Volume XV - Annexes 467-490 | COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

Document Number

166-20180612-WRI-01-15-EN

Parent Document Number

166-20180612-WRI-01-00-EN

Case

166 - Application de la convention internationale pour la répression du financement du terrorisme et de la convention internationale sur l'élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Ukraine

Date of the Document

mar 12/06/2018 - 12:00

Document File

166-20180612-wri-01-15-en.pdf

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
VOLUME XV OF THE ANNEXES
TO THE MEMORIAL
SUBMITTED BY UKRAINE
12 JUNE 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Annex 467 Prosecutor v. Dragomir Miloševiü, Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, para. 37 (12 November 2009)
Annex 468 Prosecutor. v. Dragomir Miloševiü, Case No. IT-02-54, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, p. 18, para. 37 (19 November 2009)
Annex 469 Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01, Interlocutory Decision on the
Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative
Charging, pp. 70௅71, para. 108 (Special Trib. for Lebanon 16 February 2011)
Annex 470 Prosecutor v. Perišiü, Case No. IT-04-81, Trial Chamber Judgment, p. 26, para.
97 (6 September 2011)
Annex 471 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) v. Council of the European Union,
Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition), T-
208/11, p. 5 (16 October 2014)
Annex 472 French Cour de cassation, Judgement of April 12th, 2005, No. 04-84264
Annex 473 Italy v. Abdelaziz and ors, Final Appeal Judgment, No. 1072, 2007, 17 Guida al
Diritto 90, ILDC 559, Supreme Court of Cassation, Italy, 17 January 2007, para.
4.1
Annex 474 Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 698 (7th Cir. 2008)
Annex 475 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2009)
Annex 476 “Fighters and Lovers Case,” Case 399/2008 (Sup. Ct., Den., 25 March 2009)
Annex 477 French Cour de cassation, Judgement of May 21st 2014, No. 13-83758
Annex 478 Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Targets Additional
Ukrainian Separatists and Russian Individuals and Entities (19 December
2014)
Annex 479 Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ukraine
Sanctions: Review of Australia’s Autonomous Sanctions Imposed on 84
Individuals and Entities in Relation to Ukraine (2 September 2017)
Annex 480 Nouvelobs, Deux Ans de Prison Pour la Mère d'un Djihadiste :
"J'aurais Pu Sauver mon Fils" (6 Septembre 2017)
Annex 481 Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, SECO Bilateral Economic
Relations Sanctions, Programs (Situation in Ukraine: Ordinance of 27 August
2014), Individual Malofeev Konstantin Valerevich (23 May 2018)
Annex 482 9Ǵ38Ǵ1 Missile. Technical Description. 9Ǵ38Ǵ1.0000.000 TD. 1984
Annex 483 Firing and combat operation rules for surface-to-air missile systems of antiaircraft
defense forces of the infantry. Part 6. Buk-M1 surface-to-Air Missile
System. Moscow : Military Publishing House, 1986.
Annex 484 Roberto Lavalle, The International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, 60 ZaoȿRV 491, 496-97 (2000)
Annex 485 Anthony Aust, Counter-Terrorism — A New Approach: The International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 5 Max Planck
Y.B. U.N. L. 285, 287 (2001)
Annex 486 Kai Ambos and Steffen Wirth, The Current Law of Crimes Against Humanity:
An Analysis of UNTAET Regulation 15/2000, 13 Criminal Law Forum (2002)
Annex 487 Pigin, E.A. History and Trends of Development of Medium-Range Mobile
Surface-to-Air Missile Systems for Anti-Aircraft Defense of the Infantry / Radio
Engineering and Electronics, 2005
Annex 488 Zverev, V.I., et al. Weapons of radioelectronic divisions and units of the antiaircraft
defense forces. 9S18Ǵ1 radar station: Study manual. Kharkiv: KhUPS,
2005
Annex 489 Design, maintenance, and combat use of the combat control center of the Buk-
M1 SAM system. Part II. 9S470Ǵ1 Combat Control Center: Study Manual /
Zubrytsky, H.M., Kyryliuk, A.S., Lukyanchuk, V.V., Khil, P.Ya. // Kharkiv
University of the Air Force. Kharki
Annex 490 Marja Lehto, Indirect Responsibility for Terrorist Acts (2009)
Annex 467
Prosecutor v. Dragomir Miloševi􀃼, Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para. 37
(12 November 2009)

UNITED
NATIONS
Case No. IT-98-29/1-A
Date: 12 November 2009
International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Original: English
IN THE APPEAL CHAMBER
Before: Judge Fausto Pocar, Presiding
Judge Mehmet Güney
Judge Liu Daqun
Judge Andrésia Vaz
Judge Theodor Meron
Registrar: Mr John Hocking
Judgement of: 12 November 2009
PROSECUTOR
v.
DRAGOMIR MILOŠEVI􀃥
PUBLIC
JUDGEMENT
The Office of the Prosecutor:
Mr Paul Rogers
Counsel for the Accused:
Mr Branislav Tapuškovi􀃫
Ms Branislava Isailovi􀃫
Case No.: IT-98-29/1-A 12 November
2009
i
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................1
A. BACKGROUND..............................................................................................................................1
1. The Appeals .............................................................................................................................3
(a) Prosecution’s Appeal................................................................................................................ 3
(b) Miloševi􀃫’s Appeal .................................................................................................................. 3
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW..........................................................................................................6
III. ALLEGED FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF CRIMES
(MILOŠEVI􀃥’S FIRST GROUND OF APPEAL) ................................................................10
A. PRELIMINARY ISSUES .................................................................................................................10
1. Standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt ..........................................................................10
2. Applicability of Additional Protocols....................................................................................12
B. CRIME OF TERROR ......................................................................................................................13
1. Arguments of the parties........................................................................................................13
2. Analysis..................................................................................................................................15
(a) Elements of the crime............................................................................................................. 15
(b) Establishing the required mens rea ........................................................................................ 18
(c) Cumulative convictions.......................................................................................................... 19
3. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................19
C. ACTS DIRECTED AGAINST A CIVILIAN POPULATION.....................................................................20
1. The definition of “civilian population”..................................................................................20
(a) Arguments of the parties ........................................................................................................ 20
(b) Analysis.................................................................................................................................. 22
(i) The term “civilian population” ........................................................................................... 23
(ii) “Civilian population” and “civilian areas” ........................................................................ 23
(iii) Individual victims as civilians .......................................................................................... 25
(iv) Presumption of civilian status........................................................................................... 26
(c) Conclusion.............................................................................................................................. 27
2. Indicia supporting the inference that the SRK attacks were directed against the civilian
population............................................................................................................................27
(a) General issues......................................................................................................................... 27
(i) Arguments of the parties..................................................................................................... 27
(ii) Analysis ............................................................................................................................. 29
(b) Means and methods used in the course of the attack ............................................................. 30
(c) Compliance or attempted compliance with the laws of war .................................................. 31
(d) Resistance to the assailants at the time .................................................................................. 32
(i) Arguments of the parties..................................................................................................... 32
(ii) Analysis ............................................................................................................................. 35
(e) The status and number of victims of the attacks carried out by the SRK .............................. 36
(i) Arguments of the parties..................................................................................................... 36
(ii) Analysis ............................................................................................................................. 39
(f) Discriminatory nature of the SRK attacks .............................................................................. 41
(g) Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 41
D. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY......................................................................................................42
1. Nexus between the acts of the perpetrator and the attacks ....................................................42
2. Murder and inhumane acts.....................................................................................................42
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................44
Case No.: IT-98-29/1-A 12 November
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ii
IV. FINDINGS ALLEGEDLY NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE (MILOŠEVI􀃥’S
SECOND GROUND OF APPEAL).........................................................................................45
A. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES .....................................................................................................45
B. ANALYSIS...................................................................................................................................46
V. ALLEGED FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE AS A WHOLE
(MILOŠEVI􀃥’S THIRD GROUND OF APPEAL)...............................................................50
A. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES .....................................................................................................50
B. ANALYSIS...................................................................................................................................50
VI. ALLEGED ERRORS CONCERNING THE TRIAL CHAMBER’S FINDINGS IN
RELATION TO THE CIVILIAN STATUS OF THE TRAMS AND THE SIEGE OF
SARAJEVO (MILOŠEVI􀃥’S FOURTH GROUND OF APPEAL) ....................................52
A. CIVILIAN STATUS OF TRAMS .......................................................................................................52
1. Arguments of the parties........................................................................................................52
2. Analysis..................................................................................................................................52
B. CIVILIAN STATUS OF VICTIMS .....................................................................................................54
C. SIEGE..........................................................................................................................................54
1. Arguments of the parties........................................................................................................54
2. Analysis..................................................................................................................................55
D. MILOŠEVI􀃪’S RESPONSIBILITY DURING HIS ABSENCE FROM SARAJEVO ......................................56
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................56
VII. ALLEGED ERRORS OF FACT REGARDING THE CIVILIAN STATUS OF
CERTAIN AREAS IN SARAJEVO (MILOŠEVI􀃥’S SIXTH GROUND OF APPEAL)..57
A. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES .....................................................................................................57
B. ANALYSIS...................................................................................................................................58
VIII. ALLEGED ERRORS WITH RESPECT TO THE FINDINGS THAT SRK
MEMBERS WERE BEHIND SPECIFIC SNIPER FIRE (MILOŠEVI􀃥’S SEVENTH
GROUND OF APPEAL) ..........................................................................................................62
A. INCIDENT OF 14 MAY 1995 ........................................................................................................62
1. Arguments of the parties........................................................................................................62
2. Analysis..................................................................................................................................63
B. TRAMWAY INCIDENTS ................................................................................................................65
1. Arguments of the parties........................................................................................................65
2. Analysis..................................................................................................................................66
C. INCIDENT OF 18 NOVEMBER 1994 ..............................................................................................69
1. The origin of fire....................................................................................................................70
(a) Arguments of the parties ........................................................................................................ 70
(b) Analysis.................................................................................................................................. 71
2. The victims’ location at the moment of impact .....................................................................72
(a) Arguments of the parties ........................................................................................................ 72
(b) Analysis.................................................................................................................................. 73
3. The direction of the shot ........................................................................................................75
(a) Arguments of the parties ........................................................................................................ 75
(b) Analysis.................................................................................................................................. 77
D. INCIDENTS IN SEDRENIK.............................................................................................................81
1. Arguments of the parties........................................................................................................81
2. Analysis..................................................................................................................................82
E. INCIDENT OF 24 OCTOBER 1994..................................................................................................83
1. Arguments of the parties........................................................................................................83
2. Analysis..................................................................................................................................84
Case No.: IT-98-29/1-A 12 November
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iii
F. CONCLUSION...............................................................................................................................86
IX. ALLEGED ERRORS IN FINDINGS THAT MEMBERS OF THE SRK WERE
BEHIND SPECIFIC MORTAR SHELLING INCIDENTS (MILOŠEVI􀃥’S EIGHTH
GROUND OF APPEAL) ..........................................................................................................87
A. INCIDENT OF 8 NOVEMBER 1994 ................................................................................................87
1. Arguments of the parties........................................................................................................87
2. Analysis..................................................................................................................................88
3. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................90
B. INCIDENT OF 22 DECEMBER 1994...............................................................................................90
1. Arguments of the parties........................................................................................................90
2. Analysis..................................................................................................................................94
3. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................96
C. INCIDENT OF 28 AUGUST 1995 ...................................................................................................96
D. CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................97
X. ALLEGED ERRORS RELATED TO THE FINDINGS ON AERIAL BOMBS
(MILOŠEVI􀃥’S NINTH, TENTH AND ELEVENTH GROUNDS OF APPEAL)............98
A. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES .....................................................................................................98
B. ANALYSIS.................................................................................................................................103
1. ABiH alleged possession of air bombs................................................................................103
2. Incident of 28 June 1995 (shelling of the TV Building)......................................................104
3. Use of aerial bombs in explosions between 7 April and 23 August 1995 ...........................106
C. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................109
XI. ALLEGED ERRORS CONCERNING THE FINDINGS THAT MILOŠEVI􀃥
ORDERED THE SNIPING AND SHELLING OF CIVILIANS (MILOŠEVI􀃥’S
TWELFTH GROUND OF APPEAL)...................................................................................110
A. MODES OF LIABILITY................................................................................................................110
1. Arguments of the parties......................................................................................................110
2. Analysis................................................................................................................................111
(a) Ordering and planning the campaign ................................................................................... 112
(b) Shelling incidents................................................................................................................. 114
(c) Sniping incidents .................................................................................................................. 116
(d) Responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute .................................................................. 117
3. Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................119
B. MILOŠEVI􀃪’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INCIDENTS OCCURRED DURING HIS ABSENCE FROM
SARAJEVO ..............................................................................................................................120
1. Arguments of the parties......................................................................................................120
2. Analysis................................................................................................................................122
C. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................125
XII. SENTENCING .......................................................................................................................126
A. STANDARD FOR APPELLATE REVIEW ON SENTENCING...............................................................126
B. MILOŠEVI􀃪’S FIFTH GROUND OF APPEAL.................................................................................127
1. Arguments of the parties......................................................................................................127
2. Analysis................................................................................................................................128
(a) Alleged double-counting between the elements of the crime and the aggravating
circumstances...................................................................................................................... 128
(b) Double-counting in assessing the gravity of the crimes and the aggravating circumstances130
3. Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................131
C. PROSECUTION’S APPEAL ..........................................................................................................133
1. Mitigation.............................................................................................................................134
Case No.: IT-98-29/1-A 12 November
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iv
(a) Arguments of the Prosecution .............................................................................................. 134
(b) Analysis................................................................................................................................ 135
2. Gravity of the crimes and Miloševi􀃫’s role..........................................................................136
(a) Arguments of the parties ...................................................................................................... 136
(b) Analysis................................................................................................................................ 137
3. Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................140
D. IMPACT OF THE APPEALS CHAMBER’S FINDINGS ......................................................................141
1. Mode of liability ..................................................................................................................141
2. Specific incidents .................................................................................................................142
3. Double-counting ..................................................................................................................142
4. Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................142
XIII. DISPOSITION......................................................................................................................144
XIV. PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE LIU DAQUN.......................................146
A. THE “CRIME OF TERROR”..........................................................................................................146
1. Jurisdiction...........................................................................................................................146
2. State practice........................................................................................................................147
3. Opinio juris ..........................................................................................................................149
4. Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................151
B. THE ELEMENTS OF TERROR .......................................................................................................151
1. Actus reus.............................................................................................................................152
2. Mens rea...............................................................................................................................153
3. Lack of result requirement ...................................................................................................153
C. A NEW APPROACH TO THE CRIME OF TERROR............................................................................154
D. ORDERING: DOUBLE COUNTING ELEMENTS THE CRIME.............................................................156
E. SENTENCING .............................................................................................................................157
XV. ANNEX A – PROCEDURAL HISTORY............................................................................159
A. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS ................................................................................................................159
B. APPEAL PROCEEDINGS..............................................................................................................160
1. Notices of appeal..................................................................................................................160
2. Composition of the Appeals Chamber.................................................................................160
3. Appeal briefs........................................................................................................................160
(a) Prosecution’s Appeal............................................................................................................ 160
(b) Miloševi􀃫’s Appeal .............................................................................................................. 161
4. Provisional release ...............................................................................................................162
5. Decisions under Rule 115 of the Rules................................................................................162
6. Other pre-appeal decisions...................................................................................................163
(a) Access to material in the present case by accused in other cases before the Tribunal......... 163
7. Disclosure ............................................................................................................................163
8. Status Conferences...............................................................................................................164
9. Appeals Hearing...................................................................................................................164
XVI. ANNEX B – GLOSSARY ....................................................................................................165
A. JURISPRUDENCE .......................................................................................................................165
1. Tribunal................................................................................................................................165
2. ICTR ....................................................................................................................................169
B. LIST OF DESIGNATED TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS...................................................................170
Case No.: IT-98-29/1-A 12 November
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1
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (“Appeals Chamber” and “Tribunal”, respectively) is seized
of the appeals filed by the Office of the Prosecutor (“Prosecution”)1 and Counsel for Dragomir
Miloševi􀃫 (“Miloševi􀃫”)2 against the Judgement rendered by Trial Chamber III (“Trial Chamber”)
on 12 December 2007 in the case of Prosecutor v. Dragomir Miloševi􀃦, Case No. IT-98-29/1-T
(“Trial Judgement”).
A. Background
2. Miloševi􀃫 was born on 4 February 1942, in the village of Murgas, Ub municipality, Serbia.3
He was an officer in the Yugoslav People’s Army (“JNA”) and after the proclamation of the
Bosnian-Serb Republic (later renamed “Republika Srpska”), he became an officer of the newlyformed
Army of the Republika Srpska (“VRS”). From on or about 6 July 1993, Miloševi􀃫 served as
Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander in the Sarajevo Romanija Corps (“SRK”) of the VRS under
General Stanislav Gali􀃫 (“Gali􀃫”). Miloševi􀃫 became Commander of the SRK on or about
10 August 1994 and retained that position until on or about 21 November 1995 (“Indictment
period”).4
3. The events giving rise to these appeals relate to the siege of Sarajevo. The Prosecution
charged Miloševi􀃫 with terror, a violation of the laws or customs of war (count 1); murder, a crime
against humanity (counts 2 and 5); inhumane acts, a crime against humanity (counts 3 and 6); and
1 Prosecution Notice of Appeal, 31 December 2007 (“Prosecution Notice of Appeal”); Prosecution
Appeal Brief, 30 January 2008 (“Prosecution Appeal Brief”) (collectively, “Prosecution’s Appeal”).
2 Defence Notice of Appeal Against the Trial Judgement, French original filed on 11 January 2008
(confidential); English translation filed on 16 January 2008; public redacted version filed in French
on 11 May 2009; English translation of the public redacted version filed on 20 October 2009
(jointly, “Defence Notice of Appeal”); Defence Appeal Brief Including Confidential Annexes A
and B and Public Annexes C and D, French original filed on 14 August 2008 (confidential); English
translation filed on 11 September 2008; public redacted version filed in French on 11 May 2009;
English translation of the public redacted version filed on 1 October 2009 (jointly, “Defence Appeal
Brief”) (collectively, “Miloševi􀃫’s Appeal”).
3 See Prosecutor v. Dragomir Miloševi􀃦, Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Prosecution’s Catalogue of Facts
Agreed Between the Prosecution and Defence, with Annex A thereto, 28 February 2007, Annex A
(“Agreed Facts”), para. 1. The list of the Agreed Facts was admitted by the Trial Chamber on 10
April 2007 (Prosecutor v. Dragomir Miloševi􀃦, Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Decision on Prosecution’s
Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts and Prosecution’s Catalogue of Agreed Facts With
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Harhoff, 10 April 2007, p. 12).
4 Trial Judgement, para. 2.
Case No.: IT-98-29/1-A 12 November
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2
unlawful attacks against civilians, a violation of the laws or customs of war (counts 4 and 7).5 These
crimes were charged under both Article 7(1) (planning and ordering, as well as aiding and abetting
the planning, preparation, and/or execution) and Article 7(3) of the Statute (for crimes committed
by his subordinates which he knew or had reason to know about and failed to take reasonable and
necessary measures to prevent or punish).6
4. The Trial Chamber found that during the Indictment period the SRK troops under
Milo{evi}’s command were responsible for continuously sniping and shelling the area of Sarajevo,
resulting in the killing and serious injury of many civilians.7 It noted that throughout the siege, the
civilian population was subjected to conditions of extreme fear and insecurity, which, combined
with the inability to leave the city, resulted in “deep and irremovable mental scars on that
population as a whole”.8 The Trial Chamber concluded that in these circumstances, every incident
of sniping and shelling for which the SRK was found responsible was deliberately conducted with
the intent to terrorise the civilian population of Sarajevo.9 It found that these acts also qualified as
unlawful attacks against civilians and civilian population under Article 3 of the Tribunal’s Statute
(“Statute”).10 Further, the Trial Chamber found that the SRK’s military campaign in Sarajevo was a
“classical illustration of a large-scale and organised attack, that is, a widespread and systematic
attack” constitutive of crimes against humanity.11
5. The Trial Chamber also concluded that Miloševi􀃫’s orders to target civilians in Sarajevo
formed part of the continuous strategy of sniping and shelling of civilians commenced under
Gali􀃫’s command. It was satisfied that he planned and ordered those attacks with the intent to
spread terror among the population.12 It thus found Miloševi􀃫 guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) of the
Statute of the crimes of terror (count 1), murder (counts 2 and 5), and inhumane acts (counts 3 and
6).13 As a consequence of the conviction entered under count 1, the Trial Chamber dismissed the
charges of unlawful attacks against civilians under counts 4 and 7, as impermissibly cumulative on
the ground that the elements of the crime of unlawful attack against civilians are fully encompassed
5 Prosecutor v. Dragomir Miloševi􀃦, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT, Amended Indictment, 18 December
2006 (“Indictment”), paras 22-25.
6 Indictment, paras 19-21.
7 Trial Judgement, para. 905.
8 Trial Judgement, para. 910.
9 Trial Judgement, paras 910-913.
10 Trial Judgement, para. 953.
11 Trial Judgement, para. 928.
12 Trial Judgement, para. 978.
13 Trial Judgement, para. 1006.
Case No.: IT-98-29/1-A 12 November
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3
by the crime of terror.14 The Trial Chamber imposed a single sentence of 33 years of
imprisonment.15
1. The Appeals
(a) Prosecution’s Appeal
6. The Prosecution puts forth a single ground of appeal, in which it alleges that the Trial
Chamber erred in imposing a manifestly inadequate sentence in light of the gravity of the crimes for
which Miloševi􀃫 was convicted16 and his role in the crimes.17 The Prosecution seeks a life sentence,
which it deems justified irrespective of any mitigating circumstances applicable to the case,
especially in view of the life imprisonment imposed on Gali􀃫 on appeal.18
7. In response, Miloševi􀃫 argues that the facts underlying his convictions were not established
beyond reasonable doubt, rendering the sentencing matters moot.19 In the alternative, he insists that
all relevant mitigating circumstances taken into account by the Trial Chamber should be
maintained.20
(b) Miloševi􀃫’s Appeal
8. Miloševi􀃫 seeks an acquittal of all charges.21 He sets forth twelve grounds of appeal. First,
he argues that the Trial Chamber misapplied the law on the crime of terror and the crimes against
humanity of murder and inhumane acts, violated the presumption of innocence and failed to
establish beyond reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crimes he was convicted of.22
Miloševi􀃫 further contends that the Trial Chamber violated Rule 89 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence (“Rules”) by making findings not supported by evidence on the record and failing to
consider the evidence as a whole.23 Miloševi􀃫 alleges that the Trial Chamber erroneously set out
and applied the law with respect to the civilian status of the trams targeted in sniping incidents, the
14 Trial Judgement, paras 981, 1007.
15 Trial Judgement, para. 1008.
16 Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras 5-21.
17 Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras 22-31.
18 Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras 32-43. See also Prosecution Reply Brief, 12 August 2008
(“Prosecution Reply Brief”), paras 2-3.
19 Defence Respondent’s Brief with Annex 1, French original filed on 6 August 2008; English
translation filed on 13 August 2008 (“Defence Response Brief”), para. 5.
20 Defence Response Brief, para. 6.
21 Defence Appeal Brief, p. 94.
22 Defence Appeal Brief, paras 6-145 (Ground 1).
23 Defence Appeal Brief, paras 146-150 (Grounds 2 and 3).
18
Case No.: IT-98-29/1-A 12 November
2009
36. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber’s legal error regarding the
actus reus of the crime of terror is without impact on its analysis of the evidence of the case and
eventually on the findings of guilt.
(b) Establishing the required mens rea
37. The Appeals Chamber notes that the mens rea of the crime of terror consists of the intent to
make the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities the object of
the acts of violence or threats thereof, and of the specific intent to spread terror among the civilian
population.110 While spreading terror must be the primary purpose of the acts or threats of violence,
it need not be the only one.111 The Gali} Appeal Judgement suggests that such intent can be
inferred from the “nature, manner, timing and duration” of the acts or threats.112 However, this is
not an exhaustive list of mandatory considerations but an indication of some factors that may be
taken into account according to the circumstances of the case. Contrary to Milo{evi}’s assertion, in
the instant case the Trial Chamber did explicitly state and consider these factors.113 Furthermore,
the Appeals Chamber rejects Miloševi􀃫’s argument that the Trial Chamber could not take into
account the evidence relative to the actus reus of the crime when establishing the mens rea. In this
regard, the Appeals Chamber finds that both the actual infliction of terror and the indiscriminate
nature of the attack were reasonable factors for the Trial Chamber to consider in determining the
specific intent of the accused in this case.
38. Concerning Milo{evi}’s allegation that the Trial Chamber failed to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that the primary purpose of the attacks was to spread terror, the Appeals Chamber
notes that he fails to support his allegation with any specific arguments. In fact, the Trial Chamber
based its relevant conclusions on facts that it established beyond reasonable doubt, such as (i) the
SRK was responsible for the sniping and shelling resulting in death or serious injuries within the
civilian population of the affected areas; (ii) the shelling was either directly aimed at the civilian
population and objects (mortar fire) or carried out in an indiscriminate manner, including the use by
the SRK of such “highly inaccurate and indiscriminate weapon” as the modified air bomb; (iii) the
very role of snipers requires deliberate shots intended to kill or injure the victim; and (iv) the fact
that the campaign of shelling and sniping the civilian population by the troops under Miloševi􀃫’s
110 Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 104.
111 Gali􀃦 Appeal Judgement, para. 104.
112 Gali} Appeal Judgement, para. 104.
113 Trial Judgement, para. 881.
19
Case No.: IT-98-29/1-A 12 November
2009
command continued for a period of over 14 months.114 Subject to its analysis of Miloševi􀃫’s
particular challenges to the underlying evidence, the Appeals Chamber cannot discern any error in
the Trial Chamber’s approach.
(c) Cumulative convictions
39. In light of the Appeals Chamber’s conclusions above with respect to the Trial Chamber’s
error in defining the actus reus of the crime of terror, the Appeals Chamber finds it necessary to
provide guidance with respect to the applicable law on cumulative convictions in relation to the
crime of terror and unlawful attacks against civilians. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber recalls
the two-pronged test articulated in the ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement115 and emphasizes that the focus
of the analysis is to be placed on the legal elements of each crime, rather than on the underlying
conduct of the accused.116 With respect to the offence of unlawful attacks against civilians, the
Appeals Chamber recalls that it requires proof of death or serious injury to body or health, which, as
explained in paragraph 33 above, is not per se an element of the crime of terror. Conversely, the
offence of terror requires proof of an intent to spread terror among the civilian population which is
not an element of the crime of unlawful attacks against civilians. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber
finds that each offence has an element requiring proof of a fact not required by the other, thus
allowing cumulative convictions. The Trial Chamber’s conclusion to the contrary was, accordingly,
erroneous.
40. Having clarified the applicable law, the Appeals Chamber notes that the matter of
cumulative convictions was not appealed by the Prosecution.117 Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber
declines to consider the matter any further.
3. Conclusion
41. In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber dismisses this sub-ground of appeal, Judge
Liu Daqun dissenting with respect to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the crime of terror and the
elements of the offence.
114 Trial Judgement, paras 905-913.
115 ^elebi}i Appeal Judgement, paras 412-413.
116 Staki} Appeal Judgement, para. 356.
117 Although arguing that the crime of terror has distinct material elements when compared to the
unlawful attacks against civilians (AT. 106-109), the Prosecution has not appealed the Trial
Chamber’s findings regarding the cumulation of the convictions for these two crimes. Miloševi􀃫, on
the other hand, appears to concur with the erroneous approach of the Trial Chamber with respect to
both the elements of the crime of terror and the issue of cumulation (AT. 127).
20
Case No.: IT-98-29/1-A 12 November
2009
C. Acts directed against a civilian population
42. The targeting of the civilian population underlies Miloševi􀃫’s convictions for both the crime
of terror and the crimes against humanity (murder and inhumane acts).118 Miloševi􀃫 notes that the
unlawful acts of violence attributed to him consist of a campaign of shelling and sniping against
civilians.119 He submits that the Trial Chamber failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the
attacks carried out by the SRK were directed against civilians or that civilians were the victims of
these attacks.120 The Appeals Chamber will first consider Miloševi􀃫’s challenges related to the
definition of a civilian population and the manner of determining its existence, including the
presence of the military and the onus of proof. It will then discuss Milo{evi}’s arguments on the
factors to be considered when determining whether an attack was directed against civilians. Finally,
it will deal with Milo{evi}’s arguments on the factual findings for particular incidents.121
1. The definition of “civilian population”
(a) Arguments of the parties
43. Miloševi􀃫 alleges that the Trial Chamber erred by failing to state specifically the law applied
in its determination of the civilian status of the population in certain areas of Sarajevo.122
Emphasising that the Prosecution bears the burden of proof as to the civilian status of a person,123
Milo{evi} contends that the Trial Chamber erred in law by failing to specify that the presumption of
a person’s civilian status, as embodied in Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I, does not apply
when members of the armed forces are tried before a criminal jurisdiction.124
44. Miloševi􀃫 submits that the Trial Chamber erred with respect to the factors it considered in
determining the civilian status of the population and areas. Notwithstanding Article 50(3) of
Additional Protocol I, he argues that the number of soldiers present within the civilian population
should be considered in determining whether the population retains its civilian status.125 He
118 Trial Judgement, paras 875, 882, 921-924.
119 Defence Appeal Brief, para. 23.
120 Defence Appeal Brief, paras 22, 24.
121 Defence Appeal Brief, para. 24, referring to Defence Notice of Appeal, para. 11.
122 Defence Appeal Brief, para. 27. In this context, Milo{evi} refers to Article 4(A)(1) of the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 (“Third
Geneva Convention”); Article 50, para. 2 of Additional protocol I; Blaški􀃦 Appeal Judgement, para.
114 (Defence Appeal Brief, paras 28, 29).
123 Defence Appeal Brief, para. 30, referring to Blaški􀃦 Appeal Judgement, para. 111.
124 Defence Appeal Brief, para. 30.
125 Defence Appeal Brief, para. 31, referring to Blaški􀃦 Appeal Judgement, para. 115.

Annex 468
Prosecutor. v. Dragomir Miloševi􀃼, Case No. IT-02-54, Appeals Chamber Judgment, p. 18, para.
37 (19 November 2009)

Annex 469
Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law:
Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, pp. 70􀯅71, para. 108
(Special Trib. for Lebanon 16 February 2011)

Annex 470
Prosecutor v. Periši􀃼, Case No. IT-04-81, Trial Chamber Judgment, p. 26, para. 97 (6 September
2011)

􀀸􀀱􀀬􀀷􀀨􀀧􀀃
􀀱􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀃􀀃
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􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃
􀀧􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀝􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀃
􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀀹􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀃
􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀃
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􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁒􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀔􀀃 􀀲􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀝􀀃 􀀨􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀃
􀀬􀀱􀀃􀀷􀀵􀀬􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀦􀀫􀀤􀀰􀀥􀀨􀀵􀀃􀀬􀀃
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􀀥􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀝􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀥􀁄􀁎􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁗􀁒􀀏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁇􀁕􀁒􀀃􀀧􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁇􀀃
􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁆􀁋􀃂􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃
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􀀵􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁕􀀝􀀃 􀀰􀁕􀀑􀀃􀀭􀁒􀁋􀁑􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
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􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀲􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀝􀀃
􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁎􀀃􀀫􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀀃 􀀃
􀀧􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁈􀁏􀀃􀀶􀁄􀁛􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀀃 􀀃
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􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀝􀀃
􀀱􀁒􀁙􀁄􀁎􀀃􀀯􀁘􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀃 􀀃
􀀪􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀪􀁘􀁜􀀐􀀶􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀀃 􀀃
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IT-04-81-T 29246
D29246 - D28597
06 September 2011 AJ
􀀃
􀀬􀀃
􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
􀀃
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􀀬􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀱􀀷􀀵􀀲􀀧􀀸􀀦􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔
􀀤􀀑􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀤􀀦􀀦􀀸􀀶􀀨􀀧􀀃􀀰􀀲􀀰􀃬􀀬􀀯􀀲􀀃􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀬􀁬􀀬􀃪 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔
􀀥􀀑􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀦􀀤􀀶􀀨􀀃􀀤􀀪􀀤􀀬􀀱􀀶􀀷􀀃􀀰􀀲􀀰􀃬􀀬􀀯􀀲􀀃􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀬􀁬􀀬􀃪 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁒􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀱􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀽􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁅􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀖􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀌 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀃􀀋􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗
􀀦􀀑􀀃􀀦􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀨􀀵􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀃􀀵􀀨􀀪􀀤􀀵􀀧􀀬􀀱􀀪􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀨􀀹􀀬􀀧􀀨􀀱􀀦􀀨 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀨􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀨􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀛
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀛
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀛
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀨􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀜
􀀋􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀨􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀜􀀕􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀜
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀸􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀜􀀕􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁖􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀸􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀜􀀕􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀸􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀜􀀕􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓
􀀋􀁈􀀌􀀃􀀨􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀚􀀔 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀔
􀀋􀁉􀀌􀀃􀀨􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀜􀀗􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀔
􀀋􀁊􀀌􀀃􀀸􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁖􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀖
􀀋􀁋􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁒􀁏􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀳􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀱􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁘􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀘
􀀋􀁍􀀌􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁘􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀘
􀀋􀁎􀀌􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀥􀁄􀁕􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀙
􀀋􀁏􀀌􀀃􀀤􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀩􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀩􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁌􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀙
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀤􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀩􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁌􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀙
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀱􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀩􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀙
􀀋􀁐􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀃􀀋􀁴􀀶􀀧􀀦􀁵􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁓􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀚
􀀋􀁑􀀌􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁘􀁐􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁓􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀚
􀀋􀁒􀀌􀀃􀀰􀁏􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀱􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁅􀁒􀁒􀁎􀀃􀀨􀁛􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀛
􀀬􀀬􀀑􀀃􀀤􀀳􀀳􀀯􀀬􀀦􀀤􀀥􀀯􀀨􀀃􀀯􀀤􀀺 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀜
􀀤􀀑􀀃􀀪􀀨􀀱􀀨􀀵􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀵􀀨􀀴􀀸􀀬􀀵􀀨􀀰􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀤􀀵􀀷􀀬􀀦􀀯􀀨􀀃􀀖􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀶􀀷􀀤􀀷􀀸􀀷􀀨 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀜
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀨􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁈􀁛􀁘􀁖􀀃􀀥􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀜
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀓
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀔
􀀥􀀑􀀃􀀪􀀨􀀱􀀨􀀵􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀵􀀨􀀴􀀸􀀬􀀵􀀨􀀰􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀤􀀵􀀷􀀬􀀦􀀯􀀨􀀃􀀘􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀶􀀷􀀤􀀷􀀸􀀷􀀨 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀕
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀕
􀀦􀀑􀀃􀀤􀀷􀀷􀀤􀀦􀀮􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀦􀀬􀀹􀀬􀀯􀀬􀀤􀀱􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀗
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁘􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀗
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁄􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀙
􀀧􀀑􀀃􀀰􀀸􀀵􀀧􀀨􀀵􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀚
􀀨􀀑􀀃􀀨􀀻􀀷􀀨􀀵􀀰􀀬􀀱􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀛
􀀩􀀑􀀃􀀲􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀵􀀃􀀬􀀱􀀫􀀸􀀰􀀤􀀱􀀨􀀃􀀤􀀦􀀷􀀶􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀜
􀀪􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀶􀀨􀀦􀀸􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀔
􀀫􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀹􀀬􀀧􀀸􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀦􀀵􀀬􀀰􀀬􀀱􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀵􀀨􀀶􀀳􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀬􀀥􀀬􀀯􀀬􀀷􀀼 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀖
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀚􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁷􀀃􀀤􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀖
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀤􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀖
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁘􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀖
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁄 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀗
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀲􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀘
􀀋􀁌􀁙􀀌􀀃􀁴􀀷􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁗􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀨􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁵􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀙
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀚􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁷􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀙
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􀀬􀀬􀀃
􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀚
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁕􀀐􀀶􀁘􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁓􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀨􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀝􀀃􀁴􀀮􀁑􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀫􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀮􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁵􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀓
􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀮􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀓
􀁅􀀑􀀃􀁴􀀫􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀮􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁵 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀔
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀳􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁋 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀕
􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁘􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀕
􀁅􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁘􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀳􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀖
􀁆􀀑􀀃􀀱􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀗
􀀬􀀬􀀬􀀑􀀃􀀪􀀨􀀱􀀨􀀵􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀲􀀹􀀨􀀵􀀹􀀬􀀨􀀺􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀨􀀹􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀃􀀬􀀱􀀃􀀦􀀵􀀲􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀤􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀥􀀬􀀫􀀃􀀥􀀨􀀷􀀺􀀨􀀨􀀱􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀓􀀃
􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀘
􀀤􀀑􀀃􀀦􀀵􀀲􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀤 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀘
􀀥􀀑􀀃􀀥􀀲􀀶􀀱􀀬􀀤􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀫􀀨􀀵􀀽􀀨􀀪􀀲􀀹􀀬􀀱􀀤 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀛
􀀬􀀹􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀲􀀯􀀬􀀷􀀬􀀦􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀬􀀷􀀬􀀨􀀶􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀶􀀷􀀵􀀸􀀦􀀷􀀸􀀵􀀨􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀤􀀵􀀰􀀬􀀨􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀘
􀀤􀀑􀀃􀀩􀀨􀀧􀀨􀀵􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀵􀀨􀀳􀀸􀀥􀀯􀀬􀀦􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀼􀀸􀀪􀀲􀀶􀀯􀀤􀀹􀀬􀀤􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀘
􀀥􀀑􀀃􀀲􀀵􀀪􀀤􀀱􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀩􀀵􀀼 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀘
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀘
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀀵􀀼􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀚
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁌􀁈􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁉􀁉􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀛
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁌􀁈􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁉􀁉􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀜
􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁉􀁉􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀙􀀓
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁘􀁐 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀙􀀕
􀀙􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀙􀀖
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀙􀀖
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀲􀀧 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀙􀀗
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀲􀀧􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀥􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀙􀀘
􀀦􀀑􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀬􀀷􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀹􀀭 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀙􀀙
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀀥􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁇􀁈 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀙􀀚
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀚􀀕􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀥􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁇􀁈 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀙􀀚
􀀧􀀑􀀃􀀰􀀬􀀯􀀬􀀷􀀤􀀵􀀼􀀃􀀭􀀸􀀧􀀬􀀦􀀬􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀶􀀼􀀶􀀷􀀨􀀰􀀃􀀬􀀱􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀩􀀵􀀼 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀙􀀛
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀙􀀛
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀙􀀛
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀙􀀜
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀚􀀓
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁇 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀚􀀔
􀀨􀀑􀀃􀀶􀀷􀀵􀀸􀀦􀀷􀀸􀀵􀀨􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀲􀀵􀀪􀀤􀀱􀀬􀀶􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀤􀀵􀀰􀀼􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀵􀀨􀀳􀀸􀀥􀀯􀀬􀀮􀀤􀀃􀀶􀀵􀀳􀀶􀀮􀀤􀀃􀀋􀁴􀀹􀀵􀀶􀁵􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀚􀀕
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀨􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀚􀀕
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀫􀁌􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀚􀀖
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀵􀀶􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀚􀀖
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁉􀁉 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀚􀀗
􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀲􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀚􀀗
􀁅􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀚􀀙
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀚􀀙
􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁕􀁓􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀚􀀛
􀁅􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁒􀀐􀀵􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁍􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁕􀁓􀁖􀀃􀀋􀁴􀀶􀀵􀀮􀁵􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀛􀀓
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀶􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀛􀀔
􀀩􀀑􀀃􀀶􀀷􀀵􀀸􀀦􀀷􀀸􀀵􀀨􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀲􀀵􀀪􀀤􀀱􀀬􀀶􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀶􀀨􀀵􀀥􀀬􀀤􀀱􀀃􀀤􀀵􀀰􀀼􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀮􀀵􀀤􀀭􀀬􀀱􀀤􀀃􀀋􀁴􀀶􀀹􀀮􀁵􀀌 􀀛􀀔
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀨􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀀹􀀮􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀛􀀔
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁉􀁉 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀛􀀕
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀶􀀹􀀮􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀛􀀖
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀶􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀛􀀗
􀀹􀀑􀀃􀀩􀀬􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀱􀀪􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀦􀀵􀀬􀀰􀀨􀀶􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀛􀀘
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􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀀤􀀑􀀃􀀶􀀤􀀵􀀤􀀭􀀨􀀹􀀲 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀛􀀘
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁒 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀛􀀘
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁈􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁇􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀛􀀘
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀥􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁆􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁈􀁊􀁈 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀛􀀘
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁈􀁊􀁈 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀛􀀙
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀧􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁈􀁊􀁈 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀛􀀛
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁕􀁉􀁄􀁕􀁈 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀜􀀓
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀲􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀜􀀓
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀜􀀔
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁑􀁌􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀜􀀖
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀜􀀚
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀃􀀭􀁄􀁑􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀤􀀔􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀜􀀚
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀜􀀚
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀜􀀚
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀜􀀛
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀗􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀤􀀕􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀜􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀜􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀜􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀜􀀜
􀀋􀁌􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀜􀀜
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀘􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀤􀀖􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓􀀓
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓􀀓
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓􀀔
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓􀀕
􀀋􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀤􀀗􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓􀀖
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓􀀖
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁏􀁈􀁄􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀲􀁏􀁇􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁒 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓􀀖
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓􀀖
􀀋􀁌􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓􀀗
􀀋􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓􀀘
􀀋􀁈􀀌􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀤􀀘􀀌 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓􀀙
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓􀀙
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓􀀙
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓􀀜
􀀋􀁉􀀌􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀤􀀙􀀌 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓􀀜
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓􀀜
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀓􀀜
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀔􀀔
􀀋􀁌􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀔􀀔
􀀋􀁊􀀌􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀤􀀚􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀔􀀕
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀔􀀕
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀳􀁘􀁐􀁓􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁕􀀃􀀨􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀶􀁆􀁋􀁒􀁒􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁅􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁍􀁄􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀔􀀕
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀔􀀖
􀀋􀁌􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀔􀀘
􀀋􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀔􀀛
􀀋􀁋􀀌􀀃􀀔􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀤􀀛􀀌 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀕􀀓
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀕􀀓
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀫􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀕􀀓
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀕􀀔
􀀋􀁌􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀕􀀖
􀀋􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁗􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀕􀀙
􀀋􀁙􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀕􀀚
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀕􀀛􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀤􀀜􀀌 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀕􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀕􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀕􀀛
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􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀕􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀕􀀜
􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀕􀀜
􀁅􀀑􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀲􀀃􀀲􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀔 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀖􀀓
􀁆􀀑􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀲􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀩􀀲􀀵􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀖􀀕
􀁇􀀑􀀃􀀯􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀖􀀘
􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀖􀀚
􀁉􀀑􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀀃􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀔
􀁊􀀑􀀃􀀨􀁛􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀕
􀁋􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀖
􀁌􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀰􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀀬􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁈􀁄 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀗
􀀋􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀘
􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁑􀁌􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀗􀀙
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀖􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀥􀀔􀀌 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀙
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀙
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀙
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀕􀀃􀀱􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀥􀀕􀀌 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀙
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀙
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀙
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀙􀀃􀀭􀁄􀁑􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀥􀀖􀀌 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀚
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀚
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀚
􀀋􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀥􀀗􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀚
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀚
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀚
􀀋􀁈􀀌􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀥􀀘􀀌 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀛
􀀋􀁉􀀌􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀥􀀙􀀌 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀜
􀀋􀁊􀀌􀀃􀀛􀀃􀀱􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀥􀀚􀀌 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀜
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗􀀜
􀀋􀁋􀀌􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀃􀀱􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀥􀀛􀀌 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀘􀀓
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀘􀀓
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀯􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁑􀁌􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀘􀀓
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀘􀀓
􀀋􀁌􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀘􀀕
􀀋􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀘􀀗
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀥􀀜􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀘􀀗
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀘􀀗
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀯􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁑􀁌􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀘􀀗
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀘􀀘
􀀋􀁌􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀘􀀙
􀀋􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀘􀀛
􀀋􀁍􀀌􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀥􀀔􀀓􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀘􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀘􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀘􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀙􀀓
􀀋􀁌􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀙􀀔
􀀋􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀙􀀕
􀀋􀁎􀀌􀀃􀀖􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀥􀀔􀀔􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀙􀀕
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀙􀀕
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀙􀀕
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀙􀀗
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􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀀋􀁌􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀙􀀙
􀀋􀁏􀀌􀀃􀀖􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀥􀀔􀀕􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀙􀀙
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀙􀀙
􀀙􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀙􀀙
􀀚􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀓
􀀛􀀑􀀃􀀯􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀕
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀚􀀕
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀲􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀚􀀖
􀀥􀀑􀀃􀀽􀀤􀀪􀀵􀀨􀀥 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀗
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀯􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀐􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀶􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀗
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀘
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀖􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀙
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁒􀀃􀀲􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀽􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁅􀀢 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀚
􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀺􀁈􀁄􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀸􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀓
􀀙􀀑􀀃􀀯􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀔
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀛􀀔
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀛􀀔
􀀦􀀑􀀃􀀶􀀵􀀨􀀥􀀵􀀨􀀱􀀬􀀦􀀤 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀖
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀙􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀖
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀥􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁕 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀛􀀖
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁴􀀶􀁄􀁉􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁵􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀛􀀖
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀯􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀐􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀲􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀛􀀘
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀐􀀲􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀙
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀝􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁉􀁘􀁊􀁈􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀩􀁏􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁗􀁒􀃭􀁄􀁕􀁌􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀛
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁅􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀃􀀰􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀜
􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁄􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀜􀀓
􀀙􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁉􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀜􀀕
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀲􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀥􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀜􀀕
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁉􀁘􀁊􀁈􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀜􀀗
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁐􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀐􀀤􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀜􀀚
􀀚􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁘􀁖􀁏􀁌􀁐􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀜􀀜
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀜􀀜
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀱􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀓􀀓
􀀛􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁗􀁒􀃭􀁄􀁕􀁌􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁈􀁄􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀕􀁷􀀔􀀚􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀓
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀁴􀀲􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁵􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀓􀀓
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁖􀁖􀀃􀀨􀁛􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁌􀁑􀁎􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀃􀀽􀁌􀁑􀁆􀀃􀀩􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀓􀀔
􀀜􀀑􀀃􀀥􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁆􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁈􀁄􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀘􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀖
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀓􀀖
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀥􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁛􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀓􀀖
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀹􀁘􀁎􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁇􀁃􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀶􀁆􀁋􀁒􀁒􀁏 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀓􀀘
􀀋􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀭􀁄􀁇􀁄􀁕􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀖􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀌 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀓􀀙
􀀋􀁈􀀌􀀃􀀦􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁎􀁄􀀃􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁜􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀖􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀓􀀙
􀀋􀁉􀀌􀀃􀀱􀁒􀁙􀁄􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁖􀁄􀁅􀁄􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀖􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀓􀀙
􀀋􀁊􀀌􀀃􀀪􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁄􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀚􀁷􀀕􀀚􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀌 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀓􀀚
􀀋􀁋􀀌􀀃􀀮􀁕􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀖􀁷􀀔􀀗􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀓􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀮􀁕􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀖􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀓􀀛
􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀃􀀽􀁙􀁒􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁎􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁈􀁄􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀔􀀔
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁉􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀥􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀽􀁙􀁒􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁎􀀃􀀰􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀔􀀔
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀲􀁕􀁄􀁋􀁒􀁙􀁄􀁆􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀗􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀔􀀔
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁗􀁎􀁒􀁙􀁆􀁌􀀃􀀶􀁆􀁋􀁒􀁒􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀧􀁄􀁐􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀗􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀌 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀔􀀗
􀀋􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀳􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁆􀁋􀁒􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀗􀁷􀀔􀀘􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀔􀀙
􀀋􀁈􀀌􀀃􀀥􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁒􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀩􀁄􀁕􀁐􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀙􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀌 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀔􀀙
􀀋􀁉􀀌􀀃􀀳􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀙􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀌 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀔􀀛
􀀋􀁊􀀌􀀃􀀮􀁒􀁝􀁏􀁘􀁎􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀙􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀕􀀓
􀀋􀁋􀀌􀀃􀀱􀁈􀁝􀁘􀁎􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀜􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀌 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀕􀀔
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􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁷􀀔􀀃􀀱􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀕􀀔
􀀔􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀕􀀕
􀀔􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀰􀀸􀀳􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀕􀀕
􀀔􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀯􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀕􀀖
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀕􀀖
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀕􀀖
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀰􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀕􀀗
􀀋􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀕􀀘
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀺􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀕􀀘
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁉􀁈􀁕 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀕􀀘
􀀋􀁈􀀌􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀀵􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀀪􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀕􀀙
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀕􀀙
􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀕􀀙
􀁅􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁘􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀕􀀙
􀁆􀀑􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁉􀁈􀁕 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀕􀀚
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀕􀀚
􀀋􀁉􀀌􀀃􀀨􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀕􀀚
􀀹􀀬􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀹􀀬􀀧􀀸􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀦􀀵􀀬􀀰􀀬􀀱􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀵􀀨􀀶􀀳􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀬􀀥􀀬􀀯􀀬􀀷􀀼 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀕􀀜
􀀤􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀶􀀲􀀱􀀱􀀨􀀯􀀃􀀤􀀶􀀶􀀬􀀶􀀷􀀤􀀱􀀦􀀨􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀖􀀓􀀷􀀫􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀗􀀓􀀷􀀫􀀃􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀶􀀲􀀱􀀱􀀨􀀯􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀵􀀨􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀕􀀜
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀨􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀯􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀕􀀜
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀯􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀨􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀖􀀕
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀳􀀦􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁜 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀖􀀙
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀀹􀀮􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀖􀀜
􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀹􀀮􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀷􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀗􀀖
􀀙􀀑􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀲􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁉􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀀹􀀮􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀗􀀘
􀀚􀀑􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁜􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀗􀀛
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁜􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀘􀀓
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀵􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁜􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀘􀀕
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀘􀀘
􀀛􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁈􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀘􀀘
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀘􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀘􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀹􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀘􀀜
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁴􀀹􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁵 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀙􀀔
􀀋􀁌􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀵􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁴􀀹􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁵􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀙􀀖
􀀋􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀙􀀙
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁄􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀙􀀚
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀚􀀖
􀀋􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀚􀀘
􀀋􀁈􀀌􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀚􀀛
􀀋􀁉􀀌􀀃􀀲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀥􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁗􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀚􀀜
􀀋􀁊􀀌􀀃􀀩􀀵􀀼􀀃􀀦􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁓􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀛􀀖
􀀜􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁈 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀛􀀗
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀛􀀗
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀵􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀛􀀙
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀜􀀓
􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁙􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀧􀁘􀁗􀁜 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀜􀀔
􀀔􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁅􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀜􀀕
􀀥􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀬􀁬􀀬􀃪􀁳􀀶􀀃􀀤􀀸􀀷􀀫􀀲􀀵􀀬􀀷􀀼􀀃􀀲􀀹􀀨􀀵􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀯􀀲􀀪􀀬􀀶􀀷􀀬􀀦􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀤􀀶􀀶􀀬􀀶􀀷􀀤􀀱􀀦􀀨􀀃􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀜􀀖
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀜􀀖
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀀹􀀮􀀃􀀲􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀜􀀖
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀨􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀜􀀘
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀯􀁒􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀓􀀔
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􀀹􀀬􀀬􀀃
􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀀵􀀼􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀲􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀩􀀵􀀼􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃
􀀩􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀓􀀜
􀀙􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀯􀁒􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀔􀀖
􀀚􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀔􀀘
􀀦􀀑􀀃􀀯􀀲􀀪􀀬􀀶􀀷􀀬􀀦􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀷􀀨􀀦􀀫􀀱􀀬􀀦􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀤􀀶􀀶􀀬􀀶􀀷􀀤􀀱􀀦􀀨􀀃􀀷􀀲􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀔􀀚
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀔􀀚
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀺􀁈􀁄􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀨􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁓􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀔􀀚
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀤􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁜􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀔􀀚
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀥􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀕􀀘
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀥􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀶􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀬􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀀵􀀼􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁎􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁓􀁖􀁎􀁄 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀕􀀜
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁎􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁓􀁖􀁎􀁄 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀖􀀙
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁖􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀩􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁎􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁓􀁖􀁎􀁄 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀖􀀚
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀖􀀛
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁓􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀖􀀜
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀭􀁄􀁑􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀖􀀜
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁳􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀖􀀜
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀵􀁄􀁚􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀀵􀀼 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀗􀀔
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀺􀁈􀁄􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀗􀀕
􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀰􀁒􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁌􀁕􀀐􀀥􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀗􀀗
􀀙􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁘􀁈􀁏􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀗􀀛
􀀚􀀑􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁜􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀘􀀓
􀀛􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁒􀁒􀁓􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀘􀀚
􀀜􀀑􀀃􀀲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀯􀁒􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀙􀀕
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀙􀀕
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀺􀁈􀁄􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀳􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀩􀀵􀀼􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀩􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀙􀀙
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀤􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁎􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁓􀁖􀁎􀁄􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀙􀀚
􀀋􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀩􀁘􀁈􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁎􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁓􀁖􀁎􀁄􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀚􀀙
􀀋􀁈􀀌􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀩􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁎􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁓􀁖􀁎􀁄􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀚􀀛
􀀋􀁉􀀌􀀃􀀯􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀶􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁎􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁓􀁖􀁎􀁄 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀛􀀔
􀀋􀁊􀀌􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀺􀁈􀁄􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀛􀀕
􀀋􀁋􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁐􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀛􀀖
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀛􀀘
􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀯􀁒􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀷􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀛􀀘
􀀧􀀑􀀃􀀯􀀲􀀪􀀬􀀶􀀷􀀬􀀦􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀷􀀨􀀦􀀫􀀱􀀬􀀦􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀤􀀶􀀶􀀬􀀶􀀷􀀤􀀱􀀦􀀨􀀃􀀷􀀲􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀶􀀹􀀮􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀛􀀛
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀀹􀀮􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀹􀀭 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀛􀀛
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀺􀁈􀁄􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀨􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁓􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀀹􀀮 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀛􀀜
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀺􀁈􀁄􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀛􀀜
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀲􀁕􀁎􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀶􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀜􀀔
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁘􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀀨􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁓􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀜􀀕
􀀋􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀀹􀀮􀀃􀀶􀁒􀁏􀁇􀁌􀁈􀁕􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀜􀀖
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀜􀀙
􀀨􀀑􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀧􀀨􀀩􀀨􀀱􀀦􀀨􀁳􀀶􀀃􀀨􀀻􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀷􀀃􀀺􀀬􀀷􀀱􀀨􀀶􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀯􀀲􀀪􀀬􀀶􀀷􀀬􀀦􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀤􀀶􀀶􀀬􀀶􀀷􀀤􀀱􀀦􀀨􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀜􀀚
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀂯􀁒􀁎􀁌􀃫􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀥􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀜􀀚
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀴􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁇􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀨􀁛􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀜􀀚
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀸􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁜􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀀶􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀜􀀛
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁻􀁌􀃫􀀃􀀫􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀯􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀲􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀯􀁒􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀜􀀜
􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀪􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁖􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀯􀁒􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀓􀀕
􀀙􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀓􀀖
􀀩􀀑􀀃􀀨􀀹􀀬􀀧􀀨􀀱􀀦􀀨􀀃􀀵􀀨􀀦􀀲􀀹􀀨􀀵􀀨􀀧􀀃􀀩􀀵􀀲􀀰􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀤􀀯􀀯􀀨􀀪􀀨􀀧􀀃􀀦􀀵􀀬􀀰􀀨􀀃􀀶􀀦􀀨􀀱􀀨􀀶􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀓􀀘
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀓􀀘
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁖􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀶􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁒􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀓􀀘
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀥􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀓􀀙
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀓􀀛
􀀪􀀑􀀃􀀲􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀵􀀃􀀩􀀲􀀵􀀰􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀤􀀶􀀶􀀬􀀶􀀷􀀤􀀱􀀦􀀨 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀓􀀜
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􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁄􀀃􀀳􀁏􀁄􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀓􀀜
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀪􀁙􀁒􀁝􀁇􀀃􀀳􀁏􀁄􀁑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀔􀀕
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁜􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀀶􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀔􀀖
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀲􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁕􀀐􀀕􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀔􀀖
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀶􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁕􀁓􀁖􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁜􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀔􀀘
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀰􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀣􀁘􀁠􀀃􀁷􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀔􀀙
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁋􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀔􀀚
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁈􀁄 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀕􀀓
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁈􀁄 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀕􀀕
􀀋􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀶􀀧􀀦􀀃􀀔􀀛􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀚􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀕􀀕
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀥􀁌􀀫􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀕􀀖
􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀨􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀧􀁄􀁗􀁄􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀕􀀗
􀀫􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀬􀁞􀀬􀁠􀁳􀀶􀀃􀀵􀀨􀀯􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀫􀀬􀀳􀀃􀀺􀀬􀀷􀀫􀀃􀀰􀀯􀀤􀀧􀀬􀁠 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀕􀀚
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁓􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀰􀁏􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁠 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀕􀀚
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀰􀁏􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁉􀁉 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀕􀀛
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀕􀀛
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀺􀁒􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀖􀀓
􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀩􀀲􀀵􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀖􀀔
􀀙􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁻􀁌􀃫􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀰􀁏􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀖􀀕
􀀚􀀑􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀳􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀖􀀕
􀀛􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀧􀁄􀁕􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀰􀁏􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁈􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀚 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀖􀀘
􀀜􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀹􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀰􀁏􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁄􀁍􀁄􀁆􀀃􀀩􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀚􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀖􀀙
􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀹􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀰􀁏􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁌􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁗􀁘􀁐􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀚􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀖􀀙
􀀔􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀹􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀰􀁏􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁄􀁍􀁄􀁆􀀃􀀩􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀖􀀚
􀀬􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀬􀁞􀀬􀁠􀁳􀀶􀀃􀀤􀀦􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀶􀀃􀀷􀀲􀀃􀀬􀀱􀀩􀀲􀀵􀀰􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀖􀀛
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀥􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀖􀀛
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀲􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀖􀀜
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀲􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀖􀀜
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀗􀀓
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀗􀀔
􀀋􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀗􀀕
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁏􀁒􀁚􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀏􀀃􀀶􀀹􀀮􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀗􀀕
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀗􀀕
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀗􀀗
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀗􀀘
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀀲􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀗􀀘
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀲􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁴􀀳􀁄􀁘􀁎􀁵 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀗􀀛
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀶􀀹􀀮􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁳􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀗􀀜
􀀋􀁌􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀤􀁇􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁆􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀯􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀘􀀔
􀀋􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀘􀀕
􀀭􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀬􀁞􀀬􀁠􀁳􀀶􀀃􀀮􀀱􀀲􀀺􀀯􀀨􀀧􀀪􀀨􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀦􀀵􀀬􀀰􀀨􀀶􀀃􀀦􀀲􀀰􀀰􀀬􀀷􀀷􀀨􀀧􀀃􀀬􀀱􀀃􀀶􀀤􀀵􀀤􀀭􀀨􀀹􀀲􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀶􀀵􀀨􀀥􀀵􀀨􀀱􀀬􀀦􀀤 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀘􀀗
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀘􀀗
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀮􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀘􀀗
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀨􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁌􀁈􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁉􀁉 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀘􀀗
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀨􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁌􀁈􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁉􀁉 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀙􀀓
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀙􀀓
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀙􀀓
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀙􀀚
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀮􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁒􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀙􀀛
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀙􀀛
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁒􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀚􀀔
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁒 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀚􀀘
􀀋􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀛􀀓
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀮􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀛􀀖
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􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀮􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀨􀁄􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀀃􀀨􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀛􀀖
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀮􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀨􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀃􀀥􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀧􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀛􀀘
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀛􀀙
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀮􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀛􀀜
􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀜􀀓
􀁅􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀜􀀔
􀁆􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀜􀀖
􀁇􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀜􀀗
􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀜􀀘
􀁉􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀜􀀙
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀗􀀜􀀜
􀀹􀀬􀀬􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀬􀀾􀀬􀁀􀁮􀀶􀀃􀀦􀀵􀀬􀀰􀀬􀀱􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀵􀀨􀀶􀀳􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀬􀀥􀀬􀀯􀀬􀀷􀀼􀀃􀀩􀀲􀀵􀀃􀀤􀀬􀀧􀀬􀀱􀀪􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀤􀀥􀀨􀀷􀀷􀀬􀀱􀀪􀀃
􀀦􀀵􀀬􀀰􀀨􀀶􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀧􀀨􀀵􀀃􀀤􀀵􀀷􀀬􀀦􀀯􀀨􀀃􀀚􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀓􀀔
􀀤􀀑􀀃􀀨􀀯􀀨􀀰􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀤􀀬􀀧􀀬􀀱􀀪􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀤􀀥􀀨􀀷􀀷􀀬􀀱􀀪􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀓􀀔
􀀥􀀑􀀃􀀩􀀬􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀱􀀪􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀲􀀥􀀭􀀨􀀦􀀷􀀬􀀹􀀨􀀃􀀨􀀯􀀨􀀰􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀤􀀬􀀧􀀬􀀱􀀪􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀤􀀥􀀨􀀷􀀷􀀬􀀱􀀪 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀓􀀔
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀓􀀔
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁎􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀓􀀕
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁜􀀃􀀨􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀓􀀖
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀯􀁒􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀓􀀗
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀓􀀗
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀓􀀘
􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀓􀀚
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀓􀀚
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀓􀀛
􀀙􀀑􀀃􀀲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀔􀀕
􀀚􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀔􀀖
􀀦􀀑􀀃􀀩􀀬􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀱􀀪􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀰􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀨􀀯􀀨􀀰􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀤􀀬􀀧􀀬􀀱􀀪􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀤􀀥􀀨􀀷􀀷􀀬􀀱􀀪􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀔􀀗
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁎􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀔􀀗
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁒􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀔􀀘
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀔􀀙
􀀧􀀑􀀃􀀦􀀲􀀱􀀦􀀯􀀸􀀶􀀬􀀲􀀱 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀔􀀜
􀀹􀀬􀀬􀀬􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀬􀀾􀀬􀁀􀁮􀀶􀀃􀀦􀀵􀀬􀀰􀀬􀀱􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀵􀀨􀀶􀀳􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀬􀀥􀀬􀀯􀀬􀀷􀀼􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀧􀀨􀀵􀀃􀀤􀀵􀀷􀀬􀀦􀀯􀀨􀀃􀀚􀀋􀀖􀀌 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀕􀀓
􀀤􀀑􀀃􀀶􀀸􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀬􀀲􀀵􀀐􀀶􀀸􀀥􀀲􀀵􀀧􀀬􀀱􀀤􀀷􀀨􀀃􀀵􀀨􀀯􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀫􀀬􀀳􀀃􀀥􀀨􀀷􀀺􀀨􀀨􀀱􀀃􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀬􀁞􀀬􀁠􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀳􀀨􀀷􀀵􀀤􀀷􀀲􀀵􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃
􀀦􀀵􀀬􀀰􀀨􀀶􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀕􀀓
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀳􀀦􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀕􀀔
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀗􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀳􀀦􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀕􀀔
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀗􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀳􀀦􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀕􀀗
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀕􀀗
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀨􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁏􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀕􀀗
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀨􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁏􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀕􀀙
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀳􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀀦􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀕􀀙
􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀳􀀦 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀕􀀙
􀁅􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀳􀀦􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀖􀀔
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀬􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀀃􀀥􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀲􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀳􀀦􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀖􀀗
􀁄􀀑􀀃􀁴􀀱􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁇􀁅􀁄􀁵􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁴􀀱􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁟􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁈􀁵 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀖􀀗
􀁌􀀑􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁇􀁅􀁄􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀖􀀘
􀁌􀁌􀀑􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁟􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁈 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀖􀀘
􀁅􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀬􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀲􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀀋􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁟􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁈􀀌􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀳􀀦􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀖􀀙
􀁌􀀑􀀃􀀥􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀽􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁅􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀖􀀙
􀁌􀁌􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀐􀀖􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀖􀀛
􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀽􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁅􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀗􀀔
􀁆􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀬􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀲􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀀋􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁟􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁈􀀌􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀳􀀦􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀗􀀖
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􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁜􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁄􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀀥􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀳􀀦􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀗􀀖
􀀋􀁌􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀳􀀦􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀗􀀗
􀀋􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁉􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀗􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀳􀀦􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀗􀀙
􀀋􀁙􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀀹􀀮􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀯􀁒􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀗􀀚
􀀋􀁙􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀀹􀀮􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁉􀁉􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀗􀀚
􀀥􀀑􀀃􀀩􀀬􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀱􀀪􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀶􀀸􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀬􀀲􀀵􀀐􀀶􀀸􀀥􀀲􀀵􀀧􀀬􀀱􀀤􀀷􀀨􀀃􀀵􀀨􀀯􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀫􀀬􀀳􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀗􀀛
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁎􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀗􀀛
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀨􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀨􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀀹􀀮􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀗􀀛
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀶􀀹􀀮 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀗􀀜
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀘􀀖
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀮􀁑􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀫􀁄􀁇􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀮􀁑􀁒􀁚 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀘􀀘
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀩􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀳􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁋 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀘􀀙
􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀘􀀙
􀀬􀀻􀀑􀀃􀀦􀀸􀀰􀀸􀀯􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀹􀀨􀀃􀀦􀀲􀀱􀀹􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀘􀀛
􀀤􀀑􀀃􀀤􀀵􀀷􀀬􀀦􀀯􀀨􀀶􀀃􀀖􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀘􀀝􀀃􀀺􀀤􀀵􀀃􀀦􀀵􀀬􀀰􀀨􀀶􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀦􀀵􀀬􀀰􀀨􀀶􀀃􀀤􀀪􀀤􀀬􀀱􀀶􀀷􀀃􀀫􀀸􀀰􀀤􀀱􀀬􀀷􀀼 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀘􀀛
􀀥􀀑􀀃􀀤􀀵􀀷􀀬􀀦􀀯􀀨􀀃􀀖􀀝􀀃􀀰􀀸􀀵􀀧􀀨􀀵􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀤􀀷􀀷􀀤􀀦􀀮􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀦􀀬􀀹􀀬􀀯􀀬􀀤􀀱􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀘􀀛
􀀦􀀑􀀃􀀤􀀵􀀷􀀬􀀦􀀯􀀨􀀃􀀘􀀝􀀃􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀶􀀨􀀦􀀸􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀏􀀃􀀰􀀸􀀵􀀧􀀨􀀵􀀏􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀬􀀱􀀫􀀸􀀰􀀤􀀱􀀨􀀃􀀤􀀦􀀷􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀘􀀛
􀀻􀀑􀀃􀀶􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀨􀀱􀀦􀀬􀀱􀀪 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀙􀀓
􀀤􀀑􀀃􀀯􀀤􀀺􀀃􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀶􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀨􀀱􀀦􀀬􀀱􀀪􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀙􀀓
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀙􀀓
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀦􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀙􀀔
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁒􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁄 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀙􀀖
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀷􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁇􀁜􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀙􀀗
􀀥􀀑􀀃􀀧􀀨􀀷􀀨􀀵􀀰􀀬􀀱􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀶􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀨􀀱􀀦􀀨 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀙􀀗
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀙􀀗
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀙􀀙
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀪􀁕􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀙􀀙
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁒 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀙􀀙
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀽􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁅 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀙􀀚
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀙􀀚
􀀋􀁌􀁙􀀌􀀃􀀤􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀦􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘􀀙􀀛
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀦􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀙􀀜
􀀻􀀬􀀑􀀃􀀧􀀬􀀶􀀳􀀲􀀶􀀬􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘􀀚􀀔
􀀻􀀬􀀬􀀑􀀃􀀧􀀬􀀶􀀶􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀬􀀱􀀪􀀃􀀲􀀳􀀬􀀱􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀭􀀸􀀧􀀪􀀨􀀃􀀰􀀲􀀯􀀲􀀷􀀲􀀃􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀦􀀲􀀸􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀃􀀔􀀃􀀷􀀲􀀃􀀗􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀜􀀃􀀷􀀲􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔
􀀤􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀱􀀷􀀵􀀲􀀧􀀸􀀦􀀷􀀲􀀵􀀼􀀃􀀵􀀨􀀰􀀤􀀵􀀮􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀯􀁒􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀯􀁌􀁑􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁅􀀃􀀯􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁓􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕
􀀥􀀑􀀃􀀤􀀦􀀷􀀸􀀶􀀃􀀵􀀨􀀸􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁎􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀲􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀯􀁒􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀘
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀚
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀛
􀀦􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀬􀁞􀀬􀁠􀁳􀀶􀀃􀀮􀀱􀀲􀀺􀀯􀀨􀀧􀀪􀀨􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀦􀀵􀀬􀀰􀀨􀀶􀀃􀀦􀀲􀀰􀀰􀀬􀀷􀀷􀀨􀀧􀀃􀀬􀀱􀀃􀀶􀀤􀀵􀀤􀀭􀀨􀀹􀀲􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀶􀀵􀀨􀀥􀀵􀀨􀀱􀀬􀀦􀀤 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀓
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁎􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀮􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀓
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀮􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀔
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀨􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁌􀁈􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁉􀁉 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀕
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀨􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁌􀁈􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁉􀁉 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗
􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀯􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀗
􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀘
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􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀀋􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀙
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀮􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁒􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀚
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀚
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀛
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁒 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀜
􀀋􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀔
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀮􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀔
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀔
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀕
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀵􀀶􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀕
􀀋􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀖
􀀋􀁈􀀌􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁕􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀗
􀀋􀁉􀀌􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀗
􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀘
􀀻􀀬􀀬􀀬􀀑􀀃􀀧􀀬􀀶􀀶􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀬􀀱􀀪􀀃􀀲􀀳􀀬􀀱􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀭􀀸􀀧􀀪􀀨􀀃􀀰􀀲􀀯􀀲􀀷􀀲􀀃􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀦􀀲􀀸􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀃􀀘􀀃􀀷􀀲􀀃􀀛􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀙
􀀤􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀱􀀷􀀵􀀲􀀧􀀸􀀦􀀷􀀲􀀵􀀼􀀃􀀵􀀨􀀰􀀤􀀵􀀮􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀙
􀀥􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀬􀁞􀀬􀁠􀁳􀀶􀀃􀀤􀀥􀀬􀀯􀀬􀀷􀀼􀀃􀀷􀀲􀀃􀀬􀀶􀀶􀀸􀀨􀀃􀀲􀀵􀀧􀀨􀀵􀀶􀀃􀀷􀀲􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀗􀀓􀀷􀀫􀀃􀀳􀀦􀀃􀀰􀀨􀀰􀀥􀀨􀀵􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀕􀀙
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁞􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀞 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀚
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁞􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀀹􀀮􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀞 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀚
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀲􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀳􀀦􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀞 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀚
􀀋􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀞􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀚
􀀋􀁈􀀌􀀃􀀲􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀼􀁄􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁋􀁌􀀃􀀤􀁎􀁄􀁖􀁋􀁌􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀩􀀲􀀵􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀺􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁄􀀞􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀚
􀀋􀁉􀀌􀀃􀃬􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁎􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁞􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁐􀀏􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁞􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕􀀚
􀀦􀀑􀀃􀀤􀀥􀀬􀀯􀀬􀀷􀀼􀀃􀀷􀀲􀀃􀀬􀀱􀀬􀀷􀀬􀀤􀀷􀀨􀀃􀀧􀀬􀀶􀀦􀀬􀀳􀀯􀀬􀀱􀀤􀀵􀀼􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀒􀀲􀀵􀀃􀀦􀀵􀀬􀀰􀀬􀀱􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀬􀀱􀀹􀀨􀀶􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀕
􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀳􀀦􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀗
􀁅􀀑􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀗􀀓􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀳􀀦􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀶􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀶􀀹􀀮 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖􀀗
􀀧􀀑􀀃􀀦􀀲􀀱􀀦􀀯􀀸􀀶􀀬􀀲􀀱 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀘
􀀻􀀬􀀹􀀑􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀱􀀨􀀻􀀨􀀶 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔
􀀤􀀑􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀱􀀨􀀻􀀃􀀤􀀃􀁷􀀃􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀦􀀨􀀧􀀸􀀵􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀥􀀤􀀦􀀮􀀪􀀵􀀲􀀸􀀱􀀧􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀀐􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀤􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔
􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀕
􀀋􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁏􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖
􀀋􀁈􀀌􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀖
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀗
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁈 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀘
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀹􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁗􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀙
􀀥􀀑􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀱􀀨􀀻􀀃􀀥􀀃􀁷􀀃􀀪􀀯􀀲􀀶􀀶􀀤􀀵􀀼􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀚
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀚
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀘
􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀙
􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀚
􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀚
􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀯􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑 􀀔􀀚
􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁖 􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀛
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􀀻􀀬􀀬􀀃
􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀀻􀀹􀀑􀀃􀀦􀀲􀀱􀀩􀀬􀀧􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀬􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀱􀀨􀀻􀀃􀀦
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􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
􀀃
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􀀬􀀑􀀃􀀃 􀀬􀀱􀀷􀀵􀀲􀀧􀀸􀀦􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃
􀀤􀀑􀀃􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀰􀁒􀁐􀃨􀁌􀁏􀁒􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁶􀁌􀃦􀀃
􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀰􀁒􀁐􀃭􀁌􀁏􀁒􀀃 􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁻􀁌􀃫􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀶􀁕􀁈􀃫􀁎􀁒􀀏􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁖 􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀀕􀀕􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀀮􀁒􀁻􀁗􀁘􀁑􀁌􀃫􀁌􀀏􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁅􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀶􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁒􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁄􀀃 􀀋􀁴􀀶􀀩􀀵􀀼􀁵􀀌􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁍􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁒􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁙􀀃 􀀳􀁈􀁒􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁳􀁖􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁐􀁜􀀃
􀀋􀁴􀀭􀀱􀀤􀁵􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁄􀁇􀁈􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀙􀀙􀀑􀀔􀀃
􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁒􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁄􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁻􀁌􀃫􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀭􀀱􀀤􀀃
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀶􀁆􀁋􀁒􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀽􀁄􀁇􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁄􀀑􀀕􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀀭􀁄􀁑􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀕􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁚􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀔􀀖􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁕􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀭􀀱􀀤􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀫􀁈􀁕􀁝􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁄􀀃􀀋􀁴􀀥􀁌􀀫􀁵􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀤􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀭􀀱􀀤􀁳􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀥􀁌􀀫􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀕􀀏􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁻􀁌􀃫􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁌􀁈􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁉􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀖􀁕􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁒􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁙􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁐􀁜􀀃􀀋􀁴􀀹􀀭􀁵􀀌􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀱􀁌􀁻􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁅􀁌􀁄􀀑􀀖􀀃
􀀖􀀑􀀃 􀀲􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁒􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁄􀀃􀀋􀁴􀀩􀀵􀀼􀁵􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁻􀁌􀃫􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁌􀁈􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀀭􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁉􀁉􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀹􀀭􀀑􀀗􀀃 􀀫􀁈􀀃 􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁏􀀃 􀀕􀀗􀀃 􀀱􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀏􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀩􀀵􀀼􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁋􀁌􀁐􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀘􀀃􀀃
􀀥􀀑􀀃􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀰􀁒􀁐􀃨􀁌􀁏􀁒􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁶􀁌􀃦􀀃
􀀗􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁻􀁌􀃫􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀚􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀑􀀙􀀃 􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁻􀁌􀃫􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀀚􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀏􀀃 􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁇􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀚􀀃 􀀤􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀕􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀏􀀃 􀀔􀀖􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀚􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀘􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀛􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀋􀁴􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁵􀀌􀀑􀀛􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀃􀀃 􀀨􀁛􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀔􀀜􀀙􀀏􀀃 􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀩􀀵􀀼􀀏􀀃 􀀕􀀙􀀃 􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀞􀀃 􀀨􀁛􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀛􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁓􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃
􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀭􀁄􀁑􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀃􀀃 􀀭􀁒􀃩􀁈􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁍􀁈􀀏􀀃􀀷􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀓􀀛􀀜􀀐􀀖􀀓􀀜􀀓􀀞􀀃􀀨􀁛􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀚􀀓􀀙􀀏􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀴􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁜􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀃􀀲􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀃
􀀖􀀃􀀃 􀀨􀁛􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀚􀀓􀀙􀀏􀀃 􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀁳􀁖􀀃 􀀺􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀀴􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀃 􀀲􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀖􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀞􀀃 􀀨􀁛􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀛􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀃
􀀷􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁓􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀏􀀃 􀀕􀀖􀀃 􀀭􀁄􀁑􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀙􀀞􀀃 􀀨􀁛􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀛􀀔􀀘􀀏􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁓􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀏􀀃
􀀕􀀘􀀃􀀭􀁄􀁑􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀑􀀃
􀀗􀀃􀀃 􀀨􀁛􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀔􀀜􀀙􀀏􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀀵􀀼􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀞􀀃􀀨􀁛􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀖􀀚􀀘􀀏􀀃􀀨􀁛􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁎􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀀨􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀝􀀃􀀥􀁈􀁏􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀯􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁓􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁅􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀛􀀏􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀑􀀃
􀀘􀀃􀀃 􀀨􀁛􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀚􀀓􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁜􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁻􀁌􀁠􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀱􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀑􀀃
􀀙􀀃􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀞􀀃􀀲􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃
􀀤􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀰􀁒􀁐􀃭􀁌􀁏􀁒􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁻􀁌􀃫􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀑􀀃
􀀚􀀃􀀃 􀀲􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃􀀛􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀑􀀃
􀀛􀀃􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁳􀁖􀀃 􀀩􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀤􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀀲􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀕􀀜􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀏􀀃
􀀕􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀞􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀚􀀞􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀤􀀏􀀃􀀘􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀛􀀑􀀃
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􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀀥􀀑􀀃􀀃 􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀀚􀀜􀀑􀀃 􀀰􀁒􀁐􀁡􀁌􀁏􀁒􀀃 􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀘􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀁑􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀔􀀗􀀜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀔􀀘􀀔􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀔􀀘􀀕􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀃 􀀵􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀀛􀀓􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁊􀁈􀁒􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀔􀀘􀀖􀀃
􀀛􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀰􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃
􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃 􀁴􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁵􀀑􀀔􀀘􀀗􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁚􀀑􀀃
􀀛􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁯􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁰􀀑􀀔􀀘􀀘􀀃 􀀤􀁑􀀃 􀁴􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁵􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀔􀀘􀀙􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁴􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁵􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁴􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁵􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀃
􀀵􀁄􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀔􀀘􀀚􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁏􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀑􀀔􀀘􀀛􀀃
􀀛􀀖􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀔􀀘􀀜􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀑􀀔􀀙􀀓􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃 􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀗􀀜􀀃􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀏􀀃􀀘􀀏􀀃􀀜􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀃􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀚􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀘􀀔􀀃􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀘􀀕􀀃􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀘􀀖􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃 􀁈􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀛􀀖􀀞􀀃 􀀷􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀜􀀏􀀃 􀀕􀀘􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃
􀀲􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀔􀀞􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀔􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀘􀀗􀀃􀀃 􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀛􀀘􀀑􀀃 􀀃
􀀔􀀘􀀘􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀛􀀘􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀘􀀙􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁕􀁑􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁆􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀗􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀛􀀜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀔􀀘􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀘􀀚􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀛􀀙􀀏􀀃􀀛􀀜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀔􀀙􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀘􀀛􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀛􀀙􀀞􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀔􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀘􀀜􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀛􀀘􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀙􀀓􀀃􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀓􀀘􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀔􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃 􀁈􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀝􀀃 􀁴􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁇􀀃 􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁵􀀏􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀔􀀑􀀃
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􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁒􀁐􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀑􀀔􀀙􀀔􀀃
􀀛􀀗􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁴􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁵􀀃 􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁉􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀑􀀔􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀙􀀖􀀃􀀃
􀀛􀀘􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀑􀀔􀀙􀀗􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃
􀁴􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁵􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀑􀀔􀀙􀀘􀀃􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃
􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀑􀀔􀀙􀀙􀀃
􀀛􀀙􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀑􀀔􀀙􀀚􀀃􀁴􀀺􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁵􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁴􀁖􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁵􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀑􀀔􀀙􀀛􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀑􀀔􀀙􀀜􀀃
􀀛􀀚􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀓􀀃 􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃 􀁑􀁈􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁇􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀑􀀃􀀤􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃
􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀙􀀔􀀃􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀓􀀘􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀓􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀓􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃 􀀬􀀞􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀙􀀐􀀔􀀖􀀚􀀏􀀃 􀀔􀀗􀀗􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃
􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀘􀀓􀀏􀀃 􀀜􀀚􀀞􀀃􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀃 􀀔􀀔􀀘􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃 􀁴􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀓􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁵􀀏􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀓􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀗􀀏􀀃 􀁉􀁑􀀑􀀃 􀀗􀀖􀀚􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀚􀀞􀀃 􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀐􀀔􀀔􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀕􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀙􀀖􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀙􀀐􀀔􀀖􀀚􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀗􀀞􀀃􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀘􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀙􀀗􀀃􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀖􀀓􀀘􀀏􀀃􀀖􀀓􀀚􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀙􀀘􀀃􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀓􀀛􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀙􀀙􀀃􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀔􀀔􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀙􀀚􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀛􀀘􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀙􀀛􀀃􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀙􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃 􀁈􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀗􀀑􀀃 􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁇􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁘􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀘􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀙􀀜􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃 􀁈􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀞􀀃 􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁴􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁵􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀚􀀓􀀃􀀃 􀀰􀁕􀁎􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀾􀁏􀁍􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁡􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀔􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀛􀀘􀀏􀀃􀀜􀀜􀀐􀀔􀀓􀀓􀀞􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃
􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀛􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀘􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀓􀀑􀀃
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􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀀛􀀛􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁎􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁒􀁉􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀃􀀱􀁈􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁒􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀗􀀃􀀃
􀀦􀀑􀀃􀀃 􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀀛􀀜􀀑􀀃 􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁐􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀀋􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀀗􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀛􀀌􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀔􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀬􀀬􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁴[􀁗]􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁵􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀘􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀃 􀀤􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁘􀁖􀀃
􀀜􀀓􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁇􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁋􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀃􀀃
􀀜􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀀃􀁴􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁵􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁴􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁵􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀚􀀃􀀃
􀀜􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀘􀀓􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃 􀀬􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁴􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁵􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁴􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀌􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀋􀀙􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇􀀃
􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁙􀁄􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀗􀀖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃 􀀬􀁵􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀀃 􀁴􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁵􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁑􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀜􀀃 􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀃􀀃 􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀗􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀜􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃 􀁈􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀜􀀜􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀕􀀞􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀛􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀕􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀚􀀗􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀏􀀃
􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀚􀀘􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀔􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀬􀀞􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀬􀀬􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀃􀀃 􀀧􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁞􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀗􀀕􀀞􀀃􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀘􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀘􀀙􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀚􀀚􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀚􀀞􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀙􀀛􀀞􀀃􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃
􀀘􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀃􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀓􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁴􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁵􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁴􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁵􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀝􀀃 􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀃 􀀋􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁴􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀓􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃 􀀬􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁵􀀌􀀞􀀃
􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀜􀀜􀀃 􀀋􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁴􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁵􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀚􀀜􀀃􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀚􀀞􀀃􀀧􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁞􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀗􀀘􀀑􀀃
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􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁓􀁖􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁐􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀱􀁈􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀓􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀝􀀃
[􀀷]􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀀃 􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁉􀀃 􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀔􀀃
􀀜􀀖􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀕􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁗􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁴􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁵􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁖􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁊􀁄􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃 􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁌􀁎􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀃈􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀖􀀃􀀃
􀀜􀀗􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃
􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀗􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁴􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁇􀁌􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁇􀁌􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀁵􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀘􀀃
􀀜􀀘􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀐􀁅􀁜􀀐􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁜􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁙􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃
􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀝􀀃􀀃
[􀀷]􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃
[􀁧]􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀙􀀃
􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀛􀀓􀀃􀀃 􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀖􀀞􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀜􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀌􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇􀀃
􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁙􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀛􀀔􀀃􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀜􀀘􀀞􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁉􀁑􀀑􀀃 􀀗􀀖􀀚􀀞􀀃􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀗􀀑􀀃
􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀀬􀀦􀀵􀀦􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀚􀀙􀀃 􀀋􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀖􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀬􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀛􀀕􀀃􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀔􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃 􀀬􀀞􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃 􀀬􀀬􀀞􀀃 􀀧􀀑􀀃 􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁞􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀗􀀚􀀞􀀃􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀛􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀛􀀖􀀃􀀃 􀀧􀀑􀀃 􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁞􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀗􀀚􀀞􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀛􀀞􀀃 􀀬􀀦􀀵􀀦􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀃􀀋􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀔􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀬􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀛􀀗􀀃􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀙􀀞􀀃 􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀃 􀀔􀀔􀀘􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀓􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀛􀀘􀀃􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀚􀀞􀀃 􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀘􀀞􀀃 􀀬􀀦􀀵􀀦􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀕􀀕􀀃􀀋􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀓􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀬􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀛􀀙􀀃􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀞􀀃 􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀃 􀁈􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀔􀀑􀀃
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􀀕􀀙􀀃
􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁖􀁳􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀚􀀃􀀃
􀀜􀀙􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁋􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀛􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀜􀀃􀀃
􀀜􀀚􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁖􀁄􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁎􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀔􀀜􀀓􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁈􀁄􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀜􀀔􀀃 􀀤􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀑􀀔􀀜􀀕􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀑􀀔􀀜􀀖􀀃􀀃
􀀜􀀛􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁴􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁛􀁌􀁐􀁘􀁐􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀁉􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁑􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁵􀀑􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁴􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁵􀀑􀀔􀀜􀀘􀀃􀀃
􀀜􀀜􀀑􀀃 􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁇􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁋􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀔􀀜􀀙􀀃
􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀃 􀀰􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁄􀀃
􀀔􀀓􀀓􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁉􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁉􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀛􀀚􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁊􀁄􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀔􀀞􀀃􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀖􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀛􀀛􀀃􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀓􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀗􀀃 􀀋􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁐􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀃􀀭􀁄􀁑􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀌􀀞􀀃􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀜􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀛􀀜􀀃􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀓􀀞􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀙􀀜􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁊􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀜􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁉􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁴􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁓􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁇􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁵􀀏􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀕􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀬􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀃦􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀖􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀜􀀓􀀃􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀚􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀀸􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀱􀁘􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀀺􀁈􀁄􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀭􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀲􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀚􀀛􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀜􀀔􀀃􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀞􀀃􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁉􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀜􀀕􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀛􀀞􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀔􀀋􀀘􀀌􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀬􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀜􀀖􀀃􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀙􀀓􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀃􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀜􀀘􀀃􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀙􀀔􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀜􀀙􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀘􀀘􀀐􀀙􀀚􀀞􀀃 􀀧􀀑􀀃 􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁞􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀗􀀕􀀞􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀗􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀘􀀙􀀞􀀃􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀓􀀞􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀛􀀘􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀬􀀑􀀃􀀃
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􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀑􀀔􀀜􀀚􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁴􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁉􀁘􀁏􀁑􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁵􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁎􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁑􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁊􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁗􀀃 􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁇􀁒􀁘􀁅􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁳􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃
􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁴􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃
􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁖􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁵􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁗􀀃
􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀕􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃
􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁉􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁴[􀁗]􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀞􀀃
􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁋􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁵􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀖􀀃􀀃
􀀧􀀑􀀃􀀃 􀀰􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀀔􀀓􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀝􀀃
􀁌􀀑 􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀀞􀀃
􀁌􀁌􀀑 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁌􀁌􀁌􀀑 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁎􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁉􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁐􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁎􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁋􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀗􀀃
􀀔􀀓􀀖􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀘􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁜􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀁘􀁅􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀜􀀚􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁊􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀓􀀞􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀓􀀞􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀛􀀘􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀬􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀃􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁊􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀓􀀞􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀓􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀗􀀞􀀃 􀀧􀀑􀀃 􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁞􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀘􀀔􀀞􀀃 􀀬􀀦􀀵􀀦􀀃
􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀗􀀚􀀗􀀃􀀋􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀛􀀘􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀬􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀃􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀓􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀘􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀃􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀓􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃 􀀬􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀀦􀀵􀀦􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀕􀀓􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁴􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁖􀀃
􀁇􀁒􀁘􀁅􀁗􀁉􀁘􀁏􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃 􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁏􀀃 􀁉􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁇􀁵􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀀧􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁞􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀙􀀓􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀃􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀓􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀘􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀔􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀛􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀓􀀕􀀃􀀃 􀀧􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁞􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀙􀀙􀀐􀀙􀀚􀀞􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁊􀁄􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀔􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀓􀀖􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁊􀁄􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀔􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀓􀀗􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁙􀁒􀁡􀁎􀁄􀀃 􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀚􀀞􀀃􀁁􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁅􀁌􀁠􀁌􀀃
􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀓􀀘􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀀮􀁙􀁒􀁡􀁎􀁄􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀜􀀑􀀃
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􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁳􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁒􀁇􀁜􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀙􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀚􀀃
􀀔􀀓􀀗􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁳􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁳􀁖􀀃􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀛􀀃 􀀱􀁈􀁊􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁈􀁊􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀜􀀃
􀀨􀀑􀀃􀀃 􀀨􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀓􀀘􀀑􀀃 􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀋􀁅􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀑􀀃 􀀨􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁎􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀑􀀕􀀔􀀓􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁖􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀑􀀕􀀔􀀔􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁴􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁎􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃 􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁵􀀑􀀕􀀔􀀕􀀃 􀀬􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁴􀁄􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃 􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁒􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁓􀁈􀁒􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁋􀁖􀁵􀀑􀀕􀀔􀀖􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀓􀀚􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁎􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁐􀁘􀁐􀀏􀀕􀀔􀀗􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁑􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀞􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁎􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀑􀀕􀀔􀀘􀀃􀀤􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀓􀀙􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀀮􀁙􀁒􀁡􀁎􀁄􀀃 􀁈􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀓􀀞􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀜􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁕􀁑􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁆􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀕􀀙􀀞􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀓􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀓􀀚􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁙􀁒􀁡􀁎􀁄􀀃 􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀓􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀀧􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀚􀀞􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀜􀀞􀀃 􀀥􀁕􀁟􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀖􀀛􀀖􀀐􀀖􀀛􀀘􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁕􀁑􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁆􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀖􀀕􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀕􀀚􀀞􀀃 􀀷􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀓􀀞􀀃􀀫􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀚􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀓􀀛􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀀮􀁙􀁒􀁡􀁎􀁄􀀃 􀁈􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀜􀀞􀀃 􀀧􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀛􀀞􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁊􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀘􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀜􀀘􀀞􀀃􀁁􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁅􀁌􀁠􀁌􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀖􀀘􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀓􀀜􀀃􀀃 􀀧􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀛􀀞􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀙􀀓􀀞􀀃􀀲􀁕􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀗􀀛􀀞􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀛􀀚􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁊􀁄􀁕􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀘􀀐􀀕􀀖􀀙􀀞􀀃􀀥􀁕􀁟􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀛􀀙􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀔􀀓􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀜􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀱􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁕􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁕􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁄􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀔􀀙􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁄􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀓􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀔􀀔􀀃 􀀮􀁕􀁄􀁍􀁌􀁶􀁑􀁌􀁎􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀚􀀔􀀙􀀞􀀃 􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁊􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁌􀃦􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀭􀁒􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀚􀀔􀀞􀀃 􀀥􀁕􀃩􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀛􀀛􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀙􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀩􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁕􀁄􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀀔􀀓􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀓􀀗􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁄􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀜􀀏􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀥􀁕􀁟􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀛􀀜􀀞􀀃 􀀹􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁏􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀜􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀔􀀖􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀜􀀞􀀃􀀱􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁕􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁕􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁄􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀕􀀕􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀔􀀗􀀃􀀃 􀀥􀁕􀁟􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀚􀀔􀀞􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀓􀀞􀀃 􀀱􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁕􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁄􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀱􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁕􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁄􀀃
􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀔􀀙􀀑􀀃 􀀥􀁜􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀀮􀁕􀁄􀁍􀁌􀁞􀁑􀁌􀁎􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁎􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁏􀁉􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀀮􀁕􀁄􀁍􀁌􀁞􀁑􀁌􀁎􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀓􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀔􀀘􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀓􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀱􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁕􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁄􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀱􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁕􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁄􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀕􀀔􀀞􀀃
􀀥􀁕􀁟􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀚􀀔􀀑􀀃
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􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀐􀁅􀁜􀀐􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁜􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀑􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀃 􀀬􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃
􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁎􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁇􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁴􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁵􀀑􀀕􀀔􀀚􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁉􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁴􀁙􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁵􀀑􀀕􀀔􀀛􀀃
􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁴􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁈􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁎􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃 􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁒􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁖􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃
􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁒􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁋􀁖􀁵􀀑􀀕􀀔􀀜􀀃􀀃
􀀩􀀑􀀃􀀃 􀀲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀓􀀜􀀑􀀃 􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃
􀀘􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀀋􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀀖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀚􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁉􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀋􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀃 􀁴􀀲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀁵􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀑􀀕􀀕􀀓􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃
􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁚􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀘􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁘􀀃
􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀕􀀕􀀔􀀃
􀀔􀀔􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁓􀁋􀁜􀁖􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁴􀁌􀁑􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁵􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀑􀀕􀀕􀀕􀀃􀀷􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁴􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁇􀁌􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁵􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀑􀀕􀀕􀀖􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁈􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀕􀀕􀀗􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀃􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀙􀀖􀀞􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀙􀀗􀀓􀀞􀀃 􀀥􀁕􀁟􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀜􀀔􀀞􀀃
􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁊􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀭􀁒􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀚􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁴􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁎􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁇􀁵􀀏􀀃􀀮􀁕􀁄􀁍􀁌􀁞􀁑􀁌􀁎􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀚􀀔􀀙􀀑􀀃
􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁋􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁄􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀔􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀔􀀚􀀃􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀙􀀖􀀞􀀃 􀀥􀁕􀁟􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀜􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀙􀀗􀀓􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀔􀀛􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀛􀀐􀀕􀀘􀀜􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀀮􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀘􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀔􀀜􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀜􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀱􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁕􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁕􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁄􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀕􀀕􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀕􀀓􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀔􀀘􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀝􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀙􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀱􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁊􀀃 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀞􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀷􀁒􀁎􀁜􀁒􀀃 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀞􀀃
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀬􀀋􀁆􀀌􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁏􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀃 􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃 􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃
􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁴􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁋􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁵􀀏􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀬􀀦􀀦􀀳􀀵􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀨􀀦􀀫􀀵􀀏􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁉􀁑􀀑􀀃 􀀙􀀗􀀜􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀕􀀔􀀃􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀃦􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀃧􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀕􀀕􀀃􀀃 􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀜􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀃦􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀃧􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀕􀀖􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀃦􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀃧􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀃 􀀬􀁅􀁌􀁇􀀑􀀃
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􀀖􀀓􀀃
􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀀔􀀔􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁉􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁋􀁜􀁖􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁳􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀕􀀕􀀘􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁎􀁑􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁎􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁋􀁜􀁖􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁘􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁎􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁒􀀑􀀕􀀕􀀙􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀔􀀖􀀑􀀃 􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁉􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁴􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀁵􀀑􀀕􀀕􀀚􀀃 􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁉􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁄􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁉􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀑􀀕􀀕􀀛􀀃
􀀔􀀔􀀗􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁉􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀕􀀕􀀜􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁋􀁒􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀕􀀖􀀓􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁖􀁜􀁆􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀀃 􀁆􀁋􀁒􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀕􀀖􀀔􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁙􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁴􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁳􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁵􀀑􀀕􀀖􀀕􀀃
􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁐􀁒􀁖􀁓􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁖􀁳􀀃 􀁙􀁘􀁏􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁒􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀑􀀕􀀖􀀖􀀃
􀀔􀀔􀀘􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀑􀀕􀀖􀀗􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀕􀀘􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁕􀁑􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁆􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀞􀀃 􀀹􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁏􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀙􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁄􀁜􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁐􀁄􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀵􀁘􀁝􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁄􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀕􀀙􀀃􀀃 􀀧􀀑􀀃 􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁞􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀖􀀘􀀞􀀃 􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁊􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀭􀁒􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀙􀀕􀀛􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁕􀁑􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁆􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀞􀀃􀀹􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁏􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀙􀀞􀀃􀀪􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀗􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁄􀁜􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁐􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀵􀁘􀁝􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁄􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀕􀀚􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀔􀀚􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁘􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀁈􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀙􀀙􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀓􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀕􀀛􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁕􀁄􀁍􀁌􀁞􀁑􀁌􀁎􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀖􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀕􀀜􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀖􀀓􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀜􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁕􀁑􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁆􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀜􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀖􀀔􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀛􀀔􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀖􀀕􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀜􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀀮􀁕􀁑􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁆􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀜􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀖􀀖􀀃􀀃 􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁊􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀭􀁒􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀜􀀙􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀖􀀗􀀃􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀜􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁙􀁄􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀀬􀀹􀀏􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁴􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀲􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁓􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁆􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁄􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁵􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀤􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀬􀀬􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁴[􀁗]􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁒􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁵􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀜􀀑􀀃􀀃
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􀀖􀀔􀀃
􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁉􀁈􀁕􀀑􀀕􀀖􀀘􀀃 􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀁳􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁉􀁘􀁏􀀃
􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀕􀀖􀀙􀀃
􀀔􀀔􀀙􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁉􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁖􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀑􀀕􀀖􀀚􀀃 􀀬􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀕􀀖􀀛􀀃
􀀪􀀑􀀃􀀃 􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀃 􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁞􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃 􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀘􀀋􀁋􀀌􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀀋􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀀔􀀕􀀌􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁘􀁈􀁏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁉􀁈􀁕􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀔􀀛􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀝􀀃
(a) 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁘􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃 􀁉􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀀋􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁘􀁖􀀌􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀃
(b) 􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃
􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀀋􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀀌􀀑􀀕􀀖􀀜􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀔􀀜􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀀐
􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁏􀁖􀁈􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀕􀀗􀀓􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀑􀀕􀀗􀀔􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀑􀀕􀀗􀀕􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃
􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀕􀀗􀀖􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁍􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀖􀀘􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀕􀀛􀀙􀀐􀀕􀀛􀀚􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀖􀀙􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀛􀀚􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀖􀀚􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀖􀀛􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀃􀀖􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀖􀀜􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀕􀀚􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁙􀁒􀁡􀁎􀁄􀀃 􀁈􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀕􀀓􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀞􀀃􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀔􀀞􀀃􀀹􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁏􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀖􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁕􀁑􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁆􀀃
􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀱􀁒􀁗􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁍􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁴􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁵􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀋􀁋􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃
􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀋􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀌􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀀷􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀚􀀔􀀖􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃
􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀗􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁕􀁑􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁆􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀗􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀗􀀓􀀃􀀃 􀀥􀁕􀁟􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀜􀀙􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁕􀁑􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁆􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀜􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀗􀀔􀀃􀀃 􀀥􀁕􀁟􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀜􀀙􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀀮􀁙􀁒􀁡􀁎􀁄􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀖􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀖􀀕􀀖􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀗􀀕􀀃􀀃 􀀥􀁕􀁟􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀜􀀙􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁙􀁒􀁡􀁎􀁄􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀕􀀖􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀗􀀖􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀖􀀞􀀃􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀜􀀑􀀃
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􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀃 􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃
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􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀕􀀗􀀘􀀃
􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁘􀁈􀁏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁉􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀕􀀗􀀙􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀑􀀕􀀗􀀚􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀞􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁄􀀃 􀁴􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁵􀀑􀀕􀀗􀀛􀀃 􀀬􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀕􀀗􀀜􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁴􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁵􀀃 􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀕􀀘􀀓􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀕􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀕􀀘􀀔􀀃􀀦􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃 􀁴􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃
􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁵􀀑􀀕􀀘􀀕􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁴􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁜􀁵􀀑􀀕􀀘􀀖􀀃
􀀔􀀕􀀖􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁻􀁌􀃫􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀀔􀀏􀀃 􀀘􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀜􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁐􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀀕􀀏􀀃 􀀙􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀔􀀓􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀃􀀃 􀀥􀁕􀃩􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀜􀀙􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀚􀀞􀀃 􀀱􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃
􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀚􀀗􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁙􀁒􀁡􀁎􀁄􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀖􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀖􀀕􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀗􀀘􀀃􀀃 􀀱􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀚􀀗􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁙􀁒􀁡􀁎􀁄􀀃 􀁈􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀩􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀀮􀁙􀁒􀁡􀁎􀁄􀀃 􀁈􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀖􀀕􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀕􀀘􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁕􀁑􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁆􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀗􀀙􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁈􀀑􀁊􀀑􀀃􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀞􀀃􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀘􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀘􀀞􀀃
􀀹􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁏􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀖􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁕􀁑􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁆􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀛􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀗􀀚􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀕􀀛􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁙􀁒􀁡􀁎􀁄􀀃 􀁈􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀙􀀓􀀞􀀃 􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀗􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀞􀀃􀀹􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁏􀁍􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀖􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁕􀁑􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁆􀀃
􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀗􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀗􀀛􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀔􀀞􀀃􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀘􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀗􀀜􀀃􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀘􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀙􀀓􀀚􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀘􀀓􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀔􀀞􀀃􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁞􀁎􀁌􀁠􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀘􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀘􀀔􀀃􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀀱􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁠􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀔􀀏􀀃 􀀔􀀗􀀙􀀞􀀃 􀀮􀁙􀁒􀁡􀁎􀁄􀀃 􀁈􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀙􀀙􀀞􀀃
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􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀗􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀘􀀕􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁙􀁒􀁡􀁎􀁄􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀙􀀓􀀞􀀃􀀮􀁕􀁑􀁒􀁍􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁆􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀘􀀖􀀃􀀃 􀀮􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁠􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁁􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁝􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀚􀀔􀀘􀀑􀀃
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Annex 471
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of the
General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition), T-208/11, p. 5 (16 October 2014)

