Non Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2010/10
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2010
Public sitting
held on Wednesday 15 September 2010, at 4 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada presiding,
in the case concerning Application of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russian Federation)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2010
Audience publique
tenue le mercredi 15 septembre 2010, à 16 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention internationale
sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale
(Géorgie c. Fédération de Russie)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presdenkta
Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Judge ad hoc Gaja
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
viceMpra,ident
KoMroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Crinçade
Yusuf
Greenwood
XuMe mes
Dojnogshue,
jugeGaja,. ad hoc
Cgoffrerr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Georgia is represented by:
Ms Tina Burjaliani, First Deputy-Minister of Justice,
H.E. Mr. Shota Gvineria, Ambassador of Georgia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
a s Agents;
Mr. Payam Akhavan, LL.M., S.J.D. (Harvard), Pr ofessor of International Law, McGill University,
Member of the Bar of New York,
as Co-Agent and Advocate;
Mr.James R.Crawford, S.C., LL.D., F.B.A., Whew ell Professor of International Law, University
of Cambridge, Member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister, Matrix Chambers,
Mr.PhilippeSands, Q.C., Professor of Law, University College London, Barrister, Matrix
Chambers,
Mr. Paul S. Reichler, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., Member of the Bars of the United States
Supreme Court and the District of Columbia,
as Advocates;
Ms Nino Kalandadze, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Giorgi Mikeladze, Consul, Embassy of Georgia in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Khatuna Salukvadze, Head of the Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Nino Tsereteli, Deputy Head of the Department of State Representation to International Human
Rights Courts, Ministry of Justice,
Mr.ZacharyDouglas, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of
Cambridge,
Mr.AndrewB.Loewenstein, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bar of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts,
Ms Clara E. Brillembourg, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and
New York,
MsAmy Senier, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of th e Bars of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
and New York,
as Advisers. - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de Géorgie est représenté par :
Mme Tina Burjaliani, premier vice-ministre de la justice,
S. Exc. M. Shota Gvineria, ambassadeur de Géorgie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agents ;
M.PayamAkhavan, LL.M., S.J.D. (Harvard), pr ofesseur de droit international à l’Université
McGill, membre du barreau de New York,
comme coagent et avocat;
M.James R.Crawford, S.C., LL.D., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de
Cambridge, titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat,
Matrix Chambers,
M.PhilippeSands, Q.C., professeur de droit au University College de Londres, avocat, Matrix
Chambers,
M. Paul S. Reichler, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, W ashington D.C., membre des barreaux de la Cour
suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,
comme avocats ;
Mme Nino Kalandadze, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères,
M. Giorgi Mikeladze, consul à l’ambassade de Géorgie aux Pays-Bas,
MmeKhatuna Salukvadze, chef du département des affaires politiques au ministère des affaires
étrangères,
MmeNino Tsereteli, chef adjoint chargé de la représentation de l’Etat auprès des juridictions
internationales des droits de l’homme au ministère de la justice,
M. Zachary Douglas, avocat, Matrix Chambers, chargé de cours à la faculté de droit de l’Université
de Cambridge,
M.Andrew B.Loewenstein, cabinet Foley Ho ag LLP, membre du barreau du Commonwealth du
Massachusetts,
MmeClara E.Brillembourg, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et de New York,
MmeAmySenier, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du Commonwealth du
Massachusetts et de New York,
comme conseillers. - 6 -
The Government of the Russian Federation is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Kirill Gevorgian, Director, Legal Departme nt, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation,
H.E.Mr.Roman Kolodkin, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Agents;
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, member and former
Chairman of the International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de droit
international,
Mr. Andreas Zimmermann, Dr. jur. (Heidelberg), LL.M. (Harvard), Professor of International Law
at the University of Potsdam, Director of the Postdam Center of Human Rights, Member of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration,
Mr.Samuel Wordsworth, member of the English Bar, member of the Paris Bar, Essex Court
Chambers,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Evgeny Raschevsky, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
Mr. M. Kulakhmetov, Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,
Mr. V. Korchmar, Principal Counsellor, Fourth CIS Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation,
Mr.GrigoryLukyantsev, Senior Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the
United Nations, New York,
Mr.IvanVolodin, Acting Head of Section, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation,
Mr.MaximMusikhin, Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
MsDianaTaratukhina, Third Secretary, Perman ent Mission of the Russian Federation to the
United Nations, New York,
Mr.ArsenDaduani, Third Secretary, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr. Sergey Leonidchenko, Attaché, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation,
MsSvetlanaShatalova, Attaché, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the United States of
America,
Ms Daria Golubkova, expert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,
Mr. M. Tkhostov, Deputy Chief of Administration, Government of North Ossetia-Alania, - 7 -
Le Gouvernement de la Fédération de Russie est représenté par :
S.Exc.M.KirillGevorgian, directeur du département des affaires juridiques du ministère des
affaires étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
S. Exc. M. Roman Kolodkin, ambassadeur de la Fédération de Russie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comma egents ;
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Pari s Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre et ancien
président de la Commission du droit internatio nal, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
M.Andreas Zimmermann, docteur en droit (Université de Heidelberg), LL.M. (Harvard),
professeur de droit international à l’Université de Potsdam, directeur du centre des droits de
l’homme de Potsdam, membre de laCour permanente d’arbitrage,
M. Samuel Wordsworth, membre des barreaux d’Angleterre et de Paris, Essex Court Chambers,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Evgeny Raschevsky, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
M. M. Kulakhmetov, conseiller du ministre des affaires étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
M.V.Korchmar, conseiller principal au qu atrième département de la Communauté d’Etats
indépendants du ministère des affaires étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
M.GrigoryLukyantsev, conseiller principal à la mission permanente de la Fédération de Russie
auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies à New York,
M.IvanVolodin, chef de division par intérim du département des affaires juridiques du ministère
des affaires étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
M. Maxim Musikhin, conseiller à l’ambassade de la Fédération de Russie aux Pays-Bas,
MmeDianaTaratukhina, troisième secrétaire à la mission permanente de la Fédération de Russie
auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies à New York,
M. Arsen Daduani, troisième secrétaire à l’ambassade de la Fédération de Russie aux Pays-Bas,
M.SergeyLeonidchenko, attaché au département des affaires juridiques du ministère des affaires
étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
MmeSvetlanaShatalova, attaché à l’ambassade de la Fédération de Russie aux Etats-Unis
d’Amérique,
Mme Daria Golubkova, expert au ministère des affaires étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
M. M. Tkhostov, chef adjoint de l’administration, gouvernement d’Ossétie du Nord-Alanie, - 8 -
Ms Amy Sander, member of the English Bar,
Mr.Christian Tams, LL.M., PhD. (Cambridge), Pr ofessor of International Law, University of
Glasgow,
MsAlina Miron, Researcher, Centre for International Law (CEDIN), University Paris Ouest,
Nanterre-La Défense,
Ms Elena Krotova, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
Ms Anna Shumilova, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
Mr. Sergey Usoskin, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
as Advisers. - 9 -
Mme Amy Sander, membre du barreau d’Angleterre,
M.ChristianTams, LL.M., docteur en droit (U niversité de Cambridge), professeur de droit
international à l’Université de Glasgow,
Mme Alina Miron, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Mme Elena Krotova, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
Mme Anna Shumilova, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
M. Sergey Usoskin, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
commc eonseillers. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open. The Court meets today to hear the
second round of oral argument of the Russian Fede ration. As I announced yesterday, we have two
hours for this particular sitting and I am goingcall the first speaker on the side of the Russian
Federation to take the floor but, before doing so, le t me say that, given the fact that we have only a
two-hour session this afternoon, my intention is not to have a coffee break. Of course, subject to
circumstances which might require having a break, but that is the understanding on which I am
going to conduct the business this afternoon.
I am going to call Mr. Samuel Wordsworth to the floor.
WMOr.RDSWORTH:
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I will deal with the issues in the same order as in my
speech on Monday, that is: first, the meaning of the term “dispute” in Article22; secondly,
general legal principles, and thirdly, the documents on which Georgia relies to establish the
existence of a dispute.
2. The first issue: it is not “exegesis gone w ild” to focus on the wording of Article 22. My
friend Professor Crawford says that what is needed is a “sense of reality”, and he gives the example
of States A and B, where State B takes measures against villagers in State A’s territory, and State A
believes that there is a CERD dispute with its powerful neighbour, seeks unsuccessfully to
negotiate the resolution of that dispute, and is th en faced with the decision of whether to come to
this Court or to seek provisional measures oto go to the CERD Committee under Article11 of
CERD.
3. But, however much Georgia may wish things were different, that State A and State B
analogy is not this case. On any reading, Artic le 22 establishes the preconditions for the peaceful
settlement of disputes by the Court. To apply, for a moment, a rather more accurate sense of
reality, the relevant example is where State A ha s gone down a different and impermissible route.
It has resorted to unlawful military force to resolve its problems or, to use the words of the
Commander of the Georgian continge nt to the Joint Peacekeeping Forces ⎯ without of course
wishing to give away the identity of State A ⎯ it has launched a military operation “aimed at - 11 -
1
restoring the constitutional order in the territory of South Ossetia” . State A then, without ever
having mentioned CERD to State B, appears before this Court and suddenly says that it has a 15 or
20 year old CERD dispute with State B.
4. In these circumstances, it is a vital part of this Court’s judicial function to subject the
preconditions in CERD to the seisin of the Court to the closest scrutiny, and to apply them in
accordance with well-established principles of interpretation. And this close scrutiny is all the
more warranted in circumstances where States Parties to CERD have not previously sought to seise
this Court with CERD disputes in the context of an armed conflict 2, with the one exception, of
course, of the Congo v. Rwanda case, where CERD was one of the nine different treaties invoked
(Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 6, para 1).
5. I move onto Professor Crawford’s specific comments on Russia’s case on the meaning of
the term “dispute” in Article 22 which, I should clarif y, was not in fact raised for the first time at
3
the hearing on Monday, but is outlined in Russia’s Preliminary Objections . He dealt with the
point very briefly because, as he put it, Russia’s in terpretation is “utterly defeated” by the use of
the word “matter” in Article13, and it was said that the terms “dispute” and “matter” were used
interchangeably in Article 13.
6. But, with all the respect due to such a distinguished colleague, the point cannot be batted
away quite so easily. The first phrase of Article 13, which is the phrase that Professor Crawford is
focussing on, establishes what happens “When the Commission has fully considered the matter”.
The use of the term “matter” is what would be expect ed in that context. It is a “matter” that is
submitted to the Committee under Articles 11, paragraphs 1 and 2: that is the formal name for the
originating document on which the Commission is reporting. The Commission reports on a matter,
just as a court determines a claim. The point is made all the more clear when one looks at the
1
Fact-Finding Mission, Vol. 1, para. 14; PORF, Ann. 75.
2
See PORF, para. 3.13.
3CR 2010/9, p. 34, para. 4 (Crawford); cf. PORF, paras. 3.19 to 3.22. - 12 -
travaux: the word originally used in Article13 w as “complaint”, not “matter”, before this was
changed in line with the changes to Article 11 that I referred to on Monday 4.
7. Nothing Professor Crawford said detracts from the main point, which is that the States
Parties to CERD evidently did not consider the “matter”, as first communicated by the complaining
State to the Committee under Article11, paragraph1, to be correctly characterized as a dispute.
The matter has to undergo a five-stage crystallization process before it is characterized as a dispute.
That is not just Russia’s interpretation, it is th e interpretation of the Committee in the formulation
of its Rules of Procedure, as to which Professor Crawford had nothing to say 5.
8. As to Professor Crawford’s suggested “mor e plausible interpretation”, which was that the
intention behind the different terms used in Articles 11 and 12 was to enable the CERD Committee
to receive communications from State Parties to CERD whether or not they were party to an
underlying dispute ⎯ because, he said, the world did not yet know the magic of obligations erga
6
omnes ⎯ that is flatly contradicted by the intention of the drafters as established in the travaux .
9. The simple point remains that CERD carefully distinguishes between a non-crystallized
“matter” and a “dispute” in Articles11 and 12, and makes an equivalent distinction in Article16,
whereas Article22 only uses the term “dispute”. So, we have a situation where a treaty
deliberately distinguishes, in two sets of provisions , between a “matter” or “complaint” on the one
hand, and a “dispute” on the other hand, but, when it comes to the third relevant provision, the
compromissory clause, which only uses the term “dispute”, it is said that the term can be
interpreted and applied as if there was no distinction at all.
10. Article 22 can of course be interpreted as if it lived in splendid isolation, as if it were not
located in the only human rights treaty with a mandatory conciliation procedure that carefully
distinguishes between non-crystallized matters and disputes, but was instead, for example, to be
found in a bilateral FCN treaty with no such procedures and no such distinctions, but we submit
that cannot be the correct approach. Professor Cr awford’s reference to the esoteric provisions of
the Indus Waters Treaty does not change matters.
4
CR 2010/8, p. 30, para. 10 (Wordsworth).
5Ibid., p.30, para9 (Wordsworth); Rules of Procedur e of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, CERD/C/35/Rev.3.
6See, e.g., Third Committee, 1356th Meeting, Mr. Lamptey, p. 388, para. 12 (WSG, Ann. 34). - 13 -
11. I turn to our case on the generally legal principles, as to which my friend Mr. Reichler
was happy to list a number of matters on which the Parties agree. Three points.
