Volume VIII - Annexes 278-298

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
VOLUME VIII OF THE ANNEXES
TO THE MEMORIAL
SUBMITTED BY UKRAINE
12 JUNE 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Annex 278 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 51/210, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210,
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (17 December 1999)
Annex 279 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third
Session, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 53rd. Sess., U.N. Doc. No. A/56/10 (23
April-1 June, 2 July-10 August 2001), art. 58 & commentary, pp. 142-143,
para. 3, reproduced un Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001,
vol.II (2)
Annex 280 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (28 September
2001)
Annex 281 Letter from J.W Wainwright, Expert Adviser, to the Chairman of the Counter-
Terrorism Committee, para. 7 (12 November 2002)
Annex 282 U.N. G.A. Res. 57/173, Strengthening the United Nations Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice Programme, in Particular its Technical Cooperation
Capacity (21 January 2003)
Annex 283 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1636, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1636 (31 October
2005)
Annex 284 UNODC, Legislative Guide to the Universal Anti-Terrorism Conventions and
Protocols 12-13 (2008)
Annex 285 UNODC, Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime Against Terrorism
30-31 (2008)
Annex 286 Committee Against Torture, General Comment No. 2 (28 January 2008)
Annex 287 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Effects of Armed Conflicts
on Treaties, with Commentaries (2011)
Annex 288 International Law Commission, The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (aut
dedere aut judicare): Final Report on the International Law Commission
(2014)
Annex 289 Brienfing by ASG Ivan Šimonovic to the UN Security Council (16 April 2014)
Annex 290 U.N. Security Council, Records of 7165th Meetin, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7165 (29
Apr. 2014)
Annex 291 Press Statement by the ASG Ivan Simonovic, UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Launch of the Second Report on the
Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 May 2014)
Annex 292 OHCHR, UN Official Cites ‘Worsening’ Human Rights Situation in Southern,
Eastern Regions (21 May 2014)
Annex 293 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 June 2014)
Annex 294 Statement of the Assistant Secretary General Ivan Simonovic at the Security
Council meeting on Ukraine (24 June 2014)
- ii -
Annex 295 OHCHR, Intensified Fighting Putting at Risk Lives of People in Donetsk and
Luhansk – Pillay (4 July 2014)
Annex 296 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 July 2014)
Annex 297 U.N. Security Council Resolution 2166, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2166, para. 11 (21
July 2014)
Annex 298 Statement to the Security Council by Ivan Simonovic, Assistant Secretary-
General for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Ukraine (8
August 2014)
Annex 278
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 51/210, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210, Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism (17 December 1999)

UNITED A
NATIONS
General Assembly
Distr.
GENERAL
A/RES/51/210
16 January 1997
Fifty-first session
Agenda item 151
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
[on the report of the Sixth Committee (A/51/631)]
51/210. Measures to eliminate international
terrorism
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994, by which it adopted
the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, and its
resolution 50/53 of 11 December 1995,
Recalling also the Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the United Nations,1
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations,
Deeply disturbed by the persistence of terrorist acts, which have taken
place worldwide,
Stressing the need further to strengthen international cooperation
between States and between international organizations and agencies, regional
organizations and arrangements and the United Nations in order to prevent,
combat and eliminate terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, wherever
and by whomsoever committed,
Mindful of the need to enhance the role of the United Nations and the
relevant specialized agencies in combating international terrorism,
Noting, in this context, all regional and international efforts to
combat international terrorism, including those of the Organization of African
Unity, the Organization of American States, the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the European
Union, the Council of Europe, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the
1 See resolution 50/6.
97-76165 /...
A/RES/51/210
Page 2
countries of the group of seven major industrialized countries and the Russian
Federation,
Taking note of the report of the Director-General of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on educational activities
under the project entitled "Towards a culture of peace",2
Recalling that in the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism the General Assembly encouraged States to review urgently the scope
of the existing international legal provisions on the prevention, repression
and elimination of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, with the aim
of ensuring that there was a comprehensive legal framework covering all
aspects of the matter,
Bearing in mind the possibility of considering in the future the
elaboration of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism,
Noting that terrorist attacks by means of bombs, explosives or other
incendiary or lethal devices have become increasingly widespread, and
stressing the need to supplement the existing legal instruments in order to
address specifically the problem of terrorist attacks carried out by such
means,
Recognizing the need to enhance international cooperation to prevent the
use of nuclear materials for terrorist purposes and to develop an appropriate
legal instrument,
Recognizing also the need to strengthen international cooperation to
prevent the use of chemical and biological materials for terrorist purposes,
Convinced of the need to implement effectively and supplement the
provisions of the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism,
Having examined the report of the Secretary-General,3
I
1. Strongly condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as
criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed;
2. Reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a
state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular
persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever
the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic,
religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them;
3. Calls upon all States to adopt further measures in accordance with
the relevant provisions of international law, including international
standards of human rights, to prevent terrorism and to strengthen
international cooperation in combating terrorism and, to that end, to consider
the adoption of measures such as those contained in the official document
adopted by the group of seven major industrialized countries and the Russian
Federation at the Ministerial Conference on Terrorism, held in Paris on
2 A/51/395, annex.
3 A/51/336 and Add.1.
/...
A/RES/51/210
Page 3
30 July 1996,4 and the plan of action adopted by the Inter-American
Specialized Conference on Terrorism, held at Lima from 23 to 26 April 1996
under the auspices of the Organization of American States,5 and in particular
calls upon all States:
(a) To recommend that relevant security officials undertake
consultations to improve the capability of Governments to prevent, investigate
and respond to terrorist attacks on public facilities, in particular means of
public transport, and to cooperate with other Governments in this respect;
(b) To accelerate research and development regarding methods of
detection of explosives and other harmful substances that can cause death or
injury, undertake consultations on the development of standards for marking
explosives in order to identify their origin in post-blast investigations, and
promote cooperation and transfer of technology, equipment and related
materials, where appropriate;
(c) To note the risk of terrorists using electronic or wire
communications systems and networks to carry out criminal acts and the need to
find means, consistent with national law, to prevent such criminality and to
promote cooperation where appropriate;
(d) To investigate, when sufficient justification exists according to
national laws, and acting within their jurisdiction and through appropriate
channels of international cooperation, the abuse of organizations, groups or
associations, including those with charitable, social or cultural goals, by
terrorists who use them as a cover for their own activities;
(e) To develop, if necessary, especially by entering into bilateral
and multilateral agreements and arrangements, mutual legal assistance
procedures aimed at facilitating and speeding investigations and collecting
evidence, as well as cooperation between law enforcement agencies in order to
detect and prevent terrorist acts;
(f) To take steps to prevent and counteract, through appropriate
domestic measures, the financing of terrorists and terrorist organizations,
whether such financing is direct or indirect through organizations which also
have or claim to have charitable, social or cultural goals or which are also
engaged in unlawful activities such as illicit arms trafficking, drug dealing
and racketeering, including the exploitation of persons for purposes of
funding terrorist activities, and in particular to consider, where
appropriate, adopting regulatory measures to prevent and counteract movements
of funds suspected to be intended for terrorist purposes without impeding in
any way the freedom of legitimate capital movements and to intensify the
exchange of information concerning international movements of such funds;
4. Also calls upon all States, with the aim of enhancing the
efficient implementation of relevant legal instruments, to intensify, as and
where appropriate, the exchange of information on facts related to terrorism
and, in so doing, to avoid the dissemination of inaccurate or unverified
information;
5. Reiterates its call upon States to refrain from financing,
encouraging, providing training for or otherwise supporting terrorist
activities;
4 A/51/261, annex.
5 See A/51/336, para. 57.
/...
A/RES/51/210
Page 4
6. Urges all States that have not yet done so to consider, as a
matter of priority, becoming parties to the Convention on Offences and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,6 signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963,
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,7 signed at
The Hague on 16 December 1970, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,8 concluded at Montreal on
23 September 1971, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents,9
adopted in New York on 14 December 1973, the International Convention against
the Taking of Hostages,10 adopted in New York on 17 December 1979, the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,11 signed at Vienna
on 3 March 1980, the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence
at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation,12 signed at Montreal on 24 February 1988, the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,13 done
at Rome on 10 March 1988, the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf,14 done
at Rome on 10 March 1988, and the Convention on the Marking of Plastic
Explosives for the Purpose of Detection,15 done at Montreal on 1 March 1991,
and calls upon all States to enact, as appropriate, domestic legislation
necessary to implement the provisions of those Conventions and Protocols, to
ensure that the jurisdiction of their courts enables them to bring to trial
the perpetrators of terrorist acts and to provide support and assistance to
other Governments for those purposes;
II
7. Reaffirms the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism contained in the annex to resolution 49/60;
8. Approves the Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, the text of which is annexed to
the present resolution;
III
6 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 704, No. 10106.
7 Ibid., vol. 860, No. 12325.
8 Ibid., vol. 974, No. 14118.
9 Ibid., vol. 1035, No. 15410.
10 Resolution 34/146, annex.
11 United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1456, No. 24631.
12 International Civil Aviation Organization, document DOC 9518.
13 International Maritime Organization, document SUA/CONF/15/Rev.1.
14 Ibid., document SUA/CONF/16/Rev.2.
15 S/22393, annex I; see Official Records of the Security Council, Fortysixth
year, Supplement for January, February and March 1991.
/...
A/RES/51/210
Page 5
9. Decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee, open to all States
Members of the United Nations or members of specialized agencies or of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, to elaborate an international convention
for the suppression of terrorist bombings and, subsequently, an international
convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, to supplement
related existing international instruments, and thereafter to address means of
further developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with
international terrorism;
10. Decides also that the Ad Hoc Committee will meet from 24 February
to 7 March 1997 to prepare the text of a draft international convention for
the suppression of terrorist bombings, and recommends that work continue
during the fifty-second session of the General Assembly from 22 September to
3 October 1997 in the framework of a working group of the Sixth Committee;
11. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Ad Hoc Committee
with the necessary facilities for the performance of its work;
12. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to report to the General Assembly at
its fifty-second session on progress made towards the elaboration of the draft
convention;
13. Recommends that the Ad Hoc Committee be convened in 1998 to
continue its work as referred to in paragraph 9 above;
IV
14. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-second
session the item entitled "Measures to eliminate international terrorism".
88th plenary meeting
17 December 1996
ANNEX
Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures
to Eliminate International Terrorism
The General Assembly,
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations,
Recalling the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism adopted by the General Assembly by its resolution 49/60 of
9 December 1994,
Recalling also the Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the United Nations,1
Deeply disturbed by the worldwide persistence of acts of international
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including those in which States
are directly or indirectly involved, which endanger or take innocent lives,
have a deleterious effect on international relations and may jeopardize the
security of States,
Underlining the importance of States developing extradition agreements
or arrangements as necessary in order to ensure that those responsible for
terrorist acts are brought to justice,
/...
A/RES/51/210
Page 6
Noting that the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,16 done at
Geneva on 28 July 1951, does not provide a basis for the protection of
perpetrators of terrorist acts, noting also in this context articles 1, 2, 32
and 33 of the Convention, and emphasizing in this regard the need for States
parties to ensure the proper application of the Convention,
Stressing the importance of full compliance by States with their
obligations under the provisions of the 1951 Convention16 and the 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,17 including the principle of
non-refoulement of refugees to places where their life or freedom would be
threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion, and affirming that the present
Declaration does not affect the protection afforded under the terms of the
Convention and Protocol and other provisions of international law,
Recalling article 4 of the Declaration on Territorial Asylum adopted by
the General Assembly by its resolution 2312 (XXII) of 14 December 1967,
Stressing the need further to strengthen international cooperation
between States in order to prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism in all its
forms and manifestations,
Solemnly declares the following:
1. The States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their
unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as
criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed, including
those which jeopardize friendly relations among States and peoples and
threaten the territorial integrity and security of States;
2. The States Members of the United Nations reaffirm that acts,
methods and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations; they declare that knowingly financing, planning and
inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and principles of
the United Nations;
3. The States Members of the United Nations reaffirm that States
should take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of
national and international law, including international standards of human
rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the
asylum-seeker has not participated in terrorist acts, considering in this
regard relevant information as to whether the asylum-seeker is subject to
investigation for or is charged with or has been convicted of offences
connected with terrorism and, after granting refugee status, for the purpose
of ensuring that that status is not used for the purpose of preparing or
organizing terrorist acts intended to be committed against other States or
their citizens;
4. The States Members of the United Nations emphasize that asylumseekers
who are awaiting the processing of their asylum applications may not
thereby avoid prosecution for terrorist acts;
5. The States Members of the United Nations reaffirm the importance
of ensuring effective cooperation between Member States so that those who have
participated in terrorist acts, including their financing, planning or
incitement, are brought to justice; they stress their commitment, in
16 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, No. 2545.
17 Ibid., vol. 606, No. 8791.
/...
A/RES/51/210
Page 7
conformity with the relevant provisions of international law, including
international standards of human rights, to work together to prevent, combat
and eliminate terrorism and to take all appropriate steps under their domestic
laws either to extradite terrorists or to submit the cases to their competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution;
6. In this context, and while recognizing the sovereign rights of
States in extradition matters, States are encouraged, when concluding or
applying extradition agreements, not to regard as political offences excluded
from the scope of those agreements offences connected with terrorism which
endanger or represent a physical threat to the safety and security of persons,
whatever the motives which may be invoked to justify them;
7. States are also encouraged, even in the absence of a treaty, to
consider facilitating the extradition of persons suspected of having committed
terrorist acts, insofar as their national laws permit;
8. The States Members of the United Nations emphasize the importance
of taking steps to share expertise and information about terrorists, their
movements, their support and their weapons and to share information regarding
the investigation and prosecution of terrorist acts.

Annex 279
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 53rd.
Sess., U.N. Doc. No. A/56/10 (23 April–1 June, 2 July–10 August 2001), art. 58 & commentary,
pp. 142–143, para. 3, reproduced in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, vol.
II(2)

