’Université de Padoue,
M. Robert Kolb, professeur de droit international public à l’Université de Genève,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Guido Hildner, chef de la division du droit inte rnational public au ministère fédéral des affaires
étrangères,
M. Götz Schmidt-Bremme, chef de la division du droit international en matière civile, commerciale
et fiscale au ministère fédéral des affaires étrangères,
M. Felix Neumann, ambassade de la République fédérale d’Allemagne au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Gregor Schotten, ministère fédéral des affaires étrangères,
M. Klaus Keller, ambassade de la République fédérale d’Allemagne au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
MmeSusanneAchilles, ambassade de la République fédérale d’Allemagne au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
Mme Donate Arz von Straussenburg, ambassade de la République fédérale d’Allemagne au
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers ;
Mme Fiona Kaltenborn,
commaessistante. - 6 -
The Government of the Italian Republic is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Paolo Pucci di Benisichi, Ambassador and State Counsellor,
as Agent;
Mr. Giacomo Aiello, State Advocate,
H.E. Mr. Franco Giordano, Ambassador of the Italian Republic to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agents;
Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professor of International Law, University of Florence,
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor of International Law, Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, Geneva, and University of Paris II (Panthéon-Assas),
Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Associate Professor of International Law, University of Macerata,
Mr.SalvatoreZappalà, Professor of International Law, University of Catania, Legal Adviser,
Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr.GiorgioMarrapodi, Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of the Service for Legal Affairs, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs,
Mr.GuidoCerboni, Minister Plenipotentiary, Co-ordinator for the countries of Central and
Western Europe, Directorate-General for the European Union, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Roberto Bellelli, Legal Adviser, Embassy of Italy in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Sarah Negro, First Secretary, Embassy of Italy in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Mel Marquis, Professor of Law, European University Institute, Florence,
Ms Francesca De Vittor, International Law Researcher, University of Macerata,
as Advisers. - 7 -
Le Gouvernement de la République italienne est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Paolo Pucci di Benisichi, ambassadeur et conseiller d’Etat,
comme agent ;
M. Giacomo Aiello, avocat de l’Etat,
S. Exc. M. Franco Giordano, ambassadeur de la République italienne auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme coagents ;
M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Florence,
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur de droit international à l’Institu t universitaire de hautes études
internationales et du développement de Genève et à l’Université de Paris II (Panthéon-Assas),
M. Paolo Palchetti, professeur associé de droit international à l’Université de Macerata,
M.SalvatoreZappalà, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Catane, conseiller
juridique à la mission permanente de l’Italie auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M.GiorgioMarrapodi, ministre plénipotentiaire, chef du département juridique du ministère des
affaires étrangères,
M.GuidoCerboni, ministre plénipotentiaire, coordinateur pour les pays d’Europe centrale et
occidentale à la direction générale de l’Union européenne au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Roberto Bellelli, conseiller juridique à l’ambassade d’Italie au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Sarah Negro, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade d’Italie au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Mel Marquis, professeur de droit à l’Institut universitaire européen de Florence,
Mme Francesca De Vittor, chercheur en droit international à l’Université de Macerata,
comme conseillers. - 8 -
The Government of the Hellenic Republic is represented by:
Mr.Stelios Perrakis, Professor of International and European Institutions, Panteion University of
Athens,
as Agent;
H.E.Mr.Ioannis Economides, Ambassador of the Hellenic Republic to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Deputy-Agent;
Mr.Antonis Bredimas, Professor of International Law, National and Kapodistrian University of
Athens,
as Counsel and Advocate;
Ms Maria-Daniella Marouda, Lecturer in International Law, Panteion University of Athens,
as Counsel. - 9 -
Le Gouvernement de la République hellénique est représenté par :
M.SteliosPerrakis, professeur des institutions in ternationales et européennes à l’Université
Panteion d’Athènes,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Ioannis Economides, ambassadeur de la République hellénique auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme agent adjoint ;
M.AntonisBredimas, professeur de droit internatio nal à l’Université nationale et capodistrienne
d’Athènes,
comme conseil et avocat ;
Mme Maria-Daniella Marouda, maître de conférences en droit international à l’Université Panteion
d’Athènes,
comme conseil. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open.
The Court meets today for the start of one week’s hearings in the case concerning
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening).
I recall that, since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of Italian nationality, Italy
exercised its right under Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the
case: it chose Mr. Giorgio Gaja.
Article 20 of the Statute provides: “Every Member of the Court shall, before taking up his
duties, make a solemn declaration in open court that he will exercise his powers impartially and
conscientiously.” Pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 6, of the Statute, that same provision applies to
judges ad hoc. Although Mr.Gaja has already served as a judge ad hoc and made a solemn
declaration in previous cases, Article8, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court provides that he must
make a further solemn declaration in the present case.
In accordance with custom, I shall first say a few words about the career and qualifications
of Mr. Gaja before inviting him to make his solemn declaration.
Mr. Giorgio Gaja, of Italian nationality, is Pr ofessor at the Faculty of Law of the University
of Florence and a former Dean of that Faculty. He has held numerous other teaching posts around
the world including at the European University Institute and the University of Paris I, and has also
lectured at The Hague Academy of International Law. Mr.Gaja has been a Member of the
International Law Commission since 1999 and is a me mber of the Institut de droit international.
He was counsel to the Italian Government before the Court in the Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI)
case and has sat as judge ad hoc in a number of other cases, namely, the case concerning Legality of
Use of Force involving Serbia and Montenegro and Italy, the case concerning Maritime
Delimitation between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea , the case concerning
Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaraguaand Colombia and the case concerning
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (preliminary objections phase) between Georgia and the Russian Federation.
I shall now invite Mr.Gaja to make the sole mn declaration prescribed by the Statute and I
request all those present to rise. Mr. Gaja. - 11 -
M.GAJA: «Je déclare solennellement que j’exercerai tous mes devoirs et attributions de
juge en tout honneur et dévouement, en pleine et parfaite impartialité et en toute conscience.»
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Judge Gaja. Please be seated. I take note of the solemn
declaration made by Mr.Giorgio Gaja and declare him duly installed as judge ad hoc in the case
concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening).
*
I shall now recall the principal steps of the procedure so far followed in this case.
On 23December 2008, Federal Republic of Germ any filed in the Registry of the Court an
Application instituting proceedings against the Ita lian Republic in respect of a dispute originating
in “violations of obligations under internationa l law” allegedly committed by Italy through its
judicial practice “in that it has failed to respect the jurisdictional
immunity which... Germany
enjoys under international law”.
As a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, Ge rmany, in its Application, invoked Article 1 of
the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of 29 April 1957.
By an Order of 29 April 2009, the Court fixed 23 June 2009 as the time-limit for the filing of
the Memorial of Germany and 23December 2009 as the time-limit for the filing of the
Counter-Memorial of Italy; those pleadings were duly filed within the time-limits so prescribed.
The Counter-Memorial of Italy included a counter-claim “with respect to the question of the
reparation owed to Italian victims of grave violations of international humanitarian law committed
by forces of the German Reich”.
By an Order of 6 July 2010, the Court decide d that the counter-claim presented by Italy was
inadmissible as such, under Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court. By the same Order, the
Court authorized Germany to submit a Reply and Italy to submit a Rejoinder, and fixed
14 October 2010 and 14 January 2011 respectively as the time-limits for the filing of those
pleadings; those pleadings were duly filed within the time-limits so prescribed.
On 13 January 2011, Greece filed in the Registry an Application for permission to intervene
in the case pursuant to Article 62 of the Statute. In its Application, Greece stated, in particular, that - 12 -
“its intention [was] to solely intervene in the aspect of the procedure relating to judgments rendered
by its own (domestic-Greek) Tribunals and Courts on occurrences during World War II and
enforced... by the Italian Courts”. In its Application, Greece further indicated that it “[did] not
seek to become a party to the case”.
By an Order of 4July2011 the Court, considering that Greece had sufficiently established
that “it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the judgment that the Court will
hand down in the main proceedings”, authorized it to intervene in the case as a non-party. The
Court further fixed the following time-limits for the filing of the written statement and the written
observations referred to in Article 85, paragraph1, of the Rules of Court, namely, 5August2011
for the written statement of Greece and 5 September 2011 for the written observations of Germany
and Italy on that statement.
The written statement of Greece and the writte n observations of Germany were duly filed
within the time-limits so fixed. By a letter dated 1September2011, the Agent of Italy indicated
that the Italian Republic would not be presenting observations on the written statement of Greece at
that stage of the proceedings, but reserved “its pos ition and right to address certain points raised in
the written statement, as necessary, in the course of the oral proceedings”.
*
Having ascertained the views of the Parties, the Court decided, pursuant to Article53,
paragraph 2, of its Rules, that copies of the pl eadings and the documents annexed would be made
accessible to the public on the opening of the oral proceedings. After consulting the Parties and
Greece, the Court has decided to do the same with the written statement of the intervening State
and the written observations of Germany on that statement. Further, in accordance with the Court’s
practice, the pleadings without their annexes will be put on the Court’s website from today.
* - 13 -
I note the presence at the hearing of the Agents, counsel and advocates of the two Parties and
of Greece. In accordance with the arrangements on the organization of th e procedure which have
been declared by the Court, the hearings will co mprise a first and a second round of oral argument
by the Parties and a single round of oral observati ons by Greece with respect to the subject-matter
of its intervention. Germany will present its fi rst round of oral argument this morning and Italy
will do so tomorrow morning, with each Party having a maximum speaking time of three hours.
Greece will take the floor after the first round of oral argument by the Parties, on Wednesday
14 September, between 10 a.m. and 12 noon, to give its oral observations on the subject-matter of
its intervention. The Parties will then present th eir second round of oral argument, with Germany
addressing the Court on Thursday 15 September, between 10 a.m. and 12.30 p.m., and Italy on
Friday 16 September, between 2.30 p.m. and 5 p.m. Let me recall that the Parties have been given
additional time for their second round of oral argum ent in order to present their observations with
respect to the subject-matter of the intervention.
*
Germany, which will be heard first, may, if so required, in this first sitting of the first round
of oral argument, avail itself of a short extension of time beyond 1 p.m., in view of the time taken
up by my introductory words. I now give the floor to Her Excellency Ms Susanne Wasum-Rainer
to take the floor.
WMAsSUM-RAINER:
1. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, as Legal Adviser of the German
Federal Foreign Office it is a great honour to appear before you in these oral proceedings
concerning the case on Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, submitted to you by my country.
We are here to obtain a ruling of this Court on legal issues of great significance, not only for
the immediate parties to this dispute, but for the international legal order as a whole and its future
development.
We request a ruling on the principle of State immunity, a pillar of present-day substantive
international law. - 14 -
This pillar derives from the principle of s overeign equality of States, as enshrined in
Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the Un ited Nations, a principle that has for centuries been
deeply rooted in customary international law.
Central to the principle of State immunity is that of jurisdictional immunity which, of course,
debars private parties from bringing suits before th e courts of a forum State against another State
for its acts iure imperii.
2. Germany’s sovereign right of jurisdictional immunity has been infringed by a series of
judgments by Italian courts.
These judgments were rendered in proceedings that had been instituted against Germany by
individuals who had suffered injury as a consequence of World War II.
Contrary to international law, these claims we re not dismissed by the Italian national courts
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in respect of acta iure imperii performed by the German
armed forces and other Third Reich authorities.
The Italian Court of Cassation (Corte di Cassazione), expressly acknowledging its wish to
develop the law and to base its decision on a rule “in formation”, failed to act in compliance with
existing international law. It insisted that German y had forfeited its immunity by applying its new
doctrine to occurrences dating back more than 60 years.
The Italian Government a ttempted to persuade the Corte di Cassazione that it should
abandon its erroneous course, but could not reverse that strain of jurisprudence.
3. Thus, both our Governments, Italian and German, are of the view that only an
authoritative finding of this Court will lead out of the impasse and “will help to clarify this
complex issue”, as it was put by our two Foreign Ministers in their Joint Declaration of
18 November 2008.
As fellow founding members of the European Union, Germany and Italy co-operate closely
on many European and international issues. Ou r bilateral relationship is excellent and well
established. Germany and Italy are united in th eir commitment to the ideals of reconciliation,
solidarity and integration.
4. It is in this spirit of co-operation that we have examined the horrific incidents that
occurred during World WarII. Our two Foreign Ministries, for example, have established an - 15 -
Independent German-Italian Commission of Historians which is to deal openly and in detail with
the German-Italian war past and the fate of Italia n military internees, as “a contribution to creating
a common culture of remembrance”. This Commission began its work in March 2009.
Mr.President, allow me to repeat the word s of our Foreign Ministers in their Joint
Declaration, words which deserve to be underlined at the beginning of our present hearing:
“[T]ogetwIityr,mauny lly acknowledges the untold suffering
inflicted on Italian men and women in pa rticular during mass acres and on Italian
military internees, and keeps alive the memory of these terrible events.”
5. The democratic Germany which emerged after the end of the Nazi dictatorship has
consistently expressed its deepest regret over the egregious violations of international humanitarian
law perpetrated by German forces and fully ac knowledges the suffering inflicted on the Italian
people during the period from September 1943 until the liberation of Italy in May 1945.
In this context, the German Government has, in co-operation with the Italian Government,
made a number of gestures to reach out to the victims and their families.
In particular, Germany concluded the tw o agreements of 2June1961 under which
considerable payments were made to Italy, notw ithstanding Italy’s explicit waiver of all claims
against Germany in the Peace Treaty with the victorious Allied Powers in 1947.
The political gestures include the joint visit of the Foreign Ministers Steinmeier and Frattini
to the memorial site of the former concentration camp at “La Risiera di San Sabba” near Trieste in
November 2008, where the German-Italian Commission of Historians was founded.
Recently, in October 2010, the members of the Historians Commission visited the forced
labour camp at Niederschöneweide ⎯ close to Berlin ⎯ where a large number of Italian military
internees were held.
This visit was co-ordinated by the German Federal Foreign Office and the Italian Embassy in
Berlin.
