Volume XVI - Annexes 491-527

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
VOLUME XVI OF THE ANNEXES
TO THE MEMORIAL
SUBMITTED BY UKRAINE
12 JUNE 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Annex 491 Ove Dullum, The Rocket Artillery Reference Book, Norwegian Defence
Research Establishment (30 June 2010)
Annex 492 Bertrand Perrin, “L’incrimination du financement du terrorisme en droits
canadien et suisse,” 42 Revue générale de droit 1 (2012)
Annex 493 Ben Saul, International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, United
Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law (2014)
Annex 494 Els De Busser, Open Source Data and Criminal Investigations, Groningen
J.I.L. 2(2) (2014)
Annex 495 Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young, Terrorism, Spoiling, and the
Resolution of Civil Wars, 77 J. of Politics 115 (2015)
Annex 496 Keith Hiatt, Open Source Evidence on Trial, 125 Yale L.J. 323 (2016)
Annex 497 Design, maintenance and combat use of short-range surface-to-air missile
systems. 9Ǩ310Ǵ1 self-propelled transporter-erector-launcher-radar. Set of
lectures. Part 1. Skorik, A.B., Florov, O.D., Nikiforov, I.A., Halytskyi, O.F.,
Morhun, Ye.V.; Kharkiv: KhN
Annex 498 Karpenko, A.V. 9K317M BUK-M3 Surface-to-Air Missile System / NEVSKY
BASTION Military Technology Almanac
Annex 499 Ryabov, K. Surface-to-Air Missile Systems of the Buk Family / Military
Review online
Annex
500
Mikhail Khodarenok / “Password” Is Almost Unheard
Annex 501 Skorik, A.B. Design, Maintenance, and Combat Use of Launchers of the Buk-
M1 Surface-to-Air Missile System
Annex 502 Akiva Hamilton, Bankrupting Terrorism - One Interception at a Time,
Jerusalem Post (24 November 2012)
Annex 503 Kyiv Post, Russian Armed Forces Seize Crimea as Putin Threatens Wider
Military Invasion of Ukraine (2 March 2014)
Annex 504 Alan Taylor, ‘Believed to Be Russian Soldiers’, The Atlantic (11 March 2014)
Annex 505 Vitaly Shevchenko, “Little Green Men” or “Russian invaders”? BBC News (11
March 2014)
Annex 506 Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, President of Russia (17 April 2014)
Annex 507 Luke Harding and Oksana Grytsenko, Kidnapping of Ukrainian Patriots Has
Russia’s Full Support, Says Kiev, Guardian (23 April 2014)
Annex
508
Ukrainian Deputy Rybak Was Tortured and Then Drowned, MKRU (23 April
2014)
Annex 509 MKRU, SBU - People’s Mayor Slavyansk Discussed with an Officer of the
GRU RF How to Red of the Corpse of Deputy Rybak (24 April 2014)
Annex 510 Intentionally Omitted
Annex 511 In Donetsk Region, an Orthodox Priest Was Killed, Gazeta (5 May 2014)
Annex 512 Zhirinovsky Gave a Military Vehivle to the Ukrainian Militiamen, 161.ru (6
May 2014)
Annex 513 The Body of the Heads of the Krasnolimanskaya Prosvita Was Found in a
Burned Car, Radiosvoboda (8 May 2014)
Annex 514 Ukrainian Orthodox Church Confirms Priest Murdered in Donetsk Region,
Kyiv Post (10 May 2014)
Annex 515 Aleksander Vasovic & Maria Tsvetkova, Elusive Muscovite with Three
Names Takes Control of Ukraine Rebels, Reuters (15 May 2014)
Annex 516 Terrorist Shot a Resident of Donetsk Region in Front of his Family, Unian
(18 May 2014)
Annex 517 Details of Shooting a Farmer Near Slaviansk, PN (19 May 2014)
Annex 518 Hannah Levintova, Armed Groups in Ukraine Target Gays, Journalists,
Minorities, and Anyone Who Speaks Up, Mother Jones (21 May 2014)
Annex 519 Tom Balmforth, A Guide To The Separatists Of Eastern Ukraine, Radio Free
Europe / Radio Liberty (3 June 2014)
Annex 520 Alexander Zhuchkovsky’s “Militia” of the DPR: The Only Support is in the
Russian Media, Zaks (10 June 2014)
Annex 521 Andrew E. Kramer & Michael R. Gordon, Russia Sent Tanks to Separatists in
Ukraine, U.S. Says, N.Y. Times (13 June 2014)
Annex 522 Ilya Arkhipov, Irina Reznik & Henry Meyer, Putin’s ‘Soros’ Dreams of
Empires as Allies Wage Ukraine Revlot, Bllomberg (16 June 2014)
Annex 523 Alec Luhn, Fight Club, Donetsk, Foreign Policy (18 June 2014)
Annex 524 Interfax Ukraine, Kyiv Demands Moscow to Explain Use of Igla MANPADs
in Donetsk Region, Kyiv Post (19 June 2014)
Annex 525 Max Vit, Military Equipment in Stary Oskol, KaviCom.ru (24 June 2014)
Annex 526 Lugansk Terrorists Are Financed by the Communist Party of Russia, Details
(26 June 2014)
Annex 527 Harriet Salem, Who’s Who in the Donetsk People’s Republic, VICE News (1
July 2014)

Annex 491
Ove Dullum, The Rocket Artillery Reference Book, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
(30 June 2010)