Draft articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
with commentaries
2001
Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in
2001, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report
covering the work of that session (A/56/10). The report, which also contains
commentaries on the draft articles, appears in the Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, as corrected.
Copyright © United Nations
2008
State responsibility 31
RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR
INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS
General commentary
(1) These articles seek to formulate, by way of codification
and progressive development, the basic rules of
international law concerning the responsibility of States
for their internationally wrongful acts. The emphasis is
on the secondary rules of State responsibility: that is to
say, the general conditions under international law for the
State to be considered responsible for wrongful actions or
omissions, and the legal consequences which flow therefrom.
The articles do not attempt to define the content of
the international obligations, the breach of which gives
rise to responsibility. This is the function of the primary
rules, whose codification would involve restating most of
substantive customary and conventional international
law.
(2) Roberto Ago, who was responsible for establishing
the basic structure and orientation of the project, saw the
articles as specifying:
the principles which govern the responsibility of States for internationally
wrongful acts, maintaining a strict distinction between this task
and the task of defining the rules that place obligations on States, the
violation of which may generate responsibility … [I]t is one thing to
define a rule and the content of the obligation it imposes, and another
to determine whether that obligation has been violated and what should
be the consequences of the violation.32
(3) Given the existence of a primary rule establishing
an obligation under international law for a State, and assuming
that a question has arisen as to whether that State
has complied with the obligation, a number of further
issues of a general character arise. These include:
(a) The role of international law as distinct from the
internal law of the State concerned in characterizing
conduct as unlawful;
(b) Determining in what circumstances conduct is
to be attributed to the State as a subject of international
law;
(c) Specifying when and for what period of time there
is or has been a breach of an international obligation by
a State;
(d) Determining in what circumstances a State may be
responsible for the conduct of another State which is incompatible
with an international obligation of the latter;
(e) Defining the circumstances in which the wrongfulness
of conduct under international law may be precluded;
(f) Specifying the content of State responsibility, i.e.
the new legal relations that arise from the commission
by a State of an internationally wrongful act, in terms of
cessation of the wrongful act, and reparation for any
injury done;
(g) Determining any procedural or substantive preconditions
for one State to invoke the responsibility of
32 Yearbook ... 1970, vol. II, p. 306, document A/8010/Rev.l,
para. 66 (c).
another State, and the circumstances in which the right to
invoke responsibility may be lost;
(h) Laying down the conditions under which a State
may be entitled to respond to a breach of an international
obligation by taking countermeasures designed to ensure
the fulfilment of the obligations of the responsible State
under these articles.
This is the province of the secondary rules of State
responsibility.
(4) A number of matters do not fall within the scope of
State responsibility as dealt with in the present articles:
(a) As already noted, it is not the function of the articles
to specify the content of the obligations laid down by
particular primary rules, or their interpretation. Nor do the
articles deal with the question whether and for how long
particular primary obligations are in force for a State. It
is a matter for the law of treaties to determine whether a
State is a party to a valid treaty, whether the treaty is in
force for that State and with respect to which provisions,
and how the treaty is to be interpreted. The same is true,
mutatis mutandis, for other “sources” of international obligations,
such as customary international law. The articles
take the existence and content of the primary rules
of international law as they are at the relevant time; they
provide the framework for determining whether the consequent
obligations of each State have been breached, and
with what legal consequences for other States.
(b) The consequences dealt with in the articles are
those which flow from the commission of an internationally
wrongful act as such.33 No attempt is made to deal
with the consequences of a breach for the continued validity
or binding effect of the primary rule (e.g. the right of
an injured State to terminate or suspend a treaty for material
breach, as reflected in article 60 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention). Nor do the articles cover such indirect or
additional consequences as may flow from the responses
of international organizations to wrongful conduct. In carrying
out their functions it may be necessary for international
organizations to take a position on whether a State
has breached an international obligation. But even where
this is so, the consequences will be those determined by
or within the framework of the constituent instrument of
the organization, and these fall outside the scope of the
articles. This is particularly the case with action of the
United Nations under the Charter, which is specifically
reserved by article 59.
(c) The articles deal only with the responsibility for
conduct which is internationally wrongful. There may be
cases where States incur obligations to compensate for the
injurious consequences of conduct which is not prohibited,
and may even be expressly permitted, by international law
(e.g. compensation for property duly taken for a public
purpose). There may also be cases where a State is obliged
to restore the status quo ante after some lawful activity
has been completed. These requirements of compensation
or restoration would involve primary obligations; it would
be the failure to pay compensation, or to restore the status
33 For the purposes of the articles, the term “internationally wrongful
act” includes an omission and extends to conduct consisting of
several actions or omissions which together amount to an internationally
wrongful act. See paragraph (1) of the commentary to article 1.
32 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
quo which would engage the international responsibility
of the State concerned. Thus for the purposes of these
articles, international responsibility results exclusively
from a wrongful act contrary to international law. This is
reflected in the title of the articles.
(d) The articles are concerned only with the responsibility
of States for internationally wrongful conduct, leaving
to one side issues of the responsibility of international
organizations or of other non-State entities (see articles
57 and 58).
(5) On the other hand, the present articles are concerned
with the whole field of State responsibility. Thus they are
not limited to breaches of obligations of a bilateral character,
e.g. under a bilateral treaty with another State. They
apply to the whole field of the international obligations
of States, whether the obligation is owed to one or several
States, to an individual or group, or to the international
community as a whole. Being general in character, they
are also for the most part residual. In principle, States are
free, when establishing or agreeing to be bound by a rule,
to specify that its breach shall entail only particular consequences
and thereby to exclude the ordinary rules of
responsibility. This is made clear by article 55.
(6) The present articles are divided into four parts. Part
One is entitled “The internationally wrongful act of a
State”. It deals with the requirements for the international
responsibility of a State to arise. Part Two, “Content of
the international responsibility of a State”, deals with the
legal consequences for the responsible State of its internationally
wrongful act, in particular as they concern cessation
and reparation. Part Three is entitled “The implementation
of the international responsibility of a State”.
It identifies the State or States which may react to an
internationally wrongful act and specifies the modalities
by which this may be done, including, in certain circumstances,
by the taking of countermeasures as necessary to
ensure cessation of the wrongful act and reparation for its
consequences. Part Four contains certain general provisions
applicable to the articles as a whole.
PART ONE
THE INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL
ACT OF A STATE
Part One defines the general conditions necessary for
State responsibility to arise. Chapter I lays down three basic
principles for responsibility from which the articles
as a whole proceed. Chapter II defines the conditions
under which conduct is attributable to the State. Chapter
III spells out in general terms the conditions under which
such conduct amounts to a breach of an international obligation
of the State concerned. Chapter IV deals with certain
exceptional cases where one State may be responsible
for the conduct of another State not in conformity with an
international obligation of the latter. Chapter V defines
the circumstances precluding the wrongfulness for conduct
not in conformity with the international obligations
of a State.
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Article 1. Responsibility of a State for its
internationally wrongful acts
Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails
the international responsibility of that State.
Commentary
(1) Article 1 states the basic principle underlying the
articles as a whole, which is that a breach of international
law by a State entails its international responsibility.
An internationally wrongful act of a State may consist
in one or more actions or omissions or a combination of
both. Whether there has been an internationally wrongful
act depends, first, on the requirements of the obligation
which is said to have been breached and, secondly, on the
framework conditions for such an act, which are set out in
Part One. The term “international responsibility” covers
the new legal relations which arise under international law
by reason of the internationally wrongful act of a State.
The content of these new legal relations is specified in
Part Two.
(2) PCIJ applied the principle set out in article 1 in a
number of cases. For example, in the Phosphates in Morocco
case, PCIJ affirmed that when a State commits an
internationally wrongful act against another State international
responsibility is established “immediately as between
the two States”.34 ICJ has applied the principle on
several occasions, for example in the Corfu Channel case,35
in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua case,36 and in the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros
Project case.37 The Court also referred to the principle
in its advisory opinions on Reparation for Injuries,38 and
on the Interpretation of Peace Treaties (Second Phase),39
in which it stated that “refusal to fulfil a treaty obligation
involves international responsibility”.40 Arbitral tribunals
have repeatedly affirmed the principle, for example in the
Claims of Italian Nationals Resident in Peru cases,41 in
34 Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938, P.C.I.J., Series A/B,
No. 74, p. 10, at p. 28. See also S.S. “Wimbledon”, 1923, P.C.I.J.,
Series A, No. 1, p. 15, at p. 30; Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction, Judgment
No. 8, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 21; and ibid., Merits,
Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 29.
35 Corfu Channel, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 4, at
p. 23.
36 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1986, p. 14, at p. 142, para. 283, and p. 149, para. 292.
37 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), at p. 38,
para. 47.
38 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 174, at p. 184.
39 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania, Second Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950,
p. 221.
40 Ibid., p. 228.
41 Seven of these awards rendered in 1901 reiterated that “a universally
recognized principle of international law states that the State
is responsible for the violations of the law of nations committed by its
agents” (UNRIAA, vol. XV (Sales No. 66.V.3), pp. 399 (Chiessa claim),
401 (Sessarego claim), 404 (Sanguinetti claim), 407 (Vercelli claim),
408 (Queirolo claim), 409 (Roggero claim), and 411 (Miglia claim)).
State responsibility 33
the Dickson Car Wheel Company case,42 in the International
Fisheries Company case,43 in the British Claims in
the Spanish Zone of Morocco case44 and in the Armstrong
Cork Company case.45 In the “Rainbow Warrior” case,46
the arbitral tribunal stressed that “any violation by a State
of any obligation, of whatever origin, gives rise to State
responsibility”.47
(3) That every internationally wrongful act of a State
entails the international responsibility of that State, and
thus gives rise to new international legal relations additional
to those which existed before the act took place,
has been widely recognized, both before48 and since49 article
1 was first formulated by the Commission. It is
true that there were early differences of opinion over the
definition of the legal relationships arising from an internationally
wrongful act. One approach, associated with
Anzilotti, described the legal consequences deriving from
an internationally wrongful act exclusively in terms of a
binding bilateral relationship thereby established between
the wrongdoing State and the injured State, in which the
obligation of the former State to make reparation is set
against the “subjective” right of the latter State to require
reparation. Another view, associated with Kelsen, started
from the idea that the legal order is a coercive order and
saw the authorization accorded to the injured State to apply
a coercive sanction against the responsible State as
the primary legal consequence flowing directly from the
wrongful act.50 According to this view, general international
law empowered the injured State to react to a wrong;
the obligation to make reparation was treated as subsidi-
42 Dickson Car Wheel Company (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States,
UNRIAA, vol. IV (Sales No. 1951.V.1), p. 669, at p. 678 (1931).
43 International Fisheries Company (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican
States, ibid., p. 691, at p. 701 (1931).
44 According to the arbitrator, Max Huber, it is an indisputable principle
that “responsibility is the necessary corollary of rights. All international
rights entail international responsibility”, UNRIAA, vol. II
(Sales No. 1949.V.1), p. 615, at p. 641 (1925).
45 According to the Italian-United States Conciliation Commission,
no State may “escape the responsibility arising out of the exercise of
an illicit action from the viewpoint of the general principles of international
law”, UNRIAA, vol. XIV (Sales No. 65.V.4), p. 159, at p. 163
(1953).
46 Case concerning the difference between New Zealand and
France concerning the interpretation or application of two agreements
concluded on 9 July 1986 between the two States and which related
to the problems arising from the Rainbow Warrior affair, UNRIAA,
vol. XX (Sales No. E/F.93.V.3), p. 215 (1990).
47 Ibid., p. 251, para. 75.
48 See, e.g., D. Anzilotti, Corso di diritto internazionale, 4th ed.
(Padua, CEDAM, 1955) vol. I, p. 385; W. Wengler, Völkerrecht (Berlin,
Springer, 1964), vol. I, p. 499; G. I. Tunkin, Teoria mezhdunarodnogo
prava (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia, 1970), p. 470, trans. W.
E. Butler, Theory of International Law (London, George Allen and
Unwin, 1974), p. 415; and E. Jiménez de Aréchaga, “International
responsibility”, Manual of Public International Law, M. Sørensen,
ed. (London, Macmillan, 1968), p. 533.
49 See, e.g., I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law,
5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 435; B. Conforti, Diritto
internazionale, 4th ed. (Milan, Editoriale Scientifica, 1995), p. 332;
P. Daillier and A. Pellet, Droit international public (Nguyen Quoc
Dinh), 6th ed. (Paris, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence,
1999), p. 742; P.-M. Dupuy, Droit international public, 4th ed. (Paris,
Dalloz, 1998), p. 414; and R. Wolfrum, “Internationally wrongful acts”,
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, R. Bernhardt, ed. (Amsterdam,
North-Holland, 1995), vol. II, p. 1398.
50 See H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd ed., R. W.
Tucker, ed. (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 22.
ary, a way by which the responsible State could avoid
the application of coercion. A third view, which came to
prevail, held that the consequences of an internationally
wrongful act cannot be limited either to reparation or to
a “sanction”.51 In international law, as in any system of
law, the wrongful act may give rise to various types of
legal relations, depending on the circumstances.
(4) Opinions have also differed on the question whether
the legal relations arising from the occurrence of an internationally
wrongful act were essentially bilateral, i.e.
concerned only the relations of the responsible State and
the injured State inter se. Increasingly it has been recognized
that some wrongful acts engage the responsibility
of the State concerned towards several or many States or
even towards the international community as a whole. A
significant step in this direction was taken by ICJ in the
Barcelona Traction case when it noted that:
an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a
State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising
vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their
very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.52
Every State, by virtue of its membership in the international
community, has a legal interest in the protection of
certain basic rights and the fulfilment of certain essential
obligations. Among these the Court instanced “the outlawing
of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also … the
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human
person, including protection from slavery and racial
discrimination”.53 In later cases the Court has reaffirmed
this idea.54 The consequences of a broader conception of
international responsibility must necessarily be reflected
in the articles which, although they include standard bilateral
situations of responsibility, are not limited to them.
(5) Thus the term “international responsibility” in article
1 covers the relations which arise under international
law from the internationally wrongful act of a State,
whether such relations are limited to the wrongdoing State
and one injured State or whether they extend also to other
States or indeed to other subjects of international law, and
whether they are centred on obligations of restitution or
compensation or also give the injured State the possibility
of responding by way of countermeasures.
(6) The fact that under article 1 every internationally
wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility
of that State does not mean that other States may
not also be held responsible for the conduct in question,
or for injury caused as a result. Under chapter II the same
51 See, e.g., R. Ago, “Le délit international”, Recueil des cours...,
1939–II (Paris, Sirey, 1947), vol. 68, p. 415, at pp. 430–440;
and L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol. I, Peace, 8th
ed., H. Lauterpacht, ed. (London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1955),
pp. 352–354.
52 Barcelona Traction (see footnote 25 above), p. 32, para. 33.
53 Ibid., para. 34.
54 See East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1995, p. 90, at p. 102, para. 29; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226, at p. 258,
para. 83; and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 595, at pp. 615–616, paras. 31–32.
34 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
conduct may be attributable to several States at the same
time. Under chapter IV, one State may be responsible for
the internationally wrongful act of another, for example
if the act was carried out under its direction and control.
Nonetheless the basic principle of international law is that
each State is responsible for its own conduct in respect of
its own international obligations.
(7) The articles deal only with the responsibility of
States. Of course, as ICJ affirmed in the Reparation for
Injuries case, the United Nations “is a subject of international
law and capable of possessing international
rights and duties … it has capacity to maintain its rights
by bringing international claims”.55 The Court has also
drawn attention to the responsibility of the United Nations
for the conduct of its organs or agents.56 It may be that the
notion of responsibility for wrongful conduct is a basic element
in the possession of international legal personality.
Nonetheless, special considerations apply to the responsibility
of other international legal persons, and these are
not covered in the articles.57
(8) As to terminology, the French term fait internationalement
illicite is preferable to délit or other similar
expressions which may have a special meaning in internal
law. For the same reason, it is best to avoid, in English,
such terms as “tort”, “delict” or “delinquency”, or
in Spanish the term delito. The French term fait internationalement
illicite is better than acte internationalement
illicite, since wrongfulness often results from omissions
which are hardly indicated by the term acte. Moreover, the
latter term appears to imply that the legal consequences
are intended by its author. For the same reasons, the term
hecho internacionalmente ilícito is adopted in the Spanish
text. In the English text, it is necessary to maintain the expression
“internationally wrongful act”, since the French
fait has no exact equivalent; nonetheless, the term “act” is
intended to encompass omissions, and this is made clear
in article 2.
Article 2. Elements of an internationally
wrongful act of a State
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State
when conduct consisting of an action or omission:
(a) is attributable to the State under international
law; and
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation
of the State.
Commentary
(1) Article 1 states the basic principle that every internationally
wrongful act of a State entails its international
responsibility. Article 2 specifies the conditions required
to establish the existence of an internationally wrong-
55 Reparation for Injuries (see footnote 38 above), p. 179.
56 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion,
I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 62, at pp. 88–89, para. 66.
57 For the position of international organizations, see article 57 and
commentary.
ful act of the State, i.e. the constituent elements of such
an act. Two elements are identified. First, the conduct in
question must be attributable to the State under international
law. Secondly, for responsibility to attach to the act
of the State, the conduct must constitute a breach of an
international legal obligation in force for that State at that
time.
(2) These two elements were specified, for example,
by PCIJ in the Phosphates in Morocco case. The Court
explicitly linked the creation of international responsibility
with the existence of an “act being attributable to the
State and described as contrary to the treaty right[s] of
another State”.58 ICJ has also referred to the two elements
on several occasions. In the United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran case, it pointed out that, in order
to establish the responsibility of the Islamic Republic of
Iran:
[f]irst, it must determine how far, legally, the acts in question may be
regarded as imputable to the Iranian State. Secondly, it must consider
their compatibility or incompatibility with the obligations of Iran under
treaties in force or under any other rules of international law that may
be applicable.59
Similarly in the Dickson Car Wheel Company case, the
Mexico-United States General Claims Commission noted
that the condition required for a State to incur international
responsibility is “that an unlawful international act be
imputed to it, that is, that there exist a violation of a duty
imposed by an international juridical standard”.60
(3) The element of attribution has sometimes been
described as “subjective” and the element of breach as
“objective”, but the articles avoid such terminology.61
Whether there has been a breach of a rule may depend
on the intention or knowledge of relevant State organs
or agents and in that sense may be “subjective”. For example,
article II of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide states that: “In the
present Convention, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such …”
In other cases, the standard for breach of an obligation
may be “objective”, in the sense that the advertence or
otherwise of relevant State organs or agents may be irrelevant.
Whether responsibility is “objective” or “subjective”
in this sense depends on the circumstances, including
the content of the primary obligation in question. The
articles lay down no general rule in that regard. The same
is true of other standards, whether they involve some degree
of fault, culpability, negligence or want of due diligence.
Such standards vary from one context to another
for reasons which essentially relate to the object and
purpose of the treaty provision or other rule giving rise
to the primary obligation. Nor do the articles lay down
any presumption in this regard as between the different
58 See footnote 34 above.
59 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3, at p. 29, para. 56. Cf. page 41,
para. 90. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (footnote 36 above), pp. 117–118, para. 226; and Gabˇcíkovo-
Nagymaros Project (footnote 27 above), p. 54, para. 78.
60 See footnote 42 above.
61 Cf. Yearbook ... 1973, vol. II, p. 179, document A/9010/Rev.1,
paragraph (1) of the commentary to article 3.
State responsibility 35
possible standards. Establishing these is a matter for the
interpretation and application of the primary rules engaged
in the given case.
(4) Conduct attributable to the State can consist of actions
or omissions. Cases in which the international
responsibility of a State has been invoked on the basis of
an omission are at least as numerous as those based on
positive acts, and no difference in principle exists between
the two. Moreover, it may be difficult to isolate an “omission”
from the surrounding circumstances which are relevant
to the determination of responsibility. For example,
in the Corfu Channel case, ICJ held that it was a sufficient
basis for Albanian responsibility that it knew, or must have
known, of the presence of the mines in its territorial waters
and did nothing to warn third States of their presence.62
In the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran case, the Court concluded that the responsibility
of the Islamic Republic of Iran was entailed by the “inaction”
of its authorities which “failed to take appropriate
steps”, in circumstances where such steps were evidently
called for.63 In other cases it may be the combination of
an action and an omission which is the basis for responsibility.
64
(5) For particular conduct to be characterized as an internationally
wrongful act, it must first be attributable
to the State. The State is a real organized entity, a legal
person with full authority to act under international law.
But to recognize this is not to deny the elementary fact
that the State cannot act of itself. An “act of the State”
must involve some action or omission by a human being
or group: “States can act only by and through their agents
and representatives.”65 The question is which persons
should be considered as acting on behalf of the State, i.e.
what constitutes an “act of the State” for the purposes of
State responsibility.
(6) In speaking of attribution to the State what is meant
is the State as a subject of international law. Under many
legal systems, the State organs consist of different legal
persons (ministries or other legal entities), which are regarded
as having distinct rights and obligations for which
they alone can be sued and are responsible. For the purposes
of the international law of State responsibility
the position is different. The State is treated as a unity,
consistent with its recognition as a single legal person in
international law. In this as in other respects the attribution
of conduct to the State is necessarily a normative operation.
What is crucial is that a given event is sufficiently
62 Corfu Channel, Merits (see footnote 35 above), pp. 22–23.
63 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (see
footnote 59 above), pp. 31–32, paras. 63 and 67. See also Velásquez
Rodríguez v. Honduras case, Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
Series C, No. 4, para. 170 (1988): “under international law a State is
responsible for the acts of its agents undertaken in their official capacity
and for their omissions”; and Affaire relative à l’acquisition de la
nationalité polonaise, UNRIAA, vol. I (Sales No. 1948.V.2), p. 401, at
p. 425 (1924).
64 For example, under article 4 of the Convention relative to the
Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines (Hague Convention
VIII of 18 October 1907), a neutral Power which lays mines off its
coasts but omits to give the required notice to other States parties would
be responsible accordingly.
65 German Settlers in Poland, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C.I.J.,
Series B, No. 6, p. 22.
connected to conduct (whether an act or omission) which
is attributable to the State under one or other of the rules
set out in chapter II.
(7) The second condition for the existence of an internationally
wrongful act of the State is that the conduct
attributable to the State should constitute a breach of an
international obligation of that State. The terminology of
breach of an international obligation of the State is long
established and is used to cover both treaty and non-treaty
obligations. In its judgment on jurisdiction in the Factory
at Chorzów case, PCIJ used the words “breach of
an engagement”.66 It employed the same expression in its
subsequent judgment on the merits.67 ICJ referred explicitly
to these words in the Reparation for Injuries case.68
The arbitral tribunal in the “Rainbow Warrior” affair referred
to “any violation by a State of any obligation”.69
In practice, terms such as “non-execution of international
obligations”, “acts incompatible with international obligations”,
“violation of an international obligation” or
“breach of an engagement” are also used.70 All these formulations
have essentially the same meaning. The phrase
preferred in the articles is “breach of an international obligation”
corresponding as it does to the language of Article
36, paragraph 2 (c), of the ICJ Statute.
(8) In international law the idea of breach of an obligation
has often been equated with conduct contrary to the
rights of others. PCIJ spoke of an act “contrary to the treaty
right[s] of another State” in its judgment in the Phosphates
in Morocco case.71 That case concerned a limited
multilateral treaty which dealt with the mutual rights and
duties of the parties, but some have considered the correlation
of obligations and rights as a general feature of
international law: there are no international obligations of
a subject of international law which are not matched by an
international right of another subject or subjects, or even
of the totality of the other subjects (the international community
as a whole). But different incidents may attach to
a right which is held in common by all other subjects of
international law, as compared with a specific right of a
given State or States. Different States may be beneficiaries
of an obligation in different ways, or may have different
interests in respect of its performance. Multilateral
obligations may thus differ from bilateral ones, in view of
the diversity of legal rules and institutions and the wide
variety of interests sought to be protected by them. But
whether any obligation has been breached still raises the
two basic questions identified in article 2, and this is so
whatever the character or provenance of the obligation
breached. It is a separate question who may invoke the responsibility
arising from the breach of an obligation: this
question is dealt with in Part Three.72
66 Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction (see footnote 34 above).
67 Factory at Chorzów, Merits (ibid.).
68 Reparation for Injuries (see footnote 38 above), p. 184.
69 “Rainbow Warrior” (see footnote 46 above), p. 251, para. 75.
70 At the Conference for the Codification of International Law, held
at The Hague in 1930, the term “any failure ... to carry out the international
obligations of the State” was adopted (see Yearbook ... 1956,
vol. II, p. 225, document A/CN.4/96, annex 3, article 1).
71 See footnote 34 above.
72 See also article 33, paragraph 2, and commentary.
36 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
(9) Thus there is no exception to the principle stated in
article 2 that there are two necessary conditions for an
internationally wrongful act—conduct attributable to
the State under international law and the breach by that
conduct of an international obligation of the State. The
question is whether those two necessary conditions are
also sufficient. It is sometimes said that international responsibility
is not engaged by conduct of a State in disregard
of its obligations unless some further element exists,
in particular, “damage” to another State. But whether such
elements are required depends on the content of the primary
obligation, and there is no general rule in this respect.
For example, the obligation under a treaty to enact a uniform
law is breached by the failure to enact the law, and
it is not necessary for another State party to point to any
specific damage it has suffered by reason of that failure.
Whether a particular obligation is breached forthwith
upon a failure to act on the part of the responsible State,
or whether some further event must occur, depends on the
content and interpretation of the primary obligation and
cannot be determined in the abstract.73
(10) A related question is whether fault constitutes a
necessary element of the internationally wrongful act of a
State. This is certainly not the case if by “fault” one understands
the existence, for example, of an intention to harm.
In the absence of any specific requirement of a mental
element in terms of the primary obligation, it is only
the act of a State that matters, independently of any
intention.
(11) Article 2 introduces and places in the necessary
legal context the questions dealt with in subsequent
chapters of Part One. Subparagraph (a)—which states
that conduct attributable to the State under international
law is necessary for there to be an internationally wrongful
act—corresponds to chapter II, while chapter IV deals
with the specific cases where one State is responsible for
the internationally wrongful act of another State. Subparagraph
(b)—which states that such conduct must
constitute a breach of an international obligation—corresponds
to the general principles stated in chapter III,
while chapter V deals with cases where the wrongfulness
of conduct, which would otherwise be a breach of an
obligation, is precluded.
(12) In subparagraph (a), the term “attribution” is used
to denote the operation of attaching a given action or omission
to a State. In international practice and judicial decisions,
the term “imputation” is also used.74 But the term
“attribution” avoids any suggestion that the legal process
of connecting conduct to the State is a fiction, or that the
conduct in question is “really” that of someone else.
73 For examples of analysis of different obligations, see United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (footnote 59 above),
pp. 30–33, paras. 62–68; “Rainbow Warrior” (footnote 46 above),
pp. 266–267, paras. 107–110; and WTO, Report of the Panel, United
States–Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (WT/DS152/R),
22 December 1999, paras. 7.41 et seq.
74 See, e.g., United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(footnote 59 above), p. 29, paras. 56 and 58; and Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (footnote 36 above), p. 51,
para. 86.
(13) In subparagraph (b), reference is made to the breach
of an international obligation rather than a rule or a norm
of international law. What matters for these purposes is
not simply the existence of a rule but its application in the
specific case to the responsible State. The term “obligation”
is commonly used in international judicial decisions
and practice and in the literature to cover all the possibilities.
The reference to an “obligation” is limited to an obligation
under international law, a matter further clarified
in article 3.
Article 3. Characterization of an act of a State
as internationally wrongful
The characterization of an act of a State as internationally
wrongful is governed by international law.
Such characterization is not affected by the characterization
of the same act as lawful by internal law.
Commentary
(1) Article 3 makes explicit a principle already implicit
in article 2, namely that the characterization of a given
act as internationally wrongful is independent of its characterization
as lawful under the internal law of the State
concerned. There are two elements to this. First, an act of
a State cannot be characterized as internationally wrongful
unless it constitutes a breach of an international obligation,
even if it violates a provision of the State’s own
law. Secondly and most importantly, a State cannot, by
pleading that its conduct conforms to the provisions of its
internal law, escape the characterization of that conduct as
wrongful by international law. An act of a State must be
characterized as internationally wrongful if it constitutes a
breach of an international obligation, even if the act does
not contravene the State’s internal law—even if, under
that law, the State was actually bound to act in that way.
(2) As to the first of these elements, perhaps the clearest
judicial decision is that of PCIJ in the Treatment of
Polish Nationals case.75 The Court denied the Polish
Government the right to submit to organs of the League
of Nations questions concerning the application to Polish
nationals of certain provisions of the Constitution of the
Free City of Danzig, on the ground that:
according to generally accepted principles, a State cannot rely, as
against another State, on the provisions of the latter’s Constitution, but
only on international law and international obligations duly accepted
... [C]onversely, a State cannot adduce as against another State its own
Constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under
international law or treaties in force ... The application of the Danzig
Constitution may ... result in the violation of an international obligation
incumbent on Danzig towards Poland, whether under treaty stipulations
or under general international law ... However, in cases of such a nature,
it is not the Constitution and other laws, as such, but the international
obligation that gives rise to the responsibility of the Free City.76
(3) That conformity with the provisions of internal
law in no way precludes conduct being characterized as
internationally wrongful is equally well settled. Interna-
75 Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin
or Speech in the Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932, P.C.I.J.,
Series A/B, No. 44, p. 4.
76 Ibid., pp. 24–25. See also “Lotus”, Judgment No. 9, 1927, P.C.I.J.,
Series A, No. 10, p. 24.
State responsibility 37
tional judicial decisions leave no doubt on that subject. In
particular, PCIJ expressly recognized the principle in its
first judgment, in the S.S. “Wimbledon” case. The Court
rejected the argument of the German Government that the
passage of the ship through the Kiel Canal would have
constituted a violation of the German neutrality orders,
observing that:
a neutrality order, issued by an individual State, could not prevail over
the provisions of the Treaty of Peace. ... under Article 380 of the Treaty
of Versailles, it was [Germany’s] definite duty to allow [the passage
of the Wimbledon through the Kiel Canal]. She could not advance her
neutrality orders against the obligations which she had accepted under
this Article.77
The principle was reaffirmed many times:
it is a generally accepted principle of international law that in the relations
between Powers who are contracting Parties to a treaty, the provisions
of municipal law cannot prevail over those of the treaty;78
... it is certain that France cannot rely on her own legislation to limit the
scope of her international obligations;79
... a State cannot adduce as against another State its own Constitution
with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under international
law or treaties in force.80
A different facet of the same principle was also affirmed in
the advisory opinions on Exchange of Greek and Turkish
Populations81 and Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig.82
(4) ICJ has often referred to and applied the principle.83
For example, in the Reparation for Injuries case, it noted
that “[a]s the claim is based on the breach of an international
obligation on the part of the Member held responsible
… the Member cannot contend that this obligation is
governed by municipal law”.84 In the ELSI case, a Chamber
of the Court emphasized this rule, stating that:
Compliance with municipal law and compliance with the provisions of
a treaty are different questions. What is a breach of treaty may be lawful
in the municipal law and what is unlawful in the municipal law may be
wholly innocent of violation of a treaty provision. Even had the Prefect
held the requisition to be entirely justified in Italian law, this would not
exclude the possibility that it was a violation of the FCN Treaty.85
Conversely, as the Chamber explained:
the fact that an act of a public authority may have been unlawful in
municipal law does not necessarily mean that that act was unlawful in
77 S.S. “Wimbledon” (see footnote 34 above), pp. 29–30.
78 Greco-Bulgarian “Communities”, Advisory Opinion, 1930,
P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 17, p. 32.
79 Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, Order of
6 December 1930, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 24, p. 12; and ibid., Judgment,
1932, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 46, p. 96, at p. 167.
80 Treatment of Polish Nationals (see footnote 75 above), p. 24.
81 Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Advisory Opinion,
1925, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 10, p. 20.
82 Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1928,
P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 15, pp. 26–27. See also the observations of
Lord Finlay in Acquisition of Polish Nationality, Advisory Opinion,
1923, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 7, p. 26.
83 See Fisheries, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 116, at p. 132;
Nottebohm, Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1953,
p. 111, at p. 123; Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the
Guardianship of Infants, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1958, p. 55, at p. 67;
and Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of
the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 12, at pp. 34–35, para. 57.
84 Reparation for Injuries (see footnote 38 above), at p. 180.
85 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1989,
p. 15, at p. 51, para. 73.
international law, as a breach of treaty or otherwise. A finding of the
local courts that an act was unlawful may well be relevant to an argument
that it was also arbitrary; but by itself, and without more, unlawfulness
cannot be said to amount to arbitrariness … Nor does it follow from a
finding by a municipal court that an act was unjustified, or unreasonable,
or arbitrary, that that act is necessarily to be classed as arbitrary in
international law, though the qualification given to the impugned act by
a municipal authority may be a valuable indication.86
The principle has also been applied by numerous arbitral
tribunals.87
(5) The principle was expressly endorsed in the work undertaken
under the auspices of the League of Nations on
the codification of State responsibility,88 as well as in the
work undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations
on the codification of the rights and duties of States and
the law of treaties. The Commission’s draft Declaration on
Rights and Duties of States, article 13, provided that:
Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising
from treaties and other sources of international law, and it may not
invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure
to perform this duty.89
(6) Similarly this principle was endorsed in the 1969
Vienna Convention, article 27 of which provides that:
A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification
for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to
article 46.90
86 Ibid., p. 74, para. 124.
87 See, e.g., the Geneva Arbitration (the “Alabama” case), in Moore,
History and Digest, vol. IV, p. 4144, at pp. 4156 and 4157 (1872);
Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims (Norway v. United States of America),
UNRIAA, vol. I (Sales No. 1948.V.2), p. 307, at p. 331 (1922); Aguilar-
Amory and Royal Bank of Canada Claims (Tinoco case) (Great Britain
v. Costa Rica), ibid., p. 369, at p. 386 (1923); Shufeldt Claim, ibid.,
vol. II (Sales No. 1949.V.1), p. 1079, at p. 1098 (“it is a settled principle
of international law that a sovereign can not be permitted to set up one
of his own municipal laws as a bar to a claim by a sovereign for a wrong
done to the latter’s subject”) (1930); Wollemborg Case, ibid., vol. XIV
(Sales No. 65.V.4), p. 283, at p. 289 (1956); and Flegenheimer, ibid.,
p. 327, at p. 360 (1958).
88 In point I of the request for information on State responsibility sent
to States by the Preparatory Committee for the 1930 Hague Conference
it was stated:
“In particular, a State cannot escape its responsibility under international
law, if such responsibility exists, by appealing to the provisions
of its municipal law.”
In their replies, States agreed expressly or implicitly with this principle
(see League of Nations, Conference for the Codification of
International Law, Bases of Discussion for the Conference drawn up
by the Preparatory Committee, vol. III: Responsibility of States for
Damage caused in their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners
(document C.75.M.69.1929.V), p. 16). During the debate at the 1930
Hague Conference, States expressed general approval of the idea embodied
in point I and the Third Committee of the Conference adopted
article 5 to the effect that “A State cannot avoid international responsibility
by invoking the state of its municipal law” (document C.351(c)
M.145(c).1930.V; reproduced in Yearbook ... 1956, vol. II, p. 225,
document A/CN.4/96, annex 3).
89 See General Assembly resolution 375 (IV) of 6 December 1949,
annex. For the debate in the Commission, see Yearbook ... 1949,
pp. 105–106, 150 and 171. For the debate in the Assembly, see Official
Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Sixth Committee,
168th–173rd meetings, 18–25 October 1949; 175th–183rd meetings,
27 October–3 November 1949; and ibid., Fourth Session, Plenary
Meetings, 270th meeting, 6 December 1949.
90 Article 46 of the Convention provides for the invocation of provisions
of internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties in
limited circumstances, viz., where the violation of such provisions
“was manifest and concerned a rule of … internal law of fundamental
importance”.
38 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
(7) The rule that the characterization of conduct as
unlawful in international law cannot be affected by the
characterization of the same act as lawful in internal law
makes no exception for cases where rules of international
law require a State to conform to the provisions of its internal
law, for instance by applying to aliens the same legal
treatment as to nationals. It is true that in such a case,
compliance with internal law is relevant to the question of
international responsibility. But this is because the rule of
international law makes it relevant, e.g. by incorporating
the standard of compliance with internal law as the applicable
international standard or as an aspect of it. Especially
in the fields of injury to aliens and their property and
of human rights, the content and application of internal
law will often be relevant to the question of international
responsibility. In every case it will be seen on analysis that
either the provisions of internal law are relevant as facts in
applying the applicable international standard, or else that
they are actually incorporated in some form, conditionally
or unconditionally, into that standard.
(8) As regards the wording of the rule, the formulation
“The municipal law of a State cannot be invoked to prevent
an act of that State from being characterized as wrongful
in international law”, which is similar to article 5 of the
draft adopted on first reading at the 1930 Hague Conference
and also to article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention,
has the merit of making it clear that States cannot use their
internal law as a means of escaping international responsibility.
On the other hand, such a formulation sounds like
a rule of procedure and is inappropriate for a statement
of principle. Issues of the invocation of responsibility belong
to Part Three, whereas this principle addresses the
underlying question of the origin of responsibility. In addition,
there are many cases where issues of internal law
are relevant to the existence or otherwise of responsibility.
As already noted, in such cases it is international law
which determines the scope and limits of any reference to
internal law. This element is best reflected by saying, first,
that the characterization of State conduct as internationally
wrongful is governed by international law, and secondly by
affirming that conduct which is characterized as wrongful
under international law cannot be excused by reference to
the legality of that conduct under internal law.
(9) As to terminology, in the English version the term
“internal law” is preferred to “municipal law”, because
the latter is sometimes used in a narrower sense, and because
the 1969 Vienna Convention speaks of “internal
law”. Still less would it be appropriate to use the term
“national law”, which in some legal systems refers only to
the laws emanating from the central legislature, as distinct
from provincial, cantonal or local authorities. The principle
in article 3 applies to all laws and regulations adopted
within the framework of the State, by whatever authority
and at whatever level.91 In the French version the expression
droit interne is preferred to législation interne and
loi interne, because it covers all provisions of the internal
legal order, whether written or unwritten and whether
they take the form of constitutional or legislative rules,
administrative decrees or judicial decisions.
91 Cf. LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Provisional
Measures, Order of 3 March 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 9, at p. 16,
para. 28.
CHAPTER II
ATTRIBUTION OF CONDUCT TO A STATE
Commentary
(1) In accordance with article 2, one of the essential conditions
for the international responsibility of a State is that
the conduct in question is attributable to the State under
international law. Chapter II defines the circumstances in
which such attribution is justified, i.e. when conduct consisting
of an act or omission or a series of acts or omissions
is to be considered as the conduct of the State.
(2) In theory, the conduct of all human beings, corporations
or collectivities linked to the State by nationality,
habitual residence or incorporation might be attributed
to the State, whether or not they have any connection to
the Government. In international law, such an approach
is avoided, both with a view to limiting responsibility to
conduct which engages the State as an organization, and
also so as to recognize the autonomy of persons acting on
their own account and not at the instigation of a public
authority. Thus, the general rule is that the only conduct
attributed to the State at the international level is that of its
organs of government, or of others who have acted under
the direction, instigation or control of those organs, i.e. as
agents of the State.92
(3) As a corollary, the conduct of private persons is not
as such attributable to the State. This was established, for
example, in the Tellini case of 1923. The Council of the
League of Nations referred to a Special Commission of
Jurists certain questions arising from an incident between
Italy and Greece.93 This involved the assassination on
Greek territory of the Chairman and several members of
an international commission entrusted with the task of delimiting
the Greek-Albanian border. In reply to question
five, the Commission stated that:
The responsibility of a State is only involved by the commission in its
territory of a political crime against the persons of foreigners if the State
has neglected to take all reasonable measures for the prevention of the
crime and the pursuit, arrest and bringing to justice of the criminal.94
(4) The attribution of conduct to the State as a subject
of international law is based on criteria determined by international
law and not on the mere recognition of a link
92 See, e.g., I. Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations: State
Responsibility, Part I (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 132–
166; D. D. Caron, “The basis of responsibility: attribution and other
trans-substantive rules”, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Its
Contribution to the Law of State Responsibility, R. B. Lillich and
D. B. Magraw, eds. (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y., Transnational, 1998),
p. 109; L. Condorelli, “L’imputation à l’État d’un fait internationalement
illicite : solutions classiques et nouvelles tendances”, Recueil
des cours…, 1984–VI (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), vol. 189,
p. 9; H. Dipla, La responsabilité de l’État pour violation des
droits de l’homme: problèmes d’imputation (Paris, Pedone, 1994);
A. V. Freeman, “Responsibility of States for unlawful acts of their
armed forces”, Recueil des cours…, 1955–II (Leiden, Sijthoff, 1956),
vol. 88, p. 261; and F. Przetacznik, “The international responsibility of
States for the unauthorized acts of their organs”, Sri Lanka Journal of
International Law, vol. 1 (June 1989), p. 151.
93 League of Nations, Official Journal, 4th Year, No. 11 (November
1923), p. 1349.
94 Ibid., 5th Year, No. 4 (April 1924), p. 524. See also the Janes case,
UNRIAA, vol. IV (Sales No. 1951.V.1), p. 82 (1925).
State responsibility 39
of factual causality. As a normative operation, attribution
must be clearly distinguished from the characterization
of conduct as internationally wrongful. Its concern is to
establish that there is an act of the State for the purposes
of responsibility. To show that conduct is attributable to
the State says nothing, as such, about the legality or otherwise
of that conduct, and rules of attribution should not
be formulated in terms which imply otherwise. But the
different rules of attribution stated in chapter II have a
cumulative effect, such that a State may be responsible
for the effects of the conduct of private parties, if it failed
to take necessary measures to prevent those effects. For
example, a receiving State is not responsible, as such, for
the acts of private individuals in seizing an embassy, but
it will be responsible if it fails to take all necessary steps
to protect the embassy from seizure, or to regain control
over it.95 In this respect there is often a close link between
the basis of attribution and the particular obligation said
to have been breached, even though the two elements are
analytically distinct.
(5) The question of attribution of conduct to the State for
the purposes of responsibility is to be distinguished from
other international law processes by which particular organs
are authorized to enter into commitments on behalf
of the State. Thus the Head of State or Government or the
minister of foreign affairs is regarded as having authority
to represent the State without any need to produce full
powers.96 Such rules have nothing to do with attribution
for the purposes of State responsibility. In principle, the
State’s responsibility is engaged by conduct incompatible
with its international obligations, irrespective of the level
of administration or government at which the conduct occurs.
97 Thus, the rules concerning attribution set out in
this chapter are formulated for this particular purpose,
and not for other purposes for which it may be necessary
to define the State or its Government.
(6) In determining what constitutes an organ of a State
for the purposes of responsibility, the internal law and
practice of each State are of prime importance. The structure
of the State and the functions of its organs are not,
in general, governed by international law. It is a matter
for each State to decide how its administration is to be
structured and which functions are to be assumed by government.
But while the State remains free to determine its
internal structure and functions through its own law and
practice, international law has a distinct role. For example,
the conduct of certain institutions performing public
functions and exercising public powers (e.g. the police) is
attributed to the State even if those institutions are regarded
in internal law as autonomous and independent of the
executive government.98 Conduct engaged in by organs
of the State in excess of their competence may also be
95 See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(footnote 59 above).
96 See articles 7, 8, 46 and 47 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
97 The point was emphasized, in the context of federal States, in
LaGrand (see footnote 91 above). It is not of course limited to federal
States. See further article 5 and commentary.
98 See paragraph (11) of the commentary to article 4; see also article
5 and commentary.
attributed to the State under international law, whatever
the position may be under internal law.99
(7) The purpose of this chapter is to specify the conditions
under which conduct is attributed to the State as a
subject of international law for the purposes of determining
its international responsibility. Conduct is thereby attributed
to the State as a subject of international law and
not as a subject of internal law. In internal law, it is common
for the “State” to be subdivided into a series of distinct
legal entities. For example, ministries, departments,
component units of all kinds, State commissions or corporations
may have separate legal personality under internal
law, with separate accounts and separate liabilities. But
international law does not permit a State to escape its international
responsibilities by a mere process of internal
subdivision. The State as a subject of international law is
held responsible for the conduct of all the organs, instrumentalities
and officials which form part of its organization
and act in that capacity, whether or not they have
separate legal personality under its internal law.
(8) Chapter II consists of eight articles. Article 4 states
the basic rule attributing to the State the conduct of its
organs. Article 5 deals with conduct of entities empowered
to exercise the governmental authority of a State, and
article 6 deals with the special case where an organ of
one State is placed at the disposal of another State and
empowered to exercise the governmental authority of that
State. Article 7 makes it clear that the conduct of organs
or entities empowered to exercise governmental authority
is attributable to the State even if it was carried out
outside the authority of the organ or person concerned or
contrary to instructions. Articles 8 to 11 then deal with
certain additional cases where conduct, not that of a State
organ or entity, is nonetheless attributed to the State in
international law. Article 8 deals with conduct carried out
on the instructions of a State organ or under its direction
or control. Article 9 deals with certain conduct involving
elements of governmental authority, carried out in the absence
of the official authorities. Article 10 concerns the
special case of responsibility in defined circumstances for
the conduct of insurrectional movements. Article 11 deals
with conduct not attributable to the State under one of the
earlier articles which is nonetheless adopted by the State,
expressly or by conduct, as its own.
(9) These rules are cumulative but they are also limitative.
In the absence of a specific undertaking or guarantee
(which would be a lex specialis100), a State is not responsible
for the conduct of persons or entities in circumstances
not covered by this chapter. As the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal has affirmed, “in order to attribute an act
to the State, it is necessary to identify with reasonable
certainty the actors and their association with the State”.101
This follows already from the provisions of article 2.
99 See article 7 and commentary.
100 See article 55 and commentary.
101 Kenneth P. Yeager v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-U.S.
C.T.R., vol. 17 , p. 92, at pp. 101–102 (1987).
40 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
Article 4. Conduct of organs of a State
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered
an act of that State under international law,
whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial
or any other functions, whatever position it holds
in the organization of the State, and whatever its character
as an organ of the central Government or of a
territorial unit of the State.
2. An organ includes any person or entity which
has that status in accordance with the internal law of
the State.
Commentary
(1) Paragraph 1 of article 4 states the first principle of
attribution for the purposes of State responsibility in international
law—that the conduct of an organ of the State
is attributable to that State. The reference to a “State organ”
covers all the individual or collective entities which
make up the organization of the State and act on its behalf.
It includes an organ of any territorial governmental entity
within the State on the same basis as the central governmental
organs of that State: this is made clear by the final
phrase.
(2) Certain acts of individuals or entities which do not
have the status of organs of the State may be attributed to
the State in international law, and these cases are dealt with
in later articles of this chapter. But the rule is nonetheless
a point of departure. It defines the core cases of attribution,
and it is a starting point for other cases. For example,
under article 8 conduct which is authorized by the State,
so as to be attributable to it, must have been authorized by
an organ of the State, either directly or indirectly.
(3) That the State is responsible for the conduct of its
own organs, acting in that capacity, has long been recognized
in international judicial decisions. In the Moses
case, for example, a decision of a Mexico-United States
Mixed Claims Commission, Umpire Lieber said: “An
officer or person in authority represents pro tanto his government,
which in an international sense is the aggregate
of all officers and men in authority.”102 There have been
many statements of the principle since then.103
(4) The replies by Governments to the Preparatory Committee
for the 1930 Hague Conference104 were unanimously
of the view that the actions or omissions of organs
of the State must be attributed to it. The Third Committee
of the Conference adopted unanimously on first reading
an article 1, which provided that international responsibility
shall be incurred by a State as a consequence of “any
102 Moore, History and Digest, vol. III, p. 3127, at p. 3129 (1871).
103 See, e.g., Claims of Italian Nationals (footnote 41 above);
Salvador Commercial Company, UNRIAA, vol. XV (Sales No. 66.V.3),
p. 455, at p. 477 (1902); and Finnish Shipowners (Great Britain/Finland),
ibid., vol. III (Sales No. 1949.V.2), p. 1479, at p. 1501 (1934).
104 League of Nations, Conference for the Codification of International
Law, Bases of Discussion … (see footnote 88 above), pp. 25, 41
and 52; Supplement to Volume III: Replies made by the Governments
to the Schedule of Points; Replies of Canada and the United States of
America (document C.75(a)M.69(a).1929.V), pp. 2–3 and 6.
failure on the part of its organs to carry out the international
obligations of the State”.105
(5) The principle of the unity of the State entails that the
acts or omissions of all its organs should be regarded as
acts or omissions of the State for the purposes of international
responsibility. It goes without saying that there is
no category of organs specially designated for the commission
of internationally wrongful acts, and virtually any
State organ may be the author of such an act. The diversity
of international obligations does not permit any general
distinction between organs which can commit internationally
wrongful acts and those which cannot. This is reflected
in the closing words of paragraph 1, which clearly
reflect the rule of international law in the matter.
(6) Thus, the reference to a State organ in article 4 is intended
in the most general sense. It is not limited to the organs
of the central government, to officials at a high level
or to persons with responsibility for the external relations
of the State. It extends to organs of government of whatever
kind or classification, exercising whatever functions,
and at whatever level in the hierarchy, including those at
provincial or even local level. No distinction is made for
this purpose between legislative, executive or judicial organs.
Thus, in the Salvador Commercial Company case,
the tribunal said that:
a State is responsible for the acts of its rulers, whether they belong to
the legislative, executive, or judicial department of the Government, so
far as the acts are done in their official capacity.106
ICJ has also confirmed the rule in categorical terms. In
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights,
it said:
According to a well-established rule of international law, the conduct of
any organ of a State must be regarded as an act of that State. This rule
… is of a customary character.107
In that case the Court was principally concerned with
decisions of State courts, but the same principle applies to
legislative and executive acts.108 As PCIJ said in Certain
German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Merits):
105 Reproduced in Yearbook ... 1956, vol. II, p. 225, document
A/CN.4/96, annex 3.
106 See Salvador Commercial Company (footnote 103 above).
See also Chattin case, UNRIAA, vol. IV (Sales No. 1951.V.1), p. 282,
at pp. 285–286 (1927); and Dispute concerning the interpretation of
article 79 of the Treaty of Peace, ibid., vol. XIII (Sales No. 64.V.3),
p. 389, at p. 438 (1955).
107 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights (see footnote
56 above), p. 87, para. 62, referring to the draft articles on State responsibility,
article 6, now embodied in article 4.
108 As to legislative acts, see, e.g., German Settlers in Poland
(footnote 65 above), at pp. 35–36; Treatment of Polish Nationals (footnote
75 above), at pp. 24–25; Phosphates in Morocco (footnote 34 above),
at pp. 25–26; and Rights of Nationals of the United States of America
in Morocco, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 176, at pp. 193–194.
As to executive acts, see, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicaragua (footnote 36 above); and ELSI (footnote 85
above). As to judicial acts, see, e.g., “Lotus” (footnote 76 above);
Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig (footnote 82 above); and Ambatielos,
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1953, p. 10, at pp. 21–22. In some
cases, the conduct in question may involve both executive and judicial
acts; see, e.g., Application of the Convention of 1902 (footnote 83 above)
at p. 65.
State responsibility 41
From the standpoint of International Law and of the Court which is its
organ, municipal laws ... express the will and constitute the activities
of States, in the same manner as do legal decisions or administrative
measures.109
Thus, article 4 covers organs, whether they exercise
“legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions”.
This language allows for the fact that the principle of the
separation of powers is not followed in any uniform way,
and that many organs exercise some combination of public
powers of a legislative, executive or judicial character.
Moreover, the term is one of extension, not limitation,
as is made clear by the words “or any other functions”.110
It is irrelevant for the purposes of attribution that the conduct
of a State organ may be classified as “commercial”
or as acta iure gestionis. Of course, the breach by a State
of a contract does not as such entail a breach of international
law.111 Something further is required before international
law becomes relevant, such as a denial of justice
by the courts of the State in proceedings brought by the
other contracting party. But the entry into or breach of a
contract by a State organ is nonetheless an act of the State
for the purposes of article 4,112 and it might in certain circumstances
amount to an internationally wrongful act.113
(7) Nor is any distinction made at the level of principle
between the acts of “superior” and “subordinate” officials,
provided they are acting in their official capacity.
This is expressed in the phrase “whatever position it holds
in the organization of the State” in article 4. No doubt
lower-level officials may have a more restricted scope of
activity and they may not be able to make final decisions.
But conduct carried out by them in their official capacity
is nonetheless attributable to the State for the purposes of
article 4. Mixed commissions after the Second World War
often had to consider the conduct of minor organs of the
State, such as administrators of enemy property, mayors
and police officers, and consistently treated the acts of
such persons as attributable to the State.114
109 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Merits, Judgment
No. 7, 1926, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 7, at p. 19.
110 These functions might involve, e.g. the giving of administrative
guidance to the private sector. Whether such guidance involves a breach
of an international obligation may be an issue, but as “guidance” it is
clearly attributable to the State. See, e.g., GATT, Report of the Panel,
Japan–Trade in Semi-conductors, 24 March 1988, paras. 110–111;
and WTO, Report of the Panel, Japan–Measures affecting Consumer
Photographic Film and Paper (WT/DS44/R), paras. 10.12–10.16.
111 See article 3 and commentary.
112 See, e.g., the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights
in Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v. Sweden, Eur. Court H.R., Series
A, No. 20 (1976), at p. 14; and Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden, ibid.,
Series A, No. 21 (1976), at p. 15.
113 The irrelevance of the classification of the acts of State organs
as iure imperii or iure gestionis was affirmed by all those members of
the Sixth Committee who responded to a specific question on this issue
from the Commission (see Yearbook ... 1998, vol. II (Part Two), p. 17,
para. 35).
114 See, e.g., the Currie case, UNRIAA, vol. XIV (Sales No.
65.V.4), p. 21, at p. 24 (1954); Dispute concerning the interpretation
of article 79 (footnote 106 above), at pp. 431–432; and Mossé case,
UNRIAA, vol. XIII (Sales No. 64.V.3), p. 486, at pp. 492–493 (1953).
For earlier decisions, see the Roper case, ibid., vol. IV (Sales No. 1951.
V.1), p. 145 (1927); Massey, ibid., p. 155 (1927); Way, ibid., p. 391, at
p. 400 (1928); and Baldwin, ibid., vol. VI (Sales No. 1955.V.3), p. 328
(1933). Cf. the consideration of the requisition of a plant by the Mayor
of Palermo in ELSI (see footnote 85 above), e.g. at p. 50, para. 70.
(8) Likewise, the principle in article 4 applies equally to
organs of the central government and to those of regional
or local units. This principle has long been recognized.
For example, the Franco-Italian Conciliation Commission
in the Heirs of the Duc de Guise case said:
For the purposes of reaching a decision in the present case it matters
little that the decree of 29 August 1947 was not enacted by the Italian
State but by the region of Sicily. For the Italian State is responsible
for implementing the Peace Treaty, even for Sicily, notwithstanding the
autonomy granted to Sicily in internal relations under the public law of
the Italian Republic.115
This principle was strongly supported during the preparatory
work for the 1930 Hague Conference. Governments
were expressly asked whether the State became responsible
as a result of “[a]cts or omissions of bodies exercising
public functions of a legislative or executive character
(communes, provinces, etc.)”. All answered in the
affirmative.116
(9) It does not matter for this purpose whether the territorial
unit in question is a component unit of a federal State
or a specific autonomous area, and it is equally irrelevant
whether the internal law of the State in question gives the
federal parliament power to compel the component unit to
abide by the State’s international obligations. The award
in the “Montijo” case is the starting point for a consistent
series of decisions to this effect.117 The French-Mexican
Claims Commission in the Pellat case reaffirmed “the
principle of the international responsibility ... of a federal
State for all the acts of its separate States which give
rise to claims by foreign States” and noted specially that
such responsibility “... cannot be denied, not even in cases
where the federal Constitution denies the central Government
the right of control over the separate States or the
right to require them to comply, in their conduct, with the
rules of international law”.118 That rule has since been
consistently applied. Thus, for example, in the LaGrand
case, ICJ said:
Whereas the international responsibility of a State is engaged by the action
of the competent organs and authorities acting in that State, whatever
they may be; whereas the United States should take all measures at
its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the
final decision in these proceedings; whereas, according to the information
available to the Court, implementation of the measures indicated
in the present Order falls within the jurisdiction of the Governor of
Arizona; whereas the Government of the United States is consequently
under the obligation to transmit the present Order to the said Governor;
whereas the Governor of Arizona is under the obligation to act in conformity
with the international undertakings of the United States.119
115 UNRIAA, vol. XIII (Sales No. 64.V.3), p. 150, at p. 161 (1951).
For earlier decisions, see, e.g., the Pieri Dominique and Co. case, ibid.,
vol. X (Sales No. 60.V.4), p. 139, at p. 156 (1905).
116 League of Nations, Conference for the Codification of International
Law, Bases of Discussion … (see footnote 104 above), p. 90;
Supplement to Vol. III … (ibid.), pp. 3 and 18.
117 See Moore, History and Digest, vol. II, p. 1440, at p. 1440
(1874). See also De Brissot and others, Moore, History and Digest,
vol. III, p. 2967, at pp. 2970–2971 (1855); Pieri Dominique and Co.
(footnote 115 above), at pp. 156–157; Davy case, UNRIAA, vol. IX
(Sales No. 59.V.5), p. 467, at p. 468 (1903); Janes case (footnote 94
above); Swinney, UNRIAA, vol. IV (Sales No. 1951.V.1), p. 101 (1925);
Quintanilla, ibid., p. 101, at p. 103 (1925); Youmans, ibid., p. 110,
at p. 116 (1925); Mallén, ibid., p. 173, at p. 177 (1927); Venable, ibid.,
p. 218, at p. 230 (1925); and Tribolet, ibid., p. 598, at p. 601 (1925).
118 UNRIAA, vol. V (Sales No. 1952.V.3), p. 534, at p. 536 (1929).
119 LaGrand, Provisional Measures (see footnote 91 above).
See also LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment,
I.C.J.Reports 2001, p. 466, at p. 495, para. 81.
42 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
(10) The reasons for this position are reinforced by the
fact that federal States vary widely in their structure and
distribution of powers, and that in most cases the constituent
units have no separate international legal personality
of their own (however limited), nor any treaty-making
power. In those cases where the constituent unit of a federation
is able to enter into international agreements on its
own account,120 the other party may well have agreed to
limit itself to recourse against the constituent unit in the
event of a breach. In that case the matter will not involve
the responsibility of the federal State and will fall outside
the scope of the present articles. Another possibility is that
the responsibility of the federal State under a treaty may
be limited by the terms of a federal clause in the treaty.121
This is clearly an exception to the general rule, applicable
solely in relations between the States parties to the treaty
and in the matters which the treaty covers. It has effect
by virtue of the lex specialis principle, dealt with in article
55.
(11) Paragraph 2 explains the relevance of internal law
in determining the status of a State organ. Where the law
of a State characterizes an entity as an organ, no difficulty
will arise. On the other hand, it is not sufficient to refer to
internal law for the status of State organs. In some systems
the status and functions of various entities are determined
not only by law but also by practice, and reference exclusively
to internal law would be misleading. The internal
law of a State may not classify, exhaustively or at all,
which entities have the status of “organs”. In such cases,
while the powers of an entity and its relation to other bodies
under internal law will be relevant to its classification
as an “organ”, internal law will not itself perform the task
of classification. Even if it does so, the term “organ” used
in internal law may have a special meaning, and not the
very broad meaning it has under article 4. For example,
under some legal systems the term “government” refers
only to bodies at the highest level such as the Head of
State and the cabinet of ministers. In others, the police
have a special status, independent of the executive; this
cannot mean that for international law purposes they are
not organs of the State.122 Accordingly, a State cannot
avoid responsibility for the conduct of a body which does
in truth act as one of its organs merely by denying it that
status under its own law. This result is achieved by the use
of the word “includes” in paragraph 2.
(12) The term “person or entity” is used in article 4,
paragraph 2, as well as in articles 5 and 7. It is used in a
broad sense to include any natural or legal person, including
an individual office holder, a department, commission
or other body exercising public authority, etc. The term
“entity” is used in a similar sense123 in the draft articles
120 See, e.g., articles 56, paragraph 3, and 172, paragraph 3, of the
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999.
121 See, e.g., article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage.
122 See, e.g., the Church of Scientology case, Germany, Federal Supreme
Court, Judgment of 26 September 1978, case No. VI ZR 267/76,
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, No. 21 (May 1979), p. 1101; ILR,
vol. 65, p. 193; and Propend Finance Pty Ltd. v. Sing, England, Court of
Appeal, ILR, vol. 111, p. 611 (1997). These were State immunity cases,
but the same principle applies in the field of State responsibility.
123 See Yearbook … 1991, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 14–18.
on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property,
adopted in 1991.
(13) Although the principle stated in article 4 is clear
and undoubted, difficulties can arise in its application.
A particular problem is to determine whether a person
who is a State organ acts in that capacity. It is irrelevant
for this purpose that the person concerned may have had
ulterior or improper motives or may be abusing public
power. Where such a person acts in an apparently
official capacity, or under colour of authority, the actions
in question will be attributable to the State. The distinction
between unauthorized conduct of a State organ and
purely private conduct has been clearly drawn in international
arbitral decisions. For example, the award of the
Mexico-United States General Claims Commission in the
Mallén case involved, first, the act of an official acting in
a private capacity and, secondly, another act committed
by the same official in his official capacity, although in an
abusive way.124 The latter action was, and the former was
not, held attributable to the State. The French-Mexican
Claims Commission in the Caire case excluded responsibility
only in cases where “the act had no connexion with
the official function and was, in fact, merely the act of a
private individual”.125 The case of purely private conduct
should not be confused with that of an organ functioning
as such but acting ultra vires or in breach of the rules
governing its operation. In this latter case, the organ is
nevertheless acting in the name of the State: this principle
is affirmed in article 7.126 In applying this test, of course,
each case will have to be dealt with on the basis of its own
facts and circumstances.
Article 5. Conduct of persons or entities exercising
elements of governmental authority
The conduct of a person or entity which is not an
organ of the State under article 4 but which is empowered
by the law of that State to exercise elements of
the governmental authority shall be considered an act
of the State under international law, provided the person
or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular
instance.
Commentary
(1) Article 5 deals with the attribution to the State of
conduct of bodies which are not State organs in the sense
of article 4, but which are nonetheless authorized to
exercise governmental authority. The article is intended
to take account of the increasingly common phenomenon
of parastatal entities, which exercise elements of governmental
authority in place of State organs, as well as
situations where former State corporations have been privatized
but retain certain public or regulatory functions.
124 Mallén (see footnote 117 above), at p. 175.
125 UNRIAA, vol. V (Sales No. 1952.V.3), p. 516, at p. 531 (1929).
See also the Bensley case in Moore, History and Digest, vol. III, p. 3018
(1850) (“a wanton trespass … under no color of official proceedings,
and without any connection with his official duties”); and the Castelain
case ibid., p. 2999 (1880). See further article 7 and commentary.
126 See paragraph (7) of the commentary to article 7.
State responsibility 43
(2) The generic term “entity” reflects the wide variety
of bodies which, though not organs, may be empowered
by the law of a State to exercise elements of governmental
authority. They may include public corporations, semipublic
entities, public agencies of various kinds and even,
in special cases, private companies, provided that in each
case the entity is empowered by the law of the State to
exercise functions of a public character normally exercised
by State organs, and the conduct of the entity relates
to the exercise of the governmental authority concerned.
For example, in some countries private security firms may
be contracted to act as prison guards and in that capacity
may exercise public powers such as powers of detention
and discipline pursuant to a judicial sentence or to prison
regulations. Private or State-owned airlines may have
delegated to them certain powers in relation to immigration
control or quarantine. In one case before the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, an autonomous foundation established
by the State held property for charitable purposes
under close governmental control; its powers included the
identification of property for seizure. It was held that it
was a public and not a private entity, and therefore within
the tribunal’s jurisdiction; with respect to its administration
of allegedly expropriated property, it would in any
event have been covered by article 5.127
(3) The fact that an entity can be classified as public or
private according to the criteria of a given legal system,
the existence of a greater or lesser State participation in its
capital, or, more generally, in the ownership of its assets,
the fact that it is not subject to executive control—these
are not decisive criteria for the purpose of attribution of
the entity’s conduct to the State. Instead, article 5 refers
to the true common feature, namely that these entities
are empowered, if only to a limited extent or in a specific
context, to exercise specified elements of governmental
authority.
(4) Parastatal entities may be considered a relatively
modern phenomenon, but the principle embodied in article
5 has been recognized for some time. For example,
the replies to the request for information made by the
Preparatory Committee for the 1930 Hague Conference
indicated strong support from some Governments for the
attribution to the State of the conduct of autonomous bodies
exercising public functions of an administrative or legislative
character. The German Government, for example,
asserted that:
when, by delegation of powers, bodies act in a public capacity, e.g.,
police an area … the principles governing the responsibility of the State
for its organs apply with equal force. From the point of view of international
law, it does not matter whether a State polices a given area
with its own police or entrusts this duty, to a greater or less extent, to
autonomous bodies.128
The Preparatory Committee accordingly prepared the
following basis of discussion, though the Third Commit-
127 Hyatt International Corporation v. The Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Iran-U.S. C.T.R., vol. 9, p. 72, at pp. 88–94
(1985).
128 League of Nations, Conference for the Codification of International
Law, Bases of Discussion … (see footnote 88 above), p. 90.
The German Government noted that these remarks would extend to the
situation where “the State, as an exceptional measure, invests private
organisations with public powers and duties or authorities [sic] them
to exercise sovereign rights, as in the case of private railway companies
permitted to maintain a police force”, ibid.
tee of the Conference was unable in the time available to
examine it:
A State is responsible for damage suffered by a foreigner as the result of
acts or omissions of such … autonomous institutions as exercise public
functions of a legislative or administrative character, if such acts or
omissions contravene the international obligations of the State.129
(5) The justification for attributing to the State under international
law the conduct of “parastatal” entities lies in
the fact that the internal law of the State has conferred on
the entity in question the exercise of certain elements of
the governmental authority. If it is to be regarded as an act
of the State for purposes of international responsibility,
the conduct of an entity must accordingly concern governmental
activity and not other private or commercial activity
in which the entity may engage. Thus, for example,
the conduct of a railway company to which certain police
powers have been granted will be regarded as an act of the
State under international law if it concerns the exercise of
those powers, but not if it concerns other activities (e.g.
the sale of tickets or the purchase of rolling stock).
(6) Article 5 does not attempt to identify precisely the
scope of “governmental authority” for the purpose of attribution
of the conduct of an entity to the State. Beyond
a certain limit, what is regarded as “governmental” depends
on the particular society, its history and traditions.
Of particular importance will be not just the content of the
powers, but the way they are conferred on an entity, the
purposes for which they are to be exercised and the extent
to which the entity is accountable to government for their
exercise. These are essentially questions of the application
of a general standard to varied circumstances.
(7) The formulation of article 5 clearly limits it to entities
which are empowered by internal law to exercise
governmental authority. This is to be distinguished from
situations where an entity acts under the direction or
control of the State, which are covered by article 8, and
those where an entity or group seizes power in the absence
of State organs but in situations where the exercise of
governmental authority is called for: these are dealt with
in article 9. For the purposes of article 5, an entity is
covered even if its exercise of authority involves an independent
discretion or power to act; there is no need to
show that the conduct was in fact carried out under the
control of the State. On the other hand, article 5 does not
extend to cover, for example, situations where internal
law authorizes or justifies certain conduct by way of selfhelp
or self-defence; i.e. where it confers powers upon
or authorizes conduct by citizens or residents generally.
The internal law in question must specifically authorize
the conduct as involving the exercise of public authority;
it is not enough that it permits activity as part of the
general regulation of the affairs of the community.
It is accordingly a narrow category.
Article 6. Conduct of organs placed at the disposal
of a State by another State
The conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of
a State by another State shall be considered an act of
the former State under international law if the organ is
129 Ibid., p. 92.
44 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental
authority of the State at whose disposal it is placed.
Commentary
(1) Article 6 deals with the limited and precise situation
in which an organ of a State is effectively put at the disposal
of another State so that the organ may temporarily
act for its benefit and under its authority. In such a case,
the organ, originally that of one State, acts exclusively for
the purposes of and on behalf of another State and its conduct
is attributed to the latter State alone.
(2) The words “placed at the disposal of ” in article 6
express the essential condition that must be met in order
for the conduct of the organ to be regarded under international
law as an act of the receiving and not of the sending
State. The notion of an organ “placed at the disposal of ”
the receiving State is a specialized one, implying that the
organ is acting with the consent, under the authority of
and for the purposes of the receiving State. Not only must
the organ be appointed to perform functions appertaining
to the State at whose disposal it is placed, but in performing
the functions entrusted to it by the beneficiary State,
the organ must also act in conjunction with the machinery
of that State and under its exclusive direction and control,
rather than on instructions from the sending State.
Thus article 6 is not concerned with ordinary situations of
inter-State cooperation or collaboration, pursuant to treaty
or otherwise.130
(3) Examples of situations that could come within this
limited notion of a State organ “placed at the disposal” of
another State might include a section of the health service
or some other unit placed under the orders of another
country to assist in overcoming an epidemic or natural
disaster, or judges appointed in particular cases to act as
judicial organs of another State. On the other hand, mere
aid or assistance offered by organs of one State to another
on the territory of the latter is not covered by article 6. For
example, armed forces may be sent to assist another State
in the exercise of the right of collective self-defence or
for other purposes. Where the forces in question remain
under the authority of the sending State, they exercise elements
of the governmental authority of that State and not
of the receiving State. Situations can also arise where the
organ of one State acts on the joint instructions of its own
and another State, or there may be a single entity which is
a joint organ of several States. In these cases, the conduct
in question is attributable to both States under other articles
of this chapter.131
(4) Thus, what is crucial for the purposes of article 6 is
the establishment of a functional link between the organ
in question and the structure or authority of the receiv-
130 Thus, the conduct of Italy in policing illegal immigration at sea
pursuant to an agreement with Albania was not attributable to Albania:
Xhavara and Others v. Italy and Albania, application No. 39473/98,
Eur. Court H.R., decision of 11 January 2001. Conversely, the conduct
of Turkey taken in the context of the Turkey-European Communities
customs union was still attributable to Turkey: see WTO, Report of the
Panel, Turkey: Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products
(WT/DS34/R), 31 May 1999, paras. 9.33–9.44.
131 See also article 47 and commentary.
ing State. The notion of an organ “placed at the disposal”
of another State excludes the case of State organs, sent
to another State for the purposes of the former State or
even for shared purposes, which retain their own autonomy
and status: for example, cultural missions, diplomatic
or consular missions, foreign relief or aid organizations.
Also excluded from the ambit of article 6 are situations in
which functions of the “beneficiary” State are performed
without its consent, as when a State placed in a position
of dependence, territorial occupation or the like is compelled
to allow the acts of its own organs to be set aside
and replaced to a greater or lesser extent by those of the
other State.132
(5) There are two further criteria that must be met for
article 6 to apply. First, the organ in question must possess
the status of an organ of the sending State; and secondly
its conduct must involve the exercise of elements of the
governmental authority of the receiving State. The first
of these conditions excludes from the ambit of article 6
the conduct of private entities or individuals which have
never had the status of an organ of the sending State. For
example, experts or advisers placed at the disposal of a
State under technical assistance programmes do not usually
have the status of organs of the sending State. The
second condition is that the organ placed at the disposal of
a State by another State must be “acting in the exercise of
elements of the governmental authority” of the receiving
State. There will only be an act attributable to the receiving
State where the conduct of the loaned organ involves
the exercise of the governmental authority of that State.
By comparison with the number of cases of cooperative
action by States in fields such as mutual defence, aid and
development, article 6 covers only a specific and limited
notion of “transferred responsibility”. Yet, in State practice
the situation is not unknown.
(6) In the Chevreau case, a British consul in Persia,
temporarily placed in charge of the French consulate, lost
some papers entrusted to him. On a claim being brought
by France, Arbitrator Beichmann held that: “the British
Government cannot be held responsible for negligence
by its Consul in his capacity as the person in charge of
the Consulate of another Power.”133 It is implicit in the
Arbitrator’s finding that the agreed terms on which the
British Consul was acting contained no provision allocating
responsibility for the Consul’s acts. If a third State had
brought a claim, the proper respondent in accordance with
article 6 would have been the State on whose behalf the
conduct in question was carried out.
(7) Similar issues were considered by the European
Commission of Human Rights in two cases relating to the
exercise by Swiss police in Liechtenstein of “delegated”
powers.134 At the relevant time Liechtenstein was not
132 For the responsibility of a State for directing, controlling or
coercing the internationally wrongful act of another, see articles 17 and
18 and commentaries.
133 UNRIAA, vol. II (Sales No. 1949.V.1), p. 1113, at p. 1141
(1931).
134 X and Y v. Switzerland, application Nos. 7289/75 and 7349/76,
decision of 14 July 1977; Council of Europe, European Commission
of Human Rights, Decisions and Reports, vol. 9, p. 57; and Yearbook
of the European Convention on Human Rights, 1977, vol. 20 (1978),
p. 372, at pp. 402–406.
State responsibility 45
a party to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention
on Human Rights), so that if the conduct was attributable
only to Liechtenstein no breach of the Convention
could have occurred. The Commission held the case admissible,
on the basis that under the treaty governing the
relations between Switzerland and Liechtenstein of 1923,
Switzerland exercised its own customs and immigration
jurisdiction in Liechtenstein, albeit with the latter’s consent
and in their mutual interest. The officers in question
were governed exclusively by Swiss law and were considered
to be exercising the public authority of Switzerland.
In that sense, they were not “placed at the disposal” of the
receiving State.135
(8) A further, long-standing example of a situation to
which article 6 applies is the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council, which has acted as the final court of appeal
for a number of independent States within the Commonwealth.
Decisions of the Privy Council on appeal from
an independent Commonwealth State will be attributable
to that State and not to the United Kingdom. The Privy
Council’s role is paralleled by certain final courts of appeal
acting pursuant to treaty arrangements.136 There are
many examples of judges seconded by one State to another
for a time: in their capacity as judges of the receiving
State, their decisions are not attributable to the sending
State, even if it continues to pay their salaries.
(9) Similar questions could also arise in the case of organs
of international organizations placed at the disposal
of a State and exercising elements of that State’s governmental
authority. This is even more exceptional than
the inter-State cases to which article 6 is limited. It also
raises difficult questions of the relations between States
and international organizations, questions which fall outside
the scope of these articles. Article 57 accordingly excludes
from the ambit of the articles all questions of the
responsibility of international organizations or of a State
for the acts of an international organization. By the same
token, article 6 does not concern those cases where, for
example, accused persons are transferred by a State to an
international institution pursuant to treaty.137 In cooperating
with international institutions in such a case, the State
concerned does not assume responsibility for their subsequent
conduct.
Article 7. Excess of authority or contravention
of instructions
The conduct of an organ of a State or of a person
or entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental
authority shall be considered an act of the
135 See also Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, Eur. Court
H.R., Series A, No. 240 (1992), paras. 96 and 110. See also Controller
and Auditor-General v. Davison (New Zealand, Court of Appeal), ILR,
vol. 104 (1996), p. 526, at pp. 536–537 (Cooke, P.) and pp. 574–576
(Richardson, J.). An appeal to the Privy Council on other grounds was
dismissed, Brannigan v. Davison, ibid., vol. 108, p. 622.
136 For example, Agreement relating to Appeals to the High Court of
Australia from the Supreme Court of Nauru (Nauru, 6 September 1976)
(United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1216, No. 19617, p. 151).
137 See, e.g., article 89 of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court.
State under international law if the organ, person or
entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority
or contravenes instructions.
Commentary
(1) Article 7 deals with the important question of unauthorized
or ultra vires acts of State organs or entities.
It makes it clear that the conduct of a State organ or an
entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental
authority, acting in its official capacity, is attributable
to the State even if the organ or entity acted in excess of
authority or contrary to instructions.
(2) The State cannot take refuge behind the notion
that, according to the provisions of its internal law or
to instructions which may have been given to its organs
or agents, their actions or omissions ought not to have
occurred or ought to have taken a different form. This is
so even where the organ or entity in question has overtly
committed unlawful acts under the cover of its official
status or has manifestly exceeded its competence. It is
so even if other organs of the State have disowned the
conduct in question.138 Any other rule would contradict
the basic principle stated in article 3, since otherwise a
State could rely on its internal law in order to argue that
conduct, in fact carried out by its organs, was not attributable
to it.
(3) The rule evolved in response to the need for clarity
and security in international relations. Despite early
equivocal statements in diplomatic practice and by arbitral
tribunals,139 State practice came to support the proposition,
articulated by the British Government in response
to an Italian request, that “all Governments should always
be held responsible for all acts committed by their agents
by virtue of their official capacity”.140 As the Spanish
Government pointed out: “If this were not the case, one
would end by authorizing abuse, for in most cases there
would be no practical way of proving that the agent had
or had not acted on orders received.”141 At this time the
United States supported “a rule of international law that
sovereigns are not liable, in diplomatic procedure, for
damages to a foreigner when arising from the misconduct
of agents acting out of the range not only of their real but
138 See, e.g., the “Star and Herald” controversy, Moore, Digest,
vol. VI, p. 775.
139 In a number of early cases, international responsibility was
attributed to the State for the conduct of officials without making it
clear whether the officials had exceeded their authority: see, e.g., the
following cases: “Only Son”, Moore, History and Digest, vol. IV,
pp. 3404–3405; “William Lee”, ibid., p. 3405; and Donoughho’s, ibid.,
vol. III, p. 3012. Where the question was expressly examined, tribunals
did not consistently apply any single principle: see, e.g., the Lewis’s
case, ibid., p. 3019; the Gadino case, UNRIAA, vol. XV (Sales No.
66.V.3), p. 414 (1901); the Lacaze case, Lapradelle-Politis, vol. II,
p. 290, at pp. 297–298; and the“William Yeaton” case, Moore, History
and Digest, vol. III, p. 2944, at p. 2946.
140 For the opinions of the British and Spanish Governments given
in 1898 at the request of Italy in respect of a dispute with Peru,
see Archivio del Ministero degli Affari esteri italiano, serie politica P,
No. 43.
141 Note verbale by Duke Almodóvar del Río, 4 July 1898, ibid.
46 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
of their apparent authority”.142 It is probable that the different
formulations had essentially the same effect, since
acts falling outside the scope of both real and apparent
authority would not be performed “by virtue of … official
capacity”. In any event, by the time of the 1930 Hague
Conference, a majority of States responding to the Preparatory
Committee’s request for information were clearly in
favour of the broadest formulation of the rule, providing
for attribution to the State in the case of “[a]cts of officials
in the national territory in their public capacity (actes de
fonction) but exceeding their authority”.143 The Basis
of Discussion prepared by the Committee reflected this
view. The Third Committee of the Conference adopted an
article on first reading in the following terms:
International responsibility is … incurred by a State if damage is sustained
by a foreigner as a result of unauthorised acts of its officials
performed under cover of their official character, if the acts contravene
the international obligations of the State.144
(4) The modern rule is now firmly established in this
sense by international jurisprudence, State practice and
the writings of jurists.145 It is confirmed, for example,
in article 91 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
protection of victims of international armed conflicts
(Protocol I), which provides that: “A Party to the conflict
… shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons
forming part of its armed forces”: this clearly covers acts
committed contrary to orders or instructions. The commentary
notes that article 91 was adopted by consensus
and “correspond[s] to the general principles of law on
international responsibility”.146
(5) A definitive formulation of the modern rule is found
in the Caire case. The case concerned the murder of a
French national by two Mexican officers who, after failing
to extort money, took Caire to the local barracks and
shot him. The Commission held:
that the two officers, even if they are deemed to have acted outside their
competence … and even if their superiors countermanded an order,
have involved the responsibility of the State, since they acted under
cover of their status as officers and used means placed at their disposal
on account of that status.147
142 “American Bible Society” incident, statement of United States
Secretary of State, 17 August 1885, Moore, Digest, vol. VI, p. 743;
“Shine and Milligen”, G. H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law
(Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1943),
vol. V, p. 575; and “Miller”, ibid., pp. 570–571.
143 League of Nations, Conference for the Codification of International
Law, Bases of Discussion … (see footnote 88 above), point V,
No. 2 (b), p. 74, and Supplement to Vol. III … (see footnote 104 above),
pp. 3 and 17.
144 League of Nations, Conference for the Codification of International
Law, Bases of Discussion ..., document C.351(c)M.145(c).1930.
V (see footnote 88 above), p. 237. For a more detailed account of the
evolution of the modern rule, see Yearbook … 1975, vol. II, pp. 61–70.
145 For example, the 1961 revised draft by the Special Rapporteur,
Mr. García Amador, provided that “an act or omission shall likewise
be imputable to the State if the organs or officials concerned exceeded
their competence but purported to be acting in their official capacity”
(Yearbook ... 1961, vol. II, p. 53).
146 ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva, Martinus Nijhoff,
1987), pp. 1053–1054.
147 Caire (see footnote 125 above). For other statements of the
rule, see Maal, UNRIAA, vol. X (Sales No. 60.V.4), pp. 732–733
(1903); La Masica, ibid., vol. XI (Sales No. 61.V.4), p. 560 (1916);
Youmans (footnote 117 above); Mallén, ibid.; Stephens, UNRIAA,
(6) International human rights courts and tribunals
have applied the same rule. For example, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in the Velásquez
Rodríguez case said:
This conclusion [of a breach of the Convention] is independent of
whether the organ or official has contravened provisions of internal
law or overstepped the limits of his authority: under international law a
State is responsible for the acts of its agents undertaken in their official
capacity and for their omissions, even when those agents act outside the
sphere of their authority or violate internal law.148
(7) The central issue to be addressed in determining
the applicability of article 7 to unauthorized conduct of
official bodies is whether the conduct was performed
by the body in an official capacity or not. Cases where
officials acted in their capacity as such, albeit unlawfully
or contrary to instructions, must be distinguished from
cases where the conduct is so removed from the scope
of their official functions that it should be assimilated to
that of private individuals, not attributable to the State.
In the words of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,
the question is whether the conduct has been “carried out
by persons cloaked with governmental authority”.149
(8) The problem of drawing the line between unauthorized
but still “official” conduct, on the one hand, and “private”
conduct on the other, may be avoided if the conduct
complained of is systematic or recurrent, such that
the State knew or ought to have known of it and should
have taken steps to prevent it. However, the distinction
between the two situations still needs to be made in some
cases, for example when considering isolated instances of
outrageous conduct on the part of persons who are officials.
That distinction is reflected in the expression “if the
organ, person or entity acts in that capacity” in article
7. This indicates that the conduct referred to comprises
only the actions and omissions of organs purportedly or
apparently carrying out their official functions, and not the
private actions or omissions of individuals who happen to
be organs or agents of the State.150 In short, the question
is whether they were acting with apparent authority.
(9) As formulated, article 7 only applies to the conduct
of an organ of a State or of an entity empowered to
exercise elements of the governmental authority, i.e.
vol. IV (Sales No. 1951.V.1), pp. 267–268 (1927); and Way (footnote
114 above), pp. 400–401. The decision of the United States Court of
Claims in Royal Holland Lloyd v. United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 722 (1931)
(Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases (London, Butterworth,
1938), vol. 6, p. 442) is also often cited.
148 Velásquez Rodríguez (see footnote 63 above); see also ILR,
vol. 95, p. 232, at p. 296.
149 Petrolane, Inc. v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Iran-U.S. C.T.R., vol. 27, p. 64, at p. 92 (1991). See also paragraph (13)
of the commentary to article 4.
150 One form of ultra vires conduct covered by article 7 would be
for a State official to accept a bribe to perform some act or conclude
some transaction. The articles are not concerned with questions that
would then arise as to the validity of the transaction (cf. the 1969
Vienna Convention, art. 50). So far as responsibility for the corrupt
conduct is concerned, various situations could arise which it is not necessary
to deal with expressly in the present articles. Where one State
bribes an organ of another to perform some official act, the corrupting
State would be responsible either under article 8 or article 17. The
question of the responsibility of the State whose official had been bribed
towards the corrupting State in such a case could hardly arise, but there
could be issues of its responsibility towards a third party, which would
be properly resolved under article 7.
State responsibility 47
only to those cases of attribution covered by articles 4, 5
and 6. Problems of unauthorized conduct by other persons,
groups or entities give rise to distinct problems, which are
dealt with separately under articles 8, 9 and 10.
(10) As a rule of attribution, article 7 is not concerned
with the question whether the conduct amounted to a
breach of an international obligation. The fact that instructions
given to an organ or entity were ignored, or that its
actions were ultra vires, may be relevant in determining
whether or not the obligation has been breached, but that
is a separate issue.151 Equally, article 7 is not concerned
with the admissibility of claims arising from internationally
wrongful acts committed by organs or agents acting
ultra vires or contrary to their instructions. Where there
has been an unauthorized or invalid act under local law
and as a result a local remedy is available, this will have to
be resorted to, in accordance with the principle of exhaustion
of local remedies, before bringing an international
claim.152
Article 8. Conduct directed or controlled by a State
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall
be considered an act of a State under international law
if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on
the instructions of, or under the direction or control
of, that State in carrying out the conduct.
Commentary
(1) As a general principle, the conduct of private persons
or entities is not attributable to the State under international
law. Circumstances may arise, however, where
such conduct is nevertheless attributable to the State because
there exists a specific factual relationship between
the person or entity engaging in the conduct and the State.
Article 8 deals with two such circumstances. The first involves
private persons acting on the instructions of the
State in carrying out the wrongful conduct. The second
deals with a more general situation where private persons
act under the State’s direction or control.153 Bearing in
mind the important role played by the principle of effectiveness
in international law, it is necessary to take into
account in both cases the existence of a real link between
the person or group performing the act and the State machinery.
(2) The attribution to the State of conduct in fact authorized
by it is widely accepted in international jurisprudence.
154 In such cases it does not matter that the person
or persons involved are private individuals nor whether
151 See ELSI (footnote 85 above), especially at pp. 52, 62 and 74.
152 See further article 44, subparagraph (b), and commentary.
153 Separate issues are raised where one State engages in internationally
wrongful conduct at the direction or under the control of
another State: see article 17 and commentary, and especially paragraph
(7) for the meaning of the words “direction” and “control” in
various languages.
154 See, e.g., the Zafiro case, UNRIAA, vol. VI (Sales No. 1955.
V.3), p. 160 (1925); the Stephens case (footnote 147 above), p. 267;
and Lehigh Valley Railroad Company and Others (U.S.A.) v. Germany
(Sabotage cases): “Black Tom” and “Kingsland” incidents, ibid.,
vol. VIII (Sales No. 58.V.2), p. 84 (1930) and p. 458 (1939).
their conduct involves “governmental activity”. Most
commonly, cases of this kind will arise where State organs
supplement their own action by recruiting or instigating
private persons or groups who act as “auxiliaries” while
remaining outside the official structure of the State. These
include, for example, individuals or groups of private individuals
who, though not specifically commissioned by the
State and not forming part of its police or armed forces,
are employed as auxiliaries or are sent as “volunteers” to
neighbouring countries, or who are instructed to carry out
particular missions abroad.
(3) More complex issues arise in determining whether
conduct was carried out “under the direction or control”
of a State. Such conduct will be attributable to the State
only if it directed or controlled the specific operation and
the conduct complained of was an integral part of that operation.
The principle does not extend to conduct which
was only incidentally or peripherally associated with an
operation and which escaped from the State’s direction or
control.
(4) The degree of control which must be exercised by
the State in order for the conduct to be attributable to
it was a key issue in the Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua case. The question was
whether the conduct of the contras was attributable to the
United States so as to hold the latter generally responsible
for breaches of international humanitarian law committed
by the contras. This was analysed by ICJ in terms of
the notion of “control”. On the one hand, it held that the
United States was responsible for the “planning, direction
and support” given by the United States to Nicaraguan
operatives.155 But it rejected the broader claim of Nicaragua
that all the conduct of the contras was attributable
to the United States by reason of its control over them. It
concluded that:
[D]espite the heavy subsidies and other support provided to them by
the United States, there is no clear evidence of the United States having
actually exercised such a degree of control in all fields as to justify
treating the contras as acting on its behalf.
…
All the forms of United States participation mentioned above, and even
the general control by the respondent State over a force with a high
degree of dependency on it, would not in themselves mean, without
further evidence, that the United States directed or enforced the perpetration
of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law
alleged by the applicant State. Such acts could well be committed by
members of the contras without the control of the United States. For
this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it
would in principle have to be proved that that State had effective control
of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the
alleged violations were committed.156
Thus while the United States was held responsible for its
own support for the contras, only in certain individual
instances were the acts of the contras themselves held
attributable to it, based upon actual participation of and
directions given by that State. The Court confirmed that
a general situation of dependence and support would be
155 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(see footnote 36 above), p. 51, para. 86.
156 Ibid., pp. 62 and 64–65, paras. 109 and 115. See also the concurring
opinion of Judge Ago, ibid., p. 189, para. 17.
48 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
insufficient to justify attribution of the conduct to the
State.
(5) The Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia has also addressed these issues.
In the Tadi´c, case, the Chamber stressed that:
The requirement of international law for the attribution to States of acts
performed by private individuals is that the State exercises control over
the individuals. The degree of control may, however, vary according
to the factual circumstances of each case. The Appeals Chamber fails
to see why in each and every circumstance international law should
require a high threshold for the test of control.157
The Appeals Chamber held that the requisite degree of
control by the Yugoslavian “authorities over these armed
forces required by international law for considering the
armed conflict to be international was overall control
going beyond the mere financing and equipping of such
forces and involving also participation in the planning
and supervision of military operations”.158 In the course
of their reasoning, the majority considered it necessary to
disapprove the ICJ approach in the Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua case. But the legal
issues and the factual situation in the Tadi´c case were different
from those facing the Court in that case. The tribunal’s
mandate is directed to issues of individual criminal
responsibility, not State responsibility, and the question in
that case concerned not responsibility but the applicable
rules of international humanitarian law.159 In any event it
is a matter for appreciation in each case whether particular
conduct was or was not carried out under the control
of a State, to such an extent that the conduct controlled
should be attributed to it.160
(6) Questions arise with respect to the conduct of companies
or enterprises which are State-owned and controlled.
If such corporations act inconsistently with the international
obligations of the State concerned the question
arises whether such conduct is attributable to the State. In
discussing this issue it is necessary to recall that international
law acknowledges the general separateness of corporate
entities at the national level, except in those cases
where the “corporate veil” is a mere device or a vehicle
for fraud or evasion.161 The fact that the State initially establishes
a corporate entity, whether by a special law or
otherwise, is not a sufficient basis for the attribution to
the State of the subsequent conduct of that entity.162 Since
157 Prosecutor v. Duško Tadi´c, International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Case IT-94-1-A (1999), ILM, vol. 38, No. 6 (November
1999), p. 1518, at p. 1541, para. 117. For the judgment of the Trial
Chamber (Case IT-94-1-T (1997)), see ILR, vol. 112, p. 1.
158 ILM, vol. 38, No. 6 (November 1999), p. 1546, para. 145.
159 See the explanation given by Judge Shahabuddeen, ibid.,
pp. 1614–1615.
160 The problem of the degree of State control necessary for the
purposes of attribution of conduct to the State has also been dealt with,
for example, by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the European
Court of Human Rights: Yeager (see footnote 101 above), p. 103.
See also Starrett Housing Corporation v. Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Iran-U.S. C.T.R., vol. 4, p. 122, at p. 143 (1983);
Loizidou v. Turkey, Merits, Eur. Court H.R., Reports, 1996–VI, p. 2216,
at pp. 2235–2236, para. 56, also p. 2234, para. 52; and ibid., Preliminary
Objections, Eur. Court H.R., Series A, No. 310, p. 23, para. 62
(1995).
161 Barcelona Traction (see footnote 25 above), p. 39, paras. 56–58.
162 For example, the Workers’ Councils considered in Schering
Corporation v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-U.S. C.T.R.,
corporate entities, although owned by and in that sense
subject to the control of the State, are considered to be
separate, prima facie their conduct in carrying out their
activities is not attributable to the State unless they are
exercising elements of governmental authority within
the meaning of article 5. This was the position taken, for
example, in relation to the de facto seizure of property by
a State-owned oil company, in a case where there was no
proof that the State used its ownership interest as a vehicle
for directing the company to seize the property.163 On the
other hand, where there was evidence that the corporation
was exercising public powers,164 or that the State was using
its ownership interest in or control of a corporation
specifically in order to achieve a particular result,165 the
conduct in question has been attributed to the State.166
(7) It is clear then that a State may, either by specific
directions or by exercising control over a group, in
effect assume responsibility for their conduct. Each case
will depend on its own facts, in particular those concerning
the relationship between the instructions given or the
direction or control exercised and the specific conduct
complained of. In the text of article 8, the three terms “instructions”,
“direction” and “control” are disjunctive; it is
sufficient to establish any one of them. At the same time
it is made clear that the instructions, direction or control
must relate to the conduct which is said to have amounted
to an internationally wrongful act.
(8) Where a State has authorized an act, or has exercised
direction or control over it, questions can arise as to the
State’s responsibility for actions going beyond the scope
of the authorization. For example, questions might arise
if the agent, while carrying out lawful instructions or
directions, engages in some activity which contravenes
both the instructions or directions given and the international
obligations of the instructing State. Such cases
can be resolved by asking whether the unlawful or unauthorized
conduct was really incidental to the mission or
clearly went beyond it. In general a State, in giving lawful
instructions to persons who are not its organs, does not
assume the risk that the instructions will be carried out in
an internationally unlawful way. On the other hand, where
persons or groups have committed acts under the effective
control of a State, the condition for attribution will still be
met even if particular instructions may have been ignored.
vol. 5, p. 361 (1984); Otis Elevator Company v. The Islamic Republic
of Iran, ibid., vol. 14, p. 283 (1987); and Eastman Kodak Company v.
The Government of Iran, ibid., vol. 17, p. 153 (1987).
163 SEDCO, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company, ibid., vol. 15,
p. 23 (1987). See also International Technical Products Corporation
v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, ibid., vol. 9, p. 206
(1985); and Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc. v. The Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, ibid., vol. 12, p. 335, at p. 349 (1986).
164 Phillips Petroleum Company Iran v. The Islamic Republic of Iran,
ibid., vol. 21, p. 79 (1989); and Petrolane (see footnote 149 above).
165 Foremost Tehran, Inc. v. The Government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, Iran-U.S. ibid., vol. 10, p. 228 (1986); and American Bell
International Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, ibid., vol. 12, p. 170
(1986).
166 See Hertzberg et al. v. Finland (Official Records of the General
Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/37/40),
annex XIV, communication No. R.14/61, p. 161, at p. 164, para. 9.1)
(1982). See also X v. Ireland, application No. 4125/69, Yearbook of the
European Convention on Human Rights, 1971, vol. 14 (1973), p. 199;
and Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Court H.R.,
Series A, No. 44 (1981).
State responsibility 49
The conduct will have been committed under the control
of the State and it will be attributable to the State in accordance
with article 8.
(9) Article 8 uses the words “person or group of persons”,
reflecting the fact that conduct covered by the article
may be that of a group lacking separate legal personality
but acting on a de facto basis. Thus, while a State may
authorize conduct by a legal entity such as a corporation,
it may also deal with aggregates of individuals or groups
that do not have legal personality but are nonetheless acting
as a collective.
Article 9. Conduct carried out in the absence
or default of the official authorities
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall
be considered an act of a State under international law
if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising
elements of the governmental authority in the absence
or default of the official authorities and in circumstances
such as to call for the exercise of those elements of
authority.
Commentary
(1) Article 9 deals with the exceptional case of conduct
in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority
by a person or group of persons acting in the absence of the
official authorities and without any actual authority to do
so. The exceptional nature of the circumstances envisaged
in the article is indicated by the phrase “in circumstances
such as to call for”. Such cases occur only rarely, such as
during revolution, armed conflict or foreign occupation,
where the regular authorities dissolve, are disintegrating,
have been suppressed or are for the time being inoperative.
They may also cover cases where lawful authority is
being gradually restored, e.g. after foreign occupation.
(2) The principle underlying article 9 owes something to
the old idea of the levée en masse, the self-defence of the
citizenry in the absence of regular forces:167 in effect it is
a form of agency of necessity. Instances continue to occur
from time to time in the field of State responsibility. Thus,
the position of the Revolutionary Guards or “Komitehs”
immediately after the revolution in the Islamic Republic
of Iran was treated by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
as covered by the principle expressed in article 9.
Yeager concerned, inter alia, the action of performing immigration,
customs and similar functions at Tehran airport
in the immediate aftermath of the revolution. The tribunal
held the conduct attributable to the Islamic Republic of
Iran, on the basis that, if it was not actually authorized by
the Government, then the Guards:
167 This principle is recognized as legitimate by article 2 of the Regulations
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (annexed to
the Hague Conventions II of 1899 and IV of 1907 respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land); and by article 4, paragraph A (6), of the
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of
12 August 1949.
at least exercised elements of governmental authority in the absence of
official authorities, in operations of which the new Government must
have had knowledge and to which it did not specifically object.168
(3) Article 9 establishes three conditions which must be
met in order for conduct to be attributable to the State:
first, the conduct must effectively relate to the exercise of
elements of the governmental authority, secondly, the conduct
must have been carried out in the absence or default
of the official authorities, and thirdly, the circumstances
must have been such as to call for the exercise of those
elements of authority.
(4) As regards the first condition, the person or group
acting must be performing governmental functions, though
they are doing so on their own initiative. In this respect,
the nature of the activity performed is given more weight
than the existence of a formal link between the actors and
the organization of the State. It must be stressed that the
private persons covered by article 9 are not equivalent to
a general de facto Government. The cases envisaged by
article 9 presuppose the existence of a Government in office
and of State machinery whose place is taken by irregulars
or whose action is supplemented in certain cases.
This may happen on part of the territory of a State which
is for the time being out of control, or in other specific
circumstances. A general de facto Government, on the
other hand, is itself an apparatus of the State, replacing
that which existed previously. The conduct of the organs
of such a Government is covered by article 4 rather than
article 9.169
(5) In respect of the second condition, the phrase “in the
absence or default of ” is intended to cover both the situation
of a total collapse of the State apparatus as well as
cases where the official authorities are not exercising their
functions in some specific respect, for instance, in the case
of a partial collapse of the State or its loss of control over a
certain locality. The phrase “absence or default” seeks to
capture both situations.
(6) The third condition for attribution under article 9
requires that the circumstances must have been such as
to call for the exercise of elements of the governmental
authority by private persons. The term “call for” conveys
the idea that some exercise of governmental functions was
called for, though not necessarily the conduct in question.
In other words, the circumstances surrounding the exercise
of elements of the governmental authority by private
persons must have justified the attempt to exercise police
or other functions in the absence of any constituted authority.
There is thus a normative element in the form of
agency entailed by article 9, and this distinguishes these
situations from the normal principle that conduct of private
parties, including insurrectionary forces, is not attributable
to the State.170
168 Yeager (see footnote 101 above), p. 104, para. 43.
169 See, e.g., the award of 18 October 1923 by Arbitrator Taft in the
Tinoco case (footnote 87 above), pp. 381–382. On the responsibility
of the State for the conduct of de facto Governments, see also J. A.
Frowein, Das de facto-Regime im Völkerrecht (Cologne, Heymanns,
1968), pp. 70–71. Conduct of a Government in exile might be covered
by article 9, depending on the circumstances.
170 See, e.g., the Sambiaggio case, UNRIAA, vol. X (Sales
No. 60.V.4), p. 499, at p. 512 (1904); see also article 10 and
commentary.
50 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
Article 10. Conduct of an insurrectional
or other movement
1. The conduct of an insurrectional movement
which becomes the new Government of a State shall
be considered an act of that State under international
law.
2. The conduct of a movement, insurrectional or
other, which succeeds in establishing a new State in
part of the territory of a pre-existing State or in a territory
under its administration shall be considered an
act of the new State under international law.
3. This article is without prejudice to the attribution
to a State of any conduct, however related to that
of the movement concerned, which is to be considered
an act of that State by virtue of articles 4 to 9.
Commentary
(1) Article 10 deals with the special case of attribution
to a State of conduct of an insurrectional or other movement
which subsequently becomes the new Government
of the State or succeeds in establishing a new State.
(2) At the outset, the conduct of the members of the
movement presents itself purely as the conduct of private
individuals. It can be placed on the same footing as that of
persons or groups who participate in a riot or mass demonstration
and it is likewise not attributable to the State.
Once an organized movement comes into existence as a
matter of fact, it will be even less possible to attribute its
conduct to the State, which will not be in a position to
exert effective control over its activities. The general principle
in respect of the conduct of such movements, committed
during the continuing struggle with the constituted
authority, is that it is not attributable to the State under
international law. In other words, the acts of unsuccessful
insurrectional movements are not attributable to the State,
unless under some other article of chapter II, for example
in the special circumstances envisaged by article 9.
(3) Ample support for this general principle is found
in arbitral jurisprudence. International arbitral bodies,
including mixed claims commissions171 and arbitral tribunals172
have uniformly affirmed what Commissioner
Nielsen in the Solis case described as a “well-established
principle of international law”, that no Government can
be held responsible for the conduct of rebellious groups
committed in violation of its authority, where it is itself
guilty of no breach of good faith, or of no negligence in
suppressing insurrection.173 Diplomatic practice is remarkably
consistent in recognizing that the conduct of an
171 See the decisions of the various mixed commissions: Zuloaga
and Miramon Governments, Moore, History and Digest, vol. III,
p. 2873; McKenny case, ibid., p. 2881; Confederate States, ibid., p. 2886;
Confederate Debt, ibid., p. 2900; and Maximilian Government, ibid.,
p. 2902, at pp. 2928–2929.
172 See, e.g., British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco
(footnote 44 above), p. 642; and the Iloilo Claims, UNRIAA, vol. VI
(Sales No. 1955.V.3), p. 158, at pp. 159–160 (1925).
173 UNRIAA, vol. IV (Sales No. 1951.V.1), p. 358, at p. 361 (1928)
(referring to Home Frontier and Foreign Missionary Society, ibid.,
vol. VI (Sales No. 1955.V.3), p. 42 (1920)); cf. the Sambiaggio case
(footnote 170 above), p. 524.
insurrectional movement cannot be attributed to the State.
This can be seen, for example, from the preparatory work
for the 1930 Hague Conference. Replies of Governments
to point IX of the request for information addressed to
them by the Preparatory Committee indicated substantial
agreement that: (a) the conduct of organs of an insurrectional
movement could not be attributed as such to the
State or entail its international responsibility; and (b) only
conduct engaged in by organs of the State in connection
with the injurious acts of the insurgents could be attributed
to the State and entail its international responsibility,
and then only if such conduct constituted a breach of an
international obligation of that State.174
(4) The general principle that the conduct of an insurrectional
or other movement is not attributable to the State
is premised on the assumption that the structures and organization
of the movement are and remain independent
of those of the State. This will be the case where the State
successfully puts down the revolt. In contrast, where the
movement achieves its aims and either installs itself as the
new Government of the State or forms a new State in part
of the territory of the pre-existing State or in a territory
under its administration, it would be anomalous if the new
regime or new State could avoid responsibility for conduct
earlier committed by it. In these exceptional circumstances,
article 10 provides for the attribution of the conduct
of the successful insurrectional or other movement
to the State. The basis for the attribution of conduct of a
successful insurrectional or other movement to the State
under international law lies in the continuity between the
movement and the eventual Government. Thus the term
“conduct” only concerns the conduct of the movement as
such and not the individual acts of members of the movement,
acting in their own capacity.
(5) Where the insurrectional movement, as a new Government,
replaces the previous Government of the State,
the ruling organization of the insurrectional movement
becomes the ruling organization of that State. The continuity
which thus exists between the new organization of
the State and that of the insurrectional movement leads
naturally to the attribution to the State of conduct which
the insurrectional movement may have committed during
the struggle. In such a case, the State does not cease to
exist as a subject of international law. It remains the same
State, despite the changes, reorganizations and adaptations
which occur in its institutions. Moreover, it is the
only subject of international law to which responsibility
can be attributed. The situation requires that acts committed
during the struggle for power by the apparatus of
the insurrectional movement should be attributable to the
State, alongside acts of the then established Government.
(6) Where the insurrectional or other movement succeeds
in establishing a new State, either in part of the
territory of the pre-existing State or in a territory which
was previously under its administration, the attribution to
the new State of the conduct of the insurrectional or other
movement is again justified by virtue of the continuity be-
174 League of Nations, Conference for the Codification of International
Law, Bases of Discussion … (see footnote 88 above), p. 108;
and Supplement to Volume III … (see footnote 104 above), pp. 3
and 20.
State responsibility 51
tween the organization of the movement and the organization
of the State to which it has given rise. Effectively the
same entity which previously had the characteristics of an
insurrectional or other movement has become the Government
of the State it was struggling to establish. The predecessor
State will not be responsible for those acts. The
only possibility is that the new State be required to assume
responsibility for conduct committed with a view to its
own establishment, and this represents the accepted rule.
(7) Paragraph 1 of article 10 covers the scenario in
which the insurrectional movement, having triumphed,
has substituted its structures for those of the previous
Government of the State in question. The phrase “which
becomes the new Government” is used to describe this
consequence. However, the rule in paragraph 1 should not
be pressed too far in the case of Governments of national
reconciliation, formed following an agreement between
the existing authorities and the leaders of an insurrectional
movement. The State should not be made responsible
for the conduct of a violent opposition movement merely
because, in the interests of an overall peace settlement,
elements of the opposition are drawn into a reconstructed
Government. Thus, the criterion of application of paragraph
1 is that of a real and substantial continuity between
the former insurrectional movement and the new Government
it has succeeded in forming.
(8) Paragraph 2 of article 10 addresses the second scenario,
where the structures of the insurrectional or other
revolutionary movement become those of a new State,
constituted by secession or decolonization in part of the
territory which was previously subject to the sovereignty
or administration of the predecessor State. The expression
“or in a territory under its administration” is included in
order to take account of the differing legal status of different
dependent territories.
(9) A comprehensive definition of the types of groups
encompassed by the term “insurrectional movement” as
used in article 10 is made difficult by the wide variety
of forms which insurrectional movements may take in
practice, according to whether there is relatively limited
internal unrest, a genuine civil war situation, an anti-colonial
struggle, the action of a national liberation front,
revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movements and
so on. Insurrectional movements may be based in the territory
of the State against which the movement’s actions
are directed, or on the territory of a third State. Despite
this diversity, the threshold for the application of the laws
of armed conflict contained in the Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the protection of victims of non-international armed
conflicts (Protocol II) may be taken as a guide. Article
1, paragraph 1, refers to “dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups which, under responsible command,
exercise such control over a part of [the relevant
State’s] territory as to enable them to carry out sustained
and concerted military operations and to implement this
Protocol”, and it contrasts such groups with “situations of
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated
and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar
nature” (art. 1, para. 2). This definition of “dissident
armed forces” reflects, in the context of the Protocols, the
essential idea of an “insurrectional movement”.
(10) As compared with paragraph 1, the scope of the
attribution rule articulated by paragraph 2 is broadened to
include “insurrectional or other” movements. This terminology
reflects the existence of a greater variety of movements
whose actions may result in the formation of a new
State. The words do not, however, extend to encompass
the actions of a group of citizens advocating separation or
revolution where these are carried out within the framework
of the predecessor State. Nor does it cover the situation
where an insurrectional movement within a territory
succeeds in its agitation for union with another State. This
is essentially a case of succession, and outside the scope
of the articles, whereas article 10 focuses on the continuity
of the movement concerned and the eventual new
Government or State, as the case may be.
(11) No distinction should be made for the purposes of
article 10 between different categories of movements on
the basis of any international “legitimacy” or of any illegality
in respect of their establishment as a Government,
despite the potential importance of such distinctions in
other contexts.175 From the standpoint of the formulation
of rules of law governing State responsibility, it is unnecessary
and undesirable to exonerate a new Government
or a new State from responsibility for the conduct of its
personnel by reference to considerations of legitimacy or
illegitimacy of its origin.176 Rather, the focus must be on
the particular conduct in question, and on its lawfulness or
otherwise under the applicable rules of international law.
(12) Arbitral decisions, together with State practice and
the literature, indicate a general acceptance of the two
positive attribution rules in article 10. The international
arbitral decisions, e.g. those of the mixed commissions
established in respect of Venezuela (1903) and Mexico
(1920–1930), support the attribution of conduct by insurgents
where the movement is successful in achieving its
revolutionary aims. For example, in the Bolívar Railway
Company claim, the principle is stated in the following
terms:
The nation is responsible for the obligations of a successful revolution
from its beginning, because in theory, it represented ab initio a changing
national will, crystallizing in the finally successful result.177
The French-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission in
its decision concerning the French Company of Venezuelan
Railroads case emphasized that the State cannot be
held responsible for the acts of revolutionaries “unless the
revolution was successful”, since such acts then involve
the responsibility of the State “under the well-recognized
rules of public law”.178 In the Pinson case, the French-
Mexican Claims Commission ruled that:
175 See H. Atlam, “National liberation movements and international
responsibility”, United Nations Codification of State Responsibility,
B. Simma and M. Spinedi, eds. (New York, Oceana, 1987), p. 35.
176 As ICJ said, “[p]hysical control of a territory, and not sovereignty
or legitimacy of title, is the basis of State liability for acts affecting
other States”, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion
I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16, at p. 54, para. 118.
177 UNRIAA, vol. IX (Sales No. 59.V.5), p. 445, at p. 453 (1903).
See also Puerto Cabello and Valencia Railway Company, ibid., p. 510,
at p. 513 (1903).
178 Ibid., vol. X (Sales No. 60.V.4), p. 285, at p. 354 (1902). See also
the Dix case, ibid., vol. IX (Sales No. 59.V.5), p. 119 (1902).
52 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
if the injuries originated, for example, in requisitions or forced contributions
demanded ... by revolutionaries before their final success, or if
they were caused ... by offences committed by successful revolutionary
forces, the responsibility of the State ... cannot be denied.179
(13) The possibility of holding the State responsible for
the conduct of a successful insurrectional movement was
brought out in the request for information addressed to
Governments by the Preparatory Committee for the 1930
Hague Conference. On the basis of replies received from
a number of Governments, the Preparatory Committee
drew up the following Basis of Discussion: “A State is responsible
for damage caused to foreigners by an insurrectionist
party which has been successful and has become
the Government to the same degree as it is responsible
for damage caused by acts of the Government de jure or
its officials or troops.” 180 Although the proposition was
never discussed, it may be considered to reflect the rule of
attribution now contained in paragraph 2.
(14) More recent decisions and practice do not, on the
whole, give any reason to doubt the propositions contained
in article 10. In one case, the Supreme Court of
Namibia went even further in accepting responsibility
for “anything done” by the predecessor administration of
South Africa.181
(15) Exceptional cases may occur where the State was
in a position to adopt measures of vigilance, prevention
or punishment in respect of the movement’s conduct but
improperly failed to do so. This possibility is preserved by
paragraph 3 of article 10, which provides that the attribution
rules of paragraphs 1 and 2 are without prejudice to
the attribution to a State of any conduct, however related
to that of the movement concerned, which is to be considered
an act of that State by virtue of other provisions in
chapter II. The term “however related to that of the movement
concerned” is intended to have a broad meaning.
Thus, the failure by a State to take available steps to protect
the premises of diplomatic missions, threatened from
attack by an insurrectional movement, is clearly conduct
attributable to the State and is preserved by paragraph 3.
(16) A further possibility is that the insurrectional movement
may itself be held responsible for its own conduct
under international law, for example for a breach of international
humanitarian law committed by its forces. The
topic of the international responsibility of unsuccessful
insurrectional or other movements, however, falls outside
the scope of the present articles, which are concerned only
with the responsibility of States.
179 Ibid., vol. V (Sales No. 1952.V.3), p. 327, at p. 353 (1928).
180 League of Nations, Conference for the Codification of International
Law, Bases of Discussion … (see footnote 88 above), pp. 108
and 116; and Basis of discussion No. 22 (c), ibid., p. 118; reproduced in
Yearbook ... 1956, vol. II, p. 223, at p. 224, document A/CN.4/96.
181 Guided in particular by a constitutional provision, the Supreme
Court of Namibia held that “the new government inherits responsibility
for the acts committed by the previous organs of the State”, Minister
of Defence, Namibia v. Mwandinghi, South African Law Reports,
1992 (2), p. 355, at p. 360; and ILR, vol. 91, p. 341, at p. 361. See, on
the other hand, 44123 Ontario Ltd. v. Crispus Kiyonga and Others,
11 Kampala Law Reports 14, pp. 20–21 (1992); and ILR, vol. 103,
p. 259, at p. 266 (High Court, Uganda).
Article 11. Conduct acknowledged and
adopted by a State as its own
Conduct which is not attributable to a State under
the preceding articles shall nevertheless be considered
an act of that State under international law if and to
the extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the
conduct in question as its own.
Commentary
(1) All the bases for attribution covered in chapter II,
with the exception of the conduct of insurrectional or other
movements under article 10, assume that the status of
the person or body as a State organ, or its mandate to act
on behalf of the State, are established at the time of the
alleged wrongful act. Article 11, by contrast, provides for
the attribution to a State of conduct that was not or may
not have been attributable to it at the time of commission,
but which is subsequently acknowledged and adopted by
the State as its own.
(2) In many cases, the conduct which is acknowledged
and adopted by a State will be that of private persons or
entities. The general principle, drawn from State practice
and international judicial decisions, is that the conduct
of a person or group of persons not acting on behalf of
the State is not considered as an act of the State under
international law. This conclusion holds irrespective of
the circumstances in which the private person acts and of
the interests affected by the person’s conduct.
(3) Thus, like article 10, article 11 is based on the principle
that purely private conduct cannot as such be attributed
to a State. But it recognizes “nevertheless” that conduct
is to be considered as an act of a State “if and to the
extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct
in question as its own”. Instances of the application of
the principle can be found in judicial decisions and State
practice. For example, in the Lighthouses arbitration, a
tribunal held Greece liable for the breach of a concession
agreement initiated by Crete at a period when the latter
was an autonomous territory of the Ottoman Empire,
partly on the basis that the breach had been “endorsed
by [Greece] as if it had been a regular transaction … and
eventually continued by her, even after the acquisition of
territorial sovereignty over the island”.182 In the context
of State succession, it is unclear whether a new State succeeds
to any State responsibility of the predecessor State
with respect to its territory.183 However, if the successor
State, faced with a continuing wrongful act on its territory,
endorses and continues that situation, the inference
may readily be drawn that it has assumed responsibility
for it.
(4) Outside the context of State succession, the United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case
provides a further example of subsequent adoption by a
182 Affaire relative à la concession des phares de l’Empire ottoman,
UNRIAA, vol. XII (Sales No. 63.V.3), p. 155, at p. 198 (1956).
183 The matter is reserved by article 39 of the Vienna Convention
on Succession of States in respect of Treaties (hereinafter “the 1978
Vienna Convention”).
State responsibility 53
State of particular conduct. There ICJ drew a clear distinction
between the legal situation immediately following the
seizure of the United States embassy and its personnel by
the militants, and that created by a decree of the Iranian
State which expressly approved and maintained the situation.
In the words of the Court:
The policy thus announced by the Ayatollah Khomeini, of maintaining
the occupation of the Embassy and the detention of its inmates as hostages
for the purpose of exerting pressure on the United States Government
was complied with by other Iranian authorities and endorsed by
them repeatedly in statements made in various contexts. The result of
that policy was fundamentally to transform the legal nature of the situation
created by the occupation of the Embassy and the detention of its
diplomatic and consular staff as hostages. The approval given to these
facts by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of the Iranian State,
and the decision to perpetuate them, translated continuing occupation
of the Embassy and detention of the hostages into acts of that State.184
In that case it made no difference whether the effect of the
“approval” of the conduct of the militants was merely prospective,
or whether it made the Islamic Republic of Iran
responsible for the whole process of seizure of the embassy
and detention of its personnel ab initio. The Islamic
Republic of Iran had already been held responsible in relation
to the earlier period on a different legal basis, viz.
its failure to take sufficient action to prevent the seizure or
to bring it to an immediate end.185 In other cases no such
prior responsibility will exist. Where the acknowledgement
and adoption is unequivocal and unqualified there
is good reason to give it retroactive effect, which is what
the tribunal did in the Lighthouses arbitration.186 This is
consistent with the position established by article 10 for
insurrectional movements and avoids gaps in the extent of
responsibility for what is, in effect, the same continuing
act.
(5) As regards State practice, the capture and subsequent
trial in Israel of Adolf Eichmann may provide an
example of the subsequent adoption of private conduct by
a State. On 10 May 1960, Eichmann was captured by a
group of Israelis in Buenos Aires. He was held in captivity
in Buenos Aires in a private home for some weeks before
being taken by air to Israel. Argentina later charged the
Israeli Government with complicity in Eichmann’s capture,
a charge neither admitted nor denied by Israeli Foreign
Minister Golda Meir, during the discussion in the Security
Council of the complaint. She referred to Eichmann’s captors
as a “volunteer group”.187 Security Council resolution
138 (1960) of 23 June 1960 implied a finding that the
Israeli Government was at least aware of, and consented
to, the successful plan to capture Eichmann in Argentina.
It may be that Eichmann’s captors were “in fact acting
on the instructions of, or under the direction or control
of ” Israel, in which case their conduct was more properly
attributed to the State under article 8. But where there are
doubts about whether certain conduct falls within article
8, these may be resolved by the subsequent adoption of
the conduct in question by the State.
184 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (see
footnote 59 above), p. 35, para. 74.
185 Ibid., pp. 31–33, paras. 63–68.
186 Lighthouses arbitration (see footnote 182 above), pp. 197–198.
187 Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, 866th
meeting, 22 June 1960, para. 18.
(6) The phrase “acknowledges and adopts the conduct
in question as its own” is intended to distinguish cases
of acknowledgement and adoption from cases of mere
support or endorsement.188 ICJ in the United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran case used phrases
such as “approval”, “endorsement”, “the seal of official
governmental approval” and “the decision to perpetuate
[the situation]”.189 These were sufficient in the context of
that case, but as a general matter, conduct will not be attributable
to a State under article 11 where a State merely
acknowledges the factual existence of conduct or expresses
its verbal approval of it. In international controversies,
States often take positions which amount to “approval”
or “endorsement” of conduct in some general sense but
do not involve any assumption of responsibility. The language
of “adoption”, on the other hand, carries with it the
idea that the conduct is acknowledged by the State as, in
effect, its own conduct. Indeed, provided the State’s intention
to accept responsibility for otherwise non-attributable
conduct is clearly indicated, article 11 may cover cases
where a State has accepted responsibility for conduct of
which it did not approve, which it had sought to prevent
and which it deeply regretted. However such acceptance
may be phrased in the particular case, the term “acknowledges
and adopts” in article 11 makes it clear that what is
required is something more than a general acknowledgement
of a factual situation, but rather that the State identifies
the conduct in question and makes it its own.
(7) The principle established by article 11 governs the
question of attribution only. Where conduct has been acknowledged
and adopted by a State, it will still be necessary
to consider whether the conduct was internationally
wrongful. For the purposes of article 11, the international
obligations of the adopting State are the criterion for
wrongfulness. The conduct may have been lawful so far
as the original actor was concerned, or the actor may have
been a private party whose conduct in the relevant respect
was not regulated by international law. By the same token,
a State adopting or acknowledging conduct which is lawful
in terms of its own international obligations does not
thereby assume responsibility for the unlawful acts of any
other person or entity. Such an assumption of responsibility
would have to go further and amount to an agreement
to indemnify for the wrongful act of another.
(8) The phrase “if and to the extent that” is intended to
convey a number of ideas. First, the conduct of, in particular,
private persons, groups or entities is not attributable to
the State unless under some other article of chapter II or
unless it has been acknowledged and adopted by the State.
Secondly, a State might acknowledge and adopt conduct
only to a certain extent. In other words, a State may elect
to acknowledge and adopt only some of the conduct in
question. Thirdly, the act of acknowledgment and adoption,
whether it takes the form of words or conduct, must
be clear and unequivocal.
(9) The conditions of acknowledgement and adoption
are cumulative, as indicated by the word “and”. The order
of the two conditions indicates the normal sequence of
188 The separate question of aid or assistance by a State to internationally
wrongful conduct of another State is dealt with in article 16.
189 See footnote 59 above.
54 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
events in cases in which article 11 is relied on. Acknowledgement
and adoption of conduct by a State might be
express (as for example in the United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran case), or it might be inferred
from the conduct of the State in question.
CHAPTER III
BREACH OF AN INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION
Commentary
(1) There is a breach of an international obligation when
conduct attributed to a State as a subject of international
law amounts to a failure by that State to comply with an
international obligation incumbent upon it or, to use the
language of article 2, subparagraph (b), when such conduct
constitutes “a breach of an international obligation
of the State”. This chapter develops the notion of a breach
of an international obligation, to the extent that this is possible
in general terms.
(2) It must be stressed again that the articles do not
purport to specify the content of the primary rules of
international law, or of the obligations thereby created
for particular States.190 In determining whether given
conduct attributable to a State constitutes a breach of its
international obligations, the principal focus will be on
the primary obligation concerned. It is this which has to
be interpreted and applied to the situation, determining
thereby the substance of the conduct required, the standard
to be observed, the result to be achieved, etc. There is
no such thing as a breach of an international obligation in
the abstract, and chapter III can only play an ancillary role
in determining whether there has been such a breach, or
the time at which it occurred, or its duration. Nonetheless,
a number of basic principles can be stated.
(3) The essence of an internationally wrongful act lies in
the non-conformity of the State’s actual conduct with the
conduct it ought to have adopted in order to comply with
a particular international obligation. Such conduct gives
rise to the new legal relations which are grouped under
the common denomination of international responsibility.
Chapter III, therefore, begins with a provision specifying
in general terms when it may be considered that there is a
breach of an international obligation (art. 12). The basic
concept having been defined, the other provisions of the
chapter are devoted to specifying how this concept applies
to various situations. In particular, the chapter deals with
the question of the intertemporal law as it applies to State
responsibility, i.e. the principle that a State is only responsible
for a breach of an international obligation if the obligation
is in force for the State at the time of the breach
(art. 13), with the equally important question of continuing
breaches (art. 14), and with the special problem of determining
whether and when there has been a breach of an
obligation which is directed not at single but at composite
acts, i.e. where the essence of the breach lies in a series of
acts defined in aggregate as wrongful (art. 15).
190 See paragraphs (2) to (4) of the general commentary.
(4) For the reason given in paragraph (2) above, it is
neither possible nor desirable to deal in the framework
of this Part with all the issues that can arise in determining
whether there has been a breach of an international
obligation. Questions of evidence and proof of such a
breach fall entirely outside the scope of the articles. Other
questions concern rather the classification or typology of
international obligations. These have only been included
in the text where they can be seen to have distinct consequences
within the framework of the secondary rules of
State responsibility.191
Article 12. Existence of a breach of an
international obligation
There is a breach of an international obligation by
a State when an act of that State is not in conformity
with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless
of its origin or character.
Commentary
(1) As stated in article 2, a breach by a State of an international
obligation incumbent upon it gives rise to its
international responsibility. It is first necessary to specify
what is meant by a breach of an international obligation.
This is the purpose of article 12, which defines in the
most general terms what constitutes a breach of an international
obligation by a State. In order to conclude that
there is a breach of an international obligation in any specific
case, it will be necessary to take account of the other
provisions of chapter III which specify further conditions
relating to the existence of a breach of an international
obligation, as well as the provisions of chapter V dealing
with circumstances which may preclude the wrongfulness
of an act of a State. But in the final analysis, whether and
when there has been a breach of an obligation depends on
the precise terms of the obligation, its interpretation and
application, taking into account its object and purpose and
the facts of the case.
(2) In introducing the notion of a breach of an international
obligation, it is necessary again to emphasize the
autonomy of international law in accordance with the
principle stated in article 3. In the terms of article 12, the
breach of an international obligation consists in the disconformity
between the conduct required of the State by
that obligation and the conduct actually adopted by the
State—i.e. between the requirements of international law
and the facts of the matter. This can be expressed in different
ways. For example, ICJ has used such expressions as
“incompatibility with the obligations” of a State,192 acts
“contrary to” or “inconsistent with” a given rule,193 and
191 See, e.g., the classification of obligations of conduct and results,
paragraphs (11) to (12) of the commentary to article 12.
192 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(see footnote 59 above), p. 29, para. 56.
193 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(see footnote 36 above), p. 64, para. 115, and p. 98, para. 186, respectively.
State responsibility 55
“failure to comply with its treaty obligations”.194 In the
ELSI case, a Chamber of the Court asked the “question
whether the requisition was in conformity with the requirements
… of the FCN Treaty”.195 The expression “not
in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation”
is the most appropriate to indicate what constitutes
the essence of a breach of an international obligation by a
State. It allows for the possibility that a breach may exist
even if the act of the State is only partly contrary to an
international obligation incumbent upon it. In some cases
precisely defined conduct is expected from the State
concerned; in others the obligation only sets a minimum
standard above which the State is free to act. Conduct proscribed
by an international obligation may involve an act
or an omission or a combination of acts and omissions; it
may involve the passage of legislation, or specific administrative
or other action in a given case, or even a threat
of such action, whether or not the threat is carried out,
or a final judicial decision. It may require the provision
of facilities, or the taking of precautions or the enforcement
of a prohibition. In every case, it is by comparing
the conduct in fact engaged in by the State with the conduct
legally prescribed by the international obligation that
one can determine whether or not there is a breach of that
obligation. The phrase “is not in conformity with” is flexible
enough to cover the many different ways in which an
obligation can be expressed, as well as the various forms
which a breach may take.
(3) Article 12 states that there is a breach of an international
obligation when the act in question is not in conformity
with what is required by that obligation “regardless
of its origin”. As this phrase indicates, the articles
are of general application. They apply to all international
obligations of States, whatever their origin may be. International
obligations may be established by a customary
rule of international law, by a treaty or by a general
principle applicable within the international legal order.
States may assume international obligations by a unilateral
act.196 An international obligation may arise from provisions
stipulated in a treaty (a decision of an organ of an
international organization competent in the matter, a judgment
given between two States by ICJ or another tribunal,
etc.). It is unnecessary to spell out these possibilities in
article 12, since the responsibility of a State is engaged
by the breach of an international obligation whatever the
particular origin of the obligation concerned. The formula
“regardless of its origin” refers to all possible sources of
international obligations, that is to say, to all processes for
creating legal obligations recognized by international law.
The word “source” is sometimes used in this context, as in
the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations which
stresses the need to respect “the obligations arising from
treaties and other sources of international law”. The word
194 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), p. 46,
para. 57.
195 ELSI (see footnote 85 above), p. 50, para. 70.
196 Thus, France undertook by a unilateral act not to engage in
further atmospheric nuclear testing: Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 253; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand
v. France), ibid., p. 457. The extent of the obligation thereby undertaken
was clarified in Request for an Examination of the Situation in
Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 December
1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, Order of
22 September 1995, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 288.
“origin”, which has the same meaning, is not attended by
the doubts and doctrinal debates the term “source” has
provoked.
(4) According to article 12, the origin or provenance of
an obligation does not, as such, alter the conclusion that
responsibility will be entailed if it is breached by a State,
nor does it, as such, affect the regime of State responsibility
thereby arising. Obligations may arise for a State by a
treaty and by a rule of customary international law or by
a treaty and a unilateral act.197 Moreover, these various
grounds of obligation interact with each other, as practice
clearly shows. Treaties, especially multilateral treaties, can
contribute to the formation of general international law;
customary law may assist in the interpretation of treaties;
an obligation contained in a treaty may be applicable to a
State by reason of its unilateral act, and so on. Thus, international
courts and tribunals have treated responsibility
as arising for a State by reason of any “violation of a duty
imposed by an international juridical standard”.198 In the
“Rainbow Warrior” arbitration, the tribunal said that “any
violation by a State of any obligation, of whatever origin,
gives rise to State responsibility and consequently, to
the duty of reparation”.199 In the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros
Project case, ICJ referred to the relevant draft article provisionally
adopted by the Commission in 1976 in support
of the proposition that it is “well established that, when a
State has committed an internationally wrongful act, its
international responsibility is likely to be involved whatever
the nature of the obligation it has failed to respect”.200
(5) Thus, there is no room in international law for a distinction,
such as is drawn by some legal systems, between
the regime of responsibility for breach of a treaty and for
breach of some other rule, i.e. for responsibility arising
ex contractu or ex delicto. In the “Rainbow Warrior” arbitration,
the tribunal affirmed that “in the field of international
law there is no distinction between contractual
and tortious responsibility”.201 As far as the origin of the
obligation breached is concerned, there is a single general
regime of State responsibility. Nor does any distinction
exist between the “civil” and “criminal” responsibility as
is the case in internal legal systems.
(6) State responsibility can arise from breaches of bilateral
obligations or of obligations owed to some States
197 ICJ has recognized “[t]he existence of identical rules in international
treaty law and customary law” on a number of occasions,
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(see footnote 36 above), p. 95, para. 177; see also North Sea Continental
Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3, at pp. 38–39, para. 63.
198 Dickson Car Wheel Company (see footnote 42 above); cf. the
Goldenberg case, UNRIAA, vol. II (Sales No. 1949.V.1), p. 901, at
pp. 908–909 (1928); International Fisheries Company (footnote 43
above), p. 701 (“some principle of international law”); and Armstrong
Cork Company (footnote 45 above), p. 163 (“any rule whatsoever of
international law”).
199 “Rainbow Warrior” (see footnote 46 above), p. 251, para. 75.
See also Barcelona Traction (footnote 25 above), p. 46, para. 86
(“breach of an international obligation arising out of a treaty or a
general rule of law”).
200 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), p. 38,
para. 47. The qualification “likely to be involved” may have been
inserted because of possible circumstances precluding wrongfulness in
that case.
201 “Rainbow Warrior” (see footnote 46 above), p. 251, para. 75.
56 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
or to the international community as a whole. It can involve
relatively minor infringements as well as the most
serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms
of general international law. Questions of the gravity of
the breach and the peremptory character of the obligation
breached can affect the consequences which arise for the
responsible State and, in certain cases, for other States
also. Certain distinctions between the consequences of
certain breaches are accordingly drawn in Parts Two and
Three of these articles.202 But the regime of State responsibility
for breach of an international obligation under Part
One is comprehensive in scope, general in character and
flexible in its application: Part One is thus able to cover
the spectrum of possible situations without any need for
further distinctions between categories of obligation concerned
or the category of the breach.
(7) Even fundamental principles of the international legal
order are not based on any special source of law or
specific law-making procedure, in contrast with rules of
constitutional character in internal legal systems. In accordance
with article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention,
a peremptory norm of general international law is one
which is “accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only
by a subsequent norm of general international law having
the same character”. Article 53 recognizes both that
norms of a peremptory character can be created and that
the States have a special role in this regard as par excellence
the holders of normative authority on behalf of the
international community. Moreover, obligations imposed
on States by peremptory norms necessarily affect the vital
interests of the international community as a whole and
may entail a stricter regime of responsibility than that applied
to other internationally wrongful acts. But this is
an issue belonging to the content of State responsibility.203
So far at least as Part One of the articles is concerned,
there is a unitary regime of State responsibility which is
general in character.
(8) Rather similar considerations apply with respect to
obligations arising under the Charter of the United Nations.
Since the Charter is a treaty, the obligations it contains
are, from the point of view of their origin, treaty
obligations. The special importance of the Charter, as reflected
in its Article 103,204 derives from its express provisions
as well as from the virtually universal membership
of States in the United Nations.
(9) The general scope of the articles extends not only to
the conventional or other origin of the obligation breached
but also to its subject matter. International awards and
decisions specifying the conditions for the existence of
an internationally wrongful act speak of the breach of an
international obligation without placing any restriction on
202 See Part Three, chapter II and commentary; see also article 48
and commentary.
203 See articles 40 and 41 and commentaries.
204 According to which “[i]n the event of a conflict between the
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present
Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement,
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail”.
the subject matter of the obligation breached.205 Courts
and tribunals have consistently affirmed the principle that
there is no a priori limit to the subject matters on which
States may assume international obligations. Thus, PCIJ
stated in its first judgment, in the S.S. “Wimbledon” case,
that “the right of entering into international engagements
is an attribute of State sovereignty”.206 That proposition
has often been endorsed.207
(10) In a similar perspective, it has sometimes been
argued that an obligation dealing with a certain subject
matter could only have been breached by conduct of the
same description. That proposition formed the basis of an
objection to the jurisdiction of ICJ in the Oil Platforms
case. It was argued that a treaty of friendship, commerce
and navigation could not in principle have been breached
by conduct involving the use of armed force. The Court
responded in the following terms:
The Treaty of 1955 imposes on each of the Parties various obligations
on a variety of matters. Any action by one of the Parties that is incompatible
with those obligations is unlawful, regardless of the means by
which it is brought about. A violation of the rights of one party under
the Treaty by means of the use of force is as unlawful as would be
a violation by administrative decision or by any other means. Matters
relating to the use of force are therefore not per se excluded from the
reach of the Treaty of 1955.208
Thus, the breach by a State of an international obligation
constitutes an internationally wrongful act, whatever the
subject matter or content of the obligation breached, and
whatever description may be given to the non-conforming
conduct.
(11) Article 12 also states that there is a breach of an
international obligation when the act in question is not
in conformity with what is required by that obligation,
“regardless of its … character”. In practice, various classifications
of international obligations have been adopted.
For example, a distinction is commonly drawn between
obligations of conduct and obligations of result. That distinction
may assist in ascertaining when a breach has occurred.
But it is not exclusive,209 and it does not seem to
bear specific or direct consequences as far as the present
articles are concerned. In the Colozza case, for example,
the European Court of Human Rights was concerned with
the trial in absentia of a person who, without actual notice
of his trial, was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment and
was not allowed subsequently to contest his conviction.
205 See, e.g., Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction (footnote 34 above);
Factory at Chorzów, Merits (ibid.); and Reparation for Injuries
(footnote 38 above). In these decisions it is stated that “any breach
of an international engagement” entails international responsibility.
See also Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania (footnote 39 above), p. 228.
206 S.S. “Wimbledon” (see footnote 34 above), p. 25.
207 See, e.g., Nottebohm, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1955, p. 4, at pp. 20–21; Right of Passage over Indian Territory, Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 6, at p. 33; and Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (footnote 36 above),
p. 131, para. 259.
208 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America),
Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 803, at
pp. 811–812, para. 21.
209 Cf. Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (footnote 27 above), p. 77,
para. 135, where the Court referred to the parties having accepted
“obligations of conduct, obligations of performance, and obligations
of result”.
State responsibility 57
He claimed that he had not had a fair hearing, contrary
to article 6, paragraph 1, of the European Convention on
Human Rights. The Court noted that:
The Contracting States enjoy a wide discretion as regards the choice of
the means calculated to ensure that their legal systems are in compliance
with the requirements of article 6 § 1 in this field. The Court’s task
is not to indicate those means to the States, but to determine whether
the result called for by the Convention has been achieved ... For this to
be so, the resources available under domestic law must be shown to be
effective and a person “charged with a criminal offence” ... must not be
left with the burden of proving that he was not seeking to evade justice
or that his absence was due to force majeure.210
The Court thus considered that article 6, paragraph 1,
imposed an obligation of result.211 But, in order to decide
whether there had been a breach of the Convention
in the circumstances of the case, it did not simply compare
the result required (the opportunity for a trial in the
accused’s presence) with the result practically achieved
(the lack of that opportunity in the particular case). Rather,
it examined what more Italy could have done to make the
applicant’s right “effective”.212 The distinction between
obligations of conduct and result was not determinative
of the actual decision that there had been a breach of article
6, paragraph 1.213
(12) The question often arises whether an obligation is
breached by the enactment of legislation by a State, in
cases where the content of the legislation prima facie conflicts
with what is required by the international obligation,
or whether the legislation has to be implemented in the
given case before the breach can be said to have occurred.
Again, no general rule can be laid down that is applicable
to all cases.214 Certain obligations may be breached by the
mere passage of incompatible legislation.215 Where this
is so, the passage of the legislation without more entails
the international responsibility of the enacting State, the
210 Colozza v. Italy, Eur. Court H.R., Series A, No. 89 (1985),
pp. 15–16, para. 30, citing De Cubber v. Belgium, ibid., No. 86 (1984),
p. 20, para. 35.
211 Cf. Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria, in which the
Court gave the following interpretation of article 11:
“While it is the duty of Contracting States to take reasonable and
appropriate measures to enable lawful demonstrations to proceed
peacefully, they cannot guarantee this absolutely and they have a
wide discretion in the choice of the means to be used … In this area
the obligation they enter into under article 11 of the Convention
is an obligation as to measures to be taken and not as to results to
be achieved” (Eur. Court H.R., Series A, No. 139, p. 12, para. 34
(1988)).
In the Colozza case (see footnote 210 above), the Court used similar
language but concluded that the obligation was an obligation of result.
Cf. C. Tomuschat, “What is a ‘breach’ of the European Convention on
Human Rights?”, The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights
in Europe: Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, Lawson and
de Blois, eds. (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), vol. 3, p. 315, at
p. 328.
212 Colozza case (see footnote 210 above), para. 28.
213 See also The Islamic Republic of Iran v. The United States of
America, cases A15 (IV) and A24, Iran-U.S. C.T.R., vol. 32, p. 115
(1996).
214 Cf. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21
of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947 (footnote
83 above), p. 30, para. 42.
215 A uniform law treaty will generally be construed as requiring immediate
implementation, i.e. as embodying an obligation to make the
provisions of the uniform law a part of the law of each State party:
see, e.g., B. Conforti, “Obblighi di mezzi e obblighi di risultato nelle
convenzioni di diritto uniforme”, Rivista di diritto internazionale
privato e processuale, vol. 24 (1988), p. 233.
legislature itself being an organ of the State for the purposes
of the attribution of responsibility.216 In other circumstances,
the enactment of legislation may not in and
of itself amount to a breach,217 especially if it is open to
the State concerned to give effect to the legislation in a
way which would not violate the international obligation
in question. In such cases, whether there is a breach will
depend on whether and how the legislation is given effect.
218
Article 13. International obligation in force for a State
An act of a State does not constitute a breach of an
international obligation unless the State is bound by
the obligation in question at the time the act occurs.
Commentary
(1) Article 13 states the basic principle that, for responsibility
to exist, the breach must occur at a time when the
State is bound by the obligation. This is but the application
in the field of State responsibility of the general principle
of intertemporal law, as stated by Judge Huber in another
context in the Island of Palmas case:
[A] juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary
with it, and not of the law in force at the time when a dispute in
regard to it arises or falls to be settled.219
Article 13 provides an important guarantee for States in
terms of claims of responsibility. Its formulation (“does
not constitute … unless …”) is in keeping with the idea of
a guarantee against the retrospective application of international
law in matters of State responsibility.
(2) International tribunals have applied the principle
stated in article 13 in many cases. An instructive example
is provided by the decision of Umpire Bates of the United
States-Great Britain Mixed Commission concerning the
216 See article 4 and commentary. For illustrations, see, e.g., the
findings of the European Court of Human Rights in Norris v. Ireland,
Eur. Court H.R., Series A, No. 142, para. 31 (1988), citing Klass and
Others v. Germany, ibid., No. 28, para. 33 (1978); Marckx v. Belgium,
ibid., No. 31, para. 27 (1979); Johnston and Others v. Ireland,
ibid., No. 112, para. 42 (1986); Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, ibid.,
No. 45, para. 41 (1981); and Modinos v. Cyprus, ibid., No. 259, para.
24 (1993). See also International responsibility for the promulgation
and enforcement of laws in violation of the Convention (arts. 1 and 2
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC–14/94,
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series A, No. 14 (1994).
The Inter-American Court also considered it possible to determine
whether draft legislation was compatible with the provisions of human
rights treaties: Restrictions to the Death Penalty (arts. 4(2) and 4(4)
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC–3/83,
Series A, No. 3 (1983).
217 As ICJ held in LaGrand, Judgment (see footnote 119 above),
p. 497, paras. 90–91.
218 See, e.g., WTO, Report of the Panel (footnote 73 above),
paras. 7.34–7.57.
219 Island of Palmas (Netherlands/United States of America),
UNRIAA, vol. II (Sales No. 1949.V.1), p. 829, at p. 845 (1928).
Generally on intertemporal law, see resolution I adopted in 1975 by
the Institute of International Law at its Wiesbaden session, Annuaire
de l’Institut de droit international, vol. 56 (1975), pp. 536–540; for
the debate, ibid., pp. 339–374; for M. Sørensen’s reports, ibid., vol. 55
(1973), pp. 1–116. See further W. Karl, “The time factor in the law of
State responsibility”, Spinedi and Simma, eds., op. cit. (footnote 175
above), p. 95.
58 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
conduct of British authorities who had seized United States
vessels engaged in the slave trade and freed slaves belonging
to United States nationals. The incidents referred to
the Commission had taken place at different times and the
umpire had to determine whether, at the time each incident
took place, slavery was “contrary to the law of nations”.
Earlier incidents, dating back to a time when the
slave trade was considered lawful, amounted to a breach
on the part of the British authorities of the international
obligation to respect and protect the property of foreign
nationals.220 The later incidents occurred when the slave
trade had been “prohibited by all civilized nations” and
did not involve the responsibility of Great Britain.221
(3) Similar principles were applied by Arbitrator Asser
in deciding whether the seizure and confiscation by
Russian authorities of United States vessels engaged in
seal hunting outside Russia’s territorial waters should be
considered internationally wrongful. In his award in the
“James Hamilton Lewis” case, he observed that the question
had to be settled “according to the general principles
of the law of nations and the spirit of the international
agreements in force and binding upon the two High Parties
at the time of the seizure of the vessel”.222 Since, under
the principles in force at the time, Russia had no right
to seize the United States vessel, the seizure and confiscation
of the vessel were unlawful acts for which Russia was
required to pay compensation.223 The same principle has
consistently been applied by the European Commission
and the European Court of Human Rights to deny claims
relating to periods during which the European Convention
on Human Rights was not in force for the State concerned.
224
(4) State practice also supports the principle. A requirement
that arbitrators apply the rules of international law
in force at the time when the alleged wrongful acts took
place is a common stipulation in arbitration agreements,225
and undoubtedly is made by way of explicit confirmation
of a generally recognized principle. International law
writers who have dealt with the question recognize that
the wrongfulness of an act must be established on the ba-
220 See the “Enterprize” case, Lapradelle-Politis (footnote 139
above), vol. I, p. 703 (1855); and Moore, History and Digest,
vol. IV, p. 4349, at p. 4373. See also the “Hermosa” and “Créole” cases,
Lapradelle-Politis, op. cit., p. 704 (1855); and Moore, History and
Digest, vol. IV, pp. 4374–4375.
221 See the “Lawrence” case, Lapradelle-Politis, op. cit., p. 741; and
Moore, History and Digest, vol. III, p. 2824. See also the “Volusia”
case, Lapradelle-Politis, op. cit., p. 741.
222 Affaire des navires Cape Horn Pigeon, James Hamilton Lewis,
C. H. White et Kate and Anna, UNRIAA, vol. IX (Sales No. 59.V.5),
p. 66, at p. 69 (1902).
223 See also the “C. H. White” case, ibid., p. 74. In these cases the arbitrator
was required by the arbitration agreement itself to apply the law
in force at the time the acts were performed. Nevertheless, the intention
of the parties was clearly to confirm the application of the general
principle in the context of the arbitration agreement, not to establish
an exception. See further the S.S. “Lisman” case, ibid., vol. III (Sales
No. 1949.V.2), p. 1767, at p. 1771 (1937).
224 See, e.g., X v. Germany, application No. 1151/61, Council of
Europe, European Commission of Human Rights, Recueil des décisions,
No. 7 (March 1962), p. 119 (1961) and many later decisions.
225 See, e.g., Declarations exchanged between the Government of
the United States of America and the Imperial Government of Russia,
for the submission to arbitration of certain disputes concerning the
international responsibility of Russia for the seizure of American ships,
UNRIAA, vol. IX (Sales No. 59.V.5), p. 57 (1900).
sis of the obligations in force at the time when the act was
performed.226
(5) State responsibility can extend to acts of the utmost
seriousness, and the regime of responsibility in such cases
will be correspondingly stringent. But even when a new
peremptory norm of general international law comes
into existence, as contemplated by article 64 of the 1969
Vienna Convention, this does not entail any retrospective
assumption of responsibility. Article 71, paragraph 2 (b),
provides that such a new peremptory norm “does not affect
any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties
created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination,
provided that those rights, obligations or situations
may thereafter be maintained only to the extent that
their maintenance is not in itself in conflict with the new
peremptory norm”.
(6) Accordingly, it is appropriate to apply the intertemporal
principle to all international obligations, and article
13 is general in its application. It is, however, without
prejudice to the possibility that a State may agree
to compensate for damage caused as a result of conduct
which was not at the time a breach of any international
obligation in force for that State. In fact, cases of the retrospective
assumption of responsibility are rare. The lex
specialis principle (art. 55) is sufficient to deal with any
such cases where it may be agreed or decided that responsibility
will be assumed retrospectively for conduct which
was not a breach of an international obligation at the time
it was committed.227
(7) In international law, the principle stated in article
13 is not only a necessary but also a sufficient basis for
responsibility. In other words, once responsibility has accrued
as a result of an internationally wrongful act, it is
not affected by the subsequent termination of the obligation,
whether as a result of the termination of the treaty
which has been breached or of a change in international
law. Thus, as ICJ said in the Northern Cameroons case:
[I]f during the life of the Trusteeship the Trustee was responsible for
some act in violation of the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement which
resulted in damage to another Member of the United Nations or to one
of its nationals, a claim for reparation would not be liquidated by the
termination of the Trust.228
Similarly, in the “Rainbow Warrior” arbitration, the arbitral
tribunal held that, although the relevant treaty obli-
226 See, e.g., P. Tavernier, Recherches sur l’application dans le temps
des actes et des règles en droit international public: problèmes de droit
intertemporel ou de droit transitoire (Paris, Librairie générale de droit
et de jurisprudence, 1970), pp. 119, 135 and 292; D. Bindschedler-Robert,
“De la rétroactivité en droit international public”, Recueil d’études
de droit international en hommage à Paul Guggenheim (University of
Geneva Law Faculty/Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1968),
p. 184; M. Sørensen, “Le problème intertemporel dans l’application de
la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme”, Mélanges offerts
à Polys Modinos (Paris, Pedone, 1968), p. 304; T. O. Elias, “The doctrine
of intertemporal law”, AJIL, vol. 74, No. 2 (April 1980), p. 285;
and R. Higgins, “Time and the law: international perspectives on an
old problem”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 46
(July 1997), p. 501.
227 As to the retroactive effect of the acknowledgement and adoption
of conduct by a State, see article 11 and commentary, especially
paragraph (4). Such acknowledgement and adoption would not, without
more, give retroactive effect to the obligations of the adopting State.
228 Northern Cameroons, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1963, p. 15, at p. 35.
State responsibility 59
gation had terminated with the passage of time, France’s
responsibility for its earlier breach remained.229
(8) Both aspects of the principle are implicit in the ICJ
decision in the Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru case.
Australia argued there that a State responsibility claim relating
to the period of its joint administration of the Trust
Territory for Nauru (1947–1968) could not be brought
decades later, even if the claim had not been formally
waived. The Court rejected the argument, applying a liberal
standard of laches or unreasonable delay.230 But it
went on to say that:
[I]t will be for the Court, in due time, to ensure that Nauru’s delay in
seising [sic] it will in no way cause prejudice to Australia with regard to
both the establishment of the facts and the determination of the content
of the applicable law.231
Evidently, the Court intended to apply the law in force at
the time the claim arose. Indeed that position was necessarily
taken by Nauru itself, since its claim was based on
a breach of the Trusteeship Agreement, which terminated
at the date of its accession to independence in 1968. Its
claim was that the responsibility of Australia, once engaged
under the law in force at a given time, continued
to exist even if the primary obligation had subsequently
terminated.232
(9) The basic principle stated in article 13 is thus well
established. One possible qualification concerns the progressive
interpretation of obligations, by a majority of
the Court in the Namibia case.233 But the intertemporal
principle does not entail that treaty provisions are to be
interpreted as if frozen in time. The evolutionary interpretation
of treaty provisions is permissible in certain cases,234
but this has nothing to do with the principle that a State
can only be held responsible for breach of an obligation
which was in force for that State at the time of its conduct.
Nor does the principle of the intertemporal law mean that
facts occurring prior to the entry into force of a particular
obligation may not be taken into account where these are
otherwise relevant. For example, in dealing with the obligation
to ensure that persons accused are tried without undue
delay, periods of detention prior to the entry into force
of that obligation may be relevant as facts, even though no
compensation could be awarded in respect of the period
prior to the entry into force of the obligation.235
229 “Rainbow Warrior” (see footnote 46 above), pp. 265–266.
230 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 240, at pp. 253–255,
paras. 31–36. See article 45, subparagraph (b), and commentary.
231 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, ibid., p. 255, para. 36.
232 The case was settled before the Court had the opportunity to consider
the merits: Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Order of 13 September
1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 322; for the settlement agreement,
see Agreement between Australia and the Republic of Nauru for the
Settlement of the Case in the International Court of Justice concerning
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru, 10 August 1993) (United
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1770, No. 30807, p. 379).
233 Namibia case (see footnote 176 above), pp. 31–32, para. 53.
234 See, e.g., Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Court H.R., Series A,
No. 26, pp. 15–16 (1978).
235 See, e.g., Zana v. Turkey, Eur. Court H.R., Reports, 1997–VII,
p. 2533 (1997); and J. Pauwelyn, “The concept of a ‘continuing violation’
of an international obligation: selected problems”, BYBIL, 1995,
vol. 66, p. 415, at pp. 443–445.
Article 14. Extension in time of the breach
of an international obligation
1. The breach of an international obligation by an
act of a State not having a continuing character occurs
at the moment when the act is performed, even if its
effects continue.
2. The breach of an international obligation by an
act of a State having a continuing character extends
over the entire period during which the act continues
and remains not in conformity with the international
obligation.
3. The breach of an international obligation requiring
a State to prevent a given event occurs when
the event occurs and extends over the entire period
during which the event continues and remains not in
conformity with that obligation.
Commentary
(1) The problem of identifying when a wrongful act
begins and how long it continues is one which arises
frequently236 and has consequences in the field of State
responsibility, including the important question of cessation
of continuing wrongful acts dealt with in article 30.
Although the existence and duration of a breach of an
international obligation depends for the most part on the
existence and content of the obligation and on the facts
of the particular breach, certain basic concepts are established.
These are introduced in article 14. Without seeking
to be comprehensive in its treatment of the problem, article
14 deals with several related questions. In particular, it
develops the distinction between breaches not extending
in time and continuing wrongful acts (see paragraphs (1)
and (2) respectively), and it also deals with the application
of that distinction to the important case of obligations of
prevention. In each of these cases it takes into account
the question of the continuance in force of the obligation
breached.
(2) Internationally wrongful acts usually take some time
to happen. The critical distinction for the purpose of article
14 is between a breach which is continuing and one
which has already been completed. In accordance with
paragraph 1, a completed act occurs “at the moment
when the act is performed”, even though its effects or
consequences may continue. The words “at the moment”
are intended to provide a more precise description of the
time frame when a completed wrongful act is performed,
236 See, e.g., Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2,
1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 35; Phosphates in Morocco (footnote
34 above), pp. 23–29; Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria,
Judgment, 1939, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 77, p. 64, at pp. 80–82;
and Right of Passage over Indian Territory (footnote 207 above),
pp. 33–36. The issue has often been raised before the organs of the
European Convention on Human Rights. See, e. g., the decision of the
European Commission of Human Rights in the De Becker v. Belgium
case, application No. 214/56, Yearbook of the European Convention on
Human Rights, 1958–1959, p. 214, at pp. 234 and 244; and the Court’s
judgments in Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Court H.R., Series
A, No. 25, p. 64 (1978); Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece,
ibid., No. 260–B, para. 40 (1993); and Agrotexim and Others v. Greece,
ibid., No. 330–A, p. 22, para. 58 (1995). See also E. Wyler, “Quelques
réflexions sur la réalisation dans le temps du fait internationalement
illicite”, RGDIP, vol. 95, p. 881 (1991).
60 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
without requiring that the act necessarily be completed in
a single instant.
(3) In accordance with paragraph 2, a continuing
wrongful act, on the other hand, occupies the entire period
during which the act continues and remains not in
conformity with the international obligation, provided
that the State is bound by the international obligation during
that period.237 Examples of continuing wrongful acts
include the maintenance in effect of legislative provisions
incompatible with treaty obligations of the enacting State,
unlawful detention of a foreign official or unlawful occupation
of embassy premises, maintenance by force of
colonial domination, unlawful occupation of part of the
territory of another State or stationing armed forces in another
State without its consent.
(4) Whether a wrongful act is completed or has a continuing
character will depend both on the primary obligation
and the circumstances of the given case. For example,
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has
interpreted forced or involuntary disappearance as a continuing
wrongful act, one which continues for as long as
the person concerned is unaccounted for.238 The question
whether a wrongful taking of property is a completed or
continuing act likewise depends to some extent on the content
of the primary rule said to have been violated. Where
an expropriation is carried out by legal process, with the
consequence that title to the property concerned is transferred,
the expropriation itself will then be a completed
act. The position with a de facto, “creeping” or disguised
occupation, however, may well be different.239 Exceptionally,
a tribunal may be justified in refusing to recognize a
law or decree at all, with the consequence that the resulting
denial of status, ownership or possession may give rise
to a continuing wrongful act.240
(5) Moreover, the distinction between completed and
continuing acts is a relative one. A continuing wrongful
act itself can cease: thus a hostage can be released, or the
body of a disappeared person returned to the next of kin.
In essence, a continuing wrongful act is one which has
been commenced but has not been completed at the relevant
time. Where a continuing wrongful act has ceased,
for example by the release of hostages or the withdrawal
of forces from territory unlawfully occupied, the act is
considered for the future as no longer having a continuing
character, even though certain effects of the act may
continue. In this respect, it is covered by paragraph 1 of
article 14.
(6) An act does not have a continuing character merely
because its effects or consequences extend in time.
It must be the wrongful act as such which continues. In
many cases of internationally wrongful acts, their consequences
may be prolonged. The pain and suffering caused
by earlier acts of torture or the economic effects of the
expropriation of property continue even though the torture
has ceased or title to the property has passed. Such
237 See article 13 and commentary, especially para. (2).
238 Blake, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C, No. 36,
para. 67 (1998).
239 Papamichalopoulos (see footnote 236 above).
240 Loizidou, Merits (see footnote 160 above), p. 2216.
consequences are the subject of the secondary obligations
of reparation, including restitution, as required by Part
Two of the articles. The prolongation of such effects will
be relevant, for example, in determining the amount of
compensation payable. They do not, however, entail that
the breach itself is a continuing one.
(7) The notion of continuing wrongful acts is common
to many national legal systems and owes its origins in
international law to Triepel.241 It has been repeatedly referred
to by ICJ and by other international tribunals. For
example, in the United States Diplomatic and Consular
Staff in Tehran case, the Court referred to “successive and
still continuing breaches by Iran of its obligations to the
United States under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and
1963”.242
(8) The consequences of a continuing wrongful act
will depend on the context, as well as on the duration
of the obligation breached. For example, the “Rainbow
Warrior” arbitration involved the failure of France to detain
two agents on the French Pacific island of Hao for a
period of three years, as required by an agreement between
France and New Zealand. The arbitral tribunal referred
with approval to the Commission’s draft articles (now
amalgamated in article 14) and to the distinction between
instantaneous and continuing wrongful acts, and said:
Applying this classification to the present case, it is clear that the
breach consisting in the failure of returning to Hao the two agents has
been not only a material but also a continuous breach. And this classification
is not purely theoretical, but, on the contrary, it has practical
consequences, since the seriousness of the breach and its prolongation
in time cannot fail to have considerable bearing on the establishment
of the reparation which is adequate for a violation presenting these two
features.243
The tribunal went on to draw further legal consequences
from the distinction in terms of the duration of French
obligations under the agreement.244
(9) The notion of continuing wrongful acts has also been
applied by the European Court of Human Rights to establish
its jurisdiction ratione temporis in a series of cases.
The issue arises because the Court’s jurisdiction may be
limited to events occurring after the respondent State became
a party to the Convention or the relevant Protocol
and accepted the right of individual petition. Thus, in the
Papamichalopoulos case, a seizure of property not involving
formal expropriation occurred some eight years
before Greece recognized the Court’s competence. The
Court held that there was a continuing breach of the right
to peaceful enjoyment of property under article 1 of the
Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights,
241 H. Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (Leipzig, Hirschfeld,
1899), p. 289. The concept was subsequently taken up in various
general studies on State responsibility as well as in works on the interpretation
of the formula “situations or facts prior to a given date” used
in some declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of
ICJ.
242 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (see
footnote 59 above), p. 37, para. 80. See also pages 36–37, paras. 78–
79.
243 “Rainbow Warrior” (see footnote 46 above), p. 264, para. 101.
244 Ibid., pp. 265–266, paras. 105–106. But see the separate opinion
of Sir Kenneth Keith, ibid., pp. 279–284.
State responsibility 61
which continued after the Protocol had come into force; it
accordingly upheld its jurisdiction over the claim.245
(10) In the Loizidou case,246 similar reasoning was
applied by the Court to the consequences of the Turkish
invasion of Cyprus in 1974, as a result of which the
applicant was denied access to her property in northern
Cyprus. Turkey argued that under article 159 of the Constitution
of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
of 1985, the property in question had been expropriated,
and this had occurred prior to Turkey’s acceptance
of the Court’s jurisdiction in 1990. The Court held that,
in accordance with international law and having regard
to the relevant Security Council resolutions, it could not
attribute legal effect to the 1985 Constitution so that the
expropriation was not completed at that time and the property
continued to belong to the applicant. The conduct of
the Turkish Republic and of Turkish troops in denying the
applicant access to her property continued after Turkey’s
acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction, and constituted a
breach of article 1 of the Protocol to the European Convention
on Human Rights after that time.247
(11) The Human Rights Committee has likewise endorsed
the idea of continuing wrongful acts. For example,
in Lovelace, it held it had jurisdiction to examine the
continuing effects for the applicant of the loss of her status
as a registered member of an Indian group, although
the loss had occurred at the time of her marriage in 1970
and Canada only accepted the Committee’s jurisdiction in
1976. The Committee noted that it was:
not competent, as a rule, to examine allegations relating to events having
taken place before the entry into force of the Covenant and the
Optional Protocol … In the case of Sandra Lovelace it follows that the
Committee is not competent to express any view on the original cause
of her loss of Indian status … at the time of her marriage in 1970 …
The Committee recognizes, however, that the situation may be different
if the alleged violations, although relating to events occurring
before 19 August 1976, continue, or have effects which themselves
constitute violations, after that date.248
It found that the continuing impact of Canadian legislation,
in preventing Lovelace from exercising her rights
as a member of a minority, was sufficient to constitute a
breach of article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights after that date. Here the notion of a
continuing breach was relevant not only to the Committee’s
jurisdiction but also to the application of article 27
as the most directly relevant provision of the Covenant to
the facts in hand.
(12) Thus, conduct which has commenced some time in
the past, and which constituted (or, if the relevant primary
rule had been in force for the State at the time, would have
245 See footnote 236 above.
246 Loizidou, Merits (see footnote 160 above), p. 2216.
247 Ibid., pp. 2230–2232 and 2237–2238, paras. 41–47 and 63–64.
See, however, the dissenting opinion of Judge Bernhardt, p. 2242,
para. 2 (with whom Judges Lopes Rocha, Jambrek, Pettiti, Baka and
Gölcüklü in substance agreed). See also Loizidou, Preliminary Objections
(footnote 160 above), pp. 33–34, paras. 102–105; and Cyprus
v. Turkey, application No. 25781/94, judgement of 10 May 2001,
Eur. Court H.R., Reports, 2001–IV.
248 Lovelace v. Canada, Official Records of the General Assembly,
Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/36/40), annex XVIII,
communication No. R.6/24, p. 172, paras. 10–11 (1981).
constituted) a breach at that time, can continue and give
rise to a continuing wrongful act in the present. Moreover,
this continuing character can have legal significance for
various purposes, including State responsibility. For example,
the obligation of cessation contained in article 30
applies to continuing wrongful acts.
(13) A question common to wrongful acts whether completed
or continuing is when a breach of international law
occurs, as distinct from being merely apprehended or imminent.
As noted in the context of article 12, that question
can only be answered by reference to the particular primary
rule. Some rules specifically prohibit threats of conduct,
249 incitement or attempt,250 in which case the threat,
incitement or attempt is itself a wrongful act. On the other
hand, where the internationally wrongful act is the occurrence
of some event—e.g. the diversion of an international
river—mere preparatory conduct is not necessarily
wrongful.251 In the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case,
the question was when the diversion scheme (“Variant C”)
was put into effect. ICJ held that the breach did not occur
until the actual diversion of the Danube. It noted:
that between November 1991 and October 1992, Czechoslovakia confined
itself to the execution, on its own territory, of the works which
were necessary for the implementation of Variant C, but which could
have been abandoned if an agreement had been reached between the
parties and did not therefore predetermine the final decision to be taken.
For as long as the Danube had not been unilaterally dammed, Variant C
had not in fact been applied.
Such a situation is not unusual in international law or, for that matter,
in domestic law. A wrongful act or offence is frequently preceded by
preparatory actions which are not to be confused with the act or offence
itself. It is as well to distinguish between the actual commission of a
wrongful act (whether instantaneous or continuous) and the conduct
prior to that act which is of a preparatory character and which “does not
qualify as a wrongful act”. 252
Thus, the Court distinguished between the actual commission
of a wrongful act and conduct of a preparatory
character. Preparatory conduct does not itself amount to a
249 Notably, Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United
Nations prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state”. For the question of
what constitutes a threat of force, see Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons (footnote 54 above), pp. 246–247, paras. 47–48; see
also R. Sadurska, “Threats of force”, AJIL, vol. 82, No. 2 (April 1988),
p. 239.
250 A particularly comprehensive formulation is that of article III
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide which prohibits conspiracy, direct and public incitement,
attempt and complicity in relation to genocide. See also article 2 of
the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
and article 2 of the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism.
251 In some legal systems, the notion of “anticipatory breach” is used
to deal with the definitive refusal by a party to perform a contractual
obligation, in advance of the time laid down for its performance.
Confronted with an anticipatory breach, the party concerned is entitled
to terminate the contract and sue for damages. See K. Zweigert and
H. Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd rev. ed., trans. T. Weir
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 508. Other systems achieve similar
results without using this concept, e.g. by construing a refusal to perform
in advance of the time for performance as a “positive breach of
contract”, ibid., p. 494 (German law). There appears to be no equivalent
in international law, but article 60, paragraph 3 (a), of the 1969 Vienna
Convention defines a material breach as including “a repudiation … not
sanctioned by the present Convention”. Such a repudiation could occur
in advance of the time for performance.
252 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), p. 54,
para. 79, citing the draft commentary to what is now article 30.
62 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
breach if it does not “predetermine the final decision to be
taken”. Whether that is so in any given case will depend
on the facts and on the content of the primary obligation.
There will be questions of judgement and degree, which it
is not possible to determine in advance by the use of any
particular formula. The various possibilities are intended
to be covered by the use of the term “occurs” in paragraphs
1 and 3 of article 14.
(14) Paragraph 3 of article 14 deals with the temporal
dimensions of a particular category of breaches of international
obligations, namely the breach of obligations
to prevent the occurrence of a given event. Obligations
of prevention are usually construed as best efforts obligations,
requiring States to take all reasonable or necessary
measures to prevent a given event from occurring,
but without warranting that the event will not occur. The
breach of an obligation of prevention may well be a continuing
wrongful act, although, as for other continuing
wrongful acts, the effect of article 13 is that the breach
only continues if the State is bound by the obligation for
the period during which the event continues and remains
not in conformity with what is required by the obligation.
For example, the obligation to prevent transboundary
damage by air pollution, dealt with in the Trail Smelter
arbitration,253 was breached for as long as the pollution
continued to be emitted. Indeed, in such cases the breach
may be progressively aggravated by the failure to suppress
it. However, not all obligations directed to preventing an
act from occurring will be of this kind. If the obligation
in question was only concerned to prevent the happening
of the event in the first place (as distinct from its continuation),
there will be no continuing wrongful act.254 If the
obligation in question has ceased, any continuing conduct
by definition ceases to be wrongful at that time.255 Both
qualifications are intended to be covered by the phrase
in paragraph 3, “and remains not in conformity with that
obligation”.
Article 15. Breach consisting of a composite act
1. The breach of an international obligation by a
State through a series of actions or omissions defined
in aggregate as wrongful occurs when the action or
omission occurs which, taken with the other actions or
omissions, is sufficient to constitute the wrongful act.
2. In such a case, the breach extends over the
entire period starting with the first of the actions or
omissions of the series and lasts for as long as these
actions or omissions are repeated and remain not in
conformity with the international obligation.
253 Trail Smelter, UNRIAA, vol. III (Sales No. 1949.V.2), p. 1905
(1938, 1941).
254 An example might be an obligation by State A to prevent certain
information from being published. The breach of such an obligation
will not necessarily be of a continuing character, since it may be that
once the information is published, the whole point of the obligation is
defeated.
255 See the “Rainbow Warrior” case (footnote 46 above), p. 266.
Commentary
(1) Within the basic framework established by the distinction
between completed and continuing acts in article
14, article 15 deals with a further refinement, viz. the
notion of a composite wrongful act. Composite acts give
rise to continuing breaches, which extend in time from the
first of the actions or omissions in the series of acts making
up the wrongful conduct.
(2) Composite acts covered by article 15 are limited to
breaches of obligations which concern some aggregate of
conduct and not individual acts as such. In other words,
their focus is “a series of acts or omissions defined in aggregate
as wrongful”. Examples include the obligations
concerning genocide, apartheid or crimes against humanity,
systematic acts of racial discrimination, systematic
acts of discrimination prohibited by a trade agreement,
etc. Some of the most serious wrongful acts in international
law are defined in terms of their composite character.
The importance of these obligations in international
law justifies special treatment in article 15.256
(3) Even though it has special features, the prohibition
of genocide, formulated in identical terms in the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide and in later instruments,257 may be taken as an
illustration of a “composite” obligation. It implies that the
responsible entity (including a State) will have adopted a
systematic policy or practice. According to article II, subparagraph
(a), of the Convention, the prime case of genocide
is “[k]illing members of the [national, ethnical, racial
or religious] group” with the intent to destroy that group
as such, in whole or in part. Both limbs of the definition
contain systematic elements. Genocide has also to be carried
out with the relevant intention, aimed at physically
eliminating the group “as such”. Genocide is not committed
until there has been an accumulation of acts of killing,
causing harm, etc., committed with the relevant intent, so
as to satisfy the definition in article II. Once that threshold
is crossed, the time of commission extends over the whole
period during which any of the acts was committed, and
any individual responsible for any of them with the relevant
intent will have committed genocide.258
(4) It is necessary to distinguish composite obligations
from simple obligations breached by a “composite”
act. Composite acts may be more likely to give rise to
256 See further J. J. A. Salmon, “Le fait étatique complexe: une
notion contestable”, Annuaire français de droit international, vol. 28
(1982), p. 709.
257 See, e.g., article 4 of the statute of the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, originally published as an annex to document
S/25704 and Add.1, approved by the Security Council in its resolution
827 (1993) of 25 May 1993, and amended on 13 May 1998 by
resolution 1166 (1998) and on 30 November 2000 by resolution 1329
(2000); article 2 of the statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda,
approved by the Security Council in its resolution 955 (1994) of
8 November 1994; and article 6 of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court.
258 The intertemporal principle does not apply to the Convention,
which according to its article I is declaratory. Thus, the obligation to
prosecute relates to genocide whenever committed. See Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Preliminary Objections (footnote 54 above), p. 617,
para. 34.
State responsibility 63
continuing breaches, but simple acts can cause continuing
breaches as well. The position is different, however, where
the obligation itself is defined in terms of the cumulative
character of the conduct, i.e. where the cumulative
conduct constitutes the essence of the wrongful act. Thus,
apartheid is different in kind from individual acts of racial
discrimination, and genocide is different in kind from
individual acts even of ethnically or racially motivated
killing.
(5) In Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Ireland complained
of a practice of unlawful treatment of detainees in
Northern Ireland which was said to amount to torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment, and the case was held to
be admissible on that basis. This had various procedural
and remedial consequences. In particular, the exhaustion
of local remedies rule did not have to be complied with in
relation to each of the incidents cited as part of the practice.
But the Court denied that there was any separate wrongful
act of a systematic kind involved. It was simply that
Ireland was entitled to complain of a practice made up by
a series of breaches of article VII of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
and to call for its cessation. As the Court said:
A practice incompatible with the Convention consists of an accumulation
of identical or analogous breaches which are sufficiently numerous
and inter-connected to amount not merely to isolated incidents or exceptions
but to a pattern or system; a practice does not of itself constitute a
violation separate from such breaches* ...
The concept of practice is of particular importance for the operation
of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies. This rule, as embodied
in Article 26 of the Convention, applies to State applications ... in the
same way as it does to “individual” applications ... On the other hand
and in principle, the rule does not apply where the applicant State complains
of a practice as such, with the aim of preventing its continuation
or recurrence, but does not ask the Commission or the Court to give a
decision on each of the cases put forward as proof or illustrations of
that practice.259
In the case of crimes against humanity, the composite act
is a violation separate from the individual violations of
human rights of which it is composed.
(6) A further distinction must be drawn between the
necessary elements of a wrongful act and what might be
required by way of evidence or proof that such an act has
occurred. For example, an individual act of racial discrimination
by a State is internationally wrongful,260 even
though it may be necessary to adduce evidence of a series
of acts by State officials (involving the same person or
other persons similarly situated) in order to show that any
one of those acts was discriminatory rather than actuated
by legitimate grounds. In its essence such discrimination
is not a composite act, but it may be necessary for the
purposes of proving it to produce evidence of a practice
amounting to such an act.
259 Ireland v. the United Kingdom (see footnote 236 above), p. 64,
para. 159; see also page 63, para. 157. See further the United States
counterclaim in Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States
of America), Counter-Claim, Order of 10 March 1998, I.C.J. Reports
1998, p. 190, which likewise focuses on a general situation rather than
specific instances.
260 See, e.g., article 2 of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; and article 26 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
(7) A consequence of the character of a composite act
is that the time when the act is accomplished cannot be
the time when the first action or omission of the series
takes place. It is only subsequently that the first action or
omission will appear as having, as it were, inaugurated
the series. Only after a series of actions or omissions takes
place will the composite act be revealed, not merely as a
succession of isolated acts, but as a composite act, i.e. an
act defined in aggregate as wrongful.
(8) Paragraph 1 of article 15 defines the time at which a
composite act “occurs” as the time at which the last action
or omission occurs which, taken with the other actions
or omissions, is sufficient to constitute the wrongful act,
without it necessarily having to be the last in the series.
Similar considerations apply as for completed and continuing
wrongful acts in determining when a breach of
international law exists; the matter is dependent upon the
precise facts and the content of the primary obligation.
The number of actions or omissions which must occur to
constitute a breach of the obligation is also determined by
the formulation and purpose of the primary rule. The actions
or omissions must be part of a series but the article
does not require that the whole series of wrongful acts
has to be committed in order to fall into the category of
a composite wrongful act, provided a sufficient number
of acts has occurred to constitute a breach. At the time
when the act occurs which is sufficient to constitute the
breach it may not be clear that further acts are to follow
and that the series is not complete. Further, the fact that
the series of actions or omissions was interrupted so that
it was never completed will not necessarily prevent those
actions or omissions which have occurred being classified
as a composite wrongful act if, taken together, they are
sufficient to constitute the breach.
(9) While composite acts are made up of a series of actions
or omissions defined in aggregate as wrongful, this
does not exclude the possibility that every single act in
the series could be wrongful in accordance with another
obligation. For example, the wrongful act of genocide is
generally made up of a series of acts which are themselves
internationally wrongful. Nor does it affect the temporal
element in the commission of the acts: a series of acts or
omissions may occur at the same time or sequentially, at
different times.
(10) Paragraph 2 of article 15 deals with the extension
in time of a composite act. Once a sufficient number of
actions or omissions has occurred, producing the result of
the composite act as such, the breach is dated to the first
of the acts in the series. The status of the first action or
omission is equivocal until enough of the series has occurred
to constitute the wrongful act; but at that point the
act should be regarded as having occurred over the whole
period from the commission of the first action or omission.
If this were not so, the effectiveness of the prohibition
would thereby be undermined.
(11) The word “remain” in paragraph 2 is inserted to
deal with the intertemporal principle set out in article 13.
In accordance with that principle, the State must be bound
by the international obligation for the period during which
the series of acts making up the breach is committed. In
64 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
cases where the relevant obligation did not exist at the
beginning of the course of conduct but came into being
thereafter, the “first” of the actions or omissions of the
series for the purposes of State responsibility will be the
first occurring after the obligation came into existence.
This need not prevent a court taking into account earlier
actions or omissions for other purposes (e.g. in order to
establish a factual basis for the later breaches or to provide
evidence of intent).
CHAPTER IV
RESPONSIBILITY OF A STATE IN CONNECTION
WITH THE ACT OF ANOTHER STATE
Commentary
(1) In accordance with the basic principles laid down
in chapter I, each State is responsible for its own internationally
wrongful conduct, i.e. for conduct attributable to
it under chapter II which is in breach of an international
obligation of that State in accordance with chapter III.261
The principle that State responsibility is specific to the
State concerned underlies the present articles as a whole.
It will be referred to as the principle of independent responsibility.
It is appropriate since each State has its own
range of international obligations and its own correlative
responsibilities.
(2) However, internationally wrongful conduct often results
from the collaboration of several States rather than
of one State acting alone.262 This may involve independent
conduct by several States, each playing its own role
in carrying out an internationally wrongful act. Or it may
be that a number of States act through a common organ to
commit a wrongful act.263 Internationally wrongful conduct
can also arise out of situations where a State acts
on behalf of another State in carrying out the conduct in
question.
(3) Various forms of collaborative conduct can coexist
in the same case. For example, three States, Australia,
New Zealand and the United Kingdom, together constituted
the Administering Authority for the Trust Territory
of Nauru. In the Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru case,
proceedings were commenced against Australia alone
in respect of acts performed on the “joint behalf ” of the
261 See, in particular, article 2 and commentary.
262 See M. L. Padelletti, Pluralità di Stati nel Fatto Illecito Internazionale
(Milan, Giuffrè, 1990); Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations
… (footnote 92 above), pp. 189–192; J. Quigley, “Complicity in international
law: a new direction in the law of State responsibility”, BYBIL,
1986, vol. 57, p. 77; J. E. Noyes and B. D. Smith, “State responsibility
and the principle of joint and several liability”, Yale Journal of International
Law, vol. 13 (1988), p. 225; and B. Graefrath, “Complicity in the
law of international responsibility”, Revue belge de droit international,
vol. 29 (1996), p. 370.
263 In some cases, the act in question may be committed by the
organs of an international organization. This raises issues of the
international responsibility of international organizations which fall
outside the scope of the present articles. See article 57 and commentary.
three States.264 The acts performed by Australia involved
both “joint” conduct of several States and day-to-day administration
of a territory by one State acting on behalf of
other States as well as on its own behalf. By contrast, if
the relevant organ of the acting State is merely “placed at
the disposal” of the requesting State, in the sense provided
for in article 6, only the requesting State is responsible for
the act in question.
(4) In certain circumstances the wrongfulness of a
State’s conduct may depend on the independent action of
another State. A State may engage in conduct in a situation
where another State is involved and the conduct of
the other State may be relevant or even decisive in assessing
whether the first State has breached its own international
obligations. For example, in the Soering case the
European Court of Human Rights held that the proposed
extradition of a person to a State not party to the European
Convention on Human Rights where he was likely
to suffer inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
involved a breach of article 3 of the Convention by the
extraditing State.265 Alternatively, a State may be required
by its own international obligations to prevent certain conduct
by another State, or at least to prevent the harm that
would flow from such conduct. Thus, the basis of responsibility
in the Corfu Channel case266 was Albania’s failure
to warn the United Kingdom of the presence of mines
in Albanian waters which had been laid by a third State.
Albania’s responsibility in the circumstances was original
and not derived from the wrongfulness of the conduct of
any other State.
(5) In most cases of collaborative conduct by States,
responsibility for the wrongful act will be determined
according to the principle of independent responsibility
referred to in paragraph (1) above. But there may be cases
where conduct of the organ of one State, not acting as an
organ or agent of another State, is nonetheless chargeable
to the latter State, and this may be so even though the
wrongfulness of the conduct lies, or at any rate primarily
lies, in a breach of the international obligations of the
former. Chapter IV of Part One defines these exceptional
cases where it is appropriate that one State should assume
responsibility for the internationally wrongful act of another.
(6) Three situations are covered in chapter IV. Article 16
deals with cases where one State provides aid or assistance
to another State with a view to assisting in the commission
of a wrongful act by the latter. Article 17 deals
with cases where one State is responsible for the internationally
wrongful act of another State because it has exercised
powers of direction and control over the commission
of an internationally wrongful act by the latter. Article 18
deals with the extreme case where one State deliberately
coerces another into committing an act which is, or but for
264 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Preliminary Objections
(see footnote 230 above), p. 258, para. 47; see also the separate opinion
of Judge Shahabuddeen, ibid., p. 284.
265 Soering v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Court H.R., Series A,
No. 161, pp. 33–36, paras. 85–91 (1989). See also Cruz Varas and
Others v. Sweden, ibid., No. 201, p. 28, paras. 69–70 (1991); and
Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom, ibid., No. 215, p. 37,
paras. 115–116 (1991).
266 Corfu Channel, Merits (see footnote 35 above), p. 22.
State responsibility 65
the coercion would be,267 an internationally wrongful act
on the part of the coerced State. In all three cases, the act
in question is still committed, voluntarily or otherwise, by
organs or agents of the acting State, and is, or but for the
coercion would be, a breach of that State’s international
obligations. The implication of the second State in that
breach arises from the special circumstance of its willing
assistance in, its direction and control over or its coercion
of the acting State. But there are important differences between
the three cases. Under article 16, the State primarily
responsible is the acting State and the assisting State has a
mere supporting role. Similarly under article 17, the acting
State commits the internationally wrongful act, albeit
under the direction and control of another State. By contrast,
in the case of coercion under article 18, the coercing
State is the prime mover in respect of the conduct and the
coerced State is merely its instrument.
(7) A feature of this chapter is that it specifies certain
conduct as internationally wrongful. This may seem to
blur the distinction maintained in the articles between
the primary or substantive obligations of the State and its
secondary obligations of responsibility.268 It is justified
on the basis that responsibility under chapter IV is in a
sense derivative.269 In national legal systems, rules dealing,
for example, with conspiracy, complicity and inducing
breach of contract may be classified as falling within
the “general part” of the law of obligations. Moreover, the
idea of the implication of one State in the conduct of another
is analogous to problems of attribution, dealt with
in chapter II.
(8) On the other hand, the situations covered in chapter
IV have a special character. They are exceptions to
the principle of independent responsibility and they only
cover certain cases. In formulating these exceptional cases
where one State is responsible for the internationally
wrongful acts of another, it is necessary to bear in mind
certain features of the international system. First, there is
the possibility that the same conduct may be internationally
wrongful so far as one State is concerned but not for
another State having regard to its own international obligations.
Rules of derived responsibility cannot be allowed
to undermine the principle, stated in article 34 of the 1969
Vienna Convention, that a “treaty does not create either
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent”;
similar issues arise with respect to unilateral obligations
and even, in certain cases, rules of general international
law. Hence it is only in the extreme case of coercion that a
State may become responsible under this chapter for conduct
which would not have been internationally wrongful
if performed by that State. Secondly, States engage in a
wide variety of activities through a multiplicity of organs
and agencies. For example, a State providing financial or
other aid to another State should not be required to assume
the risk that the latter will divert the aid for purposes
which may be internationally unlawful. Thus, it is
267 If a State has been coerced, the wrongfulness of its act may be
precluded by force majeure: see article 23 and commentary.
268 See paras. (1)–(2) and (4) of the general commentary for an
explanation of the distinction.
269 Cf. the term responsabilité dérivée used by Arbitrator Huber in
British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco (footnote 44 above),
p. 648.
necessary to establish a close connection between the action
of the assisting, directing or coercing State on the
one hand and that of the State committing the internationally
wrongful act on the other. Thus, the articles in this
chapter require that the former State should be aware of
the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act in
question, and establish a specific causal link between that
act and the conduct of the assisting, directing or coercing
State. This is done without prejudice to the general question
of “wrongful intent” in matters of State responsibility,
on which the articles are neutral.270
(9) Similar considerations dictate the exclusion of certain
situations of “derived responsibility” from chapter
IV. One of these is incitement. The incitement of
wrongful conduct is generally not regarded as sufficient
to give rise to responsibility on the part of the inciting
State, if it is not accompanied by concrete support or
does not involve direction and control on the part of the
inciting State.271 However, there can be specific treaty
obligations prohibiting incitement under certain circumstances.
272 Another concerns the issue which is described
in some systems of internal law as being an “accessory
after the fact”. It seems that there is no general obligation
on the part of third States to cooperate in suppressing
internationally wrongful conduct of another State which
may already have occurred. Again it is a matter for specific
treaty obligations to establish any such obligation of
suppression after the event. There are, however, two important
qualifications here. First, in some circumstances
assistance given by one State to another after the latter has
committed an internationally wrongful act may amount to
the adoption of that act by the former State. In such cases
responsibility for that act potentially arises pursuant to article
11. Secondly, special obligations of cooperation in
putting an end to an unlawful situation arise in the case of
serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms
of general international law. By definition, in such cases
States will have agreed that no derogation from such obligations
is to be permitted and, faced with a serious breach
of such an obligation, certain obligations of cooperation
arise. These are dealt with in article 41.
Article 16. Aid or assistance in the commission
of an internationally wrongful act
A State which aids or assists another State in the
commission of an internationally wrongful act by the
latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:
(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances
of the internationally wrongful act; and
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if
committed by that State.
270 See above, the commentary to paragraphs (3) and (10) of
article 2.
271 See the statement of the United States-French Commissioners
relating to the French Indemnity of 1831 case in Moore, History
and Digest, vol. V, p. 4447, at pp. 4473–4476. See also Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (footnote 36 above),
p. 129, para. 255, and the dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel,
p. 389, para. 259.
272 See, e.g., article III (c) of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; and article 4 of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
66 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
Commentary
(1) Article 16 deals with the situation where one State
provides aid or assistance to another with a view to facilitating
the commission of an internationally wrongful act
by the latter. Such situations arise where a State voluntarily
assists or aids another State in carrying out conduct
which violates the international obligations of the latter,
for example, by knowingly providing an essential facility
or financing the activity in question. Other examples include
providing means for the closing of an international
waterway, facilitating the abduction of persons on foreign
soil, or assisting in the destruction of property belonging
to nationals of a third country. The State primarily responsible
in each case is the acting State, and the assisting
State has only a supporting role. Hence the use of the
term “by the latter” in the chapeau to article 16, which
distinguishes the situation of aid or assistance from that
of co-perpetrators or co-participants in an internationally
wrongful act. Under article 16, aid or assistance by the
assisting State is not to be confused with the responsibility
of the acting State. In such a case, the assisting State
will only be responsible to the extent that its own conduct
has caused or contributed to the internationally wrongful
act. Thus, in cases where that internationally wrongful act
would clearly have occurred in any event, the responsibility
of the assisting State will not extend to compensating
for the act itself.
(2) Various specific substantive rules exist, prohibiting
one State from providing assistance in the commission
of certain wrongful acts by other States or even requiring
third States to prevent or repress such acts.273 Such
provisions do not rely on any general principle of derived
responsibility, nor do they deny the existence of such a
principle, and it would be wrong to infer from them the
non-existence of any general rule. As to treaty provisions
such as Article 2, paragraph 5, of the Charter of the United
Nations, again these have a specific rationale which goes
well beyond the scope and purpose of article 16.
(3) Article 16 limits the scope of responsibility for aid
or assistance in three ways. First, the relevant State organ
or agency providing aid or assistance must be aware of the
circumstances making the conduct of the assisted State
internationally wrongful; secondly, the aid or assistance
must be given with a view to facilitating the commission
of that act, and must actually do so; and thirdly, the completed
act must be such that it would have been wrongful
had it been committed by the assisting State itself.
(4) The requirement that the assisting State be aware
of the circumstances making the conduct of the assisted
State internationally wrongful is reflected by the phrase
“knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally
wrongful act”. A State providing material or financial assistance
or aid to another State does not normally assume
the risk that its assistance or aid may be used to carry
out an internationally wrongful act. If the assisting or aid-
273 See, e.g., the first principle of the Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October
1970, annex); and article 3 (f) of the Definition of Aggression
(General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974,
annex).
ing State is unaware of the circumstances in which its aid
or assistance is intended to be used by the other State, it
bears no international responsibility.
(5) The second requirement is that the aid or assistance
must be given with a view to facilitating the commission
of the wrongful act, and must actually do so. This limits
the application of article 16 to those cases where the aid or
assistance given is clearly linked to the subsequent wrongful
conduct. A State is not responsible for aid or assistance
under article 16 unless the relevant State organ intended,
by the aid or assistance given, to facilitate the occurrence
of the wrongful conduct and the internationally wrongful
conduct is actually committed by the aided or assisted
State. There is no requirement that the aid or assistance
should have been essential to the performance of the internationally
wrongful act; it is sufficient if it contributed
significantly to that act.
(6) The third condition limits article 16 to aid or assistance
in the breach of obligations by which the aiding or
assisting State is itself bound. An aiding or assisting State
may not deliberately procure the breach by another State
of an obligation by which both States are bound; a State
cannot do by another what it cannot do by itself. On the
other hand, a State is not bound by obligations of another
State vis-à-vis third States. This basic principle is also embodied
in articles 34 and 35 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
Correspondingly, a State is free to act for itself in a
way which is inconsistent with the obligations of another
State vis-à-vis third States. Any question of responsibility
in such cases will be a matter for the State to whom
assistance is provided vis-à-vis the injured State. Thus, it
is a necessary requirement for the responsibility of an assisting
State that the conduct in question, if attributable to
the assisting State, would have constituted a breach of its
own international obligations.
(7) State practice supports assigning international responsibility
to a State which deliberately participates in
the internationally wrongful conduct of another through
the provision of aid or assistance, in circumstances where
the obligation breached is equally opposable to the assisting
State. For example, in 1984 the Islamic Republic of
Iran protested against the supply of financial and military
aid to Iraq by the United Kingdom, which allegedly
included chemical weapons used in attacks against Iranian
troops, on the ground that the assistance was facilitating
acts of aggression by Iraq.274 The Government of
the United Kingdom denied both the allegation that it had
chemical weapons and that it had supplied them to Iraq.275
In 1998, a similar allegation surfaced that the Sudan had
assisted Iraq to manufacture chemical weapons by allowing
Sudanese installations to be used by Iraqi technicians
for steps in the production of nerve gas. The allegation was
denied by Iraq’s representative to the United Nations.276
(8) The obligation not to use force may also be breached
by an assisting State through permitting the use of its territory
by another State to carry out an armed attack against
a third State. An example is provided by a statement made
by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany
274 The New York Times, 6 March 1984, p. A1.
275 Ibid., 5 March 1984, p. A3.
276 Ibid., 26 August 1998, p. A8.
State responsibility 67
in response to an allegation that Germany had participated
in an armed attack by allowing United States military
aircraft to use airfields in its territory in connection with
the United States intervention in Lebanon. While denying
that the measures taken by the United States and the United
Kingdom in the Near East constituted intervention, the
Federal Republic of Germany nevertheless seems to have
accepted that the act of a State in placing its own territory
at the disposal of another State in order to facilitate the
commission of an unlawful use of force by that other State
was itself an internationally wrongful act.277 Another example
arises from the Tripoli bombing incident in April
1986. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya charged the United
Kingdom with responsibility for the event, based on the
fact that the United Kingdom had allowed several of its air
bases to be used for the launching of United States fighter
planes to attack Libyan targets.278 The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
asserted that the United Kingdom “would be held
partly responsible” for having “supported and contributed
in a direct way” to the raid.279 The United Kingdom
denied responsibility on the basis that the raid by the
United States was lawful as an act of self-defence
against Libyan terrorist attacks on United States targets.280
A proposed Security Council resolution concerning the
attack was vetoed, but the General Assembly issued a resolution
condemning the “military attack” as “a violation
of the Charter of the United Nations and of international
law”, and calling upon all States “to refrain from extending
any assistance or facilities for perpetrating acts of
aggression against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”.281
(9) The obligation not to provide aid or assistance to
facilitate the commission of an internationally wrongful
act by another State is not limited to the prohibition on the
use of force. For instance, a State may incur responsibility
if it assists another State to circumvent sanctions imposed
by the Security Council282 or provides material aid to a
State that uses the aid to commit human rights violations.
In this respect, the General Assembly has called on Member
States in a number of cases to refrain from supplying
arms and other military assistance to countries found to
be committing serious human rights violations.283 Where
the allegation is that the assistance of a State has facilitated
human rights abuses by another State, the particular
circumstances of each case must be carefully examined to
determine whether the aiding State by its aid was aware of
and intended to facilitate the commission of the internationally
wrongful conduct.
277 For the text of the note from the Federal Government,
see Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht,
vol. 20 (August 1960), pp. 663–664.
278 See United States of America, Department of State Bulletin,
No. 2111 (June 1986), p. 8.
279 See the statement of Ambassador Hamed Houdeiry, Libyan
People’s Bureau, Paris, The Times, 16 April 1986, p. 6.
280 Statement of Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister, House
of Commons Debates, 6th series, vol. 95, col. 737 (15 April 1986),
reprinted in BYBIL, 1986, vol. 57, pp. 637–638.
281 General Assembly resolution 41/38 of 20 November 1986,
paras. 1 and 3.
282 See, e.g., Report by President Clinton, AJIL, vol. 91, No. 4
(October 1997), p. 709.
283 Report of the Economic and Social Council, Report of the Third
Committee of the General Assembly, draft resolution XVII (A/37/745),
p. 50.
(10) In accordance with article 16, the assisting State is
responsible for its own act in deliberately assisting another
State to breach an international obligation by which they
are both bound. It is not responsible, as such, for the act of
the assisted State. In some cases this may be a distinction
without a difference: where the assistance is a necessary
element in the wrongful act in absence of which it could
not have occurred, the injury suffered can be concurrently
attributed to the assisting and the acting State.284 In other
cases, however, the difference may be very material: the
assistance may have been only an incidental factor in the
commission of the primary act, and may have contributed
only to a minor degree, if at all, to the injury suffered.
By assisting another State to commit an internationally
wrongful act, a State should not necessarily be held to indemnify
the victim for all the consequences of the act,
but only for those which, in accordance with the principles
stated in Part Two of the articles, flow from its own
conduct.
(11) Article 16 does not address the question of the admissibility
of judicial proceedings to establish the responsibility
of the aiding or assisting State in the absence of
or without the consent of the aided or assisted State. ICJ
has repeatedly affirmed that it cannot decide on the international
responsibility of a State if, in order to do so, “it
would have to rule, as a prerequisite, on the lawfulness”285
of the conduct of another State, in the latter’s absence and
without its consent. This is the so-called Monetary Gold
principle.286 That principle may well apply to cases under
article 16, since it is of the essence of the responsibility
of the aiding or assisting State that the aided or assisted
State itself committed an internationally wrongful act.
The wrongfulness of the aid or assistance given by the
former is dependent, inter alia, on the wrongfulness of
the conduct of the latter. This may present practical difficulties
in some cases in establishing the responsibility
of the aiding or assisting State, but it does not vitiate the
purpose of article 16. The Monetary Gold principle is
concerned with the admissibility of claims in international
judicial proceedings, not with questions of responsibility
as such. Moreover, that principle is not all-embracing,
and the Monetary Gold principle may not be a barrier to
judicial proceedings in every case. In any event, wrongful
assistance given to another State has frequently led to
diplomatic protests. States are entitled to assert complicity
in the wrongful conduct of another State even though
no international court may have jurisdiction to rule on the
charge, at all or in the absence of the other State.
Article 17. Direction and control exercised over the
commission of an internationally wrongful act
A State which directs and controls another State in
the commission of an internationally wrongful act by
the latter is internationally responsible for that act if:
(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances
of the internationally wrongful act; and
284 For the question of concurrent responsibility of several States for
the same injury, see article 47 and commentary.
285 East Timor (see footnote 54 above), p. 105, para. 35.
286 Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1954, p. 19, at p. 32; Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru,
Preliminary Objections (see footnote 230 above), p. 261, para. 55.
68 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if
committed by that State.
Commentary
(1) Article 17 deals with a second case of derived responsibility,
the exercise of direction and control by one
State over the commission of an internationally wrongful
act by another. Under article 16, a State providing
aid or assistance with a view to the commission of an
internationally wrongful act incurs international responsibility
only to the extent of the aid or assistance given.
By contrast, a State which directs and controls another in
the commission of an internationally wrongful act is responsible
for the act itself, since it controlled and directed
the act in its entirety.
(2) Some examples of international responsibility flowing
from the exercise of direction and control over the
commission of a wrongful act by another State are now
largely of historical significance. International dependency
relationships such as “suzerainty” or “protectorate”
warranted treating the dominant State as internationally
responsible for conduct formally attributable to the
dependent State. For example, in Rights of Nationals of
the United States of America in Morocco,287 France commenced
proceedings under the Optional Clause in respect
of a dispute concerning the rights of United States nationals
in Morocco under French protectorate. The United
States objected that any eventual judgment might not be
considered as binding upon Morocco, which was not a
party to the proceedings. France confirmed that it was
acting both in its own name and as the protecting power
over Morocco, with the result that the Court’s judgment
would be binding both on France and on Morocco,288 and
the case proceeded on that basis.289 The Court’s judgment
concerned questions of the responsibility of France in respect
of the conduct of Morocco which were raised both
by the application and by the United States counterclaim.
(3) With the developments in international relations
since 1945, and in particular the process of decolonization,
older dependency relationships have been terminated.
Such links do not involve any legal right to direction
or control on the part of the representing State. In cases
of representation, the represented entity remains responsible
for its own international obligations, even though
diplomatic communications may be channelled through
another State. The representing State in such cases does
not, merely because it is the channel through which communications
pass, assume any responsibility for their content.
This is not in contradiction to the British Claims in
the Spanish Zone of Morocco arbitration, which affirmed
that “the responsibility of the protecting State … proceeds
… from the fact that the protecting State alone represents
287 Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco
(see footnote 108 above), p. 176.
288 Ibid., I.C.J. Pleadings, vol. I, p. 235; and vol. II, pp. 431–433;
the United States thereupon withdrew its preliminary objection: ibid.,
p. 434.
289 See Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in
Morocco (footnote 108 above), p. 179.
the protected territory in its international relations”,290
and that the protecting State is answerable “in place of
the protected State”.291 The principal concern in the arbitration
was to ensure that, in the case of a protectorate
which put an end to direct international relations by the
protected State, international responsibility for wrongful
acts committed by the protected State was not erased to
the detriment of third States injured by the wrongful conduct.
The acceptance by the protecting State of the obligation
to answer in place of the protected State was viewed
as an appropriate means of avoiding that danger.292 The
justification for such an acceptance was not based on the
relationship of “representation” as such but on the fact
that the protecting State was in virtually total control over
the protected State. It was not merely acting as a channel
of communication.
(4) Other relationships of dependency, such as dependent
territories, fall entirely outside the scope of article 17,
which is concerned only with the responsibility of one
State for the conduct of another State. In most relationships
of dependency between one territory and another,
the dependent territory, even if it may possess some international
personality, is not a State. Even in cases where
a component unit of a federal State enters into treaties or
other international legal relations in its own right, and not
by delegation from the federal State, the component unit
is not itself a State in international law. So far as State
responsibility is concerned, the position of federal States
is no different from that of any other State: the normal
principles specified in articles 4 to 9 of the draft articles
apply, and the federal State is internationally responsible
for the conduct of its component units even though that
conduct falls within their own local control under the federal
constitution.293
(5) Nonetheless, instances exist or can be envisaged
where one State exercises the power to direct and control
the activities of another State, whether by treaty or as a
result of a military occupation or for some other reason.
For example, during the belligerent occupation of Italy by
Germany in the Second World War, it was generally acknowledged
that the Italian police in Rome operated under
the control of the occupying Power. Thus, the protest
by the Holy See in respect of wrongful acts committed by
Italian police who forcibly entered the Basilica of St. Paul
in Rome in February 1944 asserted the responsibility of
the German authorities.294 In such cases the occupying
State is responsible for acts of the occupied State which it
directs and controls.
(6) Article 17 is limited to cases where a dominant State
actually directs and controls conduct which is a breach of
an international obligation of the dependent State. International
tribunals have consistently refused to infer responsibility
on the part of a dominant State merely because
290 British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco (see footnote 44
above), p. 649.
291 Ibid., p. 648.
292 Ibid.
293 See, e.g., LaGrand, Provisional Measures (footnote 91 above).
294 See R. Ago, “L’occupazione bellica di Roma e il Trattato
lateranense”, Comunicazioni e Studi (Milan, Giuffrè, 1945), vol. II,
pp. 167–168.
State responsibility 69
the latter may have the power to interfere in matters of
administration internal to a dependent State, if that power
is not exercised in the particular case. In the Brown case,
for example, the arbitral tribunal held that the authority of
Great Britain, as suzerain over the South African Republic
prior to the Boer War, “fell far short of what would be
required to make her responsible for the wrong inflicted
upon Brown”.295 It went on to deny that Great Britain
possessed power to interfere in matters of internal administration
and continued that there was no evidence “that
Great Britain ever did undertake to interfere in this way”.296
Accordingly, the relation of suzerainty “did not operate to
render Great Britain liable for the acts complained of ”. 297
In the Heirs of the Duc de Guise case, the Franco-Italian
Conciliation Commission held that Italy was responsible
for a requisition carried out by Italy in Sicily at a time
when it was under Allied occupation. Its decision was not
based on the absence of Allied power to requisition the
property, or to stop Italy from doing so. Rather, the majority
pointed to the absence in fact of any “intermeddling
on the part of the Commander of the Occupation forces or
any Allied authority calling for the requisition decrees”.298
The mere fact that a State may have power to exercise
direction and control over another State in some field is
not a sufficient basis for attributing to it any wrongful acts
of the latter State in that field.299
(7) In the formulation of article 17, the term “controls”
refers to cases of domination over the commission of
wrongful conduct and not simply the exercise of oversight,
still less mere influence or concern. Similarly, the word
“directs” does not encompass mere incitement or suggestion
but rather connotes actual direction of an operative
kind. Both direction and control must be exercised over
the wrongful conduct in order for a dominant State to incur
responsibility. The choice of the expression, common
in English, “direction and control”, raised some problems
in other languages, owing in particular to the ambiguity
of the term “direction” which may imply, as is the case
in French, complete power, whereas it does not have this
implication in English.
(8) Two further conditions attach to responsibility under
article 17. First, the dominant State is only responsible if
it has knowledge of the circumstances making the conduct
of the dependent State wrongful. Secondly, it has to be
shown that the completed act would have been wrongful
had it been committed by the directing and controlling
State itself. This condition is significant in the context
of bilateral obligations, which are not opposable to the
directing State. In cases of multilateral obligations and
295 Robert E. Brown (United States) v. Great Britain, UNRIAA,
vol. VI (Sales No. 1955.V.3), p. 120, at p. 130 (1923).
296 Ibid., p. 131.
297 Ibid.
298 Heirs of the Duc de Guise (see footnote 115 above). See also, in
another context, Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain (footnote 135
above); see also Iribarne Pérez v. France, Eur. Court H.R., Series A,
No. 325–C, pp. 62–63, paras. 29–31 (1995).
299 It may be that the fact of the dependence of one State upon another
is relevant in terms of the burden of proof, since the mere existence
of a formal State apparatus does not exclude the possibility that control
was exercised in fact by an occupying Power. Cf. Restitution of Household
Effects Belonging to Jews Deported from Hungary (Germany),
Kammergericht of Berlin, ILR, vol. 44, p. 301, at pp. 340–342 (1965).
especially of obligations to the international community,
it is of much less significance. The essential principle is
that a State should not be able to do through another what
it could not do itself.
(9) As to the responsibility of the directed and controlled
State, the mere fact that it was directed to carry out an
internationally wrongful act does not constitute an excuse
under chapter V of Part One. If the conduct in question
would involve a breach of its international obligations, it is
incumbent upon it to decline to comply with the direction.
The defence of “superior orders” does not exist for States
in international law. This is not to say that the wrongfulness
of the directed and controlled State’s conduct may
not be precluded under chapter V, but this will only be so
if it can show the existence of a circumstance precluding
wrongfulness, e.g. force majeure. In such a case it is to
the directing State alone that the injured State must look.
But as between States, genuine cases of force majeure or
coercion are exceptional. Conversely, it is no excuse for
the directing State to show that the directed State was a
willing or even enthusiastic participant in the internationally
wrongful conduct, if in truth the conditions laid down
in article 17 are met.
Article 18. Coercion of another State
A State which coerces another State to commit an
act is internationally responsible for that act if:
(a) the act would, but for the coercion, be an internationally
wrongful act of the coerced State; and
(b) the coercing State does so with knowledge of the
circumstances of the act.
Commentary
(1) The third case of derived responsibility dealt with
by chapter IV is that of coercion of one State by another.
Article 18 is concerned with the specific problem of coercion
deliberately exercised in order to procure the breach
of one State’s obligation to a third State. In such cases
the responsibility of the coercing State with respect to the
third State derives not from its act of coercion, but rather
from the wrongful conduct resulting from the action of
the coerced State. Responsibility for the coercion itself
is that of the coercing State vis-à-vis the coerced State,
whereas responsibility under article 18 is the responsibility
of the coercing State vis-à-vis a victim of the coerced
act, in particular a third State which is injured as a result.
(2) Coercion for the purpose of article 18 has the same
essential character as force majeure under article 23.
Nothing less than conduct which forces the will of the
coerced State will suffice, giving it no effective choice
but to comply with the wishes of the coercing State. It
is not sufficient that compliance with the obligation is
made more difficult or onerous, or that the acting State
is assisted or directed in its conduct: such questions are
covered by the preceding articles. Moreover, the coercing
State must coerce the very act which is internationally
wrongful. It is not enough that the consequences of the
70 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
coerced act merely make it more difficult for the coerced
State to comply with the obligation.
(3) Though coercion for the purpose of article 18 is
narrowly defined, it is not limited to unlawful coercion.300
As a practical matter, most cases of coercion meeting the
requirements of the article will be unlawful, e.g. because
they involve a threat or use of force contrary to the Charter
of the United Nations, or because they involve intervention,
i.e. coercive interference, in the affairs of another
State. Such is also the case with countermeasures. They
may have a coercive character, but as is made clear in
article 49, their function is to induce a wrongdoing State
to comply with obligations of cessation and reparation towards
the State taking the countermeasures, not to coerce
that State to violate obligations to third States.301 However,
coercion could possibly take other forms, e.g. serious
economic pressure, provided that it is such as to deprive
the coerced State of any possibility of conforming
with the obligation breached.
(4) The equation of coercion with force majeure means
that in most cases where article 18 is applicable, the responsibility
of the coerced State will be precluded vis-àvis
the injured third State. This is reflected in the phrase
“but for the coercion” in subparagraph (a) of article 18.
Coercion amounting to force majeure may be the reason
why the wrongfulness of an act is precluded vis-à-vis the
coerced State. Therefore, the act is not described as an
internationally wrongful act in the opening clause of the
article, as is done in articles 16 and 17, where no comparable
circumstance would preclude the wrongfulness of
the act of the assisted or controlled State. But there is no
reason why the wrongfulness of that act should be precluded
vis-à-vis the coercing State. On the contrary, if the
coercing State cannot be held responsible for the act in
question, the injured State may have no redress at all.
(5) It is a further requirement for responsibility under
article 18 that the coercing State must be aware of the
circumstances which would, but for the coercion, have
entailed the wrongfulness of the coerced State’s conduct.
The reference to “circumstances” in subparagraph (b) is
understood as reference to the factual situation rather than
to the coercing State’s judgement of the legality of the act.
This point is clarified by the phrase “circumstances of the
act”. Hence, while ignorance of the law is no excuse, ignorance
of the facts is material in determining the responsibility
of the coercing State.
(6) A State which sets out to procure by coercion a
breach of another State’s obligations to a third State
will be held responsible to the third State for the consequences,
regardless of whether the coercing State is also
bound by the obligation in question. Otherwise, the injured
State would potentially be deprived of any redress,
because the acting State may be able to rely on force majeure
as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. Article
18 thus differs from articles 16 and 17 in that it does not
allow for an exemption from responsibility for the act of
300 P. Reuter, Introduction to the Law of Treaties, 2nd rev. ed.
(London, Kegan Paul International, 1995), paras. 271–274.
301 See article 49, para. 2, and commentary.
the coerced State in circumstances where the coercing
State is not itself bound by the obligation in question.
(7) State practice lends support to the principle that a
State bears responsibility for the internationally wrongful
conduct of another State which it coerces. In the Romano-
Americana case, the claim of the United States Government
in respect of the destruction of certain oil storage
and other facilities owned by a United States company on
the orders of the Government of Romania during the First
World War was originally addressed to the British Government.
At the time the facilities were destroyed, Romania
was at war with Germany, which was preparing to invade
the country, and the United States claimed that the Romanian
authorities had been “compelled” by Great Britain to
take the measures in question. In support of its claim, the
United States Government argued that the circumstances
of the case revealed “a situation where a strong belligerent
for a purpose primarily its own arising from its defensive
requirements at sea, compelled a weaker Ally to acquiesce
in an operation which it carried out on the territory of that
Ally”.302 The British Government denied responsibility,
asserting that its influence over the conduct of the Romanian
authorities “did not in any way go beyond the limits
of persuasion and good counsel as between governments
associated in a common cause”.303 The point of disagreement
between the Governments of the United States and
of Great Britain was not as to the responsibility of a State
for the conduct of another State which it has coerced, but
rather the existence of “compulsion” in the particular
circumstances of the case.304
Article 19. Effect of this chapter
This chapter is without prejudice to the international
responsibility, under other provisions of these articles,
of the State which commits the act in question, or
of any other State.
Commentary
(1) Article 19 serves three purposes. First, it preserves
the responsibility of the State which has committed the
internationally wrongful act, albeit with the aid or assistance,
under the direction and control or subject to the coercion
of another State. It recognizes that the attribution
of international responsibility to an assisting, directing or
coercing State does not preclude the responsibility of the
assisted, directed or coerced State.
(2) Secondly, the article makes clear that the provisions
of chapter IV are without prejudice to any other basis for
establishing the responsibility of the assisting, directing
or coercing State under any rule of international law defining
particular conduct as wrongful. The phrase “under
302 Note from the United States Embassy in London, dated 16 February
1925, in Hackworth, op. cit. (footnote 142 above), p. 702.
303 Note from the British Foreign Office dated 5 July 1928, ibid.,
p. 704.
304 For a different example involving the coercion of a breach of contract
in circumstances amounting to a denial of justice, see C. L. Bouvé,
“Russia’s liability in tort for Persia’s breach of contract”, AJIL, vol. 6,
No. 2 (April 1912), p. 389.
State responsibility 71
other provisions of these articles” is a reference, inter
alia, to article 23 (Force majeure), which might affect the
question of responsibility. The phrase also draws attention
to the fact that other provisions of the draft articles may
be relevant to the State committing the act in question,
and that chapter IV in no way precludes the issue of its
responsibility in that regard.
(3) Thirdly, article 19 preserves the responsibility “of
any other State” to whom the internationally wrongful
conduct might also be attributable under other provisions
of the articles.
(4) Thus, article 19 is intended to avoid any contrary inference
in respect of responsibility which may arise from
primary rules, precluding certain forms of assistance, or
from acts otherwise attributable to any State under chapter
II. The article covers both the implicated and the acting
State. It makes it clear that chapter IV is concerned only
with situations in which the act which lies at the origin
of the wrong is an act committed by one State and not by
the other. If both States commit the act, then that situation
would fall within the realm of co-perpetrators, dealt with
in chapter II.
CHAPTER V
CIRCUMSTANCES PRECLUDING
WRONGFULNESS
Commentary
(1) Chapter V sets out six circumstances precluding the
wrongfulness of conduct that would otherwise not be in
conformity with the international obligations of the State
concerned. The existence in a given case of a circumstance
precluding wrongfulness in accordance with this chapter
provides a shield against an otherwise well-founded claim
for the breach of an international obligation. The six circumstances
are: consent (art. 20), self-defence (art. 21),
countermeasures (art. 22), force majeure (art. 23), distress
(art. 24) and necessity (art. 25). Article 26 makes it
clear that none of these circumstances can be relied on if
to do so would conflict with a peremptory norm of general
international law. Article 27 deals with certain consequences
of the invocation of one of these circumstances.
(2) Consistent with the approach of the present articles,
the circumstances precluding wrongfulness set out
in chapter V are of general application. Unless otherwise
provided,305 they apply to any internationally wrongful
act whether it involves the breach by a State of an obligation
arising under a rule of general international law, a
treaty, a unilateral act or from any other source. They do
not annul or terminate the obligation; rather they provide
a justification or excuse for non-performance while the
circumstance in question subsists. This was emphasized
by ICJ in the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case. Hungary
sought to argue that the wrongfulness of its conduct in
discontinuing work on the Project in breach of its obliga-
305 For example, by a treaty to the contrary, which would constitute a
lex specialis under article 55.
tions under the Treaty on the Construction and Operation
of the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Barrage System was precluded
by necessity. In dealing with the Hungarian plea,
the Court said:
The state of necessity claimed by Hungary—supposing it to have been
established—thus could not permit of the conclusion that ... it had acted
in accordance with its obligations under the 1977 Treaty or that those
obligations had ceased to be binding upon it. It would only permit the
affirmation that, under the circumstances, Hungary would not incur
international responsibility by acting as it did.306
Thus a distinction must be drawn between the effect of
circumstances precluding wrongfulness and the termination
of the obligation itself. The circumstances in chapter
V operate as a shield rather than a sword. As Fitzmaurice
noted, where one of the circumstances precluding
wrongfulness applies, “the non-performance is not only
justified, but ‘looks towards’ a resumption of performance
so soon as the factors causing and justifying the non-performance
are no longer present”.307
(3) This distinction emerges clearly from the decisions
of international tribunals. In the “Rainbow Warrior” arbitration,
the tribunal held that both the law of treaties
and the law of State responsibility had to be applied, the
former to determine whether the treaty was still in force,
the latter to determine what the consequences were of
any breach of the treaty while it was in force, including
the question whether the wrongfulness of the conduct in
question was precluded.308 In the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros
Project case, the Court noted that:
[E]ven if a state of necessity is found to exist, it is not a ground for the
termination of a treaty. It may only be invoked to exonerate from its
responsibility a State which has failed to implement a treaty. Even if
found justified, it does not terminate a Treaty; the Treaty may be ineffective
as long as the condition of necessity continues to exist; it may in
fact be dormant, but—unless the parties by mutual agreement terminate
the treaty—it continues to exist. As soon as the state of necessity ceases
to exist, the duty to comply with treaty obligations revives.309
(4) While the same facts may amount, for example, to
force majeure under article 23 and to a supervening impossibility
of performance under article 61 of the 1969
Vienna Convention, the two are distinct. Force majeure
justifies non-performance of the obligation for so long as
the circumstance exists; supervening impossibility justifies
the termination of the treaty or its suspension in accordance
with the conditions laid down in article 61. The
former operates in respect of the particular obligation, the
latter with respect to the treaty which is the source of that
obligation. Just as the scope of application of the two doctrines
is different, so is their mode of application. Force
majeure excuses non-performance for the time being, but
a treaty is not automatically terminated by supervening
impossibility: at least one of the parties must decide to
terminate it.
(5) The concept of circumstances precluding wrongfulness
may be traced to the work of the Preparatory
306 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), p. 39,
para. 48.
307 Yearbook … 1959, vol. II, p. 41, document A/CN.4/120.
308 “Rainbow Warrior” (see footnote 46 above), pp. 251–252,
para. 75.
309 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), p. 63,
para. 101; see also page 38, para. 47.
72 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
Committee of the 1930 Hague Conference. Among its
Bases of discussion,310 it listed two “[c]ircumstances under
which States can decline their responsibility”, self-defence
and reprisals.311 It considered that the extent of a
State’s responsibility in the context of diplomatic protection
could also be affected by the “provocative attitude”
adopted by the injured person (Basis of discussion No.
19) and that a State could not be held responsible for damage
caused by its armed forces “in the suppression of an
insurrection, riot or other disturbance” (Basis of discussion
No. 21). However, these issues were not taken to any
conclusion.
(6) The category of circumstances precluding wrongfulness
was developed by ILC in its work on international responsibility
for injuries to aliens312 and the performance
of treaties.313 In the event, the subject of excuses for the
non-performance of treaties was not included within the
scope of the 1969 Vienna Convention.314 It is a matter for
the law on State responsibility.
(7) Circumstances precluding wrongfulness are to be
distinguished from other arguments which may have the
effect of allowing a State to avoid responsibility. They
have nothing to do with questions of the jurisdiction of
a court or tribunal over a dispute or the admissibility of a
claim. They are to be distinguished from the constituent
requirements of the obligation, i.e. those elements which
have to exist for the issue of wrongfulness to arise in the
first place and which are in principle specified by the obligation
itself. In this sense the circumstances precluding
wrongfulness operate like defences or excuses in internal
legal systems, and the circumstances identified in chapter
V are recognized by many legal systems, often under
the same designation.315 On the other hand, there is no
common approach to these circumstances in internal law,
and the conditions and limitations in chapter V have been
developed independently.
(8) Just as the articles do not deal with questions of the
jurisdiction of courts or tribunals, so they do not deal with
issues of evidence or the burden of proof. In a bilateral
dispute over State responsibility, the onus of establishing
responsibility lies in principle on the claimant State.
Where conduct in conflict with an international obligation
is attributable to a State and that State seeks to avoid its
responsibility by relying on a circumstance under chapter
V, however, the position changes and the onus lies on that
State to justify or excuse its conduct. Indeed, it is often the
case that only that State is fully aware of the facts which
might excuse its non-performance.
310 Yearbook ... 1956, vol. II, pp. 219–225, document A/CN.4/96.
311 Ibid., pp. 224–225. Issues raised by the Calvo clause and the
exhaustion of local remedies were dealt with under the same heading.
312 Yearbook ... 1958, vol. II, p. 72. For the discussion of the
circumstances by Special Rapporteur García Amador, see his first report
on State responsibility, Yearbook ... 1956, vol. II, pp. 203–209,
document A/CN.4/96, and his third report on State responsibility,
Yearbook ... 1958, vol. II, pp. 50–55, document A/CN.4/111.
313 See the fourth report on the law of treaties of Special Rapporteur
Fitzmaurice (footnote 307 above), pp. 44–47, and his comments,
ibid., pp. 63–74.
314 See article 73 of the Convention.
315 See the comparative review by C. von Bar, The Common European
Law of Torts (Oxford University Press, 2000), vol. 2, pp. 499–
592.
(9) Chapter V sets out the circumstances precluding
wrongfulness presently recognized under general international
law.316 Certain other candidates have been excluded.
For example, the exception of non-performance
(exceptio inadimpleti contractus) is best seen as a specific
feature of certain mutual or synallagmatic obligations and
not a circumstance precluding wrongfulness.317 The principle
that a State may not benefit from its own wrongful
act is capable of generating consequences in the field of
State responsibility but it is rather a general principle than
a specific circumstance precluding wrongfulness.318 The
so-called “clean hands” doctrine has been invoked principally
in the context of the admissibility of claims before
international courts and tribunals, though rarely applied.
It also does not need to be included here.319
Article 20. Consent
Valid consent by a State to the commission of a
given act by another State precludes the wrongfulness
of that act in relation to the former State to the extent
that the act remains within the limits of that consent.
Commentary
(1) Article 20 reflects the basic international law principle
of consent in the particular context of Part One. In accordance
with this principle, consent by a State to particular
conduct by another State precludes the wrongfulness
of that act in relation to the consenting State, provided the
consent is valid and to the extent that the conduct remains
within the limits of the consent given.
(2) It is a daily occurrence that States consent to conduct
of other States which, without such consent, would
constitute a breach of an international obligation. Simple
examples include transit through the airspace or internal
waters of a State, the location of facilities on its territory
or the conduct of official investigations or inquiries
there. But a distinction must be drawn between consent in
relation to a particular situation or a particular course of
316 For the effect of contribution to the injury by the injured State or
other person or entity, see article 39 and commentary. This does not preclude
wrongfulness but is relevant in determining the extent and form
of reparation.
317 Cf. Diversion of Water from the Meuse, Judgment, 1937, P.C.I.J.,
Series A/B, No. 70, p. 4, especially at pp. 50 and 77. See also the
fourth report on the law of treaties of Special Rapporteur Fitzmaurice
(footnote 307 above), pp. 43–47; D. W. Greig, “Reciprocity, proportionality
and the law of treaties”, Virginia Journal of International Law,
vol. 34 (1994), p. 295; and for a comparative review, G. H. Treitel,
Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 245–317. For the relationship between the
exception of non-performance and countermeasures, see below, paragraph
(5) of commentary to Part Three, chap. II.
318 See, e.g., Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction (footnote 34 above),
p. 31; cf. Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (footnote 27 above), p. 67,
para. 110.
319 See J. J. A. Salmon, “Des ‘mains propres’ comme condition
de recevabilité des réclamations internationales”, Annuaire français
de droit international, vol. 10 (1964), p. 225; A. Miaja de la Muela,
“Le rôle de la condition des mains propres de la personne lésée dans
les réclamations devant les tribunaux internationaux”, Mélanges offerts
à Juraj Andrassy (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 189, and
the dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel in Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (footnote 36 above), pp. 392–394.
State responsibility 73
conduct, and consent in relation to the underlying obligation
itself. In the case of a bilateral treaty, the States parties
can at any time agree to terminate or suspend the treaty,
in which case obligations arising from the treaty will be
terminated or suspended accordingly.320 But quite apart
from that possibility, States have the right to dispense with
the performance of an obligation owed to them individually,
or generally to permit conduct to occur which (absent
such permission) would be unlawful so far as they are
concerned. In such cases, the primary obligation continues
to govern the relations between the two States, but it is
displaced on the particular occasion or for the purposes of
the particular conduct by reason of the consent given.
(3) Consent to the commission of otherwise wrongful
conduct may be given by a State in advance or even at the
time it is occurring. By contrast, cases of consent given
after the conduct has occurred are a form of waiver or
acquiescence, leading to loss of the right to invoke
responsibility. This is dealt with in article 45.
(4) In order to preclude wrongfulness, consent dispensing
with the performance of an obligation in a particular
case must be “valid”. Whether consent has been validly
given is a matter addressed by international law rules
outside the framework of State responsibility. Issues include
whether the agent or person who gave the consent
was authorized to do so on behalf of the State (and if not,
whether the lack of that authority was known or ought
to have been known to the acting State), or whether the
consent was vitiated by coercion or some other factor.321
Indeed there may be a question whether the State could
validly consent at all. The reference to a “valid consent”
in article 20 highlights the need to consider these issues
in certain cases.
(5) Whether a particular person or entity had the authority
to grant consent in a given case is a separate question
from whether the conduct of that person or entity was attributable
to the State for the purposes of chapter II. For
example, the issue has arisen whether consent expressed
by a regional authority could legitimize the sending of
foreign troops into the territory of a State, or whether such
consent could only be given by the central Government,
and such questions are not resolved by saying that the acts
of the regional authority are attributable to the State under
article 4.322 In other cases, the “legitimacy” of the Government
which has given the consent has been questioned.
Sometimes the validity of consent has been questioned
because the consent was expressed in violation of relevant
provisions of the State’s internal law. These questions
depend on the rules of international law relating to the
320 1969 Vienna Convention, art. 54 (b).
321 See, e.g., the issue of Austrian consent to the Anschluss of
1938, dealt with by the Nuremberg Tribunal. The tribunal denied
that Austrian consent had been given; even if it had, it would have
been coerced and did not excuse the annexation. See “International
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), judgment and sentences October 1, 1946:
judgment”, reprinted in AJIL, vol. 41, No. 1 (January 1947) p. 172, at
pp. 192–194.
322 This issue arose with respect to the dispatch of Belgian troops
to the Republic of the Congo in 1960. See Official Records of the
Security Council, Fifteenth Year, 873rd meeting, 13–14 July 1960,
particularly the statement of the representative of Belgium, paras. 186–
188 and 209.
expression of the will of the State, as well as rules of internal
law to which, in certain cases, international law refers.
(6) Who has authority to consent to a departure from
a particular rule may depend on the rule. It is one thing
to consent to a search of embassy premises, another to
the establishment of a military base on the territory of a
State. Different officials or agencies may have authority
in different contexts, in accordance with the arrangements
made by each State and general principles of actual and
ostensible authority. But in any case, certain modalities
need to be observed for consent to be considered valid.
Consent must be freely given and clearly established. It
must be actually expressed by the State rather than merely
presumed on the basis that the State would have consented
if it had been asked. Consent may be vitiated by error,
fraud, corruption or coercion. In this respect, the principles
concerning the validity of consent to treaties provide
relevant guidance.
(7) Apart from drawing attention to prerequisites to a
valid consent, including issues of the authority to consent,
the requirement for consent to be valid serves a further
function. It points to the existence of cases in which consent
may not be validly given at all. This question is discussed
in relation to article 26 (compliance with peremptory
norms), which applies to chapter V as a whole.323
(8) Examples of consent given by a State which has the
effect of rendering certain conduct lawful include commissions
of inquiry sitting on the territory of another
State, the exercise of jurisdiction over visiting forces,
humanitarian relief and rescue operations and the arrest
or detention of persons on foreign territory. In the Savarkar
case, the arbitral tribunal considered that the arrest
of Savarkar was not a violation of French sovereignty as
France had implicitly consented to the arrest through the
conduct of its gendarme, who aided the British authorities
in the arrest.324 In considering the application of article
20 to such cases it may be necessary to have regard to
the relevant primary rule. For example, only the head of
a diplomatic mission can consent to the receiving State’s
entering the premises of the mission.325
(9) Article 20 is concerned with the relations between
the two States in question. In circumstances where the
consent of a number of States is required, the consent
of one State will not preclude wrongfulness in relation
to another.326 Furthermore, where consent is relied on to
323 See paragraph (6) of the commentary to article 26.
324 UNRIAA, vol. XI (Sales No. 61.V.4), p. 243, at pp. 252–255
(1911).
325 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 22, para. 1.
326 Austrian consent to the proposed customs union of 1931 would
not have precluded its wrongfulness in regard of the obligation to
respect Austrian independence owed by Germany to all the parties
to the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and
Germany (Treaty of Versailles). Likewise, Germany’s consent would
not have precluded the wrongfulness of the customs union in respect
of the obligation of the maintenance of its complete independence
imposed on Austria by the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and
Associated Powers and Austria (Peace Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-
Laye). See Customs Régime between Germany and Austria, Advisory
Opinion, 1931, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 41, p. 37, at pp. 46 and 49.
74 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
preclude wrongfulness, it will be necessary to show that
the conduct fell within the limits of the consent. Consent
to overflight by commercial aircraft of another State
would not preclude the wrongfulness of overflight by aircraft
transporting troops and military equipment. Consent
to the stationing of foreign troops for a specific period
would not preclude the wrongfulness of the stationing of
such troops beyond that period.327 These limitations are
indicated by the words “given act” in article 20 as well as
by the phrase “within the limits of that consent”.
(10) Article 20 envisages only the consent of States to
conduct otherwise in breach of an international obligation.
International law may also take into account the
consent of non-State entities such as corporations or private
persons. The extent to which investors can waive the
rules of diplomatic protection by agreement in advance
has long been controversial, but under the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of other States (art. 27, para. 1), consent
by an investor to arbitration under the Convention has the
effect of suspending the right of diplomatic protection
by the investor’s national State. The rights conferred by
international human rights treaties cannot be waived by
their beneficiaries, but the individual’s free consent may
be relevant to their application.328 In these cases the particular
rule of international law itself allows for the consent
in question and deals with its effect. By contrast, article
20 states a general principle so far as enjoyment of
the rights and performance of the obligations of States are
concerned.
Article 21. Self-defence
The wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded
if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence
taken in conformity with the Charter of the United
Nations.
Commentary
(1) The existence of a general principle admitting selfdefence
as an exception to the prohibition against the use
of force in international relations is undisputed. Article 51
of the Charter of the United Nations preserves a State’s
“inherent right” of self-defence in the face of an armed
attack and forms part of the definition of the obligation
to refrain from the threat or use of force laid down in Article
2, paragraph 4. Thus, a State exercising its inherent
right of self-defence as referred to in Article 51 of the
Charter is not, even potentially, in breach of Article 2, paragraph
4.329
327 The non-observance of a condition placed on the consent will
not necessarily take conduct outside of the limits of the consent. For
example, consent to a visiting force on the territory of a State may be
subject to a requirement to pay rent for the use of facilities. While the
non-payment of the rent would no doubt be a wrongful act, it would not
transform the visiting force into an army of occupation.
328 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
arts. 7; 8, para. 3; 14, para. 3 (g); and 23, para. 3.
329 Cf. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (footnote
54 above), p. 244, para. 38, and p. 263, para. 96, emphasizing the lawfulness
of the use of force in self-defence.
(2) Self-defence may justify non-performance of certain
obligations other than that under Article 2, paragraph 4,
of the Charter of the United Nations, provided that such
non-performance is related to the breach of that provision.
Traditional international law dealt with these problems by
instituting a separate legal regime of war, defining the
scope of belligerent rights and suspending most treaties
in force between the belligerents on the outbreak of war.330
In the Charter period, declarations of war are exceptional
and military actions proclaimed as self-defence by one
or both parties occur between States formally at “peace”
with each other.331 The 1969 Vienna Convention leaves
such issues to one side by providing in article 73 that the
Convention does not prejudice “any question that may
arise in regard to a treaty ... from the outbreak of hostilities
between States”.
(3) This is not to say that self-defence precludes the
wrongfulness of conduct in all cases or with respect to all
obligations. Examples relate to international humanitarian
law and human rights obligations. The Geneva Conventions
for the protection of war victims of 12 August 1949
and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims
of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) apply equally
to all the parties in an international armed conflict, and
the same is true of customary international humanitarian
law.332 Human rights treaties contain derogation provisions
for times of public emergency, including actions
taken in self-defence. As to obligations under international
humanitarian law and in relation to non-derogable human
rights provisions, self-defence does not preclude the
wrongfulness of conduct.
(4) ICJ in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons provided some guidance
on this question. One issue before the Court was
whether a use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be a
breach of environmental obligations because of the massive
and long-term damage such weapons can cause. The
Court said:
[T]he issue is not whether the treaties relating to the protection of
the environment are or are not applicable during an armed conflict,
but rather whether the obligations stemming from these treaties were
intended to be obligations of total restraint during military conflict.
The Court does not consider that the treaties in question could have
intended to deprive a State of the exercise of its right of self-defence
under international law because of its obligations to protect the environment.
Nonetheless, States must take environmental considerations
into account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the
pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Respect for the environment
330 See further Lord McNair and A. D. Watts, The Legal Effects of
War, 4th ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1966).
331 In Oil Platforms, Preliminary Objection (see footnote 208 above),
it was not denied that the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations
and Consular Rights remained in force, despite many actions by United
States naval forces against the Islamic Republic of Iran. In that case
both parties agreed that to the extent that any such actions were justified
by self-defence they would be lawful.
332 As the Court said of the rules of international humanitarian law
in the advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons (see footnote 54 above), p. 257, para. 79, “they constitute
intransgressible principles of international customary law”. On the relationship
between human rights and humanitarian law in time of armed
conflict, see page 240, para. 25.
State responsibility 75
is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity
with the principles of necessity and proportionality.333
A State acting in self-defence is “totally restrained” by an
international obligation if that obligation is expressed or
intended to apply as a definitive constraint even to States
in armed conflict.334
(5) The essential effect of article 21 is to preclude the
wrongfulness of conduct of a State acting in self-defence
vis-à-vis an attacking State. But there may be effects visà-
vis third States in certain circumstances. In its advisory
opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, the Court observed that:
[A]s in the case of the principles of humanitarian law applicable in
armed conflict, international law leaves no doubt that the principle of
neutrality, whatever its content, which is of a fundamental character
similar to that of the humanitarian principles and rules, is applicable
(subject to the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter), to
all international armed conflict, whatever type of weapons might be
used.335
The law of neutrality distinguishes between conduct as
against a belligerent and conduct as against a neutral. But
neutral States are not unaffected by the existence of a state
of war. Article 21 leaves open all issues of the effect of
action in self-defence vis-à-vis third States.
(6) Thus, article 21 reflects the generally accepted position
that self-defence precludes the wrongfulness of the
conduct taken within the limits laid down by international
law. The reference is to action “taken in conformity with
the Charter of the United Nations”. In addition, the term
“lawful” implies that the action taken respects those obligations
of total restraint applicable in international armed
conflict, as well as compliance with the requirements of
proportionality and of necessity inherent in the notion of
self-defence. Article 21 simply reflects the basic principle
for the purposes of chapter V, leaving questions of the
extent and application of self-defence to the applicable
primary rules referred to in the Charter.
Article 22. Countermeasures in respect of
an internationally wrongful act
The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity
with an international obligation towards another
State is precluded if and to the extent that the act
constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter
State in accordance with chapter II of Part Three.
Commentary
(1) In certain circumstances, the commission by one
State of an internationally wrongful act may justify another
State injured by that act in taking non-forcible countermeasures
in order to procure its cessation and to achieve
reparation for the injury. Article 22 deals with this situation
from the perspective of circumstances precluding
333 Ibid., p. 242, para. 30.
334 See, e.g., the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.
335 I.C.J. Reports 1996 (see footnote 54 above), p. 261, para. 89.
wrongfulness. Chapter II of Part Three regulates countermeasures
in further detail.
(2) Judicial decisions, State practice and doctrine confirm
the proposition that countermeasures meeting certain
substantive and procedural conditions may be legitimate.
In the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, ICJ clearly
accepted that countermeasures might justify otherwise
unlawful conduct “taken in response to a previous international
wrongful act of another State and … directed
against that State”,336 provided certain conditions are met.
Similar recognition of the legitimacy of measures of this
kind in certain cases can be found in arbitral decisions, in
particular the “Naulilaa”,337 “Cysne”,338 and Air Service
Agreement339 awards.
(3) In the literature concerning countermeasures, reference
is sometimes made to the application of a “sanction”,
or to a “reaction” to a prior internationally wrongful
act; historically the more usual terminology was that
of “legitimate reprisals” or, more generally, measures of
“self-protection” or “self-help”. The term “sanctions” has
been used for measures taken in accordance with the constituent
instrument of some international organization, in
particular under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations—despite the fact that the Charter uses the term
“measures”, not “sanctions”. The term “reprisals” is now
no longer widely used in the present context, because of
its association with the law of belligerent reprisals involving
the use of force. At least since the Air Service Agreement
arbitration,340 the term “countermeasures” has been
preferred, and it has been adopted for the purposes of the
present articles.
(4) Where countermeasures are taken in accordance
with article 22, the underlying obligation is not suspended,
still less terminated; the wrongfulness of the conduct
in question is precluded for the time being by reason of its
character as a countermeasure, but only provided that and
for so long as the necessary conditions for taking countermeasures
are satisfied. These conditions are set out
in Part Three, chapter II, to which article 22 refers. As a
response to internationally wrongful conduct of another
State, countermeasures may be justified only in relation to
that State. This is emphasized by the phrases “if and to the
extent” and “countermeasures taken against” the responsible
State. An act directed against a third State would not
fit this definition and could not be justified as a countermeasure.
On the other hand, indirect or consequential
effects of countermeasures on third parties, which do not
involve an independent breach of any obligation to those
third parties, will not take a countermeasure outside the
scope of article 22.
(5) Countermeasures may only preclude wrongfulness
in the relations between an injured State and the State
which has committed the internationally wrongful act.
336 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), p. 55,
para. 83.
337 Portuguese Colonies case (Naulilaa incident), UNRIAA,
vol. II (Sales No. 1949.V.1), p. 1011, at pp. 1025–1026 (1928).
338 Ibid., p. 1035, at p. 1052 (1930).
339 Air Service Agreement (see footnote 28 above).
340 Ibid., especially pp. 443–446, paras. 80–98.
76 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
The principle is clearly expressed in the “Cysne” case,
where the tribunal stressed that:
reprisals, which constitute an act in principle contrary to the law of
nations, are defensible only insofar as they were provoked by some
other act likewise contrary to that law. Only reprisals taken against the
provoking State are permissible. Admittedly, it can happen that legitimate
reprisals taken against an offending State may affect the nationals
of an innocent State. But that would be an indirect and unintentional
consequence which, in practice, the injured State will always endeavour
to avoid or to limit as far as possible.341
Accordingly, the wrongfulness of Germany’s conduct visà-
vis Portugal was not precluded. Since it involved the use
of armed force, this decision concerned belligerent reprisals
rather than countermeasures in the sense of article 22.
But the same principle applies to countermeasures, as the
Court confirmed in the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project
case when it stressed that the measure in question must be
“directed against” the responsible State.342
(6) If article 22 had stood alone, it would have been necessary
to spell out other conditions for the legitimacy of
countermeasures, including in particular the requirement
of proportionality, the temporary or reversible character
of countermeasures and the status of certain fundamental
obligations which may not be subject to countermeasures.
Since these conditions are dealt with in Part Three,
chapter II, it is sufficient to make a cross reference to
them here. Article 22 covers any action which qualifies
as a countermeasure in accordance with those conditions.
One issue is whether countermeasures may be taken by
third States which are not themselves individually injured
by the internationally wrongful act in question, although
they are owed the obligation which has been breached.343
For example, in the case of an obligation owed to the international
community as a whole ICJ has affirmed that
all States have a legal interest in compliance.344 Article
54 leaves open the question whether any State may
take measures to ensure compliance with certain international
obligations in the general interest as distinct from
its own individual interest as an injured State. While article
22 does not cover measures taken in such a case to
the extent that these do not qualify as countermeasures,
neither does it exclude that possibility.
Article 23. Force majeure
1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity
with an international obligation of that State
is precluded if the act is due to force majeure, that is
the occurrence of an irresistible force or of an unforeseen
event, beyond the control of the State, making it
materially impossible in the circumstances to perform
the obligation.
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if:
341 “Cysne” (see footnote 338 above), pp. 1056–1057.
342 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), p. 55,
para. 83.
343 For the distinction between injured States and other States
entitled to invoke State responsibility, see articles 42 and 48 and
commentaries.
344 Barcelona Traction (see footnote 25 above), p. 32, para. 33.
(a) the situation of force majeure is due, either alone
or in combination with other factors, to the conduct of
the State invoking it; or
(b) the State has assumed the risk of that situation
occurring.
Commentary
(1) Force majeure is quite often invoked as a ground
for precluding the wrongfulness of an act of a State.345 It
involves a situation where the State in question is in effect
compelled to act in a manner not in conformity with
the requirements of an international obligation incumbent
upon it. Force majeure differs from a situation of distress
(art. 24) or necessity (art. 25) because the conduct of the
State which would otherwise be internationally wrongful
is involuntary or at least involves no element of free
choice.
(2) A situation of force majeure precluding wrongfulness
only arises where three elements are met: (a) the act
in question must be brought about by an irresistible force
or an unforeseen event; (b) which is beyond the control
of the State concerned; and (c) which makes it materially
impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation.
The adjective “irresistible” qualifying the word
“force” emphasizes that there must be a constraint which
the State was unable to avoid or oppose by its own means.
To have been “unforeseen” the event must have been neither
foreseen nor of an easily foreseeable kind. Further the
“irresistible force” or “unforeseen event” must be causally
linked to the situation of material impossibility, as
indicated by the words “due to force majeure … making
it materially impossible”. Subject to paragraph 2, where
these elements are met, the wrongfulness of the State’s
conduct is precluded for so long as the situation of force
majeure subsists.
(3) Material impossibility of performance giving rise to
force majeure may be due to a natural or physical event
(e.g. stress of weather which may divert State aircraft
into the territory of another State, earthquakes, floods or
drought) or to human intervention (e.g. loss of control over
a portion of the State’s territory as a result of an insurrection
or devastation of an area by military operations carried
out by a third State), or some combination of the two.
Certain situations of duress or coercion involving force
imposed on the State may also amount to force majeure if
they meet the various requirements of article 23. In particular,
the situation must be irresistible, so that the State
concerned has no real possibility of escaping its effects.
Force majeure does not include circumstances in which
performance of an obligation has become more difficult,
for example due to some political or economic crisis. Nor
does it cover situations brought about by the neglect or
345 “‘Force majeure’ and ‘fortuitous event’ as circumstances
precluding wrongfulness: survey of State practice, international judicial
decisions and doctrine”, study prepared by the Secretariat (Yearbook …
1978, vol. II (Part One), p. 61, document A/CN.4/315).
State responsibility 77
default of the State concerned,346 even if the resulting injury
itself was accidental and unintended.347
(4) In drafting what became article 61 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention, ILC took the view that force majeure
was a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in relation
to treaty performance, just as supervening impossibility
of performance was a ground for termination of a treaty.
348 The same view was taken at the United Nations
Conference on the Law of Treaties.349 But in the interests
of the stability of treaties, the Conference insisted on a
narrow formulation of article 61 so far as treaty termination
is concerned. The degree of difficulty associated
with force majeure as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness,
though considerable, is less than is required by article
61 for termination of a treaty on grounds of supervening
impossibility, as ICJ pointed out in the Gabˇcíkovo-
Nagymaros Project case:
Article 61, paragraph 1, requires the “permanent disappearance or destruction
of an object indispensable for the execution” of the treaty to
justify the termination of a treaty on grounds of impossibility of performance.
During the conference, a proposal was made to extend the
scope of the article by including in it cases such as the impossibility
to make certain payments because of serious financial difficulties ...
Although it was recognized that such situations could lead to a preclusion
of the wrongfulness of non-performance by a party of its treaty
obligations, the participating States were not prepared to consider such
situations to be a ground for terminating or suspending a treaty, and
preferred to limit themselves to a narrower concept.350
(5) In practice, many of the cases where “impossibility”
has been relied upon have not involved actual impossibility
as distinct from increased difficulty of performance
and the plea of force majeure has accordingly failed. But
cases of material impossibility have occurred, e.g. where
a State aircraft is forced, due to damage or loss of control
of the aircraft owing to weather, into the airspace of another
State without the latter’s authorization. In such cases
346 For example, in relation to occurrences such as the bombing of
La Chaux-de-Fonds by German airmen on 17 October 1915, and of
Porrentruy by a French airman on 26 April 1917, ascribed to negligence
on the part of the airmen, the belligerent undertook to punish the
offenders and make reparation for the damage suffered (study prepared
by the Secretariat, ibid., paras. 255–256).
347 For example, in 1906 an American officer on the USS
Chattanooga was mortally wounded by a bullet from a French warship
as his ship entered the Chinese harbour of Chefoo. The United States
Government obtained reparation, having maintained that:
“While the killing of Lieutenant England can only be viewed as
an accident, it cannot be regarded as belonging to the unavoidable
class whereby no responsibility is entailed. Indeed, it is not conceivable
how it could have occurred without the contributory element of
lack of proper precaution on the part of those officers of the Dupetit
Thouars who were in responsible charge of the rifle firing practice
and who failed to stop firing when the Chattanooga, in the course
of her regular passage through the public channel, came into the
line of fire.”
M. M. Whiteman, Damages in International Law (Washington,
D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1937), vol. I, p. 221.
See also the study prepared by the Secretariat (footnote 345 above),
para. 130.
348 Yearbook … 1966, vol. II, p. 255.
349 See, e.g., the proposal of the representative of Mexico, United
Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First and second sessions,
Vienna, 26 March–24 May 1968 and 9 April–22 May 1969, Documents
of the Conference (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.70.V.5),
Report of the Committee of the Whole on its work at the first session of
the Conference, document A/CONF.39/14, p. 182, para. 531 (a).
350 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), p. 63,
para. 102.
the principle that wrongfulness is precluded has been accepted.
351
(6) Apart from aerial incidents, the principle in article
23 is also recognized in relation to ships in innocent
passage by article 14, paragraph 3, of the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 18,
para. 2), as well as in article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention
on Transit Trade of Land-locked States. In these
provisions, force majeure is incorporated as a constituent
element of the relevant primary rule; nonetheless, its
acceptance in these cases helps to confirm the existence
of a general principle of international law to similar
effect.
(7) The principle has also been accepted by international
tribunals. Mixed claims commissions have frequently
cited the unforeseeability of attacks by rebels in denying
the responsibility of the territorial State for resulting damage
suffered by foreigners.352 In the Lighthouses arbitration,
a lighthouse owned by a French company had been
requisitioned by the Government of Greece in 1915 and
was subsequently destroyed by enemy action. The arbitral
tribunal denied the French claim for restoration of the
lighthouse on grounds of force majeure.353 In the Russian
Indemnity case, the principle was accepted but the
plea of force majeure failed because the payment of the
debt was not materially impossible.354 Force majeure was
acknowledged as a general principle of law (though again
the plea was rejected on the facts of the case) by PCIJ
in the Serbian Loans and Brazilian Loans cases.355 More
recently, in the “Rainbow Warrior” arbitration, France
relied on force majeure as a circumstance precluding the
wrongfulness of its conduct in removing the officers from
Hao and not returning them following medical treatment.
The tribunal dealt with the point briefly:
New Zealand is right in asserting that the excuse of force majeure is
not of relevance in this case because the test of its applicability is of
351 See, e.g., the cases of accidental intrusion into airspace attributable
to weather, and the cases of accidental bombing of neutral
territory attributable to navigational errors during the First World War
discussed in the study prepared by the Secretariat (footnote 345 above),
paras. 250–256. See also the exchanges of correspondence between
the States concerned in the incidents involving United States military
aircraft entering the airspace of Yugoslavia in 1946, United States of
America, Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol. XV,
No. 376 (15 September 1946), p. 502, reproduced in the study prepared
by the Secretariat, para. 144, and the incident provoking the application
to ICJ in 1954, I.C.J. Pleadings, Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft
and Crew of the United States of America, p. 14 (note to the Hungarian
Government of 17 March 1953). It is not always clear whether these
cases are based on distress or force majeure.
352 See, e.g., the decision of the American-British Claims Commission
in the Saint Albans Raid case, Moore, History and Digest, vol. IV,
p. 4042 (1873), and the study prepared by the Secretariat (footnote 345
above), para. 339; the decisions of the United States-Venezuela Claims
Commission in the Wipperman case, Moore, History and Digest, vol.
III, p. 3039, and the study prepared by the Secretariat, paras. 349–350;
De Brissot and others case (footnote 117 above), and the study prepared
by the Secretariat, para. 352; and the decision of the British-
Mexican Claims Commission in the Gill case, UNRIAA, vol. V (Sales
No. 1952.V.3), p. 157 (1931), and the study prepared by the Secretariat,
para. 463.
353 Lighthouses arbitration (see footnote 182 above), pp. 219–220.
354 UNRIAA, vol. XI (Sales No. 61.V.4), p. 421, at p. 443 (1912).
355 Serbian Loans, Judgment No. 14, 1929, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 20,
pp. 39–40; Brazilian Loans, Judgment No. 15, ibid., No. 21, p. 120.
78 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
absolute and material impossibility, and because a circumstance
rendering performance more difficult or burdensome does not constitute
a case of force majeure.356
(8) In addition to its application in inter-State cases as
a matter of public international law, force majeure has
substantial currency in the field of international commercial
arbitration, and may qualify as a general principle of
law.357
(9) A State may not invoke force majeure if it has caused
or induced the situation in question. In Libyan Arab Foreign
Investment Company and The Republic of Burundi,
the arbitral tribunal rejected a plea of force majeure because
“the alleged impossibility [was] not the result of an
irresistible force or an unforeseen external event beyond
the control of Burundi. In fact, the impossibility is the
result of a unilateral decision of that State ...”358 Under
the equivalent ground for termination of a treaty in article
61 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, material impossibility
cannot be invoked “if the impossibility is the result
of a breach by that party either of an obligation under the
treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any
other party to the treaty”. By analogy with this provision,
paragraph 2 (a) excludes the plea in circumstances where
force majeure is due, either alone or in combination with
other factors, to the conduct of the State invoking it. For
paragraph 2 (a) to apply it is not enough that the State
invoking force majeure has contributed to the situation
of material impossibility; the situation of force majeure
must be “due” to the conduct of the State invoking it. This
allows for force majeure to be invoked in situations in
which a State may have unwittingly contributed to the occurrence
of material impossibility by something which,
in hindsight, might have been done differently but which
was done in good faith and did not itself make the event
any less unforeseen. Paragraph 2 (a) requires that the
State’s role in the occurrence of force majeure must be
substantial.
(10) Paragraph 2 (b) deals with situations in which the
State has already accepted the risk of the occurrence of
force majeure, whether it has done so in terms of the obligation
itself or by its conduct or by virtue of some unilateral
act. This reflects the principle that force majeure
should not excuse performance if the State has undertaken
to prevent the particular situation arising or has otherwise
assumed that risk.359 Once a State accepts the responsibil-
356 “Rainbow Warrior” (see footnote 46 above), p. 253.
357 On force majeure in the case law of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal, see G. H. Aldrich, The Jurisprudence of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 306–320. Force
majeure has also been recognized as a general principle of law by the
European Court of Justice: see, e.g., case 145/85, Denkavit v. Belgium,
Eur. Court H.R., Reports 1987–2, p. 565; case 101/84, Commission of
the European Communities v. Italian Republic, ibid., Reports 1985–
6, p. 2629. See also article 79 of the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods; P. Schlechtriem, ed.,
Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods,
2nd ed. (trans. G. Thomas) (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), pp.
600–626; and article 7.1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles, Principles of
International Commercial Contracts (Rome, Unidroit, 1994), pp. 169–
171.
358 ILR, vol. 96 (1994), p. 318, para. 55.
359 As the study prepared by the Secretariat (footnote 345 above),
para. 31, points out, States may renounce the right to rely on force
majeure by agreement. The most common way of doing so would be by
ity for a particular risk it cannot then claim force majeure
to avoid responsibility. But the assumption of risk must
be unequivocal and directed towards those to whom the
obligation is owed.
Article 24. Distress
1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity
with an international obligation of that State
is precluded if the author of the act in question has
no other reasonable way, in a situation of distress, of
saving the author’s life or the lives of other persons
entrusted to the author’s care.
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if:
(a) the situation of distress is due, either alone or in
combination with other factors, to the conduct of the
State invoking it; or
(b) the act in question is likely to create a comparable
or greater peril.
Commentary
(1) Article 24 deals with the specific case where an individual
whose acts are attributable to the State is in a situation
of peril, either personally or in relation to persons
under his or her care. The article precludes the wrongfulness
of conduct adopted by the State agent in circumstances
where the agent had no other reasonable way of
saving life. Unlike situations of force majeure dealt with
in article 23, a person acting under distress is not acting
involuntarily, even though the choice is effectively nullified
by the situation of peril.360 Nor is it a case of choosing
between compliance with international law and other
legitimate interests of the State, such as characterize situations
of necessity under article 25. The interest concerned
is the immediate one of saving people’s lives, irrespective
of their nationality.
(2) In practice, cases of distress have mostly involved
aircraft or ships entering State territory under stress of
weather or following mechanical or navigational failure.361
An example is the entry of United States military aircraft
into Yugoslavia’s airspace in 1946. On two occasions,
United States military aircraft entered Yugoslav airspace
without authorization and were attacked by Yugoslav air
defences. The United States Government protested the
Yugoslav action on the basis that the aircraft had entered
Yugoslav airspace solely in order to escape extreme danger.
The Yugoslav Government responded by denouncing
the systematic violation of its airspace, which it claimed
could only be intentional in view of its frequency. A later
note from the Yugoslav chargé d’affaires informed the
United States Department of State that Marshal Tito had
an agreement or obligation assuming in advance the risk of the particular
force majeure event.
360 For this reason, writers who have considered this situation have
often defined it as one of “relative impossibility” of complying with
the international obligation. See, e.g., O. J. Lissitzyn, “The treatment of
aerial intruders in recent practice and international law”, AJIL, vol. 47,
No. 4 (October 1953), p. 588.
361 See the study prepared by the Secretariat (footnote 345 above),
paras. 141–142 and 252.
State responsibility 79
forbidden any firing on aircraft which flew over Yugoslav
territory without authorization, presuming that, for its
part, the United States Government “would undertake the
steps necessary to prevent these flights, except in the case
of emergency or bad weather, for which arrangements
could be made by agreement between American and
Yugoslav authorities”.362 The reply of the United States
Acting Secretary of State reiterated the assertion that no
United States planes had flown over Yugoslavia intentionally
without prior authorization from Yugoslav authorities
“unless forced to do so in an emergency”. However, the
Acting Secretary of State added:
I presume that the Government of Yugoslavia recognizes that in case
a plane and its occupants are jeopardized, the aircraft may change its
course so as to seek safety, even though such action may result in flying
over Yugoslav territory without prior clearance.363
(3) Claims of distress have also been made in cases of
violation of maritime boundaries. For example, in December
1975, after British naval vessels entered Icelandic
territorial waters, the British Government claimed that
the vessels in question had done so in search of “shelter
from severe weather, as they have the right to do under
customary international law”.364 Iceland maintained that
British vessels were in its waters for the sole purpose of
provoking an incident, but did not contest the point that if
the British vessels had been in a situation of distress, they
could enter Icelandic territorial waters.
(4) Although historically practice has focused on cases
involving ships and aircraft, article 24 is not limited to such
cases.365 The “Rainbow Warrior” arbitration involved a
plea of distress as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness
outside the context of ships or aircraft. France sought
to justify its conduct in removing the two officers from
the island of Hao on the ground of “circumstances of distress
in a case of extreme urgency involving elementary
humanitarian considerations affecting the acting organs of
the State”.366 The tribunal unanimously accepted that this
plea was admissible in principle, and by majority that it
was applicable to the facts of one of the two cases. As to
the principle, the tribunal required France to show three
things:
(1) The existence of very exceptional circumstances of extreme
urgency involving medical or other considerations of an elementary
nature, provided always that a prompt recognition of the existence of
those exceptional circumstances is subsequently obtained from the
other interested party or is clearly demonstrated.
362 United States of America, Department of State Bulletin
(see footnote 351 above), reproduced in the study prepared by the
Secretariat (see footnote 345 above), para. 144.
363 Study prepared by the Secretariat (see footnote 345 above),
para. 145. The same argument is found in the Memorial of 2 December
1958 submitted by the United States Government to ICJ in relation
to another aerial incident (I.C.J. Pleadings, Aerial Incident of 27 July
1955, pp. 358–359).
364 Official Records of the Security Council, Thirtieth Year, 1866th
meeting, 16 December 1975, para. 24; see the study prepared by the
Secretariat (footnote 345 above), para. 136.
365 There have also been cases involving the violation of a land frontier
in order to save the life of a person in danger. See, e.g., the case
of violation of the Austrian border by Italian soldiers in 1862, study
prepared by the Secretariat (footnote 345 above), para. 121.
366 “Rainbow Warrior” (see footnote 46 above), pp. 254–255,
para. 78.
(2) The reestablishment of the original situation of compliance
with the assignment in Hao as soon as the reasons of emergency
invoked to justify the repatriation had disappeared.
(3) The existence of a good faith effort to try to obtain the consent
of New Zealand in terms of the 1986 Agreement.367
In fact, the danger to one of the officers, though perhaps
not life-threatening, was real and might have been imminent,
and it was not denied by the New Zealand physician
who subsequently examined him. By contrast, in the case
of the second officer, the justifications given (the need
for medical examination on grounds of pregnancy and
the desire to see a dying father) did not justify emergency
action. The lives of the agent and the child were at no
stage threatened and there were excellent medical facilities
nearby. The tribunal held that:
[C]learly these circumstances entirely fail to justify France’s responsibility
for the removal of Captain Prieur and from the breach
of its obligations resulting from the failure to return the two officers
to Hao (in the case of Major Mafart once the reasons for
their removal had disappeared). There was here a clear breach of its
obligations.368
(5) The plea of distress is also accepted in many treaties
as a circumstance justifying conduct which would
otherwise be wrongful. Article 14, paragraph 3, of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone permits stopping and anchoring by ships during
their passage through foreign territorial seas insofar as
this conduct is rendered necessary by distress. This provision
is repeated in much the same terms in article 18,
paragraph 2, of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea.369 Similar provisions appear in the international
conventions on the prevention of pollution at sea.370
(6) Article 24 is limited to cases where human life is at
stake. The tribunal in the “Rainbow Warrior” arbitration
appeared to take a broader view of the circumstances justifying
a plea of distress, apparently accepting that a serious
health risk would suffice. The problem with extending
article 24 to less than life-threatening situations is where
to place any lower limit. In situations of distress involving
aircraft there will usually be no difficulty in establishing
that there is a threat to life, but other cases present a wide
range of possibilities. Given the context of chapter V and
the likelihood that there will be other solutions available
for cases which are not apparently life-threatening, it does
367 Ibid., p. 255, para. 79.
368 Ibid., p. 263, para. 99.
369 See also articles 39, paragraph 1 (c), 98 and 109, of the Convention.
370 See, e.g., the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, article IV, paragraph 1 (a) of which
provides that the prohibition on the discharge of oil into the sea does
not apply if the discharge takes place “for the purpose of securing
the safety of the ship, preventing damage to the ship or cargo, or saving
life at sea”. See also the Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, article V, paragraph
1 of which provides that the prohibition on dumping of wastes
does not apply when it is “necessary to secure the safety of human life
or of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea
… in any case which constitutes a danger to human life or a real threat
to vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea, if
dumping appears to be the only way of averting the threat”. See also the
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from
Ships and Aircraft (art. 8, para. 1); and the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (MARPOL Convention),
annex I, regulation 11 (a).
80 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
not seem necessary to extend the scope of distress beyond
threats to life itself. In situations in which a State agent is
in distress and has to act to save lives, there should however
be a certain degree of flexibility in the assessment of
the conditions of distress. The “no other reasonable way”
criterion in article 24 seeks to strike a balance between
the desire to provide some flexibility regarding the choices
of action by the agent in saving lives and the need to
confine the scope of the plea having regard to its exceptional
character.
(7) Distress may only be invoked as a circumstance precluding
wrongfulness in cases where a State agent has
acted to save his or her own life or where there exists a
special relationship between the State organ or agent and
the persons in danger. It does not extend to more general
cases of emergencies, which are more a matter of necessity
than distress.
(8) Article 24 only precludes the wrongfulness of conduct
so far as it is necessary to avoid the life-threatening
situation. Thus, it does not exempt the State or its agent
from complying with other requirements (national or international),
e.g. the requirement to notify arrival to the
relevant authorities, or to give relevant information about
the voyage, the passengers or the cargo.371
(9) As in the case of force majeure, a situation which
has been caused or induced by the invoking State is not
one of distress. In many cases the State invoking distress
may well have contributed, even if indirectly, to the situation.
Priority should be given to necessary life-saving
measures, however, and under paragraph 2 (a), distress
is only excluded if the situation of distress is due, either
alone or in combination with other factors, to the conduct
of the State invoking it. This is the same formula as that
adopted in respect of article 23, paragraph 2 (a).372
(10) Distress can only preclude wrongfulness where the
interests sought to be protected (e.g. the lives of passengers
or crew) clearly outweigh the other interests at stake
in the circumstances. If the conduct sought to be excused
endangers more lives than it may save or is otherwise likely
to create a greater peril it will not be covered by the plea
of distress. For instance, a military aircraft carrying explosives
might cause a disaster by making an emergency
landing, or a nuclear submarine with a serious breakdown
might cause radioactive contamination to a port in which
it sought refuge. Paragraph 2 (b) stipulates that distress
does not apply if the act in question is likely to create a
comparable or greater peril. This is consistent with paragraph
1, which in asking whether the agent had “no other
reasonable way” to save life establishes an objective test.
371 See Cashin and Lewis v. The King, Canada Law Reports (1935),
p. 103 (even if a vessel enters a port in distress, it is not exempted
from the requirement to report on its voyage). See also the “Rebecca”,
Mexico-United States General Claims Commission, AJIL, vol. 23,
No. 4 (October 1929), p. 860 (vessel entered port in distress; merchandise
seized for customs offence: held, entry reasonably necessary in the
circumstances and not a mere matter of convenience; seizure therefore
unlawful); the “May” v. The King, Canada Law Reports (1931), p.
374; the “Queen City” v. The King, ibid., p. 387; and Rex v. Flahaut,
Dominion Law Reports (1935), p. 685 (test of “real and irresistible
distress” applied).
372 See paragraph (9) of the commentary to article 23.
The words “comparable or greater peril” must be assessed
in the context of the overall purpose of saving lives.
Article 25. Necessity
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a
ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not
in conformity with an international obligation of that
State unless the act:
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential
interest against a grave and imminent peril;
and
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of
the State or States towards which the obligation exists,
or of the international community as a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a
State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if:
(a) the international obligation in question excludes
the possibility of invoking necessity; or
(b) the State has contributed to the situation of
necessity.
Commentary
(1) The term “necessity” (état de nécessité) is used to
denote those exceptional cases where the only way a State
can safeguard an essential interest threatened by a grave
and imminent peril is, for the time being, not to perform
some other international obligation of lesser weight or urgency.
Under conditions narrowly defined in article 25,
such a plea is recognized as a circumstance precluding
wrongfulness.
(2) The plea of necessity is exceptional in a number of
respects. Unlike consent (art. 20), self-defence (art. 21)
or countermeasures (art. 22), it is not dependent on the
prior conduct of the injured State. Unlike force majeure
(art. 23), it does not involve conduct which is involuntary
or coerced. Unlike distress (art. 24), necessity consists
not in danger to the lives of individuals in the charge of a
State official but in a grave danger either to the essential
interests of the State or of the international community
as a whole. It arises where there is an irreconcilable conflict
between an essential interest on the one hand and an
obligation of the State invoking necessity on the other.
These special features mean that necessity will only
rarely be available to excuse non-performance of an obligation
and that it is subject to strict limitations to safeguard
against possible abuse.373
(3) There is substantial authority in support of the existence
of necessity as a circumstance precluding wrongful-
373 Perhaps the classic case of such an abuse was the occupation of
Luxembourg and Belgium by Germany in 1914, which Germany sought
to justify on the ground of necessity. See, in particular, the note presented
on 2 August 1914 by the German Minister in Brussels to the Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, in J. B. Scott, ed., Diplomatic Documents
relating to the Outbreak of the European War (New York, Oxford University
Press, 1916), part I, pp. 749–750, and the speech in the Reichstag
by the German Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, on 4 August
1914, containing the well-known words: wir sind jetzt in der Notwehr;
und Not kennt kein Gebot! (we are in a state of self-defence and necessity
knows no law), Jahrbuch des Völkerrechts, vol. III (1916), p. 728.
State responsibility 81
ness. It has been invoked by States and has been dealt with
by a number of international tribunals. In these cases the
plea of necessity has been accepted in principle, or at least
not rejected.
(4) In an Anglo-Portuguese dispute of 1832, the Portuguese
Government argued that the pressing necessity
of providing for the subsistence of certain contingents
of troops engaged in quelling internal disturbances had
justified its appropriation of property owned by British
subjects, notwithstanding a treaty stipulation. The British
Government was advised that:
the Treaties between this Country and Portugal are [not] of so stubborn
and unbending a nature, as to be incapable of modification under any
circumstances whatever, or that their stipulations ought to be so strictly
adhered to, as to deprive the Government of Portugal of the right of using
those means, which may be absolutely and indispensably necessary
to the safety, and even to the very existence of the State.
The extent of the necessity, which will justify such an appropriation of
the Property of British Subjects, must depend upon the circumstances
of the particular case, but it must be imminent and urgent.374
(5) The “Caroline” incident of 1837, though frequently
referred to as an instance of self-defence, really involved
the plea of necessity at a time when the law concerning
the use of force had a quite different basis than it has at
present. In that case, British armed forces entered United
States territory and attacked and destroyed a vessel owned
by United States citizens which was carrying recruits
and military and other material to Canadian insurgents.
In response to the protests by the United States, the British
Minister in Washington, Fox, referred to the “necessity of
self-defence and self-preservation”; the same point was
made by counsel consulted by the British Government,
who stated that “the conduct of the British Authorities”
was justified because it was “absolutely necessary as a
measure of precaution”.375 Secretary of State Webster
replied to Minister Fox that “nothing less than a clear
and absolute necessity can afford ground of justification”
for the commission “of hostile acts within the territory
of a Power at Peace”, and observed that the British
Government must prove that the action of its forces had
really been caused by “a necessity of self-defence, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation”.376 In his message to Congress
of 7 December 1841, President Tyler reiterated that:
This Government can never concede to any foreign Government the
power, except in a case of the most urgent and extreme necessity, of
invading its territory, either to arrest the persons or destroy the property
of those who may have violated the municipal laws of such foreign
Government.”377
The incident was not closed until 1842, with an exchange
of letters in which the two Governments agreed that “a
strong overpowering necessity may arise when this great
principle may and must be suspended”. “It must be so”,
374 Lord McNair, ed., International Law Opinions (Cambridge University
Press, 1956), vol. II, Peace, p. 232.
375 See respectively W. R. Manning, ed., Diplomatic Correspondence
of the United States: Canadian Relations 1784–1860 (Washington,
D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1943),
vol. III, p. 422; and Lord McNair, ed., International Law Opinions
(footnote 374 above), p. 221, at p. 228.
376 British and Foreign State Papers, 1840–1841 (London, Ridgway,
1857), vol. 29, p. 1129.
377 Ibid., 1841–1842, vol. 30, p. 194.
added Lord Ashburton, the British Government’s ad hoc
envoy to Washington, “for the shortest possible period
during the continuance of an admitted overruling necessity,
and strictly confined within the narrowest limits imposed
by that necessity”.378
(6) In the Russian Fur Seals controversy of 1893, the
“essential interest” to be safeguarded against a “grave and
imminent peril” was the natural environment in an area
not subject to the jurisdiction of any State or to any international
regulation. Facing the danger of extermination of
a fur seal population by unrestricted hunting, the Russian
Government issued a decree prohibiting sealing in an area
of the high seas. In a letter to the British Ambassador dated
12 February (24 February) 1893, the Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs explained that the action had been taken
because of the “absolute necessity of immediate provisional
measures” in view of the imminence of the hunting
season. He “emphasize[d] the essentially precautionary
character of the above-mentioned measures, which were
taken under the pressure of exceptional circumstances”379
and declared his willingness to conclude an agreement
with the British Government with a view to a longer-term
settlement of the question of sealing in the area.
(7) In the Russian Indemnity case, the Government of
the Ottoman Empire, to justify its delay in paying its debt
to the Russian Government, invoked among other reasons
the fact that it had been in an extremely difficult financial
situation, which it described as “force majeure” but
which was more like a state of necessity. The arbitral tribunal
accepted the plea in principle:
The exception of force majeure, invoked in the first place, is arguable in
international public law, as well as in private law; international law must
adapt itself to political exigencies. The Imperial Russian Government
expressly admits ... that the obligation for a State to execute treaties
may be weakened “if the very existence of the State is endangered, if
observation of the international duty is ... self-destructive”.380
It considered, however, that:
It would be a manifest exaggeration to admit that the payment (or the
contracting of a loan for the payment) of the relatively small sum of
6 million francs due to the Russian claimants would have imperilled
the existence of the Ottoman Empire or seriously endangered its internal
or external situation.381
In its view, compliance with an international obligation
must be “self-destructive” for the wrongfulness of the
conduct not in conformity with the obligation to be precluded.
382
378 Ibid., p. 195. See Secretary of State Webster’s reply on page 201.
379 Ibid., 1893–1894 (London, HM Stationery Office, 1899), vol. 86,
p. 220; and the study prepared by the Secretariat (see footnote 345
above), para. 155.
380 See footnote 354 above; see also the study prepared by the Secretariat
(footnote 345 above), para. 394.
381 Ibid.
382 A case in which the parties to the dispute agreed that very
serious financial difficulties could justify a different mode of
discharging the obligation other than that originally provided for arose in
connection with the enforcement of the arbitral award in Forests of
Central Rhodopia, UNRIAA, vol. III (Sales No. 1949.V.2), p. 1405
(1933); see League of Nations, Official Journal, 15th Year, No. 11
(part I) (November 1934), p. 1432.
82 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
(8) In Société commerciale de Belgique,383 the Greek
Government owed money to a Belgian company under
two arbitral awards. Belgium applied to PCIJ for a declaration
that the Greek Government, in refusing to carry
out the awards, was in breach of its international obligations.
The Greek Government pleaded the country’s serious
budgetary and monetary situation.384 The Court noted
that it was not within its mandate to declare whether the
Greek Government was justified in not executing the arbitral
awards. However, the Court implicitly accepted the
basic principle, on which the two parties were in agreement.
385
(9) In March 1967 the Liberian oil tanker Torrey
Canyon went aground on submerged rocks off the coast of
Cornwall outside British territorial waters, spilling large
amounts of oil which threatened the English coastline.
After various remedial attempts had failed, the British
Government decided to bomb the ship to burn the remaining
oil. This operation was carried out successfully.
The British Government did not advance any legal justification
for its conduct, but stressed the existence of a
situation of extreme danger and claimed that the decision
to bomb the ship had been taken only after all other
means had failed.386 No international protest resulted.
A convention was subsequently concluded to cover future
cases where intervention might prove necessary to avert
serious oil pollution.387
(10) In the “Rainbow Warrior” arbitration, the arbitral
tribunal expressed doubt as to the existence of the excuse
of necessity. It noted that the Commission’s draft article
“allegedly authorizes a State to take unlawful action
invoking a state of necessity” and described the Commission’s
proposal as “controversial”.388
(11) By contrast, in the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project
case, ICJ carefully considered an argument based on the
Commission’s draft article (now article 25), expressly
accepting the principle while at the same time rejecting
its invocation in the circumstances of that case. As to the
383 Société commerciale de Belgique, Judgment, 1939, P.C.I.J.,
Series A/B, No. 78, p. 160.
384 P.C.I.J., Series C, No. 87, pp. 141 and 190; study prepared by the
Secretariat (footnote 345 above), para. 278. See generally paragraphs
276–287 for the Greek arguments relative to the state of necessity.
385 See footnote 383 above; and the study prepared by the Sec-retariat
(footnote 345 above), para. 288. See also the Serbian Loans case,
where the positions of the parties and the Court on the point were very
similar (footnote 355 above); the French Company of Venezuelan
Railroads case (footnote 178 above) p. 353; and the study prepared
by the Secretariat (footnote 345 above), paras. 263–268 and 385–386.
In his separate opinion in the Oscar Chinn case, Judge Anzilotti
accepted the principle that “necessity may excuse the non-observance
of international obligations”, but denied its applicability on the facts
(Judgment, 1934, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 63, p. 65, at pp. 112–114).
386 The “Torrey Canyon”, Cmnd. 3246 (London, HM Stationery Office,
1967).
387 International Convention relating to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties.
388 “Rainbow Warrior” (see footnote 46 above), p. 254. In Libyan
Arab Foreign Investment Company and The Republic of Burundi
(see footnote 358 above), p. 319, the tribunal declined to comment
on the appropriateness of codifying the doctrine of necessity, noting
that the measures taken by Burundi did not appear to have been the
only means of safeguarding an essential interest “against a grave and
imminent peril”.
principle itself, the Court noted that the parties had both
relied on the Commission’s draft article as an appropriate
formulation, and continued:
The Court considers ... that the state of necessity is a ground recognized
by customary international law for precluding the wrongfulness
of an act not in conformity with an international obligation. It observes
moreover that such ground for precluding wrongfulness can only be accepted
on an exceptional basis. The International Law Commission was
of the same opinion when it explained that it had opted for a negative
form of words ...
Thus, according to the Commission, the state of necessity can only be
invoked under certain strictly defined conditions which must be cumulatively
satisfied; and the State concerned is not the sole judge of
whether those conditions have been met.
... In the present case, the following basic conditions ... are relevant: it
must have been occasioned by an “essential interest” of the State which
is the author of the act conflicting with one of its international obligations;
that interest must have been threatened by a “grave and imminent
peril”; the act being challenged must have been the “only means” of
safeguarding that interest; that act must not have “seriously impair[ed]
an essential interest” of the State towards which the obligation existed;
and the State which is the author of that act must not have “contributed
to the occurrence of the state of necessity”. Those conditions reflect
customary international law. 389
(12) The plea of necessity was apparently an issue in
the Fisheries Jurisdiction case.390 Regulatory measures
taken to conserve straddling stocks had been taken by the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) but
had, in Canada’s opinion, proved ineffective for various
reasons. By the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act 1994,
Canada declared that the straddling stocks of the Grand
Banks were “threatened with extinction”, and asserted
that the purpose of the Act and regulations was “to enable
Canada to take urgent action necessary to prevent further
destruction of those stocks and to permit their rebuilding”.
Canadian officials subsequently boarded and seized
a Spanish fishing ship, the Estai, on the high seas, leading
to a conflict with the European Union and with Spain.
The Spanish Government denied that the arrest could be
justified by concerns as to conservation “since it violates
the established provisions of the NAFO Convention [Convention
on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries] to which Canada is a party”.391
Canada disagreed, asserting that “the arrest of the Estai
was necessary in order to put a stop to the overfishing of
Greenland halibut by Spanish fishermen”.392 The Court
held that it had no jurisdiction over the case.393
389 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), pp. 40–
41, paras. 51–52.
390 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the
Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 432.
391 Ibid., p. 443, para. 20. For the European Community protest of
10 March 1995, asserting that the arrest “cannot be justified by any
means”, see Memorial of Spain (Jurisdiction of the Court), I.C.J.
Pleadings, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), p. 17, at p. 38,
para. 15.
392 Fisheries Jurisdiction (see footnote 390 above), p. 443, para. 20.
See also the Canadian Counter-Memorial (29 February 1996), I.C.J.
Pleadings (footnote 391 above), paras. 17–45.
393 By an Agreed Minute between Canada and the European Community,
Canada undertook to repeal the regulations applying the 1994 Act
to Spanish and Portuguese vessels in the NAFO area and to release the
Estai. The parties expressly maintained “their respective positions on
the conformity of the amendment of 25 May 1994 to Canada’s Coastal
Fisheries Protection Act, and subsequent regulations, with customary
international law and the NAFO Convention” and reserved “their ability
to preserve and defend their rights in conformity with international
law”. See Canada-European Community: Agreed Minute on the ConState
responsibility 83
(13) The existence and limits of a plea of necessity have
given rise to a long-standing controversy among writers.
It was for the most part explicitly accepted by the early
writers, subject to strict conditions.394 In the nineteenth
century, abuses of necessity associated with the idea of
“fundamental rights of States” led to a reaction against
the doctrine. During the twentieth century, the number of
writers opposed to the concept of state of necessity in international
law increased, but the balance of doctrine has
continued to favour the existence of the plea.395
(14) On balance, State practice and judicial decisions
support the view that necessity may constitute a circumstance
precluding wrongfulness under certain very limited
conditions, and this view is embodied in article 25. The
cases show that necessity has been invoked to preclude
the wrongfulness of acts contrary to a broad range of obligations,
whether customary or conventional in origin.396
It has been invoked to protect a wide variety of interests,
including safeguarding the environment, preserving the
very existence of the State and its people in time of public
emergency, or ensuring the safety of a civilian population.
But stringent conditions are imposed before any
such plea is allowed. This is reflected in article 25. In particular,
to emphasize the exceptional nature of necessity
and concerns about its possible abuse, article 25 is cast
in negative language (“Necessity may not be invoked …
unless”).397 In this respect it mirrors the language of article
62 of the 1969 Vienna Convention dealing with fundamental
change of circumstances. It also mirrors that
language in establishing, in paragraph 1, two conditions
without which necessity may not be invoked and excluding,
in paragraph 2, two situations entirely from the scope
of the excuse of necessity.398
servation and Management of Fish Stocks (Brussels, 20 April 1995),
ILM, vol. 34, No. 5 (September 1995), p. 1260. See also the Agreement
for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks.
394 See B. Ayala, De jure et officiis bellicis et disciplina militari,
libri tres (1582) (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Institution, 1912), vol.
II, p. 135; A. Gentili, De iure belli, libri tres (1612) (Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1933), vol. II, p. 351; H. Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, libri
tres (1646) (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1925), vol. II, pp. 193 et seq.;
S. Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium, libri octo (1688) (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1934), vol. II, pp. 295–296; C. Wolff, Jus gentium
methodo scientifica pertractatum (1764) (Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1934), pp. 173–174; and E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles
of Natural Law (1758) (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Institution,
1916), vol. III, p. 149.
395 For a review of the earlier doctrine, see Yearbook … 1980, vol.
II (Part Two), pp. 47–49; see also P. A. Pillitu, Lo stato di necessità
nel diritto internazionale (University of Perugia/Editrice Licosa, 1981);
J. Barboza, “Necessity (revisited) in international law”, Essays in International
Law in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs, J. Makarczyk, ed.
(The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), p. 27; and R. Boed, “State of
necessity as a justification for internationally wrongful conduct”, Yale
Human Rights and Development Law Journal, vol. 3 (2000), p. 1.
396 Generally on the irrelevance of the source of the obligation
breached, see article 12 and commentary.
397 This negative formulation was referred to by ICJ in the Gabˇcíkovo-
Nagymaros Project case (see footnote 27 above), p. 40, para. 51.
398 A further exclusion, common to all the circumstances precluding
wrongfulness, concerns peremptory norms (see article 26 and commentary).
(15) The first condition, set out in paragraph 1 (a), is
that necessity may only be invoked to safeguard an essential
interest from a grave and imminent peril. The extent
to which a given interest is “essential” depends on all the
circumstances, and cannot be prejudged. It extends to particular
interests of the State and its people, as well as of
the international community as a whole. Whatever the interest
may be, however, it is only when it is threatened by
a grave and imminent peril that this condition is satisfied.
The peril has to be objectively established and not merely
apprehended as possible. In addition to being grave, the
peril has to be imminent in the sense of proximate. However,
as the Court in the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project
case said:
That does not exclude ... that a “peril” appearing in the long term might
be held to be “imminent” as soon as it is established, at the relevant
point in time, that the realization of that peril, however far off it might
be, is not thereby any less certain and inevitable.399
Moreover, the course of action taken must be the “only
way” available to safeguard that interest. The plea is
excluded if there are other (otherwise lawful) means available,
even if they may be more costly or less convenient.
Thus, in the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, the
Court was not convinced that the unilateral suspension
and abandonment of the Project was the only course open
in the circumstances, having regard in particular to the
amount of work already done and the money expended
on it, and the possibility of remedying any problems by
other means.400 The word “way” in paragraph 1 (a) is not
limited to unilateral action but may also comprise other
forms of conduct available through cooperative action
with other States or through international organizations
(for example, conservation measures for a fishery taken
through the competent regional fisheries agency). Moreover,
the requirement of necessity is inherent in the plea:
any conduct going beyond what is strictly necessary for
the purpose will not be covered.
(16) It is not sufficient for the purposes of paragraph 1
(a) that the peril is merely apprehended or contingent. It
is true that in questions relating, for example, to conservation
and the environment or to the safety of large structures,
there will often be issues of scientific uncertainty
and different views may be taken by informed experts on
whether there is a peril, how grave or imminent it is and
whether the means proposed are the only ones available
in the circumstances. By definition, in cases of necessity
the peril will not yet have occurred. In the Gabˇcíkovo-
Nagymaros Project case the Court noted that the invoking
State could not be the sole judge of the necessity,401 but a
measure of uncertainty about the future does not necessarily
disqualify a State from invoking necessity, if the peril
is clearly established on the basis of the evidence reasonably
available at the time.
(17) The second condition for invoking necessity, set out
in paragraph 1 (b), is that the conduct in question must
not seriously impair an essential interest of the other State
or States concerned, or of the international community as
399 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), p. 42,
para. 54.
400 Ibid., pp. 42–43, para. 55.
401 Ibid., p. 40, para. 51.
84 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
a whole (see paragraph (18) below). In other words, the
interest relied on must outweigh all other considerations,
not merely from the point of view of the acting State but
on a reasonable assessment of the competing interests,
whether these are individual or collective.402
(18) As a matter of terminology, it is sufficient to use the
phrase “international community as a whole” rather than
“international community of States as a whole”, which
is used in the specific context of article 53 of the 1969
Vienna Convention. The insertion of the words “of States”
in article 53 of the Convention was intended to stress the
paramountcy that States have over the making of international
law, including especially the establishment of
norms of a peremptory character. On the other hand, ICJ
used the phrase “international community as a whole” in
the Barcelona Traction case,403 and it is frequently used
in treaties and other international instruments in the same
sense as in paragraph 1(b).404
(19) Over and above the conditions in paragraph 1,
paragraph 2 lays down two general limits to any invocation
of necessity. This is made clear by the use of the
words “in any case”. Paragraph 2 (a) concerns cases
where the international obligation in question explicitly
or implicitly excludes reliance on necessity. Thus, certain
humanitarian conventions applicable to armed conflict
expressly exclude reliance on military necessity. Others
while not explicitly excluding necessity are intended to
apply in abnormal situations of peril for the responsible
State and plainly engage its essential interests. In such a
case the non-availability of the plea of necessity emerges
clearly from the object and the purpose of the rule.
(20) According to paragraph 2 (b), necessity may not
be relied on if the responsible State has contributed to the
situation of necessity. Thus, in the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros
Project case, ICJ considered that because Hungary had
“helped, by act or omission to bring about” the situation
of alleged necessity, it could not then rely on that situation
as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness.405 For a
plea of necessity to be precluded under paragraph 2 (b),
the contribution to the situation of necessity must be sufficiently
substantial and not merely incidental or peripheral.
Paragraph 2 (b) is phrased in more categorical terms
than articles 23, paragraph 2 (a), and 24, paragraph 2 (a),
because necessity needs to be more narrowly confined.
402 In the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case ICJ affirmed the
need to take into account any countervailing interest of the other State
concerned (see footnote 27 above), p. 46, para. 58.
403 Barcelona Traction (see footnote 25 above), p. 32, para. 33.
404 See, e.g., third preambular paragraph of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents; fourth preambular paragraph
of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages; fifth
preambular paragraph of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation; third preambular
paragraph of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel; tenth preambular paragraph of the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; ninth preambular
paragraph of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;
and ninth preambular paragraph of the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
405 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), p. 46,
para. 57.
(21) As embodied in article 25, the plea of necessity is
not intended to cover conduct which is in principle regulated
by the primary obligations. This has a particular importance
in relation to the rules relating to the use of force
in international relations and to the question of “military
necessity”. It is true that in a few cases, the plea of necessity
has been invoked to excuse military action abroad, in
particular in the context of claims to humanitarian intervention.
406 The question whether measures of forcible humanitarian
intervention, not sanctioned pursuant to Chapters
VII or VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, may
be lawful under modern international law is not covered
by article 25.407 The same thing is true of the doctrine of
“military necessity” which is, in the first place, the underlying
criterion for a series of substantive rules of the law
of war and neutrality, as well as being included in terms in
a number of treaty provisions in the field of international
humanitarian law.408 In both respects, while considerations
akin to those underlying article 25 may have a role,
they are taken into account in the context of the formulation
and interpretation of the primary obligations.409
Article 26. Compliance with peremptory norms
Nothing in this chapter precludes the wrongfulness
of any act of a State which is not in conformity with an
obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general
international law.
Commentary
(1) In accordance with article 53 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention, a treaty which conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law is void. Under article
64, an earlier treaty which conflicts with a new peremp-
406 For example, in 1960 Belgium invoked necessity to justify its
military intervention in the Congo. The matter was discussed in the
Security Council but not in terms of the plea of necessity as such.
See Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, 873rd
meeting, 13–14 July 1960, paras. 144, 182 and 192; 877th meeting,
20–21 July 1960, paras. 31 et seq. and para. 142; 878th meeting,
21 July 1960, paras. 23 and 65; and 879th meeting, 21–22 July 1960,
paras. 80 et seq. and paras. 118 and 151. For the “Caroline” incident,
see above, paragraph (5).
407 See also article 26 and commentary for the general exclusion
of the scope of circumstances precluding wrongfulness of conduct in
breach of a peremptory norm.
408 See, e.g., article 23 (g) of the Regulations respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land (annexed to the Hague Conventions II of
1899 and IV of 1907), which prohibits the destruction of enemy property
“unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the
necessities of war”. Similarly, article 54, paragraph 5, of the Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I),
appears to permit attacks on objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population if “imperative military necessity” so requires.
409 See, e.g., M. Huber, “Die Kriegsrechtlichen Verträge und die
Kriegsraison”, Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, vol. VII (1913), p. 351;
D. Anzilotti, Corso di diritto internazionale (Rome, Athenaeum, 1915),
vol. III, p. 207; C. De Visscher, “Les lois de la guerre et la théorie de
la nécessité”, RGDIP, vol. 24 (1917), p. 74; N. C. H. Dunbar, “Military
necessity in war crimes trials”, BYBIL, 1952, vol. 29, p. 442; C. Greenwood,
“Historical development and legal basis”, The Handbook of
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, D. Fleck, ed. (Oxford University
Press, 1995), p. 1, at pp. 30–33; and Y. Dinstein, “Military necessity”,
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, R. Bernhardt, ed. (Amsterdam,
Elsevier, 1997), vol. 3, pp. 395–397.
State responsibility 85
tory norm becomes void and terminates.410 The question
is what implications these provisions may have for the
matters dealt with in chapter V.
(2) Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice as Special Rapporteur on the
Law of Treaties treated this question on the basis of an
implied condition of “continued compatibility with international
law”, noting that:
A treaty obligation the observance of which is incompatible a new
rule or prohibition of international law in the nature of jus cogens will
justify (and require) non-observance of any treaty obligation involving
such incompatibility …
The same principle is applicable where circumstances arise subsequent
to the conclusion of a treaty, bringing into play an existing rule of international
law which was not relevant to the situation as it existed at the
time of the conclusion of the treaty.411
The Commission did not, however, propose with any specific
articles on this question, apart from articles 53 and
64 themselves.
(3) Where there is an apparent conflict between primary
obligations, one of which arises for a State directly under
a peremptory norm of general international law, it is
evident that such an obligation must prevail. The processes
of interpretation and application should resolve such
questions without any need to resort to the secondary
rules of State responsibility. In theory, one might envisage
a conflict arising on a subsequent occasion between a
treaty obligation, apparently lawful on its face and innocent
in its purpose, and a peremptory norm. If such a case
were to arise it would be too much to invalidate the treaty
as a whole merely because its application in the given case
was not foreseen. But in practice such situations seem not
to have occurred.412 Even if they were to arise, peremptory
norms of general international law generate strong
interpretative principles which will resolve all or most
apparent conflicts.
(4) It is, however, desirable to make it clear that the
circumstances precluding wrongfulness in chapter V of
Part One do not authorize or excuse any derogation from
a peremptory norm of general international law. For example,
a State taking countermeasures may not derogate
from such a norm: for example, a genocide cannot justify
a counter-genocide.413 The plea of necessity likewise cannot
excuse the breach of a peremptory norm. It would be
possible to incorporate this principle expressly in each of
the articles of chapter V, but it is both more economical
and more in keeping with the overriding character of this
410 See also article 44, paragraph 5, which provides that in cases
falling under article 53, no separation of the provisions of the treaty is
permitted.
411 Fourth report on the law of treaties, Yearbook … 1959 (see
footnote 307 above), p. 46. See also S. Rosenne, Breach of Treaty
(Cambridge, Grotius, 1985), p. 63.
412 For a possible analogy, see the remarks of Judge ad hoc
Lauterpacht in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of
13 September 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 325, at pp. 439–441. ICJ did
not address these issues in its order.
413 As ICJ noted in its decision in the case concerning the Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, “in no case could one breach of the Convention serve as
an excuse for another” (Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997,
I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 243, at p. 258, para. 35).
class of norms to deal with the basic principle separately.
Hence, article 26 provides that nothing in chapter V can
preclude the wrongfulness of any act of a State which is
not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory
norm of general international law.414
(5) The criteria for identifying peremptory norms of
general international law are stringent. Article 53 of the
1969 Vienna Convention requires not merely that the norm
in question should meet all the criteria for recognition as
a norm of general international law, binding as such, but
further that it should be recognized as having a peremptory
character by the international community of States
as a whole. So far, relatively few peremptory norms have
been recognized as such. But various tribunals, national
and international, have affirmed the idea of peremptory
norms in contexts not limited to the validity of treaties.415
Those peremptory norms that are clearly accepted and
recognized include the prohibitions of aggression, genocide,
slavery, racial discrimination, crimes against humanity
and torture, and the right to self-determination.416
(6) In accordance with article 26, circumstances precluding
wrongfulness cannot justify or excuse a breach
of a State’s obligations under a peremptory rule of general
international law. Article 26 does not address the prior issue
whether there has been such a breach in any given
case. This has particular relevance to certain articles in
chapter V. One State cannot dispense another from the
obligation to comply with a peremptory norm, e.g. in relation
to genocide or torture, whether by treaty or otherwise.
417 But in applying some peremptory norms the consent
of a particular State may be relevant. For example, a
State may validly consent to a foreign military presence
on its territory for a lawful purpose. Determining in which
circumstances consent has been validly given is again a
matter for other rules of international law and not for the
secondary rules of State responsibility.418
Article 27. Consequences of invoking a circumstance
precluding wrongfulness
The invocation of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness
in accordance with this chapter is without prejudice
to:
(a) compliance with the obligation in question, if
and to the extent that the circumstance precluding
wrongfulness no longer exists;
(b) the question of compensation for any material
loss caused by the act in question.
414 For convenience, this limitation is spelled out again in the context
of countermeasures in Part Three, chapter II. See article 50 and commentary,
paras. (9) and (10).
415 See, e.g., the decisions of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia in case IT-95-17/1-T, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, judgement
of 10 December 1998; ILM, vol. 38, No. 2 (March 1999), p. 317, and
of the British House of Lords in Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan
Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3),
ILR, vol. 119. Cf. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
(footnote 54 above), p. 257, para. 79.
416 Cf. East Timor (footnote 54 above).
417 See paragraph (4) of the commentary to article 45.
418 See paragraphs (4) to (7) of the commentary to article 20.
86 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
Commentary
(1) Article 27 is a without prejudice clause dealing
with certain incidents or consequences of invoking circumstances
precluding wrongfulness under chapter V.
It deals with two issues. First, it makes it clear that circumstances
precluding wrongfulness do not as such affect
the underlying obligation, so that if the circumstance no
longer exists the obligation regains full force and effect.
Secondly, it refers to the possibility of compensation in
certain cases. Article 27 is framed as a without prejudice
clause because, as to the first point, it may be that the
effect of the facts which disclose a circumstance precluding
wrongfulness may also give rise to the termination of
the obligation and, as to the second point, because it is not
possible to specify in general terms when compensation
is payable.
(2) Subparagraph (a) of article 27 addresses the question
of what happens when a condition preventing compliance
with an obligation no longer exists or gradually
ceases to operate. It makes it clear that chapter V has a
merely preclusive effect. When and to the extent that a circumstance
precluding wrongfulness ceases, or ceases to
have its preclusive effect for any reason, the obligation in
question (assuming it is still in force) will again have to be
complied with, and the State whose earlier non-compliance
was excused must act accordingly. The words “and
to the extent” are intended to cover situations in which the
conditions preventing compliance gradually lessen and
allow for partial performance of the obligation.
(3) This principle was affirmed by the tribunal in the
“Rainbow Warrior” arbitration,419 and even more clearly
by ICJ in the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case. In
considering Hungary’s argument that the wrongfulness
of its conduct in discontinuing work on the Project was
precluded by a state of necessity, the Court remarked that
“[a]s soon as the state of necessity ceases to exist, the duty
to comply with treaty obligations revives”.420 It may be
that the particular circumstances precluding wrongfulness
are, at the same time, a sufficient basis for terminating the
underlying obligation. Thus, a breach of a treaty justifying
countermeasures may be “material” in terms of article 60
of the 1969 Vienna Convention and permit termination of
the treaty by the injured State. Conversely, the obligation
may be fully reinstated or its operation fully restored in
principle, but modalities for resuming performance may
need to be settled. These are not matters which article 27
can resolve, other than by providing that the invocation of
circumstances precluding wrongfulness is without prejudice
to “compliance with the obligation in question, if and
to the extent that the circumstance precluding wrongfulness
no longer exists”. Here “compliance with the obligation
in question” includes cessation of the wrongful
conduct.
(4) Subparagraph (b) of article 27 is a reservation as to
questions of possible compensation for damage in cases
covered by chapter V. Although the article uses the term
419 “Rainbow Warrior” (see footnote 46 above), pp. 251–252,
para. 75.
420 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), p. 63,
para 101; see also page 38, para. 47.
“compensation”, it is not concerned with compensation
within the framework of reparation for wrongful conduct,
which is the subject of article 34. Rather, it is concerned
with the question whether a State relying on a circumstance
precluding wrongfulness should nonetheless be
expected to make good any material loss suffered by any
State directly affected. The reference to “material loss”
is narrower than the concept of damage elsewhere in the
articles: article 27 concerns only the adjustment of losses
that may occur when a party relies on a circumstance covered
by chapter V.
(5) Subparagraph (b) is a proper condition, in certain
cases, for allowing a State to rely on a circumstance precluding
wrongfulness. Without the possibility of such
recourse, the State whose conduct would otherwise be
unlawful might seek to shift the burden of the defence of
its own interests or concerns onto an innocent third State.
This principle was accepted by Hungary in invoking the
plea of necessity in the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project
case. As ICJ noted, “Hungary expressly acknowledged
that, in any event, such a state of necessity would not
exempt it from its duty to compensate its partner”.421
(6) Subparagraph (b) does not attempt to specify in what
circumstances compensation should be payable. Generally,
the range of possible situations covered by chapter V
is such that to lay down a detailed regime for compensation
is not appropriate. It will be for the State invoking a
circumstance precluding wrongfulness to agree with any
affected States on the possibility and extent of compensation
payable in a given case.
PART TWO
CONTENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF A STATE
(1) Whereas Part One of the articles defines the general
conditions necessary for State responsibility to arise, Part
Two deals with the legal consequences for the responsible
State. It is true that a State may face legal consequences
of conduct which is internationally wrongful outside the
sphere of State responsibility. For example, a material
breach of a treaty may give an injured State the right to
terminate or suspend the treaty in whole or in part.422 The
focus of Part Two, however, is on the new legal relationship
which arises upon the commission by a State of an internationally
wrongful act. This constitutes the substance
or content of the international responsibility of a State
under the articles.
(2) Within the sphere of State responsibility, the consequences
which arise by virtue of an internationally
wrongful act of a State may be specifically provided for in
such terms as to exclude other consequences, in whole or
421 Ibid., p. 39, para. 48. A separate issue was that of accounting
for accrued costs associated with the Project (ibid., p. 81, paras. 152–
153).
422 1969 Vienna Convention, art. 60.
State responsibility 87
in part.423 In the absence of any specific provision, however,
international law attributes to the responsible State
new obligations, and in particular the obligation to make
reparation for the harmful consequences flowing from
that act. The close link between the breach of an international
obligation and its immediate legal consequence
in the obligation of reparation was recognized in article
36, paragraph 2, of the PCIJ Statute, which was carried
over without change as Article 36, paragraph 2, of
the ICJ Statute. In accordance with article 36, paragraph