A. The facts
6. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, please allow me to recall the facts of
the case before you in order to prepare the ground for the detailed legal argument. - 16 -
The case started in 2004 with the famous Ferrini decision of the Italian Court of Cassation.
Here, the Corte di Cassazione held that Italian courts had jurisdiction to hear a claim directed
against Germany for acta iure imperii.
The plaintiff was an Italian citizen who ha d been deported to Germany during the Second
World War to perform forced labour. Germany had invoked the principle of State immunity before
the Italian courts, but the argument was not heeded.
At that time, in 2004, it was not yet clear if this would remain an isolated case or herald a
new trend.
In the aftermath of the ruling, however, many other cases were filed by Italian citizens who
suffered the same plight of forced labour in Germany.
7. Four years later, in 2008, several decisions by the Italian Court of Cassation (Corte di
Cassazione) confirmed the approach taken in the Ferrini case, ruling that the Italian courts had
jurisdiction to hear cases ag ainst Germany for her acts jure imperii . The facts of these cases were
similar to those of Ferrini.
In short, in its Orders of 29May2008 in the Maietta and the Mantelli cases, the Corte di
Cassazione held that immunity of foreign States for acts jure imperii could be deemed to have been
abrogated with respect to acts which qualify as crimes against humanity.
8. Such cases brought by Italians who were deported to Germany and subsequently subjected
to forced labour are only one subset of proceedings brought against Germany.
Another set of cases pertains to massacres committed by the German Wehrmacht, the armed
forces, in Italy. One case in point is the Milde case, in which the Corte di Cassazione in a
judgment of 21 October 2008 again decided that Germany was not entitled to invoke immunity.
9. A third subset of cases concerns attempts undertaken in Italy to enforce a decision by a
Greek court.
In 1995, the relatives of the victims of a massacre perpetrated by the German armed forces in
Distomo, Greece, filed a claim for compensation against Germany.
In 1997, a regional court in Livadia held Germany liable, despite the principle of State
immunity, and, on 4 May 2000, the Greek Areios Pagos (Hellenic Supreme Court) confirmed this
decision. - 17 -
Upon the refusal of the Minister of Justice of Greece to authorize enforcement action in
Greece against German property, the claimants sought other avenues to obtain satisfaction.
After Ferrini, in 2004, Italy seemed to be a promising option. Indeed, the Court of Appeal
of Florence declared the Distomo decision enforceable in Italy on 2 May 2005.
This is where we stand today.
I should like to add that these proceedings and their outcome have not remained unnoticed.
Far from it. Many more cases have been filed before Italian courts and are still pending. The total
of cases currently reached is about 80 court cases pending, with almost 500 plaintiffs.
B. Consequences of the jurisprudence of the Corte di Cassazione
10. The jurisprudence of the Italian Corte di Cassazione and its retrospective denial of
sovereign immunity ⎯ if allowed to stand ⎯ would have far-reaching consequences.
Once an exception to the principle of State immunity is allowed, it will not be possible to
limit such exceptions to breaches of international humanitarian law. It will just be a matter of time
until other areas of jure imperii-behaviour are judged by domestic courts.
But the basis for State immunity is not to be found in the character of the legal norm which
was allegedly violated, but in the character of the act as a State act which can, by its very nature,
not be subject to the jurisdiction of another State.
Therefore, once State immunity has been pe rforated there is no reason not to extend the
exceptions to a range of other areas.
The consequences would be severe:
Firstly, the whole system set up after the Second World War to address injuries caused by
the war, which was the basis for comprehensiv e payments and reparations, would be put in
question and opened to challenge before the domestic courts.
This would of course not only affect acts of German officials, but also acts of all other
participants of the war, Germany’s allies ⎯ like Italy ⎯ and opponents alike.
Secondly, all inter-State peace settlements conc luded after an armed conflict would be put
into jeopardy by allowing the domestic courts to re-examine and to reopen them. This would apply - 18 -
not only to peace settlements following past conflic ts. Efforts to reach peace settlements in the
future would also be affected as their validity and reliability would be more than questionable.
Thirdly, the international legal order would be seriously weakened.
If domestic courts were able to pronounce j udgment on foreign States, this could result in
divergent, if not contradictory decisions. Plaintiffs would shop around for the most favourable
national courts.
As a matter of fact, the case before you illu strates how realistic the scenario of forum
shopping already is. The jurisprudence of the Italian Corte di Cassazione has attracted Greek
claimants who were unsuccessful in Greece because of State immunity ⎯ and the Corte di
Cassazione ordered execution on German State property in their favour even though the case had
no connection with Italy.
As a result of such undermining of the principl e of State immunity, legal proceedings before
the courts would not settle disputes but would instead create new disputes and legal disorder.
If the national courts of all States were free to sit in judgment on the acts of foreign States,
international law would be atomized and, of cour se, politicized. It would lose its character as an
impartial balancing of interests and, thus, its authority.
11. Mr.President, this is the crux of this case. What this case is not about, is the Second
World War, violations of international hum anitarian law committed during the war and the
question of reparations. You have confirmed this with your Order of 6 July last year rejecting the
Italian counter-claim as inadmissible.
12. Mr.President, most horrendous crimes were committed by Germans during World
War II.
Germany is fully aware of her responsibility in this regard.
Those crimes were unique, as were the instruments and mechanisms for compensation and
reparation ⎯ financially, politically and otherwise ⎯ set up and implemented by Germany since
the end of the war.
We cannot undo history. If victims or desce ndants of victims feel that these mechanisms
were not sufficient, we do regret this. - 19 -
However, the mechanisms for compensation and reparation are not the subject of the present
dispute.
C. The German team
13. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, our legal arguments will be
presented in detail by my academic colleagues.
With your permission, Mr. President, I would like to introduce them:
⎯ Professor Christian Tomuschat, former member and Chairman of the International Law
Commission, Professor emeritus of Humboldt University Berlin;
⎯ Professor Andrea Gattini from the University of Padua; and, next,
⎯ Professor Robert Kolb from the University of Geneva.
D. Line of argument
14. Let me now indicate how we will structure our presentation.
Firstly, ProfessorTomuschat will analyse the shortcomings of the Ferrini decision of the
Corte di Cassazione in 2004. He will underscore that the Corte di Cassazione overstepped its
judicial role by trying to rewrite and to develop international law.
He will also prove that State immunity for acts jure imperii does not yield any exception.
15. Thereafter, ProfessorGattini will dwell upon the tort exception in the law of State
immunity as the Italian argument tries to rely on this exception to justify the Court’s “innovative”
approach.
Professor Gattini will demonstrate that this tort exception does not apply to the conduct of
armed forces in the course of an armed conflict and, therefore, is of no avail here.
He will then turn to a second line of argument, brought forward by our distinguished Italian
colleagues in their written submissions, whic h could be called the “necessity argument”.
ProfessorGattini will show that this argumen t, according to which the Italian courts had to act in
this way out of necessity, is erroneous.
16. Next, Professor Kolb will address two further aspects of our case:
He will first examine the character of jus cogens, a concept upon which Italy relies heavily
and will demonstrate that the Italian use of jus cogens for its line of argument is misleading. - 20 -
He will then set out the consequences of the judgment of the Italian Corte di Cassazione. As
I mentioned earlier, your ruling in this case is liable to have repercussions far beyond Germany and
Italy. Professor Kolb will highlight the impact it could have in various fields, ranging from the
destabilization of peace agreements to giving incentives for forum shopping.
17. Finally, I will conclude Germany’s pleadings with a very brief summary of the most
important aspects of our argument.
Mr.President, I respectfully ask you to give the floor to my distinguished colleague,
Professor Christian Tomuschat.
The PRESIDENT: I thank AmbassadorMsSusanne Wasum-Rainer for her statement. I
now call to the floor Professor Dr. Christian Tomuschat.
TMOM. USCHAT:
A. Introduction
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, Germany appears today before you in
a dispute that can only be resolved by a pronouncem ent of the world’s highest judicial body. The
background of this case is well known to you. Its main features were reiterated a few moments ago
by Dr.Wasum-Rainer. Obviously, a negotiated se ttlement might have been preferable. But the
Italian Government has been unable to issue a ca ll for order to its courts, in particular the
Corte di Cassazione. Under the rule of law, courts are independent and cannot be made to obey
orders imparted to them by the executive branch of government. They are subject only to the law.
In practice, this means that they follow the law as they perceive and interpret it. In Italy, the
general rules of international law pertain also to the body of law which is domestically applicable.
Article 10 (1) of the Constitution provides explicitly that “the Italian legal system conforms to the
generally recognized principles of international law”. Thus, in principle decisions of Italian courts
should never have given rise to complaints that the sovereign rights of another State were
encroached upon. Unfortunately, th is has been and still is the case, however, to the detriment of
Germany. - 21 -
B. The defects of the Ferrini jurisprudence of the Italian Corte di Cassazione
I. Assumption of a political role as legislator
2. In the famous Ferrini case 1 referred to a moment ago, the Corte di Cassazione departed
deliberately from well-established rules of cust omary international la w by denying Germany
jurisdictional immunity although acts jure imperii were in issue. Already in that first judgment, it
acknowledged openly that it was intent on creating a new rule, feeling that the traditional rule was
inopportune as being inconsistent with b asic values of the international community 2. In fact, the
Corte di Cassazione was not able to indicate a single judicial decision supporting its stance, apart
3
from the earlier judgment of the Greek Areios Pagos in the Distomo case , overruled two years
later by Greece’s Constitutional Court in the Margellos case 4, and a number of United States
judgments based on the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which is not of any
relevance in the present context. In f act, in a series of later decisions the Corte di Cassazione
manifested even more openly that it saw its judici al mandate as including the task of basically
reforming the régime of jurisdictional immunity in light of requirements of justice and good order
in international relations. It did not hide this intention but said with missionary zeal that it: “is
aware that it is contributing to the emergence of a formative rule concerning the immunity of a
foreign State” 5, which it saw already “implicit in the system of international law”. In other words,
the Corte di Cassazione wished to bring about change, unilaterally, without taking due note of the
facts of international practice and jurispruden ce where similar lines of reasoning had nowhere
found acceptance.
3. First of all, it is a truism to state that domestic judges are not called upon to amend and
change international law. Their true mandate is to apply the law conscientiously and objectively.
Private, subjective preferences and wishes should not determine the substance of a decision which
the judge is entrusted with giving. It is certainly true that international law is not a static body of
law. Many times, domestic courts have paved the way for the development of rules of international
1Judgment of 11 March 2004, ILR 128, p. 658.
2
Ibid., p. 665, para. 7.
3
Judgment of 4 May 2000, ILR 129, p. 513.
4Judgment of 17 September 2002, ILR 129, p. 526.
5Order of 29 May 2008; Memorial of Germany, Ann. 13, p. 7. - 22 -
law, in particular in the field of State immunity. But as a rule they have given expression to broad
trends and tendencies and current s emerging from the relevant actors in international relations.
Thus, in the United Kingdom the Trendtex judgment 6, where for the first time, under the authority
of LordDenning, a suit against a foreign governme ntal agency was declared admissible, came
about at the end of a long chain of precedentia l developments characterized by broad political
support. Judges cannot be front-runners, they have no mandate to act as legislative bodies with a
view to promoting political goals. International law derives its authority from consensus in the
international community. Rightly, Article38 of the Statute of the Court provides that customary
rules are based on “a general practice accepted as law”. International law would fall into an
anarchic state of disorder if any person handling i ssues of international law could lightly claim that
a given rule should be discarded because it did not fit into a system whose paramount values are
peace and justice. It is indeed practice wh ich moves forward under the impact of these key
concepts which provide guidelines for all actions and activities in international relations. However,
some consolidation is necessary. By contrast, the Corte di Cassazione went ahead with a bolt of
lightning, sending out a cry to all other nations that its views should be followed and supported.
Nothing of that kind has happened. More than seven years after its revolutionary Ferrini
judgment ⎯ we abstain from calling it “ground-breaking”⎯ the Corte di Cassazione still stands in
isolation ⎯ or, put more drastically, in splendid isolation.
4. It is the great advantage of case law th at the judges concentrate on the individual case
pending before them. They try their best to do justice to the litigant parties. The specificities of the
case at hand are meticulously examined. As it appear s, this was also the general approach of the
judges of Italy’s highest court in civil matters in Ferrini and later similar proceedings. They took
note of the suffering of the claimant, which is uncontested, but not bothering to inquire into the
reasons underlying the rule of State immunity whic h they considered to be a pure technicality, and
disregarding the systemic consequences of their jurisprudence.
6
Court of Appeal, ILR 64, p. 111; ILM 16, 1977, p. 471. - 23 -
II. No automatic link between substantive and procedural law
5. First, not a single word was spent on whether it corresponds to consistent logic to infer
from the gravity of a breach of international law, a breach of substantive law, that domestic judges
should be entitled to adjudicate private claims fo r reparation. Primary rules of conduct and the
relevant rules of secondary law governing the procedural consequences must be carefully
distinguished. This Court has consistently held that arguments derived from an alleged breach of
obligations erga omnes or rules of jus cogens do not alter the principle of consent which is
fundamental for peaceful settlement of international disputes. Referring to its judgment in the East
Timor case, it held again in its decision in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New
Application: 2002) that “the fact that a dispute relat es to compliance with a norm having such a
character... cannot of itself provide a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain that
dispute” ( Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 32, para. 64; see also, p. 35, para. 78; p. 52,
para. 125).
6. This is a fundamental proposition of the inte rnational law of the current epoch, which is
generally heeded today. Thus, most recently, Ge orgia took care to base its application against the
Russian Federation on the jurisdictional clause in Article 22 of CERD, reserving the right to invoke
as an alternative Article IX of the Genocide Convention 7. No attempt was made to rely directly on
the alleged massive violations of human rights by Russian military forces. Even where serious
charges are brought against another State, the ways and means of peaceful settlement are not
predetermined. States decide freely on what m odalities they consider appropriate and suitable.