FFI-rapport 2009/00179
The Rocket Artillery Reference Book
Ove Dullum
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)
30 June 2010
2 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
FFI-rapport 2009/00179
352601
P: ISBN 978-82-464-1828-5
E: ISBN 978-82-464-1829-2
Keywords
Ammunisjon
Rakettartilleri
Trusselvurdering
Dødelighet
Approved by
Thor Engøy Project Manager
Jan Ivar Botnan Director
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 3
English Summary
This report contains a general overview of the current state of rocket artillery. Its aim is to give a
complete picture of the technology, capacity and distribution of these types of weapon.
Although the principles of rocket propulsion have been known for centuries, the concept of rocket
artillery, as it is known today, was introduced during The Second World War. Since then its
popularity and distribution has steadily increased, and it is currently a part of the inventory of
more than one hundred national armies. In addition, non-state armed units have also acquired this
capacity, and have used it on several occasions during the last decade. This use has also included
the application of improvised rockets based on readily available components, and used in a mode
where the precision and the accuracy of the delivery have been compromised. This development
is a result of the increasing tendency towards asymmetric warfare, where direct exchange of fire
in a regular battle is of secondary importance.
Herein, rocket artillery is defined as rockets fired in an indirect mode and with a capability to
engage targets at less than 100 km range, but not excluding systems capable of reaching several
hundred kilometres However, the class commonly known as short range ballistic missiles is not
included here. With these limitations, rocket artillery includes systems of around 50 mm calibre
with a range of a few kilometres and a load of a few hundred grams of explosives up to large
systems that may contain more than 100 kg of explosives.
The report discusses several technological aspects including construction, ballistics, accuracy of
delivery, use, and the effect of the warhead. Some examples of use and its effect on a given target
are presented. This target is chosen to represent a typical target in the context of defence of camps
against such ordnance.
Serving the purpose of a reference document, a high number of rocket artillery systems are briefly
described. Systems that are obsolete or that never have matured beyond the prototype level have
not been included.
4 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Norwegian summary
Denne rapporten gir en generell oversikt over rakettartilleriet slik det er i dag. Formålet er å gi et
fullstendig bilde av teknologi, kapasitet og utbredelse av denne typen våpen.
Selv om prinsippene for rakettdrift har vært kjent i århundrer, ble rakettartilleri først introdusert
under andre verdenskrig. Siden den gang har dets popularitet og utbredelse stadig øket, og det er
pr i dag en del av inventaret til mer en ett hundre nasjonale hærer. I tillegg har ikke-statlige
aktører også skaffet seg denne kapasiteten, og tatt den i bruk flere anledninger i det siste tiåret.
Denne bruken har også omfattet bruk av såkalte improviserte raketter som er basert på bruk av
allment tilgjengelige komponenter, og brukt i en sammenheng hvor presisjon og nøyaktighet av
ildgivninger er av underordnet betydning. Denne utviklingen er et resultat av den økende
tendensen til asymmetrisk krigføring, hvor direkte utveksling av ild i regulære slag ikke er vanlig.
I denne rapporten er rakettartilleri definert som raketter som fyres i en indirekte modus og som er
i stand til nå mål som ligger på mindre enn 100 km avstand, men uten å ekskludere systemer med
lenger rekkevidde. Den klassen som omtales som ballistiske kortdistansemissiler (short range
ballistic missiles) er ikke tatt med her. Med disse begrensningene, vil rakettartilleri omfatte
systemer fra ca 50 mm kaliber med noen hundre gram sprengstoff og med noen få kilometers
rekkevidde opp til store systemer som er i stand til å nå flere hundre kilometer med en
sprengladning på over 100 kg.
Rapporten diskuterer flere teknologiske aspekter inkludert konstruksjon, ballistikk, leveringsnøyaktighet,
bruk, og virkningen i målet. Eksempler på bruk mot et gitt mål er vist. Målet er valgt
som en representant for et typisk mål i sammenheng med beskyttelse av leire (camper) mot slik
våpen.
Ettersom denne rapporten skal være et referanseskrift, så er et større antall systemer gitt en kort
beskrivelse. Systemer som er avleggs, eller som aldri har kommet forbi prototyp-stadiet, er ikke
tatt med.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 5
Contents
Preface 9
1 Introduction 10
1.1 Defining rocket artillery 10
1.2 Legal aspects 12
2 Historical overview 12
2.1 Pre WWII 12
2.2 WWII developments 13
2.3 Cold War developments 15
2.4 Distribution 16
3 Types of rocket artillery 16
3.1 Portable systems 16
3.2 Towed systems 18
3.3 Vehicle mounted systems 18
3.4 Artillery missiles / tactical missiles 19
3.5 Guidance systems 20
3.5.1 Inertial Navigations Systems (INS) 20
3.5.2 Global Positioning System (GPS) 20
4 Components of rocket artillery 21
4.1 Rail or tube systems 21
4.2 Aiming devices 22
4.3 Fire control systems 22
4.4 Carrier 23
4.5 Rate of fire 23
5 Basic rocket design 24
5.1 General design 24
5.2 Warhead 25
5.3 Motor 25
5.4 Nozzle 25
5.5 Fins and stabilizers 26
5.5.1 Fixed fins 26
5.5.2 Wrap around fins 26
5.5.3 Grid fins 27
5.5.4 Other fins or stabilizers 27
5.6 Fuzes 29
6 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
5.6.1 Impact fuzes 29
5.6.2 Time fuzes 30
5.6.3 Proximity fuzes 31
5.6.4 Multi-function fuzes 31
5.7 Igniters 31
5.8 Guidance devices 33
6 Rocket artillery ballistics 34
6.1 Interior ballistics / propulsion 34
6.1.1 Fuel burning 34
6.1.2 The rocket equations 37
6.1.3 Rail phase movement 37
6.2 Launch dynamics 38
6.2.1 Windage jump 38
6.2.2 Launcher movement 38
6.3 Exterior ballistics 38
6.3.1 Stabilization 42
6.3.2 Braking devices 45
6.3.3 Coriolis’ force 46
6.4 Trajectories 46
6.5 Accuracy of delivery 46
6.5.1 Random errors 47
6.5.2 Systematic errors 47
6.5.3 Wind induced errors 47
6.6 Reported accuracy 48
6.7 Direct fire 49
6.8 Submunition ballistics 49
6.8.1 Ejection 50
6.8.2 Descent phase 51
7 Rocket payloads 51
7.1 Fragmentation high explosive charges 51
7.2 Enhanced effect warheads 52
7.2.1 Fuel-air explosives (FAE) 52
7.2.2 Thermobaric explosives 53
7.3 Submunition payload 54
7.4 Incendiary payload 57
7.5 Chemical payloads 57
8 Lethal effects 57
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 7
8.1 Lethal area 57
8.2 Fragmentation 59
8.3 Blast 62
8.4 Examples of performance 64
8.5 Comparisons between conventional artillery, rocket artillery and mortars 65
9 Improvised systems 67
9.1 Explosives 67
9.2 Propellants 68
9.3 Fuzes 69
9.4 Rocket bodies 69
9.5 Launchers 69
9.6 Fire control system 70
9.7 The Qassam rockets 70
9.8 IRAM 71
9.9 Other examples 72
10 Organization 76
11 Some scenarios 78
12 The future of rocket artillery 81
References 84
Appendix A Abbreviations 87
Appendix B Accuracy of long range artillery 89
B.1 Sources of inaccuracy 89
B.2 Meteorological models 89
Appendix C Lethality models 91
C.1 Sperrazza’s model 91
C.2 Feinstein’s model 93
Appendix D Details on some typical systems 95
D.1 Aerodynamic data 95
D.2 Error budget 96
D.2.1 Systematic errors 96
D.2.2 Random errors 97
D.3 Trajectories and firing tables 98
D.3.1 60 mm Qassam fin stabilized 98
8 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
D.3.2 107 mm spin stabilized rocket 99
D.3.3 122 mm short (6 feet) 99
D.3.4 122 mm 9M22U for BM-21 Grad (9 feet) 100
D.3.5 160 mm LAR 101
D.3.6 220 mm 9M27F for BM-27 Uragan 102
D.3.7 227 mm M26 102
D.3.8 240 mm Falaq-1 spin stabilized rocket 103
D.3.9 300 mm 9M55K for BM-30 Smerch 104
D.4 Graphical displays of ballistic tables 106
Appendix E Russian ammunition nomenclature 109
Appendix F Rocket artillery in Iraq and Afghanistan 117
F.1 Afghanistan 117
F.2 Iraq 118
Appendix G Rockets and rocket launchers operated by non-state
parties 119
G.1 Hezbollah 119
G.2 Hamas 120
G.3 Taliban 121
Appendix H Current launcher systems 123
H.1 122 mm systems 162
H.1.1 BM-21 162
H.1.2 Chinese variants 165
H.1.3 Turkish variants 165
H.1.4 Other variants 168
H.2 220 mm systems (BM-27 Uragan) 168
H.3 The MLRS system 169
H.3.1 610 mm ATACMS 171
H.4 300 mm systems (Smerch) 172
Appendix I Distribution of rocket artillery 174
Appendix J Country abbreviations 178
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 9
Preface
The present report is written for the NATO Defence Against Mortar Attacks (DAMA) project, the
ninth initiative under the Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work. The decision to make
a reference report on rocket artillery was taken at the joint meeting of the DAMA Working Group
and CRAM Team of Experts in Copenhagen, Denmark in September 2008.
A similar work on mortars[1] was presented to the DAMA WG in 2007. For ease of comparison
between the two weapons systems, The Mortar Reference Book has been used as a template for
this report when appropriate. However, rocket artillery is a more versatile and complex weapon
system than mortars. This fact is reflected in the description of the systems and in the scope of the
themes that are discussed. Rocket artillery is easier to improvise than conventional gun artillery
and even mortars. Improvised rockets are also a reality in some war affected areas. Thus, aspects
concerning the possibility of using primitive components, and the limitations of such technology
are also discussed.
The report starts with a general historical overview of the theme and a classification of the
different types of systems in chapters 2 and 3. The technology of the different parts and payloads
are discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Performance aspects as accuracy and lethality are the theme
of chapters 7 and 9. The important aspect of making improvised systems is discussed in chapter 9.
The final three chapters are committed to organizational aspects, some examples of the effects to
be expected in attack of a typical camp, and finally some speculations on the future of these kinds
of weapons.
The author would like to thank Thor Engøy, who has managed this project and who is also
chairing the DAMA WG. The author also would like to extend his gratitude to several other
colleagues at FFI for their contribution and useful discussions.
The work has been financially supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence.
10 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
1 Introduction
In many armies, field artillery is considered as the most precious of weapons, superior to both
infantry and cavalry. During the twentieth century, no other weapon contributed to the enemy
casualty rate as the artillery. Therefore, in most nations, artillery has been a major component of
the army, and the supreme fire support weapon at short and medium ranges. This status has been
most prominent in the Soviet and Russian armies where artillery often is referred to as the “God
of War”.
There are several types of artillery; coastal artillery, air-defence artillery, ship artillery, and - field
artillery. The concept of field artillery usually is understood as two types of weapons – gun
artillery, usually howitzers, and rocket artillery.
Although rocket artillery is not as common as the tube artillery, delivery of fire by rockets
provides several advantages over guns
- the launching unit can be made light and simple
- the launching does not put heavy strain on neither platform nor projectile
- very high calibre charges can be fired by relatively primitive launchers
- the payload does not have to be as rugged and robust as that of gun artillery projectiles
because the acceleration of a rocket may typically be just a percent of that experienced in
gun artillery
- a high volume of fire can be delivered within a very short period
Of course, there are also some disadvantages like:
- accuracy
- ammunition weight
- ammunition cost
- not suited for direct fire mode
- more pronounced signature
- limited ability to deliver sustained fire
This report will focus on the different aspect of rocket artillery. Hopefully this will make the
reader more able to understand these kinds of weapon, and to find ways to counter the threat they
constitute.
1.1 Defining rocket artillery
There are certain challenges in delimiting the extent of the definition of rocket artillery, both at
the low end and at the high end.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 11
The main characteristics of field artillery is that it fires in an indirect mode, i.e. the target can not
be seen from the launcher unit, and the attitude of the launcher is set upon information from
forward observers, or intelligence information, on where a valid target is located. So far, such a
definition may seem clear-cut. However at the low end there may be cases where a weapon
designed for direct fire is used in an indirect mode. These weapons will in general not be
considered here. There are, however, some interesting examples on how direct fire weapons have
been reconfigured to an indirect mode. Some of these will be mentioned.
Some indirect systems can also be used in a direct mode. The effect of such use will not be
included in this report.
At the high end, the limitations may be more difficult to set. The requirement of multiple rocket
launchers will be too strict as some very common rocket systems are also found in a single tube
configuration. The most reasonable criterion may be that of firing range. In this report, systems
being able to deliver its payload at ranges of less than 100 km are included, while systems
exceeding around 200 km will generally not be considered. The latter systems are usually theatre
level, or strategic, weapons that are only supposed to be used in a conflict of continental extent.
However, it has recently been observed that such systems are used in conflicts of limited size and
at relatively short ranges, which justifies their inclusion.
More specifically, we will include systems with singular vehicle-mounted rockets that have a
maximum range not exceeding 500 km and a minimum range of less than 80 km. Thus they will
have an operational range that is overlapped by MRL. This class will not cover the so-called
SRBM class (Short Range Ballistic Missile), which by definition has a range exceeding 500 km.
Many of the weapons mentioned in this report have the capacity to carry nuclear warheads, but
this aspect is not considered here.
Some “lateral” limitations also have to be drawn. The following rockets or rocket-like projectiles
are not considered
- gun artillery projectiles with rocket-like auxiliary propulsion. Hence, projectiles with
rocket propellant assistance (RAP or BB) are not included.
- surface-to-air rockets
- air-to-surface rocket, unless they have been reconfigured to surface-to-surface mode
- rockets intended for maritime warfare, including sea-to-land systems
- types that have not been deployed in regular armies or never seen in use by non-state
parties
- systems with rockets exclusively intended for mine-laying or mine-clearance
12 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
1.2 Legal aspects
There are no international convention regulating the use of rocket artillery as such, but the type of
payload may be affected by several conventions. Among these are
- Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
(Geneva 1980)
- Chemical Weapons Convention (1993)
- Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices
(Ottawa 1996)
- Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (1980)
- Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo 2008)
However, the validity of some of these conventions is still limited as many nations, and especially
the most belligerent nations, have not signed some of the conventions.
2 Historical overview
2.1 Pre WWII
There seems to be consensus among historians that rockets were first used in China in 1232 AD
during the Mongol siege of the city Kai Fung Fu. It is not known what kind of rockets was used,
and it may even be doubted whether they can be classified as artillery.
In Europe rockets were not used in earnest until early
19th century. This development was due to the
pioneering work by Sir General William Congreve in
Britain. He is considered as The Father of Modern
Rocket Artillery. His proposed designs, which were
like today’s fireworks rockets, were promoted to
British authorities and were used by for the first time
by the British Navy in the attack against the French
city of Boulogne in 1806. The first massive use of
these rockets was made by Lord Admiral Horatio
Nelson’s fleet attacking Copenhagen in 1807. 25000
rockets were fired at this event, resulting in a total
burn-down of the city. Congreve’s rocket design was
used during the British attack on United States in
1813 (see box)
Figure 2.1 William Congreve – the father of rocket artillery
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 13
The rockets’ red glare
On September 13 and 14, 1814 a 25-hour barrage of Congreve rockets was fired from the British
ship Erebus against Fort McHenry in Baltimore. The Erebus carried about 20 Congreve rocket
batteries consisting of a box housing multiple metal firing tubes. Each of the rockets fired against
Fort McHenry weighed about 30 pounds, and carried an incendiary charge. Although a number of
American ships were destroyed by Congreve rockets during the War of 1812, just four deaths and
minimal damage was reported at Fort McHenry during the siege. However, the battle was
witnessed by a young lawyer named Francis Scott Key, who mentioned the Congreve "rockets'
red glare" in his song "The Star Spangled Banner". The song later became the U.S. National
Anthem, paying tribute to the tenacity of the American forces under siege. [2]
Congreve’s rocket fired from a boat
In the mid 1800s, Congreve’s concepts were modified and improved by his countryman William
Hale leading to the development of a spinning rocket which dramatically improved the accuracy
of the vehicle. He was also the first to use rails or grids to support the rocket in the first phase of
acceleration, which also improved the precision. Although Hale was an Englishman, his rockets
were used by the U S Army in the American – Mexican war during the 1840s.[3]
Over the next decades the rockets were discarded in favour of gun artillery, which made great
progress during the American Civil War. The other main wars; the Crimean War, the Franco-
Prussian War, the Boer War, the Balkan Wars, the First World War, did not include any
significant use of rocketry.
2.2 WWII developments
During WWII rocket artillery was developed by all main fighting parties – US, UK, Germany,
USSR and Japan. However, for the latter the development and use were very modest.
14 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Germany had their Wurfgranate or Nebelwerfer in various configurations with calibres from 150
mm to 300 mm. US had their M8 rocket in the Calliope system with a 60-tube rack at the top of a
Sherman tank. Britain did not have any working system before the last year of the war. Most
notable was the Land Mattress which was a towed 12-tube rack able to fire 127 mm rocket out to
almost 8 km.[4]. UK and US made an exchange of data on their development before US entered
the war.
The first 20 months of WWII went by without any use of rocket artillery. However, in the USSR
the military rocket development started in the early 1930s. By 1939 the first prototypes were
ready. The order to produce these weapons issued on 21 June 1941, the day before the German
invasion started. Rocket artillery was used for the first time in WWII during the Soviet defence of
Orsha, a city on the Minsk – Moscow line, on 14 July 1941, just 23 days after the order was
issued. The system used was the BM-13-16 with a rack of rails on the back of ZIS-6 truck. [5;6]
The rack consisted of 8 rails on which there were two M13 132 mm rockets on each – one at the
upper side and one at the lower side of the rail. The M13 rocket was a fin-stabilized device, 1.4 m
long and with a weight of 42.5 kg. It could reach a velocity of 355 m/s and had a firing range of
about 8.5 km [7]. The M13 rocket was the most proliferated rocket during WWII and was
produced at the number of almost 7 millions.
Although the official name of the system was as mentioned above, the soldiers soon gave it the
name of Katyusha, a name that is now used for artillery rockets in general. The reason was no
other than that the carrier trucks had the letter “K” painted on the doors. Katyusha is a diminutive
of the common Russian female name Yekaterina.
BM-13 stayed in service in the Soviet Army until 1960 and is in fact still in service in PR China
in a modified form as a mine laying rocket.
The table below shows some characteristics of the systems used by the Soviets during WWII.
These systems were to become the basis of the systems to come.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 15
M-8 M-13 M-13-UK M-31 M-31-UK
Calibre (mm) 82 132 132 300 300
Rocket weight (kg) 8.0 42.0 42.5 95.5 94.8
Warhead weight (kg) 3.2 21.6 21.6 51.6 51.6
Weight of high explosive (kg) 0.6 4.9 4.9 28.9 28.9
Weight of propulsive fuel (kg) 1.2 7.2 7.2 11.2 11.2
Maximum velocity (m/s) 315 355 335 255 245
Launch velocity (m/s) 70 70 85 55 50
Maximum range (m) 5515 8470 7900 4325 4000
Longitudinal dispersion (%)* 1.9 1.3 1.0 2.4 1.4
Transversal dispersion (%)* 4.0 2.4 1.2 5.9 1.9
Radius of total defeat (m)* 3 - 4 8 - 10 8 – 10 (15 – 18) (15 – 18)
Radius of effective defeat (m)* 10 - 12 25 - 30 25 - 30 (45 – 50) (45 – 50)
Table 2.1 Some characteristics of WWII Soviet artillery rockets [5]
*) The exact definition of this term is not known
Numbers in parentheses are assumptive
Figure 2.2 The original BM-13-16
2.3 Cold War developments
After WWII, the development in the Western countries was either progressing at low pace or
more or less discontinued. U S developed their towed 24 tubes M21 which was used until the late
1980s. The truck mounted 45 tubes M91 (115 mm) was declared obsolete in the mid 1990s. The
most significant development was the development of MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System)
which had its first test firing in 1980 and which had its first wartime use in Operation Desert
Storm in 1991. [8]
16 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
For the long ranges, U S started off designing the rockets Lance and Honest John. However,
theses systems were relatively short lived. The ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) was
developed as follow-up to MLRS, using the same launching platform. This system was also used
during the Gulf War in 1991.
Some other Western countries also had their development. The most prominent was the German
LARS (Leichte Artillerie Raket Systeme), which was in service in the German Army from 1969
until quite recently. Also France, Italy and Spain each developed their systems.
Israel deployed their first system, a 290 mm calibre long range mounted on a tank, in the mid
1960s. Following the Yom Kippur war in 1973, IDF (Israel Defense Forces) issued a requirement
for a lighter system, which matured into the 160 mm LAR. This was used in combat for the first
time in 1982 in Lebanon.
USSR, however, continued their development at very high pace throughout the period. The types
used during WWII, were kept and additional type based on new principles were developed and
deployed in massive numbers. Designs based on spin stabilization, liquid propellants or tubular
launchers replacing the rails were all deployed. Range, calibre and accuracy were also steadily
improved or increased. A wide variety of payloads like smoke, illumination, mines, bomblets and
ECM were also developed.
2.4 Distribution
By the end of the Cold War the former Warsaw Pact nations had around 7000 MRL systems
deployed, while NATO had less than 1000. A limited number of other nations had systems of
Soviet origin, of which many were of WWII designs or other more or less obsolete kinds.
Today, Russia and other former Soviet nations have sold or phased out a substantial part of their
rocket artillery systems. NATO has slightly increased their inventory, which is focused on the
MLRS system in addition to some systems inherited from former Warsaw Pact states. Since the
end of the Cold War, there has been a proliferation to many nations. Currently more than 100
nations have rocket artillery units deployed, although some nations may just have a handful of
units. The most disturbing fact is that these weapons have proliferated into a number of non-state
parties. It seems that these units often are of Iranian origin, but nations like China, North Korea
and some former Soviet states have contributed in this respect.
3 Types of rocket artillery
3.1 Portable systems
This is the most primitive of all artillery and can be made out of a single tube attached to a tripod
along with aiming devices and an umbilical system for remote triggering or ignition. (see figure
3.1 below). The tube and tripod may have a mass of some 20 kg. Rockets up to 122 mm calibre
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 17
and 45 kg rocket mass can be fired in this way. A squad of 4 – 5 men can carry the launcher and
three rockets. However, the mass of the different units prevents long tactical movements without
access to a vehicle of some kind. Twin tubular launchers on a tripod have also been seen. Such
systems are particularly favoured by guerrilla and insurgency forces.
Figure 3.1 A portable single tube launcher
Portable systems can also be designed in a mortar-like way, with a bipod and a baseplate. The
Yugoslavian system called M-71 Partizan (see figure below) with a 128 mm calibre is an
example. This is for a spin stabilized rocket. There is also a parallel design for the fin stabilized
M-77 Oganj system.
Figure 3.2 The M-71 Partizan system with a mortar-like configuration.
18 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
The advantage of having a mortar configuration is obviously the stability. It is probably possible
to fire several rockets without readjustment of the sight. However, such a system may be far
heavier than tripod systems.
3.2 Towed systems
The first systems developed by Germany, UK and US during WWII were multiple tube racks
placed on top of a two-wheeled boggy and with an arm to facilitate towing behind a vehicle.
Systems of that type are still in use today in many countries, and are popular among non-state
armies due to their size, lightness, simplicity, cost and low maintenance requirements. The
number of tubes attached can vary from a handful to dozens.
The limitations on size and on the total weight of a loaded system prevent any use of high calibre
rockets or rockets with an elongated motor section. Short spin stabilized rockets are consequently
usually chosen as ammunition for such systems. Thus the possible maximum firing range will
usually be limited to 8 – 10 km.
Figure 3.3 A 12-tubed towed system behind a light vehicle with the same system mounted on the
vehicle
3.3 Vehicle mounted systems
When a tube rack is mounted on the back of a truck or on a specially designed vehicle, we have a
fully fledged multiple rocket launcher (MRL). Most MRL-types belong to this type. However,
this class covers a wide spectrum in vehicle size, rocket calibre and number of tubes/rails. Smaller
systems may be placed on an ordinary truck. Larger systems may require a specially designed
carrier vehicle.
With some few exceptions, an MRL system carry only the ammunition that is ready to fire and
loaded in the tubes or at the rails. Additional rockets have to be carried by support vehicles.
Vehicle mounted systems requires a crew consisting of 3 – 8 soldiers. Highly automated systems,
like the MLRS, have the lowest crew requirement. Systems based on manual loading, like the
BM-21, have a crew of 7 soldiers.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 19
Figure 3.4 Truck-mounted multiple rocket launcher
3.4 Artillery missiles / tactical missiles
This class consists of systems with singular vehicle-mounted rockets, as to distinguish them from
multiple rocket systems. Herein, we will consider those systems that have a maximum range not
exceeding 500 km and a minimum range of less than 80 km. Such rockets are carried by specially
designed vehicles with just one rocket on board. The mass of these rockets exceeds 1 ton, their
calibre may be 500 mm or more and they may be more than 10 m in length. Obsolete systems like
the American Honest John and the Soviet made FROG fall into this category. Although these
rockets originally were intended for grand scale warfare, they were seen in use in the Russian-
Georgian conflict in 2008.
The current systems of this type are the American ATACMS, the Russian FROG, Tochka and
Iskander, and some Chinese and Iranian systems.
All systems in this class must have some kind of guidance in order to effectively hit a target at
long range.
20 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Figure 3.5 Iraqi FROG-7 rocket encountered during OIF
3.5 Guidance systems
The majority of artillery rockets are unguided (free rockets). However, guided rockets are
becoming more common. The guidance systems are usually based on either inertial navigation
(INS) or GPS.
3.5.1 Inertial Navigations Systems (INS)
Inertial navigation is a well proven principle. The system is based on accelerometers and gyros
that register the linear and angular movements in each direction. The inputs are then integrated to
find to position relative the initial position of the unit. INS thus requires the initial position and
orientation as input.
All inertial navigation systems suffer from integration drift. Small errors in the measurement of
acceleration and angular velocity are integrated into progressively larger errors in velocity, which
result in still greater errors in position. This is a problem that is inherent in every system. The
inaccuracy of a good-quality navigational system is normally less than 1 km per hour in position
and on the order of tenths of a degree per hour in orientation.
3.5.2 Global Positioning System (GPS)
A GPS receiver calculates its position by carefully timing the signals sent by the GPS satellites
high above the Earth. Each satellite continually transmits messages containing the time the
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 21
message was sent, precise orbital information, and the general system health and rough orbits of
all GPS satellites (the almanac). The receiver measures the transit time of each message and
computes the distance to each satellite. Geometric triangulation is used to combine these
distances with the location of the satellites to determine the receiver's location. The position is
displayed, perhaps with a moving map display of latitude and longitude; elevation information
may also be included. Many GPS units also show derived information such as direction and
speed, calculated from position changes.
Opposite to INS, GPS does not suffer from any drift over time. However, disturbances and other
technical limitations limit the accuracy to a few meters horizontally. Differential GPS, where the
position is measured relative to an accurately known reference point, has an accuracy of a few
centimetres. GPS is becoming the most used navigational system for guidance of artillery rockets.
GPS is an external system not controlled by the user. It is currently operated by U S Air Force.
Other nations, or group of nations, have or are in the process of establishing alternative systems
based on the same principles
4 Components of rocket artillery
The concept of rocket artillery is comparatively simple, both with respect to the projectile, the
rocket, and the launcher platform, whether the system is a self propelled vehicle or a tubular
device put on a simple tripod.
The basic components are shown in the table below
Rocket components Launcher components
Fuze Rail or tube
Warhead Aiming devices
Motor incl. fuel and nozzle Fire control system
Igniter Carrier
Fins
Table 4.1 Basic rocket components
The rocket components, i.e. the ammunition will be covered the succeeding chapter.
4.1 Rail or tube systems
There are basically three ways of launching a rocket – by a rail, by a tube, or by the so-called zero
length launch. In the latter mode the rocket is just held stable during the initial launch, but has no
devices that keep the direction once it is free. Well known examples of such are NASA’s space
rockets. Firing in this mode requires that the rocket is fully guided and steerable in every phase.
Most artillery rockets are exclusively based on rail of tube launchers, but some tactical rockets
22 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
use zero length launchers. All unguided systems have to use rails or tubes as they initially have to
obtain the predefined flight direction.
The first rocket artillery systems, like BM-13, were true rail launchers. The rockets started their
flight sliding along a straight rail of a few meters length. This way of launching is not very
accurate, as the rocket continues to accelerate for a long distance after leaving the rail. Such a
non-spinning rocket is very prone to disturbances during this phase. Manufacture flaws and other
disturbances will seriously affect the accuracy.
A tube basically has the same function as a rail. The only difference is that the rocket may be free
to rotate, or it may have a device inducing spin to it. A common solution is a tube-rail
combination, a tube with helical rails on which the rocket rides. The rail system can be inside the
tube, which requires a tube that is wider than the rocket diameter. Alternatively, the tube fits the
rocket calibre, while the rails protrude from the tubes, making them clearly visible.
A disadvantage of a tube is that it may be difficult to adapt to rockets with fixed fins. This can be
solved by using a kind of cage construction, but this will require more space on the launcher. A
majority of the modern multiple rocket systems have solved this problem by using so-called
wrap-around fins (WAF). They fit the curvature of the rocket hull, and flip out into a locked state
after leaving the launcher. Wrap-around fins give a somewhat higher drag than fixed fins, but
when all factors are considered, it is a good solution.
4.2 Aiming devices
There is no principal difference between gun artillery and rocket artillery with respect to aiming.
Both artilleries are indirect fire in the sense that the target or aim point cannot be seen from the
firing post. The launching platform must therefore point its rockets in a direction determined by
ballistic calculations. The aiming devices are indicators displaying the orientation relative to the
vehicle, and a compass and other navigational instruments for determining the orientation and
position.
4.3 Fire control systems
Like howitzers, rocket artillery systems require a Fire Control System (FCS) capable of handling
a comprehensive amount of input – the Fire Control Input (FCI). The output of the fire control
system will be the parameters needed to complete the fire mission, i.e.
- launcher elevation
- launcher azimuth angle (horizontal orientation)
- use of any braking device if applicable
- fuze setting (timing) if a time fuze is applied
- the types and amount of rockets to be fired
If the mission involves multiple launchers, possibly an entire battalion, each launcher or each
battery has to be given individual firing data.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 23
The FCI may consist of the following groups of input, but the amount depends on the complexity
of the system.
- launcher geographical position
- target geographical position
- meteorological data (temperature, air pressure and wind velocity at different altitudes)
- ammunition data (aerodynamic data, motor data, physical data, expected precision data)
Modern systems have a ballistic computer that makes use of all the data mentioned above. Older
systems may still be based on ballistic tables and slide rulers and will not be able to fully make
use of all the data above.
4.4 Carrier
Most rocket artillery systems are carried on the back of a 4-wheeled of 6-wheeled truck. These
trucks are usually multirole vehicles that have been specially adapted to carry the rocket
launching units. These truck mounted launchers will require a crew of 4 to 7 men in addition to
one or more supply vehicles.
The largest rocket type, like the tactical missiles, may use a specially designed vehicle, mostly 8 x
8 wheeled, as the carrier.
Some systems with calibres not exceeding 122 mm may be man portable, but the distance to be
covered or the load to be carried will be severely limited by the size and weight of the rockets.
4.5 Rate of fire
Many rocket artillery systems have a rate of fire far exceeding both conventional artillery and
mortars. While manually loaded conventional artillery may reach 5 shells per minute in short
salvos, and hardly more that 3 per minute in sustained fire, multiple rockets systems may fire the
whole load of 40 rockets in as little as 20 seconds. Consequently a battery of MRLs can fire
hundreds of rockets onto a limited area within a short interval.
A high rate of fire requires that the launcher platform is very stable. For some systems, like
MLRS, each rocket in the launcher may be designated to an individual aim point. Thus the system
has to re-aim for each shot, and the rate of fire may be as low as 10 – 15 rockets per minute.
A major drawback with rocket systems is their inability to deliver sustained fire. When the whole
load has been fired, it may take many minutes, even as long as 20 minutes to reload the system.
24 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
The table below gives some values for the firing rate and the reload time
System No. of rockets Firing time Reload time
BM-21Grad 40 20 s 10 min
BM-22 Uragan 16 20 s 25 min
BM-27 Smerch 12 38 s 20 min+
M26 MLRS 12 60 s 10 min
LAR-160 26 60 s 5 min
Filin (FROG) 1 n/a 20 min
Table 4.2 Duration of full salvo firing and reloading
It appears that most rocket artillery systems are able to fire their load in one batch. There is
usually possible also to deliver smaller salvos, even a single rocket. For systems with a high rate
of fire, like the BM-21, there is usually no readjustment of the launcher during the salvo. This
implies that all rockets in a salvo are aimed at the same target, and that the lack of readjustment
results in a wide dispersion of the salvo.
5 Basic rocket design
5.1 General design
The figure below show the typical rocket design with the following components:
􀁸 warhead
􀁸 fuze
􀁸 motor casing with propellant grain
􀁸 nozzle
􀁸 fins (if not spin stabilized)
􀁸 igniter (in the front or back end of the motor)
􀁸 umbilical(s)
Figure 5.1 Typical rocket design
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 25
5.2 Warhead
The warhead may account for 25 – 50% of the rocket mass. It is almost exclusively placed in the
front part of the rocket. The payload has to be encapsulated in a casing which is rigid enough to
withstand the firing loads and normal handling. For fragmenting warhead, this encapsulation is
may be designed in order to generate an optimal fragment pattern.
The different payloads are treated in more detail in the successive chapter.
5.3 Motor
The motor consist of a shell encapsulating a propellant grain or several grains. The design of the
grains is described in the interior ballistics section in the next chapter.
It should, however, be pointed out that most rocket artillery motor have a quit short burn time –
usually less than 3 seconds. This is contrary to the impression one might get when observing
rocket artillery. After this short time, the rocket may still burn and eject smoke, but just slivers of
propellant are burning and the acceleration is very weak or completely absent.
The smoke gives a quite high visual signature. The use of smokeless propellants has obviously
not been a serious issue in rocket artillery, but smokeless seems to be in use for some newly
developed spin stabilized systems. The rocket will in any case will give a quite high launch
signature in terms of dust and flash. Besides, a rocket may be readily detected by artillery locating
radars.
5.4 Nozzle
The primary function of the nozzle is to expand the hot propellant gases from the high pressure in
the combustion chamber to the external ambient pressure, thereby converting thermal energy into
directed kinetic energy or thrust. The theoretical thermodynamic relations provide methods for
the calculations of rocket motor performance and nozzle design parameters. The flow of
combustion gases, as they are expanded through the nozzle, is assumed to be an isentropic flow
(adiabatic and reversible).
The maximum thrust from a motor is obtained when the combustion gases are expanded to the
ambient atmospheric pressure. Since rockets usually operate at varying altitudes and the
atmospheric pressure varies with altitude, the selected design expansion ratio of the nozzle is
usually a compromise between the thrust and the nozzle expansion ratio, length, and weight.
An ideal nozzle profile should obey the following requirements:
􀁸 There should be no heat transfer across the rocket walls; therefore, the flow is adiabatic.
􀁸 There should be no appreciable friction and all boundary layer effects are neglected.
􀁸 There should be no shock waves or discontinuities in the nozzle flow.
26 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
􀁸 The flow of the combustion products should be steady and constant. The expansion of the
working fluid should be uniform and steady, without vibration.
􀁸 All exhaust gases leaving the rocket should have an axially directed velocity.
􀁸 The gas velocity, pressure, temperature, and density should all be uniform across any
section normal to the nozzle axis.
In reality, these, and even more requirements, can not all be fulfilled. A nozzle design is a
compromise that gives an acceptable performance at different environmental condition and during
the entire burning phase. There will also be a substantial heat transfer in the nozzle material and
some erosion of the nozzle material.
The most common nozzle materials are:
􀁸 tungsten (alloyed with molybdenum)
􀁸 graphite
􀁸 glass phenolics
􀁸 ceramics
􀁸 steel
The latter is of course the most inexpensive choice. Steel may be the natural material if the burn
time is short, like a couple of seconds. A material that has better erosion properties is
advantageous from the accuracy point of view.
5.5 Fins and stabilizers
The purpose of stabilizers is to ensure that the rocket becomes aerodynamically stable. More
specifically, the stabilizer moves the aerodynamic centre of pressure backwards. Usually, the
centre of pressure should be put behind the centre of gravity and thus ensuring a statically stable
rocket.
5.5.1 Fixed fins
Fixed fins are the most obvious choice and the conventional kind of fins. Unguided rockets,
however, require some kind of restrained movement until a certain velocity has been achieved,
which is realized by rails of tubes. Fixed fins are quite cumbersome in this respect. Rail launchers
may handle fixed wings – tubular launcher usually will not. Rail launcher imposing initial spin is
technically rather complicated, but has been solved for some large calibre systems.
Fixed fins were the only configuration when the concept of rocket artillery was introduced during
WWII, but today they are used very rarely.
5.5.2 Wrap around fins
There are two types of Wrap-Around Fins (WAF). The original and genuine type is the one where
the fin is a flexible blade, made of spring steel, that wrapped around the rocket body, usually in a
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 27
half circle. When leaving the launch tube, the fins open up and stay in a position that is tangential
to the body. This type is also known as tangential tri-form, or tangential six-form, etc., according
to the number of fins.
The other type has rigid fins shaped like a quarter cylinder attached to the body with a springloaded
hinge. In the launcher tube the fins are wrapped around the rocket body and locked by a
strap around them. This strap is broken at or immediately after leaving the launch tube. After
release the fins are locked in a fixed position, usually almost perpendicular to the body.
The first type, with spring steel fins, is usually not used in rocket artillery, as they tend to flex and
vibrate at high speed. Rigidity of fins is paramount for the performance of high velocity rockets.
Wrap-around fins may be opened either way, with or against the spin direction. It does not seem
to be any regular policy here. Left-spinning MLRS rocket fins open up to the right, i.e. against the
spin. Most Russian systems, which are right-spinning, also open to the right.
Wrap-around fins are not suited as a steering device. For that purpose canard fins at the fuze
section must be applied.
5.5.3 Grid fins
Grid fins are planar grids that are placed parallel to the body during launch. After launch they are
locked into a position perpendicular to the body. This type was first used by Soviet Union in the
1970s on their tactical missiles like SS-21. Such fins are very well suited for guided rockets.
Guidance is achieved by tilting the fins around an axis transverse to the body axis.
Figure 5.2 Grid fins at an the back American bomb[9]
5.5.4 Other fins or stabilizers
An overview of several kinds of aerodynamic stabilizers is shown in the table below. The table
also includes some of the types mentioned above.
28 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Thin profile cruciform planar rectangular Clipped triangular
Delta wings Double delta wing
Tangentially folding Tangent tri-form
Solid conical flare Split petal conical flare
Ringtail Wrap-around
Figure 5.3 Different types of stabilizer devices[10]
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 29
5.6 Fuzes
The role of the fuze is threefold
􀁸 to ensure that the rocket can be handled safely during storage, loading, transport and
launch
􀁸 to arm the ignition train prior to the time of function
􀁸 to function by detonating or ejecting the payload
Basically, rocket artillery fuzes have the same set of functions as gun artillery fuzes. For gun
artillery, the high acceleration is usually exploited to arm the fuze in combination with spin.
However, a gun artillery fuze can not be used as on a rocket because rockets have far less
acceleration, and often far less spin, than gun artillery projectiles. While a gun artillery fuze may
be subject to an acceleration exceeding 20000 G, the acceleration for a rocket may typically be
around 200 G. The latter is a level of acceleration that can be experienced during handling of the
munition. Thus the design of a rocket fuze may be more challenging than a gun fuze. However,
the need to make the fuze rugged and robust can be somewhat relaxed for rocket artillery.
5.6.1 Impact fuzes
This is, without comparison, the most common type of fuze. Impact fuzes can be made simple,
inexpensive and with adequate reliability. The more sophisticated versions contain features that
arm the fuze by acceleration or spin or both. If safety can be compromised, the ignition may take
place by a firing pin that is strikes an igniter by inertia alone.
Figure 5.4 Some impact fuzes (left to right) MRV for 122 mm Grad, M20-C1 for Astros II, V-24
and V-25 both for 240 mm spin stabilized rockets
30 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
5.6.2 Time fuzes
Time fuzes are required for kinds of rockets carrying submunition payload. A representative type
is the M445 for MLRS. It is described in [11] and in the following factbox illustrates the
complexity of such a fuze.
The M445 fuze
The fuze is composed of a fluidic (ram air) generator power source, an electronic module with
telemeter umbilical and setter cables, an S & A mechanism, and an explosive lead charge
Fuze safety is achieved by restraining a rotor by an acceleration-time sensor and a piston actuator
initiated by the fluidic generator operated from sustained airflow.
Upon firing, a spring-based setback weight moves rearward, oscillating in a zigzag path. If a
proper rocket motor boost is obtained, this partially releases the rotor and closes a switch to an
electronic timer. In flight, ram air passes through an annular orifice into a resonating cavity and
the acoustic vibrations oscillate a diaphragm connected to a reed in a magnetic field and thus
generate an electromagnetic field. After 1024 cycles of the diaphragm, a capacitor is charged, and
after 1536 cycles, it is discharged into the piston actuator. The piston actuator removes the second
lock to release the rotor completely. Sustained acceleration rotates the unbalanced rotor against a
bias spring to the armed position; this rotation unshorts the detonator and closes the firing circuit.
The rotor is then I s then locked in the armed position by a lock pin. Timing is accomplished with
a twin oscillator, a divider circuit, and a counter. To enhance overhead safety, at 3.4 s before set
time the firing capacitor is charged and, at set time, functions the Mk84 detonator, which initiates
the lead.
Before flight the fuze is set by the MLRS FCS. A status switch, which is closed when the rotor is
unarmed and open if the rotor moves, assures that the fuze can be set only if it is unarmed prior to
launch. The S & A assembly is designed so that it cannot be installed in the fuze if the rotor is
armed.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 31
Figure 5.5 The M445 for MLRS (see description above)
5.6.3 Proximity fuzes
Warheads of the unitary high-explosive and fragmentation type (not bomblets) may be set off by
a proximity fuze. Such fuzes respond to the echo of a radio wave emitted from the fuze itself and
are designed to function at an altitude of 5 – 15 m above ground. Small calibre rocket will benefit
from a lower height than large calibre rockets. Proximity fuzes may be subject to jamming. To
minimize this threat, they may be set to arm and emit signals just a couple of seconds before the
intended target encounter.
5.6.4 Multi-function fuzes
Multi-function fuzes contain a suite of functions like impact, proximity, time and even delay. For
obvious reasons, the time function must override the proximity function, which again must
override the impact function. The latter will be the last resort function if the others should fail.
5.7 Igniters
The igniter’s mission is to initiate the burning of the fuel. This is made possible by injecting a
flame into the empty cavity in the interior of the propellant grain. Ideally the whole surface of the
grain should start burning simultaneously.
The igniter may be placed in the forward end, in the middle of the motor cavity or in the nozzle
opening. In the latter case the igniter is spit out as the pressure inside the rocket builds up. In spin
32 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
stabilized rocket the igniter is placed in the centre of the rocker rear end, surrounded by the suite
of nozzles.
Figure 5.6 A squib type igniter
Small and medium rockets often have a squib placed in the nozzle. For the sake of redundancy, 2
squibs may be used. MLRS uses this method.
Larger rockets may need a larger igniter like the pyrodyne, which is a rod with perforations at the
sides that eject burning particles. This principle is also used to ignite other charges like those of
large calibre tank ammunition.
Figure 5.7 A pyrodyne igniter
A smaller variant of this principle is the pelleted pyrotechnics that ejects burning powder pellets.
BM-21 rockets apply this principle with the additional feature that the ignition unit is placed halfway
inside the motor, ejecting the propellant grains in both directions.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 33
Figure 5.8 The BM-21 igniter ejecting burning pellets in both direction
The largest rockets may have a so-called pyrogen igniter. This device is like a rocket motor itself,
initiated by a squib. The exhaust gases from this device ignite the propellant grain of the main
rocket.
Figure 5.9 A Pyrogen igniter
The igniter is triggered by an electric current (of the order of 1 Ampere) supplied by the fire
control system. The current is transmitted though the umbilical chord. The attachment to the
rocket is cut as the igniter is spit out or as the chord is broken by the tension caused by the rocket
movement.
5.8 Guidance devices
Steering or trajectory correction can be achieved in two ways – aerodynamically, by fins, or
reactionary, by thrust vector control.
When the rocket is spinning, it is very difficult to use the fins at the back end of the rocket as
steering devices. One way is to let the body spin while the fin assembly does not. However, it
may be difficult to achieve this mechanically as the spin of the body will always induce some spin
on the fins. The most used way is to use canard fins – 4 small fins extending from the front part of
34 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
the body, usually integrated with the fuze. On a spinning rocket, this part should be despun in
order to ease the control. This system in used at the guided version of MLRS.
6 Rocket artillery ballistics
6.1 Interior ballistics / propulsion
The interior ballistics of rockets is different from that of guns and rifles. In most rockets only a
fraction of the fuel has been consumed when the rocket leaves the launcher. Thus the exterior
ballistics phase starts before the interior ballistics phase is over. This phase will therefore have
aspects of both interior and exterior ballistics.
6.1.1 Fuel burning
From a purely dynamical point of view, the best way to propel a rocket is to consume all the fuel
in the shortest time possible. However, such an approach will converge into a conventional gun
barrelled system. That would, however, require equipments that is as heavy and rugged as those
of guns. The main advantages of rockets over guns could then not be exploited. They are
- relatively low and smooth acceleration
- lighter and less robust constructions for both the launcher and the warheads
- possibilities to reach longer ranges
- less mechanical stress on the crew in terms of blast waves
Artillery rockets have almost exclusively used solid fuel propulsion. Although liquid fuel has
been uses in the past, such propellants are now only used for tactical and strategic rockets.
As opposed to guns, where the fuel is found as a granulate of rather small and fast burning
powder grains giving a very large surface, the rocket fuel usually has the shape of a unitary grain,
or a very small number of grains. The burning rates are also slow compared to gunpowder – a few
centimetres per second.
The larger rockets will usually have its fuel as one unitary grain that is cast inside the motor tube.
Such grains are usually star shaped in the sense that they have an internal cavity, with a star
shaped cross section. The star shape provides a reasonable burning surface and also ensures that
the surface area is close to constant throughout most of the burning phase.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 35
Figure 6.1 A modern grain configuration
The alternative to one star shaped grain is to have a small number (e.g. seven) of tubular grains
placed inside the motor chamber. Here the tube shape ensures that the burning takes place both on
the inside and the outside face of the grain which gives a quite stable surface area. Older Soviet
rockets usually had this configuration. (see figure above [7]). This alternative is somewhat
simpler as the casting inside the chamber is avoided. (figure 7.1-right).[12]
Figure 6.2 Cross sections of old propellant grain configurations (left - 140 mm; right – 240
mm)
The guiding factor for construction of a rocket motor chamber is to let the combustion gases exit
through the nozzle with as high velocity as possible while maintaining an internal chamber
pressure not exceeding the level where the chamber will be blown apart.
The burn time for the motor is typically a few seconds. In the example below, showing thrust as a
function of time is a result of the grain shape. At a certain time (in the figure below at 1.6 s at
25ºC ambient temperature), the grain is burnt through (web burn-through) at which the thrust falls
abruptly. However, the motor may continue to burn for another few seconds until the grain slivers
are completely consumed. The burn time is very dependent on the initial temperature of the fuel.
In extreme low temperatures the burn time may be twice as long as in hot conditions. However,
the total impulse, quantified as the area under the thrust curve is less affected. The impulse is just
a couple of percent higher at the high temperature compared to the low one. In terms of rocket
velocity at burn-out, the effect is somewhat larger than that.
36 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Figure 6.3 A typical thrust profile at three different ambient temperatures [14]
Specific impulse
The term specific impulse expresses the propulsive quality of the rocket propellant. The purpose
of the propellant is to increase the momentum of the vehicle. That again is depending of speed
which the exhaust gases from propellant can gain.
The Specific Impulse, Isp, is expressed in two ways – as speed or as time. When given as speed it
is simply the exhaust velocity – as time it can be considered as the time at which one kilogramme
of the propellant can maintain a force of 1 Newton.
Modern solid rocket propellants have an Isp in the range of 210 – 250 s. Liquid propellant fuel can
reach an Isp of around 450 s.
An example: The M26 rocket has a fuel content of 98.4 kg with an Isp of 239 s. Assuming that the
force is constant for 1.8 s, this force becomes
2
0 239 98.4 9.82 128.3
1.8
sp p I m g F s kg ms kN
t s
􀂘 􀂘 􀀐
􀀠 􀀠 􀀠
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 37
6.1.2 The rocket equations
The basic equation relating the velocity of the rocket to the payload and the amount of propellant
is the so-called Tsoikovskiy’s equation1 giving the final velocity of the rocket at burnout as
log t
e
p
v v m
m
􀂧 􀂷
􀀠 􀂨􀂨 􀂸􀂸
􀂩 􀂹
where ve is the exhaust velocity, mt is the total mass of the rocket at ignition and mp is the
payload2
e sp 0 . The exhaust velocity is of historical reasons mostly written as v 􀀠 I g where Isp is
called the specific impulse and g0 is the standard acceleration of gravity. (see box above)
Having found the exhaust velocity, the thrust of the rocket motor is simply given as
􀀋 2 􀀌
f e e 0 e T 􀀠 􀁕 v 􀀎 p 􀀐 p A
where Ae is the nozzle area, 􀁕 f is the gas density at the nozzle, pe is the pressure at the nozzle and
p0 is the ambient pressure. The shape of the nozzle is the determining factor for pe and thus the
efficiency of the rocket. This equation also tells us that the performance increases with lowering
ambient pressure reaching its optimal performance in vacuum.
6.1.3 Rail phase movement
Before and during firing the rocket is usually not free to move along the rail. The rocket is
generally held at the back end of the rail by some retaining device. Apart from avoiding
unintended movement while under transport and loading, this device also have the purpose of
letting the thrust build up until it has reached a certain level before the rocket is released. This
ensures better control of the launch velocity and better consistency of the impact point. The
retaining device may be a set of bolts that breaks at a certain force (shear bolt). The strength of
the shear bolts is for MLRS around 5 kN. The negative aspect of a retaining device is that it may
generate a vibrational movement in the launcher that negatively affects the accuracy.
As will be explained later, most systems induce a moderate spin on the rocket during launch. This
is not for stabilizing the rocket, but to even out asymmetries in the thrust and the drag and thereby
improving the accuracy. Many tubular launchers have helical rails on the inside of the tubes in
order to induce spin on the rocket. The rocket has to be fitted with knobs or lugs that follow the
helical rails during launch and thus induce spin to the rocket. These lugs are usually located at the
hinge of the wrap-around fins in order to minimize the drag they may cause during the flight of
the rocket. Most systems seem to induce a right turned (clockwise) spin – the same direction as
with most guns and rifles. The MLRS induces a left turn for whatever reason.
1 Named after the renowned Russian rocket designer Konstantin E Tsoikovskiy (1867 – 1935)
2 In this context, the payload is the rocket mass excluding the fuel
38 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Spin stabilized rockets, i.e. rapidly spinning, also seem to rotate to the right as a general rule.
However, it is known than the original Russian 240 mm M-24 rocket was left spinning. It is not
known whether later foreign version of this projectile was made the same way. A subtle
advantage of left spin is that it results in a drift that is opposed to the Coriolis force – as long as
the rocket is used on the northern hemisphere.
6.2 Launch dynamics
6.2.1 Windage jump
The rocket leaves the launcher at a relatively low speed (40 – 80 m/s). At this stage, any wind
across the tube axis will affect the flight of the rocket. The part of the rocket that has passed the
tube opening will be subject to the wind force while the rear end of the rocket is attached to the
rails. This may make the axis of the rocket to deviate slightly in the direction of the wind. In
MLRS this effect is minimized as the rails only occupy the rear half of the tube and the rocket
then moves freely through the forward half of the tube. In Russian systems the rail extends along
the whole length of the launch tube.
6.2.2 Launcher movement
As mentioned above, in order to increase the launch velocity, the rocket movement may be
obstructed until a certain thrust has built up. During this phase, the launcher is subject to a recoil
that may result in a slight movement or shaking of the launcher. This may result in a deviation of
the direction of the rail and even a pitching or yawing motion at launch with a certain inaccuracy
as a result.
After the release of the rocket, friction between the rocket and the launch tube will inflict some
recoil, but this is quite small. If spin is induced by the launch tube, the rotational momentum must
be counter-balanced by an equal momentum to the launcher. Usually the inertial moment of the
launcher by far exceeds the axial inertial moment of the rocket. The turning of the launcher will
thus be minimal. However, for light launchers this effect may be significant.
Rockets with self induced spin, or no spin at all, have the most benign effect on the launchers.
Consequently, such rockets may be launched from very primitive launchers like a simple rack, a
tripod or a light towed multiple launcher.
6.3 Exterior ballistics
Fin stabilized projectiles, like a mortar bomb, have a high degree of stability. In order to do
ballistic calculation, the so-called point mass model (PMM) is sufficient. This kind of ballistics is
characterized by having the air drag coefficient as the only aeroballistic coefficient needed in the
model. The axis of the projectile is always assumed to be aligned the trajectory or its velocity.
Thus there is no need to calculate the attitude of the projectile.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 39
For spin stabilized projectiles, like those fired by tube artillery, the so-called modified point mass
model (MPMM) is applied for ballistic calculations. Here a number of aeroballistic coefficients is
applied, like drag, lift, spin damping, overturning moment etc. Both the trajectory and the attitude
of the projectile axis are calculated through two coupled differential equations. The method is not
able to represent the swirling motion taking place during one revolution of the projectile, but have
expressions determining the average attitude during one revolution.
The ballistics for rockets, and indeed for spinning rockets, should be described by using the socalled
six degrees of freedom model (6DOF). This may be characterized as a physically complete
solution of the ballistic equation. Apart from keeping track of the position of the projectile, the
attitude of the projectile during a revolution is solved along with the phase of the revolution. The
method requires access to a high number of aeroballistic (aerodynamic) coefficients, some of
which may be very difficult to obtain. In some instances, even second or third order coefficients
are required. The accuracy of and availability to these coefficients is the main limitation of the
method. One should, however, bear in mind that the ballistic equations will not exactly represent
nature. The basic limitation is that the aerodynamic coefficients are represented as linear
functions of the angle of attack of the projectile.
40 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
The quaternions
Rocket exterior ballistics is usually solved by 6DOF-models. Some of these models, like one of
those applied to MLRS [13], make use of quaternions. Hidden behind this name is a type of
algebraic entities, discovered and developed by the Irish mathematician William Rowan Hamilton
(1805-1865) in the mid 19th century. Quaternions constitute an extension of the well-known
complex numbers. While complex numbers have a real part and an imaginary part, quaternions
consist of one real part and three imaginary parts and can be generally written as
Q 􀀠 q0 􀀎 q1i 􀀎 q2 j 􀀎 q3k
where q0 … q3 are scalar magnitudes and i, j and k are the imaginary units. An important point
here is that the product between these units is non-commutative giving ij = k, ji = -k, jk = i, kj =
-i, ki = j, ik = -j and i2 = j2 = k2 = -1 from which it follows that ijk = -1, jik = 1, etc.
The quaternions are well suited to describe the orientation or attitude of an object in space. A
change in orientation is represented as a multiplication of the current quaternion with another
quaternion describing the change. The use of quaternions makes the ballistic equations more
compact, but also more abstract, which may be the reason for their limited use. The theory of
quaternions was a breakthrough in multidimensional algebra, but it was soon overshadowed by
more general theories. More recently quaternions have found their renaissance in the description
of movable bodies in computer games.
The exterior ballistic phase of most rockets has two distinct phases:
- the boost phase in which the motor burns and the rocket is accelerating
- the coast phase in which the motor has completely burnt out giving no contribution to any
forward force
- there is also an intermediate phase in which the motor force is too weak to generate
acceleration, but the motor still gives some forward force or contributes by reducing the
base drag of the rocket
The most critical parameter for the exterior ballistics is the aerodynamic drag coefficient. This
parameter has several components:
Wave drag
The wave drag is the component of the drag caused by the parts of the rocket facing the
airstream, in particular the nose part. Nose wave-drag is influenced by the fineness ratio, nose
shape, and Mach number. For preliminary design estimates, the nose shapes are mainly cones
and ogives.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 41
Skin friction drag
Friction drag results from the boundary layer airflow over the rocket surface. Shear stress is
imposed on the external surface of the rocket due to the velocity gradient in the boundary
layer. The magnitude of this shear stress is a function of the position of transition from
laminar to turbulent flow, and therefore of the air velocity. Skin structure caused by surface
treatment or painting affects the skin-friction contribution.
Drag due to fins
The fins contribute to wave drag, friction drag and base drag. The critical parameters
determining the fin drag are their length, width and thickness, and the shapes of the front and
rear edges. Whether they are of the fixed type or they are wrap-around fins is of less
importance.
Base drag
The base drag is caused by the pressure forces resulting from airflow separation at rearward
facing steps, especially the body base and the nozzle section. The low pressure behind the
base works as a suction force that slows the rocket. As long as the motor burns the rear
pressure is high and the base drag is absent.
Figure 6.4 Air drag coefficient (CD) for a 130 mm rocket showing the difference in drag during
boost phase and coast phase. The figure is taken from MIL-HDBK-762 [14].
Other aerodynamic coefficients that are accounted for are:
42 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
The lift coefficient (CL).
This is the force acting perpendicular to the velocity vector and caused by the angle of attack
between the rocket axis and the trajectory tangent.
The Magnus3
This force, which is caused by any difference in the surface stream velocity on one side of the
projectile compared to the other, works perpendicular to the angle attack. Its contribution is
mainly small and is present only when the rocket has a pitching/yawing motion. Wind from
the side will also result in Magnus forces.
force coefficient (CNpa) (spin stabilized rockets only).
The overturning moment coefficient ( CMa).
This term quantifies the tendency of the rocket to overturn. A slow spinning or non spinning
rocket will have a positive coefficient as long as the fins are closed. A positive coefficient
means that an overturning disturbance will increase with time. As the fins open, the
coefficient becomes negative contributing to the stabilization of the rocket.
The pitch damping moment coefficient (CNq).
This is mostly used together with the previous coefficient, but this coefficient is not affected
by the fins. A rocket body will usually have a negative damping coefficient which means that
a rotation around an axis perpendicular to the rocket axis will be dampened.
The spin damping (and driving) coefficient (Clp).
A spinning object will tend to slow its spin due to the air streaming along the body surface. A
rocket with fins may also have a spin driving moment that is realized by canting the fins,
asymmetric fin edges, or flaps at the nozzle exit diverting the exhaust gases. For spin
stabilized rockets the spin driving moment is extremely high during the boost phase.
The Magnus moment coefficient (CMpa) (spin stabilized rockets only).
This momentum, which is caused by any non-zero Magnus force, works perpendicular
to the plane spanned out by the rocket axis and the Magnus force. Like the Magnus
force, it is usually small, but it may affect the stability of the spinning rocket.
6.3.1 Stabilization
In general, there are two main type of stabilization – by spin (gyroscopic stabilization) and by fins
(aerodynamic stabilization)
The first artillery rockets had fixed fins for stabilization. Being launched from a straight rail, there
were no possibilities to obtain spin during launch. A non-spinning fin stabilized rocket is a quite
simple and safe design. The prime drawback is its lack of accuracy. Any asymmetry in design or
propulsion may seriously affect the accuracy. Likewise, the disturbances caused by wind will do
the same.
Gun artillery shells are spin-stabilized induced by the gun rifling. Likewise, rockets can also get
their spin by helical rails on which they ride during launch. However, as rockets have a rather
moderate launch velocity, this spin will be much lower than for gun artillery and insufficient to
3 Named after the German physicist Heinrich Gustav Magnus (1802- 1870)
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 43
fully stabilize the rocket. A better solution is to have a rocket motor with a multiple nozzle
arrangement where each nozzle is mounted eccentrically and inclined to the rocket axis so that the
motor both gives forward thrust and angular momentum inducing spin. In this way, a spin rate
exceeding 300 rps (revolution per second) is possible which is sufficient for stability. Spin driving
motors will to some extent decrease the range of the rocket, but at an acceptable rate.
Spin-stabilized rockets are known to have better accuracy than rockets that only have fins for
stabilization.[14]
The ballistic aspects of spin-stabilized rocket are addressed in [15]
Figure 6.5 The spin stabilized rocket for RPU-14 towed system.
Figure 6.6 Test firing of a 107 mm spin stabilized rocket (MKEK)
It is not possible to spin-stabilize a rocket for which the length to diameter ratio is 7 or more. This
is the reason why such rockets have a more stubby shape than modern rockets like, MLRS, or
Uragan. The limitation in length also has the consequence that the effective range of such rockets
is limited to hardly more than 10 km. The limitation in length limits the amount of fuel to weight
ratio.
Fins are incompatible with fully spin-stabilized rockets, as the fins themselves tend to dampen a
high spin. However, as fin-stabilized rockets will benefit from some degree of spin, some fin
44 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
configurations have a spin driving moment that is obtained by having a slightly inclined mounting
or by having an asymmetric profile.
An advantage with spin stabilized rocket is that they, just like a gun artillery projectile, may have
a smooth surface which diminishes the radar cross section. Finned rockets, even those with wraparound
fins have a far larger radar cross section and may be easily detectable by an artillery
locating radar.
Spin stabilization (elementary theory)
Spin stabilization is obtained by having multiple nozzles that are inclined with respect to the
rocket axis and situated eccentrically to induce spin moment.
The number of nozzles may be between 6 and 16. Irrespective of the number of nozzles a simple
theory for the boost phase can be outlined as follows.
Consider a rocket with mass m and with a motor that yields a thrust T. The rocket has an axial
momentum of inertia Ix. The nozzles are inclined an angle 􀁔 with the axis and their opening are
situated at a distance r from the rocket axis.
The axial acceleration then becomes
x T cos
m
􀀆􀀆 􀀠 􀁔
,
while the rotational acceleration becomes
sin
x
Tr
I
􀁍􀀆􀀆 􀀠 􀁔
.
Thus, disregarding the aerodynamic drag, the ratio between the rotational and axial acceleration,
is found by
tan
x
mr
x I
􀁍
􀀠 􀁔 􀀆
􀀆
As an example, consider a rocket with 240 mm calibre with 200 kg mass. Assume that the
momentum of inertia is 1 kgm2, the nozzles are 0.1 m from the axis and tan 􀁔 is 0.2. The ratio
between the rotational and axial velocity then becomes 4 rad/m. The implication of this value is
that if the rocket leaves the launch tube at a velocity of 30 m/s, the spin is 120 rad/s. This rate is
sufficient to make the rocket aerodynamically stable.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 45
Calibre
Country of
origin
Length
(m)
Mass (kg)
Range
(km)
Explosive
mass (kg)
Spin or
velocity
107 mm TUR 0.84 14 8.5 2.5 370 m/s
128 mm SER 0.81 23 8.5 4.0 444 m/s
140 mm RUS 1.08 40 9.8 4.2 370 rps
240 mm PRC 1.12 112 10 27 250 rps
333 mm IRN 1.82 255 13 60
Table 6.1 Some examples of spin stabilized rockets. These are the standard configurations.
Some calibres have rockets with enhanced range, but with smaller payloads.
6.3.2 Braking devices
A drawback with many artillery rocket systems is the relatively large minimum range. A long
minimum range is not just a problem when faced with short range targets, but also when targets
are found behind high crests. It is also problematic to obtain the sufficient accuracy at short
ranges as the angle of fall will be very shallow and small inaccuracies up or down will result in a
substantial error in impact point.
Gun artillery can circumvent such problems by selecting at smaller propellant charge, but rockets
have just one charge. The problem may be partially solved by giving the rocket a higher air drag,
making the trajectory shorter and more curved.
Some systems, of which the most pronounced is the 122 mm BM-21 and its derivates, have a
braking device implemented and rings, a narrow ring (around 80 mm diameter) for moderate
reduction and a wider ring (122 mm diameter) for a more drastic velocity reduction. The ring is
put over the fuze part, and serves as a kind of spoiler, For BM-21 the ring reduces the minimum
range from 5 km to 1600 m. Such a ring is inserted at the interface between the fuze and the
warhead, at which the BM-21 rocket has a diameter of 64 mm.
The ring will increase the air drag and make the trajectory more curved. The air drag curve will
approximately be multiplied by a certain factor depending on the diameter of the brake ring.
This kind of device was originally used on the now obsolete Soviet system 140 mm M-14. It is
not known for certain whether it is used on other systems than 122 mm.
Figure 6.7 Braking system / spoiler on BM-21 (both small and large ring fitted)
46 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
6.3.3 Coriolis’ force
The Coriolis’4 force is not a real force, but virtual force due to the rotational movement of the
reference system. If induces a drift to the right on the northern hemisphere and to the left on the
southern one. It also depends on the compass direction of the fire.
When firing at distances beyond 10 km the Coriolis’ force must be included as its contribution
may exceed more than one per cent of the range of the rocket. However, there are no principal
difficulties with the inclusion of this force in the equations. The trajectory calculation will
consequently depend on the latitude of the firing post and the azimuthal direction of fire. In order
to include this force a three-dimensional model must be applied.5
6.4 Trajectories
Appendix D contains a collection of trajectories and other characteristics for some of the most
common rocket artillery systems.
6.5 Accuracy of delivery
There are many factors affecting the accuracy of rocket fire. Statistically they are of two different
kinds:
Systematic error
- those errors that repeat themselves from rocket to rocket resulting in a bias in the impact
pattern of the fire
Random errors
- those that are completely random from rocket to rocket resulting in a dispersion within a
salvo of rockets
In general, every error component has a vector character. If every component is independent of
each other, they should be summarized as vector and not as scalars. Some error components,
however, may not be completely independent. If these are summed vectorially, a covariant
component should be subtracted from the sum.
Assuming that there n error components with variances 􀁖2
i, i = 1, …n and with correlation
coefficients 􀁕ij, i,j = 1, … n, the total error can be written as
2 2
1 1 1
2
n n n
total i ij i j
i i j
􀁖 􀁖 􀁕􀁖􀁖
􀀠 􀀠 􀀠
􀀠􀂦 􀀐 􀂦􀂦
4 Named after the French mathematician Gaspard-Gustave Coriolis (1792 – 1843)
5 The Coriolis force may be felt if sitting in a merry-go-round. Try throwing a ball to a friend sitting in a
distant seat. The ball follows an oddly curved path as seen from both you and your friend. However, from
an observer standing on the ground the curve looks normal.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 47
Often the correlations coefficients are zero, indication the actual error sources are independent.
6.5.1 Random errors
Random errors are mostly connected to the rockets. Examples are
- variations in mass
- variation in fuel mass
- variations in surface finish affecting the skin friction drag
- variations in the shape of fins
- variations in fuze timing (if applicable)
- variations in centre of gravity and moments of inertia
- thrust misalignment
- unpredicted launcher movement and vibrations
- short term meteorological variations
6.5.2 Systematic errors
The systematic errors are more of operational inaccuracies and environmental variations like:
- difference between the actual and measured or predicted meteorological state
- deviations of the ammunition lot properties compared to the standard properties
- aiming errors
- errors in target acquisition data
- error in launcher position and orientation
- incomplete ballistic models
- deviations between actual and anticipated ammunition temperature
6.5.3 Wind induced errors
Rocket artillery projectiles have two distinct phases:
- the boost phase, in which the fuel burns and the rocket accelerates
- the coast phase, in which there is no propulsion and the projectile flies like any other
projectile
The effect of wind is opposite in the two phases. In the latter phase, the projectile is affected in a
“normal” way and it diverts in the direction or the wind. In the boost phase however, there is a net
acceleration of the rocket and the fins will align the rocket with the airstream felt by the rocket. If
the wind comes from the right, the net airstream will divert to the right and consequently the
rocket will also divert to the right. The rocket will thus, somewhat counter-intuitively, move
against the wind. The tendency to move against the wind will be in proportion to the net
acceleration, i.e. the higher the acceleration, the more it will divert.
The boost phase will take place in the lower few hundred meters of the atmosphere. Although the
wind speed is low near ground and has a steady increase with altitude, the variability of the wind
48 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
is most pronounced in the lowest atmosphere. At hundred meters altitude wind variations take
place at a time scale of a few minutes. This effect is especially pronounced when in broken
terrain. This implies that it is almost impossible to forecast the boost phase wind and that any
measurement of this wind will be valid for just a few minutes.
When firing at ranges beyond 20 km, this factor is the most serious contribution to inaccuracy of
the rocket. Compared with tube artillery fired at the same range, rockets tend to have an average
error in the hit point that is twice as high. A typical error produced by tube artillery is 0.9% of its
range, while rockets typically may have 2% error.
6.6 Reported accuracy
The value of the accuracy is known for the most prominent rocket systems. However, for many of
these reports the concept of accuracy is not well defined. The numbers are not defined according
to random or systematic error contributions. Often it is not even specified whether the numbers
refer to the probable error or the standard deviation with respect to the aim-point.
There are no standards on how to define average conditions for the state of the troposphere. As an
example, the term average wind may be defined as
- the time average
- the median value of a regularly sampled set of values
- the surface wind average value
- the ballistic (see box) wind average value
Ballistic wind
The term ballistic wind is a term used in gun artillery ballistics for calculating the effect of the
wind. It is based a vertical sampling of the meteorological state of the atmosphere. The sampling
is made at specified layers (zones) of the atmosphere and the ballistic wind is weighted average of
the wind measurements for the part of the atmosphere through which the projectile moves. The
weighting is done according to how much the wind in certain zone potentially may affect the total
accuracy. In addition to ballistic wind, term like ballistic air density and ballistic temperature can
be defined in the same way. However, while temperature and density are scalar values, the wind
is defined as a 2-dimensional (horizontal) vector.
The definition of ballistic wind can be found in [16]
The table below shows some values for accuracy of some common rocket systems. The values
given are for the maximum firing range. At shorter range, the values can be assumed as being
proportional to the range raised to 3/2.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 49
System Max. range
(km)
Random errors
(m)
Systematic
errors
(m)
Total error for
single fire (m)
107 mm 8 70 x 100 45 x 90 80 x 130
122 mm (portable) 11 100 x 150 90 x 180 130 x 230
122 mm 20 110 x 180 120 x 240 160 x 300
227 mm 32 160 x 360 120 x 240 200 x 430
240 mm 11 180 x 400 110 x 220 210 x 460
300 mm (guided) 70 - - 150 x 150
Table 6.2 Some assumptive values for accuracy of some selected systems at maximum firing
range. For the two first systems, the error will vary according to the quality of the
launcher.
6.7 Direct fire
Direct fire by artillery is normally not used. The need to use rockets in direct mode may be as a
last resort in a defensive operation, when no other means are available. The firing range in direct
fire may be limited to 1000 m.
Many of the vehicle borne rocket systems have a minimum and maximum angle of elevation. The
maximum value may be like 50 - 55° and the minimum value may be around 10°. Such systems
cannot be used in a direct mode as the required elevation will just be a few degrees. It can
however be circumvented by using a braking devices like rings at the front tip of the rocket, or by
placing the vehicle in downhill slope facing the target.
Most portable or towed systems can easily be used in direct mode provided that a simple aiming
device is adapted to the launcher. On improvised systems, any restriction on elevation can also
easily be circumvented.
6.8 Submunition ballistics
Submunition payload is quite common for rocket artillery munitions. As mentioned elsewhere in
this report, there is a wide variety of submunitions.
The main reason for using submunitions is to spread the effect of the payload over an area. If the
submunition is inadequately spread, there will be an oversaturation of effect inside the area, and
much of the effect will be spilled. The size of the area should be so large that oversaturation is
avoided against any kind of target. On the other hand, the area can not be so large that it exceeds
the size of a typical target, thereby spilling some of the effect outside the target and increasing the
possibility of collateral damage.
50 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
6.8.1 Ejection
One way to spread out the payload would be to split the casing covering the payload in two
pieces, exposing the payload to the air-stream. The possible disadvantages are that the spread
could be small, the submunitions could be damaged by interference with the motor shell and the
process could have limited repeatability. Consequently, most payloads contain a centre charge
that blows the submunitions away from the canister. Such a charge can eject the submunitions
with a speed exceeding 100 m/s. The charge itself can be a high explosive charge or a powder
charge.
The splitting of the casing can be due to the inside pressure caused by the centre core burster
(CCB). Alternatively can be a separate process as the casing is split by the detonation of an
explosive cord stretched along the inside of the casing. (see figure 7.8)
The timing of the centre charge and also of the detonating cord is governed by the main fuze of
the rocket warhead.
Figure 6.8 The expulsion charge of the MLRS M26 rocket
The next two figures show an example of the trajectory of the bomblets expelled from a MLRS
rocket and the impact pattern on the ground.
Figure 6.9 Bomblet trajectories for M26 cluster rocket. The ejection takes place at a height of
760 m.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 51
Figure 6.10 Dispersion pattern of M26 cluster munition rocket
6.8.2 Descent phase
The ballistics of the submunition is usually a quite simple process that can be modelled by 2-
dimensional ballistic models. Most of the submunition has some kind a stabilizer, like a ribbon or
streamer, or flaps or fins avoiding any chaotic rotation of the munition.
There are also some examples of a two stage descent phase, where initially a number of packages
containing several submunitions (literally sub-submunitions) are thrown out. The packages are
then set to open after a certain time at which the true submunitions are released.
7 Rocket payloads
7.1 Fragmentation high explosive charges
This is the classical and simplest kind of warhead. The payload is just a batch of high explosive
intend to detonate at impact with the ground, or in some cases a few meters above ground. Apart
from the explosive charge, the warhead contains a fuze with a detonator to initiate the high
explosive charge. Before 1970, almost all rocket artillery warheads were of this kind.
Explosives like TNT or RDX confined in a metallic container have their primary effect by
ejecting fragments and, to less extent, by emitting a pressure wave in order to destroy structures
and incapacitate humans.
-50
0
50
100
150
200
31500 31550 31600 31650 31700 31750 31800
52 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
7.2 Enhanced effect warheads
Some explosives or explosive mixtures have a blast pressure character different from that of a
conventional explosive.
In some cases, it may be desirable to have warheads with an enhanced pressure wave. Actual
targets could be urban areas, people in shelters with strong overhead protection. There are
basically two ways to achieve this – by thermobarics or by fuel-air explosives.
7.2.1 Fuel-air explosives (FAE)
Fuel-Air Explosives (FAE) in military munitions are based on the same principles that cause
many accidental explosions in buildings, silos and industries – deflagration or detonation
reactions of highly combustible materials in mixture with air. Military FAE however use these
principles intentionally for generating intensive air blast and heat impulses for destruction of
ground forces (personnel and vehicles), infrastructure, and to set off mines in a mine field.
The main advantage of FAE systems in general is the fact that only a part of the explosive energy
has to be delivered at the target. Additional energy is extracted from the oxygen in the air. The
combustible part are usually dispersed and mixed with the air by a smaller explosive charge and
ignited at a stage when the mixture with air is supposed to be optimal.
The combustible part is often one of the following compounds:
- ethylene oxide (C2H4O)
- propylene oxide (C3H6O)
- decane (C10H22)
- kerosene (CnH2n+2)
- mixture of 51% methyl acetylene (C3H4), 26% propane (C3H8) and 23% propadiene
(C3H4)
The blast effect of a FAE charge may be 2 – 3 times greater than the same amount of TNT.
U S Army implemented FAE in a rocket system called SLUFAE (Surface Launched Unit, Fuel
Air Explosive) using the rocket M130 carrying 45 kg FAE. The rocket had a calibre of 345 mm
and a weight of 85 kg. Its range was quite short as it was primarily intended for clearing
minefields. The development started in the 1970s, but the system never entered production.[17]
FAE warheads are not yet very widespread, but it is known that the Russian Uragan and Smerch
systems have FAE-ammunition. It is not known whether these munitions have been exported.
Also the Russian TOS-1 Buratino6 220 mm system, fired from a modified main battle tank, has
FAE payloads.
6 Buratino is a Russian fairy-tale figure whose parallel is the American Pinocchio
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 53
Figure 7.1 220 mm TOS-1 systems firing FAE rockets
7.2.2 Thermobaric explosives
FAE may be called a two stage explosive, involving dispersion and detonation. Its relative, the
thermobaric explosive (TBX) is more of a one stage explosive like conventional ones.
Thermobaric explosions involve a conventional detonation followed by rapid burning of
detonation products with the surrounding air a in deflagration regime close to the detonation. The
initial detonation disperses detonations products and unreacted fuel into the air where detonation
products, the fuel and the ambient oxygen continue to burn. The reactions of detonation products
reinforce the pressure wave from the initial detonation and create a long-lasting moderate wave
that will travel down streets and corridors and around corners.
This technology has been implemented in Russian munitions for around two decades. Some
Western countries are also in the process of acquiring this technology.
The original TBX was a mixture of magnesium powder and isopropyl nitrate (IPN) surrounding a
conventional explosive charge. Later aluminium powder has replaced the magnesium and liquids
like nitramine, ammonium nitrate, ammonium chlorate or ethyl nitrate have been applied.
The effect TBX may give a pressure pulse which is twice as high and with a longer duration than
that of TNT. In addition, an extensive flame zone with around 0.7 s duration is also created.
54 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Figure 7.2 Explosion of a thermobaric charge [18]
7.3 Submunition payload
Submunition payloads are also known as cargo payload and even as cluster warhead. The first
type of submunition was probably mines, either of the anti-personnel or the anti-tank type. Later
many other type have been deployed including
- explosive and fragmenting bomblets (ICM – Improved Conventional Munition)
- explosive and fragmenting bomblets with a shaped charge (DPICM – Dual Purpose
Improved Conventional Munition)
- incendiary bomblets
- subunits generating electromagnetic noise (ECM – Electronic Countermeasure)
- anti-tank mines
- anti-personnel mines
- advanced anti-armour submunitions
Submunitions are normally ejected from the carrier at a certain altitude, ensuring an adequate
dispersion of the bomblets without compromising the precision of the delivery. In some systems,
the time of ejection is controlled by the fire control system specifying or actively setting the
timing of the fuze. In some occasions it may be useful to override this setting in order to minimize
the dispersion or to reach targets situated behind high crests. An automated fuze setting set by the
fire control system can easily be circumvented by specifying a false target altitude.
The maximum spread of the submunition is mainly determined by the mass and, to some extent,
the size of the submunition units. If the expulsion takes place at an altitude that ensures that the
submunition reaches the natural free fall velocity, the impact velocity will also be determined by
the mass and size of the submunition. Expulsion at an altitude exceeding the optimum height is
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 55
pointless as it will just marginally increase the dispersion of the submunition, but decrease the
accuracy of the bombardment.
The table below shows some examples of typical ballistic properties of common submunition
units.
Submunition
Carrier Type Mass
(kg)
Crosssection
(cm2)
Expulsion
height (m)
Free-fall
velocity (m/s)
M77 MLRS/M26 DPICM 0.23 14 ~500 40
KB-1 M67 Orkan DPICM 0.25 14 ~500 (40)
9N235 Smerch AP 1.9 33 n/a (70)
SPBE Smerch SFW 15.6 30
M74 ATACMS AP 0.59 270 ~1000 50
PTM-3 Uragan AT 4.9 1750 70
Table 7.1 Ballistic properties of some typical submunition rocket systems
The Russian SPBE submunition is a Sensor Fuzed Warhead that is designed to engage targets that
have characteristics associated with armoured vehicles. The sensors are a suite of radiometry,
radar, infrared at different wave-lengths, and laser. Usually two or three of these are found in a
warhead. The submunition are expelled at high altitude, say 1000 m, and is decelerated by
different devices before it enters the search phase 200 – 300 meters above ground. Its shape
ensures that the movement of the warhead is nutative7 so that it scans the ground along an inward
spiralling track. When a possible target is found the warheads ejects at solid projectile weighing
around 1 kg and with a speed of around 2000 m/s against the top of the target. Against an
armoured vehicle a hit should implicate 20 – 50% probability of a kill.
This kind of submunitions is in development for different types of ammunition for artillery and
bombs. However, Russia is so far the only nation that has applied this technology in rocket
artillery munition. There were plans to develop a MLRS projectile with this submunition, but
these plans seems to have been put aside.
7 A nutation is a movement where the axis of rotation deviates from the natural axis of the object. In the
present case this deviation is around 30º.
56 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Figure 7.3 The search mode of a Sensor Fuzed Warhead
M77 KB-1 SFW
M74 PTM-3
9N235
Figure 7.4 Some submunitions in rocket artillery payloads
The performance for submunitions are described in [19].
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 57
7.4 Incendiary payload
Some warheads may have the ability to burn and to create fire as its primary effect. It is well
known that white phosphorus (WP) has this ability in addition to creating smoke screens. Other
materials with incendiary effect are thermite (aluminium power mixed with iron oxide), and
magnesium powder. Liquid hydrocarbons can also be used.
FAE and TBX warhead are sometimes called incendiary warheads, which may be somewhat
inaccurate. As indicated above, those warheads should rather be called explosive.
Incendiary warheads are not very widespread as rocket artillery ammunition, but incendiary
bomblets have been used in cluster munitions in combination with explosive bomblets.
7.5 Chemical payloads
It is well known that U S Army acquired large amounts of chemical rockets for their 115 mm
M91 towed launcher in the 1950s and 1960s. It is probable that such developments also took
place in other nations. The rocket was called M55. It was never used in combat and was declared
obsolete in 1981. It could carry 4 – 5 kg of either GB (Sarin) or VX agent. Both are nerve gases.
[20]
In 1998, U N inspectors found 122 mm rockets with nerve gas in Iraq. It is probable that such
ammunition was used during the attack on the Kurdish village of Halabja in 1988 killing more
than 5000 civilians. [21]
8 Lethal effects
8.1 Lethal area
Quantifying the effect of warhead is quite complicated. Apart from the effect of being directly hit
by the warhead, the effects at distance are the following three:
􀁸 Blast effects may be the easiest effect to quantify, as the pressure and impulse from an
explosion is a function of the charge size and distance. Other factors are of secondary
importance.
􀁸 Fragment effects are more complicated. Firstly it is a problem to assess the initial state of
the fragments, i.e. their initial velocity, their weight distribution and their shape.
Secondly, the aerodynamic performance is not known with certainty. Thirdly, there is
some uncertainty about the effect fragments have when entering a human body. Finally,
the exposed area and the posture of the human body are to some extent random.
􀁸 Incendiary effects are also complicated to describe. They will depend on environment, the
victim’s clothing, and incendiary components. The short term effect may be benign and
vague, while the long term effect could be fatal. Compared to the previous effects, this is
of lesser importance and will not be discussed further herein.
58 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Whatever the effect is, it can be quantified by a two-dimensional function p(x,y) which is the
probability of being affected by the weapon when the position of the target is given by the ground
coordinates (x,y). The position of the bomblet can be set as origin (0,0), although it is not a
necessary premise.
When this injury probability function has been established, the effect of the munition can be
stated as a single quantity called lethal area. However, the term lethal may sound more dramatic
than it is. In military context this means incapacitation which may not necessarily imply lethality.
This term is defined as
( , ) , L A p x y dx dy
􀁦 􀁦
􀀐􀁦 􀀐􀁦
􀀠 􀂳 􀂳
The interpretation of the lethal area in practical terms is the size of the area that is completely
affected by the warhead. In military terms, if the number of targets per area is known to be 􀁖,
then the number of targets destroyed by the warhead is found as:
N 􀀠 AL􀁖
Example: A 155 mm artillery shell is known to have a lethal area of around 800 m2 against
unprotected soldiers in an upright posture. The density of such soldiers in a target area is assumed
to be 20 soldiers per hectare, or 0.002 soldiers per square meter. The number of soldiers
incapacitated by this warhead will then be 800 m2 x 0.002 soldiers/m2 = 1.6 soldiers.
When trying to estimate the probability of being incapacitated when being a distance x from the
detonation, then the following expression can be used when the lethal area AL is known.
2
( ) exp
L
P x x
A
􀂧 􀁓 􀂷
􀀠 􀂨􀀐 􀂸
􀂩 􀂹
Example: Returning to the previous example with a lethal area of 800 m2; the probability of being
incapacitated at 3 m distance will be 97%, at 10 m it will be 68%, at 20 m 21%, and at 40 m
0.01%.
When multiple warheads are spread out over a footprint area AF, there will be more or less
overlap between lethal areas originating from different warheads or bomblets. As there is no need
to kill a target more than once, the total lethal area will become less than the sum over individual
areas. The expression for the cumulative lethal area of a cluster bomb containing N bomblets with
individual lethal areas AL each then becomes:
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 59
, 1 exp L
L total F
F
A A NA
A
􀂪 􀂧 􀂷􀂺
􀀠 􀂫 􀀐 􀂨􀀐 􀂸􀂻
􀂬 􀂩 􀂹􀂼
This formula presupposes that the bomblets are uniformly distributed over the footprint; if not the
total lethal area will be even more diminished.
Of course, these approaches can be applied for any warhead against any target, also for
quantifying the humanitarian effect of a cluster munition.
8.2 Fragmentation
Fragments usually originate from the casing surrounding the explosive charge of a bomb or a
shell. Fragments may come in all sizes and shapes. When the casing has a smooth and even
surface, both at the inside and outside, the casing will splinter by so-called natural fragmentation.
The fragments will then usually get quite irregular shapes, and cover a wide variety of sizes. A
typical shape is the elongated one as in the left figure below, but any shape is possible.
Prefragmented ones have a more regular shape as shown in the right picture
Figure 8.1 Examples of fragments. Left – a natural fragment, right – prefragmented
fragments[17]
Prefragmentation is made by having grooves or scores on the inside or outside of the shells. The
casing is split up preferably along these grooves. Alternatively, spherical particles of a hard or
heavy metal can be embedded in a matrix of a softer or lighter material. The spheres will then be
the main injuring mechanism. Heavy spherical fragments will also have a far longer range than
light or irregularly shaped fragments.
The effect of fragments on humans is determined by their mass and velocity and to a lesser extent
by their size and shape.
The initial velocity of the fragments is given by the so called Gurney’s equation
0
v 2E
M k
C
􀀠
􀀎
,
60 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
where v0 is the initial velocity. M is the mass of the fragmenting material. C is the mass of the
explosive. E is the energy content per mass of the explosive. k is a shape factor of the charge. Its
value is 0.5 for a cylindrical charge and 0.6 for a spherical charge. The numerator, 2E , the
Gurney velocity, is found in table 6.1. These values are valid for ideal charges (i.e. perfectly
spherical or cylindrical). In reality there will be deviations from these values due to variations in
the casing thickness and radius, and due to other non-ideal shapes. However the Gurney equation
may serve as a good estimate of the maximum speed of the fragments. Initial fragment velocities
are usually between 800 and 2000 m/s.
All fragments, ejected from a certain part of the warhead, get the same initial velocity,
independent of the size. The velocity of small fragments will subsequently decrease far more
rapidly than larger fragments. This fact can most easily be illustrated by the so called halfdistance
defined as the distance over which the velocity of the fragment will be halved. As an
example, consider a fragment with initial velocity of 1200 m/s and a half-distance of 30 m. After
a travel of 30 m the velocity will be 600 m/s, after 60 m it will be 300 m/s, after 90 m it will be
150 m/s and so on. Actual values of the half-distances are shown in the Table 8.1 below. As most
shells eject either natural shaped fragments or spherical fragments, and accounting for the
difference in air drag for these two shapes, the table below addresses both these shapes.
Fragment mass Natural shape
(steel)
Spherical shape
(steel)
Spherical shape
(tungsten)
10 mg 4 m 8 m 14 m
100 mg 8 m 17 m 30 m
1g 20 m 40 m 70 m
10 g 40 m 80 m 150 m
100 g 80 m 170 m 320 m
Table 8.1 Performance of fragments in air in terms in distances travelled to reach 50% of their
initial velocity
The direction of the ejected fragments is exclusively determined by the geometry of the charge. In
most cases the direction of the fragments will be close to the normal8 to the surface of the
fragmenting body. When the detonation wave sweeps along the inner surface of the body, the
direction will be slightly diverted along the direction of propagation. This deviation is, however,
usually less than 10°[22].
Many warheads have a predefined fragment mass of 0.1 to 0.2 grams. This is considered the
optimum fragment size if the main purpose is to defeat unprotected soft targets [23]. The
optimum size is a compromise between having a few massive, long ranging fragments, or a high
number of small and short-ranged ones.
8 At right angle to the surface.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 61
The effective direction of ejection is of course also dependent upon the velocity of descent which
is added vectorially to the ordinary ejection velocity. A fall velocity of several hundred meters per
second will divert the fragments into a more forward facing trajectory that may affect the
performance of the ammunition.
Another factor that is very dependent on distance is the hit probability. Let us consider a case
where a shell detonates ejecting N fragments. Disregarding the velocity loss and the curved
trajectory of fragments, the probability that a person will be hit by any of these fragments can be
found by the following formula
2 1 exp
4
P NA
􀁓 r
􀀠 􀀐 􀂧 􀀐 􀂷 􀂨 􀂸
􀂩 􀂹
where A is the body area exposed to the charge and r is the distance from the shell. The formula
presupposes that N is a large number. Figure 8.2 shows how the hit probability decreases with
distance for a typical case of a shell ejecting 1000 fragments. The exposed area of the person is
set to 0.5 m2, which is a typical value for an adult person. The figure also shows that at 200 m
distance the probability of being hit is quite marginal.
Figure 8.2. Hit probability as a function of distance to a shell ejecting 1000 fragments.
The fragment’s capacity for perforation of armour plates is shown in the following Figure 8.3. It
shows the velocity required to perforate armour steel plates of 1 mm and 3 mm thicknesses. When
these data are combined with the deceleration of fragments in air it can be shown that the ability
of fragments to perforate armour is very limited.
0,01
0,1
1
10
100
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Distance (m)
Hit probability (%)
62 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Figure 8.3 Armour perforation capacity of naturally shaped fragments
8.3 Blast
The blast effect of warheads is believed to be the most important effect when suppression of
enemy fire is the purpose of the fire mission.
Table 8.2 below shows the basic characteristics of the most common military explosives.
Density
(kg/m3)
Detonation
velocity
(m/s)
Detonation
pressure
(MPa)
Gurney
velocity*
(m/s)
TNT
equivalent
factor
Comp B 1742 7920 29.5 2350 1.15
HMX 1903 9110 39.0 2970 1.26
Octol 1843 8480 34.2 2830 1.23
RDX 1806 8700 33.8 2451 1.19
TNT 1654 6930 21.0 2097 1.00
Table 8.2 Properties of some common explosives
* see section 8.2
The blast effect from an explosive detonation is characterized by a shock wave that propagates
outwards from the detonation point. The speed of propagation is initially very high and
supersonic (several km/s). Depending on the size of the charge, the speed eventually drops to the
sonic level, and the wave becomes an ordinary pressure wave.
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
0,1 1 10 100
Fragment mass (g)
Perforation velocity (m/s)
1 mm
3 mm
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 63
The quantitative characteristics of a shock wave are its peak pressure and its duration. The
general shape of the shock wave is shown in Figure 8.4 below. Here the duration is the length of
the initial positive part of the pressure.
Duration
Peak pressure
Figure 8.4 A shock wave profile showing peak pressure and duration.
The peak pressure is the height of the discontinuous front, while the duration is the time length of
the positive phase. These two parameters, which we may call p and t respectively, are both scaled
according to the size of the charge. The principle behind scaling is shown in Figure 8.5 below
where 􀁎 is the geometric one-dimensional scaling factor of the charge.
Figure 8.5 Scaling of blast wave effects
The essence of the scaling is that the distance and duration both scale with the charge size, while
the peak pressure remains constant at scaled distances. This also implies that the impulse in the
shock wave scales with the charge size.
64 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
An encased charge will have a somewhat reduced pressure compared to a bare charge. If the
casing has a weight twice the weight of the explosive, the pressure will be reduced by more than
50%. We can define an effective explosive mass C’ which is less than the actual mass explosive
C. The formula to be used here is
' 0.2 0.8
1 /
C C
M C
􀀠 􀂧 􀀎 􀂷 􀂨 􀀎 􀂸 􀂩 􀂹
where M is the mass of the casing.9
8.4 Examples of performance
C’ is then the effective explosive mass generating the blast
wave.
Some of the effects described above may be hard to compare, especially against complex or
composite targets. In order to exemplify the performance the human body may be easiest one to
use.
As explained in section 8.1, ordinary warheads have a combination of fragment effects and blast
effects. The concept of lethal area is the common way to quantify the effect. In an open
environment the fragments dominate the damage inflicted on the target. Blast effects are of
secondary importance. In closed space environment, the blast effect may be the most effective
one. However, as rocket artillery is designed for area targets, which for obvious reasons have to
be open space targets, fragments will be the most important effect for most targets. For guided
systems, which may have a point target role, blast warheads may be viable. The following tables
give typical values for lethal areas for some typical systems.
System
Explosive
mass (kg)
Lethal area
(m2)
(point fuze)
Lethal area
(m2)
(proximity
fuze)
107 mm spun 1.3 450 550
122 mm finned 6.4 700 850
160 mm finned 9 1050 1200
220 mm finned 52 1700 1950
240 mm spun 42 1500 1700
300 mm finned 75 2400 2600
333 mm spun 60 2400 2700
610 mm finned ~200 5300 5600
Table 8.3 Typical performance data for some high explosive rocket warheads
9 Putting a casing around the explosive will have the same effect as downscaling the dimensions of the
explosive by a factor equal to the third root of the expression inside the parentheses.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 65
System Number of
bomblets
Dispersion
area (ha)
Bomblet
type
Bomblet lethal
area (m2)
Total lethal
area (m2)
122 mm 39 (1.5) MZD-2 17 650
160 mm 104 3.1 M85 41 3500
227 mm 644 4.0 M77 19 10200
300 mm 646 (2.5) KOBE 20 10500
610 mm 980 (4.0) M74 30 25000
Table 8.4 Typical performance data for rocket delivered cluster munition warhead. Numbers
in parentheses are assumptive.
8.5 Comparisons between conventional artillery, rocket artillery and mortars
The following graphs briefly show some comparisons in terms of ammunition weight, range and
accuracy for some selected but typical systems. For the purpose of comparison, mortars and
conventional howitzers are also included. Furthermore, we have also distinguished between fin
stabilized and spin stabilized systems, as the latter category has used in light rocket systems, but
is also inferior in terms of range.
Figure 8.6 shows the relations between calibre and range of the systems. The most noticeable
feature is that guns, mortars and spin stabilized rockets all have limited range. Especially for guns
and mortars, it may be claimed that they have reached their limit in terms of range. This limit is
determined mechanical and propulsive constraints. For rockets, and especially for fin stabilized
rockets, such a limit hardly exists, as the graph could have extended to include strategic and
intercontinental systems.
Guns and fin stabilized rockets roughly increase their range in proportion to the calibre. Spin
stabilized have, as mentioned earlier, an aerodynamic limitation as it is very difficult to spinstabilize
long slender bodies. Thus spin stabilized rocket have to keep a rather small length to
diameter ratio. This factor subsequently limits the payload to fuel ratio.
66 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Figure 8.6 Maximum range as a function of the calibre. A few extremely long range systems
are not included here.
Figure 8.7 shows the same systems as shown in figure 8.6, but here the system weight as a
function of calibre is plotted. The categorization of systems is the same as in figure 8.6. As the
figure shows, there is no strong correlation between calibre and system weight for rocket systems.
For guns and mortars, this correlation is quite strong, but rocket system may have very different
weights due to the number of rockets carried by the vehicle. Some systems have a single rocket,
while others may have 40 rockets ready to fire.
No rockets system seems to have a system weight exceeding 45 tons. This limit is due to
mobility. A heavier system put a heavy load on roads and bridges and on the strategic mobility by
rail.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Range (km)
Calibre (mm)
Fin stabilized
Spin stabilized
Guns
Mortars
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 67
Figure 8.7 System mass as a function of calibre
9 Improvised systems
As mentioned before, rocket artillery is a relatively simple system. Compared to cannons or
howitzers, a workable rocket launcher can be made without any strict requirements on strengths
or tolerances in the construction. Even the rockets themselves can be made in moderately
advanced workshops provided that the requirements for firing accuracy are relaxed.
Building and firing rockets is an acknowledged and fully legal hobby in many countries.
Consequently there is an abundance of literature available on subjects like ignition, propulsion,
stabilization and aerodynamic design.
9.1 Explosives
The explosive may be the easiest component to get. In war-ridden areas there is abundant access
to Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) from abandoned ammunitions stores, unexploded
ordnance (UXOs) and booty. The high explosive content can with acceptable risk be melted and
recasted into new charges and warheads.
Secondary explosives can also be home made based on components that may be readily available.
Recipes of explosive are available from a wide variety of sources – anarchists, terrorists,
hobbyists etc. However, the most authoritative, as well as safest, source may be the technical
manual [23] on improvised explosives that was issued by the U S Department of the Army during
the Vietnam war. Although dated, it is still an invaluable source on how to make your own
explosive out of simple ingredients, and in a relatively safe manner.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
0 200 400 600 800 1000
System mass (tons)
Calibre (mm)
Fin
stabilizedd
Spin
stabilized
Guns
Mortars
68 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
One of the most popular high explosives is ANFO which is an abbreviation for the mixture of
ammonium nitrate and fuel oil. Ammonium nitrate is an ordinary fertilizer which is available in
most countries while the oil can be regular diesel fuel. However, ANFO may be hard to bring to
detonation and requires a small lump of TNT or another high explosive to react with high order.
Primary explosives are in general more difficult and risky to make, but the technical manual
mentioned above also provides recipes for that. Primary explosives are only needed in small
quantities, and they can also be acquired by disassembling left-behind fuzes.
9.2 Propellants
Unlike most high explosives, rocket propellants contain curing compounds and can not be melted
out of abandoned ammunition and reused in other systems.
The Qassam rockets manufactured by the Hamas at the Gaza strip are made with TNT high
explosive warheads and a propellant made of fertilizer, potassium nitrate (KNO3) and cane sugar.
Depending on the quality of ingredients and of the mixing and curing process, such propellants
can reach a specific impulse (see chapter 6.1) of 90 – 120 s. This is approximately half of what is
achieved by ordinary propellant. Still it is adequate for producing workable rockets.
Sugar syrup propellant
100g KNO3, finely powdered
40g cane sugar
30g corn syrup
The KNO3 is placed in a pan and heated to 200 degrees in a conventional oven.
This is to keep it from cooling down the sugar syrup too much when it is
added.
Warm KNO3 mixes in easier and allows a longer working time.
Sugar and corn syrup are placed in a 1-quart Pyrex measuring pitcher, mixed
together, and heated in a microwave oven on "high" until the liquid is
perfectly clear.
Heavy shirt, face mask, and gloves are used to make the body more flameresistant,
just in case.
Sugar syrup is stirred to eliminate any "hot spots." Then the KNO3 added, and
everything is stirred vigorously with a wooden spoon. Whilst stirring,
mouth of glass container is pointed away from face and other things of
importance, just in case.
Upon cooling, this propellant tends to be somewhat crumbly and more brittle
than recrystallized propellant. Heating to 200 degrees F does not soften it
like recrystallized. But heating to 250 to 270 degrees brings it to a nearliquid
state, at which point it can be stirred and then kneaded as it cools
a bit.
Figure 9.1 One of many recipes found on the Internet on how to make your own rocket
propellant. (Plain copy of the text) [24]
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 69
It should also be noticed that if potassium nitrate is in scarcity, it can be made by heat treating
wood ash with alcohol. This recipe, and other recipes are documented in the U S Army Technical
Manual on improvised munition.[25]
Figure 9.2 Improvised rocket fuel being poured into a plastic casting container to cool and
cure. The container is then cut away and the casting is placed inside the rocket. [26]
9.3 Fuzes
The fuzes of an improvised rocket do not have to be very sophisticated. A simple device
consisting of a firing pin aligned with a detonator can be made quite easily. The firing pin is
forced into the detonator at impact and the only safety precaution could consist of a safety pin
(e.g. like that on a hand grenade) that is withdrawn just before launch. The firing pin can be
merely restrained by a helical spring that resists the acceleration during launch and boost, but not
the forces imparted at impact with the ground.
9.4 Rocket bodies
The main challenge of making a rocket may be the strength of the motor casing including the
nozzle and the nozzle-tube interface.
While the grain is burning the pressure inside the motor may be as high as 10 MPa (100 atm.). To
make a 120 mm tube able to withstand this pressure, a wall thickness of 6 mm is adequate if
aluminium is used and 4 mm if steel is used. If high strength alloys are used the thickness can be
reduced further
9.5 Launchers
An improvised launcher does not have to be very sophisticated. A simple gutter or tube supported
by a bipod or tripod will be sufficient provided that it is heavy and rigid enough to be stable
70 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
during launch. The rigidity or stability is crucial for the accuracy of the firing. However, for
systems not intended for precision firing, this is not an issue.
9.6 Fire control system
In order to obtain a reasonable accuracy of an improvised system, some kind of fire control input
data (FCI) has to be in place. However, such a system requires extensive testing and monitoring
of a high number of rockets to give reliable data. Such data will mainly consist of aerodynamic
data and motor performance data at different ambient temperature. The absence of such data will
seriously affect the accuracy of the weapon. In addition, geographical and meteorological inputs
are also a requirement for an FCI.
However, when firing small or medium sized rockets onto an extended area in a terror mode, a
rigid FCI may not be required. When firing a rocket at some kilometres distance into a large
urban area, the probability that the rocket will hit something, or at least create the desired havoc,
will be quite large.
9.7 The Qassam rockets
The Hamas organization, which currently governs the Gaza strip, has an inventory of rocket
artillery that partially belongs to the term improvised. Hamas has some rockets produced in China
(PRC), but they also produce a suite of home made rockets called Qassam (or Kassam) which has
been in service since 2001 and which are frequently launched into Israel.
The first version of Qassam was rather primitive, reaching approximately just 3 km. By 2007 the
range of the same size rocket had increased to 10 km. Due to the improvised nature of the
production, it is hard to exactly quantify the parameters of the rockets. Current sources mostly
operate with three sizes (classes) of Qassam rockets as given in the table below. [27]
Qassam I Qassam II Qassam III
Diameter 60 mm 150 mm 170 mm
Weight 5.5 kg 32 kg 90 kg
Length 79 cm 180 cm > 200 cm
Range 3 km 8 -10 km 10 km
Explosive
payload
0.5 kg 5 - 7 kg 10 kg
Table 9.1 Basic properties of Qassam rockets
There is also supposed to be a recently developed Qassam IV rocket capable of reaching 15 – 17
km.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 71
Figure 9.3 Preparations for firing Qassam II rockets
Some of the warheads on the Qassam rockets seem to be mortar bombs that are fixed to the
extension
9.8 IRAM
IRAM has become the acronym for Improvised Rocket Assisted Munition. As the name indicates
the clue is here to adapt any ammunition for which the proper launching platform is unavailable
onto the front of a rocket. Thereby the original potential of the munition is regained although not
with the same precision of delivery. The warhead will then be of high standard while the rocket
may be of inferior quality. This method became popular with IRA in Northern Ireland in the
1980. In 2008 it was also seen among the Mahdi Army in Iraq. [28]
The munition that is most easily adapted to this kind of improvisation is, above all, mortar
munitions, but small calibre artillery, rocket propelled grenades and hand grenades could also be
candidates. The rocket propelled grenades RPG-7 is very widespread, but this warhead will not
function in this role unless its self-destruct function is disabled. Otherwise, the warhead will selfdestruct
after 3 – 4 seconds of flight..
72 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Figure 9.4 Wreckage from Iraq containing launchers for IRAM
An IRAM can also be made with improvised warhead. In Iraq big propane tanks have been used
for this purpose. These are heavy warheads for which the range with rockets will be limited. They
can be characterized more like remotely launched IEDs.
9.9 Other examples
Only fantasy may limit the possibility of making improvised rocket artillery, as the following two
pictures show
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 73
Figure 9.5 Young Hezbollah soldiers manning an improvised vehicle intended for both indirect
and direct rocket fire. The type of indirect rocket is not identified.
http://community.livejournal.com/shushpanzer_ru/?skip=20&tag=2007
Figure 9.6 A small truck discovered in the Basrah area in Iraq displaying built-in rocket
launching tubes in the floor of the platform. It is supposed that this unit is able to fire
122 mm BM-21 rockets. [29]
Another special example is shown below where a primitive rack, a piece of sheet metal and a car
jack are put together to make a launcher for a 107 mm spin stabilized rocket.
74 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Figure 9.7 Improvised launcher for 107 mm rocket [Colin King]
Launchers can be made with even less sophistication than this. The next picture shows a “battery”
of 107 mm launcher pads that is simply dug out in the soil. The accuracy of such a system will, of
course, be terrible, but the method may be satisfactory if the target is a larger area a few
kilometres away. In this particular case, the target was a US regional depot south of Mosul, Iraq.
107 mm spin stabilized rockets are, despite their limited range, very popular for improvised
systems. The rocket is light (less than 20 kg), but with a powerful warhead. It is very robust, as it
can be handled very roughly without losing performance. It can easily be carried by one man and
is easy to hide. Moreover, spin stabilized rockets are less in need of accurate and sophisticated
launchers than fin stabilized rockets. As we have seen, finned rockets also have to spin, although
slowly, in order to compensate for some inherent inaccuracies. They have to draw their spin from
the launcher, which put certain requirements on the launcher. Spin stabilized rockets draw their
spin from themselves and are thus in less need for launcher quality.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 75
Figure 9.8 107 mm rocket with extremely simple launch pads[20]
The picture below shows a rocket with an apparently 122 mm nozzle section with quite large fins.
It is claimed to be a Qassam rocket found in Israel [30]. As this is originally made with wraparound
fins, the picture indicates that this is a incomplete replica of the 122 mm, or a reused
motor section on which the original fins have been missing or damaged.
Figure 9.9 Finned and spin stabilized rocket wreck found in Israel.
76 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
10 Organization
Rocket artillery is not just the rockets, the launchers, the carrying vehicles and the crewmen.
Without a supporting organization the rocket artillery may be of feeble use. The need for
ammunition supply is obvious, so is also the supply of fuel, lubricant, water, food and spare parts.
However, the most important component may be the collection information on where any
potential targets are located. Without such information, artillery will just become a logistic burden
without ability to exploit its truly tremendous potential. This fact was bitterly experienced by the
Iraqi Army in 2003. The Iraqi inventory of rocket artillery was very impressive, but they were
quite unable to locate targets and were just serving as tempting targets for the coalition forces.
[31]
Like conventional gun artillery, rocket artillery has both an offensive and defensive role. The
ability to engage in counter-battery fire may not be as good as for gun artillery, due to the lack of
precision. On the other hand its ability to inflict damage on an extensive target area with a short
time is surely impressive. As a consequence of this, multiple rocket forces are considered as a
vital part to be organized at a high level, usually at divisional level or higher.
According to OPFOR FM 100-60 [32] the artillery group of the mechanized divisions (DAG –
Divisional Artillery Group) has three battalions of 152 mm howitzer and one battalion of 122 mm
MRL. The latter has 18 launchers organized in three batteries. In a battery, in addition to the 6
launchers, there are 2 command vehicles, 6 trucks, 5 officers and 56 enlisted men[33].
A battalion of light artillery rockets has the following requirement on manpower and vehicles
according [34]:
- 18 launcher vehicles
- 8 command and control vehicles
- 24 close-in defence units
- 41 support trucks
- 8 vans
- 36 trailers
- 16 rangefinders
- 32 GPS receivers
- 28 radios
- 23 officers
- 234 enlisted men [32;33]
The number of men directly dedicated to a launcher is mostly between 3 and 8. The most
automated systems require less crew, while towed systems require a lot of manpower.
On the corps or army level there is one artillery brigade of howitzers only and an artillery
regiment with either 122 mm or 220 mm organized in three battalions.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 77
300 mm MRL is considered a national asset and will be organized on an army group level in the
event of a war. The army group will then contain an artillery division in which there will be an
MRL brigade with 4 MRL battalions of either 220 mm or 300 mm. An artillery division may be
designated to a particular army as the Army Artillery group (AAG). Each battalion has 3
batteries. The 220 mm has 6 launchers in each battery while 300 mm units have just 4 launchers.
At each level the howitzer seem to outnumber the MRL by 3 to 1.
Figure 10.1 Organization of an artillery division [25]
Figure 10.2 Organization of rocket brigade [25]
Rocket battalions have the same manpower requirement as battalions with self-propelled
howitzer. As comparison, a towed artillery battalion has around 10% higher manpower demand.
78 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Traditionally, on the battlefield, the launchers were deployed with 15 – 20 m between each in a
battery. However, improved FCS and communications leaves an opportunity to extend the
separation. Within a battalion, the spacing between the batteries is 1 – 2 km.
The DAG may be located 3 – 6 km behind the forward edge of battle area (FEBA). For the AAG
this distance may be increased to 8 km. It is of course paramount to keep this distance as small as
possible in order to exploit the range of the systems. [35].
Tactical missiles may be organized on army level as separate SSM brigades with 12 – 24
launchers and a manpower of 1000 – 1500 men.
Considering insurgency forces, and referring to OPFOR 7-100.4 [34], 122 mm MRL may be
organized with one battery subordinated to a brigade tactical group and as a part of a composite
artillery battalion.
In a smaller insurgent group the single tube launchers may be found in so-called direct action
cells together with light mortars and grenade launchers. Such a cell may consist of 13 men with 6
men assigned to the mortar and 6 men assigned to the rocket launcher. The single tube may be
either 9P132 122 mm or 107 mm Type 63 or Type 85.
11 Some scenarios
This chapter describes some generic scenarios involving rockets and adapted to the question of
defence of military camps. The camp chosen for these scenarios is a camp used in a previous
Norwegian study [36]. The camp is dimensioned for a single company and has an internal
perimeter of 130 x 170 m2. It is outlined in the figure below. The blue dotted line is the external
perimeter which has a size of around 250 x 210 m2. The camp is intended to accommodate 154
officers and soldiers plus 14 visitors, interpreters and other external personnel.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 79
Figure 11.1 Possible layout of a company camp
80 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
The following table shows a breakdown of the area used in the camp.
Code Type
Container area
(m2)
Outdoor area
(m2)
A VIP accommodation 60
B Common accommodation 1125 2000
C Laundries and wet rooms 310
D Kitchen and Cantina 300
E Offices 215
I Guard 70
J Entrance control 600
K Observation towers 60
L Storages 120 500
M Vehicle maintenance 10 300
O Outdoor activities / cleaning 210 2400
P POL site 15
Q Weapons and ammo depot 40
R Shelter area 150
T Power station 75
V Sports and fitness area 100
W Welfare 140
Table 11.1 Space distributions of the different functions in the camp
The total used area sums up 2900 m2 of indoor area and 5900 m2 of dedicated outdoor area out of
a total area of 22900 m2 inside the inner perimeter including the entrance control area
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 81
Scenario 1
Light fire – one BM-21
launcher stationed at a
distance of 15 km from the
camp and firing HE
munition.
The launcher contains 40 rockets each having a fragmenting
warhead of 18 kg. Anticipated lethal area is 400 m2 against
unprotected standing personal. All 40 rockets are fired within a
period of just 20 seconds. The flight time is 39 s. The firing is
supposed to take place during calm and stable weather
conditions. The mean point of impact deviates just 50 m from the
target centre. The salvo dispersion has a standard deviation of 90
m both along and across the line of fire.
The rockets impact at a speed of around 300 m/s and at an angle
with the ground close to 35 deg.
Scenario 2
Cluster fire – a group of 6
9P132 single tube launchers
at 6 km range firing
ammunition each containing
39 MZD-2 DPICM
munition. Each launcher will
fire three rockets each.
Due to reloading the fire will be distributed over 2 – 3 minutes,
with a steadily decreasing intensity. However the first volley of 6
rockets may come quite simultaneously. The rockets will eject in
total 702 bomblets. Of these around 300 will hit inside the outer
perimeter and will be quite evenly distributed inside this area.
The rockets eject their cargo at an altitude of 500 m. The
bomblets hit the ground after 8 – 10 seconds. Around 40
bomblets are expected to remain on the ground as UXOs.
Scenario 3
Heavy fire – a battery of 6
Falaq-1 launcher units firing
at 5 km range with HE
munition.
Each launcher vehicle has 6 rockets ready to fire. All 36 rockets
are fired within a period of 15 seconds. All rockets will probably
hit inside the perimeter, around 10 rockets will fall inside the
inner perimeter. They arrive with a speed of 250 m/s and at an
angle of fall of 15°. Each rocket carries around 20 kg of high
explosives and has a lethal area of around 1400 m2.
Scenario 4
Close fire – a group with 2
12-tube 107 mm launchers
firing at 1.5 km range using
HE munition.
The 24 rockets arrive with a speed of 350 m/s and with a low
trajectory attitude of 8 – 10°. The salvo arrives within a period of
15 seconds. Almost all rockets will fall inside the perimeter.
12 The future of rocket artillery
The intention of this report has been to describe all aspects of rocket artillery technology and
especially those related to their use against permanent camps in order to understand the problems
of defending the camps against this threat.
The advantage of rocket artillery is its ability to deliver a massive firepower at long range with a
relatively simple technology, as long as no guidance devices are applied. Its main drawbacks are,
however, its lack of precision, and its inability to engage close-in targets by direct fire. The ideal
target for this weapon is large areas of unprotected or lightly protected infantry units.
Contemporary rocket artillery is a product of WWII when Soviet forces, after a very hasty
development, used this weapon en masse and successfully against large opposing infantry units.
82 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
During the Cold War, the concept was retained in the Eastern Bloc which contined to improve its
rocket inventory with increasing range. In the west, the development was slow, but made a boost
by the development of MLRS during the last two decades of the Cold War. However, the
objective was still to defeat large targets at long distance.
Lack of precision made the weapon attractive for deployment of wide-area indiscriminate
payloads like cluster munitions. Such munition was also adapted to the role of defeating armoured
units. However, the success of this approach was limited as the armour protection of such units
improved.
In the post Cold War era, the role of Rocket Artillery has been maintained. In terms of numbers
deployed, there is less rocket artillery now than 15 years ago, but this can be seen to follow a
general decrease in armed forces worldwide.
Mortars have been considered as the “poor man’s artillery”, albeit with limited firing ranges.
Rocket artillery may equally deserve the characterisation of “the poor man’s artillery”. It is a
comparatively simple system, has longer ranges and may cover an area exceeding any other
system having a comparative degree of sophistication. This assessment is supported by the fact
that ever more nations, and mostly third world nations, acquire rocket artillery.
In the recent decade we have seen the use of rocket artillery by non-state parties, especially in the
Middle-East and adjacent areas. The target is not primarily large infantry units, but infrastructural
node point or simply urban areas. For the latter, the goal is apparently not to hit a specific target
but just to hit something in order to inflict havoc and fear. In this role, medium sized, improvised,
inaccurate rockets serve the purpose. Unfortunately, rocket artillery is an almost ideal weapon for
this purpose and there is reason to believe that the gap between improvised systems and regular
systems will close as the skill and experience of the manufacturers and operators improve.
Unguided rocket artillery is probably at the end of its development potential. The main limiting
factors of progress are not in technology, but environment. The lack of precision is mainly due to
wind and especially the rather unpredictable wind during the boost phase.
Guided artillery rockets should be expected to fill in at ranges where the lack of precision for
unguided rockets is a problem. The accuracy of today’s guided rockets is in the area of 10 – 30 m
or better. The ability to defeat buildings is probable on the verge of becoming realistic. The
ability to gain direct hits at parked vehicles may also soon be available. However, the ability of
hitting moving vehicles is not that easy to achieve because of the long and curved trajectory. For
that purpose the rockets must carry advanced seeking and guiding devices. In this role, advanced
jet-fuelled cruise missiles may be an alternative.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 83
We have during the last 5 years seen large scale use of rocket artillery at least four times
􀁸 the Hezbollah – Israeli conflict in Southern Lebanon in 2006
􀁸 the Russian – Georgian conflict in 2008
􀁸 the continuous use of rockets by Hamas onto Israel, especially until the beginning of
2009
􀁸 on the eve of the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009
This relative frequent use demonstrates that rocket artillery is still a capability to be taken
seriously. However, rocket artillery was initially designed for large scale conventional war, where
the target areas are large and densely populated with individual targets are abundant. After the
end of the Cold War such targets have become a rarity.
On the other hand rocket artillery have several properties that are attractive to non-state party
forces and insurgency groups:
􀁸 the technology is simple, robust, inexpensive and can be made without strict tolerances
􀁸 it can be made in primitive workshop
􀁸 it can be handled by a poorly educated crew
􀁸 it is light and mobile
􀁸 there is an easy access to launchers and ammunition in many areas
As long as the requirement on accuracy, consistency and reliability are relaxed, rocket artillery
may be the ideal kind of weapon. Such improvised are not the tool for winning a battle, but it well
suited to in the role of creating havoc, imposing fear, and thereby terrorizing large areas.
Defence against rocket artillery is a challenge. Locating the launch site and attacking the launch
crew have to be made before any rockets are fired. This is a fire-and-forget weapon and the
launch site may be abandoned before the rocket hits the target. The only realistic alternative is
then to destroy or neutralize the rocket before impact. Although this aspect is beyond the scope of
this report, but the aspects of simplicity and robustness, as mentioned above, adds to that
problem.
84 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
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FFI-rapport 2009/00179 87
Appendix A Abbreviations
AAG Army Artillery Group
AP Anti-Personnel
AT Anti-Tank
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System
BB Base-burn (or base-bleed)
BM Boyevaya Mashina (War Machine)
CBRN Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear
CCB Centre Core Burster
DAG Divisional Artillery Group
DOF Degrees Of Freedom
DPICM Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition
ECM Electromagnetic Countermeasure
EFP Explosively Formed Projectile
ERW Explosive Remnants of War
FAE Fuel-Air Explosive
FEBA Forward Edge of Battle Area
FCI Fire Control Input
FCS Fire Control System
FIROS Field Rocket System
FROG Free Rocket Over Ground
HE High Explosive
HMX High Melting Explosive
ICM Improved Conventional Munition
IDF Israel Defence Force
IED Improvised Explosive Device
ILL Illumination
IPN Isopropyl Nitrate
IRA Irish Republican Army
IRAM Improvised Rocket Assisted Munition/Mortars
LAR Light Artillery Rocket
LARS Light Artillery Rocket Systems
MPMM Modified Point Mass Model
MRL Multiple Rocket Launcher
MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System
NASA National Air and Space Administration
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom (2001 - )
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003 - )
OPFOR Opposing Force
PMM Point Mass Model
88 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
RAP Rocket Assisted Projectile (or Propulsion)
RDX Research Department Explosive
SFW Sensor Fuzed Warhead
SLUFAE Surface Launched Unit, Fuel Air Explosive
SRBM Short Range Ballistic Missile
SSM Surface-to-Surface Missile
TBX Thermobaric explosive
TCS Trajectory Correction System
TGW Terminally Guided Warhead
TNT Trinitrotoluene
UXO UneXploded Ordnance
WAF Wrap-Around Fins
WHE WarHead Event
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 89
Appendix B Accuracy of long range artillery
B.1 Sources of inaccuracy
􀁸 Launcher position
􀁸 Target position
􀁸 Launcher alignment
􀁸 Launch release force
􀁸 Launch velocity variation
􀁸 Launch tip-off
􀁸 Temperature and air pressure
􀁸 Aerodynamic errors
􀁸 Boost phase wind
􀁸 Ballistic phase wind
􀁸 Fuze error
B.2 Meteorological models
The most critical meteorological parameter for is the wind. For any system firing at distances
beyond 10 – 15 km the wind is the most contributing factor to the overall lack of accuracy. The
simplest approach to wind is the so-called Didion’s10 equation then says that
the deviation due to sideway wind is equal of the sidewind velocity multiplied with
the time loss caused by axial air drag
Most artillery systems have a meteorological unit allocated to the parent battalion. This unit will
monitor the wind, temperature and air pressure up to a required altitude. However, these
meteorological data may have been sampled several kilometres from the actual trajectory, and
several hours before the firing took place. Consequently, it is not the wind speed itself that
determine the accuracy, but the change in wind from the time and position of the sampling to
those of the firing. The variability, i.e. expected change of the wind, is strongly dependent of the
following three parameters
- altitude – The wind tends to become increasing stable with altitude. At low altitude, e.g.
below 500 m, the wind is very unstable and may change dramatically in a matter of 5 –
15 minutes. It is also heavily influenced by the terrain structure and even the vegetation.
At high altitudes, like in the stratosphere, the stability is very good and the wind may be
very stable on a time scale of many hours, even days. It is assumed that the altitude
variability increases as the inverse cubic root of the altitude.
- wind speed – The variability increases with the average wind speed. The variability
during a gentle breeze is far less than during a gale. When spectral models of the wind is
10 Named after the French artillery general Isidore Didion (1798 – 1878)
90 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
considered, it can be shown that the variability increases with the wind speed raised to
4/3.
- time and distance - There is an equivalence between time and space variability. It is
usually assumed that one hour time variability is equivalent to the 30 km space
variability. The variability will increase as the cubic root of time (or space)
The following table shows the expected variability after 2 hours (or 60 km) and different altitudes
and different wind speeds. Please note that the variabilities may be come larger than the average
wind velocities as the velocity here must be considered as a vector.
Altitude Gentle breeze
(5 m/s)
Moderate gale
(18 m/s)
Strong gale
(25 m/s)
100 m 3.3 10.2 28.3
500 m 1.9 5.9 16.5
1000 m 1.5 4.7 13.1
2000 m 1.2 3.7 10.4
5000 m 0.9 2.8 7.7
10000 m 0.7 2.2 6.1
20000 m 0.6 1.7 4.8
For rockets, the wind induced deviation is most pronounced during the boost phase due to the
high rate of acceleration. After the boost phase is over the wind influence is more moderate.
However the wind near the top of the trajectory becomes quite important as the rocket spends
more time near the top due to the shape of the trajectory and because the velocity is at a minimum
in that region. The wind influence during the descending part of the trajectory is even more
moderate than the ascending part because the remaining trajectory is short and any wind deviation
will have a short time to work.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 91
Appendix C Lethality models
Fragments are the dominating effect of artillery warheads, including those of rocket artillery.
hence, lethality models will focus on that effect.
There are several ways to quantify the effects of fragments on the human body. Such a model
requires the following components
- criteria for a fragment to be able to penetrate the human skin
- the probability of an incapacitating injury if the body is penetrated
- injury criteria have to depend on which part of the body is hit
C.1 Sperrazza’s model
This is quite detailed vulnerability model based on the U S Army experiences during the Vietnam
War and probably also the Korean War. The model is documented in a paper by Kokinakis and
Sperrazza11 [37]. In mathematical terms the model is based on the following expression of
probability
( , ) 1 exp 􀀋 3 2 􀀌n
kill P m v 􀀠 􀀐 􀂪􀂫􀂬􀀐a mv 􀀐 b 􀂺􀂻􀂼
The expression gives the probability of kill (inability to serve as a soldier) when hit by a fragment
with velocity v and mass m. The parameters a, b and n are adapted to experimental and empirical
data obtain through firing made on goats and, to some extent, on human cadavers. The values of
the parameters may be given for body as a whole or for any major body part. Separate sets of a, b
and n are also made for different clothing, for different fragment shapes and for different tactical
roles. As an example, the table below shows the set for a fully clothed soldier with helmet, in a
defensive role and exposed to randomly shaped steel fragments
11 This work was originally classified as Secret, but it is now downgraded to Unclassified
92 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Body part a b n r*
Head & Neck 0,19866 0,21808 0,57884 0,0651
Thorax 0,43317 0,49068 0,27859 0,1304
Abdomen 0,13200 0,47433 0,48523 0,1065
Pelvis 0,02766 0,39800 0,77314 0,1156
Arms 0,15519 0,33258 0,45662 0,2045
Legs 0,12437 0,34239 0,47749 0,3778
Entire body 0,15368 0,34239 0,45106 1,0000
Table C.1 Set of parameters for a soldier in winter uniform exposed to random fragment and in
a defensive role. SI-units are used. The number of digits in the numbers does not
reflect the accuracy of the model.
* r is a relative exposed area of the respective body part.
As another example consider the following graph showing a soldier with practically no clothes,
and in an assault role. In this role the locomotive body parts is given more emphasize. The model
uses two separate assault modes – assault < 30 seconds, and assault < 5 minutes – were the time
gives time maximum time between the hit and the moment at which the incapacitation takes
place.
In order not to be considered incapacitated, the soldier must be able to run, to use his weapon, to
see, to hear and to communicate with his fellows.
Figure C.1 Sperrazza/Kokinakis criteria for nude soldier in assault mode (< 30 seconds)
exposed to random steel fragments. Head & Neck is shown as the most vulnerable
body part.
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
0,1 1 10 100 1000
mv3/2
P(kill)
Head & Neck
Thorax
Abdomen
Pelvis
Arms
Legs
Entire body
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 93
C.2 Feinstein’s model
Starting with the first criterion, according to Lewis[38], the probability of skin penetration for a
fragment with kinetic energy K and cross section area A. The empirical formula for this
probability is
􀀋 􀀌
1 P SkinPenetration 1 exp 34.19 ln 2K
A
􀀐 􀂪 􀂧 􀂧 􀂷 􀂷􀂺 􀀠 􀂫 􀀎 􀂨 􀀐 􀂨 􀂸 􀂸􀂻 􀂬 􀂩 􀂩 􀂹 􀂹􀂼 ,
where SI-units are strictly applied.
A criterion according to Feinstein is used herein[39]. The probability of injury when being hit by
a fragment with kinetic energy K is given by the following, quite complex expression containing
a log-normal distribution
􀀋 􀀌 􀀋 􀀌2
2
0
1 ln ln | exp
2 2
K x
P injury K dx
x
􀁄
􀁅 􀁓 􀁅
􀂪 􀀐 􀂺
􀀠 􀂫􀀐 􀂻
􀂫􀂬 􀂻􀂼
􀂳
When the probability of being injured by a given fragment is known, the total probability of
injury when hit by several, say n, fragments is
􀀋 􀀌
1
1 1
n
i
i
P p
􀀠
􀀠 􀀐􀂖 􀀐 ,
where the index i designates the individual fragments.
The vulnerability model according to Feinstein divides the human body into three parts: the head,
the thorax, and the rest of the body (abdomen, arms, legs). The reason for this rather rough
division is believed to be that each of the parts has a quite uniform vulnerability.
There are other criteria for vulnerability of warfighters which use the term incapacitation. This
implies that the soldier has received an injury that makes him unable to perform his duties. These
criteria, however, are not dramatically different from Feinstein’s criteria.
The parameters for each body part are given in the table below
Part 􀁄 (J) 􀁅􀀃􀀃 Area (%)
Head 75 1.32 9
Thorax 60 1.45 23
Abdomen & limbs 130 1.54 68
Table C.2 The parameters of Feinstein’s model
94 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
The parameter 􀁄 indicates the energy level where the probability of kill is 50%, while 􀁅 is a
measure for the width of the region where the probability goes from close to zero to almost 100%.
The actual kill probabilities are plotted below
Fig C.2 Graphical presentation of the Feinstein model
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
10 100 1000
Kinetic energy (J)
Kill probability
Head
Thorax
Abdomen & limbs
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 95
Appendix D Details on some typical systems
Qassam-
1
9K132
Grad
9M22
LAR-
160
Uragan
9M27F
MRLS
M26
Smerch
9M55K
Diameter of fuselage
(mm)
60 122 122 160 220 227 300
Rocket length (m) 0.79 1.905 2.87 3.31 4.83 3.94 7.6
Mass at launch (kg) 5.5 45.8 66.35 110.0 280.4 306.2 800
Fuel mass (10.7) 20.45 (34.4) 98.4 (227)
Max. range at std.
cond. (km)
3 10.8 20.4 34 34 32 70
Muzzle velocity (m/s) 50 60 (50)
Max velocity (m/s) (200) 450 715 1022 818 (1030)
Motor thrust (kN) 125 (220)
Burn time (s) (1.5) 1.5 (2.0)
Specific impulse (s) (140) (240) (240) (240) (240) 239 (240)
Axial mom. of inertia
(kgm2)
(0.105) (0.152) (0.434) (2.09) 2.43 (11.1)
Transv. mom. of
inertia (kgm2)
(11.1) (36.8) (80.8) (440.6) 320.1 (3112)
Spin rate at launch
(rps)
10.76
Final spin rate (rps) 6 - 7
Table D.1 Basic data for some selected types of rocket artillery. Numbers in parentheses are
assumptive.
D.1 Aerodynamic data
Most current artillery rockets belongs either to one of the following two types
- long rockets with a length to diameter aspect ration in the order of 20 with wrap-around
fins near the rear end and with moderate spin
- spin stabilized rockets without fins and with a length to diameter aspect ratio in the range
of 5 to 7
96 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
As an indication of the value aerodynamic coefficients consider the following table.
Aerodynamic coefficient 140 mm spin stab. 227 mm fin stab.
Drag coefficient at 0.9 Mach 0.31 0.15
Drag coefficient at 1.1 Mach 0.57 0.39
Drag coefficient at maximum velocity 0.56 0.34
Lift coefficient at 0.9 Mach 2.3 3.6
Lift coefficient at 1.1 Mach 2.5 4.5
Lift coefficient maximum velocity 2.7 2.2
Overturning moment at 0.9 Mach 0.74 2.1
Overturning moment at 1.1 Mach 1.92 2.7
Overturning moment at maximum velocity 1.8 1.2
Pitch damping moment at 0.9 Mach -15.7 -12
Pitch damping moment at 1.1 Mach -96.7 -16
Pitch damping moment at max. velocity -116 -9.5
Spin damping moment at 0.9 Mach -0.04 -0.14
Spin damping moment at 1.1 Mach -0.04 -0.16
Spin damping moment at maximum velocity -0.04 -0.08
Table D.2 Typical values for the most important aerodynamic coefficients
D.2 Error budget
Most sources that give the accuracy of rocket systems present the round-to-round accuracy or
random error contribution. The accuracy turns out be around 1 – 2% of the firing range. Such a
value is actually quite good, but is somewhat removed from reality as the systematic error
contribution may exceed the random errors to become the dominating errors. Systematic errors
can be minimized by accurate launcher and target positioning and, above all, advanced wind
monitoring systems especially in the vicinity of the launcher and the boost trajectory of the
rocket.
D.2.1 Systematic errors
Using MLRS as an illustration of systematic errors, consider the table below. It is believed that
these numbers are representative for any un-guided system fired at the same ranges.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 97
Error source 12 km 20 km 30 km
Temperature deviation 8/0 10/0 14/0
Manufacturing inaccuracies 18/10 28/14 45/26
Aiming errors 0/17 0/28 4/14
Fuze timing errors 9/0 9/0 6/0
Wind induced errors 40/65 48/122 83230
Atmospheric temperature and pressure 20/0 32/0 58/0
Total systematic error 50/68 66/126 112/235
Table D.3 Error budget for the M26 systematic errors (in meters). Numbers show probable
error in meter along (before the slash) and across (after the slash) the line of
fire[31]
D.2.2 Random errors
.Error budget requires detailed information of a specific system, which in general is not available.
The following table is taken from [40] describing the values for the M26 rocket of MLRS. It
shows the random error along and across the line fire when firing at normal condition at three
different ranges.
Error source 12 km 20 km 30 km
Shear bolt strength 2/0 3/0 7/0
Motor impulse 35/0 55/0 89/1
Grain temperature 15/0 18/0 27/0
Rocket mass 8/0 20/0 37/0
Nozzle inclination 0/20 1/27 6/52
Transversal centre of gravity 0/0 0/9 2/18
Longitudinal centre of gravity 0/0 0/0 0/0
Time fusing 9/0 15/0 20/0
Fin angle 0/0 0/0 0/2
Fin release 0/0 0/2 5/4
Air drag 20/0 45/0 95/0
Tip-off 3/83 4/160 44/314
Aiming 0/23 1/38 14/57
Boost wind 10/70 6/76 6/143
Coast wind 14/14 17/17 24/24
TOTAL ERROR 48/114 80/184 149/355
Table D.4 Error budget for M26 random errors (in meters). Numbers show probable error in
meter along (before the slash) and across (after the slash) the line of fire[31]
98 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
D.3 Trajectories and firing tables
In order to illustrate the ballistics of rocket artillery, we have worked through the ballistics for
some of the most common rocket artillery systems. The calculations are based upon the
TRANSM model developed by LTV for simulating the MLRS rocket [13]. This model requires a
high number of input parameters, of which many are not known. However, many of these
parameters have a minute effect on the trajectory. The most critical input parameters are:
- size and mass of rocket
- fuel mass
- specific impulse
- burn characteristic
- air drag coefficients
Even some of these parameters may be unknown, but based or design and other constraints,
assumptive values can be used and adjusted to give the expected values for known performances
like the maximum range and others.
Six different systems have been simulated. These are
- a 60 mm Qassam rocket
- a 107 spin stabilized rocket
- a 122 mm short rocket
- the 122 mm 9M22U as used in BM-21
- the 160 mm rocket as used in LAR-160
- the 220 mm 9M27F as used in Uragan
- the 227 mm MLRS M26 rocket
- the 240 mm Falaq-1 rocket
- the 300 mm 9M55K rocket used in Smerch
D.3.1 60 mm Qassam fin stabilized
Range
(km)
Elevation
(°)
TOF
(s)
Apogee
(m)
Velocity
(m/s)
AOF
(°)
1.0 8.5 5.4 32 187 7.4
1.5 12.6 8.4 78 170 12.7
2.0 17.6 11.8 159 156 19.7
2.5 23.6 15.8 291 146 28.6
3.0 34.3 22.2 579 141 43.3
3.1 44.8 28.2 945 145 56.4
Table D.5 Suggestive firing table for a 60 mm Qassam rocket
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 99
D.3.2 107 mm spin stabilized rocket
Range
(km)
Elevation
(°)
TOF
(s)
Apogee
(m)
Velocity
(m/s)
AOF
(°)
2 8.0 6.6 41 318 4.9
2.5 9.3 8.2 66 303 6.5
3 10.7 9.9 101 291 8.4
3.5 12.2 11.7 147 279 10.6
4 13.7 13.6 199 269 12.8
4.5 15.4 15.6 259 259 15.4
5 17.3 17.8 353 250 18.2
5.5 19.3 20.0 454 242 21.3
6 21.6 22.6 582 235 24.8
6.5 24.1 25.3 735 230 28.7
7 27.0 28.3 929 226 33.0
7.5 30.5 31.8 1185 224 38.1
8 35.0 36.2 1541 224 44.0
8.5 46.0 45.9 2500 233 56.2
Table D.6 Suggestive firing table for 107 mm spin stabilized rocket
D.3.3 122 mm short (6 feet)
Range
(km)
Elevation
(°)
TOF
(s)
Apogee
(m)
Velocity
(m/s)
AOF
(°)
2 4.6 5.3 26 405 3.1
3 6.3 8.0 64 358 5.3
4 8.3 11.1 129 314 8.5
5 10.6 14.5 227 288 12.3
6 13.3 18.1 371 277 16.7
7 16.5 22.3 574 262 22.0
8 20.3 27.0 856 251 28.2
9 24.9 32.4 1249 244 35.3
10 31.2 39.4 1861 244 43.9
10.8 46.0 54.1 3515 260 59.5
Table D.7 Suggestive firing table for 122 mm short rocket
100 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
D.3.4 122 mm 9M22U for BM-21 Grad (9 feet)
Range
(km)
Elevation
(°)
TOF
(s)
Apogee
(m)
Velocity
(m/s)
AOF
(°)
5 3.5 8.5 69 540.9 3.7
6 4.3 10.5 110 490.6 5.0
7 5.2 12.6 165 442.6 6.7
8 6.3 15.2 245 403.1 8.9
9 7.5 17.8 345 368.2 11.6
10 8.8 20.6 469 339.8 14.5
11 10.4 23.8 640 318.4 18.2
12 12.2 27.2 853 306.5 22.2
13 14.2 30.8 1114 299.3 26.4
14 16.5 34.7 1442 294.7 30.8
15 19.0 38.8 1833 292.9 35.2
16 21.9 43.3 2312 293.8 39.7
17 25.1 48.1 2886 297.4 44.2
18 28.7 53.4 3573 303.7 48.5
19 33.3 60.1 4515 311.6 53.3
20 39.2 68.3 5803 318.0 58.6
20.47 47.0 78.8 7600 324.1 63.6
Table D.8 Suggestive firing table for 122 mm 9M22U rocket
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 101
D.3.5 160 mm LAR
Range
(km)
Elevation
(°)
TOF
(s)
Apogee
(m)
Velocity
(m/s)
AOF
(°)
12 5.6 17.4 323 444 9.0
13 6.3 19.7 423 403 11.2
14 7.3 22.3 550 369 13.9
15 8.3 25.2 711 339 17.2
16 9.5 28.3 912 320 20.9
17 10.8 31.4 1148 310 24.7
18 12.2 34.6 1421 305 28.4
19 13.8 38.1 1754 303 32.3
20 15.5 41.7 2132 303 36.1
21 17.3 45.4 2558 304 39.7
22 19.2 49.2 3034 307 43.1
23 21.2 53.2 3565 309 46.5
24 23.3 57.3 4153 312 49.6
25 25.6 61.8 4834 314 52.8
26 27.9 66.4 5552 316 55.8
27 30.3 71.2 6341 318 58.6
28 32.9 76.4 7242 320 61.4
29 35.6 82.0 8227 322 64,0
30 38.6 88.2 9379 324 66.6
31 41.5 94.1 10552 326 68.3
32 44.6 100.2 11863 330 69.7
33 47.9 106.5 13324 335 70.8
34.2 55.6 120.7 16916 353 73.0
Table D.9 Suggestive firing table for 160 mm LAR rocket
102 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
D.3.6 220 mm 9M27F for BM-27 Uragan
Range
(km)
Elevation
(°)
TOF
(s)
Apogee
(m)
Velocity
(m/s)
AOF
(°)
9 5.1 13.0 177 588 5.4
10 5.7 14.8 231 553 6.5
11 6.3 16.5 291 523 7.6
12 7.0 18.4 368 492 9.0
13 7.8 20.6 465 463 10.7
14 8.7 22.9 584 436 12.7
15 9.6 25.2 714 414 14.7
16 10.6 27.7 870 394 17.0
17 11.7 30.4 1054 376 19.6
18 12.9 33.2 1270 362 22.3
19 14.2 36.2 1520 349 25.3
20 15.6 39.3 1806 340 28.4
21 17.1 42.6 2132 334 31.6
22 18.7 46.0 2501 330 34.8
23 20.4 49.5 2915 329 37.9
24 22.1 53.0 3351 329 40.8
25 24.0 56.8 3864 330 43.8
26 25.9 60.6 4403 332 46.6
27 28.0 64.7 5027 335 49.4
28 30.1 68.8 5681 338 51.8
29 32.4 73.2 6429 344 54.2
30 34.9 77.9 7279 352 56.4
31 37.5 82.8 8201 360 58.5
32 40.5 88.3 9309 369 60.6
33 44.3 95.1 10772 381 62.8
34 52.2 108.6 18825 407 66.7
D.3.7 227 mm M26
Range
(km)
Elevation
(°)
Fuze time
(s)
Apogee
(m)
HOB
(m)
Velocity
(m/s)
AOF
(°)
7 9.6 9.25 646 640 650 -2.2
8 9.6 10.84 669 668 614 -0.8
9 9.6 12.53 672 669 580 0.8
10 9.6 14.33 672 641 548 2.6
11 9.6 16.24 672 579 517 4.6
12 9.6 18.28 672 480 488 6.8
13 10.2 20.44 758 470 461 8.7
14 11.0 22.73 884 489 438 10.7
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 103
Range
(km)
Elevation
(°)
Fuze time
(s)
Apogee
(m)
HOB
(m)
Velocity
(m/s)
AOF
(°)
15 11.9 25.16 1033 510 416 12.9
16 13.0 27.73 1207 530 397 15.2
17 14.1 30.44 1409 551 380 17.8
18 15.3 33.30 1642 572 366 20.6
19 16.6 36.31 1909 592 355 23.6
20 18.1 39.48 2215 613 346 26.7
21 19.6 42.79 2561 633 340 29.9
22 21.2 46.46 2952 654 336 33.2
23 23.0 49.89 3392 674 334 36.5
24 24.9 53.68 3886 695 334 39.7
25 26.9 57.66 4441 716 336 42.8
26 29.1 61.83 5061 736 339 45.8
27 31.4 66.25 5763 761 344 48.7
28 34.0 70.99 6568 795 351 51.4
29 36.9 76.16 7507 829 360 54.2
30 40.2 82.17 8657 863 370 57.0
31 44.8 90.06 10287 896 386 60.3
31.5 50.9 99.98 12526 930 406 64.0
Table D.10 Firing table for M26 MLRS rocket
The M26 MLRS rocket may serve as typical example of a large calibre medium range rocket with
a high number of submunitions.
D.3.8 240 mm Falaq-1 spin stabilized rocket
Range
(km)
Elevation
(°)
TOF
(s)
Apogee
(m)
Velocity
(m/s)
AOF
(°)
3 8.8 8.9 79 321 6.7
3.5 9.9 10.5 114 308 8.4
4 11.2 12.2 158 298 10.2
4.5 12.6 13.9 212 290 12.2
5 14.0 15.8 277 280 14.4
5.5 15.6 17.8 357 272 16.9
6 17.2 19.8 446 265 19.3
6.5 19.0 21.9 555 259 22.1
7 21.0 24.3 685 254 25.1
7.5 23.1 26.7 834 249 28.3
8 25.6 29.5 1026 246 32.0
8.5 28.3 32.5 1248 244 35.8
104 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
9 31.5 35.9 1531 243 40.1
9.5 35.7 40.2 1928 245 45.4
10 45.5 49.5 2936 254 55.8
D.3.9 300 mm 9M55K for BM-30 Smerch
Range
(km)
Elevation
(°)
TOF
(s)
Apogee
(m)
Velocity
(m/s)
AOF
(°)
19 7.4 23.8 607 642 9.1
20 7.9 25.3 695 622 10.0
21 8.3 27.0 793 604 11.0
22 8.9 28.7 901 586 12.0
23 9.4 30.4 1018 570 13.1
24 10.0 32.2 1146 554 14.2
25 10.6 34.0 1288 540 15.4
26 11.2 35.9 1438 527 16.6
27 11.8 37.8 1604 515 17.9
28 12.4 39.7 1779 504 19.2
29 13.1 41.7 1971 494 20.6
30 13.8 43.8 2176 486 22.0
31 14.5 45.9 2392 478 23.4
32 15.2 47.9 2633 472 24.8
33 16.0 50.1 2869 466 26.2
34 16.7 52.2 3128 462 27.2
35 17.5 54.4 3403 458 29.1
36 18.2 56.5 3683 455 30.4
37 19.0 58.7 3988 453 31.8
38 19.8 60.9 4299 452 33.1
39 20.6 63.3 4623 452 34.4
40 21.4 65.3 4958 452 35.6
41 22.3 67.6 5311 452 36.8
42 23.1 69.8 5669 454 38.0
43 23.9 72.0 6042 455 39.1
44 24.7 74.2 6425 458 40.1
45 25.5 76.4 6814 460 41.1
46 26.3 78.6 7218 463 42.0
47 27.1 80.8 7627 466 42.9
48 28.0 83.1 8072 470 43.8
49 28.8 85.2 8494 474 44.6
50 29.6 87.4 8929 478 45.3
51 30.4 89.5 9372 482 46.0
52 31.2 91.6 9824 486 46.7
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 105
Range
(km)
Elevation
(°)
TOF
(s)
Apogee
(m)
Velocity
(m/s)
AOF
(°)
53 32.0 94.0 10319 491 47.4
54 32.9 96.1 10818 497 48.0
55 33.7 98.3 11301 502 48.5
56 34.5 100.4 11793 507 49.0
57 35.3 102.5 12294 513 49.5
58 36.1 104.6 12805 518 50.0
59 36.9 106.7 13325 524 50.4
60 37.7 108.8 13855 530 50.8
61 38.6 111.1 14457 537 51.3
62 39.5 113.5 15078 543 51.7
63 40.4 115.8 15705 550 52.2
64 41.3 118.1 16343 557 52.6
65 42.3 120.6 17062 565 53.1
66 43.4 123.4 17865 573 53.6
67 44.6 126.4 18753 582 54.2
68 46.0 129.9 19806 592 55.0
69 47.8 134.2 21179 605 56.0
70 52.0 144.0 24427 632 58.5
Table D.11 Suggestive firing table for 300 mm Smerch rocket
106 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
D.4 Graphical displays of ballistic tables
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Elevation (deg)
Firing range (km)
300 mm Smerch
240 mm Falaq-1
MLRS M26
220 mm Uragan
160 mm LAR
122 mm Normal
122 mm short
107 mm
Qassam-1
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 107
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Time of flight (s)
Firing range (km)
300 mm Smerch
240 mm Falaq-1
MLRS M26
220 mm Uragan
160 mm LAR
122 mm Normal
122 mm short
107 mm
Qassam-1
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Height of apogee (m)) Firing range (
km)
300 mm Smerch
240 mm Falaq-1
MLRS M26
220 mm Uragan
160 mm LAR
122 mm Normal
122 mm short
107 mm
Qassam-1
108 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Terminal velocity (m/s)
Firing range (km)
300 mm Smerch
240 mm Falaq-1
MLRS M26
220 mm Uragan
160 mm LAR
122 mm Normal
122 mm short
107 mm
Qassam-1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Angle of fall (deg) Firing range (
km)
300 mm Smerch
240 mm Falaq-1
MLRS M26
220 mm Uragan
160 mm LAR
122 mm Normal
122 mm short
107 mm
Qassam-1
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 109
Appendix E Russian ammunition nomenclature
Russian nomenclature for munitions can be quite confusing especially when it comes to such
complex systems as rocket artillery. Basically the GRAU index (see below) is used, but other and
less strict systems are also used. In addition, the Russians tend to give their most popular
ordnance nicknames that eventually may become an official part of the name
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀀵􀀤􀀸􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀋􀈽􀉥􀉚􀉜􀉧􀉨􀉟􀀃􀉪􀉚􀉤􀉟􀉬􀉧􀉨-􀉚􀉪􀉬􀉢􀉥􀉥􀉟􀉪􀉢􀉣􀉫􀉤􀉨􀉟􀀃􀉭􀉩􀉪􀉚􀉜􀉥􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉟􀀃– Main Agency of Missiles
and Artillery) has names that consist of three parts:
- a number from 1 to 17 indicating the category of equipment (e.g. artillery, air-defence,
missiles)
- a letter signifying the class of equipment with the category (e.g. launcher, missile,
warhead)
- a number with up to 3 digit signifying a particular model
In addition variants of the model may be differentiated by adding an additional letter and digit at
the end.
As an example, consider the BM-21. The system has GRAU-number 9K51; the vehicle is 2B5;
the launcher is 9P132, the main ammunition is 9M22; the ammunition transport vehicle is 9T530;
the warhead itself could have a 9N number and so would also any submunitions have. However,
the latter two items do not have a number that is known.
􀁸 Equipment for rocket artillery mainly belongs to category 9.
􀁸 The system including vehicle and launcher usually have class P or sometimes A.
􀁸 The launching unit usually has class K. However is the vehicle is inseparable from the
launching unit (i.e. special built vehicle) the whole system has class K
􀁸 The rocket itself has class M.
􀁸 If the warhead is a separate unit (i.e. interchangeable warhead) is has class N
􀁸 Any submunition in a warhead may also have class N
A list of GRAU indexed equipment for rocket artillery in the following pages.
􀀕􀈻􀀕􀀃- vehicle B􀉆-􀀔􀀗􀉆􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀓􀀃􀁐􀁐 MRL
􀀕􀈻􀀕􀉊􀀃- vehicle B􀉆-􀀔􀀗􀉆􀉆􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀓 mm MRL
􀀕􀈻􀀘􀀃- vehicle B􀉆-21 122 mm MRL Grad
􀀕􀈻􀀚􀀃- vehicle B􀉆-􀀔􀀖􀉇􀉆􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀕 mm MRL
􀀕􀈻􀀚􀉊􀀃- vehicle B􀉆-􀀔􀀖􀉇􀉆􀉆􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀕mm MRL
􀀕􀈻􀀔􀀚􀀃- vehicle B􀉆-21-1 122 mm MRL Grad
􀀕􀉉􀀔􀀖􀀃- 􀉋􀉉􀉍􀀃Br-230 tactical rocket complex Luna
􀀕􀉉􀀔􀀙􀀃- 􀉋􀉉􀉍􀀃􀀶-􀀔􀀕􀀖􀈺􀀃tactical rocket complex Luna
􀀕􀉉􀀔􀀚􀀃- 􀉌􀉁􀉆􀀃􀀶-􀀔􀀕􀀗􀈺􀀃tactical rocket complex Luna
􀀕􀉉􀀕􀀔􀀃- 􀉋􀉉􀉍􀀃􀀥􀁕-226-II tactical rocket complex Luna
􀀖􀉆􀀔􀀙􀀃􀀋􀀜􀉆􀀔􀀙􀀌􀀃- 122-mm rocket projectile MRL Grad with cluster warhead (5 POM-2 mines)
110 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
􀀖􀉎􀀔􀀃- 240-mm explosive charge 􀉆􀀧-24F 􀉫􀀃blast warhead for 􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀉆-24
􀀖􀉏􀀔􀀃- 240-mm explosive charge 􀉆􀀶-24 for chemical warhead for 􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀉆-24
􀀛􀉌􀀔􀀖􀀚􀉅􀀃– modification of tactical rocket system Luna
􀀛􀉍􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀃– Cable for remote firing of MRL BMD-20, B􀉆-24, B􀉆-14
􀀛􀉍􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀃– 􀀳􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀉉􀉓􀉋􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕 MRL
􀀛􀉍􀀖􀀔􀀃- vehicle B􀉆-24
􀀛􀉍􀀖􀀕􀀃- vehicle B􀉆-14
􀀛􀉍􀀖􀀖􀀃- vehicle B􀉆D-20
􀀛􀉍􀀖􀀗􀀃- vehicle B􀉆-􀀕􀀗􀉌􀀃
􀀛􀉍􀀖􀀙􀀃- vehicle B􀉆-14-17
􀀛􀉍􀀖􀀙􀉆􀀃- vehicle B􀉆-14-􀀔􀀚􀉆
􀀜􀈺􀀘􀀔􀀃- MRL vehicle Prima
􀀜􀈺􀀘􀀕􀀃- MRL vehicle Smerch
􀀜􀈺􀀘􀀕-2 - 􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀋􀉆􀀌􀀃
􀀜􀈺􀀘􀀕-􀀕􀉌􀀃- 􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀋􀉆􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁗􀁕􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁖􀁖is
􀀜􀈺􀀖􀀗􀀜􀀃– self-aiming anti-tank munition Motiv-3M
􀀜􀈻􀀙􀀖􀀃– automativ inertial system for guided rocket 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁎􀁄
􀀜􀈻􀀙􀀗􀀃– command gyroskopic device for rocket 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁎􀁄
􀀜􀈻􀀙􀀘􀀃– diskette analog computer for rocket 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁎􀁄
􀀜􀈻􀀙􀀙􀀃– circuit board 􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁎􀁄
􀀜􀈻􀀙􀀚􀀃– hydraulic feeding station rocket 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁎􀁄
􀀜􀈻􀀙􀀛􀀃– lower steering unit – 2 ea􀀑􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁎􀁄
􀀜􀈻􀀙􀀜􀀃– upper steering unit – 2 ea. rocket 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁎􀁄
􀀜􀈻􀀔􀀗􀀜􀀃– turbo charger power supply for rocket 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁎􀁄
􀀜􀈻􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀃– guidance unit for rockets 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁎􀁄
􀀜􀈻􀀔􀀘􀀔􀀃– resistance unit in 9B149 for rocket 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁎􀁄
􀀜􀈻􀀔􀀘􀀕􀀃– gas turbine unit in 9B􀀔􀀗􀀜􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁎􀁄
􀀜􀈻􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀃- onboard system management for 300 mm for rocket projectile system Smerch
􀀜􀈻􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀃–electroninc timer for 9B171
􀀜􀈻􀀔􀀚􀀗􀀃– apparatus for electronic measurement 9B171
􀀜􀈻􀀔􀀜􀀔􀀃- onborad system managment 300 mm for rocket projectile systems Smerch
􀀜􀈻􀀕􀀔􀀚􀀃– 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀀃􀉌􀀽􀉆􀀃􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀃
􀀜􀈻􀀕􀀖􀀕􀀃– 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀀃􀉌􀀽􀉆􀀃􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀃
􀀜􀈻􀀕􀀗􀀕􀀃– regulatory unit in 9B􀀔􀀗􀀜􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁎􀁄
􀀜􀈻􀀙􀀔6 – hydraulic drive for rockets 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁎􀁄
􀀜􀈻􀀛􀀚􀀚-􀀔􀈻􀀃– angular speed gauges for tactical rocket 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀕􀀖􀀃
􀀜􀈼􀀘􀀚􀉆-1 - computeR 􀉄􀀳􀀃􀀜􀀶􀀗􀀗􀀘􀉆􀀃
􀀜􀈼􀀙􀀜􀀃– test unit for rocket complex 􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀔􀀗
9􀈼120 – impulse meter
9􀈼370􀉆 – firing monitor for B􀉆-21
􀀜􀈼􀀖􀀜􀀔􀀃– operator’s console for launcher 9P􀀔􀀕􀀜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜
􀀜􀈼􀀖􀀜􀀗􀀃– remote console for launcher 9P􀀔􀀕􀀜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜
􀀜􀈼􀀖􀀜􀀙􀀃– ground based monitor for launcher 9P􀀔􀀕􀀜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀉚􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜
􀀜􀈼􀀛􀀔􀀛-820 – automatic control and montoric unit for tactical rocket complex Tochka
􀀜􀈼􀀛􀀔􀀛-820-1 - automatic control and montoric unit for 􀉚􀀃tactical rocket complex Tochka-U
􀀜􀈼􀀛􀀗􀀗􀀃– service vehicle for tactical rocket complex Tochka
􀀜􀈼􀀛􀀗􀀗􀉆􀀃– service vehicle tactical rocket complex Tochka-U
􀀜􀈼􀀜􀀖􀀕-1 – test and control unit for. 9B172
􀀜􀈾􀀔2 - solid 􀁉􀁘􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀉈􀉌􀀵 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀔􀀏􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀕􀀃
􀀜􀈾19 - 􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀉌􀀵 􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀃
􀀜􀈾􀀔􀀗􀀓􀀃- solid fuel rocket engine
􀀜􀈾􀀔􀀘􀀛􀀃- solid fuel rocket engine 122 mm for rocket projectile 􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀛􀀃
􀀜􀈾􀀔􀀘􀀜􀀃- solid fuel rocket engine 220 mm for rocket projectile type 9􀉆􀀕􀀚􀀃
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 111
􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀔􀀃- MRL Grad
􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀕􀀃- tactical rocket complex Luna-M
􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀕􀉆􀀃- tactical rocket complex Luna-Z
􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀕􀉆􀀕􀀃- tactical rocket complex Luna-M2
􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀗􀀃- rocket complex Grad-B
􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀘􀀃- MRL Grad-1
􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀚􀀃- MRL Uragan
􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀛􀀃- MRL Smerch
􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀜􀀃- MRL Prima
􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜􀀃- tactical rocket complex Tochka
􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜-1 - tactical rocket complex Tochka-U
􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀔􀀓􀀃– illumination rocket "Illyuminatsiya"
􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀔􀀔􀀃- operational-tactical rocket complex Uran
􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀔􀀗􀀃- operational-tactical rocket complex Oka
􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀕􀀓􀀃- operational-tactical rocket complex Tender (Iskander)
9M16 (3M16) - 122-􀉦􀉦 rocket projectile MRL "Grad" with cluster warhead (5 POM-2 mines)
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀃􀀋􀀖􀉊􀀔􀀔􀀌􀀃- tactical rocket Luna-􀀰􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀕􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀈺􀀃􀀋􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀈾􀀌􀀃- 􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁄􀀃􀁚arhead 9N􀀔􀀛􀈺􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀈻􀀃- 􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 nuclear 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀈺􀈺-52
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀈻􀀔􀀃- 􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋 nuclear 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀈺􀈺-38
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀈽􀀃􀀋􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀉏􀀌􀀃- 􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁐􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀜􀀱􀀔􀀛􀈽􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀈿􀀃􀀋􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀉍􀀌􀀃- 􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀜􀀱􀀖􀀕􀈿􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀈿􀀔􀀃- 􀉌􀉊 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀉆􀀔􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀜􀀱􀀖􀀙􀈿􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀈿􀀖􀀃– 􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀜􀀱􀀖􀀕􀈿
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀈿􀀗􀀃– 􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀜􀀱􀀖􀀙􀈿
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀉄􀀃􀀋􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔-OF) - 􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀜􀀱18-􀉈􀀩
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀉆􀀃- tactical rocket Luna-􀀖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀉚􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀕􀉆􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀉆􀀔􀀃- tactical rocket Luna-􀉆􀀔 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀕􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀉆􀀕􀀃- tactical rocket Luna-􀉆􀀕 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀕􀉆􀀕􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀉌􀉎􀀃- 􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃heavy explosive warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀉎􀀃- 􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀛􀀩
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀉎􀀕􀀃- 􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀉆􀀔􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀛􀀩2
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀕􀀃- 􀀔􀀕􀀕􀀃􀁐􀁐􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀉆-21-􀉈􀀩 MRL type Grad with HE/frag warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀕􀈾􀀃- 122 mm rocket projectile MRL type Grad with propaganda warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀕􀉄􀀕􀀃- 122 mm rocket projectile MRL type Grad with cluster warhead (3 PTM-3 mines)
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀕􀉆􀀃- 122 mm rocket projectile for unit Grad-P
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀕􀉋􀀃- 􀀔􀀕􀀕􀀃􀁐􀁐􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀉆􀉁-21 MRL type Grad with incendiary warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀕􀉍􀀃- 122 mm 􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀉆-21-􀉈􀀩 MRL type Grad with HE/frag warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀕􀉍􀀕􀀃- 122 mm rocket projectile MRL type Grad with HE/frag warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀖􀀃- 122 mm rocket projectile Leyka MRL type Grad with chemical warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀖􀉆􀀃- 122 mm rocket projectile MRL type Grad with chemical warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀗􀀃- tactical rocket complex Reseda
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀘􀀃- tactical rocket Luna-􀀖􀉆 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀕􀉆􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀀃- 􀀕􀀕􀀓􀀃􀁐􀁐􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀚􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀈾􀀃- rocket projectile Absats - 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀉄􀀃- rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀋􀀖􀀓􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀌􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀉄􀀔􀀃- contains incendiary submunition
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀉄􀀕􀀃- rocket projectile Inkubator - 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀗􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀳􀀷􀀰-1)
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀉄􀀖􀀃- rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀋􀀖􀀔􀀕􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀳􀀩􀀰-1S)
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀉋􀀃- rocket projectile Abrikos - 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀉎􀀃- rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀛􀈾􀀃- 122 mm rocket projectile MRL type Grad with propaganda warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀛􀉄􀀃- 122 mm rocket projectile MRL type Grad with cluster warhead (3 mines PTM-3)
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀛􀉋􀀃- 122 mm rocket projectile MRL type Grad with incendiary warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀛􀉎􀀃- 122 mm rocket projectile MRL type Grad with separate explosive warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀗􀀕􀀃- 122 mm rocket projectile system 􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀔􀀓􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀗􀀖􀀃- 122 mm rocket projectile MRL type Grad with smoke warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀔􀀃- 􀀕􀀕􀀓􀀃􀁐􀁐􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀚􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃fuel air warhead
112 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀕􀀃- 􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀉆􀀕􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀫􀀨􀀒􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁊􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀖􀉎􀀃- 122 mm rocket projectile MRL type Grad with HE/frag warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀘􀉄􀀃- 300 mm rock􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀛􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀋􀀚􀀕􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀌􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀘􀉄􀀔􀀃- 􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀃􀁐􀁐􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀛􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇 (5 self-􀁄􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀜􀈺􀀖􀀗􀀜􀀃
Motiv-3M)
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀘􀉄􀀗􀀃- 􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀃􀁐􀁐􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀛􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀘 PTM-3 mines)
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀘􀉄􀀘􀀃- 􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀃􀁐􀁐􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀛􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀋􀀙􀀗􀀙􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁓􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀌􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀘􀉋􀀃- 􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀃􀁐􀁐􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀛􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃termobaric warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀘􀉎􀀃- 􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀃􀁐􀁐􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀛􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃HE/frag warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀜􀀃- 220 mm rocke􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀚􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀋􀀜􀀃PTM-3 mines)
􀀜􀉆􀀙􀀔􀀃– remotely piloted flying devicefor 􀉌􀀜􀀓-11 for 300 mm for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀖􀀗􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀃- tactical rocket complex Tochka
􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜-1 - tactical rocket complex Tochka-U
􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜-􀀔􀈻􀀃- 􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜-1 with special warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜-􀀔􀉄􀀃- 􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜-1 with cluster warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜-􀀔􀉎􀀃- 􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜-1 with explosive warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀉄􀀃- variant with cluster warhead 9N􀀔􀀕􀀖􀉄
􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀉆􀀃- tactical rocket complex Tochka-M
􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀉊􀀃- tactical rocket complex Tochka-P
􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀉎􀀃- 􀉌􀀵 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀉎􀉊􀀃- 􀉌􀀵 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀉊􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀚􀀃- 122 mm rocket projectile MRL type Grad with cluster warhead (2 self-aiming submunitions)
􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀛􀀃- 122 mm rocket projectile MRL type Grad with cluster warhead (45 dual-purpose submunition)
􀀜􀉆􀀖􀀖􀀗􀀃– four-􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁇􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀖􀀖􀀔􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀔􀀜-1...7 - complex 122 mm rocket projectile Liliya-􀀕􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁕􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀉩􀉨􀉫􀉬􀉚􀉧􀉨􀉜􀉤􀉢􀀃􀉪􀉚􀉞􀉢􀉨􀉩􀉨􀉦􀉟􀉯􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀕􀀔􀀃- 122 mm rocket projectile MRL type Grad with HE/frag warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀕􀀕􀀃- 􀀔􀀕􀀕􀀃􀁐􀁐􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁕􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀉨􀉬􀉞􀉟􀉥􀉹􀉟􀉦􀉨􀉣􀀃HE/frag warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀕􀀘􀀃- 􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀃􀁐􀁐􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀛􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀋􀀚􀀕􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀌􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀕􀀙􀀃– 􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀛􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀋􀀘􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉-aiming submunitions)
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀕􀀚􀀃- 􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀃􀁐􀁐􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀛􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀘􀀃􀀳􀀷􀀰-3 mines)
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀕􀀛􀀃- 􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀃􀁐􀁐􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀛􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃separate HE/frag warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀕􀀜􀀃- 􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀃􀁐􀁐􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀛􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃fuel air warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀖􀀓􀀃- 300 mm rocket projectile 􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀛􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃explosive warhead
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀖􀀔􀀃- 􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀃􀁐􀁐􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀛􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇 (646 shaped charge submunitions)
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀖􀀖􀀃- 􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀃􀁐􀁐􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀛􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀘􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉-aiming submunitions)
􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀖􀀗􀀃- 300 mm rocket projecti􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀛􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃remotely piloted flying device
􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀔􀀗􀀃- 􀉈􀉌􀀵 system Oka
􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀔􀀗􀈻􀀃- 􀉈􀉌􀀵 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀔􀀗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃
􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀔􀀗􀉄􀀃- 􀉈􀉌􀀵 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀔􀀗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃
9M714F – fragmenting-explosive warhead for 9M714
􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀕􀀖􀉄􀀔􀀃- 􀉈􀉌R complex Tender (Iskander)
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀙􀀃- warhead
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀛􀈺􀀃􀀋􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀛􀈾􀀌􀀃- propaganda warhead 􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀈺􀀃􀀋􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀧)
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀛􀈽􀀃- chemical warhead 􀉌􀀵 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀪􀀃􀀋􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀮􀁋)
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀛􀉄􀀃􀀋􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀛-􀉈􀉎􀀌􀀃- 􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀉄􀀃􀀋􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔-OF) with 42 fragmenting-explosive submunition
􀀜􀉇􀀕􀀔􀉎􀀃- 􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀉎􀀃
􀀜􀉇􀀕􀀔􀉎􀀕􀀃- 􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀩2
􀀜􀉇􀀕􀀗􀀃- fragmenting submunition for cluster warhead
􀀜􀉇􀀖􀀕􀀃- nuclear warhea􀁇􀀃􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀥 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀈺􀈺-21
􀀜􀉇􀀖􀀕􀈿􀀃- practice warhead for 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀈿􀀃
􀀜􀉇􀀖􀀕􀉆􀀃- nuclear 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀈺􀈺-􀀘􀀕􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀉌􀀵 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔
􀀜􀉇􀀖􀀙􀀃- nuclear warhead with charge 􀈺􀈺-􀀖􀀛􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀉌􀀵 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀃
􀀜􀉇􀀖􀀙􀈿􀀃- practice warhead for 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀈿􀀔􀀃
􀀜􀉇􀀖􀀛􀉆􀀃- nuclear 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀉆􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀈺􀈺-38
􀀜􀉇􀀖􀀜􀀃- nuclear 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀈺􀈺-60
􀀜􀉇􀀖􀀜􀀃- nuclear 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀈻􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀈺􀈺-60
􀀜􀉇􀀘􀀙􀀃- chemical warhead for rocket projectile
9􀉇􀀘􀀚􀀃- chemical warhead for rocket projectile
􀀜􀉇􀀘􀀛􀀃- chemical warhead for rocket projectile
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 113
􀀜􀉇􀀙􀀘􀀃- nuclear 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀉌􀀵 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀥 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀈺􀈺-80
􀀜􀉇􀀙􀀘􀀃- nuclear 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀉌􀀵 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀥􀀔􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀈺􀈺-86
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀕􀀖􀈽􀀃- 􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁐􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀉌􀀵 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀃
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀕􀀖􀈽􀀕-1 - chemical warhe􀁄􀁇􀀃􀉌􀀵 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀃
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀕􀀖􀉄􀀃- 􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀉌􀀵 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀉄􀀏􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜-􀀔􀉄􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀘􀀓􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀜􀀱24
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀕􀀖􀉎􀀃- fragmenting-􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀉌􀀵􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀩􀀏􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜-1F
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀕􀀖􀉎-1 - fragmenting-􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀉌􀀵􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀩􀀵􀀃with passive radar homing warhead
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀕􀀛􀈾􀀃- propaganda warhead for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀈾􀀃
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀕􀀛􀉄􀀃- cluster warhead for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀉄􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀖􀀓􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖ubmunition 9N210
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀕􀀛􀉄􀀕􀀃- cluster warhead for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀉄􀀕􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀜􀀱211
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀕􀀛􀉄􀀖􀀃- cluster warhead for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀉄􀀖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀖􀀔2 mines 9N212
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀕􀀛􀉋􀀃- incendiary warhead for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚S
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀕􀀛􀉎􀀃- explosive warhead for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀀩
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀖􀀛􀀃- warhead for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀘􀉄􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃fragmenting submunition
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀖􀀜􀀃- cluster warhead for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀘􀉄􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀃fragmenting 􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀜􀉇􀀕􀀖􀀘􀀃
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀃- separate fragmenting-explosive warhead for rocket projectile 􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀘􀀃
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀘􀀕􀀃- cluster warhead for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀘􀉄􀀔􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀘􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉-aiming submunition Motiv-3M
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀚􀀗􀀃- thermobaric warhead for rocket projectile 􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀘􀀃
􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀃- cluster warhead for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀘􀉄􀀘􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀙􀀗􀀙􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏-purpose submunition
􀀜􀉇􀀕􀀔􀀓􀀃- fragmenting submunition for cluster warhead
􀀜􀉇􀀕􀀔􀀔􀀃- anti-􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁎􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀉉􀉌􀉆-1 for cluster warhead
􀀜􀉇􀀕􀀔􀀕􀀃– anti-􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀉉􀉎􀉆-􀀔􀉋􀀃􀁉or cluster warhead
􀀜􀉇􀀕􀀔􀀘􀀃– 􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁇􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀉌􀀵􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀵
􀀜􀉇􀀕􀀖􀀓􀀃- chemical submunition
􀀜􀉇􀀕􀀖􀀘􀀃- rebounding fragmenting submunition Poprygunya for cluster warhead
􀀜􀉇􀀖􀀔􀀓􀀃– 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁏􀀃􀀜􀉇􀀔􀀕􀀖􀀩 rocket 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀩 Tochka
􀀜􀉇􀀖􀀔􀀔􀀃– hull for cluster fragmenting warhead 9N􀀔􀀕􀀖􀉄􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀉵􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀉄􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁎􀁄
􀀜􀉇􀀘􀀔􀀙􀀃- cluster warhead for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀉄􀀔 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀉨􀉫􀉤􀉨􀉥􀉨􀉱􀉧􀉵􀉦􀉢􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀜􀀱235
􀀜􀉇􀀘􀀔􀀜􀀃- chemical warhead for rocket projectile
􀀜􀉇􀀘􀀕􀀗􀀃- cluster warhead for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀜􀀃PTM-3 mines
􀀜􀉇􀀘􀀕􀀛􀉄3 - cluster warhead for rocket projectile
􀀜􀉇􀀘􀀖􀀜􀀃- cluster warhead for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀘􀉄􀀗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀕􀀘 PTM-3 anti-tank mines
􀀜􀉉􀀔􀀔􀀕􀀃– Self-propelled launcher B􀉪-􀀕􀀖􀀚􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀕􀀃􀀋tracked)
􀀜􀉉􀀔􀀔􀀖􀀃– Self-propelled launcher B􀉪-􀀕􀀖􀀔􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀕􀀃􀀋wheeled)
􀀜􀉉􀀔􀀔􀀖􀉆􀀃- Self-propelled launcher 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀕􀉆􀀃
􀀜􀉉􀀔􀀔􀀖􀉆􀀕􀀃- Self-propelled launcher 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀕􀉆􀀕􀀃
􀀜􀉉􀀔􀀔􀀗􀀃- Self-propelled launcher 􀈻􀉪-􀀕􀀘􀀚􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀖􀀃
􀀜􀉉􀀔􀀕􀀘􀀃– military vehicle B􀉆-􀀕􀀔􀈼􀀃􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀃􀀅􀈽􀉪􀉚􀉞-􀈼􀀅􀀃
􀀜􀉉􀀔􀀕􀀜􀀃- Self-propelled launcher 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜􀀃
􀀜􀉉􀀔􀀕􀀜􀉆-1 - Self-propelled launcher 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜-1
􀀜􀉉􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀃– 􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀉉􀉍􀀃􀉌􀀮􀀥-042 Grad-P (Partizan) for 122 mm for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀕􀉆􀀃
􀀜􀉉􀀔􀀖􀀛􀀃– combat vehicle MRL Grad-1
􀀜􀉉􀀔􀀖􀀜􀀃– combat vehicle MRL Grad-1 (tracked)
􀀜􀉉􀀔􀀗􀀓􀀃– combat vehicle MRL Uragan
􀀜􀉉􀀙􀀔􀀕􀀃– device for remote installation of initiators 9Eh260-1
􀀜􀉉􀀙􀀔􀀛-􀀔􀉆􀀃- 􀉚􀉩􀉩􀉚􀉪􀉚􀉬􀉭􀉪􀉚􀀃􀉞􀉢􀉫􀉬􀉚􀉧􀉰􀉢􀉨􀉧􀉧􀉨􀉝􀉨􀀃􀉜􀉜􀉨􀉞􀉚􀀃􀉞􀉚􀉧􀉧􀉵􀉯􀀃􀉜􀀃􀈻􀉋􀉍􀀃􀀜􀀥191
􀀜􀉉􀀚􀀔􀀃- Self-propelled launcher 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀔􀀗􀀃
􀀜􀉉􀀚􀀛􀀃- Self-propelled launcher Astrolog 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀕􀀓􀀃
􀀜􀉉􀀚􀀛-1 - Self-propelled launcher comp􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀕􀀓􀀃
􀀜􀉉􀀛􀀔􀀃- Self-propelled launcher complex 􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀕􀀓􀀃
􀀜􀉋􀀛􀀖􀀃– metorological station
􀀜􀉋􀀗􀀗􀀘􀀃– reference point
􀀜􀉋􀀗􀀗􀀘􀉆􀀃– command node 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀕􀀃
􀀜􀉋􀀗􀀚􀀖􀀃– staff command vehicle
􀀜􀉋􀀗􀀛􀀕􀀃– navigational vehicles 􀉉􀉍-12 (with variants)
􀀜􀉋􀀘􀀕􀀕􀀃– staff command vehicle system 􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀕􀀓􀀃
􀀜􀉋􀀙􀀔􀀜􀀃– data transmission unit for radar data processor
􀀜􀉋􀀚􀀖􀀛􀀃– staff command vehicle Pled
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􀀜􀉋􀀚􀀙􀀙􀉆􀀔􀀃– rear units maintainance vehicle
􀀜􀉋􀀜􀀔􀀓􀀃– automatic guidance unit
􀀜􀉋􀀜􀀕􀀓􀀃– information distribution unit 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀕􀀓􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀔􀀔􀀗􀀃– airport storage handler for container 9Ya236
􀀜􀉌􀀔􀀕􀀚􀀃- airport storage handler 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀔􀀖􀀖􀀃- airport storage handler for container􀉨􀉜􀀃􀀜􀀼􀁄234
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀜􀀃– auxiliary transport vehilce 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀕􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀜-1 - auxiliary transport vehilce 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀕􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀜􀉆􀀃- auxiliary transport vehilce 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀕􀉆􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀃- auxiliary transport vehilce 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀕􀉆􀀕􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀔􀀘􀀃- 􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀉧􀉵􀉯􀀃􀉱􀉚􀉫􀉬􀉟􀉣􀀃􀉈􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀙􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀔􀀛􀀃- auxiliary transport vehilce 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀔􀀛-1 - auxiliary transport vehilce 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜-1
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀔􀀛-􀀔􀉆􀀃- auxiliary transport vehilce 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜-1
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀔􀀜􀀃- 􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀉈􀉌􀉊􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀙􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀕􀀕􀀃- 􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜􀀃􀉢􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜-1
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀖􀀓􀀃- auxiliary transport vehilce complex 􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀔􀀗􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀖􀀕􀉆􀀃- auxiliary transport vehilce MRL Prima
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀖􀀗􀀃- auxiliary transport vehilce MRL Smerch
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀖􀀗-2 - auxiliary transport vehilce MRL Smerch
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀖􀀗-􀀕􀉌􀀃- auxiliary transport vehilce MRL Smerch (Tatra chassis)
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀖􀀛􀀃- transport vehicle 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜􀀃􀀋􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁙􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀌
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀖􀀜􀀃- transport vehicle
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀗􀀓􀀃- 􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀔􀀗􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀘􀀓􀀃- auxiliary transport vehilce 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀕􀀓􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀘􀀗􀀃- transport vehicle MRL Grad
􀀜􀉌􀀖􀀖􀀃- 􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀖􀀖
􀀜􀉌􀀖􀀘􀀃– crane for 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀙􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀖􀀔􀀘􀀃–overload support arm for rocket, warhead complex 􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀖􀀔􀀙􀀃– overload support arm 􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀖􀀕􀀘􀀃- 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀉬􀉚􀉤􀉟􀉥􀉚􀉠􀉧􀉨􀉝􀉨􀀃􀉨􀉛􀉨􀉪􀉭􀉞􀉨􀉜􀉚􀉧􀉢􀉹􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀗􀀘􀀓􀀃- auxiliary transport vehilce MRL Grad-1
􀀜􀉌􀀗􀀘􀀕􀀃- auxiliary transport vehilce MRL Uragan
􀀜􀉌􀀗􀀙􀀓􀀃- rack for MRL
􀀜􀉌􀀘􀀕􀀃– rocket complex rig
􀀜􀉌􀀘􀀖􀀃– crane for auxiliary transport vehilce 􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀘􀀘􀀃– overload support contruction for 􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀘􀀘􀈺􀀃- rocket complex rig
􀀜􀉌􀀘􀀚􀀃- rocket complex rig
􀀜􀉌􀀙􀀕􀀃– isothermal vehicle for rocket and 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀉚􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀙􀀖􀀃– isothermal vehicle for rocket and 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀉚􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀙􀀗􀀃– support beam for 􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀙􀀙􀀃– support beam for 􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜􀀃
􀀜􀉌􀀙􀀔􀀓􀀃– isothermal vehicle for rocket and 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀉚􀀃􀀜􀉄􀀚􀀜􀀃
􀀜􀉎􀀔􀀜􀀃– mobile technical repair base MRL
􀀜􀉎􀀕􀀘􀀃– computer simulator for rocket complexes Tochka, Tochka-U
􀀜􀉎􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀃- mobile technical repair base
􀀜􀉎􀀔􀀔􀀚􀀃- process equipment unit
􀀜􀉎􀀕􀀕􀀕􀀃– machine storage
􀀜􀉎􀀕􀀕􀀖􀀃- transport vehicle warhead complex 􀀜􀉄􀀘􀀕􀀃
􀀜􀉎􀀖􀀕􀀃- transport vehicle
􀀜􀉎􀀖􀀚􀀃– rack system MRL Grad
􀀜􀉎􀀖􀀚􀈻􀀃- rack system MRL Grad
􀀜􀉎􀀖􀀚􀈼􀀃- rack system MRL Grad-B
􀀜􀉎􀀖􀀚􀉆􀀃– unified rack complex for MRL Grad, Grad-1, Prima, Damba
􀀜􀉎􀀖􀀗􀀕-344 - rig
􀀜􀉎􀀖􀀚􀀓􀀃- special arsenal complex for equipment and tools for Tochka
􀀜􀉎􀀖􀀚􀀓-1 - special arsenal complex for equipment and tools for Tochka-U
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 115
􀀜􀉎􀀖􀀚􀀗􀀃– welding equipment at auxiliary transport vehicle for 􀀜􀉌􀀕􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀃
􀀜􀉎􀀖􀀛􀀔􀀃– special arsenal complex for equipment and tools MRL Uragan
􀀜􀉎􀀙􀀕􀀘􀀃– computer simulation complex self-propelled launcher complex Tochka
􀀜􀉎􀀙􀀕􀀘-1 - computer simulation complex self-propelled launcher complex Tochka-U
􀀜􀉎􀀙􀀗􀀚􀀃– education and training unit Sizyak in complex Smelchak
9􀉎689 – target arrangement Bobr for MRL Grad
􀀜􀉎􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀃– training and practice complex MRL Uragan
􀀜􀉎􀀛􀀔􀀜􀀃- complex special arsenal complex for equipment and tool MRL Smerch
􀀜􀉎􀀛􀀕􀀚􀀃– education and training unit MRL Smerch
􀀜􀉎􀀛􀀖􀀜􀀃- 122 mm rocket projectile – air target imitator complex 9F689
􀀜􀉎􀀛􀀖􀀜-1 - 122 mm rocket projectile - air target imitator complex 9F689
􀀜􀉎􀀛􀀖􀀜-2 - 122 mm rocket projectile - air target imitator complex 9F689
􀀜􀉎􀀛􀀗􀀓􀀃– education and training arrangement MRL Smerch
􀀜􀉏􀀔􀀔􀀃- charge solid fuel rocket engine 9D12
􀀜􀉏􀀔􀀘􀀃- powder charge solid fuel rocket engine
􀀜􀉏􀀔􀀛􀀃- charge solid fuel rocket engine 9D19
􀀜􀉏􀀖􀀚􀀃- explosive 􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀜􀉇􀀕􀀔􀀓􀀃
􀀜􀉏􀀔􀀔􀀔􀀃- charge solid fuel rocket engine for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀕􀀃
􀀜􀉏􀀔􀀔􀀔􀉆􀀕􀀃- charge solid fuel rocket engine for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆22U
􀀜􀉏􀀔􀀔􀀔􀉆􀀖􀀃- charge solid fuel rocket engine for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀕􀀸2
􀀜􀉏􀀔􀀘􀀔􀀃– fuel charge DAP-15V impeller unit 􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁎􀁄
􀀜􀉏􀀔􀀙􀀗􀀃- charge solid fuel rocket engine for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀀃
􀀜􀉏􀀕􀀕􀀙􀀃– ignitor safety unit (for incendiary 9Kh249)
􀀜􀉏􀀕􀀗􀀜􀀃– fuel ignitor charge 9Kh􀀔􀀘􀀔􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁎􀁄
􀀜􀉗􀀜􀀕􀀃- safety and arming unit
􀀜􀉗􀀜􀀙􀀃- safety and arming unit
􀀜􀉗􀀔􀀔􀀚􀀃– safety and 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁐􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀜􀀱􀀔􀀕􀀖􀀩􀀋􀉄􀀌􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀩􀀋􀉄􀀌􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁎􀁄
􀀜􀉗􀀔􀀔􀀛􀀃–no contact fuze for warhead 9N123F rocket 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀩 Tochka
􀀜􀉗􀀔􀀕􀀛􀀃– contact fuze for warhead 9N123F rocket 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀀩 Tochka
􀀜􀉗􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀃- safety and arming unit
􀀜􀉗􀀔􀀖􀀙􀀃- fuze Prosvetitel’ for 􀉈􀀩􀀶􀀃􀀖􀉈􀀩30, 152 mm and 􀀔􀀕􀀕􀀃􀁐􀁐􀀃􀉈􀀩􀀶
􀀜􀉗􀀕􀀜􀀃- fuze warhead 9N18F
􀀜􀉗􀀕􀀔􀀓􀀃- mechanical fuze MRV for for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀕􀀏􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀖􀀃
􀀜􀉗􀀕􀀖􀀔􀀃- fuze for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀕􀉆􀀃
􀀜􀉗􀀕􀀖􀀗􀉆􀀃- safety and arming unit
􀀜􀉗􀀕􀀖􀀙􀀃- fuzing device
􀀜􀉗􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀃- mechanical fuze for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀀩
􀀜􀉗􀀕􀀗􀀘􀀃– 120 seconds remote tube for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀚􀉄􀀃
􀀜􀉗􀀕􀀗􀀙􀀃- fuze for submunition 9N210
􀀜􀉗􀀕􀀗􀀙􀉆􀀃- fuze for submunition 9N210
􀀜􀉗􀀕􀀙􀀓􀀃- electro-mechanical head proximity-contact fuze 122 mm for rocket projectile
􀀜􀉗􀀕􀀙􀀓-1 - electro-mechanical head PD - proximity fuze 122 mm for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀘􀀖􀀩
􀀜􀉗􀀕􀀙􀀘􀀃– fuzing device
􀀜􀉗􀀕􀀙􀀛􀀃- safety and arming unit 300 mm for rocket projectile
􀀜􀉗􀀕􀀙􀀜􀀃- safety and arming unit 300 mm for rocket projectile
􀀜􀉗􀀕􀀚􀀔􀀃- fuze
􀀜􀉗􀀕􀀚􀀕􀀃- fuze for fragmenting submunition
􀀜􀉗􀀕􀀚􀀖􀀃– fuzing device
􀀜􀉗􀀕􀀛􀀘􀀃- electro-mechanical head PD - proximity fuze 301􀈼􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀕􀀃􀁐􀁐􀀃for rocket projectile
􀀜􀉗􀀖􀀔􀀓􀀃– proximity (radio-localizing) fuze 122 mm for rocket projectile 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀖􀀃
􀀜􀉗􀀖􀀕􀀙􀀃– radio warhead 9N􀀔􀀕􀀖􀉄􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀁖 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀜􀉄􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁎􀁄
􀀜􀉗􀀖􀀕􀀛􀀃- proximity fuze Gibrid
􀀜􀉗􀀖􀀗􀀖􀀃- proximity fuze Polufinal
􀀜􀉗􀀗􀀕􀀛􀀃– guidance head self-aiming submunition
􀀜􀉗􀀗􀀖􀀙􀀃– guidance head 􀉈􀉌􀀵 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀕􀀕􀀃
􀀜􀉙􀀕􀀙􀀰􀀃– transpor􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀈺􀈺-􀀘􀀕􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀉌􀀵 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔
􀀜􀉙􀀕􀀕􀀗􀀰􀀃– 􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀈺􀈺-38 for 􀉌􀀵 􀀜􀉆􀀕􀀔
116 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
􀀜􀉙􀀕􀀖􀀓􀀃– 􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁕􀀃􀉈􀉌􀀵 􀀜􀉆􀀚􀀙􀀃
􀀜􀉙􀀕􀀖􀀗􀀃- transport container rocket motor part of complex Tochka
􀀜􀉙􀀕􀀖􀀙􀀃- transport container warhead complex Tochka
􀀜􀉙􀀕􀀗􀀛􀉆􀀃- container for for rocket projectile MRL Uragan
􀀜􀉙􀀕􀀛􀀔􀀃- 􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁇􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀖􀀖􀀗􀀃
􀀜􀉙􀀗􀀖􀀃- transport container
􀀜􀉙􀀙􀀔􀀙􀀃- transport container for rocket motor part of complex Luna-M2
􀀜􀉙􀀙􀀖􀀗􀀃- transport container for warhead 9N18F, 9N32E and 9N36E
􀀜􀉙􀀙􀀙􀀘􀀃- transport container for warhead 9N􀀔􀀛􀈿
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 117
Appendix F Rocket artillery in Iraq and Afghanistan
The following data is taken from the EOD guides that U S Navy have issued for the forces in
Afghanistan [41] and Iraq [42].
The pictures are not to scale.
F.1 Afghanistan
Type 63. Chinese 107 mm HE for MD-21
R107 North Korean
9M28F
9M22U. Standard rocket for BM-21 Grad
9M22M Standard rocket for portable system
Grad-P
9N128K2 AT mine dispensing warhead on
9M27K2 for Uragan
9N128F HE/Fragmenting warhead on
9M27F for Uragan
9M27K1
9M27K3 AP mine dispensing rocket
KB-1 submunition from 262 mm rocket
PTM-1 scatterable AT mine delivered by
BM22 Uragan
118 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
POM-2S AP mine delivered with 9M18 122
mm rocket
F.2 Iraq
Type 63 . Chinese 107 mm HE for MD-21
Type 63-1 Chinese 107 mm Incendiary for
MD-21 and MJ-1
Type 63-2, Chinese 107 mm HE for MJ-1
Type 81, Chinese 122 mm HE for MJ-4 and
MJ-4A
Firos, Italian 122 mm HE
9M22U, Russian 122 mm HE for BM-21
Grad
M77 DPICM bomblet delivered with M26
MLRS
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 119
Appendix G Rockets and rocket launchers operated by nonstate
parties
G.1 Hezbollah
The Hezbollah organization, representing the Shia muslims in Southern Lebanon, made use of
their stock of rocket artillery most recently during the war in Lebanon in 2006. Hezbollah is
supposed to have received most of its inventory of ordnance from Iran through Syria, as a major
part of their inventory is of Iranian origin. However, some quite modern Russian or Chinese
systems are also found probably received directly from Syria. The whole arsenal is supposed to
constitute around 13000 rockets.
The table below shows the types that a believed to be in stock. The number of each type is too
uncertain to be given here.
Type Calibre (mm) Range (km) Warhead (kg)
Haseb* 107 9 8
BM-21 122 20 21
Type 90 122 30
BM-27 220 40 100
Fadjr-3 240 45 45
Shahin I (Ra’ad I) 333 13 190
Shahin 2 333 29 190
Fadjr-5 (Khaibar-1) 333 75 90
Falaq-1 240 11 50
WS-1 302 80 150
Fateh-110 170 >200 500
Arash 122 20 18
Oghab 230 45 70
Zelzal-2 610 400 600
Table G.1 Rockets in the inventory of Hezbollah
*) Haseb is an Iranian version of the Chinese Type 63, which again was a copy of
the Russian BM-12
120 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
During the war in 2006 close to 4000 rocket were fired into Israel. Hezbollah itself claims that
twice that number was fired. According to Human Rights Watch [43] the following six types
were used:
􀁸 1111 of 122 mm rockets of unspecified types
􀁸 246 of 122 mm enhanced range rocket, probably Type 90
􀁸 86 of 220 mm Uragan
􀁸 6 of 240 mm Falaq-1 spin stabilized rockets
􀁸 6 of 240 mm long range Fadjr-3 rockets
􀁸 31 of 302 mm rockets probably WS-1
In addition 107 mm Haseb rockets were probably also used. The list above is not complete since
it does not sum up to 4000 rockets. It contains only examined sites of strike.
Figure G.1 Hezbollah preparing the launch of a rocket – probably the Shahin-1
G.2 Hamas
The Hamas organization in the Gaza strip is known to have a wide variety of rockets, both for
direct fire and indirect fire. The Qassam rockets are the most renown. They are described in
chapter x.x as improvised systems.
The Gaza conflict that started in late December 2008, proved that Hamas was in possession of
122 mm Grad rockets reaching beyond 20 km range, even as far as 40 km. It is not known what
kind of launcher has been used. The length and size of these rockets would make them hard to
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 121
smuggle. However, it may be possible to divide the long range motor of Grad into three parts.
The fourth part would then be the warhead, which is rather small on that rocket.[44]
The Hamas is also claimed to have other rockets as well. The data about these are scarce and hard
to verify. However according to an Israeli source [45], Hamas or other Palestinian organizations
like Islamist Jihad, Jenin Martyr’s Brigade and Fatah, are in possession of rockets as shown in the
table below. It should be emphasized that this source may not have total credibility.
It has been claimed that Hamas is in possession of 70 km range Fadjr rockets. These rockets are
10 m long and it would be very challenging to smuggle and conceal such ordnance. This claim
has not been confirmed.[44]
Name Weight (kg) Length (cm) Calibre
(mm)
Range (km) Warhead
(kg)
Haseb 19 84 107 9 8
Nasser 3
(long)
30 160 90 9 9 – 10
Nasser 3
(short)
25 125 90 6 9 – 10
Nasser 4 40 180 115 9 9 – 10
Quds 2A 23.5 150 90 6 8
Quds 2B 33.5 110 115 7 8
Quds 3A 35 130 102 8.5 6 – 7
Quds 3B 42 200 127.5 9 8
Hawkeye 55 15 – 20
Kafah 17
Arafat 8
Table G.2 Rockets in the inventory of Hamas
Recognizing that quite unsophisticated rockets with obviously low accuracy are quite effective as
weapons of terror, Palestinian organizations seems to be very active in developing new versions
of their rockets with ever increasing range.
G.3 Taliban
Before Operation Enduring Freedom starting late 2001 which toppled the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan, it was known that Taliban had a considerable inventory of rocket artillery. It
consisted primarily of the old Soviet Russian systems 122 mm BM-21, the old 132 mm BM-13-
16, the spin stabilized BM-14 and 220 mm BM-14-17. [46;47] The number is uncertain, but
possibly in the range of 50 – 80 units.
It is not known for certain how many of these unit still are in Taliban service, but the majority of
inventory was obviously lost or destroyed during Operation Enduring Freedom. However, there
122 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
have been reports indicating that some units of BM-21 have been used in the aftermath of that
operation. Among those was a claim that BM-21 was applied in an air defence role. However,
BM-21 or any other rocket artillery is very ill-suited for such a role. [48]
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 123
Appendix H Current launcher systems
This appendix describes, in some detail, the current rocket system that is believed to be in
operation. For many systems, the operational status is not known with certainly. However, the
possibility that some of these systems can be revived should not be excluded.
The list is not complete. Especially, several North Korean and Iranian systems are excluded due
to lack of available information.
The systems are ordered according to the calibre of the system.
For country abbreviations, see appendix J.
The main sources for this section are Jane’s Armour and Artillery (JAA) [49] and Jane’s
Ammunition Handbook (JAH) [50]. Some information are also taken from World Equipment
Guide 2001 [51], and the book by Hull et al [52]
Firos BPD Difesa e Spezio Italy
Calibre 51 mm
Carrier: ACMAT Jeep
No. of tubes/rails: 48
Range 6.5 km
Ammunition types
HE
HE – preformed fragments
AT/AP – shaped charge
Smoke
Spotting
Training smoke
Used by: MEX Rocket mass 4.8 kg; warhead 2.2 kg
Velocity 515 m/s at burnout at 1.1 s
Firing rate 10 rockets/s
124 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
S-5 Soviet Union
Calibre 57mm
Carrier: Light truck
No. of tubes/rails:20
Range - 4.5 km
Ammunition types:
HE
Used by: UKR, BIH To large extent an improvised system
The pod is an original direct fire rocket pod for the Mi-24 Hind
helicopter
LAU97 Forges de Zeebrugge Belgium
Calibre 70 mm
Carrier: VLRS 4.15 LRM
No. of tubes/rails: 40
Range 0.7 - 9 km
Ammunition types
FZ-100 Cargo
FZ-49 Anti-Armor
FZ-71 Anti-personnel
M257 ILL
Used by: UAE, INA A ground launched version of the air-launched HYDRA
system. Cargo warhead contains 9 DPICM 0.48 kg each.
The rocket weighs about 6.2 kg
Source: JAA
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 125
SBAT-70 Brazil
Calibre : 70 mm
Carrier: Towed
No. of tubes/rails:36 or 42
Range - 7.5 / 12 km
Ammunition types
HE
Used by: BRA Rocket mass 14.6 kg; warhead 3.2 kg
Velocity 700 m/s
Developed in U SA as Slammer-6
TF M95 Heron Croatia
Calibre:70 mm
Carrier: Towed
No. of tubes/rails: 40
Range -8 km
Ammunition types
HE
ILL
Smoke
Incendiary
Training
Used by: CRO Rocket mass 10 kg; warhead 3.7 kg
Velocity 400 m/s (enhanced version 550m/s)
A modified version has a range of 10 km
JAH
126 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
S-8 Soviet Union
Calibre: 80 mm
Carrier: Light/medium truck
No. of tubes/rails: 20
Range - 6 km
Ammunition types
HE
Used by: UKR, ABK An half-improvised system applying the rocket pod of the S-8
system used av Russian helicopters. Rocket vel. 450 m/s.
Rocket mass 15.2 kg; warhead 7.4 kg.
PAMPERO Fabrica Militar Fray Luis Beltran Argentina
Calibre: 105 mm
Carrier: MB unimog 4 x 4
No. of tubes/rails:16
Range - 10.1 km
Ammunition types
HE
Used by: ARG Rocket weight 28.5 kg, length 1,467 m;
burn-out velocity 530 m/s
JAA; JAH
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 127
Type 63 NORINCO DR Korea
Calibre:107 mm
Carrier: Towed or jeep
mounted
No. of tubes/rails: 12
Range - 8.5 km
Ammunition types
HE
Incendiary
ECM
Used by: ALB, BUF, CMB,
DRC, JOR, LIB, MYA, NIC,
PAK, SUD, SYR, UGA
Spin stabilized (6 nozzles). Launch velocity 34 m/s
Rocket mass 14 kg
Previously known as H-12
Variants made in IRN, NKO, RSA
T-107 MKEK / Roketsan Turkey
Calibre: 107 mm
Carrier:Towed
No. of tubes/rails:12
Range - 8.5 km
Ammunition types
HE (TR-107)
HE (TRB-107 – prefragm.)
Used by: TUR
The launcher may also be
placed on a light vehicle
Spin stabilized rocket, mass 19.5 kg, length 0.84 m
Warhead 8.5 kg, 1.25 kg TNT
Max. velocity 370 m/s
128 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
108-R Avibras, Brazil
Calibre: 108 mm
Carrier: Towed
No. of tubes/rails: 16
Range - 9.1 km
Ammunition types
HE
Used by: BRA (may be
phased out)
Rocket mass 16.8 kg, warhead 7.8 kg, explosive 2.5 kg
Rocket length 0.97 m. Max.velocity 440 m/s
JAA
Kung-Feng VI Rep China
Calibre: 117 mm
Carrier: M52A1 (6 x 6)
No. of tubes/rails:45
Range: - 14.9 km
Ammunition types
HE
Used by: ROC Rocket mass 59.8 kg
To be replaced by RT2000 Mk15
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 129
RT2000 Mk15 Rep China
Calibre: 117 mm
Carrier: M977 HEMTT
No. of tubes/rails: 60
Range -15 km
Ammunition types
HE
Used by: ROC Rocket mass 59.8 kg (same rocket as for Kung Feng IV A)
http://www.military-today.com/artillery/rt2000.htm
http://wiki.livedoor.jp/namacha2/d/117mm45%cf%a2%c1%f5%bc%ab%c1%f6%a5%ed%a5%b1
%a5%c3%a5%c8%cb%a4%a1%d6%b9%a9%cb%aa6%b7%bf%a1%d7
9K132 Grad-P Kovrovsk Mech. Plant Soviet Union
Calibre: 122 mm
Carrier: Portable
No. of tubes/rails: !
Range 0.8 – 10.0 km
Ammunition types
HE
Smoke
Used by: RUS, EGY, HIZ
Egyptian version is called PR-
113
Rocket mass 91 kg, warhead 46 kg
130 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Sakr-30/36/40 Egypt
Calibre: 122 mm
Carrier:Towed or truck
No. of tubes/rails:6 /21/30/40
Range - 20/36 km
Ammunition types
Sakr 10 (HE)
Sakr 18 (HE)
Sakr 30 (HE)
D-4000 (smoke)
D-6000 (smoke)
Cargo (98 DPICM)
Mines (5 AT mines)
Used by: EGY Rocket mass: Sakr-30 56.5 kg; Sakr-18 – 67 kg
Rocket length:Sakr-30 2.58 m. Sakr-18 3.25 m
Velocity Sakr-30 – 1090 m/s, Sakr-18 - 1290 m/s
SAKR Series 122 and 325 mm Multiple Launch Rocket Systems - Archived 8/2003; Forecast International,
August 2002
BM-21 Grad Soviet Union
Calibre: 122 mm
Carrier:
No. of tubes/rails:40
Range 1.6/5 – 20.75
Ammunition types
HE
DPICM
AT mines
AP mines
Used by: Numerous (see
section H-1 and I)
This system and its variants are described further in section H-1
Equiv PRC Type 81
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 131
Firos-25/30 Snia Viscosa Italy
Calibre: 122 mm
Carrier:
No. of tubes/rails: 40
Range: 8 – 25/34
Ammunition types
HE
HE-prefragmented
WP smoke
AT-mines (6)
AP-mines (22)
DPICM (77)
Used by: ITA Rocket mass 58 / 65 (Firos-30)
FIROS 51 and 122 mm Multiple Launch Rocket Systems - Archived 8/2003
Type 90 / KRL 122 Norinco PR China
Calibre: 122 mm
Carrier: XC2000 6 x 6
No. of tubes/rails: 40
Range: 12.7 – 32.7 km
Ammunition types
HE
Used by: ARM, BAN, PRC Another 40 rockets is transported on the vehicle. Rocket length
2.75 m. Long range version 40 km range
132 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
T-122 Sakarya Roketsan Turkey
Calibre: 122 mm
Carrier: XC2000 6 x 6
No. of tubes/rails: 40
Range: 3 – 40 km
Ammunition types
HE
HE/Frag
Used by: TUR, UAE See table x.x
JAH
Type 89 Norinco PR China
Calibre: 122 mm
Carrier: 12150L.
No. of tubes/rails: 40
Range: 15 - 40 km
Ammunition types
HE/Frag
prefragmented
DPICM
AT mines
AP mines
Used by: PRC, Another 40 rockets is transported on the vehicle. Rocket length
2.75 m.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 133
BM-11 Soviet Union
Calibre: 122 mm
Carrier: Various
No. of tubes/rails: 30
Range: 5 – 20.75
Ammunition types
HE
Used by: NKO North Korean version of BM-21 with same rocket
RM-70 /RM-75 Czech Rep
Calibre : 122 mm
Carrier: Tatra 813 8 x 8
No. of tubes/rails: 40
Range: 1.6 - 20
Ammunition types
HE/Frag
DPICM (56 AGAT)
AT mines
Ap mines
Used by: ANG, CZE, FIN,
GEO, GRE, LIB, MYA, PER,
POL, ROM, RWA, SLK, SRI,
UGA, YEM
See own 122 mm /BM-21section below
HE-version has 6.4 kg explosives
Romanian version is called APR-40 and APR-21
134 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
LAROM BM-21 Romania
Calibre: 122 mm
Carrier:SR-114
No. of tubes/rails:
Range - 20.75 mm
Ammunition types
HE
Used by: ROM Same rockets as BM-21 Grad
Lynx IMI Israel
Calibre: 122 / 160 / 300 mm
Carrier:KamAZ-740
No. of tubes/rails: 40 / 26 / 8
Range - 21 / 45 / 150 km
Ammunition types
HE Frag
Smoke
Prefrag
Incendiary
AT mines
Cluster
Illumination
Used by: AZB 122 mm uses same rockets as BM-21 Grad
160 mm uses same rockets as for LAR-160
300 mm rocket weighs 450 kg; warhead 150 kg; Length 3970
mm; guided
http://www.military-today.com/artillery/azerbaijan_lynx.htm
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 135
Valkiri Mk I 22 Armscor South Africa
Calibre 127 mm
Carrier: Samil 20
No. of tubes/rails: 24
Range 8 – 22.7 km
Ammunition types
HE - 53.5 kg
Used by: RSA Remarks: Firing on less than 15 km requires drag rings
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/astros/specs.html
Kung-Feng III/IV Rep China
Calibre: 126 mm No picture available
Carrier: Tracked
No. of tubes/rails:40
Range: - 9 km
Ammunition types
HE
Used by: ROC Limited information. Some sources claim that the calibre is 117
mm
136 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Astros II (SS-30) Avibrás Brazil
Calibre 127 mm
Carrier: Tectran 6x6 AVLMU
No. of tubes/rails: 32
Range 9 – 30 km
Ammunition types
HE
Used by: BAH, BRA, IRQ,
MLA, QAT, KSA
Previously built in Iraq under licence as Sajil-30
Rocket length 3.9 m
Weight 68 kg
JAA/ JAH
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/astros/specs.html
Valkiri Mk I 5 Armscor South Africa
Calibre 127 mm No picture available
Carrier: Towed
No. of tubes/rails: 12
Range 5.5 km
Ammunition types
HE - 18 kg - prefragmented
Used by: RSA Remarks: Burnout velocity 250 m/s at 0.8 s
Rocket mass 30 kg; length 1.4 m,
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 137
Valkiri I Armscor South Africa
Calibre 127 mm
Carrier: Samil 20 4 x 4
No. of tubes/rails: 24
Range 8 - 22 km
Ammunition types
HE - 18 kg - prefragmented
Used by: RSA Rocket length 2.68 m; weight 53 kg
Production has ceased for the benefit of Bateleur
http://www.military-today.com/artillery/valkiri.htm
Bateleur Armscor South Africa
Calibre 127 mm
Carrier: Samil 100
No. of tubes/rails: 40
Range 8 - 36 km
Ammunition types
HE - 18 kg - prefragmented
Used by: RSA Rocket mass 62 kg; length 2.95 m
138 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
M77 Oganj Serbia
Calibre 128 mm
Carrier: FAP-2026
No. of tubes/rails: 32
Range 1.5 – 20.6 km
Ammunition types
HE
DPICM
Used by: BIH, CRO, SER
A portable system is also
available
Rocket length 2.6 m, Mass 66.8 m, warhead 19.5 m
Max velocity 750 m/s
M63 Plamen SDPR, Belgrade Yugoslavia
Calibre: 128 mm
Carrier: Towed
No. of tubes/rails: 32
Range 3 – 8.5 km
Ammunition types
HE M85
HE M87
Used by: BIH, SER, CRO,
MAC, SLV, CYP
Portable variant: M71
Partizan
M63: length 0.814 m, rocket mass 23 kg, warhead 8 kg
M87: length 0.96 m; rocket mass 25.5 kg, warhead 9.4 kg
Max velocity 444 m/s, Spin stabilized system
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 139
Type 82 PR China
Calibre: 130 mm
Carrier: 6 x 6 truck
No. of tubes/rails: 30
Range - 10.1 km
Ammunition types
HE
Enh. frag (2600 frags.)
Used by: PRC, BAN Spin stabilized rocket
Rocket mass 32 kg; warhead 3 kg, length ~1 m
Improved Type 63 system
sinodefence
LOV RAK 24/128 RH ALAN Croatia
Calibre: 130 mm (128 mm)
Carrier: LOV APC
No. of tubes/rails:24
Range: - 8.55 km
Ammunition types
HE M91
HE M93
Same rocket as for M85 Plamen
Used by: CRO M91 mass 23.2 kg, warhead 8.5 kg, fuel 4.5 kg
M93 mass 26.0 kg, warhead 9.0 kg, fuel 7.5 kg
M93 has 13 km range. Spin stabilized
140 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Kooyong Daewoo Heavy Ind Rep. Korea
Calibre 130 mm
Carrier: KM809A1
No. of tubes/rails: 36
Range 10 – 32 km
Ammunition types
Mk 1 – 54 kg
Mk 2 – 64 kg
Used by: SKO Remarks: Warhead weight 21 kg with 6.5 kg HE
BM-13-16 SOV
Calibre: 132 mm
Carrier: ZIL-151
No. of tubes/rails: 16
Range - 9.0 km
Ammunition types
HE
Used by: CMB, EGY, SML,
TLB, VIE
Rocket mass 93 kg; warhead 43 kg
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 141
BM-14-16/17 Soviet Union
Calibre: 140 mm
Carrier:GAZ-63
No. of tubes/rails:16/17
Range - 10.6 km
Ammunition types
HE (FG-14)
Smoke
Incendary
Used by: ALG, CMB, CON,
CUB, INA, KAZ, SML, TLB,
VIE, YEM
Rocket length 1051 mm; mass 40.3 kg
Warhead 7.65 kg, explosive 4.2 kg
Velocity at launch 27 – 40 m/s; at burnout 400 m/s
Teruel Santa Barbara Spain
Calibre 140 mm
Carrier: Pegaso 3055 6x6
No. of tubes/rails: 40
Range 6 – 18/28 km
Ammunition types
HE
Cargo – 42 ESPIN bomblets
Cargo – 24 DPICM
Cargo – 6 AT mines
Smoke – 14 grenades
Used by: SPA, GAB
(Spain to replace by
HIMARS)
Remarks: Two rocket versions – a standard 18 km range and an
extended range 28 km
142 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
VCLC-CAL Thyssen-Henschel / IMI Argentina
Calibre: 160 mm
Carrier:
No. of tubes/rails: 36
Range 12 – 35 km
Ammunition types
HE
Used by: ARG No concrete information on the rocket, but probably the same as
the Israeli 160 mm
LAR-160 IMI Israel
Calibre 160 mm
Carrier:Various
No. of tubes/rails: 36
Range 12 – 34 km
Ammunition types
LAR Mk 1
LAR Mk II
LAR Cargo
ACCULAR Mk I
ACCULAR Mk II
ACCULAR Mk IV
Used by: ISL, GEO, VEN Remarks: LAR Mk II weighs 110 kg with 46 kg WH, length
3.31 m, burnout velocity is 1022 m/s. Cargo WH carries 104
M85
ACCULAR has a TCS in nose.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 143
LAROM LAR-160 Aerostar Israel
Calibre: 160 mm
Carrier:
No. of tubes/rails: 28
Range - 45km
Ammunition types
HE/Frag
DPICM
Used by: ROM Joint development with IMI, Israel
Rocket length 3.3 m, Weight 110 kg Warhead 46 kg (MKII)
Rayo FAMAE, Chile
Calibre 160 mm
Carrier: MAN SX2000
No. of tubes/rails: 24
Range – 45 km.
Ammunition types
HE 11 kg
Used by: CHL Remarks: Rockets weigh 122.5 kg, length 3.5 m and reaches
1240 m/s after 2 seconds..
http://www.acapomil.cl/investigacion/boletines/boletin_2000/03_Articulos_Gestion_de_Calidad/
03_Art%EDculos_Gesti%F3n_de_calidad_por_medio_de_la_administraci%F3n_de_proyectos_e
_ingenier%EDa_de_sist emas.htm
144 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Astros II (SS-40) Avibrás Brazil
Calibre 180 mm
Carrier: Tectran 6x6 AVLMU
No. of tubes/rails: 16
Range 15 – 35 km
Ammunition types
HE-1
DPICM (20 bomblets)
Mines (AP or AT)
Anti-tunway
Used by: BAH, BRA,
IRQ, MAY, KSA
Rocket length 4.2 m
Weight 152 kg
Built in Iraq under licence as Sajil-40
Bomblet are probably 72 mm in diameter
RT2000 Mk30 Rep. China
Calibre: 180 mm
Carrier:M977 HEMTT
No. of tubes/rails: 27
Range - 30 km
Ammunition types
HE
Cluster
Used by: ROC The vehicle can fire while moving.
http://www.military-today.com/artillery/rt2000.htm
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 145
BMD-20 (8U33) Soviet Union
Calibre: 200 mm
Carrier:ZIS-151
No. of tubes/rails: 4
Range - 18.75 km
Ammunition types
HE (MD-20F)
HE (MD-24F)
Used by: ETI, PRK Rocket weight 194 kg
Burn-out velocity 535 – 590 m/s
Pinaka Larsen & Toubro / Tata group India
Calibre 214 mm
Carrier: Tatra T-815
No. of tubes/rails: 12
Range 7 –45 km
Ammunition types
HE
Incendiary
Cargo - AT mines
Cargo - AP mines
Cargo – DPICM bomblets
Used by: IND Rocket weighs 276 kg with around 100 kg explosive. Full load
salvo takes 44 s. Rocket length 4.9 m
146 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
TOS-1 Ryssia
Calibre: 220 mm
Carrier: Tank chassis (T-72)
No. of tubes/rails: 30 km
Range: 0.4 – 3.5
Ammunition types
FAE (tetranite fuel)
Used by: RUS Incendiary warhead with FAE or Thermobaric content
BM-27 Uragan Splav Soviet Union
Calibre: 220 mm
Carrier:
No. of tubes/rails:
Range
Ammunition types
Varied ammo available
See section H.x
Used by: AFG, BLR, GUI,
KAZ, MOL, RUS, TLB,
TRM, UKR, UZB, YEM
Se special section H-2
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 147
MLRS Vought Corp. USA
Calibre: 227 mm
Carrier: M270 tracked veh.
No. of tubes/rails: 12
Range 7 - 32/40 km
Ammunition types
M26 (644 M77 DPICM)
M26A1 (518 M77 DPICM)
M26A2 (518 M85 DPICM)
M30 (404 M101 DPICM)
AT2 (28 AT2 mines)
Used by: BAH, DEN, EGY,
FRA, GER, ISL, ITA, JAP,
NOR, ROK, TUR, UAE,
UK, US
See appendix H-3
Tubes have 240 mm inner diameter
MLRS USA
Calibre: 227 mm
Carrier: HIMARS
No. of tubes/rails:6
Range - 32 – 60 km
Ammunition types
M26 (644 M77 DPICM)
M26A1 (518 M77 DPICM)
M26A2 (518 M85 DPICM)
M30 (404 M101 DPICM)
AT2 (28 AT2 mines)
M26 (644 M77 DPICM)
Used by: SIN, UAE, US Tubes have 240 mm inner diameter
Further described in section H-3
148 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
TOROS 230A MKEK / SAGE Turkey
Calibre: 230 mm
Carrier: Various trucks
No. of tubes/rails: 6
Range 10 - 65 km
Ammunition types
HE/Frag
Used by: TUR Rocket mass 326 kg, warhead 120 kg
Rocker length 4.1 m
4 WAFs
Oghab Parchin Missile Ind./AOI Iran
Calibre: 230 mm
Carrier: 6 x 6 truck
No. of tubes/rails: 4
Range - 34 km
Ammunition types
HE/Frag
Long range version 45 km
Used by: IRN Max. velocity 750 m/s.
Rocket length 4.82 m.
Rocket mass 360 kg, 70 kg warhead, 128 kg propellant
JAH
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 149
RT2000 Mk45 Rep. China
Calibre: 230 mm
Carrier:M977 HEMTT
No. of tubes/rails:12
Range - 45 km
Ammunition types
HE
Cluster
Used by: ROC (status
uncertain)
The vehicle can fire while moving
http://www.military-today.com/artillery/rt2000.htm
BM-24 Soviet Union
Calibre: 240 mm
Carrier: ZIL-151/157
No. of tubes/rails:12
Range - 10.2
Ammunition types
HE
Smoke
Chemical
Used by: AFG, ALG, EGY,
HEZ, ISL, SML, YEM
Warhead weight 60.8 kg; explosive 27.4 kg
Rocket length 1124 mm; mass 112 kg
150 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Fadjr-3 Parchin Missile Ind./AOI Iran
Calibre: 240 mm
Carrier: MB 6 x 6
No. of tubes/rails:12
Range: 17 - 43 km
Ammunition types
HE/Frag
Smoke
Inc
Chemical
Used by: IRN, HEZ
Believed to be equiv to north
Koren M1985 and M1991
Rockat mass 407 kg; warhead 90 kg, explosive 42 kg
Rocket length 5.2 nm.
3 WAFs
JAH, JAA, Shapir
Falaq-1 Aerospace Industries Organization Iran
Calibre: 240 mm
Carrier:4 x 4 light jeep
No. of tubes/rails: 4
Range - 10.8 km
Ammunition types
Used by: IRN Rocket length 1,32 m. Rocket mass 111 kg
Warhead mass 50 kg
The rocket is right spin stabilized with 16 nozzles
A single launch tube be mounted on a tripod
JAH, Cordesman[53]
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 151
Korshun 3P7 / BM-25 Soviet Union
Calibre:250 mm
Carrier: KrAZ-214 6x6
No. of tubes/rails: 6
Range - 55 km
Ammunition types
HE
Used by: YEM (may now be
phased out)
The motor is supposed to be liquid based
Rocket mass 375 kg, wahead 100 kg. Rocket length 5535 mm
Burn time 7,8 s. Max. velocity 1002 m/s
Öst
The term BM-25 is also a tactical rocket system (North Korean), but is not related to 3P7
TOROS 260A MKEK / SAGE Turkey
Calibre: 260 mm
Carrier: Various trucks
No. of tubes/rails: 4
Range 15 - 100 km
Ammunition types
HE/Frag
Used by: TUR Rocket mass 410 kg, warhead 145 kg
Rocker length 4.8 m
4 WAFs
152 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
M87 Orkan (R-262) Serbia
Calibre 262 mm
Carrier: FAP 2832 and others
No. of tubes/rails: 12
Range: 5 - 50 km
Ammunition types
Cargo – 288 DPICM bomblets
Mines – 24 AT mines
Used by: SER; BIH, CRO.
System was developed jointly
with Iraq, where it was known
as Ababil-50
Remarks: Bomblet contain 420 spherical fragments.
Rocket mass 390 kg, (mine-rocket 382 kg)
Booster 10 kg, sustainer 130 kg (burns for 5 s)
Burnout velocity 1200 m/s
3-step aerodynamic brake
Type 83 Norinco PR China
Calibre: 273 mm
Carrier: Type 60-1 tracked
No. of tubes/rails: 4
Range 23 - 40 km
Ammunition types
HE/Frag
80 km version available
Used by: PRC, Iran produces
its own variant called Oghab
Rocket length 4.753 m
Lauch velocity 39 m/s; burnout velocity 810.5 m/s
Rocket mass 484 kg
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 153
WM-80 Norinco PR China
Calibre: 273 mm
Carrier: TA-580 8 x 8 truck
No. of tubes/rails:8
Range 34 - 80 km
Ammunition types
HE/Frag
Cargo (380 DPICM)
Used by: PRC Launch velocity 40 m/s, burnout velocity 1140 m/s, apogee 31
km. Rocket length 4.582 m
Rocket mass 505 kg, propellant 205.5 kg, warhead 150 kg,
explosibe 34 kg
MAR-290 IMI Israel
Calibre 290 mm
Carrier: Centurion/Sherman
No. of tubes/rails: 4
Range - 40 km
Ammunition types
Used by: ISL Status
uncertain)
Remarks: The rocket is launched from a rail with both rail and
rocket inside a tube due to the fixed fins arrangement.
154 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Astros II (SS-60/SS-80) Avibrás Brazil
Calibre 300 mm
Carrier: Tectran 6x6 AVLMU
No. of tubes/rails: 4
Range 20 – 80 km
Ammunition types
DPICM (65) 212 kg
Mines (AP or AT)
HE-I
Anti-runway
Used by: BAH, BRA, IRQ,
MAY, QAT, KSA
.Built in Iraq under licence as Sajil-60
SS-80 has a range of 22 – 90 km
Rocket length 5.6 m
Weight 595 kg
Bomblet is 390 mm long 130 mm in diameter
JAH/JAA
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/astros/specs.html
BM-30 Smerch Splav Soviet Union
Calibre: 300 mm
Carrier:
No. of tubes/rails: 12
Range 20 – 70 km
Ammunition types
Various
See section H.x
Used by: ALG, AZB, BLR,
IND, KUW, RUS, TRM,
UAE, UKR
See special section H-4
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 155
A-100 Norinco PR China
Calibre: 300 mm
Carrier: WS-2400
No. of tubes/rails:10
Range: 20 – (50-100)
Ammunition types
Frag-bomblets
Mines
HE/frag
FAE
DPICM
Used by: PRC, PAK
sinodefemce
http://trishulgroup.blogspot.com/2008/09/pakistan-army-upgrades-its-field.html
T-300 Kasirga Roketsan Turkey
Calibre: 302 mm
Carrier: MAN 6 x 6
No. of tubes/rails: 4
Range 20 - 100 km
Ammunition types
HE/Prefrag
Cluster
Used by: TUR
Turkish version the Chinese
WS-1
Rocket length 4.7 m; weigth 524 kg
Warhead 150 kg
Asian Defence
156 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
WS-1 PR China
Calibre: 302 mm
Carrier: 6 x 6 or 8 x 8 truck
No. of tubes/rails: 4
Range: 40 -100 km
Ammunition types
Various
Used by: PRC Rocket length 4.737 m; mass 524 kg; warhead150 kg
Burnout velocity: 1250 m/s
Accuracy 1 – 1.25%
Sinodefence, Shapir
WS-1B PR China
Calibre: 302 mm
Carrier: Various trucks
No. of tubes/rails:4 - 8
Range: 60 -180 km
Ammunition types
Various
Used by: Rocket length 6.376 m; mass 725 kg; warhead150 kg
Burnout velocity: 1750 m/s
Accuracy 1 – 1.25%
Sinodefence
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 157
Falaq-2 Shahid Bagheri Ind /AOI Iran
Calibre: 333 mm
Carrier: 4 x 4 jeep
No. of tubes/rails:1
Range - 11 km
Ammunition types
HE
Used by: IRN, HEZ Rocket mass 255 kg; warhead 120 kg, explosive 60 kg
Rocket length 1.82 m. Max altitude 3200 m
Right spin-stabilized with 8 nozzles
Shahin II AOI Iran
Calibre: 333 mm
Carrier:
No. of tubes/rails:
Range - 20 km
Ammunition types
HE
Used by: IRN, HEZ
Also called Fadjr-4
Rocket mass 384/530 kg, Warhead mass 190 kg, length 2.90
(Shahin I), 3.90 m (Shahin II)
Picture above is Shahin II, Shahin I is shorter with 13 km range
158 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Fadjr-5 Aerospace Industries Organization Iran
Calibre: 333 mm
Carrier: 6 x 6 truck
No. of tubes/rails: 4
Range: - 75 km
Ammunition types
HE/Frag
Used by: IRN, HEZ Rocket length 6.485 m
Rocket mass 915 kg
Propellant 175 kg, warhead 90 kg
MAR-350 IMI Israel
Calibre: 350 mm
Carrier: Tank chassis
No. of tubes/rails: 2
Range 40 - 80 km
Ammunition types
HE/Frag
Cargo (770 Bantam
bomblets)
TCS rocket available
Used by: ROM, ISL (status
is uncertain)
Rocket mass 835 kg, propellant 320 kg, warhead 334 kg
Rocket length 5 m
Launch velocity 40 m/s; burnout velocity 1200 m/s; burn time 3.3
s; apogee 28 km; thrust 235 kN
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 159
Nazeat AIO Iran
Calibre 356 mm
Carrier: MB 2624 6 x 6
No. of tubes/rails:
Range - 120 km
Ammunition types
Used by: IRN Different version N4, N5, N6
Max velocity 1800 m/s
WS-2 PR China
Calibre: 400 mm
Carrier:
No. of tubes/rails: 6
Range 70 – 200 km
Ammunition types
Used by: PRC Rocket length 7.3 m; mass 1285 kg, warhead 200 kg
Primitive INS guidance with accuracy 0.17%
Sinodefence
160 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Luna-M (NATO:FROG-7B) BAZ Soviet Union
Calibre: 544 mm
Carrier:ZIL-135 LM
No. of tubes/rails:1
Range: 15 – 65 km
Ammunition types
9M21B (nuc)
9M21F (HE)
9M21E (42 9N18 bomblets)
9M21Kh (chem. bomblets)
Used by: BLR, BIH, CUB,
EGY, HUN, NKO, LEB,
ROM, RUS, SLV, SYR,
UKR, YEM
Warhead weight 420 – 57 kg, Rocket length 8.95 – 9.4 m
Rocket weight 2.5 tons
http://www.rwd-mb3.de/pages/9m21.htm
9P129 Tochka OTR-21,
(NATO: SS-21 Scarab)
KBM, Kolomna Russia
Calibre: 650 mm
Carrier: BAZ-5921
No. of tubes/rails:
Range: 20 – 120 km
Ammunition types
9M79F (HE)
9M79K (50 9N123K
bomblets)
9M79B (Nuc.)
Used by: AZE, BLR, BUL,
POL, RUS, UKR, SYR, YEM
Rocket length 6.4m, weight 2.0 tons, warhead 482 kg
Max. velocity 1800 m/s
INS guidance
http://www.rwd-mb3.de/pages/9m79.htm
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 161
MGM-140 ATACMS Northrop - Grumman USA
Calibre : 607 mm
Carrier: M270
No. of tubes/rails:2
Range - 140+ km
Ammunition types
M39 (950 M74 bomblets)
Used by: BAH, GRE, ROK,
UAE, US,
Rocket length 3.978 m; mass 1495 kg
Warhead 500 kg;
Zelzal-2 AIO Iran
Calibre : 610 mm
Carrier: MB truck
No. of tubes/rails:1
Range - 210 km
Ammunition types
HE
Used by: IRN Rocket length 8.325 m; mass 3400 kg
Warhead 600 kg; propellant 1840 kg
Isp 235 s PPG fuel
Accuracy 5%
162 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Iskander (NATO: SS-26
Stone)
KBM, Kolomna Russia
Calibre 950 mm
Carrier: MAZ-79306 8 x 8
No. of tubes/rails:2
Range. 50 – 500 km*
Ammunition types
HE
Cluster (54 bomblets)
Others
Used by: RUS Rocket weight 3800 kg, length 7.2 m
Burnout velocity 2100 m/s, warhead 480 kg
Guided – accuracy < 10 m
Range is 280 km for Iskander-E (export version)
H.1 122 mm systems
H.1.1 BM-21
122 mm constitute are by far the most proliferated systems of rocket artillery. The classical type
is the Russian (Soviet) BM-21 Grad which was developed in the mid 1950s. This system has been
exported into many countries of which several have modified and improved the system into their
own independent product.
BM-21 was used for the first time in combat during the brief Soviet-Chinese conflict on the
Damanskiy Island on the Ussuri river in March 1969.
This BM-21 system has been developed along several avenues and is currently in used in dozens
of countries. A somewhat obsolete feature of the system is that it has to be reloaded manually and
with one rocket at a time. A process that with a well trained crew takes 10 – 15 seconds per tube.
When fired at a range of around 14 km, BM-21 rockets are supposed to have an accuracy
(probable error) of 100 m in range and 80 m in deflection [33]. It is believed that only random
errors are included in this budget.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 163
Figure H.1 BM-21 – the most proliferated artillery rocket system
The most known types are
􀁸 BM-21 – the original type – had 40 launch tubes (4 rows with 10 each) and was carried
by an Ural-375D 6 wheeled truck. As with other truck carried version the rockets could
be fired selectively or by a complete salvo.
􀁸 BM-21V (Grad-V) has 12 tubes (2 rows with 6 each) carried by a Gaz-66B 4 wheeled
light truck providing better terrain mobility than the original one. It was intended to be
used by air deployed units.
􀁸 BM-21B (Grad-1/9P138) has 36 tubes arranged in the same way as on the original one
but two tubes in the middle of the two lower rows has been removed. It is carried by a
Zil-131 6 wheeled truck. Only rockets with high explosive warhead and with reduced
range can be used.
􀁸 BM-21-1 is similar to the original version but is mounted on a more modern Ural 4320
truck. It was developed in the late 1980s
􀁸 BM-21 P (Partizan) was originally developed for Speznaz or special forces. It is a single
tube system consisting of a bipod, a tube and a shortened version of the rocket weighing
46 kg. The total weight of the system including one rocket is around 75 kg. The rocket
can be disassembled into two parts for the purpose of portability. This system has become
popular in some non-state forces like Hezbollah. This system can not fire the standard 3
meter long BM-21 rockets.
􀁸 Prima (9A51) is the latest development taking place in the early 1990s. It uses the same
vehicle as BM-21-1. The launcher has 50 tubes. The complete system also includes at
reloading vehicle.
164 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
􀁸 Romania once showed a single tube version consisting of a tube, an aiming device and a
tripod. Including one rocket the weight was supposed to be 105 kg. The range of the
rocket was limited to 13.4 km probably due to the limited elevation at launch.
􀁸 RM-70 is a modernized version of the original system made in the early 1970 by
Czechoslovakia. It is carried by a Tatra 813 8-wheeled vehicle. The improvement
consisted of crew fragment protection a devices to speed up the reloading process
􀁸 RM70/85 was also developed in Czechoslovakia. It is quite similar to the previous
version but uses a Tatra T815 vehicle. The emphasize to put more on CBRN-protection
than on fragment protection
Ammunition for BM-21
Type Length
(m)
Weight
(kg)
Min range
(km)
Max.
range
(km)
Content Remarks
9M22 2.87 66 20.75 HE/Frag 700 m/s
9M22U 3.226 66.35 1.5 20.38 HE/Frag 18.4 kg WH
9M22M 1.913 45.7 3 10.8 HE/Frag Portable
9M22S Incendiary
9M23 Frag/Chem 2.3 kg agent
9M28D Leaflets
9M28F 1.93 56.5 1.4 13.4 HE/Frag 450/585 m/s
21 kg WH
9M53F 3.037 70 5 33 HE/Frag/p
9M43 2.949 66 5 20.2 Smoke 5 elements
w/0.8 kg RP
9M42 ~1.5 27 1 5 Illumination 1.5 min
9M28K 3.019 57.7 4 13.4 AT mines 3 PTM-3
3M16 3.019 56.4 4 13.4 AP mines 5 POM-2
9M21 2.87 66 5 20.4 Chemical
9M519 3.025 66 4.5 18.5 Jammer (9
types)
18.5 kg
9M521 2.84 66 40 HE/Frag
9M522 3.037 70 37.5 HE/Frag Parachute
descent
9M217 3.037 70 33 2 SFW
9M218 3.037 70 30 DPICM 45 KOBE
9M22S 66.6 9N510
Table H.1 Russian 122 mm ammunition
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 165
The BM-21 was produced by the Russian company NII-147 in Tula. This company was later
renamed Splav.
H.1.2 Chinese variants
People’s Republic of China has several quite modern versions of 122 mm systems. Beside the
classical Soviet made BM-21 they also have the track vehicle carried Type-89, the wheeled
carried Type 90 which both are from the 1980. An even newer version of the WS-6, as new 40
barrel on a truck is produced by The Sichuan Aerospace Industry Corporation (SCAIC) and has
recently gone into production. (JAH). It is not what the difference between WS-6 and WS-1E is.
Warhead Length
(m)
Total
weight
(kg)
Warhead
weight
(kg)
Max.
range
(km)
Min.
range
(km)
He/Frag 2.87 67 18.3 20 9.6
Enhanced
fragmentation
2.87 67 18.3 20 9.6
Enhanced
fragmentation
2.87 67 18.3 20 12
Cluster (39 bomblets) 3.037 66 18.3 20 9.6
Cluster (74 bomblets) 2.87 68 28 26 13
He/Frag 2.757 61 18.3 33 12.7
Enhanced
fragmentation
2.757 61 18.3 33 12.4
Cluster (13 bomblets) 2.927 61 18.3 32 15
Enhanced
fragmentation
2.9 67 22 40 20
Cluster (44 bomblets) 3.008 67 22 40 20
Cluster (6 AT mines) 2.95 58 26 15 6
Cluster (8AT mines) 2.83 63 33 7 -
Cluster (128 AP mines) 2.83 63 33 7 -
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/search/index7.htm and JAH
Table H.2 Chinese types of ammunition for 122 mm rockets (The cluster warhead with 39 or 44
bomblets probably contain MZD-2 bomblets; the 74 bomblets warhead must have
smaller bomblets). The enhanced fragmentation warheads have metal spheres in the
casing
H.1.3 Turkish variants
The Turkish variant of 122 mm is produced by the company Roketsan. It seems likely that Turkey
has got a lot of their MRL technology from PR China. Many similarities are found for 122 mm
systems and for higher calibre types.
166 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Warhead Length
(m)
Total
weight
(kg)
Warhead
weight
(kg)
Max.
range
(km)
Min.
range
(km)
Fuze
TR-122 HE 2.93 65.9 18.4 40 10 PDet
TRB-122 HE/Frag 2.93 65.9 18.4 40 10 Prox
TRK-122 Cluster
(see text below)
3.24 71.6 22.9 30 16 Time
SR-122 HE 2.9 66.6 18.4 20 3 PDet
SRB-122 HE/Frag 2.9 67.1 18.4 20 3 Pros
Cluster (128 AP mines) - - - - -
http://www.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/t122/t122.shtml
Table H.3 Turkish variant of 122 mm ammunition. The cluster warhead contains 50 DPICM
and 6 incendiary bomblets each weighing 280 g with hexogene content
Figure H.2 Chinese warheads for 122 mm. From above: HE with enhanced fragmentation effect
(metal spheres); ordinary HE, and DPICM warhead. ( http://rbase.newfactoria.
ru/search/index7.htm)
Other countries producing equivalent ammunition for 122 mm rockets are shown in the table
below.
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 167
Country Manufacturer Rocket/system name Note
Belarus BelGrad
Bulgaria Vazov Eng. M-21 OF
China Norinco
Sichuan AIC
Type 81
Type 83 (tracked)
Type 83 (wheeled)
Type 89
Type 90A
WS-6
4 types of ammo
Croatia R H ALAN M93 M-21 OF copy
Czech Republic RM-70
RM-70/85
Egypt Heliopolis
Helwan
Saqr copies
Saqr-10 (short 46 kg)
Saqr-18
Saqr-36
PR-111
PR-113
Cargo WH
Smoke D-6000
India ARDE, Pune LRAR 9M22 copy
Iran AMIG Arash
Noor
Arash (long range)
Fadjr 6
9M22 copy
Single tube version
Enlarges motor
Mines payload
Italy Simmel Firos 25
Firos 30
7 types for each
(HE, TP, WP,
prefragmentes, AT
mines, AP mines and
DPICM)
North Korea State factories BM-11 9M22 copy
Pakistan Pak. Ord. Factories
A Q Khan Res. Lab.
Yarmuk
-
9M22 derivate
HE/Frag rocket
Poland Tlocznia MPSA
Presta
Grad
Spall
Platan
9M22 derivate
Airburst
AT mines
M21 HE/Frag
M21-OF HE/FRag
AT mines
Romania APR-21
Serbia Yugoimport-SDPR M88 9M22 derivate
Slovakia Technopol AGAT/JRKK-G
LR (long range)
Trnovik
DPICM bomblets
Aircraft mounted
DPICM bomblets
168 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Country Manufacturer Rocket/system name Note
Synthesia
ZVS Holding
EXP-122
JROF
JROF-K
9M22 derivate
9M22 derivate
Shortened rocket
South Africa Mechem RO 122
68 mm subcalibre
Prefragmented
Training
Turkey Roketsan T-122 Long range version
Ukraine BM-21/KraZ chassis
H.1.4 Other variants
It is known that North-Korea, Belarus, former Yugoslavia, Czech Republic, Iran, Egypt have
produced their own variants of BM-21
H.2 220 mm systems (BM-27 Uragan)
The 9P140 Uragan (previously referred to incorrectly as BM-22 or BM-27) is the world’s first
modern fin and spin-stabilized heavy rocket system. Essentially a scaled-up version of the BM-
21, the 9P140 use many of the same design features. The launcher, the 9T452 transloader, the
rockets, and support equipment constitute the 9K57 complex.
The 9P140 and its transloader are both based on variants of the gasoline-powered ZIL-135LM 8-
ton 8x8 chassis. The truck is unusual in that it uses two engines, each driving the wheels on one
side of the truck, and only the front and rear axles steer. The 9P140 cab has a blast shield that is
raised during firing, and the vehicle is stabilized during firing by two manually emplaced
hydraulic jacks at the rear of the chassis.
The launcher has electrically powered traversing and elevating mechanisms. During travel, the
launcher assembly is oriented rearward and a light sheet metal cover over the muzzle end of the
tubes prevents foreign material from entering the tube. This is a safety feature that is designed for
travel when loaded. There is no such cover for the muzzle end of an unloaded launcher.
The rockets have a maximum velocity of 700 – 800 m/s. The motor is said to burn for 3.18 s, but
the maximum thrust of 58 kN is probably reached at 15 – 2.0 seconds after start.
The ammunition used for Uragan is shown in the table below. Less is known about Uragan than
the other Russian systems
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 169
Type Length
(m)
Weight
(kg)
Min range
(km)
Max.
range
(km)
Content Warhead
9M27F 4.832 280.4 10 35 99 kg HE 9N128 F
9M27K 5.178 271 8.5 34 30 ICM 9N210
9M27K1 270 Cargo 9N128K1
9M27K2 270 AT mines 9N128K2
9M27K3 270 AP mines 9N128K3
9M51 256 FAE 9N515
9M59 5.178 270 10 35 AT mines 9 POM-2
9M27S Incendiary 9N128S
9M27? Chemical
9M27D Leaflets
9F839 Air target
9F689 n/a
unknown 35 SFW
H.3 The MLRS system
In the West, rocket artillery systems were never given a major role in the armies until the mid
1980s. NATO armies shortly tried systems like Honest John in the 50s and 60s, but their role was
quite short-lived. One of the main drawbacks of the Honest John system was its lack of accuracy.
It simply could not be used if the wind in the launch area exceeded a certain level, as a strong
wind during the boost phase would result in a very unpredictable hit point.
This situation changed in the 1980, when the defensive NATO doctrine shifted towards increased
emphasize on the defeat of second echelon forces. This strategy was especially expressed by the
SACEUR, general Bernhard Rogers. The MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System), which had
been planned since the early 1970[51] got a pivot role in this strategy.
The MLRS was, with the possible exception of the German LARS (Light Army Rocket System)
the first NATO MRL in earnest and with a capacity to deliver a wide variety of warheads.
The first combat test of MLRS took place during the Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) in
Kuwait in 1991. There is hardly any doubt that MLRS made a devastating effect on enemy forces,
but the conflict lasted to short to be called a comprehensive test of the systems. In the aftermath
the problems of the dud from the ammunition left in Kuwait was said to create more casualties
among EOD forces than among enemy soldiers.
170 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
After the Gulf War there were many plans to develop a number of alternative warheads for
MLRS in addition to the cluster warhead and the anti-tank mine warheads developed so far. The
development plans included
- Sensor Fuzed Warheads (SFW)
- Terminally Guided Warheads (TGW)
- BAT (Brilliant Anti-Tank submunitions)
- cluster warheads with improved bomblets
- Unitary warheads
- Guided rockets
Programs for guided versions of MLRS have been conducted in Israel, USA, Switzerland,
Germany and Taiwan. Only Israel and USA are known to have a guided system in operation. That
system in base on radio frequency ground tracking and is supposed to have an accuracy of 70 –
120 m. The other programs were supposed to give an accuracy of 50 m based in GPS and INS
technology. [54]
The first three of these programs were terminated in the late 1990 with reaching the beyond the
prototype level. However, the last three have been completed.
The current MLRS ammunition currently includes the following rockets
Rocket Warhead Submunition Calibre Range
M26 Cargo 644 M77 227 mm 31.5 km
M26A1 Cargo 518 M77 227 mm 45 km
M26A2 Cargo 518 M85 227 mm 45 km
AT-2 AT mines 28 AT-2 237 mm 37.5 km
M28A1 Training 227 mm 14.3 km
FZ204 Training - 70 mm 9.05 km
M30 (guided) DPICM 404 M101 227 mm 70 km
M31 (guided) Unitary 82 kg warhead 227 mm 85 km
Source [55]
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 171
As an example, the following table shows the sequence of events for the M26 MLRS rocket from
ignition to ground impact
Time Event
-17 ms Igniter squib fired by FCS
0 Shear bolts break (first motion)
12 ms Forward tube cover impact
13 ms Fin restraint delay device initiated (500 ms delay)
25 ms External umbilical connector separation
85 ms Sabot separation (free flight)
130 ms Nozzle exits tube
250 ms Fuze timer active
513 ms Fin restraint device release
535 Fins deployed and locked
1000 ms Fuze mechanical arming
1500 ms Motor web burn-out
7300 ms Complete burn-out
WHE - 3400 ms Fuze electrical arming
WHE Warhead event – payload ejection
WHE + ~15 s Payload ground impact
H.3.1 610 mm ATACMS
ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) is the American the counterpart to the Russian FROG
and other tactical missiles. It uses the same M270 launcher as MLRS and can be considered as a
MLRS-munition. The rockets have a calibre of 610 mm and are fired from a pod that externally is
the same as the ordinary MLRS pod. Instead of 6 rockets, the ATACMS pod contains a single
rocket. The rocket is guided.
Currently, three different types of rockets are on the market as shown below
Rocket Warhead Submunition Calibre Range
Block I Cargo 970 M73 610 mm
Block IA Cargo M73 610 mm
Unitary HE - 610 mm
172 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
H.4 300 mm systems (Smerch)
This is the largest and most complex of the Russian systems, and is superior to the other systems
in terms of range, size and accuracy.
The system, called 9A52 or 9A52-2, is placed on an MAZ 8 x 8 wheeled special vehicle weighing
44 tons. There are two sets of ammunition available. The original set had a range of 70 km, while
the new set has a range of 90 km. The minimum range is 20 – 25 km. The vehicle has 12 tubes
that can be elevated up to 55°. The rockets have a weight of 800 – 815 kg, of which 240 kg
constitutes the warhead. The rocket is believed to reach a velocity of 1030 m/s after around 3
seconds of flight.
At 90 km, a guided rocket is a prerequisite. At the Smerch this is implemented as small nozzles at
each side of the tip of the rocket. The principle for guidance is not known, but it is probably an
inertial systems. The accuracy is claimed to be 0.21%, which translates to 190 m at 90 km range.
This is considerably better than unguided systems.
The Chinese A-100 systems are probably built with Smerch as a model.
The table below shows the ammunitions available for this system
Type Weight( kg) Content
9M55F 820 He/Frag 1100 frags 50 g ea
9M55K 800 ICM 72 9N235
9M55K1 800 SFW 5 Motiv-3M
9M55K3 800 AP mines 64 POM-2
9M55K4 800 AT mines 24 PTM-3
9M55K5 800 DPICM 646 or 588 (2 var)
9M55K6 800 SFW 5 9N268
9M55K7 800 SFW 20 SPBE
9M55S 800 TBX 100 kg HE
9M525 815 ICM 72 9N235 (8 9N139 subcontainers)
9M526 815 SFW 5 Motiv-3M
9M527 815 AT mines 25 PTM-3
9M528 815 HE/Frag 800 frags 5 g ea
9M529 815 TBX 100 kg HE
9M530 815 AS* 75 kg HE
9M531 815 DPICM 646 or 588 (2 var)
9M532 815 SFW 20 9N282
9M533 815 SFW 5 9N268
9M534 815 Drone “Kipchak”
9M536 815 ICM 20 POBE
9M537 815 ICM 32 OBE NP
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 173
AS – anti structural (penetrator)
Submunition used in Smerch
Type Name Mass
(kg)
Length
(mm)
Diam.(mm) HE
mass
(kg)
SD* time Remarks
ICM 9N235 1.75 263 69 0.32 110 s
ICM POBE 2 800 40 0.6 70 mm steel
pen.
ICM OBE NP 4.5 215 114 0.9
DPICM KOBE 0.24 118/128 43 0.35/0.46 130 – 260
s
120 mm steel
pen.
SFW Motiv-3M 15 185 4.5 70 mm steel
pen.
SFW 9N282
Gnom
6.7 307.5 114 110 s 70 mm steel
pen.
SFW 9N268 17.3 384 185 5.8 70 mm steel
pen.
AP mine POM-2 180 63 0.13 4 – 100 h
AT mine PTM-3 4.85 330 84 1.85 16 – 24 h
*) SD = Self-Destruct device
Cluster munition delivered with Smerch is dispersed over an area of 40 hectares.
174 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Appendix I Distribution of rocket artillery
This list is based on different sources, but mostly on Jane’s. However, even different sources
from Jane’s do not always match. Other sources may deviate substantially. The list below or what
seems to be the most probable one. Apart from Jane’s, it is mainly based on Wikipedia pages and
the home pages of the respective armies.
Country Systems
Abkhazia 7 BM-21; S-8
Afghanistan BM-21; 18 BM-27; BM-24
Albania Type 63
Algeria 50 BM-21; 50 BM-14; 30 BM-2412; 18 BM-30
Angola 50 BM-21; 40 RM-70
Argentina Pampero; VCLC-CAL
Armenia 50 BM-21; 4 WM-80; KRL-122
Azerbaijan 63 BM-21; 3 LAR-160; 2 TR-107; 3 MAR-350; 12 BM-30; 3 OTR-
21; Lynx
Bahrain Astros II; 9 MLRS (incl ATACMS)
Bangladesh KRL 122 / Type 90B; Type 82
Belarus 208 BM-21; 84 BM-27; 48 BM-30; 36 OTR-21; FROG
Bosnia- Herzegovina 2 BM-21; S-5; M94 Plamen-S; 7 M-77 Oganj; 1 M-87 Orkan; FROG;
Brazil 20 Astros II; SBAT-70; 108-R
Bulgaria 350 BM-21; 18 OTR-21
Burkina Faso 4-6 Type 63
Burundi 10 BM-21
Cambodia 8 BM-21; 10 BM-14; BM-13; Type 63
Central African Rep. 5 BM-21
Chad 5 BM-21
Chile 8 Famae Rayo (LAR-160)
China WS-1B; Type 63; Type 81; Type 70; Type 90; WS-1A; A-100; Type-
82; Type-83/WN-40; Type 85/YW 306; WS-2; (WM-80);
3500 in total
Congo DR 30 Type 63
Congo Rep 6 BM-21; BM-14
Croatia 36 BM-21; 8 M-91 Vulkan; 2 M-95 Tajfun; 68 RAK-12; 4 M87
Orkan; 4 M63 Plamen; M77 Oganj; LOV RAK 24/128
Cuba 250 BM-21; BM-14; FROG
Cyprus 18 BM-21; 24 M63 Plamen
12 http://www.country-data.com/frd/cs/algeria/dz_appen.html
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 175
Country Systems
Czech Rep 60 RM-70
Denmark 12 MLRS (out of service)
Djibouti BM-21
Ecuador 6 RM-75; BM-21
Egypt 96 BM-11; 24 BM-13; 215 BM-21; 48 BM-24; PR-113: 120 Saqr-4;
48 Saqr-8; 50 Saqr-10; 72 Sakr-18; 130 Saqr-30; 50 Sakr-36; 48
FROG; 46 MLRS; 60 Saqr-80
Eritrea 25 BM-21
Ethiopia 10 BM-21; BMD-20
Finland 36 Rakh 89 (RM-70/85); Rakh 91; Rakh 07; 22 MLRS
France 55 MLRS
Gabon 8 Teruel, 16 Type 63
Georgia 150 BM-21; 135 RM-70; 15 GRADLAR-160; 12 M63 Plamen
Germany 72 MLRS (MARS)
Greece 116 RM-70; 36 MLRS, ATACMS
Guinea 2 BM-27
Hamas/Fatah Qassam 1; Qassam-2; Qassam-3; al-Quds; al-Nasser; Saria-2; Kafah;
BM-21;
Hizbollah BM-21; Grad-P; BM-24; Zelzal (B302); Fajr-3; Fajr-5; Thunder 1
Hungary 56 BM-21; FROG (uncertain)
India 150+ BM-21; 38 BM-30; 80 Pinaka
Indonesia 24 BM-14; 9 RM-70; FZ Lau-97
Iran 64 BM-21¸ Haseb, Arash; Noor; Fajr-2/3/5, Shahin II, Fajr-5/6/7;
Hwasong-5; Shahab-1/2/3/4/5/6; Ml 2; ML 4; Zelzal-2; WS-1; OSS-
8; Nazeat; 20 BM-11; 50 Hadid/Azrash/Nur; 100 Type-63, Type-81;
Falaq-1/2; Samid, Oghab, Tondar-69
Iraq Had a very rich and varied inventory prior to 2003. None seems to be
kept in the current forces.
Israel 50 LAR-160; 20 Mar-290; 86 MLRS; 36 BM-24; 58 BM-21
Italy 22 MLRS; Firos 30
Japan 90 MLRS
Jordan Type 63
Kazakhstan 190 BM-21; 130 BM-27; 220 Type 63; 13 M1985 (BM-21 variant);
80 BM-14
Kenya 35 BM-21
Kuwait 27 BM-30
Kyrgyzistan 21 BM-21
Lebanon 25 BM-21; 5 BM-11; FROG
Libya 400 BM-21; 200 RM-70; 300 Type-63
Macedonia 6 BM-21; 15 M63 Plamen
176 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Country Systems
Malaysia 36 Astros II
Mali 2 BM-21
Mexico Firos 6
Moldova 15 BM-27
Morocco 36 BM-21
Mozambique 5 BM-21
Myanmar 30 Type 63; RM-70
Namibia 5 BM-21
Nicaragua 30 BM-21, 33 Type-63 (JAA)
Nigeria 11 BM-21
North Korea BM-21; BM-11; BMD-20; FROG; Hwasong-5/6, Rodong-1;
2000 in total
Norway 12 MLRS (out of service)
Oman 27 BM-30 (uncertain)
Pakistan Type 81; 36 A-100; 45 Type 83 (Azer)
Peru 14 BM-21
Poland 219 BM-21; 30 RM-70/85; 4 OTR-21; 6 WR-40
Qatar 4 Astros II
Romania 128 APR-40; 24 LAROM; FROG
Russia 1750 BM-21; 106 BM-30; 675 BM-27; TOS-1; 140 OTR-21;
Iskander
Rwanda 5 RM-70 (uncertain)
Saudi Arabia 60 Astros II
Serbia 100 M-63 Plamen; M-77 Oganj; 1 M-87 Orkan; M71; Kosava; 18
M94 Plamen-S (modified M77)
Singapore 18 HIMARS
Slovakia 87 RM-70/85; FROG
Somalia Light systems (up to 122 mm) are believed to be possessed by nonstate-
parties
Somaliland (northern
Somalia)
74 BM-21; BM-13; BM-14; BM-24
South-Africa 60 Valkiri; Bateleur; RO 68
South Korea 156 Kooryong (K136); 96 MLRS, 29 ATACMS
South Ossetia BM-21
Spain 14 Teruel
Sri Lanka BM-21; 24 RM-70
Sudan 22 BM-21; 400 Type 63; WS-2
Syria 280 BM-21; 200 Type 63; 18 OTR-21; FROG
Tadjikistan 10 BM-21
Taiwan RT-2000; 117 mm KF-VI; 126 mm KF-IV
FFI-rapport 2009/00179 177
Country Systems
Taliban BM-13; BM-14; BM-21; BM-2213
Tanzania 50 BM-21
Thailand 60 130 mm Type 82
Turkmenistan 86 BM-21; 54 BM-27; 6 BM-30
Turkey TOROS-230A; TOROS 260A; 24 MLRS (incl 72 ATACMS); 100+
TR-107; 100+ T-122; 100+ T-300Kasirga (WS1A/B)
UAE 6 MLRS (incl ATACMS); 73 Firos 25; 6 BM-30; 48 BM-21; 20
HIMARS; 18 LAU-97
Uganda 6 RM-70; Type 63
UK 36 MLRS
Ukraine 450 BM-21; 76 BM-27; 100 BM-30; S-5M1; S-8M; 50 Frog; 90
OTR-21
Uruguay 5 RM-70
US 857 MLRS; ATACMS; 60 HIMARS;
Uzbekistan 49 BM-27; 60 BM-21
Venezuela 20 LAR-160
Vietnam 800 BM-21; 500 BM-13; 700 BM-14
Yemen 280 BM-21; 14 BM-14; 35 BM-24; 13 BM-27; 30 BM-13; RM-70;
12 FROG-7; 10 OTR-21
Zambia 30 BM-21
Zimbabwe 60 RM-70/85, 18 Type 63; 25 BM-21
13 http://www.fas.org/terrorism/str/index.html
178 FFI-rapport 2009/00179
Appendix J Country abbreviations
AFG Afghanistan GEO Georgia POL Poland
ALB Albania GER Germany PRC China
ALG Algeria GRE Greece PRK North Korea
ANG Angola GUI Guinea (Conakry) QAT Qatar
ARG Argentina INA Indonesia ROC Taiwan
ARM Armenia IND India ROK South Korea
AUT Austria IRN Iran ROM Romania
AZB Azerbaijan IRQ Iraq RSA South Africa
BAH Bahrain ISL Israel RUS Russia
BDE Bangladesh ITA Italy RWA Rwanda
BEL Belgium JAP Japan SER Serbia
BIH Bosnia – Herzegov. JOR Jordan SIN Singapore
BLR Belarus KAZ Kazakhstan SLK Slovakia
BRA Brazil KEN Kenya SOM Somalia
BUF Burkina Faso KSA Saudi-Arabia SOV Soviet Union
BUL Bulgaria KUW Kuwait SPA Spain
BUR Burundi KYR Kyrgizia SRI Sri Lanka
CAR Central African Rep. LEB Lebanon SUD Sudan
CHA Chad LIB Libya SYR Syria
CHL Chile MAC Macedonia TAD Tadzhikistan
CMB Cambodia MEX Mexico TAN Tanzania
CON Congo (Brazzaville) MLA Malaysia THA Thailand
CRO Croatia MLI Mali TRM Turkmenistan
CUB Cuba MNG Montenegro TUR Turkey
CYP Cyprus MOL Moldova UAE United Arab Emirates
CZE Czech Rep. MOR Morocco UGA Uganda
DEN Denmark MOZ Mozambique UK United Kingdom
DJI Djibouti MYA Burma UKR Ukraine
DRC Congo (Kinshasa) NAM Namibia URU Uruguay
ECU Ecuador NED Netherlands US United States
EGY Egypt NIC Nicaragua UZB Uzbekistan
ERI Eritrea NIG Nigeria VEN Venezuela
ETI Ethiopia NOR Norway VIE Vietnam
FIN Finland OMA Oman YEM Yemen
FRA France PAK Pakistan ZAM Zambia
GAB Gabon PER Peru ZIM Zimbabwe
None-state parties and areas that are not generally acknowledged as states
ABK Abkhazia (GEO) HEZ Hezbollah (LEB) SOS South Ossetia (GEO)
HAM Hamas (Palestine) SML Somaliland (Somalia) TLB Taliban (AFG, PAK)
Annex 492
Bertrand Perrin, “L’incrimination du financement du terrorisme en droits canadien et suisse,”
42 Revue générale de droit 1 (2012)