12. First, Russia’s case is that the general principles do not apply. Mr.Reichler’s position
was, in essence, just apply Mavrommatis and we’re home and dry. But the Mavrommatis definition
(Mavrommatis Palestine Concessi ons, Judgment No.2, 1924, P.C.I.J., SeriesA, No.2 ), which is
fundamental to Georgia’s case on the existence of a dispute, was established by the Permanent
Court in a context where the underlying treaty ⎯ the Mandate for Palestine ⎯ contained no
crystallization and conciliation procedures analogous to those in CERD. And, although of course
Mavrommatis has frequently been applied in this Court’s jurisprudence, this has been in the context
of optional declarations u nder Article36, paragraph2 7 , or compromissory clauses in bilateral 8 or
9
multilateral treaties that did not have the special featur es of CERD that I have outlined. CERD is
lex specialis.
13. Second, Mr. Reichler placed great emphasis on Russia’s acceptance from the Nicaragua
case that there is, as I said on Monday, no absolute requirement as a matter of the general principles
that a State must have specified that a given treaty has been violated in order later to invoke that
10
treaty before the Court . But Mr.Reichler did not respond to the thrust of my submission: this
was to highlight that the absence of a specific clai m in the record will often be a very important
indicator that there is no such dispute, but also that the obvious inference to draw from Georgia’s
failure to say to the CERD Committee that it had a dispute with Russia was that Georgia did not, in
fact, have a CERD claim against Russia. About that failure, he said not one word.
14. Third, Mr.Reichler places great weight on Russia’s position that the existence of a
dispute as to the use of force or compliance with the laws of war does not exclude the possibility
that there is a separate and justiciable dispute under CERD. That is not a concession, as was
7See, for example, Land and Maritime Boundary between Camer oon and Nigeria, Preliminary Objection s,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 279, para 1; East Timor (Portugal v Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 92,
para 1.
8Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) ,
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 395, para 5.
9Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America) , Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1998, p.118, para 1; Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 10, para 1.
10CR 2010/8, p. 32, para. 17 (Wordsworth). - 14 -
11
suggested . The point is that there is no such separate and justiciable dispute in this case. In this
respect, the Court has repeatedly held that it is for the Court, itself, to determine “the real dispute
that has been submitted to it”. (Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998 , p. 449, para. 31; and Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France),
12
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 466, para. 30) . This is a point that Georgia is very sensitive to,
and it has taken the care in its Written Statement to assert that “the ethnic discrimination alleged by
Georgia was not merely parallel or peripheral to the wider conflict between the two States (as
Russia would have the Court believe), but a central element of it ” (emphasis added). Let me test
this in one rather obvious way.
15. In this Court’s Advisory Opinion in the Wall case, particular attention was accorded to
the contentions that Israel had made in its reports to the Human Rights Committee as to the
applicability of the ICCPR in the West Bank and Gaza, and on the conclusions of that Committee
on those contentions ( Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004(I) , p.179, para. 110). A similar
attention was paid to Israel’s reports to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
and the views of that Committee ( ibid., p.180, para. 112). In a related vein, in the Bosnian
Genocide case, the Court stated that “it should in principle accept as highly persuasive relevant
findings of fact made by the Tribunal” ( Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), I.C.J.
13
Reports 2007, Judgment, p. 134, para. 223) .
16. Thus the Court has, quite naturally, placed a particular weight on the views of the United
Nations human rights committees or international tribunals with a direct interest in a matter that has
become before it. In this case, when it comes to the determination of the existence of a dispute, the
position of the CERD Committee should also be acco rded a particular importance. Indeed, I note
11CR, 2010/9, p. 29, para 47 (Reichler).
12See also Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment
of 20 Dec.1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealandv. France) Case (New Zealand v. France), Order of
22 September 1995, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 304, para. 55.
13See also President Higgins’s statement to the press26 Feb. 2007, in which she noted how the Court had
“greatly benefited from the findings of fact that had bmade by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) when it was dealing with accused individuals”. - 15 -
that the honourable Agent for Georgia expressly relied on the CERD Committee’s characterizations
in her opening remarks yesterday, drawing attention to the CERD Committee’s Concluding
14
Observations of 2001, 2005 and 2007 . If I can take these and the relevant Georgian reports in
turn:
(a) In its first report to the Committee, dated May 2000, Georgia said that it:
[Slide SW1]
“Unreservedly condemns any policy, ideology or practice conducive to racial
hatred or any form of ‘ethnic cleansing’ such as that practised in the Abkhaz region of
Georgia following the armed conflict of 199 2-1993. Hundreds of thousands of
displaced persons, a large majority of whom are women, elderly persons and children,
lost their homes and means of survival and became exiles in their own country. Such
has been the outcome of the policy pursued by the authorities of the self-proclaimed
‘Republic of Abkhazia’, the aim of which has been to “cleanse” the region of
15
Georgians and ⎯ in many cases ⎯ representatives of other nationalities as well.”
(b) The matter was then specifically discussed in the Committee on 15 and 16March2001 16.
Various questions were raised by the Country Rapporteur. There was no suggestion of any
kind of Russian responsibility for any form of raci al discrimination, whether in terms of ethnic
cleansing in Abkhazia, discriminating against IDPs or otherwise. However, Georgia’s
representative did refer to the ethnic and politi cal violence in Abkhazia in 1992 and 1993 and
say:
[Slide SW2]
“The efforts of the international community had not managed to resolve the
conflict and serious ethnically motivated human rights violations were still occurring.
The Government was currently engaged in high-level negotiations to reach an
agreement with the separatist organization responsible for the di17urbances , and the
issue of respect for human rights loomed large in the talks.”
(c) The Committee then reported as follows:
[Slide SW3]
“the situations in South Ossetia and Abkh azia have resulted in discrimination against
people of different ethnic origins, including a large number of internally displaced
persons and refugees. On repeated occasions, attention has been drawn to the
1CR 2010/9, p.10, para.3 (Ms Burjaliani).
15
WSG, Ann. 64, para. 55; emphasis added.
1WSG, Anns. 65 and 67.
1WSG, Ann. 67, para. 21; emphasis added. - 16 -
obstruction by18he Abkhaz authorities of the voluntary return of displaced
populations” .
(d) I move on to Georgia’s second and third periodi c reports, which were lodged in October 2004
(Annex70) and considered in the Committe e in August2005 (Annex72). Georgia’s
representative said that:
[Slide SW4]
“Her Government was gravely concerne d about violations of the human rights
of Georgian citizens in the Gali district of Abkhazia and called for the establishment
of a United Nations human rights protection office in the city of Gali to monitor the
situation. The situation of internally disp laced persons who had been unable to return
to Abkhazia was another cause for concern. Her Government was hopeful that an
agreement cou19 be reached with the Abkhaz aut horities to the satisfaction of all
parties . . .”
(e) I would add that Georgia then submitted further information to the Committee in
December2006, which contains no suggestion of an allegation of racial discrimination by
Russia, although I do note that Georgia informed the Committee of a new draft law “aimed at
restituting property and restoring rights and freedoms of persons affected by [the]
20
Georgian-Ossetian conflict, whose rights were roughly violated during this conflict” . No
mention of Russia.
(f) The Committee’s Concluding Obser vations, issued in March 2007, then contain no suggestion
whatever of Russian responsibility for alleged acts of racial discrimination 21.
17. So much, we say, for the case on which so much emphasis was placed yesterday, on the
alleged dispute with Russia over return of the IDPs to Abkhazia. A dispute that Georgia never saw
fit to mention to the CERD Committee, a dispute that is inconsistent with the Concluding
Observations of the CERD Committee on three separate reports ⎯ that is, on each occasion that
the Committee has had the opportunity to make its observations so far as concerns Georgia. A
dispute that is, in addition, radically inconsistent with multiple Security Council resolutions,
including resolution 1808 of April 2008, which, as I said on Monday, repeatedly refers to Georgia
1WSG, Ann. 66, para. 4; emphasis added.
19
WSG, Ann. 72, para. 24; emphasis added.
2CERD/C/GEO/CO/3/ADD.1, para. 27; emphasis added.
2WSG, Ann. 86. - 17 -
and Abkhazia as the two sides to a conflict 22, and as to which Georgia had precisely nothing to say
yesterday.
18. Mr.President, Georgia cannot be entitled to take a very careful selection of documents
from a no doubt vast diplomatic record, characterize these as CERD claims against Russia, and say
that it is entitled to bring a 17 or 18-year old dispute over alleged discrimination in the return of
refugees before the Court. If Georgia had had a claim to make it would have been made it before,
before, the landscape changed with Georgia’s unla wful use of force in August 2008. Georgia
would have made that claim before the CE RD Committee or, on Georgia’s understanding of
Article 22, before this Court. It did not do so, and it is not entitled to do so now.
19. I move on to the August 2008 conflict, now also repackaged as a CERD dispute, but a
conflict that in fact took place at a time when the CERD Committee was in session, and Russia was
appearing before the Committee. And yet the Co mmittee raised no questions or concerns of any
kind concerning the armed conflict. It gave no indication of any kind that it thought that the armed
conflict engaged Russia’s responsibility under CERD. Of course, that does not have the weight of
a positive determination or expression of view, but it is nonetheless a very significant silence.
20. Mr.President, our case remains strongly that the real dispute so far as concerns the
armed conflict does not concern CERD and, in this regard, we respectfully endorse the views of the
seven Judges at paragraph 9 of the Joint Dissenting Opinion of 15 October 2008.
21. The statements of President Saakashv ili of 9 and 11August2008, on which so much
emphasis is now placed do not detract from this; likewise the other press briefings and cuttings
23
that Mr.Reichler relies on . Of course, the President said what he said, and it is almost as if in
directly accusing Russia of ethnic cleansing on 11August, he had in mind that Georgia would be
lodging a CERD claim within less than 24 hours. In any event, Mr. Reichler elected completely to
ignore the central point, which is, as I said on Monday, that these statements to the press were
made at a time when Georgia was in fact engaged in negotiations with Russia, and was not in fact
alleging in those negotiations breach of CERD or , indeed, racial discrimination more broadly 24.
22CR 2010/8, p.38, para. 29 (Wordsworth); PORF Ann. 67.
23
WSG, Anns. 185, 187 and 201.
24CR 2010/8, p. 40, para 33 (Wordsworth). - 18 -
Georgia has a bizarre argument that Russia was refu sing to engage in negotiations with Georgia at
this time, but I will leave it to Professor Zimmermann to deal with that. For now, it is sufficient to
say that the argument is self-evidently incorrect. Mr.Reichler also said that Russia denied
PresidentSaakashvili’s 9August allegation of ethni c cleansing in the debates before the Security
Council on 10 August 2008 25. No reference was given by Mr. Reichler, so that is no doubt a task
for the second round. But so far as I can see from the document relied on in Georgia’s Written
Statement, there was no such denial 26. As to the statement of Mr. Lavrov of 12 August 2008, this
needs to be read in its context, and who knows whether it was made before or after Georgia lodged
its Application on the very same day. Self-evidently it cannot have inspired the alleged dispute
recorded in Georgia’s Application.
22. Mr. President, both Mr. Reichler and Professor Akhavan elected to put Georgia’s case on
the existence of a dispute, and the existence of negotiations, by reference to the events of 9to
12August2008. Then, but very much as the second string to Georgia’s bow, they both said ⎯
look, this reference to CERD on 12August2008 was not artificial despite what Russia has
repeatedly said, because there are in fact some 17 or 18years of dispute, and negotiations of that
dispute, that trail behind. Mr. President, the re-packaging of the armed conflict of August 2008 as
a CERD dispute in this case is a legal concoction, and the avowed need to parcel it up with the
17 or 18 years simply serves to emphasize the point.
23. For a start, there is no continuum. Presi dent Saakashvili’s briefings on ethnic cleansing
self-evidently are not the same allegations of ethnic cleansing that were earlier levelled so far as
concerns the events of Abkhazia of 1993, howev er much those earlier allegations are now
re-packaged as allegations against Russia.
24. And, when it comes to the documents, the re-packaging of those earlier events falls apart
as soon as one takes a closer look. Take the statement of PresidentSaakashvili of
25February2004 that was at tab6 of Georgia’s folder yesterday ⎯ my friend Mr.Reichler
described this as a “widely disseminated public statement directly accusing Russia of ethnic
25
CR 2010/9, p.17, para. 13 (Reichler).
2From Georgia’s written pleadings, it is understood that the annex relied on is WSG, Ann. 96. - 19 -
27
cleansing” in Abkhazia in the early 1990s . The statement is in fact a transcript of a lengthy
interview called “Ask Georgia’s president: Georgia’s new president, Mikhael Saakashvili, answers
your questions”, in the BBC news “talking points” ser ies. From this 15-page transcript, Georgia
has selected two sound bites from the President’s response to the fifth member of the public who
calls in. If this had been a case about how Georgi a and Russia were on good relations at this time,
Georgia would have no doubt have selected sound bi tes such as “But we want to be also on good
terms with the Russians”, which is what the Preside nt had said to the third caller, one Alexei from
Moscow. It is almost surreal that this is being put forward as a statement of a CERD claim against
Russia, and this is all the more so given the releva nt context, that is, the context of what Georgia
was in fact saying to the CERD Committee at this time.
25. Let me take you to some more of Mr. Reic hler’s selection of Georgia’s best documents.
These are the next two documents in the seri es in which he introduced the talking points
28
interview .
26. First, there is what Mr.Reichler de scribed as President Saakashvili accusing Russia of
ethnic cleansing in an address to the European Par liament of November2006. I do not think so.