2, States parties to the Statute may recognize as
compulsory the Court’s jurisdiction, inter alia, in all legal
disputes concerning:
(c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute
a breach of an international obligation;
(d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach
of an international obligation.
Part One of the articles sets out the general legal rules
applicable to the question identified in subparagraph (c),
while Part Two does the same for subparagraph (d).
(3) Part Two consists of three chapters. Chapter I sets
out certain general principles and specifies more precisely
the scope of Part Two. Chapter II focuses on the forms
of reparation (restitution, compensation, satisfaction) and
the relations between them. Chapter III deals with the special
situation which arises in case of a serious breach of an
obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international
law, and specifies certain legal consequences
of such breaches, both for the responsible State and for
other States.
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Commentary
(1) Chapter I of Part Two comprises six articles, which
define in general terms the legal consequences of an internationally
wrongful act of a State. Individual breaches
of international law can vary across a wide spectrum from
the comparatively trivial or minor up to cases which imperil
the survival of communities and peoples, the territorial
integrity and political independence of States and the
environment of whole regions. This may be true whether
the obligations in question are owed to one other State
or to some or all States or to the international community
as a whole. But over and above the gravity or effects
of individual cases, the rules and institutions of State responsibility
are significant for the maintenance of respect
for international law and for the achievement of the goals
which States advance through law-making at the international
level.
(2) Within chapter I, article 28 is an introductory article,
affirming the principle that legal consequences are
423 On the lex specialis principle in relation to State responsibility,
see article 55 and commentary.
entailed whenever there is an internationally wrongful act
of a State. Article 29 indicates that these consequences are
without prejudice to, and do not supplant, the continued
obligation of the responsible State to perform the obligation
breached. This point is carried further by article 30,
which deals with the obligation of cessation and assurances
or guarantees of non-repetition. Article 31 sets out
the general obligation of reparation for injury suffered in
consequence of a breach of international law by a State.
Article 32 makes clear that the responsible State may not
rely on its internal law to avoid the obligations of cessation
and reparation arising under Part Two. Finally, article
33 specifies the scope of the Part, both in terms of the
States to which obligations are owed and also in terms
of certain legal consequences which, because they accrue
directly to persons or entities other than States, are not
covered by Parts Two or Three of the articles.
Article 28. Legal consequences of an internationally
wrongful act
The international responsibility of a State which is
entailed by an internationally wrongful act in accordance
with the provisions of Part One involves legal consequences
as set out in this Part.
Commentary
(1) Article 28 serves an introductory function for Part
Two and is expository in character. It links the provisions
of Part One which define when the international responsibility
of a State arises with the provisions of Part Two
which set out the legal consequences which responsibility
for an internationally wrongful act involves.
(2) The core legal consequences of an internationally
wrongful act set out in Part Two are the obligations of the
responsible State to cease the wrongful conduct (art. 30)
and to make full reparation for the injury caused by the
internationally wrongful act (art. 31). Where the internationally
wrongful act constitutes a serious breach by the
State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm
of general international law, the breach may entail further
consequences both for the responsible State and for other
States. In particular, all States in such cases have obligations
to cooperate to bring the breach to an end, not to
recognize as lawful the situation created by the breach and
not to render aid or assistance to the responsible State in
maintaining the situation so created (arts. 40–41).
(3) Article 28 does not exclude the possibility that an
internationally wrongful act may involve legal consequences
in the relations between the State responsible for
that act and persons or entities other than States. This follows
from article 1, which covers all international obligations
of the State and not only those owed to other States.
Thus, State responsibility extends, for example, to human
rights violations and other breaches of international law
where the primary beneficiary of the obligation breached
is not a State. However, while Part One applies to all the
cases in which an internationally wrongful act may be
committed by a State, Part Two has a more limited scope.
It does not apply to obligations of reparation to the extent
88 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
that these arise towards or are invoked by a person or entity
other than a State. In other words, the provisions of
Part Two are without prejudice to any right, arising from
the international responsibility of a State, which may accrue
directly to any person or entity other than a State, and
article 33 makes this clear.
Article 29. Continued duty of performance
The legal consequences of an internationally wrongful
act under this Part do not affect the continued duty
of the responsible State to perform the obligation
breached.
Commentary
(1) Where a State commits a breach of an international
obligation, questions as to the restoration and future of the
legal relationship thereby affected are central. Apart from
the question of reparation, two immediate issues arise,
namely, the effect of the responsible State’s conduct on
the obligation which has been breached, and cessation of
the breach if it is continuing. The former question is dealt
with by article 29, the latter by article 30.
(2) Article 29 states the general principle that the legal
consequences of an internationally wrongful act do not
affect the continued duty of the State to perform the obligation
it has breached. As a result of the internationally
wrongful act, a new set of legal relations is established
between the responsible State and the State or States to
whom the international obligation is owed. But this does
not mean that the pre-existing legal relation established
by the primary obligation disappears. Even if the responsible
State complies with its obligations under Part Two
to cease the wrongful conduct and to make full reparation
for the injury caused, it is not relieved thereby of the
duty to perform the obligation breached. The continuing
obligation to perform an international obligation, notwithstanding
a breach, underlies the concept of a continuing
wrongful act (see article 14) and the obligation of cessation
(see subparagraph (a) of article 30).
(3) It is true that in some situations the ultimate effect
of a breach of an obligation may be to put an end to the
obligation itself. For example, a State injured by a material
breach of a bilateral treaty may elect to terminate
the treaty.424 But as the relevant provisions of the 1969
Vienna Convention make clear, the mere fact of a breach
and even of a repudiation of a treaty does not terminate
the treaty.425 It is a matter for the injured State to react
to the breach to the extent permitted by the Convention.
The injured State may have no interest in terminating the
treaty as distinct from calling for its continued performance.
Where a treaty is duly terminated for breach, the
termination does not affect legal relationships which have
accrued under the treaty prior to its termination, includ-
424 See footnote 422 above.
425 Indeed, in the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, ICJ held that
continuing material breaches by both parties did not have the effect of
terminating the 1977 Treaty on the Construction and Operation of the
Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Barrage System (see footnote 27 above), p. 68,
para. 114.
ing the obligation to make reparation for any breach.426 A
breach of an obligation under general international law is
even less likely to affect the underlying obligation, and indeed
will never do so as such. By contrast, the secondary
legal relation of State responsibility arises on the occurrence
of a breach and without any requirement of invocation
by the injured State.
(4) Article 29 does not need to deal with such contingencies.
All it provides is that the legal consequences of
an internationally wrongful act within the field of State
responsibility do not affect any continuing duty to comply
with the obligation which has been breached. Whether and
to what extent that obligation subsists despite the breach
is a matter not regulated by the law of State responsibility
but by the rules concerning the relevant primary obligation.
Article 30. Cessation and non-repetition
The State responsible for the internationally wrongful
act is under an obligation:
(a) to cease that act, if it is continuing;
(b) to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees
of non-repetition, if circumstances so require.
Commentary
(1) Article 30 deals with two separate but linked issues
raised by the breach of an international obligation: the
cessation of the wrongful conduct and the offer of assurances
and guarantees of non-repetition by the responsible
State if circumstances so require. Both are aspects of the
restoration and repair of the legal relationship affected by
the breach. Cessation is, as it were, the negative aspect
of future performance, concerned with securing an end
to continuing wrongful conduct, whereas assurances and
guarantees serve a preventive function and may be described
as a positive reinforcement of future performance.
The continuation in force of the underlying obligation is
a necessary assumption of both, since if the obligation
has ceased following its breach, the question of cessation
does not arise and no assurances and guarantees can be
relevant.427
(2) Subparagraph (a) of article 30 deals with the obligation
of the State responsible for the internationally wrongful
act to cease the wrongful conduct. In accordance with
article 2, the word “act” covers both acts and omissions.
Cessation is thus relevant to all wrongful acts extending
in time “regardless of whether the conduct of a State is
426 See, e.g., “Rainbow Warrior” (footnote 46 above), p. 266, citing
Lord McNair (dissenting) in Ambatielos, Preliminary Objection,
I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 28, at p. 63. On that particular point the Court
itself agreed, ibid., p. 45. In the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case,
Hungary accepted that the legal consequences of its termination of
the 1977 Treaty on the Construction and Operation of the Gabˇcíkovo-
Nagymaros Barrage System on account of the breach by Czechoslovakia
were prospective only, and did not affect the accrued rights of either
party (see footnote 27 above), pp. 73–74, paras. 125–127. The Court
held that the Treaty was still in force, and therefore did not address the
question.
427 1969 Vienna Convention, art. 70, para. 1.
State responsibility 89
an action or an omission … since there may be cessation
consisting in abstaining from certain actions”.428
(3) The tribunal in the “Rainbow Warrior” arbitration
stressed “two essential conditions intimately linked” for
the requirement of cessation of wrongful conduct to arise,
“namely that the wrongful act has a continuing character
and that the violated rule is still in force at the time
in which the order is issued”.429 While the obligation to
cease wrongful conduct will arise most commonly in the
case of a continuing wrongful act,430 article 30 also encompasses
situations where a State has violated an obligation
on a series of occasions, implying the possibility of
further repetitions. The phrase “if it is continuing” at the
end of subparagraph (a) of the article is intended to cover
both situations.
(4) Cessation of conduct in breach of an international
obligation is the first requirement in eliminating the consequences
of wrongful conduct. With reparation, it is
one of the two general consequences of an internationally
wrongful act. Cessation is often the main focus of the
controversy produced by conduct in breach of an international
obligation.431 It is frequently demanded not only
by States but also by the organs of international organizations
such as the General Assembly and Security Council
in the face of serious breaches of international law. By
contrast, reparation, important though it is in many cases,
may not be the central issue in a dispute between States as
to questions of responsibility.432
(5) The function of cessation is to put an end to a violation
of international law and to safeguard the continuing
validity and effectiveness of the underlying primary rule.
The responsible State’s obligation of cessation thus protects
both the interests of the injured State or States and
the interests of the international community as a whole in
the preservation of, and reliance on, the rule of law.
(6) There are several reasons for treating cessation as
more than simply a function of the duty to comply with
the primary obligation. First, the question of cessation
only arises in the event of a breach. What must then occur
depends not only on the interpretation of the primary
obligation but also on the secondary rules relating to rem-
428 “Rainbow Warrior” (see footnote 46 above), p. 270, para. 113.
429 Ibid., para. 114.
430 For the concept of a continuing wrongful act, see paragraphs (3)
to (11) of the commentary to article 14.
431 The focus of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is on cessation
rather than reparation: Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization, annex 2 (Understanding on Rules and Procedures
governing the Settlement of Disputes), especially article 3, paragraph 7,
which provides for compensation “only if the immediate withdrawal of
the measure is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the
withdrawal of the measure which is inconsistent with a covered agreement”.
On the distinction between cessation and reparation for WTO
purposes, see, e.g., Report of the Panel, Australia-Subsidies Provided to
Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather (WT/DS126/RW and
Corr.1), 21 January 2000, para. 6.49.
432 For cases where ICJ has recognized that this may be so, see,
e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland),
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 175, at pp. 201–205,
paras. 65–76; and Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (footnote 27 above),
p. 81, para. 153. See also C. D. Gray, Judicial Remedies in International
Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 77–92.
edies, and it is appropriate that they are dealt with, at least
in general terms, in articles concerning the consequences
of an internationally wrongful act. Secondly, continuing
wrongful acts are a common feature of cases involving
State responsibility and are specifically dealt with in article
14. There is a need to spell out the consequences of
such acts in Part Two.
(7) The question of cessation often arises in close connection
with that of reparation, and particularly restitution.
The result of cessation may be indistinguishable
from restitution, for example in cases involving the freeing
of hostages or the return of objects or premises seized.
Nonetheless, the two must be distinguished. Unlike restitution,
cessation is not subject to limitations relating to
proportionality.433 It may give rise to a continuing obligation,
even when literal return to the status quo ante is
excluded or can only be achieved in an approximate way.
(8) The difficulty of distinguishing between cessation
and restitution is illustrated by the “Rainbow Warrior”
arbitration. New Zealand sought the return of the two
agents to detention on the island of Hao. According to
New Zealand, France was obliged to return them to and
to detain them on the island for the balance of the three
years; that obligation had not expired since time spent
off the island was not to be counted for that purpose. The
tribunal disagreed. In its view, the obligation was for a
fixed term which had expired, and there was no question
of cessation.434 Evidently, the return of the two agents to
the island was of no use to New Zealand if there was no
continuing obligation on the part of France to keep them
there. Thus, a return to the status quo ante may be of little
or no value if the obligation breached no longer exists.
Conversely, no option may exist for an injured State to renounce
restitution if the continued performance of the obligation
breached is incumbent upon the responsible State
and the former State is not competent to release it from
such performance. The distinction between cessation and
restitution may have important consequences in terms of
the obligations of the States concerned.
(9) Subparagraph (b) of article 30 deals with the obligation
of the responsible State to offer appropriate assurances
and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances
so require. Assurances and guarantees are concerned with
the restoration of confidence in a continuing relationship,
although they involve much more flexibility than cessation
and are not required in all cases. They are most commonly
sought when the injured State has reason to believe
that the mere restoration of the pre-existing situation does
not protect it satisfactorily. For example, following repeated
demonstrations against the United States Embassy
in Moscow from 1964 to 1965, President Johnson stated
that:
The U.S. Government must insist that its diplomatic establishments and
personnel be given the protection which is required by international
law and custom and which is necessary for the conduct of diplomatic
relations between states. Expressions of regret and compensation are no
substitute for adequate protection.435
433 See article 35 (b) and commentary.
434 UNRIAA, vol. XX, p. 217, at p. 266, para. 105 (1990).
435 Reprinted in ILM, vol. 4, No. 2 (July 1965), p. 698.
90 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
Such demands are not always expressed in terms of assurances
or guarantees, but they share the characteristics of
being future-looking and concerned with other potential
breaches. They focus on prevention rather than reparation
and they are included in article 30.
(10) The question whether the obligation to offer assurances
or guarantees of non-repetition may be a legal consequence
of an internationally wrongful act was debated
in the LaGrand case. This concerned an admitted failure
of consular notification contrary to article 36 of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In its fourth
submission, Germany sought both general and specific
assurances and guarantees as to the means of future compliance
with the Convention. The United States argued
that to give such assurances or guarantees went beyond
the scope of the obligations in the Convention and that
ICJ lacked jurisdiction to require them. In any event, formal
assurances and guarantees were unprecedented and
should not be required. Germany’s entitlement to a remedy
did not extend beyond an apology, which the United
States had given. Alternatively, no assurances or guarantees
were appropriate in the light of the extensive action it
had taken to ensure that federal and State officials would
in future comply with the Convention. On the question of
jurisdiction, the Court held:
that a dispute regarding the appropriate remedies for the violation of
the Convention alleged by Germany is a dispute that arises out of the
interpretation or application of the Convention and thus is within the
Court’s jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction exists over a dispute on a particular
matter, no separate basis for jurisdiction is required by the Court
to consider the remedies a party has requested for the breach of the
obligation … Consequently, the Court has jurisdiction in the present
case with respect to the fourth submission of Germany.436
On the question of appropriateness, the Court noted that
an apology would not be sufficient in any case in which a
foreign national had been “subjected to prolonged detention
or sentenced to severe penalties” following a failure
of consular notification.437 But in the light of information
provided by the United States as to the steps taken to comply
in future, the Court held:
that the commitment expressed by the United States to ensure implementation
of the specific measures adopted in performance of its obligations
under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), must be regarded as meeting
Germany’s request for a general assurance of non-repetition.438
As to the specific assurances sought by Germany, the
Court limited itself to stating that:
if the United States, notwithstanding its commitment referred to …
should fail in its obligation of consular notification to the detriment
of German nationals, an apology would not suffice in cases where the
individuals concerned have been subjected to prolonged detention or
convicted and sentenced to severe penalties. In the case of such a conviction
and sentence, it would be incumbent upon the United States to
allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by
taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention.
439
436 LaGrand, Judgment (see footnote 119 above), p. 485, para. 48,
citing Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction (footnote 34 above).
437 LaGrand, Judgment (see footnote 119 above), p. 512,
para. 123.
438 Ibid., p. 513, para. 124; see also the operative part, p. 516,
para. 128 (6).
439 Ibid., pp. 513–514, para. 125. See also paragraph 127 and the
operative part (para. 128 (7)).
The Court thus upheld its jurisdiction on Germany’s fourth
submission and responded to it in the operative part. It
did not, however, discuss the legal basis for assurances of
non-repetition.
(11) Assurances or guarantees of non-repetition may be
sought by way of satisfaction (e.g. the repeal of the legislation
which allowed the breach to occur) and there is thus
some overlap between the two in practice.440 However,
they are better treated as an aspect of the continuation
and repair of the legal relationship affected by the breach.
Where assurances and guarantees of non-repetition are
sought by an injured State, the question is essentially the
reinforcement of a continuing legal relationship and the
focus is on the future, not the past. In addition, assurances
and guarantees of non-repetition may be sought by a State
other than an injured State in accordance with article 48.
(12) Assurances are normally given verbally, while guarantees
of non-repetition involve something more—for example,
preventive measures to be taken by the responsible
State designed to avoid repetition of the breach. With
regard to the kind of guarantees that may be requested,
international practice is not uniform. The injured State
usually demands either safeguards against the repetition
of the wrongful act without any specification of the form
they are to take441 or, when the wrongful act affects its
nationals, assurances of better protection of persons and
property.442 In the LaGrand case, ICJ spelled out with
some specificity the obligation that would arise for the
United States from a future breach, but added that “[t]his
obligation can be carried out in various ways. The choice
of means must be left to the United States”.443 It noted
further that a State may not be in a position to offer a firm
guarantee of non-repetition.444 Whether it could properly
do so would depend on the nature of the obligation in
question.
(13) In some cases, the injured State may ask the responsible
State to adopt specific measures or to act in a
specified way in order to avoid repetition. Sometimes the
injured State merely seeks assurances from the responsible
State that, in future, it will respect the rights of the injured
State.445 In other cases, the injured State requires specific
instructions to be given,446 or other specific conduct to be
440 See paragraph (5) of the commentary to article 36.
441 In the “Dogger Bank” incident in 1904, the United Kingdom
sought “security against the recurrence of such intolerable incidents”,
G. F. de Martens, Nouveau recueil général de traités, 2nd series,
vol. XXXIII, p. 642. See also the exchange of notes between China
and Indonesia following the attack in March 1966 against the Chinese
Consulate General in Jakarta, in which the Chinese Deputy Minister
for Foreign Affairs sought a guarantee that such incidents would not be
repeated in the future, RGDIP, vol. 70 (1966), pp. 1013 et seq.
442 Such assurances were given in the Doane incident (1886), Moore,
Digest, vol. VI, pp. 345–346.
443 LaGrand, Judgment (see footnote 119 above), p. 513, para. 125.
444 Ibid., para. 124.
445 See, e.g., the 1901 case in which the Ottoman Empire gave a
formal assurance that the British, Austrian and French postal services
would henceforth operate freely in its territory, RGDIP, vol. 8 (1901),
p. 777, at pp. 788 and 792.
446 See, e.g., the incidents involving the “Herzog” and the “Bundesrath”,
two German ships seized by the British Navy in December
1899 and January 1900, during the Boer war, in which Germany drew
the attention of Great Britain to “the necessity for issuing instructions
State responsibility 91
taken.447 But assurances and guarantees of non-repetition
will not always be appropriate, even if demanded. Much
will depend on the circumstances of the case, including
the nature of the obligation and of the breach. The rather
exceptional character of the measures is indicated by the
words “if circumstances so require” at the end of subparagraph
(b). The obligation of the responsible State with
respect to assurances and guarantees of non-repetition is
formulated in flexible terms in order to prevent the kinds
of abusive or excessive claims which characterized some
demands for assurances and guarantees by States in the
past.
Article 31. Reparation
1. The responsible State is under an obligation to
make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally
wrongful act.
2. Injury includes any damage, whether material
or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act
of a State.
Commentary
(1) The obligation to make full reparation is the second
general obligation of the responsible State consequent
upon the commission of an internationally wrongful act.
The general principle of the consequences of the commission
of an internationally wrongful act was stated by PCIJ
in the Factory at Chorzów case:
It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement
involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form. Reparation
therefore is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a
convention and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention
itself. Differences relating to reparations, which may be due by
reason of failure to apply a convention, are consequently differences
relating to its application.448
In this passage, which has been cited and applied on many
occasions,449 the Court was using the term “reparation”
in its most general sense. It was rejecting a Polish argument
that jurisdiction to interpret and apply a treaty did
not entail jurisdiction to deal with disputes over the form
and quantum of reparation to be made. By that stage of the
dispute, Germany was no longer seeking for its national
the return of the factory in question or of the property
seized with it.
to the British Naval Commanders to molest no German merchantmen in
places not in the vicinity of the seat of war”, Martens, op. cit. (footnote
441 above), vol. XXIX, p. 456 at p. 486.
447 In the Trail Smelter case (see footnote 253 above), the arbitral
tribunal specified measures to be adopted by the Trail Smelter, including
measures designed to “prevent future significant fumigations in
the United States” (p. 1934). Requests to modify or repeal legislation
are frequently made by international bodies. See, e.g., the decisions of
the Human Rights Committee: Torres Ramirez v. Uruguay, decision of
23 July 1980, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth
Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/35/40), p. 126, para. 19; Lanza v.
Uruguay, decision of 3 April 1980, ibid., p. 119, para. 17; and Dermit
Barbato v. Uruguay, decision of 21 October 1982, ibid., Thirty-eighth
Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/38/40), p. 133, para. 11.
448 Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction (see footnote 34 above).
449 Cf. the ICJ reference to this decision in LaGrand, Judgment
(footnote 119 above), p. 485, para. 48.
(2) In a subsequent phase of the same case, the Court
went on to specify in more detail the content of the obligation
of reparation. It said:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal
act—a principle which seems to be established by international practice
and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals—is that reparation
must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal
act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this
is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a
restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss
sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment
in place of it—such are the principles which should serve to determine
the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international
law.450
In the first sentence, the Court gave a general definition of
reparation, emphasizing that its function was the re-establishment
of the situation affected by the breach.451 In the
second sentence, it dealt with that aspect of reparation encompassed
by “compensation” for an unlawful act—that
is, restitution or its value, and in addition damages for loss
sustained as a result of the wrongful act.
(3) The obligation placed on the responsible State by
article 31 is to make “full reparation” in the Factory at
Chorzów sense. In other words, the responsible State must
endeavour to “wipe out all the consequences of the illegal
act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability,
have existed if that act had not been committed”452
through the provision of one or more of the forms of reparation
set out in chapter II of this part.
(4) The general obligation of reparation is formulated
in article 31 as the immediate corollary of a State’s responsibility,
i.e. as an obligation of the responsible State
resulting from the breach, rather than as a right of an injured
State or States. This formulation avoids the difficulties
that might arise where the same obligation is owed
simultaneously to several, many or all States, only a few
of which are specially affected by the breach. But quite
apart from the questions raised when there is more than
one State entitled to invoke responsibility,453 the general
obligation of reparation arises automatically upon commission
of an internationally wrongful act and is not, as
such, contingent upon a demand or protest by any State,
even if the form which reparation should take in the circumstances
may depend on the response of the injured
State or States.
(5) The responsible State’s obligation to make full reparation
relates to the “injury caused by the internationally
wrongful act”. The notion of “injury”, defined in paragraph
2, is to be understood as including any damage
caused by that act. In particular, in accordance with paragraph
2, “injury” includes any material or moral damage
caused thereby. This formulation is intended both as inclusive,
covering both material and moral damage broadly
understood, and as limitative, excluding merely abstract
concerns or general interests of a State which is individu-
450 Factory at Chorzów, Merits (see footnote 34 above), p. 47.
451 Cf. P.-M. Dupuy, “Le fait générateur de la responsabilité internationale
des États”, Collected Courses ... 1984–V (Dordrecht, Martinus
Nijhoff, 1986), vol. 188, p. 9, at p. 94, who uses the term restauration.
452 Factory at Chorzów, Merits (see footnote 34 above), p. 47.
453 For the States entitled to invoke responsibility, see articles 42
and 48 and commentaries. For the situation where there is a plurality of
injured States, see article 46 and commentary.
92 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
ally unaffected by the breach.454 “Material” damage here
refers to damage to property or other interests of the State
and its nationals which is assessable in financial terms.
“Moral” damage includes such items as individual pain
and suffering, loss of loved ones or personal affront associated
with an intrusion on one’s home or private life.
Questions of reparation for such forms of damage are
dealt with in more detail in chapter II of this Part.455
(6) The question whether damage to a protected interest
is a necessary element of an internationally wrongful act
has already been discussed.456 There is in general no such
requirement; rather this is a matter which is determined
by the relevant primary rule. In some cases, the gist of a
wrong is the causing of actual harm to another State. In
some cases what matters is the failure to take necessary
precautions to prevent harm even if in the event no harm
occurs. In some cases there is an outright commitment to
perform a specified act, e.g. to incorporate uniform rules
into internal law. In each case the primary obligation will
determine what is required. Hence, article 12 defines a
breach of an international obligation as a failure to conform
with an obligation.
(7) As a corollary there is no general requirement, over
and above any requirements laid down by the relevant
primary obligation, that a State should have suffered material
harm or damage before it can seek reparation for
a breach. The existence of actual damage will be highly
relevant to the form and quantum of reparation. But there
is no general requirement of material harm or damage for
a State to be entitled to seek some form of reparation. In
the “Rainbow Warrior” arbitration it was initially argued
that “in the theory of international responsibility, damage
is necessary to provide a basis for liability to make reparation”,
but the parties subsequently agreed that:
Unlawful action against non-material interests, such as acts affecting the
honor, dignity or prestige of a State, entitle the victim State to receive
adequate reparation, even if those acts have not resulted in a pecuniary
or material loss for the claimant State.457
The tribunal held that the breach by France had “provoked
indignation and public outrage in New Zealand and caused
a new, additional non-material damage … of a moral, political
and legal nature, resulting from the affront to the
dignity and prestige not only of New Zealand as such, but
of its highest judicial and executive authorities as well”.458
454 Although not individually injured, such States may be entitled to
invoke responsibility in respect of breaches of certain classes of obligation
in the general interest, pursuant to article 48. Generally on
notions of injury and damage, see B. Bollecker-Stern, Le préjudice dans
la théorie de la responsabilité internationale (Paris, Pedone, 1973);
B. Graefrath, “Responsibility and damages caused: relationship between
responsibility and damages”, Collected Courses ... 1984–II
(The Hague, Nijhoff, 1985), vol. 185, p. 95; A. Tanzi, “Is damage a
distinct condition for the existence of an internationally wrongful
act?”, Spinedi and Simma, eds., op. cit. (footnote 175 above), p. 1; and
Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations … (footnote 92 above),
pp. 53–88.
455 See especially article 36 and commentary.
456 See paragraph (9) of the commentary to article 2.
457 “Rainbow Warrior” (see footnote 46 above), pp. 266–267,
paras. 107 and 109.
458 Ibid., p. 267, para. 110.
(8) Where two States have agreed to engage in particular
conduct, the failure by one State to perform the obligation
necessarily concerns the other. A promise has been broken
and the right of the other State to performance correspondingly
infringed. For the secondary rules of State responsibility
to intervene at this stage and to prescribe that
there is no responsibility because no identifiable harm or
damage has occurred would be unwarranted. If the parties
had wished to commit themselves to that formulation of
the obligation they could have done so. In many cases,
the damage that may follow from a breach (e.g. harm
to a fishery from fishing in the closed season, harm to
the environment by emissions exceeding the prescribed
limit, abstraction from a river of more than the permitted
amount) may be distant, contingent or uncertain. Nonetheless,
States may enter into immediate and unconditional
commitments in their mutual long-term interest in such
fields. Accordingly, article 31 defines “injury” in a broad
and inclusive way, leaving it to the primary obligations to
specify what is required in each case.
(9) Paragraph 2 addresses a further issue, namely the
question of a causal link between the internationally
wrongful act and the injury. It is only “[i]njury … caused
by the internationally wrongful act of a State” for which
full reparation must be made. This phrase is used to make
clear that the subject matter of reparation is, globally, the
injury resulting from and ascribable to the wrongful act,
rather than any and all consequences flowing from an
internationally wrongful act.
(10) The allocation of injury or loss to a wrongful act is,
in principle, a legal and not only a historical or causal process.
Various terms are used to describe the link which must
exist between the wrongful act and the injury in order for
the obligation of reparation to arise. For example, reference
may be made to losses “attributable to [the wrongful]
act as a proximate cause”,459 or to damage which is “too
indirect, remote, and uncertain to be appraised”,460 or to
“any direct loss, damage including environmental damage
and the depletion of natural resources or injury to foreign
Governments, nationals and corporations as a result of ”
the wrongful act.461 Thus, causality in fact is a necessary
459 See United States-German Mixed Claims Commission, Administrative
Decision No. II, UNRIAA, vol. VII (Sales No. 1956.V.5),
p. 23, at p. 30 (1923). See also Dix (footnote 178 above), p. 121, and the
Canadian statement of claim following the disintegration of the Cosmos
954 Soviet nuclear-powered satellite over its territory in 1978, ILM,
vol. 18 (1979), p. 907, para. 23.
460 See the Trail Smelter arbitration (footnote 253 above), p. 1931.
See also A. Hauriou, “Les dommages indirects dans les arbitrages internationaux”,
RGDIP, vol. 31 (1924), p. 209, citing the “Alabama” arbitration
as the most striking application of the rule excluding “indirect”
damage (footnote 87 above).
461 Security Council resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, para. 16.
This was a resolution adopted with reference to Chapter VII of the Charter
of the United Nations, but it is expressed to reflect Iraq’s liability
“under international law … as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation
of Kuwait”. UNCC and its Governing Council have provided
some guidance on the interpretation of the requirements of directness
and causation under paragraph 16. See, e.g., Recommendations made
by the panel of Commissioners concerning individual claims for serious
personal injury or death (category “B” claims), report of 14 April 1994
(S/AC.26/1994/1), approved by the Governing Council in its decision
20 of 26 May 1994 (S/AC.26/Dec.20 (1994)); Report and recommendations
made by the panel of Commissioners appointed to review the
Well Blowout Control Claim (the “WBC claim”), of 15 November 1996
(S/AC.26/1996/5/Annex), paras. 66–86, approved by the Governing
State responsibility 93
but not a sufficient condition for reparation. There is a
further element, associated with the exclusion of injury
that is too “remote” or “consequential” to be the subject
of reparation. In some cases, the criterion of “directness”
may be used,462 in others “foreseeability”463 or “proximity”.
464 But other factors may also be relevant: for example,
whether State organs deliberately caused the harm in
question, or whether the harm caused was within the ambit
of the rule which was breached, having regard to the purpose
of that rule.465 In other words, the requirement of a
causal link is not necessarily the same in relation to every
breach of an international obligation. In international as
in national law, the question of remoteness of damage “is
not a part of the law which can be satisfactorily solved
by search for a single verbal formula”.466 The notion of a
sufficient causal link which is not too remote is embodied
in the general requirement in article 31 that the
injury should be in consequence of the wrongful act, but
without the addition of any particular qualifying phrase.
(11) A further element affecting the scope of reparation
is the question of mitigation of damage. Even the wholly
innocent victim of wrongful conduct is expected to act
reasonably when confronted by the injury. Although often
expressed in terms of a “duty to mitigate”, this is not a
legal obligation which itself gives rise to responsibility. It
is rather that a failure to mitigate by the injured party may
preclude recovery to that extent.467 The point was clearly
made in this sense by ICJ in the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros
Project case:
Slovakia also maintained that it was acting under a duty to mitigate
damages when it carried out Variant C. It stated that “It is a general
principle of international law that a party injured by the non-performance
of another contract party must seek to mitigate the damage he has
sustained”.
It would follow from such a principle that an injured State which has
failed to take the necessary measures to limit the damage sustained
would not be entitled to claim compensation for that damage which
could have been avoided. While this principle might thus provide a ba-
Council in its decision 40 of 17 December 1996 (S/AC.26/Dec.40
(1996)).
462 As in Security Council resolution 687 (1991), para. 16.
463 See, e.g., the “Naulilaa” case (footnote 337 above), p. 1031.
464 For comparative reviews of issues of causation and remoteness,
see, e.g., H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honoré, Causation in the Law, 2nd
ed. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985); A. M. Honoré, “Causation and
remoteness of damage”, International Encyclopedia of Comparative
Law, A. Tunc, ed. (Tübingen, Mohr/The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff,
1983), vol. XI, part I, chap. 7; Zweigert and Kötz, op. cit. (footnote 251
above), pp. 601–627, in particular pp. 609 et seq.; and B. S. Markesinis,
The German Law of Obligations: Volume II The Law of Torts: A
Comparative Introduction, 3rd ed. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997),
pp. 95–108, with many references to the literature.
465 See, e.g., the decision of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
in The Islamic Republic of Iran v. The United States of America, cases
A15 (IV) and A24, Award No. 590–A15 (IV)/A24–FT, 28 December
1998, World Trade and Arbitration Materials, vol. 11, No. 2 (1999),
p. 45.
466 P. S. Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract, 5th ed.
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 466.
467 In the WBC claim, a UNCC panel noted that “under the general
principles of international law relating to mitigation of damages
… the Claimant was not only permitted but indeed obligated to take
reasonable steps to … mitigate the loss, damage or injury being caused”
report of 15 November 1996 (S/AC.26/1996/5/Annex) (see footnote
461 above), para. 54.
sis for the calculation of damages, it could not, on the other hand, justify
an otherwise wrongful act.468
(12) Often two separate factors combine to cause damage.
In the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran case,469 the initial seizure of the hostages by militant
students (not at that time acting as organs or agents
of the State) was attributable to the combination of the
students’ own independent action and the failure of the
Iranian authorities to take necessary steps to protect the
embassy. In the Corfu Channel case,470 the damage to the
British ships was caused both by the action of a third State
in laying the mines and the action of Albania in failing to
warn of their presence. Although, in such cases, the injury
in question was effectively caused by a combination
of factors, only one of which is to be ascribed to the responsible
State, international practice and the decisions
of international tribunals do not support the reduction or
attenuation of reparation for concurrent causes,471 except
in cases of contributory fault.472 In the Corfu Channel
case, for example, the United Kingdom recovered the full
amount of its claim against Albania based on the latter’s
wrongful failure to warn of the mines even though Albania
had not itself laid the mines.473 Such a result should
follow a fortiori in cases where the concurrent cause is
not the act of another State (which might be held separately
responsible) but of private individuals, or some natural
event such as a flood. In the United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran case, the Islamic Republic
of Iran was held to be fully responsible for the detention
of the hostages from the moment of its failure to protect
them.474
(13) It is true that cases can occur where an identifiable
element of injury can properly be allocated to one of several
concurrently operating causes alone. But unless some
part of the injury can be shown to be severable in causal
terms from that attributed to the responsible State, the latter
is held responsible for all the consequences, not being
too remote, of its wrongful conduct. Indeed, in the Zafiro
claim the tribunal went further and in effect placed the
468 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), p. 55,
para. 80.
469 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (see footnote
59 above), pp. 29–32.
470 Corfu Channel, Merits (see footnote 35 above), pp. 17–18 and
22–23.
471 This approach is consistent with the way in which these issues are
generally dealt with in national law. “It is the very general rule that if
a tortfeasor’s behaviour is held to be a cause of the victim’s harm, the
tortfeasor is liable to pay for all of the harm so caused, notwithstanding
that there was a concurrent cause of that harm and that another is
responsible for that cause … In other words, the liability of a tortfeasor
is not affected vis-à-vis the victim by the consideration that another is
concurrently liable.”: T. Weir, “Complex liabilities”, A. Tunc, ed., op.
cit. (footnote 464 above), part 2, chap. 12, p. 43. The United States
relied on this comparative law experience in its pleadings in the Aerial
Incident of 27 July 1955 case when it said, referring to Article 38,
paragraph 1 (c) and (d), of the ICJ Statute, that “in all civilized countries
the rule is substantially the same. An aggrieved plaintiff may sue any or
all joint tortfeasors, jointly or severally, although he may collect from
them, or any one or more of them, only the full amount of his damage”
(Memorial of 2 December 1958 (see footnote 363 above), p. 229).
472 See article 39 and commentary.
473 See Corfu Channel, Assessment of Amount of Compensation,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 244, at p. 250.
474 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (see
footnote 59 above), pp. 31–33.
94 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
onus on the responsible State to show what proportion of
the damage was not attributable to its conduct. It said:
We think it clear that not all of the damage was done by the Chinese
crew of the Zafiro. The evidence indicates that an unascertainable part
was done by Filipino insurgents, and makes it likely that some part was
done by the Chinese employees of the company. But we do not consider
that the burden is on Great Britain to prove exactly what items of damage
are chargeable to the Zafiro. As the Chinese crew of the Zafiro are
shown to have participated to a substantial extent and the part chargeable
to unknown wrongdoers can not be identified, we are constrained
to hold the United States liable for the whole.
In view, however, of our finding that a considerable, though unascertainable,
part of the damage is not chargeable to the Chinese crew of the
Zafiro, we hold that interest on the claims should not be allowed.475
(14) Concerns are sometimes expressed that a general
principle of reparation of all loss flowing from a breach
might lead to reparation which is out of all proportion to
the gravity of the breach. However, the notion of “proportionality”
applies differently to the different forms of
reparation.476 It is addressed, as appropriate, in the individual
articles in chapter II dealing with the forms of
reparation.
Article 32. Irrelevance of internal law
The responsible State may not rely on the provisions
of its internal law as justification for failure to comply
with its obligations under this Part.
Commentary
(1) Article 3 concerns the role of internal law in the
characterization of an act as wrongful. Article 32 makes
clear the irrelevance of a State’s internal law to compliance
with the obligations of cessation and reparation. It
provides that a State which has committed an internationally
wrongful act may not invoke its internal law as
a justification for failure to comply with its obligations
under this part. Between them, articles 3 and 32 give effect
for the purposes of State responsibility to the general
principle that a State may not rely on its internal law as a
justification for its failure to comply with its international
obligations.477Although practical difficulties may arise
for a State organ confronted with an obstacle to compliance
posed by the rules of the internal legal system under
which it is bound to operate, the State is not entitled
to oppose its internal law or practice as a legal barrier to
the fulfilment of an international obligation arising under
Part Two.
(2) Article 32 is modelled on article 27 of the 1969
Vienna Convention, which provides that a party may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification
for its failure to perform a treaty. This general principle
is equally applicable to the international obligations
deriving from the rules of State responsibility set out in
Part Two. The principle may be qualified by the relevant
primary rule, or by a lex specialis, such as article 50 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, which provides
for just satisfaction in lieu of full reparation “if the inter-
475 The Zafiro case (see footnote 154 above), pp. 164–165.
476 See articles 35 (b), 37, paragraph 3, and 39 and commentaries.
477 See paragraphs (2) to (4) of the commentary to article 3.
nal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows
only partial reparation to be made”.478
(3) The principle that a responsible State may not rely
on the provisions of its internal law as justification for
failure to comply with its obligations arising out of the
commission of an internationally wrongful act is supported
both by State practice and international decisions.
For example, the dispute between Japan and the United
States in 1906 over California’s discriminatory education
policies was resolved by the revision of the Californian
legislation.479 In the incident concerning article 61, paragraph
2, of the Weimar Constitution (Constitution of
the Reich of 11 August 1919), a constitutional amendment
was provided for in order to ensure the discharge
of the obligation deriving from article 80 of the Treaty
of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and
Germany (Treaty of Versailles).480 In the Peter Pázmány
University case, PCIJ specified that the property to be
returned should be “freed from any measure of transfer,
compulsory administration, or sequestration”.481 In short,
international law does not recognize that the obligations
of a responsible State under Part Two are subject to the
State’s internal legal system nor does it allow internal law
to count as an excuse for non-performance of the obligations
of cessation and reparation.
Article 33. Scope of international obligations
set out in this Part
1. The obligations of the responsible State set out
in this Part may be owed to another State, to several
States, or to the international community as a whole,
depending in particular on the character and content
of the international obligation and on the circumstances
of the breach.
2. This Part is without prejudice to any right, arising
from the international responsibility of a State,
which may accrue directly to any person or entity
other than a State.
Commentary
(1) Article 33 concludes the provisions of chapter I of
Part Two by clarifying the scope and effect of the international
obligations covered by the Part. In particular, paragraph
1 makes it clear that identifying the State or States
towards which the responsible State’s obligations in Part
Two exist depends both on the primary rule establishing
478 Article 41 of the Convention, as amended by Protocol No. 11 to
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery established thereby.
Other examples include article 32 of the Revised General Act for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and article 30 of the European
Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.
479 See R. L. Buell, “The development of the anti-Japanese agitation
in the United States”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 37 (1922),
pp. 620 et seq.
480 See British and Foreign State Papers, 1919 (London, HM
Stationery Office, 1922), vol. 112, p. 1094.
481 Appeal from a Judgment of the Hungaro/Czechoslovak Mixed
Arbitral Tribunal (The Peter Pázmány University), Judgment, 1933,
P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 61, p. 208, at p. 249.
State responsibility 95
the obligation that was breached and on the circumstances
of the breach. For example, pollution of the sea, if it
is massive and widespread, may affect the international
community as a whole or the coastal States of a region;
in other circumstances it might only affect a single neighbouring
State. Evidently, the gravity of the breach may
also affect the scope of the obligations of cessation and
reparation.
(2) In accordance with paragraph 1, the responsible
State’s obligations in a given case may exist towards another
State, several States or the international community
as a whole. The reference to several States includes the
case in which a breach affects all the other parties to a
treaty or to a legal regime established under customary
international law. For instance, when an obligation can be
defined as an “integral” obligation, the breach by a State
necessarily affects all the other parties to the treaty.482
(3) When an obligation of reparation exists towards a
State, reparation does not necessarily accrue to that State’s
benefit. For instance, a State’s responsibility for the breach
of an obligation under a treaty concerning the protection of
human rights may exist towards all the other parties to the
treaty, but the individuals concerned should be regarded
as the ultimate beneficiaries and in that sense as the holders
of the relevant rights. Individual rights under international
law may also arise outside the framework of human
rights.483 The range of possibilities is demonstrated from
the ICJ judgment in the LaGrand case, where the Court
held that article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations “creates individual rights, which, by virtue of
Article I of the Optional Protocol, may be invoked in this
Court by the national State of the detained person”.484
(4) Such possibilities underlie the need for paragraph 2
of article 33. Part Two deals with the secondary obligations
of States in relation to cessation and reparation, and
those obligations may be owed, inter alia, to one or several
States or to the international community as a whole.
In cases where the primary obligation is owed to a non-
State entity, it may be that some procedure is available
whereby that entity can invoke the responsibility on its
own account and without the intermediation of any State.
This is true, for example, under human rights treaties
which provide a right of petition to a court or some other
body for individuals affected. It is also true in the case
of rights under bilateral or regional investment protection
agreements. Part Three is concerned with the invocation
of responsibility by other States, whether they are to be
considered “injured States” under article 42, or other interested
States under article 48, or whether they may be
exercising specific rights to invoke responsibility under
some special rule (art. 55). The articles do not deal with
the possibility of the invocation of responsibility by persons
or entities other than States, and paragraph 2 makes
this clear. It will be a matter for the particular primary rule
482 See further article 42 (b) (ii) and commentary.
483 Cf. Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig (footnote 82 above),
pp. 17–21.
484 LaGrand, Judgment (see footnote 119 above), para. 77. In the
circumstances the Court did not find it necessary to decide whether
the individual rights had “assumed the character of a human right”
(para. 78).
to determine whether and to what extent persons or entities
other than States are entitled to invoke responsibility
on their own account. Paragraph 2 merely recognizes the
possibility: hence the phrase “which may accrue directly
to any person or entity other than a State”.
CHAPTER II
REPARATION FOR INJURY
Commentary
Chapter II deals with the forms of reparation for injury,
spelling out in further detail the general principle stated
in article 31, and in particular seeking to establish more
clearly the relations between the different forms of reparation,
viz. restitution, compensation and satisfaction, as
well as the role of interest and the question of taking into
account any contribution to the injury which may have
been made by the victim.
Article 34. Forms of reparation
Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally
wrongful act shall take the form of restitution,
compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in
combination, in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter.
Commentary
(1) Article 34 introduces chapter II by setting out the
forms of reparation which separately or in combination
will discharge the obligation to make full reparation for
the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.
Since the notion of “injury” and the necessary causal link
between the wrongful act and the injury are defined in the
statement of the general obligation to make full reparation
in article 31,485 article 34 need do no more than refer to
“[f]ull reparation for the injury caused”.
(2) In the Factory at Chorzów case, the injury was a
material one and PCIJ dealt only with two forms of reparation,
restitution and compensation.486 In certain cases,
satisfaction may be called for as an additional form of
reparation. Thus, full reparation may take the form of
restitution, compensation and satisfaction, as required
by the circumstances. Article 34 also makes it clear that
full reparation may only be achieved in particular cases
by the combination of different forms of reparation. For
example, re-establishment of the situation which existed
before the breach may not be sufficient for full reparation
because the wrongful act has caused additional material
damage (e.g. injury flowing from the loss of the use of
property wrongfully seized). Wiping out all the consequences
of the wrongful act may thus require some or all
forms of reparation to be provided, depending on the type
and extent of the injury that has been caused.
485 See paragraphs (4) to (14) of the commentary to article 31.
486 Factory at Chorzów, Merits (see footnote 34 above), p. 47.
96 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
(3) The primary obligation breached may also play an
important role with respect to the form and extent of reparation.
In particular, in cases of restitution not involving
the return of persons, property or territory of the injured
State, the notion of reverting to the status quo ante has to
be applied having regard to the respective rights and competences
of the States concerned. This may be the case,
for example, where what is involved is a procedural obligation
conditioning the exercise of the substantive powers
of a State. Restitution in such cases should not give the
injured State more than it would have been entitled to if
the obligation had been performed.487
(4) The provision of each of the forms of reparation described
in article 34 is subject to the conditions laid down
in the articles which follow it in chapter II. This limitation
is indicated by the phrase “in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter”. It may also be affected by any
valid election that may be made by the injured State as
between different forms of reparation. For example, in
most circumstances the injured State is entitled to elect to
receive compensation rather than restitution. This element
of choice is reflected in article 43.
(5) Concerns have sometimes been expressed that the
principle of full reparation may lead to disproportionate
and even crippling requirements so far as the responsible
State is concerned. The issue is whether the principle
of proportionality should be articulated as an aspect of
the obligation to make full reparation. In these articles,
proportionality is addressed in the context of each form
of reparation, taking into account its specific character.
Thus, restitution is excluded if it would involve a burden
out of all proportion to the benefit gained by the injured
State or other party.488 Compensation is limited to damage
actually suffered as a result of the internationally
wrongful act, and excludes damage which is indirect or
remote.489 Satisfaction must “not be out of proportion to
the injury”.490 Thus, each of the forms of reparation takes
such considerations into account.
(6) The forms of reparation dealt with in chapter II represent
ways of giving effect to the underlying obligation
of reparation set out in article 31. There are not, as it were,
separate secondary obligations of restitution, compensation
and satisfaction. Some flexibility is shown in practice
in terms of the appropriateness of requiring one form of
reparation rather than another, subject to the requirement
of full reparation for the breach in accordance with article
31.491 To the extent that one form of reparation is dispensed
with or is unavailable in the circumstances, others,
487 Thus, in the judgment in the LaGrand case (see footnote 119
above), ICJ indicated that a breach of the notification requirement in
article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, leading to
a severe penalty or prolonged detention, would require reconsideration
of the fairness of the conviction “by taking account of the violation of
the rights set forth in the Convention” (p. 514, para. 125). This would
be a form of restitution which took into account the limited character
of the rights in issue.
488 See article 35 (b) and commentary.
489 See article 31 and commentary.
490 See article 37, paragraph 3, and commentary.
491 For example, the Mélanie Lachenal case (UNRIAA, vol. XIII
(Sales No. 64.V.3), p. 117, at pp. 130–131 (1954)), where compensation
was accepted in lieu of restitution originally decided upon, the
Franco-Italian Conciliation Commission having agreed that restitution
especially compensation, will be correspondingly more
important.
Article 35. Restitution
A State responsible for an internationally wrongful
act is under an obligation to make restitution, that
is, to re-establish the situation which existed before
the wrongful act was committed, provided and to the
extent that restitution:
(a) is not materially impossible;
(b) does not involve a burden out of all proportion
to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of
compensation.
Commentary
(1) In accordance with article 34, restitution is the first
of the forms of reparation available to a State injured by
an internationally wrongful act. Restitution involves the
re-establishment as far as possible of the situation which
existed prior to the commission of the internationally
wrongful act, to the extent that any changes that have occurred
in that situation may be traced to that act. In its
simplest form, this involves such conduct as the release
of persons wrongly detained or the return of property
wrongly seized. In other cases, restitution may be a more
complex act.
(2) The concept of restitution is not uniformly defined.
According to one definition, restitution consists in reestablishing
the status quo ante, i.e. the situation that existed
prior to the occurrence of the wrongful act. Under
another definition, restitution is the establishment or reestablishment
of the situation that would have existed if the
wrongful act had not been committed. The former definition
is the narrower one; it does not extend to the compensation
which may be due to the injured party for loss suffered,
for example for loss of the use of goods wrongfully
detained but subsequently returned. The latter definition
absorbs into the concept of restitution other elements of
full reparation and tends to conflate restitution as a form
of reparation and the underlying obligation of reparation
itself. Article 35 adopts the narrower definition which has
the advantage of focusing on the assessment of a factual
situation and of not requiring a hypothetical inquiry into
what the situation would have been if the wrongful act
had not been committed. Restitution in this narrow sense
may of course have to be completed by compensation in
order to ensure full reparation for the damage caused, as
article 36 makes clear.
(3) Nonetheless, because restitution most closely conforms
to the general principle that the responsible State is
bound to wipe out the legal and material consequences of
its wrongful act by re-establishing the situation that would
exist if that act had not been committed, it comes first
among the forms of reparation. The primacy of restitution
was confirmed by PCIJ in the Factory at Chorzów
would require difficult internal procedures. See also paragraph (4) of the
commentary to article 35.
State responsibility 97
case when it said that the responsible State was under “the
obligation to restore the undertaking and, if this be not
possible, to pay its value at the time of the indemnification,
which value is designed to take the place of restitution
which has become impossible”. The Court went on
to add that “[t]he impossibility, on which the Parties are
agreed, of restoring the Chorzów factory could therefore
have no other effect but that of substituting payment of
the value of the undertaking for restitution”.492 It can be
seen in operation in the cases where tribunals have considered
compensation only after concluding that, for one
reason or another, restitution could not be effected.493 Despite
the difficulties restitution may encounter in practice,
States have often insisted upon claiming it in preference
to compensation. Indeed, in certain cases, especially those
involving the application of peremptory norms, restitution
may be required as an aspect of compliance with the primary
obligation.
(4) On the other hand, there are often situations where
restitution is not available or where its value to the injured
State is so reduced that other forms of reparation take
priority. Questions of election as between different forms
of reparation are dealt with in the context of Part Three.494
But quite apart from valid election by the injured State or
other entity, the possibility of restitution may be practically
excluded, e.g. because the property in question has
been destroyed or fundamentally changed in character or
the situation cannot be restored to the status quo ante for
some reason. Indeed, in some cases tribunals have inferred
from the terms of the compromis or the positions of the
parties what amounts to a discretion to award compensation
rather than restitution. For example, in the Walter
Fletcher Smith case, the arbitrator, while maintaining that
restitution should be appropriate in principle, interpreted
the compromis as giving him a discretion to award compensation
and did so in “the best interests of the parties,
and of the public”.495 In the Aminoil arbitration, the parties
agreed that restoration of the status quo ante following
the annulment of the concession by the Kuwaiti decree
would be impracticable.496
(5) Restitution may take the form of material restoration
or return of territory, persons or property, or the reversal
of some juridical act, or some combination of them. Examples
of material restitution include the release of detained
individuals, the handing over to a State of an indi-
492 Factory at Chorzów, Merits (see footnote 34 above), p. 48.
493 See, e.g., British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco (footnote
44 above), pp. 621–625 and 651–742; Religious Property Expropriated
by Portugal, UNRIAA, vol. I (Sales No. 1948.V.2), p. 7 (1920);
Walter Fletcher Smith, ibid., vol. II (Sales No. 1949.V.1), p. 913, at
p. 918 (1929); and Heirs of Lebas de Courmont, ibid., vol. XIII (Sales
No. 64.V.3), p. 761, at p. 764 (1957).
494 See articles 43 and 45 and commentaries.
495 Walter Fletcher Smith (see footnote 493 above). In the Greek
Telephone Company case, the arbitral tribunal, while ordering restitution,
asserted that the responsible State could provide compensation
instead for “important State reasons” (see J. G. Wetter and
S. M. Schwebel, “Some little known cases on concessions”, BYBIL,
1964, vol. 40, p. 216, at p. 221.
496 Government of Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Company
(Aminoil) ILR, vol. 66, p. 519, at p. 533 (1982).
vidual arrested in its territory,497 the restitution of ships498
or other types of property,499 including documents, works
of art, share certificates, etc.500 The term “juridical restitution”
is sometimes used where restitution requires or
involves the modification of a legal situation either within
the legal system of the responsible State or in its legal
relations with the injured State. Such cases include the
revocation, annulment or amendment of a constitutional
or legislative provision enacted in violation of a rule of
international law,501 the rescinding or reconsideration of
an administrative or judicial measure unlawfully adopted
in respect of the person or property of a foreigner502 or
a requirement that steps be taken (to the extent allowed
by international law) for the termination of a treaty.503 In
some cases, both material and juridical restitution may be
involved.504 In others, an international court or tribunal
can, by determining the legal position with binding force
for the parties, award what amounts to restitution under
another form.505 The term “restitution” in article 35 thus
497 Examples of material restitution involving persons include the
“Trent” (1861) and “Florida” (1864) incidents, both involving the arrest
of individuals on board ships (Moore, Digest, vol. VII, pp. 768 and
1090–1091), and the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran case in which ICJ ordered Iran to immediately release every
detained United States national (see footnote 59 above), pp. 44–45.
498 See, e.g., the “Giaffarieh” incident (1886) which originated
in the capture in the Red Sea by an Egyptian warship of four
merchant ships from Massawa under Italian registry, Società Italiana per
l’Organizzazione Internazionale–Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche,
La prassi italiana di diritto internazionale, 1st series (Dobbs Ferry,
NY., Oceana, 1970), vol. II, pp. 901–902.
499 For example, Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1962, p. 6, at pp. 36–37, where ICJ decided in favour of a
Cambodian claim which included restitution of certain objects removed
from the area and the temple by Thai authorities. See also the Hôtel
Métropole case, UNRIAA, vol. XIII (Sales No. 64.V.3), p. 219 (1950);
the Ottoz case, ibid., p. 240 (1950); and the Hénon case, ibid., p. 248
(1951).
500 In the Bužau-Nehoias , i Railway case, an arbitral tribunal provided
for the restitution to a German company of shares in a Romanian railway
company, UNRIAA, vol. III (Sales No. 1949.V.2), p. 1839 (1939).
501 For cases where the existence of a law itself amounts to a breach
of an international obligation, see paragraph (12) of the commentary
to article 12.
502 For example, the Martini case, UNRIAA, vol. II (Sales No. 1949.
V.1), p. 975 (1930).
503 In the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty case (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua),
the Central American Court of Justice decided that “the Government of
Nicaragua, by availing itself of measures possible under the authority
of international law, is under the obligation to re-establish and maintain
the legal status that existed prior to the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty between
the litigant republics in so far as relates to matters considered in
this action” (Anales de la Corte de Justicia Centroamericana (San José,
Costa Rica), vol. VI, Nos. 16–18 (December 1916–May 1917), p. 7);
and AJIL, vol. 11, No. 3 (1917), p. 674, at p. 696; see also page 683.
504 Thus, PCIJ held that Czechoslovakia was “bound to restore to the
Royal Hungarian Peter Pázmány University of Budapest the immovable
property claimed by it, freed from any measure of transfer, compulsory
administration, or sequestration, and in the condition in which it
was before the application of the measures in question” (Appeal from
a judgment of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak Mixed Arbitral Tribunal
(see footnote 481 above)).
505 In the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case, PCIJ decided that
“the declaration of occupation promulgated by the Norwegian Government
on July 10th, 1931, and any steps taken in this respect by that
Government, constitute a violation of the existing legal situation and
are accordingly unlawful and invalid” (Judgment, 1933, P.C.I.J., Series
A/B, No. 53, p. 22, at p. 75). In the case of the Free Zones of Upper
Savoy and the District of Gex (see footnote 79 above), the Court decided
that France “must withdraw its customs line in accordance with
(Continued on next page.)
98 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
has a broad meaning, encompassing any action that needs
to be taken by the responsible State to restore the situation
resulting from its internationally wrongful act.
(6) What may be required in terms of restitution will often
depend on the content of the primary obligation which
has been breached. Restitution, as the first of the forms of
reparation, is of particular importance where the obligation
breached is of a continuing character, and even more
so where it arises under a peremptory norm of general
international law. In the case, for example, of unlawful
annexation of a State, the withdrawal of the occupying
State’s forces and the annulment of any decree of annexation
may be seen as involving cessation rather than restitution.
506 Even so, ancillary measures (the return of persons
or property seized in the course of the invasion) will be
required as an aspect either of cessation or restitution.
(7) The obligation to make restitution is not unlimited.
In particular, under article 35 restitution is required “provided
and to the extent that” it is neither materially impossible
nor wholly disproportionate. The phrase “provided
and to the extent that” makes it clear that restitution may
be only partially excluded, in which case the responsible
State will be obliged to make restitution to the extent that
this is neither impossible nor disproportionate.
(8) Under article 35, subparagraph (a), restitution is not
required if it is “materially impossible”. This would apply
where property to be restored has been permanently lost
or destroyed, or has deteriorated to such an extent as to be
valueless. On the other hand, restitution is not impossible
merely on grounds of legal or practical difficulties, even
though the responsible State may have to make special efforts
to overcome these. Under article 32 the wrongdoing
State may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for the failure to provide full reparation, and
the mere fact of political or administrative obstacles to
restitution does not amount to impossibility.
(9) Material impossibility is not limited to cases where
the object in question has been destroyed, but can cover
more complex situations. In the Forests of Central Rhodopia
case, the claimant was entitled to only a share in the
forestry operations and no claims had been brought by the
other participants. The forests were not in the same condition
as at the time of their wrongful taking, and detailed
inquiries would be necessary to determine their condition.
Since the taking, third parties had acquired rights to
them. For a combination of these reasons, restitution was
denied.507 The case supports a broad understanding of
the impossibility of granting restitution, but it concerned
questions of property rights within the legal system of the
responsible State.508 The position may be different where
(Footnote 505 continued.)
the provisions of the said treaties and instruments; and that this régime
must continue in force so long as it has not been modified by agreement
between the Parties” (p. 172). See also F. A. Mann, “The consequences
of an international wrong in international and municipal law”, BYBIL,
1976–1977, vol. 48, p. 1, at pp. 5–8.
506 See above, paragraph (8) of the commentary to article 30.
507 Forests of Central Rhodopia (see footnote 382 above), p. 1432.
508 For questions of restitution in the context of State contract arbitration,
see Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic
Oil Company v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (1977),
the rights and obligations in issue arise directly on the international
plane. In that context restitution plays a particularly
important role.
(10) In certain cases, the position of third parties may
have to be taken into account in considering whether restitution
is materially possible. This was true in the Forests
of Central Rhodopia case. But whether the position of a
third party will preclude restitution will depend on the circumstances,
including whether the third party at the time
of entering into the transaction or assuming the disputed
rights was acting in good faith and without notice of the
claim to restitution.
(11) A second exception, dealt with in article 35, subparagraph
(b), involves those cases where the benefit to
be gained from restitution is wholly disproportionate to its
cost to the responsible State. Specifically, restitution may
not be required if it would “involve a burden out of all
proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead
of compensation”. This applies only where there is a grave
disproportionality between the burden which restitution
would impose on the responsible State and the benefit
which would be gained, either by the injured State or by
any victim of the breach. It is thus based on considerations
of equity and reasonableness,509 although with a preference
for the position of the injured State in any case where
the balancing process does not indicate a clear preference
for compensation as compared with restitution. The balance
will invariably favour the injured State in any case
where the failure to provide restitution would jeopardize
its political independence or economic stability.
Article 36. Compensation
1. The State responsible for an internationally
wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for
the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is
not made good by restitution.
2. The compensation shall cover any financially
assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as
it is established.
Commentary
(1) Article 36 deals with compensation for damage
caused by an internationally wrongful act, to the extent
that such damage is not made good by restitution. The
notion of “damage” is defined inclusively in article 31,
paragraph 2, as any damage whether material or moral.
510 Article 36, paragraph 2, develops this definition by
specifying that compensation shall cover any financially
ILR, vol. 53, p. 389, at pp. 507–508, para. 109; BP Exploration Company
(Libya) Limited v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, ibid.,
p. 297, at p. 354 (1974); and Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO)
v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic ibid., vol. 62, p. 141, at
p. 200 (1977).
509 See, e.g., J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective
(Leiden, Sijthoff, 1973), part VI, p. 744, and the position taken
by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht (German International
Law Association) in Yearbook ... 1969, vol. II, p. 149.
510 See paragraphs (5) to (6) and (8) of the commentary to
article 31.
State responsibility 99
assessable damage including loss of profits so far as this
is established in the given case. The qualification “financially
assessable” is intended to exclude compensation
for what is sometimes referred to as “moral damage” to
a State, i.e. the affront or injury caused by a violation of
rights not associated with actual damage to property or
persons: this is the subject matter of satisfaction, dealt
with in article 37.
(2) Of the various forms of reparation, compensation is
perhaps the most commonly sought in international practice.
In the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, ICJ declared:
“It is a well-established rule of international law
that an injured State is entitled to obtain compensation
from the State which has committed an internationally
wrongful act for the damage caused by it.”511 It is equally
well established that an international court or tribunal
which has jurisdiction with respect to a claim of State
responsibility has, as an aspect of that jurisdiction, the
power to award compensation for damage suffered.512
(3) The relationship with restitution is clarified by the
final phrase of article 36, paragraph 1 (“insofar as such
damage is not made good by restitution”). Restitution, despite
its primacy as a matter of legal principle, is frequently
unavailable or inadequate. It may be partially or entirely
ruled out either on the basis of the exceptions expressed in
article 35, or because the injured State prefers compensation
or for other reasons. Even where restitution is made,
it may be insufficient to ensure full reparation. The role
of compensation is to fill in any gaps so as to ensure full
reparation for damage suffered.513 As the Umpire said in
the “Lusitania” case:
The fundamental concept of “damages” is ... reparation for a loss suffered;
a judicially ascertained compensation for wrong. The remedy
should be commensurate with the loss, so that the injured party may be
made whole.514
Likewise, the role of compensation was articulated by
PCIJ in the following terms:
Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding
to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award,
if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered
by restitution in kind or payment in place of it—such are the principles
which should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for
an act contrary to international law.515
511 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), p. 81,
para. 152. See also the statement by PCIJ in Factory at Chorzów, Merits
(footnote 34 above), declaring that “[i]t is a principle of international
law that the reparation of a wrong may consist in an indemnity”
(p. 27).
512 Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction (see footnote 34 above); Fisheries
Jurisdiction (see footnote 432 above), pp. 203–205, paras. 71–76;
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(see footnote 36 above), p. 142.
513 Factory at Chorzów, Merits (see footnote 34 above), pp. 47–48.
514 UNRIAA, vol. VII (Sales No. 1956.V.5), p. 32, at p. 39 (1923).
515 Factory at Chorzów, Merits (see footnote 34 above), p. 47,
cited and applied, inter alia, by ITLOS in the case of the M/V “Saiga”
(No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Judgment,
ITLOS Reports 1999 , p. 65, para. 170 (1999). See also Papamichalopoulos
and Others v. Greece (article 50), Eur. Court H.R., Series A,
No. 330–B, para. 36 (1995); Velásquez Rodríguez (footnote 63 above),
pp. 26–27 and 30–31; and Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMSAFFA
Consulting Engineers of Iran, Iran-U.S. C.T.R., vol. 6, p. 219, at
p. 225 (1984).
Entitlement to compensation for such losses is supported
by extensive case law, State practice and the writings of
jurists.
(4) As compared with satisfaction, the function of compensation
is to address the actual losses incurred as a result
of the internationally wrongful act. In other words,
the function of article 36 is purely compensatory, as its
title indicates. Compensation corresponds to the financially
assessable damage suffered by the injured State or
its nationals. It is not concerned to punish the responsible
State, nor does compensation have an expressive or exemplary
character.516 Thus, compensation generally consists
of a monetary payment, though it may sometimes take the
form, as agreed, of other forms of value. It is true that
monetary payments may be called for by way of satisfaction
under article 37, but they perform a function distinct
from that of compensation. Monetary compensation is intended
to offset, as far as may be, the damage suffered by
the injured State as a result of the breach. Satisfaction is
concerned with non-material injury, specifically non-material
injury to the State, on which a monetary value can
be put only in a highly approximate and notional way.517
(5) Consistently with other provisions of Part Two, article
36 is expressed as an obligation of the responsible
State to provide reparation for the consequences flowing
from the commission of an internationally wrongful act.518
The scope of this obligation is delimited by the phrase
“any financially assessable damage”, that is, any damage
which is capable of being evaluated in financial terms.
Financially assessable damage encompasses both damage
suffered by the State itself (to its property or personnel
or in respect of expenditures reasonably incurred to remedy
or mitigate damage flowing from an internationally
wrongful act) as well as damage suffered by nationals,
whether persons or companies, on whose behalf the State
is claiming within the framework of diplomatic protection.
(6) In addition to ICJ, international tribunals dealing
with issues of compensation include the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,519 the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal,520 human rights courts and other
516 In the Velásquez Rodriguez, Compensatory Damages case, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that international law did
not recognize the concept of punitive or exemplary damages (Series
C, No. 7 (1989)). See also Letelier and Moffitt, ILR, vol. 88, p. 727
(1992), concerning the assassination in Washington, D.C., by Chilean
agents of a former Chilean minister; the compromis excluded any award
of punitive damages, despite their availability under United States law.
On punitive damages, see also N. Jørgensen, “A reappraisal of punitive
damages in international law”, BYBIL, 1997, vol. 68, pp. 247–266;
and S. Wittich, “Awe of the gods and fear of the priests: punitive damages
in the law of State responsibility”, Austrian Review of International
and European Law, vol. 3, No. 1 (1998), p. 101.
517 See paragraph (3) of the commentary to article 37.
518 For the requirement of a sufficient causal link between the internationally
wrongful act and the damage, see paragraphs (11) to (13) of
the commentary to article 31.
519 For example, the M/V “Saiga” case (see footnote 515 above),
paras. 170–177.
520 The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal has developed a substantial
jurisprudence on questions of assessment of damage and the
valuation of expropriated property. For reviews of the tribunal’s juris-
(Continued on next page.)
100 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
bodies,521 and ICSID tribunals under the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of other States.522 Other compensation claims
have been settled by agreement, normally on a without
prejudice basis, with the payment of substantial compensation
a term of the agreement.523 The rules and principles
developed by these bodies in assessing compensation can
be seen as manifestations of the general principle stated
in article 36.
(7) As to the appropriate heads of compensable damage
and the principles of assessment to be applied in quantification,
these will vary, depending upon the content of particular
primary obligations, an evaluation of the respective
behaviour of the parties and, more generally, a concern to
reach an equitable and acceptable outcome.524 The following
examples illustrate the types of damage that may
be compensable and the methods of quantification that
may be employed.
(8) Damage to the State as such might arise out of the
shooting down of its aircraft or the sinking of its ships,
attacks on its diplomatic premises and personnel, damage
caused to other public property, the costs incurred in
responding to pollution damage, or incidental damage
arising, for example, out of the need to pay pensions and
medical expenses for officials injured as the result of a
wrongful act. Such a list cannot be comprehensive and
the categories of compensable injuries suffered by States
are not closed.
(9) In the Corfu Channel case, the United Kingdom
sought compensation in respect of three heads of damage:
replacement of the destroyer Saumarez, which be-
(Footnote 520 continued.)
prudence on these subjects, see, inter alia, Aldrich, op. cit. (footnote
357 above), chaps. 5–6 and 12; C. N. Brower and J. D. Brueschke, The
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff,
1998), chaps. 14–18; M. Pellonpää, “Compensable claims before the
Tribunal: expropriation claims”, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal:
Its Contribution to the Law of State Responsibility, R. B. Lillich
and D. B. MaGraw, eds. (Irvington-on-Hudson, Transnational, 1998),
pp. 185–266; and D. P. Stewart, “Compensation and valuation issues”,
ibid., pp. 325–385.
521 For a review of the practice of such bodies in awarding compensation,
see D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law
(Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 214–279.
522 ICSID tribunals have jurisdiction to award damages or other remedies
in cases concerning investments arising between States parties and
nationals. Some of these claims involve direct recourse to international
law as a basis of claim. See, e.g., Asian Agricultural Products Limited
v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Reports (Cambridge University Press,
1997), vol. 4, p. 245 (1990).
523 See, e.g., Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Preliminary Objections
(footnote 230 above), and for the Court’s order of discontinuance
following the settlement, ibid., Order (footnote 232 above); Passage
through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 10 September
1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 348 (order of discontinuance following
settlement); and Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of
Iran v. United States of America), Order of 22 February 1996, I.C.J.
Reports 1996, p. 9 (order of discontinuance following settlement).
524 See Aldrich, op. cit. (footnote 357 above), p. 242. See also
Graefrath, “Responsibility and damages caused: relationship between
responsibility and damages” (footnote 454 above), p. 101;
L. Reitzer, La réparation comme conséquence de l’acte illicite en droit
international (Paris, Sirey, 1938); Gray, op. cit. (footnote 432 above),
pp. 33–34; J. Personnaz, La réparation du préjudice en droit international
public (Paris, 1939); and M. Iovane, La riparazione nella teoria
e nella prassi dell’illecito internazionale (Milan, Giuffrè, 1990).
came a total loss, the damage sustained by the destroyer
“Volage”, and the damage resulting from the deaths and
injuries of naval personnel. ICJ entrusted the assessment
to expert inquiry. In respect of the destroyer Saumarez, the
Court found that “the true measure of compensation” was
“the replacement cost of the [destroyer] at the time of its
loss” and held that the amount of compensation claimed
by the British Government (£ 700,087) was justified.
For the damage to the destroyer “Volage”, the experts had
reached a slightly lower figure than the £ 93,812 claimed
by the United Kingdom, “explained by the necessarily approximate
nature of the valuation, especially as regards
stores and equipment”. In addition to the amounts awarded
for the damage to the two destroyers, the Court upheld the
United Kingdom’s claim for £ 50,048 representing “the
cost of pensions and other grants made by it to victims or
their dependants, and for costs of administration, medical
treatment, etc”.525
(10) In the M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) case, Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines sought compensation from Guinea following
the wrongful arrest and detention of a vessel registered
in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the “Saiga”, and its
crew. ITLOS awarded compensation of US$ 2,123,357
with interest. The heads of damage compensated included,
inter alia, damage to the vessel, including costs
of repair, losses suffered with respect to charter hire of
the vessel, costs related to the detention of the vessel, and
damages for the detention of the captain, members of the
crew and others on board the vessel. Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines had claimed compensation for the violation
of its rights in respect of ships flying its flag occasioned
by the arrest and detention of the “Saiga”; however, the
tribunal considered that its declaration that Guinea acted
wrongfully in arresting the vessel in the circumstances,
and in using excessive force, constituted adequate reparation.
526 Claims regarding the loss of registration revenue
due to the illegal arrest of the vessel and for the expenses
resulting from the time lost by officials in dealing with
the arrest and detention of the ship and its crew were also
unsuccessful. In respect of the former, the tribunal held
that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines failed to produce
supporting evidence. In respect of the latter, the tribunal
considered that such expenses were not recoverable since
they were incurred in the exercise of the normal functions
of a flag State.527
(11) In a number of cases, payments have been directly
negotiated between injured and injuring States following
wrongful attacks on ships causing damage or sinking
of the vessel, and in some cases, loss of life and injury
among the crew.528 Similar payments have been negotiated
where damage is caused to aircraft of a State, such as
525 Corfu Channel, Assessment of Amount of Compensation (see
footnote 473 above), p. 249.
526 The M/V “Saiga” case (see footnote 515 above), para. 176.
527 Ibid., para. 177.
528 See the payment by Cuba to the Bahamas for the sinking by Cuban
aircraft on the high seas of a Bahamian vessel, with loss of life
among the crew (RGDIP, vol. 85 (1981), p. 540), the payment of compensation
by Israel for an attack in 1967 on the USS Liberty, with loss
of life and injury among the crew (ibid., p. 562), and the payment by
Iraq of US$ 27 million for the 37 deaths which occurred in May 1987
when Iraqi aircraft severely damaged the USS Stark (AJIL, vol. 83,
No. 3 (July 1989), p. 561).
State responsibility 101
the “full and final settlement” agreed between the Islamic
Republic of Iran and the United States following a dispute
over the destruction of an Iranian aircraft and the killing
of its 290 passengers and crew.529
(12) Agreements for the payment of compensation are
also frequently negotiated by States following attacks on
diplomatic premises, whether in relation to damage to
the embassy itself530 or injury to its personnel.531 Damage
caused to other public property, such as roads and infrastructure,
has also been the subject of compensation
claims.532 In many cases, these payments have been made
on an ex gratia or a without prejudice basis, without any
admission of responsibility.533
(13) Another situation in which States may seek compensation
for damage suffered by the State as such is
where costs are incurred in responding to pollution damage.
Following the crash of the Soviet Cosmos 954 satellite
on Canadian territory in January 1978, Canada’s claim for
compensation for expenses incurred in locating, recovering,
removing and testing radioactive debris and cleaning
up affected areas was based “jointly and separately on (a)
the relevant international agreements … and (b) general
principles of international law”.534 Canada asserted that
it was applying “the relevant criteria established by general
principles of international law according to which fair
compensation is to be paid, by including in its claim only
those costs that are reasonable, proximately caused by the
intrusion of the satellite and deposit of debris and capable
of being calculated with a reasonable degree of certainty”.
535 The claim was eventually settled in April 1981
when the parties agreed on an ex gratia payment of Can$
3 million (about 50 per cent of the amount claimed).536
529 Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (see footnote 523 above) (order
of discontinuance following settlement). For the settlement agreement
itself, see the General Agreement on the Settlement of Certain International
Court of Justice and Tribunal Cases (1996), attached to the Joint
Request for Arbitral Award on Agreed Terms, Iran-U.S. C.T.R., vol. 32,
pp. 213–216 (1996).
530 See, e.g., the Exchange of Notes between the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government
of the Republic of Indonesia concerning the losses incurred by the
Government of the United Kingdom and by British nationals as a result
of the disturbances in Indonesia in September 1963 (1 December 1966)
for the payment by Indonesia of compensation for, inter alia, damage to
the British Embassy during mob violence (Treaty Series No. 34 (1967))
(London, HM Stationery Office) and the payment by Pakistan to the
United States of compensation for the sacking of the United States
Embassy in Islamabad in 1979 (RGDIP, vol. 85 (1981), p. 880).
531 See, e.g., Claim of Consul Henry R. Myers (United States v. Salvador)
(1890), Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, pp. 64–65; (1892), pp. 24–44 and 49–51; (1893), pp. 174–179,
181–182 and 184; and Whiteman, Damages in International Law (footnote
347 above), pp. 80–81.
532 For examples, see Whiteman, Damages in International Law
(footnote 347 above), p. 81.
533 See, e.g., the United States-China agreement providing for an ex
gratia payment of US$ 4.5 million, to be given to the families of those
killed and to those injured in the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade on 7 May 1999, AJIL, vol. 94, No. 1 (January 2000), p. 127.
534 The claim of Canada against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
for damage caused by Cosmos 954, 23 January 1979 (see footnote
459 above), pp. 899 and 905.
535 Ibid., p. 907.
536 Protocol between Canada and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
in respect of the claim for damages caused by the Satellite
“Cosmos 954” (Moscow, 2 April 1981), United Nations, Treaty Series,
(14) Compensation claims for pollution costs have been
dealt with by UNCC in the context of assessing Iraq’s liability
under international law “for any direct loss, damage—
including environmental damage and the depletion
of natural resources … as a result of its unlawful invasion
and occupation of Kuwait”.537 The UNCC Governing
Council decision 7 specifies various heads of damage encompassed
by “environmental damage and the depletion
of natural resources”.538
(15) In cases where compensation has been awarded
or agreed following an internationally wrongful act that
causes or threatens environmental damage, payments
have been directed to reimbursing the injured State for
expenses reasonably incurred in preventing or remedying
pollution, or to providing compensation for a reduction in
the value of polluted property.539 However, environmental
damage will often extend beyond that which can be
readily quantified in terms of clean-up costs or property
devaluation. Damage to such environmental values (biodiversity,
amenity, etc.—sometimes referred to as “nonuse
values”) is, as a matter of principle, no less real and
compensable than damage to property, though it may be
difficult to quantify.
(16) Within the field of diplomatic protection, a good
deal of guidance is available as to appropriate compensation
standards and methods of valuation, especially as
concerns personal injury and takings of, or damage to,
tangible property. It is well established that a State may
seek compensation in respect of personal injuries suffered
by its officials or nationals, over and above any direct
injury it may itself have suffered in relation to the
same event. Compensable personal injury encompasses
not only associated material losses, such as loss of earnings
and earning capacity, medical expenses and the like,
but also non-material damage suffered by the individual
(sometimes, though not universally, referred to as “moral
damage” in national legal systems). Non-material damage
is generally understood to encompass loss of loved ones,
pain and suffering as well as the affront to sensibilities associated
with an intrusion on the person, home or private
life. No less than material injury sustained by the injured
State, non-material damage is financially assessable and
may be the subject of a claim of compensation, as stressed
in the “Lusitania” case.540 The umpire considered that
international law provides compensation for mental
vol. 1470, No. 24934, p. 269. See also ILM, vol. 20, No. 3 (May 1981),
p. 689.
537 Security Council resolution 687 (1991), para. 16 (see footnote
461 above).
538 Decision 7 of 16 March 1992, Criteria for additional categories of
claims (S/AC.26/1991/7/Rev.1), para 35.
539 See the decision of the arbitral tribunal in the Trail Smelter case
(footnote 253 above), p. 1911, which provided compensation to the
United States for damage to land and property caused by sulphur dioxide
emissions from a smelter across the border in Canada. Compensation
was assessed on the basis of the reduction in value of the affected
land.
540 See footnote 514 above. International tribunals have frequently
granted pecuniary compensation for moral injury to private parties.
For example, the Chevreau case (see footnote 133 above) (English
translation in AJIL, vol. 27, No. 1 (January 1933), p. 153); the Gage
case, UNRIAA, vol. IX (Sales No. 59.V.5), p. 226 (1903); the Di Caro
case, ibid., vol. X (Sales No. 60.V.4), p. 597 (1903); and the Heirs of
Jean Maninat case, ibid., p. 55 (1903).
102 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
suffering, injury to feelings, humiliation, shame, degradation,
loss of social position or injury to credit and reputation,
such injuries being “very real, and the mere fact that
they are difficult to measure or estimate by money standards
makes them none the less real and affords no reason
why the injured person should not be compensated …”.541
(17) International courts and tribunals have undertaken
the assessment of compensation for personal injury on
numerous occasions. For example, in the M/V “Saiga”
case, 542 the tribunal held that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines’
entitlement to compensation included damages
for injury to the crew, their unlawful arrest, detention and
other forms of ill-treatment.
(18) Historically, compensation for personal injury suffered
by nationals or officials of a State arose mainly in
the context of mixed claims commissions dealing with
State responsibility for injury to aliens. Claims commissions
awarded compensation for personal injury both in
cases of wrongful death and deprivation of liberty. Where
claims were made in respect of wrongful death, damages
were generally based on an evaluation of the losses of the
surviving heirs or successors, calculated in accordance
with the well-known formula of Umpire Parker in the
“Lusitania” case:
Estimate the amounts (a) which the decedent, had he not been killed,
would probably have contributed to the claimant, add thereto (b) the
pecuniary value to such claimant of the deceased’s personal services
in claimant’s care, education, or supervision, and also add (c) reasonable
compensation for such mental suffering or shock, if any, caused
by the violent severing of family ties, as claimant may actually have
sustained by reason of such death. The sum of these estimates reduced
to its present cash value, will generally represent the loss sustained by
claimant.543
In cases of deprivation of liberty, arbitrators sometimes
awarded a set amount for each day spent in detention.544
Awards were often increased when abusive conditions of
confinement accompanied the wrongful arrest and imprisonment,
resulting in particularly serious physical or
psychological injury.545
(19) Compensation for personal injury has also been
dealt with by human rights bodies, in particular the European
Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. Awards of compensation encompass
material losses (loss of earnings, pensions, medical
expenses, etc.) and non-material damage (pain and suffering,
mental anguish, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of
life and loss of companionship or consortium), the latter
usually quantified on the basis of an equitable assessment.
Hitherto, amounts of compensation or damages
awarded or recommended by these bodies have been modest.
546 Nonetheless, the decisions of human rights bodies
541 “Lusitania” (see footnote 514 above), p. 40.
542 See footnote 515 above.
543 “Lusitania” (see footnote 514 above), p. 35.
544 For example, the “Topaze” case, UNRIAA, vol. IX (Sales
No. 59.V.5), p. 387, at p. 389 (1903); and the Faulkner case, ibid.,
vol. IV (Sales No. 1951.V.1), p. 67, at p. 71 (1926).
545 For example, the William McNeil case, ibid., vol. V (Sales
No. 1952.V.3), p. 164, at p. 168 (1931).
546 See the review by Shelton, op. cit. (footnote 521 above),
chaps. 8–9; A. Randelzhofer and C. Tomuschat, eds., State Responsibility
and the Individual: Reparation in Instances of Grave Violations
on compensation draw on principles of reparation under
general international law.547
(20) In addition to a large number of lump-sum compensation
agreements covering multiple claims,548 property
claims of nationals arising out of an internationally
wrongful act have been adjudicated by a wide range of ad
hoc and standing tribunals and commissions, with reported
cases spanning two centuries. Given the diversity of
adjudicating bodies, the awards exhibit considerable variability.
549 Nevertheless, they provide useful principles to
guide the determination of compensation under this head
of damage.
(21) The reference point for valuation purposes is the
loss suffered by the claimant whose property rights have
been infringed. This loss is usually assessed by reference
to specific heads of damage relating to (i) compensation
for capital value; (ii) compensation for loss of profits; and
(iii) incidental expenses.
(22) Compensation reflecting the capital value of property
taken or destroyed as the result of an internationally
wrongful act is generally assessed on the basis of the “fair
market value” of the property lost.550 The method used to
of Human Rights (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1999); and R. Pisillo
Mazzeschi, “La riparazione per violazione dei diritti umani nel diritto
internazionale e nella Convenzione europea”, La Comunità internazionale,
vol. 53, No. 2 (1998), p. 215.
547 See, e.g., the decision of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in the Velásquez Rodríguez case (footnote 63 above), pp. 26–27
and 30–31. Cf. Papamichalopoulos (footnote 515 above).
548 See, e.g., R. B. Lillich and B. H. Weston, International Claims:
Their Settlement by Lump Sum Agreements (Charlottesville, University
Press of Virginia, 1975); and B. H. Weston, R. B. Lillich and D. J.
Bederman, International Claims: Their Settlement by Lump Sum Agreements,
1975–1995 (Ardsley, N.Y., Transnational, 1999).
549 Controversy has persisted in relation to expropriation cases,
particularly over standards of compensation applicable in the light of
the distinction between lawful expropriation of property by the State
on the one hand, and unlawful takings on the other, a distinction clearly
drawn by PCIJ in Factory at Chorzów, Merits (footnote 34 above), p. 47.
In a number of cases, tribunals have employed the distinction to rule in
favour of compensation for lost profits in cases of unlawful takings (see,
e.g., the observations of the arbitrator in Libyan American Oil Company
(LIAMCO) (footnote 508 above), pp. 202–203; and also the Aminoil
arbitration (footnote 496 above), p. 600, para. 138; and Amoco International
Finance Corporation v. The Government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, Iran-U.S. C.T.R., vol. 15, p. 189, at p. 246, para. 192 (1987)).
Not all cases, however, have drawn a distinction between the applicable
compensation principles based on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the
taking. See, e.g., the decision of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
in Phillips Petroleum (footnote 164 above), p. 122, para. 110. See also
Starrett Housing Corporation v. Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Iran-U.S. C.T.R., vol. 16, p. 112 (1987), where the tribunal made
no distinction in terms of the lawfulness of the taking and its award
included compensation for lost profits.
550 See American International Group, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic
of Iran, which stated that, under general international law, “the valuation
should be made on the basis of the fair market value of the shares”, Iran-
U.S. C.T.R., vol. 4, p. 96, at p. 106 (1983). In Starrett Housing Corporation
(see footnote 549 above), the tribunal accepted its expert’s concept
of fair market value “as the price that a willing buyer would pay to a
willing seller in circumstances in which each had good information,
each desired to maximize his financial gain, and neither was under
duress or threat” (p. 201). See also the Guidelines on the Treatment
of Foreign Direct Investment, which state in paragraph 3 of part IV
that compensation “will be deemed ‘adequate’ if it is based on the fair
market value of the taken asset as such value is determined immediately
before the time at which the taking occurred or the decision to
take the asset became publicly known”, World Bank, Legal Framework
State responsibility 103
assess “fair market value”, however, depends on the nature
of the asset concerned. Where the property in question or
comparable property is freely traded on an open market,
value is more readily determined. In such cases, the choice
and application of asset-based valuation methods based
on market data and the physical properties of the assets is
relatively unproblematic, apart from evidentiary difficulties
associated with long outstanding claims.551 Where the
property interests in question are unique or unusual, for
example, art works or other cultural property,552 or are
not the subject of frequent or recent market transactions,
the determination of value is more difficult. This may be
true, for example, in respect of certain business entities in
the nature of a going concern, especially if shares are not
regularly traded.553
(23) Decisions of various ad hoc tribunals since 1945
have been dominated by claims in respect of nationalized
business entities. The preferred approach in these cases
has been to examine the assets of the business, making
allowance for goodwill and profitability, as appropriate.
This method has the advantage of grounding compensation
as much as possible in some objective assessment of
value linked to the tangible asset backing of the business.
The value of goodwill and other indicators of profitability
may be uncertain, unless derived from information provided
by a recent sale or acceptable arms-length offer. Yet,
for profitable business entities where the whole is greater
than the sum of the parts, compensation would be incomplete
without paying due regard to such factors.554
for the Treatment of Foreign Investment (Washington, D.C., 1992),
vol. II, p. 41. Likewise, according to article 13, paragraph 1, of the
Energy Charter Treaty, compensation for expropriation “shall amount
to the fair market value of the Investment expropriated at the time
immediately before the Expropriation”.
551 Particularly in the case of lump-sum settlements, agreements
have been concluded decades after the claims arose. See, e.g., the
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics concerning the Settlement of Mutual Financial
and Property Claims arising before 1939 of 15 July 1986 (Treaty Series,
No. 65 (1986)) (London, HM Stationery Office) concerning claims dating
back to 1917 and the Agreement between the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government
of the People’s Republic of China concerning the Settlement of
Mutual Historical Property Claims of 5 June 1987 (Treaty Series,
No. 37 (1987), ibid.) in respect of claims arising in 1949. In such cases,
the choice of valuation method was sometimes determined by availability
of evidence.
552 See Report and recommendations made by the panel of Commissioners
concerning part two of the first instalment of individual claims
for damages above US$ 100 000 (category “D” claims), 12 March 1998
(S/AC.26/1998/3), paras. 48–49, where UNCC considered a compensation
claim in relation to the taking of the claimant’s Islamic art collection
by Iraqi military personnel.
553 Where share prices provide good evidence of value, they may
be utilized, as in INA Corporation v. The Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Iran-U.S. C.T.R., vol. 8, p. 373 (1985).
554 Early claims recognized that even where a taking of property was
lawful, compensation for a going concern called for something more
than the value of the property elements of the business. The American-
Mexican Claims Commission, in rejecting a claim for lost profits in
the case of a lawful taking, stated that payment for property elements
would be “augmented by the existence of those elements which constitute
a going concern”: Wells Fargo and Company (Decision No. 22–B)
(1926), American-Mexican Claims Commission (Washington, D.C.,
United States Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 153 (1926). See
also decision No. 9 of the UNCC Governing Council in “Propositions
and conclusions on compensation for business losses: types of damages
and their valuation” (S/AC.26/1992/9), para. 16.
(24) An alternative valuation method for capital loss is
the determination of net book value, i.e. the difference between
the total assets of the business and total liabilities
as shown on its books. Its advantages are that the figures
can be determined by reference to market costs, they are
normally drawn from a contemporaneous record, and they
are based on data generated for some other purpose than
supporting the claim. Accordingly, net book value (or
some variant of this method) has been employed to assess
the value of businesses. The limitations of the method lie
in the reliance on historical figures, the use of accounting
principles which tend to undervalue assets, especially
in periods of inflation, and the fact that the purpose for
which the figures were produced does not take account of
the compensation context and any rules specific to it. The
balance sheet may contain an entry for goodwill, but the
reliability of such figures depends upon their proximity to
the moment of an actual sale.
(25) In cases where a business is not a going concern,555
so-called “break-up”, “liquidation” or “dissolution” value
is generally employed. In such cases, no provision is made
for value over and above the market value of the individual
assets. Techniques have been developed to construct,
in the absence of actual transactions, hypothetical values
representing what a willing buyer and willing seller might
agree.556
(26) Since 1945, valuation techniques have been developed
to factor in different elements of risk and probability.
557 The discounted cash flow (DCF) method has gained
some favour, especially in the context of calculations involving
income over a limited duration, as in the case of
wasting assets. Although developed as a tool for assessing
commercial value, it can also be useful in the context of
calculating value for compensation purposes.558 But difficulties
can arise in the application of the DCF method to
establish capital value in the compensation context. The
method analyses a wide range of inherently speculative
elements, some of which have a significant impact upon
the outcome (e.g. discount rates, currency fluctuations,
inflation figures, commodity prices, interest rates and
other commercial risks). This has led tribunals to adopt a
555 For an example of a business found not to be a going concern, see
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-U.S. C.T.R.,
vol. 10, p. 121 (1986), where the enterprise had not been established
long enough to demonstrate its viability. In SEDCO, Inc. v. National
Iranian Oil Co., the claimant sought dissolution value only, ibid.,
p. 180 (1986).
556 The hypothetical nature of the result is discussed in Amoco International
Finance Corporation (see footnote 549 above), at pp. 256–
257, paras. 220–223.
557 See, for example, the detailed methodology developed by UNCC
for assessing Kuwaiti corporate claims (report and recommendations
made by the panel of Commissioners concerning the first instalment
of “E4” claims, 19 March 1999 (S/AC.26/1999/4), paras. 32–62) and
claims filed on behalf of non-Kuwaiti corporations and other business
entities, excluding oil sector, construction/engineering and export guarantee
claims (report and recommendations made by the panel of Commissioners
concerning the third instalment of “E2” claims, 9 December
1999 (S/AC.26/1999/22)).
558 The use of the discounted cash flow method to assess capital
value was analysed in some detail in Amoco International Finance
Corporation (see footnote 549 above); Starrett Housing Corporation
(ibid.); Phillips Petroleum Company Iran (see footnote 164 above); and
Ebrahimi (Shahin Shaine) v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-U.S. C.T.R.,
vol. 30, p. 170 (1994).
104 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
cautious approach to the use of the method. Hence, although
income-based methods have been accepted in
principle, there has been a decided preference for assetbased
methods.559 A particular concern is the risk of double-
counting which arises from the relationship between
the capital value of an enterprise and its contractually
based profits.560
(27) Paragraph 2 of article 36 recognizes that in certain
cases compensation for loss of profits may be appropriate.
International tribunals have included an award for
loss of profits in assessing compensation: for example,
the decisions in the Cape Horn Pigeon case561 and Sapphire
International Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian
Oil Company.562 Loss of profits played a role in the Factory
at Chorzów case itself, PCIJ deciding that the injured
party should receive the value of property by way
of damages not as it stood at the time of expropriation
but at the time of indemnification.563 Awards for loss
of profits have also been made in respect of contractbased
lost profits in Libyan American Oil Company
(LIAMCO)564 and in some ICSID arbitrations.565
Nevertheless, lost profits have not been as commonly
awarded in practice as compensation for accrued losses.
Tribunals have been reluctant to provide compensation
for claims with inherently speculative elements.566 When
559 See, e.g., Amoco (footnote 549 above); Starrett Housing Corporation
(ibid.); and Phillips Petroleum Company Iran (footnote 164 above).
In the context of claims for lost profits, there is a corresponding preference
for claims to be based on past performance rather than forecasts.
For example, the UNCC guidelines on valuation of business losses in
decision 9 (see footnote 554 above) state: “The method of a valuation
should therefore be one that focuses on past performance rather than on
forecasts and projections into the future” (para. 19).
560 See, e.g., Ebrahimi (footnote 558 above), p. 227, para. 159.
561 Navires (see footnote 222 above) (Cape Horn Pigeon case),
p. 63 (1902) (including compensation for lost profits resulting from the
seizure of an American whaler). Similar conclusions were reached in
the Delagoa Bay Railway case, Martens, op. cit. (footnote 441 above),
vol. XXX, p. 329 (1900); Moore, History and Digest, vol. II, p. 1865
(1900); the William Lee case (footnote 139 above), pp. 3405–3407;
and the Yuille Shortridge and Co. case (Great Britain v. Portugal),
Lapradelle–Politis, op. cit. (ibid.), vol. II, p. 78 (1861). Contrast the decisions
in the Canada case (United States of America v. Brazil), Moore,
History and Digest, vol. II, p. 1733 (1870) and the Lacaze case (footnote
139 above).
562 ILR, vol. 35, p. 136, at pp. 187 and 189 (1963).
563 Factory at Chorzów, Merits (see footnote 34 above), pp. 47–48
and 53.
564 Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) (see footnote 508
above), p. 140.
565 See, e.g., Amco Asia Corporation and Others v. The Republic
of Indonesia, First Arbitration (1984); Annulment (1986); Resubmitted
case (1990), ICSID Reports (Cambridge, Grotius, 1993), vol. 1,
p. 377; and AGIP SpA v. the Government of the People’s Republic of the
Congo, ibid., p. 306 (1979).
566 According to the arbitrator in the Shufeldt case (see footnote 87
above), “the lucrum cessans must be the direct fruit of the contract
and not too remote or speculative” (p. 1099). See also Amco Asia
Corporation and Others (footnote 565 above), where it was stated that
“non-speculative profits” were recoverable (p. 612, para. 178). UNCC
has also stressed the requirement for claimants to provide “clear and
convincing evidence of ongoing and expected profitability” (see report
and recommendations made by the panel of Commissioners
concerning the first instalment of “E3” claims, 17 December 1998
(S/AC.26/1998/13), para. 147). In assessing claims for lost profits on
construction contracts, Panels have generally required that the claimant’s
calculation take into account the risk inherent in the project (ibid.,
para. 157; report and recommendations made by the panel of Commissioners
concerning the fourth instalment of “E3” claims, 30 September
1999 (S/AC.26/1999/14), para. 126).
compared with tangible assets, profits (and intangible
assets which are income-based) are relatively vulnerable
to commercial and political risks, and increasingly
so the further into the future projections are made. In
cases where lost future profits have been awarded, it has
been where an anticipated income stream has attained
sufficient attributes to be considered a legally protected
interest of sufficient certainty to be compensable.567 This
has normally been achieved by virtue of contractual
arrangements or, in some cases, a well-established history
of dealings.568
(28) Three categories of loss of profits may be distinguished:
first, lost profits from income-producing property
during a period when there has been no interference
with title as distinct from temporary loss of use; secondly,
lost profits from income-producing property between the
date of taking of title and adjudication;569 and thirdly, lost
future profits in which profits anticipated after the date of
adjudication are awarded.570
(29) The first category involves claims for loss of profits
due to the temporary loss of use and enjoyment of the
income-producing asset.571 In these cases there is no interference
with title and hence in the relevant period the
loss compensated is the income to which the claimant was
entitled by virtue of undisturbed ownership.
(30) The second category of claims relates to the unlawful
taking of income-producing property. In such cases
567 In considering claims for future profits, the UNCC panel dealing
with the fourth instalment of “E3” claims expressed the view that in
order for such claims to warrant a recommendation, “it is necessary to
demonstrate by sufficient documentary and other appropriate evidence
a history of successful (i.e. profitable) operation, and a state of affairs
which warrants the conclusion that the hypothesis that there would have
been future profitable contracts is well founded” (S/AC.26/1999/14),
para. 140 (see footnote 566 above).
568 According to Whiteman, “in order to be allowable, prospective
profits must not be too speculative, contingent, uncertain, and the like.
There must be proof that they were reasonably anticipated; and that the
profits anticipated were probable and not merely possible” (Damages in
International Law (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing
Office, 1943), vol. III, p. 1837).
569 This is most commonly associated with the deprivation of property,
as opposed to wrongful termination of a contract or concession.
If restitution were awarded, the award of lost profits would be analogous
to cases of temporary dispossession. If restitution is not awarded, as in
the Factory at Chorzów, Merits (see footnote 34 above) and Norwegian
Shipowners’ Claims (footnote 87 above), lost profits may be awarded
up to the time when compensation is made available as a substitute for
restitution.
570 Awards of lost future profits have been made in the context of a
contractually protected income stream, as in Amco Asia Corporation
and Others v. The Republic of Indonesia, First Arbitration; Annulment;
Resubmitted case (see footnote 565 above), rather than on the basis
of the taking of income-producing property. In the UNCC report and
recommendations on the second instalment of “E2” claims, dealing
with reduced profits, the panel found that losses arising from a decline
in business were compensable even though tangible property was not
affected and the businesses continued to operate throughout the relevant
period (S/AC.26/1999/6, para. 76).
571 Many of the early cases concern vessels seized and detained.
In the “Montijo”, an American vessel seized in Panama, the Umpire
allowed a sum of money per day for loss of the use of the vessel
(see footnote 117 above). In the “Betsey”, compensation was awarded
not only for the value of the cargo seized and detained, but also for
demurrage for the period representing loss of use: Moore, International
Adjudications (New York, Oxford University Press, 1933) vol. V,
p. 47, at p. 113.
State responsibility 105
lost profits have been awarded for the period up to the
time of adjudication. In the Factory at Chorzów case,572
this took the form of re-invested income, representing
profits from the time of taking to the time of adjudication.
In the Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims case,573 lost profits
were similarly not awarded for any period beyond the date
of adjudication. Once the capital value of income-producing
property has been restored through the mechanism of
compensation, funds paid by way of compensation can
once again be invested to re-establish an income stream.
Although the rationale for the award of lost profits in
these cases is less clearly articulated, it may be attributed
to a recognition of the claimant’s continuing beneficial
interest in the property up to the moment when potential
restitution is converted to a compensation payment.574
(31) The third category of claims for loss of profits arises
in the context of concessions and other contractually protected
interests. Again, in such cases, lost future income
has sometimes been awarded.575 In the case of contracts,
it is the future income stream which is compensated, up to
the time when the legal recognition of entitlement ends. In
some contracts this is immediate, e.g. where the contract
is determinable at the instance of the State,576 or where
some other basis for contractual termination exists. Or it
may arise from some future date dictated by the terms of
the contract itself.
(32) In other cases, lost profits have been excluded on
the basis that they were not sufficiently established as a legally
protected interest. In the Oscar Chinn case577 a monopoly
was not accorded the status of an acquired right. In
the Asian Agricultural Products case,578 a claim for lost
profits by a newly established business was rejected for
lack of evidence of established earnings. Claims for lost
profits are also subject to the usual range of limitations
on the recovery of damages, such as causation, remoteness,
evidentiary requirements and accounting principles,
572 Factory at Chorzów, Merits (see footnote 34 above).
573 Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims (see footnote 87 above).
574 For the approach of UNCC in dealing with loss of profits claims
associated with the destruction of businesses following the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait, see S/AC.26/1999/4 (footnote 557 above), paras. 184–
187.
575 In some cases, lost profits were not awarded beyond the date of
adjudication, though for reasons unrelated to the nature of the incomeproducing
property. See, e.g., Robert H. May (United States v. Guatemala),
1900 For. Rel. 648; and Whiteman, Damages in International
Law, vol. III (footnote 568 above), pp. 1704 and 1860, where the concession
had expired. In other cases, circumstances giving rise to force
majeure had the effect of suspending contractual obligations: see, e.g.,
Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, Iran-U.S. C.T.R., vol. 6, p. 272 (1984); and Sylvania Technical
Systems, Inc. v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
ibid., vol. 8, p. 298 (1985). In the Delagoa Bay Railway case (footnote
561 above), and in Shufeldt (see footnote 87 above), lost profits
were awarded in respect of a concession which had been terminated.
In Sapphire International Petroleums Ltd. (see footnote 562 above),
p. 136; Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) (see footnote 508
above), p. 140; and Amco Asia Corporation and Others v. The Republic
of Indonesia, First Arbitration; Annulment; Resubmitted case (see footnote
565 above), awards of lost profits were also sustained on the basis
of contractual relationships.
576 As in Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. (see the footnote above).
577 See footnote 385 above.
578 See footnote 522 above.
which seek to discount speculative elements from projected
figures.
(33) If loss of profits are to be awarded, it is inappropriate
to award interest under article 38 on the profit-earning
capital over the same period of time, simply because the
capital sum cannot be simultaneously earning interest and
generating profits. The essential aim is to avoid double
recovery while ensuring full reparation.
(34) It is well established that incidental expenses are
compensable if they were reasonably incurred to repair
damage and otherwise mitigate loss arising from the
breach.579 Such expenses may be associated, for example,
with the displacement of staff or the need to store or sell
undelivered products at a loss.
Article 37. Satisfaction
1. The State responsible for an internationally
wrongful act is under an obligation to give satisfaction
for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be
made good by restitution or compensation.
2. Satisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement
of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology
or another appropriate modality.
3. Satisfaction shall not be out of proportion to
the injury and may not take a form humiliating to the
responsible State.
Commentary
(1) Satisfaction is the third form of reparation which the
responsible State may have to provide in discharge of its
obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by
an internationally wrongful act. It is not a standard form
of reparation, in the sense that in many cases the injury
caused by an internationally wrongful act of a State may
be fully repaired by restitution and/or compensation. The
rather exceptional character of the remedy of satisfaction,
and its relationship to the principle of full reparation, are
emphasized by the phrase “insofar as [the injury] cannot
be made good by restitution or compensation”. It is only
in those cases where those two forms have not provided
full reparation that satisfaction may be required.
(2) Article 37 is divided into three paragraphs, each
dealing with a separate aspect of satisfaction. Paragraph 1
addresses the legal character of satisfaction and the types
of injury for which it may be granted. Paragraph 2 describes,
in a non-exhaustive fashion, some modalities of
satisfaction. Paragraph 3 places limitations on the obliga-
579 Compensation for incidental expenses has been awarded by
UNCC (report and recommendations on the first instalment of “E2”
claims (S/AC.26/1998/7) where compensation was awarded for evacuation
and relief costs (paras. 133, 153 and 249), repatriation (para. 228),
termination costs (para. 214), renovation costs (para. 225) and expenses
in mitigation (para. 183)), and by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
(see General Electric Company v. The Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Iran-U.S. C.T.R., vol. 26, p. 148, at pp. 165–169,
paras. 56–60 and 67–69 (1991), awarding compensation for items
resold at a loss and for storage costs).
106 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
tion to give satisfaction, having regard to former practices
in cases where unreasonable forms of satisfaction were
sometimes demanded.
(3) In accordance with paragraph 2 of article 31, the
injury for which a responsible State is obliged to make
full reparation embraces “any damage, whether material
or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of
a State”. Material and moral damage resulting from an
internationally wrongful act will normally be financially
assessable and hence covered by the remedy of compensation.
Satisfaction, on the other hand, is the remedy for
those injuries, not financially assessable, which amount
to an affront to the State. These injuries are frequently
of a symbolic character, arising from the very fact of the
breach of the obligation, irrespective of its material consequences
for the State concerned.
(4) The availability of the remedy of satisfaction for injury
of this kind, sometimes described as “non-material
injury”,580 is well established in international law. The
point was made, for example, by the tribunal in the “Rainbow
Warrior” arbitration:
There is a long established practice of States and international Courts
and Tribunals of using satisfaction as a remedy or form of reparation
(in the wide sense) for the breach of an international obligation. This
practice relates particularly to the case of moral or legal damage done
directly to the State, especially as opposed to the case of damage to
persons involving international responsibilities.581
State practice also provides many instances of claims for
satisfaction in circumstances where the internationally
wrongful act of a State causes non-material injury to another
State. Examples include situations of insults to the
symbols of the State, such as the national flag,582 violations
of sovereignty or territorial integrity,583 attacks on
ships or aircraft,584 ill-treatment of or deliberate attacks
on heads of State or Government or diplomatic or consular
representatives or other protected persons585 and violations
of the premises of embassies or consulates or of
the residences of members of the mission.586
580 See C. Dominicé, “De la réparation constructive du préjudice
immatériel souffert par un État”, L’ordre juridique international entre
tradition et innovation: recueil d’études (Paris, Presses Universitaires
de France, 1997), p. 349, at p. 354.
581 “Rainbow Warrior” (see footnote 46 above), pp. 272–273,
para. 122.
582 Examples are the Magee case (Whiteman, Damages in International
Law, vol. I (see footnote 347 above), p. 64 (1874)), the Petit
Vaisseau case (La prassi italiana di diritto internazionale, 2nd series
(see footnote 498 above), vol. III, No. 2564 (1863)) and the case that
arose from the insult to the French flag in Berlin in 1920 (C. Eagleton,
The Responsibility of States in International Law (New York University
Press, 1928), pp. 186–187).
583 As occurred in the “Rainbow Warrior” arbitration (see footnote
46 above).
584 Examples include the attack carried out in 1961 against a Soviet
aircraft transporting President Brezhnev by French fighter planes over
the international waters of the Mediterranean (RGDIP, vol. 65 (1961),
p. 603); and the sinking of a Bahamian ship in 1980 by a Cuban aircraft
(ibid., vol. 84 (1980), pp. 1078–1079).
585 See F. Przetacznik, “La responsabilité internationale de l’État à
raison des préjudices de caractère moral et politique causés à un autre
État”, RGDIP, vol. 78 (1974), p. 919, at p. 951.
586 Examples include the attack by demonstrators in 1851 on the
Spanish Consulate in New Orleans (Moore, Digest, vol. VI, p. 811, at
p. 812), and the failed attempt of two Egyptian policemen, in 1888,
to intrude upon the premises of the Italian Consulate at Alexandria
(5) Paragraph 2 of article 37 provides that satisfaction
may consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression
of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate
modality. The forms of satisfaction listed in the article
are no more than examples. The appropriate form of satisfaction
will depend on the circumstances and cannot be
prescribed in advance.587 Many possibilities exist, including
due inquiry into the causes of an accident resulting in
harm or injury,588 a trust fund to manage compensation
payments in the interests of the beneficiaries, disciplinary
or penal action against the individuals whose conduct
caused the internationally wrongful act589 or the award of
symbolic damages for non-pecuniary injury.590 Assurances
or guarantees of non-repetition, which are dealt with in
the articles in the context of cessation, may also amount to
a form of satisfaction.591 Paragraph 2 does not attempt to
list all the possibilities, but neither is it intended to exclude
them. Moreover, the order of the modalities of satisfaction
in paragraph 2 is not intended to reflect any hierarchy
or preference. Paragraph 2 simply gives examples which
are not listed in order of appropriateness or seriousness.
The appropriate mode, if any, will be determined having
regard to the circumstances of each case.
(6) One of the most common modalities of satisfaction
provided in the case of moral or non-material injury to
the State is a declaration of the wrongfulness of the act by
a competent court or tribunal. The utility of declaratory
relief as a form of satisfaction in the case of non-material
injury to a State was affirmed by ICJ in the Corfu Channel
case, where the Court, after finding unlawful a minesweeping
operation (Operation Retail) carried out by the
British Navy after the explosion, said:
[T]o ensure respect for international law, of which it is the organ, the
Court must declare that the action of the British Navy constituted a
violation of Albanian sovereignty.
(La prassi italiana di diritto internazionale, 2nd series (see footnote
498 above), vol. III, No. 2558). Also see cases of apologies and expressions
of regret following demonstrations in front of the French Embassy
in Belgrade in 1961 (RGDIP, vol. 65 (1961), p. 610), and the fires
in the libraries of the United States Information Services in Cairo in
1964 (ibid., vol. 69 (1965), pp. 130–131) and in Karachi in 1965 (ibid.,
vol. 70 (1966), pp. 165–166).
587 In the “Rainbow Warrior” arbitration the tribunal, while rejecting
New Zealand’s claims for restitution and/or cessation and declining to
award compensation, made various declarations by way of satisfaction,
and in addition a recommendation “to assist [the parties] in putting an
end to the present unhappy affair”. Specifically, it recommended that
France contribute US$ 2 million to a fund to be established “to promote
close and friendly relations between the citizens of the two countries”
(see footnote 46 above), p. 274, paras. 126–127. See also L. Migliorino,
“Sur la déclaration d’illicéité comme forme de satisfaction: à propos
de la sentence arbitrale du 30 avril 1990 dans l’affaire du Rainbow
Warrior”, RGDIP, vol. 96 (1992), p. 61.
588 For example, the United States naval inquiry into the causes of
the collision between an American submarine and the Japanese fishing
vessel, the Ehime Maru, in waters off Honolulu, The New York Times,
8 February 2001, sect. 1, p. 1.
589 Action against the guilty individuals was requested in the case
of the killing in 1948, in Palestine, of Count Bernadotte while he was
acting in the service of the United Nations (Whiteman, Digest of International
Law, vol. 8, pp. 742–743) and in the case of the killing of two
United States officers in Tehran (RGDIP, vol. 80 (1976, p. 257).
590 See, e.g., the cases “I’m Alone”, UNRIAA, vol. III (Sales
No. 1949.V.2), p. 1609 (1935); and “Rainbow Warrior” (footnote 46
above).
591 See paragraph (11) of the commentary to article 30.
State responsibility 107
This declaration is in accordance with the request made by Albania
through her Counsel, and is in itself appropriate satisfaction.592
This has been followed in many subsequent cases.593
However, while the making of a declaration by a competent
court or tribunal may be treated as a form of satisfaction
in a given case, such declarations are not intrinsically
associated with the remedy of satisfaction. Any
court or tribunal which has jurisdiction over a dispute has
the authority to determine the lawfulness of the conduct
in question and to make a declaration of its findings, as
a necessary part of the process of determining the case.
Such a declaration may be a preliminary to a decision
on any form of reparation, or it may be the only remedy
sought. What the Court did in the Corfu Channel case was
to use a declaration as a form of satisfaction in a case
where Albania had sought no other form. Moreover, such
a declaration has further advantages: it should be clear
and self-contained and will by definition not exceed the
scope or limits of satisfaction referred to in paragraph 3
of article 37. A judicial declaration is not listed in paragraph
2 only because it must emanate from a competent
third party with jurisdiction over a dispute, and the articles
are not concerned to specify such a party or to deal with
issues of judicial jurisdiction. Instead, article 37 specifies
the acknowledgement of the breach by the responsible
State as a modality of satisfaction.
(7) Another common form of satisfaction is an apology,
which may be given verbally or in writing by an appropriate
official or even the Head of State. Expressions of
regret or apologies were required in the “I’m Alone”,594
Kellett595 and “Rainbow Warrior”596 cases, and were offered
by the responsible State in the Consular Relations597
and LaGrand598 cases. Requests for, or offers of, an apology
are a quite frequent feature of diplomatic practice and
the tender of a timely apology, where the circumstances
justify it, can do much to resolve a dispute. In other circumstances
an apology may not be called for, e.g. where
a case is settled on an ex gratia basis, or it may be insufficient.
In the LaGrand case the Court considered that “an
apology is not sufficient in this case, as it would not be in
other cases where foreign nationals have not been advised
without delay of their rights under article 36, paragraph
1, of the Vienna Convention and have been subjected to
prolonged detention or sentenced to severe penalties”.599
592 Corfu Channel, Merits (see footnote 35 above), p. 35, repeated in
the operative part (p. 36).
593 For example, “Rainbow Warrior” (see footnote 46 above),
p. 273, para. 123.
594 See footnote 590 above.
595 Moore, Digest, vol. V, p. 44 (1897).
596 See footnote 46 above.
597 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United
States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 9 April 1998,
I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 248. For the text of the United States’ apology,
see United States Department of State, Text of Statement Released in
Asunción, Paraguay; Press statement by James P. Rubin, Spokesman,
4 November 1998. For the order discontinuing proceedings of
10 November 1998, see I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 426.
598 See footnote 119 above.
599 LaGrand, Merits (ibid.), para. 123.
(8) Excessive demands made under the guise of “satisfaction”
in the past600 suggest the need to impose some
limit on the measures that can be sought by way of satisfaction
to prevent abuses, inconsistent with the principle
of the equality of States.601 In particular, satisfaction is
not intended to be punitive in character, nor does it include
punitive damages. Paragraph 3 of article 37 places
limitations on the obligation to give satisfaction by setting
out two criteria: first, the proportionality of satisfaction to
the injury; and secondly, the requirement that satisfaction
should not be humiliating to the responsible State. It is
true that the term “humiliating” is imprecise, but there are
certainly historical examples of demands of this kind.
Article 38. Interest
1. Interest on any principal sum due under this
chapter shall be payable when necessary in order to
ensure full reparation. The interest rate and mode of
calculation shall be set so as to achieve that result.
2. Interest runs from the date when the principal
sum should have been paid until the date the obligation
to pay is fulfilled.
Commentary
(1) Interest is not an autonomous form of reparation,
nor is it a necessary part of compensation in every case.
For this reason the term “principal sum” is used in article
38 rather than “compensation”. Nevertheless, an
award of interest may be required in some cases in order
to provide full reparation for the injury caused by an internationally
wrongful act, and it is normally the subject
of separate treatment in claims for reparation and in the
awards of tribunals.
(2) As a general principle, an injured State is entitled
to interest on the principal sum representing its loss, if
that sum is quantified as at an earlier date than the date
of the settlement of, or judgement or award concerning,
the claim and to the extent that it is necessary to ensure
full reparation.602 Support for a general rule favouring the
award of interest as an aspect of full reparation is found in
international jurisprudence.603 In the S.S. “Wimbledon”,
PCIJ awarded simple interest at 6 per cent as from the
date of judgment, on the basis that interest was only payable
“from the moment when the amount of the sum due
600 For example, the joint note presented to the Chinese Government
in 1900 following the Boxer uprising and the demand by the Conference
of Ambassadors against Greece in the Tellini affair in 1923: see
C. Eagleton, op. cit. (footnote 582 above), pp. 187–188.
601 The need to prevent the abuse of satisfaction was stressed by early
writers such as J. C. Bluntschli, Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten
Staten als Rechtsbuch dargestellt, 3rd ed. (Nördlingen, Beck,
1878); French translation by M. C. Lardy, Le droit international codifié,
5th rev. ed. (Paris, Félix Alcan, 1895), pp. 268–269.
602 Thus, interest may not be allowed where the loss is assessed in
current value terms as at the date of the award. See the Lighthouses
arbitration (footnote 182 above), pp. 252–253.
603 See, e.g., the awards of interest made in the Illinois Central Railroad
Co. (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States case, UNRIAA, vol. IV
(Sales No. 1951.V.1), p. 134 (1926); and the Lucas case, ILR, vol. 30,
p. 220 (1966); see also administrative decision No. III of the United
States-Germany Mixed Claims Commission, UNRIAA, vol. VII (Sales
No. 1956.V.5), p. 66 (1923).
108 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
has been fixed and the obligation to pay has been established”.
604
(3) Issues of the award of interest have frequently arisen
in other tribunals, both in cases where the underlying claim
involved injury to private parties and where the injury was
to the State itself.605 The experience of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal is worth noting. In The Islamic
Republic of Iran v. The United States of America (Case
A–19), the Full Tribunal held that its general jurisdiction to
deal with claims included the power to award interest, but
it declined to lay down uniform standards for the award of
interest on the ground that this fell within the jurisdiction
of each Chamber and related “to the exercise … of the
discretion accorded to them in deciding each particular
case”.606 On the issue of principle the tribunal said:
Claims for interest are part of the compensation sought and do not
constitute a separate cause of action requiring their own independent
jurisdictional grant. This Tribunal is required by [a]rticle V of the
Claims Settlement Declaration to decide claims “on the basis of respect
for law”. In doing so, it has regularly treated interest, where sought, as
forming an integral part of the “claim” which it has a duty to decide.
The Tribunal notes that the Chambers have been consistent in awarding
interest as “compensation for damages suffered due to delay in payment”.
… Indeed, it is customary for arbitral tribunals to award interest
as part of an award for damages, notwithstanding the absence of any
express reference to interest in the compromis. Given that the power to
award interest is inherent in the Tribunal’s authority to decide claims,
the exclusion of such power could only be established by an express
provision in the Claims Settlement Declaration. No such provision exists.
Consequently, the Tribunal concludes that it is clearly within its
power to award interest as compensation for damage suffered.607
The tribunal has awarded interest at a different and slightly
lower rate in respect of intergovernmental claims.608
It has not awarded interest in certain cases, for example
where a lump-sum award was considered as reflecting full
compensation, or where other special circumstances pertained.
609
(4) Decision 16 of the Governing Council of the United
Nations Compensation Commission deals with the question
of interest. It provides:
1. Interest will be awarded from the date the loss occurred until
the date of payment, at a rate sufficient to compensate successful claimants
for the loss of use of the principal amount of the award.
2. The methods of calculation and of payment of interest will be
considered by the Governing Council at the appropriate time.
604 See footnote 34 above. The Court accepted the French claim for
an interest rate of 6 per cent as fair, having regard to “the present financial
situation of the world and … the conditions prevailing for public
loans”.
605 In the M/V “Saiga” case (see footnote 515 above), ITLOS awarded
interest at different rates in respect of different categories of loss
(para. 173).
606 The Islamic Republic of Iran v. The United States of America,
Iran-U.S. C.T.R., vol. 16, p. 285, at p. 290 (1987). Aldrich, op. cit.
(see footnote 357 above), pp. 475–476, points out that the practice of
the three Chambers has not been entirely uniform.
607 The Islamic Republic of Iran v. The United States of America
(see footnote 606 above), pp. 289–290.
608 See C. N. Brower and J. D. Brueschke, op. cit. (footnote 520
above), pp. 626–627, with references to the cases. The rate adopted was
10 per cent, as compared with 12 per cent for commercial claims.
609 See the detailed analysis of Chamber Three in McCollough and
Company, Inc. v. Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, Iran-U.S.
C.T.R., vol. 11, p. 3, at pp. 26–31 (1986).
3. Interest will be paid after the principal amount of awards.610
This provision combines a decision in principle in favour
of interest where necessary to compensate a claimant with
flexibility in terms of the application of that principle.
At the same time, interest, while a form of compensation,
is regarded as a secondary element, subordinated to the
principal amount of the claim.
(5) Awards of interest have also been envisaged by human
rights courts and tribunals, even though the compensation
practice of these bodies is relatively cautious and
the claims are almost always unliquidated. This is done,
for example, to protect the value of a damages award
payable by instalments over time.611
(6) In their more recent practice, national compensation
commissions and tribunals have also generally allowed
for interest in assessing compensation. However in certain
cases of partial lump-sum settlements, claims have been
expressly limited to the amount of the principal loss, on
the basis that with a limited fund to be distributed, claims
to principal should take priority.612 Some national court
decisions have also dealt with issues of interest under international
law,613 although more often questions of interest
are dealt with as part of the law of the forum.
(7) Although the trend of international decisions and
practice is towards greater availability of interest as an aspect
of full reparation, an injured State has no automatic
entitlement to the payment of interest. The awarding of
interest depends on the circumstances of each case; in
particular, on whether an award of interest is necessary
in order to ensure full reparation. This approach is compatible
with the tradition of various legal systems as well
as the practice of international tribunals.
(8) An aspect of the question of interest is the possible
award of compound interest. The general view of courts
and tribunals has been against the award of compound
interest, and this is true even of those tribunals which
hold claimants to be normally entitled to compensatory
interest. For example, the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal has consistently denied claims for compound
interest, including in cases where the claimant suffered
losses through compound interest charges on indebtedness
associated with the claim. In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
the tribunal failed to find:
any special reasons for departing from international precedents
which normally do not allow the awarding of compound interest. As
noted by one authority, “[t]here are few rules within the scope of the
610 Awards of interest, decision of 18 December 1992 (S/
AC.26/1992/16).
611 See, e.g., the Velásquez Rodríguez, Compensatory Damages case
(footnote 516 above), para. 57. See also Papamichalopoulos (footnote
515 above), para. 39, where interest was payable only in respect of
the pecuniary damage awarded. See further D. Shelton, op. cit. (footnote
521 above), pp. 270–272.
612 See, e.g., the Foreign Compensation (People’s Republic of China),
Order, Statutory Instrument No. 2201 (1987) (London, HM Stationery
Office), para. 10, giving effect to the settlement Agreement between the
United Kingdom and China (footnote 551 above).
613 See, e.g., McKesson Corporation v. The Islamic Republic of
Iran, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 116 F,
Supp. 2d 13 (2000).
State responsibility 109
subject of damages in international law that are better settled than the
one that compound interest is not allowable” … Even though the term
“all sums” could be construed to include interest and thereby to allow
compound interest, the Tribunal, due to the ambiguity of the language,
interprets the clause in the light of the international rule just stated, and
thus excludes compound interest. 614
Consistent with this approach, the tribunal has gone
behind contractual provisions appearing to provide for
compound interest, in order to prevent the claimant gaining
a profit “wholly out of proportion to the possible loss
that [it] might have incurred by not having the amounts
due at its disposal”.615 The preponderance of authority
thus continues to support the view expressed by Arbitrator
Huber in the British Claims in the Spanish Zone of
Morocco case:
the arbitral case law in matters involving compensation of one State for
another for damages suffered by the nationals of one within the territory
of the other … is unanimous … in disallowing compound interest. In
these circumstances, very strong and quite specific arguments would be
called for to grant such interest.616
The same is true for compound interest in respect of Stateto-
State claims.
(9) Nonetheless, several authors have argued for a reconsideration
of this principle, on the ground that “compound
interest reasonably incurred by the injured party
should be recoverable as an item of damage”.617 This
view has also been supported by arbitral tribunals in some
cases.618 But given the present state of international law,
it cannot be said that an injured State has any entitlement
to compound interest, in the absence of special circumstances
which justify some element of compounding as an
aspect of full reparation.
(10) The actual calculation of interest on any principal
sum payable by way of reparation raises a complex of issues
concerning the starting date (date of breach,619 date
on which payment should have been made, date of claim
or demand), the terminal date (date of settlement agreement
or award, date of actual payment) as well as the applicable
interest rate (rate current in the respondent State,
in the applicant State, international lending rates). There
614 Iran-U.S. C.T.R., vol. 7, p. 181, at pp. 191–192 (1984), citing
Whiteman, Damages in International Law, vol. III (see footnote 568
above), p. 1997.
615 Anaconda-Iran, Inc. v. The Government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, Iran-U.S. C.T.R., vol. 13, p. 199, at p. 235 (1986). See also
Aldrich, op. cit. (footnote 357 above), pp. 477–478.
616 British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco (see footnote 44
above), p. 650. Cf. the Aminoil arbitration (footnote 496 above), where
the interest awarded was compounded for a period without any reason
being given. This accounted for more than half of the total final award
(p. 613, para. 178 (5)).
617 F. A. Mann, “Compound interest as an item of damage in international
law”, Further Studies in International Law (Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1990), p. 377, at p. 383.
618 See, e.g., Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. Republic
of Costa Rica, case No. ARB/96/1, ICSID Reports (Cambridge, Grotius,
2002), vol. 5, final award (17 February 2000), paras. 103–105.
619 Using the date of the breach as the starting date for calculation of
the interest term is problematic as there may be difficulties in determining
that date, and many legal systems require a demand for payment by
the claimant before interest will run. The date of formal demand was
taken as the relevant date in the Russian Indemnity case (see footnote
354 above), p. 442, by analogy from the general position in European
legal systems. In any event, failure to make a timely claim for payment
is relevant in deciding whether to allow interest.
is no uniform approach, internationally, to questions of
quantification and assessment of amounts of interest payable.
620 In practice, the circumstances of each case and the
conduct of the parties strongly affect the outcome. There
is wisdom in the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal’s observation
that such matters, if the parties cannot resolve
them, must be left “to the exercise … of the discretion accorded
to [individual tribunals] in deciding each particular
case”.621 On the other hand, the present unsettled state
of practice makes a general provision on the calculation of
interest useful. Accordingly, article 38 indicates that the
date from which interest is to be calculated is the date
when the principal sum should have been paid. Interest
runs from that date until the date the obligation to pay is
fulfilled. The interest rate and mode of calculation are to
be set so as to achieve the result of providing full reparation
for the injury suffered as a result of the internationally
wrongful act.
(11) Where a sum for loss of profits is included as part
of the compensation for the injury caused by a wrongful
act, an award of interest will be inappropriate if the
injured State would thereby obtain double recovery. A
capital sum cannot be earning interest and notionally
employed in earning profits at one and the same time.
However, interest may be due on the profits which would
have been earned but which have been withheld from the
original owner.
(12) Article 38 does not deal with post-judgement or
moratory interest. It is only concerned with interest that
goes to make up the amount that a court or tribunal should
award, i.e. compensatory interest. The power of a court or
tribunal to award post-judgement interest is a matter of its
procedure.
Article 39. Contribution to the injury
In the determination of reparation, account shall
be taken of the contribution to the injury by wilful or
negligent action or omission of the injured State or
any person or entity in relation to whom reparation is
sought.
Commentary
(1) Article 39 deals with the situation where damage
has been caused by an internationally wrongful act of a
State, which is accordingly responsible for the damage in
accordance with articles 1 and 28, but where the injured
State, or the individual victim of the breach, has materially
620 See, e.g., J. Y. Gotanda, Supplemental Damages in Private International
Law (The Hague, Kluwer, 1998), p. 13. It should be noted
that a number of Islamic countries, influenced by the sharia, prohibit
payment of interest under their own law or even under their constitution.
However, they have developed alternatives to interest in the commercial
and international context. For example, payment of interest is prohibited
by the Iranian Constitution, articles 43 and 49, but the Guardian
Council has held that this injunction does not apply to “foreign
governments, institutions, companies and persons, who, according to
their own principles of faith, do not consider [interest] as being prohibited”
(ibid., pp. 38–40, with references).
621 The Islamic Republic of Iran v. The United States of America
(Case No. A-19) (see footnote 606 above).
110 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
contributed to the damage by some wilful or negligent act
or omission. Its focus is on situations which in national
law systems are referred to as “contributory negligence”,
“comparative fault”, “faute de la victime”, etc.622
(2) Article 39 recognizes that the conduct of the injured
State, or of any person or entity in relation to whom reparation
is sought, should be taken into account in assessing
the form and extent of reparation. This is consonant with
the principle that full reparation is due for the injury—but
nothing more—arising in consequence of the internationally
wrongful act. It is also consistent with fairness as
between the responsible State and the victim of the
breach.
(3) In the LaGrand case, ICJ recognized that the conduct
of the claimant State could be relevant in determining
the form and amount of reparation. There, Germany
had delayed in asserting that there had been a breach and
in instituting proceedings. The Court noted that “Germany
may be criticized for the manner in which these proceedings
were filed and for their timing”, and stated that
it would have taken this factor, among others, into account
“had Germany’s submission included a claim for indemnification”.
623
(4) The relevance of the injured State’s contribution to
the damage in determining the appropriate reparation is
widely recognized in the literature624 and in State practice.
625 While questions of an injured State’s contribution
to the damage arise most frequently in the context of
compensation, the principle may also be relevant to other
forms of reparation. For example, if a State-owned ship is
unlawfully detained by another State and while under detention
sustains damage attributable to the negligence of
the captain, the responsible State may be required merely
to return the ship in its damaged condition.
(5) Not every action or omission which contributes to
the damage suffered is relevant for this purpose. Rather,
article 39 allows to be taken into account only those actions
or omissions which can be considered as wilful or
negligent, i.e. which manifest a lack of due care on the
part of the victim of the breach for his or her own property
or rights.626 While the notion of a negligent action or
622 See C. von Bar, op. cit. (footnote 315 above), pp. 544–569.
623 LaGrand, Judgment (see footnote 119 above), at p. 487, para. 57,
and p. 508, para. 116. For the relevance of delay in terms of loss of
the right to invoke responsibility, see article 45, subparagraph (b), and
commentary.
624 See, e.g., B. Graefrath, “Responsibility and damages caused:
relationship between responsibility and damages” (footnote 454 above)
and B. Bollecker-Stern, op. cit. (footnote 454 above), pp. 265–300.
625 In the Delagoa Bay Railway case (see footnote 561 above), the arbitrators
noted that: “[a]ll the circumstances that can be adduced against
the concessionaire company and for the Portuguese Government mitigate
the latter’s liability and warrant ... a reduction in reparation.” In
S.S. “Wimbledon” (see footnote 34 above), p. 31, a question arose as
to whether there had been any contribution to the injury suffered as a
result of the ship harbouring at Kiel for some time, following refusal
of passage through the Kiel Canal, before taking an alternative course.
PCIJ implicitly acknowledged that the captain’s conduct could affect
the amount of compensation payable, although it held that the captain
had acted reasonably in the circumstances. For other examples, see
Gray, op. cit. (footnote 432 above), p. 23.
626 This terminology is drawn from article VI, paragraph 1, of the
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects.
omission is not qualified, e.g. by a requirement that the
negligence should have reached the level of being “serious”
or “gross”, the relevance of any negligence to reparation
will depend upon the degree to which it has contributed
to the damage as well as the other circumstances of
the case.627 The phrase “account shall be taken” indicates
that the article deals with factors that are capable of affecting
the form or reducing the amount of reparation in
an appropriate case.
(6) The wilful or negligent action or omission which
contributes to the damage may be that of the injured State
or “any person or entity in relation to whom reparation is
sought”. This phrase is intended to cover not only the situation
where a State claims on behalf of one of its nationals
in the field of diplomatic protection, but also any other
situation in which one State invokes the responsibility of
another State in relation to conduct primarily affecting
some third party. Under articles 42 and 48, a number of
different situations can arise where this may be so. The
underlying idea is that the position of the State seeking
reparation should not be more favourable, so far as reparation
in the interests of another is concerned, than it would
be if the person or entity in relation to whom reparation is
sought were to bring a claim individually.
CHAPTER III
SERIOUS BREACHES OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER
PEREMPTORY NORMS OF GENERAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Commentary
(1) Chapter III of Part Two is entitled “Serious breaches
of obligations under peremptory norms of general international
law”. It sets out certain consequences of specific
types of breaches of international law, identified by
reference to two criteria: first, they involve breaches of
obligations under peremptory norms of general international
law; and secondly, the breaches concerned are in
themselves serious, having regard to their scale or character.
Chapter III contains two articles, the first defining
its scope of application (art. 40), the second spelling out
the legal consequences entailed by the breaches coming
within the scope of the chapter (art. 41).
(2) Whether a qualitative distinction should be recognized
between different breaches of international law
has been the subject of a major debate.628 The issue was
underscored by ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case, when
it said that:
627 It is possible to envisage situations where the injury in question
is entirely attributable to the conduct of the victim and not at all to that
of the “responsible” State. Such situations are covered by the general
requirement of proximate cause referred to in article 31, rather than by
article 39. On questions of mitigation of damage, see paragraph (11) of
the commentary to article 31.
628 For full bibliographies, see M. Spinedi, “Crimes of State: bibliography”,
International Crimes of State, J. H. H. Weiler, A. Cassese
and M. Spinedi, eds. (Berlin, De Gruyter, 1989), pp. 339–353; and
N. H. B. Jørgensen, The Responsibility of States for International
Crimes (Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 299–314.
State responsibility 111
an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a
State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising
vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their
very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.629
The Court was there concerned to contrast the position
of an injured State in the context of diplomatic protection
with the position of all States in respect of the breach of
an obligation towards the international community as a
whole. Although no such obligation was at stake in that
case, the Court’s statement clearly indicates that for the
purposes of State responsibility certain obligations are
owed to the international community as a whole, and that
by reason of “the importance of the rights involved” all
States have a legal interest in their protection.
(3) On a number of subsequent occasions the Court has
taken the opportunity to affirm the notion of obligations
to the international community as a whole, although it
has been cautious in applying it. In the East Timor case,
the Court said that “Portugal’s assertion that the right
of peoples to self-determination, as it evolved from the
Charter and from United Nations practice, has an erga
omnes character, is irreproachable”.630 At the preliminary
objections stage of the Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
case, it stated that “the rights and obligations enshrined by
the [Genocide] Convention are rights and obligations erga
omnes”:631 this finding contributed to its conclusion that
its temporal jurisdiction over the claim was not limited
to the time after which the parties became bound by the
Convention.
(4) A closely related development is the recognition of
the concept of peremptory norms of international law in
articles 53 and 64 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. These
provisions recognize the existence of substantive norms
of a fundamental character, such that no derogation from
them is permitted even by treaty.632
(5) From the first it was recognized that these developments
had implications for the secondary rules of State
responsibility which would need to be reflected in some
way in the articles. Initially, it was thought this could be
done by reference to a category of “international crimes
of State”, which would be contrasted with all other cases
of internationally wrongful acts (“international delicts”).
633 There has been, however, no development of
penal consequences for States of breaches of these fundamental
norms. For example, the award of punitive damages
is not recognized in international law even in relation
to serious breaches of obligations arising under peremptory
norms. In accordance with article 34, the function
629 Barcelona Traction (see footnote 25 above), p. 32, para. 33.
See M. Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997).
630 See footnote 54 above.
631 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections (see footnote 54
above), p. 616, para. 31.
632 See article 26 and commentary.
633 See Yearbook … 1976, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 95–122,
especially paras. (6)–(34). See also paragraph (5) of the commentary
to article 12.
of damages is essentially compensatory.634 Overall, it
remains the case, as the International Military Tribunal
said in 1946, that “[c]rimes against international law are
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the
provisions of international law be enforced”.635
(6) In line with this approach, despite the trial and conviction
by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals
of individual government officials for criminal acts committed
in their official capacity, neither Germany nor
Japan were treated as “criminal” by the instruments creating
these tribunals.636 As to more recent international
practice, a similar approach underlies the establishment
of the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda by
the Security Council. Both tribunals are concerned only
with the prosecution of individuals.637 In its decision relating
to a subpoena duces tecum in the Blaski c´ case, the
Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia stated that “[u]nder present international
law it is clear that States, by definition, cannot be
the subject of criminal sanctions akin to those provided
for in national criminal systems”.638 The Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court likewise establishes
jurisdiction over the “most serious crimes of concern to
the international community as a whole” (preamble), but
limits this jurisdiction to “natural persons” (art. 25, para.
1). The same article specifies that no provision of the Statute
“relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect
the responsibility of States under international law”
(para. 4).639
(7) Accordingly, the present articles do not recognize
the existence of any distinction between State “crimes”
and “delicts” for the purposes of Part One. On the other
hand, it is necessary for the articles to reflect that there are
certain consequences flowing from the basic concepts of
peremptory norms of general international law and obligations
to the international community as a whole within
the field of State responsibility. Whether or not peremptory
norms of general international law and obligations to
the international community as a whole are aspects of a
single basic idea, there is at the very least substantial overlap
between them. The examples which ICJ has given of
634 See paragraph (4) of the commentary to article 36.
635 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), judgement of
1 October 1946, reprinted in AJIL (see footnote 321 above), p. 221.
636 This despite the fact that the London Charter of 1945 specifically
provided for the condemnation of a “group or organization” as
“criminal”; see Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Agreement
for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals
of the European Axis, annex, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 82,
No. 251, p. 279, arts. 9 and 10.
637 See, respectively, articles 1 and 6 of the statute of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; and articles 1 and 7 of the statute
of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (footnote 257 above).
638 Prosecutor v. Blaski´c, International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Case IT-95-14-AR 108 bis, ILR, vol. 110, p. 688, at p. 698,
para. 25 (1997). Cf. Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections
(footnote 54 above), in which neither of the parties treated the
proceedings as being criminal in character. See also paragraph (6) of the
commentary to article 12.
639 See also article 10: “Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as
limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international
law for purposes other than this Statute.”
112 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
obligations towards the international community as a
whole640 all concern obligations which, it is generally accepted,
arise under peremptory norms of general international
law. Likewise the examples of peremptory norms
given by the Commission in its commentary to what became
article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention641 involve
obligations to the international community as a whole. But
there is at least a difference in emphasis. While peremptory
norms of general international law focus on the scope
and priority to be given to a certain number of fundamental
obligations, the focus of obligations to the international
community as a whole is essentially on the legal interest
of all States in compliance—i.e. in terms of the present articles,
in being entitled to invoke the responsibility of any
State in breach. Consistently with the difference in their
focus, it is appropriate to reflect the consequences of the
two concepts in two distinct ways. First, serious breaches
of obligations arising under peremptory norms of general
international law can attract additional consequences, not
only for the responsible State but for all other States. Secondly,
all States are entitled to invoke responsibility for
breaches of obligations to the international community as
a whole. The first of these propositions is the concern of
the present chapter; the second is dealt with in article 48.
Article 40. Application of this chapter
1. This chapter applies to the international responsibility
which is entailed by a serious breach by
a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory
norm of general international law.
2. A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves
a gross or systematic failure by the responsible
State to fulfil the obligation.
Commentary
(1) Article 40 serves to define the scope of the breaches
covered by the chapter. It establishes two criteria in order
to distinguish “serious breaches of obligations under peremptory
norms of general international law” from other
types of breaches. The first relates to the character of the
obligation breached, which must derive from a peremptory
norm of general international law. The second qualifies
640 According to ICJ, obligations erga omnes “derive, for example, in
contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression,
and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning
the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery
and racial discrimination”: Barcelona Traction (see footnote 25 above),
at p. 32, para. 34. See also East Timor (footnote 54 above); Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (ibid.); and Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Preliminary Objections (ibid.).
641 The Commission gave the following examples of treaties which
would violate the article due to conflict with a peremptory norm of
general international law, or a rule of jus cogens: “(a) a treaty contemplating
an unlawful use of force contrary to the principles of the
Charter, (b) a treaty contemplating the performance of any other act
criminal under international law, and (c) a treaty contemplating or
conniving at the commission of such acts, such as trade in slaves, piracy
or genocide, in the suppression of which every State is called upon to
co-operate … treaties violating human rights, the equality of States or
the principle of self-determination were mentioned as other possible
examples”, Yearbook … 1966, vol. II, p. 248.
the intensity of the breach, which must have been serious
in nature. Chapter III only applies to those violations of
international law that fulfil both criteria.
(2) The first criterion relates to the character of the obligation
breached. In order to give rise to the application of
this chapter, a breach must concern an obligation arising
under a peremptory norm of general international law. In
accordance with article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention,
a peremptory norm of general international law is
one which is:
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character.
The concept of peremptory norms of general international
law is recognized in international practice, in the jurisprudence
of international and national courts and tribunals
and in legal doctrine.642
(3) It is not appropriate to set out examples of the peremptory
norms referred to in the text of article 40 itself,
any more than it was in the text of article 53 of the 1969
Vienna Convention. The obligations referred to in article
40 arise from those substantive rules of conduct that prohibit
what has come to be seen as intolerable because of
the threat it presents to the survival of States and their
peoples and the most basic human values.
(4) Among these prohibitions, it is generally agreed that
the prohibition of aggression is to be regarded as peremptory.
This is supported, for example, by the Commission’s
commentary to what was to become article 53,643 uncontradicted
statements by Governments in the course of the
Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties,644 the submissions
of both parties in the Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua case and the Court’s
own position in that case.645 There also seems to be widespread
agreement with other examples listed in the Commission’s
commentary to article 53: viz. the prohibitions
against slavery and the slave trade, genocide, and racial
discrimination and apartheid. These practices have been
prohibited in widely ratified international treaties and
conventions admitting of no exception. There was general
agreement among Governments as to the peremptory
character of these prohibitions at the Vienna Conference.
As to the peremptory character of the prohibition against
642 For further discussion of the requirements for identification of a
norm as peremptory, see paragraph (5) of the commentary to article 26,
with selected references to the case law and literature.
643 Yearbook … 1966, vol. II, pp. 247–249.
644 In the course of the conference, a number of Governments
characterized as peremptory the prohibitions against aggression and
the illegal use of force: see Official Records of the United Nations
Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session, Vienna, 26 March to
24 May 1968, summary records of the plenary meeting and of the meetings
of the Committee of the Whole (United Nations publication, Sales
No. E.68.V.7), 52nd meeting, paras. 3, 31 and 43; 53rd meeting,
paras. 4, 9, 15, 16, 35, 48, 59 and 69; 54th meeting, paras. 9, 41, 46
and 55; 55th meeting, paras. 31 and 42; and 56th meeting, paras. 6, 20,
29 and 51.
645 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(see footnote 36 above), pp. 100–101, para. 190; see also the separate
opinion of magistrate Nagendra Singh (president), p. 153.
State responsibility 113
genocide, this is supported by a number of decisions by
national and international courts.646
(5) Although not specifically listed in the Commission’s
commentary to article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention,
the peremptory character of certain other norms
seems also to be generally accepted. This applies to the
prohibition against torture as defined in article 1 of the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The peremptory
character of this prohibition has been confirmed by decisions
of international and national bodies.647 In the light
of the description by ICJ of the basic rules of international
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict as “intransgressible”
in character, it would also seem justified to treat
these as peremptory.648 Finally, the obligation to respect
the right of self-determination deserves to be mentioned.
As the Court noted in the East Timor case, “[t]he principle
of self-determination ... is one of the essential principles
of contemporary international law”, which gives rise to an
obligation to the international community as a whole to
permit and respect its exercise.649
(6) It should be stressed that the examples given above
may not be exhaustive. In addition, article 64 of the 1969
Vienna Convention contemplates that new peremptory
norms of general international law may come into existence
through the processes of acceptance and recognition
by the international community of States as a whole,
as referred to in article 53. The examples given here are
thus without prejudice to existing or developing rules of
international law which fulfil the criteria for peremptory
norms under article 53.
(7) Apart from its limited scope in terms of the comparatively
small number of norms which qualify as peremptory,
article 40 applies a further limitation for the
purposes of the chapter, viz. that the breach should itself
have been “serious”. A “serious” breach is defined in
paragraph 2 as one which involves “a gross or systematic
failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation”
in question. The word “serious” signifies that a certain
order of magnitude of violation is necessary in order not
to trivialize the breach and it is not intended to suggest
that any violation of these obligations is not serious or is
somehow excusable. But relatively less serious cases of
646 See, for example, ICJ in Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional
Measures (footnote 412 above), pp. 439–440; Counter-Claims (footnote
413 above), p. 243; and the District Court of Jerusalem in the
Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann case,
ILR, vol. 36, p. 5 (1961).
647 Cf. the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, in Siderman
de Blake and Others v. The Republic of Argentina and Others, ILR,
vol. 103, p. 455, at p. 471 (1992); the United Kingdom Court of Appeal
in Al Adsani v. Government of Kuwait and Others, ILR, vol. 107,
p. 536, at pp. 540–541 (1996); and the United Kingdom House of Lords
in Pinochet (footnote 415 above), pp. 841 and 881. Cf. the United States
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, ILR,
vol. 77, p. 169, at pp. 177–179 (1980).
648 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (see footnote
54 above), p. 257, para. 79.
649 East Timor (ibid.). See Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly
resolution 2625 (XXV), annex, fifth principle.
breach of peremptory norms can be envisaged, and it is
necessary to limit the scope of this chapter to the more
serious or systematic breaches. Some such limitation is
supported by State practice. For example, when reacting
against breaches of international law, States have often
stressed their systematic, gross or egregious nature. Similarly,
international complaint procedures, for example in
the field of human rights, attach different consequences to
systematic breaches, e.g. in terms of the non-applicability
of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies.650
(8) To be regarded as systematic, a violation would have
to be carried out in an organized and deliberate way. In
contrast, the term “gross” refers to the intensity of the
violation or its effects; it denotes violations of a flagrant
nature, amounting to a direct and outright assault on the
values protected by the rule. The terms are not of course
mutually exclusive; serious breaches will usually be both
systematic and gross. Factors which may establish the seriousness
of a violation would include the intent to violate
the norm; the scope and number of individual violations;
and the gravity of their consequences for the victims.
It must also be borne in mind that some of the peremptory
norms in question, most notably the prohibitions of
aggression and genocide, by their very nature require an
intentional violation on a large scale.651
(9) Article 40 does not lay down any procedure for determining
whether or not a serious breach has been committed.
It is not the function of the articles to establish
new institutional procedures for dealing with individual
cases, whether they arise under chapter III of Part Two or
otherwise. Moreover, the serious breaches dealt with in
this chapter are likely to be addressed by the competent
international organizations, including the Security Council
and the General Assembly. In the case of aggression,
the Security Council is given a specific role by the Charter
of the United Nations.
Article 41. Particular consequences of a serious breach
of an obligation under this chapter
1. States shall cooperate to bring to an end through
lawful means any serious breach within the meaning of
article 40.
650 See the Ireland v. the United Kingdom case (footnote 236 above),
para. 159; cf., e.g., the procedure established under Economic and
Social Council resolution 1503 (XLVIII), which requires a “consistent
pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights”.
651 At its twenty-second session, the Commission proposed the
following examples as cases denominated as “international crimes”:
“(a) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential
importance for the maintenance of international peace and security,
such as that prohibiting aggression;
“(b) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential
importance for safeguarding the right of self-determination of peoples,
such as that prohibiting the establishment or maintenance by
force of colonial domination;
“(c) a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international
obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human being,
such as those prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid;
“(d) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential
importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the human
environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the
atmosphere or of the seas.”
Yearbook … 1976, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 95–96.
114 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
2. No State shall recognize as lawful a situation
created by a serious breach within the meaning of article
40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining
that situation.
3. This article is without prejudice to the other
consequences referred to in this Part and to such further
consequences that a breach to which this chapter
applies may entail under international law.
Commentary
(1) Article 41 sets out the particular consequences of
breaches of the kind and gravity referred to in article 40. It
consists of three paragraphs. The first two prescribe special
legal obligations of States faced with the commission
of “serious breaches” in the sense of article 40, the third
takes the form of a saving clause.
(2) Pursuant to paragraph 1 of article 41, States are under
a positive duty to cooperate in order to bring to an
end serious breaches in the sense of article 40. Because
of the diversity of circumstances which could possibly be
involved, the provision does not prescribe in detail what
form this cooperation should take. Cooperation could be
organized in the framework of a competent international
organization, in particular the United Nations. However,
paragraph 1 also envisages the possibility of non-institutionalized
cooperation.
(3) Neither does paragraph 1 prescribe what measures
States should take in order to bring to an end serious
breaches in the sense of article 40. Such cooperation must
be through lawful means, the choice of which will depend
on the circumstances of the given situation. It is, however,
made clear that the obligation to cooperate applies to
States whether or not they are individually affected by the
serious breach. What is called for in the face of serious
breaches is a joint and coordinated effort by all States to
counteract the effects of these breaches. It may be open
to question whether general international law at present
prescribes a positive duty of cooperation, and paragraph 1
in that respect may reflect the progressive development of
international law. But in fact such cooperation, especially
in the framework of international organizations, is carried
out already in response to the gravest breaches of international
law and it is often the only way of providing an
effective remedy. Paragraph 1 seeks to strengthen existing
mechanisms of cooperation, on the basis that all States are
called upon to make an appropriate response to the serious
breaches referred to in article 40.
(4) Pursuant to paragraph 2 of article 41, States are under
a duty of abstention, which comprises two obligations,
first, not to recognize as lawful situations created by serious
breaches in the sense of article 40 and, secondly, not
to render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.
(5) The first of these two obligations refers to the obligation
of collective non-recognition by the international
community as a whole of the legality of situations
resulting directly from serious breaches in the sense of
article 40.652 The obligation applies to “situations” created
by these breaches, such as, for example, attempted acquisition
of sovereignty over territory through the denial of
the right of self-determination of peoples. It not only refers
to the formal recognition of these situations, but also
prohibits acts which would imply such recognition.
(6) The existence of an obligation of non-recognition in
response to serious breaches of obligations arising under
peremptory norms already finds support in international
practice and in decisions of ICJ. The principle that territorial
acquisitions brought about by the use of force are not
valid and must not be recognized found a clear expression
during the Manchurian crisis of 1931–1932, when
the Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, declared that the
United States of America—joined by a large majority of
members of the League of Nations—would not:
admit the legality of any situation de facto nor ... recognize any treaty or
agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof,
which may impair the ... sovereignty, the independence or the territorial
and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, ... [nor] recognize
any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by
means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of
August 27, 1928.653
The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations affirms
this principle by stating unequivocally that States
shall not recognize as legal any acquisition of territory
brought about by the use of force.654 As ICJ held in Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,
the unanimous consent of States to this declaration
“may be understood as an acceptance of the validity of
the rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by themselves”.
655
(7) An example of the practice of non-recognition of
acts in breach of peremptory norms is provided by the
reaction of the Security Council to the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait in 1990. Following the Iraqi declaration of a
“comprehensive and eternal merger” with Kuwait, the Security
Council, in resolution 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990,
decided that the annexation had “no legal validity, and is
considered null and void”, and called upon all States, international
organizations and specialized agencies not to
recognize that annexation and to refrain from any action
or dealing that might be interpreted as a recognition of it,
whether direct or indirect. In fact, no State recognized the
652 This has been described as “an essential legal weapon in the
fight against grave breaches of the basic rules of international law”
(C. Tomuschat, “International crimes by States: an endangered
species?”, International Law: Theory and Practice — Essays in Honour
of Eric Suy, K. Wellens, ed. (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1998),
p. 253, at p. 259.
653 Secretary of State’s note to the Chinese and Japanese Governments,
in Hackworth, Digest of International Law (Washington,
D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1940), vol. I, p. 334;
endorsed by Assembly resolutions of 11 March 1932, League of
Nations Official Journal, March 1932, Special Supplement No. 101,
p. 87. For a review of earlier practice relating to collective nonrecognition,
see J. Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations
(Cambridge, Grotius, 1987), pp. 24–27.
654 General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), annex, first
principle.
655 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(see footnote 36 above), at p. 100, para. 188.
State responsibility 115
legality of the purported annexation, the effects of which
were subsequently reversed.
(8) As regards the denial by a State of the right of selfdetermination
of peoples, the advisory opinion of ICJ in
the Namibia case is similarly clear in calling for a nonrecognition
of the situation.656 The same obligations are
reflected in the resolutions of the Security Council and
General Assembly concerning the situation in Rhodesia657
and the Bantustans in South Africa.658 These examples
reflect the principle that where a serious breach
in the sense of article 40 has resulted in a situation that
might otherwise call for recognition, this has nonetheless
to be withheld. Collective non-recognition would seem to
be a prerequisite for any concerted community response
against such breaches and marks the minimum necessary
response by States to the serious breaches referred to in
article 40.
(9) Under article 41, paragraph 2, no State shall recognize
the situation created by the serious breach as lawful.
This obligation applies to all States, including the responsible
State. There have been cases where the responsible
State has sought to consolidate the situation it has created
by its own “recognition”. Evidently, the responsible
State is under an obligation not to recognize or sustain
the unlawful situation arising from the breach. Similar
considerations apply even to the injured State: since the
breach by definition concerns the international community
as a whole, waiver or recognition induced from the
injured State by the responsible State cannot preclude the
international community interest in ensuring a just and
appropriate settlement. These conclusions are consistent
with article 30 on cessation and are reinforced by the peremptory
character of the norms in question.659
(10) The consequences of the obligation of non-recognition
are, however, not unqualified. In the Namibia advisory
opinion the Court, despite holding that the illegality
of the situation was opposable erga omnes and could not
be recognized as lawful even by States not members of the
United Nations, said that:
the non-recognition of South Africa’s administration of the Territory
should not result in depriving the people of Namibia of any advantages
derived from international cooperation. In particular, while official acts
performed by the Government of South Africa on behalf of or concerning
Namibia after the termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid,
this invalidity cannot be extended to those acts, such as, for instance, the
registration of births, deaths and marriages, the effects of which can be
ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the Territory.660
656 Namibia case (see footnote 176 above), where the Court held that
“the termination of the Mandate and the declaration of the illegality of
South Africa’s presence in Namibia are opposable to all States in the
sense of barring erga omnes the legality of a situation which is maintained
in violation of international law” (p. 56, para. 126).
657 Cf. Security Council resolution 216 (1965) of 12 November
1965.
658 See, e.g., General Assembly resolution 31/6 A of 26 October
1976, endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 402 (1976) of
22 December 1976; Assembly resolutions 32/105 N of 14 December
1977 and 34/93 G of 12 December 1979; see also the statements of
21 September 1979 and 15 December 1981 issued by the respective
presidents of the Security Council in reaction to the “creation” of Venda
and Ciskei (S/13549 and S/14794).
659 See also paragraph (7) of the commentary to article 20 and
paragraph (4) of the commentary to article 45.
660 Namibia case (see footnote 176 above), p. 56, para. 125.
Both the principle of non-recognition and this qualification
to it have been applied, for example, by the European
Court of Human Rights.661
(11) The second obligation contained in paragraph 2
prohibits States from rendering aid or assistance in
maintaining the situation created by a serious breach in
the sense of article 40. This goes beyond the provisions
dealing with aid or assistance in the commission of an
internationally wrongful act, which are covered by article
16. It deals with conduct “after the fact” which assists the
responsible State in maintaining a situation “opposable to
all States in the sense of barring erga omnes the legality
of a situation which is maintained in violation of international
law”.662 It extends beyond the commission of the
serious breach itself to the maintenance of the situation
created by that breach, and it applies whether or not the
breach itself is a continuing one. As to the elements of
“aid or assistance”, article 41 is to be read in connection
with article 16. In particular, the concept of aid or assistance
in article 16 presupposes that the State has “knowledge
of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful
act”. There is no need to mention such a requirement in
article 41, paragraph 2, as it is hardly conceivable that a
State would not have notice of the commission of a serious
breach by another State.
(12) In some respects, the prohibition contained in paragraph
2 may be seen as a logical extension of the duty
of non-recognition. However, it has a separate scope of
application insofar as actions are concerned which would
not imply recognition of the situation created by serious
breaches in the sense of article 40. This separate existence
is confirmed, for example, in the resolutions of the Security
Council prohibiting any aid or assistance in maintaining
the illegal apartheid regime in South Africa or Portuguese
colonial rule.663 Just as in the case of the duty of
non-recognition, these resolutions would seem to express
a general idea applicable to all situations created by serious
breaches in the sense of article 40.
(13) Pursuant to paragraph 3, article 41 is without
prejudice to the other consequences elaborated in Part
Two and to possible further consequences that a serious
breach in the sense of article 40 may entail. The purpose
of this paragraph is twofold. First, it makes it clear that
a serious breach in the sense of article 40 entails the legal
consequences stipulated for all breaches in chapters I
and II of Part Two. Consequently, a serious breach in the
sense of article 40 gives rise to an obligation, on behalf of
the responsible State, to cease the wrongful act, to continue
performance and, if appropriate, to give guarantees
and assurances of non-repetition. By the same token, it
entails a duty to make reparation in conformity with the
rules set out in chapter II of this Part. The incidence of
these obligations will no doubt be affected by the gravity
of the breach in question, but this is allowed for in the
actual language of the relevant articles.
661 Loizidou, Merits (see footnote 160 above), p. 2216; Cyprus
v. Turkey (see footnote 247 above), paras. 89–98.
662 Namibia case (see footnote 176 above), p. 56, para. 126.
663 See, e.g., Security Council resolutions 218 (1965) of 23 November
1965 on the Portuguese colonies, and 418 (1977) of
4 November 1977 and 569 (1985) of 26 July 1985 on South Africa.
116 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
(14) Secondly, paragraph 3 allows for such further consequences
of a serious breach as may be provided for by
international law. This may be done by the individual primary
rule, as in the case of the prohibition of aggression.
Paragraph 3 accordingly allows that international law may
recognize additional legal consequences flowing from the
commission of a serious breach in the sense of article 40.
The fact that such further consequences are not expressly
referred to in chapter III does not prejudice their recognition
in present-day international law, or their further development.
In addition, paragraph 3 reflects the conviction
that the legal regime of serious breaches is itself in
a state of development. By setting out certain basic legal
consequences of serious breaches in the sense of article
40, article 41 does not intend to preclude the future development
of a more elaborate regime of consequences
entailed by such breaches.
PART THREE
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF A STATE
Part Three deals with the implementation of State responsibility,
i.e. with giving effect to the obligations of
cessation and reparation which arise for a responsible State
under Part Two by virtue of its commission of an internationally
wrongful act. Although State responsibility arises
under international law independently of its invocation by
another State, it is still necessary to specify what other
States faced with a breach of an international obligation
may do, what action they may take in order to secure the
performance of the obligations of cessation and reparation
on the part of the responsible State. This, sometimes
referred to as the mise-en-oeuvre of State responsibility,
is the subject matter of Part Three. Part Three consists of
two chapters. Chapter I deals with the invocation of State
responsibility by other States and with certain associated
questions. Chapter II deals with countermeasures taken in
order to induce the responsible State to cease the conduct
in question and to provide reparation.
CHAPTER I
INVOCATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY
OF A STATE
Commentary
(1) Part One of the articles identifies the internationally
wrongful act of a State generally in terms of the breach
of any international obligation of that State. Part Two defines
the consequences of internationally wrongful acts in
the field of responsibility as obligations of the responsible
State, not as rights of any other State, person or entity.
Part Three is concerned with the implementation of State
responsibility, i.e. with the entitlement of other States to
invoke the international responsibility of the responsible
State and with certain modalities of such invocation. The
rights that other persons or entities may have arising from
a breach of an international obligation are preserved by
article 33, paragraph 2.
(2) Central to the invocation of responsibility is the concept
of the injured State. This is the State whose individual
right has been denied or impaired by the internationally
wrongful act or which has otherwise been particularly
affected by that act. This concept is introduced in article
42 and various consequences are drawn from it in
other articles of this chapter. In keeping with the broad
range of international obligations covered by the articles,
it is necessary to recognize that a broader range of States
may have a legal interest in invoking responsibility and
ensuring compliance with the obligation in question. Indeed,
in certain situations, all States may have such an
interest, even though none of them is individually or
specially affected by the breach.664 This possibility is recognized
in article 48. Articles 42 and 48 are couched in
terms of the entitlement of States to invoke the responsibility
of another State. They seek to avoid problems
arising from the use of possibly misleading terms such
as “direct” versus “indirect” injury or “objective” versus
“subjective” rights.
(3) Although article 42 is drafted in the singular (“an
injured State”), more than one State may be injured by
an internationally wrongful act and be entitled to invoke
responsibility as an injured State. This is made clear by
article 46. Nor are articles 42 and 48 mutually exclusive.
Situations may well arise in which one State is “injured”
in the sense of article 42, and other States are entitled to
invoke responsibility under article 48.
(4) Chapter I also deals with a number of related questions:
the requirement of notice if a State wishes to invoke
the responsibility of another (art. 43), certain aspects of
the admissibility of claims (art. 44), loss of the right to invoke
responsibility (art. 45), and cases where the responsibility
of more than one State may be invoked in relation
to the same internationally wrongful act (art. 47).
(5) Reference must also be made to article 55, which
makes clear the residual character of the articles. In addition
to giving rise to international obligations for States, special
rules may also determine which other State or States are
entitled to invoke the international responsibility arising
from their breach, and what remedies they may seek. This
was true, for example, of article 396 of the Treaty of Versailles,
which was the subject of the decision in the S.S.
“Wimbledon” case.665 It is also true of article 33 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. It will be a matter
of interpretation in each case whether such provisions are
intended to be exclusive, i.e. to apply as a lex specialis.
664 Cf. the statement by ICJ that “all States can be held to have a legal
interest” as concerns breaches of obligations erga omnes, Barcelona
Traction (footnote 25 above), p. 32, para. 33, cited in paragraph (2) of
the commentary to chapter III of Part Two.
665 Four States there invoked the responsibility of Germany, at least
one of which, Japan, had no specific interest in the voyage of the S.S.
“Wimbledon” (see footnote 34 above).
State responsibility 117
Article 42. Invocation of responsibility
by an injured State
A State is entitled as an injured State to invoke
the responsibility of another State if the obligation
breached is owed to:
(a) that State individually; or
(b) a group of States including that State, or the
international community as a whole, and the breach
of the obligation:
i(i) specially affects that State; or
(ii) is of such a character as radically to change
the position of all the other States to which
the obligation is owed with respect to the
further performance of the obligation.
Commentary
(1) Article 42 provides that the implementation of State
responsibility is in the first place an entitlement of the
“injured State”. It defines this term in a relatively narrow
way, drawing a distinction between injury to an individual
State or possibly a small number of States and the legal
interests of several or all States in certain obligations established
in the collective interest. The latter are dealt with
in article 48.
(2) This chapter is expressed in terms of the invocation
by a State of the responsibility of another State. For this
purpose, invocation should be understood as taking measures
of a relatively formal character, for example, the raising
or presentation of a claim against another State or the
commencement of proceedings before an international
court or tribunal. A State does not invoke the responsibility
of another State merely because it criticizes that State
for a breach and calls for observance of the obligation,
or even reserves its rights or protests. For the purpose of
these articles, protest as such is not an invocation of responsibility;
it has a variety of forms and purposes and is
not limited to cases involving State responsibility. There
is in general no requirement that a State which wishes to
protest against a breach of international law by another
State or remind it of its international responsibilities in
respect of a treaty or other obligation by which they are
both bound should establish any specific title or interest to
do so. Such informal diplomatic contacts do not amount
to the invocation of responsibility unless and until they
involve specific claims by the State concerned, such as for
compensation for a breach affecting it, or specific action
such as the filing of an application before a competent international
tribunal,666 or even the taking of countermeasures.
In order to take such steps, i.e. to invoke responsibility
in the sense of the articles, some more specific
entitlement is needed. In particular, for a State to invoke
responsibility on its own account it should have a specific
right to do so, e.g. a right of action specifically conferred
666 An analogous distinction is drawn by article 27, paragraph 2,
of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of other States, which distinguishes between the
bringing of an international claim in the field of diplomatic protection
and “informal diplomatic exchanges for the sole purpose of facilitating
a settlement of the dispute”.
by a treaty,667 or it must be considered an injured State.
The purpose of article 42 is to define this latter category.
(3) A State which is injured in the sense of article 42 is
entitled to resort to all means of redress contemplated in
the articles. It can invoke the appropriate responsibility
pursuant to Part Two. It may also—as is clear from the
opening phrase of article 49—resort to countermeasures
in accordance with the rules laid down in chapter II of
this Part. The situation of an injured State should be distinguished
from that of any other State which may be entitled
to invoke responsibility, e.g. under article 48 which
deals with the entitlement to invoke responsibility in some
shared general interest. This distinction is clarified by the
opening phrase of article 42, “A State is entitled as an
injured State to invoke the responsibility”.
(4) The definition in article 42 is closely modelled on
article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, although the
scope and purpose of the two provisions are different. Article
42 is concerned with any breach of an international
obligation of whatever character, whereas article 60 is
concerned with breach of treaties. Moreover, article 60 is
concerned exclusively with the right of a State party to a
treaty to invoke a material breach of that treaty by another
party as grounds for its suspension or termination. It is not
concerned with the question of responsibility for breach
of the treaty.668 This is why article 60 is restricted to “material”
breaches of treaties. Only a material breach justifies
termination or suspension of the treaty, whereas in the
context of State responsibility any breach of a treaty gives
rise to responsibility irrespective of its gravity. Despite
these differences, the analogy with article 60 is justified.
Article 60 seeks to identify the States parties to a treaty
which are entitled to respond individually and in their own
right to a material breach by terminating or suspending it.
In the case of a bilateral treaty, the right can only be that of
the other State party, but in the case of a multilateral treaty
article 60, paragraph 2, does not allow every other State
to terminate or suspend the treaty for material breach. The
other State must be specially affected by the breach, or at
least individually affected in that the breach necessarily
undermines or destroys the basis for its own further performance
of the treaty.
(5) In parallel with the cases envisaged in article 60 of
the 1969 Vienna Convention, three cases are identified in
article 42. In the first case, in order to invoke the responsibility
of another State as an injured State, a State must have
an individual right to the performance of an obligation, in
the way that a State party to a bilateral treaty has vis-à-vis
the other State party (subparagraph (a)). Secondly, a State
may be specially affected by the breach of an obligation
to which it is a party, even though it cannot be said that
the obligation is owed to it individually (subparagraph (b)
(i)). Thirdly, it may be the case that performance of the
obligation by the responsible State is a necessary condition
of its performance by all the other States (subparagraph
(b) (ii)); this is the so-called “integral” or “inter-
667 In relation to article 42, such a treaty right could be considered a
lex specialis: see article 55 and commentary.
668 Cf. the 1969 Vienna Convention, art. 73.
118 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
dependent” obligation.669 In each of these cases, the possible
suspension or termination of the obligation or of its
performance by the injured State may be of little value to
it as a remedy. Its primary interest may be in the restoration
of the legal relationship by cessation and reparation.
(6) Pursuant to subparagraph (a) of article 42, a State is
“injured” if the obligation breached was owed to it individually.
The expression “individually” indicates that in the
circumstances, performance of the obligation was owed
to that State. This will necessarily be true of an obligation
arising under a bilateral treaty between the two States
parties to it, but it will also be true in other cases, e.g. of
a unilateral commitment made by one State to another. It
may be the case under a rule of general international law:
thus, for example, rules concerning the non-navigational
uses of an international river which may give rise to individual
obligations as between one riparian State and another.
Or it may be true under a multilateral treaty where
particular performance is incumbent under the treaty as
between one State party and another. For example, the
obligation of the receiving State under article 22 of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to protect the
premises of a mission is owed to the sending State. Such
cases are to be contrasted with situations where performance
of the obligation is owed generally to the parties to
the treaty at the same time and is not differentiated or individualized.
It will be a matter for the interpretation and
application of the primary rule to determine into which of
the categories an obligation comes. The following discussion
is illustrative only.
(7) An obvious example of cases coming within the
scope of subparagraph (a) is a bilateral treaty relationship.
If one State violates an obligation the performance
of which is owed specifically to another State, the latter is
an “injured State” in the sense of article 42. Other examples
include binding unilateral acts by which one State assumes
an obligation vis-à-vis another State; or the case of
a treaty establishing obligations owed to a third State not
party to the treaty.670 If it is established that the beneficiaries
of the promise or the stipulation in favour of a third
State were intended to acquire actual rights to performance
of the obligation in question, they will be injured
by its breach. Another example is a binding judgement
of an international court or tribunal imposing obligations
on one State party to the litigation for the benefit of the
other party.671
(8) In addition, subparagraph (a) is intended to cover
cases where the performance of an obligation under a
multilateral treaty or customary international law is owed
to one particular State. The scope of subparagraph (a)
in this respect is different from that of article 60, paragraph
1, of the 1969 Vienna Convention, which relies on
the formal criterion of bilateral as compared with multilat-
669 The notion of “integral” obligations was developed by Fitzmaurice
as Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties: see Yearbook …
1957, vol. II, p. 54. The term has sometimes given rise to confusion,
being used to refer to human rights or environmental obligations which
are not owed on an “all or nothing” basis. The term “interdependent
obligations” may be more appropriate.
670 Cf. the 1969 Vienna Convention, art. 36.
671 See, e.g., Article 59 of the Statute of ICJ.
eral treaties. But although a multilateral treaty will characteristically
establish a framework of rules applicable to
all the States parties, in certain cases its performance in a
given situation involves a relationship of a bilateral character
between two parties. Multilateral treaties of this kind
have often been referred to as giving rise to “ ‘bundles’ of
bilateral relations”.672
(9) The identification of one particular State as injured
by a breach of an obligation under the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations does not exclude that all States
parties may have an interest of a general character in compliance
with international law and in the continuation of
international institutions and arrangements which have
been built up over the years. In the United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran case, after referring to
the “fundamentally unlawful character” of the Islamic Republic
of Iran’s conduct in participating in the detention of
the diplomatic and consular personnel, the Court drew:
the attention of the entire international community, of which Iran itself
has been a member since time immemorial, to the irreparable harm that
may be caused by events of the kind now before the Court. Such events
cannot fail to undermine the edifice of law carefully constructed by
mankind over a period of centuries, the maintenance of which is vital
for the security and well-being of the complex international community
of the present day, to which it is more essential than ever that the rules
developed to ensure the ordered progress of relations between its members
should be constantly and scrupulously respected.673
(10) Although discussion of multilateral obligations
has generally focused on those arising under multilateral
treaties, similar considerations apply to obligations under
rules of customary international law. For example, the
rules of general international law governing the diplomatic
or consular relations between States establish bilateral
relations between particular receiving and sending States,
and violations of these obligations by a particular receiving
State injure the sending State to which performance
was owed in the specific case.
(11) Subparagraph (b) deals with injury arising from
violations of collective obligations, i.e. obligations that
apply between more than two States and whose performance
in the given case is not owed to one State individually,
but to a group of States or even the international
community as a whole. The violation of these obligations
only injures any particular State if additional requirements
are met. In using the expression “group of States”, article
42, subparagraph (b), does not imply that the group has
any separate existence or that it has separate legal personality.
Rather, the term is intended to refer to a group of
States, consisting of all or a considerable number of States
in the world or in a given region, which have combined
to achieve some collective purpose and which may be
672 See, e.g., K. Sachariew, “State responsibility for multilateral
treaty violations: identifying the ‘injured State’ and its legal status”,
Netherlands International Law Review, vol. 35, No. 3 (1988), p. 273,
at pp. 277–278; B. Simma, “Bilateralism and community interest in the
law of State responsibility”, International Law at a Time of Perplexity:
Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne, Y. Dinstein, ed. (Dordrecht,
Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), p. 821, at p. 823; C. Annacker, “The legal
régime of erga omnes obligations in international law”, Austrian
Journal of Public and International Law, vol. 46, No. 2 (1994), p. 131,
at p. 136; and D. N. Hutchinson, “Solidarity and breaches of multilateral
treaties”, BYBIL, 1988, vol. 59, p. 151, at pp. 154–155.
673 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (see footnote
59 above), pp. 41–43, paras. 89 and 92.
State responsibility 119
considered for that purpose as making up a community of
States of a functional character.
(12) Subparagraph (b) (i) stipulates that a State is injured
if it is “specially affected” by the violation of a collective
obligation. The term “specially affected” is taken
from article 60, paragraph (2) (b), of the 1969 Vienna
Convention. Even in cases where the legal effects of an
internationally wrongful act extend by implication to the
whole group of States bound by the obligation or to the
international community as a whole, the wrongful act may
have particular adverse effects on one State or on a small
number of States. For example a case of pollution of the
high seas in breach of article 194 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea may particularly impact
on one or several States whose beaches may be polluted
by toxic residues or whose coastal fisheries may be
closed. In that case, independently of any general interest
of the States parties to the Convention in the preservation
of the marine environment, those coastal States parties
should be considered as injured by the breach. Like article
60, paragraph (2) (b), of the 1969 Vienna Convention,
subparagraph (b) (i) does not define the nature or extent
of the special impact that a State must have sustained in
order to be considered “injured”. This will have to be assessed
on a case-by-case basis, having regard to the object
and purpose of the primary obligation breached and the
facts of each case. For a State to be considered injured,
it must be affected by the breach in a way which distinguishes
it from the generality of other States to which the
obligation is owed.
(13) In contrast, subparagraph (b) (ii) deals with a special
category of obligations, the breach of which must be
considered as affecting per se every other State to which
the obligation is owed. Article 60, paragraph 2 (c), of the
1969 Vienna Convention recognizes an analogous category
of treaties, viz. those “of such a character that a
material breach of its provisions by one party radically
changes the position of every party with respect to the
further performance of its obligations”. Examples include
a disarmament treaty,674 a nuclear-free zone treaty, or any
other treaty where each party’s performance is effectively
conditioned upon and requires the performance of each
of the others. Under article 60, paragraph 2 (c), any State
party to such a treaty may terminate or suspend it in its
relations not merely with the responsible State but generally
in its relations with all the other parties.
(14) Essentially, the same considerations apply to obligations
of this character for the purposes of State responsibility.
The other States parties may have no interest in
the termination or suspension of such obligations as distinct
from continued performance, and they must all be
considered as individually entitled to react to a breach.
This is so whether or not any one of them is particularly
affected; indeed they may all be equally affected, and none
may have suffered quantifiable damage for the purposes
of article 36. They may nonetheless have a strong interest
in cessation and in other aspects of reparation, in particular
restitution. For example, if one State party to the Ant-
674 The example given in the commentary of the Commission to what
became article 60: Yearbook … 1966, vol. II, p. 255, document A/6309/
Rev.1, para. (8).
arctic Treaty claims sovereignty over an unclaimed area
of Antarctica contrary to article 4 of that Treaty, the other
States parties should be considered as injured thereby and
as entitled to seek cessation, restitution (in the form of the
annulment of the claim) and assurances of non-repetition
in accordance with Part Two.
(15) The articles deal with obligations arising under international
law from whatever source and are not confined
to treaty obligations. In practice, interdependent obligations
covered by subparagraph (b) (ii) will usually arise
under treaties establishing particular regimes. Even under
such treaties it may not be the case that just any breach of
the obligation has the effect of undermining the performance
of all the other States involved, and it is desirable that
this subparagraph be narrow in its scope. Accordingly, a
State is only considered injured under subparagraph (b)
(ii) if the breach is of such a character as radically to affect
the enjoyment of the rights or the performance of the
obligations of all the other States to which the obligation
is owed.
Article 43. Notice of claim by an injured State
1. An injured State which invokes the responsibility
of another State shall give notice of its claim to that
State.
2. The injured State may specify in particular:
(a) the conduct that the responsible State should
take in order to cease the wrongful act, if it is continuing;
(b) what form reparation should take in accordance
with the provisions of Part Two.
Commentary
(1) Article 43 concerns the modalities to be observed by
an injured State in invoking the responsibility of another
State. The article applies to the injured State as defined in
article 42, but States invoking responsibility under article
48 must also comply with its requirements.675
(2) Although State responsibility arises by operation of
law on the commission of an internationally wrongful act
by a State, in practice it is necessary for an injured State
and/or other interested State(s) to respond, if they wish to
seek cessation or reparation. Responses can take a variety
of forms, from an unofficial and confidential reminder
of the need to fulfil the obligation through formal protest,
consultations, etc. Moreover, the failure of an injured
State which has notice of a breach to respond may have legal
consequences, including even the eventual loss of the
right to invoke responsibility by waiver or acquiescence:
this is dealt with in article 45.
(3) Article 43 requires an injured State which wishes to
invoke the responsibility of another State to give notice of
its claim to that State. It is analogous to article 65 of the
1969 Vienna Convention. Notice under article 43 need not
675 See article 48, paragraph (3), and commentary.
120 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
be in writing, nor is it a condition for the operation of the
obligation to provide reparation. Moreover, the requirement
of notification of the claim does not imply that the
normal consequence of the non-performance of an international
obligation is the lodging of a statement of claim.
Nonetheless, an injured or interested State is entitled to
respond to the breach and the first step should be to call
the attention of the responsible State to the situation, and
to call on it to take appropriate steps to cease the breach
and to provide redress.
(4) It is not the function of the articles to specify in detail
the form which an invocation of responsibility should
take. In practice, claims of responsibility are raised at different
levels of government, depending on their seriousness
and on the general relations between the States concerned.
In the Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru case,
Australia argued that Nauru’s claim was inadmissible
because it had “not been submitted within a reasonable
time”.676 The Court referred to the fact that the claim had
been raised, and not settled, prior to Nauru’s independence
in 1968, and to press reports that the claim had been mentioned
by the new President of Nauru in his independence
day speech, as well as, inferentially, in subsequent correspondence
and discussions with Australian Ministers.
However, the Court also noted that:
It was only on 6 October 1983 that the President of Nauru wrote to
the Prime Minister of Australia requesting him to “seek a sympathetic
reconsideration of Nauru’s position”. 677
The Court summarized the communications between the
parties as follows:
The Court … takes note of the fact that Nauru was officially informed,
at the latest by letter of 4 February 1969, of the position of Australia on
the subject of rehabilitation of the phosphate lands worked out before
1 July 1967. Nauru took issue with that position in writing only on
6 October 1983. In the meantime, however, as stated by Nauru and
not contradicted by Australia, the question had on two occasions been
raised by the President of Nauru with the competent Australian authorities.
The Court considers that, given the nature of relations between
Australia and Nauru, as well as the steps thus taken, Nauru’s Application
was not rendered inadmissible by passage of time. 678
In the circumstances, it was sufficient that the respondent
State was aware of the claim as a result of communications
from the claimant, even if the evidence of those communications
took the form of press reports of speeches or meetings
rather than of formal diplomatic correspondence.
(5) When giving notice of a claim, an injured or interested
State will normally specify what conduct in its view
is required of the responsible State by way of cessation of
any continuing wrongful act, and what form any reparation
should take. Thus, paragraph 2 (a) provides that the
injured State may indicate to the responsible State what
should be done in order to cease the wrongful act, if it is
continuing. This indication is not, as such, binding on the
responsible State. The injured State can only require the
responsible State to comply with its obligations, and the
legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act are
not for the injured State to stipulate or define. But it may
be helpful to the responsible State to know what would
676 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Preliminary Objections
(see footnote 230 above), p. 253, para. 31.
677 Ibid., p. 254, para. 35.
678 Ibid., pp. 254–255, para. 36.
satisfy the injured State; this may facilitate the resolution
of the dispute.
(6) Paragraph 2 (b) deals with the question of the election
of the form of reparation by the injured State. In general,
an injured State is entitled to elect as between the
available forms of reparation. Thus, it may prefer compensation
to the possibility of restitution, as Germany did
in the Factory at Chorzów case,679 or as Finland eventually
chose to do in its settlement of the Passage through the
Great Belt case.680 Or it may content itself with declaratory
relief, generally or in relation to a particular aspect
of its claim. On the other hand, there are cases where a
State may not, as it were, pocket compensation and walk
away from an unresolved situation, for example one involving
the life or liberty of individuals or the entitlement
of a people to their territory or to self-determination. In
particular, insofar as there are continuing obligations the
performance of which are not simply matters for the two
States concerned, those States may not be able to resolve
the situation by a settlement, just as an injured State may
not be able on its own to absolve the responsible State
from its continuing obligations to a larger group of States
or to the international community as a whole.
(7) In the light of these limitations on the capacity of the
injured State to elect the preferred form of reparation, article
43 does not set forth the right of election in an absolute
form. Instead, it provides guidance to an injured State as
to what sort of information it may include in its notification
of the claim or in subsequent communications.
Article 44. Admissibility of claims
The responsibility of a State may not be invoked if:
(a) the claim is not brought in accordance with any
applicable rule relating to the nationality of claims;
(b) the claim is one to which the rule of exhaustion
of local remedies applies and any available and effective
local remedy has not been exhausted.
Commentary
(1) The present articles are not concerned with questions
of the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals,
or in general with the conditions for the admissibility
of cases brought before such courts or tribunals. Rather,
they define the conditions for establishing the international
responsibility of a State and for the invocation of
679 As PCIJ noted in the Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction (see footnote
34 above), by that stage of the dispute, Germany was no longer
seeking on behalf of the German companies concerned the return of the
factory in question or of its contents (p. 17).
680 In the Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark),
Provisional Measures, Order of 29 July 1991, I.C.J. Reports 1991,
p. 12, ICJ did not accept Denmark’s argument as to the impossibility
of restitution if, on the merits, it was found that the construction of the
bridge across the Great Belt would result in a violation of Denmark’s
international obligations. For the terms of the eventual settlement, see
M. Koskenniemi, “L’affaire du passage par le Grand-Belt”, Annuaire
français de droit international, vol. 38 (1992), p. 905, at p. 940.
State responsibility 121
that responsibility by another State or States. Thus, it is
not the function of the articles to deal with such questions
as the requirement for exhausting other means of peaceful
settlement before commencing proceedings, or such
doctrines as litispendence or election as they may affect
the jurisdiction of one international tribunal vis-à-vis another.
681 By contrast, certain questions which would be
classified as questions of admissibility when raised before
an international court are of a more fundamental character.
They are conditions for invoking the responsibility of
a State in the first place. Two such matters are dealt with
in article 44: the requirements of nationality of claims and
exhaustion of local remedies.
(2) Subparagraph (a) provides that the responsibility of
a State may not be invoked other than in accordance with
any applicable rule relating to the nationality of claims.
As PCIJ said in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions
case:
It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled
to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international
law committed by another State, from whom they have been unable to
obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels.682
Subparagraph (a) does not attempt a detailed elaboration
of the nationality of claims rule or of the exceptions to
it. Rather, it makes it clear that the nationality of claims
rule is not only relevant to questions of jurisdiction or the
admissibility of claims before judicial bodies, but is also
a general condition for the invocation of responsibility in
those cases where it is applicable.683
(3) Subparagraph (b) provides that when the claim is
one to which the rule of exhaustion of local remedies applies,
the claim is inadmissible if any available and effective
local remedy has not been exhausted. The paragraph
is formulated in general terms in order to cover any case
to which the exhaustion of local remedies rule applies,
whether under treaty or general international law, and in
spheres not necessarily limited to diplomatic protection.
(4) The local remedies rule was described by a Chamber
of the Court in the ELSI case as “an important principle of
customary international law”.684 In the context of a claim
681 For discussion of the range of considerations affecting jurisdiction
and admissibility of international claims before courts, see G.
Abi-Saab, Les exceptions préliminaires dans la procédure de la Cour
internationale (Paris, Pedone, 1967); Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The
Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice (Cambridge,
Grotius, 1986), vol. 2, pp. 427–575; and S. Rosenne, The Law and
Practice of the International Court, 1920–1996, 3rd ed. (The Hague,
Martinus Nijhoff, 1997), vol. II, Jurisdiction.
682 Mavrommatis (see footnote 236 above), p. 12.
683 Questions of nationality of claims will be dealt with in detail in
the work of the Commission on diplomatic protection. See first report
of the Special Rapporteur for the topic “Diplomatic protection” in
Yearbook … 2000, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/506 and
Add.1.
684 ELSI (see footnote 85 above), p. 42, para. 50. See also Interhandel,
Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 6, at p. 27. On the
exhaustion of local remedies rule generally, see, e.g., C. F. Amerasinghe,
Local Remedies in International Law (Cambridge, Grotius, 1990);
J. Chappez, La règle de l’épuisement des voies de recours internes
(Paris, Pedone, 1972); K. Doehring, “Local remedies, exhaustion of ”,
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, R. Bernhardt, ed. (footnote
409 above), vol. 3, pp. 238–242; and G. Perrin, “La naissance de la responsabilité
internationale et l’épuisement des voies de recours internes
brought on behalf of a corporation of the claimant State,
the Chamber defined the rule succinctly in the following
terms:
for an international claim [sc. on behalf of individual nationals or corporations]
to be admissible, it is sufficient if the essence of the claim
has been brought before the competent tribunals and pursued as far as
permitted by local law and procedures, and without success.685
The Chamber thus treated the exhaustion of local remedies
as being distinct, in principle, from “the merits of
the case”.686
(5) Only those local remedies which are “available and
effective” have to be exhausted before invoking the responsibility
of a State. The mere existence on paper of
remedies under the internal law of a State does not impose
a requirement to make use of those remedies in
every case. In particular, there is no requirement to use a
remedy which offers no possibility of redressing the situation,
for instance, where it is clear from the outset that
the law which the local court would have to apply can lead
only to the rejection of any appeal. Beyond this, article
44, subparagraph (b), does not attempt to spell out comprehensively
the scope and content of the exhaustion of
local remedies rule, leaving this to the applicable rules of
international law.687
Article 45. Loss of the right to invoke responsibility
The responsibility of a State may not be invoked if:
(a) the injured State has validly waived the claim;
(b) the injured State is to be considered as having,
by reason of its conduct, validly acquiesced in the lapse
of the claim.
Commentary
(1) Article 45 is analogous to article 45 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention concerning loss of the right to invoke a
ground for invalidating or terminating a treaty. The article
deals with two situations in which the right of an injured
State or other States concerned to invoke the responsibility
of a wrongdoing State may be lost: waiver and acquiescence
in the lapse of the claim. In this regard, the position
of an injured State as referred to in article 42 and other
States concerned with a breach needs to be distinguished.
A valid waiver or settlement of the responsibility dispute
dans le projet d’articles de la Commission du droit international”,
Festschrift für Rudolf Bindschedler (Bern, Stämpfli, 1980), p. 271.
On the exhaustion of local remedies rule in relation to violations of
human rights obligations, see, e.g., A. A. Cançado Trindade, The Application
of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International
Law: Its Rationale in the International Protection of Individual Rights
(Cambridge University Press, 1983); and E. Wyler, L’illicite et la condition
des personnes privées (Paris, Pedone, 1995), pp. 65–89.
685 ELSI (see footnote 85 above), p. 46, para. 59.
686 Ibid., p. 48, para. 63.
687 The topic will be dealt with in detail in the work of the Commission
on diplomatic protection. See second report of the Special Rapporteur
on diplomatic protection in Yearbook … 2001, vol. II (Part One),
document A/CN.4/514.
122 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
between the responsible State and the injured State, or,
if there is more than one, all the injured States, may preclude
any claim for reparation. Positions taken by individual
States referred to in article 48 will not have such
an effect.
(2) Subparagraph (a) deals with the case where an injured
State has waived either the breach itself, or its consequences
in terms of responsibility. This is a manifestation
of the general principle of consent in relation to rights or
obligations within the dispensation of a particular State.
(3) In some cases, the waiver may apply only to one aspect
of the legal relationship between the injured State and
the responsible State. For example, in the Russian Indemnity
case, the Russian embassy had repeatedly demanded
from Turkey a certain sum corresponding to the capital
amount of a loan, without any reference to interest or
damages for delay. Turkey having paid the sum demanded,
the tribunal held that this conduct amounted to the abandonment
of any other claim arising from the loan.688
(4) A waiver is only effective if it is validly given. As
with other manifestations of State consent, questions of
validity can arise with respect to a waiver, for example,
possible coercion of the State or its representative, or a
material error as to the facts of the matter, arising perhaps
from a misrepresentation of those facts by the responsible
State. The use of the term “valid waiver” is intended to
leave to the general law the question of what amounts to
a valid waiver in the circumstances.689 Of particular significance
in this respect is the question of consent given
by an injured State following a breach of an obligation
arising from a peremptory norm of general international
law, especially one to which article 40 applies. Since such
a breach engages the interest of the international community
as a whole, even the consent or acquiescence of the
injured State does not preclude that interest from being
expressed in order to ensure a settlement in conformity
with international law.
(5) Although it may be possible to infer a waiver from
the conduct of the States concerned or from a unilateral
statement, the conduct or statement must be unequivocal.
In the Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru case, it was
argued that the Nauruan authorities before independence
had waived the rehabilitation claim by concluding an
agreement relating to the future of the phosphate industry
as well as by statements made at the time of independence.
As to the former, the record of negotiations showed
that the question of waiving the rehabilitation claim had
been raised and not accepted, and the Agreement itself
was silent on the point. As to the latter, the relevant statements
were unclear and equivocal. The Court held there
had been no waiver, since the conduct in question “did
not at any time effect a clear and unequivocal waiver of
their claims”.690 In particular, the statements relied on
“[n]otwithstanding some ambiguity in the wording …
did not imply any departure from the point of view ex-
688 Russian Indemnity (see footnote 354 above), p. 446.
689 Cf. the position with respect to valid consent under article 20: see
paragraphs (4) to (8) of the commentary to article 20.
690 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Preliminary Objections (see
footnote 230 above), p. 247, para. 13.
pressed clearly and repeatedly by the representatives of
the Nauruan people before various organs of the United
Nations”.691
(6) Just as it may explicitly waive the right to invoke
responsibility, so an injured State may acquiesce in the
loss of that right. Subparagraph (b) deals with the case
where an injured State is to be considered as having, by
reason of its conduct, validly acquiesced in the lapse of
the claim. The article emphasizes conduct of the State,
which could include, where applicable, unreasonable delay,
as the determining criterion for the lapse of the claim.
Mere lapse of time without a claim being resolved is not,
as such, enough to amount to acquiescence, in particular
where the injured State does everything it can reasonably
do to maintain its claim.
(7) The principle that a State may by acquiescence lose
its right to invoke responsibility was endorsed by ICJ in
the Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru case, in the following
passage:
The Court recognizes that, even in the absence of any applicable treaty
provision, delay on the part of a claimant State may render an application
inadmissible. It notes, however, that international law does not lay
down any specific time limit in that regard. It is therefore for the Court
to determine in the light of the circumstances of each case whether the
passage of time renders an application inadmissible.692
In the LaGrand case, the Court held the German application
admissible even though Germany had taken legal
action some years after the breach had become known
to it.693
(8) One concern of the rules relating to delay is that additional
difficulties may be caused to the respondent State
due to the lapse of time, e.g. as concerns the collection
and presentation of evidence. Thus, in the Stevenson case
and the Gentini case, considerations of procedural fairness
to the respondent State were advanced.694 In contrast, the
plea of delay has been rejected if, in the circumstances of
a case, the respondent State could not establish the existence
of any prejudice on its part, as where it has always
had notice of the claim and was in a position to collect and
preserve evidence relating to it.695
(9) Moreover, contrary to what may be suggested by
the expression “delay”, international courts have not engaged
simply in measuring the lapse of time and applying
clear-cut time limits. No generally accepted time limit,
691 Ibid., p. 250, para. 20.
692 Ibid., pp. 253–254, para. 32. The Court went on to hold that,
in the circumstances of the case and having regard to the history of
the matter, Nauru’s application was not inadmissible on this ground
(para. 36). It reserved for the merits any question of prejudice to the
respondent State by reason of the delay. See further paragraph (8) of the
commentary to article 13.
693 LaGrand, Provisional Measures (see footnote 91 above)
and LaGrand, Judgment (see footnote 119 above), at pp. 486–487,
paras. 53–57.
694 See Stevenson, UNRIAA, vol. IX (Sales No. 59.V.5), p. 385
(1903); and Gentini, ibid., vol. X (Sales No. 60.V.4), p. 551 (1903).
695 See, e.g., Tagliaferro, UNRIAA, vol. X (Sales No. 60.V.4),
p. 592, at p. 593 (1903); see also the actual decision in Stevenson
(footnote 694 above), pp. 386–387.
State responsibility 123
expressed in terms of years, has been laid down.696 The
Swiss Federal Department in 1970 suggested a period
of 20 to 30 years since the coming into existence of the
claim.697 Others have stated that the requirements were
more exacting for contractual claims than for non-contractual
claims.698 None of the attempts to establish any
precise or finite time limit for international claims in general
has achieved acceptance.699 It would be very difficult
to establish any single limit, given the variety of situations,
obligations and conduct that may be involved.
(10) Once a claim has been notified to the respondent
State, delay in its prosecution (e.g. before an international
tribunal) will not usually be regarded as rendering it inadmissible.
700 Thus, in the Certain Phosphate Lands in
Nauru case, ICJ held it to be sufficient that Nauru had referred
to its claims in bilateral negotiations with Australia
in the period preceding the formal institution of legal
proceedings in 1989.701 In the Tagliaferro case, Umpire
Ralston likewise held that, despite the lapse of 31 years
since the infliction of damage, the claim was admissible
as it had been notified immediately after the injury had
occurred.702
(11) To summarize, a claim will not be inadmissible on
grounds of delay unless the circumstances are such that
the injured State should be considered as having acquiesced
in the lapse of the claim or the respondent State
has been seriously disadvantaged. International courts
generally engage in a flexible weighing of relevant circumstances
in the given case, taking into account such
matters as the conduct of the respondent State and the
importance of the rights involved. The decisive factor is
whether the respondent State has suffered any prejudice
as a result of the delay in the sense that the respondent
could have reasonably expected that the claim would no
longer be pursued. Even if there has been some prejudice,
it may be able to be taken into account in determining the
form or extent of reparation.703
696 In some cases time limits are laid down for specific categories of
claims arising under specific treaties (e.g. the six-month time limit for
individual applications under article 35, paragraph 1, of the European
Convention on Human Rights) notably in the area of private law (e.g.
in the field of commercial transactions and international transport). See
the Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of
Goods, as amended by the Protocol to the Convention. By contrast, it is
highly unusual for treaty provisions dealing with inter-State claims to
be subject to any express time limits.
697 Communiqué of 29 December 1970, in Annuaire suisse de droit
international, vol. 32 (1976), p. 153.
698 C.-A. Fleischhauer, “Prescription”, Encyclopedia of Public International
Law (see footnote 409 above), vol. 3, p. 1105, at p. 1107.
699 A large number of international decisions stress the absence of
general rules, and in particular of any specific limitation period measured
in years. Rather, the principle of delay is a matter of appreciation
having regard to the facts of the given case. Besides Certain Phosphate
Lands in Nauru (footnotes 230 and 232 above), see, e.g. Gentini (footnote
694 above), p. 561; and the Ambatielos arbitration, ILR, vol. 23,
p. 306, at pp. 314–317 (1956).
700 For statements of the distinction between notice of claim and
commencement of proceedings, see, e.g. R. Jennings and A. Watts, eds.,
Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed. (Harlow, Longman, 1992),
vol. I, Peace, p. 527; and C. Rousseau, Droit international public (Paris,
Sirey, 1983), vol. V, p. 182.
701 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Preliminary Objections
(see footnote 230 above), p. 250, para. 20.
702 Tagliaferro (see footnote 695 above), p. 593.
703 See article 39 and commentary.
Article 46. Plurality of injured States
Where several States are injured by the same internationally
wrongful act, each injured State may separately
invoke the responsibility of the State which has
committed the internationally wrongful act.
Commentary
(1) Article 46 deals with the situation of a plurality of
injured States, in the sense defined in article 42. It states
the principle that where there are several injured States,
each of them may separately invoke the responsibility for
the internationally wrongful act on its own account.
(2) Several States may qualify as “injured” States under
article 42. For example, all the States to which an interdependent
obligation is owed within the meaning of article
42, subparagraph (b) (ii), are injured by its breach. In a
situation of a plurality of injured States, each may seek
cessation of the wrongful act if it is continuing, and claim
reparation in respect of the injury to itself. This conclusion
has never been doubted, and is implicit in the terms
of article 42 itself.
(3) It is by no means unusual for claims arising from
the same internationally wrongful act to be brought by
several States. For example, in the S.S. “Wimbledon”
case, four States brought proceedings before PCIJ under
article 386, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Versailles,
which allowed “any interested Power” to apply in the
event of a violation of the provisions of the Treaty concerning
transit through the Kiel Canal. The Court noted
that “each of the four Applicant Powers has a clear interest
in the execution of the provisions relating to the Kiel
Canal, since they all possess fleets and merchant vessels
flying their respective flags”. It held they were each covered
by article 386, paragraph 1, “even though they may
be unable to adduce a prejudice to any pecuniary interest”.
704 In fact, only France, representing the operator of
the vessel, claimed and was awarded compensation. In
the cases concerning the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955,
proceedings were commenced by the United States, the
United Kingdom and Israel against Bulgaria concerning
the destruction of an Israeli civil aircraft and the loss of
lives involved.705 In the Nuclear Tests cases, Australia
and New Zealand each claimed to be injured in various
ways by the French conduct of atmospheric nuclear tests
at Mururoa Atoll.706
(4) Where the States concerned do not claim compensation
on their own account as distinct from a declaration
704 S.S. “Wimbledon” (see footnote 34 above), p. 20.
705 ICJ held that it lacked jurisdiction over the Israeli claim: Aerial
Incident of 27 July 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1959, p. 131, after which the United Kingdom and United States claims
were withdrawn. In its Memorial, Israel noted that there had been active
coordination of the claims between the various claimant Governments,
and added: “One of the primary reasons for establishing coordination
of this character from the earliest stages was to prevent, so far as was
possible, the Bulgarian Government being faced with double claims
leading to the possibility of double damages” (see footnote 363 above),
p. 106.
706 See Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France) and (New Zealand
v. France) (footnote 196 above), pp. 256 and 460, respectively.
124 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
of the legal situation, it may not be clear whether they are
claiming as injured States or as States invoking responsibility
in the common or general interest under article
48. Indeed, in such cases it may not be necessary to decide
into which category they fall, provided it is clear that
they fall into one or the other. Where there is more than
one injured State claiming compensation on its own account
or on account of its nationals, evidently each State
will be limited to the damage actually suffered. Circumstances
might also arise in which several States injured by
the same act made incompatible claims. For example, one
State may claim restitution whereas the other may prefer
compensation. If restitution is indivisible in such a case
and the election of the second State is valid, it may be that
compensation is appropriate in respect of both claims.707
In any event, two injured States each claiming in respect
of the same wrongful act would be expected to coordinate
their claims so as to avoid double recovery. As ICJ pointed
out in its advisory opinion on Reparation for Injuries, “International
tribunals are already familiar with the problem
of a claim in which two or more national States are interested,
and they know how to protect the defendant State
in such a case”.708
Article 47. Plurality of responsible States
1. Where several States are responsible for the
same internationally wrongful act, the responsibility
of each State may be invoked in relation to that act.
2. Paragraph 1:
(a) does not permit any injured State to recover, by
way of compensation, more than the damage it has suffered;
(b) is without prejudice to any right of recourse
against the other responsible States.
Commentary
(1) Article 47 deals with the situation where there is
a plurality of responsible States in respect of the same
wrongful act. It states the general principle that in such
cases each State is separately responsible for the conduct
attributable to it, and that responsibility is not diminished
or reduced by the fact that one or more other States are
also responsible for the same act.
(2) Several States may be responsible for the same internationally
wrongful act in a range of circumstances. For
example, two or more States might combine in carrying
out together an internationally wrongful act in circumstances
where they may be regarded as acting jointly in respect
of the entire operation. In that case the injured State
can hold each responsible State to account for the wrongful
conduct as a whole. Or two States may act through a
707 Cf. Forests of Central Rhodopia, where the arbitrator declined to
award restitution, inter alia, on the ground that not all the persons or
entities interested in restitution had claimed (see footnote 382 above),
p. 1432.
708 Reparation for Injuries (see footnote 38 above), p. 186.
common organ which carries out the conduct in question,
e.g. a joint authority responsible for the management of a
boundary river. Or one State may direct and control another
State in the commission of the same internationally
wrongful act by the latter, such that both are responsible
for the act.709
(3) It is important not to assume that internal law concepts
and rules in this field can be applied directly to international
law. Terms such as “joint”, “joint and several”
and “solidary” responsibility derive from different legal
traditions710 and analogies must be applied with care. In
international law, the general principle in the case of a
plurality of responsible States is that each State is separately
responsible for conduct attributable to it in the
sense of article 2. The principle of independent responsibility
reflects the position under general international law,
in the absence of agreement to the contrary between the
States concerned.711 In the application of that principle,
however, the situation can arise where a single course of
conduct is at the same time attributable to several States
and is internationally wrongful for each of them. It is to
such cases that article 47 is addressed.
(4) In the Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru case,712
Australia, the sole respondent, had administered Nauru
as a trust territory under the Trusteeship Agreement on
behalf of the three States concerned. Australia argued that
it could not be sued alone by Nauru, but only jointly with
the other two States concerned. Australia argued that the
two States were necessary parties to the case and that in
accordance with the principle formulated in Monetary
Gold,713 the claim against Australia alone was inadmissible.
It also argued that the responsibility of the three
States making up the Administering Authority was “solidary”
and that a claim could not be made against only
one of them. The Court rejected both arguments. On the
question of “solidary” responsibility it said:
Australia has raised the question whether the liability of the three States
would be “joint and several” (solidaire), so that any one of the three
would be liable to make full reparation for damage flowing from any
breach of the obligations of the Administering Authority, and not merely
a one-third or some other proportionate share. This … is independent of
the question whether Australia can be sued alone. The Court does not
consider that any reason has been shown why a claim brought against
only one of the three States should be declared inadmissible in limine
litis merely because that claim raises questions of the administration
of the Territory, which was shared with two other States. It cannot be
denied that Australia had obligations under the Trusteeship Agreement,
in its capacity as one of the three States forming the Administering Authority,
and there is nothing in the character of that Agreement which
debars the Court from considering a claim of a breach of those obligations
by Australia.714
The Court was careful to add that its decision on jurisdiction
“does not settle the question whether reparation
709 See article 17 and commentary.
710 For a comparative survey of internal laws on solidary or joint
liability, see T. Weir, loc. cit. (footnote 471 above), vol. XI, especially
pp. 43–44, sects. 79–81.
711 See paragraphs (1) to (5) of the introductory commentary to
chapter IV of Part One.
712 See footnote 230 above.
713 See footnote 286 above. See also paragraph (11) of the commentary
to article 16.
714 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Preliminary Objections
(see footnote 230 above), pp. 258–259, para. 48.
State responsibility 125
would be due from Australia, if found responsible, for
the whole or only for part of the damage Nauru alleges it
has suffered, regard being had to the characteristics of the
Mandate and Trusteeship Systems … and, in particular,
the special role played by Australia in the administration
of the Territory”.715
(5) The extent of responsibility for conduct carried on
by a number of States is sometimes addressed in treaties.716
A well-known example is the Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects. Article
IV, paragraph 1, provides expressly for “joint and several
liability” where damage is suffered by a third State as a
result of a collision between two space objects launched
by two States. In some cases liability is strict; in others it
is based on fault. Article IV, paragraph 2, provides:
In all cases of joint and several liability referred to in paragraph 1 …
the burden of compensation for the damage shall be apportioned between
the first two States in accordance with the extent to which they
were at fault; if the extent of the fault of each of these States cannot be
established, the burden of compensation shall be apportioned equally
between them. Such apportionment shall be without prejudice to the
right of the third State to seek the entire compensation due under this
Convention from any or all of the launching States which are jointly
and severally liable.717
This is clearly a lex specialis, and it concerns liability for
lawful conduct rather than responsibility in the sense of
the present articles.718 At the same time, it indicates what
a regime of “joint and several” liability might amount to
so far as an injured State is concerned.
(6) According to paragraph 1 of article 47, where several
States are responsible for the same internationally
wrongful act, the responsibility of each State may be invoked
in relation to that act. The general rule in international
law is that of separate responsibility of a State for
its own wrongful acts and paragraph 1 reflects this general
rule. Paragraph 1 neither recognizes a general rule
of joint and several responsibility, nor does it exclude the
possibility that two or more States will be responsible for
the same internationally wrongful act. Whether this is so
will depend on the circumstances and on the international
obligations of each of the States concerned.
(7) Under paragraph 1 of article 47, where several States
are each responsible for the same internationally wrongful
act, the responsibility of each may be separately invoked
by an injured State in the sense of article 42. The conse-
715 Ibid., p. 262, para. 56. The case was subsequently withdrawn
by agreement, Australia agreeing to pay by instalments an amount
corresponding to the full amount of Nauru’s claim. Subsequently, the
two other Governments agreed to contribute to the payments made
under the settlement. See Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Order
(footnote 232 above) and the settlement agreement (ibid.).
716 A special case is the responsibility of the European Union and its
member States under “mixed agreements”, where the Union and all or
some members are parties in their own name. See, e.g., annex IX to the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Generally on mixed
agreements, see, e.g., A. Rosas, “Mixed Union mixed agreements”,
International Law Aspects of the European Union, M. Koskenniemi,
ed. (The Hague, Kluwer, 1998), p. 125.
717 See also article V, paragraph 2, which provides for indemnification
between States which are jointly and severally liable.
718 See paragraph 4 of the general commentary for the distinction
between international responsibility for wrongful acts and international
liability arising from lawful conduct.
quences that flow from the wrongful act, for example in
terms of reparation, will be those which flow from the
provisions of Part Two in relation to that State.
(8) Article 47 only addresses the situation of a plurality
of responsible States in relation to the same internationally
wrongful act. The identification of such an act will
depend on the particular primary obligation, and cannot
be prescribed in the abstract. Of course, situations can
also arise where several States by separate internationally
wrongful conduct have contributed to causing the same
damage. For example, several States might contribute to
polluting a river by the separate discharge of pollutants.
In the Corfu Channel incident, it appears that Yugoslavia
actually laid the mines and would have been responsible
for the damage they caused. ICJ held that Albania was
responsible to the United Kingdom for the same damage
on the basis that it knew or should have known of the presence
of the mines and of the attempt by the British ships to
exercise their right of transit, but failed to warn the ships.719
Yet, it was not suggested that Albania’s responsibility for
failure to warn was reduced, let alone precluded, by reason
of the concurrent responsibility of a third State. In
such cases, the responsibility of each participating State
is determined individually, on the basis of its own conduct
and by reference to its own international obligations.
(9) The general principle set out in paragraph 1 of article
47 is subject to the two provisos set out in paragraph
2. Subparagraph (a) addresses the question of
double recovery by the injured State. It provides that
the injured State may not recover, by way of compensation,
more than the damage suffered.720 This provision is
designed to protect the responsible States, whose obligation
to compensate is limited by the damage suffered.
The principle is only concerned to ensure against the
actual recovery of more than the amount of the damage.
It would not exclude simultaneous awards against two or
more responsible States, but the award would be satisfied
so far as the injured State is concerned by payment in full
made by any one of them.
(10) The second proviso, in subparagraph (b), recognizes
that where there is more than one responsible State
in respect of the same injury, questions of contribution
may arise between them. This is specifically envisaged,
for example, in articles IV, paragraph 2, and V, paragraph
2, of the Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects. On the other hand,
there may be cases where recourse by one responsible
State against another should not be allowed. Subparagraph
(b) does not address the question of contribution
among several States which are responsible for the same
wrongful act; it merely provides that the general principle
stated in paragraph 1 is without prejudice to any right of
recourse which one responsible State may have against
any other responsible State.
719 Corfu Channel, Merits (see footnote 35 above), pp. 22–23.
720 Such a principle was affirmed, for example, by PCIJ in the
Factory at Chorzów, Merits case (see footnote 34 above), when it
held that a remedy sought by Germany could not be granted “or the
same compensation would be awarded twice over” (p. 59); see also
pp. 45 and 49.
126 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
Article 48. Invocation of responsibility
by a State other than an injured State
1. Any State other than an injured State is entitled
to invoke the responsibility of another State in accordance
with paragraph 2 if:
(a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of
States including that State, and is established for the
protection of a collective interest of the group; or
(b) the obligation breached is owed to the international
community as a whole.
2. Any State entitled to invoke responsibility under
paragraph 1 may claim from the responsible State:
(a) cessation of the internationally wrongful act,
and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition in
accordance with article 30; and
(b) performance of the obligation of reparation in
accordance with the preceding articles, in the interest
of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation
breached.
3. The requirements for the invocation of responsibility
by an injured State under articles 43, 44 and
45 apply to an invocation of responsibility by a State
entitled to do so under paragraph 1.
Commentary
(1) Article 48 complements the rule contained in article
42. It deals with the invocation of responsibility by
States other than the injured State acting in the collective
interest. A State which is entitled to invoke responsibility
under article 48 is acting not in its individual capacity by
reason of having suffered injury, but in its capacity as a
member of a group of States to which the obligation is
owed, or indeed as a member of the international community
as a whole. The distinction is underlined by the
phrase “[a]ny State other than an injured State” in paragraph
1 of article 48.
(2) Article 48 is based on the idea that in case of breaches
of specific obligations protecting the collective interests
of a group of States or the interests of the international
community as a whole, responsibility may be invoked
by States which are not themselves injured in the sense
of article 42. Indeed, in respect of obligations to the international
community as a whole, ICJ specifically said
as much in its judgment in the Barcelona Traction case.721
Although the Court noted that “all States can be held to
have a legal interest in” the fulfilment of these rights, article
48 refrains from qualifying the position of the States
identified in article 48, for example by referring to them
as “interested States”. The term “legal interest” would not
permit a distinction between articles 42 and 48, as injured
States in the sense of article 42 also have legal interests.
(3) As to the structure of article 48, paragraph 1 defines
the categories of obligations which give rise to the wider
721 Barcelona Traction (see footnote 25 above), p. 32, para. 33.
right to invoke responsibility. Paragraph 2 stipulates which
forms of responsibility States other than injured States
may claim. Paragraph 3 applies the requirements of invocation
contained in articles 43, 44 and 45 to cases where
responsibility is invoked under article 48, paragraph 1.
(4) Paragraph 1 refers to “[a]ny State other than an injured
State”. In the nature of things, all or many States will
be entitled to invoke responsibility under article 48, and
the term “[a]ny State” is intended to avoid any implication
that these States have to act together or in unison. Moreover,
their entitlement will coincide with that of any injured
State in relation to the same internationally wrongful
act in those cases where a State suffers individual injury
from a breach of an obligation to which article 48
applies.
(5) Paragraph 1 defines the categories of obligations,
the breach of which may entitle States other than the injured
State to invoke State responsibility. A distinction is
drawn between obligations owed to a group of States and
established to protect a collective interest of the group
(paragraph 1 (a)), and obligations owed to the international
community as a whole (paragraph 1 (b)).722
(6) Under paragraph 1 (a), States other than the injured
State may invoke responsibility if two conditions are met:
first, the obligation whose breach has given rise to responsibility
must have been owed to a group to which the State
invoking responsibility belongs; and secondly, the obligation
must have been established for the protection of
a collective interest. The provision does not distinguish
between different sources of international law; obligations
protecting a collective interest of the group may derive
from multilateral treaties or customary international
law. Such obligations have sometimes been referred to as
“obligations erga omnes partes”.
(7) Obligations coming within the scope of paragraph 1
(a) have to be “collective obligations”, i.e. they must apply
between a group of States and have been established
in some collective interest.723 They might concern, for
example, the environment or security of a region (e.g. a
regional nuclear-free-zone treaty or a regional system for
the protection of human rights). They are not limited to arrangements
established only in the interest of the member
States but would extend to agreements established by a
group of States in some wider common interest.724 But in
any event the arrangement must transcend the sphere of
bilateral relations of the States parties. As to the requirement
that the obligation in question protect a collective
interest, it is not the function of the articles to provide
an enumeration of such interests. If they fall within paragraph
1 (a), their principal purpose will be to foster a
common interest, over and above any interests of the States
concerned individually. This would include situations in
722 For the extent of responsibility for serious breaches of obligations
to the international community as a whole, see Part Two, chap. III and
commentary.
723 See also paragraph (11) of the commentary to article 42.
724 In the S.S. “Wimbledon” (see footnote 34 above), the Court noted
“[t]he intention of the authors of the Treaty of Versailles to facilitate
access to the Baltic by establishing an international regime, and consequently
to keep the canal open at all times to foreign vessels of every
kind” (p. 23).
State responsibility 127
which States, attempting to set general standards of protection
for a group or people, have assumed obligations protecting
non-State entities.725
(8) Under paragraph 1 (b), States other than the injured
State may invoke responsibility if the obligation in
question was owed “to the international community as
a whole”.726 The provision intends to give effect to the
statement by ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case, where
the Court drew “an essential distinction” between obligations
owed to particular States and those owed “towards
the international community as a whole”.727 With regard
to the latter, the Court went on to state that “[i]n view of
the importance of the rights involved, all States can be
held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are
obligations erga omnes”.
(9) While taking up the essence of this statement, the
articles avoid use of the term “obligations erga omnes”,
which conveys less information than the Court’s reference
to the international community as a whole and has
sometimes been confused with obligations owed to all the
parties to a treaty. Nor is it the function of the articles to
provide a list of those obligations which under existing
international law are owed to the international community
as a whole. This would go well beyond the task of codifying
the secondary rules of State responsibility, and in any
event, such a list would be only of limited value, as the
scope of the concept will necessarily evolve over time.
The Court itself has given useful guidance: in its 1970
judgment it referred, by way of example, to “the outlawing
of acts of aggression, and of genocide” and to “the
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human
person, including protection from slavery and racial
discrimination”.728 In its judgment in the East Timor case,
the Court added the right of self-determination of peoples
to this list.729
(10) Each State is entitled, as a member of the international
community as a whole, to invoke the responsibility
of another State for breaches of such obligations. Whereas
the category of collective obligations covered by paragraph
1 (a) needs to be further qualified by the insertion
of additional criteria, no such qualifications are necessary
in the case of paragraph 1 (b). All States are by definition
members of the international community as a whole, and
the obligations in question are by definition collective obligations
protecting interests of the international community
as such. Of course, such obligations may at the same
time protect the individual interests of States, as the prohibition
of acts of aggression protects the survival of each
State and the security of its people. Similarly, individual
States may be specially affected by the breach of such an
725 Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, establishing
the Mandate system, was a provision in the general interest in this
sense, as were each of the Mandate agreements concluded in accordance
with it. Cf., however, the much-criticized decision of ICJ in South
West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6, from
which article 48 is a deliberate departure.
726 For the terminology “international community as a whole”,
see paragraph (18) of the commentary to article 25.
727 Barcelona Traction (see footnote 25 above), p. 32, para. 33, and
see paragraphs (2) to (6) of the commentary to chapter III of Part Two.
728 Barcelona Traction (ibid.), p. 32, para. 34.
729 See footnote 54 above.
obligation, for example a coastal State specially affected
by pollution in breach of an obligation aimed at protection
of the marine environment in the collective interest.
(11) Paragraph 2 specifies the categories of claim which
States may make when invoking responsibility under article
48. The list given in the paragraph is exhaustive, and
invocation of responsibility under article 48 gives rise to
a more limited range of rights as compared to those of
injured States under article 42. In particular, the focus of
action by a State under article 48—such State not being
injured in its own right and therefore not claiming compensation
on its own account—is likely to be on the very
question whether a State is in breach and on cessation if the
breach is a continuing one. For example, in the S.S. “Wimbledon”
case, Japan, which had no economic interest in
the particular voyage, sought only a declaration, whereas
France, whose national had to bear the loss, sought and
was awarded damages.730 In the South West Africa cases,
Ethiopia and Liberia sought only declarations of the legal
position.731 In that case, as the Court itself pointed out in
1971, “the injured entity” was a people, viz. the people of
South West Africa.732
(12) Under paragraph 2 (a), any State referred to in
article 48 is entitled to request cessation of the wrongful
act and, if the circumstances require, assurances and
guarantees of non-repetition under article 30. In addition,
paragraph 2 (b) allows such a State to claim from
the responsible State reparation in accordance with the
provisions of chapter II of Part Two. In case of breaches
of obligations under article 48, it may well be that there
is no State which is individually injured by the breach,
yet it is highly desirable that some State or States be in a
position to claim reparation, in particular restitution. In
accordance with paragraph 2 (b), such a claim must be
made in the interest of the injured State, if any, or of the
beneficiaries of the obligation breached. This aspect of
article 48, paragraph 2, involves a measure of progressive
development, which is justified since it provides a means
of protecting the community or collective interest at stake.
In this context it may be noted that certain provisions, for
example in various human rights treaties, allow invocation
of responsibility by any State party. In those cases
where they have been resorted to, a clear distinction has
been drawn between the capacity of the applicant State
to raise the matter and the interests of the beneficiaries
of the obligation.733 Thus, a State invoking responsibility
under article 48 and claiming anything more than a
declaratory remedy and cessation may be called on to establish
that it is acting in the interest of the injured party.
Where the injured party is a State, its Government will be
able authoritatively to represent that interest. Other cases
may present greater difficulties, which the present articles
730 S.S. “Wimbledon” (see footnote 34 above), p. 30.
731 South West Africa, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1962, p. 319; South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment
(see footnote 725 above).
732 Namibia case (see footnote 176 above), p. 56, para. 127.
733 See, e.g., the observations of the European Court of Human
Rights in Denmark v. Turkey (friendly settlement), judgment of 5 April
2000, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-IV, pp. 7, 10 and 11,
paras. 20 and 23.
128 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
cannot solve.734 Paragraph 2 (b) can do no more than set
out the general principle.
(13) Paragraph 2 (b) refers to the State claiming
“[p]erformance of the obligation of reparation in accordance
with the preceding articles”. This makes it clear that
article 48 States may not demand reparation in situations
where an injured State could not do so. For example, a
demand for cessation presupposes the continuation of the
wrongful act; a demand for restitution is excluded if restitution
itself has become impossible.
(14) Paragraph 3 subjects the invocation of State
responsibility by States other than the injured State to
the conditions that govern invocation by an injured State,
specifically article 43 (notice of claim), 44 (admissibility
of claims) and 45 (loss of the right to invoke responsibility).
These articles are to be read as applicable equally,
mutatis mutandis, to a State invoking responsibility under
article 48.
CHAPTER II
COUNTERMEASURES
Commentary
(1) This chapter deals with the conditions for and limitations
on the taking of countermeasures by an injured
State. In other words, it deals with measures that would
otherwise be contrary to the international obligations of
an injured State vis-à-vis the responsible State, if they
were not taken by the former in response to an internationally
wrongful act by the latter in order to procure cessation
and reparation. Countermeasures are a feature of a
decentralized system by which injured States may seek to
vindicate their rights and to restore the legal relationship
with the responsible State which has been ruptured by the
internationally wrongful act.
(2) It is recognized both by Governments and by the
decisions of international tribunals that countermeasures
are justified under certain circumstances.735 This is
reflected in article 22 which deals with countermeasures
in response to an internationally wrongful act in the
context of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness.
Like other forms of self-help, countermeasures are liable
to abuse and this potential is exacerbated by the factual
inequalities between States. Chapter II has as its aim to
establish an operational system, taking into account the
exceptional character of countermeasures as a response
734 See also paragraphs (3) to (4) of the commentary to article 33.
735 For the substantial literature, see the bibliographies in E. Zoller,
Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of Countermeasures
(Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Transnational, 1984), pp. 179–189; O. Y. Elagab,
The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in International
Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 227–241; L.-A. Sicilianos,
Les réactions décentralisées à l’illicite: Des contre-mesures à la légitime
défense (Paris, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence,
1990), pp. 501–525; and D. Alland, Justice privée et ordre juridique
international: Etude théorique des contre-mesures en droit international
public (Paris, Pedone, 1994).
to internationally wrongful conduct. At the same time, it
seeks to ensure, by appropriate conditions and limitations,
that countermeasures are kept within generally acceptable
bounds.
(3) As to terminology, traditionally the term “reprisals”
was used to cover otherwise unlawful action, including
forcible action, taken by way of self-help in response to
a breach.736 More recently, the term “reprisals” has been
limited to action taken in time of international armed
conflict; i.e. it has been taken as equivalent to belligerent
reprisals. The term “countermeasures” covers that part
of the subject of reprisals not associated with armed conflict,
and in accordance with modern practice and judicial
decisions the term is used in that sense in this chapter.737
Countermeasures are to be contrasted with retorsion, i.e.
“unfriendly” conduct which is not inconsistent with any
international obligation of the State engaging in it even
though it may be a response to an internationally wrongful
act. Acts of retorsion may include the prohibition of
or limitations upon normal diplomatic relations or other
contacts, embargoes of various kinds or withdrawal of
voluntary aid programmes. Whatever their motivation, so
long as such acts are not incompatible with the international
obligations of the States taking them towards the
target State, they do not involve countermeasures and
they fall outside the scope of the present articles. The
term “sanction” is also often used as equivalent to action
taken against a State by a group of States or mandated by
an international organization. But the term is imprecise:
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations refers
only to “measures”, even though these can encompass a
very wide range of acts, including the use of armed force
(Articles 39, 41 and 42). Questions concerning the use
of force in international relations and of the legality of
belligerent reprisals are governed by the relevant primary
rules. On the other hand, the articles are concerned with
countermeasures as referred to in article 22. They are taken
by an injured State in order to induce the responsible
State to comply with its obligations under Part Two. They
are instrumental in character and are appropriately dealt
with in Part Three as an aspect of the implementation of
State responsibility.
(4) Countermeasures are to be clearly distinguished
from the termination or suspension of treaty relations on
account of the material breach of a treaty by another State,
as provided for in article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
Where a treaty is terminated or suspended in accordance
with article 60, the substantive legal obligations of
the States parties will be affected, but this is quite different
from the question of responsibility that may already
have arisen from the breach.738 Countermeasures involve
conduct taken in derogation from a subsisting treaty
736 See, e.g., E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or the Principles of
Natural Law (footnote 394 above), vol. II, chap. XVIII, p. 342.
737 Air Service Agreement (see footnote 28 above), p. 443,
para. 80; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(see footnote 59 above), p. 27, para. 53; Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (see footnote 36 above), at p. 106,
para. 201; and Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above),
p. 55, para. 82.
738 On the respective scope of the codified law of treaties and the
law of State responsibility, see paragraphs (3) to (7) of the introductory
commentary to chapter V of Part One.
State responsibility 129
obligation but justified as a necessary and proportionate
response to an internationally wrongful act of the State
against which they are taken. They are essentially temporary
measures, taken to achieve a specified end, whose
justification terminates once the end is achieved.
(5) This chapter does not draw any distinction between
what are sometimes called “reciprocal countermeasures”
and other measures. That term refers to countermeasures
which involve suspension of performance of obligations
towards the responsible State “if such obligations correspond
to, or are directly connected with, the obligation
breached”.739 There is no requirement that States taking
countermeasures should be limited to suspension of performance
of the same or a closely related obligation.740 A
number of considerations support this conclusion. First,
for some obligations, for example those concerning the
protection of human rights, reciprocal countermeasures
are inconceivable. The obligations in question have a nonreciprocal
character and are not only due to other States
but to the individuals themselves.741 Secondly, a limitation
to reciprocal countermeasures assumes that the injured
State will be in a position to impose the same or related
measures as the responsible State, which may not be so.
The obligation may be a unilateral one or the injured State
may already have performed its side of the bargain. Above
all, considerations of good order and humanity preclude
many measures of a reciprocal nature. This conclusion
does not, however, end the matter. Countermeasures are
more likely to satisfy the requirements of necessity and
proportionality if they are taken in relation to the same or
a closely related obligation, as in the Air Service Agreement
arbitration.742
(6) This conclusion reinforces the need to ensure that
countermeasures are strictly limited to the requirements
of the situation and that there are adequate safeguards
against abuse. Chapter II seeks to do this in a variety of
ways. First, as already noted, it concerns only non-forcible
countermeasures (art. 50, para. 1 (a)). Secondly, countermeasures
are limited by the requirement that they be
directed at the responsible State and not at third parties
(art. 49, paras. 1 and 2). Thirdly, since countermeasures
are intended as instrumental—in other words, since they
are taken with a view to procuring cessation of and reparation
for the internationally wrongful act and not by way
of punishment—they are temporary in character and must
be as far as possible reversible in their effects in terms
of future legal relations between the two States (arts. 49,
paras. 2 and 3, and 53). Fourthly, countermeasures must
be proportionate (art. 51). Fifthly, they must not involve
any departure from certain basic obligations (art. 50,
para. 1), in particular those under peremptory norms of
general international law.
739 See the sixth report of the Special Rapporteur on State responsibility,
William Riphagen, article 8 of Part Two of the draft articles,
Yearbook … 1985, vol. II (Part One), p. 10, document A/CN.4/389.
740 Contrast the exception of non-performance in the law of treaties,
which is so limited: see paragraph (9) of the introductory commentary
to chapter V of Part One.
741 Cf. Ireland v. the United Kingdom (footnote 236 above).
742 See footnote 28 above.
(7) This chapter also deals to some extent with the conditions
of the implementation of countermeasures. In particular,
countermeasures cannot affect any dispute settlement
procedure which is in force between the two States
and applicable to the dispute (art. 50, para. 2 (a)). Nor
can they be taken in such a way as to impair diplomatic or
consular inviolability (art. 50, para. 2 (b)). Countermeasures
must be preceded by a demand by the injured State
that the responsible State comply with its obligations under
Part Two, must be accompanied by an offer to negotiate,
and must be suspended if the internationally wrongful
act has ceased and the dispute is submitted in good faith
to a court or tribunal with the authority to make decisions
binding on the parties (art. 52, para. 3).
(8) The focus of the chapter is on countermeasures taken
by injured States as defined in article 42. Occasions
have arisen in practice of countermeasures being taken by
other States, in particular those identified in article 48,
where no State is injured or else on behalf of and at the request
of an injured State. Such cases are controversial and
the practice is embryonic. This chapter does not purport
to regulate the taking of countermeasures by States other
than the injured State. It is, however, without prejudice to
the right of any State identified in article 48, paragraph 1,
to take lawful measures against a responsible State to ensure
cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest
of the injured State or the beneficiaries of the obligation
breached (art. 54).
(9) In common with other chapters of these articles,
the provisions on countermeasures are residual and may
be excluded or modified by a special rule to the contrary
(see article 55). Thus, a treaty provision precluding the
suspension of performance of an obligation under any circumstances
will exclude countermeasures with respect to
the performance of the obligation. Likewise, a regime for
dispute resolution to which States must resort in the event
of a dispute, especially if (as with the WTO dispute settlement
system) it requires an authorization to take measures
in the nature of countermeasures in response to a proven
breach.743
Article 49. Object and limits of countermeasures
1. An injured State may only take countermeasures
against a State which is responsible for an internationally
wrongful act in order to induce that State to
comply with its obligations under Part Two.
2. Countermeasures are limited to the non-performance
for the time being of international obligations
of the State taking the measures towards the
responsible State.
3. Countermeasures shall, as far as possible, be
taken in such a way as to permit the resumption of
performance of the obligations in question.
743 See Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization,
annex 2 (Understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the
Settlement of Disputes), arts. 1, 3, para. 7, and 22.
130 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
Commentary
(1) Article 49 describes the permissible object of countermeasures
taken by an injured State against the responsible
State and places certain limits on their scope.
Countermeasures may only be taken by an injured State
in order to induce the responsible State to comply with its
obligations under Part Two, namely, to cease the internationally
wrongful conduct, if it is continuing, and to provide
reparation to the injured State.744 Countermeasures
are not intended as a form of punishment for wrongful
conduct, but as an instrument for achieving compliance
with the obligations of the responsible State under Part
Two. The limited object and exceptional nature of countermeasures
are indicated by the use of the word “only” in
paragraph 1 of article 49.
(2) A fundamental prerequisite for any lawful countermeasure
is the existence of an internationally wrongful act
which injured the State taking the countermeasure. This
point was clearly made by ICJ in the Gabˇcíkovo Nagymaros
Project case, in the following passage:
In order to be justifiable, a countermeasure must meet certain conditions
…
In the first place it must be taken in response to a previous international
wrongful act of another State and must be directed against that
State.745
(3) Paragraph 1 of article 49 presupposes an objective
standard for the taking of countermeasures, and in particular
requires that the countermeasure be taken against a
State which is responsible for an internationally wrongful
act in order to induce that State to comply with its obligations
of cessation and reparation. A State taking countermeasures
acts at its peril, if its view of the question of
wrongfulness turns out not to be well founded. A State
which resorts to countermeasures based on its unilateral
assessment of the situation does so at its own risk and
may incur responsibility for its own wrongful conduct in
the event of an incorrect assessment.746 In this respect,
there is no difference between countermeasures and other
circumstances precluding wrongfulness.747
744 For these obligations, see articles 30 and 31 and commentaries.
745 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), p. 55,
para. 83. See also “Naulilaa” (footnote 337 above), p. 1027; “Cysne”
(footnote 338 above), p. 1057. At the 1930 Hague Conference, all
States which responded on this point took the view that a prior wrongful
act was an indispensable prerequisite for the adoption of reprisals;
see League of Nations, Conference for the Codification of International
Law, Bases of Discussion … (footnote 88 above), p. 128.
746 The tribunal’s remark in the Air Service Agreement case (see footnote
28 above), to the effect that “each State establishes for itself its
legal situation vis-à-vis other States” (p. 443, para. 81) should not be
interpreted in the sense that the United States would have been justified
in taking countermeasures whether or not France was in breach of the
Agreement. In that case the tribunal went on to hold that the United
States was actually responding to a breach of the Agreement by France,
and that its response met the requirements for countermeasures under
international law, in particular in terms of purpose and proportionality.
The tribunal did not decide that an unjustified belief by the United
States as to the existence of a breach would have been sufficient.
747 See paragraph (8) of the introductory commentary to chapter V
of Part One.
(4) A second essential element of countermeasures is
that they “must be directed against”748 a State which has
committed an internationally wrongful act, and which has
not complied with its obligations of cessation and reparation
under Part Two of the present articles.749 The word
“only” in paragraph 1 applies equally to the target of the
countermeasures as to their purpose and is intended to
convey that countermeasures may only be adopted against
a State which is the author of the internationally wrongful
act. Countermeasures may not be directed against States
other than the responsible State. In a situation where a
third State is owed an international obligation by the State
taking countermeasures and that obligation is breached by
the countermeasure, the wrongfulness of the measure is
not precluded as against the third State. In that sense the
effect of countermeasures in precluding wrongfulness is
relative. It concerns the legal relations between the injured
State and the responsible State.750
(5) This does not mean that countermeasures may not
incidentally affect the position of third States or indeed
other third parties. For example, if the injured State suspends
transit rights with the responsible State in accordance
with this chapter, other parties, including third States,
may be affected thereby. If they have no individual rights
in the matter they cannot complain. The same is true if, as
a consequence of suspension of a trade agreement, trade
with the responsible State is affected and one or more
companies lose business or even go bankrupt. Such indirect
or collateral effects cannot be entirely avoided.
(6) In taking countermeasures, the injured State effectively
withholds performance for the time being of one or
more international obligations owed by it to the responsible
State, and paragraph 2 of article 49 reflects this element.
Although countermeasures will normally take the
form of the non-performance of a single obligation, it is
possible that a particular measure may affect the performance
of several obligations simultaneously. For this reason,
paragraph 2 refers to “obligations” in the plural. For
example, freezing of the assets of a State might involve
what would otherwise be the breach of several obligations
to that State under different agreements or arrangements.
Different and coexisting obligations might be affected by
the same act. The test is always that of proportionality, and
a State which has committed an internationally wrongful
act does not thereby make itself the target for any form
or combination of countermeasures, irrespective of their
severity or consequences.751
(7) The phrase “for the time being” in paragraph 2 indicates
the temporary or provisional character of countermeasures.
Their aim is the restoration of a condition of
legality as between the injured State and the responsible
748 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), pp. 55–
56, para. 83.
749 In the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case ICJ held that the
requirement had been satisfied, in that Hungary was in continuing
breach of its obligations under a bilateral treaty, and Czechoslovakia’s
response was directed against it on that ground.
750 On the specific question of human rights obligations, see
article 50, paragraph (1) (b), and commentary.
751 See article 51 and commentary. In addition, the performance of
certain obligations may not be withheld by way of countermeasures in
any circumstances: see article 50 and commentary.
State responsibility 131
State, and not the creation of new situations which cannot
be rectified whatever the response of the latter State to the
claims against it.752 Countermeasures are taken as a form
of inducement, not punishment: if they are effective in inducing
the responsible State to comply with its obligations
of cessation and reparation, they should be discontinued
and performance of the obligation resumed.
(8) Paragraph 1 of article 49 refers to the obligations of
the responsible State “under Part Two”. It is to ensuring
the performance of these obligations that countermeasures
are directed. In many cases the main focus of countermeasures
will be to ensure cessation of a continuing
wrongful act, but they may also be taken to ensure reparation,
provided the other conditions laid down in chapter II
are satisfied. Any other conclusion would immunize from
countermeasures a State responsible for an internationally
wrongful act if the act had ceased, irrespective of the seriousness
of the breach or its consequences, or of the State’s
refusal to make reparation for it. In this context an issue
arises whether countermeasures should be available where
there is a failure to provide satisfaction as demanded by
the injured State, given the subsidiary role this remedy
plays in the spectrum of reparation.753 In normal situations,
satisfaction will be symbolic or supplementary and
it would be highly unlikely that a State which had ceased
the wrongful act and tendered compensation to the injured
State could properly be made the target of countermeasures
for failing to provide satisfaction as well. This concern
may be adequately addressed by the application of
the notion of proportionality set out in article 51.754
(9) Paragraph 3 of article 49 is inspired by article 72,
paragraph 2, of the 1969 Vienna Convention, which provides
that when a State suspends a treaty it must not, during
the suspension, do anything to preclude the treaty
from being brought back into force. By analogy, States
should as far as possible choose countermeasures that are
reversible. In the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, the
existence of this condition was recognized by the Court,
although it found that it was not necessary to pronounce
on the matter. After concluding that “the diversion of the
Danube carried out by Czechoslovakia was not a lawful
countermeasure because it was not proportionate”, the
Court said:
It is therefore not required to pass upon one other condition for the lawfulness
of a countermeasure, namely that its purpose must be to induce
the wrongdoing State to comply with its obligations under international
law, and that the measure must therefore be reversible.755
However, the duty to choose measures that are reversible
is not absolute. It may not be possible in all cases to reverse
all of the effects of countermeasures after the occasion
for taking them has ceased. For example, a requirement
of notification of some activity is of no value after
the activity has been undertaken. By contrast, inflicting
irreparable damage on the responsible State could amount
752 This notion is further emphasized by articles 49, paragraph 3,
and 53 (termination of countermeasures).
753 See paragraph (1) of the commentary to article 37.
754 Similar considerations apply to assurances and guarantees of nonrepetition.
See article 30, subparagraph (b), and commentary.
755 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), pp. 56–
57, para. 87.
to punishment or a sanction for non-compliance, not a
countermeasure as conceived in the articles. The phrase
“as far as possible” in paragraph 3 indicates that if the
injured State has a choice between a number of lawful
and effective countermeasures, it should select one which
permits the resumption of performance of the obligations
suspended as a result of countermeasures.
Article 50. Obligations not affected
by countermeasures
1. Countermeasures shall not affect:
(a) the obligation to refrain from the threat or use
of force as embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations;
(b) obligations for the protection of fundamental
human rights;
(c) obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting
reprisals;
(d) other obligations under peremptory norms of
general international law.
2. A State taking countermeasures is not relieved
from fulfilling its obligations:
(a) under any dispute settlement procedure applicable
between it and the responsible State;
(b) to respect the inviolability of diplomatic or consular
agents, premises, archives and documents.
Commentary
(1) Article 50 specifies certain obligations the performance
of which may not be impaired by countermeasures.
An injured State is required to continue to respect these
obligations in its relations with the responsible State, and
may not rely on a breach by the responsible State of its
obligations under Part Two to preclude the wrongfulness
of any non-compliance with these obligations. So far as
the law of countermeasures is concerned, they are sacrosanct.
(2) The obligations dealt with in article 50 fall into two
basic categories. Paragraph 1 deals with certain obligations
which, by reason of their character, must not be
the subject of countermeasures at all. Paragraph 2 deals
with certain obligations relating in particular to the maintenance
of channels of communication between the two
States concerned, including machinery for the resolution
of their disputes.
(3) Paragraph 1 of article 50 identifies four categories
of fundamental substantive obligations which may not be
affected by countermeasures: (a) the obligation to refrain
from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter
of the United Nations; (b) obligations for the protection
of fundamental human rights; (c) obligations of a humanitarian
character prohibiting reprisals; and (d) other obligations
under peremptory norms of general international
law.
132 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
(4) Paragraph 1 (a) deals with the prohibition of the
threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations, including the express prohibition of the
use of force in Article 2, paragraph 4. It excludes forcible
measures from the ambit of permissible countermeasures
under chapter II.
(5) The prohibition of forcible countermeasures is
spelled out in the Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, by which the General Assembly proclaimed
that “States have a duty to refrain from acts of
reprisal involving the use of force”.756 The prohibition is
also consistent with the prevailing doctrine as well as a
number of authoritative pronouncements of international
judicial757 and other bodies.758
(6) Paragraph 1 (b) provides that countermeasures may
not affect obligations for the protection of fundamental
human rights. In the “Naulilaa” arbitration, the tribunal
stated that a lawful countermeasure must be “limited by
the requirements of humanity and the rules of good faith
applicable in relations between States”.759 The Institut de
droit international in its 1934 resolution stated that in taking
countermeasures a State must “abstain from any harsh
measure which would be contrary to the laws of humanity
or the demands of the public conscience”.760 This has
been taken further as a result of the development since
1945 of international human rights. In particular, the relevant
human rights treaties identify certain human rights
which may not be derogated from even in time of war or
other public emergency.761
(7) In its general comment No. 8 (1997) the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights discussed
the effect of economic sanctions on civilian populations
and especially on children. It dealt both with the effect
of measures taken by international organizations, a topic
which falls outside the scope of the present articles,762
as well as with countermeasures imposed by individual
States or groups of States. It stressed that “whatever the
circumstances, such sanctions should always take full account
of the provisions of the International Covenant on
756 General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), annex, first principle.
The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe also contains an explicit condemnation of forcible measures.
Part of Principle II of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations
between Participating States embodied in the first “Basket” of that
Final Act reads: “Likewise [the participating States] will also refrain
in their mutual relations from any act of reprisal by force.”
757 See especially Corfu Channel, Merits (footnote 35 above),
p. 35; and Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(footnote 36 above), p. 127, para. 249.
758 See, e.g., Security Council resolutions 111 (1956) of 19 January
1956, 171 (1962) of 9 April 1962, 188 (1964) of 9 April 1964, 316
(1972) of 26 June 1972, 332 (1973) of 21 April 1973, 573 (1985) of
4 October 1985 and 1322 (2000) of 7 October 2000. See also General
Assembly resolution 41/38 of 20 November 1986.
759 “Naulilaa” (see footnote 337 above), p. 1026.
760 Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international, vol. 38 (1934),
p. 710.
761 See article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights; article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights; and
article 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights.
762 See below, article 59 and commentary.
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”,763 and went on to
state that:
it is essential to distinguish between the basic objective of applying
political and economic pressure upon the governing elite of a country to
persuade them to conform to international law, and the collateral infliction
of suffering upon the most vulnerable groups within the targeted
country.764
Analogies can be drawn from other elements of general
international law. For example, paragraph 1 of article 54
of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims
of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) stipulates unconditionally
that “[s]tarvation of civilians as a method of
warfare is prohibited”.765 Likewise, the final sentence of
paragraph 2 of article 1 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that
“In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence”.
(8) Paragraph 1 (c) deals with the obligations of humanitarian
law with regard to reprisals and is modelled on
article 60, paragraph 5, of the 1969 Vienna Convention.766
The paragraph reflects the basic prohibition of reprisals
against individuals, which exists in international humanitarian
law. In particular, under the Geneva Convention
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1929, the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the protection of victims of international
armed conflicts (Protocol I) of 1977, reprisals are prohibited
against defined classes of protected persons, and
these prohibitions are very widely accepted.767
(9) Paragraph 1 (d) prohibits countermeasures affecting
obligations under peremptory norms of general international
law. Evidently, a peremptory norm, not subject to
derogation as between two States even by treaty, cannot be
derogated from by unilateral action in the form of countermeasures.
Subparagraph (d) reiterates for the purposes
of the present chapter the recognition in article 26 that
the circumstances precluding wrongfulness elaborated in
chapter V of Part One do not affect the wrongfulness of
any act of a State which is not in conformity with an obligation
arising under a peremptory norm of general international
law. The reference to “other” obligations under
763 E/C.12/1997/8, para. 1.
764 Ibid., para. 4.
765 See also paragraph 2 of article 54 (“objects indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population”) and article 75. See also Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts
(Protocol II).
766 Paragraph 5 of article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Convention precludes
a State from suspending or terminating for material breach
any treaty provision “relating to the protection of the human person
contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to provisions
prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons protected by
such treaties”. This paragraph was added at the Vienna Conference on
the Law of Treaties on a vote of 88 votes in favour, none against and
7 abstentions.
767 See K. J. Partsch, “Reprisals”, Encyclopedia of Public International
Law, R. Bernhardt, ed. (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2000), vol. 4,
p. 200, at pp. 203–204; and S. Oeter, “Methods and means of combat”,
D. Fleck, ed., op. cit. (footnote 409 above) p. 105, at pp. 204–207, paras.
476–479, with references to relevant provisions.
State responsibility 133
peremptory norms makes it clear that subparagraph (d)
does not qualify the preceding subparagraphs, some of
which also encompass norms of a peremptory character.
In particular, subparagraphs (b) and (c) stand on their own.
Subparagraph (d) allows for the recognition of further
peremptory norms creating obligations which may not be
the subject of countermeasures by an injured State.768
(10) States may agree between themselves on other
rules of international law which may not be the subject
of countermeasures, whether or not they are regarded as
peremptory norms under general international law. This
possibility is covered by the lex specialis provision in article
55 rather than by the exclusion of countermeasures
under article 50, paragraph 1 (d). In particular, a bilateral
or multilateral treaty might renounce the possibility of
countermeasures being taken for its breach, or in relation
to its subject matter. This is the case, for example, with the
European Union treaties, which have their own system of
enforcement.769 Under the dispute settlement system of
WTO, the prior authorization of the Dispute Settlement
Body is required before a member can suspend concessions
or other obligations under the WTO agreements in
response to a failure of another member to comply with
recommendations and rulings of a WTO panel or the
Appellate Body.770 Pursuant to article 23 of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU), members seeking
“the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification
or impairment of benefits” under the WTO agreements,
“shall have recourse to, and abide by” the DSU
rules and procedures. This has been construed both as
an “exclusive dispute resolution clause” and as a clause
“preventing WTO members from unilaterally resolving
their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations”.771
To the extent that derogation clauses or other treaty provisions
(e.g. those prohibiting reservations) are properly
interpreted as indicating that the treaty provisions are
“intransgressible”,772 they may entail the exclusion of
countermeasures.
(11) In addition to the substantive limitations on the taking
of countermeasures in paragraph 1 of article 50, paragraph
2 provides that countermeasures may not be taken
with respect to two categories of obligations, viz. certain
obligations under dispute settlement procedures applicable
between it and the responsible State, and obligations with
768 See paragraphs (4) to (6) of the commentary to article 40.
769 On the exclusion of unilateral countermeasures in European
Union law, see, for example, joined cases 90 and 91-63 (Commission
of the European Economic Community v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
and Kingdom of Belgium), Reports of cases before the Court, p. 625, at
p. 631 (1964); case 52/75 (Commission of the European Communities
v. Italian Republic), ibid., p. 277, at p. 284 (1976); case 232/78
(Commission of the European Economic Communities v. French Republic),
ibid., p. 2729 (1979); and case C-5/94 (The Queen. v. Ministry
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland)
Ltd.), Reports of cases before the Court of Justice and the Court of First
Instance, p. I–2553 (1996).
770 See Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization,
annex 2 (Understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the
Settlement of Disputes), arts. 3, para. 7 and 22.
771 See WTO, Report of the Panel, United States–Sections 301–310
of the Trade Act of 1974 (footnote 73 above), paras. 7.35–7.46.
772 To use the synonym adopted by ICJ in its advisory opinion on
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (see footnote 54
above), p. 257, para. 79.
respect to diplomatic and consular inviolability. The justification
in each case concerns not so much the substantive
character of the obligation but its function in relation to
the resolution of the dispute between the parties which has
given rise to the threat or use of countermeasures.
(12) The first of these, contained in paragraph 2 (a),
applies to “any dispute settlement procedure applicable”
between the injured State and the responsible State. This
phrase refers only to dispute settlement procedures that are
related to the dispute in question and not to other unrelated
issues between the States concerned. For this purpose the
dispute should be considered as encompassing both the
initial dispute over the internationally wrongful act and
the question of the legitimacy of the countermeasure(s)
taken in response.
(13) It is a well-established principle that dispute settlement
provisions must be upheld notwithstanding that they
are contained in a treaty which is at the heart of the dispute
and the continued validity or effect of which is challenged.
As ICJ said in Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction
of the ICAO Council:
Nor in any case could a merely unilateral suspension per se render jurisdictional
clauses inoperative, since one of their purposes might be,
precisely, to enable the validity of the suspension to be tested.773
Similar reasoning underlies the principle that dispute settlement
provisions between the injured and the responsible
State and applicable to their dispute may not be suspended
by way of countermeasures. Otherwise, unilateral action
would replace an agreed provision capable of resolving
the dispute giving rise to the countermeasures. The point
was affirmed by the Court in the United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran case:
In any event, any alleged violation of the Treaty [of Amity] by either
party could not have the effect of precluding that party from invoking
the provisions of the Treaty concerning pacific settlement of disputes.774
(14) The second exception in paragraph 2 (b) limits the
extent to which an injured State may resort, by way of
countermeasures, to conduct inconsistent with its obligations
in the field of diplomatic or consular relations. An
injured State could envisage action at a number of levels.
To declare a diplomat persona non grata, to terminate
or suspend diplomatic relations, to recall ambassadors in
situations provided for in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations—such acts do not amount to countermeasures
in the sense of this chapter. At a second level,
measures may be taken affecting diplomatic or consular
privileges, not prejudicing the inviolability of diplomatic
or consular personnel or of premises, archives and documents.
Such measures may be lawful as countermeasures
if the requirements of this chapter are met. On the other
hand, the scope of prohibited countermeasures under article
50, paragraph 2 (b), is limited to those obligations
which are designed to guarantee the physical safety and
inviolability (including the jurisdictional immunity) of
diplomatic agents, premises, archives and documents in
773 Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India
v. Pakistan), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1972, p. 46, at p. 53. See also
S. M. Schwebel, International Arbitration: Three Salient Problems
(Cambridge, Grotius, 1987), pp. 13–59.
774 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(see footnote 59 above), p. 28, para. 53.
134 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
all circumstances, including armed conflict.775 The same
applies, mutatis mutandis, to consular officials.
(15) In the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran case, ICJ stressed that “diplomatic law itself
provides the necessary means of defence against, and
sanction for, illicit activities by members of diplomatic or
consular missions”,776 and it concluded that violations of
diplomatic or consular immunities could not be justified
even as countermeasures in response to an internationally
wrongful act by the sending State. As the Court said:
The rules of diplomatic law, in short, constitute a self-contained regime
which, on the one hand, lays down the receiving State’s obligations
regarding the facilities, privileges and immunities to be accorded to
diplomatic missions and, on the other, foresees their possible abuse by
members of the mission and specifies the means at the disposal of the
receiving State to counter any such abuse.777
If diplomatic or consular personnel could be targeted by
way of countermeasures, they would in effect constitute
resident hostages against perceived wrongs of the sending
State, undermining the institution of diplomatic and
consular relations. The exclusion of any countermeasures
infringing diplomatic and consular inviolability is thus
justified on functional grounds. It does not affect the various
avenues for redress available to the receiving State
under the terms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
778 On the other hand, no reference need be made in
article 50, paragraph 2 (b), to multilateral diplomacy. The
representatives of States to international organizations are
covered by the reference to diplomatic agents. As for officials
of international organizations themselves, no retaliatory
step taken by a host State to their detriment could
qualify as a countermeasure since it would involve noncompliance
not with an obligation owed to the responsible
State but with an obligation owed to a third party, i.e. the
international organization concerned.
Article 51. Proportionality
Countermeasures must be commensurate with the
injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the
internationally wrongful act and the rights in question.
Commentary
(1) Article 51 establishes an essential limit on the taking
of countermeasures by an injured State in any given case,
based on considerations of proportionality. It is relevant
in determining what countermeasures may be applied and
775 See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, arts. 22,
24, 29, 44 and 45.
776 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (see
footnote 59 above), p. 38, para. 83.
777 Ibid., p. 40, para. 86. Cf. article 45, subparagraph (a), of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; article 27, paragraph 1
(a), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (premises, property
and archives to be protected “even in case of armed conflict”).
778 See articles 9, 11, 26, 36, paragraph 2, 43 (b) and 47, paragraph
2 (a), of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and
articles 10, paragraph 2, 12, 23, 25 (b) and (c) and article 35, paragraph
(3), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
their degree of intensity. Proportionality provides a measure
of assurance inasmuch as disproportionate countermeasures
could give rise to responsibility on the part of
the State taking such measures.
(2) Proportionality is a well-established requirement
for taking countermeasures, being widely recognized in
State practice, doctrine and jurisprudence. According to
the award in the “Naulilaa” case:
even if one were to admit that the law of nations does not require that
the reprisal should be approximately in keeping with the offence, one
should certainly consider as excessive and therefore unlawful reprisals
out of all proportion to the act motivating them.779
(3) In the Air Service Agreement arbitration,780 the issue
of proportionality was examined in some detail. In that
case there was no exact equivalence between France’s refusal
to allow a change of gauge in London on flights from
the west coast of the United States and the United States’
countermeasure which suspended Air France flights to
Los Angeles altogether. The tribunal nonetheless held the
United States measures to be in conformity with the principle
of proportionality because they “do not appear to be
clearly disproportionate when compared to those taken by
France”. In particular, the majority said:
It is generally agreed that all counter-measures must, in the first instance,
have some degree of equivalence with the alleged breach: this
is a well-known rule … It has been observed, generally, that judging
the “proportionality” of counter-measures is not an easy task and can
at best be accomplished by approximation. In the Tribunal’s view, it is
essential, in a dispute between States, to take into account not only the
injuries suffered by the companies concerned but also the importance of
the questions of principle arising from the alleged breach. The Tribunal
thinks that it will not suffice, in the present case, to compare the losses
suffered by Pan Am on account of the suspension of the projected services
with the losses which the French companies would have suffered
as a result of the counter-measures; it will also be necessary to take
into account the importance of the positions of principle which were
taken when the French authorities prohibited changes of gauge in third
countries. If the importance of the issue is viewed within the framework
of the general air transport policy adopted by the United States
Government and implemented by the conclusion of a large number of
international agreements with countries other than France, the measures
taken by the United States do not appear to be clearly disproportionate
when compared to those taken by France. Neither Party has provided
the Tribunal with evidence that would be sufficient to affirm or reject
the existence of proportionality in these terms, and the Tribunal must be
satisfied with a very approximative appreciation. 781
In that case the countermeasures taken were in the same
field as the initial measures and concerned the same
routes, even if they were rather more severe in terms of
their economic effect on the French carriers than the initial
French action.
(4) The question of proportionality was again central
to the appreciation of the legality of possible countermeasures
taken by Czechoslovakia in the Gabˇcíkovo-
Nagymaros Project case.782 ICJ, having accepted that
779 “Naulilaa” (see footnote 337 above), p. 1028.
780 Air Service Agreement (see footnote 28 above), para. 83.
781 Ibid.; Reuter, dissenting, accepted the tribunal’s legal analysis of
proportionality but suggested that there were “serious doubts on the
proportionality of the counter-measures taken by the United States,
which the tribunal has been unable to assess definitely” (p. 448).
782 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), p. 56,
paras. 85 and 87, citing Territorial Jurisdiction of the International
Commission of the River Oder, Judgment No. 16, 1929, P.C.I.J., Series
A, No. 23, p. 27.
State responsibility 135
Hungary’s actions in refusing to complete the Project
amounted to an unjustified breach of the Treaty on the
Construction and Operation of the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros
Barrage System of 1977, went on to say:
In the view of the Court, an important consideration is that the effects
of a countermeasure must be commensurate with the injury suffered,
taking account of the rights in question.
In 1929, the Permanent Court of International Justice, with regard to
navigation on the River Oder, stated as follows:
“[the] community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis
of a common legal right, the essential features of which are the
perfect equality of all riparian States in the user [sic] of the whole
course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of
any one riparian State in relation to the others”...
Modern development of international law has strengthened this
principle for non-navigational uses of international watercourses as
well ...
The Court considers that Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally assuming
control of a shared resource, and thereby depriving Hungary of its
right to an equitable and reasonable share of the natural resources of the
Danube—with the continuing effects of the diversion of these waters on
the ecology of the riparian area of the Szigetköz—failed to respect the
proportionality which is required by international law ...
The Court thus considers that the diversion of the Danube carried
out by Czechoslovakia was not a lawful countermeasure because it was
not proportionate.
Thus, the Court took into account the quality or character
of the rights in question as a matter of principle and (like
the tribunal in the Air Service Agreement case) did not
assess the question of proportionality only in quantitative
terms.
(5) In other areas of the law where proportionality is
relevant (e.g. self-defence), it is normal to express the requirement
in positive terms, even though, in those areas
as well, what is proportionate is not a matter which can
be determined precisely.783 The positive formulation of
the proportionality requirement is adopted in article 51.
A negative formulation might allow too much latitude, in
a context where there is concern as to the possible abuse
of countermeasures.
(6) Considering the need to ensure that the adoption of
countermeasures does not lead to inequitable results, proportionality
must be assessed taking into account not only
the purely “quantitative” element of the injury suffered,
but also “qualitative” factors such as the importance of the
interest protected by the rule infringed and the seriousness
of the breach. Article 51 relates proportionality primarily
to the injury suffered but “taking into account” two further
criteria: the gravity of the internationally wrongful
act, and the rights in question. The reference to “the rights
in question” has a broad meaning, and includes not only
the effect of a wrongful act on the injured State but also
on the rights of the responsible State. Furthermore, the
position of other States which may be affected may also
be taken into consideration.
(7) Proportionality is concerned with the relationship
between the internationally wrongful act and the countermeasure.
In some respects proportionality is linked to the
783 E. Cannizzaro, Il principio della proporzionalità nell’ordinamento
internazionale (Milan, Giuffrè, 2000).
requirement of purpose specified in article 49: a clearly
disproportionate measure may well be judged not to have
been necessary to induce the responsible State to comply
with its obligations but to have had a punitive aim and to
fall outside the purpose of countermeasures enunciated in
article 49. Proportionality is, however, a limitation even
on measures which may be justified under article 49. In
every case a countermeasure must be commensurate with
the injury suffered, including the importance of the issue
of principle involved and this has a function partly independent
of the question whether the countermeasure was
necessary to achieve the result of ensuring compliance.
Article 52. Conditions relating to resort
to countermeasures
1. Before taking countermeasures, an injured
State shall:
(a) call upon the responsible State, in accordance
with article 43, to fulfil its obligations under Part
Two;
(b) notify the responsible State of any decision to
take countermeasures and offer to negotiate with that
State.
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 (b), the injured
State may take such urgent countermeasures as are
necessary to preserve its rights.
3. Countermeasures may not be taken, and if already
taken must be suspended without undue delay
if:
(a) the internationally wrongful act has ceased;
and
(b) the dispute is pending before a court or tribunal
which has the authority to make decisions binding on
the parties.
4. Paragraph 3 does not apply if the responsible
State fails to implement the dispute settlement procedures
in good faith.
Commentary
(1) Article 52 lays down certain procedural conditions
relating to the resort to countermeasures by the injured
State. Before taking countermeasures an injured State is
required to call on the responsible State in accordance
with article 43 to comply with its obligations under Part
Two. The injured State is also required to notify the responsible
State that it intends to take countermeasures and
to offer to negotiate with that State. Notwithstanding this
second requirement, the injured State may take certain urgent
countermeasures to preserve its rights. If the responsible
State has ceased the internationally wrongful act and
the dispute is before a competent court or tribunal, countermeasures
may not be taken; if already taken, they must
be suspended. However, this requirement does not apply if
the responsible State fails to implement dispute settlement
procedures in good faith. In such a case countermeasures
do not have to be suspended and may be resumed.
136 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
(2) Overall, article 52 seeks to establish reasonable procedural
conditions for the taking of countermeasures in a
context where compulsory third party settlement of disputes
may not be available, immediately or at all.784 At the
same time, it needs to take into account the possibility that
there may be an international court or tribunal with authority
to make decisions binding on the parties in relation
to the dispute. Countermeasures are a form of self-help,
which responds to the position of the injured State in an
international system in which the impartial settlement of
disputes through due process of law is not yet guaranteed.
Where a third party procedure exists and has been invoked
by either party to the dispute, the requirements of that procedure,
e.g. as to interim measures of protection, should
substitute as far as possible for countermeasures. On the
other hand, even where an international court or tribunal
has jurisdiction over a dispute and authority to indicate
interim measures of protection, it may be that the responsible
State is not cooperating in that process. In such cases
the remedy of countermeasures necessarily revives.
(3) The system of article 52 builds upon the observations
of the tribunal in the Air Service Agreement arbitration.
785 The first requirement, set out in paragraph 1
(a), is that the injured State must call on the responsible
State to fulfil its obligations of cessation and reparation
before any resort to countermeasures. This requirement
(sometimes referred to as “sommation”) was stressed both
by the tribunal in the Air Service Agreement arbitration786
and by ICJ in the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case.787
It also appears to reflect a general practice.788
(4) The principle underlying the notification requirement
is that, considering the exceptional nature and potentially
serious consequences of countermeasures, they
should not be taken before the other State is given notice
of a claim and some opportunity to present a response. In
practice, however, there are usually quite extensive and
detailed negotiations over a dispute before the point is
reached where some countermeasures are contemplated.
In such cases the injured State will already have notified
the responsible State of its claim in accordance with article
43, and it will not have to do it again in order to comply
with paragraph 1 (a).
(5) Paragraph 1 (b) requires that the injured State which
decides to take countermeasures should notify the responsible
State of that decision to take countermeasures
and offer to negotiate with that State. Countermeasures
can have serious consequences for the target State, which
should have the opportunity to reconsider its position
faced with the proposed countermeasures. The temporal
relationship between the operation of subparagraphs (a)
784 See above, paragraph (7) of the commentary to the present
chapter.
785 Air Service Agreement (see footnote 28 above), pp. 445–446,
paras. 91 and 94–96.
786 Ibid., p. 444, paras. 85–87.
787 Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), p. 56,
para. 84.
788 A. Gianelli, Adempimenti preventivi all’adozione di contromisure
internazionali (Milan, Giuffrè, 1997).
and (b) of paragraph 1 is not strict. Notifications could be
made close to each other or even at the same time.
(6) Under paragraph 2, however, the injured State may
take “such urgent countermeasures as are necessary to
preserve its rights” even before any notification of the
intention to do so. Under modern conditions of communications,
a State which is responsible for an internationally
wrongful act and which refuses to cease that act or
provide any redress therefore may also seek to immunize
itself from countermeasures, for example by withdrawing
assets from banks in the injured State. Such steps can be
taken within a very short time, so that the notification required
by paragraph 1 (b) might frustrate its own purpose.
Hence, paragraph 2 allows for urgent countermeasures
which are necessary to preserve the rights of the injured
State: this phrase includes both its rights in the subject
matter of the dispute and its right to take countermeasures.
Temporary stay orders, the temporary freezing of assets
and similar measures could fall within paragraph 2,
depending on the circumstances.
(7) Paragraph 3 deals with the case in which the wrongful
act has ceased and the dispute is submitted to a court
or tribunal which has the authority to decide it with binding
effect for the parties. In such a case, and for so long
as the dispute settlement procedure is being implemented
in good faith, unilateral action by way of countermeasures
is not justified. Once the conditions in paragraph 3
are met, the injured State may not take countermeasures;
if already taken, they must be suspended “without undue
delay”. The phrase “without undue delay” allows a limited
tolerance for the arrangements required to suspend
the measures in question.
(8) A dispute is not “pending before a court or tribunal”
for the purposes of paragraph 3 (b) unless the court or
tribunal exists and is in a position to deal with the case.
For these purposes a dispute is not pending before an ad
hoc tribunal established pursuant to a treaty until the tribunal
is actually constituted, a process which will take
some time even if both parties are cooperating in the appointment
of the members of the tribunal.789 Paragraph
3 is based on the assumption that the court or tribunal to
which it refers has jurisdiction over the dispute and also
the power to order provisional measures. Such power is
a normal feature of the rules of international courts and
tribunals.790 The rationale behind paragraph 3 is that once
the parties submit their dispute to such a court or tribunal
for resolution, the injured State may request it to order
provisional measures to protect its rights. Such a request,
provided the court or tribunal is available to hear it, will
perform a function essentially equivalent to that of countermeasures.
Provided the order is complied with it will
789 Hence, paragraph 5 of article 290 of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea provides for ITLOS to deal with provisional
measures requests “[p]ending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal to
which the dispute is being submitted”.
790 The binding effect of provisional measures orders under Part XI
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is assured
by paragraph 6 of article 290. For the binding effect of provisional
measures orders under Article 41 of the Statute of ICJ, see the decision
in LaGrand, Judgment (footnote 119 above), pp. 501–504,
paras. 99–104.
State responsibility 137
make countermeasures unnecessary pending the decision
of the tribunal. The reference to a “court or tribunal” is
intended to refer to any third party dispute settlement procedure,
whatever its designation. It does not, however, refer
to political organs such as the Security Council. Nor
does it refer to a tribunal with jurisdiction between a private
party and the responsible State, even if the dispute
between them has given rise to the controversy between
the injured State and the responsible State. In such cases,
however, the fact that the underlying dispute has been
submitted to arbitration will be relevant for the purposes
of articles 49 and 51, and only in exceptional cases will
countermeasures be justified.791
(9) Paragraph 4 of article 52 provides a further condition
for the suspension of countermeasures under paragraph
3. It comprehends various possibilities, ranging from an
initial refusal to cooperate in the procedure, for example
by non-appearance, through non-compliance with a provisional
measures order, whether or not it is formally binding,
through to refusal to accept the final decision of the
court or tribunal. This paragraph also applies to situations
where a State party fails to cooperate in the establishment
of the relevant tribunal or fails to appear before the tribunal
once it is established. Under the circumstances of
paragraph 4, the limitations to the taking of countermeasures
under paragraph 3 do not apply.
Article 53. Termination of countermeasures
Countermeasures shall be terminated as soon as the
responsible State has complied with its obligations under
Part Two in relation to the internationally wrongful
act.
Commentary
(1) Article 53 deals with the situation where the responsible
State has complied with its obligations of cessation
and reparation under Part Two in response to countermeasures
taken by the injured State. Once the responsible
State has complied with its obligations under Part Two, no
ground is left for maintaining countermeasures, and they
must be terminated forthwith.
(2) The notion that countermeasures must be terminated
as soon as the conditions which justified them have ceased
is implicit in the other articles in this chapter. In view of
its importance, however, article 53 makes this clear. It underlines
the specific character of countermeasures under
article 49.
791 Under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of other States, the State of nationality
may not bring an international claim on behalf of a claimant individual
or company “in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another
Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have
submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless such other Contracting
State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award
rendered in such dispute” (art. 27, para. 1); see C. H. Schreuer, The
ICSID Convention: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2001)
pp. 397–414. This excludes all forms of invocation of responsibility
by the State of nationality, including the taking of countermeasures.
See paragraph (2) of the commentary to article 42.
Article 54. Measures taken by States other
than an injured State
This chapter does not prejudice the right of any
State, entitled under article 48, paragraph 1, to invoke
the responsibility of another State, to take lawful measures
against that State to ensure cessation of the breach
and reparation in the interest of the injured State or of
the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.
Commentary
(1) Chapter II deals with the right of an injured State
to take countermeasures against a responsible State in
order to induce that State to comply with its obligations
of cessation and reparation. However, “injured” States, as
defined in article 42, are not the only States entitled to
invoke the responsibility of a State for an internationally
wrongful act under chapter I of this Part. Article 48 allows
such invocation by any State, in the case of the breach of
an obligation to the international community as a whole,
or by any member of a group of States, in the case of
other obligations established for the protection of the collective
interest of the group. By virtue of article 48, paragraph
2, such States may also demand cessation and
performance in the interests of the beneficiaries of the
obligation breached. Thus, with respect to the obligations
referred to in article 48, such States are recognized as having
a legal interest in compliance. The question is to what
extent these States may legitimately assert a right to react
against unremedied breaches.792
(2) It is vital for this purpose to distinguish between
individual measures, whether taken by one State or by a
group of States each acting in its individual capacity and
through its own organs on the one hand, and institutional
reactions in the framework of international organizations
on the other. The latter situation, for example where it
occurs under the authority of Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations, is not covered by the articles.793 More
generally, the articles do not cover the case where action
is taken by an international organization, even though the
member States may direct or control its conduct.794
(3) Practice on this subject is limited and rather embryonic.
In a number of instances, States have reacted against
what were alleged to be breaches of the obligations
referred to in article 48 without claiming to be individually
injured. Reactions have taken such forms as economic
sanctions or other measures (e.g. breaking off air links or
other contacts). Examples include the following:
792 See, e.g., M. Akehurst, “Reprisals by third States”, BYBIL,
1970, vol. 44, p. 1; J. I. Charney, “Third State remedies in international
law”, Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 10, No. 1 (1989),
p. 57; Hutchinson, loc. cit. (footnote 672 above); Sicilianos, op. cit.
(footnote 735 above), pp. 110–175; B. Simma, “From bilateralism
to community interest in international law”, Collected Courses ...,
1994–VI (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1997), vol. 250, p. 217; and J.
A. Frowein, “Reactions by not directly affected States to breaches of
public international law”, Collected Courses ..., 1994–IV (Dordrecht,
Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), vol. 248, p. 345.
793 See article 59 and commentary.
794 See article 57 and commentary.
138 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
United States-Uganda (1978). In October 1978, the
United States Congress adopted legislation prohibiting
exports of goods and technology to, and all imports
from, Uganda.795 The legislation recited that “[t]he
Government of Uganda … has committed genocide
against Ugandans” and that the “United States should
take steps to dissociate itself from any foreign government
which engages in the international crime of genocide”.
796
Certain Western countries-Poland and the Soviet
Union (1981). On 13 December 1981, the Polish
Government imposed martial law and subsequently
suppressed demonstrations and detained many dissidents.
797 The United States and other Western countries
took action against both Poland and the Soviet Union.
The measures included the suspension, with immediate
effect, of treaties providing for landing rights of Aeroflot
in the United States and LOT in the United States,
Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland
and Austria.798 The suspension procedures provided
for in the respective treaties were disregarded.799
Collective measures against Argentina (1982). In
April 1982, when Argentina took control over part of the
Falkland Islands (Malvinas), the Security Council called
for an immediate withdrawal.800 Following a request by
the United Kingdom, European Community members,
Australia, Canada and New Zealand adopted trade sanctions.
These included a temporary prohibition on all imports
of Argentine products, which ran contrary to article
XI:1 and possibly article III of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. It was disputed whether the
measures could be justified under the national security
exception provided for in article XXI (b) (iii) of the
Agreement.801 The embargo adopted by the European
countries also constituted a suspension of Argentina’s
rights under two sectoral agreements on trade in textiles
and trade in mutton and lamb,802 for which security
exceptions of the Agreement did not apply.
795 Uganda Embargo Act, Public Law 95-435 of 10 October 1978,
United States Statutes at Large 1978, vol. 92, part 1 (Washington,
D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 1051–
1053.
796 Ibid., sects. 5(a) and (b).
797 RGDIP, vol. 86 (1982), pp. 603–604.
798 Ibid., p. 606.
799 See, e.g., article 15 of the Air Transport Agreement between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Polish People’s Republic of 1972 (United States Treaties and Other
International Agreements, vol. 23, part 4 (1972), p. 4269); and article
17 of the United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Civil Air
Transport Agreement of 1966, ILM, vol. 6, No. 1 (January 1967), p. 82
and vol. 7, No. 3 (May 1968), p. 571.
800 Security Council resolution 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982.
801 Western States’ reliance on this provision was disputed by other
GATT members; cf. communiqué of Western countries, GATT document
L. 5319/Rev.1 and the statements by Spain and Brazil, GATT
document C/M/157, pp. 5–6. For an analysis, see M. J. Hahn,
Die einseitige Aussetzung von GATT-Verpflichtungen als Repressalie
(Unilateral Suspension of GATT Obligations as Reprisal (English
summary)) (Berlin, Springer, 1996), pp. 328–334.
802 The treaties are reproduced in Official Journal of the European
Communities, No. L 298 of 26 November 1979, p. 2; and No. L 275 of
18 October 1980, p. 14.
•
•
•
United States-South Africa (1986). When in 1985,
the Government of South Africa declared a state of
emergency in large parts of the country, the Security
Council recommended the adoption of sectoral economic
boycotts and the freezing of cultural and sports
relations.803 Subsequently, some countries introduced
measures which went beyond those recommended
by the Security Council. The United States Congress
adopted the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act which
suspended landing rights of South African Airlines on
United States territory.804 This immediate suspension
was contrary to the terms of the 1947 United States of
America and Union of South Africa Agreement relating
to air services between their respective territories805
and was justified as a measure which should encourage
the Government of South Africa “to adopt reforms
leading to the establishment of a non-racial democracy”.
806
Collective measures against Iraq (1990). On 2 August
1990, Iraqi troops invaded and occupied Kuwait.
The Security Council immediately condemned the invasion.
European Community member States and the
United States adopted trade embargoes and decided to
freeze Iraqi assets.807 This action was taken in direct
response to the Iraqi invasion with the consent of the
Government of Kuwait.
Collective measures against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (1998). In response to the humanitarian
crisis in Kosovo, the member States of the European
Community adopted legislation providing for the freezing
of Yugoslav funds and an immediate flight ban.808
For a number of countries, such as France, Germany
and the United Kingdom, the latter measure implied
the non-performance of bilateral aviation agreements.809
Because of doubts about the legitimacy of the action,
the British Government initially was prepared to follow
the one-year denunciation procedure provided for
in article 17 of its agreement with Yugoslavia. However,
it later changed its position and denounced flights
with immediate effect. Justifying the measure, it stated
that “President Milosevic’s ... worsening record on human
rights means that, on moral and political grounds,
he has forfeited the right of his Government to insist
upon the 12 months notice which would normally ap-
803 Security Council resolution 569 (1985) of 26 July 1985.
For further references, see Sicilianos, op. cit. (footnote 735 above),
p. 165.
804 For the text of this provision, see ILM, vol. 26, No. 1 (January
1987), p. 79 (sect. 306).
805 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 66, p. 239 (art. VI).
806 For the implementation order, see ILM (footnote 804 above),
p. 105.
807 See, e.g., President Bush’s Executive Orders of 2 August 1990,
reproduced in AJIL, vol. 84, No. 4 (October 1990), pp. 903–905.
808 Common positions of 7 May and 29 June 1998, Official Journal
of the European Communities, No. L 143 of 14 May 1998, p. 1 and
No. L 190 of 4 July 1998, p. 3; implemented through Council Regulations
1295/98, ibid., No. L 178 of 23 June 1998, p. 33 and 1901/98,
ibid., No. L 248 of 8 September 1998, p. 1.
809 See, e.g., United Kingdom, Treaty Series No. 10 (1960) (London,
HM Stationery Office, 1960); and Recueil des Traités et Accords de la
France, 1967, No. 69.
•
•
•
State responsibility 139
ply”.810 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia protested
these measures as “unlawful, unilateral and an example
of the policy of discrimination”.811
(4) In some other cases, certain States similarly suspended
treaty rights in order to exercise pressure on States
violating collective obligations. However, they did not rely
on a right to take countermeasures, but asserted a right to
suspend the treaty because of a fundamental change of
circumstances. Two examples may be given:
Netherlands-Suriname (1982). In 1980, a military
Government seized power in Suriname. In response
to a crackdown by the new Government on opposition
movements in December 1982, the Dutch Government
suspended a bilateral treaty on development assistance
under which Suriname was entitled to financial subsidies.
812 While the treaty itself did not contain any suspension
or termination clauses, the Dutch Government
stated that the human rights violations in Suriname
constituted a fundamental change of circumstances
which gave rise to a right of suspension.813
European Community member States-the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (1991). In the autumn of 1991,
in response to resumption of fighting within the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, European Community
members suspended and later denounced the 1983
Cooperation Agreement with Yugoslavia.814 This led
to a general repeal of trade preferences on imports
and thus went beyond the weapons embargo ordered
by the Security Council in resolution 713 (1991) of 25
September 1991. The reaction was incompatible with
the terms of the Cooperation Agreement, which did
not provide for the immediate suspension but only for
denunciation upon six months’ notice. Justifying the
suspension, European Community member States explicitly
mentioned the threat to peace and security in
the region. But as in the case of Suriname, they relied
on fundamental change of circumstances, rather than
asserting a right to take countermeasures.815
(5) In some cases, there has been an apparent willingness
on the part of some States to respond to violations of
obligations involving some general interest, where those
810 BYBIL, 1998, vol. 69, p. 581; see also BYBIL, 1999, vol. 70,
pp. 555–556.
811 Statement of the Government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia on the suspension of flights of Yugoslav Airlines of
10 October 1998. See M. Weller, The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999
(Cambridge, Documents & Analysis Publishing, 1999), p. 227.
812 Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, No. 140
(1975). See H.-H. Lindemann, “The repercussions resulting from the
violation of human rights in Surinam on the contractual relations between
the Netherlands and Surinam”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, vol. 44 (1984), p. 64, at pp. 68–69.
813 R. C. R. Siekmann, “Netherlands State practice for the parliamentary
year 1982–1983”, NYIL, 1984, vol. 15, p. 321.
814 Official Journal of the European Communities, No. L 41 of
14 February 1983, p. 1; No. L 315 of 15 November 1991, p. 1, for
the suspension; and No. L 325 of 27 November 1991, p. 23, for the
denunciation.
815 See also the decision of the European Court of Justice in A. Racke
GmbH and Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, case C-162/96, Reports of cases
before the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, 1998-6,
p. I–3655, at pp. 3706–3708, paras. 53–59.
•
•
States could not be considered “injured States” in the
sense of article 42. It should be noted that in those cases
where there was, identifiably, a State primarily injured
by the breach in question, other States have acted at the
request and on behalf of that State.816
(6) As this review demonstrates, the current state of international
law on countermeasures taken in the general
or collective interest is uncertain. State practice is sparse
and involves a limited number of States. At present, there
appears to be no clearly recognized entitlement of States
referred to in article 48 to take countermeasures in the
collective interest. Consequently, it is not appropriate to
include in the present articles a provision concerning the
question whether other States, identified in article 48, are
permitted to take countermeasures in order to induce a
responsible State to comply with its obligations. Instead,
chapter II includes a saving clause which reserves the position
and leaves the resolution of the matter to the further
development of international law.
(7) Article 54 accordingly provides that the chapter
on countermeasures does not prejudice the right of any
State, entitled under article 48, paragraph 1, to invoke the
responsibility of another State, to take lawful measures
against the responsible State to ensure cessation of the
breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State
or the beneficiaries of the obligation breached. The article
speaks of “lawful measures” rather than “countermeasures”
so as not to prejudice any position concerning
measures taken by States other than the injured State in
response to breaches of obligations for the protection of
the collective interest or those owed to the international
community as a whole.
PART FOUR
GENERAL PROVISIONS
This Part contains a number of general provisions applicable
to the articles as a whole, specifying either their
scope or certain matters not dealt with. First, article 55
makes it clear by reference to the lex specialis principle
that the articles have a residual character. Where some
matter otherwise dealt with in the articles is governed by
a special rule of international law, the latter will prevail to
the extent of any inconsistency. Correlatively, article 56
makes it clear that the articles are not exhaustive, and that
they do not affect other applicable rules of international
law on matters not dealt with. There follow three saving
clauses. Article 57 excludes from the scope of the articles
questions concerning the responsibility of international
organizations and of States for the acts of international
organizations. The articles are without prejudice to any
question of the individual responsibility under international
law of any person acting on behalf of a State, and
this is made clear by article 58. Finally, article 59 reserves
the effects of the Charter of the United Nations itself.
816 Cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(footnote 36 above) where ICJ noted that action by way of collective selfdefence
could not be taken by a third State except at the request of the
State subjected to the armed attack (p. 105, para. 199).
140 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
Article 55. Lex specialis
These articles do not apply where and to the extent
that the conditions for the existence of an internationally
wrongful act or the content or implementation of
the international responsibility of a State are governed
by special rules of international law.
Commentary
(1) When defining the primary obligations that apply
between them, States often make special provision for
the legal consequences of breaches of those obligations,
and even for determining whether there has been such
a breach. The question then is whether those provisions
are exclusive, i.e. whether the consequences which would
otherwise apply under general international law, or the
rules that might otherwise have applied for determining a
breach, are thereby excluded. A treaty may expressly provide
for its relationship with other rules. Often, however,
it will not do so and the question will then arise whether
the specific provision is to coexist with or exclude the
general rule that would otherwise apply.
(2) Article 55 provides that the articles do not apply
where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence
of an internationally wrongful act or its legal consequences
are determined by special rules of international
law. It reflects the maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali.
Although it may provide an important indication,
this is only one of a number of possible approaches towards
determining which of several rules potentially applicable
is to prevail or whether the rules simply coexist.
Another gives priority, as between the parties, to the rule
which is later in time.817 In certain cases the consequences
that follow from a breach of some overriding rule may
themselves have a peremptory character. For example,
States cannot, even as between themselves, provide for
legal consequences of a breach of their mutual obligations
which would authorize acts contrary to peremptory norms
of general international law. Thus, the assumption of article
55 is that the special rules in question have at least
the same legal rank as those expressed in the articles. On
that basis, article 55 makes it clear that the present articles
operate in a residual way.
(3) It will depend on the special rule to establish the extent
to which the more general rules on State responsibility
set out in the present articles are displaced by that rule.
In some cases, it will be clear from the language of a treaty
or other text that only the consequences specified are
to flow. Where that is so, the consequence will be “determined”
by the special rule and the principle embodied
in article 55 will apply. In other cases, one aspect of the
general law may be modified, leaving other aspects still
applicable. An example of the former is the WTO Understanding
on Rules and Procedures governing the Settlement
of Disputes as it relates to certain remedies.818 An
817 See paragraph 3 of article 30 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
818 See Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization,
annex 2, especially art. 3, para. 7, which provides for compensation
“only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure is impractical
and as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measure
example of the latter is article 41 of Protocol No. 11 to
the European Convention on Human Rights.819 Both concern
matters dealt with in Part Two of the articles. The
same considerations apply to Part One. Thus, a particular
treaty might impose obligations on a State but define the
“State” for that purpose in a way which produces different
consequences than would otherwise flow from the rules
of attribution in chapter II.820 Or a treaty might exclude a
State from relying on force majeure or necessity.
(4) For the lex specialis principle to apply it is not enough
that the same subject matter is dealt with by two provisions;
there must be some actual inconsistency between
them, or else a discernible intention that one provision is
to exclude the other. Thus, the question is essentially one
of interpretation. For example, in the Neumeister case, the
European Court of Human Rights held that the specific
obligation in article 5, paragraph 5, of the European Convention
on Human Rights for compensation for unlawful
arrest or detention did not prevail over the more general
provision for compensation in article 50. In the Court’s
view, to have applied the lex specialis principle to article
5, paragraph 5, would have led to “consequences incompatible
with the aim and object of the Convention”.821 It
was sufficient, in applying article 50, to take account of
the specific provision.822
(5) Article 55 is designed to cover both “strong” forms
of lex specialis, including what are often referred to as
self-contained regimes, as well as “weaker” forms such as
specific treaty provisions on a single point, for example,
a specific treaty provision excluding restitution. PCIJ referred
to the notion of a self-contained regime in the S.S.
“Wimbledon” case with respect to the transit provisions
concerning the Kiel Canal in the Treaty of Versailles,823
which is inconsistent with a covered agreement”. For WTO purposes,
“compensation” refers to the future conduct, not past conduct, and involves
a form of countermeasure. See article 22 of the Understanding.
On the distinction between cessation and reparation for WTO purposes,
see, e.g., Report of the Panel, Australia–Subsidies Provided to Producers
and Exporters of Automotive Leather (footnote 431 above).
819 See paragraph (2) of the commentary to article 32.
820 Thus, article 1 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment only applies to torture
committed “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”.
This is probably narrower than the bases for attribution of conduct to
the State in Part One, chapter II. Cf. “federal” clauses, allowing certain
component units of the State to be excluded from the scope of a treaty
or limiting obligations of the federal State with respect to such units
(e.g. article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural
and Natural Heritage).
821 Neumeister v. Austria, Eur. Court H.R., Series A, No. 17 (1974),
paras. 28–31, especially para. 30.
822 See also Mavrommatis (footnote 236 above), pp. 29–33; Marcu
Colleanu v. German State, Recueil des décisions des tribunaux arbitraux
mixtes institués par les traités de paix (Paris, Sirey, 1930),
vol. IX, p. 216 (1929); WTO, Report of the Panel, Turkey–Restrictions
on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (footnote 130 above),
paras. 9.87–9.95; Case concerning a dispute between Argentina and
Chile concerning the Beagle Channel, UNRIAA, vol. XXI (Sales
No. E/F. 95.V.2), p. 53, at p. 100, para. 39 (1977). See further C. W. Jenks,
“The conflict of law-making treaties”, BYBIL, 1953, vol. 30, p. 401;
M. McDougal, H. D. Lasswell and J. C. Miller, The Interpretation of
International Agreements and World Public Order: Principles of
Content and Procedure (New Haven Press, 1994), pp. 200–206; and
P. Reuter, Introduction to the Law of Treaties (footnote 300 above),
para. 201.
823 S.S. “Wimbledon” (see footnote 34 above), pp. 23–24.
State responsibility 141
as did ICJ in the United States Diplomatic and Consular
Staff in Tehran case with respect to remedies for abuse of
diplomatic and consular privileges.824
(6) The principle stated in article 55 applies to the articles
as a whole. This point is made clear by the use of
language (“the conditions for the existence of an internationally
wrongful act or the content or implementation of
the international responsibility of a State”) which reflects
the content of each of Parts One, Two and Three.
Article 56. Questions of State responsibility
not regulated by these articles
The applicable rules of international law continue
to govern questions concerning the responsibility of a
State for an internationally wrongful act to the extent
that they are not regulated by these articles.
Commentary
(1) The present articles set out by way of codification
and progressive development the general secondary rules
of State responsibility. In that context, article 56 has two
functions. First, it preserves the application of the rules
of customary international law concerning State responsibility
on matters not covered by the articles. Secondly,
it preserves other rules concerning the effects of a breach
of an international obligation which do not involve issues
of State responsibility but stem from the law of treaties
or other areas of international law. It complements the lex
specialis principle stated in article 55. Like article 55, it
is not limited to the legal consequences of wrongful acts
but applies to the whole regime of State responsibility set
out in the articles.
(2) As to the first of these functions, the articles do not
purport to state all the consequences of an internationally
wrongful act even under existing international law and
there is no intention of precluding the further development
of the law on State responsibility. For example, the
principle of law expressed in the maxim ex injuria jus non
oritur may generate new legal consequences in the field
of responsibility.825 In this respect, article 56 mirrors the
preambular paragraph of the 1969 Vienna Convention
which affirms that “the rules of customary international
law will continue to govern questions not regulated by the
provisions of the present Convention”. However, matters
of State responsibility are not only regulated by customary
824 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (see
footnote 59 above), at p. 40, para. 86. See paragraph (15) of the commentary
to article 50 and also B. Simma, “Self-contained regimes”,
NYIL, 1985, vol. 16, p. 111.
825 Another possible example, related to the determination whether
there has been a breach of an international obligation, is the so-called
principle of “approximate application”, formulated by Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht in Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee
on South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 23,
at p. 46. In the Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case (see footnote 27
above), the Court said that “even if such a principle existed, it could by
definition only be employed within the limits of the treaty in question”
(p. 53, para. 76). See also S. Rosenne, Breach of Treaty (footnote 411
above), pp. 96–101.
international law but also by some treaties; hence article
56 refers to the “applicable rules of international law”.
(3) A second function served by article 56 is to make
it clear that the present articles are not concerned with
any legal effects of a breach of an international obligation
which do not flow from the rules of State responsibility,
but stem from the law of treaties or other areas of law.
Examples include the invalidity of a treaty procured by
an unlawful use of force,826 the exclusion of reliance on
a fundamental change of circumstances where the change
in question results from a breach of an international obligation
of the invoking State to any other State party,827 or
the termination of the international obligation violated in
the case of a material breach of a bilateral treaty.828
Article 57. Responsibility of an international
organization
These articles are without prejudice to any question
of the responsibility under international law of an international
organization, or of any State for the conduct
of an international organization.
Commentary
(1) Article 57 is a saving clause which reserves two related
issues from the scope of the articles. These concern,
first, any question involving the responsibility of international
organizations, and secondly, any question concerning
the responsibility of any State for the conduct of an
international organization.
(2) In accordance with the articles prepared by the Commission
on other topics, the expression “international organization”
means an “intergovernmental organization”.829
Such an organization possesses separate legal personality
under international law,830 and is responsible for its own
acts, i.e. for acts which are carried out by the organization
through its own organs or officials.831 By contrast, where
a number of States act together through their own organs
as distinct from those of an international organization,
the conduct in question is that of the States concerned,
in accordance with the principles set out in chapter II of
Part One. In such cases, as article 47 confirms, each State
remains responsible for its own conduct.
826 1969 Vienna Convention, art. 52.
827 Ibid., art. 62, para. 2 (b).
828 Ibid., art. 60, para 1.
829 See article 2, paragraph 1 (i), of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or
between International Organizations (hereinafter “the 1986 Vienna
Convention”).
830 A firm foundation for the international personality of the
United Nations is laid in the advisory opinion of the Court in Reparation
for Injuries (see footnote 38 above), at p. 179.
831 As the Court has observed, “the question of immunity from legal
process is distinct from the issue of compensation for any damages
incurred as a result of acts performed by the United Nations or
by its agents acting in their official capacity. The United Nations may
be required to bear responsibility for the damage arising from such
acts”, Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights (see footnote 56
above).
142 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
(3) Just as a State may second officials to another State,
putting them at its disposal so that they act for the purposes
of and under the control of the latter, so the same
could occur as between an international organization and
a State. The former situation is covered by article 6. As
to the latter situation, if a State seconds officials to an
international organization so that they act as organs or officials
of the organization, their conduct will be attributable
to the organization, not the sending State, and will
fall outside the scope of the articles. As to the converse
situation, in practice there do not seem to be convincing
examples of organs of international organizations which
have been “placed at the disposal of ” a State in the sense
of article 6,832 and there is no need to provide expressly
for the possibility.
(4) Article 57 also excludes from the scope of the articles
issues of the responsibility of a State for the acts of an
international organization, i.e. those cases where the international
organization is the actor and the State is said to
be responsible by virtue of its involvement in the conduct
of the organization or by virtue of its membership of the
organization. Formally, such issues could fall within the
scope of the present articles since they concern questions
of State responsibility akin to those dealt with in chapter
IV of Part One. But they raise controversial substantive
questions as to the functioning of international organizations
and the relations between their members, questions
which are better dealt with in the context of the law of
international organizations.833
(5) On the other hand article 57 does not exclude from
the scope of the articles any question of the responsibility
of a State for its own conduct, i.e. for conduct attributable
to it under chapter II of Part One, not being conduct
performed by an organ of an international organization. In
this respect the scope of article 57 is narrow. It covers only
what is sometimes referred to as the derivative or second-
832 Cf. Yearbook ... 1974, vol. II (Part One), pp. 286–290. The High
Commissioner for the Free City of Danzig was appointed by the League
of Nations Council and was responsible to it; see Treatment of Polish
Nationals (footnote 75 above). Although the High Commissioner exercised
powers in relation to Danzig, it is doubtful that he was placed at
the disposal of Danzig within the meaning of article 6. The position of
the High Representative, appointed pursuant to annex 10 of the General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 14 December
1995, is also unclear. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and
Herzegovina has held that the High Representative has a dual role, both
as an international agent and as an official in certain circumstances acting
in and for Bosnia and Herzegovina; in the latter respect, the High
Representative’s acts are subject to constitutional control. See Case U
9/00 on the Law on the State Border Service, Official Journal of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, No. 1/01 of 19 January 2001.
833 This area of international law has acquired significance following
controversies, inter alia, over the International Tin Council: J. H.
Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry, case
2 A.C. 418 (1990) (England, House of Lords); Maclaine Watson and
Co., Ltd. v. Council and Commission of the European Communities,
case C-241/87, Reports of cases before the Court of Justice and the
Court of First Instance, 1990-5, p. I–1797; and the Arab Organization
for Industrialization (Westland Helicopters Ltd. v. Arab Organization
for Industrialization, ILR, vol. 80, p. 595 (1985) (International Chamber
of Commerce Award); Arab Organization for Industrialization v.
Westland Helicopters Ltd., ibid., p. 622 (1987) (Switzerland, Federal
Supreme Court); Westland Helicopters Ltd. v. Arab Organization for
Industrialization, ibid., vol. 108, p. 564 (1994) (England, High Court).
See also Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, Eur. Court H.R., Reports,
1999–I, p. 393 (1999).
ary liability of member States for the acts or debts of an
international organization.834
Article 58. Individual responsibility
These articles are without prejudice to any question
of the individual responsibility under international
law of any person acting on behalf of a State.
Commentary
(1) Article 58 makes clear that the articles as a whole
do not address any question of the individual responsibility
under international law of any person acting on behalf
of a State. It clarifies a matter which could be inferred in
any case from the fact that the articles only address issues
relating to the responsibility of States.
(2) The principle that individuals, including State officials,
may be responsible under international law was
established in the aftermath of the Second World War. It
was included in the London Charter of 1945 which established
the Nuremberg Tribunal835 and was subsequently
endorsed by the General Assembly.836 It underpins more
recent developments in the field of international criminal
law, including the two ad hoc tribunals and the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court.837 So far this
principle has operated in the field of criminal responsibility,
but it is not excluded that developments may occur in
the field of individual civil responsibility.838 As a saving
clause, article 58 is not intended to exclude that possibility;
hence the use of the general term “individual responsibility”.
(3) Where crimes against international law are committed
by State officials, it will often be the case that the State
itself is responsible for the acts in question or for failure
to prevent or punish them. In certain cases, in particular
aggression, the State will by definition be involved. Even
so, the question of individual responsibility is in principle
distinct from the question of State responsibility.839 The
834 See the work of the Institute of International Law under R. Higgins,
Yearbook of the Institute of International Law, vol. 66–I (1995),
p. 251, and vol. 66–II (1996), p. 444. See also P. Klein, La responsabilité
des organisations internationales dans les ordres juridiques internes et
en droit des gens (Brussels, Bruylant Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles,
1998). See further WTO, Report of the Panel, Turkey: Restrictions
on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (footnote 130).
835 See footnote 636 above.
836 General Assembly resolution 95 (I) of 11 December 1946. See
also the Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the
Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, elaborated by
the International Law Commission, Yearbook ... 1950, vol. II, p. 374,
document A/1316.
837 See paragraph (6) of the commentary to chapter III of Part Two.
838 See, e.g., article 14 of the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, dealing with
compensation for victims of torture.
839 See, e.g., Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany (application
Nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98), judgment of 22 March 2001,
Eur. Court H.R., Reports, 2001–II: “If the GDR still existed, it would
be responsible from the viewpoint of international law for the acts concerned.
It remains to be established that alongside that State responsibility
the applicants individually bore criminal responsibility at the
material time” (para. 104).
State responsibility 143
State is not exempted from its own responsibility for internationally
wrongful conduct by the prosecution and punishment
of the State officials who carried it out.840 Nor
may those officials hide behind the State in respect of
their own responsibility for conduct of theirs which is contrary
to rules of international law which are applicable to
them. The former principle is reflected, for example, in article
25, paragraph 4, of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, which provides that: “[n]o provision
in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility
shall affect the responsibility of States under
international law.” The latter is reflected, for example, in
the well-established principle that official position does
not excuse a person from individual criminal responsibility
under international law.841
(4) Article 58 reflects this situation, making it clear that
the articles do not address the question of the individual
responsibility under international law of any person acting
on behalf of a State. The term “individual responsibility”
has acquired an accepted meaning in the light of the Rome
Statute and other instruments; it refers to the responsibility
of individual persons, including State officials, under
certain rules of international law for conduct such as genocide,
war crimes and crimes against humanity.
840 Prosecution and punishment of responsible State officials may be
relevant to reparation, especially satisfaction: see paragraph (5) of the
commentary to article 36.
841 See, e.g., the Principles of International Law recognized in the
Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal,
Principle III (footnote 836 above), p. 375; and article 27 of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Article 59. Charter of the United Nations
These articles are without prejudice to the Charter
of the United Nations.
Commentary
(1) In accordance with Article 103 of the Charter of the
United Nations, “[i]n the event of a conflict between the
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under
the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the
present Charter shall prevail”. The focus of Article 103 is
on treaty obligations inconsistent with obligations arising
under the Charter. But such conflicts can have an incidence
on issues dealt with in the articles, as for example
in the Lockerbie cases.842 More generally, the competent
organs of the United Nations have often recommended or
required that compensation be paid following conduct by
a State characterized as a breach of its international obligations,
and article 103 may have a role to play in such
cases.
(2) Article 59 accordingly provides that the articles cannot
affect and are without prejudice to the Charter of the
United Nations. The articles are in all respects to be interpreted
in conformity with the Charter.
842 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional
Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 3; (Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), ibid., p. 114.
Annex 280
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001)