Both litigants, the applicant and the respondent party, must be in agreement. Even a State that has
allegedly ⎯ or even admittedly ⎯ committed serious breaches of international human rights law
and international humanitarian law is still a sovereign State that does not suffer any forfeiture of its
prerogatives under international law. Article 2 (3 ) of the United Nations Charter does not impose
any specific modality of addressing the consequences of an internationally wrongful act. Only the
Security Council has the power to impose partic ular ways and means of providing reparation,
which it did in a particularly conspicuous manne r when, dealing with Iraq’s responsibility for the
invasion of Kuwait, it determined that the aggressor country was
7Case concerning Application of the International Conventioon the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Judgment of 1 April 2011, para. 1. - 24 -
“liable under international law for any direct loss, damage ⎯ including environmental
damage and the depletion of natural res ources or injury to foreign Governments,
nationals and corporations as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation of
Kuwait” .8
7. The same reasons, i.e., no direct infere nce from a breach of substantive law to the
available remedies, apply with even greater weig ht where an attempt is made to suggest that
domestic judges should assume the responsibility for th e settlement of an international dispute.
Obviously, the ICJ enjoys the highest degree of c onfidence and trustworthiness in the international
arena. Its impartiality and objectiveness are beyond any challenge. Unfortunately, the same cannot
be said of domestic judges even when, according to their sincere beliefs and convictions, they
attempt to act without the least prejudice or bias. Institutionally, they are by necessity a component
element of the governmental structure of the country in whose name they deliver judgment. They
have lived their professional lives in the environment of their specific legal culture. International
law is not their main field of expertise. Additionally, they are invariably exposed to the climate
and the pressures of their national constituencies. The public at large generally expects that a judge
called upon to make determin ations in a dispute confronting the claimant with a foreign State will
resolutely defend the perceived national interest.
8. All this is not meant to convey the messag e that domestic judges will never be able to
issue correct rulings in instances where a case has some confrontational aspects, opposing the home
State of the judge to a foreign State. But it is abundantly clear that a domestic judge is not
endowed, from an institutional viewpoint, with the same guarantees of neutrality and objectivity as
an international judge, in particular the bench of the ICJ. Accordingly, since the institutional logic
of international law denies even the jurisdiction of the ICJ where allegations of a breach of
obligations erga omnes or rules of jus cogens are in issue, there is even less justification for
affirming the jurisdiction of domestic courts in instances where such charg es are to be addressed.
Thus, to jump from the assertion that an international crime has been committed to the conclusion
that, in derogation from the traditional principle of jurisdictional immunity in respect of acts jure
imperii, national judges are entitled to assume jurisdiction, is an arbitrary leap, which has no legal
8
Resolution 687 (1991), para. 16. - 25 -
basis whatsoever. More arguments on this point will be presented somewhat later by my colleague
Robert Kolb.
III. Disregard of the systemic context
9. One specific aspect, however, should be highlighted already at this early stage of
Germany’s pleadings. For a national judge adjudi cating a dispute between two private parties it
may be sufficient just to scrutinize the particular facts of the case and to engage in a balancing
process which takes into account no more than, and solely, the interests of the litigant parties as
they have emerged in the course of the proceedings. However, the Corte di Cassazione pleads for
a systemic change in the way international law operates. It was just pointed out that the proposition
on which the Ferrini judgment is based overthrows the principle of consent which lies at the heart
of international dispute settlement. Unilateral se lf-help is not condoned by international law as it
applies between sovereign States. In practice, the opinion of the Corte di Cassazione would mean
that, after an armed conflict during which international crimes were perpetrated, each side involved
could make authoritative determinations on the torts allegedly attributable to the adversary. This
consequence conflicts with the key principles of jus contra bellum and jus in bello. The parties to
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 have carefully avoided providing for the jurisdiction of the
ICJ in respect of such disputes. They agreed th at authors of “grave breaches” should be punished,
establishing for that purpose even the principle of universal jurisdiction. Otherwise, however, in
procedural terms the main achievement was in 1977 the establishment of the International
Fact-Finding Commission pursuant to Article90 of Additional Protocol I. This Commission,
although it became operative in 1991, has hitherto not been entrusted once with investigating
charges that grave breaches were committed dur ing a conflict. This observation shows
unequivocally that the taking of appropriate procedur al steps after an armed conflict is considered
by States to be within the exclusive realm of th eir decision-making power. And indeed it is trivial
to state that war damages can be repaired only on the basis of mutual understanding ⎯ or on the
basis of a relevant resolution of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. In
sum: the Corte di Cassazione wishes to revolutionize the system of operation and enforcement of - 26 -
international law, decreeing that, where there appe ars to be a lacuna in the available array of
remedies, domestic judges should simply fill in that gap ⎯ and this is wrong.
IV. Erroneous equation of personal immunity with State immunity
10. Another one of the systemic flaws of the Ferrini jurisprudence is the argument, resorted
to quite openly by the judges of the Corte di Cassazione , that personal immunity and State
immunity should be treated in the same manner. It held that, where on account of the commission
of an international crime a governmental agent is deprived of any immunity, “there is no valid
reason, in the same circumstances, to uphold State immunity and consequently to deny that one
State’s responsibility for such crimes can be evaluated in the courts of another State” 9.
11. It is precisely this inference which shows that the judges were not aware of the systemic
specificities of the applicable legal régime gove rning international crimes. Since the landmark
decision of the Victorious Powers of World War II to establish international criminal courts for the
prosecution of the major war criminals of the Ax is Powers, direct criminal responsibility under
international law has become a unanimously accep ted legal proposition. Although for more than
four decades it appeared doubtful whether th e precedents of Nuremberg and Tokyo would
definitively find consolidation through practice, th e creation of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda by the Security Council in 1992 and 1993 has
definitively removed those doubts. The Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, adopted by the ILC in 1996, laid out the rationale and justification of that subordination
10
of the individual under the authority of customary international criminal law . All this is in full
harmony with the provisions on universal jurisdic tion of the Geneva Conventions on international
humanitarian law. The international commun ity deems it necessary and useful to prosecute
individuals charged with committing international cr imes, irrespective of the official position of a
suspect within the system of government of his or her home country. This is not the moment to
look into details. It is well known that domest ic tribunals are bound to respect the traditional
9
See fn. 1 supra, p. 674, para. 11.
1Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1996, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 17. - 27 -
immunities of heads of States and high-ranking ministers 11. In any event, however: persons
charged with international crimes should in princi ple be prosecuted. They cannot rely on their
functional immunity to bar the operation of competent judicial machinery.
12. The immunity of a State is a totally different legal issue, for many reasons. When talking
about the responsibility of a State, one really talks about the responsibility of a people, many
members of which may also have been the victims of the same régime that caused injury through
breaches of international law. This does not seriously matter in instances where a single act of
non-respect of international law is in issue. Ho wever, to make determinations on the responsibility
of a State on account of an armed conflict requi res the utmost care. The situation must be
considered in its totality. Generally, the conventional instruments are all based on a clear and sharp
distinction between civil responsibility of States a nd criminal responsibility of individuals. Since
Nuremberg and Tokyo in 1945 and the four Gene va Conventions of 1949, the prosecution of
perpetrators of grave international crimes has be come the standard policy of the international
community. On the other hand, precisely the Gene va Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional
Protocols of 1977 contain no clauses establishing the jurisdiction of the ICJ for reparation claims.
The relevant provisions, in particular Article91 of Additional ProtocolI, confine themselves to
providing that any violation of the rules of humanitarian law entails a duty to make reparation. But
no jurisdictional clause was added to that substa ntive rule. In sum, the distinction between
personal immunity on account of criminal acts and State immunity is crucial. Whoever infers from
the absence of personal immunity ratione functionis that in the same way State immunity must be
disregarded, does not argue within the confines of the current system of international law, but
wishes to change boundaries the raison d’être of which has by no means become extinct.
13. Thus, we come back to the basic flaw of the Ferrini jurisprudence: the judges slipped
into the role of legislators, wishing to remedy th e structural weakness of international law, to wit,
that it lacks a complete set of remedies. It may indeed be desirable to improve the effectiveness of
international law by complementing the enforcement mechanisms. Yet, this is what international
law is still about at the present stage of its deve lopment. Many steps forward have been made
1Arrest Warrant of 11April2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2002, p. 3. - 28 -
during the last decades. In particular, the institutions of the organized international community
have been endowed with new powers or have been enabled to exercise the powers held by them in
an effective fashion. Since 1990, the Security Council has obtained the opportunity actually to act
as the guardian of international peace and security on the basis of agreement among the five veto
powers. Additionally, new avenues have been acknowledged for States to safeguard interests of
the international community on the basis of the concepts of obligations erga omnes and jus cogens
(see, in particular, Art. 48 of the ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States). But crude self-help is
something else. It has no legitimacy, not even, and even less so, under the modern conception of
international law under the auspices of the United Nations Charter.
V. Assumption of jurisdiction as countermeasure?
14. It is true that countermeasures are an acknowledged concept. Countermeasures have
been included in the ILC’s Articles on Responsibilit y of States. Yet they may not be taken at
random. According to Article49 of those Articles, they are permissible only with a view to
inducing a State responsible for an internationall y wrongful act “to comply with its obligations
under Part Two”. They would also presuppose meeting specific procedural requirements.
Countermeasures based on the grave misdeeds perp etrated by the German occupation forces in
Italy from September1943 to May1945 are to be categorically discarded. World War II is
definitely over, since no less than 66years, and Germany and Italy are strong partners within the
European Union. Likewise, it would be outright absu rd to argue that the jurisdiction of the Italian
courts may be justified as a countermeasure res ponding to Germany’s failure to fulfil its duty of
reparation. There is no such failure, and for more than 40 years, from the conclusion of the two
compensation treaties of 1961 until the culmination of the Ferrini case, Italy never made any
representation to Germany in that sense. Lastly, Italy has never contended that the assumption of
jurisdiction by the Corte di Cassazione was legally justified as a countermeasure.
VI. Practice confirms the traditional rule
15. The focus should now be again on the Ferrini judgment as the decision which sent the
entire judicial system of Italy on a slippery slope, contrary to advice provided by the Avvocatura - 29 -
dello Stato which, in its submission of 28 April 2008 12, demystified the reasoning of the Corte di
Cassazione with accurate and persuasive legal logic, point by point. Germany could confine itself
to referring to that submission which is abundantly persuasive. Yet, the main issues should be
recalled again, albeit in a summary fashion since a more detailed presentation can be found in our
Memorial.
16. Germany relies simply on the rule that Stat es enjoy jurisdictional immunity in respect of
civil suits brought against them before the courts of another country if the controversial conduct
(allegedly) entailing international responsibilit y was performed in the exercise of powers jure
imperii. It would be annoying and tedious to presen t here once again all the wealth of evidence
that supports this legal conclusion. We conf ine ourselves to referring to the United Nations
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of Stat es and Their Property adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly by resolution 59/38 of 2 December 2004. Article 5 of that Convention
provides: “A State enjoys immunity, in respect of itself and its property, from the jurisdiction of
the courts of another State subject to the provisions of the present Convention.”
17. No exception to this rule appli es with regard to sovereign acts, acts jure imperii. My
colleague Andrea Gattini will later elaborate in great er detail on the territorial clause of Article 12
which has no relevance in the present proceeding as he will demonstrate. It is true that the
Convention has not yet entered into force; current ly, the number of ratifications stands at 11
(August2011). Yet the Convention reflects generally ⎯ not everywhere ⎯ customary law. It is
for that reason that States do not feel pressed for ratification. They see the Convention as an
illustration of the customary rules that are applicable in any event.
18. The contention that the rule of jurisdictional immunity has shrunk ratione materiae with
regard to serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law has no valid basis.
It presupposes that a practice to the contrary has e volved which denies immunity in such instances.
Significantly enough, neither the Ferrini judgment nor the later orders of 29 May 2008 in the cases
of Maietta and Others were able to identify such a practice. Vaguely enough, the Corte di
Cassazione speaks of “trends”, but the only true piece of evidence it could find was the Distomo
12
MG, Ann. 12. - 30 -
judgment of the Greek Areios Pagos , apart from the United States judgments that derived their
lawfulness within the United States domestic lega l order from the Effective Death Penalty Act of
1994 and which are conditioned by specific circumstances, namely a certification by the United
States Secretary of State that the respondent State was a sponsor of terrorism. This is still the legal
position today. Vainly did the Corte di Cassazione look for supporters outside the Italian borders.
Nowhere else has the judiciary r esponded positively to that suggesti on. Just the contrary can be
observed. Again and again, the Corte di Cassazione referred to the judgment of the European
Court of Human Rights in the Al-Adsani case but had to acknowledge that the views sharing its
own stance were nothing else than the dissenting vote of a minority group of the Court. It is of no
great help to underline that the decision in Al-Adsani was taken by only a slight majority ⎯ which
often occurs in judicial proceedings. What is more important is the fact that to date the Strasbourg
Court has not seen fit to reconsider its jurisprudence even after many years.
19. Great importance must also be attached to the undeniable fact that the ILC, when
re-examining its 1996draft in a working group speci fically in respect of serious violations of
human rights, was unable to reach consensus on creating a new exception from the principle of
13
sovereign immunity . The Respondent has attempted to exploit this fact in its favour. But just the
contrary is true. All the discourse about trends a nd tendencies cannot hide the simple truth that the
ILC did not find it suitable to create a new exception with unforeseeable consequences. Obviously,
a State needs the immunity rule precisely in instances where a claimant alleges that it has
committed an internationally wrongful act. Fo llowing the Respondent’s conception, it would
always be necessary, at the initial stage of a proceeding, to distinguish between a “normal” ⎯
what is a normal violation ⎯ and a particularly serious violation. Without having a complete
overview of the available evidence, the judge would therefore invariably be required to proceed to
a cursory advance assessment of the case, which wo uld put him into an extremely uncomfortable,
almost impossible, situation. Thus, the hesitati ons of the members of the working group are fully
understandable and do not, by no means, support the interpretation that jurisdictional immunity is
even further on the decline. Just the opposite is true; the issue was carefully considered. On that
1Report of the Working Group on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, Annex to the Report of
the ILC on the work of its Fifty-First Session, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1999, Vol.II, Part Two,
p. 149, App., p. 171; see also MG, para. 108. - 31 -
basis, the ILC decided not to alter its draft. He nce, we are faced with a deliberate decision of the
highest law-making body in the system of the world organization to the effect that the scope of
jurisdictional immunity should not be reduced.