PresidentSaakashvili was in fact quoting ⎯ and I quote ⎯ “one of the most famous
Georgian-French film directors, MrO . troseliani, while commentating on the current
anti-Georgian campaign in Russia who remarked that history seems to be repeating itself”, and then
there is a quote from this film director about Russian ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia 29. So, the
subject-matter of what is being said is in fact some alleged anti-Georgian campaign in Russia, not a
matter before you. The allegedly relevant words are those of a film director who may have a
significant role in Georgian-Russian relations, but I doubt it. Then, at other points in this lengthy
speech, President Saakashvili says that his message is one of reconciliation and, interestingly, there
is one reference to “disputes”. The President says, with reference to “our separatist problems”:
27
CR 2010/9, p. 22, para. 25 (Reichler); WSG, Ann. 198.
28
CR 2010/9, p. 22, para 26 (Reichler); WSG, Anns. 172 and 88.
29WSG, Ann. 172, ninth page. - 20 -
[Slide SW5]
“Our disputes continue because they are based on recidivist territorial claims ⎯
remnants from the Soviet peri od when an empire collapsed ⎯ and elites sought to
retain their privileges and fiefdoms.”
27. In the unlikely event that this was all being followed by the Russian Government, could
this have been understood as a CERD claim? I think not.
28. Next document in Mr. Reichler’s series ⎯ it is said by Mr. Reichler that the President
“made a similar accusation in September 2007 in a speech to the United Nations
General Assembly, when he cited Russia for its: ‘m30ally repugnant politics of ethnic
cleansing, division, violence and indifference’” .
I respectfully invite the Court to give the sp eech a careful read, as with every single one of
Georgia’s documents. The extract reli ed on says nothing about Russia at all ⎯ nothing. The
extract is to be found in the seventeenth paragraph of a lengthy speech, as to which in the eighth
paragraph there is a reference to Georgia’s most challenging relationship being with its neighbour,
Russia. In between this reference to Russia and the reference to ethnic cleansing, on which
Georgia now relies, one learns about matters such as the rate of growth of Georgia’s economy and
reforms in education. How the remark is interpreted as a CERD claim against Russia I have no
idea. Two paragraphs further down, there is an oblique reference to Russian peacekeepers, and a
further two paragraphs down we find the following reference to ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia:
[Slide SW6]
“The brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing uprooted ethnic Georgians,
Armenians, Estonians, Greeks, Jews, Russians and others who had lived peacefully in
that land for centuries . . .”
29. So this is a case that turns on Russia’ s ethnic cleansing of Russians. As I said on
Monday, a very serious refugee issue, yes; a dispute between Georgia and Russia over racial
discrimination, no, and this particular docum ent could not conceivably be construed as the
communication of a CERD claim. Let me continue a little further into the speech. If one goes
down four more paragraphs, rather out of the bl ue, there is a reference to “years of biased and
unbalanced actions by supposed peacekeeping for ces”, then some Martin Luther King and then,
this:
30
CR 2010/9, p. 22, para. 26 (Reichler); WSG Ann. 88. - 21 -
[Slide SW7]
“The continued ignorance of the ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia, Georgia is a
stain on the moral account book of the international community. [Note: of course, no
reference to Russia.] These disputes are no lo nger about ethnic grievances; they are
about the manipulation of greed by a tiny ma jority of activists, militants, militias and
foreign backers, at the expense of the local population . . .”
30. No longer about ethnic grievances.
31. That brings me onto my next point. Mr .Reichler mis-characterized my references to
what I called “background noise”. I did not say that Georgia’s allegations of CERD were
31
background noise ; to the contrary, I said that there was a very high level of background noise
against which Russia would have had to discern the existence of the alleged CERD dispute with
Georgia. The background noise is all the claims th at Georgia was in fact making, its claims in
particular against the South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities, that principally concerned
Georgia’s territorial sovereignty 32.
32. But that was not the only form of background noise. For much of the noise was of
Georgia saying things that are completely incons istent with the case that it now seeks to bring ⎯
like President Saakashvili saying to the United Nati ons General Assembly that the “disputes are no
longer about ethnic grievances” 33. If I can take another of the documents that Mr. Reichler relies
34
on, a statement of Georgia’s Permanent Representa tive in the United Nations of October2006 ,
there is an assertion that Russia’s actions have for years only served to de-stabilize the situation in
Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and Tskinvali, ther e is a statement which Georgia deploys on the
failure of Russian peacekeeper s to carry out their mandate of creating favourable security
environment for returning IDPs, and then there is this:
[Slide 8]
“The Russian political leader’s statem ents and actions once again make clear
that what we are dealing with is not a f undamentally ethnic conflict, but rather one
stemming from Russia’s territorial ambitions against my country.”
31CR 2010/9, p. 23, para. 28 (Reichler).
32
CR 2010/8, p. 37, paras. 26-27 (Wordsworth).
33WSG, Ann. 88.
34CR 2010/9, p. 25, footnote 47 (Reichler); WSG, Ann. 171. - 22 -
33. Not a fundamentally ethnic conflict. Quite right. True in 2006; true in 2007 when
PresidentSaakashvili said the same thing to the General Assembly; true in 2008 when Georgia
unlawfully used force against the Russian peacekeeping forces and a fe w days later turned to this
Court with its concocted CERD claim.
34. Mr.President, I do not have time to go through all of Mr.Reichler’s documents in the
detail I would like, but as I said in opening, there is a vital who, what and when question for every
35
single one. I note that the exchange of June-July 2008 relied on by Mr. Reichler was addressed in
some detail by Ambassador Roman Kolodkin in the first round ⎯ no need to say anything further
on that. The remaining documents that Mr. Reichler referred to are as follows:
(a) The who: Mr. Reichler refers to Annexes 82, 124, 125, 132, 136, 145, 146 and 158 which are
all documents that emanate from Georgia’s Parliament. As I said on Monday, the Georgian
Parliament does not implement Georgia’s foreign policy 36. There was no response to that. The
Georgian Parliament cannot make a CERD claim. It does not speak with the same voice as the
Georgian Government, as the concrete example that I gave you on Monday of the competing
accounts of events of May 1998 amply demonstrated ⎯ another matter on which Mr. Reichler
37
has had nothing to say . To take another obvious example, Georgia’s Parliament has
repeatedly passed resolutions on the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers ⎯ on which Georgia
now relies, but, which the Georgian Government repeatedly ignored at the time.
(b) The who question, a second limb: there is a further category of documents, press statements
that were not communicated to Russia: these are Annexes 180 and 182.
(c) The what question: Mr. Reichler refers to A nnexes 91, 163 and 170 which when read in their
entirety in fact concern assertions that Russia is seeking to annex Georgia’s territory, or that
some political act of recognition of the authorities in South Ossetia or Abkazia in fact
constitutes support for ethnic cleansing. Or th ere is some banal reference to Russian
peacekeepers. Mr.Reichler also referred to a report submitted before the Human Rights
Committee, which is Annex 85, but the complaint made there is not of racial discrimination, it
35
MG, Anns. 308 and 311.
36
CR 2010/8, p. 37, para. 27 (Wordsworth).
3Ibid. - 23 -
is not under Article 26 of the ICCPR, and I note in passing that Mr. Reichler sought to rely on
38
this report but of course passed over all Georgia’s reports before the CERD Committee .
(d) The when question, finally: Mr. Reichler refe rs to Annexes 124, 125, 132, 136 and 138 which
all concern events prior to 1999. Pr ofessorZimmermann will return to the ratione temporis
issue later today. But it is absurd to say that a pre-1999 document can constitute the
communication by Georgia of a claim under CERD . And that is the full list of documents
deployed by Mr. Reichler.
35. Mr. President, Members of the Court, that completes my remarks. I thank you for your
kind attention, and may I ask you to hand the floor to Professor Pellet.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr.Samuel Wordsworth for his statement. I now invite
Professor Alain Pellet to take the floor.
M.PELLET: Thank you very much Mr.President. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et
Messieurs les juges, le texte que je vais lire vous dira sûrement quelque chose.
o A. La nécessité d’un sens utile
[Projection n 1]
1. «Tout différend entre deux ou plusieurs Etats parties touchant l’interprétation ou
l’application de la présente convention sera porté, à la requête de toute partie au différend, devant
la Cour internationale de Justice pour qu’elle stat ue à son sujet.» Et pourtant ce n’est pas le texte
de l’article22 de la convention CERD. C’est ai nsi que la Géorgie lit cette disposition. Et je
comprends pourquoi le professeur Crawford a préféré éviter de la relire lorsqu’il
s’est employé à la
«désinterpréter».
[Projection n o2]
2. C’est que cette disposition dit en réalité quel que chose de très différent de ce que la Partie
géorgienne tente de lui faire dire. Je la lis pour de vrai :
«Tout différend entre deux ou plusieurs Etats parties touchant l’interprétation ou
l’application de la présente convention, qui n’aura pas été réglé par voie de
négociation ou au moyen des procédures expressément prévues par ladite convention ,
3WSG, Ann. 85. - 24 -
sera porté, à la requête de toute partie au di fférend, devant la Cour internationale de
Justice pour qu’elle statue à son sujet...»
3. Le professeur Crawford s’est donné la peine de compter les mots de la vraie version, celle
de la convention. Soixante-cinqmots nous dit-il 39(en français, langue plus fleurie que l’anglais,
cela fait soixante et onze ⎯ et encore, sans les apostrophes) ; mais, en réalité, l’interprétation qu’il
s’efforce de promouvoir réduit cette disposition à cinquante-deuxmots. En d’autres termes mon
contradicteur fait passer dix-neufmots à la tra ppe comme si les négociateurs de la convention
CERD les avaient inclus par inadvertance alors qu’ils ne signifieraient rien. Cela ne se peut : il faut
leur trouver un sens ⎯et pourtant, le conseil de la Géorgi e ne s’en soucie guère: «Article22
provides that a State Party may unilaterally refer a dispute to the Court if that dispute «is not settled
by…the procedures expressly provided for in [the] Convention», but it does not establish any
obligation to have recourse to those procedures.» 40
4. Encore une fois, Monsieur le président, la thèse de la Géorgie revient à compter pour rien
⎯ à effacer, une expression faite d’une vingtaine de mots qui, selon son interprétation, devrait être
privée de tout effet utile, au mépris des méthodes d’interprétation les mieux établies.
o
[Fin de la projection n 2]
5. Et cette superbe indifférence pour le vrai sens des mots (du mot «ou» en l’occurrence) se
retrouve dans l’obstination de mon adversaire et ami à affirmer benoîtement que «whether or not
they are preconditions to access to the Court, the drafters treated «negotiation» and «the procedures
41
expressly provided for in this Convention» as alternatives» . Ce n’est tout simplement pas exact
pour au moins trois raisons décisives :
⎯ l’une de texte: dans la phrase litigieuse utiliser la conjonction «et» au lieu de «ou» aurait
constitué un non-sens ;
⎯ une autre de «vérité historique», si je puis dire qui tient aux travaux préparatoires de la
convention ;
39
CR 2010/9, p. 44, par. 35. Voir aussi p. 33, par. 2 (Crawford).
40
CR 2010/9, p. 37-38, par. 16 ; voir aussi p. 38, par. 17 (Crawford).
41CR 2010/9, p. 45, par. 36 (Crawford). - 25 -
⎯ quant à la troisième, elle est fondée sur un argument d’autorité: cela va à l’encontre de votre
jurisprudence bien établie.
B. Le sens ordinaire du texte de l’article 22 interprété dans son contexte
o o
[Projection n 3 (= projection n 4-2 du premier tour)]
6. Monsieur le président, sur le premier point, je ne puis que me répéter puisque le
professeur Crawford n’en n’a rien dit ⎯ son silence (une attitude inhabituelle chez lui) témoignant
sans doute de son embarras tant la chose paraît évidente; écrire «et» au lieu de «ou» dans cette
phrase aurait été tout simplement absurde : on ne peut régler un différend à la fois par l’un et par
l’autre de ces moyens ; on peut tenter de le régler successivement par l’un ou par l’autre.
7. Et le curieux argument selon lequel dans d’autres dispositions de la convention ⎯ ou dans
l’article22 lui-même, il y a des «et» cumulatifs et des «ou» alternatifs 42 n’y change rien: nous
n’avons évidemment jamais dit que les deux conjonctions sont toujours interchangeables : tout est
question de circonstances et de contexte. S’agissant de l’expression qui nous occupe, les rédacteurs
de la convention pouvaient seule ment utiliser «ou»; et ce «ou» ne pouvait qu’être cumulatif,
comme c’est en général le cas dans une phrase négative 43. Dans d’autres cas (bien sûr plus
nombreux), ils ont, bien sûr aussi, retenu «ou» dans son sens alternatif.
o
[Projection n 4 (article 2 1) b) en mettant les deux «ou» ou «or» en gras et en rouge)]
8. Au demeurant, Monsieur le président, l’article22 n’est pas, tant s’en faut, la seule
disposition de la convention qui u tilise la conjonction «ou» après une formule verbale négative. Il
y en a beaucoup d’exemples mais l’article2, paragraphe1 b), présente un intérêt particulier car,
dans son texte français, il comporte deux fois la conjonction «ou», qui a dans chacun une
signification distincte et qui, pourtant est traduite de manière non uniforme dans les différentes
langues officielles: « b) Chaque Etat partie s’engage à ne pas encourager, défendre ou appuyer la
discrimination raciale...» Ici le verbe négatif («à ne pas...») est suivi par «ou» qui correspond bien
à «or» en anglais, à «o» en espagnol; et pourtant ce «ou» signifie évidemment «et», ce qui est
42
CR 2010/9, p. 44, par. 35 (Crawford) ; voir aussi p. 46, par. 43 (Crawford).