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Language of document : English ECLI:EU:T:2014:885
JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition)
16 October 2014(*)
(Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures against certain persons and entities with a view to
combating terrorism — Freezing of funds — Applicability of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 to situations of armed
conflict — Possibility for an authority of a third State to be classified as a competent authority within the meaning of
Common Position 2001/931/CFSP — Factual basis of the decisions to freeze funds — Reference to terrorist acts —
Need for a decision of a competent authority for the purpose of Common Position 2001/931)
In Joined Cases T‑208/11 and T‑508/11,
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), established in Herning (Denmark), represented by V. Koppe, A. M. van
Eik and T. Buruma, lawyers,
applicant,
v
Council of the European Union, represented by G. Étienne and E. Finnegan, acting as Agents,
defendant,
supported by
Kingdom of the Netherlands, represented, in Case T‑208/11, initially by M. Bulterman, N. Noort and C. Schillemans,
and subsequently, as well as in Case T‑508/11, by C. Wissels, M. Bulterman and J. Langer, acting as Agents,
intervener in Cases T‑208/11 and T‑508/11,
by
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, represented initially by S. Behzadi-Spencer, H. Walker
and S. Brighouse, and subsequently by S. Behzadi-Spencer, H. Walker and E. Jenkinson, acting as Agents, assisted by
M. Gray, Barrister,
intervener in Case T‑208/11,
and by
European Commission, represented initially by F. Castillo de la Torre and S. Boelaert, and subsequently by Castillo
de la Torre and É. Cujo, acting as Agents,
intervener in Cases T‑208/11 and T‑508/11,
APPLICATION, initially, in Case T‑208/11, for annulment of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 83/2011 of
31 January 2011 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed
against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Implementing Regulation (EU)
No 610/2010 (OJ 2011 L 28, p. 14), and, in Case T‑508/11, for annulment of Council Implementing Regulation (EU)
No 687/2011 of 18 July 2011 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive
measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, and repealing
Implementing Regulations (EU) No 610/2010 and No 83/2011 (OJ 2011 L 188, p. 2), in so far as those measures apply
to the applicant,
THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition),
composed of F. Dehousse (Rapporteur), acting as President, I. Wiszniewska-Białecka, E. Buttigieg, A. M. Collins and
I. Ulloa Rubio, Judges,
Registrar: S. Spyropoulos, Administrator,
further to the hearing on 26 February 2014,
gives the following
Judgment
Facts and procedure
On 27 December 2001, the Council of the European Union adopted Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the
application of specific measures to combat terrorism (OJ 2001 L 344, p. 93), Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific
restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism (OJ 2001 L 344,
p. 70) and Decision 2001/927/EC establishing the list provided for in Article 2(3) of Regulation No 2580/2001 (OJ 2001
L 344, p. 83).
On 29 May 2006, the Council adopted Decision 2006/379/EC implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation No 2580/2001
and repealing Decision 2005/930/EC (OJ 2006 L 144, p. 21). By Decision 2006/379, the Council placed the applicant,
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), on the list relating to frozen funds provided for in Article 2(3) of Regulation
No 2580/2001 (‘the list relating to frozen funds’). Its name has remained on that list ever since.
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On 31 January 2011, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) No 83/2011 implementing Article 2(3) of
Regulation No 2580/2001 and repealing Implementing Regulation (EU) No 610/2010 (OJ 2011 L 28, p. 14). The LTTE
was maintained on the list annexed to Implementing Regulation No 83/2011.
By document lodged at the Court Registry on 11 April 2011, the LTTE brought an action, registered as Case T‑208/11,
for annulment of Implementing Regulation No 83/2011 in so far as that measure concerned it.
By letter of 30 May 2011, the Council sent the LTTE the reasons why it intended to maintain LTTE’s name on that list
when the list relating to frozen funds next came up for review.
By documents lodged at the Court Registry on 28 July, 2 and 3 August 2011 respectively, the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, the European Commission and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland applied for leave
to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the Council in Case T‑208/11. After hearing the parties, the
President of the Second Chamber of the Court granted those applications by order of 16 September 2011.
On 18 July 2011, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) No 687/2011 implementing Article 2(3) of
Regulation No 2580/2001 and repealing Implementing Regulations (EU) No 610/2010 and No 83/2011 (OJ 2011 L 188,
p. 2). The LTTE was maintained on the list annexed to Implementing Regulation No 687/2011.
By letter of 19 July 2011, the Council sent the LTTE the reasons for maintaining it on that list.
By document lodged at the Court Registry on 28 September 2011 and rectified on 19 October 2011, the LTTE brought
an action, registered as Case T‑508/11, for annulment of Implementing Regulation No 687/2011 in so far as that
measure concerned it.
By documents lodged at the Court Registry on 9 and 17 January 2012 respectively, the Kingdom of the Netherlands
and the Commission applied for leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the Council in Case
T‑508/11. After hearing the parties, the President of the Second Chamber of the Court granted those applications by
orders of 9 March 2012.
By letter of 18 November 2011, the Council sent the LTTE the reasons why it intended to maintain its name on the list
relating to frozen funds when it next came up for review.
On 22 December 2011, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1375/2011 implementing Article 2(3)
of Regulation No 2580/2001 and repealing Implementing Regulation No 687/2011 (OJ 2011 L 343, p. 10). The LTTE
was maintained on the list annexed to Implementing Regulation No 1375/2011.
By letter of 3 January 2012, the Council sent the LTTE the reasons for maintaining it on that list.
By letter lodged at the Court Registry on 27 February 2012, the LTTE requested that Cases T‑208/11 and T‑508/11 be
joined and sought leave to amend the forms of order sought in the present actions so that they would apply to
Implementing Regulation No 1375/2011; it also lodged offers of evidence.
By documents of 24 and 25 May 2012, the Commission, the Council and the Kingdom of the Netherlands submitted
their observations on the offers of evidence and the request for leave to amend the forms of order sought.
After hearing the parties, the President of the Second Chamber of the Court joined Cases T‑208/11 and T‑508/11 by
order of 15 June 2012.
On 25 June 2012, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) No 542/2012 implementing Article 2(3) of
Regulation No 2580/2001 and repealing Implementing Regulation No 1375/2011 (OJ 2012 L 165, p. 12). The LTTE was
maintained on the list annexed to Implementing Regulation No 542/2012.
By letter of 26 June 2012, the Council sent the LTTE the reasons for maintaining it on that list.
By letter lodged at the Court Registry on 19 July 2012, the LTTE sought leave to amend the forms of order sought in
the present actions so that they would apply to Implementing Regulation No 542/2012.
Since the letters of 27 February and 19 July 2012 had been added to the file as requests for leave to amend the forms
of order sought, the LTTE lodged on 2 August 2012, at the request of the Court, a document amending the forms of
order sought in the present actions so that they applied to Implementing Regulations No 1375/2011 and No 542/2012.
By documents lodged at the Court Registry on 5 and 6 September 2012, the United Kingdom, the Commission and the
Council submitted their observations on that amendment of the forms of order sought.
On 10 December 2012, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1169/2012 implementing Article 2(3)
of Regulation No 2580/2001 and repealing Implementing Regulation No 542/2011 (OJ 2012 L 337, p. 2). The LTTE was
maintained on the list annexed to Implementing Regulation No 1169/2012.
On 7 February 2013, the LTTE lodged a document amending the forms of order sought in the present actions so that
they applied to Implementing Regulation No 1169/2012.
By documents lodged at the Court Registry on 21 February, 12 and 13 March 2013, the Commission, the Council and
the United Kingdom submitted their observations on that amendment of the forms of order sought.
On 25 July 2013, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) No 714/2013 implementing Article 2(3) of
Regulation No 2580/2001 and repealing Implementing Regulation No 1169/2012 (OJ 2013 L 201, p. 10). The LTTE was
maintained on the list annexed to Implementing Regulation No 714/2013.
On 22 August 2013, the LTTE lodged a document amending the forms of order sought in the present actions so that
they applied to Implementing Regulation No 714/2013.
By documents lodged at the Court Registry on 9, 17 and 25 September 2013, the Commission, the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the Council submitted their observations on that amendment of the forms of
order sought.
Following a change in the composition of the Chambers of the Court, the Judge-Rapporteur was assigned to the Sixth
Chamber, to which the present cases were accordingly allocated.
By decision of 13 November 2013, the Court referred the present cases to the Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition.
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By letter of 15 January 2014, the Court requested the parties to reply to certain questions. The parties complied with
that request by documents lodged at the Court Registry on 6 February 2014.
On 10 February 2014, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) No 125/2014 implementing Article 2(3) of
Regulation No 2580/2001 and repealing Implementing Regulation No 714/2013 (OJ 2014 L 40, p. 9). The LTTE was
maintained on the list annexed to Implementing Regulation No 125/2014.
On 18 February 2014, the LTTE lodged a document amending the forms of order sought in the present actions so that
they applied to Implementing Regulation No 125/2014.
On 25 February 2014, as a member of the Chamber was unable to sit, the President of the General Court designated
another Judge to complete the Chamber pursuant to Article 32(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court.
At the hearing of 26 February 2014, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the Council and the
Commission stated that they did not have any objections to the amendment of the forms of order sought on
18 February 2014.
On 22 July 2014, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) No 790/2014 implementing Article 2(3) of
Regulation No 2580/2001 and repealing Implementing Regulation (EU) No 125/2014 (OJ 2014 L 217, p. 1). The LTTE
was maintained on the list annexed to Implementing Regulation No 790/2014, on the basis of modified reasons.
On 20 August 2014, the LTTE lodged a document amending the forms of order sought in the present actions so that
they applied to Implementing Regulation No 790/2014.
By documents lodged at the Court Registry on 23 and 25 September 2014, the Council and the Kingdom of the
Netherlands submitted their observations on that amendment of the forms of order sought.
Forms of order sought
The LTTE claims that the Court should:
annul Implementing Regulations No 83/2011, No 687/2011, No 1375/2011, No 542/2012, No 1169/2012,
No 714/2013, No 125/2014 and No 790/2014 (‘the contested regulations’) in so far as they concern the LTTE;
order the Council to pay the costs.
The Council — supported, in Case T‑208/11, by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the
Commission and, in Case T‑508/11, by the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Commission — contends that the Court
should:
dismiss the actions as unfounded;
order the LTTE to pay the costs.
Law
The LTTE raises, in essence, seven pleas in law, six of which apply both in Case T‑208/11 and in Case T‑508/11, and
one of which applies only in Case T‑508/11.
The six pleas common to both actions allege (i) inapplicability of Regulation No 2580/2001 to the conflict between the
LTTE and the Government of Sri-Lanka; (ii) wrongful categorisation of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation for the
purposes of Article 1(3) of Common Position 2001/931; (iii) lack of any decision taken by a competent authority; (iv)
failure to undertake the review required under Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931; (v) breach of the obligation
to state reasons; and (vi) infringement of the rights of defence and the right to effective judicial protection. Solely in
Case T‑508/11 it alleges (vii) infringement of the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity.
The first plea in law: inapplicability of Regulation No 2580/2001 to the conflict between the LTTE and the Government
of Sri-Lanka
Arguments of the parties
The LTTE submits that Regulation No 2580/2001 is not applicable to situations of armed conflict, since those
conflicts — and therefore the acts committed in that context — can, in its opinion, only be governed by international
humanitarian law.
However, the historical facts show that the LTTE was involved in armed conflict against the armed forces of the
Government of Sri-Lanka, seeking self-determination for the Tamil people and their ‘liberation from the oppression’ of
that government. Given the way in which the LTTE’s armed forces were organised and their manner of conducting
operations, the members of those forces meet all the requirements laid down by international law for recognition as
‘combatants’. That status gave them immunity in respect of acts of war that were lawful under the terms of the law on
armed conflict and meant that, in the case of unlawful acts, the LTTE would be subject only to that law, and not to any
anti-terrorism legislation. Since legitimate acts of war cannot be categorised as unlawful under national law, they fall
outside the scope of Common Position 2001/931, which, as provided under Article 1(3) thereof, does not apply to acts
which are not offences under national law.
The placing of the LTTE on the list relating to frozen funds accordingly constitutes interference by a third country in an
armed conflict, contrary to the principle of non-interference under international humanitarian law.
In its replies, the LTTE claims that a clear distinction should be made between armed conflict and terrorism. The first
question is not whether an event has the characteristics of a terrorist act, but whether there is an ongoing armed
conflict, in which case the only law that applies is humanitarian law. Humanitarian law does not preclude armed
conflicts; homicides committed in the context of war, but not in breach of the law on armed conflict, are excusable. It
follows that to categorise a suicide attack against enemy headquarters as a terrorist act — as the Council did in the
circumstances of these cases — is to criminalise an act of war which is nevertheless acceptable under international
humanitarian law.
In support of its arguments, the LTTE relies moreover on a judgment of the Rechtbank’s-Gravenhague (District Court
of The Hague (Netherlands)) of 21 October 2011 and a judgment of the Tribunale di Napoli (Court of Naples (Italy)) of
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23 June 2011, which held that the LTTE was involved in an ‘internal armed conflict’ within the meaning of international
law and refused to accept that the LTTE could properly be categorised as a ‘terrorist’ organisation.
The Council, supported by the interveners, disputes the LTTE’s arguments. It states that, under international law,
categorisation as ‘armed conflict’ does not preclude the application — where terrorist acts are committed — of the
international law rules relating to the fight against terrorism, a fight in which the European Union actively participates
in support of the measures adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations (‘the Security Council’). International
humanitarian law does not preclude the application of specific conventions relating to the fight against terrorism. The
definition of ‘terrorist acts’ in Common Position 2001/931 remains valid whatever the circumstances in which such acts
are committed. The Council disputes the argument that the LTTE’s categorisation of the situation in Sri-Lanka can
exempt it from the application of the international legislation relating to the fight against terrorism.
In its rejoinders, the Council maintains its position. With regard to the judgment of the Rechtbank’s-Gravenhague, it
observes that that judgment is under appeal and argues that the General Court cannot attach to that judgment the
consequences that the LTTE wishes to attribute to it with regard to the interpretation of international humanitarian law
and European law.
The Commission argues that the LTTE is mistaken in asserting an incompatibility between armed conflicts and terrorist
acts. There are no principles of immunity for combatants in respect of terrorist acts perpetrated during armed conflict.
The LTTE does not substantiate its claim that the acts of which it is accused in the grounds for the contested
regulations are lawful acts of war. The LTTE is wrong to claim that terrorist acts committed in the context of an armed
conflict are subject only to humanitarian law. The institutions of the European Union enjoy a broad discretion as
regards the European Union’s external relations and the factors to be taken into consideration for the purposes of
adopting measures to freeze funds. The European Union compiles a list of terrorist organisations in order to deprive
them of their sources of income, and it does this whether or not they are participants in an armed conflict. That
approach is consistent with the European Union’s view — broadly shared, moreover, by the rest of the world — that all
terrorist acts are reprehensible and must be eradicated, whether committed in times of peace or of armed conflict.
It is not necessary, therefore, to determine the exact nature of the conflict — whether armed or not, whether internal
or international, whether a war of liberation or not — between the LTTE and the Government of Sri-Lanka.
With regard to the alleged breach of the principle of non-interference, the Commission notes that that principle is
established for the benefit of States and, accordingly, can be invoked only by them, and not by ‘rebel groups’. The fact
that only the LTTE — and not the Government of Sri-Lanka — is on the list relating to frozen funds is an argument of
opportunity which cannot be considered by the Court. The reference to Article 6(5) of the Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Additional Protocol II), of 8 June 1977 is not relevant.
The Commission disputes, as do the other interveners, the relevance or the substance of the references made by the
LTTE to the judgments of the Rechtbank’s-Gravenhague and the Tribunale di Napoli.
It is clear that the question whether a particular attack is of a terrorist nature is not dependent upon the political
cause in the name of which the attack was launched, but rather on the means and methods used. The law on armed
conflicts does not allow any exception to the prohibition of acts of terror and there is no rule of humanitarian law that
precludes the adoption of measures, such as the freezing of funds, designed to stop the financing of terrorism,
wherever it is committed.
Findings of the Court
By the present plea, the LTTE maintains, in essence, that, in a case of armed conflict within the meaning of
international humanitarian law — which, in its view, is the case here — only that law is applicable to any unlawful acts
committed within the context of that conflict, and not the law organising the prevention and suppression of terrorism.
LTTE is, it claims, a liberation movement which led an armed conflict against an ‘oppressive government’. The placing
of the LTTE on the list relating to frozen funds constitutes an infringement of the principle of non-interference under
international humanitarian law and the Council was wrong to apply to the LTTE the provisions of EU law on terrorism.
In support of its arguments, the LTTE puts forward various references to provisions of international law and EU law.
However, contrary to what the LTTE claims, the applicability of international humanitarian law to a situation of armed
conflict and to acts committed in that context does not imply that legislation on terrorism does not apply to those acts.
That is true both of the provisions of EU law applied in the present case, in particular Common Position 2001/931 and
Regulation No 2580/2001, and of international law invoked by the LTTE.
As regards, in the first place, EU law, it should be noted that the existence of an armed conflict within the meaning of
international humanitarian law does not exclude the application of provisions of EU law concerning terrorism to any
acts of terrorism committed in that context.
In fact, Common Position 2001/931 makes no distinction as regards its scope according to whether or not the act in
question is committed in the context of an armed conflict within the meaning of international humanitarian law.
Moreover, as the Council rightly points out, the objectives of the European Union and its Member States are to combat
terrorism, whatever form it may take, in accordance with the objectives of current international law.
It is notably to implement, at EU level, Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, which
‘reaffirm[s] the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts’ and ‘calls on Member States to complement international
cooperation by taking additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their territories through all lawful means, the
financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism’, that the Council adopted Common Position 2001/931 (see recitals 5
to 7 to that common position) and then, in accordance with that common position, Regulation No 2580/2001 (see
recitals 3, 5 and 6 to that regulation).
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As regards, in the second place, the international law invoked by the LTTE, it should be noted that, apart from the fact
that an armed conflict may undeniably give rise to acts corresponding, by their nature, to terrorist acts, international
humanitarian law expressly classifies such acts as ‘terrorist acts’ that are contrary to that law.
The Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War expressly
provides, in Article 33, that all measures of terrorism are prohibited. Similarly, Additional Protocols I and II to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International and Non-
International Armed Conflicts, of 8 June 1977, which seek to ensure better protection of those victims, provide that
acts of terrorism are prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever (Article 4(2) of Additional Protocol II) and
that acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are
prohibited (Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II).
It follows from the foregoing considerations that the perpetration of terrorist acts by participants in an armed conflict
is expressly covered and condemned as such by international humanitarian law.
Further, the existence of an armed conflict within the meaning of international humanitarian law does not appear to
preclude, in the case of a terrorist act committed in the context of that conflict, the application not only of provisions of
that humanitarian law on breaches of the laws of war, but also of provisions of international law specifically relating to
terrorism.
Thus, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, signed in New York on
9 December 1999 (‘the 1999 New York Convention’), expressly envisages the commission of terrorist acts in the
context of an armed conflict within the meaning of international law. In Article 2(1)(b) thereof, it renders unlawful ‘any
act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act’.
That convention confirms that, even in an armed conflict within the meaning of international humanitarian law, there
may be terrorist acts liable to be punished as such and not only as war crimes. Those acts include those intended to
cause death or serious bodily injury to civilians.
The LTTE’s a contrario argument that Article 2(1)(b) of the 1999 New York Convention excludes from the scope of that
convention any act directed against persons ‘taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict’ in
no way calls into question that finding.
The LTTE is therefore wrong to claim that, in international law, the notions of armed conflict and of terrorism are
incompatible.
It is also apparent from the foregoing considerations that the fact that terrorist acts emanate from ‘freedom fighters’
or liberation movements engaged in an armed conflict against an ‘oppressive government’ is irrelevant. Such an
exception to the prohibition of terrorist acts in armed conflicts has no basis in European law or even in international
law. In their condemnation of terrorist acts, European law and international law do not distinguish between the status
of the author of the act and the objectives he pursues.
As for the LTTE’s reference to the principle of non-interference which, in its opinion, the Council infringed by placing it
on the list relating to frozen funds, it should be noted that that customary international law principle, also called the
principle of non-intervention, concerns the right of any sovereign State to conduct its affairs without external
interference and constitutes a corollary of the principle of sovereign equality of States (judgment of the International
Court of Justice of 26 November 1984 in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States of America), on competence and admissibility, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 392, paragraph 73, and of 27 June
1986, on the substance, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 96, paragraph 202). As the Council points out, that principle of
international law is set out for the benefit of sovereign States, and not for the benefit of groups or movements.
Contrary to the LTTE’s submissions, the placing on the list relating to frozen funds of a movement — even if it is a
liberation movement — in a situation of armed conflict with a sovereign State, on account of the involvement of that
movement in terrorism, does not therefore constitute an infringement of the principle of non-interference.
In addition, the LTTE’s argument that the interference by the European Union stems from the discriminatory nature of
the European Union’s position, consisting in adopting restrictive measures only against the LTTE and not against the
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri-Lanka, cannot succeed.
The lawfulness of measures taken by the Council against a group, on the basis of Common Position 2001/931,
depends on whether that institution complied, in its decision, with the conditions and requirements defined in that
common position, and not on whether other parties could possibly be subject to restrictive measures. Common Position
2001/931 and its implementation by the Council do not seek to determine who, in a conflict between a State and a
group, is right or wrong, but to combat terrorism. In that context, having regard to the broad discretion conferred on
the EU institutions as regards the European Union’s external relations (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 October
1982 in Faust v Commission, 52/81, ECR, EU:C:1982:369, paragraph 27; of 16 June 1998 in Racke, C‑162/96, ECR,
EU:C:1998:293, paragraph 52, and of 27 September 2007 in Ikea Wholesale, C‑351/04, ECR, EU:C:2007:547,
paragraph 40; order of 6 September 2011 in Mugraby v Council and Commission, T‑292/09, EU:T:2011:418,
paragraph 60), there is no need, for the purposes of the present dispute, to examine whether restrictive measures
under EU law could have been adopted with regard to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri-Lanka. In any event,
even if the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri-Lanka were to have committed acts which are liable to give rise to
criticism and be the basis for an action of the European Union, it should be noted that the principle of equal treatment
must be reconciled with the principle of legality, according to which no one may rely, to his own benefit, on an unlawful
act committed in favour of another (judgments of 9 July 2009 in Melli Bank v Council, T‑246/08 and T‑332/08, ECR,
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EU:T:2009:266, paragraph 75, and of 14 October 2009 in Bank Melli Iran v Council, T‑390/08, ECR, EU:T:2009:401,
paragraphs 56 and 59).
In order to contest the applicability of Regulation No 2580/2001 to terrorist acts committed in the context of an armed
conflict, the LTTE is also wrong to rely on Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating
terrorism (OJ 2002 L 164, p. 3) and, in particular, recital 11 to that Framework Decision, according to which ‘[a]ctions
by armed forces during periods of armed conflict, which are governed by international humanitarian law within the
meaning of these terms under that law, and, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law,
actions by the armed forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties are not governed’ by that Framework
Decision. The LTTE adds that Framework Decision 2002/475 was accompanied by a statement by the Council explicitly
excluding from its scope armed resistance such as that conducted by the various European resistance movements
during World War II.
Regulation No 2580/2001 was not adopted pursuant to Framework Decision 2002/475, which concerns criminal law,
but pursuant to Common Position 2001/931. Framework Decision 2002/475 cannot therefore determine the scope of
Regulation No 2580/2001.
Moreover, Common Position 2001/931, just like Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) which it implements at EU
level, does not contain any provision comparable to recital 11 to Framework Decision 2002/475.
It follows that the LTTE’s reference to Framework Decision 2002/475 and to a statement of the Council accompanying
that Framework Decision is irrelevant.
Moreover, the Court considers, like the Commission, that the absence, in Common Position 2001/931, of a recital
comparable to recital 11 to Framework Decision 2002/475 must, at best, be interpreted as expressing the Council’s
intention not to provide for any exception to the application of EU provisions when it comes to preventing terrorism by
combating its financing. That lack of any exception is in accordance with the 1999 New York Convention which also
contains no provision of the type contained in recital 11 to Framework Decision 2002/475.
As for the LTTE’s reference to the European Parliament recommendation on the role of the European Union in
combating terrorism [2001/2016 (INI)] (OJ 2002 C 72 E, p. 135), it should be noted that it refers to a non-binding
document. Moreover, that recommendation does not legitimise the commission of terrorist acts by liberation
movements. In a recital to that recommendation, the Parliament merely draws a distinction between terrorist acts
committed within the European Union — the Member States of which are governed by the rule of law — and ‘acts of
resistance in third countries against state structures which themselves employ terrorist methods’.
The LTTE’s reference to Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (see
paragraph 61 above) is irrelevant. That provision, according to which, ‘[a]t the end of [the internal] hostilities, the
authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the
armed conflict’, concerns the criminal proceedings that may be brought by the government concerned against, inter
alia, members of armed groups having taken up arms against it, whereas Regulation No 2580/2001 does not concern
the imposition of such criminal proceedings and sanctions, but the adoption by the European Union of preventive
measures on terrorism.
As for the expression ‘as defined as an offence under national law’ found in Article 1(3) of Common Position
2001/931 — an expression from which the LTTE deduces the recognition by the European Union, in its Common
Position, of an immunity from the application of measures to freeze funds in cases of lawful acts of war — it should be
stated that that expression actually relates to the immunity of combatants in armed conflicts for lawful acts of war, an
immunity which Additional Protocols I and II (see paragraph 61 above) express in the following similar terms: no one
shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal
offence under the national or international law to which he was subject at the time when it was committed
(Article 75(4)(c) of Additional Protocol I and Article 6(2)(c) of Additional Protocol II).
The presence of that expression in Common Position 2001/931 therefore does not alter the fact that Regulation
No 2580/2001 is applicable to terrorist acts, which still constitute unlawful acts of war when committed within the
context of armed conflicts.
It follows from all of the foregoing considerations that, contrary to what the LTTE claims, Regulation No 2580/2001 is
applicable to terrorist acts committed within the context of armed conflicts.
The LTTE cannot therefore invoke the existence of an alleged armed conflict between it and the Government of Sri-
Lanka in order to exclude itself from the application of Common Position 2001/931 for any terrorist acts which it
committed in that context.
This plea in law must therefore be rejected.
The third plea in law: lack of any decision taken by a competent authority
Arguments of the parties
The LTTE maintains that the grounds for the contested regulations contain, after a list of attacks imputed to it,
references to British and Indian decisions. It claims that none of those grounds can amount to a decision by a
competent authority for the purposes of Common Position 2001/931.
With regard, first, to the list of attacks imputed to the LTTE, it is clear that this is not a decision by a competent
authority. None the less, that does not preclude the observation that that list and the alleged attacks therein are
unsubstantiated and they cannot therefore serve as a basis for maintaining the LTTE’s name on the list relating to
frozen funds.
Second, the United Kingdom (‘UK’) decisions invoked in the grounds for the contested regulations are not decisions
taken by competent authorities. Since those decisions do not condemn any acts that are relevant in the context of
Common Position 2001/931, they cannot serve as a lawful basis unless they concern the instigation of investigations or
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prosecutions and if they are based on serious and credible evidence or indicia. That is not the position in the case of
the UK decisions, which are administrative — rather than criminal — decisions categorising the LTTE as a terrorist
group and freezing its funds. Only decisions taken within the context of criminal procedures can be used as a basis for
a decision placing a body on the list relating to frozen funds. The only case of non-criminal decisions accepted as a
basis for listing are decisions of the Security Council, as referred to in Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931.
The LTTE adds that the UK authorities at issue are not competent authorities, in so far as none of them are judicial
authorities, despite the fact that there are judicial authorities in the United Kingdom with competence in the field
covered by Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931.
Alternatively, in the event that the Court should hold that the UK decisions amount to the instigation of investigations
or prosecutions, or condemnation for a terrorist act, the LTTE submits that those decisions are not based on serious
and credible evidence or indicia. In that regard, the grounds for the contested regulations do not identify the bases for
those UK decisions. The LTTE notes that its categorisation by the UK authorities was not made individually, but
‘collectively’ with 20 other groups.
With regard, third, to the Indian decisions, the LTTE submits, in essence, that, in the light of the principle of sincere
cooperation, only decisions of a national authority of a Member State — with the exception of those of the Security
Council — may be considered to be decisions of competent authorities. To hold otherwise would thwart the EU system
of sanctions by ‘undermining’ the leading role of the Member States in that respect and leading the Council to rely on
information from third countries which are not bound by the principle of sincere cooperation and whose decisions the
Council cannot assume to be consistent with European Union standards in terms of protection of the rights of defence
and the right to effective judicial protection.
Alternatively, in the event that the Court should hold that the Council could rely on a decision taken by an authority of
a third country, the LTTE submits that the Indian decisions at issue cannot be considered to be decisions of competent
authorities. As in the case of the UK decisions, they do not amount to the instigation of investigations or prosecutions,
or to condemnations, and there are Indian courts with jurisdiction to deal with terrorist matters.
Furthermore, although provision is made under Indian law for any association declared unlawful to have a right of
referral to a tribunal, so that that body can decide whether the declaration is well founded, the LTTE has never been so
referred and the statements of reasons for the decisions maintaining its name on the list relating to frozen funds
adopted by the European Union make no mention of that fact; nor is there anything in those statements to show that
the decisions made by the Indian Government are indeed decisions adopted by a competent authority for the purposes
of Common Position 2001/931.
In the further alternative, in the event that the Court should hold that the Indian decisions amount to the instigation
of investigations or prosecutions, or to condemnation for a terrorist act, the LTTE submits that those decisions are not
based on serious and credible evidence or indicia. In that regard, the grounds for the contested regulations in no way
identify the bases for those Indian decisions. The Council cannot simply rely on decisions taken by national authorities
without ensuring that they are decisions for the purposes of Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931. That is all the
more so in the case of a decision taken by a State which is not a Member State of the European Union.
Lastly, the Indian authorities cannot be regarded as a reliable source of information since they have adopted a ‘biased
position’ in the conflict between the LTTE and the Government of Sri-Lanka.
The LTTE submits that the Council’s argument, according to which it is for the LTTE to challenge before the national
courts the facts set out in the statements of reasons for the decisions maintaining its name on the list relating to
frozen funds, fails to have regard to the fact that the Council itself offers no evidence as to how the national decisions
on which it relied examined and imputed those facts to the LTTE. The argument that the Council need not provide
additional evidence because the European Union measure is administrative and not of a penal nature is unfounded.
Furthermore, the LTTE cannot be obliged to bring actions in each of the national legal systems where the decisions on
which the Council bases its decision have been taken.
The Council, supported by the interveners, disputes the LTTE’s arguments.
With regard to the list of attacks set out in the statements of reasons for the decisions maintaining the LTTE’s name
on the list, the Council denies that it is required to provide additional evidence concerning the imputation of those acts
to the LTTE. The Council contends that if the LTTE wishes to contest the accuracy of the facts imputed to it, it should do
so before the national courts of the States that initially adopted measures against it.
With regard to the UK decisions, the Council contests the argument that they are not decisions of competent
authorities because they did not instigate any investigation or prosecution and are not based on serious and credible
evidence or indicia. It also contests the argument that the UK authorities in question are not judicial authorities. It
contends that Common Position 2001/931 does not require the national decision to be a criminal decision. As regards
the assessment of evidence and indicia on which the national decision was based, the principle of sincere cooperation
entails an obligation for the Council to rely as much as possible on the assessment made by the competent national
authority, since the prime consideration for the Council is its perception or evaluation of the danger that, in the
absence of a measure to freeze funds, the funds at issue could be used to finance terrorism. The fact that the national
authority is an administrative authority and not a judicial authority is not decisive.
More specifically, with regard to the decision of the UK Secretary of State for the Home Department (‘the Home
Secretary’) of 29 March 2001, the Council notes that the Court has already held that this was a decision of a
competent authority for the purposes of Common Position 2001/931. The Council notes that that decision was adopted
by the Home Secretary under Section 3(3)(a) of the UK Terrorism Act 2000, under which, after receiving the approval
of Parliament, the Home Secretary has competence to ban any organisation which he considers to be ‘involved in
terrorism’.
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That decision of the Home Secretary is sufficient, in itself, to be a basis for the Council decisions, without it even being
necessary to examine the decision of the UK Treasury of 6 December 2001 on the freezing of funds, a decision referred
to in the statement of reasons of 15 November 2010 on which Implementing Regulation No 83/2011 was based, and
then omitted because there was no longer any separate fund-freezing decision in force in the United Kingdom. The
Council notes that the content of that decision was then reproduced in a subsequent decision of 7 October 2009 of the
same nature and with the same effect in terms of freezing funds, and contends that, like the decision of the Home
Secretary, it constitutes a decision of a competent authority for the purposes of Common Position 2001/931.
As regards the decision adopted by the Indian Government in 1992 under the Unlawful Activities Act of 1967, as
amended in 2004, the Council contends that it is entitled to adopt fund-freezing measures based on decisions adopted
by the competent authorities of a third country, either on a proposal from a Member State submitted to that end
following an initial examination of the case concerned or at the request of the relevant third country itself. The Council
states that it must then ensure that the decisions concerned have been adopted with due regard for the fundamental
principles governing the protection of human rights, the rule of law, the principle of the presumption of innocence, the
right to a fair trial and the right not to be judged or convicted twice for the same crime or offence. That was the case
in this instance.
In the rejoinder, the Council, while maintaining its position in essence, refers, as regards the UK decisions, to
information provided in the United Kingdom’s statement in intervention. It adds that it took cognisance of the following
information, according to which the LTTE has continued without interruption to be the subject of proscription measures
adopted by the Indian authorities: the most recent decision entered into force on 14 May 2010 for two years and was
confirmed on 12 November 2010 in the context of a judicial review. The LTTE therefore continues to be listed as a
terrorist organisation in India.
The United Kingdom contends, in its statement in intervention, that the decisions of the Home Secretary and the UK
Treasury satisfy the necessary requirements to be classified as decisions of competent authorities. As regards the
Indian decision, the United Kingdom agrees with the Council’s position, according to which that decision falls to be
categorised as a decision of a competent authority.
Findings of the Court
The LTTE states, correctly, that the list of facts placed at the top of the grounds for the contested regulations does not
constitute a competent authority; it also claims that the UK and Indian decisions invoked in the grounds for the
contested regulations are not decisions of competent authorities for the purposes of the second subparagraph of
Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931.
As for the general objection that the UK and Indian authorities at issue are not competent authorities because they
are not judicial authorities and there are judicial authorities with jurisdiction to deal with terrorist matters in those
countries, it should be rejected for the following reasons.
The Court has already held, in the case of a decision of a Dutch administrative authority (a regulation on sanctions
(‘Sanctieregeling’) for the suppression of terrorism adopted by the Netherlands Ministers for Foreign Affairs and for
Finance), that the fact that that decision constituted an administrative decision and not a judicial decision was not in
itself decisive, since the actual wording of Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931 expressly provided that a nonjudicial
authority might also be classified as a competent authority for the purposes of that provision (judgment of
9 September 2010 in Al-Aqsa v Council, T‑348/07, ECR, EU:T:2010:373, paragraph 88, ‘the judgment in Al-Aqsa
T‑348/07’). In its judgment on appeal against the judgment in Al-Aqsa T‑348/07, the Court of Justice confirmed, in
essence, that the Sanctieregeling could be regarded as a decision of a competent authority (judgment of 15 November
2012 in Al-Aqsa v Council, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, ECR, EU:C:2012:711, paragraphs 66 to 77, ‘the judgment in
Al-Aqsa C‑539/10 P’).
In a previous judgment concerning a decision of the Home Secretary, the Court held that that decision did indeed
appear, in the light of the relevant national legislation, to be a decision of a competent national authority meeting the
definition in Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931 (judgment of 23 October 2008 in People’s Mojahedin
Organization of Iran v Council, T‑256/07, ECR, EU:T:2008:461, paragraphs 144 and 145, last sentence, ‘the judgment
in PMOI T‑256/07’; see also, to that effect, the judgment in Al-Aqsa T‑348/07, paragraph 105 above, EU:T:2010:373,
end of paragraph 89).
Thus, even if the second subparagraph of Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931 contains a preference for
decisions from judicial authorities, it in no way excludes the taking into account of decisions from administrative
authorities where (i) those authorities are actually vested, in national law, with the power to adopt restrictive decisions
against groups involved in terrorism and (ii) where those authorities, although only administrative, may nevertheless
be regarded as ‘equivalent’ to judicial authorities.
The fact alleged by the LTTE that UK and Indian courts have powers concerning the suppression of terrorism does not
therefore imply that the Council was not able to take account of the decisions of the national administrative authority
entrusted with the adoption of restrictive measures on terrorism.
In that regard, it should be noted that the LTTE does not claim that the decisions adopted by the UK and Indian
authorities in question were adopted by authorities unauthorised for this purpose under the national laws of the States
concerned.
It follows from the foregoing considerations that the LTTE’s general objection (see paragraph 104 above) must be
rejected.
Furthermore, the LTTE claims that, since the national decisions mentioned in the grounds for the contested regulations
do not contain any condemnation of the LTTE, they can serve as a lawful basis only if they concern the instigation of
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investigations or prosecutions and if they are based on serious and credible evidence or indicia. That is not the case for
national decisions, which are administrative — rather than criminal — determinations categorising the LTTE as a
terrorist group and freezing its funds. Only decisions taken within the context of criminal procedures can be used as a
basis for a decision placing a body on the list relating to frozen funds. The only case of a non-criminal decision
accepted as a basis for such listing are decisions of the Security Council, as referred to in Article 1(4) of Common
Position 2001/931.
By those arguments, the LTTE argues, in essence, that only criminal decisions can constitute decisions of competent
authorities for the purposes of Common Position 2001/931. The LTTE also suggests that mere listing decisions are not
sufficient.
It should be remembered that Common Position 2001/931 does not require that the decision of the competent
authority should be taken in the context of criminal proceedings stricto sensu, even if that is more often the case.
However, in the light of the objectives of Common Position 2001/931, in the context of the implementation of Security
Council Resolution 1373 (2001), the purpose of the national proceedings in question must none the less be to combat
terrorism in the broad sense. Those assessments made by the General Court in the judgment in Al-Aqsa T‑348/07,
paragraph 105 above (EU:T:2010:373, paragraphs 98 and 100) were, in essence, confirmed in the judgment in Al-
Aqsa C‑539/10 P, paragraph 105 above (EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 70), since the Court of Justice held that the
protection of the persons concerned was not called into question if the decision taken by the national authority did not
form part of a procedure seeking to impose criminal sanctions, but of a procedure aimed at the adoption of preventive
measures.
The General Court has also held that a decision to ‘instigat[e] … investigations or prosecut[e]’ must, if the Council is to
be able validly to invoke it, form part of national proceedings seeking, directly and primarily, the imposition on the
person concerned of measures of a preventive or punitive nature, in connection with the combating of terrorism and by
reason of that person’s involvement in terrorism. The Court held that that requirement is not satisfied by a decision of
a national judicial authority ruling only incidentally and indirectly on the possible involvement of the person concerned
in such activity in relation to a dispute concerning, for example, rights and duties of a civil nature (judgment of
30 September 2009 in Sison v Council, T‑341/07, ECR, EU:T:2009:372, paragraph 111, ‘the judgment in Sison
T‑341/07’).
In the present case, it should be noted that, although the decisions adopted by the UK authorities (namely the Home
Secretary and the UK Treasury) and Indian authorities do not in fact constitute, strictly speaking, decisions for the
‘instigation of investigations or prosecutions for an act of terrorism’ or ‘condemnation for such deeds’, within the strict
criminal sense of the term, the fact remains that those decisions lead to the ban on the LTTE in the United Kingdom
and the freezing of its funds, and also the proscription of the LTTE in India, and that they therefore clearly form part of
national proceedings seeking, primarily, the imposition on the LTTE of measures of a preventive or punitive nature, in
connection with the fight against terrorism.
To that extent, and contrary to what LTTE suggests, the fact that the national decisions at issue in the present case do
not correspond exactly to the wording of Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931 in no way leads, in itself, to the
conclusion that they could not be taken into account by the Council.
Therefore, the LTTE is incorrect to claim that the only case of a non-criminal decision accepted as a basis for listing are
decisions of the Security Council, as mentioned in Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931. The purpose of the last
sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 1(4) of that common position is only to afford the Council an additional
listing possibility alongside the listings which it can make on the basis of decisions of competent national authorities.
It is true that the activity of the administrative authorities in question leads, in the end, to classification in a list. None
the less, that fact does not mean, in itself, that those authorities did not carry out an individual appraisal of each of the
groups concerned prior to their insertion in those lists, or that those appraisals should necessarily be arbitrary or
unfounded. Thus, what matters is not that the activity of the authority in question leads to classification in a list of
persons, groups or entities involved in terrorism, but that that activity is carried out with sufficient safeguards to allow
the Council to rely on it to found its own listing decision.
That said and beyond the general objections examined above, it must be determined whether, specifically, the
administrative authorities in question in the present case, namely (i) the Home Secretary and the UK Treasury and (ii)
the Indian Government, could have been considered competent authorities within the meaning of Common Position
2001/931.
As regards, first, the Home Secretary, it should be noted that the Court has already held, in the light of the relevant
national law, that that authority was a competent authority within the meaning of Article 1(4) of Common Position
2001/931 (judgment in PMOI, T‑256/07, paragraph 106 above, EU:T:2008:461, paragraph 144).
Beyond the general arguments already mentioned and rejected by the Court (see paragraphs 104 to 118 above), the
LTTE puts forward no argument to the contrary other than that alleging that its classification as a terrorist organisation
in the United Kingdom took place simultaneously with 20 other groups and that the House of Commons of the United
Kingdom allegedly had no other option than to wholly accept or refuse the list that was submitted to it by the Home
Secretary, without being able to treat each organisation individually.
However, it is not apparent from the extract, produced by the LTTE, of the debates of the House of Commons of
13 March 2001 relating to the draft order submitted for its approval by the Home Secretary on 28 February 2001 that
the House of Commons was deprived of the possibility of individually examining the situation of each of the
organisations included in that draft order. First, all the members of the House of Commons received a summary of the
facts concerning each of the organisations included in the list of the draft order, which implied the possibility of an
individual examination by the House of Commons. Secondly, the debates of the House of Commons were in fact able to
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cover individual organisations, in particular so far as concerns the ‘Revolutionary Organisation 17 November’. Finally,
the fact that the measures submitted for the approval of the House of Commons were submitted to it in the form of a
single order and not in the form of as many orders as organisations concerned did not imply that an actual individual
examination was impossible, since the House of Commons remained free, in any event, to refuse to approve the draft
order.
It follows from the foregoing considerations that the capacity of the Home Secretary as a competent authority is not
called into question by the LTTE’s arguments.
The same applies to the UK Treasury, to which the Council only refers in the grounds of Implementing Regulation
No 83/2011 but not in the grounds of subsequent regulations. In the present actions, the LTTE, however, makes no
particular challenge to the capacity of the UK Treasury as a competent authority beyond the general arguments
mentioned in paragraphs 104 to 118 above, which have already been rejected by the Court.
As regards, lastly, the Indian government, the LTTE, by contrast, puts forward detailed arguments. It considers,
primarily, that, having regard to the principle of sincere cooperation, which, it claims, exists only between the
European Union and the Member States, an authority of a third State cannot be recognised as a competent authority
within the meaning of Common Position 2001/931.
That argument of principle, according to which an authority of a third State cannot be recognised as a competent
authority within the meaning of Common Position 2001/931, must be rejected for the following reasons.
In the first place, it is apparent from recitals 5 and 7 to Common Position 2001/931 that that common position was
adopted within the context and for the purposes of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), a
resolution in which the Security Council decided that ‘all States [were to] take the necessary steps to prevent the
commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information’
(paragraph 2(b) of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)) and ‘afford one another the greatest measure of
assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of
terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings’
(paragraph 2(f) of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)). In its resolution, the Security Council also called upon ‘all
States … to exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law and cooperate on administrative
and judicial matters to prevent the commission of terrorist acts’ (paragraph 3(b) of Security Council Resolution 1373
(2001)).
It should be observed that, as the Court of Justice has held, although, because of the adoption of a common position,
the European Union is obliged to take, under the Treaty, the measures necessitated by that common position, that
obligation means, when the object is to implement a resolution of the Security Council adopted under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations, that in drawing up those measures the European Union is to take due account of the
terms and objectives of the resolution concerned and of the relevant obligations under the Charter of the United
Nations relating to such implementation (judgment of 3 September 2008 in Kadi and Al Barakaat International
Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, ECR, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 296; see also
judgment of 13 March 2012 in Melli Bank v Council, C‑380/09 P, ECR, EU:C:2012:137, paragraph 55).
Having regard both to the objectives of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), aimed at the intensification of the
fight against terrorism at global level by the systematic and close cooperation of all States, and to the fact that
Common Position 2001/931 was adopted in order to implement that resolution, the LTTE’s argument, put forward even
though that common position does not contain any a priori limitation as regards the nationality of competent
authorities, disregards both the wording and the objective of that Common Position and is thus incompatible with the
implementation, at EU level, of the Security Council resolution.
In addition, it should be noted that recital 6 to Regulation No 2580/2001 states that ‘[that] Regulation is a measure
needed at Community level and complementary to administrative and judicial procedures regarding terrorist
organisations in the European Union and third countries’.
In the second place, it must be held that the LTTE’s argument is based on an incorrect perception of the function of
the principle of sincere cooperation within the framework of the scheme created by Common Position 2001/931 and
the adoption by the Council of restrictive measures.
Under Article 4(3) TEU, relations between the Member States and the EU institutions are governed by reciprocal duties
to cooperate in good faith (judgment in Sison, T‑341/07, paragraph 114 above, EU:T:2009:372, paragraph 94).
As established by the case-law, the principle of sincere cooperation entails for the Council, in the context of the
application of Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931 and Article 2(3) of Regulation No 2580/2001, the obligation to
defer as far as possible to the assessment by the competent national authority of the Member State concerned, at
least where it is a judicial authority, in particular in respect of the existence of ‘serious and credible evidence or clues’
on which the decision is based (judgment in Sison, T‑341/07, paragraph 114 above, EU:T:2009:372, paragraph 95).
Contrary to what the LTTE suggests, that principle therefore does not concern the question of the classification of a
national authority as a competent authority within the meaning of Common Position 2001/931, but only the scope of
the Council’s obligations with regard to the decisions of such an authority, where the latter is an authority of a Member
State.
The fact that the principle of sincere cooperation applies only in relations between the European Union and Member
States therefore does not mean that an authority of a third country cannot be classified as a competent authority
within the meaning of Common Position 2001/931 and that the Council cannot, if necessary, rely on the assessments
of that authority.
It follows from the foregoing considerations that the LTTE’s main argument that the inapplicability of the principle of
sincere cooperation in the relations between the Union and third States precludes, as a matter of principle, an
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authority of a third State being classified as a competent authority must be dismissed. The aim pursued by Common
Position 2001/931 leads to the opposite conclusion.
None the less, the fact remains that, as the Court inferred from the provisions of Common Position 2001/931, since
the mechanism established by that common position has the effect of allowing the Council to include a person on a list
relating to frozen funds on the basis of a decision taken by a national authority, verification that there is a decision of a
national authority fulfilling the definition of Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931 is an essential precondition for
the adoption, by the Council, of its own decision to freeze funds (see, to that effect, judgment in Sison, T‑341/07,
paragraph 114 above, EU:T:2009:372, paragraph 93).
That condition, laid down by the Court in the context of decisions adopted by authorities of EU Member States, is all
the more important in the case of decisions adopted by authorities of a third State. Unlike Member States, many third
States are not bound by the requirements stemming from the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, and none of them is subject to the provisions of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
Therefore the Council must, before acting on the basis of a decision of an authority of a third State, carefully verify
that the relevant legislation of that State ensures protection of the rights of defence and a right to effective judicial
protection equivalent to that guaranteed at EU level. In addition, there cannot be evidence showing that the third State
in practice fails to apply that legislation. In that case, the existence of legislation formally satisfying the conditions set
out above would not allow the conclusion that the decision was one of a competent authority within the meaning of
Common Position 2001/931.
It should be added that, in the absence of equivalence between the level of protection ensured by the legislation of a
third State and that ensured at EU level, a finding that a national authority of a third State had the status of a
competent authority within the meaning of Common Position 2001/931 would entail a difference in treatment between
the persons covered by EU fund-freezing measures, according to whether the national decisions underlying those
measures emanated from authorities of third States or authorities of Member States.
However, the Court finds, as the LTTE has submitted, that the grounds for the contested regulations do not contain
any evidence to suggest that the Council carried out such a thorough verification of the extent to which the rights of
defence and the right to effective judicial protection were safeguarded under the Indian legislation. Those grounds are
limited to the following considerations in Implementing Regulations Nos 83/2011 through to 125/2014:
‘Having regard to the commission and participation in acts of terrorism by the [LTTE], the Government of India
proscribed LTTE in 1992 under the Unlawful Activities Act 1967 and subsequently included it in the list of terrorist
organisations in the Schedule to the Unlawful Activities Prevention (Amendment) Act 2004.
Decisions in respect of the [LTTE] have thus been taken by competent authorities within the meaning of Article 1(4) of
Common Position 2001/931.’
By contrast, in the case of the UK authorities which are authorities of an EU Member State, the Council was at pains to
state, after the reference to the applicable legislation, that the decisions of those authorities were subject to periodic
review by a Governmental Commission (fifth paragraph of the grounds for the various contested regulations) or to
judicial review (sixth paragraph of the grounds of 25 August and 15 November 2010). However, for the Indian
authorities (a third State), the Council does not provide any assessment of the levels of protection of the rights of
defence and to judicial protection provided by the Indian legislation.
In that regard, the Council unconvincingly suggested at the hearing that the failure to assess the protection levels in
the case of the Indian authorities resulted from the fact that the contested regulations concerned reviews and not the
initial listing, which would have given rise to a more detailed statement of reasons reflecting a more detailed initial
assessment of the Indian legislation.
First, that suggestion is contradicted by the repeated specific statement of reasons as regards the UK authorities in all
of the various successive contested regulations. Secondly, the Council does not produce, in support of its suggestion,
the allegedly more detailed grounds for the initial listing regulation and does not claim, still less prove, that it
communicated them to the LTTE. If the Council’s suggestion were proved, it would follow at the very least, owing to
the transmission to the LTTE of the resulting incomplete statement of reasons, that there was an infringement of the
rights of defence. Thirdly, it should be noted that fund-freezing measures, notwithstanding their preventive nature, are
measures which may have a very substantial negative impact on the persons and groups concerned (see, to that
effect, judgment of 18 July 2013 in Commission v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, ECR, EU:C:2013:518,
paragraph 132 and the case-law cited). Therefore, both the adoption and the extension of those measures must be
based on a sufficiently sound and express statement of reasons.
As regards Implementing Regulation No 790/2014, the grounds for maintenance are supplemented by the indications
that Sections 36 and 37 of the Unlawful Activities Act 1967 include provisions for the review and revision of the list and
that the decision proscribing the LTTE as an unlawful association is periodically reviewed by the Home Affairs Minister
of India. The Council adds that the last revision took place on 14 May 2012 and that, following the revision made by
the tribunal established under the Unlawful Activities Act 1967, the designation of the LTTE was confirmed by the Home
Affairs Minister of India on 11 December 2012. The Council states that those decisions were published by notification in
the Official Journal of India.
As regards a third State, in the light of the considerations set out in paragraphs 138 to 140 above, the Council must,
inter alia, carefully verify that the relevant legislation of the third State ensures protection of the rights of defence and
a right to effective judicial protection equivalent to that guaranteed at EU level. In that context, the mere reference to
sections of legislative provisions and to a periodical revision by the Home Affairs Minister is insufficient to support a
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conclusion as to the existence of a thorough examination of the guarantees provided by the third State at issue as to
the protection of the rights of defence and the right to effective judicial protection.
It follows from the foregoing considerations that, in the light of the grounds for the contested regulations, the Council
cannot be considered to have carried out, prior to maintaining the LTTE on the list relating to frozen funds, a thorough
verification that the third State in question had legislation ensuring compliance with the rights of defence and the right
to effective judicial protection to an extent equivalent to that guaranteed at EU level.
That is particularly so because the grounds for the contested regulations make no mention of Indian provisions, in
particular the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). The defence indicates, but a posteriori before the Court, that they
were relevant since they determined the procedure applicable to the proscription of groups regarded as infringing the
Indian laws on illegal activities. That lacuna in the statement of reasons for the contested regulations confirms the lack
of a thorough examination, which is particularly important in the case of decisions of authorities of third States.
That lack of thorough examination at the stage of the adoption of the contested regulations, and the resulting
infringement of the obligation to state reasons, cannot be remedied by the Council’s references and explanations made
for the first time before the Court.
Finally, it should be noted, in connection with the considerations expressed in the second sentence of paragraph 139
above, that neither the Council nor any intervener in its support responds to the arguments in the application, which
are reproduced in the reply, that the repeal of the POTA in 2004 arose from the fact that it had led to arbitrary
detentions, acts of torture, disappearances and extrajudicial executions, and that the legislative amendments made
after that repeal did not solve the problems.
Consequently, whereas the Council was entitled to classify the UK authorities mentioned in the grounds for the
contested regulations as competent authorities, that could not, at the very least as the grounds for the contested
regulations are formulated, be the case for the Indian authorities.
It is therefore appropriate to uphold the present plea in so far as it concerns the Indian authorities and to reject it in
so far as it concerns the UK authorities.
The Court will continue its examination of the actions by considering the LTTE’s criticisms of the approach followed by
the Council and the reasons given by the Council for maintaining the LTTE’s name on the list relating to frozen funds
and, in particular, by considering the criticism that the imputation to the LTTE of the violent acts mentioned in the
grounds for the contested regulations has no sufficient factual or legal basis.
For this purpose, it is appropriate to examine the fourth to sixth pleas, taken together with the second plea.
The fourth to sixth pleas, taken together with the second plea
Arguments of the parties
The LTTE claims that, far from having carried out a serious examination of the developments in procedures at national
level, as required by Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931, the Council based the contested regulations not so
much on decisions of competent authorities but on a list of acts directly attributed by the Council to the LTTE. That list
does not constitute a decision of a competent authority. The imputation in it has no sufficient factual or legal basis
(second and fourth pleas). In addition, there are too many gaps in the grounds for the contested regulations to enable
the LTTE to mount an effective defence and to allow judicial review (fifth and sixth pleas).
The Council, supported by the interveners, disputes the LTTE’s arguments and contends that it undertook a detailed
review before deciding, by the contested regulations, to maintain the LTTE’s name on the list relating to frozen funds.
The outcome of that review is a political question to be decided only by the legislator. The Council enjoys a wide
discretion. With regard to its consideration of developments in procedures at national level, the Council refers to two
applications for removal from the list made by LTTE to the Home Secretary in 2007 and 2009, which were rejected.
The Council denies not having duly taken into consideration developments in the situation in Sri-Lanka since the
military defeat of the LTTE in 2009. It considers that it fully complied with its obligation to state reasons and disputes
that the LTTE’s rights of defence were infringed. It was for the LTTE to challenge the facts attributed to it, if necessary,
at national level. Moreover, those facts constitute contextual material of public knowledge, of which the LTTE had been
aware for a long time, but which it challenges only before the Court.
Findings of the Court
First, it should be noted that following the adoption, on the basis of decisions of competent national authorities, of a
decision placing a person or group on the list relating to frozen funds, the Council must, at regular intervals, and at
least once every six months, be satisfied that there are grounds for continuing to include the party concerned in the
list at issue.
While verification that there is a decision of a national authority as defined in Article 1(4) of Common Position
2001/931 is an essential precondition for the adoption by the Council of an initial decision to freeze funds, verification
of the consequences of that decision at national level is essential for the adoption of a subsequent decision to freeze
funds (judgments of 12 December 2006 in Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council, T‑228/02, ECR,
EU:T:2006:384, paragraph 117, ‘the judgment in OMPI T‑228/02’, and of 11 July 2007 in Sison v Council, T‑47/03,
EU:T:2007:207, paragraph 164). The essential question when reviewing whether to continue to include a person on
the list at issue is whether, since the inclusion of that person in that list or since the last review, the factual situation
has changed in such a way that it is no longer possible to draw the same conclusion concerning the involvement of that
person in terrorist activities (judgment in Al-Aqsa C‑539/10, paragraph 105 above, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 82).
Secondly, the Court has consistently held that the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU, which must be
appropriate to the measure at issue and the context in which it was adopted, must disclose in a clear and unequivocal
fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the
persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent court to exercise its power to
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review its lawfulness. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of
each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which
the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining
explanations (see judgment in OMPI T‑228/02, paragraph 158 above, EU:T:2006:384, paragraph 141 and the case-law
cited).
In the context of the adoption of a decision to freeze funds under Regulation No 2580/2001, the statement of reasons
for that decision must be assessed primarily in the light of the legal conditions for the application of that regulation to
a particular case, as laid down in Article 2(3) thereof and, by reference, to either Article 1(4) or Article 1(6) of
Common Position 2001/931, depending on whether it is an initial decision or a subsequent decision to freeze funds
(judgment in OMPI T‑228/02, paragraph 158 above, EU:T:2006:384, paragraph 142).
The Court cannot accept that the statement of reasons may consist merely of a general, stereotypical formulation
modelled on the wording of Article 2(3) of Regulation No 2580/2001 and Article 1(4) or (6) of Common Position
2001/931. In accordance with the principles referred to above, the Council is required to state the matters of fact and
law that constitute the legal basis of its decision and the considerations which led it to adopt that decision. The
grounds for such a measure must therefore indicate the actual and specific reasons why the Council considers that the
relevant rules are applicable to the party concerned (see judgment in OMPI T‑228/02, paragraph 158 above,
EU:T:2006:384, paragraph 143 and the case-law cited).
Therefore, both the statement of reasons for an initial decision to freeze funds and the statement of reasons for
subsequent decisions must refer not only to the legal conditions for the application of Regulation No 2580/2001, in
particular the existence of a national decision taken by a competent authority, but also to the actual and specific
reasons why the Council considers, in the exercise of its discretion, that the party concerned must be made the subject
of a fund-freezing measure (judgment in Sison T‑341/07, paragraph 114 above, EU:T:2009:372, paragraph 60).
Thirdly, with regard to the review carried out by the Court, the latter has recognised that the Council has broad
discretion as to what matters to take into consideration for the purpose of adopting economic and financial sanctions
on the basis of Articles 75 TFEU, 215 TFEU and 352 TFEU, consistent with a common position adopted on the basis of
the common foreign and security policy. This discretion concerns, in particular, the assessment of the considerations of
appropriateness on which such decisions are based (see judgment in Sison T‑341/07, paragraph 114 above,
EU:T:2009:372, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited). However, although the Court acknowledges that the Council has
a broad discretion in that sphere, that does not mean that the Court will refrain from reviewing the Council’s
interpretation of the relevant facts. The European Union judicature must not only establish whether the evidence put
forward is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but must also determine whether that evidence contains all the
relevant data that must be taken into consideration in appraising the situation and whether it is capable of
substantiating the conclusions drawn from it. However, when conducting such a review, it must not substitute its own
assessment of what is appropriate for that of the Council (see judgment in Sison T‑341/07, paragraph 114 above,
EU:T:2009:372, paragraph 98 and the case-law cited).
Fourthly, as regards the factual or legal grounds of a fund-freezing decision concerning terrorism, it should be noted
that, according to Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931, the list relating to frozen funds is to be drawn up on the
basis of precise information or material in the relevant file which indicates that a decision was taken by a competent
authority in respect of that person, group or entity, irrespective of whether it concerns the instigation of investigations
or prosecutions for a terrorist act, an attempt to perpetrate, participate in or facilitate such an act based on serious
and credible evidence or indicia, or condemnation for such deeds.
In its judgment in Al-Aqsa C‑539/10 P, paragraph 105 above, (EU:C:2012:711), the Court of Justice noted that it is
apparent from the references, in Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931, to a decision of a ‘competent authority’,
‘precise information’ and ‘serious and credible evidence or [indicia]’ that that provision aims to protect the persons
concerned by ensuring that they are included on the list at issue only on a sufficiently solid factual basis, and that the
common position seeks to attain that objective by requiring a decision taken by a national authority (paragraph 68 of
the judgment). The Court of Justice observed that the European Union does not have the means to carry out its own
investigations regarding the involvement of a person in terrorist acts (paragraph 69 of the judgment).
The grounds put forward by the Council to found the contested regulations should be examined in the light of the
foregoing considerations.
Those grounds begin with a paragraph in which the Council (i) describes the LTTE as a ‘terrorist group’ formed in 1976
which fights for a separate Tamil State in the north and east of Sri-Lanka, (ii) states that the LTTE has carried out ‘a
number of terrorist acts including repeated attacks on and intimidation of civilians, frequent attacks against
government targets, disruption of political processes and kidnappings and political assassinations’ and (iii) submits that
‘while the recent military defeat of the LTTE has significantly weakened its structure, the likely intention of the
organisation is to continue terrorist attacks in Sri-Lanka’ (first paragraphs of the grounds for the contested
regulations).
Next the Council draws up a list of the ‘terrorist attacks’ which it claims that the LTTE carried out from August 2005
until April 2009 or — according to the contested regulations — until June 2010 (second paragraphs of the grounds for
the contested regulations).
After stating that ‘those acts fall within the provision of Article 1(3), subpoints (a), (b), (c), (f) and (g) of Common
Position 2001/931, and were committed with the aims set out in Article 1(3), points (i) and (iii) thereof’ and that ‘[the
LTTE] falls within Article 2(3)(ii) of Regulation No 2580/2001’ (third and fourth paragraphs of the grounds for the
contested regulations), the Council refers to decisions that the UK and Indian authorities adopted in 1992, 2001 and
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2004 against the LTTE (fifth and sixth paragraphs of the grounds for Implementing Regulations Nos 83/2011 through
to 125/2014), as well as in 2012 (sixth and seventh paragraphs of the grounds for Implementing Regulation
No 790/2014).
As regards the UK decisions and — solely in the grounds for Implementing Regulation No 790/2014 — the Indian
decisions, the Council refers to the fact that they are reviewed regularly or are subject to review or appeal.
The Council deduces from those considerations that ‘[d]ecisions in respect of the [LTTE] have thus been taken by
competent authorities within the meaning of Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931’ (seventh paragraphs of the
grounds for the contested regulations).
Finally, the Council ‘notes that the above decisions … still remain in force, and is satisfied that the reasons for
including [the LTTE] on the list [relating to frozen funds] remain valid’ (eighth paragraphs of the grounds for the
contested regulations). The Council concludes from this that the LTTE must continue to appear on that list (ninth
paragraphs of the grounds for the contested regulations).
It should be noted, first of all, that, even though the list of acts drawn up by the Council in the second paragraphs of
the grounds for the contested regulations plays a decisive role in the assessment of the appropriateness of continuing
the freezing of the LTTE’s funds, since that list is the basis for the finding by the Council of the existence of terrorist
acts committed by the LTTE, none of those acts were examined in the national decisions invoked in the fifth and sixth
paragraphs of the grounds for Implementing Regulations Nos 83/2011 through to 125/2014 and in the sixth and
seventh paragraphs of the grounds for Implementing Regulation No 790/2014.
Regarding Implementing Regulations Nos 83/2011 through to 125/2014, all those acts are subsequent to the national
decisions relied on in the grounds for those regulations. Accordingly, they cannot have been examined in those
decisions.
Although the grounds for Implementing Regulations Nos 83/2011 through to 125/2014 state that the national
decisions to which they refer have remained in force, they still do not contain any reference to more recent national
decisions and, still less, to the grounds of such decisions.
In response to the LTTE’s criticisms in this regard, the Council does not produce any more recent decision of the UK or
Indian authorities which it proves that it had at its disposal at the time of the adoption of Implementing Regulation Nos
83/2011 through to 125/2014 and from which it is apparent, in concrete terms, that the acts listed in the grounds had
actually been examined and confirmed by those authorities.
As for the UK procedure, the Council produces only the 2001 decisions referred to in the grounds for the contested
regulations. The Council does not produce any subsequent UK decision and, still less, the grounds of such a decision.
At most, the Council refers to a decision of the UK Treasury of 7 December 2009 and to the rejections of two
applications submitted by the LTTE in 2007 and 2009 seeking its removal from the UK list relating to frozen funds, but
does not produce them or give any precise indication as to their specific statement of reasons.
In the light of the considerations in paragraphs 138 to 140 above, the Indian judicial decision of 12 November 2010
produced by the Council at the stage of its rejoinders and an Indian judicial decision of 7 November 2012, produced in
the Council’s reply of 6 February 2014 to questions put by the General Court, are irrelevant. Furthermore, and for the
sake of completeness, it should be noted that those decisions fail to mention, still less rule on, any of the 24,
subsequently 21, acts specifically listed in the grounds for Implementing Regulations Nos 83/2011 through to
125/2014.
As regards Implementing Regulation No 790/2014, the same considerations as those set out in paragraph 178 above
apply with regard to the Indian decisions of 2012 (including the judicial decision of 7 November 2012) mentioned, for
the first time, in the seventh paragraph of the grounds for that regulation.
As regards the two French decisions of 23 November 2009 and 22 February 2012 (one at first instance and the other
on appeal) referred to by the Council in its rejoinder in Case T‑508/11, and which in its view took account of a number
of acts listed in the grounds for the contested regulations, the following points should be noted.
First, those decisions are not mentioned in the grounds for the contested regulations adopted before the rejoinder.
They therefore constitute an attempt to provide a belated statement of reasons, which is inadmissible (see, to that
effect, judgments of 12 November 2013 in North Drilling v Council, T‑552/12, EU:T:2013:590, paragraph 26, and of
12 December 2013 in Nabipour and Others v Council, T‑58/12, EU:T:2013:640, paragraphs 36 to 39).
Secondly, and more fundamentally, those French decisions are not even mentioned in the contested regulations
adopted subsequently to the rejoinder (Implementing Regulations Nos 542/2012, 1169/2012, 714/2013, 125/2014
and 790/2014). The Council cannot claim, as ‘grounds’ for its restrictive measures, national decisions which it does not
invoke in the grounds for the contested regulations after it has become aware of those decisions.
The considerations set out in paragraphs 180 to 182 above apply equally with regard to a German decision referred to
by the Council for the first time at the hearing.
In its rejoinder, the Council submits, however, that the acts listed in the statements of reasons ‘fall within a context
that all parties have been aware of … the context of the conflict in Sri-Lanka in which the applicant was one of the
parties’ and that ‘the aim of this contextual material, based on well-publicised events, was to inform the party against
which preventive measures were adopted of the Council’s reasons for its assessment of the terrorist threat the
applicant represents’. In order to support its reference to ‘contextual material’, the Council refers to the judgment in
PMOI T‑256/07, paragraph 106 above (EU:T:2008:461, paragraph 90). In support of its argument regarding the public
knowledge of the acts which it imputes to the LTTE, the Council provides references to press articles from the internet.
The Council adds that ‘those factual grounds were not intended to replace any judicial assessment, with the force of
res judicata, of the civil or criminal liability of the perpetrators of those acts or of the allegation that those acts were
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committed by them; that was not their purpose’. It states that ‘these elements were not only public but also perfectly
well known to the [LTTE] at the date of the adoption of the [contested regulations]’.
Those arguments, combined with the lack of any reference in the grounds for the contested regulations to decisions of
competent authorities which are more recent than the imputed acts and referring to such acts, clearly show that the
Council based the contested regulations not on assessments contained in the decisions of competent authorities, but
on information which it derived from the press and the internet.
However, as is apparent from the considerations set out in paragraphs 164 and 165 above, Common Position
2001/931 requires, for the protection of the persons concerned and having regard to the lack of the European Union’s
own means of investigation, that the factual basis of a decision of the European Union to freeze funds concerning
terrorism be based not on information that the Council derived from the press or the internet, but on information
which has been specifically examined and upheld in decisions of competent national authorities within the meaning of
Common Position 2001/931.
It is only on such a reliable factual basis that the Council can then exercise its broad discretion in the context of the
adoption of decisions to freeze funds at EU level, in particular as regards the considerations of appropriateness on
which such decisions are based.
It is apparent from the foregoing considerations that the Council has failed to comply with those requirements of
Common Position 2001/931.
The statement of reasons for the contested regulations reveals, moreover, that the Council’s line of reasoning is
contrary to the requirements of that common position.
Thus, instead of taking, for the factual basis of its assessment, decisions adopted by competent authorities that have
taken into consideration the specific acts and acted on the basis of those acts, and then verifying that those acts are
indeed ‘terrorist acts’ and that the group concerned is indeed ‘a group’, as defined in Common Position 2001/931, in
order to decide, on that basis and in exercising its broad discretion, whether to adopt a decision at EU level, the
Council does the reverse in the grounds for the contested regulations.
It begins with assessments which are, in actual fact, its own assessments, classifying the LTTE as a terrorist from the
first sentence of the grounds — which determines the question which those grounds are supposed to resolve — and
imputing to it a series of acts of violence which the Council took from the press and the internet (first and second
paragraphs of the grounds for the contested regulations).
It should be noted in this respect that the fact that it is a case of a review of the list relating to frozen funds, which
therefore takes place after previous examinations, cannot justify that a priori classification. Without ignoring the past,
a review of a fund-freezing measure is by definition open to the possibility that the person or group concerned is no
longer terrorist at the time of the Council’s decision. It is therefore only at the end of that review that the Council can
reach its conclusion.
The Council then states that the acts which it imputes to the LTTE fall within the definition of terrorist act within the
meaning of Common Position 2001/931 and that the LTTE is a group within the meaning of that position (third and
fourth paragraphs of the grounds for the contested regulations).
It is only after those remarks that the Council refers to decisions of national authorities (fifth to eighth paragraphs of
the grounds for the contested regulations), which, however, at least for Implementing Regulations Nos 83/2011
through to 125/2014, predate the imputed acts.
The Council does not seek to show, in the grounds for the latter implementing regulations, that subsequent national
review decisions, or other decisions of competent authorities, actually examined and upheld the specific acts set out at
the beginning of those grounds. In the grounds for Implementing Regulations Nos 83/2011 through to 125/2014, the
Council merely cites the initial national decisions and states, without more, that they remain in force. It is only in the
grounds for Implementing Regulation No 790/2014 that the Council mentions national decisions subsequent to the acts
specifically imputed to the LTTE, but, once again, fails to show that those decisions — which are moreover irrelevant in
the light of the considerations in paragraphs 138 to 140 above — actually examined and upheld the specific acts set
out at the beginning of those grounds.
The present case is therefore clearly different from the first cases before the Court relating to fund-freezing measures
concerning terrorism after the adoption of Common Position 2001/931 (Al-Aqsa v Council, Sison v Council and People’s
Mojahedin Organization of Iran v Council).
Whereas, in those first cases concerning terrorism, the factual basis of the Council regulations had its origin in
decisions of competent national authorities, in the present case, the Council no longer relies on facts which were first
of all assessed by national authorities, but itself makes its own independent imputations of fact on the basis of the
press or the internet. In so doing, the Council exercises the functions of the ‘competent authority’ within the meaning
of Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931, which, as the Court of Justice has essentially observed, is neither within
its competence according to that common position nor within its means.
It is thus to no avail that the Council (see paragraph 184 above) refers in particular to the judgment in PMOI
T‑256/07, paragraph 106 above (EU:T:2008:461, paragraph 90). In that case, the acts listed in the grounds for
freezing its funds which the Council sent to the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (‘the PMOI’) were not based on
independent assessments of the Council, but on assessments of the competent national authority. As is apparent from
paragraph 90 of the judgment in PMOI T‑256/07, paragraph 106 above (EU:T:2008:461), the statement of reasons of
30 January 2007 sent to the group concerned (the PMOI) referred to acts of terrorism for which the PMOI was said to
be responsible and stated that ‘because of those acts, a decision had been taken by a competent national authority’.
The acts listed in the Council’s statement of reasons of 30 January 2007 sent to the PMOI had therefore been
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examined and upheld against that group by the competent national authority. Unlike the present case, their
compilation did not stem from the Council’s own independent assessments.
In the same way, in Case T‑348/07, Al-Aqsa v Council, the Court had available to it the text of the decisions of
competent authorities relied upon in the grounds for the contested regulations and analysed them in detail. It
concluded that the Council had not made any manifest error of assessment in finding that the applicant knew that the
funds which it was gathering would be used for the purposes of terrorism (judgment in Al-Aqsa T‑348/07,
paragraph 105 above, EU:T:2010:373, paragraphs 121 to 133). According to the findings of the Court, the factual
basis on which the Council was working was therefore a fully sound factual basis arising directly from the findings
made by the competent national authorities. In the judgment of 11 July 2007 in Al-Aqsa v Council (T‑327/03,
EU:T:2007:211) it is also clear from the grounds (paragraphs 17 to 20 of the judgment) that the assessments on
which the EU fund-freezing measure was based derived from factual findings which were not specific to the Council but
which came from decisions of competent national authorities.
Likewise, in Case T‑341/07, Sison v Council, the assessments on which the fund-freezing measure was based derived
from factual findings which were not specific to the Council but which came from decisions which had the force of res
judicata and had been adopted by competent national authorities (Raad van State (Council of State, Netherlands) and
Rechtbank (District Court, Netherlands)) (judgment in Sison T‑341/07, paragraph 114 above, EU:T:2009:372,
paragraphs 1, 88 and 100 to 105).
It is true that the factual statement of reasons for the contested regulations — the list of acts imputed by the Council
to the LTTE in the present case — does indeed not constitute, to repeat the Council’s argument (see paragraph 185
above), a ‘judicial assessment with the force of res judicata’. Nevertheless that factual statement of reasons for the
contested regulations played a decisive role in the Council’s assessment of the appropriateness of maintaining the LTTE
on the list relating to frozen funds and the Council, far from establishing that it derived that statement of reasons from
decisions of competent authorities, in fact attests to having relied on information derived from the press and the
internet.
The Court considers that that approach contravenes the two-tier system established by Common Position 2001/931 on
terrorism.
Although, as the Court of Justice has observed, the essential question during a review is whether, since the inclusion
of the person concerned in the list relating to frozen funds or since the last review, the factual situation has changed in
such a way that it is no longer possible to draw the same conclusion concerning the involvement of that person in
terrorist activities (judgment in Al-Aqsa C‑539/10, paragraph 105 above, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 82) — with the
consequence that the Council may, if necessary and within the context of its broad discretion, decide to maintain a
person on the list relating to frozen funds in the absence of a change in the factual situation — the fact remains that
any new terrorist act which the Council inserts in its statement of reasons during that review for the purposes of
justifying maintaining the person concerned on the list relating to frozen funds must, in the two-tier decision-making
system of Common Position 2001/931 and because of the Council’s lack of means of investigation, have been the
subject of an examination and a decision by a competent authority within the meaning of that common position.
The Council and the Commission suggest to no avail that the lack of reference in the grounds for the contested
regulations to specific decisions of competent authorities which specifically examined and upheld the acts set out at the
top of those grounds is attributable to the LTTE, which, according to the Council and the Commission, could and should
have challenged the restrictive measures concerning it at national level.
Firstly, the obligation upon the Council to base its fund-freezing decisions as far as concerns terrorism on a factual
basis deriving from decisions of competent authorities arises directly from the two-tier system established by Common
Position 2001/931, as confirmed by the judgment in Al-Aqsa C‑539/10, paragraph 105 above (EU:C:2012:711,
paragraphs 68 and 69). That obligation is not therefore subject to the action by the person or group concerned. On the
basis of its duty to state reasons, which is an essential procedural requirement, the Council must state, in the grounds
for its fund-freezing decisions, the decisions of competent national authorities which specifically examined and found
the terrorist acts which it uses as a factual basis for its own decisions.
Secondly, the argument advanced by the Council and Commission ultimately merely confirms the finding, which has
already been made in paragraph 186 above, that the Council in fact relied not on assessments contained in decisions
of competent authorities, but on information which it derived from the press and the internet. In this respect, it is
paradoxical that the Council complains that the LTTE did not challenge at national level factual imputations which it
does not itself manage to link to any specific decision of a competent authority.
Finally, that argument is problematic to say the least, inasmuch as it suggests that the national fund-freezing
decisions on which the Council decides to rely in its specific practice under Common Position 2001/931, might
themselves, if no dispute has been raised by the party concerned at national level, not be based on any specific act of
terrorism.
It is also to no avail that the Council and the Commission dispute the obligation to derive the factual basis of the fundfreezing
regulations from decisions of competent authorities on the ground that that could lead, in the absence of such
decisions, to unjustified removals of persons or groups from the list relating to frozen funds. The Council and the
Commission refer in particular to the fact that the timing of review in the Member States may differ from the biannual
review applicable at EU level.
Firstly, once again, that dispute is inconsistent with Common Position 2001/931 (Article 1(4) of Common Position
2001/931), as confirmed by the judgment in Al-Aqsa C‑539/10, paragraph 105 above (EU:C:2012:711, paragraphs 68
and 69), which requires, for the protection of the persons concerned and having regard to the lack of the European
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Union’s own means of investigation, that the factual basis of a decision of the European Union to freeze funds
concerning terrorism be based on information which has been specifically examined and upheld in decisions of
competent national authorities within the meaning of Common Position 2001/931. Secondly, it should be noted that, in
the two-tier system of that Common Position and for the purposes of ensuring the effectiveness of the fight against
terrorism, it is for the Member States to regularly transmit to the Council, and for the Council to collect, the decisions
of competent authorities adopted within those Member States, as well as the grounds for those decisions.
Moreover, that necessary transmission and collection of decisions of competent authorities corresponds exactly to the
circulation of information provided for, inter alia, in paragraphs 2, 3, 8 and 24 of the document entitled ‘Working
methods of the Working Party on implementation of Common Position 2001/931 on the application of specific
measures to combat terrorism’ which is set out in Annex II to Council document 10826/1/07 REV 1 of 28 June 2007.
If, despite that transmission of information, a decision of a competent authority concerning a specific act capable of
constituting a terrorist act is not available to the Council, the Council, in the absence of its own means of investigation,
must ask a competent national authority to assess that act, with a view to a decision being taken by that authority.
For this purpose, the Council may contact the 28 EU Member States and in particular the Member States which have
already examined the situation of the person or group concerned. It may also contact a third State which satisfies the
conditions required with regard to protection of the rights of defence and of the right to effective judicial protection.
The decision in question, which must, in the words of Common Position 2001/931, be an ‘instigation of investigations
or prosecution … or [a] condemnation’, does not necessarily have to be the national decision periodically reviewing the
placement of the person or group concerned on the national list relating to frozen funds. Even in the latter case,
however, the existence at national level of a timing of periodic review which is different from that in force at EU level
cannot justify the deferral by the Member State concerned of the examination of the act in question which the Council
has requested. Having regard both to the two-tier structure of the system established by Common Position 2001/931
and to the mutual duties of sincere cooperation existing between the Member States and the European Union, the
Member States must respond without delay to the Council’s requests to them for an assessment and, where
appropriate, a decision of a competent authority within the meaning of Common Position 2001/931 of an act capable of
constituting a terrorist act.
It follows from the foregoing considerations that the argument that the requirement of a decision by a competent
authority might lead to unjustified removals from the list relating to frozen funds is unconvincing.
It should be added, moreover, that the absence of any new terrorist act in respect of a given six month period does
not in any way mean that the Council should withdraw the person or group concerned from the list relating to frozen
funds. As the Court has already found, nothing in the provisions of Regulation No 2580/2011 and of Common Position
2001/931 precludes the imposition or maintenance of restrictive measures on persons or entities that have in the past
committed acts of terrorism, despite the lack of evidence to show that they are at present committing or participating
in such acts, if the circumstances warrant it (see, to that effect, the judgment in PMOI T‑256/07, paragraph 106 above,
EU:T:2008:461, paragraphs 107 to 113). Thus, the obligation to make new imputations of terrorist acts only on the
basis of decisions of competent authorities does not in any way preclude the Council’s right to maintain the person
concerned on the list relating to frozen funds, even after the cessation of the terrorist activity in the strict sense, if the
circumstances warrant it.
The possibility, also mentioned by the Council and the Commission, that decisions of competent authorities which are
incompatible with decisions of the European Union might be adopted cannot constitute a valid reason for challenging
the obligation to derive, in the interest of the protection of the persons and groups concerned, the factual basis of the
decisions of the European Union from decisions of competent authorities.
Finally, contrary to what by the Council and the Commission suggest, such an obligation to derive the factual basis of
the fund-freezing regulations from decisions of competent authorities is not such as to give rise to a risk of
unjustifiably maintaining a person or group on the list relating to frozen funds.
Although Article 1(1) to (4) and (6) of Common Position 2001/931 precludes the Council from including, in the
statement of reasons for its decision to place or maintain a person or group on the list relating to frozen funds,
terrorist acts (including attempts, participation in or facilitation of such acts) which have not been the subject of a
decision of a competent authority (instigation of investigations or prosecutions, or condemnation), Common Position
2001/931 does not contain any comparable obligation as regards the non-maintenance by the Council of a person or
group in the list relating to frozen funds. That decision not to maintain them on the list, which is favourable to the
person or group concerned, is not subject to the same procedural requirements, even though, in the majority of cases,
it will take place in the light of favourable decisions adopted at national level, such as an abandonment or
discontinuance of investigations or prosecutions for terrorist acts, an acquittal in criminal proceedings or indeed the
withdrawal of the person or group concerned from the national classification list.
It follows from the considerations set out in paragraphs 209 to 218 above that the Council and the Commission are
wrong in claiming that the obligation on the Council to derive the factual basis of its fund-freezing decisions from
decisions of competent authorities is such as to undermine the European Union’s policy of combating terrorism.
It should be added that the Court’s overall findings made above do not exceed the scope of the limited review which it
is to carry out, whereby it is to check that the procedure has been complied with and that the facts are materially
accurate, but without thereby calling in question the Council’s broad discretion. In fact, in the judgment in Sison
T‑341/07, paragraph 114 above (EU:T:2009:372), the Court was prompted to check — and was able to find — that the
factual allegations made against Mr Sison set out in the grounds for maintaining his name on the list relating to frozen
funds were duly substantiated by the findings of fact made in the decisions of the Netherlands authorities (Raad van
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State and Rechtbank) on which the Council relied in those grounds (judgment in Sison T‑341/07, paragraph 114
above, EU:T:2009:372, paragraphs 87 and 88).
By contrast, in the present case, in the grounds for the contested regulations there are no references to any decision
of a competent authority to whose grounds the Court could link the factual evidence upheld by the Council against the
LTTE.
Furthermore, and once more with regard to the judgment in Sison T‑341/07, paragraph 114 above, (EU:T:2009:372),
it should be noted that, while finding that the facts set out in the grounds for the Council’s regulations did indeed come
from the two Dutch decisions relied on in those same grounds, the Court none the less then held that those Dutch
decisions were not decisions of competent authorities, on the ground that they did not concern the imposition on the
person concerned of measures of a preventive or punitive nature in connection with the combating of terrorism
(judgment in Sison T‑341/07, paragraph 114 above, EU:T:2009:372, paragraphs 107 to 115).
If the Court was thus able dismiss the findings of fact nevertheless stemming from competent authorities on the
ground that the decisions of those authorities were not ‘condemnations or instigations of investigations or
prosecutions’, that implies that it cannot, in the present case, grant press articles — which are in any event not
mentioned in the grounds for the contested regulations — the procedural and probative status reserved by Common
Position 2001/931 only for decisions of competent authorities.
Finally, the Court considers it appropriate to underline the importance of the guarantees provided by fundamental
rights in that context (see Opinion in France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, ECR,
EU:C:2011:482, paragraphs 235 to 238).
In the light of all the foregoing considerations, from which it is apparent that Regulation No 2580/2001 is applicable in
the case of armed conflict and, moreover, that the Council infringed both Article 1 of Common Position 2001/931
and — in the absence of a reference in the statement of reasons to decisions of competent authorities relating to the
acts imputed to the LTTE — the obligation to state reasons, the contested regulations should be annulled in so far as
they concern the LTTE.
The Court stresses that those annulments, on fundamental procedural grounds, do not imply any substantive
assessment of the question of the classification of the LTTE as a terrorist group within the meaning of Common Position
2001/931.
So far as concerns the temporal effects of those annulments, it must be borne in mind that, under the second
paragraph of Article 60 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, by way of derogation from
Article 280 TFEU, decisions of the General Court declaring a regulation to be void are to take effect only as from the
date of expiry of the appeal period referred to in the first paragraph of Article 56 of that statute or, if an appeal has
been brought within that period, as from the date of dismissal of the appeal. In any event, the Council therefore has a
minimum period of two months, extended on account of distance by 10 days, as from the notification of this judgment,
to remedy the infringements established by adopting, if appropriate, a new restrictive measure with respect to the
LTTE.
However, and on the basis of the second paragraph of Article 264 TFEU, the General Court may provisionally maintain
the effects of the annulled decision (see, to that effect, the judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation
v Council and Commission, paragraph 128 above, EU:C:2008:461, paragraphs 373 to 376, and the judgment of
16 September 2011 in Kadio Morokro v Council, T‑316/11, EU:T:2011:484, paragraph 39).
In the circumstances of the present case, the Court finds that, to avoid the risk of a serious and irreversible
impairment of the effectiveness of the restrictive measures, while taking account of the major impact of the restrictive
measures in question on the rights and freedoms of the LTTE, the effects of Implementing Regulation No 790/2014
must, by virtue of Article 264 TFEU, be maintained for a period of three months following delivery of this judgment.
Costs
Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have
been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the Council has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay
the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the LTTE.
Under the first subparagraph of Article 87(4) of the Rules of Procedure, Member States and institutions which have
intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. Consequently, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom and the Commission are to bear their own costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition)
hereby:
Annuls Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 83/2011 of 31 January 2011, No 687/2011 of 18 July
2011, No 1375/2011 of 22 December 2011, No 542/2012 of 25 June 2012, No 1169/2012 of 10 December
2012, No 714/2013 of 25 July 2013, No 125/2014 of 10 February 2014 and No 790/2014 of 22 July 2014
implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed
against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Implementing
Regulations (EU) Nos 610/2010, 83/2011, 687/2011, 1375/2011, 542/2012, 1169/2012, 714/2013 and
125/2014 in so far as those measures concern the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE);
Maintains the effects of Implementing Regulation No 790/2014 for three months following delivery of this
judgment;
Orders the Council of the European Union to pay, in addition to its own costs, the costs of the LTTE;
Orders the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
European Commission to bear their own respective costs.
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Dehousse Wiszniewska-Białecka Buttigieg
Collins Ulloa Rubio
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 16 October 2014.
[Signatures]
Table of contents
Facts and procedure
Forms of order sought
Law
The first plea in law: inapplicability of Regulation No 2580/2001 to the conflict between the LTTE and the Government
of Sri-Lanka
Arguments of the parties
Findings of the Court
The third plea in law: lack of any decision taken by a competent authority
Arguments of the parties
Findings of the Court
The fourth to sixth pleas, taken together with the second plea
Arguments of the parties
Findings of the Court
Costs
* Language of the case: English.

Annex 472
French Cour de cassation, Judgement of April 12th, 2005, No. 04-84264

Annex 473
Italy v. Abdelaziz and ors, Final Appeal Judgment, No. 1072, 2007, 17 Guida al Diritto 90, ILDC
559, Supreme Court of Cassation, Italy, 17 January 2007, para. 4.1
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.

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Covington & Burling Library; date: February 16, 2017
Decision – full text
Law
1.— As a preliminary matter, the Court must address the admissibility of the appeal brought by the public
prosecutor of the decision of the Judge for Preliminary Hearings acquitting the defendants of the crime of
participation and association with the aim of international terrorism charged in count 1, determining
whether the acquittal is subject to the law introduced by Arts. 1 and 10 of Italian Law no. 46 of February
20, 2006. The first of the two articles replaced Art. 593, making acquittal judgments unappealable except
in the case of new decisive evidence under Art. 603, paragraph 2 of the Italian Code of Criminal
Procedure, while the second provided rules of transitional law, establishing that the new law applies also
to pending proceedings (paragraph 1), that an appeal of a judgment of acquittal by the defendant or the
public prosecutor before the date the law took effect is held inadmissible in an unappealable order
(paragraph 2) and that such rule applies even where a judgment of conviction by an assize court of appeal
or court of appeal that reformed a judgment of acquittal is reversed on points other than the punishment or
the security measure (paragraph 4). In this procedural matter, the appeal brought by the public prosecutor
against the trial decision cannot be ruled inadmissible, since the appeal was exhausted even before Law
no. 46 of 2006 took effect with the conformation of the judgment of acquittal. This latter fact makes it
clear that, in this case, the provision in Art. 10, paragraph 4 cannot apply; that provision requires the
Court of Cassation to rule an appeal inadmissible only when a judgment of conviction by the court of
appeal that reformed a judgment of acquittal on points other than the punishment or security measure
must be reversed, and not also the completely different case where both trials on the merits led to a
judgment of acquittal (“two concordant decisions”). Consequently, according to well-settled opinion, we
must hold that the transitional rules of law are only applicable to the cases addressed in them and are thus
– like all transitional rules – subject to analogous application pursuant to Art. 14 of the Provisions on law
in general (Cassation, Section 1, September 29, 1997, Cascino, in Foro it., 1997, 2nd, 665; Civil Cass.,
Section 1, no. 14348, December 21, 1999; Joined Sections, no. 12966, December 7, 1992): with the
further consequence that the rules under Art. 10, paragraph 4 of Law no. 46 of 2006 cannot be extended to
the different situation of the dual acquittals handed down by the trial and appeal courts. It is also
worthwhile observing that a ruling that the Public Prosecutor’s appeal is inadmissible would be prevented
by Art. 7 of that same Law no. 46 of 2006 which, modifying Art. 580 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
provided that when different appeals are made of the same judgment, if the appeals are connected as
stated in Art. 12, the petition for cassation converts into the appeal, for the obvious purpose of keeping the
regiudicanda from being fragmented for reasons of economy and procedural concentration and to prevent
the possibility of conflicting decisions (Cass., Section 6, October 4, 1999, Artuso, journal no. 214895).
However, to keep the appeal from being inadmissible, it is not even necessary to cite the conversion rules,
since the Public Prosecutor’s appeal was admissible both at the time it was filed and when the appeal
proceeding was pending, for its entire duration until the judgment confirming the acquittal was handed
down. It follows that, applying the principle of “tempus regit actum,” the appeal process must be
conducted according to the procedural law in effect at the time, thus a final appeal can certainly not be
converted.
2.— Criminalizing conduct linked to associations with the aim of international terrorism was introduced
by Art. 1, paragraph 1 of Italian Decree Law no. 374 of October 18, 2001, converted into Italian Law no.
438 of December 15, 2001, by extending the scope of application of the crime of association set forth in
Art. 270 bis of the Italian Criminal Code which, before that change, was considered not applicable to
From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber:
Covington & Burling Library; date: February 16, 2017
terrorist organizations whose program of violent actions was directed against a foreign State or an
international institution, given the principle of certainty of criminal law (Cass., Section 6, February 24,
1999, Public Prosecutor in Abdaoui et al., journal no. 214311; Section 5, May 26, 1998, Avari, journal
no. 212161; Section 6, March 1, 1996, Public Prosecutor in Ferdjoni et al., journal no. 204785). The use
of the pre-existing association model and the extension of the criminalizing scope by adding Art. 270 bis,
paragraph 3 of the Criminal Code (“for purposes of the criminal law, the aim of terrorism is also present
when the violent acts are directed against a foreign State, institution or international body”) imply specific
consequences from a standpoint of analyzing the language of the criminalizing law, because, firstly, they
make the same conceptual frameworks created by legal commentary and case law in regard to the
previous crime and, in general, the category of crimes of association practicable, and, secondly, present
the need to identify the phenomenon of terrorism from the perspective of international relationships and
its impact within organizations other than the Italian State. The terms “terrorism” and “aim of terrorism”
were not new to our legal system, since several provisions of the Criminal Code made explicit reference
to them: Art. 270 bis of the Criminal Code (“associations with the aim of terrorism and subversion of the
democratic order”), Art. 280, introduced by Art. 2 of Law no. 15 of 1980 (“attack for terrorism or
subversion purposes”), Art. 289 bis, added by Art. 2 of Law no. 191 of 1978 (“kidnapping for purposes of
terrorism or subversion”), and Art. 1 of Law no. 15 of 1980 concerning the aggravating factor with
special effect applicable to crimes with the aim of terrorism. In that specific context, reference was
primarily made to the semantic value of the expression based on a common cultural heritage, and a
descriptive definition of terrorism was coined to include any action for the purposes of engaging in acts
intended to cause panic in the population (see Cass., Joined Sections, November 23, 1995, Attorney
General in Fachini et al., journal no. 203769, relating to terrorism purposes as an aggravating factor), in
the sense that terrorism purposes exist where there is violent conduct intended to generate fear and panic
and elicit terror in society with indiscriminate criminal actions, i.e., those directed not at individual
persons but against what they represent or, if directed against a person regardless of his/her function in
society, intended to incite terror to diminish trust in the legal system and weaken its structures (Cass.,
Section 1, July 11, 1987, Benacchio, journal no. 176946). Once the scope of the criminalizing law under
Art. 270 bis of the Criminal Code was broadened as a result of Art. 1 of Decree Law no. 374 of 2001,
converted into Law no. 438 of 2001, the inadequacy of such a concept to describe the specific attributes
of international terrorism was immediately perceived and a need was felt to create a legal definition that
would reflect the specific transnational characteristics of the criminal conduct by analyzing the many
international sources aimed at preventing terrorism activity.
2.1.— To begin with, to create a general category, the various international conventions ratified by Italy
which concern prevention of terrorist acts in specific areas (such as, among others, the Tokyo
Conventions of 1963, the Hague Convention of 1970 and the Montreal Convention of 1971 concerning
air transport, the Rome Convention of 1988 concerning the safety of navigation at sea and the Vienna
Convention of 1980 concerning the physical protection of nuclear material), are of limited importance; it
must be stressed that from the start, the search for a general definition hinged above all on two
international sources, namely, first, the New York Convention of 1999, passed by the General Assembly
of the United Nations to inhibit the funding of terrorism, and, second, by the Framework Decision
2002/475/GAI of the European Union. In the absence of global agreement concerning terrorism,
consensus on which has been obstructed for decades by disagreement between the Member States of the
UN on the question of terrorism committed in the course of wars of liberation and armed struggle to
establish self-determination of peoples, it should be noted that the wording of the Convention of 1999,
implemented by Law no. 7 of January 27, 2003, has sufficiently wide scope to be regarded as a general
definition applicable both in peacetime and in wartime and including any kind of behavior directed
against civilian life or integrity or, in case of war, against “any other person not taking an active part in
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hostilities in a situation of armed conflict” in order to spread terror among the population or to force a
State or an international organization to take or refrain from action. In addition to being characterized by
such objective and subjective elements and by the identity of the victims (civilians or persons not
involved in military operations), it is generally held that in order to be regarded as terrorism, acts must at
the psychological level meet a further requirement as to political, religious or ideological motivation in
accordance with generally accepted international standards reflected in various resolutions of the UN
General Assembly and Security Council, and in the Convention of 1997 against terrorist acts committed
with the use of explosives. The definition of acts of terrorism under Art. 1 of the European Union’s
Framework Decision is for its part based on a list of specific crimes considered as such under national
law, which can cause serious damage to a country or an international organization and which are
committed to seriously intimidate the population or force the public authorities or an international
organization to take or abstain from taking certain action, or to seriously destabilize or destroy
fundamental, economic or social structures of a country or of an international organization. The defining
formula set out in the Framework Decision of 2002 is different from that under the UN Convention of
1999, although it follows the general thrust in regard to the following two aspects. Firstly, the area of
application of crimes of terrorism is more limited, relating only to acts committed in peacetime, as is
made clear by introductory “consideration” number 11, which excludes from its scope “activities of the
armed forces in times of armed conflict,” in accordance with the definitions given to these terms in
international humanitarian law: thus the definition under consideration excludes acts committed in
wartime, which are governed by international humanitarian law and, in the first instance, by the Geneva
Conventions and related Additional Protocols. Secondly, the Framework Decision has extended the
concept of acts of terrorism by providing that these can also be characterized by destructive purposes,
namely the purpose of “seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental, constitutional, economic or
social political structures of a country or of an international organization,” absent from the wording of the
1999 Convention. Both definitions therefore include the typical characteristic of acts of terrorism
described by the most authoritative commentators as “depersonalization of the victim,” meaning the
general anonymous nature of persons affected by violent action, the true purpose of which is to spread
fear indiscriminately among the general public and to force a government or international organization to
take or abstain from pursuing specific action. Finally, the reference to situations of armed conflict—
present in the 1999 Convention and absent from the Framework Decision—shows the two-sided nature of
the laws on acts of terrorism and the need to differentiate it from the legal provisions concerning the
identity of the persons actually concerned and the victims, in the sense that whether the rules of
international humanitarian law or ordinary law apply depends on whether the acts are committed by
persons who may be regarded as “combatants” and are aimed at civilians or against persons not actively
engaged in hostilities. It follows from this that, reframing these subjective requirements, acts of terrorism
must fall within the category of war crimes or crimes against humanity.
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2.2.— In accordance with the obligation to amend domestic law so as to enable them to conform to the
Community’s legal provisions, Art. 15, para. 1 of Decree Law no. 144 of July 27, 2005, converted into
Law no. 155 of July 31, 2005, upholds the concept contained in the Framework Decision and defines
“acts with terrorist aims” as those “which, by their nature or context may cause serious damage to a
country or to an international organization and which are committed with the purpose of intimidating the
population or forcing the public authorities or an international organization to take or refrain from taking
specific action or destabilizing or destroying the fundamental, constitutional, economic or social political
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structures of a country or of an international organization, and other conduct defined as terrorism or
committed with terrorist purposes under conventions or other provisions of international law binding
upon Italy.” The explicit reference to international sources means that the definition adopted by Art. 270
sexies of the Criminal Code is an open definition intended to be extended or restricted as a result not only
of the international conventions already ratified but also of future conventions that may be adopted. In
this way, provision is made by law for a dynamic, formal mechanism that should automatically ensure
harmonization of the laws of the States of the international community in order to ensure that tools are
available for joint action in combating transnational terrorist crime. It must be inferred from the above
consideration that the definition under Art. 270 sexies of the Criminal Code must be read together with
that of the 1999 Convention, implemented by Law no. 7 of 2003, and that, by analogy, the elements
constituting terrorist acts, set forth in national law in the wake of the European Union’s Framework
Decision, must be supplemented by reference also to the provisions of that Convention. From this, the
conclusion must be drawn that supplementing domestic law with the aforementioned international law
means that terrorist aims can thus be found if acts are committed in the context of armed conflict—
described as such in international law even in the case of internal civil war—and are committed not only
against civilians but also against persons not actively engaged in hostilities, consequently excluding only
acts aimed at combatants, which remain subject to the rules of international humanitarian law.
3.— Having identified the essential characteristics of conduct with the aim of terrorism, the structure of
the crime of association set forth in Art. 270 bis of the Criminal Code must be examined. That crime is
placed by case law in the category of crimes of presumed danger, or crimes prior to commission,
characterized by bringing the threshold of punishability forward to the moment when an organization of
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persons or resources is created with the goal of achieving a program consisting of violence and attacks for
the aim of international terrorism, where the punishment relates to activities that are merely preparatory
prior to carrying out the planned violent conduct (Cass., Sec. 2, no. 24994, May 25, 2006, Bouhrama;
Section 1, no. 35427, June 21, 2005, Drissi). However, it must be said that while it is true that the
criminalizing law punishes the mere establishment of the association, regardless of whether the criminal
actions comprising the program and instrumental to the particular goal pursued are achieved, it is also
undeniable that the organizational structure must evidence a degree of effectiveness that makes
implementation of the criminal plan at least possible, so as to justify a legal finding of danger that is
associated with the likelihood that the structure will commit a series of crimes for the accomplishment of
which the association was established. Otherwise, i.e., if the association’s structure was conceived of in
generic, fleeting and evanescent terms, moving up the criminal repression would, in the guise of a crime
of association, end up punishing the mere fact of adhering to an abstract ideology which, although it is
aberrant because it glorifies indiscriminate violence and spreading of terror, it is not accompanied by any
possibility of carrying out the program: in short, the result would be repressing ideas, not actions, which,
at the most, could constitute—in the case of an agreement that does not constitute an organization to carry
out a terroristic plan—a political conspiracy by agreement under Art. 304 of the Criminal Code, which
cites, in Art. 302, also Art. 270 bis of the Criminal Code (see Cass., Section 1, February 27, 2002, Marra,
journal no. 221834).
3.1— The crime set forth in Art. 270 bis of the Criminal Code can be classified as a crime with multiple
victims, with complex legal subject matter, because it injures or endangers the life and integrity of the
victims and, at the same time, the freedom of self-determination of States and international organizations
(or, according to others, the worldwide public order). The objective element of the crime is characterized
by a multiplicity of actions that contemplate the insertion of the subject into the structure in relation to the
various roles played within the association. In that regard, it must be emphasized that the criminalizing
law is not limited to reproducing the provisions of every crime of association by listing the positions of
those who promote, establish, organize, direct or participate, but adds to that list the persons who finance
terroristic associations, encompassing the specific role of the person who provides the financial resources
necessary to carry out the criminal program. In regard to, in particular, the conduct of participating in
terroristic associations, we must cite the principles articulated by the Joined Sections of this Court about
the crime of association set forth in Art. 416 bis of the Criminal Code. On this point, it was clarified that
“a participant is someone who, having been included continuously and organically in the organizational
structure of the Mafia association, not only is but comprises a part of (even better; takes part in) the same;
this expression is not to be interpreted in a static sense, as the mere acquisition of a status, but in a
dynamic and functional sense, in regard to the actual role in which he/she is immersed and the tasks
he/she is charged with performing for the association to achieve its goals, at the ready for the activities
organized by the association” (Cass., Joined Sections, July 12, 2005, Mannino, journal no. 231673). A
recent decision of this Court must be interpreted in this sense. That case held that proof of participation in
terroristic associations cannot be inferred solely from psychological or ideological adherence to the
criminal program, but a conviction presupposes that there was a demonstration of actual insertion into the
organized structure through unequivocally symptomatic conduct consisting of carrying out activities in
preparation of the execution of the program or assuming a tangible role in the criminal structure (Cass.,
Sec. 1, no. 30824, June 15, 2006, Tartag). It follows that an individual’s participation in a terroristic
group can also take the form of instrumental conduct and logistical support for the activities of the
association that unequivocally evidence his/her insertion in the organization, provided that a portion of
that conduct takes place in Italy. On the subjective level, the crime under Art. 270 bis of the Criminal
Code is a typical crime of specific intent, in which the awareness of and intent to commit the crime must
be directed at pursuing the specific aim of terrorism that connotes the activity of the entire association,
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which that law identifies, alternatively, as the objective of spreading terror among the population or
forcing States or international organizations to take or refrain from taking a specified action.
3.2— In the view of the Panel, the structure of the subject matter set forth in Art. 270 bis of the Criminal
Code is compatible with applying the principles established by well-settled case law regarding possible
complicity in the crime of association. The most recent and lucid contribution clarifying and conceptually
organizing that delicate topic was offered by the Joined Sections of this Court, which held that external
complicity in the crime of Mafia-type association can exist even in the case of a “political-Mafia
exchange agreement,” pursuant to which a politician who is not participating in the criminal association
(and thus not inserted continuously in the organization’s fabric and lacking “affectio societatis”) agrees,
in exchange for support requested from a Mafia association in an election, to support the group’s
interests: with the clarification that, to constitute the crime, it is necessary that: a) the promises made by
the politician to the Mafia association must be serious and concrete, based on the reliability and character
of the parties to the agreement, the structural characteristics of the criminal association, the applicable
historical context and the specificity of the terms; and b) at the conclusion of the “ex post” probative
review of their causal efficacy, it is determined, based on principles of experience along with empirical
plausibility, that the promises made by the politician actually and significantly had an effect, in and of
themselves and apart from any subsequent actions implementing the agreement, of conserving or
reinforcing the operational capabilities of the entire criminal organization or its industry divisions (Cass.,
Joined Sections, July 12, 2005, Marinino [sic], journal no. 231673). In the decision of the highest
assembly of the Supreme Court, of particular interest are the arguments supporting the existence of
external complicity in the crime of association, which stated that “not even an extensive and widespread
legislative fragmentation of the various cases of Mafia proximity into independent and typical crimes (as
occurred, for example, in the case of the distinct terroristic phenomenon by the introduction of the new
concepts of “financing” associations with the aim of terrorism—Art. 270 bis of the Criminal Code,
paragraph 1, added by Art. 1, paragraph 1 of Decree Law no. 374 of 2001, converted into Law no. 438 of
2001—or the “enrollment” and “training” of individuals to carry out activities with the aim of terrorism,
which may be international—Arts. 270 quater and 270 quinquies of the Criminal Code, added by Art. 15,
paragraph 1 of Decree Law no. 144 of 2005, converted into Law no. 155 of 2005) would be able to
paralyze the operational expansion of the general clause extending responsibility for atypical and external
contributions other than those listed in detail, according to the model dictated by Art. 110 of the Criminal
Code on individuals’ complicity in the crime, except by introducing a provision of derogation excluding
that clause’s application to crimes of association.” The application of those principles to the crime under
Art. 270 bis of the Criminal Code highlights that applying the complicity framework outlined in Art. 110
of the Criminal Code makes the concept of external complicity also applicable to crimes of association
with the aim of international terrorism in regard to those persons who, although they remain outside the
organizational structure, make a concrete and knowing contribution that is causally relevant to
maintaining, reinforcing and achieving the purposes of the criminal organization or its industry divisions,
provided, obviously, that there is an awareness of the objective pursued by the organization for the benefit
of which the contribution was provided.
4.— The analysis reconstructing the laws regarding associations with the aim of international terrorism
must be followed by a review of the outline of the arguments developed in the reasoning for the appealed
judgment to verify—in light of the criticisms made in the Attorney General of Milan’s appeal—the
correctness of the interpretation of Art. 270 bis of the Criminal Code and the proper use of the paradigms
for assessing the evidence underlying the logical and legal coherence of the determination of the facts to
which the criminalizing law on which the charge described in count 1 is based must be applied. The
approach of the investigation conducted by the Court of Appeal was substantively appropriate, as stated in
the recitals relating to the need to define the concept of terrorism underlying the law set forth in the
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international sources, mainly the UN Convention of 1999 and the Framework Decision adopted by the
European Union in 2002. In its abstract and generalizing scope, however, we cannot subscribe to the
conclusion that the appealed judgment reached regarding the definition of conduct with the aim of
terrorism set forth in Art. 270 sexies of the Criminal Code, which was deemed to apply “to interpret the
legal meaning of the term terrorism, even though it was added to our legal system after the events in
question (Decree Law no. 144 of July 27, 2005, converted into Law no. 155 of July 31, 2005), because it
does not contain sanctioning language and, in fact, by clarifying the concept in question, limits its scope
of application.” In the first place, we must highlight the incorrectness of the stated lack of sanctioning
language in the provisions introduced by Art. 270 sexies of the Criminal Code, since it is clear that it
contains a defining rule with direct impact on the actual scope of the criminalizing provision of Art. 270
bis of the Criminal Code and, thus, on the scope of applicability of the criminal sanction. In addition, as to
the alleged restriction of the scope of application, the arguments made previously (see 2.1.) allow us to
hold that the new definition, taken from the Framework Decision of 2002, on the one hand is broader
because it added a subversive aim to the terroristic aim (contrary to the positions in case law: Cass.,
Section 6, July 1, 2003, Public Prosecutor in Nerozzi, journal no. 226049), and, on the other hand, that the
concept set forth in Art. 270 sexies of the Criminal Code contains a precise delimitation for the reason
that it does not include terroristic activities carried out in the context of armed conflicts and includes as
the victims of the acts of violence only the population and not also military personnel not taking an active
part in the hostilities. Hence, in relation to the changes to, either expanding or restricting, the legal
definition of conduct with the aim of terrorism, it must be recognized that the rules are subject to the
principle of the effectiveness of criminal law over time and application of the provisions of Art. 2,
paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Criminal Code. The error in law we found in the reasoning for the challenged
judgment did not, however, have any tangible impact on the decision rendered by the Assize Court of
Appeal, since the principles of law actually applied to verify the existence of the aim of terrorism were
taken primarily from the law established by the UN Convention of 1999, made effective with Law no. 7
of 2003, regarding both the identity of the victims of the acts of violence (distinguished between civilians,
persons not actively involved in the hostilities and combatants) and the war context in which those acts
were engaged in. It follows that, taking into account the role played by the aforementioned 1999
Convention in adding to the definition set forth in Art. 270 sexies of the Criminal Code and the “open”
character that the latter took on as a result of the reference to international sources that are binding upon
Italy (see 2.2.), the rationale justifying the decision, notwithstanding the error in law cited, cannot
legitimize reversing the judgment and must be amended by correcting the reasoning pursuant to Art. 619,
paragraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
4.1.— The Attorney General’s appeal, in which he complained, in accordance with Art. 606, paragraph 1,
letter b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, of misapplication of criminal law where the District Court
held that “only acts directed exclusively against the civilian population” are terrorism, consequently
ruling that in a situation of armed conflict, “Kamikaze” suicide actions, when committed against military
objectives, cannot be regarded as terrorism, even if they cause serious damage and spread fear among the
civil population. A statement of this kind, with its broad scope, cannot be accepted and must be further
specified and explained. Above all, the statement is clearly at odds with the explicit provision of the 1999
Convention, although the latter was repeatedly cited in the appealed judgment, since that international
source describes terrorism as “any act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to
any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict.” Consequently,
attacks directed against military personnel engaged in tasks completely unconnected with war operations
and not in any way attributable thereto, such as, for example, the providing of humanitarian aid, must
therefore be included in this class. However, this view cannot be entirely accepted even under a further
perspective, since situations may well arise in a context of armed conflict (between States or in civil war)
where acts of violence are directed both against military persons and against the civil population, at a time
when—due to the nature of such acts, the means employed and the specific conditions in which they are
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engaged in—they will undoubtedly produce serious injury not only to military persons but also to
civilians. It must therefore be said that the wording and the “reasoning” of the international law, which
are aimed at defining the objectives of terrorism in an armed conflict, provide unambiguous interpretative
arguments for saying that an action against a military objective must also be regarded as terrorism if the
particular circumstances show beyond any doubt that serious harm to the life and integrity of the civilian
population are inevitable, creating fear and panic among the local people. A simple example is an attack
using explosives against a military vehicle in a crowded market. In a situation of this kind, an
interpretative approach that would see the joint presence of military and civilian victims as an element
sufficient in itself to deny the terrorist nature of the act undoubtedly lacks coherence and rationality, as it
is clear that the certainty (and not mere possibility or probability) of serious harm inflicted on civilians
shows unequivocally that the committing of an intentional and specific act marked by an intent to engage
in the action and achieve the particular results that constitute terrorist purposes. The relevance to the
outcome of the trial of the obvious discrepancy on this point, between the letter of the law and the wrong
interpretation of it by the Trial Court must be re-examined upon a review of the reconstruction of the facts
made by evaluating the probative evidence.
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5.— After acknowledging that count 1 of the charge delineates a cross-border structure operating in Italy
and abroad under the auspices of various causes which share an adherence to fundamentalist Islamic
ideology, the Territorial Court stated that the investigation must focus on the specific acts with which the
defendants in this trial were accused of committing, in furtherance of the program they shared, and
evidence collected against other persons who acted at different places and times cannot be used. The
Court’s ruling was criticized by the Attorney General, who argued that the principles governing the crime
of association with the aim of terrorism (which is a crime because of presumed danger) were distorted,
and criticized the fragmentary evaluation of the evidence, adding that the erroneous evaluation method
ignored the demonstrated connections of the groups operating in Italy with the Ansar Al Islam
organization, which was added to the terrorist organizations with ties to Al Qaeda in the UN Security
Council’s Resolution no. 1267/99. We uphold the grounds for the appeal within the limits specified
above. It must be said first of all that the arguments of the Trial Court can be fully upheld insofar as it
denied that simply belonging to the religious area of Islamic fundamentalism and even statements made in
support of forms of political and military struggle can in themselves justify the conclusion that
organizational links exist aimed at the pursuit of terrorist activities, as long as they remain simply ideas,
since in our legal system—which includes freedom of expression among fundamental human rights—
simply advocating an ideology, even if subversive, cannot amount to a criminal act until it results in
achieving an organizational structure or actual acts of violence (Cass., Section 1, May 11, 2000, Attorney
General in Paiano et al., journal no. 216253). On the other hand, the appealed judgment, like that of the
trial court, is open to the criticisms made in the Attorney-General’s appeal to the extent that it completely
failed to examine the relationships between the group formed by the defendants and the transnational
organization referred to in the charge’s count. An approach of this kind in assessing the evidence should
necessarily have included mandatory examination of the approach and development of the available
results, since it was obvious that the investigation should have focused on verifying, in order, the
existence of the Milanese cell which the three defendants are said to have belonged to, the actions it took,
the true independence of the other cells operating in Italy (confirmed by the preliminary hearing judge of
the Court of Milan, which rejected territorial jurisdiction over the activities of other Islamic groups
existing in other parts of Italy) and, finally, the links among those groups and links with organizations
active abroad dedicated to terrorism.
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In that regard, it is worth keeping in mind that, in regard to the crime of Mafia-type association, case law
has analyzed the different types of relationships that can arise among distinct criminal groups, holding
that, depending on the individual situations, they can be classified into different organizational forms,
connoted by continuing or occasional functional connections or federation-type independence (Cass.,
Section 6, September 20, 2005, Attorney General in Gionta et al, journal no. 233488). It should further be
noted that once these aspects have been clarified after examining the evidence, the trial court should have
determined whether the logistic support activities for the benefit of the organization operating abroad—
achieved by gathering funds, supplying forged documents and assisting with unlawful entry to Italy of
persons intending to fight in foreign countries—could constitute an adequate basis to justify the holding
relating to participation in a transnational organization and the existence of a deliberate intention to
commit terrorist activities. Hence, the fact that the Milanese group was not directly involved in terrorist
activities but rather engaged in actions in support of militants who were conducting such activities abroad
is insufficient to rule out commission of the crime under Art. 272 bis Criminal Code, given the undeniable
functional relationship existing between the groups. Moreover, even if such inquiries had been made, the
same could not be considered the end of the investigation, because, if no structural and organizational
connections were found to exist between the Milanese cell and the broader organization operating abroad,
the courts deciding on the merits should also have determined whether the evidence warranted holding the
defendants responsible for terroristic activities as external complicity in the crime of association, pursuant
to Arts. 272 bis and 110 of the Criminal Code, on the specific terms indicated previously (see 3.2.). The
prior findings show that the evaluation made by the District Court is lacking and spotty due to the failure
to examine certain essential aspects of the evidentiary investigation and failure to examine certain aspects
of decisive relevance in greater depth.
5.1.— Having indicated the thema probandum as indicated above, this Court must now review the
evidentiary reasoning set forth in the rationale for the appealed judgment by determining, above all,
whether the evaluation by the courts deciding on the merits involved probatory evidence obtained in
accordance with the requirements of procedural law and in conformity with the epistemological criteria
set forth in Art. 192 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It must be noted first of all that in the fight
against international terrorism, the position of the Italian legal system has been that of respecting the
guarantees, both substantive and procedural, that essentially reflect the principles of the Constitutional
Charter, and refraining from repressive action undertaken through forms of true denial of jurisdiction, the
result of which is to deny the constitutional bases and procedural functions which are an irreplaceable
instrument of civilized society resulting from its liberal-democratic traditions. Consequently, it is not by
chance that in commenting on the choices made by other legal systems when examining terrorism of the
Islamic mold that the expression “the enemy’s criminal law” has been used to designate systems of law
that do not offer the usual guarantees (starting with habeas corpus) to persons who, merely because they
are suspected of terrorism, are deprived of civil and political rights to which any person is entitled. Under
our legal system, therefore, proceedings involving acts of international terrorism remain subject to a legal
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approach which is no different from that of ordinary law, apart from a few explicit points subject to
different laws, i.e., the provisions of a series of laws (starting with Decree Law no. 374 of 2001,
converted into Law no. 438 of 2001), which introduced special provisions modelled on the approach
taken with regard to organized Mafia-type crime and which primarily relates to the preliminary
investigation stage, without, however, contravening the fundamental principles of the procedural system
stated in Art. 111 of the Constitution within the framework of proper process.
The appealed judgment properly observed the procedural rules stated above where it held that information
obtained from “intelligence” sources regarding connections with the transnational organization Ansar Al
Islam cannot be used in the trial, since it is knowledge obtained without adhering to any of the prescribed
forms by authorities that were not given investigative powers within the proceeding and, therefore, is
vitiated by a vulnus in the legality of the evidentiary process that is so drastic that it can be categorized as
being fundamentally inadmissible. (see Cass., Joined Sections, June 21, 2000, Tamarro, journal no.
216246). The appellant Attorney General argued in his brief that the Trial Court failed to take account of
the fact that the Ansar Al Islam organization appears on the lists of terrorist organizations in Resolution
no. 1267/99 of the UN Security Council, and thus the purposes pursued by this group, with which the
defendants had repeated contacts, cannot be ignored. The criticism is groundless; the argument that
inclusion in the lists prepared by international bodies should in itself be sufficient to demonstrate the
terrorist nature of that association cannot be upheld, as if the mere categorization made by such bodies
could bind the determination that is left to the court’s unfettered discretion at trial. The lists of “terrorist
suspects” or of “prohibited persons” were introduced following a UN resolution in 1999, cited by the
Attorney General in Milan, to sanction the Taliban government in Afghanistan for its support of Islamic
terrorism, by imposing an embargo and freezing financial resources. The European Union quickly
followed this proceeding by issuing further regulations, binding on all Member States, which imposed the
obligation to freeze assets destined for individuals or legal entities included in the list of “prohibited
persons,” the composition of which is updated by the Commission based on Resolutions passed by the
UN Security Council. In Italy, the Financial Security Committee set up within the Ministry of the
Economy was given the task of providing the European Union with information for drawing up lists
based on evidence taken from criminal proceedings and judicial measures issued in the course of
preliminary investigations. With this understanding, it must be stressed that, according to the almost
unanimous views in legal commentary, inclusion of a group in these lists has purely administrative value
and justifies imposition of the sanctions indicated, but the effects thereof cannot extend to becoming
evidence. It has been clearly stated in legal commentary that to do otherwise would “introduce an item of
legal proof into the system, transforming Art. 270 bis Criminal Code into a blank check criminal law” and
this view has been adopted in the case law of this Court which, in denying that appearance on lists of
“prohibited persons” has evidentiary value, itself referred to the inadmissibility of creating a kind of legal
proof that would clearly violate the principles of legality and separation of powers (Cass., Section 1, no.
30824, June 15, 2006, Tartag). In conclusion, it must be said that placing an association on those lists
represents an element with value only as an investigatory starting point and that proof of terrorist
purposes must necessarily be adduced according to the rules of admissibility and evidentiary assessment
set forth in procedural law.
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6.— The ruling on which the appealed decision is based not only exhibits the logical and legal flaws cited
previously, which relate to the inaccurate reconstruction of the legal concept of terrorism and the failure
to consider potential external complicity in the association pursuant to Art. 270 bis Criminal Code, but
also the clear discrepancy between the criteria for evidentiary evaluation imposed by the first and second
paragraphs of Art. 192 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since the Trial Court reviewed the evidence in
a fragmentary manner and without in any way scrutinizing the interactions to be found among the various
probative results. This Court’s case law has clarified that the logical process of evaluating circumstantial
evidence consists of two distinct steps: the first is focused on determining the greater or lesser level of
seriousness and precision of the circumstantial evidence, each piece considered in isolation, keeping in
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mind that that level is directly proportional to the force of logical necessity with which the circumstantial
elements lead to the fact to be demonstrated and is inversely proportional to the multiplicity of events that
can be inferred from them based on the rules of experience; the second stage of evaluating circumstantial
evidence consists of an overall and unitary examination that tends to dispel its relative ambiguity (“quae
singula non probant, simul unita probant”) given that “in the overall evaluation, each piece of
circumstantial evidence (as everyone knows) adds up and, moreover, combines with the others, so that the
extent of the value of each is exceeded and the positive probative impact is heightened by the
combination, such that all the evidence taken together can take on weighty and unequivocal
demonstrative meaning, and hence the logical proof of the fact can be deemed to have occurred …
which—it is worth keeping in mind—does not constitute a less worthy tool compared to direct (or
historical) evidence when it is obtained with the methodological rigor that justifies and substantiates the
principle of the ‘judge’s inner conviction’” (Cass., Joined Sections, February 4, 1992, Ballan). The outline
of the paradigms for evaluating circumstantial evidence was recently reiterated by the Joined Sections,
according to which the method for unitarily and comprehensively reading the entire body of evidence
does not end with merely summing the pieces of circumstantial evidence and, therefore, cannot fail to
include the preparatory process which consists of evaluating each piece of circumstantial evidence
individually, each with respect to its qualitative value and degree of precision and seriousness, to then
assess it, if the prerequisites are satisfied, from a global and unitary perspective focused on highlighting
the connections and convergence into a single demonstrative context (Cass., Joined Sections, July 12,
2005, Mannino, journal no. 231678). The structure and framing of the rationale for the appealed decision
are lacking from the perspective described above, because the Trial Court evaluated the defendants’
positions by analyzing the individual pieces of evidence without placing them in a context that
undoubtedly could have contributed to clarifying their actual demonstrative weight and their true
consistency in regard to the investigative theme advanced by the prosecution in the charge, which—it
must be emphasized—was based on the connections with the other cells operating in Italy and with the
larger Ansar Al Islam organization that is active abroad.
6.1— After indicating the importance of the role played by M., who had been the principal operative of
the activities with which the defendants are charged, the District Court examined the content of the
wiretaps, emphasizing that such recorded conversations unequivocally showed M.’s repeated contacts not
only with all the defendants but with senior representatives of associations professing fundamentalist
Islamic ideology which, in Syria and Afghanistan, managed training camps for volunteers seeking to fight
the “holy war” in Iraq against the Americans in contemplation of the imminent invasion of that country.
The appealed judgment also acknowledged that M. declared himself to be a combatant who intended to
die as a martyr for the “jihad,” that he was in constant connection with mullah F., the director of the
Ansar Al Islam association, that his positions were close to those of that organization and that, when
recruiting volunteers to fight abroad, that he was seeking suicide bombers. Moving to an examination of
B.M.’s position, the Trial Court reconstructed the defendant’s movements in Italy and Turkey in the years
2002-2003 and contacts maintained with known proponents of Islamic fundamentalism, stating that,
following a search of his residence, a manual entitled “Basic Elements for Preparing Jihad for the Cause
of Allah,” a French residence permit in his brother H.’s name, numerous passport photos, 8,625.00 euros
in cash and numerous cassette tapes containing Arabic prayers were seized. At the conclusion of the
examination, the Court held that it had been proven that B.M., at least since early February 2003, had
participated, along with mullah F. and M., in recruiting Muslim volunteers and forging documents
necessary for the aspiring martyrs to reach the Middle East from Europe. The conclusions from the
examination of T.A.’s position were identical, with the Territorial Court holding—based on adequate and
thorough reasoning—that the activities collaborating with M., in connection with mullah F., in forging
documents and residence permits to be delivered to the volunteers destined for the training camps in Syria
had been demonstrated. As to D.M.’s position, the Trial Court found that he was not involved in the
activities of the group of which B.M. and T.A. were a part, observing that the evidence relating to the first
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defendant related only to the hospitality provided to C., a Somali, and the fact that he took steps,
unsuccessfully, to obtain forged documents for the latter to reach Syria: hence the challenged decision
classified D.’s conduct as merely occasional. The rationale justifying the decision to acquit D was
criticized by the appellant Attorney General, who criticized the Court’s holding that the evidence obtained
was illogical and contradictory. We share that criticism. Truthfully, the devaluation of D.’s role seems to
lack a plausible logical basis, if one considers that the contents of the wiretaps show that he made contact
with C. at M.’s behest, following a request from mullah F, and that on the occasion of that episode he was
in telephone contact with Syria, speaking with M.A., another leader of Ansar Al Islam, about the
assistance to be provided to C., who intended to go there to fight the holy war, even to the extent of
martyrdom. In addition, the probative relevance of that information becomes decisive if it is kept in mind
that—as was carefully emphasized in the appeal—the intercepted conversations show that M. and A.,
prominent figures in the organization, judged D. to be a completely reliable person who was ready to help
the “brothers,” which circumstance is extremely significant since the help requested of the defendant
consisted of illegal activities for which the surveillance of the police authorities had to be avoided. It
follows that the argumentative framework of the reasoning must be considered flawed by manifest gaps in
logic and is in total conflict with trial evidence of significant probative weight.
6.2— The appealed decision is also subject to criticism in the part where the evidence was examined
regarding the activities of the Ansar Al Islam group, which managed the camps where the volunteers
coming from Europe were trained. It has already been seen that—contrary to the Attorney General’s
assertions in his appeal—a finding of an aim of terrorism cannot be based solely on the fact that the
association was added to the lists of “suspects” or “prohibited persons” used to combat terrorist
organizations on the financial level (see 5.1.). The Territorial Court properly ruled the evidence obtained
through the Norwegian letter rogatory was admissible, and examined the statements made by persons who
had joined Ansar Al Islam, founded by mullah K. in December 2001, holding that the association
“officially had the structure of a true Islamic combatant organization, with its own training camps where
volunteers were instructed in the use of arms and to fight, but it is highly probable that there were
significant fringe elements within that organization that were also inclined, at least in certain situations, to
engage in terrorism to reach the political results that the organization favored.” Given such eloquent
probative information, which should have become the subject of an in-depth and properly reasoned
investigation, it is difficult to understand the reasons that led to minimizing that information’s importance
because it “relates to episodes that occurred in contexts and at times that are completely different from the
events in this trial, involving episodes that occurred in the internal war that Ansar Al Islam carried out in
Kurdistan against the P.U.K. and not what happened in the training camps, when volunteers who had
arrived from various parts of the world prepared to repel what they considered to be an invasion of an
Arab State.” The rationale for the appealed decision are, on the point, not plausible and in no way
convincing, given that the Trial Court never asked itself whether it was reasonable to rule that Ansar Al
Islam did not intend to follow the same terrorism method extensively applied in other situations of
conflict also in the fight against the invasion of Iraq.
6.3— After describing the political background for the United States’ and its allies’ intervention in Iraq,
the Territorial Court held that there was no aim of international terrorism, which is necessary to constitute
the crime under Art. 270 bis of the Criminal Code, stating that “during the entire period of the true war
operations (March 20 – May 1, 2003) and until early August 2003, no terroristic attack (in the sense
indicated above) de facto occurred in Iraq, although from the first days of the war suicide bombers were
active against military objectives and the Iraqi authorities had warned the Americans to stay away from
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Baghdad or four thousand suicide bombers would be ready.” Those facts—deemed to be notorious and
thus “admissible without the need for specific proof”—in the appealed decision led to the consequence
that the defendants engaged in no actions punishable under Art. 270 bis of the Criminal Code because
their conduct facilitating the transfer of Muslim volunteers to Syria and, then, to Iraq was engaged in
primarily in February and March 2003, while the terroristic attacks began starting in August 2003. We
disagree with those assertions for several reasons. To begin with, we note an inappropriate use of the
concept of a notorious fact. The use of that category, for evidentiary purposes regarding international
terrorism, is also present in the case law of this Court, which has had occasion to clarify that facts are
notorious if, because they are known to citizens generally, must also be considered as known also by the
court without the need for a specific determination, holding—in relation to the specifics of the situation
examined—that the recent history of Algeria and the actions of a terroristic group in that country must be
considered notorious facts, to be considered, in modern society, no longer limited to a narrow local
context but including sensational events occurring in foreign countries, which, due to their importance,
must be considered common knowledge (Cass., Section 2, February 9, 2005, Public Prosecutor in Gasry
et al., journal no. 231258). However, on the topic of a notorious fact, and particular that relating to events
of international terrorism, it is appropriate to point out that the court has the duty, with rigorous caution
and prudence, to make sure that the event falls within the established heritage of knowledge common to
all of society, thus ensuring that there is no possibility of admitting evidence outside of due process at
trial. In fact, failure to carry out that necessary check gives rise to a risk that inadmissible evidentiary
“shortcuts” will be introduced at trial through which—without the filter of normal trial dialectics—
uncontrolled and uncontrollable factual circumstances can be deemed to have been demonstrated merely
by dint of having been repeatedly spread by means of mass communication. And for events of terrorism,
the danger that improper use of notorious fact can result in an alteration of the rules of the trial and
contamination of sources of judicial knowledge seems even more significant if one considers the
undeniable effect that, in a situation of war, the propaganda of the warring forces has and their influence
on the flows and substance of the information based on criteria of political and military benefit. The
appealed decision shows that there was no review conducted to see if the facts relating to the absence of
terroristic acts in the early months of the military operations in Iraq were truly notorious: therefore, apart
from the discussion to follow about the non-decisive relevance of terroristic conduct engaged in during
the period stated in the charges, we hold that the schematic and rigid chronological dating of the
beginning of the attacks that also struck the civilian population cannot be considered to have been
demonstrated without the need for any investigation.
6.4.— The ratio decidendi behind the Trial Court’s decision is also vitiated by the error of law of having
stated that whether the defendants had purposes of international terrorism would decisively depend on
whether attacks directed at the civilian population had begun. In this respect, it has already been made
clear that an act against a military objective constitutes a terroristic act if the particulars and specific
factual circumstances of the event show that serious harm to life and the physical integrity of civilians is
certain and unavoidable, thus contributing to spreading fear and panic among the population (see 4.1.). It
follows from this that an investigation of international terrorism purposes could not end with the
confirmation of the military nature of the objective of the violent conduct, but should have been extended
to examining the causation at the same time of serious damage to life and physical integrity of civilians
occurring in such situations such that the same becomes a certain and inevitable result of the conduct
concerned, due to the means employed and the specific circumstances. A further logical and legal flaw in
the reasoning of the appealed decision can be found where the Territorial Court held that excluding the
defendants’ responsibility was justified by the fact that the conduct involved in this trial was carried out
before the terroristic attacks using car bombs and suicide bombers began in Iraq. A similar opinion is
reflected in the erroneous conception of the nature and elements constituting the crime of association set
forth by Art. 270 bis of the Criminal Code, because it infers that commission of the end crimes are
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essential to that crime, and does not consider that, to constitute the former crime, the creation of a suitable
association structure with a program with the aim of international terrorism is sufficient, regardless of
whether the planned criminal activities are actually carried out. Therefore, based on the evidentiary results
to be used to determine the defendants’ relationships with Ansar Al Islam, the Territorial Court should
have determined whether they were in direct connection with that association or whether they were
externally complicit in the crime of association: with the latter inquiry, in either case, focused on
determining whether they had knowledge that Ansar Al Islam was pursuing a program that also included
recourse to terroristic attacks, also keeping in mind that actions of that kind had already been carried out
in Kurdistan even before the Iraqi war operations. Under this latter perspective, which relates to the
psychological element of the crime charged in count 1, we note the lack of adequate arguments in support
of the Court’s ruling, because the Court apodictically ruled that the defendants acted without intent,
without investigating the question relating to their knowledge of the fighting methods and the objectives
of the association for whose benefit they engaged in the conduct charged in counts 2 and 3.
7.— In conclusion, in light of all the above considerations, the appealed judgment must be set aside and
the case referred to another section of the Assize Court of Appeal of Milan which, in a new trial, must
reassess the evidence and, applying the principles of law mentioned above, must decide whether the three
defendants should be convicted of the crime of association as provided by Art. 270 bis of the Criminal
Code due to participation or external complicity. The decision to reverse must be limited only to the crime
charged in count 1, since the Attorney General of Milan, although he initially stated that his appeal
involved all the counts of the decision, he did not then provide any grounds for appeal relating to the
remaining charges and points regarding the failure to apply the aggravating factor under Art. 1 of Law
no. 15 of 1980. As a result of that reversal, if there is a conviction in the trial following remand in the
charge under count 1, the penalties imposed for the crimes in counts 2 and 3 must be redetermined if they
are deemed to be in continuation with the most serious crime of association.
For Which Reasons
The Supreme Court of Cassation, First Criminal Section, reverses the appealed decision and remands for
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a new trial to another Section of the Assize Court of Appeals of Milan, solely in regard to the crime under
count 1. So decided in Rome on October 11, 2006. Filed with the Court Clerk’s Office on January 17,
2007.