20. Article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute must be taken seriously. More important than trends and
tendencies devoid of any hard substance are the tangi ble and concrete facts of international judicial
practice. We shall confine ourselves to mentioning five decisions of domestic tribunals, three of
which likewise had to address claims for reparation of grave breaches of the law perpetrated by the
authorities of the German Third Reich. A fuller account is given in Germany’s Memorial
(paras. 115-130).
21. Although already referred to in that Memorial, the decision of the French Cour de
cassation in Bucheron of 16 December 2003 14should be recalled again because of the similarity of
the underlying facts. Like Ferrini in Italy, Bucheron had been sent to Germany in June 1944 to
perform forced labour. The Cour de cassation rightly found that no contract had been concluded
between Bucheron and the German occupation for ces. Accordingly, the work accomplished by
Bucheron in Germany was founded on an act of “puissance publique”. Without further ado, very
succinctly, the Cour de cassation concluded that consequently Germany enjoyed judicial
immunity. It appears significant that the Corte di Cassazione did not mention the Bucheron
precedent when three months later it handed down its judgment in Ferrini.
15
22. The judgment of the House of Lords in Jones had to address an entirely different set of
circumstances, where the alleged acts of torture had not been committed on the soil of the
UnitedKingdom, but in Saudi Arabia. On the ot her hand, the main issue was identical. Can a
private suit be brought against a foreign sovereign nation outside the purview of commercial
transactions? The House of Lords did not only focus on the United Kingdom State Immunity
Act 1978 but considered the legal position also from the viewpoint of general international law. It
had no doubt that the applicable international ru les on jurisdictional immunity of States had not
changed under the impact of the Greek Distomo decision and the Ferrini decision of the Corte di
14
RGDIP 108, 2004, p. 259.
1Jones v. Ministry of Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya AS Sandiya (the Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia), 14 June 2006,
ILR, Vol. 129, p. 713. - 32 -
Cassazione. In this connection, Lord Bingham of Cornhill made the statement which sheds a
determinative light on the issue since it captur es the essence of the emergence of custom in
international law:
“The Ferrini decision cannot in my opinion be treated as an accurate statement
of international law as generally understood; and one swallow does not make a rule of
international law.” 16
One might argue that the British judges did not fully grasp the modern tendencies of international
law and that they should have decided otherwi se. Academic criticism is free to make such
suggestions. However, when it comes to finding out what the international practice is, one cannot
ignore the dictum of the House of Lords. It must be characterized as a supplementary confirmation
of the existing traditional rule. For the British j udges, no valid reason justifying a departure from
the long-standing rule could be perceived.
23. In Brazil, the Federal Court in Rio de Jan eiro rejected, by a judgment of 9 July 2008, a
reparation claim against Germany on account of the sinking of a fishing vessel by a German
submarine in July 1943, in violation of international humanitarian law. On the basis of a few lines,
the Brazilian Court rejected the action, invoking the principle of State immunity 17.
24. A third case is a fairly summary decision of the Israeli District Court in Tel Aviv-Jaffa of
31 December 2008 18. It concerns again victims of Nazi barbarism who had filed a suit against
Germany, requesting reparation for the injuries suffe red by them during World War II. The Israeli
court saw no necessity of proceeding to a deep-goi ng analysis of the legal position. With a few
sentences, it determined that the suit, as it was di rected against a foreign State on account of the
exercise of public power, did not come within Isr aeli jurisdiction; accordingly, it recommended to
the plaintiffs to withdraw their action, which they did. It need not be explained that in Israel
millions of people live who, either directly or in directly, had become victims of Nazi measures of
persecution during World War II. Nonetheless, the Court, without going into that sad background,
flatly denied the jurisdiction of the Israeli courts in respect of the reparation claim.
16
Jones v. Ministry of Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya AS Sandiya (the Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia), 14 June 2006,
ILR, Vol. 129, p. 726, para. 22.
17
An English translation of the judgment will be submitted.
18Case of Irit Tzemach and Others. - 33 -
25. The most meticulous examination of the legal position can be found in the judgment of
the Polish Supreme Court of 29October2010 in the Natoniewski case. Mr.Natoniewski was a
victim of an armed raid conducted by German tr oops against the village of Szczeczyn in today’s
south-eastern Poland in 1944. This raid was di rected against the civilian population. The
properties of the civilians were destroyed and th eir houses were burned down. Together with his
grandfather, Mr.Natoniewski took cover in a pot ato pit but was not able to escape the fire and
consequently suffered severe burns leading to permanent scars on his face and partial limb
disabilities. A co-claimant, Mr.Skrzypek, clai med compensation for his physical disabilities and
mental-health problems termed “syndrome of the second generation”, both being a consequence of
pseudo-medical experiments to which his father was subjected in the Nazi-German concentration
camp of Dachau. Obviously, the Polish Supreme Court was fully aware of the gravity of the acts
causing the injuries. However, it strictly applied th e immunity rule. It held that that an armed
conflict entailing victims, damages and sufferi ng on a large scale cannot be reduced to a
relationship between the State perpetrator and an individual victim. An armed conflict takes place
first and foremost between States and it is for th e States to decide on a comprehensive solution for
mutual claims in a treaty after the termination of hostilities. The jurisdictional immunity is a
warranty that the decision will be made in precisely this way and that a series of domestic court
proceedings does not impair the re-established peaceful inter-State relations.
26. This is a line of argument which perfec tly fits the specificities of the present dispute
between Germany and Italy. A settlement on the issu e of reparations was established decades ago.
Judicial proceedings resulting from individual claims would disturb that balance. In any event,
above all, the judgment of the Polish Supreme Court in Natoniewski shows that it amounts to a
basic error to accept individual suits without taking account of the overall context of the legal issue,
generally and also in respect of the specific case at hand.
27. In sum, it must be reiterated: consiste nt international practice denies any support to the
thesis of the Corte di Cassazione that grave crimes under international law entail automatically
domestic jurisdiction. Whoever takes the essential cr iteria of international custom seriously must
accordingly draw the appropriate conclusions. Jurisdictional immunity of States in respect of acts - 34 -
jure imperii continues to be a firm rule under international law. No rule to the contrary has evolved
for serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.
C. The inter-temporal dimension of the dispute
28. Lastly, a second issue should be addressed, namely the inter-temporal dimension. The
Respondent maintains that the applicability of a “purely” procedural rule must be assessed with
specific regard to the date of the relevant proceedings and not in conformity with the law as it stood
when the relevant facts occurred. Thus, Italy ma intains that the compatibility of its judicial
practice should be assessed against the legal sta ndards applicable as from 2004 and not against the
standards in force from 1943 to 1945.
29. It has been shown in the preceding observa tions that the relevant rules on jurisdictional
immunity have not changed during the last 70 years. Absolute jurisdictional immunity in respect of
sovereign acts of government is still the generally acknowledged customary rule today like back in
the past. Accordingly, there is no pressing need to discuss the issue. However, Germany wishes to
make clear pre-emptively that the stance maintained by Italy cannot be justified.
30. In Germany’s Memorial, lengthy consider ations have been devoted to showing that
jurisdictional immunity of States cannot be treated like any other procedural rule that is
19
continuously in flux . Through the commission of an internationally wrongful act, a legal
relationship is brought into existe nce with specific features and pa rticularities. On the one hand,
the law in force determines the substantive con sequences which are definitive and exhaustive.
Later developments in international law do not alter that relationship. The scope and substance of
the duty to make reparation do no t underlie ups and downs in th e same way as stock exchange
prices. The principle of certainty of the law would be seriously disturbed by such volatility.
31. The same must be true of the rule of jurisdictional immunity. On the one hand, seen
from the viewpoint of national procedural law, immunity is indeed no more than a procedural issue:
in fact, its objective is to impede private clai ms, establishing therefore a procedural obstacle.
Before the ICJ, too, jurisdiction must be assessed on the date of the filing of the act instituting
19
Paras. 91-102. - 35 -
proceedings . On the other hand, jurisdictional immunity, barring private suits, is a ground rule
for the relationships between sovereign States. It determines profoundly the relationship between
an alleged wrong-doer and its victims by shaping exp ectations and prospects. It is on the basis of
the knowledge that private suits cannot be filed that generally reparati on schemes are conceived
and implemented. In fact, after World War II, the Victorious Allied Powers, convening in Potsdam
at the gates of Berlin, decided that war repara tions should be made according to the classical
inter-State scheme. Determinations were made in unambiguous terms. Chapter IV of the Potsdam
Agreement specified that Germany ⎯ Germany as a State ⎯ would have to provide reparations to
the USSR, to Poland, to the United States, the United Kingdom “and other countries entitled to
reparations”. This was a structural decision, in accordance with the rules of international law
applicable at that time. No leeway was left for additional private claims of injured persons.
32. It stands to reason that there exists a close interconnection between the rule of immunity,
on the one hand, and the substantive rule indicati ng to whom reparation is due. According to the
classic concept, as laid down in Article 3 of the Hague Convention No. 4 of 1907, only States were
regarded as being entitled to reparations resulting from a breach of the Hague rules. The immunity
rule supports this substantive rule from the procedur al side. By claiming that individual suits can
be entertained by Italian courts, the Corte di Cassazione now seeks to topple the fundamental
determinations made in Potsdam. Its intention is to open up a second level of reparation, reparation
in each and every individual case, alongside the collective mode of settlement agreed upon by the
Victorious Powers which, in 1945, acted as trust ees of the entire group of States that had declared
war on Germany, among them also Italy. The entire process of reparation was based on the
understanding that restoration and compensation wo uld be effected within the framework of the
existing inter-State relationships. Additionall y, Germany has voluntarily decided to provide
compensation to specific groups of victims who were particularly hard hit, in particular persons
that had sustained racial persecution. All these elements together form a coherent system. By
contrast, the retrospective application of any narrowed-down new rule on jurisdictional immunity
2Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility , Judgment, I.C.J.Reports2006, p. 29, para. 54; Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 437, para. 79. - 36 -
would destroy the entire architecture of the peace set tlement that received its first and fundamental
features in Potsdam and was definitively approved, 45 years later, by Germany in the so-called
Two-Plus-Four Treaty of 12 September 1990 21on Germany’s reunification. Therefore, under the
specific circumstances of the present context, any denial of jurisdictional immunity to Germany
amounts to the overthrow of a legally consolidated situation under international law.
Mr.President, these observations conclude the first part of Germany’s pleadings. I do not
know whether you wish to give the floor to my colleague or that you would rather opt for the
coffee break now. Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Tomusch at, for your presentation. I believe that
perhaps it is an appropriate moment for us to have a short coffee break of 10minutes. Could we
return in, shall we say, about 20 minutes?
The Court adjourned from 11.25 to 11.45 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The Court now resumes its oral proceedings. I take it
that the next speaker on my list is Professor Andrea Gattini, who is going to make his presentation.
I invite him to the floor.
Mr. GATTINI: Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is a great honour and a great privilege
to appear before you for the first time, and on behalf of the Federal Re public of Germany. I
particularly feel the responsibility to act as coun sel for the Federal Republic of Germany in a case
which is so symbolically charged with her past , and of such importance for her present, for her
future and for the future of international legal orde r. The fact that I am a citizen of the respondent
State is another little testimony that the traditi onal close friendship and mutual understanding
between our two States have not in the least be en clouded by the unfortunate Italian judicial
developments which have led to the present controversy.
21
Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, ILM 29, 1990, p. 1186. - 37 -
In the next 40 minutes I am going to refute two main arguments of the Respondent in order
to justify the assumption of jurisdiction by Ita lian judges, the so-called tort exception and the
so-called jurisdiction by necessity.
A. T ORT EXCEPTION
1. After having reached the supreme heights of jus cogens, and proclaimed the universal civil
jurisdiction as one of its inescapable corollaries, in the Ferrini decision the Italian Court of
Cassation stepped down to a more down to earth approach. The Court found it convenient to
stress, that, at any rate, a part of the criminal conduct attributable to Germany ⎯ that is,
deportation for forced labour ⎯ had taken place in Italy. Therefore the Supreme Court suggested
that it could assert ⎯ that the Italian judges could assert ⎯ jurisdiction as the forum loci delicti
commissi.
2. In the present proceedings, too, the Res pondent, besides its many arguments based on the
pre-eminence of the concept of jus cogens, which my colleague Robert Kolb will later discuss,
finds it convenient to stress the so-called tort ex ception, or territorial exception, as the Respondent
prefers to call it, as a legitimate ground for denyin g State immunity to Germany. The exercise of
jurisdiction would not need to be justified because of the commission of an international crime, but
simply because, according to Article 12 of the 2004 United Nations State Immunity Convention, a
State cannot enjoy immunity in the case of an action for personal injuries where the injury occurred
in the territory of the forum State and the organ whose conduct is attributed to the foreign State was
present in the territory of the forum State at the time of the occurrence.
3. By relying on the forum delicti commissi , the Court of Cassation first, and now the
Respondent, make the jus cogens plinth of their arguments shaky, because they could have
altogether narrowed the whole question from the be ginning to the issue as to whether the conduct
of foreign armed forces is included in the tort excep tion. But, even so, the attempt to deny State
immunity on this narrower basis is doomed to fail, for at least three reasons, as I will demonstrate.
The first reason is that Article 12, as such, does not codify customary international law as it stands.
The second is that, at any rate, Article 12 does not apply to activities of armed forces. The third is
that, besides the wording of Article12 of the United Nations Convention, State practice does not - 38 -
support the view that armed forces’ activities fall into the scope of any tort exception, however
framed.