United Nations S/RES/1373 (2001)
Security Council Distr.: General
28 September 2001
01-55743 (E)
*0155743*
Resolution 1373 (2001)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on
28 September 2001
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999 and 1368 (2001) of
12 September 2001,
Reaffirming also its unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks which
took place in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001,
and expressing its determination to prevent all such acts,
Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of international terrorism,
constitute a threat to international peace and security,
Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as
recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368
(2001),
Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist
acts,
Deeply concerned by the increase, in various regions of the world, of acts of
terrorism motivated by intolerance or extremism,
Calling on States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist
acts, including through increased cooperation and full implementation of the
relevant international conventions relating to terrorism,
Recognizing the need for States to complement international cooperation by
taking additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their territories through all
lawful means, the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism,
Reaffirming the principle established by the General Assembly in its
declaration of October 1970 (resolution 2625 (XXV)) and reiterated by the Security
Council in its resolution 1189 (1998) of 13 August 1998, namely that every State
has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its
territory directed towards the commission of such acts,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
2
S/RES/1373 (2001)
1. Decides that all States shall:
(a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
(b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or
indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the
funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry
out terrorist acts;
(c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic
resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate
in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf
of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or
generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons
and associated persons and entities;
(d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories
from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other
related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who
commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of
terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons
and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons;
2. Decides also that all States shall:
(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities
or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of
members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;
(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts,
including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information;
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist
acts, or provide safe havens;
(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from
using their respective territories for those purposes against other States or their
citizens;
(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning,
preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought
to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such
terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and
regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist
acts;
(f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with
criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support
of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession
necessary for the proceedings;
(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border
controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and
through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity
papers and travel documents;
3
S/RES/1373 (2001)
3. Calls upon all States to:
(a) Find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational
information, especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or
networks; forged or falsified travel documents; traffic in arms, explosives or
sensitive materials; use of communications technologies by terrorist groups; and the
threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups;
(b) Exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law
and cooperate on administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of
terrorist acts;
(c) Cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements
and agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against
perpetrators of such acts;
(d) Become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999;
(e) Increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and Security Council resolutions
1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001);
(f) Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of
national and international law, including international standards of human rights,
before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker
has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts;
(g) Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not
abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims
of political motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the
extradition of alleged terrorists;
4. Notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism
and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal armstrafficking,
and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other
potentially deadly materials, and in this regard emphasizes the need to enhance
coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in
order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to
international security;
5. Declares that acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations and that knowingly financing,
planning and inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations;
6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of
procedure, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members of
the Council, to monitor implementation of this resolution, with the assistance of
appropriate expertise, and calls upon all States to report to the Committee, no later
than 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution and thereafter according to
a timetable to be proposed by the Committee, on the steps they have taken to
implement this resolution;
7. Directs the Committee to delineate its tasks, submit a work programme
within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, and to consider the support it
requires, in consultation with the Secretary-General;
4
S/RES/1373 (2001)
8. Expresses its determination to take all necessary steps in order to ensure
the full implementation of this resolution, in accordance with its responsibilities
under the Charter;
9. Decides to remain seized of this matter.
Annex 281
Letter from J.W. Wainwright, Expert Adviser, to the Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism
Committee, para. 7 (12 November 2002)