Annex 493
Ben Saul, International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, United Nations Audiovisual
Library of International Law (2014)

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INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES
By Ben Saul*
Professor of International Law
University of Sydney, Australia
1. Historical Context
The impetus for the negotiation of the International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages (“Hostages Convention”) was the proliferation of hostage-taking in
the 1970s. In September 1976, the Federal Republic of Germany (“Germany”) proposed
that the drafting of a convention to address the problem should be included on the
agenda of the thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly.1 Hostages
had recently been taken at the German Embassy in Sweden in April 1975, resulting in
the loss of two lives. Other prominent seizures of hostages around that time included an
incident at the Vienna headquarters of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) in December 1975 and an aircraft hijacking at Entebbe airport in
Uganda in June 1976.2
In explaining its proposal for a convention, Germany stated that hostage-taking
for any purpose was “abhorrent and inhuman”, and “absolutely intolerable and
incompatible with universally accepted standards of human conduct”.3 It was said to
infringe basic values upheld by the United Nations, namely the dignity and fundamental
rights of every individual, including the rights to life, liberty and security of person in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).4 Germany further warned that hostage-taking
threatened international peace and transnational relations.5
While hostage-taking was already prohibited under international humanitarian
law,6 including as a war crime,7 there was not yet any international instrument
addressing hostage-taking outside armed conflict. Nor did the few existing “sectoral”
anti-terrorism conventions adequately address the problem, since they were confined to
specific contexts such as aircraft safety or harm to internationally protected persons.8
Other norms of general international law too were insufficient; for instance, rules on the
inviolability of diplomatic premises and personnel did not cover other victims,
criminalise the perpetrators, or impose obligations directly on non-State actors for
whom no State can be held responsible.
* The author expresses appreciation to Ms. Kate Bones and Ms. Kathleen Heath for their assistance.
1 A/31/242.
2 Joseph Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law: A Commentary on the Hostages Convention 1979
(Cambridge, Grotius Publications, 1990), pp. 2-3.
3 A/31/242, para. 5.
4 Ibid., para. 5.
5 Ibid., para. 1.
6 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, article 34 (in international armed
conflicts); Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions, article 75(2)(c) and (e) (in international conflicts);
four Geneva Conventions of 1949, common article 3(1)(b) (non-international armed conflicts); and Additional Protocol
II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions, article 4(2)(c) (non-international conflicts).
7 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, article 146, and Additional
Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions, article 85(5) (both concerning international conflicts); subsequent to the
Hostages Convention, see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 8(2)(a)(viii) and (c)(iii).
8 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970; Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971; and Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 1973.
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The General Assembly referred the German proposal to the Sixth Committee,9
which recommended establishing an ad hoc committee (of 35 State members) to draft a
convention, and the General Assembly agreed in a resolution of 15 December 1976.10
The creation of a new committee was in part designed to avoid the ideological deadlock
which had developed in the existing Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism,
established in 1972 and in place until 1979, over the definition of “terrorism” (including
“State terrorism”), its causes, and debate over the legitimacy of national liberation
violence. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages met in three sessions in 1977, 1978 and 1979.11
Hostage-taking persisted during the negotiations, further emphasising the need
for a convention. Incidents included the hijackings of a German airliner to Somalia in
1977 and an Egyptian aircraft to Cyprus in 1978, as well as the protracted occupation of
the United States Embassy in Tehran from November 1979 to January 1981.12 Attention
was also drawn to hostage-taking in armed conflict during the contemporaneous
negotiations on Additional Protocols I and II to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,
both adopted in 1977.13
2. Significant Developments in the Negotiating History
The drafting of the convention proceeded on the basis of a German working paper
(“Working Paper”).14 The proposal deliberately avoided reference to the politicized term
“terrorism”.15 Instead, the Working Paper modelled the draft convention on the existing
sectoral anti-terrorism conventions, which strongly influenced the negotiations and the
final instrument.
Some States felt that a convention should fill the gaps in and supplement the
existing legal framework without duplicating, disturbing or derogating from existing
instruments, including the sectoral treaties and the Geneva Conventions.16 However, no
provision was ultimately included in the Hostages Convention concerning its
relationship with other sectoral treaties.17 Article 12 provides only that the Convention
shall not apply to certain hostage-taking in armed conflicts covered by international
humanitarian law.
The essential elements of hostage-taking were relatively uncontentious in the
drafting. The most contested issue was whether the convention should apply to national
liberation movements which, depending on how one approaches the issue, is a question
of either definition or an exception to the definition. Many African and Eastern-bloc
States preferred that the convention not apply to national liberation movements, as it
“must above all protect the rights of a people which engaged in violent action against
colonialist, racist, alien régimes in order to regain its legitimate rights or redress an
injustice which it had suffered”.18 On this view, it was essential that a convention did
not delegitimize national liberation movements19 or impede their struggle for self-
9 A/31/430.
10 General Assembly resolution 31/103 of 15 December 1976.
11 Its mandate was renewed in General Assembly resolutions 32/148 and 33/19.
12 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1980, p. 3.
13 Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions, article 75(2)(c) and (e) and article 85(5) (in international
conflicts); and Additional Protocol II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions, article 4(2)(c).
14 A/AC.188/L.3, reproduced in A/32/39, annex II.
15 See Clive Aston, “The United Nations Convention Against the Taking of Hostages: Realistic or Rhetoric?”, in British
Perspectives on Terrorism, Paul Wilkinson, ed. (Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 139-140.
16 A/32/39, p. 20 (Mexico), p. 22 (Canada), p. 54 (France) and p. 35 (Lesotho).
17 A/34/39, p. 18.
18 A/32/39, p. 30 (Algeria).
19 Ibid., p. 28 (Yugoslavia) and p. 35 (United Republic of Tanzania).
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determination.20 On the other hand, Western States insisted that the convention should
apply to all hostage-taking, since such violence was “inadmissible in all cases” and no
matter how just or noble the cause.21
The controversy reopened a debate which had apparently been settled with
adoption of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977, which
absolutely prohibit hostage-taking “at any time and in any place whatsoever, whether
committed by civilian or by military agents”.22 Self-determination movements too were
covered by those prohibitions, whether as parties to an international conflict (under
Additional Protocol I) or in non-international conflicts (under Additional Protocol II).
Some of the States which supported the Additional Protocols nonetheless argued for a
liberation exception in the context of a hostages convention.
There was thus a proposal to exclude from the definition of hostage-taking “any
act or acts carried out in the process of national liberation against colonial rule, racist or
foreign régimes, by liberation movements recognized by the United Nations or regional
organisations”.23 Germany expressed concern that such an exception “would be
interpreted as relieving liberation movements of their obligations under international
law”.24
A related suggestion introduced the concept of the “innocent hostage”,25 which
implied a subjective distinction between innocent and “guilty” captives, with only the
former entitled to protection. The suggestion did not gain wide support. A further
proposal defined hostage-taking as “the seizure or detention, not only of a person or
persons, but also of masses under colonial, racist or foreign domination”,26 but this
definition, aimed at the conceptually different harm of State colonial repression, also did
not attract support.
The impasse over liberation movements was resolved in part through a procedural
move at the second session of the Ad Hoc Committee to establish two working groups,
the first to examine “thornier questions” (including national liberation),27 and the second
to consider less controversial matters.28 Working Group I eventually secured the
agreement of many developing and developed States alike that, regardless of the cause,
“no one should be granted an open licence for taking hostages”.29
Such consensus was achieved partly because of an apparent concession, in article
12, to exclude from the application of the Convention certain hostage-taking in armed
conflicts “in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien
occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of selfdetermination”.
30 Such exclusion does not, however, imply that hostage-taking by
liberation movements is permitted, but only that it is dealt with by international
humanitarian law rather than the Convention when humanitarian law imposes a
prosecute or extradite obligation. It remains an offence for “any” person to commit
hostage-taking under article 1 of the Convention and there is no exception for any actor
(State or non-State) or cause, including liberation movements in peacetime or in armed
20 Ibid., p. 76 (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya).
21 Ibid., p. 55 (United States of America) and p. 20 (France).
22 Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions, article 75(2)(c).
23 A/AC.188/L.5, reproduced in A/32/39, annex II (United Republic of Tanzania and Lesotho, later joined by Algeria,
Egypt, Guinea, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Nigeria).
24 A/32/39, p. 70 (Federal Republic of Germany).
25 A/C.6/31/SR.58; and A/32/39, p. 27 (Jordan), p. 36 (United Republic of Tanzania) and p. 38 (Egypt).
26 A/AC.188/L.9, reproduced in A/32/39, p. 112 (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya).
27 A/33/39, pp. 5 and 56.
28 Ibid., p. 7.
29 Ibid., p. 5.
30 Based on a Mexican proposal in 1977: A/AC.188/L.6, reproduced in A/32/39, annex II.
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conflicts where hostage-taking is not covered by an obligation to prosecute or extradite
under humanitarian law.31
Another contested issue in the drafting concerned the transboundary use of force
to rescue hostages, in the wake of a controversial Israeli operation at Entebbe, Uganda,
in 1976. A number of African and Arab States insisted that “States shall not resort to the
threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or independence of
other States as a means of rescuing hostages”.32 Other States felt that such a provision
was unnecessary.33 An article was eventually adopted based on compromise language
proposed by the Syrian Arab Republic in 1977.34 Article 14 provides that the
Convention itself cannot authorise the use of force. It does not, however, preclude or
alter the application of the international law on self-defence, insofar as that law may
apply to hostage rescue situations.35
Also contentious was a proposal by Mexico, supported by other Latin American
States, that the convention should not impair the right of asylum.36 Some Western States
objected that such a provision was unnecessary because States enjoyed the right to
choose between extradition or local prosecution, and so retained the option of granting
asylum.37 Working Group I was unable to agree on the issue; it was resolved later by a
Sixth Committee working group in 1979, though some Latin American States were
dissatisfied with the final article.38 Article 15 preserves the right of asylum under
“Treaties on Asylum”. Also, the Convention does not require States to treat hostagetaking
as extraditable non-political offences, despite proposals from some States that it
should.39
In relation to the obligation to prosecute under article 7, the Netherlands
suggested that prosecution should only be required if extradition were refused, since it
would be unreasonable to expect the State of custody to prosecute if no other State,
including the State in which the offence was committed, wished to prosecute.40 It was
objected that such a provision could create a loophole in the system and that a “no safe
haven” approach should be preferred,41 and the qualification was not included.42
A proposal to widen jurisdiction under article 5, to allow member States of an
international organisation subject to demands by hostage-takers to assert jurisdiction,43
was not adopted.44 It was pointed out that if the United Nations was subjected to
demands, virtually every State would have jurisdiction over the offence.45 A different
French proposal to permit passive personality jurisdiction was also debated but
eventually included.46 It was not, however, agreed to recognise jurisdiction over serious
violent acts related to hostage-taking offences.47
31 On such circumstances, see Lambert, op. cit., pp. 263-298.
32 A/AC.188/L.7, reproduced in A/32/39, annex II, and A/32/39, p. 62 (United Republic of Tanzania).
33 A/34/39, p. 7.
34 A/AC.188/L.11, reproduced in A/32/39, annex II.
35 On which, see Lambert, op. cit., pp. 316-322. The question was not before the Court in relation to United States
rescue operation in Iran: see Tehran Hostages case, op. cit., paras. 93-94.
36 A/AC.188/L.6, reproduced in A/32/39, annex II; and A/32/39, p. 21 (Mexico).
37 A/32/39, p. 53 (United States of America) and p. 93 (Federal Republic of Germany).
38 A/C.6/34/SR.62, p. 5 (Ecuador, Venezuela) and p. 12 (Cuba).
39 A/C.6/31/SR.55, p. 9 (Australia).
40 A/32/39, p. 89 (Netherlands) and A/AC.188/L.14, reproduced in A/32/39, annex II.
41 A/32/39, p. 89 (United States of America) and p. 93 (Federal Republic of Germany).
42 Ibid., p. 16.
43 A/AC.188/L.3, reproduced in A/32/39, annex II A.
44 A/33/39, p. 10 and A/AC.188/L.14, reproduced in A/32/39, annex II L.
45 A/32/39, p. 78 (Mexico). For the debate, see also A/32/39, p. 84 (United States of America), pp. 84-85 (Japan), p. 93
(Federal Republic of Germany); A/33/39, p. 39 (Netherlands), p. 40 (United Kingdom) and p. 44 (Canada).
46A/34/39, p. 12. For the debate, see A/33/39, p. 39 (Netherlands) and A/AC.188/L.13, reproduced in A/32/39, annex II.
47 A/33/39, p. 39 (Netherlands) and A/34/39, p. 12.
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In relation to penalties for hostage-taking under article 2 of the Convention, there
was debate about whether penalties should be “severe” or “appropriate”48 in order to
sufficiently punish and deter offenders. The compromise was to require “appropriate
penalties [for the offences] which take into account their grave nature”.49 A proposal for
mitigation of penalties where hostages were voluntarily released was contentious and
not accepted.50
The draft convention concluded by the Ad Hoc Committee was submitted to the
General Assembly,51 which referred it to the Sixth Committee. The draft was considered
by a working group comprised of the same States that had constituted the Ad Hoc
Committee,52 and then by the Sixth Committee between 27 November and 7 December
1979. The General Assembly adopted the Convention without a vote on 17 December
1979, annexed to resolution 34/146. The Convention was opened for signature at New
York on 18 December 1979. The Convention entered into force on 3 June 1983.
3. Summary of Key Provisions
The preamble to the Hostages Convention declares that “the taking of hostages is
an offence of grave concern to the international community”. It also highlights the
Convention’s role in furthering the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations in maintaining international peace and security and promoting friendly relations
and co-operation among States; and in securing the rights to life, liberty and security of
person as recognised in the UDHR and ICCPR. While the preamble also describes “all
acts of taking of hostages as manifestations of international terrorism”, it is clear from
the definition of offences in article 1 that hostage-taking is an offence even if it involves
compulsion for private rather than political purposes.53
Article 1 of the Hostages Convention defines the offences of hostage-taking,
attempted hostage-taking, and complicity in hostage-taking. There is, however, no
offence of threatening to commit hostage-taking.54 According to article 1, paragraph 1,
the offence of hostage-taking is committed by:
Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to
detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the “hostage”) in order to compel a third
party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or
juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit
or implicit condition for the release of the hostage …
There is no requirement that force be used to take hostages as long as force is
threatened. Article 2 requires States parties to make the above offences “punishable [in
domestic criminal law] by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave
nature of those offences”.
There are two important limitations on the scope of application of the offences.
First, the Convention only applies to hostage-taking which has a transnational element
and does not apply to purely domestic acts. Thus article 13 provides that the Convention
“shall not apply where the offence is committed within a single State, the hostage and
the alleged offender are nationals of that State and the alleged offender is found in the
territory of that State”.
48 A/32/39, p. 80 (Netherlands), p. 85 (Denmark) and p. 92 (Federal Republic of Germany).
49 A/33/39, p. 9 and A/34/39, p. 11.
50 A/AC.188/L.8, reproduced in A/32/39, annex II; and A/33/39, p. 30 (United Kingdom), p. 31 (Sweden) and p. 32
(United States of America).
51 A/34/39.
52 A/C.6/34/L.12.
53 See United States v. Rodriguez 587 F.3d 573 (2d Cir 2009).
54 Lambert, op. cit., p. 83.
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Secondly, pursuant to article 12, the Convention does not apply to hostage-taking
committed in armed conflicts governed by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its
Additional Protocols of 1977, where such laws already require States “to prosecute or
hand over the hostage-taker”. The Hostages Convention could still apply to hostagetaking
by liberation movements committed in armed conflicts involving a State not
party to Additional Protocol I, since then only common article 3 of the four Geneva
Conventions would apply and it does not impose a prosecute or extradite obligation.
States must establish prescriptive jurisdiction over the offences in accordance
with article 5, which invokes the territoriality, nationality, passive personality, and
(treaty-based) universality principles. Specifically, mandatory jurisdiction must be
established by a State in relation to offences committed (i) in its territory or on board a
ship or aircraft registered in that State; (ii) by its nationals; (iii) to compel the State to do
or abstain from doing any act; or (iv) where the offender is present in the State’s
territory and the State declines to extradite. In addition, a State may optionally establish
jurisdiction over stateless persons who are habitually resident in its territory, or where a
hostage is a national of the State. The Convention does not, however, prioritize or
otherwise resolve valid competing jurisdictional claims by different States.
The Convention is built around the “extradite or prosecute” (aut dedere aut
judicare) principle that is common to many of the sectoral anti-terrorism conventions.
As a first step, under article 6 a State has a duty to apprehend an alleged offender in its
territory, to facilitate prosecution or extradition, and the State must conduct a
preliminary inquiry into the facts. States parties must also afford one another “the
greatest measure of assistance” in connection with criminal proceedings, including by
supplying all necessary evidence (article 11, paragraph 1).
Under article 8, paragraph 1, if the State of custody does not extradite the alleged
offender, “without exception whatsoever” it must submit the case to its competent
authorities for prosecution. It is not, therefore, a duty to prosecute, but a duty to consider
prosecution “in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a grave nature
under the law of that State”. The Convention does not establish any priority between
local prosecution or extradition.
In either case article 8, paragraph 2, recognises a suspect’s right to be “guaranteed
fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings”, including “all the rights” under local law.
Persons taken into custody also enjoy a right to communicate with the nearest
representative of their State of nationality or habitual residence (article 6, paragraph 3).
A State claiming jurisdiction is also entitled to invite the International Committee of the
Red Cross to communicate with and visit the alleged offender (article 6, paragraph 5).
The Convention facilitates extradition by deeming the Convention’s offences as
extraditable offences in any existing extradition treaty between States parties (article 10,
paragraph 1). States parties also undertake to include such offences in every extradition
treaty concluded between them. Where no extradition treaty exists between relevant
States, the requested State may elect to treat the Hostages Convention as the legal basis
for extradition (article 10, paragraph 2). The Convention may also serve as the basis for
extradition where national law does not require an extradition treaty (article 10,
paragraph 3). Article 10, paragraph 4, provides that the Convention’s offences shall be
treated as if they had been committed not only in the place they occurred but also in the
territories of States required to establish their jurisdiction by the Convention.
National law continues to govern the preconditions of extradition to the extent not
modified by the Convention. Thus, for instance, States which refuse to extradite their
nationals may continue not to do so; or States could still insist on satisfaction of the
“specialty” rule (namely, that an extradited person can only be extradited to face the
charge for which extradition was requested). The State must then submit the case for
prosecution.
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The Convention contains important safeguards in respect of extradition. An
extradition request must be refused if it was made for the purpose of prosecuting or
punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political
opinion, or if the person’s position would be prejudiced for such reasons; or if a person
cannot communicate with the State entitled to diplomatically protect him or her (article
9, paragraph 1).
Unlike a few later sectoral anti-terrorism treaties, the Hostages Convention does
not “depoliticise” its offences by requiring States not to treat it as a non-extraditable
“political offence” under national law.55 Article 15 expressly preserves the right of
asylum under the “Treaties on Asylum”, as between States parties to those treaties. The
asylum treaties are not specified and it is unclear whether it also includes the Refugee
Convention of 1951.56
It is therefore conceivable that the extradition of an alleged offender may be
refused on the basis that the conduct constitutes a “political offence” under national
extradition and/or asylum law. The case must still then be submitted to the competent
local authorities for prosecution. National legal systems may then take the political
nature of the offence into account in various ways, such as in exercising the discretion
whether to prosecute or in mitigation in sentencing.
The Convention contains various procedural obligations in relation to the
criminal process. A State must notify affected States, through the United Nations
Secretary-General, where an alleged offender is taken into custody (article 6, paragraph
2) and of the results of an investigation (article 6, paragraph 6). The final outcome of a
prosecution must also be communicated to the Secretary-General for transmission to
concerned States and international organisations (article 7).
Certain humanitarian considerations are addressed by the Convention. The State
in which the hostage is held “shall take all measures it considers appropriate to ease the
situation of the hostage, in particular, to secure his release and, after his release, to
facilitate, when relevant, his departure” (article 3, paragraph 1). The property of
hostages must also be returned as soon as possible (article 3, paragraph 2).
The Convention thus accords a discretion to States in choosing how to respond to
hostage-taking, conceivably extending from negotiation at one end of the spectrum to
forcible measures of rescue at the other. While some States refuse to negotiate with
terrorists or to pay ransoms as a matter of policy, the Convention neither requires nor
prohibits either step.57 Even granting immunity from prosecution may not be ruled out,
as in the case of the Achille Lauro hijacking in 1986.58 Any response must, however,
comply with other relevant international laws, including human rights law and United
Nations counter-terrorism financing obligations.59
Other States are prohibited, however, from taking forcible action to rescue
hostages in the territory of another State without that State’s consent. Article 14 thus
provides that “[n]othing in this Convention shall be construed as justifying the violation
of the territorial integrity or political independence of a State in contravention of the
Charter of the United Nations”. That provision does not affect, however, the application
55 See also Lambert, op. cit., p. 233.
56 Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention excludes from refugee status a person in relation to whom there are serious
reasons for considering he or she has committed a serious non-political crime. Some acts of hostage-taking may thus be
regarded as non-political under both international refugee law and certain national extradition laws. Criminal law
defences must still be considered, such as pleas of duress or necessity which mitigate responsibility for an offence.
57 The European Court of Human Rights has also recognised the discretion of States in their choice of response: see
Finogenov and others v. Russia [2011] ECHR 2234 (20 December 2011), para. 223.
58 Lambert, op. cit., pp. 113-116.
59 See, e.g., Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001); and International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999.
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of any relevant international law of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations and customary international law.
All State parties bear an obligation to cooperate to prevent hostage-taking under
article 4. In particular, States must take all practicable measures to prevent preparations
in their territories for its commission (within or outside their territories), including by
prohibiting illegal activities by persons or groups that encourage, instigate, organize or
engage in it. The rule is a specific reiteration of the general obligation on States not to
permit their territories to be used for activities harmful to other States, including by
terrorist acts.60 Prevention must also be pursued through the exchange of information
(such as, for example, intelligence) and administrative coordination.
Where inter-State disputes arise concerning the Convention, article 16 provides
that they should be settled by negotiation, or failing that, arbitration or a subsequent
reference to the International Court of Justice, unless a State reserves otherwise upon
expressing its consent to the Convention.
4. Influence on Subsequent Legal Developments
By February 2014, the Hostages Convention had attracted 173 States parties and
39 signatories.61 The influence of the Convention is difficult to evaluate. Prosecutions or
extraditions arising pursuant to the Convention appear reasonably scarce, even though
many States parties have enacted the necessary domestic implementing legislation. It is
undoubtedly comforting for States to know that the Convention is available in the rare
cases that it may be needed. Some States have gone beyond what the Convention
requires to treat its offences as non-political crimes for the purpose of national
extradition law62 or refugee law.
Whether the Convention has deterred potential hostage-takers is more difficult to
know. Certainly many terrorists do not care for international law prohibitions which get
in the way of violently attaining their political goals. There is also a risk that the
prohibition of hostage-taking may divert terrorists to resort to other, as yet unregulated
methods of terrorism, in the absence of a comprehensive treaty prohibiting all
terrorism.63
The Hostages Convention has nevertheless influenced various areas of
international and national legal practice, including international criminal law and
international humanitarian law. In Prosecutor v. Blaskic, the Appeals Chamber of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia invoked the Hostages
Convention in support of its definition of the war crime of hostage-taking in
international humanitarian law.64 This was the case notwithstanding that the Hostages
Convention itself does not apply in armed conflicts.
Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (RUF case), the Appeals
Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone observed that the “elements” of the war
crime of taking of hostages in armed conflict under the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court borrow heavily from the Hostages Convention.65 The
international humanitarian law treaty prohibitions on hostage-taking provide no
60 See, e.g., General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, annex: Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations.
61 United Nations Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, chapter XVIII.5
(https://treaties.un.org) .
62 See, e.g., Australia, Extradition Regulations (1988), Reg. 2B(1)(d).
63 The United Nations draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism has been under negotiation since 2000
but is not yet agreed.
64 Prosecutor v. Blaskic (Appeal Judgement), IT-95-14-A, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 639, footnote 1332.
65 Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (RUF Case), SCSL-04-15-A (26 October 2009), para. 579.
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definition of it.66 The Appeals Chamber found the Hostages Convention “useful” in
interpreting the war crime of hostage-taking. It drew on the Convention definition in
overturning the Trial Chamber’s finding that hostage-taking requires the communication
of a threat or demand to a third party.67 It found instead that the offence requires only an
intention by the perpetrator to compel a third party, which may be proved, for instance,
by the issuing of a threat to the detained person alone, or inferred from other evidence.
The Appeals Chamber’s review of domestic laws was also said to support that
conclusion, with rare exceptions.68 There is thus a convergence of the meaning of
hostage-taking under the Hostages Convention, humanitarian law, and national law.
While the Hostages Convention is silent on State immunities, in the Pinochet
proceedings before the British House of Lords, some judges suggested that the
Convention has the effect of removing any immunity for hostage-taking.69 This is
because either adherence to the Convention constitutes a waiver of immunity or acts of
hostage-taking cannot be viewed as official or sovereign acts of State. On this view
immunity is removed at least in respect of hostage-taking involving States parties to the
Convention (as opposed to all States under customary international law). The issue was
not, however, definitively settled in the Pinochet case, because the final decision turned
on the treaty crime of torture rather than the less factually well founded allegation of
hostage-taking.
The duty on States under article 3 of the Convention to take all measures it
considers appropriate to secure the release of a hostage was raised in a regional human
rights case concerning Russia’s rescue of hostages from a Moscow theatre. Russia
invoked article 3 in defence of its use of gas to storm the theatre, which led to 125
deaths, in response to a claim that it had violated the right to life under article 2 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.70 The European Court of Human Rights did
not address the point, instead deciding the case by applying the Court’s jurisprudence on
article 2. This may be because the incident was domestic not transnational. In any event
article 3 of the Hostages Convention could not justify violations of human rights law.
This view is consistent with many resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly
and Security Council urging States to comply with their human rights obligations in
countering terrorism.
Interpretation of the Hostages Convention has also arisen in a number of national
criminal cases. For example, one United States court found that article 5 of the
Convention supports the optional exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of
the passive personality principle.71 Another United States decision clarified that the
United States hostage-taking legislation was enacted to implement the Hostages
Convention to enable extraterritorial jurisdiction, and thereby expand the more limited
reach of existing domestic kidnapping offences.72
While the Convention describes hostage-taking as manifestations of terrorism, the
United States and United Kingdom criminal cases confirm that the offence is not limited
to political violence. It can apply to a purely domestic, intra-familial abduction,73 and to
the many United States cases involving the confinement of illegal aliens where payment
is demanded for their release.74 The latter can include cases where an initially
66 Ibid., para. 577.
67 Ibid., para. 580.
68 Ibid., para. 582 (the exception being the Canadian Criminal Code, article 279.1).
69 R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others, Ex part Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [2000] 1 AC 147.
70 Finogenov and others v. Russia [2011] ECHR 2234 (20 December 2011), para. 186.
71 United States v. Yunis 924 F.2d 1086 (DC Cir 1991) 1090.
72 United States v. Salad 907 F.Supp.2d 743 (EDVa 2012).
73 HM, PM v. KH, HM [2010] EWHC 870 (Fam); and United States v. Santos-Riviera 183 F.3d 367 (5th Cir 1999)
(confinement of United States citizen infant to demand ransom for her release).
74 United States v. Tchibassa 452 F.3d 918 (DC Cir 2006); United States v. Si Lu Tian 339 F.3d 143 (2d Cir 2003);
United States v. Ferreira 275 F.3d 1020 (11th Cir 2001); United States v. Fei Lin 139 F.3d 1303, supplemented by
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consensual agreement to be smuggled for a fee later turns into involuntary
confinement.75
Detention is not limited to physical restraint, but can extend to threats, coercion,
or deception which causes the person to remain under another’s control. It thus includes,
for instance, where an alien is frightened of her smugglers, witnessed the beatings of
others, was threatened, and held in a guarded apartment.76 The person’s circumstances
are relevant, such as where an alien is unfamiliar with the new country, cannot speak the
language, and lacks the resources to escape.77
However, brief confinement for 15 minutes was not sufficient to constitute
hostage-taking, in a case where an illegal alien was held in a “gypsy taxi” extortion
scheme until her husband paid to release her, and while awaiting the arrival of police
who had been called.78 In part this was because although the Hostages Convention is not
limited to terrorism, its anti-terrorism background suggests that the offence should not
be stretched too far. Even so, detention for a few hours can constitute hostage-taking
where, for instance, a vulnerable infant is abducted.79
The Hostages Convention has also influenced the development of national civil
and administrative laws. A frequently litigated example is the United States’ Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which provides an exception to State immunity in
civil proceedings before United States courts against foreign State sponsors of hostagetaking.
The United States law offence of hostage-taking implements the United States’
obligations under the Hostages Convention and defines hostage-taking in identical
terms. The Convention itself does not establish any civil law exception to foreign State
immunity for hostage-taking so the FSIA exception reflects domestic not international
law.
Nonetheless, the significant number of FSIA cases involving hostage-taking
provide useful interpretive guidance on the Convention definition, particularly given the
scarcity of criminal or extradition proceedings in national law. Thus, for instance,
United States courts have found that the intention of a perpetrator is decisive, not
whether his or her purpose or demands were communicated to a third party,80 or
whether his or her demands are realistic or achievable.81 Unpleasant imprisonment
absent an intent to compel another is not hostage-taking.82
The United States cases have also clarified what it means to “seize” or “detain” a
person, namely that a person is held or confined against his or her will for an
appreciable period of time.83 Actual physical force or violence is unnecessary as long as
the person was threatened, frightened, deceived or coerced so as to cause the person to
remain under the offender’s control.84 Thus a person may be constructively detained, as
where Americans were compelled to hide in safe houses or diplomatic premises under
the constant fear of capture by Iraqi security forces, where threats to Americans were
being used by Iraq to prevent to the United States from attacking it.
In an administrative law case, the Israeli Supreme Court held that a domestic
statute authorising administrative detention could not permit detaining non-threatening
United States v. Fei 141 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir 1998); United States v. Wang Kun Lue 134 F.3d at 81; United States v.
Lopez-Flores 63 F.3d 1468 (9th Cir 1995); and United States v. Carrion-Caliz 944 F.2d 220 (5th Cir 1991).
75 United States v. Si Lu Tian 339 F.3d 143 (2d Cir 2003).
76 Ibid.
77 United States v. Carrion-Caliz 944 F.2d 220 (5th Cir 1991) 225.
78 United States v. Rodriguez 587 F.3d 573 (2d Cir 2009).
79 United States v. Santos-Riviera 183 F.3d 367 (5th Cir 1999).
80 Simpson v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 470 F.3d 356 (DC Cir 2006) 360.
81 Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic 362 F.Supp.2d 103 (DDC 2005) 113.
82 Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 294 F.3d 82, 352 U.S.App.D.C. 284 (2002).
83 Vine v. Republic of Iraq 459 F.Supp.2d 10 (DDC 2006) 17-19.
84 United States v. Si Lu Tian 339 F.3d 143 (2d Cir 2003) 153.
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persons as “bargaining chips”, since that did not comply with article 1 of the Hostages
Convention or article 34 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War.85 While those treaty provisions were not domestically binding
in the absence of legislation, the Court found that there was a “presumption of
compatibility” between international law and domestic law, which applied in the
interpretation of the domestic detention statute.
The cases mentioned above illustrate that the Hostages Convention has influenced
diverse legal contexts, including criminal, extradition, civil, administrative, human
rights, and refugee law.
Related Materials
A. Legal Instruments
International
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Paris, 10 December 1948, General Assembly
resolution 217 (III) of 10 December 1948.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol.
75, p. 31.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva, 12 August 1949, United
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75 p. 85.
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August
1949, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, p. 135.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Geneva, 12 August 1949, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, p. 287.
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 28 July 1951, United Nations,
Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 16 December 1966,
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, The Hague, 16
December 1970, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 860, p. 105.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Montreal, 23 September 1971, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 974, p. 177.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, New York, 14 December 1973, United
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1035, p. 167.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June
1977, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1125, p. 3.
85 Anonymous (Lebanese citizens) v. Minister of Defence, Final decision, Israeli Supreme Court (Court of Appeals),
FCrA 7048/97.
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Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Geneva, 8
June 1977, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1125, p. 609.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, United Nations,
Treaty Series, vol. 2187, p. 3.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, New York,
9 December 1999, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2178, p. 197.
National
Australia, Extradition Regulations (1988).
Canada, Criminal Code (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46).
United States, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (1976).
B. Jurisprudence
International
International Court of Justice, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(United States of America v. Iran), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3.
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, IT-95-
14-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement of 29 July 2004.
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (RUF Case),
SCSL-04-15-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment of 26 October 2009.
European Court of Human Rights, Finogenov and others v. Russia, Application Nos.
18299/03 and 27311/03, Judgment of 20 December 2011.
National
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, United States v.
Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (1991), 29 January 1991.
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Carrion-Caliz, 944
F.2d 220 (1991), 27 September 1991.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Lopez-Flores, 63
F.3d 1468 (1995), 10 August 1995.
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States v. Wang Kun Lue,
134 F.3d 79 (1998), 14 January 1998.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Fei Lin, 139 F.3d
1303 (1998), 30 March 1998.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Fei, 141 F.3d
1180 (1998), 30 March 1998.
United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law
13
Copyright © United Nations, 2014. All rights reserved
www.un.org/law/avl
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Santos-Riviera,
183 F.3d 367 (1999), 29 July 1999.
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, United States v. Ferreira, 275
F.3d 1020 (2001), 11 December 2001.
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Price v. Socialist
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 352 U.S.App.D.C. 284 (2002), 28 June
2002.
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States v. Si Lu Tian 339
F.3d 143 (2003), 12 August 2003.
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Wyatt v. Syrian
Arab Republic, 362 F.Supp.2d 103 (2005), 3 March 2005.
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, United States v.
Tchibassa, 452 F.3d 918 (2006), 7 July 2006.
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Vine v. Republic of
Iraq, 459 F.Supp.2d 10 (2006), 7 September 2006.
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Simpson v.
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 470 F.3d 356 (2006), 21 November 2006.
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States v. Rodriguez, 587
F.3d 573 (2009), 30 November 2009.
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, United States v. Salad,
907 F.Supp.2d 743 (2012), 27 November 2012.
Israeli Supreme Court (Court of Appeals), Anonymous (Lebanese citizens) v. Minister of
Defence, Final decision, FCrA 7048/97, 12 April 2000.
United Kingdom House of Lords, R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate
and others, Ex part Pinochet Ugarte, No. 3 AC 147 (2000).
High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Family Division, HM, PM v. KH, HM,
[2010] EWHC 870 (Fam), 30 April 2010.
C. Documents
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (General
Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, annex).
Letter dated 28 September 1976 from the Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Secretary-General (A/31/242, 28
September 1976).
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, Summary records of the 55th and 58th
meetings of the thirty-first regular session of the General Assembly, held, respectively,
on 26 and 30 November 1976 (A/C.6/31/SR.55 and 58).
United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law
14
Copyright © United Nations, 2014. All rights reserved
www.un.org/law/avl
Report of the Sixth Committee to the General Assembly (Drafting of an international
convention against the taking of hostages) (A/31/430, 14 December 1976).
General Assembly resolution 31/103 of 15 December 1976 (Drafting of an international
convention against the taking of hostages).
Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/AC.188/L.3),
reproduced in the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International
Convention against the Taking of Hostages (A/32/39, 27 September 1977, annex II A).
Working paper submitted by Lesotho and the United Republic of Tanzania, later joined
by Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, the Libyan Arab Republic and Nigeria (A/AC.188/L.5),
reproduced in the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International
Convention against the Taking of Hostages (A/32/39, 27 September 1977, annex II C).
Working paper submitted by Mexico (A/AC.188/L.6), reproduced in the Report of the
Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention against the Taking of
Hostages (A/32/39, 27 September 1977, annex II D).
Working paper submitted by Algeria and the United Republic of Tanzania, later joined
by Egypt, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Nigeria
(A/AC.188/L.7), reproduced in the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of
an International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (A/32/39, 27 September
1977, annex II E).
Working paper submitted by France (A/AC.188/L.8) concerning article 4 of the working
paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/AC.188/L.3), reproduced in the
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention against
the Taking of Hostages (A/32/39, 27 September 1977, annex II F).
Working paper submitted by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (A/AC.188/L.9), reproduced
in the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention
against the Taking of Hostages (A/32/39, 27 September 1977, annex II G).
Working paper submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic (A/AC.188/L.11) concerning the
working paper submitted by Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, Nigeria and the United Republic of Tanzania (A/AC.188/L.7), reproduced
in the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention
against the Taking of Hostages (A/32/39, 27 September 1977, annex II I).
Working paper submitted by France (A/AC.188/L.13) concerning the working paper
submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/AC.188/L.3), reproduced in the
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention against
the Taking of Hostages (A/32/39, 27 September 1977, annex II K).
Working paper submitted by the Netherlands (A/AC.188/L.14) concerning the working
paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/AC.188/L.3), reproduced in the
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention against
the Taking of Hostages (A/32/39, 27 September 1977, annex II L).
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention against
the Taking of Hostages (A/32/39, 27 September 1977).
General Assembly resolutions 32/148 of 16 December 1977 (Drafting of an
international convention against the taking of hostages).
United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law
15
Copyright © United Nations, 2014. All rights reserved
www.un.org/law/avl
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention against
the Taking of Hostages (A/33/39, 4 May 1978).
General Assembly resolution 33/19 of 29 November 1978 (Drafting of an international
convention against the taking of hostages).
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention against
the Taking of Hostages (A/34/39, 20 March 1979).
Report of the Working Group on the Drafting of an International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages, 16 November 1979 (A/C.6/34/L.12, 16 November 1979, and
A/C.6/34/L.12/Corr.4, 3 December 1979).
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, Summary record of 62nd meeting of the
thirty-fourth regular session of the General Assembly, held on 7 December 1979
(A/C.6/34/SR.62).
Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999.
Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001.
D. Doctrine
C. Aston, “The United Nations Convention Against the Taking of Hostages: Realistic or
Rhetoric?”, in British Perspectives on Terrorism, Paul Wilkinson, ed., Allen & Unwin,
Australia,1981.
J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law: A Commentary on the
Hostages Convention 1979, Grotius Publications, Cambridge, 1990.

Annex 494
Els De Busser, Open Source Data and Criminal Investigations, Groningen J.I.L. 2(2) (2014)