Annex 474
Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 698 (7th Cir. 2008)

BOIM v. HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEV. 685
Cite as 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008)
Government’s petition for rehearing. The
judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
,
Stanley BOIM, individually and as administrator
of the Estate of David
Boim, deceased; and Joyce Boim,
Plaintiffs–Appellees,
v.
HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR
RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT,
et al., Defendants–Appellants.
Nos. 05–1815, 05–1816, 05–1821, 05–1822.
United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.
Argued Sept. 10, 2008.
Decided Dec. 3, 2008.
Background: Parents of United States
national, who had been fatally shot in Israel
by gunmen allegedly acting on behalf of
terrorist organization, sued array of individuals
and organizations in United States
with alleged connections to terrorist organization.
The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Arlander Keys, United States Magistrate
Judge, 340 F.Supp.2d 885, entered partial
summary judgment as to liability against
some organizations, and United Statesbased
alleged military leader of terrorist
organization, and entered judgment on
jury verdict against remaining organization.
The Court of Appeals, 511 F.3d 707,
vacated and remanded.
Holdings: On rehearing en banc, the
Court of Appeals, Posner, Circuit Judge,
held that:
(1) statute providing civil cause of action
for those injured by act of international
terrorism does not impose secondary
liability;
(2) donation to terrorist group that targets
Americans outside United States is
within statute’s scope;
(3) individual who had been in custody
between effective date of ‘‘material
support’’ statute and date of murder
could not be liable;
(4) donor’s liability requires showing of
knowledge or deliberate indifference;
(5) causation element of civil liability statute
could be satisfied by defendants’
having donated money to terrorist organization;
(6) organization was not collaterally estopped
from contesting its knowledge
of terrorist organization’s activities;
and
(7) District Court did not abuse its discretion
by admitting expert’s opinion that
terrorist organization had been responsible
for murder.
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded
in part.
Rovner, Circuit Judge, filed opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part,
joined by Circuit Judge Williams and
joined in part by Circuit Judge Wood.
Wood, Circuit Judge, filed opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part, joined
in part by Circuit Judges Rovner and
Williams.
1. War and National Emergency O50
Statute providing civil cause of action
for those injured by act of international
terrorism does not impose secondary liability,
e.g. aiding and abetting. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2333(a).
686 549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
2. Statutes O240
Statutory silence on subject of secondary
liability means there is none.
3. International Law O7
Congress has power to impose liability
for acts that occur abroad but have effects
within United States, but it must make
extraterritorial scope of statute clear.
4. War and National Emergency O50
Donation to terrorist group that targets
Americans outside United States is
within scope of statute providing civil
cause of action for those injured by act of
international terrorism; donation qualifies
as ‘‘act dangerous to human life’’ within
applicable statutory definition of international
terrorism, and violates federal statute
criminalizing ‘‘provid[ing] material support
or resources MMM knowing or intending
that they are to be used in preparation for,
or in carrying out’’ the killing, conspiring
to kill, or inflicting bodily injury on any
American citizen outside United States.
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2331(1), 2332, 2333(a),
2339A.
5. War and National Emergency O50
In civil suit brought by parents of
victim killed by terrorists outside United
States, against individual who allegedly
had provided material support to terrorist
organization responsible for murder, fact
that individual had been in custody between
effective date of ‘‘material support’’
statute and date of murder precluded liability,
since individual could not have rendered
material support to organization
during that period. 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2333(a), 2339A.
6. War and National Emergency O50
Donor to terrorist organization, to be
liable under statute providing civil cause of
action for those injured by act of international
terrorism, must have known that
organization engages in such acts or have
been deliberately indifferent, i.e. reckless,
to whether it does or not. 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2332, 2333(a), 2339A.
7. War and National Emergency O50
In civil suit brought by parents of
victim killed by terrorists outside United
States, causation element of statute providing
civil cause of action for those injured
by act of international terrorism
could be satisfied by defendants’ having
donated money to organization allegedly
responsible for murder, even though defendants
had earmarked money for organization’s
ongoing social welfare activities;
donations of money were fungible, and organization’s
social welfare activities reinforced
its terrorist activities. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2333(a).
8. Judgment O725(1)
In civil suit brought against domestic
organization by parents of victim killed by
terrorists outside United States, alleging
that domestic organization knowingly had
provided material support to terrorist organization,
domestic organization was not
collaterally estopped from contesting its
knowledge of terrorist organization’s activities
by virtue of unrelated prior litigation
involving freezing of domestic organization’s
assets by Treasury Secretary; any
finding in previous case as to domestic
organization’s knowledge concerning terrorist
organization had not been necessary
to court’s affirmance of Secretary’s action,
which required only fact of material support,
not knowledge. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2333(a).
9. War and National Emergency O50
Domestic organization that donated
money to second domestic organization,
while knowing or being reckless in failing
to discover that second organization would
refer donation to terrorist organization,
was liable under statute providing civil
BOIM v. HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEV. 687
Cite as 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008)
cause of action for those injured by act of
international terrorism, based on terrorist
organization’s murder abroad of American
citizen, regardless of whether intermediate
organization had same awareness of terrorist
organization’s nature. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2333(a).
10. Evidence O555.4(1)
In civil suit brought against domestic
organization by parents of victim killed by
terrorists outside United States, alleging
defendant’s providing material support to
terrorist organization, federal district
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
terrorism expert’s opinion that murderers
had been members of terrorist organization
and that terrorist organization
had acknowledged its responsibility, even
though expert had relied in part on evidence
lacking in proper foundation, including
Internet sites attributed to terrorist
organization. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2333(a); Fed.
Rules Evid.Rule 703, 28 U.S.C.A.
Stephen J. Landes (argued), Wildman,
Harrold, Allen & Dixon, Chicago, IL, Nathan
Lewin (argued), Lewin & Lewin,
Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs–Appellees.
John W. Boyd (argued), Freedman,
Boyd, Daniels, Peifer, Hollander, Guttman
& Goldbe, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant–
Appellant Holy Land Foundation for
Relief and Development in No. 05-1815.
Matthew J. Piers (argued), Mary M.
Rowland, Hughes Socol Piers Resnick &
Dym, for Defendant-Appellant Mohammad
Abdul Hamid Khalil Salah in No. 05-1816.
John M. Beal, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-
Appellant Quaranic Literacy Institute
in No. 05-1821.
James R. Fennerty, Brendan Shiller,
Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant
American Muslim Society in No. 05-1822.
Joseph A. Morris, Morris & De La
Rosa, Chicago, IL, for Jewish Community
Relations Council of the Jewish United
Fund of Metropolitan Chicago.
Daniel Elbaum, Anti-Defamation
League, Jonathan K. Baum, Katten Muchin
Rosenman, Chicago, IL, for Anti-Defamation
League.
Thomas P. Walsh, Office of United
States Attorney, Chicago, IL for U.S.
Leon F. DeJulius, Jr., Jones Day, Pittsburgh,
PA, for OMB Watch.
Andrea Bierstein, Hanly Conroy Bierstein
Sheridan Fisher & Hayes, New York,
NY, for 9/11 Families United to Bankrupt
Terrorism.
David Yerushalmi, Washington, DC,
Center for Security Policy.
Richard A. Samp, Washington Legal
Foundation, Washington, DC, for Washington
Legal Foundation, Jewish Institute
for National Security Affairs and Allied
Educational Foundation.
Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge,
and POSNER, FLAUM, KANNE,
ROVNER, WOOD, EVANS, WILLIAMS,
SYKES, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.
POSNER, Circuit Judge.
In 1996 David Boim, a Jewish teenager
who was both an Israeli citizen and an
American citizen, living in Israel, was shot
to death by two men at a bus stop near
Jerusalem. His parents filed this suit four
years later, alleging that his killers had
been Hamas gunmen and naming as defendants
Muhammad Salah plus three organizations:
the Holy Land Foundation for
Relief and Development, the American
Muslim Society, and the Quranic Literacy
Institute. (A fourth, the Islamic Associa688
549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
tion of Palestine–National, appears to be
either an alter ego of the American Muslim
Society or just an alternative name for
it, and need not be discussed separately.
There are other defendants as well but
they are not involved in the appeals.) The
complaint accused the defendants of having
provided financial support to Hamas
before David Boim’s death and by doing so
of having violated 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a),
which provides that ‘‘any national of the
United States injured in his or her person,
property, or business by reason of an act
of international terrorism, or his or her
estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor
in any appropriate district court of the
United States and shall recover threefold
the damages he or she sustains and the
cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.’’
The district court denied the defendants’
motion to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim, 127 F.Supp.2d
1002 (N.D.Ill.2001); the defendants had
argued that providing financial assistance
to a terrorist group is not an act of international
terrorism and therefore is not
within the scope of section 2333. We authorized
an interlocutory appeal, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), and the panel that heard the
appeal affirmed the district court. Boim
v. Quranic Literacy Institute, 291 F.3d
1000 (7th Cir.2002). The case then resumed
in that court. The court granted
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
with respect to the liability of the
three defendants other than the Quranic
Literacy Institute. 340 F.Supp.2d 885
(N.D.Ill.2004). A jury was convened and,
after a trial lasting a week, found the
Institute—which having filed a statement
of ‘‘nonparticipation’’ attended but did not
participate in the trial—liable. The jury
then assessed damages of $52 million
against all the defendants (including the
ones not before us) jointly and severally.
The amount was then trebled and attorneys’
fees added.
These defendants again appealed, this
time from a final judgment. The panel
vacated the judgment and directed the district
court to redetermine liability. 511
F.3d 707 (7th Cir.2007). Judge Evans
agreed with the reversal as to the Holy
Land Foundation but otherwise dissented.
The plaintiffs petitioned for rehearing en
banc, and the full court granted the petition,
primarily to consider the elements of
a suit under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 against financial
supporters of terrorism. The parties
have filed supplemental briefs. A
number of amici curiae have weighed in as
well, including the Department of Justice,
which has taken the side of the plaintiffs.
The first panel opinion rejected the argument
that the statute does not impose
liability on donors to groups that sponsor
or engage in terrorism. The supplemental
briefs do not revisit the issue, and at oral
argument counsel for Salah and the Holy
Land Foundation disclaimed reliance on
their former position concerning the liability
of donors. But in a letter to the court
after oral argument, Salah’s counsel indicated
that the disclaimer had been based
solely on a belief that the doctrine of law
of the case foreclosed any further consideration
of the statutory issue in this court.
That was a mistake. The full court can
revisit any ruling by a panel. All arguments
that the defendants have presented
in their appeals are open today—and will
be open in the Supreme Court. It is better
to decide the question than to leave it
hanging; why bother to address the elements
of a legal claim that may not exist?
Before deciding what a plaintiff must
prove in order to recover from a donor
under section 2333, we should decide
whether the statute applies. United
States National Bank of Oregon v. Insurance
Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S.
BOIM v. HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEV. 689
Cite as 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008)
439, 445–48, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d
402 (1993).
[1] Section 2333 does not say that
someone who assists in an act of international
terrorism is liable; that is, it does
not mention ‘‘secondary’’ liability, the kind
that 18 U.S.C. § 2 creates by imposing
criminal liability on ‘‘whoever commits an
offense against the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures
its commission,’’ or ‘‘willfully causes
an act to be done which if directly performed
by him or another would be an
offense against the United States.’’ See
also 18 U.S.C. § 3 (accessory after the
fact). The Supreme Court in Central
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 114
S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994), held
that section 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, which prohibits securities
fraud, does not reach aiding and
abetting because it makes no reference to
secondary liability, the kind of liability that
statutes such as 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 3
create in criminal cases. The Court discussed
the securities laws at length, but
nothing in its holding turns on particular
features of those laws.
[2] So statutory silence on the subject
of secondary liability means there is none;
and section 2333(a) authorizes awards of
damages to private parties but does not
mention aiders and abettors or other secondary
actors. Nevertheless the first panel
opinion concluded that section 2333 does
create secondary liability. It distinguished
Central Bank of Denver as having involved
an implied private right of action (for it
was a private suit, yet section 10(b) does
not purport to authorize such suits), while
section 2333(a) expressly creates a private
right. But as the dissenting Justices in
Central Bank of Denver had pointed out,
the majority’s holding was not limited to
private actions. 511 U.S. at 200, 114 S.Ct.
1439. It encompassed suits by the SEC,
which section 10(b) authorizes expressly.
Congress agreed with this understanding
of Central Bank of Denver, for the
next year it enacted 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) to
allow the SEC in section 10(b) suits to
obtain relief against aiders, abettors, and
others who facilitate primary violations.
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v.
Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., ––– U.S. ––––, 128
S.Ct. 761, 771–72, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008).
The enactment of section 78t(e) would
have been pointless had Central Bank of
Denver allowed secondary liability to be
imposed in suits, such as suits by the SEC
under section 10(b), that the statute expressly
authorizes. Years later, reaffirming
Central Bank of Denver, the Supreme
Court repeated that the earlier decision
had not been limited to private suits under
section 10(b). Stoneridge Investment
Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc.,
supra, 128 S.Ct. at 768–69.
The first panel opinion relied on Harris
Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith
Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 120 S.Ct. 2180,
147 L.Ed.2d 187 (2000), an ERISA case
involving an application of trust law.
Trust law permits trust beneficiaries to
maintain actions against third parties who
have received trust assets improperly.
ERISA not only does not upset this principle
of trust law; it authorizes the Secretary
of Labor to penalize third parties who
‘‘knowing[ly] participat[e]’’ in a fiduciary’s
misconduct. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a),
1132(l)(1)(B). Harris Trust did not cite
Central Bank of Denver and did not purport
to limit its holding. Stoneridge, decided
eight years after Harris Trust, also
did not treat Harris Trust as circumscribing
Central Bank of Denver—it did not
even cite Harris Trust.
[3] To read secondary liability into section
2333(a), moreover, would enlarge the
690 549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
federal courts’ extraterritorial jurisdiction.
The defendants are accused of promoting
terrorist activities abroad. Congress has
the power to impose liability for acts that
occur abroad but have effects within the
United States, F. Hoffmann–La Roche
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165,
124 S.Ct. 2359, 159 L.Ed.2d 226 (2004), but
it must make the extraterritorial scope of a
statute clear. Small v. United States, 544
U.S. 385, 388–89, 125 S.Ct. 1752, 161
L.Ed.2d 651 (2005); EEOC v. Arabian
American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248, 111
S.Ct. 1227, 113 L.Ed.2d 274 (1991).
[4] The first panel opinion discussed
approvingly an alternative and more promising
ground for bringing donors to terrorist
organizations within the grasp of section
2333. The ground involves a chain of
explicit statutory incorporations by reference.
The first link in the chain is the
statutory definition of ‘‘international terrorism’’
as ‘‘activities that TTT involve violent
acts or acts dangerous to human life
that are a violation of the criminal laws of
the United States,’’ that ‘‘appear to be
intended TTT to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population’’ or ‘‘affect the conduct
of a government by TTT assassination,’’ and
that ‘‘transcend national boundaries in
terms of the means by which they are
accomplished’’ or ‘‘the persons they appear
intended to intimidate or coerce.’’ 18
U.S.C. § 2331(1). Section 2331 was enacted
as part of the Federal Courts Administration
Act of 1992, Pub.L. No. 102–572,
§ 1003(a)(3), 106 Stat. 4506, 4521. Section
2333 (having been originally enacted in
1990 and repealed for a technical reason
the next year) was reenacted in 1992 as
part of that same Federal Courts Administration
Act. So the two sections are part of
the same statutory scheme and are to be
read together. Nicholas J. Perry, ‘‘The
Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of
Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many
Grails,’’ 30 J. Legis. 249, 257 (2004).
Section 2331(1)’s definition of international
terrorism (amended in 2001 by the
PATRIOT Act, Pub.L. No. 107–56,
§ 802(a)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 376, but in respects
irrelevant to this case) includes not
only violent acts but also ‘‘acts dangerous
to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States.’’ Giving
money to Hamas, like giving a loaded
gun to a child (which also is not a violent
act), is an ‘‘act dangerous to human life.’’
And it violates a federal criminal statute
enacted in 1994 and thus before the murder
of David Boim—18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a),
which provides that ‘‘whoever provides material
support or resources TTT, knowing or
intending that they are to be used in preparation
for, or in carrying out, a violation
of [18 U.S.C. § 2332],’’ shall be guilty of a
federal crime. So we go to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2332 and discover that it criminalizes the
killing (whether classified as homicide, voluntary
manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter),
conspiring to kill, or inflicting
bodily injury on, any American citizen outside
the United States.
By this chain of incorporations by reference
(section 2333(a) to section 2331(1) to
section 2339A to section 2332), we see that
a donation to a terrorist group that targets
Americans outside the United States may
violate section 2333. Which makes good
sense as a counterterrorism measure.
Damages are a less effective remedy
against terrorists and their organizations
than against their financial angels. Terrorist
organizations have been sued under
section 2333, e.g., Ungar v. Palestine Liberation
Organization, 402 F.3d 274 (1st
Cir.2005); Biton v. Palestinian Interim
Self–Government Authority, 252 F.R.D. 1
(D.D.C.2008); Knox v. Palestine Liberation
Organization, 248 F.R.D. 420
(S.D.N.Y.2008), but to collect a damages
BOIM v. HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEV. 691
Cite as 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008)
judgment against such an organization, let
alone a judgment against the terrorists
themselves (if they can even be identified
and thus sued), is, as the first panel opinion
pointed out, 291 F.3d at 1021, well-nigh
impossible. These are foreign organizations
and individuals, operating abroad and
often covertly, and they are often impecunious
as well. So difficult is it to obtain
monetary relief against covert foreign organizations
like these that Congress has
taken to passing legislation authorizing the
payment of judgments against them from
U.S. Treasury funds. E.g., Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
2000, Pub.L. No. 106–386, § 2002, 114
Stat. 1464. But that can have no deterrent
or incapacitative effect, whereas suits
against financiers of terrorism can cut the
terrorists’ lifeline.
And whether it makes good sense or not,
the imposition of civil liability through the
chain of incorporations is compelled by the
statutory texts—as the panel determined
in its first opinion. 291 F.3d at 1012–16.
But in addition the panel placed a common
law aiding and abetting gloss on section
2333. The panel was worried about a timing
problem: section 2339A was not
passed until 1994, and the defendants’ contributions
to Hamas began earlier. But
that is not a serious problem on the view
we take of the standard for proving causation
under section 2333; we shall see that
the fact of contributing to a terrorist organization
rather than the amount of the
contribution is the keystone of liability.
[5] Only because this is a very old
case—David Boim was killed 12 years
ago—does the 1994 effective date of section
2339A, two years before his killing,
present an obstacle to liability, though only
with respect to Salah and possibly the
Holy Land Foundation (but we are vacating
the judgment against the latter anyway,
as we shall explain). For there is no
doubt that the other defendants made contributions
after section 2339A’s effective
date. Salah, however, having been arrested
by Israeli authorities in 1993 and not
released until 1997, did not render material
support to Hamas between the effective
date of section 2339A and Boim’s killing,
so the judgment against him must be reversed.
Few future cases will be affected
by the timing issue, because few such
cases will involve donations that were
made after section 2333 was enacted in
1990 or re-enacted in 1992 but that ceased
before 1994.
[6] In addition to providing material
support after the effective date of section
2339A, a donor to terrorism, to be liable
under section 2333, must have known that
the money would be used in preparation
for or in carrying out the killing or attempted
killing of, conspiring to kill, or
inflicting bodily injury on, an American
citizen abroad. We know that Hamas kills
Israeli Jews; and Boim was an Israeli
citizen, Jewish, living in Israel, and therefore
a natural target for Hamas. But we
must consider the knowledge that the donor
to a terrorist organization must be
shown to possess in order to be liable
under section 2333 and the proof required
to link the donor’s act to the injury sustained
by the victim. The parties have
discussed both issues mainly under the
rubrics of ‘‘conspiracy’’ and ‘‘aiding and
abetting.’’ Although those labels are significant
primarily in criminal cases, they
can be used to establish tort liability, see,
e.g., Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472
(D.C.Cir.1983); Restatement (Second) of
Torts §§ 876(a), (b) (1979), and there is no
impropriety in discussing them in reference
to the liability of donors to terrorism
under section 2333 just because that liability
is primary. Primary liability in the
form of material support to terrorism has
the character of secondary liability.
692 549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
Through a chain of incorporations by reference,
Congress has expressly imposed
liability on a class of aiders and abettors.
When a federal tort statute does not
create secondary liability, so that the only
defendants are primary violators, the ordinary
tort requirements relating to fault,
state of mind, causation, and foreseeability
must be satisfied for the plaintiff to obtain
a judgment. See, e.g., Bridge v. Phoenix
Bond & Indemnity Co., ––– U.S. ––––, 128
S.Ct. 2131, 2141–44, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012
(2008); Stoneridge Investment Partners,
LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., supra, 128
S.Ct. at 769; Holmes v. Securities Investor
Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268–69,
112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992);
Associated General Contractors of California,
Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74
L.Ed.2d 723 (1983). But when the primary
liability is that of someone who aids
someone else, so that functionally the primary
violator is an aider and abettor or
other secondary actor, a different set of
principles comes into play. Those principles
are most fully developed in the criminal
context, but we must be careful in
borrowing from criminal law because the
state-of-mind and causation requirements
in criminal cases often differ from those in
civil cases. For example, because the
criminal law focuses on the dangerousness
of a defendant’s conduct, the requirement
of proving that a criminal act caused an
injury is often attenuated and sometimes
dispensed with altogether, as in the statutes
that impose criminal liability on providers
of material support to terrorism (18
U.S.C. §§ 2339A, B, and C), which do not
require proof that the material support
resulted in an actual terrorist act, or that
punish an attempt (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1113)
that the intended victim may not even
have noticed, so that there is no injury.
The law of attempt has no counterpart in
tort law, United States v. Gladish, 536
F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir.2008), because there
is no tort without an injury. E.g., Rozenfeld
v. Medical Protective Co., 73 F.3d 154,
155–56 (7th Cir.1996); Winskunas v. Birnbaum,
23 F.3d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir.1994).
So prudence counsels us not to halt our
analysis with aiding and abetting but to go
on and analyze the tort liability of providers
of material support to terrorism under
general principles of tort law. We begin
by noting that knowledge and intent have
lesser roles in tort law than in criminal
law. A volitional act that causes an injury
gives rise to tort liability for negligence if
the injurer failed to exercise due care,
period. But more is required in the case
of intentional torts, and we can assume
that since section 2333 provides for an
automatic trebling of damages it would
require proof of intentional misconduct
even if the plaintiffs in this case did not
have to satisfy the state-of-mind requirements
of sections 2339A and 2332 (but
they do).
Punitive damages are rarely if ever imposed
unless the defendant is found to
have engaged in deliberate wrongdoing.
‘‘Something more than the mere commission
of a tort is always required for punitive
damages. There must be circumstances
of aggravation or outrage, such as
spite or ‘malice,’ or a fraudulent or evil
motive on the part of the defendant, or
such a conscious and deliberate disregard
of the interests of others that the conduct
may be called wilful or wanton.’’ W. Page
Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts § 2, pp. 9–10 (5th ed.1984);
see, e.g., Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S.
301, 305–07, 112 S.Ct. 711, 116 L.Ed.2d 731
(1992); Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 35
(7th Cir.1996). Treble damages too, not
being compensatory, tend to have a punitive
aim. ‘‘The very idea of treble damages
reveals an intent to punish past, and
to deter future, unlawful conduct.’’ Texas
BOIM v. HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEV. 693
Cite as 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008)
Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630, 639, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 68
L.Ed.2d 500 (1981); see also Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources v. United
States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 784–
86, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000);
Zelinski v. Columbia 300, Inc., 335 F.3d
633, 642 (7th Cir.2003); Gorenstein Enterprises,
Inc. v. Quality Care–USA, Inc., 874
F.2d 431, 435–36 (7th Cir.1989); United
States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 830–31
(9th Cir.2001).
To give money to an organization that
commits terrorist acts is not intentional
misconduct unless one either knows that
the organization engages in such acts or is
deliberately indifferent to whether it does
or not, meaning that one knows there is a
substantial probability that the organization
engages in terrorism but one does not
care. ‘‘When the facts known to a person
place him on notice of a risk, he cannot
ignore the facts and plead ignorance of the
risk.’’ Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v.
Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 704 (7th Cir.
2008). That is recklessness and equivalent
to recklessness is ‘‘wantonness,’’ which
‘‘has been defined as the conscious doing of
some act or omission of some duty under
knowledge of existing conditions and conscious
that from the doing of such act or
omission of such duty injury will likely or
probably result.’’ Graves v. Wildsmith,
278 Ala. 228, 177 So.2d 448, 451 (1965); see
also Landers v. School District No. 203,
O’Fallon, 66 Ill.App.3d 78, 22 Ill.Dec. 837,
383 N.E.2d 645 (1978). ‘‘[I]n one case we
read that ‘willful and wanton misconduct
approaches the degree of moral blame attached
to intentional harm, since the defendant
deliberately inflicts a highly unreasonable
risk of harm upon others in
conscious disregard of it.’ Similarly, [another
case] defines ‘willful and wanton’ as
exhibiting ‘an utter indifference to or conscious
disregard for’ safety.’’ Fagocki v.
Algonquin/Lake–in–the–Hills Fire Protection
District, 496 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir.
2007) (citations omitted).
So it would not be enough to impose
liability on a donor for violating section
2333, even if there were no state-of-mind
requirements in sections 2339A and 2332,
that the average person or a reasonable
person would realize that the organization
he was supporting was a terrorist organization,
if the actual defendant did not realize
it. That would just be negligence.
But if you give a gun you know is loaded to
a child, you know you are creating a substantial
risk of injury and therefore your
doing so is reckless and if the child shoots
someone you will be liable to the victim.
See Pratt v. Martineau, 69 Mass.App.Ct.
670, 870 N.E.2d 1122 (2007); Bowen v.
Florida, 791 So.2d 44, 48–49 (Fla.App.
2001). That case should be distinguished
from one in which the gun is given to an
adult without adequately explaining the
dangers—a case of negligent entrustment.
To give a small child a loaded gun would
be a case of criminal recklessness and
therefore satisfy the state of mind requirement
for liability under section 2333 and
the statutes that it incorporates by reference.
For the giver would know he was
doing something extremely dangerous and
without justification. ‘‘If the actor knows
that the consequences are certain, or substantially
certain, to result from his act,
and still goes ahead, he is treated by the
law as if he had in fact desired to produce
the result.’’ Restatement, supra, § 8A,
comment b. That you did not desire the
child to shoot anyone would thus be irrelevant,
not only in a tort case, see EEOC v.
Illinois, 69 F.3d 167, 170 (7th Cir.1995),
but in a criminal case. United States v.
Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 798 (7th Cir.1985);
cf. United States v. Ortega, 44 F.3d 505,
508 (7th Cir.1995).
A knowing donor to Hamas—that is, a
donor who knew the aims and activities of
694 549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
the organization—would know that Hamas
was gunning for Israelis (unlike some other
terrorist groups, Hamas’s terrorism is
limited to the territory of Palestine, including
Israel; see Council on Foreign Relations,
‘‘Hamas,’’ www.cfr.org/publication/
8968/, visited Nov. 16, 2008), that Americans
are frequent visitors to and sojourners
in Israel, that many U.S. citizens live
in Israel (American Citizens Abroad, an
advocacy group for expatriates, reports on
the basis of State Department data that in
1999 there were about 184,000 American
citizens living in Israel, accounting for
about 3.1 percent of the country’s population,
www.aca.ch/amabroad.pdf, visited
Nov. 16, 2008), and that donations to Hamas,
by augmenting Hamas’s resources,
would enable Hamas to kill or wound, or
try to kill, or conspire to kill more people
in Israel. And given such foreseeable consequences,
such donations would ‘‘appear
to be intended TTT to intimidate or coerce
a civilian population’’ or to ‘‘affect the conduct
of a government by TTT assassination,’’
as required by section 2331(1) in
order to distinguish terrorist acts from
other violent crimes, though it is not a
state-of-mind requirement; it is a matter
of external appearance rather than subjective
intent, which is internal to the intender.
It is true that ‘‘the word ‘recklessness’ in
law covers a spectrum of meaning, ranging
from gross negligence in an accident case
to the conduct of a robber in shooting at a
pursuing policeman without aiming carefully.’’
Wright v. United States, 809 F.2d
425, 427 (7th Cir.1987). In tort law it
sometimes connotes merely gross negligence
and at other times requires only
that the defendant have acted in the face
of an unreasonable risk that he should
have been aware of even if he wasn’t. But
when, as in the passages we have quoted
both from judicial opinions and from the
Restatement, recklessness entails actual
knowledge of the risk, the tort concept
merges with the criminal concept, which
likewise ‘‘generally permits a finding of
recklessness only when a person disregards
a risk of harm of which he is aware.’’
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114
S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); see
also Desnick v. American Broadcasting
Cos., 233 F.3d 514, 517–518 (7th Cir.2000);
American Law Institute, Model Penal
Code § 2.02(2)(c) (1962) (defining recklessness
as ‘‘consciously disregard[ing] a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his
conduct’’).
Critically, the criminal (like the tort)
concept of recklessness is more concerned
with the nature and knowledge of the risk
that the defendant creates than with its
magnitude. The Court in Farmer v. Brennan
spoke of an ‘‘excessive’’ risk, a ‘‘significant’’
risk, a ‘‘substantial’’ risk, and an
‘‘intolerable’’ risk, 511 U.S. at 837–38, 842–
43, 846, 114 S.Ct. 1970, the Model Penal
Code of a ‘‘substantial and unjustifiable’’
risk, and the Restatement of an ‘‘unreasonable’’
risk, Restatement, supra, § 500,
rather than assigning a minimum probability
to the risk. These are relative terms;
what is excessive, intolerable, etc., depends
on the nature of the defendant’s conduct.
Ordinarily, it is true, the risk is great in a
probabilistic sense; for the greater it is,
the more likely it is to materialize and so
give rise to a lawsuit or a prosecution and
thus be mentioned in a judicial opinion.
The greater the risk, moreover, the more
obvious it will be to the risk taker, enabling
the trier of fact to infer the risk
taker’s knowledge of the risk with greater
confidence, see, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan,
supra, 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S.Ct. 1970;
Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652
(7th Cir.1985), though, as the Farmer decision
emphasizes, subject to rebuttal. 511
U.S. at 837–42, 114 S.Ct. 1970.
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But probability isn’t everything. The
risk that one of the workers on a project to
build a bridge or a skyscraper will be
killed may be greater than the risk that a
driver will be killed by someone who flings
rocks from an overpass at the cars traveling
on the highway beneath. But only the
second risk, though smaller, is deemed
excessive and therefore reckless. McNabb
v. State, 887 So.2d 929, 974–75 (Ala.Crim.
App.2001). (The first risk might not even
be negligent.) As we explained in United
States v. Boyd, 475 F.3d 875, 877 (7th
Cir.2007) (emphasis added), ‘‘firing multiple
shots from a powerful gun TTT in the
downtown of a large city at a time when
pedestrians TTT are known to be in the
vicinity creates a risk of harm that, while
not large in probabilistic terms, is ‘substantial’
relative to the gratuitousness of
the defendant’s actionsTTTT An activity is
reckless when the potential harm that it
creates TTT is wildly disproportionate to
any benefits that the activity might be
expected to conferTTTT The emotional gratification
that defendant Boyd derived
from shooting into the night, though perhaps
great, is not the kind of benefit that
has weight in the scales when on the other
side is danger to life and limb, even if the
danger is limited, as it was here.’’ Lennon
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 504 F.3d
617, 623 (6th Cir.2007), says that the risk
must be ‘‘weighed against the lack of social
utility of the activity’’ in adjudging its reasonableness.
See also Orban v. Vaughn,
123 F.3d 727, 733 (3d Cir.1997).
So if you give a person rocks who has
told you he would like to kill drivers by
dropping them on cars from an overpass,
and he succeeds against the odds in killing
someone by this means, you are guilty of
providing material support to a murderer,
or equivalently of aiding and abetting—for
remember that when the primary violator
of a statute is someone who provides assistance
to another he is functionally an aider
and abettor. The mental element required
to fix liability on a donor to Hamas is
therefore present if the donor knows the
character of that organization.
The Court also said in Farmer v. Brennan
that it was no defense that ‘‘he [a
particular prison official] did not know that
the complainant was especially likely to be
assaulted by the specific prisoner who
eventually committed the assault.’’ 511
U.S. at 843, 114 S.Ct. 1970. That brings
us to our next question—the standard of
causation in a suit under section 2333.
It is ‘‘black letter’’ law that tort liability
requires proof of causation. But like much
legal shorthand, the black letter is inaccurate
if treated as exceptionless. We made
that point explicitly, with the aid of an
example, in Maxwell v. KPMG LLP, 520
F.3d 713, 716 (7th Cir.2008): ‘‘when two
fires join and destroy the plaintiff’s property
and each one would have destroyed it
by itself and so was not a necessary condition
TTT each of the firemakers (if negligent)
is [nevertheless] liable to the plaintiff
for having ‘caused’ the injury. Kingston v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 191 Wis. 610, 211
N.W. 913 (Wis.1927)’’ (emphasis added);
see also United States v. Feliciano, 45
F.3d 1070, 1075 (7th Cir.1995). (A ‘‘necessary
condition’’ is another term for a ‘‘but
for’’ cause. Maxwell v. KPMG LLP, supra,
520 F.3d at 716.)
The multiple-fire example and the principle
that subtends it were explained at
greater length in United States v. Johnson,
380 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir.2004):
‘‘[T]wo defendants each start a fire, and
the fires join and destroy the plaintiff’s
house; either fire, however, would have
destroyed his house. Each defendant
could therefore argue that he should not
be liable for the damage because it would
have occurred even if he had not set his
fire; but the law rejects the argumentTTTT
696 549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
[I]n the famous old case of Cook v. Minneapolis,
St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry., 98
Wis. 624, 74 N.W. 561, 564 (1898), we read
that ‘it is no defense for a person against
whom negligence which causes damages is
established, to prove that without fault on
his part the same damage would have resulted
from the negligent act of the other,
but each is responsible for the entire damage.’
See also Anderson v. Minneapolis,
St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry., 146
Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45, 49 (1920); Collins
v. American Optometric Ass’n, 693 F.2d
636, 640 n. 4 (7th Cir.1982); Housing 21,
L.L.C. v. Atlantic Home Builders Co., 289
F.3d 1050, 1056–57 (8th Cir.2002); Sanders
v. American Body Armor & Equipment,
Inc., 652 So.2d 883, 884–85 (Fla.App.
1995); Garrett v. Grant School Dist. No.
124, 139 Ill.App.3d 569, 93 Ill.Dec. 874, 487
N.E.2d 699, 706 (1985); Hart v. Browne,
103 Cal.App.3d 947, 163 Cal.Rptr. 356,
363–64 (1980); W. Page Keeton et al.,
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts
§ 41, pp. 266–67 (5th ed.1984). The tortfeasor
cannot avoid liability by pointing to
an alternative unlawful cause of the damage
that he inflictedTTTT [S]ince neither
fire was a sine qua non of the plaintiff’s
injury, it could be argued that neither fire
maker had committed a tort. Tort law
rejects this conclusion for the practical
reason that tortious activity that produces
harm would go unsanctioned otherwise.’’
The Prosser treatise also recognizes the
multiple-fire case as one in which the
plaintiff is not required to prove ‘‘but for’’
causation. Keeton et al., supra, § 41, pp.
266–68; cf. Edward J. Schwartzbauer and
Sidney Shindell, ‘‘Cancer and The Adjudicative
Process: The Interface of Environmental
Protection and Toxic Tort Law,’’ 14
Am. J.L. & Med. 1, 31–32 (1988).
In the fire cases the acts of each defendant
are sufficient conditions of the resulting
injury, though they are not necessary
conditions (that is, they are not but-for
causes). But in Summers v. Tice, 33
Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), where two
hunters negligently shot their rifles at the
same time and a third hunter was hit by
one of the bullets, it could not be determined
which hunter’s gun the bullet had
come from and so it could not be proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that
either of the shooters was the injurer in
either a sufficient-condition or a necessarycondition
sense; for each hunter, the probability
that he had caused the injury was
only 50 percent, since one of the shots had
missed. Nevertheless both defendants
were held jointly and severally liable to the
injured person. See Restatement, supra,
§ 433B(3) and comment f; Smith v. Cutter
Biological, 72 Haw. 416, 823 P.2d 717, 725
(1991); In re ‘‘Agent Orange’’ Product Liability
Litigation, 597 F.Supp. 740, 822–23
(E.D.N.Y.1984).
Similarly, if several firms spill toxic
waste that finds its way into groundwater
and causes damage to property but it is
impossible to determine which firm’s spill
caused the damage, all are liable. See,
e.g., Chem–Nuclear Systems, Inc. v. Bush,
292 F.3d 254, 259–60 (D.C.Cir.2002); United
States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964
F.2d 252, 267–69 (3d Cir.1992); Michie v.
Great Lakes Steel Division, 495 F.2d 213,
217–18 (6th Cir.1974); Landers v. East
Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex.
251, 248 S.W.2d 731, 734 (1952); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Hardee, 189 F.2d 205,
211–12 (5th Cir.1951); 2 Frank P. Grad,
Treatise on Environmental Law § 3.02
(2007); Kenneth S. Abraham, ‘‘The Relation
Between Civil Liability and Environmental
Regulation: An Analytical Overview,’’
41 Washburn L.J. 379, 386–87
(2002). Even if the amount of pollution
caused by each party would be too slight
to warrant a finding that any one of them
had created a nuisance (the common law
basis for treating pollution as a tort), ‘‘polBOIM
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lution of a stream to even a slight extent
becomes unreasonable [and therefore a
nuisance] when similar pollution by others
makes the condition of the stream approach
the danger point. The single act
itself becomes wrongful because it is done
in the context of what others are doing.’’
Keeton et al., supra, § 52, p. 354.
In all these cases the requirement of
proving causation is relaxed because otherwise
there would be a wrong and an injury
but no remedy because the court would be
unable to determine which wrongdoer inflicted
the injury. If ‘‘each [defendant]
bears a like relationship to the event’’ and
‘‘each seeks to escape liability for a reason
that, if recognized, would likewise protect
each other defendant in the group, thus
leaving the plaintiff without a remedy,’’ the
attempt at escape fails; each is liable. Id.,
§ 41, p. 268.
But we must consider the situation in
which there is uncertainty about the causal
connection between the wrongful conduct
of all potential tortfeasors and the injury.
Suppose in our first case that there was a
third fire, of natural origin (the result of a
lightning strike, perhaps), and it alone
might have sufficed to destroy the plaintiff’s
house. One might think the law
would require the plaintiff to prove that it
was more likely than not that had it not
been for the defendants’ negligence, his
house would not have burned down—the
fire of natural origin would have petered
out before reaching it. Instead the law
requires proof only that there was a substantial
probability that the defendants’
fires (or rather either of them) were the
cause. See, e.g., Anderson v. Minneapolis,
St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry.,
supra, 179 N.W. at 46; Restatement, supra,
§ 432(2) (‘‘if two forces are actively
operating, one because of the actor’s negligence,
the other not because of any misconduct
on his part, and each of itself is
sufficient to bring about harm to another,
the actor’s negligence may be found to be
a substantial factor in bringing it about’’);
see also id., illustration 3.
Our final example is Keel v. Hainline,
331 P.2d 397 (Okla.1958). Thirty to forty
junior high school students showed up one
day for their music class, but the instructor
failed to show so the kids began throwing
wooden erasers, chalk, and even a
Coke bottle at each other. One of the
students was struck in the eye by an eraser,
and sued. One of the defendants, Keel,
apparently had not thrown anything. But
he had retrieved some of the erasers after
they had been thrown and had handed
them back to the throwers. There was no
indication that Keel had handed the eraser
to the kid who threw it at the plaintiff and
injured her, but the court deemed that
immaterial. It was enough that Keel had
participated in the wrongful activity as a
whole. He thus was liable even though
there was no proven, or even likely, causal
connection between anything he did and
the injury. ‘‘ ‘One who commands, directs,
advises, encourages, procures, instigates,
promotes, controls, aids, or abets a wrongful
act by another has been regarded as
being as responsible as the one who commits
the act so as to impose liability upon
the former to the same extent as if he had
performed the act himself.’ ’’ Id. at 401.
The court did not use the term ‘‘material
support,’’ but in handing erasers to the
throwers Keel was providing them with
material support in a literal sense. It was
enough to make him liable that he had
helped to create a danger; it was immaterial
that the effect of his help could not be
determined—that his acts could not be
found to be either a necessary or a sufficient
condition of the injury.
[7] The cases that we have discussed
do not involve monetary contributions to a
wrongdoer. But then criminals and other
698 549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
intentional tortfeasors do not usually solicit
voluntary contributions. Terrorist organizations
do. But this is just to say that
terrorism is sui generis. So consider an
organization solely involved in committing
terrorist acts and a hundred people all of
whom know the character of the organization
and each of whom contributes $1,000
to it, for a total of $100,000. The organization
has additional resources from other,
unknown contributors of $200,000 and it
uses its total resources of $300,000 to recruit,
train, equip, and deploy terrorists
who commit a variety of terrorist acts one
of which kills an American citizen. His
estate brings a suit under section 2333
against one of the knowing contributors of
$1,000. The tort principles that we have
reviewed would make the defendant jointly
and severally liable with all those other
contributors. The fact that the death
could not be traced to any of the contributors
(as in the example the Supreme Court
gave in Farmer v. Brennan ) and that
some of them may have been ignorant of
the mission of the organization (and therefore
not liable under a statute requiring
proof of intentional or reckless misconduct)
would be irrelevant. The knowing
contributors as a whole would have significantly
enhanced the risk of terrorist acts
and thus the probability that the plaintiff’s
decedent would be a victim, and this would
be true even if Hamas had incurred a cost
of more than $1,000 to kill the American,
so that no defendant’s contribution was a
sufficient condition of his death.
This case is only a little more difficult
because Hamas is (and was at the time of
David Boim’s death) engaged not only in
terrorism but also in providing health, educational,
and other social welfare services.
The defendants other than Salah directed
their support exclusively to those services.
But if you give money to an organization
that you know to be engaged in terrorism,
the fact that you earmark it for the organization’s
nonterrorist activities does not get
you off the liability hook, as we noted in a
related context in Hussain v. Mukasey,
518 F.3d 534, 538–39 (7th Cir.2008); see
also Singh–Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293,
301 (3d Cir.2004). The reasons are twofold.
The first is the fungibility of money.
If Hamas budgets $2 million for terrorism
and $2 million for social services and receives
a donation of $100,000 for those
services, there is nothing to prevent its
using that money for them while at the
same time taking $100,000 out of its social
services ‘‘account’’ and depositing it in its
terrorism ‘‘account.’’ Kilburn v. Socialist
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 376
F.3d 1123, 1130 (D.C.Cir.2004).
Second, Hamas’s social welfare activities
reinforce its terrorist activities both directly
by providing economic assistance to the
families of killed, wounded, and captured
Hamas fighters and making it more costly
for them to defect (they would lose the
material benefits that Hamas provides
them), and indirectly by enhancing Hamas’s
popularity among the Palestinian
population and providing funds for indoctrinating
schoolchildren. See, e.g., Justin
Magouirk, ‘‘The Nefarious Helping Hand:
Anti–Corruption Campaigns, Social Service
Provision, and Terrorism,’’ 20 Terrorism
& Political Violence 356 (2008); Eli
Berman & David D. Laitin, ‘‘Religion, Terrorism,
and Public Goods: Testing the
Club Model’’ 7–10 (National Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 13725,
2008). Anyone who knowingly contributes
to the nonviolent wing of an organization
that he knows to engage in terrorism is
knowingly contributing to the organization’s
terrorist activities. And that is the
only knowledge that can reasonably be
required as a premise for liability. To
require proof that the donor intended that
his contribution be used for terrorism—to
make a benign intent a defense—would as
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a practical matter eliminate donor liability
except in cases in which the donor was
foolish enough to admit his true intent. It
would also create a First Amendment
Catch–22, as the only basis for inferring
intent would in the usual case be a defendant’s
public declarations of support for
the use of violence to achieve political
ends.
Although liability under section 2333 is
broad, to maintain perspective we note two
cases that fall on the other side of the
liability line. One is the easy case of a
donation to an Islamic charity by an individual
who does not know (and is not
reckless, in the sense of strongly suspecting
the truth but not caring about it) that
the charity gives money to Hamas or some
other terrorist organization.
The other case is that of medical (or
other innocent) assistance by nongovernmental
organizations such as the Red
Cross and Doctors Without Borders that
provide such assistance without regard to
the circumstances giving rise to the need
for it. Suppose an Israeli retaliatory
strike at Hamas causes so many casualties
that the local medical services cannot treat
all of them, and Doctors Without Borders
offers to assist. And suppose that many of
the casualties that the doctors treat are
Hamas fighters, so that Doctors Without
Borders might know in advance that it
would be providing medical assistance to
terrorists.
However, section 2339A(b)(1) excludes
‘‘medicine’’ from the definition of ‘‘material
resources.’’ And even if the word should
be limited (an issue on which we take no
position) to drugs and other medicines, an
organization like Doctors Without Borders
would not be in violation of section 2333.
It would be helping not a terrorist group
but individual patients, and, consistent
with the Hippocratic Oath, with no questions
asked about the patients’ moral virtue.
It would be like a doctor who treats a
person with a gunshot wound whom he
knows to be a criminal. If doctors refused
to treat criminals, there would be less
crime. But the doctor is not himself a
criminal unless, besides treating the criminal,
he conceals him from the police (like
Dr. Samuel Mudd, sentenced to prison for
trying to help John Wilkes Booth, Lincoln’s
assassin, elude capture) or violates a
law requiring doctors to report wounded
criminals. The same thing would be true
if a hospital unaffiliated with Hamas but
located in Gaza City solicited donations.
Nor would the rendering of medical assistance
by the Red Cross or Doctors
Without Borders to individual terrorists
‘‘appear to be intended TTT to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population’’ or ‘‘affect the
conduct of a government by TTT assassination,’’
and without such appearance there
is no international terrorist act within the
meaning of section 2331(1) and hence no
violation of section 2333. Nor is this point
limited to the rendering of medical assistance.
For example, UNRWA (the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East) renders
aid to Palestinian refugees that is not limited
to medical assistance to individual refugees,
www.un.org/unrwa/english.html
(visited Nov. 16, 2008). But so far as one
can glean from its website (see id. and
www.un.org/unrwa/allegations/index.html,
also visited Nov. 16, 2008), it does not give
money to organizations, which might be
affiliates of Hamas or other terrorist
groups; it claims to be very careful not to
employ members of Hamas or otherwise
render any direct or indirect aid to it. Id.
To the objection that the logic of our
analysis would allow the imposition of liability
on someone who with the requisite
state of mind contributed to a terrorist
organization in 1995 that killed an American
abroad in 2045, we respond first that
700 549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
that is not this case—the interval here was
at most two years (1994, when section
2339A was enacted, to 1996, when Boim
was killed)—and second that the imposition
of liability in the hypothetical case
would not be as outlandish, given the character
of terrorism, as one might think.
(There would of course be no defense of
statute of limitations, since the limitations
period would not begin to run until the tort
was committed, and that would not occur
until the injury on which suit was based
was inflicted.) Terrorism campaigns often
last for many decades. Think of Ireland,
Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Colombia,
Kashmir—and Palestine, where Arab terrorism
has been more or less continuous
since 1920. Seed money for terrorism can
sprout acts of violence long after the investment.
In any event, whether considerations
of temporal remoteness might at
some point cut off liability is not an issue
we need try to resolve in this case.
An issue to which the first panel opinion
gave much attention (see 291 F.3d at 1021–
27), but which received little attention
from the parties afterward, is brought into
focus by our analysis of the elements of a
section 2333 violation. That is whether
the First Amendment insulates financiers
of terrorism from liability if they do not
intend to further the illegal goals of an
organization like Hamas that engages in
political advocacy as well as in violence. If
the financier knew that the organization to
which it was giving money engaged in
terrorism, penalizing him would not violate
the First Amendment. Otherwise someone
who during World War II gave money
to the government of Nazi Germany solely
in order to support its anti-smoking campaign
could not have been punished for
supporting a foreign enemy.
But it is true that ‘‘an organization is not
a terrorist organization just because one of
its members commits an act of armed violence
without direct or indirect authorization,
even if his objective was to advance
the organization’s goals, though the organization
might be held liable to the victim of
his violent act.’’ Hussain v. Mukasey,
supra, 518 F.3d at 538. That is the principle
of NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886, 920, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 73
L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982). The defendants in
the present case could not be held liable
for acts of violence by members of Hamas
that were not authorized by Hamas. Nor
would persons be liable who gave moral
rather than material support, short of incitement,
to violent organizations that have
political aims. As intimated earlier in this
opinion, a person who gives a speech in
praise of Hamas for firing rockets at Israel
is exercising his freedom of speech, protected
by the First Amendment. See, e.g.,
Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb,
414 U.S. 441, 447–49, 94 S.Ct. 656,
38 L.Ed.2d 635 (1974); Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48, 89 S.Ct. 1827,
23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) (per curiam). But
as Hamas engages in violence as a declared
goal of the organization, anyone
who provides material support to it, knowing
the organization’s character, is punishable
(provided he is enchained by the chain
of statutory incorporations necessary to
impose liability under section 2333) whether
or not he approves of violence.
[8] Enough about the liability standard.
We have now to consider its application
to the facts. That turns out to be
straightforward, except with respect to one
of the defendants, the Holy Land Foundation,
about which we can be brief because
of the thoroughness of the panel’s consideration.
See 511 F.3d at 720–33. A principal
basis for the district court’s finding
that the Foundation had violated the statute
was the court’s giving collateral estoppel
effect to findings made in Holy Land
Foundation for Relief & Development v.
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Ashcroft, 219 F.Supp.2d 57 (D.D.C.2002),
affirmed, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C.Cir.2003).
The panel was unanimous that this ruling
was erroneous.
In 2001 the Secretary of the Treasury
determined that the Foundation ‘‘acts for
or on behalf of’’ Hamas, and an order
freezing the Foundation’s funds was issued.
The Foundation sued in the District
of Columbia. The district court there
found that the Secretary’s finding was not
‘‘arbitrary and capricious’’ (the standard of
review) and upheld the blocking order.
Although the court recited extensive evidence
that the Foundation knew that Hamas
was and had long been a terrorist
organization, 219 F.Supp.2d at 69–75, and
it appears that most or perhaps all of the
evidence related to its knowledge before
1996 when David Boim was killed, the
validity of the blocking order did not depend
on the Foundation’s knowledge. 511
F.3d at 731; see Executive Order 13244,
66 Fed.Reg. 49079 (Sept. 23, 2001); Garry
W. Jenkins, ‘‘Soft Power, Strategic Security,
and International Philanthropy,’’ 85 N.
Car. L.Rev. 773, 808–09 (2007); Jennifer
Lynn Bell, ‘‘Terrorist Abuse of Non–Profits
and Charities: A Proactive Approach to
Preventing Terrorist Financing,’’ 17 Kan.
J.L. & Public Policy 450, 458–59 (2008).
If someone is giving money to an organization
that the government knows to be a
terrorist organization, any subsequent gift
can be blocked whether or not the donor
knows (or agrees with the government
concerning) the nature of the recipient.
Even if the decision of the district court
in the District of Columbia were read as
finding that the Foundation knew that Hamas
was a terrorist organization (and, as
the court also found, that the Holy Land
Foundation made contributions to Hamas
after the effective date of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A, 219 F.Supp.2d at 70–71), such a
finding would not have been essential to
the judgment upholding the blocking order—
and essentiality is at the heart of
collateral estoppel. Arizona v. California,
530 U.S. 392, 414, 120 S.Ct. 2304, 147
L.Ed.2d 374 (2000); Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 159, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59
L.Ed.2d 210 (1979); H–D Michigan, Inc.
v. Top Quality Service, Inc., 496 F.3d 755,
760 (7th Cir.2007); Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Empresa Naviera Santa
S.A., 56 F.3d 359, 368 (2d Cir.1995); Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 27
(1982). If a finding is unnecessary to the
judgment, the appellant has no reason to
challenge it and if he does the appellate
court has no reason to review it because it
is irrelevant to the appeal—and so the
appellant would not have his (full) day in
court.
[9] So the judgment against the Foundation
must be reversed and the case
against it remanded for further proceedings
to determine its liability. The judgment
against Salah must also be reversed,
as we explained earlier. Regarding the
remaining defendants, the American Muslim
Society and the Quranic Literacy Institute,
the judgment of the district court was
in our view correct. The activities of the
American Muslim Society are discussed at
length in the district court’s second opinion.
See 340 F.Supp.2d at 906–13. There
we learn that while its activities included
donating money to the Holy Land Foundation,
there was much else besides. Moreover,
the fact that the Foundation may not
have known that Hamas was a terrorist
organization (implausible as that is) would
not exonerate the American Muslim Society,
which did know and in giving money
to the Foundation was deliberately funneling
money to Hamas. The funnel doesn’t
have to know what it’s doing to be an
effective funnel.
Nor should donors to terrorism be able
to escape liability because terrorists and
702 549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
their supporters launder donations
through a chain of intermediate organizations.
Donor A gives to innocent-appearing
organization B which gives to innocentappearing
organization C which gives to
Hamas. As long as A either knows or is
reckless in failing to discover that donations
to B end up with Hamas, A is liable.
Equally important, however, if this knowledge
requirement is not satisfied, the donor
is not liable. And as the temporal
chain lengthens, the likelihood that a donor
has or should know of the donee’s connection
to terrorism shrinks. But to set the
knowledge and causal requirement higher
than we have done in this opinion would be
to invite money laundering, the proliferation
of affiliated organizations, and twotrack
terrorism (killing plus welfare). Donor
liability would be eviscerated, and the
statute would be a dead letter.
[10] With regard to the Quranic Literacy
Institute, the district court, after denying
the Institute’s motion for summary
judgment, 340 F.Supp.2d at 929, submitted
the case against the Institute to a jury
trial but instructed the jury that Hamas
was responsible for the murder of David
Boim. The jury was left to decide whether
the Institute had knowingly provided material
support to Hamas. The jury found
the Institute liable. By deciding not to
participate in the trial, the Institute
waived any objection it might have had to
the jury instructions or the jury’s findings.
In any event, the only factual determination
underlying the judgment against the
Institute, as against the American Muslim
Society, that might be questioned—and
was by the panel—was the determination,
made by the district court on summary
judgment, that Hamas had been responsible
for the murder. The panel thought
that the district judge had considered inadmissible
evidence that the two terrorists
who shot Boim were in fact members of
Hamas.
Here is the panel’s critique of the principal
though not only evidence of their membership:
To show that the murder of David
Boim was the work of Hamas, the Boims
submitted the declaration of Dr. Ruven
[sic ] Paz, a former member of the Israeli
security community who describes
himself as an expert in terrorism and
counter-terrorism, Islamic movements in
the Arab and Islamic world, Palestinian
Islamic groups, and Palestinian society
and politics. Based on his review of
various exhibits submitted in connection
with this case, his independent research,
and his knowledge of how Hamas and
other Islamic terror organizations operate,
Paz concluded that Hinawi and Al–
Sharif had murdered David Boim, that
Hinawi and Al–Sharif were members of
Hamas at the time they killed Boim, and
that Hamas itself had accepted responsibility
for the murderTTTT
In concluding that Al–Sharif was a
member of Hamas and that Hamas had
taken responsibility for the murder, Paz
relied heavily on information set forth
on certain websites that he attributed to
Hamas. Paz explained that Hamas publicly
acknowledges its terrorist acts and
identifies its ‘‘martyrs’’ as a way to promote
itself and to recruit new members.
According to Paz, internet websites are
a means by which Hamas disseminates
such information. Paz’s declaration asserts
that scholars, journalists, and law
enforcement routinely rely on the website
postings of terrorist organizations
for what they reveal about the activities
of those organizations. Looking to certain
websites whose content he asserts is
controlled by Hamas, Paz found statements
indicating that Hamas had taken
responsibility for the Beit–El attack that
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took David Boim’s life and that Al–Sharif
was one of the participants in this
attack. Paz repeated these statements
in his declaration.
Paz’s reliance upon, and his recounting
of, internet website postings demand
a certain caution in evaluating his prospective
testimony. Such postings
would not be admissible into evidence
for their truth absent proper authentication,
and this would typically require
some type of proof that the postings
were actually made by the individual or
organization to which they are being
attributed—in this case, Hamas—as opposed
to others with access to the website.
Paz’s declaration identifies the
websites from which he quotes as ones
controlled by Hamas, but it does not
describe the basis for his conclusion, and
consequently his declaration does not
permit any independent assessment of
the purported links between these sites
and Hamas and the source of the postings
that he recounts. Of course, the
rules of evidence do not limit what type
of information an expert may rely upon
in reaching his opinion; even if that
information would not otherwise be admissible
in a court proceeding, an expert
witness may rely upon it so long as it is
the type of information on which others
in the field reasonably rely. Indeed,
Rule 703 now expressly permits the expert
to disclose such information to the
jury, provided the court is satisfied that
its helpfulness in evaluating the expert’s
opinion substantially outweighs its prejudicial
effect. Nonetheless, a judge
must take care that the expert is not
being used as a vehicle for circumventing
the rule against hearsay. Where, as
here, the expert appears to be relying to
a great extent on web postings to establish
a particular fact, and where as a
result the factfinder would be unable to
evaluate the soundness of his conclusion
without hearing the evidence he relied
on, we believe the expert must lay out,
in greater detail than Paz did, the basis
for his conclusion that these websites
are in fact controlled by Hamas and that
the postings he cites can reasonably and
reliably be attributed to Hamas.
Paz’s conclusion that Hinawi was responsible
for the murder of David Boim
was based in significant part on two
documents related to Hinawi’s trial and
sentencing by a Palestinian Authority
tribunal: (1) a set of notes prepared by
a U.S. foreign service officer who attended
Hinawi’s trial in February 1998,
and (2) an Arabic-language document
purporting to be the written verdict reflecting
Hinawi’s conviction and sentence.
The foreign service officer’s
notes indicate that Hinawi was tried in
open proceedings for participating in a
terrorist act and acting as an accomplice
in the killing of David Boim, that he was
afforded counsel by the tribunal, that he
contended in his defense that his friend
Al–Sharif was the gunman and that Al–
Sharif exploited his friendship with Hinawi
by asking him to drive the car, and
that he was convicted on both charges
and sentenced to ten years. Paz’s declaration
accepts these documents as genuine
and relies principally on them for the
proposition that Hinawi participated in
David Boim’s murder and was convicted
by the Palestinian Authority tribunal for
the same.
Once again we have concerns about
whether the record as it stands lays an
appropriate foundation for these documents.
We can assume that the report
of a U.S. government official who, in the
course of his duties, observed a trial in a
foreign tribunal may constitute proof of
what occurred in that proceeding. We
also have no doubt that a properly authenticated,
official report of a judgment
704 549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
issued by a foreign tribunal constitutes
adequate proof of that judgment. The
difficulty we have with Paz’s reliance
upon these documents is that they have
not been properly authenticated. The
foreign service officer’s notes are unsigned
and reveal nothing about the circumstances
under which they were prepared.
The document that we are told
is the official verdict is entirely in Arabic,
is not readily evident as an official
document, and is unaccompanied by an
English translation. There is a single
cover note, on the letterhead of the U.S.
Consulate General in Jerusalem, which
accompanies these documents and explains
what they are. But the cover
note itself is unsigned and does not even
identify its author. This is unacceptable.
We assume that Paz knows more
about these documents and that he
would not have relied upon them if he
had doubts about their authenticity.
But given that Paz relies almost exclusively
on these documents as proof of
Hinawi’s complicity in Boim’s murder,
and because a factfinder could not evaluate
the soundness of Paz’s conclusion
without knowing what these documents
say, an appropriate foundation must be
laid for these documents before the conclusions
that Paz has drawn from these
documents may be admitted.
511 F.3d at 752–54 (citations omitted).
We accept the panel majority’s description
of the infirmities of the evidence on
which Reuven Paz (formerly research director
of Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic security
agency) based his expert opinion. But
we do not agree that the district court
abused its discretion in allowing the opinion
into evidence. As the quoted passage
acknowledges (albeit grudgingly, in its
warning against using an expert witness
‘‘as a vehicle for circumventing the rule
against hearsay’’), an expert is not limited
to relying on admissible evidence in forming
his opinion. Fed.R.Evid. 703; Wendler
& Ezra, P.C. v. American Int’l Group,
Inc., 521 F.3d 790, 791 (7th Cir.2008); In
re James Wilson Associates, 965 F.2d 160,
172–73 (7th Cir.1992); United States v.
Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 938 (2d Cir.1993).
That would be a crippling limitation because
experts don’t characteristically base
their expert judgments on legally admissible
evidence; the rules of evidence are not
intended for the guidance of experts. Biologists
do not study animal behavior by
placing animals under oath, and students
of terrorism do not arrive at their assessments
solely or even primarily by studying
the records of judicial proceedings. Notice,
moreover, that there was no need for
the plaintiffs to prove that both Al–Sherif
and Hinawi were complicit in Boim’s
death; if either was complicit and a member
of Hamas, that is enough to fix responsibility
on Hamas for killing Boim.
In dissenting from the panel’s ruling
Judge Evans offered an assessment of
Paz’s evidence (see 511 F.3d at 758) that
we find persuasive. An expert on terrorism
in the Arab world, fluent in Arabic,
Paz explained that the websites of Islamic
movements and Islamic terrorist organizations
have long been accepted by security
experts as valid, important, and indeed
indispensable sources of information. Terrorist
organizations rely on the web to
deliver their messages to their adherents
and the general public. The United States
Institute for Peace, a nonpartisan federal
institution created by Congress, published
an extensive report, submitted to the district
court along with Paz’s declaration, on
the use of the Internet by terrorists.
And—critically—the defendants presented
no evidence to contradict Paz: no evidence
that the killing of Boim was not a Hamas
hit. Had they thought Paz had mistranslated
the Arabic judgment against Hinawi,
they could have provided the district court
BOIM v. HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEV. 705
Cite as 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008)
with their own translation. Had they
doubted that Paz can identify a Hamas
website (he gave the web addresses of
several of them), they could have presented
testimony to that effect. Paz’s 12–page
declaration is detailed, concrete, and
backed up by a host of exhibits. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting his evidence; and with it in the
record and nothing on the other side the
court had no choice but to enter summary
judgment for the plaintiffs with respect to
Hamas’s responsibility for the Boim killing.
To summarize, the judgment of the district
court is affirmed except with respect
to (1) Salah, as to whom the judgment is
reversed with instructions to enter judgment
in his favor; (2) the Holy Land
Foundation, as to which the judgment is
reversed and the case remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion;
and (3) the award of attorneys’ fees—
for we adopt the panel’s criticisms of that
award, 511 F.3d at 749–50, and anyway the
award will have to be adjusted because of
the further proceedings on remand that we
are ordering.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
REMANDED.
ROVNER, Circuit Judge, with whom
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, joins,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.1
At this late stage in the litigation, we
are now turning to a fundamental question:
Are we going to evaluate claims for
terrorism-inflicted injuries using traditional
legal standards, or are we going to rewrite
tort law on the ground that ‘‘terrorism
is sui generis ’’? Ante at 698. My
colleagues in the majority have opted to
‘‘relax[ ]’’—I would say eliminate—the basic
tort requirement that causation be
proven, believing that ‘‘otherwise there
would be a wrong and an injury but no
remedy because the court would be unable
to determine which wrongdoer inflicted the
injury.’’ Ante at 697. The choice is a
false one. The panel took pains to identify
a number of ways in which the plaintiffs
might establish a causal link between the
defendants’ financial contributions to (and
other support for) Hamas and the murder
of David Boim. Boim II, 511 F.3d at 741–
43. It is not the case that the plaintiffs
were unable show causation, it is rather
that they did not even make an attempt;
and that was the purpose of the panel’s
decision to remand the case.2 But rather
than requiring the plaintiffs to present evidence
of causation and allowing the factfinder
to determine whether causation has
been shown, the majority simply deems it
a given, declaring as a matter of law that
any money knowingly given to a terrorist
organization like Hamas is a cause of terrorist
activity, period. This sweeping rule
of liability leaves no role for the factfinder
to distinguish between those individuals
and organizations who directly and purposely
finance terrorism from those who
are many steps removed from terrorist
activity and whose aid has, at most, an
indirect, uncertain, and unintended effect
on terrorist activity. The majority’s approach
treats all financial support provided
to a terrorist organization and its affiliates
as support for terrorism, regardless of
whether the money is given to the terrorist
organization itself, to a charitable entity
controlled by that organization, or to an
intermediary organization, and regardless
of what the money is actually used to do.
1. Judge Wood also joins this opinion except
as to Salah’s liability.
2. Judge Evans, in his dissent from this holding,
not only thought that the plaintiffs could
show causation, but that they already had.
511 F.3d at 760–61.
706 549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
The majority’s opinion is remarkable in
two additional respects. By treating all
those who provide money and other aid to
Hamas as primarily rather than secondarily
liable—along with those who actually
commit terrorist acts—the majority eliminates
any need for proof that the aid was
given with the intent to further Hamas’s
terrorist agenda. Besides eliminating yet
another way for the factfinder to distinguish
between those who deliberately aid
terrorism from those who do so inadvertently,
this poses a genuine threat to First
Amendment freedoms. Finally, the majority
sustains the entry of summary
judgment on a basic factual question—Did
Hamas kill David Boim?—based on an expert’s
affidavit that both relies upon and
repeats multiple examples of hearsay.
Rather than sustain the panel’s unexceptional
demand that the expert’s sources be
proven reliable, consistent with Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2799, 125
L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the majority gives its
blessing to circumventing the rules of evidence
altogether.
Thus, although I concur in the decision
to remand for further proceedings as to
HLF, I otherwise dissent from the court’s
decision.
1.
One point of clarification at the outset.
The majority’s opinion reads as though the
defendants were writing checks to Hamas,
perhaps with a notation on the memo line
that read ‘‘for humanitarian purposes.’’ If
indeed the defendants were directing money
into a central Hamas fund out of which
all Hamas expenses—whether for humanitarian
or terrorist activities—were paid, it
would be easy to see that the defendants
were supporting Hamas’s terrorism even if
their contributions were earmarked for
charity. In fact, the case is not as simple
as that. For example, much of the money
that defendant HLF provided to Hamas
apparently was directed not to Hamas per
se but to a variety of zakat committees and
other charitable entities, including a hospital
in Gaza, that were controlled by Hamas.
See Holy Land Found. for Relief &
Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F.Supp.2d 57, 70–71
(D.D.C.2002), j. aff’d, 333 F.3d 156
(D.C.Cir.2003).3 I gather that this is a
distinction without a difference in the majority’s
view, and certainly I agree that if
the zakat committees and other recipients
of HLF’s funding were mere fronts for
Hamas or were used to launder donations
targeted for Hamas generally, then those
donations ought to be treated as if they
were direct donations to Hamas itself.4
But to the extent that these Hamas subsidiary
organizations actually were engaged
solely in humanitarian work and
HLF was sending its money to those subsidiaries
to support that work, HLF is one
or more significant steps removed from
the direct financing of terrorism and the
case for HLF’s liability for terrorism is, in
my view, a much less compelling one. Defendant
AMS is yet another step removed,
in that AMS is alleged to have contributed
money not to Hamas but to HLF.
Moreover, the type of support that can
give rise to civil liability is not limited to
financial support. As the panel discussed
3. HLF’s ties to Hamas have yet to be evaluated
in this litigation, because the district court
erroneously gave collateral estoppel effect to
the D.C. Circuit’s determination that HLF
funded terrorism by funding Hamas and its
affiliates. See ante at 700–01; Boim II, 511
F.3d at 726–33.
4. Thus, when I discuss aid given to zakat
committees and other organizations controlled
by or affiliated with Hamas, I am
assuming that they are not, in fact, mere
fronts for Hamas that are used to launder
donations meant to fund Hamas’s terrorism.
BOIM v. HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEV. 707
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in Boim I, civil liability under section
2333(a) can result from the provision of
‘‘material support or resources’’ to terrorism
and to terrorist organizations as prohibited
by 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B,
see 291 F.3d at 1012–17, and ‘‘material
support or resources’’ is defined broadly to
include not only weapons and money but
‘‘any property, tangible or intangible, or
service,’’ including such things as lodging,
expert advice, training, and personnel.
§ 2339A(b)(1). Notably, the plaintiffs
have sought to hold AMS liable, and the
district court found it liable, not simply for
the financial support it provided to HLF,
but for various types of pro-Hamas advocacy,
such as hosting Hamas speakers at
its conferences, publishing sympathetic editorials
in its newsletter, and the like. See
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340
F.Supp.2d 885, 908–13 (N.D.Ill.2004).
So the majority’s rule has the potential
to sweep within its reach not only those
who write checks to Hamas and the organizations
that it controls but also individuals
and groups who support Hamas and its
affiliates in myriad other ways, including
those who advocate on Hama’s behalf. My
point is not that there is no case to be
made for imposing liability on such supporters
for Hamas’s terrorist acts. My
point is simply that the basis for their
liability is not nearly as clean and straightforward
as it might seem from the majority’s
opinion.
2.
The majority has chosen to evaluate the
prospective liability of the defendants in
this case through the lens of primary liability,
reasoning that those who provide
financial and other aid to terrorist organizations
are themselves engaging in terrorism
and thus may be held liable on the
same basis as those who actually commit
terrorist acts.5 In formulating its theory
of primary liability, the majority relies in
part upon section 2331(1)’s definition of
‘‘international terrorism’’ and partly upon
section 2339A(a)’s criminal proscription
against providing material support or resources
to terrorists. Treating the defendants
as primarily rather than secondarily
liable enables the majority to accomplish
two things: First, it compensates for what
the majority believes was Congress’s failure
in section 2333(a) to authorize the imposition
of secondary liability on those who
aid or abet terrorist acts or conspire with
terrorists. Second, it eliminates any need
for proof of a defendant’s intent to support
terrorism; a defendant’s knowledge that it
is providing aid to an organization that
engages in terrorism is deemed enough to
hold that defendant liable for the organization’s
terrorist acts.
5. There is a point in the majority’s opinion at
which it appears to describe its liability
framework as one that straddles both primary
and secondary liability. After concluding that
Congress did not authorize the imposition of
secondary liability under section 2333(a), ante
at 688–90, the majority goes on to say that
‘‘there is no impropriety in discussing’’ such
secondary liability theories as conspiracy and
aiding and abetting, ante at 691, and that
‘‘[p]rimary liability in the form of material
support to terrorism has the character of secondary
liability,’’ ante at 691. I must confess
to some uncertainty as to the majority’s
meaning. What is clear to me is that the
majority has rejected the theories of secondary
liability discussed in Boim I and Boim II,
and at the same time the majority is not
conditioning liability under section 2333(a) on
proof of a defendant’s intent or agreement to
aid terrorism, which would of course be necessary
to recover under a traditional aiding
and abetting or conspiracy theory of liability.
I shall therefore describe the majority’s liability
framework as one of primary liability
while recognizing that the majority sees some
continued relevance—I am not sure what—in
aiding and abetting and conspiracy concepts
to liability under section 2333.
708 549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
For the reasons outlined in the Boim I
opinion, I continue to believe that Congress
when it enacted section 2333(a) subjected
to civil liability not only those who
engage in terrorism but also those who aid
or abet terrorism. 291 F.3d at 1016–21.
The government as an amicus curiae has
expressed agreement with that view. The
secondary liability framework is a much
more natural fit for what the defendants
here are alleged to have done and as I
shall discuss below, the elements of aiding
and abetting serve a useful function in
distinguishing between those who intend to
aid terrorism and those who do not.
But even if I am wrong about the availability
of secondary liability under section
2333(a), I have my doubts about the viability
of the majority’s theory of primary liability.
For there are conceptual problems
with this approach, particularly as it is
applied in this case. These problems may
help to explain why the plaintiffs have long
since abandoned any theory of primary
liability and have relied solely on theories
of secondary liability in this appeal. And
it makes it all the more extraordinary that
this court has gone out on a limb to craft a
liability standard that none of the parties
has advocated.
The majority first posits that the defendants’
alleged conduct falls within section
2331(1)’s definition of ‘‘international terrorism,’’
ante at 689–90, but the fit is by no
means perfect. In full, the statutory definition
of the term reads as follows:
[T]he term ‘‘international terrorism’’
means activities that—
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous
to human life that are a violation
of the criminal laws of the United
States or of any State, or that would
be a criminal violation if committed
within the jurisdiction of the United
States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended—
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government
by intimidation or coercion;
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government
by mass destruction, assassination,
or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States,
or transcend national boundaries in
terms of the means by which they are
accomplished, the persons they appear
intended to intimidate or coerce, or
the locale in which their perpetrators
operate or seek asylum[.]
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1). The language of this
definition certainly is broad enough to
reach beyond bomb-throwers and shooters
to include those who provide direct and
intentional support to terrorists: someone
who ships arms to a terrorist organization,
for example, easily could be thought to be
engaging in activity that ‘‘involve[s] violent
acts or acts dangerous to human life’’ as
set forth in section 2331(1)(A). See Boim
I, 291 F.3d at 1014–15. But it is far from
clear that sending money to a Hamascontrolled
charitable organization, for example,
is on par with that type of direct
support for terrorism. It may be, as the
majority posits, that donations to Hamas’s
humanitarian wing indirectly aid its terrorism
by freeing up other funds for terrorism,
by giving cover to Hamas, and by
otherwise enhancing Hamas’s image. But
it is difficult if not implausible to characterize
donations that are earmarked and
used for humanitarian work as violent or
life-threatening acts as referenced in section
2331(1)(A). Nor is it evident (to say
the least) that financially supporting a Hamas-
affiliated charity is an act that ‘‘appear[
s] to be intended’’ to have the sorts of
coercive or intimidating effects on governBOIM
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ment policy or upon a civilian population as
described in section 2331(1)(B).
It may be more plausible to say, as the
majority does, that one who provides financial
support to Hamas, even to its charitable
subsidiaries, is ‘‘provid[ing] material
support or resources’’ to Hamas’s terrorist
acts in violation of section 2339A(a) by
increasing the heft of Hamas’s purse. See
ante at 690–91. But that theory too has
its problems. The language of section
2339A(a) requires that the material support
or resources be given with the knowledge
or intent that they ‘‘are to be used in
preparation for, or in carrying out’’ one of
a number of specified crimes, including as
relevant here the killing of American citizens.
(Emphasis mine.); see ante at 690,
citing 18 U.S.C. § 2332. In other words,
the donor must at least know that the
financial or other support he lends to Hamas
will be used to commit terrorist acts.
In Boim I, the panel agreed that giving
money to Hamas with the purpose of financing
its terrorism would both violate
section 2339A(a) and give rise to civil liability
under section 2333. 291 F.3d at 1012–
16. But at that early stage of this litigation,
the Boims had a straightforward and
direct theory that Hamas’s American contributors
(including HLF) intended for
their money be used to support terrorism,
that the zakat committees and other humanitarian
organizations to which these
contributors were sending their money
were mere fronts for Hamas, and that the
money received by these front organizations
was laundered and funneled into Hamas’s
coffers to fund terrorist activity, including
the attack that took David Boim’s
life. See id. at 1004. That theory was
consistent with the express terms of section
2339A(a). But that is no longer the
Boims’ theory (they have long since abandoned
it in favor of aiding and abetting
and conspiracy), nor is it the majority’s.
The majority posits that any money given
to a Hamas affiliate, even if it is given with
a benign intent and even if it is actually
put to charitable use, furthers Hamas’s
terrorism in one way or another. Ante at
698. Even if that is so, not all donors will
know or intend that their contributions will
be used to commit the sorts of criminal
acts identified in section 2339A(a). And
what the statute proscribes is the knowing
or intentional support of specific terrorist
acts, not the knowing support of a terrorist
organization. If nothing else, the defendants’
contributions to charitable organizations
controlled by Hamas would present a
factual question as to whether the defendants
knew that they were supporting the
murder of American citizens or any of the
other crimes listed in section 2339A(a).
3.
Causation, as the majority acknowledges,
is a staple of tort law, ante at 695,
and yet the majority relieves the plaintiffs
of any obligation to demonstrate a causal
link between whatever support the defendants
provided to Hamas and Hamas’s terrorist
activities (let alone David Boim’s
murder in particular). Instead, the majority
simply declares as a matter of law that
any money given to an organization like
Hamas that engages in both terrorism and
legitimate, humanitarian activity, necessarily
enables its terrorism, regardless of the
purpose for which the money was given or
the channel through which the organization
received it. ‘‘Anyone who knowingly
contributes to the nonviolent wing of an
organization that he knows to engage in
terrorism is knowingly contributing to the
organization’s terrorist activities.’’ Ante at
698. This is judicial activism at its most
plain. The majority offers no rationale for
relieving the plaintiffs of the burden of
showing causation, and there is none that I
can discern. The panel in Boim II expressly
disavowed any requirement that
710 549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
the Boims link specific donations or other
acts of support to David Boim’s murder in
particular. 511 F.3d at 741. But it did
insist on proof that the types of support
the defendants were alleged to have given
Hamas were, in fact, a cause of Hamas’s
terrorism. Id. at 741–43. The panel outlined
multiple ways in which the plaintiffs
might show that support given to Hamas,
even donations to its humanitarian activities,
furthers its terrorist agenda, such
that it could be considered a cause of
David Boim’s murder. Id. Someone familiar
with Hamas’s financial structure, or
with the financing of terrorism generally,
presumably could provide that sort of testimony.
But the majority is not even conditioning
liability on expert opinion that
might link the various types of support
provided to Hamas with its terrorist acts.
Expert testimony as to the ways in which
even aid to Hamas’s humanitarian wing
enables terrorism would be subject to adversarial
testing and the judgment of the
factfinder based on the totality of the evidence
put before the court. But rather
than subject the notion of causation to
those checks, the majority, acting as
though we ourselves are experts, simply
declares causation to be a given that cannot
be challenged. Liability under the
majority’s announced rule is sweeping:
one who gives money to any Hamas entity,
even if it is a small donation to help buy an
x-ray machine for a Hamas hospital, is
liable from now until the end of time for
any terrorist act that Hamas might thereafter
commit against an American citizen
outside of the United States. (The majority
itself acknowledges that under its approach
a contribution to a terrorist organization
in 1995 might render the donor
liable for the murder of an American citizen
committed by that organization fifty
years later. Ante at 700.) This type of
across-the-board judgment is out of place
in the realm of torts. As an appellate
court, it is our job to articulate a framework
of liability under the statute and
thereafter leave it to the parties to present
evidence pursuant to that framework and
to the factfinder to determine whether or
not liability has been established. Where
it is open to question, as I believe it is,
whether even humanitarian support given
to Hamas, to its charitable subsidiary, or
to a hospital or other institution that receives
funding from Hamas, actually contributes
to Hamas’s terrorist activities, it
should be left to factfinding in individual
cases (subject, of course, to appellate review)
to evaluate, based on the evidence
presented in those cases, what types of
support to Hamas and its affiliated entities
actually cause terrorism. Cf. Thorogood v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 547 F.3d 742, 744–
45 (7th Cir.2008) (where the claims of multiple
plaintiffs present complex factual
questions, it is preferable to let those
claims be resolved via individual lawsuits,
so that the aggregate outcome fairly reflects
the uncertainty of the plaintiffs’
claims, rather than risk error by having
the issue resolved on a class-wide basis by
a single trier of fact).
The majority’s decision to carve out an
exception to its sweeping liability rule for
non-governmental organizations like the
Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders
who provide humanitarian aid to individuals
affiliated with Hamas lays bare the
weakness of the rule’s analytical underpinnings.
6 Providing medical care on the bat-
6. True, ‘‘medicine’’ is excluded from the definition
of the ‘‘material support or resources’’
to terrorists proscribed by section 2339(A)(a),
see ante at 699, citing § 2239(A)(b)(1). But to
the extent that the medical exclusion lets an
organization like the Red Cross off the hook
(although I note that the services of the Red
Cross are not limited to medical aid), then it
logically ought to exonerate those who fund
medical services provided by Hamas hospiBOIM
v. HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEV. 711
Cite as 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008)
tlefield to individuals that one knows are
Hamas terrorists (see ante at 699) undoubtedly
would have the effect of aiding
Hamas’s terrorism—patching up an injured
terrorist enables him to strike again.
I do not doubt that such aid could be given
for noble and compassionate reasons, but
neither do I doubt that from the standpoint
of the Israelis whom Hamas targets,
the knowing provision of medical care to
individual terrorists could be and would be
understood as aid to terrorism. One can
also imagine scenarios in which medical aid
could be provided for ignoble and devious
reasons. Cf. United States v. Alvarez–
Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657, 112 S.Ct.
2188, 2190, 119 L.Ed.2d 441 (1992) (physician
indicted for participating in the kidnap
and murder of agent of Drug Enforcement
Administration by helping to prolong
captured agent’s life so that others could
continue to interrogate and torture him).
Yet, for no apparent reason other than our
own sense that organizations like the Red
Cross and Doctors Without Borders are
good and do good, the majority simply
declares them exempt from the broad liability
standard that it has announced.
Ante at 699. On the other hand, any other
individual or organization that gives to a
Hamas-controlled charity is deemed liable,
regardless of whether the money is given
with a humanitarian purpose and regardless
of whether the money is, in fact, put to
humanitarian use. So one cannot fund the
construction of a Hamas hospital, buy the
hospital an x-ray machine, or volunteer her
medical services to the hospital, because
this is not providing direct aid to individuals
in the manner of the Red Cross. My
colleagues reason that there is a distinction
between providing aid to an individual,
even if he is terrorist, and aid to a terrorist
organization. Ante at 699. But to my
mind, that is a distinction without a difference
when one knows that the individual
being aided is engaged in terrorism (or is
recklessly indifferent to that possibility).
For example, the majority notes that one
way in which Hamas uses its social welfare
activities to reinforce its terrorist agenda
is by providing economic aid to the families
of killed, wounded, or captured Hamas terrorists,
which ensures the continued loyalty
of these family members to Hamas.
Ante at 698. In that respect, one who
donates money to Hamas in order to fund
such payments thus could be thought to be
promoting terrorism. Yet, the same could
be said of a donor who instead makes
payments directly to the family members
of terrorists rather than giving the money
to Hamas. Indeed, that is exactly what
HLF is alleged to have done (among other
things). See Boim II, 511 F.3d at 722;
Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 219
F.Supp.2d at 71–73. So providing this
type of aid to individuals, rather than to
Hamas, would be accomplishing the same
end, notwithstanding the fact that the donor
was giving aid to individuals rather
than to a terrorist organization. See
Singh–Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293, 301
(3d Cir.2004) (providing food and shelter to
militant Sikhs who had committed or
planned to commit terrorist acts constituted
material support for terrorism). The
distinction between aiding an organization
and aiding individual members of that organization
does not hold up.
It is only the majority’s sweeping rule of
liability that puts humanitarian organizations
like Doctors Without Borders in peril
and that forces the majority to carve out
tals, for example, for the statute in no way
suggests that the exclusion depends on how
the medical aid is provided. Yet the majority
insists that funding a Hamas hospital would
render the donor liable while directly aiding
individual Hamas terrorists would not. See
ante at 698, 699.
712 549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
an unprincipled exemption for such organizations.
If a plaintiff were required to
establish a donor’s intent to aid terrorism,
along with a causal link between the aid
provided and terrorist activity, then the
factfinder would be able to draw reasoned,
pragmatic distinctions (subject, of course,
to appellate review) between those defendants
who are truly enabling terrorism
and those who are not.
4.
The secondary liability framework that
we outlined in Boim I, and on which the
plaintiffs built their entire case against the
defendants, provides a more grounded and
effective way of identifying and distinguishing
between the types of support and
supporters that actually aid terrorism and
those that do not. As the panel recognized,
those who aid and abet Hamas’s
terrorism can be held liable to the same
extent as those who commit the terrorist
acts. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1016–21. But in
addition to showing knowledge of Hamas’s
terrorist activity and the provision of financial
or other support to Hamas, aiding
and abetting would require proof of an
intent to help Hamas’s terrorist activities
succeed. Id. at 1021, 1023.
Proof of intent would serve two important
functions. First, it would serve to
single out the most culpable of Hamas’s
financiers and other supporters by focusing
on those who actually mean to contribute
to its terrorist program, as opposed to
those who may unwittingly aid Hamas’s
terrorism by donating to its charitable
arm. I think it would be possible to infer
the intent to further terrorism in a number
of scenarios. Donations to Hamas itself
have been a crime since 1997, for example,
when Hamas was formally designated a
foreign terrorist organization pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1189, see § 2339B(a) and (g)(6);
and so a prohibited donation in the wake of
that designation would be prima facie
proof of one’s intent to further terrorism.7
The same could be said of donations to
zakat committees and other organizations
that themselves have been formally designated
as terrorist organizations based on
their links with Hamas. On the other
hand, a factfinder confronted with evidence
that a donor gave only to a non-designated,
Hamas-controlled hospital for the purpose
of funding the medical services provided
by that hospital would be free to
conclude that the donor had a benign intent
and did not aid or abet Hamas’s terrorism
even if, in the abstract, one might
believe that furthering Hamas’s humanitarian
activity enhances its image and
thereby supports its violent activities.
The ability of the factfinder to draw such
distinctions is important, given the difficulty
there might be in deciding, under the
majority’s standard, what constitutes a terrorist
organization and what constitutes
the knowing provision of support to such
an organization. Organizations that openly
embrace terrorism as their declared goal
are easy to categorize as terrorist organizations.
But what about organizations
that engage in terrorism but disclaim responsibility?
Or organizations whose
members frequently engage in terrorist
acts with implicit but not explicit approval
from the organizations themselves? And
what are we to make of charitable entities
that are affiliated with such organizations?
7. Hamas previously had been designated a
terrorist organization in January 1995 (some
fourteen months before David Boim was
killed) and donations to Hamas were prohibited
from that point forward. See Boim II, 511
F.3d at 720. But the criminal penalties of
section 2339B were not triggered until 1997
(the year after Boim was murdered), when
Hamas was designated a foreign terrorist organization
pursuant to section 1189. See
Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1016.
BOIM v. HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEV. 713
Cite as 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008)
Or charitable entities that receive some
but not all of their funding from such
organizations—a hospital that receives
contributions from Hamas but is not controlled
by it, for example? I am not sure
just how far the majority’s liability rule
extends. Insisting on proof of a donor’s
intent to support terrorism would help to
confirm the donor’s culpability in instances
where the terrorist nature of the organization
receiving aid is less clear than it would
be if a donor were making out a check
payable to Hamas. It would also serve as
a principled way to exempt organizations
like the Red Cross and Doctors Without
Borders, who engage in humanitarian
work that may incidentally or tangentially
aid individual terrorists or terrorist organizations,
but who have no intent to aid
terrorist activity.
The intent requirement would also play
a vital role in protecting the First Amendment
rights of those accused of facilitating
Hamas’s terrorism. The possibility that a
section 2333(a) suit might implicate First
Amendment rights is not an abstract one.
Even to the extent that such a suit is
based on the money that a defendant has
contributed to an organization that engages
in terrorism, the defendant’s First
Amendment rights must be accounted for,
given that donating money to an organization,
though it is not speech in and of itself,
is one way to express affinity with that
organization and to help give voice to the
viewpoints that organization espouses.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65–66, 96
S.Ct. 612, 657, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per
curiam) (‘‘The right to join together ‘for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas’ is
diluted if it does not include the right to
pool money through contributions, for
funds are often essential if ‘advocacy’ is to
be truly or optimally ‘effective.’ ’’) (quoting
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78
S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958));
see also Citizens Against Rent Control v.
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 102 S.Ct. 434, 70
L.Ed.2d 492 (1981). Certainly, given the
government’s paramount interest in battling
terrorism, the government may prospectively
ban, and even criminalize, donations
to an organization that it deems a
terrorist organization. See § 2339B(a);
Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1027; Humanitarian
Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135
(9th Cir.2000). Hamas was so designated
in 1997, the year after David Boim was
murdered. See n. 7, supra. But when an
organization engages in both legal and illegal
activities and donations to that organization
have not been prohibited, a donor
may not be held civilly liable for the organization’s
illegal activity based solely on his
contributions, for to do so would infringe
upon the defendant’s First Amendment
freedoms. In re Asbestos School Litigation,
46 F.3d 1284, 1290 (3d Cir.1994) (Alito,
J.).
And money is not the only type of support
that the defendants are alleged to
have provided Hamas. One need only look
again at the conduct for which AMS was
held liable by the district court: hosting
Hamas speakers at its conferences, publishing
pro-Hamas articles and editorials in
his newsletters, rallying support for HLF
when it was declared a terrorist organization,
and so forth. 340 F.Supp.2d at 908–
13. All of that conduct involves pure
speech. See ante at 700; Boim I, 291 F.3d
at 1026.
And so the First Amendment is very
much implicated by this case. Both
through their contributions of money to
Hamas and its subsidiary organizations,
and (in the case of AMS) through their
advocacy on behalf of Hamas, the defendants
have demonstrated an affiliation
with and affinity for Hamas. But NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,
102 S.Ct. 3409, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982),
holds that an individual may not be held
714 549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
civilly liable for his mere association with
an organization whose members engage in
illegal acts.
Civil liability may not be imposed merely
because an individual belonged to a
group, some members of which committed
acts of violence. For liability to be
imposed by reason of association alone,
it is necessary to establish that the
group itself possessed unlawful goals
and that the individual held a specific
intent to further those illegal aims.
Id. at 920, 102 S.Ct. at 3429 (footnote
omitted). Moreover, an individual’s intent
vis-`a-vis an organization that holds both
lawful and unlawful purposes ‘‘must be
judged ‘according to the strictest law,’ ’’
for ‘‘otherwise there is a danger that one
in sympathy with the legitimate aims of
such an organization, but not specifically
intending to accomplish them by resort
to violence, might be punished for his
adherence to lawful and constitutionally
protected purposes, because of other
and unprotected purposes which he does
not necessarily share.’’
Id. at 919, 102 S.Ct. at 3429 (quoting Noto
v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299–300, 81
S.Ct. 1517, 1521, 6 L.Ed.2d 836 (1961)).
The panel in Boim I recognized that the
aiding and abetting standard is consistent
with the rule announced in Claiborne
Hardware in that it conditions liability on
proof that a defendant knew of the organization’s
illegal purposes and had the intent
to further those purposes when that defendant
joined and/or aided the organization.
291 F.3d at 1023–24. By contrast, the
majority’s approach requires no proof of
an intent to further Hamas’s activities; so
long as a donor to Hamas or its affiliate
knows that Hamas engages in terrorism,
the donor is liable for any terrorist act
committed by Hamas against an American
citizen regardless of the purpose behind
the donation.
The majority suggests that the rule of
Claiborne Hardware does not apply because
violence is a stated goal of Hamas
rather than something a few rogue members
happen to engage in without its approval.
The defendants in the present case could
not be held liable for acts of violence by
members of Hamas that were not authorized
by HamasTTTT But as Hamas
engages in violence as a declared goal of
the organization, anyone who provides
material support to it, knowing the organization’s
character, is punishable TTT
whether or not he approves of violence.
Ante at 700 (emphasis in original). But
this holding is directly contrary to Claiborne
Hardware, which requires proof of a
defendant’s intent to further violence even
when violence is a goal that the organization
embraces. See 458 U.S. at 920, 102
S.Ct. at 3429 (‘‘For liability to be imposed
by reason of association alone, it is necessary
to establish that the group itself possessed
unlawful goals and that the individual
held a specific intent to further those
illegal aims.’’) (emphasis added). See
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229,
81 S.Ct. 1469, 1486, 6 L.Ed.2d 782 (1961)
(individual may be convicted for active
membership in organization that advocates
violent overthrow of U.S. government so
long as there is ‘‘clear proof that a defendant
‘specifically intend[s] to accomplish
[the aims of the organization] by resort to
violence.’ ’’) (quoting Noto v. United States,
367 U.S. at 299, 81 S.Ct. at 1522); see also
Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb,
414 U.S. 441, 447–49, 94 S.Ct. 656,
661–62, 38 L.Ed.2d 635 (1974) (government
may not forbid advocacy of lawbreaking or
use of force unless it is inciting imminent
lawless action) (citing Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48, 89 S.Ct. 1827,
1829–30, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969)); Elfbrandt
v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 15–18, 86
BOIM v. HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEV. 715
Cite as 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008)
S.Ct. 1238, 1240–41, 16 L.Ed.2d 321 (1966).
Certainly I agree that someone who gives
money or other support to Hamas knowing
that it will be used for terrorist activity—a
violation of section 2339A(a)—can be held
civilly liable for that activity, but in that
case one’s intent could readily be inferred.
But to impose liability based on aid that
may have been given—and, in fact, usedfor
humanitarian purposes is to do exactly
what Claiborne Hardware proscribes:
punish the supporter ‘‘for his adherence to
[an organization’s] lawful and constitutionally
protected purposes, because of other
and unprotected purposes which he does
not necessarily share.’’ 458 U.S. at 919,
102 S.Ct. at 3429 (quoting Noto ).
Given that the majority’s analysis requires
no proof of that any of the defendants
intended to support Hamas’s terrorism,
it is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.
Although the majority suggests that an
intent requirement would, as a practical
matter, eliminate donor liability except in
those few cases where a donor declared his
intent to support terrorism, ante at 698,
that certainly is not true in other areas of
the law where proof of a defendant’s intent
is required. As we often note in employment
discrimination and a wide variety of
other cases, there is rarely direct proof of
a defendant’s intent, and yet intent can be
proved circumstantially. See, e.g., Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 141, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2105, 147
L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (age discrimination);
Amrhein v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 546
F.3d 854, 858 (7th Cir.2008) (Title VII
retaliation); United States v. Roberts, 534
F.3d 560, 571 (7th Cir.2008) (wire fraud);
United States v. Patterson, 348 F.3d 218,
225–26 (7th Cir.2003) (narcotics conspiracy),
abrogated on other grounds by Blakely
v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct.
2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004); Toushin v.
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 223 F.3d
642, 647 (7th Cir.2000) (tax fraud); United
States v. Rose, 12 F.3d 1414, 1417, 1420
(7th Cir.1994) (aiding and abetting the
transportation and receipt of a stolen motor
vehicle). Moreover, should there be
evidence that a defendant has made statements
in support of the use of violence to
achieve political ends, relying on such
statements as proof that the defendant
provided financial or other aid to a terrorist
organization with the intent to support
its terrorist activities would not, as the
majority suggests, ante at 698–99, pose a
First Amendment problem. See Wisconsin
v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489, 113 S.Ct.
2194, 2201, 124 L.Ed.2d 436 (1993) (‘‘The
First Amendment TTT does not prohibit
the evidentiary use of speech to establish
the elements of a crime or to prove motive
or intent.’’).
5.
Finally, the majority treats Dr. Paz’s
affidavit as sufficient evidence that Hamas
was responsible for David Boim’s murder.
Although the majority recognizes that Paz
relied on a variety of unauthenticated electronic
and documentary sources for his
conclusion, it nonetheless deems his affidavit
admissible and sufficient to sustain
summary judgment for the plaintiffs on
this point because an expert is free in
forming his opinion to rely on evidence
that would not be admissible in court.
Ante at 704. But the panel’s principal
point was that Dr. Paz’s conclusion as to
who killed David Boim is meaningless
without reference to the websites and documents
that he so heavily relied upon in
forming his opinion, and yet allowing Paz
to recount what those sources say without
establishing their authenticity and trustworthiness
would contradict the basic requirement
that expert opinion have ‘‘a reliable
foundation,’’ Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, supra, 509 U.S. at 597,
716 549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
113 S.Ct. at 2799; see also Fed.R.Evid.
703. Paz’s opinion is based exclusively on
what these websites and documents say;
he has no personal knowledge of who
killed David Boim. So if these sources are
not genuine or say something other than
what he has represented, then his opinion
is worthless. No expert worth his salt
would base his opinion on internet and
documentary sources without assuring
himself that they are reliable—that a website
thought to be a Hamas site is, in fact,
a website controlled by Hamas and authorized
to make representations on its behalf,
for example, or that what purports to be
the written judgment of a foreign tribunal
is actually that. But Paz’s affidavit does
not describe any such efforts that he made,
and there is no other evidence in the record
that establishes the authenticity and
reliability of the websites and documents
whose contents he recounts.
The glaring lack of any information confirming
the authenticity and accuracy of
Paz’s sources raises obvious doubts about
the reliability of his opinion. To cite just a
few examples: For the proposition that
Hinawi killed David Boim, Paz relies on a
document in Arabic that purports to be the
written judgment reflecting Hinawi’s conviction
and sentence before a Palestinian
Authority tribunal, along with the notes of
a U.S. State Department employee who
observed Hinawi’s trial. Here is the cover
letter accompanying and describing both
the trial notes and the judgment (Figure
1), followed by the judgment form (Figure
2):
Figure 1: Cover letter
BOIM v. HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEV. 717
Cite as 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008)
Figure 2: Hinawi Judgment
No translation of the Arabic-language
judgment has been provided (it could be an
advertisement for all I know), and neither
the judgment nor the notes of the foreign
service officer have been authenticated in
any meaningful way by the cover letter,
which does not even identify the letter’s
author. We have absolutely no way to
know, given the current state of the record,
whether these documents are what
Paz says they are, and thus no way of
assessing the reliability of his conclusions.
As a final example, here is one of the web
pages Paz relied on as evidence that Hamas
took responsibility for David Boim’s
murder:
718 549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
Figure 3: web page
The selective translation obviously
makes it impossible for the reader to independently
evaluate the context and meaning
of what Paz is relying on. Notwithstanding
these infirmities, the majority is
content not only to deem Paz’s opinion
admissible, but to sustain the entry of
summary judgment against the defendants
on this point. The defendants cannot be
faulted for failing to refute Paz’s conclusions,
see ante at 704–05, for the party
opposing summary judgment is not required
to rebut factual propositions on
which the movant bears the burden of
proof and that the movant has not properly
supported in the first instance. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331,
106 S.Ct. 2548, 2557, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 10A C.
Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2727 (2d
ed.1983)); L & W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc.,
471 F.3d 1311, 1318 (Fed.Cir.2006); Black
v. M & W Gear Co., 269 F.3d 1220, 1238
(10th Cir.2001). In any other sort of case,
this sort of sloppiness would not be tolerated,
and we certainly would not sustain
the entry of summary judgment based on
such shaky evidence.8
6.
The murder of David Boim was an unspeakably
brutal and senseless act, and I
can only imagine the pain it has caused his
parents. Terrorism is a scourge, but it is
our responsibility to ask whether it presents
so unique a threat as to justify the
abandonment of such time-honored tort requirements
as causation. Our own re-
8. One of the other concerns the panel noted
was the lack of a foundation for attributing
the representations on various websites regarding
David Boim’s murder to Hamas.
511 F.3d at 753. If that seems like nitpicking,
consider the following: Octavia Nasr,
‘‘bin Laden hacked?’’, AC360, http://ac360.
blogs.cnn.com/2008/10/23/bin-laden-hacked/
(last visited 11/25/2008).
BOIM v. HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEV. 719
Cite as 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008)
sponse to a threat can sometimes pose as
much of a threat to our civil liberties and
the rule of law as the threat itself. See,
e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 65 S.Ct. 193, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944).
The panel’s opinion in Boim II took a
conservative approach, fully consistent
with precedent, that insisted on proof that
the defendant’s actions were a cause of
Hamas’s terrorism, proof that the defendants
intended to support terrorism, and
admissible evidence to support such basic
factual points as whether Hamas was responsible
for David Boim’s murder. This
en banc court, by contrast, relieves the
plaintiffs of all of these obligations, following
a path that portends sweeping liability
for those individuals and groups who give
their support to the humanitarian activities
and affiliates of terrorist organizations but
who may have no intent to support terrorism
and whose actual link to terrorism has
never been evaluated by a factfinder. I
stand by the approach taken by the Boim
I and Boim II panel.
7.
For all of the reasons set forth above
and in the panel’s Boim II opinion, I would
remand for further proceedings as to all
four defendants, including Salah. I would
require the plaintiffs on remand to demonstrate
that any financial or other support
the defendants have given to Hamas and
Hamas-affiliated entities was in some way
a cause of Hamas’s terrorism. I would
also insist the plaintiffs set forth a more
complete evidentiary foundation for the
proposition that Hamas killed David Boim.
WOOD, Circuit Judge, concurring in
part and dissenting in part.1
This is a heart-breaking case. No parent
can fail to empathize with Joyce and
Stanley Boim, who lost their son to the evil
of terrorism just as he was on the brink of
all of life’s promise. Nothing can bring
David Boim back, but the Boims have taken
advantage of a statute that Congress
passed that was designed to provide some
degree of accountability for those who
commit such awful acts. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333(a). In Boim v. Quranic Literacy
Inst. & Holy Land Found., 291 F.3d 1000
(7th Cir.2002) (‘‘Boim I ’’), this court decided
that the set of possible defendants in
such an action includes not only the direct
actors (here, Amjad Hinawi and Khalil
Tawfiq Al–Sharif) and the organization to
which they belonged and that directed
their actions (here, said to be Hamas), but
also organizations that aid and abet the
former two. When all is said and done,
the en banc majority has reaffirmed the
latter ruling, though it does so under a
slightly different rubric. But, in our zeal
to bring justice to bereaved parents, we
must not lose sight of the need to prove
liability on the facts that are presented to
the court. Assumptions and generalizations
are no substitute for proof. Particularly
because, unfortunately, this probably
will not be the last case brought by a
victim of international terrorism, it is crucial
that we be as clear as we can in
fleshing out the statutory requirements
and that we do not rush to judgment.
Because I do not agree with the majority’s
articulation and application of some of the
governing legal standards, and I find too
many central facts to be in dispute, I am
still of the view that this case needs to be
remanded for further proceedings.
I begin, however, by underscoring that I
agree with the en banc majority’s analysis
on a number of points. First, throughout
1. Judge Rovner and Judge Williams join this
opinion except with respect to Salah’s liability.
720 549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
the proceedings before this court, we have
unanimously rejected the district court’s
decision to give collateral estoppel effect to
the findings in the case that was litigated
in the District of Columbia, Holy Land
Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219
F.Supp.2d 57 (D.D.C.2002), affirmed, 333
F.3d 156 (D.C.Cir.2003) (‘‘HLF v. Ashcroft
’’). See Boim v. Holy Land Foundation
for Relief and Dev., 511 F.3d 707,
720–33 (7th Cir.2007) (‘‘Boim II ’’). We all
agree that it was error to grant summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against
the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and
Development (‘‘HLF’’), and that further
proceedings are required. Second, under
the new analysis that the en banc majority
has undertaken, which uses ‘‘a chain of
explicit statutory incorporations by reference,’’
ante, at 690, it was error to grant
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
against Muhammad Salah. Again, we
all agree that there are problems with
Salah’s part of the case. The en banc
majority is reversing the finding of liability
outright because Salah could not have rendered
material support to Hamas between
the effective date of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A,
September 13, 1994, and the date of David
Boim’s murder, May 13, 1996, because he
was in Israeli custody between January
1993 and November 1997. Ante, at 691. In
fact, the Boim II panel majority took a
less absolute approach. It found that the
district court erred in concluding that Salah’s
liability could be established only by
showing that (1) he knew of Hamas’s terrorist
activities, (2) he desired to help
those activities succeed, and (3) through
his participation in the Hamas conspiracy,
acts of co-conspirators sufficed to show
that he engaged in some act of helping to
bring about Boim’s murder. Rather than
reversing outright, as the en banc majority
has done, the Boim II panel majority
would have reversed the summary judgment
in the plaintiffs’ favor and remanded
to give plaintiffs the opportunity to identify
‘‘evidence that would permit a reasonable
factfinder to find that Salah’s actions
on behalf of Hamas in some way caused or
contributed to David Boim’s death.’’ Boim
II, 511 F.3d at 748.
I am persuaded by the en banc majority’s
statutory analysis that the correct result
is reversal of the finding against Salah,
rather than a remand for further
proceedings. Its careful exegesis of the
way that the governing statutes in this
area work together demonstrates why the
furnishing of material assistance is a
ground for liability under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333. I thus do not dissent from the
en banc court’s decision that the judgment
against Salah must be reversed.
It is the en banc majority’s analysis of
the cases against the Quranic Literacy Institute
(‘‘QLI’’) and the American Muslim
Society (‘‘AMS’’) (along with the Islamic
Association of Palestine) that I find problematic.
I continue to believe that the decisions
in Boim I and Boim II correctly
found that Congress intended, in passing
18 U.S.C. § 2333, to create an intentional
tort, that it meant to ‘‘extend civil liability
for acts of international terrorism to the
full reaches of traditional tort law,’’ Boim
I, 291 F.3d at 1010, that nothing in Central
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 114
S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994), suggests
that Congress lacks the power to do
so when it wishes, and finally that § 2333
does impose secondary liability on those
who aid and abet acts of terrorism. The
en banc majority expresses doubts about
this holding, although in the end it neither
adopts it nor rejects it. Instead, it turns
to ‘‘an alternative and more promising
ground for bringing donors to terrorist
organizations within the grasp of section
2333.’’ Ante, at 690.
BOIM v. HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEV. 721
Cite as 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008)
Working through a chain of statutes—
from § 2333(a) (treble damages action for
person injured by an act of international
terrorism), to § 2331(1) (definition of international
terrorism), to § 2339A (providing
material support for something that violates
a federal criminal law is itself a
crime), to § 2332 (criminalizing the killing
of any American citizen outside the United
States)—the en banc majority concludes
that there is primary liability under
§ 2333(a) for someone who donates money
‘‘to a terrorist group that targets Americans
outside the United States.’’ Ante, at
690. The en banc majority then establishes
several criteria for the claim it has recognized:
(1) it is the fact of contributing to a
terrorist organization, not the amount of
the contribution, that is the key to liability,
ante, at 691; and (2) there is a knowledge
requirement, to the effect that the donordefendant
must have known that the money
would be used ‘‘in preparation for or in
carrying out the killing or attempted killing
of, conspiring to kill, or inflicting bodily
injury on, an American citizen abroad.’’
Ante, at 691. At that point, however, the
en banc majority announces that its theory
does not establish primary liability after
all—instead, a claim based on material
support ‘‘has the character of secondary
liability. Through a chain of incorporations
by reference, Congress has expressly
imposed liability on a class of aiders
and abettors.’’ Id.
I would have thought that this was exactly
the conclusion that the Boim I panel
reached. By labeling its theory as one of
primary liability, the en banc majority is
apparently trying to reap the advantages
of both kinds of theories. It acknowledges
that in order to prove a primary liability
case, the plaintiffs would need to establish
‘‘the ordinary tort requirements relating to
fault, state of mind, causation, and foreseeability.’’
Ante, at 692. But, it says, those
requirements do not apply here, because
‘‘functionally the primary violator is an
aider and abettor or other secondary actor.’’
Ante, at 692.
I believe that the following is a fair
summary of the formal requirements that
the en banc majority has announced for
proving a case under § 2333:
1. Act requirement: the defendant
must have provided material assistance,
in the form of money or other
acts, directly or indirectly, to an organization
that commits terrorist
acts.
2. State of mind requirement: the defendant
must either know that the
donee organization (or the ultimate
recipient of the assistance) engages
in such acts, or the defendant must
be deliberately indifferent to whether
or not it does so.
3. Causation: there is no requirement
of showing classic ‘‘but-for’’ causation,
nor, apparently, is there even a
requirement of showing that the defendant’s
action would have been
sufficient to support the primary actor’s
unlawful activities or any limitation
on remoteness of liability.
There is little to criticize in the first of
these criteria, as an abstract matter. The
second may also pass muster, again as an
abstract matter. For both of these, my
problem with the en banc majority’s opinion
lies more in the way that they are
applied to these facts, as I explain further
below, than in their formal scope. With
respect to the third requirement, there is
both a theoretical problem and a problem
with the application, and so I begin with
that.
The en banc majority asserts that its
position on causation is supported by a
number of cases that it discusses. Those
cases, however, do not go as far as the en
banc majority claims, nor am I familiar
722 549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
with anything else in the law of torts that
does so. It is important here to be precise
once again about areas of agreement and
areas of disagreement. The en banc majority
is quite right to point out that literal
‘‘but-for’’ causation cannot be shown in
certain cases, and in those cases, the
courts have accepted substitutes for the
‘‘but-for’’ showing. Thus, in the case
where there are two independent acts, and
either one alone would have brought about
the injury, a defendant who was responsible
for one of those acts cannot defeat
liability by pointing out that the other one
would have been enough to create the
harm by itself. That is the principle illustrated
by Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.
Co., 191 Wis. 610, 211 N.W. 913 (1927),
discussed in our decision in Maxwell v.
KPMG LLP, 520 F.3d 713, 716 (7th Cir.
2008). It is also the principle endorsed by
the most recent draft of the American Law
Institute’s Restatement (Third) of the Law
of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional
Harm, § 27 (‘‘Restatement (Third)
of Torts’’), which says ‘‘[i]f multiple acts
occur, each of which alone would have been
a factual cause under § 26 of the physical
harm at the same time in the absence of
the other act(s), each act is regarded as a
factual cause of the harm.’’ This is a far
cry from saying that cause need not be
proven if there are multiple sufficient
causes; the ALI’s draft acknowledges simply
that some harms may be overdetermined,
and in those cases, cause can be
proven by demonstrating that the defendant’s
tortious conduct was sufficient to
produce the harm. Maxwell, cited by the
en banc majority, illustrates this principle
as well as anything: ‘‘There are also cases
in which a condition that is not necessary,
but is sufficient, is deemed the cause of an
injury, as when two fires join and destroy
the plaintiff’s property and each one would
have destroyed it by itself and so was not a
necessary condition; yet each of the firemakers
(if negligent) is liable to the plaintiff
for having ‘caused’ the injury.’’ 520
F.3d at 716. The key word here is ‘‘sufficient’’:
the plaintiff cannot win without
showing that the defendant’s act would
have been sufficient to cause the injury,
even though it may be the case that other
acts might also have been sufficient.
The other examples the en banc majority
uses fit the rule articulated in Restatement
(Third) § 27. Thus, if there were
two wrongful causes and a third innocent
one (two arsonists plus a lightning strike,
for example), any of which would have
caused the injury at issue, the person responsible
for one of the wrongful acts cannot
take refuge in the fact that other sufficient
causes were also present. Or if, as in
the classic case of Summers v. Tice, 33
Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), there are two
possible causes, either of which would have
been sufficient to cause the harm (a bullet
from each of two guns, either one of which
would have sufficed to harm the third party),
once again sufficient cause has been
proven even if necessary cause cannot be.
Ditto with the en banc majority’s example
of several firms that spill toxic waste that
finds its way into groundwater and damages
property. Even if the damage is
slight, that wrongful act is sufficient for
liability. Any remaining uncertainties can
be resolved through rules on apportionment
of damages.
In the end, the en banc majority is
reduced to relying on a case where a roomful
of junior high school students erupted
into a melee and a bystander student was
seriously hurt. See Keel v. Hainline, 331
P.2d 397 (Okla.1958). A closer look at the
facts of that case is useful. Approximately
35 to 40 students were in their music
classroom one day, but because the instructor
failed to show up on time, they
were unsupervised for about a half hour.
BOIM v. HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEV. 723
Cite as 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008)
Here is the court’s description of what
unfolded:
During the absence of the instructor,
several of the male students indulged in
what they termed ‘‘horse play’’. This
activity consisted of throwing wooden
blackboard erasers, chalk, cardboard
drum covers, and, in one instance, a
‘‘coke’’ bottle, at each other. It appears
that two or three of the defendants went
to the north end of the class room and
the remaining defendants went to the
south end of the room. From vantage
points behind the blackboard on the
north end and the piano on the south
end, they threw the erasers and chalk
back and forth at one another. This
activity was carried on for a period of
some 30 minutes, and terminated only
when an eraser, thrown by defendant
[Larry] Jennings, struck plaintiff in the
eye, shattering her eye glasses, and resulting
in the loss of the use of such eye.
331 P.2d at 398–99. The defendants to
whom the court refers were six boys—two
or three at one end of the room, the rest at
the other end of the room. Robert Keel,
the plaintiff-in-error, was in one of those
groups—the facts do not mention whether
Keel was on Jennings’s ‘‘team’’ or the other
one. The court first found that what it
characterized as ‘‘the willful and deliberate
throwing of wooden blackboard erasers at
other persons in a class room containing 35
to 40 students’’ was wrongful conduct, because
it amounted to an assault and battery.
Id. at 399. The intent of the actors
was immaterial. Addressing Keel’s argument
that there was no evidence that he
aided or abetted Jennings in the final
throw that injured the plaintiff, the court
said:
It is undisputed that defendant Keel
participated in the wrongful activity engaged
in by the other defendants of
throwing wooden blackboard erasers at
each other back and forth across a class
room containing 35 to 40 students, although
most of the testimony indicates
that defendant Keel’s participation was
limited to the retrieving of such erasers
and handing them to other defendants
for further throwing. Keel aided and
abetted the wrongful throwing by procuring
and supplying to the throwers
the articles to be thrown. It is immaterial
whether defendant Keel aided, abetted
or encouraged defendant Jennings in
throwing the eraser in such a manner as
to injure Burge, or not, since it is virtually
undisputed that defendant Keel
aided, abetted or encouraged the wrongful
activity of throwing wooden erasers
at other persons, which resulted in the
injury to Burge.
331 P.2d at 400 (emphasis added). The en
banc majority reads this as a holding that
Keel was liable ‘‘even though there was no
proven, or even likely, causal connection
between anything he did and the injury.’’
Ante, at 697. But that reading entirely
ignores the perspective that the Oklahoma
court adopted. Keel and the other five
boys jointly created a dangerous situation
in the classroom. By acting together, they
greatly enhanced the risk of harm to the
other students in the room. So viewed,
there is a readily observable causal link
between the collective action of the six
boys and the harm the plaintiff suffered.
Whether we call Keel’s contribution ‘‘material
support’’ or something else does not
matter—the point here is that the Oklahoma
court did not dispense with the requirement
of proving causation.
So, too, must we insist on proof that
QLI’s and AMS’s actions amounted to at
least a sufficient cause of the terrorist act
that killed David Boim, even if, on these
facts, there were multiple such causes.
The Boim II panel majority opinion outlines
ways in which this might be done. I
would summarize these approaches to the
724 549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
causation element as follows: there must
be proof (1) that the actual recipient organization
received a non-trivial amount of
money from either QLI or AMS, and (2)
that the recipient was, itself, sufficiently
affiliated with Hamas that those dollars
indirectly supported Hamas’s terrorist
mission. Because money is fungible, the
combination of the link to Hamas and the
receipt of an amount that would have been
sufficient to finance the shooting at the
Beit El bus stop would be enough to show
that the ‘‘material assistance’’ of giving
money caused the terrorist act that took
David Boim’s life. (There is no allegation
here that either QLI or AMS directly funneled
money to Hamas; had there been,
this obviously would have sufficed as well.)
Another reason why I find it ill-advised
to exempt plaintiffs suing under § 2333 on
a ‘‘material assistance’’ theory from showing
causation is that this approach also
appears to eliminate the need to show
what was classically called ‘‘proximate
cause.’’ As the Proposed Final Draft to
the Restatement (Third) of Torts points
out, that term is imprecise at best. See
Restatement (Third) of Torts, ch. 6, Special
Note on Proximate Cause. The new
Restatement refers to this concept as
‘‘scope of liability,’’ in recognition of the
fact that ‘‘[t]ort law does not impose liability
on an actor for all harm factually caused
by the actor’s tortious conduct.’’ Id. At
some point, the harm is simply too remote
from the original tortious act to justify
holding the actor responsible for it. It
may be the case that the boundaries of
liability are wider for intentional torts, see
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 33, but
that does not mean that they are limitless.
In part, this reflects the reality that as the
temporal or factual chain between the tortious
act and the harm becomes ever longer,
the likelihood of intervening or superseding
causes becomes greater. See
generally Restatement (Third) of Torts
§ 34. The en banc majority freely concedes
that there are no limits at all to its
rule, and that a donor who gave funds to
an organization affiliated with Hamas in
1995 might still be liable under § 2333 half
a century later, in 2045. I see no warrant
for assuming that § 2333, unlike the rest
of tort law, contains no scope-of-liability
limitations. I note as well that such an
open-ended rule would be in serious tension
with the general four-year statute of
limitations Congress has passed for civil
actions based on statutes passed after 1990
(like this one). See 28 U.S.C. § 1658.
The scope of the causation element is
not my only concern about the en banc
majority’s opinion. My other problem is
with its application of the principles that,
at a high level of generality, state the law
correctly. As I noted earlier, the plaintiffs
must prove that the defendant provided
material assistance to an organization that
commits terrorist acts. But what does it
take to qualify as such an organization?
The Boims did not sue Hamas, nor does
their case rely on the proposition that QLI
or AMS sent money directly to Hamas.
We must decide how far down the chain of
affiliates, in this shadowy world, the statute
was designed to reach, and how deeply
Hamas must be embedded in the recipient
organization. QLI and AMS argue strenuously
that at worst they sent money to
charitable organizations with some kind of
link to Hamas. Some might have been
analogous to wholly owned subsidiaries;
some might have been analogous to joint
ventures; some might have been independent
entities that accepted funding from
Hamas as well as other more reputable
organizations. The record throws little
light on these matters, because the district
court thought them irrelevant. As I understand
the en banc majority opinion, it is
saying that even if an independent day
care center receives $1 from organization
BOIM v. HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEV. 725
Cite as 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008)
H known to be affiliated with Hamas, not
only the day care center but also anyone
who gave to H is liable for all acts of
terrorism by Hamas operatives from that
time forward against any and all Americans
who are outside the United States.
That is a proposition of frightening, and
I believe unwise, breadth. The en banc
majority has tried to carve out humanitarian
non-governmental organizations like the
American Red Cross and Doctors Without
Borders, which (fortuitously) may also
benefit from a ‘‘medical services’’ exemption
in the statute. But I am not sure that
it has succeeded. Those worthy organizations
are not the only ones committed to
nondiscriminatory treatment of all needy
human beings. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees sponsors
many programs designed to assist people
in war-torn areas. The United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (‘‘UNRWA’’)
has been in existence since 1950. See
http://www.unhcr.org/partners/
PARTNERS/48fdeced20.html (last visited
November 11, 2008). It describes itself as
‘‘the main provider of basic services—education,
health, relief and social services—to
over 4.1 million registered Palestine refugees
in the Middle East.’’ Id. The odds are
strong that some of the agencies that UNRWA
helps may also receive assistance
from Hamas. The en banc majority does
not tell us whether, if QLI or AMS also
happens to give money to such an agency,
the donor has violated § 2333 by doing so.
The en banc majority also slides over
the statutory requirement (derived from
its chain of statutory connections) that the
entity providing material assistance must
know that the donee plans to commit terrorist
acts against U.S. citizens. Ante, at
691–92, 693. All that is necessary, we are
told, is that
a donor [to Hamas—and presumably to
another organization with an adequate
link to Hamas, whatever that may be]
who knew the aims and activities of the
organization [only Hamas? or the affiliated
recipient?]—would know that Hamas
was gunning for Israelis, that
Americans are frequent visitors to and
sojourners in Israel, that some Israeli
citizens have U.S. citizenship as well,
and that donations to Hamas, by augmenting
Hamas’s resources, would enable
Hamas to kill or wound, or try to
kill, or conspire to kill more people in
Israel.
Ante, at 693–94. This is awfully vague.
Americans travel, and are known to travel,
to every country on the face of the globe—
they even go to places like Antarctica that
are not even countries. If one could, it
would be more realistic and sound as a
legal matter simply to hold that it makes
no difference whether or not the terrorist
acts that the organization commits are directed
toward Americans. The only problem
with such a holding—which otherwise
would be a routine application of the doctrine
of transferred intent—is that the
statutory basis for a tort action under
§ 2333 depends upon a finding that the
material support violated U.S. federal
criminal law, and that here the crime in
question is the killing of an American citizen
outside the United States. In my
view, given the language of the statutes
that Congress has passed thus far, we are
required to take a more restricted view of
§ 2333. A statute focusing on extraterritorial
killings of Americans would still be a
strong tool against terrorist activities and
organizations that threaten vital U.S. interests.
Al Qaeda, for example, trumpets
its intent to target Americans whenever
and wherever it can. If the plaintiffs could
show both that Hamas has done the same
thing and further that Hamas’s intent
should be attributed to the donee organiza726
549 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
tion (recalling once again that neither QLI
nor AMS gives money directly to Hamas),
then a § 2333 claim may proceed; otherwise,
it may not. Put differently, I find it
difficult to read § 2333 as creating a claim
against an organization that has, in effect,
declared war on the entirety of civilization.
The Boim II opinion explains the problems
with a finding, on the present record,
that Hamas was indeed responsible for
David Boim’s murder. That finding rests
entirely on the affidavit submitted by Dr.
Reuven Paz. The majority accepts that
affidavit as adequate, noting only the uncontroversial
point that experts are allowed
to rely on hearsay and other inadmissible
evidence. See FED.R.EVID. 703
(expert may rely on facts or data ‘‘reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject’’). No one doubts this.
The panel’s point in Boim II was that, at
least since Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct.
2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and the revision
of FED. R. EVID. 702, there must
nevertheless be a solid foundation for the
expert’s opinion. Rule 702 puts the point
this way: the expert may offer an opinion
‘‘if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the principles
and methods reliably to the facts of
the case.’’ It is these threshold criteria
that are at issue. No one is saying that
these requirements cannot be met in this
case, or in any other case involving international
terrorism. They just have not
been satisfied yet, and so QLI and AMS
should have won a remand on this basis as
well.
For these reasons, I would remand for
further proceedings on the claims against
QLI and AMS. I concur in the en banc
majority’s opinion insofar as it reverses
the judgment against Salah and it remands
for further proceedings on the claims
against HLF.
,
UNITED STATES of America,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Gregg Michael LANGLEY,
Defendant–Appellant.
No. 08–1508.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: Sept. 22, 2008.
Filed: Dec. 10, 2008.
Background: Following jury trial, defendant
was convicted in the United States
District Court for the Western District of
Arkansas, Jimm Larry Hendren, J., of
traveling in interstate commerce for the
purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct
with a minor and using a means of
interstate commerce to persuade, induce,
entice, or coerce a minor to engage in
sexual activity. Defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Bye,
Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) admission of computer pictures depicting
another apparent minor engaging
in sexual conduct was harmless, and
(2) evidence was sufficient to show that
defendant believed victim was under
age of 16, as required for convictions.
Affirmed.
Beam, Circuit Judge, filed concurring
opinion.
Annex 475
18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2009)