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􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀃􀀄􀀃􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀊􀀋􀀈􀀅􀀌􀀃􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀢􀀯􀀑􀀒􀀡􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀒􀀡􀀢􀀓􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀔􀀢􀀯􀀚􀀒􀀪􀀒􀀗􀀚􀀪􀀰􀀢􀀪􀀘􀀘􀀃􀀍􀀘􀀢􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀃􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀓􀀙􀀚􀀗􀀢􀀔􀀃􀀘􀀓􀀑􀀔􀀗􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀎􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀒􀀘
􀀂􀀌􀀓􀀢􀀗􀀓􀀙􀀙􀀚􀀍􀀫􀀢􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀪􀀍􀀍􀀃􀀙􀀎􀀍􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀗􀀓􀀙􀀙􀀚􀀍􀀫􀀢􀀍􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀘􀀍􀀢􀀪􀀗􀀍􀀘􀀸􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀍􀀚􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀓􀀂􀀒􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀍􀀔􀀓􀀰􀀰􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀡􀀚􀀔􀀃􀀗􀀍􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀓􀀔
􀀚􀀒􀀡􀀚􀀔􀀃􀀗􀀍􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀄􀀣􀀢􀀘􀀑􀀗􀀌􀀢􀀎􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀒􀀘􀀸􀀢􀀪􀀒􀀡􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀎􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀒􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀒􀀡􀀢􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀍􀀚􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀗􀀍􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀄􀀃􀀌􀀪􀀰􀀯􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀫􀀢􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀪􀀍􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃
􀀡􀀚􀀔􀀃􀀗􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀘􀀑􀀗􀀌􀀢􀀎􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀒􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀒􀀡􀀢􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀍􀀚􀀃􀀘􀀫􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀗􀀰􀀑􀀡􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀯􀀑􀀒􀀡􀀘􀀢􀀡􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀩􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀕􀀃􀀒􀀃􀀔􀀪􀀍􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀯􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀢􀀎􀀔􀀓􀀎􀀃􀀔􀀍􀀣
􀀓􀀂􀀒􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀍􀀔􀀓􀀰􀀰􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀡􀀚􀀔􀀃􀀗􀀍􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀡􀀚􀀔􀀃􀀗􀀍􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀄􀀣􀀢􀀘􀀑􀀗􀀌􀀢􀀎􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀒􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀒􀀡􀀢􀀪􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀗􀀚􀀪􀀍􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀎􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀒􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀒􀀡
􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀍􀀚􀀃􀀘􀀸
􀀦􀀐􀀠􀀰􀀘􀀓􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀔􀀃􀀰􀀃􀀩􀀪􀀒􀀗􀀃􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀚􀀘􀀢􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀍􀀃􀀱􀀍􀀫􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀢􀀩􀀚􀀃􀀂􀀫􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀢􀀎􀀪􀀔􀀍􀀚􀀗􀀑􀀰􀀪􀀔􀀫􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀗􀀪􀀰􀀰􀀫􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀢􀀘􀀑􀀄􀀬􀀎􀀪􀀔􀀪􀀕􀀔􀀪􀀎􀀌􀀢􀀛􀀢􀀶􀀡􀀷
􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀵􀀃􀀘􀀓􀀰􀀑􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀫􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀲􀀍􀀪􀀍􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀹􀀺􀀄􀀻􀀃􀀗􀀓􀀙􀀃􀀢􀀎􀀪􀀔􀀍􀀚􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀘􀀢􀀘􀀓􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀪􀀘􀀢􀀎􀀓􀀘􀀘􀀚􀀄􀀰􀀃􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀼􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀽􀀒􀀍􀀃􀀔􀀒􀀪􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀪􀀰
􀀤􀀓􀀒􀀩􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀲􀀑􀀎􀀎􀀔􀀃􀀘􀀘􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀾􀀚􀀒􀀪􀀒􀀗􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀥􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀘􀀙􀀿􀀢􀀶􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀤􀀓􀀒􀀩􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀷􀀫􀀢􀀚􀀘
􀀎􀀪􀀔􀀪􀀕􀀔􀀪􀀎􀀌􀀢􀀉􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀠􀀔􀀍􀀚􀀗􀀰􀀃􀀢􀀈􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀤􀀓􀀒􀀩􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀫􀀢􀀂􀀌􀀚􀀗􀀌􀀢􀀔􀀃􀀪􀀡􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀘􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀰􀀰􀀓􀀂􀀘􀀏
􀁀􀀪􀀗􀀌􀀢􀀲􀀍􀀪􀀍􀀃􀀢􀁁􀀪􀀔􀀍􀀣􀀢􀀘􀀌􀀪􀀰􀀰􀀢􀀍􀀪􀀮􀀃􀀢􀀪􀀎􀀎􀀔􀀓􀀎􀀔􀀚􀀪􀀍􀀃􀀢􀀙􀀃􀀪􀀘􀀑􀀔􀀃􀀘􀀫􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀢􀀪􀀗􀀗􀀓􀀔􀀡􀀪􀀒􀀗􀀃􀀢􀀂􀀚􀀍􀀌􀀢􀀚􀀍􀀘􀀢􀀡􀀓􀀙􀀃􀀘􀀍􀀚􀀗􀀢􀀰􀀃􀀕􀀪􀀰
􀀎􀀔􀀚􀀒􀀗􀀚􀀎􀀰􀀃􀀘􀀫􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀚􀀡􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀯􀀚􀀗􀀪􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀫􀀢􀀡􀀃􀀍􀀃􀀗􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀪􀀒􀀡􀀢􀀯􀀔􀀃􀀃􀀳􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀘􀀃􀀚􀀳􀀑􀀔􀀃􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀪􀀒􀀣􀀢􀀯􀀑􀀒􀀡􀀘􀀢􀀑􀀘􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀓􀀔
􀀪􀀰􀀰􀀓􀀗􀀪􀀍􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀎􀀑􀀔􀀎􀀓􀀘􀀃􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀗􀀓􀀙􀀙􀀚􀀍􀀍􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀯􀀃􀀒􀀗􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀘􀀃􀀍􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀍􀀌􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀢􀀠􀀔􀀍􀀚􀀗􀀰􀀃􀀢􀀅􀀢􀀪􀀘􀀢􀀂􀀃􀀰􀀰􀀢􀀪􀀘􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃
􀀎􀀔􀀓􀀗􀀃􀀃􀀡􀀘􀀢􀀡􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀩􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀯􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀢􀀘􀀑􀀗􀀌􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀯􀀃􀀒􀀗􀀃􀀫􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀎􀀑􀀔􀀎􀀓􀀘􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀎􀀓􀀘􀀘􀀚􀀄􀀰􀀃􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀯􀀃􀀚􀀍􀀑􀀔􀀃􀀐
􀀇􀀐􀀽􀀒􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀩􀀚􀀃􀀂􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀃􀀱􀀎􀀃􀀔􀀍􀀘􀀫􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀗􀀰􀀃􀀪􀀔􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀍􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀔􀀃􀀯􀀃􀀔􀀃􀀒􀀗􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀯􀀔􀀃􀀃􀀳􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀪􀀘􀀘􀀃􀀍􀀘􀀢􀀶􀀪􀀘
􀀡􀀚􀀘􀀍􀀚􀀒􀀗􀀍􀀢􀀯􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀚􀀔􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀯􀀃􀀚􀀍􀀑􀀔􀀃􀀷􀀢􀀚􀀘􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀃􀀒􀀘􀀑􀀔􀀃􀀢􀀎􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀎􀀍􀀢􀀪􀀗􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀃􀀒􀀘􀀑􀀔􀀃􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀪􀀍􀀢􀀪􀀘􀀘􀀃􀀍􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀔􀀃􀀢􀀒􀀓􀀍
􀀔􀀃􀀙􀀓􀀩􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀯􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀢􀀪􀀢􀀗􀀓􀀑􀀒􀀍􀀔􀀣􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀢􀀓􀀔􀀡􀀃􀀔􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀪􀀩􀀓􀀚􀀡􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀯􀀃􀀚􀀍􀀑􀀔􀀃􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀰􀀰􀀓􀀂􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀗􀀪􀀔􀀔􀀣􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀓􀀑􀀍􀀢􀀓􀀯
􀀚􀀒􀀩􀀃􀀘􀀍􀀚􀀕􀀪􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀒􀀡􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀡􀀑􀀗􀀍􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀰􀀃􀀕􀀪􀀰􀀢􀀎􀀔􀀓􀀗􀀃􀀃􀀡􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀐
􀀊􀀐􀀲􀀑􀀄􀁂􀀃􀀗􀀍􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀘􀀍􀀚􀀍􀀑􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀪􀀰􀀢􀀪􀀒􀀡􀀢􀀓􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀔􀀢􀀰􀀃􀀕􀀪􀀰􀀢􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀘􀀍􀀔􀀪􀀚􀀒􀀍􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀎􀀎􀀰􀀚􀀗􀀪􀀄􀀰􀀃􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀢􀀪􀀢􀀲􀀍􀀪􀀍􀀃􀀫􀀢􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀢􀀙􀀃􀀪􀀒􀀘
􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀎􀀔􀀓􀀩􀀚􀀡􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀰􀀃􀀕􀀪􀀰􀀢􀀪􀀑􀀍􀀌􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀍􀀣􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀯􀀔􀀃􀀃􀀳􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀶􀀓􀀔􀀫􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀡􀀃􀀃􀀡􀀫􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀯􀀃􀀚􀀍􀀑􀀔􀀃􀀷􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀪􀀘􀀘􀀃􀀍􀀘􀀢􀀚􀀘􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃
􀀚􀀡􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀯􀀚􀀗􀀪􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀎􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀒􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀒􀀡􀀢􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀍􀀚􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀂􀀌􀀓􀀘􀀃􀀢􀀪􀀘􀀘􀀃􀀍􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀔􀀃􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀄􀀃􀀢􀀯􀀔􀀓􀀳􀀃􀀒􀀢􀀄􀀣􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀗􀀰􀀑􀀡􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀚􀀔
􀀒􀀪􀀙􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀢􀀪􀀢􀀰􀀚􀀘􀀍􀀫􀀢􀀂􀀌􀀃􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀔􀀢􀀘􀀪􀀒􀀗􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀄􀀣􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀲􀀃􀀗􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀍􀀣􀀢􀀤􀀓􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀚􀀰􀀢􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀗􀀓􀀙􀀎􀀚􀀰􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀄􀀣􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀲􀀍􀀪􀀍􀀃
􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀗􀀃􀀔􀀒􀀃􀀡􀀫􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀪􀀍􀀢􀀚􀀘􀀢􀀕􀀚􀀩􀀃􀀒􀀢􀀰􀀃􀀕􀀪􀀰􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀃􀀢􀀄􀀣􀀢􀀰􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀘􀀰􀀪􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀐􀀢􀀽􀀍􀀢􀀘􀀌􀀓􀀑􀀰􀀡􀀢􀀄􀀃􀀢􀀒􀀓􀀍􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀪􀀍􀀢􀀒􀀃􀀚􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀔􀀢􀀘􀀑􀀄􀀬
􀀎􀀪􀀔􀀪􀀕􀀔􀀪􀀎􀀌􀀢􀀉􀀢􀀶􀀗􀀷􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀵􀀃􀀘􀀓􀀰􀀑􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀒􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀠􀀔􀀍􀀚􀀗􀀰􀀃􀀢􀀈􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀤􀀓􀀒􀀩􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀙􀀪􀀒􀀡􀀪􀀍􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀑􀀘􀀃􀀢􀀓􀀯
􀀍􀀌
􀀉􀀁􀀅
􀀰􀀚􀀘􀀍􀀘􀀐􀀥􀀌􀀃􀀚􀀔􀀢􀀩􀀪􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀚􀀙􀀎􀀰􀀃􀀙􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀪􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀵􀀃􀀘􀀓􀀰􀀑􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀰􀀚􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀯􀀪􀀗􀀍􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀪􀀍􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀣􀀢􀀗􀀪􀀒􀀢􀀄􀀃
􀀪􀀡􀀓􀀎􀀍􀀃􀀡􀀢􀁃􀀑􀀚􀀗􀀮􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀄􀀣􀀢􀀗􀀓􀀑􀀒􀀍􀀔􀀚􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀌􀀪􀀩􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀒􀀓􀀢􀀯􀀚􀀔􀀘􀀍􀀬􀀌􀀪􀀒􀀡􀀢􀀮􀀒􀀓􀀂􀀰􀀃􀀡􀀕􀀃􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀚􀀡􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀍􀀣􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀍􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀘􀀍􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀒􀀡
􀀍􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀘􀀍􀀢􀀕􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀎􀀘􀀢􀀚􀀡􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀯􀀚􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀃􀀰􀀘􀀃􀀂􀀌􀀃􀀔􀀃􀀢􀀪􀀒􀀡􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀣􀀢􀀃􀀰􀀚􀀙􀀚􀀒􀀪􀀍􀀃􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀒􀀃􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀎􀀔􀀓􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀪􀀗􀀍􀀑􀀪􀀰
􀀚􀀒􀀩􀀓􀀰􀀩􀀃􀀙􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀐
􀀜􀀐􀁄􀀓􀀂􀀃􀀩􀀃􀀔􀀫􀀢􀀰􀀚􀀘􀀍􀀘􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀪􀀍􀀢􀀮􀀚􀀒􀀡􀀢􀀪􀀔􀀃􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀰􀀚􀀍􀀍􀀰􀀃􀀢􀀑􀀘􀀃􀀢􀀂􀀌􀀃􀀔􀀃􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀪􀀑􀀍􀀌􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀍􀀚􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀪􀀢􀀗􀀓􀀑􀀒􀀍􀀔􀀣􀀢􀀌􀀪􀀩􀀃
􀀃􀀩􀀚􀀡􀀃􀀒􀀗􀀃􀀢􀀘􀀑􀀎􀀎􀀓􀀔􀀍􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀪􀀢􀀔􀀃􀀪􀀘􀀓􀀒􀀪􀀄􀀰􀀃􀀢􀀘􀀑􀀘􀀎􀀚􀀗􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀪􀀍􀀢􀀪􀀢􀀎􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀕􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀎􀀢􀀌􀀚􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀔􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀑􀀒􀀮􀀒􀀓􀀂􀀒􀀢􀀓􀀔
􀀓􀀎􀀃􀀔􀀪􀀍􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀑􀀒􀀡􀀃􀀔􀀢􀀪􀀢􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀢􀀒􀀪􀀙􀀃􀀢􀀚􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀗􀀍􀀑􀀪􀀰􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀃􀀒􀀕􀀪􀀕􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀢􀀪􀀗􀀍􀀚􀀩􀀚􀀍􀀚􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀢􀀘􀀑􀀎􀀎􀀓􀀔􀀍􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀍􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀘􀀙􀀐􀀽􀀒
􀀍􀀌􀀓􀀘􀀃􀀢􀀗􀀚􀀔􀀗􀀑􀀙􀀘􀀍􀀪􀀒􀀗􀀃􀀘􀀫􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀔􀀃􀀢􀀚􀀘􀀢􀀒􀀓􀀢􀀍􀀚􀀙􀀃􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀄􀀃􀀢􀀰􀀓􀀘􀀍􀀢􀀂􀀪􀀚􀀍􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀪􀀢􀀄􀀓􀀡􀀣􀀢􀀘􀀑􀀗􀀌􀀢􀀪􀀘􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀲􀀃􀀗􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀍􀀣
􀀤􀀓􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀚􀀰􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀎􀀔􀀓􀀒􀀓􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀃􀀢􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀙􀀪􀀍􀀍􀀃􀀔􀀢􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀃􀀩􀀃􀀒􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀪􀀂􀀪􀀚􀀍􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀕􀀪􀀳􀀃􀀍􀀍􀀪􀀰􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀘􀀓􀀙􀀃􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀃􀀱􀀃􀀗􀀑􀀍􀀚􀀩􀀃
􀀓􀀔􀀡􀀃􀀔􀀐􀀽􀀒􀀡􀀃􀀃􀀡􀀫􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀍􀀚􀀙􀀃􀀢􀀍􀀪􀀮􀀃􀀒􀀢􀀃􀀩􀀃􀀒􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀓􀀄􀀍􀀪􀀚􀀒􀀢􀀪􀀢􀀂􀀪􀀔􀀔􀀪􀀒􀀍􀀢􀀯􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀢􀀪􀀢􀀙􀀪􀀕􀀚􀀘􀀍􀀔􀀪􀀍􀀃􀀢􀀙􀀪􀀣􀀢􀀎􀀑􀀍􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃
􀀒􀀃􀀗􀀃􀀘􀀘􀀪􀀔􀀣􀀢􀀯􀀔􀀃􀀃􀀳􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀪􀀗􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀪􀀍􀀢􀀔􀀚􀀘􀀮􀀐
􀀈􀀐􀀠􀀗􀀗􀀓􀀔􀀡􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀰􀀣􀀫􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀃􀀱􀀎􀀃􀀔􀀍􀀘􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀓􀀮􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀩􀀚􀀃􀀂􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀪􀀍􀀢􀀚􀀍􀀢􀀚􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀎􀀎􀀔􀀓􀀎􀀔􀀚􀀪􀀍􀀃􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀲􀀍􀀪􀀍􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀪􀀡􀀓􀀎􀀍􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀙􀀓􀀘􀀍
􀀃􀀯􀀯􀀃􀀗􀀍􀀚􀀩􀀃􀀢􀀙􀀃􀀪􀀒􀀘􀀢􀀎􀀓􀀘􀀘􀀚􀀄􀀰􀀃􀀫􀀢􀀘􀀑􀀄􀁂􀀃􀀗􀀍􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀘􀀪􀀯􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀪􀀔􀀡􀀘􀀫􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀙􀀃􀀃􀀍􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀔􀀃􀁃􀀑􀀚􀀔􀀃􀀙􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀘􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀘􀀑􀀄􀀬
􀀎􀀪􀀔􀀪􀀕􀀔􀀪􀀎􀀌􀀢􀀉􀀢􀀶􀀗􀀷􀀫􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀗􀀰􀀑􀀡􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀫􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀢􀀎􀀪􀀔􀀍􀀚􀀗􀀑􀀰􀀪􀀔􀀫􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀪􀀡􀀓􀀎􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀰􀀪􀀂􀀘􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀕􀀃􀀒􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀗􀀢􀀪􀀎􀀎􀀰􀀚􀀗􀀪􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀚􀀒
􀀪􀀡􀀡􀀚􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀔􀀃􀀰􀀚􀀪􀀒􀀗􀀃􀀢􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀎􀀑􀀄􀀰􀀚􀀘􀀌􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀰􀀚􀀘􀀍􀀘􀀫􀀢􀀪􀀒􀀡􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀪􀀍􀀢􀀚􀀍􀀢􀀚􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀎􀀎􀀔􀀓􀀎􀀔􀀚􀀪􀀍􀀃􀀢􀀪􀀰􀀘􀀓􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀤􀀥􀀤􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀎􀀑􀀍
􀁃􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀘􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀲􀀍􀀪􀀍􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀘􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀚􀀔􀀢􀀎􀀃􀀔􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀪􀀒􀀗􀀃􀀢􀀪􀀒􀀡􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀍􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀘􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀪􀀍􀀢􀀔􀀃􀀕􀀪􀀔􀀡􀀐
􀀋􀀐􀀲􀀑􀀎􀀎􀀓􀀔􀀍􀀢􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀚􀀘􀀢􀀩􀀚􀀃􀀂􀀢􀀚􀀘􀀢􀀗􀀓􀀒􀀍􀀪􀀚􀀒􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀾􀀃􀀄􀀔􀀑􀀪􀀔􀀣􀀢􀀅􀀆􀀆􀀅􀀢􀀵􀀃􀀎􀀓􀀔􀀍􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀁀􀀱􀀎􀀃􀀔􀀍􀀢􀀞􀀓􀀔􀀮􀀚􀀒􀀕
􀁅􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀎􀀢􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀟􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀘􀀰􀀪􀀍􀀚􀀩􀀃􀀢􀀪􀀒􀀡􀀢􀀠􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀒􀀚􀀘􀀍􀀔􀀪􀀍􀀚􀀩􀀃􀀢􀀧􀀃􀀪􀀘􀀑􀀔􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀤􀀓􀀙􀀄􀀪􀀍􀀢􀀥􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀘􀀙􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃
􀀤􀀓􀀙􀀙􀀓􀀒􀀂􀀃􀀪􀀰􀀍􀀌􀀢􀀲􀀃􀀗􀀔􀀃􀀍􀀪􀀔􀀚􀀪􀀍􀀐􀀥􀀌􀀪􀀍􀀢􀀔􀀃􀀎􀀓􀀔􀀍􀀢􀀡􀀃􀀪􀀰􀀘􀀢􀀃􀀱􀀍􀀃􀀒􀀘􀀚􀀩􀀃􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀂􀀚􀀍􀀌􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀩􀀪􀀔􀀚􀀓􀀑􀀘􀀢􀀎􀀓􀀘􀀘􀀚􀀄􀀰􀀃􀀢􀀙􀀃􀀪􀀒􀀘
􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀕􀀚􀀩􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀃􀀯􀀯􀀃􀀗􀀍􀀫􀀢􀀘􀀎􀀃􀀗􀀚􀀯􀀚􀀗􀀪􀀰􀀰􀀣􀀫􀀢􀀍􀀓􀀢􀀲􀀃􀀗􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀍􀀣􀀢􀀤􀀓􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀚􀀰􀀢􀀰􀀚􀀘􀀍􀀘􀀢􀀄􀀑􀀍􀀢􀀶􀀪􀀍􀀢􀀎􀀪􀀕􀀃􀀜􀀷􀀢􀀘􀀑􀀕􀀕􀀃􀀘􀀍􀀘􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀪􀀡􀀓􀀎􀀍􀀚􀀓􀀒􀀢􀀓􀀯
􀀪􀀢􀀰􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀘􀀰􀀪􀀍􀀚􀀩􀀃􀀢􀀘􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀙􀀃􀀢􀀹􀀯􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀢􀀯􀀔􀀃􀀃􀀳􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀪􀀘􀀘􀀃􀀍􀀘􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀄􀀓􀀍􀀌􀀢􀀰􀀚􀀘􀀍􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀡􀀚􀀩􀀚􀀡􀀑􀀪􀀰􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀒􀀡􀀢􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀍􀀚􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀪􀀒􀀡
􀀎􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀒􀀘􀀢􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀍􀀚􀀃􀀘􀀢􀀘􀀑􀀘􀀎􀀃􀀗􀀍􀀃􀀡􀀢􀀓􀀯􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀩􀀓􀀰􀀩􀀃􀀙􀀃􀀒􀀍􀀢􀀚􀀒􀀢􀀍􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀘􀀍􀀢􀀪􀀗􀀍􀀘􀀢􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀯􀀚􀀒􀀪􀀒􀀗􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀿􀀐
􀀝􀀐􀀞􀀐􀀢􀀞􀀪􀀚􀀒􀀂􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀌􀀍
􀀉􀀉􀀢􀀨􀀓􀀩􀀃􀀙􀀄􀀃􀀔􀀢􀀅􀀆􀀆􀀅
􀀅􀀁􀀅
Annex 282
U.N. G.A. Res. 57/173, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/173, Strengthening the United Nations Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme, in Particular its Technical Cooperation Capacity
(21 January 2003)

United Nations A/RES/57/173
General Assembly Distr.: General
21 January 2003
Fifty-seventh session
Agenda item 100
02 54960
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly
[on the report of the Third Committee (A/57/547)]
57/173. Strengthening the United Nations Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice Programme, in particular its technical
cooperation capacity
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 46/152 of 18 December 1991 on the creation of an
effective United Nations crime prevention and criminal justice programme, in which
it approved the statement of principles and programme of action annexed to that
resolution,
Recalling also its resolution 56/123 of 19 December 2001 on strengthening the
United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme, in particular its
technical cooperation capacity,
Emphasizing the role of the United Nations in the field of crime prevention
and criminal justice, specifically the reduction of criminality, more efficient and
effective law enforcement and administration of justice, respect for human rights
and the rule of law, and promotion of the highest standards of fairness, humanity
and professional conduct,
Recognizing that action against global criminal activity is a common and
shared responsibility,
Convinced of the desirability of closer coordination and cooperation among
States in combating crime, including organized crime, corruption, the smuggling of
migrants and trafficking in persons, especially women and children, drug-related
crimes, money-laundering, the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms,
their parts and components and ammunition and the criminal misuse of information
technologies, as well as criminal activities carried out for the purpose of furthering
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, bearing in mind the role that could be
played by both the United Nations and regional organizations in this respect,
Recognizing existing efforts at the regional level that complement the work of
the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme in combating
the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons, especially women and
children, and noting in this context the outcomes of the Regional Ministerial
A/RES/57/173
2
Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational
Crime, held at Bali, Indonesia, from 26 to 28 February 2002,1 and the seventh
Regional Conference on Migration, held at Antigua, Guatemala, from 28 to 31 May
2002, as part of the Puebla Process,
Recognizing also the urgent need to increase technical cooperation activities to
assist countries, in particular developing countries and countries with economies in
transition, with their efforts in translating United Nations conventions and other
legal instruments and policy guidelines into practice,
Recalling its resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, by which it adopted the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air,
and its resolution 55/255 of 31 May 2001, by which it adopted the Protocol against
the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and
Components and Ammunition,
Emphasizing the importance of the expeditious entry into force of the
Convention and the Protocols thereto as a milestone in the efforts to fight and
prevent organized crime, one of the most serious contemporary threats to democracy
and peace,
Recognizing the need to maintain a balance in the technical cooperation
capacity of the Centre for International Crime Prevention of the Office on Drugs and
Crime2 of the Secretariat between all priorities identified by the General Assembly
and the Economic and Social Council,
Recalling its relevant resolutions, in which it requested the Secretary-General,
as a matter of urgency, to provide the United Nations Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice Programme with sufficient resources for the full implementation of
its mandate, in conformity with the high priority attached to the Programme,
Recalling also its resolution 56/253 of 24 December 2001, in which it
requested the Secretary-General to make proposals to strengthen the Terrorism
Prevention Branch at the United Nations Office at Vienna and to report thereon to
the General Assembly for its consideration,
Bearing in mind the Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the
Challenges of the Twenty-first Century, adopted by the General Assembly in its
resolution 55/59 of 4 December 2000,
Recalling the plans of action for the implementation of the Vienna Declaration
on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century annexed
to General Assembly resolution 56/261 of 31 January 2002,
Recalling also its resolution 56/260 of 31 January 2002, by which the General
Assembly established the terms of reference of the Ad Hoc Committee for the
Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption,
Taking note of Economic and Social Council resolution 2002/19 of 24 July
2002, entitled “Strengthening international cooperation and technical assistance
_______________
1 See A/57/64.
2 Formerly known as the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention.
A/RES/57/173
3
within the framework of the activities of the Centre for International Crime
Prevention in preventing and combating terrorism”,
Welcoming the progress made thus far by the Ad Hoc Committee for the
Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption,
Aware of the continued increase in requests for technical assistance forwarded
to the Centre by least developed countries, developing countries, countries with
economies in transition and countries emerging from conflict,
Appreciating the funding provided by certain Member States in 2001 and 2002
that has permitted the Centre to enhance its capacity to execute an increased number
of projects,
1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General on
the progress made in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 56/123;3
2. Affirms the importance of the work of the Centre for International Crime
Prevention of the Office on Drugs and Crime of the Secretariat in the fulfilment of
its mandate, including to prevent and combat terrorism, and in particular in
strengthening international cooperation and providing technical assistance, upon
request, which complements the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the
Security Council, and in this context takes note with appreciation of the report of
the Secretary-General on strengthening the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the
Secretariat4 requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 56/253;
3. Reaffirms the importance of the United Nations Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice Programme in promoting effective action to strengthen
international cooperation in crime prevention and criminal justice, in responding to
the needs of the international community in the face of both national and
transnational criminality and in assisting Member States in achieving the goals of
preventing crime within and among States and improving the response to crime;
4. Also reaffirms the role of the Centre in providing to Member States, upon
request, technical cooperation, advisory services and other forms of assistance in the
field of crime prevention and criminal justice, including in the areas of prevention
and control of transnational organized crime and terrorism, as well as in the area of
reconstruction of national criminal justice systems;
5. Welcomes the programme of work of the Centre, including the three
global programmes addressing trafficking in human beings, corruption and
organized crime, formulated on the basis of close consultations with Member States
and the review by the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, and
calls upon the Secretary-General to enhance further the visibility of that programme
of work and to strengthen the Centre by providing it with the resources necessary
for the full implementation of its mandate;
6. Supports the high priority given to technical cooperation and advisory
services in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice, including in the areas
of prevention and control of transnational organized crime and terrorism, and
stresses the need to enhance the operational activities of the Centre to assist, in
particular, developing countries, countries with economies in transition and
countries emerging from conflict;
_______________
3 A/57/153.
4 A/57/152 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1 and 2 and Add.2.
A/RES/57/173
4
7. Urges States and relevant international organizations to develop national,
regional and international strategies and other necessary measures that complement
the work of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme
in addressing effectively the significant problems posed by the smuggling of
migrants and trafficking in persons and related activities;
8. Invites all States to support, through voluntary contributions to the
United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Fund, the operational
activities of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme,
including for the provision of technical assistance for the implementation of the
commitments entered into at the Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders,5 including the measures outlined in the
plans of action for the implementation of the Vienna Declaration on Crime and
Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century annexed to resolution
56/261;
9. Encourages relevant programmes, funds and organizations of the United
Nations system, in particular the United Nations Development Programme,
international financial institutions, in particular the World Bank, and regional and
national funding agencies, to support the technical operational activities of the
Centre;
10. Urges States and funding agencies to review, as appropriate, their
funding policies for development assistance and to include a crime prevention and
criminal justice component in such assistance;
11. Welcomes the efforts undertaken by the Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice to exercise more vigorously its mandated function
of resource mobilization, and calls upon the Commission to strengthen further its
activities in this direction;
12. Expresses its appreciation to non-governmental organizations and other
relevant sectors of civil society for their support to the United Nations Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme;
13. Invites relevant entities of the United Nations system, including the
United Nations International Drug Control Programme, the United Nations
Development Programme and the World Bank, and other international funding
agencies, to increase their interaction with the Centre, in order to benefit from
synergies and avoid duplication of effort, and to ensure that, as appropriate,
activities on crime prevention and criminal justice, including activities related to the
prevention of corruption, are considered in their sustainable development agenda,
and that the expertise of the Centre in activities related to crime prevention and
criminal justice, including activities related to the prevention of corruption and the
promotion of the rule of law, is fully utilized;
14. Requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary measures to provide
adequate support to the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, as
the principal policy-making body in this field, in performing its activities, including
cooperation and coordination with the United Nations Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice Programme Network of Institutes and other relevant bodies;
_______________
5 See Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Vienna,
10–17 April 2000: report prepared by the Secretariat (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.00.IV.8).
A/RES/57/173
5
15. Urges all States and regional economic organizations that have not yet
done so to sign and ratify the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto as soon as possible in order to ensure
their speedy entry into force;
16. Welcomes the voluntary contributions already made, and encourages
States to make adequate and regular voluntary contributions for the entry into force
and implementation of the Convention and the Protocols thereto, through the United
Nations funding mechanism specifically designed for that purpose in the
Convention;
17. Requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary measures and to
provide adequate support to the Centre so as to enable it to promote the speedy entry
into force of the Convention and the Protocols thereto, including the organization of
a treaty event, in cooperation with the Office of Legal Affairs of the Secretariat, in
2003;
18. Reaffirms the importance of the completion of the work of the Ad Hoc
Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption in accordance
with the terms of resolution 56/260, and urges the Ad Hoc Committee to endeavour
to complete its work by the end of 2003;
19. Welcomes the decision of the Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice to mainstream a gender perspective into its activities and its request
to the Secretariat that a gender perspective be integrated into all activities of the
Centre;
20. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report on the implementation
of the present resolution to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session.
77th plenary meeting
18 December 2002

Annex 283
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1636, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1636 (31 October 2005)

United Nations S/RES/1636 (2005)
Security Council Distr.: General
31 October 2005
05-57961 (E) 311005
*0557961*
Resolution 1636 (2005)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 5297th meeting, on
31 October 2005
The Security Council,
Reaffirming all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular
resolutions 1595 (2005) of 7 April 2005, 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, and
1566 (2004) of 8 October 2004,
Reiterating its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity,
unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority
of the Government of Lebanon,
Reaffirming that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of
the most serious threats to peace and security,
Having examined carefully the report of the international independent
investigation Commission (S/2005/662) (“the Commission”) concerning its
investigation into the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, that
killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others, and caused injury
to dozens of people,
Commending the Commission for the outstanding professional work it has
accomplished under difficult circumstances in assisting the Lebanese authorities in
their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act, and taking note of the
Commission’s conclusion that the investigation is not yet complete,
Commending States which have provided assistance to the Commission in the
discharge of its duties,
Commending also the Lebanese authorities for the full cooperation they have
provided to the Commission in the discharge of its duties, in accordance with
paragraph 3 of resolution 1595 (2005),
Recalling that pursuant to its relevant resolutions, all States are required to
afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal
investigations or criminal proceedings relating to terrorist acts, and recalling in
particular that it had requested in its resolution 1595 (2005) all States and all parties
to cooperate fully with the Commission,
2
S/RES/1636 (2005)
Taking note of the Commission’s findings that although the inquiry has already
made considerable progress and achieved significant results, it is of the utmost
importance to continue the trail both within and outside Lebanon in order to
elucidate fully all aspects of this terrorist act, and in particular to identify and hold
accountable all those who bear responsibility in its planning, sponsoring,
organization and perpetration,
Mindful of the demand of the Lebanese people that all those responsible for the
terrorist bombing that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and
others be identified and held accountable,
Acknowledging in this connection the letter of the Prime Minister of Lebanon
to the Secretary-General of 13 October 2005 (S/2005/651) requesting that the
mandate of the Commission be extended to enable the Commission to continue to
assist the competent Lebanese authorities in any further investigation of the various
dimensions of the terrorist crime,
Acknowledging also the concurrent recommendation of the Commission that
continued international assistance is needed to help the Lebanese authorities get
right to the bottom of this terrorist act, and that a sustained effort on the part of the
international community to establish an assistance and cooperation platform
together with the Lebanese authorities in the field of security and justice is essential,
Willing to continue to assist Lebanon in the search for the truth and in holding
those responsible for this terrorist act accountable for their crime,
Calling upon all States to extend to the Lebanese authorities and to the
Commission the assistance they may need and request in connection with the
inquiry, and in particular to provide them with all relevant information they may
possess pertaining to this terrorist attack,
Reaffirming its profound commitment to the national unity and stability of
Lebanon, emphasizing that the future of Lebanon should be decided through
peaceful means by the Lebanese themselves, free of intimidation and foreign
interference, and warning in this regard that attempts to undermine the stability of
Lebanon will not be tolerated,
Taking note of the Commission’s conclusions that, given the infiltration of
Lebanese institutions and society by the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services
working in tandem, it would be difficult to envisage a scenario whereby such a
complex assassination plot could have been carried out without their knowledge,
and that there is probable cause to believe that the decision to assassinate former
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri could not have been taken without the approval of topranked
Syrian security officials,
Mindful of the Commission’s conclusion that while the Syrian authorities, after
initial hesitation, have cooperated to a limited degree with the Commission, several
Syrian officials have tried to mislead the investigation by giving false or inaccurate
statements,
Convinced that it is unacceptable in principle that anyone anywhere should
escape accountability for an act of terrorism for any reason, including because of his
own obstruction of the investigation or failure to cooperate in good faith,
3
S/RES/1636 (2005)
Determining that this terrorist act and its implications constitute a threat to
international peace and security,
Emphasizing the importance of peace and stability in the region, and the need
for peaceful solutions,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
== I ==
1. Welcomes the report of the Commission;
2. Takes note with extreme concern of the Commission’s conclusion that,
there is converging evidence pointing at the involvement of both Lebanese and
Syrian officials in this terrorist act, and that it is difficult to envisage a scenario
whereby such complex assassination could have been carried out without their
knowledge;
3. Decides as a step to assist in the investigation of this crime and without
prejudice to the ultimate judicial determination of the guilt or innocence of any
individual;
(a) that all individuals designated by the Commission or the Government of
Lebanon as suspected of involvement in the planning, sponsoring, organizing or
perpetrating of this terrorist act, upon notification of such designation to and
agreement of the Committee established in subparagraph (b) below, shall be subject
to the following measures:
– All States shall take the measures necessary to prevent entry into or transit
through their territories of such individuals, provided that nothing in this
paragraph shall obligate a state to refuse entry into its territory to its own
nationals, or, if such individuals are found within their territory, shall ensure in
accordance with applicable law that they are available for interview by the
Commission if it so requests;
– All States shall: freeze all funds, financial assets and economic resources that
are on their territories that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by
such individuals, or that are held by entities owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by such individuals or by persons acting on their behalf or at their
direction; ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are
made available by their nationals or by any persons within their territories to
or for the benefit of such individuals or entities; and cooperate fully in
accordance with applicable law with any international investigations related to
the assets or financial transactions of such individuals, entities or persons
acting on their behalf, including through sharing of financial information;
(b) to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of
procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the
Council to undertake the tasks described in the annex to this resolution;
(c) that the Committee and any measures still in force under
subparagraph (a) will terminate when the Committee reports to the Security Council
that all investigative and judicial proceedings relating to this terrorist attack have
been completed, unless otherwise decided by the Security Council;
4
S/RES/1636 (2005)
4. Determines that the involvement of any State in this terrorist act would
constitute a serious violation by that State of its obligations to work to prevent and
refrain from supporting terrorism, in accordance in particular with
resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1566 (2004) and that it would amount also to a serious
violation of its obligation to respect the sovereignty and political independence of
Lebanon;
5. Takes note with extreme concern also of the Commission’s conclusion
that, while the Syrian authorities have cooperated in form but not in substance with
the Commission, several Syrian officials tried to mislead the Commission by giving
false or inaccurate information, and determines that Syria’s continued lack of
cooperation to the inquiry would constitute a serious violation of its obligations
under relevant resolutions, including 1373 (2001), 1566 (2004) and 1595 (2005);
6. Takes note of the recent statement by Syria regarding its intention now to
cooperate with the Commission and expects the Syrian Government to implement in
full the commitments it is now making;
== II ==
7. Acknowledges that continued assistance from the Commission to
Lebanon, as requested by its Government in its letter to the Secretary-General of
13 October 2005 and recommended by the Commission in its report, remains
necessary to elucidate fully all aspects of this heinous crime, thus enabling that all
those involved in the planning, sponsoring, organizing and perpetrating of this
terrorist act, as well as their accomplices, be identified and brought to justice;
8. Welcomes in this regard the decision of the Secretary-General to extend
the mandate of the Commission until 15 December 2005, as authorized by the
Security Council in its resolution 1595 (2005), and decides that it will extend the
mandate further if recommended by the Commission and requested by the Lebanese
Government;
9. Commends the Lebanese authorities for the courageous decisions they
have already taken in relation to the inquiry, including upon recommendation of the
Commission, in particular the arrest and indictment of former Lebanese security
officials suspected of involvement in this terrorist act, and encourages the Lebanese
authorities to persist in their efforts with the same determination in order to get right
to the bottom of this crime;
== III ==
10. Endorses the Commission’s conclusion that it is incumbent upon the
Syrian authorities to clarify a considerable part of the questions which remain
unresolved;
11. Decides in this context that:
(a) Syria must detain those Syrian officials or individuals whom the
Commission considers as suspected of involvement in the planning, sponsoring,
organizing or perpetrating of this terrorist act, and make them fully available to the
Commission;
(b) the Commission shall have vis-à-vis Syria the same rights and authorities
as mentioned in paragraph 3 of resolution 1595 (2005), and Syria must cooperate
with the Commission fully and unconditionally on that basis;
5
S/RES/1636 (2005)
(c) the Commission shall have the authority to determine the location and
modalities for interview of Syrian officials and individuals it deems relevant to the
inquiry;
12. Insists that Syria not interfere in Lebanese domestic affairs, either
directly or indirectly, refrain from any attempt aimed at destabilizing Lebanon, and
respect scrupulously the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political
independence of this country;
== IV ==
13. Requests the Commission to report to the Council on the progress of the
inquiry by 15 December 2005, including on the cooperation received by the
Commission from the Syrian authorities, or anytime before that date if the
Commission deems that such cooperation does not meet the requirements of this
resolution, so that the Council, if necessary, could consider further action;
14. Expresses its readiness to consider any additional request for assistance
from the Lebanese Government to ensure that all those responsible for this crime are
held accountable;
15. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
6
S/RES/1636 (2005)
Annex
The following are the functions of the Committee established pursuant to
paragraph 3 of this resolution:
1. To register as subject to the measures in paragraph 3 (a) in this resolution an
individual designated by the Commission or the Government of Lebanon, provided
that within two working days of receipt of such designation no member of the
Committee objects, in which case the Committee shall meet within fifteen days to
determine the applicability of the measures in paragraph 3 (a).
2. To approve exceptions to the measures established in paragraph 3 (a) on a
case-by-case basis:
(i) with respect to the travel restrictions, where the Committee determines
that such travel is justified on the ground of humanitarian need, including religious
obligation, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise
further the objectives of this resolution;
(ii) with respect to the freezing of funds and other economic resources,
where the Committee determines that such exceptions are necessary for basic
expenses, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and
medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges, or
exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of
incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service
charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or other financial assets
or economic resources;
3. To register the removal of an individual from the scope of the measures in
paragraph 3 (a) upon notification from the Commission or the Government of
Lebanon that the individual is no longer suspected of involvement in this terrorist
act, provided that within two working days of receipt of such designation no
member of the Committee objects, in which case the Committee shall meet within
fifteen days to determine the removal of an individual from the scope of the
measures in paragraph 3 (a).
4. To inform all Member States as to which individuals are subject to the
measures in paragraph 3 (a).
Annex 284
UNODC, Legislative Guide to the Universal Anti-Terrorism Conventions and Protocols 12-13
(2008)

V.03-85663 (E)
Legislative Guide to the Universal Anti-Terrorism
Conventions and Protocols
Prepared by the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime
United Nations

Legislative Guide to the Universal Anti-Terrorism
Conventions and Protocols
Prepared by the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime
United Nations
New York, 2003
Note
Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures.
Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.
Material in this publication may be freely quoted or reprinted, but acknowledgement is
requested, together with a copy of the publication containing the quotation or reprint.
United Nations publication
Sales No. [E.03.XXX]
ISBN [XXX
iii
Contents
Page
I. Introduction ............................................................................................... 1
A. Background ..................................................................................... 1
B. Strengthening the legal regime against terrorism ............................ 4
C. Development of anti-terrorism instruments and models .................. 5
II. Penalization requirements of the anti-terrorism conventions
and protocols ............................................................................................. 7
A. General considerations and definitions ............................................ 7
B. Offences related to civil aviation ..................................................... 9
C. Offences based on the status of the victim ...................................... 12
D. Offences related to dangerous materials .......................................... 13
E. Offences related to vessels and fixed platforms .............................. 17
F. Offences related to the financing of terrorism ................................. 19
III. Other core elements of the anti-terrorism conventions and protocols ........ 24
A. Establishment of jurisdiction over the offence ................................ 24
B. Obligation to conduct an inquiry, to report findings and to
advise of intent to exercise jurisdiction ........................................... 28
C. Obligation to submit for prosecution ............................................... 29
D. Elements of knowledge and intent ................................................... 29
E. Offences of participation ................................................................. 30
F. Mutual assistance ............................................................................ 32
G. Extradition provisions ..................................................................... 33
H. Exceptions made on grounds of political offence or
discriminatory purposes .................................................................. 34
I. Rights of the alleged offender to communicate and to fair treatment 35