Groningen Journal of International Law, vol 2(2): Privacy in International Law
Open Source Data and Criminal
Investigations: Anything You Publish Can and
Will Be Used Against You
Els De Busser*
Keywords
DATA PROTECTION; INFORMATION EXCHANGE; OPEN SOURCE DATA; RIGHT TO BE
FORGOTTEN
Abstract
Various misconceptions exist regarding open source data, what is meant by this term and
how these data can legally be used. This contribution focuses on developing a
comprehensive definition of the term and highlights the differences with similar – often
confusing – concepts. The fact that open source data are publicly available does not mean
that they can be used and processed in any way or for any purpose. As far as open
sources contain personal data, the general data protection legislation (national as well as
EU and Council of Europe legislation) is applicable. Several difficulties however arise,
especially when different types of data are mixed.
This can happen in the context of a criminal investigation. The use of personal data
for the purpose of prevention, investigation or prosecution of criminal offences is
protected by more specific legal provisions to protect the secrecy of the investigation as
well as the fundamental rights of the suspect and the victim(s). The fair trial rights of
article 6 ECHR should be respected once a criminal charge has been made.
Open source data are vulnerable for abuse by any individual. Additionally, they are
widely available and distributable when the internet is used. In several instances open
source data have been used for the purpose of vigilantism (individuals taking law
enforcement into their own hands). It is important to draw the line between a legal use of
open source data, including the use of open source data for the purpose of a criminal
investigation and the illegal use of open source data.
This contribution combines the elements of open source data, personal data and
criminal investigations. Answers to the following research questions are sought:
- What are open source data?
- How to protect personal data included in open source data?
- How to use open source data in criminal investigations while respecting
data protection legislation?
I. Introduction
Various misconceptions exist regarding open source data, what is meant by this term and
how these data can legally be used. This contribution focuses on developing a
comprehensive definition of the term and highlights the differences with concepts that
seem similar and therefore are often confused. The fact that open source data are publicly
available does not mean that they can be used and processed in any way or for any
* Head of Section European Criminal Law, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal
Law, Freiburg, Germany. The author would like to thank Tania Boulot, Nora Römling and Kamand
Gharun for their assistance and feedback while preparing this paper.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.
Open Source Data and Criminal Investigations 91
purpose. As far as open sources contain or consist of personal data, general data
protection legislation (national as well as European Union and Council of Europe
legislation) is applicable. Several difficulties, however, arise related to the nature of the
data and their use or processing.
Besides data protection laws, the use of personal data for the purpose of prevention,
investigation or prosecution of criminal offences is also protected by more specific legal
provisions to protect the secrecy of the investigation as well as the fundamental rights of
the suspect and the victim(s). The fair trial rights of Article 6 European Convention of
Human Rights should be respected once a criminal charge has been made. This goes for
personal data that are open source as well as closed source data. More and more open
source data are used by law enforcement and intelligence services, especially where social
media is concerned. In 2012 LexisNexis® Risk Solutions surveyed 1,200 United States
federal, state, and local law enforcement professionals concluding that four out of five
use various social media networks to assist in investigations with Facebook and
YouTube ranking among the most used platforms. This use concerned identifying people
and locations; discovering criminal activity and locations; and gathering evidence. Of all
respondents, 67% reported believing that social media helps solving crime more quickly.1
Even though this survey was conducted in the United States, it shows the rising
importance of social media as an investigative tool for law enforcement.
Open source data are vulnerable for abuse by any individual. Additionally, they are
widely available and distributable when the Internet is used. In several instances open
source data have been used for the purpose of vigilantism (individuals taking law
enforcement into their own hands). It is important to draw the line between a legal use of
open source data, including the use of open source data for the purpose of a criminal
investigation and the illegal use of open source data. Lastly, since the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU) ruled on a landmark case against Google in May 2014, it is
equally relevant to discuss here the catchphrase “the right to be forgotten”, the fact that it
does not exist and what this debate is really about.
Referring to the so-called Miranda rights in the title—the rights that should be read by
US law enforcement officers when taking an individual into custody—is not meant to
sound harsh or depressing. It is rather intended to create awareness for Internet and
social media users indiscriminately, publicly posting personal data identifying themselves
or others. The consequences of this recent trend are not always directly perceived, which
makes it all the more difficult to control. Besides raising awareness, this contribution
focuses on identifying the precise problem(s) rather than offering concrete solutions.
Combining the elements of open source data, personal data and criminal
investigations, this paper intends to offer an answer to questions such as what are open
source data; how can personal data included in open source data be protected; and how
can open source data be used in criminal investigations while respecting data protection
legislation? The legal instruments that are used to answer these questions are the relevant
legal instruments adopted by the Council of Europe (CoE) and by the European Union
(EU). These include the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the
Convention on the processing of personal data by automated means (Data Protection
1 LexisNexis Risk Solutions, Role of Social Media in Law Enforcement Significant and Growing, available
online at <lexisnexis.com/en-us/about-us/media/pressrelease.
page?id=1342623085481181#sthash.pbREo4je.dpuf> (accessed 30 July 2014).
92 GroJIL 2(2) (2014), 90–114
Convention),2 Resolutions 73(22) and 74(29), and Recommendation 87(15). For the EU
the most relevant legal instruments include Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data (Directive 95/46/EC), 3 the Framework Decision
2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the
framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Framework Decision
2008), and the legislative proposals that are being negotiated at the present time to reform
both the Directive4 and the Framework Decision.5 Using these legal instruments does not
mean that the geographical scope of this paper is limited to the EU. Rather, all Member
States of the CoE are bound by the same data protection standards as well as countries
that are not Member States of the CoE.
II. Defining Open Source Data
In order to define what open source data are, it is necessary to first explain what they are
not. Open source data are not identical to personal data but can contain or consist of
personal data. Traditionally, personal and non-personal data are distinguished based on
the characteristic of identifying an individual or enable to identify an individual. Personal
data enable one to “single out” a person. The fact whether personal data are open source
or not is not part of the definition. On the contrary, the definition of personal data
includes any information, which can be open source or closed source. Open source data
in their turn can be personal or non-personal.
II.1. Personal Data
The concept of personal data is frequently confused with the right to a private life or
privacy. Both concepts overlap, but only to a certain extent. They are certainly not
identical. Where personal data are those data that identify or enable to identify an
individual, the private life of a person consists of personal as well as of non-personal
data. As one of the most difficult concepts to explain—not in the least because of its
evolvement in line with technological advancements—the best definition is still the
traditional definition introduced by Warren and Brandeis in 1890 describing the right to a
2 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data,
1981, ETS No. 108 available online at <conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm>
(accessed 27 September 2014) (CoE Data Protection Convention).
3 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data, available online at <eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31995L0046&from=EN> (accessed 1 2014) (Data Protection
Directive 95/46/EC).
4 Proposal for a Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data, 25 January 2012, COM (2012)11 final, available online at
<ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf> (accessed 16
November 2014).
5 Proposal for a Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data, 25
January 2012, COM (2012), 10, available online at <eurlex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0010:FIN:EN:PDF> (accessed 3
November 2014).
Open Source Data and Criminal Investigations 93
private life as the right to be let alone.6 Exercising the right to be let alone and not tolerate
interference from private or public persons such as the government, involves more than
only personal data. 7 One should thus be careful not to confuse both concepts.
Nonetheless, in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) the
right to a private life has been used to include rulings on personal data. After all, a
genuine right to data protection is so far only included in the EU Charter on
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, not in the ECHR.
The data protection standards applicable in the EU and the CoE Member States
originate from the CoE Data Protection Convention and two preceding Resolutions.8 In
the Convention and in Directive 95/46/EC, personal data are defined as any information
relating to an identified or identifiable individual.9 Public sector information is also
covered by this definition.10 An identifiable person is a physical11 person who can be easily
identified, meaning not by using very sophisticated12 methods that should be judged
considering technological evolutions.13
“Any information” refers to any type of information, objective as well as subjective
statements concerning objects, events or persons. Opinions, assessments or conclusions
about objects or persons establish subjective information. The format in which the
information is held or its carrier is not relevant. Information in any structured or
6 Often incorrectly quoted as “to be left alone”. See Warren, S. D. and Brandeis, L. D., “The right to
privacy”, Harvard Law Review, vol. 4, 1890, 193–220. See also Council of Europe, Parliamentary
Assembly, Recommendation 509(1968) on human rights and modern scientific and technological developments,
1968, available online at
<assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta68/EREC509.htm> (accessed 30 July
2014). This Recommendation started the legislative development of data protection rules and
guidelines.
7 See also De Busser, E., Data Protection in EU and US Criminal Cooperation, Maklu Publishers, Antwerp-
Apeldoorn, 2009, 48–52.
8 The Convention’s Explanatory Report explained that the terms and definitions generally follow those
used in Resolutions (73) 22 and (74) 29. Some modifications and additions have been made in view of
recent national legislation and having regard to the special problems called forth by transfrontier data
flows.
9 Article 2(a) CoE Data Protection Convention; Article 2(a) Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC.
10 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/99 on public sector information and the protection
of personal data, WP 20, 3 May 1999, available online at <ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/1999/wp20_en.pdf> (accessed 30 July 2014).
11 In accordance with Article 3, paragraph 2(b) of the Convention, Member States have the opportunity to
declare the provisions of the Convention applicable to legal persons. Declarations in that sense have
been submitted by Albania, Austria, Italy, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.
12 The focus on ‘very sophisticated methods’ as is mentioned in the Explanatory Report to the Data
Protection Convention can lead to confusion. One might think that the higher the level of sophistication
in the method used in order to identify a person, the less likely it is for the personal information that is
detected this way to fall within the scope of the Convention. However—and rightfully pointed out by
Bygrave—the higher the level of sophistication is, the easier it is for a person to identify an individual
and consequently have access to personal data. Bygrave, L.A., Data protection law. Approaching its
rationale, logic and limits, Kluwer law International, The Hague, 2002, 43–44.
13 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, ETS No. 108, 1981, available online at
<conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Reports/Html/108.htm> (accessed 30 July 2014). See also the
remarks made by the Court in: Klass and others v. Germany, App no 5029/71), para. 4, and ECtHR, 16
February 2000, Amman v. Switzerland, App no 27798/95), Section 56. See also Concurring Opinion of
Judge Pettiti in ECtHR, 2 August 1984, Malone v. UK, App no 8691/79.).
94 GroJIL 2(2) (2014), 90–114
unstructured form (numerical, photographical, acoustic or stored in a computer file)14 is
covered by the definition, taking into consideration future technological developments.
The phrase “related to” would logically mean that the information is about a specific
person.15 However, the EU’s Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 16 in a 2005
opinion on the application of Directive 95/46/EC on the practice of RFID-tags17 stated
that this phrase ‘refers to the identity, characteristics or behaviour of an individual or if
such information is used to determine or influence the way in which that person is
treated or evaluated’.18 In view of recent discussions on gathering data on people’s online
surfing behaviour and personalised online advertising, it is significant that also such data
can qualify as personal data. Nevertheless, data gathered by RFID tags or surfing
behaviour would not be open source data.
In 2007 the Data Protection Working Party divided the meaning of “relating to” in
two parts. On the one hand, certain content is required to make information relate to a
person, meaning it should provide in the person’s identity, his or her characteristics or
behaviour. No purpose or consequence on behalf of the handler of the data is necessary.
On the other hand, the use that is made of the information is divided into demonstrating
either an element of purpose to assess, treat in a different way or influence a person’s
status or behaviour or an element of result or impact. The latter refers to the impact on a
person’s rights and interests or the different treatment of a person as a result, independent
of the question whether this result was achieved.19
Singling out an individual from the general population or a smaller group of persons
by the use of information, or even the possibility of distinguishing an individual from a
multitude or a category of persons, constitutes the determining factor in personal data.
Identifying someone’s unique behaviour can already be sufficient, for example by means
of the aforementioned RFID-tags.20 A person can be isolated directly by using identifying
elements such as a name, provided that the name is sufficiently distinctive. Whether
more identifiers (address, phone number, physical characteristics, employment
information, etc.) are needed, depends on the context. The same piece of information can
be personal data in one context and not be sufficient as an identifier in a different
setting.21
Recital 26 of the Directive 95/46/EC preamble includes a reasonable means-test with
regard to the means used for identifying a person. The Data Protection Working Party
14 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, WP 136, 20
June 2007, available online at
<ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf> (accessed 30 July 2014),
7.
15 Id., 9.
16 The name “Article 29 Data Protection Working Party” is derived from the Article 29 of Directive
95/46/EC that set up this working party. It publishes opinions on specific issues related to the
application of the Directive.
17 Radio Frequency Identification Technology stands for a microchip storing data on certain behaviour,
for example purchasing behaviour, by the person carrying the tag, which is read by the controller of the
tag.
18 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on data protection issues related to RFID
technology, WP 105, 19 January 2005, 8.
19 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 4/2007, supra nt. 14, 10–11.
20 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 4/2007, supra nt. 14, 13–14; see also above nt. 17.
21 See CJEU 6 November 2003, Lindqvist, C-101/0101, para. 27. In this case the Court decided on data on
an Internet page referring to person’s names in conjunction with their phone number or information
concerning their working conditions and hobbies, to be personal data within the meaning of Directive
95/46/EC.
Open Source Data and Criminal Investigations 95
added the criteria of cost22 of conducting the identification, the intended purpose, the way
the processing is structured, the advantage expected by the controller, the interests at
stake for the individuals, the risk of organisational dysfunctions and technical failures.23
All means that are likely reasonably used by the handler of the data to identify the person
concerned should be considered by the judge deciding upon a case-by-case-basis. The
phrase “likely reasonably” causes confusion as to its exact meaning, in particular by
joining such element of probability with the element of difficulty.24 The fact that the
handler of the information would be capable of identifying a person does not necessarily
mean that he will in fact put this into practice. However, this would not cause the data to
lose their quality of personal data.25
During the negotiations on the reform of the data protection legal framework in the
EU, the concept of singling out was added to the text of the preamble in the amendments
made by the European Parliament.26 This was not a new notion as the Data Protection
Working Party already used it in its 2007 opinion on the concept of personal data.27 Data
that can lead to the singling out of a person from a group of persons thus needs to be so
specific—depending on the size of the group28—that only one individual can be isolated
from the rest of the group.
II.2. Open Source Data
Open source data or open data do not have an official definition that is laid down in any
legal instrument. Many documents use the term without defining it, yet limited sources
have included their own definition.29 The common characteristic of the definitions lies in
the information being publicly available. When data are closed off from the general
public, they can clearly not be considered open source data. When a fee is required to
obtain the data, can they still be considered open source? And does it include information
on social media profiles that are not public but still open to thousands of users? Where do
we draw the line?
22 The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party explicitly mentions the costs as a criterion for concluding
on the identification (even though it states it is not the only factor). In 1997 the Council of Europe no
longer included costs as a reliable criterion due to developments in computer technology. See Council
of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R(97)5 on the protection of medical data, 13
February 1997, available online at
<wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=56
4487&SecMode=1&DocId=560582&Usage=2> (accessed 30 July 2014).
23 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 4/2007, supra nt. 14, 15.
24 Bygrave, L. A., Data protection law. Approaching its rationale, logic and limits, Kluwer law International,
The Hague, 2002, 44.
25 Ibid.
26 European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing
of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation)
(COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)), available online at
<europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-
0212+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> (accessed 3 November 2014), Amendment 66.
27 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 4/2007, supra nt. 14, 13.
28 For example when data refers to a dark haired woman in her thirties living in New York, the group of
people will be too large to identify this individual. When the data are more specific and refer to a dark
haired woman in her thirties living in New York and teaching English literature at University X in
Manhattan, New York City, this would single out a specific individual.
29 See also Eijkman, Q. and Weggemans, D., “Open source intelligence and privacy dilemmas”, Security
and Human Rights, No. 4, 2012, 286-287.
96 GroJIL 2(2) (2014), 90–114
Open source data is not a new concept as such, demonstrated by the references in
guidelines and manuals for intelligence services. Nevertheless, the boom of social media
and other sources on the Internet have given it a new dimension by flooding the pool of
existing open source data. That does not mean that open source data need to be digital.
Even if the majority of open source data today will be found in digital form,
observations, photographs or paper publications may just as well be open and publicly
available data. The CoE Convention on Cybercrime uses the term open source data, but
only indirectly refers to it as publicly available data without giving a definition.30 With
due care not to confuse information and intelligence notions, it is still useful to examine
the definitions used in the area of (criminal as well as military) intelligence because open
source data are also for intelligence services a necessary source, possibly even a starting
point.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) describes open source data
as information that is publicly available and adds that one of the main difficulties in
working with this type of source is evaluation, as information available in the public
domain can frequently be biased, inaccurate or sensationalised.31 This definition is clearly
accommodated towards criminal intelligence analysts and is much wider than
information containing personal data. In its Open Source Intelligence Handbook, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) first separates open source intelligence from
academic, business or journalistic research by highlighting that ‘‘it represents the
application of the proven process of national intelligence to a global diversity of sources,
with the intent of producing tailored intelligence for the commander’.32 The proven
process of national intelligence logically refers to the analysing of information for
military purposes. Nonetheless, NATO’s discerning definitions of four types of
information and intelligence are relevant in this discussion due to the elements of
restriction of information for a specific person or group of persons on the one hand and
the element of verification or accuracy on the other hand. According to NATO, open
source information means that a form of processing has taken place from the raw open
source data.33 It refers to those data that can be put together, generally by an editorial
process that provides some filtering and validation as well as presentation management.
Open source information is thus generic information that is usually widely disseminated
and includes newspapers, books, broadcast, and general daily reports. Open source
intelligence refers to information that has been deliberately discovered, discriminated,
distilled, and disseminated to a select audience in order to address a specific question.
This type of information applies the proven process of intelligence to the broad diversity
of open sources of information, and creates intelligence. A more advanced type of
information is the validated open source intelligence. This is defined as information to
which a very high degree of certainty can be attributed. It can be produced by an allsource
intelligence professional, with access to classified intelligence sources. It can also
30 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, ETS No. 185, 8 November 2001,
available online at <conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/185.htm> (accessed 3 November
2014).
31 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Criminal Intelligence - Manual for Analysts, 2011, available
online at <unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-
Enforcement/Criminal_Intelligence_for_Analysts.pdf> (accessed 20 July 2014), 12.
32 NATO, Open Source Intelligence Handbook, 2001, available online at
<oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/030201/ca5fb66734f540fbb4f8f6ef759b258c/NATO%20OSINT%20
Handbook%20v1.2%20-%20Jan%202002.pdf> (accessed 20 July 2014), 1–3.
33 Open source data is defined as the raw print, broadcast, oral debriefing or other form of information
from a primary source.
Open Source Data and Criminal Investigations 97
come from an assured open source to which no question can be raised concerning its
validity. 34 Open source data and open source information are thus in the NATO
definitions meant for a wider audience and have been subject to a lower degree of
scrutiny, while open source intelligence and validated open source intelligence are rather
conclusions drawn from the data and information, the degree of accuracy and reliability
is higher and it is meant for a restricted audience.
Open source data can be authored and developed by any person. In some cases the
author or producer is unknown and the reliability or accuracy cannot possibly be verified,
for example fake profiles on social media. In other cases, such as journalism, the author
is known and the information has a high degree of reliability and accuracy. Still this is
considered open source data.35 It is thus not relevant for the description of open source
data whether its reliability and accuracy has been checked.
The size of the audience to whom the data are available brings up the question of
payment. Can data that is only available on payment be considered open source or not?
It would not be realistic to limit the definition of open source data to freely available data
as technically one would have to consider the cost of Internet connections even when
newspapers or social media have freely accessible websites.36 However, open source data
can also exist in the offline world. For example, an expensive book or report can be
publicly available, but due to its price, it is limited in accessibility. For this reason the
element of payment should not be included in the definition of open source data, rather
the aspect of availability to a wide or restricted public is significant. A restricted public is
not the general population but a group of people that is separated from the general
population based on one or more filtering conditions such as their professional
occupation, their paid or unpaid subscription to a newspaper or their friendship with a
person on a social media profile. The latter brings up a particular question regarding the
threshold that is required. When the account holder of a Facebook profile that is not
public posts information, one would tend to label this information as closed source data.
However, if this Facebook user has over 5,000 friends, can we still rightfully speak of
closed source data? In addition, every one of these friends can share the information with
his or her friends creating a snowball effect and an uncontainable distribution of the
information. The same goes for a newspaper that has thousands of paying subscribers
who can spread information further. A solution could be to interpret the term “restricted
public” as referring to the ability to specify the recipients of the data and to limit the
dissemination of the information. This interpretation results in any information that is
posted on a Facebook profile allowing the friends of the account holder to share, should
be labelled as open source data. This does not mean that any person can do anything he
or she wants with the data, for two reasons. First, the fact that such data are open source
does not mean that they are reliable or accurate. Second, open source data can contain
personal data. If this is the case they are protected by data protection regulations.
Developing a definition of open source data that is not exclusively meant for the field
of criminal and military intelligence, it is clearer to describe what open source data are
not rather than to describe what is covered by the term. Based on the analysis above,
34 Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, supra nt. 30.
35 See above, nt. 29.
36 Even in the description of personal data in 1997, the Council of Europe did not consider cost a reliable
criterion due to the developments in computer technology. Council of Europe Committee of Ministers,
Recommendation No. R(97)5 on the protection of medical data, 13 February 1997, available online at
<wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=56
4487&SecMode=1&DocId=560582&Usage=2> (accessed 30 July 2014).
98 GroJIL 2(2) (2014), 90–114
open source data can be described as any information that is not restricted to a specified
public and that is not necessarily reliable or accurate. Whether or not the information
identifies or enables to identify an individual is not part of the definition since open
source data can include both personal data and non-personal data.
III. Personal Data Protection
When open source data contain personal data, they are protected by the traditional data
protection standards. These are laid down in binding legal instruments. The data
protection legal instrument that has the widest geographical scope and is also the oldest
international convention on this matter is the 1981 CoE Data Protection Convention.
Ratified by forty six states, the Convention has introduced the basic principles to be
complied with when personal data are processed. Even though its scope is limited to
automatic processing, many states have widened the scope of their implementing
legislation to also include non-automatic data processing. In this part, the data protection
standards are applied to the central theme of open source data including the particular
challenges that this type of data can raise for data protection.
III.1. Data Protection Standards
As the basic binding37 legal instrument, the Data Protection Convention sets out the five
minimum requirements personal data should fulfil. Article 5 of the Convention was
based on the text of two older CoE Resolutions38 and distinguishes two groups of
standards: quality standards for personal data on the one hand, and quality standards for
the processing of personal data on the other hand. Both are divided into more detailed
principles that will be dealt with here in line with the two fundamental legal standards
presented by the CoE.39 Besides the data subject giving his or her consent, derogations
are allowed but only in accordance with Article 9 that is in turn based on the provisions
of Article 8 ECHR. It should be pointed out that for the EU Member States, the
standards of the Convention have been implemented and further specified in Directive
95/46/EC for commercial matters and in Framework Decision 2008 for criminal
matters.
37 As non-binding instruments, the OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data, C(80)58/Final, 23 September 1980 (OECD Guidelines) and the United
Nations Guidelines concerning Computerized Personal Data Files, General Assembly, 14 December
1990, encompass the same basic principles, leaving room for national legislators to implement data
protection rules based on these guidelines (UN Guidelines).
38 Resolution (73) 22 of the Committee of Ministers of 26 September 1973 on the Protection of the Privacy
of Individuals vis-à-vis Electronic Data Banks in the Private Sector, available online at
<wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=58
9402&SecMode=1&DocId=646994&Usage=2> (accessed 21 September 2014); Resolution (74)29 of
the Committee of Ministers of 20 September 1974 on the Protection of the Privacy of Individuals vis-àvis
Electronic Data Banks in the Public Sector, available online at
<wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=59
0512&SecMode=1&DocId=649498&Usage=2> (accessed 21 September 2014). .
39 Explanatory Report of the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
Regards to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data, ETS no. 108, Section 40, available online at
<conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/108.htm> (accessed 27 September 2014).
Open Source Data and Criminal Investigations 99
III.1.1. Quality Standards for Personal Data
III.1.1.1. Accuracy and Reliability
Ensuring the accuracy of personal data that are processed and updating them whenever
necessary is the first standard of data protection. In other words, this standard assures the
correspondence of the data to the reality they refer to, such as a person’s name and
address, employment status, health data, etc. The Data Protection Convention provides
the data subject (the person who is identified by the data) with the right to have data
corrected or erased if they do not comply with this standard. This implies notification to
the data subject of the fact data were gathered and the purpose thereof, unless the
individual already has this information or unless other exceptions apply such as the
prevailing interests of an ongoing investigation.
As additional protection, Directive 95/46/EC assigns the data controller as the
responsible party for ensuring the accuracy of the data as well as updates.40 The data
controller is the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which
alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of
personal data.41 The frequency of updates is not regulated. Although United Nations
(UN) Guidelines recommend updates to be held regularly or when the data contained in
a file are used, 42 the Convention and the Directive limit updating data to “where
necessary”.43 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines
mention that data quality standards are not intended to be more far-reaching than is
necessary for the purposes for which the data are used.44 For example, data processed for
historical or statistical purposes do not necessarily need updating.
In accordance with the definition of open source data developed in this contribution,
they are not necessarily accurate or reliable. When open source data contain data that
identify or enable to identify an individual however, they should also be updated or
corrected when necessary. Considering the possibly wide and uncontainable distribution
of open source data, updating and correcting can only be done at the source, whether this
is an update on a social media page or a newspaper publishing an erratum. Logically, the
data subject can enforce his or her right to correct or erase false personal data that are
open source.
40 Article 6, Section 1(d) and Section 2, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data, available online at <eurlex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML> (accessed 27
September 2014).
41 Id., Article 2(d).
42 Article A.2, GA Resolution 45/95 (68th plenary meeting) A/RES/45/95 14, December 1990.
43 Article 5(d) CoE Data Protection Convention; Article 6(1)(d) Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC.
44 Article 53, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,
available online at
<oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonal
data.htm> (accessed 27 September 2014).
100 GroJIL 2(2) (2014), 90–114
III.1.1.2. Adequate, Relevant and Proportionate Personal Data
Personal data should be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes
they are gathered and processed for. The Data Protection Convention 45 and the
Directive46 provide for a qualitative and a quantitative condition;47 no personal data
should be collected and stored in view of a potential future use, without having an exact
view on the purpose it would be used for.48 This was one of the reasons why on 8 April
2014 the CJEU annulled the controversial Directive 2006/24/EC (Data Retention
Directive) obliging telecommunication providers to store personal data for periods of
time up to two years in case they may be needed in a future criminal investigation or
prosecution.49
A qualitative connection should exist between the personal data and the purpose. If
there is no direct nexus—for example the same result can be achieved by other less
intrusive means50—the data are not adequate or relevant in relation to the purpose. No
personal data can be processed for undefined purposes,51 a specified purpose should be
provided as well as a direct link between purpose and data. Respecting the
proportionality rule means that the data controller should determine and distinguish the
minimum amount of personal data needed in order to successfully accomplish a specific
purpose and limit its processing to these data. 52 Blanket data collection or fishing
expeditions53 are not in line with the data protection standards.54
The purpose for the processing of personal data included in open source data could be
journalistic purposes or academic research. Determining whether personal data are in
such cases adequate, relevant and not excessive can be challenging. The recent case
before the Court of Justice on the debated and often misunderstood catchphrase ‘the right
to be forgotten’ demonstrates how difficult the adequacy and relevance of personal data
in open source situations can be. For this reason a separate part of this contribution is
dedicated to an analysis of the Court of Justice ruling of spring 2014.
45 Article 5(c), CoE Data Protection Convention.
46 Article 6, Section 1(c), Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC.
47 Also the non-binding UN Guidelines, Section A.3 and OECD Guidelines, para. 53 provide in this rule.
48 This should be distinguished from the case in which data are gathered and kept for a particular
foreseeable emergency which may never occur, for example, where an employer holds details of blood
groups of employees engaged in hazardous occupations. Information Commissioner, Data Protection
Act 1998, Legal Guidance, 1998, 37.
49 European Court of Justice (ECJ), 13 May 2014, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de
Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, C-131/12.
50 For example the Belgian Privacy Commission did not authorise the National Organization for the
Identification and Registration of Dogs access to the national register of inhabitants based on the lack of
proportionality, since in case a dog owner should be contacted, local or federal police authorities can be
involved in order to find the owner’s contact data. Belgian Privacy Commission, Advise no. 38/2001, 8
October 2001.
51 Open Source Intelligence Handbook, supra nt. 32, 41.
52 Information Commissioner, Data Protection Act 1998, Legal Guidance, 1998, 36.
53 Fishing expeditions refer to random and untargeted searches in a large collection of data in an attempt
to find relevant information.
54 See Committee of Ministers, Resolution (1973) 22, Article 21, in which adopting a rule that would ‘halt
unbridled hoarding of data’ is recommended.
Open Source Data and Criminal Investigations 101
III.1.1.3. No Such Thing as a Right to Be Forgotten
The so-called right to be forgotten became a catchphrase in 2012 with the launch of the
EU data protection legal framework reform. The term however is fundamentally
incorrect. There is no such thing as a right to be forgotten and there never will be as long
as the individual human memory and the collective memory cannot be physically
tampered with.55 What exists in accordance with applicable data protection rules is a
right to have personal data corrected, updated or deleted when necessary. This is nothing
new as this right has been in existence since the aforementioned data quality standards
were laid down in the 1981 Data Protection Convention.
On 13 May 2014 the Court of Justice ruled on a preliminary question brought before it
by the Spanish Audiencia Nacional. The Court decided that the world’s most popular
search engine Google is responsible for removing links to personal data that are no longer
relevant to the purpose they were processed for. Data subject in the case is Costeja
González, a Spanish citizen who had social security debts in the late nineties. The
recovery of these debts led to a real-estate auction that was in accordance with an order
by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs announced in newspaper La Vanguardia
with the purpose to give the auction maximum publicity and attract as many bidders as
possible. In 1998, not every newspaper had an online version as is the case today. Also,
La Vanguardia has in the meantime made its publication and archive available online,
including the announcement mentioning Costeja González. When he realised the open
source availability of this information after a Google search on his name, he submitted
complaints with the Spanish data protection authority against the newspaper and against
Google. According to the data protection authority, the publication by La Vanguardia
was legally justified because of the order by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. As
a result, this complaint was rejected. The complaint against Google and the request that
Google remove the links to the published personal data was brought before a national
judge, who sent a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice. Contrary to
what the Advocate General to the Court of Justice concluded, the Court first of all
considered Google a data controller for the activity consisting in finding information
published or placed on the Internet by third parties, indexing it automatically, storing it
temporarily and, finally, making it available to Internet users according to a particular
order of preference. Secondly, the Court considered the search engine also responsible for
removing the links making the information concerning Costeja González available on the
Internet.
The personal data as such are not contested in this case as they are not incorrect.
Nevertheless, according to Costeja González an announcement for a real-estate auction
held in 1998, published for the purpose of ensuring a higher amount of bidders has lost
all relevance two decades later. Because personal data should be relevant for the purpose
they were processed for, and should not be stored in a database longer than is necessary
for that purpose, thus far the Court of Justice’s ruling is acceptable. Holding Google
responsible for the fact that this announcement is still available today however is focusing
on the wrong target. Google only makes information that already exists searchable and
creates an index of search results; it did not create the data, nor was Google the source of
the information as such. Requiring Google to remove the links is not the correct issue to
55 See also De Hert, P. and Papakonstantinou, V., “How the European Google Decision May Have
Nothing To Do With a Right to Be Forgotten”, Privacy Perspectives, International Association of Privacy
Professionals, 19 June 2014, available online at <privacyassociation.org/news/a/how-the-europeangoogle-
decision-may-have-nothing-to-do-with-a-right-to-be> (accessed 27 September 2014).
102 GroJIL 2(2) (2014), 90–114
address from a data protection point of view. Even after removal of the link, the
information is still available on the La Vanguardia website. Many countries have legal
provisions on the publication of certain announcements or judgments that entered into
force before the development of the Internet. In the meantime, the concept of publication
has evolved. It now also includes online publication, making newspapers available on a
wider scale and for a possibly indefinite period of time. The real issue here is the fact that
the personal data are still present on the La Vanguardia website two decades after it was
legal and necessary to publish it for a particular real-estate auction. The correct target is
therefore the national Spanish law and its data retention provisions, not Google. The
Court of Justice was logically limited by the scope of the request for a preliminary ruling
but could have at least ruled that Google was not responsible for removing the links in
question.
Besides the described data protection issue in this case, it is also dangerous to put a
private company in a position to decide whether or not the link to certain information is
relevant. A search engine’s interests are of a commercial nature and do not encompass
the rights of the data subject. This is a task for a data protection authority or a judge, not
a private company. Moreover, Google is now overwhelmed with over 90,000 requests for
the removal of links since the Court of Justice ruling.56 The company has even reinstalled
links to newspaper articles from the Guardian after the British newspaper protested their
removal.57 This shows the difficulties for a private company to be in such a position and
the inevitable tension with the freedom of information.
III.1.2. Quality Standards for the Processing of Personal Data
Personal data should be obtained and processed fairly and lawfully. This data protection
rule means that gathering personal data, and as a possible result infringing upon a
person’s right to a private life, can only be done when this encompasses lawfully
derogating from Article 8 ECHR. In other words, the gathering of personal data must be
laid down in law, it should have a legitimate aim and it should be necessary in the
interest of protecting state security, public safety, the monetary interests of the state or the
suppression of criminal offences or in the interests of protecting the data subject or the
rights and freedoms of others. Two principles complete the quality standards for data
processing: the purpose limitation principle and the data retention principle.
56 Schechner, S., “Google Grants Majority of 'Right to Be Forgotten' Requests”, The Wall Street Journal, 24
July 2014, available online at <online.wsj.com/Articles/google-grants-more-than-half-of-right-to-beforgotten-
requests-processed-so-far-1406223241?mod=yahoo_hs> (accessed 27 September 2014).
57 Lee, D., “Google reinstates 'forgotten' links after pressure”, BBC News, 4 July 2014, available online at
<bbc.com/news/technology-28157607> (accessed 27 September 2014).
Open Source Data and Criminal Investigations 103
III.1.2.1. Purpose Limitation
In the aforementioned 1973 Resolution of the CoE, purpose limitation first made its
introduction when the need was felt to control the use made of information stored in
electronic databanks.58 The purpose limitation principle means that personal data should
be stored for specified and legitimate purposes only and should not be used in a way that
is incompatible with those purposes. In other words, the purpose for which personal data
may be processed is either the original purpose they were collected for or a purpose that
is compatible therewith. What exactly constitutes a compatible purpose is not defined by
the Data Protection Convention or its explanatory report. It was not until 2013 that the
EU Data Protection Working Party published an opinion on what should be understood
by the term “compatible purpose”. 59 Rather than offering a strict definition of
compatibility, which would be too stringent, the Working Party listed key indicators to
be considered when assessing compatibility. These are the relationship between the
purposes for which the data have been collected and the purposes of further processing,
the context in which the data have been collected and the reasonable expectations of the
data subjects as to their further use, the nature of the data and the impact of the further
processing on the data subjects and the safeguards applied by the controller to ensure fair
processing and to prevent any undue impact on the data subjects. Since this is an
opinion, it is not legally binding. Nevertheless, it offers guidance to data controllers, data
protection authorities or judges deciding on the matter.
In this respect, Article 8, paragraph 2 ECHR should be referred to, since every
interference with the right to privacy should be legal and necessary in the interests of a
legitimate aim. Even with the difference between the right to privacy and the processing
of personal data described above, derogating from both is governed by the same
restrictions as Article 9 of the Data Protection Convention is modelled on the provisions
of Article 8, paragraph 2 ECHR. Lawfully derogating from the data protection standards
will be discussed in the next sub-section of this paper.
III.1.2.2. Purpose Limitation and Open Source Data
The significance of purpose limitation for open source data lies in the fact that the public
availability of open source data raises the risk of processing for incompatible purposes.
Any personal data that can be drawn from an open source, such as statements or
pictures, posted on a public social media profile can be misused for other purposes.60
58 Committee of Ministers, Resolution (73)22 on the Protection of the Privacy of Individuals vis-à-vis
Electronic Data Banks in the Private Sector, 26 September 1973. In addition a similar Resolution was
adopted on the protection of privacy of individuals vis-à-vis electronic data banks in the public sector,
Committee of Ministers, Resolution (74)29 on the Protection of the Privacy of Individuals vis-à-vis
Electronic Data Banks in the Public Sector, 20 September 1974. The Explanatory Report to Resolution
(73)22 demonstrates the fear of data abuse: ‘There is a certain risk that the user of a data bank, in order
to pay off the cost of storing data, might try to find new applications for which the data in his
possession could be used. If such applications were to go beyond the original purposes for which the
information had been compiled, a violation of the right of the persons concerned to privacy might
ensue.’
59 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation, 2 April 2013, 23–
27, available online at <ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/
files/2013/wp203_en.pdf> (accessed 27 September 2014).
60 This does not mean that a data protection infringement is the only possibly intrusion, (criminal)
offences such as defamation and slander could occur or intellectual property rights could be
disrespected. These, however, reach outside the scope of this contribution.
104 GroJIL 2(2) (2014), 90–114
The first question is what the original purpose of the open source data is. In some
cases such as academic research or journalism this can be clear, in the case of social
media the purpose for publishing personal data can range from holiday pictures to
wedding announcements, informing people of a new phone number or simply chatting.
The bottom line is communication. Perhaps one could even consider social media as a
purpose in itself combining the communication element with the element of spreading
information on oneself to a limited group of persons or to the general public.61 An
example of misusing open source data could be the public posting of a birth
announcement—including the address of the new parents—on a social media page that is
followed by an insurance company sending the parents folders for life insurance.
This seems similar to behavioural advertising but the difference is that the latter uses
cookies or similar devices installing software on Internet users’ computers to track their
surfing behaviour, enabling them to show users personalised ads on specific webpages.
The EU Data Protection Working Party has argued that the use of such identifiers
enabling the creation of very detailed user profiles can in most cases be considered
personal data processing, so users’ prior consent for installing cookies is required.62 This
does not concern open source data since the surfing behaviour can only be tracked by
specific software that is connected to companies’ websites; thus the data that are gathered
are restricted to a specified public.
When personal data on social media are publicly available, often the perception is that
these may be used for any other purpose by anyone. Nonetheless, traditional data
protection laws still apply and besides the described compatible purposes, such personal
data, may only be used when the legality and necessity requirements are fulfilled. A
typical example is a criminal investigation. The riots in several London neighbourhoods
in 2011 led not only to the arrests of those inciting the looters on Facebook and Twitter,
but also those who had unwisely posted pictures of themselves on social media with
stolen goods. In the next part of this contribution, the use of open source data for
criminal investigations and prosecutions will be discussed further.
III.1.2.3. Retention of Personal Data
Even if personal data are adequate, relevant and not excessive at the moment of their
collection, after a certain amount of time these data could be no longer adequate and
relevant in relation to the purpose they were gathered for. This was the case in the recent
ruling by the Court of Justice against Google (see above).
The longer personal data are stored for, the higher the risk of intentional or
unintentional misuse becomes.63 The data retention principle specifies that personal data
can be saved in databases for as long as is required for the purpose they are stored for.
After this period of time has passed, the data can still be retained but need to be separated
from the identifying factor, removing the quality of personal data. This separation does
not need to be permanent, it is sufficient that the identification of the person concerned
cannot be done easily.64
61 Oxford Dictionary defines social media as websites and applications that enable users to create and
share content or to participate in social networking.
62 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural advertising, 22 June
2010, 9, available online at
<ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp171_en.pdf>.
63 Committee of Ministers, Resolution (73)22 on the Protection of the Privacy of Individuals vis-à-vis
Electronic Data Banks in the Private Sector, 26 September 1973, paras. 23–25.
64 Open Source Intelligence Handbook, supra nt. 32, 42.
Open Source Data and Criminal Investigations 105
Derogating from the data retention principle is lawful under the same conditions as
explained above. In other words, personal data can be stored for longer than necessary,
but this must be laid down in law and it needs to be necessary in the interests of
protecting state security, public safety, the monetary interests of the state or the
suppression of criminal offences or in the interest of protecting the data subject or the
rights and freedoms of others. Before declaring the Data Retention Directive invalid, the
Court of Justice confirmed that the fight against serious crime is indeed of the utmost
importance in order to ensure public security. However, according to the Court such an
objective of general interest cannot in itself justify a retention measure such as that
established by the contested Directive being considered to be necessary for the purpose of
that fight. In addition, the Court criticised the text of the Directive since it covers, in a
generalised manner, all persons and all means of electronic communication as well as all
traffic data without any differentiation, limitation or exception being made in the light of
the objective of fighting against serious crime. The Directive applies even to persons for
whom there is no evidence capable of suggesting that their conduct might have a direct or
remote link with serious crime. It does not provide for any exception, meaning that it
applies even to persons whose communications are subject, according to rules of national
law, to the obligation of professional secrecy. Therefore, the Directive does not limit the
processing of personal data to what is strictly necessary.65
III.1.2.4. Data Retention and Open Source Data
A significant issue with open source data and data retention is the lack of control. The
availability of the data gives them a perceived outlaw-status. Without the data subject’s
knowledge, data identifying him or her can be copied and stored on servers, computers or
portable devices where they may remain stored for very long periods of time and may or
may not impact the data subject’s life at a much later stage, as was the case in the
aforementioned judgment against Google. Similar issues rise with public pictures or
statements on social media that can be easily found online by potential employers
negatively influencing their image of the data subject. For the reasons set out above,
search engine operators should not be made responsible for providing links to open
source data that are online.
In case a data subject would want to file a complaint against such retention and
misuse of personal data, it is thus not the search engine but the website keeping the
personal data in their databases that should be the target.
III.2. Derogating from Data Protection Standards
The lawful ways of derogating from the data protection standards have been briefly
touched upon above. Not being able to derogate from these standards would hinder
many forms of data processing that have legitimate aims and are necessary for the
functioning of a democratic society, such as the prevention, investigation and
prosecution of criminal offences. When open source data that contain or consist of
personal data are processed outside the scope of the data protection standards, the
processing should fulfil the requirements of legality and necessity.
Typically it is the necessity requirement that causes most difficulties in practice. The
requirement of necessity was introduced in order not to give a state too much leeway and
to identify a pressing social need. Still it encompasses a range of interests—fundamental
65 ECJ, 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others, C 293/12 and C 594/12, 51–58.
106 GroJIL 2(2) (2014), 90–114
values in a democratic society—that could make derogating from the standards
necessary.66 The protection of state security refers to internal and external threats, making
it legal to violate privacy rights—for example by conducting a telephone tap—in the
context of an investigation against an attack on state institutions but also the gathering of
intelligence. This derogation could therefore be used for allowing the use made of
personal data by security services provided there is a nexus with a specific investigation.
The monetary interests of the state refer to tax collection requirements and exchange
control.67 It does not entirely cover the economic well-being of the state, which was the
wording used in Article 8, paragraph 2 ECHR. It covers however a specific part of it,
namely all means of financing a state’s policies. It is important—especially for the next
part of this contribution—which the suppression of criminal offences does not require a
criminal charge has been made against the individual involved. Where Article 8,
paragraph 2 ECHR provides an exception for the prevention of disorder or crime, it
encompasses a wider range of acts than merely investigation and prosecution of a
criminal offence.
In its jurisprudence the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has added three
conditions: infringements of the right to a private life should also be precise, foreseeable
and proportionate.68 This means that every time an individual’s right to a private life is
restricted, the restriction should be counterbalanced by the assurance that it is legal and
necessary for fulfilling a legitimate aim. Besides the fact that the legal provisions
describing the allowed infringement should be precise enough, the individual should be
able to predict from the relevant law in which cases his or her personal data could be
collected and processed and these provisions should be precise and foreseeable in order
for the individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly.
Derogating from the right to a private life by processing personal data needs to be
proportionate to the legitimate aim that is pursued. Proportionality is thus a requirement
for the data itself as well as for the processing of the data. On the one hand, the personal
data gathered by means of infringing upon an individual’s privacy should not be
excessive in quantity in relation to the objective to be served, for example the annulment
of the Data Retention Directive was besides the potential use also based on the massive
and undiscriminating retention of data. On the other hand, regardless the amount of data
gathered, in cases where the same result could have been accomplished with actions that
are less privacy-intrusive the proportionality requirement is not fulfilled.
The foreseeability aspect relates to the clarity of the legal provisions on processing of
personal data as exceptions to the right to a private life. National data protection laws
should be sufficiently clear in defining what constitutes a compatible purpose due to the
interference with an individual’s private life that the use of personal data entails. It is,
however, not enough to simply provide in sufficiently clear laws. The EU Data
Protection Working Party stated that in practice, laws should not only mention the final
objectives of the legislative measure and designate the controller of the processing. They
should also specifically describe the objectives of the relevant data processing, the
66 CoE Data Protection Convention, supra nt. 2, paras. 55–56.
67 Id., para. 57.
68 European Data Protection Supervisor, Third Opinion 27 April 2007 on the Proposal for a Council
Framework Decision on the Protection of Personal Data processed in the Framework of Police and
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, O.J. C139, 23 June 2007, 5, available online at
<secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2007/07-
04-27_3dpillar_3_EN.pdf> (accessed 27 September 2014); ECtHR, 2 August 1984, Malone v. UK,
8691/79, paras. 67–68; and ECtHR, 4 May 2000, Rotaru v. Romania, 28341/95, para. 55.
Open Source Data and Criminal Investigations 107
categories of personal data to be processed, the specific purposes and means of
processing, the categories of persons authorised to process the data, the procedure to be
followed for the processing, and the safeguards against any arbitrary interference by
public authorities.69
Derogating from the rule of purpose limitation or from the data retention principle can
only be foreseeable if it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable any individual –
if need be with appropriate advice – to regulate his or her conduct. The individual should
be able to predict the consequences of certain behaviour to a reasonable degree.
However, the consequences should not be foreseeable with absolute certainty.70 This
requirement implies a responsibility on behalf of a state’s legislator to design clear-cut
and transparent provisions when enacting measures that interfere with individuals’ right
to a private life. In the judgment annulling the Data Retention Directive the Court of
Justice criticised the EU legislator for not limiting data retention to what is strictly
necessary. On EU level objective criteria should have been formulated, according to
which the national legislators could limit the periods of data retention as well as the
access rights to the databases.
IV. Evidence in Criminal Investigations
Open source data can and will be often used as evidence in criminal investigations. Based
on their impact on the human rights of the individual(s) concerned—suspect, victims,
witnesses, etc.—and on the society or community in which a criminal offence has been
committed, criminal investigations and prosecutions are regulated by a special set of
rights. The information that is used to investigate the offence and to establish the truth
will also contain personal data, whose processing is regulated by the data protection
standards discussed above. Open source data can equally be included in criminal
investigations and prosecutions, triggering separate issues. In this section, these issues are
identified after introducing the correct terminology and the rights to be considered.
IV.1. Information, Intelligence and Evidence
Before engaging in a discussion on investigations into criminal offences and the evidence
used in criminal proceedings, it is important to understand the difference between the
terms “information”, “intelligence” and “evidence”. Similar to NATO’s explanation (see
above), the UNODC explained the relevant terminology and stated that information is
raw data of any type, whilst intelligence is data that has been worked on, given added
value or significance. Information is evaluated through a process of considering it with
regard to its context through its source and reliability.71 This could, for example, include
the combining of information with other information, the “connecting the dots” process.
Obviously information can consist of open source data. By interpreting open source
data and giving them meaning, intelligence can be obtained. This is not yet evidence.
Evidence is information and intelligence that is used to establish proof of one of more
criminal offences. Which evidence is admissible and how evidence can be presented is
69 See above nt. 22, 38.
70 ECtHR, 16 February 2000, Amman v. Switzerland, 27798/95, para. 56; ECtHR, 26 April 1979, The
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 6538/74, para. 49.
71 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Criminal Intelligence – Manual for Analysts, 2011, 1-2,
available online at <unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-
Enforcement/Criminal_Intelligence_for_Analysts.pdf> (accessed 20 July 2014).
108 GroJIL 2(2) (2014), 90–114
regulated by national laws. In principle there is no objection for open source data not to
become evidence in criminal proceedings when they are relevant for the case and they are
admissible as evidence. However, when open source data consist of personal data, then
data protection standards should be complied with. Stating that police can use the
information on a public social network profile without any restriction is thus incorrect.72
Besides the described data protection standards, another set of rights should be
respected once a criminal charge is made: the so-called fair trial rights of Article 6 ECHR.
In this context it is relevant to highlight the relationship between Article 6 and Article 8
ECHR. The latter describes the right to a private life, which is not identical to the right to
data protection. At the present time only the EU has adopted a genuine right to data
protection, in the Charter on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. In the jurisprudence of
the ECtHR however, the right to private life has been used to protect personal data as
well. Therefore it is relevant to include the tension between Article 6 and Article 8 ECHR
in this discussion.
IV.2. Fair Trial Rights
Article 6 ECHR is often referred to as the fair trial right, since it encompasses inter alia
the requirement of an independent and impartial tribunal; the presumption of innocence
and the right to a confrontation of witnesses. These rights should protect the defendant
from arbitrariness or prejudgment in the course of the proceedings. Article 6 is applicable
in civil as well as in criminal proceedings. However, when criminal proceedings are
concerned, it is only applicable after a criminal charge has been made. In Deweer v.
Belgium, the ECtHR determined this moment by means of the official notification of the
allegation that the individual concerned has committed a criminal offence or an
implication thereof has been given.73 Whether or not a charge was criminal—and not
administrative—was interpreted in further case-law. For a criminal charge it is necessary
that the relevant national provisions belong to the criminal law of a state, disciplinary law
or both, and when the nature of the offence and the severity of the penalty are considered
to be criminal.74
Gathering information and intelligence is for a large part done before a criminal
charge is made; usually it is needed in order to make a criminal charge. This would mean
that the evidence derived from this information and intelligence would fall outside the
scope of Article 6. With regard to the proactive use of special investigative techniques to
collect information, the CoE has adopted specific recommendations. 75 Special
72 Voigt, S., Jansen, N. and Hinz, O., “Law Enforcement 2.0 – The Potential and the (Legal) Restrictions
of Facebook Data for Police Tracing and Investigation”, European Conference on Information Systems 2013
Completed Research, 2013, available online at <staff.science.uu.nl/~Vlaan107/ecis/files/ECIS2013-
0141-paper.pdf> (accessed on 25 July 2014).
73 ECtHR, 27 February 1980, Deweer v. Belgium, 6903/75, para. 46.
74 ECtHR, 8 June 1976, Engel and others v. the Netherlands, 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72, 5370/72,
para. 82; ECtHR, 21 February 1984, Öztürk v. Germany, 8544/79, paras. 55–56.
75 Council of Europe, Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism, 11 July 2002, available
online at <umn.edu/humanrts/instree/HR%20and%20the%20fight%20against%20terrorism.pdf>
(accessed 1 October 2014); Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec(2005)9 to member states on the
protection of witnesses and collaborators of justice, 20 April 2005, available online at
<wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=849237&Site=COE> (accessed 1 October 2014); Council of Europe,
Recommendation Rec(2005)10 to Member States on special investigation techniques in relation to
serious crimes including acts of terrorism, 20 April 2005, available online at
<wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=849269> (accessed 1 October 2014).
Open Source Data and Criminal Investigations 109
investigative techniques will not be needed when open source data are concerned. The
question remains whether open source data that consist of personal data and have been
collected before a criminal charge was made, can be used as evidence in criminal
proceedings.
IV.3. Gap between Article 6 and Article 8 ECHR
Article 8 ECHR prohibits unnecessary interference with an individual’s private life. It
can be derogated from, provided that this is laid down in clear-cut and accessible
legislation and provided it is necessary in the interests of preventing disorder or crime.
Accurate information should be provided to the competent authorities that violation of a
person’s right to a private life is in fact genuinely preventing disorder or crime.76 When it
is clear to public authorities that there is little or no risk of disorder or crime occurring,
they should refrain from interfering in a person’s private life.77
Even though it was pointed out before that in the ECtHR jurisprudence Article 8
ECHR is used to protect personal data, it can still only serve as a basic rule and not as a
detailed set of provisions for protecting personal data that are gathered for the purpose of
prevention, investigation, prosecution and punishment of criminal offences. Article 6
ECHR in its turn protects the individual against whom a criminal charge was made but
does not foresee in specific rights protecting the individual’s private life or personal data.
The ECtHR has ruled more than once on the effect of a violation of Article 8 on the
trial. In Schenk v. Switzerland and Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal, the Court considered it not
necessary to discuss Article 8 after deciding on Article 6. In the first case no breach of
Article 6 was detected due to the disputed recording of a private telephone conversation
not being the only evidence.78 In the Teixeira de Castro case the use of evidence as a
result of incitement by undercover agents meant a clear breach of the right to a fair trial,
so the Court did not see a need to consider the complaint on a breach of Article 8
separately.79 In the Khan case, however, the Court took a stand on the relationship
between Article 6 and Article 8. It ruled that a fair trial had been provided to the
applicant who received due opportunities for challenging the evidence, even after
confirming a breach of Article 8 based on the use of unlawfully installed listening
devices.80 With this judgment the Court cut the link between Article 6 and 8. The ruling
is inspired by the established ECtHR case law stating that the right to a fair trial is based
on all circumstances of the case. The proceedings as a whole, including appeal and
cassation, should be part of the assessment whether a fair trial has taken place or not.81
Rules on the admissibility of evidence as such are not within the ECtHR’s competence.
However, the Court concluded that, as long as the defendant has been given the
76 ECtHR, 6 June 2006, Segerstedt-Wiberg and others v. Sweden, 62332/00, paras. 89 and 92. See also
ECtHR, 6 September 1978, Klass and others v. Germany, 5029/71, para. 48; ECtHR, 25 December 2011,
P.G. and J.H. v. The United Kingdom, 44787/98, paras. 50–51; ECtHR, 28 April 2003, Peck v. the United
Kingdom, 44647/98, para. 67.
77 For example, police officers should refrain from entering a person’s private home in order to prevent
crime or disorder when this is highly unlikely to occur due to the absence of the person who was
considered to potentially cause a breach of the peace. See in that regard for example ECtHR, 23
September 1998, McLeod v. United Kingdom, 72/1997/856/1065, paras. 56–57.
78 ECtHR, 12 July 1988, Schenk v. Switzerland, 10862/84, paras. 49 and 53.
79 ECtHR, 9 June 1998, Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal, 44/1997/828/1034, paras. 39 and 43.
80 ECtHR, 4 October 2000, Khan v. United Kingdom, 35394/97, paras. 38–40.
81 ECtHR, 16 December 1992, Edwards v. United Kingdom, 13071/87, para. 39; ECtHR, 26 October 1984,
De Cubber v. Belgium, 9186/80, para. 30.
110 GroJIL 2(2) (2014), 90–114
opportunity to challenge the evidence brought against him and the evidence is reliable
and not gathered by means of entrapment or inducement, encroaching on the right to a
private life can still produce admissible evidence.82
Taking all circumstances of the case into account, three considerations should be
made. First, the evidence resulting from the breach of privacy should not be the only
evidence in the case. In practice, no prosecutor would take the risk basing a whole case
on such evidence, especially if this evidence would be open source data. Open source
data are not necessarily reliable or accurate and would therefore have to be accompanied
by other evidence. Second, the nature of the violation of the right to a private life should
be considered. Evidence resulting from entrapment or incitement cannot lead to a fair
trial due to its effect on the reliability of the evidence. No entrapment or incitement will
be needed to collect open source data. Uncertainty regarding their accuracy and
reliability is inherently linked to the make-up of open source data. Third, the right to
challenge the evidence means that the person concerned should be given the opportunity
to object to the use of such data as evidence implying that he or she needs to be informed
of the use of these data.
IV.4. Personal Open Source Data in Criminal Investigations
IV.4.1. Accuracy and Reliability
Since open source data can theoretically be produced and distributed by any person, their
accuracy and reliability is difficult to verify. When using such data for an investigation
into a criminal offence or an offender, sufficient care should be taken to check source and
content of the data. Law enforcement and intelligence authorities have implemented
systems for verifying such data. Already in 1987 the CoE recognised the importance of
these issues for police authorities in Recommendation (87)15. 83 With this
recommendation, a group of experts drafted a special set of data protection principles for
the specific tasks of the police while at the same time adapting them to take account of
particular requirements, notably in respect of the suppression of criminal offences.84
The explanatory text of the recommendation rightfully states that the retaining of
personal data in a police file may lead to a permanent record and indiscriminate storage
of data, which may prejudice the rights and freedoms of the individual. It is also in the
interests of the police that it has only accurate and reliable data at its disposal for the
performance of its tasks. For these reasons, these guidelines encourage the
implementation of a system of data classification; suggest distinctions between
corroborated data and uncorroborated data, including assessments of human behaviour;
between facts and opinions; between reliable information (and the various shades
thereof) and conjecture; between reasonable cause to believe that information is accurate,
82 ECtHR, 4 October 2000, Khan v. United Kingdom, 35394/97, para. 36.
83 Council of Europe, Recommendation No.R(87) 15 regulating the use of personal data in the police sector, 17
September 1987, available online at
<wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=21
96553&SecMode=1&DocId=694350&Usage=2> (accessed 1 October 2014).
84 Even though this is not a legally binding instrument, it was explicitly endorsed in legally binding
instruments covering police cooperation, such as the Europol Decision, the Schengen Implementation
Convention as far as police cooperation is concerned, the Prüm Convention and the decision on the
stepping-up of cross-border crime and the decision concerning access for consultation of the Visa
Information System (VIS) by designated authorities of Member States and by Europol.
Open Source Data and Criminal Investigations 111
and a groundless belief in its accuracy.85 For example Europol has not only included
Recommendation (87)15 in their standard of data protection,86 the EU’s agency for
police cooperation also has a system in place for distinguishing incoming information
based on its reliability.
In the current debates on the revision of the EU’s data protection legal framework, the
proposed directive for data protection in criminal matters included an additional
provision on distinguishing personal data in accordance with their degree of accuracy
and reliability. Also, the distinction between personal data based on facts and personal
data based on personal assessments has been introduced in the text of the proposed
directive.87 Upon adoption of the proposed directive, making such distinction would then
be mandatory for all data controllers processing personal data within the scope of this
legal instrument.
IV.4.2. Necessity
Information will be collected for the purpose of a criminal investigation for a large part
before a criminal charge is made; often it will be collected in order to make a criminal
charge in the first place. This means that the protection of Article 6 ECHR is not
activated yet, but the collected information can include data on suspects, witnesses as
well as victims, and it can range from hard facts to suspicion and mere speculation.
These can contain personal data so the data protection standards should apply. In most
cases this would mean derogating from the standards as the use of personal data for
criminal investigations will be an incompatible purpose as well as a possible breach of the
data retention principle. Since derogating from the data protection standards is only
lawful when it is laid down in law and necessary in the interests of – in this case – the
suppression of criminal offences, the precise meaning of necessity in this respect deserves
a closer look.
In the above explanation, necessity was referred to as the link between personal data
and the purpose for which they are processed, in this case an investigation into one or
more criminal offences. It does not explicitly require a criminal charge to be made,
allowing a wider form of information—including proactive—gathering of personal data.
Defining this link however, remains a nearly impossible task. In its assessment of the
necessity of the mass retention of data in accordance with the Data Retention Directive
the EU Court of Justice stated that the fight against serious crime, in particular against
organised crime and terrorism, is indeed of the utmost importance in order to ensure
public security and its effectiveness may depend to a great extent on the use of modern
investigative techniques. The Court continued nonetheless that such an objective of
general interest, however fundamental it may be, does not, in itself, justify a retention
85 Council of Europe, Recommendation No.R(87) 15 regulating the use of personal data in the police sector –
Explanatory Memorandum, 17 September 1987, para. 52, available online at
<wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=704861&Site=CM> (accessed 28 November 2014).
86 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol) (2009/371/JHA),
OJ L121/37, 15 May 2009, available online at
<europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/council_decision.pdf> (accessed 1 October 2014).
87 European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for a directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing
of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such
data (COM(2012)0010 – C7-0024/2012 – 2012/0010(COD)), 12 March 2014, available online at
<europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2014-0219>
(accessed 1 October 2014).
112 GroJIL 2(2) (2014), 90–114
measure such as that established by Directive 2006/24 being considered necessary for the
purpose of that fight.88 If the fight against serious crime is too wide to justify necessity,
then a more specific link must exist. The 1987 CoE Recommendation regulating the use
of personal data in the police sector gives further indications. 89 With regard to the
collection of personal data, the recommendation defines the derogation regarding the
suppression of criminal offences as the prevention of a real danger or the suppression of a
specific criminal offence. “Real danger” should then be understood as not being restricted
to a specific offence or offender but includes any circumstances where there is reasonable
suspicion that serious criminal offences have been or might be committed to the
exclusion of unsupported speculative possibilities.90
Translated into the issue of open source data, this means that it is a lawful exception
to the data protection standards when open source data consisting of personal data are
collected for the purpose of investigations into a specific criminal offence or offender, or
in cases where a reasonable suspicion exists that one or more serious criminal offences
have been or might be committed. Purely speculative collection of data—so-called fishing
expeditions—does not concern necessary data collection and does not fall within the
scope of the lawful derogation.
IV.4.3. Vigilantism
When discussing the topic of open source data and criminal investigations, the relatively
recent trend of vigilantism using open sources on social media or the Internet should not
be overlooked. What is meant by “vigilantism” or “vigilante justice" is a movement
among citizens who take justice into their own hands and—often violently—react to
alleged offenders out of discontent with law enforcement’s action or lack thereof.
Vigilantism in itself is not new, however it has been facilitated in recent years by the
expansion of social media.
With estimates ranging from 80-90% of intelligence coming from open sources,91 it is
unsurprising that open sources are abused by persons outside the law enforcement and
intelligence community. The fact that open source data are publicly available means that
they are often viewed by the public as being used freely. This does not only have data
protection violations as a consequence. Referring back to the aforementioned issue of
88 Court of Justice of the European Union, 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others, C
293/12 and C 594/12, para. 51.
89 Council of Europe, Recommendation No.R(87) 15 regulating the use of personal data in the police sector, 17
September 1987, available online at
<wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=21
96553&SecMode=1&DocId=694350&Usage=2> (accessed 1 October 2014).
90 In the text of the recommendation a helpful example is added: reasonable suspicion that unspecified
drugs were being illegally brought into a country through a port by unidentified private yachts would
justify the collection of data on all such yachts using that port, but not all yachts, their owners and
passengers using every port in that country. See Council of Europe, Recommendation No.R(87) 15
regulating the use of personal data in the police sector, 17 September 1987, available online at
<wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=21
96553&SecMode=1&DocId=694350&Usage=2> (accessed 1 October 2014).
91 Congressional Research Service, Best, R.A. and Cumming, A., Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues
for Congress, 5 December 2007, available online at <fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34270.pdf> (accessed on
26 July 2014), 4.
Open Source Data and Criminal Investigations 113
accuracy and reliability of open source data, in cases of vigilantism, abusing such data
can have fatal consequences.92
V. Reflections on Open Source Data
Open source data may appear, to the general public, as having an outlaw status and open
to all kinds of use. This assumption is essentially incorrect. When open source data
contain or consist of data that can identify or enable to identify an individual, they may
not be used at free will. Even when the user is a law enforcement or intelligence officer
doing his or her job to prevent or investigate a criminal offence, the data protection
legislation should be complied with. Use of open source data for the suppression of
criminal offences allows derogating from the personal data protection principles;
nonetheless the following points deserve special attention.
Open source data are not necessarily verified, accurate or reliable. In comparison to
already verified data, law enforcement and intelligence authorities have to invest more
resources in organising, filtering and subsequently using open source data that are
relevant for preventing and investigating criminal offences. The current revision of the
EU’s data protection legal framework makes the distinction of personal data based on
different degrees of accuracy and reliability mandatory for data processing for the
purpose of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the
execution of criminal penalties.
Collecting and processing open source data for targeted prevention and investigation
into criminal offences constitutes a lawful derogation from the data protection standards.
Mass or untargeted personal data collection, however, does not. Regardless of personal
data being open source or closed source, the necessity and proportionality requirements
apply.
A different light is shed on these data protection standards however by the ECtHR
jurisprudence that has ruled on an independent relationship between the right to a private
life and the right to a fair trial. When the person concerned had the opportunity over the
course of the proceedings to challenge the evidence used against him, an interference
with his privacy can still lead to a fair trial. Theoretically, this could endanger the
necessity and proportionality requirements, also with regard to open source data. It is
essential to closely monitor any future jurisprudence concerning this subject.
Open source data are available in vast amounts on account of the Internet and search
engines such as Google, and they are tempting. In that sense, they are also unforgiving
with regard to past mistakes and unfortunate life events. It may sound unfair to call this a
“new reality”, since the use of the Internet and social networks has increased for several
decades already. However, the judicial and the legislative process are slow and
cumbersome, or, to quote two privacy experts in a reaction to the judgment against
Google: ‘The CJEU decision is trying to balance things, perhaps assisting individuals a
bit more than they deserve, until we all—Internet users, the Internet and Internet
companies—get to better grips with the, still new, medium.’93 On top of getting used to
92 For example The Guardian, Morris, S., Investigations opened into vigilante murder of man mistaken for
paedophile, 29 October 2013, available online at <theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/29/vigilantemurder-
paedophile-bristol-bijan-ebrahimi> (accessed on 26 July 2014).
93 Privacy Perspectives, De Hert, P. and Papakonstantinou, V., How the European Google Decision May Have
Nothing To Do With a Right to Be Forgotten, 19 June 2014, available online at
<privacyassociation.org/news/a/how-the-european-google-decision-may-have-nothing-to-do-with-aright-
to-be/> (accessed 30 July 2014).
114 GroJIL 2(2) (2014), 90–114
this relatively new reality, modernising the data protection legal framework is an
undertaking with many stakeholders and diverging interests at stake. Legislators as well
as judges are realising that the new questions that have surfaced need answers and by the
time an answer has been found to one question, another issue will have appeared. The
aftermath of the judgment against Google shows exactly how challenging this new reality
is for those who perform a supervising role in it. It is of fundamental importance that in
getting used to this new reality and adapting the existing legal framework to it, we do not
lose touch with the data protection principles that have survived technological
developments for several decades already.
The particular issues and questions that are triggered by the use of open source data
warrant thorough and detailed reflection, although, this is not only the case for legislators
and judges. Also the general public should reflect thoroughly on how to behave
appropriately in this new reality. Prevention being the best cure, the simple awareness of
what could happen once personal data are posted publicly can make a difference. This
does not mean that the future of Internet and social media should come with a warning
similar to the Miranda rights referred to in the title of this paper; it means that the debate
on open source data should not only be held in parliaments and around congress tables
but also in living rooms and around kitchen tables.
*
www.grojil.org

Annex 495
Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young, Terrorism, Spoiling, and the Resolution of Civil Wars,
77 J. of Politics 115 (2015)

Terrorism, Spoiling, and the Resolution
of Civil Wars
Michael G. Findley, University of Texas at Austin
Joseph K. Young, American University
Civil war combatants use terrorism frequently, yet we understand little about terrorism’s effects on war resolution. It
is assumed that the primary combatants to a war hold a veto over resolution, but less attention has been devoted to
whether the use of terrorism can derail peace agreements. We contend that even terrorism, a generally low intensity
form of violence, can make civil war peace processes less likely to conclude in a peaceful, durable resolution. Using
a new and large geographically coded database of terrorism in civil wars, we find that the use of terrorism can spoil
peace processes by prolonging the duration of a war hastening the time until recurrence. Our argument and results add
to the literature on civil wars by explicating the process linking terrorism to war duration and outcome. More generally,
the results underscore the importance of investigating different varieties of political violence during civil conflict.
In civil wars throughout the world, achieving durable peace
is difficult because of the role of leaders and groups that
seek to destabilize and often derail peace processes. The
behavior of such leaders and groups has resulted in the failure
of peace processes in contexts as diverse as Rwanda, Northern
Ireland, and Bosnia, which has resulted in the resumption
and sometimes expansion of civil war. Until Stedman’s (1997)
work on what he termed spoilers of signed peace agreements,
conflict resolution scholars paid little direct attention to the
challenges that these leaders or groups pose to peace. In recent
years, a number of studies have appeared suggesting that
spoiling could have dire consequences, but nearly all of them
lack systematic evidence about the effects of violence in peace
processes. By contrast, several arguments suggest that spoilers
should not influence the peace because signatories to an
agreement have already factored in potential spoiling when
signing agreements (Nilsson 2008). Additionally, Kydd and
Walter (2002) offer a formal model that suggests that instead
of the tactics of the spoiler mattering, peace will endure
depending on the perceived weakness of the moderates making
the deal.
In this paper, we take a first step toward more complete
and systematic tests of the effects of violence on the outcome
of peace processes by considering how terrorism affects civil
war resolution. We investigate why terrorism may have a
negative impact on combatants’ ability to reach an agreement
and then, if signed, implement that agreement. A variety
of motives underlie the use of terrorist violence during
war, which we investigate, and regardless of motivation,
such acts likely complicate moves toward peace. The case of
Angola is illustrative.
In Angola, several peace agreements were signed in the
early 1990s, but as the peace process ramped up, so too did
terrorist violence by UNITA, the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola. Arguably the violence destabilized
the other parties’ (the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
commitment to the peace process as well. Figure 1a shows a
Mike Findley ([email protected]) is associate professor, Department of Government, 3.108 Batts Hall, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712.
Joseph Young ([email protected]) is associate professor, School of Public Affairs and School of International Service, 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, NW,
American University, Washington, DC 20016.
Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in the paper are available in the JOP Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard
.edu/dataverse/jyoung). An online appendix with supplementary material is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/682400.
The Journal of Politics, volume 77, number 4. Published online August 6, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/682400
q 2015 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved. 0022-3816/2015/7704-0017$10.00 1115
timeline of events from 1977 to 1997. The dashed vertical lines
represent three signed peace agreements as defined by the
Uppsala Conflict Database (Uppsala 2006). The connected,
dotted line represents the number of terrorist events over
time occurring in civil war zones. It is clear that the number
of events is very low until the peace process gains momentum
in the late 1980s, at which time terrorism begins
to ramp up. There is a small increase in the number of events
in the year prior to the first agreement, and then there are
two large increases in the years following the first two peace
agreements, potentially contributing to their demise. These
data thus illustrate the possibility that terrorism in civil wars
may have spoiled steps toward peace.
The case of Bangladesh offers a different perspective. The
conflict between the government and the United People’s Party
of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and its armed wing, the Shanti
Bahini, occurred for nearly two decades, from 1977 to 1997. At
issue were indigenous rights for those in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts and some form of autonomy from the central government.
After a lengthy peace process, the government and
representatives for the rebels signed the Chittagong Hill Tracts
Peace Accord. As figure 1b demonstrates, terrorism was common
in the context of the conflict, but it did not spike during
the period of peace agreement implementation. In fact, terrorism
reached its apogee in 1996, then declined precipitously
in the year leading up to the agreement. After the agreement
was signed in December of 1997, terrorism remained relatively
low compared to the average levels during the conflict.
In contrast to Angola, terrorist acts by the violent wing of
the United People’s party did not spoil an existing peace and
civil war did not recur after the signing of the accord. Terrorist
acts by this group, however, may have contributed to
increasing the duration of the conflict, especially in the early
1990s.
While these examples deal with terrorism influencing the
duration of conflict, spoiling could also be related to ending
the peace and bringing about a new civil conflict. A deadly
bombing in August 1998 by the Real Irish Republican Army,
an IRA splinter group, for example, attempted to restart the
civil conflict inNorthern Ireland.1 While the so-called Troubles
occurred off and on for decades, peace was near. The more
extreme R-IRA bombing had no effect, however, in spoiling the
peace as the act was widely condemned and the Good Friday
Agreements that effectively ended the Troubles was reached.
These case discussions briefly illustrate the potential effects
terrorism might have on the ending and recurrence of civil
war. While there are some case examples of how terrorism
might cause recurrence or not and of why terrorism might
lead to a longer conflict or not, as with most of the literature,
they are anecdotal. What we lack is a broader investigation
of how spoiling behavior and specifically terrorism influences
these civil war processes.
In this paper, we provide an empirical test of the consequences
of terrorism for war endings and recurrence in all
civil wars between 1970 and 2002. We use data on terrorist
events worldwide (LaFree and Dugan 2007) and map the
data subnationally to civil war zones to isolate how localized
terrorism affects peace processes. Most terrorist events
worldwide are geocoded (geographic coordinates are coded),
and we spatially join the terrorist events to geocoded data
on civil war zones in order to identify events that relate to
civil wars. All attacks against military and government targets
are dropped to avoid capturing violence that is a regu-
Figure 1. Peace and violence trajectories in Angola (a) and Bangladesh (b).
1. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program codes the conflict as minor for
most of the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. They code this minor conflict
ending in 1991, then a recurrence of conflict due to the Omagh bombing
in 1998. See http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?idp163#.
1116 / Terrorism, Spoiling, and Civil War Resolution Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young
lar part of the civil war. Using event-history models, we test
the hypothesis that terrorism should lengthen the time until
conflict ends and shorten the time until conflict recurs.
In what follows, we first examine literature on terrorism
and spoiling during and after civil wars. Extant literature focuses
primarily on the post-agreement period, and as such
we develop other conceptual and theoretical arguments about
the consequences of terrorist violence during and after wartime.
The argument identifies testable expectations about the
consequences of terrorist violence on the course of a peace
process. Following this, we detail the research design and empirical
tests, which evaluate the hypotheses and provide a
number of implications for the civil war literature. A primary
lesson that emerges from the analysis is that terrorism
is a consequential means to spoil peace processes. Scholars
and practitioners should thus be cautious about ignoring
the potential destabilizing influence that terrorist violence
can have.
TERRORISM AND SPOILING IN CIVIL WARS
Terrorism is used for a variety of reasons both in and out of
civil war. With a fewexceptions (e.g., Findley and Young 2012b;
Kalyvas 2004; Sambanis 2008), very little work examines the
role of terrorism during civil wars. Some have considered violence
against civilians for purposes of inducing compliance
(Balcells 2010; Kalyvas 2006), outbidding rival groups (Bloom
2005), facilitating bargaining with governments (Hultman 2007;
Lake 2002), intimidating or outlasting other groups (Kydd and
Walter 2006), as a substitute for guerrilla tactics conditional on
state response (Carter 2015), and recruitment (Humphreys and
Weinstein 2006).
While it has many purposes more generally, one key role of
terrorism when used during war is to spoil attempts at achieving
durable peace (Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Kydd and Walter 2002,
2006). Some actors may hope to stop the peace process and return
to war, whereas others may not intend to cause the breakdown
of peace but could instead use terrorist violence to extract
further concessions, for example. But a crucial question remains,
if terrorist violence is used, regardless of the motivation, does it
derail the peace process by prolonging the time until settlement
or hastening the time until recurrence?
Spoilers and spoiling
A fundamental challenge to understanding the role of spoiling
is to clarify (i) how to identify spoilers and (ii) when they are
active. Much current work on spoilers identifies any group that
attempted to derail a peace process completely, whether successful
or not, as a spoiler. Implicitly, this approach assumes
that only certain actors are problematic—those that attempted
to stop the peace process. It neglects the possibility that, a
priori, all groups have the potential to use strategies, such as
terrorism, that risk subverting the peace. Furthermore, identifying
spoilers based on behavioral traits fails to distinguish
between actors with different intentions. Some groups use
various strategieswith the intention towreck the peace process
completely and return to war. Other groups might use these
same strategies with the simple intention of increasing their
bargaining leverage, hoping not to cause the complete breakdown
of the peace process, but nonetheless they risk derailing
it permanently.
Analytically, labeling groups as spoilers is laden with pitfalls.
Shifting the emphasis from a group label to an action
helps solve the problem. Rather than discuss spoilers, one
can think in terms of the action of spoiling, in which various
forms of behavior, such as terrorism, may affect the course
and the outcome of the peace process.2 Alternatively, because
all combatants in a civil war use various violent strategies
to achieve their goals—many of which threaten peace processes—
one could maintain group labels but refer to groups
as potential spoilers. In the context of this paper, each combatant
(potential spoiler) uses terrorism to alter the course
and outcome of a war and peace process and, whether intending
to or not, risks complicating or derailing the process
completely.
A related difficulty surrounding the concept of spoilers
is that these groups are often thought to be marginal actors
who espouse fringe or extremist preferences and who do not
have a chance at being included in a postwar settlement. That
is, these groups cannot compete with the primary combatants;
therefore, they resort to terrorism or other lower-level violence
in an attempt to upset others’ chances. With few exceptions,
marginal groups are largely considered irrelevant,
especially if they are using small-scale tactics such as terrorism.
Perhaps because such groups are considered only marginal
actors, the civil war literature focuses more extensively
on two primary combatants: a government and a single opposition
group (e.g., Mason and Fett 1996; Walter 2002).
Recent work contends that we should look beyond twoactor
models and incorporate a role for greater heterogeneity
of combatants. Some have argued, for example, that certain
actors are “veto players.” Cunningham (2006) argues that
there could be more than two relevant actors but that additional
actors must be fairly coherent, structured groups, which
neglects the possibility that less cohesive groups can have
2. Asal et al. (2012) discuss a similar debate over focusing on actors
involved in terrorism vs. terrorist acts and the implications for research on
the topic. Also, on different conceptualizations of spoiling, Findley (2007)
contends that spoiling may not just be violent but could include a range of
nonviolent strategies.
Volume 77 Number 4 October 2015 / 1117
an influence by other means. Third-party extremists, for example,
could be weak structurally or in their capabilities yet
still be able to have an influence over moderates or the government
(Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Kydd and Walter 2002).
This research highlights important possibilities about the
role of multiple actors, and an important next step is to begin
more systematic empirical investigations.
Moving further from a two-actor understanding of spoilers,
one could further distinguish between groups and individuals
as potential spoilers. Even individuals typically act
on behalf of a group, however. Jonas Savimbi in Angola, for
example, is widely blamed for derailing the 1991 peace agreement
with the MPLA-led government, but he relied on the
rebel group UNITA to carry out the violence. In some cases,
potential spoiler groups are fairly cohesive entities, whereas
at other times they are fractured and may stretch the definition
of a group. Regardless, it may not take an excessive number
of people to engage in terrorist violence that risks spoiling
the peace.
Empirical studies of spoiling
Theoretical and conceptual work on spoiling is abundant,
with much research arguing that potential spoilers are dangerous
to the peace process (e.g., Greenhill and Major 2007;
Newman and Richmond 2006; Stedman 1997; Zahar 2003).
Despite significant attention directed to potential spoilers,
systematic empirical analysis is limited. The most prominent
empirical studies are insightful but incorporate only
brief empirical discussions, focusing on a limited number
of cases (Greenhill and Major 2007; Johnston, n.d.; Newman
and Richmond 2006; Stedman 1997). Other studies empirically
analyze single cases, primarily referencing terrorism
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Bosnian war (e.g.,
Braithwaite, Foster, and Sobek 2010; Kydd and Walter 2002).
Some scholars have turned to cross-country statistical analyses
examining the duration of peace following war. Implicitly,
these studies incorporate a potential role for violence
that risks spoiling the peace but only indirectly and
not as a primary objective (e.g., Fortna 2004a; Nilsson 2008).
Nilsson (2008), for example, examines the duration of peace
following civil war settlements between 1989 and 2003. She
posits that groups signing peace deals are likely to anticipate
violence from excluded groups and only sign if they
believe they can withstand post-agreement violence. Thus,
a commonly held assumption that only deals including all
potential spoilers should increase the likelihood that peace
will last might not be accurate.
Nilsson’s 2008 work is an important step toward sorting
out and testing hypotheses applicable to spoiling and opens
further avenues of research. The empirical analysis, however,
only considers the post-settlement behavior of warring
parties. Although this is consistent with what Stedman (1997)
originally outlined, it excludes the possibility of understanding
the consequences of violence earlier in the peace process.
That is, like most other works in this area, it is unable
to account for the peace agreements that did not happen
when groups successfully prevented agreements from being
signed in the first place. While Nilsson is doubtful that groups
can derail peace when they are outside of an agreement, she
(2008) finds that spoilers have no effect on the peace. Nilsson’s
key explanatory variables are the number of groups and
exclusion/inclusion from the process—neither of these factors
directly proxy violence that can spoil the peace later.
Other studies have begun to consider the role of violence
during peace processes more directly, but they are typically
limited to smaller comparisons of cases (Darby and MacGinty
2003; Höglund 2008). Cross-country empirical analyses explicitly
devoted to violence during peace processes have only
begun to address the topic more directly. Ayres (2006) attempts
a direct analysis using seven civil wars and measures
15 active potential spoilers; he finds preliminary support for
the hypotheses that (i) rates of attacks and (ii) numbers of
casualties may have an impact on whether groups “win.” Although
this is an important start, the study relies on a limited
number of cases, does not examine multiple stages of
the peace process, and does not move beyond a descriptive
application of the data.
In sum, existing work makes important contributions to
the study of spoilers, yet it also stimulates other possibilities
for research. Most striking, perhaps, very little research
has examined the consequences of violence on whether peace
processes are spoiled. Further, almost no research systematically
addresses violence over the course of a peace process,
as opposed to following a peace agreement. Yet we might expect
that potential spoilers would be most active in using
strategies such as terrorism to alter the course and outcome
of the peace process from the outset. The following theoretical
section makes a case for this possibility and generates
testable hypotheses.
TERRORIST VIOLENCE AND SPOILING THE PEACE
Peace emerges only as part of a long and complicated process
that includes negotiations, agreements, and post-agreement
cooperation (Darby 2001; Walter 2002). For example, Hamas
has consistently used terrorist tactics prior to (and during)
negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian
Authority. In the Chechen conflict, terrorism occurred
prior to reaching agreements as well as after the
agreements were signed, which resulted in the resumption
of war. In each case the direct motives for terrorism varied,
1118 / Terrorism, Spoiling, and Civil War Resolution Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young
but the terrorist violence had the effect of spoiling moves
toward peace.
Why do groups use violence during
peace processes?
Our primary motivation is to explain the effect of terrorist
violence once undertaken. To understand this effect, however,
first we need to consider what motivates groups to
use terrorist violence. Typically, groups hope to obtain some
outcome from the civil war or associated peace process. During
war, combatants might seek a military victory on the battlefield,
which guarantees full control over the postwar settlement
terms; military victory, however, is often the most
difficult outcome to achieve (Bohrer and Hartzell 2005; Fortna
2004b). When combatants pursue a negotiated agreement,
they are vying for a share in the outcome of peace accords,
which include a variety of factors, such as property rights,
electoral rules, disarmament, territory, and amnesty for political
prisoners (Darby and MacGinty 2000; Wood 2006).
The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, for example,
had a number of provisions, including a power-sharing
parliamentary assembly and a coalition government (both
with Catholic and Protestant representation), disarmament
of paramilitary factions within two years, and the release of
prisoners charged with terrorist acts. In some cases, groups
seek a share in these benefits and use violence to force their
way into contention for these goods. In other cases, groups
oppose the particular settlement terms being negotiated because
the proposed changes fundamentally threaten the
group’s interests, such as with Bosnian Serbs during the
Vance-Owen peace process, who effectively derailed this push
for peace. These groups thus use violence to undermine any
serious discussion. Terrorism, in particular, has been used
in a diverse set of conflicts to attempt to achieve these various
goals.
Bargaining during wartime is a complex process full of
uncertainties. Because of the uncertainties, as the peace process
progresses and becomes more institutionalized, groups
must repeatedly (i) attempt to shape the process, (ii) reevaluate
whether they are obtaining their objectives, and
(iii) stop the process if they are losing out in important
ways. Terrorist violence can occur anytime during the entire
process, and it is one means by which groups try to achieve
their goals. Throughout the peace process, groups might
only seek a temporary interruption to gain more leverage
over future negotiations or implementation. This is important
because it acknowledges that groups might use violence
for different purposes at various stages of the peace process
(see, e.g., Darby and MacGinty 2003; Höglund 2008). During
early negotiations, for example, groups might use violence
to demonstrate the necessity of being included in the negotiations
and agreement (i.e., that they could wreck the agreement
down the road, and so others should be aware). During
implementation, the violence might be used to derail the
peace process completely. Or it might be used to force the
renegotiation of certain terms of a settlement. Despite the variety
of motivations that can change both within and across
conflicts, the violence always has the potential to derail the
peace process.
The consequences of terrorist violence
This perspective raises the issue of what happens to the
peace process when terrorist violence is used: does it result
in spoiled peace? Kydd and Walter (2002) argue that violence
by a faction of one of the parties creates distrust in the
groups that are actively negotiating or that signed onto an
agreement.3 Not only does the violence generate mistrust,
it can intimate a general lack of commitment to the peace
process in its current form. Even in cases where groups use
violence intending to force their way into the peace process,
the immediate effect can be to communicate disapproval
of the current process and undermine others’ valuations of
the likelihood of successfully agreeing to peace. The violence
could be the ticket into the peace process, but other groups
will lack short-term assurances that violence will eventually
subside and that the group using violent tactics intends to
act in good faith. This should influence the duration of the
conflict.
Terrorist violence by moderate or extremist factions may
also provoke a harsh response from the government. Although
the harsh government response could hurt those
using violence, it often leads to the anger, injury, or death of
once-neutral individuals or groups. This collateral damage
can lead to more recruits and renewed interest in fighting
against the government. Importantly, this process also potentially
alters the distribution of capabilities among the combatants
(Lake 2002).
According to rationalist explanations of war, both of these
processes create uncertainty about the distribution of capabilities,
the resolve of the combatants, or the credibility of
any commitments that parties negotiate with each other.
As Mattes and Savun (2009) argue, agreements to end civil
war need to provide commitment mechanisms to reduce
fear and costs to noncompliance. Agreements that do not
3. In the context of intragroup relations, violence actually could increase
trust between parties, such as when groups use violence against
subgroups that they are trying to keep in line. In this case, violence demonstrates
to the opponent that the main group can control its followers.
Such intragroup violence, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
Volume 77 Number 4 October 2015 / 1119
resolve these commitment problems should then lead to an
increased likelihood of recurrence. In the absence of clear
information about these factors, combatants are not likely
to cooperate with each other. In sum, whether groups are
deciding to reach an agreement or implement the agreement,
violent behavior only undermines parties’ abilities
to continue their support of the peace process in the short
term.
This discussion leads to a negative expectation. Terrorist
violence by moderates or extremists should make it more
difficult to reach and implement a peace agreement. In some
cases, such as Northern Ireland, parties learn over time that
the moderates intend to cooperate despite violence by
peripheral groups (such as the Real IRA). In these events,
it takes significant time for the parties to develop the trust
to move forward despite the violence. This suggests that violence
does make agreements and implementation more likely
to be spoiled, but it also indicates that violence affects the
duration until a peace settlement as well as the duration until
recurrence of a war should the peace fall apart.
Terrorism, as compared to other forms of violence in a
civil conflict may be unique in its ability to spoil either trust
between moderates (Kydd and Walter 2002) or other conditions
that are necessary to either generate or maintain a
peaceful equilibrium. Abrahms (2013), like the rationalist
models of civil conflict, suggests that terrorism is a credible
signal of resolve in a conflict. In contrast to arguments that
suggest that terrorism may be an effective tool at extracting
concessions from a state, Abrahms (2013) argues that
extreme tactics by the rebels demonstrate to the state that
negotiation is impossible with the group. In short, terrorism
leads to a reduction in the willingness of governments
to reach a negotiated settlement even when the demands
of the group are relatively moderate.4 Thus, we hypothesize
the following:
H1. As terrorism occurs more frequently, the duration
until a war ends should increase.
H2. As terrorism occurs more frequently, the duration
of postwar peace should decrease.
Note that these hypotheses state expectations about what
happens to the peace process when groups engage in terrorism.
We expect that terrorism impedes progress, making
wars longer and postwar peace shorter. The peace process
might not be even-handed or optimal, and therefore the violence
might be justified by the participants, but such questions
are beyond the scope of this paper.
These hypotheses suggest that terrorism is a strategy
by an opponent to achieve an objective, either continuing a
conflict or bringing about a new one. Abrahms (2006, 2012)
suggests that terrorism is a losing strategy and thus attempts
to achieve even these process goals are likely self-defeating.
By contrast, others contend that terrorism is successful (Pape
2005). Among them, Thomas (2014), using data from African
civil wars, finds that terrorism can be an effective tool to
gain concessions from the state and to get a seat at the negotiation
table. Still others might argue that when the government
and moderates reach an agreement, then terrorism
may occur concurrently with long wars as the government
works with moderates to slowly outlast the violence, which
would be consistent with hypothesis 1 but for different reasons.
While our tests cannot resolve the debate over the relevance
and effectiveness of terrorism, they should provide
evidence that will begin to address the underlying mechanisms.
In the following section, we discuss the research design
and accompanying empirical tests.
RESEARCH DESIGN
To test these hypotheses on the consequences of terrorism,
we consider two outcomes of interest. One dependent
variable is the time to the end of the war. The end of a war
is coded dichotomously as either (1) ended or (0) not ended
in a given country-month, based on Cunningham (2006). Because
we are interested in whether terrorist violence prevents
the war from ending, which means that the war lasts longer,
we use a duration modeling approach. The unit of observation
in these models is the civil war–month. Our spatial domain
is all countries experiencing civil war, and the temporal
domain includes all months during these conflicts from
1970 to 2002.5 Again, we expect that increases in terrorism
events will increase the time to the end of a civil war.
The second dependent variable is time to recurrence of
war once a previous civil war ended. In this second analysis,
we use data from Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2008)
on recurrence of war, which is coded dichotomously as
(1) war recurred or (0) war did not recur in a given year.
Because of a lack of monthly data in postconflict years, the
unit of observation for these data is the country-year for a
4. Terrorism can also occur from pro-government groups and thus
reduce the credibility of the state to comply with peace agreements.
5. We are limited by the available terrorism data to this time period.
We do not expect, however, that our inferences would change if we were
able to extend the data back to 1945. Prior to World War II, as Kalyvas
and Balcells (2010) suggest, international factors may influence the patterns
of internal violence in different ways. Once terrorism data are geographically
coded from 2002 to the present, future research should consider
whether the patterns change in the post-9/11 period.
1120 / Terrorism, Spoiling, and Civil War Resolution Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young
state that has previously experienced a civil war. Our spatial
domain again is all countries that have experienced the ending
of a civil war. The number of observations is necessarily
limited as compared to the first analysis, as we include observations
once a war has ended and do not include observations
for countries that have never experienced a civil
war. Our expectation is that more frequent terrorist events
will lead to shorter durations until war recurrence.
Graphs of the baseline hazard rates for each reveal nonmonotonic
hazards rates. In other words, the baseline hazard
rate may increase or decrease at different periods of
time. We estimated this in two ways. First, we used a routine
that estimates the baseline hazard without covariates. Second,
we used Carter and Signorino’s (2010) code for predicting
these baseline hazards, using a discrete hazard model
with the full set of covariates set at the mean. Each graph
confirms our expectations (see the online appendix).
Given these nonmonotonic baseline hazards, we use three
approaches to estimate the time to war ending as well as the
time to war recurrence. First, we use a parametric model
that can take into account nonmonotonic hazards. The lognormal
model can model this process well (Cleves et al.
2008). Second, we estimate Cox proportional hazard models.
These models do not assume any functional form for
the baseline hazard. Their use is common in the social sciences,
especially where we lack strong theory predicting what
the baseline hazard should look like (Box-Steffensmeier and
Jones 2004). They are less efficient, however, than properly
parameterized duration models. Third, we estimate a discrete
time model in a logistic regression framework. In sum,
the dependent variable is either war ending or war recurrence.
A variable that counts the years since war began or
since the end of the previous civil war is included. Additionally,
squared and cubed versions of this counter are included
to provide a flexible way to model the hazard of failure
(Carter and Signorino 2010). This way of estimating a
duration model is analogous to a Cox implementation as
using a cubic form of time allows for nearly any shape for
the baseline hazard of failure.6 The main results reported
here utilize the parametric, log-normal regression technique,
but the results are not sensitive to this estimation choice.
Terrorism and spoiling
While spoiling could occur in different ways, we consider
one very prominent form, terrorism (Kydd and Walter 2006),
based on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD; LaFree and
Dugan 2007). The GTD defines terrorism as “the threatened
or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor
to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through
fear, coercion or intimidation” (LaFree and Dugan 2007). The
GTD contains approximately 60,000 terror events worldwide
from 1970 to 1997 and an additional 7,154 from 1998 to 2004
collected separately (using a slightly different definition).7
The data cover both domestic and transnational terrorist
events perpetrated by a diverse set of opposition groups
against a variety of civilian, military, and government targets.
In order to avoid capturing normal wartime events, we drop
any event directed at a military or government target from
the two analyses. Compared to other data sets on terrorism,
the GTD contains at least five times asmany events, making it
the most comprehensive source of terrorism database available.
8
Even if terrorist violence does not capture all acts that
groups take that might spoil the peace, these events occurring
in the context of war and peace processes are one of
the best measures of spoiling behavior. Targeting civilians
rather than combatants is a signal that unrestrained violence
may continue.
Kydd and Walter (2006, 72–76) make a compelling case
that one of the primary strategies of terrorism is spoiling
peace processes.9 For them, peace processes dominated by
moderates threaten extremist and terrorist goals, creating
incentives to stop the peace process. In this paper, we con-
6. A simple time counter assumes some monotonic increase or decrease,
whereas a cubic term implies a quadratic form.
7. The 1998–2004 data were collected using different coding rules
than the 1970–97 data. As such, pooling the two time periods might be
problematic. Because we want to use both sets of data together, we take a
couple of steps to be sure that the data are comparable. As a first cut, we
estimate the models on both samples separately and note that the results
are qualitatively similar (the coefficients are of the same sign and the
results are statistically significant). This suggests that measurement differences
are not fundamentally altering the results but is by no means
conclusive. We also conduct a Chow test, which essentially tests whether
coefficients estimated for two groups of data are the same, to demonstrate
that the samples can, in fact, be pooled together. The results of these two
steps offer support for the decision to pool the two potentially different
samples.
8. Like most data, this source of data needs to be accompanied by some
caveats. According to LaFree and Dugan (2007), the 1970–97 data were coded
as terrorist incidents if they “substantially concur with the definition.” Thus,
the measurement is largely consistent with the operationalization but leaves
open a subjective element in the coding process. Second, each incident required
only a single source to be coded, whereas it might be desirable to crosscheck
each source. Third, as LaFree and Dugan (2007) outlines, the 1993 data
were lost, but the GTD project has recovered “marginal” estimates of the
overall number of attacks. We use the marginals for 1993 in this paper. Despite
possible concerns in the measurement and coding process, these data
provide a useful means to test the hypotheses set forth above. We also estimated
models without these 1993 marginals, and the results are substantively
the same.
9. See also arguments by Bueno de Mesquita (2005).
Volume 77 Number 4 October 2015 / 1121
tend that groups might be motivated to use violence for a
variety of reasons. Regardless of the motivation, however,
the violence should have a negative effect. From Northern
Ireland to Israel, and Chechnya to Colombia, it is evident
that groups engage in terrorist-type behavior in attempts to
derail peace agreements.
Clearly not all terrorism is related to civil wars. Terrorist
events in the United States, such as the Fort Hood shooting
or the Oklahoma City bombing, are not related to a civil
war.10 Even terrorist events within a country engaged in a
civil war might not be related to that war. Not all terrorist events
in India, for example, are related to the conflict in Kashmir.
Instead, many terrorist events can occur for other reasons, such
as the pursuit of limited policy change or the pursuit of some
status quo (e.g., Klan violence in the American South during
Reconstruction). This creates a problem of how to associate
terrorist events with civil wars. In many cases, the groups
perpetrating terrorism are identified in the data, and we can
determine whether they are also rebel groups engaged in a civil
war. In other cases, however, the perpetrators are not coded. To
compound the problem of group identification, multiple groups
could carry out (or claim credit for) a single attack. A group that
did not, in fact, perpetrate the attack could also claim credit for
the attack in an attempt to increase its status.
To identify which terrorist events are associated with
civil war in a more systematic way, we follow recent practice
(Findley and Young 2012b; Nemeth, Mauslein, and Stapley
2014) and use geographic coordinates for nearly all of the
terrorist events in the GTD (about 50,000 of the events).11
The geo-coded terrorist events contain the latitude and
longitude of each event based on the city in which the event
occurred or the city to which the event was closest.Once geocoded,
we spatially joined the terrorist event codes with a
database of geographically coded civil war zones as defined
in the ViewConflicts software by Rød (2003). The terrorism
data are precise to the daily level, and the civil war coordinate
data are precise at the monthly level, so there is a slight
disconnect in the temporal periods.
In general, overlaying the data in such a way increases the
likelihood that the terrorist events are indeed related to the
civil war. This approach is fairly conservative, because terrorist
events related to the civil war could occur outside of
the civil war zone and our initial approach does not capture
these events. The Moscow theater bombing and the Beslan
school attack in Russia are both examples of terrorist behavior
clearly related to the civil war in Chechnya, but both
took place outside of the conflict zones.12
To illustrate the match between the civil wars and terrorist
events, figure 2 matches terrorist events and civil war geographically
in Colombia. The darker-colored, background regions
of Colombia represent the civil war zones, and the dots
represent the terrorist events. This figure demonstrates that
a large proportion of terrorist violence occurs in the regions
in which civil war is taking place. Although just one example,
Colombia is representative of many other civil war zones
throughout the world.
Because terrorist events are heavily skewed to the right
(concentrated closer to zero, and they have fewer large values),
we log the value of terrorism for the model estimation. In the
main analyses, we lag the logged terrorism measure by one
period and also include a smoothed measure of terrorism
in the previous and current periods. We include the current
period in the smoothed estimate because the impact is dependent
not only on events in the months or years preceding
potential settlements but also in the days immediately
prior. As noted above, we exclude all events that occurred
in civil war zones during the civil wars if they were directed
against the military, police, or government, in order to reduce
the chance of capturing traditional war-related violence
such as battle deaths.13
Control variables
Because the samples are different (during vs. after wars), we
estimate two sets of models. We included some similar control
variables in both sets of models but also some different
covariates more appropriate to each stage.14 In general, we
include common measures from studies of recurrence and
10. Sambanis (2008), e.g., argues that one of the distinguishing
characteristics of civil war relates to it being a form of violence that exceeds
a given threshold. Definitions and conceptualizations of terrorism
never include a death threshold (Weinberg, Pedahzu, and Hirsch-Hoefler
2004; Young and Findley 2011).
11. The GTD 1.1 database is available as study no. 22541 from ICPSR
at the University of Michigan: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/TPDRC
/STUDY/22541.xml. The GTD provided preliminary geographic coordinates
for a portion of the data set. Findley and Young (2012b) used many of these
in conjunction with the coordinates they had independently coded. Thus,
they coded geographic coordinates for many more events than are in the
GTD. Because it is the most comprehensive and contains over time information,
we use the Findley and Young (2012b) data in this paper.
12. We estimated models using all terrorist events rather than those
only in civil war zones. The results are similar qualitatively, but not
identical. In all but one case, the size of the effects decreases, likely due to
the inclusion of many unrelated events. Moreover, the p-values attenuate
in comparison to the main results reported in the paper, though all but
one case is still statistically significant at conventional levels.
13. Because our argument is not precise enough to operationalize terrorism
in a single way, we also estimated models using alternative measures
of the terrorism concept. Whether we use an indicator of attacks, lagged
attacks, logged attacks, lagged and logged attacks, or smoothed attacks over
different time periods, the results are consistent.
14. For sources and descriptive statistics, see the appendix.
1122 / Terrorism, Spoiling, and Civil War Resolution Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young
civil war duration (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004;
DeRouen and Sobek 2004). To maintain a relatively parsimonious
model, we concentrate on control variables that
might influence terrorism and the duration of the conflict
(Achen 2005; Ray 2005).
For the duration of war models, we include measures of
the number of parties to the war, as this could lead to changes
in the amount of terrorism (Bloom 2005; Findley and Young
2012a), and population (logged), as it covaries with both terrorism
and civil war duration (Collier et al. 2004; Li 2005;
Young and Findley 2011).15 The ethnolinguistic fractionalization
index has an uncertain relationship with each, but
this is often included to attempt to explain both civil war
duration and terrorism. We include a logged measure of battle
deaths to avoid the possibility that the terrorist attacks
are simply measures of traditional civil war battles. Gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita has been used as a proxy
for many different concepts in civil war and terrorism research,
such as poverty, state capacity, and effective counterinsurgency
(Fearon and Laitin 2003; Findley and Young
2011; Sambanis 2004). Regardless, GDP may correlate with
both terrorism and the duration of wars. Difficult terrain, or
the percentage of mountainous terrain in a country, is correlated
with duration and may also influence rebels’ abilities
to use violence, such as terrorism (Collier et al. 2004). Finally,
the presence of a security guarantee (Walter 2002) may lead
to an incentive for using terrorism while reducing the duration
of the war.
For the civil war recurrence models, we again include the
ethnolinguistic fractionalization index, GDP per capita, and
population (logged). We also include a measure of whether
there is instability in the state, as this instability could lead to
both terrorism and recurrence of war. A control for the average
democracy score of neighbors is included to control
for the influence of the stability of the region on both forms
of conflict. Finally, whether a third-party force was present
might influence both terrorist attacks and war recurrence.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The first step in the analysis is to consider whether and how
terrorism affects the duration of war. In the following, we
consider whether terrorism increases the risk of war recurrence.
To preview, these results show that terrorism makes
wars last longer and increases the risk of war recurrence once
a war has ended. These results are robust across a wide variety
of specifications, suggesting that terrorism is frequently
responsible for spoiling peace processes by increasing the
duration of war or hastening the time until war recurrence.
Spoiling war ending
Table 1 shows the results of two models estimating the
relationship between terrorism and the duration of wars.
Model 1 contains the results in which terrorism is lagged
by one month. Because the model is estimated in accelerated
failure-time form, a positive coefficient indicates longer durations
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Thus, the results
show that as the amount of terrorism increases, the duration
of war also increases, which is consistent with hypothesis 1.
Although model 1 suggests a strong relationship between
terrorism and longer civil wars, arguably the logged/lagged
measure is not the best indicator of the concept. Numerous
events in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, for example,
illustrate that groups use terrorism not only in the months
prior to proposed agreements but also in the days immediately
preceding. The level of terrorism in the current period,
therefore, might be most appropriate for estimating when
Figure 2. Terrorist events and civil war in Colombia. This figure shows the
country of Colombia with terrorist events plotted onto civil war zones. The
darker background shades on the western side of Colombia represent
the main area of civil war. As is evident, most terrorist events occur in the
civil war zones.
15. We also used a more stringent measure of the number of actors,
namely, “veto players.” The results for terrorism reported in the paper
hold with or without the inclusion of the veto players measure.
Volume 77 Number 4 October 2015 / 1123
civil wars end. Using only those events could be problematic,
however, because events could occur after an agreement is
reached, suggesting that terrorism is not affecting the duration
of the war.
Because of these concerns, we use a smoothed measure
of terrorism in model 2 (table 1) that weights terrorism in
the previous month with terrorism in the current month.
While this does not solve the problem of events occurring
after an agreement, it allows us to consider the currentmonth
while incorporating the weight of the recent past. The results
for the smoothed measure in model 2 indicate that spoiling
is again associated with longer durations of civil war.
Table 1. Log-normal Survival Models of War Ending and Recurrence
Hazard (War Ending)
Model 1 Model 2
^b
SE p ^b SE p
War-related terror (log/lag) .369 .188 .049
War-related terror (log/smooth) .566 .222 .011
Population (log) .369 .116 .001 .363 .120 .002
Ethnic fractionalization 2.499 .783 .524 2.255 .781 .744
GDP (log) 2.194 .177 .272 2.237 .179 .187
Number of actors .776 .192 .000 .857 .190 .000
Battle deaths (log) .126 .095 .183 .115 .095 .224
Mountainous terrain .002 .006 .731 .000 .006 .976
Security guarantee 26.097 2.734 .026 26.310 2.716 .020
Constant 2.660 1.903 .729 2.429 1.946 .826
Results in accelerated-failure time form; Years p 1970–2002;
Number of subjects p 119; Total war endings p 63
Hazard (War Recurrence)
Model 3 Model 4
^b
SE p ^b SE p
War-related terror (log/lag) 2.501 .122 .000
War-related terror (log/smooth) 2.609 .121 .000
Population (log) 2.075 .160 .641 2.059 .145 .683
Ethnic fractionalization .783 .661 .237 .706 .604 .242
GDP/capita (log/lag) .622 .281 .027 .681 .265 .010
Instability 2.953 .391 .015 21.004 .367 .006
Democracy in region .127 .054 .018 .127 .050 .012
No third-party peacekeepers 2.841 .489 .086 2.843 .457 .065
Constant 10.871 2.601 .000 10.865 2.375 .000
Results in accelerated-failure time form; Years p 1970–99;
Number of subjects p 60; Total recurrences p 30
1124 / Terrorism, Spoiling, and Civil War Resolution Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young
To aid substantive interpretation, we calculated the predicted
hazard of war ending. We generate predictions when
all other variables are set at their means and medians and
the shift in terrorism is from the mean to one standard deviation
above the mean. A standard deviation increase in the
logged/lagged version of the variable leads to, on average,
an expected decrease in the risk of civil war ending by 52%
(model 1, table 1). A standard deviation increase in the
logged, smoothed version of the variable leads to, on average,
an expected decrease in the risk of civil war ending by
86% (model 2, table 1).
Figure 3a plots these predicted hazards and shows that
for average (mean) levels of terrorism, the risk of war ending
is higher than it is when there are greater numbers of terrorist
events. Put differently, the less terrorism that occurs
the more likely it is the war ends sooner. The more terrorism
there is, the risk of war ending goes down (the war is longer).
These results support hypothesis 1 and indicate that terrorism
can have strong negative effects on reaching a settlement
to the war.
Spoiling the implementation of peace
Table 1 shows the results of two models estimating the duration
of peace until war recurrence. Model 3 shows the results
in which the measure of terrorism is lagged by one year.
The results show that as the amount of terrorism increases,
the duration of time until the war recurs decreases, which is
consistent with hypothesis 1. Because the temporal unit of
analysis is the year, using information from the current year
is very important in these analyses in order to capture events
preceding settlements by days or months. As with model 2,
we thus use a smoothed measure over the current year and
one previous year. Using information from the current year
shows that the results are stronger.
To aid substantive interpretation, we again considered
predicted changes in the hazard of war recurrence. We generate
predictions when all other variables are set at their
means and medians and the shift in terrorism goes from the
mean to one standard deviation above the mean. A standard
deviation increase in the logged, lagged version of the variable
leads to, on average, an expected increase in the risk of
civil war recurrence by 55% (model 3, table 1). A standard
deviation increase in the logged, smoothed version of the
variable leads to, on average, an expected increase in the risk
of civil war recurrence by 60% (model 4, table 1).
Figure 3b displays these predicted hazards and shows
that for average levels of terrorism the risk of war recurrence
is lower than it is when more terrorism occurs. Put differently,
the more terrorism that occurs, the higher the risk of
civil war recurrence. Taken together, these results support hypothesis
2 and suggest that terrorism can be detrimental and
hasten the time to war recurrence.
We also estimated models 1–4 with and without controls
as well as with a variety of different control variable specifications,
and the results are not sensitive to these changes
in specification. We also include the change in war-related
terrorism over time. Presumably, both the levels and changes
ought to have an effect on the duration of the war. Increases in
terrorism should make wars longer (and time-to-recurrence
quicker), whereas decreases in terrorism should make war
shorter (and time-to-recurrence longer). As with levels of
terrorism, we also calculated the smoothed changes in terrorism
over two months, and the results are robust to including
earlier changes. The results attenuate some, suggesting
that the more proximate changes have a greater effect.
Models 1–4 above include a variety of control variables
thought to affect the duration of war and, if ended, the subsequent
duration of peace. The results for the control variables
are, qualitatively, what we would expect based on past
research. Thus, although the results suggest that terrorism
Figure 3. Predicted hazards of war ending (a) and recurrence (b) given
changes in terrorism.
Volume 77 Number 4 October 2015 / 1125
is an important factor, it is not the sole factor nor is it necessarily
the most important. Including terrorism complements
other explanations and is robust across a diverse set
of alternative factors. In all of these analyses, the results demonstrate
that terrorism makes civil wars more difficult to
resolve.
Robustness
To probe the robustness of the results to different specifications,
alternative measures, and ways to better isolate the potential
impact of terrorism on civil war duration and recurrence,
we estimate a series ofmodels in an appendix.16 In sum,
we find unqualified support for hypothesis 2, or that terrorism
tends to increase the likelihood that war recurs, across
many different models. Our support for hypothesis 1, or that
terrorism tends to increase the duration of civil war, is generally
supported. We do find that the inference becomes less
stable when implementing different estimators for the survival
analysis and when including controls for state violence.
With that said, the majority of the models provide support
for this hypothesis.
CONCLUSION
Our argument and results suggest that terrorism influences
civil war processes and results in making wars more difficult
to resolve and more likely to recur. Although many scholars
discount the role of potential spoilers as marginal or fringe
actors, these results show that even low-level terrorist-type
violence during peace processes can have a powerful effect
on the outcomes of the war. The results are robust across a
variety of specifications.
These results offer insights for several different literatures.
First, the general literature on civil war resolution mostly
considers only the two main actors to the war: a government
and opposition (e.g., Mason and Fett 1996; Walter 2002).
Our results suggest that other peripheral parties can have
an important impact on war outcomes. Although we do not
examine a more micro-level analysis of this process, we expect
that looking at a particular dynamic interaction between
a state and a main insurgent group and violence from tertiary
actors would provide an extension and direction for
future research.17 Second, the spoiler literature has argued
that spoiler groups could affect whether wars recur (e.g.,
Greenhill and Major 2007; Stedman 1997) but has not provided
systematic empirical tests of the hypothesis. This study
provides a test not only for the postwar phase but also for
the negotiation phase and offers new empirical insights about
the possible effects of extremist group violence.
Further research on this topic needs to address at least
a few areas. First, it might be the case that specific targets
(or tactics) are chosen in attempts to spoil. As a first venture
into this domain, we have aggregated all terrorist events
on the logic that they all are relevant to the peace process.
Disaggregation, however would likely create some important
insights about which targets are chosen and which tactics
are most useful in spoiling the peace. Notably, the intensity
of the attack or its symbolic value may have differential impacts.
Suicide terrorism is one version of spoiling, which
could have its own logic (Pape 2005) or may be utilized in
constrained sets of circumstances (Bloom 2005). Second,
there could be a feedback effect in that terrorism affects the
outcome of the war, which affects whether more terrorism
is used, which in turn affects whether wars recur. Uncovering
how the sequence of events motivates behavior is an
important but challenging next step. To sort out possible endogeneity,
this area faces significant challenges in identifying
instrumental variables and other randomization strategies.
That said, we conjecture that there could be natural
experiments that could be leveraged in order to take advantage
of the benefits of randomization. The prerequisite
would be to identify terrorism that is used as-if at random
and then identify the differential effects of areas with and
without terrorism. While these empirical findings are solid,
the mechanisms for why spoiling can succeed or fail are not
fully identified here or elsewhere. In the future, work that
can sort among potential claims and examine more microlevel
data could help develop a more complete picture of
this process of violence. Finally, once terrorism data are geographically
coded for the most recent decade, this question
should be considered again for possible post-9/11 differences.
Although scholars have identified some post-9/11 effects, it is
not straightforward that patterns within civil war zones would
change in this most recent era.
In conclusion, much of the recent work on civil war and
terrorism treats these forms of political violence as distinct
phenomena worthy of independent analysis.18 If they are
both types of contention that are utilized when states and
dissidents cannot resolve disputes through institutional means,
then considering how they interact, overlap, and relate is an
important path of inquiry. Related, many of these violent interactions
develop out of initially nonviolent interactions be-
16. See www.michael-findley.com and https://dataverse.harvard.edu
/dataverse/jyoung for the appendix and replication materials.
17. See Phillips (2015) for a discussion about focusing on terrorist
groups as the unit of observation. 18. Findley and Young (2012b) and Sambanis (2008) are exceptions.
1126 / Terrorism, Spoiling, and Civil War Resolution Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young
tween and among societal actors. Recent work has renewed
interest in nonviolent dissent (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008)
and should be integrated with the study of larger processes that
lead to political violence to help explain why some tactics are
primarily utilized in certain conflicts while others are largely
ignored.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Erica Chenoweth, Andreas Beger, Darren Hawkins,
Will Moore, Amanda Murdie, Cooper Drury, the University
of Missouri Political Science Department, and Political
Violence seminar participants from Florida State University
for helpful comments on previous drafts and Jeff Tanner for
research assistance.
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Sambanis, Nicholas. 2008. “Terrorism and CivilWar.” In Philip Keefer and
Norman Loayza, eds., Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political
Openness. New York: Cambridge.
Stedman, Stephen. 1997. “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.” International
Security 22 (2): 5–53.
Stephan, Maria, and Erica Chenoweth. 2008. “Why Civil Resistance Works:
The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.” International Security 33
(1): 7–44.
Thomas, Jakana. 2014. “Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond
to Terrorism in CivilWar.” American Journal of Political Science
58 (4): 804–18.
Uppsala. 2006. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala Conflict Database,
Uppsala University. http://www.pcr.uu.se/database (accessed May 30,
2006).
Walter, Barbara F. 2002. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement
of Civil Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Weinberg, Leonard, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler. 2004. “The
Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism.” Terrorism and Political Violence
16 (4): 777–94.
Wood, Elisabeth. 2006. “Forging an End to Civil War: Distributional
Aspects of Robust Settlements.” Unpublished manuscript, Department
of Politics, New York University.
Young, Joseph K., and Michael G. Findley. 2011. “Promise and Pitfalls of
Terrorism Research.” International Studies Review 13 (3): 411–31.
Zahar, Marie-Joëlle. 2003. “Reframing the Spoiler Debate in Peace Processes.”
In John Darby, Roger MacGinty, and Rolf Habbel, eds., Contemporary
Peace Making: Conflict, Violence, and Peace Processes. Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 114–24.
1128 / Terrorism, Spoiling, and Civil War Resolution Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young
Annex 496
Keith Hiatt, Open Source Evidence on Trial, 125 Yale L.J. 323 (2016)

323
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM
MARCH 3 , 2016
􀀁
Open Source Evidence on Trial
Keith Hiatt
introduction
Investigating war crimes is a messy business. It is difficult and dangerous.
International criminal tribunals charge powerful individuals, including heads
of state and leaders of armed forces, whose personal resources may well exceed
the annual operating budget of the investigating tribunal.1 It is not surprising
when witnesses for the prosecution recant or decline to testify.2 Witnesses may
end up missing or killed. In court, as in war, witnesses bear the risks. While the
court pays the financial expense of an investigation, witnesses put their lives on
the line. No other form of evidence is so costly.3
1. In 2011, defendant Uhuru Kenyatta had an estimated net worth of $500 million. Kerry
A. Dolan, Tallying Africa’s Wealthiest, FORBES (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.forbes.com
/lists/2011/89/africa-billionaires-11_Uhuru-Kenyatta_FO2Q.html [http://perma.cc/M68F
-3NF8].
2. In 2014, the International Criminal Court (ICC) dismissed charges against President Uhuru
Kenyatta, without prejudice, in part due to witnesses dying, recanting, or refusing to testify.
Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the Withdrawal of Charges Against Mr. Uhuru Muigai
Kenyatta (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media
/press%20releases/Pages/otp-statement-05-12-2014-2.aspx [http://perma.cc/8BJS-7JLL].
3. In fact, the financial costs of investigations are relatively modest. For example, the 2015
budget of the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, which consists of both investigators and
prosecuting attorneys, is roughly $42 million—or $18 million less than the City of Berkeley
spends on its municipal Police Department. See Report on Budget Performance of the
International Criminal Court as of 30 June 2015, INT’L CRIM. CT. 4 (Aug. 7, 2015), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP14/ICC-ASP-14-11-ENG.pdf [http://perma.cc/A6CF
-7GC3] (noting that the approved annual budget for the Office of the Prosecutor for 2015 is
€39.61 million); see also Teresa Berkeley-Simmons et al., City of Berkeley FY 2014 & FY 2015
Adopted Biennial Budget, OFF. BUDGET & FISCAL MGMT. 260 (June 26, 2013), http://www.ci
.berkeley.ca.us/uploadedFiles/Manager/Budget/BudgetBookPRINT_102313.pdf [http://
perma.cc/5Y94-A3U3] (noting that the adopted annual budget for the City of Berkeley
police department in FY 2015 is $60.24 million); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (US) (Jan. 25, 2016), U.S. / Euro Foreign Exchange Rate [EXUSEU], retrieved
from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series
the yale law journal forum March 3, 2016􀀁
324
International human rights courts and their observers have expressed hope
that new information technologies might bring about better, cheaper, and safer
prosecutions. A promising but underexplored approach involves the use of
“open source intelligence” in international prosecutions for genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity. Open source intelligence “refers to a
broad array of information and sources that are generally available”4 to the
public, such as news media, academic work, and public reports.5 Increasingly,
social media and online video and image sharing services provide a rich, open
source of information about crimes and their perpetrators. A recent survey of
law enforcement professionals found that eighty percent “used social media
platforms as intelligence gathering tools.”6 But to date, international criminal
tribunals have made only limited use of such sources.7
In this Essay, I examine challenges presented by open source investigations
that rely on social media or online video and image sharing websites. I present
one example of these challenges drawn from the International Criminal Court
(ICC). While questions remain about the reliability and admissibility of
evidence obtained from open sources, I contend that these new investigative
techniques are too important to ignore.
i. security
Open source investigations present several challenges. Reliance on open
source evidence may increase the risks facing eyewitnesses and people who
gather the information first-hand—the uploader of an incriminating video,
perhaps, or bystanders in a photo. By using these materials, investigators may
draw unwanted attention to people depicted in them. The disclosure of a
photograph to a powerful defendant or a hostile government might expose the
identity of a witness, or otherwise endanger third parties.
/EXUSEU [http://perma.cc/596C-XSUA] (noting USD:EUR exchange rate for December
2015 of 1.09:1).
4. Intelligence Collection Disciplines (INTs), FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov
/about-us/intelligence/disciplines [http://perma.cc/W6XK-YNK3].
5. Despite the identical terminology, “open source” investigations are not related to “open
source” software. In the jargon of investigators, the term only refers to publicly available
information, as distinct from human, signal, imagery, or other forms of intelligence.
6. Alexandra Mateescu et al., Social Media Surveillance and Law Enforcement,
DATACIVILRIGHTS.ORG (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.datacivilrights.org/pubs/2015-1027
/Social_Media_Surveillance_and_Law_Enforcement.pdf [http://perma.cc/D8R8-SVRE].
7. Though the ICC’s Strategic Plan articulates the need to collect and analyze open source
evidence, progress has been slow. See Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan 2016-2018,
INT’L CRIM. CT. ¶¶ 54-55 (July 6, 2015), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/070715-OTP
_Strategic_Plan_2016-2018.pdf [http://perma.cc/WA8W-ADYS].
open source evidence on trial
325
But despite the risks, in other ways open source investigations can actually
be safer than traditional, eyewitness-based investigations.8 Investigators need
not travel and can do much of their work from an Internet-connected device,
away from physical dangers that missions may present. Additionally, open
source investigations may draw on the expertise of multiple experts and “the
crowd” through online collaboration.9 These collaborations have produced
high-quality reports presenting compelling evidence about chemical weapon
deployment in Syria10 and Russian involvement in Ukraine.11
Importantly, those reports did not rely on witness testimony. Investigators
made their case by relying exclusively on open source materials. In court, the
use of open source information, together with other forms of corroborating
evidence, can help protect witnesses. First, when key facts are established by
open source evidence, fewer witnesses must take the risk of testifying. Second,
when witnesses do testify, corroboration from open sources helps makes them
safer. A lone witness is a vulnerable witness. But when witness testimony is
backed by corroboration from other sources, the witness is bolstered and
supported.12 Witnesses will always be necessary at trial, and there will always
be risks, but open source investigations can help make human rights
prosecutions safer.
i i . availability
Open source investigations face another challenge: the availability of open
source materials in the region under investigation. Human rights tribunals
usually are established after the cessation of hostilities, and it may take years
8. Storyful, a pioneer in “social journalism” that relies heavily on open sources to corroborate
and verify reported events, cites as its “founding commandment” the principle that “[t]here
is [a]lways [s]omeone [c]loser to the [s]tory.” Mark Little, Ten Principles that Power Social
Journalism, STORYFUL (Mar. 12, 2014), http://blog.storyful.com/2014/03/12/ten-principles
-that-power-social-journalism [http://perma.cc/65Q2-5MWE].
9. For example, see the many and varied contributors to Bellingcat’s citizen-led investigative
efforts. Contributors, BELLINGCAT, http://www.bellingcat.com/contributors [http://perma.cc
/WBG4-SBTX].
10. See Patrick Radden Keefe, Rocket Man: How an Unemployed Blogger Confirmed that Syria Had
Used Chemical Weapons, NEW YORKER (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com
/magazine/2013/11/25/rocket-man-2 [http://perma.cc/JTN9-M5GA].
11. See Maksymilian Czuperski et al., Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin’s War in Ukraine, ATLANTIC
COUNCIL (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/hiding
-in-plain-sight-putin-s-war-in-ukraine-and-boris-nemtsov-s-putin-war [http://perma.cc
/Y7NR-ALVY].
12. See Alexa Koenig, Stephen Cody & Eric Stover, After Kenya, Lessons for Witness Protection,
INT’L CRIM. JUST. TODAY (June 1, 2015), http://www.international-criminal-justice
-today.org/arguendo/article/after-kenya-lessons-for-witness-protection [http://perma.cc
/F6FA-JYGT].
the yale law journal forum March 3, 2016􀀁
326
before they are ready for trial. As a result, today’s investigations concern
yesterday’s atrocities. And those atrocities are documented with yesterday’s
technologies, like paper documents, witness statements, NGO reports, news
media, and photographs obtained from the field. For example, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia concerns itself with
crimes committed during conflicts that were resolved by 2001, years before the
advent of social media and online video sharing.13 Similarly, the ICC has only
prosecuted crimes that occurred in regions of Africa where access to the
Internet was limited.14
But times have changed, and human rights tribunals must change with
them. The ICC is currently engaged in preliminary examinations in Colombia,
Georgia, Palestine, and Ukraine, among other countries.15 In African countries,
too, time has not stood still, and the court continues to investigate more recent
human rights violations. If these preliminary examinations become
prosecutions, the universe of potential evidence will be different, and much
larger, than anything the court has seen in the past. Millions of people living in
these regions have access to Internet-connected devices and social media.
Hundreds of thousands of videos depicting human rights violations have
already been posted online. Many of them will be relevant and all of them will
need examination.
iii. reliability
A. Circumstantial, not Direct, Evidence
Perhaps the biggest challenge presented by open source investigations is
reliability. Open source evidence is almost always circumstantial, requiring an
inferential step to connect the dots. For example, a video shared online
depicting a Russian anti-aircraft system in Luhansk, Ukraine, supports an
inference that the Russian military supplied the weapon to rebels in Ukraine.16
But that inference is not unassailable. Even assuming the video is entirely
authentic, the footage might mean only that the Ukrainian army seized a
13. INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, The Conflicts, http://www.icty.org
/en/about/what-former-yugoslavia/conflicts [http://perma.cc/Z2DY-T4MU].
14. Prosecutions, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the
%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/prosecutions/Pages/prosecutions.aspx [http://
perma.cc/RU6B-ZER6].
15. Preliminary Examinations, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure
%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref/Pages
/communications%20and%20referrals.aspx [http://perma.cc/86AF-SYA6].
16. See Eliot Higgins, Russia’s Pantsir-S1s Geolocated in Ukraine, BELLINGCAT (May
28, 2015), http://www.bellingcat.com/resources/case-studies/2015/05/28/russias-pantsir-s1s
-geolocated-in-ukraine [http://perma.cc/37G5-3ZR6].
open source evidence on trial
327
Russian weapon. Or it might be that the city seen in the video is not actually
Luhansk, or that the weapon system is not actually Russian. A fair trier of fact,
faced with the video, would likely want to examine corroborating evidence
from other sources before reaching a conclusion. Indeed, open source evidence
requires corroboration and triangulation from multiple sources to piece
together what it might prove. It may also require an expert witness to explain
what it is, and what it means. When taken in context, corroborated, and
explained by knowledgeable witnesses, open source evidence can be very
compelling.
B. A Flexible, but Unclear, Evidentiary Standard
But open source evidence is largely untested in international human rights
tribunals. A recent example from the ICC will illustrate the uncertain
evidentiary status of open source materials. The court’s governing law, the
Rome Statute, and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence require it to consider
treaties and rules of international law.17 But the ICC is generally barred from
following any particular set of national rules governing evidence.18
Interestingly, the Rules do not designate categories of inadmissible evidence.
Instead, the Rules set out a simple framework for evidentiary analysis.19 As
construed by the court, and in theory, the Rules require that evidence be
admitted or rejected based on its (1) relevance, (2) probative value, and (3)
prejudicial impact.20 In practice, though, most evidence is admitted, and
questions about the evidence go to its weight rather than its admissibility.21
C. Bemba and Social Media
The ongoing case against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo shows the impact of
this flexible evidentiary standard. The ICC indicted Bemba, in his capacity as a
17. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 21(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
18. Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, First
Session, New York 3-10 September 2002 Official Records, pt. II.A, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3
(Sept. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Rules of Evidence and Procedure].
19. Rules of Evidence and Procedure, supra note 18, at ¶ 63.
20. Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-2299, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for
Admission of Materials into Evidence Pursuant to Article 64(9) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 7
(Oct. 8, 2012) [hereinafter Bemba, Decision on Admission].
21. Aida Ashouri, Caleb Bowers & Cherrie Warden, An Overview of the Use of Digital Evidence in
International Criminal Courts, 11 DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND ELEC. SIGNATURE L. REV. 115, 118
(2014).
the yale law journal forum March 3, 2016􀀁
328
military commander, for murder, rape, and pillaging.22 But the court also
alleged that Bemba attempted to pay off a witness. Lawyers for the prosecution
submitted to the court evidence that showed a wire transfer of $1,335.16 from
Bemba’s sister to a witness, who they claimed then relayed the money to
another witness, who then gave false testimony.23 The prosecution also
submitted photographs obtained from a Facebook page.24 The Facebook
photos purported to show the two allegedly corrupted witnesses together—
important linkage evidence for the prosecution.25 The defense objected to the
admission of these photos.26
In this case, the dispute over admission of the photos consists of one
question: whether they have probative value.27 Probative value, according to
the court, is determined via a “fact-specific inquiry [that] . . . take[s] into
account innumerable factors, including the indicia of reliability,
trustworthiness, accuracy . . . as well as . . . the extent to which the item has
been authenticated.”28 The defense contends that it is impossible to know who
posted the photos, when they were taken, where they were taken, who took
them, or even if the people in the photos are who the prosecution claims they
are.29 The defense also takes aim at the prosecution’s method of extracting the
photos from Facebook.30 Because the prosecution does not have direct access to
Facebook’s servers or data, it relied on screenshots of Facebook pages showing
the photos. As a result, the prosecution does not have access to metadata (such
as a time stamp or the IP address of the uploader) to assist in authentication,
and there is no way to authoritatively determine the identity of the person who
posted the photos.31
22. Prosecutor v Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of
the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo
(June 15, 2009).
23. Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/13-1170, Prosecution’s Third Request for the Admission
of Evidence from the Bar Table, ¶¶ 49-53 (Sept. 18, 2015).
24. Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/13-1245, Public Redacted Version of Defense Response
to Prosecution’s Third Request for the Admission of Evidence from the Bar Table, ¶¶ 83
(Oct. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Bemba, Defense Response].
25. See Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/13-1170, Prosecution’s Third Request for the
Admission of Evidence from the Bar Table, ¶¶ 49-53 (Sept. 18, 2015).
26. Bemba, Defense Response, supra note 24, at ¶¶ 83-86.
27. The defense appears to have conceded the other two criteria for admissibility under the
Statute: relevance and lack of prejudicial impact. Id.
28. Bemba, Decision on Admission, supra note 20, at ¶ 8 (quoting Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-
01/05-01/08-2012, Public Redacted Version of the First Decision on the Prosecution and
Defense Requests for the Admission of Evidence, ¶ 15 (Dec. 15, 2011)).
29. See Bemba, Defense Response, supra note 24, at ¶¶ 83-84.
30. Id. at ¶ 85.
31. Id.
open source evidence on trial
329
As of this writing, the ICC has not issued its decision. The court’s flexible
evidentiary standard makes it difficult to predict the court’s ruling on the
prosecution’s submission or, more importantly, the future of open source
evidence. It is likely that the court will admit the photos, because most
evidence is admitted.32 But the probative value of the photos depends on
whether they are what the prosecution says they are. Taken alone, the photos
are not enough to establish that Bemba paid off witnesses. Taken together with
other evidence, they might be.
Even though the court will likely admit the photos, it is less clear how
much weight it will accord them. On the one hand, the ICC’s flexible
evidentiary standard allows it to take a holistic approach to weighing evidence.
On the other hand, the flexibility has the effect of concealing the standard. The
weighing happens in the judges’ heads, not in a written decision.
By eschewing the complex and elaborated evidentiary standards of other
jurisdictions, the ICC has maximized its flexibility to admit whatever it likes.
But exclusionary rules of evidence exist for a reason. For example, in the
United States, the hearsay rule excludes out-of-court statements when offered
to prove the truth of the matter asserted, unless the statement is covered by one
of several exceptions (such business, public, and family records). Courts have
developed these exceptions over centuries, and they function as a guide to the
kinds of statements judges will find reliable.33 The ICC, free of the hearsay rule
and its exceptions, is also “free” of clear guidance about what to consider
reliable. For that reason, it is far from clear what standards the court will apply
when it considers social media and open source evidence in the future.
conclusion
Open source investigations present several challenges. They introduce
certain safety risks even while mitigating or eliminating others. They may not
be available or effective for situations that predate social media or video
sharing, though this is an ever-diminishing concern. And they pose a challenge
to tribunals about the nature of reliability and evidentiary standards.
International human rights tribunals, like the ICC, are only just beginning to
decide what to make of evidence obtained from open sources like Facebook and
YouTube.
But the defenders of human rights must change with a changing world.
The widespread adoption of Internet-connected mobile devices and social
32. Ashouri et al., supra note 21, at 118.
33. Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1339, 1346 (1987)
(“Judges, and now legislatures, have categorized the particular kinds of declarants,
circumstances, and contents of speech that they believe increase the reliability of hearsay
statements.”).
the yale law journal forum March 3, 2016􀀁
330
media has resulted in rich but untraditional sources of evidence. Open source
investigations offer a way to make sense of the vast amount of information
available online. They will save money. More importantly, they will save lives.
For these reasons, international human rights tribunals should embrace open
source investigations, and should clarify evidentiary rules to allow for
admission, and clearer weighing, of this new and powerful kind of evidence.
Keith Hiatt is the Director of the Human Rights and Technology Program at the
Human Rights Center at UC Berkeley School of Law. He serves on the Technology
Advisory Board of the International Criminal Court’s Office of the Prosecutor. For her
excellent research assistance, he thanks Natalia Krapiva.
Preferred Citation: Keith Hiatt, Open Source Evidence on Trial, 125 YALE
L.J. F. 323 (2016), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/open-source-evidence
-on-trial.
Annex 497
Design, maintenance and combat use of short-range surface-to-air missile systems. 9􀇨310􀇴1
self-propelled transporter-erector-launcher-radar. Set of lectures. Part 1. Skorik, A.B., Florov,
O.D., Nikiforov, I.A., Halytskyi, O.F., Morhun, Ye.V.; Kharkiv: KhN
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE
IVAN KOZHEDUB NATIONAL AIR FORCE UNIVERSITY
OF KHARKIV
CONSTRUCTION, TECHNICAL OPERATION
AND COMBAT USE
OF FIRE CONTROL TOOLS
IN SHORT-RANGE
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS
Part 1
SELF-PROPELLED FIRE INSTALLATION 9A310M1
Study Guide
Editors
A.B. Skoryk PhD (Engineering), lecturer
O.D. Florov PhD (Engineering), lecturer
Kharkiv
2017
2
UDK 623.76:621.396.9(075.8)
BBK Ts641.4:571.432.ya73
S15
Approved for publication by the
Academic Council of the Kharkiv
National Air Force University
(Transcript No 8 of 06/17/2014)
Authors: A.B. Skoryk, O.D. Florov, I.A. Nikiforov, O.F. Galytsky, Y.V. Morgun.
Reviewers: Prof M.O. Yermoshyn, PhD (Military Science);
Prof. V.V. Burtsev, PhD (Engineering)
Construction, technical operation and combat use of fire control tools in short-range
surface-to-air missile systems Part 1.
Self-propelled fire installation 9A310M1: study guide/ A.B. Skoryk, O.D. Florov, I.A.
Nikiforov, O.F. Galytsky, Y.V. Morgun, Ed. A.B. Skoryk and O.D. Florov. – Kharkiv National
Air Force University, 2017. – 208 pages, illustrated.
The guide describes features characterizing the construction, functioning, hardware
implementation and technical operation of the self-propelled mount launching system 9A310M1.
The guide is intended for use during training at the higher education establishments of the
Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and other military institutions, in the study of the self-propelled
mount launching system 9A310M1, a component of the BUK-M1 surface-to-air missile system. The
guide is intended for use by officers in their independent study of specialist subjects as part of
commanding officer training and in the technical and specialist training of personnel. The study guide
“Construction, technical operation and combat use of fire control tools in short-range surface- to-air
missile systems” consists of two parts.
Part 2, “The 9S35M1 radar”, was published separately in 2016. Authors: A.B. Skoryk, O.D.
Florov, O.F. Galytsky, O.O. Zverev; Ed. A.B. Skoryk.
UDK 623.76:621.396.9(075.8)
BBK Ts641.4:571.432ya73
© Copyright: Skoryk, A.B., Florov, O.D., Nikoforov, I.A., Galytsky, O.F. and Morgun, Y.V., 2017
© Copyright: Ivan Kozhedub National Air Force University of Kharkiv, 2017
S15
3
CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS........................................................................................................ 6
FOREWORD.....................................................................................................................................8
Section 1. BUK– M1 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM.
GENERAL INFORMATION......................................................................... . 9
1.1. PURPOSE, COMPOSITION AND COMBAT POTENTIAL OF
BUK- M1 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM.................................................... 9
1.2. SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS: COMBAT TOOL
CHARACTERISTICS.....................................................................................................14
1.2.1. Command post 9S470M1............................................................................. 14
1.2.2. Target tracking radar 9S18M1...................................................................... 16
1.2.3. Self-propelled mount transporter erector launcher 9A310M1...................... 17
1.2.4. Surface-to-air guided missile 9M38M1......................................................... 19
1.2.5. Loader-launcher 9A39M1............................................................................. 21
1.3. SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS: TECHNICAL TOOL
CHARACTERISTICS............................................................................................. 22
Section 2. EQUIPMENT ON SPM TELAR 9A310M1. GENERAL
CHARACTERISTICS............................................................................................... 25
2.1. CONSTRUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE 9P147 LAUNCHING
DEVICE.............................................................................................................. 25
2.2. CONSTRUCTION OF TRACKED BASE VEHICLE 569A...................................... 28
2.2.1 Hull and power unit of 569A tracked vehicle.......................................................... 29
2.2.2. Electric equipment and power supply system on 569A TV..................................... 37
2.2.3. Communication tools and observation, illumination and signaling
equipment on 569A TV................................................................................ 39
2.2.4. Life support and fire extinguishing equipment on 569A TV................................... 40
2.3. MAIN SYSTEMS INTERFACE ON 9A310M1 TELAR.............................................. 42
2.4. PURPOSE OF CONTROLS ON 9A310M1 TELAR.................................................... 43
2.4.1. General crew responsibilities on 9A310M1 TELAR.............................................. 44
2.4.2. Controls at commanding officer position on 9A310M1 TELAR.............................44
2.4.3. Controls at operator 1 position on 9A310M1 TELAR............................................. 51
2.4.4. Controls at operator 2 position on 9A310M1 TELAR........................................ 56
Section 3. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 9S35M1 RADAR......................................... 62
3.1. PURPOSE, COMPOSITION AND MAIN TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL
CHARACTERISTICS OF 9S35M1 RADAR.................................................................62
3.2. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERACTION OF KEY COMPONENTS IN
9S35M1 RADAR............................................................................................................ 67
Section 4. Ground IFF interrogator radar IL24........................................................................... 77
4.1. PURPOSE, COMPOSITION AND MAIN TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF IL24
IFF INTERROGATOR................................................................................................... 77
4.2. PRINCIPLES OF IFF TARGET IDENTIFICATION................................................... 78
4.3. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL FEATURES OF IL24 GROUND
IFF INTERROGATOR ................................................................................................. 80
Section 5. DIGITAL COMPUTER SYSTEM 9S471M1........................................................... 84
5.1. PURPOSE, COMPOSITION AND MAIN TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
DIGITAL COMPUTER SYSTEM 9S471M1............................................................... 84
5.2 CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL FEATURES OF DIGITAL COMPUTER
SYSTEM 9S471M1....................................................................................................... 89
5.2.1. Construction and functional features of Argon A-15A digital computer................. 91
4
5.2.2. Construction and functional features of 1BM1 cabinet.................................... 92
5.2.3. Construction and functional features of rotary encoders............................... 99
5.2.4. Construction and functional features of coordinate input
device B-20-1 ………………………………………………………………….100
5.2.5. Construction and functional features of the B36-1M1 unit………………….103
5.2.6. Construction and functional features of synchronized data exchange
between 9A310M1 TELAR and 9A39M1 launcher-loader.
BM1-1 container………………………………………………………….105
Section 6. TELECODE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM 9S625................................... 116
6.1. PURPOSE, COMPOSITION AND MAIN TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
9S625 TELECODE COMMS SYSTEM................................................................... 116
6.1.1. Principles of telecode communications. Composition and characteristics of data
exchange between TELAR and launcher-loader.................................................... 116
6.1.2. Components of 9S625 telecode communication system........................................ 120
6.2. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL FEATURES OF 9S625 TELECODE
COMMUNICATION SYSTEM.................................................................................... 120
6.2.1. Functional purpose of 9S625 system blocks.............................................................120
6.2.2. Functional purpose of 9S625 equipment in different modes................................... 123
Section 7. Speech and internal communication systems and switchboard on
9A310M1 TELAR.................................................................................................... 127
7.1. SPEECH COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 9S623.................................................... 127
7.1.1. Purpose, composition and main technical characteristics of 9S623
speech comms system...............................................................................................127
7.1.2. Construction and operation of 9S623 speech comms system.................................. 128
7.1.3. Construction and functional features of R-123MT radio station..............................132
7.2. INTERNAL TELEPHONE EXCHANGE AND SWITCHBOARD 9S727
.........................................................................................................................................137
7.2.1. Purpose, composition and main technical characteristics of 9S727
internal exchange and switchboard........................................................... 137
7.2.2. Construction and functional features of 9S727 internal
exchange and switchboard equipment....................................................... 139
7.3. MS-61 FLIGHT RECORDER.......................................................................... 143
7.4. SPM COMBAT CREW DUTIES DURING DEPLOYMENT
AND CONNECTION OF SPEECH COMMUNICATION SYSTEM ......................... 146
Section 8. TELEVISION OPTICAL SIGHT 9SH-38-3............................................................. 149
8.1. PURPOSE, COMPOSITION AND MAIN TECHNICAL
CHARACTERISTICS OF 9SH-38-3 TELEVISION OPTICAL SIGHT...................... 149
8.2. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL FEATURES
OF 9SH-38-3 TELEVISION OPTICAL SIGHT................................................ 151
Section 9. SIMULATOR ON 9A310M1 TELAR......................................................... 153
9.1. GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE 9A310M1 TELAR
IN-BUILT SIMULATOR................................................................................ 153
9.2. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL FEATURES
OF IN-BUILT SIMULATOR.......................................................................... 155
9.2.1 Target simulation device............................................................................ 155
9.2.2. Local object and passive obstacle simulation device................................ 156
9.2.3. Noise radar simulation device................................................................... 158
5
9.3. SIMULATOR TRAINING FOR 9A310M1 TELAR CREW........................ 161
9.4. COMPREHENSIVE SIMULATOR TRAINING FOR BUK M1 CREW .................. 162
Section 10. 9P147 LAUNCHER. AUTOMATED LAUNCH EQUIPMENT............ 164
10.1. GENERAL INFORMATION ON 9P147 LAUNCHER........................... 164
10.2 CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL FEATURES OF 9P147 LAUNCHER
COMPONENTS ..........................................................................................................166
10.2.1. Rotating turret of 9P147 launcher.......................................................... 166
10.2.2. Oscillating turret of 9P147 launcher....................................................... 169
10.2.3. Construction and functional features of the 9I31M1-0 hydraulic power
tracking drive ......................................................................................... 173
10.3. AUTOMATED LAUNCH EQUIPMENT.................................................. 177
10.3.1. Purpose, composition, construction and functional features of automated
launch equipment..................................................................................... 177
10.3.2. Construction and functional features of automated launch equipment
units......................................................................................................... 182
10.4. SYSTEM INTERFACE IN 9P147 LAUNCHER........................................ 187
10.4.1. Locking PU 9P147 launcher.................................................................... 187
10.4.2. Putting PU 9P147 launcher in standby position...................................... 188
10.4.3. PU 9P147 system interaction when loading missiles............................. 189
10.4.4. PU 9P147 system interaction when unloading missiles........................... 189
10.4.5. PU 9P147 system interaction during missile launch................................ 189
11. NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT ON 9A310M1 TELAR....................................... 190
11.1 TNA-4-1 NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT.................................................... 190
11.1.1. Purpose, composition and main technical characteristics
of TNA-4-1 navigation equipment.............................................................. 190
11.1.2. Construction and functional features of TNA-4-1 navigation equipment.. 191
11.2 VOP-3 PANORAMIC SIGHT........................................................................ 197
11.2.1. General information about VOP-3 panoramic sight................................... 197
11.2.2. Setting up and using VOP-3 panoramic sight............................................. 197
11.3. PERISCOPIC ARTILLERY AIMING CIRCLE PAB 2M....................... 199
11.3.1. General information about PAB 2M artillery aiming circle........................ 199
11.3.2. Setting up and using PAB 2M artillery aiming circle.................................. 204
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................... 207
15
1.2. SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS: COMBAT TOOL CHARACTERISTICS
1.2.1. Command Post 9S470M1
The 9S470M1 command post (Figure 1.2) is intended for the automatic control of a detached
surface to air missile battalion. The PBU 9S470M1 equipment provides automation for the following
tasks:
1) putting the battalion’s combat tools into different stages of combat alert;
2) gathering, processing and displaying information about the airborne environment received
from the 9S18M1 acquisition radar and the SPM 9A310M1 launcher;
3) receiving and displaying data on the location and condition of 9K37M1 surface to air
missile system combat tools and allocating areas of responsibility for TELAR 9A310M1;
4) processing and working out the optimum solution for target allocation;
5) transmitting target selection to the 9A310M1 TELAR and control over task performance;
6) control over combat tool operational modes in the surface to air missile system;
7) exchanging information with the surface to air missile brigade command post;
8) alerting friendly planes in the battalion’s zone of action;
9) documenting combat;
10) simulating airborne environment for command post crew training;
11) monitoring the operation of the system’s combat tools.
Figure 1.2. General view of command vehicle PBU 9S470M1: a) in standby position; b) in locked position.
PBU 9S470M1 combat crew is made up of 6 personnel: battalion commander, chief of
command post/section commander, senior operator, operator, radio and telecoms engineer, driver.
a
b
77
Figure 3.1. View of R-4SA radar screen when
switching on the target locking marker to
search mode:
1 – banned target mark;
2 – allowed target mark;
3 – locked target mark
Figure 3.2. View of R-4SA radar screen when
switching on the target locking marker in
tracking mode:
1 – tracked target mark;
2 – warning point mark; 3 – long-distance
point;
4 – short-distance point; 5 – locked target
mark
Figure 3.3. View of R-4SA radar screen in
Triangulation mode:
1,3 – distance from target;
2 – sector located by noise radar;
4 – discreet target indication mark 75 and 15;
5 – conventional noise radar line for the first
SPM;
6 – SPM interface position (conventional)out
from the group.
Figure 3.4. View of R-4SA radar screen when
switching the TARGET mark to group target
search mode:
1 – group target;
2 – target indication mark;
3 – mark of suspected target which stands
The R-4V spotter is intended for indicating the airborne environment, target recognition
results (prior to locking) and target selection for autotracking. The screen shows the radar situation
similar to the situation on the sectoral screen. The screen has a right-angled section (figures 3.5, 3.6)
78
The screen shows distance calibration marks depending on the distance set on the R-4SA unit
and the sight mark guided according to the azimuth and distance (speed in quasi-continuous emission
mode) by the R-51TsA joystick.
In the quasi-continuous emission mode, instead of calibration marks, the indicator screen
shows division by time channels. The front panel of the R-4V unit has a board which shows the linear
scan sequence according to the location angle, as well as buttons to start searching a single row
according to the location angle – where the target signal has the maximum value.
The precise coordinates indicator R-4NA is intended for strobing the target according to
distance in impulse mode and according to speed in quasi-continuous emission mode. There are two
nets on the indicator screen in the form of horizontal lines: the upper line is the exact distance net, and
the bottom line is the rough distance net. The lower net distance may be, respectively 100 or 50 km,
depending on the distance set on the R-4SA unit.
The exact net displays the dark sight, while the rough net displays the target location (TL)
strobe in chirp mode and the target indication strobe (figure 3.7).
The dark sight is linked to the TL strobe, with an enlarged scale of the exact net showing the
same section of the rough net where the TL strobe is.
In quasi-continuous emission mode, the upper net shows the scan outlet of the quasicontinuous
receiver and the guided heterodyne (GH) mark. The GH mark is moved with the R-51SA
joystick and the R-51-SA steering wheel.
79
Quasi-continuous emission mode during autonomous operation
Figure 3.5 View of R-4V indicator screen in search mode
The bottom net may display: one of the eight scan channels, one of two the radar receiver
outlets, one of two long-distance receiver outlets as well as the quasi-continuous emission impulse
from the RPDP [unknown abbreviation]. The information displayed on the bottom net is selected
using the switches on the front panel of the R-4HA unit.
A system of angular tracking ensures the locking and tracking of the detected target according
to angle coordinates. In chirp mode, if there is a target mark in the target position strobe and a “Zone
10°” command, the antenna switches from the 10 °x 6 ° search mode to guiding a package of impulses
from the target to a designated digital computer. The calculation is performed after a “Zone 10°”
command and impulses are received from the start and end of the package from the R-75 unit.
Calibration
marks
Calibration
marks
sight
general recognition mark
off target mark
local objects
sight
sight
off target mark
off target mark
Impulse mode during autonomous operation
Moving target selection mode
unrecovered parts of local
objects
reflection from powerful
local object
distributed time
channels
lateral
components of
reflection from
ground surface
80
Figure 3.6 View of indicator screens during target locking and tracking
When in search mode, the R-75 target detection unit, accumulates a package signal, forms the
target detection impulses and the start and end of package impulse. These impulses are received by
the digital computer which, in the Zone 10° mode, scans the angle automation sensor for the mirror
coordinates according to the location angle and azimuth, corresponding to the start and end of the
package.
The computer calculates the package center according to the scanned coordinates and, after a
“Calculate AZ-I” command, the computer uses the closed tracking system while processing the
discrepancy signal, to guide the antenna mirror to the calculated target coordinates. A tracking is used
to process the antenna position, which is locked onto the angle position sensor via the 9S471M1
digital computer.
The transition to autotracking takes place if the target shows in the ray, if it is strobed
according to distance and there is an AZ-I command.
R-4SA
far point
near point
general recognition
mark
target
target indication
w arning
point
R-4B
calibration
marks
Chirp mode
sight
off target
mark
sight
calibration
marks
calibration
marks
calibration
marks
far point
near point
general recognition
mark
target
target indication
ca libration
marks
off target
mark
Chirp + moving
target selection mode
Quasi-continuous emission mode
sight
off target
mark
Autonomous mode
85
• U0.08.01.00 – response signal imitator;
2) transmitting device – U0.22.00.00-B comprising:
• U0.02.04.00 – feeder device;
• U0.02.01.00-A – setting generator
3) the coding/decoding device comprises the main and auxiliary equipment. The main
equipment which supports combat operation includes the 6110-21 device, which is installed on the
SPM TELAR.
Auxiliary equipment installed outside the SPM TELAR and used for the input and input
monitoring of key software as well as to monitor the working condition of the coding/decoding device
includes the 6110-40 unit and a special UMD notepad pack.
The radar detection system is a system of impulse radio communication which works by
exchanging information between the interrogator and the responder.
To ensure recognition of detected targets, the ground interrogator communicates with the
radar, that is, ensures the spatial combination of the radar and interrogator antenna radiation pattern
lobes, as well as the synchronized emission of radar probe signals and interrogation signals during
area scanning and target tracking.
The interrogation signal is formed ahead of the radar probe signal in order to record the time
taken by the aircraft to process the interrogation signal and by the interrogator to process the response
signal. This makes it possible for the radar screen to link the interrogator’s outgoing signal to the
signal reflected from the target according to the distance.
4.2. PRINCIPLES OF IFF TARGET IDENTIFICATION
MODE I , RANGE VII OF THE GROUND IFF INTERROGATOR
ModeI1, range VII is the general recognition mode resistant to spoofing (Figure 4.1), which
ensures IFF target identification. This mode uses one interrogation signal which is a synchronized
group of three impulses at frequency f4 at time positions 0, 1, and 4 when interrogating an aircraft and
positions 0, 1, and 3 when interrogating a ship. The lateral lobe suppression impulse is formed at
position 5. It serves to prevent interrogation from responders along the lateral antenna radiation
pattern lobes.
Figure 4.1. Interrogation and response signals in Mode I, range VII of the ground IFF interrogator
The Mode I response signal is coded with the frequency-time code. It is two impulses on
either an f2 or an f3 frequency.
The first impulse is a superimpulse (SI) formed at the 0 position, while the other, information
impulse – at position 1, 2, or 3. When SI is emitted at frequency f2 (codes 1–3), the information
impulse is emitted at frequency f3.
Synchronized group
Ground interrogator signal
Lateral love
suppression
impulse
Synchronized impulses f2 (f3)
Impulse information f2 (f3)
Aircraft response signal

Annex 498
Karpenko, A.V. 9K317M BUK-M3 Surface-to-Air Missile System / NEVSKY BASTION Military
Technology Almanac
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.