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􀀎􀀚􀀖􀀖􀀉􀀆􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀍􀀍
􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀃􀀈􀀉􀀉􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀊􀀍􀀄􀀄􀀱􀀩􀀍􀀆􀀓􀀆􀀕􀀃􀀝􀀕􀀍􀀓􀀉􀀞􀀆􀀚􀀃􀀖􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀕􀀉􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀚􀀛􀀝􀀝􀀍􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀕􀀆􀀚􀀍􀀛􀀕􀀙􀀆􀀚􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀙􀀍􀀗􀀙􀀆􀀐􀀌􀀚􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀞􀀉􀀚􀀑􀀛􀀉􀀚􀀆􀀚􀀃􀀊􀀩􀀆􀀃􀀗􀀐􀀊􀀛􀀕􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀌􀀍􀀙􀀐􀀊􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀧􀀃􀀚􀀍􀀛􀀕􀀙􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀍􀀕
􀀍􀀎􀀗􀀆􀀕􀀚􀀩􀀉􀀝􀀃 􀀍􀀲􀀃 􀀖􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀕􀀉􀀐􀀌􀀃 􀀚􀀛􀀝􀀝􀀍􀀕􀀊􀀃 􀀍􀀕􀀃 􀀕􀀆􀀚􀀍􀀛􀀕􀀙􀀆􀀚􀀧􀀃 􀀦􀀗􀀍􀀎􀀉􀀗􀀑􀀃 􀀍􀀕􀀃 􀀉􀀗􀀊􀀆􀀗􀀞􀀉􀀗􀀑􀀃 􀀊􀀩􀀐􀀊􀀃 􀀊􀀩􀀆􀀇􀀃 􀀐􀀕􀀆􀀃 􀀊􀀍􀀃 􀀡􀀆􀀃 􀀛􀀚􀀆􀀞􀀃 􀀉􀀗􀀃 􀀝􀀕􀀆􀀝􀀐􀀕􀀐􀀊􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀃 􀀲􀀍􀀕􀀧􀀃 􀀍􀀕􀀃 􀀉􀀗
􀀙􀀐􀀕􀀕􀀇􀀉􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀍􀀛􀀊􀀧􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀓􀀉􀀍􀀌􀀐􀀊􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀃􀀍􀀲􀀃􀀚􀀆􀀙􀀊􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀃􀀳􀀯􀀧􀀃􀀳􀀰􀀧􀀃􀀴􀀭􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀰􀀵􀀧􀀃􀀯􀀯􀀨􀀧􀀃􀀳􀀵􀀭􀀧􀀃􀀴􀀳􀀭􀀧􀀃􀀴􀀶􀀯􀀪􀀖􀀫􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀪􀀗􀀫􀀧􀀃􀀴􀀶􀀶􀀪􀀲􀀫􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀪􀀉􀀫􀀧􀀃􀀨􀀳􀀮􀀪􀀙􀀫􀀧􀀃􀀨􀀵􀀷􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀮􀀨􀀭􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀭􀀭􀀶􀀧
􀀭􀀭􀀭􀀷􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀯􀀮􀀳􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀳􀀷􀀭􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀳􀀷􀀯􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀳􀀷􀀳􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀳􀀷􀀷􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀨􀀨􀀯􀀧􀀃􀀯􀀭􀀵􀀵􀀧􀀃􀀯􀀭􀀵􀀷􀀧􀀃􀀯􀀯􀀴􀀮􀀧􀀃􀀯􀀯􀀴􀀭􀀧􀀃􀀯􀀳􀀳􀀯􀀧􀀃􀀯􀀳􀀳􀀯􀀐􀀧􀀃􀀯􀀳􀀳􀀯􀀡􀀧􀀃􀀯􀀳􀀳􀀯􀀲􀀧􀀃􀀯􀀳􀀶􀀮􀀸􀀧􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀯􀀶􀀶􀀯􀀃􀀍􀀲
􀀊􀀩􀀉􀀚􀀃􀀊􀀉􀀊􀀌􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀚􀀆􀀙􀀊􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀃􀀯􀀳􀀷􀀃􀀍􀀲􀀃􀀊􀀩􀀆􀀃􀀸􀀊􀀍􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀃􀀹􀀗􀀆􀀕􀀑􀀇􀀃􀀸􀀙􀀊􀀃􀀍􀀲􀀃􀀭􀀨􀀵􀀶􀀃􀀪􀀶􀀯􀀃􀀘􀀤􀀺􀀤􀀈􀀤􀀃􀀯􀀯􀀴􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀃􀀚􀀆􀀙􀀊􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀃􀀶􀀷􀀵􀀮􀀯􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀷􀀮􀀭􀀯􀀳􀀪􀀡􀀫􀀃􀀍􀀲􀀃􀀊􀀉􀀊􀀌􀀆􀀃􀀶􀀨􀀧􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀇
􀀍􀀲􀀲􀀆􀀗􀀚􀀆􀀃􀀌􀀉􀀚􀀊􀀆􀀞􀀃􀀉􀀗􀀃􀀚􀀆􀀙􀀊􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀃􀀯􀀳􀀳􀀯􀀡􀀪􀀑􀀫􀀪􀀵􀀫􀀪􀀻􀀫􀀃􀀪􀀆􀀼􀀙􀀆􀀝􀀊􀀃􀀲􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀚􀀆􀀙􀀊􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀚􀀃􀀯􀀳􀀳􀀨􀀸􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀞􀀃􀀯􀀳􀀳􀀨􀀻􀀫􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀉􀀗􀀃􀀝􀀕􀀆􀀝􀀐􀀕􀀐􀀊􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀃􀀲􀀍􀀕􀀧􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀉􀀗􀀃􀀙􀀐􀀕􀀕􀀇􀀉􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀍􀀛􀀊􀀧
􀀊􀀩􀀆􀀃􀀙􀀍􀀗􀀙􀀆􀀐􀀌􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀊􀀃􀀍􀀲􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀃􀀆􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀝􀀆􀀃􀀲􀀕􀀍􀀖􀀃􀀊􀀩􀀆􀀃􀀙􀀍􀀖􀀖􀀉􀀚􀀚􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀃􀀍􀀲􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀇􀀃􀀚􀀛􀀙􀀩􀀃􀀓􀀉􀀍􀀌􀀐􀀊􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀧􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀐􀀊􀀊􀀆􀀖􀀝􀀊􀀚􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀙􀀍􀀗􀀚􀀝􀀉􀀕􀀆􀀚􀀃􀀊􀀍􀀃􀀞􀀍􀀃􀀚􀀛􀀙􀀩􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀃􀀐􀀙􀀊􀀧
􀀚􀀩􀀐􀀌􀀌􀀃􀀡􀀆􀀃􀀲􀀉􀀗􀀆􀀞􀀃􀀛􀀗􀀞􀀆􀀕􀀃􀀊􀀩􀀉􀀚􀀃􀀊􀀉􀀊􀀌􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀉􀀖􀀝􀀕􀀉􀀚􀀍􀀗􀀆􀀞􀀃􀀗􀀍􀀊􀀃􀀖􀀍􀀕􀀆􀀃􀀊􀀩􀀐􀀗􀀃􀀭􀀵􀀃􀀇􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀚􀀧􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀡􀀍􀀊􀀩􀀧􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀞􀀧􀀃􀀉􀀲􀀃􀀊􀀩􀀆􀀃􀀞􀀆􀀐􀀊􀀩􀀃􀀍􀀲􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀇􀀃􀀝􀀆􀀕􀀚􀀍􀀗􀀃􀀕􀀆􀀚􀀛􀀌􀀊􀀚􀀧􀀃􀀚􀀩􀀐􀀌􀀌􀀃􀀡􀀆
􀀉􀀖􀀝􀀕􀀉􀀚􀀍􀀗􀀆􀀞􀀃􀀲􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀇􀀃􀀊􀀆􀀕􀀖􀀃􀀍􀀲􀀃􀀇􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀚􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀲􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀌􀀉􀀲􀀆􀀤􀀃􀀸􀀃􀀓􀀉􀀍􀀌􀀐􀀊􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀃􀀍􀀲􀀃􀀊􀀩􀀉􀀚􀀃􀀚􀀆􀀙􀀊􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀃􀀖􀀐􀀇􀀃􀀡􀀆􀀃􀀝􀀕􀀍􀀚􀀆􀀙􀀛􀀊􀀆􀀞􀀃􀀉􀀗􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀇􀀃􀀏􀀆􀀞􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀣􀀛􀀞􀀉􀀙􀀉􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀞􀀉􀀚􀀊􀀕􀀉􀀙􀀊
􀀉􀀗􀀃􀀎􀀩􀀉􀀙􀀩􀀃􀀊􀀩􀀆􀀃􀀛􀀗􀀞􀀆􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀉􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀍􀀲􀀲􀀆􀀗􀀚􀀆􀀃􀀎􀀐􀀚􀀃􀀙􀀍􀀖􀀖􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀆􀀞􀀧􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀉􀀗􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀇􀀃􀀍􀀊􀀩􀀆􀀕􀀃􀀏􀀆􀀞􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀣􀀛􀀞􀀉􀀙􀀉􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀞􀀉􀀚􀀊􀀕􀀉􀀙􀀊􀀃􀀐􀀚􀀃􀀝􀀕􀀍􀀓􀀉􀀞􀀆􀀞􀀃􀀡􀀇􀀃􀀌􀀐􀀎􀀤
􀀅􀀎􀀇􀀃􀀏􀀊􀀉􀀐􀀋􀀐􀀑􀀐􀀒􀀋􀀌􀀍􀀄􀀄􀀸􀀚􀀃􀀛􀀚􀀆􀀞􀀃􀀉􀀗􀀃􀀊􀀩􀀉􀀚􀀃􀀚􀀆􀀙􀀊􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀄􀀄
􀀅􀀓􀀇􀀃􀀊􀀩􀀆􀀃􀀊􀀆􀀕􀀖􀀃􀀽􀀖􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀕􀀉􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀚􀀛􀀝􀀝􀀍􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀕􀀆􀀚􀀍􀀛􀀕􀀙􀀆􀀚􀀾􀀃􀀖􀀆􀀐􀀗􀀚􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀇􀀃􀀝􀀕􀀍􀀝􀀆􀀕􀀊􀀇􀀧􀀃􀀊􀀐􀀗􀀑􀀉􀀡􀀌􀀆􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀉􀀗􀀊􀀐􀀗􀀑􀀉􀀡􀀌􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀚􀀆􀀕􀀓􀀉􀀙􀀆􀀧􀀃􀀉􀀗􀀙􀀌􀀛􀀞􀀉􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀙􀀛􀀕􀀕􀀆􀀗􀀙􀀇
􀀍􀀕􀀃 􀀖􀀍􀀗􀀆􀀊􀀐􀀕􀀇􀀃 􀀉􀀗􀀚􀀊􀀕􀀛􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀊􀀚􀀃 􀀍􀀕􀀃 􀀲􀀉􀀗􀀐􀀗􀀙􀀉􀀐􀀌􀀃 􀀚􀀆􀀙􀀛􀀕􀀉􀀊􀀉􀀆􀀚􀀧􀀃 􀀲􀀉􀀗􀀐􀀗􀀙􀀉􀀐􀀌􀀃 􀀚􀀆􀀕􀀓􀀉􀀙􀀆􀀚􀀧􀀃 􀀌􀀍􀀞􀀑􀀉􀀗􀀑􀀧􀀃 􀀊􀀕􀀐􀀉􀀗􀀉􀀗􀀑􀀧􀀃 􀀆􀀼􀀝􀀆􀀕􀀊􀀃 􀀐􀀞􀀓􀀉􀀙􀀆􀀃 􀀍􀀕􀀃 􀀐􀀚􀀚􀀉􀀚􀀊􀀐􀀗􀀙􀀆􀀧
􀀚􀀐􀀲􀀆􀀩􀀍􀀛􀀚􀀆􀀚􀀧􀀃􀀲􀀐􀀌􀀚􀀆􀀃􀀞􀀍􀀙􀀛􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀊􀀐􀀊􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀉􀀞􀀆􀀗􀀊􀀉􀀲􀀉􀀙􀀐􀀊􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀧􀀃􀀙􀀍􀀖􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀉􀀙􀀐􀀊􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀚􀀃􀀆􀀿􀀛􀀉􀀝􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀊􀀧􀀃􀀲􀀐􀀙􀀉􀀌􀀉􀀊􀀉􀀆􀀚􀀧􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀝􀀍􀀗􀀚􀀧􀀃􀀌􀀆􀀊􀀩􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀚􀀛􀀡􀀚􀀊􀀐􀀗􀀙􀀆􀀚􀀧
􀀆􀀼􀀝􀀌􀀍􀀚􀀉􀀓􀀆􀀚􀀧􀀃􀀝􀀆􀀕􀀚􀀍􀀗􀀗􀀆􀀌􀀃􀀪􀀭􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀖􀀍􀀕􀀆􀀃􀀉􀀗􀀞􀀉􀀓􀀉􀀞􀀛􀀐􀀌􀀚􀀃􀀎􀀩􀀍􀀃􀀖􀀐􀀇􀀃􀀡􀀆􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀃􀀉􀀗􀀙􀀌􀀛􀀞􀀆􀀃􀀍􀀗􀀆􀀚􀀆􀀌􀀲􀀫􀀧􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀞􀀃􀀊􀀕􀀐􀀗􀀚􀀝􀀍􀀕􀀊􀀐􀀊􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀧􀀃􀀆􀀼􀀙􀀆􀀝􀀊􀀃􀀖􀀆􀀞􀀉􀀙􀀉􀀗􀀆􀀃􀀍􀀕
􀀕􀀆􀀌􀀉􀀑􀀉􀀍􀀛􀀚􀀃􀀖􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀕􀀉􀀐􀀌􀀚􀁀
􀀅􀀔􀀇􀀃 􀀊􀀩􀀆􀀃 􀀊􀀆􀀕􀀖􀀃 􀀽􀀊􀀕􀀐􀀉􀀗􀀉􀀗􀀑􀀾􀀃 􀀖􀀆􀀐􀀗􀀚􀀃 􀀉􀀗􀀚􀀊􀀕􀀛􀀙􀀊􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀃 􀀍􀀕􀀃 􀀊􀀆􀀐􀀙􀀩􀀉􀀗􀀑􀀃 􀀞􀀆􀀚􀀉􀀑􀀗􀀆􀀞􀀃 􀀊􀀍􀀃 􀀉􀀖􀀝􀀐􀀕􀀊􀀃 􀀐􀀃 􀀚􀀝􀀆􀀙􀀉􀀲􀀉􀀙􀀃 􀀚􀀦􀀉􀀌􀀌􀀧􀀃 􀀐􀀚􀀃 􀀍􀀝􀀝􀀍􀀚􀀆􀀞􀀃 􀀊􀀍􀀃 􀀑􀀆􀀗􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀌
􀀦􀀗􀀍􀀎􀀌􀀆􀀞􀀑􀀆􀁀􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀞
􀀅􀀕􀀇􀀃 􀀊􀀩􀀆􀀃 􀀊􀀆􀀕􀀖􀀃 􀀽􀀆􀀼􀀝􀀆􀀕􀀊􀀃 􀀐􀀞􀀓􀀉􀀙􀀆􀀃 􀀍􀀕􀀃 􀀐􀀚􀀚􀀉􀀚􀀊􀀐􀀗􀀙􀀆􀀾􀀃 􀀖􀀆􀀐􀀗􀀚􀀃 􀀐􀀞􀀓􀀉􀀙􀀆􀀃 􀀍􀀕􀀃 􀀐􀀚􀀚􀀉􀀚􀀊􀀐􀀗􀀙􀀆􀀃 􀀞􀀆􀀕􀀉􀀓􀀆􀀞􀀃 􀀲􀀕􀀍􀀖􀀃 􀀚􀀙􀀉􀀆􀀗􀀊􀀉􀀲􀀉􀀙􀀧􀀃 􀀊􀀆􀀙􀀩􀀗􀀉􀀙􀀐􀀌􀀃 􀀍􀀕􀀃 􀀍􀀊􀀩􀀆􀀕
􀀚􀀝􀀆􀀙􀀉􀀐􀀌􀀉􀁁􀀆􀀞􀀃􀀦􀀗􀀍􀀎􀀌􀀆􀀞􀀑􀀆􀀤
􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀏􀀙􀀚􀀅􀀛􀀇
􀀪􀀸􀀞􀀞􀀆􀀞􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀡􀀤􀀢􀀤􀀃􀀭􀀮􀀳􀀄􀀳􀀯􀀯􀀧􀀃􀀔􀀉􀀊􀀌􀀆􀀃􀁂􀁃􀁃􀀧􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀭􀀯􀀮􀀮􀀮􀀵􀀪􀀐􀀫􀀧􀀃􀀺􀀆􀀝􀀊􀀤􀀃􀀭􀀳􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀨􀀨􀀶􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀮􀀴􀀃􀀺􀀊􀀐􀀊􀀤􀀃􀀯􀀮􀀯􀀯􀁀􀀃􀀐􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀞􀀆􀀞􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀡􀀤􀀢􀀤􀀃􀀭􀀮􀀶􀀄􀀭􀀳􀀯􀀧􀀃􀀔􀀉􀀊􀀌􀀆􀀃􀁃􀁃􀁃􀀧􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀳􀀯􀀳􀀧
􀀸􀀝􀀕􀀤􀀃􀀯􀀶􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀨􀀨􀀷􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀭􀀮􀀃􀀺􀀊􀀐􀀊􀀤􀀃􀀭􀀯􀀵􀀵􀁀􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀡􀀤􀀢􀀤􀀃􀀭􀀮􀀶􀀄􀀯􀀨􀀶􀀧􀀃􀀔􀀉􀀊􀀌􀀆􀀃􀀟􀁃􀀧􀀃􀁄􀁄􀀃􀀷􀀮􀀭􀀪􀀡􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀫􀀧􀀃􀀪􀀚􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀫􀀧􀀃􀀪􀀳􀀫􀀧􀀃􀀷􀀮􀀶􀀪􀀡􀀫􀀪􀀵􀀫􀀧􀀃􀁅􀀙􀀊􀀤􀀃􀀭􀀭􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀨􀀨􀀷􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀭􀀮􀀃􀀺􀀊􀀐􀀊􀀤􀀃􀀳􀀶􀀨􀀴􀀧
􀀳􀀵􀀮􀀯􀀧􀀃􀀳􀀵􀀮􀀷􀁀􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀡􀀤􀀢􀀤􀀃􀀭􀀮􀀰􀀄􀀵􀀷􀀧􀀃􀀔􀀉􀀊􀀌􀀆􀀃􀀟􀁃􀁃􀁃􀀧􀀃􀁄􀁄􀀃􀀴􀀮􀀵􀀪􀀐􀀫􀀧􀀃􀀴􀀭􀀮􀀪􀀙􀀫􀀧􀀃􀀴􀀭􀀭􀀪􀀲􀀫􀀧􀀃􀁅􀀙􀀊􀀤􀀃􀀯􀀷􀀧􀀃􀀯􀀮􀀮􀀭􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀭􀀵􀀃􀀺􀀊􀀐􀀊􀀤􀀃􀀳􀀰􀀰􀀧􀀃􀀳􀀴􀀮􀀧􀀃􀀳􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀡􀀤􀀢􀀤􀀃􀀭􀀮􀀰􀀄􀀭􀀨􀀰􀀧
􀀅􀀃􀀆􀀇􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀊􀀃􀀋􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀃􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀖􀀌􀀏􀀔􀀗􀀃􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀚􀀍􀀌􀀕􀀃􀀕􀀍􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀌􀀌􀀍􀀌􀀏􀀘􀀕􀀘􀀛􀀃􀀜􀀝􀀃􀀞􀀟􀀠􀀉􀀃􀀅􀀃􀀆􀀇􀀇􀀈􀀉
􀀃􀀅􀀃􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀃􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀑􀀔􀀎􀀕􀀃􀀖􀀌􀀃􀀗􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀍􀀃􀀓􀀌􀀃􀀌􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀚􀀏􀀙􀀘􀀃􀀜􀀕􀀝􀀕􀀃􀀞􀀌􀀟􀀑􀀔􀀏􀀍􀀑􀀏􀀓􀀃􀀠􀀌􀀔􀀡􀀎􀀕 􀀆
􀀔􀀉􀀊􀀌􀀆􀀃􀁃􀁃􀁃􀀧􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀭􀀪􀀙􀀫􀀧􀀃􀁆􀀛􀀗􀀆􀀃􀀯􀀵􀀧􀀃􀀯􀀮􀀮􀀯􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀭􀀷􀀃􀀺􀀊􀀐􀀊􀀤􀀃􀀰􀀯􀀴􀁀􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀡􀀤􀀢􀀤􀀃􀀭􀀮􀀰􀀄􀀯􀀰􀀳􀀧􀀃􀀬􀀉􀀓􀀤􀀃􀀻􀀧􀀃􀀔􀀉􀀊􀀌􀀆􀀃􀁃􀀟􀀧􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀶􀀮􀀮􀀯􀀪􀀐􀀫􀀪􀀰􀀫􀀧􀀃􀀪􀀙􀀫􀀪􀀭􀀫􀀧􀀃􀀪􀀆􀀫􀀪􀀭􀀭􀀫􀀧􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀓􀀤􀀃􀀯􀀧􀀃􀀯􀀮􀀮􀀯􀀧
􀀭􀀭􀀷􀀃􀀺􀀊􀀐􀀊􀀤􀀃􀀭􀀴􀀮􀀰􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀴􀀮􀀴􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀴􀀭􀀭􀁀􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀡􀀤􀀢􀀤􀀃􀀭􀀮􀀴􀀄􀀶􀀵􀀴􀀧􀀃􀀔􀀉􀀊􀀌􀀆􀀃􀀟􀁃􀀧􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀷􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀪􀀐􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀫􀀧􀀃􀀪􀀡􀀫􀀧􀀃􀀬􀀆􀀙􀀤􀀃􀀭􀀰􀀧􀀃􀀯􀀮􀀮􀀶􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀭􀀴􀀃􀀺􀀊􀀐􀀊􀀤􀀃􀀳􀀰􀀷􀀯􀁀􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀡􀀤􀀢􀀤􀀃􀀭􀀮􀀨􀀄􀀭􀀰􀀰􀀧
􀀔􀀉􀀊􀀌􀀆􀀃􀁃􀀧􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀭􀀭􀀮􀀪􀀡􀀫􀀪􀀳􀀫􀀪􀀻􀀫􀀧􀀃􀀥􀀐􀀕􀀤􀀃􀀨􀀧􀀃􀀯􀀮􀀮􀀷􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀯􀀮􀀃􀀺􀀊􀀐􀀊􀀤􀀃􀀯􀀮􀀴􀁀􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀡􀀤􀀢􀀤􀀃􀀭􀀭􀀭􀀄􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀧􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀳􀀪􀀞􀀫􀀧􀀃􀀬􀀆􀀙􀀤􀀃􀀯􀀯􀀧􀀃􀀯􀀮􀀮􀀨􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀯􀀳􀀃􀀺􀀊􀀐􀀊􀀤􀀃􀀳􀀶􀀴􀀭􀀤􀀫
􀀒􀀍􀀊􀀆􀀚􀀃􀀍􀀲􀀃􀀬􀀆􀀙􀀉􀀚􀀉􀀍􀀗􀀚􀀃􀀪􀀶􀀯􀀫
􀀭􀀴􀀃􀀘􀀤􀀺􀀤􀀈􀀤􀀸􀀤􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀯􀀳􀀳􀀨􀀸􀀧􀀃􀀭􀀴􀀃􀀘􀀺􀀈􀀸􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀯􀀳􀀳􀀨􀀸
􀀈􀀛􀀕􀀕􀀆􀀗􀀊􀀃􀀊􀀩􀀕􀀍􀀛􀀑􀀩􀀃􀀜􀀤􀀢􀀤􀀃􀀭􀀭􀀵􀀄􀀭􀀰􀀭􀀤
􀀘􀀋􀀜􀀃􀀒􀀉􀀃􀀏􀀒􀀝􀀞􀀟􀀊􀀋􀀑 􀁇􀀃􀀯􀀮􀀭􀀴􀀃􀀔􀀩􀀍􀀖􀀚􀀍􀀗􀀃􀁈􀀆􀀛􀀊􀀆􀀕􀀚􀀤􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀃􀀙􀀌􀀐􀀉􀀖􀀃􀀊􀀍􀀃􀀍􀀕􀀉􀀑􀀉􀀗􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀘􀀤􀀺􀀤􀀃􀁉􀀍􀀓􀀆􀀕􀀗􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀊􀀃􀀱􀀍􀀕􀀦􀀚􀀤
Annex 476
“Fighters and Lovers Case,” Case 399/2008 (Sup. Ct., Den., 25 March 2009)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.

Feb/28/2018 Supreme Court "Fighters and Lovers Case"
1
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“Fighters and Lovers Case”
March 25, 2009
Case 399/2008
March 25, 2009
PRESS RELEASE
The Danish Supreme Court today handed down a decision in the so-called “Fighters and Lovers Case.” The Supreme
Court upheld the decision of the High Court, albeit with the sentences for the accused being suspended, while the
sentence for one of the accused was reduced from a four-month suspended prison sentence to a 60-day suspended
prison sentence.
The case before the Supreme Court concerned six individuals who had been accused of attempting to provide support
to groups engaged in terror, in that they had been involved, via the Fighters and Lovers company, in the sale of T-shirts
with the intent of sending a portion of the proceeds to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and
Fuerzas Armadas Revoluncionarias de Colombia (FARC) organizations.
All were acquitted by the Copenhagen Municipal Court, but were found guilty in the Eastern High Court judgment. The
High Court sentenced two people to six-month unsuspended prison terms; the others were given suspended prison
sentences of four months and 60 days, respectively.
Seven justices took part in the Supreme Court’s hearing of the case. The verdict was unanimous.
The Supreme Court’s decision was based on the following grounds:
“Pursuant to § 114 b (formerly § 114 a) of the Danish Penal Code, it a condition for punishment in connection with the
raising or collection of funds, that the collection, etc., has been carried out for a person, group or association that is
perpetrating or intends to perpetrate acts covered by § 114 of the Penal Code. It is not a requirement that they be
collected for specific perpetrated or future acts of terror. To be convicted under § 114 b, it is enough that evidence
exists that the person, group or association for which the funds were collected is engaged in or intends to engage in acts
of the type and with the particular terrorist intentions specified in § 114, without it being necessary, as in connection
with conviction under § 114, to take a more specific stance with respect to the perpetration and scope of the individual
acts.
The Supreme Court finds, based on the High Court’s description of its assessment of the evidence, that the High Court
did perform an assessment of the evidence in the case that was in accordance with these requirements.
With regard to the claim of the accused that, in its assessment of the evidence, the High Court did not take a stance with
respect to the evidence they presented in the form of reports and witness testimony, it is noted that, based on the
presentation of the case in the High Court’s judgment, that evidence was included in the High Court’s evidentiary
assessment.
As a result of its assessment of the evidence, the High Court accepted as grounds for its decision that FARC and PFLP
have perpetrated serious attacks on a civilian population with the intent of terrorizing that population to a serious extent
or to destabilize the fundamental political, constitutional, economic and social structures in, respectively, Colombia and
Israel in such a way that, given their nature, these acts could cause those countries serious harm. In the case of FARC
this pertained to FARC having murdered civilians, subjected civilians to gross acts of violence, carried out
kidnappings, including kidnappings of politicians and a presidential candidate, and used imprecise mortar shells in
civilian areas, in which civilians became victims. In the case of PFLP, this pertained to PFLP having attacked or
Feb/28/2018 Supreme Court "Fighters and Lovers Case"
2
murdered civilians, including through the use of car bombs and suicide bombers.
Under § 933 Paragraph 2, cf. § 912 Paragraph 1, of the Danish Administration of Justice Act, appeals to the Supreme
Court cannot be based on the High Court having wrongly decided that the accused are to be punished as a result of a
faulty assessment of the evidence in the case. The Supreme Court must thus use the results of the High Court’s review
as the basis for its decision.
According to the preparatory works for § 114 (Legal Affairs Committee’s report in Folketingstidende 2001-02, 2nd
Session, L 35, Addendum B, p. 1466 et seq.), an evaluation as to whether an act is covered under § 114 Paragraph 1
must include whether the act targeted a democratic society that respects the principle of the rule of law, or if it targeted
an occupying power, etc. These circumstances must be included in an overall assessment of all the elements of the case.
The accused have claimed that Israel must be viewed as an occupying power that is violating democracy and the
principle of the rule of law, and that Colombia cannot be considered to be a democratic society that respects the
principle of the rule of law, and that these circumstances must be taken into account in hearing the case. Regardless of
its position with respect to the claims of the accused, the Supreme Court finds that the scope and nature of the acts
which, according to the results of the High Court’s review of the evidence, FARC and PFLP have perpetrated against
civilians must, following an overall assessment, lead to the conclusion that these acts do not fall outside of the scope of
§ 114.
The accused individuals have further claimed that FARC and PFLP must be equated with state actors or the like, and
that their actions in this case must consequently be judged based on the rules regarding war crimes. Based on the
information in the case, the Supreme Court finds no grounds for equating the actions of FARC and PFLP with the use
of power by a state; cf. Item 11 in the preamble to the Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism.
Based on the evidence presented, the Supreme Court finds that the High Court properly referred the aforementioned
actions of FARC and PFLP to § 114.
A, B, C and D acknowledged before the High Court that they had cooperated in the production, sale and distribution of
the T-shirts in question, with the profits to be used to purchase radio equipment for FARC and a printing press for
PFLP.
In the case of F, the High Court found it to be proved that he had similarly cooperated in raising financial funds. The
High Court emphasized in this regard that he had made server capacity available in the knowledge that it had to do with
raising money for FARC and PFLP, and that he had written a draft for a press release.
The High Court based its decision in part on all of the accused having been aware that, or in any case having
considered it to be overwhelmingly likely that FARC and PFLP were engaging in acts covered by § 114, or intended to
do so.
The Supreme Court finds that the fact that the accused do not view FARC or PFLP as terrorist organizations cannot be
ascribed significance with respect to the issue of guilt, insofar as it must be accepted that, based on the High Court’s
evidentiary assessment, they possessed the factual knowledge of the actions of FARC and PFLP required for intent.
Based on the foregoing, and because the assertions made by the accused regarding the humanitarian purpose of their
support and material atypicality cannot lead to impunity, the Supreme Court concurs that A, B, C, D and E are guilty of
attempted violation of § 114 Item 2 as per the indictment.
With regard to F, the High Court has, as noted, emphasized that he had prepared a draft for a press release. Based on
the parties’ unanimous declaration with respect thereto, this element must be omitted in assessing his status, which
consists hereafter solely in that he made server capacity available with the knowledge that it pertained to raising money
for FARC and PFLP.
The Supreme Court finds that this circumstance constitutes assistance that is punishable under § 114 b Paragraph 2 and
not exempt from punishment under § 16 of the Danish Act on Services in the Information Society. The Supreme Court
consequently concurs that F also be found guilty of attempted violation of § 144 Item 2 as per the indictment. His
motion for annulment and remission for retrial can consequently not be granted.
Based on the grounds cited by the High Court, the Supreme Court finds that the sentences handed down for A, B, C, E
and D are appropriate.
Feb/28/2018 Supreme Court "Fighters and Lovers Case"
3
With respect to F, it must now be accepted that he alone made server capacity available. The Supreme Court finds that
the sentence will hereafter be imprisonment for 60 days.
With respect to A, B, E and F, the Supreme Court concurs that the sentences for these accused are suspended.
With respect to C and D, the Supreme Court finds that, under the present circumstances, including that the narrower
scope of § 144 b has given cause for doubt, there is justification for suspending the sentences of these individuals
entirely.
The Supreme Court concurs with the determination in the judgment regarding confiscation.
The Supreme Court hereafter upholds the High Court judgment, subject to the changes that the sentence for F be
reduced to imprisonment for 60 days, and that the sentences for C and D be suspended subject to the conditions cited
below.
The probationary period for all six accused will be calculated from the date of the Supreme Court judgment.
The judgment of the Court
The High Court judgment is upheld, subject to the following changes:
The six-month prison sentence for C is stayed and will be rescinded after one year of probation, subject to the condition
that he does not engage in criminal activity during the probationary period.
The six-month prison sentence for D is stayed and will be rescinded after one year of probation, subject to the condition
that he does not engage in criminal activity during the probationary period.
The suspended sentence for F is reduced to 60 days in prison.
The Danish Treasury will pay the costs of the Supreme Court case.
< Back

Annex 477
French Cour de cassation, Judgement of May 21st 2014, No. 13-83758

􀀐 􀀐
COUR DE CASSATION
BULLETIN DES ARRÊTS
CHAMBRE CRIMINELLE
NO 5
MAI 2014
319
􀀐 􀀐
qu’il a déjà été indiqué, il n’est pas contestable que s’il est
établi qu’au mépris des dispositions de l’article 3 de la
convention de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme des aveux
ou des mises en cause ont été obtenus grâce la torture, cette
violation des droits fondamentaux prévaut sur les principes
de reconnaissance et de confiance mutuelles et fait obstacle
à l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen ; qu’outre qu’il
n’y a pas lieu à interprétation de ce texte la question telle
qu’elle est proposée comporte l’affirmation qu’il est établi
que la mise en cause de M. X... a été obtenue grâce à la
torture ce qui n’est nullement établi en l’espèce ; qu’il n’y a
en conséquence pas lieu à question préjudicielle ;
« alors que constituait une question sérieuse le point de
savoir si, dans le cas d’un mandat d’arrêt européen fondé
sur les déclarations d’une personne lors de sa garde à vue,
au cours de laquelle elle a dénoncé avoir subi des mauvais
traitements et tortures, l’article 1er, § 3, de la Décisioncadre
du Conseil de l’union européenne du 13 juin 2002,
selon lequel ladite Décision-cadre “ne saurait avoir pour
effet de modifier l’obligation de respecter les droits fondamentaux
et les principes juridiques fondamentaux tels
qu’ils sont consacrés par l’article 6 du Traité sur l’Union
européenne” permet au juge de l’Etat requis d’écarter le
principe de confiance mutuelle pour non-respect par l’Etat
d’émission des dispositions de l’article 47 de la Charte des
droits de l’homme de l’Union européenne, des articles 3
et 6 de la Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme
et des libertés fondamentales, et de l’article 15 de la
Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements
cruels, inhumains ou dégradants ; que la solution de
la présente procédure dépend de la réponse apportée à cette
question par la CJUE dès lors qu’un recours devant la
Cour européenne des droits de l’homme présentait le risque
d’aboutir à la constatation d’une violation de l’article 3 de
la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de
l’homme ; que dès lors la chambre de l’instruction, qui a
retenu qu’il n’y avait pas lieu à interprétation de ce texte
et que la question posée supposait établi, ce qui ne l’était
pas, le fait que la mise en cause de M. X... ait été obtenue
grâce à la torture, ne pouvait refuser de saisir à titre préjudiciel
la cour de justice de l’Union européenne sans violer
l’article 267 du TFUE ; qu’en tant que de besoin, il
appartiendra à la Cour de cassation de saisir préjudiciellement
la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne de ladite
question » ;
Les moyens étant réunis ;
Attendu qu’il résulte de l’arrêt attaqué et des pièces
de la procédure qu’en vue de l’exercice de poursuites,
les autorités espagnoles ont émis le 10 décembre 2008
un mandat d’arrêt européen contre M. X... visant des
faits de terrorisme ;
Attendu que, pour ordonner la remise différée de
l’intéressé qui faisait valoir que les charges retenues à
son encontre reposaient sur les déclarations de M. A...
recueillies en violation des articles 3 et 6 de la Convention
européenne des droits de l’homme, l’arrêt, après
avoir constaté que le mandat d’arrêt européen satisfaisait
aux prescriptions de l’article 695-13 du code de
procédure pénale, relève, que les allégations de M. A...
étaient infondées, la juridiction suprême espagnole
ayant acquitté les gardes civils des accusations portées à
leur encontre, et que la saisine, à la supposer avérée, par
ce dernier, de la Cour européenne des droits de
l’homme ne constitue pas une voie de recours contre la
décision définitive de la cour suprême espagnole ; que
les juges ajoutent, pour dire n’y avoir lieu à transmettre
à la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne une question
préjudicielle sur l’interprétation de l’article 1er, § 3,
de la Décision-cadre du Conseil du 13 juin 2002 relative
au mandat d’arrêt européen, qu’il n’est pas contestable
que, s’il est établi qu’au mépris de l’article 3 de la
Convention européenne des droits de l’homme des
aveux ou des mises en cause ont été obtenus grâce à la
torture, cette violation des droits fondamentaux prévaut
sur les principes de reconnaissance et de confiance
mutuelles et fait obstacle à l’exécution du mandat d’arrêt
européen ;
Attendu qu’en prononçant ainsi, la chambre, à
laquelle il ne saurait être reproché de ne pas s’être
expliquée davantage qu’elle ne l’a fait, dès lors que les
griefs invoqués par le demandeur demeuraient à l’état
de simples allégations, a justifié sa décision ;
D’où il suit, et sans qu’il y ait lieu de poser une
question préjudicielle à la Cour de justice de l’Union
européenne, que les moyens ne sauraient être admis ;
Et attendu que l’arrêt a été rendu par une chambre
de l’instruction compétente et composée conformément
à la loi, et que la procédure est régulière ;
REJETTE le pourvoi.
Président : M. Louvel – Rapporteur : Mme Moreau –
Avocat général : M. Le Baut – Avocat : SCP Nicolay¨,
de Lanouvelle et Hannotin.
Sur l’examen des conditions dans lesquelles les
éléments fondant les charges objet du mandat d’arrêt
européen ont été recueillies, évolution par rapport
à :
Crim., 5 avril 2006, pourvoi no 06-81.835, Bull.
crim. 2006, no 106 (rejet).
No 136
RESPONSABILITE PENALE
Personne morale – Conditions – Commission
d’une infraction pour le compte de la personne
morale par l’un de ses organes ou représentants –
Applications diverses – Association – Membres –
Organisation et gestion de la partie clandestine
des activités constituant un soutien logistique et
financier à une organisation terroriste
Est justifiée la décision de la cour d’appel qui déclare une
association coupable d’association de malfaiteurs en relation
avec une entreprise terroriste, financement du terrorisme,
par des constatations qui établissent que certains
membres identifiés de cette association, mandatés par
une organisation terroriste et également poursuivis, organisaient,
supervisaient, coordonnaient la partie clandestine
des activités de cette association, au profit de l’organisation
terroriste, notamment les réunions régulières de
cadres venus de divers pays européens, la propagande, le
recueil des fonds, la tenue de la comptabilité et, plus
généralement, dirigeaient, pour son compte, les opérations
représentant la contribution délibérée de celle-ci au
soutien de l’organisation terroriste.
REJET des pourvois formés par M. Nedim X... se
disant Y..., M. Kadri Z..., l’association Centre culturel
kurde Ahmet Kaya, contre l’arrêt de la cour d’appel
de Paris, chambre 8-1, en date du 23 avril 2013,
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qui, pour association de malfaiteurs en vue de la préparation
d’un acte de terrorisme et financement
d’entreprise terroriste, a condamné le premier, à
quatre ans d’emprisonnement avec sursis, le
deuxième, à trois ans d’emprisonnement avec sursis,
a prononcé la dissolution de la dernière, et a
ordonné la confiscation des scellés.
21 mai 2014 No 13-83.758
LA COUR,
Joignant les pourvois en raison de la connexité ;
I. – Sur les pourvois formés par MM. X... et Z... :
Attendu qu’aucun moyen n’est produit ;
II. – Sur le pourvoi formé par l’association Centre
culturel kurde (CCK) Ahmet Kaya :
Vu le mémoire produit ;
Sur le premier moyen de cassation, pris de la violation
des articles 11 et 14 de la Convention européenne
des droits de l’homme, 1er de la Déclaration des droits
de l’homme et du citoyen, de la loi du 1er juillet 1901
relative à la liberté d’association, ensemble violation du
principe de non-discrimination :
« en ce que l’arrêt confirmatif attaqué a déclaré la prévenue
coupable de participation à une association de malfaiteurs
en vue de la préparation d’un acte de terrorisme et
de financement d’entreprise terroriste et l’a condamnée à la
peine de dissolution ;
« aux motifs que la cour relève qu’il ressort des éléments
recueillis au cours de l’enquête et de l’instruction, que
l’association CCK Ahmet Kaya était “la vitrine légale du
PKK”, de nombreux membres de cette organisation fréquentant
ses locaux et le présentant comme un lieu de rencontre
de propagande, d’information et de soutien à cette
organisation ; que d’ailleurs Metin A... le représentant
légal du CCK, ne contestait pas devant le juge d’instruction
que “des gens de tous horizons” du PKK, du
TKPLM, du MKP s’exprimaient mais expliquait qu’il ne
pouvait les censurer ; qu’elle relève encore que de nombreux
documents comportant des listes de comptes ont été
saisis dans les armoires de l’association, les chiffres y figurant
étant bien supérieurs à la somme de 5 euros représentant
le montant de la cotisation de chaque adhérent. Si le
montant global collecté par le biais du CCK ne pouvait
être déterminé avec précision, la comptabilité découverte
étant partielle et les dons perçus en numéraire ou en
chèque, encaissés sur le compte des collecteurs, il ressort
toutefois de la procédure que le CCK a favorisé les activités
et le financement de membres du PKK sur le territoire
national, même si l’association a effectivement poursuivi
d’autres buts, culturels notamment, présentés comme étant
dans l’intérêt de la communauté kurde en France ; le
CCK a ainsi assuré le soutien du PKK, la propagande de
ce mouvement et son financement sur le territoire national
et en a coordonné les collecteurs [...] ; que la Cour considère
enfin que le rapport de police établi en 2008 et au
demeurant avant la fin de l’instruction intervenue le
20 décembre 2010, dont il est fait état dans les conclusions
déposées par le conseil de l’association, selon lequel
“l’hypothèse d’un réseau financier occulte ne peut à ce jour
être confirmée” n’est pas de nature à remettre en cause les
autres éléments du dossier et les déclarations de certains
coprévenus qui établissent au contraire, qu’il existait sur le
sol français une activité des prévenus consistant à apporter
une aide financière aux Kurdes restés au pays et à la guérilla,
cette aide servant notamment à l’achat d’armes et
d’explosifs et à l’entretien des combattants ;
« alors que nul ne peut faire l’objet d’une condamnation
et d’une sanction pénales en raison de son appartenance à
une minorité nationale ; qu’il ressort des constatations des
juges du fond que la prévenue a vocation à rassembler et
représenter l’ensemble de la communauté et de la culture
kurde en France ; que le PKK, de par son importance au
sein de la communauté kurde, est nécessairement amené à
être présent et à exercer une influence au sein de cette
communauté ; que, dès lors, déclarer coupable et dissoudre
une association culturelle kurde en raison de ses liens supposés
avec le PKK revient à interdire toute forme associative
à la communauté kurde de France ; qu’en condamnant
l’association CCK pour le financement et la
participation à une entreprise terroriste et en en prononçant
la dissolution, les juges du fond ont violé le principe
de nondiscrimination visé ci-dessus » ;
Attendu que le moyen, mélangé de fait et de droit,
est nouveau en ce qu’il invoque, pour la première fois
devant la Cour de cassation, la méconnaissance des articles
11 et 14 de la Convention européenne des droits
de l’homme, et comme tel irrecevable ;
Sur le deuxième moyen de cassation, pris de la violation
des articles 421-1, 421-2-1 et 421-2-2 du code
pénal, 485, 591 et 593 du code de procédure pénal,
défaut de motifs, manque de base légale :
« en ce que l’arrêt confirmatif attaqué a déclaré l’association
prévenue coupable de participation à une association
de malfaiteurs en vue de la préparation d’un acte de
terrorisme ;
« aux motifs que “les diligences entreprises ont permis de
faire apparaître l’existence, sur le territoire français, d’un
réseau structuré de militants actifs du PKK chargé de procéder
à des collectes de fonds au bénéfice de cette organisation
; que les écoutes téléphoniques ont confirmé que le
réseau était hiérarchisé avec des responsables en Europe, en
France et locaux, ayant des contacts fréquents entre eux et
partageant l’idéologie du PKK auquel ils apportaient leur
soutien [...] ; que les prévenus n’ont pu ignorer, comme
l’ont démontré les premiers juges dans la décision déférée,
les idées développées par le PKK, les actes déjà intervenus
et revendiqués par le mouvement, revendication dont la
presse internationale se faisait l’écho ; qu’en poursuivant
leur action, ils ont ainsi manifesté une adhésion à la cause
et aux moyens de ladite cause et se sont engagés sciemment
dans l’organisation illicite avec la volonté d’y apporter une
aide efficace dans la poursuite du but que celle-ci s’était
assignée. Elle [la cour] constate qu’il n’est nullement reproché
aux prévenus, comme le soutient la défense, d’avoir
commis une des infractions énumérées aux articles 421-1
ou 421-2 du code pénal ni même d’avoir commis des
crimes ou des délits en Turquie mais d’avoir participé à
une organisation terroriste, délit prévu par l’article 421-2-1
du code pénal. Elle rappelle que cet article dispose que la
participation à une entente établie en vue de la préparation
d’un des actes de terrorisme visés aux articles 421-1
et 421-2 du code pénal constitue un acte de terrorisme et
que cette participation est caractérisée dès lors qu’un ou
plusieurs faits matériels ont été commis par un individu et
qu’il est bien évidemment démontré que celui-ci entendait
ainsi par cette action, soutenir l’organisation critiquée ;
qu’elle constate en conséquence que les juridictions françaises
sont compétentes pour connaître des faits matériels
reprochés aux prévenus commis en France et que les articles
visés par les avocats au soutien de leurs conclusions ne
321
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sont pas applicables en l’espèce [...] ; que la cour relève
qu’il ressort des éléments recueillis au cours de l’enquête et
de l’instruction, que l’association CCK Ahmet Kaya était
“la vitrine légale du PKK”, de nombreux membres de cette
organisation fréquentant ses locaux et le présentant comme
un lieu de rencontre de propagande, d’information et de
soutien à cette organisation. D’ailleurs Metin A... le représentant
légal du CCK, ne contestait pas devant le juge
d’instruction que “des gens de tous horizons” du PKK, du
TKPLM, du MKP s’exprimaient mais expliquait qu’il ne
pouvait les censurer ; qu’elle relève encore que de nombreux
documents comportant des listes de comptes ont été
saisis dans les armoires de l’association, les chiffres y figurant
étant bien supérieurs à la somme de 5 euros représentant
le montant de la cotisation de chaque adhérent. Si le
montant global collecté par le biais du CCK ne pouvait
être déterminé avec précision, la comptabilité découverte
étant partielle et les dons perçus en numéraire ou en
chèque, encaissés sur le compte des collecteurs, il ressort
toutefois de la procédure que le CCK a favorisé les activités
et le financement de membres du PKK sur le territoire
national, même si l’association a effectivement poursuivi
d’autres buts, culturels notamment, présentés comme étant
dans l’intérêt de la communauté kurde en France ; que le
CCK a ainsi assuré le soutien du PKK, la propagande de
ce mouvement et son financement sur le territoire national
et en a coordonné les collecteurs ; que la cour, pour ces
motifs et les motifs liminaires ci-dessus exposés, en réponse
aux conclusions déposées par la défense et ceux du tribunal
qu’elle adopte expressément, sauf à ne pas retenir comme
élément à charge la perquisition effectuée en 2009 hors de
la période de prévention, les faits étant établis pour les
deux infractions visées à l’ordonnance de renvoi, confirmera
le jugement sur la déclaration de culpabilité dans les
termes de la prévention, la cour relevant, en tout état de
cause, que la participation à l’association terroriste visée à
l’ordonnance de renvoi est caractérisée, pour l’intéressée,
par les faits matériels relevés par le tribunal et par la cour,
entente à laquelle le CCK en tant que personne morale a
sciemment adhéré, en connaissant les objectifs ;
« alors que l’infraction de participation à une association
de malfaiteurs en vue de la préparation d’un acte de
terrorisme suppose pour être constituée que soit rapportée la
preuve de ce qu’un acte de terrorisme était en préparation,
préparation caractérisée par un ou plusieurs actes matériels
; qu’en constatant que les prévenus étaient en lien
avec une organisation ayant commis des actes terroristes
sans rechercher si de tels actes étaient en préparation
durant la période de la prévention et si les prévenus
avaient matériellement contribué à leur préparation, la
cour d’appel a violé l’article 421-2-1 du code pénal et
privé sa décision de base légale » ;
Sur le troisième moyen de cassation, pris de la violation
des articles 121-1 et 121-2 du code pénal, 591 du
code procédure pénale :
« en ce que l’arrêt confirmatif attaqué a déclaré l’association
prévenue coupable de participation à une association
de malfaiteurs en vue de la préparation d’un acte de
terrorisme et de financement d’entreprise terroriste ;
« aux motifs que l’association CCK en tant que personne
morale a adhéré à l’entente terroriste visée à la prévention
et assuré le soutien financier du PKK ;
« alors que nul n’est responsable pénalement que de son
propre fait ; que la mise en cause de la responsabilité
pénale des personnes morales ne peut être retenue qu’à la
condition de démontrer que les infractions ont été
commises, pour leur compte, par leurs organes ou représentants
; qu’en se bornant à constater que certains des
membres de l’association prévenue étaient adhérents à l’organisation
terroriste et en attribuant la responsabilité
pénale directement à la personne morale sans rechercher si
l’infraction avait été commise par l’un de ses organes ou
représentants, la cour d’appel a violé les dispositions
susvisées » ;
Les moyens étant réunis ;
Attendu que, pour déclarer l’association Centre
culturel kurde Ahmet Kaya coupable des infractions de
participation à une association de malfaiteurs en relation
avec une entreprise terroriste, financement d’une
entreprise terroriste, l’arrêt attaqué relève que l’enquête
et l’information, notamment les résultats des commissions
rogatoires internationales, perquisitions et surveillances,
l’exploitation de ses comptes bancaires, les déclarations
des personnes mises en examen et des témoins
établissent que cette association servait régulièrement de
lieu de rencontre à des membres importants du Parti
des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK) et de ses émanations,
qu’elle était un lieu majeur d’élaboration et de
diffusion de la propagande pour le compte de celui-ci
et se chargeait de la collecte de fonds destinés à son
financement ; que les juges ajoutent que, si cette personne
morale a effectivement poursuivi d’autres buts,
notamment culturels, présentés comme étant dans l’intérêt
de la communauté kurde en France, elle avait également
pour objet d’assurer un soutien logistique et
financier au PKK, organisation terroriste ou à ses émanations,
dont elle constituait la vitrine légale ; que les
constatations de l’arrêt et du jugement qu’il confirme
établissent également que certains membres de cette
association, mandatés par le PKK ou des organisations
assimilées, parmi lesquels MM. Kadri Z... et
Nedim X..., également poursuivis, organisaient, supervisaient,
coordonnaient la partie clandestine des activités
du Centre culturel kurde au profit du PKK, notamment
les réunions régulières de cadres venus de divers
pays européens, la propagande, le recueil des fonds, la
tenue de la comptabilité et, plus généralement, dirigeaient,
pour le compte de l’association, les opérations
représentant sa contribution au soutien de l’organisation
terroriste ;
Attendu qu’en l’état de ces motifs reproduits partiellement
aux moyens, qui établissent que l’association
Centre culturel kurde Ahmet Kaya a apporté, en
connaissance de cause, par ses organes ou ses représentants,
en l’espèce par les dirigeants de fait identifiés cidessus,
ayant agi pour son compte, un soutien logistique
et financier effectif à une organisation classée
comme terroriste, la cour d’appel a caractérisé en tous
leurs éléments les infractions dont elle l’a déclarée coupable
;
D’où il suit que les moyens ne sauraient être accueillis
;
Sur le quatrième moyen de cassation, pris de la violation
des articles 6, 7 et 11 de la Convention européenne
des droits de l’homme, 8 de la Déclaration des
droits de l’homme et du citoyen, de la loi du 1er juillet
1901 relative à la liberté d’association, des articles
111-3 et 131-39 du code pénal, 485, 591 et 593
du code de procédure pénale, défaut de motifs, manque
de base légale :
« en ce que l’arrêt confirmatif attaqué a prononcé la
dissolution de l’association CCK Ahmet Kaya ;
« aux motifs propres que selon l’article 6, § 3, de la
Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, tout prévenu
a droit d’être informé de la nature et de la cause de
322
􀀐 􀀐
la prévention dont il est l’objet et doit, par suite, être mis
en mesure de se défendre sur les divers chefs d’infractions
qui lui sont imputées ; que la cour constate que l’association
CCK Ahmet Kaya représentée par son président, a
toujours été assistée d’un avocat devant le juge d’instruction,
le tribunal et la cour, que la copie de l’ordonnance
de renvoi a été jointe au mandement de citation devant le
tribunal ; que dès lors, nonobstant le seul visa de l’article
422-6 du code pénal sur la peine complémentaire de
confiscation encourue, à l’ordonnance de renvoi, à l’exclusion
de l’article 422-5 du code pénal prévoyant les autres
peines, l’ensemble des constatations qui précèdent permet à
la cour de s’assurer que l’association CCK Ahmet Kaya a
été informée, dès la première comparution devant le magistrat
instructeur, d’une manière détaillée, de la nature et de
la cause de l’accusation portée contre elle et a disposé du
temps et des facilités nécessaires à la préparation de sa
défense ; que les dispositions de l’article 6, § 3, de la
Convention européenne des droits de l’homme n’ont donc
pas été méconnues ; que la cour relève qu’il ressort des éléments
recueillis au cours de l’enquête et de l’instruction,
que l’association CCK Ahmet Kaya était “la vitrine légale
du PKK”, de nombreux membres de cette organisation fréquentant
ses locaux et le présentant comme un lieu de rencontre
de propagande, d’information et de soutien à cette
organisation. D’ailleurs Metin A... le représentant légal du
CCK, ne contestait pas devant le juge d’instruction que
“des gens de tous horizons” du PKK, du TKPLM, du
MKP s’exprimaient mais expliquait qu’il ne pouvait les
censurer ; qu’elle relève encore que de nombreux documents
comportant des listes de comptes ont été saisis dans les
armoires de l’association, les chiffres y figurant étant bien
supérieurs à la somme de 5 euros représentant le montant
de la cotisation de chaque adhérent. Si le montant global
collecté par le biais du CCK ne pouvait être déterminé
avec précision, la comptabilité découverte étant partielle et
les dons perçus en numéraire ou en chèque, encaissés sur le
compte des collecteurs, il ressort toutefois de la procédure
que le CCK a favorisé les activités et le financement de
membres du PKK sur le territoire national, même si l’association
a effectivement poursuivi d’autres buts, culturels
notamment, présentés comme étant dans l’intérêt de la
communauté kurde en France ; le CCK a ainsi assuré le
soutien du PKK, la propagande de ce mouvement et son
financement sur le territoire national et en a coordonné les
collecteurs ; [...] que la cour confirmera la dissolution de
l’association CCK prononcée à bon droit par le tribunal,
seule peine de nature à sanctionner justement les infractions
commises et le soutien apporté à une organisation terroriste
;
« aux motifs adoptés que la première perquisition, effectuée
dans le cadre de la présente enquête, avait permis d’y
saisir : de très nombreux documents manuscrits et
comptables associant des noms et des surnoms de mis en
examen de ce dossier (notamment B..., C..., D..., E...,
F..., G...) avec des sommes d’argent dans différentes
régions, villes, un document récapitulatif de la collecte de
sommes en 2005 (1 134 854 euros), un document récapitulatif
correspondant à la clôture des comptes 2006, des
mentions de sommes d’argent excédant de beaucoup le
budget officiel du CCK, des carnets à souches dont certains
remplis avec la mention TECAK inscrite sur chacun des
reçus ; des blocs-notes contenant principalement des montants
associés à des noms ainsi que des notes prises pendant
des réunions et des congrès relatives au PKK ; des documents
de propagande du PKK, d’affiches d’Abdullalh H...,
de drapeaux de posters de combattants ; des supports informatiques
contenant de très nombreux fichiers divers et
variés, la découverte d’écrits, d’entretiens avec ou sur
Abdullah H..., des rapports du YJA dont un daté du
28 septembre 2006 rendant compte principalement de
l’avancement des travaux de campagne et de la situation
organisationnelle et financière de Paris, un tract signé
PAJK (parti des femmes libres du Kurdistan) rédigé à l’occasion
du 29e arrondissement [sic] de la fondation du
PKK ainsi qu’un discours de Murat, un questionnaire sous
forme QCM comportant des questions sur le PKK, des
exemplaires de bulletins de vote destinés à être utilisés lors
des élections des membres de l’assemblée du conseil général
du KONGRA GEL, une circulaire signée Comité de la
défense du Peuple du KKK [sic] et adressée à tous les
commandants et combattants du HPG, une lettre datée du
7 décembre 2006 signée du “comité des Martyrs” et adressée
à la famille I..., l’informant de ce que leur fils
Kasim I... était tombé martyr le 20 décembre 1994 au
cours d’une fusillade à Bingol ; divers dessins représentant
le marteau et la faucille, une kalachnikov, l’étoile du drapeau
du PKK, des documents relatifs à des extraits du
livre d’Abdullah H..., des interviews de ce leader en prison,
divers articles sur la place de la femme et sur les
combattants martyrs issus du magazine Serxwebun, un
historique du PKK [... motifs non adoptés en appel] ; que
par ailleurs, dès le 18 octobre 2006, la direction de la surveillance
du territoire (DST) avait indiqué qu’en plus de
ses activités culturelles légales, le CCK servait également de
lieu pour des conférences ou des réunions clandestines des
cadres du PKK, ce qu’avaient d’ailleurs admis notamment
Riza J... et Burcin K... dans leurs déclarations à la police ;
qu’enfin les éléments de comptabilités occultes, manifestement
en rapport avec le produit des collectes de fonds effectuées
pour le compte du PKK, avaient été saisis dans une
armoire de cette association ; que dès lors et malgré les
dénégations des responsables du CCK, cette association sera
déclarée coupable des infractions qui lui sont imputées ;
qu’en conséquence, il y a lieu d’en prononcer la dissolution
;
« 1o alors que le principe de légalité de la peine s’oppose
à ce qu’une peine soit prononcée alors que toutes les conditions
requises par la loi ne seraient pas réunies ; qu’en
vertu de l’article 131-39 du code pénal, la peine de dissolution
ne peut être prononcée qu’à l’encontre des personnes
morales créées ou détournées de leur objet pour commettre
les faits incriminés ; qu’en prononçant la dissolution du
CCK alors même qu’il ressortait de ses constatations que
l’objet initial et licite de l’association prévenue avait été
préservé, la cour d’appel a violé l’article 131-39 du code
pénal et le principe de légalité des peines ;
« 2o alors que tout arrêt doit comporter les motifs
propres à justifier son dispositif ; qu’en vertu de l’article
131-39 du code pénal, la peine de dissolution ne peut
être prononcée à l’encontre des partis ou groupements politiques
; que l’entière condamnation de l’association prévenue
repose sur sa supposée affiliation au parti des travailleurs
du Kurdistan, parti politique turc ; qu’en ne
recherchant pas si cette association était susceptible d’être
qualifiée de parti ou groupement politique et en en prononçant
la dissolution, la cour d’appel a insuffisamment
motivé sa décision au regard de l’article 131-39 du code
pénal ;
« 3o alors que tout prévenu a le droit d’être informé de
la nature et de la cause de l’accusation portée contre lui ;
que cette information comprend celle, nécessaire à l’exercice
des droits de la défense, relative à la nature des peines
encourues ; qu’en constatant que l’association prévenue
n’avait pas été informée de ce qu’elle encourrait la dissolution
sans en conclure que ses droits de la défense avaient
été méconnus, la cour d’appel a violé les prescriptions de
l’article 6, § 3, de la Convention européenne des droits de
l’homme ;
323
􀀐 􀀐
« 4o alors que peuvent seules être prononcées des peines
strictement nécessaires et proportionnées ; que la peine de
dissolution constitue une atteinte grave à la liberté d’association
et implique à ce titre que sa nécessité et sa proportionnalité
au regard des faits commis et du but poursuivi
soient spécifiquement motivées ; qu’en prononçant la peine
de dissolution en s’abstenant de toute motivation, la cour
d’appel a insuffisamment motivé sa décision et violé les
principes de nécessité et de proportionnalité des peines » ;
Attendu que, d’une part, pour prononcer la dissolution
de l’association Centre culturel kurde Ahmet Kaya,
après l’avoir déclarée coupable de participation à une
association de malfaiteurs en relation avec une entreprise
terroriste et de financement du terrorisme, l’arrêt
attaqué retient que cette personne morale a sciemment
adhéré, en connaissant les objectifs recherchés, à une
entente destinée à assurer, sur le territoire français, la
propagande et le financement du PKK, servant notamment
à l’achat d’armes et d’explosifs ainsi qu’à l’entretien
des combattants de ce mouvement ; que les juges
ajoutent que cette dissolution est la seule peine de
nature à sanctionner justement les infractions commises
et le soutien apporté à une organisation terroriste ; que,
d’autre part, le prononcé de la dissolution d’une association
étant rendu possible par l’article 422-5 du code
pénal, qui renvoie à l’article 131-39 du même code,
pour déterminer les peines encourues par les personnes
morales déclarées coupables des infractions prévues par
les articles 421-1, 421-2-1 et 421-2-2 dudit code, visés
par l’ordonnance de renvoi devant le tribunal correctionnel,
il en résulte qu’en l’absence d’incertitude sur
l’objet de la prévention et la peine encourue, l’omission,
dans l’ordonnance précitée, de la mention du texte
applicable à la dissolution ne saurait entraîner la nullité
;
Attendu qu’en l’état de ces motifs et en l’absence de
toute cause de nullité, la cour d’appel a justifié sa décision,
sans méconnaître les dispositions conventionnelles
dont la violation est alléguée au moyen ;
D’où il suit que le moyen ne peut qu’être écarté ;
Et attendu que l’arrêt est régulier en la forme ;
REJETTE les pourvois.
Président : M. Louvel – Rapporteur : Mme Caron –
Avocat général : M. Lacan – Avocat : SCP Waquet,
Farge et Hazan.
Sur la responsabilité pénale d’une personne
morale résultant d’une infraction commise par l’un
de ses organes ou représentants, à rapprocher :
Crim., 11 décembre 2012, pourvoi no 11-87.421, Bull.
crim. 2012, no 274 (rejet), et les arrêts cités.
Sur la nécessité de rechercher si l’infraction a été
commise pour le compte de la personne morale par
l’un de ses organes ou représentants, à rapprocher :
Crim., 1er avril 2014, pourvoi no 12-86.501, Bull.
crim. 2014, no 99 (cassation), et les arrêts cités.
Sur la qualité de représentant de la personne
morale, à rapprocher :
Crim., 25 mars 2014, pourvoi no 13-80.376, Bull.
crim. 2014, no 94 (rejet), et l’arrêt cité.
No 137
1o ACCIDENT DE LA CIRCULATION
Victime – Victime autre que le conducteur – Loi
du 5 juillet 1985 – Dispositions d’ordre public
de la loi du 5 juillet 1985 – Compatibilité –
Application – Règles de la responsabilité du fait
d’autrui – Portée
2o ASSURANCE
Assureur appelé en garantie – Juridictions pénales –
Intervention ou mise en cause – Assureur du
prévenu ou du civilement responsable – Subrogation
dans les droits de la victime – Action
récursoire contre des codébiteurs solidaires –
Recevabilité (non)
1o Les dispositions d’ordre public de la loi du 5 juillet
1985 relatives à l’indemnisation des victimes d’accidents
de la circulation n’excluent pas celles de l’article
1384, alinéa 5, du code civil relatives à la
responsabilité du commettant du fait de son préposé.
Justifie sa décision la cour d’appel qui dit non tenu à
indemnisation à l’égard de la victime le préposé,
condamné pour blessures involontaires, conducteur du
véhicule d’un tiers dans le cadre de l’activité accomplie
pour le compte de son commettant.
2o L’assureur couvrant la responsabilité civile du prévenu,
conducteur non autorisé d’un véhicule automobile et de
son civilement responsable, qui a indemnisé la victime
en cette qualité, ne peut exercer, devant la juridiction
répressive, contre le responsable de l’accident ayant
obtenu la garde ou la conduite du véhicule sans autorisation,
l’action récursoire prévue à l’article L. 211-1
du code des assurances.
CASSATION PARTIELLE sans renvoi sur les pourvois
formés par M. Frédéric X..., l’Etablissement national
des invalides de la Marine, parties intervenantes,
contre l’arrêt de la cour d’appel de Poitiers, chambre
correctionnelle, en date du 21 décembre 2012, qui,
dans la procédure suivie contre M. Jean-François Y...
du chef de blessures involontaires, a prononcé sur les
intérêts civils.
27 mai 2014 No 13-80.849
LA COUR,
Joignant les pourvois en raison de la connexité ;
Vu les mémoires en demande, en défense et les
observations complémentaires produits ;
Attendu qu’il résulte de l’arrêt attaqué et des pièces
de procédure que M. Y..., marin pêcheur, chargé par
son employeur, M. X..., de placer le produit de la
pêche dans la glacière de la criée du port, en a été
empêché par une fourgonnette arrêtée devant le bâti􀀵􀁈􀁍􀁈􀁗
􀀵􀁰􀁉􀁰􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖
􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈
􀀤􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁇􀁌􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁌􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗
􀀱􀂃􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁒􀁌􀀝􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀐􀀛􀀖􀀚􀀘􀀛
􀀳􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁰􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑
􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀯􀁒􀁘􀁙􀁈􀁏􀀃􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗
􀀰􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁕􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁘􀁕
􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁊􀁰􀁑􀁰􀁕􀁄􀁏
􀀶􀀦􀀳􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁗􀀏􀀃􀀩􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀫􀁄􀁝􀁄􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁗􀀋􀁖􀀌
􀀷􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁰􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁏
􀀵􀀨􀀳􀀸􀀥􀀯􀀬􀀴􀀸􀀨􀀃􀀩􀀵􀀤􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀬􀀶􀀨
􀀤􀀸􀀃􀀱􀀲􀀰􀀃􀀧􀀸􀀃􀀳􀀨􀀸􀀳􀀯􀀨􀀃􀀩􀀵􀀤􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀬􀀶
􀀯􀀤􀀃􀀦􀀲􀀸􀀵􀀃􀀧􀀨􀀃􀀦􀀤􀀶􀀶􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀏􀀃􀀦􀀫􀀤􀀰􀀥􀀵􀀨􀀃􀀦􀀵􀀬􀀰􀀬􀀱􀀨􀀯􀀯􀀨􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁲􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀝
􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁒􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀀝
􀀐􀀃􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀱􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁐􀀃􀀻􀀑􀀑􀀑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀽􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀃􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁇􀁕􀁌􀀃􀀼􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀏
􀀐􀀃􀀯􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁎􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁜􀁄􀀏
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁲􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀳􀀤􀀵􀀬􀀶􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀛􀀐􀀔􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁕􀁌􀁏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁏􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑
􀁙􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁐􀁑􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁌􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁖
􀁇􀀊􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁆􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁘􀁛􀁌􀁱􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁆􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄
􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁱􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁰􀁖􀀃􀀞
􀀯􀁄􀀃􀀦􀀲􀀸􀀵􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁕􀁱􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀚􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁌􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀃􀁒􀁿􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁪
􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀙􀀚􀀐􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁰􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀝􀀃􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀯􀁒􀁘􀁙􀁈􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀀰􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁕􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁘􀁕􀀏􀀃􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁰􀀏
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀞
􀀪􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀝􀀃􀀰􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀽􀁌􀁗􀁄􀀃􀀞
􀀶􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀦􀀤􀀵􀀲􀀱􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁰􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁉􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀺􀀤􀀴􀀸􀀨􀀷􀀏􀀃􀀩􀀤􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀃􀁈􀁗
􀀫􀀤􀀽􀀤􀀱􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀰􀀑􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁊􀁰􀁑􀁰􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀯􀀤􀀦􀀤􀀱􀀃􀀞
􀀭􀁒􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁒􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀀞
􀀬􀀐􀀶􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁒􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀀰􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀻􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀼􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀝
􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁄􀁘􀁆􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁜􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁑􀀊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁇􀁘􀁌􀁗􀀃􀀞
􀀬􀀬􀀐􀀶􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁒􀁌􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁰􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁎􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀌􀀃􀀤􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁜􀁄􀀃􀀝
􀀹􀁘􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁰􀁐􀁒􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁇􀁘􀁌􀁗􀀃􀀞
􀀶􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁌􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁜􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁰􀁈􀁑􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈
􀁏􀀊􀁋􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃􀀔􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀀧􀁰􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁋􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁜􀁈􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁌􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀔􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀓􀀔􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁰
􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀞
􀀅􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁲􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁔􀁘􀁰􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁏􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑
􀁙􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁐􀁑􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀞
􀀅􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁱􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁰􀁏􀁰􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁈􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁈􀁑􀁔􀁘􀁲􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈
􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀃􀀤􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁜􀁄􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀂩􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀃􀂪􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁰􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗
􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁘􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀞
􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀀑􀀑􀀑􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀂩􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁘􀁖
􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁝􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀂪􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀯􀀰􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀰􀀮􀀳􀀃􀁖􀀊􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁱􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁈
􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁒􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖
􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁊􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁰􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀃􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁔􀁘􀁈
􀁄􀁇􀁋􀁰􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁌􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁊􀁏􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁄􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁲􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁰􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁆􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰
􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁯􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁰􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁱􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁏
􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁰􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁌􀁕􀁈
􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁲􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁌􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁌􀁙􀁌􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁄􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗
􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁰􀁕􀁲􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁎􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈
􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀂢􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁱􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁑
􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀛􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁗
􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁰􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁏􀀃􀂩􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁋􀁜􀁓􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁱􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁄􀁘
􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁲􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁰􀁈􀀃􀂪􀀃􀁑􀀊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁰􀁏􀁰􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘
􀁇􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁌􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁯􀁄􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁰
􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁱􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁛􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁜􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁘􀁰􀁕􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁄􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁉􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀞
􀀅􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁏􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁐􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈
􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁏􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁗
􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁎􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈
􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁎􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁰􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁰􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁲􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁰
􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁱􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁇􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁎􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁆􀀃􀁏􀁈
􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁎􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁐􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮
􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁯􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁗
􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁰􀀃􀁆􀁌􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁖􀀃􀀅􀀃􀀞
􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁜􀁈􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁰􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁰􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁘􀁙􀁈􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁌􀁱􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕
􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁰􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁰􀁈􀁑􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁋􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁏
􀁌􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀞
􀀶􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁘􀁛􀁌􀁱􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁜􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀏􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀕􀀐􀀕􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀀗􀀛􀀘􀀏􀀃􀀘􀀜􀀔
􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀘􀀜􀀖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁰􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁉􀁄􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀞
􀀅􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁲􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁔􀁘􀁰􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁰􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈
􀁐􀁄􀁏􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁙􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀞
􀀅􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀂩􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁶􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁯􀁄􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑
􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁰􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁰􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁰􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁅􀁰􀁑􀁰􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀞
􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁰􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁰􀁏􀁰􀁓􀁋􀁒􀁑􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁰􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁰􀁕􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁖􀁰􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁆􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗
􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁛􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁜􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁰􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁌􀁇􀁰􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁌􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀂢􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈
􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁑􀀊􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁘􀀃􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁌􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁉􀁰􀁕􀁰􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁰􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁓􀁓􀁰􀁈􀁖
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁍􀁪􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈
􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁰􀁆􀁋􀁒􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁉􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁋􀁰􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁜􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁈
􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁊􀁄􀁊􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁆􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄
􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁌􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀐􀁆􀁌􀀃􀁖􀀊􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁰􀁈􀀑
􀀨􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁑􀀊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁰􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖
􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁰􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁰􀁕􀁰􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀕􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁑􀁌􀀃􀁐􀁲􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑
􀀷􀁘􀁕􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁰􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁏􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁘􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀨􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈
􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁙􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁐􀁈
􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀕􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁰􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁰􀁈
􀁇􀁱􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁰􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁰􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁰􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈
􀁆􀁈􀁏􀁘􀁌􀀐􀁆􀁌􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁰􀁈􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁰􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖
􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁯􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁰􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁄􀁶􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁰􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗
􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁱􀁆􀁈􀀃􀂢􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁱􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁰􀁏􀁰􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁈􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁈􀁑􀁔􀁘􀁲􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀃􀀤􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁜􀁄􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁗
􀂩􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀃􀂪􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁰􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈
􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁘􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀧􀀊􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀀑􀀑􀀑􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗
􀁏􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀂩􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁝􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀂪􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀯􀀰􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀰􀀮􀀳
􀁖􀀊􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁱􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁒􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁊􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁈􀁑
􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁰􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀃􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁋􀁰􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁌􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁊􀁏􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁏
􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁄􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁲􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁰􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁆􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁖
􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁯􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁰􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁱􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁰􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮
􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁲􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁌􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄
􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁌􀁙􀁌􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁄􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁰􀁕􀁲􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁰
􀁎􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈
􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁌􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁖
􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁰􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁰􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁰􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁘􀁉􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁑􀁈
􀁓􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁰􀁏􀁰􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀜􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗
􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁰􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁌􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁓􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰
􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈
􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁌􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁰􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁰􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁰􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁰􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁰􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄
􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁋􀁰􀁕􀁰􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁖􀀃􀀞
􀀅􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁏􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁙􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁐􀁈
􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁲􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁘􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁰􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁰􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁏􀁖􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁆􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀁄􀁜􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁌􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄
􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁌􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁰􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁰􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁰􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀕􀀐􀀔
􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁰􀀃􀁖􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀅􀀃􀀞
􀀶􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁱􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁜􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀕􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀀘􀀜􀀔􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁰􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀞
􀀅􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁲􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁔􀁘􀁰􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁰􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈
􀁐􀁄􀁏􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁙􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀞
􀀅􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁋􀁰􀁕􀁰􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗
􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀃􀀞
􀀅􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁏􀀃􀁑􀀊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖
􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁲􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁘􀁕
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁋􀁰􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈
􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁌􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁰
􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁰􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀅􀀃􀀞
􀀯􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁜􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁖􀀃􀀞
􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁎􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁜􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈
􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁏􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁆􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁲􀁗
􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁔􀁘􀁰􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁱􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁈􀁑􀁔􀁘􀁲􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁄􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀏
􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗
􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁰􀁐􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁌􀁱􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁘􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘
􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀋􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀌􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁰􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁘􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁰􀁏􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈
􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁏􀁘􀁌􀀐􀁆􀁌􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁊􀁈􀁖
􀁄􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁌􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁌􀁙􀁌􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁄􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈
􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁰􀁕􀁲􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁎􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗
􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁰􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖
􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁲􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕
􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁰􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁌􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁏􀁖􀀃􀀰􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁇􀁕􀁌􀀃􀀼􀀑􀀑􀀑􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀱􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁐􀀃􀀻􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀃􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏
􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁎􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁉􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁄􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖
􀁕􀁰􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁌􀁱􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁜􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁰􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁈􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁰􀁑􀁰􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁰􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁄
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀞
􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁇􀁘􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁜􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁌􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁏
􀁎􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁜􀁄􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁰􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁱􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖
􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁌􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁜􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁌􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈
􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁰􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁰􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁰􀁏􀁰􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄
􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀞
􀀧􀀊􀁒􀁿􀀃􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁜􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁲􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁈􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁖􀀃􀀞
􀀶􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁱􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁜􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀙􀀏􀀃􀀚􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁰􀁈􀁑􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗􀁖
􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁋􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃􀀛􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀀧􀁰􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁋􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁜􀁈􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁌􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀔􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀓􀀔􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁰
􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀔􀀐􀀖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀔􀀐􀀖􀀜􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀀗􀀛􀀘􀀏􀀃􀀘􀀜􀀔􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀘􀀜􀀖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁰􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁉􀁄􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈
􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀞
􀀅􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁲􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁔􀁘􀁰􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀃􀀤􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁜􀁄􀀃􀀞
􀀅􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀙􀀏􀀃􀂆􀀃􀀖􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁰􀁈􀁑􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁋􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗
􀁇􀀊􀁲􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁰􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁌􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁌􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁲􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈
􀁇􀁰􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁉􀁖􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁌􀀃􀁏􀁘􀁌􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁘􀁗􀁰􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀃􀀤􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁜􀁄
􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁘􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈
􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁓􀁌􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁌􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁍􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁱􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁅􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈
􀁖􀁈􀁘􀁏􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀕􀀐􀀙􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁰􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁘􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁌􀀏
􀁪􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀕􀀐􀀘􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁒􀁜􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁌􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁆􀁱􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗
􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀃􀀤􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁜􀁄􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁰􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁱􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁌􀁱􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈
􀁐􀁄􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁘􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁱􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁰􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁰
􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁰􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁰􀁈􀁑􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁋􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁑􀀊􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁆􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁐􀁰􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁘􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁱􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁰􀁏􀁰􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁈􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁖
􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁈􀁑􀁔􀁘􀁲􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀃􀀤􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁜􀁄􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀂩􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀃􀂪􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁘􀁛
􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁰􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁘􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀀏
􀁇􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀧􀀊􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀀑􀀑􀀑􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁖
􀁇􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀂩􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁝􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀂪􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀯􀀰􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀰􀀮􀀳􀀃􀁖􀀊􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁌􀁗
􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁱􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁗
􀁰􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁒􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁊􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁰􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀃􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁖
􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁋􀁰􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁌􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁊􀁏􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁄􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁗
􀁲􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁰􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁆􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁯􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁰􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁱􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀏
􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁰􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈
􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁲􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁌􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁌􀁙􀁌􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁖􀀏
􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁄􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁰􀁕􀁲􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁎􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁈
􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖
􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀀞􀀃􀂢􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁈
􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀞
􀀅􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁌􀁱􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁇􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁔􀁘􀁲􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁕􀀃􀀝
􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁱􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁘􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈
􀁇􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀋􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁄􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀫􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀃􀀬􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀃􀀭􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀃􀀮􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀃􀀧􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀃􀀯􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁆􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁰􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗
􀁕􀁰􀁆􀁄􀁓􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀗􀀃􀀛􀀘􀀗􀀃􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁖􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁆􀁄􀁓􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁻􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈
􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀙􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁰􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁄􀁘􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁪
􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁆􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀷􀀨􀀦􀀤􀀮􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁆􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁯􀁘􀁖􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁖􀀐􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗
􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁕􀁱􀁖
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀀊􀀤􀁅􀁇􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁄􀁏􀁋􀀃􀀨􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁱􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁙􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁰􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁰􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀏
􀁇􀀊􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁆􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁅􀁇􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁄􀁋􀀃􀀨􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀼􀀭􀀤􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀕􀀛􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀙􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈
􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁊􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁱􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑
􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁰􀀃􀀳􀀤􀀭􀀮􀀃􀀋􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁈􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀀌􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁇􀁌􀁊􀁰􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁆􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀕􀀜􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁘
􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀱􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀴􀀦􀀰􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁖
􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁲􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁰􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁏􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁊􀁰􀁑􀁰􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀮􀀲􀀱􀀪􀀵􀀤
􀀪􀀨􀀯􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁰􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁘􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀮􀀮􀀮􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖
􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀫􀀳􀀪􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀚􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀙􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀂩􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀁕􀁖􀀃􀂪􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀩􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁗
􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁏􀁖􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁐􀀃􀀩􀀑􀀑􀀑􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁰􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀀥􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁖
􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁘􀁆􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁎􀁄􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁎􀁒􀁙􀀏􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁰􀁗􀁒􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁖􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁖
􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁙􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀀊􀀤􀁅􀁇􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁄􀁋􀀃􀀨􀀑􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁈􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁝􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁛􀁚􀁈􀁅􀁘􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀃􀂢􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁏􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕
􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁱􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀃􀁒􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁅􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀙􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀧􀀶􀀷􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁰􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁰􀁖
􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁘􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁰􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘
􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁐􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁄􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁝􀁄􀀃􀀪􀀑􀀑􀀑􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀥􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀰􀀑􀀑􀀑􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖
􀁰􀁏􀁰􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁉􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁆􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁇􀁘􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁰􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁒􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁱􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁏􀁊􀁕􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁑􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖
􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁌􀀃􀁏􀁘􀁌􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁘􀁗􀁰􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁰􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏
􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁜􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁘􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀞
􀀅􀀃􀀔􀂃􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁖􀀊􀁒􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖
􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁌􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁘􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀔􀀐􀀖􀀜􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁘􀁗
􀁲􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁪􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁰􀁰􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁗􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁰􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁖
􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁰􀁖􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁯􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀮􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁲􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁗
􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁰􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁰􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀔􀀐􀀖􀀜􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈
􀁏􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀞
􀀅􀀃􀀕􀂃􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁲􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁉􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁘􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀔􀀐􀀖􀀜􀀃􀁇􀁘
􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁲􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈
􀁏􀀊􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁱􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁐􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀀏
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁆􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁌􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁲􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗
􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁯􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁰􀀃􀁖􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈
􀀔􀀖􀀔􀀐􀀖􀀜􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀞
􀀅􀀃􀀖􀂃􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁲􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁰􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁘􀁌􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈
􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁰􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖
􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁘􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁑􀀊􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁐􀁰􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁘􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀙􀀏
􀂆􀀃􀀖􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁰􀁈􀁑􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁋􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀞
􀀅􀀃􀀗􀂃􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁘􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁲􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁰􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁰􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁰􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁰􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁄
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁌􀁙􀁌􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁰􀁆􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁰􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁯􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄
􀁓􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁖􀀊􀁄􀁅􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁰􀀃􀁖􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁰􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖
􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁰􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀅􀀃􀀞
􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁎􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁜􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁕􀁱􀁖􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁌􀁕
􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁏􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁆􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈
􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁲􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁔􀁘􀁰􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁋􀁰􀁕􀁰􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖
􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁋􀁰􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁯􀁄􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀳􀀮􀀮􀀏
􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁄􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁉􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁪􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖
􀁍􀁘􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈
􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁰􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗
􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀕􀀐􀀘􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁌􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁌􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀔􀀐􀀖􀀜􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁐􀁲􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖
􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁘􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁰􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁘􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀏􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀃􀁈􀁗
􀀗􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀕􀀐􀀕􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁌􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈
􀁇􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁘􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁰􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁘
􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁶􀁑􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀀞
􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁰􀀃􀁖􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁖
􀁐􀁰􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁄􀁶􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁰􀁊􀁘􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁜􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀞
􀀧􀀊􀁒􀁿􀀃􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁜􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀀊􀁲􀁗􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁰􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁰􀀃􀀞
􀀨􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁲􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀞
􀀵􀀨􀀭􀀨􀀷􀀷􀀨􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁒􀁌􀁖􀀃􀀞
􀀤􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁊􀁰􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁰􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁌􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁘􀁛􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁝􀁈
􀀞
􀀨􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁌􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁒􀁌􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁲􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁰􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀞
􀀨􀀦􀀯􀀬􀀝􀀩􀀵􀀝􀀦􀀦􀀤􀀶􀀶􀀝􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀝􀀦􀀵􀀓􀀕􀀚􀀜􀀓
􀀤􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁜􀁖􀁈
􀀳􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀝􀀃􀀥􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀏􀀃􀁑􀂃􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀙
􀀧􀁰􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁔􀁘􀁰􀁈􀀃􀀝􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀀃􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁕􀁌􀁏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀖
􀀷􀁌􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁰􀁖􀀃􀀝􀀃􀀵􀀨􀀶􀀳􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀤􀀥􀀬􀀯􀀬􀀷􀀨􀀃􀀳􀀨􀀱􀀤􀀯􀀨􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕
􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀐
􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀲􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁪
􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈
􀀨􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁌􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁏􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁆􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁌􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁖
􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁰􀁊􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏
􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁉􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁄􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁌􀁱􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁜􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁰􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁈􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖
􀁉􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁰􀁑􀁰􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁄􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁰􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁏􀁌􀁅􀁰􀁕􀁰􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀀐􀁆􀁌􀀃􀁄􀁘􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈
􀀷􀀨􀀵􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀬􀀶􀀰􀀨􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁆􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁜􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕
􀁏􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁘􀁕􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈
􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀲􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈
􀀳􀁕􀁰􀁆􀁰􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁏􀁖􀀃􀀝􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀀊􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀝􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀀑􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀃􀁇􀁰􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁒􀁌􀀃􀁑􀂃􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀐􀀛􀀚􀀑􀀗􀀕􀀔􀀏
􀀥􀁘􀁏􀁏􀀑􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀃􀁑􀂃􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀗􀀃􀀋􀁕􀁈􀁍􀁈􀁗􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁲􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁰􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁌􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁰􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀝􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀀑􀀏􀀃􀀔􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁕􀁌􀁏􀀃􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁒􀁌􀀃􀁑􀂃
􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀛􀀙􀀑􀀘􀀓􀀔􀀏􀀃􀀥􀁘􀁏􀁏􀀑􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀏􀀃􀁑􀂃􀀃􀀜􀀜􀀃􀀋􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁲􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁰􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁰􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈
􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁪􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀝􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀀑􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁖􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁒􀁌􀀃􀁑􀂃􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀐􀀛􀀓􀀑􀀖􀀚􀀙􀀏􀀃􀀥􀁘􀁏􀁏􀀑􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀏􀀃􀁑􀂃􀀃􀀜􀀗􀀃􀀋􀁕􀁈􀁍􀁈􀁗􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀀊􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁲􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁰
􀀷􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁰􀁖􀀃􀀝
􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀕􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀏􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀕􀀃􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀕􀀐􀀕􀀃􀁇􀁘􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁰􀁑􀁄􀁏

Annex 478
Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Targets Additional Ukrainian
Separatists and Russian Individuals and Entities (19 December 2014)

6/3/2018 Treasury Targets Additional Ukrainian Separatists and Russian Individuals and Entities
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9729.aspx 1/3
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Press Center
Treasury Targets Additional Ukrainian Separatists and Russian Individuals and
Entities
12/19/2014
Action Targets 24 Ukrainian and Russian Separatist Leaders,
a Financier, and the Militias or Entities they Lead
Complements Action Taken by the President to Ban Investment in and Trade with Crimea
WASHINGTON – In light of the continued conflict in eastern Ukraine and Russia’s continued disregard for its obligations under the Minsk agreements, which fuels the
continued conflict, the U.S. Department of the Treasury today imposed sanctions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13660 on 24 Ukrainian and Russian-backed
separatists and the militias or entities they lead or support. The individuals and entities sanctioned today were designated for being responsible for, or complicit in,
actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine, or for being militias or entities, and/or asserting
governmental authority over a part or region of Ukraine without the authorization of the Government of Ukraine.
This action complements the step taken by President Obama today to issue an E.O. that prohibits new investment in the Crimea region of Ukraine by U.S. persons;
the importation of any goods, services, or technology from the Crimea region of Ukraine into the United States; the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply of any
goods, services, or technology from the United States to the Crimea region of Ukraine; and any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a U.S. person of any
such transaction by a foreign person. This new E.O. also authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on
any person determined to be operating in the Crimea region of Ukraine, to be a leader of an entity operating in the Crimea region of Ukraine, or to be owned or
controlled by, or to provide material support to any person designated under this E.O. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is simultaneously issuing a
general license to authorize the sale of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical supplies to the Crimea region of Ukraine.
Both of these actions complement recent measures taken by the European Union. Our efforts respond to actions by Russia, and the separatists Russia supports,
which destabilize and undermine the territorial integrity of Ukraine. These actions also reflect the ongoing close collaboration between the United States and
European Union on our respective sanctions programs. As the President has said, our goal is to promote a diplomatic solution that provides a lasting resolution to the
conflict and helps to promote growth and stability in Ukraine and regionally, including in Russia. In this context, the President has continued to call on Russia's
leadership to implement the Minsk agreements and to reach a lasting and comprehensive resolution to the conflict that respects Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
“These actions target people who are undermining peace and stability in Ukraine and impose additional costs on Russia for its destabilizing actions,” said Under
Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “Alongside our partners in Europe and around the world, we call on Russia to end its occupation
and attempted annexation of Crimea, to cease its support to separatists in eastern Ukraine, and to implement the obligations it signed up to under the Minsk
agreements. The ball is in Russia’s court; if it implements its commitments and abides by international law, sanctions could be rolled back.”
Vladimir Antyufeyev was appointed “deputy prime minister” of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic in July 2014. He was engaged in separatist “governmental”
activities on behalf of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and was responsible for its domestic security and law enforcement. Antyufeyev is being designated
because he has acted or purported to act for or on behalf of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and was responsible for or complicit in, or has engaged in,
actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Fedor Berezin served as the deputy to Igor Girkin (a.k.a. Igor Strelkov), “defense minister” of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic. Berezin continues to play a
leadership role in the separatist region’s armed forces following Girkin’s August 2014 resignation. Berezin is being designated because he is responsible for actions
that threaten the territorial integrity of Ukraine, has acted on behalf of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, and is a leader of the so-called Donetsk People’s
Republic.
Igor Bezler is a former Russian military officer who has actively coordinated subversion activities in Ukrainian territory. Bezler served in the Main Intelligence
Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces until 2002 and was then sent to Ukraine. In April, Bezler ordered the arrest and
kidnapping of OSCE representatives. Bezler is being designated because he is responsible for or complicit in, or has engaged in, actions or polices that threaten the
peace security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine.
The Donbass People’s Militia is being designated because of the group’s engagement in actions and policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty,
and territorial integrity of Ukraine. The Donbass People’s Militia is an armed pro-Russian separatist group of rebels fighting Government of Ukraine forces in eastern
Ukraine and threatening the stability and security of Ukraine in the Donetsk region. This militia seized control of several government buildings in eastern Ukraine in
early April 2014 and under the command of its former leader, Pavel Gubarev, took over the regional government building in Donetsk while Gubarev proclaimed himself
the “people’s governor.” Its forces have been involved in organizing “referendums” on Donetsk’s future without the involvement of the Government of Ukraine.
Pavel Gubarev was the self-proclaimed “governor” of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, an entity that was designated pursuant to E.O. 13660 on July 16,
2014. Gubarev has been described as one of the three most prominent leaders of the separatists in southeast Ukraine. In March 2014, Gubarev was detained by
Ukraine’s Security Service during a media conference in Donetsk and then moved to a detention center in Kyiv. He is facing charges of separatism, organizing mass
disorder, and infringing Ukrainian territorial integrity. Gubarev is being designated because he is responsible for or complicit in, or has engaged in, actions or polices
that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine and is a leader of an entity that has, or whose members have, engaged in
actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Alexei Karyakin is speaker of the self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic Council of Ministers. Karyakin signed a memorandum uniting the so-called Donetsk and
Luhansk People’s Republics on May 24, 2014. On June 20, 2014 Karyakin addressed a letter to Belarusian President Lukashenka and the national assembly of
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Belarus requesting that Belarus recognize the independence of the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic. On June 25, 2014 he declared the separatist regions’ intent
to seek accession to the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Karyakin is being designated because he is responsible for actions that threaten the
territorial integrity of Ukraine and has asserted governmental authority over a region of Ukraine.
Alexander Khryakov was the self-proclaimed “information and mass communications minister” of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and was responsible for
directing its pro-separatist propaganda activities. Khryakov is now a member of the council for the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic. Khryakov is being designated
because he has acted or purported to act for or on behalf of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, and is responsible for or complicit in, or has engaged in, actions
or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Nikolai Kozitsyn is described as one of the first-hand organizers and coordinators of the separatist actions in Ukraine and is responsible for forming separatist groups
on the territory of Ukraine. He also provides separatists with weapons and sends them to Ukraine. Kozitsyn is being designated because he is responsible for or
complicit in, or has engaged in, actions or polices that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Konstantin Malofeyev funds separatist activities in eastern Ukraine and is closely linked with Aleksandr Borodai, Igor Girkin (a.k.a. Igot Strelkov), and the so-called
Donetsk People’s Republic, which have all been previously sanctioned as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs). Malofeyev is one of the main sources of financing
for Russians promoting separatism in Crimea. Malofeyev is being designated because he is responsible for or complicit in, or has engaged in, actions or polices that
threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine and has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or
technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic.
Malofeyev owns the Marshall Capital Fund, which is a Russian equity investment group. The Marshall Capital Fund is being designated because it is owned or
controlled by Malofeyev.
Aleksey Mozgovy is described as the commander of a separatist force in Ukraine’s Luhansk region. He is responsible for training separatists to fight against the
Government of Ukraine forces and has called for regions in Ukraine’s southeast to unite in order to achieve their separatist objectives. Mozgovy is being designated
because he is responsible for or complicit in, or has engaged in, actions or polices that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of
Ukraine and is a leader of an entity that has, or whose members have, engaged in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or
territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Dmitry Neklyudov was appointed “deputy minister of interior of the so-called Republic of Crimea on May 5, 2014. Neklyudov is being designated because he has
asserted governmental authority over a region of Ukraine without the authorization of the Government of Ukraine.
The Novorossiya Party was created to unite all supporters for the establishment of an independent federal state of Novorossiya and to withdraw all southeastern
lands in Ukraine from the authority of Kyiv. The Novorossiya Party is being designated because it has engaged in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security,
stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Oplot is one of the militias that is attempting to assert control over the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine. In April, its members occupied the Donetsk city
council building, and the militia pushed for the holding of a “referendum” on the territorial status of the Donetsk Region. Oplot is being designated because it is
responsible for or complicit in, or has engaged in, actions or polices that undermine democratic processes or institutions in Ukraine, and actions or polices that
threaten the peace security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Igor Plotnitsky, an ex-Soviet army officer, was “elected” head of the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic in unrecognized “elections” that took place on November 2,
2014, which also included ballots from polling stations in Russia. Plotnitsky became the leader of the separatists in Luhansk in February 2014. In April, he became
the first commander of the so-called Zarya (Dawn) separatist battalion and in May 2014, he took the position of Defense Minister of the so-called Luhansk People’s
Republic. Plotnitsky is being designated because he is responsible for or complicit in, or has engaged in, actions or polices that threaten the peace, security, stability,
sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine and has asserted governmental authority over a part or region of Ukraine without the authorization of the Government of
Ukraine.
Natalia Poklonskaya was appointed as the de facto prosecutor of the so-called Republic of Crimea in May 2014 by Russian President Vladimir Putin. A Ukraine
court in Kyiv ordered Poklonskaya’s detention on suspicion of subverting Ukraine’s constitutional system and seizing state power. She is accused of having accepted
an illegal offer to head the Crimean prosecutor’s office and has illegally taken office. Poklonskaya is being designated because she has asserted governmental
authority over a part or region of Ukraine without the authorization of the Government of Ukraine.
Miroslav Rudenko is described as an official of the government of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, and he is also the deputy commander of its defense
forces. He rejected Ukrainian President Poroshenko’s unilateral cease-fire offer as a “tactical ploy” and refused to negotiate on the organization of the Ukrainian
presidential elections in Donetsk. Rudenko is being designated because he is responsible for actions that threaten the territorial integrity of Ukraine, has acted on
behalf of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, and is a leader of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic.
Petr Savchenko was the “minister of taxes and duties” of the so-called Donetsk Peoples Republic and is now a member of its council. Savchenko is being
designated because he is responsible for or complicit in, or has engaged in, actions or polices that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial
integrity of Ukraine.
Savchenko is the Chief Executive, Principal and Senior Executive of PROFAKTOR, TOV, which specializes in accounting, auditing and bookkeeping in Ukraine.
PROFAKTOR, TOV is being designated because it is owned or controlled by, or has acted or purported to act for or on behalf, directly or indirectly, of Savchenko.
Oleh Tsaryov is a leader of the separatist South-East Movement and chairman of the parliament of the union of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s
Republics. Tsaryov is additionally a member of the Committee for Public Support for the Inhabitants of Southeast Ukraine, operating under the auspices of the
Russian parliament, providing volunteers and military material to separatists in eastern Ukraine. Tsaryov is being designated because he is responsible for actions
that threaten the territorial integrity of Ukraine and has asserted governmental authority over a region of Ukraine.
The South-East Movement (Yugo-Vostok Movement) promotes the creation of a separate pro-Russian state in southeast Ukraine and was banned in Ukraine in
August 2014. The South-East Movement is being designated because it has engaged in actions which threaten the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and for being
controlled by Tsaryov.
Alexander Zakharchenko was declared the winner of a recent unrecognized election in the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic. Ukrainian President Petro
Poroshenko denounced the November 2, 2014 “elections” in the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics as an “electoral farce” and stated that they
violated the September 5, 2014 Minsk Accord. Prior to claiming the position of prime minister, Zakharchenko was a commander in the insurgency against the
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government of Ukraine. He is being designated because he is responsible for actions that threaten the territorial integrity of Ukraine, has acted on behalf of the socalled
Donetsk People’s Republic, and is a leader of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic.
The Night Wolves biker group had its members serve in the Crimean self-defense forces as early as February 2014, which supported local Crimeans against the
Government of Ukraine. In March 2014, the Night Wolves conducted intimidation and criminal activities within Ukraine and also abducted and subsequently assaulted
a Ukrainian Border Guard official. This biker group also participated in the storming of the gas distribution station in Strikolkove and the storming of the Ukrainian
Naval Forces Headquarters in Sevastopol. In early-April 2014, the Night Wolves helped smuggle a former senior Ukrainian official out of Ukraine and also helped
obtain Russian passports for another larger group of senior Ukrainian officials that they helped get into Russia. The Night Wolves have been closely connected to the
Russian special services, have helped to recruit separatist fighters for Donetsk and Luhansk, Ukraine, and were deployed to the cities of Luhansk and Kharkiv. The
Night Wolves group is being designated because it is an entity that is responsible for or complicit in, or has engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that
threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Aleksandr Zaldostanov, also known as “the Surgeon,” is the leader of the Night Wolves. Zaldostanov chairs the overall Night Wolves organization, and some of his
responsibilities include the punishing of chapter groups and members for disloyalty to the Night Wolves organization. During the late-March storming of the Ukrainian
Naval Forces Headquarters in Sevastopol, he coordinated the confiscation of Ukrainian weapons with the Russian forces. Zaldostanov is being designated for being
a leader of a group, the Night Wolves, that is engaging in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial
integrity of Ukraine.
For identifying information on the individuals and entities named in this release, please click here.
###

Annex 479
Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ukraine Sanctions: Review of
Australia’s Autonomous Sanctions Imposed on 84 Individuals and Entities in Relation to
Ukraine (2 September 2017)

6/3/2018 Ukraine Sanctions: Review of Australia’s autonomous sanctions imposed on 84 individuals and entities in relation to Ukraine - Department…
http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/sanctions/Pages/ukraine-sanctions-review-of-australias-autonomous-sanctions-imposed-on-84-individ… 1/3
Ukraine Sanctions: Review of Australia’s autonomous sanctions
imposed on 84 individuals and entities in relation to Ukraine
Members of the public are invited to comment on a statutory review of Australia's autonomous sanctions imposed on 63
individuals and 21 entities in response to Russia's ongoing threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. These
individuals and entities have been designated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs under the Autonomous Sanctions
Regulations 2011 for the purpose of targeted financial sanctions. These individuals have also been declared by the Minister
under the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 for the purpose of travel bans. These listings were made on 2 September
2014 and will expire on 2 September 2017 unless extended by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Individuals:
1. Sergey BESEDA
2. Alexander Vasilyevich BORTNIKOV
3. Mikhail Vladimiorich DEGTYAREV
4. Mikhail Yefimovich FRADKOV
5. Valery Vasilevich GERASIMOV
6. Boris Vyacheslavoich GRYZLOV
7. Ramzan Akhmadovitch KADYROV
8. Sergei Ivanovich MENYAILO
9. Sergei Ivanovich NEVEROV
10. Rashid Gumorovich NURGALIEV
11. Nikolai Platonovich PATRUSHEV
12. Vladimir Nikolavich PLIGIN
13. Nikolay Terentievich SHAMALOV
14. Vladimir SHAMANOV
15. Ludmila Ivanovna SHVETSOVA
16. Sergey ABISOV
17. Vladimir ANTYUFEYEV (also known as Vladimir Shevtsov)
18. Marat BASHIROV
19. Fedir Dmytrovych BEREZIN
20. Igor Mykolaiovych BEZLER
21. Valeriy BOLOTOV
22. Aleksandr Yurevich BORODAI
23. Pavel Yurevich GUBAREV
24. Ekaterina GUBAREVA
25. Yurij IVAKIN
26. Petr Grigorievich JAROSH
27. Igor KAKIDZYANOV
28. Alexandr Aleksandrovich KALYUSSKY
29. Aleksey KARYAKIN
30. Valery Vladimirovich KAUROV
31. Alexander KHODAKOVSKY
32. Alexander KHRYAKOV
33. Nikolay KOZITSYN
34. Oleg Grigorievich KOZYURA
35. Boris LITVINOV
36. Roman LYAGIN
37. Konstantin Valerevich MALOFEEV
38. Aleksandr MALYKHIN
39. Oleksiy MOZGOVYI
40. Vasyl NIKITIN
41. Igor PLOTNITSKY
42. Natalia Vladimirovna POKLONSKAYA
43. Andriy PURGIN
6/3/2018 Ukraine Sanctions: Review of Australia’s autonomous sanctions imposed on 84 individuals and entities in relation to Ukraine - Department…
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44. Igor Sergeievich SHEVCHENKO
45. Oksana TCHIGRINA
46. Alexander Nikolayevich TKACHYOV
47. Oleg TSARIOV
48. Serhii Anatoliyovych ZDRILIUK
49. Victor Yuriiovych ANOSOV
50. Viacheslav Anatoliiovych APRAKSIMOV
51. Ruslan Yunirovish ILKAEV
52. Victor Petrovich IVANOV
53. Alexander KARAMAN
54. Valery Vladimirovich KULIKOV
55. Valerii Kostiantynovych MUSIIENKO
56. Alexander Mihailovich NOSATOV
57. German PROKOPIV
58. Yurii Oleksandrovych PROTSENKO
59. Sergey Gennadevich TSYPLAKOV
60. Lt. Gen. Igor TURCHENYUK
61. Oleh Anatoliiovych VASIN
62. Aleksandr ZAKHARCHENKO
63. Vladimir ZHIRINOVSKY
Entities:
1. Almaz-Antey
2. Army of the Southeast
3. Azov Distillery Plant
4. Donbass People's Militia
5. Factory of Sparkling Wine Novy Svet – State Enterprise
6. Federal State of Novorossiya
7. Feodosiya Enterprise
8. International Union of Public Associations 'Great Don Army'
9. Kerch Ferry – State Ferry Enterprise
10. Kerch Commercial Sea Port – State Enterprise
11. Luhansk Guard
12. Magarach of the National Institute of Wine – State Enterprise
13. National Association of Producers "Massandra" – State Concern
14. People's Republic of Donetsk
15. People's Republic of Luhansk
16. Resort 'Nizhnyaya Oreanda'
17. Russian National Commercial Bank
18. Sevastopol Commercial Seaport
19. SOBOL
20. Universal-Avia – State Enterprise
21. Vostok Battalion
Under the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 in relation to Ukraine, the Minister for Foreign Affairs may designate an
entity or designate and/or declare a person that the Minister is satisfied is responsible for, or complicit in, the threat to the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Persons and entities who have been designated by the Minister are subject to targeted financial sanctions. Persons who
have been declared by the Minister are subject to travel bans.
Details of all persons and entities listed by the Australian Government pursuant to the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations
2011, including Australia's autonomous sanctions in relation to Ukraine, can be found in the DFAT Consolidated List.
More information on Australian sanctions laws in relation to Ukraine
How to make a submission
1. Complete a submission cover sheet [Word 305 KB]
2. Prepare your submission
3. Email your cover sheet and submission to [email protected]
6/3/2018 Ukraine Sanctions: Review of Australia’s autonomous sanctions imposed on 84 individuals and entities in relation to Ukraine - Department…
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Alternatively, post your submission to:
Sanctions Section
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
R.G. Casey Building
John McEwen Crescent
Barton ACT 0221 Australia
Submissions must be received by 5pm on Wednesday 2 August 2017, Australian Eastern Standard Time. The Department
reserves the right not to consider late submissions.
Confidentiality and privacy
All submissions will be made available on the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) website, subject to DFAT's
sole discretion. If you would like your submission to be treated as confidential, in whole or in part, please note this on the
submission cover sheet. If you ask for part of your submission to be treated as confidential, please provide two versions of it,
one with the confidential information removed for publication.
DFAT will collect personal information from you for the purpose of processing, reviewing and assessing your submission.
Your personal information will be used and disclosed for the purpose for which it was collected, or as otherwise authorised in
accordance with the Privacy Act 1988.
The names of individuals making submissions will be published unless you ask us not to publish your name. No contact
details will be disclosed. For submissions made by or on behalf of organisations only the name of the organisation will be
published.
DFAT's privacy policy is available online and contains information about how you may access and seek correction of your
personal information and how you can complain about a breach of your privacy.