43Voir CR 2010/8, p. 54-55, par. 36 (Pellet). - 26 -
illustré sans ambiguïté par le « и» [i]) en russe. Je continue ma lecture : «la discrimination raciale
pratiquée par une personne ou une organisation quelconque».
Cette fois, le «ou» ⎯que l’on retrouve également en anglais et en espagnol ⎯ est sans aucun
doute alternatif ; le mot en russe «или» [«ili»], en revanche, a un sens exclusivement alternatif.
[Fin de la projection n 4]
C. Les travaux préparatoires de la convention
9. Monsieur le président, pour ce qui est des tr avaux préparatoires, on ne peut pas dire qu’ils
soient d’un grand secours à la Géorgie malgré les tentatives téméraires du professeur Crawford qui,
de même que le saint protecteur de la Géorgie av ait affronté le dragon, n’hésite pas à tenter de
retourner le sens, fort clair, des travaux préparatoires. La différence, c’est que saint Georges, lui,
avait terrassé le dragon...
10. Sans répéter ce que j’ai dit lundi 44, passons brièvement en revue les travaux préparatoires
tels que mon contradicteur tente de se les approprier.
11. Sans se lasser, il reprend l’antienne de la Géorgie à ce sujet : «Article 22 has its roots in
an entirely distinct process from that involve d in constructing the mechanism of the CERD
45
Committee.» Et d’insister sur la confusion qu’aurait commise la Russie, qui se serait trompée sur
46
l’origine de la clause compromissoire et sur le chemin qu’elle a parcouru lors de la négociation .
12. Monsieur le président, il est exact que le Bureau de la Troisième Commission a proposé
47
le texte des dispositions finales , mais cet épisode n’est ni le début, ni la fin de l’histoire.
13. Elle commence, comme le concède du bout des lèvres le professeurCrawford (en
utilisant une formule un peu méprisante), av ec «un certain M.Inglés des Philippines» («a
48
Mr.Inglés from the Philippines») ⎯il s’agit du très respecté expert philippin à la
Sous-Commission des droits de l’homme, qui est véritablement «l’inventeur» du mécanisme de
surveillance de la convention par un comité d’expe rts indépendants et qui a proposé, de prévoir,
44
CR 2010/8, p. 55-58, par. 39-45 (Pellet).
45
CR 2010/9, p. 48, par. 47 (Crawford).
46CR 2010/9, p. 49, par. 51 (Crawford).
47Voir CR 2010/8, p. 56-57, par. 41-43 (Pellet).
48CR 2010/9, p. 48, par. 48 (Crawford). - 27 -
dans la même disposition 49, la saisine de la Cour «faute pour le comité de parvenir à une solution
50 51
dans le délai imparti» . C’est ce texte qui a été remis à la Commission des droits de l’homme
52
puis à la Troisième Commission . Et ce n’est qu’à ce stade que, pas pour des raisons de principe
mais pour des motifs de commodité, le principe de la compétence de la Cour a été renvoyé aux
clauses finales.
14. Ceci était, au surplus, conforme à la pratique usuelle selon laquelle les clauses
juridictionnelles figurent en général dans des dispositions finales. C’est donc très légitimement
que, dans le document de travail sur les clauses fi nales préparé par le Secrétariat (et non par la
53
Commission des droits de l’homme) , celui-ci a fait figurer un choix de rédactions possibles pour
ce qui est de la saisine de la Cour. Mais, le professeurCrawford occulte deux éléments
significatifs :
⎯ d’une part, ce document du Secrétariat, après l’énumération de quatre clauses-types empruntées
à divers traités conclus antérieurement, attire explicitement l’attention «sur l’avant-projet de
mesures de mise en Œuvre complémentaires, dont on a proposé l’insertion dans le projet de
convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale et que
54
la Sous-Commission a transmis à la Commission [en fait, il s’agissait du projet Inglés]» ; et,
49 o
Article17 de la proposition Inglés, onglet n 4 du dossier de plaidoiries, Russie, 13septembre2010: «Les
Etats parties à la présente convention c onviennent que tout Etat partie, défendeu r ou plaignant, peut, si aucune solution
n’a pu être obtenue selon les dispositions du paragraphe 1 de l’article 14, porter l’affaire devant la Cour internationale de
Justice, après que le rapport prévu au paragraphe 3 de l’article 14 a été établi.» (M. Inglés, Projet relatif aux mesures de
mise en Œuvre, Nations Unies, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.321, 17 janvier 1964.)
50 Conseil économique et social, Projet de convention internationale sur l’ élimination de toutes les formes de
discrimination raciale ,compte rendu analytique de la 427eséance, Na tions Unies, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.427, p.13
(observations écrites de la Géorgie (OEG), vol. II, annexe 7).
51
Conseil économique et social, Rapport de la sous-commission de la lutte contre les mesures discriminatoires et
de la protection des minorités, Nations Unies, doc. E/CN.4/873 E/CN.4/Sub.2/241, p. 53-54.
52
Philippines, Projet d’artioles concernant le s mesures de mise en Œuvre , NationsUnies, doc.A/C.3/L.1221,
11 octobre 1965 ; voir aussi onglet n 4 du dossier de plaidoiries, Russie, 13 septembre 2010.
53
Cf. CR 2010/9, p. 48, par. 48 (Crawford).
54NationsUnies, Conseil économique et social, Projet de convention internationa le sur l’élimination de toutes
les formes de discrimination racial e, Clauses finales, Document de tr avail préparé par le Secrétariat, OEG, vol.II,
annexe 13, p. 17 pour la version française et p. 16 pour la version anglaise. - 28 -
⎯ d’autre part, ce même avant-projet est annexé au rapport de la Commission des droits de
l’homme à la Troisième Commission ⎯alors que le document sur les clauses finales du
Secrétariat ne l’est pas .55
56
15. Et, contrairement aux affirmations de mon d’habitude savant contradicteur , lors des
débats au sein de la Troisième Commission elle-même, les discussions sur la clause
compromissoire sont longtemps allées de pair av ec celles relatives aux autres mesures de mise en
57 e
Œuvre ; ce n’est qu’à la 1349 séance, soit le 19novembre1965, que les promoteurs de ces
mesures ont renoncé à l’inclusion de la clause ju ridictionnelle parmi ces mesures et présenté un
projet ne comportant aucune clause sur l’interventi on de la Cour internationa le de Justice. Ceci
tout en précisant expressément par la voix du repr ésentant du Ghana que la saisine de la Cour
58
«pourra être prévue dans les clauses finales» .
16. A ce stade, contrairement à ce que suggère M.Crawford 59, la possibilité de saisine
unilatérale de la Cour était loin d’être acquise. Comme l’a précisé ⎯à ce moment là ⎯ le
représentant du Ghana, dans une déclaration que mentionne mon contradicteur sans la citer:
«[L]’idée de recours à la Cour internationale de Justice, dont il sera question dans les clauses
60
finales, donne lieu à de nombreuses réserves.»
17. C’est pour, je dirais, «assurer» d’abord le rôle du Comité que le Ghana et les Philippines
ont exclu toute mention de la Cour de leurs propos itions sur la procédure de conciliation. Et cette
61
dissociation temporaire a été unanimement approuvée . Mais on ne saurait en tirer la conclusion
55
Nationsnies, Commission des droits de l’homme, Rapport sur la vingtième session
(17 février-18 mars 1964), doc. E/CN.4/874, p. 113-117, OEG, vol. II, annexe 16.
56
CR 2010/9, p. 48, par. 47 (Crawford).
57
Cf. Documents officiels de la Troisièm e Commission de l’Assemblée générale , vingtième session,
Nations Unies, doc. A/C.3/SR.1344, p. 338, par. 16 ; p. 341, par. 43 ; Documents officiels de la Troisième Commission de
l’Assemblée générale, vingtième session, NationsUnies, doc.A/C.3/ SR.1345, p.351, par.40; Documents officiels de la
Troisième Commission de l’Assemblée générale, vingtième session , Nations Unies, doc. A/C.3/SR.1347, p. 365,
par. 68-69.
58 Documents officiels de la Troisième Commission de l’Assemblée générale , vingtième session, NationsUnies,
doc. A/C.3/SR.1349, p. 373, par. 29 (OEG, vol. II, annexe 28).
59 CR 2010/9, p. 50, par. 53 (Crawford).
60
Documents officiels de la Troisième Commission de l’Assemblée générale , vingtième session, NationsUnies,
doc. A/C.3/SR. 1354, p. 403, par. 54.
61
Documents officiels de la Troisième Commission de l’Assemblée générale , vingtième session, NationsUnies,
doc. A/C.3/SR.1353, p. 398, par. 58. - 29 -
hâtive et erronée que la clause compromissoire alla it pour autant faire cavalier seul. Il a toujours
été entendu par les négociateurs, que «la Commissi on ne devrait pas étudier les clauses finales
62
avant les clauses d’application» .
18. Du reste, une fois la procédure de conciliation sous l’égide du Comité acquise, les
mêmes Etats auxquels la Mauritanie s’était associée ont dépo sé l’amendement «des trois
63
puissances» au projet de clause compromissoire élaboré par le Bureau . Ceci était conforme à la
décision de la Commission, que la Géorgie s’obs tine à citer d’une manière tronquée, selon laquelle
64
les dispositions finales «seraient revisées co mpte tenu du texte final de la convention» .
L’adoption de l’amendement des trois puissances constitue, elle, «la fin de l’histoire» : dorénavant,
comme je l’ai expliqué lundi 65 , le rôle premier du Comité et celui, ultime, de la Cour, sont
préservés et, pourrait-on dire, sont «synchronisés» : d’abord la négociation et les procédures
institutionnelles ; ensuite, en cas d’échec, la Cour.
19. Voici donc, Monsieur le président, ce que les auteurs de la convention ont, délibérément,
voulu faire : trouver un équilibre entre la faculté pour les Etats de saisir l
a Cour tout en préservant
le rôle du Comité, de façon à lui permettre de désamorcer le différend avant que celui-ci soit, en cas
d’échec, porté devant la Cour. Le dragon remue toujours, Monsieur le président! M.Crawford
n’a pas réussi à débarrasser la Géorgie du spectre des travaux préparatoires.
20. Sur un point cependant, je suis prêt à r econnaître que ces travaux préparatoires laissent
un aspect de l’article22 dans une certaine incertitude : qu’avant de saisir la Cour l’Etat requérant
doive avoir fait une tentative de règlement au titr e de la phase de conciliation des articles 11 à 13,
cela ne fait aucun doute. Qu’il faille également que «la Partie demanderesse [doive] avoir tenté
d’engager, avec la Partie défenderesse, des discu ssions sur des questions pouvant relever de la
62Documents officiels de la Troisième Commission de l’Assemblée générale , vingtième session, NationsUnies,
doc. A/C.3/SR.1326, p. 208, par. 58 ; voir aussi déclaration du représentant de l’Irlande; Documents officiels de la
Troisième Commission de l’Assemblée générale, vingtième session, Nations Unies, doc. A/C.3/SR.1348, par. 3.
63Projet de convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de di scrimination raciale; Ghana,
Mauritanie, Philippines: amendements aux suggestions relatives aux clauses final es présentées par le Bureau de la
Troisième Commission, NationU s nies, doc. /C.3/L.1237, A/C.3/L.1313, Russie, dossier de plaidoiries,
13 septembre 2010, onglet no 5.
64 Documents officiels de l’Assemblée générale, Rapport de la Troisième Commission , NationsUnies,
doc. A/6181, 18 décembre 1965, p. 36, par. 174 (pour le texte anglais du rapport, voir OEG, vol.II, annexe40, p.35,
par. 174). Voir CR 2010/8, p. 56, par. 41 (Pellet) et par contraste, CR 2010/9, p. 49, par. 51 (Crawford).
65CR 2010/8, p. 48-49, par. 24-25 et p. 57-58, par. 44 (Pellet). - 30 -
CIEDR» (Application de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de
discrimination raciale (Géorgie c.Fédération de Russie) , mesures conservatoires, ordonnance
du 15 octobre 2008, par. 114) comme vous l’avez noté dans votre ordonnance de2008, cela n’est
pas non plus douteux. Mais en quoi doit consister cette négociation? Rien dans le texte de
l’article 22, ni dans les travaux préparatoires, ne permet de le déterminer avec certitude.
21. Tout ce que l’on peut constater est que l’ exigence d’une négociation est indissociable de
celle des «procédures expressément prévues par ladite convention» et que ces procédures prévoient
elles-mêmes des négociations bilaté rales suite à la saisine du Comité, ce qui implique sans doute
possible que, lorsque, contrairement à la Géorgi e, un Etat suit la procédure prévue par la
convention, la condition de la négociation ⎯ ou plutôt de l’échec des tentatives de négociation ⎯
devra nécessairement être réputée avoir été remplie. Etant donnée la date très tardive à laquelle le
compromis «Comité d’abord/Cour ensuite» a été atteint, il est certainement raisonnable de soutenir
qu’interprétée dans son contexte, l’exigence de tentatives de négociation préalable renvoie à
l’article 11 comme la mention des procédures prévues par la convention le fait à l’évidence.
22. J’ajoute que si, comme vous l’avez constaté même prima facie , la Partie demanderesse
doit avoir tenté d’engager des discussions avec la Partie défenderesse (Application de la convention
internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Géorgie
c. Fédération de Russie), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 15 octobre 2008, par. 114 66), cela
montre que, contrairement à l’insistance appuyée de l’avocat de la Géorgie, il n’est pas exact que
tout ce qu’exige l’article 22 est «a simple finding of fact by the Court, namely that there is a dispute
which is not already settled either by negotiation or by recourse to the other procedures in the
Convention» 67. Vous ne sauriez, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, vous contenter de ce constat,
fût-il double. Il vous appartient, au contraire, de vous assurer que des tentatives de négociation ont
effectivement eu lieu ⎯de même qu’il vous incombe d’ailleurs de vérifier que les procédures
CERD ont été utilisées (mais, en l’espèce, il n’est pas contesté qu’elles ne l’ont pas été).