NEVSKIY BASTION, MILITARY-TECHNICAL ANTHOLOGY, ARMAMENTS, MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, MILITARY-TECHNICAL ANTHOLOGY, CURRENT STATE, HISTORY OF
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIC, BASTION VTS, NEVSKIY BASTION, JOURNAL, ANTHOLOGY, VPK, ARMIES, SHOWS, SALONS, MILITARY-TECHNICAL, NEWS, LATEST NEWS,
MILITARY NEWS, …
http://nevskii-bastion.ru/buk-m3/[6/5/2018 12:41:54 AM]
[…]
ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE SYSTEM 9K317M BUK-M3
ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE SYSTEM 9K317M BUK-M3
ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE SYSTEM 9K317M BUK-M3
NEVSKIY BASTION, MILITARY-TECHNICAL ANTHOLOGY, ARMAMENTS, MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, MILITARY-TECHNICAL ANTHOLOGY, CURRENT STATE, HISTORY OF
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIC, BASTION VTS, NEVSKIY BASTION, JOURNAL, ANTHOLOGY, VPK, ARMIES, SHOWS, SALONS, MILITARY-TECHNICAL, NEWS, LATEST NEWS,
MILITARY NEWS, …
http://nevskii-bastion.ru/buk-m3/[6/5/2018 12:41:54 AM]
Work to create the next-generation ZRK [anti-aircraft missile system] Buk-M3 has been performed by the V.V. Tikhomirov Scientific
Research Institute of Instrument Design. ZRK Buk-M3 is the fourth generation of mobile medium-range systems. Having preserved the
overall construction of ZRK Buk-M2, the latest-generation Buk-M3 system fundamentally exceeds it in terms of tactical and technical
specifications.
The military actions in Yugoslavia (1999) and Iraq (2003) influenced to a significant degree the creation of Air Defense's new antiaircraft
missile system. They showed that successful use of an anti-aircraft missile system requires the extreme minimization of the
operating time during active operation of the radar equipment that is part of the system. The resolution of this problem by experts at
the Scientific Research Institute of Instrument Design, which was vital for the Air Defense Troops of the Russian Ground Forces, is seen
in the use of an active self-guiding radar head, which gives the anti-aircraft missile system the ability to operate using the "fire-andforget"
principle. This makes it possible to significantly increase the system's military durability (20 seconds after changing the position
of the anti-aircraft missile system, combat use can begin again).
The other most important improvement must be the introduction of an active electronically scanned array (AFAR), which was
implemented in the previous modification of the Buk family of anti-aircraft missile systems: the ZRK Buk M2.
NEVSKIY BASTION, MILITARY-TECHNICAL ANTHOLOGY, ARMAMENTS, MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, MILITARY-TECHNICAL ANTHOLOGY, CURRENT STATE, HISTORY OF
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIC, BASTION VTS, NEVSKIY BASTION, JOURNAL, ANTHOLOGY, VPK, ARMIES, SHOWS, SALONS, MILITARY-TECHNICAL, NEWS, LATEST NEWS,
MILITARY NEWS, …
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By the time work began on ZRK Buk-M3, the Buk-M2 modification was considered one of the most effective members of its class. Its
development was completed in 1988, but it was only brought into mass production 15 years later. The ZRK Buk-M3 allows for
simultaneous processing of information about the air situation of a large number of targets based on data from its own target
acquisition facilities that are part of the composition of the anti-aircraft missile system, and based on data from higher command posts
(VKP) that is passed to the anti-aircraft missile system surveillance facilities. The anti-aircraft missile system's full complement allows
for simultaneously firing at up to 36 air targets flying from any directions. Main advantages relative to the third-generation anti-aircraft
missile system:
Compared with the ZRK Buk-M2 the following increased by a factor of 1.5:
- on-board ammunition capacity,
- strike zone,
- number of targets simultaneously fired at.
The system's noise-tolerance and durability were increased, as well as its operational specifications, including thanks to the use of antiaircraft
guided missile containers.
At the present time, the ZRK Buk-M3 has no counterparts in the world among anti-aircraft missile systems in its class.
NEVSKIY BASTION, MILITARY-TECHNICAL ANTHOLOGY, ARMAMENTS, MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, MILITARY-TECHNICAL ANTHOLOGY, CURRENT STATE, HISTORY OF
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIC, BASTION VTS, NEVSKIY BASTION, JOURNAL, ANTHOLOGY, VPK, ARMIES, SHOWS, SALONS, MILITARY-TECHNICAL, NEWS, LATEST NEWS,
MILITARY NEWS, …
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Scientific Production Association Start, which also has experience working on the Buk-M2, was brought in to work on creating the ZRK
Buk-M3 self-propelled turrets (SOU). Still in the design phase, instead of the existing television viewfinder capable of effectively working
only in daylight hours and in good weather, the modernized system is expected to introduce a thermal imager for the anti-aircraft
missile system to be used in any weather and around the clock.
The thermal imager's shortcoming is a narrow field of view, which makes it difficult to search for air targets. Heat-based directionfinders,
which have significant coverage along the horizon and with respect to elevation (roughly 30-40 degrees), do not have this
shortcoming. However, heat-based direction finders are not sufficiently effective for collision courses. Accordingly, it seems reasonable
to integrate the thermal imaging and heat-based direction-finding hardware into a unified system. The improved anti-aircraft missile
system, which has significantly increased range, also has a new missile placed in a transport/launch container. This significantly
improves the operational specifications of the anti-aircraft guided missiles. The more compact missile, which possesses improved
specifications, will make it possible to raise by a factor of 1.5 the ammunition load of the combat machines, bringing it to six units for
the self-propelled turret and to 12 for the transport/launch platform.
During the design work, a minor update of the crawler chassis was also expected, which was necessitated by the increase in the total
weight of the system's warheads.
NEVSKIY BASTION, MILITARY-TECHNICAL ANTHOLOGY, ARMAMENTS, MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, MILITARY-TECHNICAL ANTHOLOGY, CURRENT STATE, HISTORY OF
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MILITARY NEWS, …
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In due course, experts at the Scientific Production Association Start registered Patent RU 2262647 for the self-propelled launch
platform. In an example of a specific embodiment, the self-propelled launch platform consists of a self-propelled crawler chassis (1), on
which a rotatable platform (2) is mounted. The launch platform includes powered booms (3, 4) equipped with hydraulic actuators for
vertical aiming in the form of hydraulic cylinders (5, 6). On the booms, there are latch pins (7, 8) to attach the missile containers (9,
10) of the bottom deck. The top deck's containers (11, 12) are installed on the containers of the lower deck and attached by latch pins
(13).
The launch platform is equipped as follows. The first six containers with missiles are installed on the booms (3, 4) (three for each boom)
and attached by latch pins (7, 8). The second six containers are installed directly on the containers of the lower deck, as shown in Fig.
2, and attached by pins (13). Then the containers are connected to the control lines of the automated launch equipment.
Upon receiving a warning about an expected mass attack from the air, the launch platform is moved out to the firing line. In the combat
position, the hydraulic cylinder (5) is initially connected to the launch platform’s hydraulically driven pump. As the rod (5) advances, the
boom (3) with the containers (11) is set at the required elevation. Then the hydraulic pump is connected to the hydraulic cylinder (6)
and the boom (4) with the containers (12) is set. Because the hydraulic pump works to move a single tilting part with half the missiles,
the load on the hydraulic system is cut in half.
After the launch of all twelve missiles, the launch platform is moved to a position for maintenance.
NEVSKIY BASTION, MILITARY-TECHNICAL ANTHOLOGY, ARMAMENTS, MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, MILITARY-TECHNICAL ANTHOLOGY, CURRENT STATE, HISTORY OF
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIC, BASTION VTS, NEVSKIY BASTION, JOURNAL, ANTHOLOGY, VPK, ARMIES, SHOWS, SALONS, MILITARY-TECHNICAL, NEWS, LATEST NEWS,
MILITARY NEWS, …
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Here the empty containers are removed, and containers with missiles as described above are installed in their place.
The proposed platform is mentioned in Patent RU 2262647. It has several advantages as compared with well-known counterparts. When
using the units and assemblies that have been unified with the Buk launch platform, the proposed platform replaces three Buk platforms
or four Kub launch platforms in terms of fire power.
According to the indicated plan, OAO Scientific Production Association Start has developed the corresponding design documentation and
started preparations to manufacture a prototype of the launch platform.
“We plan to receive the first Buk M3 in 2009,” said Colonel General Nikolay Frolov, head of the Air Defense Troops of the Ground Forces
of the Russian Federation, in September 2007. “This will be an entirely new system, created using new components with entirely
different capabilities," noted Frolov.
"The planned rearmament from Buk-M1 to Buk-M2 is currently underway. In the future, starting in 2016, we expect to receive the Buk-
M3. The latest Buk-M3 anti-aircraft missile system will start to enter the field in 2016," said Lieutenant General Aleksandr Leonov, head
of the Air Defense Troops of the Ground Forces, in December 2013. To prepare for the start of the mass production of the ZRK Buk-M3,
the production facilities of the M.I. Kalinin Machine Building Plant (MZIK) were modernized.
The Ministry of Defense has concluded a contract with the Ulyanov Mechanical Plant. Preparations for production have begun. “I think
that the first serially produced examples will begin to enter the field as early as the end of 2015,” said General Director of the Scientific
Research Institute of Instrument Design Yuriy Beliy in March 2014.
Annex 499
Ryabov, K. Surface-to-Air Missile Systems of the Buk Family / Military Review online
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.

Anti-aircraft missile systems [ZRK] of the Buk family Military Review [Voennoye Obozreniye]
https://topwar.ru/79989-zenitnye-raketnye-kompleksy-semeystva-buk.html[May 6, 2018 12:35:39 AM]
The ZRK Buk-M1 was the first system in the family to be offered to foreign customers. The system was supplied
to foreign armies under the name Gang. For example, in 1997, several systems were sent to Finland as part of a
repayment of government debt.
ZRK 􀀜􀉄􀀖􀀔􀀚􀀃􀀥􀁘􀁎-M2
Development of an updated anti-aircraft missile system of the Buk family, with a new 9M317 missile that received
the designation 9K317 Buk-M2, was completed as early as the end of the eighties. The distance and altitude of
target strikes were expected to be significantly increased thanks to the new guided weaponry. Additionally, the
system specifications were supposed to show the use of a range of new equipment installed in various
subsections of the system.
Unfortunately, the economic circumstances in the country did not allow the adoption of the new system at the end
of the eighties or beginning of the nineties. The question of updating the hardware of Air Defense units was
ultimately settled thanks to the "transitional" Buk-M1-2 system. Development of the 9K317 system continued
simultaneously. Work on the project for the updated Buk-M2 and its export version, the Buk-M2E, continued until
the middle of the two thousands.
Buk-M2 SOU [self-propelled turret]
The main innovation of the Buk-M2 project was the new 9M317 guided missile. The new ZUR [anti-aircraft guided
missile] differed from the 9M38 by shorter-length wings, an updated body design, and a starting weight of roughly
720 kg. Thanks to the design change and the use of a new engine, the maximum firing range was successfully
increased to 45 km. The maximum flight altitude of the target being attacked was raised to 25 km. To expand the
military capabilities of the unit, the missile gained the ability to turn off the proximity fuse and detonate the
warhead based on a contact's command.
Anti-aircraft missile systems [ZRK] of the Buk family Military Review [Voennoye Obozreniye]
https://topwar.ru/79989-zenitnye-raketnye-kompleksy-semeystva-buk.html[May 6, 2018 12:35:39 AM]
Such a mode is proposed for using the missile against ground and water targets.
The 9K317 system received an updated 9A317 SOU [self-propelled turret] based on the GM-569 crawler chassis.
The overall architecture of the turret remained as before, but the new subsection is built with modern components
and new hardware. As before, the self-propelled turret can independently find and track the target, launch a 9M317
missile, and track its trajectory, using a radio command system to make corrections if necessary.
The SOU 9A317 is equipped with a radar station with a phased-array antenna for tracking and illuminating. The
station can track targets in a sector 90° wide horizontally and with an elevation of 0° to 70°. It can acquire targets at
distances up to 20 km. In tracking mode, the target can be located within a sector 130° wide horizontally and with an
elevation of -5° to +85°. The station simultaneously locates up to 10 targets and can support a simultaneous attack
on four.
To improve the system specifications and ensure function in difficult conditions, the self-propelled turret has an
optical-electronic system with day and night channels.
Buk-M2 launching and loading equipment
The Buk-M2 system may be built with two types of launching/loading systems. A self-propelled subsection based on
the GM-577 chassis was developed along with a subsection towable with a tractor truck. The overall architecture
remained as before: four missiles are arranged in the launcher and can be launched or transferred to a self-propelled
turret. Another four are transported on the transport supports.
Anti-aircraft missile systems [ZRK] of the Buk family Military Review [Voennoye Obozreniye]
https://topwar.ru/79989-zenitnye-raketnye-kompleksy-semeystva-buk.html[May 6, 2018 12:35:39 AM]
A new 9S510 command post based on the GM-579 chassis or on a towable semitrailer was added to the modernized
system. The command post's automated equipment can receive information from surveillance devices and track up to
60 trajectories simultaneously. It is possible to issue targeting instructions for 16-36 targets. The response time is no
more than 2 seconds.
The main target detection tool in the ZRK Buk-M2 is the SOTs [target acquisition system] 9S18M1-3, which
represents the further development of the family of systems. The new radar station is equipped with a phased-array
antenna with electronic scanning and is capable of detecting air targets at distances of up to 160 km. There are
operating modes that can detect targets when the opponent uses active and passive interference.
A so-called target illumination and missile guidance system was expected to be added to the range of selfpropelled/
towable resources in the Buk-M2 system. The new 9S36 subsection is a crawler chassis or a towable
semitrailer with an antenna post on an extendable mast. This equipment makes it possible to raise the phased-array
antenna to a height of 22 m and thereby improve the specifications of the radar station. The greater relative height
allows for detection of targets at distances of up to 120 km. The 9S36 station's tracking and guidance specifications
correspond to the radar stations of self-propelled turrets. It can be used to track 10 targets and simultaneously fire at
4.
All the innovations and changes to the composition of the system made it possible to significantly improve its
specifications. The maximum target interception distance is stated at 50 km, at a maximum altitude of 25 km. The
greatest distance is achieved when attacking non-maneuvering airplanes. Tactical ballistic missiles can be
intercepted at distances of up to 20 km and heights of up to 16 km. Additionally it is possible to destroy helicopters
and winged and anti-radar missiles. If necessary, the anti-aircraft missile system's calculations can attack water or
radio-contrasting ground targets.
Anti-aircraft missile systems [ZRK] of the Buk family Military Review [Voennoye Obozreniye]
https://topwar.ru/79989-zenitnye-raketnye-kompleksy-semeystva-buk.html[May 6, 2018 12:35:39 AM]
9S36 Buk-M2 radar system for target illumination and missile guidance. The antenna is raised to its operating position.
The first version of the 9K317 project was developed as early as the end of the eighties, but the difficult economic
situation did not allow the adoption of the new anti-aircraft missile system. Use of this system by the military began
only in 2008. By then, the anti-aircraft missile system had undergone several updates that made it possible to further
improve its specifications.
ZRK Buk-M1-2
Numerous economic and political problems prevented the adoption and mass production of the new ZRK 9K317.
Therefore, in 1992 the decision was made to develop a simplified "transitional" variant of the system, which would
use several elements of the Buk-2, but would be simpler and less expensive. This variant of the anti-aircraft missile
system received the designations Buk-M1-2 and Ural.
The modernized ZRK Ural includes several updated subsections that represent the further development of the old
types of machines. Launching missiles and illuminating targets was performed by 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀀲􀀸􀀃􀀜􀀤􀀖􀀔􀀓􀉆􀀔-2, operating
􀁍􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀜􀀤􀀖􀀛􀉆􀀔􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀒􀁏􀁒􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃subsection. The SOTs remained as before- the Buk-M1-2 system had to
use the 9S18M1 station. The system's auxiliary facilities did not undergo serious changes.
To increase the secrecy of the work, and thus its durability, and to expand its circle of solvable challenges, the selfpropelled
turret gained the ability to perform passive direction-finding on a target. This involved the use of a
television-optical viewfinder and a laser range-finder. Such equipment was to be used during an attack of ground or
[…]
Annex 500
Mikhail Khodarenok / “Password” Is Almost Unheard
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.

“Parol” is almost inaudible / Armaments / Nezavisimaya Gazeta
http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2000-12-15/6_parol.html[6/5/2018 12:47:19 AM]
Tuesday, June 5, 2018 12:46 am
Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie [Independent Military Review]
[…]
Newspaper Armaments Internet version
12/15/2000
‘Parol’ [‘Password’] is almost inaudible
By Mikhail Khodarenok
Tags: Parol, Kremny [Silicon], Aeroflot, radar
Only two countries in the world have state radar identification systems: Russia (in the unified “Parol” [“Password”]
system with the participating states of the CIS), and the United States (in the Mk XII unified system with NATO
countries). Having such a system and keeping it operable is, at a minimum, a task for the government. In essence,
“Parol” is almost inaudible / Armaments / Nezavisimaya Gazeta
http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2000-12-15/6_parol.html[6/5/2018 12:47:19 AM]
having (on a par with the U.S.) a unique unified state radar system for identifying above-water and land-based
objects attests to our state’s prestige.
It is hardly necessary to explain the importance of the existence in the country of a reliable state radar system for
identifying airborne, above-water and ground targets. Deficiencies and an underestimation of such a system are very
costly in a combat situation. For example, in the Middle East in October 1973, the losses of national air forces from
each country’s own anti-aircraft defenses amounted to: Egypt, up to 46%; Syria, up to 14%; Libya and Iraq, up to
30%. During the 1991 Gulf War, the cause of 15% of all personnel losses by the allies in the anti-Iraq coalition was
friendly fire on troops (forces). On April 14, 1994, in a no-fly zone for Iraqi planes, two American helicopters were
shot down by America’s own fighters. The pilots of two F-15s misidentified the pair of Black Hawk army
helicopters as Iraqi Mi-24s. The incident killed 26 British, French and Turkish service personnel.
HOW IT ALL BEGAN
The first state radar identification system to go into service in the territory of the USSR and its allies was called
“Kremny-2(2M)” [“Silicon”]. In addition to many positive characteristics it also had two major flaws. The main one
was unsatisfactory spoofing resistance. Kremny’s identification codes were determined in a few seconds (in
Kremny-2 they were 12 code filters). Through brute-force cracking of switches or tumblers (that is what the “codes”
looked like), one could find the necessary combination and imitate the identification signal “I am ours.” Moreover,
the system operated in the decimeter range prohibited by the ICAO and held back the development of television at
these frequencies, which was provided for by international agreements. In 1995 a decision was adopted to terminate
the combat use of the Kremny-2(2M) identification system on the territory of the Russian Federation, since it
reduced the effectiveness of the use of the new Parol unified state radar identification system. In addition to this,
however, it was decided to continue the use of the system’s land-based and onboard hardware (within the limits of
the operational resources installed for them) in order to perform the tasks of monitoring compliance with the
procedure of the use of airspace by aircraft.
Until that time, beginning in the 1970s, two radar identification systems, Kremny-2 and Parol, were operating
concurrently. A major personal contribution to the formation and development of the new Parol state radar
identification system was made by Air Force Marshal Yevgeny Savitsky. At the beginning of the formation of Parol,
it was hard to imagine that in the near future land-based radar transponders would be installed in the combat vehicles
of battalion commanders and they would respond to the relevant interrogation with a state radar identification signal,
and most importantly, in spoofing-resistant mode.
However, the retrofitting of all airborne, above-water and land-based objects with the new Parol state radar
identification system never was completed. While virtually all military objects were retrofitted, a sizable portion of
civilian airborne objects were not affected.
AEROFLOT AND OTHERS
In 1997 the Statute on Equipping Civilian Aircraft with Onboard Transponders of the Parol Identification System
entered into force, having been approved by the director of the Russian Federal Aviation Service, with sign-offs
from the head of the Department of the Aerospace Industry and Shipbuilding of the Russian Ministry of the
Economy and the chairman of the Aviation Registry of the Interstate Aviation Committee.
Civilian aircraft were to be equipped with onboard transponders in order to speed up decision-making regarding the
national affiliation of objects by authorities monitoring the use of airspace, and to rule out a mistaken attack on our
aircraft by our own weapons systems, especially in border areas and in zones of local military conflicts.
In addition, our experts believed, the equipping of civilian aircraft with onboard Parol system transponders would
make it possible, during the period of a threat, to rapidly bring to the necessary degree of readiness the aircraft that
would be deployed under a mobilization plan, as well as to identify aircraft issuing an SOS and thereby
“Parol” is almost inaudible / Armaments / Nezavisimaya Gazeta
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provide them with prompt assistance.
Aeroflot OJSC, as well as other operators and designers of Russia’s civilian aircraft, regardless of form of
ownership, were supposed to ensure the retrofitting of aircraft in operation with Parol system transponders for
identification of the national affiliation of objects in the territory of the Russian Federation. This was prescribed by
the Statute on Equipping Civilian Aircraft with Transponders of the Parol Identification System, which was
formulated and approved in 1997 by the director of the Russian Federal Aviation Service and the chief of the
General Staff of the RF Armed Forces.
The statute was intended to require all designers and operators of aircraft, regardless of form of ownership, to ensure
the retrofitting of aircraft in operation, in serial production and in development, with Parol system transponders for
identification of the national affiliation of objects in the territory of the Russian Federation. It also defines the
requirements for aircraft in regard to equipping them with state identification hardware. In accordance with these
requirements, all civilian aircraft intended for operation in Russian airspace (including those in serial production, in
operation and deployed under a mobilization plan, as well as those being newly designed in Russia or other
countries that are parties to the Agreement on Civil Aviation and the Use of Airspace of 12/27/1991 and the
Agreement on Ensuring the Radar Identification of Airborne, Above-Water and Land-Based Objects Equipped with
Parol System Transponders of 6/26/1992), regardless of form of ownership, must be equipped with transponders for
the aforementioned system.
For civilian aircraft designed in countries that are not parties to the above agreements, the requirements for
equipping them with Parol system transponders must be set by joint decisions of the Ministry of Defense, the
Department of the Aerospace Industry and Shipbuilding of the Russian Ministry of the Economy and the RF Federal
Aviation Service. Pursuant to the Federal Rules for the use of RF Airspace, flights by aircraft without radar
identification equipment are prohibited, except for aircraft on which the installation of this equipment was not
previously prescribed.
There are about 7,500 aircraft in civil aviation, including 1,800 on main routes, which according to a RF government
resolution must be equipped with the Parol system. However, only 15% of them have this system, which
significantly hampers the monitoring of the use of airspace. In addition, foreign-made aircraft that are operated by
domestic airlines on a leased basis do not have identification equipment either.
Aeroflot OJSC is proposing that transponders of the state identification system be removed altogether from aircraft.
This is already a dangerous precedent and will make it more difficult to perform the task facing the RF Armed
Forces of monitoring the use of airspace and crossings of Russia’s state border.
It should be mentioned that there is a government resolution that obligates aircraft operators, regardless of form of
ownership, to ensure the equipping of aircraft in operation and those newly manufactured with equipment for the
Parol state identification system according to the schedule set by this resolution.
Finally, strict fulfillment by the relevant ministries, agencies, and organizations of the requirements of the RF
government resolution and the other regulatory documents cited above will make it possible to perform the task of
reliably identifying the national affiliation of civilian airborne objects with the use of modern equipment. In
addition, the possibility of an attack on our objects with our own weapons systems will be reduced, and decisionmaking
regarding the national affiliation of objects by authorities monitoring the airspace will become faster.
PAROL AND OUR NEIGHBORS
The breakup of the Soviet Union had little effect on the operation of the unified state radar identification system.
Except for Moldova and Azerbaijan and, in part, Georgia, the remaining countries concluded the Agreement on
Ensuring the Radar Identification of Airborne, Above-Water, and Land-Based Objects Equipped with Parol System
“Parol” is almost inaudible / Armaments / Nezavisimaya Gazeta
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Transponders of 6/26/1992 and the Protocol to that Agreement of 6/4/1999 (Minsk).
In the Agreement, the governments of the participating states (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine), guided by a desire to ensure reliable identification of their
objects in order to exclude an unintentional attack on them by their own weapons systems, agreed to retain the Parol
radar system as a unified state identification system. In addition, the parties undertook, within five years from the
date of its entry into force (i.e. by 2004), to install Parol system equipment on the aircraft and marine vessels of the
ministries, agencies and organizations belonging to those states.
Therefore, the necessary regulatory framework on the matter of equipping civilian aircraft with Parol identification
system transponders has been prepared not only for the Russian Federation but also at an intergovernmental level.
WHAT PAROL RESTS ON
Russia has no permanent authorities that perform any administrative or guiding role in regard to the state radar
identification system. Even though it seemed that Parol is a state system, it rests, for the most part, on the decency of
the participants, which was established, incidentally, back in Soviet times. The country’s leadership, apparently, is
not fully aware that Parol continues to hold out on enthusiasm alone.
There are fewer and fewer capabilities for this, as well as spare parts for Parol. Each unit, in particular, of secure
identification equipment (and that is virtually what all of Parol rests on) has its own service life, an established
operating life. Without the appropriate technical maintenance, periodic repairs and replenishment of expendables,
the system will simply begin to crumble. If one follows one’s own rules and principles, then without an operable
state identification system an airplane cannot be sent into the air, nor a ship to sea. Therefore, the absence or
inoperability of a state identification system can lead to paralysis in the air and at sea.
Incidentally, not a single NATO plane in the recent events in Yugoslavia switched off its identification system or
RBS system for even a minute, because in the developed Western countries the life even of an individual pilot is
valued extremely highly. Moreover, the control of such a large number of aircraft was conducted both from the air
(AWACS planes) and from the ground (traffic control authorities). Without an impeccably functioning state
identification system, the management of such an amount of aircraft is highly problematic.
PROGRAMMED CHAOS
One of the promising areas for solving the problem of equipping civilian aircraft with state identification
transponders is the use of dual-purpose combined electronic hardware as part of onboard equipment. Specifically􀀏􀀃􀉚􀀃
4280 MSGA [abbreviation unknown] transponder is being designed for civilian aircraft; it is supposed to support
operation in the Parol identification system, the Russian secondary-radar traffic-control system and the international
ATCRBS traffic-control system with Mode S (discrete-address identification mode). The approximate date of
completion of the design (beginning of serial production) is early 2004.
The design of airplane transponders for the state identification system in the U.S. and NATO countries (Mk XII) is
moving in the same direction. In peacetime their civilian planes use only the RBS secondary transponder, and during
special periods that onboard equipment operates in spoofing-resistant mode, which ensures the operation of the state
identification system.
Proposals are currently being formulated for the equipping of aircraft with a modernized Parol system (“Strazh”
[“Sentinel”]) to ensure reliable monitoring of Russia’s airspace. There is, however, not much optimism about doing
this work.
In essence, with this kind of funding one can say good-bye to yet another feature of a great power, and the evolving
situation, in terms of its results and characteristics, is very close to this. Unless the attitude to the state radar
identification system changes, it will not be possible not only to switch to the new Strazh system, but even to
“Parol” is almost inaudible / Armaments / Nezavisimaya Gazeta
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modernize Parol and keep it operational. A return to Kremny-2 is quite likely. But Kremny will cease to exist in the
foreseeable future, since it is based on old resources; industry has long since discontinued production of spare parts
for it.
These are the realities. But without a dependable radar identification system in the air, chaos will set in – no
exaggeration. One need only imagine for a second the confusion that could arise in any military conflict when there
are hundreds and thousands of objects in the air, at sea and on land, and it will be necessary in a few seconds to
figure out where ours are and where the others are – and make a sound decision to use weapons systems.
[…]

Annex 501
Skorik, A.B. Design, Maintenance, and Combat Use of Launchers of the Buk-M1 Surface-to-Air
Missile System
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE
KHARKIV AIR FORCE UNIVERSITY
G.M. Zubrytsky, A.S. Kyrylyuk, V.V. Lukyanchuk, P.Y. Khyl
CONSTRUCTION, TECHNICAL OPERATION
AND COMBAT USE
OF THE BUK-M1 SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE SYSTEM
COMMAND POST
Part II
THE 9S470M1 COMMAND POST VEHICLE
Study Guide
Edited by P.Y. Khyl
Kharkiv
2005

UDK 623.618.2
BBK 641.4.992
Kh45
Reviewers: Prof I.O. Kyrychenko, Honored Scientist, Doctor of Military Science
(Military Institute of the Interior Troops, Ministry of Internal Affairs)
Prof B.M. Lanetsky, Doctor of Engineering (Chair 302)
P.Y. Khyl
Kh 45
Construction, technical operation and combat use of the BUK-M1 surface to
air missile system command post. Part II. The 9S470M1 command post
vehicle: Study guide / G.M. Zubrytsky, A.S. Kyrylyuk, V.V. Lukyanchuk,
P.Y. Khyl // Kharkiv Air Force University. – Kharkiv, 2005. – 75 pages.
The study guide is intended for those studying the command post tools of the
BUK-M1 surface to air missile system and for those at university studying mediumrange
surface-to-air missile systems.
The guide describes the construction and functional principles of the 9S470M1
command post vehicle as well as the fundamentals of its operation and combat use.
The content of the guide corresponds to modules II and III of the subject
syllabus “The construction, technical operation and combat use of information
technology and target guidance tools in the BUK-M1 surface to air missile system.
During the study of the book it is advisable to use the album of figures and
diagrams issued under the same title.
Illustrations: 68 (issued in a separate album), tables: 3, bibliography: 9 titles.
Approved for publication by Chair No 303, Kharkiv Air Force University.
Transcript No 8 of 9 December 2004.
© Kharkiv Air Force University
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 9S470M1 COMMAND POST VEHICLE
1.1. CP purpose and tasks
The 9S470M1 command post vehicle is a component of the surface-to-air missile
battalion command post armed with the 9K37M1 BUK-M1 surface to air missile system and
intended to provide automated control over its combat operations both during autonomous
operation and as part of a surface-to-air missile battalion.
The CP equipment is located in the cabin of the self-propelled tracked armoured
vehicle GM-579A and provides automation of the following tasks:
putting the battalion’s units into different stages of readiness to perform
assigned tasks;
receiving, processing and displaying information about the airborne
environment and combat management commands received from the brigade
command post equipped with the Polyana-D4 automated system, or from the airdefense
division command post (standard command staff vehicles MP22 and SM
MP25);
receiving, processing and displaying information about the airborne
environment received from the 9S18M1 acquisition radar and the SPM 9A310M1
launchers;
receiving and displaying data on missile presence on board SPM launchers
and the 9A39M1 launcher-loaders;
receiving and displaying data on the location and condition of surface-to-air
missile system tools;
control over SPM responsibility sectors according to azimuths and location
angles;
target allocation and the formation and output of target guidance to SPM
launchers;
control over fire assignments;
control over combat tool operational modes in the surface to air missile system
and SPM emission in the presence of active enemy interference and anti-radar
missiles;
organizing the system’s operation under special operational conditions (when
an SPM launcher is not fully operational, during the launch of missiles with “foe”
illumination, when an SPM is operating as a launcher-loader);
reporting combat readiness and combat operations to command post;
geolocation preparations for the battalion’s fire control;
documenting combat processes during enemy air attack;
simulating airborne environment for command post crew training;
monitoring the operation of CP combat tools.
1.2. CP composition and location. Combat crew.
The following equipment can be identified as part of the CP vehicle according to its
functional purpose (Figure 1.1).
1. Data processing and exchange tools – a digital computer system including:
digital computing unit (two Argon-15A computers);
data input-output device (BDM1-01 cabinet);
interface between the data input-output device and the automated workstation controls
(BD-2 unit).
The digital computer system is the main automation tool for the processing and
displaying of the airborne environment and the condition of the surface-to-air missile
battalion’s fire tools, as well as for the formation and implementation of target allocation
recommendations, the management of the SAM battalion’s combat operations and the
provision of guidance information exchange with external and internal system users.
2. Information display and management tools: four workstations - 1DM, 2DM and
two 3DM. Each automated workstation (AW) contains a D-4T1 display unit, management
controls, coordinate scanning and communication controls and the BD-5 command inputoutput
units. In addition, the SAM battalion commander AW includes a D-12-1 digital
dashboard displaying: missile presence on each SPM launcher and PZU launcher-loader, the
illumination transmitter letters set and installed on the SPM, while the chief of command post
vehicle AW includes the D-2-1 control for initial data input into the EOM long-term memory
device with the possibility of data replacement.
The information display and management tools are intended for the visual displaying
of information on the airborne environment, the location, conditions and combat operations
of the SAM battalion fire tools, EOM recommendations on target allocation to SPM
launchers and the commands and instructions received from the higher-level automated
command post.
3. The operational command communication and data transmission tools are intended
for exchanging operational and tactical information with the SAM brigade CP and with the
battalion’s units, conducting conversations with CP crew, exchanging bilateral telecode
information with the brigade CP and the SPM launcher and receiving telecode information
from the fire control radar.
Communication and data transmission tools include:
AI-011 data reception and transmission equipment and the mobile communication
center radio station – for bilateral telecode information exchange with the SAM brigade CP;
AI-011 reception equipment for airborne environment data incoming from the fire
control radar and the R-123MT (R-111) radio station;
the 9S624 telecode equipment – for the bilateral exchange of telecode information
with the SPM launcher;
the 9S623 system for speech communication between the CP vehicle crew, the fire
control radar and the SPM launcher – to ensure reception and transmission of verbal
information by the two R-123MT radio stations, the reception and transmission of individual
and circulated coded signals and the ALARM signal;
the 9S726 internal telephone communication system and switchboard – to support
individual conversations between CP crew and to control the speech communication
equipment during verbal information exchanges via radio and cable between the crew of the
SPM fire control radar and the SPM launcher. In addition, the internal communication system
and switchboard records verbal information using the on-board recorders MS-61M and the
AM3-92RK audio recording equipment;
the FL-92V antenna needle device;
cable communication lines.
4. Navigation equipment for geolocation and orientation comprising TNA-4-1
tank navigation equipment, the VOP-3-1 panoramic optical sight and the PAB-2M aiming
circle.
The TNA-4-1 is intended for continuous calculation and display of current CP
coordinates on the topographic map to 1:50 000 or 1:100 000 scale during transit, for the
determination of the self-propelled vehicle’s longitudinal axis direction angle and the
destination point direction angle, for calculating the right-angled components of the CP
parallax relative to the set starting (reference) point – the starting point in the battalion’s
unified coordinate system.
The VOP-3-1 and the PAB-2M are used for determining the self-propelled vehicle’s
longitudinal axis direction angle and inputting it into the TNA-4-1 equipment before transit.
5. The documentation equipment is intended for the recording and playback of
information about the airborne environment and the condition of the SAM battalion’s combat
tools, the operational command information in the guidance grids, the registration of tracked
target information on rolled paper, the coordinates of the SPM fire control radar and launcher,
the SPM launcher’s technical condition, missile presence on the SPM launcher and the
launcher-loader, target reallocation results and the SPM launcher’s fire assignments in real
time.
The equipment comprises:
audio recording equipment AM3-92RK including two audio recording and playback
devices - the 74A-100 units - and a remote control – the 74A-200 unit;
two MS-61M flight recorders;
the P-115P telegraphic letter printing device (RTA-7MK rolled letter-printing
automated start-stop electronic telegraphy device)
6. The simulation equipment is intended for learning, practicing and improving main
combat operations by CP crew. It supports CP crew training by simulating the airborne
environment and the SPM launcher’s combat operations.
To support CP crew learning and training, the mathematical support digital computer
provides:
electronic simulation of airborne environment data received by the CP from the SPM
fire control radar;
electronic simulation of SPM launcher operations in various operational modes;
re-enactment of actual airborne environment recorded in advance onto the AM3-
92RK tape and supporting crew operations according to self-propelled fire control radar data
(SIMULATION 1 mode);
re-enactment of the full airborne environment, the throughput of commands and
reports and SPM launcher actions with missile departure simulation (SIMULATION 2 mode)
7. The life support system is intended to create the necessary air temperature,
cleanliness and humidity in the CP vehicle in different climate conditions and to protect from
WMD.
The system comprises:
filter and ventilation system FVU-200;
heating and ventilation system OV-65;
two MK-5 air conditioners;
individual fans;
radiation and chemical reconnaissance tool GO-27;
special treatment tool set DK-4;
fire extinguishing tools (UA PPO automatic air defense fire extinguisher)
In addition, the CP is equipped with the TNPO-168 observation tool and the TVNE-
4PA night vision tool for local observation.
8. The power supply tools are intended for supplying power to CP equipment during
the operation of the gas turbine engine, the self-propelled drive engine or an outside power
source.
The power supply tools comprise:
two AC generators BG-31 (main and reserve) which can work both off the gas turbine
engine or a self-propelled drive engine;
DC generator OG-10;
BU-31 rectifier;
remote controls, switches and power system protection equipment;
four 6ST-140P 24V batteries with the volume of 70A per hour;
gas turbine engine 9I56.
The CP equipment is located in the armored cabin of the self-propelled tracked
vehicle GM-579A.
The location of the main CP tools and combat crew is shown in Figure 1.2.
Combat crew composition (Figure 1.2):
battalion commander (1);
CP crew chief (2);
senior operator (3);

Annex 502
Akiva Hamilton, Bankrupting Terrorism - One Interception at a Time, Jerusalem Post (24
November 2012)

􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀊􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀍􀀉
􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀇􀀒􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀇􀀂􀀇􀀕􀀗􀀅􀀈􀀘􀀈􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀙􀀄􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀔􀀕􀀅􀀄
􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀃􀀈􀀚􀀛􀀓􀀕􀀐􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀚􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀝􀀞􀀜􀀟􀀂􀀐􀀔􀀇􀀕􀀆􀀒􀀔􀀂􀀇􀀗􀀚􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀇􀀒􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀜􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀇􀀂􀀇􀀕􀀗􀀅􀀜􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀜􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀙􀀄􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀜􀀏􀀔􀀜􀀏􀀜􀀔􀀕􀀅􀀄
􀀛􀀐􀀠􀀂􀀂􀀑􀀄􀀇􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀡􀀒􀀗􀀢􀀈􀀣􀀏􀀐􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀏􀀔􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀥􀀈􀀦􀀧􀀌􀀨􀀈􀀩􀀓􀀢􀀂􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀙􀀇􀀄􀀞􀀕􀀔􀀪􀀈􀀫􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀈􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀄􀀠􀀈􀀬􀀄􀀠􀀠􀀄􀀅􀀚􀀭􀀢􀀄
􀀮􀀄􀀇􀀒􀀗􀀏􀀠􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀯􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀰
􀀱􀀈􀀲􀀏􀀙􀀄􀀆􀀂􀀂􀀑􀀈􀀳􀀇􀀕􀀄􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀙􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀓􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀄􀀞􀀪􀀈􀀴􀀤􀀈􀀠􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀈􀀥􀀂􀀒􀀋􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀋􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀤􀀈􀀵􀀏􀀐􀀔􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀢􀀏􀀃􀀄􀀈􀀥􀀂􀀒􀀇
􀀆􀀏􀀆􀀕􀀄􀀗􀀨􀀶
􀀬􀀒􀀙􀀢􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀂􀀒􀀔􀀓􀀂􀀒􀀇􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀠􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀏􀀓􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀙􀀕􀀏􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀳􀀂􀀇􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀈􀀄􀀷􀀔􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀇􀀞􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀈􀀓􀀕􀀄􀀙􀀄􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀄􀀠􀀕􀀈􀀔􀀄􀀙􀀢􀀐􀀂􀀠􀀂􀀖􀀥
􀀔􀀢􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀢􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀗􀀏􀀃􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀥􀀈􀀠􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀗􀀂􀀒􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀇􀀐􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀙􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀇􀀏􀀠􀀈􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀄􀀠􀀨
􀀎􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀳􀀕􀀇􀀗􀀔􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀑􀀐􀀂􀀵􀀈􀀜􀀈􀀮􀀂􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀂􀀒􀀇􀀈􀀲􀀏􀀙􀀄􀀆􀀂􀀂􀀑􀀈􀀓􀀏􀀖􀀄􀀨
􀀁􀀄􀀃􀀄􀀇􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀠􀀄􀀗􀀗􀀋􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀗􀀓􀀕􀀔􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀓􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀙􀀕􀀏􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀋􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀢􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀄􀀐􀀈􀀠􀀕􀀔􀀔􀀠􀀄􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀠􀀥􀀗􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀈􀀗􀀔􀀇􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀙
􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀐􀀕􀀳􀀕􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀄􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀨
􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀖􀀏􀀅􀀄􀀜􀀙􀀢􀀏􀀐􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀐􀀂􀀔􀀈􀀂􀀐􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀐􀀗􀀈􀀸􀀏􀀅􀀏􀀗􀀹􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀸􀀄􀀺􀀆􀀂􀀠􀀠􀀏􀀢􀀹􀀗􀀈􀀙􀀒􀀇􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀈􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀇􀀂􀀇
􀀅􀀂􀀞􀀄􀀠􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀇􀀏􀀗􀀢􀀈􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀈􀀕􀀔􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀅􀀓􀀠􀀄􀀔􀀄􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀞􀀄􀀇􀀅􀀕􀀐􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀠􀀕􀀔􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀈􀀞􀀂􀀙􀀔􀀇􀀕􀀐􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀏􀀠􀀠􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀄􀀠􀀹􀀗
􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀅􀀕􀀄􀀗􀀨
􀀍􀀚􀀊
􀀎􀀄􀀳􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀵􀀄􀀈􀀞􀀕􀀗􀀙􀀒􀀗􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀳􀀒􀀐􀀞􀀏􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀏􀀠􀀈􀀗􀀔􀀇􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀙􀀈􀀗􀀢􀀕􀀳􀀔􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀔􀀏􀀕􀀠􀀋􀀈􀀕􀀔􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀐􀀄􀀙􀀄􀀗􀀗􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀏􀀞􀀞􀀇􀀄􀀗􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀐􀀒􀀅􀀆􀀄􀀇
􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀕􀀅􀀓􀀂􀀇􀀔􀀏􀀐􀀔􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀗􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀙􀀄􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀏􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀙􀀠􀀂􀀒􀀞􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀏􀀠􀀕􀀔􀀥􀀨
􀀲􀀕􀀇􀀗􀀔􀀠􀀥􀀋􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀐􀀂􀀈􀀠􀀂􀀐􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀻􀀒􀀗􀀔􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀗􀀢􀀂􀀇􀀔􀀜􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀕􀀠􀀄􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀳􀀄􀀐􀀗􀀄􀀈􀀗􀀥􀀗􀀔􀀄􀀅􀀨􀀈􀀭􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀳􀀕􀀳􀀔􀀢􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄
􀀆􀀏􀀔􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀥􀀋􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀓􀀠􀀂􀀥􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀻􀀒􀀗􀀔􀀈􀀂􀀒􀀔􀀗􀀕􀀞􀀄􀀈􀀭􀀄􀀠􀀈􀀱􀀃􀀕􀀃􀀈􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀬􀀏􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀞􀀏􀀥􀀋􀀈􀀳􀀄􀀏􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀐􀀕􀀳􀀕􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀔􀀠􀀥
􀀕􀀅􀀓􀀇􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀏􀀇􀀈􀀗􀀥􀀗􀀔􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀩􀀆􀀥􀀈􀀝􀀠􀀔􀀏􀀋􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀗􀀒􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀢􀀄􀀇􀀂􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀗􀀔􀀂􀀇􀀥􀀰􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀗􀀂􀀳􀀔􀀵􀀏􀀇􀀄
􀀒􀀓􀀖􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀐􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀗􀀥􀀗􀀔􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀗􀀢􀀂􀀇􀀔􀀜􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀅􀀄􀀞􀀕􀀒􀀅􀀜􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀕􀀠􀀄􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀳􀀄􀀐􀀗􀀄􀀈􀀗􀀥􀀗􀀔􀀄􀀅􀀨
􀀼􀀢􀀕􀀠􀀄􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀒􀀠􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀗􀀙􀀇􀀕􀀆􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀏􀀆􀀠􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀢􀀕􀀔􀀈􀀇􀀂􀀙􀀑􀀄􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀵􀀕􀀔􀀢􀀈􀀒􀀓􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀧􀀌􀀈􀀑􀀅􀀨􀀈􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀖􀀄􀀋
􀀏􀀙􀀙􀀂􀀇􀀞􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀤􀀣􀀲􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀐􀀄􀀵􀀈􀀒􀀓􀀖􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀄􀀈􀀏􀀠􀀠􀀂􀀵􀀗􀀈􀀕􀀔􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀙􀀄􀀓􀀔􀀈􀀲􀀏􀀻􀀇􀀈􀀽􀀈􀀩􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀧􀀽􀀈􀀑􀀅􀀨􀀰􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀾􀀄􀀠􀀾􀀏􀀠
􀀩􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀌􀀈􀀑􀀅􀀨􀀰􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀕􀀠􀀄􀀗􀀨􀀈􀀭􀀢􀀒􀀗􀀋􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀳􀀄􀀐􀀗􀀄􀀈􀀗􀀥􀀗􀀔􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀠􀀇􀀄􀀏􀀞􀀥􀀈􀀏􀀙􀀢􀀕􀀄􀀃􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀐􀀕􀀳􀀕􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀔􀀈􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀈􀀂􀀳
􀀵􀀢􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀄􀀠􀀹􀀗􀀈􀀳􀀂􀀇􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀂􀀅􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀅􀀄􀀞􀀕􀀒􀀅􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀕􀀠􀀄􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀳􀀄􀀐􀀗􀀄􀀈􀀗􀀥􀀗􀀔􀀄􀀅􀀋􀀈􀀣􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀞􀀹􀀗􀀈􀀬􀀠􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀐􀀞􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀔􀀂
􀀏􀀙􀀢􀀕􀀄􀀃􀀄􀀨
􀀬􀀄􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀞􀀠􀀥􀀋􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀹􀀗􀀈􀀭􀀏􀀅􀀕􀀇􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀙􀀄􀀓􀀔􀀂􀀇􀀗􀀈􀀞􀀂􀀐􀀹􀀔􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀏􀀠􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀈􀀿􀀊􀀌􀀋􀀌􀀌􀀌􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀿􀀽􀀌􀀋􀀌􀀌􀀌􀀈􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀢􀀈􀀔􀀂
􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀳􀀏􀀙􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀄􀀨􀀈􀁀􀀕􀀑􀀄􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀥􀀈􀀢􀀕􀀖􀀢􀀈􀀔􀀄􀀙􀀢􀀐􀀂􀀠􀀂􀀖􀀥􀀈􀀗􀀥􀀗􀀔􀀄􀀅􀀋􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀏􀀗􀀔􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀻􀀂􀀇􀀕􀀔􀀥􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀏􀀇􀀄
􀀗􀀥􀀗􀀔􀀄􀀅􀀗􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀃􀀄􀀠􀀂􀀓􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀳􀀏􀀙􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀄􀀔􀀒􀀓􀀨
􀀭􀀢􀀄􀀗􀀄􀀈􀀳􀀕􀀷􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀗􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀏􀀞􀀈􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀐􀀒􀀅􀀆􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀕􀀔􀀄􀀅􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀗􀀔􀀕􀀅􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀳􀀏􀀙􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞
􀀓􀀇􀀕􀀙􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀏􀀙􀀙􀀂􀀇􀀞􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀠􀀥􀀨􀀈􀀸􀀂􀀵􀀄􀀃􀀄􀀇􀀋􀀈􀀕􀀳􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀐􀀒􀀅􀀆􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀕􀀔􀀄􀀅􀀗􀀈􀀓􀀇􀀂􀀞􀀒􀀙􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀗􀀒􀀆􀀗􀀔􀀏􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀠􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀄􀀷􀀙􀀄􀀄􀀞􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀕􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀠
􀀄􀀗􀀔􀀕􀀅􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀋􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀞􀀇􀀂􀀓􀀈􀀓􀀇􀀂􀀓􀀂􀀇􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀠􀀥􀀨
􀀭􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀏􀀙􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀠􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀠􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀓􀀇􀀂􀀞􀀒􀀙􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀭􀀏􀀅􀀕􀀇􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀙􀀄􀀓􀀔􀀂􀀇􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀠􀀂􀀵􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀳􀀠􀀄􀀙􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀂􀀳
􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀏􀀗􀀕􀀙􀀈􀀇􀀏􀀵􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀕􀀏􀀠􀀗􀁁􀀈􀀅􀀄􀀔􀀏􀀠􀀋􀀈􀀳􀀒􀀄􀀠􀀋􀀈􀀄􀀷􀀓􀀠􀀂􀀗􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀄􀀠􀀄􀀙􀀔􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀕􀀙􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀅􀀓􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀒􀀗􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀕􀀔􀀗
􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀳􀀏􀀙􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀄􀀋􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀠􀀏􀀆􀀂􀀇􀀈􀀇􀀄􀁂􀀒􀀕􀀇􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀇􀀒􀀐􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀏􀀗􀀗􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀠􀀕􀀐􀀄􀀨􀀈􀀤􀀳􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀤􀀣􀀲􀀈􀀄􀀐􀀞􀀗􀀈􀀒􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀇􀀞􀀄􀀇􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀍􀀌
􀀔􀀕􀀅􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀥􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀙􀀄􀀓􀀔􀀂􀀇􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀂􀀇􀀕􀀖􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀠􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀄􀀗􀀔􀀕􀀅􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀞􀀋􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀐􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀕􀀇􀀈􀀴􀀙􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀶􀀈􀀵􀀕􀀠􀀠􀀈􀀠􀀕􀀑􀀄􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀞􀀇􀀂􀀓􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀏􀀇􀀂􀀒􀀐􀀞
􀀿􀀽􀀋􀀌􀀌􀀌􀀨􀀈􀀱􀀔􀀈􀀍􀀌􀀌􀀈􀀔􀀕􀀅􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀥􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀴􀀙􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀶􀀈􀀵􀀕􀀠􀀠􀀈􀀏􀀓􀀓􀀇􀀂􀀏􀀙􀀢􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀠􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀠􀀄􀀗􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀏􀀐􀀈􀀿􀀍􀀌􀀌􀀌􀀨
􀀭􀀢􀀕􀀇􀀞􀀠􀀥􀀋􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀏􀀠􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀂􀀙􀀑􀀄􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀕􀀠􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀵􀀢􀀕􀀙􀀢􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀙􀀄􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀃􀀏􀀗􀀔􀀠􀀥
􀀒􀀐􀀞􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀗􀀔􀀕􀀅􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀆􀀥􀀈􀀅􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀅􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀏􀀔􀀂􀀇􀀗􀀨􀀈􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀈􀀇􀀂􀀙􀀑􀀄􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀥􀀈􀀵􀀄􀀠􀀠􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀈􀀂􀀐􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀿􀀍􀀋􀀌􀀌􀀌􀀈􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀢􀀈􀀂􀀐
􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀇􀀑􀀄􀀔􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀒􀀔􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀐􀀂􀀔􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀠􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀸􀀏􀀅􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀡􀀏􀀺􀀏􀀨
􀀭􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀗􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀠􀀕􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀳􀀇􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀡􀀏􀀺􀀏􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀈􀀄􀀷􀀔􀀇􀀄􀀅􀀄􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀃􀀂􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀄􀀷􀀓􀀄􀀐􀀗􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀈􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀵􀀢􀀕􀀙􀀢
􀀕􀀐􀀃􀀂􀀠􀀃􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀢􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀠􀀂􀀗􀀗􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀳􀀇􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀤􀀱􀀲􀀈􀀏􀀙􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀃􀀂􀀥􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀳􀀏􀀙􀀔􀀂􀀇􀀕􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀬􀀒􀀞􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞
􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀙􀀄􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀥􀀈􀀵􀀄􀀗􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀐􀀈􀀐􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀄􀀗􀀨􀀈􀁀􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀕􀀆􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀢􀀏􀀃􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀈􀀓􀀏􀀕􀀞􀀈􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀄􀀃􀀄􀀇􀀥􀀈􀀗􀀔􀀄􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀵􀀏􀀥􀀋
􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀠􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀞􀀒􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀬􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀕􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀥􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀈􀀗􀀂􀀠􀀞􀀕􀀄􀀇􀀗􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀈􀁃􀀏􀀳􀀏􀀢􀀈􀀵􀀢􀀂􀀈􀀏􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀗􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀂􀀗􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀄
􀀗􀀔􀀂􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀗􀀅􀀒􀀖􀀖􀀠􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀨
􀀱􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀠􀀂􀀗􀀗􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀄􀀈􀀂􀀐􀀙􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀈􀀖􀀄􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀡􀀏􀀺􀀏􀀋􀀈􀀵􀀕􀀔􀀢􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀤􀀣􀀲􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀒􀀠􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀗􀀔􀀇􀀂􀀥􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀇􀀂􀀙􀀑􀀄􀀔
􀀙􀀏􀀙􀀢􀀄􀀗􀀨􀀈􀀭􀀢􀀒􀀗􀀋􀀈􀀍􀀋􀀌􀀌􀀌􀀈􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀗􀀋􀀈􀀵􀀢􀀕􀀙􀀢􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀈􀀿􀀍􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀠􀀠􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀓􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀢􀀏􀀗􀀄􀀋􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀥􀀈􀀄􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀒􀀓􀀈􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀦􀀌􀀌􀀈􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀗
􀀵􀀢􀀕􀀙􀀢􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀳􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀿􀀉􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀠􀀠􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀴􀀞􀀄􀀠􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀇􀀥􀀈􀀙􀀢􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀄􀀗􀀨􀀶􀀈􀀭􀀢􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀐􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀿􀀍􀀋􀀌􀀌􀀌􀀈􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀈􀀇􀀂􀀙􀀑􀀄􀀔􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀂
􀀏􀀈􀀿􀀍􀀌􀀋􀀌􀀌􀀌􀀈􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀈􀀇􀀂􀀙􀀑􀀄􀀔􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀡􀀏􀀺􀀏􀀨
􀀲􀀂􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀢􀀠􀀥􀀋􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀳􀀒􀀐􀀞􀀏􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀏􀀠􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀢􀀕􀀖􀀢􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀏􀀞􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀅􀀓􀀒􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀗􀀥􀀗􀀔􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀵􀀕􀀔􀀢􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀃􀀄􀀇􀀥􀀈􀀇􀀏􀀓􀀕􀀞
􀀒􀀓􀀖􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀄􀀈􀀙􀀥􀀙􀀠􀀄􀀨􀀈􀀬􀀂􀀈􀀳􀀏􀀇􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀔􀀙􀀢􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀓􀀏􀀙􀀄􀀈􀀵􀀕􀀔􀀢􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀕􀀯􀀢􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀳􀀂􀀇􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀻􀀂􀀇􀀈􀀗􀀂􀀳􀀔􀀵􀀏􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞
􀀢􀀏􀀇􀀞􀀵􀀏􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀒􀀓􀀖􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀄􀀗􀀋􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀗􀀄􀁂􀀒􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀈􀀓􀀄􀀇􀀳􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀄􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀙􀀇􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀄􀀗􀀨
􀀉􀀚􀀊
􀀭􀀢􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀵􀀕􀀠􀀠􀀈􀀐􀀂􀀔􀀈􀀂􀀐􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀒􀀔􀀈􀀵􀀕􀀠􀀠􀀈􀀏􀀙􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀠􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀏􀀙􀀙􀀄􀀠􀀄􀀇􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀏􀀙􀀙􀀂􀀇􀀞􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀄􀀈􀀵􀀕􀀔􀀢􀀈􀀫􀀂􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀹􀀗􀀈􀁀􀀏􀀵􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀁃􀀏􀀥
􀁄􀀒􀀇􀀺􀀵􀀄􀀕􀀠􀀹􀀗􀀈􀁀􀀏􀀵􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀱􀀙􀀙􀀄􀀠􀀄􀀇􀀏􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀁃􀀄􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀐􀀗􀀈􀀵􀀢􀀕􀀙􀀢􀀈􀀗􀀔􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀓􀀄􀀇􀀳􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀄􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀅􀀓􀀒􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀗􀀥􀀗􀀔􀀄􀀅􀀗
􀀕􀀐􀀙􀀇􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀷􀀓􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀠􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀵􀀕􀀔􀀢􀀈􀀔􀀕􀀅􀀄􀀨
􀀼􀀕􀀔􀀢􀀈􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀢􀀈􀀒􀀓􀀖􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀙􀀄􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀇􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀈􀀵􀀕􀀠􀀠􀀈􀀕􀀅􀀓􀀇􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀕􀀠􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀕􀀔􀀈􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀙􀀄􀀓􀀔
􀀅􀀏􀀥􀀈􀀏􀀠􀀗􀀂􀀈􀀕􀀅􀀓􀀇􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀈􀀳􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀇􀀨􀀈􀀤􀀔􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀳􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀵􀀄􀀈􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀈􀀄􀀷􀀓􀀄􀀙􀀔􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀢􀀈􀀏􀀈􀁅􀀽􀀈􀀓􀀄􀀇􀀙􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀈􀀂􀀇
􀀢􀀕􀀖􀀢􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀙􀀄􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀇􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀐􀀄􀀷􀀔􀀈􀀥􀀄􀀏􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀇􀀈􀀔􀀵􀀂􀀋􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀕􀀅􀀓􀀇􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀈􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀗􀀓􀀄􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞
􀀓􀀇􀀂􀀙􀀄􀀗􀀗􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀓􀀂􀀵􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀅􀀓􀀒􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀑􀀄􀀈􀀒􀀓􀀈􀀕􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀄􀀥􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀩􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀈􀀏􀀞􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀄􀀨
􀀭􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀓􀀇􀀏􀀙􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀏􀀠􀀈􀀒􀀓􀀗􀀢􀀂􀀔􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀐􀀒􀀅􀀆􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀇􀀂􀀙􀀑􀀄􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀓􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀄􀀠􀀕􀀈􀀳􀀏􀀔􀀏􀀠􀀕􀀔􀀥􀀈􀀢􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀇􀀕􀀗􀀄􀀐􀀈􀀳􀀇􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀽􀀌􀀜
􀀧􀀽􀀈􀀩􀁀􀀄􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀡􀀏􀀺􀀏􀀈􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀰􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀦􀀌􀀌􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀍􀀍􀀈􀀩􀀧􀀽􀁆􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀙􀀄􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀰􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀏􀀇􀀂􀀒􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀽􀀌􀀌􀀈􀀕􀀐
􀀉􀀌􀀍􀀉􀀈􀀩􀁅􀀌􀁆􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀙􀀄􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀰􀀋􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀗􀀓􀀕􀀔􀀄􀀈􀀸􀀏􀀅􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀒􀀗􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀠􀀄􀀔􀀢􀀏􀀠􀀈􀀇􀀂􀀙􀀑􀀄􀀔􀀗􀀨
􀀭􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀗􀀔􀀇􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀙􀀈􀀕􀀅􀀓􀀠􀀕􀀙􀀏􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀙􀀒􀀇􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀈􀀇􀀂􀀙􀀑􀀄􀀔􀀜􀀆􀀏􀀗􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀇􀀂􀀇􀀈􀀗􀀔􀀇􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀸􀀏􀀅􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞
􀀸􀀄􀀺􀀆􀀂􀀠􀀠􀀏􀀢􀀈􀀢􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀄􀀐􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀞􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀔􀀢􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀄􀀳􀀳􀀄􀀙􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀄􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀂􀀅􀀕􀀙􀀏􀀠􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀗􀀒􀀗􀀔􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀆􀀠􀀄􀀨􀀈􀀤􀀈􀀄􀀗􀀔􀀕􀀅􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀈􀀕􀀔􀀈􀀕􀀗
􀀙􀀒􀀇􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀸􀀏􀀅􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀩􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀒􀀗􀀈􀀕􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀓􀀏􀀔􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀰􀀈􀀏􀀇􀀂􀀒􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀿􀀽􀀅􀀨􀀈􀀩􀀽􀀌􀀌􀀈􀀇􀀂􀀙􀀑􀀄􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀿􀀍􀀌􀀋􀀌􀀌􀀌􀀈􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀢􀀰
􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀅􀀒􀀇􀀞􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀗􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀠􀀄􀀈􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀄􀀠􀀕􀀨􀀈􀀼􀀢􀀄􀀐􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀢􀀄􀀗􀀈􀁅􀀽􀁆􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀙􀀄􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀇􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀗􀀄􀀈􀀳􀀕􀀖􀀒􀀇􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀵􀀕􀀠􀀠
􀀞􀀂􀀒􀀆􀀠􀀄􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀏􀀔􀀈􀁅􀀧􀀨􀀽􀁆􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀥􀀈􀀵􀀕􀀠􀀠􀀈􀀞􀀂􀀒􀀆􀀠􀀄􀀈􀀏􀀖􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀨
􀀟􀀂􀀐􀀔􀀇􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀗􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀗􀀒􀀖􀀖􀀄􀀗􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀗􀀋􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀇􀀂􀀇􀀕􀀗􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀐􀀂􀀔􀀈􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀇􀀒􀀓􀀔􀀈􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀄􀀠􀀈􀀆􀀥􀀈􀀳􀀕􀀇􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀠􀀠􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀗􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀇􀀂􀀙􀀑􀀄􀀔􀀗
􀀆􀀄􀀙􀀏􀀒􀀗􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀏􀀠􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀕􀀇􀀈􀀇􀀂􀀙􀀑􀀄􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀷􀀙􀀄􀀄􀀞􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀠􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀭􀀏􀀅􀀕􀀇􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀙􀀄􀀓􀀔􀀂􀀇􀀨
􀀫􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀇􀀋􀀈􀀅􀀂􀀗􀀔􀀈􀀇􀀂􀀙􀀑􀀄􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀕􀀖􀀐􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀅􀀨􀀈􀀤􀀐􀀞􀀄􀀄􀀞􀀋􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀗􀀔􀀇􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀈􀀵􀀕􀀠􀀠􀀈􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀇􀀒􀀓􀀔
􀀤􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀈􀀄􀀃􀀄􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀈􀁂􀀒􀀕􀀙􀀑􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀏􀀐􀀈􀀯􀀇􀀄􀀗􀀕􀀞􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀈􀁃􀀄􀀏􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀹􀀗􀀈􀀴􀀬􀀔􀀏􀀇􀀈􀀼􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀶􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀕􀀠􀀄􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀳􀀄􀀐􀀗􀀄􀀈􀀗􀀔􀀇􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀖􀀥
􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀇􀀒􀀓􀀔􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀬􀀂􀀃􀀕􀀄􀀔􀀈􀁇􀀐􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀨
􀀭􀀢􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀃􀀏􀀗􀀔􀀏􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀐􀀂􀀔􀀈􀀂􀀐􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀇􀀂􀀇􀀈􀀗􀀔􀀇􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀸􀀏􀀅􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀸􀀄􀀺􀀆􀀂􀀠􀀠􀀏􀀢􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀒􀀔􀀈􀀏􀀠􀀗􀀂􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄
􀀅􀀕􀀠􀀕􀀔􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀈􀀞􀀂􀀙􀀔􀀇􀀕􀀐􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀄􀀠􀀹􀀗􀀈􀀐􀀏􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀗􀀔􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀈􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀅􀀕􀀄􀀗􀀋􀀈􀀗􀀒􀀙􀀢􀀈􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀬􀀥􀀇􀀕􀀏􀀋􀀈􀀵􀀢􀀕􀀙􀀢􀀈􀀢􀀏􀀃􀀄􀀈􀀢􀀄􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀠􀀥
􀀕􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀗􀀔􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀕􀀠􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀇􀀂􀀙􀀑􀀄􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀅􀀓􀀄􀀐􀀗􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀈􀀳􀀂􀀇􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀕􀀇􀀈􀀵􀀄􀀏􀀑􀀈􀀏􀀕􀀇􀀈􀀓􀀂􀀵􀀄􀀇􀀨
􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀠􀀇􀀄􀀏􀀞􀀥􀀈􀁅􀀌􀁆􀀈􀀄􀀳􀀳􀀄􀀙􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀈􀀏􀀖􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀗􀀔􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀥􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀬􀀥􀀇􀀕􀀏􀀹􀀗􀀈􀀅􀀄􀀞􀀕􀀒􀀅􀀜􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀕􀀠􀀄􀀗􀀋􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞
􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀄􀀠􀀹􀀗􀀈􀀱􀀇􀀇􀀂􀀵􀀈􀀉􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀕􀀠􀀄􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀳􀀄􀀐􀀗􀀄􀀈􀀗􀀥􀀗􀀔􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀗􀀕􀀅􀀕􀀠􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀄􀀳􀀳􀀄􀀙􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀈􀀏􀀖􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀗􀀔􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀹􀀗􀀈􀀠􀀂􀀐􀀖􀀜􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀕􀀠􀀄􀀗􀀨
􀀭􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀅􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀅􀀓􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀄􀀠􀀹􀀗􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀅􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀢􀀄􀀐􀀗􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀈􀀅􀀒􀀠􀀔􀀕􀀜􀀠􀀏􀀥􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀕􀀠􀀄􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀳􀀄􀀐􀀗􀀄􀀈􀀒􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀄􀀠􀀠􀀏􀀋
􀀣􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀞􀀹􀀗􀀈􀀬􀀠􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀱􀀇􀀇􀀂􀀵􀀈􀀦􀀋􀀈􀀵􀀕􀀠􀀠􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀙􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀇􀀏􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀏􀀠􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀍􀀦􀀚􀀍􀀊􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀵􀀕􀀠􀀠􀀈􀀳􀀂􀀠􀀠􀀂􀀵􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀗􀀕􀀅􀀕􀀠􀀏􀀇
􀀔􀀄􀀙􀀢􀀐􀀂􀀠􀀂􀀖􀀕􀀙􀀏􀀠􀀈􀀒􀀓􀀖􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀇􀀏􀀻􀀄􀀙􀀔􀀂􀀇􀀥􀀈􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀨􀀈􀀱􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀗􀀒􀀠􀀔􀀋􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀅􀀥􀀹􀀗􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀕􀀠􀀄􀀈􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀄􀀐􀀏􀀠􀀗􀀈􀀵􀀕􀀠􀀠
􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀙􀀠􀀕􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀄􀀳􀀳􀀄􀀙􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀗􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀄􀀷􀀓􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀠􀀈􀀇􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀙􀀄􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀇􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀄􀀠􀀹􀀗􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀕􀀠􀀄
􀀞􀀄􀀳􀀄􀀐􀀗􀀄􀀈􀀗􀀥􀀗􀀔􀀄􀀅􀀗􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀙􀀇􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀄􀀨
􀀤􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀈􀀬􀀥􀀇􀀕􀀏􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀕􀀇􀀈􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀇􀀂􀀇􀀈􀀓􀀇􀀂􀀷􀀕􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀳􀀕􀀖􀀢􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀠􀀂􀀗􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀆􀀏􀀔􀀔􀀠􀀄􀀈􀀵􀀕􀀔􀀢􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀄􀀷􀀓􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀠􀀈􀀇􀀏􀀔􀀄􀀈􀀂􀀳
􀀔􀀄􀀙􀀢􀀐􀀂􀀠􀀂􀀖􀀕􀀙􀀏􀀠􀀈􀀓􀀇􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀄􀀗􀀗􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀳􀀕􀀄􀀠􀀞􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀵􀀢􀀕􀀙􀀢􀀈􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀄􀀠􀀈􀀠􀀄􀀏􀀞􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀵􀀂􀀇􀀠􀀞􀀨
􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀖􀀏􀀅􀀄􀀜􀀙􀀢􀀏􀀐􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀢􀀄􀀇􀀏􀀠􀀞􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀄􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀂􀀳􀀈􀀇􀀂􀀙􀀑􀀄􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀕􀀠􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀵􀀢􀀕􀀙􀀢􀀈􀀏􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀖
􀀒􀀗􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀆􀀥􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀠􀀄􀀗􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀄􀀙􀀢􀀐􀀂􀀠􀀂􀀖􀀕􀀙􀀏􀀠􀀠􀀥􀀈􀀏􀀞􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀄􀀞􀀨􀀈􀀤􀀐􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀗􀀄􀀐􀀗􀀄􀀋􀀈􀀻􀀒􀀗􀀔􀀈􀀠􀀕􀀑􀀄􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀂􀀇􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀕􀀺􀀏􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀤􀀈􀀵􀀂􀀇􀀑􀀈􀀳􀀂􀀇
􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀇􀀒􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀇􀀂􀀇􀀕􀀗􀀅􀀈􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀠􀀏􀀵􀀗􀀒􀀕􀀔􀀈􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀔􀀕􀀅􀀄􀀋􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀞􀀂􀀄􀀗􀀈􀀗􀀂􀀈􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀙􀀄􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀔􀀕􀀅􀀄􀀨
􀀦􀀚􀀊
􀀭􀀢􀀄􀀈􀀵􀀇􀀕􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀈􀀏􀀔􀀔􀀂􀀇􀀐􀀄􀀥􀀈􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀬􀀢􀀒􀀇􀀏􀀔􀀈􀀸􀀏􀀣􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀘􀀈􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀄􀀠􀀈􀁀􀀏􀀵􀀈􀀟􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀋􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀕􀀠􀀈􀀇􀀕􀀖􀀢􀀔􀀗􀀈􀀂􀀇􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀕􀀺􀀏􀀔􀀕􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀞
􀀵􀀂􀀇􀀠􀀞􀀈􀀠􀀄􀀏􀀞􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀙􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀏􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀇􀀂􀀇􀀕􀀗􀀅􀀈􀀔􀀢􀀇􀀂􀀒􀀖􀀢􀀈􀀠􀀏􀀵􀀗􀀒􀀕􀀔􀀗􀀨􀀈􀀭􀀢􀀄􀀕􀀇􀀈􀀵􀀄􀀆􀀗􀀕􀀔􀀄􀀪􀀈􀀵􀀵􀀵􀀨􀀕􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀄􀀠􀀠􀀏􀀵􀀙􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀨􀀂􀀇􀀖
􀀭􀀏􀀖􀀗􀀪
􀀭􀀄􀀠􀀈􀀱􀀃􀀕􀀃
􀀇􀀂􀀙􀀑􀀄􀀔􀀗
􀀕􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀂􀀅􀀄
􀀊􀀚􀀊
Annex 503
Kyiv Post, Russian Armed Forces Seize Crimea as Putin Threatens Wider Military Invasion of
Ukraine (2 March 2014)

􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀊􀀇􀀋
􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀘􀀍􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀐􀀎
􀀚􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀝􀀂􀀎􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒
􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀊􀀆􀀋􀀠􀀂􀀃􀀙􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀒􀀠􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀠􀀒􀀍􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀂􀀐􀀠􀀙􀀒􀀐􀀎􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀡􀀃􀀏􀀎􀀒􀀡􀀏􀀐􀀡􀀂􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀡􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀕􀀔􀀔􀀡􀀏􀀐􀀡􀀄􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀡􀀢􀀒􀀙􀀚􀀒􀀒􀀐􀀡􀀍􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀡􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀡􀀃􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀡􀀢􀀂􀀄􀀟􀀒􀀓􀀡
􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀡􀀣􀀣􀀤􀀥􀀋􀀉􀀦􀀅􀀙􀀑􀀛
􀀘􀀕􀀧􀀍􀀛􀀂􀀃􀀆
􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀏􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀏􀀂
􀀨􀀂􀀑􀀕􀀍􀀎􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀩􀀕􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀂􀀛􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀈􀀆􀀘􀀍􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀄􀀆􀀑􀀍􀀃􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀪􀀜􀀏􀀝􀀆􀀣􀀋􀀫􀀉􀀆􀀬􀀒􀀂􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀇􀀭􀀡􀀜􀀒􀀂􀀃􀀡􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀆􀀮􀀏􀀃􀀛􀀆􀀏􀀐
􀀎􀀅􀀒􀀛􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀬􀀕􀀐􀀢􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀅􀀏􀀮􀀅􀀛􀀏􀀮􀀅􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀏􀀛􀀓􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀂􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀛􀀛􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀯􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀤􀀫􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀩􀀕􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀂􀀛􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀰􀀂􀀢􀀄􀀅􀀒􀀐􀀟􀀕􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀏􀀝􀀒􀀈
􀀎􀀂􀀜􀀎􀀆􀀅􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀔􀀂􀀟􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀱􀀑􀀍􀀃􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀲􀀆􀀚􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀙􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀯􀀆􀀫􀀊􀀋
􀀁􀀒􀀑􀀢􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀨􀀒􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀕􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀏􀀛􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀏􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀧􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀒􀀓􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀕
􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀄􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀔􀀒􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀛􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀒􀀙􀀅􀀐􀀏􀀄􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀅􀀕􀀍􀀛􀀓􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀜
􀀍􀀐􀀙􀀏􀀛􀀆􀀳􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀙􀀏􀀙􀀍􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀕􀀃􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀈􀀴􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀏􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀧􀀕􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀢􀀛􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀙􀀙􀀒􀀑􀀧􀀙
􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀙􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀧􀀕􀀚􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀵􀀏􀀟􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀶􀀂􀀐􀀍􀀟􀀕􀀝􀀜􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀍􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀨􀀒􀀢􀀦􀀆􀀉􀀉􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀛􀀛
􀀂􀀐􀀕􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀪􀀃􀀒􀀑􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀡􀀔􀀃􀀏􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀛􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀦􀀆
􀀬􀀒􀀎􀀧􀀏􀀙􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀪􀀃􀀒􀀑􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀃􀀅􀀒􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀏􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀆􀀒􀀝􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀒􀀙􀀅􀀐􀀏􀀄􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀜
􀀓􀀂􀀐􀀮􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀕􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀜􀀢􀀕􀀓􀀜􀀆􀀒􀀛􀀎􀀒􀀦
􀀨􀀒􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀕􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀏􀀛􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀑􀀢􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀅􀀒􀀂􀀧􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀎􀀄􀀕􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀷􀀍􀀃􀀕􀀁􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀌􀀒􀀝􀀕􀀛􀀍􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀍􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀓
􀀶􀀂􀀐􀀍􀀟􀀕􀀝􀀜􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀑􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀄􀀙􀀏􀀝􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀔􀀂􀀎􀀄􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀙􀀏􀀡􀀸􀀒􀀑􀀏􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀕􀀡􀀹􀀂􀀖􀀏􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙
􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀺􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀐􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀍􀀧􀀃􀀏􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀒􀀓􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀕􀀧􀀧􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀆􀀎􀀧􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀦
􀀇􀀠􀀇􀀇
􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀚􀀂􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀍􀀃􀀎􀀒􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀑􀀕􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀎􀀄􀀕􀀚􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀔􀀏􀀄􀀏􀀂􀀛􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀶􀀂􀀐􀀍􀀟􀀕􀀝􀀜􀀄􀀅􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀒􀀮􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀧􀀛􀀏􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀜
􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀂􀀙􀀅􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀂􀀃􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀇􀀊􀀊􀀆􀀷􀀍􀀃􀀕􀀁􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀛􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀑􀀕􀀐􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀚􀀒􀀛􀀛􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀅􀀏􀀎
􀀂􀀓􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀚􀀒􀀛􀀛􀀡􀀓􀀕􀀄􀀍􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀃􀀃􀀍􀀧􀀙􀀆􀀃􀀍􀀛􀀒􀀦
􀀘􀀍􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀼􀀍􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀚􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀚􀀕􀀃􀀓􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀚􀀂􀀜􀀽􀀆􀀳􀀬􀀍􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀒􀀾􀀙􀀃􀀂􀀕􀀃􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀂􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀙􀀍􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀂􀀟􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀎􀀅􀀂􀀧􀀒
􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀛􀀏􀀝􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀖􀀒􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀨􀀒􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀍􀀃􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀧􀀂􀀙􀀃􀀏􀀕􀀙􀀎􀀈
􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀕􀀐􀀐􀀒􀀛􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀿􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀨􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀨􀀒􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀕􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀧􀀛􀀕􀀜􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒
􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀆􀁀􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀿􀀍􀀙􀀕􀀐􀀕􀀑􀀕􀀍􀀎􀀆􀀌􀀒􀀧􀀍􀀢􀀛􀀏􀀄􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀁁􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀙􀀜􀀈􀀆􀁂
􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀢􀀜􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀍􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀗􀀛􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀒􀀆􀁀􀀮􀁁􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀘􀀂􀀃􀀙􀀆􀀇􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀿􀀃􀀙􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀒􀀆􀀉􀀊􀀇􀀉􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀗􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀙􀀏􀀙􀀍􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐
􀀨􀀒􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀧􀀧􀀒􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀍􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀿􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀨􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀨􀀒􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒
􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀃􀀑􀀂􀀛􀀏􀀖􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀏􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀧􀀕􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀙􀀍􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙
􀀄􀀕􀀍􀀐􀀙􀀃􀀜􀀦􀀴
􀀘􀀍􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀼􀀍􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀈􀀆􀀅􀀕􀀚􀀒􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀔􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀔􀀂􀀄􀀙􀀦
􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀎􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀜􀀆􀀚􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀜􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀑􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀂􀀟􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀂􀀃􀀮􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀮􀀏􀀄􀀆􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀲􀀎
􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀒􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀍􀀛􀀂􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀏􀀑􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀍􀀑􀀢􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀧􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀡􀀢􀀂􀀄􀀟􀀒􀀓
􀀂􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀜􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀎􀀕􀀏􀀛􀀆􀀃􀀂􀀐􀀮􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀔􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀆􀀫􀀈􀀊􀀊􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀉􀁃􀀈􀀊􀀊􀀊􀀦
􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀂􀀟􀀒􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀚􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀡􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀈􀀆􀀸􀀒􀀃􀀮􀀒􀀏􀀆􀀿􀀟􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀕􀀝􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀒􀀓
􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀔􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀍􀀑􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀣􀀊􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀕􀀚􀀆􀀝􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀉􀀦􀀉􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀛􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀡􀀧􀀕􀀧􀀍􀀛􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀮􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀓􀀒
􀀚􀀅􀀒􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀜􀀆􀀚􀀂􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀑􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀈􀀆􀀩􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀆􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀑􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀧􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀦􀀆
􀁄􀀕􀀚􀀒􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀈􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀮􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀔􀀏􀀄􀀏􀀂􀀛􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀪􀀜􀀏􀀝􀀆􀀼􀀍􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀛􀀒􀀮􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀑􀀂􀀄􀀜􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀿􀀟􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀕􀀝􀀲􀀎
􀀂􀀧􀀧􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀔􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀍􀀑􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀧􀀂􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀎􀀑􀀆􀀏􀀛􀀛􀀒􀀮􀀂􀀛􀀦􀀆􀀁􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀚􀀅􀀏􀀛􀀒􀀈􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀔􀀏􀀄􀀏􀀂􀀛􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓
􀀒􀀾􀀡􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀘􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀵􀀏􀀟􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀶􀀂􀀐􀀍􀀟􀀕􀀝􀀜􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀧􀀕􀀎􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀨􀀒􀀢􀀦􀀆􀀉􀀉􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀼􀀍􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀛􀀒􀀮􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀑􀀂􀀄􀀜
􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀚􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀮􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀦
􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀨􀀒􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀕􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀏􀀛􀀈􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀏􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀛􀀕􀀕􀀟􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀂􀀐􀀏􀀑􀀕􀀍􀀎􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀝􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒
􀀏􀀐􀀝􀀂􀀎􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀢􀀜􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀧􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀢􀀃􀀕􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀛􀀏􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀆􀀻􀀕􀀓􀀂􀀜􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀪􀀃􀀒􀀑􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀡
􀀔􀀍􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀻􀀵􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀦
􀀌􀀍􀀈􀀇􀀎􀀏􀀃􀀐􀀁􀀑􀀈􀀎􀀒􀀒􀀇􀀑􀀓􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀈􀀆􀀑􀀔􀀃􀀈􀀕􀀖􀀗􀀍􀀔􀀑􀀈􀀗􀀆􀀆􀀅􀀇
􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀚􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀈􀀆􀀿􀀃􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀏􀀜􀀆􀀶􀀂􀀙􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀏􀀍􀀟􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀓􀀂􀀜􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀘􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀵􀀛􀀂􀀓􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀃
􀀘􀀍􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀓􀀃􀀂􀀚􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀧􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀏􀀑􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀐􀀍􀀑􀀢􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀛􀀒􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀫􀀈􀀊􀀊􀀊􀀆􀀎􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀕􀀃􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀔􀀒􀀐􀀎􀀒
􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀆􀁂􀀅􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀻􀀒􀀐􀀏􀀍􀀟􀀅􀀦􀀆􀁄􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀧􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀳􀀂􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀝􀀕􀀄􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀴
􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀝􀀏􀀕􀀛􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀓􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀅􀀕􀀎􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀐􀀂􀀝􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀢􀀂􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀲􀀎
􀀸􀀒􀀝􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀕􀀧􀀕􀀛􀀦
􀀉􀀠􀀇􀀇
􀀶􀀕􀀍􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀢􀀕􀀜􀀎􀀆􀀛􀀕􀀕􀀟􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀏􀀔􀀏􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀓􀀏􀀝􀀏􀀓􀀍􀀂􀀛􀀎􀀆􀀢􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀟􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀰􀀂􀀛􀀂􀀟􀀛􀀂􀀝􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀂􀀃
􀀸􀀒􀀝􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀕􀀧􀀕􀀛􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀦􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀧􀀂􀀃􀀛􀀏􀀂􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀆􀀮􀀂􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀘􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀵􀀛􀀂􀀓􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀃􀀆􀀘􀀍􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀮􀀕􀀡
􀀂􀀅􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀧􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀈􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀎􀀧􀀏􀀙􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀚􀀂􀀃􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀔􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀆􀀺􀀂􀀎􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀙􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀎􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀧􀀛􀀕􀀜􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙
􀀚􀀕􀀍􀀛􀀓􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀍􀀛􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀳􀀄􀀕􀀎􀀙􀀎􀀴􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀎􀀄􀀕􀀚􀀦􀀆􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀟􀀆􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀒􀀾􀀡􀀸􀀕􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀍􀀐􀀙􀀃􀀜􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀃􀀒􀀒􀀡
􀀑􀀕􀀐􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀧􀀕􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀄􀀃􀀏􀀎􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀑􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀮􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀢􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀒􀀓􀀕􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀂􀀐􀀙􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐
􀀧􀀒􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀍􀀛􀀂􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀅􀀕􀀍􀀎􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀪􀀃􀀒􀀑􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀐􀀂􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀂􀀃􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀉􀀭􀀊􀀆􀀜􀀒􀀂􀀃􀀎􀀦􀀆􀀿􀀨􀀘􀀆􀀘􀁄􀁅􀀻􀁅􀀠
􀀵􀁂􀀪􀀻􀁅􀀌􀀆􀀬􀀌􀀿􀀗􀁄􀀷􀀵
􀀘􀀂􀀎􀀔􀀃􀀈􀀏􀀎􀀇􀀇􀀙􀀑􀀚􀀗􀀋􀀎􀀖􀀑􀀈􀀍􀀁􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀎􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀇􀀑􀀛􀀍􀀑􀀔􀀆􀀗􀀁􀀑􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀅􀀗􀀆􀀜􀀗􀀎􀀇􀀇􀀝
􀀿􀀐􀀓􀀃􀀏􀀜􀀆􀁂􀀮􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀕􀀝􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀚􀀕􀀃􀀟􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀻􀀵􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀚􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀃􀀒􀀚􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀧􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒
􀀑􀀒􀀒􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀢􀀜􀀆􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀎􀀦􀀆􀀰􀀍􀀙􀀆􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀜􀀲􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀙􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀚􀀒􀀛􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀦
􀀳􀁂􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀆􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀅􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀎􀀑􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀃􀀏􀀝􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀧􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀑􀀂􀀜􀀢􀀒􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀄􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀜􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀏􀀮􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀎􀀦
􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀒􀀒􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀄􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀓􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀕􀀚􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀦􀀆􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀙􀀙􀀏􀀙􀀍􀀓􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀒􀀙􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀑􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀱􀀛􀀒􀀙􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀮􀀕􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀕􀀚􀀦􀀲
􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀢􀀕􀀍􀀙􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀮􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀧􀀧􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀾􀀙􀀦􀀆􀀘􀀒􀀕􀀧􀀛􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀟􀀈􀀆􀀱􀀿􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀚􀀒􀀆􀀮􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀂􀀃􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀔
􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀚􀁆􀀆􀀺􀀒􀀛􀀛􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀐􀀈􀀆􀁅􀀪􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀛􀀕􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀆􀀔􀀏􀀮􀀅􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀦􀀴
􀀿􀀛􀀙􀀅􀀕􀀍􀀮􀀅􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀄􀀟􀀐􀀕􀀚􀀛􀀒􀀓􀀮􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀧􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀏􀀢􀀛􀀒􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀂􀀟􀀒􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀎
􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀂􀀏􀀃􀀧􀀕􀀃􀀙􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀑􀀍􀀐􀀏􀀄􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀢􀀛􀀏􀀎􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀮􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀢􀀍􀀏􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐
􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀆􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀛􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀆􀀓􀀂􀀜􀀎􀀈􀀆􀁂􀀮􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀕􀀝􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀒􀀂􀀃􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀕􀀧􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀦􀀆􀁄􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒
􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀎􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀚􀀕􀀃􀀟􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀕􀀎􀀒􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀡􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀨􀀒􀀢􀀦􀀆􀀉􀀣􀀦
􀀁􀀕􀀃􀀒􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀈􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀲􀀎􀀆􀁂􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀏􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀁􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀚􀀒􀀢􀀎􀀏􀀙􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀟􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀕􀀛􀀏􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀔􀀏􀀄􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀚􀀕􀀃􀀟􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅
􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀑􀀦
􀀳􀀺􀀒􀀆􀀚􀀂􀀙􀀄􀀅􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀧􀀎􀀲􀀆􀀙􀀂􀀟􀀒􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀏􀀃􀀧􀀕􀀃􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀸􀀒􀀝􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀕􀀧􀀕􀀛􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀚􀀆􀀏􀀐
􀀸􀀏􀀑􀀔􀀒􀀃􀀕􀀧􀀕􀀛􀀈􀀴􀀆􀁂􀀮􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀕􀀝􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀦􀀆􀀳􀀨􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀅􀀂􀀝􀀏􀀕􀀃􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀧􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀚􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀜􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀙􀀆􀀎􀀧􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀢􀀍􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒
􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀎􀀦􀀆􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀏􀀃􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀏􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀑􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀜􀀦􀀆􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀜􀀆􀀍􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀚􀀒􀀂􀀧􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀍􀀎􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀢􀀜􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐
􀀣􀀠􀀇􀀇
􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀦􀀆􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀜􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀍􀀛􀀛􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀕􀀃􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀛􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀸􀀍􀀐􀀓􀀂􀀜􀀦􀀆􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀜􀀆􀀮􀀒􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀎
􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀄􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀧􀀎􀀆􀀔􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀙􀀂􀀄􀀙􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀜􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀕􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀧􀀎􀀆􀀓􀀕􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀙􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀜􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀚􀀕􀀃􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀐􀀐􀀕􀀙
􀀢􀀒􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀄􀀕􀀮􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀢􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀏􀀃􀀆􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀎􀀦􀀴
􀀆􀀿􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀝􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀏􀀮􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀩􀀕􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀂􀀛􀀏􀀎􀀑􀀆􀀢􀀍􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀍􀀆􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀏􀀑􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀑􀀂􀀐􀀜􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀉􀁃􀀈􀀊􀀊􀀊􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀧􀀎
􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀚􀀕􀀃􀀟􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀒􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀍􀀛􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀂􀀃􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀔􀀏􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀅􀀏􀀮􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀔􀀒􀀐􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃
􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀏􀀑􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀓􀀂􀀜􀀦
􀀰􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀏􀀃􀀧􀀕􀀃􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀮􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀢􀀍􀀏􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀎􀀈􀀆􀁂􀀮􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀝􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀕􀀟􀀆􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀏􀀃
􀀓􀀒􀀔􀀒􀀐􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀛􀀆􀀢􀀂􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀨􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀕􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀕􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀎􀀑􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀦􀀆􀀳􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀂􀀟􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀧􀀒􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀙􀀒􀀃
􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀅􀀂􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀐􀀡􀀅􀀕􀀎􀀙􀀏􀀛􀀒􀀆􀀚􀀂􀀜􀀈􀀴􀀆􀁂􀀮􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀕􀀝􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀦
􀁂􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀒􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀒􀀛􀀒􀀧􀀅􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀝􀀏􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀚􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀢􀀃􀀏􀀒􀀔􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀃􀀍􀀧􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀅􀀕􀀍􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀛􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀐􀀏􀀮􀀅􀀙􀀈􀀆􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀈
􀀢􀀍􀀙􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀙􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀃􀀑􀀂􀀛􀀦􀀆􀁄􀀕􀀚􀀒􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀆􀀄􀀏􀀝􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀮􀀅􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀑􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀛􀀛􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀓􀀂􀀜􀀦
􀀸􀀕􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀮􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀢􀀍􀀏􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀜􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀂􀀮􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀧􀀦􀀆􀁅􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀛􀀏􀀟􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒
􀀃􀀒􀀮􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀧􀀕􀀛􀀏􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀅􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀼􀀍􀀂􀀃􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀧􀀛􀀒􀀓􀀮􀀒􀀆􀀛􀀕􀀜􀀂􀀛􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀪􀀜􀀏􀀝􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀂􀀮􀀦
􀀳􀁂􀀙􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀚􀀕􀀃􀀟􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀮􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀎􀀦􀀆􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀜􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀮􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀝􀀒􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀂􀀟􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀂􀀃􀀮􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀮􀀏􀀄􀀆􀀕􀀢􀀩􀀒􀀄􀀙􀀎􀀈􀀴􀀆􀁂􀀮􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀕􀀝
􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀦
􀀞􀀐􀀇􀀇􀀃􀀍􀀏􀀑􀀟􀀆􀀗􀀎􀀃􀀜􀀏􀀑􀀠􀀃􀀏􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀗􀀂􀀑􀀊􀀃􀀈􀀎􀀇􀀑􀀈􀀕􀀗􀀎􀀍􀀈􀀇􀀡􀀑􀀊􀀍􀀒􀀒􀀑􀀢􀀆􀀗􀀑􀀕􀀎􀀒􀀅􀀑􀀢􀀗􀀆􀀋􀀑􀀚􀀁􀀇􀀎􀀏􀀆􀀄
􀀆􀀁􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀚􀀅􀀏􀀛􀀒􀀈􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀨􀀕􀀃􀀒􀀏􀀮􀀐􀀆􀀁􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀩􀀍􀀎􀀙􀀏􀀔􀀏􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀎􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀢􀀜􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀜􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀿􀀟􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀕􀀝􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀚􀀛􀀜
􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀟􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀪􀀃􀀒􀀑􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀅􀀒􀀛􀀧􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀢􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀧􀀍􀀢􀀛􀀏􀀄􀀆􀀕􀀃􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒
􀀃􀀒􀀮􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀦􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀎􀀄􀀕􀀚􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀒􀀮􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀓􀀂􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀳􀀍􀀐􀀟􀀐􀀕􀀚􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀆􀀪􀀜􀀏􀀝􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀏􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀐
􀁂􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀏􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀁􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀏􀀮􀀅􀀙􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀚􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀩􀀍􀀃􀀏􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀙􀀙􀀂􀀄􀀟􀀦􀀴
􀀳􀀁􀀕􀀎􀀄􀀕􀀚􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀛􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀝􀀒􀀛􀀕􀀧􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀟􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀜􀀆􀀔􀀍􀀃􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃
􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀚􀀕􀀍􀀛􀀓􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀃􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀧􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀏􀀢􀀛􀀒􀀈􀀴􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀨􀀕􀀃􀀒􀀏􀀮􀀐􀀆􀀁􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀂􀀓􀀓􀀒􀀓􀀦􀀆􀀳􀀻􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀟􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀎􀀏􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀄􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐
􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀛􀀔􀀡􀀓􀀒􀀔􀀒􀀐􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀼􀀍􀀂􀀓􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀙􀀙􀀒􀀑􀀧􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀢􀀍􀀏􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀁂􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀏􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀁􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀚􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀛􀀒􀀓􀀦
􀀻􀀅􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀙􀀙􀀒􀀑􀀧􀀙􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀏􀀃􀀑􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀧􀀕􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀄􀀏􀀃􀀄􀀛􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀪􀀏􀀒􀀝􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀢􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒
􀀎􀀏􀀙􀀍􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀒􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀍􀀛􀀂􀀦􀀴
􀀸􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀔􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀪􀀃􀀒􀀑􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀒􀀛􀀍􀀓􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀝􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀈
􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀆􀀓􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀉􀀊􀀊􀁃􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀆􀀩􀀍􀀎􀀙􀀏􀀔􀀏􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀝􀀂􀀎􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀏􀀮􀀅􀀢􀀕􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀁇􀀒􀀕􀀃􀀮􀀏􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀕􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀃
􀀸􀀕􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀧􀀍􀀢􀀛􀀏􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀒􀀎􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀏􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀄􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀁇􀀒􀀕􀀃􀀮􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀢􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀟􀀂􀀚􀀂􀀜
􀀃􀀒􀀧􀀍􀀢􀀛􀀏􀀄􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀸􀀕􀀍􀀙􀀅􀀆􀁅􀀎􀀎􀀒􀀙􀀏􀀂􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀿􀀢􀀟􀀅􀀂􀀖􀀏􀀂􀀦
􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀨􀀕􀀃􀀒􀀏􀀮􀀐􀀆􀀁􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀪􀀃􀀒􀀑􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀘􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀵􀀛􀀂􀀓􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀃
􀀘􀀍􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀧􀀧􀀒􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀿􀀟􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀕􀀝􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀅􀀒􀀛􀀧􀀆􀀳􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀧􀀒􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀂􀀐􀀼􀀍􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒
􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀍􀀙􀀕􀀐􀀕􀀑􀀕􀀍􀀎􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀧􀀍􀀢􀀛􀀏􀀄􀀈􀀴􀀆􀀆􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀕􀀃􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀦
􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀪􀀃􀀒􀀑􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀍􀀎􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀧􀀆􀀑􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀧􀀧􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀕􀀃􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀿􀀟􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀕􀀝􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒
􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀛􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀮􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀆􀀛􀀕􀀐􀀮􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀛􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀪􀀜􀀏􀀝􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀂􀀐􀀎􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀂􀀛
􀀮􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀦
􀀋􀀠􀀇􀀇
􀀚􀀁􀀇􀀎􀀏􀀆􀀄􀀑􀀊􀀍􀀒􀀒􀀇􀀑􀀢􀀆􀀗􀀑􀀄􀀆􀀈􀀎􀀑􀀆􀀏􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀎􀀈􀀕􀀎􀀗􀀑􀀈􀀆􀀑􀀇􀀎􀀊􀀎􀀖􀀎􀀑􀀢􀀗􀀆􀀋􀀑􀀣􀀁􀀗􀀍􀀃􀀏􀀎
􀀁􀀕􀀃􀀒􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀈􀀆􀀿􀀟􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀕􀀝􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀎􀀍􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀝􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀝􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀣􀀊
􀀃􀀒􀀔􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀍􀀑􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀑􀀕􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀃􀀒􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀕􀀏􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀽􀀆􀀳􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀙􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀃􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀍􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀍􀀙􀀕􀀐􀀕􀀑􀀕􀀍􀀎
􀀃􀀒􀀧􀀍􀀢􀀛􀀏􀀄􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀧􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀂􀀃􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀦􀀴
􀀿􀀟􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀕􀀝􀀆􀀑􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀍􀀧􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀔􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀍􀀑􀀆􀀓􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀆􀀔􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀒􀀝􀀏􀀕􀀍􀀎􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀎􀀄􀀅􀀒􀀓􀀍􀀛􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀜􀀆􀀉􀀭􀀆􀀓􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀦
􀀿􀀟􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀕􀀝􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀎􀀕􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀂􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀑􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀧􀀕􀀛􀀏􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀕􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃
􀀎􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀝􀀏􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀮􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀦􀀆􀁄􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀄􀀛􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀕􀀛􀀏􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀂􀀛
􀀎􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀝􀀏􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀢􀀕􀀃􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀮􀀍􀀂􀀃􀀓􀀎􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀛􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀎􀀚􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀅􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀃􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀦􀀆􀁄􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀜􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀜
􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀑􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀕􀀆􀀓􀀕􀀐􀀲􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀮􀀃􀀒􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀅􀀕􀀍􀀛􀀓􀀆􀀛􀀒􀀂􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀏􀀃􀀆􀀧􀀕􀀎􀀙􀀎􀀦
􀀿􀀟􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀕􀀝􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀅􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀡􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀆􀀧􀀂􀀃􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀮􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀚􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀧􀀧􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀢􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀐
􀀧􀀂􀀃􀀛􀀏􀀂􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀨􀀒􀀢􀀦􀀆􀀉􀀤􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀒􀀐􀀎􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀕􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀚􀀆􀀂􀀍􀀙􀀅􀀕􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐
􀀪􀀜􀀏􀀝􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀕􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀧􀀛􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀕􀀍􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀘􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀵􀀏􀀟􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀶􀀂􀀐􀀍􀀟􀀕􀀝􀀜􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀅􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀧􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀔􀀏􀀄􀀏􀀂􀀛􀀎􀀦􀀆􀀿􀀟􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀕􀀝
􀀃􀀒􀀧􀀛􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀶􀀂􀀐􀀍􀀟􀀕􀀝􀀜􀀄􀀅􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀧􀀧􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀒􀀈􀀆􀀿􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀕􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀮􀀏􀀛􀀒􀀝􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀏􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀦
􀀘􀀃􀀕􀀡􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀄􀀙􀀏􀀝􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀅􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀆􀀍􀀧􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀂􀀮􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀒􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀂􀀔􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀮􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀮􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙
􀀢􀀍􀀏􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀃􀀟􀀏􀀝􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀊􀀇􀀋􀀦􀀆􀀬􀀕􀀖􀀒􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀚􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀅􀀍􀀃􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀊􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀡􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂
􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀒􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀃􀀟􀀏􀀝􀀆􀀙􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀝􀀏􀀕􀀛􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀈􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀑􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀙􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀜􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀑
􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀮􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀢􀀍􀀏􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀦􀀆􀀸􀀕􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀉􀀊􀀈􀀊􀀊􀀊􀀆􀀩􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀮􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀪􀀏􀀒􀀝􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀚􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀡􀀺􀀒􀀎􀀙
􀀮􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀔􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀍􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀪􀀃􀀒􀀑􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀡􀀢􀀂􀀄􀀟􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀛􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀵􀀏􀀟􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀶􀀂􀀐􀀍􀀟􀀕􀀝􀀜􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀛􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀕􀀍􀀐􀀓
􀀣􀀊􀀊􀀆􀀛􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀅􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀎􀀂􀀍􀀛􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀮􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀢􀀍􀀏􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀦􀀆􀀸􀀙􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀍􀀐􀀆􀀮􀀃􀀒􀀐􀀂􀀓􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀚􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀐
􀀭􀀠􀀇􀀇
􀀙􀀅􀀕􀀍􀀮􀀅􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀆􀀚􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀛􀀒􀀂􀀃􀀆􀀢􀀜􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀕􀀑􀀦􀀆􀀿􀀨􀀘􀀆􀀘􀁄􀁅􀀻􀁅􀀠􀀆􀀸􀀷􀀌􀁇􀀷􀀶􀀆􀀰􀁅􀀰􀁅􀀪
􀀓􀀗􀀆􀀈􀀎􀀇􀀈􀀇􀀑􀀈􀀍􀀁􀀎􀀑􀀅􀀒􀀍􀀊􀀎􀀑􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀤􀀕􀀍􀀗􀀁􀀃􀀄􀀡􀀑􀀥􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀈􀀇􀀁􀀑􀀍􀀏􀀖􀀑􀀆􀀈􀀕􀀎􀀗􀀑􀀎􀀍􀀇􀀈􀀎􀀗􀀏􀀑􀀊􀀃􀀈􀀃􀀎􀀇
􀀸􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀂􀀃􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀧􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀒􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀬􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀙􀀎􀀟􀀈􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀕􀀍􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀽􀀣􀀊􀀆􀀧􀀦􀀑􀀦
􀀙􀀕􀀓􀀂􀀜􀀆􀀑􀀕􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀤􀀈􀀊􀀊􀀊􀀆􀀧􀀒􀀕􀀧􀀛􀀒􀀆􀀮􀀂􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀁈􀀒􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀸􀀼􀀍􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀓􀀏􀀎􀀄􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀕􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀢􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀅􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀂
􀀃􀀒􀀔􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀍􀀑􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀎􀀍􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀦􀀆􀀆􀀿􀀄􀀄􀀕􀀃􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀁅􀀛􀀒􀀟􀀎􀀏􀀜􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀙􀀎􀀍􀀟􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀒􀀓􀀏􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀡􀀏􀀐􀀡􀀄􀀅􀀏􀀒􀀔􀀆􀀕􀀔
􀀬􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀙􀀎􀀟􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀚􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀙􀀒􀀆􀀹􀀕􀀝􀀕􀀎􀀙􀀏􀀆􀀬􀀕􀀐􀀢􀀂􀀎􀀎􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀓􀀆􀀚􀀂􀀐􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀅􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀆􀀒􀀛􀀒􀀄􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀚􀀆􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀂􀀛
􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀮􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀮􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀍􀀃􀀮􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀍􀀛􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀎􀀍􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀂􀀎􀀎􀀧􀀕􀀃􀀙􀀎
􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀦
􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀚􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀎􀀕􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀝􀀏􀀕􀀛􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀂􀀎􀀅􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀃􀀟􀀏􀀝􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀛􀀂􀀃􀀮􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀕􀀎􀀒
􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀢􀀕􀀃􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀦􀀆
􀀿􀀆􀁈􀀏􀀔􀀒􀀹􀀒􀀚􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀃􀀟􀀏􀀝􀀆􀀎􀀅􀀕􀀚􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀡􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀓􀀃􀀂􀀮􀀮􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀡􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀍􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀔
􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀮􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀂􀀓􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀢􀀍􀀏􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀄􀀄􀀍􀀧􀀜􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀔􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀎􀀄􀀍􀀔􀀔􀀛􀀒􀀎􀀦􀀆􀀘􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀎􀀕􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀕􀀟
􀀓􀀕􀀚􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀂􀀮􀀆􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀃􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀢􀀍􀀏􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀧􀀛􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀂􀀮􀀦􀀆􀀳􀀺􀀒
􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀃􀀟􀀏􀀝􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀍􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀈􀀴􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀻􀀵􀀆􀀩􀀕􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀂􀀛􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀦􀀆􀀿􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀧􀀕􀀃􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀽􀀆􀀳􀀁􀀂􀀐􀀜
􀀧􀀒􀀕􀀧􀀛􀀒􀀆􀀚􀀂􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀛􀀏􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀒􀀛􀀒􀀝􀀏􀀎􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀦􀀆􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀜􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀍􀀧􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀕􀀍􀀃􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀑􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀒􀀾􀀧􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀏􀀃
􀀧􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀚􀀦􀀆􀀸􀀕􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀎􀀅􀀕􀀚􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀏􀀃􀀆􀀧􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀕􀀛􀀎􀀦􀀴
􀁂􀀐􀀆􀁈􀀍􀀮􀀂􀀐􀀎􀀟􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀸􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀙􀀎􀀟􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀧􀀕􀀃􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀎􀀧􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀏􀀃􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀍􀀧
􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀦
􀀫􀀠􀀇􀀇
􀀘􀀃􀀕􀀡􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀅􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀢􀀂􀀐􀀐􀀒􀀃􀀆􀁀􀀗􀁁􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀳􀀬􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀙􀀎􀀟􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀮􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀴􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀧􀀛􀀂􀀄􀀂􀀃􀀓
􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀳􀀸􀀕􀀍􀀙􀀅􀀡􀀒􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀮􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀔􀀂􀀎􀀄􀀏􀀎􀀑􀁉􀀴􀀆􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀓􀀍􀀎􀀙􀀃􀀏􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀬􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀙􀀎􀀟
􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀊􀀇􀀋􀀦􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀊􀀈􀀊􀀊􀀊􀀆􀀧􀀒􀀕􀀧􀀛􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀃􀀃􀀜􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀂􀀮􀀎􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀒􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀐
􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀬􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀙􀀎􀀟􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀐􀀮􀀅􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀕􀀍􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀵􀀏􀀟􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀶􀀂􀀐􀀍􀀟􀀕􀀝􀀜􀀄􀀅􀀦􀀆􀀘􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀎
􀀓􀀒􀀄􀀛􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀜􀀆􀀎􀀍􀀧􀀧􀀕􀀃􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀳􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀧􀀏􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀩􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀴􀀈􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀔􀀒􀀃􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀡
􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀆􀀧􀀒􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀍􀀛􀀂􀀆􀀔􀀍􀀃􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀎􀀕􀀍􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀪􀀏􀀒􀀝􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀍􀀎􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀎􀀄􀀕􀀚􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀛􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀳􀀂􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀓
􀀏􀀐􀀝􀀂􀀎􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀦􀀴􀀆􀀿􀀨􀀘􀀆􀀘􀁄􀁅􀀻􀁅􀀠􀀆􀀿􀁈􀀷􀁊􀀿􀀹􀀬􀀷􀀌􀀆􀀪􀁄􀀞􀀬􀁅􀀻􀀷􀀘􀁈􀀶
􀀦􀀐􀀗􀀊􀀕􀀂􀀏􀀆􀀄􀀑􀀊􀀃􀀈􀀎􀀇􀀑􀀞􀀐􀀇􀀇􀀃􀀍􀀏􀀑􀀃􀀏􀀄􀀍􀀇􀀃􀀆􀀏􀀑􀀆􀀢􀀑􀀧􀀎􀀆􀀗􀀜􀀃􀀍􀀑􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀨􀀩􀀩􀀪
􀀿􀀛􀀎􀀕􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀨􀀒􀀢􀀦􀀆􀀉􀁃􀀈􀀆􀁅􀀛􀀒􀀟􀀎􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀃􀀆􀀻􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀜􀀐􀀕􀀝􀀈􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀄􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀅􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀍􀀎􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀆􀀕􀀔
􀀳􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀝􀀕􀀟􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀄􀀙􀀴􀀆􀀢􀀜􀀆􀀢􀀂􀀄􀀟􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀍􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀂􀀃􀀛􀀏􀀂􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀢􀀍􀀏􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀕􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃
􀀮􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀔􀀏􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀒􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀍􀀛􀀂􀀦􀀆􀀿􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀮􀀍􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀎􀀕􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀲􀀎
􀀙􀀒􀀛􀀒􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀑􀀍􀀐􀀏􀀄􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀧􀀂􀀐􀀜􀀦
􀀳􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀜􀀲􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀛􀀂􀀜􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀿􀀢􀀟􀀅􀀂􀀖􀀏􀀂􀀆􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀐􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀕􀀈􀀴􀀆􀀻􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀜􀀐􀀕􀀝􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀛􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀏􀀮􀀅􀀙􀀆􀀢􀀃􀀏􀀒􀀔􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀵􀀒􀀃􀀟􀀅􀀕􀀝􀀐􀀂
􀀌􀀂􀀓􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀔􀀒􀀃􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀊􀀊􀁃􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀝􀀂􀀎􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀁇􀀒􀀕􀀃􀀮􀀏􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀏􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀛􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀢􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀟􀀂􀀚􀀂􀀜
􀀏􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀧􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀮􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀿􀀢􀀟􀀅􀀂􀀖􀀏􀀂􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀸􀀕􀀍􀀙􀀅􀀆􀁅􀀎􀀎􀀒􀀙􀀏􀀂􀀦
􀀻􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀜􀀐􀀕􀀝􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀎􀀕􀀆􀀚􀀂􀀃􀀐􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀘􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀵􀀛􀀂􀀓􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀃􀀆􀀘􀀍􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀳􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀕􀀧􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀝􀀕􀀄􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀛
􀀢􀀂􀀄􀀟􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀔􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀿􀀍􀀙􀀕􀀐􀀕􀀑􀀕􀀍􀀎􀀆􀀌􀀒􀀧􀀍􀀢􀀛􀀏􀀄􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀚􀀕􀀃􀀟􀀆􀀒􀀾􀀄􀀛􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀝􀀒􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒
􀀔􀀃􀀂􀀑􀀒􀀚􀀕􀀃􀀟􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀮􀀐􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀮􀀃􀀒􀀒􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀎􀀈􀀴􀀆􀀻􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀜􀀐􀀕􀀝􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀈􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀔􀀒􀀃􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀓􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃
􀀅􀀕􀀎􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀂􀀝􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀢􀀂􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀸􀀒􀀝􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀕􀀧􀀕􀀛􀀦􀀆􀀻􀀅􀀕􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀓􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀛􀀍􀀓􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀧
􀀑􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀒􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀍􀀛􀀂􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀕􀀍􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀍􀀙􀀅􀀕􀀃􀀏􀀖􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀮􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀦
􀀦􀀐􀀗􀀊􀀕􀀂􀀏􀀆􀀄􀀑􀀊􀀍􀀒􀀒􀀇􀀑􀀢􀀆􀀗􀀑􀀫􀀎􀀇􀀈􀀎􀀗􀀏􀀑􀀕􀀎􀀒􀀅
􀀻􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀜􀀐􀀕􀀝􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀎􀀕􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀒􀀾􀀧􀀒􀀄􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀅􀀒􀀛􀀧􀀆􀀔􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀺􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀒􀀐􀀎􀀍􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀏􀀮􀀐􀀙􀀜􀀦
􀀳􀁂􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀎􀀕􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀞􀀐􀀏􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀸􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀁇􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀰􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀎􀀕􀀆􀀮􀀍􀀂􀀃􀀂􀀐􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒
􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀈􀀴􀀆􀀻􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀜􀀐􀀕􀀝􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀈􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀔􀀒􀀃􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀇􀀥􀀥􀀋􀀆􀀰􀀍􀀓􀀂􀀧􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀁􀀒􀀑􀀕􀀃􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀍􀀑
􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀧􀀛􀀒􀀓􀀮􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀺􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀎􀀍􀀧􀀧􀀕􀀃􀀙􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀒􀀾􀀄􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀮􀀒􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀍􀀃􀀃􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀸􀀕􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀡􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀆􀀐􀀍􀀄􀀛􀀒􀀂􀀃
􀀚􀀒􀀂􀀧􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀂􀀛􀀦
􀀳􀀺􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀑􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀕􀀧􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀝􀀕􀀄􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀚􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀑􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀃􀀑􀀂􀀛􀀏􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀙􀀍􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀦􀀆􀀺􀀒􀀲􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀍􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙
􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀛􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀜􀀈􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀛􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀔􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀧􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀜􀀆􀀂􀀙􀀙􀀒􀀑􀀧􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔
􀀂􀀐􀀐􀀒􀀾􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀃􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀛􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀏􀀕􀀍􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀒􀀼􀀍􀀒􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀈􀀴􀀆􀀻􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀜􀀐􀀕􀀝􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀦
􀀤􀀠􀀇􀀇
􀀿􀀆􀀚􀀕􀀑􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀅􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀮􀀐􀀆􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀑􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀙􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀃􀀕􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀷􀀑􀀢􀀂􀀎􀀎􀀜􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀪􀀏􀀒􀀝􀀆􀀕􀀐
􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀊􀀇􀀋􀀦􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀘􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀵􀀛􀀂􀀓􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀃􀀆􀀘􀀍􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀊􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀎􀀍􀀢􀀑􀀏􀀙􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀼􀀍􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒
􀀍􀀧􀀧􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀅􀀕􀀍􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀧􀀂􀀃􀀛􀀏􀀂􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀟􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀂􀀧􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀝􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀍􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀧􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒
􀀪􀀃􀀒􀀑􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀦􀀆􀀳􀁂􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀐􀀒􀀄􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀒􀀾􀀙􀀃􀀂􀀕􀀃􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀂􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀙􀀍􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒
􀀛􀀏􀀝􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀖􀀒􀀐􀀎􀀯􀀆􀁂􀀆􀀎􀀍􀀢􀀑􀀏􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀨􀀒􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀕􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀏􀀛􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀼􀀍􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀍􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀓
􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀨􀀒􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀙􀀏􀀛􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀃􀀑􀀂􀀛􀀏􀀎􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀕􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀄􀀂􀀛
􀀎􀀏􀀙􀀍􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀍􀀐􀀙􀀃􀀜􀀈􀀴􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀪􀀃􀀒􀀑􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀼􀀍􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀘􀀍􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀜􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀕􀀄􀀍􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀦􀀆􀀿􀀨􀀘􀀆􀀘􀁄􀁅􀀻􀁅􀀠
􀀶􀀞􀀌􀀶􀀆􀀪􀁂􀀌􀀹􀁂􀀗􀁄􀀹􀀶
􀀣􀀁􀀗􀀍􀀃􀀏􀀎􀀝􀀇􀀑􀀈􀀗􀀍􀀏􀀇􀀃􀀈􀀃􀀆􀀏􀀍􀀒􀀑􀀜􀀆􀀄􀀎􀀗􀀏􀀋􀀎􀀏􀀈􀀑􀀐􀀏􀀍􀀬􀀒􀀎􀀑􀀈􀀆􀀑􀀇􀀈􀀆􀀅􀀑􀀈􀀍􀀁􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀎􀀗􀀇􀀑􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀭􀀗􀀃􀀋􀀎􀀍
􀁄􀀕􀀚􀀒􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀈􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀂􀀐􀀎􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀮􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀔􀀂􀀏􀀛􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀒􀀝􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀂􀀟􀀒􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀐
􀀮􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀢􀀍􀀏􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀏􀀃􀀧􀀕􀀃􀀙􀀎􀀦􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀃􀀒􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀏􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀂􀀐􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀃􀀕􀀂􀀓
􀀄􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀟􀀧􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀂􀀮􀀦
􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀡􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀿􀀟􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀕􀀝􀀈􀀆􀀅􀀕􀀎􀀙􀀏􀀛􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀪􀀜􀀏􀀝􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀂􀀐􀀎􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀮􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀕􀀟􀀆􀀧􀀕􀀚􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀨􀀒􀀢􀀦􀀆􀀉􀀤
􀀂􀀔􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀂􀀃􀀛􀀏􀀂􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀔􀀏􀀃􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀶􀀂􀀐􀀍􀀟􀀕􀀝􀀜􀀄􀀅􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀧􀀧􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀧􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀝􀀒􀀈􀀆􀀿􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀕􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀮􀀏􀀛􀀒􀀝􀀈
􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀏􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀦
􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀂􀀃􀀛􀀏􀀂􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀓􀀆􀀎􀀄􀀅􀀒􀀓􀀍􀀛􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀔􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀍􀀑􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀜􀀆􀀉􀀭􀀆􀁋􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀑􀀍􀀛􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀒􀀕􀀍􀀎􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀕
􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀾􀀙􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀏􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀒􀀛􀀒􀀄􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀆􀁋􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀒􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀆􀀔􀀂􀀝􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀑􀀕􀀃􀀒
􀀏􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀧􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀔􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀆􀀪􀀜􀀏􀀝􀀦􀀆􀁂􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀓􀀓􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀸􀀒􀀝􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀕􀀧􀀕􀀛􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀑􀀂􀀜􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀮􀀐􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀏􀀛􀀆􀀒􀀛􀀒􀀄􀀙􀀒􀀓
􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀖􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀿􀀛􀀒􀀟􀀎􀀒􀀏􀀆􀀗􀀅􀀂􀀛􀀏􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀙􀀂􀀟􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀂􀀃􀀮􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀨􀀒􀀢􀀦􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀦
􀀿􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀛􀀒􀀮􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀑􀀢􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀧􀀂􀀃􀀛􀀏􀀂􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀈􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀛􀀍􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀍􀀛􀀙􀀃􀀂􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀂􀀛􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀵􀀛􀀂􀀓􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀃􀀆􀁌􀀅􀀏􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀕􀀝􀀎􀀟􀀜􀀈
􀁃􀀠􀀇􀀇
􀀅􀀂􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀝􀀏􀀎􀀏􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀦􀀆􀁄􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀆􀀚􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀙􀀆􀀧􀀛􀀂􀀐􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀙􀀂􀀟􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀦
􀀁􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀚􀀅􀀏􀀛􀀒􀀈􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀚􀀂􀀃􀀎􀀅􀀏􀀧􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀃􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀰􀀂􀀛􀀂􀀟􀀛􀀂􀀝􀀂􀀆􀀰􀀂􀀜􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀑􀀂􀀐􀀜􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀇􀀊
􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀅􀀒􀀛􀀏􀀄􀀕􀀧􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀧􀀕􀀃􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀝􀀏􀀕􀀛􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀏􀀃􀀎􀀧􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀦􀀆􀀆
􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀗􀀕􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀆􀁇􀀍􀀂􀀃􀀓􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀙􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀸􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀆􀀰􀀕􀀃􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀸􀀒􀀃􀀝􀀏􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀰􀀛􀀂􀀟􀀛􀀂􀀝􀀂􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀒􀀐
􀀎􀀍􀀃􀀃􀀕􀀍􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀢􀀜􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀎􀀆􀁋􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀓􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀂􀀃􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀸􀀒􀀝􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀕􀀧􀀕􀀛􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐
􀀰􀀛􀀂􀀄􀀟􀀆􀀸􀀒􀀂􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀒􀀒􀀙􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀓􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀆􀀢􀀕􀀃􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀮􀀍􀀂􀀃􀀓􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀝􀀏􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀚􀀎􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀛􀀒􀀂􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀦
􀀹􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀸􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀬􀀒􀀔􀀒􀀐􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀗􀀕􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀏􀀛􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀄􀀃􀀒􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀿􀀐􀀓􀀃􀀏􀀜􀀆􀀘􀀂􀀃􀀍􀀢􀀏􀀜􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀨􀀒􀀢􀀦􀀆􀀉􀁃􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀄􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐
􀀧􀀛􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀒􀀝􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀳􀀎􀀒􀀧􀀂􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀐􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀕􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀦􀀴􀀆􀁄􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀓􀀓􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀂􀀃􀀆􀀪􀀃􀀒􀀑􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀡
􀀢􀀂􀀄􀀟􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀧􀀂􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀧􀀛􀀂􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀛􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀕􀀍􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀒􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀮􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒
􀀔􀀃􀀏􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀦
􀀳􀀰􀀍􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀙􀀍􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀚􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀏􀀖􀀒􀀓􀀆􀁀􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀁁􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀚􀀒􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀛􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀂􀀝􀀕􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀴
􀀆􀀘􀀂􀀃􀀍􀀢􀀏􀀜􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀦
􀀚􀀄􀀍􀀁􀀆􀀄􀀑􀀊􀀍􀀒􀀒􀀇􀀑􀀭􀀗􀀃􀀋􀀎􀀍􀀑􀀇􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀈􀀃􀀆􀀏􀀑􀀍􀀑􀀞􀀐􀀇􀀇􀀃􀀍􀀏􀀑􀀛􀀋􀀃􀀒􀀃􀀈􀀍􀀗􀀂􀀑􀀃􀀏􀀈􀀎􀀗􀀄􀀎􀀏􀀈􀀃􀀆􀀏􀀝
􀀷􀀂􀀃􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀃􀀈􀀆􀁂􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀏􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀁􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀿􀀃􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀿􀀝􀀂􀀟􀀕􀀝􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀝􀀒􀀛􀀕􀀧􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀳􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀜
􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀝􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀴􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀳􀀕􀀄􀀄􀀍􀀧􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀴􀀆􀀢􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀪􀀃􀀒􀀑􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀦􀀆
􀀳􀀺􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀚􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀐􀀒􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀎􀀧􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀕􀀧􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀒􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀢􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀪􀀃􀀒􀀑􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀈􀀴􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀁅􀀛􀀒􀀟􀀎􀀏􀀜
􀀁􀀒􀀛􀀐􀀜􀀟􀀈􀀆􀀓􀀏􀀃􀀒􀀄􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀒􀀏􀀮􀀐􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀛􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀮􀀃􀀂􀀑􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀖􀀍􀀑􀀟􀀕􀀝􀀆􀀗􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀈
􀀂􀀆􀀪􀀜􀀏􀀝􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀟􀀆􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀟􀀦
􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀢􀀩􀀒􀀄􀀙􀀏􀀝􀀒􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀒􀀾􀀧􀀒􀀃􀀙􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀈􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀳􀀓􀀒􀀧􀀃􀀏􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀧􀀕􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀧􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓
􀀙􀀅􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀏􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀮􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀯􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀟􀀒􀀒􀀧􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀧􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀔􀀛􀀍􀀒􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀍􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀕􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃
􀀢􀀂􀀃􀀮􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀕􀀛􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀺􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀦􀀴
􀀺􀀅􀀏􀀛􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀅􀀕􀀚􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀆􀀮􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀛􀀆􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀻􀀃􀀂􀀐􀀎􀀓􀀐􀀏􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀸􀀕􀀍􀀙􀀅􀀆􀁅􀀎􀀎􀀒􀀙􀀏􀀂
􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀿􀀢􀀟􀀅􀀂􀀖􀀏􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀁􀀒􀀛􀀐􀀜􀀟􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀑􀀂􀀐􀀒􀀍􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀆􀀚􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀆􀀧􀀂􀀃􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀢􀀏􀀮􀀆􀀧􀀛􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀕
􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀳􀀙􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀸􀀒􀀝􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀕􀀧􀀕􀀛􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀪􀀂􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀃􀀂􀀓􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀼􀀍􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀮􀀒􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅
􀀒􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀦􀀴
􀀿􀀛􀀙􀀅􀀕􀀍􀀮􀀅􀀆􀀪􀀜􀀏􀀝􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀓􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀂􀀝􀀕􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀄􀀙􀀈􀀆􀀁􀀒􀀛􀀐􀀜􀀟􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀪􀀜􀀏􀀝􀀆􀀘􀀕􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒
􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀮􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀳􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀎􀀐􀀲􀀙􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀔􀀍􀀛􀀛􀀆􀀂􀀍􀀙􀀅􀀕􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀓􀀕􀀚􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀦􀀴
􀁄􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀐􀀍􀀑􀀢􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀰􀀒􀀃􀀟􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀃􀀏􀀕􀀙􀀆􀀧􀀕􀀛􀀏􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀏􀀙􀀆􀀓􀀏􀀎􀀢􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀢􀀜􀀆􀀪􀀜􀀏􀀝􀀲􀀎
􀀐􀀒􀀚􀀆􀀮􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀢􀀛􀀂􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀂􀀙􀀅􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀎􀀄􀀕􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀷􀀍􀀃􀀕􀀁􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀦􀀆􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀜􀀆􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀲􀀙􀀆􀀢􀀒
􀀙􀀕􀀕􀀆􀀛􀀕􀀜􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀮􀀏􀀝􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀜􀀆􀀩􀀍􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀙􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀔􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀆􀀪􀀜􀀏􀀝􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀳􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀜􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀙􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀄􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀂􀀄􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀛
􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀄􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀂􀀝􀀕􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀅􀀒􀀛􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀕􀀍􀀐􀀙􀀂􀀢􀀛􀀒􀀈􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀒􀀛􀀐􀀜􀀟􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀦
􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀏􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀧􀀂􀀃􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀂􀀟􀀒􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀎
􀀻􀀅􀀍􀀎􀀆􀀔􀀂􀀃􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀰􀀛􀀂􀀄􀀟􀀆􀀸􀀒􀀂􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀒􀀒􀀙􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀏􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀧􀀂􀀃􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀏􀀃􀀧􀀕􀀃􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀂􀀟􀀒􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓
􀀕􀀄􀀄􀀍􀀧􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀮􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀢􀀍􀀏􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀎􀀦
􀀥􀀠􀀇􀀇
􀁄􀀕􀀚􀀒􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀈􀀆􀀁􀀒􀀛􀀐􀀜􀀟􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀰􀀛􀀂􀀄􀀟􀀆􀀸􀀒􀀂􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀒􀀒􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀮􀀒􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃
􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀨􀀒􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀸􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀸􀀒􀀃􀀝􀀏􀀄􀀒􀀆􀁀􀀨􀀸􀀰􀁁􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀏􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀃􀀏􀀮􀀅􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀕􀀧􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂
􀀎􀀕􀀈􀀆􀀳􀀏􀀔􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀕􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀢􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀟􀀎􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀜􀀆􀀢􀀂􀀎􀀒􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀜􀀦􀀴
􀁂􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀓􀀓􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀁􀀒􀀛􀀐􀀜􀀟􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀕􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀙􀀙􀀒􀀑􀀧􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀂􀀟􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀏􀀃􀀧􀀕􀀃􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀕
􀀅􀀂􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀄􀀄􀀍􀀧􀀏􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀢􀀍􀀏􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀎􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀏􀀮􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀆􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀏􀀔􀀏􀀄􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀦
􀀳􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀜􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀜􀀕􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀛􀀑􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀛􀀂􀀚􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀍􀀛􀀓􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀑􀀧􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀃􀀕􀀃􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀃
􀀑􀀒􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀐􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀒􀀎􀀈􀀴􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀁􀀒􀀛􀀐􀀜􀀟􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀓􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀑􀀕􀀃􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀧􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀕􀀐􀀐􀀒􀀛􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀃􀀃􀀏􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀟􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀃􀀂􀀐􀀎􀀧􀀕􀀃􀀙􀀏􀀐􀀮
􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀎􀀕􀀆􀀓􀀕􀀐􀀲􀀙􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀏􀀔􀀏􀀂􀀢􀀛􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀂􀀮􀀆􀀐􀀍􀀑􀀢􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀦
􀀓􀀂􀀍􀀈􀀈􀀑􀀇􀀍􀀂􀀇􀀑􀀣􀀮􀀑􀀃􀀇􀀑􀀊􀀆􀀋􀀋􀀃􀀈􀀈􀀎􀀖􀀑􀀈􀀆􀀑􀀣􀀁􀀗􀀍􀀃􀀏􀀃􀀍􀀏􀀑􀀇􀀆􀀄􀀎􀀗􀀎􀀃􀀜􀀏􀀈􀀂
􀀞􀀦􀀸􀀦􀀆􀀿􀀑􀀢􀀂􀀎􀀎􀀂􀀓􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀆􀁇􀀒􀀕􀀔􀀔􀀃􀀒􀀜􀀆􀀘􀀜􀀂􀀙􀀙􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀨􀀒􀀢􀀦􀀆􀀉􀀤􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀳􀀐􀀕􀀢􀀕􀀓􀀜􀀆􀀎􀀅􀀕􀀍􀀛􀀓􀀆􀀑􀀂􀀟􀀒
􀀑􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀟􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀧􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀞􀀐􀀏􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀸􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀙􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀕􀀝􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀏􀀮􀀐􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓
􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀏􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀮􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀙􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀯􀀆􀀸􀀕􀀆􀀚􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀒􀀧􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀝􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀖􀀒􀀃􀀕􀀡􀀎􀀍􀀑
􀀏􀀎􀀎􀀍􀀒􀀦􀀴
􀁄􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀓􀀓􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀢􀀛􀀒􀀆􀀳􀀎􀀏􀀙􀀍􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙
􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀛􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀐􀀒􀀔􀀏􀀙􀀆􀀔􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀑􀀕􀀄􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀜􀀈􀀆􀀒􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀕􀀑􀀏􀀄􀀆􀀮􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀙􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀮􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀍􀀐􀀙􀀃􀀜􀀦􀀴
􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀚􀀂􀀜􀀎􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀧􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀏􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀜􀀆􀀝􀀕􀀛􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀛􀀒􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀮􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀔􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀸􀀕􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀆􀀛􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀹􀀏􀀟􀀏􀀙􀀂􀀆􀀪􀀅􀀃􀀍􀀎􀀅􀀄􀀅􀀒􀀝
􀀙􀀃􀀂􀀐􀀎􀀔􀀒􀀃􀀃􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀆􀀔􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀥􀀭􀀋􀀦
􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀍􀀛􀀙􀀍􀀃􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀟􀀎􀀆􀀚􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀛􀀚􀀂􀀜􀀎􀀆􀀔􀀂􀀃􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀐􀀮􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀦􀀆􀀻􀀕􀀓􀀂􀀜􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀕􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀭􀁃􀀆􀀧􀀒􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀔
􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀏􀀔􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀑􀀎􀀒􀀛􀀝􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀒􀀙􀀅􀀐􀀏􀀄􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀏􀀛􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀢􀀕􀀍􀀙􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀆􀀧􀀒􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀎
􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀻􀀂􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀆􀀚􀀅􀀕􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀙􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀏􀀃􀀆􀀅􀀕􀀑􀀒􀀛􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀛􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀆􀀇􀀥􀁃􀀊􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀔􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀏􀀐􀀮
􀀒􀀾􀀧􀀒􀀛􀀛􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀢􀀜􀀆􀀸􀀕􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀆􀀓􀀏􀀄􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀆􀁍􀀕􀀎􀀒􀀔􀀆􀀸􀀙􀀂􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀔􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀺􀀕􀀃􀀛􀀓􀀆􀀺􀀂􀀃􀀆􀁂􀁂􀀦􀀆􀀿􀀢􀀕􀀍􀀙􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀧􀀒􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀎􀀦
􀀿􀀄􀀄􀀕􀀃􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀄􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀧􀀕􀀛􀀛􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀛􀀒􀀂􀀎􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀛􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀚􀀒􀀒􀀟􀀆􀀢􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀬􀀒􀀑􀀕􀀄􀀃􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀄􀀆􀁂􀀐􀀏􀀙􀀏􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀝􀀒􀀎􀀆􀀨􀀕􀀍􀀐􀀓􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀕􀀑􀀒
􀀋􀀉􀀆􀀧􀀒􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀚􀀂􀀐􀀙􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀏􀀙􀀒􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀦
􀀻􀀍􀀃􀀟􀀒􀀜􀀲􀀎􀀆􀀨􀀕􀀃􀀒􀀏􀀮􀀐􀀆􀀁􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀿􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀙􀀆􀀬􀀂􀀝􀀍􀀙􀀕􀁎􀀛􀀍􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀨􀀒􀀢􀀦􀀆􀀉􀀤􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀮􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀏􀀑􀀧􀀕􀀃􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀕
􀀻􀀍􀀃􀀟􀀒􀀜􀀦􀀆􀀻􀀂􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀻􀀍􀀃􀀟􀀏􀀄􀀆􀀒􀀙􀀅􀀐􀀏􀀄􀀆􀀮􀀃􀀕􀀍􀀧􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀢􀀕􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀁􀀍􀀎􀀛􀀏􀀑􀀎􀀦􀀆􀀳􀀨􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀻􀀍􀀃􀀟􀀒􀀜􀀈􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀲􀀎
􀀙􀀒􀀃􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀏􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀮􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀢􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀎􀀧􀀒􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀏􀀂􀀛􀀦􀀆􀁅􀀍􀀃􀀆􀀮􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀎􀀙􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀎􀀅􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀐􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀔
􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀢􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀈􀀴􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀬􀀂􀀝􀀍􀀙􀀕􀁎􀀛􀀍􀀦
􀀁􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀚􀀅􀀏􀀛􀀒􀀈􀀆􀀻􀀂􀀙􀀂􀀃􀀆􀀛􀀂􀀚􀀑􀀂􀀟􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀁􀀍􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀔􀀂􀀆􀀬􀀖􀀅􀀒􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀒􀀝􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀰􀀂􀀙􀀟􀀏􀀝􀀎􀀅􀀄􀀅􀀜􀀐􀀂􀀆􀀘􀀂􀀃􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀟􀀒􀀓
􀀻􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀜􀀐􀀕􀀝􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀧􀀛􀀕􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀏􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀑􀀜􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀦􀀆􀀳􀀻􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃
􀀕􀀢􀀛􀀂􀀎􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀜􀀒􀀙􀀦􀀆􀀗􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀒􀀑􀀒􀀃􀀮􀀒􀀐􀀄􀀜􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀂􀀟􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀛􀀈􀀴􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀬􀀖􀀅􀀒􀀑􀀏􀀛􀀒􀀝􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀆􀀢􀀜􀀆􀀌􀀰􀀪􀀡
􀀞􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀦
􀀘􀀂􀀃􀀍􀀢􀀏􀀜􀀦􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀚􀀆􀀐􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀂􀀛􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀏􀀛􀀆􀀅􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀈􀀆􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀓􀀂􀀜􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀂􀀙􀀒􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀒􀀑􀀒􀀃􀀮􀀒􀀐􀀄􀀜􀀆􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀲􀀙
􀀎􀀕􀀛􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀜􀀙􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀦
􀀳􀀻􀀅􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀟􀀏􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀕􀀔􀀆􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀐􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀕􀀆􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀲􀀙􀀆􀀅􀀒􀀛􀀧􀀆􀀎􀀕􀀛􀀝􀀒􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀕􀀢􀀛􀀒􀀑􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀚􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀂􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀸􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀏􀀙􀀜
􀀗􀀕􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀏􀀛􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀛􀀕􀀕􀀟􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀕􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀙􀀅􀀕􀀓􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀆􀀢􀀃􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀙􀀍􀀂􀀙􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀛􀀈􀀴􀀆􀀎􀀂􀀏􀀓􀀆􀀘􀀂􀀃􀀍􀀢􀀏􀀜􀀦
􀀇􀀊􀀠􀀇􀀇
􀀣􀀅􀀖􀀍􀀈􀀎􀀖􀀑􀀍􀀈􀀑􀀯􀀩􀀙􀀰􀀱􀀑􀀅􀀉􀀋􀀉􀀑􀀠􀀍􀀗􀀊􀀕􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀤􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀑􀀈􀀃􀀋􀀎
􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀊􀀅􀀄􀀋􀀌􀀉􀀍􀀎􀀃􀀈􀀉􀀏􀀆􀀄􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀏􀀈􀀉􀀒􀀋􀀋􀀓􀀉􀀔􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀕􀀐􀀋􀀂􀀉􀀖􀀃􀀄􀀎􀀉􀀈􀀕􀀔􀀔􀀅􀀆􀀄􀀉􀀗􀀆􀀅􀀘􀀉􀀄􀀎􀀋􀀉􀀔􀀆􀀅􀀙􀀋􀀐􀀄
􀀖􀀖􀀖􀀚􀀘􀀛􀀘􀀋􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀚􀀅􀀆􀀜􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀝􀀉􀀗􀀃􀀓􀀏􀀓􀀐􀀃􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀛􀀉􀀈􀀕􀀔􀀔􀀅􀀆􀀄􀀋􀀂􀀉􀀒􀀛􀀉􀀄􀀎􀀋􀀉􀀞􀀃􀀓􀀃􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀛􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀉􀀟􀀅􀀆􀀋􀀃􀀜􀀓􀀉􀀠􀀗􀀗􀀏􀀃􀀆􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀗
􀀡􀀋􀀓􀀘􀀏􀀆􀀢􀀝􀀉􀀏􀀓􀀂􀀉􀀃􀀘􀀔􀀑􀀋􀀘􀀋􀀓􀀄􀀋􀀂􀀉􀀒􀀛􀀉􀀏􀀉􀀙􀀅􀀃􀀓􀀄􀀉􀀣􀀋􀀓􀀄􀀕􀀆􀀋􀀉􀀒􀀋􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀋􀀓􀀉􀀊􀀤􀀥􀀠􀀦􀀉􀀏􀀓􀀂􀀉􀀧􀀧􀀨􀀉􀀞􀀋􀀂􀀃􀀏
􀀠􀀐􀀄􀀃􀀅􀀓􀀚􀀍􀀎􀀋􀀉􀀐􀀅􀀓􀀄􀀋􀀓􀀄􀀉􀀃􀀓􀀉􀀄􀀎􀀃􀀈􀀉􀀏􀀆􀀄􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀋􀀉􀀘􀀏􀀛􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀄􀀉􀀓􀀋􀀐􀀋􀀈􀀈􀀏􀀆􀀃􀀑􀀛􀀉􀀆􀀋􀀗􀀑􀀋􀀐􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀎􀀋􀀉􀀣􀀃􀀋􀀖􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀉􀀄􀀎􀀋􀀉􀀡􀀏􀀓􀀃􀀈􀀎
􀀜􀀅􀀣􀀋􀀆􀀓􀀘􀀋􀀓􀀄􀀝􀀉􀀊􀀤􀀥􀀠􀀦􀀉􀀏􀀓􀀂􀀉􀀧􀀧􀀨􀀉􀀠􀀐􀀄􀀃􀀅􀀓􀀉􀀞􀀋􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀚
􀀨􀀕􀀍􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀎􀀧􀀒􀀛􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀮􀀆􀀒􀀃􀀃􀀕􀀃􀁆􀀆􀁈􀀒􀀙􀀆􀀍􀀎􀀆􀀟􀀐􀀕􀀚􀀆􀁋􀀆􀀅􀀏􀀮􀀅􀀛􀀏􀀮􀀅􀀙􀀆􀀏􀀙􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀎􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀅􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀉􀀃􀀦
􀀇􀀇􀀠􀀇􀀇