1
I. Introduction
A. Background
1. In its resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, the Security Council
declared that “acts, methods and practices of terrorism [were] contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations [and] that knowingly financing,
planning and inciting terrorist acts [were] also contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations” (para. 5). In the same resolution, the Security
Council decided that all Member States should “take the necessary steps to prevent
the commission of terrorist acts” (para. 2 (b)). The Council also decided to establish
a Committee to monitor implementation of that resolution.
2. In its resolution 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001, the Council stated that it
regarded “any act of international terrorism as a threat to international peace and
security”. Under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, “the Members of
the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with the ... Charter”. In paragraph 2 of its resolution 1373
(2001), the Council decided that all Member States should:
“ ...
“(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support or commit
terrorist acts, or provide safe havens;
“ ...
“(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning,
preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is
brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against
them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in
domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the
seriousness of such terrorist acts;
“(f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection
with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing
or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their
possession necessary for the proceedings;
“ ... ”
3. In elaborating means to accomplish these mandatory obligations, the Council
called upon all Member States to (resolution 1373 (2201), para. 3):
“ ...
“(d) Become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December
1999;
“(e) Increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and Security Council
resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001);
2
“ ...”
4. The conventions (meaning multilateral treaties) and protocols (meaning
agreements supplementary to a convention) referred to in paragraphs 3 (d) and (e) of
Council resolution 1373 (2001) were compiled, together with other global and
regional instruments on terrorism, by the Secretariat in a 2001 publication, entitled
International Instruments Related to the Prevention and Suppression of
International Terrorism.1 In accordance with the guidance of the Security Council
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counterterrorism
(the Counter-Terrorism Committee), the present Legislative Guide focuses
on the following 12 universal instruments 2 selected for inclusion in the
aforementioned publication:
(a) Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft (1963);3
(b) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970);4
(c) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviation (1971);5
(d) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Offences against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (1973) (the “1973
Internationally Protected Persons Convention”);6
(e) International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979) (the
“1979 Hostages Convention”);7
(f) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980) (the
“1980 Nuclear Material Convention”);8
(g) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports
Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the
__________________
1 International Instruments Related to the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism
(United Nations publication, Sales No. E.01.V.3).
2 The English-language versions of these conventions and protocols, or links to them, are
available at www.un.org/terrorism/. Translations of the conventions and protocols in the other
official languages of the United Nations, or links to them, are available in Arabic at
www.un.org/arabic/terrorism/; in Chinese at www.un.org/chinese/terrorism/; in French at
www.un.org/french/terrorism/; in Spanish at
www.un.org/spanish/terrorismo/tratados/terrorismo.html; and in Russian at
www.un.org/russian/terrorism/.
3 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 704, p. 218. Available at
http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv1.pdf.
4 The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft was signed at The Hague
on 16 December 1970 and entered into force on 14 October 1971. Available at
www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_convention_aircraft_seizure.html.
5 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 974, No. 14118. Available at
http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv3.pdf.
6 Ibid., vol. 1035, No. 15410. Available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv4.pdf.
7 Ibid., vol. 1316, No. 21931. Available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv5.pdf.
8 Ibid., vol. 1456, No. 24631. Available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv6.pdf.
3
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1988) (the “1988
Montreal Protocol”);9
(h) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (1988) (the “1988 Safety of Maritime Navigation
Convention”);10
(i) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988) (the “1988 Fixed
Platforms Protocol”);11
(j) Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of
Detection (1991) (the “1991 Plastic Explosives Convention”);12
(k) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
(1997) (the “1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention”);13
(l) International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism (1999) (the “1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention”).14
5. In the preface to International Instruments Related to the Prevention and
Suppression of International Terrorism,15 United Nations Secretary-General Kofi
Annan described the increasing danger faced by the world community in the
following terms:
“Terrorism strikes at the very heart of everything the United Nations stands for.
It presents a global threat to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
stability. Globalization brings home to us the importance of a truly concerted
international effort to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.”
6. At a symposium entitled “Combating terrorism: the contribution of the United
Nations”, the Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee expressed the desire of
the members of the Committee that the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
based in Vienna, should play an important role by providing assistance for the
legislative implementation of anti-terrorism measures, as the Committee was
__________________
9 The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International
Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Civil Aviation was signed at Montreal on 24 February 1988 and entered into force
on 6 August 1989. Available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv7.pdf.
10 The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
was adopted on 10 March 1988 and entered into force on 1 March 1992. Available at
http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv8.pdf.
11 The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, was done at Rome on 10 March 1988
and entered into force on 1 March 1992. Available at
www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_convention_platforms.html.
12 The International Civil Aviation Organization Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives
for the Purpose of Detection was signed at Montreal on 1 March 1991 and entered into force on
21 June 1998. Available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv10.pdf.
13 General Assembly resolution 52/164, annex. Available at
www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_convention_terrorist_bombing.html.
14 General Assembly resolution 54/109, annex. Available at www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm.
15 International Instruments Related to the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism
(United Nations publication, Sales No. E.01.V.3).
4
responsible for analysing the anti-terrorism needs of Member States, but did not
itself provide technical assistance. Such a role had been envisaged for the Centre for
International Crime Prevention of the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
of the Secretariat16 by its guiding body, the Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice and reaffirmed by the Economic and Social Council in its
resolution 2002/19 of 24 July 2002, as well as by the General Assembly in its
resolutions 57/173 of 18 December 2002 and 57/292 of 20 December 2002. The
Centre has initiated a preparatory assistance project on strengthening the legal
regime against terrorism, which will be executed with the assistance of
extrabudgetary funding.
B. Strengthening the legal regime against terrorism
7. Full implementation of the anti-terrorism conventions, as called for by the
Security Council in resolution 1373 (2001), will mean far more than ratifying the
relevant international conventions and putting in place the supporting legislative
framework. It has many aspects, including national security doctrine, budgetary
allocations and administrative and personnel measures. The development of
legislation is, however, the initial practical obstacle to compliance by a State party
with resolution 1373 (2001) and to ratification of the global anti-terrorism
conventions.
8. Some countries will not, either because of domestic law or as a matter of
policy, ratify a treaty until legislation that permits the satisfaction of all of its
juridical obligations is in place. This may be true both with respect to domestic
ratification, that is, the constitutional process by which a State commits itself to
accept the obligations of the agreement, and international ratification, that is, the
formal notification to the designated treaty depository that the State has accepted
the reciprocal obligations of the agreement. In other countries, a ratified treaty may
have the same status as domestic law, but legislation may be required to provide
elements necessary for implementation that are not contained in the treaty. For
example, if financing an act of terrorism to take place in another country were not
otherwise penalized in domestic law, ratification of the International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism would not permit such an act to be
punished until domestic legislation had established a penalty.
9. Providing reference materials and technical advice (online, telephonically, and
in person when cost-effective) to those responsible for drafting legislation and other
persons involved in the incorporation of anti-terrorism conventions in national
legislation directly helps achieve the international cooperation and full
implementation of anti-terrorism instruments called for in Security Council
resolution 1373 (2001), paragraph 3 (e). Because the development of acceptable
legislation also removes technical obstacles to ratification, legislative assistance is
an indirect but practical way of encouraging States to become parties to the
instruments promptly, as called for in the same resolution, paragraph 3 (d). The
present Legislative Guide was therefore developed to inform those responsible for
drafting legislation and other readers of the development and requirements of the
__________________
16 The Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention became the United Nations Office on Drugs
Crime on 1 October 2002.
5
12 international conventions. The International Association of Penal Law, the
International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences and the Monitoring
Body on Organized Crime hosted a meeting of international experts in Siracusa,
Italy, from 3 to 5 December 2002 to provide general comments and guidance on the
proposed text. The present Legislative Guide provides drafting resources in the form
of laws currently in force or under parliamentary consideration, as well as access to
illustrative model laws developed by the Commonwealth Secretariat and others. The
Legislative Guide and accompanying checklists of the convention requirements have
already been used in technical consultations conducted with a total of 25 countries.
The process involves a review, carried out with national authorities, of the status of
ratification of the 12 conventions and protocols, an examination of whether
domestic legislation effectively implements the requirements of those instruments
and identification of necessary improvements consistent with resources and legal
traditions of the State concerned.
10. The Legislative Guide is posted on the web site of the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime17 and periodically updated. Accordingly, the Office would
welcome suggestions of additional examples of national legislation effectively
implementing the penalization, jurisdiction or international cooperation obligations
of one or more of the 12 anti-terrorism conventions, as well as information
regarding problems which may arise in legislative implementation, drafting or
application.18
C. Development of anti-terrorism instruments and models
11. The conventions and protocols examined in the present Legislative Guide were
negotiated over four decades, from the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft to the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999. They cover topics as disparate
as detection markers in plastic explosives and the prevention and punishment of
crimes against internationally protected persons. Their approach changed
significantly during that time. The 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft provides that none of its provisions authorize or
require action in respect of an offence against penal laws of a political nature, which
could be considered to include laws against terror-producing violence committed in
furtherance of revolutionary and separatist movements or wars of national liberation.
The most recent conventions contain articles expressly rejecting any “political
offence” exception.
12. Considering the number of subjects covered, the evolution of language and
content over time and the variety of legal systems in which the conventions and
protocols must be ratified and implemented, it is essential to recognize the validity
of many possible approaches to their implementation. The present Legislative Guide
is intended to provide a country considering ratification and implementation of one
or more of the anti-terrorism conventions and protocols with an overview of the
__________________
17 The present Legislative Guide is available at www.unodc.org/odccp/terrorism.html?id=11702.
18 Staff of the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime can
be contacted by e-mail at [email protected], by telephone at + (43) (1) 26060-4177 or by
facsimile at + (43) (1) 26060-5968.
6
relevant general principles and experience. In order to provide legislative templates
adaptable to a wide variety of legal systems, models of an illustrative nature are
presented. The Commonwealth Secretariat has prepared model laws and explanatory
materials for the 12 conventions and protocols, collectively entitled Implementation
Kits for the International Counter-Terrorism Conventions, as well as comprehensive
model legislation and explanatory guides for implementation of all the requirements
of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), entitled Model Legislative Provisions
on Measures to Combat Terrorism.19
13. In addition to presenting model laws prepared by the Commonwealth
Secretariat and other sources, the Legislative Guide attempts to provide or refer the
reader to examples of, or references to, national legislation currently in force or
under parliamentary consideration for each of the 12 instruments. Various means of
satisfying the core requirements of the instruments are discussed, emphasizing
possible means of combining implementing legislation for related conventions and
protocols. The reader is alerted when other applicable international standards
require more than the mandatory obligations imposed by the conventions and
protocols, such as those relating to the financing of terrorism. Additional useful
materials can be found at the web site of the Counter-Terrorism Committee,20 which
contains reports from Member States, some of which contain summaries of aspects
of the national legislative scheme and attach the text of relevant legislation.
__________________
19 These materials are available at www.thecommonwealth.org/law/model.html. Additional
information may be obtained from Kimberly Prost, Head, Criminal Law Unit, Deputy Director,
Legal and Constitutional Affairs Division of the Commonwealth Secretariat, at
[email protected], telephone + (44) 207 747 6420 or + (44) 207 839 3302.
20 The web site of the Counter-Terrorism Committee is at www.un.org/docs/sc/committees/1373.
7
II. Penalization requirements of the anti-terrorism conventions
and protocols
A. General considerations and definitions
14. In two of the 12 anti-terrorism instruments, offences are not defined. Although
clearly aimed at unlawful aircraft seizures, commonly called hijackings, the 1963
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft
simply requires a State party to establish jurisdiction over offences defined
according to its domestic law that are committed on board aircraft registered in that
Contracting State. Many of the provisions of that Convention are substantially
refined in subsequent aviation instruments. The Convention on the Marking of
Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection requires its parties to take measures,
which may be penal in nature but are not required to be, to prohibit and prevent the
movement of unmarked explosives.
15. Of the 12 anti-terrorism instruments, eight conventions and two related
protocols obligate parties to penalize offences defined in the instrument: the 1970
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the 1971
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation and its 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, the 1973 Internationally Protected
Persons Convention, the 1979 Hostages Convention, the 1980 Nuclear Material
Convention, the 1988 Safety of Maritime Navigation Convention and its 1988 Fixed
Platforms Protocol, the 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention and the 1999
Financing of Terrorism Convention. The format used in each of these 10 instruments
comprised four elements:
(a) The definition as an offence of a particular type of terrorist activity that
was at that time causing great concern, as were unlawful seizures of aircraft in 1970
and attacks involving bombs and other dangerous devices in the 1990s;
(b) The requirement that parties to the instrument penalize that conduct;
(c) The identification of certain bases upon which the parties agreed to
exercise their criminal jurisdiction to control the defined offence, such as the
country of registration of a ship or vessel, territoriality or nationality;
(d) The creation of the further jurisdictional obligation that a State party in
whose territory a suspect is found must establish and exercise competence over the
offence and refer it for prosecution if extradition is not granted pursuant to the
particular convention or protocol. This last element is popularly known as the
principle of “no safe haven for terrorists”.
16. The core elements of the offences established in the various conventions are
summarized in the present chapter, with references to illustrative models or
legislation currently in force as examples of how these penalization requirements
can effectively be met. This may be achieved by passage of a single consolidated
anti-terrorism law; legislative action addressing related groups of anti-terrorism
instruments, such as the three conventions and one protocol relating to air travel; or
separate legislative implementation of each convention and protocol.
8
17. The publication of the Commonwealth Secretariat entitled Model Legislative
Provisions on Measures to Combat Terrorism provides a comprehensive antiterrorism
statute intended to achieve compliance with the mandatory requirements
of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). These requirements are broader in many
ways than the penal offences and other actions required under the 12 anti-terrorism
instruments, as is explained in the publication. In part I of Model Legislative
Provisions, entitled “Interpretation”, the terms used throughout the model are
defined. In part III, entitled “Offences”, the elements of 16 specified types of
criminal conduct related to terrorist acts are listed, including financing, facilitation,
support, supply, recruitment, incitement and participation offences. As terrorist acts
are defined in part I of the model to include any act or omission constituting an
offence within the scope of the 12 relevant conventions and protocols, adoption of
this model would satisfy the penalization requirements of all the instruments by
incorporation.
18. Since differing national definitions of offences can create problems of dual
criminality and other procedural issues, it is desirable to repeat the terminology
used in the conventions in national implementing laws or to adopt the definitions
used in the conventions by reference.
19. The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002, of Barbados defines an offence of terrorism as
including any offence under nine of the penal conventions and protocols examined
in the present Legislative Guide (that is, all the instruments examined in the present
publication, with the exception of the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, the 1991 Plastic Explosives Convention
and the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention, the last being dealt with by the
creation of the separate crime of financing of terrorism in the Barbados statute).
Under the Act, in addition to offences defined by reference to the conventions,
terrorism is defined as:
“(b) any other act:
“(i) that has the purpose by its nature or context, to intimidate the
public or to compel a government or an international organization
to do or to refrain from doing any act; and
“(ii) that is intended to cause:
“(A) death or serious bodily harm to a civilian or in a situation of
armed conflict, to any other person not taking an active part in
the hostilities;
“(B) serious risk to the health or safety of the public or any
segment of the public;
“(C) substantial property damage, whether to public or private
property, where the damage involves a risk of the kind
mentioned in sub-paragraph (B) or an interference or
disruption of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (D); or
“(D) serious interference with or serious disruption of an essential
service, facility or system, whether public or private, not
being an interference or disruption resulting from lawful
advocacy, or from protest, dissent or stoppage of work and
9
not involving a risk of the kind mentioned in subparagraph
(B).”
20. This formulation corresponds to part I, “Interpretation”, option 1 of Model
Legislative Provisions on Measures to Combat Terrorism, in which “terrorist act” is
defined. Model Legislative Provisions presents alternative ways of defining a
terrorist act: option 1 defines the offence as not requiring a political, ideological or
religious motivation in addition to the intent to intimidate by killing, damaging or
threatening to do so, while option 2 requires such a motive. The Terrorism Act 2000
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, discussed in
paragraph 37 below, is an example of an option 2 statute, requiring both an intent to
influence or intimidate and an ideological motivation. One practical consideration in
choosing between these options is that, unless a suspected offender confesses, such
a subjective motivation could be impossible to prove. Another is that dual
criminality is a standard requirement for granting extradition; adding a motivation
element may be used as the basis of claims that dual criminality is lacking when
States request extradition or mutual legal assistance. Others believe that dual
criminality should be judged only on whether the intentional physical act would be
punishable under the law of both countries, without regard to motivation.
B. Offences related to civil aviation
21. The 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft, the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation and its 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation all derive from a
common concern about the safety of air transportation and were negotiated under
the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization. While aimed at acts
jeopardizing the safety, good order and discipline of aircraft and of persons and
property on board, the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft only requires the establishment of jurisdiction over
the location of offences. While providing rules and procedures in cases of “seizure,
or other wrongful exercise of control of an aircraft in flight” (art. 11, para. 1), the
initial Convention simply obligates a party to take “such measures as may be
necessary to establish its jurisdiction as the State of registration over offences
committed on board aircraft registered in such State” (art. 3, para. 2). There is no
requirement to define any particular conduct endangering the safety of an aircraft
and/or persons on board as an offence. Moreover, the requirement to establish
jurisdiction only applies to acts committed on board an aircraft in flight, defined in
that Convention as from the moment when power is applied for the purpose of takeoff
until the moment when the landing run ends.
22. The three subsequent aviation instruments progress incrementally in reacting
to terrorist acts. The 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft defines a crime which parties are required to punish by severe penalties. It
requires a party to penalize the act of a person who “unlawfully, by force or threat
thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seizes, or exercises control of, that
aircraft” (art. 1, para. (a)). Performing or attempting to perform any such act and
acting as accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform such an act
10
are only required to be penalized when committed on board an aircraft in flight, but
the meaning of that term is expanded to mean after closure of its external doors
following embarkation until the moment when any such door is opened for
disembarkation (art. 3, para. 1), not just from take-off to landing.
23. Historically, both the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft and the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft were responses to and focused upon hijacking attempts
to gain control of aircraft in flight. Terrorist acts aimed at the destruction of aircraft
were addressed by the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation. This instrument requires penalization of attacks
on aircraft in service, meaning from the beginning of the preflight preparation of the
aircraft by ground personnel or by the crew for a specific flight until 24 hours after
any landing (art. 2, para. (b)) and not just in flight and extends to acts of violence
against persons on board an aircraft in flight, aircraft or air navigation facilities if
those acts are likely to endanger aircraft safety (art. 1). The penalization
requirement also extends to attempts to commit such offences (art. 1, para. 2) and
accomplices without the limitation in the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft that they be committed on board aircraft.
24. The most recently adopted air travel instrument, the 1988 Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation, is integrally related to the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, which must be ratified by any
party wishing to ratify the Protocol. The Protocol defines and applies the attempt
and accomplice concepts to the additional offence committed by a person if he,
using any device, substance or weapon:
“(a) performs an act of violence against a person at an airport serving
international civil aviation which causes or is likely to cause serious
injury or death; or
“(b) destroys or seriously damages the facilities of an airport serving
international civil aviation or aircraft not in service located thereon or
disrupts the services of the airport,
if such an act endangers or is likely to endanger safety at that airport”
(art. 2, para. 1).
25. From a domestic law perspective, the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation defines
as an offence acts that would already be criminal in any country, that is, violence
likely to cause serious injury or death committed on the State’s territory. However,
the 1988 Montreal Protocol has the significant effect of imposing an international
treaty obligation to either extradite or to assume domestic jurisdiction and to extend
international cooperation. As described above, the 1970 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the 1971 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation and the 1988
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation define an evolving series of offences, from hijacking of
an aircraft in flight, through violence against persons on an aircraft in flight and
attacks on an aircraft on the ground, to violence against persons in airports and
attacks against airports and other ground facilities. A number of countries responded
11
to these evolving convention offence requirements with separate acts of ratification
and separate implementing statutes, first for the 1963 Convention on Offences and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, then for the later conventions.
26. Models for such separate implementation are available in the Commonwealth
Secretariat Implementation Kits, which provide model statutes to implement each of
the four aviation instruments. Legislative implementation has been achieved in other
countries by combining the jurisdictional bases and the offences required by the
various aviation instruments in a single statute. After negotiation of the 1971
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation a number of countries approved legislation that combined implementation
of the related 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft , 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft and 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation relating to air travel safety. Among these were the New
Zealand Aviation Crimes Act 1972, the Malawi Hijacking Act of 1972, the
Malaysian Aviation Offences Act 1984 and the Mauritius Civil Aviation (Hijacking
and Other Offences) Act 1985. Some of these statutes were later amended by the
insertion of an article incorporating the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, as was
done by Mauritius. Its Hijacking and Other Offences Act of 1985 had provided for
offences of hijacking, violence against passengers or crew and endangering the
safety of aircraft, corresponding to the types of offence addressed in the air travel
safety conventions negotiated up to 1971.21 In 1994, it was amended by the addition
of a single article in response to the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation on endangering the
safety of airport and airport facilities, of which the text follows (section 6A):
“(1) Any person who, at an airport, unlawfully and by means of any device,
substance or weapon—
“(a) makes use of violence against any person which causes or is likely to
cause serious injury or death to that person;
“(b) performs any act which causes or is likely to cause serious damage to the
environment;
“(c) destroys or seriously damages any aircraft not in service located thereon;
“(d) disrupts the services of an airport,
“shall, where any of the acts specified in subsection (1) (a) to (d) endangers or is
likely to endanger safety at that airport, commit an offence;
“(2) Any person who attempts to do or is an accomplice of any person who does
any of the acts specified in subsection (1) shall commit an offence”.
Subparagraph (1) (b) was not defined as an offence in the 1988 Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation.
__________________
21 National Laws and Regulations on the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism:
Part I, United Nations Legislative Series (United Nations publication, Sales No. E/F.02.V.7),
pp. 246-250.
12
27. Other consolidated laws enacted after negotiation of the 1988 Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation incorporate not only the offences defined therein, but go beyond the
requirements of the Convention by penalizing the unauthorized introduction of
weapons and other dangerous articles into airports and on board aircraft. The
Australia Crimes (Aviation) Act 199122 and the Fiji Civil Aviation (Security) Act
199423 are comprehensive post-1988 rewritings of prior aircraft enactments. These
laws not only incorporate the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, but also provide ancillary
airport security measures, such as forbidding the introduction of weapons and other
dangerous articles and, in the law of Fiji, include provisions on airport access,
security searches and related topics.
C. Offences based on the status of the victim
28. The 1973 Internationally Protected Persons Convention required parties to
criminalize violent attacks directed against heads of State and foreign ministers and
their family members in a foreign State, as well as those directed against diplomatic
agents when those agents are entitled to special protection under international law.
The 1979 Hostages Convention requires penalization of any seizure or detention and
threat to kill, injure or continue to detain a hostage to compel any State,
international organization or person to do or abstain from any act. Penalization is
also required for attempts to perform such acts and acting as an accomplice of a
person who performs or attempts to perform such acts. This Convention only
addresses the seizure, detention, threats and demands involved in hostage-taking if
it has an international dimension. If a death or injury results, other conventions and
treaties could be implicated, but the incidental seizure, detention and threats would
provide a basis for invocation of the provisions of this Convention.
29. The Cook Islands Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons and Hostages) Act
1982, No. 6,24 implements these two conventions in one statute. It should be noted
that, while the 1973 Internationally Protected Persons Convention requires
penalization of attacks upon internationally protected persons, it is silent as to
whether that intent must include knowledge of the victim’s protected status. The
Cook Islands legislation criminalizes the offences established by the two
conventions and addresses the issue of knowledge of the victim’s protected status in
the following manner:
“7. Prosecution need not prove certain matters
“Notwithstanding anything in sections 3 to 6 of this Act [Crimes against
persons; Crimes against premises or vehicles; Threats against persons; Threats
against premises or vehicles], in any proceedings brought under any of those
sections it shall not be necessary for the prosecution to prove the following matters:
__________________
22 Ibid., pp. 28-58. Available at http://scalepus.law.gov.au/html/comact/7/3826/top.htm.
23 Ibid., pp. 158-177. Available at www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/fijian_act_english.pdf.
24 Ibid., pp. 120-129. Available at www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/Paclawmat/Cook_Islands_legislation/
Crimes_(Internationally_Protected).html.
13
“(a) In respect of any internationally protected person to whom paragraph (a)
or paragraph (c) of the definition of that term in section 2 of this Act applies, that
defendant knew, at the time of the alleged crime, the identity of that person or the
capacity in which he was internationally protected;
“(b) In respect of any internationally protected person to whom paragraph (b)
of that definition applies, that defendant knew, at the time of the alleged crime, that
the internationally protected person was accompanying any other person to who
paragraph (a) of that definition applies;
“(c) In respect of any internationally protected person to whom paragraph (c)
of that definition applies, the defendant knew, at the time of the alleged crime, that
the internationally protected person was entitled under international law to special
protection from attack on his person, freedom or dignity;
“(d) In respect of any internationally protected person to whom paragraph (d)
of that definition applies, that defendant knew, at the time of the alleged crime, that
the internationally protected person was a member of the household of any other
person referred to in paragraph (c) of that definition.”
30. Such an approach is typically used by those countries that provide particular
penalties or special jurisdiction, for example, by national authorities in a federal
system, for assaults on government officials. Invocation of such special jurisdiction
or particular penalties does not depend upon proof that the perpetrator knew that the
victim occupied an official position. The necessary element of a criminal intent is
supplied by the fact that an assault upon any person is a clearly criminal act, malum
in se. Such legislation can be regarded as a demonstration of a Government’s
commitment to protecting functionaries of and relationships with other States rather
than as a special deterrent to criminal conduct.
D. Offences related to dangerous materials
31. Three conventions deal with inherently dangerous substances, the 1980
Nuclear Material Convention, the 1991 Plastic Explosives Convention and the 1997
Terrorist Bombings Convention, dealing with bombs and other lethal devices. The
first two have significant regulatory elements that require coordination with
authorities other than those concerned with criminal justice matters. The 1980
Nuclear Material Convention requires penalization of the possession or handling
without lawful authority of nuclear material that is likely to cause death, serious
injury or substantial damage to property; the theft, robbery, embezzlement or
fraudulent obtaining of nuclear material; demanding nuclear material by force or
intimidation; threatening to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to
any person or substantial property damage; and threatening to commit one of the
offences defined above in order to compel a natural or legal person, international
organization or State to do or refrain from doing something. This Convention is only
one of several dealing with the protection of nuclear or other radioactive material
and nuclear facilities. A draft amendment to strengthen its provisions is currently
being prepared by an expert group; those concerned with legislative implementation
14
of the Convention may obtain further information from the International Atomic
Energy Agency.25
32. The various conventions dealing with the protection of nuclear or radioactive
material and nuclear facilities employ different wording for the definition of
offences, but most employ wording similar to that used in the statutes established by
Australia and Ireland that are reproduced below. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation
(Safeguards) Act 1987 of Australia 26 corresponds to that used in the Nuclear
Material Convention. The definition is given below:
“Interpretation
“32. In this Division, ‘nuclear material’ has the same meaning as in the
Physical Protection Convention.
“Stealing nuclear material
“33. A person shall not:
“(a) steal;
“(b) fraudulently misappropriate;
“(c) fraudulently convert to that person’s own use; or
“(d) obtain by false pretences;
“any nuclear material.
“Penalty: $20,000 or imprisonment for 10 years, or both.
“Demanding nuclear material by threats
“34. A person shall not demand that another person give nuclear material to
the first-mentioned person or some other person by force or threat of force or
by any form of intimidation.
“Penalty: $20,000 or imprisonment for 10 years, or both.
“Use of nuclear material causing injury to persons or damage to property
“35. A person shall not use nuclear material to cause:
“(a) serious injury to any person; or
“(b) substantial damage to property.
“Penalty: $20,000 or imprisonment for 10 years, or both.
“Threat to use nuclear material
“36. A person shall not:
__________________
25 Those concerned with legislative implementation of the 1980 Nuclear Material Convention may
obtain further information from Maria de Lourdes Vez Carmona at the International Atomic
Energy Agency by sending an e-mail to [email protected].
26 National Laws and Regulations ..., pp. 18-21. Available at http://scaletext.law.gov.au/
html/pasteact/0/12/top.htm.
15
“(a) threaten;
“(b) state that it is his or her intention; or
“(c) make a statement from which it could reasonably be inferred that it
is his or her intention;
“to use nuclear material to cause:
“(d) the death of, or injury to any person; or
“(e) damage to property.
“Penalty: $20,000 or imprisonment for 10 years, or both.
“Threat to commit offence
“37. A person shall not:
“(a) threaten;
“(b) state that it is his or her intention; or
“(c) make a statement from which it could reasonably be inferred that it
is his or her intention;
“to do any act that would be a contravention of section 33 in order to
compel a person (including an international organisation or the
Government of Australia or of a foreign country) to do or refrain from
doing any act or thing.
“Penalty: $20,000 or imprisonment for 10 years, or both.”
33. The Radiological Protection Act 1991 of Ireland, 27 giving effect to the
Convention, includes the following provisions:
“Interpretation.
“2. ... ‘nuclear material’ has the meaning assigned to it by Article 1 of the
Protection Convention.
“Offences relating to nuclear material.
“38.—(1) A person who—
“( a ) possesses, uses, transfers, alters, disposes or disperses nuclear
material in such a manner so as to cause or be likely to cause death or
serious injury to any person, or substantial damage to property, or
“( b ) steals nuclear material, or
“( c ) embezzles or fraudulently obtains nuclear material, or
“( d ) does any act constituting an unlawful demand for nuclear material,
by the threat of the use of force, by the use of force, or by a threat of any
kind, or
__________________
27 The Radiological Protection Act 1991 of Ireland is available at www.bailii.org/ie/legis/num_
act/rpa1991240/.
16
“( e ) threatens—
“(i) to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to any
person or substantial property damage,
“(ii) to commit an offence under paragraph (b) of this subsection in
order to compel any person, an international organisation or state to
do or to refrain from doing any act
shall be guilty of an offence.
“39.—...
“40.—(1) ...
“(2) A person who is guilty of an offence under this Act shall be liable:
“( a ) ...
“( b ) ...
“( c ) on conviction on indictment for an offence under section 38 of this
Act, to a fine not exceeding 􀇧1,000,000 or to imprisonment for life or
other term decided by the court or to both ...”
34. Unlike all the other conventions examined in the present publication apart
from the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, the 1991 Plastic Explosives Convention defines no offence. It requires
parties to take the necessary measures to establish controls over unmarked
explosives stocks and to prohibit and prevent the manufacture of unmarked
explosives. The Convention does not specify whether those controls and their
enforcement should be penal, regulatory or administrative in nature. This is another
convention for which the depository is the International Civil Aviation Organization,
as it is for the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft, the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation and its 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation. That organization may
serve as a resource for technical advice on implementing legislation.28
35. The Government of South Africa has submitted an explosives bill to
parliament that would adopt the technical definitions in the 1991 Plastic Explosives
Convention. If enacted, the bill would provide criminal penalties to enforce its
provisions that:
“(1) Notwithstanding any other provision in this Act but subject to
subsection (3), no person may manufacture, import, transport, keep, store,
possess, transfer, purchase, sell, supply or export any unmarked plastic
explosives.
“(2) (a) The marking of plastic explosives must be done in such a
manner as to achieve homogeneous distribution in the finished product;
“(b) The minimum concentration of a detection agent in the finished
product must be in accordance with the Technical Annex to the Convention.”
__________________
28 The web site of the International Civil Aviation Organization is at www.icao.int.
17
Subsection (3) goes on to deal with the exceptions provided in the Convention for
the disposal of existing stocks, and so forth.
36. Unlike the predominantly regulatory 1980 Nuclear Material Convention and
the 1991 Plastic Explosives Convention, the 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention is
penal in nature and requires parties to criminalize knowing participation in the
placement or use of an explosive, incendiary, toxic, biologically dangerous or
radioactive device with the intent to cause death, serious injury or major economic
loss. Activities of armed forces during an armed conflict are not governed by the
Convention, as they are subject to the separate rules of international humanitarian
law. Some countries have enacted legislation that essentially tracks the language of
the Terrorist Bombings Convention in defining the offence.
37. Other statutes, such as the Terrorism Act 2000 of the United Kingdom, include
a specific terrorist intent element, a further political, religious or ideological
requirement and address not only the threats listed in the Convention, but also
attacks on electronic data or control systems. An extract from the section on
interpretation of the Terrorism Act 2000 is given below:
“(1) In this Act ‘terrorism’ means the use or threat of action where—
“(a) the action falls within subsection (2),
“(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to
intimidate the public or a section of the public, and
“(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political,
religious or ideological cause.
“(2) Action falls within this subsection if it—
“(a) involves serious violence against a person,
“(b) involves serious damage to property,
“(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing
the action,
“(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a
section of the public, or
“(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an
electronic system.
“(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves
the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b)
is satisfied.”
E. Offences related to vessels and fixed platforms
38. The hijacking of vessels and aircraft present analogous considerations,
involving as they do the safety of passengers and crew, elements of mobility and
historical parallels based on the authority of the commander and the concept of
extraterritorial sovereignty based upon the registration or flag of the conveyance.
However, the four air travel instruments were negotiated under the auspices of the
18
International Civil Aviation Organization, while the 1988 Safety of Maritime
Navigation Convention and its contemporaneous Fixed Platforms Protocol were
negotiated under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization. Given the
independent interests and separate technical and advisory programmes of the two
depository organizations, it was considered advisable to treat the 1988 Safety of
Maritime Navigation Convention and its Protocol separately.
39. The 1988 Safety of Maritime Navigation Convention combines many of the
provisions developed in the preceding decades in dealing with attacks upon aircraft.
It requires the penalization of seizures of a ship, damage to a ship or its cargo that is
likely to endanger its safe navigation, introduction of a device or substance likely to
endanger the ship, endangering safe navigation by serious damage to navigation
facilities or by communicating false information and injuring or killing any person
in connection with the commission of the previously listed offences. Attempts to
commit such offences and participation in them are also required to be penalized. A
virtually contemporaneous Protocol extends the coverage of the Convention to
attacks upon fixed platforms located on the continental shelf. The Commonwealth
Secretariat Implementation Kits include separate model laws for implementation of
the Convention and its Protocol. An example of legislation from a coastal country is
the Australia Crimes (Ships and Fixed Platforms) Act 1992, 29 simultaneously
implementing the Convention and Protocol.
40. Opened for signature in March 1988, the 1988 Safety of Maritime Navigation
Convention and the 1988 Fixed Platforms Protocol entered into force on 1 March
1992 and had gained 69 ratifications, accessions or successions as at 2 July 2002.
This number is smaller than the 80 recorded for the more recent 1991 Plastic
Explosives Convention, but almost equal to the 64 recorded for the 1997 Terrorist
Bombings Convention. The status of ratifications can be found at the web site of the
Counter-Terrorism Committee.30
41. It may be perceived by some countries that are landlocked, do not have oil
drilling or other fixed platforms on a continental shelf and do not have a significant
commercial fleet under their flag and registration that the 1988 Safety of Maritime
Navigation Convention and its Fixed Platforms Protocol are inapplicable to their
interests. However, a country may be confronted by situations in which its nationals
are killed or injured on board a ship or fixed platform or commit an offence under
the Convention or Protocol, suspected offenders are found within its territory, or
preparations for the commission of offences against the safety of maritime
navigation or a fixed platform are made within its territory. All of those situations
are covered by these two instruments and legal procedures agreed to in advance
under these international agreements could minimize post-attack friction between
States. It should also be remembered that ratification and implementation of the
global anti-terrorism instruments were called for in Security Council resolution
1373 (2001) and by the Counter-Terrorism Committee, without regard to whether or
not a State possessed a sea coast. Non-coastal countries such as Austria and
Hungary have ratified both the Convention and its Protocol.
__________________
29 National Laws and Regulations ..., pp. 59-70.
30 The web site of the Counter-Terrorism Committee is at www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/.
19
F. Offences related to the financing of terrorism
42. The 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention requires parties to penalize
conduct by any person who (art. 2, para. 1):
“ ... by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or
collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge
that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out:
“(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as
defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex [meaning the nine treaties
predating the Financing of Terrorism Convention which defined terrorist
offences]; or
“(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a
situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”
43. Subparagraph (a) incorporates by reference the offences penalized by nine of
the previous global anti-terrorism instruments as acts for which the provision or
collection of funds are forbidden. Another means of achieving the same effect
would be to quote the offence definition from each instrument in full in the
domestic law, either in its body or in an annex listing all of the defined offences.
Subparagraph (b) sets out a self-contained definition of a terrorist act. An example
of national legislation that parallels the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention in
this two-part definition of acts for which the provision or collections of funds is
prohibited is the Barbados Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 (discussed in paras. 14-20
above). This Act creates the crime of terrorism and the offence of financing of
terrorism, defined as follows:
“4. (1) A person who in or outside Barbados directly or indirectly,
unlawfully and wilfully,
“(a) provides or collects funds; or
“(b) provides financial services or makes such services available to
persons
“with the intention that the funds or services are to be used or with the
knowledge that the funds or services are to be used in full or in part, in order
to carry out
“(i) an act that constitutes an offence under or defined in any of the
Treaties listed in the Third Schedule [meaning all of the penal
conventions/protocols except the Terrorism Financing Convention
itself]; or
“(ii) any other act
“(A) that has the purpose by its nature or context, to intimidate the
public or to compel a government or an international organization
to do or to refrain from doing any act; and
20
“(B) that is intended to cause
“(aa) death or serious bodily harm to a civilian or in a
situation of armed conflict, to any other person not taking an
active part in the hostilities;
“(bb) the risk, damage, interference or disruption of the kind
mentioned in subparagraph (B), (C), or (D) of section 3 (1) as
the case may be.
“is guilty of an offence ...”
44. By its Act of 15 November 2001, France defined the specific offence of
financing of terrorism by the following law, the original version of which can be
found in the French-language version of the Legislative Guide:
“It also constitutes an act of terrorism to finance a terrorist organisation by
providing, collecting or managing funds, securities or property of any kind, or
by giving advice for this purpose, intending that such funds, security or
property be used, or knowing that they are intended to be used, in whole or in
part, for the commission of any of the acts of terrorism listed in the present
chapter, irrespective of whether such an act takes place.”31
45. An updated version of the Legislative Guide will, through hyperlinks, make
available relevant national legislation and model laws being developed in both the
civil and common law traditions.32 The Commonwealth Secretariat Implementation
Kits provides model legislation and carefully explores the issues and terminology
found in the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention (and their relationship to the
1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention) and should be consulted in regard to the
criminalization of offences under either of those Conventions.
46. In addition to the obligation to penalize the financing of terrorism, the 1999
Financing of Terrorism Convention contains significant non-penal elements. It
obligates parties to have legislation to enable a legal entity to be held civilly,
administratively or criminally liable when a person responsible for its management
or control has committed an offence set forth in article 2 of the Convention. It also
requires States parties to have in place appropriate measures to identify, detect,
freeze and seize for the purpose of forfeiture funds used or allocated for the
commission of terrorist offences. Parties must cooperate to prevent the commission
of terrorist acts by adapting their national legislation to require financial institutions
and other professions involved in financial transactions to identify their customers
and to report transactions suspected of stemming from a criminal activity.
47. It is noteworthy that this last obligation, found in article 18 (b), is not confined
to the reporting of suspected terrorist activity, but extends to all suspected criminal
activity. This broad formulation of the reporting obligation is necessary to recognize
the reality that a financial professional may fairly be expected to identify
transactions with no apparent business rationale, but cannot and should not be
expected to determine what kind of illegal activity may lie behind such transactions.
Article 18 (b) (iii) deals with regulations imposing on financial institutions the
obligation to report “ ... all complex, unusual large transactions and unusual patterns
__________________
31 French Criminal Code, Art. 421-2-2 (added by Law No. 2001-1062 of 15 November 2001).
32 The present Legislative Guide is available at www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism.html.
21
of transactions, which have no apparent economic or obviously lawful purpose”.
Under this classic formulation of what constitutes a suspicious transaction for antimoney
laundering purposes, there is no need for an apparent connection to drug
trafficking or terrorism and the simple lack of an apparent economic or lawful
purpose is sufficient. Once that condition appears, it is the financial institution’s
responsibility to report the transaction, leaving it to government authorities to
determine whether trafficking in drugs, arms, terrorism or any other serious crime,
or a legitimate business or personal purpose, lies behind the transaction.
48. There are obviously significant factual differences between the practices and
offences of money-laundering and terrorist financing. Money-laundering typically
involves transferring significant proceeds from illegal transactions into legitimate
commerce or banking channels, often divided or disguised to avoid detection.
Conversely, terrorist financing may involve aggregating sums derived from lawful
activities or microcriminality and transferring them to a person or organization,
which ultimately may send relatively small payments to support terrorist activities.
Such funds become legally tainted only when a person handling them forms the
intention to use them to finance a terrorist act. Despite these differences in the two
phenomena, global efforts to fight money-laundering and suppression of the
financing of terrorism both have need of the assistance of financial institutions and
professions in the detection of suspicious transactions and both rely heavily upon
intelligence collection and analysis, often through financial intelligence units. As
illustrated by the application to terrorist financing of suspicious activity reporting, a
control mechanism initially developed to combat the laundering of drug money, the
global regimes for control of money-laundering and financing of terrorism are
increasingly becoming integrated.
49. The 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention is only one aspect of a larger
international effort to prevent, detect and suppress the financing and support of
terrorism. Under Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), Member States are
required to take measures not only against the financing of terrorism, but also
against other forms of support, such as recruitment and the supply of weapons. The
1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention only prohibits the provision or collection
of “funds”, meaning assets or evidence of title to assets. However, when legislation
to implement the Convention is enacted, the resolution’s requirement to suppress
recruitment and the supply of weapons should also be considered.
50. A 1994 statute of the United States of America (United States Code, Title 18,
sect. 2339a) predates both the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention and
resolution 1373 (2001) and creates the offence of “Providing material support to
terrorists”. This law criminalizes not only the provision or collection of funds
prohibited by the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention, but virtually all forms of
material support and the concealment of such support, a crime with obvious
similarity to a money-laundering concealment offence:
“(a) Offense.—
Whoever provides material support or resources or conceals or disguises
the nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or
resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation
for, or in carrying out, a violation ... or in preparation for, or in carrying
22
out, the concealment of an escape from the commission of any such
violation ... shall be [guilty of an offence].
“(b) Definition.—
In this section, the term ‘material support or resources’ means currency
or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services,
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false
documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities,
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation and
other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.”
51. The United States has also enacted a law specifically implementing the 1999
Financing of Terrorism Convention and utilizing its terminology and definitions,
entitled “The Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention
Implementation Act of 2002”, Title II of Public Law 107-197 of 25 June 2002.
52. Decree Law No. 25475 of 5 May 1992 of Peru treats terrorist financing as one
form of prohibited act of collaboration with terrorism. The original version of the
law can be found in the Spanish-language version of the Legislative Guide; the
English-language version of article 4 of that Decree Law, concerning collaboration,
provides that:
“Anyone who wilfully secures, gathers, collects or supplies any goods or
means or in any manner engages in acts such as to further the commission of
offences referred to by this Decree Law or furthers the goals of a terrorist
group, shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of no less than 20 years”.
53. Authorities considering legislation to implement the 1999 Financing of
Terrorism Convention may also take into consideration the work of the Financial
Action Task Force on Money Laundering, an intergovernmental organization housed
at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris and
originally formed to combat money-laundering. In October 2001, the Task Force
issued eight special recommendations on terrorist financing, which go beyond the
requirements of the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention and Security Council
resolution 1373 (2001) in several respects. These were in addition to its original
40 recommendations on the control of money-laundering, which were issued in
1990, revised in 1996 and further revised in 2003 to be applicable to both moneylaundering
and terrorism. The eight special recommendations deal with (I)
ratification and implementation of the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention and
implementation of the United Nations resolutions relating to the financing of
terrorism; (II) penalization of the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist
organizations and designation of such offences as money-laundering predicate
offences; (III) freezing and confiscating terrorist assets; (IV) reporting of suspicious
transactions involving terrorist acts or organizations; (V) international cooperation
in connection with criminal, civil enforcement, and administrative investigations,
inquiries and proceedings relating to the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and
terrorist organizations; (VI) control of alternative remittance systems; (VII)
strengthening of originator information requirements for wire transfers; and (VIII)
controls to prevent the misuse of non-profit organizations in the financing of
terrorism. The first five special recommendations overlap, to a great extent, the
provisions of the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention and Council resolution
1373 (2001), whereas the last three cover new ground regarding informal remittance
23
systems, identifying information to accompany wire transfers, and controls to
prevent the use of non-profit organizations in financing terrorism.
54. In the above-mentioned article, participation in the financing of terrorism is
defined as including:
“... any kind of economic action, assistance or intervention undertaken
voluntarily for the purpose of financing the activities of terrorist elements or
groups.”
55. In 2002, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank added the
Forty Recommendations on money-laundering of the Financial Action Task Force
and the eight special recommendations on terrorist financing to their list of useful
standards and undertook a pilot project of assessments that will involve IMF, the
World Bank, the Financial Action Task Force and Task Force-style regional bodies.
The assessments will be undertaken by IMF and the World Bank in their Financial
Sector Assessment Programme and by IMF under its programme of assessments of
offshore financial centres. In order to guide these assessments, the plenary meeting
of the Task Force adopted a detailed Methodology for Assessing Compliance with
Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT)
Standard, which had been developed in cooperation with IMF and the World Bank.
56. For all of the above reasons and because of the inherent complexity of the
issues, when drawing up legislation to implement the 1999 Financing of Terrorism
Convention or the related financing of terrorism obligations set out in Security
Council resolution 1373 (2001), Member States are encouraged to consult available
resources. These resources include the Global Programme against Money-
Laundering of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, which has developed
model legislation targeting money-laundering and proceeds of crime,33 the Anti-
Money Laundering Unit of IMF, which has published Suppressing the Financing of
Terrorism: A Handbook for Legislative Drafting, 34 the World Bank 35 and the
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering.36
__________________
33 Staff of the Global Programme against Money Laundering may be contacted by e-mail at
[email protected], by telephone on + (43) (1) 26060-4313, or by facsimile on + (43) (1) 26060-
6878.
34 International Monetary Fund, Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism: A Handbook for
Legislative Drafting (2003).
35 The web site of the World Bank is at www.worldbank.org.
36 The staff of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering may be contacted by e-mail
at [email protected].
24
III. Other core elements of the anti-terrorism conventions and
protocols
A. Establishment of jurisdiction over the offence
1. No safe haven for terrorists
57. The most prevalent and perhaps most significant type of jurisdiction that the
universal instruments require to be established is that necessary to ensure that there
shall be no safe haven for terrorists. The principle of aut dedere aut judicare, which
states that a country that does not extradite an alleged offender shall assume
jurisdiction to judge that person according to its own laws, is now the fundamental
principle of anti-terrorism instruments and was prominently restated in Security
Council resolution 1373 (2001), in which the Council:
“...
“2. Decides also that all States shall:
“...
“(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit
terrorist acts, or provide safe havens”.
58. Ten of the conventions and protocols require the penalization of defined
offences (meaning all but the initial 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft and the 1991 Plastic Explosives
Convention). All of those instruments require States parties to establish jurisdiction
whenever the alleged offender is present in the State and the party with custody
does not extradite to a party that has established jurisdiction pursuant to that
Convention or Protocol. A direct approach to this jurisdictional obligation was
adopted by China at the twenty-first meeting of the Standing Committee of the Sixth
National People’s Congress on 23 June 1987, as follows:
“The 21st Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People’s
Congress resolves that the People’s Republic of China shall, within the scope
of its treaty obligations, exercise criminal jurisdiction over crimes prescribed
in the international treaties to which the People’s Republic of China is a party
or has acceded.”37
59. The appendices to the legislation then quote the articles of five of the global
Conventions, which provide that a State party in whose territory an alleged offender
is present shall, if it does not extradite him, submit, without exception whatsoever
and without undue delay, the case to its competent authorities for the purposes of
prosecution, thus clearly demonstrating the statutory intent to establish such
jurisdiction.
__________________
37 National Laws and Regulations on the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism:
Part I, United Nations Legislative Series (United Nations publication, Sales No. E/F.02.V.7),
p. 115.
25
60. The same effect is achieved by section I, article 4, of the Russian Federation
Federal Act on the Suppression of Terrorism of 25 July 1998.38 That article states
that:
“The Russian Federation, guided by the interests of ensuring the safety and
security of the individual, society and the State, shall prosecute persons within
its territory who are involved in terrorism [defined in art. 3 on definition of
terms as including various Convention offences] including in circumstances
where the acts of terrorism were planned or committed outside the Russian
Federation but caused harm to the Russian Federation, and in other
circumstances provided for by the Russian Federation’s international
agreements.”
61. The Commonwealth Secretariat Implementation Kits for individual
conventions and protocols does not suggest statutory language explicitly referencing
the “extradite or prosecute” imperative in the global instruments, but it does refer to
the issue in prominent notes and explains that for the obligation to be implemented,
a State must have legislation permitting prosecution when the only jurisdictional
basis is the alleged offender’s presence. The Commonwealth Secretariat models
given in the Implementation Kits provide the options of jurisdiction based on the
presence of the person or a more restricted jurisdiction based upon presence plus the
impossibility of extradition, which presumably would arise from an impediment,
such as a legitimate fear of discriminatory prosecution or a constitutional ban
against extradition of nationals.
62. The other circumstances in which parties are required to establish jurisdiction
over defined offences vary according to the nature of the terrorist activity being
addressed and to the evolution of anti-terrorist measures over the decades. They are
discussed below.
2. Jurisdiction based on registration of aircraft or ships or on territoriality
63. The 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft addresses hijacking and requires parties to establish jurisdiction over
offences committed on board aircraft based upon their registration. The 1970
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft contains the
requirement to establish jurisdiction based upon registration, as does the 1971
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation and its 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, which add a requirement to establish
territorial jurisdiction over the offences defined in those Conventions. This new
requirement of territorial jurisdiction reflects the nature of these two instruments as
reactions to attacks on aircraft on the ground before and after flight and at ground
facilities such as airports.
64. The 1973 Internationally Protected Persons Convention also requires that
jurisdiction be established by a State party for offences committed in its territory or
on board a ship or an aircraft registered in that State, as does the 1979 Hostages
Convention. The 1980 Nuclear Material Convention focuses on the protection of
nuclear material and its transit, requiring that jurisdiction over offences involving
__________________
38 Ibid., pp. 347-361.
26
such materials be established based upon territoriality and registration of the ship or
aircraft involved. The 1988 Safety of Maritime Navigation Convention and its 1988
Fixed Platforms Protocol require that jurisdiction be established based upon
territoriality (specified in the Protocol as location on the continental shelf of a State)
and upon registration of a ship on which an offence is committed. The 1997
Terrorist Bombings Convention and the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention
both require the establishment of jurisdiction based upon territoriality and upon
registration of a ship or aircraft. The Criminal Code of the Republic of Korea39
expresses these types of jurisdiction very clearly:
“Article 2 (Domestic Crimes)
“This Code shall apply both to Korean nationals and aliens who commit
crimes within the territory of the Republic of Korea.
“...
“Article 4 (Crimes by Aliens on Board a Korean vessel outside of Korea)
“This Code shall apply to aliens who commit crimes on board a Korean vessel
or aircraft outside the territory of the Republic of Korea.”
65. Another form of jurisdiction or competence dealt with under the 1997 Terrorist
Bombings Convention and the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention is
jurisdiction over offences committed within a State’s territory that affect another
State. Article 6 of the 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention and article 7 of the 1999
Financing of Terrorism Convention are divided into two categories of grounds upon
which jurisdiction may be established. Article 6 of the 1997 Terrorist Bombings
Convention requires in paragraph 1 that jurisdiction be established on the basis of
territoriality, registration of a vessel or aircraft and the nationality of the offender.
Paragraph 2 of article 6 refers to various grounds upon which parties may choose to
establish jurisdiction, such as the nationality of a victim or an attempt to compel
that State to do or abstain from doing any act. Article 7 of the 1999 Financing of
Terrorism Convention requires in paragraph 1 the same obligatory grounds of
jurisdiction as does the 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention. Paragraph 2 of
article 7 of the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention then lists discretionary
grounds upon which jurisdiction may be established, similar to those in paragraph 2
of article 6. In considering this division between mandatory and discretionary
grounds under the 1997 and 1999 Conventions, it is worthwhile to consider Security
Council resolution 1373 (2001), which provides in the mandatory language of
paragraph 2, subparagraphs (d) and (e), that all States shall:
“(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts
from using their respective territories for those purposes against other States or
their citizens;
“(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning,
preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is
brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against
them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in
domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the
seriousness of such terrorist acts;”
__________________
39 Ibid., pp. 331-332.
27
3. Jurisdiction based upon the nationality of the alleged offender
66. The 1973 Internationally Protected Persons Convention was the first of the
universal anti-terrorism instruments to introduce the requirement that a State party
should establish jurisdiction over an alleged offender who is a national of that State.
The 1980 Nuclear Material Convention, the 1988 Safety of Maritime Navigation
Convention and its 1988 Fixed Platforms Protocol, the 1997 Terrorist Bombings
Convention and the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention all require jurisdiction
to be established based upon the nationality of the alleged offender.
67. The Criminal Code of the Republic of Korea provides a clear statement of this
type of jurisdiction:
“Article 3 (Crimes by Koreans outside Korea)
“This Code shall apply to all Korean nationals who commit crimes outside the
territory of the Republic of Korea.”
4. Jurisdiction based upon the protection of other specified interests
68. The 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft and
the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviation require a Contracting State to establish jurisdiction when the lessee of
an aircraft has his principal place of business in that State. The 1973 Internationally
Protected Persons Convention requires the establishment of jurisdiction over crimes
committed against a person whose protected status derives from the functions
exercised for a State which is a party to the Convention. The 1979 Hostages
Convention, the 1980 Nuclear Material Convention, the 1988 Safety of Maritime
Navigation Convention, its 1988 Fixed Platforms Protocol and the 1997 Terrorist
Bombings Convention all define as offences violence or threats used to compel a
Government or international organization to do or refrain from doing an act.
However, only the 1979 Hostages Convention affirmatively requires that
jurisdiction be established over an offence committed to compel that State to do or
refrain from doing any act. The 1988 Safety of Maritime Navigation Convention
and its 1988 Fixed Platforms Protocol, the 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention and
the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention list this circumstance as among those
discretionary grounds for which a State may establish jurisdiction.
69. Sections 129 and 129a of the German Criminal Code define the offences of
forming, being a member of, supporting or recruiting for a criminal (section 129) or
terrorist (section 129a) organization. Section 129b establishes the following
jurisdiction, based upon various State interests, as reflected in the following
unofficial translation:
“Sections 129 and 129a shall also apply to organisations abroad. If the offence
relates to an organisation outside the Member States of the European Union,
this shall only apply if the offence was committed by virtue of an activity
exercised within the territorial scope of this law or if the perpetrator or the
victim is a German or is within Germany. In cases that fall under the second
sentence, the offence shall only be prosecuted on authorisation by the Federal
Ministry of Justice. Authorisation may be granted for an individual case or in
general for the prosecution of future acts relating to a specific organisation.
When deciding on whether to give authorisation, the Federal Ministry of
28
Justice shall take into account whether the efforts of the organisation are
directed against the fundamental values of a state order which respects human
dignity or against the peaceful coexistence of peoples, and which seem to be
reprehensible when the entire circumstances are weighed up.”40
5. Jurisdiction required to be maintained for extradition or prosecution once an
alleged offender is present
70. Practical implementation of the fundamental principle of “no safe haven for
terrorists” is accomplished in the 11 conventions that define criminal offences or
establish criminal jurisdiction (that is, all except the 1991 Plastic Explosives
Convention) by the requirement that a State party in whose territory the offender or
alleged offender is present shall ensure that person’s presence for the purpose of
prosecution or extradition. The 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft and the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation contain provisions requiring a contracting State
to establish jurisdiction when the aircraft on which the offence was committed lands
in its territory with the alleged offender still on board. In most circumstances these
two places would be the same, but there have been circumstances in which a
hijacked plane has first landed in one State and then continued on to another State.
In that case, the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft would require the States of registration, landing and where the suspect is
eventually found to establish jurisdiction and the 1971 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation would also
require the State in whose territory the offence was committed to do so.
B. Obligation to conduct an inquiry, to report findings and to
advise of intent to exercise jurisdiction
71. All of the conventions that define a criminal offence (that is, all of the
conventions examined in the present publication, except the 1963 Convention on
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft and the 1991 Plastic
Explosives Convention) require that a State party which is obligated to ensure the
presence of a person for criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted shall
conduct a preliminary inquiry into the facts, report its findings to concerned States
and indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction. The 1980 Nuclear Material
Convention uses more generic language, providing that a State party ensuring the
presence of an alleged offender for prosecution or extradition shall take appropriate
measures and shall notify them to concerned States.
72. Paragraph 6 of the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings Act No. 11 of 1999 of
Sri Lanka41 implements the reporting obligation in the following terms:
“Where a request is made to the Government of Sri Lanka, by or on behalf of
the Government of a Convention State for the extradition of any person
accused or convicted of an offence specified in the Schedule to this Act, the
Minister shall, on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka, forthwith notify the
__________________
40 See Germany, Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Code), section 1296b.
41 National Laws and Regulations ..., pp. 405-410.
29
Government of the requesting State of the measures which the Government of
Sri Lanka has taken, or proposes to take, for the prosecution or extradition of
that person for that offence.”
C. Obligation to submit for prosecution
73. While the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft did not require submission for prosecution, all of the subsequent
instruments containing penal offences (that is, all except the 1991 Plastic Explosives
Convention) require that a State party where the alleged offender is present shall, if
it does not extradite him, without exception, submit the case for prosecution. This
does not mean that an allegation which is investigated and determined to be
unfounded must be brought to trial. A State’s constitutional principles and its
substantive and procedural law will determine to what extent the prosecution must
be pursued, but the Conventions require the prosecution process to be invoked as it
would be for a serious domestic offence. Statutes such as those of China and the
Russian Federation, discussed in paragraphs 57-62 above, explicitly convert these
convention obligations into domestic law.
D. Elements of knowledge and intent
74. In order to avoid the danger of overly broad criminal prohibitions in statutes
penalizing terrorism offences, careful drafting is required to maintain full respect
for the rule of law and to avoid the penalization of innocent conduct. Two crucial
issues are the degree of knowledge or intent required for criminalization of an
offence and the extent of knowing participation that justifies the imposition of
criminal liability. The 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention requires the
criminalization of unlawful and intentional conduct which “in any other way
contributes to the commission of one or more offences … by a group of persons
acting with a common purpose” (art. 2, para. 3c.). This broad prohibition is then
qualified by the explicit requirement that “such contribution shall be intentional and
either made with the aim of furthering the general criminal activity or purpose of
the group or be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the
offence or offences concerned”.
75. Similarly, the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention is applicable to fundraising,
which can have benevolent as well as sinister purposes. Its criminal intent
language requires not merely a general intent that the providing or collecting of
funds be done “unlawfully and wilfully”, but also the specific factual qualification
that it be done “with the intention that they be used or in the knowledge that they
are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out …” (art. 1) a terrorist act. This
intention or knowledge requirement ensures that the Convention offence applies
only to conduct which is both harmful to society and recognizable as such. Some
national legislation defining the offence of terrorist financing, such as the Barbados
Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002, uses a similar formulation.
76. In the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, of India, section 22, entitled “Fund
raising for a terrorist organization to be an offence”, reckless disregard is equated
30
with knowledge, by making acts of financing punishable if there is reasonable cause
to suspect that the money or other property will be used for terrorism:
“(1) A person commits an offence if he—
“(a) invites another to provide money or other property, and
“(b) intends that it should be used, or has reasonable cause to suspect that it
may be used, for the purposes of terrorism.
“(2) A person commits an offence if he—
“(a) receives money or property, and
“(b) intends that it should be used, or has reasonable cause to suspect that it
may be used, for the purposes of terrorism.
“(3) A person commits an offence if he—
“(a) provides money or other property, and
“(b) knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that it will or may be used for
the purposes of terrorism.
“(4) In this section, a reference to the provision of money or other property is
a reference to its being given, lent or otherwise made available, whether or not
for consideration.”
77. In section 2332d of Title 18 of the United States Code, entitled “Financial
transactions”, a similar approach is adopted with regard to any financial transaction
with a Government of a country designated as supporting international terrorism.
The intent element of the statute can be satisfied either by “knowing or having
reasonable cause to know that a country is designated ... as a country supporting
international terrorism” (section 2332d, para. (a)). This type of statute is useful and
may be required to carry into domestic effect measures imposed under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations, such as those decided upon in Security
Council resolution 1373 or in resolutions requiring measures not involving the use
of armed force. A model is given in Model Legislative Provisions on Measures to
Combat Terrorism, part II, entitled “Specified entities”.
E. Offences of participation
78. A related issue is the extent of participation that justifies the imposition of
criminal liability. Nine of the 10 conventions and protocols listed above as creating
criminal offences expressly require the penalization of participation as an
accomplice and many require that other specified forms of participation be made
offences, such as organizing or directing a terrorist bombing offence. The 1980
Nuclear Material Convention refers simply to “participation” in any of the offences
described in article 7 of that Convention. It is difficult to determine whether
“participation” should be considered as equivalent to the criminal liability of an
accomplice or was intended to move toward a broader liability for participation,
which has developed in many legal systems.
79. In Italy, various associations to commit crimes generally, to engage in Mafiatype
activities and to engage in terrorism, including international terrorism, are
31
penalized. A well-developed jurisprudence exists on the degree of internal or
external participation necessary to establish criminal liability. See article 416 of the
Codice penale, Associazione per delinquere, article 416 bis, Associazione di tipo
mafioso and new article 270 bis, Associazione con finalità di terrorismo anche
internazionale. In order to combat its own organized crime phenomenon, the United
States has developed not only an expansive concept of conspiracy, but also the
concept of a membership in a racketeering enterprise proved by participation in a
pattern of specified crimes and the further possibility of a conspiracy to engage in a
racketeering enterprise involving various crimes, including terrorism offences. See
sections 371 and 1962, Title 18, of the United States Code.42
80. Law No. 599 of 24 July 2000 of Colombia, the original of which appears in
the Spanish-language version of the Legislative Guide, is entitled “Concerning
(agreement) or (joint action), terrorism, threats and instigation”. “When a number of
persons (agree together) or (act together) for the purpose of committing crimes,
each of them will be punished, for this conduct alone, with imprisonment”.
Article 343, entitled “Terrorism”, is translated below:
“Whoever provokes a state of fright or terror in the population or a sector of it,
through acts that endanger life, the physical integrity or the liberty of persons
or structures or means of communication, transport, processing or transmission
of fluids or energy, using means capable of causing mass destruction, will be
incarcerated for this offence, without prejudice to the separate penalties
provided for the crimes committed in the course of this conduct ...”.
81. While this law unquestionably requires the mens rea (guilty mind) of a
criminal agreement, whether the necessary actus reus (criminal act) is closer to what
would be called an attempt in many legal cultures or to conspiracy as applied in
common law legal systems requires interpretation by persons familiar with
Colombian jurisprudence.
82. Article 2 of the Federal Act against Organized Crime of Mexico provides that:
“When three or more persons organize or agree to organize in order to engage,
continuously or repeatedly, in conduct which in itself or in combination with
other conduct has as its purpose or result the perpetration of one or more of the
following offences, they shall be punished, solely by virtue of that fact, as
members of organized crime:
“1. Terrorism, provided for in article 139, first paragraph, ... of the Federal
Penal Code.”43
83. These technical difficulties can be overcome by the use of language such as
that used in article 5 of the Law against Acts of Terrorism of Cuba, Law No. 93 of
20 December 2001:44
“Under this Law, preparatory acts, attempts and consummated acts of
terrorism shall be punishable in connection with the offences envisaged in this
__________________
42 Available at www4.LAW.CORNELL.EDU/USCODE/18/.
43 National Laws and Regulations ..., p. 254.
44 The English-language version of the Law against Acts of Terrorism of Cuba is available at
www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/Cuban_law_english.pdf.
32
Law. Likewise, under the rules established in the Penal Code for preparatory
acts, the following shall be punished:
“(a) any person who, having decided to commit one of the offences
envisaged in this Law, proposes to another or to other persons that
they participate in carrying out the act in question;
“(b) any person who conspires with one or more persons to carry out
some of the offences envisaged in this Law, and they decide to
commit them;
“(c) any person who incites or induces another or other persons, by
spoken word, in writing or in any other form, publicly or privately,
to carry out some of the offences envisaged in this Law. If the
offence is committed following such incitement or inducement, the
person who provokes it shall be punished as the perpetrator of the
offence committed.”
84. In connection with all of these concepts of participation, it is necessary to
maintain the distinction that participation with others in a terrorism offence cannot
be characterized, as can an organized crime associational offence, as being
committed for financial or other material advantage. At the same time, defining an
ideological or religious purpose to be an element of the offence may create a nearly
impossible burden of proof. Proof of such a subjective, internal mental element may
be impossible to establish unless the alleged offender voluntarily declares such a
purpose. Such an element may not be regarded as necessary when the offence is
objectively characterized by particularly harmful terrorist tactics, such as a bomb
attack on a civilian population. In this regard, see the Terrorism Act 2000 of the
United Kingdom, discussed in paragraph 37 above, on offences related to dangerous
materials.
F. Mutual assistance
85. The requirement that parties afford assistance in criminal proceedings
appeared first in the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft. It is repeated in all of the subsequent penal conventions (meaning all
except the 1991 Plastic Explosives Convention). In the 1979 Hostages Convention
and subsequent instruments, that assistance is specified as including the obtaining of
evidence at a party’s disposal. Beginning with the 1971 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, the conventions
all obligate parties to take measures to prevent offences against other parties. This
obligation was broadened in the 1973 Internationally Protected Persons Convention
to a duty to exchange information and coordinate administrative and other
preventive measures. All subsequent instruments incorporate such a duty, except the
1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation extending the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, as the original Convention had
not contained such an obligation.
86. In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the
chief executives of a number of States issued decrees instructing governmental
33
bodies to increase their involvement in international cooperation. Since much nonjudicial
cooperation can be accomplished by the executive branch within its existing
powers, these orders may be an expeditious and effective means of implementing
basic mutual assistance requirements. More formal and binding arrangements can be
secured by ratification and implementation of the universal anti-terrorism
Conventions and by negotiation of bilateral or multilateral mutual assistance treaties
(see the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (General Assembly
resolution 45/117, annex) and the Manual on the Model Treaty on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters).45
G. Extradition provisions
87. All of the penal conventions since 1970 (meaning all except the 1991 Plastic
Explosives Convention) contain a provision that the offences which they define
shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any existing treaty
between States parties, who undertake to include such offences in future extradition
treaties. If a treaty is required, the Convention may be relied upon between parties.
If no treaty is required, the offence shall be treated as extraditable. For purposes of
extradition, offences shall be treated as if they had been committed not only in the
place where they occurred, but also in the territory of the States that have
established jurisdiction under that Convention or Protocol (or in a place within the
jurisdiction of the party requesting extradition, a formulation used only in the 1988
Safety of Maritime Navigation Convention).
88. The Commonwealth Secretariat Implementation Kits for the various antiterrorism
instruments all contain virtually identical language for the extradition
clauses. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings Act No. 11 of
Sri Lanka, given below, are typical expressions of language implementing the
standard Convention obligation:
“7. Where there is an extradition arrangement made by the Government of
Sri Lanka with any Convention State in force on the date on which this Act
comes into operation, such arrangement shall be deemed, for the purposes of
the Extradition Law, No. 8 of 1977, to include provision for extradition in
respect of the offences specified in the Schedule to this Act.
“8. Where there is no extradition agreement made by the Government of Sri
Lanka with any Convention State, the Minister may, by Order published in the
Gazette, treat the Convention, for the purposes of the Extradition Law, No. 8
of 1977, as an extradition arrangement made by the Government of Sri Lanka
with that Convention State providing for extradition in respect of the offences
specified in the Schedule to this Act.”
See also the Model Treaty on Extradition (General Assembly resolution 45/116,
annex) and the Manual on the Model Treaty on Extradition.46
__________________
45 International Review of Criminal Policy, Nos. 45 and 46, 1995 (United Nations publication,
Sales No. E.96.IV.2).
46 Ibid.
34
H. Exceptions made on grounds of political offence or
discriminatory purposes
89. The 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft expressly exempted from its application offences against penal laws
of a political nature or those based on racial or religious discrimination. Any
reference to an exception based on political or discriminatory grounds was omitted
from the subsequent conventions between 1970 and 1991 (the 1970 Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the 1971 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation and its 1988
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, the 1980 Nuclear Material Convention, the 1988 Safety
of Maritime Navigation Convention and its 1988 Fixed Platforms Protocol and the
1991 Plastic Explosives Convention, which in any event has no penalization
obligation), but included in the 1979 Hostages Convention, as explained below.
90. The 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention and the 1999 Financing of Terrorism
Convention contain similar articles requiring the parties to deny any validity, in
their domestic political and legal institutions, to any political offence, defence or
justification for the acts of terrorism defined in those conventions. In article 5, the
1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention states:
“Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, including,
where appropriate, domestic legislation, to ensure that criminal acts within the
scope of this Convention, in particular where they are intended or calculated to
provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or
particular persons, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of
a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar
nature and are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature.”
91. This provision would seem to dictate that such considerations should not be
allowable as mitigating circumstances for punishment purposes and that they should
not be allowed to be presented or argued as a defence to criminal liability.
92. In addition, article 11 of the 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention and
article 14 of the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention provide that:
“None of the offences set forth in article 2 [the offence-defining article in both
Conventions] shall be regarded, for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal
assistance, as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political
offence or as an offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request
for extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such an offence may not
be refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political offence or an offence
connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives.”
93. The articles eliminating the political offence exception are immediately
followed in both conventions by anti-discrimination provisos in identical language.
Article 12 of the 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention and article 15 of the 1999
Financing of Terrorism Convention provide that:
“Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to
extradite or to afford mutual legal assistance, if the requested State Party has
substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition for offences
35
set forth in article 2 or for mutual legal assistance with respect to such
offences has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person
on account of that person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political
opinion or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that
person’s position for any of these reasons.”
94. Similar language, although referring only to extradition, is found in the 1979
Hostages Convention. Those anti-discrimination articles that accompany the articles
eliminating the political offence exception correspond to and embody the principles
of non-discrimination and impartiality of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (General Assembly resolution 217 A (III)). Article 7 of the Declaration
recognizes that:
“All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to
such discrimination.”
95. Article 10 of the Declaration establishes that:
“Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and
obligations and of any criminal charge against him.”
96. An example of domestic legislation implementing these principles and the
requirements of the Convention with respect to extradition is the Extradition Act
1988 No. 4 of Australia, amended by the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism Act
2002 No. 66, 2002. Section 5 of the amended act excludes from the definition of
“political offence” a list of offences, which includes those referred to in article 2 of
the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention. That article incorporates the other
nine anti-terrorism instruments which define offences. Section 5 also excludes
crimes declared by national regulation not to be offences of a political nature. The
anti-discrimination elements of the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention are
implemented in section 7, which lists possible extradition objections, including a
discriminatory purpose for the request or such an effect if extradition is granted.
97. It should be noted that, in addition to the prohibitions set out in the 1997
Terrorist Bombings Convention and the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention on
the recognition of a political offence exception for crimes defined by those
Conventions, the Security Council, in paragraph 3 (g) of its resolution 1373 (2001),
calls upon all States to:
“Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not abused
by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims
of political motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for
the extradition of alleged terrorists.”
I. Rights of the alleged offender to communicate and to fair
treatment
98. The 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft requires immediate notification to the State of nationality of an
36
alleged offender held for prosecution or extradition and provides that the person be
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to nationals of the custody
State. The notification provision has become standard in all of the anti-terrorism
conventions, although sometimes achieved with different verbal formulations. An
example of how this obligation may be recognized appears in section 5 of the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings Act No. 11 of 1999 of Sri Lanka:
“Where a person who is not a citizen of Sri Lanka is arrested for an offence
under this Act, such person shall be entitled—
“(a) to communicate without delay, with the appropriate representative of the
State of which he is a national or which is otherwise entitled to protect his
rights, or if he is a stateless person, with the nearest appropriate representative
of the State in the territory of which he was habitually resident;
“(b) to be visited by a representative of that State; and
“(c) to be informed of his rights under paragraphs (a) and (b).”
99. Article 9 of the 1973 Internationally Protected Persons Convention states that:
“Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in connexion
with any of the crimes set forth in article 2 shall be guaranteed fair treatment
at all stages of the proceedings.”
The offences covered by the Convention are defined in article 2.
100. The 1980 Nuclear Material Convention used the same language as above, but
the 1979 Hostages Convention added the following words:
“... including enjoyment of all the rights and guarantees provided by the law of
the State in the territory of which he is present.”
101. That version was reproduced in the 1988 Safety of Maritime Navigation
Convention, and additional language was again added in the 1997 Terrorist
Bombings Convention, as follows:
“... and applicable provisions of international law, including international law
of human rights.”
102. The latter part of that formulation was revised in the 1999 Financing of
Terrorism Convention to read “including international human rights law”. Neither of
those two conventions defines this terminology. Between members of regional
groupings, the jurisprudence of forums such as the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights or the European Court of Human Rights can provide a common frame of
reference to interpret this phrase. When all parties involved in an interpretation
dispute are not bound by such a common jurisprudence, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (General
Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex), the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Assembly resolution
39/46, annex) and other applicable United Nations standards and instruments would
certainly be consulted.
Annex 285
UNODC, Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime Against Terrorism 30􀯅31 (2008)

LEGISLATIVE GUIDE
TO THE UNIVERSAL LEGAL REGIME
AGAINST TERRORISM
Prepared by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME
Vienna
UNITED NATIONS
New York, 2008
LEGISLATIVE GUIDE
TO THE UNIVERSAL LEGAL REGIME
AGAINST TERRORISM
Prepared by
the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime
Note
Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention
of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.
Material in this publication may be freely quoted or reprinted, but acknowledgement is requested,
togehter with a copy of the publication containing the quotation or reprint.
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the
expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations
concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area of its authorities, or concerning
the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
This publication has not been formally edited.
UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION
Sales No.: E.08.V.9
ISBN 978-92-133780-8
Contents
Page
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
I. The universal legal regime against terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. The universal conventions and protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
C. Binding resolutions of the Security Council concerning terrorist acts
and terrorist funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
D. Fundamental considerations in providing legislative advisory services . . . . . . . . 5
E. Insistence that counter-terrorism measures be based upon
human rights standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
F. The role of the criminal justice system in preventing terrorist acts . . . . . . . . . . . 6
G. Prohibiting incitement to terrorism as required by the ICCPR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
H. Steps in becoming a party to and implementing the conventions
and protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
II. Criminalization and other legislative requirements of the terrorism
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
related conventions and protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A. Common elements of the conventions and protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
B. Agreements relating to the safety of civil aviation developed by
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
C. Agreements relating to maritime safety developed by
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
D. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1979 and
its 2005 Amendment developed by the IAEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
E. Agreements relating to other protections for civilians developed
at the initiative of the General Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
F. Other legislative requirements relating to the financing of terrorism . . . . . . . . . 19
G. Issues common to all conventions and protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
H. Forms of participation in an offence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
I. Elements of knowledge and intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
III. Jurisdiction over offences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
A.Jurisdiction based upon territoriality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
B. Jurisdiction based upon registration of aircraft or maritime vessels . . . . . . . . . . 33
iii
C. Jurisdiction based upon nationality of the offender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
D. Jurisdiction based upon protection of nationals and national interests . . . . . . . . 34
E. Jurisdiction based upon the presence of a person in the national territory . . . . . 35
IV. Obligation to extradite or prosecute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
A. Nature and consequences of the obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
B. Obligation to conduct an inquiry, to report findings and to advise of intent . . . . . 38
V. International cooperation in criminal matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
A.Dependence of the legal regime against terrorism
upon international cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
B. Mutual legal assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
C. Extradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
D. Dual criminality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
E. Protections for political activity, against discrimination and
requiring fair treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
F. Concluding human rights considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
iv
Preface
The Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) is mandated to provide legal and related assistance to requesting countries to ratify
and implement the universal legal instruments against terrorism. The Global Project on
Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism provides the overall framework for delivering
such assistance to countries. The overall project objective is to support Member States in
achieving a functional universal legal regime against terrorism in accordance with the principles
of the rule of law, especially by facilitating the ratification and implementation of the universal
legal instruments against terrorism and enhancing the related capacity of national
criminal justice systems.
To assist in identifying and drafting the laws necessary or desirable to implement the terrorismrelated
instruments, UNODC/TPB furnishes reference materials and technical advice, both by
video and telephone conferences, by electronic communications, and by field missions when
they are cost effective. These efforts are designed to assist the work of the national officials who
ultimately must draft and administer legislation incorporating international commitments into
national law. Providing these legal advisory services encourages adoption of the instruments by
removing some of the uncertainties and technical obstacles that accompany membership in any
international convention. In delivering this assistance UNODC/TPB makes extensive use of
several technical assistance tools. Please see the annex for a full listing of available tools and
publications and information on how to access them.
This updated version of the Legislative Guide has been prepared to facilitate the task of national
authorities in adopting and implementing the universal legal regime against terrorism. It
replaces a publication issued in 2003, the Legislative Guide to the Universal Anti-Terrorism
Conventions and Protocols. Both the 2003 and 2008 versions of the Guide were prepared for
the information of government officials and others concerned with the international legal
aspects of the prevention and suppression of terrorism. The 2003 Guide grouped the then existing
12 conventions and protocols according to subject matter, that is as relating to: (a) civil
aviation; (b) status of the victim; (c) dangerous materials; (d) vessels and fixed platforms; and
(e) the financing of terrorism. The 2008 Guide groups the offences according to the entities of
the United Nations system responsible for their development in order to place recent developed
instruments in context and to indicate sources of technical expertise.
v

I.—The universal legal regime against terrorism
A.—Introduction
A key element of the international community’s response to terrorism has been the gradual
development, since 1963, of a legal infrastructure of terrorism-related conventions and
protocols, simply meaning multilateral treaties and supplemental agreements. Those legal
instruments, numbering 16 including recent protocols and amendments, require the States that
adopt them to criminalize most foreseeable terrorist acts. Another core part of the global legal
regime to counter terrorism is a series of Security Council resolutions relating to terrorism,
many of them adopted under the authority of chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which
empowers the Security Council to adopt resolutions legally binding on all Member States of the
United Nations.
This legal regime against terrorism offers the legal framework to address serious crimes committed
by terrorists utilizing a wide array of criminal justice mechanisms. It is based on the
premise that perpetrators of terrorist crimes should be brought to trial by their national governments,
or should be extradited to a country willing to bring them to trial. The well-known principle
of aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute) is meant to make the world inhospitable
to terrorists (and those who finance and support them) by denying them safe havens.
Yet it is essential to emphasize that the legal authority to enforce these measures against terrorism
is exclusively within the responsibility of sovereign States. No international tribunal exists
with competence to prosecute an offender for aircraft or ship hijacking, bombings of civilian
targets or financing of terrorism.1 The legal instruments developed over decades to deal with
those offences can only be implemented under national legislation which criminalizes the
defined offences, creates appropriate jurisdiction in domestic courts, and authorizes the cooperation
mechanisms provided in the international instruments and essential to their effectiveness.
B.—The universal conventions and protocols
The selection of the sixteen universal instruments2 examined herein reflects the annex to
General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996 and General Assembly resolution
61/40 of 18 December 2006. Resolution 51/210 urged Member States to become members of
ten specific agreements. Those agreements included:
1
1The International Criminal Court, created in 1998 by the Treaty of Rome, is granted jurisdiction over the crime of genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. Jurisdiction over acts of terrorism was rejected during the negotiations
that resulted in the Court’s creation.
2The term universal is used to describe those agreements open to membership to all States of the United Nations or its
affiliated specialized agencies, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, as opposed to agreements open only to
members of a regional or other restricted groupings, such as the Council of Europe.
2 Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism
(a) Four conventions and one protocol elaborated by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO);3
(b) Two conventions developed under the leadership of the General Assembly;4
(c) One convention elaborated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);5
(d) One convention and a protocol developed by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO).6
In addition, the 1996 resolution established an Ad Hoc Committee open to all Member States:
. . . to elaborate an international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings
and, subsequently, an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear
terrorism, to supplement related existing international instruments and thereafter to
address means of further developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions
dealing with international terrorism.
Within a year that Committee had elaborated the 1997 International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. It was given an additional mandate by the General
Assembly to develop an agreement on terrorist financing, resulting in the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999. The International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was adopted in 2005 and came
into force in July 2007. Negotiations on a comprehensive instrument dealing with terrorism
continue as of 2008. The instruments developed by the specialized agencies are also being
updated. The IMO developed two protocols in 2005 to update its 1988 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and the 1988 Protocol
for the Suppression of Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf. The
IAEA adopted Amendments in 2005 to its 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material.7 The ratification status of all 16 instruments can be found at
www.un.org/sc/ctc under International Law.
3Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 1963; Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aircraft, 1971;
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 1991; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, 1988.
4Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents, 1973; International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 1979.
5Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Convention, 1979.
6Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988; Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental shelf, 1988.
7The organization sponsoring negotiations for a convention typically becomes the treaty depository. All of the terrorismrelated
treaties developed by a General Assembly committee name the Secretary-General of the United Nations in New York as
their depository. The specialized agency agreements vary. The 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft names the ICAO as its depository. The 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft and the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aircraft identify the
Governments of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America as the
depositaries for instruments of ratification, accession and denunciation. The 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation identifies the same three depositary governments and adds the
International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal, which became the sole depositary for the 1991 Convention on the
Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection. The 1979 Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Convention and
its 2005 Amendment both provide for signature either at the IAEA in Vienna or at UN Headquarters in New York, and identify
the Director General of the IAEA as the depositary for the original convention text. This reference to the IAEA Director General
appears to be treated as an implied designation of the IAEA as the depositary for subsequent treaty purposes, although no
explicit reference is made in either instrument to the place of deposit of instruments of ratification, accession or denunciation.
The IMO instruments all designate the Secretary General of that organization, headquartered in London, as their depositary.
The practical significance of these varying designations is that a ratification or accession document sent to the wrong depositary
may never take effect. It would be wrong to assume that the Secretary-General of the United Nations in New York is the
depositary for all 16 of the universal terrorism-related instruments. Moreover, advisory services on technical aspects of certain
specialized instruments may be within the particular competence of the organization that developed the agreement, such as
information from the IAEA in Vienna on the levels of protection required under the 2005 Amendment to the IAEA Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material Convention, or from the IMO in London on ship boarding procedures under the 2005 Protocol
to the Maritime Safety Convention.
The universal legal regime against terrorism 3
On 20 September 2006, the Member States of the United Nations adopted General Assembly
resolution 60/288. In a Plan of Action of 8 September 2006 annexed to this resolution, the
Assembly agreed upon the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. In paragraph
III-7 of that Plan of Action, the Member States resolved:
7.—To encourage the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, including its
Terrorism Prevention Branch, to enhance, in close consultation with the Counter-
Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate, its provision of technical assistance
to States, upon request, to facilitate the implementation of the international
conventions and protocols related to the prevention and suppression of terrorism and
relevant United Nations resolutions.
Resolution 61/40 of 18 December 2006 followed soon after the adoption of the Global Strategy.
The General Assembly therein called upon Member States to implement that Strategy and upon
all States to become parties to all of the ten conventions and protocols referenced in resolution
51/210 of 1996, as well as to the subsequent three conventions, two protocols and one amendment.
8 In its resolution 62/71 of 8 January 2008, the General Assembly repeated the call made
in the Global Strategy for the Terrorism Prevention Branch of UNODC to continue its work
assisting States in becoming parties to and implementing the terrorism-related conventions and
protocols, adding that this should include national capacity-building.
C.—Binding resolutions of the Security Council concerning
terrorist acts and terrorist funds
States become Members of the United Nations by adopting its Charter, which is an international
convention with legally binding obligations. Under Articles 24, 25 and 48 of the Charter
those obligations include the duty to carry out decisions taken by the Security Council when it
is acting to preserve peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. In October 1999 the
Security Council adopted resolution 1267, demanding that the Taliban in Afghanistan turn over
Osama bin Laden to a country where he would be brought to justice. In order to enforce the
demand the Council decided that all States should:
4(b)—Freeze funds and other financial resources, including funds derived or generated
from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban, or by any
undertaking owned or controlled by the Taliban, as designated by the Committee
established by paragraph 6 below, and ensure that neither they nor any other funds or
financial resources so designated are made available, by their nationals or by any
persons within their territory, to or for the benefit of the Taliban or any undertaking
owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Taliban, except as may be authorized
by the Committee on a case-by-case basis on the grounds of humanitarian need.
Non-compliance with the resolution by the Taliban led to resolution 1333 in December 2000,
expanding the freezing obligation to “funds and other financial assets of Usama bin Laden and
individuals and entities associated with him as designated by the Committee, including those in
the Al-Qaida organization”. Resolution 1390 of January 2002 continued the freezing of funds
and provided for regular updating by the Committee, which came to be known as the Al-Qaida
8While tragic events have demonstrated the grave risk to United Nations personnel from terrorism, the 1994 Convention on
the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel is not included on this list. Historically, that Convention was developed following
a series of deaths of United Nations military and police personnel in conflict situations.
4 Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism
and Taliban Sanctions Committee, of the list of designated individuals and entities. That
updated list is known as the Consolidated List because it consolidates alphabetically organized
lists of Taliban associated individuals, Taliban associated entities, Al-Qaida associated individuals,
Al-Qaida associated entities and delisted individuals and entities. The list is available at
www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/consolist.shtml. As of 21 January, 2008 it named 142 individuals
associated with the Taliban; 228 individuals and 112 entities associated with the
Al-Qaida organization, and 11 individuals and 24 entities removed from the list.9
On 28 September 2001 the Security Council adopted resolution 1373, expanding freezing obligations
to persons (and certain related persons and entities) who commit or attempt to commit
terrorist acts. This freezing obligation therefore applies to a broader group than the Taliban and
Al-Qaida associated individuals and entities listed under resolution 1267 (1999) and its successor
resolutions. Paragraph 1 of resolution 1373 (2001) requires the freezing without delay of:
“funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or
attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of
terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and
of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities,
including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by such persons and associated persons and entities. (Emphasis added).
The resolution required the criminalization of the financing of terrorism, which lead to a number
of law enforcement and international cooperation measures. It also called upon Member
States to become parties, as soon as possible, to the relevant international conventions and protocols
relating to terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism. This appeal to become parties to relevant agreements can also be
understood to include regional agreements related to terrorism. Those instruments can play a
valuable role complementing bilateral treaties and universal terrorism-related conventions and
protocols, so long as those arrangements are “consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the
United Nations” in accordance with Article 52 of the United Nations Charter.
Unlike Security Council resolution 1267 (1999), resolution 1373 (2001) does not specify
particular individuals or entities whose funds must be frozen because those persons are
involved with terrorist acts, nor does it establish a listing mechanism. It also does not define
“terrorist acts”. At a minimum that phrase would include crimes that a country denominated as
terrorism or terrorist acts under domestic law. Most countries would consider that the offences
in the universal terrorism-related conventions and protocols adopted by that country would be
considered terrorist acts. In view of the many references describing terrorism and terrorist acts
as victimization of civilians in resolutions of the Security Council10 and the General Assembly,11
the definition in Article 2.1 (b) of the Financing of Terrorism Convention provides another
practical guide for identification of acts for which the provision or collection of funds should be
forbidden:
Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other
person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the
purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.
9Relevant successor resolutions dealing with procedures for listing, delisting and humanitarian exceptions include
resolutions 1333 (2000), 1390 (2002), 1452 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1730 (2006) and 1735 (2006).
10See Security Council resolutions 1456 (2003), 1540 (2004) and 1566 (2004), 1624 (2005) and 1735 (2006).
11See General Assembly resolutions 56/88, 57/27, 58/81 and 58/174, 60/288 and 61/40.
The universal legal regime against terrorism 5
D.—Fundamental considerations in providing legislative advisory
services
The task assigned to the UNODC by the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy is to continue the
work it has done since 2002 by providing requesting States with technical assistance to facilitate
the implementation of the terrorism-related conventions and protocols and of related
Security Council resolutions.12 In executing that task, the legal advisory services provided by
UNODC’s Terrorism Prevention Branch are conducted according to certain fundamental considerations.
A dominant concern is to scrupulously avoid any interference in the internal political
affairs of the States requesting legal advisory services. That value is served by providing
objective advice, in response to a State’s express request, on gaps that may exist between the
international requirements of the universal terrorism-related agreements and the provisions of
national law and on possible solutions. This technical, apolitical, approach is reinforced by
TPB’s consistent and limited focus upon terrorism as a set of criminal offences with precise elements
defined by the relevant United Nations instruments.
This is in no way intended to undervalue the need for governments and elements of the
United Nations system to address terrorist acts and groups in their political and social context
and to deal with the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism listed in Section 1 of the
Global Strategy’s Plan of Action, as is being done by the organizations and entities in the
Secretary-General’s Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). However, as is
evident from the listing of those conditions, many of them cannot be influenced in any
significant way by international criminal justice processes.13 Moreover, the mandate of the
Terrorism Prevention Branch is geared towards advancing the implementation of the universal
terrorism-related instruments. Ensuring that the technical assistance provided by the Branch is
confined to criminal justice and related procedural aspects of countering terrorism, enables the
Branch to work clearly within the limits of its mandate. It also capitalizes upon the advantages
of UNODC’s established expertise with penal law conventions and international cooperation
mechanisms.
E.—Insistence that counter-terrorism measures be based
upon human rights standards
The UN’s counter-terrorism efforts are built upon the uncompromising conviction that successful
terrorism prevention efforts should not merely comply with, but must actually be based
upon, the spirit and the language of rule of law standards, specifically including the guarantees
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The premise of this
approach is that when communities believe that terrorist acts can be successfully prevented and
punished by legal mechanisms that faithfully incorporate human rights protections, there will
be less demand for harsher measures and more respect for the rule of law. Instead of a
competition in which either security or liberty must be reduced for the other value to be maintained,
it is possible to produce synergy so that both effective crime control and respect for
human rights are increased. Moreover, the social compact in which citizens willingly support
12Resolution 62/71 is the latest GA resolution, regarding TPB’s mandate as of January 2008.
13“. . . including but not limited to prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism in all its forms
and manifestations, lack of rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political
exclusion, socio-economic marginalization, and lack of good governance, while recognizing that none of these conditions can
excuse or justify acts of terrorism:” Section 1 of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy’s Plan of Action, UN doc. A/Res/60/288.
6 Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism
their government, obey the law and avoid vigilantism depends upon public confidence that the
government will do its part to prevent terrorist attacks and deal firmly but fairly with those
accused of planning or committing such attacks.
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the foundational
human rights document in the criminal justice field, provides that: “Every human being has the
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of his life”.
There can be no clearer example of an arbitrary deprivation of life than the killing by terrorists
of harmless civilians enjoying a holiday or shopping. To the citizen, the guarantee of the
ICCPR that the right to life will be protected means preventing terrorists from murdering them
and their families and friends, not merely supplying a fair and efficient system for trial and punishment
after an attack has been accomplished. Protection by law thus demands legal measures
to interrupt and interdict preparations by terrorists aimed at arbitrarily depriving civilians of
their lives. This interruption and interdiction of terrorist planning and preparation before innocent
civilians become victims is infinitely preferable to conducting autopsies and crime scene
investigations after a tragedy has occurred and is essential to preserving the faith of citizens in
the rule of law and in the credibility of their government.
This insistence upon treating human rights guarantees as the foundation for counter-terrorism
technical assistance is simply one aspect of providing integrated legal advisory services. The
Global Project on Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism is carefully supervised
and subject to great transparency to ensure that it remains within its mandates. Subject to that
limitation, however, it would be wasteful to encourage a country to comply only with the
technical elements of the Financing of Terrorism Convention and relevant Security Council
resolutions on the freezing of terrorist property, without advising the Government of that
country to simultaneously consider the human rights implications of its measures, together with
the provisions of the Financial Action Task Force’s 40 Recommendations for the control of
money laundering and its Nine Special Recommendations relating to the financing of terrorism.
Similarly, UNODC technical experts must be prepared to inform States of applicable best
practices for implementing international requirements, even though the universal instruments
often impose general obligations without specifying the particular legislative language or
international cooperation mechanism by which fulfillment of those obligations should be
accomplished.
F.—The role of the criminal justice system in preventing
terrorist acts
Preventive measures exemplify the need to inform countries of pertinent trends and standards,
as they are intimately related to the simultaneous achievement of respect for human rights and
effective criminal justice practices. The existing conventions and protocols contain no conspiracy,
planning, preparation or other prospective provisions. They punish only offences that have
been “committed”, “attempted”, “aided or abetted”, “ordered”, “directed” or “contributed to”.14
14The only exception is the Financing Convention. That instrument achieves a prospective, preventive effect by establishing
as an offence the non-violent financial preparations that precede and support violent terrorist acts. It also avoids ambiguity
by specifying that the offence of providing or collecting funds for a terrorist act is not dependent upon commission of the
planned violent act. Part II, Section H, explains why the offence of ordering or directing others to commit a terrorist act, established
under other recent terrorism-related conventions, arguably may not apply when the act being ordered or directed is not
attempted or accomplished.
The universal legal regime against terrorism 7
As a representative example, the offence established by the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation would not have
been committed until an attack at an airport were actually attempted or accomplished. That
would be true even if overwhelming evidence existed that a group were planning an attack, had
secured automatic weapons, ammunition and hand grenades and had printed manifestos
announcing their intention to kill as many travelers in the airport as possible in order to
publicize their political or ideological cause. Obviously, a regime for international cooperation
is not completely satisfactory if a legal prerequisite for its use is an attempted or successful
attack with the potential to inflict hundreds of deaths.
Moreover, the phenomenon of suicide attacks makes the deterrent effect of the criminal justice
process seem irrelevant. The realization that the criminal justice system cannot deter attackers
who are willing to die for their cause can lead to calls for a militarized response, with its obvious
risks of further polarization and a weakened respect for procedural protections. To reduce
that danger and to contribute to the reduction of terrorism while maintaining confidence in the
rule of law, there is increased recognition that intervention against terrorist acts must be possible
at the planning and preparation stage. One of the Security Council’s mandatory decisions in
resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001, is that all States must bring to justice not only those who
perpetrate terrorist acts, but also those who “... participate in the financing, planning,
preparation of such acts.” (Emphasis added).
G.—Prohibiting incitement to terrorism as required by the ICCPR
The UNODC Terrorism Prevention Branch has prepared a technical assistance working paper
analyzing the crucial importance of criminal justice preventive measures in anti-terrorism
efforts. This paper is entitled Preventing Terrorist Acts: A Criminal Justice Strategy Integrating
Rule of Law Standards in Implementation of United Nations Anti-Terrorism Instruments
(2006). It reviews the substantive and procedural mechanisms that permit effective intervention
against terrorist planning and preparation, while observing human rights guarantees. Among
the substantive offences reviewed are association de malfaiteurs and conspiracy, material
support for terrorism, preparation offences, recruitment for, training and membership in a
terrorist group. Among the procedural mechanisms are undercover operations, technical
surveillance, witness incentives, evidentiary rules, regulatory controls and international
cooperation improvements.
The Financing of Terrorism Convention was the first global instrument to require the imposition
of criminal liability for the logistical support that precedes almost every significant act of
terrorist violence and is essential to the groups that form the institutional infrastructure of
terrorism. Intense consideration at the global level is now being given to measures aimed at the
psychological indoctrination that incites to hatred and violence and is similarly essential to
motivating acts of organized terrorism. Article 20, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR requires that:
Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law. (Emphasis added).
General Comment 11 (1983) of the independent experts making up the Human Rights
Committee created pursuant to the ICCPR emphasizes that for Article 20 to become fully
effective there ought to be a law making it clear that propaganda and advocacy as described here
are contrary to public policy and providing for an appropriate sanction in case of violation.
8 Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism
Neither the ICCPR Article 20 nor General Comment 11 specifies that the prohibition or
sanction against advocacy of discrimination, hostility or violence must be criminal in nature.
Realistically, however, it is difficult to imagine non-penal sanctions being effective against
dedicated clandestine terrorist groups. The rule of law as expressed in other international
instruments recognizes that incitement to crime may itself be criminalized. Article 25-3 (e) of
the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court imposes criminal responsibility for any
persons who:
In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit
genocide.15
The United Nations Security Council has addressed incitement to terrorism in two of its resolutions.
In paragraph 5 of resolution 1373 (2001) the Council:
Declares that acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations and knowingly financing, planning and inciting
terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
(Emphasis added).
The Council focused specifically on the incitement problem in resolution 1624 (2005), in
which it:
1.—Calls upon all States to adopt such measures as may be necessary and appropriate
and in accordance with their obligations under international law to:
(a)—Prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts;
(b)—Prevent such conduct;
(c)—Deny safe haven to any persons with respect to whom there is credible and relevant
evidence giving serious reasons for considering that they have been guilty of such
conduct; (Emphasis added);
[…]
3.—Calls upon all States to continue international efforts to enhance dialogue and
broaden understanding among civilizations, in an effort to prevent the indiscriminate
targeting of different religions and cultures, and to take all measures as may be necessary
and appropriate and in accordance with their obligations under international law to
counter incitement of terrorist acts motivated by extremism and intolerance and to prevent
the subversion of educational, cultural, and religious institutions by terrorists and
their supporters;
Pursuant to the Council’s direction, the Counter-Terrorism Committee created by resolution
1373 (2001) prepared a report, S/2006/737 dated 15 September 2006, on the implementation of
resolution 1624 (2005). Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the report indicated that most of the reporting
States that prohibit incitement, do so by expressly criminalizing the making of public
statements inciting the commission of a terrorist act. Other States indicated that private
15See also Article 3.1 (c) (iii) of the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances. This article requires a State Party, subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its
legal system, to criminalize “publicly inciting or inducing others, by any means, to commit any of the offences established in
accordance with this article or to use narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances illicitly”.
The universal legal regime against terrorism 9
communications were included if they amounted to counseling, inducing or soliciting acts of
terrorism. Most of the prohibitions imposed criminal liability without regard to whether a
terrorist act was actually attempted or committed, which would help to fill the gap resulting
from the reactive nature of the universal terrorism-related conventions and protocols.
The inadequacy of reactive criminal law mechanisms, that depend upon violence being
attempted or accomplished, to protect society against persons willing to die for a cause is also
leading to greater attention to preventive anti-terrorism mechanisms at the regional level. The
Council of Europe, with 47 Member States, long ago developed a Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism (1977). In 2005, its Members negotiated a Convention on the
Prevention of Terrorism, which has entered into force in June 2007. Among its preventive
measures are the establishment of new offences of public provocation to commit a terrorist
offence,16 recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism. Article 5 of the Conventions thus
states:
For the purposes of this Convention, “public provocation to commit a terrorist offence”
means the distribution of, or otherwise making available, of a message to the public,
with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence, where such conduct,
whether or not directly advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more
such offences may be committed.
Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish public provocation
to commit a terrorist offence, as defined in paragraph 1, when committed unlawfully
and intentionally, as a criminal offence under its domestic law.
The European Convention is not limited to incitement based upon national, racial or religious
hatred. However, since those are the principal grounds used for recruitment for current terrorist
acts and groups, the Convention effectively implements the ICCPR requirement that advocacy
of hatred that incites violence be prohibited. Of course, the offence established in the
Prevention of Terrorism Convention also must comply with the requirement of ICCPR Article
19, that everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference, and that:
2.—Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds […]
The Convention’s incitement offence applies only to public provocation to commit criminal
offences clearly defined by law, when done with the specific criminal intent to incite the commission
of an offence, so mere careless conduct or unforeseen consequences will not result in
criminal liability. In view of those safeguards, the provocation offence appears consistent with
ICCPR paragraph 3 of Article 19, which states that:
3.—The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions,
but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For the respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public
health or morals.
16A terrorist offence is defined as an offence established under any of the universal terrorism-related instruments from the
Aircraft Seizure Convention of 1970 through the Financing of Terrorism Convention of 1999.
10 Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism
H.—Steps in becoming a party to and implementing
the conventions and protocols
The process of becoming party to an international treaty or convention (multilateral treaty)
involves both an international and a domestic component. The international component consists
of a formal procedure dictated by the terms of the agreement and governed by international
law principles. The terrorism-related conventions and protocols require the deposit of a formal
legal instrument with the depository identified in footnote 7 above for the particular agreement.
This document must express, in the appropriate international law terminology, the country’s
willingness to be bound by the obligations of that instrument. Obviously, however, that formal
process will not take place until a domestic component of the process has been satisfied. A
political decision leading to satisfaction of the approval requirements of a country’s constitutional
or other legal rules will be necessary, and often legislative action as well.
An analysis of legislation required in order to meet international counter-terrorism standards is
normally the first step to becoming a party to the global terrorism-related agreements.
Governments and legislatures understandably want to know in advance what changes in their
legal system will be required as a result of membership in an international treaty or compliance
with other international standards. Some countries will not, either because of domestic law or
as a matter of policy, adopt a treaty until legislation is in effect that permits the fulfillment of all
of its international obligations, and do not consider a treaty binding until implemented by a
domestic law.17 This is often referred to as the “dualist” position, in that international law and
domestic law are considered as two separate systems, so that legislation is required to introduce
an international obligation into the domestic legal order.18
In other countries, adoption of a treaty may automatically incorporate its provisions into
domestic law, which would permit articles relating to mutual legal assistance and other
procedural matters to serve as self-executing legal authorization for their use upon the treaty
entering into force, without further executive or legislative action except for the practical step of
publication of the treaty in the official Gazette or otherwise giving notice to the public.
However, even countries that follow what is called a “monist” tradition of automatic treaty
incorporation will require legislation to provide non-self executing elements essential to
implementation.19 The clearest example of this relates to criminalization of offences. None of
the terrorism-related agreements specify a penalty or even a penalty range for the offences
defined therein. Typical language is found in Article 4 of the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism:
Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary:
(a)—To establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the offences set forth in
article 2;
(b)—To make those offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into
account the grave nature of the offences.
17Unless otherwise stated, all laws and court decisions cited are available either in English or their original language in the
terrorism legislative database of the UNODC, at www.unodc.org/tldb.
18See for example the South African Constitution. 1996, Section 231.
19 Article 122 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania provides that: Any international agreement that has been
ratified constitutes part of the internal juridical system after it is published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Albania. It
is implemented directly, except for cases when it is not self-executing and its implementation requires issuance of a law. […]
The universal legal regime against terrorism 11
Even if a country’s legal tradition were to allow the theoretical possibility of a criminal charge
for committing an offence defined only in an international treaty by which that country was
bound, and not in a domestic piece of legislation, that offence would remain a crime without
punishment until legislation defined the penalty. A fundamental principle of the rule of law is
that there can be no punishment without a law, and few persons would argue in favor of
allowing punishment to be imposed by analogy to another offence. Consequently, a country
that automatically incorporates an offence into its domestic law upon the adoption of a treaty, as
defined therein, must take legislative action to provide a penalty for that offence and to
implement any other non-self executing provisions.

II. Criminalization and other legislative requirements
of the terrorism related conventions and protocols
A.—Common elements of the conventions and protocols
Two of the sixteen terrorism-related agreements do not create any offences and therefore are not
described in detail. The 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft establishes procedures for return of the aircraft and treatment of passengers and
crew after an unlawful diversion. It also requires a Contracting State to establish its jurisdiction
to punish offences committed on board aircraft registered in that State, but does not establish
any offences that State Parties are obligated to punish. The Convention on the Marking of
Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection requires a State Party to take measures to control
explosives that do not contain volatile chemicals subject to detection by scanning equipment,
but those measures need not be penal in nature. It also does not contain any criminal
justice cooperation mechanism, so it is not discussed here. The remaining nine conventions,
four protocols and one amendment all have common elements. Each requires: (a) criminalization
of the conduct defined in a particular agreement as a punishable offence; (b) establishment
of specified grounds of jurisdiction over that offence, such as the registration of an aircraft or
ship, or the location of an attack; and (c) the ability and obligation to refer a case against a suspected
or accused offender to domestic authorities for prosecution if extradition is not granted
pursuant to the applicable agreement and to furnish related forms of international cooperation.
B.—Agreements relating to the safety of civil aviation
developed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
B-1—1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
The earliest terrorism-related conventions were developed by the ICAO in 1963, 1970 and 1971
in response to aircraft hijackings. The 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft requires its Parties to take “such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction as the State of registration over offences committed on board aircraft
registered in such State” (Art.3.2). There is no requirement to define any particular conduct
endangering the safety of an aircraft or of persons on board as an offence. Moreover, the requirement
to establish jurisdiction only applies to acts committed on board an aircraft in flight,
defined as from the moment when power is applied for the purpose of take-off until the moment
when the landing run ends. Subsequent aviation-related instruments were incremental reactions
to the aircraft hijackings then prevalent. Article 1(a) of the 1970 Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizures of Aircraft requires State Parties to punish by severe penalties the act of a
person who “unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seizes,
or exercises control of, that aircraft”. That article refers to an aircraft “in flight”, defined in
Article 3.1 as “at any time from the moment when all of its external doors are closed following
embarkation until the moment when any such door is open for disembarkation”.
13
B-2 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Civil Aviation
This agreement was adopted after the destruction of four civilian aircraft on the ground in the
Middle East in September 1970. It requires criminalization of attacks on aircraft “in service”,
defined in Article 2(b) as “from the beginning of the preflight preparation of the aircraft by
ground personnel or by the crew for a specific flight until twenty-four hours after any landing;”
Article 1(a) and (d) also require criminalization of any act of violence against a person on board
an aircraft in flight and any damage to or interference with air navigation facilities likely to
endanger the safety of an aircraft.
B-3 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports
Serving International Civil Aviation
Only States that are parties to the 1971 Montreal Convention may join this Protocol. Its negotiation
followed attacks on travelers in airports in Vienna, Rome and elsewhere in the 1980s. It
requires criminalization of acts of violence likely to cause death or serious injury, at airports
serving international civil aviation, as well as destroying or seriously damaging aircraft or facilities
if such acts endanger or are likely to endanger safety at that airport. The UNODC Model
Law against Terrorism, available at www.unodc.org on the Terrorism Prevention page, under
technical assistance tools, contains draft laws implementing the criminal provisions of the air
travel safety conventions. Legislative implementation has been achieved in some countries by
enacting the jurisdictional bases and the offences required by multiple agreements in a single
statute. After negotiation of the 1971 Convention, a number of countries approved legislation
implementing the 1963, 1970 and 1971 Conventions in a single law.20 Some consolidated laws
enacted after negotiation of the 1988 Airport Protocol incorporate not only the offences defined
therein, but also the unauthorized introduction of weapons and other dangerous articles into
airports and on board aircraft.21
C.—Agreements relating to maritime safety developed by the
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
C-1 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Maritime Navigation and its Fixed Platform Protocol
This agreement is often called the SUA Convention in the maritime community. It combines
many of the provisions developed in the preceding decades to deal with attacks upon aircraft.
Development of the 1988 SUA Convention followed the 1985 hijacking of the cruise ship
Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean and the murder of a passenger. The agreement requires
the criminalization of a ship seizure, damage to a ship or its cargo that is likely to endanger its
safe navigation; introduction of a device or substance likely to endanger the ship; endangering
safe navigation by serious damage to navigation facilities and injuring or killing any person
in connection with the previously listed offences. Its contemporaneous Protocol for the
14 Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism
20Among these were the New Zealand Aviation Crimes Act 1972, the Malawi Hijacking Act of 1972, the Malaysian
Aviation Offences Act 1984 and the Mauritius Civil Aviation (Hijacking and Other Offences) Act 1985. Some of the statutes
were later amended by insertion of an article incorporating the 1988 Airport Protocol, as was done by Mauritius. Its 1985
Hijacking and Other Offences Act was amended in 1994 by the addition of an article 6A, which criminalized the conduct
defined as an offence in the 1988 Airport Protocol to the 1971 Safety of Civil Aviation Convention, as well as any act at an airport
using a device, substance or weapon likely to cause serious damage to the environment.
21The Australia Crimes (Aviation) Act of 1991 and the Fiji Civil Aviation (Security) Act 1994 are comprehensive post-1988
rewritings of prior air travel safety legislation and incorporate airport security measures forbidding the introduction of weapons
and other dangerous articles, and in the law of Fiji, provisions on airport access, security searches and related topics.
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf
extended similar provisions to attacks upon those platforms.22 An example of legislation simultaneously
implementing both the Convention and Protocol is the Australia Crimes (Ships and
Fixed Platforms) Act 1992, as amended by Schedule 17 of the Law and Justice Amendment Act,
No. 24, 2001.
C-2 Protocols to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation and to the Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the
Continental Self (2005)
Protocols to both the Convention and Protocol of 1988 were negotiated in 2005. These instruments
provide that upon coming into force with the requisite number of adoptions they shall be
combined with the earlier instruments, and designated portions will be called the Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 2005 and the
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on
the Continental Shelf, 2005. The new agreements create additional offences, including: using
against or discharging from a ship explosive, radioactive, biological, chemical or nuclear materials
or weapons in a manner likely to cause death, serious injury or damage; discharging other
hazardous or noxious substances likely to cause death or serious injury or damage; or using a
ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or damage; or threatening to do so.
Transportation on board a ship of certain materials must be criminalized if done with an intent
to intimidate a population or to coerce a government or international organization, as well as
any equipment, material, software or technology that significantly contributes to the design of a
biological, chemical or nuclear weapon. Additional articles require the creation of offences for
transporting a person knowing that the person has committed an offence defined in the 2005
Protocol or in the annexed list of terrorism-related treaties and for injuring a person in connection
with the commission of the defined offences. The UNODC Model Law contains draft articles
criminalizing these new offences and implementing the requirement, as indicated in the
2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention, that Parties take measures to hold liable a legal entity
located in its territory or organized under its laws criminally, civilly or administratively liable
when a person responsible for its management or control has, in that capacity, committed an
offence set forth in the Convention as amended.
D.—Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,
1979 and its 2005 Amendment developed by the IAEA
In 1979 the IAEA developed the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,
establishing obligations concerning the protection and transportation of defined materials.
Article 7 requires the State Parties to create offences of unlawful handling of nuclear materials
or a threat thereof; a theft, robbery or other unlawful acquisition of or demand for such material;
or a threat of such unlawful acquisition in order to coerce a person, international organization or
State. In 2005 that instrument was amended to criminalize acts directed against or interfering
with a nuclear facility likely to cause serious injury or damage, as well as; unauthorized
movement of such material into or out of a State without lawful authority; a demand for
Criminalization and other legislative requirements of the terrorism related conventions and protocols 15
22A definition of the continental shelf is found in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In very simplified
terms it is the natural prolongation of a State’s land territory to the point where the deep ocean floor begins. However, there are
very technical limits and qualifications in the Convention on the Law of the Sea that need to be examined to determine whether
a particular location constitutes part of the continental shelf.
nuclear material by threat or use of force; a threat to use such materials to cause death or serious
injury or damage to property or to the environment or to commit an offence in order to coerce a
person, international organization or State.23 As will be explained in part II, section E-4, application
of this agreement should be considered in conjunction with an instrument developed by
the General Assembly’s Ad Hoc Committee in 2005, the International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
E.—Agreements relating to other protections for civilians
developed at the initiative of the General Assembly
E-1 The Internationally Protected Persons and Hostage Taking Conventions of
1973 and 1979
The 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, requires State Parties to criminalize violent
attacks directed against Heads of State and foreign ministers and their family members, as well
as against diplomatic agents entitled to special protection under international law. The term
“diplomatic agents” and the circumstances under which such persons are entitled to special
protections can be found in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961.24 The 1979
Hostage Taking Convention requires criminalization of any seizure or detention and threat to
kill, injure or continue to detain any hostage, not merely diplomatic agents, in order to compel
any State, international organization or person to do or abstain from doing any act. This
Convention only addresses detentions and related threats, and not any resulting death or injury,
and applies only when there is an international dimension to the event. The Cook Islands implemented
the 1973 Internationally Protected Persons Convention and the 1980 Hostage Taking
Convention in one statute, the Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons and Hostages) Act
1982, No. 6. While the 1973 Internationally Protected Persons Convention requires criminalization
of attacks on protected persons, it is silent as to whether the necessary criminal intent
must include knowledge of the victim’s protected status. The Cook Islands legislation specifically
provides that knowledge of the person’s protected status is not an element of the offence
and need not be proven by the prosecution.
E-2 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention
As mentioned previously, General Assembly 51/210 of 1996 established an Ad Hoc Committee
open to all Member States of the United Nations and charged with negotiating instruments for
the suppression of various manifestations of terrorism. The first result of the Committee’s work
was the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997). Although
its title refers only to bombings, this instrument also deals with weapons of mass destruction.
Article 1.3 defines explosive or other lethal device as:
(a) An explosive or incendiary weapon or device that is designed, or has the capability,
to cause death, serious bodily injury or substantial material damage; or
(b) A weapon or device that is designed, or has the capability, to cause death, serious
bodily injury or substantial material damage through the release, dissemination or
impact of toxic chemicals, biological agents or toxins or similar substances or radiation
or radioactive material.
16 Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism
232005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, creating a new agreement to be
called the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities.
24Entered into force 24 April 1964, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 500, p. 95
Article 2 requires the creation of an offence of intentionally placing or using an explosive or
other lethal device with the intent to cause death, serious injury or major economic loss.
Activities of armed forces during an armed conflict are not governed by this Convention, as
they are subject to separate rules of international humanitarian law, primarily codified in the
Geneva and Hague Conventions and Protocols on the law of armed conflicts.25 The Suppression
of Terrorist Bombings Act, No. 11 of 1999 of the Republic of Sri Lanka is an example of
national legislation implementing the provisions of the Terrorist Bombings Convention.
E-3—1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention (Criminalization)
The second result of the Ad Hoc Committee’s work was the 1999 International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Article 2.1 requires State Parties to criminalize
conduct by any person who:
...by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides or collects
funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be
used, in full or in part, in order to carry out:
(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of
the treaties listed in the annex; or
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to
any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict,
when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population,
or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from
doing any act.
Subparagraph 2.1(a) incorporates by reference the offences penalized in nine of the universal
terrorism-related instruments that predate the Financing Convention as acts for which the provision
or collection of funds are forbidden. Another means of achieving the same effect would
be to quote the offence definition from each instrument in full in the domestic law. Subparagraph
2.1(b) establishes a self-contained definition of violent terrorist acts for which the
provision or collection of funds is prohibited.
By Law 2001-1062 of 15 November 2001, Article 421-2-2 of the Penal Code, France defined an
offence of financing of terrorism, informally translated in the following terms:
It also constitutes an act of terrorism to finance a terrorist organization by providing,
collecting or managing funds, securities or property of any kind, or by giving advice for
this purpose, intending that such funds, security or property be used, or knowing that
they are intended to be used, in whole or in part, for the commission of any of the acts of
terrorism listed in the present chapter, irrespective of whether such an act takes place.26
Criminalization and other legislative requirements of the terrorism related conventions and protocols 17
25See www.icrc.org under International humanitarian law.
26Original text: Constitue également un acte de terrorisme le fait de financer une entreprise terroriste en fournissant, en
réunissant ou en gérant des fonds, des valeurs ou des biens quelconques ou en donnant des conseils à cette fin, dans l'intention
de voir ces fonds, valeurs ou biens utilisés ou en sachant qu'ils sont destinés à être utilisés, en tout ou partie, en vue de
commettre l'un quelconque des actes de terrorisme prévus au présent chapitre, indépendamment de la survenance éventuelle
d'un tel acte.
The last phrase of the French law implements Article 2-3 of the Convention, which provides
that:
For an act to constitute an offence set forth in paragraph 1, it shall not be necessary that
the funds were actually used to carry out an offence referred to in paragraph 1, subparagraphs
(a) or (b).
Convention Article 2-3 is part of a highly important advance in the use of anti-terrorism measures
to prevent rather than merely to react to terrorist violence. Although the Financing
Convention parallels the Terrorist Bombings Convention in its structure and language, it
achieves a strategic breakthrough against the planning and preparation that precedes almost
every terrorist attack. It accomplishes this result by two innovations. Instead of prohibiting a
particular form of violence associated with terrorism, the Financing Convention criminalizes
the non-violent logistical preparation and support that make significant terrorist groups and
terrorist operations possible. Moreover, Article 2-3 eliminates any ambiguity by expressly
providing that the prohibited provision or collection of funds need not result in a violent act
specified in Article 2.1 of the Convention to be punishable. Meeting all of the international
standards applicable to the financing of terrorism can be fully achieved only by legislation
establishing the Convention offence and not by reliance upon theories of complicity,
conspiracy, money-laundering or other offences not specific to the financing of terrorism.
E-4 2005 Nuclear Terrorism Convention
The Nuclear Terrorism Convention was also a product of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. It
defines as offences: (a) the possession or use of radioactive material or a nuclear explosive or
radiation dispersal device with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury or substantial
damage to property or the environment; (b) the use of radioactive material or a device, or the use
of or damage to a nuclear facility which risks the release of radioactive material with the intent
to cause death or serious injury or substantial damage to property or to the environment, or with
the intent to compel a natural or legal person, an international organization or a State to do or
refrain from doing any act. These offences focus more explicitly on nuclear devices specifically
constructed to do harm than do those in the 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Materials, but the IAEA agreements also contain prohibitions against harmful use,
theft, robbery, embezzlement or other illegal means of obtaining such materials and to related
threats. Both conventions define their terminology, and these definitions must be reviewed
carefully by experts in the legislative drafting process. For example, a “nuclear facility” is protected
by both agreements, but the term is defined differently in the two instruments.
Accordingly, national drafting experts may wish to consider consultation with the legal advisors
of the UNODC and the IAEA to avoid conflicts and duplication in domestic legislation
implementing these two instruments. The UNODC Model Law against Terrorism provides a
criminalization package incorporating the offences in both these conventions dealing with
nuclear matters. Moreover, in any situation involving possible misuse of radioactive materials,
one must also consider the applicability of the Terrorist Bombings Convention, 1997 that
applies to:
A weapon or device that is designed, or has the capacity to cause death, serious bodily
injury or substantial material damage through the release, dissemination or impact of
[…] radiation or radioactive material.
18 Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism
E-5 Ongoing Work on a Comprehensive Convention against Terrorism
The continuing work of the Ad Hoc Committee as of 2007 is reflected in General Assembly
Document A/62/37, “Report of the Ad Hoc Committee” established by General Assembly
resolution 51/210 on meetings of 5, 6 and 15 February 2007. That report, on the negotiation of
a comprehensive convention, reflects differing views on a number of issues. As widespread
implementation of any such convention could be years in the future, the UNODC and its
Terrorism Prevention Branch continue to work for adoption and implementation of the existing
terrorism-related instruments.
F.—Other legislative requirements relating to the
financing of terrorism
F-1 Sources of international standards on the financing of terrorism
Criminalization as discussed in part II, section E-3 is only one of the measures for combating
the financing of terrorism required by international standards, and the Financing of Terrorism
Convention is only one of those standards. Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) independently
requires, not just the 160 State Parties to the Financing Convention, but all States, to
criminalize financing, defined in almost exactly the same words as the Convention. The Special
Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), discussed below, and the work
of FATF-style regional bodies also reinforce this criminalization requirement. Security Council
resolutions and FATF Special Recommendations also deal with a number of non-criminal
standards, including the freezing of terrorist funds. All of these standards need to be taken into
account in drafting legislation to deal with any aspect of combating the financing of terrorism,
as the standards and obligations are highly interrelated.
In addition to the obligation to criminalize the financing of terrorism, the Financing Convention
contains significant non-criminal elements. It obligates its Parties to have legislation enabling
a legal entity to be held civilly, administratively or criminally liable when a person responsible
for its management or control has, in that capacity, committed a financing offence.27 It also
requires the Parties to have in place appropriate measures to identify, detect, freeze and seize for
the purpose of forfeiture funds used or allocated for the commission of terrorist offences. Its
Article 18, 1 (b) (iii) requires Parties to oblige financial institutions and other professions
involved in financial transactions to identify their customers. The Parties must consider regulations
on the reporting of “all complex, unusual large transactions and unusual patterns of
transactions, which have no apparent economic or obviously lawful purpose.” Under this
formulation of what constitutes a suspicious transaction, there is no need for an apparent
connection to drug trafficking or terrorism. The lack of an apparent lawful purpose after
consideration of all relevant circumstances is sufficient to require the institution’s management
to report the transaction. A broad formulation of the reporting duty is necessary because a
Criminalization and other legislative requirements of the terrorism related conventions and protocols 19
27It should be noted that the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Maritime Navigation also contains a counterpart obligation to establish the legal responsibility of a legal entity when a person
responsible for its management or control has, in that capacity, committed an offence established by the Convention. A
general provision to that effect is found in section 5 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 2002 of Barbados:
Where an offence referred to under section 3 or 4 [meaning acts of terrorism or financing of terrorism] is committed by a
person responsible for the management or control of an entity located or registered in Barbados or in any other way
organized under the laws of Barbados, that entity, in circumstances where the person committed the offence while acting
in that capacity, is guilty of an offence […].
financial professional may fairly be expected to identify transactions with no apparent legitimate
rationale consistent with the client’s business profile, but cannot be expected to determine
what kind of illegitimate activity may lie behind such transactions.
There are significant factual differences between the practices and offences of money-laundering
and terrorist financing, which is one reason why money-laundering offences cannot be
relied upon to adequately criminalize the financing of terrorism. Money-laundering typically
involves the transfer of significant proceeds derived from illegal transactions into legitimate
commerce or banking channels, often divided or disguised to avoid being conspicuous.
Conversely, terrorist financing may involve aggregating sums derived from lawful activities or
micro-criminality and transferring them to a person or entity that ultimately may send relatively
small payments to support terrorist or terrorist activities. Such funds become legally tainted
only when the originator or some person in the chain along which they pass, has the intent to use
them to finance a terrorist act. Despite these differences between money laundering and terrorist
financing, global efforts to fight the two phenomena both need the assistance of banks and
non-bank financial institutions and professions in the detection of suspicious transactions.
Both rely heavily upon intelligence collection and analysis, often through Financial
Intelligence Units. Suspicious activity reporting was developed as an anti-money laundering
administrative control mechanism. Its use to combat terrorist financing demonstrates how the
global regimes to combat money-laundering and financing of terrorism are increasingly
becoming integrated.
F-2 Freezing and confiscation of terrorist funds
The 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention is only one aspect of a larger international effort
to deter, detect and suppress the financing and support of terrorism. Article 8 of the Convention
provides that each State must take measures for freezing, seizing and forfeiting proceeds and
instrumentalities of the offences listed in the agreement. Following the model of the 1988
Vienna Drug Convention,28 the Financing Convention treats freezing as an interim measure to
prevent the disappearance or dissipation of property preliminary to a decision on whether its
ownership should be permanently transferred to the State, or in some cases to a victim or
rightful owner. The Convention foresees an ultimate determination of forfeitability based upon
the property being an instrumentality or the proceeds of crime. Forfeiture proceedings under
national laws are usually determined by a conviction of the owner or, in some systems, by the
finding of a preponderance or other civil burden of proof that the property was either the
proceeds or instrumentality of crime.
However, when countries implement the Financing of Terrorism Convention, it is advisable that
they provide for and differentiate the regimes established by the resolutions of the Security
Council. Resolution 1267 was adopted in 1999 and its successor resolutions have continuously
renewed its freezing obligations. Most recently, in the preamble to resolution 1735 (2006) it
was reiterated “that the measures referred to in paragraph 1 below [assets freeze, travel ban and
arms embargo], are preventative in nature and are not reliant upon criminal standards set out
under national law.”
20 Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism
28Article 5 of the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.
Thus, the resolution 1267 (1999) obligation to freeze must be continued, from time to time as
determined by the Security Council, without any connection to an ultimate confiscation of the
frozen funds, to prosecution of any offence, or any judicial finding. Resolution 1373 (2001)
presents different issues. Its emphasis on criminal remedies and lack of explicit characterization
of terrorists and what are terrorist acts, leave these matters to be determined within the
national legal system, and may lead to forfeiture if grounds exist under domestic law. However,
the scope of freezing must apply to all property owned or controlled by persons who commit or
attempt to commit terrorist acts, whereas most existing laws only permit the freezing of property
that is ultimately subject to forfeiture, which in most countries means instrumentalities and
proceeds of crime. Authorities considering legislation to implement the 1999 Financing
Convention thus must provide for preventative freezing under resolution 1267 (1999), possible
forfeiture under resolution 1373 (2001) if appropriate evidence can be secured, and traditional
freezing and forfeiture of instrumentalities and proceeds of the offences under the Financing
Convention. One means of providing such legal authority is a law giving a Government the
power to enforce decisions of the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter. A representative example is the United Nations Act Canada:
Application of Security Council decisions;
2.—When, in pursuance of Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, set out in the
schedule, the Security Council of the United Nations decides on a measure to be
employed to give effect to any of its decisions and calls on Canada to apply the measure,
the Governor in Council may make such orders as appear to him to be necessary or
expedient for enabling the measure to be effectively applied.
Offences and punishment
3(1)—Any person who contravenes an order or regulation made under this Act is guilty
of an offence and liable
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine of not more than $100,000 or to imprisonment
for not more than one year, or to both, or
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.
F-3 The FATF Special Recommendations
The work of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF, or GAFI in its French acronym) and the
FATF style regional bodies that apply the Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering and
Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing must also be taken into account. FATF
is an intergovernmental organization housed at the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development in Paris whose work is reinforced by regional FATF-style bodies throughout
the world. The Forty Recommendations on the control of money laundering were issued in
1990 and subsequently updated. Eight Special Recommendations on combating the financing
of terrorism were issued in October 2001, and a ninth added in October 2004. They deal with:
(I) The adoption and implementation of the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention
and implementation of the United Nations resolutions relating to the financing of terrorism;
(II) The criminalization of the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organizations
and designation of such offences as money-laundering predicate offences;
Criminalization and other legislative requirements of the terrorism related conventions and protocols 21
(III) The freezing and confiscating of terrorist assets;
(IV) The reporting of suspicious transactions involving terrorist acts or organizations;
(V) International cooperation in connection with criminal, civil enforcement, and
administrative investigations, inquiries and proceedings relating to the financing of terrorism,
terrorist acts and terrorist organizations;
(VI) The control of alternative remittance systems;
(VII) The strengthening of originator information requirements for wire transfers;
(VIII) Controls to prevent the misuse of non-profit organizations; and
(IX) Controls over physical cross-border movement of cash.
Because the FATF recommendations are ultimately reflected in national legislation and regulations,
they influence international banking practices and affect every country.
The FATF and the FATF-style regional bodies conduct evaluations of their members. The materials
used for those assessments provide an excellent internal checklist for compliance not only
with the provisions of the Financing Convention but also the relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions and can be accessed at the FATF web site, www.fatf-gafi.org. A
Methodology developed with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and used
by those organizations for evaluations, is provided. It is a 92-page document with hundreds of
questions designated as “essential criteria” or as “additional considerations”, organized according
to the pertinent Recommendation. Moreover, an explanatory, 145 page, Handbook is provided
for countries and assessors using the Methodology. The International Monetary Fund
and the UNODC have also developed Model Legislation on Money Laundering and the
Financing of Terrorism, December 2005, available at www.imolin.org under the heading
International Norms and Standards.
22 Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism
Summary: financing of terrorism criminalization and freezing provisions
Criminalization and other legislative requirements of the terrorism related conventions and protocols 23
1999 Financing Convention
Security Council resolution 1373
(2001)
Security Council resolution 1267
(1999) and related resolutions
Legal obligation Treaty obligation for State
parties. Currently 160 State
parties.
Adopted under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter. Legally
binding for all States.
Adopted under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter. Legally
binding for all States.
Criminalization
provision
Any person commits an offence
when he unlawfully and
wilfully, provides or collects
funds with the intention that
they should be used or in the
knowledge that they are to be
used, in full or in part, in order
to carry out [certain defined
acts, including Convention
offences and specific civiliancentered
definition provided in
the Convention. See below].
Criminalize the wilful
provision or collection, by any
means, directly or indirectly,
of funds by their nationals or
in their territories with the
intention that the funds should
be used, or in the knowledge
that they are to be used, in
order to carry out terrorist acts.
No criminalization provision,
only freezing of assets, travel ban,
and arms sanctions.
Freezing
obligation
Take appropriate measures, in
accordance with its domestic
legal principles, for the
identification, detection and
freezing or seizure of any
funds used or allocated for the
purpose of committing the
offences set forth in the
Convention as well as the
proceeds derived from such
offences, for purposes of
possible forfeiture.
Freeze the funds, and other
financial assets or economic
resources of persons who
commit, or attempt to
commit, terrorist acts; of
entities owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by such
persons; and of persons and
entities acting on behalf of, or
at the direction of such persons
and entities.
Freeze funds and other financial
resources, including funds derived
or generated from property owned
or controlled directly or indirectly
by Al-Qaeda, Usama bin Laden
and the Taliban and other
individuals and entities associated
with them, or by any undertaking
owned or controlled by Al-Qaeda
and the Taliban, as designated by
the Committee.
Confiscation/
forfeiture
obligation
Take appropriate measures, in
accordance with its domestic
legal principles, for the
forfeiture of funds used or
allocated for the purpose of
committing the offences set
forth in the Convention and the
proceeds derived from such
offences.
No confiscation or forfeiture
requirement. Only preventative
(non-criminal) freezing
required.
No confiscation or forfeiture
requirement. Only preventative
(non-criminal) freezing required.
Other For an act to constitute an
offence set forth in the
Convention, it shall not be
necessary that the funds were
actually used to carry out a
defined terrorist purpose.
Criminalization, freezing and
forfeiture apply to funds of
innocent origin once provided
or collected with the intention
or in the knowledge they will be
used for one of the defined
terrorist purposes
In the absence of a definitive
explanation in resolution 1373
(2001) of what acts trigger its
freezing obligation, countries
apply their own interpretations.
Many countries have
definitions of terrorism or
terrorist acts in criminal
statutes.
The resolution requires
freezing all property of those
who commit or support acts of
terrorism, including innocent
property not intended for
criminal use
Consolidated list, as of
21 January 2008:
- 142 individuals belonging
to or associated with the
Taliban;
- 228 individuals belonging
to or associated with the
Al-Qaeda organization;
- 112 entities belonging to or
associated with the Al-Qaeda
organization
Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) should
guide the application and implementation of the obligations above
G.—Issues common to all conventions and protocols
G-1 Defining terrorist acts and terrorism
The elements of the offences established in the various treaties are summarized in the UNODC
Model Law against Terrorism provisions, available at www.unodc.org, on the Terrorism
Prevention page under technical assistance tools.29 There is no single formula for criminalization
of these offences that is applicable to all countries, particularly as to whether the offence
should be introduced as part of a special anti-terrorism law, or by amendment to a penal code.
However, to the extent feasible it is desirable to repeat the terminology used in international
conventions in domestic implementing legislation. This is because offence definitions that differ
between countries can create problems with the dual criminality requirement of international
cooperation, to be discussed in part V, section D. What will be the proper approach to
criminalization will depend on the problems facing a country, its history and circumstances,
and the legal tradition and jurisprudence that dictate how laws will be interpreted. Some countries
have adopted comprehensive anti-terrorism laws that incorporate many or most of the
offences created in the universal instruments in to one law, as alternative means of committing
an offence of terrorism or terrorist violence. Another approach creates a single generic offence
of terrorism in language similar to that in the UNODC Model Law and drawn from Section 2.1
(b) of the Financing of Terrorism Convention:
Whoever commits an act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian,
or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or
to abstain from doing any act, shall be punished with...
Section 261 of the Hungarian Penal Code criminalizes “Acts of terrorism" in the following
words:
(1) Any person committing a violent felony against a person, a crime posing a public
threat, or a crime involving weapons as specified in subsection (9), with an intention to:
(a) compel a government body, another state or an international organization to
commit or to refrain from or to endure any act,
(b) intimidate or coerce the civilian population;
(c) to change or interfere with the constitutional, social or economic order of another
state, or to disrupt the operation of an international organization, is guilty of felony…
As explained in the Model Law, the preferred interpretation of “population” and “government”
also refers to the population and government of other countries. This implements the mandatory
requirement of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), paragraph 2 (d), that States “Prevent
those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories
for those purposes against other States or their citizens”. The Terrorism Act 2000 of the United
Kingdom implements this concept in its Article 1, defining terrorism:
24 Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism
29See also the Commonwealth Secretariat Implementation Kits for the International Counter-Terrorism Conventions,
available at: http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/38061/documents/ Scroll to the bottom of the page and download in
PDF form.
(4) In this section
(a) “action” includes action outside the United Kingdom,
(b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property,
wherever situated,
(c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other than
the United Kingdom, and
(d) “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the
United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom.
(5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference
to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organization.
Some countries enact laws that use the explicit term “terrorism” in their title and in substantive
offence descriptions.30 The Anti-Terrorism Act 2002 of Barbados, Section 3.1, defines an
offence of terrorism as including any offence established under any of the listed terrorismrelated
conventions and protocols negotiated through 1997, with the 1999 Financing of
Terrorism Convention being dealt with by the creation of the separate crime of financing of terrorism
in the Barbados statute. The Barbados law also addresses the concern that an anti-terrorism
law may be applied to suppress political dissent or industrial actions. Under the Act, in
addition to offences defined by reference to the conventions, terrorism is defined as:
(b) any other act:
(i) that has the purpose by its nature or context, to intimidate the public or to
compel a government or an international organization to do or to refrain from
doing any act; and
(ii) that is intended to cause:
(A) death or serious bodily harm to a civilian or in a situation of armed
conflict, to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities;
(B) serious risk to the health or safety of the public or any segment of the
public;
(C) substantial property damage, whether to public or private property,
where the damage involves a risk of the kind mentioned in subparagraph (B)
or an interference or disruption of the kind mentioned in subparagraph (D);
or
(D) serious interference with or serious disruption of an essential service,
facility or system, whether public or private, not being an interference or
disruption resulting from lawful advocacy, or from protest, dissent or
stoppage of work and not involving a risk of the kind mentioned in subparagraph
(B).
Criminalization and other legislative requirements of the terrorism related conventions and protocols 25
30See the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2001 of India, replaced in 2004 by the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 2004.
Unless otherwise stated, all laws and court decisions cited are available either in English or their original language in the
terrorism legislative database of the UNODC, at www.unodc.org/tldb.
G-2 Proving motive or intent
A frequently encountered legislative drafting issue is whether to include a terrorist motivation
as an element of the offence, meaning that the act must be committed with a political, ideological
or religious motive. This is a separate and additional requirement of motivation, in addition
to a general criminal intent to kill or injure,31 or to the specific criminal intent to intimidate or
coerce a person, government or international organization.32 An example of a terrorism offence
with a motivational element is found in Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 of the United
Kingdom:
(1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where:
(a) the action falls within subsection (2),
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the
public or a section of the public, and
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or
ideological cause.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it:
(a) involves serious violence against a person,
(b) involves serious damage to property,
(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action,
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public,
or
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.
Evidentiary difficulties may flow from the inclusion of an ideological motive or of a specific
intent to coerce a government or to intimidate a population as an offence element. Those difficulties
involve establishing a defendant’s mental state or purpose without proof of oral or written
statements or a post-arrest confession revealing a terrorist purpose. Some legal cultures and
some individual adjudicators may be reluctant to infer a defendant’s mental state because of the
proverbial impossibility of seeing into a person’s mind or heart. An example would be a refusal
to regard the fact that an attack was targeted at a house of worship on a religious feast day as sufficient,
without a public claim by the responsible group, to establish an underlying religious
motivation. In that situation, the investigating authorities will seek associates who may be able
to testify to statements revealing a suspect’s intent and motive, or those authorities will be compelled
to seek a confession from the accused. This creates pressures that may contribute to
improper interrogation or investigative practices, and this danger should be anticipated and
guarded against by policy makers and executive authorities. Making a confession the only feasible
way to prove an element of an offence is unhealthy, as it may lead to coercion and conflicts
with Article 14, 3 (g) of the ICCPR, providing that in the determination of any criminal charge,
the accused is entitled “Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.”
26 Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism
31The offence created by Article 2.1 of the 1997 Terrorist Bombing Convention is an example of a general criminal intent
crime, defined as the doing of certain acts involving specified weapons or devices “(a)With the intent to cause death or serious
bodily injury; or (b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction […] where such destruction results or is likely to result in
major economic loss.”
32This specific intent is found in the 1979 Hostage Taking Convention (Article 1), the 1988 Maritime Convention (Article
3) and its Fixed Platform Protocol (Article 2), the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention (Article 2), the 2005 Nuclear
Terrorism Convention (Article 2), the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Maritime Navigation (Article 4) and to its 1988 Fixed Platform Protocol (Article 3).
At least since the publication of Cesare Beccaria’s work On Crimes and Punishments in 1764,
criminology and criminal law have moved away from reliance upon confessions, placing more
emphasis upon the reasonable inferences to be drawn from other elements of proof. This trend
is demonstrated by Article 28 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2002).
Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of an offence established in
accordance with the Convention may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.
Thus, in a prosecution for having committed a crime requiring an ideological element, evidence
of membership in an organization endorsing political violence, possession of extremist literature
attacking other religions, past expressions of hatred of the victim group, or the circumstances
and target of the attack itself could substitute for a confession as evidence of the
defendant’s motive.
The need for a realistic approach to proof of an offence’s mental element was recognized by the
inclusion of a specific evidentiary rule in the Financing Convention. Article 2.1 requires not
merely the criminalization of attacks on civilians, but specifies how the specific intent to
intimidate or coerce may be proved:
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to
any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act. (Emphasis added).
To ensure compliance with the Financing Convention, which has rather complex state of mind
elements, the evidentiary rule of Article 2.1 (b) may need to be introduced into a country’s Code
of Criminal Procedure or specifically included in special laws dealing with terrorism.
G-3 Special laws and code amendments
Rather than enacting special laws on terrorism and creating specific offences of terrorism, some
countries prefer to simply amend their Penal Code or Code of Penal Procedure to fill any gaps
between existing law and the requirements of particular conventions or protocols. This
approach is not precluded by the terrorism-related conventions and protocols, none of which
require use of the words “terrorist” or “terrorism” to define prohibited conduct. The word
“terrorism” is not found in any of the pertinent conventions from 1963 through 1979, even
though historically the agreements were clearly responses to terrorist incidents. The word first
appears in the preamble to the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages,
referring to the need for cooperation against acts of hostage taking as manifestations of international
terrorism, and is repeated in the preambles of subsequent agreements.
The 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings was the first
agreement to use the word “terrorist” in its title as well as in the preamble. In Article 5 it also
required the adoption of measures to ensure that offences created by the Convention, “in particular
where they are intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in
a group of persons or particular persons, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations
of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature
and are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature.” The 1999 International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing and the 2005 International Convention
Criminalization and other legislative requirements of the terrorism related conventions and protocols 27
for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism closely resemble the Terrorist Bombing
Convention by their use of the terrorism terminology in their titles, preambles and in articles
specifying that no justification may be permitted for acts of terrorism. But none of these instruments
use the word terrorism or terrorist in their offence definitions. Those definitions employ
only traditional criminal code terminology—a description of an act constituting a social harm,
such as bombing, hostage-taking or use of a ship to distribute dangerous materials, and a general
or specific illegal intent, without any requirement that terrorism be mentioned or defined.33
G-4 Relevancy of the universal instruments to all countries
Questions are often raised about how certain agreements could possibly be relevant to the circumstances
of a country and why a country should adopt them. Officials of a land-locked State
may question how their country could experience a violation of the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. If the country has no
seacoast and no registered ships or offshore platforms, it clearly cannot suffer an unlawful
seizure of its vessel or platform. However, one of its nationals might commit such a crime; its
citizens could be among the passengers threatened or killed; the unlawful seizure and threats to
kill or destroy could be directed to force that country to release a particular prisoner or refrain
from taking a certain action; or the offender could be found on its territory. These are all
grounds of jurisdiction found in the SUA Maritime Convention of 1988, and there are many reasons
why a country might wish to have the option to extradite or to prosecute in its own courts,
or to be able to ask for extradition of an offender from another country.
Similarly, it is the need for international cooperation, not the ability to punish a domestic crime,
that explains the negotiation of an agreement like the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation. No country needed
the Airport Protocol to cause it to criminalize attacks with machine guns and grenades on passengers
in airports on its territory, as such murderous conduct was already criminal everywhere.
That Protocol did not popularize a new offence that did not previously exist in most countries,
as did the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The
purpose and value of the Airport Protocol lie in the establishment of jurisdictional grounds,
international cooperation mechanisms and the obligation to extradite or to prosecute.
Moreover, the voluntary ideal of showing international good citizenship by membership in
reciprocal cooperation agreements coincides with the concrete legal obligations set forth in
mandatory paragraph 2 of resolution 1373 (2001) to:
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts, or
provide safe haven;
(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their
respective territories for those purposes against other States or their citizens;
(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or
perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and
ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established
as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the
punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts;
28 Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism
33As previously mentioned, certain offences do include the intent to intimidate a population or to coerce a government or
international organization, which in substance is the intent to terrorize. The important point for legislative drafters is that terminology
defining the intended effect of acts on a population or a government has an objective factual meaning, whereas “intent
to terrorize” could be interpreted very subjectively unless accompanied by a factual definition.
H.—Forms of participation in an offence
The test of criminal responsibility has evolved under the terrorism-related conventions and
protocols. The eight terrorism-related conventions and protocols negotiated between 1970 and
1988 create reactive criminal offences. They require that criminal liability be imposed, assuming
the existence of the necessary guilty state of mind, in only three circumstances:
(a) The physical commission of the conduct established in a particular convention as
an offence, usually called responsibility as a principal. A principal would be the person
who personally seizes an aircraft or maritime vessel, or takes hostages, attacks
diplomats or passengers at an international airport, steals or unlawfully uses nuclear
material, or makes threats prohibited by certain of the universal instruments;
(b) An attempt to commit a prohibited offence, that fails for reasons beyond the
offender’s control, such as an armed intrusion into a diplomatic compound that is foiled
by the security guards of the diplomats who were to be the victim of an intended
hostage taking;
(c) Intentional participation as an abettor or accomplice in the commission or
attempted commission of an offence. Examples would include an embassy employee
who leaves a gate unlocked so that assassins may enter, or someone who provides
false identity documents to aid the flight of members of a group that has placed and
detonated a bomb in a marketplace.
These forms of criminal responsibility developed incrementally. The 1970 convention applied
only to an accomplice on board an aircraft in flight. The 1971 convention was expanded to
cover any attempt, or to any accomplice, wherever located. In subsequent instruments other
forms of criminal responsibility were introduced, including an act constituting participation in
the principal offence (the 1979 Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials Convention) or abetting
its commission (the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation). Prior to 1997 it was clear that the conventions required the
punishment only of completed or attempted acts. In 1997 Article 2.3 of the Terrorist Bombing
Convention established two new forms of criminal liability for one who:
(b) Organizes or directs others to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 or 2
[meaning either accomplishment of the principal offence or its attempted commission];
or
(c) In any other way contributes to the commission of one or more offences as set
forth in paragraph 1 or 2 by a group of persons acting with a common purpose
[…]
Article 2.3 (c) of the Bombings Convention by its terms applies only to the commission of an
offence. From a purely grammatical perspective, however, it could be argued that Article 2.3
(b) imposes criminal responsibility the moment a person organizes or directs others to commit
an offence, regardless of whether that act is ever attempted or accomplished. However,
grammatical interpretation may not be enough to prevail over the well-established rule of law
principle that any ambiguity in a criminal statute must be resolved in favour of the accused. This
is particularly true in view of the fact that the Terrorist Bombings Convention does not contain
the express clarification found in Article 2.3 of the Financing of Terrorism Convention, which
Criminalization and other legislative requirements of the terrorism related conventions and protocols 29
was apparently considered necessary to establish that the intended act of terrorism need not be
committed for the crime of financing to exist.
Viewed in this context, the strategic significance of the 1999 International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism becomes evident. The formal structure of the
Convention introduces no new form of criminal liability and simply repeats the same five forms
of participation listed in the 1997 Terrorist Bombing Convention, that is as a principal,
attempter, accomplice, organizer or director, or contributor to group action. However, the conduct
criminalized is no longer a violent terrorist act. Instead, what is prohibited for the first time
by a terrorism-related convention or protocol is the non-violent financial preparation that precedes
nearly every significant terrorist act. Moreover, that preparation or contribution is explicitly
made independently punishable by Article 2-3 of the Convention, regardless of whether the
intended terrorist act is actually accomplished or attempted. This criminalization of preparatory
conduct re-establishes the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. Unlike a highly indoctrinated
suicide bomber, most of those who knowingly provide or collect funds for terrorism do
not themselves wish to die, or even go to prison, for their cause, and are therefore subject to
deterrence.
I.—Elements of knowledge and intent
The Financing Convention applies only to unlawful and willful provision or collection of funds
“with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full
or in part, in order to carry out” specified violent acts. Some national laws have extended
criminal liability to a person who “has reasonable cause to suspect” that his or her participation,
support or funds may be used for the purposes of supporting terrorist groups or actions. The
question may arise whether proof of reasonable cause for suspicion is a standard of negligence
or at most recklessness and not of intentional or knowing wrongdoing. Accordingly, a request
for international assistance involving reasonable grounds to suspect terrorist activity may be
attacked as not satisfying dual criminality under the Financing Convention. The opposing argument
is that proof that an offender had reasonable cause to suspect the intended illegal use of
funds allows an inference that the accused made a conscious decision to remain willfully blind
to the illegality and therefore acted intentionally, or at least knowingly. Which view will prevail
depends upon local jurisprudence and statutory language.
The description of the mental element in the Financing Convention as intentionally providing
or collecting funds with either the intention or knowledge that funds are to be used for unlawful
acts tends to provoke two opposing reactions. Some persons question how a provider or collector
can know that funds will be used to carry out a terrorist act and yet claim not to intend that
result. Others question if it is fair to establish an offence that punishes a person who does not
personally desire and intend that his or her funds will be used for a terrorist act. A hypothetical
situation serves to answer both questions. Assume that an influential person in an expatriate
community is subject to lawful electronic surveillance by the security services of his country of
residence. He is overheard reporting his activities to a superior in an organization in his country
of origin. This organization carries on both legitimate social programmes and bomb attacks on
non-combatant civilians of an opposing group. In the conversation the target of the surveillance
advises that he will be sending funds collected from fellow emigrants to the organization by
courier, and that he personally hopes that they will be used for medical care for the community.
The person being intercepted then acknowledges that despite his personal desires he knows the
organization will make the ultimate decision on how to spend the funds and may decide to use
30 Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism
them for bomb attacks on civilians. By those declarations, the speaker indicates that he does not
personally desire that the funds be used for terrorist attacks but knows and is willing that such
attacks may be facilitated by his fund raising. The offence established to implement the
Financing Convention reaches a personal desire and intent to provide or collect funds to support
terrorist acts. However, that prohibition alone was not considered sufficient to accomplish the
goal of reducing terrorist attacks by discouraging the knowing provision or collection of funds
for their accomplishment. Consequently, the offence implementing the Convention must also
punish provision or collection of funds with the knowledge and willing acceptance of the
possibility that they may be used for terrorist acts.
Criminalization and other legislative requirements of the terrorism related conventions and protocols 31

III.—Jurisdiction over offences
A.—Jurisdiction based upon territoriality
The location of the offence is the most ancient and fundamental basis upon which a country can
assert jurisdiction to punish an offence. The social harm of criminal acts inflicted falls most
immediately upon victims and property located within the country’s boundaries, and it is that
country’s public order and tranquility that are undermined by a violation of its laws.
Nevertheless, this ground of jurisdiction was not recognized in the 1970 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. That agreement dealt with in-flight hijackings,
many of which involved situations in which the territorial jurisdiction was either uncertain, in
dispute, or not applicable, such as seizures over the high seas. However, the 1971 Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, protected aircraft “in
service”, meaning on the ground in the 24 hours before and after a flight, as well as air navigation
facilities. It therefore listed territoriality as its first ground of jurisdiction in Article 5.1 (a).
Every one of the terrorism conventions developed since then has included the jurisdictional
basis of territoriality. The Criminal Code of the Republic of Korea establishes territorial
jurisdiction in the following language:
Article 2 (domestic Crimes)
This Code shall apply both to Korean nationals and aliens who commit crimes within
the territory of the Republic of Korea.
B.—Jurisdiction based upon registration of aircraft
or maritime vessels
The 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft
declares that the State of registration of an aircraft is competent and obligated to exercise jurisdiction
over criminal offences committed on board aircraft registered to that State. In recognition
of the prevalence of aircraft leasing, the subsequent air travel safety conventions of 1970
and 1971 added a requirement to establish jurisdiction when the offence is committed against or
on board an aircraft leased without crew to a lessee whose principal place of business is in that
State. Article 6.1 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation used the traditional maritime registration concept, that jurisdiction
exists when an offence established by the Convention is committed:
(a) against or on board a ship flying the flag of the State at the time the offence is
committed
33
34 Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism
The Korean Criminal Code establishes this form of jurisdiction in the following language:
Article 4 (Crimes by Aliens on Board a Korean vessel outside of Korea),
This Code shall apply to aliens who commit crimes on board a Korean vessel or aircraft
outside the territory of the Republic of Korea.
The 1963, 1970 and 1971 aircraft conventions were all focused upon the safety of international
civil aviation and specifically excluded aircraft used in military, customs or police service. The
1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention permits an optional ground of jurisdiction if an offence
established by that instrument is committed on board an aircraft operated by the Government of
a State, regardless of its use. That ground is carried forward in the 1999 Financing Convention
and the 2005 Nuclear Terrorism Convention. The International Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment do not specifically exclude aircraft
used in military, customs or police service, and simply require jurisdiction to be established
when the offence is committed in the territory of the State or on board a vessel or aircraft
registered in that State.
C.—Jurisdiction based upon nationality of the offender
The 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, introduced the requirement that a State Party
must establish jurisdiction over an alleged offender who is a national of that State. Continuing
the use of the Republic of Korea Criminal Code to illustrate how these various grounds of
jurisdiction may be established, Article 3 of that Code provides:
Article 3 (Crimes by Koreans outside Korea)
This code shall apply to all Korean nationals who commit crimes outside the territory of
the Republic of Korea.
All of the subsequent terrorism-related agreements that create offences require the establishment
of jurisdiction over nationals, with the exception of the 1988 Airport Protocol. That
instrument supplemented the 1971 International Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, which did not contain the nationality provision. An
element of flexibility was introduced in the 1979 Hostage Taking Convention, which recognized
that a State might wish to also establish jurisdiction over stateless persons who have their
habitual residence in its territory. That ground is listed with other optional grounds in the 1988
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
and its Fixed Platform Protocol (and therefore applies to their 2005 Protocols), in the 1997
Terrorist Bombings Convention, the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention and the 2005
Nuclear Terrorism Convention.
D.—Jurisdiction based upon protection of nationals
and national interests
The assassination of the Jordanian Prime Minister in 1971 in Cairo and the murder of three
foreign diplomats in Khartoum in 1973 preceded the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents,
Jurisdiction over offences 35
1973. This was the first of the terrorism-related conventions that established jurisdiction based
upon the status or nationality of the victim. In the 1973 Convention the protected status was that
of “an internationally protected person as defined in article 1 who enjoys his status as such by
virtue of functions which he exercises on behalf of that State.” Jurisdiction based upon the
nationality of the hostage was established in the 1979 International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages as an optional basis of jurisdiction. That Convention also introduced the
protection of national interests principle in Article 5.1 (c) as a mandatory ground of jurisdiction,
when hostage taking was committed “in order to compel that State to do or abstain from doing
any act.” The 1988 Maritime Safety Convention and its Fixed Platform Protocol included jurisdiction
based upon the nationality of the victim and upon an effort to compel a State to do or
abstain from doing any act, but treated them as optional rather than mandatory grounds. The
optional treatment of both those grounds was continued in the Terrorist Bombings Convention
1997, which also established the optional ground of an offence committed against a State facility
abroad. Those three options were repeated in the Financing of Terrorism Convention, 1999
and the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, 2005.
E.—Jurisdiction based upon the presence of a person
in the national territory
The obligation to extradite or prosecute is discussed separately in part IV, but depends upon a
jurisdictional element requiring discussion in this part. The competence of domestic courts to
exercise jurisdiction over an act which took place elsewhere and has no connection with a
country’s citizens or interests other than the alleged offender’s presence, is a prerequisite to
obligating the referral of a case for prosecution, if extradition is refused. Many countries provide
for extra-territorial jurisdiction over acts by citizens, as a corollary to constitutional or legislative
mandates or jurisprudential tradition that citizens not be extradited. All of the terrorism-related
conventions and protocols that create criminal offences impose the obligation to refer for
prosecution. As a consequence, so-called “monist” countries, that automatically incorporate
treaties in domestic law, may be able to exercise jurisdiction over an alleged offender found in the
territory based simply upon the international treaty. However, not all countries provide that a
non-citizen found in the territory may be prosecuted for an extra-territorial act simply based
upon that person’s presence, or upon presence plus a decision not to extradite. If that is not the
case, legislation like Article 64 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 of The Gambia may be necessary:
(1) A Gambian Court shall have jurisdiction to try an offence and inflict the penalties
specified in this Act where the act constituting the offence under sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
11, 15, 18 or 19 had been done or completed outside The Gambia and –
[…]
(c) the alleged offender is in The Gambia, and The Gambia does not extradite him or
her.