Annex 480
Nouvelobs, Deux Ans de Prison Pour la Mère d'un Djihadiste :
"J'aurais Pu Sauver mon Fils" (6 Septembre 2017)

Deux ans de prison pour la mère d'un djihadiste :
"J’aurais pu sauver mon fils"
nouvelobs.com/rue89/rue89-nos-vies-connectees/20170906.OBS4330/deux-ans-de-prison-pour-la-mere-d-undjihadiste-
j-aurais-pu-sauver-mon-fils.html
Une mère qui avait envoyé de l'argent à son fils parti faire le
djihad a été condamnée ce jeudi à deux ans de prison ferme
pour "financement du terrorisme".
Par Emilie Brouze
Publié le 06 septembre 2017 à 19h02
Mise à jour : ajout de la condamnation du tribunal, ce 28 septembre 2017.
Est-ce qu’envoyer de l’argent à un proche radicalisé, qui a ensuite rejoint les rangs de l’Etat
islamique, signifie financer le terrorisme ? La question était au coeur de l’audience, pesante
et extrêmement tendue, qui s’est déroulée dans la nuit de mardi 4 au mercredi 5
septembre, au tribunal correctionnel de Paris.
Abbes Bounaga, le fils, le frère et le meilleur ami des trois prévenus, est présumé mort
après avoir rejoint les rangs de l’Etat islamique en zone irako-syrienne. C’est par une vidéo
testamentaire envoyée sur la messagerie Telegram qu’on a fait savoir à Nathalie Haddadi,
le 17 août 2016, que son fils de 21 ans était mort au combat.
Veste de tailleur noir et long carré brun, elle s’avance à la barre. Nathalie Haddadi
comparaît ce mardi pour complicité de sortie de territoire et financement de terrorisme. Les
deux autres prévenus, le frère et un ami, sont tous les deux présents pour ce dernier chef
d’inculpation. En cause, plusieurs sommes d’argent envoyées par mandat à Abbes pendant
son périple qui le mènera jusqu’aux rangs de l'Etat islamique.
"Conneries sur conneries"
Né en Algérie en 1994, Abbes, "très actif sur les réseaux djihadistes", avait attiré l’attention
des services de la DGSI en 2015, après avoir acheté des billets pour Istanbul. Il fut
condamné et incarcéré juste avant sa date de départ pour des faits de délinquance. Depuis
son adolescence, il enchaîne "conneries sur conneries", et écope à plusieurs reprises de
peine de prison pour vol avec violence ou trafic de stups.
Pour ses proches, sa radicalisation remonte à son avant-dernier passage en prison, à
Strasbourg. "Il n’était pas comme d’habitude", appuie son frère, Tarik. "Il était froid. Il
m’encourageait à faire mes prières."
Le 7 novembre 2015, Abbes reçoit au domicile familial la visite de la police, qui lui notifie
une interdiction de sortie de territoire et qui lui demande de donner son passeport français
– le ministère public craint alors qu’il ne parte en Syrie. Le lendemain, Abbes se rend en
Allemagne pour s’envoler vers l’Algérie, avec le passeport qu’il disait avoir perdu.
Au terme d’un périple de six mois détaillé pendant l’audience, d'abord en Malaisie, puis
1/5
dans les pays du Golfe, en Iran et enfin via la Turquie, le djihadiste rejoindra l’Etat
islamique en juin 2017.
Sur place, il dit à Souleymane, son ami et prévenu ce mardi, espérer intégrer les forces
spéciales. "Ce sont les meilleurs soldats, dont l’espérance de vie ne dépasse pas une
semaine." Il deviendra, dit-il, un "inghimasi", terme utilisé par Daech pour désigner celui qui
combat avec une ceinture explosive mais ne l’actionne qu’en dernier recours. Il mourra
moins de deux mois après son arrivée.
"J'ai perdu la chair de ma chair"
La mère, Nathalie Haddadi, ne signale pas à la police le voyage et la mort présumée de
son fils. C’est l’une de ses amies d’enfance qui s'en chargera.
Pourquoi avoir supprimé la vidéo testamentaire et caché les circonstances de sa mort,
s'interroge le tribunal ? "Je ne voulais pas avoir de soucis moi-même, mes enfants, et notre
réputation aussi", répond la mère.
La présidente lit ses propos dans une conversation versée au dossier : "La mort au djihad
doit rester secrète, et notamment par rapport aux autorités, ils vont le salir." "Ce qu’a fait
mon fils n'est pas beau, pas glorieux, il s’est sali lui-même", rectifie Nathalie Haddadi.
Cette conseillère commerciale en Alsace reconnaît avoir payé à son fils un aller et retour
en Algérie en novembre 2015, avant que celui-ci ne fasse l’objet d’une interdiction de
sortie de territoire. Elle l’a envoyé chez son père parce qu’elle "n'en pouvait plus".
A-t-elle dissimulé le passeport français de son fils, réclamé par les policiers quand ils sont
venus chez elle ? La présidente remarque que ses versions à son sujet ont varié. Nathalie
Haddadi raconte l'avoir entreposé hors de sa portée, dans une pochette enroulée dans la
piscine gonflable entreposée sur la terrasse du logement. A moins que son fils ne soit allé
le récupérer au consulat d’Algérie, lors de sa demande de visa. "C’est un grand
manipulateur mon fils."
La présidente, sarcastique : "S’il avait respecté son interdiction…" "Il serait en vie",
complète Nathalie Haddadi. "Et oui", ponctue la juge Isabelle Prévost-Desprez.
La remarque fait éclater son avocat, Me Hervé Denis, qui menace de quitter le tribunal :
"Madame, vous être odieuse !" La mère éclate en sanglots, l’avocat s’emporte.
Soulagement quand le procureur demande une suspension de séance. Tarik, le fils cadet,
accompagne sa mère vers la sortie, qui pleure, "j’ai perdu la chair de ma chair".
"J'aurais pu sauver mon fils"
L’audience reprendra dans le calme une dizaine de minutes plus tard. "Je vis avec les
remords et la culpabilité", expose à la barre Nathalie Haddadi.
""J’aurais pu sauver mon fils si j’avais fait autrement. J’aime mon fils, il représente
beaucoup pour moi.""
Elle dit avoir pensé qu’Abbes avait changé pendant son séjour algérien. "Il avait le projet
d’ouvrir un fast-food, il avait rencontré une fille", argumente-t-elle.
2/5
La mère lui enverra de l'argent sur place, ainsi que son passeport algérien. C’est elle qui lui
a ensuite payé son billet pour la Malaisie ainsi qu'un vol interne. Nathalie Haddadi lui a
aussi transmis 2.800 euros parce qu'il s'était fait agresser en Malaisie, où il était soi-disant
pour des vacances. A "aucun moment" il ne s'agissait de financer son projet, soutient-elle.
"Un des grands travers de Mme Haddadi, c’est d’avoir menti", appuiera plus tard le
procureur. "On a bien du mal à lui accorder du crédit et de la bonne foi. Ses déplacements,
sa cohérence, ne pouvaient pas lui échapper. Son état d’esprit en Malaisie non plus."
Pour le procureur, Nathalie Haddadi n'est pas "quelqu’un de radical". "Ce n’est pas une
démarche pro-Daech, c’est une démarche de valorisation de son fils, indéfectible, y
compris dans ses pires erreurs." D’une "hypervalorisation" du fils aîné. Il s’appuie sur les
propos de Tarik, le cadet, en audition : "Ma mère considérait Abbes comme son égal, et
moi j’étais en dessous."
"Machine de guerre"
Souleymane, le deuxième prévenu, est un ami d'enfance d'Abbes, un "frère", avec qui il a
d'ailleurs été à plusieurs reprises condamné, la première fois à 15 ans pour vol. Lui aussi
a envoyé de l'argent à Abbes. 2.280 euros en Algérie et à Dubaï, pendant une escale. En
grande partie des dettes de stups, collectées par ses soins.
"Pendant une période de ma vie, j’ai été pour Daech", admet-il. "J’ai été mis dedans par sa
faute." Jusqu’à quand, tente de déterminer le tribunal ? Automne 2015, répond-il à la barre,
juste avant son mariage.
Souleymane a été en contact avec son ami tout au long de son périple. "Devine je suis où ?
Tiens je t’envoie une photo." Il affirme : "Je ne savais pas que le but était le Shâm, je l’ai su
que quand il était au Shâm."
Février 2016, Abbes est en Malaisie. Il hésite sur le choix de sa "kounia" (nom de guerre).
Il lui dit sur WhatsApp qu'il est "en mode mission", "en mode sport intensif, un mois et je
deviens une machine de guerre". La présidente tique. "Chez nous à Strasbourg, être une
machine de guerre, c’est pas ce que vous pensez. C’est avoir un beau corps, c’est une
expression, Madame."
"T’aurais pu me raconter", lui écrit Souleymane quand Abbes le prévient qu'il est "en zone".
Il tente de l’inciter à le rejoindre. "Vivre là-bas c’est formidable, les vrais musulmans doivent
le faire sinon ce sont des kouffars." Abbes lui demande de dire à sa mère "qu’il est bien
arrivé et qu’il vit des trucs de fou". Pour l'avocat du prévenu, son client est dans ses
conversations "complaisant", mais "il n’essaie pas de le faire revenir, il essaie de le
maintenir en vie".
"Si c’était à refaire, j’aurais prévenu la police", regrette Souleymane à la barre.
"J'y croyais"
Tard dans la soirée, Tarik, 20 ans, le petit frère, casier judiciaire vierge, prend la parole
devant le tribunal d’une voix douce et triste. Ses derniers échanges avec Abbes, sur
Facebook, remontent au printemps 2016. Il n’a pas regardé jusqu’à la fin la vidéo
3/5
testamentaire, "pas eu le courage".
Sur demande de son frère, Tarik a envoyé plusieurs sommes d’argent, donné par
Souleymane (les dettes, encore). A Dubaï, puis au Maroc et en Turquie.
""Je me suis posé des questions", assure-t-il. " ""J’ai demandé à quoi sert l’argent. Il m'a dit
qu'il servait à faire l'aumône. J’y croyais.""
Tarik explique s'être détaché progressivement de son frère, avoir pris un chemin
différent. La présidente : "On a l’impression que vous avez cloisonné, que ce soit par
rapport à la délinquance de votre frère ou sa radicalisation."
"J’ai une vie comme tout le monde, j’ai une vie ordinaire", opine Tarik.
"On reste parent. C'est tout"
Début de la nuit. Véronique Roy, dont le fils est présumé mort en Syrie en 2014, est
appelée à entrer dans la chambre du tribunal, citée comme témoin.
"Je me sens solidaire de Mme Haddadi", formule-t-elle dans une salle d’audience
absolument silencieuse. A l'instar d’autres parents, la mère explique n’avoir pas compris la
radicalisation de son fils et n’avoir rien vu de son projet de départ.
""Je comprends le lien qu’on veut garder avec son enfant quand il se radicalise et qu’il
parte car c’est la seule chose qui nous reste. [...] On continue d’aimer un enfant qui est
parti, ça ne veut pas dire qu’on légitime.""
Véronique Roy parle des parents qui ont envoyé et continuent d’envoyer de l’argent à leur
fils ou à leur fille, pour payer du lait aux petits-enfants nés sur place par exemple.
""On ne cautionne pas le terrorisme, on reste parent. C’est tout.
Je n’ai pas donné d’argent à mon enfant car il me l’a pas demandé. C’est une question que
je me suis posée avec mon mari. Est-ce que je l’aurais fait ? Peut-être."
Alors tous les parents le sont
Pour cette mère qui a raconté son combat dans un livre, s’il y a financement du terrorisme,
il est à grande échelle – elle cite pour exemple un cimentier accusé de financer Daech.
'"Si Nathalie est jugée coupable ce soir, je le suis aussi et tous les parents le sont."' "
"Je crois que les enjeux de cette audience dépassent très largement le cas de ces quatre
prévenus", entame le procureur dans son réquisitoire, soulignant que le parquet ne poursuit
pas systématiquement les familles et les proches pour ce motif.
""Le parquet a estimé que dans ce dossier, on n’était pas dans un cas de naïveté absolu et
que les rôles des uns et des autres sont beaucoup plus importants qu’il ne pourrait y
paraître."" "
Pour la mère, le procureur requiert 18 mois de prison et un mandat de dépôt (c'est-à-dire
son incarcération immédiate) ; pour Tarik, 1 an de prison dont 6 mois avec sursis ; et 3 ans
de prison et un mandat de dépôt pour Souleymane.
"In fine"
4/5
Dans sa plaidoirie, le conseil de Souleymane a repris les mots du procureur prononcés au
sujet des sommes d'argent, "destinées in fine à financer le périple pour rallier le djihad". "In
fine."
""C'est facile de le dire a posteriori, parce que c’est arrivé, que ça devait arriver."" "
L'argent a été envoyé avant qu'Abbes rejoigne l'Etat islamique, souligne son confrère. Il
aurait pu changer d'avis, faire demi-tour. "Comment savoir ce qu’il avait dans sa tête à ce
moment-là ?" Il rappelle que le périple a duré six mois, "c'est long".
L'avocat de la mère, "affligé", pointe également les faiblesses de l'accusation. "En quoi ça
protégera plus [la société] que Nathalie soit incarcérée ?"
Les avocats des trois prévenus ont demandé la relaxe, un peu avant 4 heures du matin.
Ce 28 septembre 2017, le tribunal correctionnel de Paris a condamné la mère à deux ans
de prison ferme.
"
5/5

Annex 481
Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, SECO Bilateral Economic Relations Sanctions,
Programs (Situation in Ukraine: Ordinance of 27 August 2014), Individual Malofeev Konstantin
Valerevich (23 May 2018)

Federal Department of Economic Affairs,
Education and Research EAER
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO
Bilateral Economic Relations
Sanctions
Version of 23.05.2018
Sanctions program: Situation in Ukraine: Ordinance of 27 August 2014 on measures to
prevent the circumvention of international sanctions related to the situation in Ukraine (RS
946.231.176.72), annexes 2, 3 and 4 Origin: EU Sanctions: article 8 (Ban on entering into
new business relationships)
Individuals
SSID: 175-28550 Name: Malofeev Konstantin Valerevich Spelling variant: 􀉆􀉚􀉥􀉨􀉮􀉟􀉟􀉜􀀃
􀉄􀉨􀉧􀉫􀉬􀉚􀉧􀉬􀉢􀉧􀀃􀈼􀉚􀉥􀉟􀉪􀉶􀉟􀉜􀉢􀉱􀀃􀀋􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀌􀀃
DOB: 3 Jul 1974 POB: Puschino, Moscow region
Justification: a) Mr Malofeev is closely linked to Ukrainian separatists in Eastern Ukraine
and Crimea. He is a former employer of Mr Borodai, former so-called "Prime Minister" of the
"Donetsk People's Republic" and met with Mr Aksyonov, so-called "Prime Minister" of the socalled
"Republic of Crimea", during the period of the Crimean annexation process. The
Ukrainian Government has opened a criminal investigation into his alleged material and
financial support to separatists. In addition, he gave a number of public statements
supporting the annexation of Crimea and the incorporation of Ukraine into Russia and
notably stated in June 2014 that "You can't incorporate the whole of Ukraine into Russia.
The East (of Ukraine) maybe". b) Therefore Mr Malofeev is acting in support of the
destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine. Modifications: Listed on 27 Aug 2014, amended on 6
Oct 2015, 11 Oct 2016, 26 Sep 2017

Annex 482
9􀇴38􀇴1 Missile. Technical Description. 9􀇴38􀇴1.0000.000 TD. 1984
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.

􀀬􀁑􀁙􀀑􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀉉-1236
APPROVED
[illegible] m/i 64176
No. A01250-83
Specifications Ref. No. 7N-98g
[illegible]
Copy No. 31
9M38M1 MISSILE
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
9M38M1.0000.000 TO
[Stamp: 431186]
[Stamp: 43783,
crossed out]
1984
CONTENTS
Pg. No.
1. INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………. 6
2. GENERAL MISSILE INFORMATION ………………………………………….. 19
2.1. Purpose, components, technical data, and operating conditions
of the missile……………………………………………………………………….. 19
2.2. General structure and operating principles of the missile……………………... 21
2.3. Brief information on missile guidance ………………………………………... 30
3. MISSILE AIRFRAME ……………………………………………………………. 34
4. MISSILE ENGINE …………………………………............................................... 39
4.1. Purpose, components, and structure of the engine ……………………………. 39
4.2. Operating principles of the engine ……………………………………………. 44
5. MISSILE GUIDANCE APPARATUS ……………………………………………. 46
5.1. Radar guidance head: Purpose, general structure, and operating principles … 46
5.2. Autopilot: Purpose, general structure, and operating principles ………............ 69
6. MISSILE PAYLOAD ……………………………………………………………... 77
6.1. Warhead: Purpose and structure ………………………………………………. 77
6.2. Radar proximity fuse: Purpose, general structure, and operating principles … 80
6.3. Safing and arming device and contact sensor system: Purpose, general
structure, and operating principles ………................................................................ 90
ref. 1450s
[Pentagonal
stamp]
A01250-83
9M38M1
Sht.
9M38M1.803
No. Doc.
[illegibl
e]
3/6/84 9M37M1.0000.000 TO
Rev
.
[illegible]
Savintsev
[5 signatures:
all illegible]
7/22/84 9M38M1 MISSILE
TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATIONS
[illegible]
Sviridova 7/22/84 1 3 222
Pliev 7/22/84
Kozlov 7/22/84 DT
Ektov 7/22/84
[illegible] [illegible]
Form 5 GOST 2.106.68
1-804 [Signature: illegible] 03/06/84
Pg. No.
7. MISSILE ELECTRICAL CITCUITRY …………………………………………... 101
7.1. Purpose and components of missile electrical circuitry ………………………. 101
7.2. Onboard power source: General structure and operating principles ………….. 102
8. MISSILE GAS SUPLY SYSTEM (GAS SYSTEM) ……………………………... 111
9. MISSILE ELECTRICAL FUNCTIONAL DIAGRAM ……………....................... 114
10. MISSILE AIRBORNE EQUIPMENT OPERATION UNDER VARIOUS
MODES OF OPERATION ……………………………………………....................... 141
11. ATTACHMENTS AND ACCESSORIES ………………………………………. 156
12. PLACING THE MISSILE ON A LAUNCHER TRANSPORT
VEHICLE……………………………………………………………………............... 157
13. TRAINING MISSILE CLASSIFICATION AND CONSTRUCTION DETAILS
………………………………………………………………………………………… 159
14. PAINTING, MARKING, AND SEALING THE MISSILE ………………........... 161
15. MISSILE PACKAGING CONTAINER …………………………........................ 163
16. ILLUSTRATIONS ……………………………………………………………….. 167
Fig. 1. Airframe component parts …………………………………………………. 169
Fig. 2. Missile assembly …………………………………………………………… 171
Fig. 3. Proportional navigation diagram …………………………............................ 173
Fig. 4. Section No. 1 ……………………………………………………………….. 175
Fig. 5. Section No. 2 (with warhead) ……………………………………………… 177
Fig. 6. Section No. 3 ……………………………………………………………….. 179
Fig. 7. Section No. 4 ……………………………………………………………….. 181
Fig. 8. Functional diagram of the radar guidance head ……………………………. 183
Fig. 9. Autopilot functional diagram ………………………………………………. 185
Fig. 10. Functional diagram of the radar proximity fuse ………………………… 187
ref. 1450s
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9M38M1.0000.000 TO
30 Rev. Sht. No. Doc. Signature Date
Pg. No.
Fig. 11. Principal electrical diagram of the safing and arming device and contact
sensor system ……………………………………………………………………… 189
Fig. 12. Structure of the safing and arming device ………………………………... 191
Fig. 13. Onboard power source ……………………………………………………. 193
Fig. 14. Umbilical cable …………………………………………………………… 195
Fig. 15. Missile gas supply system and static pressure measuring system ………... 197
Fig. 16. Missile electrical functional diagram ……………………………………... 199
Fig. 17. Functional diagram of the missile gas supply system ……………….......... 201
Fig. 18. Missile aerodynamic diagram and signal diagrams ………………………. 203
Fig. 19. Cyclogram of commands, signals, and processes: Complex 9K37M1
(9K37). Acquisition mode for TELAR, TEL ……………………………………… 205
Fig. 20. Cyclogram of commands, signals, and processes: Complex 9K37M1
(9K37). In-air acquisition mode …………………………………………………… 207
Fig. 21. Cyclogram of commands, signals, and processes, Complex M-22 ………. 209
Fig. 22. Marking and sealing the missile ………………………………………….. 211
􀀩􀁌􀁊􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀜􀉙􀀑􀀕􀀙􀀙􀀑􀀜􀀛􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀃………………………………………………. 213
Fig. 24. Placing the missile on a transport vehicle ………………………………… 215
Fig. 25. Placing the missile for TELAR and TEL …………………………………. 217
Fig. 26. Placing the missile on a 3C90 launcher …………………………………... 219
LIST OF REGISTERED REVISIONS 221
ref. 1450s
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Rev. Sht. No. Doc. Signature Date 29
[illegible] [illegible]
1-804 [Signature: illegible] 03/06/84
There is no KNI-L mode in the M-22 air defense system.
Guidance of the missile to the target can be carried out either by signal reflected from the
target or active noise generated by the target.
Depending on the target acquisition mode used (when the missile is located on a launcher
or in the air), the radar guidance head acquires the signal reflected from the target (or the active
noise) either before the missile leaves the launcher or after the missile leaves the launcher, during
the flight process. In the latter case, before transitioning to guidance, radar correction mode can be
used to refine the initial target designation and increase the probability of capturing the target or
performing the maneuver. Radar correction mode is not used in the M-22 air defense system,
when firing for a third time, or when firing a 9K37M1 (9K37) air defense system using a TEL.
When firing a radar guidance head using a signal reflected from the target (AF-IC mode),
the missile is launched after the start of the RGS target autoconfiguration. This mode is possible
only with the 9K37M1 (9K37) air defense system and is used only to illuminate a target with a
nearby TELAR.
When firing a radar guidance head using a signal reflected from the target (or noise signal)
in the air (ZV mode), missile control and generation of the RGS angular and Doppler target
designation prior to target acquisition is performed by the on-board computing equipment or with
or without using radar line correction (RLC).
In ZV mode without using RLC, the target acquisition authorization command is given in
the second second of flight when the NEAR ZONE (NZ) command is present or in the fourth
second of flight when the NZ command is absent. This is the only mode for the M-22 air defense
system when firing a TEL at a 9K37M1 (9K37)
ref. 1450s
9M38M1.0000.000 TO Pg.
Rev. Pg No. Doc. Signature Date 29
[illegible] [illegible]
1-804 [Signature: illegible] 03/06/84
air defense system.
ZV mode with RLC significantly increases the missile’s flight duration before RGS target
acquisition with signal from the target, which in turn increases the missile's possible range and
provides protection from interference in SPT mode.
The latter is ensured by signal acquisition occurring at the minimum possible distance from
the target and by preventing RGS radar antenna beam interference. This mode is used only with
the 9K37M1 (9K37) air defense system.
Missile equipment function under various modes of operation is described in Section 10 of
these technical specifications.
The volume and order of issue and execution of commands and signals during operation
of the missile's on-board equipment are shown in cyclograms (Figs. 19, 20, 21)
2.3. Brief information on missile guidance
Guiding the 9M38M1 missile to its target after target is acquired by the radar guidance
head using proportional nativation A diagram of proportional navigation is given in Fig. 3.
The essence of proportional navigation lies in the fact that the missile’s flight to the meeting
point with the target during the guidance phase occurs on a trajectory at each point of which the
speed of rotation of the velocity vector of the missile that is proportional to the angular velocity of
rotation of the “missile-target” line (RGS antenna line of sight to the target).
The principle of proportional navigation on, for example, the vertical plane, can be
expressed by the equation:
􀝀􀟠
􀝀􀝐
=
􀝀􀔭
􀝀􀝐
􀎮 􀝂 (􀈟, 􀜰􀝔, 􀟮),
where 􀟠 is equal to the tilt angle of the velocity vector of the missile to the horizon;
ref. 1450s
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9M38M1.0000.000 TO
30 Rev. Pg No. Doc. Signature Date
Order 464
4. MISSILE ENGINE
4.1. Purpose, components, and structure of the engine
The 9D131 engine of the 9M38M1 (see Fig. 6) is designed to generate jet propulsion to
allow the missile to allow the missile to fly at a given speed and is a single-chamber, dual-mode,
solid-propellant jet engine with a case-bonded charge of composite propellant.
Main technical characteristics of the engine:
432.2 ± 5.[illegible]
􀀐 engine mass……………………………………………………………….. 433 kg;
􀀐 composite propellant mass (PD 17/18) …………………………………… 339.4 ± 3.6 kg;
􀀐 engine output time ……………………………………………................... less than 0.1 s;
􀀐 engine operating time …………………………………………………….. 19.35 ± 3.65 s;
􀀐 maximum pressure of engine combustion chamber within the temperature
range of combat use ………………………………………………………… 127 kG/cm2;
􀀐 nozzle throat diameter ……………………………………………………. 95 mm;
􀀐 nozzle exit diameter ………………………………………………………. 340 mm;
[illegible] 272 ± 7.5 s.
The engine consists of the 9X172 charge, the 9X253 igniter, fore end plate (3), aft end plate
(30), and nozzle cluster (26). The 9X172 charge consists of a steel body (1) with a protective
fastening barrier and an attached propellant monoblock (12) of grooved tubing. The blast tube (29)
is welded to the aft end plate.
The engine’s charge body, fore end plate, aft end plate, and blast tube make up the engine’s
combustion chamber during its operation.
ref. 1450s
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[illegible] [illegible]
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The engine's charge body (1) has a complex design consisting of two flanges (7), two shells
(11), a heavy ring (13), and collar with lobes attached with resin.
The flanges, shells, and heavy ring are made of corrosion-resistant steel. The fore end plate,
aft end plate with blast tube, nozzle cluster body, and collar are made of titanium alloy.
The fore and aft flanges have 67 threaded holes for bolts and studs. The end plates are
attached to the shell with bolts (33), and the engine coupling with adjacent sections is attached
with studs (2) and flange nuts. To orient the sections and fore and aft end plates with respect to the
body, nails are pressed into the flanges (49).
On the engine’s fore end plate there are an adapter (4), 15X341 engine ignition cartridge
(37), 9X253 igniter (6), and SSD-65 pressure decay signaling device (36).
There are lobes (31) on the heavy ring for attaching the fins, hook, and rear rigging.
There is additional rigging for attaching the fins on the ring (24).
The 15X341 engine ignition cartridge has a preliminary arming setting in the ignition chain
(to prevent accidental triggering of the charge). In its initial state, the ignition chain of the combat
charge initiator is blocked by a flap that allows access to the ignition channel only after preliminary
arming of the initiator.
The ignition channel between the 15X341 cartridge (37) and the 9X235 igniter (6) in the
adapter (4) is blocked by the safety-start device rotor (39) in order to prevent accidental starting of
the engine in the initial state. A switch automatically switches the SSD rotor from the CLOSED
position to the OPEN position.
ref. 1450s
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9M38M1.0000.000 TO
40 Rev. Sht. No. Doc. Signature Date
SSD during missile launch on the launching shoe
The SSD-65 pressure decay signaling device is designed to deliver to SAD the CRUISE
MODE signal (+ 27V PTSh MR) to remove the second stage of SAD safing.
The engine’s dual-mode (high thrust on startup mode and low thrust on cruise mode)
operation is achieved by contouring the engine’s composite propellant. The propellant monoblock
(23) of grooved tubing has free ends and aft placement of the slit compensator for moving the
engine’s center of gravity during operation.
The interior channel of the fore monoblock portion of the charge is shaped like a truncated
cone with the top facing the fore end. The difference in the radii of the bases of the cone provides
the required duration for the pressure drop. The slit compensator is transitioned to the main part
radially to reduce the stress level at the base of the slit. The shape of the slit and thickness of the
arch in the fore part of the charge were chosen so as to ensure balance in strength. The ends of the
charge protrude and fill part of the volume of the combustion chamber formed by the charge body,
fore end plate, aft end plate, and blast tube.
The inner surface of the body is protected by a heat-resistant coating (HRC). To prevent
the plasticizer from migrating from the propellant to the body HRC there is an oxidized aluminum
foil (near the slit) on the surface of the HRC. The body section (near the slit) containing the
propellant that burns during startup mode has a thicker coating of HRC. Near the body’s flanges,
HRC switches to wedge-shaped elastic cuffs (9) designed to reduce pull on the joints of the
propellant monoblock when the body experiences a difference of temperature
􀁕􀁈􀁉􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀘􀀓􀉫
9M38M1.0000.000 TO Pg.
Rev. Sht. No. Doc. Signature Date 41
[illegible] [illegible]
1-804 [Signature: illegible] 03/06/84
with ambient temperature of ±50°C. To reduce the weight of the engine on the outer surface of the
body, there are grooves filled with fiberglass near the flanges (8).
The fore end plate (3) is made of titanium alloy and is a torispherical shell with an outer
flange and a central hole for mounting the adapter (4). On the end plate flange there are grooves
for sealing the rubber ends, a hole for securing the angular orientation of Section No. 2, and 67
holes (50 bolt holes and 17 stud holes). Section No. 2 is attached to the engine with 17 threaded
studs.
The adapter has a threaded socket for mounting the 15X341 cartridge (37) gas supply
connection to the SSD-65 pressure decay signaling device (36). The adapter is affixed to the end
plate central hole with a nut (5), which is threaded for installation of the 9X253 igniter (6). The
nut and the internal surface of the fore end plate are protected by a heat-resistant coating.
A nozzle with blast tube converts the combustion products of the propellant into the kinetic
energy of gas outflow with minimal losses of thermal energy. The blast tube (29) is included in
the engine construction because of the need for optimal placement of missile components on the
tail section, is made of titanium alloy, and is a shell (16) with an outer flange for attaching the blast
tube to the body of the engine. In the central section, the spherical shell becomes cylindrical,
ending in a threaded flange with a groove for sealing of the rubber ring. The outer flange has a
groove for sealing rings and holes for connecting the blast tube to the engine body and Section No.
4 of the missile. Section No. 4 attaches to the engine
ref. 1450s
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9M38M1.0000.000 TO
42 Rev. Sht. No. Doc. Signature Date
with 17 threaded studs.
HRC has been applied to the inner surface of the blast tube body to protect the spherical
and cylindrical shells from the thermal effects of the propellant combustion products. To prevent
the HRC from eroding, a protective collar (17) is adhered to the entrance to the cylindrical part of
the blast tube. A single layer of asbestos cloth is applied between the blast tube body and HRC as
a drainage course for decomposition products. The inner surface of the cylindrical part of the blast
tube is protected from thermal and erosive effects of hot gas flow by a carbon fiber insert (19) in
the form of a tube attached to the HRC.
The engine nozzle consists of the nozzle body (22), nozzle insert (27), insert (20) with
substrate (21), and barrier seal (28). The nozzle body is made of titanium by welding, and consists
of the insert body (cylindrical part), two conical shells (23), and a flange. The nozzle is attached
to the blast tube with a threaded joint.
To prevent the nozzle from spontaneously unscrewing, the nozzle contacts the body of the
fourth section (see Fig. 2) with eight screws (71) screwed into the threaded holes on the body of
the section. Between the nozzle body and the body of the fourth section there is a ring slit (72)
designed to release exhaust fumes from the missile’s gas supply system and which is closed by a
plug (27) in the initial state that burns on startup of the missile.
The graphite insert with substrate (see Fig. 6, pos. 20, 21) prevents the cylindrical part of
the nozzle from overheating. To prevent the nozzle throat from heat, the inner surface of the insert
is coated with an anti-corrosive coating. The supercritical nozzle flow passage
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is constructed by the nozzle insert (27) mounted with adhesive..
A seal made of aluminum alloy and mounted with two rubber sealing rings on screws
ensures the engine’s sealing.
The 9X253 igniter creates the initial pressure in the combustion chamber and ignites the
engine's propellant charge. The igniter is attached to the engine’s fore end plate adapter with a
threaded joint. The igniter structure is shown in Fig. 6 (position 6).
The 15X341 cartridge is designed to ignite the explosive material of the 9X253 igniter. It
is attached to the adapter socket of the engine’s fore end plate with a threaded joint. The cartridge
electrical circuit and missile are connected using a small plug-in connector.
The safety-start device located in the cartridge provides safety when operating the 15X341
cartridge and arming the cartridge in the ignition chain during electric current pulse. The cartridge
becomes live by arming the igniter and is triggered by the igniter. The cartridge is an electric switch
with two independent bridgewires. The 15X341 cartridge has measures preventing the arming of
the propellant charge cartridge by gases from the arming of the igniter as well as in the event of
accidental arming of the propellant igniter when the cartridge is unarmed.
4.2. Operating principles of the engine
The 15X341 cartridge starts the engine by igniting the explosive material of the 9X253
igniter.
ref. 1450s
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6. MISSILE PAYLOAD
The missile payload of the 9M38M1 consists of the 9H314M warhead, the 94231M1
radar proximity fuse, the 9E129 safing and arming device, and the 9E242 contact sensor system.
6.1. Warhead: Purpose and structure
The 9H314M warhead is designed to defeat air and surface targets with its fragments
(damaging agents) and the propellant action of its explosion.
The warhead is a one-shot initiation carried out by the 9E129 safing and arming device
(SAD). The SAD’s operating signal during non-contact firing of the warhead is delivered to the
SAD on the 9E241M1 radar proximity fuse and during contact firing of the warhead from the
9E242 contact sensor system (CSS).
Main characteristics of the 9H314M warhead:
􀀐 warhead mass …………………………………………………………….. 70-2.6 kg;
􀀐 mass of the body and damaging agents …………………………................ 35.5􀬿􀬵.􀬶
􀬾􀬴.􀬻 kg;
􀀐 mass of the explosive material ……………………………………………. 33.5􀬿􀬴.􀬸
􀬾􀬴.􀬷 kg;
􀀐 the warhead contains three types of damaging agents: two small and one
large;
􀀐 mass [illegible] 27 kg;
􀀐 average mass of a small damaging agent:
Type 1 ……………………………………………………………………. 2.1 grams
Type 2 ……………………………………………………………………. 2.35 grams
ref. 1450s
9M38M1.0000.000 TO Pg.
Rev. Sht. No. Doc. Signature Date 77
[illegible] [illegible]
􀀐 total number of small damaging agents:
Type 1 ………………………………………………………………….. 1870 ± 47
Type 2 …………………………………………………………………... 4060 ± 100
􀀐 average mass of a large damaging agent ………………………………… 8.1 grams
􀀐 total number of large damaging agents ………………………………… 1870 ± 47
angle of separation of damaging agents 38°
The warhead (see Fig. 5) consists of the body (8) and explosive charge (23). The body
consists of a frame adhered with fiberglass (fragmentation shell) with prepared damaging agents
(22).
The warhead fragmentation shell consists of two layers of damaging agents. The inner
layer consists of large damaging agents and the outer later consists of small damaging agents.
The damaging agents are made of steel. Large damaging agents are shaped like I-bars
while the small damaging agents are parallelepiped.
The band with the damaging agents is soaked in an epoxy resin when being wound onto
the frame. The fragment layers along the outer surface are soaked in an epoxy resin. After
polymerization of the resin under the appropriate thermal conditions, a solid monolithic
fragmentation assembly is formed.
The explosive charge is a composite of TG-24, containing 24% tritol and 76% hexogen.
The warhead frame consists of the bottom (1), the shell (7), the gasket (16), and the cover
(17). The bottom of the frame is made of aluminum alloy. In the center, the bottom has a thin
wall (opposite
ref. 1450s
Pg.
9M38M1.0000.000 TO
78 Rev. Sht. No. Doc. Signature Date
the SAD detonating part) and threaded holes for attaching the SAD (3) to the warhead. The
bottom is attached to the warhead shell with screws. The bottom and shell joint is sealed with
resin.
The frame cover is made of aluminum alloy and has a platform (18) and two eyes (15) to
mount the lifting attachment on the warhead and a platform with threaded holes to attach the
bracket (14), on which the electrical plug is mounted (13). The cover attaches to the shell with
screws after filling the body of the warhead with the TG-24 composite explosive material. A
paronite gasket (16) is mounted at the junction of the cover and shell and sealed with resin.
The shell (7) is the warhead’s main constructive element and provides the specified
fragmentation profile in the form of the explosive charge, and together with the bottom and cover
forms a sealed chamber for the explosive charge.
The shell consists of a flange (24), shells (21), and plates (19). The flange is made of
aluminum alloy and has threaded holes for thrust bearings (25), with which the warhead connects
to Section No. 2 of the missile using four thrust screws (26). The shell is a thin sheet made of
aluminum alloy welded to a plate and flange. The plate is made of aluminum alloy and has four
eyes (11) with stud holes (12) that attaches to the warhead in Section No. 2.
The mounting plate (5) is attached to the warhead shell flange with four bolts (6), on
which the contact sensor system B-168B sensors (2) and B-166 distribution unit (shoe) are
mounted.
Electric wiring harnesses (10) from the SAD to the CSS, which lay along the body of the
warhead, are affixed with rubber rims (9) and brackets (27).
ref. 1450s
9M38M1.0000.000 TO Pg.
Rev. Sht. No. Doc. Signature Date 79
[illegible] [illegible]
The on-board electric wiring harness is attached to the missile's in vehicle network.
The 9H314M warhead is located in Section No. 2 of the missile. The aft end of the
warhead (plate) is mounted by its eyes on the four studs of the aft frame of the section and is
attached with flange nuts. The fore end of the warhead rests by its thrust bearings on the
tightened thrust screws (26) of the fore frame of the section.
ref. 1450s
Pg.
9M38M1.0000.000 TO
80 Rev. Sht. No. Doc. Signature Date
Annex 483
Firing and combat operation rules for surface-to-air missile systems of anti-aircraft defense
forces of the infantry. Part 6. Buk-M1 surface-to-Air Missile System. Moscow : Military
Publishing House, 1986.
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE
KHARKOV IVAN KOZHEDUB NATIONAL
AIR FORCE UNIVERSITY
A. B. Skorik
CONSTRUCTION, TECHNICAL OPERATION AND
TACTICAL USE OF BUK-M1
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM LAUNCHERS
Textbook
Kharkov
2016
UDC 623.76:621.396.9(075.8) Recommended for printing by the
BBK Ts641.4:571.432ya73 Scientific Council
S15 of Kharkov National Air Force University
(report No. ___ of October 1, 2016)
Author: A. B. Skorik.
Reviewers:
M. A. Yermoshin, Dr. of Military Science, Professor
V. V. Burtsev, Candidate of Technical Science, Professor
Construction, Technical Operation, and Tactical Use of Buk-M1 Surface-to-Air Missile System
Launchers: Textbook, S16 A. B. Skorik, Kharkov: Kharkov National Air Force University, 2016,
294 p., illustrations
The textbook discloses the features of the construction, functioning, equipment design,
and technical operation of SOU 9A310M1 electronic devices.
The textbook is designed to train foreign specialists who are serving in units armed with
the Buk-M1 surface-to-air missile system. This textbook may be used by officers for independent
study of specialized topics in the commander training system and for conducting exercises with
personnel in technical and specialized training.
UDC 623.76:621.396.9(075.8)
BBK Ts641.4:571.432ya73
© Skorik A. B. 2016
© Kharkivskiy natsionalniy universitet Povitryanikh Sil im. I. Kozheduba, 2016
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 6
PREFACE 8
SECTION 1. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONING OF 9A39M1
LAUNCHER-LOADER VEHICLE
9
Chapter 1. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 9A39M1 LAUNCHERLOADER
VEHICLE
10
1.1. PURPOSE, COMPOSITION AND MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF
9A39M1 LLV
10
1.2. DESIGN OF 9A39M1 LLV AND PLACEMENT OF MECHANISMS,
FITTINGS, AND EQUIPMENT
12
1.3. CONSTRUCTION OF 577A BASIC TRACKED VEHICLE 17
1.3.1. GM 577A Chassis and powerplant 18
1.3.2. GM 577A Electrical equipment and power supply system 21
1.3.3. GM 577A Communications devices, observation, lighting, and alarm
instrumentation
22
1.3.4. GM 577A Life support system 22
1.4. INTERACTION OF 9A39M1 LLV SYSTEMS 23
Chapter 2. 9P315 LAUNCHER 26
2.1. GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT 9P315 LAUNCHER 26
2.2. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONING OF THE BASE WITH
9P315 LAUNCHER
30
2.2.1. Construction and functioning of 9P315 launcher traversing mechanism
and traverse guidance angle limiter
33
2.2.2. 9P315 launcher manual turning, lifting, and locking mechanisms 41
2.2.3. Construction of the 9P315 launcher front support 44
2.2.4. Construction of the 9P315 launcher trunnion assemblies 46
2.3. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONING OF 9P315 LAUNCHER
ROCKER
48
2.3.1. Construction and functioning of boom with mechanisms 48
2.3.2. Construction and functioning of MCP 52
2.4. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONING OF 9P315 LAUNCHER
TRACKING DRIVE
56
2.4.1. General information about the electro-hydraulic power tracking drive 56
2.4.2. Interaction of the EGSSP devices 58
2.5. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONING OF 9T321 HOIST 60
2.5.1. General information about 9T321 hoist 60
2.5.2 Construction of crane electrical equipment 61
2.5.3. Construction of crane hydraulic equipment 64
2.5.4. Operation of electrical equipment and crane hydraulic equipment 70
2.6. INTERACTION OF 9P315 LAUNCHER MECHANSIMS 71
2.6.1. Putting 9P315 launcher in firing position 71
2.6.2. Putting 9P315 launcher in travelling position 73
2.6.3. Operation of 9P315 launcher mechanisms when working with missiles 74
2.7. FUNCTIONING OF 9A39M1 LAUNCHER-LOADER VEHICLE IN
LOADING-OFFLOADING OPERATIONS
75
Chapter 3. 9A39M1 LLV CONTROL AND LAUNCHING AUTOMATIC
EQUIPMENT
77
3.1. 9A39M1 LLV CONTROL EQUIPMENT 77
3.2. LAUNCHING AUTOMATIC EQUIPMENT 83
3.2.1. Construction and functioning of P-36 control unit 84
3.2.2. Construction and functioning of P-10 analysis unit 86
3.2.3. Construction and functioning of P-6 communications unit 87
3.2.4. Construction and functioning of BP4-M launching unit 89
Chapter 4. TELECODE (SYNCHRONOUS) COMMUNICATIONS AND
CONVERSION EQUIPMENT
92
4.1. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONING PRINCIPLES OF AM1
CONTAINER
93
4.2. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONING PRINCIPLES OF 2V-01
BOX
95
4.3. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF V-11 AND V-22 UNITS 100
4.4. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF B-19 UNIT 100
Chapter 5. ANALOG COMPUTER 102
5.1. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ANALOG COMPUTER 102
5.2. FUNCTIONING FEATURES OF ANALOG COMPUTER IN
DIFFERENT MODES
104
5.2.1. AC functioning in “Preparation” mode 104
5.2.2. AC functioning in “Target lock-on” mode 105
5.2.3. AC functioning in “Control” mode 105
Chapter 6. 9A39M1 LLV COMMUNICATIONS AND DOCUMENTING
DEVICES
106
6.1. 9S728 INTERNAL TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION AND
SWITCHING EQUIPMENT
106
6.2. 5Ya373 SPEECH COMMUNICATION 107
6.3. DOCUMENTING EQUIPMENT 109
SECTION 11. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONING OF 9M38M1
SURFACE-TO-AIR GUIDED MISSILE
Chapter 7. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 9M38M1 SURFACE-TOAIR
GUIDED MISSILE
Chapter 8. FEATURES OF CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONING OF
9M38M1 SGM ONBOARD EQUIPMENT
8.1. 9M38M1 SGM CONTROL EQUIPMENT, OPERATING PRINCIPLE
OF MISSILE GUIDANCE SYSTEM
8.2. 9M38M1 SGM COMBAT EQUIPMENT
8.3. 9D131 ENGINE
8.4. 9B155M1 TURBOGENERATOR POWER SOURCE
8.5. 9M38M1 SGM GAS POWER SOURCE
Chapter 9. RGS 9E50M1 FEATURES OF CONSTRUCTION AND
FUNCTIONING
9.1. FEATURES OF CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONING OF RGS
9E50M1 ANTENNA-WAVEGUIDE SYSTEM
9.2. FEATURES OF CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONING OF RGS
9E50M1 RECEIVING SYSTEM
9.3. FEATURES OF CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONING OF RGS
9E50M1 AUTOMATIC LOCK-ON AND TARGET SPEED
TRACKING SYSTEM
9.4. FEATURES OF CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONING OF RGS
9E50M1 ANGULAR TRACKING AND STABILIZATON SYSTEM
9.5. FEATURES OF CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONING OF SGM
9M38M1 RADIO-CORRECTION CHANNEL
9.6. FEATURES OF CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONING OF
ONBOARD COMPUTER
9.6.1. E14M1 ONBOARD COMPUTER
9.6.2. FORMER OF UNIT E16M1 RADIO COMMAND
Chapter 10. PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONING OF
9B615M1 AUTOPILOT
10.1. PURPOSE AND OVERALL DESIGN OF 9B615M1 AUTOPILOT
10.2. CONSTRUCTION FEATURES OF 9B615M1 AUTOPILOT
EQUIPMENT
10.3. FEATURES OF FUNCTIONING AND OPERATING MODES OF
9B615M1 AUTOPILOT
Chapter 11. PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONING OF
9E241M1 VT PROXIMITY FUSE
10.1. TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF VT PF
9E241M1
10.2. OPERATING PRINCIPLES OF ACTIVE IMPULSE VT PROMIXITY
FUSE 9E241M1
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fig. 2.12. Angle limiter: a) Limiter image; b) Limiter diagram
1 – housing; 2 – conical wheel;
3 – cam washer; 4 – shaft; 5 – housing; 6 – cam washer; 7 – pinion;
8 – outlet shaft unit; 9 – pinion shaft; 10 – articulated coupling; 11 – spindle.
CONICAL REDUCTION GEAR
The conical reduction gear 24 (Fig. 2.13) is designed to transmit rotation from the angle
limiter through the hinged shaft system to HP drive cradle 9I31M1. The conical reduction gear
consists of interconnected housings 2 (Fig. 12) and 6. Housing 2 on bearings 4 has shaft-pinion 5
which is coupled to conical wheel 9 installed on the shaft by hinge 8. Housing 2 is covered by
covers 1 and 7. Pads 3 have been placed between housings 2 and 6, as well as between housing 2
covers 1 and 7.
2.2.2. 9P315 LAUNCHER MANUAL TURNING, LIFTING, AND LOCKING
MECHANISMS
MANUAL TURNING DRIVE
The manual turning drive, consists of two drives (Fig. 2.14b, 2.14c), together with the
manual turning unit and turning valve box with handle ensuring manual turning of the launcher
base on the azimuth.
Drive I transmits rotation from the manual turning unit to drive II, which then transmits
rotation to the turning mechanism brake (Fig. 2.5 and 2.7).
Drive I (Fig. 2.14b) consists of housing 7, closed by covers 1 and 5. The housing on the
bearings holds two conical shaft-pinions 2, each of which is connected with hinged coupling 4.
The hinged couplings are connected to shaft 3 and spindle 8, the first of which is connected to
spindle 8 of the drive (Fig. 13), while the second is connected to manual turning unit shaft 12.
Drive II (Fig. 2.14c) consists of housing 9, closed by covers 3 and 7. The housing 9 holds
shaft-pinion 10, coupled to pinion 5. Pinion 5 is installed on spindle 6, the end of which is
connected with hinged coupling 1, while it, in turn, is connected to shaft 2. Shaft 2 is connected
to shaft yoke 3 (Fig. 2.9) of the turning mechanism brake.
Shaft-pinion 10 (Fig. 2.14b) installed on bearings 4 is connected via the hinged coupling
with spindle 8, which, in turn, is connected to shaft 3 of drive I (Fig. 2.14b).
MANUAL TURNING UNIT
The manual turning unit consists of shaft 6 (Fig. 2.15), connected through hinged
coupling 5 with shaft 2, sleeve 4, bushing 3, and lubricating valve 1. Sleeve 4 is secured to the
base wall, while handle 9P315.11.02.110 for the manual GP drive is mounted on the stem of
shaft 2. The plate (Fig. 2.15b) indicates the direction in which the handle needs to be turned.
Lubricating valve 1 ensures lubrication of the contacting surfaces of shaft 2 and bushing 3.
Fig. 2.13. Conical Reduction Gear:
1 – cover; 2 – housing; 3 – pad; 4- bearing; 5 – shaft-pinion;
6 – housing; 7 – cover; 8 – hinged shaft; 9 – conical wheel.
Fig. 2.14. Manual turning drive: a) image of manual turning drive; b) drive I diagram; c) drive II
diagram
Fig. 2.15. Manual turning unit: a) image of manual turning unit; b) plate; c) manual turning unit
diagram
1 – cover; 2 – shaft-pinion;
3 – shaft; 4 – hinged coupling;
5 – cover; 6 – sleeve;
7 – housing; 8 – spindle;
9 – shaft-pinion.
1 – lubricating valve; 2 – shaft; 3 – bushing; 4 – sleeve;
5 – hinged coupling; 6 – shaft
1 – hinged coupling; 2 – shaft; 3 – cover;
4 – bearing; 5 – pinion; 6 – spindle;
7 – cover; 8 – spindle; 9-housing;
10 – shaft-pinion
Annex 484
Roberto Lavalle, The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, 60 Zao􀈿RV 491, 496-97 (2000)

The International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism
Roberto Lavalle*
Prior to the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly, on December
9, 1999, of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism (Financing Convention or Convention),1 the community of states had
made arduous efforts, which are being pursued, to cope with international terrorism
in a collective manner. This has been done through two basic modalities. The
longest established one is embodied in an impressive series of complex and wideranging
multilateral treaties, most of them open to all states, that seek to cope with
the phenomenon by depriving terrorists of sanctuaries and ensuring international
cooperation in suppressing their activities and bringing them to justice. Each of
these treaties is directed towards a specific type or area of terrorist activity.2 The
other, far more recent of the two modalities takes the form of two comprehensive
declarations on measures to eliminate international terrorism, adopted without a
vote by the United Nations General Assembly in 1994 and 1996 and which may
be a source of customary law.3 Since 1998 the Security Council also has become
engaged.4
* Minister Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the United Nations.
The views expressed here are, however, purely personal to the author, who is indebted to Professor
Midiger Wo I f r u m, as well as Roger S. C I a r k, Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers
University School of Law-Camden, for valuable comments and suggestions on initial drafts of this
article.
' The text of the Financing Convention is contained in the Annex to resolution 54/169, adopted
on the date indicated. in accordance with paragraph 1 of article 26, it will come into force thirty days
after 22 states have taken action to become parties.
2 The existing global, as distinct from regional, counterterrorism treaties are the nine listed in the
Annex to the Financing Convention (and in note 14 infra), as well as the Convention on Offences
and Certain Other Acts committed on Board Aircraft, of 1963 (text in 704 UNTS, 219) and the Convention
on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, of 1991. Another multilateral
treaty against terrorism is the 1971 Organization of American States Convention to Prevent
and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that
are of International Significance, which, although adopted within a regional organization, is, pursuant
to its article 9, open to participation by all members of the United Nations or of a specialized
agency. (There are three purely regional treaties, one of which is the 1977 European Convention on
the Suppression of Terrorism.)
3 The two declarations, adopted on reports of the Sixth Committee, are annexed, respectively, to
General Assembly resolutions 49/60 and 51/210, of December 9, 1994 and December 17, 1996,
respectively.
4 Cf. the general pronouncements on terrorism contained in the preambles of Council resolutions
1189 (1998) and 1267 (1999), of August 13, 1998 and October 15, 1999, respectively, as well as operative
paragraph 5 of the former, and, more important, the resolution dealing with terrorism as a whole
that the Council adopted on October 19, 1999, i.e. resolution 1269 (1999).
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492 Lavalle
It may be added that, although the 1998 Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) does not include terrorism among the crimes falling within
the jurisdiction of the ICC, the crime of terrorism was provided for in proposals
considered in the course of the preparatory work.5 Moreover at the close of the
Rome conference a resolution was adopted without a vote by which it was recognized,
inter alia, that "terrorist acts, by whomever and wherever perpetrated and
whatever their forms, methods or motives, are serious crimes of concern to the
international community" and recommended further "that a Review Conference
pursuant to article 123 of the Statute consider" (together with drug crimes) the
crime "of terrorism with a view" to its "inclusion in the list of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court."6
The Financing Convention, the most recent addition to the series of treaties
mentioned, takes an altogether different approach from its forerunners in that, instead
of addressing, as they do, specific types or areas of terrorism, it seeks to cripple
the phenomenon as a whole. It does so not by addressing acts of terrorism
proper, but by striving to cut off what can be regarded as the lifeblood of terrorism
of all types, L e. the provision of material, chiefly financial, resources to terrorists.
This feature of the Financing Convention puts it in a class by itself among
counterterrorism treaties.
This note aims to provide a critical overview of the latter and other principal
features of the Financing Convention.
L
In paragraph 3 (f) of the second of the two resolutions referred to in note 3, entitled
"Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism," the United Nations General
Assembly called "upon all States to prevent and counteract, through appropriate
domestic measures, the financing of terrorists and terrorist organizations,
whether such financing is direct or indirect through organizations which also have
5 The draft statute initially prepared by the International Law Commission included the crime of
terrorism, but only by way of a reference to so-called .treaty crimes," i. e. those provided for in the
counterterrorism treaties whose titles are listed in the annex to the draft statute. (For the text of the
latter see GAOR, 49th session, Supplement No. 10, para. 91.) In contrast, in including that crime
among those over which the ICC was to have jurisdiction, the draft statute elaborated at the intersessional
meeting held in the Netherlands in January 1998, gave a definition thereof. (Text in M. Cherif
Bassiouni, The Statute of the International Criminal Court, a Documentary History, 221, at
234-235 [1998].) This text found its way, between brackets, into the draft statute that was the basis
of the work of the Rome Conference. (Cf. UN doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, P. 27-28.) (The core
element of this definition does not differ from the one by India referred to in note 19 infra.) At the
plenary meetings of the Conference and those of its Committee of the Whole the majority of
representatives (including those belonging to the Western European and others Group) opposed
recommendations by a minority advocating the inclusion of the crime of terrorism in the Statute. (Its
final exclusion is, needless to say, not unrelated to the political problems involved in its definition and
referred to in note 19 infra.)
6 For the text of the resolution (numbered "F"), see p. 7-8 of the Final Act of the Conference
(UN doc. A/CONF/183/10).
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Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 493
or claim to have charitable, social or cultural goals or which are also engaged in
[other] unlawful activities including the exploitation of persons for purposes of
funding terrorist activities." In the same provision the General Assembly also
called on states -to consider, where appropriate, adopting regulatory measures to
prevent and counteract movements of funds suspected to be intended for terrorist
purposes and to intensify the exchange of information concerning international
movements of such funds." On September 23, 1998, at the 53rd regular session of
the General Assembly, the French foreign minister echoed those concerns by emphasizing
the "need to define concrete mechanisms for legal measures and mutual
judicial assistance against those who finance terrorism" and proposed that negotiations
on the matter be launched before the end of the year.7 In November 1998,
the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations followed up on
this statement by submitting a draft international convention for the suppression
of terrorist financing and proposing that it be considered by the open-ended Ad
Hoc Committee established by the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution
51/210.8 This Committee dealt with the proposal at a two-week session in
March 1999.9 Its work was completed, in September-October 1999, by an openended
working group of the General Assembly's Sixth Committee, Which, on the
recommendation of the working group,10 adopted without change a draft convention
later submitted to the plenary, which also adopted it as submitted. Pursuant
to its testimonium, the Financing Convention was opened for signature at United
Nations Headquarters on January 10, 2000.
ii.
1. Basic Features Common to the Financing Convention
and Prior Counterterrorism Treaties
Broadly speaking, one can consider global counterterrorism treaties, particularly
the most recent ones, as consisting of a fairly standard element and a set of
provisions specific to each treaty.11 The core of the latter provisions is the definition
of the offences sanctioned by the particular treaty.
7 Cf. UN Doc. A/54/PV. 11, p. 18.
8 Cf. UN Doc. A/C.6/53/9, of November 4, 1998.
9 For the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, see GAOR, 54th session, Supplement No. 37.
A revised version of the French proposal whose symbol is given in the preceding note was before the
Ad Ho'c Committee. (For the text see Annex II of its report.)
10 For the report of the working group (which for all practical purposes is indistinguishable from
the Ad Hoc Committee), s e e UN Doc. A/C.6/54/L.2.
11 The first postwar global counterterrorism treaty, i. e. the 1963 Convention on Offences and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, does not follow this pattern. This treaty concerns
itself more with the allocation of jurisdiction of states parties over and the coordination of actions by
them with respect to the wrongful acts with which it deals than with ensuring cooperation among
those states with a view to the suppression of those acts. The 1991 Convention on the Marking of
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494 Lavalle
The standard element contains provisions requiring states to criminalize those
offences and make them punishable by appropriate penalties, as well as provisions
that specify a wide range of cases in which states parties are required to or may establish
their jurisdiction over the offences. These provisions are complemented by
one to the effect that whenever an alleged offender is present in the territory of a
state party it shall either prosecute or extradite that person, as well as by other
provisions seeking to ensure, particularly through mutual legal assistance and
other forms of cooperation among the states parties, that no person suspected of
having committed an offence covered by the treaty can find refuge in the territories
of any of them. Also part of the standard element are provisions that crirninalize,
in addition to the primary offences defined in each particular treaty, ancillary
offences, typically attempts to commit and participation as an accomplice in
the commission of the primary offences. Other important provisions of the standard
element prohibit the characterization of the offences covered, for purposes of
extradition or mutual legal assistance, as political offences, as well as their justification
on other grounds of a general nature (e.g. their alleged ideological character).
The standard element also includes certain miscellaneous provisions, such as
savings, dispute settlement and final clauses, as well as a few other sundry provisions.
It is on the standard element of the most recent prior global counterterrorism
treaty, i. e. the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings (Bombing Convention),12 that the corresponding provisions of the
Financing Convention are based.13
Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, whose objective is merely to prohibit acts that facilitate
but do not constitute acts of terrorism, deviates even more markedly from the normal pattern of
counterterrorism treaties. As used in the remainder of the text, the expression "counterterrorism treaties&
quot; does not include these two treaties. (A 1937 counterterrorism treaty that did not come into force
is referred to in note 19 infra.)
12 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, on December 15, 1997, as the annex to its
resolution 52/164, of that date. In respect of this treaty, cf. Samuel M. Witten, The International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 92 AJIL 774-781 (1998). Interestingly, the
treaty contains a provision (paragraph (a) of article 15) that, among other things, requires states parties
to "prohibit in their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and organizations that
knowingly finance the perpetration of offences" covered by it.
13 Most of the provisions of the Financing Convention, pertaining as they do to what has been
termed the "standard element," are identical with or very similar to provisions of the Bombing Convention.
Thus: (a) article 4 of the former, requiring a state party "to adopt such measures as may be
necessary [t]o establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the offences" covered and
'make them punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature," is identical
with article 4 of the Bombing Convention; (b) article 2 (4 and 5) of the Financing Convention,
on ancillary offences (i. e. attempts to commit an offence, acts of complicity therewith, organizing or
directing others to commit an offence, and contributing to the commission of an offence by a group
of persons acting with a common purpose), is almost identical with article 2 (2 and 3) of the Bombing
Convention); (c) article 6 of the Financing Convention, precluding certain abstract considerations
from justifying the offences covered, is mutatis mutandis identical with article 5 of the Bombing Convention;
(d) articles 7 (4) and 10 (1) of the Financing Convention set out the fundamental aut dedere
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Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 495
2. Primary Offences Provided for in the Financing Convention
Each of the prior counterterrorism treaties complemented its predecessors in
what could be described as a self-contained manner, the offences covered being autonomous,
i. e. entirely distinct from the ones defined in those treaties. In contrast,
the offences that the Financing Convention covers are, in a sense, grafted upon other
wrongful acts, i. e. either the offences defined in those prior counterterrorism treaties,
or another wrongful act, namely one that the Financing Convention defines in
the abstract and, although in the nature of a terrorist act, does not coincide with any
of the offences defined in the prior counterterrorism treaties.
The relevant provision of the Financing Convention is paragraph 1 of article 2,
in conjunction with the Annex to the Convention. These provisions are, together
with paragraph 1 of article 1 of the Convention, which defines a fundamental term
figuring in paragraph 1 of article 2, i. e. the term '(funds," the key elements of the
Convention. Paragraph I of article 2 reads as follows:
"Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person
by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, p r o v i d e s or c o I -
lects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge
that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out: (a) An act which constitutes
an offence within the scope and as defined in one of the [counterterrorism] treaaut
judicare principle in the same terms as articles 6 (4) and 8 (1) of the Bombing Convention; (e)
article 9 of the Financing Convention, on the treatment by states parties and the rights of alleged
perpetrators of offences covered by it, is identical with article 7 of the Bombing Convention; (f)
article 10 (2) of the Financing Convention, on service of sentences imposed in one state that extradited
the person sentenced, is identical with article 8 (2) of the Bombing Convention; (g) article 11 of
the Financing Convention, on extradition, is identical with article 9 of the Bombing Convention; (h)
article 12 (1 and 5) of the Financing Convention, on reciprocal assistance between states parties in
criminal investigations, or criminal or extradition proceedings, is identical with article 10 (1 and 2) of
the Bombing Convention; (i) articles 14 and 15 of the Financing Convention, prescribing, respectively,
that requests for extradition shall not be denied on account of the alleged political nature of the
corresponding offences and prohibiting requests for extradition or legal assistance from being denied
on the grounds that they are improperly motivated, are identical, respectively, with articles I I and 12
of the Bombing Convention; (j) articles 16, 17 and 19 of the Financing Convention, on, respectively,
the transfer from one state party to another, for certain purposes, of persons serving sentences in the
former, fair treatment of persons in respect of whom measures are taken or proceedings are carried
out, and communication to the United Nations Secretary-General of the outcome of prosecutions
under the Convention, are identical with articles 13, 14 and 16, respectively, of the Bombing Convention;
(k) articles 20 and 22 of the Financing Convention, which aim to prevent states from abusing
their rights under the Convention, are identical with articles 16 and 18 of the Bombing Convention;
(1) article 21 of the Financing Convention, providing for the prevalence of general international law,
and in particular the United Nations Charter and international humanitarian law, over the Convention,
is identical with article 19 (1) of the Bombing Convention; (in) article 24 of the Financing Convention,
which, subject to the possibility of opting out, mandates arbitration as a means of settling
disputes on the interpretation or application of the Convention (and recourse to the International
Court of justice if no agreement is possible on the terms of arbitration), is identical with article 20 of
the Bombing Convention; (n) article 27 of the Financing Convention, which allows states parties to
denounce it, is identical with article 23 of the Bombing Convention.
For a summary of and comments on the provisions of the Bombing Convention referred to in this
note, see Witten, supra note 12, at 777-781.
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ties listed in the annex;14 or (b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury to a civilian, or any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a
situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to
do or to abstain from doing any act." (Emphasis added.)
a) The notion of "funds"
In regard to the scope of the above-quoted paragraph, attention must be drawn
to the definition to which reference has been made, namely that of the third of the
words underlined in the quotation, that is, the term "funds."
The inclusion in multilateral treaties adopted under United Nations auspices of
definitions of the terms they use, which definitions are akin to the logical category
of "stipulative definitions,"15 is a fairly common feature of those treaties. There is,
however, a significant difference between the definition of "funds" contained in
the Financing Convention and the definitions that normally figure in other multilateral
treaties. The latter definitions do not as a rule depart considerably from the
common or dictionary definitions of the terms defined, or, if they do, the departure
is not very significant.16 The contrary is, however, the case with the definition
in the Financing Convention to which reference has been made, i. e. that of
the term "funds." Thus, as defined in the relevant provision of the Convention,
i. e. paragraph 1 of article 1, this term means "a s s e t s of every kind, wh e t h e r
tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired,
and legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital,
evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not limited to, bank
credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds,
drafts letters of credit. "(Emphasis added.) The meaning of the term in question is
thus stretched very far beyond its dictionary meaning, which is that of "pecuniary
resources,"17 to cover any tangible or intangible "asset." Thus, animals, buildings
14 These treaties are the following: 1. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
of 1970; 2. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
of 1971; 3. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973; 4. International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages, of 1979; 5. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, of 1980;
6. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Civil Aviation, of 1988; 7. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, of 1988; 8. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, of 1988; and 9. International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, of 1997.
15 Cf. Irving M. C o p i /Carl C o h e n, Introduction to Logic, 132 -133 and 486 -488 (1990).
16 An exception is the definition of the "continental shelf" in article 76 of the United Nations Law
of -the Sea Convention; this article expands the concept of continental shelf to include the continental
slope and the continental rise.
17 Cf. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, loth ed., which defines the term "funds" to mean
-available pecuniary resources."
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Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 497
or vehicles of any kind are "funds" for the purposes of the Financing Convention.
A curious corollary of the violence thus done to the meaning of a rather precise
term, which is made to cover virtually anything under the sun,
18 is that the title of
the Financing Convention is a misnomer: in this title the meaning of the term
"financing," which normally designates the provision of pecuniary resources, is
stretched to the same extent as the definition of the term "funds," so that the title
would be more appropriate if it referred not to "financing" but rather to "material
assistance."
The act of terrorism that, as has been pointed out, is defined by the Financing
Convention in the abstract, is the one specified in subparagraph (b) of paragraph
1 of article 2. This subparagraph creates a residual category whose purpose is to
" catch" any act that clearly corresponds to what the layman normally understands
by terrorist act but is not one of the offences defined in any of the treaties listed
in the Annex to the Financing Convention. An example of such an act would be
one by which individuals, without any attempt at kidnapping, would, in order to
create terror in the general public, indiscriminately use firearms against a crowd in
a public place (other than an airport) of any city or a rural area. This act (assuming
that no explosive bullets are used) would be covered neither by the Bombing
Convention, nor by any other of the counterterrorism treaties listed in the Annex
to the Financing Convention.
An interesting characteristic of the residual class of wrongful acts in question is
that their definition in subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 of article 2 could well
serve as a general definition of terrorism.19
The overall definition in paragraph 1 of article 2 of the Financing Convention
is manifestly a complex one.
b) The necessary mens rea
The dichotomy between subparagraphs (a) and (b), already commented on, is
clear and can hardly raise major difficulties. It is necessary, however, to break paragraph
1 down into its other basic elements.
18 The only objects that, conceivably, might not be covered by paragraph I of article I would be
those that, having no pecuniary value whatsoever, cannot be regarded as assets. (one wonders, however,
if, assuming that such objects exist, any of them are likely to be of assistance to terrorists.)
19 Although the need or usefulness of such a definition has long been emphasized, it has thus far
proved impossible to adopt one. As is well known, the reason for this failure is that the question is a
politically charged one. This arises, primarily if not exclusively, from the urging by many developing
countries that the definition exclude acts of violence by national liberation movements and include
so-called "state terrorism." (In respect of which cf. UN General Assembly resolution 39/159 of December
17, 1984.) For what could also be regarded as a general definition of terrorist acts cf. paragraph
2 (1) of the draft international convention on the suppression of terrorism submitted by India
to the United Nations in 1996. (UN doc. A/C.6/51/6, Annex, of November 11, 1996.) (This definition
borrows from the one contained in article 1 (2) of the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and
Punishment of Terrorism. [Text in 19 League of Nations 0. J. 23 (1938), and in I R. F r i e d I a n d e r,
Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control 253 (1979)].)
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The first point to be noted in this respect is that the definition contained in the
paragraph has two distinct branches, an active and a (largely) passive one, i. e. the
p r o v i s i o n of "funds" and the c o I I e c t i o n of "funds," each of which corresponds
to a separate offence.20 Moreover, the commission of either offence involves,
in addition to certain acts done by the offender (i. e. providing or collecting
"funds"), a certain type of awareness by the latter that his action can or will
entail certain wrongful consequences. This additional element constitutes the mens
rea of each of the two offences.
The additional element, which is the same for both offences, subdivides into
two variants. One is providing or collecting, as the case may be, "funds wi t h t h e
i n t e n t i o n that they should be used in full or in part, in order to carry out"
(emphasis added) an offence covered by either subparagraph (a) or subparagraph
(b) of paragraph 1 of article 2. The other variant consists in likewise providing or
collecting, as the case may be, "funds in the knowledge that they are to
be [so] used" (emphasis added).
What is the basis of the distinction between these two variants? It would seem
that the former is in the nature of a desire (or conviction of the appropriateness)
that the funds provided or collected be used for supporting an act of terrorism,
coupled with a belief that they probably will be so used, whereas the latter is in
the nature of a certainty that they will be so used. It should be noted, however,
that the distinction between the two variants appears to be one without much of
a difference. For, on the one hand, there can never be absoltite certainty as to
how anyone will behave, and, on the other, it is inconceivable that someone who
does not desire that material assistance provided to terrorists be used to further
their criminal activities should knowingly provide any such assistance to theM.21
20 Although collecting "funds" may be a preparatory act to their provision, it is not a prerequisite
to it (since "funds" provided to terrorists need not have been the object of a prior collection). Thus
if, in accordance with paragraph 1 of article 2, someone first collects "funds" for terrorists and then
provides them to the latter, he will have (successively) committed two separate offences. Moreover, in
each particular case where "funds" have been collected and then provided to terrorists, the perpetrator
of the "collection" offence need not be the person who has perpetrated the "provision" offence
(since the transfer of the "funds" from one person to another cannot normally be regarded as a
collection). From all these considerations it follows that each of the two offences is an altogether
freestanding one. (For which reason it might have been wise for the drafters of the Convention not
to have lumped them together.)
21 A conceivable difference between the two variants might appear to be that, in a prosecution
under the "intention" variant, lack of evidence that the recipients of the "funds" (or their intended
recipients, if the charge is that of collecting) are terrorists would not necessarily prevent the
defendant's conviction, whereas in a prosecution under the "knowledge" variant the contrary would
be the case. (I can have the i n t e n t i o n of murdering a person who, unknown to me, is dead; but in
no case can I possibly have the k n o wI e d g e that by doing a certain act I will have murdered that
person.) In the opinion of the present author, however, such a difference between the "intention" and
the "knowledge" variants, consistent as it may be with the letter of paragraph I of article 2, cannot
be accepted: one cannot hold a person accountable for merely intending, wishing or believing that an
act done by him will have consequences that are entirely outside the realm of possibility. Accordingly,
under either variant, lack of evidence that the recipients (or intended recipients) of the "funds" are
terrorists should be a valid defense in any criminal action brought under paragraph 1 of article 2.
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The lack of a real difference between the two variants is corroborated by a contextual
analysis of the key term of the former variant, i. e. the term "intention". It
appears that there is some abuse of language here. For the general concept of
intention is a reflexive one, in the sense that the intention of a person normally
refers only to what that person plans to do himself, not to future actions by
others.22 This can nevertheless be countered, censurable though this abuse of
language may be, by resorting to the well known concept of dolus eventualis, or
(roughly) recklessness. This Latin term (a French synonym for which is insouciance)
designates the criminal offence committed by a person who, knowing that
an act he plans to carry out involves the risk of (generally physical) damage to others,
nonetheless carries out the act.23 In such cases one may consider that the
actor has, indirectly, intended such harmful consequences as may arise from his
behaviour. Thus the notion of dolus eventualis has been rendered in English by the
expression "oblique" or "indirect" intention.24 Similarly Swiss criminal courts
have considered that the concept of intention can encompass the dolus eventualis.
25 But, whatever its nature, intention cannot exist without some degree of
knowledge, for no criminal act takes place in a vacuum and, as has been pointed
out by a well-known British author, "an act is not intentional as to a circumstance
of which the actor is ignorant,"26 which ties in with the German doctrine of Tatbestandsvorsatz.
27 We are thus brought to the knowledge variant.
It follows from the foregoing that the drafters of the Convention could well,
without in any way changing the thrust of paragraph 1, have done away with the
distinction between the two variants. This could have been done by adopting a
single formulation, namely the one contained in the second of the two draft con-
22 One would normally experience some puzzlement on hearing someone, say John, state that he
i n t e n d s that someone else, say Peter, is to do something. Such a statement might make sense to the
layman if, but only if, John has control so complete over the behaviour of Peter that the latter can be
regarded, at least so far as the intended act is concerned, as his instrument. (Thus one might not be
overly surprised to hear the master of a ship state that he intends that in exercising his duties the first
mate is to do this or that.)
23 Cf. Jean P r a d e 1, Droit p6nal compar6, 261 (1995). Two differences may be noted between the
normal features of a dolus eventualis offence and the one dealt with here. In the normal case the reprehensible
act or omission giving rise to the offence becomes criminal only upon the occurrence of a
harmful result. Moreover the actor will not at all desire that result. In the case under consideration
here, however, the offence is consummated by the culprit's action, whatever occurs later being irrelevant.
In addition, the actor will not normally look askance at the harmful consequences of his act.
It can thus be considered that the dolus eventualis that is part of the offence defined in paragraph
1 of article 2 of the Convention is, to a certain extent, virtual (or otherwise sui generis) in nature.
24 Cf. Ilias B a n t e k a s, The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility, 93 AJIL 573, at 590
(1999).
25 Cf. P r a d e 1. supra note 23, 261. Similarly, some American courts, in finding criminally liable
motorists who as a result of speeding involuntarily hit pedestrians, have grounded their decisions on
the idea that the motorists were deemed to intend the natural consequences of their acts. (Cf. Glanville
Wi I I i a m s, Criminal Law, The General Part, 2nd ed., 35, note 5 [1961
26 Cf. Wi I I i ams, supra note 25, 148.
27 Cf. paragraph 16 (1) of the German Strafgesetzbucb, as well as article 30 of the Rome Statute of
the ICC.
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ventions successively proposed by France, which formulation would have merely
called for knowledge by the person charged with the offence that the financing
provided by that person "will or could be used" to commit the terrorist offences
in question.28
Another formulation that could have been used would have been one along the
lines of what appears to have been the wording of a British Second World War
Regulation. This would have consisted in defining the primary offence as that of
providing funds with the intent to assist terrorists in the commission of terrorist
offences.29
At any rate, given the inherent subtlety of the questions that the "intention"
and "knowledge" variants elements of paragraph 1 of article 2 may raise, as well
as the differences between the ways in which different national criminal laws envisage
the criminal state of mind, it would appear that discrepancies in the application
and interpretation of that key provision are likely to arise as between national
criminal justice systems.
c) The 'unlawfulness" of the provision offunds
Another difficulty may result from the use, in the introductory sentence of paragraph
1, of the adverb "unlawfully" to qualify the actions that constitute the collecting
and providing offences. If paragraph 1 is, in this respect, taken literally, the
effect of the adverb would be that if the conduct described in the paragraph is,
under the law of a state concerned, unlawful but not criminal at the time of its
becoming a party to the Financing Convention, then that state would not, after
acquiring this status, be under a duty to criminalize that conduct. This would of
course be the height of absurdity. The adverb in question, which did not figure in
the draft originally presented by France (cf. note 8 supra), might however give rise
to difficulties. To be sure, the adverb is also included, to qualify the primary
offence sanctioned by the Bombing Convention, in the provision thereof that
defines that offence. (Cf. the introductory sentence of paragraph 1 of article 2 of
the Bombing Convention.) But in this case its inclusion can be justified (at least to
a certain extent) on the ground that in all countries persons other than the
military can lawfully use explosives in certain cases (e. g. in civil engineering
work). It appears that the adverb in question was included in paragraph I of
article 2 of the Financing Convention, at least in part, to meet concerns expressed
by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of
the Red Cross, which feared that in providing assistance, under their mandates, to
28 Cf. the introductory part of paragraph 1 of article 2 of the draft convention in Annex Il of the
report referred to in note 5 above. The same formulation is contained in language proposed by Brazil
for that paragraph at the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee.
For the full text of this proposal, see the report referred to in note 9 supra, 38, No. 28. Adoption
of the formulation would have had the advantage of eliminating the word "intention," which, regard
being had to its context, could prove perplexing in some countries and thus give rise to problems of
interpretation.
29 Williams, supra note 25,40-41.
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Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 501
groups of individuals they might fall afoul of that paragraph.30 In United States
criminal statutes the adverb is used as a shorthand reference to grounds excluding
criminal responsibility that are to be developed by the courts. The extrapolation
of such authority to national courts as interpreters of paragraph I of article 2
might, conceivably, be helpful to those organizations. One wonders,, however,
whether it could not, by leading national courts to use the adverb as a pretext for
acquitting individuals financing terrorism in certain cases, be harmful in other
respects.31
d) The link between the provision offunds and the terrorist acts
Another point that should be noted is that the primary offences covered by the
Financing Convention are defined in such a way that they may, in specific cases,
render the perpetrators of those offences guilty of complicity (or attempted complicity)
pure and simple with respect to offences within the scope of one of the
treaties listed in the Annex to the Convention (or offences covered by subparagraph
(b) of paragraph 1 of article 2, which defines an act that cannot but be sanctioned
by the general criminal law of any state).32 Thus, for instance, if the owner
of an automobile were to make it available to terrorists for the specific purpose of
its being used as a car bomb at a certain place at a certain time, as well as with the
knowledge that it is to be so used, and the vehicle is in fact so used, then that person
would, in accordance with paragraph 3 (a) of article 2 of the Terrorist Bombing
Convention, be an accomplice to an offence covered by it. The owner of the
automobile could thus be charged with having committed an ancillary offence
under the Bombing Convention and another, primary, offence under the Financing
Convention.
Another question, far more important than but not unrelated to the overlap just
adverted to, deserves to be discussed at greater length. This question is the link
that, in accordance with paragraph I of article 2 of the Financing Convention,
should exist between the offences covered by the Financing Convention and those
covered by the treaties listed in its Annex, or coming within the residual category
30 Cf. UN docs. A/AC.252/1999/INF/2, Annex, and A/C.6/54/WG.I/INF/l, of March 26 and
November 9, 1999, respectively, as well as paragraph 67 of Annex III to the report referred to in note
10 supra.
31 The travaux pr6paratoires of the Convention show that the reason for the inclusion of the adverb
in question was similar to the one that, as has been noted, justifies its inclusion in United States
criminal statutes. (Cf. paragraph 67 of the Informal Summary of the Discussions in the Working
Group that is contained in Annex III to the report referred to in note 10 supra; the reference in this
paragraph to "ransom payments" as being lawful is quite noteworthy; equally worthy of being
pointed out is the reference in paragraph 81 to "lawful acts of national liberation movements.")
32 In fact the language of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph I of article 2, which begin with
the words "[a]n act" and "[ajny other act," respectively, seems to suggest that what the drafters of
these provisions had in mind were no more than acts of complicity pure and simple. Such an interpretation
(which at any rate may not be entirely consistent with paragraph 3 of article 2) should
nevertheless be rejected, as largely depriving the Financing Convention of useful effect.
33 Za6RV 60/2
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defined in subparagraph (b) of that paragraph.33 As provided by the latter, in order
that an act (whether of providing or of collecting "funds") falling within the
definition contained in the introductory sentence of the paragraph constitute an
offence covered by the Financing Convention, it is necessary that the person who,
as the case may be, has provided or collected the "funds," have done so with the
"intention" or in the "knowledge" that they are to be used, in full or in part, to
carry out an offence covered by one of the treaties listed in the Annex, or falling
within the residual category.
This would mean that if in the trial of a person charged with an offence under
the Financing Convention the prosecutor proves that the defendant has Provided
or collected "funds" as laid down in paragraph 1 of article 2, that the actual or intended
recipient or recipients of the "funds" were terrorists and as such have committed
and/or are willing and able to commit any of the terrorist offences referred
to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of that paragraph, and that the defendant was
aware of this, the evidence will fall short of what is needed to secure the conviction
sought. The prosecutor will still have to prove that all has gone as further
specified in paragraph 1, namely that in providing or collecting the "funds" the
defendant has i n t e n d e d that they should be used or k n own that they are to be
used to carry out an act within the purview of one or the other of those subparagraphs.
The interpretation of paragraph I underlying this conclusion is buttressed not
only by the letter of paragraph 1, but also by paragraph 2 of article 2, as well as
article 23 of the Financing Convention. In conformity with paragraph 2, if a state,
on becoming a party to the Convention, is not a party to one of the treaties listed
in its annex, that state may, at that time, declare that "in the application to" it
of the Convention that "treaty shall be deemed not to be included in the annex;"
paragraph 2 complements the latter provision by laying down that if a state party
to the Convention ceases to be a party to a treaty listed in its annex, it may make
a declaration having the same effect "with respect to that treaty." Article 23 of the
Convention lays down, for its part, a procedure for adding future global multilateral
treaties to its Annex. These provisions seem to reflect considerable rigour on
the part of the drafters of the Convention with respect to the link established in
paragraph 1 of article 2 between the offence of providing or collecting "funds" and
their use to carry out an offence precisely covered by subparagraphs (a) or (b) of
paragraph 1 of article 2.
There are several reasons why, regrettably, it will, in many if not most cases, be
impossible to Prove the existence of the one-on-one link that thus appears to be
required between an act of collecting or providing "funds" and an offence specifically
covered by one of the treaties listed in the annex or falling within the residual
category.
33 Subject to paragraph 2 of article 2 of the Financing Convention, a provision to be commented
on later, for a treaty listed in the annex to apply with respect to any particular state party to the
Financing Convention it is not necessary for that state to be a party to that treaty.
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The specific use to which the recipient or recipients will put the "funds"
received will as a rule be a matter of indifference to whoever provides material
assistance of any kind to a terrorist or a terrorist group or organization. What will
determine that person to render the assistance is usually no more than that
person's desire to support the particular cause that the recipient or recipients promote.
It is moreover unlikely that the latter will specialize in acts covered by this
or that counterterrorism treaty (or subparagraph (b)). In addition, it may be the
case that at the time they receive the "funds" the terrorist or terrorists have not
yet decided on their next strike. Finally, it is quite probable that, for obvious
security reasons, terrorists may be unwilling to reveal their plans to persons
outside their inner circle, even when they are a source of assistance. It follows that
very frequently, if not normally, whoever provides "funds" or (a fortiori) collects
them for terrorists will have virtually no idea about the precise use to which they
will be put.
Besides, and perhaps more importantly, it will often be very difficult if not
impossible to establish a precise link between items provided to terrorists and a
particular act or acts of terrorism committed by the recipient(s). What will happen
in the instances where the "funds" provided take the form of pecuniary
resources, which will generally be the case, is that the resources, being perfectly
fungible, will, in the hands of the terrorist or terrorists that received them, merge
with their other pecuniary resources in a way that makes it impossible to link
the particular provision of "funds" with a particular terrorist act.34 And clearly
this is a fortiori the case with the collection of "funds." Such difficulties will be
compounded whenever a terrorist group or organization carries out activities,
lawful or unlawful, other than terrorist acts. One could accordingly, in respect
of the provision or collection of purely pecuniary resources, argue that, in strictness,
it does not normally make sense to speak of an intention or, a fortiori, of
knowledge, that they are to be used to carry out a specific act of terrorism or
one of a specific type.35
For all these reasons it would appear that, regard being had to the importance
attributed by article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to the
34 A colorful simile that is apropos here is the impossibility of unscrambling scrambled eggs.
(It may be noted that, as shown by paragraph 6 (b) of article 5 of the United Nations Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, the authors of this treaty
realized that financial resources could become "intermingled". [Text in 28 (1) International Legal
Materials 497 (1989)].)
35 One can hardly expect terrorists to use a specific financial contribution to set up a trust fund
that would receive only monies destined for defraying the commission of a particular terrorist act.
More realistic would be the case where a cheque received by terrorists would be endorsed to a purveyor
of weapons or explosives used for committing a particular terrorist crime. An analogous but
simpler case would be that where the contributor of an amount of money to terrorists would himself
pay the purveyors. But such cases are not likely and at any rate the facts would often be difficult to
prove.
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-object and purpose" of a treaty, paragraph 1 of article 2 of the Financing Convention,
whose object is epitomized by its very title,36 should be interpreted to
mean that to convict a person of a primary offence under the Convention it is sufficient
to prove that the recipient or recipients, actual or intended, of the "funds"
are terrorists, that that person was aware of this, and that accordingly he or she
had to know that the "funds" would probably be used (or could be used) to commit
an offence or offences covered by one of the treaties listed in the Annex to the
Financing Convention, or falling within the residual category. It is submitted that
the discrepancy between this liberal interpretation of the Convention and the letter
of paragraph I of article 2 of the Convention is sufficiently minor to justify
that interpretation.
This raises a difficulty, however. If a state party to the Convention, either because,
treaties being self-executing under its legal system, paragraph 2 of article 1
of the Convention may be applied directly by its courts,37 or, this not being the
case, it has enacted a statute defining the offences provided for in paragraph 1 of
article 2 of the Convention in substantially the same way as that paragraph, then
its courts could not adopt the liberal interpretation of the Convention that has
been advocated without violating the principle nullum crimen sine lege.38
It follows that every state should, on becoming a party to the Convention, enact
a statute embodying that interpretation, i. e. one prescribing that to commit an
offence under the Convention it suffices that the accused has knowingly provided
funds, as defined in the Convention, to individuals likely to use them to commit
offences as defined in subparagraphs (a) or (b) of paragraph I of article 2 of the
Convention.
e) Specific issues
Strictly speaking, the offences to which the Financing Convention applies, as
defined in paragraph I of article 2, are victimless ones. The reason is that no harm
comes within the o b j e c t i v e elements of those offences, as thus defined. It may
be noted, moreover, that, unlike the offence of providing funds, the separate
offence of collecting them cannot in and of itself be an even indirect source of
36 Cf. also the second, ninth, tenth and twelfth paragraphs of the preamble of the Financing Convention,
in which, respectively, states parties declare themselves to be "[d]eeply concerned about the
worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations," state that "the financing
of terrorism is a matter of grave concern to the international community as a whole," note "that
the number and seriousness of acts of international terrorism depend on the financing that terrorists
may obtain," and express their conviction "of the urgent need to enhance international cooperation
among States in devising and adopting effective measures for the prevention of the financing of
terrorism, as well as for its suppression through the prosecution and punishment of its perpetrators"
(emphasis added).
37 There are likely to be few, if any, states parties to the Convention for which paragraph I of article
2 is self-executing.
38 Cf. the provision in article 22 of the Rome Statute that "the definition of a crime shall be strictly
construed." The article adds that "[fln case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour
of the person being prosecuted or convicted."
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Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 505
harm.39 It was therefore not absolutely necessary for the drafters of the Financing
Convention to have provided in it, as they did in paragraph 3 of article 2, that
"[flor an act to constitute" an offence under the Convention, "it shall not be necessary
that the funds were actually used to carry out an act of terrorism."
The nature of the offences criminalized by the Financing Convention accounts
for a significant difference between it and the counterterrorism treaties it complements.
Being as they are grave instances of violent behavior (murder or manslaughter,
mayhem, wounding, kidnapping, or the destruction of or severe damage
to property), the offences criminalized by those treaties can hardly not be punishable
under the general criminal law of any state. It therefore seems that, in order
to fulfil its obligation to criminalize the offences defined by a particular one of the
treaties in question, a state party for which treaties are not self-executing need not
normally take any specific legislative action.40 Such is clearly not the case, however,
with the offences criminalized by the Financing Convention, which, given
their nonviolent, victimless and extremely specific nature, are not likely to constitute
offences under the general criminal law of states.
Another difference between the Financing Convention and prior counterterrorism
treaties may also be noted. Since those treaties normally define the offences
they cover without any reference to terrorism, they may apply in practice to offences
committed for purposes unrelated to terrorism. (Thus someone placing a
bomb on an airliner for the sole purpose of collecting on a life insurance policy
taken out by a passenger falls afoul of the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation.)41 The contrary is the case
with the Financing Convention.
3. jurisdiction of States Parties over Offences
under the Financing Convention
Under either the Financing or the Bombing Convention a state party is, by virtue
of a provision that can be regarded as part of the standard element, obligated
39 In respect of the "collecting" offence, two points may be noted. It would appear, in the first
place, that in this case the all-embracing definition of the term "funds" is hardly appropriate: Can one
take up a collection of, say, weapons in aid of terrorists? Nor does it seem possible that a collection
of "funds" could be carried out "indirectly."
40 Cf. Gilbert Guillaume, Terrorisme et droit international, Recueil des Cours, Hague
Academy, vol. 215, 327 (1989). Thus, as stated in the general report on terrorism submitted by the
UN Secretary-General to the General Assembly in 1999, Austria and Sweden, which are parties to
the majority of global counterterrorism treaties, have no specific criminal legislation against terrorism
and accordingly sanction terrorist acts under their general criminal law. (UN doc. A/54/301, paras. 7
and 31.)
41 it is submitted that there is nothing wrong with this wide casting of the net. So long as an
offence falling within the definition of one of the treaties has not been completely cleared up (and
even a conviction will not necessarily achieve this), the public (and the authorities) will suspect that
the offence has been a terrorist one, for which reason it will, by arousing or stimulating fear of
terrorist acts, have promoted the aims of terrorism.
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to establish its jurisdiction over an offence covered by them in any of the following
three cases: whenever it is committed in its territory'42 by one of its nationals,
or on board a vessel or an aircraft flying its flag or registered under its laws, respectivelY.
43 Equally under either Convention a state party may establish its jurisdiction
over the offences covered by it if the perpetrator of the offence is a
stateless person residing habitually in its territory, or the offence is committed on
board an aircraft operated by its government.44 Under the Bombing Convention
a state party ma y further establish its jurisdiction over an offence covered by it if
the offence is committed against a national of the state or against the state or one
of its facilities abroad, including its diplomatic or consular premises, or in an attempt
to compel the state to do or abstain from doing any act.45 Since, as has been
observed, the offences covered by the Financing Convention are in themselves, as
therein defined, victimless ones, the Financing Convention could not possibly
contain provisions duplicating exactly the ones just referred to. It does, however,
contain provisions based on them. They are to the effect that a state party to the
Financing Convention ma y establish its jurisdiction over an offence covered by
it if the offence is directed towards or resulted in the carrying out
of an offence referred to in subparagraphs (a) or (b) of paragraph 1 of article 2 of
the Financing Convention, provided that the offence falls into one of three categories:
(1) the offence is committed in the territory or against a national of the
state, (2) it is committed against the state or one of its facilities abroad, including
diplomatic or consular premises, or (3) it is committed in an attempt to compel the
state to do or abstain from doing an act.46
4. Scope of the Financing Convention
As provided in article 3 of the Financing Convention, which is Mutatis mutandis
identical with article 3 of the Bombing Convention, the Financing Convention
applies only in cases other than those where "the offence is committed within a
single State, the alleged offender is a national of that State and is present in the territory
of that State and no other State has a basis under" article 7 to exercise jurisdiction.
Paralleling article 3 of the Bombing Convention, article 3 of the Financing
Convention exempts from this limitation, however, the applicability, "as
42 This may create difficulties in cases of transboundary financing.
43 Paragraph 1 of article 7 of the Financing Convention, identical with paragraph 1 of article 6 of
the Bombing Convention.
44 Subparagraphs (d) and (e) of paragraph 2 of article 7 of the Financing Convention, identical
with subparagraphs W and (e), respectively, of paragraph 2 of article 6 of the Bombing Convention.
45 Subparagraphs (a), (b) and (d) of paragraph 2 of article 6 of the Bombing Convention.
46 Subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 2 of article 7 of the Financing Convention. (It may
be noted that in this respect difficulties may arise from the link [unfortunately] required by paragraph
1 of article 2 between the offences it defines and those covered by the treaties listed in the Annex [or
defined in subparagraph (b) of that paragraph].)
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Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 507
appropriate, of its articles 12 to 18, on legal assistance and other forms of
cooperation between states parties.47
5. Position of Legal Entities in Respect of the Commission
of Offences under the Convention
A significant difference between the Financing Convention and the prior counterterrorism
treaties lies in that, unlike what is the case with the offences defined
in the latter treaties, all of which are acts for whose commission legal entities could
hardly be held directly responsible, the offences defined by the Financing Convention,
which consist in providing or collecting pecuniary resources, may well be
attributed directly to such entities. And, as is well-known, in certain countries legal
entities are subjects of the criminal law.
One might therefore have expected the Financing Convention not to differentiate,
in the sanctioning of the offences it defines, between natural persons and legal
entities. And one could indeed, by reading paragraph 1 of article 2 in complete
isolation, be inclined to feel that the term "person," as used in the introductory
sentence of that paragraph, encompasses legal entities.
Since, however, in many if not the majority of states only natural persons can
incur criminal responsibility, the drafters of the Financing Convention steered
clear of putting legal entities on a footing of equality with natural persons insofar
as the perpetration and sanctioning of the offences it covers are concerned. They
did so by including in the Convention article 5, which reads as folloWS:48
"l. Each State Party, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, shall take the
necessary measures to enable a legal entity located in its territory or organized under its
laws to be held liable when a person responsible for the management or
control of that legal entity has, in that capacity, committed an
offence set forth in article 2. Such liability maybe criminal, civil or administrative.
2. Such liability is incurred without prejudice to the criminal liability of individuals
having committed the offences.
3. Each State Party shall ensure, in particular, that legal entities liable in accordance
with paragraph 1 above are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal,
civil or administrative sanctions. Such sanctions may include monetary sanctions."
(Emphasis added.)49
47 Regarding these articles, s e e note 13 supra, as well as the relevant parts of the remainder of the
text.
48 This article of the Financing Convention largely parallels article 5 of the Revised draft United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. (Text in UN doc. A/AC.254/4/Rev. 4,
of July 19, 1999.)
49 The underlined phrase of paragraph 1 is of particular importance, since it lays down the condition
precedent to the applicability of article 5. In so doing it adopts the narrow version of corporate
criminal responsibility found in certain common law jurisdictions. It may further be noted that the
country where the offence to which the phrase refers is committed will normally be the country
where the legal entity concerned is "located" or under whose laws it is "organized," but that this will
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It is interesting to note that, although all states are legal entities, the language of
paragraph 1 of article 5 clearly precludes a state party to the Convention from
holding another one, under that paragraph, liable for committing offences as set
forth in article 2 of the Convention. For, whatever may be meant by the location
of a legal entity, no state can possibly be deemed to be "located" in "the territory"
of another one or "organized under its laws." Thus if the embassy of a state party
in another state party carries out in the territory of the latter state acts falling
within the definition of paragraph 1 of article 2, the latter state could not reasonably
consider that the former should (assuming that state immunity does not stand
in the way) be held liable under paragraph 1 of article 5. For embassies, in addition
to lacking legal personality, are not "organized under" the laws of the state
where they carry out their activities.
As regards public authorities or public entities of a state party to the Convention
acting in the territory of a foreign state also a party to the Convention, it
would'also appear that paragraph I of article 5 precludes the latter state from
holding them liable thereunder for the commission in its territory of offences set
forth in article 2, even if they have branches or offices in the territory of that state.
Needless to say, every state party is obligated to apply paragraph I of article 5 to
any of its public authorities or public entities.
6. Control of "Funds"
Another article of the Financing Convention not forming part of what has been
called the standard element should also be noted. This is article 8, which is based
on an OECD treaty, namely the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime, of 1990. Article 8 obligates states parties
to the Financing Convention to take measures to identify, detect, freeze, seize or
decree forfeiture of "funds" used or allocated to commit offences covered by the
Convention and proceeds therefrom.
7. Cooperation between States Parties
In its introductory sentence and subparagraph (a), paragraph 1 of article 18 of
the Financing Convention requires states parties to cooperate against offences
covered by the Convention by preventing and countering "preparations in their
respective territories for the commission of those offences within and outside their
territories, including measures to prohibit in their territories illegal activities of
persons and organizations that knowingly encourage, instigate, organize, or ennot
necessarily be the case. It may be observed further that the nebulous notion of a legal entity being
"located in" a certain territory, which, in addition to jarring with the corpus mysticum nature of
any legal entity, is not among the criteria normally applied to determine the law governing the status
of legal entities, is liable to cause difficulties of interpretation. (It should be recognized, however, in
fairnesSI that use of more orthodox criteria would not have entirely eliminated those difficulties.)
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Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 509
gage in the commission of" those offences.50 The remainder of article 18 contains
provisions of a specifically financial nature that aim to strengthen cooperation
between states parties. In particular those provisions obligate them to take measures
requiring their financial institutions to identify their customers, whether
usual or occasional, paying special attention to unusual or suspicious transactions.
Article 18 also imposes on those states the obligation to exchange, through Interpol
if they so wish, information to prevent offences covered by the Convention,
in particular by cooperating in the conduct of inquiries. In addition article 18 sets
forth a number of specific measures that are not mandatory for states parties but
which they are required to "consider" in that connection.
It should be noted further that particular importance appears to attach to paragraphs
2 and 3 of article 12 of the Financing Convention. These provisions deny
states parties the possibility of turning down requests for legal assistance on the
ground of bank secrecy (limiting, however, use by a state party of information obtained
from another to the purposes stated in the corresponding request, unless
the state party that complied with it otherwise consents). A somewhat comparable
provision is article 13, which precludes states parties from refusing in specific cases
to comply with the provisions of the Convention on extradition or mutual legal
assistance in respect of offences it covers by characterizing them as "fiscal
offences."
As has been noted, the core provisions of the Financing Convention, namely
those that define the primary offences it is intended to suppress, are liable to raise
difficulties of interpretation and application (not all of which have been commented
on). Moreover it is to be regretted that, if taken literally, the link that paragraph
1 of article 2 establishes between acts sanctioned by the Convention and
specific terrorist acts could, as has been observed, inhibit its application to certain
modalities of terrorism financing. One can hardly expect these difficulties not to
be compounded by the discrepancies in the application of the Convention that the
diversity of national criminal systems are apt to generate (to say nothing of the
fact that they will be interpreted in different countries through the different language
versions). The drafters of the Convention would, moreover, have been welladvised
to leave out paragraph 2 of article 2. In addition certain weaknesses in the
provisions that call for cooperation between the parties are to be regretted.51
50 Cf. the introductory sentence and paragraph (a) of article 15 of the Bombing Convention,
which parallel the provisions of the Financing Convention referred to.
51 These are provisions that, instead of requiring states parties to take certain measures, obligate
them merely to c o n s i d e r taking them or are otherwise merely permissive. (Cf. paragraph 4 of
article 8 [a provision that is, however, of little practical importance], paragraph 4 of article 12
[a provision already mentioned], and, particularly, the measures numbered (i) to (iv) in paragraph 1
(b) of article 18, as well as paragraph 4 of the same article.)
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It is nevertheless to be hoped that given good faith on the part of the states parties
and a genuine desire to accomplish the objectives of the Financing Convention,
it will make a significant contribution to the struggle against the scourge of
international terrorism.52
52 It would seem that only with the assistan of persons with a solid background in finance, as
well as expert knowledge, not only of terrorism in general, but also of the methods by which terrorists
finance their nefarious activities, of the importance to them of such financing, and of the degree
of effectiveness attained in the application of earlier counterterrorism treaties, could one, with a modicum
of confidence, hazard a prediction about how effective the Financing Convention is likely to be.
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Annex 485
Anthony Aust, Counter-Terrorism — A New Approach: The International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 5 Max Planck Y.B. U.N. L. 285, 287 (2001)

Annex 486
Kai Ambos and Steffen Wirth, The Current Law of Crimes Against Humanity: An Analysis of
UNTAET Regulation 15/2000, 13 Criminal Law Forum (2002)