Annex 504
Alan Taylor, ‘Believed to Be Russian Soldiers’, The Atlantic (11 March 2014)

􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀃􀀇􀀂􀀈􀀉
􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀋􀀌􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀔􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀊
􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀅􀀄􀀆􀀁􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀈􀀊􀀋􀀕􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀐􀀈􀀕􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀕􀀙􀀜􀀕􀀝􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀞􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀝􀀌􀀞􀀉􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀞􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀚􀀙􀀙􀀟􀀠􀀟􀀕
􀀡􀀌􀀓􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀢􀀈􀀅􀀢􀀌􀀌􀀣􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀤􀀈􀀥􀀅􀀃􀀦􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀖􀀉􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀓􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀖􀀖􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀗􀀃􀀎􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀒􀀓􀀐􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀨􀀉􀀌􀀓􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀅􀀩􀀍􀀣􀀐􀀈􀀉
􀀪􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀣􀀈􀀎􀀇􀀫􀀗􀀥􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀈􀀒􀀓􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀓􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀅􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀍􀀦􀀇􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀬􀀃􀀉􀀣􀀓􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀤􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀖􀀖􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀍􀀄􀀤
􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀊􀀓􀀅􀀖􀀉􀀈􀀞􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀍􀀄􀀓􀀒􀀂􀀃􀀮􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀒􀀐􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀍􀀐􀀍􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀏􀀌􀀄􀀇􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀌
􀀍􀀄􀀎􀀃􀀏􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀥􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀓􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀏􀀌􀀓􀀫􀀉􀀍􀀝􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀬􀀅􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀯􀀂􀀈􀀫􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀂􀀦􀀞􀀏􀀌􀀦􀀌􀀄􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀫􀀌􀀓􀀯􀀅􀀢􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀍􀀄􀀤
􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀬􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀎􀀃􀀍􀀂􀀃􀀝􀀂􀀌􀀅􀀦􀀉􀀈􀀬􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀇􀀅􀀓􀀒􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀒􀀓􀀅􀀫􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀮􀀅􀀰􀀈􀀢􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀉􀀥􀀅􀀄􀀒􀀬􀀌􀀉􀀈􀀒􀀓􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀖􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀤􀀉􀀈􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀗􀀃􀀎􀀌
􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀍􀀦􀀍􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀐􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀖􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀥􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀫􀀂􀀒􀀏􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀏􀀍􀀉􀀌􀀫􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀎􀀍􀀌􀀢􀀓􀀅􀀢􀀍􀀐􀀗􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀉􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀮􀀅􀀁􀀓􀀅􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀄
􀀂􀀃􀀢􀀬􀀃􀀣􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀐􀀅􀀒􀀖􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀚􀀟􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀦􀀌􀀉􀀌􀀄􀀏􀀒􀀬􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀄􀀫􀀌􀀅􀀦􀀉􀀈􀀬􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀥􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀌􀀄
􀀗􀀃􀀎􀀌􀀅􀀓􀀒􀀉􀀉􀀈􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀄􀀒􀀬􀀌􀀉􀀈􀀒􀀓􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀦􀀃􀀫􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀍􀀌􀀓􀀥􀀅􀀝􀀂􀀈􀀫􀀣􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀉􀀃􀀄􀀫􀀌􀀓􀀥􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀐􀀅􀀒􀀖
􀀉􀀈􀀃􀀏􀀝􀀂􀀈􀀫􀀣􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀗􀀍􀀤􀀗􀀢􀀃􀀇􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀉􀀈􀀒􀀤􀀗􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀤􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀮
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀌􀀇􀀆􀀁􀀍􀀎􀀅􀀩􀀍􀀌􀀢􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀍􀀓􀀅􀀖􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀅􀀦􀀒􀀂􀀂􀀅􀀓􀀫􀀉􀀌􀀌􀀄􀀮􀀅􀀔􀀣􀀍􀀖􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀄􀀌􀀲􀀐􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀖􀀉􀀌􀀎􀀍􀀈􀀒􀀓􀀅􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀝􀀇􀀅􀀐􀀇􀀖􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀳􀀕􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀴􀀕􀀵􀀮
􀀁􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀥􀀅􀀢􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀓􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀅􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀍􀀦􀀇􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀬􀀃􀀉􀀣􀀓􀀥􀀅􀀝􀀒􀀐􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄
􀀓􀀌􀀉􀀎􀀍􀀫􀀌􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀥􀀅􀀓􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀤􀀒􀀃􀀉􀀏􀀅􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀂􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀦
􀀨􀀌􀀉􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀅􀀔􀀍􀀬􀀦􀀌􀀉􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀶􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀊􀀓􀀅􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀓􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀓􀀃􀀍􀀏􀀅􀀗􀀍􀀓
􀀫􀀈􀀒􀀄􀀐􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀦􀀌􀀌􀀂􀀓􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀣􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀐􀀊􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀂􀀬􀀈􀀓􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀓􀀐􀀃􀀐􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀢􀀃􀀉􀀅􀀃􀀦􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀫􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀈􀀣􀀅􀀌􀀦􀀦􀀌􀀫􀀐􀀍􀀎􀀌􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀄􀀐􀀉􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀦
􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀊􀀓􀀅􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀨􀀌􀀄􀀍􀀄􀀓􀀒􀀂􀀃􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀩􀀃􀀓􀀍􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀸􀀌􀀏􀀈􀀓􀀌􀀄􀀣􀀈
􀀚􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀖􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀈􀀄􀀄􀀌􀀂􀀅􀀫􀀃􀀉􀀉􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀏􀀉􀀍􀀎􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀉􀀈􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀦􀀉􀀈􀀬􀀅􀀔􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀈
􀀔􀀍􀀬􀀦􀀌􀀉􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀛􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀋􀀃􀀺􀀅􀀑􀀃􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀉
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀘􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀁􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀫􀀈􀀖􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀦􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀄􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀅􀀔􀀍􀀬􀀦􀀌􀀉􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀥􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀜􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀋􀀃􀀺􀀅􀀑􀀃􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀉
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀔􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀥􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀥􀀅􀀉􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀖􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀈􀀄􀀄􀀌􀀂􀀅􀀫􀀃􀀉􀀉􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀉􀀈􀀃􀀏
􀀄􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀖􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀅􀀫􀀍􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀔􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀚􀀙􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀋􀀃􀀺􀀅􀀑􀀃􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀉
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀜􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀁􀀅􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀦􀀃􀀐􀀍􀀤􀀒􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀓􀀍􀀐􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀖􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀖􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀈􀀄􀀄􀀌􀀂􀀅􀀫􀀃􀀉􀀉􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀉􀀈􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀦􀀉􀀈􀀬
􀀔􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀔􀀍􀀬􀀦􀀌􀀉􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀥􀀅􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀥􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀚􀀙􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀁􀀨􀀅􀀨􀀗􀀈􀀐􀀈􀀕􀀻􀀃􀀉􀀣􀀈􀀅􀀩􀀈􀀳􀀍􀀄􀀈􀀎􀀍􀀫
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀛􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀁􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀉􀀎􀀍􀀫􀀌􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀢􀀃􀀍􀀐􀀅􀀄􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀎􀀌􀀗􀀍􀀫􀀂􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀝􀀈􀀉􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀤􀀒􀀃􀀉􀀏
􀀖􀀈􀀓􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀢􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀋􀀃􀀂􀀃􀀫􀀂􀀃􀀎􀀃􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀚􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀉􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀌􀀉
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀧􀀄􀀍􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀥􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀉􀀎􀀍􀀫􀀌􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀥􀀅􀀬􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇
􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀂􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀨􀀌􀀉􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀅􀀔􀀍􀀬􀀦􀀌􀀉􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀶􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀩􀀃􀀓􀀍􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀸􀀌􀀏􀀈􀀓􀀌􀀄􀀣􀀈
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀶􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀉􀀎􀀍􀀫􀀌􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀢􀀃􀀂􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀍􀀉􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀝􀀌
􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀼􀀄􀀈􀀐􀀅􀀖􀀍􀀫􀀐􀀒􀀉􀀌􀀏􀀽􀀅􀀓􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀤􀀒􀀃􀀉􀀏􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀄􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀅􀀔􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀥
􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀹􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀋􀀃􀀺􀀅􀀑􀀃􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀉
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀰􀀌􀀃􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀇􀀞􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀖􀀓􀀅􀀏􀀍􀀓􀀖􀀂􀀃􀀇􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀅􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀍􀀦􀀇􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀓􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀢􀀗􀀈􀀅􀀢􀀌􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀢􀀍􀀐􀀗􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀫􀀃􀀂
􀀖􀀉􀀈􀀞􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀐􀀓􀀅􀀓􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀤􀀒􀀃􀀉􀀏􀀅􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀫􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀤􀀈􀀎􀀌􀀉􀀄􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀅􀀝􀀒􀀍􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀜􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛
􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀔􀀍􀀬􀀦􀀌􀀉􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀥􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀮􀀅􀀨􀀈􀀂􀀍􀀫􀀌􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀬􀀈􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀉􀀈􀀃􀀏􀀝􀀂􀀈􀀫􀀣􀀓􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀫􀀍􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀫􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀃􀀫􀀫􀀌􀀓􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌
􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀨􀀃􀀉􀀂􀀍􀀃􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀅􀀝􀀒􀀍􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀈􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀃􀀤􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀏􀀃􀀍􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀦􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀓􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀐􀀒􀀉􀀄􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀬􀀅􀀈􀀦
􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀬􀀃􀀂􀀫􀀇􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀖􀀉􀀈􀀞􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀫􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀗􀀃􀀎􀀌􀀅􀀫􀀌􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀍􀀉􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀄􀀐􀀉􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀄
􀀫􀀃􀀖􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀂􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀔􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀾􀀃􀀂􀀂􀀒􀀖􀀕􀀾􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀿􀀬􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀓
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀟􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀁􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀫􀀣􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀫􀀈􀀖􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀥􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀥􀀅􀀦􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀄
􀀔􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀥􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀁀􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀨􀀉􀀌􀀓􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀅􀀩􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀍􀀬􀀍􀀉􀀅􀀨􀀒􀀐􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀝􀀒􀀦􀀦􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀢􀀃􀀉􀀄􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀦􀀉􀀈􀀬􀀅􀀧􀀮􀀔􀀮
􀀨􀀉􀀌􀀓􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀅􀀋􀀃􀀉􀀃􀀫􀀣􀀅􀁁􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀃􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀱􀀈􀀓􀀫􀀈􀀢􀀊􀀓􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀎􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀥􀀅􀀓􀀃􀀇􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀈􀀄
􀀸􀀉􀀍􀀏􀀃􀀇􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀒􀀂􀀏􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀫􀀃􀀂􀀂􀀓􀀅􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀂􀀖􀀅􀀦􀀉􀀈􀀬􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀖􀀌􀀃􀀣􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀮􀀅􀀆􀀗􀀌
􀀢􀀈􀀉􀀏􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀢􀀃􀀂􀀂􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀯􀀾􀀂􀀈􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀁂􀀃􀀎􀀇􀀯􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀻􀀃􀀎􀀍􀀏􀀅􀀱􀀏􀀺􀀍􀀄􀀃􀀉􀀍􀀓􀀗􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀍
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀁀􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀁􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀥􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀥􀀅􀀫􀀃􀀉􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀎􀀇􀀅􀀬􀀃􀀫􀀗􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀅􀀤􀀒􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀅􀀃
􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀪􀀌􀀎􀀖􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀉􀀍􀀃􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀠􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀆􀀗􀀈􀀬􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀨􀀌􀀐􀀌􀀉
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀹􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀫􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀈􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀄􀀃􀀎􀀇􀀅􀀓􀀗􀀍􀀖􀀅􀀔􀀂􀀃􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀍􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀗􀀃􀀉􀀝􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀔􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀥
􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀶􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀸􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀖􀀖􀀈􀀅􀀱􀀈􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀌􀀕􀀁􀀸􀀨􀀕􀀾􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀿􀀬􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀓
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀁􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀦􀀍􀀫􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀖􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀐􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀝􀀒􀀂􀀂􀀌􀀐􀀅􀀗􀀈􀀂􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀏􀀈􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀐􀀍􀀞􀀃􀀍􀀉􀀫􀀉􀀃􀀦􀀐􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀂􀀌
􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀄􀀫􀀗􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀄􀀐􀀉􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀖􀀈􀀓􀀍􀀐􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀐􀀥􀀅􀀢􀀗􀀍􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀢􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀃􀀣􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄
􀀫􀀈􀀄􀀐􀀉􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀶􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀥􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀔􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀁􀀨􀀅􀀨􀀗􀀈􀀐􀀈􀀕􀀁􀀄􀀏􀀉􀀌􀀢􀀅􀀡􀀒􀀝􀀍􀀬􀀈􀀎
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀠􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀁􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀝􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀈􀀄􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀄􀀃􀀎􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀓􀀗􀀍􀀖􀀅􀀓􀀒􀀄􀀣􀀅􀀝􀀇􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀄􀀃􀀎􀀇􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀝􀀂􀀈􀀫􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀉􀀃􀀄􀀫􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌
􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀖􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀪􀀌􀀎􀀖􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀉􀀇􀀃􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀹􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀻􀀃􀀎􀀍􀀏􀀅􀀱􀀏􀀺􀀍􀀄􀀃􀀉􀀍􀀓􀀗􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀍
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀁􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀃􀀍􀀂􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀢􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀓􀀅􀀗􀀍􀀬􀀓􀀌􀀂􀀦􀀅􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀓􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀓􀀅􀀢􀀃􀀐􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀈􀀣􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀢􀀗􀀈
􀀬􀀃􀀇􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀐􀀌􀀬􀀖􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀐􀀃􀀣􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀍􀀓􀀅􀀎􀀌􀀓􀀓􀀌􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀌􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀍􀀂􀀥􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀔􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀛􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀆􀀗􀀌
􀀝􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀣􀀌􀀐􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀃􀀐􀀐􀀉􀀌􀀓􀀓􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀖􀀂􀀃􀀫􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀓􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀓􀀗􀀍􀀖􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀗􀀍􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀇􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀐􀀌􀀬􀀖􀀐􀀌􀀏
􀀃􀀓􀀓􀀃􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀚􀀙􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀁􀀨􀀅􀀨􀀗􀀈􀀐􀀈􀀕􀀿􀀎􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀔􀀌􀀣􀀉􀀌􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀌􀀎
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀁􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀥􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀥􀀅􀀓􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀓􀀅􀀤􀀒􀀃􀀉􀀏􀀅􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄
􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀨􀀌􀀉􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀈􀀌􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀶􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀆􀀗􀀈􀀬􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀨􀀌􀀐􀀌􀀉
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀚􀀚􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀆􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀖􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀖􀀖􀀃􀀉􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀬􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀃􀀓􀀓􀀌􀀬􀀝􀀂􀀌􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀤􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀐􀀉􀀒􀀫􀀣􀀓􀀅􀀄􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌
􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀇􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀝􀀂􀀈􀀫􀀣􀀃􀀏􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀶􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀨􀀌􀀉􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀌􀀥􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀮
􀀱􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀢􀀗􀀍􀀂􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀖􀀃􀀉􀀃􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀐􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀖􀀓􀀥􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀫􀀂􀀒􀀏􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀭􀀈􀀓􀀓􀀃􀀫􀀣􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀢􀀍􀀐􀀗􀀅􀁃􀀂􀀃􀀓􀀗􀀄􀀍􀀣􀀈􀀎􀀅􀀉􀀍􀀦􀀂􀀌􀀓
􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀖􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀈􀀄􀀄􀀌􀀂􀀅􀀫􀀃􀀉􀀉􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀥􀀅􀀗􀀃􀀎􀀌􀀅􀀏􀀒􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀉􀀄􀀅􀀌􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀈􀀒􀀄􀀏
􀀁􀀉􀀬􀀇􀀃􀀄􀀓􀀣􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀢􀀗􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀌􀀬􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀌􀀦􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀌􀀦􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀄􀀌􀀢􀀅􀀝􀀈􀀉􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀐􀀢􀀌􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏
􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀔􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀾􀀃􀀂􀀂􀀒􀀖􀀕􀀾􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀿􀀬􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀓
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀚􀀘􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀧􀀄􀀍􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀉􀀎􀀍􀀫􀀌􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀢􀀃􀀂􀀣􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀈􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇
􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀄􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀅􀀔􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀹􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀋􀀃􀀺􀀅􀀑􀀃􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀉
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀚􀀜􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀡􀀈􀀫􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀓􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀓􀀅􀀢􀀃􀀂􀀣􀀅􀀝􀀇􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀫􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀼􀀉􀀍􀀤􀀗􀀐􀀽􀀅􀀝􀀂􀀈􀀫􀀣􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀃􀀫􀀫􀀌􀀓􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀜􀀟􀀐􀀗
􀀏􀀌􀀐􀀃􀀫􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀝􀀉􀀍􀀤􀀃􀀏􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀁂􀀃􀀎􀀇􀀊􀀓􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀅􀀤􀀒􀀃􀀉􀀏􀀥􀀅􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀓􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀤􀀒􀀃􀀉􀀏
􀀝􀀌􀀗􀀍􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀉􀀃􀀄􀀫􀀌􀀅􀀤􀀃􀀐􀀌􀀅􀀼􀀂􀀌􀀦􀀐􀀽􀀥􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀐􀀅􀀦􀀃􀀉􀀅􀀦􀀉􀀈􀀬􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀂􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀨􀀌􀀉􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀌􀀥􀀅􀀄􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀅􀀔􀀍􀀬􀀦􀀌􀀉􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄
􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀶􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀁􀀂􀀌􀀲􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀅􀁂􀀌􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀎􀀕􀀁􀀸􀀨􀀕􀀾􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀿􀀬􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀓
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀁􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀓􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀝􀀌􀀣􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀤􀀌􀀐􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀌􀀫􀀐􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀃􀀐􀀌􀀅􀀖􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀦􀀉􀀈􀀬􀀅􀀃
􀀢􀀈􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀢􀀗􀀈􀀅􀀢􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀬􀀈􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀃􀀖􀀖􀀉􀀈􀀲􀀍􀀬􀀃􀀐􀀌􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀐􀀢􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀈􀀺􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀢􀀗􀀈􀀅􀀓􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀄􀀍􀀤􀀗􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀤􀀃􀀐􀀌
􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀒􀀖􀀖􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀡􀀒􀀝􀀍􀀬􀀈􀀎􀀣􀀃􀀥􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀛􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀆􀀌􀀄􀀓􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀥
􀀢􀀗􀀌􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀐􀀢􀀌􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀜􀀙􀀙􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀛􀀙􀀙􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀓􀀐􀀃􀀐􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀌􀀏􀀥􀀅􀀢􀀌􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀗􀀍􀀤􀀗􀀅􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀛􀀖􀀬
􀀏􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀏􀀃􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀖􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀌􀀏􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀤􀀍􀀎􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀝􀀇􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀖􀀓􀀅􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀈
􀀓􀀒􀀉􀀉􀀌􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀖􀀃􀀓􀀓􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀐􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀖􀀓􀀅􀀦􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀓􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀤􀀗􀀐􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀫􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀌􀀉􀀄􀀍􀀤􀀗􀀐􀀮
􀀱􀀃􀀄􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀗􀀃􀀎􀀌􀀅􀀦􀀃􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀖􀀃􀀉􀀐􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀅􀀝􀀂􀀈􀀫􀀣􀀓􀀅􀀳􀀒􀀓􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏
􀀃􀀝􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀢􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀈􀀺􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀦􀀃􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀬􀀌􀀬􀀝􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀝􀀉􀀃􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀇􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀝􀀂􀀈􀀫􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀉􀀈􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌
􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀉􀀃􀀄􀀫􀀌􀀅􀀓􀀗􀀈􀀒􀀂􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀖􀀖􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀔􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀾􀀃􀀂􀀂􀀒􀀖􀀕􀀾􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀿􀀬􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀓
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀚􀀛􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀓􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀗􀀍􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀤􀀃􀀐􀀌􀀅􀀢􀀗􀀍􀀂􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀍􀀦􀀍􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀝􀀂􀀈􀀫􀀣􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌
􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀏􀁄􀀒􀀃􀀉􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀁂􀀃􀀎􀀇􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀔􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀜􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀩􀀍􀀣􀀐􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀻􀀉􀀃􀀫􀀗􀀌􀀎􀀕􀀁􀀸􀀨􀀕􀀾􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀿􀀬􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀓
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀚􀀶􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀡􀀈􀀫􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀢􀀈􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀢􀀃􀀐􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀥􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀥􀀅􀀃􀀓􀀓􀀌􀀬􀀝􀀂􀀌􀀅􀀄􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀅􀀃
􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀨􀀌􀀉􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀈􀀌􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀶􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀆􀀗􀀈􀀬􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀨􀀌􀀐􀀌􀀉
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀁􀀅􀀐􀀉􀀒􀀫􀀣􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀝􀀂􀀈􀀫􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀉􀀈􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀂􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀋􀀃􀀝􀀌􀀣􀀅􀀁􀀍􀀉􀀖􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀅􀀄􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀅􀀔􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀥􀀅􀀃􀀖􀀖􀀃􀀉􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀂􀀇
􀀈􀀫􀀫􀀒􀀖􀀍􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀝􀀇􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀖􀀓􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀘􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀅􀀄􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀅􀀋􀀃􀀂􀀝􀀌􀀣􀀥􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀔􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀾􀀃􀀂􀀂􀀒􀀖􀀕􀀾􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀿􀀬􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀓
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀚􀀟􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀊􀀒􀀑􀀓􀀔􀀅􀀁􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀢􀀍􀀐􀀗􀀅􀀗􀀍􀀓􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀫􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀦􀀍􀀤􀀗􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀳􀀌􀀐􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀢􀀃􀀐􀀫􀀗􀀌􀀓
􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀉􀀎􀀍􀀫􀀌􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀝􀀌􀀣􀀅􀀃􀀍􀀉􀀖􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀤􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀛􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀋􀀃􀀺􀀅􀀑􀀃􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀉
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀚􀁀􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀏􀀕􀀑􀀊􀀒􀀑􀀓􀀔􀀅􀀭􀀈􀀂􀀈􀀄􀀌􀀂􀀅􀀪􀀒􀀂􀀍􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀬􀀫􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀥􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀬􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀤􀀃􀀉􀀉􀀍􀀓􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀝􀀌􀀣
􀀃􀀍􀀉􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀥􀀅􀀓􀀃􀀂􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀂􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀚􀀙􀀙􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀗􀀍􀀓􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀖􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀐􀀃􀀣􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀝􀀌􀀣􀀅􀀃􀀍􀀉􀀦􀀍􀀌􀀂􀀏
􀀦􀀉􀀈􀀬􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀬􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀛􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀡􀀒􀀝􀀍􀀬􀀈􀀎􀀣􀀃􀀥
􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀮􀀅􀀁􀀦􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀓􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀏􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀐􀀌􀀄􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀄􀀍􀀤􀀗􀀐􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀐􀀍􀀫􀀍􀀖􀀃􀀐􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀫􀀣􀀅􀀦􀀈􀀂􀀂􀀈􀀢􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌
􀀌􀀲􀀖􀀍􀀉􀀃􀀐􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀏􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀓􀀒􀀉􀀉􀀌􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀥􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀢􀀗􀀍􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀦􀀃􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀬􀀌􀀬􀀝􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀐􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀖􀀓􀀅􀀓􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀐
􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀄􀀍􀀤􀀗􀀐􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀤􀀃􀀉􀀉􀀍􀀓􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀤􀀃􀀐􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀒􀀖􀀖􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀥􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀬􀀫􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀒􀀄􀀫􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀗􀀍􀀓􀀅􀀝􀀈􀀂􀀏
􀀖􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀗􀀍􀀓􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀍􀀓􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀔􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀾􀀃􀀂􀀂􀀒􀀖􀀕􀀾􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀿􀀬􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀓
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀏􀀖􀀑􀀊􀀒􀀑􀀓􀀔􀀅􀀧􀀄􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀖􀀓􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀍􀀉􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀤􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀦􀀂􀀃􀀤􀀓􀀅􀀬􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗
􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀄􀀦􀀉􀀈􀀄􀀐􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀬􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀈􀀫􀀫􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀝􀀌􀀣􀀅􀀃􀀍􀀉􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀛􀀥
􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀔􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀾􀀃􀀂􀀂􀀒􀀖􀀕􀀾􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀿􀀬􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀓
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀚􀀹􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀏􀀗􀀑􀀊􀀒􀀑􀀓􀀔􀀅􀀁􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀬􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀃􀀍􀀬􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀉􀀈􀀫􀀣􀀌􀀐􀀅􀀖􀀉􀀈􀀖􀀌􀀂􀀂􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀤􀀉􀀌􀀄􀀃􀀏􀀌􀀅􀀂􀀃􀀒􀀄􀀫􀀗􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀃􀀐
􀀃􀀅􀀤􀀉􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀚􀀙􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀖􀀓􀀅􀀢􀀗􀀈􀀅􀀬􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀝􀀌􀀣􀀅􀀃􀀍􀀉􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀥􀀅􀀢􀀗􀀍􀀫􀀗
􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀖􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀫􀀫􀀫􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀛􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀔􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀾􀀃􀀂􀀂􀀒􀀖􀀕􀀾􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀿􀀬􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀓
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀚􀀠􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀏􀀘􀀑􀀊􀀒􀀑􀀓􀀔􀀅􀀆􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀖􀀓􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀬􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀦􀀍􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀢􀀌􀀃􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀓􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀍􀀉􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀓􀀫􀀉􀀌􀀃􀀬􀀅􀀈􀀉􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀈
􀀐􀀒􀀉􀀄􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀫􀀣􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀖􀀖􀀉􀀈􀀃􀀫􀀗􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀤􀀉􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀚􀀙􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀖􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀝􀀌􀀣
􀀃􀀍􀀉􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀛􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀔􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀾􀀃􀀂􀀂􀀒􀀖􀀕􀀾􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀿􀀬􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀓
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀏􀀙􀀑􀀊􀀒􀀑􀀓􀀔􀀅􀀁􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀬􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀓􀀐􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀈􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀃􀀦􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀦􀀍􀀉􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀗􀀍􀀓􀀅􀀢􀀌􀀃􀀖􀀈􀀄
􀀍􀀄􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀍􀀉􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀓􀀫􀀉􀀌􀀃􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀈􀀉􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀖􀀖􀀉􀀈􀀃􀀫􀀗􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀤􀀉􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀚􀀙􀀙􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏
􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀖􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀝􀀌􀀣􀀅􀀃􀀍􀀉􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀛􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀔􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀾􀀃􀀂􀀂􀀒􀀖􀀕􀀾􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀿􀀬􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀓
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀘􀀙􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀏􀀓􀀑􀀊􀀒􀀑􀀓􀀔􀀅􀀭􀀈􀀂􀀈􀀄􀀌􀀂􀀅􀀪􀀒􀀂􀀍􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀬􀀫􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀼􀀉􀀍􀀤􀀗􀀐􀀽􀀥􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀬􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀤􀀃􀀉􀀉􀀍􀀓􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀐
􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀝􀀌􀀣􀀅􀀃􀀍􀀉􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀥􀀅􀀓􀀖􀀌􀀃􀀣􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀐􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀖􀀓􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀬􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀈􀀫􀀫􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀍􀀉􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄
􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀛􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀡􀀒􀀝􀀍􀀬􀀈􀀎􀀣􀀃􀀥􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀮􀀅􀀆􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀞􀀂􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀖􀀓􀀅􀀤􀀉􀀃􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀬􀀫􀀗􀀈􀀉
􀀃􀀫􀀫􀀌􀀓􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀤􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀄􀀌􀀤􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀓􀀅􀀢􀀍􀀐􀀗􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀍􀀉􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀬􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀔􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀾􀀃􀀂􀀂􀀒􀀖􀀕􀀾􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀿􀀬􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀓
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀘􀀚􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀨􀀌􀀈􀀖􀀂􀀌􀀅􀀢􀀃􀀂􀀣􀀅􀀖􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀖􀀈􀀓􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀔􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀚􀀚􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀯􀁁􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀚􀀟􀀅􀀢􀀌
􀀢􀀍􀀂􀀂􀀅􀀫􀀗􀀈􀀈􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀌􀀍􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀉􀀮􀀮􀀮􀀅􀀈􀀉􀀮􀀮􀀮􀀯􀀥􀀅􀀏􀀌􀀖􀀍􀀫􀀐􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀢􀀍􀀐􀀗􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀓􀀢􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀍􀀣􀀃􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀎􀀌􀀉􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀉􀀝􀀌􀀏
􀀢􀀍􀀉􀀌􀀥􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀅􀀢􀀍􀀐􀀗􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀂􀀈􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀦􀀂􀀃􀀤􀀮􀀅􀀨􀀉􀀈􀀞􀀱􀀈􀀓􀀫􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀂􀀃􀀢􀀬􀀃􀀣􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃
􀀎􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀄􀀫􀀌􀀅􀀦􀀉􀀈􀀬􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀚􀀚􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀖􀀉􀀌􀀫􀀒􀀉􀀓􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀦􀀌􀀉􀀌􀀄􀀏􀀒􀀬􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀍􀀓
􀀢􀀌􀀌􀀣􀀌􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀤􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀫􀀈􀀬􀀌􀀅􀀖􀀃􀀉􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀩􀀍􀀣􀀐􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀻􀀉􀀃􀀫􀀗􀀌􀀎􀀕􀀁􀀸􀀨􀀕􀀾􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀿􀀬􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀓
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀘􀀘􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀱􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀖􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀈􀀄􀀄􀀌􀀂􀀅􀀫􀀃􀀉􀀉􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀥􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀥􀀅􀀏􀀉􀀍􀀎􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀉􀀈􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀄􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌
􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀖􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀅􀀫􀀍􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀔􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀚􀀙􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀋􀀃􀀺􀀅􀀑􀀃􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀉
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀘􀀜􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀁􀀅􀀐􀀉􀀃􀀫􀀐􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀏􀀍􀀤􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀉􀀍􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀗􀀈􀀂􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀄􀀌􀀲􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀫􀀗􀀌􀀫􀀣􀀖􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀭􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀤􀀃􀀉􀀥􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀉􀀄􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄
􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀁀􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀔􀀖􀀉􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀅􀀦􀀉􀀈􀀬􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀉􀀈􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀝􀀇􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀫􀀗􀀌􀀫􀀣􀀖􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀖􀀌􀀉􀀦􀀌􀀫􀀐􀀅􀀉􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀈􀀦
􀀗􀀈􀀂􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀏􀀒􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀐􀀗􀀥􀀅􀀌􀀃􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀃􀀝􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀅􀀗􀀃􀀂􀀦􀀞􀀃􀀞􀀬􀀌􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀢􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀥􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀢􀀗􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀈􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀣􀀌􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀦􀀍􀀉􀀓􀀐􀀅􀀓􀀐􀀌􀀖􀀓
􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀓􀀐􀀃􀀂􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀝􀀈􀀉􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀦􀀌􀀄􀀫􀀌􀀮􀀅􀀔􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀓􀀅􀀄􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀝􀀇􀀅􀀢􀀃􀀉􀀄􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀢􀀌􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀬􀀃􀀉􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀯􀀔􀀐􀀈􀀖􀁅
􀀻􀀃􀀄􀀤􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀡􀀍􀀦􀀌􀁅􀀯􀀅􀀢􀀍􀀐􀀗􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀓􀀣􀀒􀀂􀀂􀀞􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀞􀀫􀀉􀀈􀀓􀀓􀀝􀀈􀀄􀀌􀀓􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀁􀀂􀀌􀀲􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀅􀁂􀀌􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀎􀀕􀀁􀀸􀀨􀀕􀀾􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀿􀀬􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀓
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀁􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀥􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀉􀀎􀀍􀀫􀀌􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀥􀀅􀀓􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀉􀀃􀀄􀀫􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀐
􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀔􀀍􀀬􀀦􀀌􀀉􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀚􀀙􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀆􀀗􀀌􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀫􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀄􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀍􀀏􀀃􀀐􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀍􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀊􀀓
􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀅􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀍􀀄􀀓􀀒􀀂􀀃􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀈􀀄􀀏􀀃􀀇􀀥􀀅􀀐􀀃􀀣􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀗􀀈􀀓􀀖􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀂􀀌􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀓
􀀈􀀦􀀦􀀍􀀫􀀍􀀃􀀂􀀓􀀅􀀤􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀒􀀖􀀅􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀦􀀌􀀉􀀌􀀄􀀏􀀒􀀬􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀤􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀊􀀓􀀅􀀦􀀒􀀐􀀒􀀉􀀌􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀩􀀃􀀓􀀍􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀸􀀌􀀏􀀈􀀓􀀌􀀄􀀣􀀈
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀘􀀛􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀨􀀉􀀈􀀞􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀇􀀬􀀖􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀍􀀺􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀗􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀤􀀍􀀦􀀐􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀫􀀍􀀤􀀃􀀉􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀌􀀓􀀥􀀅􀀫􀀗􀀈􀀫􀀈􀀂􀀃􀀐􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀦􀀂􀀈􀀢􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄
􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀓􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀓􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀝􀀂􀀈􀀫􀀣􀀃􀀏􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀹􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀅􀀍􀀄
􀀔􀀍􀀬􀀦􀀌􀀉􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀮􀀅􀀔􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀉􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀗􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀉􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀖􀀉􀀈􀀞􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀖􀀉􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀓􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀬􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀖􀀌􀀃􀀫􀀌􀀦􀀒􀀂􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀉􀀈􀀒􀀤􀀗􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌
􀀫􀀍􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀫􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀗􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀝􀀂􀀈􀀫􀀣􀀃􀀏􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀝􀀇􀀅􀀖􀀉􀀈􀀞􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀐􀀓
􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀂􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀔􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀾􀀃􀀂􀀂􀀒􀀖􀀕􀀾􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀅􀀿􀀬􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀓
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀘􀀶􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀁􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀥􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀉􀀎􀀍􀀫􀀌􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀥􀀅􀀬􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀓􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌
􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀂􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀨􀀌􀀉􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀚􀀙􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀻􀀃􀀎􀀍􀀏􀀅􀀱􀀏􀀺􀀍􀀄􀀃􀀉􀀍􀀓􀀗􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀍
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀘􀀟􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀀁􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀬􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀼􀀉􀀍􀀤􀀗􀀐􀀽􀀥􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀉􀀎􀀍􀀫􀀌􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀥􀀅􀀓􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀓􀀅􀀄􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀅􀀬􀀌􀀬􀀝􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀃
􀀖􀀉􀀈􀀞􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀂􀀦􀀅􀀏􀀌􀀦􀀌􀀄􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀐􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀇􀀅􀀐􀀃􀀣􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀤􀀈􀀎􀀌􀀉􀀄􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀄
􀀔􀀍􀀬􀀦􀀌􀀉􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀂􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀚􀀙􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀩􀀃􀀓􀀍􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀸􀀌􀀏􀀈􀀓􀀌􀀄􀀣􀀈
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀦􀀍􀀫􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀅􀀓􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀗􀀍􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀤􀀃􀀐􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀂􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀨􀀌􀀉􀀌􀀎􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀥
􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀃􀀉􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀚􀀚􀀥􀀅􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀮􀀅􀀁􀀅􀀖􀀉􀀈􀀞􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀫􀀌􀀅􀀈􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀦􀀍􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀍􀀺􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀧􀀣􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀬􀀍􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀃􀀓􀀌
􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀈􀀄􀀏􀀃􀀇􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀁂􀀁􀀆􀁁􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀒􀀄􀀫􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀫􀀈􀀄􀀄􀀃􀀍􀀓􀀓􀀃􀀄􀀫􀀌􀀅􀀦􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀗􀀐􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀂􀀈􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀐􀀓􀀅􀀌􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀄
􀀦􀀉􀀈􀀄􀀐􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀮􀀅􀀻􀀍􀀖􀀂􀀈􀀬􀀃􀀐􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀓􀀐􀀃􀀐􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀓􀀐􀀍􀀂􀀂􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀌􀀣􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀌􀀦􀀒􀀓􀀌􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀖􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀍􀀃􀀂􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀂􀀃􀀐􀀍􀀂􀀌
􀀫􀀉􀀍􀀓􀀍􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀗􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀏􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀖􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀓􀀍􀀄􀀫􀀌􀀅􀀖􀀉􀀈􀀞􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀫􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀍􀀺􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀖􀀈􀀢􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀭􀀉􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀃􀀉􀀌
􀀓􀀌􀀌􀀣􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀳􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀍􀀄􀀓􀀒􀀂􀀃􀀅􀀢􀀍􀀐􀀗􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀮􀀅􀀷
􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀕􀀩􀀃􀀓􀀍􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀸􀀌􀀏􀀈􀀓􀀌􀀄􀀣􀀈
􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌
􀀱􀀈􀀓􀀐􀀅􀀑􀀌􀀫􀀌􀀄􀀐
􀀪􀀒􀀉􀀍􀀅􀀭􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀌􀀺􀀅􀀕􀀅􀀁􀀸􀀨􀀅􀀕􀀅􀀾􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀇
􀀨􀀗􀀈􀀐􀀈􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀁆􀀌􀀌􀀣􀁇􀀅􀁈􀀫􀀈􀀞􀀸􀀃􀀓􀀗􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀥􀀅􀀻􀀃􀀄􀀫􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀻􀀌􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀓􀀥
􀀔􀀖􀀌􀀂􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀋􀀌􀀌
􀀁􀀅􀀦􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀉􀀞􀀫􀀗􀀍􀀂􀀏􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀑􀀈􀀬􀀃􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀥􀀅􀀣􀀍􀀐􀀐􀀌􀀄􀀓􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀔􀀗􀀃􀀄􀀤􀀗􀀃􀀍􀀥􀀅􀀻􀀈􀀐􀀃􀀅􀀘􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀓􀀖􀀂􀀃􀀇􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀋􀀍􀀉􀀬􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀗􀀃􀀬􀀥
􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀂􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀅􀀓􀀫􀀗􀀈􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀂􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀱􀀍􀀄􀀓􀀣􀀥􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀐􀀍􀀞􀀐􀀈􀀝􀀃􀀫􀀫􀀈􀀅􀀓􀀣􀀌􀀂􀀌􀀐􀀈􀀄􀀓􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀁃􀀈􀀂􀀣􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀥􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀬􀀒􀀫􀀗􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀮
􀀘􀁀􀀕􀀘􀀹
􀁁􀀓􀀢􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀈􀀅􀀑􀀍􀀎􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀕􀀅􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓
􀀁􀀅􀀱􀀈􀀄􀀐􀀗􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀁􀀄􀀐􀀍􀀞􀀾􀀈􀀎􀀌􀀉􀀄􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀅􀀨􀀉􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀓􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀁂􀀍􀀫􀀃􀀉􀀃􀀤􀀒􀀃
􀁆􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀓􀀖􀀉􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀖􀀉􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀓􀀐􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀤􀀃􀀍􀀄􀀓􀀐􀀅􀁂􀀍􀀫􀀃􀀉􀀃􀀤􀀒􀀃􀀅􀀨􀀉􀀌􀀓􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀅􀀻􀀃􀀄􀀍􀀌􀀂􀀅􀁁􀀉􀀐􀀌􀀤􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀅􀀤􀀈􀀎􀀌􀀉􀀄􀀬􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀥􀀅􀀢􀀗􀀍􀀫􀀗
􀀝􀀌􀀤􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀁􀀖􀀉􀀍􀀂􀀅􀀚􀀹􀀥􀀅􀀗􀀃􀀎􀀌􀀅􀀏􀀌􀀎􀀈􀀂􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀏􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀈􀀂􀀌􀀄􀀫􀀌􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀎􀀌􀀉􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀓􀀮
􀀭􀀗􀀒􀀄􀀨􀀈􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀡􀀌􀀒􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀕􀀅􀁂􀀃􀀐􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀾􀀌􀀈􀀤􀀉􀀃􀀖􀀗􀀍􀀫􀀅􀀆􀀉􀀃􀀎􀀌􀀂􀀅􀀨􀀗􀀈􀀐􀀈􀀤􀀉􀀃􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀪􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀅􀀭􀀈􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀓􀀐
􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀹􀀅􀁂􀀃􀀐􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀾􀀌􀀈􀀤􀀉􀀃􀀖􀀗􀀍􀀫􀀅􀀆􀀉􀀃􀀎􀀌􀀂􀀅􀀨􀀗􀀈􀀐􀀈􀀤􀀉􀀃􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌
􀀪􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀅􀀭􀀈􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀓􀀐
􀀆􀀗􀀌􀀅􀁂􀀃􀀐􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀾􀀌􀀈􀀤􀀉􀀃􀀖􀀗􀀍􀀫􀀅􀀆􀀉􀀃􀀎􀀌􀀂􀀅􀀨􀀗􀀈􀀐􀀈􀀤􀀉􀀃􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀪􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀅􀀭􀀈􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀓􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀓􀀅􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀉􀀢􀀃􀀇􀀥􀀅􀀢􀀍􀀐􀀗
􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀉􀀍􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀝􀀌􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀃􀀫􀀫􀀌􀀖􀀐􀀌􀀏􀀅􀀦􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀳􀀒􀀓􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀌􀀅􀀬􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀏􀀃􀀇􀁉􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀬􀀖􀀌􀀐􀀍􀀐􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀫􀀂􀀈􀀓􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀈􀀄􀀥􀀅􀁈􀀻􀀆􀀥􀀅􀀈􀀄
􀀱􀀃􀀇􀀅􀀜􀀚􀀮
􀁆􀀍􀀂􀀂􀀇􀀃􀀬􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀃􀀏􀀝􀀌􀀉􀀉􀀇􀀅􀀕􀀅􀀔􀀗􀀒􀀐􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀐􀀈􀀫􀀣
􀀰􀀈􀀈􀀎􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀅􀁆􀀃􀀐􀀌􀀉􀁇􀀅􀀔􀀢􀀍􀀬􀀬􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀨􀀍􀀤􀀓􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀻􀀍􀀎􀀍􀀄􀀤
􀀰􀀈􀀉􀀓􀀌􀀓
􀀁􀀖􀀉􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀐􀀗􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀖􀀃􀀉􀀐􀀍􀀫􀀒􀀂􀀃􀀉􀀥􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀏􀀃􀀇􀀅􀀢􀀌􀀅􀀗􀀃􀀎􀀌􀀅􀀃􀀅􀀫􀀈􀀂􀀂􀀌􀀫􀀐􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀍􀀬􀀃􀀤􀀌􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀦􀀅􀀗􀀈􀀈􀀦􀀌􀀏
􀀬􀀃􀀬􀀬􀀃􀀂􀀓􀀅􀀓􀀢􀀍􀀬􀀬􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀅􀀓􀀖􀀂􀀃􀀓􀀗􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀃􀀝􀀈􀀒􀀐􀀮
􀀱􀀈􀀓􀀐􀀅􀀨􀀈􀀖􀀒􀀂􀀃􀀉􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀗􀀌􀀅􀀁􀀐􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀐􀀍􀀫
􀁂􀀌􀀢􀀓􀀂􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀔􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀖
􀀋􀀃􀀫􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀆􀀈􀀖
􀀘􀀹􀀕􀀘􀀹
Annex 505
Vitaly Shevchenko, “Little Green Men” or “Russian invaders”? BBC News (11 March 2014)

"Little green men" or "Russian invaders"? - BBC News
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154[6/1/2018 6:30:20 PM]
11 March 2014
Ukraine crisis
"Little green men" or "Russian invaders"?
By Vitaly Shevchenko
BBC Monitoring
The internet has no shortage of photographs and videos showing armed men in
Crimea who look like members of the Russian military. Their guns are the same as
those used by the Russian army, their lorries have Russian number plates and they
speak in Russian accents.
Yet according to President Vladimir Putin, they are in fact members of "self-defence groups"
organised by the locals who bought all their uniforms and hardware in a shop.
This poses a challenge to the media covering the crisis: what do you call people who are
officially not there?
REUTERS
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"Little green men" or "Russian invaders"? - BBC News
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154[6/1/2018 6:30:20 PM]
The state-run and pro-government media in Russia have chosen to take little notice of them,
and the heavily armed men are rarely if ever shown on TV. Instead, they show groups of
lightly-armed "volunteers" described as local "self-defence groups".
"Polite men"
Russian journalists less aligned with the Kremlin often use the phrase "polite men". According
to centrist daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta, "'polite, armed men' are in charge of Crimea now".
Describing them as Russian troops in the Russian media "is not the done thing, and even
dangerous, too," prominent photojournalist Denis Sinyakov comments on independent
website Colta.
According to popular blogger Ilya Varlamov, the term "polite men" was invented by spin
doctors who arrived in Crimea from Moscow. "They are creating an image of a Russian
liberator-soldier wearing a nice new uniform and armed with beautiful weapons, who has
come to defend peaceful towns and villages," Mr Varlamov says.
"Little green men"
Another phrase used by reporters in Russia and Ukraine alike is "little green men", which
refers both to the colour of their uniforms and their unconfirmed origin.
Their involvement in Crimea is a "tragicomic masquerade", says Russian liberal newspaper
Novaya Gazeta, which argues that "the little green men will turn into Russian troops very
soon".
According to Kiev-based private TV channel One Plus One, the term "little green men" was
coined by local residents in Crimea. It is now frequently mentioned on Ukrainian TV, by a
defence ministry spokesman in his posts on Facebook and even by Prime Minister Arseniy
Yatsenyuk in his recent addresses to parliament.
Some Ukrainian journalists have criticised the use of this term. "Colleagues, stop using the
affectionate term 'little green men' to describe the Russian troops," tweeted journalist
Svyatoslav Tseholko. "Otherwise you get the impression that we trust Putin more than we
do common sense."
'Russian invaders'
Most journalists in Ukraine, however, have little doubt about the true identity of the pro-
Russian armed men.
"Russian invaders" and "occupiers from Russia" is how popular Kiev-based news website
Ukrayinska Pravda describes the military men in Crimea. Meanwhile, analytical daily Den
calls them "Russian extremists", echoing language used by the Russian media to describe
Islamist militants.
Even outlets previously supportive of ousted President Viktor Yanukovych - such as
Segodnya, a tabloid owned by Ukraine's richest man Rinat Akhmetov, - are now calling the
"Little green men" or "Russian invaders"? - BBC News
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154[6/1/2018 6:30:20 PM]
military presence in Crimea "an armed intervention".
Ukraine's most popular TV channel Inter is treading a more cautious line. Previously critical of
the protests that led to President Yanukovych's downfall, Inter speaks of "unknown armed
men" in Crimea. But it also said that they were bringing Russian military hardware to the
peninsula.
BBC Monitoring reports and analyses news from TV, radio, web and print media around the
world. For more reports from BBC Monitoring, click here. You can follow BBC Monitoring on
Twitter and Facebook.
Related Topics
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Annex 506
Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, President of Russia (17 April 2014)