I. Questionable customary international status of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention
4. First, it is more than doubtful that Article12 of the United Nations State Immunity
Convention codifies international customary law. To be more precise, it is more than doubtful
whether the exception, to the extent that it deserts the traditional distinction of activities jure
gestionis and activities iure imperii, reflects the real practice and opinio juris of States.
5. The codification work of the International Law Commission on this point is quite clear. In
his fifth report to the ILC in 1983 the Special Rapporteur Mr. Sucharitkul recognized that even in
the so-called “restrictive” jurisdictions, i.e., cour ts of a State not granting absolute immunity to
foreign States, “immunity has been upheld wherever the courts have found the activities giving rise
to damage to property or persona l injuries to have been conducted jure imperii ” ( YILC 1983 ,
Vol. II, Part One, p. 41, para. 77). Nevertheless, the Special Rapporteur drafted the article on tort
exception without making any formal distinction, but leaning on the sole authority of the well
known Letelier case, in which some years earlier the District Court for the District of Columbia
denied immunity to the Republic of Chile for an act of political assassination which had occurred in
the United States. The Commission followed the Special Rapporteur, but some members, among
them one who is now a Member of this C ourt, Judge Koroma, expressed some doubts on the
advisability of inserting such an exception for matte rs which “were best dealt with extrajudicially”
(YILC 1984, Vol. I, p. 325, para. 32).
6. On the second reading of what was then draft Article13, the second Special Rapporteur
Mr. Ogiso, drew the attention of the Commission to the opportunity to “reconsider the scope of the
article in the light of the fact that liability casesconnected with criminal offences have thus far
been very few in practice” (YILC 1989, Vol. II, Part One, p. 66, para. 22). The proposal to limit the
scope of application of the article to the jurispr udentially anchored cases of civil suits arising from
traffic accidents involving State-owned or State-operated means of transport occurring within the
territory of the forum State was ev entually abandoned. However, if we consider later judicial
developments, apart from the United States jurisprudence on political assassination of residents on - 39 -
the territory of the United States, there are no further cases, either in the United States nor
elsewhere, in which the tort exception has been used by courts wh en the act of the foreign State
was clearly jure imperii, of course with the only exceptions of the Distomo decision by the Greek
Areopagos in 2000 and the Ferrini jurisprudence of the Italian Court of Cassation.
II. Armed forces activities outside the scope of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention
7. But the second and even more important reason why the reference to Article 12 must fail
in the present context is that a correct interpretation of the norm leads to the conclusion that it does
not and it cannot encompass activities of armed forces.
8. When presenting to the ILC, in 1983, the draft Article, Special Rapporteur Sucharitkul
drew the attention of the ILC to the fact that
“the question of State immunity should not be raised, or indeed need not to be raised,
when the causes of action are outside the jurisd iction of the courts, or when the courts
before which proceedings have been brought have no jurisdiction, because of the
subject-matter” (YILC 1983, Vol. II, Part One, p. 40, para. 66).
The underlying rationale that the individual must at any rate have a cause of action found
expression in the final text of the Article, accordi ng to which the forum Stat e must be “otherwise
competent” in the proceedings. Whereas one can assume that there is a cause of action for personal
injuries or damage to property deriving from tortious liability of the foreign State involved in cases
of road accidents, or assault and battery, the sa me cannot be said for damages suffered in the
context of an armed conflict. To affirm so would mean to have preventively and positively
answered the question whether individuals might have a right to reparation for war damages under
international law. And, as I will later explain, this is not so.
9. It seems therefore safe to conclude that the exclusion of armed forces’ activities from the
scope of Article 12 was taken for granted by the IL C, as the short commentary of the Article in the
second reading of 1991 makes clear: “the article does not apply to situations involving armed
conflicts” (YILC 1991, Vol.II, Part Two, p.46, para.10). The same position was shared by the
AdHoc Committee on Jurisdictional Immunities of States established in the General Assembly
Sixth Committee with the goal of exploring the f easibility of the adoption of a convention; it was
summarized in 2004 by the Chairman of the Committee with the remark that “the general
understanding had always prevailed that armed forces activities are excluded from the scope of - 40 -
Article12” (United Nations doc.A/C.6/59/SR13, para.36). For its part, the General Assembly,
when adopting in December2004 the text of the C onvention, in the last preambular paragraph of
its resolution took into account this statement. In our Memorial we have maintained that the
interplay of these different sources could be seen as an “instrument of interpretation” of a
convention in the meaning of Article 31(2) (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the
Treaties. But, even without going so far, there is evidence enough that as recently as
December 2004 no State had ever raised the claim that the tort exception should include activities
of armed forces.
10. The Respondent makes a big deal of the absence in the United Nations Convention of a
rule similar to that expressed in Article 31 of the European Convention on State Immunity of 1972,
which expressly excludes the activities of armed for ces from its scope of application, and therefore
from the scope of application of Article 11 on the tort exception. Of course, one could regret that
the ILC first, and the General Assembly later, did not show the same prudence and accuracy as the
Council of Europe, but the argument does not prove anything. States are obviously free to append
a declaration ⎯ declaration nota bene, not a reservation, which would be superfluous ⎯ to that
effect in their instrument of ratification, as was already done by Sweden and Norway, and, by the
way, let me notice that it is not by chance that this move came from two States which are well
known for their generous contribution to United Nations peacekeeping missions.
III. Lack of any State practice
11. Apart from the correct reading of Article 12 of the United Nations 2004 Convention, it is
foremost the practice of States as well as interna tional and national jurisprudence which clearly
show that armed forces activities are excluded from the scope of application of any tort exception,
however framed. A case in point, which deserves particular attention, is the McElhinney case,
decided by the European Court of Human Rights on 21November2001. In that case the Irish
Supreme Court in 1995 had recognized sovereign immunity for the United Kingdom with regard to
a tortious act committed on the territory of Ireland by a British soldier. What is significant in the
case is that the Irish Supreme Court expressly re ferred to Articles11 and31 of the European
Convention, although Ireland had not ratified it. What is even more significant is that the European - 41 -
Court of Human Rights fully endorsed the findings and reasoning of the Irish Supreme Court, by a
larger majority than that in the Al-Adsani case, previously referred to by ProfessorTomuschat,
which was decided on the same date.
12. Equally significant is that the same position is shared by the Criminal Chamber of the
Italian Court of Cassation itself. Indeed, in July2008, a couple of months after the Majetta,
Mantelli and the other orders of the Civil United Ch ambers previously referred to, the First
Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation in the Lozano case plainly affirmed that the conduct of
armed forces is excluded from the scope of Ar ticle 12 of the United Nations 2004 Convention
(Lozano, Court of Cassation, First Criminal Division, Judgment No. 31171 of 24 July 2008). It is
telling, but nonetheless amazing, that in the subsequent Josef Milde judgment of October2008,
which was the case that actually precipitated German y’s decision to invest you with this dispute,
the same First Criminal Chamber of the Italian C ourt of Cassation found it preferable to avoid
altogether the whole issue of its jurisdictional basis.
13. Now I turn to the Italian second argument: jurisdiction by necessity.
B. JURISDICTION BY NECESSITY
14. Being aware that the argument based on a tort exception would no t and indeed does not
stand up to scrutiny, the Respondent tried to infuse in the Ferrini jurisprudence a different
rationality, which the Court of Cassation appa rently never intended. So the Respondent
endeavoured to weave a complex argument, whic h, once stripped of its delicate rhetorical
intricacies, boils down to affirming that Italian judges were compelled to exercise a sort of
jurisdiction by necessity in order to offer a judicial remedy to Italian victims of a “blatant denial of
justice”, allegedly inflicted upon them by the German judicial system.
15. By this argument the Respondent shrewdly mixed the question of State immunity, which
is the only issue you are required to judge in the present dispute, with the different issue of the
alleged existence of a subjacent individual cau se of action. Reserving our position on the
pertinence of this last question in the present c ase to a possibly later pleading, some words are
nevertheless necessary at this point as a matter of principle, in order to disentangle the Italian
argument. - 42 -
16. The Respondent’s argument can be summarized as follows. International law provides
for an individual right of reparation, which is di rectly actionable. Initially this right of action
should be exercised before the courts of the responsib le State. In the case that the courts of that
State do not recognize the right of reparation, the individual may then bring the action before the
courts of his or her own State. I think I do not need too many words in order to demonstrate how
ungrounded, as well as dangerous, this theory is. I will do it, by illustrating and refuting the three
steps of the Respondent’s argument.
I. Lack of any individual right to reparation under general international law
17. One could of course stop the entire reasoni ng at the first step, by simply noting that
general international law does not grant any individual right of reparation, and certainly not for war
damages. Article3 of the IVHague Conven tion of1907, as well as Article91 of the First
Additional Protocol to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1977, because of the very structure of the
conventions, can only deal with inter-State responsibility and hence, cannot have any direct effect
for individuals. The travaux préparatoires of both texts make this abundantly clear; and also the
jurisprudence of domestic supreme courts is unanimous on this point.
18. Certainly, Article33, paragraph2, of the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility,
inserted in Part Two on the content of international responsibility, states that: “This Part is without
prejudice to any right, arising from the international responsibility of a State, which may accrue
directly to any person or entity other than a State.” Apart from the fact that this is simply a saving
clause, inserted into the project at the very last minute and without any adequate discussion, it is
telling that in the commentary to the article, besi des a generic reference to human right treaties,
there is no trace of any alleged individual right to reparation for war crimes, or even for crimes in
general. The only example given by the ILC in the Commentary is that of Article36 of the
1963Vienna Convention on Cons ular Relations, i.e., a treaty right whose potentialities as well as
limits we know thanks to your decisions in the LaGrand and the Avena cases, so that it is not
necessary to dwell upon it in the present context. - 43 -
II. Lack of any individual right of action under general international law
19. But let us, for the sake of argument, share the Italian assumption of an individual right to
reparation and proceed to the second step of the Italian demonstration.
20. The Respondent argues that from the right of reparation there necessarily derives a right
of action. Here again this assumption is devoid of any foundation. To come back to the ILC
Articles on State Responsibility, it is once again te lling that, when coming to Part Three dealing
with the invocation of responsibility, the ILC did not mention, not even for the purpose of a saving
clause, any role for individuals. The reason is quite simply that under general international law
there is no such role.
21. In spite of great juridical refinement and inventiveness, our esteemed colleagues left,
most probably on purpose, some fundamental aspects in a shadow. Is the right of action the object
of a secondary rule or rather of a primary rule ? Reading the Italian Counter-Memorial and the
Rejoinder one is left with a confusing impression. I guess that the blurring is not accidental.
22. Of course, there is an established practi ce granting to individuals a claim for reparation
before the domestic courts of the responsible Stat e. The Italian counterpart quotes in this context
the jurisprudence of the Italian Court of Cass ation of 1974 asserting the competence of Italian
courts to adjudicate lawsuits for compensation re garding war damages brought by citizens of the
Allied Powers against the Italian State. There is nothing extraordinary or remarkable in all this. In
that case the legal basis was found in Article 78, paragraph 4, of the Italian Peace Treaty of 1947.
In other cases the right of action is that provi ded for under the domestic law of the responsible
State. This is exactly what happened in German y, where, as the evidence shows and of course the
same Italian Government concedes, the domes tic judicial venue was opened without any
discrimination to all Italian claimants, who even went up to the Federal Constitutional Court.
23. Aware of the non-existence under general international law of any individual right of
action as a consequence of an international wrongful act of a State, the Respondent found it
expedient to clothe this alleged right of acti on in a different garb, invoking a right to access to
justice as a primary rule. This move is of no avail either.
24. The right to access to justice, in its two me anings of the right to an effective remedy and
the right to a fair trial, is a well-establishe d human right, enshrined in main international - 44 -
conventions. But the point is that in each one of those texts, and a fortiori in customary
international law, if one were to concede its cust omary law nature, beside being an ancillary right,
the right to access to justice is not an absolute one, being subjected to various limitations and
conditions that a State can legitimately impose on its exercise. One of those limits is the rule of
foreign State immunity. Far from there being an “irreducible contradiction” between the right of
access to justice and the rule on State immunity, as the Italian Counter-Memorial maintains (CMI,
para. 4.88), the two must live together in the sense that, on some occasions, such as those illustrated
by the European Court of Human Rights in the McElhinney and the Al-Adsani case of 2001, the
first must yield to the second.
25. The Respondent points at a decision by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in
September 2006 ⎯ Goiburù and others v. Paraguay ⎯ in which access to justice was described as
a peremptory norm of international law in all t hose cases in which the substantive rights violated
were granted by jus cogens norms. In this regard three observations are appropriate. First, the case
mentioned by the Respondent, as well as some other later cases decided by the same
Inter-American Court, did not concern war damag es. Second, the case dea lt with access to justice
in the State which was responsible for the wrongful act, and therefore did not concern in any way
the rule of foreign State immunity. Third, it will be recalled that an approach similar to that of the
Inter-American Court on Human Rights was taken a year later by the United Nations Committee of
Human Rights in its General Comment No.32 on Article14 of the ICCPR (CCPR/C/GC/
32 (2007), para. 6). The Committee limited itself to saying that the guarantees of fair trial may not
be “subject to measures of derogation”, or in the very precise French text, “objet de mesures qui
détourneraient la protection”, whenever one of the core rights enshrined in Article 4, paragraph 2,
ICCPR, is at issue. However, in the absence of any discussion whatsoever on the point within the
Committee, it would be a totally unjustified conc lusion to include in the phrase “measures of
derogation” the respect due to State immunity in accordance with applicable rules of customary
international law. - 45 -
26. In conclusion, it is hard to see how the unwarranted blend of two different concepts, one
of which ⎯ the right to access to justice ⎯ is subjected to various limitations, and the other of
which ⎯ the alleged right of action as a consequence of a war crime ⎯ simply does not exist
de lege lata, can together create a super-rule of jus cogens.
III. Inexistence of any “jurisdiction by necessity”
27. But once again, and for the sake of argum ent, let us proceed from the Italian assumption
of the existence of an individual right of action. So we reach the third step of the Italian construct.