66
Op. cit. par. 20.
67CR2010/9, p.33, par.2; voir aussi, p.38, par.16; p. 39, par.20; p.43-44, par.33 ou p.51, par.611)
(Crawford). - 31 -
D. Une jurisprudence bien établie
23. Il est, à cet égard, très curieux que le professeurCrawford appelle à la rescousse
l’article II du pacte de Bogotá appliqué pa r la Cour (notamment dans l’affaire des Actions armées
de 1988), ou l’opinion de Jessup dans les affaires du Sud-Ouest africain 6. Dans l’un comme dans
l’autre cas, un élément subjectif était en jeu: dans le premier, la Cour devait seulement
«s’interroger sur l’avis des Parties» quant à la possibilité de régler le différend par la voie
diplomatique ( Actions armées frontalières et transfr ontalières (Nicaragua cH . onduras),
compétence et recevabilité, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1988, p.94, par.63); dans le second ( Sud-Ouest
africain), il s’agissait d’apprécier si les Parties av aient «démontré que le différend n’[était] pas
susceptible d’être réglé par des négociations» ( Sud-Ouest africain (Ethiopie c.Afrique du Sud;
Libéria c.Afrique du Sud), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, opinion individuelle du juge Jessup,
C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p.435) et, dans cette hypothèse, l’appréciation devait émaner de la Cour
(comme c’était aussi le cas dans l’affaire du Nicaragua de1984 dans laquelle le FCN Treaty
exigeait que le différend ne pût «être réglé d’une manière satisfaisante [satisfactorily adjusted] par
la voie diplomatique» ( Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci
(Nicaragua c.Etats-Unis d’Amérique), compétence et recevabilité, arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1984 ,
p. 427, par. 81) 69). Je n’ai pas de querelle à cet égard avec le professeur Crawford ⎯ sinon
que...ceci n’a aucune pertinence en ce qui nous concerne. Nul ne conteste que la Cour doit
déterminer objectivement si le différend a ou n’a p as («n’aura pas») «été réglé» ; mais, s’il ne l’a
pas été, elle doit s’assurer aussi que les moyens énumérés à l’article 22 ont été tentés.
24. C’est ce qu’elle fait en effet chaque fois qu’il lui est demandé d’exercer sa juridiction sur
la base d’une clause compromissoire du type de ce lle qui figure à l’article22 de la convention
CERD ⎯c’est-à-dire d’une disposition permettant à une partie à un différend de saisir la Cour
unilatéralement si le différend en question n’a pas été réglé auparavant par des moyens spécifiés.
A cet égard, les explications embarrassées du professeur Crawford concernant l’affaire RDC
70
c. Rwanda) ne peuvent dissimuler :
68CR 2010/9, p. 38, par. 19 (Crawford).
69
Voir aussi l’opinion individuelle de sir Robert Jennings, ibid., p. 556. Voir aussi CR 2010/8, p. 50-51, par. 29
(Pellet).
70CR 2010/9, p. 41-42, par. 28 (Crawford). - 32 -
⎯ primo : que l’article 75 de la Constitution de l’OMS est en tous points comparable à l’article 22
de la convention CERD ;
⎯ secondo : que la constatation par la Cour de l’absence de différend au sujet de l’application de
la Constitution de l’OMS ⎯ sur laquelle notre contradicteur met exclusivement l’accent ⎯ n’a
justement pas empêché la Cour de s’interr oger sur la réalisation des deux conditions
procédurales posées par l’article 75 ; et
⎯ tertio : qu’elle a expressément indiqué qu’il s’ag issait de «conditions préalables» qui doivent
être «remplies» ⎯et ceci au pluriel ( Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (nouvelle
requête2002) (République démocratique du Congo c.Rwanda), compétence et recevabilité,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2006, p. 43, par. 100).
E. Les relations entre les modes conventionnellement prévus
et les autres modes de règlement des différends
25. Au demeurant, dire que les conditions po sées à l’article 22 de la convention CERD sont
des préalables nécessaires à la saisine de la Cour, ne signifie évidemment pas que les Parties ont
une obligation juridique de régler le ur différend par l’un de ces moyens ⎯ contrairement à ce que
le professeur Crawford veut nous faire dire lors qu’il prétend que, selon la Russie, l’article22
imposerait trois conditions préalables à la saisine de la C our dont la première serait le «devoir de
régler le différend avant de saisir la Cour» («th e «duty to settle the dis pute before seizing the
71
Court»») . Il m’arrive sûrement de dire des bêtises, Monsieur le président, mais de proférer une
telle absurdité, honnêtement je ne crois pas: il est en effet inconcevable que le règlement du
différend puisse être une condition à la saisine de la Cour ⎯ dont la mission est justement de régler
les différends ! En revanche, ce qui est vrai, c’est que tous les Etats ont le devoir absolu de ⎯ vous
reconnaîtrez la formule ⎯ «régler leurs différends internationa ux par des moyens pacifiques, de
telle manière que la paix et la sécurité internati onales ainsi que la justice ne soient pas mises en
72
danger» . Et ce n’est sûrement pas en utilisant la force armée que la Géorgie pouvait espérer
régler son prétendu différend avec la Russie conformément au droit international.
71
CR 2010/9, p. 37, par. 15 (Crawford).
72Charte des Nations Unies, art. 2, par. 3 ; voir aussi art. 33, par. 1. - 33 -
26. Au demeurant, ce que nous avons dit est tout à fait différent que ce que l’avocat de la
Géorgie veut nous faire dire: ce n’est év idemment pas que la Géorgie devait avoir réglé ce
prétendu différend avant de le soumettre à la Cour ⎯ ce qui n’a aucun sens ⎯ mais qu’elle devait
s’y être efforcée en utilisant les deux moyens expressément mentionnés à l’article22. Etant
entendu que rien n’aurait empêché les deux Etats de le régler par tout autre moyen licite convenu
entre eux comme le rappellent et l’article 22 lui-même et l’article 16 de la convention.
27. Et ceci me conduit à dire à nouveau un mot de l’extraordinaire insistance mise par la
Géorgie à chercher secours dans cette dernière di sposition, dans l’article 16. Celle-ci confirme,
sans doute aucun, «that the procedures expressly prov ided for in the Convention are not exclusive
73
or exhaustive» ; mais les choses sont plus compliquées lorsque mon contradicteur affirme
qu’elles ne sont pas non plus «obligatoires» («co mpulsory»), car, comme je l’ai dit lundi, c’est là
74
qu’il joue sur les mots . Elles ne sont pas obligatoires, c’est vrai, à deux points de vue :
⎯ du moment que la paix et la sécurité internati onales ne sont pas mises en danger, les Etats,
même s’ils sont en désaccord sur une question concernant l’interprétation ou l’application de la
convention ne sont pas obligés d’y recourir, non plus d’ailleurs qu’à aucun autre moyen ; et
⎯ rien, évidemment, ne leur interdit, de régler leurs différends à ce sujet par d’autres moyens ; en
revanche (et à cet égard les recours à la né gociation et aux procédures expressément prévues
par la convention sont rigoureusement «obligatoires» («compulsory»)),
⎯ la Cour de céans ne peut pas être saisie d’un différend (à condition qu’ il existe effectivement)
si le requérant n’a pas tenté de le régler par les moyens spécifiés à l’article 22.
28. J’ajoute que je ne vois pas du tout pourquoi il ne pourrait «possibly be suggested that this
Court would have jurisdiction under the Optiona l Clause in relation to the dispute, but not
75
jurisdiction under Article 22 of the Convention? It does not make any sense.» ⎯ c’est
M. Crawford qui le dit. Cela, en réalité, fait parfaitement sens : l’une des raisons pour lesquelles de
nombreux Etats ⎯et c’est le cas de la Fédération de Russie ⎯ ne font pas de déclaration
facultative de l’article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut tout en acceptant les clauses compromissoires de
73CR 2010/9, p. 46, par. 44 (Crawford).
74
CR 2010/8, p. 45, par. 15 (Crawford).
75CR 2010/9, p. 47, par. 44 (Crawford). - 34 -
nombreux traités en précisant qu’ils ne récusent p as par principe la compétence de la Cour, mais
qu’ils souhaitent que les conditions particulières dont celle-ci est assortie par ces traités soient
respectées.
29. Quant à l’emplacement respectif des articles 16 et 22, je persiste et signe : l’argument est
parfaitement chimérique: l’article16 est situé là où il doit l’être, à la fin de la partie sur les
mesures de mise en Œuvre, car les négociateurs n’ entendaient pas, que la création du comité, porte
atteinte à l’autorité d’organes déjà établis par d’ autres conventions internationales. Ainsi, comme
l’avait expliqué, toujours M. Inglés,
«les Etats parties à la convention sont entièrement libres de recourir à «d’autres
procédures» pour le règlement de leur différend. Ces procédures pourraient inclure …
par exemple la Cour des droits de l’homme créée par la convention européenne de
76
sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales.»
Du reste, la Géorgie ne s’est pas privée du bénéfice de cette clause puisqu’elle a saisi la Cour
européenne des droits de l’homme 77.
30. De même, comme c’est le cas des clauses juridictionnelles de nombreux traités,
l’article 22, qui concerne le règlement des différends, figure dans les clauses finales ; il renvoie aux
procédures prévues dans la deuxième partie de la convention, et rappelle, lui aussi, que le recours
possible et conditionnel à la Cour, dont il pose le principe, n’est pas exclusif. Il n’y a rien d’épatant
dans tout ceci ⎯ et l’on ne saurait assurément y trouver un argument pour priver le renvoi effectué
à l’article 22 de tout effet utile.
F. Les relations entre la Cour et le Comité
31. Monsieur le président, il m’est arrivé de dénoncer les excès de ce que j’appelle le
«droits-de-l’hommisme» en droit international 78. Mais je dois dire que la charge véhémente du
76
M.Inglés, Conseil économique et social, Projet de conveneion internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les
formes de discrimination raciale, compte rendu analytique de la 427 séance, Nations Unies, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.427,
p. 13 ; voir aussi Natan Lerner, The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Sitjhoff
& Noordhoff, 1980, p. 90.
77 e o
CEDH, 5 section, décision sur la recevabilité, 3 juillet 2009, Géorgie c. Russie, requête n 13255/07.
78
Voir ««Human Rightism» and International Law», Italian Yearbook of International Law , 2000, p.3-16
(traduction anglaise de la «Conférence Gilberto Amado» prononcée aux NationsUnies à Genève le 18juillet2000 sur
««Droits de l’hommisme» et droit international» (http:// untreaty.un.org/ilc/sessions/52/french/amado.pdf) et également
disponible dans Droits fondamentaux, http://www.droits-fondamentaux.org/article.php3?id_article=27. - 35 -
79
professeurCrawford contre le Comité CERD m’a mis extrêmement mal à l’aise . Selon lui, les
80 81
procédures prévues par la convention sont «futiles» et «obsolètes» . «The [Conciliation]
Commission’s decisions are not binding; it can only recommend. It cannot order provisional
82
measures. It cannot decide points of law. Faced with an intransigent State, it is helpless.» Ce
mépris affiché pour le CERD s’étend d’ailleurs à l’
ensemble des organes de traités de droits de
l’homme qui, pas plus que lui, ne sont de véritables juridictions («they are no courts») 83 et
84
auxquels, dans la plupart des cas, les clauses compromissoires ne se réfèrent pas .
32. Je dois dire, Monsieur le président, que malgré la grande estime amicale et la sincère
admiration professionnelle que je lui porte, que je sois l’EtatA, B ou G, j’hésiterais, dans ces
conditions, à consulter le professeur Crawford sur la procédure à suivre : il n’y a pas besoin d’être
particulièrement «formaliste» 85 pour admettre que, comme les juridictions elles-mêmes, les juristes
sont appelés «à interpréter… non à réviser» les traités ( Interprétation des traités de paix conclus
avec la Bulgarie, la Hongrie et la Roumanie, deuxième phase, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1950,
p. 229). Or c’est ce que fait mon contradicteur et ce qu’il veut vous convaincre de faire : il n’aime
pas ⎯la Géorgie n’aime pas les mécanismes de la convention CERD; elle juge les procédures
qu’elle met à sa disposition futiles ; elle les procla me obsolètes ; elle s’en libère et décrète pouvoir
vous saisir directement car ce serait plus efficace. Ce n’est pas juridiquement défendable, ni
objectivement soutenable.
33. Ce n’est pas juridiquement défendable car ce n’est pas parce que des dispositions
conventionnelles ne sont pas du goût de la Géor gie qu’elle peut se dégager des règles qu’elles
posent. Le professeurCrawford ne dit pas que la description que j’ai faite des étapes de la
procédure des articles11 à13 est inexacte; il d it qu’elle est trop lente et qu’elle présente
l’inconvénient de ne pas aboutir à une décision obl igatoire. Le premier point est subjectif mais,
79 Voir CR 2010/9, p. 34-35, par. 4-5 ; p. 45, par. 37-38 ; et p. 47, par. 45 (Crawford).
80
CR 2010/9, p. 35, par. 5, ou p. 47, par. 45 (Crawford).
81
CR 2010/9, p. 45, par. 38 (Crawford).