April 17, 2014 15:55 Moscow
Direct Line with Vladimir Putin
The annual special Direct Line with Vladimir Putin was broadcast live
by Channel One, Rossiya-1 and Rossiya-24 TV channels, and Mayak,
Vesti FM and Radio Rossii radio stations.
Especially popular in the course of the discussion were questions about Crimea, including
the socioeconomic situation in Russia’s new regions – the Crimean Republic
and Sevastopol, the development of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, and the situation regarding
the Crimean Tatars. There were also questions about the situation in Ukraine,
and the assessment of the developments in the southeast of the country.
The discussion also touched upon international issues, such as relations with the West
and NATO, the deployment of US anti-missile defence systems in Europe, the situation
with Transnistria, and economic issues related to the global oil and gas markets. Vladimir
Putin answered questions not only from citizens of Russia, but of other countries as well,
for instance from experts of the Valdai Club from Germany, the US and Hungary,
and a question from Edward Snowden.
Numerous questions dealing with the country’s life were raised, including those related
to healthcare, housing and utility services, relief efforts following the largest ever flood
in the Far East last year, prospects for the future use of Olympic facilities in Sochi, as well
as ways of instilling patriotism, and building relations with the opposition.
There were also a few personal questions. In the final part of the Direct Line, the President
answered questions of his own choice.
During the live television broadcast that lasted 3 hours 54 minutes, the President
responded to a total of 81 questions and appeals.
* * *
Direct line programme host Kirill Kleymenov: Good afternoon,
You are watching Direct Line with President Vladimir Putin. Here in the studio today are
Maria Sittel and Kirill Kleymenov.
Direct line programme host Maria Sittel:
Good afternoon,
I could say that we are having today yet another conversation with Vladimir Putin, however
the situation is different since the country we are talking to now has changed. After waiting
for 23 years, since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Crimea and Sevastopol have joined
Russia. For this reason, every question today will be directly or indirectly related to Crimea.
We will discuss a number of issues today, including healthcare, army, taxes, agriculture
and, naturally, Ukraine. There is no doubt that we’ll discuss developments in Ukraine’s
southeast and the genocide that was unleashed in this region. Ukraine is sliding into civil
war.
Kirill Kleymenov: Our colleagues Olga Ushakova, Valeriya Korableva, Tatyana Stolyarova
and Dmitry Shchugorev will assist us during today’s broadcast, while Tatyana Remizova
and Anna Pavlova are working in the call and SMS processing centre.
I would like to remind you that you can watch us live on Channel One, as well
as on Rossiya-1 and Rossiya-24 TV channels, and on Russia’s Public Television channel,
where interpretation into sign language will be available for people with impaired hearing.
Radio listeners can join our conversation on Mayak, Vesti FM and Radio Rossii stations.
We are live with President Vladimir Putin.
Tatyana Remezova: Good afternoon, colleagues! Hello, Mr President.
Our call centre has been working for a week, and we will continue to take calls during
the Direct Line broadcast. You can call us at the toll-free number 8 (800) 200–4040
or send text messages to 04040. There is a separate Moscow number, which is also toll
free, for residents of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol: +7 (495) 539–2442. People
from other countries can call us at the number you can see on the screen.
Over the past eight days, our call centre has received over two million questions,
or 17,500 per minute – we are definitely going to set a new record – and many callers just
say, “Thank you for Crimea.”
Anna Pavlova: Good afternoon. I’d like to remind you that this year you can send video
questions to the President from your PC or any mobile device. Our operators continue
to accept your messages on the websites www.moskva-putinu.ru and москва-путину.рф.
There is still time to record and send your questions.
I’d like to tell you that this is the first time that this programme will be broadcast with
a sign-interpreted version on our website. These new options have been introduced
to increase the audience.
Maria, Kirill, back to you.
Kirill Kleymenov: So, about Ukraine. Events are unfolding there with an incredible
and sometimes alarming speed. Indeed, two months ago, during the Olympic Winter
Games on February 17, no one thought that Crimea would reunite with Russia and that
people in eastern Ukraine would stop armoured convoys sent from Kiev with their bare
hands.
Mr Putin, the first question is perfectly obvious: What do you think about the events
underway in the Lugansk and Donetsk regions?
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Before I answer your question, I’d like to go back
a little to review recent events in Ukraine. As you know, President Yanukovych refused
to sign the Association Agreement with the EU. No, he did not refuse to sign it, but said
that he could not sign it on the EU conditions, because it would dramatically worsen
the socioeconomic situation in Ukraine and affect Ukrainians. Yanukovych said that he
needed more time to analyse the document and to discuss it together with Europeans.
This provoked public unrest that eventually culminated in an unconstitutional coup,
an armed seizure of power. Some liked it, and some did not. People in eastern
and southeastern regions of Ukraine were worried about their future and the future
of their children, because they saw a rapid growth of nationalist sentiments, heard threats
and saw that [the new authorities] wanted to invalidate some of the ethnic minorities’
rights, including the rights of the Russian minority. On the other hand, this description is
relative, because Russians are native persons in Ukraine. But an attempt was made
to invalidate all decisions regarding the use of the native language. This alarmed people,
of course. What happened next?
Instead of starting a dialogue with these people, Kiev appointed new governors –
oligarchs and billionaires – to these regions. People are suspicious of oligarchs as it is.
They believe that they earned their riches by exploiting people and embezzling public
property, and these oligarchs have been appointed to head their regions. This only added
to the public discontent. People chose their own leaders, but what did the new
government do to them? They were thrown into prison. Meanwhile, nationalist groups did
not surrender their weapons, but threatened to use force in the eastern regions.
In response, people in the east started arming themselves. Refusing to see that
something was badly wrong in the Ukrainian state and to start a dialogue, the government
threatened to use military force and even sent tanks and aircraft against civilians. It was
one more serious crime committed by the current Kiev rulers.
I hope that they will see that they are moving into a deep hole, and that they are pulling
their country along. In this sense, the talks that will start today in Geneva are very
important, because I believe that we should get together to think about ways out of this
crisis and to offer people a real, not sham, dialogue. The current Kiev authorities have
travelled to the eastern regions, but who do they talk to there? They talk to their
appointees. There’s no need to go to Donbass for this, because they can summon them
to Kiev for a meeting. They should talk with people and with their real representatives, with
those whom people trust. They should release the arrested [opponents], help people
to express their opinion in an organised manner, suggest new leaders and start
a dialogue.
People in the eastern regions are talking about federalisation, and Kiev has at long last
started talking about de-centralisation. But what do they mean? To be able to understand
what they mean, they should sit down at the negotiating table and search
for an acceptable solution. Order in the country can only be restored through dialogue
and democratic procedures, rather than with the use of armed force, tanks and aircraft.
Kirill Kleymenov: So far the dialogue has started between diplomats: top diplomats from
the United States, Russia, the European Union and Ukraine are meeting in Geneva at this
very moment. Russia is represented by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Could you outline
Russia’s stance at the talks in just a few words?
Vladimir Putin: I just did exactly that. We feel strongly that this should not be a sham
dialogue between representatives of the authorities, but a dialogue with the people to find
the compromise I was talking about.
Kirill Kleymenov: How would you respond to the statements coming from both Kiev
and the West about Russia being behind the protests in eastern Ukraine, allegedly staged
and financed by “Moscow’s hand”? They even claim that certain Russian armed units are
there.
Vladimir Putin: Nonsense. There are no Russian units in eastern Ukraine – no special
services, no tactical advisors. All this is being done by the local residents, and the proof
of that is the fact that those people have literally removed their masks. So I told
my Western partners, “They have nowhere to go, and they won’t leave. This is their land
and you need to negotiate with them.”
Maria Sittel: I’m sure we’ll get back to the events in the southeast later in the course
of this conversation. Now let’s talk about Crimea and how you took the decision. You never
gave as much as a hint about Crimea over the course of your political career. You must
have thought about it, but you never even mentioned Crimea in private talks.
So how was this decision made? Can you tell us again? Was this opposed by any
members of your team? What was your assessment of the possible risks, from
international sanctions to the civil war we are watching unfold now?
Vladimir Putin: The most obvious risk was that the Russian speaking population was
threatened and that the threats were absolutely specific and tangible. This is what made
Crimean residents, the people who live there, think about their future and ask Russia
for help. This is what guided our decision.
I said in my recent speech in the Kremlin that Russia had never intended to annex any
territories, or planned any military operations there, never. Quite to the contrary, we were
going to build our relations with Ukraine based on current geopolitical realities. But we
also thought, and have always hoped, that all native Russians, the Russian-speaking
people living in Ukraine, would live in a comfortable political environment, that they would
not be threatened or oppressed.
But when this situation changed, and Russians in Crimea were facing exactly that, when
they began raising the issue of self-determination – that’s when we sat down to decide
what to do. It was at this exact moment that we decided to support Crimeans, and not 5,
10 or 20 years ago.
I discussed this problem with the Security Council members, and no one objected. In fact
all of them supported my position. And I’m more than happy now that all the steps
in the action plan were taken in a very precise manner, quickly, professionally
and resolutely.
Kirill Kleymenov: I would say the way the plan was executed was unique and unparalleled
in history.
Mr Putin, we who live in Russia are very well aware of how things are done here. But
indeed, this was done very quickly – a complicated referendum was organised
in the shortest time possible, security issues addressed, and Ukrainian units disarmed –
that really gave the impression of a long-planned and prepared action.
Vladimir Putin: No. This had not been pre-planned or prepared. It was done on the spot,
and we had to play it by ear based on the situation and the demands at hand. But it was
all performed promptly and professionally, I have to give you that.
Our task was not to conduct a full-fledged military operation there, but it was to ensure
people’s safety and security and a comfortable environment to express their will. We did
that. But it would not have been possible without the Crimeans’ own strong resolution.
Also, I must say that I didn’t add the concluding line to my Kremlin speech – about
initiating a draft law on the inclusion of Crimea in the Russian Federation – until the very
last day, last moment, because I was waiting for the referendum results. Polls and surveys
are one thing, along with certain groups’ sentiments, but a referendum is the expression
of the will of all the residents of an area. It was very important for me to know what their
will was.
So when the voter turnout reached 83 percent and more than 96 percent supported
Crimea’s inclusion in the Russian Federation, it became obvious that this decision was
made by the majority, if not unanimously. In this situation, we couldn’t have done
otherwise.
Kirill Kleymenov: We’ll return to your Kremlin speech later. Now we have an opportunity
to hear from Crimea.
Maria Sittel: Let’s invite Sevastopol, a hero city and a city of military glory – to join in our
discussion. Our camera crew in Sevastopol, Dmitry Kaistro and Nikolai Dolgachyov.
Dmitry Kaistro: Good afternoon, Mr President.
Good afternoon, colleagues and everybody who tuned in.
Sevastopol is indeed a city of Russian glory. There are hundreds of people gathered here,
in the heart of the city, on Primorsky Boulevard. There are people from all walks of life,
including navy and civilian personnel. These are people who voted for the accession
of Crimea and Sevastopol to Russia.
We are currently working at two sites; this is not the only location. Another site is located
very close to the sea. My colleague, Nikolai Dolgachyov, is working there.
Nikolai Dolgachyov: Here, on the very shore of the famous Sevastopol Bay where
the Russian Black Sea Fleet is based and has been based for over 200 years, people have
gathered from across Crimea. There are students and pensioners, veterans, workers,
doctors and representatives of self-defence units. We are ready to talk.
Good afternoon, colleagues. Good afternoon, Mr President.
Vladimir Putin: Good afternoon.
Nikolai Dolgachyov: Primorsky Boulevard is indeed the heart of Sevastopol. The main
symbols of the city are located right there. They are the Grafskaya Quay, a memorial
to sunken ships, and Admiral Nakhimov Square, named after the navy man who fought
and died as an infantry lieutenant. Local residents bring flowers to his statue every night.
This is something you will see only here, in Sevastopol.
Sevastopol is a symbol, a fortress, a city full of special meaning for Russia’s destiny.
And the people of Sevastopol have been contesting that meaning for a long 23 years,
which concerns the right to speak Russian and the right to Russian values. They defended
their rights. Almost the entire city voted in favour of joining Russia.
Today, Sevastopol residents came here to ask their questions. And they have many. Who
would like to ask a question? Please introduce yourself.
Larisa Medvedeva: The civilian personnel of the military units are very concerned about
the fate of the Black Sea Fleet. For many of us, the fleet means work and people
and the only unique artillery repair plant. What will happen to the Black Sea Fleet
and other state-owned enterprises?
Vladimir Putin: You probably know better than anyone else in Russia that we had certain
agreements with Ukraine on upgrading the fleet. Unfortunately, those agreements were
not diligently fulfilled, if at all. We had many problems with upgrading the fleet. I hope
there will be no such problems anymore and that the major part of modern vessels
and support ships will be transferred from Novorossiysk to Sevastopol. This will give us
an opportunity to even save some money. This is the first point.
Secondly, Crimea has good shipbuilding and ship-repairing potential. Therefore,
a substantial amount of this work will be carried out in Crimean shipyards. The Russian
Defence Ministry has already placed an order worth 5 billion rubles with one
of the shipyards. We undoubtedly will be increasing this potential of Crimea because
currently it is not in high demand, it is idle. This will take time, but we will, of course, move
in this direction.
Certainly, Sevastopol is a city of Russian naval glory, which every Russian citizen knows.
We will be guided by this understanding.
Dmitry Kaistro: Indeed, so many different people live in Sevastopol, people from different
walks of life, with different backgrounds and of different ethnicities. And the tragedy that is
now happening in Ukraine has upset too many people. Sevastopol residents talk about
this too.
So I would like to give you the floor as I can see you have questions. You can address one
of them to the President.
Question: Good afternoon Mr Putin. Ukraine is currently in a situation where there is
a divide within families, not just between nations. I live in Sevastopol, while my sisters live
in Ukraine. This is relevant for many Crimean families. Given the current state of affairs
in Ukraine, we do not understand each other on many issues and have even become
enemies. How can we remain friendly and brotherly nations?
Vladimir Putin: Make no mistake, this issue is highly relevant, and all of us are now
guided by certain emotions. However, if we love and respect each other, we should find
ways and means to understand each other. I think that it should be easier for a family
than for a nation. But even if we are talking about relations between countries, I’m
confident that we’ll find common ground with Ukraine and we’ll be there for one another.
I hope that people in Ukraine will also understand that Russia could not do otherwise
regarding Crimea.
There’s another issue I wanted to raise. I think it’ll be a recurrent one during today’s
conversation. What I wanted to say is that if we respect each other, we should
acknowledge that each of us has the right to make our own choices. People living
in Ukraine should respect the choice made by Crimean residents. This is the first thing.
Second, Russia has always been close to Ukraine and will always remain closely related
to it. I’m not talking about the assistance that Russia has been providing to Ukraine
for many long years, and I’m sure that we’ll get back to that issue. This assistance adds up
to hundreds of billions of dollars. But this is not the point. The point is that we have
extensive common interests. If we want to succeed, we must cooperate and join efforts.
I’m confident that we will understand this despite all the emotional complications we’re
seeing today.
Maria Sittel: Another question from Sevastopol, please.
Nikolai Dolgachyov: It is highly symbolic that people from across Crimea joined us here
in Sevastopol. Many of them view reunification with Russia as the end of the third siege
of this Hero City. There were two historic sieges, one lasted 349 days during the Crimean
War, and the other lasted for 250 days during the Great Patriotic War. Many people regard
the last 23 years as the third siege of the city and the whole region. Now that Crimea’s
dream of reunification has been fulfilled, there are naturally a lot of questions regarding
the future. Let’s find out what questions local residents have.
Yevgeny Kostylev: I would like to start by thanking you, Mr President, on behalf of all
the people of Crimea, for the resolve you showed in helping us reunite with our
motherland. We can now proudly call ourselves Russian citizens.
That said, the self-proclaimed Ukrainian government is doing its outmost to make life
intolerable for the people of Crimea. For example, almost all banks have left Crimea, which
means that we now have problems with exchanging hryvnas and people can’t make
payments and transfers. Specifically, pensioners, who have been saving for many years
for a rainy day, can’t withdraw their pension savings because Ukrainian banks are ignoring
their requests and legitimate interests.
Mr President, my question is the following: How does the Russian Government intend
to resolve this issue?
Vladimir Putin: This is currently one of the most urgent issues that has yet to be
addressed. There are other issues as well, as you know, such as power and water supply.
However, the problems with banking have not been fully resolved. We will seek to reach
common ground with our Ukrainian partners. These efforts have so far been unsuccessful.
Oschadbank and Privatbank with its owner Mr Kolomoisky and the head of the Crimean
branch Mr Finkelstein are not willing to meet us halfway. Hryvna circulation is limited, so
we have no other choice but to accelerate the transition to the ruble. The solution is
to open accounts for individuals and legal entities and establish a new banking network.
Doing this the right way takes time. I think that it will take us about one month to open
the required number of accounts, roll out the network and equip it with modern
technology.
You have also mentioned pensioners and public sector employees. I’m also aware
of certain economic setbacks, but it will all pass. We’ll overcome all challenges.
As you know, pensioners and public sector employees will have equal incomes with
Russian pensioners and public sector employees, and the Russian Government has
already adopted a resolution to this effect. In order to prevent any sharp increases
in the inflation rate and prices, which is happening in Crimea anyway, we decided
to enforce this on a step-by-step basis in four stages: incomes of Crimean pensioners
and public sector employees are to rise by 25% from April 1, by another 25% from May 1,
and then another 25% on June 1 and 25% more on July 1. During this period incomes
of pensioners and public sector employees will surge. For pensioners, income will soar
100%, which means that the gap between pensions in Russian and Crimea… In Russia,
pensioners receive twice as much as in Crimea. The average pension in Russia will be
11,600 rubles this year, while in Crimea it is about 5,500 rubles. The same goes for public
sector employees, who earn twice or even two and a half times more in Russia. Russian
military personnel – and it should be mentioned that a lot of local residents will be serving
in Crimea – earn four times as much as in Crimea.
All in all, I’m confident, I hope and believe that people in Crimea will feel the economic
benefits of joining Russia, not to mention Crimea’s economy, infrastructure development
in the tourism and travel industries. We’ll get back to those issues.
Maria Sittel: Mr President, Sevastopol mothers are asking for some details. For example,
there is a question from Elizaveta Maslennikova: “Will a mother in Crimea or Sevastopol
expecting her second child be entitled to maternity capital?”
Vladimir Putin: Of course. We believe that all benefits and preferences that were available
to Crimean residents in Ukraine should remain in place. If some programmes do not exist
or didn’t exist in Russia, we will keep those preferences in place by providing additional
subsidies to the regional budget. Furthermore, residents of Crimea and Sevastopol will be
able to benefit from all social norms and allocations that exist in Russia in accordance
with applicable laws.
Maria Sittel: Thank you.
Maria Sittel: Sevastopol, one more question from you, please.
Nikolai Dolgachyov: There are a lot of people here. Please introduce yourself and ask your
question.
Question: Mr Putin, it is widely believed that Crimea is only good for vacationing
and tourism. But what about our industry and agriculture? What steps will Russia take
to develop all Crimea’s industries?
Another question: You promised to establish a free economic zone in Crimea. What will
this mean for the average person?
Vladimir Putin: You are absolutely right that Crimea is associated with vacationing
and tourism. But this isn’t the whole story. Crimea has very good industrial
and agricultural potential and we’ll develop it. What does this consist of? There are viable
businesses that require modernisation and additional investment, and we’ll certainly take
care of that. I’ve mentioned shipbuilding and ship maintenance, but there are also other
industrial centres and promising businesses. The infrastructure has fairly good
development potential, including the port; there is an agricultural sector, and so on.
Regrettably, agricultural output declined by 60 percent in 2013 in comparison to 1990.
In 2013, Crimean agricultural enterprises produced only 40% of what had been their
output in 1990. The agricultural sector also needs additional investment. There are many
issues to be addressed. Rice farms, for example, use a lot of water, and water is currently
a problem. This takes time and investment. We’ll take care of this as well. Regarding
services, we shouldn’t forget that Crimea was always famous not only as a base
for the Russian Black Sea Fleet but also as Russia’s and the USSR’s top health resort.
We’ll develop this area as well. Regrettably, the holiday infrastructure, hotels and resorts
have been decaying. Our specialists have inspected these businesses, recreation
facilities, resorts and hotels, and have come to the conclusion that some of these, if not
all, can’t be used under Russian sanitary and epidemiological standards.
When they asked how former vacationers could have put up with this sort of quality, they
heard this odd – and shameful – answer: “It’s OK, we mostly had miners as guests here;
it made no difference to them; they’d down half a glass of vodka and go to the beach.” But
we can’t take this approach with Russian vacationers. This area will require additional
investment as well. The free economic zone you mentioned is something that can provide
Russian investors with certain privileges in order to encourage them to come to Crimea
and Sevastopol and accelerate development.
Many local people have proposals of their own. I talked to Mr Alexei Chaly not too long ago
and he suggested that we establish a development agency. We’ll certainly support this
idea. I’m confident we’re on the right track and sure to achieve some positive and visible
results.
Maria Sittel: Mr Putin, there is a fly in the ointment though. There are many SMS
messages from people who are apprehensive that Crimea might lose its distinctiveness.
They fear the arrival of big money, people who will put up hunting lodges and big castles,
palaces and high fences where there used to be recreation areas and nature reserves,
while neglecting to build a sewage system, which Crimea lacks to this day.
Vladimir Putin: There are enough castles and high fences there now. We’ve come face
to face with this problem – regrettably. These palaces with fences mushroomed all over
the place against the background of an astounding disregard for average holidaymakers.
And the owners were the oligarchs or CEOs I mentioned earlier. All of this involved major
violations of environmental legislation. I talked to Crimean leaders and the heads
of Russia’s federal agencies today: we must do our best to approve timely decisions that
end these development practices.
Maria Sittel: We have a text message on our programme’s website: “Who were these
young men, after all? They looked a lot like Russians.”
Vladimir Putin: What young men?
Maria Sittel: Those polite young men.
Kirill Kleymenov: The “little green men.”
Vladimir Putin: I have already spoken about this publicly on several occasions, perhaps
not loud enough. However, in my conversations with my foreign colleagues I did not hide
the fact that our goal was to ensure proper conditions for the people of Crimea to be able
to freely express their will. And so we had to take the necessary measures in order
to prevent the situation in Crimea unfolding the way it is now unfolding in southeastern
Ukraine. We didn’t want any tanks, any nationalist combat units or people with extreme
views armed with automatic weapons. Of course, the Russian servicemen did back
the Crimean self-defence forces. They acted in a civil but a decisive and professional
manner, as I’ve already said.
It was impossible to hold an open, honest, and dignified referendum and help people
express their opinion in any other way. Still, bear in mind that there were more than
20,000 well-armed soldiers stationed in Crimea. In addition, there were 38 S-300 missile
launchers, weapons depots and rounds of ammunition. It was imperative to prevent even
the possibility of someone using these weapons against civilians.
Maria Sittel: After Sevastopol, let's bring in Russian Black Sea Fleet Commander
Alexander Vitko. He’s in the sector covered by Dmitry Shchugorev.
Dmitry Shchugorev: Mr Vitko, please go ahead with your question.
Alexander Vitko: Comrade Commander-in-Chief, Black Sea Fleet Commander Vice
Admiral Alexander Vitko.
Vladimir Putin: Where’s the commander’s commanding voice?
Alexander Vitko: Before I ask my question, I’d like to take this opportunity to thank
the Russian people and you personally, Comrade Commander-in-Chief, for the support
provided to our fleet during that difficult period in Crimea.
Here’s my question. There were no major investments in Crimea’s military infrastructure
over the past 23 years. It is in poor condition, to put it mildly. The housing situation is
particularly difficult, especially for former servicemen of the Ukrainian Navy who are now
enlisted in the Black Sea Fleet.
Comrade Commander-in-Chief, the results of your projects have become the pride
of the Russian people. Will there be a presidential programme or a federal targeted
programme for the Crimean troops similar to the programmes for the submarine base
in Vilyuchinsk or Geoporta in Novorossiysk? Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: First, there will be a programme for the development of the Sevastopol
Naval Base and the Black Sea Fleet in general. Of course, all social programmes that are
implemented in the Russian Armed Forces, including permanent and service housing, will
apply to the City of Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet.
Kirill Kleymenov: Mr Putin, in your previous answer you mentioned Crimea’s self-defence
forces. I can see several representatives of these forces in this studio. The officers
of the Crimean Berkut and, of course, the Cossacks were the key players. There were
many intense and dramatic moments, such as in Perekop where the Berkut was just a few
hours quicker than the extremists who were bussed to Crimea, and this helped avoid
a major tragedy.
Kirill Kleymenov: I would like to ask my colleague Valeriya Korableva to give the floor
to commander of Crimea’s Berkut riot police Yury Abisov. Go ahead, please.
Valeriya Korableva: Yes, let me say just a few words. Mr Abisov’s troops, as well as other
regional Berktut units, stayed in Kiev during the most difficult time. At some point, they
simply stopped receiving any orders. In other words, they were essentially abandoned.
Colonel Abisov told me how they had to make decisions on their own, withdrew their
soldiers under fire, took the wounded from hospitals and transported them to permanent
garrisons – all that while their vehicles were being fired at.
Yury Abisov: Good afternoon.
Mr President, here’s what I’d like to say. Our squad was in Kiev when the Maidan took
power from Yanukovych. They burned us, threw stones and opened fire at us. Dozens
of fighters were killed, hundreds were wounded, but we had an order not to shed blood.
After that we were betrayed.
I have a question. You have known Mr Yanukovych for a long time, [you knew him] when
he was President. Has he always been such a wimp and a turncoat? Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: You know, there is a Russian saying: “Heavy lies the crown.” The burden
of responsibility on the shoulders of a head of state, whether large or small, is great.
In critical moments, one relies on his or her own personal experience and moral values.
As for Mr Yanukovych, he fulfilled his duty in the way he considered possible
and appropriate. Certainly, I spoke with him many times during the crisis and after he
arrived in the Russian Federation. We talked about the possibility of using force, among
other things. There can be different attitudes to this, but the essence of his answer was
that he thought of using force many times but he said that he did not have the heart
to sign the order to use force against his citizens.
As far as the Berkut is concerned, you and your colleagues undoubtedly fulfilled your duty
honestly, professionally and honourably. This evokes respect for you and all your soldiers.
After all, what happened to you and the way your colleagues are treated now in Kiev will
come back to bite the Ukrainian state. You can’t humiliate the soldiers who protect
the state’s interests, or force them to their knees, or malign them, or deprive them
of medical assistance when they are in hospital. I know that Berkut officers who are
in hospital do not receive proper treatment or even food.
Our numerous appeals to the Kiev authorities to allow us to take everyone in have gone
unanswered. If a state treats people who honestly fulfil their duty like this, such a state
can hardly count on others to behave similarly in the future.
Actually, this is what we are seeing now. I think that eventually everyone will realise how
professionally and honourably you executed your order, and they will thank you for it.
Kirill Kleymenov: Many of the callers point to historical allusions in the Ukrainian events.
Valery Klimov from the Sverdlovsk Region described a concrete situation: “President
of Chile Salvador Allende died fighting for his country, while the President of Ukraine fled
his country. Would you fight to the bitter end for your country’s independence?”
Vladimir Putin: First, I don’t agree that Yanukovych fled. He had to leave, but he did not
flee from Kiev; he was on a regional trip while the presidential administration
and government buildings were taken over in Kiev in breach of a signed agreement.
When Yanukovych signed the agreement on February 21, which was guaranteed by three
European foreign ministers from Poland, France and Germany, he believed that this
agreement would be honoured. Under it, Yanukovych pledged not to use the army or other
armed force against protesters and to pull the Interior Ministry units, including the Berkut,
out of Kiev, while the opposition was to withdraw from the occupied administrative
buildings, dismantle the barricades and disarm its fighters. Yanukovych agreed to hold
early parliamentary elections, to return to the 2004 constitution and to hold presidential
elections in December 2014. Had they wanted it, he would have agreed to hold
presidential elections in a month or a month and a half, because he was ready to agree
to anything. But as soon as he left Kiev and pulled the Interior Ministry units out of the city,
the opposition renewed its attacks, seizing the presidential administration building,
among other government buildings and accomplishing a coup d’état in the full
and classical meaning of the word. No one can say why they did it, why they acted so
unprofessionally and unwisely, and why they pushed the country towards the current
situation. There is no answer.
As for me, you know that the decisions we take in a critical situation depend on our
experience and values. You know that I worked for the Soviet Union’s KGB, or, more
precisely, foreign intelligence, where we were trained in a specific manner that boils down
to absolute loyalty to people and the country.
Maria Sittel: Clearly, the Ukrainian issue, the unconstitutional seizure of power
and Crimea are the number one issues currently discussed. In Russian society, this topic
has provoked heated debates. According to a poll, some 96 percent of Russians think your
decision on Crimea was right. But there are those who do not agree.
Today we have representatives of both sides in this studio. Those who spoke in favour of it
are Yury Bashmet, Denis Matsuyev and Karen Shakhnazarov. I suggest we give the floor
to the people who are present here today.
Tatyana Stolyarova: Yes, it’s true. Let me remind you about a letter from Russian cultural
figures who supported Vladimir Putin and Russia’s stance on Crimea. As of now, the letter
has been signed by over 500 people. The letter received a strong public response.
Karen Shakhnazarov is here today in this studio. You signed the letter. How would you
explain your view?
Karen Shakhnazarov: It was obvious to me, and I said so repeatedly. I have two reasons.
The first reason is personal. Maybe it is not important to someone else, but it is to me.
My late father was one of the soldiers who liberated Crimea. He was 20 at the time. He
was a reconnaissance commander in an artillery brigade. He participated in the storm
of Sevastopol. By the way, he was an ethnic Armenian. Neither he nor his comrades had
any doubt that it was a Russian city. So he would not have understood me at all if I had
taken any other stance.
The second reason is probably more important. In the circumstances when, as I see it,
the Ukrainian statehood ceased to exist, there was no reason to deprive the people
of Crimea of the right to determine their fate. Speaking of which, Mr Putin said that
the Ukrainian parliament is partially legitimate. I don’t really agree with that because how
can a parliament be legitimate if it abrogated its own constitution? I personally think there
is no legitimate power in Ukraine now.
Therefore, the people of Crimea had every right to determine their destiny. Of course,
I understand that it was a difficult decision which has many international and political
implications.
So I have a question for you, Mr Putin. In the past 10 years, we have been forging ties with
the People’s Republic of China, and I can see that the convergence is mutual. In this
situation, is it possible to formalise this partnership as a military and political union?
Vladimir Putin: First of all, thank you for you stance on Crimea and your support.
Speaking of our relations with China, they are progressing very successfully in terms
of trust and collaboration, which are unprecedented. This includes political cooperation
and our shared views on international affairs and global security, which is the basis
for these inter-governmental relations. We are neighbours and allies as well, in a sense.
We have not raised the question of a military and political union.
Generally, I think that the bloc mentality is a thing of the past. NATO was established
as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union and to the Soviet Union’s policy in Eastern
Europe. The Warsaw Pact was signed in response. The Soviet Union ceased to exist, but
NATO remains. We are told it is changing and becoming more of a political organisation.
But Article 5 is still in effect, which is an article on mutual military support. Who does NATO
act against? Why is it expanding towards our borders?
Are there plans to establish new blocs? I don’t know; we haven’t thought about this. But it
is absolutely clear that we will be expanding collaboration with China. Our trade with
the United States is 27.5 [billion], but trade with China is 87 billion, and it is growing.
And experts will agree that China is gradually becoming the number one economic power.
The question is when it will happen: in 15, 20 or 25 years. But everybody understands that
it is inevitable.
With China’s population of almost 1.5 billion and its modernised economy, this is basically
an accomplished fact. Therefore, we will certainly continue to develop relations with
China. We have never had such trust-based relations in the military industry. We began
holding joint drills at sea and on land, in both China and the Russian Federation. This
gives us reason to assume that Russian-Chinese relations will be a significant factor
in global policy and will substantially influence modern international relations.
Maria Sittel: Mr President, let us return to the open letter signed by prominent Russian
cultural figures. What do you think of open letters in general, and of this particular
situation personally, which sounds very much like a question from old Soviet times:
artists, where do your loyalties lie?
Vladimir Putin: Let me repeat how much I appreciate everyone’s support for my policies
on Crimea as well as on other issues. As for making public statements, I think this should
be up to them. Take, for instance, Mr [Karen] Shakhnazarov – I have known him for years,
but frankly had no idea about his political views. So it came as a big surprise to me when
he spelled out our common stance on some issues so clearly, definitively and eloquently,
and much more vividly than I ever do.
About collective letters – well I think they do no harm, but I would rather they not be
orchestrated. I mean these things should speak from the heart and be spontaneous,
rather than coolly organised by someone. This is something I do not support and never
will.
Kirill Kleymenov: Let us return to the on-going public debate on Crimea and Sevastopol’s
accession to Russia. I see here in this studio Andrei Norkin, a well-know journalist
and my colleague from 20 years ago. His statements on the issue could not pass
unnoticed.
Olga, please.
Olga Ushakova: Yes. Andrei Norkin, journalist, Kommersant FM radio host.
Mr Norkin, I would like to ask you the following: you are known for your independent
positions on various issues, but this time you spoke out in support of the Russian
government’s actions in Crimea, causing a landslide of criticism from your colleagues.
Why do you think your opinion is opposed this time around by the very people who have
always shared your views?
Andrei Norkin: I would not say this is just about Crimea; the criticism largely came after
the Dozhd TV channel events. You know that geopolitical issues are not even my biggest
concern with Ukraine. I am more worried about how these events are being discussed
in Russia, and what I hear is yet further proof that the problem I first encountered several
years ago is still there. I am very much alarmed by the distorted world outlook many young
people are developing.
Since I do not only work as a journalist, but also teach journalism, I can tell you that it
takes a lot of effort to convince my future colleagues that, for example, the word patriot is
not synonymous with idiot, or that Victory Day is not a ”Colorado beetle celebration,“ as it
is trendy to call it on social networks. Being trendy is crucial to them, because
for teenagers, for adolescents, being part of a trend – complying with the standards
accepted in their community – is extremely important. The Government seems to have
abstained from addressing these trends, so to love our motherland just isn’t trendy these
days.
Mr President, you have mentioned how you were raised and educated. As I was walking
to this meeting, I thought I would talk about this, but the fact that our discussion naturally
turned this way based on the events in Ukraine further convinces me that I am right. I have
four children; two of them – a daughter and a son – are adults, and the other two are still
in school. So I must say that schools have fully delegated the functions of upbringing
to parents. But parents cannot be with their children all the time. So with my younger boys,
I spent a lot of time trying to find a solution to this problem. Finally, I enrolled the older
of them in a cadet school in a neighbouring town, and the youngest will go there as well.
This school respects historical traditions. All teachers are military people or, at least liable
for service, most of them men. So cadets not only receive a more profound education –
there are five people in each class, not 35 – but they receive a different kind of guidance.
They are taught to love their motherland and its history, to respect women and seniors
and peers, and not to be afraid of physical work and pain. They are brought up to be
men – honest, decent, honourable citizens of their country, the best part of its human
reserve. The problem is, such schools are few – if I remember correctly, there are about
15 in Moscow and Moscow Region.
Therefore, my question is – do you think it would be a good idea to create legislation
about this format of education, cadet schools? I know that these things are not done
overnight, but is it possible to set up, say, regional funds that would provide financial
assistance to families who want to send their children to cadet schools? This I think could
make it trendy again to love our motherland.
Vladimir Putin: Firstly, about your statement that it is not trendy to love our motherland –
you must be talking about some specific group of young people you deal with.
Andrei Norkin: Well I mentioned my journalistic experience.
Vladimir Putin: Look at how the events in Crimea and Sevastopol shook society. It turned
out that patriotism is still out there, somewhere, only we are not always aware of it. Yet, it
is an integral part of our people, part of our identity. On the other hand, it speaks well that
you, a journalist, are alarmed to see this lack of love for the motherland or patriotism
as an old-fashioned value. If this troubles you, it means you have this deep inside,
and that’s why you have sent your son to a cadet school.
Do we need to adopt a special law on this? We’ll have to look at the legal framework
for education that we have. I agree with you that this is a step in the right direction, but
we’ll have to think if we need to add a new law. I am not ready to say anything right now.
But I promise that we’ll give it a look and it is definitely a good idea to further develop this
form of education. You are right. Your family is well-off, and you sent your son to that
school. But it is even more important for families who have problems, such as loss
of breadwinner – especially if the father was a military serviceman – to raise their children
and teach them the right attitudes. We’ll certainly look at this again, also from
the financial perspective. By the way we are planning to establish more schools in Crimea,
including cadet schools. Thank you.
Maria Sittel: Mr Putin, as you probably know, those who disagree with you are speaking
out loudly using various platforms. Some have taken a very aggressive stand, asking
the West to teach Russia a bloody lesson…
Vladimir Putin: Bloody? Is that so?
Maria Sittel: Yes. There are people who are openly calling for our soldiers to be fired upon,
while others publish lists of Russians who should be sanctioned in US newspapers.
Vladimir Putin: That’s true.
Maria Sittel: This is to say that there are differing views. And today there are people who
hold such views here in the studio. Let’s give the floor to Tatyana Stolyarova’s section so
that they can express their views.
Tatyana Stolyarova: I would like to remind you that those who have spoken out against
Russia’s position on Crimea are an absolute minority. The opinion polls have already been
mentioned today. That said, there are high-profile people, politicians, musicians
and actors among them and their voices are heard.
Here with us today is Irina Khakamada. What’s your opinion?
The question is …
Vladimir Putin: Ira, are you really against our position on Crimea? Why has this label been
pinned on you?
Tatyana Stolyarova: We would like to hear your perspective on why this dispute has
emerged in Russian society?
Irina Khakamada: Mr Putin, this is not the first time that I’ve been labelled, so don’t worry.
By the way, this is a sign that we need to put an end to the information warfare. You simply
can’t keep using such stereotypes to label people who are trying to oppose you
in an intelligent way.
What I wanted to say is that Crimea has always aspired to a Russian identity. I have visited
Crimea on numerous occasions. Even during the years of relative calm, when the “blue”
were replaced by the “orange” and vice-versa, nobody actually touched Crimea, but its
residents have always sought to be part of Russia. Whatever happened, happened. In any
case, you are the winner. You conducted a stunning operation without a single shot being
fired. I would like to congratulate you on honestly acknowledging that the “green men”
were Russian military who protected the Russians in a peaceful manner. It is very
important to state such things in public so that there is no speculation. As the winner,
you’ve done even more to seek compromise. Today, for the first time your representative,
the Foreign Minister, is meeting with and talking to representative of the Ukrainian
authorities, or whatever you want to call them, but they are the only counterpart available
to discuss peace. Time magazine has named you the most influential politician
in the world.
I don’t think that we started this war. But only those who won the war without starting it
can put an end to it. The sooner it happens, the better, since ordinary people will soon
feel, even in Crimea, that their lives depend greatly on what’s happening in Ukraine.
Ordinary people are suffering and feeling the consequences of having to fight against their
own people. I believe that everything now depends on you, on Russia. Now is the crucial
moment. I’m telling you this as a former politician, I have a sense of when the time is right
politically.
My question is the following. Europe has been left by the wayside. It has never solved any
problems. Europe doesn’t like solving problems because it has grown used to living
in peace. The dialogue is between Russia and the United States. The US is ready to pay
one billion dollars to ensure that the elections are held on May 25. Russia insists
on a referendum or regionalisation, or convening a constitutional assembly to draft a new
Ukrainian constitution and holding elections only after that.
It is my firm belief that the war will engulf the entire post-Soviet space if both parties
continue to insist on their positions. No one needs this – not Russians, the people
of Crimea, which is now part of Russia, Ukrainians, or the east of Ukraine.
The regionalisation of Ukraine is a compromise, which means providing the eastern
and southern regions of Ukraine with the ability to speak Russian, elect local governments
and live in peace. At the same time, there is an understanding that elections should be
held as soon as possible to calm tensions. In your opinion, could Russia put forward
a proposal that would facilitate a compromise with the US? So that elections are held
on May 25, while at the same time all guaranteeing parties agree before May 25
on the future regionalisation of Ukraine through negotiations or any other diplomatic
means.
Vladimir Putin: Is there a possibility of Russia reaching a compromise with the US
on Ukraine? A compromise should be reached by the various political forces in Ukraine,
not third parties. This is actually the key issue here. We can only support and accompany
this process.
Regarding the question of what should come first: a constitutional referendum followed
by elections, or elections first to stabilise the situation and then a referendum.
The essential issue is how to ensure the legitimate rights and interests of ethnic Russians
and Russian speakers in the southeast of Ukraine. I would like to remind you that what
was called Novorossiya (New Russia) back in the tsarist days – Kharkov, Lugansk,
Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolayev and Odessa – were not part of Ukraine back then. These
territories were given to Ukraine in the 1920s by the Soviet government. Why? Who
knows. They were won by Potyomkin and Catherine the Great in a series of well-known
wars. The centre of that territory was Novorossiysk, so the region is called Novorossiya.
Russia lost these territories for various reasons, but the people remained.
Today, they live in Ukraine, and they should be full citizens of their country. That’s what
this is all about. The issue is not whether the referendum on decentralisation
or federalisation is followed by elections or the elections come before the architecture
of the state is changed. The key issue is providing guarantees to these people. Our role is
to facilitate a solution in Ukraine, to ensure that there are guarantees. People from
southeast Ukraine will ask you, will ask us and the current authorities in Kiev: “Fine,
the elections will be held on May 25, but do you want us to recognise their outcome? You’ll
forget your promises the very next day and send new oligarchs to Donetsk, Kharkov,
Lugansk, and so on. What about guarantees? We need answers.” I hope that an answer
will be found.
Kirill Kleymenov: I suggest that we turn it over to another woman with a bold position. We
have Irina Prokhorova in our studio.
Valeriya Korableva: Irina Prokhorova, the leader of the Civic Platform party and editor-inchief
of the New Literary Review magazine.
Irina Prokhorova: Good afternoon, Mr President.
You know, I'll give it a light cultural twist, although it will still concern Crimea. Remember,
when Gerard Depardieu was trying to obtain Russian citizenship, he confessed his love
for Russia, referring to Russia mostly as a country of great culture. Lately, and the Crimean
events have triggered this, we see that not only the budget to support culture
and education has been steadily declining, but cultural figures who express a somewhat
different position are being persecuted as well. We are witnessing the early stages
of persecution of contemporary art, which is being blamed for all imaginable
and unimaginable sins. Laws are being drafted that actually reduce culture to the level
of a servant of ideology. We’ve been there, and it has always been a terrible blow not only
to culture and education in the narrow sense of the word, but it had sad consequences
for society as well. I believe that this internal division that is being carried out by society
itself when people voicing other positions are denied the right to be called patriots
or people who care about their country is profoundly unfair. After all, you admitted that
the decision regarding Crimea was difficult. It was not a celebratory decision, but
a necessary step. Thus, the fears of the people who are concerned about the ensuing
complications for their own country are quite understandable.
Don’t you think that this internal bitterness in society which, unfortunately, is frequently
fuelled by politicians, in particular, members of parliament, who love to flaunt lofty words,
undermines the foundations of our truly multi-ethnic culture? Won’t Russia lose its status
of a great cultural power if things keep going down that road?
Vladimir Putin: Thank you for your question.
Frankly, I do not see any particular changes with this situation. Nothing that would stand
out even in connection with the events in Crimea and Sevastopol. Admittedly, there is
a conflict of motives and viewpoints, but no one is preventing anyone to state them. No
one is being arrested, put behind bars or sent to labour camps as in 1937. People who
express their opinions are, thank God, alive, in good health and engage in their
professional activities. However, some members of the Russian intelligentsia are
unaccustomed to the fact that they might meet resistance or have someone else express
a different position and disagree with their position. Some people believe that whatever
they say is the ultimate truth, and there’s no way that things can be any different, so when
they get something in response, it causes a strong emotional reaction.
With regard to the situation in Crimea in recent months, I heard and read that some want
their country to lose and think that this is a good thing. Here, too, there is certain
continuity. As is known, during the First World War the Bolsheviks also wanted
the Russian government and Russia in general to lose and the situation quickly got out
of hand, which led to the revolution. There is some sort of historical continuity here, not
the best, though. However, I agree that in any case we should not slip into some extreme
forms of dealing with each other’s views or cast aspersions on people for their opinions.
I will do my best to prevent this from happening.
Kirill Kleymenov: We have been on the air for just over an hour now. Let’s take some
phone calls. Our colleague, Tatyana Remezova, is at the call centre, which also receives
text messages. Tatyana, please, go ahead.
Tatyana Remezova: Thank you, colleagues. We have received a huge number of calls
about Ukraine. People are calling from Ukraine and also from Crimea and other Russian
regions that border Ukraine. But not only from there. People are calling from all of Russia.
Here is a call from the village of Pivovarikha, in Irkutsk Region.
Roman Kuznetzov, good afternoon. You're on the air.
Roman Kuznetsov: Good afternoon, Mr Putin. My name is Roman.
Vladimir Putin: Hello, Roman.
Roman Kuznetsov: Are you planning to send a limited contingent of troops
to southeastern Ukraine to protect its Russian-speaking population? Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: You know, despite the events in Crimea, we should not lose our heads, but
should proceed from realities. What are these realities today? First, we must admit that
the ethnic composition of Crimea differs from that of southeastern Ukraine. These
territories, as I just said, were transferred to Ukraine in the mid-1920s, and in 1954,
Crimea was annexed to Ukraine for some reason as well.
The ethnic composition of the population there is approximately 50–50. I have already
mentioned that the final decision to return Crimea to the Russian Federation was only
based on the results of the referendum. When I saw these results, and saw for myself that
almost all residents voted for joining Russia, I repeat, we had no other choice and there
could have been no other decision.
As for what is happening in southeastern Ukraine, we don’t know for sure. But we believe
that we ought to do everything we can to help these people defend their rights
and determine their fate on their own. This is what we will fight for. Let me remind you that
the Federation Council of Russia gave the President the right to use the Armed Forces
in Ukraine. I very much hope that I will not have to exercise this right and that, through
political and diplomatic means, we will be able to resolve all the pressing, if not to say
burning, issues in Ukraine.
Maria Sittel: Mr President, there is a difficult situation right now not only
in the southeastern regions of Ukraine, but also in Transnistria. It is blocked by Moldova
on one side and by the newly self-proclaimed Kiev authorities on the other. Here’s a text
message: “What are ways to resolve the current situation in Transnistria and what is
Russia’s stance on it?” I would like to recall that just yesterday its parliament asked
Russia to recognise the republic’s independence.
Vladimir Putin: This is one of the most complex problems that we inherited after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. First of all, the population of the republic is over 500,000
people, if I’m not mistaken. People there express pro-Russian sentiments and a large
number of Russian citizens live in Transnistria. They have their own views on how to build
their future and their fate. It would be nothing more than a display of democracy if we were
to allow those people do as they wish. Of course, we need to maintain dialogue with both
Moldova and Ukraine, to boost talks within the 5+2 format, which includes Moldova,
Transnistria and five other states that are taking part in the settlement process. I think
that the blockade should be lifted without delay; the residents of the republic are feeling
its negative consequences both on the part of Moldova and Ukraine. Nationalist armed
groups have already gathered on the border between Transnistria and Ukraine; such
developments must be stopped without delay. In the long run, people should be allowed
to decide their own destiny. This is what we and our partners are going to work on, taking
into account the interests of the residents of Transnistria, of course.
Maria Sittel: Tatyana, over to you.
Tatyana Remezova: Mr President, there was a caller with another very interesting
question. I will read the message: “Russia has annexed Crimea by force. Does that mean
that power is the only guarantee of a state's sovereignty these days?”
Vladimir Putin: Russia did not annex Crimea by force. Russia created conditions – with
the help of special armed groups and the Armed Forces, I will say it straight – but only
for the free expression of the will of the people living in Crimea and Sevastopol. It was
the people themselves who made this decision. Russia answered their call and welcomed
the decision of Crimea and Sevastopol. This was natural, and it could not have been any
other way.
As for the power factor in international relations, it has always existed and will always
exist. That’s a different issue, and the thing is that countries, taking into account that
power plays a significant role in international affairs, should develop and strengthen,
based on their common sense, such rules of conduct which would be stable and would
allow for negotiating, compromising and balancing the interests of a state and its people
on the international arena without using this power.
The events in Crimea themselves have nothing to do with this. Let’s recall what happened
in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and other regions. In my opinion, when the world becomes
unipolar, or when someone tries to make it so, then this one pole has the illusion that all
issues can be settled through power. And only when there is a balance of power does
the desire to negotiate appears. I hope that we will be moving along the path to strengthen
international law.
Maria Sittel: Thank you.
Maria Sittel: Mr Putin, just a few minutes for our new format – video questions. Anna
Pavlova, please.
Anna Pavlova: Thank you. Our video centre is receiving a lot of questions on the Ukrainian
crisis as well; many people are concerned about our future relations with our neighbours,
given the latest events. To continue, let’s watch a video question sent by Sergei Lukas
from St Petersburg.
Sergei Lukas: Mr Putin, who stands to profit from the overblown myth that Russia’s
Armed Forces are preparing for an invasion in Ukraine? What goals are pursued by those
who want to set us against our brothers, neighbours and European partners? And can we
openly invite all those willing to visit our cross-border regions? Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: The intention to split Russia and Ukraine, to separate what is essentially
a single nation in many ways, has been an issue of international politics for centuries. If
you recall the statements uttered by the White movement leaders, you’ll see that
regardless their political disagreements with the Bolsheviks, they never had even
the slightest thought about a possible division between Ukraine and Russia, as they
always perceived them as part of a common, united space and a single nation. And they
were absolutely right.
But today we’re are living in separate countries. And, unfortunately, this policy of division,
of pulling apart and weakening both parts of a single nation continues. There are enough
forces in the world that are afraid of our strength, “our hugeness,” as one of our
sovereigns said. So, they seek to divide us into parts, this is a well-known fact. Look
at what they did with Yugoslavia: they cut it into small pieces and are now manipulating
everything that can be manipulated there, which is almost anything. Apparently, someone
would like to do the same with us, and if you look at what’s happening, you’ll be able
to answer your own question about who is doing what.
Maria Sittel: Mr President, there are millions of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine. After
the events in Crimea, the new authorities regard them as outcasts. Ms Tymoshenko even
urged her supporters to take up arms and deal with them.
Kirill Kleymyonov: The “damned Russians.”
Maria Sittel: Yes, exactly. There are many utterances of this sort and a huge number –
actually the majority – of questions about the fate of ethnic Russians in Ukraine.
Let us give the floor to Mr Lukyanenko, a writer, who has a question on this topic.
Dmitry Shchugorev: Sergei Lukyanenko is a well-known writer, who denounced Ukraine
as a damned land after the bloodletting on the Maidan in February, which no one wants
to investigate, and responded to his Ukrainian colleagues’ reproaches by banning his
books from being translated and published in Ukraine.
What is your question, Mr Lukyanenko?
Sergei Lukyanenko: Mr President, Ukraine has developed as a state hostile to Russia
for 23 years…
Vladimir Putin: I beg your pardon?
Sergei Lukyanenko: I say that Ukraine has developed as a state hostile to Russia
for the last 23 years. There was even a saying to this effect: “Ukraine is not Russia.”
The most horrible thing is that these seeds have borne fruit. We see what is happening:
the country is being plunged into nationalist, if not fascist, hysteria. The authorities are
sending army units and punitive squads to southeastern Ukraine. And the most glaring
thing, as I see it, is that Russia’s position is being ignored by the West and hushed up
in Ukraine.
How, in your opinion, can we bring our point of view across? And is this even possible?
Can we convince the West to listen to us and understand us? Sometimes I have
the impression that we are unable to get through to them.
Vladimir Putin: You know, Sergei (may I call you Sergei?), I don’t agree with you. I know
you as one of the best modern writers – a widely read and widely published one. But
I can’t agree that Ukraine is a damned land; please don't use this expression with regard
to Ukraine. Ukraine is a long-suffering land; it’s a very complicated community and a longsuffering
one in the direct sense of the word. Nationalism and even neo-Nazism are
experiencing a resurgence in western Ukraine. But you know well the history of this
territory and its people. Some of these territories were part of Czechoslovakia, some
of Hungary, some of Austro-Hungary and some of Poland, where they were never fullfledged
citizens. You know, something has always been growing in their heart of hearts.
Some people seem to believe that it is this circumstance – because these territories were
former possessions of several present-day EU countries – that imbues them with some
special European substance. That they were second-rate citizens in those states seems
to have been forgotten, but this still lurks in their historical memory, under the crust, deep
down in their hearts, see? It’s where their nationalism comes from, I think.
Central, eastern and southeastern Ukraine is another matter. I’ve just mentioned this
area, New Russia, which has intertwined its roots with those of the Russian state.
The local people have a somewhat different mentality. They found themselves part
of present-day Ukraine, which had been pieced together in the Soviet period. Of course, it
is difficult for them to establish proper relations and to understand each other. But we
should help them to do so as much as we can.
What, under the circumstances, is our role, the role of a good neighbour and the closest
relative? Will our overseas partners and partners in Europe hear us? I hope they will. But
at the same time – I have just said as much – there are certain apprehensions with
regard to Russia itself, its huge territory, its potential growth and power. This is why they
prefer to cut us to size and take us to pieces. Will our partners hear us in this case? I’ve
just said what they are largely being guided by, but I think they should hear us, because
in the burgeoning modern world, keeping in mind its development trends in the short
historical term and in the longer historical term, this world, the whole of Europe, as I said,
from Lisbon to Vladivostok, should unite to be competitive and viable in the rapidly
developing world. This is an extremely important circumstance. I hope that our partners
will hear and understand us.
Kirill Kleymenov: Mr Putin, the questions about Ukraine are quite prevalent on the Direct
Line website. I browsed through the most frequent ones over the past minutes and found
some repeated ones.
Vladimir Putin: Just a moment.
Sergei, please, there is no need to ban your books from being published anywhere,
including Ukraine. It’s not about money but the fact that you are one of Russia’s most
outstanding authors, part of Russian culture. And we must promote Russian culture there
instead of removing it, all right?
Sergei Lukyanenko: Right, then I agree.
Vladimir Putin: Thank you.
Kirill Kleymenov: I found another very typical question on our programme’s website. It is
a question from Alexander Zhabinsky, Moscow Region. Here it is: “We refuse to negotiate
with the current Kiev authorities. We think they are illegitimate. We doubt the legitimacy
of the presidential election scheduled for May. We could continue ignoring them, but
Ukraine will not just float away from the Russian border. We will have to deal with these
officials eventually, legitimate or not. Perhaps it would be better not to waste time
and start talks with the potential winners of the presidential race?”
Vladimir Putin: We do believe the current authorities are illegitimate. They cannot be
legitimate as they do not have a national mandate for running the country, which speaks
for itself. At the same time, we do not refuse to deal with them. We stay in touch
at the ministerial level. Our ministers continue relations with their Ukrainian counterparts.
Mr Medvedev talked to Mr Yatsenyuk. Mr Naryshkin talked to Mr Turchynov. They stay
in touch. Speaking of the presidential candidates, you know what is going on with
the presidential race. What is happening is absolutely unacceptable. If it goes on like this,
we will not be able to recognise anything that happens after May 25 as legitimate.
How can this election be legitimate when candidates from the east are being assaulted,
spattered with ink and kept from meeting with voters? What kind of election campaign is
this? And that’s to say nothing of the Ukrainian constitution. Irina Khakamada had
a question about the legitimacy of the election according to the Ukrainian constitution.
Without changes to the constitution, the new election cannot be held because Mr
Yanukovych remains the incumbent president. According to the constitution, a new
president cannot be elected if there is a living incumbent and legitimate president. So if
we want the election to be legitimate, the constitution must be changed. Only then can we
talk about federalisation and decentralisation. This is what common sense tells me.
We could, of course, continue to act despite common sense, although I don’t know where
that would lead us. But we stay in touch with everyone. Mr Poroshenko is currently
a leading candidate. A substantial part of his business takes place in Russia. His company
produces sweets that many of you have probably eaten without even knowing that
Poroshenko owns the factory and that he is running for president.
I know Ms Tymoshenko very well. Even though she calls for Russians to be “destroyed
by nuclear weapon”, I think she said that while having some sort of emotional breakdown.
But I know her quite well. By the way, she signed the gas contract that her fellow party
members and other contract parties are refusing to honour. However, at some point, we
had good business relations with her. I have not met any candidates from the east –
Tsarev and former Kharkov Governor – but we generally understand what kind of people
they are. And we will definitely work with all of them.
Maria Sittel: Could I say something please.
Mr President, the Maidan campaign against the southeast is unconstitutional as well. This
is also against…
Vladimir Putin: Excuse me, please. Now there is pressure on the people in the southeast
to lay down their arms, but I say to our partners: “This is a proper, correct approach, but
pull the military back from the civilians then.” They have gone completely mad: bringing
in tanks, armoured vehicles (I’m looking at the TV screen) and cannons. What do they
intend to do with cannons? Have they completely gone mad?
Kirill Kleymenov: The multiple launch rocket system.
Vladimir Putin: The multiple launch rocket system, combat aircraft and fighters in the air.
Have they lost their minds? And what’s next? Nationalist armed groups are coming. All
right, suppose the east will disarm, let’s assume the army will withdraw – why have
the nationalist groups not been disarmed yet? And later they’ll say they can’t do anything.
How can the people in the east be disarmed, when Berkut officers, employees
of the Interior Ministry and even some military units change sides? The issue should be
resolved otherwise. It should be resolved through compromise and guaranteeing people’s
legitimate rights.
Maria Sittel: But no one is willing to compromise. With whom can we find an agreement?
You say there must be guarantees, but who will provide them? The United States,
the West, the EU leaders, the self-appointed Maidan authorities? Who?
Vladimir Putin: It’s necessary to find an agreement with those who think they are in power
in Kiev now. They should rely on common sense and reality.
Maria Sittel: Thank you.
Kirill Kleymenov: There are people on the sanctions list in this studio. Probably some
of them don’t even know they’ve been blacklisted. But Dmitry Kiselev knows for sure that
his name is on the list. Valeria, go ahead, please.
Valeria Korableva: Dmitry Kiselev, Director General of the Rossiya Segodnya Information
Agency.
Dmitry Kiselev: Good afternoon, Mr Putin. They’ve promised us the video question format,
and I was eager to support it in some way. But since we’re having some technical
problems, I’ll create an image with my fingers.
Here’s a ring, and it seems to me our country is inside it. I have a feeling that someone is
stifling me. I think this is NATO because it is spreading like a cancerous tumour.
In the past 25 years, this bloc has literally swallowed our Warsaw Treaty allies, then some
parts of the Soviet Union, and the Baltic states. It has opened its jaws to swallow Georgia
and now Ukraine as well.
Officials at the NATO headquarters say that it would make sense to admit Ukraine into
NATO as well, whereas you’re saying that the bloc system is dying out. I cannot agree with
that because I feel this bloc is stifling me.
Of course, you can call me paranoid, to attribute this to paranoia. But even if someone has
paranoia, it doesn’t mean he isn’t harassed. So it’s not about me, but about NATO’s
expansion. Where is the red line? Does it exist at all? And what do you feel as the national
leader? Nothing personal, Mr Putin. Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: We’ll strangle all of them ourselves! Why are you so afraid? (Applause.)
Dmitry Kiselev: No, I’m not afraid, of course. I just want to know where the red line is
and where to stop. Are there limits, and who will define them? Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: We aren’t afraid – neither me nor anyone else. Nobody should be afraid,
but we must proceed from reality. As for reality, you’ve just described it rather vividly
in your brilliant manner and given us the creeps in some way. Let me repeat that I wouldn’t
fear anything, but we must assess the situation realistically. So what is it like? You’ve
conjured up the image.
At one time, we were promised (I mentioned this at the Munich security conference) that
after Germany’s unification, NATO wouldn’t spread eastward. The then NATO SecretaryGeneral
told us that the alliance wouldn’t expand beyond its eastern borders. However, it
started expanding by incorporating former Warsaw Treaty member-countries and later on,
the Baltic states, former Soviet republics.
I used to say at one time: “Why are you doing this? Do you want to ensure the security
of these countries? Do you think someone may attack them? Well, it’s enough to sign
a bilateral treaty on friendship and mutual assistance, including military aid, and their
security will be ensured.” I heard in response: “This doesn’t concern you. Nations
and countries have the right to choose a way of ensuring their security themselves.”
All right, this is true. But it is also true that when the infrastructure of a military bloc
approaches our borders, we have grounds for certain apprehensions and questions. We
must take certain steps, and this is also true; nobody can deny us this right. And this
compels us to counteract.
I’ll use this opportunity to say a few words about our talks on missile defence. This issue is
no less, and probably even more important, than NATO’s eastward expansion. Incidentally,
our decision on Crimea was partially prompted by this.
Needless to say, first and foremost we wanted to support the residents of Crimea, but we
also followed certain logic: If we don’t do anything, Ukraine will be drawn into NATO
sometime in the future. We’ll be told: “This doesn’t concern you,” and NATO ships will
dock in Sevastopol, the city of Russia’s naval glory.
But it isn’t even the emotional side of the issue. The point is that Crimea protrudes into
the Black Sea, being in its centre, as it were. However, in military terms, it doesn’t have
the importance it used to have in the 18th and 19th centuries – I’m referring to modern
strike forces, including coastal ones.
But if NATO troops walk in, they will immediately deploy these forces there. Such a move
would be geopolitically sensitive for us because, in this case, Russia would be practically
ousted from the Black Sea area. We’d be left with just a small coastline of 450 or 600km,
and that’s it!
In this way, Russia may be really ousted from this region that is extremely important for us,
a region for which so many Russians gave up their lives during all the previous centuries.
This is a serious thing. So we shouldn’t fear anything but we must consider these
circumstances and react accordingly.
As I’ve just said, the same is happening with our talks on the deployment of US missile
defence elements. This is not a defensive system, but part of the offensive potential
deployed far away from home. Again we’re being told: “This is not against you.”
However, at the expert level, everyone understands very well that if these systems are
deployed closer to our borders, our ground-based strategic missiles will be within their
striking range. Everyone is well aware of this, but we’re being told: “Please believe us, this
is not against you.”
Our American partners have turned down our proposal to sign even some trifling legal
paper that would say that these systems are not directed against us. Surprising as it is,
but this is a fact. Naturally, we are bound to ask: “And why do you refuse to sign anything if
you believe this is not directed against us?”
It would seem a trifle – a piece of paper that could be signed today and thrown away
tomorrow – but they are reluctant to do even that. If they deploy these elements
in Europe, we’ll have to do something in response, as we’ve said so many times. But this
means an escalation of the arms race! Why do this?
It would be much better to look at this issue and determine if there are missile threats
from some directions and decide how this system should be controlled or accessed. It
would be sensible to do it together, but no, they don’t want that.
Naturally, we’ll continue these talks with patience and persistence, but in any event, we’ll
do everything to guarantee the security of the Russian people, and I’m sure we’ll succeed.
Kirill Kleymenov: Mr President, our people, who continue to call in and write to us, want
to know the price of our victory in Crimea. Has Russia taken on an unbearable burden
by incorporating Crimea?
Vladimir Putin: Do they mean related expenditures?
Kirill Kleymenov: Yes, primarily financial outlays.
Vladimir Putin: Well, speaking about the price of victory and other spending, I can tell you
that, unfortunately, the physical infrastructure of Crimea, including its resorts, is in a bad
state and we will need to invest heavily in it. We will also have to invest in increasing
pensions and public sector wages, and in the development of Crimea’s economy,
including agriculture.
What kind of money am I talking about? Take pensioners and public sector employees.
The spending obligations of Russia’s Pension Fund are about 6 trillion rubles. Not
counting allocations for the payment of maternity capital and other social benefits,
pensions proper account for 4.5 trillion rubles. How much should we allocate this year
to help Crimean pensioners? 28 billion rubles. Is this a lot or a little? It may seem like
a huge sum, but compared to 4.5 trillion this is a low number. Spending on public sector
employees [in Crimea] amounts to only 16.5 billion, which is entirely doable. Apart from
infrastructure, we will also have to make other spending choices. We will not need
to divert money from other programmes, because we have an additional government
reserve fund in the amount of 245 billion, or slightly less, 240 billion rubles for this year.
I don’t think that subsidies for all Crimean programmes will be more than 100 billion.
Kirill Kleymenov: But what about the bridge, electricity and other things?
Vladimir Putin: A bridge is a vital element, or it could be a tunnel – we have not decided
yet because the issue should be assessed by experts. Some say a tunnel is a more flexible
structure, but experts point to the tectonic faults in the area. So we should consider this
issue very carefully, because no matter what we choose – a bridge, several bridges
or a tunnel – the project will require not only financing but also time. It cannot be
accomplished within a year. We have been talking about current spending, but I am
absolutely confident that in future, and even in the near or medium term, Crimea will
become a donor region. It will go from a region that needs federal subsidies to a selfsufficient
region and then a donor region. I can tell you frankly – I think my former
colleagues, the Ukrainian leaders, will not resent this: they told me candidly that they
deliberately turned Crimea into a subsidised region by taking more money from it than
from other regions to redistribute among other regions where the situation was especially
difficult.
Kirill Kleimenov: You know, the Crimean issue has taken on a new dimension we didn’t
expect. I’ll read out just one of many similar messages. It arrived from Sergei Bibartsev,
a pensioner who lives in Krasnoyarsk Region: “At a teacher’s meeting today my wife was
told – and she is a teacher at Secondary School No 71 in the village of Kedrovy – that
teachers’ salaries will be cut by 20 percent as of May because of Crimea’s reunification
with the Russian Federation.”
Vladimir Putin: Crooks!
Kirill Kleimenov: “Is this true or not? And why by 20 percent?” Teachers, as everyone
knows, are under the jurisdiction of the local authorities. Perhaps…
Vladimir Putin: No. Schools are run at the municipal level, and they are supported
by the regions. This is, of course, a false statement that has nothing to do with reality.
Kirill Kleimenov: We have received numerous similar messages from various regions.
Vladimir Putin: Well, I want people to hear me and we will later look at all of the incoming
information and sort it all out. As I’ve already said, we have no need to reduce any of our
social programmes and guarantees. I’d like to repeat this with full responsibility
and warrant that not a single social programme adopted by Russia and funded out
of the Russian budget will be reduced. All of the resources are available. Everything we
need for the people of Crimea will come from the Government’s reserve funds and will not
affect any of our social programmes.
Kirill Kleimenov: Where should people go to complain if they get such…
Vladimir Putin: Well, they have complained now and we’ll try to react.
Kirill Kleimenov: Good. Pensioners are similarly worried, saying: “We’ve been promised
that pensions would increase by 3 percent as of April, but they were increased by just 1.7
percent. We think that this is connected with Crimea,” Irina Shalygina wrote from
the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area.
Vladimir Putin: I repeat that this is not in any way connected with Crimea or Sevastopol. It
is linked with inflation, the level of inflation and the level of Pension Fund revenues. Under
the laws of the Russian Federation, pensions are adjusted for inflation twice a year –
in February and in April. I don’t remember that the Government publicly and officially
announced that pensions would go up by 3 percent in April.
Opinions were divided in the Government on that score. They debated the issue
and in the end, they acted in line with the law.
Under the law, adjusting pensions for inflation is implemented in accordance with accrued
inflation and the Pension Fund revenues. In February, pensions were adjusted by 6.5
percent and in April by 1.7 percent. Of course, this is a modest increase, but it is still better
than a cut. That is number one.
Number two. This is clearly not sufficient, but if we add 6.5 percent and 1.7 percent, we
get 8.2 percent, don’t we? That is still higher than inflation this year. The target is 6
percent, although it will probably be 6.5 percent. However, it is not yet 8.2 percent. This is
what the Government should keep an eye on.
In general, we should continue thinking and moving to raise the incomes of our
pensioners. This is obvious.
Maria Sittel: More from anxious pensioners. “If the West refuses to purchase gas from
Russia, how will that affect people’s well-being, especially that of pensioners?” – Lyudmila
Budarina, Tambov Region.
Vladimir Putin: I have to say that oil and gas revenues make up a large part of the Russian
budget revenue. This is a serious component for us in addressing economic development,
budget funding for our development programmes and, of course, and meeting of our
social commitments to our citizens.
I’ll tell you what. I am not sure that I’ll get the figures right, but, if my memory serves me
correctly, the bulk of oil and gas revenue comes not from gas but from oil. In terms
of the dollar equivalent, our oil revenues last year amounted to $191–194 billion and gas
revenues to about $28 billion. See the difference? 191 from oil and 28 from gas.
Oil is sold on world markets. Is there any way to do us harm? One may try. But what would
be the result for those who would attempt to do it? First of all, how would this be done?
Of all the countries in the world, only Saudi Arabia has the real potential to increase
production and thus bring down world prices. Saudi Arabia’s budget assumes a price
of $85-$90 per thousand cubic metres.
Kirill Kleymenov: President Obama has already visited them.
Vladimir Putin: I’m sorry, I meant oil, not gas. The budget assumes a price of $85-$90 per
barrel, and our budget, I think, $90. So, if one goes below $85, Saudi Arabia will be
on the losing end and have problems. For us a drop from $90 to $85 is not critical. That is
first.
Second, we are on very good terms with Saudi Arabia. We may, for example, differ in terms
of our views on Syria, but we practically have identical positions on the development
of the situation in Egypt. There are many other things where we see eye-to-eye.
I have great respect for the custodian of the two Muslim shrines, the King of Saudi Arabia.
He is a very clever and balanced man. I don’t think that our Saudi friends would make any
abrupt changes to harm themselves and the Russian economy.
Furthermore, they are members of OPEC, where we have many supporters. It is not that
they have sympathy for us, but that they have their own economic interests and sharply
reducing production – which can only be done in a manner agreed upon within OPEC – is
a fairly complicated business.
Finally, in the United States, which is developing shale gas and shale oil production,
production costs are very high. These are expensive projects. If world prices tumble, these
projects may turn out to be unprofitable, loss-making and the nascent industry may simply
die.
And one last point. Oil is priced and traded in the world in dollars. If prices fall, demand
for dollars will plummet and the dollar will start losing its significance as a world currency.
There are very many factors involved. The wish to bite us is there, but the opportunities
are limited. That said, some damage can be caused.
Now about gas. We sell gas by pipeline (most of our sales are by pipeline) mainly
to the European countries that depend on Russian supplies to cover about 30–35, 34
percent of their needs. Can they stop buying Russian gas altogether? I don’t think that this
is possible.
Some of our neighbours, very good neighbours with which we have very sound relations,
such as, for example, Finland…Finland gets 90 percent of its gas from Russia. Some
countries that used to be called People’s Democracies in Eastern Europe depend
on Russian gas if not for 90 percent, then for 60, 50 or 70 percent of their needs.
Can supplies be stopped altogether? I think that this is totally unrealistic. But one can do
this at one’s own cost, by hurting oneself. However, I cannot imagine such a situation.
Therefore, of course, everyone is keen on diversifying their sources of supplies. Europe is
talking about greater independence from Russia as a supplier, and similarly we are
beginning to talk and act to become less dependent on our consumers.
However, so far, there is a measure of balance between consumers and suppliers.
The only problem is transit countries. And the most dangerous part, of course, is transit
via Ukraine with which we have tremendous difficulties in agreeing on energy problems.
But I hope that we will be able to bring things back to normal, considering the contracts
that have been signed and are functioning.
Maria Sittel: Thank you.
Retired people in Russia are very active. Here's the next question: “Are there any plans
regarding the annexation of Alaska? We would be very happy to see that happen. Thank
you. Pensioner Faina Ivanovna.”
Kirill Kleymenov: That’s a popular joke, Mr Putin. They call Alaska “Ice Crimea” in jest.
Vladimir Putin: Yes, I’m aware of that.
Faina Ivanovna, why do you need Alaska? By the way, Alaska was sold sometime
in the 19th century. Louisiana was sold to the United States by the French at about
the same time. Thousands of square kilometres were sold for $7.2 million, although
in gold. We can calculate the equivalent amount, but it was definitely inexpensive. Russia
is a northern country with 70% of its territory located in the north and the far north. Alaska
is not located in the southern hemisphere, either, is it? It’s cold out there as well. Let's not
get worked up about it, all right?
Kirill Kleymenov: Let’s return to Crimea.
Vladimir Putin: We’ll have to pay them allowances to live in the north. We need
to calculate our budget expenses. (Laughter.)
Kirill Kleymenov: Here is a question that came in as we were having this conversation.
Rishat Akhmadiyev asks, “I’d like to know what steps will be taken to rehabilitate
the Crimean Tatars?”
Vladimir Putin: Crimean Tatars suffered some serious damage during the Stalinist
reprisals and were deported from Crimea, which is their traditional place of residence,
their home. We certainly need to do everything we can to rehabilitate and restore
the legitimate rights and interests of the Crimean Tatar people at a time when Crimea is
joining the Russian Federation.
By the way, immediately after the annexation of Crimea to Russia, in 1783, I believe,
forgive me if I’m wrong, Catherine II issued a decree to the effect – I can’t quote it word
for word – but its meaning was as follows: Crimean Tatars will be perceived by Russia
as its own citizens with all ensuing consequences. Their rights, their mosques and their
religion will be fully respected, which is extremely important.
It was a very wise and appropriate policy, and we plan to stick to such a policy today
as well. That is why my colleagues in the Government and the Presidential Executive Office
and I are now preparing an executive order on the rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatars. Not
only the Crimean Tatars though, because Armenians, Germans and Greeks also suffered
during Stalin's reprisals, so representatives of all of these peoples should be included
as well.
Kirill Kleymenov: We have been on the air live for two hours now. Russia’s Far East is
seven hours ahead of us, so it’s already 9 pm there. I mention the Far East because we
can’t fail to raise the issue of the disastrous floods that occurred there last August.
Thousands of people have yet to recover from this natural disaster. We have chosen two
communities, the villages of Belgo and Novoye, in which to set up our mobile TV stations.
Few people in Russia have heard of these villages, so in order to remind you of what
happened back then, we have put together a video sequence that was broadcast by all
channels.
So we are joined by the village of Belgo and our colleague Pavel Zarubin.
Pavel Zarubin: Hello Moscow! Greetings from Belgo. This village was almost totally
destroyed by last year’s unprecedented floods in the Far East. This is why a new cottage
village is now being erected on this huge mound. A total of 87 houses like this one will be
built with all the needed amenities. For instance, local residents will have hot water
supply, while there was no running water before the flooding.
People who stayed in the village despite the floods’ disastrous consequences came here
today. Here with us today we have Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Far Eastern
Federal District Yury Trutnev. He was appointed by the President to head the government
commission that coordinates relief efforts in the Far East in the aftermath of the floods.
Vladimir Putin: Good afternoon. Mr Trutnev and I meet quite often. I hope that other
people who went there will also have an opportunity to say something.
Pavel Zarubin: Ok, let’s start with questions then. I would like to remind the audience that
funding for building houses here was raised during a telethon with assistance from our
colleagues. We have been here for several days now and have talked to almost all
residents. People say that they really like these houses, but they have a lot of other
questions. Here is a question that is relevant to all local residents. Andrei, a local car
owner, will ask it.
Question: Hello Mr President, here’s my question: as a car owner, I pay a 4,000-ruble
transport tax, but there’s no road here. Belgo is 50 kilometres away from a federal route.
Vladimir Putin: Why do you need a car then? If there’s no road, why have a car? Where
can you drive? Sounds like a provocation to me.
Question: No, this is an urgent issue for all of us, not a provocation. Sometimes people
get sick and you can’t even take them out of the village because the road is just terrible.
Vladimir Putin: I see.
Question: I wanted to ask you to help us address this issue. New cottages are being built.
They are so great. But we also need a decent road. It could be just a dirt road, we’re not
asking for much.
Vladimir Putin: Very well, I understand.
You know, when I visited the territories that had been battered by floods and met with
people and heads of municipal government bodies, infrastructure recovery
and development were among the issues raised during conversations and meetings we
held. It was about supporting agriculture and daily living in communities. We came
to the conclusion that no matter how much you invest in, say, agriculture, although this
a separate issue and there are probably many things that have yet to be done in this
segment, if it is impossible to deliver the equipment needed for agriculture to the villages,
these efforts are meaningless. Roads and bridges should be rebuilt. I must say that such
funding was factored into relevant federal programmes for helping the affected regions.
We could even increase such expenses if the region needs it. In order to do that, these
needs should be communicated to the Russian Government first by the municipal
government bodies and then by governors. Mr Trutnev is there with you today. You could
share the requests and needs of your village with him. When Mr Trutnev comes back, we’ll
discuss it. If a village is built, there should be a road leading to it. This is the way it should
be.
Kirill Kleymenov: One more question, Pavel, please.
Pavel Zarubin: There is another issue of concern to many Russians living in rural areas.
Ms Kuzyurina, please.
Olga Kuzyurina: Good afternoon, Mr Putin. I’d like to make a request on behalf of all
the villagers. A gas pipeline runs one kilometre outside our village, there is a gas
distribution station. We would like to ask you to make a decision to connect our village,
which is under construction now, to the gas pipeline. Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: If there is a gas system in place (I don’t know what kind of gas pipeline it
is, a high-pressure system? Most likely, it is), then the construction of low-pressure
networks needs to be included in the relevant municipal and regional costs. This is one
of the problems of gas infrastructure development in our country. The obligations are
shared as follows: Gazprom and the federal budget are responsible for the construction
of high-pressure systems, while municipal governments finance low-pressure systems
for consumers. But this is a special case, and given that this is essentially a new village,
this issue must and will be resolved. Please, send this request to Mr Trutnev as well. I’m
sure that we will solve the problem.
Kirill Kleymenov: Thank you. Thank you, Pavel, thank you to the village of Belgo. We can
see that the houses that are under construction there are almost completed even though
construction started just this week. These are pre-fabricated homes, and, as Pavel said,
the funds were raised by Channel One’s audience during the “All Together” telethon.
By the way, Mr Putin, we’ve received some unexpected ideas from our viewers. “Let’s build
the Kerch Strait Bridge as a symbol of Russian unity. We’ll raise money via television
and SMS. I dream of crossing it one day and visiting Crimea and Artek,” writes 12-year-old
Yana Mikhailenko from Klin. How do you like that idea?
Vladimir Putin: It sounds like she’s going to spend the money she gets for snacks
at school to help pay for a bridge to Crimea. This is very noble, thank her for this. I also
thank Channel One, which held such a major campaign. Incidentally, the money that was
raised is a considerable amount, Mr Ernst has just told me that it was about $30 million,
which is an enormous sum. And I’d like to thank Channel One and all Russian citizens who
responded when they saw the problems that residents of the Far East faced as a result
of a major flood, the biggest flood in the last 100 years. At the same time, I’d like to note
that the Government is also making its modest contribution by allocating 40 billion rubles
to build housing, infrastructure, dams, etc., and to revive the economy. The key goal is
to spend the funds efficiently.
As for the bridge to Crimea, this is a special matter. It will be quite expensive, but we will
strive to do this as quickly as possible, with the best possible quality and in a costeffective
manner.
Kirill Kleymenov: We’ll now switch to the village of Novoye in the Jewish Autonomous
Area, to our correspondent Darya Grigorova.
Darya Grigorova: Good afternoon. Greetings to Moscow from Novoye in the Jewish
Autonomous Area. The mark you can see here is the maximum water level ever recorded
here, which is 10.5 metres. It’s quite high, well above the average, even at the highest
point in the village. When the dam in the village was destroyed, the village was not just
flooded, it was isolated from the rest of the world. People held up here, on the second floor
of the culture centre where they were supplied with essentials, water and food. Right here,
in boats, people voted. Now that spring has come, the culture centre has been restored.
Novoye is being restored too. The people who are here today went through that ordeal.
I suggest giving the floor to the local residents. This is Galina Alekhina. Ms Alekhina was
here with her large family when the disaster happened. She has four children and six
grandchildren. She managed to help not only her family but many other residents.
Ms Alekhina, your question please.
Galina Alekhina: First of all I would like to thank the people of Russia for their help. Many
thanks to those who didn’t remain indifferent to our troubles.
My question is about the dams. The dams that are being restored do not meet our needs.
They must be higher, and the flood in 2013 proved this. If the dams are not high enough
all the restored and newly built houses will just be destroyed again. Without higher dams,
all the invested money will just be wasted.
Will there be a government programme for dam building around our villages so people
won’t have to suffer any more and won’t have to worry about another disaster.
Vladimir Putin: Of course. I just talked about this. The money that was allocated
by the Government to restore the infrastructure and ensure the residents’ safety will be
spent on the dams. As far as I know, the dams are being built. But you believe they are
lower than is necessary for your safety. Initially, we assumed that the housing would be
rebuilt on safe ground, at higher levels that won’t be flooded. Where that’s not possible,
dams must be built. I’ll look into this by all means. I cannot tell you for sure what is going
on there and whether this dam height is enough or whether it should be higher. We’ll
make sure an additional expert review is done and make corrections, if necessary.
Galina Alekhina: Thank you very much.
Kirill Kleymenov: One more question from your village please.
Darya Grigorova: We have been here for several days. Of course, most of us worry not only
about rehabilitating, but also about developing farming. The flood, which has robbed many
of us of everything we had, has given us a fresh opportunity to think about whether we
should rebuild our homes here. Vladimir Badarin should be in this audience – we met him
during the flood last August. Although he was hit hard, Vladimir does not plan to leave his
native village.
Vladimir, what did you want to ask?
Vladimir Badarin: Good afternoon, Mr President.
Vladimir Putin: Good afternoon.
Vladimir Badarin: I live in a nearby village, more than half of which was flooded. We
received financial compensation for our houses, which were flooded, and we also got coal,
firewood, vegetables, potatoes and other kinds of assistance. We are sincerely grateful
for this. But there is a question. People are leaving the village, and the number of those
who are leaving has increased since the flood. The same is going on in neighbouring
villages, which stand on the border. Young people are leaving.
Here is my question: Have you considered drafting a development programme
for the border villages in the Amur River area? My question only concerns the border
villages that are not part of the priority development area. For example, a dam should be
built in my village to prevent further flooding. Mr President, we really need a dam.
And one more thing: Are there flood forecasts in the Amur River area for July, August
and September?
Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: Regarding the outflow of people, it’s true that young people are leaving.
I believe that one of the reasons behind this is that they were given an opportunity
to choose between financial compensation for housing reconstruction or construction,
and a ready-made house. I think that some people take money and buy housing in some
other region. They have the right to do this; we cannot stop them.
But you are right, and I understand and feel your concern, because these are border
villages we are talking about. This is an issue we should seriously consider as part
of the Far East development programme. I will instruct those who are responsible for this
programme to focus on this issue.
Regarding the dam, I will inquire as to whether there are any plans. As for now, I cannot
tell you anything. But we will certainly ask about plans to develop infrastructure and [flood]
protection for these villages.
As for weather forecasts, we plan to considerably expand the network of monitoring
and weather stations. To be honest, I can’t say that our plans in this respect are being
fulfilled in full. We should monitor this issue more closely. We will do this, and I hope that
the government agencies concerned will promptly respond to changes in the situation.
Maria Sittel: Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: Thank you very much.
Maria Sittel: Now let’s return to our call centres. Tatyana, first to you.
Tatyana Remezova: Thank you, Maria.
The call centre has been operating for a week; over the past days, we have received 2.2
million phone calls, over 400,000 text messages, about 200,000 messages sent to our
website and over 7,500 video questions. At this moment we are receiving 91 video
questions per minute.
Another interesting detail is that people from Krasnodar Territory have become really
active, probably because they saw Governor Alexander Tkachev in our studio.
I would like to remind you that this year we are conducting a public ranking of the topics
raised and questions Mr Putin was asked. You can vote online on our website
for the questions you like, and thus define how relevant the subject is. At the moment,
the ranking is as follows: Crimea and Ukraine are in first place, naturally, followed by social
security, housing and utilities, roads and healthcare.
Maria Sittel: Thank you.
Anna, what are the most popular video questions?
Anna Pavlova: We have a similar picture here in the video centre: Crimea and the events
in eastern Ukraine are in the lead. Housing and utilities rank second, followed by social
security issues. From this category we have another question, which we simply can’t
ignore.
Mr Putin, Amangeldy Akhmetov from Omsk would like to address you. Twenty years ago,
he was severely injured in a car crash. Please, take a look at the screen.
Amangeldy Akhmetov: Good afternoon, Mr Putin.
Here is my question. I’ve been a wheelchair user since 1995. In 1998, I joined a waiting
list to get a flat, but nothing has happened since: I can’t have a wash like a normal person
and my house gets too cold in the winter. Please help, you are my only hope.
Vladimir Putin: You know, it is sad to hear these words. As for this particular case,
of course, we will respond and help.
There is something I would like to say on the issue. Providing wheelchair users with
housing is the regional authorities’ responsibility. In some regions, this issue gets resolved
and people can see the results, but in other regions, unfortunately, the process is very
slow or nothing happens at all, as in your case, for instance. I would like to repeat that we
will by all means respond to this particular request.
But in general, there is a lot for us to do to help people with disabilities feel comfortable
in the modern world, in modern society. We are taking steps in this direction, we have
allocated significant funding from the federal budget – some 35 or 34.5 billion roubles
a year for five consecutive years – for creating an accessible environment for people with
disabilities.
But creating an accessible environment in residential areas is a slightly different subject.
Housing is also a very urgent issue. We need to think about how to help the regions cope
with it more effectively. Again, we will address this particular case separately.
Kirill Kleymenov: We’ve heard the message handling centre’s statistics; let’s take a live
call.
Tatyana, please.
Tatyana Remezova: Yes, thank you, Kirill.
A great many callers are outraged by rising prices of housing and utilities. We’ll take one
of these calls. Our editors are telling me that it is Svetlana Shcherbakova calling from
Chelyabinsk.
Ms Shcherbakova, good afternoon. Ask your question, please.
Svetlana Shcherbakova: Good afternoon.
Thank you for Crimea, of course. But why are you pursuing a housing and utilities policy
that hurts people? Why are you forcing already impoverished people to pay not only their
own bills but also for communal meters and needs, increasing costs by almost 50 percent
and reducing our standard of living? I hope you don’t want us all to starve to death.
Vladimir Putin: Housing and utilities are among our most pressing problems, affecting
practically every family in Russia. Problems have been piling up for decades in this sector,
including dilapidated housing, relocating tenants from dilapidated housing, rundown
housing, and the problem of housing and utilities maintenance in general. I will not go into
detail now, but what I’ve heard leads me again to some unhappy thoughts. You’ve
mentioned communal meters that increase an individual consumer’s bill by more than 50
percent. This is absolutely unacceptable. Do we have any information about this caller?
Maria Sittel: Yes, of course.
Vladimir Putin: This issue must be dealt with separately. I will say why. Because it has
become standard practice for so-called management companies to shift their costs
to tenants via collective expenditure systems. One light bulb somewhere in a hallway
appears to consume more electricity than the entire building. What does this reveal?
Either the management company itself is inefficient, or, on the contrary, it is stealing from
tenants and shifting its costs and whatever else it wants to add to the bill to these
communal meters. This requires an additional investigation, and we will certainly
investigate.
As far as the system as a whole is concerned, I would like to say this. To avoid the growth
in prices, which should certainly be restrained by local authorities, we have taken
the following course of action: a bill was signed into law late last year that enabled
the regions of the Russian Federation to set the upper price limit, while the state, or rather
the Government, presents and proposes the settlement method and determines
the upper – so-called combined – payment. Basically, the Government should have done
this before April 1 of this year. But it hasn’t, as far as I know. I’d like to draw the attention
of the relevant government agency to this fact, and I do hope that this will be done shortly.
Moreover, a decision has been approved requiring that management companies be
licensed to operate. The issuing of licenses will start later this year. Management
companies lacking licenses will be unable to continue operations starting in mid-2015.
Kirill Kleymenov: I think the guests in our studio have not had an opportunity to ask
the President a question to for a long time. Olga, please.
Olga Ushakova: Thank you Kirill. Yevgeny Artyukh, representative of the OPORA Russia
SME support organisation and member of the Sverdlovsk Region Legislative Assembly, go
ahead, please.
Yevgeny Artyukh: Good afternoon, Mr Putin. Here is my question. Russia is a member
of many international organisations. Now, given the situation in Ukraine, many of them are
not just shaking their finger at us but are threatening to expel us, and they seem to mean
it. We know that PACE has suspended Russia's voting rights until the end of the year, as if
we were some kind of poor relative or as if they had taken us in out of charity. As if we do
not pay our membership fees regularly.
So my question is, do you think, personally, that Russia needs to review its membership
in these organisations? Shouldn’t we make our move and suspend or even terminate our
membership in some of them? I am not insisting on this, but I suggest we think about it
and I would like to hear your opinion.
We’ll just wait and see who will benefit in the end.
Vladimir Putin: You see, the world is evolving fast. If – as I have already said – someone
wishes to make it a unipolar world and dominate all international organisations, they are
unlikely to succeed with that.
At the same time, we often come up against the failure to understand our position,
and sometimes even an unwillingness to understand. We have already discussed this
today. We will not insist on continuing our membership in certain international groups,
especially those that fail to show an independent attitude and to work out their own
perspective on major international issues. On the other hand, we will not make any
demarches either. We will continue working as normal.
As for PACE, we do pay our membership fees, and rather substantial fees, I should say.
But it won’t hurt much if they don’t want to see us. But we do not intend to impose
isolation on ourselves either.
Kirill Kleymenov: Mr Putin, let’s return to the consequences of Crimea’s integration into
Russia – a question about the sanctions. As is known, these sanctions hit several major
businessmen such as Yury Kovalchuk, Gennady Timchenko and the Rotenberg brothers.
They are rumoured to be your personal friends and part of your inner circle and that their
fortunes were made thanks to that friendship. Now as it happens, they have sanctions
imposed on them, also to a large extent due to their friendship with you. Don’t you get
the feeling that the main target of the EU sanctions is you, personally?
Vladimir Putin: It looks like they are trying to make me the object of these sanctions.
As for the people you mentioned, they are indeed my good acquaintances, my friends. But
for the most part they had made their fortunes before we even met. Mr Timchenko,
for example, has been doing business since the 1990s, but this story is well known.
Seriously, they certainly have nothing to do with Crimea, absolutely. However, Mr
Timchenko’s wife had serious surgery and was unable to pay for it because her bank
account and credit cards were frozen. This is a flagrant violation of human rights, that’s
what it is, and an action beyond reason.
I also have to tell you that I am not in any way ashamed for my friends. I’m sure they
learned about Crimea from the TV news and they had tears in their eyes when they saw it.
If they’re being punished for that, well let’s say they deserve this punishment. (Applause.)
Maria Sittel: An SMS from Saratov Region: “Why is the price of grain falling and the price
of bread growing?”
Vladimir Putin: Another tough one, but that’s the way things are. Indeed the price of grain
has dipped. As for bread prices, they have increased a bit, but not much, I am aware of it
because bread as you know is the basis of everything and people like myself, members
of the Government, are obliged to know it: the price is up 1.3%.
On the whole inflation, that is price growth, as we noted the day before yesterday, was
2.3%, but the latest Central Bank figures put it at 2.8% and bread prices are up 1.3% (not
much, as you see). But grain accounts for just 30% of the price of bread, the rest is
electricity, power, transport and other factors, including import.
In general the inflation target for this year is 6–6.5% and I hope the Central Bank will keep
it within these limits. But what worries me is that the structure of these prices, of the 2.8%
increase, is very mixed. In the first quarter of this year the price of vegetables soared
by almost 18%, 17.9% to be exact.
And if we look at vegetables as a group there are some differences too – these are small
details, but they matter to people: for example – such things as onions and cabbage have
gone up by 25, 30 and even more than 50%. The reason is the sagging ruble and the rising
cost of imports, because we import a lot of food products at this time of year.
But let me repeat, I very much hope that on the whole the Government and the Central
Bank will manage to rein in prices and stay within the 6–6.5% band.
Maria Sittel: So, agriculture turns out to be more important than guns and planes,
and in the light of the Western threats of sanctions national food security is the number
one issue.
Vladimir Putin: As much as I may like the army, I have to admit that agriculture has always
been more important than guns because without it there can be nothing. As our farmers
say, bread comes first. So we have paid and will continue to pay due attention
to the development of agriculture.
In 2011 agricultural output grew significantly, by 23%, and it increased last year too,
though not by so much. This year the budget envisages subsidies and money in support
of agriculture to the tune of 170 billion rubles.
We will keep our finger on the pulse, monitor what is taking place in daily practice
and I hope the Government will react promptly. Having said that, I know the mood among
farmers who believe that the Government is sometimes late in providing subsidies
and other support measures, that the new system of support per hectare is in need
of improvement – we know all that and we will follow all this closely and will respond.
Maria Sittel: Thank you.
Kirill Kleymenov: Mr President, bread is the staff of life, but Russia is getting its money
from exporting energy, gas and petroleum products. We have a lot of questions about this.
Why does Russia help Ukraine, and fail to cut gas supplies to debtor countries, but
at the same time can cut gas supplies to its own people in winter for failure to pay 3,000
rubles on time? Why are Russians cut off for non-payment and Ukraine is not? We have
lots of questions about this.
Vladimir Putin: I believe that payment discipline should, of course, be integral to our
economic activities. In Ukraine, for example, consumers used to pay around 30%-35%, but
now they are paying less than 20%. This undermines the entire national economy
and the energy system, even the entire utility sector. This just runs it into the ground.
However, given all that and the fact that compliance with payment discipline is very
important, we must still always act based on a specific situation. I very much hope that
there will be no extreme situation in connection with these cut-offs. It’s imperative
to assess the situation in each particular household.
With regard to Ukraine (I’ll use your question to talk about it), the current contract was
signed in 2009. Up until now, Ukraine has been paying us. Not always on time, but it has
been paying for its gas nevertheless. The price formula which we expected Ukraine to use
to pay for Russian gas hasn’t budged since the time this contract was signed in 2009 with
Prime Minister Tymoshenko and her then Energy Minister, a gentleman with the telling
name Prodan (he’s still the Minister of Energy) [prodan is the Russian for “sold” – ed.].
This formula has not changed once since then. What did we do? In 2010, we signed
the so-called Kharkov agreements to extend the stay of the Russian fleet in the Crimean
city of Sevastopol.
Please note that Russia has been paying about $90 million ($95, I think, or even $97
million) annually for the presence of the Russian fleet in Crimea. In addition, with the sole
purpose of supporting the economy of Ukraine, we agreed that the Russian Government
would remove or reduce the export duty on gas supplies to Ukraine. The reduction
of export duties resulted in the final cost of Russian gas decreasing by $100 per 1,000
cubic metres. In fact, we should have begun our payments in 2017, that is, remove this
duty in 2017, because the agreement for our fleet staying in Crimea is valid until 2017.
Nevertheless, we started paying immediately upon signing the agreement in 2010. That is,
we began to pay in advance. We were paying $100 million in current expenses plus
advance payments that were coming due only in 2017. So, that makes it 2011, 2012,
2013 and 2014. Over these four years, in fact for 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021, we have
already paid $11.4 billion. That’s 11.4 billion dollars. This begs the question: where’s
the money? The event has not yet happened, the agreement on the fleet is still valid,
and we have already begun to pay as if it has already ended. This is my first point.
Of course, we have now dropped this price decreasing mechanism and cancelled
the Kharkov agreements.
Next. Responding to our Ukrainian partners’ requests, we took another step in 2013
and loaned them $3 billion and even lowered the gas price to $268.5 per 1,000 cubic
metres on the assumption, and based on the agreement, that they would pay us
the arrears for the previous year which amount to about $1.5 billion, and would continue
the regular current payments at reduced prices. What happened next? By the way, we
agreed that if they failed to pay, we’d revert to the previous prices. And what happened?
They paid in January, and their debt was reduced slightly. In January, they paid in full;
in February, they paid less than half, and in March, the new Ukrainian government has not
paid anything at all. Of $525 million owed, they paid nothing, zero, not a single dollar, not
a single ruble. Under the existing agreements, if they fail to make their current payments,
Gazprom is entitled to go back to the previous pricing. Why would we lock in the increasing
debt at a low price when we can lock it in at the real contract price? That’s the problem.
Kirill Kleymenov: The previous pricing was $485, right?
Vladimir Putin: Yes, it’s going to be $485.
What do we hear? That Russia has a biased approach to Ukraine, and this is the political
cost. However, this is the price that they agreed on with us in 2009. We lowered it under
the agreement that they would pay us at least the lower price. But they don’t even pay
that. Zero. That's the problem. I told our Western partners, including Germany, “We do not
insist on the immediate payments. We understand Ukraine’s difficulties, but we are asking
you to join us in this work and take part in rescuing the Ukrainian economy.” What does
the United States do? They promised Ukraine a billion. A billion what? Guarantees. It's not
the actual money, it’s just a guarantee to the banks that will agree to loan money
to Ukraine. Where are these banks? There’s no one to be seen yet. We can wait a little
longer, a month. If there are no payments next month, we’ll then switch to the prepayment
arrangement in accordance with the contract. What does this mean? This means
that Ukraine will need to pay us upfront for the next month, and we’ll send them as much
gas as they paid for. This is a difficult calculation method, and it can lead to disruptions
in the distribution of our gas to our European consumers. This is exactly why we’re
showing such corporate responsibility, such willingness to negotiate and be patient.
Kirill Kleymenov: Mr President, when will this system go into effect?
Vladimir Putin: Like I said, we’ll wait for another month. We could do it today, but we’ll
wait one more month.
Kirill Kleymenov: News from Europe is coming in just as we are holding this Direct Line
event. This has to do with Jose Manuel Barroso’s reply to your letter, which says that
the European Commissioner for Energy will get in touch with partners in Russia
and Ukraine to organise consultations on gas supplies. As far as I understand, they will
also discuss the security of gas supply and transit to European consumers. The European
Commission said this is Gazprom’s responsibility, not Ukraine’s.
Vladimir Putin: I can agree about the supplies, but the transit is up to Ukraine.
The contract I mentioned stipulates supplies to Ukraine at a price calculated according
to the well-known formula – $485 per 1,000 cubic metres at the moment –
and unimpeded transit of the Russian gas to Europe.
This was actually one of the reasons we built the Nord Stream pipeline: to secure our
exports from such incidents, to ensure direct supplies to our European customers via
a pipeline system along the Baltic Sea bottom. This is why we are also building the South
Stream, a pipeline across the Black Sea linked to the European Union.
Kirill Kleymenov: We have Berlin on the line.
Vladimir Putin: Good timing.
Kirill Kleymenov: Our correspondent Ivan Blagoi works in Europe’s most influential
country.
But before giving the floor to him, I’d like to ask you to return to the speech that we
discussed at the very beginning, the one that you made before signing the treaty
on Crimea and Sevastopol’s accession to Russia. Many people were very impressed by it
and compared it to your Munich speech. They even called it your best speech.
I’d like to ask you why you made this speech. First, the protocol didn’t demand it and,
second, the format was very unusual – you addressed peoples rather than countries
or governments.
Vladimir Putin: The format was chosen based on the importance of the event
and the situation. This is an unusual event in the life of our people, our country and our
state. This is why I considered it my duty to address the Federal Assembly and the people
of the Russian Federation in the presence of members of the State Duma
and the Federation Council. This is the first point.
Second. Why was the speech addressed to the peoples of other countries rather than their
governments? As you know, the modern world, especially the Western world, is highly
monopolised and many Western countries – whether they want to hear this or not – have
voluntarily given up a considerable part of their sovereignty. To some extent, this is
a result of the politics of blocs. Sometimes we find it very difficult to come to terms with
them on geopolitical issues. It is hard to reach an agreement with people who whisper
even at home for fear of being overheard by the Americans. This is not a joke or a figure
of speech. Listen to me, I’m serious, I’m not joking. However, they are our main partners
on economic and some other issues.
But I addressed the peoples of these countries primarily because an ordinary person from
Germany, France or Italy will instantly sense whether a statement is false or not. Our
position is absolutely open, honest and transparent, and for this reason it is easier to get it
across to ordinary people than even to some leaders. It seems to me we succeeded
to some extent. No matter what government rules a country, it will have to consider
the opinion of its voters. This is why I addressed the people.
Maria Sittel: We have a question from Berlin, from our correspondent Ivan Blagoi, who
has been working in one of Europe’s most influential countries.
Ivan Blagoi: Good afternoon.
How united is the West in its desire to punish Russia? Which EU countries are in favour
of isolating Russia? Is this even possible? And lastly, what is going on in Ukraine? These
are the questions that the Valdai International Discussion Club experts have been
discussing.
Some of them are here in this studio. Let me introduce them: Alexander Rahr, Germany;
Nicolai Petro, USA; Gabor Stier, Hungary; Gerhard Mangott, Austria; and Arnaud Dubien,
France. The first to ask his question will be Alexander Rahr, member of the Valdai
Discussion Club Advisory Board.
Mr Rahr, go ahead please.
Alexander Rahr: Good afternoon, Moscow. Good afternoon, Mr Putin.
Vladimir Putin: Good afternoon.
Alexander Rahr: Greetings from Berlin.
The Valdai Club members had a meeting that lasted several hours yesterday, and many
Club members, including our German colleagues, expressed their concern about the kind
of Europe we will live in – in addition to the shared task of stabilising Ukraine, which is
falling apart as we speak. After all, it is a country of 45 million people and our common
concern.
What future do you envision for Europe in five or, say, ten years? Will we live in a common
Europe from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean? Or will we live in two different Europes?
I remember how you said at the Valdai Club last September that Russia is a different kind
of Europe, whole values differ from those of the post-modernist West. Can we bring these
two views together? What can Germany do to help build a common Europe?
Vladimir Putin: First, good afternoon, Alexander.
Second, I’d like to say that there is no contradiction in what I said at the Valdai Club.
Russia’s values do not differ dramatically from European values. We belong to the same
civilisation. We are different, and we have some features that are unique to us, but we
have the same ingrained values. I believe that we must certainly strive to create a greater
Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok, as I have said more than once, including today. If we
accomplish this task, we will be able to take our rightful place in the future world. But if we
choose a different path, if we divide Europe, European values and people, if we promote
separatism in the broad meaning of the word, this will make us all insignificant
and mediocre players who will have no influence over their own development, let alone
global development.
Maria Sittel: Berlin, please, one more question from you.
Ivan Blagoi: Yes, Mr Petro, please, your question for the President.
Nicolai Petro: Good afternoon, Mr President.
My question concerns Russia-US relations. The relations between Russia and the United
States have worsened to a critical level recently. The US media unanimously speak about
total mistrust between the US and Russian leaders. However, global issues still need to be
resolved, and this requires closer cooperation between the US and Russia.
So my question is: How can the lost trust be recovered? What particular steps are
necessary for the US and Russia to transform from rivals to allies in settling global issues?
Vladimir Putin: You know the answer is simple. I agree with you that we have lost trust.
But why did this happen? We believe it’s not our fault, because these double standards,
as we call them, have always been disappointing.
We see a situation in which it’s appropriate to act the way the United States did
in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya but it’s inappropriate for Russia to defend its
interests. I gave you the example of Kosovo, which is totally obvious and clear
to the average person not involved in politics. Everything is being turned upside down. This
position is devoid of any logic, any logic whatsoever.
We just mentioned that I addressed the European people and other nations directly,
because ordinary people can see insincerity. In order to restore trust we need to respect
each other’s interests, speak the same language, avoid double standards and lies
in international politics, focus on international laws but not on the politics of force, which
we also mentioned here. I hope this will be possible. And I can assure you that Russia will
certainly strive for this.
Kirill Kleymenov: Mr President, you remember the story with a button that Ms Clinton
gave to Mr Lavrov as a gift? The “reset” inscription on the button was translated into
Russian with a mistake, as “overload” rather than “reload.” An overload is what eventually
happened.
Vladimir Putin: You know, it didn’t happen just now because of Crimea. I think it
happened much earlier, just after the events in Libya. Dmitry Medvedev, who was Russia's
President at the time, supported our western partners and upheld the resolution on Libya.
This was about a ban on flights of Libyan government air force.
The actual result was air bombing, the overthrow of Gaddafi, his murder and the murder
of the US ambassador, and the collapse of the country. This is where mistrust comes
from. This is how the “overload” happened. But I would like to emphasise this once again.
Russia is interested in improving relations with the United States and will do whatever is
necessary to restore trust.
Kirill Kleymenov: We can take one more question from Berlin. Ivan, go ahead.
Ivan Blagoi: Mr Stier, your question, please.
Gabor Stier: Good afternoon, Mr President. We are witnessing now not just a reframing
of the world order, but a reframing of views. We are witnessing a conservative renaissance
in Russia. In many European countries, traditional views are gaining ground; from Hungary
to France, people vote for politicians who defend the national interests of their countries
without looking constantly to Brussels. This approach is not always appreciated
in Europe.
What do you think, will it be possible to build relations, to build a dialogue between Russia
and Europe based on interests? Aren’t you afraid that the United States could damage
the Russia-EU relationship for a long time to come?
Vladimir Putin: We, in any case, are not seeking to damage relations with Europe,
and I hope our European partners are not planning to either.
As for the rethinking of values in European countries, yes, I agree that we are witnessing
this process. So-called conservative values are acquiring a new significance. I spoke
about that more than once. The victory of Viktor Orban in Hungary, the success
of the conservative forces in the latest election there, the success of Marine Le Pen
in France (she came third in the municipal elections), the growth of such trends in other
countries is obvious.
As I see it, this is associated with the desire to strengthen national sovereignty, with
the realisation that some issues that are vitally important for citizens can be addressed
more effectively at the national level than, say, in Brussels. But there is also
an understanding that it is important to join efforts to deal with some challenges that
concern everyone. But a certain reframing process is underway indeed, and I hope that
the results will be positive.
As for our relations with Europe and western countries, I have mentioned before that this
is an issue of trust. In fact, you also spoke about it. You know, this is very important, this is
a vital issue – trust on both the personal and intergovernmental level.
You know what came to my mind? The current Secretary General of NATO, Mr Rasmussen,
used to be Prime Minister of Denmark, a wonderful country with wonderful people. We
have excellent relations with Denmark, at least that has been the case so far, and I hope it
will remain so in the future. When Mr Rasmussen was Prime Minister, he once asked me
to hold an unplanned meeting. I agreed and we met.
It later turned out that he had recorded our conversation and then published it. I could not
believe my eyes and ears. Sounds unbelievable, right? He explained that he recorded our
conversation for history. All right, I’m flattered, but even for if it was for history, shouldn’t
he have at least warned me or asked my permission to publish those talks? How can we
speak of trust after something like that?
You see, relationships – whether between people or governments – should be more
stable, transparent and collaborative.
Maria Sittel: Berlin, thank you so much for your participation and your questions. Stay
with us; we will continue to discuss international issues in our Moscow studio.
We have a question from the video call centre. Anna, please.
Anna Pavlova: Yes, colleagues, thank you. We have a surprise video call, which I would
describe as sensational. It was sent by a person who has made an information revolution
by exposing a mass surveillance programme that affected millions of people around
the world.
Mr President, you have a question from former intelligence agent Edward Snowden.
Vladimir Putin: Do I really?
Edward Snowden: Zdravstvuyte. I'd like to ask you a question about the mass surveillance
of online communications and the bulk collection of private records by intelligence
and law enforcement services. Recently, the United States, two independent White House
investigations, as well as a federal court all concluded that these programmes are
ineffective in stopping terrorism. They also found that they unreasonably intrude into
the private lives of ordinary citizens – individuals who have never been suspected of any
wrongdoing or criminal activity; and that these kinds of programmes are not the least
intrusive means available to such agencies for these investigative purposes. Now, I've
seen little public discussion of Russia's own involvement in the policies of mass
surveillance. So I'd like to ask you: Does Russia intercept, store, or analyse in any way
the communications of millions of individuals, and do you believe that simply increasing
the effectiveness of intelligence or law enforcement investigations can justify placing
societies – rather than subjects – under surveillance? Thank you.
Kirill Kleymenov: Mr President, did you get the gist of the question?
Vladimir Putin: Yes, by and large.
Kirill Kleymenov: This is a professional question from Mr Snowden. You speak freely with
foreign leaders during summit meetings, as we can see. But I will try to translate
the question for our audience.
Vladimir Putin: Still, American English is slightly different…
Kirill Kleymenov: I tried to write down the question, which, as I have said, concerns some
professional aspects…
Vladimir Putin: As I understood it, he wants to know if we engage in electronic
surveillance.
Kirill Kleymenov: He asked about the mass surveillance of online communications
and the collection of users’ private records. He said that the US federal court concluded
that these programmes are ineffective in stopping terrorism. This is an important
admission. He also said something about intrusion into the private lives of ordinary
citizens. Mr Snowden also said that he had seen the public discussion launched in Russia
on this topic. And, lastly, he has asked you if Russia intercepts, stores, or analyses in any
way the communications of millions of individuals. He wants to know if you believe that
such mass surveillance can be justified.
Vladimir Putin: Mr Snowden, you are a former intelligence officer, and I have worked
for an intelligence agency, too. So let’s talk like two professionals. To begin with, Russia
has laws that strictly regulate the use of special equipment by security services, including
for the tapping of private conversations and for the surveillance of online
communications. They need to receive a court warrant to be able to use this equipment
in each particular case. So there is no, and cannot be any, indiscriminate mass
surveillance under Russian law.
Since criminals, including terrorists, use these modern communication systems for their
criminal activity, security services should be able to respond accordingly and use modern
equipment to combat crime, including terrorism. Yes, we do this, but not on such a large
scale and not arbitrarily. Hopefully – I hope very much – we will never act in this manner.
Besides, we do not have such technical capabilities and funds as the United States. But
the main thing is that, happily, our security services are strictly controlled by the state
and society and their operation is strictly regulated by law.
Kirill Kleymenov: Mr Putin, we have been talking about big politics for over three hours,
but our audience is also interested in other issues. One of our viewers is asking when
the country is going to see its First Lady.
Vladimir Putin: You know, I need to marry off my ex-wife Lyudmila first, and then I’ll think
about myself.
Maria Sittel: And now let’s talk about Sochi, our Olympics, our Olympic and Paralympic
Games, which have become the brand identity of our country, which were held
at the highest organisational level. Many thanks to our athletes – they are here in our
studio – for bringing us so much joy.
Kirill Kleymenov: I see them behind your back: Alexander Zubkov and Alexei Voyevoda,
our wonderful bobsledders. Thank you very much for the emotions you have given us.
Maria Sittel: Let’s switch on Sochi.
Kirill Kleymenov: Sure. We couldn’t possibly do without it. We have Sochi, the Olympic
and Paralympic capital on the line. Our colleague Anton Vernitsky works there.
Anton Vernitsky: Hello, Moscow. Sochi is on the line. Does the empty Olympic Park look
unusual? Just recently, a few weeks ago, millions of TV viewers watched what was
happening here at the Olympics in Sochi. Tens of thousands of our tourists and foreign
fans came here to support their favourite athletes.
Now builders are working in the Olympic Park. They are building the track for Formula One,
which will be held next autumn. But otherwise the Olympic Park is unusually quiet and this
is a source of concern for local people who are mostly involved in the tourist business. Our
first question is about this.
Question: Crimea has joined Russia and this is great. But what will happen with our city?
Won’t it be forgotten? Hotels have been built in our city and today it is the most accessible
Russian city for people with disabilities. We have trained personnel to host foreign guests.
Our seaport and airport coped with the foreign and Russian tourist influx. Meanwhile,
accessible tickets from different Russian regions have only been arranged for Crimea.
Residents of Sochi who had been asked to weather massive Olympic projects have been
waiting for this first post-Olympic season for the past few years as for manna from heaven.
Will we be forgotten this year and the next two or three years after managing to cope with
the pre-Olympic load? Will our home city, Sochi, be supported and developed?
Vladimir Putin: It goes without saying we’ll support and develop Sochi. It is time
to understand what we should do in addition for Sochi’s development. I don’t think you
should worry about what might happen because of Crimea’s accession. You’ve just said
yourself that many modern and very comfortable hotels for tourists have been built
in Sochi. These are world-class hotels and their rates should not be reduced below
the limit – otherwise economically they won’t make any sense. This means that Crimea
and Sochi should have different categories of tourists and vacationers. Given its current
infrastructure, Crimea is designed for people with small incomes. They can hardly afford
to stay in glamorous, top-notch Sochi hotels. Regardless of Crimea’s jurisdiction –
Russian or not – there are categories of people who won’t be able to stay in Sochi’s chic
hotels, and it is important to be clear on that. People without a great deal of money can
afford a vacation in Crimea but the question is how to get there, by what means
of transport. In this context we are thinking about low-cost air tickets. I don’t know
whether the Government has announced this or not but if not, it will do so very soon.
Anyway, I recently met with my colleagues – I invited them for a meeting on this score –
and told them that we must provide return air tickets for vacationers in Crimea at about
7,500 rubles.
Kirill Kleymenov: Aeroflot has already announced this, Mr President.
Vladimir Putin: Well, that’s great. We’ll have to provide railway tickets for 2,000, 2,500
and a maximum of 3,000 rubles in an open-berth carriage, because it will be quite difficult
to get there. If we don’t offer cheap tickets people simply won’t go. What I mean is, it won’t
be possible to go by the usual northern route because Ukraine will shut down railway
service from the north of the peninsula. So people will have to travel to Anapa
or Krasnodar and then get to the Black Sea coast, from where they should go by ferry
or ship to relevant ports and finally to hotels. This is a fairly complicated route and if such
travel is not cheap we won’t be able to attract holidaymakers to Crimea. This is why we are
trying to create these special conditions for Crimean health resorts and increase
the number of aircraft that would carry those who’d like to vacation in Crimea.
However, this doesn’t mean at all that we’ll forget about Sochi. On the contrary, we’ll do
everything to support Sochi in the price niche that is designed for people with at least
medium incomes. You know that after the Olympics some of its facilities are being
converted to other uses. We have the Governor here and he knows all about this. I hope
he’s already started turning one facility into a major shopping centre and another into
a huge exhibition complex. We’re planning to host permanent shows of leading figure
skaters from Russia and the world on the skating rink that hosted the Olympic figure
skating competitions. All these innovations will add to Sochi’s appeal to visitors. I think
the same is true of Formula One and the future FIFA World Cup.
Of course, it will take time to convert these Olympic facilities into post-Olympic ones but
there is no doubt that Sochi will carry on and flourish.
Kirill Kleymenov: Mr Putin, speaking of the FIFA World Cup, may I ask you a question
as a football fan? There have been threats to relocate the 2018 FIFA World Cup, which
Russia is to host. Some US senators have sent a letter to the FIFA headquarters about
this. Do you think this is possible?
Vladimir Putin: As FIFA head Mr Blatter said, football and politics don’t mix,
and the organisation is not going to review its schedule or the host countries, including
Russia.
Maria Sittel: That’s good news.
Sochi, one more question please.
Anton Vernitsky: Yes, we have questions. Not only business people are present here
today. We have invited young Sochi athletes, builders that built all these beautiful
facilities, and students of the Olympic University in Sochi. So they have a question.
Ivan Belyayev (student of the Russian International Olympic University): Good afternoon.
So here is my question. Construction of the Olympic facilities required substantial money.
However, now, as you can see, the Olympic Park is abandoned and out of use. Don’t you
think the Olympic facilities will become so-called “white elephants”? Who will maintain
them and how? And most importantly, how will they be used? Do you plan to develop any
government programmes for this?
Vladimir Putin: Ivan, I have just said that the future of the facilities is already known.
Some of them will be turned into exhibition centres, shopping malls; some will be used
as concert halls; some ice rinks will still be used for their initial purpose. For example,
the Small Arena [Shaiba] or the Large Arena [Bolshoy Ice Dome]. The Large Arena, I hope,
will be available for the Sochi ice hockey team, while the Small Arena will be a permanent
sports camp for children with facilities in both the coastal and the mountain cluster. We
decided long ago how these facilities will be used. I repeat once again, restructuring
and re-equipping them takes time, but everything will be done, all these projects will be
completed.
Kirill Kleymenov: Mr Putin, we were all amazed by the Olympics, but the Paralympics left
just as powerful an impression on us.
Vladimir Putin: Yes.
Kirill Kleymenov: Above all, we were impressed by our superheroes, the athletes who
competed for Russia. Here in the studio we have a person without whom many of our
Paralympic victories would not have been possible.
I would like to ask Olga to present the next speaker.
Olga Ushakova: It is a great pleasure for me to present Irina Gromova, the coach
of the Russian cross-country skiing and biathlon team. She is the person behind
the numerous moments of joy that our Paralympic athletes brought us. Irina trained
the athletes who won 30 medals for Russia, including 13 gold medals.
Ms Gromova, your question for the President.
Irina Gromova: Mr Putin, the phenomenal success of our Olympians and Paralympians
produced a boom: children are dragging their parents to sports centres and parents are
eager to get their children involved in sports. What does the Government intend to do
to encourage children to take up sports, especially kids with disabilities and disabled
people in general, who live in remote areas? How can we reach them? Could it be possible
to explore opportunities for creating boarding schools across Russia, including in Moscow,
to enable children from remote areas to do sports, since the availability of sports facilities
is very poor where they live? Availability is now a major issue. If we could do this, we would
be able to achieve great results, including in sport.
What do you think?
Vladimir Putin: You and I discussed this issue when we meat in Sochi. Responsibilities
should be split between regions, municipalities and the Federation. As you know,
the Federation is already doing a lot for high performance Paralympic athletes by creating
specialised training centres and promoting a barrier-free environment in old venues so
that Paralympic athletes can use them.
Popular sports, including for adults and children with disabilities, is a separate issue that
has received little attention until recently. Special attention should be paid to disabled
sports as part of the efforts to promote mass sport. These initiatives should be
coordinated with the regions. We will move in this direction and are committed
to encouraging regions to make the necessary allocations for creating specialised
facilities. A part of funds that I’ve already mentioned, 34.5 billion rubles that will be
allocated for creating a barrier-free environment, could also go towards such efforts.
Maria Sittel: Mr Putin, let me continue with this topic and ask you if you are aware
of the fact that in our country people with impaired hearing cannot even call
an ambulance? There is no one to help them if anything should happen, and their chances
of survival are, in fact, close to zero.
Vladimir Putin: We recently discussed practically the same thing with the Agency
for Strategic Initiatives, when we talked about an even more difficult case – deaf-blind
people. But let’s also pay attention to those with impaired hearing and how we can help
them adapt. I will ask our colleagues from the Agency to look at this issue as well. There
are many energetic, young people at the Agency who have many good ideas. In general,
this is a solvable problem.
Maria Sittel: Yes, quite so.
Vladimir Putin: The internet can be used for this, and there are other ways.
Maria Sittel: Mobile apps.
Vladimir Putin: We just need to focus on it. I will definitely ask our colleagues to take up
the issue.
Maria Sittel: Please do.
Kirill Kleymenov: Healthcare is a sensitive issue. Lots of questions here. “New healthcare
reforms in our region have led to disruptions in supplies of medications for patients with
diabetes,” that’s from Krasnoyarsk Territory. In the Republic of Khakassia, doctors do not
issue prescriptions for free drugs citing the lack of financing in Khakassia; high prices
for medications; the shortage of skilled medical personnel; the closing of rural health
posts and rural hospitals, and so on. During preparations for the programme, Tatyana
Remezova and I identified the regions where these problems are most acute.
Mr Remezova, over to you.
Tatyana Remezova: Yes, Kirill, as we looked at the regions, we were able to identify two
of the most painful issues for all of Russia from Rostov to Chita. There is an enormous
amount of complaints about rural hospitals being shut down. People called us with
the same complaint: at best, there’s one rural doctor left serving several villages in areas
that are hundreds of square kilometres apart; one ambulance that can’t negotiate local
roads that are so bad that people say they are left to die because ambulances can’t get
to them; and not a single decently equipped hospital within their reach. We have tonnes
of such complaints.
The second issue concerns low salaries for medical personnel. We have received lots
of calls from all over Russia about this. I believe we have an incoming call from Volgograd
about this. Sergei, you are on the air.
Good afternoon, Sergei, please go ahead.
Question: Good afternoon, I’m a doctor and I have a question for Mr Putin. Why is it
claimed that the official salary of doctors is 49,000 rubles a month, whereas in fact
doctors are paid anywhere from 12,000 to 15,000 rubles a month (that’s for high-skilled
doctors who also have to pay utility bills, taxes and so on from their salaries)?
Tatyana Remezova: Mr Putin, we have many such questions. Let me quote another one:
“It's a shame that healthcare officials from St Petersburg misinform you about doctors’
salaries. I’m a registered nurse with 40 years in the industry, including in the intensive
care unit at a children's hospital; ambulance; department of toxicology and drug
addiction – all of these jobs involve hard work. Now, I work at Outpatient Clinic No. 43,
in St Petersburg’s Frunzensky District. My base pay is 16,057 rubles a month. I work one
and a half shifts and my salary is 26,600 before taxes. My after-tax salary is 23,000
rubles. Executive order No. 597 is not working. Our staff members wrote
to the Presidential Executive Office on several occasions. The Chief Physician wrote
in a reply letter that the average salary for a nurse is 47,000 rubles. We have only retired
people working in our building. Young people refuse to work for such meagre salaries.”
Indeed, Mr Putin, Governors invariably report to you that all is well and doctors’ salaries
are above the average salary paid in their respective regions, but things are different
in real life. How come?
Vladimir Putin: First of all, I’d like to focus on healthcare in rural areas. People are saying
that rural medical posts are being closed. It’s very strange indeed that this is happening.
Most of the funds allocated as part of the effort to modernise the healthcare system were
used to improve rural medicine. As far as I can remember, the amount of funds allocated
to the programme and the regions in general was almost double the amount used
to improve healthcare in urban areas, primarily because we wanted to maintain
and reinforce the network of medical institutions in rural areas.
So, if a rural medical post is closed somewhere, then inter-village rural posts should be set
up with proper transport access, roads, etc. I’ll look into it closely and see what’s going
on in the regions in question. This is absolutely unacceptable. This is my first point.
Second, with regard to doctors’ salaries. In general, the statistics show that salaries
in medicine are growing faster than in other industries. Specialists saw their salaries grow
141 percent last year, that is up 41 percent, nurses 80 percent, and paramedics 47
percent.
With regard to the situation described by the nurse from St Petersburg, we need to look
carefully into this case in order to understand what’s going on there. I promise you that
this is exactly what we are going to do. We will take a thorough look at this medical
institution in the Frunzensky District of St Petersburg.
If memory serves, the average salary in St Petersburg is around 37,500 rubles,
approximately 37,600. If we use this number as 100 percent, we can arrive at the salary
paid to medical personnel as a percentage. If this lady’s salary is 26,600 rubles,
or 23,000 after taxes, how much is that as a percentage? She’s a registered nurse. What
percentage is that of 37,500? Perhaps less than 80%, but around that figure.
Clearly, this person works one and a half shifts. The Government should then …
The Government makes calculations of real wages: base salary, base salary and a half.
I've heard people say this, but we believe that it’s not so important.
Importantly, people are earning this money. But then the Government should clearly
and openly say how these salaries are being calculated. Whether they are consistent with
workplace safety standards. And so on and so forth. There is, of course, something to work
on. But all in all, I repeat, the salaries of medical personnel are growing faster than
average salaries across Russia.
As for salaries of 12,000–13,000 ruble being paid to highly skilled professionals, we
should also look at specific regions, and we will look at it by all means. Again, this should
not be significantly different from the average figures nationwide. We should look
at the average wage in this particular region.
However, there’s another point that I’d like to draw your attention to. The Government has
issued a resolution whereby salaries of executives in publicly funded institutions should
be no more than eight times higher than the average salary in that particular institution.
This difference is high enough to provide a decent salary to senior executives
and recognise their managerial abilities and qualifications. Anything above that is
unacceptable. I do not rule out the possibility of violations in this area. We will get back
to this and take a look at this issue at the local level.
Maria Sittel: Mr President, I have here a question about civil liberties, if I may. I will read
you a text message from Ilya Belov from Moscow. He asks: “Do you think that the events
in Crimea have greatly reduced the place of the liberal opposition in our society?”
Vladimir Putin: I believe that it has never been very broad in our society, and that it only
looked strong. We have a small group of revolutionaries who are far removed from
the people, as the classics said, but they are an important part of society. Irina Prokhorova
addressed this issue today.
Of course, we should take the opinion of the majority of people into account when taking
decisions and shaping our domestic and foreign policy. But we must never disregard
the opinion of the minority who have a different opinion of the developments taking place
in the country and on the international stage, and we must take their opinion into account
and listen to what they have to say. But I cannot say that the government is deliberately
trying to limit their space.
Maria Sittel: As a follow-up, let's give the Nezavisimaya Gazeta editor-in-chief a chance
to ask a question.
Tatiana Stoliarova: Mr Remchukov, over to you.
Konstantin Remchukov: Mr Putin, you have touched upon many questions that I wanted
to ask you regarding international relations and the level of trust in the world. I belong
to a group of Russians who believe that normal relations with the West are good
for Russia and its citizens.
We live in a global world and we need to communicate and exchange opinions in all
spheres, including the economy, technology, healthcare, education and culture. This is
an important and integral part of our civilisation. It’s sad that our relations have
deteriorated so much lately.
Interestingly, society has polarised, including on the issue of Crimea: friend-foe, one of usone
of them, black-white, patriot-liberal. If you extrapolate this for domestic policy, these
judgments are often mirrored as well. You have made known your position on Crimea
and explained your line of thinking: historical circumstances, political injustice, threats,
risks, the referendum and the decision.
There are other views as well on this problem, including in our brotherly nation of Ukraine,
which are formulated using words, such as violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. You
can’t easily overcome such a view of this event, all the more so since most nations,
including Russia, are very sensitive with regard to territorial integrity. You have signed
an addendum to Article 282 of the Penal Code, which will enter into force on May 9, that
holds that public calls through the media for separatism or violation of territorial integrity,
will be punished by up to five years in prison. This is a serious matter.
That is, hypothetically, if someone writes in a newspaper on May 10, “I believe that Crimea
is part of Ukrainian territory,” he or she may well be found guilty. This doesn’t mean that
this will necessarily be the case, but there will be grounds for that.
I have a feeling of narrowing of space in this situation. The media is treated almost
as the main source of troubles: if someone steals money in the Defence Ministry,
or someone has a go at someone, or someone shoots someone, no one is going to shut
down the Ministry. They’ll start looking for the corrupt official, put him behind bars, etc.
However, if a journalist misuses a word, they issue an instant warning. The second
warning means that the media outlet will be closed and typesetters, editors
and proofreaders will be on the receiving end, even though they have nothing to do with
such a misstep. They cut off TV channels just because they don’t like their tone of voice.
However, while I understand your message about the need to heed the majority, I still
think that the 21st century is all about high-quality discussions. It’s not about being pushy,
deciding things by the majority or hooting, but rather a meaningful debate.
Here’s my question. As President, do you need such a nationwide consensus in order
to be able to conduct your policies, or do you need the majority in order to carry out your
policies, allowing others to breathe and live, including those in the media with alternative
views?
Vladimir Putin: I pretty much answered your question when I said that we will be guided
by the opinion of the majority and build our policy based on their interests. Of course, we
need to hear other points of view, even if they come from a minority. This is my position.
You know, in my everyday work I always listen to what my colleagues have to say. Even if
I disagree with them, I always give them a chance to speak and always think that maybe
there’s something useful in what they are saying. Before taking a decision, I always try
to discuss the problem again, this time from the perspective of the colleague who has
a different opinion. This is important in everyday work and in politics, both domestic
and international. This is a necessary thing. That's how I feel about it. I believe this
answers your question.
With regard to other issues that you mentioned in your remarks, it’s normal to think like
that about our relations with the West. Who does not want our relations to be good? We
want this. We are part of the common civilisation, which is mostly Christian civilisation.
But even Russian Muslims and Russian Jews are very close to us. Fundamentally, we
share the same culture. We want our relations to be good, but we simply cannot afford
to have someone always presume that we will give up our interests and move the line all
the time in exchange for someone agreeing to be friendly with us. For being allowed to sit
next to someone, we must make concessions here and there and turn a blind eye
to certain things. This is impossible. In the end, we have reached a point beyond which we
cannot retreat. You also mentioned our motives. We want to establish good relations with
all our partners in the West and the East. Of course, we certainly need to analyse a variety
of viewpoints to resolve this or that problem as we develop these approaches.
Kirill Kleymenov: Let’s hear one more point of view: with us in the studio is Viktor
Baranets, an observer with the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda. Let's give him
the floor.
Dmitry Shchugorev: He’s also a colonel, journalist and military expert.
Viktor Baranets: Good afternoon, Mr President.
First, I would like to make a small remark. Dear friends, I would like to ask all of you, those
who are listening today and who are sitting in this room, not to use the words “little green
men.” I think it is insulting for the people who serve their country, some of whom are
present in this room. Let us leave this term to history, to the arrogant manner
of addressing soldiers and officers that was current during the times of Vasilyeva
and Serdyukov. Thank you.
Now for my question to you, Mr President. It is hard to name an event over the past two
decades that injected into the hearts of millions of Russians a more powerful charge
of genuine patriotism, rather than poster patriotism, that helped unite the people
and the army. This is our most cherished national possession.
And what do we see on the other side? On the other side we see liberal “hamsters”
of every stripe who are trying to plunge their little rotten teeth into these pillars of our
national pride. Yes, of course, people may have different opinions. But I do not understand
what other opinion there may be when 2.5 million people are knocking on our door, asking
for help. Are we supposed to tell them, “Guys, get lost, we have enough problems
in Russia as it is?” No, we are Christians, we are Russians, and we have opened our door
and said, “Welcome home, come back and we shall live together.”
So this is my question to you: we have seen all these provocative marches which carried
posters reading “No to War,” and I would like to ask these people, these provocateurs who
were marching in Moscow waving posters that read “We Are Against War,” where did they
see war in Crimea? Did they see anything similar to what is happening in the southeast
now? If we had not brought back Crimea to where it belongs today Crimea would have
turned into a huge Maidan or into what we are witnessing today in the southeast
of Ukraine.
Mr President, I think the challenge facing the state today is to defend our victories,
the Victory in the Great Patriotic War and this other national victory for which we are
responsible to ourselves and our posterity.
Thank you very much.
Vladimir Putin: Thank you for your views and your uncompromising stand on sensitive
problems and issues. I think you are right, but we should use a different set of instruments
in conducting the discussion. On the one hand, one cannot apply harsh epithets
to the people who have made a substantial, if not the decisive, contribution to enabling
the people of Crimea to express their will. They are our servicemen. As I have already said,
their actions were very courageous, decisive and highly professional. Analysts will yet
study and draw lessons from what has been done and how.
But on the other hand the “hamsters” have sharp teeth, they have no rotten teeth
and they don’t need to see a doctor. If they had bad teeth they would all die out. So let us
not talk about “little green men” on the one hand and “hamsters with rotten teeth”
on the other, let us upgrade the culture of our communication and our discussion. It would
do us all good.
Kirill Kleymenov: Mr Putin, I suggest we do a lightning round for some questions.
Masha and I have selected some and I know that you usually select the most original
and interesting questions.
Vladimir Putin: Sure.
Kirill Kleymenov: Please give short answers, if possible.
Dmitry Dutrov from Tambov Region asks: “There is a trend in the Government of replacing
old governors. Will this positive trend continue?”
Vladimir Putin: You know, this is not a trend. There is no trend at all.
Moreover, I will tell you that the governor corps in Russia is healthy and strong. They are
ready to take responsibility for their regions. Many of them achieve excellent results.
I can see Mr Kadyrov here. He does a lot for his region.
Only a few years ago, Minutka Square [in Grozny] was totally run-down. I remember flying
over Grozny in a helicopter and there was nothing to look at. We even raised the issue
of moving the Chechen capital to another city because we didn’t believe it would be
possible to restore it. Now the city is prospering. A lot has been done in Krasnodar
Territory, especially in Sochi.
Of course, there are still problems in the North Caucasus – for example, unemployment
and other problems in Ingushetia and Dagestan. But there has been some progress. And it
is amazing what is happening in other regions, like Kaluga Region, which, with its scarce
natural resources, has achieved outstanding results in increasing regional GDP. However,
if we encounter any ethical violations, any abuse of power, we reserve the right to make
the appropriate personnel decisions.
Maria Sittel: Mr President, our audience is curious. What is your favourite movie?
Vladimir Putin: “Chapayev”, of course.
Kirill Kleymenov: Here is another interesting question. “Mr President, first I have to say
you look tired – please take a few days off. Second, I’m very concerned with the following
issue: When will the Russian coat of arms appear on Russian bank notes?
Vladimir Putin: It is for the Central Bank to decide according to Russian law. It hasn’t
occurred to me, but I will think about that.
Maria Sittel: By the way, you have your own folder, Mr Putin. You can take out questions
yourself if you like.
Vladimir Putin: Yes, I have chosen some. I don’t know if they are interesting but they
should be informative at least. We have just talked about replacing governors. I hope this
doesn’t really concern governors. This is not even a question, just someone thinking out
loud: “Maybe if you publicly execute at least 350 major crooks, like they did in China, your
people will support you.”
You know, I would like to stress that in our country thieves have never been executed. It is
not the severity of the punishment but its unavoidability. This is what we strive for. But
I read this question to let officials at various levels of government know what the public
mood is like.
Maria Sittel: Why don’t you make official state visits to the United States? Are they not
allowing you to enter the country or do you not want to go?
Vladimir Putin: Nothing of the sort. We were planning some contacts but our American
counterparts decided to suspend this work. But I hope that eventually we will be back
on the same track.
Here’s a question: “Will there be another iron curtain?”
The iron curtain is a Soviet invention, a domestic phenomenon. We are not going to isolate
our country, our people and our society from anyone. No, there won’t be an iron curtain.
“Mr Putin, why does the United States do whatever it wants and remain unpunished while
Russia has to face punishment?”
You know, this seems to be a simple question but it is quite important. The United States
is a major global player and at a certain point it seemed to think that it was the only leader
and a unipolar system was established. Now we can see that it is not the case
and everything in the world is interrelated. If they try to punish someone like misbehaving
children or to stand them in the corner on a sack of peas or do something to hurt them,
eventually they will bite the hand that feeds them. Sooner or later, they will realise this.
So what is the score? You know, I’d rather not speak metaphorically about this. This is not
a sports competition. We are partners and I hope our future entails good development
prospects because our interests correspond in many aspects. These include international
security, non-proliferation of weapons, combating terrorism, and the global economy.
These are our common interests with the US. We will not be able to succeed in these
issues if we don’t join forces.
“We live some 250 km away from Moscow…” Then it says that their village is in quite
a poor condition. “Could you send your representatives here?” The Governor is
my representative there. So I’m asking the Governor to immediately go there and see
what’s happening. This village is in Tula Region. Therefore, this task is for the Tula
Governor.
Here is an interesting question about the Crimean economy and banking system. The first
part of the question concerns certain difficulties, including economic issues. The second
part is as follows: “I hired a car on lease from Privatbank. It will take me only two years
to repay the loan. The car officially belongs to Avtoprivat Group in Kiev. Privatbank no
longer operates in Crimea. What am I supposed to do?”
Please use the car and don’t worry. If Mr Kolomoisky and Mr Finkelstein don’t want your
money, it’s their problem.
But another and more important question concerns private bank accounts, which is very
serious. I would like to note that we have a database of Privatbank and Oschadbank
depositors. We will of course act according to the data we have. But the decision is almost
made, so if people lose any money they have in their accounts we will repay them up
to 700,000 roubles in line with Russian laws.
Vladimir Putin: “Will you agree to remain president for life?” No.
“Mr President, how many hours do you sleep?” Six, as I said.
“I’m Daniil Chuchin from Shchetino Children’s Home #1. Could you say ‘hello’ to me?”
Daniil, hello to you and all your friends and acquaintances, to everyone living in this
children’s home. I hope we’ll meet one day.
Here’s an interesting question from Albina. She’s six years old and her question is about
Russian-US relations. Just wait, you’ll like it.
“Do you think President Obama would save you if you were drowning?”
I sure hope this doesn’t happen, but you know that there are personal relationships
as well as relations between governments. I can’t say that I have a special personal
relationship with the US President, but I think he is a decent man and brave enough. So,
I think he definitely would.
“I’d like to have a Q&A like this with our ministers at least once a year. Otherwise, it’s not
democracy.”
You know, the Government has established a whole agency – the Open Government. If
such questions are being asked now (I picked this one out on purpose), that means
the Open Government is not so open after all and isn’t doing such a good job.
Vladimir Putin: ”We’re asking you questions now. But what if these questions were put
to the regional Governor?”
As you know, in many of Russia’s regions, Governors regularly appear in the media
and reach out to the public. This is something I know for a fact.
This question is from Rostov Region. And if this is indeed an issue, the Rostov Region
Governor should draw the appropriate conclusions. Hopefully, he’ll listen to this.
“If you weren’t President, which of the Russian regions would you want to live in?”
St Petersburg, of course. That’s where I was born, after all. It’s my home city.
Christina says she is “ready to come to Moscow with her parents to shake my hand.”
Thank you very much, Christina. Let me invite you and your parents to the Victory Day
parade on May 9.
Vladimir Putin: I thought for a long while about whether to answer this question at all. It is
not a question that would fit in a blitz Q&A section. This is a philosophical question. I’ll
read it out. This question was asked by Yekaterina Shcherbonos from St Petersburg: “I’m
asking you as a politician but I’d like to hear your personal rather than political opinion.
What is the Russian people to you? By virtue of your position you’ve probably been to all
countries of the world. You’ve seen a tremendous number of nations and ethnic groups
and learned about their cultural traditions, national habits, cuisine and arts. In this context
I’d like to ask you: In your opinion, what does it mean to be Russian? What do you think
about their pluses and minuses, their weaknesses and strengths?”
Well, some specialists believe that the people as a community do not have specific
features, that only individuals have them. I find it hard to accept this position because if
people are using the same language, live in a common state, on a common territory with
a certain climate, if they have common cultural values and history, they are bound to have
some common features.
As for our people, our country, like a magnet, has attracted representatives of different
ethnic groups, nations and nationalities. Incidentally, this has become the backbone not
only for our common cultural code but also a very powerful genetic code, because genes
have been exchanged during all these centuries and even millennia as a result of mixed
marriages.
And this genetic code of ours is probably, and in fact almost certainly, one of our main
competitive advantages in today’s world. This code is very flexible and enduring. We don’t
even feel it but it is certainly there.
So what are our particular features? We do have them, of course, and I think they rely
on values. It seems to me that the Russian person or, on a broader scale, a person
of the Russian world, primarily thinks about his or her highest moral designation, some
highest moral truths. This is why the Russian person, or a person of the Russian world,
does not concentrate on his or her own precious personality…
Of course, in everyday life we all think about how to live a wealthier and better life, to be
healthier and help our family, but these are still not the main values. Our people open
themselves outward. Western values are different and are focused on one’s inner self.
Personal success is the yardstick of success in life and this is acknowledged by society.
The more successful a man is, the better he is.
Publication status
This is not enough for us in this country. Even very rich people say: “Okay, I’ve made
millions and billions, so what next?” At any rate, everything is directed outward,
and oriented toward society. I think only our people could have come up with the famous
saying: “Meeting your death is no fear when you have got people round you.” How come?
Death is horrible, isn’t it? But no, it appears it may be beautiful if it serves the people:
death for one’s friends, one’s people or for the homeland, to use a modern word.
These are the deep roots of our patriotism. They explain mass heroism during armed
conflicts and wars and even sacrifice in peacetime. Hence there is a feeling of fellowship
and family values. Of course, we are less pragmatic, less calculating than representatives
of other peoples, and we have bigger hearts. Maybe this is a reflection of the grandeur
of our country and its boundless expanses. Our people have a more generous spirit.
I don’t want to offend anyone by saying this. Many peoples have their own advantages but
this is certainly ours. An intensive genetic, informational and cultural exchange is going
on in the modern world. There is no doubt that other peoples have precious and useful
things that we can borrow, but we have relied for centuries on our own values, which have
never let us down and will stand us in good stead in the future.
Thank you very much. (Applause.)
Maria Sittel: Thank you, Mr President.
Kirill Kleymenov: Thank you.
Published in sections: News, Transcripts
Publication date: April 17, 2014, 15:55
Direct link: en.kremlin.ru/d/20796
Annex 507
Luke Harding and Oksana Grytsenko, Kidnapping of Ukrainian Patriots Has Russia’s Full
Support, Says Kiev, Guardian (23 April 2014)

􀂱
Kidnapping of Ukrainian patriots has Russia's full support,
says Kiev
Luke Harding in Horlovka and Oksana Grytsenko in Kiev
The last time Vladimir Rybak was seen alive was on Thursday 17 April . The local councillor was
walking away from the city hall in the eastern Ukrainian city of Horlovka after taking part in a pro-
Ukrainian flashmob in the central square. Three days earlier, separatists had seized the
government building, taking down the Ukrainian flag and replacing it with the tricolour of the
Donetsk People's Republic.
According to friends, Rybak, who was 42, made no secret of his strong anti-separatist views. "He
was entirely open – and at times impulsive," fellow councillor Yurii Zhuk said. After the
demonstration Rybak tried to barge his way into the Horlovka city hall and take down the rebel
flag. A video captured what happened next. Pro-Russian protesters jostled Rybak; they refused to
let him inside; a youth in a balaclava grabbed his arm and led him away.
Case of Vladimir Rybak is latest in a string of kidnappings which Kiev blames on Russia and its
undercover agents
Wed 23 Apr 2014 12.34􀂱EDT
Zhuk said that Rybak and a friend then left the square, tracking away from its Lenin statue, and
headed towards the city's Palace of Culture. A Kia car pulled up, and four men in masks and
military fatigues jumped out and grabbed him. Rybak's friends assume the kidnappers must have
had a gun. "Vladimir was a sportsman and an ex-policeman. He knew how to handle himself,"
Zhuk said.
Over the weekend, Rybak's battered body was found in a river near the separatist stronghold of
Slavyansk, 60 miles away. According to investigators, he had been tortured. There were stab
marks on his stomach and bruising on his chest. Rybak's kidnappers tied a sandbag to his body
and drowned him while he was unconscious. On Wednesday, his widow Elena, a 49-year-old
doctor, and 25-year-old son Yura, went to Slavyansk to retrieve his body.
The gruesome case is the latest in a string of kidnappings and murders in eastern Ukraine which
Kiev blames on Russia and its undercover agents. Law and order in Slavyansk and surrounding
areas of the Donetsk region has deteriorated dramatically. In Kramatorsk, pro-Russian gunmen
hijacked the security agency HQ. They also beat up the city's deputy mayor and kidnapped its
police chief – both supporters of Ukrainian unity.
The situation in Slavyansk, the separatists' fortified capital, appears to be one of gun rule. Pro-
Russian militias continue to hold an American journalist, Simon Ostrovsky, taken hostage early on
Tuesday, as well as several Ukrainian reporters including Irma Krat. The gunmen have threatened
western correspondents, evicted Roma families from their homes and apparently imprisoned the
local mayor.
Vyacheslav Ponomaryov, the "people's mayor" of Slavyansk said that Ostrovsky wasn't a hostage
as such but was being "held" by his militia. He described the journalist as a "provocateur" and
berated the media for not reporting on the fate of pro-Russian activists arrested by Kiev for
separatism. The mayor gave no indication of when Ostrovsky might be released. He said he was
being kept in good conditions, with enough to eat, and the opportunity to wash.
In the past week, 16 people have been kidnapped in Slavyansk and Horlovka, and two murdered,
including Rybak. Rybak was a deputy for the Batkivshchyna party of Ukraine's acting president,
Olexsander Turchynov, who announced on Tuesday that Kiev would now restart military
operations against pro-Russian separatists in the east. The body of a second party supporter,
unidentified, was found near Rybak's. Both had been tortured to death, Turchynov said.
"The terrorists who effectively took the whole Donetsk region hostage have now gone too far, by
starting to torture and murder Ukrainian patriots. These crimes are being committed with the full
support and connivance of the Russian Federation," he said on Tuesday.
There were few signs of an offensive on Wednesday, however. Ukraine's interior ministry claimed
it had flushed gunmen out of a small town called Svyatogorsk, just outside Slavyansk, but there
had been no previous reports of gunmen in the town.
It is unclear if Kiev's latest military operation will be more successful than a similar attempt last
week.
That ended in humiliating failure when well-organised pro-Russian gunmen captured six
Ukrainian armoured vehicles sent to Kramatorsk, 10 miles from Slavyansk. Either way, it is clear
that the international deal to defuse the crisis, agreed last week in Geneva, is dead and buried.
The EU called on Russia on Wednesday to ensure an immediate end to the kidnappings and
killings in eastern Ukraine. But Russia's foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, accused Kiev of violating
the Geneva statement, and warned that Russia would respond if its interests were attacked in
Ukraine.
Lavrov used an interview with the Russian state-controlled broadcaster RT to accuse the US of
"running the show" in Ukraine, saying it was quite telling that Kiev announced a new military
campaign immediately after a visit by the US vice-president, Joe Biden. "If we are attacked, we
would certainly respond," said Lavrov, who recalled the 2008 war with Georgia over breakaway
South Ossetia.
In the capital, Kiev, Ukraine's SBU security service revealed details of Russia's alleged role in
Rybak's abduction and murder. Officials named two Russian agents as the masterminds behind
special operations in the east of Ukraine. Both agents work for Moscow's GRU military intelligence
wing, the officials said.
Zhuk said he last saw Rybak in Horlovka's central square half an hour before his abduction. They
had agreed to meet at 10am the next day. "That someone can be kidnapped in 2014 in the centre
of Europe is terrible. I don't have words," he said.
Who was responsible? "Radical elements who exist in the city. The fact that he was found in
Slavyansk confirms this was the work of separatists."
According to Zhuk, the majority of Horlovka – a mining and industrial city of 275,000 people – do
not support the separatists' cause. But he said Russian television had had a brainwashing effect,
with many people now unable to tell "what was true and what a lie". He stressed: "The big
majority are peaceful."
Zhuk described calls for an anti-Kiev referendum on 11 May as completely absurd, saying: "There
is no legal basis for it." He is one of three representatives in the 75-seat city assembly for the
Europe party.
The police had done little to halt the breakdown in public order, he said. "They are demoralised,
and split into two halves: one group supports the Donetsk People's Republic, the other Ukrainian
unity. There's no unified leadership. Nor are there any clear orders from Kiev."
He said he had sympathy for young officers, aged 25 or so, who were supposed to deal with angry
crowds armed with just a stick.
Rybak was elected to Horlovka's city council in October 2010. A father of two, he had previously
worked as a detective, heading up the investigations unit.
Another councillor – Oleg Gurbanov, an independent – said he had disagreed with Rybak over
many topics, but respected him for his forthright views. "I absolutely condemn the people who
did this. Everybody has a right to life," Gurbanov said.
The Donetsk People's Republic flag still flies above the building, even though normal work
resumed last week after the separatists left.
"I want a united Ukraine. But we've left [the flag] up there for now to try and avoid conflict,"
Vasily Mirozhnik, head of public affairs, explained. Who was behind Rybak's murder? "It's a
riddle," he said.
Since you’re here …
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Annex 508
Ukrainian Deputy Rybak Was Tortured and Then Drowned, MKRU (23 April 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.