Assuming that there is an individual right of reparation and an individual right of action, in the case
of non-recognition by the domestic judges of the responsible State, the judges of a national State
may, and indeed should, come to the rescue of th e individual victims, i.e., they should exercise
jurisdiction getting rid of foreign State immunity. This third step is, if possible, even less
justifiable than the previous two.
28. To begin with, it is totally unwarranted to assume that in a situation such as the present
one, there has been a denial of justice, not to speak of a “blatant” one.
29. In order to speak of a denial of justice, the Italian citizens must have been debarred from
any possibility whatsoever of bringing an action be fore German courts or must have wilfully and
maliciously been deprived of their procedural right s, or must have been discriminated against on
the basis of their nationality. Now, of course, nothing of the sort happened. On the contrary, the
Associazione Nazionale Reduci dalla Prigionia and 942 Italian citizens, among them Mr.Ferrini
himself, were able to lodge a joint constitu tional complaint before the German Federal
Constitutional Court, which, with a well-reasoned or der, rejected the complaint on 28June2004.
The correctness of the order was confirmed by an unanimous judgment of the Fifth Chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights on 4September2007, which also reiterated the lack of any
individual right to reparation, stating as follows:
“Whatever suffering the applicants’ for ced labour brought about, none of the
Conventions referred to by the applicants establishes any individual claims for
compensation.” (ECHR, 2007, 5556.)
30. By the way, the same appli es to the Greek claimants in the Distomo case. Parallel to the
civil action in Greece, the claimants had sued th e German Government before German courts and - 46 -
had access to all available judicial venues up to the German Federal Constitutional Court, which
rendered its decision in June 2003. In this case as well, the Fifth Chamber of the European Court
of Human Rights, in its recent judgment of 31May2011, Sfountouris and Others v. Germany
(Application24120/06) rejected the claim and confirmed the correctness of German judicial
proceedings and findings with the following words [I quote in my own translation]:
“The Court finds that it could not be maintained that the application and
interpretation of internatio nal and domestic law made by the German judges were
vitiated by unreasonable or arbitrary arguments.”
[ “La Cour estime que l’on ne saurait soutenir que l’application et
l’interprétation du droit international et interne auxquelles ont procédé les
juridictions allemandes aient été enta chées de considérations déraisonnables ou
arbitraires.” (P. 16 ; original French.)]
31. I would like to draw your attention to the date of a decision of the German Constitutional
Court in the Italian citizens’ claim, the 28 June 2004, because it alone demolishes the whole Italian
thesis of a jurisdiction by necessity, which the It alian Court of Cassation would have reluctantly
exercised only after the denial of justice su ffered at the hand of German judges. The Ferrini
decision of the Italian Court of Cassation actually dates back to December 2003, and was deposited
on the 11March 2004, three and a half months before the Order of the German Constitutional
Court was delivered.
32. Furthermore, the legal basis of such a “forum by replacement”, so to say, is anything but
clear. If one tries to extract the pith from the well-torn but ultimately frail Italian arguments, one is
left with a heap of unusable notions, which do not b ecome more usable for the fact of having been
intermingled. We have identified at least three.
33. To start with, is the underlying concept that of countermeasures? If so, the immediate
objection, as already formulated by Professor Tomuschat, would be that it is not the business of
domestic courts to decide and enforce countermeasures against a foreign State.
34. Is the underlying concept that of necess ity? The Italian Counter-Memorial (CMI) and
Rejoinder are sprinkled with such phrases describi ng the exercise of domestic jurisdiction as “the
only path to pursue in order to secure compliance” (CMI, para.1.9), and the resort to the Italian
courts as “the only means, the ultima ratio, for obtaining redress” (CMI, para.4.42). If one is
aware of the extreme delicacy of the notion of necessity and therefore takes seriously the restrictive - 47 -
wording of Article 25 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, as you rightly did in the
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, then it is impossible to subsum e under the notion of state of necessity
the self-conferred power of a domestic judge to stand alone as the protector of the essential
interests of the State, let alone the essential interests of the international community as such.
35. Is it then in the end the concept of an individual right of reparation as such which forms
the underlying rationale of the Respondent’s position ? But, if so, the Respondent’s argument falls
into the trap of circularity, inferring each lega l consequence from the previous one on the mere
strength of a mantra. What is more curious is that the Respondent’s third step runs counter to the
very concept of jus cogens on which the entire construction is based. And I will explain this.
36. If an individual were the bearer of a right of reparation and of a right of action under
international law, as the Respondent maintains, it would still make some sense to require him first
to exercise his right before the domestic courts of the responsible State. But, in a case of a
dismissal, why should the individual be subsequently restrained in his right to bring the claim in
front of his domestic judges instead of the judges of any other State of his choice? If one were to
find any merit in the Ferrini decision, and I am one who scarce ly found any, it would be the
parallel between jus cogens and the concept of universal civil jurisdiction.
37. I do not need to spend many words to refute the conformity with international law of this
kind of jurisdiction. Allow me just to recall what three former judges of your Court, each of them
eminent advocates of human rights and particularly sensitive to the development of the instruments
for their international protection, as all of us are, said in this regard. In their joint separate opinion
in the Arrest Warrant case, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal took issue with universal
civil jurisdiction as practised in the United States under the Alien Tort Claims Act: “this unilateral
exercise of the function of guardian of internationa l values . . . has not attracted the approbation of
States generally” (I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 77, para. 48).
38. To follow the Respondent’s argument to its logical conclusions, why should the
individual bearer of the right rest content with the outcome of the judicial process provided by the
judges of a certain State instead of another State? Given the lack of co-ordination of domestic civil
judicial systems, neither the electa una via nor the res judicata principles would constitute effective
deterrents from a never-ending carousel of forum shopping. - 48 -
39. Moreover, why should the individual rest content with the compact agreed upon by his or
her own State and the responsible one? By just sketching this scenario, everyone who cares for the
authority of international law as the ordering ha nd of international relations, as your Excellencies
and your predecessors have always done, can easily and vividly sense how the “best of all possible
worlds” prefigured by some authors, who, as new Candides, hail such developments in
international law, would rapidly turn into a nightmare of abuses and prevarications.
40. But apart from such obvious observati ons on the unsuitability of the solution
envisaged ⎯ even de lege ferenda ⎯ by the Italian counterpart, there is another major flaw in the
Italian argument. This is, quite simply, the utte r inconsistency of the Italian argument with the
structure of positive international law. Under pr esent general international law, if an individual
suffers a denial of justice abroad, the consequence will be the faculty of his State of nationality to
espouse his claim through the exercise of diplomat ic protection, nothing more, but also nothing
less.
41. And that is not a trivial thing, as the Respondent tends to suggest. The fact that no Italian
Government from 1945 onwards and actually up to now had ever thought to exercise diplomatic
protection in favour of its citizens who might have suffered patrimonial or personal injuries
because of war crimes committed by German forces during World War II, is simply due to the firm
Italian belief, which until the Ferrini decision was shared by the Italian Supreme Court itself, that
Italian citizens, apart from those who had suffered injury because of National Socialist measures of
persecution and for whom Italy reached a satisfa ctory compensation agreement with the Federal
Republic of Germany in 1961, had no right whatsoever to assert.
42. Mr.President, this concludes my remarks, and may I respectfully ask you to give the
floor to my colleague Professor Robert Kolb.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor Andrea Gattini for his presentation. Now I invite
Professor Robert Kolb to take the floor.
M. KOLB : Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, c’est la première fois
que j’ai le privilège de me présenter devant votre haute juridiction. Avant d’aborder mon exposé,
je désire adresser à la Cour l’expression de mon profond dévouement et la prier de m’accorder - 49 -
toute l’indulgence dont j’aurai besoin. Je désire aussi adresser mon salut cordial aux éminents
confrères qui sont nos contradicteu rs dans la présente affaire. Il n’y a pas si longtemps, j’étais
encore l’étudiant de l’un d’entre eux.
1. Le point qui est soumis à votre jugement est, à mon avis, relativement simple. Aussi, je
tâcherai de m’expliquer de manière brève, car je crois que la cause de l’Allemagne n’a rien à
redouter de votre sagesse. J’aborderai deux points dans mon exposé d’aujourd’hui. D’abord une
question technique et juridique. Ensuite une questi on générale, allant largement au-delà des plages
du droit positif. C’est d’abord la question du jus cogens. C’est ensuite la mise en relief des
conséquences prévisibles d’une négation de l’i mmunité juridictionnelle et d’exécution dans des
situations telles que celles qui nous intéressent présentement.
A. La question du jus cogens
2. La question du jus cogens a tenu une place éminen te dans cette affaire ⎯ une place trop
éminente. En réalité, ce concept est ici de peu de secours, à condition qu’on veuille bien regarder
les choses de près, sans passion et avec le regard affûté du juriste. La position de la Cour de
cassation italienne, dans l’affaire Ferrini, suivie par d’autres instances devant la même Cour, a été
la suivante. Des normes internationales possédant un statut supérieur au regard des valeurs qu’elles
expriment doivent avoir le pas sur des normes de droit international dont le statut serait inférieur au
regard du fait qu’elles n’expriment pas de telle s valeurs ou qu’elles expriment des valeurs moins
éminentes. Cette manière de voir a été expo sée devant vous avec tale nt par nos honorables
contradicteurs. Je me réfère au paragraphe 4.23 de leur réplique, et aussi aux paragraphes 4.68 et
suivants de leur contre-mémoire. Le jus cogens est ainsi subrepticement transformé en un vecteur
de hiérarchie plus ou moins générale au sein de l’ordre juridique international. Mais sont-ce bien là
son sens et sa portée ? Nous ne le croyons pas. Plusieurs arguments décisifs militent contre cette
manière de voir. Vous me permettrez d’en mentionner trois.
1. Le jus cogens n’affecte pas les règles secondaires
3. En premier lieu, le jus cogens concerne les règles primaires et non les règles secondaires.
Je m’explique. Le régime impératif d’une norme porte sur sa qualité intrinsèque comme
proposition indérogeable, c’est-à-dire sur sa qualité co mme norme primaire. Il concerne le rapport - 50 -
entre une norme plus générale et une norme plus sp éciale, interdisant la dérogation de la première
par la seconde. Tout ce mécanisme s’inscrit dans le plan du métabolisme des normes elles-mêmes.
En revanche, le jus cogens ne porte pas sur les normes secondaires touchant aux conséquences de
la violation de dispositions ayant un caractère impératif. Il n’existe pas de réglementation juridique
générale relative aux conséquences de la vi olation de normes impératives. Une telle
réglementation ne peut pas être inventée au cas par cas par chaque Etat selon ses orientations et
idiosyncrasies. Elle ne peut découler que de réglementations agréées de nature conventionnelle ou
coutumière. De telles règles font manifestement défaut pour la question de l’immunité qui nous
intéresse ici. L’Italie n’a pu faire fond que sur un seul précédent pour étayer sa thèse, celui de sa
propre Cour de cassation. Même les juridictions grecques, comme le montre l’affaire Margellos, se
sont finalement départies d’une mise à l’écart de l’immunité, sentant tout ce qu’elle avait
d’iconoclaste, de dangereux et d’infondé. N’est-il pas caractéristique que pour montrer ce qu’elle
appelle «a far more complex picture» (réplique, par.4.19), l’Italie soit forcée de faire appel à des
opinions dissidentes (donc minoritaires !) et à des tendances législatives de nature la plus diverse,
pour ainsi faire feu de tout bois? Vous avez- vous-même fort justement refusé de vous laisser
obnubiler par la magie incantatoire du jus cogens en rappelant que la «violation» d’une règle
impérative est une chose et que votre compétence en est une autre. En effet, n’avait-on pas essayé
de manière très similaire à ce que l’on tente présentement, de vous convaincre qu’à l’égard des
valeurs essentielles qu’incorpore le jus cogens, un recours au juge s’imposait comme conséquence
nécessaire afin de ne pas laisser sans sanction une situation de telle gravité ? Or, qu’avez-vous fait,
par exemple dans l’affaire République démocratique du Congo c. Rwanda (2006)? Vous avez
appliqué le droit du Statut comme règle pertinente, que nous pouvons appeler «secondaire». Le
jus cogens n’a pas prévalu sur elle, parce que justement ce concept ne signifie pas une hiérarchie
normative généralisée, en fonction de laquelle l’on pourrait écarter tour à tour, selon les besoins du
moment, telle ou telle règle bien assise du droit international.
4. On nous objecte volontiers l’article 41 des articles sur la responsabilité des Etats de 2001
(réplique, par.4.11). Or, loin de contredire not re position, cette dispos ition apporte de l’eau au
moulin de notre thèse. Elle pose deux conséquences de la «violation» d’une règle de jus cogens
ayant la gravité requise : un devoir de coopération po ur mettre fin à la situation créée (par. 1) et un - 51 -
devoir de non-reconnaissance (par.2). En réalité, il s’agit de normes primaires. La première est
peu ou prou nouvelle. La seconde existe de longue date, indépendamment de la «responsabilité des
Etats». Ces obligations ne con cernent ni la mise à l’écart de l’immunité, ni d’ailleurs ne
s’appliquent à toutes les normes impératives. Je me réfère à cet égard par exemple aux normes
impératives donnant lieu à un devoir de non-reconnaissance, à savoir l’utilisation illicite de la force
et la violation de l’autodétermination des pe uples. Les autres normes impératives n’y sont pas
incluses. Le paragraphe3 de l’article41 renvoi e par ailleurs au droit in ternational général.
Comme nous l’avons montré, celui-ci ne contient pas à ce jour de norme permettant la mise à
l’écart de l’immunité dans les situations qui nous intéressent. L’article41 montre donc que la
«violation» d’une norme de jus cogens ne permet pas à un Etat de réagir par n’importe quel moyen
proportionné à la gravité de la violation, selon son appréciation propre: levée de l’immunité,
utilisation de la force, suspension des droits de l’homme, etc. Au contraire, les conséquences de
cette violation doivent être mesurées aux normes «secondaires» (ou primaires) existantes et se
conformer à elles. Le jus cogens n’est pas une sorte d’entité surnaturelle, subvertissant tout le
corps du droit international dans la splendeur d’un pouvoir legibus solutus. Ce serait une étrange
manière de favoriser la cohérence de l’ordre ju ridique au regard de ses valeurs fondamentales,
comme le veulent nos honorables contradicteurs, que d’utiliser ce concept pour littéralement
assassiner l’agencement savamment dosé des règles secondaires. Vous devez porter un soin et une
attention tout particuliers à celles-ci: car ell es sont décisives pour combattre l’hydre toujours
menaçante et grimaçante de l’unilatéralisme et de l’affranchissement du droit international. Aucun
prétexte ne doit être bon à un tel dessein ou à un tel résultat.