IV.—Obligation to extradite or prosecute
A.—Nature and consequences of the obligation
The most fundamental rule of international cooperation established by the terrorism-related
conventions and protocols is the principle of extradite or prosecute. This obligation is found in
all of the terrorism-related agreements that define criminal offences. As phrased in Article 8 of
the 1997 Terrorist Bombing Convention, a State Party that does not extradite a person to a
Requesting State Party shall:
[…] be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was
committed in its territory, to submit the case without undue delay to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the
laws of that State. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in
the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the law of that State.
Analytically, compliance with this obligation requires both jurisdiction over the extra-territorial
offence and an obligation to refer the case for prosecutive examination. As mentioned previously,
extra-territorial jurisdiction based upon mere presence may be limited to cases wherein
extradition is refused. It would also be dependent upon the standard condition of dual criminality.
In some countries both jurisdiction over a foreign offence committed by a person found on
the national territory and the obligation to extradite or prosecute flow automatically from membership
in the terrorism-related agreements. In others, legislative action may be necessary to
make referral for prosecution mandatory rather than discretionary. As a matter of executive
administrative policy, this could easily be interpreted as a self-executing provision of a convention.
However, the language that the “authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as
in the case of any other offence of a grave nature.” demonstrates that an allegation that is investigated
and determined to be unfounded need not be brought to trial. A State’s constitutional
principles and its substantive and procedural law will determine to what extent the prosecution
must be pursued “in accordance with the laws of that State.”
The phrase found in the extradite or prosecute articles of the conventions and protocols providing
that the requested State Party is obliged to submit the case for the purpose of prosecution
“without exception whatsoever” can be interpreted in differing ways. One possible meaning is
that the words eliminate the traditional “public order” exception to international cooperation.
Under that exception a State would not be required to render cooperation in a matter that would
undermine its domestic tranquility by causing public disturbance or disrupt public morale. In
the terrorism context that might equate to refusal of cooperation for fear that a terrorist group
would retaliate against the requested State’s nationals or national interests if it granted extradition
of aircraft hijackers who had been found on its territory. Another potential interpretation is
that the language is an implicit rejection of the political offence exception. That possible
meaning will be discussed in part V, section E, dealing with protections for political activity,
against discrimination and requiring fair treatment.
37
38 Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism
Reference to part V, section E, dealing with protection against discrimination, raises the
question of whether the obligation to extradite or prosecute applies even when there are
substantial grounds to believe that a request for international cooperation is made for discriminatory
reasons or that a person’s position would be prejudiced for such reasons. In the abstract,
it may seem counter-intuitive that a State should pursue the prosecution of a person who would
suffer prejudice if extradited. However it must be recognized that a person believed to have
committed atrocities may well provoke hatred and be the type of person most likely to suffer
discrimination and unjust treatment. One can imagine a situation in which there is overwhelming
evidence, perhaps including the offender’s own claims of responsibility, that a person has
committed terrorist acts. At the same time, there may be very substantial ground to believe that
the person’s position would be prejudiced if extradition were granted, because of official hatred
of his or her political position or ethnic or religious affiliation. In that situation there is no
obligation to extradite or even to grant mutual assistance, but there may well be an obligation to
ensure that the available evidence is considered objectively by the authorities of the requested
State under the “prosecute” alternative of the extradite or prosecute rule, considering that it
applies “without exception whatsoever.”
B.—Obligation to conduct an inquiry, to report findings
and to advise of intent
Because the terrorism-related conventions and protocols must deal with a wide variety of legal
systems, they normally do not include the level of procedural detail found in bilateral treaties,
such as the number of days allowed for certain actions or the precise form or channel of
communications. However, the agreements do contain articles concerning the need for orderly
procedures governing the custody and extradition or prosecution of a suspect.34 When a
requested State is satisfied that grounds exist to take an alleged offender into custody, that
custody should ensure the person’s presence for the purposes of prosecution or extradition. A
preliminary inquiry into the facts must be made. All of these procedural steps are to be governed
by national law. The State of nationality and other interested states must be notified
immediately of the custody and informed promptly of the results of the inquiry, and of whether
the custodial State intends to exercise jurisdiction.
34Representative language is found in Article 10 of the International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism,
2005.
V.—International cooperation in criminal matters
A.—Dependence of the legal regime against terrorism
upon international cooperation
There being no international tribunal with competence for acts of terrorism, those acts can only
be dealt with by domestic courts. The international community has come to recognize how
handicapped domestic authorities are when they confront criminals and terrorists who conduct
their illegal activities so that national borders serve as insulation from investigation and prosecution.
The terrorism-related conventions and protocols provide essential tools of extradition
and mutual legal assistance so that national authorities can effectively conduct cross-border
investigations and ensure that there are no safe havens from prosecution and extradition. Some
salient points in connection with the use of those tools are mentioned below. The complexities
of those mechanisms are analyzed in greater detail in the Manual for International Cooperation
in Criminal Matters against Terrorism, available through the UNODC website.
B.—Mutual legal assistance
The requirement that Parties afford assistance in criminal proceedings appeared first in Article
10.1 of the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft:
Contracting States shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in
connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of the offence and other acts
mentioned in article 4. The law of the State requested shall apply in all cases.
A mutual assistance article appears in all of the subsequent conventions that create criminal
offences (except the 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purposes of
Detection). In the 1979 Hostages Convention and subsequent instruments, that assistance is
specified as including the obtaining of evidence at a party’s disposal. Beginning with the 1971
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, the
Conventions obligate parties to take measures to prevent offences against other parties. This
obligation was broadened in the 1973 Convention on Internationally Protected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents, to a duty to exchange information and coordinate administrative and
other preventive measures. Prior to the 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention the mutual assistance
articles all referred to “assistance in connection with criminal proceedings.” In 1997 the
language was expanded, or at least clarified. The words “criminal proceedings” clearly apply
to the evidence-gathering phrase in civil law systems, where inquiries are conducted under the
authority of a magistrate who opens a formal proceeding. It arguably may not apply to the evidence-
gathering phase in systems where investigations are opened and conducted by the police
without participation by a prosecutor or judge until a formal charge is filed. Whether an investigation
by police authorities prior to the filing of a charge would be regarded as a criminal
39
40 Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism
proceeding depends on the law and discretion of the Requested State. Despite this ambiguity,
the “criminal proceeding” language was used in all of the conventions and protocols until
the Terrorist Bombings Convention introduced the language “investigations or criminal or
extradition proceedings,” which has been used in the subsequent conventions developed by the
General Assembly’s Ad Hoc Committee.
C.—Extradition
All of the terrorism-related agreements that create criminal offences contain a provision that the
offences established therein shall be deemed to be extraditable offences in any existing treaty
between State Parties. This provision gives treaty partners the opportunity to use a bilateral
treaty that is likely to contain more procedural details than the universal instruments, which are
written to apply to a variety of legal systems. If the law of a Requested State requires a treaty as
a legal basis for extradition, the State may at its option choose to regard the Convention as such
a basis. If no treaty is required, the offence shall be treated as extraditable. For purposes of
extradition, offences shall be treated as if they had been committed not only in the place where
they occurred, but also in the territory of the States that have established jurisdiction under that
convention or protocol (or in a place within the jurisdiction of the party requesting extradition,
a formulation used only in the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation and its 2005 Protocol). Countries that maintain the death
penalty should be aware that many countries will refuse to extradite unless assurances are
received that a death sentence will not be imposed, or if imposed, will not be carried out.
Similar assurances are sometimes required, with regard to other penalties that are considered to
violate the public policy of a requested country, such as a sentence of life imprisonment without
possibility of parole.
D.—Dual criminality
Although the tests for its application are progressively becoming more flexible, an important
limitation upon international cooperation is the necessity for dual or double criminality. In
simple terms this policy means that a Requested State will normally not assist a Requesting
State in investigating or punishing an activity that the Requested State does not consider as
meriting criminal punishment. An example might be blasphemy or adultery, which are
criminal offences in some legal systems, but only considered socially undesirable, not criminal,
in others. As a consequence, a request for extradition of an adulterous spouse would not be
granted by a country that did not criminalize adultery. At one time this doctrine was applied in
a legalistic fashion that focused on form rather than substance, that is on whether the offence
was similarly denominated in both systems, or whether the offence elements were identical.
Modern treaties and domestic jurisprudence tend to focus more on whether the conduct
would be punishable by the laws of both countries, regardless of the name of the offence or its
elements.
An unresolved question in the terrorism context is the effect of dual criminality of an offence
that must be committed with a particular motive. Inclusion of an ideological motive as an
element of terrorism-related offences, in addition to a specific intent to coerce a government or
to intimidate a population and a general criminal intent to commit the prohibited act, permits a
very precise definition of offences and thus reduces the risk of the overly broad application of
severe sentences or special procedural measures. However, inclusion of such a motivation
requirement may have consequences for international cooperation. None of the terrorismInternational
cooperation in criminal matters 41
related instruments require that the prohibited conduct be committed for a racial, religious,
political or other ideological motive, and so many countries require only that the defined
offences be committed with the state of mind specified in the respective convention or protocol.
That specified state of mind may be a general criminal intent (to do the prohibited act
“intentionally”, or in some instruments “willfully”) or a specific intent in other cases (in order
to intimidate a population or to coerce a government or international organization to do or to
refrain from doing any act). If a country that defines an offence as only requiring a general
or specific intent were to request international cooperation from a country that also requires
an ideological motivation as an element of the offence, the question arises whether dual
criminality exists.
E.—Protections for political activity, against discrimination
and requiring fair treatment
The evolution of protective articles in the conventions and protocols demonstrates a progression
toward ensuring the rule of law in international criminal justice cooperation while reducing
tolerance for terrorist violence. For over a century prior to adoption of the first terrorism-related
convention in 1963, the political offence exception had constituted a ground for refusal of
international cooperation in many countries. That exception to the obligation to grant extradition
was based on the choice by certain countries not to assist in punishing political activity directed
against the government of another country, such as treason, sedition, or attempts to force a ruling
group to change or adopt certain policies. In addition to prohibited, but non-violent, political
activity, such as unauthorized public demonstrations or publications, the exception often covered
violent offences connected with a political offence, such as injuries or damage inflicted during a
political protest or in the course of resisting an arrest for a political offence. Proponents of the
exception argued that it should cover even an attack upon civilians to draw attention to a cause
because the inspiration for the offence was political in nature. Obviously, application of the
exception to shield political violence from extradition or international evidence gathering would
frustrate an anti-terrorism convention, as terrorist incidents involving violence against airline and
ship passengers, hostages and civilians, are routinely inspired by political motives and associated
with efforts to change government policies.
By the time of the adoption of the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts on Board
Aircraft in 1963, the international law community had come to recognize the difficulties in
applying the traditionally broad and ambiguous political offence exception to terrorism-related
offences. The 1963 Convention reflects an attempt to allow a limited exception for laws of a
political nature without negating the purpose of the agreement. Its Article 2 provides in pertinent
part that:
“[…] except when the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property on board so
requires, no provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as authorizing or requiring
any action in respect of offences against penal laws of a political nature or those based
on racial or religious discrimination.”
The stated exception recognizes the most limited form of political offence exception, that of
offences against penal laws of a political nature, such as those prohibiting specified political
speech or activity, but not the more problematic exceptions for violent offences connected to a
political offence or unlawful acts inspired by political motives. This protective article also
introduced a form of non-discrimination protection, making the agreement inapplicable to violations
of laws based on racial or religious discrimination.
42 Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism
For 34 years after 1963, no express reference is found to any form of political offence exception
in any of the terrorism-related conventions and protocols.35 However, some interpret the obligation
to extradite or prosecute “without exception whatsoever” found in the 1970 Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft as an implicit rejection of the political offence
exception. This interpretation is based in part on the disappearance of the limited political
offence exception which exists in the 1963 aircraft convention, which was negotiated under the
auspices of the same organization, ICAO. In part it is also based on the 1970 Unlawful Seizure
Convention reference to the obligation to decide upon prosecution in the same manner as any
“ordinary” offence of a serious nature.36 In legal writing the term “ordinary” crimes was often
used to distinguish murders and other crimes in which the motives and consequences resembled
normal criminality, because involving personal advantage or harm to innocent civilians, from
offences more directly related to political expression and considered more worthy of the political
offence exception. While the boundary between “ordinary” and “political” offences was
never clear or coherent, use of the term “ordinary” offence normally conveyed a contrast with a
“political” offence.
An important factor facilitating the rejection of the political offence exception in the 1997
Terrorist Bombing Convention and in subsequent universal terrorism-related instruments is the
expansion of superior safeguards for alleged offenders. The 1963 Convention required minimal
protection for a suspected hijacker. Custody of a suspect could be continued only “for such time
as is reasonably necessary to enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted.”
Article 13.3 granted a person in custody the right to be assisted in communicating immediately
with the nearest appropriate representative of the State of nationality. Article 15.2 also required
a State to accord a suspect disembarked in its territory treatment no less favorable for his
protection and security than that accorded to its own nationals.
Protections for suspected offenders have grown steadily during the decades since 1963, as
demonstrated by the relevant articles in the 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention. Article 7.3
ensures that any suspect regarding whom restrictive measures have been taken against shall be
entitled to:
(a) Communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate representative of the
State of which that person is a national or which is otherwise entitled to protect that person’s
rights or, if that persons is a stateless person, the State in the territory of which that
person habitually resides;
35Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963), Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970), Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(1971), Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents (1973), International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979), Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material (1979), Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation (1988), Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(1988), Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf
(1988), Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (1991), International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997), International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999),
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005), Amendment to the Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2005), Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (2005), Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf (2005).
36Article 7, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970:
The Contracting State in the territory which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged,
without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the
case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State.
International cooperation in criminal matters 43
(b) Be visited by a representative of that State;
(c) Be informed of that person’s rights under subparagraphs (a) and (b).
Article 14 is a so-called “fair treatment” article, elaborating the concept found in Article 15.2 of
the 1963 Convention, but with more precision regarding the international law component of
human rights guarantees:
Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any other measures are taken
or proceedings are carried out pursuant to this Convention shall be guaranteed fair
treatment, including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in conformity with the law
of the State in the territory of which that person is present and applicable provisions of
international law, including international law of human rights.37
Article 12 establishes the important principle of non-discrimination in the following language:
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite or
to afford mutual legal assistance, if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for
believing that the request for extradition for offences set forth in article 2 or for mutual
legal assistance with respect to such offences has been made for the purpose of
prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person’s race, religion, nationality,
ethnic origin or political opinion or that compliance with the request would cause
prejudice to that person’s position for any of these reasons.
The above non-discrimination article is found immediately following an article abolishing the
political offence exception not only in the 2005 Nuclear Bombings Convention, but in the 1997
Terrorist Bombings Convention, the 1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention and the 2005
Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation. These articles expressly declare that the offences established in those agreements:
... shall not be regarded, for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a
political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an offence
inspired by political motives.38
The political offence exception was always a difficult tool for legal analysis except in its simplest
application to non-violent expressions of political speech or activity. This was particularly
true of offences connected with a political offence, most typically consisting of violence utilized
to implement a political goal and of offences inspired by a political motive, which could
involve the most extreme forms of demonstrative violence. Various tests were developed to
judge whether the offence was a prohibited expression of an attempt to force change upon a
government or more analogous to an ordinary crime, but consistently satisfactory rules of appli-
37At a minimum, this body of law would includes obligations assumed under the ICCPR, the Convention against Torture,
the International Convention on the Status of Refugees and those guarantees recognized as part of jus gentium, the customary
law of nations existing independently of treaty law. Further information in this regard can be found in an Introduction to
International Law Aspects of Counter-Terrorism, available at www.unodc.org, on the Terrorism Prevention page under technical
assistance tools.
38All of these articles are similarly worded, except the 2005 Maritime Protocol, which adds gender to the list of impermissible
considerations.
44 Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism
cation were never achieved. Excusing attacks against innocent civilians inspired by political
motives increasingly came to be viewed as a protection for terrorists. These difficulties are
avoided by the rejection of the political offence exception for the offences defined by the 1997
Terrorist Bombings conventions and subsequent agreements. At the same time, the legitimate
interests of the accused offenders are protected by incorporation of a robust anti-discrimination
article that protects against any prejudice a person might suffer for political or other impermissible
reasons. If a person was being prosecuted or punished because of her political opinion or
if her position would suffer prejudice for that reason, the non-discrimination articles allow an
extradition or mutual assistance request to be refused, leaving the Requested State free to deal
with the person as dictated by its own national law and the available evidence.
F.—Concluding human rights considerations
In a Legislative Guide intended as a concise introduction to the universal legal regime against
terrorism, it is not possible to analyze each of the human rights protections that may become
relevant in a particular investigation, prosecution or international cooperation situation.
Readers are therefore encouraged to supplement their reading of this Guide with the detailed
examination of protections found in a companion UNODC publication. That work, an
Introduction to International Law Aspects Related to Counter-Terrorism, contains valuable
explanations of human rights considerations that could only be touched upon in this Guide.
Specific issues include the application of humanitarian law principles and the Geneva
Conventions to terrorism, asylum law and the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, the structure and functions of the United Nations human rights bodies,
and the extent and conditions of permissible derogation from the guarantees of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The interaction of these topics and the terrorism-related
conventions and protocols and Security Council resolutions are examined in the context of the
overall principles of international human rights and humanitarian law. Accordingly, readers
should be aware that this guide is only a partial introduction to the legal regime against terrorism
and should be supplemented by consulting other resources available at the UNODC website,
particularly the above-described Introduction and the Manual for International
Cooperation in Criminal Matters against Terrorism.
Annex
The Terrorism Prevention Branch has developed the following technical assistance tools to
assist countries in their work to combat terrorism:
• Legislative guide to universal anti-terrorism conventions and protocols
• Guide for the legislative incorporation of the provisions of the universal legal
instruments against terrorism
• Preventing terrorist acts: a criminal justice strategy integrating rule of law standards
in the implementation of United Nations anti-terrorism instruments
• Model legislative provisions against terrorism
• Model law on extradition (prepared jointly with the Treaty and Legal Assistance
Branch)
• Mutual legal assistance request writer tool (prepared by the Treaty and Legal
Assistance Branch)
• Electronic legal resources on international terrorism
• Comparative study on anti-terrorism legislative developments in seven Asian and
Pacific countries
These tools and publications are accessible on TPB’s website in all six official languages of the
United Nations (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/index.html); print copies are available
upon request from TPB. Further technical assistance tools and publications are currently
under preparation.
45

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Annex 286
Committee Against Torture, General Comment No. 2 (28 January 2008)

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􀀂􀀒􀀔􀀢􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀮
􀀆􀀊􀀉􀀧􀀄􀀋􀀘
􀀁􀀂􀀊􀀯􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀄􀀂􀀊􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀈􀀄􀀊􀀋􀀅􀀇􀀅􀀂􀀌􀀅􀀍􀀌􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀟􀀇􀀂􀀅􀀘􀀆􀀌􀀇􀀁􀀌􀀍􀀆􀀧􀀤􀀇􀀄􀀊􀀘􀀍􀀃􀀈􀀊􀀇􀀂􀀌􀀇􀀟􀀆􀀉􀀌􀀈􀀟􀀄􀀊􀀉
􀀅􀀌􀀆􀀈􀀅􀀃􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀇􀀂􀀌􀀇􀀦􀀍􀀊􀀄􀀋􀀘􀀃􀀆􀀊􀀅
􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀌􀀈􀀧􀀇􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀃􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀠􀀜􀀇􀀨
􀀄􀀥􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀨􀀇􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖
􀀲􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀛􀀛􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀖􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀒􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀨􀀤􀀇􀀏􀀙􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀔􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀏􀀖
􀀛􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀒􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀏􀀖􀀖􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀔􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀢􀀔􀀒􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀴􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀱􀀖􀀠􀀐􀀣􀀡􀀏
􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀝􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀢􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀜􀀇􀀋􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀛􀀠􀀰􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀢􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀅􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀙􀀱􀀖􀀠􀀐􀀣􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀚􀀵􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀠􀀢􀀙􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀝􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀝􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀕􀀏􀀰􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀥􀀙􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀒
􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀕􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀥􀀙􀀒􀀫􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀐􀀙􀀳􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀓􀀔􀀖􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀨􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀥􀀰􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀫􀀇􀀶􀀣􀀖
􀀕􀀠􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀒􀀥􀀇􀀙􀀢􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀡􀀣􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀴􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀣􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀠
􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀱􀀣􀀡􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀡􀀇􀀐􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖
􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀱􀀖􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀸􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀲􀀹􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀰􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀏􀀓􀀠􀀐􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀖􀀣􀀏􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛
􀀰􀀒􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀜
􀀨􀀜􀀇􀀈􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀨􀀤􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀢􀀒􀀙􀀰􀀝􀀇􀀲􀀤􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀏􀀙􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀙􀀺􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀝􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀢􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀒􀀠􀀣􀀢􀀝􀀇􀀐􀀏􀀢􀀔􀀖􀀐􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀛􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀒􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀶􀀣􀀛􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀤􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡
􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀤􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀠􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀙􀀺􀀏􀀚
􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀺􀀚􀀠􀀳􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀚􀀔􀀖􀀝􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀣􀀡􀀐􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚
􀀖􀀣􀀱􀀖􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀙􀀺􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀔􀀚􀀜
􀀉􀀆􀀜􀀬􀀭􀀵􀀩􀀬􀀨􀀹􀀨􀀸􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀨􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀵􀀒􀀙􀀚􀀢􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏 􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖
􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀕􀀒􀀣􀀏􀀐􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀝􀀣􀀥􀀙􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀢􀀒􀀙􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀚􀀔􀀖􀀝􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡
􀀻􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀑􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀼􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀽􀀾􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀲􀀹􀀤􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀢􀀒􀀙􀀰􀀝􀀇􀀲􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀖􀀔􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀛􀀏􀀰􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛
􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀒􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀓􀀏􀀒􀀐􀀙􀀰􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀢􀀏􀀐􀀫
􀀲􀀎􀀭
􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀢􀀒􀀣􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀜􀀇􀀈􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀲􀀹􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀑􀀫􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑
􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀤􀀇􀀏􀀥􀀰􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀔􀀿􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀼􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀣􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀽􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀣􀀡􀀐􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀲􀀬
􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀲􀀸􀀤􀀇􀀱􀀣􀀡􀀇􀀛􀀠􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀡􀀇􀀐􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀖
􀀏􀀞􀀰􀀐􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀤􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀙􀀥􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀰􀀏􀀚􀀖􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀲􀀩􀀜􀀇􀀄􀀚􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀛􀀏􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀝􀀠􀀐􀀛􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀡􀀳􀀏􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀡􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀡􀀇􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀙􀀒􀀜􀀇􀀆􀀞􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀔􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏
􀀛􀀏􀀥􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀒􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀢􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀑􀀒􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏
􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀰􀀰􀀐􀀔􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵
􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀇􀀈􀀕􀀕􀀠􀀒􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀐􀀫􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀝􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀱􀀏
􀀐􀀔􀀺􀀏􀀳􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀚􀀵􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀠􀀢􀀙􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀚􀀵
􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀠􀀢􀀙􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀜
􀀩􀀜􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀐􀀏􀀢􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀛􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀁀􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀙􀀺􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀠􀀖􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏
􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀛􀀣􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀣􀀒􀀒􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀜􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖
􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀠􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀣􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀺􀀏􀀏􀀰􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀔􀀏􀀳􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀐􀀙􀀳􀀖
􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀥􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀕􀀠􀀒􀀛􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀴􀀖􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀢
􀀠􀀱􀀖􀀏􀀒􀀓􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀏􀀳􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀛􀀠􀀰􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀣􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀣􀀚􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀜􀀇􀀄􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀛􀀠􀀰􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀱􀀫
􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀔􀀐􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀰􀀐􀀔􀀖􀀝􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀒􀀰􀀠􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀛􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚
􀀒􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀫􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀎􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀚􀀏􀀳􀀤􀀇􀀥􀀠􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀛􀀠􀀰􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀜
􀀧􀀔􀀺􀀏􀀳􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀴􀀖􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏
􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀣􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀏􀀓􀀠􀀐􀀣􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀐􀀫􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀛􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑
􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀜
􀀄􀀄􀀜􀀇􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀠􀀐􀀣􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀝􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚
􀁁􀀜􀀈􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀨􀀤􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀢􀀒􀀙􀀰􀀝􀀇􀀨􀀤􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀝􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀢􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀱􀀖􀀠􀀐􀀣􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀚􀀵
􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀠􀀢􀀙􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀜􀀇􀀄􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀥􀀰􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀔􀀿􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀕􀀏􀀰􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀕􀀔􀀒􀀕􀀣􀀥􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀖􀀠􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀥􀀙􀀫􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀓􀀠􀀺􀀏􀀛
􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀦􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀶􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀑􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀫􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀶􀀣􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀛􀀔􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏
􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀥􀀠􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀕􀀔􀀒􀀕􀀣􀀥􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀳􀀙􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀠􀀑􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀚􀀙􀀐
􀀰􀀠􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀱􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀒􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀫􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀒􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀒
􀀓􀀔􀀠􀀐􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀥􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀏􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀥􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀑􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀡􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀚􀀵􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀖
􀀛􀀏􀀏􀀰􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀒􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀶􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀱􀀖􀀠􀀐􀀣􀀡􀀏􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀶􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀑􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵
􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀡􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀖􀀙􀀑􀀏􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀓􀀏􀀒􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀒􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒
􀀖􀀔􀀡􀀣􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀜􀀇􀀋􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀐􀀫􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀶􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀔􀀠􀀣􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀒􀀙􀀛􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀶􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀳􀀠􀀣􀀐􀀛􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀠􀀐􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀔􀀖
􀀙􀀱􀀖􀀠􀀐􀀣􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀝􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀥􀀚􀀏􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀏􀀛􀀔􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀔􀀕􀀝
􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀳􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀚􀀏􀀖􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀥􀀰􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀖􀀏􀀕􀀣􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀚􀀔􀀖􀀝􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡
􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀰􀀏􀀡􀀒􀀙􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀠􀀐􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀔􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀚􀀵􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀠􀀢􀀙􀀱􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀜
􀀹􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀚􀀵􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀠􀀢􀀙􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏
􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀡􀀙􀀺􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀥􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀒􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀑􀀫􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀜􀀇􀀄􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀑􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀥􀀙􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀙􀀡􀀡􀀙􀀕􀀺􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀲􀀲􀀇􀀋􀀏􀀰􀀡􀀏􀀥􀀱􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀨􀀬􀀬􀀲􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀨
􀀻􀀳􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀼􀀚􀀠􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀕􀀏􀀰􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀕􀀔􀀒􀀕􀀣􀀥􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀖􀀠􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀒􀁂􀀥􀀙􀀫􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀓􀀠􀀺􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀶􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑
􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀽􀀾􀀤􀀇􀀲􀁁􀀇􀀻􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀝􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀑􀀏􀀖􀀖􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀙􀀛􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀏􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀕􀀏􀀰􀀡
􀀙􀀢􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀒􀀾􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀲􀀹􀀇􀀻􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀝􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀕􀀒􀀣􀀏􀀐􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀝􀀣􀀥􀀙􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀢􀀒􀀙􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀒
􀀰􀀣􀀚􀀔􀀖􀀝􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀾􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀒􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀓􀀔􀀖􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀼􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀖􀀏􀀒􀀓􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀕􀀔􀀒􀀕􀀣􀀥􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀽􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏
􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀸􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀲􀁁􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀐􀀔􀀺􀀏􀀳􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀰􀀰􀀐􀀔􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀱􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏
􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀠􀀢􀀚􀀔􀀿􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀥􀀙􀀫􀀇􀀕􀀝􀀠􀀠􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖
􀀡􀀝􀀒􀀠􀀣􀀢􀀝􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀔􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀫􀀇􀀑􀀣􀀐􀀑􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀖􀀠􀀇􀀐􀀠􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝
􀀨􀀎􀀭
􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀶􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀒􀀰􀀠􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀜
􀁃􀀜􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀠􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀰􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀼􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀫􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀶􀀣􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀛􀀔􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀽
􀀐􀀔􀀚􀀺􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀔􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀚􀀵􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀠􀀢􀀙􀀱􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛
􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀰􀀰􀀐􀀔􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀡􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀕􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀿􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀚􀀵􀀕􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀿􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀣􀀡􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀱􀀶􀀏􀀕􀀡
􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀇􀀶􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀠􀀒􀀛􀀏􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀒􀀠􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀫􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀥􀀰􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀔􀀿􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀴􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀠􀀇􀀙􀀰􀀰􀀐􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀠􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀤􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀇􀀶􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀠􀀤
􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀚􀀙􀀥􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀶􀀣􀀚􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀤􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀝􀀏􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀫􀀜􀀇􀀄􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀥􀀙􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀑
􀀣􀀒􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀙􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀖􀀝􀀠􀀣􀀐􀀛􀀇􀀕􀀐􀀠􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀥􀀠􀀚􀀔􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀖
􀀱􀀏􀀝􀀙􀀐􀀑􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀖􀀝􀀠􀀣􀀐􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀑􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀰􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵
􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀵􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀒􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀥􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀥􀀠􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖
􀀡􀀙􀀺􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀚􀀔􀀖􀀝􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀑􀀣􀀒􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀑􀀣􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝
􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀣􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀐􀀏􀀢􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀰􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀱􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀰􀀏􀀡􀀒􀀙􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚
􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀝􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀤􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀏􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀷􀀣􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀕􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀜
􀀄􀀄􀀄􀀜􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀙􀀺􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏
􀀭􀀜􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀥􀀙􀀺􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀚􀀔􀀖􀀝􀀙􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀖
􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀐􀀙􀀳􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀕􀀠􀀒􀀛􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀥􀀣􀀥􀀤􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏
􀀲􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀩􀀜
􀁄􀀜􀀋􀀏􀀒􀀔􀀠􀀣􀀖􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀒􀀏􀀰􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀡􀀳􀀏􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀴􀀖􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀠􀀒􀀰􀀠􀀒􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀠
􀀛􀀠􀀥􀀏􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀐􀀙􀀳􀀇􀀕􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀣􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀰􀀠􀀡􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀐􀀠􀀠􀀰􀀝􀀠􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀣􀀚􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀜􀀇􀀄􀀚􀀇􀀖􀀠􀀥􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀙􀀖􀀏􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀣􀀢􀀝
􀀖􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀇􀀐􀀙􀀚􀀢􀀣􀀙􀀢􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀙􀀫􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀣􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀚􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀥􀀙􀀫􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀷􀀣􀀙􀀐􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀛􀀠􀀥􀀏􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀐􀀙􀀳􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀶􀀣􀀛􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐
􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀣􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀇􀀣􀀰􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀏􀀙􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑
􀀔􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀉􀀠􀀓􀀏􀀒􀀚􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀛􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀖􀀏􀀡􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀒􀀰􀀠􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑
􀀛􀀏􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀜􀀇􀀈􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀙􀀥􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀔􀀥􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀠􀀢􀀚􀀔􀀿􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡
􀀱􀀒􀀠􀀙􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀛􀀠􀀥􀀏􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀠􀀇􀀙􀀛􀀓􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀶􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀒􀀰􀀠􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀖􀀠
􀀐􀀠􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀫􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀰􀀰􀀐􀀔􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀕􀀠􀀒􀀛􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀙􀀒􀀛􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀡
􀀙􀀇􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀥􀀣􀀥􀀜􀀇􀀄􀀚􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀣􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀥􀀰􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀔􀀿􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀒􀀰􀀠􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚
􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀲􀀇􀀛􀀠􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀓􀀠􀀐􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀱􀀶􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀷􀀣􀀔􀀒􀀫􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀠􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀰􀀏􀀡􀀒􀀙􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀱􀀣􀀡
􀀒􀀙􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀶􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀔􀀒􀀕􀀣􀀥􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀜􀀇􀀄􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀏􀀖􀀖􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀡􀀠
􀀔􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀏􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀖􀀝􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀰􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀝􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀏􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀙􀀖
􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀰􀀏􀀡􀀒􀀙􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀻􀀖􀀾􀀜
􀀲􀀬􀀜􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀠􀀢􀀚􀀔􀀿􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀥􀀠􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀑􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀏􀀒􀀡􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀛􀀣􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀖
􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀛􀀏􀀖􀀜􀀇􀀄􀀚􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀥􀀙􀀫􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀖􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀒􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀛􀀠􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀡􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀥􀀔􀀖􀀖􀀔􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀒􀀰􀀠􀀖􀀏􀀖􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏
􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀥􀀰􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀔􀀿􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀇􀀳􀀠􀀣􀀐􀀛􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀠􀀐􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀖􀀏􀀕􀀣􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀛􀀣􀀕􀀡
􀀖􀀠􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀜
􀀲􀀲􀀜􀁅􀀫􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀑􀀒􀀠􀀥􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀖􀀙􀀣􀀐􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀥􀀏􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀛􀀓􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀴􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀓􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀒􀀕􀀝􀀔􀀚􀀢
􀀙􀀔􀀥􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀇􀀊􀀙􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀥􀀏􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀥􀀠􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀴􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀔􀀥􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀔􀀙􀀤􀀇􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀏􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀒􀀫􀀠􀀚􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀰􀀏􀀡􀀒􀀙􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀥􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀰􀀣􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀢􀀒􀀙􀀓􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀥􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀜􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀛􀀔􀀑􀀫􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀥􀀏􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀠􀀇􀀻􀀙􀀾
􀀏􀀥􀀰􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀔􀀿􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀚􀀏􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀰􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀚􀀔􀀖􀀝􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀙􀀺􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀕􀀠􀀣􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀢􀀒􀀙􀀓􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀻􀀱􀀾􀀇􀀖􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀚􀀢􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀒􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀝􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀤􀀇􀀻􀀕􀀾􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀝􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀱􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀑
􀀸􀀎􀀭
􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀰􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀒􀀙􀀕􀀺􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀥􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀻􀀛􀀾􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀙􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀏􀀥􀀰􀀠􀀳􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀰􀀣􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀥􀀠􀀚􀀔􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀤􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀛􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀕􀀝􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀏􀀚􀀢􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀏􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚
􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀠􀀐􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀜
􀀲􀀨􀀜􀀅􀀝􀀒􀀠􀀣􀀢􀀝􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀔􀀏􀀳􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀕􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀖􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀰􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀑􀀒􀀠􀀥􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀙􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀣􀀙􀀐
􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀣􀀚􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀥􀀠􀀚􀀔􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀠􀀰􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀢
􀀠􀀱􀀖􀀏􀀒􀀓􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀣􀀐􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀡􀀣􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀝􀀔􀀢􀀝􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀝􀀡􀀖
􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀔􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀳􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀏􀀡􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀜􀀇􀀄􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀥􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀱􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀔􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀙􀀰􀀰􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀨
􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀠􀀰􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀱􀀣􀀔􀀐􀀛􀀇􀀣􀀰􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀖
􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀖􀀔􀀢􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀝􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀙􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀫􀀴􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀱􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀖􀀳􀀔􀀑􀀡􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛
􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀚􀀏􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀖􀀙􀀒􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀰􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛
􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀖􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀱􀀒􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀐􀀙􀀳􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀑􀀣􀀐􀀐
􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀰􀀐􀀔􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀜
􀀲􀀸􀀜􀀁􀀏􀀒􀀡􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀱􀀙􀀖􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀢􀀣􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀰􀀰􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀐􀀔􀀱􀀏􀀒􀀡􀀫􀀜􀀇􀀋􀀠􀀥􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀖􀀏
􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀕􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀇􀀣􀀰􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖
􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀣􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀥􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀴􀀖􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀒􀀚􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀔􀀥􀀇􀀡􀀠
􀀕􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀔􀀑􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀣􀀒􀀒􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀱􀀙􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀝􀀙􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀜􀀇􀀋􀀣􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀢􀀣􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀔􀀙􀀤
􀀥􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀢􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀡􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀏􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀔􀀢􀀝􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀡􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀥􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀔􀀒
􀀒􀀔􀀢􀀝􀀡􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀔􀀢􀀝􀀡􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀥􀀰􀀡􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀏􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀰􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀐􀀏􀀢􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀖􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀰􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀛􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀐
􀀙􀀖􀀖􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀐􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀚􀀏􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀏􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀖􀀝􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀕􀀝􀀙􀀚􀀔􀀖􀀥􀀖􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒
􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀖􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀰􀀐􀀙􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀡􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀓􀀙􀀔􀀐􀀙􀀱􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀠
􀀛􀀏􀀡􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀺􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀶􀀣􀀛􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀛􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡
􀀳􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀠􀀳􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀥􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀰􀀐􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀥􀀰􀀡􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀙􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀔􀀒
􀀒􀀔􀀢􀀝􀀡􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀕􀀝􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀏􀀚􀀢􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀐􀀏􀀢􀀙􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀡􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀜
􀀲􀀩􀀜􀀆􀀞􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀔􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀕􀀙􀀥􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀝􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀴􀀖
􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀕􀀠􀀰􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀝􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀢􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀥􀀏􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀛􀀠􀀐􀀠􀀢􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀞􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀔􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀕􀀕􀀣􀀒􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀏􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀙􀀖
􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀏􀀓􀀠􀀐􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀞􀀡􀀖􀀜􀀇􀀗􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀙􀀥􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀏􀀥􀀰􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀔􀀿􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀖􀀙􀀥􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀏􀀞􀀇􀀢􀀣􀀙􀀒􀀛􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀕􀀫􀀇􀀔􀀖
􀀔􀀚􀀓􀀠􀀐􀀓􀀏􀀛􀀜􀀇􀀈􀀖􀀇􀀚􀀏􀀳􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀛􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀻􀀏􀀜􀀢􀀜􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀠􀀡􀀙􀀰􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀒􀀠􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀣􀀡􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀿􀀔􀀚􀀢
􀀔􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀕􀀏􀀛􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀱􀀣􀀐􀀇􀀦􀀒􀀠􀀡􀀠􀀕􀀠􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀲􀁄􀁄􀁄􀀤􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀚􀀏􀀳􀀇􀀙􀀰􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀙􀀕􀀝􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠
􀀰􀀣􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀏􀀛􀀣􀀕􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀡􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀠􀀒􀀖􀀾􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀠􀀓􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀛􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀤
􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀨􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀣􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀱􀀣􀀔􀀐􀀛􀀇􀀣􀀰􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀥􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀰􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀕􀀠􀀰􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑
􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀜
􀀄􀀯􀀜􀀇􀀋􀀕􀀠􀀰􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀰􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫
􀀲􀁁􀀜􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀠􀀖􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀣􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀜􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖
􀀱􀀏􀀙􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀰􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀥􀀔􀀖􀀖􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀤
􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀙􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀒􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀕􀀙􀀰􀀙􀀕􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀠􀀚
􀀱􀀏􀀝􀀙􀀐􀀑􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀶􀀣􀀚􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀒􀀠􀀐􀀤􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀳􀀔􀀖􀀏
􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀐􀀠􀀣􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀐􀀙􀀳􀀜􀀈􀀕􀀕􀀠􀀒􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀐􀀫􀀤􀀇􀀏􀀙􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀖􀀝􀀠􀀣􀀐􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀝􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀡􀀤􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀛􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀖
􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀞􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀕􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀛􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀒􀀠􀀐􀀤􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀙􀀥􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀤
􀀝􀀠􀀖􀀰􀀔􀀡􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀖􀀕􀀝􀀠􀀠􀀐􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀡􀀣􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀢􀀙􀀢􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀕􀀝􀀔􀀐􀀛􀀒􀀏􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀢􀀏􀀛􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐
􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀖􀀙􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀛􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀥􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀙􀀒􀀫􀀇􀀖􀀏􀀒􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀡􀀣􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀏􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀞􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀔􀀐􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑
􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀠􀀣􀀒􀀙􀀢􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀝􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀙􀀚􀀢􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀒􀀥􀀜􀀅􀀝􀀏
􀀩􀀎􀀭
􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀛􀀠􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀡􀀤􀀇􀀝􀀠􀀳􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀒􀀤􀀇􀀐􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀰􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀒
􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀣􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀇􀀕􀀙􀀚􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀣􀀒􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀰􀀏􀀡􀀒􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀕􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀥􀀙􀀒􀀫
􀀐􀀙􀀳􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀜
􀀲􀀹􀀜􀀈􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀨􀀤􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀢􀀒􀀙􀀰􀀝􀀇􀀲􀀤􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀙􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀖􀀝􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀡􀀙􀀺􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠
􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀚􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀖􀀠􀀓􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀔􀀢􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀫􀀇􀀱􀀣􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀠􀀇􀀼􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀫􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀖
􀀶􀀣􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀛􀀔􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀜􀀽􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀠􀀢􀀚􀀔􀀿􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀼􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀫􀀽􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀏􀀒􀀕􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀐􀀫􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀠􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀤􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀇􀀶􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏
􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀒􀀠􀀐􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀕􀀠􀀒􀀛􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀐􀀙􀀳􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀼􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀫􀀽􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀨􀀤􀀇􀀐􀀔􀀺􀀏
􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀇􀁁􀀤􀀇􀀲􀀲􀀤􀀇􀀲􀀨􀀤􀀇􀀲􀀸􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀲􀀹􀀤􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀝􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀚􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀱􀀠􀀙􀀒􀀛􀀇􀀙
􀀖􀀝􀀔􀀰􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀔􀀒􀀕􀀒􀀙􀀑􀀡􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀢􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀫􀀤􀀇􀀱􀀣􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀠􀀇􀀛􀀣􀀒􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀥􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀙􀀒􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀕􀀕􀀣􀀰􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀒
􀀰􀀏􀀙􀀕􀀏􀀺􀀏􀀏􀀰􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀠􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀰􀀐􀀙􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀏􀀥􀀱􀀙􀀖􀀖􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀥􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀙􀀒􀀫􀀇􀀱􀀙􀀖􀀏􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀡􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚
􀀑􀀙􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀓􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀔􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀏􀀒􀀕􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀣􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀒􀀠􀀐􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏
􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀁁􀀤􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀢􀀒􀀙􀀰􀀝􀀇􀀲􀀇􀀻􀀱􀀾􀀤􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀔􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀖
􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀙􀀺􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀏􀀒􀀕􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀶􀀣􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀛􀀔􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀼􀀳􀀝􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀏􀀢􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀖
􀀙􀀇􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀜􀀽􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀕􀀠􀀰􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀼􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀫􀀽􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏
􀀨􀀇􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀠􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀔􀀡􀀣􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀏􀀒􀀕􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀐􀀫􀀤􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀠
􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀇􀀶􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀒􀀠􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀓􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀡􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀜
􀀲􀁃􀀜􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀖􀀏􀀒􀀓􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀙􀀛􀀠􀀰􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖
􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀙􀀣􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀕􀀙􀀰􀀙􀀕􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀑􀀒􀀠􀀥􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀐􀀫
􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀤􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀠􀀣􀀒􀀙􀀢􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀷􀀣􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀕􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀳􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀰􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀠􀀒
􀀱􀀏􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀰􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀣􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀖􀀝􀀠􀀣􀀐􀀛
􀀙􀀛􀀠􀀰􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀙􀀣􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀕􀀙􀀰􀀙􀀕􀀔􀀡􀀫
􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀐􀀠􀀣􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀐􀀙􀀳􀀤􀀇􀀑􀀒􀀠􀀥􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀷􀀣􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀕􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀜􀀅􀀝􀀏
􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀠􀀐􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀫
􀀑􀀙􀀔􀀐􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀑􀀣􀀐􀀑􀀔􀀐􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀜􀀇􀀗􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀙􀀥􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀡􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀕􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀳􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀒
􀀒􀀣􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀚􀀏􀀐􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀕􀀙􀀰􀀙􀀕􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀕􀀠􀀣􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀑
􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀰􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀒􀀫􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀠􀀣􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀑􀀣􀀚􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀣􀀡􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀠􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑
􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀥􀀠􀀚􀀔􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀙􀀺􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀜
􀀲􀀭􀀜􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀥􀀙􀀛􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀙􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀣􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐
􀀕􀀙􀀰􀀙􀀕􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀐􀀠􀀣􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀐􀀙􀀳􀀤􀀇􀀺􀀚􀀠􀀳􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀢􀀒􀀠􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀐􀀔􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑
􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀚􀀵􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀫
􀀑􀀙􀀔􀀐􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀏􀀒􀀕􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀣􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀖􀀏􀀕􀀣􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀚􀀔􀀖􀀝􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀚􀀵􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏
􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀙􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀰􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫
􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀇􀀖􀀝􀀠􀀣􀀐􀀛􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀣􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀒􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀰􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀳􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀰􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒
􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀷􀀣􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀕􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀥􀀔􀀖􀀖􀀔􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀖􀀜􀀇􀀋􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀑􀀙􀀔􀀐􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀏􀀒􀀕􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀣􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀰􀀤􀀇􀀖􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀏
􀀒􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀛􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀥􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀕􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀙􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀚􀀵􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀖
􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀥􀀔􀀖􀀖􀀔􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀣􀀚􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀴􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚
􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀥􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀠􀀣􀀒􀀙􀀢􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀎􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀠􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀥􀀔􀀖􀀖􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀰􀀰􀀐􀀔􀀏􀀛
􀀡􀀝􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀔􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀴􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀔􀀐􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀡􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀥􀀖􀀇􀀑􀀒􀀠􀀥􀀇􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀵􀀱􀀙􀀖􀀏􀀛
􀀓􀀔􀀠􀀐􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀒􀀙􀀰􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀛􀀠􀀥􀀏􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀠􀀐􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀑􀀏􀀥􀀙􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀔􀀡􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀥􀀣􀀡􀀔􀀐􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀒􀀙􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀺􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀜
􀀲􀁄􀀜􀀈􀀛􀀛􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀫􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀑􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀒􀀙􀀚􀀖􀀑􀀏􀀒􀀒􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀖􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀛􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀒􀀠􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀙􀀚
􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀣􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀡􀀣􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀺􀀚􀀠􀀳􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀢􀀙􀀢􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀤􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀡
􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀛􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀙􀀑􀀏􀀢􀀣􀀙􀀒􀀛􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀰􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀱􀀶􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠
􀁁􀀎􀀭
􀀰􀀣􀀚􀀔􀀖􀀝􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀤􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀰􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀒􀀙􀀚􀀖􀀑􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀒􀀙􀀒􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀴􀀖
􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀙􀀺􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀕􀀠􀀒􀀛􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀨􀀤
􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀢􀀒􀀙􀀰􀀝􀀇􀀲􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀒􀀚􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀖􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀖
􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀰􀀐􀀙􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀣􀀡􀀇􀀛􀀣􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀐􀀙􀀳􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀨􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀸􀀜
􀀯􀀜􀀇􀀦􀀒􀀠􀀡􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀣􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀢􀀒􀀠􀀣􀀰􀀖􀀇􀀥􀀙􀀛􀀏􀀇􀀓􀀣􀀐􀀚􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀒
􀀥􀀙􀀒􀀢􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀔􀀿􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚
􀀨􀀬􀀜􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀔􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀚􀀵􀀛􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀱􀀙􀀖􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀔􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀡􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑
􀀝􀀣􀀥􀀙􀀚􀀇􀀒􀀔􀀢􀀝􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀑􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀙􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀰􀀰􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀜􀀇􀀊􀀠􀀚􀀵
􀀛􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀑􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀲􀀤􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀢􀀒􀀙􀀰􀀝􀀇􀀲􀀤􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀔􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀰􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀡􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀝􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀒􀀔􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀣􀀡􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀼􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀱􀀙􀀖􀀏􀀛
􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀺􀀔􀀚􀀛􀁂􀀽􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀥􀀰􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀔􀀿􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀫􀀇􀀣􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑
􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀰􀀝􀀫􀀖􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀠􀀐􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀱􀀣􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀏􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡
􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀡􀀣􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀜
􀀨􀀲􀀜􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀡􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀕􀀏􀀒􀀡􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀥􀀙􀀒􀀢􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀔􀀿􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀣􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀰􀀠􀀰􀀣􀀐􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀏􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀡
􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀺􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖
􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀠􀀑􀀙􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏
􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀒􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀤􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀐􀀙􀀳􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀰􀀰􀀐􀀔􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀢􀀙􀀒􀀛􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀒􀀙􀀕􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀐􀀠􀀣􀀒􀀤
􀀏􀀡􀀝􀀚􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀢􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀔􀀠􀀣􀀖􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀐􀀔􀀏􀀑􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀰􀀠􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀰􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀖􀀠􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀢􀀔􀀚􀀤
􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀤􀀇􀀖􀀏􀀞􀀣􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀒􀀙􀀚􀀖􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀤􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀖􀀙􀀱􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀤􀀇􀀝􀀏􀀙􀀐􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀣􀀖􀀤
􀀏􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀠􀀥􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀠􀀣􀀖􀀇􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀣􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀔􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀡􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀖
􀀙􀀕􀀕􀀣􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀰􀀠􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀒􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀫􀀐􀀣􀀥􀀵􀀖􀀏􀀏􀀺􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀑􀀣􀀢􀀏􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒
􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀡􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀣􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀜􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀖􀀝􀀠􀀣􀀐􀀛􀀤
􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀡􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀥􀀱􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀢􀀒􀀠􀀣􀀰􀀖􀀇􀀏􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀺􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀛􀀤
􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀑􀀣􀀐􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀖􀀏􀀕􀀣􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀚􀀔􀀖􀀝􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀠􀀐􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀱􀀣􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀢􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀣􀀙􀀐􀀖
􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀰􀀠􀀖􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀡􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤
􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀱􀀣􀀡􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀡􀀇􀀐􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀣􀀡􀀐􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀱􀀠􀀓􀀏􀀜
􀀨􀀨􀀜􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀰􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀑􀀒􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀐􀀙􀀕􀀺􀀇􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀥􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑
􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀳􀀠􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀥􀀰􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀔􀀿􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀺􀀏􀀫
􀀑􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀜􀀇􀁅􀀏􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀑􀀏􀀥􀀙􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀑􀀫􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀕􀀝􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀣􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀠􀀚
􀀖􀀣􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀒􀀙􀀕􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀤􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀖􀀏􀀞􀀣􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀢􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀢􀀒􀀙􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀣􀀖􀀇􀀏􀀡􀀕􀀜􀀇􀀡􀀠
􀀛􀀏􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀳􀀙􀀫􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀳􀀠􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀢􀀔􀀒􀀐􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀱􀀶􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀺􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡
􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀠􀀑􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀞􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀔􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀑􀀏􀀥􀀙􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀺􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀏
􀀛􀀏􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀐􀀔􀀱􀀏􀀒􀀡􀀫􀀤􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀛􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀤􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀣􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀓􀀠􀀐􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀛􀀣􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀕􀀔􀀖􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛
􀀓􀀔􀀠􀀐􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀣􀀚􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀝􀀠􀀥􀀏􀀖􀀜􀀇􀀃􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀠􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀱􀀶􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀕􀀏􀀒􀀡􀀙􀀔􀀚
􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀠􀀐􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀒􀀙􀀰􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀖􀀏􀀞􀀣􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀠􀀐􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀱􀀣􀀖􀀏􀀜􀀇􀁅􀀠􀀡􀀝
􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀳􀀠􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀱􀀠􀀫􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀢􀀔􀀒􀀐􀀖􀀇􀀥􀀙􀀫􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀱􀀶􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀠􀀐􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀱􀀙􀀖􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀣􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀕􀀏􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀚􀀵􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀇􀀖􀀠􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀒􀀠􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀜
􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀏􀀖􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀑􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀔􀀡􀀣􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀙􀀺􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀚􀀔􀀖􀀝
􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀥􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀰􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀖􀀜
􀀨􀀸􀀜􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀣􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀏􀀓􀀙􀀐􀀣􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀕􀀒􀀣􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀰􀀠􀀚􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏
􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀙􀀡􀀙􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀖􀀙􀀢􀀢􀀒􀀏􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀛
􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀢􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀺􀀏􀀫􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀰􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀙􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀙􀀛􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀐􀀫
􀀏􀀓􀀙􀀐􀀣􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀜􀀇􀀟􀀔􀀖􀀙􀀢􀀢􀀒􀀏􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀛􀀙􀀡􀀙􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖
􀀹􀀎􀀭
􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀑􀀫􀀤􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀙􀀺􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀡􀀏􀀰􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀛􀀫􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀫
􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀥􀀙􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀳􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀢􀀠􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀚􀀠􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀙􀀛􀀛􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀜􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀏􀀖􀀡􀀏􀀛
􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀖􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀱􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀠􀀖􀀖􀀔􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒
􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀏􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀣􀀐􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀔􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡
􀀙􀀢􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀓􀀙􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀖􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀠􀀰􀀣􀀐􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀥􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀤
􀀕􀀝􀀔􀀐􀀛􀀒􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀳􀀠􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀙􀀺􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀕􀀠􀀣􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀣􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀥􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏
􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀥􀀙􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀙􀀺􀀏􀀜
􀀨􀀩􀀜􀀆􀀐􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀏􀀥􀀰􀀐􀀠􀀫􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀛􀀣􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀠􀀚􀀢􀀠􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀖􀀏􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀿􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀒􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀔􀀚
􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀞􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀐􀀔􀀺􀀏􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀠􀀇􀀺􀀏􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢
􀀖􀀣􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀠􀀐􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀱􀀣􀀔􀀐􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀕􀀣􀀐􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀳􀀠􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀜􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀏
􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀠􀀣􀀒􀀙􀀢􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀥􀀠􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀝􀀔􀀒􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀐􀀠􀀚􀀢􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀢􀀒􀀠􀀣􀀰􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀳􀀠􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀤
􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀣􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀛􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀐􀀤􀀇􀀏􀀛􀀣􀀕􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀤􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀎􀀛􀀏􀀡􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀐􀀙􀀳􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀕􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀤􀀇􀀶􀀣􀀛􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛
􀀐􀀏􀀢􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀑􀀔􀀏􀀐􀀛􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀡􀀣􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀏􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀜􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀖􀀝􀀠􀀣􀀐􀀛
􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀰􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀥􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀢􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀖􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀙􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀛􀀔􀀖􀀙􀀢􀀢􀀒􀀏􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀱􀀫
􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀤􀀇􀀒􀀙􀀕􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀢􀀔􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀓􀀙􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀣􀀖􀀜
􀀯􀀄􀀜􀀇􀀂􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀷􀀣􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚
􀀨􀁁􀀜􀀈􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀸􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀲􀁁􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀡􀀣􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀏􀀖􀀖􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀤􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀣􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀕􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀛􀀫
􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀡􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀥􀀰􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀔􀀿􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀙􀀺􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏
􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀒􀀙􀀚􀀖􀀕􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀏􀀥􀀖􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀣􀀥􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀥􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀖
􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀇􀀗􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀙􀀥􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀰􀀠􀀰􀀣􀀐􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀱􀀏
􀀏􀀛􀀣􀀕􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀝􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀫􀀤􀀇􀀖􀀕􀀠􀀰􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀚􀀏􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀖􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀚􀀵􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀠􀀢􀀙􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀝􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏
􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀏􀀐􀀐􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀐􀀙􀀳􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀕􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀚􀀏􀀐􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀏􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀛􀀣􀀕􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀚
􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀠􀀢􀀚􀀔􀀿􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀇􀀋􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀐􀀙􀀒􀀐􀀫􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀝􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀐􀀠􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀏􀀞􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀔􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏
􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀔􀀏􀀳􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀖􀀏􀀖􀀖􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀰􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀖􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵
􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀺􀀚􀀠􀀳􀀐􀀏􀀛􀀢􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀙􀀛􀀙􀀰􀀡􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀰􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀑
􀀥􀀠􀀚􀀔􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀖􀀔􀀡􀀣􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀠􀀐􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀖
􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀐􀀫􀀜􀀇􀀋􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀖􀀝􀀠􀀣􀀐􀀛􀀇􀀖􀀰􀀏􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀰􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏
􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀡􀀙􀀔􀀐􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀥􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀔􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀤
􀀛􀀔􀀖􀀙􀀢􀀢􀀒􀀏􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀓􀀙􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀡􀀣􀀖􀀜
􀀯􀀄􀀄􀀜􀀇􀀋􀀣􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀔􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀖
􀀨􀀹􀀜􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀚􀀵􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀠􀀢􀀙􀀱􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀝􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀕􀀠􀀒􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀐􀀠􀀚􀀢􀀵􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀢
􀀰􀀒􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀔􀀰􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀥􀀱􀀠􀀛􀀔􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀨􀀤􀀇􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀢􀀒􀀙􀀰􀀝􀀇􀀸􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀔􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀙􀀣􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀫
􀀕􀀙􀀚􀀇􀀚􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀓􀀠􀀺􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀶􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀣􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀱􀀠􀀒􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀥􀀙􀀫􀀇􀀚􀀠􀀡􀀇􀀖􀀏􀀏􀀺􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀑􀀣􀀢􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚
􀀖􀀣􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀔􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀣􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀖􀀝􀀠􀀣􀀐􀀛􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀝􀀏􀀐􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀕􀀠􀀣􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀣􀀙􀀐􀀐􀀫􀀜􀀇􀀈􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀙􀀥􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀔􀀥􀀏􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀖􀀏
􀀏􀀞􀀏􀀒􀀕􀀔􀀖􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀔􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀣􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀵􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀰􀀣􀀱􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀇􀀵􀀇􀀕􀀙􀀚􀀚􀀠􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀓􀀠􀀔􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀕􀀠􀀣􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀱􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀒
􀀏􀀖􀀕􀀙􀀰􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀰􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀱􀀠􀀒􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏
􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀫􀀇􀀺􀀚􀀏􀀳􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀖􀀝􀀠􀀣􀀐􀀛􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀺􀀚􀀠􀀳􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀕􀀝􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀥􀀔􀀖􀀖􀀔􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀛􀀣􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀳􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀕􀀕􀀣􀀒􀀒􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀤􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀳􀀙􀀖
􀀐􀀔􀀺􀀏􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀠􀀕􀀕􀀣􀀒􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀫􀀇􀀑􀀙􀀔􀀐􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀡􀀙􀀺􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀱􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀚􀀏􀀕􀀏􀀖􀀖􀀙􀀒􀀫􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀇􀀥􀀏􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀜􀀇􀀅􀀝􀀏
􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀔􀀡􀀇􀀏􀀖􀀖􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀰􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀱􀀔􀀐􀀔􀀡􀀫􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀔􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀤􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀏􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒
􀀛􀀔􀀒􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀠􀀣􀀒􀀙􀀢􀀏􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀑􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀙􀀕􀀷􀀣􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀕􀀏􀀚􀀕􀀏
􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀔􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀑􀀣􀀐􀀐􀀫􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀒􀀠􀀣􀀢􀀝􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀰􀀏􀀡􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀰􀀏􀀚􀀛􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀥􀀰􀀙􀀒􀀡􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀖􀀏􀀕􀀣􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀙􀀐
􀁃􀀎􀀭
􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀇􀀶􀀣􀀛􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀙􀀣􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀔􀀏􀀖􀀜􀀇􀀦􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀠􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀖􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀫􀀇􀀓􀀔􀀏􀀳􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀣􀀚􀀐􀀙􀀳􀀑􀀣􀀐􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀳􀀝􀀠
􀀕􀀠􀀠􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀖􀀡􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀒􀀡􀀣􀀒􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀐􀀐􀀵􀀡􀀒􀀏􀀙􀀡􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀤􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀐􀀣􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀱􀀫􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀰􀀏􀀒􀀔􀀠􀀒􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀤
􀀖􀀝􀀠􀀣􀀐􀀛􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀡􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀙􀀢􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀡􀀙􀀐􀀔􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀺􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀜
􀀨􀁃􀀜􀀅􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀔􀀡􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀒􀀏􀀔􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀔􀀖􀀇􀀢􀀏􀀚􀀏􀀒􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀝􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀱􀀏􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀒􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀳􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀣􀀡
􀀰􀀒􀀏􀀶􀀣􀀛􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀇􀀡􀀠􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀝􀀔􀀢􀀝􀀏􀀒􀀇􀀛􀀏􀀢􀀒􀀏􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀰􀀒􀀠􀀡􀀏􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀛􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀇􀀙􀀚􀀫􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀒􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀒􀀣􀀥􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀇􀀠􀀒
􀀚􀀙􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀙􀀐􀀇􀀐􀀙􀀳􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀐􀀠􀀚􀀢􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀫􀀇􀀕􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀔􀀚􀀤􀀇􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀙􀀇􀀥􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀥􀀣􀀥􀀤􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀙􀀒􀀛􀀖􀀇􀀠􀀑􀀇􀀡􀀝􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀓􀀏􀀚􀀡􀀔􀀠􀀚􀀜
􀀵􀀵􀀵􀀵􀀵
􀀭􀀎􀀭
Annex 287
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, with
Commentaries (2011)