82
CR 2010/9, p. 34, par. 4 (Crawford).
83 CR 2010/9, p. 45, par. 37 (Crawford).
84 Ibid.
85
Cf. CR 2010/9, p. 34, par. 4 (Crawford). - 36 -
avec tout le respect que j’ai pour la Cour, je ne suis pas certain que la rapidité soit la caractéristique
première de la procédure qu’elle suit. Quant au second reproche, il appelle trois remarques :
1) il n’est pas du tout évident que, dans tous l es cas, une procédure contentieuse aboutissant à une
décision juridiquement obligatoire soit le meilleur moyen de régler les différends entre Etats ;
2) que cela plaise ou non à la Géorgie et au professeur Crawford, les négociateurs ont
délibérément privilégié ces modes souples de règlem ent et conditionné la saisine de la Cour à
leur échec ; tel est le droit ; en outre,
3) la possibilité de saisir votre haute juridiction lorsque cette condition est remplie constitue,
justement, l’une des grandes hardiesses de la convention CERD.
34. Il est donc fort injuste, Monsieur le président, d’accabler le mécanisme CERD de tant de
critiques: faut-il rappeler qu’il est, de tous ce ux institués par la suite, par les conventions de
protection des droits de l’homme, le seul à inclure l’obligation pour les Etats parties de se
soumettre à une procédure de règlement de leurs différends inter se ? Faut-il rappeler que parmi
toutes ces conventions, celle de1965 est l’une des quatre seules ⎯et la première ⎯ à prévoir
qu’in fine la Cour de céans peut être saisie unilatéralement pour régler ces différends (et d’ailleurs,
que les trois autres excluent également la saisine inconditionnelle et immédiate de la Cour 86) ?
35. Mais le dédain manifesté par le professeurCrawford à l’égard des procédures de la
convention est également grandeme nt injustifié pour une autre raison: contrairement à ses
allégations, le CERD n’est pas désarmé face aux situations d’urgence; le prétendre, c’est faire
sciemment abstraction de la procédure d’alerte rapide que le Comité a mis en place dans le contexte
de la crise yougoslave, avec l’objectif spécifique de pouvoir répondre aux situations d’urgence.
Comme le relève l’opinion dissidente commune jointe à l’ordonnance de la Cour du
87
15 octobre 2008 . Cette procédure n’est ni obsolète (elle a été utilisée à une vingtaine de reprises
86Voir la convention contre la torture et autres pes ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants (1984),
art. 30, par. 1 ; la convention internationale sur la protection des droits de tous les travailleurs migrants et des membres de
leur famille (1990), art.92, par.1, et la convention inationale pour la protection de toutes les personnes contre les
disparitions forcées (2006), art. 42.
87 C.I.J. Recueil 2008, p.55, par.18, qui renvoie au rapport du Cité pour l’élimination de la discrimination
raciale, Nations Unies, doc. A/48/18, annexe III. - 37 -
depuis1993 et elle a été revisée en2007), ni le nte (la réaction du Comité peut être presque
instantanée lorsqu’il est saisi), ni futile (elle peut aboutir à la saisine du Conseil de sécurité) 88.
36. Et il y a autre chose : la Géorgie a longuement expliqué que le différend l’opposant à la
Russie remontait au début des annéesquatre-vingt-d ix. Elle est devenue partie à la convention
CERD en 1999. Depuis cette date, il ne tenait qu’à elle d’actionner les mécanismes prévus par cet
instrument. Elle ne l’a pas fait; elle est bien mal venue à invoquer l’urgence ⎯et il est, pour le
moins suspect que ce soit justement au moment où l’échec de son offensive armée était avéré
qu’elle ait découvert l’urgence qu’il y avait à saisir la Cour de céans d’un différend qu’elle n’avait
jugé utile ni de notifier à la Russie, ni de régler, pendant presque vingt ans.
37. Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, par votre ordonnance du 15 octobre 2008, vous avez
estimé que l’article22 semblait prima facie constituer une base sur laquelle la compétence de la
Cour pourrait être fondée. Comme vous l’avez pr écisé dans une formule qui, pour être habituelle,
89
n’est pas une clause de style , cette décision «ne [préjugeait] en rien la question de la compétence
de la Cour pour connaître du fond de l’affaire» ( Application de la convention internationale sur
l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Géorgie c.Fédération de Russie),
mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 15 octobre 2008, par. 148). Elle a été rendue à une courte
majorité ⎯ sans que j’insinue que votre ordonnance en soit «moins obligatoire» pour les Parties ;
simplement c’est un fait. Au surplus, nous n’avions pu discuter que superficiellement de
l’interprétation de cet unique fondement de la co mpétence de la Cour invoqué par la Géorgie, des
travaux préparatoires qui avaient conduit à son adoption et de la jurisprudence de la Cour face à des
clauses similaires.
38. Nous sommes convaincus qu’après le débat contradictoire, écrit et oral, auquel les
exceptions préliminaires de la Fédération de Russie ont donné lieu, vous reviserez votre position et
88
Voir note sur l’alerte rapi de et les mesures d’urgence (http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/cerd/docs/A_48_18_Annex_III_French.pdf) et les directives appl icables aux procédures d’alerte rapide et
d’intervention d’urgence (rapport annuel A/62/18, annexe, chap.III) égalemen t disponible à l’adresse suivante:
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/Revised_Guidelines_2007_…. Voir rapport du Comité pour
l’élimination de la discrimination raciale, 22 septembre 1995, Nations Unies, doc. A/50/18, par. 224.
89
Voir Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (Royaume-Uni c.Iran), me sures conservatoires, ordonnance du 5juillet1951 ,
C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p.92-93, et Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (Royaume-Uni c.Iran), exception préliminaire, arrêt ,
C.I.J. Recueil 1952, p. 115 ; voir aussi Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 31 mars 2004 en l’affaire Avena et autres
ressortissants mexicains (Mexique c.Etats-Unis d’Amérique) (Mexique c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique) , ordonnance du
16 juillet 2008, C.I.J. Recueil 2008, p. 326, par. 57 et arrêt du 19 janvier 2009, par. 45. - 38 -
que vous ne permettrez pas à la Géorgie d’utiliser le forum de la Cour mondiale pour prendre, sur
le terrain judiciaire, une revanche à l’échec drecours à la force armée pour trancher un conflit
territorial qu’elle a ensuite déguisé en un différnd concernant l’application de la convention
CERD. Et que vous ne permettrez pas non plus que, ce faisant, elle court-circuite les procédures
expressément prévues par cet instrument, et qu’il ne tenait qu’à elle d’actionner si elle considérait
vraiment qu’un tel différend l’opposait à la Russie. Ce faisant, non seulement vous vous
prononcerez, comme il se doit, conformément au dro it international, mais encore, loin de menacer
d’une manière quelconque le système internationa l de protection des droits de l’homme, vous
contribuerez à le renforcer en préservant l’intégrité des compétences du CERD.
Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, je vous reme rcie de votre écoute attentive. Et je vous
prie, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir donner la parole au professeur Zimmermann.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor Alain Pellet for his statement. I now invite
Professor Andreas Zimmermann to take the floor.
ZMIr.MERMANN:
LACK OF NEGOTIATIONS REQUIRED BY A RTICLE 22 CERD
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is mytask to deal again with the requirement of
negotiations as provided for in Article 22 of CERD. In the second part of my intervention, I will
also briefly reply to Georgia’s arguments on jurisdiction ratione temporis and ratione loci.
A. Absence of negotiations
I. Introduction
2. Mr. President, let me begin by emphasizing the important function of negotiations. They
are a flexible mode of dispute settlement, butthey are also designed to bring about clarit⎯ a
clarity that is particularly important where, as in the case at hand, an applicant Sexpos facto
artificially seeks to portray a whole range of issues as a treaty-specific dispute.
3. This suggests that negotiation requirements s hould not be seen as a formality. And this is
corroborated by a second, more specific concern. - 39 -
4. MrP. resident, Artic22 of CERD c ontains two equally important procedural
requirements before a CERD dispute may be brought before the Court, namely, the prior use of
CERD procedures, and inter-State negotiations.
5. Of course, if Russia is correct, then it is obvious that Georgia cannot seise the Court with a
dispute that it has never presented to the CERD Co mmittee. But even if the Court does not accept
this argument, Russia submits that the special set of dispute settlement mechanisms on which
CERD relies ⎯ namely, involving negotiations, Committee procedures, and this Court ⎯ must be
taken into account when interpreting the requirement of prior negotiations.
6. In this respect, it is highly relevant that Articles 11-13 CERD envisage very specific forms
of negotiations. Pursuant to Article 11 of CERD, the receiving State must have an opportunity to
submit written explanations as to the allegation that it is not “giving effect to the provisions of the
Convention”.
7. It must be told about the specific allegations made against it, and it has an opportunity to
discuss these with the State bringing the application.
8. Mr.President, the fact that Article11 of CERD stresses the importance of bilateral and
CERD-specific negotiations supports Russia’s view that negotiations under CERD are more than a
mere formality. While Georgia has treated Article22 of CERD like a regular dispute settlement
clause, Russia would point out that it is one of the few clauses that operate in tandem with a
Committee procedure emphasising the importance of bilateral and specific negotiations.
9. In this particular setting, the comments made two years ago, in the joint dissent of seven
Members of this Court at the provisional measure s stage of these proceedings, are of particular
relevance:
“[I]t is clear that when negotiation is expressly provided for by a treaty, the
Court cannot ignore this prior condition without explanation; nor can the Court
dispose of this condition merely by observi ng that the question has not been resolved
by negotiation.” ( Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Order of
15 October 2008, Joint dissenting opinion of Vi ce-President Al-Khasawneh and
Judges Ranjeva, Shi, Koroma, Tomka, Bennouna and Skotnikov, para. 13.)
10. Mr. President, in the light of this statement, and given the importance that CERD places
on negotiations, I need not spend much time on Professor Akhavan’s attempts to rescue the specific - 40 -
approach to multilateral negotiations sanctioned in the South West Africa cases 90. What is
important is that the Court only recognized the relevance of multilateral negotiations in exceptional
circumstances, namely “where the disputed questio ns are of common interest to a group of States”
and where, moreover the State bringing the case had “already fully participated in the collective
negotiations with the same State in opposition” ( South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa;
Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 346).
11. Neither factor ⎯ common interest, nor collective negotiations ⎯ is present here.
12. Mr. President, I can be equally brief with respect to the so-called negotiations preceding
Georgia’s accession to CERD in 1999, which are irrelevant. I can be brief because Professor Sands
91
merely claimed that you are entitled to look at pre-1999 evidence ⎯ well, of course you are.
13. Yet, neither ProfessorSands nor Professor Akhavan argue that such pre-1999 instances
could constitute negotiations under Article 22 of CERD as between Georgia and Russia ⎯ indeed
how could it be otherwise since Georgia was dur ing that time not a contracting party and since
Article22 of CERD requires negotiations to take place ⎯ let me remind you ⎯ between “States
parties . . . to this Convention”?
14. This brings me now to the remaining specific instances of alleged negotiations alluded to
yesterday ⎯ and I will begin with evidence origina ting from the days immediately following
Georgia’s illegal use of force ⎯ or as ProfessorAkhavan rather put it ⎯ the days immediately
prior to the filing of Georgia’s case.
II. Alleged negotiations between 8-12 August 2008
15. Mr.President, Professor Akhavan presented th is evidence right at the outset of his first
round pleading 92, and one can safely assume that Georgia has put its best foot forward.
16. In that regard I first note in passing, however, that, by immediately falling back on events
of August 2008, when called upon to provi de specific evidence, Professor Akhavan ⎯ just like
Mr.Reichler before him ⎯ weakens Georgia’s broader claim, namely, that there had been a
continuing dispute and ensuing negotiations spanning nearly two decades.
9CR 2010/9, p. 60, para. 28 (Akhavan).
91
CR 2010/9, p. 69, para. 20 (Sands).
9CR 2010/9, pp. 53 et seq., paras. 6 et seq. (Akhavan). - 41 -
17. During his pleading, Professor Akhavan specifically referred to two statements ⎯ one by
PresidentSaakashvili and the other by Georgia’ s permanent representative in the Security
93
Council .
18. While both are full of accusations against Russia, the one by President Saakashvili of
8 August 2008 is completely silent on negotiations ⎯ and besides constitutes nothing but a
compte rendu of a mere press briefing not addressed in any manner whatsoever to Russia.
19. The second statement of 10 August 2008 by the Georgian representative in the Security
Council, indeed claims that “the Georgia leader ship had reached out overnight to the Russian
political leadership” 94, while Russia in turn is repeatedly said to have refused to negotiate . 95
20. Mr.President, but did Georgia really “reach out” to discuss questions of racial
discrimination ⎯ or rather matters relating to the use of force, which dominated the Security
Council meeting? And, more importantly, did Russia really refuse to negotiate? Let us have a look
at the very exchange of statements that Professor Akhavan relied upon yesterday. The Russian
representative had stated:
[Start slide 1]
“With respect to the Permanent Representative of Georgia’s outrage that our
President had refused to speak with the Pr esident of Georgia. Excuse me, but what
decent person would talk to him now?” 96
[End slide 1]
21. The Russian representative then went on, however, to explain why President Saakashvili
was not, to put it mildly, the ideal person to conduct negotiations with Russia, given that he had
just ordered the attack against Russian peacekeepe rs and the South Ossetia n civilian population.
But more importantly, the Russian representative expressly stated the following:
[Start slide 2]
“But this, of course, does not mean that we are evading any contacts with our
Georgian colleagues. Such contacts are continuing at a wide variety of levels. For
example, the most recent was just a few hours ago: a lengthy telephone conversation
93Cf., CR 2010/9, p. 53, para. 7 (Akhavan).