2. Le jus cogens n’est pas une règle générale de hiérarchie des normes
5. Permettez-moi, en second lieu, de reprendre l’idée que je viens d’énoncer sur un plan plus
général, à savoir sur le plan des règles primaires. Si le jus cogens concernait véritablement une
hiérarchie juridique généralisée entre toutes les nor mes du droit international, celle incorporant la
valeur la plus élevée l’emportant sur celle re flétant une valeur moins élevée, nous serions
confrontés à un véritable effondrement du droit in ternational. L’Italie a beau tenter de
fiévreusement cacher ce fait, qu’elle perçoit très nettement, en dosant très savamment cette - 52 -
hiérarchie, en nous parlant de cas unique, d’ultima ratio en cas de déni de justice, et d’autres choses
similaires encore. Or le fait demeure, car il est têtu. Réfléchissez avec moi, avec vue claire et sans
passions. La suggestion de la Cour de cassa tion italienne, partagée je suppose par de nombreux
observateurs, est que la dignité humaine ⎯concept qui nous vient d’ailleurs du droit
constitutionnel allemand ⎯ représente la valeur suprême dans ce monde. Je trouve cette équation
un peu courte et un peu self-serving, définie par no us les hommes comme juges et parties à la fois,
assurément bonne pour ce qu’elle inclut mais mauvaise pour ce (et ceux) qu’elle exclut; mais
enfin, concédons-là. Si l’on applique désormais la logique de hiérarchie très simple, très linéaire et
très primaire de la Cour de cassation, fût-elle ourlée par des fioritures plus ou moins alambiquées,
plus ou moins baroques, qui tentent maladroiteme nt de détourner le regard de l’essentiel, l’on
aboutit à ceci d’effrayant : tout l’ordre juridique in ternational développé par la sagesse de l’histoire
et le poids bénéfique des réalités peut être balayé d’un trait de plume, peut être subverti sans limite
apparente autre que celle du subjectivisme sans bornes. Les droits de l’homme, reflétant la dignité
humaine, l’emportent, en cas de vrai besoin, sur toute autre norme du droit international : malheur
au droit diplomatique; malheur au droit des imm unités; malheur à la souveraineté et l’intégrité
territoriale ; malheur au droit des traités et à pacta sunt servanda ; malheur peut-être au non-recours
à la force ; et haro sur tout ce qui peut s’opposer au Droit de l’Homme. En tant que cour de justice,
attachée au droit, vous ne pouvez pas cautionner une telle anarchie, cachée derrière une sage
hiérarchie! Car le pire vient encore, et je ne l’ ai pas encore dit. En effet, qui apprécie si la
nécessité de faire prévaloir la règle hiérarchiquement supérieure existe dans un cas donné ? A cela,
la règle générale du droit intern ational s’appliquerait: chaque Etat apprécie pour lui-même les
situations juridiques dans lesquelles il est partie. Vous l’avez justement rappelé dans l’affaire du
Génocide de 1951. Nous assisterions ainsi à une «softisation» de tout le droit international, dans le
corps émacié duquel chaque Etat pourrait pratiquer son «pick and choose» abrité derrière le
paravent lénitif du jus cogens. Nous serions témoin d’un subjec tivisme sans limites par rapport à
des mises en balance à chaque fois ouvertes, en treprises au cas par cas par les acteurs les plus
divers, selon l’arbitraire de chacun. A vouloir faire avancer le droit international, avec une
malencontreuse doctrine de la hiérarchie libreme nt appréciée par chaque sujet, on risque de ⎯ que
dis-je : on va ⎯ le faire mourir. Faust, son âme et le diable n’indiquent pas la voie du salut. On ne - 53 -
saurait récurer un petit bout du droit internationa l en ébranlant ses assises, en sapant les bases
mêmes de son fonctionnement.
3. Le jus cogens n’est pas appelé à déroger au droit international général
6. En troisième lieu, je doute fort que le jus cogens puisse être utile comme norme
hiérarchique quand il s’agit de la concurrence entre deux normes du droit international général,
l’une impérative, l’autre non impérative. En l’esp èce: réparation pour des crimes internationaux
(jus cogens) contre immunité (concédons que non jus cogens). Le jus cogens touche au rapport
entre une règle générale et une règle spéciale. Il touche à la dérogation d’une norme par une autre
dans ce contexte précis. Là, il a toute sa place. Mais ici, de quoi s’agit-il? De deux normes
coutumières générales. Or, de deux choses l’une. Ou bien la norme impérative supérieure existe et
alors il ne peut exister en même temps une norme non impérative contradictoire, car la pratique des
Etats ne peut se contredire; elle est de l’un côté ou elle est de l’autre. Ou bien la norme non
impérative inférieure s’impose, et alors la norme supérieure impérative périclite en tout ou en
partie, et ce nonobstant son caractère impératif. Il en est ainsi parce qu’une norme coutumière
exige toujours une pratique diffuse et une opinion juridique. Si une nouvelle pratique effective et
une nouvelle opinion juridique se font jour, c’est dire nécess airement que l’ancienne pratique et
opinion juridique qui supportaient la norme impérative se sont quant à elles effacées. Dans ce cas,
une norme coutumière ⎯ fût-elle impérative ⎯ ne peut se maintenir. Bien qu’impérative, en effet,
cette norme n’en reste pas moins coutumière. Privée de sa pratique et de son opinion juridique, elle
s’éteint comme le feu auquel on retire tout ox ygène. Au fond, un conflit entre deux normes
coutumières générales (y compris impératives) ne saurait exister. Au plan du droit coutumier, la
question est plutôt celle de savoir si une norme s’ est modifiée (par exemple partiellement éteinte)
au regard d’une autre. Il en irait autrement si l’on envisageait du jus cogens fondé sur une source
conventionnelle, mais cette question ne se pose pas dans le présent contexte. En l’espèce, la norme
sur l’immunité ne s’est pas modifiée. La pratique étatique n’a pas jusqu’ici concédé d’exceptions
pour le cas qui nous intéresse ici. Le jus cogens n’est donc d’aucun secours. - 54 -
4. Questions de droit intertemporel
7. Enfin, un mot encore sur des questi ons de droit intertemporel. Nos honorables
contradicteurs s’évertuent à vous faire croire que le jus cogens était bien établi déjà à l’époque de la
seconde guerre mondiale et dans son immédiat sillage . Ils ont manifestement raison. Mais j’attire
votre attention sur le fait que ce concept était à l’époque ⎯ et depuis les temps du droit de la nature
et des gens ⎯ purement doctrinal. N’est-il pas caractéristique que nos contradicteurs soient
obligés de citer Grotius, De Vitoria, Wolff (ils oublient De Vattel), le juge WalterSchücking ou
AlfredVerdross (on aurait ici encore pu ajouter bien d’autres, comme le juriste-poète
S.Séfériadès)? La naissance du jus cogens au niveau du droit positif est incontestablement la
convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de1969. On peut le regrette r. Mais on ne saurait
l’ignorer. Mes recherches assez extensives sur le jus cogens, que vous connaissez peut-être, me
permettent de l’affirmer en connaissance de cause.
8. Voudra-t-on invoquer le jus cogens superveniens de l’article64 de la convention de
Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969? Envisageons-le. Ce jus cogens superveniens suppose
toutefois qu’une norme coutumière postérieure se soit établie. Je crois que l’Allemagne a pu
démontrer que tel n’est pas le cas. Une hirondelle ne fait pas le printemps : le précédent de la Cour
de cassation italienne, dans sa «splendid isolation», n’est pas le coucou d’une pratique, qui lui ⎯ le
coucou ⎯ annonce sans faille le printemps, car il ne vient dans nos contrées que lorsqu’il peut se
cacher derrière des feuilles (il est timide, le coucou).
5. Conclusions sur le jus cogens
9. Il faut prendre garde quand on manie le concept du jus cogens. Généreux, malléable,
suggestif, il tend souvent à obstruer la vue et à fa ire reculer du champ visuel les vérités juridiques
les plus élémentaires. J’en veux pour exemple une phrase citée dans les pièces des deux Parties à
la présente instance. Les professeurs Bels ky, Roth-Arriaza et Merva identifient le jus cogens à un
système «of rules that States may not violate...» Peut-on s’exprimer moins pertinemment ? Je ne
crois pas. Cette phrase suggère en effet très dir ectement, presque irrésistiblement, que les Etats
peuvent violer les règles ordinaires du droit interna tional, à condition seulement de ne pas violer
celles impératives. Votre Cour sait à quelle distance de la vérité se situe une telle allégation. - 55 -
10. De quelle manière et sous quel angle que l’ on considère la question, dans le droit positif
actuel le jus cogens ne permet pas de justifier une mise à l’écart de l’immunité de l’Etat.
B. La question des conséquences d’une mise à l’écart de l’immunité
11. J’en viens maintenant à la question des conséquences d’une mise à l’écart de l’immunité.
La question des conséquences d’un certain choix juri dique ne fait pas partie du droit positif. Elle
en est pourtant indissociable, car le droit est une Œuvr e finaliste. Il existe en vue de certains buts,
de certaines finalités. Le droit n’est pas suspendu dans le vide. Il est fait pour s’appliquer à des
réalités concrètes et à des conjonctures humaines. Quand il s’agit du droit international, qui est lié
à la vie des Etats et des peuples, il est davantage encore nécessaire de ne pas perdre contact avec
ces réalités et avec ces buts. Le juge ne saurait se dissocier de l’effort et de la responsabilité pour
la réalisation du bien commun et pour celle de la justice. Dans les limites tracées par la norme
positive, il doit évaluer les conséquences possibles de ses choix afin de les ajuster de manière à
assurer, autant que faire se peut, la prospérité de la société dans son ensemble. En tout cas, il doit
studieusement veiller à ne pas en déranger et encore moins à en détruire les délicats équilibres.
12. Or, quelles seraient les conséquences prévisibles d’une décision écartant l’immunité ? Il
n’est pas nécessaire à cet égard de se lancer dans de fantasmagoriques spéculations ou dans
d’outrecuidantes loufoqueries. La valeur du précédent et l’effet générateur qu’il déploie sont trop
connus à une Cour de justice comme la vôtre pour que je doive insister. Voyons tour à tour quelles
seraient les conséquences les plus humainement prévisibles d’un jugement de votre part mettant au
ban l’immunité des Etats dans le contexte qui nous intéresse.
1. Déstabilisation des accords de paix
13. En premier lieu, vous déstabiliseriez de mani ère fatale les accords de paix, qui sont faits
pour durer et qui permettent de sortir de la guerre et d’en refermer la pare nthèse si douloureuse.
Les inimitiés de la guerre seraient ainsi transfér ées indéfiniment vers la période de paix. L’on
prolongerait dans l’état de paix l’enfer de l’état de guerre. En quelque sorte, la guerre ne serait
jamais finie. Je n’ai pas besoin de rappeler à cette haute juridiction l’importance traditionnelle
qu’ont eue, dans le règlement de conflits armés et dans l’instauration d’un ordre d’après-guerre, les
accords de paix. Je n’ai pas besoin de rappeler l’importance qu’on a toujours attachée, à tort ou à - 56 -
raison, à la finalité de ces accords. En mettant à l’ écart l’immunité avec effet rétroactif, votre Cour
permettrait de rouvrir tous ces règlements, notamme nt tous ceux conclus pour fermer la marche de
la seconde guerre mondiale. Chacun pourra y puiser des griefs et des revendications encore
insatisfaites, qu’ils soient anciens ou d’inven tion nouvelle. Si cela est vrai pour des plaintes
individuelles suite à des violations du droit de la guerre, pourquoi n’en serait-il pas ainsi pour
d’autres questions? L’accord est un tout. D’a illeurs, même sur les plaintes ayant trait à la
réparation pour des violations du droit de la guerre, comme celles qui nous occupent ce jour, l’effet
dit «de domino» est aisément prévisible. Quel plus puissant stimulant que l’appât d’obtenir une
«réparation», c’est-à-dire, plus prosaïquement, de l’argent? Mais pour quoi s’arrêterait-on à
l’Allemagne ? Une fois l’exemple donné, qui arrêterait l’avalanche de procès dans toutes les autres
situations d’après-guerre ? Nos honorables contradicteurs n’ignorent pas que même avec leur règle
conditionnée, portant sur la mise à l’écart de l’im munité, si savamment et si délicatement dosée,
l’Italie elle-même pourrait se trouver confrontée aux plaintes les plus diverses venant d’horizons
multiples, tantôt d’Ethiopie, tantôt de Libye, tant ôt d’Albanie, de Grèce, de Yougoslavie, tantôt
peut-être aussi d’Espagne. Et que dire des au tres guerres qui ont émaillé le monde depuis1945,
voire même avant? Aucun règlement de paix ne serait définitif. Aucun ne résisterait à
l’ébranlement des plaintes individuelles. Le principe pacta sunt servanda lui-même, tenu pour si
important, entre autres par votre juridiction, serait également subverti. Aucune sécurité juridique
ne pourrait être créée par des accords de paix, liquidant les plaies de la guerre. Des individus
auraient constamment en main la possibilité de les attaquer, de les torpiller et de les faire péricliter,
en fait d’en obtenir la revision. Ils pourraient anéantir l’effort des collectivités publiques de
chercher un équilibre durable et responsable dans le règlement global de l’après-guerre. Est-ce
juste ? Et est-ce praticable ? Je vous le demande, en particulier à vous, parmi les juges, qui venez
d’un pays qui a été ravagé par une guerre.