KAI AMBOS and STEFFENWIRTH
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
An analysis of UNTAET Regulation 15/2000
The following paper is based on a legal brief requested by the Office of
the Prosecutor General, Serious Crimes Investigation Unit, of the United
Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET), in April
2001. The Office of the Prosecutor General required that the brief analyse
the applicable law of crimes against humanity under UNTAET Regulation
15/20001 with regard to the crimes committed in East Timor between 1
January and 25 October 1999. This period is covered by the temporal
jurisdiction of the Serious Crimes Panel of the District Court of Dili (s. 2.3
of Reg. 15/2000). The exact scope of the brief was to cover the following
crimes against humanity, which are deemed to be the most important ones
with regard to the situation in East Timor: murder; deportation and forcible
transfer of persons; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of liberty;
torture; persecution; inhumane acts. The sexual crimes defined in section
5.1(g) of Regulation 15/2000 are not included as they were dealt with in a
separate brief.
Substantive parts of Regulation 15/2000, including section 5 dealing
with crimes against humanity (see annex 2), are adopted almost literally
from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).2
Therefore, the Serious Crimes Panel is the first court to apply substantive
provisions of the Rome Statute, and its case law may be regarded as
precedent for future prosecutions before the ICC. These prosecutions,
however, will probably take place in completely different settings than that
Kai Ambos, Privatdozent Dr. iur. (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München);
Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law,
Freiburg, Germany; Steffen Wirth, Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and
International Criminal Law, Freiburg, Germany. The authors wish to express their appreciation
for the support of the Serious Crimes Unit, in particular from Marco Kalbusch,
and for the financial support provided by the International Coalition for Justice. We are
also grateful to Dr. Claus Kress, University of Cologne and Prof. Johan D. van der Vyver,
Emory University, Atlanta for helpful comments. Guy Cumes of Charles Stuart University,
New South Wales, contributed to the part on the law of murder. Tobias Wenning (MPI)
assisted us in the final editing.
1 Available at <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/r-2000.htm>.
2 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998).
Criminal Law Forum 13: 1–90, 2002.
© 2002 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the Netherlands.
2 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
of East Timor. Insignificant issues before the Serious Crimes Panel may
become crucial before the ICC. In applying Regulation 15/2000 it therefore
seems important to avoid creating case law that may unnecessarily
complicate future trials before the ICC.
As to the content of this paper, it intends to present a clearly defined
set of elements, which must be proven in order to obtain a conviction for
crimes against humanity. For this purpose, the elements of crimes against
humanity have been listed in annex 1. The legal analysis will begin with an
examination of the so-called context element which distinguishes crimes
against humanity from ordinary crimes. The second section of this paper
will then set out the current law for each inhumane act. Apart from Regulation
15/2000, the analysis will take into account national and international
case law until March 2002, in particular the jurisprudence of the ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
Rwanda (ICTR). In addition, the drafts and reports of the International
Law Commission (ILC) and other international bodies as well as relevant
contributions in the literature will be considered.
I. THE CONTEXT ELEMENT
1. Background for Interpretation of the Context Element
The definition of crimes against humanity requires that the individual criminal
act, for example, a murder, be committed within a broader setting
of specified circumstances. This so called context element, in the case of
UNTAET Regulation 2000/15, is described in the chapeau of section 5.1:
For the purposes of the present regulation, “crimes against humanity” means any of the
following acts when committed as part of a “widespread or systematic attack and directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack” (emphasis added).
Section 5 of Regulation 15/2000 is an almost verbatim repetition of
article 7 of the Rome Statute, differing only in three relevant respects from
the latter. First, in section 5.1, the word “and” has been inserted between
the words “attack” and “directed”; the relevant passage of the chapeau of
the ICC Statute reads: “attack directed against any civilian population”.
The consequences of this insertion, which apparently occurred unintentionally,
3 will be discussed in connection with the individual act as a
sub-element of the context element.
3 Morten Bergsmo, Means of proof for the objective contextual element of the existence
of “a widespread and systematic attack” for crimes against humanity under s. 5 of
Regulation 15/2000, unpublished memorandum, 10 September 2000 (on file with authors),
p. 2.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 3
The second difference is the deliberate4 omission of article 7(2)(a) of
the Rome Statute in section 5.2. The subparagraph of the Rome Statute
contains a definition of the word “attack” as used in the chapeau of
article 7(1). Article 7(2)(a) reads:
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1:
(a) “Attack directed against any civilian population” means a course of conduct involving
the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population,
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organisational policy to commit such attack;
This definition is the result of a widely criticised compromise during
the negotiations of the Rome Statute.5 We will set out below, however, that
the omission of the subparagraph has no particular implications for the
interpretation of the term “attack” or the so-called policy element which is
part of the context element.
The third difference concerns the crime of persecution. Section 5.1(h)
of Regulation 15/2000 and article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute both
require a connection between the persecutory act and other conduct.
Article 7(1)(h) requires that the act be committed “in connection with
any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction
of the Court” (emphasis added). Section 5.1(h) of Regulation 15/2000
requires a “connection with [. . .] any crime within the jurisdiction of the
panels” (emphasis added). The difference between both provisions lies in
the scope of the jurisdiction of the respective judicial body. Whereas the
Rome Statute comprises only international crimes,6 the jurisdiction of the
serious crime panels also includes some “ordinary” Indonesian national
crimes (e.g., s. 8, “Murder”). However, it will turn out that this difference
is of no practical relevance because most, if not all, national crimes
under Regulation 15/2000 simultaneously fulfil the requirements of certain
enumerated inhumane acts of crimes against humanity.
a. The History of the Context Element and the War Nexus
The context element, as formulated in section 5.1 of Regulation 15/2000,
is the result of a complex evolution during which parts of the element
were adopted from earlier concepts while other parts were omitted and
still others newly invented. There was a permanent struggle on the part of
the respective drafters or judges to meet what they felt were the demands of
4 Morten Bergsmo, supra note 3, pp. 1–2.
5 Phyllis Hwang, Defining Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 457, 497–501 (1998).
6 Contempt of court is deliberately labeled an “offence” (not a “crime”) in article 70 of
the Rome Statute.
4 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
international criminal law and, at the same time, to balance these demands
with state sovereignty. Therefore, awareness of origin and history of the
distinct (sub-) elements of the context element is necessary in order to
properly assess their respective legal significance.
The problem of the so-called war nexus will also be dealt with here,
although, at present, it is only of historical interest. The survey concludes
with a résumé highlighting the observations which will serve as a guidance
for the analysis of the context element in section 5.1.7
(i) The Nuremberg Charter and Control Council Law No. 10.When crimes
against humanity were defined for criminal law purposes for the first time
in the Nuremberg Charter, the context element was different from the one
contained in section 5.1 of Regulation 15/2000 and article 7 of the Rome
Statute. Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter requires that the individual
act – e.g., a murder – be committed “in execution or connection with any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal [i.e., crimes against peace or
war crimes]”.8 Moreover, it requires that the victims be civilians. Both the
so called war nexus and the qualification of possible victims as civilians
can be explained by the origin of crimes against humanity within the law of
armed conflict.9 The Martens Clause, which is commonly cited as the first
appearance of the concept of crimes against humanity,10 is found in a treaty
on the law of war, the 1907 Hague Convention (IV).11 Another reason for
7 For a more comprehensive narration of the history of crimes against humanity, see
Beth van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence,
37 COLUMBIA J. TRANSNAT’; L. 37, 787 (1999); for the war nexus see also
recently MACHTELD BOOT, NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE AND THE SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION OF THE ICC 272, 302 (2002).
8 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis (1945), including the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, (1951)
82 U.N.T.S. 280.
9 ICTY Trial Chamber I has remarked: “The inclusion of crimes against humanity in the
Nürnberg Charter was justified by their relation to war crimes”. Prosecutor v. Tadic (Case
no. IT-94-1-T), Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 620; M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 60–69 (2nd ed.,
1999).
10 Matthew Lippmann, Crimes Against Humanity, 17 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD
WORLD L. REV. 171, 173 (1997). For references to several nineteenth century and early
twentieth century cases of international concern or intervention in cases of massive atrocities,
see United States of America v. Altstoetter et al. (“Justice Case”), 3 L.R.T.W.C. 974,
981–982 (1951).
11 “[T]he inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of
the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among
civilised peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience”
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 5
the requirement of the war nexus was the fear that, without such a nexus,
any concept of crimes against humanity would infringe on the principle of
non-intervention.12 The war nexus, therefore, was considered the international
element of crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, it has been argued
that the Nuremberg Charter’s war nexus was merely a precondition for the
International Military Tribunal’s (IMT) jurisdiction, not a material element
of crimes against humanity,13 a view strongly supported by the wording of
the 1968 Convention of the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. In any case, it can be said
that the IMT itself rather paid mere lip service to the war nexus instead of
strictly observing it.14
The war nexus disappeared for the first time as early as 1945 when
the drafters of Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL 10)15 deleted it from
the elements of crimes against humanity in article II(c) of CCL 10.16
(emphasis added). Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land, text
at DIETRICH SCHINDLER, JIˇR
`I
TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 69–93 (3rd
ed., 1988). The Martens clause is named after the Russian diplomat who drafted it: M.
Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 9, p. 62, fn. 81.
12 Matthew Lippmann, supra note 10, p. 183, quoting Justice Jackson.
13 Margaret McAuliffe de Guzman, The Road from Rome: The Developing Law of
Crimes Against Humanity, 22 HUMAN RTS Q. 335, 356 (2000).
14 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al. (Case no. IT-95-16-T), Judgment, 24 January 2000,
para. 576: “[T]here was only a tenuous link to war crimes or crimes against the peace.
This is demonstrated by the judgment rendered by the IMT in the case of defendant
von Schirach. Von Schirach, as Gauleiter of Vienna, was charged with and convicted of
crimes against humanity for the deportation of Jews from Austria. The IMT concluded that
Von Schirach was probably not involved in the ‘development of Hitler’s plan for territorial
expansion by means of aggressive war’, nor had he been charged with war crimes.
However, the link to another crime under the Charter (that of aggression) was found in the
fact that ‘Austria was occupied pursuant to a common plan of aggression’. Its occupation
was, therefore, a ‘crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal’. Another example is found
in the case of Streicher, publisher of Der Stürmer, an anti-Semitic weekly newspaper.
Streicher was convicted for ‘incitement of the German people to active persecution’. There
was no evidence that he had ever committed war crimes or ‘that he was ever within Hitler’s
inner circle of advisers; nor during his career was he closely connected with the formulation
of the policies which led to war’. Nevertheless he was convicted of persecution as a crime
against humanity (in connection with war crimes)”.
15 Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace and Against Humanity of 20 December 1945, 3 OFFICIAL GAZETTE
CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 50–55 (1946).
16 Olivia Swaak-Goldman, in I SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW. THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND
NATIONAL COURTS 141, 159–160 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman,
eds., 2000).
6 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
This elimination was not unanimously accepted. Some military tribunals
continued to require the war nexus because of the reference to the Nuremberg
Charter in Article 1 of CCL 10.17 Another reason given was that
“the only purpose of the Charter was to bring to trial ‘major war criminals’.”
18 In contrast, the judges of Military Tribunal III accepted the
elimination of the war nexus in the Justice case.19 It is significant, however,
that they nevertheless felt that “crimes against humanity [. . .] must be
strictly construed to exclude isolated cases of atrocity or persecution”.
Thus, they introduced a new element to this end, namely: “[P]roof of
conscious participation in systematic government organised or approved
procedures”.20 The Justice case indicates for the first time that what is
required under international law is not a specific context element but one
that excludes isolated crimes.
German courts which applied CCL 1021 in a great number of cases22
used a similar context element which, however, had a wider scope than
the one in the Justice case. To turn a particular criminal conduct into a
crime against humanity they required only that it be committed in “context
[Zusammenhang] with the system of power and tyranny as it existed in
the National-Socialist Period”.23 The war nexus played no role in their
judgments. Together with the Justice case these decisions represent the
beginning of a tendency in national and international practice which tries
to distinguish crimes against humanity from ordinary crimes by requiring
– instead of the war nexus – a link to some kind of authority.
17 United States of America v. Flick et al., 3 L.R.T.W.C. 1212–1214 (1952). See Darryl
Robinson, Crimes Against Humanity: Reflections on State Sovereignty, Legal Precision
and the Dictates of the Public Conscience, in I ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 139, 145 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas,
eds., 1999). For reference to further cases see Beth van Schaack, supra note 7, pp. 814–819.
18 United States v. Flick, ibid., p. 1213.
19 Justice Case, supra note 10, p. 974.
20 Ibid., p. 982.
21 On the competence of German courts to apply this law, see Ulrich Vultejus,
Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit, 12 STRAFVERTEIDIGER 602 (1992).
22 The German Supreme Court in the British occupied zone alone decided an estimated
100 published cases concerning crimes against humanity.
23 German Supreme Court in the British occupied zone, Judgment of 20 May 1948
– StS 3/48, 1 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES OBERSTEN GERICHTSHOFES FÜR DIE BRITISCHE
ZONE 11, 14 (1949), authors’ translation (“Zusammenhang mit der Gewaltund
Willkürherrschaft, wie sie in nazistischer Zeit bestanden hat”); see also German
Supreme Court in the British occupied Zone, judgment of 21 Dec. 1948 – StS 139/48, 1
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES OBERSTEN GERICHTSHOFES FÜR DIE BRITISCHE ZONE 203,
206 (“Weller Case”) (Berlin, Hamburg 1949).
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 7
(ii) Developments after World War II (1950–1996). In its 1950 Nuremberg
Principles,24 the International Law Commission repeated the war nexus in
the formulation of the Nuremberg Charter. The nexus requirement introduced
by the 1951 Draft Code of offenses against the peace and security
of mankind25 one year later was considerably broader, as it no longer
considered necessary that the nexus exist with regard to a war related crime
(as in the Nuremberg Charter). It was held sufficient for there to be a nexus
to any of the crimes contained in the Draft Code, including, for example,
“encouragement [. . .] of terrorist activities in another State”.26 However
the 1951 nexus fulfilled the same purpose as the original one because all
of the Draft Code’s crimes – except genocide – concerned incursions into
the sovereign sphere of another state. This transnational character rendered
the respective crime an international matter in the classical sense and, thus,
provided for some kind of link to international law. Indeed, it seems as if
the ILC was guided by the same concerns with regard to the principle of
non-intervention as the drafters of the Nuremberg Charter.
These concerns evidently had disappeared when the 1954 Draft Code
of offenses against the peace and security of mankind, instead of requiring
a nexus to another crime of the same draft, introduced the requirement
that the perpetrator act “at the instigation or with toleration of [state]
authorities”.27 This formulation continued the development initiated by
the courts applying CCL 10 which replaced the war nexus with a link
to authority. The new approach, thus, focussed rather on the relationship
between official authorities and individuals, a situation that is also subject
to international human rights law. Once this body of law emerged as
binding rules of international law, it would serve as the link to international
law that formerly may have been provided by the law of warfare. The Draft
Code’s only reminder of the humanitarian law origin of crimes against
humanity is its definition of possible victims as “civilian population”. This
term, as well, disappeared in later ILC Drafts. However, it was revived by
the drafters of the ICTY Statute and after that included in the definition of
crimes against humanity in the statutes or other constitutive documents of
all modern international criminal tribunals and courts.
24 Principle IV (c) of the Principles of International Law Recognised in the Charter of
the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, II YEARBOOK INT’L L.
COMM’N 374 (1950).
25 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, II YEARBOOK
INT’L L. COMM’N 134 (1951), art. 2(10).
26 Ibid., art. 2(6).
27 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, II YEARBOOK
INT’L L. COMM’N 151 (1954), art. 2(11), chapeau.
8 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
The next landmark in the development of crimes against humanity
was the 1968 Convention of the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations
to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity.28 According to article
1(b) of the Convention, it applies to “[c]rimes against humanity whether
committed in time of war or in time of peace as they are defined in
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nurnberg” (emphasis
added). Obviously, the Convention does not consider the war nexus a
requirement of crimes against humanity. Moreover, the Convention explicitly
states that the crimes against humanity to which it refers are the same
crimes which are “defined in the Charter” of the International Military
Tribunal. This evidently implies that the Nuremberg Charter’s crimes
against humanity can be committed in time of peace. Therefore, it is clear
that the Convention views the war nexus of article 6(c) of the Nuremberg
Charter not as a material element of crimes against humanity but merely
as a jurisdictional restriction of the IMT’s competence.
The shift of the context element from a war nexus to a link with some
kind of official authority, which had started in the post World War II
decisions under CCL 10 and was continued by the 1954 Draft Code,
was later affirmed by some judgments of national courts. In the Menten
case, the Dutch Supreme Court held in 1981 that the concept of crimes
against humanity requires that the crimes “form part of a system based
on terror or constitute a link in a consciously pursued policy directed
against particular groups of people”.29 This definition shows some similarity
with the formulation in the Justice case and judgments of German
courts under CCL 10. In 1985, the French Court of Cassation ruled in
the Barbie case that crimes against humanity must be “committed in a
systematic manner in the name of a State practising a policy of ideological
supremacy”.30 This ruling was repeated in 1992 in Touvier.31 A few years
later, in 1994, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in the Finta case: “What
distinguishes a crime against humanity from any other criminal offence
under the Canadian Criminal Code is that the cruel and terrible actions
which are essential elements of the offence were undertaken in pursuance
28 754 U.N.T.S. 73.
29 Menten Case, 75 I.L.R. 362, 362–363 (Dutch Supreme Court).
30 Barbie Case, 78 I.L.R. 136, 137 (French Court of Cassation).
31 Touvier Case, 100 I.L.R. 350, 352 (French Court of Cassation). The very specific
language of the context element in these cases may be aimed at excluding acts of the Vichy
regime or of French officials in Algeria from the scope of crimes against humanity, see
pp. 353–355 where the Court explains that the Vichy regime collaborated with Germany
only for pragmatic reasons and not for reasons of ideological supremacy. Also: Guyora
Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE
L.J. 1321, 1336–1338 (1989).
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 9
of a policy of discrimination or persecution of an identifiable group or
race”.32
Article 21 of the ILC’s 1991 Draft Code of crimes against the peace and
security of mankind which renamed crimes against humanity “systematic
or mass violations of human rights”, took a slightly different approach
with regard to the trend to require a link with authority. It declared punishable
any “individual who commits or orders the commission of any of
the following violations of human rights: – murder, – torture [. . .] in a
systematic manner or on a mass scale [. . .]”.33 This formulation differs
significantly from previous and subsequent formulations: it requires that
the perpetrator commit or order a multiplicity of crimes on a “systematic
or mass scale” on his or her own. It is not sufficient (as, for example, in
section 5.1 of Reg. 15/2000) that he or she commit a single act or merely a
few acts in the context of a broader attack. Therefore the Draft considered
as possible perpetrators of crimes against humanity only persons in a position
to act on a large scale. This must be kept in mind when considering the
ILC’s commentary pointing out that private individuals can also commit
the crime.34 The ILC listed as examples of such individuals persons with
“de facto power or organised in criminal gangs or groups”.35 Thus, the
draft, in fact, retains the need for some kind of authority, or at least power,
behind the crimes, simply clarifying that a non-state actor can also meet
this element.36 Finally, the Draft Code is remarkable in that it does not
require, like its successor,37 that the victims of crimes against humanity be
civilians.
The most recent result of the ILC’s work on crimes against humanity,
the 1996 Draft Code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind,38
does not, as its predecessor, require that the perpetrator personally commit
a multiplicity of crimes, but it reintroduces the context-related structure.
32 R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 812 (Supreme Court of Canada, per Cory J.).
33 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, II(2) YEARBOOK
INT’L L. COMM’N 94 (1991), art. 21.
34 Ibid., Commentary on Article 21, para. 5.
35 Ibid.
36 For a critical opinion on a too broad definition of the organisation which implements
the policy to commit crimes against humanity, see Claus Kress, Der Jugoslawien-
Strafgerichtshof im Grenzbereich zwischen internationalem bewaffneten Konflikt und
Bürgerkrieg, in VÖLKERRECHTLICHE VERBRECHEN VOR DEM JUGOSLAWIENTRIBUNAL,
NATIONALEN GERICHTEN UND DEM INTERNATIONALEN STRAFGERICHTSHOF
15, 54–55 (Horst Fischer & Sascha Rolf Lüder, eds., 1999).
37 Article 18 of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
II(2) YEARBOOK INT’L L. COMM’N 15 (1996).
38 Ibid.
10 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
Accordingly, the systematic manner or large scale commission of crimes
is required only as background for the individual criminal conduct.39
However, it is similar to the 1991 Draft Code in that the authority behind
the crimes need not be a state in the sense of public international law. It
is sufficient that the crimes be “instigated or directed by a Government
or any organisation or group”.40 A war nexus was deliberately excluded
by the ILC.41 Finally, it is worthwhile noting that the formulation “in a
systematic manner or on a large scale” greatly influenced the jurisprudence
of the ICTY and ICTR, both of which, in the wake of the 1996 Draft Code,
have required a “widespread or systematic attack”. However, it is equally
possible that the 1996 Draft was influenced by the language of the ICTR
Statute which expressly requires a “widespread or systematic attack”. The
drafters of the Rome Statute and of Regulation 15/2000 also adopted the
widespread or systematic attack requirement.
(iii) The ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals. The wording of article
5 of the ICTY Statute42 of 1993 brought a renaissance of the humanitarian
law origins of crimes against humanity. It required for the first time since
1951 a new version of the war nexus and reintroduced the requirement that
possible victims of crimes against humanity be civilians.43 The explanation
of both of these aspects may be found in the Report of the Secretary
General44 accompanying the draft Statute of the ICTY. In explaining the
inclusion of crimes against humanity in the ICTY Statute, the report
refers exclusively to common article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions,45
apparently (and incorrectly) considering the prohibition of war crimes in
39 At least this seems to be the interpretation given in Tadic, supra note 9, para. 649.
40 1996 Draft Code, supra note 37, chapeau of article 18.
41 Ibid., commentary on article 18(6).
42 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993).
43 The Statute’s drafters, in article 5, gave the ad hoc Tribunal jurisdiction over “[t]he
following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in
character, and directed against any civilian population: (a) murder [. . .]”.
44 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution
808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704.
45 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention (II) for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention
(IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 11
internal armed conflict as identical with the prohibition of crimes against
humanity.46
In this context it should also be noted that the ICTY Statute’s war nexus
differs significantly from that of the Nuremberg Charter in two respects.
On the one hand, the Nuremberg Charter was narrower than the Statute in
that it required not only a commission of the crimes “in armed conflict”
but a more specific nexus to one of the other war crimes enumerated in
the Charter. On the other hand, the Charter had a wider scope than the
ICTY Statute in that it extended the nexus to the mere preparation of
an aggressive war. Considered together with the drafting history of the
ICTY Statute, the differences between the Nuremberg war nexus and the
war nexus of the ICTY Statute make it difficult to argue that the Statute’s
war nexus is required by customary international law as expressed in the
Nuremberg Charter.47
Indeed, in one of its first rulings, – the Tadic Jurisdictional Appeal –
the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that “there is no logical or legal basis
for [a war nexus] and it has been abandoned in subsequent State practice
with respect to crimes against humanity”.48 Moreover, it stated: “It is
by now a settled rule of customary international law that crimes against
humanity do not require a connection to international armed conflict.
Indeed [. . .] customary international law may not require a connection
between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all. Thus [. . .] the
Security Council may have defined the crime in Article 5 more narrowly
than necessary under customary international law”.49 In a later decision,
the Appeals Chamber went one step further pronouncing that “the armed
46 According to the Report, supra note 44, para. 49 (footnote omitted): “Crimes against
humanity were first recognised in the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal,
as well as in Law No. 10 of the Control Council for Germany. Crimes against humanity
are aimed at any civilian population and are prohibited regardless of whether they are
committed in an armed conflict, international or internal in character”. Footnote 9 reads:
“In this context, it is to be noted that the International Court of Justice has recognised that
the prohibitions contained in common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions are based
on ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ and cannot be breached in an armed conflict,
regardless of whether it is international or internal in character”. (reference omitted;
emphasis added).
47 This is all the more true if it is accepted that the Nuremberg war nexus was a merely
jurisdictional element.
48 Prosecutor v. Tadic (Case no. IT-94-1-AR72), Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 140.
49 Ibid., para. 141. Part of this phrase was cited by the International Law Commission
in explaining its reasons for the exclusion of the war nexus in its 1996 Draft Code, supra
Note 37, commentary on article 18(6).
12 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
conflict requirement is a jurisdictional element”50 which “is satisfied by
proof that there was an armed conflict; that is all that the Statute requires,
and in so doing, it requires more than does customary international law”.51
This view has also been expressed in the Kordic case.52
Another clear indication that the war nexus is not required under
customary international law is the wording of the chapeau of article 3 of
the ICTR Statute53 which does not require any link to an armed conflict.
In fact, it seems that the ICTR did not even deliberate as to whether it
should require a war nexus as an element of crimes against humanity, since
there are no decisions dealing with the issue. Instead, the context element
introduced by the ICTR Statute is the first codification of the element of
“widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population”. It was
later repeated almost verbatim in the chapeau of article 7(1) of the Rome
Statute and finally became part of section 5.1 of Regulation 15/2000. A
last noteworthy aspect of article 3 of the ICTR Statute is the requirement
of a discriminatory intent.
In sum, the judges of both tribunals replaced the war nexus with a
context element which has been the blueprint for the immediate predecessor
of section 5.1 of Regulation 15/2000, namely article 7(1) of
the Rome Statute.54 For this reason, the jurisprudence of the ad hoc
Tribunals is of considerable relevance to interpretation of the crimes
against humanity provision in UNTAET Regulation 15/2000.
(iv) Conclusions. The most striking conclusion that can be drawn from
the above survey of the context element’s evolution is that it has continued
to change throughout its history. In a way, the only common denominator
is the fact that some kind of context has been required by every drafter or
judge dealing with crimes against humanity. In addition, after the abandonment
of the war nexus, a link to an authority or power, be it a state,
organisation or group, was required by most formulations of crimes against
humanity as well as by the case law of the ad hoc Tribunals.
It can be concluded that no specific details of the context element are
required, but rather only its general existence. Moreover, there is a strong
tendency to include a link to an authority. Thus, it seems that the fluctuations
of the past definitions of the context element leave wide discretion
50 Prosecutor v. Tadic (Case no. IT-94-1-A), Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 249.
51 Ibid., para. 251.
52 Prosecutor v. Kordic (Case no. IT-95-14/2-T), Judgment, 26 February 2001, para. 33.
53 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994), annex.
54 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 2. The Rome Statute
was adopted on 17 July 1998 and entered into force on 1 July 2002.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 13
to the drafters of international criminal law in their interpretation of the
content of the context element under customary international law. Another
important observation regards the origin of crimes against humanity in
the law of war or humanitarian law. In particular, the qualification of the
population attacked as “civilian” derives from these origins. A war nexus,
however, if it ever was an element of crimes against humanity at all, is no
longer required.
b. The Rationale of the Context Element as a Guideline for Interpretation
The reason for the inclusion of a context element in crimes against
humanity is to distinguish ordinary crimes under national law from international
crimes which are criminal under international criminal law even
if national law does not punish them. The context element is the “international
element”55 in crimes against humanity which renders certain
criminal conduct a matter of international concern.56 The exact nature of
this international concern, the rationale why these crimes are considered
important enough to deal with them on an international level, is a very
important aid in the interpretation of these crimes and, must therefore be
briefly analysed here.
There are two possible reasons why the international community may
treat a crime as a matter of international law. Firstly, a crime can obtain
an international character since it cannot be prosecuted effectively on
a national level and there is a common interest of states to prosecute.
This practical reason applies to piracy, probably the most ancient international
crime,57 or damaging submarine telegraph cables.58 The second
reason is the extreme gravity of certain crimes59 which is usually accompanied
by the unwillingness or inability of national criminal systems to
prosecute them. This is the rationale for the criminalisation of crimes
55 Prosecutor v. Tadic (Case no. IT-94-1-A and IT-94-1-A bis), Separate Opinion of
Judge Shahabuddeen, 26 January 2000; M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 9, p. 243 (cf. the
title of Chapter 6: “The International or Jurisdictional Element”).
56 Claus Kress, supra note 36, p. 53; Beth van Schaack, supra note 7, p. 819;
Matthew Lippman, supra note 10, p. 183 quoting Robert H. Jackson, head of the United
States delegation at the London Conference in 1945, where the Nuremberg Charter was
negotiated.
57 ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, I OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW
746 (9th ed., 1992); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Sources and Content of International Criminal
Law: A Theoretical Framework, in I INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMES 3,
83 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 1999); Brigitte Stern, A propos de la comp´etence universelle
. . . , in LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE MOHAMED BEDJAOUI 735, 736, 744 et seq. (Emile
Yakpo & Tahar Boumedra, eds., 1999).
58 Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts, supra note 57, p. 761 (§ 311).
59 Margaret McAuliffe de Guzman, supra note 13, p. 376.
14 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
against humanity under international law. Particularly grave violations of
individual rights by action or deliberate inaction of official authorities has
been an issue of international law since the concept of human rights began
to develop at the end of the nineteenth century.60 This concept gained the
status of “hard law”, at the latest, with the adoption of the Charter of
the United Nations.61 Thus, it was a logical consequence to criminalise
the worst human rights violations, which coincide with the gravest crimes
known to mankind.
The specific seriousness in relation to ordinary crimes (e.g., fraud) and
“normal” human rights violations (e.g., denial of the right to associate
in trade unions62) is constituted by two characteristics of crimes against
humanity. They comprise only the most severe violations of human rights
(for example violations of dignity, life or freedom) and, in addition, must
be committed in a multiplicity of cases, either in a systematic or a widespread
manner. Accordingly, it has been emphasised repeatedly, inter alia
by the International Law Commission and by case law,63 that the context
element serves to single out random acts of violence from the scope of
crimes against humanity.
The multiple commission of crimes required for crimes against
humanity increases the gravity of the single crime as it increases the danger
of the individual perpetrator’s conduct.64 For example, a victim who is
attacked in the broader context of a widespread or systematic attack is
much more vulnerable. A victim of ordinary criminal conduct has far better
means of defense. He or she can call police or neighbours or even defend
himself or herself without having to fear that the perpetrator calls to his or
her peers for support. A perpetrator of crimes against humanity also poses
a greater threat because ordinary social correctives cannot function properly.
Public disapproval of criminal behaviour, a strong counterincentive
against criminal conduct, is not available. On the contrary, collective action
tolerated or supported by the authorities helps to overcome natural inhibi-
60 Robert Jennings &ArthurWatts, supra note 57, pp. 849–850; also pp. 995–998, where
the authors consider crimes against humanity in the context of human rights.
61 ALFRED VERDROSS & BRUNO SIMMA, UNVIVERSELLES VÖLKERRECHT.
THEORIE UND PRAXIS 162 (3rd ed., 1984); German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht),
Decision of 13 December 1977, Case no. 2 BvM 1/76, 46
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 342, 362.
62 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 22.
63 1996 Draft Code, supra note 37, commentary on article 18(5); Justice Case, supra
note 19, p. 982; Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, paras. 646, 648, 653; Prosecutor v.
Akayesu (Case no. ICTR-96-4-T), Judgment, 2 Sepember 1998, para. 579.
64 Günter Heine & Hans Vest, Murder/Wilful Killing, in SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL
ASPECTS, supra note 16, pp. 175, 194.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 15
tions. Yet another reason for the magnified danger of the single perpetrator
has been pointed out by Judge Cassese who noted that, in contrast to the
perpetrator of an ordinary crime, a perpetrator committing a crime against
humanity may not fear punishment.65 What is more, not only the danger by
the single perpetrator is increased but his or her participation in the attack
also helps to constitute the attack itself, and, thus, helps to constitute the
atmosphere and the environment for the crimes of others.
Thus, the rationale of the context element can be summarised as the
protection of human rights66 against the most serious and most dangerous
violations. This rationale at the same time serves to distinguish crimes
against humanity from the less serious national law crimes.
2. Elements of the Context Element
a. Widespread or Systematic Attack
The requirement of a widespread or systematic attack was codified for the
first time in the ICTR Statute and subsequently in the Rome Statute.67 It
is repeated in section 5.1 of Regulation 15/2000. Despite its absence in
the ICTY Statute, the ICTY has adopted this element as well. In the Tadic
and the Blaskic cases it was argued that the requirement of a widespread
or systematic attack was implied in the requirement that the object of
such crimes must be a “population”.68 In addition, both judgments refer
to the 1996 ILC Draft Code which requires the commission of crimes
“in a systematic manner or on a large scale”. Finally, Blaskic considers
the Statutes of the ICTR and the ICC as well as other case law of the
Tribunals.69
65 Prosecutor v. Tadic (Case no. IT-94-1-A and IT-94-1-A bis), Separate Opinion of
Judge Cassese, 26 January 2000, para. 14.
66 “[Crimes against humanity] are intended to safeguard basic human values by banning
atrocities directed against human dignity”: Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14,
para. 547.
67 On negotiations concerning the term “widespread or systematic attack” at the Rome
Diplomatic Conference, see Darryl Robinson, Defining “Crimes against Humanity” at the
Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 47–51 (1999).
68 “[E]ither a finding of widespreadness, which refers to the number of victims, or
systematicity, indicating that a pattern or methodical plan is evident, fulfils this requirement
(that the acts must be directed against a civilian population)”. Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra
note 9, para. 648. “It is appropriate, however, to note that the words ‘directed against
any civilian population’ and some of the sub-characterisations set out in the text of the
Statute imply, both by their very nature and by law, an element of being widespread or
organised, whether as regards the acts or the victims. ‘Extermination’, ‘enslavement’ and
‘persecutions’ do not refer to single events”. Prosecutor v. Blaskic (Case no. IT-95-14-T),
Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. 202.
69 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, ibid., para. 202.
16 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
(i) Attack. The notion of “attack” as part of the concept of a “widespread
or systematic attack” concerns the nature of the action directed against any
civilian population. The particular language of the chapeau of section 5.1
may give the wrong impression, suggesting that the attack and conduct
directed against a civilian population are two different concepts. The first
explicit definition of attack was presented in the Akayesu judgment of
ICTR Trial Chamber I:
The concept of attack may be defined as an unlawful act of the kind enumerated in Article
3(a) to (i) of the Statute, like murder, extermination, enslavement etc. An attack may also
be non-violent in nature, like imposing a system of apartheid, which is declared a crime
against humanity in Article 1 of the Apartheid Convention of 1973, or exerting pressure on
the population to act in a particular manner, may come under the purview of an attack, if
orchestrated on a massive scale or in a systematic manner.70
This definition is repeated by the Trial Chamber in Rutaganda71 and
Musema.72 Its first part is slightly misleading as it paraphrases “attack”
as “unlawful act”. However, a little earlier the decision expressly sets out
that “the [individual] act must be committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack”.73 Thus it is clear that the general notion of attack and
the (individual) criminal acts, e.g., murder or torture, are not put on the
same footing. Rather, the Chamber defines an attack as a multiplicity of
such acts “orchestrated on a massive scale or in a systematic manner”.
Trial Chamber II in Kayishema seems to adopt a similar standard but
clarifies that an attack need not consist of a multiplicity of the same crimes
(for example murder) but can also consist of an accumulation of different
crimes: “The attack is the event in which the enumerated crimes must form
part. Indeed, within a single attack, there may exist a combination of the
enumerated crimes, for example murder, rape and deportation”.74
The Kupreskic decision of an ICTY Trial Chamber refers to “acts” that
“were part of a widespread or systematic occurrence of crimes”.75
Thus, the Tribunals understand an attack as the multiple commission
of acts which fulfil the requirements of the enumerated inhumane acts.
This approach fits well with the rationale of crimes against humanity, i.e.,
to criminalise only the most serious human rights violations. It also is
70 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 63, para. 581.
71 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda (Case no. ICTR-96-3-T), Judgment, 6 December 1999,
para. 70.
72 Prosecutor v. Musema (Case no. ICTR-96-13-T), Judgment and Sentence, 27 January
2000, para. 205.
73 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 63, para. 578 (emphasis added).
74 Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana (Case no. ICTR-95-1-T), Judgment, 12 May
1999, para. 122.
75 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 544.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 17
compatible with article 7(2)(a) Rome Statute, according to which attack
is “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred
to in paragraph 1”. It is true that this definition of attack has been omitted
from section 5.2 of Regulation 15/2000. However, in the light of the case
law of the ad hoc Tribunals, this omission cannot support the inclusion of
acts which are not among the enumerated inhumane acts into the definition
of attack under Regulation 15/2000. As a consequence, other human
rights violations like denial of fair trial or infringements on property do
not, in general,76 constitute an attack, even if committed on a widespread
basis or systematically. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that
among the enumerated inhumane acts are “other inhumane acts” including,
for example, severe beatings. Moreover, according to the jurisprudence of
the Tribunals, persecution may comprise acts not otherwise enumerated
among the enumerated inhumane acts, including the destruction of homes.
A further important characteristic of the attack is that it need not necessarily
be executed by a multiplicity of perpetrators, nor does a single
perpetrator have to act at different times.77 For example, if a single perpetrator
poisons the water for a large population, he or she would thereby
commit a multiplicity of killings with a single conduct. The same holds
true for the attacks of 11 September in the United States. Every single
killing, under the doctrine of concurrence of offences (concours idéal,
Idealkonkurrenz), amounts to a separate crime thus constituting the multiplicity
of crimes required for the attack.78 The general introduction of the
Draft Elements of Crimes for the ICC states: “A particular conduct may
constitute one or more crimes”.79
Finally, the above discussions leave no doubt that the attack need not
be a military attack.80
76 But see ibid., para. 631.
77 Simon Chesterman, An Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements of Crimes
against Humanity, 10 DUKE J. COMP. INT’L L. 307, 316 (2000).
78 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 712; Kai Ambos & Steffen Wirth,
Commentary on Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, in ANNOTATED LEADING
CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 1994–1999 701 (Andr´e Klip & Göran Sluiter, eds., 2001),
Ruth Rissing-van Saan, in STRAFGESETZBUCH. LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR. GROSSKOMMENTAR
§ 52 mn. 36 (Burkhard Jähnke, Heinrich Wilhelm Laufhütte & Walter Odersky,
eds., 28th delivery, 1999); Alicia Gil Gil, Comentario a la primera sentencia del Tribunal
Supremo Alem´an condenando por el delito del genocidio, 4 REVISTA DE DERECHO
PENAL Y CRIMINOLOG´IA 771, 788 et seq. (1999).
79 Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/
Add.2, general introduction, para. 9.
80 Rodney Dixon, Article 7, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT. OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE mn. 8 (Otto
Triffterer, ed., 1999).
18 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
It has been repeated many times by both international Tribunals that an
attack need not be widespread and systematic but only either widespread
or systematic.81 As this is consistent with the wording of section 5.1 the
matter need not be given further consideration here.
(ii) Systematic Attack. According to the Tadic trial judgment, a systematic
attack requires the existence of a “pattern or methodical plan”.82 Akayesu
defined a systematic attack “as thoroughly organised and following a
regular pattern on the basis of a common policy involving substantial
public or private resources”.83 Thereby, it added to the Tadic definition
inter alia the requirements that the organisation of the attack be “thorough”
and that “substantial resources” be used. ICTR Trial Chamber II,
in Kayishema, gave a shorter definition emphasising the relation between
the systematic nature of the attack and the policy: “A systematic attack
means an attack carried out pursuant to a preconceived policy or plan”.84
Similarly, Kunarac very recently held: “The adjective ‘systematic’ signifies
the organised nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of
their random occurrence”.85 All decisions rely on the 1996 ILC Draft
Code which defined a systematic attack as committed “pursuant to a
preconceived plan or policy”.86
It is unclear what the basis is for the “thoroughly organised and
following a regular pattern” and the “substantial resources” requirements
of Akayesu. Therefore, these terms should not be regarded so much as
strict requirements of a systematic attack but rather as an illustration
referring to typical situations in which an attack exists. It cannot be convincingly
assumed that the ICTR Trial Chamber intended to exclude an
attack on innocent persons from the scope of the systematic variant87 of
81 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 646–648; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra
note 63, para. 579; Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 74, para. 123; Prosecutor v.
Rutaganda, supra note 71, paras. 67–68; Prosecutor v. Musema, supra note 72, paras. 202–
203; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 207; Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al. (Case
no. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1), Judgment, 22 February 2001, para. 427; Prosecutor v.
Kordic, supra note 52, para. 178; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema (Case no. ICTR-95-1A-T),
Judgment, 7 June 2001, para. 77.
82 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 648.
83 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 63, para. 580. The same Chamber confirms this
holding in Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, supra note 71, para. 69 and Prosecutor v. Musema,
supra note 72, para. 204.
84 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 74, para. 123.
85 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 81, para. 429.
86 1996 Draft Code, supra note 37, commentary on article 18(3).
87 A widespread attack requires a larger number of victims than a systematic attack.
Therefore it cannot fully fill a gap in the definition of the systematic attack.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 19
crimes against humanity for the sole reason that it was committed with
very limited resources – for example machetes – or that it was sloppily
organised.88
ICTY Trial Chamber I, in Blaskic, adopted a set of four different criteria
which must be fulfilled to render an attack systematic:
− the existence of a political objective, a plan pursuant to which the
attack is perpetrated or an ideology, in the broad sense of the word,
that is, to destroy, persecute or weaken a community
− the perpetration of a criminal act on a very large scale against a group
of civilians or the repeated and continuous commission of inhumane
acts linked to one another;
− the preparation and use of significant public or private resources,
whether military or other;
− the implication of high-level political and/or military authorities in
the definition and establishment of the methodical plan.89
The Chamber’s somewhat hypertrophic definition of “systematic” is
derived from an accumulation of material from several different sources,
including the ILC Drafts of 1991 and 1996, and the quoted passages in
Tadic and Akayesu.90 Such a method is questionable in itself because
the result of this accumulation is a new definition of “systematic” which
cannot be attributed to any of the sources (as none of them require all of
the named criteria).
Therefore, only the first criterion from the Blaskic catalogue, which
has also been adopted by Kayishema and Kunarac, can be regarded as a
genuine element of the systematic attack. As to the second criterion in the
catalogue, the Blaskic Trial Chamber adduced no source at all for its first
alternative, namely that the crimes must be committed on a “very large
scale”. Rather, this seems to belong to the definition of the widespread
attack which is different from the systematic attack in that it requires a
large number of victims. But also the second alternative of the second
criterion, the repeated and continuous commission of inhumane acts, was
named by the ILC only as an example, that is, as a possible result of the
88 Thus the view expressed by Suzannah Linton, Regulation 2000/15 on the Establishment
of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, unpublished
paper (on file with the authors) who takes the Akayesu formula verbatim and requires that
the prosecution prove that the attacks be “thoroughly organised and following a regular
pattern”, is not shared by the authors.
89 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 203 (footnotes omitted); these requirement
are repeated in Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 179.
90 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 203, fn. 379–381.
20 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
implementation of a plan or policy.91 Thus, it seems that the inclusion of
the whole second criterion is not well founded. The same applies to the
third criterion which is taken from Akayesu and has been dealt with above.
The fourth and last criterion, finally, is formulated too narrowly, as will be
explained.
In conclusion, the common denominator in the various definitions of a
systematic attack is that “a systematic attack is one carried out pursuant
to a preconceived policy or plan”.92 More explicitly, what constitutes the
systematic character of the attack is the guidance provided for the individual
perpetrators as to the envisaged object of the attack, namely the
group of victims.
(iii) Widespread Attack. With regard to the widespread attack, most of
the decisions of the ad hoc Tribunals simply focus on the scale of the
attack or, equivalently, on the number of victims. Thus, the Tadic Trial
Chamber, following the ILC’s 1996 Draft Code,93 defined the widespread
attack as referring “to the [large] number of victims”.94 Very similarly,
Kayishema held that a widespread attack must be “directed against a multiplicity
of victims”.95 Blaskic explained, quoting the ILC: “A crime may
be widespread or committed on a large-scale by ‘the cumulative effect
of a series of inhumane acts or the singular effect of an inhumane act of
extraordinary magnitude’.”96 And the Chamber in Kunarac noted: “The
adjective ‘widespread’ connotes the large-scale nature of the attack and
the number of its victims”.97 In contrast to these concise formulations,
Akayesu provided a much longer and more complicated definition, holding
that a “massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with
considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims” is
required.98
91 1996 Draft Code, supra note 37, commentary on article 18(3).
92 Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, supra note 81, para. 77.
93 1996 Draft Code, supra note 37, commentary on article 18(4).
94 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 648.
95 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 74, para. 123.
96 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 206, quoting the International Law
Commission’s Commentary to the 1996 Draft Code, supra note 37, commentary on article
18(4). The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 179, follows closely.
97 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 81, para. 428; see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra
note 9, para. 648; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 202; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac
et al. (Case no. IT-97-25-T) Judgment, 15 March 2002, para. 57.
98 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 63, para. 580; the definition is repeated in Prosecutor
v. Rutaganda, supra note 71, para. 69, and Prosecutor v. Musema, supra note 72,
para. 204.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 21
Again, all judgments mentioned draw on the ILC’s Commentary and
their common denominator is the ILC’s formulation. Thus, it may be
concluded that all that a widespread attack requires is a large number
of victims which, as stated in Blaskic, can also be attacked by a single
conduct “of extraordinary magnitude”. The additions to this core definition
in Akayesu do not contribute substantially to this definition and may, as
above, be regarded as merely illustrative.
Finally, as to the numbers of victims, the Tribunal’s jurisprudence and
other sources imply that for a widespread attack a larger number of victims
is required than for a systematic attack.
b. Any Population
The rationale of the requirement that the object of the attack must be a
population is the same as the one for the widespread or systematic attack,
i.e., to exclude single or random acts of violence.99 In the Tadic trial
judgment the Chamber held that this element also implies the collective
nature of the crimes.100 However, the word “collective” must not be understood
as requiring that the victims of the attack be victimised because of
their membership in a certain group.101 This interpretation was rejected
by the Appeals Chamber in Tadic, which held that the Trial Chamber
was wrong in requiring discriminatory intent for crimes against humanity.
The element “population”, therefore, simply requires that a multiplicity
of victims exists and, thus, means exactly the same as the element (widespread
or systematic) attack, namely, that an isolated single crime which
is not part of an attack against a multiplicity of victims does not constitute
a crime against humanity. Indeed, the judges of the ICTY deduced the
very requirement of the widespread or systematic attack from the term
“population”. Consequently, if an instrument such as the Rome Statute or
Regulation 15/2000 explicitly requires a widespread or systematic attack,
the term “population” does not add anything to this requirement. It is
only meaningful insofar as it is qualified by the adjective “civilian” in
the phrase “any civilian population”. Therefore, the incorporation of the
term “population” in these texts should be understood rather as a historical
reminiscence to a time honoured phrase than as adding any substantial
element to crimes against humanity.102
99 See also Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 81, para. 422.
100 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 644; the same assertion was made in
Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, supra note 81, para. 80.
101 Margaret McAuliffe de Guzman, supra note 13, p. 362; Simon Chesterman, supra
note 77, p. 325.
102 Margaret McAuliffe de Guzman, supra note 13, pp. 362–364.
22 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
The word “any” which qualifies the term “population” originally was
intended to clarify that the victims need not be nationals of a foreign
state.103 Such clarification was necessary as long as crimes against
humanity had not been fully emancipated from the laws of war. At present,
the qualifier “any” only emphasises that no part of the civilian population is
excluded from the protection provided by the prohibition of crimes against
humanity.104 Moreover, it implies that a broad interpretation of the term
“civilian” is required.105
The term “any [. . .] population”, thus denotes merely a multiplicity of
victims. As this is already implied in the term “attack”, it does not add any
distinct element to the requirements of crimes against humanity.
c. Civilian
The attack must be directed against a “civilian population”. In this respect,
two questions arise. In the first place it must be clarified which individuals
fall within the definition of civilians. Secondly, it is necessary to
examine the circumstances under which a population, i.e., a multiplicity of
individuals, must be regarded as “civilian”.
The requirement that the victims of crimes against humanity must be
civilians is a relic of the origins of crimes against humanity in the laws of
war. Moreover, its inclusion in modern codifications of international criminal
law is most probably based on a confusion of common article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions with the law of crimes against humanity (see above).
If the scope of crimes against humanity was ever limited to the protection
of (civilian) war victims this is no longer the case. At present, the prohibition
of crimes against humanity serves the protection of human rights of
civilians in general. However, not only the human rights of civilians but
also those of soldiers can be violated. The ICTY described this dilemma
as follows: “One fails to see why only civilians and not also combatants
should be protected by these rules (in particular by the rule prohibiting
persecution), given that these rules may be held to possess a broader
humanitarian scope and purpose than those prohibiting war crimes”.106
Whereas the Tribunal felt that it could not ignore the wording of its
Statute – which explicitly requires the element “civilian” – it nevertheless
concluded that a wide interpretation of the term was required.107
103 Darryl Robinson, supra note 67, p. 51; also Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9,
para. 635; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 81, para. 423.
104 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/1994/674, para. 77.
105 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 208.
106 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 547.
107 Ibid.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 23
Indeed an extensive interpretation is strongly supported by case law
starting with the decisions of German courts under CCL 10. In a case of
the German Supreme Court in the British Occupied Zone, the defendants
were convicted for having sentenced to death and ordered the execution
of two (German) soldiers who had deserted in the last days of the war.
The court noted that the crime against the soldiers was not committed
against the civilian population but ruled this was not necessary since crimes
against humanity can be committed against soldiers as well.108 In another
case, the same court convicted a defendant for sentencing to death two
(German) soldiers who had committed the “crime” of demoralisation of the
armed forces (Wehrkraftzersetzung).109 Both decisions support the view
that crimes against humanity can be committed against soldiers of the same
nationality as the perpetrators.
Moreover, the ad hoc Tribunals110 have frequently referred to the
Barbie case in which the French Cour de Cassation decided that members
of the Resistance could be victims of crimes against humanity.111 The
Commission of Experts, which prepared a legal analysis of the situation
in the former Yugoslavia for the Security Council, considered that the term
“civilians”, meaning non-combatants, included a head of family who “tries
to protect his family gun-in-hand”.112
The ad hoc Tribunals have followed the Commission of Experts
and adopted a wide definition of civilian. The Vukovar decision held:
“Although according to the terms of Article 5 of the Statute of this Tribunal
combatants in the traditional sense of the term cannot be victims of a
crime against humanity, this does not apply to individuals who, at one
particular point in time, carried out acts of resistance”.113 Consequently,
the Tribunal ruled that former resistance fighters who had laid down their
108 German Supreme Court in the British Occupied Zone, Judgment, Case no. StS 111/48,
7 December 1948, in 1 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES OBERSTEN GERICHTSHOFES DER
BRITISCHEN ZONE IN STRAFSACHEN 219, 228 (1948).
109 German Supreme Court in the British Occupied Zone, judgment, Case no. StS 309/49,
18 October 1949, in 2 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES OBERSTEN GERICHTSHOFES DER
BRITISCHEN ZONE IN STRAFSACHEN 231 (1948).
110 Prosecutor v. Mrksic et al (Case no. IT-95-13-R61), Review of the Indictment
Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 3 April 1996, para. 29;
Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 614; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para.
212; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 548; also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra
note 63, para. 582, quoting Prosecutor v. Mrksic in footnote 146.
111 Barbie Case, supra note 30, p. 140. The court also held, at p. 137, that crimes
against humanity could be committed “against the opponents of [a policy of ideological
supremacy], whatever the form of their opposition”.
112 Commission of Experts, supra note 104, para. 78.
113 Prosecutor v. Mrksic, supra note 110, para. 29.
24 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
arms and were now hospital patients could be victims of crimes against
humanity.114 In Tadic, the Trial Chamber opined that “those actively
involved in a resistance movement can qualify as victims of crimes against
humanity”.115
A more comprehensive definition is given by Akayesu: “Members of
the civilian population are people who are not taking any active part in
the hostilities, including members of the armed forces who laid down
their arms and those persons placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds,
detention or any other cause”.116 This definition has been reformulated and
clarified in Blaskic:
Crimes against humanity therefore do not mean only acts committed against civilians
in the strict sense of the term but include also crimes against two categories of people:
those who were members of a resistance movement and former combatants – regardless
of whether they wore a uniform or not – but who were no longer taking part in hostilities
when the crimes were perpetrated because they had either left the army or were no longer
bearing arms or, ultimately, had been placed hors de combat, in particular, due to their
wounds or their being detained. It also follows that the specific situation of the victim at
the moment the crimes were committed, rather than his status, must be taken into account
in determining his standing as a civilian.117
The latter formulation summarises and structures the jurisprudence of
the Tribunals regarding the term “civilian”. There are two aspects which
support this interpretation of the term “civilian”. First, the element stems
from humanitarian law. Consequently, it must be understood to be at least
as comprehensive as the definition of “civilian” under humanitarian law.
Second, crimes against humanity are no longer linked to the laws of
war but rather to human rights law. Against this background, an effective
protection of any individual against inhumane acts is required. It is therefore
necessary to find an interpretation of the term “civilian” which covers
at least all persons not protected by humanitarian law. In time of peace, the
prohibition of crimes against humanity is – apart from the very narrow
law of genocide – the only applicable (criminal) law to protect human
rights. Thus, in time of peace, the term “civilian” must be interpreted even
more broadly than in time of war, when humanitarian law provides some
protection.
114 Ibid., para. 32.
115 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 643; the same definition is used in Prosecutor
v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 549.
116 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 63, para. 582; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, supra
note 71, para. 72; Prosecutor v. Musema, supra note 72, para. 207; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac,
supra note 97, para. 56.
117 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 214.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 25
In conclusion, the definition of “civilian” in the elements of crimes
against humanity must fully encompass the definition of “civilian” in
humanitarian law. At the same time it must be wider than that because
it must also cover all persons which are not protected by humanitarian
law, especially in time of peace.118 Indeed, many of the ad hoc Tribunals’
decisions base their interpretation of the term “civilian” on humanitarian
law.119 In addition the Tadic Trial Chamber emphasised that the definition
of humanitarian law is not directly applicable to crimes against humanity
but may provide useful guidance.120
The passage from Blaskic reprinted above seems to be in full accordance
with the interpretation developed here. It equates the wide concept of
non-combatants in common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions121 with
the term “civilian” as an element of crimes against humanity. Despite the
fact that common article 3 is intended only for non-international armed
conflict, Blaskic applies this definition without distinguishing between the
different kinds of armed conflict or between armed conflict and peace.
Moreover, the Trial Chamber clarified that the (formal) status of an individual
is not decisive but rather the individual’s “specific situation”. This
statement has been recently confirmed.122 It meets the needs of comprehensive
protection of human rights very well since everyone except an
active combatant of a hostile armed force is in a “specific situation”
requiring the protection of his or her human rights. This view is in full
accordance with the decisions of the German Supreme Court in the British
Occupied Zone mentioned above: the Court convicted the defendants for
crimes against humanity against soldiers who belonged to the German
forces, i.e., to military forces not hostile towards the perpetrator.
In light of the case law and the foregoing analysis, the opinion of
the ICTR Trial Chamber in Kayishema excluding, inter alia, members
of the police as possible victims of crimes against humanity must be
considered erroneous.123 Members of the police are non-combatants as
they are responsible for the maintenance of civil order. Unless a police
member takes up arms and joins a hostile military force he or she may not
be considered a non-civilian for purposes of application of crimes against
humanity. Thus, in sum, every individual, regardless of his or her formal
118 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 74, para. 127.
119 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 643; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 63,
para. 582, fns 146 and 147.
120 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 639.
121 The language of common article 3 is used almost verbatim in Prosecutor v. Blaskic,
supra note 68, para. 214.
122 Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, supra note 81, para. 79.
123 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 74, para. 127.
26 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
status as a member of an armed force, must be regarded as a civilian unless
the forces are hostile towards the perpetrator and the individual has not laid
down his or her arms or, ultimately, been placed hors de combat.
The second important issue with regard to “civilian population” is
the question of whether a certain number of hostile combatants among
a group of non-combatants deprives such a group, or multiplicity of individuals,
of their civilian character. The question has been addressed and
answered many times by the Tribunals in the sense that the character of a
predominantly civilian population is not altered by “the presence of certain
non-civilians in their midst”.124 No further consideration of the issue is
required.
d. Policy Element
As has been shown, the “international element” of crimes against humanity
has shifted away from the war nexus and turned to the requirement that the
single crime must somehow be linked to state (or organisational) authority.
Such an element was required by the ILC Draft Codes of 1954125 and
1996126 and probably also the Draft Code of 1991. Similar language can
be found in several judicial decisions in the period between World War II
and the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals. The jurisprudence of the
ad hoc Tribunals, which will be discussed below, has introduced the term
“policy element” to describe this requirement. It is explicitly codified in
article 7(2)(a) Rome Statute127 but has been deliberately omitted from
section 5.2 of Regulation 15/2000.
(i) The Entity behind the Policy. At present, there is no doubt that the
entity behind the policy does not have to be a state in the sense of public
international law. It is sufficient that the entity be an organisation which
exercises de facto power in a given territory. This was the position of the
ILC Draft Codes of 1991 and 1996 and has been codified in article 7(2)
Rome Statute which requires a “State or organisational policy” (emphasis
added).
124 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 638; affirmed in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra
note 63, para. 582; Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra, note 74, para. 128; Prosecutor v.
Rutaganda, supra note 71, para. 72; Prosecutor v. Musema, supra note 72, para. 207;
Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 549; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 81,
para. 325; Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 180; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, supra
note 81, para. 79; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, supra note 97, para. 56.
125 1954 Draft Code, supra note 27, article 2(11).
126 1996 Draft Code, supra note 37, chapeau of article 18.
127 On the negotiations of the Rome Statute, see Darryl Robinson, supra note 67,
pp. 47–51.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 27
After consideration of the 1996 Draft Code according to which not only
a government but “any organisation or group” can be behind the policy, the
ICTY concluded in Tadic: “[A]lthough a policy must exist to commit these
acts, it need not be the policy of a State”.128 Kupreskic held that behind the
policy must be an “entity holding de facto authority over a territory”.129
The Chamber went on to explain that the policy need not be conceived
on the highest level in the state or organisation.130 Similarly, the Nikolic
Rule 61 Decision held as early as 1995: “[The crimes] need not be related
to a policy established at State level, in the conventional sense of the term
[. . .]”.131 Indeed, every level in the respective state or other organisation
which, as such, exercises the de facto power in a given territory can also
develop an explicit or implicit policy with regard to the commission of
crimes against humanity in this territory.
It may be noted that the above definition does not include an organisation
which, while being able to exercise a certain power, is not the de
facto authority over a territory because there is a higher or more powerful
entity which controls it. The relevant authority is rather the entity which
exercises the highest de facto authority in the territory and can – within
limits – control all other holders of power and all individuals. Thus, a
criminal organisation in a state which still exercises the power over the
territory (e.g., through normal police forces) where the organisation is
active would not qualify as the entity behind the policy. If such an organisation,
according to its policy, commits multiple crimes, this, as such, will
not turn these crimes into crimes against humanity. The situation will be
different, however, if the highest de facto authority over the territory, for
example the state, at least tolerates these crimes in pursuance of its policy
(see below).
(ii) The Content of the Policy and the Form of its Adoption. As to the
form of the policy, it has been repeatedly stated by the ad hoc Tribunals
that “[t]here is no requirement that this policy must be adopted formally
as the policy of a state”,132 nor must the policy or plan “necessarily be
128 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 655; confirmed in Prosecutor v. Kayishema,
supra note 74, para. 126; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 551; Prosecutor v.
Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 205; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, supra note 81, para. 78.
129 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 552.
130 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 205.
131 Prosecutor v. Nikolic (Case no. IT-94-2-R61), Review of the Indictment Pursuant to
Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 20 October 1995, para. 26.
132 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 63, para. 580; also Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra
note 9, para. 653; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, supra note 71, para. 69; Prosecutor v. Musema,
28 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
declared expressly or even stated clearly and precisely”.133 Consequently,
an implicit or de facto policy is sufficient.
The content of the policy must be to commit crimes against
humanity,134 i.e., to commit a multiplicity of the enumerated individual
criminal acts against a civilian population.135
(iii) The Need for a Policy Element and the Conduct Required. The most
significant question with regard to the policy element is whether, under
current international law, it is required at all and, if so, whether it is
required for both the widespread and systematic alternative or only the
systematic. This question also demands clarification as to whether a policy
always requires active conduct from the entity behind the policy or if a
policy of toleration is sufficient.
The first pronouncement of the ad hoc Tribunals on the policy element
was the 1995 Rule 61 decision in Nikolic which stated that “[a]lthough
[the crimes] need not be related to a policy established at State level, in
the conventional sense of the term, they cannot be the work of isolated
individuals alone”.136 The Tadic Trial Chamber took a more restrictive
view and opined:
[T]he reason that crimes against humanity so shock the conscience of mankind and warrant
intervention by the international community is because they are not isolated, random acts
of individuals but rather result from a deliberate attempt to target a civilian population.
Traditionally this requirement was understood to mean that there must be some form of
policy to commit these acts.137
Thus, the judges in Tadic required a policy, even if the attack is only widespread
and not, at the same time, systematic. In contrast, the Akayesu Trial
Chamber mentioned the policy element only with regard to the systematic
alternative. It first defined the concept of widespread as requiring a
multiplicity of victims – without mentioning a policy – and then went
on to explain: “The concept of systematic may be defined as thoroughly
organised and following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy
involving substantial public or private resources”.138
supra note 72, para. 204; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 551; Prosecutor v.
Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 204.
133 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 204.
134 Cf. e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 653.
135 Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute.
136 Prosecutor v. Nikolic, supra note 131, para. 26.
137 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 653; in support, the Chamber cited the Dutch
Menten Case which is mentioned above.
138 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 63, para. 580; confirmed in Prosecutor v.
Rutaganda, supra note 71, para. 69 and Prosecutor v. Musema, supra note 72, para. 204.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 29
The next decision dealing with the issue, the Kayishema judgment,
seems to return to the position of Tadic as it develops the policy element
as an implication of the “attack against any civilian population”: “[T]he
requirement that the attack must be committed against a ‘civilian population’
inevitably demands some kind of plan and, the discriminatory
element of the attack is, by its very nature, only possible as a consequence
of a policy”.139 As the requirement “attack against any civilian population”
is valid for both widespread and systematic attacks this ruling seems
to imply that a policy would also be required for a widespread attack.
However, the reasons given in Kayishema are not convincing: It has
already been stated that the term “population” need not be interpreted
as requiring the attack on a particular group of victims. Moreover, unlike
article 3 of the ICTR Statute, customary international law does not require
a discriminatory intent for the commission of crimes against humanity.
Thus, at least in theory, there is no need for any process of selection of the
victims which would require any kind of planning and policy.
Subsequent decisions, unlike Kayishema and Tadic, have adopted a
fairly critical attitude towards the policy. Kupreskic holds that whereas
crimes against humanity necessarily imply a policy element “there is
some doubt as to whether it is strictly a requirement, as such, for crimes
against humanity”.140 The ICTR shared this doubt in Bagilishema.141
Whereas both decisions accept that a policy is not an element of crimes
against humanity they claim that, whenever the elements of crimes against
humanity are fulfilled, a policy must exist as well. However, in Kordic,
ICTY Trial Chamber III went even further and stated (after agreeing with
the quoted passage from Kupreskic): “In the Chamber’s view, the existence
of a plan or policy should better be regarded as indicative of the systematic
character of offences charged as crimes against humanity”.142 This
decision views the policy rather as an indicator and, what is more, as an
indicator (only) for a systematic attack.143
139 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 74, para. 124.
140 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 551. However, it must be noted that
the decision is somehow inconsistent as, with regard to the mental element, it relies on
a passage from Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 74, para. 134 which requires that
the “accused must know that his act(s) is part of a widespread or systematic attack on a
civilian population and pursuant to some kind of policy or plan”. The Chamber seems to
have overlooked the doubts it expressed regarding the requirement that a policy element
has necessary implications for the mental elements of the crime.
141 Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, supra note 81, para. 78.
142 Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 182.
143 However, the decision quotes the same passage of Kayishema as Kupreskic, thus
contradicting its holding that the policy element is not required for crimes against
humanity.
30 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
Thus, it is fair to say that the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals
shows a wide range of opinions regarding the policy element. However,
in more recent decisions a tendency is discernable to omit it altogether
and to regard existence of a policy merely as an indicator for the existence
of a (systematic) attack. Regulation 15/2000 supports this trend inasmuch
as paragraph (2)(a) of article 7 of the Rome Statute, which requires a
policy element, has been deliberately omitted from section 5.2 of the
Regulation.144
This new development is fairly unproblematic with regard to the
systematic attack, as any kind of systematic conduct requires, however
small, a degree of organisation which, in turn, requires a policy and an
entity powerful enough to implement it. Thus, the “systematic attack”
element indeed inevitably implies a policy element.
This is not the case, however, with regard to a widespread attack; an
issue that has drawn little attention so far because, up to now, no decision
exists which has had to rely exclusively on a widespread (and not, at
the same time, systematic) attack. The widespread element is fulfilled if
there exists a great number of crime victims. If no further requirement
were necessary a town with an extraordinarily high level of criminality
– resulting in a great number of victims – could qualify as a crime-site
for crimes against humanity. This, obviously, cannot be true because the
context element would be unable to exclude ordinary crimes from the
scope of the crime.145 On this issue, the Commission of Experts noted
“that the ensuing upsurge in crimes that follows a general breakdown of
law and order does not qualify as crimes against humanity”.146
Moreover, human rights, the value protected by the prohibition of
crimes against humanity, are norms which consider the relationship
between state (or other authorities exercising de facto power in a given
territory) and individual: “Human rights law is essentially born out of the
abuses of the state over its citizens and out of the need to protect the
latter from state-organised or state-sponsored violence”.147 In contrast, an
ordinary criminal who robs or even kills his or her victim, at least under
a classical perspective148 of human rights, does not violate the victim’s
144 Morten Bergsmo, supra note 3, p. 2.
145 Similar concerns are expressed by M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 9, p. 245.
146 Commission of Experts, supra note 104, para. 84. The Commission added: “However,
a general breakdown in law and order may be a premeditated instrument, a situation
carefully orchestrated to hide the true nature of the intended harm”.
147 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 81, para. 470.
148 The position taken here may be considered semi-classical as we accept that also nonstate
actors are bound by human rights law if they exercise the functions of a state (de facto
power) in a territory where no state effectively exercises its jurisdiction.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 31
human rights even if many similar crimes happen at the same time. It is
rather the state which violates the victim’s human rights if it does not
protect149 the victim from being robbed or killed despite its ability to do so.
Therefore, it is important to retain some link to state or de facto authority,
not only with regard to a systematic but also a widespread attack. As the
omission of the policy element in section 5.2 of Reg. 15/2000) does not
alter the need for such a link, nothing should be implied from this omission.
Given that a policy element is required even for a widespread attack
it is necessary to examine how an attack can be merely widespread, i.e.,
not systematic, and still somehow connected to a state or organisational
authority. In other words, it must be explained how a multiplicity of criminal
acts which are not organised or planned can still be the object of a
policy. Otherwise, the well established rule that the attack can be either
systematic or widespread would be violated.150
The only solution to this problem is to accept that a policy can also
consist in the deliberate denial of protection for the victims of widespread
but unsystematic crimes, i.e., in the tolerance of these crimes.151 This can
be the case, for example, if a government consciously refrains from putting
a stop to the activity of criminals who, on a very large scale, kill the inhabitants
in a certain area to gain easier access to its natural resources. The
government’s motive for inaction could be that these persons, at the same
time, oppose the government’s politics. In such a case the government
149 For example, under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“European Convention on Human Rights”), 213 U.N.T.S. 212, it is
accepted that States are under an obligation to actively protect human rights. ARTHUR
HAEFLINGER & FRANK SCHÜRMANN, DIE EUROPÄISCHE MENSCHENRECHTSKONVENTION
UND DIE SCHWEIZ 55–57 (2nd ed., 1999). Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra
note 81, para. 470, held: “In the human rights context, the state is the ultimate guarantor
of the rights protected and has both duties and a responsibility for the observance of those
rights. In the event that the state violates those rights or fails in its responsibility to protect
the rights, it can be called to account and asked to take appropriate measures to put an end
to the infringements” (emphasis added).
150 With regard to the interpretation of codified law (e.g., Regulation 15/2000 which
provides expressly that the attack must be widespread or systematic), the Appeals Chamber
in Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 50, para. 284, noted: “It is an elementary rule of interpretation
that one should not construe a provision or part of a provision as if it were
superfluous and hence pointless”.
151 The present paper, consequently, would seem not to be in full accord with Bergsmo’s
analysis, supra note 3, p. 2, that the policy requirement in article 7(2)(a) Rome Statute
turns the alternative formulation of the chapeau of article 7(1) (“widespread or systematic”)
into a cumulative requirement (widespread and systematic): An attack “pursuant to
or in furtherance of a State or organisational policy” (Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(a)) can be
widespread and still, at the same time, not systematic if the official policy consists in the
mere toleration of an (unsystematic) widespread attack.
32 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
would be content that someone else is doing the “dirty work”. Another
example – more relevant for East Timor – would be that small groups
of unorganised militia carry out small uncoordinated missions which,
however, viewed in their totality, involve sufficient victims to qualify as
widespread. If this conduct were in line with the intentions of the government
or the de facto power in the territory and would, therefore, remain
unopposed (i.e., tolerated), the policy not to oppose the attacks would meet
the requirements of the policy element.152 According to the view of the
authors, it would therefore not be necessary to prove that such militia were
actively supported or instructed by a state or organisation (as may be the
case in East Timor). However, if it could be proven, the active support
would render the attack a systematic one.
This interpretation is also in conformity with the rulings in Kupreskic.
ICTY Trial Chamber II explicitly included toleration, approval, endorsement
etc. as possible methods to implement a policy: “The need for crimes
against humanity to have been at least tolerated by a State, Government
or entity is also stressed in national and international case-law [. . .]”153
(emphasis added). Moreover, “[t]he available case-law seems to indicate
that in these cases some sort of explicit or implicit approval or endorsement
by State or governmental authorities is required [. . .]”154 (emphasis
added).
It should be noted that mere negligence on the part of an authority
would not suffice to render a multiplicity of crimes which remain unopposed
by such authority a widespread attack. The same holds true if the
authorities are not able to oppose the crimes (ultra posse nemo obligatur).
However, a policy of toleration adopted by a government which has the
ability to prevent the crimes but nevertheless chooses to tolerate them –
for example, because it expects political disadvantages in opposing them
– would fulfil the requirements of the policy element with regard to a
widespread attack.
Moreover, it is obvious that the entity must also be under a legal obligation,
based for example on international human rights law, to provide
protection against the attack. At least for purposes of defining the elements
of crimes against humanity a (foreign) state not exercising legitimate or de
152 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 9, p. 264: “[W]henever [public] officials with the
intent that certain crimes be committed, knowingly or intentionally fail to carry out their
duties to enforce criminal laws equally and fairly [. . .] then such public officials are criminally
accountable for the conduct of others”. However, it must be noted that the issue at
hand is not the criminal responsibility of the individuals who tolerate the attack but the
question of whether a policy can consist in the mere toleration of crimes.
153 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 552.
154 Ibid., para. 555.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 33
facto power in a certain territory cannot, in general, be considered under a
legal obligation to halt human rights violations in this territory.
A final issue which must be considered is the complicated wording of
the Elements of Crimes for the ICC. The third paragraph of the Introduction
to the Elements concerning article 7 reads: “It is understood
that ‘policy to commit such attack’ requires that the State or organisation
actively promote or encourage such an attack against a civilian
population”.155 This statement contradicts the result of the above analysis,
that a policy can be implemented by mere toleration. However, a footnote
attached to this sentence provides: “A policy which has a civilian
population as the object of the attack would be implemented by State or
organizational action. Such a policy may, in exceptional circumstances, be
implemented by a deliberate failure to take action, which is consciously
aimed at encouraging such attack. The existence of such a policy cannot be
inferred solely from the absence of governmental or organisational action”
(emphasis added).
The text of the Element and the footnote obviously contradict each
other. Whereas the Element requires active conduct with regard to the
attack the footnote provides that failure to take action may suffice as well.
This lack of clarity – the result of a compromise achieved during the
Fourth Session (13 to 31 March 2000) of the Preparatory Commission
(“PrepCom”) – is not resolved by the qualification that inactivity may
suffice only in “exceptional circumstances”.
However, even if the limitation (“actively promote or encourage”) is
not invalidated by the contradictory footnote, it cannot vitiate our analysis,
since in any case it has no legal effect. First, the ICC itself is not bound
by the formulation in the Elements of Crimes because it is inconsistent
with the Statute and therefore legally void.156 It has been argued above
that a policy with respect to a widespread but not, at the same time,
systematic attack can only consist in the deliberate denial of protection
against a widespread attack, i.e., in inaction on the part of the responsible
state or organisation. The Rome Statute, like section 5.1 of Regulation
15/2000 and customary international law, clearly provides for widespread
and systematic in the alternative. To require an active policy for crimes
against humanity, however, would amount to deleting the “widespread”
alternative from the Statute.157 Second, the problematic Element need not
155 Elements of Crimes, supra note 79 (emphasis added).
156 Article 9 reads: “1. Elements of Crimes shall assist the Court in the interpretation and
application of articles 6, 7 and 8 [. . .] 3. The Elements of Crimes and amendments thereto
shall be consistent with this Statute” (emphasis added).
157 Darryl Robinson, supra note 67, pp. 50–51, is of the opinion that a systematic attack,
as codified in the Rome Statute, requires a very high degree of organisation. However,
34 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
be followed by the Serious Crimes Panel because, in addition to the reasons
given above, it is not bound by the decisions of the PrepCom but only by
Regulation 15/2000 and customary international law (in this regard article
10 of the Rome Statute explicitly provides that customary international law
shall not be influenced “in any way” by the formulation of the crimes in
Part 1 of the Statute).
In conclusion, both a systematic and a widespread attack require some
kind of link with a state or a de facto power in a certain territory by means
of the policy of this entity. The policy in the case of a systematic attack
would be to provide at least certain guidance regarding the prospective
victims in order to coordinate the activities of the single perpetrators. A
systematic attack thus requires active conduct from the side of the entity
behind the policy. However, extensive or repeated activity is not required.
Rather, what counts is whether the conduct suffices to trigger and direct
the attack. Thus, for example, the identification of possible victims by the
authorities and an (implicit or explicit) announcement of impunity would
be sufficient.
A widespread attack which is not at the same time systematic must be
one that lacks any guidance or organisation. The policy behind such an
attack may be one of mere deliberate inaction (toleration). Such a policy,
however, can only exist if the entity in question is able and, moreover,
legally obligated to intervene.158
e. The Individual Act and the Context Element
The relation between the individual act and the context element is largely
a subjective one and will be discussed below. However, the wording of
the context element in the ICTY Statute also gives rise to the question
of the objective relationship between the conduct of the single perpetrator
and the context. The relevant passage of the chapeau of article 5
in support of this view he adduces the Akayesu formula, rejected above. In fact, any
multiplicity of crimes which is centrally organised must be considered a systematic attack,
regardless of the degree of organisation. This is because a systematic attack requires fewer
victims than a widespread attack. For example, if in a period of several years a few hundred
people in a large country were killed, this would hardly qualify as a widespread attack.
If, however all of the victims belonged to a small community of homosexuals, and state
officials had made known that they have no intention of prosecuting any crimes committed
against these homosexuals, the crimes amount clearly to a systematic attack. However all
the organisation required for the attack is the selection of the victims and the announcement
of impunity.
158 Members of governments which implement a policy by tolerance may be responsible
themselves under the doctrine of command responsibility, see Kai Ambos, Superior
Responsibility (Art. 28), in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE ICC: A COMMENTARY
812–813, 836–839 (Antonio Cassese et al., eds., 2002).
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 35
provides that a person is responsible “for the following crimes when
committed in armed conflict [. . .] and directed against any civilian population”
(emphasis added). This formulation (specifically the “and”) – if taken
literally – could be read to require that the perpetrator personally must
direct the crime against a civilian population (i.e., not only one or a few
single victims) and, thus, commit a multiplicity of acts.
However, as early as 1996, Trial Chamber I of the ICTY decided
that “as long as there is a link with the widespread or systematic attack
against any civilian population, a single act could qualify as a crime against
humanity”.159 This has become the invariable practice of both Tribunals.160
It was reformulated in the clearest possible way in Kunarac: “The underlying
offence does not need to constitute the attack but only to form a part
of the attack”.161
The wording of both the chapeau of article 3 of the ICTR Statute and
article 7(1) of the Rome Statute leaves no doubt about the relationship
between the single crime and the context element: they provide that the
enumerated criminal acts must be “committed as part of a widespread
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population” (emphasis
added).
Unfortunately, the wording of the chapeau of section 5.1 of Regulation
15/2000 combines the formulation of the Rome Statute and the ICTY
Statute in such a way as to require that the single act be “committed
as part of a widespread or systematic attack and directed against any
civilian population” (emphasis added). In effect, the “and” of the ICTY
Statute is inserted into the formulation of the Rome Statute. The outcome
is confusing for two reasons. First, the language, if taken literally, would
separate the attack from its very object, namely the civilian population,
suggesting that both are two different concepts. Secondly, for the same
reasons as in the case of the ICTY Statute, section 5.1 seems to provide
that a single criminal act by a perpetrator does not suffice for criminal
responsibility for crimes against humanity to be incurred.162 Bergsmo163
reports that the change of the wording in section 5.1 was not intended
by the drafters but is simply an error and recommends that it should be
corrected, deleting the word “and”. To follow this recommendation would
159 Prosecutor v. Mrksic, supra note 110, para. 30.
160 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 649; Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 74,
para. 135; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 550; Prosecutor v. Kunarac,
supra note 81, para. 417; Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 178; Prosecutor v.
Bagilishema, supra note 81, para. 82.
161 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 81, para. 417.
162 Morten Bergsmo, supra note 3, pp. 1–2.
163 Ibid.
36 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
help to avoid confusion, simplify the argumentation of both the prosecution
and the Court and, thus, save resources. In any case, section 5.1
must be applied in such a corrected form because the “new” – verbatim
– meaning would be in contradiction with customary international law and
nonsensical.
With regard to the nature of the link between the enumerated inhumane
criminal act and the attack, Kayishema requires that “[t]he crimes [. . .]
must form part of [. . .] an attack”.164 And the Kunarac Chamber held: “It is
sufficient to show that the act took place in the context of an accumulation
of acts of violence which, individually, may vary greatly in nature and
gravity”.165
A more precise definition of the required link between the act and the
attack may be derived from the rationale of crimes against humanity. It
consists in the protection against the particular dangers of multiple crimes
supported or unopposed by the authorities. If the dangerousness of an
individual criminal is increased because his or her conduct occurs in such
a context the act must be regarded objectively as a part of the attack. For
example, a person who, because of the attack and the policy behind it,
could not turn to the police for help suffers the specific risk created by the
attack. If this person is killed, the killing is part of the attack. On the other
hand, a person who is killed in the course of an ordinary burglary is not
a victim of crimes against humanity if the police would have been willing
to protect the person (but arrived too late). Such a person suffers only the
general risk to become a crime victim but not the special risk created by
the attack. Thus, an adequate test to determine whether a certain act was
part of the attack is to ask whether the act would have been less dangerous
for the victim if the attack and the policy had not existed.
f. Knowledge of the Attack
Section 5.1 of Regulation 15/2000 requires that the perpetrator has “knowledge
of the attack”. The exact meaning of this term is not easily determined
since both the meaning of “knowledge” and the question how much the
perpetrator must “know” pose complicated questions.
In general, a person incurs criminal responsibility for a certain
(objective) conduct only if a mental element with respect to this conduct
exists (actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea166). With regard to the
164 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 74, para. 135.
165 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 81, para. 419.
166 “An act does not make a culprit unless the mind is culpable as well”. It may be
noted that this phrase equates mental element and culpability; however, modern civil
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 37
commission of international crimes mere negligence is in most cases insufficient.
These crimes require a state of mind which in civil law jurisdictions
is referred to as dolus or intent.167 Dolus exists in the following forms:
dolus directus first degree (also called dolus directus), dolus directus
second degree (or dolus indirectus) and dolus eventualis. The corresponding
forms of mental states in Anglo-American law are described
by the Model Penal Code168 as purpose, knowledge and recklessness.169
Purpose and knowledge are similar to dolus directus first and second
degree. Recklessness, however, while similar to dolus eventualis, appears
to cover a wider range of mental states than dolus eventualis.170
The Blaskic Trial Chamber rendered a complete definition of the three
degrees of intent when dealing with the subjective side of the context
element. Quoting a definition from a Belgian textbook,171 the Chamber
held that there is “intent” or “direct malicious intent” if “the agent seeks
to commit the sanctioned act which is either his objective or at least the
method of achieving his objective”; there is “indirect malicious intent” if
“the agent did not deliberately seek the outcome but knew that it would be
the result”; and there is “recklessness” if “the outcome is foreseen by the
perpetrator as only a probable or possible consequence”.172
However, Blaskic does not equate the term “knowledge” with what the
Chamber calls indirect malicious intent. Applying the definition of another
law jurisdictions, in principle, distinguish between mental elements and culpability; cf.
HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK & THOMAS WEIGEND, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS.
ALLGEMEINER TEIL 430 (5th ed., 1996).
167 Note, however, that the term “intent” is also used, in a narrower sense, to denote only
the highest degree of dolus or intent in a broader sense; namely dolus directus first degree,
as defined below.
168 American Law Institute Model Penal Code. Official Draft, 1962, reprinted in
SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS 1127–1192 (6th ed., 1995).
169 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 227 (3rd ed., 2000).
170 According to German legal doctrine, a perpetrator acts with dolus eventualis if two
conditions are fulfilled. Firstly he or she must consider the prohibited result (e.g., a death)
as a possible but not certain effect of his or her conduct. Secondly he or she must accept or
approve of the forbidden result, or – in other words – if he or she hopes that, despite
the risk, the prohibited result will not occur her mental state is not regarded as dolus
eventualis but as conscious negligence. Kai Ambos, General Principles of Criminal Law
in the Rome Statute, 10 CRIM. L. FORUM 1, 21 (1999), with further references; Hans-
Heinrich Jescheck & Thomas Weigend, supra note 166, pp. 299–301. As Anglo-American
law requires only the first of both named elements for recklessness, Wayne R. LaFave,
supra note 169, p. 254, this definition is wider than dolus eventualis.
171 CHRISTIANE HENNAU & JACQUES VERHAEGEN, DROIT P ´ENAL G´EN ´ERAL (1991).
172 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 254 (footnotes omitted).
38 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
text book,173 the judges opined that “knowledge also includes the conduct
‘of a person taking a deliberate risk in the hope that the risk does not cause
injury’ ”.174 This finding was repeated in Kunarac.175 It is also compatible
with the German doctrine according to which all three forms of mental
state mentioned above require a volitional and an intellectual element.176
The intellectual element requires that the perpetrator has certain (dolus
directus second degree) or at least uncertain (dolus directus first degree
and dolus eventualis) knowledge that the prohibited result will occur or
the circumstance exists.
In the jurisprudence of the Tribunals there is no dispute that, with regard
to the context element, dolus directus first degree (intent in the narrower
sense, purpose) is not required, i.e., the perpetrator need not seek to participate
in the attack.177 All decisions agree that knowledge is sufficient and
most even expressly include “constructive knowledge”.178 Constructive
knowledge, though, is an inherently unclear concept.179 It was first used
in Tadic where, however, the Chamber introduced it for the first time in
the summary180 of its deliberations concerning the necessary mental state
regarding the context element. The Chamber did not make clear to which
of the various qualifications of the concept of knowledge in the judgment
the term “constructive knowledge” refers. Most probably it was referring to
a quotation from the Canadian Finta case181 holding that wilful blindness
with regard to the context is sufficient.182 A perpetrator is wilfully blind
if he or she wishes to remain ignorant and therefore does not engage in
173 FRANCIS LE GUNEHEC, LE NOUVEAU CODE P ´ENAL ILLUSTR´E (1996).
174 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 254 (footnotes omitted).
175 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 81, para. 434.
176 Hans-Heinrich Jescheck & Thomas Weigend, supra note 166, p. 293.
177 This is stated explicitly in Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra not 68, para. 251. No (other)
decision of the ad hoc tribunals requires dolus directus first degree or an analogous state
of mind.
178 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, paras. 656–659; Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 50,
para. 248 (does not mention constructive knowledge); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra
note 74, paras. 133–134; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, supra note 71, para. 71; Prosecutor v.
Kupreskic, supra note 14, paras. 556–557; Prosecutor v. Musema, supra note 72, para. 206;
Prosecutor v. Ruggiu (Case no. ICTR-97-32-I), Judgment and Sentence, 1 June 2000,
para. 20; Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 185.
179 Wayne R. LaFave, supra note 169, pp. 237–238.
180 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 659.
181 R. v. Finta, supra note 32.
182 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 657; Simon Chesterman, supra note 101, also
seems to think that the judges used the term “constructive knowledge’ synonymously with
“wilful blindness”.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 39
further inquiry.183 As LaFave explains, the concept is very closely linked to
a provision in the Model Penal Code which provides that knowledge of the
existence of a fact can be equated with the awareness of a high probability
of the existence of a fact.184 This concept – in turn – is close to dolus
eventualis and even recklessness, which both require that the perpetrator
be aware of a risk, i.e., aware of a probability that a circumstance exists or
a result will occur.
Therefore, the clear and also practical definition of knowledge given
in Blaskic, namely that the term “knowledge” includes knowledge of a
risk, is not in contradiction with other decisions but a useful clarification
of the obscure concept of constructive knowledge. To summarise, under
customary international law, a perpetrator has knowledge of the attack if
he or she is aware of the risk that his or her conduct is objectively part of a
broader attack.
The customary law standard which is required by the Tribunals may
be inapplicable under Regulation 15/2000. Section 18.3 of Regulation
15/2000 (which is very similar to article 30 of the Rome Statute)185 defines
“knowledge” as follows:
18.3. For the purposes of the present Section, “knowledge” means awareness that a circumstance
exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. “Know” and
“knowingly” shall be construed accordingly.
Under this standard awareness of a mere risk would not be sufficient.186
However, it is clear that the mental standard of section 18 has been
replaced by the more specific requirement in section 5.1, namely “knowledge
of the attack” (lex specialis derogat legi generali). On the other hand,
section 5.1 does not provide a definition for “knowledge”. Therefore, the
question arises whether the term “knowledge of the attack” in section 5.1
must be interpreted in line with the narrow requirements of section 18.3
or according to the broader customary international law applied by the ad
hoc Tribunals. Two reasons support the latter approach: first, the definition
of knowledge in section 18 is expressly given only “[f]or the purposes of
the present Section”. Second, the general introduction to the Elements of
183 Wayne R. LaFave, supra note 169, p. 232.
184 Ibid., quoting Model Penal Code, supra note 168, s. 2.02(2)(b)(ii). Moreover it has
been noted that the concept of knowledge in United States law is close to the concept
of dolus eventualis, NIKLAUS SCHMID, STRAFVERFAHREN UND STRAFRECHT IN DEN
VEREINIGTEN STAATEN. EINE EINFÜHRUNG 184 (2nd ed., 1993).
185 For a detailed analysis of articles 30 and 32 see: KAI AMBOS, DER ALLGEMEINE
TEIL EINES VÖLKERSTRAFRECHTS. ANSÄTZE EINER DOGMATISIERUNG, at 757 et seq.
(2002).
186 Kai Ambos, supra note 170, pp. 21–22.
40 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
Crimes for the ICC explains: “Where no reference is made in the Elements
of Crimes to a mental element [. . .] it is understood that the relevant mental
element [. . .] set out in article 30 [of the Rome Statute] applies” (emphasis
added).187 However, knowledge of the attack is mentioned separately in
the Elements for each of the enumerated criminal acts of crimes against
humanity. It appears, therefore, that the drafters of the Elements of Crimes
considered knowledge of the attack to be a standard independent of the
general provision in article 30 of the Rome Statute which is equivalent to
section 18 of Regulation 15/2000. Consequently, the knowledge requirement
in the chapeau of section 5.1 must be interpreted in accordance with
the customary international law requirement of knowledge as developed
above.
The drafters of the Elements perceived a particular problem in cases
where the perpetrator commits his or her crimes at the very beginning of
the attack, i.e., at a time where still too few crimes have been committed to
reach the threshold necessary for a widespread or systematic attack. The
Elements of Crimes provide that in such a situation it is sufficient that the
perpetrator intends “to further such an attack”,188 or intends “the conduct
to be part of a[n . . .] attack”. The drafters obviously intended that in such
situations the requirement of knowledge should be replaced by the perpetrator’s
desire to bring about the relevant facts. It is worth while pointing out
that the concept of knowledge developed by the ad hoc Tribunals makes
this clause superfluous189 since according to the Tribunals it is sufficient
that the perpetrator be aware of the risk that his or her conduct is (or will
become) part of an attack.
In summary, “knowledge of the attack” in section 5.1 of Regulation
15/2000 must be interpreted as requiring (only) awareness of the risk that
the conduct be objectively part of a broader attack. A recklessness or dolus
eventualis standard is thus sufficient with regard to the context element.
(However, it is important to note that this is not the case with respect to the
single inhumane act, where section 18 remains fully applicable.)
The ad hoc Tribunals have agreed that the perpetrator must know of
both the attack and the link which renders the individual criminal act part
of the attack.190 As the Tadic Trial Chamber held: “[T]he perpetrator must
187 Elements of Crimes, supra note 79, general introduction, para. (2).
188 Ibid., introduction to the Elements of article 7(2).
189 In any case, every crime which can be committed with dolus directus second degree
can, in general, also be committed with dolus directus first degree.
190 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 659; Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 74,
para. 133; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, supra note 71, para. 171; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic,
supra note 14, para. 557 (citing Prosecutor v. Kayishema); Prosecutor v. Musema, supra
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 41
know that there is an attack on the civilian population [and] know that
his act fits in with the attack”.191 The language of this and other rulings
suggests that the perpetrator need not have detailed knowledge of the
particularities of the attack but simply be aware (of the risk) that an attack
exists. This view is confirmed by Kunarac which noted that the knowledge
requirement does not “entail knowledge of the details of the attack”.192
Moreover, the Elements of Crimes provide that no proof is required “that
the perpetrator had knowledge of all characteristics of the attack or the
precise details of the plan or policy of the State or organisation”.193
Indeed, such an interpretation of the knowledge element is also in
accordance with the rationale of crimes against humanity. For the particular
dangerousness of crimes against humanity a crime need not be
perpetrated with knowledge of details of a widespread or systematic attack
(e.g., the number of attacks, perpetrators or victims). It is sufficient that the
perpetrator knows the facts related to the attack which increase the dangerousness
of his or her conduct or which render this conduct a contribution
to the crimes of others. Thus it is sufficient, for example, if the perpetrator
understands that his or her act is part of a collective criminal conduct which
renders the victims more vulnerable. Moreover he or she may also hope
that the collective nature of the crimes will provide impunity.
The same holds true with regard to the increased culpability of a perpetrator
of crimes against humanity.194 It is sufficient that he or she knows that
an attack exists and is thus able to understand that his or her conduct is
much more serious than the same conduct would be if committed outside
the context of a widespread or systematic attack.
In conclusion, the perpetrator must only be aware of the risk that an
attack exists and the risk that certain circumstances of the attack render his
or her conduct more dangerous than if the attack did not exist or that the
conduct creates the atmosphere for other crimes. Knowledge of details is
not required.
note 72, para. 206; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 244; Prosecutor v. Ruggiu,
supra note 178, para. 20; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 81, para. 434; Prosecutor v.
Kordic, supra note 52, para. 185.
191 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 659.
192 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 81, para. 434.
193 Elements of Crimes, supra note 79, introduction to the Elements of article 7(2).
194 Margaret McAuliffe de Guzman, supra note 13, p. 380; Prosecutor v. Kayishema,
supra note 74, para. 134, noting that it is necessary that the perpetrator knew of the attack in
order to be culpable; quoted in Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 249; Prosecutor
v. Ruggiu, supra note 178, para. 20.
42 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
Another question is whether the perpetrator must know only of the
attack or also of the policy behind the attack. McAuliffe de Guzman
notes that the wording of article 7(1) of the Rome Statute merely requires
“knowledge of the attack”.195 She, therefore, argues that the perpetrator
need not know about the exact content of the attack (but merely of its
existence) to incur culpability for crimes against humanity. As, in her view,
the policy is a mere detail of the attack, she concludes that the perpetrator
need not know of the existence of the policy.
Indeed, the question is whether the policy element must be considered
among the details of the attack which the perpetrator need not know or
whether it is a distinct material element of crimes against humanity. In the
latter case the doctrine of actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea applies,
and the same dolus is required as for the attack.
The point has already been made that the policy element is necessary to
distinguish crimes against humanity from ordinary crimes and moreover
to safeguard the link of crimes against humanity with human rights violations.
Therefore it is an indispensable material element of crimes against
humanity which is distinct from the attack. Consequently, a perpetrator
who does not know of this element, does not know all the necessary facts
to incur culpability for crimes against humanity. On the other hand, as
noted above, the perpetrator need not be absolutely sure: it is sufficient to
be aware of a risk that a policy exists. The offender need not know details
of the policy.
The decisions of the Tribunals come to the same conclusion.
Kayishema, without giving further reasons, requires that the “accused must
know that his act(s) is part of a widespread or systematic attack on a
civilian population and pursuant to some kind of policy or plan” (emphasis
added).196 This holding has been repeated by virtually all judgments
dealing with the matter.197
195 Margaret McAuliffe de Guzman, supra note 13, p. 380.
196 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 74, para. 134.
197 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, supra note 71, para. 71; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra
note 14, para. 556; Prosecutor v. Musema, supra note 72, para. 206; Prosecutor v. Blaskic,
supra note 68, para. 249; Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, supra note 178, para. 20; Prosecutor v.
Kordic, supra note 52, para. 185.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 43
II. THE INDIVIDUAL INHUMANE ACTS
1. The Mental State Required with Regard to The Individual Criminal
Acts
Section 18 of Regulation 15/2000 is reasonably clear with regard to the
required mental elements. The perpetrator must mean to engage in a certain
conduct (s. 18(2)(a)), he or she must mean to bring about the criminalised
consequence (e.g., a death) or be aware that it will occur in the ordinary
course of events and must be aware that necessary circumstances exist
(e.g., that the torture victim is under his or her control). As has been argued
above, section 18 does not apply to the perpetrator’s knowledge of the
(widespread or systematic) attack.
Where awareness is required that the consequence will occur in the
ordinary course of events or that a circumstance exists (s. 18(2)(b) and
(3)), it is not sufficient that the person consider the occurrence of the
consequence to be a mere possibility.198 This must be emphasised for the
following reasoning: as one can never be absolutely sure what happens
in the future (the perpetrator’s grenade may fail to explode), the highest
possible certainty with regard to future events is the one described in
section 18(2)(b) and (3), namely that the consequence will (not “may”)
occur “in the ordinary course of events”. Thus, the phrase “in the ordinary
course of events” cannot be read in such a way as to include mere possibilities
where the perpetrator is not sure whether the result will occur,
even if everything goes normally. Consequently, under Regulation 15/2000
recklessness or dolus eventualis are not sufficient.199
There has been much discussion as to whether crimes against humanity
can only be committed if the perpetrator acts with a discriminatory intent.
The Tadic Trial Chamber doubted whether discriminatory intent was an
indispensable requirement for crimes against humanity because it had not
been included in the ICTY Statute and for other reasons. However, the
Chamber felt forced to require discriminatory intent because the Report
198 Kai Ambos, supra note 170, pp. 21–22. See, however, the wider interpretation of
the term awareness of Donald Piragoff, Article 30, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE, supra note 80, margin no. 25–27.
199 The same view is taken by the German expert working group which prepared
the German Draft Code on International Crimes: ENTWURF EINES GESETZES
ZUR EINFÜHRUNG DES VÖLKERSTRAFGESETZBUCHES 31(2001), available at
<http://www.bmj.bund.de/images/10185.pdf>. For translations of the official govt.
draft in all United Nations languages see <www.iuscrim.mpg.de/forsch/online_pub.html
#legaltext>.
44 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
of the Secretary General on the establishment of the ICTY200 and some
members of the Security Council considered it necessary.201 This holding
was criticised in the literature202 and was reversed by the Tadic appeal
decision:
The ordinary meaning of Article 5 makes it clear that this provision does not require
all crimes against humanity to have been perpetrated with a discriminatory intent. Such
intent is only made necessary for one sub-category of those crimes, namely “persecutions”
provided for in Article 5 (h).
Moreover, the Appeals Chamber contended that an interpretation in
the light of the humanitarian goals of the drafters203 and a review of the
relevant state practice led to the same result.204 This holding has become
the ICTY’s invariable practice.205
With regard to the ICTR, the problem is more difficult. The chapeau
of article 3 of the ICTR Statute expressly requires that the crimes
be “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against
any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious
grounds” (emphasis added). The judges of the ICTR have taken notice
of the Tadic appeal but have held that the wording of their Statute forces
them to require discriminatory intent for the commission of crimes against
humanity.206 Recently, the Akayesu appeals decision207 and the Bagilishema
trial judgment have ruled that “the qualifier ‘on national, political,
ethnic, racial or religious grounds’, which is peculiar to the ICTR Statute
should, as a matter of construction, be read as a characterisation of the
nature of the ‘attack’ rather than of the mens rea of the perpetrator”.208
This opinion was explained: “Had the drafters of the Statute sought to
characterise the individual actor’s intent as discriminatory, they would have
inserted the relevant phrase immediately after the word ‘committed’, or
they would have used punctuation to set aside the intervening description
of the attack”.209
200 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 44, para. 48.
201 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 652.
202 Margaret McAuliffe de Guzman, supra note 13, pp. 364-368.
203 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 50, para. 284.
204 Ibid., paras. 288–292.
205 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 558; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra
note 68, para. 260; Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 186.
206 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, supra note 71, paras. 75–76.
207 Prosecutor v. Akayesu (Case no. ICTR-96-4-A), Judgment, 1 June 2001, para. 469,
cited after Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, supra note 81, para. 81, fn. 80 (the English text of
the decision is not yet available).
208 Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, supra note 81, para. 81.
209 Ibid., fn. 79.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 45
Thus, it may be stated that the current law of crimes against humanity
– with the exception of persecution – does not require any discriminatory
intent.
The last matter with regard to the mental elements of crimes against
humanity is the question of whether the motives of the perpetrator are of
importance. The Tadic Trial Chamber held: “[W]hile personal motives may
be present they should not be the sole motivation for the act”.210 And:
“[T]he act must not be taken for purely personal reasons unrelated to the
armed conflict”.211
This holding, like the Tadic Chamber’s opinion on discriminatory
motives, was quashed by the Appeals Chamber, which, after thorough
consideration concluded: “[T]he relevant case-law and the spirit of international
rules concerning crimes against humanity make it clear that
under customary law, ‘purely personal motives’ do not acquire any relevance
for establishing whether or not a crime against humanity has been
perpetrated”.212 All subsequent decisions of the ICTY dealing with crimes
against humanity as well as the most recent decision of the ICTR have
followed this view.213
Only Kayishema held: “The elements of the attack effectively exclude
from crimes against humanity, acts carried out for purely personal motives
and those outside of a broader policy or plan”.214 However, this ruling
must be considered erroneous for two reasons. First, it deduces the exclusion
of personal motives from the discriminatory intent which it wrongly
considers necessary. Second, even if a discriminatory intent were required
this would not exclude that the perpetrator acted for purely personal
reasons. The Tadic Appeals Chamber gave an example in which “a highranking
SS official [. . .] claims that he participated in the genocide of the
Jews and Gypsies for the ‘purely personal’ reason that he had a deepseated
hatred of Jews and Gypsies and wished to exterminate them, and
for no other reason”.215 This example shows that discriminatory intent does
not exclude personal motives. Consequently the Tadic Appeals Chamber
revised the Trial Chamber.216 Personal motives are irrelevant with regard
to the elements of crimes against humanity.
210 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 658.
211 Ibid.
212 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 50, para. 270.
213 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 558 (noting that the issue was “free
from dispute”); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 81, para. 433; Prosecutor v. Kordic,
supra note 52, para. 187; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, supra note 81, para. 95.
214 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 74, para 122.
215 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 50, para. 269.
216 Ibid.
46 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
2. Murder (s. 5.1(a))
Section 5.1(a) of Regulation 15/2000 provides that murder is one of the
inhumane acts which may amount to a crime against humanity. The section
reiterates article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute.217 Therefore, provisions
which assist in the interpretation of article 7 should also be applicable in
the interpretation of section 5. The core elements of article 7(1)(a) have
been articulated in the Elements of Crimes. In relation to murder as a crime
against humanity, the Elements of article 7(1)(a) provide only (and not
very helpfully) that in addition to proof of core elements of a crime against
humanity (namely, the context element), murder requires that the perpetrator
kill218 one or more persons. This absence of a specific definition of
the elements of murder as a crime against humanity in article 7(1)(a) or
elsewhere has the result that reliance has to be placed on other provisions
of Regulation 15/2000 (and the Rome Statute) and the general sources
of international law219 in order to ascertain these requirements, including
particularly the requisite state of mind of the accused.
Murder is one of the crimes defined in article 6(c) of the Nuremberg
Charter as a crime against humanity. These crimes constituted crimes in
the world’s major criminal law systems prior to adoption of the Charter
in 1945220 and have been replicated in the primary formulations of crimes
against humanity that have been developed since Nuremberg, i.e., article 5
of the ICTY Statute, article 3 of the ICTR Statute and article 7 of the
Rome Statute.221 These crimes can be deemed to be “general principles of
217 The mutuality of the two provisions is noted by Linton, supra note 88, p. 10.
218 The first Element to article 7(1)(a) provides: “For the purposes of this definition the
term ‘killed’ is interchangeable with the term ‘caused death’. This footnote applies to all
elements which use either of these concepts”.
219 This issue is not addressed at length here. In summary, article 21 of the Rome Statute
(followed, but not in identical terms, in section 3 of Reg. 15/2000) establishes a hierarchy
for the applicable law for interpretation of the Statute. The absence however of a definition
of murder in the Rome Statute and in Regulation 15/2000 (as well as the other international
instruments relating to murder as a crime against humanity) has the result that, in order to
define murder, resort must be had, inter alia, to decisions of international tribunals and the
common elements of the crime of murder in different legal systems.
220 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 9, 293. The methodology by which this is established
is set out at 294–300. For analysis of the main characteristics of relevant provisions of
national penal codes of the world’s major legal systems see similarly Günter Heine &
Hans Vest, supra note 64, pp. 176 et seq., esp. at p. 195.
221 See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 9, p. 290; Olivia Swaak-Goldman, supra
note 16, pp. 148 et seq., in relation to the codification and evolution of article 6(c) in
customary international law. Article 6(c) was also replicated in article 5(c) of the Tokyo
Charter (Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East of 1946, reproduced
in BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, 1 DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: THE SEARCH
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 47
law”.222 The ILC has acknowledged that “murder is a crime that is clearly
understood and well defined in the national law of every State”.223 This
prohibited act does not require any further explanation.
According to the customary practice of states, murder – if understood
as the umbrella term for all provisions which criminalise the taking of
a life – is not merely intentional killing without lawful justification (i.e.,
without the legal justifications, excuses and defenses known to the world’s
major legal systems) but rather is more broadly defined in its “largo sensu”
meaning as the creation of life-endangering conditions likely to result in
death according to reasonable human experience.224 Bassiouni concludes
that given this broad definition of murder in the world’s major criminal
justice systems, murder as intended in article 6(c) (and a fortiori in the
clauses in other instruments that are framed in the same terms) includes a
closely related form of unintentional but foreseeable death that in common
law systems is called “manslaughter”,225 and in the Romanist-Civilist-
Germanic systems is homicide with dolus (Vorsatz) and homicide with
culpa (Fahrlässigkeit).226
Within the international law of murder (and generally in international
criminal law) developed by the ad hoc Tribunals, murder has been classified
according to the common law conception of a crime based on core
criteria of actus reus and mens rea. This approach to the conception of
criminal acts within international law was approved in Celebici which
noted that, “while the terminology utilised varies, these two elements
have been described as ‘universal and persistent in mature systems of
FOR WORLD PEACE 522–527 (1975)) and article II(1)(c) of CCL 10, and both of these
instruments are in the same or similar terms as article 6(c) and certainly refer to the same
offences as article 6(c).
222 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 9, p. 300. See also Olivia Swaak-Goldman, supra
note 16, pp. 143 et seq.
223 1996 Draft Code, supra note 37, article 18(7). Noted in Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra
note 14, para. 821; endorsed in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 63, para. 587.
224 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 9, pp. 300–302. The phrase “according to reasonable
human experience” has the same meaning as “. . . according to the known or foreseeable
expectations of a reasonable person in the same circumstances” which Bassiouni uses in his
discussion of this issue. The definition of murder noted here is “the widespread common
understanding of the meaning of murder” and arises “notwithstanding the technical differences
in the definitions of various forms of intentional and unintentional killing in the
world’s major criminal justice systems”.
225 Ibid. (in both of its common law forms, i.e., voluntary and involuntary manslaughter).
226 Ibid. This definition allows an examination of motive, which is important in order to
link the offence with prerequisite legal elements of carrying out the “state action or policy”
(the nexus that establishes murder as an international crime). This extended definition is
particularly relevant to “extermination”, i.e., murder on a large scale.
48 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
law’ ”.227 Murder has been summarily defined by the ad hoc Tribunals
as the unlawful, intentional killing of a human being.228 Their case law
has considered the following as necessary elements of murder as a crime
against humanity:229
• The victim must be dead.230
• In relation to homicide of all natures the actus reus is the death of the
victim as the result of the unlawful acts or omissions by the accused231
or a subordinate.232
• The conduct of the accused or a subordinate must be a substantial
cause of the death of the victim.233
• At the time of the killing the accused or a subordinate had the intention
to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased having
known that such bodily harm is likely to cause the victim’s death, and
is reckless as to whether death ensues or not (mens rea).234
While the ICTY and ICTR have not considered the actus reus element
of the definition to be controversial, the mens rea element has been
extended and extensively discussed. In Kupreskic, purporting to follow
Akayesu, it was held that the requisite mens rea for murder as a crime
against humanity is the intent to kill or the intent to inflict serious injury
in reckless disregard of human life.235 An indication of the meaning of
227 Prosecutor v. Delalic et al. (Case no. IT-96-21-T), Judgment, 16 November 1998,
paras. 473–474, at footnote 433 noting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
The Chamber apparently overlooks the main alternative conception which would be based
on the Roman-Germanic conception: Tatbestand, Rechtswidrigkeit und Schuld.
228 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 63, para. 589 followed in Prosecutor v. Rutaganda,
supra note 71, para. 80 and Prosecutor v. Musema, supra note 72, para. 215.
229 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 63, para. 589, approved in Prosecutor v. Kupreskic,
supra note 14, para. 560, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 217, Prosecutor v.
Rutaganda, supra note 71, para. 80 and Prosecutor v. Musema, supra note 72, para. 215.
230 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 63, para. 589.
231 Prosecutor v. Delalic, supra note 227, para. 424.
232 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 63, para. 589. However, this issue is better
dealt with in connection with individual responsibility and, more specifically, command
responsibility; see Simon Chesterman, supra note 101, p. 331.
233 Prosecutor v. Delalic, supra note 227, para. 424. Followed in Prosecutor v. Blaskic,
supra note 68, para. 153 and in Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 229 in relation to
wilful killing (ICTY Statute, art. 2), adding that for the purposes of this article the victim
must be a “protected person”, and at para. 230 in relation to murder (ICTY Statute, art. 3)
noting that the offence is against a person “taking no active part in the hostilities”.
234 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 63, para. 589; Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al. (Case
no. IT-98-30/1-T), Judgment, 2 November 2001, para. 132.
235 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 561.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 49
“reckless disregard of human life” is provided in Blaskic. In confirming
that the intent, or mens rea, needed to establish the offence of wilful killing
exists once it has been demonstrated that the accused intended to cause
death or serious bodily injury, the Trial Chamber added “which, as it is
reasonable to assume, he had to understand was likely to lead to death”.236
The Chamber considered that “recklessness” is a concept “which may be
likened to serious criminal negligence”.237
In Blaskic, the Trial Chamber considered further that the accused must
have acted “in the reasonable knowledge that the attack was likely to
result in death”.238 This phrase was followed in Kordic. Here the Trial
Chamber held that mens rea would be satisfied if, in addition to the accused
intending to kill the victim, or to cause grievous bodily harm, he or she
also intended to inflict serious injury in the reasonable knowledge that the
attack was likely to result in death.239
The formulation of the mens rea for murder as a crime against humanity
in Kupreskic, Blaskic and Kordic is analogous to the definition of mens rea
as stated in Celebici240 in which the issue was the necessary intent required
to establish the crimes of wilful killing and murder as war crimes within
the Geneva Conventions. The Trial Chamber held that mens rea is present
where an intention is demonstrated on the part of the accused to kill or
inflict serious injury in reckless disregard of human life.241 The use of the
same formula for the requirement of mens rea in Kupreskic and Celebici
is striking and demonstrates the willingness of the ICTY at least to treat
236 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 153. This specific requirement is in
addition to the general requirement of proof for the general elements of article 2.
237 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 152. For the reasons noted below, this
comment is applicable to the mens rea for murder as a crime against humanity although the
context of this comment is article 2 of the ICTY Statute. Thus the mens rea constituting all
the violations of article 2 of the Statute includes both guilty intent and recklessness which
may be likened to serious criminal negligence.
238 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 217.
239 Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 236; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra
note 14, paras. 560–561; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 217; Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, supra note 63, para. 589.
240 Prosecutor v. Delalic, supra note 227, para. 439.
241 In formulating this definition, the Trial Chamber emphasised (Prosecutor v. Delalic,
supra note 227, paras. 431 and 438) the importance of considering the nature and purpose
of the prohibition contained in the Geneva Conventions and relevant principles of interpretation
of the Statute and Rules (of the ICTY) which requires taking into account the objects
of the Statute and the social and political considerations which give rise to its creation (see
paras. 160 ff., especially para. 170). This decision as to the requirement of wilful killing
was followed in Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 229.
50 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
murder and wilful killing as the same offences whether they are crimes
against humanity or war crimes.
Homicide (as a general, neutral term used here to describe unlawful
taking of life) as used in the major instruments which relate to international
criminal law is characterised as follows:
• As a crime against humanity, homicide is referred to as “murder”.
Murder has been listed as the first crime against humanity in every
international instrument defining crimes against humanity, namely
article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, article 5(c) of the Tokyo
Charter, article II(1)(c) of CCL 10, Principle VI(c) of the ILC’s
Nuremberg Principles,242 article 10 of the ILC’s 1954 Draft Code,243
article 5(a) of the ICTY Statute, article 3(a) of the ICTR Statute,
article 18(a) of the 1996 Draft Code244 and article 7 of the Rome
Statute. This use of murder as a crime against humanity is replicated
in section 5 of Regulation 15/2000.
• Similarly, as a war crime contemplated by common article 3 of
the four Geneva Conventions, homicide is referred to as “murder”.
Common article 3 totally prohibits “. . . violence to life of a person, in
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture
. . .”. For use of a provision in these terms (through the incorporation
of common article 3), see article 3 of the ICTY Statute, article 4 of the
ICTR statute and article 8(c) of the Rome Statute. This use of murder
as an offence in breach of common article 3 is replicated in s. 6.1(c)(i)
of Regulation 15/2000.
• As a war crime amounting to a “grave breach”, homicide is referred
to as “wilful killing”. Grave breaches are formulated by common
articles to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and relate only to
international armed conflicts. The offences within the grave breaches
regime are “. . . those involving any of the following acts if committed
against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful
killing . . .”. See ICTY article 2, Rome Statute article 8(a). This use
of wilful killing as a grave breach is replicated in s. 6.1(a)(i) of
Regulation 15/2000.
• As a crime amounting to genocide, homicide is referred to as the
“killing (of) members of the group” in the Genocide Convention.245
242 Supra note 24.
243 Supra note 27.
244 Supra note 37.
245 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S.
277.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 51
This clause has been replicated in article 4 of the ICTY Statute,
article 2 of the ICTR Statute and article 5 of the Rome Statute.
A provision in the same terms is contained in section 4(a) of
Regulation 15/2000.
In Celebici, it was noted that undue regard should not be given to the
difference between these alternative descriptions of homicide, and for the
purposes of proof of the constituent elements of the substantive offence
itself (as opposed to the context in which it occurs, as a crime against
humanity or war crime), nothing turns on whether the offence is “murder”
or “wilful killing”.246 Support for this proposition can be found in Blaskic
where the Trial Chamber, agreeing with Celebici, held that the content
of the offence of murder under article 3 is the same as for wilful killing
under article 2.247 Similarly, albeit in a different context, Judge Cassese, in
considering the application of duress to the “killing of innocents”, stated:
“I do not consider that, as far as this issue is concerned, it makes any
difference whether one refers to such an offence as ‘killing’, ‘unlawful
killing’, or ‘murder’ provided that it is understood that it is the killing
of innocents without lawful excuse or justification (except, possibly, the
defence of duress) with which we are concerned”.248
The homogenisation of murder and wilful killing, independently of
whether it is as a war crime or crime against humanity, has been taken
a step further in Kordic. Here the Chamber stated that the elements for
murder as a crime against humanity “are similar to those required in
connection to wilful killing under article 2 and murder under article 3
of the Statute, with the exception that in order to be characterised as a
246 The Trial Chamber, in Prosecutor v. Delalic, supra note 227, considered the definition
of homicide for the purposes of “wilful killing” as a war crime constituting a “grave
breach” (the French text version is “l’homicide intentionnel”) and “murder” as a war crime
within Common article 3 Geneva Conventions (the French text version is “meurtre”). The
Chamber sought to determine whether there is a qualitative difference between the two
terms (para. 421). It concluded that no difference of consequence flows from the use of
“wilful killing” in place of “murder” for the purposes of prosecution of offences which
incorporate these terms (para. 433). In the result, the Trial Chamber concluded that the
mens rea required to establish the crimes of wilful killing and murder, as recognized in the
Geneva Conventions, is the same (para. 439).
247 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 181, following the Trial Chamber in
Prosecutor v. Delalic, supra note 227, para. 422. Followed in Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra
note 52, para. 229.
248 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic (Case no. IT-96-22), Judgment, 7 October 1997, Separate
and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Antonio Cassese, para. 12, fn. 8. The context of these
comments was an indictment that charged the accused with a crime against humanity
(murder) and, alternatively, a violation of the laws or customs of war (murder).
52 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
crime against humanity a ‘murder’ must have been committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population”.249
This general relationship between the offences is consistent with earlier
comments by the Trial Chamber in Kupreskic on the relationship between
murder as a crime against humanity and murder as a war crime. The
Chamber considered that the two offences are not in a relationship of
“reciprocal speciality”250 and that the prohibition of murder as a crime
against humanity is lex specialis in relation to the prohibition of murder as
a war crime.251 In considering the nature of the values that are protected
by each offence the Chamber found that articles 3 and 5 of the ICTY
Statute are part of the common general framework of the Statute. They
share the same general objectives and protect the same general values
in that they are designed to ensure respect for human dignity, whatever
their specific aims and values may be.252 Thus, the Chamber felt that the
difference between the values protected by articles 3 and 5 would seem
to be inconsequential.253 It considered in all these circumstances that the
prohibition of murder as a crime against humanity may only be found
if the requirements of murder under both articles 3 and 5 are proved.254
Accordingly once the core elements of the offence of murder as a war
crime are established, the foundation is laid for proof of murder as a crime
against humanity as long as the additional core element of widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population is established.
Notwithstanding the harmonisation of the international law of
homicide, there has been controversy in the ad hoc Tribunals’ jurisprudence
arising from the use of the word “murder” in the English text of
249 Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 236. As authority for this proposition the
Tribunal referred to Prosecutor v. Delalic, supra note 227, para. 439, fn. 318.
250 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 701: “while murder as a crime against
humanity requires proof of elements that murder as a war crime does not require (the
offence must be part of a systematic or widespread attack on the civilian population), this
is not reciprocated”.
251 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 701 noting at footnote 958 that this
result is borne out by Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 48, para. 91, as to the scope and
application of common article 3 quoted above (noted also in Prosecutor v. Delalic, supra
note 227, paras. 125, 136).
252 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 702.
253 Ibid., para. 703. See also on this issue Olivia Swaak-Goldman, supra note 16, pp. 164
et seq. for discussion as to the relative seriousness of crimes against humanity and war
crimes.
254 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 704. This is a brief (and incomplete)
summation of the Trial Chamber’s deliberations. The background of the formulation of
the law concerning this issue and the terms used in this analysis is noted in Prosecutor v.
Kupreskic, supra note 14, paras. 680–695.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 53
the Statutes255 and the use of the word “assassinat” in the corresponding
French text. This has important implications for the mens rea requirement
of murder as a crime against humanity. The problem as to the proper
meaning of murder as a crime against humanity arises because of the
different meanings in law of each of these terms. The central issue that
has caused difficulty in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence is whether it is only
murder (“meurtre”) as a crime of general intent, and not premeditated
murder (“assassinat”), which must be the underlying offence of a crime
against humanity.256
The nature of the problem was stated in Kayishema: “[T]he debate has
arisen because the mens rea for murder, as it is defined in most common
law jurisdictions, includes but does not require premeditation; whereas,
in most civil law systems, premeditation is always required for assassinat”.
257 As the Tribunal noted in Blaskic, “the French version of the
Statute uses the term ‘assassinat’ – a crime with a very precise meaning in
French national law”. According to article 221–223 of the French Criminal
Code (Nouveau Code Pénal) “assassinat” means a premeditated murder –
“meurtre commis avec préméditation”258 – and corresponds to “meurtre
aggravé” (aggravated murder).259 The definition of premeditation in the
Code is “the intention formed before the action to commit a crime of
a given offense”.260 On the other hand, the English version adopts the
word “murder” which translates in French as “meurtre”.261 The effect of
the distinction is that if the mens rea element of “assassinat” is required
for proof of murder as a crime against humanity then the application of
section 5(1)(a) of Regulation 15/2000 would be restricted only to intentional
premeditated killings, thus excluding “reckless” murder262 as well
as general intent murder. This is clearly contrary to the line of cases on
the formulation of mens rea for murder noted above. The ad hoc Tribunals
have taken different positions in relation to this issue and the outcome for
the mens rea requirement is not clear.
255 Article 3(a) of the ICTR Statute and article 5(a) of the ICTY Statute
256 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 216.
257 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 74, para. 137.
258 See article 221–223 of the Nouveau Code p´enal of 1 March 1994: “Le meurtre
commis avec pr´em´editation constitue un assassinat”. See also Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra
note 68, para. 216 fn. 414; Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 74, para. 137, fn. 37.
259 Simon Chesterman, supra note 101, p. 329.
260 See article 132–172 of the Nouveau Code p´enal: “La pr´em´editation est le dessein
form´e avant l’action de commettre un crime ou un d´elit d´etermin´e”.
261 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 216.
262 Simon Chesterman, supra note 101, p. 329, draws this conclusion in relation to
article 5(a) of the ICTY Statute and article 3(a) of the ICTR Statute.
54 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
In Akayesu, Trial Chamber I held that customary international law
dictates that it is the act of “murder” (“meurtre”) that constitutes a crime
against humanity and not “assassinat”. In a short explanation of its
reasons, the Chamber considered that this position of customary international
law meant that the inclusion of “assassinat” in the French version
must have come about due to an error in translation. This constituted
sufficient reasons in the opinion of the Chamber to find that the French
text should not be followed.263 This finding as to the customary international
law on this issue was approved in Rutaganda and Musema.264
The same conclusion was reached in Blaskic, where the Tribunal noted the
decision of the Trial Chamber in Akayesu, and further that article 7(1)(a)
of the ICC Statute and article 18 of the ILC Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind refer to murder (“meurtre”). The Trial
Chamber concluded that it is murder (“meurtre”) and not premeditated
murder (“assassinat”) which must be the underlying offence of a crime
against humanity.265
In Kayishema however, in relation to the interpretation of the ICTR
Statute, Trial Chamber II held, inter alia, that the solution in Akayesu that
there was an error in translation was too simple and not convincing as both
the French and the English versions of the Statute are originals.266 The
reasoning of the Chamber is opposed to that in Akayesu and the cases on
this point are not reconcilable.267 The Trial Chamber noted:
When interpreting a term from one language to another, one may find that there is no
equivalent term that corresponds to all the subtleties and nuances. This is particularly true
with legal terms that represent jurisprudential concepts. Here, the mens rea for murder in
common law overlaps with both meurtre and assassinat (that is, a meurtre aggravé) in civil
systems.268 The drafters chose to use the term assassinat rather than meurtre. As a matter
263 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 63, para. 588.
264 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, supra note 71, para. 79; Prosecutor v. Musema, supra
note 72, para. 214. Both cases simply noted that “[c]ustomary international law dictates
that the offence of ‘Murder’, and not ‘Assassinat’, constitutes a crime against humanity”.
265 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 216. Simon Chesterman, supra note 101,
p. 329 argues that this finding as to the requirement of customary international law is
correct and notes as support for the proposition the fact that murder (meurtre) is used in
article 7(1) of the Rome Statute.
266 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 74, para. 138, fn. 40. Thus the French version is
as authoritative as the English edition. The equal status of the English and French editions
is noted by Simon Chesterman, supra note 101, p. 329, fn. 120. This is due to Rule 41 of
the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, as amended on 21 December
1982, U.N. Doc. S/96/Rev.7.
267 See for a similar conclusion, Simon Chesterman, supra note 101, p. 329.
268 Thus the Chamber explained at footnote 39 (para. 138): “For example, at the high end
of murder the mens rea corresponds to the mens rea of assassinat, i.e., unlawful killing with
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 55
of interpretation, the intention of the drafters should be followed so far as possible and a
statute should be given its plain meaning.269
According to the Chamber, contrary to the views expressed in Akayesu,
the ICTR and ICTY Statutes did not reflect customary international law at
the time of drafting. Thus the Chamber found that it may be presumed that
the drafters intended to use “assassinat” alongside murder, and by doing so
may have intended that only the higher standards of mens rea for murder
will suffice.270 Further, the Chamber considered that when in doubt, a
matter of interpretation should be decided in favour of the accused.271 The
Chamber continued:
The Chamber finds, therefore, that murder and assassinat should be considered together
in order to ascertain the standard of mens rea intended by the drafters and demanded by
the ICTR Statute. When murder is considered along with assassinat the Chamber finds
that the standard of mens rea required is intentional and premeditated killing. The result is
premeditated when the actor formulated his intent to kill after a cool moment of reflection.
In a footnote to the last sentence of this paragraph the Chamber noted:
“This explanation conforms to the French jurisprudence of the criminal
court and to the United States Supreme Court case law”. The Chamber
went on:
The result is intended when it is the actor’s purpose, or the actor is aware that it will occur
in the ordinary course of events.
The accused is guilty of murder if he, engaging in conduct which is unlawful,
1. causes the death of another
2. by a premeditated act or omission
3. intending to kill any person or,
4. intending to cause grievous bodily harm to any person.
premeditation. Conversely, at the low end of murder where mere intention or recklessness
is sufficient and premeditation is not required, the mens rea of murder corresponds to the
mens rea of meurtre”.
269 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 74, para. 138. In explanation the Chamber noted,
at footnote 40: “Notably the text was drafted in English and French, both being original and
authentic. The Statute was then translated into the four remaining official UN languages.
Therefore, between English and French there was no translation. Accordingly, there can
be no ‘error in translation’ as such; there can only be a mistake in the drafting of an
original text. Notably, the term used in the ICTY Statute is also assassinat (ICTY Statute
article 5(a))”.
270 Ibid., para. 138. The Chamber noted in this regard. at footnote 41: “Of course, in
common law, there is no crime of unlawful killing that provides for a higher standard of
mens rea than that of murder. Therefore, even if the drafters intended that only the standard
of mens rea for assassinat would suffice, the drafters would still need to use the term
murder in English”. This is not completely correct since traditional common law knew the
term “malice aforethought”.
271 Ibid., para. 139.
56 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
Thus, a premeditated murder that forms part of a widespread or systematic attack against
civilians on discriminatory grounds will be a crime against humanity. Also included will
be extra-judicial killings, that is ‘unlawful and deliberate killings carried out with the order
of a Government or with its complicity or acquiescence’.272
In Kupreskic, the Trial Chamber followed the decision in Akayesu in
confirming the constituent elements of the actus reus of murder under
article 5(a) of the Statute. The Chamber then defined murder for the
purposes of the ICTY Statute as follows: “It can be said that the accused
is guilty of murder if he or she engaging in conduct which is unlawful,
intended to kill another person or to cause this person grievous bodily
harm, and has caused the death of that person”.273 The Chamber, however,
was ambivalent in relation to the definition of the mens rea of murder. Its
primary definition is consistent with Akayesu and Celebici and the harmonisation
of the definition of mens rea between murder and wilful killing
as a crime against humanity or as a war crime. Thus, the Chamber said:
“The requisite mens rea of murder under article 5(a) is the intent to kill or
the intent to inflict serious injury in reckless disregard of human life”.274
However, the Chamber then specifically noted and apparently adopted the
mens rea requirement in Kayishema without indicating explicit approval
or rejection.275 It said:
In Kayishema it was noted that the standard of mens rea required is intentional and premeditated
killing. The result is premeditated when the actor formulated his intent to kill after
a cool moment of reflection. The result is intended when it is the actor’s purpose, or the
actor is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.276
The problem, as noted above, is that a premeditated act cannot also be
reckless and requires more than a mere general intent. Hence the adoption
of both positions by the Trial Chamber is problematic. Notwithstanding
this apparently clear divergence in the meaning of mens rea for the
purposes of murder as a crime against humanity, subsequently in Kordic an
ICTY Trial Chamber maintained that “it is now settled that premeditation
is not required in order to define the term ‘murder’ as it is used in article 5
ICTY statute”.277 This conclusion can only be reached by not following
the clear articulation of the requirement of mens rea in Kayishema (and
– though more ambiguously – Kupreskic), yet the Trial Chamber did not
satisfactorily explain its reasons for not doing so. Rather, confusingly, the
272 Ibid., paras. 139, 140 (emphasis added).
273 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 560.
274 Ibid., para. 561.
275 See on this issue the criticism of Simon Chesterman, supra note 101, p. 333.
276 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 561.
277 Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 235. Emphasis added.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 57
Trial Chamber cited Kayishema in support of its preferred statement of the
law without attempting to explain or distinguish this decision. The Trial
Chamber cited, as support for its proposition, the part of the Kayishema
decision in which the Trial Chamber established its position against the
reasoning of Akayesu.278 The purported reliance upon Kayishema is therefore
questionable. In relation to Kupreskic, the Tribunal distinguished the
decision by noting that although the Chamber defined murder as an “intentional
and premeditated killing, it did not refer to the latter element in its
factual findings”.279 On the other hand, the Tribunal found support for its
statement of the law in Blaskic.280
What is the result of this divergence? Writing before the Trial Chamber
decision in Kordic, Chesterman suggests that the case law demonstrates
that “for the purposes of the ICTY and ICTR statutes the act or omission
must be premeditated”.281 This is not the current position of the law as
stated in Kordic and is to this extent inaccurate. However, the exact position
of the law is far from clear and the issue needs to be clarified by the
Tribunals. It seems that the Tribunals will have to make an election as
to which text and which meaning of homicide is preferred. Certainly, the
English word “murder” provides a more flexible definition of homicide and
to the extent that it embraces premeditation but is not restricted to it, is a
preferable alternative. It is consistent with the formulation of “murder” as
developed in international law since the Nuremberg trials and reflects the
notion of homicide as understood within the world’s major criminal justice
systems.
Further, there may be a problem with the reasoning behind the Trial
Chamber’s formulation of “murder” in Kayishema, which suggests it
should be limited to its own facts and not followed. It is questionable
why an accused should be guilty of murder if the only premeditation is an
intention to cause grievous bodily harm. There is an ambiguity here which
is directly linked to the requirement of premeditation. If the intent to cause
grievous bodily harm is formulated “after a moment of cool reflection”
then the only mens rea that can be attributed to the accused is an intent to
effect this purpose. The premeditated purpose will not be the death of the
278 Ibid. In support of its statement, the Trial Chamber notes the case law of the ICTY and
ICTR, including Kayishema, but does not attempt to distinguish the different interpretation
of the application of murder and assassinat used in this case. See footnote 314 which lists
the case law without differentation.
279 Ibid., fn. 314, referring to Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 818.
280 Ibid., fn. 315, noting: “Most recently the Blaskic Trial Chamber held that ‘it is murder
(“meurtre”) and not premeditated murder (“assassinat”) which must be the underlying
offence of a crime against humanity’.”
281 Simon Chesterman, supra note 101, p. 334.
58 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
victim but the grievous bodily harm. This does not fulfil the requirements
of premeditated murder.
For these reasons, the correct interpretation of the international law
of homicide is achieved by the adoption of the English meaning of the
word “murder”. Thus the mens rea requirement of murder as a crime
against humanity is the formulation originally conceived in Akayesu and
subsequently adopted, approved and supplemented in the cases following
it.
The jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals has not been informed by
statutory provisions as to the meaning of intent for the purposes of ascertaining
mens rea. Unlike the Rome Statute and Regulation 15/2000, the
ICTY and ICTR Statutes do not have a provision to this effect. For the
purposes of ascertaining the international law of murder as a crime against
humanity in East Timor, the Special Panel has to take cognizance of s. 18
of Regulation 15/2000.
This provision, however, is narrower than the case law developed by
the Tribunals in two respects. First, as has been seen above, section 18
excludes recklessness or dolus eventualis. Second, the object of the mental
element must be the death of the victim since the death (or the killing282)
must be the result or consequence intended by (or known to) the perpetrator.
This is the material element of murder in the sense of section 18.1 of
Regulation 15/2000. Therefore it is not possible to consider the mere intent
to cause grievous bodily harm sufficient for the commission of the crime
of murder (it may constitute other inhumane acts, however; moreover, if
the perpetrator is convicted for other inhumane acts the death of the victim
can still be given due consideration in the sentencing stage283). Every other
interpretation would turn murder into a strict liability crime punishing the
mere creation of a danger (for the life of the victim) under the objective
condition (objektive Bedingung der Strafbarkeit) that, regardless of the
perpetrator’s intent, it turns later into actual damage (death).
As to the requirement of premeditation, the situation is also different
from that for the ad hoc Tribunals. The problem which sparked the debate,
the formulation of the French version of the ICTY’s and the ICTR’s
Statutes (‘assassinat”), does not exist with regard to proceedings under
282 The first Element to article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, supra note 83, reads: “The
perpetrator killed one or more persons”.
283 The harmfulness of the crime constituting the objective side of the crime’s gravity
is the most important sentencing factor, Jan C. Nemitz, Sentencing in the Jurisprudence
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in INTERNATIONAL
AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 605, 616 (Horst Fischer, Claus Kress & Sascha Rolf Lüder,
eds., 2001).
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 59
Regulation 15/2000 and the Rome Statute. This is because the French
version of the Rome Statute does not use the term “assassinat” but the
term “meurtre” (art. 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute). With regard to Regulation
15/2000, a French version simply does not exist. Therefore, there
can be no doubt that premeditation is not required for the crime against
humanity of murder under Regulation 15/2000.
3. Deportation or Forcible Transfer of Population (s. 5.1(d))
Sections 5.1(d) and 5.2(c) have exactly the same wording as articles 7(1)(e)
and 7(2)(d) of the Rome Statute. The latter provides the first codified definition
of deportation or forcible transfer of population. As far as can be
seen, deportation was first dealt with thoroughly in a criminal context in
the Milch case of Nuremberg Military Tribunal II. In a concurring opinion,
Judge Phillips considered that “[d]isplacement of groups of persons from
one country to another is the proper concern of international law as far
as it affects the community of nations. International law has enunciated
certain conditions under which the fact of deportation of civilians from one
nation to another during times of war becomes a crime”.284 Judge Phillips
summarized these conditions holding that “deportation of the population
is criminal whenever there is no [legal] title in the deporting authority
or whenever the purpose of the displacement is illegal or whenever the
deportation is characterized by inhumane or illegal methods”.285
According to this definition – which was adopted by Military Tribunal
III in the Krupp case286 – forced transfer of persons is illegal only under
special circumstances. However, under current international law this view
must be considered too narrow. At present, forcible transfer is not only
prohibited if additional conditions are present, rather it is generally prohibited
and may be justified only under exceptional circumstances, i.e., itmust
be shown that international law, explicitly or implicitly, permits it.
Humanitarian law expressly enumerates situations where such permission
exists. Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that:
total or partial evacuation of a given area [is permissible] if the security of the population
or imperative military reasons so demand. [. . .] Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred
back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.287
Also, article 17 of Additional Protocol II provides that displacement of
civilian population is permissible only if “the security of the civilians
284 United States of America v. Milch, 2 T.W.C. 355, 865 (1950).
285 Ibid., Concurring Opinion by Judge Phillips.
286 United States of America v. Krupp et al., 9 T.W.C. 1432 (1950).
287 Supra note 45.
60 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
involved or imperative military reasons so demand”.288 These exceptions
must be applicable also with regard to the crime against humanity
of deportation or forcible transfer. It would make little sense to permit
conduct under humanitarian law and punish it as a crime against humanity.
Moreover, as humanitarian law allows forcible transfer if the safety of the
transferred persons is at stake, the same should also apply in time of peace,
for example, when a natural disaster is imminent. In any case, the persons
must be allowed to return if the reasons for the transfer have ceased to
exist.
Finally, it is clear that a person’s right to reside in a certain area can
only be violated if it exists. Thus, the second Element of the Elements
of Crimes289 for article 7(1)(d) of the Rome Statute specifies that only
“persons lawfully present in the area” can be victims of deportation or
forcible transfer. The expulsion of other persons is not criminal unless the
circumstances of the expulsion meet the requirements of a crime themselves
(for example, torture). In any case, any (national) law prohibiting
the presence of a person in a certain area or country must be consistent
with international law (e.g., article 13 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights). Otherwise the provision could be easily circumvented
by discriminating or otherwise internationally illegal national
legislation.
A second issue with regard to the legality of forcible transfer is the
way in which it is conducted. Article 49 of the fourth Geneva Convention
provides that, if a transfer is exceptionally permissible, it must be
ensured “to the greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is
provided to receive the protected persons, that the removals are effected
in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition, and that
members of the same family are not separated”. Similarly, article 17 of
Additional Protocol II requires that “[s]hould such displacements have
to be carried out, all possible measures shall be taken in order that
the civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions of
shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition”. If the transfer takes place
under circumstances which are worse than necessary, it is illegal despite
the presence of a permissible purpose.
Judge Phillips’ definition also requires that the victims must be transferred
to the territory of another state. This element is no longer needed.
288 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Augusut 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
289 Elements of Crimes, supra note 79.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 61
The Rome Statute defines deportation or forcible transfer of population
in article 7(2)(d) as “forced displacement of the persons concerned by
expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully
present, without grounds permitted under international law” (emphasis
added). Clearly, the word “area” cannot be understood to refer to a whole
country. Von Hebel and Robinson explain that the words “forcible transfer
of population” were inserted to clarify that movements of population
within the borders of a country are also sufficient.290 In addition, a footnote
to the Elements of Crimes for article 7(1)(d) states that “ ‘[d]eported
or forcibly transferred’ is interchangeable with ‘forcibly displaced’ ”.
The word “displacement”, however, is found in article 17 of Additional
Protocol II,291 which contemplates internal displacement.
To date, the judges of the ICTY seem to have dealt with the crime of
deportation or forcible transfer only once, in the Nikolic Rule 61 decision.
Nikolic was charged with the unlawful transfer of detainees from Susica
camp to Batkovic. Both places are situated within Bosnia and Herzegovina,
i.e., within the same country. The Chamber held: “that the [. . .] facts could
be characterised as deportation and, accordingly, come under article 5
[crimes against humanity] of the Statute”.292
Moreover, in the Bosanski Samac case the accused are charged with
“the unlawful deportation and forcible transfer of hundreds of [. . .] non-
Serb civilians [. . .] to other countries or to other parts of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (emphasis added).293 Finally, the official
German Draft Code of International Crimes (Art. 1 sect. 7 No. 4)294 also
does not require that the victims be transferred to another state. Since the
Draft Code provides for universal jurisdiction (Art. 1 sect 1) and, thus,
presupposes that its crimes can be prosecuted regardless of the nationality
of the perpetrator and the place of their commission, these crimes
(including the crime of deportation or forcible transfer) must be considered
to reflect customary international law.
In any case, even if one would (erroneously) hold that the law of
deportation or forcible transfer does not apply to transfers within the
borders of a state, this does not mean that such internal displacements
290 Herman Von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court
in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT. THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE.
ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 79, 99 (Roy S. Lee, ed., 1999); Christopher K. Hall,
Article 7, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 80, margin no. 33.
291 Supra note 288.
292 Prosecutor v. Nikolic, supra note 131, para. 23.
293 Prosecutor v. Simic et al. (Case no. IT-95-9), Second Amended Indictment, 25 March
1999, paras. 36–39.
294 Völkerstrafgesetzbuch-Entwurf, supra note 199.
62 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
do not constitute a crime against humanity. Such conduct constitutes
persecution if committed with discriminatory intent and, in the case of
Regulation 15/2000 and the Rome Statute, if the connection requirement
(see below) is fulfilled.
The first Element of the Elements of Crimes to article 7(1)(d) of the
Rome Statute, regarding deportation or forcible transfer, provides: “1. The
perpetrator deported or forcibly transferred, without grounds permitted
under international law, one or more persons to another State or location,
by expulsion or other coercive acts”. Thus it is clear that the perpetrator
need only transfer one person. As to the force which must be applied
a footnote to the word “forcibly” explains: “The term ‘forcibly’ is not
restricted to physical force, but may include threat of force or coercion,
such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological
oppression or abuse of power against such person or persons or another
person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment”.
4. Imprisonment or Other Severe Deprivation of Liberty (s. 5.1(e))
Section 5.1(e) of Regulation 15/2000 has been adopted verbatim from
article 7(1)(e) of the Rome Statute. It criminalises: “Imprisonment or other
severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of
international law”. From the wording of the provision it is clear that only
the liberty of physical movement is covered. The Tribunals have dealt with
deprivation of liberty as a crime against humanity only in two decisions:
Kordic and Krnojelac. In Kordic the Trial Chamber held that the same
individual conduct is required for both, the crime against humanity of
imprisonment or other severe deprivations of liberty and the war crime
of unlawful confinement.295 Thus, according to the Chamber, both crimes
differ only with regard to the context required for their commission.
Dealing with the war crime of unlawful confinement, Kordic identified
two issues with regard to the illegality of the deprivation of liberty:
“Firstly, whether the initial confinement was lawful. Secondly, regardless
of the legality of the initial confinement, whether the confined persons
had access to the procedural safeguards regulating their confinement”.296
A deprivation of liberty can only be considered lawful if both questions
are answered in the affirmative. Moreover, Section 5.1(e) of Regulation
15/2000 and article 7(1)(e) of the Rome Statute clarify that the legality of
the deprivation of liberty must be determined according to international
law.
295 Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 301.
296 Ibid., para. 279.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 63
The Trial Chamber in Krnojelac agrees that imprisonment as a crime
against humanity is established when the requirements of unlawful
confinement as a war crime as set out above are met. But it also considers
that imprisonment as a crime against humanity cannot only be established
if the requirements of unlawful confinement are met.297 It held
that, in contrast to Kordic, any form of arbitrary physical deprivation of
liberty of an individual may constitute imprisonment as long as the other
requirements of the crime are fulfilled. However, it concluded that the
deprivation of an individual’s liberty is only arbitrary if it is imposed
without due process of law in light of the international instruments.298
Therefore, analysing these instruments, both judgments finally come to
the same result.
If Geneva law is applicable, article 42(1) of the fourth Geneva Convention
governs: “The internment or placing in assigned residence of protected
persons may be ordered only if the security of the Detaining Power makes
it absolutely necessary”. Article 43(1) provides: “Any protected person
who has been interned or placed in assigned residence shall be entitled
to have such action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate
court or administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that
purpose”. Guidance as to conditions of detention is also provided by
article 5 of Additional Protocol II.299
297 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, supra note 97, para. 111.
298 Ibid., paras. 112, 113.
299 Since Indonesia has not ratified Protocol II, it may provide only guidance but is not
directly applicable. Article 5 reads: “1. In addition to the provisions of Article 4, the
following provisions shall be respected as a minimum with regard to persons deprived
of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or
detained: (a) The wounded and the sick shall be treated in accordance with Article 7 [i.e.,
‘they shall be treated humanely and shall receive, to the fullest extent practicable and with
the least possible delay, the medical care and attention required by their condition. There
shall be no distinction among them founded on any grounds other than medical ones’.];
(b) The persons referred to in this paragraph shall, to the same extent as the local civilian
population, be provided with food and drinking water and be afforded safeguards as regards
health and hygiene and protection against the rigours of the climate and the dangers of the
armed conflict; (c) They shall be allowed to receive individual or collective relief; (d) They
shall be allowed to practise their religion and, if requested and appropriate, to receive
spiritual assistance from persons, such as chaplains, performing religious functions; (e)
They shall, if made to work, have the benefit of working conditions and safeguards similar
to those enjoyed by the local civilian population. 2. Those who are responsible for the
internment or detention of the persons referred to in paragraph 1 shall also, within the
limits of their capabilities, respect the following provisions relating to such persons: (a)
Except when men and women of a family are accommodated together, women shall be
held in quarters separated from those of men and shall be under the immediate supervision
64 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
Regardless of whether there exists an armed conflict, article 9(1) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: “No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived
of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures
as are established by law”. With respect to procedural safeguards,
paragraph (4) of the same provision declares: “Anyone who is deprived of
his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before
a court, in order that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness
of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful”. The
ICCPR’s provisions on fair trial (art. 14) apply to both the initial decision
to deprive a person of liberty and its subsequent review.300 Moreover, if
a person is not deprived of liberty as a result of criminal proceedings but
for preventive reasons, the fourth Geneva Convention provides for periodic
review (art. 43(1)). It is obvious that the same is also required under the
Covenant, since an arrest which is no longer necessary is as arbitrary as an
arrest which was illegal from the outset.301
Finally, it is very important to note that theWorking Group on Arbitrary
Detention of the Commission on Human Rights has pointed out that a
deprivation of liberty is not only illegal if the procedural standards have not
been observed but also if it is imposed solely because the victim exercised
his or her human rights.302 Thus, an imprisonment is illegal if the victim
of women; (b) They shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards, the number
of which may be limited by the competent authority if it deems necessary; (c) Places
of internment and detention shall not be located close to the combat zone. The persons
referred to in paragraph 1 shall be evacuated when the places where they are interned or
detained become particularly exposed to danger arising out of the armed conflict, if their
evacuation can be carried out under adequate conditions of safety; (d) They shall have the
benefit of medical examinations; (e) Their physical or mental health and integrity shall not
be endangered by an unjustified act or omission. Accordingly, it is prohibited to subject
the persons described in this Article to any medical procedure which is not indicated by
the state of health of the person concerned, and which is not consistent with the generally
accepted medical standards applied to free persons under similar medical circumstances
[. . .]”.
300 Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 303, considered only the safeguards of
Geneva law, as this was sufficient to deal with the case it had to decide.
301 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, supra note 97, para 114.
302 Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention
or Imprisonment. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1998/44, Annex I, para. 8: The Working Group stated that a deprivation of
liberty is illegal if “the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or
freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and, insofar as States parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22,
25, 26 and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 65
was imprisoned because he or she expressed a political opinion, within the
limits of the law.303
Although not expressly required by Krnojelac and Kordic, a deprivation
of liberty must be severe to be criminal under international criminal
law. A first indication is given in section 5.1(e) of Regulation 15/2000 as
well as article 7(1)(e) of the ICC Statute, which read: “imprisonment or
other severe deprivation of physical liberty” (italics added). This implies
that imprisonment is a severe deprivation of liberty. Imprisonment must
be understood here to be of a duration which usually applies to criminal
punishment, i.e., it must be measured at least in weeks. Therefore, as a
general guideline, any deprivation of liberty which is at least as grave as
imprisonment meets the severity requirement.
However, a closer look reveals that a deprivation of liberty can be
severe not only for the duration but also for the conditions of the detention.
Article 10 of the International Covenant requires that “[a]ll persons
deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect
for the inherent dignity of the human person”. A relatively short house
arrest would, normally, not be “severe” whereas imprisonment under good
conditions for a period measured in months or in years would clearly be
sufficiently grave. Finally, a few days or even a single night in a prison
camp with insufficient food and hygiene, no space to sleep and inhumane
treatment (like rape or beatings) may constitute the crime of severe
deprivation of liberty.
5. Torture (s. 5.1(f))
The definition of torture in section 5.2(d) of Regulation 15/2000 is taken
verbatim from article 7(2)(e) of the Rome Statute: “ ‘Torture’ means
the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the
accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising
only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions”. However, apart
from section 5.1(f), Regulation 15/2000 contains three other provisions
on torture: sections 6.1(a)(ii) and (c)(i), governing acts of torture as war
crimes, and section 7, providing an additional definition of torture taken
from the Torture Convention.304 Article 1(1) of the Convention reads:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘torture’ means any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
303 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 62, art. 19; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), art. 19.
304 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, (1987) 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
66 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing
him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination
of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.
It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions (emphasis added).
The passage in italics was omitted from the text when incorporating
it in section 7.1 of Regulation 15/2000. Moreover, s. 7.1 adds the word
“humiliating”,305 before “intimidating or coercing”. It must be noted that
s. 7.1 does not create a third type of torture (apart from torture as a crime
against humanity and as a war crime). It rather defines torture “[f]or the
purposes of the present regulation”. While the provision must be taken
into account here, the war crime of torture is not considered in this paper
and will only be considered as far as it may contribute to the understanding
of the crime against humanity of torture. Finally, as mentioned in the introduction,
sexual offences are beyond the scope of this paper and will not be
dealt with here despite the fact that they may constitute torture.
The omission of the passage in the Torture Convention requiring that
the torturous conduct must be committed, instigated etc. by a “person
acting in an official capacity” is consistent with the most recent jurisprudence
of the ICTY. Whereas the Chambers in Akayesu,306 Celebici307 and
Furundzija308 included the Torture Convention’s official capacity requirement
in their definition of torture, Kunarac held: “[T]he presence of a state
official or of any other authority-wielding person in the torture process is
not necessary”.309 This decision has recently been confirmed in Kvocka.310
Equally, the definitions of torture in article 7(2)(d) of the Rome Statute and
in section 5.1(e) of Regulation 15/2000 do not contain the official capacity
requirement.311 It may be argued that, in crimes against humanity, the need
to link the crime of torture to some public authority is met by the context
element (in war crimes the armed conflict would provide for the necessary
international element). In contrast, torture under the Torture Convention
does not require a context element.
305 With regard to the war crime of torture, humiliation was been identified as a possible
purpose in Prosecutor v. Furundzija (Case no. IT-95-17/1-T), Judgment, 10 December
1998, para. 162.
306 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 63, para. 594.
307 Prosecutor v. Delalic, supra note 227, paras. 473–474.
308 Prosecutor v. Furundzija (IT-95-17/1-A), Judgment, 21 July 2000, para. 111.
309 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 81, para. 496.
310 Prosecutor v. Kvocka, supra note 234, paras. 138–139.
311 Herman Von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, supra note 290.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 67
A more problematical issue is the question of whether the commission
of torture requires a certain purpose. The drafters of the Rome Statute
deliberately omitted the purpose requirement from the elements of the
crime against humanity of torture.312 The negotiations of the Elements of
Crimes confirm this position313 and a footnote to the Elements notes: “It is
understood that no specific purpose must be proved for [the crime against
humanity of torture]”.314 Instead, the Rome Statute introduces another
element to distinguish torture from other attacks on physical or mental
integrity, namely the control requirement.
In contrast to the Rome Statute, all relevant decisions of the ad hoc
Tribunals315 have referred to article 1(1) of the Torture Convention and
adopted its purpose requirement with minor changes as part of the definition
of torture under customary international law.316 However, it has also
been observed that the prohibited purpose need not be the sole or main
purpose.317 In any case, as section 7.1 of Regulation 15/2000 explicitly
requires purpose, the matter is settled for proceedings under Regulation
15/2000 and needs no further consideration. It should be noted, however,
that the cumulative requirement of purpose and control in Regulation
15/2000 is without precedent in codifications of torture. It is a result of
the combination of the definition of torture in the Rome Statute and that
of the Torture Convention. In contrast, all other international instruments
merely require either purpose or custody or control over the victim.
As to the content of the purpose requirement, Kunarac held: “[T]he
following purposes have become part of customary international law: (a)
obtaining information or a confession, (b) punishing, intimidating or coercing
the victim or a third person, (c) discriminating, on any ground, against
the victim or a third person”.318
312 Ibid., p. 98. The German Draft Code on International Crimes, supra note 199, § 8
No. 5, does not provide for a purpose requirement either.
313 Wiebke Rückert & Georg Witschel, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity in the
Elements of Crimes, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION, supra note 283,
pp. 59, 79–80.
314 Elements of Crimes, supra note 79, article 7(1)(f), fn. 14.
315 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 63, para. 593; Prosecutor v. Delalic, supra
note 227, para. 456; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 81, para. 483.
316 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 63, para. 594; Prosecutor v. Delalic, supra note
227, para. 494; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, supra note 305, para. 111; Prosecutor v.
Kunarac, supra note 81, para. 497. The latter decision, for example, required that the
torturous conduct must “aim at obtaining information or a confession, or at punishing,
intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, or at discriminating, on any ground,
against the victim or a third person”.
317 Prosecutor v. Delalic, supra note 227, para. 470; Prosecutor v. Kvocka, supra
note 234, para. 153.
318 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 81, para. 485.
68 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
The jurisprudence of the Tribunals is not clear as to whether this list
of purposes is exhaustive or potentially unlimited. The list in Akayesu
seems to be a conclusive one.319 Kunarac, however, states at the end of
the list: “There are some doubts as to whether other purposes have come
to be recognised under customary international law”. The Chamber left the
matter open as it considered that “the conduct of the accused [was] appropriately
subsumable under the above-mentioned purposes”.320 Finally,
Celebici states explicitly: “The use of the words ‘for such purposes’ in the
customary definition of torture, indicate that the various listed purposes
do not constitute an exhaustive list, and should be regarded as merely
representative”.321 The latter holding has been confirmed by the Trial
Chamber in Kvocka which agrees that the list is not exhaustive.322
In our opinion, if purpose is required at all, the Torture Convention
should be regarded as authoritative, since the Tribunals referred to it
when developing the purpose requirement. As the Convention’s language
(“such purposes as”) clearly supports the view that the listed purposes are
only examples, this view should prevail. It is also shared by the German
Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof).323 Moreover it is supported by the
fact that the drafters of Regulation 15/2000 considered it permissible to
add a further purpose (humiliation) to the list.
Finally, if the purpose of the infliction of pain is the execution of a
lawful sanction, the conduct does not amount to torture. To be lawful, a
sanction must be imposed as a result of a fair trial according to the international
minimum standards as codified, for example, in articles 14 and
15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Moreover,
the sanction itself must comply with general human rights law including
the minimum requirements for the treatment of detained persons (cf. for
example, article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights324).
319 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 63, para. 594. Similarly Prosecutor v. Furundzija,
supra Note 305, para. 111.
320 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 81, para. 485.
321 Prosecutor v. Delalic, supra note 227, para. 470.
322 Prosecutor v. Kvocka, supra note 234, para. 140.
323 German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), Judgment of 21 February 2001, Case
no. 3 StR 372/00; 46 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN STRAFSACHEN
292, 303–304; reprinted in 54 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 2728,
2731 (2001); see also Kai Ambos, Immer mehr Fragen im internationalen Strafrecht, 21
NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT 628, 632 (2001).
324 Article 10(1) reads: “All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 69
Section 5.2(d) of Regulation 15/2000 and article 7(2)(e) of the Rome
Statute require that the torturer’s victim must be “in the custody or under
the control” of the perpetrator. The rationale of the control requirement is
the particular helplessness of a victim, who has no possibility of escape.
Thus, the requirement must be given a broad sense; it is, in particular, not
synonymous with imprisonment.325
It is clear from the wording of section 5.2(d) of Regulation 15/2000
that torture requires a certain degree of severity with regard to “pain or
suffering”. The Trial Chamber in Kvocka stated that it is the level of
severity which distinguishes torture from other similar offences.326 On
the other hand, torture is also characterised by the additional elements of
purpose and control. Thus, in our opinion, to qualify as torture, an act
need not necessarily be more serious than acts which can be subsumed
under other inhumane acts (s. 5.1(k) of Regulation 15/2000). For example,
the Furundzija appeal considered it “inconceivable that it could ever be
argued that [. . .] the rubbing of a knife against a woman’s thighs and
stomach, coupled with a threat to insert the knife into her vagina, [. . .]
are not serious enough to amount to torture”.327 This statement at the same
time confirms that the infliction of physical pain is not a requirement of
torture.328 For example, it may be sufficient to be “forced to watch severe
mistreatment inflicted on a relative”.329 In this context it must not be overlooked
that “consciously attacking [a particular vulnerability] may well
result in greater pain or suffering for that individual than for someone
without that characteristic”.330 The fact that subjective criteria are relevant
in assessing the gravity of the harm inflicted was confirmed in Kvocka.331
To conclude, torture under section 5.1(f) requires the infliction of physical
or mental pain or suffering which is at least as severe as would be
required for other inhumane acts. The victim must be under the control
of the perpetrator, i.e., in a situation from which there is no escape.
The perpetrator must pursue a certain purpose. These purposes include
but are not limited to, obtaining information or a confession, punishing,
humiliating, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, and
325 Christopher K. Hall, supra note 290, margin no. 105.
326 Prosecutor v. Kvocka, supra note 234, para. 142, referring to the Prosecutor v.
Delalic, supra note 227, para. 468, which, however, is not as explicit.
327 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, supra note 305, para. 114.
328 Prosecutor v. Kvocka, supra note 234, para. 149; Andrew Byrnes, Torture and Other
Offences Involving the Violation of the Physical or Mental Integrity of the Human Person,
in I SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS, supra note 16, p. 210.
329 Prosecutor v. Kvocka, supra note 234, para. 149.
330 Andrew Byrnes, supra note 328, p. 209.
331 Prosecutor v. Kvocka, supra note 234, para. 143.
70 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person. If the
purpose was the execution of a sanction, the requirements of torture are not
met, provided that the sanction was imposed lawfully and was compatible
with general human rights law.
6. Persecution (s. 5.1(h))
The definition of persecution in Regulation 15/2000 is, again, taken almost
literally from the Rome Statute (art. 7(1)(h) and (2)(g)). The relevant
provisions of Regulation 15/2000 read:
5.1(h): Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in section 5.3 of the present regulation,
or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international
law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the panels.
5.2(f): ‘Persecution’ means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights
contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.
In contrast, articles 4(h) of the ICTY Statute and 3(h) of the ICTR
Statute simply provide that “[p]ersecution on political, racial and religious
grounds” is a crime against humanity. Thus, the definitions of
persecution in the Rome Statute and in Regulation 15/2000 include three
important additions to the very short provisions in the Statutes of the ad
hoc Tribunals: first, the requirement of a connection between the persecutory
act and “any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within
the jurisdiction of the [respective court]”; second, the definition of persecution
as “deprivation of fundamental [human] rights”; and third, a more
comprehensive notion of possible discriminatory grounds – the Rome
Statute explicitly includes all grounds which are “impermissible under
international law”.
The Rome Statute as well as Regulation 15/2000 require a connection
between the persecutory conduct and “any [enumerated inhumane]
act [. . .] or any crime within the jurisdiction of the [respective court]”.
This element is similar to the Nuremberg Charter’s nexus with “any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal” which, however, was required
not only for persecution but for all crimes against humanity. Neither the
Nuremberg Charter nor the Statutes of the Tribunals contain a special
connection requirement for persecution. This connection requirement must
be distinguished from the separate issue of which conduct can amount
to persecution. Whereas this was done in Kupreskic,332 Kordic apparently
mixes both concepts:
332 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 573–581.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 71
Article 5(h) does not contain any requirement of a connection between the crime of persecution
and other crimes enumerated in the Statute. The jurisprudence of Trial Chambers of
the International Tribunal thus far appears to have accepted that the crime of persecution
can also encompass acts not explicitly listed in the Statute333 (emphasis added).
Another issue which was considered in particular in Kupreskic is
whether, under customary international law, a connection between the
persecutory act and war crimes is necessary. After a review of the available
case law it concludes: “This evolution [. . .] evidences the gradual abandonment
of the nexus between crimes against humanity and war crimes”.334
In a second step the Chamber considered whether the broader nexus
required in the Rome Statute (and now in Reg. 15/2000) reflects customary
international law. The Chamber held that “[a]rticle 7(1)(h) [of the Rome
Statute] is not consonant with customary international law”.335 The judges
summarised their analysis as follows: “[T]he Trial Chamber rejects the
notion that persecution must be linked to crimes found elsewhere in the
Statute of the International Tribunal”. The Kordic Chamber seems to
agree336 and most other decisions have not mentioned a connection, much
less required one. Thus, it may be concluded that under customary international
law a connection between a persecutory act and another crime
or criminal act is not necessary. Nevertheless, as both Regulation 15/2000
and the Rome Statute require it, the scope of this requirement must be
examined.
The connection requirement of the Rome Statute was the result of a
compromise. As von Hebel and Robinson explain, some states held the
view that a connection requirement had been included in the Nuremberg
Charter and, thus, should also be included in the Rome Statute. Other
states argued against the connection requirement on the basis that it had
not been included in any of the subsequent codifications of crimes against
humanity.337 The compromise finally achieved resulted in a twofold
connection requirement. With regard to war crimes and genocide, a link
to a (complete) crime is required (“connection with [. . .] any crime within
the jurisdiction of [the respective Court]” emphasis added). However, with
regard to the individual criminal acts enumerated in article 7(1) of the
Rome Statute (s. 5.1 of Reg. 15/2000), the connection required need not
relate to another crime against humanity but only to “any act referred to
333 Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 193.
334 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 577.
335 Ibid., para. 580.
336 Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 197.
337 Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, supra note 290, p. 101.
72 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
in [art. 7(1) of the Rome Statute]” (emphasis added). Consequently, the
persecutory conduct must only be connected to a (single) murder and not
to a murder which is part of a widespread or systematic attack consisting
of other enumerated inhumane acts. Rather, if the persecutory conduct
is sufficiently widespread or systematic, the persecutory acts themselves
can constitute the context element.338 In other words, a multiplicity of
grave human rights violations (which are not, as such, enumerated among
the inhumane acts), e.g., severe attacks on personal property, can be
transformed into the crime of persecution by a single connected murder.
A special situation with regard to the connection requirement occurs
if the persecutory conduct itself consists in one of the enumerated inhumane
acts, for example, a murder committed with discriminatory intent.
In such a case, the persecutory murder need not be connected to another
murder since the connection requirement would be met by the identity
of the persecutory act (murder) and the connected act (murder). As a
consequence, there exist two types of persecution. First, persecution may
be an autonomous crime, if it is committed through conduct which is not
enumerated among the inhumane acts but it is connected with an enumerated
inhumane act. Second, persecution can be an aggravated form of
an enumerated inhumane act, if the act is committed with discriminatory
intent; a further connection to yet another inhumane act is not required.
Considered as a whole, the connection requirement is highly questionable.
In the first place, since the disappearance of the war nexus, there
is no connection requirement in the elements of crimes against humanity
and, thus, in persecution.339 Moreover, the ad hoc Tribunals have rejected a
connection requirement as inconsistent with customary international law.
Finally, from a teleological perspective, a single and isolated murder or
beating is hardly sufficient to change the character of conduct so fundamentally
as to elevate its status from an ordinary offence to an international
crime.
Nevertheless, the unambiguous wording of article 7(1)(h) of the Rome
Statute and section 5.1(h) of Regulation 15/2000 requires the connection.
Thus it is necessary to examine further what exactly is needed to
fulfil this requirement. The connection requirement stems from the war
nexus340 which, in its time, constituted the international element of (all)
crimes against humanity, i.e., the element which rendered ordinary crimes
338 Ibid., p. 102.
339 See the international law instruments referred to in Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra
note 14, paras. 573–581.
340 Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, supra note 290, p. 101.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 73
international ones. As no other possible purpose can be identified for the
connection requirement of the Rome Statute, it must be assumed that it has
the same purpose, i.e., to single out less serious crimes from the scope of
persecution.
Thus the element, despite its inappropriateness must be interpreted in a
way as consistent as possible with this purpose, while, at the same time
infringing as little as possible on the main objective of crimes against
humanity, namely the protection of human rights. Accordingly, the function
of the connection requirement should be understood as to narrow the
scope of persecution to cases which are sufficiently serious so that, at least
on occasion, enumerated inhumane acts other than persecution occur in
connection with them. Moreover, the connection between the persecution
and the enumerated criminal act need not be a causal one, as this was not
required for the Nuremberg nexus. It is sufficient that either the goal of
the persecution is somehow objectively supported by the inhumane act or
that, vice versa, the persecution supports the commission of the inhumane
act.
A mental element with regard to an objective element is required if
the culpability of a conduct depends, at least in part, on the existence of
the element. However, under customary international law no connection
is required for the crime of persecution and, as a logical consequence, a
mental element is not required either. Thus, under customary international
law, such a mental element is not necessary to establish the particular
culpability of a perpetrator of the crime of persecution. Therefore, it seems
adequate to take the view that the connection requirement serves the sole
purpose of limiting the court’s jurisdiction to forms of persecution which
are of an elevated objective dangerousness. Such a view would be in
accordance with the purpose of the connection requirement: if a persecutory
conduct is dangerous enough to support the occurrence of, for
example, a killing, it does not become less dangerous only because the
perpetrator was not fully aware that the killing would occur. This view
infringes as little as possible on the main objective of the criminalisation
of crimes against humanity, namely the protection of human rights. It can
also be reconciled with section 18 of Regulation 15/2000, as the provision
requires a mental element only with regard to the material element of
the respective crime and not with regard to mere jurisdictional elements
(objective conditions of punishability).
Moreover, if a mental element were to be required for the connection
requirement, it would be very difficult to determine the proper standard
for this mental element. For example, if the perpetrator commits the perse74
KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
cutory act before the inhumane act occurs, e.g., a killing, he or she probably
is not aware that the killing will occur “in the ordinary course of events”,
even if the possibility may have been considered. As the latter would
not satisfy the requirements of section 18.2(b) of Regulation 15/2000, a
perpetrator cannot be held responsible under the Rome Statute or Regulation
15/2000 despite the fact that his or her conduct was objectively
connected to a killing. Thus, the connection must be interpreted to be a
merely jurisdictional requirement. The perpetrator need not be aware that
the connection exists.
Clearly, all of the inhumane acts enumerated in article 7(1) of the Rome
Statute or section 5.1 of Regulation 15/2000 amount to severe deprivation
of fundamental rights and can constitute persecution. The ICTY has held
several times that acts enumerated in its Statute can be persecutory acts, if
committed with discriminatory intent.341 Finally, it has already been noted
that, in such a case, the connection requirement is always fulfilled.
However, as indicated by the definition of persecution in article 7(2)(g)
of the Rome Statute and section 5.2(f) of Regulation 15/2000, any
“severe deprivation of fundamental rights” constitutes persecution342 if it
is committed “by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity”. Both
elements require consideration.
To constitute a “severe deprivation of fundamental rights” a persecutory
conduct must fulfil two requirements. It must be in violation of international
human rights law and, simultaneously, be severe. As to the first
requirement, some decisions of the ICTY, in particular Kupreskic, have
considered that “gross or blatant denials of fundamental human rights can
constitute crimes against humanity”.343 The Chamber went on to state that
“[d]rawing upon the various provisions of [human rights instruments] it
proves possible to identify a set of fundamental rights appertaining to any
human being, the gross infringement of which may amount, depending on
the surrounding circumstances, to a crime against humanity”.344 This jurisprudence
is in full accordance with the purpose of crimes against humanity,
the protection of human rights, and also with article 7(1)(g) of the Rome
341 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 700; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14,
para. 605; Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 202; Prosecutor v. Kvocka, supra
note 234, para. 185.
342 See on this issue also Olivia Swaak-Goldman, Persecution, in I SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS, supra note 16, pp. 58–60.
343 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, paras. 621 and 627; affirmed by Prosecutor v.
Ruggiu, supra note 178, para. 21; Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 195; similarly:
Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 703.
344 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 621 (emphasis added).
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 75
Statute. The Kupreskic Chamber even referred explicitly to this provision
to support its holding.345
The Kupreskic approach was considerably modified in Kordic. While
agreeing with the finding in Kupreskic that persecution requires human
rights violations,346 when identifying persecutory acts the Chamber did
not refer to human rights instruments but to acts enumerated in the ICTY
Statute. Moreover, it also seemed to consider that all criminal acts of the
Statute – including those contemplated by article 3 of the Statute (war
crimes) – can amount to persecutory acts.347 This approach is problematic
because some war crimes are not of sufficient gravity to qualify as persecution.
348 For example, the destruction of a police car would qualify as a
war crime (e.g., under article 8(2)(b) (xiii) Rome Statute) whereas it would
not meet the gravity threshold of persecution. Moreover, war crimes can
only be committed in armed conflict. Consequently, the Kordic approach
either excludes acts committed in (relative) peace or it factually applies war
crimes in the absence of an armed conflict, to the extent that the perpetrator
had discriminatory intent. In opting for this approach, the Chamber was
probably trying to find a clear definition of persecutory acts. Indeed, the
principle of legality requires a sufficiently clear definition of persecution.
However, for the reasons outlined above, this goal cannot be reached by
the Chamber’s method.
As to the second requirement Kupreskic clearly states: “[C]rimes
against humanity, far from being trivial crimes, are offences of extreme
gravity”.349 And later emphasises: “[N]ot every denial of a human right
345 Ibid., para. 617.
346 Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 195.
347 Ibid., last sentence of para. 198, paras. 202–207; also paras. 208–210, where all
charged acts which were not enumerated in one of the Statute’s provision are excluded
from the scope of persecution.
348 This is in any case true for the war crimes governed by Reg. 5.1 because according
to s. 6.1 of Regulation 15/2000 the jurisdiction of the serious crime panels with regard to
war crimes is unlimited. In contrast, article 8(1), which has been deleted from section 6 of
Regulation 15/2000, provides that the ICC “shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes
in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large scale commission
of such crimes” (emphasis added). The meaning of this “jurisdictional threshold”
remains unclear (see on this issue Timothy McCormack & Sue Robertson, Jurisdictional
Aspects of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, 23 MELBOURNE U.L.
REV. 635, 662 (1999); it is the result of a problematic compromise achieved during the
negotiations of the Rome Statute (Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, supra note 290,
pp. 107–108).
349 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 569.
76 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
may constitute a crime against humanity”.350 Applying the maxim ejusdem
generis,351 it holds that a human rights violation must be at least as grave as
one of the other, more concrete enumerated inhumane acts.352 Moreover,
“acts of persecution must be evaluated not in isolation but in context, by
looking at their cumulative effect. Although individual acts may not be
inhumane, their overall consequences must offend humanity in such a way
that they may be termed ‘inhumane’ ” (emphasis added).353
This holding has been confirmed in Kordic,354 Kvocka355 and Krnojelac356
and it appears to be in accordance with the opinion of the Tadic
Trial Chamber that a repeated and constant denial of fundamental rights is
required.357 In this context it must be noted, though, that both Kupreskic
and Kordic emphasise that, despite the general usage of “persecution” as
denoting a series of acts, also “a single act [e.g., a murder] may constitute
persecution” if discriminatory intent exists.358
But a single act can only constitute persecution if it is, as such, of sufficient
gravity. An act which would constitute persecution only if considered
together with other similar acts in their cumulative effect cannot be
considered persecution if the other similar acts do not exist. Therefore,
in conclusion, three levels of seriousness of discriminatory acts may be
distinguished: acts which are sufficiently serious to constitute persecution
on their own even if only one act is committed; acts which are less serious
but which, together with other acts, through their cumulative effect reach
the necessary level of gravity; and acts which even cumulatively are not
sufficiently serious to amount to persecution.
The phrase “by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity”
in article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute and section 5.2(f) of Regulation
15/2000 might suggest that persecution can only be committed against a
group which has constituted itself as such and has, as a group, a certain
identity. However, such a narrow interpretation conflicts with article
7(1)(h) and section 5.1(h). Accordingly, persecution can be committed,
350 Ibid., para. 617.
351 The Latin phrase means “of the same kind”. The doctrine had been applied in this
context for the first time in United States v. Flick, supra note 17, 1215.
352 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 620; also Prosecutor v. Kvocka, supra
note 234, para. 197.
353 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, paras. 622, 615.
354 Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 199.
355 Prosecutor v. Kvocka, supra note 234, para. 185.
356 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, supra note 97, para. 434.
357 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 703.
358 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 624; Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra
note 52, para. 199.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 77
for example, by reason of the victim’s gender. Persecution of women,
however, does not refer to a group in the narrow sense but rather to a group
understood as a multiplicity of individuals which share a common feature.
The same may be the case if a government persecutes all political opponents
even if they have political backgrounds as different as, for example,
communists and catholics.359 In such a case, the only common characteristic
of the victims is their opposition to the government. Therefore, the
term “identity of the group or collectivity” must be interpreted in a broad
sense referring to the common feature according to which the victims were
singled out by the perpetrators.
Some of the possible forms of persecutory acts which have been named
by the Tribunals are summarised in Kordic:
‘[T]he seizure, collection, segregation and forced transfer of civilians to camps, callingout
of civilians, beatings and killings’; ‘murder, imprisonment, and deportation’ and such
attacks on property as would constitute ‘a destruction of the livelihood of a certain population’;
and the ‘destruction and plunder of property’, ‘unlawful detention of civilians’ and
the ‘deportation or forcible transfer of civilians’, and physical and mental injury. In Blaskic,
the Trial Chamber found that the crime of persecution encompasses both bodily and mental
harm and infringements upon individual freedom.360
Importantly, Kovack added “psychological abuses”, “humiliation”, and
“harassment”,361 holding, for example, that psychological abuse may be
inflicted on detainees “through having to see and hear torturous interrogations
and random brutality perpetrated on fellow inmates”.362
The Ruggiu Chamber, in a particular context, declared as inhumane
acts: “[D]irect and public radio broadcasts [. . .] aimed at singling out
and attacking the Tutsi ethnic group and Belgians on discriminatory
grounds, by depriving them of the fundamental rights to life, liberty and
basic humanity”.363 On the other hand, the Kordic decision held that
“[e]ncouraging and promoting hatred on political etc. grounds” was not
sufficiently grave to constitute crimes against humanity. However, this
holding does not necessarily contradict Ruggiu, since, In a footnote Kordic
explains that an act which amounts to incitement to persecution may be
sufficiently serious to be regarded as criminal under international law.364
359 In this context it should be noted, that Prosecutor v. Kvocka, supra note 234, para. 195,
correctly stated that the criterion to single out the victims of a persecution may also be a
negative one (e.g., all non-Serbs).
360 Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 198 (footnotes omitted).
361 Prosecutor v. Kvocka, supra note 234, para. 190; in para. 186 the decision provides a
similar list to the one developed in Kordic.
362 Prosecutor v. Kvocka, supra note 234, para. 192.
363 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, supra note 178, para. 22.
364 Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 209, fn. 272.
78 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
Kordic also excluded the removal of Bosnian Muslims from government
positions from the scope of persecution, holding that, “[t]his act
would have to amount to an extremely broad policy to fit within Nuremberg
jurisprudence, in which economic discrimination generally rose to the
level of legal decrees dismissing all Jews from employment and imposing
enormous collective fines”.365 In fact, the Nuremberg judgment when
considering these and other acts366 based its evaluation on their cumulative
commission, not on a sole persecutory act (such as, for example, the imposition
of a collective fine).367 Moreover, a later decision, the Flick case,
applying CCL 10, held with regard to violations of industrial property:
“A sale compelled by pressure or duress may be questioned in a court of
equity. But, so far as we are informed, such use of pressure, even on racial
or religious grounds, has never been thought a crime against humanity”.368
This decision excludes certain property violations completely from the
scope of persecution, regardless of whether there is a cumulative effect
or not.
The Tadic Chamber noted in this context that there is “a limit to the acts
which can constitute persecution”.369 And Kupreskic held: “There may be
certain types of property whose destruction may not have a severe enough
impact on the victim as to constitute a crime against humanity, even if such
a destruction is perpetrated on discriminatory grounds: an example is the
burning of someone’s car (unless the car constitutes an indispensable and
vital asset to the owner)”.370
However, this is not the last word on the matter of property violations.
The Military Tribunal in the Flick case, after ruling that industrial property
is not protected by the prohibition of persecution, distinguished industrial
property from “dwellings, household furnishings, and food supplies”.
Thus, it indicated that attacks on the latter forms of property may constitute
crimes against humanity.371 Accordingly, Kupreskic held that the
“comprehensive destruction of homes and property” which “constitutes
365 Ibid., para. 210.
366 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 704: “The Nürnberg Judgment considered the
following acts, amongst others, in its finding of persecution: discriminatory laws limiting
the offices and professions open to Jews; restrictions placed on their family life and
their rights of citizenship; the creation of ghettos; the plunder of their property and the
imposition of a collective fine” (footnote omitted).
367 See the citation in Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 705.
368 United States v. Flick, supra note 17, p. 1214.
369 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 707.
370 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 631.
371 United States v. Flick, supra note 17, p. 1214.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 79
a destruction of the livelihood of a certain population” may be sufficient
to meet the elements of persecution.372 Similarly Kordic opined:
“[W]hen the cumulative effect of such property destruction is the removal
of civilians from their homes on discriminatory grounds, the ‘wanton
and extensive destruction and/or plundering of Bosnian Muslim civilian
dwellings, buildings, businesses, and civilian personal property and livestock’
may constitute the crime of persecution”.373 In contrast, the Blaskic
Chamber was less precise:
In the context of the crime of persecution, the destruction of property must be construed
to mean the destruction of towns, villages and other public or private property belonging
to a given civilian population or extensive devastation not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully, wantonly and discriminatorily. In the same context, the plunder
of property is defined as the unlawful, extensive and wanton appropriation of property
belonging to a particular population, whether it be the property of private individuals or of
state or “quasi-state” public collectives.374
However, this statement, despite a certain broadness, clearly contemplates
very widespread violations of property and therefore may be considered to
be in line with the holdings in Tadic, Kupreskic and Kordic.
The ICTY precedents are also supported by the consideration that there
are two requirements which must be fulfilled in order to regard a certain
conduct as persecution: it must be a human rights violation and must,
alone or cumulatively, be of sufficient gravity. As to the first requirement,
there is no doubt that, at present, the destruction of homes is a clear violation
of international human rights law. The right to property has been
acknowledged in major human rights instruments including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.375 Although the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights does not enshrine the right to property, like most
other human rights instruments376 it protects the right of every individual
not to be “subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his [. . .]
372 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 631; also: Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra
note 9, para. 707.
373 Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 205 (footnote omitted).
374 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 234.
375 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 303; the right is also guaranteed,
for example, in the following instruments: Protocol to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 149, art. 1; American
Convention on Human Rights, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, art. 21; African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, 21 I.L.M. 58, art. 14; Arab Charter on Human Rights, art. 25.
376 E.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 303, art. 12; European
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 149, art. 8(1); American Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 375, art. 11(2); Arab Charter on Human Rights, supra note 375, art. 17.
80 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
home”.377 Thus, at least the property which constitutes a person’s home is
fully protected under human rights law.
As to the second requirement, it is necessary that such destruction of
homes and property, which amounts to the destruction of the livelihood
of a population, be of the same gravity as other crimes against humanity.
Most crimes against humanity are extremely grave as they regard attacks
on life or dignity. However, there are also crimes which are slightly less
serious, like, for example, the crime of imprisonment, which requires only
an unlawful deprivation of liberty, or other inhumane acts which may
consist in severe beatings (cf. the examples given in Kordic). Compared
to these crimes the destruction of a victim’s dwelling and livelihood seems
to be at least of a similar seriousness. This is confirmed by a hypothetical
example, however gruesome: If a victim has to choose between the burning
of his or her house and a severe beating or a year of unlawful imprisonment
it is not at all clear which alternative would be considered the lesser evil.
Moreover, it must be taken into consideration that in many cultures a home
is much more important than it is in western societies.
It may be added that the Blaskic Trial Chamber also covered the protection
of religious and other buildings. It followed the ILC in holding that
the “systematic destruction of monuments or buildings representative of
a particular social, religious, cultural or other group”378 may constitute
persecution. Indeed, whereas such conduct probably lacks the necessary
gravity if committed alone, it may contribute significantly to the overall
cumulative effect of persecutory conduct if committed in connection with
other acts, such as the burning of houses.
Another example for persecutory human rights violations is forcible
transfer of persons from their home area. It is a human right to live, within
the respective state, in the area of one’s own choosing. For example, article
13(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: “Everyone
has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders
of each State”. Article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights reads: “Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State
shall, within that territory, have the [. . .] freedom to choose his residence”.
Similar language is found in European, African, American and Arab
human rights law.379
377 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 62, art. 17(1).
378 1991 Draft Code, supra note 33, commentary to art. 18(9).
379 Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 2(1); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 371,
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 81
Also, the ejusdem generis maxim is satisfied by forcible transfer. As has
been argued above, the requirements of the doctrine are met if important
personal property is destroyed. Clearly, it does not matter for the victim
whether his or her property is destroyed if he or she is removed from it
by forcible transfer. Thus, forcible transfer is as grave or even graver than
the destruction of homes and dwellings. In fact, deportation and forcible
transfer in itself constitute a crime against humanity. Therefore, the qualification
of forcible transfer as persecution remains irrelevant, unless the
crime of deportation and forcible transfer is understood as having an
unduly narrow scope (see above).
In conclusion, a campaign of destruction of homes (which may be
accompanied by the destruction of religious buildings, schools, etc.), as
occurred in East Timor, would be of sufficient gravity. The same applies for
forcible transfer of persons from the area where they live. If such conduct
is connected with an intentional (s. 18 of Reg. 15/2000) killing or even
an intentional severe beating it can amount to the crime against humanity
of persecution. It does not matter if the killing or beating remains an isolated
event. Moreover, if the campaign is broad enough it may, in itself,
constitute the context element.
Like all other crimes the persecutory act must also be committed with
intent (s. 18 of Reg. 15/2000). However, a mental element with regard
to the connection requirement is not required since it is a merely jurisdictional
element. In addition to the general intent with regard to the
persecutory act, the crime of persecution requires a special mental element,
namely discriminatory intent.380 The Kordic decision clearly and convincingly
states that this mental element must be present in every single
individual perpetrator. It is not sufficient that only the widespread or
systematic attack, as such, be based on a discriminatory policy. The Trial
Chamber argued that otherwise the distinction between persecution and
other enumerated crimes against humanity would vanish and that “[s]uch
an approach also would dilute the gravity of persecution as a crime against
humanity”.381
art. 12(1); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 375, art. 22(1); Arab
Charter on Human Rights, supra note 375, art. 20.
380 Prosecution v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 217; Prosecutor v. Blaskic supra note 68,
para. 235; Prosecutor and Krnojelac, supra note 97, para. 435.
381 Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 217; Prosecutor v. Kvocka, supra note 234,
paras. 199–201, states that discriminatory intent may be inferred “from knowingly participating
in a system or enterprise that discriminates on political, racial or religious grounds”.
In our opinion, knowing participation may constitute (part of) the evidence necessary to
prove discriminatory intent. This is not, however, as such sufficient to prove this specific
82 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
If, for example, a member of the persecuted group, during an attack
on the group, burns a church with the sole intention to use the land to
build a house, such conduct does not reach the gravity necessary for an
international crime because it lacks discriminatory intent. A different case
would be if the perpetrator uses the attack to disguise a killing. Such an
act, regardless of whether it also amounts to persecution, would constitute
the crime against humanity of murder, which is much graver in itself382
and therefore can be committed without discriminatory intent.
The discriminatory intent required by articles 7(1)(h) and (2)(g) of the
Rome Statute or sections 5.1(h) and 5.2(f) of Regulation 15/2000 must,
in general, be interpreted in the same way. It should be noted, however,
that these provisions are slightly broader than those of the Statutes of the
ad hoc Tribunals. Under the Rome Statute and Regulation 15/2000 any
ground “impermissible under international law” may constitute discriminatory
intent, whereas the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals require that the
persecutory act be committed on political, racial or383 religious grounds.
Finally, the nature of the discriminatory intent must be understood as a
prohibition to single out a victim on impermissible grounds. The decisive
reason to choose a particular victim must have been the impermissible
ground. In other words, if the perpetrator would have chosen a victim
without the particular characteristic, there is no discriminatory intent. On
the other hand, it does not matter if the perpetrator, in addition to the
discriminatory intent also has, for example, the intent to steal.
Certain persecutory acts, on their own, are not sufficiently serious to
amount to persecution, yet, through the cumulative effect together with
other acts, may reach the necessary gravity. As the perpetrator can understand
the gravity of such acts only if he or she knows about the other acts,
the knowledge of these other acts is necessary for them to be culpable
for a crime against humanity. As with the knowledge of the attack, the
knowledge of details is not required.
intent. If, for example, there are reasons to assume that the perpetrator acted with the sole
purpose of personally enriching herself, his or her knowing participation could not prove
his or her discriminatory intent. This seems to have been acknowledged in para. 203 of the
decision.
382 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 68, para. 233, seems to argue that a lack of the
gravity of the actus reus of persecution is compensated by the discriminatory intent: “The
Trial Chamber finds [. . .] that the crime of ‘persecution’ encompasses [. . .] also acts which
appear less serious, such as those targeting property, so long as the victimised persons were
specially selected on grounds linked to their belonging to a particular community”.
383 In article 3(h) of the ICTR Statute and article 5(h) the ICTY Statute an “and” was
erroneously inserted; on this matter, see Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 713.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 83
7. Other Inhumane Acts (s. 5.1(k))
“Other inhumane acts” is the catch-all provision among the individual
criminal acts. It has been held that such a provision is important as “one
would never be able to catch up with the imagination of future torturers
who wished to satisfy their bestial instincts; and the more specific and
complete a list tries to be, the more restrictive it becomes” or, as another
decision put it, an exhaustive enumeration of the individual criminal acts
“would merely create opportunities for evasion of the letter of the prohibition”.
384 Still, the ad hoc Tribunals have searched for a more specific and
more practicable definition of “other inhumane acts”.385
To this end several decisions employ the ejusdem generis maxim which
is also used to determine the scope of persecution. The doctrine has been
applied by the ad hoc Tribunals mostly in such a way as to require that
violations must be as grave as the other inhumane criminal acts.386 This
approach is criticised in Kupreskic as too general.387 In addition to a sufficient
gravity of the crime, which is also required by the Kupreskic,388 the
decision refers to international human rights instruments, including the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. Thus, it holds that inhuman or degrading
treatment, forcible transfer of groups of civilians, enforced prostitution and
enforced disappearance may constitute other inhumane acts.389
The Rome Statute and Regulation 15/2000 govern the scope of other
inhumane acts in a more detailed way than the Statutes of the ad hoc
Tribunals. According to article 7(1)(k) and section 5.1 other inhumane acts
are “acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health”. The Elements of
Crimes for article 7(1)(k) require that:
1. The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health, by means of an inhumane act.
384 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 563.
385 “There is a concern that this category lacks precision and is too general to provide a
safe yardstick for the work of the Tribunal and hence, that it is contrary to the principle of
the “specificity” of criminal law. It is thus imperative to establish what is included within
this category”. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 563.
386 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 9, para. 729; Prosecutor v. Musema, supra note 72,
para. 232; Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 269; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, supra
note 81, para. 92; Prosecutor v. Kvocka, supra note 234, para. 206.
387 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 14, para. 564.
388 Ibid., para. 566.
389 Ibid., para. 566.
84 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
2. Such act was of a character similar to any other act referred to in article 7, paragraph 1,
of the Statute.390
A footnote clarifies: “It is understood that ‘character’ refers to the
nature and gravity of the act”.391 It is clear that the Preparatory Commission
was of the opinion that the Rome Statute should be interpreted in such
a way as to require acts of similar gravity. Moreover, it is also required
that the acts must be similar in nature. As crimes against humanity protect
human rights, acts similar in nature to the enumerated ones would be other
violations of human rights (for example, the right not to be subjected
to inhumane or degrading treatment (art. 7(1), International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights), such as beatings). This was also held in
Kupreskic. Finally, the last requirement of other inhumane acts, as codified
in the Rome Statute and Regulation 15/2000, is that the conduct in question
must cause “great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health”.
As to the possible forms of other inhumane acts – in addition to the
examples given in Kupreskic – Kordic lists several cases: “Acts such as
‘mutilation and other types of severe bodily harm’, ‘beatings and other
acts of violence’, and ‘serious physical and mental injury’ have been
considered as constituting inhumane acts”.392
There are acts which under customary international law amount to
torture but fulfil only either the control or the purpose requirement but
not both. These acts do not meet the very restrictive torture definition
of sections 5.2(d) and 7.1 of Regulation 15/2000. However, since they
are of gravity similar to the rest of the enumerated inhumane acts, they
must, under the eiusdem generis maxim, be regarded as other inhumane
acts. This would be the case if severe pain or suffering were inflicted for
prohibited purposes to a person not under control of the torturer or to
a person under his or her control but without a specific purpose. Those
crimes should be punished like torture, i.e., more severe than the infliction
of pain or suffering which is committed neither for specific purposes nor
against a person under the control of the perpetrator.
390 Elements of Crimes, supra note 79, Elements 1 and 2 of article 7(k).
391 Ibid., footnote 30 to Element 2 of article 7(k).
392 Prosecutor v. Kordic, supra note 52, para. 270.
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 85
ANNEX 1 – THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY
The following lists the elements of crimes against humanity under current international
criminal law. Special forms of participation or indirect responsibility such as solicitation
or attempt (cf. Sect. 14.3(b) and (f) of Reg. 15) are not considered.
(I) The Requirements of the Context Element
(1) Widespread or systematic attack
Attack is the multiple commission of inhumane acts enumerated in Sect. 5.1. A single
individual can commit multiple acts through a single conduct. A military attack is not
required.
The attack must be either widespread or systematic but need not be both.
(a) systematic attack
A systematic attack is one carried out pursuant to a preconceived policy or plan.
The number of victims required is smaller than for a widespread attack.
(b) widespread attack
A widespread attack is an attack which causes a large number of victims. The
number of victims required is larger than for a systematic attack.
(2) Civilian population
The term population refers simply to a multiplicity of victims which is already required
by the element of the “attack”.
A civilian is any individual who is not an active member of a hostile armed force, or a
combatant who has laid down arms or has been rendered hors de combat. The victim’s
formal status as a member of an armed force – hostile or not – bears no relevance.
A civilian population is a multiplicity of civilians. The character of a predominantly
civilian population is not altered by the presence of certain non-civilians in their midst.
(3) Policy
(a) the entity behind the policy (state or organization)
The entity behind the policy must be the state or organisation which exercises the
highest de facto authority in a given territory and can – within limits – control all
other bearers of power and all individuals.
(b) the content of the policy
The content of the policy must be to commit a multiplicity of inhumane acts
against a civilian population.
(c) the form of adoption of the policy
An implicit de facto policy is sufficient. It need not be adopted formally nor need
it be declared expressly or stated clearly and precisely.
(d) the implementation of the policy
A systematic attack requires active conduct from the side of the entity behind
the policy. The active identification of possible victims, providing guidance to the
perpetrators is sufficient.
The policy regarding a widespread attack can be implemented by deliberate noninterference.
However, the entity in question must be under a legal obligation to
interfere and must be able to do so.
86 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
(4) The link between the attack and the individual criminal act
An individual criminal act is objectively part of the attack if its dangerousness is
elevated by the attack. I.e., if it would be less dangerous for the particular victim,
had the attack not existed.
(5) Knowledge of the attack
Knowledge of the attack is awareness of the risk that there an attack exists and that the
perpetrator’s conduct objectively forms part of it, i.e., the perpetrator must be aware of
the risk that certain circumstances of the attack render conduct more dangerous than if
the attack would not exist or that her conduct creates the atmosphere for other crimes.
The knowledge of (further) details of the attack is not required.
(II) The Individual Inhumane Acts
The following elements comprise only the objective or material elements of the respective
inhumane act, unless a particular mental element is required. The general requirements of
the mental element with regard to the inhumane acts are dealt with below (III).
(1) Murder (Sect. 5.1. (a))
The perpetrator must cause the victim’s life to end.
(2) Deportation or forcible transfer of population (Sect. 5.1. (d))
(a) Deportation or transfer
The perpetrator must transfer one or more persons from his or her chosen area of
residence. It is not necessary to transfer the person(s) across a national border.
(b) Forcible
The perpetrator must apply force, threat of force or coercion to cause the transfer.
(c) Legality of the transfer
The transfer must be unjustifiable under international law.
(3) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of liberty (Sect. 5.1. (e))
(a) Deprivation of liberty
The perpetrator must restrict the victims liberty of physical movement.
(b) Severity
The deprivation of liberty must be severe either with regard to its duration or with
regard to the conditions of detention or both. Imprisonment measured at least in
weeks or a single night under inhumane conditions is sufficient.
(c) Illegality of the deprivation of liberty
The deprivation of liberty must be illegal under international law.
(4) Torture (Sect. 5.1. (f))
(a) Infliction of physical or mental pain or suffering
Torture requires the infliction of physical or mental pain or suffering which is at
least as severe as would be required for other inhumane acts
(b) Control
The victim must be in the custody or under the control of the perpetrator, she must
be in a situation from which she cannot escape.
(c) Purpose
The perpetrator must pursue a certain purpose. These purposes include but are not
limited to:
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 87
− obtaining information or a confession,
− punishing, humiliating, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person,
− discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person.
(d) No legal sanction
The pain or suffering may not be the consequence of a lawful sanction. However,
the sanction must be compatible with general human rights law.
(5) Persecution (Sect. 5.1. (h))
(a) Human rights violation
The persecutory act consists in a human rights violation.
(b) Severity
The human rights violation must be severe. The severity threshold may be reached
either by a very serious single act or by a multiplicity of acts through their
cumulative effect.
If the persecutory act reaches the necessary gravity only when seen cumulatively
with other conduct, the perpetrator must be aware of this other conduct.
(c) Connection requirement
In connection with the persecutory conduct an enumerated inhumane act (not a
multiplicity of acts), a war crime or genocide must be committed.
The connection between the act or crime and the persecutory conduct exists if
the goal of the persecution is supported by the act or crime or if the persecution
supports the commission of the act or crime. A causal link is not required.
(d) Discriminatory intent
The perpetrator must choose the victim on grounds impermissible under international
law.
(6) Other inhumane acts (Sect. 5.1. (k))
(a) Human rights violation
The crime of other inhumane acts consists in a violation of human rights (e.g.,
beatings which come under the purview of article 7 of the ICCPR).
(b) Suffering, or injury to body or to mental or physical health
The result of the human rights violation must be suffering or injury to body or to
mental or physical health.
(c) Severity
The suffering or injury to body or to mental or physical health must be similar in
gravity with other forms of enumerated inhumane acts.
(III) The Mental Element Required for the Individual Acts
(a) With regard to conduct
The person must mean to engage in the conduct.
(b) With regard to consequences
The person must mean to bring the consequence about or be aware that it would occur
in the ordinary course of events.
(c) With regard to circumstances
The person must be aware that the required circumstances exist.
88 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
ANNEX 2 – SYNOPSIS OF SECTION 5 OF REGULATION
15/2000 AND ARTICLE 7 OF THE ROME STATUTE
Section 5, of Regulation 15/2000 Art. 7, Rome Statute
5.1 For the purposes of the present regulation,
“crimes against humanity” means
any of the following acts when committed
as part of a widespread or systematic
attack and directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack:
Art. 7(1). For the purpose of this Statute,
“crime against humanity” means any of
the following acts when committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population,
with knowledge of the attack:
(a) Murder; (a) Murder;
(b) Extermination; (b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement; (c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of
population;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of
population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation
of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation
of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture; (f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation,
or any other form of sexual
violence of comparable gravity;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation,
or any other form of sexual
violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable
group or collectivity on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious,
gender as defined in s. 5.3 of the present
regulation, or other grounds that are
universally recognised as impermissible
under international law, in connection
with any act referred to in this paragraph
or any crime within the jurisdiction of the
panels.
(h) Persecution against any identifiable
group or collectivity on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious,
gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other
grounds that are universally recognised
as impermissible under international law,
in connection with any act referred to in
this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid; (j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character
intentionally causing great suffering,
or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health.
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character
intentionally causing great suffering,
or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health.
5.2 For the purposes of s. 5.1 of the
present regulation:
[– omitted –]
(2) For the purpose of paragraph 1:
(a) “Attack directed against any civilian
population” means a course of conduct
involving the multiple commission of
acts referred to in paragraph 1 against
any civilian population, pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organisational
policy to commit such attack;
THE CURRENT LAW OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 89
Section 5, of Regulation 15/2000 Art. 7, Rome Statute
(a) “Extermination” includes the intentional
infliction of conditions of life, inter
alia the deprivation of access to food and
medicine, calculated to bring about the
destruction of part of a population;
(b) “Extermination” includes the intentional
infliction of conditions of life, inter
alia the deprivation of access to food and
medicine, calculated to bring about the
destruction of part of a population;
(b) “Enslavement” means the exercise of
any or all of the powers attaching to
the right of ownership over a person and
includes the exercise of such power in
the course of trafficking in persons, in
particular women and children;
(c) “Enslavement” means the exercise of
any or all of the powers attaching to
the right of ownership over a person and
includes the exercise of such power in
the course of trafficking in persons, in
particular women and children;
(c) “Deportation or forcible transfer of
population” means forced displacement
of the persons concerned by expulsion or
other coercive acts from the area in which
they are lawfully present, without grounds
permitted under international law;
(d) “Deportation or forcible transfer of
population” means forced displacement
of the persons concerned by expulsion or
other coercive acts from the area in which
they are lawfully present, without grounds
permitted under international law;
(d) “Torture” means the intentional infliction
of severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, upon a person in
the custody or under the control of the
accused; except that torture shall not
include pain or suffering arising only
from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful
sanctions;
(e) “Torture” means the intentional infliction
of severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, upon a person in
the custody or under the control of the
accused; except that torture shall not
include pain or suffering arising only
from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful
sanctions;
(e) “Forced pregnancy” means the
unlawful confinement of a woman
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent
of affecting the ethnic composition of
any population or carrying out other
grave violations of international law.
This definition shall not in any way be
interpreted as affecting national laws
relating to pregnancy;
(f) “Forced pregnancy” means the
unlawful confinement, of a woman
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent
of affecting the ethnic composition of
any population or carrying out other
grave violations of international law.
This definition shall not in any way be
interpreted as affecting national laws
relating to pregnancy;
(f) “Persecution” means the intentional
and severe deprivation of fundamental
rights contrary to international law by
reason of the identity of the group or
collectivity;
(g) “Persecution” means the intentional
and severe deprivation of fundamental
rights contrary to international law by
reason of the identity of the group or
collectivity;
(g) “The crime of apartheid” means inhumane
acts of a character similar to those
referred to in s. 5.1, committed in the
context of an institutionalised regime of
systematic oppression and domination by
one racial group over any other racial
group or groups and committed with the
intention of maintaining that regime;
(h) “The crime of apartheid” means inhumane
acts of a character similar to those
referred to in paragraph 1, committed in
the context of an institutionalised regime
of systematic oppression and domination
by one racial group over any other racial
group or groups and committed with the
intention of maintaining that regime;
90 KAI AMBOS AND STEFFENWIRTH
Section 5, of Regulation 15/2000 Art. 7, Rome Statute
(h) “Enforced disappearance of persons”
means the arrest, detention or abduction
of persons by, or with the authorisation,
support or acquiescence of, a State or
a political organisation, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge that deprivation
of freedom or to give information on the
fate or whereabouts of those persons, with
the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.
(i) “Enforced disappearance of persons”
means the arrest, detention or abduction
of persons by, or with the authorisation,
support or acquiescence of, a State or
a political organisation, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge that deprivation
of freedom or to give information on the
fate or whereabouts of those persons, with
the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.
5.3 For the purpose of the present regulation,
the term “gender” refers to the two
sexes, male and female, within the context
of society. The term “gender” does not
indicate any meaning different from the
above.
(3) For the purpose of this Statute, it is
understood that the term “gender” refers
to the two sexes, male and female, within
the context of society. The term “gender”
does not indicate any meaning different
from the above.
Synopsis of section 7.1 of Regulation 15/2000 and article 1(1) of the Torture Convention
section 7.1, Regulation 15/2000 art. 1, of the Torture Convention
For the purposes of the present regulation,
torture means any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person for such purposes as obtaining
from him/her or a third person information
or a confession, punishing him/her
for an act he/she or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having
committed, or humiliating, intimidating
or coercing him/her or a third person, or
for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind.
[omission].
It does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental
to lawful sanctions.
For the purposes of this Convention, the
term “torture” means any act by which
severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on
a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him or a third person information
or a confession, punishing him for an act
he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating
or coercing him or a third person,
or for any reason based on discrimination
of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official
capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions.
Annex 487
Pigin, E.A. History and Trends of Development of Medium-Range Mobile Surface-to-Air Missile
Systems for Anti-Aircraft Defense of the Infantry / Radio Engineering and Electronics, 2005
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