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􀎀􀀒􀄂􀆉􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀎁􀀃􀁗􀅚􀅽􀆚􀅽􀍗􀀃􀁄􀄂􀆌􀅝􀅶􀄂􀀃􀁗􀄞􀆌􀄞􀇀􀅽􀇌􀅬􀅝􀅶􀄂􀀃
􀀃
􀁤􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄏􀅽􀄚􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀇁􀅽􀀃􀅵􀄞􀅶􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀀃􀅶􀄞􀄂􀆌􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅝􀆚􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁞􀅯􀄂􀇀􀇇􀄂􀅶􀆐􀅬􀀃􀅚􀄂􀆐􀀃􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶􀀃􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄂􀆐􀀃
􀄚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀇇􀀃􀁳􀅯􀄂􀄚􀅝􀅵􀅝􀆌􀀃􀁚􀇇􀄏􀄂􀅬􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀀯􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅽􀆌􀀃􀁄􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀀃􀄂􀅶􀅶􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀁤􀆵􀄞􀆐􀄚􀄂􀇇􀍘􀀃􀍞􀁤􀅽􀄚􀄂􀇇􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄏􀅽􀄚􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃
􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀇁􀅽􀀃􀄚􀄞􀄐􀄞􀄂􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀅵􀄞􀅶􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀍘􀀃􀀬􀄞􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀀧􀅽􀆌􀅯􀅽􀇀􀅬􀄂􀀃􀀒􀅝􀆚􀇇􀀃􀀒􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅝􀅯􀀃􀄚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀇇􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀅬􀅝􀇀􀆐􀅚􀄐􀅚􀅝􀅶􀄂􀀃
􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀁳􀅯􀄂􀄚􀅝􀅵􀅝􀆌􀀃􀁚􀇇􀄏􀄂􀅬􀍘􀀃􀁤􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀆵􀆐􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀄚􀄞􀄂􀆚􀅚􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀄏􀅽􀆚􀅚􀀃􀄚􀄞􀄐􀄞􀄂􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀅵􀄞􀅶􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀆵􀅯􀆚􀅝􀆉􀅯􀄞􀀃􀄏􀅽􀄚􀅝􀅯􀇇􀀃􀅝􀅶􀅩􀆵􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄂􀆐􀀃􀄂􀀃􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆵􀅯􀆚􀀃
􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅽􀆌􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞􀍕􀀃􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅯􀅯􀀃􀄂􀅯􀅝􀇀􀄞􀍕􀀃􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀄐􀅝􀅽􀆵􀆐􀀃􀇀􀅝􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅵􀆐􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄞􀆋􀆵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅯􀇇􀀃􀄏􀄞􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄚􀆌􀅽􀇁􀅶􀄞􀄚􀍕􀍟􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀀃􀆐􀄂􀇇􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁤􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄏􀅽􀄚􀅝􀄞􀆐􀀃􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶􀀃􀁞􀅯􀄂􀇀􀇇􀄂􀅶􀆐􀅬􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄏􀄞􀅯􀆐􀀃􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄂􀆌􀄐􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅯􀅽􀄐􀄂􀅯􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆌􀀃􀄚􀄞􀄂􀄚􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀇁􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄂􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄂􀄐􀅬􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀍛􀆐􀀃􀆐􀄞􀅯􀄨􀍲􀄚􀄞􀄨􀄞􀅶􀆐􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆉􀅽􀅝􀅶􀆚􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅝􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃􀀄􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀍞􀁗􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀍛􀆐􀀃
􀁄􀄂􀇇􀅽􀆌􀍟􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁞􀅯􀄂􀇀􀇇􀄂􀅶􀆐􀅬􀀃􀁳􀇇􀄂􀄐􀅚􀄞􀆐􀅯􀄂􀇀􀀃􀁗􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀄂􀆌􀄞􀇀􀍕􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀆐􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅽􀆌􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞􀀃􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄏􀅽􀄚􀅝􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃􀀾􀄂􀆐􀆚􀀃􀅶􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀀃
􀁗􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀄂􀆌􀄞􀇀􀀃􀄚􀅝􀄚􀀃􀅶􀅽􀆚􀀃􀆌􀆵􀅯􀄞􀀃􀅽􀆵􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅽􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅝􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅬􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚􀀃􀄏􀄞􀀃􀄂􀀃􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀆐􀆵􀅐􀅐􀄞􀆐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀇁􀄂􀅝􀆚􀀃
􀄨􀅽􀆌􀀃􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯􀀃􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘􀀃
􀀄􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀀯􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅽􀆌􀀃􀁄􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀇇􀀃􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀆐􀍕􀀃􀄐􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄂􀀃􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅶􀄞􀆐􀆐􀀃􀇁􀅚􀅽􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄂􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍕􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅬􀅶􀅽􀇁􀅶􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀄚􀆵􀄂􀅯􀆐􀀃
􀅬􀅝􀄚􀅶􀄂􀆉􀆉􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀇇􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀀧􀅽􀆌􀅯􀅽􀇀􀅬􀄂􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀀄􀆉􀆌􀅝􀅯􀀃􀏭􀏳􀍘􀀃􀁤􀅚􀄞􀀃􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅶􀄞􀆐􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅽􀅯􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅯􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄂􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆵􀆌􀀃􀅵􀄞􀅶􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀄨􀅯􀄂􀅐􀄞􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀆐􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀅵􀄂􀆐􀅬􀆐􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀇇􀀃􀆉􀆵􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀇇􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀆌􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀅽􀅬􀀃􀅚􀅝􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃􀆵􀅶􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄐􀅯􀅽􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀅯􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘􀀃􀀄􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃
􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀀯􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅽􀆌􀀃􀁄􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀇇􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅶􀄞􀆐􀆐􀍛􀆐􀀃􀆚􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅵􀅽􀅶􀇇􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃􀄂􀇀􀄂􀅝􀅯􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞􀀃􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅽􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁤􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀀃􀆐􀄂􀇇􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀀃􀇁􀅚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅽􀅽􀅬􀀃􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀁞􀄞􀄐􀆵􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇􀀃􀁞􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃
􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀀃􀄏􀆵􀅝􀅯􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅝􀆚􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁞􀅯􀄂􀇀􀇇􀄂􀅶􀆐􀅬􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀇀􀅽􀅯􀇀􀄞􀄚􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀆌􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀅵􀆵􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁚􀇇􀄏􀄂􀅬􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀀃
􀄚􀄞􀄐􀄞􀄂􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀅵􀄂􀅶􀍘􀀃􀀃
􀀃
􀁚􀇇􀄏􀄂􀅬􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅬􀅶􀅽􀇁􀅶􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆌􀀃􀅚􀅝􀆐􀀃􀆐􀇇􀅵􀆉􀄂􀆚􀅚􀅝􀄞􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀁄􀄂􀅝􀄚􀄂􀅶􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀅚􀅝􀆐􀀃􀆐􀅬􀄞􀆉􀆚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯􀀃􀄂􀆚􀆚􀅝􀆚􀆵􀄚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀍞􀀘􀅽􀅶􀄞􀆚􀆐􀅬􀀃􀁗􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀍛􀆐􀀃
􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀍘􀍟􀀃􀀬􀄞􀀃􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀇌􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀄞􀅵􀅽􀅶􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀀃􀍞􀀦􀅽􀆌􀀃􀄂􀀃􀁨􀅶􀅝􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍟􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀀧􀅽􀆌􀅯􀅽􀇀􀅬􀄂􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀁗􀄂􀇀􀄞􀅯􀀃􀀼􀅚􀆌􀄞􀅶􀅶􀅝􀅬􀅽􀇀􀀃
􀀃
􀁞􀅽􀆵􀆌􀄐􀄞􀍗􀀃􀁚􀀯􀀄􀀃􀁅􀅽􀇀􀅽􀆐􀆚􀅝􀀃
􀎀􀆐􀅽􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄚􀅝􀄂􀀃􀅝􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀎁􀀃
􀀃􀀃

Annex 509
MKRU, SBU - People’s Mayor Slavyansk Discussed with an Officer of the GRU RF How to Red
of the Corpse of Deputy Rybak (24 April 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.

5/16/2018 www.mk.ru/print/article/1019785/
1
http://www.mk.ru/print/article/1019785/
16+
MKRU May 16, 2018, time 19:43
Print version
SBU: “People’s Mayor” of Slavyansk discussed with an officer of the GRU RF how to get rid of Deputy
Rybak’s corpse
The Ukrainian security services made public an audio recording of negotiations over the high profile
murder
04/24/2014 at 15:30, number of views: 22,047
[social media icons]
In the recording provided by the Security Service of Ukraine, the head of the Russian commandos asks
the “People’s Mayor” of Slavyansk to “resolve the issue with the stiff,” to which the other responds:
“With the corpse?… I’ll go now and solve the issue of burying that punk.” GRU RF lieutenant colonel
Bezler also discusses the kidnapping of the Gorlovka parliamentarian.
[Photo]
[Caption:] Photo: AP
Vyacheslav Ponomarev
The Security Service of Ukraine suspects Vyacheslav Ponomarev, “People’s Mayor” of Slavyansk and
leader of the citizen militia of Donbass, and Igor Bezler, lieutenant colonel in the Main Intelligence
Directorate (GRU) of Russia (his personal code name is “Bes”) and the head of the Russian commandos
Igor Strelkov (an officer in the GRU RF) of being directly involved in the recent heinous killing of Gorlovka
City Council deputy Vladimir Rybak.
In confirmation of its “suspicions” the Security Service of Ukraine made public an audio recording of
negotiations in which Ponomarev, Bezler and Strelkov discuss Rybak’s murder. In particular, it can be
heard in the recording how the “People’s Mayor” of Slavyansk decides how to dispose of the corpse
together with the leaders of the Russian commandos. Strelkov asks Ponomarev to “resolve the issue
with the stiff” (“Slava, you please resolve the issue with the stiff. So, they drag them away from us as
quickly as possible. What’s he doing lying here; he stinks”), to which the other responds: “with the
corpse?… I’ll go now and resolve the issue of burying that punk.” GRU RF lieutenant colonel Bezler also
discusses the Gorlovka parliamentarian’s kidnapping on the recording.
5/16/2018 www.mk.ru/print/article/1019785/
2
http://www.mk.ru/print/article/1019785/
We remind readers that City Council deputy from the Batkivshchina party Vladimir Rybak, who had
earlier removed the flag of the self-proclaimed “Donetsk People’s Republic” from the Gorlovka City
Council building and was generally known for his sympathies with the Maidan (in Gorlovka he organized
demonstrations “For a United Ukraine”) was kidnapped in Gorlovka, Donetsk Region, on April 17.
According to witness testimony and a CCTV recording, four men dressed in camouflage uniforms and
masks forcibly put him in a car and took him to an undisclosed location.
On April 19 the parliamentarian’s body and the body of another man were found in the river near the
city of Slavyansk. According to information from the Interior Ministry of Ukraine, the cause of death of
both of the deceased men was multiple bodily injuries as a result of torture, with the still alive,
unconscious victims subsequently being drowned.
[Recording play button]
On April 23, the Security Service of Ukraine announced the alleged account of the murder. According to
the special services, GRU RF lieutenant colonel Bezler ordered the head of the self-proclaimed Gorlovka
militia to neutralize Rybak. He ordered the member of the Russian military to kidnap the Gorlovka
parliamentarian and then, after putting him in a car, to take him to an agreed place and beat him. At the
same time, Bezler himself planned to visit the place where the deputy was being detained. “Strelok”
(Igor Strelkov) in turn ordered that Rybak be delivered to the separatists’ headquarters in Slavyansk in
order to speak with him in person. Later Strelkov gave “People’s Mayor” of Slavyansk Vyacheslav
Ponomarev the instruction to remove the body of the murdered Rybak from the headquarters.
GRU RF lieutenant colonel Igor Bezler has already appeared in the Ukrainian media. In mid April a video
appeared on the Internet in which a person introducing himself as a “lieutenant colonel in the Russian
army” appears before militia officers after the Gorlovka Interior Ministry precinct came under the
control of the local self-defense forces. Later the Ukrainian media acknowledged that the person in
camouflage was local resident Igor Bezler. As the UNIAN agency reported, citing the Donetsk portal
“Ostrov,” earlier Bezler “headed the Prostor municipal funeral services business, from which he was
fired in 2012 after being accused of stealing enclosures and tombstones, and also for extorting money
from elderly people for a place in the cemetery.” At the same time, according to Internet portal URAInform,
Bezler is indeed a retired lieutenant colonel, but of the Ukrainian special forces, not the Russian
special forces.
Natalia Demidyuk New Ukraine. Chronicle of Events
[Copyright and registration information]
Annex 510
Intentionally Omitted

Annex 511
In Donetsk Region, an Orthodox Priest Was Killed, Gazeta (5 May 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.

5/14/2018 In Donetsk Region an Orthodox Priest Was Killed: Gazeta.Ru | News
1
https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2014/05/09/n_6140689.shtml
Gazeta.ru
__________________________________________________________________________________
In Donetsk Region an Orthodox Priest Was Killed
05/09/2014 | 17:38
Priest of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate Pavel Zhuchenko was killed near
one of the checkpoints in Donetsk Region, Interfax reports.
As the agency notes, mutually exclusive versions of what happened are coming from the scene of the
events.
The editor-in-chief of Internet publication “Ostrov,” Sergey Garmash, wrote on his Twitter feed that the
priest lived next to the checkpoint had attempted to call on the supporters of federalization to put down
their arms.
For his part, Russian Orthodox activist and head of the Corporation for Orthodox Action Kirill Frolov
stated that the murdered Orthodox priest was providing spiritual care for the rebels.
“Archpriest Pavel Zhuchenko, rector of the Church of Dmitriy Donskoy in the Donbass city of
Druzhkovka was traveling in a car near the Kondratievsk checkpoint when he was shot right in the heart,”
he said.
____________________________________________________________________________________
[Copyright, contact and registration information]

Annex 512
Zhirinovsky Gave a Military Vehivle to the Ukrainian Militiamen, 161.ru (6 May 2014)

Annex 513
The Body of the Heads of the Krasnolimanskaya Prosvita Was Found in a Burned Car,
Radiosvoboda (8 May 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.

1
May 16, 2018 Body of Krasnyi Lyman Prosvita Leader Found in a Torched Car
May 16, 2018, Kyiv 7:57 p.m.
NEWS | EVENTS
Body of Krasnyi Lyman Prosvita Leader Found in a
Torched Car
May 8, 2014, Kyiv 1:37 p.m.
Kharkiv police have discovered the body of pro-Ukrainian activist Valeriy Salo,
who vanished the other day, in Hrekivsky Forest (Luhansk Oblast). He headed
the Prosvita chapter in Krasnyi Lyman, Donetsk Oblast, according to a Radio
Svoboda correspondent.
A torched car with Valeriy Salo's charred body was found today. The day before, May
7, he was abducted by militants of the so-called “People's Donetsk Republic”. Radio
Svoboda learned about this from Mariya Oliynyk, deputy head of the Donetsk regional
chapter of Prosvita.
“On May 7, militants of the Donetsk People's Republic abducted Valeriy Salo, a
resident of the village of Shandryholove, Krasnyi Lyman District, a farmer who
supported an indivisible Ukraine,” Mariya Oliynyk said, adding: “They were just
preparing for the meeting of the local chapter. His car was flagged down in the center
of the village by armed men. They beat him up unconscious and put him in the trunk
of his car before speeding away. Today the torched car with his body was found in
Luhansk Oblast.”
Radio Svoboda have been trying to receive comment from the Donetsk
Regional police regarding this situation and the investigation into the
disappearance and murder of Valeriy Salo.
UTC+3 © Radio Svoboda, 2018 |All rights reserved.
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/25377547.html

Annex 514
Ukrainian Orthodox Church Confirms Priest Murdered in Donetsk Region, Kyiv Post (10 May
2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.

􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀅􀀉
􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀎􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀒􀀔􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀖􀀌􀀗􀀑􀀄􀀗􀀒􀀎􀀘􀀍􀀌􀀙􀀚􀀄􀀛􀀌􀀍􀀜􀀚􀀐􀀄􀀙􀀖􀀌􀀓􀀜􀀌􀀜􀀓􀀄􀀍􀀎
􀀝􀀒􀀎􀀜􀀐􀀚􀀋􀀄􀀌􀀜􀀞􀀍􀀒􀀎
􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀊􀀆􀀋􀀟􀀂􀀌􀀐􀀍􀀗􀀠􀀜􀀟􀀗􀀒􀀎􀀐􀀜􀀎􀀐􀀟􀀡􀀂􀀌􀀢􀀂􀀞􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀚􀀐􀀢􀀖􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀜􀀟􀀖􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀎􀀢􀀒􀀌􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀒􀀔􀀢􀀗􀀑􀀖􀀌􀀗􀀑􀀢􀀗􀀒􀀎􀀘􀀍􀀌􀀙􀀚􀀢􀀛􀀌􀀍􀀜􀀚􀀐􀀢􀀙􀀖􀀌􀀓􀀜􀀌􀀜􀀓􀀢􀀍􀀎􀀢􀀓􀀒􀀎􀀜􀀐􀀚􀀋􀀢􀀌􀀜􀀞􀀍􀀒􀀎􀀢
􀀣􀀉􀀤􀀅􀀥􀀆􀀦􀀑􀀐􀀙􀀠
􀀧􀀒􀀛􀀖􀀠􀀂􀀌􀀄
􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀚􀀒􀀗􀀍􀀂􀀠􀀄􀀙􀀜􀀓􀀍􀀂
􀀨􀀊􀀄􀀗􀀒􀀎􀀓􀀜􀀙􀀎􀀚􀀄􀀑􀀂􀀌􀀂􀀚􀀚􀀙􀀜􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀘􀀄􀀩􀀜􀀑􀀒􀀪􀀂􀀑􀀫􀀚􀀄􀀬􀀍􀀐􀀎􀀜􀀚􀀚􀀜􀀚􀀄􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀚􀀚􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀐􀀒􀀄􀀏􀀮􀀕􀀨􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀈􀀈􀀄􀀯􀀒􀀎􀀜􀀚􀀐􀀄􀀯􀀍􀀚􀀐􀀒􀀌􀀃􀀰
􀀯􀀒􀀡􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀚􀀚􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀖􀀚􀀜􀀚􀀄􀀱􀀒􀀎􀀜􀀄􀀎􀀂􀀐􀀍􀀒􀀎􀀫􀀄􀀙􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀄􀀐􀀒􀀄􀀲􀀖􀀚􀀐􀀍􀀘􀀃􀀄􀀍􀀙􀀛􀀜􀀌􀀍􀀂􀀠􀀍􀀚􀀙􀀄􀀣􀀈􀀳􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀚􀀚􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀌􀀓􀀜􀀌􀀜􀀓􀀄􀀐􀀒􀀄􀀛􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀴􀀅􀀵􀀶
􀀙􀀍􀀠􀀠􀀍􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀗􀀒􀀙􀀛􀀜􀀎􀀚􀀂􀀐􀀍􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀐􀀒􀀄􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀎􀀄􀀗􀀒􀀙􀀛􀀂􀀎􀀍􀀜􀀚􀀄􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀷􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀵
􀀸􀀹􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀗􀀒􀀎􀀘􀀍􀀌􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀍􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀺􀀒􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀛􀀌􀀍􀀜􀀚􀀐􀀫􀀚􀀄􀀙􀀖􀀌􀀓􀀜􀀌􀀻􀀄􀀜􀀔􀀍􀀚􀀐􀀚􀀦􀀄􀀼􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀍􀀚􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀗􀀠􀀜􀀂􀀌􀀄􀀘􀀒􀀌􀀄􀀎􀀒􀀡􀀄􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀡􀀑􀀍􀀗􀀑􀀄􀀽􀀠􀀒􀀗􀀋􀀄􀀛􀀒􀀚􀀐
􀀐􀀑􀀍􀀚􀀄􀀑􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀜􀀎􀀜􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀓􀀍􀀘􀀘􀀜􀀌􀀜􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀍􀀎􀀘􀀒􀀌􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀍􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀜􀀔􀀍􀀚􀀐􀀚􀀷􀀄􀀾􀀒􀀄􀀓􀀜􀀐􀀂􀀍􀀠􀀚􀀄􀀜􀀔􀀍􀀚􀀐􀀄􀀘􀀒􀀌􀀄􀀎􀀒􀀡􀀇􀀿􀀄􀀑􀀜􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀒􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀎
􀀏􀀌􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀒􀀔􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀖􀀌􀀗􀀑􀀄􀀚􀀃􀀎􀀒􀀓􀀄􀀍􀀎􀀘􀀒􀀌􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀍􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀂􀀎􀀓􀀄􀀜􀀎􀀠􀀍􀀞􀀑􀀐􀀜􀀎􀀙􀀜􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀓􀀜􀀛􀀂􀀌􀀐􀀙􀀜􀀎􀀐􀀇􀀄􀁀􀀌􀀗􀀑􀀛􀀌􀀍􀀜􀀚􀀐􀀄􀀯􀀜􀀒􀀌􀀑􀀍􀀃
􀁁􀀒􀀪􀀂􀀠􀀜􀀎􀀋􀀒􀀄􀀐􀀒􀀠􀀓􀀄􀁂􀀎􀀐􀀜􀀌􀀘􀀂􀀔􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀄􀁃􀀌􀀍􀀓􀀂􀀃􀀦
􀁀􀀗􀀗􀀒􀀌􀀓􀀍􀀎􀀞􀀄􀀐􀀒􀀄􀁁􀀒􀀪􀀂􀀠􀀜􀀎􀀋􀀒􀀇􀀄􀀞􀀜􀀐􀀐􀀍􀀎􀀞􀀄􀀍􀀎􀀘􀀒􀀌􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀍􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀍􀀚􀀄􀀗􀀒􀀙􀀛􀀠􀀍􀀗􀀂􀀐􀀜􀀓􀀄􀀽􀀃􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀘􀀂􀀗􀀐􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀛􀀌􀀍􀀜􀀚􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀍􀀠􀀠􀀜􀀓􀀄􀀡􀀂􀀚
􀀒􀀖􀀐􀀚􀀍􀀓􀀜􀀄􀀚􀀐􀀂􀀘􀀘􀀄􀀘􀀒􀀌􀀄􀀚􀀜􀀪􀀜􀀌􀀂􀀠􀀄􀀃􀀜􀀂􀀌􀀚􀀄􀀂􀀎􀀓􀀄􀀓􀀍􀀓􀀄􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀄􀀙􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀐􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀗􀀒􀀎􀀐􀀂􀀗􀀐􀀄􀀡􀀍􀀐􀀑􀀄􀀜􀀛􀀂􀀌􀀗􀀑􀀍􀀂􀀠􀀄􀀠􀀜􀀂􀀓􀀜􀀌􀀚􀀑􀀍􀀛􀀦
􀀸􀀯􀀜􀀄􀀪􀀍􀀌􀀐􀀖􀀂􀀠􀀠􀀃􀀄􀀓􀀒􀀜􀀚􀀄􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀄􀀑􀀂􀀪􀀜􀀄􀀂􀀎􀀃􀀄􀀗􀀒􀀙􀀙􀀖􀀎􀀍􀀗􀀂􀀐􀀍􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀡􀀍􀀐􀀑􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀜􀀛􀀂􀀌􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀇􀀄􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀍􀀚􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀐􀀚􀀍􀀓􀀜􀀄􀀚􀀐􀀂􀀘􀀘􀀄􀀘􀀒􀀌􀀄􀀚􀀜􀀪􀀜􀀌􀀂􀀠
􀀃􀀜􀀂􀀌􀀚􀀦􀀄􀀨􀀪􀀜􀀌􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀍􀀎􀀞􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀜􀀛􀀂􀀌􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀄􀀋􀀎􀀒􀀡􀀚􀀄􀀍􀀚􀀄􀀡􀀑􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀑􀀂􀀛􀀛􀀜􀀎􀀜􀀓􀀄􀀺􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀙􀀖􀀌􀀓􀀜􀀌􀀻􀀄􀀂􀀎􀀓􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀌􀀜􀀚􀀐􀀄􀀍􀀚􀀄􀀌􀀖􀀙􀀒􀀌􀀚􀀇􀀿
􀁁􀀒􀀪􀀂􀀠􀀜􀀎􀀋􀀒􀀄􀀚􀀂􀀍􀀓􀀦􀀄􀀹􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀎􀀂􀀙􀀜􀀄􀀒􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀜􀀂􀀚􀀜􀀓􀀄􀀍􀀚􀀄􀁃􀀂􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀌􀀄􀀧􀀂􀀪􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀄􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀚􀀂􀀍􀀓􀀦
􀀧􀀌􀀍􀀜􀀚􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀎􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀒􀀔􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀖􀀌􀀗􀀑􀀄􀀒􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀁􀀒􀀚􀀗􀀒􀀡􀀄􀀧􀀂􀀐􀀌􀀍􀀂􀀌􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀄􀀧􀀂􀀪􀀠􀀒􀀄􀁄􀀑􀀖􀀗􀀑􀀜􀀎􀀋􀀒􀀄􀀡􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀋􀀍􀀠􀀠􀀜􀀓
􀀎􀀜􀀂􀀌􀀄􀀂􀀄􀀽􀀠􀀒􀀗􀀋􀀄􀀛􀀒􀀚􀀐􀀄􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀝􀀒􀀎􀀜􀀐􀀚􀀋􀀄􀀌􀀜􀀞􀀍􀀒􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀠􀀒􀀗􀀂􀀠􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀢􀀠􀀍􀀎􀀜􀀄􀀙􀀂􀀚􀀚􀀄􀀙􀀜􀀓􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀐􀀠􀀜􀀐􀀚􀀄􀀂􀀎􀀓􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀒􀀔
􀀂􀀗􀀐􀀍􀀪􀀍􀀚􀀐􀀚􀀄􀀑􀀂􀀪􀀜􀀄􀀚􀀂􀀍􀀓􀀦
􀀹􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀛􀀌􀀍􀀜􀀚􀀐􀀄􀀠􀀍􀀪􀀜􀀓􀀄􀀎􀀜􀀔􀀐􀀄􀀐􀀒􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀽􀀠􀀒􀀗􀀋􀀄􀀛􀀒􀀚􀀐􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀍􀀜􀀓􀀄􀀐􀀒􀀄􀀖􀀌􀀞􀀜􀀄􀀒􀀛􀀛􀀒􀀎􀀜􀀎􀀐􀀚􀀄􀀒􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀁁􀀃􀀍􀀪􀀄􀀂􀀖􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀌􀀍􀀐􀀍􀀜􀀚􀀄􀀐􀀒
􀀚􀀖􀀌􀀌􀀜􀀎􀀓􀀜􀀌􀀄􀀂􀀌􀀙􀀚􀀄􀀂􀀎􀀓􀀄􀀡􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀋􀀍􀀠􀀠􀀜􀀓􀀄􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀂􀀄􀀌􀀜􀀚􀀖􀀠􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀍􀀚􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀓􀀍􀀐􀀒􀀌􀀢􀀍􀀎􀀢􀀗􀀑􀀍􀀜􀀘􀀄􀀒􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀁂􀀚􀀠􀀂􀀎􀀓􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀢􀀠􀀍􀀎􀀜􀀄􀀙􀀂􀀚􀀚
􀀙􀀜􀀓􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀐􀀠􀀜􀀐􀀄􀀮􀀜􀀌􀀑􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀯􀀂􀀌􀀙􀀂􀀚􀀑􀀄􀀐􀀡􀀍􀀐􀀐􀀜􀀓􀀦
􀀹􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀛􀀌􀀍􀀜􀀚􀀐􀀄􀀑􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀌􀀜􀀜􀀄􀀗􀀑􀀍􀀠􀀓􀀌􀀜􀀎􀀦
􀀸􀀁􀀒􀀎􀀚􀀐􀀜􀀌􀀚􀀄􀀚􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀄􀀜􀀍􀀞􀀑􀀐􀀄􀀽􀀖􀀠􀀠􀀜􀀐􀀚􀀄􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀛􀀌􀀍􀀜􀀚􀀐􀀄􀀘􀀌􀀒􀀙􀀄􀀂􀀖􀀐􀀒􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀍􀀗􀀄􀀘􀀍􀀌􀀜􀀂􀀌􀀙􀀇􀀿􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀎􀀄􀀧􀀌􀀒􀀚􀀜􀀗􀀖􀀐􀀒􀀌
􀁅􀀜􀀎􀀜􀀌􀀂􀀠􀀫􀀚􀀄􀀏􀀘􀀘􀀍􀀗􀀜􀀄􀀛􀀌􀀜􀀚􀀚􀀄􀀒􀀘􀀘􀀍􀀗􀀜􀀄􀀚􀀂􀀍􀀓􀀦􀀄􀁀􀀗􀀗􀀒􀀌􀀓􀀍􀀎􀀞􀀄􀀐􀀒􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀍􀀎􀀘􀀒􀀌􀀙􀀂􀀐􀀍􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀎􀀄􀀧􀀌􀀒􀀚􀀜􀀗􀀖􀀐􀀒􀀌
􀁅􀀜􀀎􀀜􀀌􀀂􀀠􀀫􀀚􀀄􀀏􀀘􀀘􀀍􀀗􀀜􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀗􀀌􀀍􀀙􀀜􀀄􀀡􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀗􀀒􀀙􀀙􀀍􀀐􀀐􀀜􀀓􀀄􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀂􀀄􀀽􀀠􀀒􀀗􀀋􀀄􀀛􀀒􀀚􀀐􀀄􀀂􀀐􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀜􀀔􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀘􀀌􀀒􀀙􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀐􀀒􀀡􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀘
􀀝􀀌􀀖􀁆􀀑􀀋􀀍􀀪􀀋􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀥􀀦􀀄􀀹􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀠􀀂􀀡􀀄􀀜􀀎􀀘􀀒􀀌􀀗􀀜􀀙􀀜􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀂􀀖􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀌􀀍􀀐􀀍􀀜􀀚􀀄􀀑􀀂􀀪􀀜􀀄􀀚􀀐􀀂􀀌􀀐􀀜􀀓􀀄􀀂􀀎􀀄􀀍􀀎􀀪􀀜􀀚􀀐􀀍􀀞􀀂􀀐􀀍􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜
􀀍􀀎􀀗􀀍􀀓􀀜􀀎􀀐􀀦
􀀸􀀹􀀜􀀌􀀌􀀒􀀌􀀍􀀚􀀐􀀚􀀄􀀽􀀜􀀍􀀎􀀞􀀄􀀗􀀒􀀒􀀌􀀓􀀍􀀎􀀂􀀐􀀜􀀓􀀄􀀽􀀃􀀄􀀂􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀐􀀚􀀍􀀓􀀜􀀄􀀂􀀞􀀞􀀌􀀜􀀚􀀚􀀒􀀌􀀿􀀄􀀂􀀌􀀜􀀄􀀌􀀜􀀚􀀛􀀒􀀎􀀚􀀍􀀽􀀠􀀜􀀄􀀘􀀒􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜􀀄􀀙􀀖􀀌􀀓􀀜􀀌􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀜
􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀎􀀄􀀧􀀌􀀒􀀚􀀜􀀗􀀖􀀐􀀒􀀌􀀄􀁅􀀜􀀎􀀜􀀌􀀂􀀠􀀫􀀚􀀄􀀏􀀘􀀘􀀍􀀗􀀜􀀄􀀚􀀂􀀍􀀓􀀦
􀀮􀀍􀀞􀀎􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀐􀀒􀀄􀀌􀀜􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀍􀀚􀀄􀀂􀀌􀀐􀀍􀀗􀀠􀀜􀀄􀀒􀀌􀀄􀀚􀀖􀀽􀀚􀀗􀀌􀀍􀀽􀀜􀀄􀀐􀀒􀀄􀀞􀀜􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀠􀀍􀀙􀀍􀀐􀀜􀀓􀀄􀀂􀀗􀀗􀀜􀀚􀀚
􀀅􀀟􀀣

Annex 515
Aleksander Vasovic & Maria Tsvetkova, Elusive Muscovite with Three Names Takes Control of
Ukraine Rebels, Reuters (15 May 2014)

􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀂􀀁􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀉􀀊􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀈􀀋􀀆􀀃􀀅􀀊􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀏􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀋􀀅􀀍􀀊􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀄􀀁􀀈􀀇􀀉􀀊􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀋􀀏􀀉􀀊􀀆􀀎􀀓􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀋􀀔􀀅􀀄􀀒􀀋􀀄􀀒􀀃􀀈􀀈􀀋􀀍􀀂􀀏􀀈􀀊􀀋􀀄􀀂􀀌􀀈􀀊􀀋􀀆􀀎􀀍􀀄􀀃􀀎􀀇􀀋􀀎􀀕􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀈􀀋
􀀃􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀇􀀊􀀋􀀅􀀐􀀗􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀜􀀝􀀛􀀞􀀟􀀛􀀠􀀞􀀡􀀝􀀞􀀢􀀡􀀢
􀀣􀀎􀀃􀀇􀀐􀀤􀀥􀀈􀀔􀀊
􀀦􀀂􀀧􀀤􀀡􀀢􀀨􀀤􀀠􀀞􀀡􀀝􀀤􀀁􀀤􀀩􀀪􀀞􀀟􀀤􀀜􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀤􀀧􀀈􀀂􀀃􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀑􀀎
􀀛􀀇􀀉􀀊􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀤􀀦􀀉􀀊􀀆􀀎􀀓􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀤􀀔􀀅􀀄􀀒􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀃􀀈􀀈􀀤􀀍􀀂􀀏􀀈􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀂􀀌􀀈􀀊􀀤􀀆􀀎􀀍􀀄􀀃􀀎􀀇􀀤􀀎􀀕
􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀈􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀇􀀊
􀀘􀀫􀀜􀀬􀀭􀀜􀀥􀀘􀀮􀀨􀀤􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀈􀀁􀀦􀀯􀀘􀀰􀀯􀀣􀀤􀀱􀀚􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀲􀀤􀀋􀀤􀀳􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀏􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀔􀀅􀀄􀀒􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀃􀀈􀀈􀀤􀀍􀀂􀀏􀀈􀀊􀀨􀀤􀀊􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀒􀀄􀀤􀀖􀀧
􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀇􀀅􀀑􀀈􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀴􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀎􀀴􀀈􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀴􀀂􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀊􀀄􀀤􀀈􀀂􀀊􀀄􀀵􀀤􀀳􀀈􀀤􀀏􀀎􀀓􀀈􀀊
􀀄􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀒􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀊􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀈􀀄􀀊􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀖􀀇􀀂􀀆􀀌􀀤􀀦􀀈􀀃􀀆􀀈􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀨􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀕􀀂􀀆􀀈􀀤􀀔􀀅􀀄􀀒􀀤􀀴􀀈􀀍􀀆􀀅􀀇􀀤􀀏􀀎􀀉􀀊􀀄􀀂􀀆􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀒􀀅􀀍􀀐
􀀄􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀔􀀅􀀍􀀐􀀎􀀔􀀊􀀨􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀅􀀏􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀶􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀄􀀃􀀎􀀧􀀷􀀤􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀆􀀈􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀓􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀉􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀎􀀍􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀃􀀅􀀄􀀎􀀃􀀧􀀵
􀀭􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀕􀀇􀀈􀀄􀀤􀀐􀀅􀀊􀀄􀀃􀀅􀀖􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀔􀀈􀀈􀀌􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀇􀀤􀀸􀀎􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀊􀀌􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀨􀀤􀀶􀀰􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀍􀀈􀀇􀀤􀀭􀀑􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀎􀀓􀀷
􀀂􀀊􀀊􀀉􀀏􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀏􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀂􀀇􀀇􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀇􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀆􀀈􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀆􀀂􀀇􀀇􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀧􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀇􀀴􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀔􀀂􀀃􀀐􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀕
􀀔􀀒􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀆􀀂􀀇􀀇􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀃􀀈􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀕􀀃􀀎􀀏􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀮􀀅􀀈􀀓􀀤􀀶􀀹􀀉􀀍􀀄􀀂􀀷􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀕􀀃􀀎􀀏􀀤􀀥􀀜􀀺􀀯􀀵
􀀺􀀎􀀤􀀮􀀅􀀈􀀓􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀅􀀄􀀊􀀤􀀣􀀈􀀊􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀇􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀨􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀎􀀓􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀇􀀅􀀓􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀴􀀃􀀎􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀦􀀎􀀊􀀆􀀎􀀔􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀒􀀅􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀉􀀴􀀃􀀅􀀊􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀅􀀍
􀀈􀀂􀀊􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀍􀀤􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀈􀀨􀀤􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀴􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀄􀀊􀀤􀀐􀀈􀀍􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀊􀀨􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀃􀀧􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀴􀀇􀀂􀀧􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀊􀀆􀀈􀀍􀀂􀀃􀀅􀀎􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀔􀀤􀀅􀀄􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀅􀀻􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈
􀀰􀀃􀀅􀀏􀀈􀀂􀀤􀀴􀀃􀀎􀀓􀀅􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀦􀀂􀀃􀀆􀀒􀀵
􀀺􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀴􀀂􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀊􀀄􀀊􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀈􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀇􀀅􀀄􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀄􀀧􀀵􀀤􀀳􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀔􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀕􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀏􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀊
􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀶􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀎􀀌􀀷􀀤􀀋􀀤􀀶􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀘􀀒􀀎􀀎􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀷􀀵􀀤􀀮􀀅􀀈􀀓􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀧􀀊􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀆􀀄􀀉􀀂􀀇􀀇􀀧􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀑􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀼􀀊􀀤􀀽􀀚􀀗􀀤􀀏􀀅􀀇􀀅􀀄􀀂􀀃􀀧
􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀇􀀅􀀑􀀈􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀵􀀤􀀚􀀈􀀊􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀊􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀦􀀎􀀊􀀆􀀎􀀔􀀤􀀊􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀃􀀖􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀧􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀏􀀅􀀇􀀐􀀋􀀏􀀂􀀍􀀍􀀈􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀍􀀈􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀖􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀧􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀈
􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀔􀀍􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀧􀀈􀀂􀀃􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀭􀀑􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀽􀀅􀀃􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀵
􀀣􀀒􀀈􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀎􀀓􀀨􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀎􀀌􀀤􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀽􀀅􀀃􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀨􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀍􀀎􀀔􀀤􀀃􀀂􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀧􀀤􀀑􀀇􀀅􀀏􀀴􀀊􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀴􀀉􀀖􀀇􀀅􀀆􀀨􀀤􀀐􀀃􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀒􀀅􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀈􀀐
􀀔􀀅􀀍􀀐􀀎􀀔􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀃􀀎􀀉􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀔􀀍􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀘􀀇􀀂􀀓􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀊􀀌􀀨􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀅􀀆􀀒􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀏􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀂􀀓􀀅􀀇􀀧􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀐
􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀅􀀃􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀊􀀉􀀃􀀃􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀵
􀀳􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀕􀀇􀀈􀀄􀀨􀀤􀀴􀀉􀀖􀀇􀀅􀀊􀀒􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀔􀀈􀀖􀀊􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀴􀀂􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀊􀀄􀀤􀀴􀀎􀀇􀀅􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀾􀀂􀀓􀀈􀀇􀀤􀀽􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀃􀀈􀀓􀀤􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀦􀀎􀀍􀀐􀀂􀀧􀀨􀀤􀀔􀀂􀀊
􀀅􀀊􀀊􀀉􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀍􀀂􀀏􀀈􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀶􀀺􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀰􀀎􀀏􀀏􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀋􀀅􀀍􀀋􀀰􀀒􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀸􀀎􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀊􀀌􀀤􀀾􀀈􀀎􀀴􀀇􀀈􀀼􀀊􀀤􀀚􀀈􀀴􀀉􀀖􀀇􀀅􀀆􀀷􀀵
􀀳􀀈􀀤􀀑􀀂􀀓􀀈􀀤􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀃􀀎􀀎􀀴􀀊􀀤􀀝􀀿􀀤􀀒􀀎􀀉􀀃􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀶􀀴􀀇􀀈􀀐􀀑􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀎􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀂􀀇􀀇􀀈􀀑􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀸􀀎􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀊􀀌
􀀾􀀈􀀎􀀴􀀇􀀈􀀼􀀊􀀤􀀚􀀈􀀴􀀉􀀖􀀇􀀅􀀆􀀤􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀓􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀄􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀃􀀅􀀄􀀎􀀃􀀧􀀷􀀵􀀤􀀦􀀈􀀏􀀖􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀥􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀇􀀤􀀽􀀉􀀂􀀃􀀐􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀃
􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀆􀀈􀀊􀀤􀀔􀀎􀀉􀀇􀀐􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀤􀀐􀀈􀀄􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀶􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀄􀀃􀀎􀀧􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀊􀀴􀀎􀀄􀀷􀀵
􀀶􀀳􀀂􀀓􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀏􀀅􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀃􀀑􀀈􀀍􀀆􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀅􀀄􀀉􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀍􀀄􀀃􀀧􀀨􀀤􀀑􀀈􀀍􀀎􀀆􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀮􀀅􀀈􀀓􀀤􀀹􀀉􀀍􀀄􀀂􀀤􀀂􀀑􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀊􀀄
􀀸􀀎􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀊􀀌􀀼􀀊􀀤􀀴􀀎􀀴􀀉􀀇􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀃􀀈􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀥􀀜􀀺􀀯􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀓􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀨􀀤􀀭􀀤􀀂􀀏􀀤􀀂􀀊􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀍
􀁀􀀈􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀴􀀃􀀎􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀤􀀏􀀅􀀇􀀅􀀄􀀂􀀃􀀧􀀤􀀂􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀊􀀄􀀂􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀸􀀾􀀚􀀨􀀷􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀏􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀨􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀕􀀈􀀃􀀃􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈
􀀸􀀎􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀊􀀌􀀤􀀾􀀈􀀎􀀴􀀇􀀈􀀼􀀊􀀤􀀚􀀈􀀴􀀉􀀖􀀇􀀅􀀆􀀤􀀖􀀧􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀎􀀍􀀧􀀏􀀵
􀀜􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀂􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀖􀀂􀀆􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀎􀀉􀀍􀀐􀀨􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀴􀀂􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀊􀀄􀀤􀀊􀀴􀀎􀀌􀀈􀀊􀀔􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀇􀀂􀀤􀀮􀀒􀀎􀀃􀀎􀀊􀀒􀀈􀀓􀀂􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀎􀀓
􀀔􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀈􀀄􀀒􀀍􀀅􀀆􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀓􀀈􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀘􀀎􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀨􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀄􀀤􀀑􀀂􀀓􀀈􀀤􀀍􀀎􀀤􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀃
􀀐􀀈􀀄􀀂􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀎􀀃􀀅􀀑􀀅􀀍􀀊􀀤􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀆􀀅􀀄􀀅􀀻􀀈􀀍􀀊􀀒􀀅􀀴􀀵
􀀡􀀁􀀝
􀀶􀀳􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀤􀀐􀀎􀀤􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀤􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀔􀀤􀀅􀀕􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀧􀀤􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀍􀀂􀀏􀀈􀀊􀀨􀀷􀀤􀀊􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀵􀀤􀀶􀀳􀀈􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀃􀀅􀀆􀀒􀀤􀀏􀀅􀀇􀀅􀀄􀀂􀀃􀀧
􀀈􀁁􀀴􀀈􀀃􀀅􀀈􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀒􀀎􀀇􀀐􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀃􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀆􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀍􀀈􀀇􀀵􀀷􀀤􀀳􀀈􀀤􀀔􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀤􀀂􀀓􀀂􀀅􀀇􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀔􀀨􀀤􀀊􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀐􀀵
􀁀􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀇􀀎􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀄􀀅􀀏􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀎􀀍􀀇􀀧􀀤􀀅􀀏􀀂􀀑􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀔􀀎􀀃􀀇􀀐􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀎􀀓􀀤􀀔􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀔􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀴􀀎􀀊􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀒􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀊􀀉􀀈􀀐
􀀖􀀧􀀤􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀈􀀼􀀊􀀤􀀘􀀙􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀃􀀅􀀄􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀆􀀈􀀵
􀀺􀀒􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀊􀀄􀀤􀀏􀀎􀀍􀀄􀀒􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀍􀀈􀀔􀀊􀀴􀀂􀀴􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀮􀀎􀀏􀀊􀀎􀀏􀀎􀀇􀀊􀀌􀀂􀀧􀀂􀀤􀀾􀀃􀀂􀀓􀀐􀀂􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀊􀀉􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀎􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀂􀀍
􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀈􀀔􀀤􀀔􀀅􀀄􀀒􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀂􀀴􀀴􀀈􀀂􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀏􀀈􀀤􀀴􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀔􀀅􀀄􀀒􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀏􀀈􀀤􀀴􀀈􀀍􀀆􀀅􀀇􀀤􀀏􀀎􀀉􀀊􀀄􀀂􀀆􀀒􀀈􀀵
􀀭􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀓􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀎􀀨􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀎􀀓􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀆􀀂􀀏􀀈􀀤􀀕􀀃􀀎􀀏􀀤􀀰􀀃􀀅􀀏􀀈􀀂􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀏􀀎􀀊􀀄􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀕􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀤􀀔􀀈􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀓􀀈􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀂􀀍􀀊
􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀤􀀔􀀅􀀄􀀒􀀤􀀖􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀇􀀐􀀤􀀈􀁁􀀴􀀈􀀃􀀅􀀈􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀵􀀤􀀺􀀒􀀈􀀅􀀃􀀤􀀔􀀈􀀂􀀴􀀎􀀍􀀊􀀤􀀔􀀈􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀇􀀇
􀀊􀀈􀀅􀀻􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀕􀀃􀀎􀀏􀀤􀀂􀀃􀀊􀀈􀀍􀀂􀀇􀀊􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀈􀀨􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀵􀀤􀀦􀀎􀀊􀀆􀀎􀀔􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀤􀀶􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀤􀀑􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀉􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀊􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀇􀀈􀀤􀀑􀀉􀀍􀀨􀀤􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀂
􀀊􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀇􀀈􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀇􀀇􀀈􀀄􀀷􀀵
􀀺􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀴􀀴􀀂􀀃􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀂􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀔􀀇􀀈􀀐􀀑􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀰􀀃􀀅􀀏􀀈􀀂􀀤􀀇􀀅􀀍􀀌􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀅􀀏􀀴􀀎􀀃􀀄􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀨􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀉􀀊􀀈􀀤􀀮􀀅􀀈􀀓􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀧􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀏􀀈
􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀑􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀊􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀎􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀅􀀻􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀴􀀃􀀎􀀓􀀅􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀤􀀋􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀅􀀆􀀒􀀤􀀦􀀎􀀊􀀆􀀎􀀔􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀍􀀈􀁁􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀦􀀂􀀃􀀆􀀒􀀤􀀋􀀤􀀂􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀍􀀎􀀔
􀀖􀀈􀀒􀀅􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀉􀀴􀀃􀀅􀀊􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀈􀀂􀀊􀀄􀀵
􀀘􀀳􀀭􀀥􀀭􀀥􀀽􀀤􀀜􀀚􀀦􀀯􀀗􀀚
􀀚􀀈􀀊􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀊􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀈􀀈􀀴􀀧􀀤􀀍􀀈􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀖􀀎􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀎􀀐􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀍􀀎􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀃􀀍􀀤􀀦􀀎􀀊􀀆􀀎􀀔􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀧􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀑􀀍􀀅􀀻􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀅􀀃
􀀍􀀈􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀖􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀔􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀏􀀤􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀈􀀓􀀅􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀊􀀄􀀤􀀏􀀎􀀍􀀄􀀒􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀃􀀎􀀐􀀉􀀆􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀏􀀊􀀈􀀇􀀕􀀤􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈
􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀏􀀅􀀇􀀅􀀄􀀅􀀂􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀘􀀇􀀂􀀓􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀊􀀌􀀵
􀀺􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀏􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀧􀀤􀀌􀀍􀀈􀀔􀀤􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀭􀀑􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀽􀀅􀀃􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀇􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀏􀀎􀀊􀀄􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀇􀀅􀀕􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀍􀀅􀀍􀀈􀀋􀀊􀀄􀀎􀀃􀀈􀀧􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀅􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀎􀀍
􀀘􀀒􀀈􀀍􀀌􀀉􀀃􀀊􀀌􀀤􀀣􀀂􀀧􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀈􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀏􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀃􀀨􀀤􀀄􀀔􀀎􀀤􀀆􀀒􀀅􀀇􀀐􀀃􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀏􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀔􀀅􀀕􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀇􀀊􀀎􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀊􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀨􀀤􀀍􀀈􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀖􀀎􀀃􀀊􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀵
􀀽􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀍􀀂􀀤􀀭􀀓􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀓􀀍􀀂􀀨􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀎􀀤􀀇􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀔􀀎􀀤􀀕􀀇􀀎􀀎􀀃􀀊􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀇􀀎􀀔􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀏􀀨􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀊􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀔􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀊􀀄􀀤􀀂􀀃􀀎􀀉􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀊􀀅􀁁􀀤􀀏􀀎􀀍􀀄􀀒􀀊
􀀂􀀑􀀎􀀵
􀀶􀀳􀀈􀀼􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀇􀀔􀀂􀀧􀀊􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀓􀀈􀀃􀀧􀀤􀀴􀀎􀀇􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀓􀀈􀀃􀀧􀀤􀁂􀀉􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀨􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀒􀀤􀀭􀀤􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀍􀀼􀀄􀀤􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀔􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀏􀀤􀀔􀀈􀀇􀀇􀀵􀀤􀀳􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀇􀀔􀀂􀀧􀀊􀀤􀀔􀀎􀀃􀀈
􀀂􀀤􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀨􀀤􀀔􀀎􀀉􀀇􀀐􀀤􀀔􀀂􀀇􀀌􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀔􀀎􀀃􀀌􀀵􀀤􀀥􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀂􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀏􀀤􀀔􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀴􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀂􀀃􀀇􀀧􀀤􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀊􀀄􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀨􀀷􀀤􀀊􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈
􀀂􀀴􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀵􀀤􀀘􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀅􀀍􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀑􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀊􀀄􀀤􀀍􀀂􀀏􀀈􀀵
􀀬􀀇􀀂􀀐􀀅􀀏􀀅􀀃􀀨􀀤􀀠􀀩􀀨􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀎􀀤􀀇􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀊􀀤􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀕􀀇􀀎􀀎􀀃􀀨􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀪􀀤􀀶􀀳􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀽􀀅􀀃􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀇􀀊􀀎􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀍􀀐
􀀊􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀂􀀏􀀈􀀨􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀎􀀓􀀵􀀤􀀦􀀧􀀤􀀏􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀔􀀍􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀏􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀏􀀂􀀍􀀧􀀤􀀧􀀈􀀂􀀃􀀊􀀵􀀷
􀀥􀀎􀀤􀀎􀀍􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀊􀀔􀀈􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀐􀀎􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀄􀀔􀀎􀀤􀀂􀀴􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀊􀀤􀀍􀀈􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀖􀀎􀀃􀀊􀀤􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀇􀀎􀀍􀀑􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀊
􀀏􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀈􀁁􀀋􀀔􀀅􀀕􀀈􀀵
􀀣􀀒􀀎􀀈􀀓􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀨􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀎􀀓􀀁􀀽􀀅􀀃􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀒􀀉􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀊􀀄􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀒􀀎􀀖􀀖􀀧􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀐􀀃􀀈􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀉􀀴􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀆􀀎􀀊􀀄􀀉􀀏􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀎
􀀃􀀈􀀋􀀈􀀍􀀂􀀆􀀄􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀊􀀄􀀎􀀃􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀇􀀤􀀖􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀨􀀤􀀴􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀴􀀂􀀃􀀂􀀏􀀅􀀇􀀅􀀄􀀂􀀃􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀄􀀉􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀵􀀤􀀙􀀇􀀎􀀑􀀑􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀤􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈
􀀭􀀍􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀈􀀤􀀉􀀍􀀈􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀴􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀎􀀊􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀏􀀤􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀋􀀈􀀍􀀂􀀆􀀄􀀏􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀊􀀨􀀤􀀐􀀃􀀈􀀊􀀊􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀊􀀒􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀏􀀈􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀓􀀂􀀇
􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀎􀀃􀀇􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀂􀀃􀀤􀀯􀀍􀀈􀀋􀀈􀀃􀀂􀀤􀀉􀀍􀀅􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀏􀀊􀀵
􀁃􀀉􀀃􀀅􀀤􀀾􀀧􀀂􀀄􀀍􀀅􀀄􀀊􀀌􀀧􀀨􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀂􀀐􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀏􀀅􀀇􀀅􀀄􀀂􀀃􀀧􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀋􀀈􀀍􀀂􀀆􀀄􀀏􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀖􀀤􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀔􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀦􀀂􀀃􀀌􀀎􀀓􀀄􀀊􀀧􀀤􀀂􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀂
􀀑􀀈􀀍􀀈􀀃􀀂􀀇􀀤􀀌􀀅􀀇􀀇􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀖􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀑􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀊􀀄􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀙􀀎􀀇􀀊􀀒􀀈􀀓􀀅􀀌􀀊􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀼􀀊􀀤􀀆􀀅􀀓􀀅􀀇􀀤􀀔􀀂􀀃􀀨􀀤􀀆􀀎􀀍􀀕􀀅􀀃􀀏􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀂􀀄
􀀽􀀅􀀃􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀁􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀎􀀓􀀤􀀔􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀏􀀈􀀏􀀖􀀈􀀃􀀵􀀤􀀳􀀈􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀎􀀓􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀤􀀊􀀎􀀏􀀈􀀤􀀖􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀇􀀐􀀤􀀈􀁁􀀴􀀈􀀃􀀅􀀈􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀨􀀤􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀒
􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀔􀀎􀀉􀀇􀀐􀀤􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀧􀀤􀀏􀀎􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀖􀀂􀀆􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀎􀀉􀀍􀀐􀀵
􀀠􀀁􀀝
􀀜􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀒􀀄􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀎􀀓􀀼􀀊􀀤􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀅􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀹􀀎􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀓􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀨􀀤􀀾􀀧􀀂􀀄􀀍􀀅􀀄􀀊􀀌􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀪􀀤􀀶􀀭
􀀃􀀈􀀊􀀴􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀂􀀄􀀵􀀤􀀣􀀒􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀈􀀇􀀊􀀈􀀤􀀊􀀒􀀎􀀉􀀇􀀐􀀤􀀭􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀧􀀤􀀂􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀏􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀎􀀤􀀄􀀂􀀌􀀈􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀊􀀄􀀃􀀎􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀊􀀄􀀈􀀴􀁄􀀤􀀳􀀈􀀤􀀔􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀎
􀀐􀀎􀀤􀀅􀀄􀀨􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀅􀀄􀀵􀀤􀀳􀀈􀀤􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀃􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀄􀀵􀀷
􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀎􀀓􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀖􀀂􀀊􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀇􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀤􀀘􀀇􀀂􀀓􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀊􀀌􀀤􀀊􀀅􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀤􀀕􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀄􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀕􀀇􀀂􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈
􀀈􀀂􀀊􀀄􀀨􀀤􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀶􀀑􀀃􀀈􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀏􀀈􀀍􀀷􀀤􀀋􀀤􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀕􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀉􀀍􀀅􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀏􀀊􀀤􀀔􀀅􀀄􀀒􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀕􀀅􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀊􀀅􀀑􀀍􀀅􀀂􀀤􀀋􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀎
􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀔􀀍􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀡􀀩􀀞􀀨􀀞􀀞􀀞􀀤􀀴􀀈􀀎􀀴􀀇􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀖􀀂􀀊􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀵
􀀮􀀅􀀈􀀓􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀧􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀑􀀃􀀈􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀏􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀋􀀆􀀎􀀍􀀄􀀃􀀎􀀇􀀇􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀂􀀑􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀊􀁅􀀤􀀦􀀎􀀊􀀆􀀎􀀔􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀧􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀧􀀤􀀂􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀶􀀊􀀈􀀇􀀕
􀀐􀀈􀀕􀀈􀀍􀀊􀀈􀀷􀀤􀀓􀀎􀀇􀀉􀀍􀀄􀀈􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀨􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀐􀀈􀀍􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀧􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀅􀀄􀀊􀀤􀀊􀀴􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀤􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀊􀀴􀀈􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀆􀀈􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀎􀀴􀀈􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈
􀀑􀀃􀀎􀀉􀀍􀀐􀀵
􀀺􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀣􀀈􀀊􀀄􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀧􀀊􀀤􀀦􀀎􀀊􀀆􀀎􀀔􀀼􀀊􀀤􀀐􀀈􀀍􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀨􀀤􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀆􀀂􀀊􀀈􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀰􀀃􀀅􀀏􀀈􀀂􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀦􀀂􀀃􀀆􀀒􀀨􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀍􀀎􀀍􀀊􀀈􀀍􀀊􀀈􀀵􀀤􀀺􀀒􀀈
􀀛􀀉􀀃􀀎􀀴􀀈􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀗􀀍􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀎􀀓􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀅􀀄􀀊􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀍􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀊􀀤􀀇􀀅􀀊􀀄􀀤􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀜􀀴􀀃􀀅􀀇􀀤􀀠􀁆􀀨􀀤􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀃􀀅􀀖􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀏􀀤􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀊􀀄􀀂􀀕􀀕
􀀏􀀈􀀏􀀖􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀼􀀊􀀤􀀽􀀚􀀗􀀤􀀏􀀅􀀇􀀅􀀄􀀂􀀃􀀧􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀇􀀅􀀑􀀈􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀵
􀀭􀀄􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀇􀀊􀀎􀀤􀀔􀀎􀀃􀀌􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀃􀀅􀀄􀀧􀀤􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀘􀀈􀀃􀀑􀀈􀀅􀀤􀀜􀀌􀀊􀀧􀀎􀀍􀀎􀀓􀀨􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀎􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀋􀀎􀀖􀀊􀀆􀀉􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀂􀀐􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈
􀀰􀀃􀀅􀀏􀀈􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀽􀀃􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀚􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀔􀀃􀀈􀀊􀀄􀀇􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀖􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀎􀀤􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀏􀀊􀀈􀀇􀀕􀀤􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀰􀀃􀀅􀀏􀀈􀀂􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀈􀀐
􀀏􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀅􀀻􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀅􀀄􀀊􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀇􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀂􀀐􀁂􀀉􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀇􀀂􀀄􀀈􀀤􀁀􀀈􀀖􀀃􀀉􀀂􀀃􀀧􀀵􀀤􀀜􀀌􀀊􀀧􀀎􀀍􀀎􀀓􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀍􀀎􀀔􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀕􀀅􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀤􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀃
􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀰􀀃􀀅􀀏􀀈􀀂􀀤􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀵
􀀙􀀉􀀄􀀤􀀈􀀓􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀛􀀗􀀼􀀊􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀍􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀊􀀤􀀇􀀅􀀊􀀄􀀨􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀕􀀉􀀇􀀇􀀤􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀄􀀧􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀎􀀓􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀊􀀤􀀏􀀧􀀊􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀊􀀪􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀈􀀍
􀀙􀀃􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀈􀀇􀀊􀀤􀀴􀀉􀀖􀀇􀀅􀀊􀀒􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀅􀀊􀀄􀀤􀀔􀀅􀀄􀀒􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀍􀀂􀀏􀀈􀀨􀀤􀀅􀀄􀀤􀀇􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀴􀀇􀀂􀀆􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀐􀀂􀀄􀀈􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀖􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀤􀀖􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀵
􀀺􀀎􀀤􀀮􀀅􀀈􀀓􀀨􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀎􀀓􀀼􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀂􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀊􀀤􀀊􀀒􀀎􀀔􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀦􀀎􀀊􀀆􀀎􀀔􀀤􀀂􀀅􀀏􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀴􀀈􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀰􀀃􀀅􀀏􀀈􀀂􀀤􀀎􀀴􀀈􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀪􀀤􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀈􀀐
􀀏􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀅􀀻􀀈􀀤􀀑􀀎􀀓􀀈􀀃􀀍􀀏􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀅􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀊􀀨􀀤􀀴􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀅􀀏􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀏􀀊􀀈􀀇􀀓􀀈􀀊􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀆􀀒􀀂􀀃􀀑􀀈􀀨􀀤􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀐􀀈􀀴􀀈􀀍􀀐􀀈􀀍􀀆􀀈
􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀴􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀅􀀏􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀅􀀃􀀤􀀎􀀔􀀍􀀤􀀏􀀅􀀇􀀅􀀄􀀅􀀂􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀕􀀅􀀆􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀃􀀅􀀄􀀧􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀆􀀈􀀊􀀵
􀀘􀀇􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀒􀀎􀀔􀀤􀀱􀀠􀀤􀀭􀀏􀀂􀀑􀀈􀀊􀀲
􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀈􀀼􀀊􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀃􀀅􀀄􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀃􀀓􀀅􀀆􀀈􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀊􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀍􀀉􀀏􀀈􀀃􀀎􀀉􀀊􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀊􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀄􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀧􀀊􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀎􀀓
􀀄􀀂􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀎􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀂􀀐􀀓􀀅􀀆􀀈􀀤􀀕􀀃􀀎􀀏􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀇􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀦􀀎􀀊􀀆􀀎􀀔􀀵 􀀺􀀒􀀎􀀊􀀈􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀊􀀤􀀆􀀂􀀍􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀤􀀓􀀈􀀃􀀅􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀐􀀵
􀀮􀀅􀀈􀀓􀀤􀀖􀀇􀀂􀀏􀀈􀀊􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀏􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀴􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀂􀀃􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀐􀀈􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀇􀀎􀀆􀀂􀀇􀀤􀀴􀀃􀀎􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀍􀀆􀀅􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀔􀀍
􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀳􀀎􀀃􀀇􀀅􀀓􀀌􀀂􀀨􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀎􀀊􀀈􀀤􀀖􀀎􀀐􀀧􀀤􀀔􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀉􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀂􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀔􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀇􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀂􀀔􀀂􀀧􀀤􀀕􀀃􀀎􀀏􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈 􀀄􀀎􀀔􀀍􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀇􀀇􀀤􀀖􀀧􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀇􀀊􀀵
􀀭􀀍􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀅􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀦􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀊􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀜􀀃􀀊􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀜􀀓􀀂􀀌􀀎􀀓􀀤􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀃􀀅􀀖􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀎􀀓􀀤􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀶􀀂􀀤􀀏􀀎􀀍􀀊􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀌􀀅􀀇􀀇􀀈􀀃􀀷􀀨􀀤􀀔􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀎􀀍
􀀆􀀒􀀂􀀃􀀑􀀈􀀊􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀴􀀃􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀐􀀅􀀄􀀂􀀄􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀏􀀉􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀨􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀖􀀎􀀄􀀂􀀑􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀓􀀎􀀇􀀓􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀅􀀻􀀉􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐
􀀔􀀈􀀈􀀌􀀋􀀇􀀎􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀐􀀈􀀄􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀈􀀅􀀑􀀍􀀤􀀏􀀅􀀇􀀅􀀄􀀂􀀃􀀧􀀤􀀎􀀖􀀊􀀈􀀃􀀓􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀔􀀎􀀤􀀔􀀈􀀈􀀌􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀑􀀎􀀵
􀀶􀁀􀀂􀀄􀀈􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀽􀀅􀀃􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀄􀀂􀀃􀀑􀀈􀀄􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀎􀀉􀀃􀀤􀀜􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀋􀀺􀀈􀀃􀀃􀀎􀀃􀀅􀀊􀀄􀀤􀀯􀀴􀀈􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀨􀀷􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀵
􀀙􀀉􀀄􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀏􀀂􀀍􀀧􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀸􀀎􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀊􀀌􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀨􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀎􀀓􀀼􀀊􀀤􀀕􀀇􀀈􀀐􀀑􀀇􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀧􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀊􀀄􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀊􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀔􀀈􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀏
􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀊􀀄􀀊􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀊􀀉􀀖􀀹􀀉􀀑􀀂􀀄􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀋􀀊􀀴􀀈􀀂􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀑
􀀴􀀎􀀴􀀉􀀇􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀵􀀤􀀘􀀇􀀂􀀓􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀊􀀌􀀤􀀅􀀄􀀊􀀈􀀇􀀕􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀂􀀇􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀕􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀆􀀈􀀊􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀏􀀎􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀏􀀎􀀍􀀄􀀒
􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀆􀀎􀀍􀀄􀀃􀀎􀀇􀀇􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀖􀀧􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀇􀀊􀀵
􀀶􀀺􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀏􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀃􀀎􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀈􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀉􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀆􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀍􀀈􀀇􀀤􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀆􀀎􀀃􀀴􀀎􀀃􀀂􀀇􀀨􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀎􀀉􀀃􀀤􀀖􀀎􀀧􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀓􀀅􀀆􀀄􀀎􀀃􀀧􀀨􀀷
􀀊􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀤􀁀􀀧􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀸􀀧􀀂􀀇􀀍􀀎􀀧􀀨􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀟􀀩􀀋􀀧􀀈􀀂􀀃􀀋􀀎􀀇􀀐􀀤􀀴􀀈􀀍􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀈􀀃􀀵􀀤􀀶􀀘􀀎􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀕􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀆􀀂􀀏􀀈􀀤􀀕􀀃􀀎􀀏􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀁄􀀤􀀭􀀕􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂
􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀇􀀐􀀤􀀎􀀍􀀇􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀈􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀉􀀊􀀤􀀏􀀎􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀴􀀈􀀎􀀴􀀇􀀈􀀤􀀇􀀅􀀌􀀈􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀏􀀵􀀷
􀀩􀀁􀀝
􀀦􀀅􀀒􀀌􀀂􀀅􀀇􀀤􀀥􀀅􀀌􀀅􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀎􀀓􀀨􀀤􀀠􀀿􀀨􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀏􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀅􀀄􀀤􀀔􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀖􀀊􀀉􀀃􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀆􀀎􀀍􀀊􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀎􀀓􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀕􀀎􀀃􀀈􀀅􀀑􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀑􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀨
􀀊􀀅􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀤􀀸􀀎􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀊􀀌􀀤􀀔􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀃􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀄􀀕􀀉􀀇􀀇􀀧􀀤􀀴􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀪􀀤􀀶􀀳􀀎􀀔􀀤􀀆􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀑􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀤􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀒􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀎􀀔􀀍􀀤􀀊􀀎􀀅􀀇􀁄􀀤􀀭􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀊
􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀃􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀨􀀤􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀅􀀄􀀤􀀊􀀒􀀎􀀉􀀇􀀐􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀵􀀷
􀀶􀀭􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀓􀀈􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀑􀀎􀀎􀀐􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀕􀀅􀀆􀀈􀀃􀀨􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀴􀀉􀀄􀀤􀀊􀀎􀀏􀀈􀀤􀀎􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀊􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀃􀀎􀀎􀀴􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀏􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀧􀀤􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀤􀀎􀀕
􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀏􀀵􀀷
􀀘􀀄􀀅􀀇􀀇􀀨􀀤􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀤􀀈􀀓􀀈􀀃􀀧􀀎􀀍􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀴􀀴􀀧􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀒􀀂􀀓􀀈􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀑􀀃􀀈􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀏􀀈􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀃􀀎􀀉􀀍􀀐􀀨􀀤􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀅􀀃􀀤􀀏􀀧􀀊􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀊􀀤􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀵
􀀭􀀃􀀅􀀍􀀂􀀨􀀤􀀩􀁆􀀨􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀎􀀤􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀅􀀍􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀤􀀑􀀅􀀓􀀈􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀊􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀂􀀏􀀈􀀨􀀤􀀊􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀊􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀔􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀈􀀐􀀤􀀶􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀏􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀂􀀇􀀇􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀈􀀊􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀈􀀐
􀀴􀀈􀀎􀀴􀀇􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀔􀀂􀀃􀀤􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀤􀀎􀀕􀀤􀀄􀀒􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀄􀀎􀀔􀀍􀀵􀀷
􀀘􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀂􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀐􀀪􀀤􀀶􀀭􀀤􀀐􀀎􀀍􀀼􀀄􀀤􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀕􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀚􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀂􀀤􀀦􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀤􀀎􀀃􀀤􀀔􀀒􀀂􀀄􀀈􀀓􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀊􀀵􀀷
􀀜􀀐􀀐􀀅􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀂􀀇􀀤􀀃􀀈􀀴􀀎􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀖􀀧􀀤􀀜􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀊􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀂􀀤􀀾􀀃􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀘􀀇􀀂􀀓􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀊􀀌􀀨􀀤􀀺􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀂􀀊􀀤􀀽􀀃􀀎􀀓􀀈􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀦􀀎􀀊􀀆􀀎􀀔􀀨􀀤􀀜􀀐􀀃􀀅􀀂􀀍
􀀰􀀃􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀙􀀃􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀈􀀇􀀊􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀾􀀂􀀓􀀈􀀇􀀤􀀾􀀎􀀇􀀅􀀄􀀧􀀉􀀌􀀤􀀅􀀍􀀤􀀮􀀅􀀈􀀓􀁅􀀤􀀣􀀃􀀅􀀄􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀤􀀖􀀧􀀤􀀚􀀂􀀇􀀴􀀒􀀤􀀙􀀎􀀉􀀇􀀄􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀤􀀾􀀈􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀽􀀃􀀂􀀕􀀕
􀀯􀀉􀀃􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀂􀀃􀀐􀀊􀀪􀀺􀀒􀀈􀀤􀀺􀀒􀀎􀀏􀀊􀀎􀀍􀀤􀀚􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀤􀀺􀀃􀀉􀀊􀀄􀀤􀀾􀀃􀀅􀀍􀀆􀀅􀀴􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀵
􀀣􀀎􀀃􀀇􀀐􀀤􀀥􀀈􀀔􀀊
􀀝􀀁􀀝
Annex 516
Terrorist Shot a Resident of Donetsk Region in Front of his Family, Unian (18 May 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.

May 16, 2018 Terrorists Execute Donetsk Oblast Resident in Front of Family - Media Reports | UNIAN
1
https://www.unian.ua/politics/919159-teroristi-u-prisutnosti-simji-rozstrilyali-jitelya-donetskoji-oblasti-zmi.html
Terrorists Execute Donetsk Oblast Resident
in Front of Family - Media Reports
15:00, May 18, 2014 POLITICS 􀀀 1 􀀀 0 􀀀 􀀀 􀀀 􀀀 􀀀 􀀀 􀀀
Militants of the “Donetsk People’s Republic Terrorist” Organization Have
Executed a Donetsk Oblast Resident as His Family Watched
Terrorists Execute Donetsk Oblast Resident in Front of Family - Media Reports | REUTERS
A group of armed terrorists of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” terrorist organization executed
a farmer suspected of ties to the Right Sector in the village of Serhiyivka, Slovyansk District,
Donetsk Oblast, this past Sunday, according to Novosti Donbasa [News of Donbas].
It will be recalled that on Victory Day terrorists fired point-blank at a car that did not stop at one
of the Luhansk Oblast roadblocks.
May 16, 2018 Terrorists Execute Donetsk Oblast Resident in Front of Family - Media Reports | UNIAN
2
https://www.unian.ua/politics/919159-teroristi-u-prisutnosti-simji-rozstrilyali-jitelya-donetskoji-oblasti-zmi.html
Local entrepreneurs, 38-year-old Oleg Burykhin and 42-year-old Iryna Burykhina from Antratsit, died on
the spot. Their 10-year-old daughter Liza was rushed to hospital in critical condition.
Also in Donetsk Oblast, terrorists coordinated by the foreign aggressor shot and killed a 44-
year-old local Orthodox priest at a roadblock outside the town of Druzhkivka.
The terrorists previously abducted and killed in cold blood one Volodymyr Rybak, a member of
the Donetsk City Council, for defending the Ukrainian flag.
If you have found an error, highlight it with the mouse and hit
Ctrl+Enter.
􀀀 􀀀 􀀀 􀀀 􀀀 􀀀 􀀀 􀀀
Annex 517
Details of Shooting a Farmer Near Slaviansk, PN (19 May 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.

5/16/2018 Details of Shooting a Farmer Near Slavyansk: Fighters Found Out that the Old Man Was
Helping the Ukrainian Security Services
1
https://news.pn/ru/RussiaInvadedUkraine/104433
[Advertising]
Details of Shooting a Farmer Near Slavyansk: Fighters Found Out that the Old Man Was Helping the
Ukrainian Security Services
reads: 0 / 5,062 05/19/2014 02:38
The details of the murder of a 68-year-old pensioner in the village of Sergievka of the Slavyansk District
of Donetsk Region who died at the hands of fighters from the so-called DNR [Donetsk People’s Republic]
have become known.
5/16/2018 Details of Shooting a Farmer Near Slavyansk: Fighters Found Out that the Old Man Was
Helping the Ukrainian Security Services
2
https://news.pn/ru/RussiaInvadedUkraine/104433
[Photo]
UNN [Ukrainian National News] reports this citing one of the village’s residents.
The pensioner had his own small agrarian business and sometimes took food to ATO [anti-terrorist
operation] security services at the checkpoint.
“The terrorists likely found out about this. They came to his house, took him out to the courtyard with
machine guns pointed at him before his entire family’s eyes, read out a so-called verdict of the Donetsk
People’s Republic and shot him in the presence of his family and neighbors. And after that they got into a
vehicle and left,” a source said.
We remind readers that it was previously reported how terrorists from the self-proclaimed Donetsk
People’s Republic had shot a resident of Donetsk Region in front of his family.
They said at the Donetsk Region militia office that this incident is being investigated.
We note that on May 7 in Slavyansk terrorists attempted to beat a confession out of a journalist who
had been taken hostage that he was a member of “Right Sector.”
We remind readers that on May 9 a twelve-year-old boy was wounded in the center of Slavyansk at 6
Lozanovich Street next to the transformer substation. On the same day terrorists shot an Orthodox
priest at the checkpoint in Konstantinovka. Also, on May 9 in Luhansk Region on the Kyiv-Kharkiv-
Dolzhanskiy road unknown individuals shot at two Toyota Land Cruiser vehicles: a man and his wife were
killed; their daughter was hospitalized.
[Advertising]
Annex 518
Hannah Levintova, Armed Groups in Ukraine Target Gays, Journalists, Minorities, and Anyone
Who Speaks Up, Mother Jones (21 May 2014)

6/1/2018 Armed Groups in Ukraine Target Gays, Journalists, Minorities, and Anyone Who Speaks Up – Mother Jones
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/05/un-report-human-rights-ukraine-abduction-journalists-activists/ 1/6
“Truth is relative”: Trump and Giuliani make the case to support MoJo’s new reporting
project to combat disinformation.
Armed Groups in Ukraine Target Gays,
Journalists, Minorities, and Anyone Who
Speaks Up
HANNAH LEVINTOVA MAY. 21, 201 4 3 :28 PM
6/1/2018 Armed Groups in Ukraine Target Gays, Journalists, Minorities, and Anyone Who Speaks Up – Mother Jones
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/05/un-report-human-rights-ukraine-abduction-journalists-activists/ 2/6
Crimean Tatars call for freedom of speech during a protest in Crimea in March. Darko Vojinovic/AP
Human rights violations, including killings, beatings, harassment of minorities, and abductions
of journalists and activists, are escalating in Ukraine, according to a report released this
weekend by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The
growing tension, the report says, is fueled primarily by the DIY armed groups and self defense
units that have sprung up around the country.
The expansive report is based on information gathered by the UN’s Human Rights Monitoring
Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), and concludes that􀁢“the continuation of the rhetoric of hatred
and propaganda fuels the escalation of the crisis in Ukraine, with a potential of spiraling out of
control.” The Russian Foreign Ministry criticized the UN’s report for a “complete lack of
objectivity, glaring disparities and double standards.”
We’ve gone through the full report and pulled out some of its noteworthy findings:
Deaths and injuries:
Looking for news you can trust?
Subscribe to our free newsletters.
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6/1/2018 Armed Groups in Ukraine Target Gays, Journalists, Minorities, and Anyone Who Speaks Up – Mother Jones
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/05/un-report-human-rights-ukraine-abduction-journalists-activists/ 3/6
Following violent clashes in early December, January, and mid-February, more than 120
activists were killed and hundreds injured.
During clashes in Odessa earlier this month that led to a fire in the city’s trade union
building, 46 people were killed and 230 injured. 􀁢
In the initial aftermath of this winter’s Maidan protests, 314 people were registered as
missing. Most have since been found alive, but some were found dead while the fate of
some others is still unknown.
Discrimination against minority groups: The UN’s special rapporteur on minority issues
visited Ukraine in April. On the issue of minority treatment, she warned that “in some localities
the level of tension had reached dangerous levels.” Namely:
There have been ongoing reports of hate crimes, threats, and harassment against LGBT
people by both pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian forces. Several Ukrainian political parties,
including the right-wing Svoboda and Right Sector, state that combating homosexuality is
one of their goals. Meanwhile, though, Ukraine’s version of a ban on “gay propaganda” was
withdrawn from parliament consideration in mid-April, though another law that would
have similar effects is still􀁢 under consideration. (The bill, draft law 0945, would prohibit
the production of media, TV, radio, or other products promoting homosexuality.)
The report notes several anti-Semitic episodes in Odessa, Donetsk, and Crimea including
one where swastikas were painted onto Jewish tombs, a Holocaust memorial, and houses
near the local synagogue.
Opioid substitution therapy, an important element of HIV/AIDS treatment for patients in
Ukraine, has been cut in Crimea, leaving approximately 800 patients who are OST users in
the region in deteriorating health.
The UN documented ongoing harassment of Crimean Tatars, including vandalism of a
memorial and an episode where a self-defense unit stormed the building of the Parliament
of the Crimean Tatars, a governing body representing this population in Ukraine. The
armed men physically and verbally harassed female employees and tore down the
Ukrainian flag. The report also lists numerous instances where Crimean Tatars’ ability to
move to and from Crimea has been obstructed.
Roma families have also suffered harassment, including attacks on at least seven Roma
6/1/2018 Armed Groups in Ukraine Target Gays, Journalists, Minorities, and Anyone Who Speaks Up – Mother Jones
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/05/un-report-human-rights-ukraine-abduction-journalists-activists/ 4/6
households in Slovyansk by armed men demanding money and valuables. Many Roma
families, the report says, have fled the region altogether.
Problems for Crimeans refusing Russian citizenship:
People in Crimea who chose not to apply for Russian citizenship, the report says, have
been facing harassment and intimidation. According to rules agreed upon following the
March 18 referendum that brought Crimea under Russian control, the region’s residents
had until April 18 to apply for an exemption from Russian citizenship, but the process has
been made increasingly difficult by authorities.
Detentions of journalists and activists
In April, two student activists and one city councilor were killed by unknown assailants.
All three of their bodies were found dumped in the river in Slovaynsk bearing signs of
torture.
The Ukraine monitoring mission documented at least 23 abductions of reporters and
photographers by armed groups. As of early May, 18 of those journalists have been
released, but “the exact number of the journalists still unlawfully detained remains
unknown.”
Activists, members of law enforcement, and international monitors have been detained
and􀁢 beaten by “self-defense units.” The recently detained include at least two members of
the anti-Russian Svoboda party, two police officers, a group of foreign military observers,
and six residents of a town in the Donetsk region, including town councilors or trade
union leaders.
Freedom of the press is faltering:
At least three Crimean media outlets have moved their editorial offices out of the region
and to mainland Ukraine, citing concerns around personal safety and the ability to do
their jobs.
Broadcasting of Ukrainian TV channels has been disconnected in Crimea since March.
In early April, 11 Ukrainian radio stations had to halt their operations in Crimea due to
new legal and technical specifications for FM broadcasting in the region.
Annex 519
Tom Balmforth, A Guide To The Separatists Of Eastern Ukraine, Radio Free Europe / Radio
Liberty (3 June 2014)

􀀀     

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Annex 520
Alexander Zhuchkovsky’s “Militia” of the DPR: The Only Support is in the Russian Media, Zaks
(10 June 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.

1
DNR “Rebel” Alexander Zhuchkovskiy: The Only
Support Comes from Russian Media
June 10, 2014
“Rebel” Alexander Zhuchkovskiy, a St. Petersburg-based activist, author of the “Sputnik i
Pogrom” site, who has been fighting in Ukraine's southeast for two months now, tells
ZAKS.Ru how it feels to fight in the detachment of Igor Strelkov. The Security Service of
Ukraine accuses Strelkov, the self-proclaimed minister of defense of the Donetsk People’s
Republic, of terrorism. The Security Service has banned Zhuchkovskiy from entering
Ukraine. In May he illegally crossed the border near Rostov, bypassing a Ukrainian
roadblock together with other resistance members from Russia.
– What were you busy doing in May?
– In May, I studied the sentiments of Russians living in Ukraine. This territory used to be of
little interest to me – an uninteresting population in a state of suspended animation. It came
as a revelation to me when those people woke up and responded with a powerful assault
to pressure from western Ukraine. I came to Novorossiya to make sure for myself. There I
saw what I would like to see in Russia.
– Did you participate in combat?
– I'd rather not say.
– Why did you go there?
– As a Russian nationalist, I believe that Russians must support other Russians, no matter
where they are.
– How old are you and what is your education?
– I am 27 years old. I studied at the History Department of St. Petersburg State University,
but dropped out. Later I was forced to find a job. I served in the Navy for 2 years.
– Why did the Security Service of Ukraine ban you from entering the country?
– I tried to get in back in April for the first time. They detained me on the border and denied
me entry. I don’t believe that I have to obey those instructions. This land is absolutely mine,
just like Moscow and St. Petersburg. I will come here if I want to. Representatives of the
Security Service of Ukraine are no authority for me.
– Are there any things that make you feel pride or, on the contrary, regret?
– There are some things I accomplished, which I cannot discuss. Let me put it this way.
Yes, we came to Novorossiya and made an announcement about this. I got hundreds of
support letters. In the first two weeks dozens of people have already crossed the border.
Dozens more are coming. This is the main cause that I take pride in.
/new/archive/view/126865zaks.ru
2
We managed to arrange this flow. There are many such flows and coordinators. Second,
we have published account numbers and gathered substantial donations to support the
rebels.
– How much have you collected in donations?
– Close to 800,000 roubles. Those who could not come are helping us with money. We
managed to buy uniforms for our detachment. We even could buy equipment for our
operations and household items. For example, we managed to entrench well while being
stationed in Semionovka. I have left the village for work-related reasons. I read the news.
The things happening there are horrible, of course. I don’t know how I will be able to get
there. I wouldn’t like to reveal my specific position. I have left to hold negotiations with
some people and discuss deliveries of critical items. Oleg Melnikov, with whom we were
there, has been detained in Moscow. They say it’s in relation to the “Bolotnoe Case”.
– Where do rebels have their weapons from?
– Most of those weapons were captured during offensives in April and May. We came by
the cannon while taking over Slovyansk. The cannon is constantly firing. We keep attacking
the Ukrainian positions in response to their attacks. There are also local weapons of the
Ukrainian law enforcement authorities and the Ukrainian Army. Some items arrive from
abroad. I don’t mean support from the Russian state. It's limited to individual people in the
military community. I can't disclose all information.
– How is work organized in your detachment?
– In many ways this depends on current circumstances. Of course, there is a joint
command that allocates people to specific areas depending on needs. When people come
in an organized group, they can operate as a standalone unit. For example, our guys from
Russia operate as a standalone unit. They added other people while moving through
Luhansk and Slovyansk. So it’s like we are an established unit. They no longer split us up,
but instead deploy us to specific areas. We spent 10 days in Semionovka. Whoever came
was joining our detachment.
– Who gave you orders?
– The command. We also acted on some personal initiatives. If a person is cut off from
Slovyansk, we are able to act on our own in some respects. But only within the limits of this
strategy of initiatives. After all, we are not regular army. We can act on personal initiative
and use partisan tactics. The most important thing is the “single line of defense” policy. For
now this is a volunteer army and we do not have any strictly assigned roles. We have a
certain hierarchy and outlined functions, but this is just a matter of convention, without any
shoulder straps.
– Are there many people with military experience among rebels?
– We have people who fought in the Chechen war. I’m not saying there are many of them,
but we do have them. I don’t know the percentage.
3
– Did you have clashes with the Right Sector?
– We clashed with them on the outskirts of Luhansk, but it’s very hard to determine who
they are: the Right Sector, National Guard, or mercenaries. We took them prisoner. We did
not have such localized clashes in Slovyansk. That’s because they can’t force their way
into the city. If it weren’t for this fact, the situation would have resolved itself much sooner.
– Did you ever have to execute rebels for their crimes?
– The media has already reported that two rebels had been executed in Slovyansk. It was
just one incident. Looting is punishable by death.
– According to rumors, soldiers from the Chechen Republic fought in Slovyansk.
– These are just rumors. Yes, we had some Chechens come over. However, I personally
did not meet a single representative of this republic in either Luhansk or Slovyansk. Yes. I
heard that some guys came over and came under fire. Many people got killed. In this case
this is more about bravado and politicking. However, there are no Russian units in
Ukrainian territory.
– Do rebels engage in active combat operations?
– The last two weeks mostly saw trench warfare and artillery fire. Sometimes we sweep the
territory. Slovyansk has been under siege for two months, so it’s difficult to attack the
enemy in this situation. Of course, we perform certain sweeps. I do not want to elaborate.
Still, certain efforts are also made to disrupt the Ukrainian Army and attack their positions.
However, we had no battles proper. I believe we have already gotten to this point. If the
Ukrainian military venture into the city, they will get bogged down in battle, and their
numbers will no longer help them.
– Do rebels get paid for their service?
– No. They are fully supported by the command: accommodation, meals, and cigarettes.
– What is a scarce commodity among rebels?
– People. No matter how many people come here, this pales in comparison with the enemy
force. In Semionovka, for example, there are several thousand our fighters to some
40,000 Ukrainian troops. However, on our side we have people who came here voluntarily
with a sacrificial mindset. On the other side you have the Ukrainian Army that is totally
demoralized and undersupplied. They go hungry there. That’s pathetic. The real danger
comes from Right Sector fanatics and the National Guard, who execute their own people
for refusing to fight. They practice sabotage and cruel treatment. They are dangerous
people. The Ukrainian Army does not pose such a big danger. If resistance is powerful
enough, they will run away or surrender. Also, people simply do not have enough time
4
to sleep and eat. They are busy reinforcing our positions at all times. People literally live in
trenches, at roadblocks, do not relax for one minute, especially so in recent weeks when
army operations have become more active.
– Is there any fear among rebels?
– People voluntarily come from Russia and other regions of Ukraine. This is their conscious
choice. Granted, I heard about a few cases in which people left and abandoned their
positions. But those are solitary incidents. I haven’t met any people with fears or lack of
confidence. Their motivation is very high. Their morale is very high. I don’t see any fear. On
the contrary, I see unity, cohesion, and desire to win, including at the cost of their own lives.
Yes, some say that this can be crushed by military might, but our people are doing this out
of principle. They will go to the very end. They are practically suicide attackers somewhere
on the frontline.
– What other scenarios are possible?
– There is a Cossack chief named Alexey Mozgovoy. He has very many Cossacks in his
partisan detachment. They are saying that they do not simply want to defend the
southeastern lands but also go all the way to Odesa, Kharkiv, and Kyiv. But so far it’s just
talk.
– In your opinion, why is the conflict dragging out?
– It is very difficult to make predictions when we are dealing with delusional people. We are
dealing with insane people. They can suspend the anti-terrorist operation today only to
resume it several hours later. Why have there been no attempts to storm Slovyansk in a
single attack? It’s because there are very many civilians, so an airborne attack would claim
thousands of lives, forcing Russia to introduce a peacekeeping force. This is a restraining
factor. Still, there are more casualties among civilians than among rebels. Somebody gets
killed or wounded every day.
– How destroyed is the infrastructure of Ukraine’s southeast?
– It is more or less functional in Slovyansk for now. There is no electricity in such small
population centers as Semionovka. Indeed, most of the people have already left the village.
We have evacuated people from a hospital facility: patients, disabled individuals, medical
personnel. A humanitarian catastrophe is unfolding there. We do not observe any major
blockades in big cities. There is traffic. Sberbank and Privatbank work in Slovyansk.
However, in the face of the activity we are witnessing, I believe that we will soon be seeing
a humanitarian catastrophe in major cities. The same goes for water and food supply
interruptions.
– Do the locals support you?
– This depends on the level of danger. For example, when I was back in Luhansk it was still
relatively peaceful. Some of the local intellectuals were against Russia and dreamed of a
peaceful agreement with Kyiv. I met with absolute support in Slovyansk. They have
5
a siege mentality. They fully support us with money and food. The more pressure we
receive from Kyiv, the greater the support in other population centers.
– Will rebels support the position of the Russian government?
– [Laughs] The Russian Government is not a political actor or party to the negotiations.
They can negotiate gas supplies. I don’t believe that Russia can solve anything for the
rebels or the Ukrainian authorities. Even when Vladimir Putin called for the referendum to
be postponed, I was in Luhansk at the time and saw that people were very displeased. The
only support comes from the Russian media. They have a pro-Russian stance. Until the
government starts supporting rebels financially or by dispatching some military experts, I
will maintain a very critical attitude. I believe they are bailing on our historical lands.
Interviewed by Svetlana Zobova

Annex 521
Andrew E. Kramer & Michael R. Gordon, Russia Sent Tanks to Separatists in Ukraine, U.S. Says,
N.Y. Times (13 June 2014)

1/4/2017 Russia Sent Tanks to Separatists in Ukraine, U.S. Says - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/14/world/europe/ukraine-claims-full-control-of-port-city-of-mariupol.html 1/4
http://nyti.ms/1qGhhKL
EUROPE
Russia Sent Tanks to Separatists in
Ukraine, U.S. Says
By ANDREW E. KRAMER and MICHAEL R. GORDON JUNE 13, 2014
DONETSK, Ukraine — The State Department said Friday that Russia had sent tanks
and other heavy weapons to separatists in Ukraine, supporting accusations Thursday
by the Ukrainian government.
A convoy of three T-64 tanks, several BM-21 multiple rocket launchers and
other military vehicles crossed the border near the Ukrainian town of Snizhne, State
Department officials said. The Ukrainian Army reported Friday that it had destroyed
two of the tanks and several other vehicles in the convoy.
“This is unacceptable,” said Marie Harf, the deputy State Department
spokeswoman. “A failure by Russia to de-escalate this situation will lead to
additional costs.”
Overnight Friday, separatists using antiaircraft and heavy machine guns fired
on a military transport plane as it was landing in Luhansk, the Ukrainian Defense
Ministry said. It did not give details of casualties, but offered condolences to family
members of the victims. News reports said the plane was carrying as many as 49
military personnel.
1/4/2017 Russia Sent Tanks to Separatists in Ukraine, U.S. Says - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/14/world/europe/ukraine-claims-full-control-of-port-city-of-mariupol.html 2/4
Earlier, a Western official said that intelligence about the movement of the
tanks and other weapons into Ukraine was shared on Friday with NATO allies.
Secretary of State John Kerry complained this week about the flow of Russian arms
to separatists in Ukraine in a phone call to Sergey V. Lavrov, the Russian foreign
minister.
The spokesman for President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, Dmitry S. Peskov,
said Friday that a Ukrainian armored personnel carrier had crossed into Russia for
unclear reasons and was abandoned there. The Russian state news agency reported
that the Russian border service said the occupants had then fled back to Ukraine
At the meeting of the Group of 7 nations last week, President Obama warned
Mr. Putin that the West would impose “additional costs” on Russia if its
provocations were to continue.
The T-64 is an obsolescent tank no longer in active use by Russian forces, but
still stored in southwest Russia.
“Russia will claim these tanks were taken from Ukrainian forces, but no
Ukrainian tank units have been operating in that area,” the State Department said
Friday. “We are confident that these tanks came from Russia.”
“We also have information that Russia has accumulated multiple rocket
launchers at this same deployment site in southwest Russia, and these rocket
launchers also recently departed,” the State Department added. “Internet video has
shown what we believe to be these same rocket launchers traveling through
Luhansk.”
Even before the State Department’s statement, Ukraine was having one of its
better days Friday in eastern Ukraine, with government forces winning control of the
port of Mariupol, the second-largest city in the separatist region of Donetsk.
The Ukrainian assault in Mariupol left five pro-Russian militants dead and four
Ukrainian soldiers wounded, and ended with the hoisting of a Ukrainian flag at City
Hall as the military routed the last separatists from the city’s administration
buildings.
1/4/2017 Russia Sent Tanks to Separatists in Ukraine, U.S. Says - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/14/world/europe/ukraine-claims-full-control-of-port-city-of-mariupol.html 3/4
In Friday’s confrontation, videos posted online showed Ukrainian soldiers
standing over captives who were lying face down with hands clenched behind their
heads. The videos also showed soldiers displaying trophies of the battle — captured
orange-and-black ribbons and shoulder patches of a pro-Russian group, the Russian
Orthodox Army — and speaking with prisoners freed from the occupied buildings.
In that pro-Ukrainian forces — volunteer patrols of factory workers, a Ukrainian
nationalist battalion called Azov and the Ukrainian military — had controlled most
of Mariupol for weeks, the action was as much a propaganda victory as a military
one.
In fighting near Slovyansk, a Grad ground-to-ground rocket of the sort said to
be in the weapons convoy from Russia killed one person and wounded several
others. Residents said the rocket went off course and hit a vegetable market in the
village of Dobroyepole.
Over the long term, Ukraine, with its far larger though badly equipped and
poorly trained army, has more forces, and it is unclear how long the separatists can
hold out without more support from Russia. That is something Moscow cannot offer
openly without risking more severe Western sanctions.
The result is misdirection and sleight of hand, and a conflict of endless puzzles
and mind games.
The daytime journey of the three tanks through eastern Ukraine, which was
filmed in multiple videos and witnessed by Western reporters, could not have been
more obvious, and yet the convoy was too small to serve a military purpose. Was it a
warning?
A rebel leader, Denis Pushilin, told Russian state TV on Friday that the
separatists had tanks but that it was “improper to ask” where they got them.
Russia ratcheted up the economic pressure on Ukraine on Friday in their
dispute over natural gas supplies and prices. The state-run energy giant Gazprom
said Kiev had to pay its debts for previous deliveries before further negotiations over
gas prices.
1/4/2017 Russia Sent Tanks to Separatists in Ukraine, U.S. Says - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/14/world/europe/ukraine-claims-full-control-of-port-city-of-mariupol.html 4/4
Andrew E. Kramer reported from Donetsk, and Michael R. Gordon from Washington.
A version of this article appears in print on June 14, 2014, on Page A4 of the New York edition with the
headline: Russia Sent Tanks to Ukrainian Separatists, U.S. Says.
© 2017 The New York Times Company
Annex 522
Ilya Arkhipov, Irina Reznik & Henry Meyer, Putin’s ‘Soros’ Dreams of Empires as Allies Wage
Ukraine Revlot, Bllomberg (16 June 2014)

When Crimea’s new premier traveled down the Black Sea coast for unscheduled talks
with President Vladimir Putin in Sochi this month, he was accompanied by a man
described by one Kremlin insider as Russia’s George Soros.
It was a rare glimpse of Konstantin Malofeev, the 39-year-old founder of Marshall Capital
in Moscow whose network stretches into the heart of Ukraine’s pro-Russian insurgency.
The self-proclaimed head of the unrecognized Donetsk People’s Republic and its rebel
army leader have both worked for Malofeev, though the financier denies any role in the
unrest.
As Putin acts publicly to ward off further U.S. and European sanctions over Ukraine, a
network of pro-Russian operatives continues to guide an uprising that’s already claimed
hundreds of lives. With his political connections and wealth, the multimillionaire has the
resources to support projects that the Kremlin wants distance from, according to Sergei
Markov, a policy consultant to Putin’s staff.
“He’s useful like Soros in that he acts on his own,” Markov said by phone. “He suits
Russian authorities because they don’t want to take responsibility for certain things.”
Malofeev said in an interview that his only financial contributions related to the conflict
in Ukraine are in support of refugees from the fighting. Still, Malofeev, who describes
himself as an “Orthodox patriot,” said he couldn’t be prouder of his former public
relations adviser, Alexander Borodai, who now runs the Donetsk separatist
administration.
‘Russian Empire’
Business
Ilya Arkhipov, Henry Meyer and Irina Reznik
June 15, 2014 1:00 PM
Putin’s ‘Soros’ Dreams of Empire as Allies
Wage Ukraine Revolt
􀀳􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁑􀂶􀁖􀀃􀂵􀀶􀁒􀁕􀁒􀁖􀂶􀀃􀀧􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀨􀁐􀁓􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁗􀀃􀀐 􀀥􀁏􀁒􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁊
􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛
“Ukraine is an artificial creation on the ruins of the Russian Empire,” Malofeev said in
his office near the U.S. embassy in central Moscow last week. “I’m sorry for my lack of
political correctness, but Ukraine is part of Russia. I can’t consider the Ukrainian people
as non-Russian.”
Malofeev, who sold his largest asset, a 7.5 percent stake in OAO Rostelecom, back to the
state-run phone company for more than $700 million last November, said he first met
Crimean Prime Minister Sergei Aksyonov in late January. A month later, the pro-Russian
leader led an armed takeover of the peninsula that paved the way for Russia’s
annexation.
Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said he knows “nothing” about Malofeev’s trip to
Sochi or his activities in Ukraine. “The Kremlin encourages any social charity by any
businesses, from big to small,” Peskov said by phone.
Putin has repeatedly rejected assertions by U.S., EU and Ukrainian officials of Russian
military involvement in southeastern Ukraine, most recently in an interview with French
television and radio channels that aired June 4. The Russian president, who met U.S.,
European and Ukrainian leaders in France this month, called on the authorities in Kiev
to declare a cease-fire and hold talks with the rebels.
Ukraine ‘Penetration’
􀀳􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁑􀂶􀁖􀀃􀂵􀀶􀁒􀁕􀁒􀁖􀂶􀀃􀀧􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀨􀁐􀁓􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁗􀀃􀀐 􀀥􀁏􀁒􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁊
􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛
The worst standoff since the Cold War between Russia and the U.S. intensified last week,
after pro-Russian militants shot down a transport plane in eastern Ukraine, killing 49
servicemen, and the U.S. accused Russia of sending heavy weapons to the rebels,
including old-model tanks and rocket launchers.
“Putin has been adamant about there being no Russian interference,” said Masha
Lipman, an analyst from the Carnegie Moscow Center. “However, this is too important
an issue to believe that Putin hasn’t endorsed the penetration of Ukraine, the sending of
volunteers.”
Malofeev declined to reveal details of his June 3 visit with Aksyonov to Putin’s residence
in Sochi. Aksyonov didn’t respond to requests for comment via an assistant, nor did
Borodai, the separatist leader in Donetsk. Borodai last month told Moscow-based
newspaper RBC Daily that Malofeev wasn’t involved in the Ukraine conflict.
‘Active Coordinators’
Konstantin Zatulin, a former lawmaker in the ruling United Russia party who was an
official observer during Crimea’s referendum on joining Russia, said by phone that
Malofeev has given “some help” to the rebels in Donetsk, without providing details.
Zatulin heads the Moscow-based Institute of the Commonwealth of Independent States,
which promotes the rights of native Russians abroad.
Ukraine’s intelligence service considers Malofeev among the “active coordinators” of the
pro-Russian insurgency, Marina Ostapenko, a spokeswoman for the agency known as
SBU, said by phone from Kiev.
“While Malofeev is officially an independent player in Ukraine, he has the Russian
government’s approval in general in the sense that everyone who can should help,” said
Markov, the Kremlin-linked political analyst.
Malofeev, not as rich as Soros, who’s donated more than $8 billion to U.S.-friendly
causes since 1979, said he didn’t encourage Borodai to join the insurgency and isn’t
helping him.
􀀳􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁑􀂶􀁖􀀃􀂵􀀶􀁒􀁕􀁒􀁖􀂶􀀃􀀧􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀨􀁐􀁓􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁗􀀃􀀐 􀀥􀁏􀁒􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁊
􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛
‘Courageous’ Rebels
Malofeev said he met Aksyonov for the first time in Sevastopol, Crimean’s largest city
and home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet since 1783. Malofeev flew to the peninsula to stage
a tour of religious relics from Greece that was financed by his St. Great Vasily Charitable
Fund.
Malofeev said Aksyonov, whom he described as “decisive,” later hired Borodai as his top
aide. After Crimea was annexed in March, Borodai took the “courageous” step of leading
the separatist struggle in Donetsk, Malofeev said.
The connection with Borodai leads to another rebel leader in Donetsk, a Russian who
goes by the name of Igor Strelkov and commands rebel forces -- a friend of Borodai,
according to Malofeev. Strelkov’s real last name is Girkin and he works for Russian
military intelligence, according to the European Union, which sanctioned him in April.
Malofeev said Strelkov provided security for the touring religious exhibit when it was in
Kiev. Strelkov didn’t respond to a request for comment via a separatist representative.
Russian ‘Spirit’
“Igor is a man of ideals,” Malofeev said. “He’s got the spirit of a Russian officer. As
someone who loves the Russian Empire, I can only sympathize with him.”
Strelkov, who loves to re-enact Czarist-era battles, has shown through his exploits in
Ukraine that he’s a “real hero,” Malofeev said.
Malofeev’s involvement in Ukraine may be motivated in part by a desire to curry Putin’s
favor and further his business interests, which have collided with some of the biggest
state-run companies, according to Lipman at Carnegie Moscow.
On Feb. 27, the Moscow-based business daily Vedomosti reported that Malofeev had
reached an agreement with VTB Group, Russia’s second-largest lender, over a $225
􀀳􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁑􀂶􀁖􀀃􀂵􀀶􀁒􀁕􀁒􀁖􀂶􀀃􀀧􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀨􀁐􀁓􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁗􀀃􀀐 􀀥􀁏􀁒􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁊
􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛
million loan that a company controlled by Marshall Capital took out in 2007 and failed to
repay.
Taking Crimea
While the details of the deal weren’t disclosed, VTB withdrew its request to open a
criminal investigation and Marshall Capital pulled a lawsuit against VTB that it had filed
in London, Malofeev said. VTB said via its press service that it doesn’t comment on
confidential client matters and knows nothing about Malofeev’s activities in Ukraine.
On the same day as Vedomosti published its report, armed men seized the parliament
and regional government buildings in the Crimean capital of Simferopol, paving the way
for Aksyonov to be declared prime minister during a closed-door session.
Malofeev, who calls himself a “monarchist” who applauds Putin for being a strong
leader, said he’s now spending most of his time on civic issues. His charity, St. Great
Vasily, has an annual budget of about $40 million and its trustees include Oscar-winning
director Nikita Mikhalkov and Igor Shchegolev, a former communications minister who
now advises Putin, according to its website.
Last month, Malofeev sponsored a meeting of European and Russian nationalist
politicians and academics in Vienna. He’s also helping to organize a “family values”
conference in Moscow in September that’s co-sponsored by an Orthodox charity
overseen by State-run OAO Russian Railways chief Vladimir Yakunin, a longtime Putin
ally.
‘East, Maybe’
As for Ukraine, Malofeev says time is running out for new President Petro Poroshenko to
agree to cede more powers to the mainly Russian-speaking regions in the east or risk an
escalation of the violence.
􀀳􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁑􀂶􀁖􀀃􀂵􀀶􀁒􀁕􀁒􀁖􀂶􀀃􀀧􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀨􀁐􀁓􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁗􀀃􀀐 􀀥􀁏􀁒􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁊
􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛
􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁈
􀀷􀁕􀁄􀁇􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁎􀁖 􀀳􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁆􀁜􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁜
􀂋􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀃􀀥􀁏􀁒􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁊􀀃􀀯􀀑􀀳􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁇
􀀦􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁕􀁖 􀀰􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀱􀀼􀀦 􀀤􀁇􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁈 􀀤􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁒􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁖 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀀸􀁖 􀀫􀁈􀁏􀁓
“Kiev still has a major chance to create a federative state and resolve everything,”
Malofeev said. “But with every new death the chances decrease and may disappear
completely. Too many people have been killed.”
Asked if Putin should annex more of Ukrainian territory than just the peninsula of
Crimea, Malofeev said: “You can’t incorporate the whole of Ukraine into Russia. The
east maybe.”
􀀳􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁑􀂶􀁖􀀃􀂵􀀶􀁒􀁕􀁒􀁖􀂶􀀃􀀧􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀨􀁐􀁓􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁗􀀃􀀐 􀀥􀁏􀁒􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁊
􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛
Annex 523
Alec Luhn, Fight Club, Donetsk, Foreign Policy (18 June 2014)

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Annex 524
Interfax Ukraine, Kyiv Demands Moscow to Explain Use of Igla MANPADs in Donetsk Region,
Kyiv Post (19 June 2014)

3/27/2018 Kyiv demands Moscow to explain use of Igla MANPADS in Donetsk region - Jun. 19, 2014 | KyivPost
https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/kyiv-demands-moscow-to-explain-use-of-igla-manpads-in-donetsk-region-352593.html 1/1
Kyiv demands Moscow to explain use of Igla MANPADS in Donetsk region
By Interfax-Ukraine.
Published June 19, 2014 at 6:59 pm
􀀀 A chapel of the Seraphim Sarovsky Cathedral, which is located near a check-point of pro-Russian
militants in the eastern Ukrainian city of Slavyansk, is seen destroyed as a result of combat against
Ukrainian forces on June 16, 2014.
Photo by AFP
“Ukraine’s relevant authorities obtained photographic proof of
Russian origin of the MANPADS used by terrorists in Donetsk and Luhansk
regions. Thus, on June 6, after repealing an attack on Marynivka
checkpoint (Donetsk region), a box that had contained 9M39 items (Igla),
was found on the battlefield. The shipping ticket found in the box
shows that the above-mentioned Igla MANPADS had been stored in the air
defense military base of Russian Armed Forces No. 33859 (Yeysk,
Krasnodar Krai) since 2001. The latest mark, verifying that the weapons
were stored in a warehouse of military base No. 33859, is dated April
12, 2014. This is obvious from the presented photo materials,” reads the
statement by Foreign Ministry posted on Wednesday.
Thus, on April 12, these MANPADS were being stored at the Russian
military base in Yeysk, and on June 6, they were used in the attack on
Marynivka checkpoint on Ukrainian-Russian border.
“Therefore, Ukraine, within the scheduled meeting of OSCE forum for
security cooperation on June 18, addressed the Russian Federation
demanding that it explain how Igla MANPADS got into separatists’ hands
from the Russian military base,” reads the statement.
The Foreign Ministry of Ukraine has noted that Russia’s handing over
MANPADS to terrorists not only confirms the facts of Russia’s direct
intervention into Ukrainian internal affairs and Russia’s support for
terrorism, but is also a crude violation of its international
obligations on the storage and transportation control of MANPADS under
the terms of the Wassenaar Arrangement – “Elements for Export Controls
of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems.”

Annex 525
Max Vit, Military Equipment in Stary Oskol, KaviCom.ru (24 June 2014)

1
KaviCom.ru – Web Portal of Staryi Oskol
June 24, 2014, 1:53 p.m., Max Vit
Movement of military vehicles was
detected at around 8 p.m. on June 23 in
Staryi Oskol. This information and
photos appeared on Odnoklassniki social
network profiles of Staryi Oskol
residents. A video showing army support
vehicles and rocket launchers moving
through Staryi Oskol is also being
circulated. According to eyewitnesses
who spoke to the military personnel in
the convoys, it would appear that these
units are being redeployed to the border
with Ukraine to “reinforce border control”.
/news-view-12861.htmlkavicom.ru
2
3
4
Max Vit
Views: 8715 Comments: 181 military
vehicles
Annex 526
Lugansk Terrorists Are Financed by the Communist Party of Russia, Details (26 June 2014)

1
Lugansk terrorists are financed by the Communist
Party of Russia (document)
June 25, 2014
Lugansk terrorists are financed by the Communist Party of Russia (document)
Terrorists of the self-proclaimed Lugansk People's Republic receive funding from the
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). This is evidenced by aletter of
gratitude from the leader of the Lugansk militants to the leader of the Russian
communists Zyuganov.
The self-proclaimed prime minister of the LNR Vasily Nikitin officially thanked the leader of
the Russian Communist Party Gennady Zyuganov for financial and humanitariansupport.
"I would like to express my deep gratitude to all the Russians, the Communist Party of the
Russian Federation ... for what you do not forget, help us." Indeed, today we have
difficulties in both medicines and food products, "noted in his speech Vasily Nikitin. A thank
you note is also attached to the video, signed by the so-called head of the LC, Valery
Bolotov.
podrobnosti.ua/982121-luganskih-terroristov-finansiruet-kompartija-rossii-dokument.html
2
A letter of gratitude from the head of the LNR Bolotov to the head of the Communist
Party of the Russian Federation Zyuganov. Photo from the site of terrorists, LNR
Recall that this is not the first fact of open support for terrorism in the Lugansk region by
representatives of the Russian State Duma. In May, the head of the LiberalDemocratic
Party of Russia Vladimir Zhirinovsky gave Lugansk fighters SUV "Tiger".This gesture
Zhirinovsky explained that "there this car is more necessary."
LEADER OF THE LUHANSK PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
3 Pl. Otechestvennoy Voiny, phone: +38 0642 58 58 88
Email: [email protected]
No. 42/03 of June 25, 2014 Luhansk
Re: No. [blank] of [blank] 2014
Attn: Chairman of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of
the Russian Federation, Leader of the
Communist Party group at the State
Duma of the Russian Federation
Mr. Gennady Andreyevich Zyuganov
LETTER OF GRATITUDE
Please accept this expression of gratitude from all of the Luhansk People’s
Republic for your humanitarian and financial aid.
/Leader of the Luhansk People’s Republic/ [Signature] V.D. Bolotov
[Seal: Southeast. Luhansk People’s Republic]
Annex 527
Harriet Salem, Who’s Who in the Donetsk People’s Republic, VICE News (1 July 2014)

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