2. Course aux procès et «forum shopping» sans bornes
14. En second lieu, et concomitamment à ce que je viens d’exposer, on verrait rapidement
s’instaurer une course malsaine aux procès plus ou moins non coordonnés, selon la règle du chacun
pour soi et du chacun en vue de tenter d’obtenir un «maximum». Des myriades de procès - 57 -
diapreraient le globe, dans une efflorescence printanière qu’on ne me voudra pas de rapprocher un
tant soit peu d’une tuméfaction hors contrôle. Da ns le «marché» de ces procès, la course au
«forum shopping» le plus favorable serait de règle. La translation des plaintes grecques vers
l’Italie en porte déjà un éloquent témoignage, qui n’attend que de faire des émules. Les juridictions
internes entreraient ainsi en concurrence dans une éventuelle politique juridique du for le plus
généreux. Il n’est guère besoin d’insister sur l’ effet d’unilatéralisme effréné qu’une telle évolution
ne manquerait pas de susciter. D’aucuns se réjouir ont de l’effet boutoir de ce tte juridiction la plus
généreuse. L’Allemagne, que j’ai l’honneur de représenter, y voit surtout un accroissement sans
fin de l’anarchie internationale et une concurrence potentiellement malsaine, toute teintée de
potentielles arrière-pensées, point trop rares da ns le concert pas toujours très euphonique des
relations internationales. Et, en effet, ne devons -nous pas nous interroger sur le point de savoir si
ce moyen est bon ou est le meilleur, au regard de tels résultats prévisibles ? Je n’ai pas besoin ici
de parler des coûts insignes que génèrent ces nu ées de procédures, car il est convenu que devant
une juridiction comme la vôtre on ne parle pas d’argent.
3. Danger de manipulations politiques
15. En troisième lieu, il faut craindre que la mise à l’écart de l’immunité ne soit, comme
disent nos collèges des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, un «loaded gun», c’est-à-dire ne provoque des
manipulations politiques de tout genre. Qui prévie ndra les règlements de compte ? Dans combien
de pays la justice est-elle réellement indépendante ? Ne reçoit-elle pas aussi des instructions dans
les Etats les plus démocratiques et les plus rompus à la prééminence du droit, tant les liens entre
l’exécutif et la justice ne sauraient être entièreme nt inexistants? Une fo is l’immunité affaiblie,
voire mortellement blessée, une fois l’immunité pulvérisée, la voie est libre pour indisposer des
Etats étrangers par l’arme du juge. L’égalité s ouveraine des Etats serait ai nsi mise en danger, car,
pour ainsi dire, ce serait: par in parem imperium habet . Or, l’égalité souveraine est l’un des
principes fondateurs de la Charte des NationsUn ies, article2, paragraphe1, et du droit
international général. Vous me direz : on est loin de cette situation dans le cas d’espèce, où il s’agit
de crimes abominables de l’Allemagne de jadis. Je vous réponds: les précédents juridiques ont - 58 -
vocation à se dépouiller de la personnalité des acteu rs à l’occasion du procès desquels ils ont été
formulés. Aujourd’hui vous avez un tel cas. Demain vous en aurez d’autres.
4. Renforcement significatif de l’unilatéralisme dans les relations internationales
16. En quatrième lieu, ouvrir les vannes de pro cès au sein de chaque Etat en faisant choir
l’obstacle de l’immunité c’est donne r libre carrière à l’unilatéralisme. Chaque Etat, dont la justice
est un organe, article4 des articles sur la responsabilité internationale des Etats (2001), agirait en
fonction de ses propres agendas. Or, je vous le de mande : quel est le sens le plus profond du droit
international ? Quelle est la rais on la plus incompressible de son existence ? On dit parfois que la
fonction du droit international est de protéger le faible contre le fort. Je réponds: plus
fondamentalement encore, c’est de barrer le chemin à l’unilatéralisme, c’est-à-dire à
l’auto-appréciation et à l’auto-action sans limites. Ils sont la négation d’une situation ou d’une
société régies par le droit. Cette haute juridiction voudra-t-elle donner sa caution à une solution qui
signifierait accorder la victoire à un unilatéralisme triomphant ?
5. Multiplication des relations conflictuelles entre les Etats
17. En cinquième lieu, en écartant l’immunité, on risque de multiplier sans limite prévisible
les relations conflictuelles entre Etats et entre gouvernements. Les proc ès de plus en plus
nombreux et de moins en moins prévisibles irr iteraient un nombre croissant de gouvernements, qui
verraient leurs relations être grevées de nuages d’orage. La présente espèce en est un exemple
encore très bénin. Unis par des liens d’amitié solides et durables, que l’histoire a scellés bien forts
et bien trempés, l’Allemagne et l’Italie n’ont pas plongé dans une crise ou dans une exacerbation de
leurs rapports. Dans les cas futurs auxquels le bannissement de l’immunité ne manquerait pas de
donner lieu, il n’en sera plus ainsi. Des individus auraient dans leurs mains la possibilité
d’embarrasser plus ou moins gravement les relati ons entre gouvernements. Le droit international
moderne est basé sur la coopération et l’accroissement de la confiance entre Etats. Sans eux, rien
de durable ne peut être construit. Le règlem ent global, entre gouvernements, des plaintes issues
d’une guerre évite l’écueil mentionné. Il fait en sorte de ne pas rehausser ces questions en autant
de motifs de discorde, mais de les embrigader dans une négociation d’en semble. N’y gagne-t-on
pas au change ? - 59 -
6. Difficulté accrue pour les Etats de posséder des biens à l’étranger
18. En sixième lieu, en écartant l’immunité, les Etats seraient bien conseillés à n’avoir aucun
titre de propriété hors de leurs frontières. Qu el anachronisme dans notre monde du début du
XXI esiècle, fait d’interdépendance et même de globa lisation! Plus même: quelle impossibilité!
La présente affaire le met bien en exergue, mais en quelque sorte encore en sourdine. Un centre
culturel italo-allemand risque d’être saisi, vendu, liquidé. Au détriment des relations entre les deux
Etats, entre les deux peuples, au préjudice des bénéficiaires nombreux des activités de ce centre.
Or, une fois l’immunité d’exécution volatilisée, comme celle juridictionnelle, sous le poids écrasant
d’un prétendu jus cogens , quelle autre pièce de propriété résisterait à la saisie et à la vente?
Comptes en banque, participations industrielles, mais aussi centres d’échange culturels, fondations
étatiques, biens de chefs d’Etat, navires de gue rre, peut-être même locaux d’ambassade. Si la
dignité humaine est au sommet de la normativité inte rnationale, tous les biens que je viens de citer
lui sont inférieurs. Une saisie et vente serait-elle dès lors à leur égard exclue? Non, c’est le
contraire. Un Etat serait ainsi bien conseillé de ne pas être titulaire de propriétés à l’étranger. Sans
doute trouvera-t-il des moyens de se départir du titre formel de propriétaire par des montages
juridiques. Peut-être faudra-t-il alors déplacer la joute juridique vers l’exercice d’une «levée des
voiles». Je vous le demande: devrions-nous en arriver là? La coopération entre les Etats
n’est-elle pas elle-même un objet digne de protecti on? Et la mise à l’écart de l’immunité ne la
met-elle pas très directement et sans ambages en danger ?
7. Lajustice
19. On m’objectera la justice, à laquelle nous sommes d’ailleurs tous attachés. Mais est-il
juste de produire des résultats tels que ceux que je viens de dépeindre ? Est-il juste de prendre en
«otage» un peuple saecula saeculorum , en le tenant ployé indéfiniment sous le joug d’une
responsabilité collective pour les méfa its d’un régime d’antan? Qu ’il paye des réparations, oui;
mais qu’un trait final puisse être tiré à cet égard, également oui. M’en voudra-t-on de paraître
insensible aux terribles souffrances des victimes, auxquelles je suis en réalité tout sauf insensible, si
j’ose poser la question de savoir jusqu’à quelle génération de descendants la «course» à une
potentielle prestation pécuniaire pour torts subis jadis devrait s’étendre ? Si l’on accepte de le faire
pour la seconde guerre mondiale, pourquoi pas pour l es guerres plus anciennes ? Des ayants droit, - 60 -
par succession, n’existent-ils pas? En somme, la justice ne peut être perçue que d’un seul côté.
Elle se trouve des deux, car des deux côtés il y a des hommes et des femmes d’aujourd’hui, pas des
hommes et des femmes d’hier. J’aimerais que vous réfléchissiez méticuleusement à ce point. Il
m’a quant à moi beaucoup interloqué.
20. Force est d’admettre qu’il n’est souvent p as possible de réaliser une justice parfaite,
parce que l’on est obligé de répartir des biens. Une solution peut alors paraître juste si l’injustice
est plus ou moins également répartie elle aussi. Votre haute juridiction savait bien pourquoi, avant
de préciser les quatre exceptions existant dans le droit positif actuel, elle a réaffirmé l’immunité
personnelle du ministre des affaires étrangères en f onction. Elle a affirmé cette orientation face à
l’accusation de crimes internationaux formulée da ns des procédures pénales devant les tribunaux
d’un autre Etat (affaire du Mandat d’arrêt du 11avril2000, arrêt , C.I.J. Recueil 2002, par.56 et
suiv.). La ratio était à l’époque la même qu’elle l’est en la présente espèce : préserver l’égalité des
Etats, permettre aux relations internationales de se poursuivre sans heurts majeurs, combattre
l’unilatéralisme. Des jugements par des tribunaux internationaux pénaux, oui; la libre carrière
pour des jugements par des tribunaux pénaux internes, non. L’Allemagne estime que la Cour
devrait suivre cette même ligne de raisonnement dans la présente espèce. Elle devrait se borner à
appliquer le droit en vigueur. Au vu de ce qui précède, il est manifeste qu’il ne serait pas bienvenu
de tenter de créer à propos de la question qui nous intéresse un droit nouveau. Ce ne serait de toute
manière pas à cette Cour, ni à aucune cour de justice, qu’incomberait cette tâche. Elle est du
ressort du législateur, des Etats.
21. Permettez-moi de conclure mon exposé d’aujourd’hui avec un petit conte. Il était une
fois une maison où vivait une famille nombreuse. Quand l’un des fils s’en fut du havre familial et
construisit sa propre maison, il demanda à son père s’il pouvait prendre une grosse pierre carrée,
extraite du mur de la maison de famille. Elle lui servait pour étayer son propre mur, dans une place
névralgique de celui-ci. Le père, très aimant, accepta . Plus tard, les autres fils et filles s’en furent
tour à tour, et chacun voulut construire sa propre maison. L’un demanda à avoir aussi une pierre
carrée, et un autre demanda à en prendre deux. Le père ne se sentit pas de leur refuser ce vŒu,
qu’il avait concédé au plus âgé. Un jour, la ma ison familiale chancela, puis elle s’effondra. Vous
aurez compris le sens évident de cette petite hist oire toute simple. Je voudrais le reformuler - 61 -
comme suit: le bien individuel, si éminent soit-il, ne peut pas toujours prévaloir sur le bien
commun. Les droits de l’homme ont leur place da ns l’édifice d’ensemble; ils ne sauraient sans
autre l’ignorer, l’attaquer ou le mettre en danger.
Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, j’en arrive ainsi à la fin de ma
plaidoirie. Je vous remercie de m’avoir prêté atte ntion, qui plus est à une heure aussi tardive du
matin.
Je vous serais reconnaissant, Monsieur le président, de redonner la parole à
Mme Wasum-Rainer pour résumer les points saillants de notre argumentation. Merci.
The PRESIDENT: I thank ProfessorRobertKolb for his presentation. Now I invite
Her Excellency Ambassador Madam Susanne Wasum-Rainer to make her concluding remarks on
behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Ms WASUM-RAINER: Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, allow me to
summarize in just two minutes the most important aspects of our argument.
1. This morning, we have shown that the Court of Cassation, by denying the application of the
principle of State immunity to Germany for acts performed iure imperii , has failed to act in
compliance with existing international law.
2. The Corte justifies its jurisprudence with its inten tion of creating a new rule of international
law, but has failed to give a valid reason for such an approach outside lex lata and disregarded
the inter-temporal dimension of international law.
3. It is erroneous to infer from the gravity of a br each of international law, a breach of substantive
law a base for jurisdiction overriding the principle of State immunity.
4. The Corte di Cassazione is also wrong in equating pe rsonal immunity and personal
responsibility with State immunity and State responsibility.
5. We have shown that, seven years after its Ferrini decision, State practice proves that the Corte
di Cassazione still remains as isolated as ever in its erroneous belief that State immunity for
sovereign acts knows any exception. This is not the case. Jurisdictional immunity in respect of
acts iure imperii continues to be a firm rule in international law. - 62 -
6. Italy, to no avail, tries to rely on a tort ex ception to State immunity. A correct interpretation of
customary law as expressed in Article12 of the United Nations State Immunity Convention
must, however, lead to the compelling conclusion that this exclusion does not apply to the
conduct of armed forces in an armed conflict.
7. Furthermore, Italy cannot rely on the ar gument that it discarded State immunity out of
necessity. This argument fails to convince because neither in the 1940s nor today has
international humanitarian law provided for an individual right to reparation.
8. Lastly, Italy also errs, for a number of reasons, in invoking the concept of jus cogens in its
defence.
In accordance with the Statute of this Court, Germany will present its formal submissions at
the end of the second round of our pleadings.
Mr.President, distinguished Members of the C ourt, I thank you, in the name of my whole
team.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Susanne Wasum-Rainer for her concluding remarks
for the first round of the pleadings. This marks the end of today’s sitting. Oral argument in the
case will resume tomorrow at 10 a.m. in order for Italy to present its first round of oral argument.
The sitting is closed.
The Court rose at 1.05 p.m.
___________
Audience publique tenue le lundi 12 septembre 2011, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Owada, président, en l'affaire relative aux Immunités juridictionnelles de l'Etat (Allemagne c. Italie ; Grèce (intervenant))