UDK 621. 396. 967
[ . . . ]
_______________
The article provides analysis of different methods to improve medium range air defense
complex (MR ADC) combat survivability. It is demonstrated that introducing systems that
significantly lower informational capacity into medium range air defense complexes greatly
increases their survivability while operating under counter fire.
Different methods analysis of MR ADC combat units vitality increasing. It is stated that
introduction of systems, decreasing combat units informational capacity greatly increases their
vitality at operation in fire counteraction environment.
The end of the twemtieth century can be characterized, in terms of military weaponry, by rapid
development of air attack weapons: first and foremost, unmanned weaponry. Given that the
probability of using nuclear weapons in local conflicts is very low, the top military command of
every country pays special attention to the use of highly effective precision weapons that
ensure that selective troops as well as facilities behind enemy lines are eliminated. These types
of weapons include both tactical and prestrategic ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and air
ballistic missiles of different types, air launched guided missiles, and bombs equipped with
targeting systems based on various physical principles.
However, some types of high precision weapons can be used, as a rule, only within the effective
range of MR ADC. Therefore, when selecting ADC features based on the need to defend against
air attack weapons, one can conclude that it is possible to combat these weapons using one of
two approaches. One is physical destruction of the carrier before the warhead is deployed, or
destruction of the warhead itself; the other includes methods that ensure destruction or failure
of the high precision weapons by disrupting their targeting system or removing the weapon’s
source of information. An intermediary approach is a mixed set of countermeasures by air
defense systems, such as blinding the target laser illumination system as well as the laser target
seeking device itself.
As the target seeking systems of precision weapons are based on a number of principles
of physics, air defense methods must be comprehensive, and most important, clustered into a
single system of defense against high precision weapons.
For example, given that ballistic missiles have an autonomous targeting system, they should be
destroyed only prior to launch or in flight, since there is no way to affect them after
deployment and disguising air defense radar installations and launch sites is not very effective.
At the same time, air to ground air launched missiles and guided aircraft bombs use a wide
range of physics principles and design solutions for their target seeking systems, including
receiving radar data as well as thermal, radio-thermal, and optical and electronic emissions,
which provide both for commanded target seeking (guided bombs with a TV target seeking
system) and for self-guidance (radar, infrared, laser, etc.). For that reason defense systems
against high precision weapons should cover the entire range of electromagnetic emissions
(including thermal, visible light and laser).
Passive methods for data distortion or disruption at the control center of the high precision
weapons may be based on different methods of disguising or concealing the data source,
including reduction in the level of energy emitted: thermal, radar and visual range emissions.
For example, intermittent modes of radar emission, deactivating radar station emissions prior
to deploying the high precision weapons, and resolving combat tasks using passive methods
significantly reduce the probability of impact to ground systems by high precision weapons.
Diverting transmitters and other devices, as well as quick exchange of air defense system
ammunition, has proved highly effective as a defense against antiradar site weaponry.
High precision weapons warheads can be destroyed by powerful ammunition of medium range
air defense complex using its guided air defense missile that homes in on the attacking high
precision weapon’s warhead or carrier which may be a tactical aviation aircraft. However, a
number of high precision weapon carriers deploy their weapons out of range of ADCs. For
example, the antiradar site weapon “Harm” has a range of 80 km; therefore destroying this high
precision weapon’s warhead if used against a self-disguised complex can be only effected by
the complex’s own guided air defense missile; for that reason combating high precision
weapons will lead to overuse of the ADC’s guidance and control resources, which may in turn
lead to the weapon reaching the protected facility.
“Radiotechnika”, 2005, No. 2
Later the enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Electronic Industry supplied to the Scientific Research
Insititute for Instrument Making Industry packaged TWT (travelling wave tubes) amplifiers with
integrated magneto-electrostatic focusing of the electron ray.
The receiving channel (after the microwave receiver) for the products developed at the enterprise in the
fifties consisted of a crystal mixer, an intermediate-frequency amplifier with a detector and a video
amplifier. For noise level reduction, the receiver was supplied with an AGC on noise. The noise level of
such receiver did not exceed 12 dB.
The main signal selection for frequency was maintained by an intermediate-frequency amplifier, the
passband of which was matched with the received signal bandwidth with the selectivity at 60 dB. The
selectivity along the mirror channel without a mirror frequencies channel (MFC) was zero. Installing a
MFC in a radar station at SHF receiver reduced the sensitivity for another 1...2 dB. The receiving device
protection from the transmitter permeating signal was achieved with a temporary automatic gain
control system (AGCS).
In the second half of 60-ies – the beginning of 70-ies, in order to provide the operation of an aircraft
radar station against the background of Earth and that of a land based radar station for low-flying
targets, a necessity arose for development and creation of a radio receiving device, multi-channeled for
frequency and timing. That became possible due to the development of the semiconductor technologies
and frequency selection devices with quartz and electromechanical filters.
The receiving devices of that type had been developed for products “ZASLON” and “BUK” and contained
a few hundreds of channels in their design.
With so many channels, alongside with the great amount of labor for the product, it was quite difficult
to ensure the required reliability of operation.
In the second half of 70-ies multi-channel receiving devices had been equipped with digital signal
processing units. That allowed to reduce the number of analog channels and raise the radio receiving
devices reliability.
The “BUK” air-defense missile system radar station SHF receiver is equipped with additional devices:
controlled digital and (or) continuous attenuators installed in SHF amplifiers inputs and outputs (to
increase the range of amplitudes of the processed signals);
switchboard for SHF receiver black-out to more depth (> 80 dB) during the radar station receiver
operation;
pre-selector (narrowband filters within 30.. .40 MHz on SHF amplifier input).
The low frequency part of the “BUK” product receiver was intended for the maintenance of operation in
the low repetition rate (LRR) mode and quasicontinuous emission (QCE) mode; application of radio
impulses linear-frequency modulation (LFM) in the LRR operation mode, which led to creation of two
processing channels for the signals reflected from a target - channel QCE and channel LFM.
Thus, a receiving unit operating in the QCE mode has 320 parallel channels various in frequency.
To implement all that, quartz filters had been designed and manufactured with the frequency selection
within the required bandwidth of up to 60 dB and with acceptable physical dimensions. A complicated
task had been fulfilled for the QCE channel reaching the dynamic range up to 90 dB along two signals
different in frequency.
A SHF receiver with double frequency conversion had been developed for ACS
(Armament Control System) “Zaslon”. The serial units Б3.07Б included waveguide devices basically. The
number of waveguide devices in the Н73.07 units is approximately equal to that of the microstrip
devices. Although the degree of integration was still not high enough, that receiver had an electrically
tunable input filter (ETF), which allowed tuning within the dedicated reception bandwidth with a
customizable tuning step. The time of switching over from one letter to another was approximately
1,5...2 seconds.
The low frequency multi-channel receiver path of “Zaslon” product is based on digital devices, which
allowed to drastically reduce the weight and dimensions, while keeping the high technical parameters.
The “Osa” product shows the greatest degree of integration, both in the SHF part of the receiving path
(unit ЖР-7) and in the signal processing path (unit ЖР-3).
As shown on Figure 4, containing the “Osa” received SHF signal diagram, each signal processing channel
in the unit ЖР-7 consists of 3 devices: РР-228А1 type protective device; low-noise amplifier (LNA) of
own design; SHF receiver of own design.
To ensure the operation of both channels, the ЖР-7 unit includes the following devices: PS – power
source; S – shaper; device “Obrouch” - frequency multiplier; second heterodyne attenuator (HE).
The “Obrouch” device input receives a signal with the frequency of f-fri/4, where f-1 is the first
heterodyne frequency, while a signal with the frequency of f г1. is shaped on its three outputs.
“Radiotekhnika”, 2005, No 2
The shaper transforms digital control signals into analog ones for controlling the SHF receiver, which is a
receiver with double frequency conversion and is made according to the hybrid-integration technology.
It contains the first and the second intermediate carrier frequency amplifiers, carrying frequency
switchboard-attenuator (20 ±3 dB), three-cascade switchboard ПЧ1 (80 dB), discrete 4-digit attenuator
ПЧ1 with the step of 1 dB (maximum inserted attenuation approximately 15 dB).
The first and the second heterodynes signal inputs are waveguide type. The waveguides communication
with the symmetrical strip line is maintained through waveguide-microstrip passages. The inputs of the
second heterodyne, those of the control signal, output ПС2 – coaxial connectors are part of coaxialmicrostrip
passages. Apart from that, a phase changer and a power amplifier may be used in the second
heterodyne circuit.
Attenuators ВЧ and ПЧ1 are used for increasing the dynamic range. During the transmitter emission
pulse the ЖР7 unit SHF receiver is blacked out to the depth of not less than 80 dB by a HF attenuator
and a three-cascade board. The amplifiers ВЧ, ПЧ1 и 1142 have pass-band filters.
The block diagram of the receiver intermediate path of “OSA” radar targeting system (unit ЖР-3) is
shown on Figure 5, where 84 MHz ±Ffl is the incoming signal frequency with Doppler increment; filters
В-В and В-П – bandwidth filters providing the “air-to-air”, “air-to-surface” modes; K - the key providing
operation in one of the modes; ФД – phase detector; АЦП - analog-to-digital converter; MS –
multiplexer; ППС – programmable signal processor; УФД – phase detective device; ФНЧ В-В and В-П –
low frequency filters for the modes “air-to-air”, “air-to-surface”; FT - analog-to-digital converter clock
frequency; sin, cos - signal; +45°, -45° - phase-shifting circuits; МПИ - data mode and acquisition control
system.
Main ЖР-3 unit specifications
No of channels 2
Intermediate frequency on outputs
1st and 2nd channels, MHz……..84 ± Ffl
Gain control on input, dB……..0.. .62
Operation modes: В-В “air-to-air”
В-П “air-to-surface”
Gain coefficient from input to analog-to-digital converter, dB……….30
Pass band on input:
mode В-В, MHz………. 3,3
mode В-П , MHz……… 6,9
Own noises level в Δ f = 100 Hz, mkW……..0,3
Динамический диапазон по выходу блока в Δ f = 100 Hz:
mode В-В, dB………95
mode В-П, dB……….50
Mirror component level, dB……….40
Harmonic signal level, dB………. 75
Масса кг, 11
Summarizing it all, the following achievements may be stated in the development of SHF signals
receivers:
1. The noise coefficient (NC) has been reduced in SHF receivers from 8...8,5 dD in the product 2К12
to 4,5 dB in the product “OSA”. The work is underway for reducing the NC down to 3,0 dB in normal
conditions and 3,5 Db in operation conditions;
2. The one-channel receivers mass has been reduced from 50 kg of 2К12 system to 9,5 kg of РЛПК
“OSA”. At that the quality of the comparable parameters goes up significantly;
3. More than 7,5-fold reduction of the volume of one channel in a ЖР-7 unit with regard to the
SHF receiver in the 2К12 product;
4. Улучшены параметры ЭМС и помехозащищенности за счет двойного преобразования
частоты.
Main developments of secondary power sources
A whole series of secondary power supply units has been designed for the “KUB” product, the electrical
circuits of which have been made with the use of continuous adjustment stabilizers based on electricalvacuum
devices and developed according to the structural diagram on Figure 6, representing the
classical SPS (secondary power supply) circuit with the input voltage of 220V, 400 Hz (or 200V, 400 Hz)
and consisting of Тр-р – insulating transformer; В - rectifier; Ф - filter; Ст-р – continuous adjustment
stabilizer.
In these developments the unification principles have been used for the first time. Rectifiers and
stabilizers, as a rule, were made as detachable units, which allowed to speed up the units designing and
adjustment.
Figure 5
Figure 6
"Radiotekhnika”, 2005, No 2

Annex 488
Zverev, V.I., et al. Weapons of radioelectronic divisions and units of the anti-aircraft defense
forces. 9S18􀇴1 radar station: Study manual. Kharkiv: KhUPS, 2005
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE
Kharkiv Air Force University
WEAPONS FOR
RADIO-TECHNICAL
AND AIR DEFENSE UNITS
9S18M1 RADAR
Study Guide
Kharkiv
2005
UDK 623.76.621.396.6
V.I. Zverev et al.
Weapons for radio-technical
and air defense units.
Radar 9S18M1.
Study guide. –
Kharkiv:
Kharkiv Air Force University, 2005. – ?? pages.
This study guide considers the main tactical and technical characteristics of the
9S18M1 radar, its structural diagram, radar information transmission and processing tracks,
as well as the composition, technical characteristics and functional principles of its main
systems and tools.
The study guide is intended for students of military engineering subjects concerning
the construction, operation and combat use of radar equipment, namely the 9S18M1 radar.
Illustrations to this study guide are presented in the album of diagrams and figures.
Authors: S.P. Volodko, D.A. Gryb, V.I. Zverev, A.A. Matsulevych,
I. M. Nevmerzhytsky, P.V. Ovsyannykov
© Kharkiv Air Force University, 2005
CONTENTS
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………5
1. PURPOSE, COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT………………………………6
2. TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL DATA, TECHNICAL PARAMETERS
OF A RADAR…………………………………………………………………….8
2.1. Tactical and technical data of a radar…………………………………………………8
2.2. Technical parameters of a radar………………………………………………………11
2.3. Area scan modes and programs……………………………………………………….12
3. STRUCTURAL DIAGRAM OF A RADAR……………………………………… 16
3.1. Principles of radar construction……………………………………………………… 16
3.2. Probe signal formation and channelization track…………………………………… 18
3.3. Echo signals reception and processing track………………………………………….19
3.4. Radar information processing and management track………………………………...22
3.5. Information indication and output track……………………………………………….24
4. RADAR TRANSMISSION DEVICE…………………………………………………26
4.1. Purpose, general description and composition of a transmission device…………… 26
4.2. Amplifier construction principle………………………………………………………27
4.3. Principles of modulating voltage formation…………………….…………………….28
4.4. Transmission device control and monitoring…………………………………………29
5. ANTENNA FEEDER SYSTEM………………………………………………………32
5.1. Purpose, general description and composition of an antenna feeder system………….32
5.2. Antenna system………………………………………………………………………..33
5.3. Waveguide feeder device…………………………………………………………… 35
5.4. Control and monitoring of an antenna feeder device………………………………….37
6. RECEIVER…………………………………………………………………………… 40
6.1. Purpose, general description and composition of a receiver………………………… 40
6.2. Signal amplification and transformation track……………………………………… 41
6.3. Jammer detection…………………………………………………………………… 43
6.4. Drive signal and heterodyne frequency formation track………………………………44
6.5. Receiver control and monitoring………………………………………………………45
7. ANTI-JAMMING DEVICE…………………………………………………………..48
7.1. Purpose, construction principles and structural diagram of an anti-jamming
device……………………………………………………………………………………. 48
7.2. Drive signal formation in amplitude mode ………………………………………… 50
7.3. Echo signal processing in amplitude mode………………………………………… 51
7.4. Chirp drive signal formation in S1 mode……………………………………………..56
7.5. Echo signal processing in S1 mode………………………………………………….. 58
7.6. Chirp drive signal formation in S2 mode……………………………………………..60
7.7. Echo signal processing in S2 mode………………………………………………… 61
7.8. Control and monitoring of an anti-jamming device…………………………………..64
8. RADAR INFORMATION PROCESSING AND MANAGEMENT DEVICE…...66
8.1. Purpose, main technical characteristics and construction principles of a radar
information processing and management device………………………………………….66
3
8.2. Structural diagram of a processing and management device………………………... 70
8.3. Principle of processing and exchanging information with consumers………………..73
8.4. Detection and coding unit…………………………………………………………….79
8.5. Strobe and blank formation unit………………………………………………………82
8.6. Interscan blanking unit………………………………………………………………..84
8.7. Control and monitoring of a processing and management device……………………85
9. DISPLAY EQUIPMENT…………………………………………………………… 87
9.1. Purpose, main characteristics and composition of display equipment………………..87
9.2. Display unit structural diagram……………………………………………………….89
9.3. General description of coordinate scanning tools…………………………………….94
10. RADAR CONTROL PRINCIPLE…………………………………………………96
10.1. Radar mode control………………………………………………………………….96
10.2. Operator dashboard…………………………………………………………………100
10.3. Radar control operator actions in combat and emergency mode………………… 104
10.4. Connection and technical condition display unit………………………………… 104
10.5. Radar connection procedure……………………………………………………….. 106
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………..109
Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………… 110
________________________________
4
2. TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL DATA, TECHNICAL PARAMETERS OF A
RADAR
2.1 Tactical and technical data of a radar
1. Detection zone characteristics.
The detection zone is formed by an antenna, which is a one-dimensional phased
antenna grid in the location angle plane. The azimuth scan is sequential, via a rotating
antenna with beam width Δβ0.5r = 1.4° ; the angle location scan is sequential and discreet,
moving a beam with the width Δβε0.5r = 1.4–1.6° which is ensured by phased electronic
scanning. This uses the location angle-row method which is explained in Figure 2.1. With the
antenna rotating steadily, the beam in the location angle plane leaps (over one or several
probe signal repetition periods) the width of the radiation pattern from the minimum location
angle εmin at the bottom to the maximum location angle at the top with the subsequent return
of the beam to the bottom position.
The complete scan circle is ensured by an agreed selection of antenna rotation speeds
in the azimuth plane and the scanning of the beam in the angle location plane.
The minimum value of the location angle detection zone is εmin = +0.7°. Depending on
the position, it is possible to set the minimum location angle discreetly at +0.5 or +1 of the
radiation pattern width in the location angle plane in designated sectors with the automatic
processing of set location angles. It is possible to pre-set up to 10 such sectors with different
values of the minimum location angles.
The maximum value of the detection zone location angle εmax = 41° (in the initial
basic mode, in which 30 angle location beam positions are formed), or εmax =55° in the
designated missile defense (missile detection) zone with the width of up to 120°. This forms
40 location angle beam positions.
An azimuth scan in different operational modes (in various jamming situations) may
be even or evenly changing with deceleration when scanning specific sectors.
Detection display range is 160 km. Detection range for MiG-21 type aircraft at 100 m
is 35 km, and at 1 to 25 km – 100 km. The gap-free detection height for MiG-21 type targets
is 25 km.
2. Make-up of output information.
Radars use manual (visual), semiautomatic and automatic methods of reading
information. During visual reading, the operator measures the azimuth, the distance slope, the
height and the friend or foe identification of the target. The semiautomatic reading of target
coordinates in semiautomatic tracking strobes provides for the locking and tracking of no
more than 6 targets at a time. During automatic reading, information about the air situation
and the radar position is transmitted using data transmission equipment. The data
transmission throughput capacity is 17 messages per second.
8
The range of data transmission to the plan position indicator repeater is up to 500 km,
to the automated surface to air 9S470 command post – up to 5 km, and to the command post
and launcher using the telecode comms line – up to 30 km.
3. Precision characteristics.
The standard deviations of coordinate measurements are as follows:
For X and Y plane coordinates – 600 m at 10–50 km distances, 1000 km at 60–90 km
distances and 1100 m at 90–160 km distances and 1000 km height.
4. Differentiating power at 400 m distance, according to azimuth and angle location
3–4.5°.
5. Information output discretion is determined by the speed of the area scanning
according to the azimuth and angle location and ranges between 4.5 and 18 c.
6. Jamming protection is provided by:
The high energy potential of the long-term probing signal;
using the wide-band chirp probing signal with the optimal processing (congestion) of
echo signals;
protection from fixed stop and frequency-targeting interference – by automatically
changing frequency according to the outcome of interference level analysis in the reception
track with output to an interference-free frequency. If this is not possible, this is achieved by
an incoherent accumulation of signals in designated sectors with scanning deceleration and
emission of several probing impulses in the direction of each interference (n = impulse 2, 4,
8, 16 and 32);
with a high level of noise interference, when this is received by the lateral lobes of the
antenna radiation pattern – by using a single-channel interference compensator. The
autocompensator’s interference suppression factor is 16 dB;
with insurmountable interference, if it exceeds its own noise by 20dB on the main
channel, jamming detection is performed according to the azimuth and angle location and
displaying the Detection mark on the display screen;
from fast-changing frequency-targeting jamming – by randomly changing the
frequency or introducing a scan deceleration sector to the NS-1 (protection from changing
interference) program with two probes in one location angle beam position with subsequent
processing using the 1 of 2 criterion;
protection from respective impulse interference is provided by changing the radar’s
carrier frequency from impulse to impulse.
The following is used against non-synchronized jamming:
NS-2 scanning (protection from non-synchronized interference) in a designated sector
with two probes in each location angle position with subsequent processing according to the 2
out of 2 criterion;
randomly changing the carrier frequency;
9
changing the frequency slope of the internal chirp impulse modulation of the probing
signal to the opposite;
for any impulse interference, for which the internal impulse modulation law does not
correspond to the echo signal modulation law, a rigid boundary is used in front of the
optimum chirp signal filter, according to the “wide band – restriction – optimum filter”
scheme.
Protection from passive interference is provided by the moving target selection
scheme, which uses the coherent-impulse method with periodic signal compensation at the
intermediate frequency. The moving target selection system works in two modes: S1 and S2.
The S1 mode is intended for suppressing signals from local objects. It is only used in
the first (lower) beam throughout or in sectors according to the azimuth. The range of the S1
strobe is 40 km. The local object signal suppression factor is 40 dB.
The S2 mode is used for suppressing signals from local objects, mobile passive
interference and weather formations. The mode is set in azimuth sectors, where there is
interference. It is set automatically in lower beams (10 or 6 beams); for other beams the S2
mode is set manually by the operator according to the location angle. The passive
interference suppression factor is 26 dB.
With intensive passive interference, protection modes may be provided in several
repetition periods (2 or 4) for each location angle direction with the accumulation of echo
signals after moving target selection. The S2 strobe range is 75 km.
The following is used to protect the radar from anti-radar missiles:
changing the frequency slowly using a specific program with the frequency change
period 1–1.5 s;
switching emission on and off after the “flickering” scan period;
a ban on emissions in the sector.
7. Mobility.
It takes no more than 5 minutes to deploy and wind up a radar. Radars provide for the
automatic deployment and winding up of the antenna device when changing positions from
locked to standby and vice versa. If need be, the antenna can be deployed and wound up
manually.
Highway speed – 65 km/hour, dirt road speed – 35–45 km per hour;
Surmountable wading depth – 1 m;
Surmountable moat depth – 1.5 m;
Reserve mileage per hour of gas turbine engine operation – 500 km;
Radar mass – 34 tons.
8. Viability is secured by ensuring personnel’s living conditions and is achieved as
follows:
By providing collective personnel protection from radioactive, chemical and
biological contamination;
10

Annex 489
Design, maintenance, and combat use of the combat control center of the Buk-M1 SAM system.
Part II. 9S470􀇴1 Combat Control Center: Study Manual / Zubrytsky, H.M., Kyryliuk, A.S.,
Lukyanchuk, V.V., Khil, P.Ya. // Kharkiv University of the Air Force. Kharki
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE
KHARKIV AIR FORCE UNIVERSITY
G.M. Zubrytsky, A.S. Kyrylyuk, V.V. Lukyanchuk, P.Y. Khyl
CONSTRUCTION, TECHNICAL OPERATION
AND COMBAT USE
OF THE BUK-M1 SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE SYSTEM
COMMAND POST
Part II
THE 9S470M1 COMMAND POST VEHICLE
Study Guide
Edited by P.Y. Khyl
Kharkiv
2005

UDK 623.618.2
BBK 641.4.992
Kh45
Reviewers: Prof I.O. Kyrychenko, Honored Scientist, Doctor of Military Science
(Military Institute of the Interior Troops, Ministry of Internal Affairs)
Prof B.M. Lanetsky, Doctor of Engineering (Chair 302)
P.Y. Khyl
Kh 45
Construction, technical operation and combat use of the BUK-M1 surface to
air missile system command post. Part II. The 9S470M1 command post
vehicle: Study guide / G.M. Zubrytsky, A.S. Kyrylyuk, V.V. Lukyanchuk,
P.Y. Khyl // Kharkiv Air Force University. – Kharkiv, 2005. – 75 pages.
The study guide is intended for those studying the command post tools of the
BUK-M1 surface to air missile system and for those at university studying mediumrange
surface-to-air missile systems.
The guide describes the construction and functional principles of the 9S470M1
command post vehicle as well as the fundamentals of its operation and combat use.
The content of the guide corresponds to modules II and III of the subject
syllabus “The construction, technical operation and combat use of information
technology and target guidance tools in the BUK-M1 surface to air missile system.
During the study of the book it is advisable to use the album of figures and
diagrams issued under the same title.
Illustrations: 68 (issued in a separate album), tables: 3, bibliography: 9 titles.
Approved for publication by Chair No 303, Kharkiv Air Force University.
Transcript No 8 of 9 December 2004.
© Kharkiv Air Force University
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 9S470M1 COMMAND POST VEHICLE
1.1. CP purpose and tasks
The 9S470M1 command post vehicle is a component of the surface-to-air missile
battalion command post armed with the 9K37M1 BUK-M1 surface to air missile system and
intended to provide automated control over its combat operations both during autonomous
operation and as part of a surface-to-air missile battalion.
The CP equipment is located in the cabin of the self-propelled tracked armoured
vehicle GM-579A and provides automation of the following tasks:
putting the battalion’s units into different stages of readiness to perform
assigned tasks;
receiving, processing and displaying information about the airborne
environment and combat management commands received from the brigade
command post equipped with the Polyana-D4 automated system, or from the airdefense
division command post (standard command staff vehicles MP22 and SM
MP25);
receiving, processing and displaying information about the airborne
environment received from the 9S18M1 acquisition radar and the SPM 9A310M1
launchers;
receiving and displaying data on missile presence on board SPM launchers
and the 9A39M1 launcher-loaders;
receiving and displaying data on the location and condition of surface-to-air
missile system tools;
control over SPM responsibility sectors according to azimuths and location
angles;
target allocation and the formation and output of target guidance to SPM
launchers;
control over fire assignments;
control over combat tool operational modes in the surface to air missile system
and SPM emission in the presence of active enemy interference and anti-radar
missiles;
organizing the system’s operation under special operational conditions (when
an SPM launcher is not fully operational, during the launch of missiles with “foe”
illumination, when an SPM is operating as a launcher-loader);
reporting combat readiness and combat operations to command post;
geolocation preparations for the battalion’s fire control;
documenting combat processes during enemy air attack;
simulating airborne environment for command post crew training;
monitoring the operation of CP combat tools.
1.2. CP composition and location. Combat crew.
The following equipment can be identified as part of the CP vehicle according to its
functional purpose (Figure 1.1).
1. Data processing and exchange tools – a digital computer system including:
digital computing unit (two Argon-15A computers);
data input-output device (BDM1-01 cabinet);
interface between the data input-output device and the automated workstation controls
(BD-2 unit).
The digital computer system is the main automation tool for the processing and
displaying of the airborne environment and the condition of the surface-to-air missile
battalion’s fire tools, as well as for the formation and implementation of target allocation
recommendations, the management of the SAM battalion’s combat operations and the
provision of guidance information exchange with external and internal system users.
2. Information display and management tools: four workstations - 1DM, 2DM and
two 3DM. Each automated workstation (AW) contains a D-4T1 display unit, management
controls, coordinate scanning and communication controls and the BD-5 command inputoutput
units. In addition, the SAM battalion commander AW includes a D-12-1 digital
dashboard displaying: missile presence on each SPM launcher and PZU launcher-loader, the
illumination transmitter letters set and installed on the SPM, while the chief of command post
vehicle AW includes the D-2-1 control for initial data input into the EOM long-term memory
device with the possibility of data replacement.
The information display and management tools are intended for the visual displaying
of information on the airborne environment, the location, conditions and combat operations
of the SAM battalion fire tools, EOM recommendations on target allocation to SPM
launchers and the commands and instructions received from the higher-level automated
command post.
3. The operational command communication and data transmission tools are intended
for exchanging operational and tactical information with the SAM brigade CP and with the
battalion’s units, conducting conversations with CP crew, exchanging bilateral telecode
information with the brigade CP and the SPM launcher and receiving telecode information
from the fire control radar.
Communication and data transmission tools include:
AI-011 data reception and transmission equipment and the mobile communication
center radio station – for bilateral telecode information exchange with the SAM brigade CP;
AI-011 reception equipment for airborne environment data incoming from the fire
control radar and the R-123MT (R-111) radio station;
the 9S624 telecode equipment – for the bilateral exchange of telecode information
with the SPM launcher;
the 9S623 system for speech communication between the CP vehicle crew, the fire
control radar and the SPM launcher – to ensure reception and transmission of verbal
information by the two R-123MT radio stations, the reception and transmission of individual
and circulated coded signals and the ALARM signal;
the 9S726 internal telephone communication system and switchboard – to support
individual conversations between CP crew and to control the speech communication
equipment during verbal information exchanges via radio and cable between the crew of the
SPM fire control radar and the SPM launcher. In addition, the internal communication system
and switchboard records verbal information using the on-board recorders MS-61M and the
AM3-92RK audio recording equipment;
the FL-92V antenna needle device;
cable communication lines.
4. Navigation equipment for geolocation and orientation comprising TNA-4-1
tank navigation equipment, the VOP-3-1 panoramic optical sight and the PAB-2M aiming
circle.
The TNA-4-1 is intended for continuous calculation and display of current CP
coordinates on the topographic map to 1:50 000 or 1:100 000 scale during transit, for the
determination of the self-propelled vehicle’s longitudinal axis direction angle and the
destination point direction angle, for calculating the right-angled components of the CP
parallax relative to the set starting (reference) point – the starting point in the battalion’s
unified coordinate system.
The VOP-3-1 and the PAB-2M are used for determining the self-propelled vehicle’s
longitudinal axis direction angle and inputting it into the TNA-4-1 equipment before transit.
5. The documentation equipment is intended for the recording and playback of
information about the airborne environment and the condition of the SAM battalion’s combat
tools, the operational command information in the guidance grids, the registration of tracked
target information on rolled paper, the coordinates of the SPM fire control radar and launcher,
the SPM launcher’s technical condition, missile presence on the SPM launcher and the
launcher-loader, target reallocation results and the SPM launcher’s fire assignments in real
time.
The equipment comprises:
audio recording equipment AM3-92RK including two audio recording and playback
devices - the 74A-100 units - and a remote control – the 74A-200 unit;
two MS-61M flight recorders;
the P-115P telegraphic letter printing device (RTA-7MK rolled letter-printing
automated start-stop electronic telegraphy device)
6. The simulation equipment is intended for learning, practicing and improving main
combat operations by CP crew. It supports CP crew training by simulating the airborne
environment and the SPM launcher’s combat operations.
To support CP crew learning and training, the mathematical support digital computer
provides:
electronic simulation of airborne environment data received by the CP from the SPM
fire control radar;
electronic simulation of SPM launcher operations in various operational modes;
re-enactment of actual airborne environment recorded in advance onto the AM3-
92RK tape and supporting crew operations according to self-propelled fire control radar data
(SIMULATION 1 mode);
re-enactment of the full airborne environment, the throughput of commands and
reports and SPM launcher actions with missile departure simulation (SIMULATION 2 mode)
7. The life support system is intended to create the necessary air temperature,
cleanliness and humidity in the CP vehicle in different climate conditions and to protect from
WMD.
The system comprises:
filter and ventilation system FVU-200;
heating and ventilation system OV-65;
two MK-5 air conditioners;
individual fans;
radiation and chemical reconnaissance tool GO-27;
special treatment tool set DK-4;
fire extinguishing tools (UA PPO automatic air defense fire extinguisher)
In addition, the CP is equipped with the TNPO-168 observation tool and the TVNE-
4PA night vision tool for local observation.
8. The power supply tools are intended for supplying power to CP equipment during
the operation of the gas turbine engine, the self-propelled drive engine or an outside power
source.
The power supply tools comprise:
two AC generators BG-31 (main and reserve) which can work both off the gas turbine
engine or a self-propelled drive engine;
DC generator OG-10;
BU-31 rectifier;
remote controls, switches and power system protection equipment;
four 6ST-140P 24V batteries with the volume of 70A per hour;
gas turbine engine 9I56.
The CP equipment is located in the armored cabin of the self-propelled tracked
vehicle GM-579A.
The location of the main CP tools and combat crew is shown in Figure 1.2.
Combat crew composition (Figure 1.2):
battalion commander (1);
CP crew chief (2);
senior operator (3);