94
UN Security Council, 5953rd Meeting, UN doc. S/PV.5953 (10 Aug. 2008), p. 5.
95Cf., e.g., CR 2010/9, p. 53 et seq., paras. 9 and 10 (Akhavan).
96UN Security Council, 5953rd Meeting, UN doc. S/PV.5953 (10 Aug. 2008), p. 9. - 42 -
between our Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Georgia. What, then, is the problem here?” 97
22. Mr.President, indeed ⎯ what, then, is the problem here? This statement ⎯ to which,
indeed, I had already previously referred to 98⎯ appears just one paragraph below the excerpt
presented to you by Professor Akhavan. It is easy to find for anyone seeking to present a balanced
account of the exchange that went on between Georgia and Russia in the Security Council.
[End slide 2]
23. It confirms that the two Parties were in close diplomatic contact even while the armed
99
conflict was on-going .
24. It confirms that contacts were taking place at the highest diplomatic level.
25. It confirms that the problem was not Russia’s alleged refusal to negotiate.
26. Rather, it confirms ⎯ but this is a problem for Georgia ⎯ that the actual negotiations
simply did not concern questions of racial discrimination.
100
27. Mr.President, allow me to reiterate the point I made on Monday , and to which
Professor Akhavan had nothing to say. Issues related to CERD were simply not raised with Russia
during the armed conflict, they did not feature in the discussions between Presidents Sarkozy and
Medvedev, and they were not taken up in the six-point plan agreed between the Parties.
28. That leaves us with the alleged refusal to negotiate by the Russian Foreign Minister
on 12 August 101⎯ or “just two days later”, as Professor Akhavan prefers to put it 102⎯
12 August 2008.
29. This statement again only referred to possi ble direct talks with PresidentSaakashvili.
Moreover, at the very same time the ceasefire negotiations between the Parties were right
97UN Security Council, 5953rd Meeting, UN doc. S/PV.5953 (10 Aug. 2008), p. 9.
98CR 2010/8, p. 69-70, para. 46 (Zimmermann).
99
See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Press Release 1153 of 10 Aug. 2008, available
athttp://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/6D57680797E966AEC32574A200354EB7.
100
CR 2010/8, pp. 69-70, para. 46 (Zimmermann).
101
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federa tion, Transcript of Rema rks and Response to Media
Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at Joint Press Conference After Meeting with
Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland Alexander Stubb, Moscow, Aug. 12, 2008
(12 Aug. 2008); WSG, Vol. IV, Ann. 187.
102
CR 2010/9, p. 53, para. 10 (Akhavan). - 43 -
underway under the auspices of President Sarkozy ⎯ a fact to which Minister Lavrov explicitly
referred.
30. And what is even more telling is that Georgia’s Application was lodged on the very same
day, during the very same hours the Press Conference of Mr.Lavrov was being held ⎯ and that
alone renders the document irrelevant.
31. So, with respect to Professor Akhavan’s primary evidence, it is obvious that Russia did
not refuse to negotiate in August 2008 and that , besides, Georgia simply did not raise
CERD-related issues in discussions with Russia.
32. Mr. President, that now brings me to the period between 2000 and June 2008.
III. Alleged negotiations between 2000-August 2008
103
33. The first instance referred to by Professor Akhavan relates to a December 2000
Agreement concerning the restoration of the economy in the Georgian-Ossetia Conflict Zone 104,
which warrants several remarks.
34. For one, it is what it is ⎯ namely, an agreement: hence, even if there had been a CERD
dispute, quod non , it was addressed to the extent governed by the agreement. Moreover, the
agreement dealt with economic prerequisites for a return of refugees only ⎯ an issue not covered
by CERD. And finally, and most important, it provided for an obligation of Georgia ⎯ and
Georgia alone ⎯ to secure the respect for human rights of refugees and IDPs ⎯ while Russia is not
mentioned in that regard. It is therefore surprising, to say the least, to take this document as
evidence of Russia’s obligations under CERD forming the subject-matter of negotiations.
35. As to his next document, Professor Akhava n referred to an internal information note of
105
the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs , which is just that, namely, a one-page summary of
how Georgia perceived six days of discussions and consultations that took place with Russia
106
throughout 2003 . What is first important to note is that Georgia and Russia had reached, in early
103
Cf., CR 2010/9, p. 56, para. 19 (Akhavan).
10Agreement between the Government of Georgia and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation
in Restoration of Economy in the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict Zone and Return of Refugees, Tbilisi (23 Dec. 2000); MG,
Vol. III, Ann. 131.
10CR 2010/9, pp. 57-58, para. 22 (Akhavan).
10Information Note prepared by the Ministry of Forei gn Affairs of Georgia (20 Jan. 2004); WSG, Vol. IV,
Ann. 155. - 44 -
2003, an “agreement about the need to take specific steps, directed... at the solution of such
problems as the dignified return of refugees and IDPs”. The discussions first and foremost then
dealt with the political status of the Gali district. Finally, it is also telling that the involvement and
agreement of the Abkhaz side as being the party to the dispute was seen as the crucial element in
bringing about a solution to the re turn of IDPs and refugees. So , again, this is not proof of
CERD-related negotiations between Georgia and Russia.
107
36. Next, the April 2004 mee ting Professor Akhavan referred to confirms that both
Georgia and Russia, as well as third parties such as UNHCR, considered Georgia and Abkhazia as
being responsible for solving the problem of refugees and IDPs. As a matter of fact, Georgia’s
own internal report confirms that Russia had characterized the Abkhazian position as
“unacceptable” and that it ⎯ Russia ⎯ “fully shared the position of Georgia” 108 ⎯ so, if there was
need to negotiate, both Russia and Georgia had to negotiate with the Abkhaz side.
37. Finally, it is also striking to note that th e next document Georgia refers to refers to the
interrelationship between the restoration of the railway system in Abkhazia and the return of
109
refugees . Moreover, Georgia stressed its willingness to “renew the process of negotiations” ⎯
yet a negotiation process Georgia itself perceived as one with “the leaders . . . in Abkhazia” rather
110
than a negotiation process with Russia .
38. That brings me to the June 2008 exch ange of letters between the two Presidents ⎯ a
matter already dealt with quite extensively on Monday 111. Georgia again portrays this exchange of
letters as evidence of negotiations related to CERD ⎯ this time when it comes to the return of IDPs
and refugees 112. Yet, Georgia itself perceived Abkhazia as its negotiation partner in this respect ⎯
hence its proposal that the Parties to the conflict ⎯ Georgia and Abkhazia ⎯ should conclude an
107
CR 2010/9, p. 58, para. 23 (Akhavan).
10Cf. Minutes of the Meeting Between the State Minister, Mr. G. Khaindrava and the Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. V. Loshinin held on 27 Apr. 2004 (27 Apr. 2004); WSG, Vol. IV, Ann. 156.
10Information Note: Concerning the meeting of Ambassador of Georgia in Russian Federation,
ValeriChechelashvili and the First Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister of the Russian Federation, Mr.V.Loshinin
(21 Oct. 2004); WSG, Vol. IV, Ann. 157.
11Ibid.
11CR 2010/8, pp. 21-22, paras. 9-12 (Kolodkin) and p. 69, para. 42 (Zimmermann).
112
CR 2010/9, p. 58-59, para. 24 (Akhavan), referring to Le tter from President Mikheil Saakashvili to President
Dmitry Medvedev (23 June 2008); MG, Vol. V, Ann. 308. - 45 -
agreement on the matter followed by a remark of the Russian President that the other side,
Abkhazia, might not be willing to follow suit. And this ties in precisely with what Georgia had
been telling the CERD Committee all these years long about responsibility for the IDP problem, as
noted by my friend and colleague Sam Wordsworth.
39. Lastly, one wonders why a proposal to eventually redeploy peacekeeping troops, not
withdraw them 113 should ⎯ or indeed could ⎯ form part of a negotiation process related to racial
discrimination.
40. And that leaves me with the very few instances of diplomatic contacts within the
framework of the United Nations 114 ⎯ provided one were to consider them to be relevant at all,
quod non.
41. The first of these is a letter addressed to the Secretary-General and the Security
Council 115⎯ thus not addressed to Russia ⎯ which in any case I have already touched upon in my
116
first intervention on Monday . May I simply remind the Court that the document in question
(which alleges instances of forced labour to have occurred in Abkhazia) did not make a claim of
racial discrimination as Georgia now claims 117: while referring to specific provisions of both the
ICCPR and the European Convention on Human Rights, neither Article26 of the ICCPR nor
Article 14 of the European Convention prohibiting discriminatory practices are mentioned.
118
42. During my first round speech , I have also already dealt with the very last document
ProfessorAkhavan referred to in which, as he put it, Georgia “represented to the General
Assembly” certain allegations 11. What he unfortunately fails to mention is that this
“representation” ⎯ apart from obviously not being addressed to Russia ⎯ originated from the
Georgian parliament and not from an organ being in a position to represent Georgia in its external
affairs, with the said document moreover being addressed to the Georgian Government only.
113
Ibid.
114
CR 2010/9, pp. 59-60, para. 26 (Akhavan).
11United Nations General A ssembly, Security Council , Identical letters dated 11 Aug.2006 from the Chargé
d’affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the United Nations addre ssed to the Secretary-General and the
President of the Security Council, Ann., UN doc. A/60/976-S/2006/638 (14 Aug. 2006); WSG, Vol. III, Ann. 83.
116
CR 2010/8, p. 64-65, para. 23 (Zimmermann).
11CR 2010/9, p. 59-60, para. 26 (Akhavan).
11CR 2010/8, p. 64, para. 19 (Zimmermann).
119
CR 2010/9, p. 59-60, para. 26 (Akhavan). - 46 -
IV. Concluding observations
43. Mr.President, it is safe to assume that , out of the 80 plus documents Georgia had
included in its written pleadings, Georgia has chosen to present those during the oral hearing that in
its view were the strongest to prove the existen ce of negotiations under Article 22 of CERD. Yet,
none of them proves what they are supposed to de monstrate, namely the existence of negotiations
under CERD.
B. The territorial and temporal scope of jurisdiction under CERD
44. Mr.President, Members of the Court, allow me now briefly to reply to arguments that
counsel for Georgia made with respect to Russia’ s third and fourth preliminary objections. Russia
is convinced that its first and second objections preclude the Court from entertaining the
Application. Accordingly, I would have prefe rred not to take up your time on these matters, but
given Georgia’s posture, it feels the need briefly to reply.
I. Russia’s Third Preliminary Objection
45. Mr.President, Russia continues to consider the third preliminary objection to be not of
120
an exclusively preliminary character .
46. Let me first note in passing my surprise at hearing Professor Sands emphatically ⎯ and
quite emphatically ⎯ arguing how preliminary this question is , given that the relevant section in
Georgia’s written observations seeks to persuade the Court to join Russia’s third preliminary
121
objection to the merits ⎯ as not being of a preliminary character.
47. Moreover, let me reiterate that Russia has not withdrawn its objection ratione loci 122; it
has only decided to no longer plead it as a preliminary objection. Having considered Russia’s
arguments and Georgia’s counter-arguments, Russia considers that to reach a decision on this
objection, the Court will have to have before it mu ch more detailed pleadings from both Parties on
the merits or otherwise of Georgia’s claims.
48. In fact Professor Sands’s pleading yesterday confirmed Russia’s approach. Russia
obviously disagrees entirely with Professor Sands’ ch aracterization of the applicable law, which
120
Cf. already CR 2010/8, p. 26, para. 31 (Kolodkin).
121
Cf. paras. 4.45-4.49.
12Cf. CR 2010/8, p. 26, para. 31 (Kolodkin). - 47 -
seemed to suggest that CERD was applicable extr aterritorially as a matter of course. The cases
Professor Sands referred to, in so far as they accep ted the extraterritorial application of human
rights treaties, have done so only after careful discussion and in very special circumstances only ⎯
sometimes relying on the law of occupation, sometimes on the wording of a specific treaty, and not
the least on the degree of effective control that a State exercises outside its own territory.
49. Russia submits that rather than showing how detached from the merits these issues are,
Professor Sands’s own pleading underlined how closely jurisdiction ratione loci is intertwined with
the facts. By way of illustration, how could a Court assess questions of “effective control” without
engaging with the facts? This is why Russia respec tfully invites the Court, should it ever decide to
uphold jurisdiction, to address issues related to the extraterritorial application of CERD as part of
the merits ⎯ and with the benefit of full argument by both Parties.
II. Russia’s Fourth Preliminary Objection
50. Mr.President, allow me to make some final remarks in relation to Russia’s fourth
objection.
51. However, Russia considers that the matter can be dealt with briefly: both Parties are in
agreement that CERD does not apply retroactively.
52. Russia’s position on this point is straightforw ard: there can be no retroactivity. Georgia
in turn seeks to avoid the obvious implications of th is statement, but equally accepts the principle.
So there is common ground.
53. Yet the Parties are in disagreement about the consequences to be drawn from their agreed
position of principle. Russia’s view is again clear. Assuming the Court has jurisdiction at all ⎯
which it does not ⎯ its jurisdiction only begins on 2 July 1999, the date on which both Georgia and
Russia had become “States parties” to CERD.
54. Georgia’s position is somewhat more complex: it accepts that there can be no
retroactivity, but then seeks to do all it can toavoid the implication of its own position. More
specifically, it invokes the doctrine of “continuous acts” to magically avoid problems of
retroactivity. - 48 -
55. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the notion of continuous acts on which Georgia
relies and with which its argument is said to be “entirely consistent” 123 was developed by the
International Law Commission in a very careful manner to address the specific issue of the
extension over time of a wrongful act.