Annex 490
Marja Lehto, Indirect Responsibility for Terrorist Acts (2009)

Chapten
has been pointed out that the impetus for the categorical exclusion of political
offence exception is "to deactivate political considerations, and to treat terrorists
as common criminals".56 At the same time, the agreement that terrorist offences
can under no circumstances be regarded as political offences can be seen tq reflect
the increasing recognition of the serious nature of terrorist crimes,57 in line with
the statement that terrorist acts cannot be justified by any political, philosophical
or religious grounds. To the extent that the concept of a political offence, as an
exception to most extradition regimes, is based on humanitarian grounds - that
a political offender should not be extradited to a state in which he or she risks an
unfair trial - its essence has been preserved in what is known as a discrimination
clause. A necessary corollary to the prohibition of the political offences exception,
the discrimination clause provides that there is no obligation to extradite or to
afford mutual assistance if the request appears to have been made for the purpose
of prosecuting a person on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, ethnic
origin or political opinion.58 Some commentators view this as a circular conclusion,
amounting to a 're-politicisation' of the crime.59 It should be noted, however, that
the requested state, in refusing extradition, may not base its decision on the alleged
motives of the offender but only on those of the requesting state. 60 What has been
removed is the political discretion with regard to terrorist crimes, which earlier
allowed any state party to invoke the 'droit de resistance' in a particular case.
LEG/CONF.15/DC/J, (the 2.005 SUA Protocol), art. ro (art. u aof the amended convention).
56 Jan Klabbers, 'Rebel with a Cause? Terrorists and Humanitarian Law: 14 E]IL (2.003),
299-312, at 306.
5 7 Historically, the political offence exception was first precluded with regard to international
crimes; see Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
New York, 9 December 1948, 1021 UNTS Vol. 78, p. 277, art. VIL See also Valerie Epps,
'Abolishing the Political Offence Exception: in M. CherifBassiouni ( ed.), Legal Responses
to International Terrorism; US. Procedural Aspects, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988,
203-217.
58 Terrorist Bombings Convention, art. 12, Terrorist Financing Convention, art. 15.
59 Jean-Marc Sorel, 'Some Questions About the Definition of Terrorism and the Fight
Against Its Financing: 14EJIL (2.003), 365-378, at 369.
6 o As Bassiouni has noted with regard to hostage-taking, ''Although the alleged hostage-taker's
motive, even if political or ideological, will[ ... ] not bar such individual's extradition,
the motives of the state requesting extradition will be likely to be a bar to such request if its
purpose is to prosecute or punish such individual because of his race, nationality or political
opinions''. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, 'Kidnapping and Hostage-Taking' in Bassiouni
(ed.), International Criminal Law, Vol. I Crimes, Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1999,
859-864, at 863.
16
The International Law of Terrorism
Where the perpetrators are concerned, terrorism is mostly understood as
private violence,61 even though the 1994 Declaration also refers to terrorist acts
in which states are "directly or indirectly involved". 62 A textual analysis suggests
that the UN anti-terrorist conventions and protocols apply to any natural persons
with no distinction between representatives and agents of a state, on the one hand,
and private individuals, on the other. Most of the crimes under these conventions
and protocols can be committed by 'any person', and the Terrorist Financing
Convention also foresees responsibility for legal persons. Treves has nevertheless
questioned this interpretation. In his view, it is doubtful whether states would
have treated obliquely such a delicate question with complex legal and political
implications. He has also pointed out that a proposal to explicitly include acts by
governmental agents was rejected in the negotiations concerning the 1988 SUA
Convention, and that the Convention does not provide for an exception to the
rules of immunity of states from jurisdiction. 63
The Terrorist Bombings Convention, as well as a number of other recent conventions,
explicitly exclude from their scope of application acts committed by the
armed forces of a state, either in an armed conflict or in the exercise of their official
duties otherwise. 64 The term 'official duties' is a broad one, but the exemption
clause applies only to 'military forces: defined in article 1 of the Convention as
"forces in the service of national defence or security, as well as persons under their
control". 61 It is further specified in the Preamble of the Convention that the exclusion
of certain actions from the coverage of the Convention does not condone or
61 Bassiouni, supra note 45, at 765-767.
62 1994 Declaration, Preamble, para. 8.
63 Treves, supra note 31, at 85, commenting on the 1988 SUA Convention. He has admitted,
however, that the question is open to different interpretations and that it seems possible
to hold the view that acts committed on behalf of.governments were not excluded.
64 Terrorist Bombings Convention, art.19 (1), states that "[t]he activities of armed forces
during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian
law, which are governed by that law; are not governed by this Convention, and the
activities undertaken by military forces of a state in the exercise of their official duties,
inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, are not governed by
this Convention". According to art.19(2), "Nothing in this Convention shall affect other
rights, obligations or responsibilities of States and individuals under international law, in
particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international
humanitarian law". See also Nuclear Terrorism Convention, art. 4, 2005 SUA
Protocol, art. 2(a)(2); 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, new art. 2(4)(b).
6 5 Terrorist Bombings Convention, art. 1 ( 4): "Military forces of a state" means armed forces
of a state which are organized, trained and equipped under its internal law for the primary
purpose of national_ defence or security, and persons acting in support of those armed
17
Chapter1
make lawful acts that are otherwise unlawful, or preclude prosecution under other
laws. 66 The exception is therefore predicated on the assumption that any unlawful
activities undertaken by military forces of a state in the exercise of their official
duties will be governed by other rules of international law.67 If those other rules
have not been specified, it should not be taken as an indication that governments
are free to do as they please. Governmental activities have been regulated in a fairly
comprehensive manner in international law at least insofar as violent acts are concerned.
68
The targets of terrorist acts have played an important role in the definition of
the offences under the UN anti-terrorist instruments. The first conventions and
protocols apply to acts against specially protected persons, airplanes and airports,
or ships in international navigation. The Terrorist Bombings Convention broadened
the target to include any victims as far as the intention is to cause death or
serious bodily injury, as well as to public places and property.69 The Convention on
Terrorist Financing contains the broadest and the most detailed definition of the
targets of terrorist acts in international law to date. The generic definition ofterrorist
acts in the Financing Convention referred to above - even though intended
only to define the criminal intent required for the crime of financing terrorism
- covers certain violent acts directed at civilians or other persons not taking an
active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict. That definition would
be equally applicable in times of peace and armed conflict, however the conflict is
defined. An important addition is the reference to non-combatants (persons not
taking an active part in an armed conflict), without which the term 'civilian' would
seem to exclude military targets in times of peace as well as certain groups of noncombatants
in an armed conflict. As the distinction between civilian and military
targets becomes applicable only after the threshold required for the application of
international humanitarian law is reached - defined inter alia in terms of a certain
intensity of violence necessary for the concept of an armed conflict - it is clear
that the nature of the target cannot be the sole and decisive criterion of terrorism.
forces who are under their formal command, control and responsibility." It therefore does
not apply to other governmental officials.
66 Ibid., Preamble, para. II.
67 Ibid.: "governed by rules of international law outside the framework of (the)
Convention".
68 As pointed out by Christian Tomuschat, 'Report on the Possible ''Added Value" of a
Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism: Council of Europe, CO DEXTER (2004)05,
reprinted in 26 HRLJ (2005), 287-306, para. 42 at 294-295.
69 Terrorist Bombings Convention, art. 2(1). Note that acts intended to cause material
damage have been further qualified by requirements concerning the seriousness of the
act.
18
The International Law of Terrorism
Situations of internal strife and tension that do not meet the requirements of an
armed conflict would be a case in point, as acts of violence are often committed
under such circumstances.
On the basis of the foregoing, international terrorism as addressed in the
sectoral conventions and protocols could be defined as primarily private violence
against civilian or non-combatant targets ( for political purposes). The requirement
of a private nature would exclude acts of terrorism in the sense of international
humanitarian law, at least as far as acts of armed forces are concerned.7° A further
requirement for terrorist acts would seem to be a certain scale or gravity. Terrorist
offences are undoubtedly serious crimes and have been considered such by governments
all over the world, as well as by the UN General Assembly, the Security
Council and other international organisations. Terrorist acts have been condemned
by consecutive UNGA resolutions as "in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever
the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious
or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them".71 The same formulation,
with minor modifications, was subsequently included in the Terrorist Bombings
Convention7' and the Convention on Terrorist Financing73 as well as in Security
Council resolution 1566 (2.004)74 and the 2.005 Council of Europe Convention on
the Prevention of Terrorism.75 All the above-mentioned instruments also explicitly
state that the offences defined in them are grave.76 While there is no reference
· to a 'widespread' or 'systematic' commission of the offences such as that found in
the case of crimes against humanity,77 the requirement of gravity can also be discerned
from the way the offences and their intended effects - such as death or serious
bodily injury, extensive destruction likely to result in major economic loss,. or
endangerment of the safe navigation of a ship - have been defined in the relevant
70 For further discussion concerning this limitation, see 1.3. and Chapter 2.2.3.2.
71 UN Doc. A/RES/ 49/ 60, para. 3 and subsequent· resolutions on the item 'Measures to
Eliminate International Terrorism'.
72 Terrorist Bombings Convention, art. 5.
73 Terrorist Financing Convention, art. 6.
74 UN Doc. S/RES/!566(2004), para. 3.
75 The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, Warsaw, 16 May
2005, CETS No. 196, art. u.
76 Terrorist Bombings Convention, art. 4 (b) requires that states parties make the offences
set forth in art. 2 punishable by appropriate penalties which " take into account the grave
nature of those offences". Similarly, the Terrorist Financing Convention, art 4(b). UN
Doc. S/RES/!566(2004), para. 9, also calls on states to ensure that terrorist acts are punished
by penalties consistent with their grave nature.
77 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 19 9 8, UN Doc. A/ CO NF.I 83/ 9,
UNTS No. 38544, art. 7, chapeau.
19
Chapter1
instruments. It has also been pointed out in the preambular parts of the conventions
and protocols that the terrorist acts falling within their scope "create a serious
threat to the maintenance of normal international relations':78 "seriously affect the
operation of maritime services",79 or constitute "an offence of grave concern to the
international community';80 to mention only a few examples of the formulations
used. The UN anti-terrorist instruments - with the notable exception of the recent
UNSC resolutions8' - have also been restricted to acts of international terrorism
where the territories or nationals of more than one state are involved.8
•
The importance of the UN legal instruments in defining terrorism is underscored
by the fact that the Security Council, although it has become an important
actor in the field of anti-terrorist measures in recent years, has refrained from
putting forward a definition of its own and has mainly drawn on the work done
by the General Assembly. With the adoption of the comprehensive anti-terrorist
resolution 1373(2.001) and a number of subsequent resolutions on the fight against
international terrorism the Security Council has contributed to the development
of new legal responses to terrorism, in particular as its determinations under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter are binding on states. With the adoption of targeted
sanctions against individuals and non-state actors, the Security Council has
also acquired a role in defining individual accountability for terrorism. For a long
time, however, it has hesitated to put forward a definition of its own and has opted
to rely on lists of designated individuals and entities or let member states apply
definitions of their own choosing. When the Security Council finally adopted, in
resolution 1566(2004), a description of terrorist violence, it took care to tie the for-
78 Convention on Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Preamble, para. 2.
79 SUA Convention, Preamble, para. 4.
80 Hostages Convention, Preamble, para. 4.
81 See Chapter 8.r.
82 The 'international element' in the conventions typically excludes the application of the
obligation to extradite or prosecute in situations where the offence is committed within
a single state, the alleged offender and victims are nationals of that state, the alleged
offender is found in the territory of that state and no other state has a legal basis to
exercise jurisdiction with regard to the offence. See for instance art. 3 of the Terrorist
Bombings Convention and art. 3 of the Terrorist Financing Convention. Kolb, supra
note 13, at 243-244, has presented a somewhat broader definition of an 'international element;
which excludes acts committed within one state not affecting other states or targets
having an international status. It is worth noting that also the title of the terrorism item
on the agenda of the UNGA has been restricted to 'international terrorism'. The Security
Council has nevertheless also referred to 'terrorism' without further qualifications.
20
The International Law of Terrorism
mulation to the existing conventions and protocols.83 Similarly, the International
Court of Justice has avoided taking a stand on the definition of terrorism, even
though it has often dealt with situations of (state-supported) private violence.84
As noted earlier, the sectoral conventions and protocols are applicable to the
prohibited ·conduct irrespective of the motives of the perpetrator. In contrast to
this approach, the resolutions of the UN General Assembly, in particular the 1994
Declaration, view terrorism in terms of criminal acts committed for political purposes
and with the intention to provoke fear. Some of the recent UN anti-terrorist
conventions have moved from objective criminalisations to subjective ones
including a terrorist motive as an element of the crime. This is the case, most notably,
with the generic definition of 'terrorist act' under the 1999 Convention on
Terrorist Financing, which covers acts
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other,
person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of an armed
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate
a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do
or to abstain from doing any act. 8
5
83 This has also provoked comments to the effect that the Security Council should have
imposed a definition of its own;. see for instance Andrea Bianchi, 'Security Council' s
Anti-terror Resolutions and their Implementation by Member States: An Overview: 4
]IC] (2006), 1044-1073, at 1048-105r.
84 Lim has referred in particular to the Lockerbie case as a lost opportunity for the Court
to rule on the status of (state-sponsored) terrorism in general international law. See C.L.
Lim, 'The Question of a Generic Definition of Terrorism Under General International
Law: in Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor and Kent Roach (eds.), Global Anti-Terrorism
Law and Policy, Cambridge University Press, 2.005, 37-64, at 48-49. See also Questions
of Interpretation and Application of the I97I Montreal Convention Arisingfrom the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Yamahiriya v. United States of America), Provisional
Measures, Order of r4 April r992., ICJ reports (r992.), p. rr4; Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the I97I Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Yamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of
r4 April r992., ICJ Reports (r992.), p. 3. Maurice Flory, 'International law: an instrument
to combat terrorism: in Rosalyn Higgins and Flory (eds.), Terrorism and International
Law, Routledge, r996, 30-39, at 32. already regarded the Iran Hostages case as a lost opportunity
for the ICJ to attempt to establish a definition of terrorism. See Case concerning
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (United States of America v. Iran),
Judgement of 2.4 May r980, ICJ Reports (1980), p. 3.
85 Terrorist Financing Convention, art. 2.(1)b).
21
Chapter1
The definition of terrorist offences under the Draft Comprehensive Convention on
the Suppression of Terrorism contains the same requirement of'terrorist intent':
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that
person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, does an act intended to
cause:
(a) death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
(b) serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public
use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure
facility or the environment; or
( c) damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph I
(b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss,
when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population,
or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act. 86
Some of the new offences added in 2005 to the SUA Convention include the same
requirement.87 While the examples above are taken from fairly recently drafted
texts, the interest in the 'terrorist motive' is not a new phenomenon. It is related
to the other strand of the international law of terrorist crimes: the tradition concerned
with the generic definition of a terrorist act, which both preceded the sectoral
strategy and has outlived it.88
1.2.2. SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE 'DEFINITION OF TERRORISM'
The issue of the 'definition of terrorism' is by no means confined to the UN
debates, but lives and thrives in the academic discussion where it is addressed from
a number of different perspectives, ranging across the disciplines of history, sociology,
political science, philosophy, law and others. The definitions suggested in the
literature present terrorism as communication by means of violence or emphasise
its war-like qualities or context-specific aspects.89 This wealth ofliterature can be
86 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 of
17 December 1996, Sixth session (2.8 January-1 February 2.002.), UN Doc.A/RES/57/37,
at 6.
87 For more detail, see Chapter 7.2..
88 The first phase of this tradition, which has focused on state terrorism, will be examined in
more detail in Chapter 2..2..1.
89 Ibid., 380-381. See also Jean-Franc.ois Mayer, 'Terrorism and Religion: Continuity
and Change in Political Violence: in Ghislaine Doucet (ed.), Terrorism, Victims and
22
11
I
Part Ill
Indirect Responsibility for Terrorist Acts

CHAPTER 6 THE CRIMINALISATION OF
TERRORIST FINANCING
6.1. The Role of the Terrorist Financing Convention
The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
was adopted in New York on 9 December 1999, just one year after France had informally
submitted the first proposal,' and following four weeks of negotiations that
began in March 1999• and were completed in September 1999.3 The Convention
was adopted by consensus, but two years later, in September 2001 only 43 states
had signed the Convention and four had ratified it. 4 As is well known, this relative
lack of enthusiasm on the part of states to adhere to the Convention was to
change quickly after the terrorist attacks of II September 2001: the international
community of states turned its attention to the threat of terrorism and the expeditious
ratification of the Convention was made one of the top priorities in the fight
against terrorism. Most notably, UN Security Council Resolution 1373(2001)
required, using the language of the Convention in a slightly modified version,
UN Doc. A/C.C.6/ 53/ 9, 4 November 1998.
2 The negotiations began in the Ad Hoc Committee established by resolution 51/210 in
accordance with a decision taken by the UNGA in 1998, see A/RES/53/Io8, para. 12.
For the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, see Chapter 1.1. The Committee held
its session from 15 to 26 March 1999; see UN GAOR 54th session, Supplement No. 37
(A/54/37) (March Report).
3 The negotiations continued in the working group of the Sixth Committee of the UNGA
from 27 September to 8 October 1999. For the Report of the working group, see UNGA,
54th session, Sixth Committee, Agenda Item 160, Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism, UN Doc. A/C.6/54/L.2 (September Report). The Convention was adopted
on 9 December 1999; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, UN Doc. A/RES/ 54/109, UNTS Vol. 2178, p. 229.
4 The Convention was opened for signature on 10 January 2000. By September 2001, it had
been ratified by Botswana, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan and the United Kingdom.
Chapter6
all states to criminalise "the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly
or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention
that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used in order to
carry out terrorist acts".s Subsequently, when adopting eight special recommendations
on terrorist financing, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified the
criminalisation of the financing of terrorism on the basis of the 1999 Convention
as among the priority measures to be taken by national governments. 6
The ratification process that ensued was an exceptionally expeditious one.
While it can be assumed that the different aspects of the Convention were thoroughly
analysed and considered in relation to the requirements of the various
national legal systems, legal commentaries were few, and the new features of the
Convention did not draw much attention in the academic world, either.7 Most
often, the Terrorist Financing Convention is mentioned as another sectoral convention.
8 Practical guidelines were elaborated by the UN Office on Drugs and
5 UN Doc. S/RES/I373(20or), para. r(b).
6 The FATF is a highly influential expert organisation attached to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD. Special Recommendation I urged
all states to take immediate steps to ratify and fully implement the Terrorist Financing
Convention. The purpose of Special Recommendation II concerning the criminalisation
of the financing of terrorism and associated money laundering was to "reiterate and reinforce
the criminalization standard as set forth in the Terrorist Financing Convention, in
particular article 2". See Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation .II, para. r and
footnote r. The FATF has since then, in October 2004, adopted one additional Special
Recommendation concerning the financing of terrorism. All special recommendations
and interpretative notes are available at the website of the FATF, http://www.oecd.org/
fatf/TerFinance_en.html.
7 Among the few analyses of the Convention thus far, see Anthony Aust, 'Counter
Terrorism - A New Approach: The International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism'. 5 Max Planck UNYB (20or), 285-306 and Roberto Lavalle, 'The
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism'. 60 ZaoRV
(2000 ). Some authors have briefly referred to the Convention with a critical interest: see
Monica Serrano, 'The Political Economy of Terrorism'. in Jane Boulden and Thomas G.
Weiss (eds.), Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September II, Indiana University
Press, 2004, r98-2r8; ErlingJohannes Husab0, 'Strafferetten ogkampen mot terrorismen'.
9r Nordisk Tidsskrift far Kriminalvidenskab (2004), r80-r93; Mark Pieth, 'Criminalizing
the Financing ofTerrorism'. 5JICJ (2006), ro74-ro86.
8 See for instance Jean-Marc Sorel, 'Some Questions About the Definition of Terrorism and
the Fight Against Its Financing'. r4EJIL (2003), 365-378, at 372-373: "So the Convention
must be considered as a framework convention which is to be added to the 'collection'
of existing conventions on terrorism:' For a similar view, see Helen Duffy, The '~r on
Terror' and the Framework of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2005, at
24, and Robert Kolb, 'The Exercise ofCriminalJurisdiction over International Terrorists'.
in Andrea Bianchi (ed.), Enforcing International Law Norms Against Terrorism, Hart
254
The Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing
Crime (UNOCD) and the FATF on how to introduce the provisions of the
Convention into national law,9 but as expressions of the strong interest on the part
of the international community after September 2.001 in the full implementation
of the Convention, they do not shed much light on the inherent tensions in the
Convention or raise questions about how its terms should be interpreted.10 The
reasons for the relative scarcity of analytical or critical interest can be put forward
only tentatively. Apart from the sense of urgency created by the new international
obligations that states tried to fulfil by ratifying the Convention and the emerging
international consensus of the instrumental role of the Convention in the fight
against terrorism, other reasons can be identified. To begin with, reference can be
made to the sheer number of new legal questions related to the anti-terrorist measures
adopted by governments or by international organisations afi:er September
2.001, not least those related to counter-terrorism and human rights, which have
occupied both governments and scholars. If terrorism was an uninteresting subject
Publishing, 2.004, 2.2.7-2.81, at 2.2.9-2.31. See,however, Andrea Gioia, 'The UN Conventions
on the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism: in Giuseppe Nesi (ed.),
International Cooperation in Counter-terrorism: The United Nations and Regional
Organizations in the Fight Against Terrorism, Ashgate, 2.006, 3-2.3, at II. It is also telling
that a collection of articles published in 2.002. on the financing of terrorism reproduced
the entire text of the Convention in the documentary annex but contained only a passing
reference to the Convention in one article. See Mark Pieth (ed.), Financing Terrorism,
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2.002..
9 C£ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Legislative Guide to the Universal Antiterrorism
Conventions and Protocols' and 'Check Lists for the 12. Universal Anti-Terrorism
Conventions: both available at the UNOCD website See also FATF, Interpretative Note to
Special Recommendation II, http://www.oecd.org/fatf/TerFinance_en.html. The CTC
has interpreted the Convention in the context of i:he ongoing dialogue with states concerning
the implementation of UNSCR 1373; see for instance Walter Gehr, 'Recurrent
Issues: Briefing for member States on 4 April, 2.002., available at www.un.org/Docs/sc/
committees/1373/rc.htm.
ro The same is true for many scholarly contributions which focus on the effective enforcement
of international obligations to suppress the financing of terrorism. See Mark Kantor,
'Effective Enforcement of International Obligations to Suppress the FinancingofTerror',
The American Society of International Law Task Force on Terrorism, ASIL Task Force
Papers, September 2.002., http://www.asil.org; Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo and Mauro
Megliani, 'Freezing the Assets oflnternational Terrorist Organisations: in Andrea Bianchi
( ed.),Enforcing International Law Norms Against Terrorism, Hart Publishing, 2.004, 377-
413 and Anna Gardella, 'The Fight against the Financing of Terrorism between Judicial
and Regulatory Cooperation', in Bianchi (ed.), op.cit., 415-452., as well as Kevin E. Davis,
'The Financial War on Terrorism: in Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor and Kent Roach,
Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, Cambridge University Press, 2.005, 179-198.
255
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in international law before 2.001, the situation has clearly changed and now features
a superabundance of meaningful topics.
Moreover, reference can be made to the background of the Convention and
to the nature of the negotiation process. As mentioned, the negotiations were completed
in a very short time and the reports show a clear focus on a limited number
of questions during the two rounds of discussions. A particular feature of anti-terrorist
conventions, whether universal or regional, is that they have been negotiated
in a fairly closed inter-governmental setting, with fewer participants and clearly
less attention from the NGO community than many other recent multilateral
conventions in the fields of international criminal law, 11 international humanitarian
law,12 or in the area ofinternational environmental law.'3 As the Terrorist Financing
Convention was the twelfth in the succession of anti-terrorist conventions and protocols
elaborated under the auspices of the UN, and the third such instrument to
be elaborated in the Sixth Committee since 1996, it may seem natural enough that
it did not provoke an extensive debate. Compared to the Rome Statute of the ICC
with its more than 12.0 articles, the Financing Convention is a lean instrument, and
most of its provisions have been reproduced as such or with minor amendments
from earlier anti-terrorist conventions. There was an. established tradition since
the 1970s on how to draft anti-terrorist instruments, the expertise was beginning
to concentrate in the UN Sixth Committee in the late 1990s and open questions
were few. In this particular case, however, appearances may be deceiving, for the
Terrorist Financing Convention is in fact a radically different instrument which
breaks new ground with regard to not only the obligations of states but also, in
particular, questions of individual criminal responsibility.
All the earlier anti-terrorist criminal law conventions, however their scope
of application is defined, address terrorism as violent crime.'4 While those instruments
may occasionally include certain non-violent offences, such as the communication
of false information under the 1988 SUA Convention,'5 their main focus
is on countering violent acts and the specific methods that terrorist groups usu-
II Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/ 9,
UNTS No. 38544.
12. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel
Mines and on their Destruction, 18 September 1997, UNTS Vol. 2.056, p. 2.II,
13 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, II December
1997, FCCC/CP/r997/L.7/ Add.1, 37 ILM (1998), at 2.2. et seq.
14 The 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives is not a criminal law convention.
15 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Nayigation, Rome, ro March 1988, UNTS No. 2.9004 (SUA Convention), art. 3 (1)(f).
256
The Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing
ally resort to. The Financing Convention, in marked contrast to the other UN
anti-terrorist instruments, deals with financial transactions and provision of material
support in the broad entourage of terrorist groups. Such transactions may
include donations to charities, the use of shell companies and otherwise legitimate
businesses, as well as the use of proceeds from organised crime, and can extend
to any sector of society.16 The specific features of the crime of terrorist financing
include that the act of financing as such does not cause injury or serious damage
to any person or property, or the environment. Furthermore, the actus reus of the
financing crime is not necessarily illegal or in breach of the normal social rules of
behaviour. Accordingly, there is for that reason no inherent stigma associated with
financing, and the unlawfulness of terrorist financing is not readily apparent to the
public. In this regard, and using a terminology with which Naylor has described
different forms of organised crime, it can be said that the earlier anti-terrorist conventions
deal with 'predatory crime: while terrorist financing is comparable to
'market-based crimes'.17 Like the latter, terrorist financing is a victimless and apparently
innocuous act which comes close to and may be difficult to distinguish from
perfectly legal activities.18 When dealing with crimes that fall outside the predatory
category, "the issues are far more complex, the morality is fuzzier, the victims
are harder to define, and the anti-social consequences are much more subject to
debate':19
The construction of terrorist financing as a specific crime was unique at the
time the Convention was adopted and raised contentious questions during the
negodations. A salient feature in the definition of the crime is that terrorist financing
is not a self-standing offence but is defined with reference to other instruments
that are listed in the Annex to the Convention. An act of financing thus becomes
terrorist when it is carried out with the intention or in the knowledge that the
funds will be used to commit one or more of the listed offences. Other examples
16 The diversity of the sources and methods of terrorist financing has been emphasized
by Kurt Eichenwald, 'Terror Money Hard to Block, Officials Find'. New York Times,
n/ro/2001 and Kantor, supra note ro.
17 R.T. Naylor, 'Predators, Parasites, or Free-Market Pioneers: Reflections on the Nature
and Analysis of Profit-Driven Crime'. in Margaret E. Beare (ed.), Critical Reflections
on Transnational Organized Crime, Money Laundering, and Corruption, University of
Toronto Press, 2003, 35-53 (Naylor 2003a), at 36. Naylor has distinguished three different
types of profit-driven cime: 'predatory'. 'market-based' and 'commercial'. While this
typology is not applicable as such to terrorist crimes, the distinction between the predatory
form and the two other forms of criminality corresponds roughly to the distinction
between violent terrorist crimes and non-violent financing.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
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of crimes so construed, and dependent on other crimes, include money-laundering
which is defined with reference to a number of predicate crimes, and transnational
organised criminality, which, according to the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, may cover different types of crimes provided that
they meet certain criteria and are serious enough in terms of the punishment prescribed
in national law.'0 Terrorist financing has often been described as 'moneylaundering
in reverse': while money-laundering consists of channelling illegitimate
funds to legal businesses, terrorist financing covers situations where legal funds
are diverted for terrorist purposes." As a matter of fact, it is irrelevant for the purposes
of the criminalisation, whether the funds provided for terrorist purposes in
accordance with the definition of the crime have been obtained by legal or illegal
means. What is decisive for the criminal nature of the conduct, according to the
definition of the crime, is the mental element - the intent or knowledge - of the
perpetrator. The act of financing must be intentional in the sense that the aim of
the financier is to make the funds available to the recipient. At the same time, he or
she must intend that they should be used for committing terrorist crimes or at least
be aware that they are to be so used. It would, however, be wrong to interpret this
standard as requiring knowledge of any specific crimes to be committed. The focus
of the Convention is broadly preventive, and it has been designed to effectively cut
off the financial flows in a network of terrorist financing that, unlike in the past, is
not dependent on state sponsorship but has become privatised and "far more diffuse
[ ... ] than any faced" so far."
It will be claimed below that it is possible to speak of a distinct 'model of
the Terrorist Financing Convention' (TFC model). This construct is justified
not only because of the specific features of the definition of the crime and
because the Financing Convention breaks new ground compared to the earlier
UN Conventions and Protocols related to acts of terrorism, but also in view of
subsequent developments. The innovative construction of the crime has since
been repeated and modified in other anti-terrorist instruments, such as the 2.005
Protocol to the SUA Convention and the 2.005 Council of Europe Convention on
the Prevention of Terrorism, which both have a preventive focus and address vari-
2.0 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2.000,
UN Doc. A/55/383, art. 3(2).
21 As Gehr, supra note 9, at 2, has pointed out, "The difference between money laundering
and the financing of terrorism is that moneys used to fund terrorist activities are not necessarily
illegal''.
22 Eichenwald, supra note r 6, at 2: "Mr. Bin Laden has fundamentally changed the nature of
terrorist financing. In effect, at a time when state sponsorship for terrorism was in decline,
Mr. Bin Laden undertook a privatization of terror, creating a far more diffuse network
th~n any faced in the past''.
258
The Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing
ous forms of activities preparatory to terrorist attacks. The 2.002 EU Framework
Decision on combating terrorism may be seen as another breakthrough rather than
an instrument drafted along the lines of the Financing Convention, but it is nevertheless
an interesting point of reference as it, too, significantly broadens the scope
of anti-terrorist criminalisations. Moreover, it contains certain provisions that are
sufficiently similar to the 'model' to be discussed in the same context. These three
subsequent instruments will be examined in Chapter 7.
6.2. Analysis of the Terrorist Financing Convention
6.2.1. THE CRIMINAL Acrs UNDER THE CONVENTION
Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Terrorist Financing Convention which defines the
principal act, consists of three elements, namely the chapeau and subparagraphs
(a) and (b):
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention
if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully,
provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in
the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry
out:
(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as
defined in one of the treaties listed in the Annex; or
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities
in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act,
by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from
doing any act.
The Annex mentioned in subparagraph 1(a) enumerates nine earlier UN antiterrorist
conventions and protocols, namely the two conventions and one protocol
related to unlawful acts against the safety of international civil aviation and
against airports serving international civil aviation, the Hostages Convention, the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the SUA treaties, and
the Terrorist Bombings Convention.'3
23 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at the Hague
on 16 December 1970, UNTS Vol. 860, No. 12325; Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 23 September
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Chapter6
Furthermore, the definitions in article 1 are to be read together and have a
bearing on the definition of the crime. According to article 1,
For the purposes of this Convention:
1. Funds means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable
or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in
any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in,
such assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, travellers cheques,
bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of
credit.
The other terms defined in article 1 - "a state or government facility" and "proceeds"
- do not affect the essence of the crime. Article 3 on the 'international element:
which excludes the application of the Convention ( except for mutual legal
assistance and cooperation to prevent the offences) to offences that do not involve
more than one state is of importance for the scope of the obligations of states, but
not for the criminalisation!+ A specific feature of the Convention is that it also
1971, UNTS Vol. 974, No. r4rr8; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents,
adopted by the UN General Assembly on 14 December 1973, UNTS Vol. 1316, p. 205;
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the UN General
Assembly on 17 December 1979, UNTS Vol. 1316, p. 205; Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 3 March 1980, UNTS Vol. 1456,
No. 24631; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February 19 88, ICAO
Doc. 9518; SUA Convention; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on ro March
1988, UNTS Vol. 1678, p. 294; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, adopted on rs December 1997, UNTS Vol. 2149, p. 256. For the criminalisations
under these instruments, see Chapter 1.r.
24 As art. 3 is formulated, it could be interpreted to exclude also the obligation to criminalise
terrorist funding within one state, as it severs only arts. 12 to r8, but this can not be taken
as a reasonable interpretation of the intent of the drafters. The same issue was discussed
in the context of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism
and clarified in the Explanatory Report as follows: "This provision does not modify the
regime established by the Convention, particularly insofar as the establishment of criminal
offences [is concerned]. Neither does it exclude or limit the possibility for States parties
to criminalise the acts provided for in the Convention, even when the conditions of
this Article are met, i.e. when only 'national' elements are present." Explanatory Report to
the <_=ouncil of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, r6 May 2005, CETS
.,
260
The Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing
applies to the liability oflegal entities, which may be criminal, civil or administrative
in nature. •s
The material act in the crime of terrorist financing covers the collection as
well as the; provision of funds. It does not, however, extend to the possession of
funds even though possession may under some circumstances qualify as complicity
in terrorist financing. Although the reception of funds is not included either,
the definition is intended to cover long and complex chains of financing, provided
that the intermediaries transfer the funds further for terrorist purposes.'6 The list
of items in the definition of funds is illustrative and not intended to exclude any
item of pecuniary value. It also extends to "assets of every kind, whether tangible or
intangible': a definition which goes beyond the ordinary meaning of 'funds' and, as
Lavalle has noted, comes close to 'material assistance'.'7 There are no requirements
concerning the provenance of the funds: they can be either criminally acquired or
lawful, and come from any private or public source. The broad definition of the
funds that can be involved in such transactions further extends the scope of the
crime, but does not help to draw the line between criminal and legal financing. The
mental element - that the perpetrator acts knowingly or intentionally - therefore
plays a central role in the definition of the crime, and is, in fact, constitutive of its
criminal nature.
The mental element of terrorist financing has been defined carefully, and consists
of several components: the chapeau of article 2, paragraph 1, subparagraphs
1(a) and (b), paragraph 3, and the Annex. According to the chapeau, the perpetrator
must have a specific intent that the funds will be used to commit crimes,
or he or she must at least know that the funds are to be so used. The addition of
subparagraph 1(a) and the Annex to the chapeau means that the construction of
the crime is not self-sufficient but relies on other instruments. The significance of
the Annex is further underlined by paragraph 2 of article 2, according to which a
state which is not a party to one or more of the treaties listed in the Annex may
declare that, in the application of the Convention to. it, the treaty is deemed not to
be included in the Annex. The purpose of this provision was to leave it to each state
party to decide whether it wished to criminalise the financing of a certain terrorist
crime even if it was not a party to the relevant instrument prescribing the criminalisation
of the underlying crime. A state not party to, for instance, the Hostages
196, available at http://www.coe.int./gmt, commentary to art. 16, paras. 181 and 182, at
21.
25 Art. 5. See also Aust, supra note 7, at 301-303.
26 September Report, Annex III, Informal Summary of the discussions in the Working
Group, prepared by the Chairman, para. 38 at 55.
27 Lavalle, supra note 7, at 496-497.
261
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Convention, can thus declare that it is not under the obligation to criminalise the
financing of hostage-taking.
The provision may give the impression that the connection between the act of
financing and any subsequent terrorist act is closer than the Financing Convention
actually requires, suggesting that the financier must know about a specific crime
that his or her financial contribution will facilitate, or at least be able to identify
the type of crime that is being planned. The first-mentioned situation would be
equivalent to complicity, provided that the principal crime is actually committed.
As an independent crime, terrorist financing covers both complicity-like situations,
where the financier knows of the intention of the recipient to use the funds
to commit a specific crime, and situations where the financier only knows that
the funds he or she has provided or collected will be used to commit some of the
offences referred to in subparagraph r(a). The actual coverage of article 2. is even
broader and includes situations where no crimes are committed as a result of the
act of financing. According to paragraph 3,
3. For an act to constitute an offence set forth in paragraph 1, it shall not be
necessary that the funds were actually used to carry out an offence referred
to in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (a) or (b).
Paragraph 3 is a clarification: what it states explicitly can also be inferred from the
definition of the crime. It was pointed out during the negotiations that it would
be impossible in practice to prove that a specific amount of money has been used
to commit a specific crime as complete financial paper trails are mostly not available
or non-existent!8 According to another practical argument, mounting terrorist
attacks is normally not very costly; rather, most of the 'terrorist expenditure'
goes to the long-term preparation of terrorist acts, procurement of safe houses or
false identity papers, maintaining or training of terrorist networks, and other such
activities that are not directly related to any specific attack.29
2.8 According to Aust, supra note 7, at 2.96-2.97, "Whereas it can be possible to trace the supplier
of a physical object used in a terrorist attack, such as a gun, given the secrecy with
which attacks are planned it would be virtually impossible to prove that a particular sum
of money had been used to finance a particular attack or even a particular category ofterrorist
act" (original emphasis). Kantor,supra note 10, at 3, is among those who have drawn
attention to the diversification of the methods of moving money, including the emergence
of trust-based money transfer systems, growth of bearer instruments in the capital and
commodities markets as well as the use of portable commodities such as diamonds and
gold instead of diret money transfers.
2.9 Kantor, supra note 10, at 1-2.; also pointed out by Jonathan M. Winer, 'Globalization,
Terr,orist Finance, and Global Conflict - Time for a White List?; in Mark Pieth (ed.),
'
262
The Criminalisation ofTerrorist Financing
Acknowledgement of this situation is also reflected in the chapeau of paragraph
I, according to which the funds are to be used "in full or in part" for the
commission of terrorist offences. More importantly, however, the practical arguments
made it easier to accept a construction for the crime in which no objective
or material causality between the act of financing and subsequent terrorist acts
needs to be proved, and the connection between the two offences is entirely created
by the intention or knowledge of the financier. Taking into account this broad
conception of the financing crime, it would be accurate to speak of collection or
provision of funds for 'terrorist purposes' or for 'terrorist activities' even though
such purposes or activities have not been defined in the Convention.30 Article 2
thus also covers funding of the preparation for terrorist attacks,3' an issue that was
debated during the negotiations but became moot as the broad concept of terrorist
financing gained ground.
Terrorist financing comes close to an inchoate crime in the sense that - unlike
the financing of a specific crime as a form of complicity - it is not dependent on
the commission of a subsequent crime. While financial contributions or material
assistance for the commission of a crime is normally subsumed under complicity,
terrorist financing is comparable to conspiracy, which is punished as such, whether
or not the principal crime actually occurs.3" It is also comparable to the planning
and ordering of the core crimes, which have sometimes been addressed as inchoate
crimes, the punishability of which is not dependent on the completion of the main
crimes.33 As Cassese has noted, the most serious international crimes ofi:en require
Financing Terrorism, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, s-40, at S· Both have assessed
the total expenditure of the September n terrorist attacks at soo,ooo - 600,000 USD.
See also Charles Freeland, 'How Can Sound Customer Due Diligence Rules Help Prevent
the Misuse of Financial Institutions in the Financing of Terrorism?; in Mark Pie th (ed.),
Financing Terrorism, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, 41-48, at 4S, who has stressed
that, at the same time, "Building and maintaining an effective terrorist organisation costs
a great deal of money - in the case of Al-Qaeda hundreds of millions''.
30 For a similar view, see Davis, supra note IO, at 182.
31 Aust, supra note 7, at 297.
32 The same goes for the 'direct and public incitement to genocide'. Antonio Cassese,
International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2003, at 190-191, has defined this
category as the 'third type of inchoate offences: the other two being preparatory acts
which, when the perpetration follows, are 'absorbed' into the actual crime, and preparatory
conduct which by definition cannot be followed by the intended crime.
33 While planning and preparation are not punishable according to the the Rome Statute,
it remains to be seen whether 'planning, preparation and initiation' of the crime of
aggression, in accordance with the IMT Charter, will find their way into the Statute. See
Gerhard Werle, Volkerstrafrecht, Mohn & Siebeck, 2003, at 421. See also Otto Triffterer,
'The Preventive and the Repressive Function of the International Criminal Court: in
263
Chapter6
careful preparation and concertation: "In consequence, international criminal
rules aim to prevent or at least circumscribe such conduct by stigmatizing it as
criminal and making it penally punishable".34
The enumeration of the ultimate terrorist crimes nevertheless serves an important
function in the construction of the crime, as it is by virtue of these crimes
that an act of financing becomes the crime of terrorist financing. More specifically,
the list of anti-terrorist conventions and protocols in the Annex and the reference
to "the offences within the scope and as defined in [them]" in subparagraph 1(a)
create a psychological connection between the act of financing and certain violent
acts that have already been established as serious crimes. The criminal nature of
terrorist financing relies heavily, if not exclusively, on the guilty mind of the perpetrator.
For the purpose of the personal culpability of the financier, the connection
is a mental one, created by the criminal knowledge or intention. The list of specific
offences referred to in the Annex gives a shape and an objective formulation to
that criminal knowledge or intention in enumerating the crimes the financier is
supposed to be contemplating. In that sense it restricts and defines the crime of
financing and draws a line between criminal and legal activity.
At the same time, and from a different perspective, the offences referred to in
subparagraphs 1 (a) and 1(b) lend some of their gravity and 'colour' to the crime
of financing, which becomes as serious a crime as the actual acts of terrorism. The
value judgement according to which terrorist financing is of equal gravity to actual
terrorist acts was the point of departure for negotiating a new convention and has
also been emphasised afi:erwards.35 The structure of the Convention and the obligations
laid down in it, to a large extent identical to those in the earlier anti-terrorist
instruments, also point to the similarity between the crime of financing and
actual terrorist crimes; this is also indicated in the provision whereby states parties
must not only establish terrorist financing and the related offences defined in the
Convention as criminal offences under their domestic law, but also "make those
offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave
nature of the offences".36 The message is elaborated also in the Preamble, according
Mauro Politi and Giuseppe Nesi (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, Ashgate, 2.001, 137-175, at 142.: "The mere planning and preparation of crimes is,
in general, not punishable, except in very rare cases, and may be difficult to detect. But,
taking influence at such an early stage can be one of the most effective ways to prevent
crimes; because no concrete harm has yet been done nor are specific values directly endangered"
( original emphasis, footnote omitted).
34 Cassese, supra note 32., at 191.
35 See Chapter 8.2..2..
36 Terrorist Financing Convention, art. 4(2.) (emphasis added).
The Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing
to which "the financing of terrorism is a matter of grave concern to the international
community as a whole':37 and, in nearly causal terms, "the number and seriousness
of acts of international terrorism depend on the financing that terrorists may
obtain''.38 1}iere is much reason to emphasise this point. As was noted earlier, the
provision or collection of funds for terrorist purposes is not distinguishable from
legal business except for the purpose of the transaction and the guilty mind of the
person in question. The apparent normality of the conduct underlines the need
for attaching a specific stigma to it in order to point up the social unacceptability
of the new crime and to enhance awareness of the relevant prohibition. Quoting
Fletcher, "The taint on terrorist activity is so strong that it arguably extends to
anyone who handles money in the knowledge that it might end up in the hands of
an organization labelled terrorist".39
Subparagraph 2(1)(b) - the generic definition of a terrorist act - serves a purpose
similar to that of 1(a) but is necessary for two additional reasons. Firstly, it
was needed in order to cover the financing of certain specific crimes that have not,
or have not yet, been the subject of international criminal law conventions. The
use of firearms, assassinations and terrorist cyber attacks were the examples most
ofi:en cited in the negotiations - the scarcity of other examples reflecting the fairly
comprehensive nature of the network of universal anti-terrorist conventions.40
Secondly, it was felt that a generic definition was necessary as a safeguard against
new terrorist methods or terrorist attacks directed at new kinds of targets, and
that restricting the criminalisation of financing to the financing of certain specific
crimes would be at odds with the broad construction of the crime. From this point
of view, it is noteworthy that when relying on subparagraph 1 (b) there is no need
to prove the specific intention of the financier to facilitate, say, a hostage-taking or
a bomb attack if it can be proved that he or she had in mind and wanted to facilitate
violent crimes directed in general at the lives or health of civilians, committed
with the purpose of intimidating the population or compelling a government or
an inter-govemmental organisation to act in a particular manner; or, that he or she
supported a certain policy change, as well as forcible measures to bring it about,
37 Ibid., Preamble, para. 9.
38 Ibid., para. ro.
39 George P. Fletcher, 'The Indefinable Concept of Terrorism: 4JCIC (2006), 894-9rr, at
897, commenting on the practice of anti-terrorist sanctions.
40 See also Aust, supra note 7, at 7-8, who has mentioned murder by shooting, bludgeoning,
stabbing, strangulation, suffocating, poisoning and drowning among acts not covered
by the existing conventions (insofar as the victim was not an internationally protected
person, it may be added).
265
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whether or not death and injury•1 would follow. The second subparagraph can be
said to set out the minimum requirements as to the supposed end-use of the funds
provided or collected by the financier. The financier does not have to know the
details of any terrorist plans, nor even the type of crimes that would be committed,
but, according to the terms of the chapeau, he or she must either want the contribution
to be used for terrorist purposes or accept that this will be the case.
The requirement of unlawfulness in the chapeau also needs an explanation, as
its inclusion was not self-evident, even though the same formulation was a standard
part of the definition of crimes in earlier anti-terrorist conventions and protocols.
It can, arguably, be considered an oxymoron when applied to paragraph r
as a whole: such conduct cannot possibly be lawful in any event. Applied to the
material act only, it is too restrictive, as the act of collecting or transferring funds,
according to the standard understanding of the criminalisation, does not need to
be illegal as such. However, it was later retained as a safeguard that could prevent
the crime from extending to legal activities. Furthermore, the expression "unlawfully"
may also refer to "conduct undertaken without authority ( whether legislative,
executive, administrative, judicial, contractual or consensual). It may also
denote conduct that is not covered by established legal defences or relevant principles
under domestic law': 4'
Finally, article 2 has two additional paragraphs: paragraph 4 containing the
criminalisation of attempt, and paragraph s which lays down the provisions on
ancillary crimes. According to paragraph 5,
5. Any person also commits an offence if that person:
(a) Participates as an accomplice in an offence as set forth in paragraph 1
or 4 of this article;
(b) Organizes or directs others to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph
1 or 4 of this article;
( c) Contributes to the commission of one or more offences as set forth
in paragraphs r or 4 of this article by a group of persons acting with
a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall
either:
41 It can be asked why damage to property was not included in the generic definition. One
answer may be derived from the residual nature of para. r(b): damage to property is to a
large extent covered by the criminalisation of terrorist bombings, the financing of which
comes under sub-para. r(a) by virtue of the Annex.
42 These reasons for retaining the expression 'unlawfully' in a criminalisation have been cited
in the Explanatory Report to the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention
of Terrorism, supra note 24, para. 82, at II. See also Aust, supra note 7, at 294-295 .
. ~
266
The Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose
involves the commission of an offence as set forth in paragraph
r of this article; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to
commit an offence as set forth in paragraph r of this article.
Paragraph s is nearly identical to the equivalent provision in article 2, paragraph
3 of the Terrorist Bombings Convention which is widely seen as setting a modern
criminal law standard for ancillary crimes.43 In particular, the Terrorist Bombings
Convention contained for the first time the common purpose provision that has
since then been reproduced in a number of criminal law conventions, most notably
in the Rome Statute, which improved its wording and made it less ambiguous.44
Subparagraph s( c) of the Financing Convention reproduces the Rome Statute formulation.
The novelty is therefore not in how the ancillary provisions have been
formulated but in the fact that they are applied to conduct that is in itself of a
preparatory nature. 41 The criminal responsibility established in accordance with
paragraph s(c) is derivative, and dependent on the commission of the principal
crime, which in this case is the crime of financing. There is no necessary link to the
actual terrorist acts, other than through the intention or knowledge of the principal
perpetrator. The inclusion of paragraph s ( c) did provoke some debate in the
Ad Hoc Committee as it had been previously applied to more straightforward
situations of serious violent crime, but the interpretation of the ancillary crimes
was left to national courts which will apply the paragraph in the light of the general
provisions of the respective national penal codes. The negotiations on article 2 will
be described in the next section, which seeks to shed light on some of the problems
encountered and solutions found in the Ad Hoc Committee and the subsequent
working group sessions.
6.2.2. THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONVENTION
Although the International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing
was concluded in a fairly short time-frame the negotiations involved difficult
issues.46 The first version of the Draft Convention was circulated by France in
43 Chapter 1.4.
44 Chapter 4.2.2.
45 Thus creating a chain of punishable acts in which the connection to actual terrorist acts
becomes more and more indirect.
46 Aust, supra note 7, at 293, has referred to "the tortuous path leading to the final text".
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1998, and the negotiations began in March 1999 on the basis of a revised version
that took into account the initial comments received thus far from various delegations.
47 In order to save time, the articles specific to the Convention were discussed
separately from those provisions that were similar to provisions in the earlier treaties
and did not need as much attention.48 The articles that were unique to the new
Convention touched on definitions, criminalisations, responsibility of legal entities,
seizure of funds, certain preventive measures, and the prohibition of treating
terrorist financing as a fiscal offence. The new version defined terrorist financing in
paragraph 1 of article 2. as follows:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that
person unlawfully and intentionally proceeds with the financing of a person or
organization in the knowledge that such financing will or could be used, in full
or in part, in order to prepare or commit:
(a) An offence within the scope of one of the Conventions itemized in the
annex, subject to its ratification by the State party; or
(b) An act designed to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian or to
any other person, other than in armed conflict, when such act, by its nature
or context, constitutes a means of intimidating a government or a civilian
population.
A separate definition of financing was contained in article 1 paragraph 1:
1. "Financing" means the transfer or reception of funds, assets or other property,
whether lawful or unlawful, by any means, directly or indirectly, to or
from another person or another organization.
The final structure of the definition of the crime is already recognisable in this text
which did not undergo major revisions during the negotiations. This should not,
however, be taken as a sign that the concept of terrorist financing was a familiar
one, for it was not in fact easily accepted or readily understood. Firstly, a number
of problems were related to the list-based nature of the new crime, which was not
47 For the second version, see A/ AC.252/L.7 and Corr.r, reproduced in the March Report,
at 14-23. The draft Convention had also been discussed in the framework of the G7 and
Russia, as well as within the European Union.
48 March Report, at r. The articles that were unique to the new Convention were listed as
follows: r (definitions), 2 (criminalisations), s (liability oflegal entities), 8 (freezing and
seizure of funds), and 12 (cooperation in connection with criminal investigations). For
the most part, the ocher articles were reproduced as such from the Terrorist Bombings
Convention .
• t".
268
The Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing
or known to be used, in full or in part, for the commission of terrorist acts.86 The
inclusion of all the ancillary provisions along the lines of the Terrorist Bombings
Convention was supported for reasons of consistency, but subparagraph s ( c)
which contains the common purpose clause raised some doubts owing to the
indirect nature of the financing crime. Even if it had been important to cover all
aspects of group criminality by criminalising "any other contribution" to terrorist
bomb attacks - or to the crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC - the crime of
financing was not regarded as comparable to them. The inclusion of s(c), it was
argued, would extend the criminalisation to acts that were remote even from the
act of financing, not to mention the actual terrorist offences. Likewise, the criminalisation
of complicity or "any other contribution" to an attempt to finance - a
cross-reference to paragraph 4 in subparagraphs s(a) to (c) - was resisted, but the
arguments in favour of consistency prevailed. Ultimately, even this issue was left
for national courts to decide.
6.3. The 'Model of the Terrorist Financing Convention'
The advantages of the new criminalisation in addressing complex networks of
international terrorism with sophisticated funding systems are evident. 87 While
prohibition offund-raisingfor particular terrorist groups is another and later muchused
method of countering terrorist financing, 88 it has been stressed that a broader
approach is needed to address the problem of the 'commingling' of licit and illicit
funds.89 The principal sources of terrorist financing - criminal activity, charities,
and front companies and investments90
- include both legal and illegal activities.
This problem is by no means specific to terrorist financing but rather a common
feature of the different ways in which the newly globalised financial system is being
86 While it has been lefi: to the courts to distinguish between minor and major cases ofterrorist
financing, it is obvious that the amounts involved would play a role.
87 Gardella, supra note 10, at 437.
88 Davis, supra note 10, at 183 et seq., has compared the advantages of the criminalisation of
terrorist financing, on the one hand, and anti-terrorist sanctions, on the other.
89 Winer, supra note 2.9, at 2.6-2.7.
9 o Aurel Croissant and Daniel Barlow, 'Following the Money Trail: Terrorist Financing and
Government Responses in Southeast Asia', 30 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (2.007),
131-156, at 135.
279
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abused for criminal purposes.9' The decline in state-sponsored terrorism9" has triggered
a process of privatisation of terrorist financing that has become another form
of illicit funding comparable to many other financial crimes.93 In view of the global
scale of terrorist financing, it has been referred to as 'macro crime', comparable to
"organized crime[ ... ], money laundering, grand corruption and embezzlement of
State funds by dictators".94
Terrorist financing as a new crime has been compared in particular to
money-laundering, the criminalisation of which also has a preventive focus "on
the theory that taking away wealth accumulated by criminals removes both the
motive (profit) and the means (operating capital) to commit further crimes".95
There are, however, three important differences, conditioned by further similarities.
First, as is often emphasised, terrorist financing is the mirror-image of money
laundering in the sense that the funds used for terrorist financing, which can be
legally acquired, 'become dirty' in the process of being used for terrorist purposes
while in money-laundering criminal proceeds are 'laundered' by being channelled
to legal businesses. The FATF Guidance for Financial Institutions also finds notable
similarities: while funding from legitimate sources does not have to be laundered,
there is often a need for a terrorist group to obscure or disguise its links
with legitimate funding sources. According to the FATF, "It follows then that terrorist
groups must similarly find ways to launder those funds in order to be able
to use them without drawing the attention of authorities."96 A second difference
is related to the political nature of terrorist violence compared to profit-driven
91 According to Winer, supra note 29, at 26, "The world's networks of non-transparent financial
services not only commingle licit with illicit funds, thus rendering the illicit funds
more difficult to detect, but also provide vessels for the intermingling of different forms of
illicit activity, which have the common element of being both destabilizing and involving
similar persons and institutions."
92 FATF Guidance for Financial Institutions in Detecting Terrorism, 24 April 2002,
reprinted in Mark Pieth (ed.), Financing Terrorism, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002,
147-159, at 151; Croissant and Barlow, supra note 90, at 135.
93 According to Winer, supra note 29, at 6, "terrorist finance can be seen from this perspective
as a subset of a larger problem, that of non-transparent movements of money in a
system to which much of the world has easy access".
94 Mark Pieth, 'Editorial: the Financing of Terrorism - Criminal and Regulatory Reform: in
Pieth (ed.), Financing Terrorism, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, 1-3, at 3.
95 R.T. Naylor, 'Follow-the-Money Methods in Crime Control Policy: in Margaret E. Beare
(ed.), Critical Reflections on Transnational Organized Crime, Money Laundering, and
Corruption, University of Toronto Press, 2003, 256-290 (Naylor 2003b ), at 256.
96 FATF Guidance for Financial Institutions, supra note 92, at 153. For a similar view, see
Armand Kersten, 'Financing Terrorism - A Predicate Offence to Money Laundering?; in
Mark Pieth (ed.), Financing Terrorism, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, 49-56, at 56.
280
The Criminalisation ofTerrorist Financing
crime: the criminalisation and prosecution of terrorist financing removes only the
means to commit terrorist crimes without necessarily affecting their causes. But
in this area as well, political and purely criminal aspects are intertwined. Levi and
Gilmore have submitted that the closest analogues of 'terrorist fund laundering'
are "(1) the corporate and political 'slush funds' used for transnational corruption
and political finance, and ( 2) tax evasion for non-criminal activities".97 At the same
time, equating terrorist financing with money-laundering may lead to understating
its specific features as a politically motivated crime.98 A third difference is related to
the pro-active nature of terrorist financing. While money-laundering takes place in
order to disguise the origin and the nature of the proceeds of a serious crime that
has actually been committed, the terrorist crime envisaged in the criminalisation
of terrorist financing is only prospective.
Several reasons spoke for the establishment of terrorist financing as a primary
offence. While the financing of terrorism can in general be covered as complicity
to terrorist crimes, this is only possible in relation to specific accomplished or
attempted crimes. Where the concepts of conspiracy or association de malfaiteurs
are available, they can be applied to terrorist financing, but again with certain
limitations. Furthermore, the aut dedere aut judicare obligation contained in the
Terrorist Financing Convention in the same way as in most of the earlier anti-terrorist
conventions, provides for a much broader reach than the provisions on complicity
in terrorist offences which may not always be applicable when the principal
crime has been committed outside the jurisdiction of the state concerned. Even
where the general provisions of the penal code apply, it may be difficult to gather
the necessary evidence if the principal crime has been perpetrated in another
country. Establishing terrorist financing as an independent crime has been a clear
policy choice, and one that was finally accepted by consensus in the UN General
Assembly. More than three fourths of the UN member states have now ratified
the Convention,99 and while some of the edges in its provisions may have been
rounded - as always - in the process of national implementation to incorporate
the new criminalisations in the existing penal codes,1°0 there are several monitor-
97 Michael Levi and William Gilmore, 'Terrorist Finance, Money Laundering and the Rise
and Rise of Mutual Evaluation: A New Paradigm for Crime Control?', in Mark Piech
(ed.), Financing Terrorism, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, 87-u4, at 91.
98 For a critical assessment of this equation, see Kersten, supra note 96, at 56. See also Piech,
supra note 7, at 1082.
99 The Convention was ratified by 167 states at the end of 2008.
100 As for national implementation in Switzerland, see Piech, supra note 7, at 1079. See also
Gardella,supra note IO, at 433. Andrea Bianchi, 'Security Council's Anti-terror Resolutions
and their Implementation by Member States: An Overview', 4]/CJ (2006), 1044-1073,
281
Chapter6
ing bodies to oversee that the essential features of the Convention are preserved.101
·
In particular, the CTC and the FATF have undertaken, as part of monitoring the
implementation of resolution 1373, the task of authoritatively interpreting the
Convention.10
•
6.3.1. THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF TERRORIST FINANCING
Even though terrorist financing is an independent offence, its definition in the
Convention is not self-standing but draws on definitions of crimes in other instruments.
In order to fully understand the relationship between the crime of financing
and the terrorist offences referred to in article 2.; subparagraphs rn) and 1b ), a closer
look should be taken at the elements of the crime of terrorist financing, which, in
accordance with the chapeau of article 2., paragraph 1, would read as follows:
1) the person collected or provided funds,
2.) the person did so with the intention that the funds should be used for the
commission of an offence specified in subparagraph rn) or in subparagraph
1{b), or
3) the person did so in the knowledge that the funds were to be used for the
commission of an offence specified in subparagraph 1(a) or in subparagraph
1(b).
It has already been noted that there seems to be a certain tension between the
various components of the definition. How is the intention requirement to be
perceived in a situation where the conduct of the financier is only remotely and
indirectly connected with any subsequent terrorist acts? What does the financier
have to know to incur criminal responsibility? What is the specific context of the
crime of financing? The analysis of the elements of terrorist financing will benefit
from references to the Rome Statute as the first comprehensive codification of the
has pointed out that there are significant differences in national implementation of the
obligation to criminalise terrorist financing.
101 The ongoing reporting obligation to the CTC and to the two other UNSC anti-terrorism
Committees established by resolutions 12.67(1999) and 1540(2004), respectively, as well
as the FATF mutual evaluation system are the most notable examples. Already in 2002,
the CTC drew attention to the fact that the auxiliary offences of 'aiding and abetting'
would not suffice to implement properly the obligation to criminalise terrorist financing
under Resolution 1373. According to Gehr, "The point here is not so much the wording
of this subparagraph [ of resolution 1373], but emanates from the obligation to become a
party of the Financing Convention". See Gehr, supra note 9, at 3.
102 For an analytical account of the mutual evaluation process within the FATF, see Levi and
Gilmore, supra note 97, at 95-111. See also Chapter 9.1.
.f
282
I i
The Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing
general principles of international criminal law. Article 30 of the Statute, in particular,
is unique in setting out systematically the requirements of intention and
knowledge for the purpose of establishing individual criminal responsibility.'03
6.3.1.1. Criminal Intention
Intention in the sense of the will to bring about a certain result is always a subjective
concept as "after all, an individual alone honestly knows what he is thinking':
104 When it comes to the crime of terrorist financing, however, the intention
has a hypothetical quality, as it is not the financier himself or herself but the eventual
recipient of the funds whose actions will bring about the intended result at
a later, unspecified point of time. Knowledge, again, does not have to be knowledge
of actual terrorist crimes being prepared. If knowledge of the intention of
other persons to commit terrorist offences could be proved, the act of financing
would constitute complicity in the sense in which the ICTY has used the concept,
provided that the financial contribution directly and substantially facilitated
the perpetration of the terrorist act. In the case of terrorist financing as a global
phenomenon, it can be assumed that the financier is aware at least of the general
nature of the terrorist activities in which the recipient or recipients are involved.
What specific knowledge the financier has will probably depend on whether he
or she is involved in criminality, business activities or charities in support ofterrorism.
105 The problem of 'commingling' may make it very difficult to distinguish
the precise purposes for which a certain transaction is meant. And finally, a person
who provides material support to a political organisation does not in general have
a precise idea of the end use of the funds provided and rather does so in order to
support a certain political cause;'06 what makes such financing acquire terrorist
qualities is the fact that the person accepts that indiscriminate violence may be
used to further the cause.
The mental element in the crime of terrorist financing thus deserves particular
attention. There are two different intent requirements in the chapeau of article
2.(1), as 1) the material act must be committed "unlawfully and wilfully", and
103 Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessberger, "'Unless Otherwise Provided": Article 30 of the
ICC Statute and the Mental Element of Crimes under International Criminal Law', 3]/Cj
(2005), 35-55, at 37. See also Chapter 4.2.2.
104 This was noted by a Canadian military court in the Johann Neitz case while reasoning why
intention must be presumed from the overt act. Quoted by Cassese, supra note 32, at 177.
105 Although even a petty criminal in the first category may have only a faint understanding
of the wider purpose his or her activities serve.
106 Lavalle, supra note 7, at 503. See also Serrano, supra note 7, at 204-206.
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2.) the perpetrator must also have the specific intention concerning the terrorist
end use of the funds, namely that they will be used for the commission of one or
more of the crimes referred to in subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b). The definition of
criminal intention in article 30 of the Rome Statute would seem to capture both
forms of intention by distinguishing between intention "in relation to conduct':
where the person "means to engage in the conduct", and intention "in relation to
a consequence': where the person means to cause a consequence or is aware that
it will occur in the ordinary course of events.'07 'Knowledge; as is recalled, is further
defined in article 30 as awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence
will occur in the ordinary course of events. The phrase "ordinary course of events"
has mostly been interpreted in a restrictive way to mean that, in the perpetrator' s
perception of the situation, his or her conduct would cause a certain consequence
unless extraordinary circumstances intervened. This follows, as Werle has pointed
out, from the words 'will occur': "afi:er all, it does not say 'may occur"'.108 This interpretation,
which is widely shared, results in an unusually strict standard that seems
to exclude recklessness and dolus eventualis and thereby a lower standard under
which the perpetrator's awareness of the risk that a particular consequence may
occur is sufficient to establish criminal responsibility.109 However, as is evident
from the words "unless otherwise provided", and also confirmed by the Elements
of Crimes, article 30 applies as a default rule in the context of the Rome Statute
and will not exclude a lower standard where it is part of the definition of a crime or
applies on the basis of customary law.110
107 It is recalled that art. 30 of the Rome Statute sets out systematically the requirements of
intention and knowledge for the purposes of establishing individual criminal responsibility.
Intention relates to the conduct as well as to the consequences specified for each
crime while knowledge relates to consequences and circumstances. According to art. 30,
a person has intent where, (a) in relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the
conduct, and (b) in relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence
or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.
108 Werle and Jess berger, supra note 103, at 41. See also Kai Ambos, Der Allgemeine Teil des
Viilkerstrafrechts. Ansdtze einer Dogmatisierung, 2. Auflage, Duncker & Humblot, 2004.
He has submitted, at 770, that the formulation "in the ordinary course of events" amounts
to a virtual certainty.
109 Werle andJessberger, supra note 103, at 41-42.
no ICC Elements of Crimes, General Introduction, para. 2, ICC Elements of Crimes, UN
Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2, reproduced in Roy S. Lee (ed.), The International
Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Transnational
Publishers, Inc., 2001, 735-772. See also Maria Kelt and Herman von Hebel, 'General
Principles of Criminal Law and the Elements of Crimes: also in Lee (ed.), 2001, 19-40, at
2,g)-30.
284
The Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing
The chapeau of article 2. of the Terrorist Financing Convention has been
formulated in a way that would suggest a strict interpretation of the intent and
knowledge requirements: "with the intention that they should be used, or in the
knowledge that they are to be used" - to paraphrase Werle: after all, it does not say
'may be used' pu The intent requirement would thus result in a standard according
to which the financier must have in mind if not concrete planned crimes, then
at least a specific type of crime that would take place in the ordinary course of
events. 'Means to cause' would in that sense seem to be applicable to the specific
intent in article 2., even though the chain of intermediate actions may be very long,
and 'causation: as discussed earlier, is a hypothetical concept since there is no specific
consequence required of the crime of terrorist financing. "Will occur in the
ordinary course of events" is similarly adequate with regard to certain instances of
terrorist financing but may be more difficult to apply to those situations where the
link between the act of financing and subsequent terrorist acts is not obvious, even
though it may be assumed that terrorist acts will be committed sooner or later,
indirectly facilitated by the transaction.
The material elements of a crime, in general, can be divided into three parts:
the (individual) conduct, the consequences of that conduct, and the (objective)
circumstances in which the conduct took place, as has been done in article 30 of
the Rome Statute. While most international crimes require a certain consequence
or define the circumstances under which the crime has to be committed,"" this
is not the case with all crimes, and not with terrorist financing. The original version
of the Draft Convention referred to a fairly straightforward case of providing
funds to a person who "subsequently commits a terrorist act",ui but article 2. as
adopted does not specify any consequences for the act of financing. According to
the definition of the offence, the criminal nature of the conduct is dependent on
the mental element, whether intent or knowledge. The relationship between the
act of financing and any subsequent terrorist acts is also dependent and builds on
the malicious intent or criminal knowledge of the financier.
The structure "with the intention to cause" .is familiar from the Terrorist
Bombings Convention which does not require a certain consequence either, but
m This is how Pieth, supra note 7, at 1079, has interpreted rhe article: "[T]he Convention
excludes all references to negligence. Furthermore, both intent and knowledge may well
be interpreted as representing a standard of firm, direct intent".
u2 Werle, supra note 33, at IOI, 102.
u3 In rhe first draft version circulated in rhe autumn of 1998, supra note r, the offence was
formulated in the following way: ''.Any person commits an offence if rhat person intentionally
organizes or proceeds with the financing ofa person or group of persons [ ... ] who
commits after such financing [a terrorist crime]".
285
Chapter6
covers acts that are only likely to cause serious injury."+ Likewise, the 1988 Protocol
to the Montreal Convention on the safety of civil aviation not only criminalises
violent acts that cause serious injury or death but also those that are likely to do
so."5 In a similar manner, the 1988 SUA Convention criminalises violent act$ that
are "likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship':"6 There is thus a considerable
practice of extending the scope of application of anti-terrorist instruments
to threatening situations, and perhaps not much reason to require that the full
consequences of the odious acts materialise. The same concept of intended consequences
is applied to terrorist financing. However, the implications of this structure
are clearly different in the crime of financing, in which the conduct element
consists of acts that are innocent in and of themselves. The likelihood that placement
or detonation of an explosive, in the ordinary course of events, will cause
death or serious injury, or extensive material destruction, is considerably greater
than the likelihood that a financial transaction, or provision of material support,
will lead to the commission of a terrorist offence. The connection between the
crime and its intended consequences is clearly closer in actual terrorist acts than in
the crime of financing. "7
It is also of interest in this regard that the crime of terrorist financing does not,
unlike the offences directed against the safety of civil aviation or maritime navigation,
require a consequence defined in terms of creating a risk or the likelihood of
harm being caused. While the act of financing does not cause harm as such, terrorist
financing can be seen as a typical endangerment offence that creates a risk
of one or more terrorist acts taking place ."8 Endangerment offences form a special
category of crime recognised in many jurisdictions: no actual harm is caused
and the creation of danger is a sufficient basis for criminal responsibility."9 This
has also been the stated rationale for the criminalisation: as will be recalled, the
Preamble to the Financing Convention links "the number and seriousness of acts
u4 Terrorist Bombings Convention, art. 2., paras. (1)(a) and (1)(b).
us Montreal Protocol, art. II (1).
u6 SUA Convention, art. 3.
u7 Possession of explosives, as well as some other 'possession offences' have commonly been
deemed as serious enough to give rise to criminal liability; Fletcher, supra note 82., at 176.
u8 Where a certain consequence is a part of the crime, it can consist either of causing harm
(for instance, causing injury to a person), or endangerment - causing a risk of harm.
Where a certain consequence is required, there must be a causal connection between the
conduct and the consequence. See Werle, supra note 3 3, at 102..
u9 See for instance Fletcher, supra note 82., at 176, who has referred to endangerment offences
as an outgrowth of attempt liability.
;
286
The Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing
of international terrorism" to "the financing that the terrorists may obtain"."0 As
article 2 has been formulated, however, it lays all the stress on the subjective side
(intention or knowledge) without elaborating on the material act or its intended
consequen.ces. It is therefore only possible to speak of causality in general terms,
between 'terrorist financing' and the 'commission of terrorist acts', which are generally
dependent on the material support provided. This relationship is necessarily
indeterminate and cannot be reduced to material causality between a specific act
of financing and a subsequent terrorist act. m Interestingly, the case law cited by the
ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic refers to 'psychological' causality in the sense
of a causal relationship between a "crime willed by one of the participants and a
different crime committed by another".112 On the basis of a textual analysis of the
Financing Convention, it would seem that the essential relationship between a
crime contemplated by the financier and any crime committed by one or more of
the recipients or persons linked to them is that they belong to the same category of
crimes defined in subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b).
However, as there is no need for the latter crime to materialise, it could as
well be argued that the only relevant crime here is the fictional crime willed by the
financier. The criminal intention, according to the terms of the Convention, could
exist independently - in a sort of vacuum - without any connection to the actions
of any real perpetrator of terrorist crimes,123 even though a hypothetical link could
be created in terms of 'psychological causation'. This is obviously not the purpose
of the Convention, and would require stretching its terms ad absurdum. There is,
however, a fictional quality to intention that has not been defined in terms of the
actual consequences but in terms of crimes intended and ultimately carried out by
other persons. Not only are the intended consequences of the crime more remote
12.0 Terrorist Financing Convention, Preamble, para. ro.
12.1 The crime of terrorist financing does not require the commission of any subsequent terrorist
offences and such offences cannot be seen as a necessary consequence of the crime
of financing.
12.2. Of the concept of 'psychological causality: see the references to the D'Ottavio and
Mannelli cases in Prosecutor v. Dufko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-r-A, Judgement of 15 July
1999 (Tadic Appeal Judgement), paras. 2.15 and 2.18. These references did, however, set
fairly strict limits on the use of the concept : all participants intend to perpetrate a crime,
know of the actual perpetration of a crime, and foresee the possible commission of a different
crime (which thereby is "caused" by chem). See also references to Aretano et al.,
para. 16.
12.3 It has been noted that this is a fairly unusual way to use the concept of intent; see Lavalle,
supra note 7, at 498-499, who has held that it amounts to "some abuse oflanguage": "one
cannot hold a person accountable for merely intending, wishing or believing that an act
done by him will have consequences that are entirely outside the realm of possibility."
Chapter6
for a financier than for a bomb-planter or an aerial hijacker, but the financier must
also intend that another person, whether known to him or her or not, plants a
bomb, hijacks an airplane or otherwise uses violence with the intention to cause
death, serious injury or damage as specified in article 2(1).
A further difficulty concerns the proving of the intent. It is usual for courts
in criminal cases to deduce the criminal intent or other requisite mental attitude
from factual circumstances. A person is normally presumed to have intended the
natural or necessary consequences of his or her acts. 124 As Schabas has pointed out,
however, this method, which is fairly straightforward when applied to principal
offenders, raises more questions in the case of ancillary offences. In the case of
principal offences,
[ C]ourts [ ... ] generally presume that absent evidence to the contrary a person is
deemed to intend the consequences of his or her acts. But in the case of secondary
offenders or accomplices, the acts of assistance are often quite ambiguous,
and it is not as easy to simply presume the guilty mind from the physical act.''5
Terrorist financing comes close to a secondary act in this sense as well, as it is often
not possible to presume the intent from the physical act of financing, especially
if the funds are of legal origin, and the transaction is part of a complex process of
financing. A specific proposal to the effect of adding a new paragraph s to article 2
so as to incorporate an evidentiary standard concerning the proof of the requisite
knowledge, intention or purpose on the basis ofobjective factual circumstances did
not find its way into the final text of the Financing Convention.'"6 Later, however,
the FATF recommended, obviously recognising the particular difficulty related
to the proof of the specific intent, that "the law should permit the intentional element
of the terrorist financing offence to be inferred from objective factual circumstances".
1•7
12.4 Cassese, supra note 32., at 177.
12.5 William A. Schabas, 'Mens Rea and The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia', 37 New England Law Review (2.003), 1015-1036, at 1019.
12.6 The proposal read as follows: "The knowledge, intention or purpose required as elements
of the offences established in this article shall be inferred from well-founded evidence
or objective and actual circumstances". A/C.6/54/WG.1/CRP.w, reproduced in the
September Report, at 2.0.
12.7 FATF, Interpretative note to Special Recommendation II, para. II. It should be noted
chat chis is a normal practice with regard co complex international crimes: see for instance
the ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note no, General Introduction, para. 3, according to
which "Existence of intent and knowledge can be inferred from relevant facts and circumstai;
ices" . . ,
288
The Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing
The wider context or circumstances of the act of financing should thus be
taken into account as evidence of the financier's intent or knowledge, even though
no particular 'context element' has been specified in the definition of the offence.
This may pe particularly important where the act of financing is of an innocuous
or ambiguous nature and the intention cannot be presumed from the material
act.128 In the application of the Convention, it must be assumed that the financing
of a group which has notoriously committed terrorist acts would meet the
requirements of paragraph 1.129 The existing lists of terrorist organisations, groups
and individuals for the purposes of preventive asset-freezing spread such notoriety,
even though such lists have not been drawn up for criminal law purposes. Thus,
the act of financing is less ambiguous where funds have been transferred to a proscribed
organisation or to a person who has been listed as an associate of AI-Qaida,
Usama bin Laden or the Taliban or on the basis of UN Security Council resolution
1373.'30 In such cases it may be presumed that the financier has intended to finance
terrorist activities.131 The sanctions obligations do, however, also require states to
impose penalties for the breach of the sanctions in question. Making funds available
to persons or organisations subject to anti-terrorist sanctions is therefore also
an offence in many jurisdictions.132 In that sense the obligations under the sane-
128 Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of Al-Qa'ida, SAQI Books, 2006, at u2, has pointed
out that a financier's knowledge of the recipient's intentions should not be presumed
where charity is an integral part of the culture: "If, for example, someone sends a charitable
contribution to an impoverished student who subsequently carries out a suicide
attack, the donor risks being incarcerated for financing and supporting terrorism though
they would have known nothing of the student's intentions. (This exact scenario happened
to Princess Haifa of Saudi Arabia, wife of the ambassador to Washington, Prince
Bandar. She provided funds in response to the request of an unknown student, who later
turned out to be an al-Qa' ida associate)".
129 As confirmed by the FATF: the 2002 FATF Guidance for Financial Institutions, supra
note 92, at 150-151, contains an example of how an "individual's account activity and
inclusion on the UN list show possible link to terrorist activity".
130 See Chapter 8.2.
131 This would not apply to humanitarian transactions which often are explicitly excluded
from the coverage of the sanction regime. See for instance UN Doc. S/RES/r452(2002)
for humanitarian exemptions to the Al-Qaida sanctions regime.
132 In Finnish legislation, the provisions of the Terrorist Financing Convention and the sanctions
obligations have been incorporated in two different provisions of the Penal Code,
namely Chapter 34a on terrorist offences and Chapter 46 on regulatory offences. Rikoslaki
(Penal Code), (19 December 1889/39); Chapter 34a (24January 2003/r7); Chapter 46
(24 August 1990), available in Finnish and in Swedish at http://finlex.fi.htm.
289
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tions regimes overlap with the Terrorist Financing Convention creating a parallel
system.'33
Two preliminary conclusions are in order with regard to the specific intent
that the funds should be used for the commission of terrorist acts as defined in the
treaties listed in the Annex to the Convention, or in subparagraph 1 (b). Firstly, as
pointed out above, the conduct of the financier is only indirectly connected with
the subsequent terrorist crimes given that the funds or the material assistance provided
may reach the final recipient through several intermediaries'34 and that the
final recipient may not take direct part in the commission of terrorist offences but
may be involved in other terrorist activities, such as managing a training camp. It
would therefore seem that the enumeration of specific treaties in the Annex does
not quite meet the broadly understood intent requirement. At the same time, the
Annex and the complementary definition in 1 (b) serve an essential function in the
definition of the offence by giving content to the financier's criminal intention and
offering examples of the types of crimes that are within the financier's contemplation.
For instance, financing a group that has been notoriously involved in aircraft
hijacking or in the taking of hostages and that could be expected to continue such
odious activities would satisfy the requirements of article 2.. While the intent in
such cases does not connect the financier to the actual commission of a specific
terrorist act, it creates a link between the financier and the terrorist purposes and
activities understood more broadly.
The travaux preparatoires of the Convention give support to this conclusion,
for they show that it was acknowledged that it would be impossible to trace how
particular amounts of funding are used and that the crime of financing therefore
would also cover the financing of the preparation of terrorist acts. In accordance
with the travaux, it can be assumed that in spite of the strict formulation of subparagraphs
1(a) and 1(b) and the Annex, the purpose was in fact to criminalise
support to terrorist activities which include much more than just the tip of the
iceberg visible in the form of the actual terrorist attacks. Terrorist activities have
not been defined in the Convention - only terrorist offences have been defined
although it is acknowledged that the funding may not go directly to the commission
of such offences, and there is no requirement that this should be the case. A
reasonable interpretation is, however, that the funded activities have some connection
to terrorist crimes. Since financing is not as such a dangerous activity, the
intended consequences of the financing crime could be defined in terms of abstract
endangerment.
133 Both regimes were created in 1999; for an account ofUNSC resolution 1267(1999), see
Chapter 8.2..
134 As ~s the case with hawala banking and other trust-based systems of money transfer .
. ,
290
The Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing
Secondly, the structure of the crime gives support to the interpretation
whereby the mental element of terrorist financing can be defined in terms of risktaking.
This understanding would also be in line with the factual situation of a
person who finances terrorism through charities. He or she could be a private individual
or a member of a diaspora motivated by ideological, religious, or ethnic
solidarity, and would rather give money in order to support a cause irrespective
of the means used in its furtherance, than in order to promote specific crimes.'is It
can be assumed that in order for such a financier to incur criminal liability, he or
she must intend that terrorist crimes will be committed, or at least willingly take
the risk that this may be the case. The mens rea standard would thus be defined in
terms of recklessness, or dolus eventualis. 'l6 Even though it contrasts with the actual
wording of paragraph 1, this interpretation would seem justified when reading the
article as a whole. While either intention or knowledge of the terrorist end use
of the funds is required of the perpetrator, both concepts have a 'programmatic'
character similar to that of the specific intent requirement in the crime of genocide.
Cases where the financier contemplates the commission of specific crimes are
covered, but the criminalisation is not limited to complicity and extends to cases
where the financier willingly takes the risk that the funding will go to the commission
of terrorist acts.
A further comparison may be made between the mens rea of the financing
crime and the specific intent requirement in the crime of genocide whereby the
material act is aggravated by the intent to cause the destruction of a protected
group in whole or in part so that, for instance, killing becomes genocide. The
specific intent in the Genocide Convention is notoriously difficult to prove, but
still indispensable. Acts of genocide get their particular quality and dangerousness
from the additional intent directed towards the future, the intent "to destroy
in whole or in part, a [ ... ] group as such".,i7 Similarly, it is the specific intent that
'makes' the crime of terrorist financing. A particular feature of the specific intent
is that it stands on its own, and, as confirmed in the ICC Elements of Crimes, is
not linked to any material element.'l8 While there is otherwise not much similarity
135 Whether the criminalisation should cover such situations is a policy choice and an area
where there are clear differences between national implementation laws.
136 See also Lavalle, supra note 7, at 499.
137 Trif!i:erer, supra note 33, at 149.
138 Kelt and von Hebel,supra note IIO, at 32, have noted that "[t]he principle of mens rea coverage
under article 30 is thus of no relevance here''. For the principle of mens rea coverage,
see ibid. at 26.
291
Chapter6
between the two crimes - for instance, the specific acts of genocide are criminal,'39
while the material act of financing may be legal as such - the reliance on intention
makes the comparison meaningful. It has been said of the criminalisation of genocide
that it combines a "rather small criminal act" with "a rather broad and farreaching
intent".1
•
0 To be able to prevent the progress of genocidal events, already
the first emergence of genocidal intent, materialised in one of the acts of genocide,
has been criminalised.1
•
1
6.3.1.2. Knowledge
The knowledge standard in article 2, covers situations where the financier, without
an active intention, is aware of the possibility that the funds he or she has collected
or passed to another person, group or organisation may be used for the commission
of terrorist acts. While the mental element in this second variant seems to
be the same as in complicity, where only knowledge of the criminal intention of
the principal perpetrator is required, there are important differences. Complicity
must always be a contribution to a crime that actually occurs. Complicity in the
meaning of facilitating a crime or providing means for its commission can consist
of financing, provided that the funds are meant to be used for committing a specific
crime and that the financier is not too far removed from the crime in terms
of time and knowledge.'•· To be an accomplice, the financier should be aware that
his or her acts assist in the commission of a specific terrorist crime. This would be
necessary to meet the requirement laid down by the ILC Draft Code, and applied
by the ICTY, that the contribution must be direct.'43 Applying the same standard,
139 As pointed out by the ILC, these acts are "by their very nature conscious, intentional and
volitional acts". See 1996 Drafi: Code, Report of the International Law Commission on
the work of its 48th session , UN GAOR 51st session 6 May-2.6 July 1996, Supplement
No.10 (A/51/10); Drafi: Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, commentary
to art.17, para. 5, at 88. Also quoted by the ICJ in Case Concerning the Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgement of 2.6 February 2.007, para. 186, at
69.
140 Triffterer, supra note 33, at 151.
141 Ibid., Triffterer has compared this structure to the German concepts of 'vorgelagerte
Strajbarkeit' or 'erweiterter Vorsatz': crimes in which an extensive intent or other mental
element (' uberschiessende Innentendenz' ) goes beyond the material elements which have
to be established.
142. There is more flexibility with regard to geographical proximity, in particular since financing
is a global phenomenon.
143 The aider and abettor must be aware of the essential elements of the crime committed
by .~, he principal offender; see Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-2.5-T,
292
The Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing
the contribution must also be substantial. While the act of an accomplice does not
have. to directly cause the act of the principal offender, the element of causality is
present, for it must have had a substantial effect on the commission of the crime.'44
Terrorist financing as defined in the 1999 Convention is a much broader concept,
although it may sometimes cover conduct that would also constitute complicity.
In particular, there is no need - or possibility - to assess the practical effect of the
act of financing. As noted earlier, the perpetrator in terrorist financing does not
have to be aware of any specific crime being planned or prepared, and no actual
terrorist acts need to be committed as a result of his or her financial contribution.
It is therefore more accurate to say that he or she is aware of the possibility,
sometimes even the probability, that the funds may be used for the commission of
terrorist acts.
A concrete example of a situation where the 'knowledge standard variant'
would be applicable, recurrently mentioned in the negotiations for the Terrorist
Financing Convention, was the funding of an organisation that carries out multiple
activities of a political and social as well as military nature, and where it may not
be possible for the financier to make a distinction between the different possible
end uses, or to assess the probability that the funds end up benefiting the military
activities. The question therefore arises whether 'knowledge' as the term is used in
the Convention fits in the definition of article 30 of the Rome Statute as "awareness
that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course
of events". Interpreting the Convention in this way would clarify the meaning of
the provision and restrict its scope.'45 The structure of the crime, which requires
no consequence, as well as the explicit confirmation in paragraph 3 of article 2 of
the irrelevance of the actual use of the funds, would nevertheless speak against
that interpretation. Reference could also be made, in light of the travaux preparatoires,
to the object and purpose of the Convention, which was clearly to fill in the
gaps left by earlier instruments.1
•
6 It may therefore be asked whether 'likelihood' or
'foreseeability' rather than 'normal course of events' would better describe the relationship
between an act of financing and subsequent terrorist acts that may take
place much later in a different part of the world. The latter alternative, which can
Judgement of 15 March 2002., paras 88-90; van Sliedregt, supra note 65, at 88-89. See also
Chapters 3 and 4.
144 Ibid.
145 See Pieth, supra note 7, at 1079, on the criminalisation of terrorist financing in the Swiss
Criminal Code, which "explicitly states that if the perpetrator merely speculates about the
possibility of financing terrorists, he will not be punishable according to this law''.
146 March Report, para. 2.7, at 3.
293
Chapter6
rely on a logical interpretation of the Convention in the light of its object and purpose,
would lower the standard of knowledge to dolus eventualis or recklessness.
It can also be claimed that the mental requirement of terrorist financing
roughly corresponds to the mens rea standard of the third category of the joint
criminal enterprise, namely that the additional crimes were foreseeable and that
the accused willingly took the risk of such crimes being committed. The lower
standard implied in the Tadic Appeal Judgement that the crime is merely predictable
and the accused remained indifferent'47 could also apply to terrorist financing
but, as pointed out earlier, would constitute a borderline case. For instance,
reference could be made to situations where the primary purpose of financing is
to further the political or humanitarian activities of a given group or organisation
even though these activities cannot in financial terms be separated from the illegal
and violent ones and the financier remains indifferent to the possibility that the
funds may end up being used, say, for buying explosives. Whether the Convention
can in fact be applied to such cases may depend on the national implementation,
but the travaux indicate that the intention of the drafters was to exclude at least the
situations described by the representatives of the ICRC and the UNCHR. This
would point to a differentiation between active risk-taking, which would seem to
be covered by article 2 and which still requires a guilty mind on the part of the perpetrator,
and indifference to a possible risk. The latter could arguably be left out in
view of the drafters' discussions concerning humanitarian relief organisations.
The reasoning of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Blafkic case can be referred
to in support of the discussion above as a plausible interpretation of the word
'knowledge'. According to Blafkic, knowledge includes the conduct "of a person
taking a deliberate risk in the hope that the risk does not cause injury".148 It may
be recalled that the knowledge standard has been applied rather liberally by the
ICTY also in other cases, and according to some commentators, is broader in customary
law than in the ICC article 30 codification.149 Cassese has submitted that
the knowledge requirement can usually be reduced to either intention or recklessness
with which it overlaps: "in most cases knowledge should not be considered as
an autonomous criminal state of mind, but only as a means of entertaining crimi-
147 Tadic Appeal Judgement, para. 204.
148 Prosecutor v. Tihomir BlaJkic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement of 3 March 2000 (Blafkic
Judgement), para. 254. The original quotation is from F.Desportes, F.LeGuenelle,Le nouveau
droit penal, Economica, Paris 1996, at 384: "de la personne qui prend un risque de
fa;:on deliberee, tout en esperant que ce risque ne provoque aucun dommage". This would
seem to apply to situations where the financier transfers funds to multivocational organizations
in the hope that they will be used for humanitarian purposes but accepting the
possibility that this may not be the case.
149 Chapter 4.2.2.
'=
294
The Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing
nal intent or recklessness."'1° Knowledge is part of the intent if the definition of
the substantive crime prescribes the existence of a particular fact or circumstance
as an element of the crime and requires of the perpetrator knowledge of the existence
of th.is fact or circumstance. One could well think of facts or circumstances
that would make it clear that the funds will be used for terrorist purposes, but no
such requirements have been specified in the definition of the crime of terrorist
financing. It would therefore not seem logical to interpret the knowledge variant
as meaning intention. If the result of the criminal conduct has been specified in the
definition of the crime, the knowledge requirement can be interpreted as recklessness
with regard to that result: the perpetrator must know, according to Cassese,
that his or her action is most likely to bring about the harmful result, yet he or she
takes the risk of causing that result.'1' This would seem a proper interpretation of
the knowledge requirement in article 2 of the Terrorist Financing Convention.
Furthermore, it can be claimed that the I CTY Trial Chamber's conclusion in
Blafkic about the knowledge requirement in crimes against humanity is also relevant
for the financier's knowledge. For an individual perpetrator's act to qualify
as a- crime against humanity, it must be part of a larger attack against a civilian
population, and the perpetrator must be aware of this. According to the Blafkic
Judgement,
It follows that the mens rea specific to a crime against humanity does not require
that the agent identified with the ideology, policy or plan in whose name the
mass crimes were perpetrated nor even that he supported it. It suffices that he
knowingly took the risk of participating in the implementation of the ideology,
policy or plan. •s•
A financier's knowledge of the general terrorist purposes of the recipient person,
group or organisation may be approached from the same angle. If it is not necessary
for the financier to be aware of the preparation of any specific crime, he or she
should mean to advance - or at least take the risk of advancing - a certain ideology,
plan or policy which involves the commission of terrorist crimes. This would
apply, in particular, to the definition of the boundaries of the crime of terrorist
financing, i.e. the tough cases which proverbially test the general rule.
Cassese has shared the view that risk-taking is sufficient as a cognitive standard
for a perpetrator of crimes against humanity. In most cases, he has noted, such
a perpetrator does not directly and immediately cause the inhumane acts but is
150 Cassese, supra note 32, at 167.
151 Ibid., at 164.
152 Blafkic Judgement, para. 257.
295
Chapter6
an agent of a system that is responsible for the attack: "It is not necessary that he
anticipates all the specific consequences of his misconduct; it is sufficient for him
to be aware of the risk that his action might bring about serjous consequences for
the victim on account of the violence and arbitrariness of the system to which he
delivers the victim".111 While it may be too far-fetched to depict a terrorist financier
as 'an agent of a system', there is no doubt about the violence and arbitrariness of
international terrorism. As to the specific act, Cassese's example - deliverance of
a victim to a criminal system - seems to require that the perpetrator has power
over a known victim, which is normally not the case with a financier, who collects
or provides money or material assistance for criminal purposes and to whom the
target of the crime may be unknown and the victims anonymous. What is common
to the two, however, is the risk of serious crimes being committed.
The provision in paragraph 3 of article 2, according to which it is not necessary
that the funds were actually used to carry out an offence referred to in sub paragraphs
1 ( a) or 1 (b ), does not address the mens rea of the offence. It is a clarification
concerning the burden of proof; the prosecutor does not have to prove that a
certain amount of money has been used to commit a certain crime. It was felt to
be important to state this expressly given the complex nature of terrorist financing
and the fact that terrorist attacks are not very costly as such compared to the
maintenance of terrorist networks and infrastructure such as training camps and
safe houses. Planning of major attacks, it was pointed out, may extend over a long
period of time. There were thus eminently practical reasons for not· requiring a
causal link between the act of financing and a subsequent act of terrorism. While
paragraph 3 does not broaden or limit the constitutive elements of the crime, it
confirms in more explicit terms what is already contained in the definition of the
offence. The nature of terrorist financing as 'a prospective crime' that may - or may
not - lead to terrorist violence is obvious from the dratting of paragraph 1.
The word "wilfully" in the chapeau of article 2, paragraph 1, was substituted
for "intentionally" at a fairly late stage of the negotiations and the change was not
discussed extensively. It is not quite clear whether the word "intentionally" was
deleted in order to avoid repetition - although it was accepted that the crime of
financing would need both a general and a specific intent - but this seems the most
plausible interpretation.'54 The term "wilfully", however, is open to different interpretations
and could also be regarded as a lower standard of mens rea than 'intentionally',
one for which reckless conduct is enough.111 In that sense, it would in any
153 Cassese, supra note 32., at Sr (original emphasis).
154 Also supported by Aust, supra note 7, at 295.
155 Werle andJessberger,supra note ro3, at 47: "The frequently used term 'wanton' also reduces
the level of the required mental state [ ... ]. The same can be presumed for'wilfullness'
.,
! I
The Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing
event seem misplaced as a qualification of the material act of financing. However,
if the notion of "unlawfully and wilfully" can be seen to qualify the definition of
the offence as a whole, and therefore to extend to paragraph r in its entirety, this
would con,firm the interpretation of the state of mind of the p.erpetrator made on
the basis of the indeterminate relationship between the act of financing and any
subsequent terrorist acts. It would be a clarification that sets straight the definition
and mitigates the somewhat strained relationship between the mental element
(intent or knowledge) and the structure of the crime as a whole, including
paragraph 3. Acting recklessly, willingly taking the risk that a financial contribution
may benefit and facilitate the maintenance of terrorist structures and may also
lead to the commission of terrorist acts, and fully accepting this possibility, even
hoping for it, seems to be the crime that the drafters wanted to capture in article 2.
The exact terms used in paragraph r do, however, seem to require a closer relationship
between the financing offence and the actual terrorist offences'56 - a source of
confusion also during the negotiations as many delegations doubted whether the
Convention could add anything to the existing regulation, as it seemed to address
participatory acts.•s7
It should, however, be noted that this understanding of the meaning of the
word "wilfully" is not undisputed and that the notion has been used in the ICTY
jurisprudence as an equivalent to "intentionally".'58 Likewise, it can be doubted
whether the drafters of the Financing Convention - or even the "Friends of the
Chair" who were responsible for producing the final text - were familiar with the
various standards of mens rea in the Rome Statute. The Statute had been adopted
during the summer of 1998 and the negotiations on the Elements of Crimes had
which is often required for war crimes as well: to this extent, reckless conduct is usually
enough". See also Ambos, supra note 108, at 468, who has agreed that terms such as 'deliberately'.
'wilfully' or 'wantonly' "niche immer Wissen und Wollen entsprechen".
15 6 For a similar view, see Lavalle, supra note 7, at 49 8.
157 For instance, it was argued that financing an individual in order to enable him or her to
commit terrorist offences could hardly be more than a participatory offence falling under
the scope of the conventions listed in the Annex. For that reason, it was suggested to mention
the financing of preparatory acts in the chapeau "since this Convention would otherwise
become largely redundant"; see A/ AC.252/i999/WP.II, reproduced in the March
Report, at 28-30.
158 Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T,Judgement of 16 November 1998 (celebici
Judgement), paras. 420, 433 and 439; Prosecutor v. Stanis/av Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T,
Judgement and Opinion of 5 December 2003, para. 54, quoting the ICRC Commentary.
See also Yves Sandoz, Christian Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary
on the Additional Protocols of S June I977 to the Geneva Conventions of I2 August I949,
International Committee of the Red Cross, 1987, para. 3474, at 994, and Schabas, supra
note 125, at 1020.
297
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begun in February 1999, but the issue of the perceived inconsistencies between ·
article 30 and the mens rea requirements in the individual criminalisations did
not emerge until the summer of 1999. Decisive clarification of this problem was
not achieved until after the Siracusa meeting held between the sessions of the
Preparatory Committee in January 2000.'59 It may therefore be assumed that article
30 of the Rome Statute, if it played any role in the deliberations of the September
1999 session of the Working Group, rather seemed to set a uniform standard of
intent and knowledge. The nature of article 30 as an unusually strict standard, and
its function in the Statute as a default rule, were recognised only afterwards. The
most plausible guess may therefore be that the Friends of the Chair, just like the
ICTY Trial Chamber, looked to the Concise Oxford English Dictionary for the
explanation of the word 'wilfully' and found that it was "intentional, deliberate".160
6.3.2. THE ELEMENTS REVISITED
Mirrored against the intention of the drafters and the object and purpose of the
Convention, the elements of the crime of terrorist financing seem to consist of
material support given to or collected for terrorist causes, and the acceptance of
the possibility - sometimes almost the certainty - that terrorist crimes will be
committed as a result of that support. The mens rea, when it is not knowledge of
the purpose for which the funds are provided or the belief that they will be used
for a terrorist purpose,161 is at the level of risk-taking (recklessness, dolus eventualis ).
The elements of the crime of terrorist financing could thus be reformulated as follows:
1) the person intentionally collected or provided funds
2) the person had reason to believe that the funds would contribute to the commission
of terrorist offences as specified in subparagraphs 1( a) and (b ), or
3) the person willingly took the risk that they would be so used.
The act of financing must be intentional in the sense of making the funds available
to a recipient. At the same time, the financier must intend or believe that the funds
should be used for committing terrorist crimes or be aware that this is the probable
outcome of his or her conduct. Lavalle has held that the intent standard in article
159 See Herman von Hebel, 'Developing Elements of Crimes', in Roy S. Lee (ed.), Ihe
International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
Transnational Publishers, Inc., :z.oo1, 8-18, at 10-II.
160 Celebici Judgement, para. 433.
161 Lavalle, supra note 7, at 498, footnote 2.1, has held chat the knowledge standard should be
the ?nly prevailing standard in the implementation of the Convention .
. ,
298
! !
The Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing
2.( I) should be subsumed under the knowledge standard.16
' There may nevertheless
be reason to keep intention and knowledge separate as knowledge that terrorist
acts will take place is not a necessary condition for intending that this would be the
case.16
' At the same time, so as to exclude mere belie£ or false belie£ as a basis for
criminalis~tion, it is submitted that intention should be understood in the sense of
having (some objective) reason to believe that the financing will contribute toterrorism.
Otherwise, taking into account that no direct relationship between the act
of financing and subsequent terrorist acts is required, and that the drafters foresaw
the possibility that the funds could be used for broad terrorist purposes including
but not limited to the preparation of terrorist offences, the financier must willingly
take a risk or at least be indifferent to the possibility that the funds might be used
for committing terrorist crimes.
Summing up the extent of the criminal knowledge of the financier, it may be
- but does not have to be - as specific as that of an accomplice. It may be rather
well described using the 'conspiracy' part of the common purpose formulation
in subparagraph s(c). The malicious intention or criminal knowledge - whether
or not the act of financing will result in any actual harm - is the essence of the
crime of terrorist financing in much the same way as an agreement is the essence
of conspiracy, whether or not that agreement will be executed.164 It could also be
compared to the knowledge required of the perpetrator concerning the context
element in crimes against humanity. Such a comparison would be justified in the
technical sense as the financier, too, is seen as a part of a larger collectivity whose
(terrorist) purposes the act of financing serves.
Should the financier be described as a link in a chain that leads to the commission
of terrorist crimes? The relationship between the act of financing and the
subsequent terrorist crimes in its simplest form can be described as the relationship
between person A and person B: A gives funding to B, who commits a terror-
162 Ibid.
163 See Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility, Oxford University Press, 2007, at 180:
"Whether an agent has an intention [ ... J is determined by his beliefs rather than his
knowledge".
164 Punja has pointed out that in the US law, "conspiracies have been divided into wheel or
spoke conspiracies, and chain conspiracies. The former involves a single person dealing
with two or more of the other people in the group and the latter a successive chain of communicative
operations". The latter form of conspiracy would seem to bear some resemblance
to terrorist financing. See Rajiv K. Punja, Issue: What is the Distinction between
Joint criminal enterprise" as de.fined by the ICTY case law and conspiracy in common law
jurisdictions?, Memorandum for the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTR, Case Western
University School of Law International War Crimes Reseach Lab. Fall 2003, at 35, available
at http://www.law.case.edu/war-crimes-research-portal/memoranda.
299
Chapter6
ist offence. More complex, and arguably more common, situations would involve
a sequence of deeds carried out by different persons from A to X. There is also
reason to assume, in view of the phenomenon of the 'commingling' of licit and
illicit funds, that the relationship between A and X would not always follow a
linear model, but that there could be one or more intervening factors which may
render it difficult to prove that a given act of financing has led to a terrorist act.
It is recalled that the reasons why the requirement of a terrorist consequence was
not made a part of the definition of the offence of terrorist financing were mainly
related to the practical problems of following a 'money trail'. At the same time, it
may be suggested that the criminalisation of terrorist financing was inspired by and
based on a general idea of causality.
Terrorist financing was established as an independent offence, distinct from
any subsequent offences and building on knowledge and intention - or, as has
been argued above, foreseeability and risk-taking- rather than causality. The crime
of financing gets its criminal nature mainly from the guilty mind of the financier.
At the same time, the idea of a causal relationship - if not between two specific
crimes, then between the general categories of terrorist financing and terrorism - is
necessary to justify the new criminalisation. While the responsibility of the terrorist
financier is not responsibility for the act of another, some meaningful and
credible connection would have to exist between the two categories of crimes, to
be specified by national legislation and by courts. What could a causal relationship
mean in this latter sense? Causation in law does not always have to belinear,'65 but
the more remote two events are from each other, the more difficult it is to establish
causality.166 Furthermore, intervening factors, such as unexpected action of other
individuals, may break the chain of causation.'67
At the same time, complex problems of causation are familiar from the law of
the core crimes. Rigaux has referred to superior responsibility as an example of a
legal construction in which the role of causation is unclear.168 The crime of omission,
165 Becker has noted that "[i]n criminal law, the role of causation in the responsibility for an
act of another can be more difficult to discern. While some causal connection between
the original conduct and the subsequent crime is required to justify liability for the crime
itself, it would be misleading to suggest that cause [ ... ] is always a necessary element."
See Ta! Becker, Terrorism and the State: Rethinking the Rules of State Responsibility, Hart
Publishing, 2.006, at 301. See also Fletcher, supra note 82., at 59-73.
166 See Tadros, supra note 163, at 165.
167 Ibid., at 173-175.
168 The other one, he has noted, is the ethical duty to refrain from inflicting harm on other
beings. Fran<,ois Rigaux, 'International Responsibility and the Principle of Causality; in
Maurizio Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar
Schachter, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2.005, 81-91, at Sr.
'
300
I I
The Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing
he has argued, is completely outside any "chain of events in which a fact is connected
with its consequences''.'69 Likewise, the assumption that an intervention by a superior,
or by a representative of a state in the case of state responsibility, would have
prevented the harm must be deemed "a purely hypothetical factor".170 In other situations
of either criminal responsibility or state responsibility, some parts of the causal
relationship are diffuse, making the analogy of 'a chain of events' hardly appropriate.
Rigaux has suggested that the familiar concept of 'chain', borrowed from the natural
sciences, may not be best suited to complex legal relationships. He has thus suggested
two other images which complement the image of a chain of events and pick up different
aspects of causality: "Chain rests on a linear approach of successive events; net
indicates that diverse chains concur in the result; and stream gives those multiple
chains of events a purposeful direction". 17
' While the relationship between the crime
of terrorist financing and any subsequent terrorist acts could not be easily described
in terms of the analogy of a chain in which successive acts are closely related to each
other, the analogy of stream is more helpful if the act of terrorist financing is to be
seen as a purposeful contribution to terrorism.'72
It has already been shown how different the innovative structure of the crime of
terrorist financing is from the offences under the earlier anti-terrorist conventions.
Another, and perhaps more relevant point of reference is offered by the doctrines of
extended responsibility adopted in international criminal law sensu stricto, whether
based on the concepts of conspiracy, criminal organisations, superior responsibility,
incitement, or joint c~iminal enterprise. Although these concepts differ from each
other, they can all be referred to as 'collective responsibility' in the sense of criminal
responsibility that exceeds a person's actual contribution to a crime.173 In superior
responsibility, the superior is held responsible for the crimes committed by his or her
subordinates while in the other categories each of the members of a collective is held
responsible for the conduct of the collective to which they belong or for the conduct
of some of its members. According to Triffierer,
169 For a different view, see Tadros, supra note 163, at 171-173 and Fletcher, supra note 82., at
67-69.
170 Rigaux, supra note 168, at 82., 85.
171 Ibid., at 86.
172. See also Fletcher, supra note 82., at 63 on how the 'original causal stream' can be overwhelmed
and dominated by new causes.
173 The other main type of collective responsibility would be corporate criminal responsibility
whereby the collective is criminally responsible for acts committed by its members; the
acts of the individuals are thus imputed to the collective. See van Sliedregt, supra note 65,
at 351.
301
Chapter6
[M]acro-criminality, in its most frequent appearances, is orientated on a sort
of "collective responsibility" in the sense that each individual contribution is
a constructive ·and often indispensable part of the whole, albeit the persons
participating in such actions may be interchangeable. In addition, the whole
functioning sometimes may depend on something which is difficult to assign to
individuals. It can be described as "a State or organizational policy".'74
In comparing the criminalisation of terrorist financing to doctrines of collective
liability, a critical question seems to be related to the definition of the 'collective'.
Even if terrorist organisations may occasionally fulfil the strict organisational criteria
required of superior responsibility,'75 this is hardly the case for the networks
of financing characterised by the problem of 'commingling'. However, as has been
pointed out in Chapters 3 and 4, the law of the core crimes as applied by the ad hoc
tribunals has not been limited to collective crimes committed within the framework
of highly institutionalised organisations but has extended to fairly unorganised
non-state groups. The concept of joint criminal enterprise, notably the third
or extended category, does not require the existence of a formal organisation, but
bases criminal attribution on the foreseeability of the crimes committed as a consequence
of a common design. The concept of direct and public incitement to
genocide also applies to situations where there is no formal relationship between
the inciter and his or her audience. Van Sliedregt has distinguished two variants of
group responsibility on the basis of the degree of institutionalisation: \nstitutionalised
membership responsibility' in the sense of attribution based on a person's
function within an organisation, and 'collateral membership responsibility', in
which attribution is based on the likelihood of the crimes being committed.176 It is
the latter type, in particular, that would seem to capture the doctrinal foundations
of the crime of terrorist financing.
The position of the financier with regard to the terrorist group or network
carrying out the ultimate crimes is not very different from that of a member of a
criminal enterprise who willingly participates in that enterprise through the act of
financing, either sharing the intention that crimes be committed, or fully foreseeing
that this may be the case. It has in fact been suggested that financing should
be counted among the ways to participate in a JCE: "The joint criminal enterprise
doctrine should also imply that those who financed the commission of the
crimes falling within the criminal design of the joint criminal enterprise must be
174 Triffi:erer, supra note 33, at 153.
175 See Chapter 4.4.
176 Van Sliedregt, supra note 65, at 352..
302
I I
The Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing
prosecuted".177 The most important difference is of course that the responsibility
of the financier is not of a derivative nature. In the case of terrorist financing, the
financier is not prosecuted for the terrorist acts his or her financial contribution
may help to bring about but for terrorist financing as an independent crime. It
must also be recalled that JCE is not a factual description but a legal construct to
allocate responsibility for a crime already perpetrated, which makes the approach
retrospective. Both could nonetheless be seen as falling under the concept of"collateral
membership responsibility", where attribution of responsibility is based on
the likelihood of the crimes being committed.
Finally, it seems that article 2, of the Terrorist Financing Convention would
have to be interpreted much along the lines of the original proposal, according to
which a person commits an offence if he or she "unlawfully and intentionally proceeds
with the financing of a person or organization in the knowledge that such
financing will or could be used, in full or in part, in order to prepare or commit
terrorist crimes". If intention has a fictional quality and 'intention in the vacuum'
must be excluded as a crime of conscience, the knowledge standard prevails unless
there is a way to link the intention to more objective circumstances. If the knowledge
standard has to be extended to cover recklessness as well, a reasonable interpretation
of that standard would include cases where the financier knows that
funds "could be used" for the commission of terrorist crimes. It seems that for all
the good attempts in the negotiations, the broad concept of financing is not easily
reconcilable with thresholds and distinctions, and where they were proposed, they
did not seem to have much practical meaning. This can at least partly be explained
by referring to the specific features of both financing and terrorism as real-world
phenomena. As for financing, its global dimensions and fungible nature made
it important to adopt a broad definition of 'funds: As for terrorist activities, it
was recognised that their most visible expression, the mounting of violent acts,
often requires long-term planning and conspiring as well as meticulous preparation.
They do, however, also include a political component, a cause that many a
bona fide or indifferent prospective financier may wish to support. The broad concept
of financing and a liberal interpretation of the Convention extend criminal
liability to acts that amount to the preparation of preparation, as much as the idea
was objected to during the negotiations. This emphasises the importance of rigor-
177 Nicola Piacente, 'Importance of the Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine for the ICTY
Prosecutorial Policy; 2 ]IC] (2004), 446-454, at 453. He has also suggested that the
action of the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor should be more focused on financial investigations.
303
ous national-level implementation, so that the Convention does not constitute a
sweeping tool for prosecuting minor cases of unintentional financing.'78
178 One possibility is to introduce a filter to assess the gravity of the acts. For instance, in
Finland any prosecutions of terrorist financing are subject to a decision of the Prosecutor
General.This procedure also applies to the other crimes under Chapter 34a of the Penal
Code concerning terrorist offences.
I I

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