56. It is not a “catch-all” concept that justifies the introduction of retroactivity “through the
backdoor”. The ILC’s commentary in fact makes that abundantly clear. It gives a number of
examples of continuous acts such as the maintenanc e in effect of national laws incompatible with
international law, the unlawful occupation of a fo reign embassy, or finally the unlawful detention
124
of an individual . These are of course exceptional instances, and so the concept of “continuous
act” is exceptional in character as it is characterized by the continuing nature of the breach itself ⎯
the continuing nature of the breach. As the ILC stressed, it must be “the act [that] continues and
125
[that] remains not in conformity with the international obligation” .
57. By contrast, and contrary to Ge orgia’s argument yesterday, an act does not become a
continuous act simply because its consequences extend over time. In the ILC’s words: “It must be
126
the wrongful act as such which continues.” And further ⎯ and in direct contradiction of
Georgia’s argument yesterday: “An act does not have a continuing character merely because its
127
effects or consequences extend in time.”
58. To be perfectly clear, this is not Russia’s statement, it is the ILC’s commentary from
which I have just quoted ⎯ the same ILC with which, if we were to follow Professor Sands,
128
Georgia’s catch-all construction of the continuing act is “entirely consistent” . It is not.
59. In short, Georgia claims to accept the prin ciple of non-retroactivity and at the same time
puts forward a catch-all notion of continuing acts that ignores the limitations of the ILC’s approach
and effectively tries to reintroduce retroactivity in all but in name. Russia submits that if indeed,
123
CR 2010/9, p. 67, para. 16 (Sands).
124
ILC, Commentary to Art. 14 of the Articles on State Responsibility, para. (3) (reproduced inReport of the
International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third session, UN doc. A/56/10, at 43 et seq.).
125
Art. 14, para. 2 of the Articles on State Responsibility.
126ILC, Commentary to Art. 14 of the Articles on State Responsibility, para. (6) (reproduced inReport of the
International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third session, UN doc. A/56/10, at 43 et seq.).
127Ibid.
128CR 2010/9, p. 67, para. 16 (Sands). - 49 -
the notion of continuing acts is of relevance, it ought to be applied cautiously, not as a licence to
extend jurisdiction.
60. Finally, Professor Sands yesterday s uggested that Russia had dropped its fourth
129
preliminary objection in so far as it related to acts subsequent to the filing of the Application ;
this is not correct.
61. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this concludes my argument. I thank you for your
kind attention. I would ask you to give th e floor to Ambassador Gevorgian who will present
Russia’s concluding statement. Thank you very much.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor Andreas Zimmermann for his statement. Now I call
His Excellency Ambassador Kirill Gevorgian to take the floor.
Mr. GEVORGIAN:
1. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, yesterday, the honourable Agent of
the applicant State once again presented this case as a case of long-standing discrimination against
ethnic Georgians, for which Russia allegedly has responsibility. According to the Georgian version
of events, it all started in 1991-1992 with the sudden and unprovoked oppression and expulsion of
thousands of ethnic Georgians from South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
2. The real sequence of events is very different. In our Written Statement and oral
presentations we have stressed the point that the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts
exploded after the Georgian authorities openly decl ared the policy of a “Georgia for Georgians” 130
as a basis for their country’s new statehood. The applicant State did not try to contest this.
3. This policy of the Georgian authorities inflamed inter-ethnic conflicts, which led to a
humanitarian catastrophe, ending in uprooting th e lives of thousands of people of various
nationalities, including ethnic Georgians. Geor gia has never mentioned during these proceedings,
that besides Georgians, there were tens of thou sands of persons of other ethnicities who perished,
were displaced or otherwise suffered in those conflicts.
129
CR 2010/9, p. 68-69, para. 19 (Sands).
13CR 2010/8, p. 12, para. 1 (Gevorgian); PORF, p. 17, para. 2.5. - 50 -
4. Contrary to Georgia’s assertion, Russia at no time was a party to these conflicts. Those
were constantly on the agenda of the Unite d Nations Security Council, OSCE and other
international bodies, none of which ever regarded Russia as a conflicting party. Georgia has failed
to produce a single document from an intergovernmental international body that would evidence to
the contrary.
5. The internationally recognized role of Russia in these conflicts was that of a facilitator and
peacekeeper. Yesterday, counsel for Georgia imp lied that the Applicant, as a small country, was
not under “conditions of true equality and independence” 131when it agreed to station Russian
peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. However, he failed to explain the fact that
Georgia itself sought Russia’s mediation services and peacekeeping. Nor did he explain, why on a
number of occasions its representatives praised Russian efforts in that capacity. Even in July 2008,
in his letter to the Russian counterpart, Preside ntSaakashvili suggested that the peacekeeping
operation under the auspices of CIS should continue and that Russia should become a guarantor of
132
agreements between the parties to the conflict .
6. Georgia asserted that since 2001, it has never praised Russian peacekeepers, as if the
absence of praise could legally amount to the withdrawal of consent. For the sake of legal clarity,
let me respectfully remind the Court that the consent was withdrawn only on 1 September 2008.
7. In its own logic, Georgia could not terminate the peacekeeping mandates because of the
fear of its big neighbour 13. How striking then that Georgia had no fear to brutally attack the
peacekeeping units of this big ne ighbour using multiple-launch rock et systems, and file the case
against it to the Court immediately afterwards. If I may remind the Court, the size of Georgia’s
army doubled in the five or so years prior to the armed conflict of August2008. In fact, the
argument of “big and small” was yesterday put in the centre of Georgia’s position. I cannot help
asking myself: is it possible to win a case in this C ourt by saying, we are so small, and they are so
big? Is it possible to cure the deficiencies of one ’s legal position by such an argument even if it is
put forward by the most distinguished lawyers?
131
CR 2010/9, p. 26, para. 37 (Reichler).
132
MG, Vol. 5, Ann. 311, Letter from President Dmitry Medvedev to President Mikhail Saakashvili (1 July 2008).
13CR 2010/9, p. 26, para. 37 (Reichler); CR 2010/9, p. 34, para. 4 (Crawford). - 51 -
8. Mr.President, according to the applicant State, for more than 16years it repeatedly
asserted a CERD dispute and called for Russia to ne gotiate on issues of racial discrimination, but
Russia persistently ignored its appeals. Not so. In fact, Russia did participate, as a mediator, in
multiple negotiations between Georgia on the one side and South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the
other. In many cases, Russia itself initiated negotiations between the conflicting parties. However,
Russia did not take part in those negotiations as a party to the conflict. Moreover, these
negotiations concerned various aspects related to the settlement of Georgian-Ossetian and
Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts, including the return of refugees and IDPs of various nationalities,
but never, never, issues of racial discrimination.
9. This raises a further issue: Russia’s alle ged “ignoring” of the right to return, which,
134
supposedly, violates CERD . First, Russia has always supported the right to return ⎯ in
numerous Security Council resolutions, agreements and statements 135. Second, non-return as such
cannot automatically be equated to racial discrimination, just as discussions on displacement do not
automatically constitute negotiations on discrimination ⎯ and in the circumstances they have never
been. Third, Russia has consistently applied the sa me standard to the issue of return of displaced
persons regardless of their ethnicity, that standard being fully in line with the standard applied by
the United Nations: returns may only be sustainable if they are voluntary, safe and dignified 136.
10. The Agent of Georgia accused Russia of “rejecting” recent United Nations General
Assembly resolutions on refugees and displ aced persons from Abkhazia and South Ossetia 137. In
fact, the primary reason for Russia’s opposition to those resolutions was the characterization of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as part of Georgia, unacceptable to Russia in view of its recognition of
their independence. As evidenced by the amendments proposed by Russia to the draft resolution in
134CR 2010/9, p. 12, para. 9 (Burjaliani).
135
PORF, Vol. 2, Ann.38, UN Security Council, reso lution 934 (1994), UNdoc. S/RES/934, 30June1994;
UN Security Council, resolution 1582 (2005), UN doc. S/RES/1582; PORF, Vol. 2, Ann. 36, Quadripartite agreement on
voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons signed on 4 Apr. 1994 (UN Security Council, Letter dated 5 Apr. 1994
from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the UN addressed to the President of the Security Council,
UNdoc.S/1994/397, 5 Apr. 1994, Anns.I and II); MG, Vo l. III, Ann.136, Concludi ng Statement on the Meeting
Mr.VladimirPutin, President of the Russian Federation and Mr.EduardShevarnadze, President of Georgia,
12 Mar. 2003; UN doc. S/PV.3407, 21 July 1994, p. 6.
136Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 11 Feb. 1998.
137CR 2010/9, p. 13, para. 10 (Burjaliani). - 52 -
138
2009, our country was broadly in agreement with the humanitarian aspects of the text .
Moreover, the displacement issues are under consideration at the ongoing Geneva Discussions
under the auspices of the European Union, United Nations and OSCE, with all sides adhering to the
principle of the right to a voluntary, safe and dignified return without any discrimination.
11. Yesterday, counsel for Georgia made vari ous assertions as to alleged current actions of
Russia in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Those alle gations are not relevant to your jurisdiction and
were evidently made for prejudicial purposes.
12. Mr. President, our opponents were very cr itical of the CERD implementation machinery
and remedies provided thereto and even doub ted whether “they are remedies at all” 139. In their
140
view, the CERD Committee could be simply “helpless” in protecting the rights guaranteed by
the Convention. We are convinced that the Court will not follow this regrettable invitation to send
a wrong message that would undermine the role of the carefully designed system established under
major human rights instruments.
13. Moreover, Georgia has failed to explain why it did not start a CERD Committee
procedure years ago and, if there have ever been c onsiderations of urgency, why it did not resort to
the urgent procedures before the Committee.
14. If we assume, as the applicant State proposes, that exhausting the CERD Committee
procedure and negotiations were not required under Article22 of the Convention, Georgia’s
position becomes even less clear. What prevente d Georgia from directly seising the Court during
almost ten years after its accession to CERD? Wh y did it not do so before unlawfully using force
against the Respondent?
15. Mr.President, never before has any country ever tried to seise the Court in such
circumstances! If I may remind you of the word s of the EU Mission Report: “on 7 August 2008
open hostilities began with a large-scale Georgian military operation against the town of Tskhinvali
and the surrounding areas” 141. Never before has the Court had to decide whether it should consider
138
UN docs. A/63/L.81-98.
139
CR 2010/9, p. 47, para. 44 (Crawford).
14CR 2010/9, p. 35, para. 4 (Crawford).
14PORF, Vol. 2, Ann. 75, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report,
Vol. I, Sep. 2009, p. 19, para. 14. - 53 -
a case brought by a State which had not only resorted to illegal use of force just days before seising
the Court, but which directed this force against an internationally recognized peacekeeper, which it
is now portraying as a party to a dispute under CERD. No doubt, current and potential contributors
to peacekeeping efforts are following these proceedings with particular attention.
18. Mr.President, indeed, this is a case with no precedent in your jurisprudence. We trust
that this honourable Court will give a due assessment of these exceptional features of the current
proceedings when considering the issue of jurisdiction.
19. This leaves me with the task of briefly recapitulating Russia’s Preliminary Objections.
20. First. The Court has no jurisdiction to en tertain the Application because, as of the date
when it was lodged, there was no dispute between Georgia and Russia over the interpretation or
application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination with regard to the ethnic Georgian population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
21. Second. The Court has no jurisdiction sin ce the Applicant State has failed to fulfil the
requirements established by Article22 of the Conve ntion, namely, negotiations and resort to the
procedures expressly provided in the Convention.
22. Third. If the Court has any jurisdiction ⎯ and we submit it does not in the light of the
first two preliminary objections ⎯ that jurisdiction is limited ratione temporis to acts or omissions
that have taken place after CERD entered into force as between Georgia and Russia on 2 July 1999.
23. Fourth. As regards the objection to the jurisdiction of the Court ratione loci, the Russian
Federation submits that questions of the extra- territorial application of CERD are closely
intertwined with the facts, for which reason that objection is not of a preliminary nature and should
be considered by the Court only in the impr obable case of these proceedings ever reaching the
merits stage.
Mr.President, before reading our final submission, let me express our gratitude to the
Registrar of the Court and the members of the Re gistry, who have been extremely helpful during
all these proceedings, and to the interpreters. I would also like to express my appreciation to our
counsel and the entire team for their excellent co- operation. And, of course, our sincere thanks go
to you, Mr. President and Members of the Court, for your kind and patient attention. - 54 -
24. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, now I have the honour to read the
final submission of the Russian Federation which, for the reasons set out in our written and oral
pleadings, and in accordance with the presentations made by our counsel, is as follows:
The Russian Federation requests the Cour t to adjudge and declare that it lacks
jurisdiction over the claims brought against the Russian Federation by Georgia,
referred to it by the Application of Georgia of 12 August 2008.
Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, this bring Russia’s presentation on the
Preliminary Objections to a close. I thank you for your kind attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Your Excellenc y Ambassador KirillGevorgian. The Court
takes note of the final submissions which you have now read on behalf of the Russian Federation.
The Court will meet again on Friday 17September from 10a.m. to 12noon to hear the
second round of oral argument of Georgia.
The sitting is adjourned.
The Court rose at 6 p.m.
___________
Audience publique tenue le mercredi 15 septembre 2010, à 16 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Owada, président, en l'affaire relative à l'Application de la convention internationale sur l'élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Géorgie c. Fédération de Russie)