Draft articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties,
with commentaries
2011
Adopted by the International Law Commission at its sixty-third session, in 2011, and
submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the
work of that session (A/66/10). The report, which also contains commentaries to the draft
vol. II, Part Two.
Copyright © United Nations
2011
articles (para. 101), appears in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011,
􀀈􀀇􀀎􀀁 􀀝􀀧􀀲􀀱􀀴􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀗􀀰􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀰􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀘􀀣􀀹􀀁􀀒􀀱􀀯􀀯􀀫􀀵􀀵􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀴􀀭􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀫􀀶􀀵􀀁􀀵􀀫􀀺􀀶􀀻􀀅􀀶􀀪􀀫􀀴􀀦􀀁􀀵􀀧􀀵􀀵􀀫􀀱􀀰
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀃 􀀲􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀀁
􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜
􀀟􀀪􀀧􀀁 􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀯􀀫􀀰􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀨􀀁 􀀱􀀴􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁 􀀹􀀫􀀶􀀪􀀦􀀴􀀣􀀹􀀣􀀮􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀯􀀁 􀀣􀀁 􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀻􀀄􀀁 􀀱􀀴􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁
􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃
􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁏􀂿􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀀅
􀀩􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀧􀀯􀀤􀀱􀀦􀀫􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀪􀀫􀀥􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀷􀀮􀀦􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀵􀀷􀀤􀀬􀀧􀀥􀀶􀀁􀀷􀀰􀀦􀀧􀀴􀀁
􀀫􀀰􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀰􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀹􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀦􀀧􀀲􀀧􀀰􀀦􀀧􀀰􀀶􀀮􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀣􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀻􀀆
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖
􀀟􀀧􀀴􀀯􀀫􀀰􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀀹􀀫􀀶􀀪􀀦􀀴􀀣􀀹􀀣􀀮􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀯􀀁 􀀱􀀴􀀁 􀀵􀀷􀀵􀀲􀀧􀀰􀀵􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀨􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁 􀀱􀀲􀀧􀀴􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀴􀀹􀀫􀀵􀀧􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀫􀀦􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀲􀀣􀀴􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀴􀀹􀀫􀀵􀀧􀀁􀀣􀀩􀀴􀀧􀀧􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀣􀀭􀀧􀀁􀀧􀀨􀀨􀀧􀀥􀀶􀀁
􀀹􀀫􀀶􀀪􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀵􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀹􀀪􀀱􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀧􀀺􀀥􀀧􀀲􀀶􀀁􀀹􀀪􀀧􀀴􀀧􀀏
􀀂􀀂􀀃􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁 􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀻􀀁 􀀥􀀱􀀰􀀶􀀣􀀫􀀰􀀵􀀁 􀀥􀀮􀀣􀀷􀀵􀀧􀀵􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀣􀀶􀀁 􀀣􀀴􀀧􀀁 􀀵􀀧􀀲􀀣􀀴􀀣􀀤􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀯􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁
􀀴􀀧􀀯􀀣􀀫􀀰􀀦􀀧􀀴􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀹􀀫􀀶􀀪􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀩􀀣􀀴􀀦􀀁􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀫􀀴􀀁􀀣􀀲􀀲􀀮􀀫􀀥􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀐
􀀂􀁅􀀃􀀁 􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀣􀀲􀀲􀀧􀀣􀀴􀀵􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀯􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀫􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀴􀀹􀀫􀀵􀀧􀀁􀀧􀀵􀀶􀀣􀀤􀀮􀀫􀀵􀀪􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀣􀀶􀀁
􀀣􀀥􀀥􀀧􀀲􀀶􀀣􀀰􀀥􀀧􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀱􀀵􀀧􀀁􀀥􀀮􀀣􀀷􀀵􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀹􀀣􀀵􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀣􀀰􀀁􀀧􀀵􀀵􀀧􀀰􀀶􀀫􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀤􀀣􀀵􀀫􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀧􀀰􀀶􀀁
􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀱􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀴􀀁􀀜􀀣􀀴􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀜􀀣􀀴􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀤􀀱􀀷􀀰􀀦􀀁􀀤􀀻􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀣􀀵􀀁􀀣􀀁􀀹􀀪􀀱􀀮􀀧􀀐􀀁
􀀣􀀰􀀦
􀀂􀀃􀀃􀀁 􀀥􀀱􀀰􀀶􀀫􀀰􀀷􀀧􀀦􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀴􀀨􀀱􀀴􀀯􀀣􀀰􀀥􀀧􀀁 􀀱􀀨􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁 􀀴􀀧􀀯􀀣􀀫􀀰􀀦􀀧􀀴􀀁 􀀱􀀨􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁 􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀻􀀁
􀀹􀀱􀀷􀀮􀀦􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀷􀀰􀀬􀀷􀀵􀀶􀀆
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀯􀁒􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀁
􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀑􀀁􀀞􀀶􀀣􀀶􀀧􀀁􀀯􀀣􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀰􀀩􀀧􀀴􀀁􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀯􀀫􀀰􀀣􀀶􀀧􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀹􀀫􀀶􀀪􀀦􀀴􀀣􀀹􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀯􀀁􀀣􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁
􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀀤􀀧􀀥􀀱􀀯􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀣􀀹􀀣􀀴􀀧􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀨􀀣􀀥􀀶􀀵􀀏
􀀂􀀂􀀃􀀁 􀀫􀀶􀀁 􀀵􀀪􀀣􀀮􀀮􀀁 􀀪􀀣􀀸􀀧􀀁 􀀧􀀺􀀲􀀴􀀧􀀵􀀵􀀮􀀻􀀁 􀀣􀀩􀀴􀀧􀀧􀀦􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀣􀀶􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁 􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀻􀀁 􀀴􀀧􀀯􀀣􀀫􀀰􀀵􀀁 􀀫􀀰􀀁
􀀨􀀱􀀴􀀥􀀧􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀰􀀶􀀫􀀰􀀷􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀧􀀴􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀐􀀁􀀱􀀴
􀀂􀁅􀀃􀀁 􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀯􀀷􀀵􀀶􀀁􀀤􀀻􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀫􀀶􀀵􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀰􀀦􀀷􀀥􀀶􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀫􀀦􀀧􀀴􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀣􀀵􀀁􀀪􀀣􀀸􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁
􀀣􀀥􀀳􀀷􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀥􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀰􀀶􀀫􀀰􀀷􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀧􀀴􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀫􀀶􀀵􀀁􀀯􀀣􀀫􀀰􀀅
􀀶􀀧􀀰􀀣􀀰􀀥􀀧􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀨􀀱􀀴􀀥􀀧􀀆􀀁
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀑􀀃 􀀵􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀁
􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗
􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁘􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃
􀀴􀀧􀀩􀀷􀀮􀀣􀀶􀀧􀀄􀀁􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀤􀀣􀀵􀀫􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀣􀀩􀀴􀀧􀀧􀀯􀀧􀀰􀀶􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀸􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀯􀀫􀀰􀀅
􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑
􀀉􀀆􀀁 􀀟􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀵􀀷􀀯􀀲􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀧􀀴􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀣􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀵􀀷􀀵􀀲􀀧􀀰􀀦􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀣􀀵􀀁
􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀀅
􀀣􀀰􀀥􀀧􀀁􀀹􀀫􀀶􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀨􀀣􀀥􀀶􀀱􀀴􀀵􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀨􀀧􀀴􀀴􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀣􀀴􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀌􀀆
􀀏􀀄􀀐􀀒􀀁􀀒􀀉􀀐􀀇􀀇
􀀙􀀗􀀞􀀒􀀔􀀘􀀘􀀑􀀚􀀔􀀛􀀠􀀞
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀑􀀃 􀀨􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀀁
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜
􀀑􀀁􀀞􀀶􀀣􀀶􀀧􀀁􀀧􀀺􀀧􀀴􀀥􀀫􀀵􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀫􀀶􀀵􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀪􀀧􀀴􀀧􀀰􀀶􀀁􀀴􀀫􀀩􀀪􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀸􀀫􀀦􀀷􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀮􀀮􀀧􀀥􀀶􀀫􀀸􀀧􀀁
􀀵􀀧􀀮􀀨􀀅􀀦􀀧􀀨􀀧􀀰􀀥􀀧􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀣􀀥􀀥􀀱􀀴􀀦􀀣􀀰􀀥􀀧􀀁􀀹􀀫􀀶􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀒􀀪􀀣􀀴􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀠􀀰􀀫􀀶􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀚􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁
􀀫􀀵􀀁􀀧􀀰􀀶􀀫􀀶􀀮􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀷􀀵􀀲􀀧􀀰􀀦􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀹􀀪􀀱􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀣􀀴􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀧􀀴􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀣􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀻􀀁
􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀪􀀫􀀥􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀫􀀵􀀁􀀣􀀁􀀲􀀣􀀴􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀵􀀱􀀨􀀣􀀴􀀁􀀣􀀵􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀣􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀧􀀴􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀫􀀵􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀥􀀱􀀯􀀲􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀤􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀹􀀫􀀶􀀪􀀁
􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀧􀀺􀀧􀀴􀀥􀀫􀀵􀀧􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀣􀀶􀀁􀀴􀀫􀀩􀀪􀀶􀀆
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀑􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁋􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁑􀁈􀂿􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈
􀀑􀀁 􀀞􀀶􀀣􀀶􀀧􀀁 􀀥􀀱􀀯􀀯􀀫􀀶􀀶􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁 􀀣􀀩􀀩􀀴􀀧􀀵􀀵􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀹􀀫􀀶􀀪􀀫􀀰􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁 􀀯􀀧􀀣􀀰􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁 􀀱􀀨􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁
􀀒􀀪􀀣􀀴􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀠􀀰􀀫􀀶􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀚􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀣􀀰􀀦􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀵􀀱􀀮􀀷􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀊􀀊􀀈􀀋􀀁􀀂􀀢􀀢􀀗􀀢􀀃􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁
􀀖􀀧􀀰􀀧􀀴􀀣􀀮􀀁 􀀑􀀵􀀵􀀧􀀯􀀤􀀮􀀻􀀁 􀀱􀀨􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁 􀀠􀀰􀀫􀀶􀀧􀀦􀀁 􀀚􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁 􀀵􀀪􀀣􀀮􀀮􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀶􀀁 􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀯􀀫􀀰􀀣􀀶􀀧􀀁 􀀱􀀴􀀁
􀀹􀀫􀀶􀀪􀀦􀀴􀀣􀀹􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀯􀀁􀀣􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀵􀀷􀀵􀀲􀀧􀀰􀀦􀀁􀀫􀀶􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀧􀀴􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀣􀀵􀀁􀀣􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀧􀀳􀀷􀀧􀀰􀀥􀀧􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁑􀁈􀂿􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀑
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀑􀀃 􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏
􀀟􀀪􀀧􀀁 􀀲􀀴􀀧􀀵􀀧􀀰􀀶􀀁 􀀦􀀴􀀣􀀨􀀶􀀁 􀀣􀀴􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀮􀀧􀀵􀀁 􀀣􀀴􀀧􀀁 􀀹􀀫􀀶􀀪􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀁 􀀲􀀴􀀧􀀬􀀷􀀦􀀫􀀥􀀧􀀁 􀀶􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀧􀀮􀀧􀀸􀀣􀀰􀀶􀀁
􀀦􀀧􀀥􀀫􀀵􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁 􀀶􀀣􀀭􀀧􀀰􀀁 􀀤􀀻􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁 􀀞􀀧􀀥􀀷􀀴􀀫􀀶􀀻􀀁 􀀒􀀱􀀷􀀰􀀥􀀫􀀮􀀁 􀀫􀀰􀀁 􀀣􀀥􀀥􀀱􀀴􀀦􀀣􀀰􀀥􀀧􀀁 􀀹􀀫􀀶􀀪􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁
􀀒􀀪􀀣􀀴􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀠􀀰􀀫􀀶􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀚􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀆
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀃 􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜
􀀟􀀪􀀧􀀁 􀀲􀀴􀀧􀀵􀀧􀀰􀀶􀀁 􀀦􀀴􀀣􀀨􀀶􀀁 􀀣􀀴􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀮􀀧􀀵􀀁 􀀣􀀴􀀧􀀁 􀀹􀀫􀀶􀀪􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀁 􀀲􀀴􀀧􀀬􀀷􀀦􀀫􀀥􀀧􀀁 􀀶􀀱􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁 􀀴􀀫􀀩􀀪􀀶􀀵􀀁
􀀣􀀰􀀦􀀁􀀦􀀷􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀞􀀶􀀣􀀶􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀣􀀴􀀫􀀵􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀯􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀹􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀰􀀧􀀷􀀶􀀴􀀣􀀮􀀫􀀶􀀻􀀆􀀁
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀑􀀃 􀀲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀟􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀧􀀵􀀧􀀰􀀶􀀁􀀦􀀴􀀣􀀨􀀶􀀁􀀣􀀴􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀮􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀣􀀴􀀧􀀁􀀹􀀫􀀶􀀪􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀧􀀬􀀷􀀦􀀫􀀥􀀧􀀁􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀯􀀫􀀰􀀣􀀅
􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀹􀀫􀀶􀀪􀀦􀀴􀀣􀀹􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀵􀀷􀀵􀀲􀀧􀀰􀀵􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀣􀀵􀀁􀀣􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀧􀀳􀀷􀀧􀀰􀀥􀀧􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀄􀀁􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀅􀀊􀀁
􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀁 􀀂􀀂􀀃􀀁 􀀣􀀁 􀀯􀀣􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀫􀀣􀀮􀀁 􀀤􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀥􀀪􀀐􀀁 􀀂􀁅􀀃􀀁 􀀵􀀷􀀲􀀧􀀴􀀸􀀧􀀰􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁 􀀫􀀯􀀲􀀱􀀵􀀵􀀫􀀤􀀫􀀮􀀫􀀶􀀻􀀁 􀀱􀀨􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀴􀀅
􀀨􀀱􀀴􀀯􀀣􀀰􀀥􀀧􀀐􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀃􀀁􀀣􀀁􀀨􀀷􀀰􀀦􀀣􀀯􀀧􀀰􀀶􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀥􀀪􀀣􀀰􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀥􀀫􀀴􀀥􀀷􀀯􀀵􀀶􀀣􀀰􀀥􀀧􀀵􀀆
􀀄􀀍􀀍􀀇􀀔
􀀗􀀚􀀓􀀗􀀒􀀑􀀟􀀗􀀡􀀔􀀁􀀘􀀗􀀞􀀟􀀁􀀛􀀕􀀁􀀟􀀝􀀔􀀑􀀟􀀗􀀔􀀞􀀁􀀝􀀔􀀅
􀀕􀀔􀀝􀀝􀀔􀀓􀀁􀀟􀀛􀀁􀀗􀀚􀀁􀀑􀀝􀀟􀀗􀀒􀀘􀀔􀀁􀀍
􀀂􀀂􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀫􀀰􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀰􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀪􀀷􀀯􀀣􀀰􀀫􀀶􀀣􀀴􀀫􀀣􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀹􀀐
􀀂􀁅􀀃􀀁 􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀁 􀀦􀀧􀀥􀀮􀀣􀀴􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀄􀀁 􀀥􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁 􀀱􀀴􀀁 􀀴􀀧􀀩􀀷􀀮􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁 􀀣􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀴􀀯􀀣􀀰􀀧􀀰􀀶􀀁
􀀴􀀧􀀩􀀫􀀯􀀧􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀵􀀶􀀣􀀶􀀷􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀮􀀣􀀶􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀴􀀯􀀣􀀰􀀧􀀰􀀶􀀁􀀴􀀫􀀩􀀪􀀶􀀵􀀄􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀥􀀮􀀷􀀦􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀧􀀵􀀅
􀀶􀀣􀀤􀀮􀀫􀀵􀀪􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀦􀀫􀀨􀀻􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀰􀀦􀀁􀀣􀀰􀀦􀀁􀀯􀀣􀀴􀀫􀀶􀀫􀀯􀀧􀀁􀀤􀀱􀀷􀀰􀀦􀀣􀀴􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀐
􀀂􀀃􀀃􀀁 􀀯􀀷􀀮􀀶􀀫􀀮􀀣􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀹􀀅􀀯􀀣􀀭􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀐
􀀂􀀄􀀃􀀁 􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀰􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀥􀀴􀀫􀀯􀀫􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀬􀀷􀀵􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀧􀀐
􀀂􀀅􀀃􀀁 􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀫􀀧􀀰􀀦􀀵􀀪􀀫􀀲􀀄􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀯􀀯􀀧􀀴􀀥􀀧􀀁􀀣􀀰􀀦􀀁􀀰􀀣􀀸􀀫􀀩􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀣􀀰􀀦􀀁􀀣􀀩􀀴􀀧􀀧􀀅
􀀯􀀧􀀰􀀶􀀵􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀰􀀥􀀧􀀴􀀰􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀫􀀸􀀣􀀶􀀧􀀁􀀴􀀫􀀩􀀪􀀶􀀵􀀐
􀀂􀁉􀀃􀀁 􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀨􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀰􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀶􀀧􀀥􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀪􀀷􀀯􀀣􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀫􀀩􀀪􀀶􀀵􀀐
􀀂􀁊􀀃􀀁 􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀁 􀀴􀀧􀀮􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁 􀀶􀀱􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁 􀀫􀀰􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀰􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀁 􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀶􀀧􀀥􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀨􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁
􀀧􀀰􀀸􀀫􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀯􀀧􀀰􀀶􀀐
􀀂􀁋􀀃􀀁 􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀮􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀰􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀹􀀣􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀥􀀱􀀷􀀴􀀵􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀣􀀰􀀦􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀮􀀣􀀶􀀧􀀦􀀁
􀀫􀀰􀀵􀀶􀀣􀀮􀀮􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀣􀀰􀀦􀀁􀀨􀀣􀀥􀀫􀀮􀀫􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀐
􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀁 􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀁 􀀴􀀧􀀮􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁 􀀶􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀳􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀧􀀴􀀵􀀁 􀀣􀀰􀀦􀀁 􀀴􀀧􀀮􀀣􀀶􀀧􀀦􀀁 􀀫􀀰􀀵􀀶􀀣􀀮􀀮􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁 􀀣􀀰􀀦􀀁
􀀨􀀣􀀥􀀫􀀮􀀫􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀐
􀀂􀀇􀀃􀀁 􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀹􀀪􀀫􀀥􀀪􀀁􀀣􀀴􀀧􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀶􀀫􀀶􀀷􀀧􀀰􀀶􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀵􀀶􀀴􀀷􀀯􀀧􀀰􀀶􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀰􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀁
􀀱􀀴􀀩􀀣􀀰􀀫􀀼􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀐
􀀂􀀈􀀃􀀁 􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀮􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀶􀀧􀀴􀀰􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀵􀀧􀀶􀀶􀀮􀀧􀀯􀀧􀀰􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀦􀀫􀀵􀀲􀀷􀀶􀀧􀀵􀀁
􀀤􀀻􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀣􀀥􀀧􀀨􀀷􀀮􀀁􀀯􀀧􀀣􀀰􀀵􀀄􀀁􀀫􀀰􀀥􀀮􀀷􀀦􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀵􀀱􀀴􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀰􀀥􀀫􀀮􀀫􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀧􀀦􀀫􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀣􀀴􀀅
􀀤􀀫􀀶􀀴􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀣􀀰􀀦􀀁􀀬􀀷􀀦􀀫􀀥􀀫􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀵􀀧􀀶􀀶􀀮􀀧􀀯􀀧􀀰􀀶􀀐
􀀂􀁏􀀃􀀁 􀀶􀀴􀀧􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀮􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀦􀀫􀀲􀀮􀀱􀀯􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀁􀀣􀀰􀀦􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀷􀀮􀀣􀀴􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀮􀀣􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀆
􀀃􀀂􀀁 􀀒􀀇􀀔􀀒􀀁􀀎􀀈􀀁􀀒􀀉􀀇􀀁􀀆􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀒􀀁􀀄􀀐􀀒􀀊􀀅􀀋􀀇􀀑􀀁􀀓􀀊􀀒􀀉􀀁
􀀅􀀎􀀌􀀌􀀇􀀍􀀒􀀄􀀐􀀊􀀇􀀑􀀁􀀒􀀉􀀇􀀐􀀇􀀒􀀎
􀀈􀀇􀀈􀀆􀀁 􀀏􀀗􀀕􀀁 􀀠􀀕􀀤􀀠􀀁 􀀜􀀖􀀁 􀀠􀀗􀀕􀀁 􀀔􀀞􀀑􀀖􀀠􀀁 􀀑􀀞􀀠􀀘􀀓􀀙􀀕􀀟􀀁 􀀣􀀘􀀠􀀗􀀁 􀀓􀀜􀀚􀀚􀀕􀀛􀀠􀀑􀀞􀀘􀀕􀀟􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃
􀀑􀀠􀀁􀀘􀀠􀀟􀀁􀀟􀀘􀀤􀀠􀀥􀀅􀀠􀀗􀀘􀀞􀀔􀀁􀀟􀀕􀀟􀀟􀀘􀀜􀀛􀀁􀀘􀀟􀀁􀀞􀀕􀀝􀀞􀀜􀀔􀀡􀀓􀀕􀀔􀀁􀀒􀀕􀀙􀀜􀀣􀀆
􀀔􀀕􀀕􀀔􀀒􀀟􀀞􀀁􀀛􀀕􀀁􀀑􀀝􀀙􀀔􀀓􀀁􀀒􀀛􀀚􀀕􀀘􀀗􀀒􀀟􀀞􀀁
􀀛􀀚􀀁􀀟􀀝􀀔􀀑􀀟􀀗􀀔􀀞
􀀏􀀄􀀐􀀒􀀁􀀎􀀍􀀇
􀀞􀀒􀀛􀀜􀀔􀀁􀀑􀀚􀀓􀀁􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀗􀀚􀀗􀀟􀀗􀀛􀀚􀀞
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁆􀁒􀁓􀁈
􀀟􀀪􀀧􀀁 􀀲􀀴􀀧􀀵􀀧􀀰􀀶􀀁 􀀦􀀴􀀣􀀨􀀶􀀁 􀀣􀀴􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀮􀀧􀀵􀀁 􀀣􀀲􀀲􀀮􀀻􀀁 􀀶􀀱􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀁 􀀧􀀨􀀨􀀧􀀥􀀶􀀵􀀁 􀀱􀀨􀀁
􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀑
􀀂􀀉􀀇􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀋􀀃􀀊􀀌
􀀂􀀈􀀃􀀁 􀀍􀀞􀀠􀀘􀀓􀀙􀀕􀀁􀀈􀀁􀀟􀀘􀀠􀀡􀀑􀀠􀀕􀀟􀀄􀀁􀀑􀀟􀀁􀀠􀀗􀀕􀀁􀀝􀀜􀀘􀀛􀀠􀀁􀀜􀀖􀀁􀀔􀀕􀀝􀀑􀀞􀀠􀀡􀀞􀀕􀀁􀀖􀀜􀀞􀀁􀀠􀀗􀀕􀀁
􀀕􀀙􀀑􀀒􀀜􀀞􀀑􀀠􀀘􀀜􀀛􀀁􀀜􀀖􀀁􀀠􀀗􀀕􀀁􀀔􀀞􀀑􀀖􀀠􀀁􀀑􀀞􀀠􀀘􀀓􀀙􀀕􀀟􀀄􀀁􀀠􀀗􀀕􀀁􀀈􀀌􀀊􀀌􀀁􀀐􀀘􀀕􀀛􀀛􀀑􀀁􀀎􀀜􀀛􀀢􀀕􀀛􀀅
􀀠􀀘􀀜􀀛􀀁􀀜􀀛􀀁􀀠􀀗􀀕􀀁􀀙􀀑􀀣􀀁􀀜􀀖􀀁􀀠􀀞􀀕􀀑􀀠􀀘􀀕􀀟􀀄􀀁􀀑􀀞􀀠􀀘􀀓􀀙􀀕􀀁􀀋􀀉􀀁􀀜􀀖􀀁􀀣􀀗􀀘􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀝􀀞􀀜􀀢􀀘􀀔􀀕􀀟􀀄􀀁
􀀅􀀈􀀋􀀄􀀊􀀁 􀀃􀀆􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀁 􀀠􀀗􀀑􀀠􀀁 􀀠􀀗􀀕􀀁 􀀝􀀞􀀜􀀢􀀘􀀟􀀘􀀜􀀛􀀟􀀁 􀀜􀀖􀀁 􀀠􀀗􀀕􀀁 􀀎􀀜􀀛􀀢􀀕􀀛􀀠􀀘􀀜􀀛􀀁 􀀔􀀜􀀁 􀀛􀀜􀀠􀀁
􀀃 􀀨􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀁 􀀃􀀂􀀄
􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀀥􀀯􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀡􀀯􀀤􀀠􀀨􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀦􀀬􀀰􀀱􀀧􀀩􀀧􀀱􀀧􀀤􀀰􀀁􀀡􀀤􀀱􀀴􀀤􀀤􀀫􀀁􀀜􀀱􀀠􀀱􀀤􀀰􀀆􀀋􀀑􀀐􀀁􀀝􀀦􀀲􀀰􀀄􀀁
􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀤􀀰􀀤􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀣􀀯􀀠􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀠􀀯􀀱􀀧􀀢􀀩􀀤􀀰􀀁􀀠􀀭􀀭􀀩􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀬􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀤􀀥􀀥􀀤􀀢􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀠􀀫􀀁􀀠􀀯􀀪􀀤􀀣􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀑
􀀂􀀊􀀃􀀁 􀀝􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀥􀀬􀀯􀀪􀀲􀀩􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀠􀀯􀀱􀀧􀀢􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀉􀀁􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀠􀀱􀀱􀀤􀀯􀀫􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀬􀀫􀀁􀀠􀀯􀀱􀀧􀀢􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀉􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀙􀀜􀀃􀀹􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁑􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀥􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀂳􀁕􀁈􀀅
􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀂴􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀀭􀀠􀀯􀀱􀀧􀀤􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀬􀀁􀀠􀀁􀀱􀀯􀀤􀀠􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀱􀀦􀀁􀀠􀀁􀀜􀀱􀀠􀀱􀀤􀀁􀀧􀀫􀀳􀀬􀀩􀀳􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀧􀀫􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀠􀀱􀀁􀀠􀀯􀀪􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀢􀀬􀀫􀀅
􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀝􀀃
􀀂􀀊􀀌􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃
􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁊􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁈􀁑􀁊􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀞􀀃􀀋􀀋􀀃􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀧􀀱􀀲􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀱􀀯􀀤􀀠􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀯􀀤􀀅
􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁊􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀂􀀌􀀃􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀧􀀱􀀲􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀤􀀥􀀥􀀤􀀢􀀱􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀠􀀁􀀫􀀬􀀫􀀅􀀧􀀫􀀱􀀤􀀯􀀫􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀠􀀩􀀁􀀠􀀯􀀪􀀤􀀣􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀔􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁋􀁜􀁓􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀅
􀀤􀀰􀀤􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀝􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀢􀀬􀀭􀀤􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀧􀀯􀀣􀀁􀀰􀀢􀀤􀀫􀀠􀀯􀀧􀀬􀀁􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀥􀀲􀀯􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀯􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀪􀀧􀀱􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀡􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁
􀀯􀀤􀀮􀀲􀀧􀀯􀀤􀀪􀀤􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀷􀀔􀀖􀀓􀀗􀀖􀀊􀀌􀀗􀀎􀀍􀀁􀀯􀀤􀀰􀀬􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀬􀀁􀀠􀀯􀀪􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀥􀀬􀀯􀀢􀀤􀀁􀀡􀀤􀀱􀀴􀀤􀀤􀀫􀀁
􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀂴􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀀅
􀃀􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀀅
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃 􀀋􀀋􀀃􀀄􀀁 􀀠􀀰􀀁 􀀴􀀤􀀩􀀩􀀁 􀀠􀀰􀀁 􀀡􀀶􀀁 􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁 􀀧􀀫􀀢􀀩􀀲􀀰􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀁 􀀬􀀥􀀁 􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁 􀀤􀀩􀀤􀀪􀀤􀀫􀀱􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀂳􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀂴􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀙􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀋􀀋􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀦􀀤􀀫􀀁
􀁄􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃
􀀴􀀧􀀱􀀦􀀣􀀯􀀠􀀴􀀠􀀩􀀁 􀀬􀀯􀀁 􀀰􀀲􀀰􀀭􀀤􀀫􀀰􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀦􀀤􀀁 􀀱􀀶􀀭􀀧􀀢􀀠􀀩􀀁 􀀫􀀬􀀫􀀅􀀧􀀫􀀱􀀤􀀯􀀫􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀠􀀩􀀁
􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀱􀀯􀀤􀀠􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀯􀀤􀀩􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀡􀀤􀀱􀀴􀀤􀀤􀀫􀀁􀀜􀀱􀀠􀀱􀀤􀀰􀀆
􀀂􀀋􀀃􀀁 􀀜􀀤􀀳􀀤􀀯􀀠􀀩􀀁 􀀖􀀬􀀳􀀤􀀯􀀫􀀪􀀤􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀤􀀵􀀭􀀯􀀤􀀰􀀰􀀤􀀣􀀁 􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁 􀀳􀀧􀀤􀀴􀀁 􀀱􀀦􀀠􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁
􀀣􀀯􀀠􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀠􀀯􀀱􀀧􀀢􀀩􀀤􀀰􀀁􀀰􀀦􀀬􀀲􀀩􀀣􀀁􀀠􀀭􀀭􀀩􀀶􀀁􀀠􀀩􀀰􀀬􀀁􀀱􀀬􀀁􀀱􀀯􀀤􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀤􀀰􀀁􀀬􀀯􀀁􀀭􀀠􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀯􀀤􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀤􀀰􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀋􀀑􀀑􀀁􀀗􀀫􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀔􀀬􀀪􀀪􀀧􀀰􀀰􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀸􀀰􀀁
􀀳􀀧􀀤􀀴􀀄􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀧􀀰􀀰􀀲􀀤􀀁􀀢􀀠􀀫􀀁􀀡􀀤􀀁􀀯􀀤􀀰􀀬􀀩􀀳􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀡􀀶􀀁􀀯􀀤􀀥􀀤􀀯􀀤􀀫􀀢􀀤􀀁􀀱􀀬􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀬􀀳􀀧􀀅
􀀰􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀠􀀯􀀱􀀧􀀢􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀊􀀍􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀉􀀑􀀎􀀑􀀁􀀞􀀧􀀤􀀫􀀫􀀠􀀁􀀔􀀬􀀫􀀳􀀤􀀫􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀆􀀌􀀈􀀈
􀀋􀀑􀀐􀀃􀀤􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀂿􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀀋􀀔􀀜􀀙􀀖􀀌􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀣􀀯􀀠􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀠􀀯􀀱􀀧􀀢􀀩􀀤􀀰􀀁􀀬􀀫􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀩􀀠􀀴􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀯􀀤􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀤􀀰􀀁􀀰􀀦􀀬􀀲􀀩􀀣􀀁􀀫􀀬􀀱􀀁􀀢􀀬􀀫􀀱􀀠􀀧􀀫􀀁􀀠􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀬􀀳􀀧􀀅
􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁎􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀁓􀁌􀁆􀀃 􀁐􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃 􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁖􀀃 􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀱􀀯􀀤􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀤􀀰􀀁􀀠􀀫􀀣􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀲􀀰􀀭􀀤􀀫􀀰􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀧􀀯􀀁􀀬􀀭􀀤􀀯􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀆􀀁􀀗􀀱􀀁􀀥􀀤􀀩􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀠􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀲􀀢􀀦􀀁􀀠􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀲􀀣􀀶􀀁
􀀴􀀬􀀲􀀩􀀣􀀁􀀧􀀫􀀤􀀳􀀧􀀱􀀠􀀡􀀩􀀶􀀁􀀧􀀫􀀳􀀬􀀩􀀳􀀤􀀁􀀠􀀁􀀢􀀬􀀫􀀰􀀧􀀣􀀤􀀯􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀤􀀥􀀥􀀤􀀢􀀱􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀬􀀳􀀧􀀰􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀰􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁘􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀀮􀀲􀀤􀀰􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀆􀀁􀀔􀀬􀀫􀀰􀀤􀀮􀀲􀀤􀀫􀀱􀀩􀀶􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀁􀀣􀀧􀀣􀀁􀀫􀀬􀀱􀀁􀀥􀀤􀀤􀀩􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀠􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀤􀀰􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀁􀀢􀀬􀀲􀀩􀀣􀀁􀀢􀀬􀀫􀀳􀀤􀀫􀀧􀀅
􀀤􀀫􀀱􀀩􀀶􀀁􀀡􀀤􀀁􀀣􀀤􀀠􀀩􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀱􀀦􀀁􀀧􀀫􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀢􀀬􀀫􀀱􀀤􀀵􀀱􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀤􀀰􀀤􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀬􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀬􀀫􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀩􀀠􀀴􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁
􀀱􀀯􀀤􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀤􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀉􀀎􀀊􀀖􀀋􀀓􀀓􀀐􀀁􀀙􀀁􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀆􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀩􀀆􀀁􀀗􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀣􀀬􀀢􀀲􀀪􀀤􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀓􀀇􀀍􀀍􀀈􀀑􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀐􀀑􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀠􀀯􀀠􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀌􀀆􀀁
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀚􀀖􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁈􀁐􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀙􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀔􀀬􀀫􀀥􀀤􀀯􀀤􀀫􀀢􀀤􀀁􀀬􀀫􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀘􀀠􀀴􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀝􀀯􀀤􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀤􀀰􀀆
􀀋􀀑􀀑􀀁􀀜􀀤􀀤􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀢􀀬􀀪􀀪􀀤􀀫􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀡􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀙􀀤􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀯􀀩􀀠􀀫􀀣􀀰􀀁􀀂􀀊􀀈􀀈􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀲􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁛􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁛􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀛􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀋􀀤􀀒􀀦􀀑􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀓􀀒􀀶􀀵􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀌􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃 􀀗􀀓􀀞􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁏􀁄􀁜􀁖􀁌􀁄􀀃 􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀙􀀌􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁇􀀑􀀏􀀃 􀀶􀁌􀁛􀁗􀁜􀀐􀂿􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁖􀀂
􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁛􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀋􀀤􀀒􀀦􀀑􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀔􀀒􀀶􀀵􀀑􀀔􀀜􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀛􀀞􀀃􀀵􀁒􀀅
􀀪􀀠􀀫􀀧􀀠􀀁􀀂􀀊􀀈􀀈􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀁􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁇􀀑􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁛􀁗􀁜􀀐􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁛􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀔􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀋􀀤􀀒􀀦􀀑􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀖􀀒􀀶􀀵􀀑􀀕􀀔􀀌􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃 􀀘􀀔􀀞􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀥􀁘􀁕􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁌􀀃 􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀓􀀌􀀏􀀃 􀀉􀀎􀀊􀀖􀀋􀀓􀀓􀀐􀀁 􀀙􀀁 􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀃􀀄􀀁
􀀳􀀬􀀩􀀆􀀁􀀗􀀗􀀁􀀂􀀛􀀠􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀚􀀫􀀤􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀣􀀬􀀢􀀲􀀪􀀤􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀓􀀇􀀔􀀙􀀆􀀌􀀇􀀎􀀊􀀊􀀁􀀠􀀫􀀣􀀁􀀓􀀣􀀣􀀆􀀉􀀆
􀀌􀀈􀀈􀀁􀀓􀀯􀀱􀀧􀀢􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀊􀀍􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀉􀀑􀀎􀀑􀀁􀀞􀀧􀀤􀀫􀀫􀀠􀀁􀀔􀀬􀀫􀀳􀀤􀀫􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀁􀀯􀀤􀀠􀀣􀀰􀀁􀀠􀀰􀀁􀀥􀀬􀀩􀀩􀀬􀀴􀀰􀀒
􀀷􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀑􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀂳􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀤􀀫􀀱􀀯􀀶􀀁􀀧􀀫􀀱􀀬􀀁􀀥􀀬􀀯􀀢􀀤􀀁􀀧􀀥􀀒
􀀷􀀂􀀊􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀞􀀃􀁒􀁕
􀀷􀀂􀀋􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁇􀀑
􀂳􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀸􀁑􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁚􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁚􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀑􀂴
􀀂􀀌􀀃􀀁 􀀝􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀔􀀬􀀪􀀪􀀧􀀰􀀰􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀁􀀣􀀤􀀢􀀧􀀣􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀫􀀬􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀬􀀁􀀧􀀫􀀢􀀩􀀲􀀣􀀤􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀱􀀦􀀧􀀫􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁
􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁓􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃 􀁏􀁌􀁎􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁑􀁈􀂿􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁇􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁒􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃
􀁈􀁑􀁊􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀀅
􀀩􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀪􀀠􀀶􀀁􀀡􀀤􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀤􀀢􀀱􀀤􀀣􀀆􀀁􀀟􀀦􀀧􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀁􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀢􀀬􀀫􀀢􀀤􀀧􀀳􀀠􀀡􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀠􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀲􀀢􀀦􀀁
􀀱􀀯􀀤􀀠􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀯􀀤􀀩􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀢􀀬􀀲􀀩􀀣􀀁􀀡􀀤􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀥􀀤􀀢􀀱􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀕􀀘􀀊􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀧􀀯􀀣􀀁􀀭􀀠􀀯􀀱􀀧􀀤􀀰􀀁􀀧􀀫􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁
􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁒􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃 􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃 􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀅
􀀢􀀧􀀣􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀱􀀬􀀁􀀩􀀤􀀠􀀳􀀤􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀢􀀬􀀫􀀰􀀧􀀣􀀤􀀯􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀰􀀲􀀢􀀦􀀁􀀧􀀰􀀰􀀲􀀤􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀬􀀁􀀠􀀁􀀭􀀬􀀰􀀰􀀧􀀡􀀩􀀤􀀁
􀁉􀁘􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁓􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁚􀀅
􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀋􀀊􀀃􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁌􀂿􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀂳􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃
􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀂳􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀂴􀀏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀀅
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀋􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀉􀀑􀀎􀀑􀀁􀀞􀀧􀀤􀀫􀀫􀀠􀀁􀀔􀀬􀀫􀀳􀀤􀀫􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀄􀀁􀀠􀀫􀀣􀀁􀀭􀀩􀀠􀀢􀀤􀀰􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀱􀀯􀀤􀀠􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀯􀀤􀀩􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀡􀀤􀀱􀀴􀀤􀀤􀀫􀀁􀀜􀀱􀀠􀀱􀀤􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀦􀀧􀀢􀀦􀀁􀀠􀀯􀀤􀀁􀀧􀀫􀀢􀀩􀀲􀀣􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀱􀀦􀀧􀀫􀀁
􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀢􀀬􀀭􀀤􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀣􀀯􀀠􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀠􀀯􀀱􀀧􀀢􀀩􀀤􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀥􀀯􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀯􀀤􀀩􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀡􀀤􀀱􀀴􀀤􀀤􀀫􀀁
􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀀠􀀯􀀤􀀁􀀤􀀵􀀢􀀩􀀲􀀣􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀥􀀯􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀢􀀬􀀭􀀤􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀠􀀯􀀱􀀧􀀢􀀩􀀤􀀰􀀆
􀀂􀀍􀀃􀀁 􀀜􀀱􀀯􀀲􀀢􀀱􀀲􀀯􀀠􀀩􀀩􀀶􀀄􀀁 􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀀤􀀰􀀤􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀯􀀠􀀥􀀱􀀁 􀀠􀀯􀀱􀀧􀀢􀀩􀀤􀀰􀀁 􀀠􀀯􀀤􀀁 􀀣􀀧􀀳􀀧􀀣􀀤􀀣􀀁
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀝􀀃 􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃 􀀲􀁑􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀂳􀀶􀁆􀁒􀁓􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁌􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀂴􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀕􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁓􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀀷􀁚􀁒􀀏􀀃
􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀂳􀀳􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀬􀀏􀀃
􀀤􀀫􀀱􀀧􀀱􀀩􀀤􀀣􀀁 􀀷􀀚􀀭􀀤􀀯􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀁 􀀬􀀥􀀁 􀀱􀀯􀀤􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀤􀀰􀀁 􀀧􀀫􀀁 􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁 􀀤􀀳􀀤􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀬􀀥􀀁 􀀠􀀯􀀪􀀤􀀣􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀀖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀀚􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀃀􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃 􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀃀􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃
􀀱􀀦􀀠􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀀯􀀤􀀠􀀱􀀧􀀤􀀰􀀁 􀀠􀀯􀀤􀀁 􀀫􀀬􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀧􀀫􀀁 􀀠􀀫􀀣􀀁 􀀬􀀥􀀁 􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀪􀀰􀀤􀀩􀀳􀀤􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀀱􀀤􀀯􀀪􀀧􀀫􀀠􀀱􀀤􀀣􀀁
􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀀚􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃
􀀧􀀫􀀁􀀢􀀦􀀠􀀯􀀠􀀢􀀱􀀤􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀔􀀦􀀠􀀭􀀱􀀤􀀯􀀁􀀗􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀤􀀫􀀱􀀧􀀱􀀩􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀷􀀚􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀯􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀬􀀳􀀧􀀰􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀯􀀤􀀩􀀤􀀅
􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀏􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀀛􀀃
􀀱􀀬􀀁􀀉􀀋􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀦􀀧􀀢􀀦􀀁􀀠􀀣􀀣􀀯􀀤􀀰􀀰􀀁􀀠􀀁􀀳􀀠􀀯􀀧􀀤􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀠􀀫􀀢􀀧􀀩􀀩􀀠􀀯􀀶􀀁􀀠􀀰􀀭􀀤􀀢􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀯􀀤􀀩􀀤􀀅
􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀀅
􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁘􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀭􀀯􀀬􀀳􀀧􀀰􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁􀀉􀀑􀀎􀀑􀀁􀀞􀀧􀀤􀀫􀀫􀀠􀀁􀀔􀀬􀀫􀀳􀀤􀀫􀀱􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀧􀀫􀀠􀀩􀀩􀀶􀀄􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀁
􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀂿􀁈􀁏􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀂳􀀰􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁒􀁘􀁖􀂴􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀀏􀀒􀀗􀀎􀀖􀀁􀀊􀀑􀀏􀀊􀀃􀂳􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁍􀁘􀀅
􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁈􀂴􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁖􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃
􀀠􀀯􀀱􀀧􀀢􀀩􀀤􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀦􀀧􀀢􀀦􀀁􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀫􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀱􀀬􀀁􀀠􀀯􀀱􀀧􀀢􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀏􀀆
􀀈􀀈􀀇􀀁 􀀏􀀕􀀟􀀞􀀠􀀢􀀁􀀞􀀖􀀁􀀢􀀘􀀕􀀁􀀍􀀝􀀢􀀕􀀠􀀝􀀑􀀢􀀙􀀞􀀝􀀑􀀛􀀁􀀎􀀑􀀥􀀁􀀋􀀞􀀜􀀜􀀙􀀡􀀡􀀙􀀞􀀝􀀁􀀞􀀝􀀁􀀢􀀘􀀕􀀁􀀥􀀞􀀠􀀚􀀁􀀞􀀖􀀁􀀙􀀢􀀡􀀁􀀡􀀙􀀦􀀢􀀧􀀅􀀢􀀘􀀙􀀠􀀔􀀁􀀡􀀕􀀡􀀡􀀙􀀞􀀝
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀧􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖
􀀌􀀞􀀠􀀁􀀢􀀘􀀕􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀠􀀟􀀞􀀡􀀕􀀡􀀁􀀞􀀖􀀁􀀢􀀘􀀕􀀁􀀟􀀠􀀕􀀡􀀕􀀝􀀢􀀁􀀔􀀠􀀑􀀖􀀢􀀁􀀑􀀠􀀢􀀙􀀓􀀛􀀕􀀡􀀉
􀀂􀀁􀀃􀀁 􀀩􀀢􀀠􀀕􀀑􀀢􀀧􀀪􀀁 􀀜􀀕􀀑􀀝􀀡􀀁 􀀑􀀝􀀁 􀀙􀀝􀀢􀀕􀀠􀀝􀀑􀀢􀀙􀀞􀀝􀀑􀀛􀀁 􀀑􀀗􀀠􀀕􀀕􀀅
􀀜􀀕􀀝􀀢􀀁 􀀓􀀞􀀝􀀓􀀛􀀣􀀔􀀕􀀔􀀁 􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀥􀀕􀀕􀀝􀀁 􀀐􀀢􀀑􀀢􀀕􀀡􀀁 􀀙􀀝􀀁 􀀥􀀠􀀙􀀢􀀢􀀕􀀝􀀁 􀀖􀀞􀀠􀀜􀀁 􀀑􀀝􀀔􀀁
􀀗􀀞􀀤􀀕􀀠􀀝􀀕􀀔􀀁 􀀒􀀧􀀁 􀀙􀀝􀀢􀀕􀀠􀀝􀀑􀀢􀀙􀀞􀀝􀀑􀀛􀀁 􀀛􀀑􀀥􀀄􀀁 􀀥􀀘􀀕􀀢􀀘􀀕􀀠􀀁 􀀕􀀜􀀒􀀞􀀔􀀙􀀕􀀔􀀁 􀀙􀀝􀀁
􀀑􀀁􀀡􀀙􀀝􀀗􀀛􀀕􀀁􀀙􀀝􀀡􀀢􀀠􀀣􀀜􀀕􀀝􀀢􀀁􀀞􀀠􀀁􀀙􀀝􀀁􀀢􀀥􀀞􀀁􀀞􀀠􀀁􀀜􀀞􀀠􀀕􀀁􀀠􀀕􀀛􀀑􀀢􀀕􀀔􀀁􀀙􀀝􀀡􀀢􀀠􀀣􀀅
􀀜􀀕􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀁 􀀑􀀝􀀔􀀁 􀀥􀀘􀀑􀀢􀀕􀀤􀀕􀀠􀀁 􀀙􀀢􀀡􀀁 􀀟􀀑􀀠􀀢􀀙􀀓􀀣􀀛􀀑􀀠􀀁 􀀔􀀕􀀡􀀙􀀗􀀝􀀑􀀢􀀙􀀞􀀝􀀄􀀁 􀀑􀀝􀀔􀀁
􀀙􀀝􀀓􀀛􀀣􀀔􀀕􀀡􀀁􀀢􀀠􀀕􀀑􀀢􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀁􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀥􀀕􀀕􀀝􀀁􀀐􀀢􀀑􀀢􀀕􀀡􀀁􀀢􀀞􀀁􀀥􀀘􀀙􀀓􀀘􀀁􀀙􀀝􀀢􀀕􀀠􀀝􀀑􀀢􀀙􀀞􀀝􀀑􀀛􀀁
􀀞􀀠􀀗􀀑􀀝􀀙􀀨􀀑􀀢􀀙􀀞􀀝􀀡􀀁􀀑􀀠􀀕􀀁􀀑􀀛􀀡􀀞􀀁􀀟􀀑􀀠􀀢􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀊
􀀂􀁅􀀌􀀃 􀂳􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀂴􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀀢􀀘􀀕􀀠􀀕􀀁 􀀙􀀡􀀁 􀀠􀀕􀀡􀀞􀀠􀀢􀀁 􀀢􀀞􀀁 􀀑􀀠􀀜􀀕􀀔􀀁 􀀖􀀞􀀠􀀓􀀕􀀁 􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀥􀀕􀀕􀀝􀀁 􀀐􀀢􀀑􀀢􀀕􀀡􀀁 􀀞􀀠􀀁
􀀟􀀠􀀞􀀢􀀠􀀑􀀓􀀢􀀕􀀔􀀁􀀠􀀕􀀡􀀞􀀠􀀢􀀁􀀢􀀞􀀁􀀑􀀠􀀜􀀕􀀔􀀁􀀖􀀞􀀠􀀓􀀕􀀁􀀒􀀕􀀢􀀥􀀕􀀕􀀝􀀁􀀗􀀞􀀤􀀕􀀠􀀝􀀜􀀕􀀝􀀢􀀑􀀛􀀁
􀀑􀀣􀀢􀀘􀀞􀀠􀀙􀀢􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀁􀀑􀀝􀀔􀀁􀀞􀀠􀀗􀀑􀀝􀀙􀀨􀀕􀀔􀀁􀀑􀀠􀀜􀀕􀀔􀀁􀀗􀀠􀀞􀀣􀀟􀀡􀀆
􀀄􀀙􀀗􀀗􀀐􀀘􀀝􀀌􀀛􀀠
􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃􀁎􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀨􀀬􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀤􀀰􀀡􀀦􀀲􀀁􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀪􀀥􀀱􀀆
􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃 􀀶􀁘􀁅􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃 􀀋􀀌􀀌􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀀃 􀂳􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀂴􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀌􀀃􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁
􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀐􀀁􀀟􀀨􀀥􀀬􀀬􀀡􀀁􀀓􀀭􀀬􀀴􀀥􀀬􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀁􀀵􀀧􀀨􀀣􀀧􀀁􀀨􀀲􀀁􀀡􀀤􀀤􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀵􀀭􀀰􀀤􀀱􀀁􀀸􀀡􀀬􀀤􀀁
􀀨􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀳􀀤􀀥􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀰􀀥􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀥􀀱􀀁 􀀢􀀥􀀲􀀵􀀥􀀥􀀬􀀁 􀀝􀀲􀀡􀀲􀀥􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀁 􀀵􀀧􀀨􀀣􀀧􀀁 􀀨􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀡􀀪􀀁
􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀀅
􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁜􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃 􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀀡􀀰􀀥􀀁􀀥􀀶􀀣􀀪􀀳􀀤􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀦􀀰􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀣􀀭􀀮􀀥􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀮􀀰􀀥􀀱􀀥􀀬􀀲􀀁􀀤􀀰􀀡􀀦􀀲􀀁􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀪􀀥􀀱􀀄􀀁
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁓􀁋􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀀦􀀭􀀰􀀥􀀱􀀲􀀡􀀪􀀪􀀁􀀡􀀬􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀮􀀰􀀥􀀲􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀣􀀭􀀮􀀥􀀁􀀵􀀧􀀨􀀣􀀧􀀁􀀵􀀭􀀳􀀪􀀤􀀁􀀧􀀡􀀴􀀥􀀁
􀀥􀀶􀀣􀀪􀀳􀀤􀀥􀀤􀀁 􀀫􀀳􀀪􀀲􀀨􀀪􀀡􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀡􀀪􀀁 􀀲􀀰􀀥􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀥􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀡􀀲􀀁 􀀨􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀳􀀤􀀥􀀁 􀀨􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀡􀀪􀀁
􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑
􀀂􀀊􀀃􀀁 􀀙􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀳􀀪􀀡􀀰􀀁􀀤􀀨􀀱􀀲􀀨􀀬􀀣􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀨􀀱􀀁􀀤􀀰􀀡􀀵􀀬􀀁􀀢􀀥􀀲􀀵􀀥􀀥􀀬􀀁􀀢􀀨􀀪􀀡􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀡􀀪􀀁
􀀡􀀬􀀤􀀁􀀫􀀳􀀪􀀲􀀨􀀪􀀡􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀡􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀰􀀥􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀥􀀱􀀆
􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀃 􀀶􀁘􀁅􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀋􀀍􀀌􀀃􀁇􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀀃􀂳􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀂴􀀃
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁗􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀃀􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁜􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁒􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁇􀁌􀃼􀀁􀀤􀀥􀀣􀀨􀀱􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀄􀀋􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀥􀀶􀀣􀀥􀀮􀀲􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀡􀀲􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀀋􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀈􀀛􀀙􀀜􀀐􀀎􀀞􀀝􀀙􀀛􀀁 􀀴􀀆􀀁 􀀧􀁘􀃣􀁎􀁒􀀃 􀀷􀁄􀁇􀁌􀃼􀀃 􀁄􀀒􀁎􀀒􀁄􀀃 􀂳􀀧􀁘􀁏􀁈􀂴􀀄􀀁 􀀓􀀡􀀱􀀥􀀁 􀀙􀀭􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀞􀀅􀀐􀀋􀀅
􀀈􀀅􀀒􀀜􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀁􀀔􀀥􀀣􀀨􀀱􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀔􀀥􀀦􀀥􀀬􀀣􀀥􀀁􀀘􀀭􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀕􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀪􀀭􀀣􀀳􀀲􀀭􀀰􀀷􀀁􀀒􀀮􀀮􀀥􀀡􀀪􀀁􀀭􀀬􀀁
􀀖􀀳􀀰􀀨􀀱􀀤􀀨􀀣􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀄􀀁 􀀔􀀥􀀣􀀨􀀱􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁 􀀭􀀦􀀁 􀀉􀀁 􀀚􀀣􀀲􀀭􀀢􀀥􀀰􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀐􀀌􀀄􀀁 􀀕􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀡􀀪􀀁 􀀞􀀰􀀨􀀢􀀳􀀬􀀡􀀪􀀁 􀀦􀀭􀀰􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁒􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀂱􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀄􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀪􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀄􀀁 􀀮􀀆􀀁 􀀋􀀉􀀏􀀄􀀁
􀀮􀀡􀀰􀀡􀀆􀀁 􀀎􀀇􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀬􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀨􀀱􀀁 􀀤􀀥􀀣􀀨􀀱􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀄􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁 􀀞􀀰􀀨􀀢􀀳􀀬􀀡􀀪􀀁 􀀬􀀭􀀲􀀥􀀤􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀡􀀲􀀁 􀀸􀀡􀀬􀀁 􀀡􀀰􀀫􀀥􀀤􀀁 􀀣􀀭􀀬􀀅
􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀂴􀀑
􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃
􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀕􀀬􀀱􀀲􀀨􀀲􀀳􀀲􀀥􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀕􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀡􀀪􀀁􀀗􀀡􀀵􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀁􀀨􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀱􀀭􀀪􀀳􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀞􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀥􀀦􀀦􀀥􀀣􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁
􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀛􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀘􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀫􀁈􀁏􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁎􀁌􀀃
􀀝􀀥􀀱􀀱􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀑
􀀸􀀃􀀛􀀝􀀔􀀎􀀖􀀐􀀁􀀂
􀂳􀀩􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀀃􀂵􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀂶􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀀅
􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀧􀀨􀀣􀀧􀀁􀀢􀀷􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀨􀀰􀀁􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀳􀀰􀀥􀀁􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀥􀀶􀀲􀀥􀀬􀀲􀀁􀀡􀀰􀀥􀀁􀀪􀀨􀀩􀀥􀀪􀀷􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀁􀀡􀀦􀀦􀀥􀀣􀀲􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀥􀀰􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀤􀀥􀀣􀀪􀀡􀀰􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀵􀀡􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀰􀀁􀀤􀀥􀀣􀀪􀀡􀀰􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀢􀀷􀀁􀀡􀀬􀀷􀀁􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀡􀀪􀀪􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀮􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀀋􀀐􀀌􀀛􀀍􀀙􀀙􀀕􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀪􀀆􀀁􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀁
􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀀬􀀬􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀫􀁈􀁏􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁎􀁌􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀘􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀛􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁌􀁇􀁌􀀐􀁌􀁌􀁏􀀑
􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀏􀀃􀂳􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀂴􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀚􀀖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀙􀀜􀀃􀀹􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁑􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃
􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁎􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀑
􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀂴􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀃
􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀀅
􀀡􀀰􀀨􀀡􀀬􀀁􀀪􀀡􀀵􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀧􀀨􀀣􀀧􀀁􀀣􀀭􀀬􀀱􀀲􀀨􀀲􀀳􀀲􀀥􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀖􀀐􀀟􀀁􀀜􀀚􀀐􀀎􀀔􀀌􀀖􀀔􀀜􀀃􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀣􀀭􀀬􀀤􀀳􀀣􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀧􀀭􀀱􀀲􀀨􀀪􀀨􀀲􀀨􀀥􀀱􀀆
􀀋􀀘􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃
􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇􀀃
􀀝􀀲􀀡􀀲􀀥􀀆􀀁􀀞􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀦􀀭􀀰􀀫􀀳􀀪􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀮􀀰􀀭􀀴􀀨􀀱􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀡􀀬􀀤􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀡􀀢􀀭􀀴􀀥􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀦􀀅
􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀂳􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀂴􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁙􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃
􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀀅
􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀀲􀀰􀀥􀀡􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀁􀀤􀀨􀀦􀀦􀀥􀀰􀀥􀀬􀀲􀀁􀀵􀀡􀀷􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀞􀀧􀀡􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀰􀀡􀀱􀀥􀀁􀀡􀀪􀀱􀀭􀀁􀀱􀀥􀀰􀀴􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀳􀀤􀀥􀀁
􀀵􀀨􀀲􀀧􀀨􀀬􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀣􀀭􀀮􀀥􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀤􀀰􀀡􀀦􀀲􀀁􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀪􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀱􀀱􀀨􀀢􀀪􀀥􀀁􀀥􀀦􀀦􀀥􀀣􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁
􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀀃
􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀥􀀫􀀮􀀧􀀡􀀱􀀨􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀥􀀦􀀦􀀥􀀣􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀨􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀡􀀮􀀮􀀪􀀨􀀣􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀥􀀰􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁
􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀲􀀰􀀥􀀡􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀰􀀡􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀡􀀬􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀲􀀰􀀥􀀡􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀨􀀲􀀱􀀥􀀪􀀦􀀆
􀀂􀀍􀀃􀀁 􀀕􀀲􀀁􀀵􀀡􀀱􀀁􀀡􀀪􀀱􀀭􀀁􀀣􀀭􀀬􀀱􀀨􀀤􀀥􀀰􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀡􀀲􀀁􀀨􀀲􀀁􀀵􀀡􀀱􀀁􀀤􀀥􀀱􀀨􀀰􀀡􀀢􀀪􀀥􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀳􀀤􀀥􀀁
􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃
􀀭􀀦􀀁 􀀡􀀰􀀫􀀥􀀤􀀁 􀀡􀀣􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀱􀀁 􀀢􀀥􀀲􀀵􀀥􀀥􀀬􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁 􀀮􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀥􀀱􀀆􀀋􀀇􀀉􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁌􀀅
􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀳􀀤􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀭􀀣􀀣􀀳􀀮􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀰􀀨􀀲􀀭􀀰􀀷􀀁􀀵􀀧􀀨􀀣􀀧􀀁􀀫􀀥􀀥􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀨􀀲􀀧􀀁
􀀬􀀭􀀁􀀡􀀰􀀫􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀱􀀨􀀱􀀲􀀡􀀬􀀣􀀥􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀬􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀨􀀱􀀁􀀣􀀭􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀶􀀲􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀮􀀰􀀭􀀴􀀨􀀱􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁
􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀋􀀁􀀓􀀭􀀬􀀴􀀥􀀬􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀦􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀛􀀰􀀭􀀲􀀥􀀣􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀓􀀳􀀪􀀲􀀳􀀰􀀡􀀪􀀁􀀛􀀰􀀭􀀮􀀥􀀰􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃
􀀨􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀪􀀥􀀴􀀡􀀬􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀄􀀁􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀪􀀥􀀁􀀈􀀏􀀁􀀮􀀰􀀭􀀴􀀨􀀤􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀡􀀱􀀁􀀦􀀭􀀪􀀪􀀭􀀵􀀱􀀑
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀈􀀆􀀁 􀀒􀀮􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀁 􀀦􀀰􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁 􀀮􀀰􀀭􀀴􀀨􀀱􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀧􀀨􀀣􀀧􀀁 􀀱􀀧􀀡􀀪􀀪􀀁 􀀲􀀡􀀩􀀥􀀁 􀀥􀀦􀀦􀀥􀀣􀀲􀀁 􀀨􀀬􀀁 􀀲􀀨􀀫􀀥􀀁 􀀭􀀦􀀁
􀀮􀀥􀀡􀀣􀀥􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀮􀀰􀀥􀀱􀀥􀀬􀀲􀀁􀀓􀀭􀀬􀀴􀀥􀀬􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀱􀀧􀀡􀀪􀀪􀀁􀀡􀀮􀀮􀀪􀀷􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀥􀀴􀀥􀀬􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀤􀀥􀀣􀀪􀀡􀀰􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀵􀀡􀀰􀀁
􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀁌􀁊􀁋􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀢􀀷􀀁􀀭􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀫􀀭􀀰􀀥􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀫􀀆
􀀉􀀆􀀁 􀀞􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀓􀀭􀀬􀀴􀀥􀀬􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀱􀀧􀀡􀀪􀀪􀀁􀀡􀀪􀀱􀀭􀀁􀀡􀀮􀀮􀀪􀀷􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀁􀀡􀀪􀀪􀀁􀀣􀀡􀀱􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀮􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀡􀀪􀀁􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀲􀀡􀀪􀀁
􀁒􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀫􀁌􀁊􀁋􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃
􀀭􀀣􀀣􀀳􀀮􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀫􀀥􀀥􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀨􀀲􀀧􀀁􀀬􀀭􀀁􀀡􀀰􀀫􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀱􀀨􀀱􀀲􀀡􀀬􀀣􀀥􀀆
􀀂􀀎􀀃􀀁 􀀝􀀨􀀫􀀨􀀪􀀡􀀰􀀁􀀣􀀭􀀬􀀱􀀨􀀤􀀥􀀰􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀱􀀁􀀫􀀨􀀪􀀨􀀲􀀡􀀲􀀥􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀁􀀦􀀡􀀴􀀭􀀳􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀅
􀀣􀀪􀀳􀀱􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀡􀀁􀀢􀀪􀀭􀀣􀀩􀀡􀀤􀀥􀀁􀀥􀀴􀀥􀀬􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀡􀀢􀀱􀀥􀀬􀀣􀀥􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀡􀀰􀀫􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀡􀀣􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀱􀀁
􀀢􀀥􀀲􀀵􀀥􀀥􀀬􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀮􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀥􀀱􀀆􀀋􀀇􀀊
􀀂􀀏􀀃􀀁 􀀓􀀭􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀫􀀮􀀭􀀰􀀡􀀰􀀷􀀁 􀀤􀀥􀀴􀀥􀀪􀀭􀀮􀀫􀀥􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀁 􀀧􀀡􀀴􀀥􀀁 􀀢􀀪􀀳􀀰􀀰􀀥􀀤􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁 􀀤􀀨􀀱􀀅
􀀲􀀨􀀬􀀣􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁 􀀢􀀥􀀲􀀵􀀥􀀥􀀬􀀁 􀀨􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀡􀀪􀀁 􀀡􀀬􀀤􀀁 􀀬􀀭􀀬􀀅􀀨􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀡􀀪􀀁
􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀱􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀀨􀀬􀀣􀀰􀀥􀀡􀀱􀀥􀀤􀀁 􀀨􀀬􀀁 􀀬􀀳􀀫􀀢􀀥􀀰􀀁 􀀡􀀬􀀤􀀁 􀀡􀀰􀀥􀀁 􀀱􀀲􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀱􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀡􀀪􀀪􀀷􀀁 􀀫􀀭􀀰􀀥􀀁 􀀦􀀰􀀥􀀯􀀳􀀥􀀬􀀲􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃 􀂳􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁖􀂴􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃 􀂳􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁙􀁄􀁕􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁉􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀑􀀃 􀀱􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀀣􀀭􀀳􀀪􀀤􀀁 􀀡􀀦􀀦􀀥􀀣􀀲􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀥􀀰􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁 􀀭􀀦􀀁 􀀲􀀰􀀥􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀥􀀱􀀁 􀀡􀀱􀀁 􀀫􀀳􀀣􀀧􀀁 􀀡􀀱􀀁 􀀨􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀅
􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀡􀀪􀀁 􀀭􀀬􀀥􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀭􀀳􀀪􀀤􀀆􀀁􀀞􀀧􀀥􀀁 􀀤􀀰􀀡􀀦􀀲􀀁 􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀪􀀥􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀰􀀥􀀦􀀭􀀰􀀥􀀁 􀀨􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀳􀀤􀀥􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀀵􀀧􀀨􀀣􀀧􀀁 􀀨􀀱􀀁 􀀨􀀬􀀤􀀨􀀣􀀡􀀲􀀥􀀤􀀁 􀀢􀀷􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀰􀀡􀀱􀀥􀀁 􀀸􀀰􀀥􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀲􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀁 􀀡􀀰􀀫􀀥􀀤􀀁 􀀦􀀭􀀰􀀣􀀥􀀁
􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀋􀀇􀀉􀀁􀀝􀀥􀀥􀀁􀀒􀀆􀀁􀀔􀀆􀀁􀀘􀀣􀀙􀀡􀀨􀀰􀀁􀀡􀀬􀀤􀀁􀀒􀀆􀀁􀀔􀀆􀀁􀀠􀀡􀀲􀀲􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀉􀀓􀀐􀀁􀀇􀀐􀀒􀀌􀀖􀀁􀀅􀀑􀀑􀀐􀀎􀀝􀀜􀀁􀀙􀀑􀀁􀀊􀀌􀀛􀀄􀀁􀀋􀀲􀀧􀀁
􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁌􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀙􀀙􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀕􀃭􀀖􀀑
􀀋􀀇􀀊􀀁􀀆􀀍􀀔􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀃭􀀕􀀔􀀑
􀀃 􀀨􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀁 􀀄􀀄􀀄
􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀂴􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀂿􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁑􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀂳􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀂴􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀀅
􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁓􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁝􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀅
􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁓􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑
􀀋􀀜􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀂳􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀂴􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀀃
􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀂳􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀂴􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀂳􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀂴􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁌􀁇􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀃀􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁖􀁓􀁈􀀅
􀁆􀁌􀂿􀁆􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃
􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁑􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁎􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀏􀀁􀀑􀀜􀀛􀀠􀀞􀀏􀀞􀀗􀀜􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀮􀀰􀀥􀀲􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀱􀀆
􀀈􀀂􀀉􀀊􀀁􀀊􀀋􀀇
􀀑􀀒􀀌􀀏􀀇􀀌􀀑􀀍􀀉􀀓
􀀃􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀄􀀉􀀁􀀆
􀀐􀀑􀀉􀀒􀀆􀀔􀀌􀀐􀀏􀀁􀀐􀀊􀀁􀀔􀀒􀀉􀀆􀀔􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀁􀀁
􀀌􀀏􀀁􀀔􀀋􀀉􀀁􀀉􀀕􀀉􀀏􀀔􀀁􀀐􀀊􀀁􀀆􀀒􀀎􀀉􀀈􀀁􀀇􀀐􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀌􀀇􀀔􀀓
􀀅􀀜􀀚􀀚􀀓􀀛􀀠􀀏􀀞􀀣
􀀑􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀪􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀊􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀁􀀎􀀁􀀡􀀰􀀥􀀁􀀣􀀥􀀬􀀲􀀰􀀡􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀥􀀰􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀥􀀬􀀲􀀨􀀰􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀥􀀲􀀁
􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀤􀀰􀀡􀀦􀀲􀀁􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀪􀀥􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀑􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀪􀀥􀀁􀀊􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀲􀀡􀀢􀀪􀀨􀀱􀀧􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀨􀀰􀀁􀀢􀀡􀀱􀀨􀀣􀀁􀀭􀀰􀀨􀀥􀀬􀀲􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀄􀀁
􀁑􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀏􀀃􀀗􀀝􀀟􀀜􀀁􀀔􀀏􀀑􀀠􀀜􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀫􀀨􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀥􀀁
􀀭􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀳􀀱􀀮􀀥􀀬􀀤􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀥􀀰􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁 􀀭􀀦􀀁 􀀲􀀰􀀥􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀥􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀑􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀪􀀥􀀱􀀁 􀀋􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀁 􀀎􀀁 􀀱􀀥􀀥􀀩􀀁
􀀲􀀭􀀁􀀡􀀱􀀱􀀨􀀱􀀲􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀤􀀥􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀫􀀨􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀵􀀧􀀥􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀰􀀁􀀡􀀁􀀲􀀰􀀥􀀡􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀱􀀳􀀰􀀴􀀨􀀴􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀁
􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃
􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀂿􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁓􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁏􀁒􀁒􀁎􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀑􀀃
􀀝􀀬􀀤􀀥􀀰􀀁 􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀪􀀥􀀁 􀀋􀀄􀀁 􀀡􀀬􀀁 􀀥􀀶􀀮􀀰􀀥􀀱􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀰􀀭􀀴􀀨􀀱􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁 􀀵􀀨􀀲􀀧􀀨􀀬􀀁 􀀡􀀁 􀀲􀀰􀀥􀀡􀀲􀀷􀀁
􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀀅
􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃
􀀰􀀥􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀲􀀁􀀵􀀭􀀳􀀪􀀤􀀁􀀬􀀥􀀶􀀲􀀁􀀢􀀥􀀁􀀧􀀡􀀤􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀤􀀥􀀰􀀁􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀪􀀥􀀁􀀌􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀲􀀡􀀢􀀪􀀨􀀱􀀧􀀥􀀤􀀁
􀀨􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀡􀀪􀀁􀀰􀀳􀀪􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀲􀀰􀀥􀀡􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀮􀀰􀀥􀀲􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀁􀀡􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀁􀀡􀀱􀀣􀀥􀀰􀀲􀀡􀀨􀀬􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃
􀀣􀀭􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀳􀀱􀀨􀀴􀀥􀀁􀀡􀀬􀀱􀀵􀀥􀀰􀀁􀀨􀀱􀀁􀀷􀀨􀀥􀀪􀀤􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀢􀀷􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀡􀀮􀀮􀀪􀀨􀀣􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀭􀀱􀀥􀀁􀀲􀀵􀀭􀀁
􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀪􀀥􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀥􀀬􀀯􀀳􀀨􀀰􀀷􀀁􀀵􀀨􀀪􀀪􀀁􀀱􀀧􀀨􀀦􀀲􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀁􀀣􀀭􀀬􀀱􀀨􀀤􀀥􀀰􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀱􀀁􀀥􀀶􀀲􀀰􀀡􀀬􀀥􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀁
􀀲􀀭􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀲􀀰􀀥􀀡􀀲􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀡􀀬􀀤􀀁􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀪􀀥􀀁􀀍􀀁􀀮􀀰􀀭􀀴􀀨􀀤􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀡􀀁􀀬􀀳􀀫􀀢􀀥􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀣􀀭􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀶􀀲􀀳􀀡􀀪􀀁
􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀭􀀬􀀥􀀁􀀵􀀡􀀷􀀁􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀭􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀔􀀨􀀬􀀡􀀪􀀪􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀤􀀥􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀫􀀨􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀨􀀱􀀁􀀦􀀳􀀰􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀰􀀁
􀀡􀀱􀀱􀀨􀀱􀀲􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀢􀀷􀀁􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀪􀀥􀀁􀀎􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀧􀀨􀀣􀀧􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀦􀀥􀀰􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀤􀀨􀀣􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀴􀀥􀀁􀀪􀀨􀀱􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀀮􀀰􀀭􀀴􀀨􀀤􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀡􀀬􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀤􀀨􀀣􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀡􀀲􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀷􀀁􀀣􀀭􀀬􀀲􀀨􀀬􀀳􀀥􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀥􀀰􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀄􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀁
􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀑􀀃 􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁓􀁖􀁒􀀃
􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀀁􀀢􀀘􀀠􀀜􀀛􀀝􀀖􀀢􀀘􀀁􀀞􀀠􀀁􀀡􀀣􀀡􀀟􀀘􀀝􀀗􀀁􀀢􀀚􀀘􀀁􀀞􀀟􀀘􀀠􀀖􀀢􀀛􀀞􀀝􀀁􀀞􀀙􀀁􀀢􀀠􀀘􀀖􀀢􀀛􀀘􀀡􀀅
􀀂􀀁􀀌􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀞
􀀂􀁅􀀌􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀀓􀀢􀀖􀀢􀀘􀀁􀀢􀀚􀀖􀀢􀀁􀀛􀀡􀀁􀀝􀀞􀀢􀀃
􀀅􀀜􀀚􀀚􀀓􀀛􀀠􀀏􀀞􀀣
􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁒􀀃
􀀲􀀧􀀡􀀲􀀁􀀥􀀬􀀤􀀄􀀁􀀨􀀲􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀣􀀭􀀰􀀮􀀭􀀰􀀡􀀲􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀩􀀥􀀷􀀁􀀤􀀥􀀴􀀥􀀪􀀭􀀮􀀫􀀥􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀥􀀫􀀢􀀭􀀤􀀨􀀥􀀤􀀁
􀀢􀀷􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁 􀀕􀀬􀀱􀀲􀀨􀀲􀀳􀀲􀀥􀀁 􀀭􀀦􀀁 􀀕􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀡􀀪􀀁 􀀖􀀡􀀵􀀁 􀀨􀀬􀀁 􀀨􀀲􀀱􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀏􀀌􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀱􀀭􀀅
􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀝􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀀗􀀝􀀟􀀜􀀁
􀀔􀀏􀀑􀀠􀀜􀀁􀀣􀀡􀀳􀀱􀀥􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀳􀀱􀀮􀀥􀀬􀀱􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀫􀀨􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀡􀀁􀀲􀀰􀀥􀀡􀀲􀀷􀀆􀀁􀀑􀀲􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁜􀀃
􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀏􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃
􀀰􀀥􀀱􀀳􀀪􀀲􀀁 􀀨􀀬􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁 􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀫􀀨􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁 􀀭􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀳􀀱􀀮􀀥􀀬􀀱􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁 􀀭􀀦􀀁 􀀲􀀰􀀥􀀡􀀲􀀷􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀪􀀡􀀅
􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀒􀀭􀀫􀀫􀀨􀀱􀀱􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀣􀀭􀀬􀀱􀀣􀀨􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀪􀀷􀀁􀀤􀀥􀀣􀀨􀀤􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀬􀀭􀀲􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀁􀀡􀀤􀀭􀀮􀀲􀀁
􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁉􀂿􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀣􀀭􀀬􀀲􀀨􀀬􀀳􀀨􀀲􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀣􀀭􀀬􀀣􀀥􀀰􀀬􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀡􀀲􀀁􀀱􀀳􀀣􀀧􀀁􀀡􀀬􀀁􀀡􀀮􀀮􀀰􀀭􀀡􀀣􀀧􀀁􀀵􀀭􀀳􀀪􀀤􀀁
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀃀􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀅
􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀡􀀪􀀁 􀀪􀀡􀀵􀀄􀀁 􀀡􀀬􀀤􀀁 􀀢􀀥􀀣􀀡􀀳􀀱􀀥􀀁 􀀨􀀲􀀁 􀀨􀀫􀀮􀀪􀀨􀀥􀀤􀀁 􀀡􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀭􀀰􀀨􀀥􀀬􀀲􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀀱􀀨􀀲􀀳􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀧􀀥􀀬􀀁􀀱􀀳􀀣􀀧􀀁􀀡􀀁􀀮􀀰􀀥􀀱􀀳􀀫􀀮􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀣􀀭􀀬􀀲􀀨􀀬􀀳􀀨􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀵􀀭􀀳􀀪􀀤􀀁
􀀬􀀭􀀲􀀁 􀀡􀀮􀀮􀀪􀀷􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀧􀀥􀀁 􀀒􀀭􀀫􀀫􀀨􀀱􀀱􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁 􀀵􀀡􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀦􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁 􀀴􀀨􀀥􀀵􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀡􀀲􀀁 􀀱􀀳􀀣􀀧􀀁
􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁘􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃
􀀰􀀨􀀱􀀩􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀡􀀬􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀨􀀮􀀡􀀲􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀏􀀁􀀑􀀜􀀛􀀠􀀞􀀏􀀞􀀗􀀜􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀮􀀰􀀥􀀲􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀲􀀁􀀣􀀭􀀬􀀅
􀀱􀀨􀀤􀀥􀀰􀀥􀀤􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀡􀀲􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁 􀀬􀀥􀀲􀀁 􀀥􀀦􀀦􀀥􀀣􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀦􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁 􀀮􀀰􀀥􀀱􀀥􀀬􀀲􀀁 􀀡􀀮􀀮􀀰􀀭􀀡􀀣􀀧􀀁 􀀭􀀦􀀁
􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀁊􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁊􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀲􀀰􀀥􀀡􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀪􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀱􀀆􀀁
􀀂􀀉􀀃􀀁 􀀜􀀧􀀥􀀁 􀀦􀀭􀀰􀀫􀀳􀀪􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁 􀀨􀀱􀀁 􀀢􀀡􀀱􀀥􀀤􀀁 􀀭􀀬􀀁 􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀪􀀥􀀁 􀀉􀀁 􀀭􀀦􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀱􀀭􀀅
􀀪􀀳􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁 􀀡􀀤􀀭􀀮􀀲􀀥􀀤􀀁 􀀢􀀷􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁 􀀕􀀬􀀱􀀲􀀨􀀲􀀳􀀲􀀥􀀁 􀀭􀀦􀀁 􀀕􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀡􀀪􀀁 􀀖􀀡􀀵􀀁 􀀨􀀬􀀁
􀀈􀀐􀀏􀀌􀀆􀀋􀀇􀀋􀀁􀀜􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀮􀀰􀀨􀀬􀀣􀀨􀀮􀀪􀀥􀀁􀀧􀀡􀀱􀀁􀀢􀀥􀀥􀀬􀀁􀀣􀀭􀀫􀀫􀀥􀀬􀀤􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀢􀀷􀀁􀀡􀀁􀀬􀀳􀀫􀀢􀀥􀀰􀀁
􀀭􀀦􀀁 􀀡􀀳􀀲􀀧􀀭􀀰􀀨􀀲􀀨􀀥􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀙􀀮􀀮􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀥􀀨􀀫􀀁 􀀡􀀱􀀱􀀥􀀰􀀲􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀡􀀲􀀁 􀀸􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀨􀀬􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁
􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁘􀁏􀁖􀀃 􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀂴􀀑􀀋􀀇􀀌􀀁 􀀗􀀣􀀘􀀡􀀨􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀲􀀡􀀲􀀥􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀡􀀲􀀁 􀀸􀀟􀀨􀀠􀀲􀀁 􀀨􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀳􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀪􀀥􀀡􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀡􀀲􀀁 􀀵􀀡􀀰􀀁
􀀤􀀭􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀬􀀭􀀲􀀁􀀝􀀓􀀞􀀁􀀟􀀓􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀀐􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀑􀀋􀀇􀀍􀀃 􀀧􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀥􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁊􀁖􀀃
􀀱􀀡􀀨􀀤􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀡􀀲􀀁
􀀾􀁒􀁀􀁘􀁕􀀃 􀂿􀁕􀁖􀁗􀂲􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁐􀁒􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀂲􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁎􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀀋􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀌􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀀗􀀝􀀟􀀜􀀁􀀔􀀏􀀑􀀠􀀜􀀁􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀅
􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀀨􀀱􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀲􀀡􀀢􀀪􀀨􀀱􀀧􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀡􀀪􀀁􀀪􀀡􀀵􀀆􀀋􀀇􀀎􀀁
􀀜􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀱􀀡􀀫􀀥􀀁􀀣􀀭􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀳􀀱􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀱􀀳􀀪􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀦􀀰􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀣􀀡􀀱􀀥􀀁􀀪􀀡􀀵􀀆􀀁􀀞􀀧􀀨􀀪􀀥􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁
􀀥􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀃􀀫􀁌􀁊􀁋􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁐􀁌􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀂳􀀌􀀖􀀓􀀁
􀀈􀀜􀀡􀀗􀀟􀂴􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀂳􀀾􀁗􀁀􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀂫􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀂿􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀂴􀀏􀀋􀀇􀀏􀀁
􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁚􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀀅
􀀴􀀨􀀤􀀥􀀤􀀁 􀀦􀀭􀀰􀀁 􀀢􀀷􀀁 􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀪􀀥􀀁 􀀊􀀁 􀀭􀀦􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁 􀀮􀀰􀀥􀀱􀀥􀀬􀀲􀀁 􀀤􀀰􀀡􀀦􀀲􀀁 􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀪􀀥􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀧􀀭􀀪􀀤􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀨􀀲􀀱􀀥􀀪􀀦􀀄􀀁􀀤􀀭􀀁􀀡􀀵􀀡􀀷􀀁􀀵􀀨􀀲􀀧􀀁􀀲􀀰􀀥􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀳􀀱􀀮􀀥􀀬􀀤􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀫􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀧􀀨􀀱􀀁􀀨􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀁
􀀮􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀳􀀪􀀡􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀣􀀭􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀳􀀱􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀡􀀣􀀧􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀢􀀷􀀁􀀝􀀬􀀨􀀲􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀛􀀲􀀡􀀲􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀣􀀭􀀳􀀰􀀲􀀱􀀄􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀋􀀜􀀑􀀗􀀓􀀠􀀣􀀁􀀔􀀜􀀞􀀁􀀠􀀖􀀓􀀁􀀊􀀞􀀜􀀝􀀏􀀕􀀏􀀠􀀗􀀜􀀛􀀁
􀀋􀀇􀀋􀀁􀀑􀀰􀀲􀀨􀀣􀀪􀀥􀀁􀀉􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀱􀀭􀀪􀀳􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀕􀀬􀀱􀀲􀀨􀀲􀀳􀀲􀀥􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀕􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀡􀀪􀀁􀀖􀀡􀀵􀀁
􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁖􀀝􀀃􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁎􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀀗􀀝􀀟􀀜􀀁􀀔􀀏􀀑􀀠􀀜􀀁
􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀫􀀨􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀥􀀁􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀳􀀱􀀮􀀥􀀬􀀤􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀥􀀰􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀰􀀥􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀥􀀱􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀁􀀦􀀭􀀰􀀣􀀥􀀁􀀢􀀥􀀲􀀵􀀥􀀥􀀬􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀮􀀡􀀰􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀂴􀀃 􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃 􀀎􀀓􀀏􀀞􀀐􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀄􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀀪􀀆􀀁􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀁􀀚􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀁􀀕􀀕􀀁􀀂􀀱􀀥􀀥􀀁􀀦􀀭􀀭􀀲􀀬􀀭􀀲􀀥􀀁􀀋􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀡􀀢􀀭􀀴􀀥􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀏􀀇􀀃􀀆
􀀋􀀇􀀌􀀁􀀖􀀆􀀁􀀙􀀮􀀮􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀥􀀨􀀫􀀄􀀁􀀆􀀛􀀠􀀓􀀞􀀛􀀏􀀠􀀗􀀜􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀁􀀈􀀏􀀢􀀃􀀁􀀏􀀁􀀌􀀞􀀓􀀏􀀠􀀗􀀟􀀓􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀪􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀕􀀄􀀁􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀀍􀀏􀀞􀀁􀀏􀀛􀀒􀀁􀀉􀀓􀀡􀀠􀀞􀀏􀀙􀀗􀀠􀀣􀀏􀀃􀀚􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀏􀀃􀀫􀀑􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁗􀀃􀀋􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀯􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀯􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀏􀀃
􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀄􀀁􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀇􀀉􀀆
􀀋􀀇􀀍􀀁􀀑􀀆􀀁 􀀓􀀆􀀁 􀀗􀀣􀀘􀀡􀀨􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀀌􀀖􀀓􀀁 􀀈􀀏􀀢􀀁 􀀜􀀔􀀁 􀀌􀀞􀀓􀀏􀀠􀀗􀀓􀀟􀀄􀀁 􀀙􀀶􀀦􀀭􀀰􀀤􀀄􀀁 􀀒􀀪􀀡􀀰􀀥􀀬􀀤􀀭􀀬􀀄􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀁
􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀍􀀐􀀎􀀆
􀀋􀀇􀀎􀀁􀀕􀀬􀀱􀀲􀀨􀀲􀀳􀀲􀀥􀀁 􀀭􀀦􀀁 􀀕􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀰􀀬􀀡􀀲􀀨􀀭􀀬􀀡􀀪􀀁 􀀖􀀡􀀵􀀄􀀁 􀀎􀀓􀀏􀀞􀀐􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀄􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀪􀀆􀀁 􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀁 􀀚􀀡􀀰􀀲􀀁 􀀕􀀄􀀁 􀀛􀀥􀀱􀀅
􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀫􀁈􀁏􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁎􀁌􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀘􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀛􀂱􀀜􀀞􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀀫􀀑􀀃􀀥􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁊􀁖􀀃􀀋􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀌􀀖􀀓􀀁􀀈􀀏􀀢􀀁􀀜􀀔􀀁
􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀝􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀄􀀁􀀉􀀬􀀤􀀁􀀥􀀤􀀆􀀄􀀁􀀖􀀭􀀬􀀤􀀭􀀬􀀄􀀁􀀛􀀲􀀥􀀴􀀥􀀬􀀱􀀁􀀡􀀬􀀤􀀁
􀀛􀀭􀀬􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀊􀀄􀀁􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀐􀀊􀀏􀀆
􀀋􀀇􀀏􀀁􀀈􀀌􀀁􀀓􀀥􀀣􀀥􀀫􀀢􀀥􀀰􀀁􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀁􀀄􀀞􀀗􀀠􀀗􀀟􀀖􀀁􀀆􀀛􀀠􀀓􀀞􀀛􀀏􀀠􀀗􀀜􀀛􀀏􀀙􀀁􀀈􀀏􀀢􀀁􀀅􀀏􀀟􀀓􀀟􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀪􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀄􀀁􀀇􀀡􀀞􀀂
􀀗􀀟􀀒􀀗􀀑􀀠􀀗􀀜􀀛􀀄􀀁􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀍􀀐􀀈􀀄􀀁􀀡􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀎􀀇􀀏􀀆
􀀅􀀅􀀆􀀁 􀀊􀀑􀀚􀀙􀀛􀀝􀀁􀀙􀀒􀀁􀀝􀀓􀀑􀀁􀀈􀀘􀀝􀀑􀀛􀀘􀀍􀀝􀀔􀀙􀀘􀀍􀀖􀀁􀀉􀀍􀀠􀀁􀀇􀀙􀀗􀀗􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀔􀀙􀀘􀀁􀀙􀀘􀀁􀀝􀀓􀀑􀀁􀀠􀀙􀀛􀀕􀀁􀀙􀀒􀀁􀀔􀀝􀀜􀀁􀀜􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀢􀀃􀀝􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀐􀀁􀀜􀀑􀀜􀀜􀀔􀀙􀀘
􀀩􀀡􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀠􀀁􀀐􀀩􀀭􀀪􀀠􀀦􀀁􀀷􀀆􀀁􀀷􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀱􀁈􀁚􀀃􀀫􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀏􀀉􀀊􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀸􀀪􀀨􀀳􀀨􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁
􀀟􀀶􀀱􀀳􀀨􀀮􀀨􀀁􀀓􀀰􀀶􀀳􀀵􀀁􀀴􀀤􀀫􀀧􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀤􀀵
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁉􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁘􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃
􀀤􀀴􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀱􀀨􀀤􀀦􀀨􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀯􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀦􀀨􀀤􀀴􀀨􀀁􀀰􀀯􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀰􀀦􀀦􀀶􀀳􀀳􀀨􀀯􀀦􀀨􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀸􀀤􀀳􀀄􀀁􀀥􀀶􀀵􀀁􀀤􀀳􀀨􀀄􀀁􀀤􀀵􀀁􀀮􀀰􀀴􀀵􀀄􀀁
􀀴􀀶􀀴􀀱􀀨􀀯􀀧􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀸􀀪􀀫􀀭􀀨􀀁􀀫􀀵􀀁􀀭􀀤􀀴􀀵􀀴􀀆􀀋􀀇􀀐
􀀑􀀁􀀮􀀰􀀳􀀨􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀨􀀯􀀵􀀁􀀦􀀤􀀴􀀨􀀁􀀫􀀴􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀤􀀵􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀓􀀜􀀬􀀨􀀯􀀮􀀣􀀁􀀷􀀆􀀁􀀛􀀨􀀤􀀮􀀠􀀟􀀁􀀙􀀮􀀜􀀮􀀠􀀭􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀉􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀁
􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀅
􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀬􀀬􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀈􀀎􀀐􀀋􀀁􀀥􀀨􀀵􀀸􀀨􀀨􀀯􀀁􀀒􀀳􀀫􀀵􀀤􀀫􀀯􀀁􀀤􀀯􀀧􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀡􀀯􀀫􀀵􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀟􀀵􀀤􀀵􀀨􀀴􀀄􀀋􀀈􀀇􀀁􀁆􀁒􀁑􀂿􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀝
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁒􀁒􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀥􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀅
􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀝􀀃
􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀞􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁎􀁈􀀞􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁐􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀀸􀀪􀀫􀀦􀀪􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀱􀀳􀀨􀀴􀀨􀀯􀀵􀀁􀀦􀀰􀀮􀀱􀀭􀀨􀀵􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀤􀀦􀀵􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀯􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀳􀀁􀀪􀀤􀀯􀀧􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀳􀀨􀀤􀀵􀀫􀀨􀀴􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀫􀀵􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁
􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁎􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀂳􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁜􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂴􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀀤􀀳􀀨􀀁􀀤􀀥􀀴􀀰􀀭􀀶􀀵􀀨􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀤􀀯􀀯􀀶􀀭􀀭􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀥􀀺􀀁􀀸􀀤􀀳􀀆􀀋􀀈􀀈
􀀤􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀭􀀫􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀩􀀰􀀭􀀭􀀰􀀸􀀨􀀧􀀆􀀁􀀠􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀫􀀯􀀨􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀤􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀳􀀄􀀁􀀫􀀴􀀁􀀵􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀫􀀮􀀫􀀵􀀁􀀵􀀨􀀳􀀮􀀫􀀯􀀤􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀂳􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀂴􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀀅
􀀫􀀴􀀵􀀨􀀯􀀦􀀨􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀪􀀰􀀴􀀵􀀫􀀭􀀫􀀵􀀫􀀨􀀴􀀁􀀤􀀯􀀧􀀁􀀵􀀳􀀨􀀤􀀵􀀫􀀨􀀴􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀮􀀤􀀫􀀯􀀵􀀨􀀯􀀤􀀯􀀦􀀨􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀸􀀪􀀫􀀦􀀪􀀁
􀁌􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀂴􀀑􀀋􀀈􀀉
􀀺􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁚􀁄􀁜􀁖􀀃
􀀮􀀰􀀧􀀨􀀭􀀴􀀁 􀀰􀀩􀀁 􀀦􀀭􀀤􀀳􀀫􀀵􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀀫􀀵􀀁 􀀪􀀤􀀴􀀁 􀀥􀀨􀀦􀀰􀀮􀀨􀀁 􀀨􀀷􀀫􀀧􀀨􀀯􀀵􀀁 􀀵􀀪􀀤􀀵􀀄􀀁 􀀶􀀯􀀧􀀨􀀳􀀁
􀀦􀀰􀀯􀀵􀀨􀀮􀀱􀀰􀀳􀀤􀀳􀀺􀀁􀀫􀀯􀀵􀀨􀀳􀀯􀀤􀀵􀀫􀀰􀀯􀀤􀀭􀀁􀀭􀀤􀀸􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀨􀀹􀀫􀀴􀀵􀀨􀀯􀀦􀀨􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀤􀀯􀀁􀀤􀀳􀀮􀀨􀀧􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀀤􀀪􀀭􀀩􀀁 􀀡􀀜􀀞􀀮􀀩􀀁 􀀱􀀶􀀵􀀁 􀀤􀀯􀀁 􀀨􀀯􀀧􀀁 􀀵􀀰􀀁 􀀰􀀳􀀁 􀀴􀀶􀀴􀀱􀀨􀀯􀀧􀀁
􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃
􀀫􀀯􀀧􀀨􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀭􀀤􀀱􀀴􀀨􀀁􀀰􀀳􀀁􀀥􀀨􀀁􀀴􀀶􀀴􀀱􀀨􀀯􀀧􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀰􀀯􀀁􀀤􀀦􀀦􀀰􀀶􀀯􀀵􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀫􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀤􀀵􀀶􀀳􀀨􀀄􀀁
􀀦􀀰􀀮􀀮􀀨􀀳􀀦􀀫􀀤􀀭􀀁􀀵􀀳􀀨􀀤􀀵􀀫􀀨􀀴􀀁􀀩􀀰􀀳􀀁􀀫􀀯􀀴􀀵􀀤􀀯􀀦􀀨􀀆􀀋􀀈􀀊
􀀂􀀊􀀃􀀁 􀀠􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀩􀀨􀀳􀀨􀀯􀀦􀀨􀀁􀀫􀀯􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀞􀀣􀀜􀀪􀀠􀀜􀀯􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀂴􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁎􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃
􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑
􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀃 􀀶􀁘􀁅􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀁖􀀃􀀋􀀜􀀃􀀁􀀤􀀯􀀧􀀁􀀂􀀝􀀃􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀵􀀤􀀥􀀭􀀫􀀴􀀪􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀷􀀤􀀳􀀫􀀰􀀶􀀴􀀁􀀪􀀺􀀅
􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀴􀀨􀀴􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀱􀀤􀀳􀀵􀀫􀀨􀀴􀀁􀀦􀀰􀀷􀀨􀀳􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀥􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀱􀀳􀀨􀀴􀀨􀀯􀀵􀀁􀀧􀀳􀀤􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀤􀀳􀀵􀀫􀀦􀀭􀀨􀀴􀀄􀀁
􀀋􀀇􀀐􀀁􀀙􀀩􀀞􀀤􀀠􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀡􀀩􀀬􀀁 􀀮􀀣􀀠􀀁 􀀗􀀬􀀩􀀪􀀜􀀢􀀜􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀁 􀀩􀀡􀀁 􀀮􀀣􀀠􀀁 􀀐􀀩􀀭􀀪􀀠􀀦􀀁 􀀷􀀆􀀁 􀀚􀀩􀀰􀀨􀀁 􀀩􀀡􀀁 􀀕􀀠􀀰􀀁
􀀫􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀄􀀁􀀑􀀗􀀙􀀓􀀁 􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀇􀀲􀀅􀀌􀀉􀀋􀀄􀀁 􀀷􀀰􀀭􀀆􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀄􀀁 􀀱􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀋􀀈􀀁 􀀠􀀮􀀁 􀀭􀀠􀀫􀀄􀀄􀀁 􀀤􀀵􀀁 􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀋􀀏􀀄􀀁 􀀉􀀈􀀁 􀀡􀀆􀀟􀀆􀀁
􀀂􀀏􀀁􀀢􀀪􀀨􀀤􀀵􀀆􀀃􀀁􀀋􀀍􀀋􀀆
􀀋􀀈􀀇􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀤􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀱􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀀫􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀀥􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁎􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀤􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀃 􀀋􀀭􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀌􀀏􀀃
􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀀯􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀃 􀀱􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀀔􀀚􀀜􀀗􀀏􀀃 􀀫􀀑􀀃 􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀀋􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀌􀀏􀀃 􀀚􀀬􀀠􀀜􀀮􀀤􀀠􀀭􀀁
􀀜􀀨􀀟􀀁􀀖􀀮􀀣􀀠􀀬􀀁􀀒􀀨􀀮􀀠􀀬􀀨􀀜􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀜􀀦􀀁􀀍􀀞􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀩􀀡􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀠􀀁􀀛􀀨􀀤􀀮􀀠􀀟􀀁􀀙􀀮􀀜􀀮􀀠􀀭􀀁􀀩􀀡􀀁􀀍􀀧􀀠􀀬􀀤􀀞􀀜􀀄􀀁􀀷􀀰􀀭􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀄􀀁
􀀺􀁄􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁗􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀀧􀀑􀀦􀀑􀀏􀀃 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀀪􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀲􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀖􀀔􀀏􀀃
􀀧􀀰􀀦􀀶􀀮􀀨􀀯􀀵􀀁􀀛􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀁􀀱􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀋􀀌􀀁􀀠􀀮􀀁􀀭􀀠􀀫􀀆􀀄􀀁􀀤􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀋􀀍􀀻􀀉􀀋􀀎􀀁􀀂􀀤􀀳􀀵􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀃􀀆
􀀋􀀈􀀈􀀁􀀓􀀜􀀬􀀨􀀯􀀮􀀣􀀁 􀀷􀀆􀀁 􀀛􀀨􀀤􀀮􀀠􀀟􀀁 􀀙􀀮􀀜􀀮􀀠􀀭􀀄􀀁􀀑􀀗􀀙􀀓􀀁 􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀇􀀲􀀅􀀌􀀉􀀋􀀄􀀁 􀀷􀀰􀀭􀀆􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀄􀀁 􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀋􀀐􀀄􀀁 􀀤􀀵􀀁
􀁓􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀕􀃭􀀘􀀖􀀑
􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀁􀀚􀀠􀀞􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀷􀀆􀀁􀀑􀀯􀀢􀀣􀀠􀀭􀀄􀀁􀀡􀀯􀀫􀀵􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀟􀀵􀀤􀀵􀀨􀀴􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀰􀀶􀀳􀀵􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀑􀀱􀀱􀀨􀀤􀀭􀀴􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀛􀀨􀀸􀀁􀀣􀀰􀀳􀀬􀀄􀀁
􀀑􀀗􀀙􀀓􀀁􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀇􀀲􀀅􀀌􀀉􀀋􀀄􀀁􀀷􀀰􀀭􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀄􀀁􀀱􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀐􀀌􀀁􀀠􀀮􀀁􀀭􀀠􀀫􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀴􀀨􀀨􀀁􀀤􀀭􀀴􀀰􀀁􀀗􀀙􀀞􀀄􀀁􀀷􀀰􀀭􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀤􀀴􀀨􀀁
􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃 􀀕􀀚􀀔􀀌􀀞􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀏􀀦􀀜􀀬􀀥􀀁 􀀷􀀆􀀁 􀀍􀀦􀀦􀀠􀀨􀀄􀀁 􀀡􀀯􀀫􀀵􀀨􀀧􀀁 􀀟􀀵􀀤􀀵􀀨􀀴􀀄􀀁 􀀟􀀶􀀱􀀳􀀨􀀮􀀨􀀁 􀀓􀀰􀀶􀀳􀀵􀀄􀀁 􀀑􀀗􀀙􀀓􀀁
􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀇􀀲􀀅􀀌􀀉􀀋􀀄􀀁􀀷􀀰􀀭􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀄􀀁􀀱􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀎􀀇􀀁􀀠􀀮􀀁􀀭􀀠􀀫􀀄􀀄􀀁􀀤􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀎􀀏􀀻􀀎􀀐􀀆
􀀋􀀈􀀊􀀁􀀘􀀯􀀭􀀭􀀤􀀜􀀨􀀲􀀐􀀠􀀬􀀧􀀜􀀨􀀁 􀀏􀀩􀀧􀀧􀀠􀀬􀀞􀀤􀀜􀀦􀀁 􀀚􀀬􀀠􀀜􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀀤􀀴􀀨􀀄􀀁 􀀖􀀨􀀳􀀮􀀤􀀯􀀁
􀀘􀀠􀀤􀀞􀀣􀀭􀀢􀀠􀀬􀀤􀀞􀀣􀀮􀀄􀀁 􀀉􀀊􀀁 􀀚􀀤􀀺􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀉􀀌􀀄􀀁 􀀑􀀔􀀝􀀗􀀙􀀓􀀁 􀀅􀀌􀀆􀀈􀀲􀀅􀀌􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀁 􀀓􀀤􀀴􀀨􀀁 􀀛􀀰􀀆􀀁 􀀊􀀊􀀈􀀄􀀁
􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀋􀀊􀀏􀀆􀀁 􀀟􀀨􀀨􀀁 􀀤􀀭􀀴􀀰􀀁 􀀘􀀩􀀭􀀭􀀩􀀁 􀀷􀀆􀀁 􀀔􀀜􀀬􀀬􀀩􀀄􀀁 􀀕􀀳􀀤􀀯􀀦􀀨􀀄􀀁 􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀀃 􀀪􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀀄􀀁
􀀈􀀏􀀁 􀀘􀀤􀀯􀀶􀀤􀀳􀀺􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀁 􀀑􀀔􀀝􀀗􀀙􀀓􀀁 􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀖􀂱􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀘􀀏􀀃 􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃 􀀔􀀓􀀗􀀞􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀎􀀯􀀭􀀭􀀤􀀁 􀀷􀀆􀀁
􀀔􀀠􀀨􀀠􀀮􀀮􀀤􀀄􀀁 􀀕􀀳􀀤􀀯􀀦􀀨􀀄􀀁 􀀏􀀩􀀯􀀬􀀁 􀀟􀀠􀀁 􀀞􀀜􀀭􀀭􀀜􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀁 􀀂􀀏􀀣􀀜􀀧􀀝􀀬􀀠􀀁 􀀭􀀩􀀞􀀤􀀜􀀦􀀠􀀃􀀄􀀁 􀀌􀀁 􀀛􀀰􀀷􀀨􀀮􀀥􀀨􀀳􀀁
􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀊􀀄􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀤􀀟􀀄􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀤􀀴􀀨􀀁􀀛􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀇􀀊􀀆
􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀅
􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃
􀀵􀀪􀀤􀀵􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀰􀀱􀀵􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀥􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀗􀀯􀀴􀀵􀀫􀀵􀀶􀀵􀀨􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀗􀀯􀀵􀀨􀀳􀀯􀀤􀀵􀀫􀀰􀀯􀀤􀀭􀀁􀀙􀀤􀀸􀀁􀀫􀀯􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀤􀀵􀀄􀀁
􀀸􀀪􀀫􀀭􀀨􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀗􀀯􀀴􀀵􀀫􀀵􀀶􀀵􀀨􀀼􀀴􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀴􀀰􀀭􀀶􀀵􀀫􀀰􀀯􀀁􀀫􀀴􀀁􀀦􀀰􀀯􀀦􀀨􀀳􀀯􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀸􀀫􀀵􀀪􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀩􀀤􀀵􀀨􀀁
􀀰􀀩􀀁 􀀵􀀳􀀨􀀤􀀵􀀫􀀨􀀴􀀁 􀀫􀀯􀀁 􀀩􀀰􀀳􀀦􀀨􀀁 􀀥􀀨􀀵􀀸􀀨􀀨􀀯􀀁 􀀟􀀵􀀤􀀵􀀨􀀴􀀁 􀀱􀀤􀀳􀀵􀀫􀀨􀀴􀀁 􀀵􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁 􀀤􀀳􀀮􀀨􀀧􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁋􀁜􀀅
􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀴􀀨􀀴􀀁􀀧􀀫􀀴􀀦􀀶􀀴􀀴􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀫􀀯􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀦􀀰􀀯􀀵􀀨􀀹􀀵􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀤􀀳􀀵􀀫􀀦􀀭􀀨􀀁􀀈􀀆
􀀋􀀘􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃 􀁄􀀃
􀀵􀀳􀀨􀀤􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀤􀀴􀀁􀀰􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀦􀀰􀀯􀀴􀀨􀀲􀀶􀀨􀀯􀀦􀀨􀀴􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀤􀀯􀀁􀀰􀀶􀀵􀀥􀀳􀀨􀀤􀀬􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀤􀀳􀀮􀀨􀀧􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀏􀀃
􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀀦􀀰􀀯􀀴􀀦􀀫􀀰􀀶􀀴􀀁􀀧􀀨􀀦􀀫􀀴􀀫􀀰􀀯􀀁􀀥􀀺􀀁􀀤􀀁􀀟􀀵􀀤􀀵􀀨􀀄􀀁􀀸􀀪􀀨􀀳􀀨􀀤􀀴􀀁􀀤􀀳􀀵􀀫􀀦􀀭􀀨􀀁􀀊􀀁􀀧􀀨􀀤􀀭􀀴􀀁􀀸􀀫􀀵􀀪􀀁
􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀤􀀶􀀵􀀰􀀮􀀤􀀵􀀫􀀦􀀁􀀤􀀱􀀱􀀭􀀫􀀦􀀤􀀵􀀫􀀰􀀯􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀭􀀤􀀸􀀆
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀑􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖
􀀌􀀓􀀑􀀛􀀑􀀁􀀍􀀁􀀝􀀛􀀑􀀍􀀝􀀢􀀁􀀔􀀝􀀜􀀑􀀖􀀒􀀁􀀏􀀙􀀘􀀝􀀍􀀔􀀘􀀜􀀁􀀚􀀛􀀙􀀟􀀔􀀜􀀔􀀙􀀘􀀜􀀁􀀙􀀘􀀁􀀔􀀝􀀜􀀁􀀙􀀚􀀃
􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀀃
􀀜􀀔􀀙􀀘􀀜􀀁􀀜􀀓􀀍􀀖􀀖􀀁􀀍􀀚􀀚􀀖􀀢􀀄
􀀏􀀩􀀧􀀧􀀠􀀨􀀮􀀜􀀬􀀱
􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁜􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃
􀀴􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀳􀀰􀀷􀀫􀀧􀀨􀀴􀀄􀀁􀀦􀀰􀀯􀀵􀀫􀀯􀀶􀀨􀀴􀀁􀀵􀀰􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀨􀀳􀀤􀀵􀀨􀀁􀀫􀀯􀀁􀀴􀀫􀀵􀀶􀀤􀀵􀀫􀀰􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀤􀀳􀀮􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀦􀀰􀀯􀀅
􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀂿􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁓􀀃
􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀫􀀯􀀲􀀶􀀫􀀳􀀺􀀁􀀴􀀪􀀰􀀶􀀭􀀧􀀁􀀥􀀨􀀁􀀵􀀰􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀵􀀤􀀥􀀭􀀫􀀴􀀪􀀁􀀸􀀪􀀨􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀳􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀵􀀳􀀨􀀤􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀴􀀰􀀁
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀀅
􀀷􀀫􀀴􀀫􀀰􀀯􀀁􀀤􀀯􀀧􀀁􀀫􀀵􀀴􀀁􀀴􀀦􀀰􀀱􀀨􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀨􀀵􀀵􀀭􀀨􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀲􀀶􀀨􀀴􀀵􀀫􀀰􀀯􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀦􀀰􀀯􀀵􀀫􀀯􀀶􀀫􀀵􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀠􀀪􀀫􀀴􀀁
􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀑
􀀂􀀉􀀃􀀁 􀀠􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀓􀀰􀀮􀀮􀀫􀀴􀀴􀀫􀀰􀀯􀀁􀀦􀀰􀀯􀀴􀀫􀀧􀀨􀀳􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀸􀀪􀀨􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀳􀀁􀀵􀀰􀀁􀀫􀀯􀀦􀀭􀀶􀀧􀀨􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁
􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀂿􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀂳􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁏􀁜􀂴􀀏􀀃 􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀩􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀂿􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃
􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀙􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀚􀀑
􀀂􀀊􀀃􀀁 􀀜􀀯􀀁 􀀤􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀳􀀫􀀦􀀵􀀁 􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀸􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀪􀀫􀀴􀀁 􀀤􀀳􀀵􀀫􀀦􀀭􀀨􀀁 􀀮􀀤􀀺􀀁 􀀴􀀨􀀨􀀮􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀧􀀶􀀯􀀧􀀤􀀯􀀵􀀄􀀁
􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀋􀀓􀀑􀀁􀀛􀀞􀀖􀀑􀀜􀀁􀀙􀀒􀀁􀀔􀀘􀀝􀀑􀀛􀀘􀀍􀀝􀀔􀀙􀀘􀀍􀀖􀀁􀀖􀀍􀀠􀀁􀀙􀀘􀀁􀀝􀀛􀀑􀀍􀀝􀀢􀀁􀀔􀀘􀀝􀀑􀀛􀀚􀀛􀀑􀀝􀀍􀀃
􀀝􀀔􀀙􀀘􀀁 􀀜􀀓􀀍􀀖􀀖􀀁 􀀎􀀑􀀁 􀀍􀀚􀀚􀀖􀀔􀀑􀀐􀀁 􀀝􀀙􀀁 􀀑􀀜􀀝􀀍􀀎􀀖􀀔􀀜􀀓􀀁 􀀠􀀓􀀑􀀝􀀓􀀑􀀛􀀁 􀀍􀀁 􀀝􀀛􀀑􀀍􀀝􀀢􀀁 􀀔􀀜􀀁
􀀜􀀞􀀜􀀏􀀑􀀚􀀝􀀔􀀎􀀖􀀑􀀁􀀝􀀙􀀁􀀝􀀑􀀛􀀗􀀔􀀘􀀍􀀝􀀔􀀙􀀘􀀂􀀁􀀠􀀔􀀝􀀓􀀐􀀛􀀍􀀠􀀍􀀖􀀁􀀙􀀛􀀁􀀜􀀞􀀜􀀚􀀑􀀘􀀜􀀔􀀙􀀘􀀁
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑
􀀏􀀩􀀧􀀧􀀠􀀨􀀮􀀜􀀬􀀱
􀀂􀀈􀀃􀀁 􀀑􀀳􀀵􀀫􀀦􀀭􀀨􀀁􀀌􀀁􀀩􀀰􀀭􀀭􀀰􀀸􀀴􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀰􀀮􀀁􀀤􀀳􀀵􀀫􀀦􀀭􀀨􀀁􀀋􀀁􀀫􀀯􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀤􀀵􀀁􀀫􀀵􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀱􀀳􀀨􀀴􀀨􀀯􀀵􀀴􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀅
􀀵􀀫􀀰􀀯􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀤􀀳􀀵􀀫􀀦􀀭􀀨􀀁􀀋􀀁􀀱􀀳􀀰􀀷􀀨􀀴􀀁􀀫􀀯􀀦􀀰􀀯􀀦􀀭􀀶􀀴􀀫􀀷􀀨􀀆􀀁􀀗􀀵􀀁􀀫􀀴􀀁􀀤􀀭􀀴􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀴􀀨􀀦􀀰􀀯􀀧􀀁
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀅
􀀵􀀨􀀳􀀯􀀤􀀭􀀁􀀵􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀵􀀳􀀨􀀤􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀤􀀴􀀁􀀧􀀫􀀴􀀵􀀫􀀯􀀦􀀵􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀰􀀮􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀦􀀰􀀯􀀴􀀫􀀧􀀨􀀳􀀤􀀵􀀫􀀰􀀯􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁
􀀩􀀤􀀦􀀵􀀰􀀳􀀴􀀁􀀨􀀹􀀵􀀨􀀳􀀯􀀤􀀭􀀁􀀵􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀵􀀳􀀨􀀤􀀵􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀩􀀨􀀳􀀳􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀵􀀰􀀁􀀫􀀯􀀁􀀤􀀳􀀵􀀫􀀦􀀭􀀨􀀁􀀍􀀄􀀁􀀸􀀪􀀫􀀦􀀪􀀁
􀁐􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀀵􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀨􀀳􀀮􀀫􀀯􀀤􀀵􀀫􀀰􀀯􀀁􀀰􀀳􀀁􀀸􀀫􀀵􀀪􀀧􀀳􀀤􀀸􀀤􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀳􀀁􀀴􀀶􀀴􀀱􀀨􀀯􀀴􀀫􀀰􀀯􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀨􀀳􀀤􀀵􀀫􀀰􀀯􀀆􀀁
􀀠􀀪􀀨􀀁 􀀱􀀳􀀰􀀷􀀫􀀴􀀫􀀰􀀯􀀁 􀀫􀀴􀀁 􀀫􀀯􀀵􀀨􀀯􀀵􀀫􀀰􀀯􀀤􀀭􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀧􀀳􀀤􀀩􀀵􀀨􀀧􀀁 􀀫􀀯􀀁 􀀤􀀯􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀨􀀯􀀅􀀨􀀯􀀧􀀨􀀧􀀁
􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀀋􀂳􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀂴􀀌􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀙􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀚􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁒􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀑
􀀃 􀀨􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀁 􀀆􀀆􀀇
􀀂􀀈􀀃􀀁 􀀏􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀁􀀋􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀦􀀪􀀟􀀧􀀜􀀨􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀘􀀩􀀄􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀘􀀙􀀨􀀜􀀣􀀚􀀜􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀁􀀘􀀁􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀘􀀧􀀁
􀀟􀀣􀀛􀀟􀀚􀀘􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀩􀀜􀀭􀀩􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀜􀀘􀀩􀀮􀀁􀀟􀀩􀀨􀀜􀀡􀀝􀀄􀀁􀀤􀀣􀀜􀀁􀀨􀀞􀀤􀀪􀀡􀀛􀀁􀀨􀀜􀀜􀀠􀀁􀀩􀀤􀀁
􀁄􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀀅
􀀡􀀟􀀨􀀞􀀜􀀛􀀁􀀧􀀪􀀡􀀜􀀨􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀩􀀜􀀧􀀣􀀘􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀘􀀡􀀁􀀡􀀘􀀬􀀁􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀜􀀘􀀩􀀮􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀩􀀜􀀧􀀥􀀧􀀜􀀩􀀘􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀄􀀁
􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁈􀃀􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀖􀀔􀀃
􀀘􀀣􀀛􀀁􀀉􀀈􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀇􀀎􀀌􀀎􀀁􀀖􀀟􀀜􀀣􀀣􀀘􀀁􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀫􀀜􀀣􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀐􀀤􀀢􀀢􀀟􀀨􀀨􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀁
􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀂴􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃
􀀘􀀡􀀡􀀁􀀔􀀩􀀘􀀩􀀜􀀨􀀁􀀘􀀧􀀜􀀁􀀥􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀜􀀨􀀁􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀇􀀎􀀌􀀎􀀁􀀖􀀟􀀜􀀣􀀣􀀘􀀁􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀫􀀜􀀣􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀄􀀁􀀘􀀣􀀛􀀁
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀑
􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃
􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀩􀀜􀀣􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀥􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀜􀀨􀀁􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀜􀀘􀀩􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀞􀀟􀀨􀀁􀀟􀀛􀀜􀀘􀀁􀀞􀀘􀀛􀀁
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀪􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃
􀀤􀀝􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀜􀀘􀀩􀀟􀀜􀀨􀀁􀀧􀀘􀀧􀀜􀀡􀀮􀀁􀀥􀀧􀀤􀀫􀀟􀀛􀀜􀀁􀀘􀀣􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀛􀀟􀀚􀀘􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀟􀀧􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀩􀀜􀀣􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀁
􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀜􀀘􀀩􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀗􀀞􀀜􀀧􀀜􀀫􀀜􀀧􀀁􀀨􀀪􀀚􀀞􀀁􀀘􀀣􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀩􀀜􀀣􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀟􀀨􀀁􀀛􀀟􀀨􀀚􀀜􀀧􀀣􀀟􀀙􀀡􀀜􀀄􀀁􀀟􀀩􀀁
􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁎􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀂲􀁄􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁙􀀅
􀀜􀀧􀀜􀀛􀀁􀀙􀀮􀀁􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀁􀀊􀀆􀀁􀀏􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀝􀀜􀀧􀀜􀀣􀀚􀀜􀀁􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀩􀀜􀀣􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀥􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀜􀀨􀀁
􀀚􀀤􀀪􀀡􀀛􀀁􀀘􀀡􀀨􀀤􀀁􀀞􀀘􀀫􀀜􀀁􀀙􀀜􀀜􀀣􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀩􀀜􀀧􀀥􀀧􀀜􀀩􀀜􀀛􀀁􀀘􀀨􀀁􀀘􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀟􀀣􀀩􀀧􀀤􀀛􀀪􀀚􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀁􀀘􀀁
􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁌􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀝􀀜􀀧􀀜􀀣􀀚􀀜􀀁􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀒􀀘􀀬􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀁􀀕􀀧􀀜􀀘􀀩􀀟􀀜􀀨􀀁􀀞􀀘􀀛􀀁􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀘􀀧􀀡􀀮􀀁􀀤􀀥􀀩􀀜􀀛􀀁􀀝􀀤􀀧􀀁
􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀂴􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃
􀀱􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀛􀀜􀀩􀀜􀀧􀀢􀀟􀀣􀀘􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀨􀀁􀀨􀀜􀀩􀀁􀀤􀀪􀀩􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀁􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀁􀀉􀀇􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀇􀀎􀀌􀀎􀀁􀀖􀀟􀀜􀀣􀀣􀀘􀀁
􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀫􀀜􀀣􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀆
􀀂􀀊􀀃􀀁 􀀕􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀩􀀟􀀩􀀡􀀜􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀁􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀁􀀋􀀁􀀟􀀨􀀁􀀝􀀤􀀧􀀢􀀪􀀡􀀘􀀩􀀜􀀛􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀁􀀨􀀪􀀚􀀞􀀁􀀘􀀁􀀢􀀘􀀣􀀣􀀜􀀧􀀁
􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀂿􀁕􀁐􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃 􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀂿􀁆􀀃
􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀘􀀧􀀜􀀁􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀙􀀜􀀁􀀘􀀥􀀥􀀡􀀟􀀜􀀛􀀆􀀁􀀏􀀨􀀁􀀬􀀟􀀩􀀞􀀁􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀁􀀊􀀄􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀥􀀧􀀤􀀫􀀟􀀨􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀟􀀨􀀁􀀨􀀩􀀧􀀟􀀚􀀩􀀡􀀮􀀁
􀀣􀀤􀀩􀀁􀀣􀀜􀀚􀀜􀀨􀀨􀀘􀀧􀀮􀀁􀀘􀀨􀀁􀀤􀀣􀀜􀀁􀀬􀀤􀀪􀀡􀀛􀀁􀀩􀀮􀀥􀀟􀀚􀀘􀀡􀀡􀀮􀀁􀀨􀀜􀀜􀀠􀀁􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀩􀀜􀀧􀀥􀀧􀀜􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁
􀀩􀀧􀀜􀀘􀀩􀀮􀀁 􀀟􀀣􀀁 􀀘􀀣􀀮􀀁 􀀜􀀫􀀜􀀣􀀩􀀆􀀁 􀀓􀀤􀀣􀀜􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀡􀀜􀀨􀀨􀀄􀀁 􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁 􀀥􀀧􀀤􀀫􀀟􀀨􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀁 􀀬􀀘􀀨􀀁 􀀟􀀣􀀅
􀀚􀀡􀀪􀀛􀀜􀀛􀀁􀀝􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀜􀀭􀀥􀀤􀀨􀀟􀀩􀀤􀀧􀀮􀀁􀀚􀀡􀀘􀀧􀀟􀀩􀀮􀀆
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀙􀀑􀀃 􀀩􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀊􀀗􀀁􀀘􀀚􀀎􀀏􀀚􀀁􀀜􀀘􀀁􀀋􀀛􀀍􀀏􀀚􀀜􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀟􀀒􀀏􀀜􀀒􀀏􀀚􀀁􀀋􀀁􀀜􀀚􀀏􀀋􀀜􀀡􀀁􀀓􀀛􀀁􀀛􀀝􀀛􀀍􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀓􀀌􀀕􀀏􀀁
􀀜􀀘􀀁􀀜􀀏􀀚􀀖􀀓􀀗􀀋􀀜􀀓􀀘􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀟􀀓􀀜􀀒􀀎􀀚􀀋􀀟􀀋􀀕􀀁􀀘􀀚􀀁􀀛􀀝􀀛􀀙􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀓􀀘􀀗􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀜􀀒􀀏􀀁􀀏􀀞􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀀐􀀋􀀍􀀜􀀘􀀚􀀛􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀍􀀕􀀝􀀎􀀓􀀗􀀑􀀈
􀀂􀀁􀀃􀀁 􀀜􀀒􀀏􀀁􀀗􀀋􀀜􀀝􀀚􀀏􀀁􀀘􀀐􀀁􀀜􀀒􀀏􀀁􀀜􀀚􀀏􀀋􀀜􀀡􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀙􀀋􀀚􀀜􀀓􀀍􀀝􀀕􀀋􀀚􀀁􀀓􀀜􀀛􀀁􀀛􀀝􀀌􀀅
􀀔􀀏􀀍􀀜􀀁􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀜􀀏􀀚􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀜􀀛􀀁􀀘􀀌􀀔􀀏􀀍􀀜􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀎􀀁􀀙􀀝􀀚􀀙􀀘􀀛􀀏􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀜􀀛􀀁􀀍􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀎􀀁􀀜􀀒􀀏􀀁
􀀗􀀝􀀖􀀌􀀏􀀚􀀁􀀘􀀐􀀁􀀙􀀋􀀚􀀜􀀓􀀏􀀛􀀁􀀜􀀘􀀁􀀜􀀒􀀏􀀁􀀜􀀚􀀏􀀋􀀜􀀡􀀉􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀎
􀀂􀁅􀀌􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀀋􀀛􀀁􀀓􀀜􀀛􀀁􀀜􀀏􀀚􀀚􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀚􀀓􀀋􀀕􀀁􀀏􀀠􀀜􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀜􀀛􀀁􀀛􀀍􀀋􀀕􀀏􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀎􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀜􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀡􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀜􀀛􀀁􀀎􀀝􀀚􀀋􀀅
􀀜􀀓􀀘􀀗􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀎􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀜􀀒􀀏􀀁􀀍􀀋􀀛􀀏􀀁􀀘􀀐􀀁􀀗􀀘􀀗􀀅􀀓􀀗􀀜􀀏􀀚􀀗􀀋􀀜􀀓􀀘􀀗􀀋􀀕􀀁􀀋􀀚􀀖􀀏􀀎􀀁􀀍􀀘􀀗􀀅
􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑
􀀂􀀌􀀊􀀊􀀆􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀎􀀒
􀀂􀀇􀀃􀀁 􀀏􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀁 􀀌􀀁 􀀛􀀜􀀧􀀟􀀫􀀜􀀨􀀁 􀀝􀀧􀀤􀀢􀀁 􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀁 􀀉􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀞􀀜􀀁 􀀜􀀭􀀟􀀨􀀩􀀜􀀣􀀚􀀜􀀁 􀀤􀀝􀀁
􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀀉􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀁 􀀇􀀃􀀅􀀐􀀌􀀁 􀀥􀀪􀀩􀀁 􀀘􀀣􀀁 􀀜􀀣􀀛􀀁 􀀩􀀤􀀁 􀀤􀀧􀀁
􀀨􀀪􀀨􀀥􀀜􀀣􀀛􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀤􀀥􀀜􀀧􀀘􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀜􀀘􀀩􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀑􀀩􀀁􀀟􀀨􀀁􀀘􀀣􀀤􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀧􀀁􀀠􀀜􀀮􀀁􀀥􀀧􀀤􀀫􀀟􀀅
􀀨􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀥􀀧􀀜􀀨􀀜􀀣􀀩􀀁􀀛􀀧􀀘􀀝􀀩􀀁􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀨􀀁􀀘􀀣􀀛􀀁􀀝􀀤􀀡􀀡􀀤􀀬􀀨􀀄􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀁􀀨􀀜􀀦􀀪􀀜􀀣􀀚􀀜􀀄􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀀟􀀩􀀨􀀜􀀡􀀝􀀄􀀁􀀥􀀪􀀧􀀨􀀪􀀘􀀣􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀨􀀁􀀊􀀁􀀘􀀣􀀛􀀁􀀋􀀆􀀁􀀑􀀝􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀘􀀣􀀘􀀡􀀮􀀨􀀟􀀨􀀁􀀪􀀣􀀛􀀜􀀧􀀁
􀀩􀀞􀀤􀀨􀀜􀀁􀀥􀀧􀀤􀀫􀀟􀀨􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀨􀀁􀀥􀀧􀀤􀀫􀀜􀀨􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀚􀀤􀀣􀀚􀀡􀀪􀀨􀀟􀀫􀀜􀀄􀀁􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀁􀀌􀀁􀀬􀀟􀀡􀀡􀀁􀀘􀀥􀀥􀀡􀀮􀀆􀀁
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁋􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃
􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀬􀀞􀀜􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀧􀀁 􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁 􀀩􀀧􀀜􀀘􀀩􀀮􀀁 􀀟􀀨􀀁 􀀨􀀪􀀨􀀚􀀜􀀥􀀩􀀟􀀙􀀡􀀜􀀁 􀀩􀀤􀀁 􀀩􀀜􀀧􀀢􀀟􀀣􀀘􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀄􀀁 􀀬􀀟􀀩􀀞􀀅
􀀛􀀧􀀘􀀬􀀘􀀡􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀨􀀪􀀨􀀥􀀜􀀣􀀨􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀆
􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃 􀀺􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀅􀀈􀀃􀀍􀀆􀀃􀀑􀀁 􀀤􀀝􀀁 􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁 􀀥􀀧􀀤􀀫􀀟􀀨􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀄􀀁 􀀘􀀣􀀛􀀁
􀀟􀀣􀀁􀀚􀀤􀀣􀀩􀀧􀀘􀀨􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀁􀀉􀀄􀀁􀀬􀀟􀀩􀀞􀀛􀀧􀀘􀀬􀀘􀀡􀀁􀀝􀀧􀀤􀀢􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀜􀀘􀀩􀀟􀀜􀀨􀀁􀀘􀀨􀀁􀀤􀀣􀀜􀀁
􀀤􀀝􀀁 􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁 􀀥􀀤􀀨􀀨􀀟􀀙􀀟􀀡􀀟􀀩􀀟􀀜􀀨􀀁 􀀤􀀥􀀜􀀣􀀁 􀀩􀀤􀀁 􀀔􀀩􀀘􀀩􀀜􀀨􀀁 􀀥􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀜􀀨􀀁 􀀩􀀤􀀁 􀀘􀀣􀀁 􀀘􀀧􀀢􀀜􀀛􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃
􀀝􀀤􀀧􀀁 􀀟􀀩􀀨􀀁 􀀟􀀣􀀚􀀡􀀪􀀨􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀁 􀀟􀀣􀀁 􀀨􀀪􀀙􀀨􀀜􀀦􀀪􀀜􀀣􀀩􀀁 􀀘􀀣􀀚􀀟􀀡􀀡􀀘􀀧􀀮􀀁 􀀛􀀧􀀘􀀝􀀩􀀁 􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀨􀀆􀀁
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀁖􀀃 􀀋􀀃􀀃􀀁 􀀘􀀣􀀛􀀁 􀀂􀀄􀀃􀀄􀀁
􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁋􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀂿􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀅􀀈􀀃􀀍􀀆􀀃􀀑􀀝􀀃 􀂳􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀂴􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀀂􀀃􀀃􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀘􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀧􀀜􀀁􀀢􀀘􀀮􀀁􀀙􀀜􀀁􀀝􀀘􀀚􀀩􀀤􀀧􀀨􀀁􀀤􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀧􀀨􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀘􀀣􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀤􀀨􀀜􀀁􀀡􀀟􀀨􀀩􀀜􀀛􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀋􀀄􀀃􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀘􀀩􀀁􀀣􀀤􀀩􀀁
􀀘􀀡􀀡􀀁􀀝􀀘􀀚􀀩􀀤􀀧􀀨􀀁􀀘􀀧􀀜􀀁􀀜􀀦􀀪􀀘􀀡􀀡􀀮􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀡􀀜􀀫􀀘􀀣􀀩􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀁􀀘􀀡􀀡􀀁􀀚􀀘􀀨􀀜􀀨􀀯􀀨􀀤􀀢􀀜􀀁􀀢􀀘􀀮􀀁􀀙􀀜􀀁
􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀁖􀀃􀀋􀀃􀀃􀀁􀀘􀀣􀀛􀀁
􀀂􀀄􀀃􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀁􀀘􀀧􀀜􀀁􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀙􀀜􀀁􀀫􀀟􀀜􀀬􀀜􀀛􀀁􀀘􀀨􀀁􀀘􀀁􀀢􀀜􀀧􀀜􀀁􀀢􀀜􀀣􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀁
􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀝􀀘􀀚􀀩􀀤􀀧􀀨􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀘􀀩􀀁􀀚􀀤􀀪􀀡􀀛􀀁􀀥􀀧􀀤􀀫􀀜􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀡􀀜􀀫􀀘􀀣􀀩􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀁􀀥􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀚􀀪􀀡􀀘􀀧􀀁􀀚􀀘􀀨􀀜􀀨􀀄􀀁
􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃
􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃 􀀶􀁘􀁅􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃 􀀋􀀃􀀌􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃
􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁 􀀣􀀪􀀢􀀙􀀜􀀧􀀁 􀀤􀀝􀀁 􀀥􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀜􀀨􀀁 􀀩􀀤􀀁 􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁 􀀩􀀧􀀜􀀘􀀩􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀗􀀞􀀟􀀡􀀜􀀁 􀀘􀀁 􀀢􀀜􀀘􀀨􀀪􀀧􀀜􀀁 􀀤􀀝􀀁
􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁄􀁓􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃
􀀬􀀞􀀜􀀣􀀁 􀀩􀀘􀀠􀀜􀀣􀀁 􀀟􀀣􀀁 􀀚􀀤􀀢􀀙􀀟􀀣􀀘􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀁 􀀬􀀟􀀩􀀞􀀁 􀀤􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀧􀀁 􀀝􀀘􀀚􀀩􀀤􀀧􀀨􀀁 􀀨􀀪􀀚􀀞􀀁 􀀘􀀨􀀁
􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁 􀀣􀀪􀀢􀀙􀀜􀀧􀀁 􀀤􀀝􀀁 􀀥􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀜􀀨􀀄􀀁 􀀢􀀘􀀮􀀁 􀀤􀀥􀀜􀀣􀀁 􀀪􀀥􀀁 􀀘􀀁 􀀣􀀜􀀬􀀁 􀀥􀀜􀀧􀀨􀀥􀀜􀀚􀀩􀀟􀀫􀀜􀀆􀀁
􀀤􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁇􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀂿􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀂿􀁆􀀃 􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁋􀁒􀁚􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃
􀁙􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀩􀀧􀀜􀀘􀀩􀀟􀀜􀀨􀀁 􀀟􀀣􀀁 􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁 􀀘􀀣􀀣􀀜􀀭􀀁 􀀡􀀟􀀣􀀠􀀜􀀛􀀁 􀀩􀀤􀀁 􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀁 􀀍􀀁 􀀬􀀞􀀟􀀚􀀞􀀁 􀀜􀀭􀀞􀀟􀀙􀀟􀀩􀀁 􀀘􀀁
􀁋􀁌􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁎􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁋􀁒􀁒􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃
􀀩􀀞􀀘􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀥􀀤􀀩􀀜􀀣􀀩􀀟􀀘􀀡􀀁􀀜􀀝􀀝􀀜􀀚􀀩􀀁􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀜􀀘􀀩􀀟􀀜􀀨􀀁􀀬􀀟􀀩􀀞􀀁􀀣􀀪􀀢􀀜􀀧􀀤􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀥􀀘􀀧􀀩􀀟􀀜􀀨􀀄􀀁
􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀑
􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀃 􀀶􀁘􀁅􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀋􀀄􀀌􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀫􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀀅
􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀀋􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀡􀀘􀀣􀀛􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀘􀀩􀀁􀀨􀀜􀀘􀀄􀀁􀀬􀀞􀀟􀀚􀀞􀀁􀀢􀀘􀀮􀀁􀀙􀀜􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀡􀀜􀀫􀀘􀀣􀀩􀀄􀀁􀀝􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀜􀀭􀀘􀀢􀀥􀀡􀀜􀀄􀀁􀀬􀀞􀀜􀀣􀀁
􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁓􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃
􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀂴􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀀅
􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀘􀀡􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀧􀀜􀀨􀀞􀀤􀀡􀀛􀀁􀀟􀀣􀀩􀀜􀀣􀀛􀀜􀀛􀀁􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀡􀀟􀀢􀀟􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀥􀀤􀀨􀀨􀀟􀀙􀀟􀀡􀀟􀀩􀀮􀀁􀀝􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀔􀀩􀀘􀀩􀀜􀀨􀀁
􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀘􀀨􀀨􀀜􀀧􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀩􀀜􀀧􀀢􀀟􀀣􀀘􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀨􀀪􀀨􀀥􀀜􀀣􀀨􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀤􀀥􀀜􀀧􀀘􀀩􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀁
􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀀜􀀡􀀜􀀢􀀜􀀣􀀩􀀁􀀨􀀜􀀧􀀫􀀜􀀨􀀁􀀘􀀨􀀁􀀘􀀁􀀝􀀘􀀚􀀩􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀤􀀝􀀁􀀚􀀤􀀣􀀩􀀧􀀤􀀡􀀁􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀝􀀘􀀫􀀤􀀪􀀧􀀁􀀩􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀨􀀩􀀘􀀙􀀟􀀡􀀟􀀩􀀮􀀁
􀀅􀀅􀀇􀀁 􀀒􀀚􀀥􀀤􀀧􀀩􀀁􀀤􀀛􀀁􀀩􀀝􀀚􀀁􀀍􀀣􀀩􀀚􀀧􀀣􀀖􀀩􀀞􀀤􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀁􀀎􀀖􀀬􀀁􀀉􀀤􀀢􀀢􀀞􀀨􀀨􀀞􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀩􀀝􀀚􀀁􀀬􀀤􀀧􀀠􀀁􀀤􀀛􀀁􀀞􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀨􀀞􀀭􀀩􀀮􀀃􀀩􀀝􀀞􀀧􀀙􀀁􀀨􀀚􀀨􀀨􀀞􀀤􀀣
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀝􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀀅
􀀝􀀟􀀝􀀦􀀫􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀖􀀦􀀁􀀦􀀤􀀚􀀖􀀦􀀝􀀚􀀥􀀁􀀩􀀝􀀟􀀟􀀁􀀗􀀚􀀁􀀖􀀛􀀛􀀚􀀘􀀦􀀚􀀙􀀄􀀁􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀁􀀨􀀝􀀘􀀚􀀁􀀨􀀚􀀤􀀥􀀖􀀆
􀀋􀀘􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀀢􀀡􀀚􀀁 􀀢􀀛􀀁 􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁 􀀛􀀖􀀘􀀦􀀢􀀤􀀥􀀁 􀀦􀀢􀀁 􀀗􀀚􀀁 􀀘􀀢􀀡􀀥􀀝􀀙􀀚􀀤􀀚􀀙􀀁 􀀧􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀤􀀁 􀀖􀀤􀀦􀀝􀀘􀀟􀀚􀀁 􀀌􀀁 􀀩􀀖􀀥􀀁
􀀚􀀪􀀖􀀠􀀝􀀡􀀚􀀙􀀄􀀁􀀗􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀝􀀦􀀁􀀩􀀖􀀥􀀁􀀙􀀚􀀘􀀝􀀙􀀚􀀙􀀁􀀦􀀢􀀁􀀤􀀚􀀥􀀢􀀟􀀨􀀚􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀠􀀖􀀦􀀦􀀚􀀤􀀁􀀝􀀡􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁
􀀘􀀢􀀡􀀦􀀚􀀪􀀦􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀖􀀤􀀦􀀝􀀘􀀟􀀚􀀥􀀁􀀈􀀊􀀁􀀦􀀢􀀁􀀈􀀌􀀆
􀀋􀀙􀀌􀀃 􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀀗􀀚􀀦􀀩􀀚􀀚􀀡􀀁􀀣􀀖􀀤􀀦􀀝􀀚􀀥􀀁􀀦􀀢􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀥􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀁􀀦􀀤􀀚􀀖􀀦􀀫􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀧􀀟􀀙􀀁􀀗􀀚􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀥􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀁􀀖􀀥􀀁
􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀁􀀖􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀝􀀤􀀙􀀁􀀔􀀦􀀖􀀦􀀚􀀆
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀚􀀑􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕
􀀈􀀣􀀁 􀀞􀀣􀀙􀀞􀀘􀀖􀀩􀀞􀀫􀀚􀀁 􀀡􀀞􀀨􀀩􀀁 􀀤􀀛􀀁 􀀩􀀧􀀚􀀖􀀩􀀞􀀚􀀨􀀁 􀀩􀀝􀀚􀀁 􀀨􀀪􀀗􀀟􀀚􀀘􀀩􀀁 􀀢􀀖􀀩􀀩􀀚􀀧􀀁 􀀤􀀛􀀁
􀀬􀀝􀀞􀀘􀀝􀀁􀀞􀀣􀀫􀀤􀀡􀀫􀀚􀀨􀀁􀀖􀀣􀀁􀀞􀀢􀀥􀀡􀀞􀀘􀀖􀀩􀀞􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀩􀀝􀀖􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀝􀀚􀀮􀀁􀀘􀀤􀀣􀀩􀀞􀀣􀀪􀀚􀀁􀀞􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀥􀀃
􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀗􀀚􀀁􀀛􀀤􀀪􀀣􀀙􀀁􀀞􀀣􀀁􀀩􀀝􀀚􀀁􀀖􀀣􀀣􀀚􀀭􀀁􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀩􀀝􀀚􀀁􀀥􀀧􀀚􀀨􀀚􀀣􀀩􀀁􀀙􀀧􀀖􀀛􀀩􀀁􀀖􀀧􀀩􀀞􀀘􀀡􀀚􀀨􀀄
􀀂􀀌􀀊􀀊􀀆􀀋􀀏􀀅􀀍􀀑
􀀐􀀤􀀦􀀝􀀘􀀟􀀚􀀁􀀍􀀄􀀁􀀩􀀜􀀝􀀘􀀜􀀁􀀝􀀥􀀁􀀚􀀪􀀣􀀢􀀥􀀝􀀦􀀢􀀤􀀫􀀁􀀝􀀡􀀁􀀘􀀜􀀖􀀤􀀖􀀘􀀦􀀚􀀤􀀄􀀁􀀝􀀥􀀁􀀟􀀝􀀡􀀞􀀚􀀙􀀁􀀦􀀢􀀁
􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀙􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀋􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀝􀀡􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀖􀀦􀀁􀀝􀀦􀀁􀀛􀀧􀀤􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀤􀀁􀀚􀀟􀀖􀀗􀀢􀀤􀀖􀀦􀀚􀀥􀀁􀀢􀀡􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀂴􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀀦􀀚􀀤􀀠􀀝􀀡􀀖􀀦􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀄􀀁􀀩􀀝􀀦􀀜􀀙􀀤􀀖􀀩􀀖􀀟􀀁􀀢􀀤􀀁􀀥􀀧􀀥􀀣􀀚􀀡􀀥􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀢􀀣􀀚􀀤􀀖􀀦􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀁􀀝􀀡􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁
􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁎􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃
􀀛􀀢􀀧􀀡􀀙􀀁􀀝􀀡􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀖􀀡􀀡􀀚􀀪􀀁􀀖􀀦􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀣􀀤􀀚􀀥􀀚􀀡􀀦􀀁􀀙􀀤􀀖􀀛􀀦􀀁􀀖􀀤􀀦􀀝􀀘􀀟􀀚􀀥􀀆
􀀃􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀁􀀆􀀆
􀀐􀀔􀀌􀀊􀀒􀀁􀀑􀀒􀀐􀀕􀀍􀀓􀀍􀀐􀀏􀀓􀀁􀀒􀀊􀀎􀀊􀀕􀀈􀀏􀀔􀀁􀀁
􀀔􀀐􀀁􀀔􀀌􀀊􀀁􀀐􀀑􀀊􀀒􀀈􀀔􀀍􀀐􀀏􀀁􀀐􀀋􀀁􀀔􀀒􀀊􀀈􀀔􀀍􀀊􀀓
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀛􀀑􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀁
􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗
􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁉􀀃
􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀘􀀡􀀪􀀙􀀚􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀚􀀖􀀩􀀞􀀚􀀨􀀁􀀞􀀣􀀁􀀖􀀘􀀘􀀤􀀧􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀘􀀚􀀁􀀬􀀞􀀩􀀝􀀁􀀞􀀣􀀩􀀚􀀧􀀣􀀖􀀩􀀞􀀤􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀁􀀡􀀖􀀬􀀄
􀀆􀀄􀀁 􀀓􀀩􀀖􀀩􀀚􀀨􀀁􀀢􀀖􀀮􀀁􀀘􀀤􀀣􀀘􀀡􀀪􀀙􀀚􀀁􀀖􀀜􀀧􀀚􀀚􀀢􀀚􀀣􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀞􀀣􀀫􀀤􀀡􀀫􀀞􀀣􀀜􀀁􀀩􀀚􀀧􀀃
􀀢􀀞􀀣􀀖􀀩􀀞􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀨􀀪􀀨􀀥􀀚􀀣􀀨􀀞􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀛􀀁􀀖􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀚􀀖􀀩􀀮􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀥􀀖􀀧􀀩􀀁􀀤􀀛􀀁􀀖􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀚􀀖􀀩􀀮􀀁
􀀩􀀝􀀖􀀩􀀁 􀀞􀀨􀀁 􀀤􀀥􀀚􀀧􀀖􀀩􀀞􀀫􀀚􀀁 􀀗􀀚􀀩􀀬􀀚􀀚􀀣􀀁 􀀩􀀝􀀚􀀢􀀁 􀀙􀀪􀀧􀀞􀀣􀀜􀀁 􀀨􀀞􀀩􀀪􀀖􀀩􀀞􀀤􀀣􀀨􀀁 􀀤􀀛􀀁
􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀩􀀧􀀚􀀖􀀩􀀮􀀄
􀀂􀀌􀀊􀀊􀀆􀀋􀀏􀀅􀀍􀀑
􀀂􀀈􀀃􀀁 􀀐􀀤􀀦􀀝􀀘􀀟􀀚􀀁􀀎􀀁􀀝􀀥􀀁􀀝􀀡􀀁􀀟􀀝􀀡􀀚􀀁􀀩􀀝􀀦􀀜􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀗􀀖􀀥􀀝􀀘􀀁􀀣􀀢􀀟􀀝􀀘􀀫􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀙􀀤􀀖􀀛􀀦􀀁
􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁎􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀃀􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀑
􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃 􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀛􀀃􀁕􀁈􀃀􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀀃
􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀂳􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁏􀁄􀁚􀂴􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁒􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀝􀀡􀀦􀀚􀀤􀀡􀀖􀀦􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀖􀀟􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀟􀀚􀀥􀀁􀀢􀀡􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀘􀀖􀀣􀀖􀀘􀀝􀀦􀀫􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀔􀀦􀀖􀀦􀀚􀀥􀀁􀀦􀀢􀀁􀀘􀀢􀀡􀀘􀀟􀀧􀀙􀀚􀀁
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀃀􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀙􀀜􀀃􀀹􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁑􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑
􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃 􀀺􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁉􀁘􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃
􀀣􀀧􀀤􀀣􀀢􀀥􀀚􀀥􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀣􀀤􀀢􀀨􀀝􀀥􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀁􀀤􀀚􀀛􀀚􀀤􀀥􀀁􀀦􀀢􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀘􀀖􀀣􀀖􀀘􀀝􀀦􀀫􀀁􀀬􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀖􀀁􀀔􀀦􀀖􀀦􀀚􀀁
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀂴􀀃􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑
􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀃 􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀕􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀀅
􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁈􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀀢􀀣􀀚􀀤􀀖􀀦􀀝􀀨􀀚􀀁􀀗􀀚􀀦􀀩􀀚􀀚􀀡􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀠􀀁􀀖􀀦􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀦􀀝􀀠􀀚􀀆􀀁􀀐􀀥􀀁􀀒􀀘􀀓􀀖􀀝􀀤􀀁􀀤􀀚􀀠􀀖􀀤􀀞􀀚􀀙􀀄􀀁
􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀂫􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃 􀁒􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀂴􀀑􀀊􀀈􀀊􀀃 􀀶􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃
􀀘􀀢􀀡􀀘􀀟􀀧􀀙􀀚􀀙􀀁􀀝􀀡􀀁􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀘􀀦􀀝􀀘􀀚􀀄􀀁􀀖􀀡􀀙􀀁􀀖􀀁􀀡􀀧􀀠􀀗􀀚􀀤􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀩􀀤􀀝􀀦􀀚􀀤􀀥􀀁􀀜􀀖􀀨􀀚􀀁􀀤􀀚􀀅
􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀑􀀃 􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀰􀁆􀀱􀁄􀁌􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀀩􀁌􀁗􀁝􀁐􀁄􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀀫􀁄􀁊􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁚􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁒􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁉􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁘􀁐􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀅
􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀊􀀈􀀋
􀀂􀀋􀀃􀀁 􀀕􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀑􀀢􀀠􀀠􀀝􀀥􀀥􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀁􀀙􀀚􀀘􀀝􀀙􀀚􀀙􀀁􀀡􀀢􀀦􀀁􀀦􀀢􀀁􀀠􀀖􀀞􀀚􀀁􀀤􀀚􀀛􀀚􀀤􀀚􀀡􀀘􀀚􀀁􀀦􀀢􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁
􀂳􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁉􀁘􀁏􀁑􀁈􀁖􀁖􀂴􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀂳􀁙􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁜􀂴􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀕􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁓􀀅
􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀃀􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀙􀀜􀀃􀀹􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁑􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑
􀀋􀀙􀀌􀀃 􀀵􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁇􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀦􀀤􀀚􀀖􀀦􀀫􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀑􀀢􀀠􀀠􀀝􀀥􀀥􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀁􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀁􀀝􀀡􀀁􀀠􀀝􀀡􀀙􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀣􀀢􀀥􀀝􀀦􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀁
􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀔􀀦􀀖􀀦􀀚􀀥􀀁􀀣􀀖􀀤􀀦􀀝􀀚􀀥􀀁􀀦􀀢􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀦􀀤􀀚􀀖􀀦􀀫􀀁􀀩􀀜􀀝􀀘􀀜􀀁􀀖􀀤􀀚􀀁􀀡􀀢􀀦􀀁􀀣􀀖􀀤􀀦􀀝􀀚􀀥􀀁􀀦􀀢􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁
􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁎􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁇􀁌􀂿􀀅
􀀘􀀖􀀦􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀁􀀢􀀤􀀁􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀦􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀦􀀤􀀚􀀖􀀦􀀫􀀆
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀜􀀑􀀃 􀀱􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀅􀀄􀀁 􀀈􀀁 􀀓􀀩􀀖􀀩􀀚􀀁 􀀞􀀣􀀩􀀚􀀣􀀙􀀞􀀣􀀜􀀁 􀀩􀀤􀀁 􀀩􀀚􀀧􀀢􀀞􀀣􀀖􀀩􀀚􀀁 􀀤􀀧􀀁 􀀬􀀞􀀩􀀝􀀙􀀧􀀖􀀬􀀁
􀀛􀀧􀀤􀀢􀀁􀀖􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀚􀀖􀀩􀀮􀀁􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀬􀀝􀀞􀀘􀀝􀀁􀀞􀀩􀀁􀀞􀀨􀀁􀀖􀀁􀀥􀀖􀀧􀀩􀀮􀀂􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀨􀀪􀀨􀀥􀀚􀀣􀀙􀀁􀀩􀀝􀀚􀀁
􀀤􀀥􀀚􀀧􀀖􀀩􀀞􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀛􀀁􀀩􀀝􀀖􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀚􀀖􀀩􀀮􀀂􀀁􀀖􀀨􀀁􀀖􀀁􀀘􀀤􀀣􀀨􀀚􀀦􀀪􀀚􀀣􀀘􀀚􀀁􀀤􀀛􀀁􀀖􀀣􀀁􀀖􀀧􀀢􀀚􀀙􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀀃
􀀩􀀞􀀚􀀨􀀁􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀩􀀝􀀚􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀚􀀖􀀩􀀮􀀂􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀞􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀙􀀚􀀥􀀤􀀨􀀞􀀩􀀖􀀧􀀮􀀂􀀁􀀤􀀛􀀁􀀨􀀪􀀘􀀝􀀁􀀞􀀣􀀩􀀚􀀣􀀩􀀞􀀤􀀣􀀄
􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁘􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁓􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀤􀀩􀀝􀀚􀀧􀀁􀀓􀀩􀀖􀀩􀀚􀀁􀀥􀀖􀀧􀀩􀀮􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀓􀀩􀀖􀀩􀀚􀀨􀀁􀀥􀀖􀀧􀀩􀀞􀀚􀀨􀀂􀀁􀀪􀀣􀀡􀀚􀀨􀀨􀀁􀀞􀀩􀀁􀀥􀀧􀀤􀀫􀀞􀀙􀀚􀀨􀀁
􀀛􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀖􀀁􀀨􀀪􀀗􀀨􀀚􀀦􀀪􀀚􀀣􀀩􀀁􀀙􀀖􀀩􀀚􀀄
􀀊􀀈􀀊􀀁􀀒􀀘􀀓􀀖􀀝􀀤􀀄􀀁􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀁􀀃􀀅􀀐􀀁􀀌􀀇􀀁􀀄􀀍􀀆􀀅􀀏􀀉􀀆􀀎􀀁􀀂􀀛􀀢􀀢􀀦􀀡􀀢􀀦􀀚􀀁􀀊􀀇􀀌􀀁􀀖􀀗􀀢􀀨􀀚􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀣􀀆􀀁􀀌􀀏􀀌􀀆
􀀊􀀈􀀋􀀃􀀪􀀑􀀃􀀪􀀑􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁗􀁝􀁐􀁄􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀏􀀃
􀀵􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁈􀁌􀁏􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀂶􀀤􀁆􀁄􀁇􀁰􀁐􀁌􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀀃 􀀯􀁄􀀃 􀀫􀁄􀁜􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀛􀀐􀀬􀀬􀀄􀀁􀀨􀀢􀀟􀀆􀀁􀀍􀀉􀀄􀀁􀀣􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀇􀀏􀀆
􀀃 􀀨􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀁 􀀅􀀅􀀈
􀀆􀀄􀀁 􀀌􀀞􀀣􀀗􀀘􀀝􀀖􀀁􀀘􀀝􀀁􀀣􀀗􀀔􀀁􀀟􀀡􀀔􀀒􀀔􀀓􀀘􀀝􀀖􀀁􀀟􀀐􀀡􀀐􀀖􀀡􀀐􀀟􀀗􀀢􀀁􀀢􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀛􀀁􀀐􀀕􀀕􀀔􀀒􀀣􀀁
􀀣􀀗􀀔􀀁􀀡􀀘􀀖􀀗􀀣􀀁􀀞􀀕􀀁􀀐􀀁􀀟􀀐􀀡􀀣􀀧􀀁􀀣􀀞􀀁􀀞􀀑􀀙􀀔􀀒􀀣􀀁􀀦􀀘􀀣􀀗􀀘􀀝􀀁􀀐􀀁􀀡􀀔􀀐􀀢􀀞􀀝􀀐􀀑􀀛􀀔􀀁􀀣􀀘􀀜􀀔􀀂􀀁
􀀘􀀝􀀁􀀐􀀒􀀒􀀞􀀡􀀓􀀐􀀝􀀒􀀔􀀁􀀦􀀘􀀣􀀗􀀁􀀣􀀗􀀔􀀁􀀣􀀔􀀡􀀜􀀢􀀁􀀞􀀕􀀁􀀣􀀗􀀔􀀁􀀣􀀡􀀔􀀐􀀣􀀧􀀁􀀞􀀡􀀁􀀞􀀣􀀗􀀔􀀡􀀁􀀐􀀟􀀃
􀀟􀀛􀀘􀀒􀀐􀀑􀀛􀀔􀀁􀀡􀀤􀀛􀀔􀀢􀀁􀀞􀀕􀀁􀀘􀀝􀀣􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀐􀀣􀀘􀀞􀀝􀀐􀀛􀀁􀀛􀀐􀀦􀀂􀀁􀀣􀀞􀀁􀀣􀀗􀀔􀀁􀀣􀀔􀀡􀀜􀀘􀀝􀀐􀀣􀀘􀀞􀀝􀀁
􀀞􀀕􀀁􀀞􀀡􀀁􀀦􀀘􀀣􀀗􀀓􀀡􀀐􀀦􀀐􀀛􀀁􀀕􀀡􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀣􀀗􀀔􀀁􀀣􀀡􀀔􀀐􀀣􀀧􀀂􀀁􀀞􀀡􀀁􀀢􀀤􀀢􀀟􀀔􀀝􀀢􀀘􀀞􀀝􀀁􀀞􀀕􀀁􀀘􀀣􀀢􀀁
􀀞􀀟􀀔􀀡􀀐􀀣􀀘􀀞􀀝􀀄
􀀇􀀄􀀁 􀀋􀀕􀀁 􀀐􀀝􀀁 􀀞􀀑􀀙􀀔􀀒􀀣􀀘􀀞􀀝􀀁 􀀗􀀐􀀢􀀁 􀀑􀀔􀀔􀀝􀀁 􀀡􀀐􀀘􀀢􀀔􀀓􀀁 􀀘􀀝􀀁 􀀐􀀒􀀒􀀞􀀡􀀓􀀐􀀝􀀒􀀔􀀁
􀀦􀀘􀀣􀀗􀀁 􀀟􀀐􀀡􀀐􀀖􀀡􀀐􀀟􀀗􀀁 􀀆􀀂􀀁 􀀣􀀗􀀔􀀁 􀀍􀀣􀀐􀀣􀀔􀀢􀀁 􀀒􀀞􀀝􀀒􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀔􀀓􀀁 􀀢􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀛􀀁 􀀢􀀔􀀔􀀚􀀁 􀀐􀀁
􀀢􀀞􀀛􀀤􀀣􀀘􀀞􀀝􀀁􀀣􀀗􀀡􀀞􀀤􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀣􀀗􀀔􀀁􀀜􀀔􀀐􀀝􀀢􀀁􀀘􀀝􀀓􀀘􀀒􀀐􀀣􀀔􀀓􀀁􀀘􀀝􀀁􀀉􀀡􀀣􀀘􀀒􀀛􀀔􀀁􀀆􀀆􀀁􀀞􀀕􀀁
􀀣􀀗􀀔􀀁􀀊􀀗􀀐􀀡􀀣􀀔􀀡􀀁􀀞􀀕􀀁􀀣􀀗􀀔􀀁􀀏􀀝􀀘􀀣􀀔􀀓􀀁􀀌􀀐􀀣􀀘􀀞􀀝􀀢􀀄
􀀈􀀄􀀁 􀀌􀀞􀀣􀀗􀀘􀀝􀀖􀀁 􀀘􀀝􀀁 􀀣􀀗􀀔􀀁 􀀟􀀡􀀔􀀒􀀔􀀓􀀘􀀝􀀖􀀁 􀀟􀀐􀀡􀀐􀀖􀀡􀀐􀀟􀀗􀀢􀀁 􀀢􀀗􀀐􀀛􀀛􀀁
􀀐􀀕􀀕􀀔􀀒􀀣􀀁 􀀣􀀗􀀔􀀁 􀀡􀀘􀀖􀀗􀀣􀀢􀀁 􀀞􀀡􀀁 􀀞􀀑􀀛􀀘􀀖􀀐􀀣􀀘􀀞􀀝􀀢􀀁 􀀞􀀕􀀁 􀀍􀀣􀀐􀀣􀀔􀀢􀀁 􀀦􀀘􀀣􀀗􀀁 􀀡􀀔􀀖􀀐􀀡􀀓􀀁
􀀣􀀞􀀁 􀀣􀀗􀀔􀀁 􀀢􀀔􀀣􀀣􀀛􀀔􀀜􀀔􀀝􀀣􀀁 􀀞􀀕􀀁 􀀓􀀘􀀢􀀟􀀤􀀣􀀔􀀢􀀁 􀀘􀀝􀀢􀀞􀀕􀀐􀀡􀀁 􀀐􀀢􀀁 􀀣􀀗􀀔􀀧􀀁 􀀗􀀐􀀥􀀔􀀁
􀀡􀀔􀀜􀀐􀀘􀀝􀀔􀀓􀀁􀀐􀀟􀀟􀀛􀀘􀀒􀀐􀀑􀀛􀀔􀀄
􀀂􀀌􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀎􀀑
􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀜􀀃 􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁆􀀃 􀁇􀁘􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀢􀀛􀀁 􀀧􀀚􀀥􀀠􀀝􀀡􀀖􀀧􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀃􀀁 􀀪􀀝􀀧􀀜􀀙􀀥􀀖􀀪􀀖􀀟􀀁 􀀢􀀥􀀁 􀀦􀀨􀀦􀀣􀀚􀀡􀀦􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀁 􀀢􀀛􀀁 􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁 􀀧􀀥􀀚􀀖􀀧􀀬􀀅􀀁
􀀏􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀧􀀚􀀫􀀧􀀁􀀝􀀦􀀁􀀗􀀖􀀦􀀚􀀙􀀁􀀢􀀡􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀖􀀧􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀖􀀥􀀧􀀝􀀘􀀟􀀚􀀁􀀊􀀉􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀆􀀋􀀊􀀋􀀁􀀕􀀝􀀚􀀡􀀡􀀖􀀁
􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁐􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁖􀀄
􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁅􀀄
􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀀍􀀥􀀧􀀝􀀘􀀟􀀚􀀁􀀈􀀈􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀎􀀜􀀖􀀥􀀧􀀚􀀥􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀧􀀚􀀙􀀁􀀐􀀖􀀧􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀦􀀅
􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃 􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃 􀀔􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁆􀀃 􀁇􀁘􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀀦􀀨􀀦􀀣􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀁􀀝􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀢􀀣􀀚􀀥􀀖􀀧􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀃􀀁􀀧􀀢􀀁􀀡􀀢􀀧􀀝􀀛􀀬􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀖􀀧􀀁􀀢􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀥􀀁􀀒􀀧􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀁􀀣􀀖􀀥􀀧􀀬􀀁􀀢􀀥􀀁
􀀒􀀧􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀦􀀁􀀣􀀖􀀥􀀧􀀝􀀚􀀦􀀁􀀧􀀢􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀧􀀥􀀚􀀖􀀧􀀬􀀃􀀁􀀢􀀥􀀁􀀝􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀙􀀚􀀣􀀢􀀦􀀝􀀧􀀖􀀥􀀬􀀃􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀝􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀝􀀡􀀧􀀚􀀡􀀧􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀅􀀁
􀀶􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀁘􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀀢􀀡􀀚􀀃􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀝􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀝􀀡􀀧􀀚􀀡􀀧􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀁􀀧􀀢􀀁􀀧􀀚􀀥􀀠􀀝􀀡􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀧􀀥􀀚􀀖􀀧􀀬􀀃􀀁􀀧􀀢􀀁􀀪􀀝􀀧􀀜􀀙􀀥􀀖􀀪􀀁
􀀛􀀥􀀢􀀠􀀁 􀀝􀀧􀀁 􀀢􀀥􀀁 􀀧􀀢􀀁 􀀦􀀨􀀦􀀣􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀁 􀀝􀀧􀀦􀀁 􀀢􀀣􀀚􀀥􀀖􀀧􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀅􀀁 􀀑􀀚􀀥􀀛􀀢􀀥􀀠􀀖􀀡􀀘􀀚􀀁 􀀢􀀛􀀁 􀀧􀀜􀀝􀀦􀀁
􀀨􀀡􀀝􀀟􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀥􀀖􀀟􀀁􀀖􀀘􀀧􀀁􀀝􀀦􀀁􀀡􀀢􀀧􀀁􀀥􀀚􀀤􀀨􀀝􀀥􀀚􀀙􀀁􀀪􀀜􀀚􀀡􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀒􀀧􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀁􀀝􀀡􀀁􀀤􀀨􀀚􀀦􀀧􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀁
􀀙􀀢􀀚􀀦􀀁􀀡􀀢􀀧􀀁􀀪􀀝􀀦􀀜􀀁􀀧􀀢􀀁􀀧􀀚􀀥􀀠􀀝􀀡􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀁􀀢􀀥􀀁􀀪􀀝􀀧􀀜􀀙􀀥􀀖􀀪􀀁􀀛􀀥􀀢􀀠􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀧􀀥􀀚􀀖􀀧􀀬􀀁􀀢􀀥􀀁
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀀄
􀀚􀀥􀀖􀀟􀀁􀀥􀀨􀀟􀀚􀀁􀀦􀀚􀀧􀀁􀀢􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀝􀀡􀀁􀀖􀀥􀀧􀀝􀀘􀀟􀀚􀀁􀀈􀀃􀀁􀀪􀀜􀀝􀀘􀀜􀀁􀀣􀀥􀀢􀀩􀀝􀀙􀀚􀀦􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀖􀀧􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀚􀀫􀀝􀀦􀀧􀀄
􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀀇􀀍􀀏􀀌􀀁􀀆􀀃􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀁􀀧􀀚􀀥􀀠􀀝􀀡􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀁􀀢􀀥􀀁
􀀦􀀨􀀦􀀣􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀢􀀣􀀚􀀥􀀖􀀧􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀧􀀥􀀚􀀖􀀧􀀝􀀚􀀦􀀅
􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃 􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀕􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀝􀀃􀁘􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁓􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀀣􀀖􀀥􀀧􀀬􀀁􀀢􀀥􀀁􀀒􀀧􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀦􀀁􀀣􀀖􀀥􀀧􀀝􀀚􀀦􀀃􀀁􀀨􀀡􀀟􀀚􀀦􀀦􀀁􀀖􀀁􀀟􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀥􀀁􀀙􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀁􀀝􀀦􀀁􀀣􀀥􀀢􀀩􀀝􀀙􀀚􀀙􀀁􀀛􀀢􀀥􀀁
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃
􀀝􀀦􀀁􀀠􀀖􀀙􀀚􀀁􀀧􀀢􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀙􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀥􀀚􀀘􀀚􀀝􀀣􀀧􀀁􀀗􀀬􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀙􀀚􀀣􀀢􀀦􀀝􀀧􀀖􀀥􀀬􀀅􀀁􀀓􀀜􀀚􀀥􀀚􀀁􀀖􀀥􀀚􀀁
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁇􀁒􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁈􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀌􀀎􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀙􀀚􀀄
􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃
􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁐􀀄
􀀣􀀢􀀥􀀧􀀖􀀡􀀧􀀁 􀀝􀀦􀀁 􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁 􀀠􀀢􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀧􀀁 􀀖􀀧􀀁 􀀪􀀜􀀝􀀘􀀜􀀁 􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁 􀀢􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀥􀀁 􀀒􀀧􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀁 􀀣􀀖􀀥􀀧􀀬􀀁 􀀢􀀥􀀁
􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀀖􀀧􀀁􀀪􀀜􀀝􀀘􀀜􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀙􀀚􀀣􀀢􀀦􀀝􀀧􀀖􀀥􀀬􀀁􀀥􀀚􀀘􀀚􀀝􀀩􀀚􀀦􀀁􀀝􀀧􀀅􀀁􀀐􀀢􀀡􀀚􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀟􀀚􀀦􀀦􀀃􀀁􀀛􀀢􀀥􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀢􀀦􀀚􀀁
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁐􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃
􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁 􀀒􀀧􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀁 􀀛􀀢􀀥􀀁 􀀪􀀜􀀝􀀘􀀜􀀁 􀀝􀀧􀀁 􀀝􀀦􀀁 􀀝􀀡􀀧􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀚􀀙􀀁 􀀥􀀚􀀘􀀚􀀝􀀩􀀚􀀦􀀁 􀀝􀀧􀀁 􀀛􀀥􀀢􀀠􀀁 􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁
􀀙􀀚􀀣􀀢􀀦􀀝􀀧􀀖􀀥􀀬􀀅
􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃 􀀫􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁 􀀝􀀡􀀧􀀚􀀡􀀧􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀁 􀀧􀀢􀀁 􀀧􀀚􀀥􀀠􀀝􀀡􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀃􀀁 􀀦􀀨􀀦􀀣􀀚􀀡􀀙􀀁 􀀢􀀥􀀁 􀀪􀀝􀀧􀀜􀀙􀀥􀀖􀀪􀀃􀀁 􀀪􀀜􀀝􀀘􀀜􀀁
􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀄
􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀀦􀀢􀀠􀀚􀀪􀀜􀀖􀀧􀀁􀀨􀀡􀀥􀀚􀀖􀀟􀀝􀀦􀀧􀀝􀀘􀀁􀀧􀀢􀀁􀀝􀀠􀀣􀀢􀀦􀀚􀀁􀀧􀀝􀀠􀀚􀀁􀀟􀀝􀀠􀀝􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀝􀀡􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀘􀀢􀀡􀀧􀀚􀀫􀀧􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁗􀀃
􀀪􀀢􀀨􀀟􀀙􀀁􀀥􀀨􀀡􀀃􀀁􀀝􀀧􀀁􀀪􀀖􀀦􀀁􀀡􀀢􀀡􀀚􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀟􀀚􀀦􀀦􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀩􀀝􀀚􀀪􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀖􀀧􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀟􀀖􀀘􀀞􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁
􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁆􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀺􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀂿􀁆􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀂳􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀂴􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁇􀀃 􀀋􀂳􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀂴􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁌􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀂴􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀀄
􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀐
􀁖􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀀖􀀘􀀘􀀢􀀨􀀡􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀇􀀋􀀐􀀅􀀎􀀁􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀃􀀃􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀛􀀖􀀘􀀧􀀢􀀥􀀦􀀁􀀚􀀡􀀨􀀠􀀚􀀥􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀙􀀁􀀝􀀡􀀁􀀖􀀥􀀧􀀝􀀘􀀟􀀚􀀁􀀊􀀅
􀀋􀀘􀀌􀀃 􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀗􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁎􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁉􀁘􀁏􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃
􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀦􀀁􀀟􀀝􀀦􀀧􀀚􀀙􀀁􀀝􀀡􀀁􀀍􀀥􀀧􀀝􀀘􀀟􀀚􀀁􀀈􀀈􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀎􀀜􀀖􀀥􀀧􀀚􀀥􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀔􀀡􀀝􀀧􀀚􀀙􀀁
􀀐􀀖􀀧􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀦􀀃􀀁􀀪􀀜􀀝􀀘􀀜􀀁􀀣􀀥􀀢􀀩􀀝􀀙􀀚􀀦􀀁􀀖􀀦􀀁􀀛􀀢􀀟􀀟􀀢􀀪􀀦􀀌
􀀆􀀅􀀁 􀀓􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀣􀀖􀀥􀀧􀀝􀀚􀀦􀀁􀀧􀀢􀀁􀀖􀀡􀀬􀀁􀀙􀀝􀀦􀀣􀀨􀀧􀀚􀀃􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀘􀀢􀀡􀀧􀀝􀀡􀀨􀀖􀀡􀀘􀀚􀀁􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀪􀀜􀀝􀀘􀀜􀀁􀀝􀀦􀀁􀀟􀀝􀀞􀀚􀀟􀀬􀀁
􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃
􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀏􀀃 􀂿􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁎􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁑􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁅􀁌􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁉􀁘􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁒􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀑
􀀇􀀅􀀁 􀀓􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀒􀀚􀀘􀀨􀀥􀀝􀀧􀀬􀀁􀀎􀀢􀀨􀀡􀀘􀀝􀀟􀀁􀀦􀀜􀀖􀀟􀀟􀀃􀀁􀀪􀀜􀀚􀀡􀀁􀀝􀀧􀀁􀀙􀀚􀀚􀀠􀀦􀀁􀀡􀀚􀀘􀀚􀀦􀀦􀀖􀀥􀀬􀀃􀀁􀀘􀀖􀀟􀀟􀀁􀀨􀀣􀀢􀀡􀀁
􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀣􀀖􀀥􀀧􀀝􀀚􀀦􀀁􀀧􀀢􀀁􀀦􀀚􀀧􀀧􀀟􀀚􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀝􀀥􀀁􀀙􀀝􀀦􀀣􀀨􀀧􀀚􀀁􀀗􀀬􀀁􀀦􀀨􀀘􀀜􀀁􀀠􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀦􀀅
􀀋􀀙􀀌􀀃 􀀤􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀄
􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃 􀀔􀀃 􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀋􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀋􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃 􀀖􀀌􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃
􀀥􀀚􀀠􀀖􀀝􀀡􀀁􀀢􀀣􀀚􀀡􀀁􀀗􀀚􀀧􀀪􀀚􀀚􀀡􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀒􀀧􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀦􀀁􀀘􀀢􀀡􀀘􀀚􀀥􀀡􀀚􀀙􀀁􀀨􀀡􀀧􀀝􀀟􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀥􀀚􀀁􀀝􀀦􀀁
􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀗􀀑
􀀋􀀚􀀌􀀃 􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃 􀀘􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁖􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀀦􀀚􀀧􀀧􀀟􀀚􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀧􀀢􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁􀀚􀀫􀀧􀀚􀀡􀀧􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀖􀀧􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀬􀀁􀀜􀀖􀀩􀀚􀀁􀀥􀀚􀀠􀀖􀀝􀀡􀀚􀀙􀀁􀀖􀀣􀀣􀀟􀀝􀀘􀀄
􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀘􀀢􀀡􀀦􀀝􀀙􀀚􀀥􀀚􀀙􀀁 􀀝􀀧􀀁 􀀨􀀦􀀚􀀛􀀨􀀟􀀁 􀀧􀀢􀀁 􀀝􀀡􀀘􀀟􀀨􀀙􀀚􀀁 􀀧􀀜􀀝􀀦􀀁 􀀣􀀥􀀢􀀩􀀝􀀦􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀁 􀀦􀀢􀀁 􀀖􀀦􀀁 􀀧􀀢􀀁
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀗􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀀘􀀟􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀁 􀀦􀀟􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀁 􀀪􀀜􀀚􀀡􀀁 􀀝􀀧􀀁 􀀘􀀢􀀠􀀚􀀦􀀁 􀀧􀀢􀀁 􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁 􀀣􀀚􀀖􀀘􀀚􀀛􀀨􀀟􀀁 􀀦􀀚􀀧􀀧􀀟􀀚􀀠􀀚􀀡􀀧􀀁 􀀢􀀛􀀁
􀀙􀀝􀀦􀀣􀀨􀀧􀀚􀀦􀀅􀀁 􀀓􀀜􀀚􀀁 􀀖􀀙􀀢􀀣􀀧􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀁 􀀢􀀛􀀁 􀀧􀀜􀀝􀀦􀀁 􀀣􀀥􀀢􀀩􀀝􀀦􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀁 􀀝􀀦􀀁 􀀖􀀟􀀦􀀢􀀁 􀀝􀀡􀀁 􀀟􀀝􀀡􀀚􀀁
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃 􀀋􀀈􀀂􀀁 􀀢􀀛􀀁 􀀧􀀜􀀚􀀁 􀀖􀀡􀀡􀀚􀀫􀀃􀀁 􀀢􀀛􀀁
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁉􀁘􀁏􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃
􀁐􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁅􀁌􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀃 􀀲􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜
􀀎􀀗􀀔􀀁􀀣􀀔􀀡􀀜􀀘􀀝􀀐􀀣􀀘􀀞􀀝􀀁􀀞􀀕􀀁􀀞􀀡􀀁􀀣􀀗􀀔􀀁􀀦􀀘􀀣􀀗􀀓􀀡􀀐􀀦􀀐􀀛􀀁􀀕􀀡􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀐􀀁􀀣􀀡􀀔􀀐􀀣􀀧􀀂􀀁
􀀞􀀡􀀁􀀣􀀗􀀔􀀁􀀢􀀤􀀢􀀟􀀔􀀝􀀢􀀘􀀞􀀝􀀁􀀞􀀕􀀁􀀘􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀞􀀟􀀔􀀡􀀐􀀣􀀘􀀞􀀝􀀂􀀁􀀐􀀢􀀁􀀐􀀁􀀒􀀞􀀝􀀢􀀔􀀠􀀤􀀔􀀝􀀒􀀔􀀁􀀞􀀕􀀁
􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀀇􀀇􀀈􀀁 􀀏􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀣􀀥􀀁􀀠􀀗􀀁􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀁􀀍􀀟􀀥􀀖􀀣􀀟􀀒􀀥􀀚􀀠􀀟􀀒􀀝􀀁􀀎􀀒􀀨􀀁􀀌􀀠􀀞􀀞􀀚􀀤􀀤􀀚􀀠􀀟􀀁􀀠􀀟􀀁􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀁􀀨􀀠􀀣􀀜􀀁􀀠􀀗􀀁􀀚􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀤􀀚􀀩􀀥􀀪􀀅􀀥􀀙􀀚􀀣􀀕􀀁􀀤􀀖􀀤􀀤􀀚􀀠􀀟
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁉􀁘􀁏􀂿􀁏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁒􀁇􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀒􀀥􀀪􀀁􀀥􀀠􀀁􀀨􀀙􀀚􀀔􀀙􀀁􀀚􀀥􀀁􀀨􀀠􀀦􀀝􀀕􀀁􀀓􀀖􀀁􀀤􀀦􀀓􀀛􀀖􀀔􀀥􀀁􀀦􀀟􀀕􀀖􀀣􀀁􀀚􀀟􀀥􀀖􀀣􀀟􀀒􀀥􀀚􀀠􀀟􀀒􀀝􀀁
􀀝􀀒􀀨􀀁􀀚􀀟􀀕􀀖􀀡􀀖􀀟􀀕􀀖􀀟􀀥􀀝􀀪􀀁􀀠􀀗􀀁􀀥􀀙􀀒􀀥􀀁􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀒􀀥􀀪􀀆
􀀊􀀟􀀝􀀝􀀗􀀞􀀣􀀓􀀡􀀥
􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁎􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁇􀁌􀂿􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃
􀀭􀀯􀀦􀀧􀀬􀀬􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀯􀀮􀀁􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀳􀀁􀀌􀀋􀀁􀀴􀀯􀀁􀀌􀀍􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀉􀀑􀀎􀀑􀀁􀀡􀀪􀀧􀀮􀀮􀀣􀀁􀀔􀀯􀀮􀀶􀀧􀀮􀀅
􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀓􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀁􀀉􀀈􀀁􀀩􀀣􀀳􀀁􀀪􀀴􀀳􀀁􀀲􀀯􀀯􀀴􀀳􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀁􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀁􀀌􀀋􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀣􀀴􀀁􀀔􀀯􀀮􀀶􀀧􀀮􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁏􀂿􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃
􀀴􀀧􀀲􀀭􀀪􀀮􀀣􀀴􀀧􀀦􀀁 􀀯􀀲􀀁 􀀳􀀵􀀳􀀰􀀧􀀮􀀦􀀧􀀦􀀄􀀁 􀀯􀀲􀀁 􀀨􀀲􀀯􀀭􀀁 􀀷􀀩􀀪􀀥􀀩􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁 􀀞􀀴􀀣􀀴􀀧􀀁 􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀹􀀁
􀀥􀀯􀀮􀀥􀀧􀀲􀀮􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀩􀀣􀀳􀀁􀀷􀀪􀀴􀀩􀀦􀀲􀀣􀀷􀀮􀀁􀀣􀀳􀀁􀀣􀀁􀀥􀀯􀀮􀀳􀀧􀀱􀀵􀀧􀀮􀀥􀀧􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀣􀀲􀀭􀀧􀀦􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁎􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀀪􀀴􀀳􀀁 􀀰􀀲􀀯􀀰􀀧􀀲􀀁 􀀥􀀯􀀮􀀴􀀧􀀸􀀴􀀁 􀀨􀀯􀀲􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀲􀀰􀀯􀀳􀀧􀀳􀀁 􀀯􀀨􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁 􀀰􀀲􀀧􀀳􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀁 􀀦􀀲􀀣􀀨􀀴􀀁
􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀳􀀆􀀁
􀀂􀀊􀀃􀀁 􀀟􀀩􀀧􀀁 􀀰􀀲􀀪􀀮􀀥􀀪􀀰􀀬􀀧􀀁 􀀳􀀧􀀴􀀁 􀀯􀀵􀀴􀀁 􀀪􀀮􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀪􀀳􀀁 􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀁 􀀳􀀧􀀧􀀭􀀳􀀁 􀀳􀀧􀀬􀀨􀀅
􀀧􀀶􀀪􀀦􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀒􀀁 􀀥􀀵􀀳􀀴􀀯􀀭􀀣􀀲􀀹􀀁 􀀪􀀮􀀴􀀧􀀲􀀮􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀣􀀬􀀁 􀀬􀀣􀀷􀀁 􀀥􀀯􀀮􀀴􀀪􀀮􀀵􀀧􀀳􀀁 􀀴􀀯􀀁 􀀣􀀰􀀰􀀬􀀹􀀁
􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀀖􀀛􀀕􀀣􀀤􀀝􀀁
􀀪􀀮􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃
􀀎􀀛􀀕􀀓􀀡􀀓􀀙􀀤􀀓􀀁􀀥􀀣􀀳􀀧􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀗􀀮􀀴􀀧􀀲􀀮􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀣􀀬􀀁􀀔􀀯􀀵􀀲􀀴􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀘􀀵􀀳􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀧􀀁􀀳􀀴􀀣􀀴􀀧􀀦􀀁
􀀣􀀳􀀁􀀨􀀯􀀬􀀬􀀯􀀷􀀳􀀒
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀾􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁖􀀅
􀁗􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁀􀀏􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀏􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁌􀂿􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀀧􀀭􀀤􀀯􀀦􀀪􀀧􀀦􀀁 􀀪􀀮􀀁 􀀭􀀵􀀬􀀴􀀪􀀬􀀣􀀴􀀧􀀲􀀣􀀬􀀁 􀀥􀀯􀀮􀀶􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀳􀀁 􀀦􀀯􀀧􀀳􀀁 􀀮􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀀭􀀧􀀣􀀮􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀣􀀴􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀹􀀁 􀀥􀀧􀀣􀀳􀀧􀀁
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃
􀀥􀀯􀀵􀀮􀀴􀀲􀀪􀀧􀀳􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀣􀀴􀀁􀀣􀀲􀀧􀀁􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀧􀀳􀀁􀀴􀀯􀀁􀀳􀀵􀀥􀀩􀀁􀀥􀀯􀀮􀀶􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀳􀀆􀀌􀀉􀀎
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖
􀀑􀀖􀀣􀀞􀀚􀀟􀀒􀀥􀀚􀀠􀀟􀀄􀀁􀀨􀀚􀀥􀀙􀀕􀀣􀀒􀀨􀀒􀀝􀀁􀀗􀀣􀀠􀀞􀀁􀀠􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀦􀀤􀀡􀀖􀀟􀀤􀀚􀀠􀀟􀀁􀀠􀀗􀀁􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀁
􀀠􀀡􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀥􀀚􀀠􀀟􀀁 􀀠􀀗􀀁 􀀒􀀁 􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀒􀀥􀀪􀀁 􀀒􀀤􀀁 􀀒􀀁 􀀔􀀠􀀟􀀤􀀖􀀢􀀦􀀖􀀟􀀔􀀖􀀁 􀀠􀀗􀀁 􀀒􀀟􀀁 􀀒􀀣􀀞􀀖􀀕􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁚􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀁􀀡􀀒􀀣􀀥􀀚􀀖􀀤􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀨􀀚􀀤􀀖􀀁􀀒􀀘􀀣􀀖􀀖􀀄􀀁􀀥􀀒􀀜􀀖􀀁􀀖􀀗􀀗􀀖􀀔􀀥􀀁􀀨􀀚􀀥􀀙􀀁􀀣􀀖􀀤􀀡􀀖􀀔􀀥􀀁􀀥􀀠􀀁
􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀁􀀨􀀙􀀠􀀝􀀖􀀁􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀒􀀥􀀪􀀁􀀖􀀩􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀥􀀁􀀨􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀖􀀉
􀀂􀀁􀀃􀀁 􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀁􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀒􀀥􀀪􀀁􀀔􀀠􀀟􀀥􀀒􀀚􀀟􀀤􀀁􀀔􀀝􀀒􀀦􀀤􀀖􀀤􀀁􀀥􀀙􀀒􀀥􀀁􀀒􀀣􀀖􀀁􀀤􀀖􀀡􀀒􀀣􀀒􀀓􀀝􀀖􀀁
􀀗􀀣􀀠􀀞􀀁􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀁􀀣􀀖􀀞􀀒􀀚􀀟􀀕􀀖􀀣􀀁􀀠􀀗􀀁􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀁􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀒􀀥􀀪􀀁􀀨􀀚􀀥􀀙􀀁􀀣􀀖􀀘􀀒􀀣􀀕􀀁􀀥􀀠􀀁􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀚􀀣􀀁
􀀒􀀡􀀡􀀝􀀚􀀔􀀒􀀥􀀚􀀠􀀟􀀊
􀀂􀁅􀀃􀀁 􀀚􀀥􀀁􀀒􀀡􀀡􀀖􀀒􀀣􀀤􀀁􀀗􀀣􀀠􀀞􀀁􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀁􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀒􀀥􀀪􀀁􀀠􀀣􀀁􀀚􀀤􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀨􀀚􀀤􀀖􀀁􀀖􀀤􀀅
􀀥􀀒􀀓􀀝􀀚􀀤􀀙􀀖􀀕􀀁􀀥􀀙􀀒􀀥􀀁􀀒􀀔􀀔􀀖􀀡􀀥􀀒􀀟􀀔􀀖􀀁􀀠􀀗􀀁􀀥􀀙􀀠􀀤􀀖􀀁􀀔􀀝􀀒􀀦􀀤􀀖􀀤􀀁􀀨􀀒􀀤􀀁􀀟􀀠􀀥􀀁􀀒􀀟􀀁
􀀖􀀤􀀤􀀖􀀟􀀥􀀚􀀒􀀝􀀁􀀓􀀒􀀤􀀚􀀤􀀁􀀠􀀗􀀁􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀁􀀔􀀠􀀟􀀤􀀖􀀟􀀥􀀁􀀠􀀗􀀁􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀁􀀡􀀒􀀣􀀥􀀪􀀁􀀠􀀣􀀁􀀡􀀒􀀣􀀅
􀀥􀀚􀀖􀀤􀀁􀀥􀀠􀀁􀀓􀀖􀀁􀀓􀀠􀀦􀀟􀀕􀀁􀀓􀀪􀀁􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀁􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀒􀀥􀀪􀀁􀀒􀀤􀀁􀀒􀀁􀀨􀀙􀀠􀀝􀀖􀀊􀀁􀀒􀀟􀀕
􀀂􀀂􀀃􀀁 􀀔􀀠􀀟􀀥􀀚􀀟􀀦􀀖􀀕􀀁 􀀡􀀖􀀣􀀗􀀠􀀣􀀞􀀒􀀟􀀔􀀖􀀁 􀀠􀀗􀀁 􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀁 􀀣􀀖􀀞􀀒􀀚􀀟􀀕􀀖􀀣􀀁 􀀠􀀗􀀁
􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀁􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀒􀀥􀀪􀀁􀀨􀀠􀀦􀀝􀀕􀀁􀀟􀀠􀀥􀀁􀀓􀀖􀀁􀀦􀀟􀀛􀀦􀀤􀀥􀀆
􀀊􀀟􀀝􀀝􀀗􀀞􀀣􀀓􀀡􀀥
􀀂􀀉􀀃􀀁 􀀓􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀁􀀉􀀉􀀁􀀦􀀧􀀣􀀬􀀳􀀁􀀷􀀪􀀴􀀩􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀳􀀧􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀣􀀤􀀪􀀬􀀪􀀴􀀹􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀰􀀲􀀯􀀶􀀪􀀳􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀳􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀰􀀬􀀣􀀹􀀳􀀁􀀣􀀁􀀫􀀧􀀹􀀁􀀲􀀯􀀬􀀧􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀰􀀲􀀧􀀳􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀁􀀦􀀲􀀣􀀨􀀴􀀁􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀳􀀁􀀤􀀹􀀁􀀻􀀭􀀯􀀦􀀧􀀲􀀅
􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀂴􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀀗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀀚􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀣􀀁􀀴􀀲􀀧􀀣􀀴􀀹􀀆
􀀌􀀉􀀎􀀁􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀀤􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀀱􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁘􀁄􀀃
􀀂􀀎􀀛􀀕􀀓􀀡􀀓􀀙􀀤􀀓􀀁 􀀶􀀆􀀁 􀀑􀀞􀀛􀀣􀀗􀀖􀀁 􀀐􀀣􀀓􀀣􀀗􀀢􀀁 􀀟􀀘􀀁 􀀉􀀝􀀗􀀡􀀛􀀕􀀓􀀃􀀄􀀁 􀀍􀀤􀀡􀀛􀀢􀀖􀀛􀀕􀀣􀀛􀀟􀀞􀀁 􀀓􀀞􀀖􀀁 􀀉􀀖􀀝􀀛􀀢􀀄
􀀢􀀛􀀔􀀛􀀜􀀛􀀣􀀥􀀄􀀁􀀍􀀤􀀖􀀙􀀝􀀗􀀞􀀣􀀄􀀁􀀬􀀑􀀦􀀑􀀭􀀑􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀜􀀕􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀚􀀖􀀞􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀎􀀟􀀡􀀣􀀚􀀁􀀐􀀗􀀓􀀁􀀊􀀟􀀞􀀣􀀛􀀞􀀗􀀞􀀣􀀓􀀜􀀁􀀐􀀚􀀗􀀜􀀘􀀄􀀁
􀀍􀀤􀀖􀀙􀀝􀀗􀀞􀀣􀀄􀀁􀀌􀀅􀀊􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀁􀀏􀀗􀀠􀀟􀀡􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀆􀀈􀀇􀀈􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀋􀀄􀀁􀀣􀀴􀀁􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀑􀀐􀀆
􀀂􀀊􀀃􀀁 􀀟􀀩􀀧􀀁 􀀰􀀲􀀧􀀳􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀁 􀀰􀀲􀀯􀀶􀀪􀀳􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀁 􀀪􀀳􀀁 􀀤􀀣􀀳􀀧􀀦􀀁 􀀯􀀮􀀁 􀀪􀀴􀀳􀀁 􀀥􀀯􀀵􀀮􀀴􀀧􀀲􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀁
􀀪􀀮􀀁 􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀁 􀀌􀀌􀀁 􀀯􀀨􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁 􀀉􀀑􀀎􀀑􀀁 􀀡􀀪􀀧􀀮􀀮􀀣􀀁 􀀔􀀯􀀮􀀶􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀆􀀁 􀀞􀀵􀀤􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀣􀀅
􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀁖􀀃 􀀋􀀓􀀃􀀁 􀀴􀀯􀀁 􀀂􀀕􀀃􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀰􀀲􀀯􀀦􀀵􀀥􀀧􀀁 􀀶􀀧􀀲􀀤􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀭􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁 􀀴􀀧􀀸􀀴􀀁 􀀯􀀨􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀪􀀲􀀁
􀀧􀀱􀀵􀀪􀀶􀀣􀀬􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀳􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀣􀀴􀀁􀀔􀀯􀀮􀀶􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀆
􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃 􀀵􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀀅
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁘􀁑􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀔􀀯􀀭􀀭􀀪􀀳􀀳􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀣􀀬􀀬􀀧􀀦􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀣􀀴􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀪􀀳􀀁 􀀰􀀲􀀯􀀶􀀪􀀳􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀁 􀀷􀀣􀀳􀀁 􀀪􀀮􀀴􀀲􀀯􀀦􀀵􀀥􀀧􀀦􀀁
􀀪􀀮􀀴􀀯􀀁 􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀁 􀀌􀀌􀀁 􀀯􀀨􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁 􀀉􀀑􀀎􀀑􀀁 􀀡􀀪􀀧􀀮􀀮􀀣􀀁 􀀔􀀯􀀮􀀶􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀁 􀀣􀀴􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁
􀀤􀀧􀀩􀀧􀀳􀀴􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀠􀀮􀀪􀀴􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀞􀀴􀀣􀀴􀀧􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀓􀀭􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀥􀀣􀀆􀀁􀀓􀀳􀀁􀀛􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀙􀀧􀀣􀀲􀀮􀀧􀀹􀀄􀀁
􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀰􀀲􀀧􀀳􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀶􀀧􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀠􀀮􀀪􀀴􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀞􀀴􀀣􀀴􀀧􀀳􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀰􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀮􀀧􀀦􀀄
􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀁐􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀀅
􀀴􀀪􀀮􀀵􀀧􀀦􀀁 􀀰􀀧􀀲􀀨􀀯􀀲􀀭􀀣􀀮􀀥􀀧􀀁 􀀯􀀨􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀭􀀣􀀪􀀮􀀦􀀧􀀲􀀁 􀀯􀀨􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁 􀀴􀀲􀀧􀀣􀀴􀀹􀀁 􀀪􀀮􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁 􀀣􀀤􀀳􀀧􀀮􀀥􀀧􀀁 􀀯􀀨􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀌􀀉􀀏􀀁
􀀗􀀮􀀁 􀀯􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀲􀀁 􀀷􀀯􀀲􀀦􀀳􀀄􀀁 􀀣􀀳􀀁 􀀪􀀳􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁 􀀥􀀣􀀳􀀧􀀁 􀀷􀀪􀀴􀀩􀀁 􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀁 􀀌􀀌􀀄􀀁 􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀣􀀅
􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃 􀀖􀀃 􀀋􀀕􀀃􀀄􀀁 􀀯􀀨􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁 􀀉􀀑􀀎􀀑􀀁 􀀡􀀪􀀧􀀮􀀮􀀣􀀁 􀀔􀀯􀀮􀀶􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀄􀀁 􀀳􀀵􀀤􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀣􀀅
􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃
􀀪􀀮􀀶􀀯􀀫􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀪􀀨􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀳􀀧􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀴􀀲􀀧􀀣􀀴􀀹􀀁􀀰􀀲􀀯􀀶􀀪􀀳􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀳􀀺􀀴􀀯􀀁􀀳􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀳􀀨􀀹􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀂲􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀂿􀀅
􀀥􀀣􀀮􀀴􀀁􀀪􀀭􀀤􀀣􀀬􀀣􀀮􀀥􀀧􀀁􀀴􀀯􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀦􀀧􀀴􀀲􀀪􀀭􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀯􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀲􀀁􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀹􀀁􀀯􀀲􀀁􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀁖􀀃􀀋􀀓􀀃􀀁􀀂􀀳􀀧􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀣􀀤􀀪􀀬􀀪􀀴􀀹􀀁
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀌􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀋􀀔􀀃􀀁 􀀂􀀣􀀥􀀥􀀧􀀰􀀴􀀣􀀮􀀥􀀧􀀁 􀀯􀀨􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁
􀀥􀀬􀀣􀀵􀀳􀀧􀀁 􀀯􀀲􀀁 􀀥􀀬􀀣􀀵􀀳􀀧􀀳􀀁 􀀷􀀩􀀯􀀳􀀧􀀁 􀀴􀀧􀀲􀀭􀀪􀀮􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀁 􀀯􀀲􀀁 􀀪􀀮􀀶􀀣􀀬􀀪􀀦􀀪􀀴􀀹􀀁 􀀪􀀳􀀁
􀀲􀀧􀀱􀀵􀀧􀀳􀀴􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀷􀀣􀀳􀀁􀀮􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀧􀀳􀀳􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀪􀀣􀀬􀀁􀀤􀀣􀀳􀀪􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀥􀀯􀀮􀀳􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁
􀀯􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀲􀀁􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀹􀀁􀀯􀀲􀀁􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀧􀀳􀀁􀀴􀀯􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀤􀀯􀀵􀀮􀀦􀀁􀀤􀀹􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀴􀀲􀀧􀀣􀀴􀀹􀀃􀀆
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀯􀁒􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀀃
􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀋􀀁􀀐􀀥􀀒􀀥􀀖􀀁􀀞􀀒􀀪􀀁􀀟􀀠􀀁􀀝􀀠􀀟􀀘􀀖􀀣􀀁􀀥􀀖􀀣􀀞􀀚􀀟􀀒􀀥􀀖􀀁􀀠􀀣􀀁􀀨􀀚􀀥􀀙􀀕􀀣􀀒􀀨􀀁􀀗􀀣􀀠􀀞􀀁
􀀒􀀁􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀒􀀥􀀪􀀁􀀠􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀦􀀤􀀡􀀖􀀟􀀕􀀁􀀚􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀠􀀡􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀥􀀚􀀠􀀟􀀁􀀒􀀤􀀁􀀒􀀁􀀔􀀠􀀟􀀤􀀖􀀢􀀦􀀖􀀟􀀔􀀖􀀁􀀠􀀗􀀁
􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀝
􀀂􀀁􀀃􀀁 􀀚􀀥􀀁 􀀤􀀙􀀒􀀝􀀝􀀁 􀀙􀀒􀀧􀀖􀀁 􀀖􀀩􀀡􀀣􀀖􀀤􀀤􀀝􀀪􀀁 􀀒􀀘􀀣􀀖􀀖􀀕􀀁 􀀥􀀙􀀒􀀥􀀁 􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀁 􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀒􀀥􀀪􀀁
􀀣􀀖􀀞􀀒􀀚􀀟􀀤􀀁􀀚􀀟􀀁􀀗􀀠􀀣􀀔􀀖􀀁􀀠􀀣􀀁􀀔􀀠􀀟􀀥􀀚􀀟􀀦􀀖􀀤􀀁􀀚􀀟􀀁􀀠􀀡􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀥􀀚􀀠􀀟􀀊􀀁􀀠􀀣
􀀂􀁅􀀃􀀁 􀀚􀀥􀀁􀀞􀀦􀀤􀀥􀀁􀀓􀀪􀀁􀀣􀀖􀀒􀀤􀀠􀀟􀀁􀀠􀀗􀀁􀀚􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀔􀀠􀀟􀀕􀀦􀀔􀀥􀀁􀀓􀀖􀀁􀀔􀀠􀀟􀀤􀀚􀀕􀀖􀀣􀀖􀀕􀀁
􀀒􀀤􀀁􀀙􀀒􀀧􀀚􀀟􀀘􀀁􀀒􀀔􀀢􀀦􀀚􀀖􀀤􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀁􀀚􀀟􀀁􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀁􀀔􀀠􀀟􀀥􀀚􀀟􀀦􀀖􀀕􀀁􀀠􀀡􀀖􀀣􀀒􀀥􀀚􀀠􀀟􀀁􀀠􀀗􀀁􀀥􀀙􀀖􀀁
􀀥􀀣􀀖􀀒􀀥􀀪􀀁􀀠􀀣􀀁􀀚􀀟􀀁􀀚􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀞􀀒􀀚􀀟􀀥􀀖􀀟􀀒􀀟􀀔􀀖􀀁􀀚􀀟􀀁􀀗􀀠􀀣􀀔􀀖􀀆
􀀊􀀟􀀝􀀝􀀗􀀞􀀣􀀓􀀡􀀥
􀀂􀀉􀀃􀀁 􀀓􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀁 􀀉􀀊􀀁 􀀪􀀳􀀁 􀀤􀀣􀀳􀀧􀀦􀀁 􀀯􀀮􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀵􀀪􀀶􀀣􀀬􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀁 􀀰􀀲􀀯􀀶􀀪􀀳􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀁 􀀯􀀨􀀁
􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀁􀀌􀀍􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀉􀀑􀀎􀀑􀀁􀀡􀀪􀀧􀀮􀀮􀀣􀀁􀀔􀀯􀀮􀀶􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀗􀀴􀀁􀀦􀀧􀀣􀀬􀀳􀀁􀀷􀀪􀀴􀀩􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃
􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁐􀁘􀁐􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁊􀁒􀁒􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑
􀀂􀀊􀀃􀀁 􀀟􀀯􀀁 􀀭􀀣􀀫􀀧􀀁 􀀪􀀴􀀁 􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀣􀀲􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀣􀀴􀀁 􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀁 􀀉􀀊􀀁 􀀪􀀳􀀁 􀀴􀀯􀀁 􀀣􀀰􀀰􀀬􀀹􀀁 􀀪􀀮􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀀤􀀧􀀧􀀮􀀁􀀣􀀦􀀦􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀕􀀚􀀓􀀠􀀗􀀓􀀤􀀆􀀁􀀟􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀔􀀯􀀭􀀭􀀪􀀳􀀳􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀦􀀧􀀲􀀳􀀴􀀯􀀯􀀦􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀂳􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀌􀀉􀀏􀀁􀀞􀀴􀀣􀀴􀀧􀀭􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀁􀀭􀀣􀀦􀀧􀀁􀀤􀀹􀀁􀀛􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀙􀀧􀀣􀀲􀀮􀀧􀀹􀀄􀀁􀀲􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀀩􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀀹􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁑􀁄􀀏􀀃
􀀕􀀙􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀂱􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀙􀀛􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀣􀀚􀀗􀀁􀀝􀀗􀀗􀀣􀀛􀀞􀀙􀀢􀀁􀀟􀀘􀀁􀀣􀀚􀀗􀀁􀀊􀀟􀀝􀀝􀀛􀀣􀀣􀀗􀀗􀀁􀀟􀀘􀀁􀀣􀀚􀀗􀀁􀀒􀀚􀀟􀀜􀀗􀀁􀀂􀀓􀀇􀀔􀀝􀀜􀀖􀀆􀀋􀀑􀀇􀀉􀀉􀀄􀀁􀀠􀀮􀀪􀀴􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀜􀀣􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀨􀀑􀀙􀀛􀀑􀀹􀀑􀀚􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀗􀀔􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀢􀀩􀀯􀀬􀀧􀀄􀀁􀀊􀀏􀀁􀀓􀀰􀀲􀀪􀀬􀀁􀀉􀀑􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀣􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀏􀀆􀀁􀀖􀀯􀀲􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀰􀀲􀀯􀀰􀀯􀀳􀀣􀀬􀀁􀀤􀀹􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀠􀀮􀀪􀀴􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀞􀀴􀀣􀀴􀀧􀀳􀀄􀀁
􀀳􀀧􀀧􀀁􀀓􀀇􀀔􀀝􀀜􀀖􀀆􀀋􀀑􀀇􀀔􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀚􀀆􀀊􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀁􀀷􀀩􀀪􀀥􀀩􀀁􀀷􀀣􀀳􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀰􀀲􀀯􀀦􀀵􀀥􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀁􀀲􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀶􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀀹􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁑􀁄􀀏􀀃 􀀕􀀙􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀂱􀀕􀀗􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀙􀀛􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀜􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁏􀂱􀀕􀀕􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀙􀀜􀀏􀀃
􀀋􀀟􀀕􀀤􀀝􀀗􀀞􀀣􀀢􀀁 􀀟􀀘􀀁 􀀣􀀚􀀗􀀁 􀀊􀀟􀀞􀀘􀀗􀀡􀀗􀀞􀀕􀀗􀀁 􀀂􀀓􀀇􀀔􀀝􀀜􀀖􀀆􀀋􀀑􀀇􀀉􀀉􀀇􀀓􀀦􀀦􀀆􀀊􀀄􀀁 􀀠􀀮􀀪􀀴􀀧􀀦􀀁 􀀜􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀳􀀁
􀀰􀀵􀀤􀀬􀀪􀀥􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀄􀀁􀀞􀀣􀀬􀀧􀀳􀀁􀀜􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀆􀀏􀀈􀀆􀀡􀀆􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀣􀀆􀀁􀀋􀀎􀀑􀀆
􀀃 􀀨􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀁 􀀅􀀅􀀈
􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀙􀀜􀀃􀀹􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁑􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀀅
􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀑
􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃 􀀬􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀮􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀮􀀳􀀴􀀱􀀣􀀤􀀟􀀣􀀁􀀧􀀝􀀳􀀁􀀨􀀩􀀮􀀁􀀣􀀝􀀰􀀡􀀁􀀞􀀡􀀡􀀨􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀟􀀝􀀭􀀡􀀁􀀝􀀮􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀩􀀯􀀮􀀞􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀥􀀆􀀁
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁒􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀀞􀀡􀀟􀀩􀀧􀀡􀀁􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀭􀀩􀀨􀀝􀀞􀀦􀀳􀀁􀀟􀀦􀀡􀀝􀀬􀀆
􀀂􀀋􀀃􀀁 􀀛􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀬􀀡􀀢􀀡􀀬􀀡􀀨􀀟􀀡􀀁􀀤􀀨􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀮􀀤􀀮􀀦􀀡􀀁􀀮􀀩􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀰􀀝􀀬􀀤􀀩􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀝􀀟􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀭􀀁􀀱􀀣􀀤􀀟􀀣􀀁
􀀟􀀝􀀨􀀁􀀞􀀡􀀁􀀮􀀝􀀥􀀡􀀨􀀁􀀂􀀵􀀮􀀩􀀁􀀮􀀡􀀬􀀧􀀤􀀨􀀝􀀮􀀡􀀁􀀩􀀬􀀁􀀱􀀤􀀮􀀣􀀠􀀬􀀝􀀱􀀁􀀢􀀬􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀝􀀁􀀮􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀮􀀳􀀁􀀩􀀬􀀁􀀮􀀩􀀁
􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂴􀀌􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁒􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀀱􀀩􀀯􀀦􀀠􀀁􀀣􀀝􀀰􀀡􀀁􀀝􀀨􀀠􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀝􀀪􀀪􀀦􀀤􀀟􀀝􀀞􀀦􀀡􀀁􀀟􀀩􀀨􀀠􀀤􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀭􀀆
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀑􀀃 􀀵􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗
􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁘􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀀡􀀔􀀢􀀤􀀜􀀘􀀣􀀁 􀀞􀀔􀀩􀀁 􀀢􀀘􀀚􀀥􀀝􀀔􀀤􀀘􀀂􀀁 􀀠􀀟􀀁 􀀤􀀛􀀘􀀁 􀀕􀀔􀀣􀀜􀀣􀀁 􀀠􀀙􀀁 􀀔􀀚􀀢􀀘􀀘􀀞􀀘􀀟􀀤􀀂􀀁 􀀤􀀛􀀘􀀁
􀀢􀀘􀀦􀀜􀀦􀀔􀀝􀀁􀀠􀀙􀀁􀀤􀀢􀀘􀀔􀀤􀀜􀀘􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀘􀀢􀀞􀀜􀀟􀀔􀀤􀀘􀀗􀀁􀀠􀀢􀀁􀀣􀀥􀀣􀀡􀀘􀀟􀀗􀀘􀀗􀀁􀀔􀀣􀀁􀀔􀀁􀀖􀀠􀀟􀀃
􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑
􀀆􀀄􀀁 􀀒􀀛􀀘􀀁 􀀢􀀘􀀣􀀥􀀞􀀡􀀤􀀜􀀠􀀟􀀁 􀀠􀀙􀀁 􀀤􀀛􀀘􀀁 􀀠􀀡􀀘􀀢􀀔􀀤􀀜􀀠􀀟􀀁 􀀠􀀙􀀁 􀀔􀀁 􀀤􀀢􀀘􀀔􀀤􀀩􀀁
􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃
􀀕􀀘􀀁􀀗􀀘􀀤􀀘􀀢􀀞􀀜􀀟􀀘􀀗􀀁􀀜􀀟􀀁􀀔􀀖􀀖􀀠􀀢􀀗􀀔􀀟􀀖􀀘􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀤􀀛􀀁􀀤􀀛􀀘􀀁􀀙􀀔􀀖􀀤􀀠􀀢􀀣􀀁􀀢􀀘􀀙􀀘􀀢􀀢􀀘􀀗􀀁
􀀤􀀠􀀁􀀜􀀟􀀁􀀔􀀢􀀤􀀜􀀖􀀝􀀘􀀁􀀇􀀄
􀀁􀀉􀀇􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀋􀀃􀀊􀀌
􀀂􀀈􀀃􀀁 􀀒􀀬􀀮􀀤􀀟􀀦􀀡􀀁 􀀈􀀊􀀁 􀀟􀀩􀀨􀀟􀀡􀀬􀀨􀀭􀀁 􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁 􀀫􀀯􀀡􀀭􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀁 􀀩􀀢􀀁 􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁 􀀬􀀡􀀰􀀤􀀰􀀝􀀦􀀁
􀀂􀀪􀀝􀀬􀀝􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀃􀀁􀀩􀀬􀀁􀀬􀀡􀀭􀀯􀀧􀀪􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀂􀀪􀀝􀀬􀀝􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀃􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀮􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀮􀀳􀀁􀀬􀀡􀀦􀀝􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀭􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀞􀀅
􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑
􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃 􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀀝􀀁􀀮􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀮􀀳􀀁􀀣􀀝􀀭􀀁􀀞􀀡􀀡􀀨􀀁􀀮􀀡􀀬􀀧􀀤􀀨􀀝􀀮􀀡􀀠􀀁􀀩􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀭􀀪􀀡􀀨􀀠􀀡􀀠􀀁􀀤􀀨􀀁􀀱􀀣􀀩􀀦􀀡􀀁􀀩􀀬􀀁􀀤􀀨􀀁
􀀪􀀝􀀬􀀮􀀄􀀁 􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁 􀀚􀀮􀀝􀀮􀀡􀀭􀀁 􀀪􀀝􀀬􀀮􀀤􀀡􀀭􀀁 􀀧􀀝􀀳􀀄􀀁 􀀤􀀢􀀁 􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀳􀀁 􀀱􀀤􀀭􀀣􀀄􀀁 􀀟􀀩􀀨􀀟􀀦􀀯􀀠􀀡􀀁 􀀝􀀨􀀁
􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀀩􀀬􀀁􀀪􀀝􀀬􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀬􀀡􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀝􀀮􀀁􀀣􀀝􀀰􀀡􀀁􀀟􀀡􀀝􀀭􀀡􀀠􀀁􀀮􀀩􀀁􀀡􀀲􀀤􀀭􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀛􀀣􀀤􀀭􀀁􀀤􀀭􀀁􀀝􀀁􀀟􀀩􀀨􀀭􀀡􀀅
􀀫􀀯􀀡􀀨􀀟􀀡􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀢􀀬􀀡􀀡􀀠􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀮􀀩􀀁􀀟􀀩􀀨􀀟􀀦􀀯􀀠􀀡􀀁􀀮􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀮􀀤􀀡􀀭􀀁􀀝􀀨􀀠􀀁􀀟􀀝􀀨􀀨􀀩􀀮􀀁􀀞􀀡􀀁
􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀂳􀁓􀁕􀁈􀀐􀁚􀁄􀁕􀂴􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁌􀁊􀁘􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃
􀀝􀀭􀀭􀀡􀀭􀀭􀀧􀀡􀀨􀀮􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀮􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀮􀀳􀀁􀀪􀀤􀀟􀀮􀀯􀀬􀀡􀀆􀀁􀀚􀀯􀀟􀀣􀀁􀀝􀀨􀀁􀀝􀀭􀀭􀀡􀀭􀀭􀀧􀀡􀀨􀀮􀀁􀀧􀀝􀀳􀀄􀀁
􀀤􀀨􀀁 􀀪􀀬􀀝􀀟􀀮􀀤􀀟􀀡􀀄􀀁 􀀤􀀨􀀰􀀩􀀦􀀰􀀡􀀁 􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁 􀀬􀀡􀀰􀀤􀀰􀀝􀀦􀀁 􀀩􀀢􀀁 􀀮􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀮􀀤􀀡􀀭􀀁 􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀝􀀮􀀯􀀭􀀁 􀀩􀀢􀀁
􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁌􀁊􀁘􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀅
􀀧􀀤􀀨􀀝􀀮􀀡􀀠􀀁􀀩􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀭􀀪􀀡􀀨􀀠􀀡􀀠􀀁􀀝􀀭􀀁􀀝􀀁􀀟􀀩􀀨􀀭􀀡􀀫􀀯􀀡􀀨􀀟􀀡􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀝􀀨􀀁􀀝􀀬􀀧􀀡􀀠􀀁􀀟􀀩􀀨􀀅
􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀂿􀁆􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀅
􀀤􀀟􀀦􀀡􀀁 􀀋􀀋􀀁 􀀩􀀢􀀁 􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁 􀀛􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀮􀀳􀀁 􀀩􀀢􀀁 􀀙􀀡􀀝􀀟􀀡􀀁 􀀱􀀤􀀮􀀣􀀁 􀀖􀀮􀀝􀀦􀀳􀀄􀀁 􀀟􀀩􀀨􀀟􀀦􀀯􀀠􀀡􀀠􀀁 􀀩􀀨􀀁
􀀈􀀇􀀁 􀀔􀀡􀀞􀀬􀀯􀀝􀀬􀀳􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀎􀀁 􀀞􀀡􀀮􀀱􀀡􀀡􀀨􀀁 􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀒􀀦􀀦􀀤􀀡􀀠􀀁 􀀙􀀩􀀱􀀡􀀬􀀭􀀁 􀀝􀀨􀀠􀀁 􀀖􀀮􀀝􀀦􀀳􀀆􀀁
􀀛􀀣􀀝􀀮􀀁􀀝􀀬􀀮􀀤􀀟􀀦􀀡􀀁􀀪􀀬􀀩􀀰􀀤􀀠􀀡􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀝􀀮􀀁􀀡􀀝􀀟􀀣􀀁􀀒􀀦􀀦􀀤􀀡􀀠􀀁􀀙􀀩􀀱􀀡􀀬􀀁􀀧􀀝􀀳􀀄􀀁􀀱􀀤􀀮􀀣􀀤􀀨􀀁
􀀝􀀁􀀮􀀤􀀧􀀡􀀁􀀦􀀤􀀧􀀤􀀮􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀭􀀤􀀲􀀁􀀧􀀩􀀨􀀮􀀣􀀭􀀄􀀁􀀨􀀩􀀮􀀤􀀢􀀳􀀁􀀖􀀮􀀝􀀦􀀳􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀮􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀮􀀤􀀡􀀭􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀁
􀀱􀀤􀀭􀀣􀀡􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀩􀀁􀀬􀀡􀀰􀀤􀀰􀀡􀀆
􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃 􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃 􀀕􀀏􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀮􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀮􀀤􀀡􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀝􀀮􀀁􀀱􀀡􀀬􀀡􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀭􀀪􀀡􀀨􀀠􀀡􀀠􀀁􀀝􀀭􀀁􀀝􀀁􀀟􀀩􀀨􀀭􀀡􀀫􀀯􀀡􀀨􀀟􀀡􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀝􀀨􀀁􀀝􀀬􀀧􀀡􀀠􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁕􀀝􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃
􀀭􀀯􀀭􀀪􀀡􀀨􀀠􀀡􀀠􀀁􀀝􀀭􀀁􀀝􀀁􀀟􀀩􀀨􀀭􀀡􀀫􀀯􀀡􀀨􀀟􀀡􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀝􀀪􀀪􀀦􀀤􀀟􀀝􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀝􀀬􀀮􀀤􀀟􀀦􀀡􀀁􀀍􀀆􀀁
􀀚􀀤􀀨􀀟􀀡􀀄􀀁􀀤􀀨􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀟􀀣􀀁􀀝􀀁􀀟􀀝􀀭􀀡􀀄􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀮􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀮􀀳􀀁􀀣􀀝􀀭􀀁􀀞􀀡􀀡􀀨􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀭􀀪􀀡􀀨􀀠􀀡􀀠􀀁􀀝􀀮􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁
􀀤􀀨􀀤􀀮􀀤􀀝􀀮􀀤􀀰􀀡􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀩􀀨􀀡􀀁􀀚􀀮􀀝􀀮􀀡􀀁􀀪􀀝􀀬􀀮􀀳􀀴􀀝􀀦􀀭􀀩􀀁􀀝􀀁􀀪􀀝􀀬􀀮􀀳􀀁􀀮􀀩􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀝􀀬􀀧􀀡􀀠􀀁􀀟􀀩􀀨􀀅
􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀂲􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀙􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃
􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃
􀀩􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀬􀀁􀀟􀀝􀀯􀀭􀀡􀀭􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀮􀀡􀀬􀀧􀀤􀀨􀀝􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀄􀀁􀀱􀀤􀀮􀀣􀀠􀀬􀀝􀀱􀀝􀀦􀀁􀀩􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀭􀀪􀀡􀀨􀀭􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀣􀀝􀀰􀀡􀀁
􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀌􀀏􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁚􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀑􀀃 􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀧􀀝􀀳􀀁􀀞􀀡􀀁􀀟􀀝􀀦􀀦􀀡􀀠􀀁􀀢􀀩􀀬􀀁􀀞􀀳􀀁􀀩􀀨􀀡􀀁􀀩􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀡􀀰􀀡􀀬􀀝􀀦􀀁􀀚􀀮􀀝􀀮􀀡􀀭􀀁􀀪􀀝􀀬􀀮􀀤􀀡􀀭􀀄􀀁􀀝􀀭􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀁􀀤􀀭􀀁􀀨􀀩􀀁
􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀭􀀯􀀟􀀣􀀁􀀝􀀨􀀁􀀤􀀨􀀤􀀮􀀤􀀝􀀮􀀤􀀰􀀡􀀁􀀱􀀤􀀦􀀦􀀁􀀞􀀡􀀁􀀠􀀡􀀮􀀡􀀬􀀧􀀤􀀨􀀡􀀠􀀁􀀤􀀨􀀁􀀝􀀟􀀟􀀩􀀬􀀠􀀝􀀨􀀟􀀡􀀁􀀱􀀤􀀮􀀣􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁
􀀢􀀝􀀟􀀮􀀩􀀬􀀭􀀁􀀦􀀤􀀭􀀮􀀡􀀠􀀁􀀤􀀨􀀁􀀝􀀬􀀮􀀤􀀟􀀦􀀡􀀁􀀍􀀆
􀀂􀀋􀀃􀀁 􀀛􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀫􀀯􀀡􀀭􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀱􀀣􀀡􀀨􀀁􀀝􀀁􀀮􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀮􀀳􀀁􀀤􀀭􀀁􀀬􀀡􀀭􀀯􀀧􀀡􀀠􀀁􀀭􀀣􀀩􀀯􀀦􀀠􀀁􀀞􀀡􀀁
􀀠􀀡􀀝􀀦􀀮􀀁􀀱􀀤􀀮􀀣􀀁􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀝􀀁􀀟􀀝􀀭􀀡􀀅􀀞􀀳􀀅􀀟􀀝􀀭􀀡􀀁􀀞􀀝􀀭􀀤􀀭􀀆
􀀅􀀂􀀆􀀇􀀁􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀃􀀃
􀀎􀀌􀀑􀀊􀀋􀀍􀀍􀀉􀀏􀀋􀀐􀀓􀀑
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀑􀀃 􀀨􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀀁
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜
􀀉􀀁􀀑􀀤􀀔􀀤􀀘􀀁􀀘􀀨􀀘􀀢􀀖􀀜􀀣􀀜􀀟􀀚􀀁􀀜􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀜􀀟􀀛􀀘􀀢􀀘􀀟􀀤􀀁􀀢􀀜􀀚􀀛􀀤􀀁􀀠􀀙􀀁􀀜􀀟􀀗􀀜􀀦􀀜􀀗􀀥􀀔􀀝􀀁􀀠􀀢􀀁
􀀖􀀠􀀝􀀝􀀘􀀖􀀤􀀜􀀦􀀘􀀁􀀣􀀘􀀝􀀙􀀃􀀗􀀘􀀙􀀘􀀟􀀖􀀘􀀁􀀜􀀟􀀁􀀔􀀖􀀖􀀠􀀢􀀗􀀔􀀟􀀖􀀘􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀤􀀛􀀁􀀤􀀛􀀘􀀁􀀊􀀛􀀔􀀢􀀤􀀘􀀢􀀁
􀀠􀀙􀀁􀀤􀀛􀀘􀀁􀀓􀀟􀀜􀀤􀀘􀀗􀀁􀀏􀀔􀀤􀀜􀀠􀀟􀀣􀀁􀀜􀀣􀀁􀀘􀀟􀀤􀀜􀀤􀀝􀀘􀀗􀀁􀀤􀀠􀀁􀀣􀀥􀀣􀀡􀀘􀀟􀀗􀀁􀀜􀀟􀀁􀀧􀀛􀀠􀀝􀀘􀀁􀀠􀀢􀀁
􀀜􀀟􀀁􀀡􀀔􀀢􀀤􀀁􀀤􀀛􀀘􀀁􀀠􀀡􀀘􀀢􀀔􀀤􀀜􀀠􀀟􀀁􀀠􀀙􀀁􀀔􀀁􀀤􀀢􀀘􀀔􀀤􀀩􀀁􀀤􀀠􀀁􀀧􀀛􀀜􀀖􀀛􀀁􀀜􀀤􀀁􀀜􀀣􀀁􀀔􀀁􀀡􀀔􀀢􀀤􀀩􀀁
􀀜􀀟􀀣􀀠􀀙􀀔􀀢􀀁􀀔􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀛􀀔􀀤􀀁􀀠􀀡􀀘􀀢􀀔􀀤􀀜􀀠􀀟􀀁􀀜􀀣􀀁􀀜􀀟􀀖􀀠􀀞􀀡􀀔􀀤􀀜􀀕􀀝􀀘􀀁􀀧􀀜􀀤􀀛􀀁􀀤􀀛􀀘􀀁􀀘􀀨􀀘􀀢􀀃
􀀖􀀜􀀣􀀘􀀁􀀠􀀙􀀁􀀤􀀛􀀔􀀤􀀁􀀢􀀜􀀚􀀛􀀤􀀄
􀀁􀀉􀀇􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀋􀀃􀀊􀀌
􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀔􀀗􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀂿􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀀞􀀝􀀭􀀡􀀠􀀁􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀬􀀡􀀦􀀡􀀰􀀝􀀨􀀮􀀁􀀬􀀡􀀭􀀩􀀦􀀯􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀖􀀨􀀭􀀮􀀤􀀮􀀯􀀮􀀡􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀖􀀨􀀮􀀡􀀬􀀅
􀀨􀀝􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀝􀀦􀀁 􀀗􀀝􀀱􀀁 􀀝􀀠􀀩􀀪􀀮􀀡􀀠􀀁 􀀝􀀮􀀁 􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀕􀀡􀀦􀀭􀀤􀀨􀀥􀀤􀀁 􀀭􀀡􀀭􀀭􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀁 􀀤􀀨􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀏􀀌􀀆􀀋􀀈􀀏􀀁
􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀃀􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃
􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁇􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀃀􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀏􀀃
􀀱􀀣􀀤􀀟􀀣􀀁􀀟􀀩􀀧􀀪􀀦􀀡􀀧􀀡􀀨􀀮􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀪􀀬􀀡􀀭􀀡􀀨􀀮􀀁􀀪􀀬􀀩􀀰􀀤􀀭􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀆
􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀀅
􀀝􀀨􀀟􀀡􀀁􀀱􀀤􀀮􀀣􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀓􀀣􀀝􀀬􀀮􀀡􀀬􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀜􀀨􀀤􀀮􀀡􀀠􀀁􀀘􀀝􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀭􀀆􀀁􀀚􀀯􀀟􀀣􀀁􀀚􀀮􀀝􀀮􀀡􀀁
􀀤􀀭􀀁 􀀡􀀨􀀮􀀤􀀮􀀦􀀡􀀠􀀁 􀀮􀀩􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀀭􀀪􀀡􀀨􀀠􀀁 􀀤􀀨􀀁 􀀱􀀣􀀩􀀦􀀡􀀁 􀀩􀀬􀀁 􀀤􀀨􀀁 􀀪􀀝􀀬􀀮􀀁 􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁 􀀩􀀪􀀡􀀬􀀝􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀑􀀃
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁒􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁 􀀜􀀨􀀤􀀮􀀡􀀠􀀁 􀀘􀀝􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀀝􀀭􀀁 􀀟􀀩􀀨􀀮􀀡􀀧􀀪􀀦􀀝􀀮􀀡􀀠􀀁 􀀤􀀨􀀁 􀀝􀀬􀀮􀀤􀀟􀀦􀀡􀀭􀀁 􀀈􀀌􀀁 􀀝􀀨􀀠􀀁
􀀔􀀙􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀁌􀁐􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁒􀁘􀁅􀁗􀁈􀁇􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁋􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀗􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀀅
􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀭􀀄􀀁􀀱􀀡􀀬􀀡􀀁􀀝􀀞􀀦􀀡􀀄􀀁􀀝􀀮􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀭􀀝􀀧􀀡􀀁􀀮􀀤􀀧􀀡􀀄􀀁􀀮􀀩􀀁􀀬􀀡􀀫􀀯􀀤􀀬􀀡􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀬􀀤􀀟􀀮􀀁􀀝􀀪􀀅
􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀋􀀈􀀏􀀁􀀖􀀨􀀁􀀪􀀝􀀬􀀮􀀤􀀟􀀯􀀦􀀝􀀬􀀄􀀁􀀝􀀬􀀮􀀤􀀟􀀦􀀡􀀁􀀎􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀬􀀡􀀭􀀩􀀦􀀯􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀖􀀨􀀭􀀮􀀤􀀮􀀯􀀮􀀡􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀖􀀨􀀮􀀡􀀬􀀅
􀀨􀀝􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀝􀀦􀀁􀀗􀀝􀀱􀀁􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀭􀀁􀀝􀀭􀀁􀀢􀀩􀀦􀀦􀀩􀀱􀀭􀀑􀀁
􀂳􀀤􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃
􀀤􀀨􀀁 􀀝􀀟􀀟􀀩􀀬􀀠􀀝􀀨􀀟􀀡􀀁 􀀱􀀤􀀮􀀣􀀁 􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁 􀀓􀀣􀀝􀀬􀀮􀀡􀀬􀀁 􀀩􀀢􀀁 􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁 􀀜􀀨􀀤􀀮􀀡􀀠􀀁 􀀘􀀝􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀭􀀁 􀀤􀀭􀀁 􀀡􀀨􀀮􀀤􀀮􀀦􀀡􀀠􀀁 􀀮􀀩􀀁
􀀭􀀯􀀭􀀪􀀡􀀨􀀠􀀁 􀀤􀀨􀀁 􀀱􀀣􀀩􀀦􀀡􀀁 􀀩􀀬􀀁 􀀤􀀨􀀁 􀀪􀀝􀀬􀀮􀀁 􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁 􀀩􀀪􀀡􀀬􀀝􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀁 􀀩􀀢􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀀮􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀮􀀳􀀁 􀀤􀀨􀀟􀀩􀀧􀀪􀀝􀀮􀀤􀀞􀀦􀀡􀀁
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀢􀀬􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀝􀀁􀀦􀀝􀀮􀀡􀀬􀀁􀀠􀀡􀀮􀀡􀀬􀀧􀀤􀀨􀀝􀀮􀀤􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀞􀀳􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀚􀀡􀀟􀀯􀀬􀀤􀀮􀀳􀀁􀀓􀀩􀀯􀀨􀀟􀀤􀀦􀀁􀀩􀀢􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀝􀀮􀀁􀀚􀀮􀀝􀀮􀀡􀀁􀀝􀀭􀀁􀀝􀀨􀀁
􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀂴􀀃 􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃 􀀂􀀅􀀃􀀊􀀄􀀉􀀉􀀆􀀄􀀁 􀀰􀀩􀀦􀀆􀀁 􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀁 􀀙􀀝􀀬􀀮􀀁 􀀖􀀖􀀁
􀀂􀀭􀀡􀀡􀀁􀀢􀀩􀀩􀀮􀀨􀀩􀀮􀀡􀀁􀀋􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀝􀀞􀀩􀀰􀀡􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀪􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀋􀀎􀀃􀀆
􀀆􀀆􀀉􀀁 􀀐􀀙􀀤􀀣􀀦􀀨􀀁􀀣􀀚􀀁􀀨􀀜􀀙􀀁􀀍􀀢􀀨􀀙􀀦􀀢􀀕􀀨􀀝􀀣􀀢􀀕􀀠􀀁􀀎􀀕􀀫􀀁􀀋􀀣􀀡􀀡􀀝􀀧􀀧􀀝􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀨􀀜􀀙􀀁􀀫􀀣􀀦􀀟􀀁􀀣􀀚􀀁􀀝􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀧􀀝􀀬􀀨􀀭􀀄􀀨􀀜􀀝􀀦􀀘􀀁􀀧􀀙􀀧􀀧􀀝􀀣􀀢
􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀅
􀀦􀀡􀀨􀀣􀀯􀀁􀀌􀀁􀀟􀀪􀀢􀀁􀀍􀀐􀀁􀀟􀀁􀀡􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀣􀀭􀀱􀀣􀀪􀀡􀀣􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀟􀀰􀀁􀀳􀀫􀀱􀀨􀀢􀀁􀀪􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀠􀀣􀀁􀀰􀀫􀀨􀀣􀀮􀀟􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀦􀀪􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀀅
􀀲􀀦􀀢􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀤􀀫􀀮􀀁􀀢􀀫􀀣􀀯􀀁􀀪􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀬􀀮􀀣􀀲􀀟􀀦􀀨􀀁􀀫􀀲􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀰􀀮􀀣􀀟􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀬􀀮􀀫􀀲􀀦􀀯􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀟􀀰􀀁􀀟􀀮􀀣􀀁
􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀀅
􀀲􀀦􀀯􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀮􀀣􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀣􀀯􀀁􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀦􀀪􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀪􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀟􀀨􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀩􀀟􀀪􀀦􀀰􀀟􀀮􀀦􀀟􀀪􀀁􀀨􀀟􀀳􀀁􀀟􀀪􀀢􀀁
􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀜􀀃 􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁙􀁄􀀃
􀀒􀀫􀀪􀀲􀀣􀀪􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀁􀀤􀀫􀀮􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀬􀀮􀀫􀀰􀀣􀀡􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀳􀀟􀀮􀀁􀀲􀀦􀀡􀀰􀀦􀀩􀀯􀀆
􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃 􀀺􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀀪􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀣􀀴􀀡􀀨􀀱􀀢􀀣􀀁􀀡􀀟􀀯􀀣􀀯􀀶􀀬􀀣􀀮􀀥􀀟􀀬􀀯􀀁􀀨􀀣􀀯􀀯􀀁􀀨􀀦􀀧􀀣􀀨􀀵􀀁􀀰􀀫􀀁􀀫􀀡􀀡􀀱􀀮􀀶􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀮􀀣􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀣􀀯􀀁
􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀰􀀥􀀦􀀮􀀢􀀁􀀙􀀰􀀟􀀰􀀣􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀚􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀟􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀡􀀨􀀣􀀁􀀢􀀫􀀣􀀯􀀁􀀪􀀫􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀥􀀫􀀳􀀣􀀲􀀣􀀮􀀄􀀁􀀡􀀫􀀪􀀡􀀣􀀮􀀪􀀁􀀪􀀫􀀪􀀅
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀘􀀔􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀰􀀫􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀯􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀯􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀟􀀪􀀢􀀁􀀢􀀫􀀣􀀯􀀁􀀪􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀬􀀮􀀫􀀲􀀦􀀢􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀫􀀮􀀁􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀩􀀦􀀪􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀆
􀀂􀀋􀀃􀀁 􀀗􀀫􀀁 􀀟􀀰􀀰􀀣􀀩􀀬􀀰􀀁 􀀥􀀟􀀯􀀁 􀀠􀀣􀀣􀀪􀀁 􀀩􀀟􀀢􀀣􀀁 􀀰􀀫􀀁 􀀬􀀮􀀣􀀯􀀡􀀮􀀦􀀠􀀣􀀁 􀀟􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁋􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀃
􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃
􀀫􀀬􀀬􀀫􀀯􀀦􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀦􀀩􀀣􀀁􀀨􀀦􀀩􀀦􀀰􀀯􀀁􀀟􀀪􀀢􀀁􀀬􀀣􀀟􀀡􀀣􀀤􀀱􀀨􀀁􀀯􀀣􀀰􀀰􀀨􀀣􀀩􀀣􀀪􀀰􀀆
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀑􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁋􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁑􀁈􀂿􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀁
􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈
􀀊􀀁􀀑􀀨􀀕􀀨􀀙􀀁􀀗􀀣􀀡􀀡􀀝􀀨􀀨􀀝􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀕􀀛􀀛􀀦􀀙􀀧􀀧􀀝􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀫􀀝􀀨􀀜􀀝􀀢􀀁􀀨􀀜􀀙􀀁􀀡􀀙􀀕􀀢􀀝􀀢􀀛􀀁􀀣􀀚􀀁
􀀨􀀜􀀙􀀁􀀋􀀜􀀕􀀦􀀨􀀙􀀦􀀁􀀣􀀚􀀁􀀨􀀜􀀙􀀁􀀓􀀢􀀝􀀨􀀙􀀘􀀁􀀏􀀕􀀨􀀝􀀣􀀢􀀧􀀁􀀕􀀢􀀘􀀁􀀦􀀙􀀧􀀣􀀠􀀩􀀨􀀝􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀇􀀇􀀆􀀈􀀁
􀀂􀀔􀀔􀀍􀀔􀀃􀀁􀀣􀀚􀀁􀀨􀀜􀀙􀀁􀀌􀀙􀀢􀀙􀀦􀀕􀀠􀀁􀀊􀀧􀀧􀀙􀀡􀀖􀀠􀀭􀀁􀀣􀀚􀀁􀀨􀀜􀀙􀀁􀀓􀀢􀀝􀀨􀀙􀀘􀀁􀀏􀀕􀀨􀀝􀀣􀀢􀀧􀀁
􀀧􀀜􀀕􀀠􀀠􀀁 􀀢􀀣􀀨􀀁 􀀨􀀙􀀦􀀡􀀝􀀢􀀕􀀨􀀙􀀁 􀀣􀀦􀀁 􀀫􀀝􀀨􀀜􀀘􀀦􀀕􀀫􀀁 􀀚􀀦􀀣􀀡􀀁 􀀕􀀁 􀀨􀀦􀀙􀀕􀀨􀀭􀀁 􀀣􀀦􀀁
􀀧􀀩􀀧􀀤􀀙􀀢􀀘􀀁 􀀝􀀨􀀧􀀁 􀀣􀀤􀀙􀀦􀀕􀀨􀀝􀀣􀀢􀀁 􀀕􀀧􀀁 􀀕􀀁 􀀗􀀣􀀢􀀧􀀙􀀥􀀩􀀙􀀢􀀗􀀙􀀁 􀀣􀀚􀀁 􀀕􀀢􀀁 􀀕􀀦􀀡􀀙􀀘􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁑􀁈􀂿􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀑
􀀂􀀋􀀉􀀉􀀇􀀊􀀏􀀄􀀍􀀑
􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀔􀀘􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁋􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁑􀁈􀂿􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀅
􀀢􀀮􀀟􀀳􀀟􀀨􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀟􀀁􀀰􀀮􀀣􀀟􀀰􀀵􀀄􀀁􀀫􀀮􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀯􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀯􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀦􀀰􀀯􀀁􀀫􀀬􀀣􀀮􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀄􀀁􀀟􀀯􀀁
􀁄􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀀬􀀮􀀫􀀲􀀫􀀧􀀣􀀢􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀰􀀯􀀁􀀤􀀫􀀮􀀩􀀱􀀨􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀦􀀯􀀁􀀠􀀟􀀯􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀟􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀡􀀨􀀣􀀁􀀏􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀯􀀫􀀅
􀀨􀀱􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀕􀀪􀀯􀀰􀀦􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀣􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀕􀀪􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀪􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀟􀀨􀀁􀀖􀀟􀀳􀀄􀀋􀀈􀀏􀀁􀀳􀀦􀀰􀀥􀀁􀀯􀀫􀀩􀀣􀀁
􀁄􀁇􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀳􀀦􀀰􀀥􀀢􀀮􀀟􀀳􀀟􀀨􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀟􀀁􀀰􀀮􀀣􀀟􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀟􀀪􀀢􀀁􀀰􀀫􀀁􀀯􀀬􀀣􀀡􀀦􀀤􀀵􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀟􀀰􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀰􀀮􀀣􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀣􀀯􀀁
􀀢􀀣􀀟􀀨􀀰􀀁􀀳􀀦􀀰􀀥􀀁􀀟􀀮􀀣􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀫􀀯􀀣􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀟􀀰􀀁􀀟􀀮􀀣􀀁􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀩􀀦􀀪􀀟􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀦􀀰􀀥􀀢􀀮􀀟􀀳􀀪􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀫􀀩􀀁
􀀫􀀮􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀯􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀢􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀄􀀎􀀁􀀄􀀁􀀆􀀋􀀊􀀎􀀇􀀌􀀐􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀀭􀀱􀀣􀀯􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀆
􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁇􀀃
􀂳􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂴􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀰􀀫􀀁 􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀩􀀦􀀪􀀟􀀰􀀣􀀁 􀀫􀀮􀀁 􀀳􀀦􀀰􀀥􀀢􀀮􀀟􀀳􀀁 􀀤􀀮􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀟􀀁 􀀰􀀮􀀣􀀟􀀰􀀵􀀁 􀀫􀀮􀀁 􀀯􀀱􀀯􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀢􀀁 􀀦􀀰􀀯􀀁
􀀋􀀈􀀏􀀁􀀑􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀡􀀨􀀣􀀁􀀏􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀯􀀫􀀨􀀱􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀕􀀪􀀯􀀰􀀦􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀣􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀕􀀪􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀪􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀟􀀨􀀁􀀖􀀟􀀳􀀁
􀀮􀀣􀀟􀀢􀀯􀀁􀀟􀀯􀀁􀀤􀀫􀀨􀀨􀀫􀀳􀀯􀀐
􀂳􀀤􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀛􀀪􀀦􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀗􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀁􀀟􀀪􀀢􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀯􀀫􀀨􀀱􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀊􀀊􀀈􀀋􀀁􀀂􀀞􀀞􀀕􀀞􀀃􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀔􀀣􀀪􀀣􀀮􀀟􀀨􀀁􀀑􀀯􀀅
􀀯􀀣􀀩􀀠􀀨􀀵􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀛􀀪􀀦􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀗􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀁􀀯􀀥􀀟􀀨􀀨􀀁􀀪􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀩􀀦􀀪􀀟􀀰􀀣􀀁􀀫􀀮􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀯􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀢􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀫􀀬􀀣􀀮􀀟􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁑􀁈􀂿􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀕􀀪􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀪􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀟􀀨􀀁􀀖􀀟􀀳􀀄􀀁􀀃􀀇􀀄􀀍􀀅􀀋􀀋􀀈􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀨􀀆􀀁􀀌􀀈􀀄􀀁􀀘􀀟􀀮􀀰􀀁􀀕􀀕􀀁􀀂􀀯􀀣􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀫􀀫􀀰􀀪􀀫􀀰􀀣􀀁􀀋􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀟􀀠􀀫􀀲􀀣􀀃􀀄􀀁
􀀬􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀋􀀎􀀃􀀆
􀀫􀀬􀀣􀀮􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀶􀀳􀀥􀀦􀀡􀀥􀀁 􀀬􀀮􀀣􀀯􀀱􀀬􀀬􀀫􀀯􀀣􀀯􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀟􀀰􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁 􀀡􀀟􀀯􀀣􀀁 􀀥􀀟􀀯􀀁 􀀠􀀣􀀣􀀪􀀁 􀀮􀀣􀀅
􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀂲􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃
􀀰􀀟􀀧􀀣􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀫􀀯􀀣􀀁􀀩􀀣􀀟􀀯􀀱􀀮􀀣􀀯􀀁􀀫􀀮􀀄􀀁􀀦􀀪􀀁􀀟􀀪􀀵􀀁􀀡􀀟􀀯􀀣􀀄􀀁􀀩􀀟􀀵􀀁􀀢􀀫􀀁􀀯􀀫􀀁􀀫􀀪􀀨􀀵􀀁􀀦􀀪􀀯􀀫􀀤􀀟􀀮􀀁
􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁑􀁈􀂿􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀞􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁈􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀀟􀀮􀀠􀀦􀀰􀀮􀀟􀀰􀀫􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀪􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀟􀀠􀀯􀀣􀀪􀀡􀀣􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀡􀀥􀀁􀀟􀀁􀀢􀀣􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀩􀀦􀀪􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀙􀀰􀀟􀀰􀀣􀀁
􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀑
􀀂􀀊􀀃􀀁 􀀓􀀮􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁 􀀩􀀫􀀩􀀣􀀪􀀰􀀁 􀀫􀀤􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁 􀀡􀀫􀀩􀀩􀀦􀀯􀀯􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀫􀀤􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁
􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀀃 􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀜􀀏􀀃 􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁐􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁑􀁈􀂿􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀯􀀦􀀰􀀱􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀳􀀦􀀨􀀨􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀮􀀣􀀤􀀫􀀮􀀣􀀁 􀀮􀀣􀀩􀀟􀀦􀀪􀀁 􀀦􀀪􀀁 􀀨􀀦􀀩􀀠􀀫􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀰􀀦􀀨􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁 􀀯􀀣􀀡􀀫􀀪􀀢􀀁
􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀑􀀃
􀀚􀀥􀀟􀀰􀀁􀀟􀀡􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀢􀀣􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀩􀀦􀀪􀀣􀀯􀀁􀀳􀀥􀀟􀀰􀀁􀀤􀀫􀀨􀀨􀀫􀀳􀀯􀀐􀀁􀀕􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀙􀀰􀀟􀀰􀀣􀀁􀀦􀀪􀀦􀀰􀀦􀀟􀀨􀀨􀀵􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃
􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁑􀁈􀂿􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀀦􀀰􀀁􀀩􀀟􀀵􀀁􀀥􀀟􀀲􀀣􀀁􀀩􀀟􀀢􀀣􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀢􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀟􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀡􀀨􀀣􀀁􀀏􀀁􀀳􀀦􀀨􀀨􀀁􀀠􀀣􀀁􀀟􀀯􀀯􀀣􀀯􀀯􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀦􀀪􀀁􀀟􀀡􀀅
􀀡􀀫􀀮􀀢􀀟􀀪􀀡􀀣􀀁􀀳􀀦􀀰􀀥􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀫􀀮􀀢􀀦􀀪􀀟􀀮􀀵􀀁􀀡􀀮􀀦􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀦􀀟􀀁􀀣􀀯􀀰􀀟􀀠􀀨􀀦􀀯􀀥􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀦􀀪􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀢􀀮􀀟􀀤􀀰􀀁
􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁉􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀂿􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁑􀁈􀂿􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁆􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀅
􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃
􀀫􀀮􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀯􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀯􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀦􀀰􀀯􀀁􀀫􀀬􀀣􀀮􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀄􀀁􀀟􀀪􀀢􀀁􀀦􀀯􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀪􀀁􀀢􀀣􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀩􀀦􀀪􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀰􀀫􀀁
􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁑􀁈􀂿􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃
􀀬􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀑
􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂴􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃
􀀳􀀦􀀰􀀥􀀁􀀟􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀦􀀮􀀢􀀁􀀙􀀰􀀟􀀰􀀣􀀆
􀀋􀀘􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁊􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁜􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁄􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀒􀀥􀀟􀀮􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀛􀀪􀀦􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀗􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀆
􀀋􀀙􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁋􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀬􀀮􀀫􀀲􀀦􀀯􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀢􀀣􀀟􀀨􀀯􀀁􀀨􀀣􀀯􀀯􀀁􀀳􀀦􀀰􀀥􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀭􀀱􀀣􀀯􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀡􀀫􀀩􀀩􀀦􀀯􀀯􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁑􀁈􀂿􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀃
􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀩􀀦􀀪􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀦􀀰􀀥􀀢􀀮􀀟􀀳􀀟􀀨􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀫􀀮􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀯􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀯􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀟􀀁
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀑􀀃 􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏
􀀒􀀜􀀙􀀁􀀤􀀦􀀙􀀧􀀙􀀢􀀨􀀁􀀘􀀦􀀕􀀚􀀨􀀁􀀕􀀦􀀨􀀝􀀗􀀠􀀙􀀧􀀁􀀕􀀦􀀙􀀁􀀫􀀝􀀨􀀜􀀣􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀤􀀦􀀙􀀞􀀩􀀘􀀝􀀗􀀙􀀁􀀨􀀣􀀁
􀀦􀀙􀀠􀀙􀀪􀀕􀀢􀀨􀀁􀀘􀀙􀀗􀀝􀀧􀀝􀀣􀀢􀀧􀀁􀀨􀀕􀀟􀀙􀀢􀀁􀀖􀀭􀀁􀀨􀀜􀀙􀀁􀀑􀀙􀀗􀀩􀀦􀀝􀀨􀀭􀀁􀀋􀀣􀀩􀀢􀀗􀀝􀀠􀀁􀀝􀀢􀀁􀀕􀀗􀀄
􀀗􀀣􀀦􀀘􀀕􀀢􀀗􀀙􀀁􀀫􀀝􀀨􀀜􀀁􀀨􀀜􀀙􀀁􀀋􀀜􀀕􀀦􀀨􀀙􀀦􀀁􀀣􀀚􀀁􀀨􀀜􀀙􀀁􀀓􀀢􀀝􀀨􀀙􀀘􀀁􀀏􀀕􀀨􀀝􀀣􀀢􀀧􀀅
􀀂􀀋􀀉􀀉􀀇􀀊􀀏􀀄􀀍􀀑
􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁎􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀅
􀀡􀀦􀀯􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀁 􀀫􀀤􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁 􀀙􀀣􀀡􀀱􀀮􀀦􀀰􀀵􀀁 􀀒􀀫􀀱􀀪􀀡􀀦􀀨􀀁 􀀰􀀟􀀧􀀣􀀪􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀢􀀣􀀮􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁 􀀒􀀥􀀟􀀮􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀁
􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀛􀀪􀀦􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀗􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀝􀀥􀀦􀀨􀀣􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀒􀀫􀀱􀀪􀀡􀀦􀀨􀀷􀀯􀀁􀀟􀀡􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀢􀀣􀀮􀀁
􀀒􀀥􀀟􀀬􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀁 􀀜􀀕􀀕􀀁 􀀫􀀤􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁 􀀒􀀥􀀟􀀮􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀁 􀀫􀀤􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁 􀀛􀀪􀀦􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀁 􀀗􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀁 􀀟􀀮􀀣􀀁
􀀃 􀀨􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀁 􀀇􀀇􀀉
􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀀫􀀤􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁 􀀒􀀫􀀱􀀪􀀡􀀦􀀨􀀁 􀀰􀀟􀀧􀀣􀀪􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀢􀀣􀀮􀀁 􀀫􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀮􀀁 􀀬􀀮􀀫􀀲􀀦􀀯􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀁 􀀫􀀤􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁
􀀒􀀥􀀟􀀮􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀝􀀪􀀦􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀘􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀡􀀥􀀁􀀟􀀯􀀁􀀑􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀡􀀨􀀣􀀁􀀏􀀋􀀁􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁
􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀕􀀱􀀯􀀰􀀦􀀡􀀣􀀄􀀁􀀩􀀟􀀵􀀁􀀠􀀣􀀁􀀣􀀭􀀱􀀟􀀨􀀨􀀵􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀨􀀣􀀲􀀟􀀪􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀑􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀡􀀨􀀣􀀁􀀈􀀍􀀁􀀥􀀟􀀯􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀯􀀟􀀩􀀣􀀁
􀀤􀀱􀀪􀀡􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀟􀀯􀀁􀀟􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀡􀀨􀀣􀀁􀀎􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀈􀀏􀀎􀀌􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀯􀀫􀀨􀀱􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀔􀀪􀀯􀀰􀀦􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀣􀀁
􀀫􀀤􀀁 􀀔􀀪􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀪􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀟􀀨􀀁 􀀖􀀟􀀳􀀆􀀋􀀉􀀇􀀁 􀀜􀀥􀀣􀀁 􀀒􀀫􀀩􀀩􀀦􀀯􀀯􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀢􀀣􀀡􀀦􀀢􀀣􀀢􀀁 􀀰􀀫􀀁
􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀂳􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁈􀂴􀀃
􀀡􀀨􀀟􀀱􀀯􀀣􀀁􀀦􀀪􀀯􀀰􀀣􀀟􀀢􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀫􀀮􀀩􀀱􀀨􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀟􀀢􀀫􀀬􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀠􀀵􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀔􀀪􀀯􀀰􀀦􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀣􀀁
􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁉􀂿􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀑􀀃
􀀂􀀉􀀃􀀁 􀀑􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀡􀀨􀀣􀀁 􀀈􀀇􀀊􀀁 􀀫􀀤􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁 􀀒􀀥􀀟􀀮􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀁 􀀫􀀤􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁 􀀝􀀪􀀦􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀁 􀀘􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀁
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀀅
􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀒􀀥􀀟􀀮􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀝􀀪􀀦􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀘􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀁􀀯􀀥􀀟􀀨􀀨􀀁􀀬􀀮􀀣􀀲􀀟􀀦􀀨􀀆􀀁􀀔􀀪􀀁􀀟􀀢􀀢􀀦􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀔􀀓􀀖􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀃀􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀀠􀀫􀀢􀀦􀀣􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀔􀀪􀀁􀀬􀀟􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀡􀀱􀀨􀀟􀀮􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀬􀀮􀀦􀀩􀀟􀀡􀀵􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀛􀀣􀀡􀀱􀀮􀀦􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀒􀀫􀀱􀀪􀀡􀀦􀀨􀀁􀀢􀀣􀀅
􀀡􀀦􀀯􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀢􀀣􀀮􀀁 􀀑􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀡􀀨􀀣􀀁 􀀈􀀇􀀊􀀁 􀀥􀀟􀀯􀀁 􀀠􀀣􀀣􀀪􀀁 􀀳􀀦􀀢􀀣􀀨􀀵􀀁 􀀟􀀡􀀡􀀣􀀬􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀁 􀀦􀀪􀀁
􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀑􀀋􀀉􀀈
􀀂􀀊􀀃􀀁 􀀑􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀡􀀨􀀣􀀁􀀈􀀍􀀁􀀨􀀣􀀟􀀲􀀣􀀯􀀁􀀫􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀲􀀟􀀮􀀦􀀣􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀭􀀱􀀣􀀯􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀟􀀰􀀁
􀀩􀀟􀀵􀀁􀀟􀀮􀀦􀀯􀀣􀀁􀀟􀀯􀀁􀀟􀀁􀀡􀀫􀀪􀀯􀀣􀀭􀀱􀀣􀀪􀀡􀀣􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀑􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀡􀀨􀀣􀀁􀀈􀀇􀀊􀀆
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀃 􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁖􀀃􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜
􀀗􀀠􀀝􀀁􀀨􀀪􀀝􀀫􀀝􀀦􀀬􀀁􀀜􀀪􀀙􀀞􀀬􀀁􀀙􀀪􀀬􀀡􀀛􀀤􀀝􀀫􀀁􀀙􀀪􀀝􀀁􀀯􀀡􀀬􀀠􀀧􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀨􀀪􀀝􀀢􀀭􀀜􀀡􀀛􀀝􀀁􀀬􀀧􀀁
􀀬􀀠􀀝􀀁􀀪􀀡􀀟􀀠􀀬􀀫􀀁􀀙􀀦􀀜􀀁􀀜􀀭􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀞􀀁􀀖􀀬􀀙􀀬􀀝􀀫􀀁􀀙􀀪􀀡􀀫􀀡􀀦􀀟􀀁􀀞􀀪􀀧􀀥􀀁􀀬􀀠􀀝􀀁􀀤􀀙􀀯􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀞􀀁
􀀦􀀝􀀭􀀬􀀪􀀙􀀤􀀡􀀬􀀰􀀆
􀀅􀀐􀀎􀀎􀀊􀀏􀀔􀀇􀀒􀀖
􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀔􀀚􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀂳􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁈􀂴􀀃 􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁎􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁇􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀂿􀁆􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀂳􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁖􀂴􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁈􀁏􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀂳􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁖􀂴􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀀪􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀡􀀨􀀣􀀟􀀮􀀁􀀳􀀥􀀣􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀦􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀤􀀣􀀮􀀮􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀰􀀫􀀁􀀤􀀫􀀮􀀩􀀟􀀨􀀁􀀪􀀣􀀱􀀰􀀮􀀟􀀨􀀦􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀫􀀮􀀁􀀩􀀣􀀮􀀣􀀁
􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁜􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀑
􀀂􀀉􀀃􀀁 􀀑􀀯􀀁􀀟􀀁􀀯􀀰􀀟􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀁􀀢􀀣􀀮􀀦􀀲􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀟􀀁􀀰􀀮􀀣􀀟􀀰􀀵􀀄􀀁􀀪􀀣􀀱􀀰􀀮􀀟􀀨􀀦􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀠􀀣􀀡􀀫􀀩􀀣􀀯􀀁
􀁉􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁎􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀞􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀀦􀀰􀀁􀀦􀀯􀀁􀀦􀀪􀀰􀀣􀀪􀀢􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀰􀀫􀀁􀀟􀀬􀀬􀀨􀀵􀀆􀀁􀀗􀀫􀀮􀀣􀀫􀀲􀀣􀀮􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀯􀀰􀀟􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀪􀀣􀀱􀀰􀀮􀀟􀀨􀀦􀀰􀀵􀀁
􀀦􀀯􀀁􀀪􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀟􀀨􀀳􀀟􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀢􀀣􀀮􀀦􀀲􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀟􀀁􀀰􀀮􀀣􀀟􀀰􀀵􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀭􀀱􀀣􀀯􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁
􀀋􀀉􀀇􀀁􀀑􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀡􀀨􀀣􀀁􀀎􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀯􀀫􀀨􀀱􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀔􀀪􀀯􀀰􀀦􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀣􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀔􀀪􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀪􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀟􀀨􀀁􀀖􀀟􀀳􀀁
􀀮􀀣􀀟􀀢􀀯􀀁􀀟􀀯􀀁􀀤􀀫􀀨􀀨􀀫􀀳􀀯􀀐􀀁
􀂳􀀤􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃 􀁈􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀀯􀀱􀀯􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀢􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁 􀀫􀀬􀀣􀀮􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀫􀀤􀀁 􀀟􀀁 􀀰􀀮􀀣􀀟􀀰􀀵􀀁 􀀳􀀥􀀦􀀡􀀥􀀁 􀀳􀀫􀀱􀀨􀀢􀀁 􀀠􀀣􀀁 􀀦􀀪􀀡􀀫􀀩􀀬􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀠􀀨􀀣􀀁 􀀳􀀦􀀰􀀥􀀁
􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂴􀀃 􀀋􀀬􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃 􀀆􀀊􀀇􀀒􀀈􀀐􀀐􀀌􀀄􀀁 􀀲􀀫􀀨􀀆􀀁 􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀁
􀀚􀀟􀀮􀀰􀀁􀀔􀀔􀀁􀀂􀀯􀀣􀀣􀀁􀀤􀀫􀀫􀀰􀀪􀀫􀀰􀀣􀀁􀀋􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀟􀀠􀀫􀀲􀀣􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀬􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀋􀀎􀀃􀀆
􀀋􀀉􀀈􀀁􀀛􀀣􀀣􀀄􀀁􀀦􀀪􀀁􀀬􀀟􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀡􀀱􀀨􀀟􀀮􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀬􀀫􀀮􀀰􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀛􀀰􀀱􀀢􀀵􀀁􀀓􀀮􀀫􀀱􀀬􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀒􀀫􀀩􀀩􀀦􀀯􀀅
􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀀋􀀤􀀒􀀦􀀱􀀑􀀗􀀒􀀯􀀑􀀙􀀛􀀕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁕􀁕􀀑􀀔􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀔􀀌􀀃􀀋􀁐􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁒􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁅􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀂿􀁉􀁗􀁜􀀐􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀞􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀂿􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀀟􀀪􀀪􀀣􀀴􀀁􀀰􀀫􀀁􀀆􀀊􀀇􀀒􀀈􀀐􀀐􀀌􀀁􀀗􀀁􀀃􀀂􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀨􀀆􀀁􀀔􀀔􀀁􀀂􀀚􀀟􀀮􀀰􀀁􀀙􀀪􀀣􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀬􀀟􀀮􀀟􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀉􀀎􀀶􀀊􀀋􀀇􀀃􀀆
􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀀟􀀮􀀦􀀯􀀣􀀁􀀦􀀪􀀁􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀩􀀯􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀮􀀲􀀦􀀲􀀟􀀨􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀯􀀰􀀟􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀪􀀣􀀱􀀰􀀮􀀟􀀨􀀦􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀠􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀂿􀁆􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀞􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃
􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀤􀀮􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀬􀀮􀀣􀀯􀀣􀀪􀀰􀀁􀀢􀀮􀀟􀀤􀀰􀀁􀀟􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀡􀀨􀀣􀀯􀀆
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀑􀀃 􀀲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀁
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀗􀀠􀀝􀀁􀀨􀀪􀀝􀀫􀀝􀀦􀀬􀀁􀀜􀀪􀀙􀀞􀀬􀀁􀀙􀀪􀀬􀀡􀀛􀀤􀀝􀀫􀀁􀀙􀀪􀀝􀀁􀀯􀀡􀀬􀀠􀀧􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀨􀀪􀀝􀀢􀀭􀀜􀀡􀀛􀀝􀀁􀀬􀀧􀀁
􀀬􀀠􀀝􀀁􀀬􀀝􀀪􀀥􀀡􀀦􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀧􀀦􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀡􀀬􀀠􀀜􀀪􀀙􀀯􀀙􀀤􀀁􀀧􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀭􀀫􀀨􀀝􀀦􀀫􀀡􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀧􀀞􀀁􀀬􀀪􀀝􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀫􀀁
􀀙􀀫􀀁􀀙􀀁􀀛􀀧􀀦􀀫􀀝􀀩􀀭􀀝􀀦􀀛􀀝􀀁􀀧􀀞􀀄􀀁􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁄􀀊􀀁􀀂􀀂􀀃􀀁􀀙􀀁􀀥􀀙􀀬􀀝􀀪􀀡􀀙􀀤􀀁􀀚􀀪􀀝􀀙􀀛􀀠􀀋􀀁
􀀂􀁅􀀃􀀁􀀫􀀭􀀨􀀝􀀪􀀮􀀝􀀦􀀡􀀦􀀟􀀁􀀡􀀥􀀨􀀧􀀫􀀫􀀡􀀚􀀡􀀤􀀡􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀧􀀞􀀁􀀨􀀝􀀪􀀞􀀧􀀪􀀥􀀙􀀦􀀛􀀝􀀋􀀁􀀧􀀪􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀃􀀁􀀙􀀁
􀀞􀀭􀀦􀀜􀀙􀀥􀀝􀀦􀀬􀀙􀀤􀀁􀀛􀀠􀀙􀀦􀀟􀀝􀀁􀀧􀀞􀀁􀀛􀀡􀀪􀀛􀀭􀀥􀀫􀀬􀀙􀀦􀀛􀀝􀀫􀀆
􀀅􀀐􀀎􀀎􀀊􀀏􀀔􀀇􀀒􀀖
􀀂􀀈􀀃􀀁 􀀑􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀡􀀨􀀣􀀁􀀈􀀎􀀁􀀬􀀮􀀣􀀯􀀣􀀮􀀲􀀣􀀯􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀬􀀫􀀯􀀯􀀦􀀠􀀦􀀨􀀦􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀩􀀦􀀪􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀮􀀁
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁒􀁉􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀤􀀮􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁 􀀟􀀬􀀬􀀨􀀦􀀡􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀫􀀤􀀁 􀀫􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀮􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀨􀀣􀀯􀀁 􀀫􀀤􀀁 􀀦􀀪􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀪􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀟􀀨􀀁 􀀨􀀟􀀳􀀄􀀁
􀀦􀀪􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀡􀀟􀀯􀀣􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀣􀀴􀀟􀀩􀀬􀀨􀀣􀀯􀀁􀀢􀀮􀀟􀀳􀀪􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀈􀀏􀀍􀀏􀀁􀀞􀀦􀀣􀀪􀀪􀀟􀀁
􀀒􀀫􀀪􀀲􀀣􀀪􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀄􀀁􀀦􀀪􀀁􀀬􀀟􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀡􀀱􀀨􀀟􀀮􀀁􀀟􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀡􀀨􀀣􀀯􀀁􀀌􀀌􀀁􀀰􀀫􀀁􀀍􀀉􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀤􀀣􀀮􀀣􀀪􀀡􀀣􀀁
􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀂳􀀲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀂴􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃
􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀅
􀀦􀀡􀀨􀀣􀀯􀀆􀀁 􀀜􀀥􀀣􀀁 􀀳􀀫􀀮􀀢􀀯􀀁 􀀷􀀋􀀏􀀔􀀊􀀒􀀁 􀀇􀀍􀀋􀀇􀂴􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁎􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁉􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁈􀁛􀁋􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀑􀀃
􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃 􀀺􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁅􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁉􀁘􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀀢􀀦􀀯􀀬􀀣􀀨􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀬􀀫􀀯􀀯􀀦􀀠􀀨􀀣􀀁􀀦􀀩􀀬􀀨􀀦􀀡􀀟􀀰􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀟􀀰􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀫􀀡􀀡􀀱􀀮􀀮􀀣􀀪􀀡􀀣􀀁􀀫􀀤􀀁􀀟􀀪􀀁
􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀍􀀊􀀕􀀁􀀓􀀑􀀊􀀉􀀋􀀇􀀍􀀋􀀓􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀀯􀀱􀀯􀀬􀀣􀀪􀀯􀀦􀀫􀀪􀀆
􀀁􀀃􀀃􀀂􀀄
􀀑􀀓􀀎􀀑􀀍􀀌􀀗􀀑􀀘􀀏􀀁􀀒􀀑􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀔􀀐􀀁􀀗􀀕􀀏􀀌􀀗􀀑􀀏􀀖􀀁
􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀕􀀕􀀏􀀎􀀁􀀗􀀔􀀁􀀑􀀓􀀁􀀌􀀕􀀗􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀏􀀁􀀈
􀀂􀀂􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀬􀀪􀀝􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀡􀀦􀀬􀀝􀀪􀀦􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀧􀀦􀀙􀀤􀀁􀀠􀀭􀀥􀀙􀀦􀀡􀀬􀀙􀀪􀀡􀀙􀀦􀀁􀀤􀀙􀀯􀀋
􀀂􀁅􀀃􀀁 􀀬􀀪􀀝􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀫􀀁􀀜􀀝􀀛􀀤􀀙􀀪􀀡􀀦􀀟􀀄􀀁􀀛􀀪􀀝􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀦􀀟􀀁􀀧􀀪􀀁􀀪􀀝􀀟􀀭􀀤􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀦􀀟􀀁􀀙􀀁􀀨􀀝􀀪􀀅
􀀥􀀙􀀦􀀝􀀦􀀬􀀁􀀪􀀝􀀟􀀡􀀥􀀝􀀁􀀧􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀬􀀙􀀬􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀪􀀁􀀪􀀝􀀤􀀙􀀬􀀝􀀜􀀁􀀨􀀝􀀪􀀥􀀙􀀦􀀝􀀦􀀬􀀁􀀪􀀡􀀟􀀠􀀬􀀫􀀄􀀁
􀀡􀀦􀀛􀀤􀀭􀀜􀀡􀀦􀀟􀀁􀀬􀀪􀀝􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀫􀀁􀀝􀀫􀀬􀀙􀀚􀀤􀀡􀀫􀀠􀀡􀀦􀀟􀀁􀀧􀀪􀀁􀀥􀀧􀀜􀀡􀀞􀀰􀀡􀀦􀀟􀀁􀀤􀀙􀀦􀀜􀀁􀀙􀀦􀀜􀀁
􀀥􀀙􀀪􀀡􀀬􀀡􀀥􀀝􀀁􀀚􀀧􀀭􀀦􀀜􀀙􀀪􀀡􀀝􀀫􀀋
􀀂􀀃􀀃􀀁 􀀥􀀭􀀤􀀬􀀡􀀤􀀙􀀬􀀝􀀪􀀙􀀤􀀁􀀤􀀙􀀯􀀅􀀥􀀙􀀣􀀡􀀦􀀟􀀁􀀬􀀪􀀝􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀫􀀋
􀀂􀀄􀀃􀀁 􀀬􀀪􀀝􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀡􀀦􀀬􀀝􀀪􀀦􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀧􀀦􀀙􀀤􀀁􀀛􀀪􀀡􀀥􀀡􀀦􀀙􀀤􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀫􀀬􀀡􀀛􀀝􀀋
􀀂􀀅􀀃􀀁 􀀬􀀪􀀝􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀫􀀁 􀀧􀀞􀀁 􀀞􀀪􀀡􀀝􀀦􀀜􀀫􀀠􀀡􀀨􀀄􀀁 􀀛􀀧􀀥􀀥􀀝􀀪􀀛􀀝􀀁 􀀙􀀦􀀜􀀁 􀀦􀀙􀀮􀀡􀀟􀀙􀀅
􀀬􀀡􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀙􀀦􀀜􀀁􀀙􀀟􀀪􀀝􀀝􀀥􀀝􀀦􀀬􀀫􀀁􀀛􀀧􀀦􀀛􀀝􀀪􀀦􀀡􀀦􀀟􀀁􀀨􀀪􀀡􀀮􀀙􀀬􀀝􀀁􀀪􀀡􀀟􀀠􀀬􀀫􀀋
􀀂􀁉􀀃􀀁 􀀬􀀪􀀝􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀫􀀁 􀀞􀀧􀀪􀀁 􀀬􀀠􀀝􀀁 􀀡􀀦􀀬􀀝􀀪􀀦􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀧􀀦􀀙􀀤􀀁 􀀨􀀪􀀧􀀬􀀝􀀛􀀬􀀡􀀧􀀦􀀁 􀀧􀀞􀀁
􀀠􀀭􀀥􀀙􀀦􀀁􀀪􀀡􀀟􀀠􀀬􀀫􀀋
􀀂􀁊􀀃􀀁 􀀬􀀪􀀝􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀫􀀁􀀪􀀝􀀤􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀦􀀟􀀁􀀬􀀧􀀁􀀬􀀠􀀝􀀁􀀡􀀦􀀬􀀝􀀪􀀦􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀧􀀦􀀙􀀤􀀁􀀨􀀪􀀧􀀬􀀝􀀛􀀬􀀡􀀧􀀦􀀁
􀀧􀀞􀀁􀀬􀀠􀀝􀀁􀀝􀀦􀀮􀀡􀀪􀀧􀀦􀀥􀀝􀀦􀀬􀀋
􀀂􀁋􀀃􀀁 􀀬􀀪􀀝􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀫􀀁􀀪􀀝􀀤􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀦􀀟􀀁􀀬􀀧􀀁􀀡􀀦􀀬􀀝􀀪􀀦􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀧􀀦􀀙􀀤􀀁􀀯􀀙􀀬􀀝􀀪􀀛􀀧􀀭􀀪􀀫􀀝􀀫􀀁
􀀙􀀦􀀜􀀁􀀪􀀝􀀤􀀙􀀬􀀝􀀜􀀁􀀡􀀦􀀫􀀬􀀙􀀤􀀤􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀧􀀦􀀫􀀁􀀙􀀦􀀜􀀁􀀞􀀙􀀛􀀡􀀤􀀡􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀫􀀋
􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀁 􀀬􀀪􀀝􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀫􀀁 􀀪􀀝􀀤􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀦􀀟􀀁 􀀬􀀧􀀁 􀀙􀀩􀀭􀀡􀀞􀀝􀀪􀀫􀀁 􀀙􀀦􀀜􀀁 􀀪􀀝􀀤􀀙􀀬􀀝􀀜􀀁
􀀡􀀦􀀫􀀬􀀙􀀤􀀤􀀙􀀬􀀡􀀧􀀦􀀫􀀁􀀙􀀦􀀜􀀁􀀞􀀙􀀛􀀡􀀤􀀡􀀬􀀡􀀝􀀫􀀋
􀀈􀀉􀀇􀀁 􀀎􀀓􀀞􀀝􀀟􀀡􀀁􀀝􀀔􀀁􀀡􀀖􀀓􀀁􀀌􀀜􀀡􀀓􀀟􀀜􀀏􀀡􀀗􀀝􀀜􀀏􀀚􀀁􀀍􀀏􀀣􀀁􀀋􀀝􀀛􀀛􀀗􀀠􀀠􀀗􀀝􀀜􀀁􀀝􀀜􀀁􀀡􀀖􀀓􀀁􀀣􀀝􀀟􀀙􀀁􀀝􀀔􀀁􀀗􀀡􀀠􀀁􀀠􀀗􀀤􀀡􀀥􀀅􀀡􀀖􀀗􀀟􀀒􀀁􀀠􀀓􀀠􀀠􀀗􀀝􀀜
􀀂􀀁􀀃􀀁 􀀡􀀟􀀓􀀏􀀡􀀗􀀓􀀠􀀁 􀀣􀀖􀀗􀀑􀀖􀀁 􀀏􀀟􀀓􀀁 􀀑􀀝􀀜􀀠􀀡􀀗􀀡􀀢􀀓􀀜􀀡􀀁 􀀗􀀜􀀠􀀡􀀟􀀢􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀡􀀠􀀁 􀀝􀀔􀀁
􀀗􀀜􀀡􀀓􀀟􀀜􀀏􀀡􀀗􀀝􀀜􀀏􀀚􀀁􀀝􀀟􀀕􀀏􀀜􀀗􀀦􀀏􀀡􀀗􀀝􀀜􀀠􀀊
􀀂􀀂􀀃􀀁 􀀡􀀟􀀓􀀏􀀡􀀗􀀓􀀠􀀁􀀟􀀓􀀚􀀏􀀡􀀗􀀜􀀕􀀁􀀡􀀝􀀁􀀡􀀖􀀓􀀁􀀗􀀜􀀡􀀓􀀟􀀜􀀏􀀡􀀗􀀝􀀜􀀏􀀚􀀁􀀠􀀓􀀡􀀡􀀚􀀓􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀡􀀁
􀀝􀀔􀀁 􀀒􀀗􀀠􀀞􀀢􀀡􀀓􀀠􀀁 􀀐􀀥􀀁 􀀞􀀓􀀏􀀑􀀓􀀔􀀢􀀚􀀁 􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀜􀀠􀀄􀀁 􀀗􀀜􀀑􀀚􀀢􀀒􀀗􀀜􀀕􀀁 􀀟􀀓􀀠􀀝􀀟􀀡􀀁 􀀡􀀝􀀁
􀀑􀀝􀀜􀀑􀀗􀀚􀀗􀀏􀀡􀀗􀀝􀀜􀀄􀀁 􀀛􀀓􀀒􀀗􀀏􀀡􀀗􀀝􀀜􀀄􀀁 􀀏􀀟􀀐􀀗􀀡􀀟􀀏􀀡􀀗􀀝􀀜􀀁 􀀏􀀜􀀒􀀁 􀀘􀀢􀀒􀀗􀀑􀀗􀀏􀀚􀀁
􀀠􀀓􀀡􀀡􀀚􀀓􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀡􀀊
􀀂􀁏􀀃􀀁 􀀡􀀟􀀓􀀏􀀡􀀗􀀓􀀠􀀁 􀀟􀀓􀀚􀀏􀀡􀀗􀀜􀀕􀀁 􀀡􀀝􀀁 􀀒􀀗􀀞􀀚􀀝􀀛􀀏􀀡􀀗􀀑􀀁 􀀏􀀜􀀒􀀁 􀀑􀀝􀀜􀀠􀀢􀀚􀀏􀀟􀀁
􀀟􀀓􀀚􀀏􀀡􀀗􀀝􀀜􀀠􀀆
􀀅􀀞􀀜􀀜􀀕􀀝􀀢􀀑􀀠􀀥
􀀃􀀉􀀄􀀁 􀀠􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀩􀀵􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀰􀀩􀀺􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀶􀀥􀀬􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀨􀀬􀀧􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀸􀀩􀀁􀀮􀀬􀀵􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀧􀀥􀀶􀀆
􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀀬􀀯􀀲􀀮􀀬􀀧􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀻􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀶􀀬􀀰􀀷􀀩􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀩􀀴􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀅􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀹􀀫􀀱􀀮􀀩􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀚􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀹􀀥􀀵􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀧􀀮􀀷􀀨􀀩􀀨􀀅􀀁􀀥􀀵􀀁􀀫􀀥􀀵􀀁􀀦􀀩􀀩􀀰􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀲􀀮􀀥􀀬􀀰􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀯􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀥􀀴􀀻􀀁
􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀬􀀵􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀅􀀁􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀪􀀷􀀴􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀴􀀁􀀩􀀮􀀥􀀦􀀱􀀴􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀁􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀮􀀩􀀯􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁
􀂳􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀂴􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀋􀀑􀀄􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀥􀀴􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀮􀀩􀀁􀀎􀀅􀀁􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀦􀀩􀀁􀀶􀀥􀀭􀀩􀀰􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀶􀀱􀀁
􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀯􀀬􀀰􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀅􀀁􀀹􀀬􀀶􀀫􀀨􀀴􀀥􀀹􀀥􀀮􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀵􀀷􀀵􀀲􀀩􀀰􀀵􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀸􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁
􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑
􀀃􀀊􀀄􀀁 􀀠􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀩􀀪􀀪􀀩􀀧􀀶􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀵􀀷􀀧􀀫􀀁 􀀥􀀰􀀁 􀀬􀀰􀀨􀀬􀀧􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀸􀀩􀀁 􀀮􀀬􀀵􀀶􀀁 􀀬􀀵􀀁 􀀶􀀱􀀁 􀀧􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀁 􀀥􀀁
􀁖􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀝􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀩􀀯􀀲􀀫􀀥􀀵􀀬􀀵􀀁􀀬􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀓􀀑􀀢􀀕􀀗􀀞􀀠􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀩􀀵􀀅􀀁􀀬􀀶􀀁􀀯􀀥􀀻􀀁􀀹􀀩􀀮􀀮􀀁􀀦􀀩􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀁
􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀶􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀧􀀥􀀴􀀴􀀬􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀬􀀯􀀲􀀮􀀬􀀧􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀶􀀬􀀰􀀷􀀥􀀰􀀧􀀩􀀇
􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀂿􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁇􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀚􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀃 􀀰􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁆􀁈􀁕􀀆
􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀀆
􀀯􀀬􀀵􀀵􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀨􀀩􀀧􀀬􀀨􀀩􀀨􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀶􀀁 􀀶􀀱􀀁 􀀬􀀰􀀧􀀮􀀷􀀨􀀩􀀁 􀀹􀀬􀀶􀀫􀀬􀀰􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀮􀀬􀀵􀀶􀀁 􀀥􀀰􀀁 􀀬􀀶􀀩􀀯􀀁
􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀚􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀓􀀞􀀗􀀕􀀝􀀡􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁖􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀐􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀀚􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀓􀀞􀀗􀀕􀀝􀀡􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁒􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀚􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃
􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀪􀀪􀀩􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀬􀀰􀀧􀀬􀀲􀀮􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀴􀀷􀀮􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀧􀀮􀀷􀀨􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁
􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀚􀀣􀀡􀀁􀀓􀀞􀀗􀀕􀀝􀀡􀀇
􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀃀􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀀆
􀀮􀀥􀀴􀀮􀀻􀀁􀀡􀀰􀀬􀀶􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀟􀀶􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀥􀀧􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀩􀀅􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀬􀀵􀀁􀀦􀀥􀀵􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀸􀀬􀀩􀀹􀀵􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃
􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁌􀁎􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁋􀁒􀁒􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀃀􀁒􀁚􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁐􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀀆
􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁘􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀑􀀃
􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀂿􀁆􀀃􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀯􀀱􀀨􀀩􀀴􀀰􀀁 􀀟􀀶􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀁 􀀲􀀴􀀥􀀧􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀩􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀪􀀩􀀴􀀵􀀅􀀁 􀀪􀀱􀀴􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀯􀀱􀀵􀀶􀀁 􀀲􀀥􀀴􀀶􀀅􀀁 􀀶􀀱􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁉􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃 􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀂿􀁕􀁐􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀂿􀁕􀁐􀀃
􀀦􀀥􀀵􀀬􀀵􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀧􀀥􀀵􀀩􀀁􀀮􀀥􀀹􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀯􀀷􀀰􀀬􀀧􀀬􀀲􀀥􀀮􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀷􀀴􀀶􀀵􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀱􀀯􀀩􀀁
􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀑
􀀃􀀥􀀄􀀁 􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀢􀀠􀀕􀀑􀀢􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀁􀀞􀀝􀀁􀀙􀀝􀀢􀀕􀀠􀀝􀀑􀀢􀀙􀀞􀀝􀀑􀀛􀀁􀀘􀀣􀀜􀀑􀀝􀀙􀀢􀀑􀀠􀀙􀀑􀀝􀀁􀀛􀀑􀀤
􀀋􀀘􀀌􀀃 􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁒􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁖􀀃
􀀲􀀱􀀬􀀰􀀶􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀁􀀦􀀻􀀁􀀜􀀧􀀝􀀥􀀬􀀴􀀅
􀀠􀀫􀀩􀀴􀀩􀀁 􀀬􀀵􀀁 􀀥􀀦􀀷􀀰􀀨􀀥􀀰􀀶􀀁 􀀩􀀸􀀬􀀨􀀩􀀰􀀧􀀩􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀁 􀀶􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀩􀀵􀀁 􀀹􀀫􀀬􀀧􀀫􀀁 􀀬􀀰􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀲􀀴􀀩􀀵􀀵􀀁 􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀯􀀵􀀁
􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁉􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀨􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀳􀀷􀀬􀀴􀀩􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀸􀀬􀀸􀀥􀀮􀀁􀀥􀀪􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀁􀀬􀀶􀀵􀀁􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀯􀀬􀀰􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀇􀀌􀀊􀀊
􀀋􀀙􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁇􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀆
􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀀥􀀵􀀁􀀉􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀅􀀁􀀥􀀴􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀮􀀩􀀁􀀊􀀌􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀠􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀓􀀯􀀬􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀕􀀱􀀯􀀯􀀩􀀴􀀧􀀩􀀁
􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀫􀁌􀁖􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀤􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀀫􀀥􀀨􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀪􀀪􀀩􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀬􀀶􀀵􀀁􀀫􀀷􀀯􀀥􀀰􀀬􀀶􀀥􀀴􀀬􀀥􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀥􀀹􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀬􀀵􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀇􀀌􀀊􀀋􀀁􀀜􀀱􀀴􀀩􀀆
􀀱􀀸􀀩􀀴􀀅􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀌􀀕􀀡􀀢􀀑􀀢􀀕􀀜􀀕􀀝􀀢􀀁 􀀞􀀖􀀁 􀀢􀀘􀀕􀀁 􀀉􀀑􀀤􀀁 􀀎􀀘􀀙􀀠􀀔􀀏􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀶􀀴􀀥􀀨􀀬􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀥􀀮􀀁 􀀲􀀱􀀵􀀬􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀦􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀭􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀹􀀥􀀴􀀁 􀀦􀀩􀀶􀀹􀀩􀀩􀀰􀀁
􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀏􀀃
􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀂳􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀆
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀂴􀀑􀀌􀀊􀀌􀀁􀀙􀀰􀀁􀀬􀀶􀀵􀀁􀀥􀀨􀀸􀀬􀀵􀀱􀀴􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀬􀀰􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀉􀀕􀀗􀀑􀀛􀀙􀀢􀀥􀀁
􀀞􀀖􀀁􀀢􀀘􀀕􀀁􀀎􀀘􀀠􀀕􀀑􀀢􀀁􀀞􀀠􀀁􀀏􀀡􀀕􀀁􀀞􀀖􀀁􀀊􀀣􀀓􀀛􀀕􀀑􀀠􀀁􀀐􀀕􀀑􀀟􀀞􀀝􀀡􀀅􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀙􀀰􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀰􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀥􀀮􀀁
􀀕􀀱􀀷􀀴􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀚􀀷􀀵􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀩􀀁􀀪􀀱􀀷􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶
􀀥􀀵􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀧􀀥􀀵􀀩􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀬􀀰􀀧􀀬􀀲􀀮􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀷􀀯􀀥􀀰􀀬􀀶􀀥􀀴􀀬􀀥􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀥􀀹􀀁􀀥􀀲􀀲􀀮􀀬􀀧􀀥􀀦􀀮􀀩􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀥􀀴􀀯􀀩􀀨􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁘􀁅􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃
􀀌􀀊􀀊􀀁􀀜􀀧􀀝􀀥􀀬􀀴􀀅􀀁􀀎􀀘􀀕􀀁􀀉􀀑􀀤􀀁􀀞􀀖􀀁􀀎􀀠􀀕􀀑􀀢􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀁􀀃􀀪􀀱􀀱􀀶􀀰􀀱􀀶􀀩􀀁􀀌􀀈􀀎􀀁􀀥􀀦􀀱􀀸􀀩􀀄􀀅􀀁􀀲􀀇􀀁􀀏􀀈􀀌􀀒
􀀼􀀠􀀫􀀩􀀴􀀩􀀁􀀹􀀩􀀴􀀩􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀬􀀵􀀶􀀩􀀰􀀧􀀩􀀁􀀥􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀦􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀭􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀗􀀬􀀴􀀵􀀶􀀁􀀢􀀱􀀴􀀮􀀨􀀁􀀢􀀥􀀴􀀁􀀥􀀁
􀀰􀀷􀀯􀀦􀀩􀀴􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀃􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀫􀀬􀀧􀀫􀀁􀀱􀀰􀀩􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀴􀀩􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀷􀀶􀀴􀀥􀀮􀀁􀀟􀀶􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀹􀀩􀀴􀀩􀀁􀀲􀀥􀀴􀀶􀀬􀀩􀀵􀀄􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁈􀀑􀁊􀀑􀀏􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀔􀀛􀀘􀀙􀀃 􀀾􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃
􀀯􀁄􀁚􀁀􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀫􀁄􀁊􀁘􀁈􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀔􀀛􀀜􀀜􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀓􀀚􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁗􀀃
􀀹􀀥􀀵􀀁􀀥􀀵􀀵􀀷􀀯􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀵􀀩􀀁􀀹􀀩􀀴􀀩􀀁􀀷􀀰􀀥􀀪􀀪􀀩􀀧􀀶􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀦􀀻􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀹􀀥􀀴􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀯􀀥􀀬􀀰􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀁
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀥􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁌􀁝􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁉􀀃 􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀁄􀁊􀁘􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁇􀁒􀁐􀀃
􀀘􀀱􀀸􀀩􀀴􀀰􀀯􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀁 􀀶􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀀩􀀁 􀀬􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀲􀀩􀀴􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀥􀀪􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀧􀀮􀀷􀀵􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀲􀀩􀀥􀀧􀀩􀀅􀀁 􀀬􀀶􀀁 􀀬􀀵􀀁
􀀵􀀷􀀲􀀲􀀮􀀬􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀦􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀷􀀯􀀩􀀴􀀱􀀷􀀵􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀪􀀩􀀴􀀩􀀰􀀧􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀯􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀰􀀷􀀥􀀮􀀁􀀔􀀴􀀬􀀶􀀬􀀵􀀫􀀁􀀮􀀬􀀵􀀶􀀵􀀁
􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀽􀀓􀀧􀀧􀀩􀀵􀀵􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀅􀀁 􀀢􀀬􀀶􀀫􀀨􀀴􀀥􀀹􀀥􀀮􀀵􀀅􀀁 􀀂􀀧􀀇􀀾􀀅􀀁 􀀲􀀷􀀦􀀮􀀬􀀵􀀫􀀩􀀨􀀁 􀀬􀀰􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀔􀀴􀀬􀀶􀀬􀀵􀀫􀀁 􀀠􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀶􀀻􀀁
􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁜􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀥􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀕􀀘􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀫􀁄􀁊􀁘􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀹􀀬􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀓􀀚􀀃􀀾􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃
􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀩􀀰􀀩􀀯􀀻􀀁􀀯􀀩􀀴􀀧􀀫􀀥􀀰􀀶􀀁􀀵􀀫􀀬􀀲􀀵􀀁􀀥􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀦􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀭􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀵􀀶􀀬􀀮􀀬􀀶􀀬􀀩􀀵􀀤􀀇􀀁􀀟􀀬􀀯􀀬􀀮􀀥􀀴􀀮􀀻􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀁
􀀔􀀜􀀕􀀖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁇􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀪􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃
􀀪􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁙􀁄􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀎􀀁􀀚􀀷􀀮􀀻􀀁􀀉􀀑􀀈􀀎􀀁􀀣􀀕􀀱􀀰􀀸􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀪􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀓􀀯􀀩􀀮􀀬􀀱􀀴􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀕􀀱􀀰􀀨􀀬􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀺􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁈􀁏􀁇􀁀􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃
􀀦􀀩􀀶􀀹􀀩􀀩􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀆􀀓􀀮􀀮􀀬􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀞􀀱􀀹􀀩􀀴􀀵􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀆􀀩􀀰􀀩􀀯􀀻􀀁􀀞􀀱􀀹􀀩􀀴􀀵􀀅􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀲􀀮􀀬􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀁
􀂵􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀫􀁌􀁖􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁜􀂶􀁖􀀃􀀪􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁎􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀂶􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀙􀀒􀀙􀀔􀀇􀀄􀀇
􀀌􀀊􀀋􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀫􀁌􀁖􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀁄􀁊􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀉􀀈􀀁 􀀟􀀩􀀲􀀶􀀩􀀯􀀦􀀩􀀴􀀁 􀀉􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀅􀀁 􀀎􀀠􀀕􀀑􀀢􀀙􀀕􀀡􀀁 􀀑􀀝􀀔􀀁 􀀋􀀢􀀘􀀕􀀠􀀁 􀀈􀀝􀀢􀀕􀀠􀀝􀀑􀀢􀀙􀀞􀀝􀀑􀀛􀀁 􀀄􀀗􀀠􀀕􀀕􀀜􀀕􀀝􀀢􀀡􀀁 􀀞􀀖􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀚􀀙􀂱􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀜􀀅􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀮􀀇􀀁􀀐􀀅􀀁􀀖􀀩􀀲􀀥􀀴􀀶􀀯􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀟􀀶􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀅􀀁
􀀔􀀜􀀚􀀔􀀏􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀚􀀛􀀃􀀋􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀭􀀑􀀃􀀫􀀑􀀃􀀺􀀑􀀃􀀹􀁈􀁕􀁝􀁌􀁍􀁏􀀃􀀋􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀈􀀝􀀢􀀕􀀠􀀝􀀑􀀢􀀙􀀞􀀝􀀑􀀛􀀁􀀉􀀑􀀤􀀁􀀙􀀝􀀁􀀇􀀙􀀡􀀢􀀞􀀠􀀂
􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀏􀀃􀀯􀁈􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁍􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁉􀁉􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀚􀀖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀚􀀔􀀌􀀑
􀀌􀀊􀀌􀀁􀀌􀀕􀀡􀀢􀀑􀀢􀀕􀀜􀀕􀀝􀀢􀀁 􀀞􀀖􀀁 􀀢􀀘􀀕􀀁 􀀉􀀑􀀤􀀁 􀀎􀀘􀀙􀀠􀀔􀀃􀀁 􀀢􀀘􀀕􀀁 􀀆􀀞􀀠􀀕􀀙􀀗􀀝􀀁 􀀌􀀕􀀛􀀑􀀢􀀙􀀞􀀝􀀡􀀁 􀀉􀀑􀀤􀀁 􀀞􀀖􀀁
􀀢􀀘􀀕􀀁􀀏􀀝􀀙􀀢􀀕􀀔􀀁􀀍􀀢􀀑􀀢􀀕􀀡􀀅􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀮􀀇􀀁􀀉􀀅􀀁􀀟􀀶􀀇􀀁􀀞􀀥􀀷􀀮􀀅􀀁􀀜􀀬􀀰􀀰􀀩􀀵􀀱􀀶􀀥􀀅􀀁􀀓􀀯􀀩􀀴􀀬􀀧􀀥􀀰􀀁􀀛􀀥􀀹􀀁􀀙􀀰􀀵􀀶􀀬􀀶􀀷􀀶􀀩􀀁
􀀞􀀷􀀦􀀮􀀬􀀵􀀫􀀩􀀴􀀵􀀅􀀁􀀉􀀑􀀐􀀏􀀅􀀁􀀲􀀥􀀴􀀥􀀇􀀁􀀋􀀋􀀎􀀁􀀃􀀩􀀄􀀇
􀀃 􀀨􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀁 􀀂􀀃􀀂
􀀺􀀭􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀹􀀫􀀵􀀁􀀮􀀷􀀶􀀁􀀩􀀲􀀱􀀷􀀫􀀱􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀺􀀭􀀮􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀶􀀁􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀬􀀸􀀱􀀪􀀧􀀰􀀫􀀱􀀷􀀧􀀯􀀁􀀩􀀭􀀧􀀵􀀧􀀩􀀷􀀫􀀵􀀁􀀶􀀮􀀰􀀮􀀯􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀷􀀲􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀧􀀷􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀋􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀵􀀫􀀯􀀫􀀹􀀧􀀱􀀷􀀁􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀹􀀮􀀶􀀮􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀥􀀔􀀭􀀧􀀵􀀷􀀫􀀵􀀁􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀢􀀱􀀮􀀷􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀜􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀦􀀃􀀁􀀷􀀲􀀁􀀧􀀯􀀯􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀷􀀫􀀵􀀅
􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁄􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀋􀀉􀀌
􀀂􀀎􀀃􀀁 􀀡􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀮􀀰􀀳􀀯􀀮􀀩􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀩􀀲􀀱􀀷􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀮􀀷􀀼􀀁􀀪􀀲􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀧􀀬􀀬􀀫􀀩􀀷􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀲􀀳􀀅
􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀩􀀣􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀣􀀡􀀧􀀟􀀩􀀧􀀯􀀁􀀧􀀳􀀅
􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃
􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀷􀀵􀀫􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀪􀀲􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀧􀀪􀀪􀀵􀀫􀀶􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀸􀀰􀀫􀀵􀀲􀀸􀀶􀀁􀀴􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀷􀀮􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀰􀀧􀀼􀀁
􀀧􀀵􀀮􀀶􀀫􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀫􀀯􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀲􀀱􀀁 􀀷􀀲􀀁 􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀧􀀳􀀳􀀯􀀮􀀩􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀲􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀬􀀁 􀀷􀀭􀀧􀀷􀀁 􀀯􀀧􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀀱􀀲􀀵􀀁 􀀮􀀶􀀁 􀀮􀀷􀀁
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁑􀀃
􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀳􀀳􀀯􀀮􀀩􀀧􀀨􀀮􀀯􀀮􀀷􀀼􀀁􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀵􀀮􀀱􀀩􀀮􀀳􀀯􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀯􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀰􀀧􀀱􀀅
􀀮􀀷􀀧􀀵􀀮􀀧􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀧􀀺􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀳􀀧􀀵􀀷􀀮􀀩􀀸􀀯􀀧􀀵􀀁􀀩􀀲􀀱􀀷􀀫􀀻􀀷􀀶􀀆
􀀂􀀨􀀃􀀁 􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀀂
􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀀧􀀫􀀡􀀩􀀱􀀢􀀧􀀫􀀥􀀁􀀰􀀮􀀣􀀟􀀰􀀧􀀣􀀯􀀁􀀣􀀯􀀰􀀟􀀠􀀩􀀧􀀯􀀦􀀧􀀫􀀥􀀁􀀬􀀮􀀁􀀪􀀬􀀢􀀧􀀤􀀴􀀧􀀫􀀥􀀁􀀩􀀟􀀫􀀢􀀁􀀟􀀫􀀢􀀁
􀀪􀀟􀀮􀀧􀀰􀀧􀀪􀀣􀀁􀀠􀀬􀀱􀀫􀀢􀀟􀀮􀀧􀀣􀀯
􀀋􀀛􀀌􀀃 􀀬􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃
􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀀅
􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀏􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁝􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀫􀀵􀀵􀀮􀀷􀀲􀀵􀀼􀀁􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀠􀀷􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀆
􀀋􀀜􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀛􀀦􀀣􀀁􀀖􀀬􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀁􀀌􀀰􀀩􀀟􀀫􀀰􀀧􀀡􀀁
􀀎􀀬􀀟􀀯􀀰􀀁 􀀑􀀧􀀯􀀦􀀣􀀮􀀧􀀣􀀯􀀁 􀀎􀀟􀀯􀀣􀀄􀀁 􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀖􀀲􀀹􀀫􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀫􀀱􀀷􀀁 􀀲􀀬􀀁 􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀢􀀱􀀮􀀷􀀫􀀪􀀁
􀀮􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁇􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀂿􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀖􀀏􀀋􀀉􀀍􀀁 􀀭􀀧􀀪􀀁 􀀨􀀫􀀫􀀱􀀁
􀁄􀁅􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀔􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀀅
􀀰􀀧􀀱􀀫􀀱􀀷􀀁􀀔􀀲􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀁􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀒􀀵􀀨􀀮􀀷􀀵􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀪􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀶􀀭􀀧􀀵􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀮􀀶􀀁􀀹􀀮􀀫􀀺􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀪􀀁
􀀶􀀷􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀾􀀥􀀮􀀦􀀱􀀷􀀫􀀵􀀱􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀲􀀱􀀧􀀯􀀁􀀯􀀧􀀺􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀷􀀶􀀁􀀰􀀲􀀪􀀫􀀵􀀱􀀁􀀪􀀫􀀹􀀫􀀯􀀲􀀳􀀰􀀫􀀱􀀷􀀁
􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁗􀂴􀀑􀀋􀀉􀀎
􀀂􀀈􀀇􀀃􀀁 􀀠􀀮􀀰􀀮􀀯􀀧􀀵􀀯􀀼􀀄􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀒􀀫􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀁􀀕􀀣􀀴􀀣􀀮􀀷􀀯􀀁􀀐􀀯􀀰􀀟􀀰􀀣􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀈􀀃􀀄􀀁
􀀧􀀱􀀁 􀀧􀀳􀀳􀀫􀀯􀀯􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀁 􀀩􀀲􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀢􀀱􀀮􀀷􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀠􀀷􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀶􀀁 􀀲􀀬􀀁 􀀒􀀰􀀫􀀵􀀮􀀩􀀧􀀄􀀁
􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀀅
􀀷􀀲􀀵􀀼􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀫􀀯􀀪􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀧􀀷
􀀾􀁗􀁀􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁉􀁈􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃
􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀰􀀧􀀮􀀱􀀷􀀫􀀱􀀧􀀱􀀩􀀫􀀁 􀀲􀀬􀀁 􀀺􀀧􀀵􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀬􀀲􀀵􀀩􀀫􀀰􀀫􀀱􀀷􀀁 􀀲􀀬􀀁 􀀪􀀮􀀶􀀳􀀲􀀶􀀮􀀷􀀮􀀹􀀫􀀁 􀀷􀀵􀀫􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀫􀀶􀀁 􀀲􀀵􀀁
􀀪􀀮􀀶􀀳􀀲􀀶􀀮􀀷􀀮􀀹􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀧􀀵􀀷􀀶􀀁􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀷􀀵􀀫􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀫􀀶􀀆􀀁􀀠􀀸􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀹􀀮􀀶􀀮􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀧􀀵􀀫􀀁􀀩􀀲􀀰􀀳􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀨􀀯􀀫􀀁􀀺􀀮􀀷􀀭􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀪􀀁
􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀑􀀋􀀉􀀏
􀀘􀀱􀀁􀀚􀀰􀀟􀀰􀀣􀀁􀀣􀀳􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀩􀀃􀀁􀀕􀀧􀀫􀀣􀀮􀀁􀀹􀀆􀀁􀀙􀀣􀀟􀀮􀀢􀀬􀀫􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀉􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀩􀀲􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀯􀀫􀀪􀀁
􀀷􀀭􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀶􀀲􀀰􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀵􀀫􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀸􀀵􀀹􀀮􀀹􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀶􀀷􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀺􀀧􀀵􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀸􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀨􀀲􀀸􀀱􀀪􀀧􀀵􀀼􀀁
􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀁􀀔􀀣􀀥􀀟􀀩􀀧􀀰􀀴􀀁 􀀬􀀤􀀁 􀀰􀀦􀀣􀀁 􀀛􀀦􀀮􀀣􀀟􀀰􀀁 􀀬􀀮􀀁 􀀜􀀯􀀣􀀁 􀀬􀀤􀀁 􀀖􀀱􀀡􀀩􀀣􀀟􀀮􀀁 􀀝􀀣􀀟􀀭􀀬􀀫􀀯􀀄􀀁 􀀤􀁇􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃
􀀗􀀭􀀧􀀫􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀄􀀁􀀒􀀃􀀎􀀃􀀓􀀃􀀁􀀙􀀣􀀭􀀬􀀮􀀰􀀯􀀁􀀅􀀊􀀊􀀇􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀉􀀍􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀧􀀵􀀧􀀆􀀁􀀏􀀐􀀆
􀀋􀀉􀀍􀀃􀀧􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀖􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀖􀀏􀀃
􀀗􀀆􀀁 􀀛􀀮􀀯􀀯􀀫􀀵􀀁 􀀂􀀫􀀪􀀆􀀃􀀄􀀁 􀀛􀀮􀀣􀀟􀀰􀀧􀀣􀀯􀀁 􀀟􀀫􀀢􀀁 􀀗􀀰􀀦􀀣􀀮􀀁 􀀒􀀫􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀫􀀟􀀰􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀟􀀩􀀁 􀀌􀀡􀀰􀀯􀀁 􀀬􀀤􀀁 􀀰􀀦􀀣􀀁 􀀜􀀫􀀧􀀰􀀣􀀢􀀁
􀀚􀀰􀀟􀀰􀀣􀀯􀀁 􀀬􀀤􀀁 􀀌􀀪􀀣􀀮􀀧􀀡􀀟􀀁 􀀂􀀶􀀫􀀫􀀁 􀀬􀀲􀀲􀀷􀀱􀀲􀀷􀀫􀀁 􀀋􀀈􀀇􀀁 􀀧􀀨􀀲􀀹􀀫􀀃􀀄􀀁 􀀪􀀲􀀩􀀸􀀰􀀫􀀱􀀷􀀁 􀀜􀀲􀀶􀀆􀀁 􀀈􀀽􀀋􀀇􀀁
􀀂􀀈􀀎􀀎􀀍􀀽􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀏􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀌􀀈􀀆
􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀁􀀛􀀦􀀣􀀁􀀖􀀬􀀮􀀰􀀦􀀁􀀌􀀰􀀩􀀟􀀫􀀰􀀧􀀡􀀁􀀎􀀬􀀟􀀯􀀰􀀁􀀑􀀧􀀯􀀦􀀣􀀮􀀧􀀣􀀯􀀁􀀎􀀟􀀯􀀣􀀄􀀁􀀒􀀺􀀧􀀵􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀎􀀁􀀠􀀫􀀳􀀷􀀫􀀰􀀨􀀫􀀵􀀁
􀀈􀀐􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀁􀀢􀀜􀀟􀀘􀀒􀀒􀀄􀀁􀀹􀀲􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀤􀀘􀀁􀀂􀀠􀀧􀀯􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀜􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀍􀀈􀀆􀀣􀀆􀀋􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀆􀀁􀀠􀀫􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀯􀀶􀀲􀀁
􀀔􀀆􀀁􀀞􀀧􀀵􀀵􀀼􀀁􀀂􀀫􀀪􀀆􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀌􀀁􀀍􀀮􀀧􀀰􀀧􀀯􀀦􀀁􀀏􀀧􀀥􀀣􀀯􀀰􀀁􀀬􀀤􀀁􀀒􀀫􀀰􀀣􀀮􀀫􀀟􀀰􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀟􀀩􀀁􀀔􀀟􀀲􀀋􀀁􀀘􀀦􀀟􀀯􀀣􀀁􀀒􀀋􀀁􀀅􀀉􀀇􀀄􀀶
􀀔􀀜􀀔􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀹􀀲􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀁􀀚􀀲􀀱􀀪􀀲􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀠􀀷􀀫􀀹􀀫􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀠􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀄􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀌􀀏􀀌􀀽􀀍􀀇􀀌􀀆
􀀋􀀉􀀏􀀁􀀒􀀫􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀁􀀕􀀣􀀴􀀣􀀮􀀷􀀯􀀁􀀐􀀯􀀰􀀟􀀰􀀣􀀄􀀁􀀈􀀇􀀎􀀁􀀔􀀧􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀒􀀳􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀪􀀁􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀁􀀏􀀇􀀌􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀏􀀈􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀒􀀘􀀚􀀔􀀁
􀀅􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀶􀀅􀀊􀀇􀀉􀀄􀀁􀀹􀀲􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀊􀀊􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀊􀀏􀀆
􀀷􀀵􀀫􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀫􀀶􀀆􀀋􀀉􀀐􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀂿􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁋􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁓􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀑
􀀋􀀔􀀔􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀀩􀀫􀀵􀀷􀀧􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀨􀀯􀀫􀀰􀀶􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀱􀀫􀀁 􀀲􀀬􀀁 􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀀶􀀁 􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀬􀀧􀀩􀀷􀀁 􀀷􀀭􀀧􀀷􀀁 􀀷􀀵􀀫􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀫􀀶􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀀅
􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃
􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀫􀀴􀀸􀀫􀀱􀀷􀀯􀀼􀀄􀀁 􀀮􀀬􀀁 􀀶􀀸􀀩􀀭􀀁 􀀷􀀵􀀫􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀧􀀵􀀫􀀁 􀀫􀀻􀀫􀀩􀀸􀀷􀀫􀀪􀀄􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀼􀀁 􀀩􀀧􀀱􀀱􀀲􀀷􀀁
􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑
􀀋􀀔􀀕􀀌􀀃 􀀤􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁘􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀀅
􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀀛􀀩􀀜􀀧􀀮􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀷􀀫􀀶􀀄
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀶􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁝􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀥􀁈􀁏􀁊􀁌􀁘􀁐􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀯􀁘􀁛􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃
􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁎􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃
􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀑􀀋􀀊􀀇
􀀋􀀔􀀖􀀌􀀃 􀀤􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀀅
􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁄􀁆􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀅
􀀰􀀫􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀁􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀶􀀸􀀶􀀩􀀫􀀳􀀷􀀮􀀨􀀯􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀲􀀁􀀷􀀫􀀵􀀰􀀮􀀱􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀧􀀵􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀲􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀬􀀬􀀫􀀵􀀫􀀱􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁖􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁓􀀏􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁑􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃
􀀡􀀭􀀮􀀶􀀁􀀩􀀯􀀧􀀶􀀶􀀁􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀷􀀵􀀫􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀮􀀶􀀁􀀪􀀫􀀧􀀯􀀷􀀁􀀺􀀮􀀷􀀭􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀯􀀲􀀺􀀆
􀀋􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀀅
􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀷􀀲􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀶􀀳􀀫􀀩􀀮􀀧􀀯􀀁􀀶􀀷􀀧􀀷􀀸􀀶􀀁􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀨􀀲􀀸􀀱􀀪􀀧􀀵􀀼􀀁􀀷􀀵􀀫􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀫􀀶􀀆􀀋􀀊􀀈􀀁􀀒􀀵􀀷􀀮􀀩􀀯􀀫􀀁􀀍􀀉􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀧􀀵􀀧􀀅
􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀟􀀃􀀁􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀐􀀁􀀣􀀮􀀫􀀱􀀱􀀧􀀁􀀔􀀲􀀱􀀹􀀫􀀱􀀷􀀮􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀹􀀮􀀪􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀧􀀁
􀁉􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀀮􀀬􀀁 􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀷􀀵􀀫􀀧􀀷􀀼􀀁 􀀫􀀶􀀷􀀧􀀨􀀯􀀮􀀶􀀭􀀫􀀶􀀁 􀀧􀀁 􀀨􀀲􀀸􀀱􀀪􀀧􀀵􀀼􀀆􀀁 􀀠􀀸􀀩􀀭􀀁 􀀷􀀵􀀫􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀫􀀶􀀁 􀀺􀀫􀀵􀀫􀀁
􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀙􀀕􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁚􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁉􀁘􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃
􀀬􀀵􀀮􀀩􀀷􀀮􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀆􀀋􀀊􀀉􀀁􀀡􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀎􀀏􀀁􀀣􀀮􀀫􀀱􀀱􀀧􀀁􀀔􀀲􀀱􀀹􀀫􀀱􀀷􀀮􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀫􀀧􀀩􀀭􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀶􀀮􀀰􀀮􀀯􀀧􀀵􀀁
􀀩􀀲􀀱􀀩􀀯􀀸􀀶􀀮􀀲􀀱􀀁 􀀧􀀨􀀲􀀸􀀷􀀁 􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀵􀀫􀀶􀀮􀀯􀀮􀀫􀀱􀀩􀀫􀀁 􀀲􀀬􀀁 􀀨􀀲􀀸􀀱􀀪􀀧􀀵􀀼􀀁 􀀷􀀵􀀫􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀫􀀶􀀄􀀁
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀔􀀔􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀂳􀀾􀁄􀁀􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀀪􀀲􀀫􀀶􀀁 􀀱􀀲􀀷􀀁 􀀧􀀶􀀁 􀀶􀀸􀀩􀀭􀀁 􀀧􀀬􀀬􀀫􀀩􀀷􀀑􀀁 􀀂􀀟􀀃􀀁 􀀧􀀁 􀀨􀀲􀀸􀀱􀀪􀀧􀀵􀀼􀀁 􀀫􀀶􀀷􀀧􀀨􀀯􀀮􀀶􀀭􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀨􀀼􀀁 􀀧􀀁
􀀋􀀉􀀐􀀁􀀢􀀱􀀮􀀷􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀠􀀷􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀶􀀄􀀁􀀠􀀸􀀳􀀵􀀫􀀰􀀫􀀁􀀔􀀲􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀁􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀙􀀧􀀱􀀶􀀧􀀶􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀠􀀧􀀢􀀃􀀏􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀜􀀞􀀃
􀀶􀀫􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀯􀀶􀀲􀀁􀀒􀀕􀀞􀀘􀀚􀀔􀀁􀀔􀀜􀀔􀀜􀂱􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀕􀀄􀀁􀀔􀀧􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀜􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀊􀀉􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀊􀀏􀀆
􀀋􀀊􀀇􀀁􀀛􀀩􀀜􀀧􀀮􀀵􀀄􀀁􀀛􀀦􀀣􀀁􀀔􀀟􀀲􀀁􀀬􀀤􀀁􀀛􀀮􀀣􀀟􀀰􀀧􀀣􀀯􀀁􀀂􀀬􀀲􀀲􀀷􀀱􀀲􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀋􀀇􀀍􀀁􀀧􀀨􀀲􀀹􀀫􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀎􀀇􀀊􀀆
􀀋􀀊􀀈􀀁􀀝􀀱􀀁 􀀷􀀭􀀮􀀶􀀁 􀀮􀀶􀀶􀀸􀀫􀀄􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀫􀀁 􀀫􀀴􀀸􀀧􀀯􀀯􀀼􀀁 􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀒􀀫􀀁 􀀮􀀣􀀁 􀀕􀀣􀀴􀀣􀀮􀀷􀀯􀀁 􀀐􀀯􀀰􀀟􀀰􀀣􀀁 􀀩􀀧􀀶􀀫􀀁 􀀰􀀫􀀱􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀓􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀑
􀀋􀀊􀀉􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀔􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀅
􀀮􀀩􀀯􀀫􀀁􀀌􀀐􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀲􀀺􀀁􀀧􀀵􀀷􀀮􀀩􀀯􀀫􀀁􀀍􀀉􀀁􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀐􀀁􀀣􀀮􀀫􀀱􀀱􀀧􀀁􀀔􀀲􀀱􀀹􀀫􀀱􀀷􀀮􀀲􀀱􀀦􀀄􀀁􀀞􀀣􀀟􀀮􀀠􀀬􀀬􀀨􀀁􀀵􀀁
􀀅􀀊􀀇􀀇􀀏􀀃􀁙􀁒􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀬􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀤􀀒􀀙􀀖􀀓􀀜􀀒􀀵􀁈􀁙􀀑􀀔􀀏􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀛􀀖􀀞􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀲􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀚􀀣􀀯􀀯􀀧􀀬􀀫􀀯􀀁􀀂􀀬􀀲􀀲􀀷􀀱􀀲􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀋􀀈􀀎􀀁􀀧􀀨􀀲􀀹􀀫􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀎􀀐􀀆􀀁􀀡􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀫􀀻􀀩􀀫􀀳􀀷􀀮􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀷􀀵􀀫􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀫􀀶􀀷􀀧􀀨􀀅
􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁈􀁚􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁒􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁍􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀠􀀷􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀢􀀱􀀮􀀷􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀜􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀔􀀲􀀱􀀬􀀫􀀵􀀫􀀱􀀩􀀫􀀁􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀚􀀧􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀬􀀁􀀡􀀵􀀫􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀫􀀶􀀆
􀀃􀀄􀀄􀀁 􀀈􀀋􀀔􀀓􀀕􀀗􀀁􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀗􀀍􀀋􀀁􀀆􀀒􀀗􀀋􀀕􀀒􀀉􀀗􀀎􀀓􀀒􀀉􀀐􀀁􀀇􀀉􀀘􀀁􀀅􀀓􀀑􀀑􀀎􀀖􀀖􀀎􀀓􀀒􀀁􀀓􀀒􀀁􀀗􀀍􀀋􀀁􀀘􀀓􀀕􀀏􀀁􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀎􀀗􀀖􀀁􀀖􀀎􀀙􀀗􀀚􀀂􀀗􀀍􀀎􀀕􀀊􀀁􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀖􀀎􀀓􀀒
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀞􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀋􀀊􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁕􀁜􀂴􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃
􀀫􀀼􀀧􀀱􀀴􀀰􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀧􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀸􀀰􀀽􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀰􀀫􀀺􀀧􀀲􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀳􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀫􀀷􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀫􀀬􀀅
􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀑
􀀂􀀩􀀃􀀁 􀀆􀀛􀀓􀀚􀀑􀀓􀀉􀀚􀀍􀀘􀀉􀀓􀀁􀀓􀀉􀀜􀀂􀀔􀀉􀀒􀀑􀀕􀀏􀀁􀀚􀀘􀀍􀀉􀀚􀀑􀀍􀀙
􀀋􀀔􀀘􀀌􀀃 􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀐􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁖􀀝
􀀂􀀑􀀃􀀁 􀀆􀀛􀀓􀀚􀀑􀀂􀀗􀀉􀀘􀀚􀀑􀀚􀀍􀀁􀀓􀀉􀀜􀀂􀀔􀀉􀀒􀀑􀀕􀀏􀀁􀀚􀀘􀀍􀀉􀀚􀀑􀀍􀀙
􀀓􀀽􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀱􀀫􀀧􀀲􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀻􀀭􀀮􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀩􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀁􀀶􀀹􀀰􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀲􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀰􀀧􀀻􀀁
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀅
􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁘􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀀨􀀫􀀁 􀀮􀀲􀀬􀀫􀀶􀀶􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀮􀀲􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀩􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀷􀀫􀀁 􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀆􀀁 􀀘􀀲􀀷􀀸􀀧􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀷􀀁 􀀧􀀶􀀫􀀁 􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀁 􀀲􀀹􀀱􀀫􀀶􀀳􀀹􀀷􀀆􀀁
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀔􀀛􀀘􀀙􀀃 􀀾􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃
􀀯􀁄􀁚􀁀􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀞􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀀃 􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀻􀀭􀀽􀀁 􀀮􀀸􀀁 􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀸􀀮􀀲􀀹􀀫􀀷􀀁 􀀮􀀲􀀁 􀀫􀀼􀀮􀀷􀀸􀀫􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀁 􀀧􀀬􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀁 􀀧􀀁 􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀁 􀀮􀀷􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀧􀀸􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀴􀀧􀀶􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁 􀀮􀀲􀀸􀀫􀀲􀀪􀀫􀀪􀀁
􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀑􀀃􀀫􀁄􀁊􀁘􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀬􀀬􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀓􀀚􀀃
􀀾􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁜􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀀃
􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀸􀀶􀀧􀀩􀀸􀀁􀀪􀀫􀀨􀀸􀀷􀀦􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀞􀀫􀀧􀀩􀀫􀀁􀀞􀀧􀀩􀀸􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀞􀀧􀀶􀀮􀀷􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀉􀀏􀀁􀀥􀀗􀀫􀀲􀀫􀀶􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀡􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀽􀀁
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁜􀀃􀀋􀀮􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁊􀀐
􀀥􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀌􀁀􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁊􀀅
􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀉􀁆􀀑􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀑􀀋􀀊􀀊
􀀋􀀔􀀙􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀀃􀂳􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀐􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀂴􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁚􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀋􀀊􀀋􀀁
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁏􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀂿􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁗􀀐􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀺􀁒􀁕􀁏􀁇􀀃
􀀣􀀧􀀶􀀆􀀁􀀘􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀫􀀲􀀁􀀧􀀷􀀷􀀫􀀶􀀸􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀧􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀛􀀹􀀰􀀸􀀮􀀰􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀔􀀳􀀲􀀺􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀷􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀂵􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀐􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀂶􀀃 􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁋􀀏􀀃 􀁇􀁕􀁘􀁊􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀀅
􀀸􀀫􀀩􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀪􀀹􀀷􀀸􀀶􀀮􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀶􀀳􀀴􀀫􀀶􀀸􀀽􀀄􀀁􀀫􀀸􀀩􀀆􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀲􀀹􀀰􀀰􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁
􀀳􀀹􀀸􀀨􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀯􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀨􀀹􀀸􀀁􀀧􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀫􀀮􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀷􀀹􀀷􀀴􀀫􀀲􀀪􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀺􀀮􀀺􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀳􀀲􀀁
􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀱􀀮􀀲􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀷􀀸􀀮􀀰􀀮􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀫􀀮􀀺􀀫􀀁􀀫􀀺􀀫􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀸􀀮􀀱􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀁
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂴􀀑􀀋􀀊􀀌
􀀂􀀈􀀎􀀃􀀁 􀀡􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀴􀀳􀀷􀀮􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀢􀀲􀀮􀀸􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀠􀀸􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀷􀀁 􀀮􀀷􀀁 􀀪􀀫􀀷􀀩􀀶􀀮􀀨􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀮􀀲􀀁
􀀧􀀁 􀀰􀀫􀀸􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀉􀀐􀀁 􀀙􀀧􀀲􀀹􀀧􀀶􀀽􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀏􀀁 􀀬􀀶􀀳􀀱􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀠􀀸􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀁 􀀕􀀫􀀴􀀧􀀶􀀸􀀱􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀁
􀀯􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀀨􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀤􀀑􀀃􀀪􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁖􀀝
􀀣􀀮􀀸􀀭􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀷􀀴􀀫􀀩􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀳􀀁􀀱􀀹􀀰􀀸􀀮􀀰􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀸􀀽􀀴􀀫􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀬􀀫􀀶􀀶􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀸􀀳􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀁􀀽􀀳􀀹􀀶􀀁
􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀀪􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐
􀀴􀀳􀀰􀀮􀀸􀀮􀀩􀀧􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀹􀀰􀀸􀀮􀀰􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀧􀀰􀀁 􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁 􀀸􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀀭􀀮􀀩􀀭􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀢􀀲􀀮􀀸􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀠􀀸􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀷􀀁 􀀻􀀧􀀷􀀁 􀀧􀀁 􀀴􀀧􀀶􀀸􀀽􀀁
􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀀗􀀳􀀺􀀫􀀶􀀲􀀱􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀧􀀷􀀁 􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀁 􀀷􀀮􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀁 􀀪􀀫􀀲􀀳􀀹􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀮􀀲􀀁 􀀧􀀩􀀩􀀳􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀁 􀀻􀀮􀀸􀀭􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀱􀀷􀀁
􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀶􀀫􀀳􀀬􀀄􀀁 􀀧􀀶􀀫􀀁 􀀷􀀸􀀮􀀰􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀀲􀀁 􀀬􀀳􀀶􀀩􀀫􀀁 􀀮􀀲􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀷􀀴􀀫􀀩􀀸􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀢􀀲􀀮􀀸􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀠􀀸􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀷􀀁 􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀧􀀸􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁
􀀫􀀼􀀮􀀷􀀸􀀫􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀷􀀸􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀸􀀻􀀫􀀫􀀲􀀁􀀷􀀳􀀱􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀶􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀸􀀳􀀁􀀷􀀹􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁
􀀪􀀮􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀁􀀑􀀗􀀙􀀖􀀁􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀚􀀖􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁐􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀑􀀃
􀀡􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀺􀀮􀀫􀀻􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀮􀀷􀀁 􀀗􀀳􀀺􀀫􀀶􀀲􀀱􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀁 􀀮􀀷􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀧􀀸􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀫􀀬􀀬􀀫􀀩􀀸􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀁 􀀳􀀲􀀁 􀀷􀀹􀀩􀀭􀀁
􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁 􀀻􀀧􀀷􀀁 􀀳􀀲􀀰􀀽􀀁 􀀸􀀳􀀁 􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀱􀀮􀀲􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀁 􀀳􀀶􀀁 􀀷􀀹􀀷􀀴􀀫􀀲􀀪􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀮􀀶􀀁 􀀫􀀼􀀫􀀩􀀹􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁 􀀧􀀷􀀁 􀀨􀀫􀀸􀀻􀀫􀀫􀀲􀀁
􀁒􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀀐􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑
􀀬􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀀪􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀀬􀀳􀀶􀀩􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀠􀀫􀀴􀀸􀀫􀀱􀀨􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀈􀀌􀀄􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀎􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀽􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀴􀀫􀀧􀀩􀀫􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀸􀀭􀀁􀀘􀀸􀀧􀀰􀀽􀀄􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀲􀀳􀀲􀀅
􀀴􀀳􀀰􀀮􀀸􀀮􀀩􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀹􀀰􀀸􀀮􀀰􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀻􀀭􀀮􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀻􀀫􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀁􀀬􀀳􀀶􀀩􀀫􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀸􀀻􀀫􀀫􀀲􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀢􀀲􀀮􀀸􀀫􀀪􀀁
􀀠􀀸􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀷􀀁 􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁 􀀘􀀸􀀧􀀰􀀽􀀁 􀀧􀀸􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀸􀀮􀀱􀀫􀀁 􀀧􀀁 􀀷􀀸􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀁 􀀩􀀳􀀱􀀱􀀫􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀨􀀫􀀸􀀻􀀫􀀫􀀲􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁
􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀀋􀀊􀀊􀀁􀀛􀀩􀀜􀀧􀀮􀀶􀀄􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀁􀀅􀀉􀀜􀀁􀀖􀀎􀀁􀀈􀀘􀀍􀀉􀀚􀀑􀀍􀀙􀀁􀀂􀀬􀀳􀀳􀀸􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀫􀀁􀀋􀀇􀀍􀀁􀀧􀀨􀀳􀀺􀀫􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀎􀀉􀀊􀀆
􀀋􀀊􀀋􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀝􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁈􀂴􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁐􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀋􀁉􀁒􀁒􀁗􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀛􀀜􀀃
􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀜􀃭􀀘􀀓􀀑
􀀋􀀊􀀌􀀁􀀘􀀆􀀁􀀒􀀆􀀁􀀠􀀭􀀫􀀧􀀶􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀂􀀫􀀪􀀆􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀇􀀚􀀉􀀘􀀒􀀍􀀝􀀙􀀁􀀄􀀕􀀚􀀍􀀘􀀕􀀉􀀚􀀑􀀖􀀕􀀉􀀓􀀁􀀅􀀉􀀜􀀄􀀁􀀈􀀈􀀸􀀭􀀁􀀫􀀪􀀆􀀄􀀁􀀚􀀳􀀲􀀪􀀳􀀲􀀄􀀁
􀀓􀀹􀀸􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀻􀀳􀀶􀀸􀀭􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀐􀀋􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀊􀀆
􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁒􀁉􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁚􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀀅
􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀸􀀻􀀫􀀫􀀲􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀢􀀲􀀮􀀸􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀠􀀸􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀘􀀸􀀧􀀰􀀽􀀆􀀁􀀒􀀁􀀷􀀮􀀱􀀮􀀰􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀴􀀳􀀷􀀮􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀫􀀲􀀁
􀁄􀁇􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀪􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀥􀁘􀁏􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁑􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀏􀀃
􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀟􀀹􀀱􀀧􀀲􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀾􀀋􀀊􀀍
􀀋􀀔􀀛􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁇􀁒􀁐􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀀲􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀚􀀃􀀭􀁄􀁑􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀛􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀝
􀀬􀀃 􀁄􀁐􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁏􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀂫􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁜􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃 􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀂫􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁜􀁒􀁘􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀰􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀫􀁌􀁖􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁜􀂶􀁖􀀃􀀪􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁇􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀀷􀀹􀀷􀀴􀀫􀀲􀀪􀀫􀀪􀀆
􀀤􀀳􀀹􀀁 􀀻􀀮􀀰􀀰􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀷􀀫􀀶􀀺􀀫􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀧􀀸􀀄􀀁 􀀮􀀲􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀞􀀫􀀧􀀩􀀫􀀁 􀀡􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁 􀀻􀀮􀀸􀀭􀀁 􀀘􀀸􀀧􀀰􀀽􀀄􀀁 􀀖􀀮􀀲􀀰􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀄􀀁
􀀵􀁒􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃􀀥􀁘􀁏􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁑􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁖􀁐􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀀬􀀳􀀶􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀪􀀹􀀶􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀺􀀮􀀺􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀧􀀹􀀸􀀳􀀱􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀩􀀧􀀰􀀰􀀽􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀸􀀭􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀴􀀫􀀧􀀩􀀫􀀆􀀁
􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀫􀁌􀁖􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁜􀂶􀁖􀀃􀀪􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀀅
􀀺􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀑􀀗􀀙􀀖􀀁􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀚􀀖􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀳􀀹􀀰􀀪􀀁􀀰􀀧􀀴􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀸􀀭􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀹􀀸􀀨􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀯􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀮􀀷􀀁􀀮􀀷􀀁
􀀴􀀧􀀶􀀸􀀮􀀩􀀹􀀰􀀧􀀶􀀰􀀽􀀁 􀀸􀀶􀀹􀀫􀀁 􀀮􀀲􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀩􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀺􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀷􀀁 􀀸􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀀭􀀮􀀩􀀭􀀁 􀀲􀀫􀀹􀀸􀀶􀀧􀀰􀀁 􀀞􀀳􀀻􀀫􀀶􀀷􀀁
􀀧􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀶􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀆􀀁􀀝􀀨􀀺􀀮􀀳􀀹􀀷􀀁􀀫􀀼􀀧􀀱􀀴􀀰􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀷􀀹􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀺􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀧􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀥􀀔􀀳􀀲􀀺􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁
􀀵􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁀􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀔􀀜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁙􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃
􀀳􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀷􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀁌􀁆􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃
􀀻􀀳􀀹􀀰􀀪􀀁􀀧􀀴􀀴􀀫􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀸􀀳􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀷􀀁􀀳􀀲􀀰􀀽􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀹􀀷􀀴􀀫􀀲􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀲􀀳􀀶􀀱􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀫􀀧􀀩􀀫􀀬􀀹􀀰􀀁
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁏􀂿􀁏􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀱􀀹􀀰􀀸􀀮􀀰􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀺􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀁􀀷􀀳􀀁􀀬􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀶􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀳􀀴􀀫􀀶􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀧􀀷􀀁
􀁄􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀅
􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀷􀀆􀀁􀀘􀀲􀀁􀀷􀀳􀀱􀀫􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀻􀀫􀀺􀀫􀀶􀀄􀀁􀀷􀀹􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀟􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀔􀀶􀀳􀀷􀀷􀀁􀀔􀀳􀀲􀀺􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀄􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁
􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀞􀀳􀀻􀀫􀀶􀀷􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀩􀀰􀀫􀀧􀀶􀀰􀀽􀀁􀀷􀀹􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀺􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀻􀀳􀀹􀀰􀀪􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀸􀀮􀀲􀀹􀀫􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀁􀀬􀀳􀀶􀀩􀀫􀀁
􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀹􀀷􀀴􀀫􀀲􀀪􀀫􀀪􀀆
􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀀧􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀶􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀮􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀲􀀳􀀲􀀅􀀴􀀳􀀰􀀮􀀸􀀮􀀩􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀸􀀫􀀩􀀭􀀲􀀮􀀩􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀸􀀹􀀶􀀫􀀄􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀺􀀮􀀫􀀻􀀁
􀁘􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀀫􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁜􀂶􀁖􀀃 􀀪􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃 􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀁􀀽􀀫􀀸􀀁􀀧􀀶􀀮􀀷􀀫􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀁􀀴􀀶􀀧􀀩􀀸􀀮􀀩􀀫􀀆􀀋􀀊􀀎
􀀋􀀊􀀍􀀁􀀟􀀆􀀁􀀟􀀧􀀲􀀯􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀛􀀳􀀪􀀫􀀶􀀲􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀺􀀧􀀰􀀮􀀪􀀮􀀸􀀽􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀑􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀱􀀴􀀧􀀶􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀺􀀫􀀁
􀁖􀁗􀁘􀁇􀁜􀂴􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀃􀀴􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀄􀀁􀀺􀀳􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀏􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀿􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀊􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀋􀀊􀀿􀀊􀀋􀀋􀀆
􀀋􀀊􀀎􀀁􀀄􀀊􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀋􀀍􀀆􀀁􀀠􀀫􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀰􀀷􀀳􀀁􀀝􀀴􀀴􀀫􀀲􀀭􀀫􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀂􀀬􀀳􀀳􀀸􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀫􀀁􀀋􀀇􀀌􀀁􀀧􀀨􀀳􀀺􀀫􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀇􀀋􀀿
􀀖􀀓􀀙􀀑􀀃 􀀩􀁌􀁗􀁝􀁐􀁄􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀅
􀀻􀀮􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀨􀀮􀀰􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀪􀀫􀀧􀀰􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀸􀀭􀀄􀀁􀀻􀀭􀀮􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀺􀀳􀀰􀀺􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀱􀀫􀀸􀀭􀀳􀀪􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀝
􀁀􀀡􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀱􀀫􀀶􀀮􀀸􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀴􀀶􀀳􀀺􀀮􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀮􀀷􀀁􀀯􀀮􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀮􀀷􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀸􀀁􀀷􀀫􀀸􀀸􀀰􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀽􀀳􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀴􀀳􀀷􀀅
􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁘􀁅􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁅􀁌􀀐􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀀻􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀁􀀬􀀳􀀶􀀩􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀹􀀸􀀨􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀯􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀸􀀻􀀫􀀫􀀲􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀬􀀳􀀶􀀱􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀫􀀲􀀫􀀱􀀽􀀁􀀠􀀸􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀷􀀁
􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀽􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀒􀀰􀀰􀀮􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀳􀀶􀀁􀀒􀀷􀀷􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀞􀀳􀀻􀀫􀀶􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀻􀀭􀀮􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀻􀀳􀀹􀀰􀀪􀀁􀀩􀀫􀀶􀀸􀀧􀀮􀀲􀀰􀀽􀀁􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀁
􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀫􀀬􀀬􀀫􀀩􀀸􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀶􀀸􀀮􀀩􀀹􀀰􀀧􀀶􀀰􀀽􀀁􀀨􀀮􀀅􀀰􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀆
􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀀅
􀀺􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀨􀀹􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀷􀀁􀀱􀀹􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀫􀀷􀀷􀀁􀀷􀀫􀀶􀀮􀀳􀀹􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀮􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀷􀀁􀀹􀀷􀀹􀀧􀀰􀀰􀀽􀀁􀀬􀀧􀀮􀀶􀀰􀀽􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀺􀀮􀀳􀀹􀀷􀀁􀀳􀀲􀀁
􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀬􀀧􀀩􀀫􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀱􀀹􀀰􀀸􀀮􀀰􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀧􀀰􀀁 􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀽􀀁 􀀳􀀶􀀁 􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀺􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁 􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀶􀀲􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀻􀀭􀀧􀀸􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁
􀀫􀀬􀀬􀀫􀀩􀀸􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀹􀀸􀀨􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀯􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀰􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀧􀀺􀀫􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀫􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀸􀀆􀀁􀀘􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀷􀀫􀀵􀀹􀀫􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁
􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀬􀀳􀀶􀀱􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀫􀀲􀀫􀀱􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀒􀀰􀀰􀀮􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀒􀀷􀀷􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀞􀀳􀀻􀀫􀀶􀀷􀀁􀀻􀀫􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀶􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁
􀀋􀁗􀁒􀁊􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀅
􀁚􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁖􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀳􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃
􀀡􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀸􀀳􀀁􀀰􀀫􀀧􀀺􀀫􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀱􀀧􀀸􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀸􀀳􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀷􀀸􀀁􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀨􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀩􀀁􀀶􀀹􀀰􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀲􀀧􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃
􀀔􀀳􀀲􀀬􀀫􀀶􀀫􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀄􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀺􀀮􀀫􀀻􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀔􀀳􀀱􀀱􀀮􀀷􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀬􀀳􀀶􀀱􀀧􀀰􀀰􀀽􀀁􀀴􀀰􀀧􀀩􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀳􀀶􀀪􀀁
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃
􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁎􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁙􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀞􀀃 􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁒􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀮􀀶􀀁􀀳􀀴􀀫􀀶􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀧􀀹􀀸􀀳􀀱􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀩􀀧􀀰􀀰􀀽􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀺􀀮􀀺􀀫􀀁􀀹􀀴􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀷􀀸􀀳􀀶􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀴􀀫􀀧􀀩􀀫􀀁
􀀃 􀀨􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀁 􀀂􀀃􀀄
􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀃􀀁 􀀟􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀯􀀮􀀲􀀩􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀗􀀮􀀵􀀦􀀱􀀭􀀬􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀲􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀗􀀦􀀱􀀬􀀢􀀭􀀸􀀄􀀋􀀊􀀏􀀁
􀀘􀀳􀀢􀀫􀀸􀀋􀀊􀀐􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁝􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀋􀀋􀀇􀀁􀀢􀀯􀀯􀀦􀀢􀀱􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀮􀀁􀀣􀀦􀀁􀀦􀀲􀀲􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀩􀀢􀀫􀀫􀀸􀀁􀀲􀀩􀀬􀀩􀀫􀀢􀀱􀀁
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀑􀀃 􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀞􀀳􀀢􀀳􀀦􀀁 􀀯􀀱􀀢􀀤􀀳􀀩􀀤􀀦􀀁 􀀩􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀳􀀁 􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀩􀀱􀀦􀀫􀀸􀀁 􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀩􀀲􀀳􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁 􀀧􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀀵􀀩􀀅
􀀥􀀦􀀭􀀤􀀦􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀯􀀱􀀢􀀤􀀳􀀩􀀤􀀦􀀄􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁 􀀦􀀲􀀯􀀦􀀤􀀩􀀢􀀫􀀫􀀸􀀁 􀀬􀀮􀀱􀀦􀀁 􀀤􀀴􀀱􀀱􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀁 􀀯􀀱􀀢􀀤􀀳􀀩􀀤􀀦􀀄􀀁
􀀩􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀦􀀥􀀦􀀥􀀆
􀀂􀀉􀀇􀀃􀀁 􀀘􀀭􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀩􀀲􀀁􀀯􀀢􀀱􀀳􀀩􀀤􀀴􀀫􀀢􀀱􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀳􀀦􀀷􀀳􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀥􀀦􀀤􀀩􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀬􀀴􀀭􀀩􀀤􀀩􀀯􀀢􀀫􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀂿􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀦􀀷􀀦􀀤􀀴􀀳􀀩􀀵􀀦􀀆􀀁 􀀞􀀦􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀥􀀫􀀸􀀄􀀁 􀀬􀀴􀀭􀀩􀀤􀀩􀀯􀀢􀀫􀀁 􀀤􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀲􀀁 􀀬􀀢􀀸􀀁 􀀱􀀦􀀫􀀸􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀁
􀀯􀀮􀀫􀀩􀀤􀀸􀀁 􀀦􀀫􀀦􀀬􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀳􀀁 􀀥􀀩􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀳􀀫􀀸􀀁 􀀱􀀦􀀫􀀢􀀳􀀦􀀥􀀁 􀀳􀀮􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀯􀀱􀀩􀀭􀀤􀀩􀀯􀀫􀀦􀀲􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁
􀀩􀀭􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀭􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀢􀀫􀀁􀀫􀀢􀀶􀀆􀀁􀀛􀀮􀀭􀀦􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀫􀀦􀀲􀀲􀀄􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀁􀀤􀀢􀀭􀀁􀀣􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀢􀀩􀀥􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀢􀀳􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀤􀀢􀀲􀀦􀀁
􀀫􀀢􀀶􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀥􀀮􀀬􀀦􀀲􀀳􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀳􀀁􀀩􀀭􀀩􀀬􀀩􀀤􀀢􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀮􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀩􀀭􀀤􀀩􀀯􀀫􀀦􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁
􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀩􀀵􀀢􀀫􀀆􀀁􀀘􀀭􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀩􀀲􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀭􀀦􀀤􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀥􀀦􀀤􀀩􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀞􀀤􀀮􀀳􀀳􀀩􀀲􀀨􀀁
􀀔􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀞􀀦􀀲􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀈􀀋􀀜􀀓􀀗􀀓􀀖􀀙􀀘􀀛􀀝􀀁􀀵􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀍􀀘􀀝􀀝􀀓􀀜􀀒􀀁􀀈􀀏􀀍􀀒􀀋􀀗􀀓􀀍􀀋􀀕􀀁
􀀇􀀓􀀑􀀒􀀝􀀁􀀆􀀗􀀎􀀞􀀜􀀝􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀜􀀁􀀇􀀝􀀎􀀂􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀎􀀍􀀃􀀋􀀋􀀈􀀁􀀬􀀢􀀸􀀁􀀣􀀦􀀁􀀤􀀩􀀳􀀦􀀥􀀆
􀀋􀀕􀀔􀀌􀀃 􀀤􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁕􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀐􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀩􀀵􀀢􀀫􀀆􀀁􀀒􀀲􀀁􀀢􀀁􀀬􀀢􀀳􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀩􀀭􀀤􀀩􀀯􀀫􀀦􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀸􀀁􀀲􀀨􀀮􀀴􀀫􀀥􀀁􀀰􀀴􀀢􀀫􀀩􀀧􀀸􀀄􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁
􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀱􀀦􀀁 􀀩􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀳􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀀁 􀀩􀀭􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀩􀀥􀀦􀀱􀀢􀀣􀀫􀀦􀀁 􀀰􀀴􀀢􀀭􀀳􀀩􀀳􀀸􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀞􀀳􀀢􀀳􀀦􀀁 􀀯􀀱􀀢􀀤􀀳􀀩􀀤􀀦􀀁
􀀧􀀢􀀵􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀢􀀣􀀫􀀦􀀁􀀳􀀮􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀩􀀭􀀤􀀩􀀯􀀫􀀦􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀩􀀵􀀢􀀫􀀆
􀀂􀀥􀀃􀀁 􀀊􀀛􀀏􀀋􀀝􀀓􀀏􀀜􀀁􀀘􀀗􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀝􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀋􀀝􀀓􀀘􀀗􀀋􀀕􀀁􀀍􀀛􀀓􀀖􀀓􀀗􀀋􀀕􀀁􀀔􀀞􀀜􀀝􀀓􀀍􀀏
􀀋􀀕􀀕􀀌􀀃 􀀥􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀂳􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀂴􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁈􀃀􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀩􀀵􀀢􀀫􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁 􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀳􀀩􀀭􀀴􀀦􀀥􀀁 􀀮􀀯􀀦􀀱􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀳􀀱􀀦􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀦􀀲􀀁 􀀲􀀴􀀤􀀨􀀁 􀀢􀀲􀀁
􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀝􀀮􀀬􀀦􀀁 􀀞􀀳􀀢􀀳􀀴􀀳􀀦􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀘􀀭􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀭􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀢􀀫􀀁 􀀔􀀱􀀩􀀬􀀩􀀭􀀢􀀫􀀁 􀀔􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀔􀀚􀀃 􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃
􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁐􀁖􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀀋􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃
􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁆􀁋􀀅
􀀢􀀭􀀩􀀲􀀬􀀲􀀁􀀧􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀮􀀲􀀦􀀤􀀴􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀯􀀦􀀱􀀲􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀲􀀯􀀦􀀤􀀳􀀦􀀥􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀤􀀨􀀁
􀀤􀀱􀀩􀀬􀀦􀀲􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀮􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀦􀀷􀀤􀀫􀀴􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀮􀀲􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀦􀀳􀀁􀀴􀀯􀀁􀀣􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀱􀀁􀀳􀀸􀀯􀀦􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁
􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁒􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀘􀀭􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀭􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀢􀀫􀀁􀀟􀀱􀀩􀀣􀀴􀀭􀀢􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀝􀀶􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀢􀀆􀀋􀀋􀀉􀀁􀀘􀀳􀀁􀀢􀀫􀀲􀀮􀀁􀀦􀀷􀀤􀀫􀀴􀀥􀀦􀀲􀀁
􀁐􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁐􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁒􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀅
􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀋􀀋􀀊􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀶􀀩􀀳􀀨􀀮􀀴􀀳􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀭􀀦􀀤􀀦􀀲􀀲􀀩􀀳􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀲􀀯􀀦􀀤􀀩􀀢􀀫􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀮􀀵􀀩􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀳􀀮􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀢􀀳􀀁􀀦􀀧􀀧􀀦􀀤􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀟􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀬􀀢􀀳􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀁
􀀩􀀲􀀁􀀢􀀤􀀳􀀴􀀢􀀫􀀫􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀳􀀁􀀰􀀴􀀩􀀳􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀮􀀁􀀲􀀩􀀬􀀯􀀫􀀦􀀁􀀢􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀢􀀳􀀄􀀁􀀦􀀵􀀦􀀭􀀁􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀫􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀳􀀮􀀁􀀬􀀴􀀫􀀳􀀩􀀫􀀢􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀢􀀫􀀁
􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀵􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀄􀀁􀀣􀀴􀀳􀀁􀀢􀀳􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀱􀀢􀀳􀀦􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀢􀀳􀀁􀀶􀀢􀀲􀀁􀀣􀀱􀀮􀀢􀀥􀀫􀀸􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀣􀀢􀀲􀀩􀀲􀀁􀀴􀀯􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀶􀀨􀀩􀀤􀀨􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀁
􀀶􀀢􀀲􀀁􀀥􀀦􀀤􀀩􀀥􀀦􀀥􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀳􀀁􀀳􀀮􀀁􀀬􀀢􀀪􀀦􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀦􀀷􀀯􀀱􀀦􀀲􀀲􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀮􀀵􀀩􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀢􀀣􀀮􀀴􀀳􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀬􀀢􀀳􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁
􀀳􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀩􀁌􀁗􀁝􀁐􀁄􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀋􀁉􀁒􀁒􀁗􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀔􀀘􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀓􀀛􀂱􀀖􀀓􀀜􀀌􀀑
􀀋􀀊􀀏􀀁􀀝􀀢􀀭􀀪􀀁􀀂􀀧􀀮􀀮􀀳􀀭􀀮􀀳􀀦􀀁􀀋􀀊􀀍􀀁􀀢􀀣􀀮􀀵􀀦􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀋􀀐􀀹􀀊􀀌􀀋􀀆
􀀋􀀊􀀐􀀁􀀆􀀌􀀓􀀎􀀂􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀋􀀎􀀹􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀆
􀀋􀀋􀀇􀀃􀀳􀀑􀀃 􀀪􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁐􀀃 􀀋􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀌􀀏􀀃 􀀵􀁰􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁒􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀝􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁰􀁇􀁰􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁱􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀔􀀗􀂱􀀔􀀜􀀖􀀜􀀏􀀃􀁙􀁒􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀏􀀃􀀥􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁏􀀏􀀃􀀫􀁈􀁏􀁅􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁􀀚􀀩􀀤􀀨􀀳􀀦􀀭􀀨􀀢􀀨􀀭􀀄􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀎􀀌􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀏􀀍􀀹􀀈􀀐􀀈􀀆
􀀋􀀋􀀈􀀁􀀈􀀋􀀜􀀓􀀗􀀓􀀖􀀙􀀘􀀛􀀝􀀁􀀵􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀍􀀘􀀝􀀝􀀓􀀜􀀒􀀁􀀈􀀏􀀍􀀒􀀋􀀗􀀓􀀍􀀋􀀕􀀁􀀇􀀓􀀑􀀒􀀝􀀁􀀆􀀗􀀎􀀞􀀜􀀝􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀜􀀁􀀇􀀝􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀁􀀘􀀚􀀝􀀄􀀁
􀀵􀀮􀀫􀀆􀀁􀀎􀀋􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀌􀀌􀀐􀀄􀀁􀀢􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀌􀀍􀀋􀀆
􀀋􀀋􀀉􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁒􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃
􀀞􀀦􀀤􀀴􀀱􀀩􀀳􀀸􀀁􀀔􀀮􀀴􀀭􀀤􀀩􀀫􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀲􀀮􀀫􀀴􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀐􀀊􀀃􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀉􀀉􀀁􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀱􀀴􀀢􀀱􀀸􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀐􀀊􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁􀀏􀀉􀀎􀀁
􀀋􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀵􀁚􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀀅
􀀫􀀩􀀲􀀨􀀦􀀥􀀁􀀣􀀸􀀁􀀞􀀦􀀤􀀴􀀱􀀩􀀳􀀸􀀁􀀔􀀮􀀴􀀭􀀤􀀩􀀫􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀲􀀮􀀫􀀴􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀐􀀌􀀌􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀐􀀋􀀃􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀏􀀁􀀛􀀮􀀵􀀦􀀬􀀣􀀦􀀱􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀐􀀋􀀆
􀀋􀀋􀀊􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀵􀁒􀁜􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀪􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁒􀁇􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁒􀁇􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀀯􀀱􀀮􀀲􀀦􀀤􀀴􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁􀀳􀀱􀀩􀀢􀀫􀀁􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀁􀀩􀀭􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀭􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀢􀀫􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀳􀀦􀀷􀀳􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁􀀥􀀮􀀦􀀲􀀁
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀀅
􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀑
􀀂􀀉􀀊􀀃􀀁 􀀟􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀯􀀱􀀮􀀲􀀦􀀤􀀴􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀩􀀭􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀭􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀢􀀫􀀁 􀀤􀀱􀀩􀀬􀀦􀀲􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃
􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀤􀀦􀀱􀀭􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀩􀀭􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀭􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀢􀀫􀀁 􀀤􀀮􀀬􀀬􀀴􀀭􀀩􀀳􀀸􀀁 􀀢􀀲􀀁 􀀢􀀁 􀀶􀀨􀀮􀀫􀀦􀀆􀀁 􀀟􀀨􀀩􀀲􀀁
􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁄􀁇􀁙􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀩􀀭􀀤􀀫􀀴􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀶􀀢􀀱􀀁􀀤􀀱􀀩􀀬􀀦􀀲􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀭􀀥􀀦􀀱􀀲􀀁􀀦􀀲􀀲􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀩􀀢􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀩􀀵􀀢􀀫􀀁
􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀳􀀱􀀦􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀦􀀲􀀁 􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀩􀀥􀀦􀀱􀀦􀀥􀀁 􀀨􀀦􀀱􀀦􀀑􀀁 􀀶􀀢􀀱􀀁 􀀤􀀱􀀩􀀬􀀦􀀲􀀁 􀀤􀀢􀀭􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀫􀀸􀀁
􀁒􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃
􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁒􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑
􀀂􀀉􀀋􀀃􀀁 􀀘􀀳􀀁 􀀬􀀢􀀸􀀁 􀀣􀀦􀀄􀀁 􀀨􀀮􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀦􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀢􀀳􀀁 􀀤􀀦􀀱􀀳􀀢􀀩􀀭􀀁 􀀯􀀱􀀮􀀵􀀩􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀀁
􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁉􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀦􀀷􀀦􀀤􀀴􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀲􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀦􀀭􀀤􀀦􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀩􀀱􀀁􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀱􀀩􀀳􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀆􀀁􀀟􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀦􀀯􀀢􀀱􀀢􀀣􀀩􀀫􀀩􀀳􀀸􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀳􀀱􀀦􀀢􀀳􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀲􀀴􀀢􀀭􀀳􀀁􀀳􀀮􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀢􀀧􀀳􀀁􀀢􀀱􀀳􀀩􀀤􀀫􀀦􀀁􀀈􀀈􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀦􀀲􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀁􀀥􀀱􀀢􀀧􀀳􀀁􀀢􀀱􀀳􀀅
􀀩􀀤􀀫􀀦􀀲􀀁􀀶􀀮􀀴􀀫􀀥􀀁􀀲􀀦􀀦􀀬􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀮􀀣􀀫􀀦􀀬􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀤􀀆
􀀂􀀉􀀌􀀃􀀁 􀀟􀀨􀀦􀀱􀀦􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀬􀀢􀀩􀀭􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀰􀀴􀀦􀀲􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀶􀀨􀀦􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀱􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀩􀀭􀀲􀀦􀀱􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁
􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀩􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀸􀀯􀀦􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀳􀀱􀀦􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀦􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀲􀀁􀀢􀀁􀀬􀀢􀀳􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀕􀀏􀀠􀀁􀀐􀀏􀀛􀀏􀀗􀀎􀀋􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀕􀀏􀀠􀀁􀀕􀀋􀀝􀀋􀀆􀀁
􀀤􀁗􀀃􀂿􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃
􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀪􀀩􀀭􀀥􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀵􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀥􀀦􀀱􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀩􀀥􀀦􀀱􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀢􀀱􀀦􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀫􀀢􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀂲􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀂲􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀀣􀀦􀀁 􀀯􀀱􀀮􀀥􀀴􀀤􀀦􀀥􀀄􀀁 􀀦􀀷􀀤􀀦􀀯􀀳􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀤􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀲􀀦􀀁 􀀧􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀧􀀢􀀤􀀳􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀢􀀳􀀁 􀀢􀀁 􀀳􀀱􀀦􀀢􀀳􀀸􀀁
􀀲􀀴􀀤􀀨􀀁 􀀢􀀲􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀝􀀮􀀬􀀦􀀁 􀀞􀀳􀀢􀀳􀀴􀀳􀀦􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀘􀀭􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀭􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀢􀀫􀀁 􀀔􀀱􀀩􀀬􀀩􀀭􀀢􀀫􀀁
􀀔􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀁 􀀶􀀢􀀲􀀁 􀀯􀀫􀀢􀀩􀀭􀀫􀀸􀀁 􀀩􀀭􀀳􀀦􀀭􀀥􀀦􀀥􀀁 􀀳􀀮􀀁 􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀳􀀩􀀭􀀴􀀦􀀁 􀀳􀀮􀀁 􀀮􀀯􀀦􀀱􀀢􀀳􀀦􀀁 􀀩􀀭􀀁
􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃
􀀲􀀨􀀮􀀴􀀫􀀥􀀁􀀢􀀫􀀲􀀮􀀁􀀣􀀦􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀤􀀢􀀫􀀫􀀦􀀥􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀢􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀢􀀱􀀳􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀳􀀱􀀦􀀢􀀳􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀮􀀵􀀩􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀀥􀀦􀀱􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀩􀀥􀀦􀀱􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀢􀀱􀀦􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀢􀀁􀀔􀀞􀀜􀀁􀀍􀀘􀀑􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀁􀀤􀀨􀀢􀀱􀀢􀀤􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀆
􀀂􀀦􀀃􀀁 􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁓􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖
􀀋􀀕􀀙􀀌􀀃 􀀥􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁜􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃
􀀧􀀢􀀳􀀦􀀁􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀲􀀮􀀬􀀦􀀁􀀥􀀦􀀳􀀢􀀩􀀫􀀄􀀁􀀢􀀁􀀧􀀦􀀶􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀦􀀫􀀩􀀬􀀩􀀭􀀢􀀱􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀣􀀲􀀦􀀱􀀵􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀁􀀢􀀱􀀦􀀁􀀩􀀭􀀁
􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀑􀀃 􀀩􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀀃 􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀂿􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁓􀀏􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁑􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀧􀀱􀀩􀀦􀀭􀀥􀀲􀀨􀀩􀀯􀀄􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀬􀀬􀀦􀀱􀀤􀀦􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀴􀀫􀀢􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀫􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀋􀀋􀀋􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀳􀀱􀀦􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀦􀀲􀀁
􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀦􀀲􀀳􀀢􀀣􀀫􀀩􀀲􀀨􀀬􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀞􀀦􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀥􀀄􀀁􀀢􀀲􀀁􀀢􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀫􀀦􀀄􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀫􀀸􀀁􀀢􀀁􀀯􀀢􀀱􀀳􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀲􀀦􀀁
􀀩􀀭􀀲􀀳􀀱􀀴􀀬􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀩􀀵􀀦􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀘􀀳􀀁􀀩􀀲􀀁􀀦􀀵􀀩􀀥􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀄􀀁􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀯􀀢􀀱􀀳􀀩􀀤􀀴􀀫􀀢􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀢􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀮􀀅
􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀂳􀁉􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁓􀂴􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁌􀁎􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃
􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁆􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁘􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁄􀀃
􀀂􀀜􀀨􀀭􀀮􀀬􀀁􀀜􀀦􀀭􀀨􀀄􀀁􀀍􀀁􀀙􀀴􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀉􀀇􀀇􀀊􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀠􀀭􀀩􀀳􀀦􀀥􀀁􀀛􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀄􀀁􀀊􀀛􀀏􀀋􀀝􀀡􀀁􀀉􀀏􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀜􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀫􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀊􀀉􀀐􀀄􀀁
􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃 􀀗􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀖􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀀑􀀃 􀀔􀀔􀀚􀀞􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀤􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀚􀀦􀀣􀀢􀀭􀀦􀀲􀀦􀀁􀀝􀀦􀀯􀀴􀀣􀀫􀀩􀀤􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀦􀀲􀀳􀀢􀀣􀀫􀀩􀀲􀀨􀀬􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀢􀀁􀀞􀀯􀀦􀀤􀀩􀀢􀀫􀀁􀀟􀀱􀀩􀀣􀀴􀀭􀀢􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀮􀀱􀀁
􀀚􀀦􀀣􀀢􀀭􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀂􀀓􀀦􀀩􀀱􀀴􀀳􀀄􀀁􀀉􀀉􀀁􀀙􀀢􀀭􀀴􀀢􀀱􀀸􀀁􀀉􀀇􀀇􀀎􀀄􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁􀀛􀀦􀀶􀀁􀀡􀀮􀀱􀀪􀀄􀀁􀀍􀀁􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀱􀀴􀀢􀀱􀀸􀀁􀀉􀀇􀀇􀀎􀀃􀀄􀀁
􀀓􀀌􀀓􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀮􀀫􀀆􀀁 􀀉􀀋􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀁 􀀛􀀮􀀆􀀁 􀀋􀀋􀀉􀀊􀀉􀀄􀀁 􀀯􀀆􀀁 􀀉􀀌􀀎􀀄􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁 􀀞􀀦􀀤􀀴􀀱􀀩􀀳􀀸􀀁 􀀔􀀮􀀴􀀭􀀤􀀩􀀫􀀁 􀀱􀀦􀀲􀀮􀀫􀀴􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁
􀀔􀀚􀀘􀀚􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀚􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀖􀀓􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀚􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀛􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀗􀀮􀀵􀀦􀀱􀀭􀀬􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀞􀀩􀀦􀀱􀀱􀀢􀀁􀀚􀀦􀀮􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀦􀀲􀀳􀀢􀀣􀀫􀀩􀀲􀀨􀀬􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁
􀀢􀀁 􀀞􀀯􀀦􀀤􀀩􀀢􀀫􀀁 􀀔􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀁 􀀧􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀞􀀩􀀦􀀱􀀱􀀢􀀁 􀀚􀀦􀀮􀀭􀀦􀀁 􀀂􀀖􀀱􀀦􀀦􀀳􀀮􀀶􀀭􀀄􀀈􀀍􀀁 􀀙􀀢􀀭􀀴􀀢􀀱􀀸􀀁 􀀉􀀇􀀇􀀉􀀃􀀄􀀁 􀀓􀀌􀀓􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀁
􀀵􀀮􀀫􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀈􀀎􀀏􀀄􀀁􀀛􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀏􀀊􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀊􀀎􀀆
􀀋􀀋􀀋􀀁􀀞􀀦􀀦􀀁 􀀃􀀛􀀘􀀟􀀗􀀏􀀕􀀕􀀁 􀀵􀀆􀀁 􀀄􀀓􀀝􀀡􀀁 􀀋􀀗􀀎􀀁 􀀄􀀘􀀞􀀗􀀝􀀡􀀁 􀀘􀀐􀀁 􀀉􀀋􀀗􀀁 􀀅􀀛􀀋􀀗􀀍􀀓􀀜􀀍􀀘􀀄􀀁 􀀔􀀢􀀫􀀩􀀧􀀮􀀱􀀭􀀩􀀢􀀁
􀀔􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀒􀀯􀀯􀀦􀀢􀀫􀀄􀀁 􀀖􀀩􀀱􀀲􀀳􀀁 􀀕􀀩􀀲􀀳􀀱􀀩􀀤􀀳􀀄􀀁 􀀉􀀈􀀁 􀀙􀀴􀀭􀀦􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀋􀀄􀀁 􀀘􀀚􀀝􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀮􀀫􀀆􀀁 􀀉􀀈􀀁 􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀋􀀃􀀄􀀁
􀀯􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀋􀀊􀀉􀀁􀀏􀀝􀀁􀀜􀀏􀀚􀀂􀀄􀀁􀀢􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀋􀀊􀀏􀀆
􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀁 􀀉􀀌􀀕􀀔􀀖􀀘􀀁􀀔􀀍􀀁􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀁􀀇􀀓􀀘􀀌􀀖􀀓􀀊􀀘􀀏􀀔􀀓􀀊􀀑􀀁􀀈􀀊􀀙􀀁􀀆􀀔􀀒􀀒􀀏􀀗􀀗􀀏􀀔􀀓􀀁􀀔􀀓􀀁􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀁􀀙􀀔􀀖􀀐􀀁􀀔􀀍􀀁􀀏􀀘􀀗􀀁􀀗􀀏􀀚􀀘􀀛􀀂􀀘􀀎􀀏􀀖􀀋􀀁􀀗􀀌􀀗􀀗􀀏􀀔􀀓
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀂳􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀑􀀋􀀋􀀌􀀁􀀢􀀬􀀭􀀵􀀩􀀄􀀁􀀺􀀬􀀭􀀯􀀪􀀁
􀀷􀀵􀀪􀀦􀀷􀀭􀀪􀀶􀀁 􀀲􀀫􀀁 􀀨􀀲􀀰􀀰􀀪􀀵􀀨􀀪􀀁 􀀷􀀪􀀱􀀩􀀁 􀀷􀀲􀀁 􀀯􀀦􀀳􀀶􀀪􀀁 􀀦􀀶􀀁 􀀦􀀁 􀀵􀀪􀀶􀀸􀀯􀀷􀀁 􀀲􀀫􀀁 􀀦􀀵􀀰􀀪􀀩􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀋􀀋􀀍􀀁􀀶􀀸􀀨􀀬􀀁􀀷􀀵􀀪􀀦􀀷􀀭􀀪􀀶􀀁􀀰􀀦􀀼􀀁􀀨􀀲􀀱􀀷􀀦􀀭􀀱􀀁􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀅
􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃
􀀺􀀬􀀭􀀨􀀬􀀁􀀰􀀦􀀼􀀁􀀶􀀸􀀵􀀹􀀭􀀹􀀪􀀁􀀦􀀶􀀁􀀦􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀶􀀸􀀯􀀷􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀳􀀦􀀵􀀦􀀧􀀭􀀯􀀭􀀷􀀼􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀵􀀪􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀁
􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀹􀀭􀀶􀀭􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀀩􀀪􀀵􀀁 􀀦􀀵􀀷􀀭􀀨􀀯􀀪􀀁 􀀈􀀈􀀁 􀀲􀀫􀀁 􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁 􀀳􀀵􀀪􀀶􀀪􀀱􀀷􀀁 􀀩􀀵􀀦􀀫􀀷􀀁 􀀦􀀵􀀷􀀭􀀨􀀯􀀪􀀶􀀆􀀁
􀀩􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀀃􀂳􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀝􀀃􀀬􀁖􀀃
􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀂶􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃
􀀪􀀱􀀨􀀲􀀰􀀳􀀦􀀶􀀶􀀁􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀨􀀪􀀩􀀸􀀵􀀦􀀯􀀁􀀲􀀱􀀪􀀶􀀒
􀀋􀀕􀀚􀀌􀀃 􀀵􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁓􀀏􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁑􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀂿􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀀷􀀲􀀁 􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁 􀀛􀀦􀀼􀀁 􀀢􀀵􀀪􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀄􀀁 􀀲􀀵􀀁 􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁 􀀢􀀵􀀪􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀁 􀀲􀀫􀀁 􀀓􀀰􀀭􀀷􀀼􀀄􀀁 􀀕􀀲􀀰􀀰􀀪􀀵􀀨􀀪􀀄􀀁
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀫􀁌􀁖􀀃􀀥􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁎􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁍􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀣􀀱􀀭􀀷􀀪􀀩􀀁 􀀡􀀷􀀦􀀷􀀪􀀶􀀁 􀀲􀀫􀀁 􀀓􀀰􀀪􀀵􀀭􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀨􀀲􀀱􀀨􀀯􀀸􀀩􀀪􀀩􀀁 􀀲􀀱􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀁 􀀞􀀲􀀹􀀪􀀰􀀧􀀪􀀵􀀁
􀀈􀀎􀀐􀀋􀀁 􀀧􀀪􀀷􀀺􀀪􀀪􀀱􀀁 􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁 􀀣􀀱􀀭􀀷􀀪􀀩􀀁 􀀡􀀷􀀦􀀷􀀪􀀶􀀁 􀀲􀀫􀀁 􀀓􀀰􀀪􀀵􀀭􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀦􀀱􀀩􀀁 􀀙􀀵􀀪􀀦􀀷􀀁
􀀔􀀵􀀭􀀷􀀦􀀭􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀡􀀲􀀰􀀪􀀁 􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀹􀀭􀀶􀀭􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀁 􀀲􀀫􀀁 􀀷􀀬􀀭􀀶􀀁 􀀢􀀵􀀪􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀁 􀀬􀀦􀀹􀀪􀀁 􀀵􀀪􀀰􀀦􀀭􀀱􀀪􀀩􀀁
􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀉􀀁􀀧􀀪􀀷􀀺􀀪􀀪􀀱􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀷􀀺􀀲􀀁􀀨􀀲􀀸􀀱􀀷􀀵􀀭􀀪􀀶􀀆
􀀋􀀕􀀛􀀌􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁋􀁄􀁓􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀁
􀀰􀀦􀀷􀀷􀀪􀀵􀀾􀀒􀀛􀀫􀀧􀀮􀀭􀀡􀀁 􀀹􀀆􀀁 􀀙􀀧􀀢􀀭􀀞􀀝􀀁 􀀗􀀭􀀛􀀭􀀞􀀬􀀁 􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀉􀀐􀀃􀀾􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁 􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀹􀀭􀀶􀀭􀀲􀀱􀀁
􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀭􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀀅
􀀷􀀲􀀵􀀼􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀵􀀆􀀁􀀤􀀬􀀭􀀯􀀪􀀁􀀭􀀷􀀁􀀬􀀪􀀯􀀩􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀦􀀵􀀷􀀭􀀨􀀯􀀪􀀁􀀭􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀸􀀪􀀶􀀷􀀭􀀲􀀱􀀁
􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃
􀀵􀀪􀀭􀀷􀀪􀀵􀀦􀀷􀀪􀀩􀀁􀀺􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀁􀀭􀀷􀀁􀀬􀀦􀀩􀀁􀀶􀀦􀀭􀀩􀀁􀀭􀀱􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀪􀀦􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀪􀀵􀀁􀀨􀀦􀀶􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀗􀀨􀀜􀀢􀀞􀀭􀀱􀀁􀀟􀀨􀀫􀀁
􀀭􀀡􀀞􀀁􀀕􀀫􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀠􀀛􀀭􀀢􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀨􀀟􀀁􀀭􀀡􀀞􀀁􀀏􀀨􀀬􀀩􀀞􀀥􀀁􀀹􀀆􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀱􀁈􀁚􀀃􀀫􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀑
􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁉􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁘􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀀺􀀪􀀯􀀯􀀁􀀦􀀶􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀪􀀦􀀨􀀪􀀄􀀁􀀩􀀲􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀨􀀪􀀦􀀶􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀨􀀨􀀸􀀵􀀵􀀪􀀱􀀨􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀺􀀦􀀵􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀷􀀁􀀦􀀵􀀪􀀄􀀁􀀦􀀷􀀁􀀰􀀲􀀶􀀷􀀄􀀁
􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁘􀁊􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀀅
􀀷􀀭􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀦􀀷􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀷􀀸􀀵􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀪􀀦􀀨􀀪􀀆􀀋􀀋􀀎
􀀂􀀉􀀐􀀃􀀁 􀀓􀀵􀀷􀀭􀀨􀀯􀀪􀀁􀀊􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀛􀀦􀀼􀀁􀀢􀀵􀀪􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀁􀀦􀀯􀀶􀀲􀀁􀀪􀀻􀀪􀀰􀀳􀀷􀀶􀀁􀀫􀀵􀀲􀀰􀀁􀀨􀀸􀀶􀀅
􀀷􀀲􀀰􀀶􀀁􀀩􀀸􀀷􀀭􀀪􀀶􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀰􀀪􀀰􀀧􀀪􀀵􀀶􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀘􀀭􀀹􀀪􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀩􀀭􀀦􀀱􀀁􀀞􀀦􀀷􀀭􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀪􀀶􀀅
􀀷􀀦􀀧􀀯􀀭􀀶􀀬􀀪􀀩􀀁 􀀲􀀱􀀁 􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁 􀀲􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀲􀀵􀀁 􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁 􀀲􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀵􀀁 􀀶􀀭􀀩􀀪􀀁 􀀲􀀫􀀁 􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁 􀀧􀀲􀀵􀀩􀀪􀀵􀀆􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀁
􀀷􀀺􀀲􀀁 􀀨􀀦􀀶􀀪􀀶􀀄􀀁 􀀣􀀱􀀭􀀷􀀪􀀩􀀁 􀀡􀀷􀀦􀀷􀀪􀀶􀀁 􀀨􀀲􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀶􀀁 􀀵􀀸􀀯􀀪􀀩􀀁 􀀷􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀁 􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀹􀀭􀀶􀀭􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀁 􀀲􀀫􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀃􀀋􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀀅
􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀋􀀋􀀏
􀀋􀀖􀀓􀀌􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀭􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀪􀀭􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀵􀀁􀀨􀀲􀀸􀀱􀀷􀀵􀀼􀀁􀀰􀀦􀀼􀀁􀀨􀀲􀀱􀀷􀀭􀀱􀀸􀀪􀀁􀀷􀀲􀀁􀀬􀀲􀀯􀀩􀀁􀀯􀀦􀀱􀀩􀀁􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀷􀀪􀀵􀀵􀀭􀀅
􀀷􀀲􀀵􀀼􀀁 􀀲􀀫􀀁 􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁 􀀲􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀵􀀆􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀁 􀀗􀀮􀀭􀀭􀀨􀀧􀀁 􀀹􀀆􀀁 􀀗􀀮􀀭􀀭􀀨􀀧􀀄􀀁 􀀦􀀁 􀀹􀀪􀀵􀀼􀀁 􀀪􀀦􀀵􀀯􀀼􀀁 􀀨􀀦􀀶􀀪􀀁
􀁅􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀥􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀠􀀲􀀯􀀯􀀶􀀁􀀬􀀪􀀯􀀩􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀁􀀶􀀭􀀱􀀨􀀪􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀯􀀪􀀹􀀦􀀱􀀷􀀁􀀷􀀵􀀪􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀁􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀹􀀭􀀶􀀭􀀲􀀱􀀁
􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁎􀁈􀁈􀁓􀀃
􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀳􀀪􀀵􀀷􀀼􀀁􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀷􀀪􀀵􀀵􀀭􀀷􀀲􀀵􀀼􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀵􀀄􀀁􀀦􀀶􀀁􀀺􀀪􀀵􀀪􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀭􀀵􀀁􀀬􀀪􀀭􀀵􀀶􀀁
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀀭􀀱􀀷􀀪􀀱􀀩􀀪􀀩􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀳􀀪􀀵􀀦􀀷􀀭􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀢􀀵􀀪􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀁􀀷􀀲􀀁􀀧􀀪􀀁􀀳􀀪􀀵􀀰􀀦􀀱􀀪􀀱􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀦􀀱􀀩􀀁
􀀋􀀋􀀌􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀞􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀜􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀑
􀀋􀀋􀀍􀀁􀀡􀀪􀀪􀀁 􀀷􀀺􀀲􀀁 􀀨􀀦􀀶􀀪􀀶􀀁 􀀵􀀪􀀳􀀲􀀵􀀷􀀪􀀩􀀁 􀀭􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁘􀁐􀀏􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀀤􀀏􀀃
􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀀃􀀕􀀏􀀃􀀷􀁒􀁐􀁘􀁖􀀃􀀔􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀏􀀎􀀐􀀽􀀈􀀐􀀉􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀍􀀊􀀄􀀁􀀞􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀁􀀦􀀱􀀩􀀁􀀘􀀨􀀦􀀮􀀬􀀁􀀇􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀍􀀽
􀀔􀀜􀀚􀀓􀀌􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀀑􀀃 􀀖􀀚􀀔􀀏􀀃 􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃 􀀚􀀛􀀞􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀖􀀮􀀬􀀬􀀢􀀛􀀧􀀳􀀏􀀞􀀫􀀦􀀛􀀧􀀁 􀀍􀀨􀀦􀀦􀀞􀀫􀀜􀀢􀀛􀀥􀀁 􀀘􀀫􀀞􀀛􀀭􀀱􀀁
􀀨􀀦􀀶􀀪􀀁􀀂􀀫􀀲􀀲􀀷􀀱􀀲􀀷􀀪􀀁􀀋􀀈􀀊􀀁􀀦􀀧􀀲􀀹􀀪􀀃􀀆
􀀋􀀋􀀎􀀁􀀒􀀛􀀫􀀧􀀮􀀭􀀡􀀁􀀹􀀆􀀁􀀙􀀧􀀢􀀭􀀞􀀝􀀁􀀗􀀭􀀛􀀭􀀞􀀬􀀁􀀂􀀶􀀪􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀲􀀲􀀷􀀱􀀲􀀷􀀪􀀁􀀋􀀈􀀈􀀁􀀦􀀧􀀲􀀹􀀪􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀌􀀋􀀆􀀁􀀡􀀪􀀪􀀁􀀦􀀯􀀶􀀲􀀁
􀀫􀀲􀀲􀀷􀀱􀀲􀀷􀀪􀀶􀀁􀀋􀀇􀀐􀀁􀀦􀀱􀀩􀀁􀀋􀀈􀀇􀀁􀀦􀀧􀀲􀀹􀀪􀀆
􀀋􀀋􀀏􀀁􀀙􀀧􀀢􀀭􀀞􀀝􀀁􀀗􀀭􀀛􀀭􀀞􀀬􀀁􀀞􀀰􀀁􀀫􀀞􀀥􀀃􀀁􀀏􀀨􀀨􀀝􀀯􀀢􀀧􀀁􀀹􀀆􀀁􀀒􀀛􀀫􀀧􀀮􀀭􀀡􀀄􀀁􀀉􀀏􀀁􀀞􀀲􀀹􀀪􀀰􀀧􀀪􀀵􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀎􀀄􀀁
􀀖􀀭􀀶􀀷􀀵􀀭􀀨􀀷􀀁 􀀕􀀲􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀁 􀀫􀀲􀀵􀀁 􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀤􀀪􀀶􀀷􀀪􀀵􀀱􀀁 􀀖􀀭􀀶􀀷􀀵􀀭􀀨􀀷􀀁 􀀲􀀫􀀁 􀀞􀀪􀀺􀀁􀀥􀀲􀀵􀀮􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀖􀀟􀀚􀀜􀀕􀀁 􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀚􀀄􀀁
􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃 􀀔􀀞􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀍􀀛􀀧􀀝􀀥􀀞􀀬􀀬􀀁 􀀹􀀆􀀁 􀀙􀀧􀀢􀀭􀀞􀀝􀀁 􀀗􀀭􀀛􀀭􀀞􀀬􀀄􀀁 􀀕􀀲􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀁 􀀲􀀫􀀁 􀀓􀀳􀀳􀀪􀀦􀀯􀀶􀀄􀀁
􀀢􀀬􀀭􀀵􀀩􀀁􀀕􀀭􀀵􀀨􀀸􀀭􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀐􀀁􀀝􀀦􀀵􀀨􀀬􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀉􀀏􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀖􀀟􀀚􀀜􀀕􀀁􀀄􀀊􀀅􀀈􀀳􀀄􀀊􀀅􀀉􀀄􀀁􀀕􀀦􀀶􀀪􀀁􀀞􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀍􀀊􀀆
􀀱􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀷􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀪􀀳􀀪􀀱􀀩􀀁􀀸􀀳􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀨􀀲􀀱􀀷􀀭􀀱􀀸􀀦􀀱􀀨􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀦􀀁􀀶􀀷􀀦􀀷􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀪􀀦􀀨􀀪􀀆􀀁􀀢􀀬􀀭􀀶􀀁
􀀺􀀦􀀶􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀵􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀸􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀝􀀦􀀶􀀷􀀪􀀵􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀠􀀲􀀯􀀯􀀶􀀁􀀦􀀩􀀩􀀪􀀩􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀼􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀿􀀷􀀵􀀸􀀪􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂴􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀩􀀲􀀰􀀪􀀶􀀷􀀭􀀨􀀁􀀯􀀪􀀹􀀪􀀯􀀆􀀋􀀋􀀐
􀀂􀀊􀀈􀀃􀀁 􀀚􀀷􀀁 􀀭􀀶􀀁 􀀱􀀲􀀺􀀁 􀀨􀀲􀀱􀀹􀀪􀀱􀀭􀀪􀀱􀀷􀀁 􀀷􀀲􀀁 􀀷􀀸􀀵􀀱􀀁 􀀷􀀲􀀁 􀀦􀀁 􀀱􀀸􀀰􀀧􀀪􀀵􀀁 􀀲􀀫􀀁 􀀳􀀵􀀪􀀅
􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀂳􀁉􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁓􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂴􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁅􀁈􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀨􀀦􀀶􀀪􀀁􀀎􀀰􀀁􀀩􀀛􀀫􀀭􀀞􀀁􀀚􀀞􀀧􀀲􀀨􀀁􀀋􀀫􀀛􀀤􀀛􀀯􀀛􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀎􀀃􀀁􀀺􀀦􀀶􀀁􀀦􀀵􀀷􀀭􀀨􀀯􀀪􀀁􀀚􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀣􀀱􀀭􀀷􀀪􀀩􀀁 􀀡􀀷􀀦􀀷􀀪􀀶􀀁 􀀦􀀱􀀩􀀁 􀀛􀀦􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀁 􀀨􀀲􀀱􀀨􀀯􀀸􀀩􀀪􀀩􀀁 􀀭􀀱􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀈􀀈􀀄􀀁 􀀺􀀬􀀭􀀨􀀬􀀁 􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀅
􀀹􀀭􀀩􀀪􀀩􀀁 􀀫􀀲􀀵􀀁 􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁 􀀨􀀲􀀱􀀶􀀷􀀦􀀱􀀷􀀁 􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀷􀀪􀀨􀀷􀀭􀀲􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀀱􀀩􀀁 􀀶􀀪􀀨􀀸􀀵􀀭􀀷􀀼􀀁 􀀲􀀫􀀁 􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁
􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀑􀀋􀀌􀀇􀀁􀀓􀀨􀀅
􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃􀂳􀀾􀁖􀁀􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀾􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀁀􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃
􀀺􀀦􀀵􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀲􀀰􀀪􀀁􀀦􀀵􀀪􀀁􀀰􀀪􀀵􀀪􀀯􀀼􀀁􀀶􀀸􀀶􀀳􀀪􀀱􀀩􀀪􀀩􀀄􀀁􀀺􀀬􀀭􀀯􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀵􀀶􀀁􀀦􀀵􀀪􀀁􀀷􀀲􀀷􀀦􀀯􀀯􀀼􀀁
􀁄􀁅􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀂴􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁑􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀂳􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀲􀀸􀀷􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀭􀀵􀀁􀀷􀀪􀀵􀀰􀀶􀀁􀀺􀀲􀀸􀀯􀀩􀀁􀀧􀀪􀀁􀀭􀀱􀀨􀀲􀀰􀀳􀀦􀀷􀀭􀀧􀀯􀀪􀀁􀀺􀀭􀀷􀀬􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀪􀀻􀀭􀀶􀀷􀀅
􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀂴􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀎􀀰􀀁􀀩􀀛􀀫􀀭􀀞􀀁􀀚􀀞􀀧􀀲􀀨􀀁􀀋􀀫􀀛􀀤􀀛􀀯􀀛􀀁􀀨􀀦􀀶􀀪􀀁
􀀰􀀦􀀼􀀁􀀧􀀪􀀁􀀦􀀁􀀶􀀳􀀪􀀨􀀭􀀦􀀯􀀁􀀲􀀱􀀪􀀄􀀁􀀬􀀲􀀺􀀪􀀹􀀪􀀵􀀄􀀁􀀨􀀲􀀱􀀩􀀭􀀷􀀭􀀲􀀱􀀪􀀩􀀁􀀦􀀶􀀁􀀭􀀷􀀁􀀺􀀦􀀶􀀁􀀧􀀼􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃
􀀨􀀲􀀸􀀱􀀷􀀵􀀭􀀪􀀶􀀁􀀦􀀱􀀩􀀁􀀳􀀪􀀵􀀬􀀦􀀳􀀶􀀁􀀦􀀯􀀶􀀲􀀁􀀧􀀼􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀩􀀭􀀰􀀪􀀱􀀶􀀭􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀅
􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀋􀀌􀀈
􀀂􀀊􀀉􀀃􀀁 􀀘􀀞􀀜􀀡􀀭􀀁 􀀹􀀆􀀁 􀀐􀀮􀀠􀀡􀀞􀀬􀀁 􀀺􀀦􀀶􀀁 􀀦􀀱􀀲􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀵􀀁 􀀯􀀦􀀱􀀩􀀰􀀦􀀵􀀮􀀁 􀀭􀀱􀀁 􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀱􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀤􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁄􀂱􀀫􀁘􀁑􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃
􀀲􀀫􀀁 􀀈􀀏􀀉􀀐􀀄􀀁 􀀰􀀲􀀵􀀪􀀁 􀀳􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀭􀀶􀀪􀀯􀀼􀀁 􀀭􀀷􀀶􀀁 􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀹􀀭􀀶􀀭􀀲􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀱􀀁 􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁 􀀷􀀪􀀱􀀸􀀵􀀪􀀁 􀀲􀀫􀀁
􀀯􀀦􀀱􀀩􀀆􀀋􀀌􀀉􀀁 􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃 􀀦􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁒􀁝􀁒􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀃
􀀷􀀲􀀁􀀶􀀪􀀪􀀁􀀺􀀬􀀼􀀄􀀁􀀺􀀬􀀭􀀯􀀪􀀁􀀭􀀱􀀁􀀗􀀨􀀜􀀢􀀞􀀭􀀱􀀁􀀟􀀨􀀫􀀁􀀭􀀡􀀞􀀁􀀕􀀫􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀠􀀛􀀭􀀢􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀨􀀟􀀁􀀭􀀡􀀞􀀁
􀀏􀀨􀀬􀀩􀀞􀀥􀀁 􀀹􀀆􀀃 􀀷􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀱􀁈􀁚􀀃 􀀫􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀋􀀌􀀊􀀁 􀀦􀀁 􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀹􀀭􀀶􀀭􀀲􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀱􀀁 􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁
􀀛􀀜􀀪􀀮􀀢􀀬􀀢􀀭􀀢􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀵􀀪􀀦􀀯􀀁􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀳􀀪􀀵􀀷􀀼􀀁􀀺􀀦􀀶􀀁􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀱􀀩􀀁􀀷􀀲􀀁􀀬􀀦􀀹􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀸􀀵􀀹􀀭􀀹􀀪􀀩􀀁
􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀤􀀦􀀵􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀭􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀬􀀲􀀸􀀯􀀩􀀁􀀧􀀪􀀁􀀩􀀭􀀶􀀦􀀯􀀯􀀲􀀺􀀪􀀩􀀁􀀺􀀬􀀪􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀷􀀁􀀨􀀦􀀰􀀪􀀁
􀀷􀀲􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀞􀀧􀀣􀀨􀀱􀀦􀀞􀀧􀀭􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀶􀀸􀀨􀀬􀀁􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀳􀀪􀀵􀀷􀀼􀀆􀀋􀀌􀀋
􀀂􀀊􀀊􀀃􀀁 􀀗􀀭􀀛􀀭􀀞􀀁 􀀞􀀰􀀁 􀀫􀀞􀀥􀀃􀀁 􀀔􀀢􀀧􀀞􀀫􀀁 􀀹􀀆􀀁 􀀖􀀞􀀛􀀫􀀝􀀨􀀧􀀁 􀀳􀀪􀀵􀀷􀀦􀀭􀀱􀀪􀀩􀀁 􀀷􀀲􀀁 􀀦􀀵􀀷􀀅
􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀕􀀛􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀧􀀪􀀷􀀺􀀪􀀪􀀱􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀣􀀱􀀭􀀷􀀪􀀩􀀁􀀡􀀷􀀦􀀷􀀪􀀶􀀁􀀦􀀱􀀩􀀁􀀟􀀵􀀸􀀶􀀶􀀭􀀦􀀆􀀁􀀓􀀁􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀹􀀭􀀶􀀭􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀁
􀀢􀀵􀀪􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀁􀀩􀀪􀀦􀀯􀀷􀀁􀀺􀀭􀀷􀀬􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀷􀀪􀀨􀀷􀀭􀀲􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀳􀀪􀀵􀀷􀀼􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀭􀀱􀀩􀀭􀀅
􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀋􀀌􀀌􀀁􀀢􀀬􀀪􀀁
􀀋􀀋􀀐􀀁􀀕􀀲􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀁 􀀲􀀫􀀁 􀀕􀀬􀀦􀀱􀀨􀀪􀀵􀀼􀀄􀀁 􀀉􀀐􀀁 􀀛􀀸􀀯􀀼􀀁 􀀈􀀏􀀊􀀇􀀄􀀁 􀀌􀀫􀀢􀀭􀀢􀀬􀀡􀀁 􀀑􀀧􀀭􀀞􀀫􀀧􀀛􀀭􀀢􀀨􀀧􀀛􀀥􀀁 􀀓􀀛􀀯􀀁
􀀍􀀛􀀬􀀞􀀬􀀄􀀁􀀹􀀲􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀋􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀍􀀉􀀄􀀁􀀦􀀷􀀁􀀳􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀍􀀎􀀽􀀊􀀍􀀏􀀆
􀀋􀀌􀀇􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀭􀁄􀁓􀁄􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁗􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀧􀀑􀀦􀀑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀔􀀔􀀏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀤􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀤􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀔􀀓􀂱􀀔􀀜􀀕􀀖􀀄􀀁􀀹􀀲􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀚􀀚􀀚􀀄􀀁
􀀺􀁄􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁗􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀀧􀀑􀀦􀀑􀀏􀀃 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀀪􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀲􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀕􀀖􀀏􀀃
􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀆
􀀋􀀌􀀈􀀁􀀖􀀭􀀶􀀷􀀵􀀭􀀨􀀷􀀁 􀀕􀀲􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀁 􀀫􀀲􀀵􀀁 􀀷􀀬􀀪􀀁 􀀗􀀦􀀶􀀷􀀪􀀵􀀱􀀁 􀀖􀀭􀀶􀀷􀀵􀀭􀀨􀀷􀀁 􀀲􀀫􀀁 􀀟􀀪􀀱􀀱􀀶􀀼􀀯􀀹􀀦􀀱􀀭􀀦􀀄􀀁 􀀓􀀚􀀜􀀕􀀁
􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀳􀀄􀀊􀀇􀀉􀀄􀀁􀀹􀀲􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀏􀀋􀀆
􀀋􀀌􀀉􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁄􀂱􀀫􀁘􀁑􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁗􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀧􀀑􀀦􀀑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀕􀀜􀀏􀀃
􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀚􀀙􀂱􀀔􀀜􀀓􀀜􀀄􀀁
􀁙􀁒􀁏􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀀏􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁗􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀀧􀀑􀀦􀀑􀀏􀀃 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀀪􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀲􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀀈􀀐􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀐􀀁􀀞􀀭􀀁􀀬􀀞􀀪􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁗􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀧􀀑􀀦􀀑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀏􀀁􀀝􀀦􀀼􀀁􀀈􀀏􀀋􀀏􀀄􀀁􀀘􀀡􀀞􀀁􀀗􀀭􀀛􀀭􀀮􀀭􀀞􀀬􀀁􀀛􀀭􀀁􀀓􀀛􀀫􀀠􀀞􀀁􀀛􀀧􀀝􀀁􀀘􀀫􀀞􀀛􀀭􀀢􀀞􀀬􀀁􀀨􀀟􀀁􀀭􀀡􀀞􀀁􀀙􀀧􀀢􀀭􀀞􀀝􀀁􀀗􀀭􀀛􀀭􀀞􀀬􀀄􀀁
􀀹􀀲􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀐􀀄􀀁􀀔􀀲􀀶􀀷􀀲􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀜􀀭􀀷􀀷􀀯􀀪􀀁􀀦􀀱􀀩􀀁􀀔􀀵􀀲􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀈􀀏􀀌􀀈􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀐􀀋􀀋􀀁􀀞􀀭􀀁􀀬􀀞􀀪􀀆
􀀋􀀌􀀊􀀁􀀗􀀨􀀜􀀢􀀞􀀭􀀱􀀁􀀟􀀨􀀫􀀁􀀭􀀡􀀞􀀁􀀕􀀫􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀠􀀛􀀭􀀢􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀨􀀟􀀁􀀭􀀡􀀞􀀁􀀏􀀨􀀬􀀩􀀞􀀥􀀁􀀹􀀆􀀁􀀷􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀱􀁈􀁚􀀃􀀫􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀁
􀀂􀀶􀀪􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀲􀀲􀀷􀀱􀀲􀀷􀀪􀀁􀀋􀀇􀀐􀀁􀀦􀀧􀀲􀀹􀀪􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀋􀀈􀀄􀀁􀀪􀀶􀀳􀀪􀀨􀀭􀀦􀀯􀀯􀀼􀀁􀀦􀀷􀀁􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀋􀀏􀀆
􀀋􀀌􀀋􀀁􀀘􀀞􀀜􀀡􀀭􀀁􀀹􀀆􀀁􀀐􀀮􀀠􀀡􀀞􀀬􀀁􀀂􀀶􀀪􀀪􀀁􀀫􀀲􀀲􀀷􀀱􀀲􀀷􀀪􀀁􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀁􀀦􀀧􀀲􀀹􀀪􀀃􀀆
􀀋􀀌􀀌􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁗􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀧􀀑􀀦􀀑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀔􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀕􀀛􀀏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀀂
􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀤􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀤􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀚􀀙􀂱􀀔􀀜􀀓􀀜􀀃􀀂􀀫􀀲􀀲􀀷􀀱􀀲􀀷􀀪􀀁􀀋􀀌􀀉􀀁
􀀦􀀧􀀲􀀹􀀪􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀹􀀲􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀚􀀚􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀍􀀁􀀞􀀭􀀁􀀬􀀞􀀪􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀦􀀷􀀁􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀇􀀆
􀀃 􀀨􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀁 􀀂􀀃􀀄
􀀰􀀳􀀻􀀫􀀶􀀁 􀀩􀀳􀀹􀀶􀀸􀀁 􀀳􀀴􀀸􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀬􀀳􀀶􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀷􀀹􀀶􀀺􀀮􀀺􀀧􀀰􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀮􀀷􀀁 􀀴􀀶􀀳􀀺􀀮􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀄􀀋􀀌􀀍􀀁
􀀧􀀷􀀁 􀀪􀀮􀀪􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀠􀀹􀀴􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀫􀀁 􀀓􀀳􀀹􀀶􀀸􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀜􀀫􀀨􀀶􀀧􀀷􀀯􀀧􀀁 􀀮􀀲􀀁 􀀧􀀁 􀀪􀀫􀀩􀀮􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁
􀀈􀀇􀀁 􀀙􀀧􀀲􀀹􀀧􀀶􀀽􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀉􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀌􀀎􀀁 􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀢􀀲􀀮􀀸􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀠􀀸􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀷􀀁 􀀠􀀹􀀴􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀫􀀁
􀀓􀀳􀀹􀀶􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀸􀀷􀀁􀀪􀀫􀀩􀀮􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀁􀀋􀀢􀀗􀀨􀀡􀀁􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀢􀀢􀀛􀀤􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀎􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀻􀀭􀀫􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀶􀀸􀀅
􀀮􀀩􀀰􀀫􀀁􀀘􀀣􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀉􀀊􀀁􀀡􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀽􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀮􀀫􀀲􀀪􀀷􀀭􀀮􀀴􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀳􀀱􀀱􀀫􀀶􀀩􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁
􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀑􀀱􀀫􀀶􀀮􀀩􀀧􀀋􀀌􀀏􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀹􀀲􀀪􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀷􀀩􀀶􀀹􀀸􀀮􀀲􀀽􀀆􀀁􀀡􀀭􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀴􀀶􀀳􀀺􀀮􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀧􀀰􀀰􀀳􀀻􀀫􀀪􀀁
􀀲􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀧􀀰􀀷􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀫􀀮􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀶􀀁 􀀠􀀸􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀁 􀀸􀀳􀀁 􀀷􀀹􀀩􀀩􀀫􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀸􀀳􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀧􀀰􀀷􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁
􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀑􀀃 􀀩􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀸􀀭􀀧􀀸􀀁􀁁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀹􀀸􀀨􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀯􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀪􀀳􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀩􀀫􀀷􀀷􀀧􀀶􀀮􀀰􀀽􀀁􀀷􀀹􀀷􀀴􀀫􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀳􀀶􀀁
􀁄􀁅􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀂴􀂲􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀂴􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀂴􀂲􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀀅
􀀺􀀮􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀱􀀧􀀽􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀹􀀶􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀩􀀳􀀱􀀴􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀨􀀰􀀫􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀸􀀭􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀫􀀼􀀮􀀷􀀸􀀫􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀁
􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀧􀀁 􀀷􀀸􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀁 􀀂􀀑􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀫􀀪􀀞􀀁 􀀺􀀆􀀁 􀀖􀀤􀀟􀀪􀀛􀀚􀀁 􀀔􀀪􀀗􀀪􀀛􀀩􀀄􀀁 􀀴􀀧􀀶􀀧􀀆􀀁 􀀂􀀉􀀏􀀃􀀁
􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀌􀀏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀅
􀀱􀀹􀀰􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀴􀀳􀀰􀀮􀀩􀀽􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀷􀀮􀀷􀀸􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀸􀀭􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀫􀀲􀀬􀀳􀀶􀀩􀀫􀀱􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀧􀀰􀀰􀀁
􀀳􀀶􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀶􀀸􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀽􀀁􀀂􀀕􀀛􀀙􀀞􀀪􀀁􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀏􀀫􀀝􀀞􀀛􀀩􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀶􀀧􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀊􀀉􀀃􀀁􀀧􀀨􀀳􀀺􀀫􀀃􀀆􀀁
􀀡􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀓􀀳􀀹􀀶􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀲􀀁􀀬􀀳􀀰􀀰􀀳􀀻􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀪􀀫􀀩􀀮􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀁􀀕􀀛􀀙􀀞􀀪􀀁􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀏􀀫􀀝􀀞􀀛􀀩􀀄􀀁
􀀻􀀭􀀫􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀷􀀮􀀱􀀮􀀰􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀽􀀁􀀴􀀶􀀳􀀺􀀮􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀭􀀫􀀰􀀪􀀁􀀸􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀧􀀺􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀹􀀶􀀺􀀮􀀺􀀫􀀪􀀆􀀁
􀀘􀀲􀀪􀀫􀀫􀀪􀀄􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀫􀀷􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀸􀀳􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀷􀀻􀀫􀀶􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀻􀀭􀀫􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀴􀀶􀀳􀀅
􀀺􀀮􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀷􀀷􀀹􀀫􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀷􀀁􀁁􀀮􀀲􀀩􀀳􀀱􀀴􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀨􀀰􀀫􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀸􀀭􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀳􀀰􀀮􀀩􀀽􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀁
􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀂴􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀑􀀋􀀌􀀐
􀀋􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀃 􀀤􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃 􀀩􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀀪􀀫􀀩􀀮􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀷􀀆􀀁 􀀊􀀫􀀩􀀩􀀟􀀁 􀀺􀀆􀀁 􀀒􀀛􀀤􀀛􀀪􀀪􀀟􀀁 􀀻􀀧􀀷􀀁 􀀧􀀨􀀳􀀹􀀸􀀁 􀀧􀀁 􀀴􀀶􀀳􀀴􀀶􀀮􀀫􀀸􀀳􀀶􀀁 􀀮􀀲􀀁
􀀤􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁚􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀀬􀁗􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀂿􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁄􀀏􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀸􀀭􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀹􀀸􀀨􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀯􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀸􀀻􀀫􀀫􀀲􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀧􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀘􀀸􀀧􀀰􀀽􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀁
􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀇􀀁 􀀭􀀧􀀪􀀁 􀀫􀀲􀀪􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀡􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀽􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀕􀀷􀀸􀀧􀀨􀀰􀀮􀀷􀀭􀀱􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀁 􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀩􀀰􀀹􀀪􀀫􀀪􀀁
􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀖􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀖􀀓􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀬􀁗􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀀮􀀲􀀁 􀀸􀀫􀀲􀀧􀀲􀀩􀀽􀀁 􀀱􀀧􀀸􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀷􀀆􀀋􀀍􀀇􀀁 􀀡􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀋􀀥􀀫􀀨􀀁 􀀚􀀛􀀁 􀀙􀀗􀀩􀀩􀀗􀀪􀀟􀀥􀀤􀀁 􀀂􀀋􀀞􀀗􀀣􀀘􀀨􀀛􀀁
􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀁􀀶􀀹􀀰􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀻􀀫􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀁􀀲􀀫􀀩􀀫􀀷􀀷􀀧􀀶􀀮􀀰􀀽􀀁􀀷􀀹􀀷􀀴􀀫􀀲􀀪􀀫􀀪􀀁
􀀨􀀽􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀫􀀼􀀮􀀷􀀸􀀫􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀆􀀁􀀘􀀲􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀶􀀸􀀮􀀩􀀹􀀰􀀧􀀶􀀄􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀓􀀳􀀹􀀶􀀸􀀁􀀷􀀧􀀮􀀪􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀧􀀸
􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀧􀀁 􀀴􀀹􀀶􀀫􀀰􀀽􀀁 􀀴􀀶􀀮􀀺􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀁 􀀰􀀧􀀻􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀸􀀹􀀶􀀫􀀄􀀁 􀀻􀀭􀀮􀀩􀀭􀀁 􀀪􀀳􀀁 􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀁 􀀮􀀲􀀺􀀳􀀰􀀺􀀫􀀁 􀀧􀀲􀀽􀀁
􀀮􀀲􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀩􀀳􀀹􀀶􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀸􀀻􀀫􀀫􀀲􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀫􀀲􀀫􀀱􀀽􀀁􀀞􀀳􀀻􀀫􀀶􀀷􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀻􀀭􀀮􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀭􀀧􀀺􀀫􀀁􀀲􀀳􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀲􀀫􀀼􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀂲􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀀰􀀫􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀷􀁀􀀧􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀁􀀷􀀹􀀷􀀴􀀫􀀲􀀪􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀱􀀫􀀶􀀫􀀰􀀽􀀁􀀨􀀽􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀹􀀸􀀨􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀯􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀆􀀋􀀍􀀈
􀀂􀀊􀀌􀀃􀀁 􀀡􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀓􀀥􀀩􀀩􀀥􀀁􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀒􀀗􀀨􀀨􀀥􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀷􀀮􀀱􀀮􀀰􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀳􀀲􀀫􀀄􀀁􀀫􀀼􀀅
􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁐􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁘􀁖􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁈􀁇􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀖􀀕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃
􀀝􀀲􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀮􀀷􀀁􀀮􀀷􀀷􀀹􀀫􀀄􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀀁􀀫􀀼􀀴􀀰􀀧􀀮􀀲􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁
􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀝
􀀡􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁 􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀩􀀰􀀹􀀪􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀨􀀫􀀸􀀻􀀫􀀫􀀲􀀁 􀀠􀀸􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀷􀀁 􀀻􀀭􀀳􀀁 􀀷􀀹􀀨􀀷􀀫􀀵􀀹􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀰􀀽􀀁 􀀨􀀫􀀩􀀳􀀱􀀫􀀁
􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀪􀀹􀀩􀀸􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀁 􀀥􀀱􀀹􀀷􀀸􀀁 􀀴􀀫􀀶􀀱􀀮􀀸􀀦􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀫􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀳􀀱􀀮􀀩􀀁 􀀰􀀮􀀬􀀫􀀁 􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁 􀀩􀀳􀀱􀀱􀀫􀀶􀀩􀀮􀀧􀀰􀀁
􀀧􀀩􀀸􀀮􀀺􀀮􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁 􀀸􀀳􀀁 􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀸􀀮􀀲􀀹􀀫􀀁 􀀮􀀲􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀩􀀳􀀱􀀱􀀳􀀲􀀁 􀀮􀀲􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀫􀀷􀀸􀀆􀀁 􀀥􀀗􀀫􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀦􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀓􀀳􀀹􀀶􀀸􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁
􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀂫􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀴􀀧􀀷􀀸􀀁􀀩􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀹􀀶􀀽􀀁􀀾􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀳􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀰􀀪􀀷􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀴􀀹􀀶􀀫􀀰􀀽􀀁􀀴􀀶􀀮􀀺􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀁􀀰􀀧􀀻􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀸􀀹􀀶􀀫􀀄􀀁
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀀳􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀋􀀌􀀍􀀁􀀔􀀪􀀗􀀪􀀛􀀁􀀛􀀬􀀁􀀨􀀛􀀢􀀂􀀁􀀒􀀟􀀤􀀛􀀨􀀁􀀺􀀂􀀁􀀓􀀛􀀗􀀨􀀚􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀂􀀷􀀫􀀫􀀁􀀬􀀳􀀳􀀸􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀫􀀁􀀋􀀉􀀐􀀁􀀧􀀨􀀳􀀺􀀫􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀉􀀉􀀆
􀀋􀀌􀀎􀀁􀀎􀀥􀀥􀀩􀀁 􀀺􀀆􀀁 􀀊􀀨􀀥􀀙􀀡􀀩􀀁 􀀛􀀪􀀁 􀀗􀀢􀀆􀀄􀀁 􀀈􀀇􀀁 􀀙􀀧􀀲􀀹􀀧􀀶􀀽􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀉􀀐􀀄􀀁 􀀠􀀹􀀴􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀫􀀁 􀀓􀀳􀀹􀀶􀀸􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁
􀀜􀀫􀀨􀀶􀀧􀀷􀀯􀀧􀀄􀀁􀀑􀀔􀀞􀀘􀀚􀀓􀀁􀀄􀀈􀀅􀀈􀀮􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀜􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀎􀀐􀀆
􀀋􀀌􀀏􀀁􀀡􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀽􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀮􀀫􀀲􀀪􀀷􀀭􀀮􀀴􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀳􀀱􀀱􀀫􀀶􀀩􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀓􀀳􀀲􀀷􀀹􀀰􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀟􀀫􀀰􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀸􀀻􀀫􀀫􀀲􀀁
􀀪􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀤􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀀺􀁄􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁗􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃
􀀧􀀑􀀦􀀑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀛􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀕􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀯􀁈􀁄􀁊􀁘􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀨􀀛􀀗􀀪􀀭􀀁􀀔􀀛􀀨􀀟􀀛􀀩􀀄􀀁􀀺􀀳􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀚􀀘􀀘􀀄􀀁
􀀜􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀋􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀊􀀊􀀁􀀛􀀪􀀁􀀩􀀛􀀧􀀆􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀴􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀌􀀏􀀿􀀈􀀌􀀐􀀆
􀀋􀀌􀀐􀀁􀀋􀀢􀀗􀀨􀀡􀀁􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀢􀀢􀀛􀀤􀀁􀀂􀀷􀀫􀀫􀀁􀀬􀀳􀀳􀀸􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀫􀀁􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀁􀀧􀀨􀀳􀀺􀀫􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀴􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀎􀀊􀀿􀀎􀀋􀀁􀀛􀀪􀀁􀀩􀀛􀀧􀀂􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁
􀀴􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀎􀀏􀀿􀀎􀀐􀀆􀀁􀀠􀀫􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀰􀀷􀀳􀀁􀀊􀀢􀀗􀀤􀀡􀀁􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀋􀀢􀀗􀀨􀀡􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀛􀀏􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀕􀀧􀀷􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀲􀀁􀀔􀀮􀀷􀀸􀀶􀀮􀀩􀀸􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀞􀀫􀀲􀀲􀀷􀀽􀀰􀀺􀀧􀀲􀀮􀀧􀀄􀀁􀀑􀀔􀀞􀀘􀀚􀀓􀀁􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀛􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀜􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀋􀀊􀀆
􀀋􀀍􀀇􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀨􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀬􀁗􀁄􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀀟􀀳􀀱􀀫􀀁 􀀳􀀲􀀁 􀀊􀀁 􀀙􀀹􀀲􀀫􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀇􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁏􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀀃 􀀵􀁰􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁯􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀄􀀁
􀀉􀀇􀀁􀀙􀀧􀀲􀀹􀀧􀀶􀀽􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀌􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀍􀀋􀀊􀀆
􀀋􀀍􀀈􀀁􀀊􀀫􀀩􀀩􀀟􀀁􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀒􀀛􀀤􀀛􀀪􀀪􀀟􀀁􀀂􀀷􀀫􀀫􀀁􀀬􀀳􀀳􀀸􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀫􀀁􀀋􀀈􀀊􀀁􀀧􀀨􀀳􀀺􀀫􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀇􀀋􀀿􀀊􀀇􀀌􀀆
􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀮􀀲􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀮􀀶􀀁􀀳􀀴􀀫􀀶􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀄􀀁􀀱􀀫􀀶􀀫􀀰􀀽􀀁􀀨􀀽􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀫􀀼􀀮􀀷􀀸􀀫􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀷􀀸􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀆􀀋􀀍􀀉
􀀂􀀊􀀍􀀃􀀁 􀀡􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀧􀀨􀀳􀀺􀀫􀀁 􀀩􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀁 􀀰􀀧􀀻􀀁 􀀮􀀷􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀻􀀫􀀺􀀫􀀶􀀄􀀁 􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀸􀀶􀀧􀀪􀀮􀀩􀀸􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀨􀀽􀀁
􀀯􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁄􀀃􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀓􀀟􀀤􀀗􀀢􀀚􀀟􀀆􀀁􀀘􀀲􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀄􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀞􀀰􀀫􀀲􀀧􀀶􀀽􀀁􀀑􀀷􀀷􀀫􀀱􀀨􀀰􀀽􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁
􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀋􀀥􀀫􀀨􀀁􀀚􀀛􀀁􀀙􀀗􀀩􀀩􀀗􀀪􀀟􀀥􀀤􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃
􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀇􀀁􀀡􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀽􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀕􀀷􀀸􀀧􀀨􀀰􀀮􀀷􀀭􀀱􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀸􀀻􀀫􀀫􀀲􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀧􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁
􀀘􀀸􀀧􀀰􀀽􀀄􀀁􀀻􀀭􀀮􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀴􀀶􀀫􀀷􀀩􀀶􀀮􀀨􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀧􀀰􀀁􀀳􀀶􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀰􀀫􀀧􀀷􀀸􀀁􀀱􀀳􀀷􀀸􀀅􀀬􀀧􀀺􀀳􀀹􀀶􀀫􀀪􀀅
􀀲􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀱􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀄􀀁􀀬􀀳􀀹􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀡􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀽􀀁􀀭􀀧􀀪􀀁􀀰􀀧􀀴􀀷􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁
􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀑􀀋􀀍􀀊􀀁􀀘􀀲􀀁􀀉􀀨􀀪􀀛􀀢􀀁
􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀔􀀛􀀭􀀣􀀗􀀤􀀚􀀄􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀋􀀥􀀫􀀨􀀁􀀚􀀛􀀁􀀙􀀗􀀩􀀩􀀗􀀪􀀟􀀥􀀤􀀁􀀂􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀁􀀧􀀰􀀷􀀳􀀁
􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀩􀀰􀀹􀀪􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀧􀀱􀀫􀀁􀀡􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀽􀀁􀀭􀀧􀀪􀀁􀀰􀀧􀀴􀀷􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀷􀀳􀀁􀀬􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀰􀀫􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀷􀀁
􀀻􀀫􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀶􀀲􀀫􀀪􀀆􀀋􀀍􀀋
􀀂􀀊􀀎􀀃􀀁 􀀘􀀲􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀰􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀸􀀳􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀇􀀁􀀡􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀽􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀕􀀷􀀸􀀧􀀨􀀰􀀮􀀷􀀭􀀱􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀅
􀀸􀀻􀀫􀀫􀀲􀀁 􀀖􀀶􀀧􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀁 􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁 􀀘􀀸􀀧􀀰􀀽􀀄􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀋􀀥􀀫􀀨􀀁 􀀚􀀛􀀁 􀀙􀀗􀀩􀀩􀀗􀀪􀀟􀀥􀀤􀀁 􀀭􀀫􀀰􀀪􀀄􀀁 􀀮􀀲􀀁
􀀔􀀜􀀘􀀖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀬􀁗􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀻􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀩􀀳􀀱􀀴􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀨􀀰􀀫􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀸􀀭􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀷􀀸􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀆􀀋􀀍􀀌
􀀂􀀊􀀏􀀃􀀁 􀀡􀀭􀀮􀀷􀀁􀀷􀀫􀀶􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀰􀀰􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀁􀀩􀀰􀀳􀀷􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀨􀀽􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀷􀀳􀀱􀀫􀀻􀀭􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀴􀀫􀀩􀀹􀀰􀀮􀀧􀀶􀀁
􀀩􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀻􀀭􀀮􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀶􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀪􀀮􀀺􀀮􀀪􀀹􀀧􀀰􀀷􀀁􀀨􀀹􀀸􀀁􀀱􀀧􀀯􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀬􀀳􀀶􀀧􀀽􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀸􀀳􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀂿􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀀅
􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀬􀁗􀁄􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀜􀀙􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀷􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀬􀁗􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁌􀀅
􀁝􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁓􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀬􀁗􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀋􀀍􀀍􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀷􀀁
􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀷􀀮􀀪􀀫􀀶􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀳􀀴􀀫􀀶􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀺􀀫􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀇􀀁􀀪􀀫􀀷􀀴􀀮􀀸􀀫􀀁􀀤􀀳􀀶􀀰􀀪􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀘􀀘􀀆􀀋􀀍􀀎
􀀋􀀖􀀜􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃
􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀰􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀁 􀀸􀀳􀀁 􀀷􀀫􀀩􀀹􀀶􀀮􀀸􀀽􀀁 􀀬􀀳􀀶􀀁 􀀩􀀳􀀷􀀸􀀷􀀁 􀀂􀀙􀀗􀀫􀀪􀀟􀀥􀀁 􀀠􀀫􀀚􀀟􀀙􀀗􀀪􀀫􀀣􀀁
􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁌􀀃􀀆􀀁􀀡􀀭􀀮􀀷􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀸􀀶􀀹􀀫􀀁􀀬􀀳􀀶􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀋􀀂􀀉􀀂􀀒􀀂􀀉􀀂􀀕􀀂􀀁􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀔􀀙􀀗􀀝􀀤􀀟􀀄􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀀅
􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀓􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀀩􀀳􀀹􀀶􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀺􀀳􀀰􀀺􀀫􀀪􀀄􀀋􀀍􀀏􀀁􀀴􀀶􀀮􀀺􀀧􀀸􀀫􀀅􀀰􀀧􀀻􀀁􀀸􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀮􀀫􀀷􀀁􀀷􀀭􀀳􀀹􀀰􀀪􀀄􀀁􀀮􀀲􀀁􀀴􀀶􀀮􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀴􀀰􀀫􀀄􀀁
􀀷􀀹􀀶􀀺􀀮􀀺􀀫􀀁 􀀨􀀹􀀸􀀁 􀀩􀀧􀀲􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀁 􀀨􀀫􀀁 􀀮􀀲􀀺􀀳􀀯􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀨􀀽􀀁 􀀧􀀰􀀮􀀫􀀲􀀷􀀁 􀀻􀀭􀀳􀀷􀀫􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀷􀀸􀀮􀀰􀀫􀀁
􀀧􀀸􀀸􀀮􀀸􀀹􀀪􀀫􀀁 􀀱􀀧􀀽􀀁 􀀭􀀧􀀺􀀫􀀁 􀀧􀀬􀀬􀀫􀀩􀀸􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀫􀀺􀀳􀀰􀀹􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀄􀀁
􀀫􀀷􀀴􀀫􀀩􀀮􀀧􀀰􀀰􀀽􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀭􀀫􀀶􀀫􀀄􀀁􀀨􀀽􀀁􀀴􀀫􀀶􀀷􀀳􀀲􀀷􀀁􀀻􀀭􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀧􀀪􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀫􀀲􀀁
􀀫􀀼􀀴􀀫􀀰􀀰􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀬􀀶􀀳􀀱􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀧􀀲􀀩􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀧􀀩􀀩􀀳􀀹􀀲􀀸􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀮􀀶􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀸􀀮􀀸􀀹􀀪􀀫􀀆􀀋􀀍􀀐􀀁􀀘􀀲􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀅
􀀳􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀩􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀪􀀫􀀧􀀰􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀸􀀭􀀁􀀨􀀽􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀔􀀹􀀸􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀹􀀶􀀸􀀁􀀧􀀬􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀁􀀤􀀳􀀶􀀰􀀪􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀘􀀘􀀄􀀁
􀀮􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀭􀀫􀀰􀀪􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀰􀀫􀀺􀀧􀀲􀀸􀀁􀀴􀀶􀀳􀀺􀀮􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀓􀀳􀀲􀀺􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁
􀀭􀀧􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀁􀀰􀀧􀀴􀀷􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀷􀀹􀀰􀀸􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀶􀀆􀀁􀀒􀀽􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀸􀀶􀀧􀀷􀀸􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀶􀀁
􀀔􀀹􀀸􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀹􀀶􀀸􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀩􀀭􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀩􀀰􀀹􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀓􀀳􀀲􀀺􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁
􀀭􀀧􀀪􀀁􀀨􀀫􀀫􀀲􀀁􀀷􀀹􀀷􀀴􀀫􀀲􀀪􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀳􀀹􀀸􀀨􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀯􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀶􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀪􀀁􀀭􀀧􀀪􀀁
􀀶􀀫􀀅􀀫􀀲􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀫􀀪􀀁 􀀮􀀲􀀸􀀳􀀁 􀀬􀀳􀀶􀀩􀀫􀀁 􀀳􀀲􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀨􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀷􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀫􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀎􀀁􀀡􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀸􀀽􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁
􀀞􀀫􀀧􀀩􀀫􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀸􀀭􀀁􀀘􀀸􀀧􀀰􀀽􀀆􀀋􀀎􀀇􀀁􀀡􀀭􀀫􀀁􀀷􀀧􀀱􀀫􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀲􀀩􀀰􀀹􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀧􀀩􀀭􀀫􀀪􀀁􀀨􀀽􀀁
􀀋􀀍􀀉􀀁􀀓􀀥􀀩􀀩􀀥􀀁􀀺􀀂􀀁􀀒􀀗􀀨􀀨􀀥􀀁􀀂􀀷􀀫􀀫􀀁􀀬􀀳􀀳􀀸􀀲􀀳􀀸􀀫􀀁􀀋􀀈􀀊􀀁􀀧􀀨􀀳􀀺􀀫􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀇􀀎􀀆
􀀋􀀍􀀊􀀁􀀯􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁄􀀃􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀓􀀟􀀤􀀗􀀢􀀚􀀟􀀄􀀁􀀪􀀫􀀩􀀮􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀉􀀉􀀁􀀙􀀹􀀲􀀫􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀐􀀄􀀁􀀑􀀔􀀞􀀘􀀚􀀓􀀁􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀜􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀁
􀀜􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀊􀀇􀀆
􀀋􀀍􀀋􀀁􀀉􀀨􀀪􀀛􀀢􀀁􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀔􀀛􀀭􀀣􀀗􀀤􀀚􀀄􀀁􀀪􀀫􀀩􀀮􀀷􀀮􀀳􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀈􀀇􀀁􀀖􀀫􀀨􀀶􀀹􀀧􀀶􀀽􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀏􀀄􀀁􀀑􀀔􀀞􀀘􀀚􀀓􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀛􀀄􀀁
􀀓􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀜􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀊􀀊􀀆
􀀋􀀍􀀌􀀁􀀎􀀗􀀣􀀘􀀟􀀤􀀥􀀁􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀋􀀥􀀤􀀩􀀥􀀨􀀪􀀩􀀁􀀉􀀨􀀙􀀛􀀤􀀩􀀄􀀁􀀈􀀈􀀁􀀛􀀧􀀶􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀊􀀄􀀁􀀋􀀥􀀫􀀨􀀁􀀚􀀛􀀁􀀙􀀗􀀩􀀩􀀗􀀪􀀟􀀥􀀤􀀄􀀁
􀀘􀀚􀀟􀀁􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀆􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀆
􀀋􀀍􀀍􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀨􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀉􀀏􀀁 􀀠􀀫􀀴􀀸􀀫􀀱􀀨􀀫􀀶􀀁 􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀄􀀁 􀀖􀀆􀀁 􀀠􀀸􀀳􀀫􀀶􀀯􀀄􀀁 􀀱􀁒􀁘􀁙􀁈􀁄􀁘􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁈􀁌􀁏􀀃 􀁊􀁰􀁑􀁰􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁰􀁖􀀃 􀁈􀁗􀀃
􀀗􀀫􀀪􀀨􀀛􀀩􀀁􀀗􀀙􀀪􀀛􀀩􀀁􀀨􀀛􀀢􀀗􀀪􀀟􀀜􀀩􀀁􀀗􀀫􀀬􀀁􀀨􀀗􀀦􀀦􀀥􀀨􀀪􀀩􀀁􀀚􀀛􀀁􀀚􀀨􀀥􀀟􀀪􀀁􀀟􀀤􀀪􀀛􀀨􀀤􀀗􀀪􀀟􀀥􀀤􀀗􀀢􀀂􀀁􀀋􀀥􀀤􀀪􀀟􀀤􀀫􀀗􀀪􀀟􀀥􀀤􀀁
􀀚􀀫􀀁􀀝􀀨􀀗􀀤􀀚􀀁􀀨􀀛􀀙􀀫􀀛􀀟􀀢􀀁􀀚􀀛􀀁􀀎􀀂􀀁􀀍􀀂􀀁􀀚􀀛􀀁􀀒􀀗􀀨􀀪􀀛􀀤􀀩􀀏􀀃􀀕􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁙􀁒􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀻􀀻􀀬􀀬􀀬􀀏􀀃􀀯􀁈􀁌􀁓􀁝􀁌􀁊􀀏􀀃
􀀚􀀮􀀨􀀶􀀧􀀮􀀶􀀮􀀫􀀁􀀡􀀭􀀫􀀳􀀪􀀳􀀶􀀁􀀤􀀫􀀮􀀩􀀭􀀫􀀶􀀄􀀁􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀍􀀊􀀁􀀛􀀪􀀁􀀩􀀛􀀧􀀂􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀁􀀴􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀍􀀍􀀿􀀊􀀍􀀎􀀆
􀀋􀀍􀀎􀀁􀀐􀀤􀀁 􀀨􀀛􀀁 􀀊􀀗􀀨􀀨􀀗􀀘􀀟􀀤􀀟􀀄􀀁 􀀉􀀏􀀁 􀀙􀀹􀀰􀀽􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀇􀀄􀀁 􀀓􀀳􀀹􀀶􀀸􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁􀀑􀀴􀀴􀀫􀀧􀀰􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀞􀀧􀀶􀀮􀀷􀀄􀀁 􀀘􀀚􀀟􀀁
􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀜􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀌􀀍􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀌􀀇􀀎􀀿􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀆
􀀋􀀍􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁊􀁈􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀑
􀀋􀀍􀀐􀀁􀀋􀀂􀀉􀀂􀀒􀀂􀀉􀀂􀀕􀀂􀀁 􀀺􀀆􀀁 􀀔􀀙􀀗􀀝􀀤􀀟􀀄􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀁 􀀜􀀳􀀺􀀫􀀱􀀨􀀫􀀶􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀍􀀄􀀁 􀀓􀀳􀀹􀀶􀀸􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁 􀀑􀀴􀀴􀀫􀀧􀀰􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁊􀁈􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀀵􀁈􀁙􀁘􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁔􀁘􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁌􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁰􀀄􀀁 􀀺􀀳􀀰􀀆􀀁 􀀊􀀍􀀄􀀁 􀀜􀀳􀀆􀀁 􀀈􀀁
􀀋􀀭􀁄􀁑􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀂱􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀚􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀜􀀗􀀞􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀀤􀀧􀀳􀀬􀀯􀀦􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀙􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀜􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀐􀀐􀀆
􀀋􀀎􀀇􀀁􀀪􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁒􀀁 􀀺􀀆􀀁 􀀌􀀛􀀫􀀪􀀩􀀙􀀞􀀛􀀁 􀀊􀀗􀀤􀀡􀀄􀀁 􀀈􀀏􀀁 􀀙􀀧􀀲􀀹􀀧􀀶􀀽􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀉􀀄􀀁 􀀔􀀮􀀷􀀸􀀶􀀮􀀩􀀸􀀁 􀀓􀀳􀀹􀀶􀀸􀀁 􀀳􀀬􀀁
􀀟􀀳􀀸􀀸􀀫􀀶􀀪􀀧􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀘􀀚􀀟􀀁􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀅􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀧􀀷􀀫􀀁􀀜􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀊􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀐􀀆
􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀁 􀀉􀀌􀀕􀀔􀀖􀀘􀀁􀀔􀀍􀀁􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀁􀀇􀀓􀀘􀀌􀀖􀀓􀀊􀀘􀀏􀀔􀀓􀀊􀀑􀀁􀀈􀀊􀀙􀀁􀀆􀀔􀀒􀀒􀀏􀀗􀀗􀀏􀀔􀀓􀀁􀀔􀀓􀀁􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀁􀀙􀀔􀀖􀀐􀀁􀀔􀀍􀀁􀀏􀀘􀀗􀀁􀀗􀀏􀀚􀀘􀀛􀀂􀀘􀀎􀀏􀀖􀀋􀀁􀀗􀀌􀀗􀀗􀀏􀀔􀀓
􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀍􀀖􀀢􀀙􀀜􀀚􀀥􀀞􀀘􀀝􀀧􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀚􀀢􀀭􀀭􀀨􀀦􀀩􀀬􀀁􀀂􀀖􀀦􀀱􀀬􀀢􀀭􀀸􀀃􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁􀀣􀀸􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀮􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀱􀀁
􀀔􀀴􀀳􀀤􀀨􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀆􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀁􀀗􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀤􀀢􀀲􀀦􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀰􀀴􀀦􀀲􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀩􀀵􀀢􀀫􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀓􀀘􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀀫􀀦􀀧􀀳􀀁􀀮􀀯􀀦􀀭􀀆􀀋􀀎􀀉
􀀂􀀋􀀇􀀃􀀁 􀀓􀀦􀀱􀀳􀀢􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀤􀀢􀀲􀀦􀀲􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀫􀀢􀀳􀀦􀀁􀀳􀀮􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀩􀀵􀀢􀀫􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀮􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀱􀀁􀀬􀀴􀀫􀀳􀀩􀀅
􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀓􀀕􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁙􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀺􀁒􀁕􀁏􀁇􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀀬􀀬􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀋􀀎􀀊
􀀂􀀋􀀈􀀃􀀁 􀀚􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀨􀀢􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀮􀀁􀀣􀀦􀀁􀀬􀀢􀀥􀀦􀀁􀀢􀀲􀀁􀀶􀀦􀀫􀀫􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀇􀀉􀀁􀀓􀀮􀀭􀀅
􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁆􀁄􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀀨􀀴􀀲􀀣􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀅􀀳􀀮􀀅􀀣􀀦􀀁􀀶􀀨􀀮􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀳􀀦􀀭􀀥􀀦􀀥􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀢􀀳􀀄􀀁􀀢􀀲􀀁􀀢􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀲􀀴􀀫􀀳􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀶􀀢􀀱􀀄􀀁
􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀓􀀮􀀭􀀵􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀨􀀢􀀥􀀁 􀀫􀀢􀀯􀀲􀀦􀀥􀀆􀀁 􀀠􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀓􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀓􀀢􀀲􀀲􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀂳􀀾􀁗􀁀􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃
􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀢􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀮􀀵􀀩􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀓􀀮􀀭􀀵􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀲􀀨􀀮􀀴􀀫􀀥􀀁􀀨􀀢􀀵􀀦􀀁􀀣􀀦􀀤􀀮􀀬􀀦􀀁
􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀂴􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀀅
􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃
􀀩􀀬􀀯􀀮􀀲􀀲􀀩􀀣􀀩􀀫􀀩􀀳􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀯􀀦􀀱􀀧􀀮􀀱􀀬􀀢􀀭􀀤􀀦􀀁􀀱􀀢􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀱􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀢􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀦􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀦􀀧􀀧􀀦􀀤􀀳􀀲􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀋􀀎􀀋
􀀂􀀋􀀉􀀃􀀁 􀀜􀀭􀀦􀀁 􀀢􀀫􀀲􀀮􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀳􀀦􀀲􀀁 􀀶􀀩􀀳􀀨􀀁 􀀩􀀭􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀦􀀲􀀳􀀁 􀀢􀀁 􀀥􀀦􀀤􀀩􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀩􀀭􀀁 􀀶􀀨􀀩􀀤􀀨􀀁
􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀓􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀒􀀯􀀯􀀦􀀢􀀫􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀒􀀩􀀷􀀁 􀀂􀀕􀀱􀀢􀀭􀀤􀀦􀀃􀀁 􀀴􀀯􀀨􀀦􀀫􀀥􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁙􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀬􀀯􀀲􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀕􀀘􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀶􀀮􀀱􀀪􀀬􀀦􀀭􀀺􀀲􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀬􀀯􀀦􀀭􀀲􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀧􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀢􀀤􀀤􀀩􀀥􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀠􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀓􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀁􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀭􀀥􀀁
􀀳􀀨􀀢􀀳􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀓􀀮􀀭􀀵􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀨􀀢􀀥􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀳􀀁 􀀫􀀢􀀯􀀲􀀦􀀥􀀁 􀀞􀀤􀀦􀀣􀀁 􀀛􀀖􀀘􀀧􀀣􀀄􀀁 􀀶􀀩􀀳􀀨􀀮􀀴􀀳􀀁
􀀥􀀦􀀭􀀴􀀭􀀤􀀩􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀯􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀮􀀴􀀳􀀣􀀱􀀦􀀢􀀪􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀢􀀁􀀶􀀢􀀱􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀢􀀳􀀄􀀁􀀢􀀳􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁
􀁐􀁒􀁖􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀶􀀢􀀲􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀲􀀯􀀦􀀭􀀥􀀦􀀥􀀋􀀎􀀌􀀹􀀢􀀭􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀲􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀲􀀧􀀢􀀤􀀳􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀤􀀫􀀴􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀣􀀦􀀤􀀢􀀴􀀲􀀦􀀁
􀀩􀀳􀀁 􀀢􀀯􀀯􀀦􀀢􀀱􀀲􀀁 􀀳􀀮􀀁 􀀲􀀢􀀸􀀄􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀦􀀁 􀀨􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀄􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀢􀀳􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀓􀀮􀀭􀀵􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁
􀀱􀀦􀀬􀀢􀀩􀀭􀀦􀀥􀀁 􀀢􀀯􀀯􀀫􀀩􀀤􀀢􀀣􀀫􀀦􀀁 􀀶􀀨􀀩􀀫􀀦􀀄􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀮􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀩􀀳􀀁 􀀲􀀯􀀦􀀢􀀪􀀲􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁
􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀑
􀀂􀀋􀀊􀀃􀀁 􀀚􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀬􀀴􀀲􀀳􀀁􀀦􀀰􀀴􀀢􀀫􀀫􀀸􀀁􀀣􀀦􀀁􀀬􀀢􀀥􀀦􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀢􀀁􀀲􀀦􀀱􀀩􀀦􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀗􀀳􀀢􀀫􀀩􀀢􀀭􀀁
􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃 􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀩􀀵􀀢􀀫􀀁􀀶􀀢􀀲􀀁􀀢􀀲􀀲􀀴􀀬􀀦􀀥􀀄􀀋􀀎􀀍􀀁􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀱􀀲􀀄􀀁􀀩􀀳􀀁􀀶􀀢􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀳􀀆􀀋􀀎􀀎
􀀂􀀋􀀋􀀃􀀁 􀀒􀀲􀀁􀀢􀀁􀀬􀀢􀀳􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀩􀀭􀀤􀀩􀀯􀀫􀀦􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁􀀲􀀮􀀴􀀭􀀥􀀁􀀯􀀮􀀫􀀩􀀤􀀸􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀩􀀭􀀅
􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁐􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁅􀁌􀀅
􀀳􀀱􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀦􀀭􀀧􀀮􀀱􀀤􀀦􀀬􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀢􀀶􀀢􀀱􀀥􀀲􀀆􀀁 􀀗􀀭􀀁 􀀎􀀖􀀦􀀞􀀢􀀞􀀡􀀤􀀣􀀥􀀧􀀁
􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀁􀀑􀀚􀀘􀀨􀀥􀀞􀀧􀀩􀀁 􀀛􀀣􀀥􀀁 􀀈􀀣􀀦􀀧􀀦􀀁 􀀤􀀢􀀲􀀦􀀄􀀁 􀀉􀀍􀀁 􀀘􀀴􀀫􀀸􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀇􀀄􀀁 􀀒􀀔􀀝􀀗􀀙􀀓􀀁 􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀜􀀄􀀁 􀀓􀀢􀀲􀀦􀀁
􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀖􀀞􀀃􀀋􀀚􀀥􀀪􀀨􀀡􀀁􀀵􀀆􀀁􀁙􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀄􀀁􀀈􀀎􀀁􀀕􀀦􀀣􀀱􀀴􀀢􀀱􀀸􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀌􀀄􀀁􀀔􀀩􀀲􀀳􀀱􀀩􀀤􀀳􀀁􀀓􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁
􀀞􀀮􀀦􀀱􀀬􀀮􀀭􀀥􀀄􀀁􀀗􀀙􀀞􀀁􀀃􀀆􀀅􀀅􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀐􀀇􀀇􀀆
􀀋􀀎􀀉􀀁􀀍􀀚􀀜􀀖􀀠􀀁􀀇􀀞􀀙􀀁􀀤􀀢􀀲􀀦􀀄􀀁􀀉􀀋􀀁􀀟􀀦􀀯􀀳􀀦􀀬􀀣􀀦􀀱􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀐􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀒􀀯􀀯􀀦􀀢􀀫􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀓􀀦􀀫􀀫􀀦􀀄􀀁
􀀖􀀦􀀱􀀬􀀢􀀭􀀸􀀄􀀁􀀒􀀔􀀝􀀗􀀙􀀓􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀜􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀢􀀲􀀦􀀁􀀛􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀊􀀉􀀆
􀀋􀀎􀀊􀀁􀀶􀁌􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀀁􀀵􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀚􀀠􀀠􀀞􀀁􀀕􀀣􀀧􀀧􀀞􀀏􀀃􀀖􀀓􀀃􀀭􀁄􀁑􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀘􀀕􀀏􀀃􀀯􀁘􀁛􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁊􀀃􀀫􀁌􀁊􀁋􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃
􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀘􀀴􀀲􀀳􀀩􀀤􀀦􀀄􀀁􀀗􀀙􀀞􀀁􀀃􀀆􀀅􀀄􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀢􀀲􀀦􀀁􀀛􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀈􀀏􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀌􀀌􀀏􀀆
􀀋􀀎􀀋􀀁􀀬􀁑􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀀸􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁼􀁋􀁏􀁈􀁑􀀄􀀁 􀀉􀀁 􀀒􀀯􀀱􀀩􀀫􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀏􀀄􀀁 􀀓􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀓􀀢􀀲􀀲􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁
􀀛􀀦􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀱􀀫􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀲􀀄􀀁􀀒􀀔􀀝􀀗􀀙􀀓􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀜􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀢􀀲􀀦􀀁􀀛􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀄􀀁􀀢􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀏􀀈􀀆
􀀋􀀎􀀌􀀁􀀫􀀧􀀖􀀗􀀠􀀞􀀦􀀦􀀚􀀡􀀚􀀢􀀧􀀦􀀁 􀀈􀀣􀀥􀀢􀀚􀀧􀀁 􀀵􀀆􀀃 􀀹􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀀪􀁄􀁌􀁇􀁒􀀄􀀁 􀀎􀀁 􀀚􀀢􀀸􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀈􀀄􀀁 􀀓􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁
􀀒􀀯􀀯􀀦􀀢􀀫􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀒􀀩􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀗􀀙􀀞􀀁􀀃􀀆􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀢􀀲􀀦􀀁􀀛􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀌􀀌􀀆
􀀋􀀎􀀍􀀁􀀏􀀂􀀁􀀎􀀂􀀁􀀵􀀆􀀁􀀎􀀞􀀘􀀠􀀞􀀘􀀝􀀁􀀚􀀁􀀏􀀥􀀚􀀦􀀞􀀄􀀁􀀊􀀁􀀟􀀦􀀯􀀳􀀦􀀬􀀣􀀦􀀱􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀌􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀓􀀢􀀲􀀲􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀄􀀁
􀀉􀀞􀀥􀀞􀀧􀀧􀀣􀀁􀀞􀀢􀀧􀀚􀀥􀀢􀀖􀀪􀀞􀀣􀀢􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀫􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀈􀀅􀀗􀀗􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀎􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀉􀀉􀀆
􀀋􀀎􀀎􀀁􀀍􀀂􀀁 􀀑􀀂􀀁 􀀕􀀂􀀁 􀀵􀀆􀀁 􀀎􀀂􀀁 􀀈􀀂􀀄􀀁 􀀉􀀉􀀁 􀀒􀀯􀀱􀀩􀀫􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀊􀀄􀀁 􀀓􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀒􀀯􀀯􀀦􀀢􀀫􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀞􀀮􀀬􀀦􀀄􀀁
􀀞􀀗􀀞􀀙􀀂􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀫􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀅􀀗􀀗􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀎􀀆􀀁􀀗􀀭􀀁􀀲􀀮􀀬􀀦􀀁􀀤􀀢􀀲􀀦􀀲􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀥􀀦􀀤􀀩􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀶􀀢􀀲􀀁􀀬􀀢􀀥􀀦􀀁
􀀥􀀦􀀯􀀦􀀭􀀥􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀶􀀨􀀦􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀱􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀱􀀦􀀫􀀦􀀵􀀢􀀭􀀳􀀁 􀀳􀀱􀀦􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀦􀀲􀀁 􀀨􀀢􀀥􀀁 􀀣􀀦􀀦􀀭􀀁 􀀯􀀴􀀳􀀁 􀀣􀀢􀀤􀀪􀀁 􀀩􀀭􀀁 􀀮􀀯􀀅
􀀦􀀱􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀑􀀁􀀐􀀞􀀜􀀖􀀢􀀣􀀁􀀵􀀆􀀃􀀶􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁗􀁪􀀃􀀭􀁒􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁜􀁈􀁕􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀓􀀢􀀲􀀲􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀄􀀁􀀐􀀁􀀚􀀢􀀸􀀁
􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀉􀀄􀀁􀀞􀀗􀀞􀀙􀀂􀀏􀀃􀁙􀁒􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀐􀀬􀀬􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀜􀀙􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀔􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀑􀀝􀀖􀀤􀀞􀀥􀀣􀀁􀀵􀀆􀀃􀀶􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁗􀁪􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀀃
􀀓􀀞􀀦􀀘􀀖􀀥􀀙􀀞􀀄􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀁 􀀚􀀢􀀸􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀋􀀄􀀁 􀀓􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀒􀀯􀀯􀀦􀀢􀀫􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀚􀀩􀀫􀀢􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀀞􀀢􀀧􀀚􀀥􀀢􀀖􀀪􀀞􀀣􀀢􀀖􀀠􀀚􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀫􀀆􀀁􀀋􀀏􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀏􀀍􀀆
􀀵􀀆􀀁􀀑􀀘􀀣􀀧􀀧􀀞􀀦􀀝􀀁􀀎􀀚􀀘􀀝􀀖􀀢􀀞􀀘􀀖􀀠􀀁􀀍􀀞􀀜􀀝􀀧􀀁􀀌􀀢􀀙􀀨􀀦􀀧􀀥􀀞􀀚􀀦􀀁􀀍􀀧􀀙􀀂􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀟􀀤􀀮􀀳􀀳􀀩􀀲􀀨􀀁
􀀓􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀟􀀦􀀲􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀨􀀦􀀫􀀥􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀢􀀳􀀁 􀀲􀀴􀀤􀀨􀀁 􀀳􀀱􀀦􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀦􀀲􀀁 􀀨􀀢􀀥􀀁 􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀩􀀵􀀦􀀥􀀁
􀀡􀀮􀀱􀀫􀀥􀀁􀀡􀀢􀀱􀀁􀀗􀀗􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁􀀶􀀦􀀱􀀦􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀳􀀁􀀤􀀮􀀵􀀦􀀱􀀦􀀥􀀁􀀣􀀸􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀎􀀁􀀠􀀱􀀦􀀢􀀳􀀸􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀵􀁒􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀝􀀱􀀮􀀳􀀮􀀤􀀮􀀫􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀒􀀱􀀣􀀩􀀳􀀱􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀓􀀫􀀢􀀴􀀲􀀦􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀉􀀋􀀁􀀟􀀦􀀯􀀳􀀦􀀬􀀣􀀦􀀱􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀉􀀊􀀁
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁛􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁅􀁌􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀤􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀕􀀚􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀂳􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀐􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀑􀀋􀀎􀀏􀀁
􀀗􀀭􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀗􀀳􀀢􀀫􀀩􀀢􀀭􀀁 􀀓􀀮􀀴􀀱􀀳􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀓􀀢􀀲􀀲􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀂􀀘􀀮􀀩􀀭􀀳􀀁 􀀟􀀦􀀲􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀃􀀁
􀀨􀀦􀀫􀀥􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀢􀀳􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀝􀀱􀀮􀀳􀀮􀀤􀀮􀀫􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀒􀀱􀀣􀀩􀀳􀀱􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀓􀀫􀀢􀀴􀀲􀀦􀀲􀀁 􀀨􀀢􀀥􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀳􀀁
􀀣􀀦􀀦􀀭􀀁 􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀬􀀩􀀭􀀢􀀳􀀦􀀥􀀁 􀀥􀀦􀀲􀀯􀀩􀀳􀀦􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀥􀀦􀀤􀀫􀀢􀀱􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀣􀀸􀀁 􀀗􀀳􀀢􀀫􀀸􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀶􀀢􀀱􀀁
􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀑􀀋􀀎􀀐􀀁􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀀴􀀭􀀲􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀲􀀧􀀢􀀤􀀳􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀁 􀀤􀀮􀀭􀀤􀀫􀀴􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀀧􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀱􀀦􀀢􀀲􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀁 􀀩􀀭􀀥􀀩􀀤􀀢􀀳􀀦􀀥􀀁 􀀩􀀭􀀁
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀋􀀗􀀕􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀈􀀣􀀥􀀢􀀚􀀧􀀁􀀤􀀢􀀲􀀦􀀃􀀆
􀀋􀀗􀀘􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃
􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁐􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁎􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀐􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀳􀀱􀀦􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀦􀀲􀀆
􀀋􀀗􀀙􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁜􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃
􀀭􀀮􀀳􀀁 􀀣􀀦􀀁 􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀩􀀱􀀦􀀫􀀸􀀁 􀀤􀀮􀀨􀀦􀀱􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀄􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀱􀀦􀀁 􀀩􀀲􀀁 􀀢􀀁 􀀤􀀫􀀦􀀢􀀱􀀁 􀀳􀀱􀀦􀀭􀀥􀀁 􀀳􀀮􀀶􀀢􀀱􀀥􀀲􀀁
􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀂳􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀏􀀃
􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀑
􀀂􀀧􀀃􀀁 􀀒􀀥􀀚􀀖􀀧􀀞􀀚􀀦􀀁􀀛􀀣􀀥􀀁􀀧􀀝􀀚􀀁􀀞􀀢􀀧􀀚􀀥􀀢􀀖􀀧􀀞􀀣􀀢􀀖􀀠􀀁􀀤􀀥􀀣􀀧􀀚􀀘􀀧􀀞􀀣􀀢􀀁􀀁
􀀣􀀛􀀁􀀝􀀨􀀡􀀖􀀢􀀁􀀥􀀞􀀜􀀝􀀧􀀦
􀀂􀀋􀀎􀀃􀀁 􀀡􀀱􀀩􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀲􀀁􀀬􀀢􀀪􀀦􀀁􀀵􀀦􀀱􀀸􀀁􀀧􀀦􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀧􀀦􀀱􀀦􀀭􀀤􀀦􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀮􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀲􀀳􀀢􀀳􀀴􀀲􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀮􀀱􀀁
􀀯􀀱􀀦􀀲􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀯􀀮􀀲􀀦􀀲􀀄􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀳􀀱􀀦􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀦􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀩􀀭􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀭􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀢􀀫􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀮􀀳􀀦􀀤􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀃
􀀰􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀀅
􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀩􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁑􀁈􀁊􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀯􀀱􀀮􀀣􀀫􀀦􀀬􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀒􀀱􀀳􀀩􀀤􀀫􀀦􀀁􀀋􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀏􀀌􀀁􀀱􀀦􀀲􀀮􀀫􀀴􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁􀀗􀀭􀀲􀀳􀀩􀀳􀀴􀀳􀀦􀀁
􀀮􀀧􀀁􀀗􀀭􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀭􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀢􀀫􀀁􀀙􀀢􀀶􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀮􀀵􀀩􀀥􀀦􀀲􀀄􀀁􀀨􀀮􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀦􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀨􀀢􀀳
􀀾􀁗􀁀􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀅
􀀢􀀫􀀫􀀸􀀁 􀀳􀀮􀀁 􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀬􀀩􀀭􀀢􀀳􀀦􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀳􀀮􀀁 􀀲􀀴􀀲􀀯􀀦􀀭􀀥􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀮􀀯􀀦􀀱􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀳􀀱􀀦􀀢􀀳􀀸􀀁 􀀯􀀱􀀮􀀵􀀩􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀁 􀀱􀀦􀀅
􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁚􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃
􀀯􀀱􀀮􀀵􀀩􀀥􀀦􀀲􀀆􀀁
􀀒􀀱􀀳􀀩􀀤􀀫􀀦􀀁 􀀋􀀁 􀀶􀀢􀀲􀀁 􀀢􀀥􀀮􀀯􀀳􀀦􀀥􀀁 􀀣􀀸􀀁 􀀊􀀍􀀁 􀀵􀀮􀀳􀀦􀀲􀀁 􀀳􀀮􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀭􀀦􀀄􀀁 􀀶􀀩􀀳􀀨􀀁 􀀉􀀁
􀀢􀀣􀀲􀀳􀀦􀀭􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀲􀀆􀀋􀀏􀀇
􀀋􀀗􀀛􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀀅
􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀬􀀢􀀸􀀁 􀀣􀀦􀀁 􀀵􀀩􀀦􀀶􀀦􀀥􀀁 􀀢􀀲􀀁 􀀢􀀁 􀀭􀀢􀀳􀀴􀀱􀀢􀀫􀀁 􀀦􀀷􀀳􀀦􀀭􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀳􀀨􀀦􀀁 􀀲􀀳􀀢􀀳􀀴􀀲􀀁
􀀢􀀤􀀤􀀮􀀱􀀥􀀦􀀥􀀁 􀀳􀀮􀀁 􀀳􀀱􀀦􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀦􀀲􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀩􀀦􀀭􀀥􀀲􀀨􀀩􀀯􀀄􀀁 􀀤􀀮􀀬􀀬􀀦􀀱􀀤􀀦􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁 􀀭􀀢􀀵􀀩􀀅
􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁆􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁜􀀑
􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁖􀀝
􀀋􀀎􀀏􀀁􀀎􀀖􀀦􀀞􀀢􀀞􀀡􀀤􀀣􀀥􀀧􀀁 􀀵􀀆􀀁 􀀑􀀘􀀣􀀧􀀧􀀞􀀦􀀝􀀁 􀀎􀀚􀀘􀀝􀀖􀀢􀀞􀀘􀀖􀀠􀀁 􀀍􀀞􀀜􀀝􀀧􀀁 􀀌􀀢􀀙􀀨􀀦􀀧􀀥􀀞􀀚􀀦􀀁 􀀍􀀧􀀙􀀂􀀁 􀀂􀀲􀀦􀀦􀀁
􀀧􀀮􀀮􀀳􀀭􀀮􀀳􀀦􀀁􀀋􀀋􀀈􀀁􀀢􀀣􀀮􀀵􀀦􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀌􀀍􀀇􀀄􀀁􀀢􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀌􀀍􀀋􀀆
􀀋􀀎􀀐􀀁􀀯􀁄􀁑􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁌􀁒􀀃􀀥􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁛􀀁􀀵􀀆􀀁􀀶􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁗􀁪􀀃􀀤􀁝􀁄􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁈􀀃􀀹􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁏􀀄􀀁􀀗􀀙􀀞􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀫􀀆􀀁􀀎􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀏􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀁
􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀌􀀐􀀌􀀆
􀀋􀀏􀀇􀀁􀀗􀀭􀀲􀀳􀀩􀀳􀀴􀀳􀀦􀀁 􀀮􀀧􀀁 􀀗􀀭􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀭􀀢􀀳􀀩􀀮􀀭􀀢􀀫􀀁 􀀙􀀢􀀶􀀄􀀁 􀀔􀀚􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀣􀀣􀀟􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀮􀀫􀀆􀀁 􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀁 􀀝􀀢􀀱􀀳􀀁 􀀗􀀗􀀁 􀀂􀀲􀀦􀀦􀀁
􀀧􀀮􀀮􀀳􀀭􀀮􀀳􀀦􀀁􀀋􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀢􀀣􀀮􀀵􀀦􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀇􀀇􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀥􀀁􀀉􀀉􀀈􀀆
􀀃 􀀨􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀁 􀀂􀀃􀀄
􀀤􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀀢􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀣􀀠􀀚􀀝􀀘􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀓􀀱􀀷􀀴􀀶􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀚􀀷􀀵􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀩􀀁 􀀵􀀶􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀨􀀁 􀀬􀀰􀀁 􀀬􀀶􀀵􀀁 􀀥􀀨􀀸􀀬􀀵􀀱􀀴􀀻􀀁 􀀱􀀲􀀬􀀰􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀰􀀷􀀧􀀮􀀩􀀥􀀴􀀁 􀀹􀀩􀀥􀀲􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁
􀀣􀀌􀀖􀀘􀀒􀀛􀀚􀀢􀀥􀀁􀀞􀀗􀀁􀀢􀀙􀀖􀀁􀀏􀀙􀀠􀀖􀀒􀀢􀀁􀀞􀀠􀀁􀀐􀀡􀀖􀀁􀀞􀀗􀀁􀀍􀀣􀀔􀀛􀀖􀀒􀀠􀀁􀀑􀀖􀀒􀀟􀀞􀀝􀀡􀀄􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀲􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀄􀀁
􀀊􀀃􀀈􀀃􀀋􀀃􀀁 􀀎􀀖􀀟􀀞􀀠􀀢􀀡􀀁 􀀄􀀇􀀇􀀅􀀄􀀁 􀀲􀀆􀀁 􀀉􀀉􀀍􀀤􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀁 􀀽􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀶􀀩􀀧􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀙􀀰􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀰􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀥􀀮􀀁
􀀦􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀀾􀁒􀁑􀁀􀀃 􀀦􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀳􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁆􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀹􀀥􀀴􀀄􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀧􀀩􀀲􀀶􀀁􀀦􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀩􀀴􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀑􀀴􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀮􀀩􀀁􀀋􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀓􀀱􀀸􀀩􀀰􀀥􀀰􀀶􀀁􀀹􀀫􀀩􀀴􀀩􀀦􀀻􀀁􀀧􀀩􀀴􀀶􀀥􀀬􀀰􀀁
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁜􀂴􀀃
􀀣􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀥􀀴􀀥􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀌􀀤􀀆􀀁􀀠􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀝􀀣􀀔􀀛􀀖􀀒􀀠􀀁􀀤􀀖􀀒􀀟􀀞􀀝􀀡􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀬􀀰􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀬􀀵􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀧􀀮􀀱􀀵􀀩􀀵􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁
􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃
􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀃
􀀓􀀱􀀯􀀯􀀬􀀵􀀵􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀶􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀨􀀁 􀀬􀀰􀀁 􀀬􀀶􀀵􀀁 􀀓􀀱􀀯􀀯􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀥􀀴􀀻􀀁 􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀥􀀴􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀮􀀩􀀵􀀁 􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀵􀀲􀀱􀀰􀀅
􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁚􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁉􀁘􀁏􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁜􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀂳􀀾􀁄􀁀􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁉􀁘􀁏􀁑􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀂴􀀑􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀀅
􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀋􀀎􀀈
􀀋􀀘􀀓􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀋􀀎􀀉􀀁􀀠􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀶􀀥􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀓􀀱􀀯􀀯􀀬􀀵􀀵􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀫􀀥􀀵􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀶􀀁
􀀦􀀩􀀩􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀨􀀩􀀥􀀮􀀁􀀹􀀬􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀵􀀷􀀧􀀫􀀁􀀯􀀥􀀶􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀵􀀷􀀦􀀵􀀶􀀥􀀰􀀧􀀩􀀁􀀦􀀷􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀶􀀁
􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁘􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀀅
􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀸􀀥􀀮􀀬􀀨􀀬􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀥􀀴􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀷􀀮􀀥􀀴􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀩􀀵􀀆􀀁􀀙􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀬􀀵􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀰􀀩􀀧􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁊􀀅
􀀥􀀦􀀬􀀮􀀬􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀧􀀩􀀴􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀩􀀴􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀬􀀵􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁
􀀬􀀵􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀮􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀬􀀵􀀵􀀷􀀩􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀶􀀬􀀰􀀷􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀯􀀬􀀰􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁
􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂴􀀃
􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀀯􀀥􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀶􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀵􀀷􀀮􀀶􀀁 􀀬􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀷􀀵􀀲􀀩􀀰􀀵􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀴􀀁 􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀯􀀬􀀰􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀑􀀶􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀩􀀰􀀨􀀁
􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀨􀀥􀀻􀀄􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀥􀀲􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀲􀀴􀀬􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀁 􀀧􀀴􀀬􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀬􀀥􀀁 􀀥􀀴􀀩􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀵􀀩􀀁 􀀮􀀥􀀬􀀨􀀁 􀀨􀀱􀀹􀀰􀀁
􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀥􀀪􀀶􀀁􀀥􀀴􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀮􀀩􀀁􀀋􀀆􀀁􀀠􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀩􀀴􀀧􀀬􀀵􀀩􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀥􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀲􀀩􀀶􀀩􀀰􀀧􀀩􀀁􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀨􀀩􀀴􀀱􀀅
􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀑
􀀂􀀌􀀈􀀃􀀁 􀀖􀀬􀀰􀀥􀀮􀀮􀀻􀀄􀀁􀀬􀀶􀀁􀀹􀀬􀀮􀀮􀀁􀀦􀀩􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀯􀀩􀀯􀀦􀀩􀀴􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀄􀀁􀀷􀀰􀀨􀀩􀀴􀀁􀀥􀀴􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀮􀀩􀀁􀀈􀀈􀀁
􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀩􀀵􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀥􀀪􀀶􀀁􀀥􀀴􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀮􀀩􀀵􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀩􀀴􀀶􀀥􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀬􀀵􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀰􀀥􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃
􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀯􀀬􀀰􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀵􀀷􀀵􀀲􀀩􀀰􀀨􀀩􀀨􀀆􀀁􀀠􀀫􀀬􀀵􀀁􀀨􀀱􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀯􀀩􀀥􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀵􀀥􀀯􀀩􀀁
􀀬􀀵􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀷􀀩􀀁􀀪􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀱􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀴􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀬􀀵􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀳􀀷􀀬􀀴􀀩􀀯􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀥􀀴􀀶􀀅
􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀀅
􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀀹􀀫􀀬􀀧􀀫􀀁􀀯􀀥􀀻􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀶􀀬􀀰􀀷􀀩􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀩􀀴􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀩􀀸􀀩􀀰􀀁􀀬􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀵􀀩􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀨􀀱􀀁
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁚􀁄􀁜􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁖􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁏􀂿􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀑
􀀋􀁊􀀌􀀃 􀀏􀀠􀀖􀀒􀀢􀀚􀀖􀀡􀀁􀀠􀀖􀀛􀀒􀀢􀀚􀀝􀀘􀀁􀀢􀀞􀀁􀀢􀀙􀀖􀀁􀀚􀀝􀀢􀀖􀀠􀀝􀀒􀀢􀀚􀀞􀀝􀀒􀀛􀀁􀀟􀀠􀀞􀀢􀀖􀀔􀀢􀀚􀀞􀀝􀀁􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗
􀀂􀀌􀀉􀀃􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀵􀀶􀀁􀀩􀀰􀀸􀀬􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀯􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀥􀀮􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀨􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀶􀀥􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀲􀀴􀀩􀀵􀀵􀀁
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁇􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀀅
􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀥􀀮􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀶􀀩􀀧􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀰􀀸􀀬􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀯􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀁􀀥􀀴􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀶􀀴􀀩􀀯􀀩􀀮􀀻􀀁􀀸􀀥􀀴􀀬􀀩􀀨􀀆􀀋􀀎􀀊
􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀃􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀝􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁈􀂴􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁐􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀋􀁉􀁒􀁒􀁗􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀛􀀜􀀃
􀀥􀀦􀀱􀀸􀀩􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀥􀀴􀀥􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀉􀀁􀀂􀀪􀀱􀀱􀀶􀀰􀀱􀀶􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀯􀀬􀀶􀀶􀀩􀀨􀀃􀀆
􀀋􀀎􀀉􀀁􀀟􀀩􀀩􀀁 􀀥􀀮􀀵􀀱􀀁 􀀞􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀵􀀶􀀄􀀁 􀀊􀀝􀀢􀀖􀀠􀀝􀀒􀀢􀀚􀀞􀀝􀀒􀀛􀀁 􀀉􀀣􀀜􀀒􀀝􀀁 􀀎􀀚􀀘􀀙􀀢􀀡􀀁 􀀒􀀝􀀕􀀁 􀀉􀀣􀀜􀀒􀀝􀀂
􀀚􀀢􀀒􀀠􀀚􀀒􀀝􀀁􀀌􀀒􀀤􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁌􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀚􀂱􀀕􀀚􀀙􀀑
􀀋􀀎􀀊􀀁􀀟􀀩􀀩􀀁 􀀝􀀆􀀁 􀀟􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀵􀀄􀀁 􀀳􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀨􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀄􀀁
􀀕􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀏􀀃 􀀦􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁌􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀖􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁓􀀑􀀃 􀀖􀀓􀀚􀂱􀀖􀀔􀀙􀀞􀀃 􀀳􀀑􀀃 􀀥􀁌􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀀤􀀑􀀃 􀀥􀁒􀁜􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀦􀀑􀀃 􀀵􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀏􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀨􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀄􀀁
􀀖􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀏􀀃􀀲􀁛􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁇􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀜􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀘􀂱􀀕􀀓􀀛􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀮􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃
􀀒􀀥􀀰􀀰􀀩􀀮􀀬􀀩􀀴􀀄􀀁􀀯􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁏􀂶􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁰􀀄􀀁
􀀝􀀥􀀴􀀬􀀵􀀄􀀁􀀝􀀩􀀨􀀱􀀰􀀩􀀄􀀁􀀉􀀇􀀇􀀈􀀆
􀀋􀀘􀀖􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁇􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀙􀀰􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀰􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀥􀀮􀀁 􀀓􀀱􀀷􀀴􀀶􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀚􀀷􀀵􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀩􀀁 􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀌􀀖􀀘􀀒􀀛􀀚􀀢􀀥􀀁 􀀞􀀗􀀁 􀀢􀀙􀀖􀀁
􀀏􀀙􀀠􀀖􀀒􀀢􀀁􀀞􀀠􀀁􀀐􀀡􀀖􀀁􀀞􀀗􀀁􀀍􀀣􀀔􀀛􀀖􀀒􀀠􀀁􀀑􀀖􀀒􀀟􀀞􀀝􀀡􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀨􀀬􀀧􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀷􀀬􀀶􀀩􀀁􀀧􀀮􀀩􀀥􀀴􀀮􀀻􀀄􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀀥􀀮􀀮􀀁􀀩􀀰􀀸􀀬􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀯􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀥􀀮􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀥􀀲􀀲􀀮􀀻􀀁􀀦􀀱􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀩􀀥􀀧􀀩􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀬􀀯􀀩􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀶􀀴􀀥􀀴􀀻􀀆􀀋􀀎􀀋
􀀂􀀌􀀋􀀃􀀁 􀀙􀀰􀀁􀀬􀀶􀀵􀀁􀀥􀀨􀀸􀀬􀀵􀀱􀀴􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀬􀀰􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀌􀀖􀀘􀀒􀀛􀀚􀀢􀀥􀀁􀀞􀀗􀀁􀀢􀀙􀀖􀀁􀀏􀀙􀀠􀀖􀀒􀀢􀀁
􀀞􀀠􀀁 􀀐􀀡􀀖􀀁 􀀞􀀗􀀁 􀀍􀀣􀀔􀀛􀀖􀀒􀀠􀀁 􀀑􀀖􀀒􀀟􀀞􀀝􀀡􀀄􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀓􀀱􀀷􀀴􀀶􀀁 􀀪􀀱􀀴􀀯􀀷􀀮􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀨􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁
􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀝
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀷􀀵􀀩􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀰􀀷􀀧􀀮􀀩􀀥􀀴􀀁􀀹􀀩􀀥􀀲􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀷􀀮􀀨􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀶􀀬􀀶􀀷􀀶􀀩􀀁􀀥􀀁􀀧􀀥􀀶􀀥􀀵􀀶􀀴􀀱􀀲􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀪􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁
􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁅􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀅
􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃 􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁏􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀥􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀵􀀁􀀦􀀩􀀻􀀱􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀰􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀥􀀮􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀶􀀴􀀱􀀮􀀁􀀬􀀵􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀁􀀲􀀥􀀴􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀴􀀲􀀷􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀅
􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑
􀀘􀀱􀀹􀀩􀀸􀀩􀀴􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀓􀀱􀀷􀀴􀀶􀀁􀀬􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀸􀀬􀀩􀀹􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀬􀀵􀀵􀀷􀀩􀀁􀀬􀀵􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀹􀀫􀀩􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀴􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁓􀀅
􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃 􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑
􀀠􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀓􀀱􀀷􀀴􀀶􀀁􀀨􀀱􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀬􀀨􀀩􀀴􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀶􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀳􀀷􀀩􀀵􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀷􀀮􀀨􀀁􀀫􀀥􀀸􀀩􀀁
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃
􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁕􀀅
􀀱􀀰􀀯􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀆􀀁 􀀜􀀱􀀰􀀩􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀮􀀩􀀵􀀵􀀄􀀁 􀀟􀀶􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀵􀀁 􀀯􀀷􀀵􀀶􀀁 􀀶􀀥􀀭􀀩􀀁 􀀩􀀰􀀸􀀬􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀯􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀥􀀮􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀬􀀨􀀩􀀴􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁕􀁒􀁑􀀅
􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁊􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀪􀀱􀀴􀀯􀀬􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀹􀀬􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀬􀀰􀀧􀀬􀀲􀀮􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀰􀀩􀀧􀀩􀀵􀀵􀀬􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀴􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀥􀀮􀀬􀀶􀀻􀀆
􀀠􀀫􀀬􀀵􀀁􀀥􀀲􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀥􀀧􀀫􀀁􀀬􀀵􀀁􀀵􀀷􀀲􀀲􀀱􀀴􀀶􀀩􀀨􀀄􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀨􀀩􀀩􀀨􀀄􀀁􀀦􀀻􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀯􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀝􀀴􀀬􀀰􀀧􀀬􀀲􀀮􀀩􀀁􀀉􀀋􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁
􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀞􀀬􀀱􀀁􀀔􀀩􀀧􀀮􀀥􀀴􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀹􀀫􀀬􀀧􀀫􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀬􀀨􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀐
􀀽􀀢􀀥􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀴􀀩􀀁 􀀬􀀵􀀁 􀀬􀀰􀀫􀀩􀀴􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀮􀀻􀀁 􀀨􀀩􀀵􀀶􀀴􀀷􀀧􀀶􀀬􀀸􀀩􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀵􀀷􀀵􀀶􀀥􀀬􀀰􀀥􀀦􀀮􀀩􀀁 􀀨􀀩􀀸􀀩􀀮􀀱􀀲􀀯􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀆􀀁
􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁓􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀑􀂴
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀖􀀘􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀘􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀑􀀨􀀨􀀬􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀥􀀮􀀁􀀝􀀴􀀱􀀶􀀱􀀧􀀱􀀮􀀁􀀙􀀁􀀣􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀗􀀩􀀰􀀩􀀸􀀥􀀁􀀓􀀱􀀰􀀸􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀪􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀶􀀩􀀧􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁
􀀹􀀥􀀴􀀁􀀸􀀬􀀧􀀶􀀬􀀯􀀵􀀤􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀬􀀨􀀩􀀁􀀥􀀨􀀨􀀬􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀥􀀮􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀶􀀩􀀧􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀪􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀰􀀸􀀬􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀯􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀆􀀁􀀠􀀥􀀭􀀩􀀰􀀁
􀁗􀁒􀁊􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁒􀁇􀁜􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀀐􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁕􀁒􀁑􀀅
􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁐􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀞􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁋􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁉􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁐􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀀅
􀁋􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁉􀁘􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀵􀀩􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀬􀀵􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀆􀀋􀀎􀀌
􀀋􀀘􀀘􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀥􀀁 􀀲􀀴􀀩􀀵􀀷􀀯􀀲􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀁 􀀩􀀰􀀸􀀬􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀯􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀥􀀮􀀁 􀀶􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀩􀀵􀀁 􀀥􀀲􀀲􀀮􀀻􀀁 􀀬􀀰􀀁 􀀧􀀥􀀵􀀩􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁌􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀀅
􀁆􀁌􀂿􀁆􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀋􀀎􀀍
􀀋􀀎􀀋􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀝􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁈􀂴􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁐􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀋􀁉􀁒􀁒􀁗􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀛􀀜􀀃
􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀛􀃭􀀙􀀖􀀑
􀀋􀀎􀀌􀀁􀀌􀀖􀀘􀀒􀀛􀀚􀀢􀀥􀀁 􀀞􀀗􀀁 􀀢􀀙􀀖􀀁 􀀏􀀙􀀠􀀖􀀒􀀢􀀁 􀀞􀀠􀀁 􀀐􀀡􀀖􀀁 􀀞􀀗􀀁 􀀍􀀣􀀔􀀛􀀖􀀒􀀠􀀁 􀀑􀀖􀀒􀀟􀀞􀀝􀀡􀀁 􀀂􀀵􀀩􀀩􀀁
􀁉􀁒􀁒􀁗􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀘􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀔􀂱􀀕􀀗􀀕􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀜􀃭􀀖􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀺􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁒􀀃
􀀔􀀩􀀧􀀮􀀥􀀴􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀕􀀰􀀸􀀬􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀯􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀔􀀩􀀸􀀩􀀮􀀱􀀲􀀯􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀁􀀂􀀞􀀬􀀱􀀁􀀔􀀩􀀧􀀮􀀥􀀴􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀩􀀩􀀁
􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀨􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁏􀀂
􀁒􀁓􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀭􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁌􀁕􀁒􀀏􀀃􀀖􀂱􀀔􀀗􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀕􀀁􀀂􀀡􀀰􀀬􀀶􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀜􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀲􀀷􀀦􀀮􀀬􀀧􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁
􀀶􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀨􀀑􀀜􀀖􀀑􀀬􀀑􀀛􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁐􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁙􀁒􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀝􀀃􀀎􀀖􀀡􀀞􀀛􀀣􀀢􀀚􀀞􀀝􀀡􀀁􀀒􀀕􀀞􀀟􀀢􀀖􀀕􀀁􀀓􀀥􀀁􀀢􀀙􀀖􀀁
􀀈􀀞􀀝􀀗􀀖􀀠􀀖􀀝􀀔􀀖􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀵􀀱􀀮􀀷􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀈􀀄􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀰􀀩􀀺􀀁􀀙􀀆
􀀋􀀎􀀍􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀀧􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁎􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀀏􀀃􀂳􀀱􀁘􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁄􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀢􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀍􀀣􀀔􀀛􀀖􀀒􀀠􀀁􀀑􀀖􀀒􀀟􀀞􀀝􀀡􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀂴􀀏􀀃􀀥􀀼􀀥􀀬􀀯􀀃
􀀄􀀇􀀇􀀆􀀄􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀮􀀆􀀁􀀍􀀎􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀏􀀏􀀎􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀎􀀊􀀼􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀆
􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀁 􀀉􀀌􀀕􀀔􀀖􀀘􀀁􀀔􀀍􀀁􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀁􀀇􀀓􀀘􀀌􀀖􀀓􀀊􀀘􀀏􀀔􀀓􀀊􀀑􀀁􀀈􀀊􀀙􀀁􀀆􀀔􀀒􀀒􀀏􀀗􀀗􀀏􀀔􀀓􀀁􀀔􀀓􀀁􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀁􀀙􀀔􀀖􀀐􀀁􀀔􀀍􀀁􀀏􀀘􀀗􀀁􀀗􀀏􀀚􀀘􀀛􀀂􀀘􀀎􀀏􀀖􀀋􀀁􀀗􀀌􀀗􀀗􀀏􀀔􀀓
􀀂􀀯􀀃􀀁 􀀎􀀠􀀔􀀐􀀢􀀘􀀔􀀡􀀁􀀠􀀔􀀚􀀐􀀢􀀘􀀜􀀖􀀁􀀢􀀝􀀁􀀘􀀜􀀢􀀔􀀠􀀜􀀐􀀢􀀘􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀚􀀁􀀤􀀐􀀢􀀔􀀠􀀒􀀝􀀣􀀠􀀡􀀔􀀡􀀁􀀐􀀜􀀓􀀁
􀀠􀀔􀀚􀀐􀀢􀀔􀀓􀀁􀀘􀀜􀀡􀀢􀀐􀀚􀀚􀀐􀀢􀀘􀀝􀀜􀀡􀀁􀀐􀀜􀀓􀀁􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀘􀀚􀀘􀀢􀀘􀀔􀀡
􀀋􀀘􀀙􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁙􀁌􀀅
􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃
􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀳􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀶􀀩􀀸􀀩􀀺􀀭􀀲􀀿􀀆
􀀂􀀍􀀏􀀃􀀁 􀀣􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀶􀀰􀀫􀀺􀀻􀀸􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀹􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀵􀀽􀀭􀀼􀀭􀀸􀀄􀀁􀀮􀀩􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀳􀀁􀀹􀀰􀀳􀀶􀀲􀀭􀀆􀀁􀀣􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀶􀀸􀀩􀀫􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁗􀁝􀁐􀁄􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀝
􀀦􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀀁 􀀩􀀲􀀲􀀁 􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁 􀀶􀀩􀀸􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀹􀀁 􀀺􀀵􀀁 􀀩􀀁 􀀫􀀵􀀴􀀼􀀭􀀴􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀄􀀁 􀀽􀀯􀀩􀀺􀀭􀀼􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀰􀀺􀀹􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀺􀀻􀀸􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀀩􀀸􀀭􀀁
􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁐􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃
􀀩􀀹􀀁 􀀰􀀮􀀁 􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁 􀀫􀀵􀀴􀀼􀀭􀀴􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀁 􀀽􀀭􀀸􀀭􀀁 􀀩􀀁 􀀪􀀰􀀲􀀩􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀩􀀲􀀁 􀀵􀀴􀀭􀀆􀀁 􀀗􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀰􀀴􀀹􀀺􀀩􀀴􀀫􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁 􀀫􀀲􀀩􀀹􀀹􀀁 􀀵􀀮􀀁
􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀐􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀁖􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀫􀀭􀀸􀀺􀀩􀀰􀀴􀀁􀀫􀀩􀀴􀀩􀀲􀀹􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀁􀀽􀀩􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀽􀀩􀀿􀀹􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀸􀀭􀀭􀀬􀀵􀀳􀀁􀀩􀀴􀀬􀀁􀀭􀀷􀀻􀀩􀀲􀀰􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀁􀀫􀀵􀀳􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀫􀀭􀀁
􀀰􀀴􀀁􀀫􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀴􀀰􀀩􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀸􀀭􀀩􀀹􀀄􀀁􀀽􀀰􀀲􀀲􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀪􀀭􀀁􀀩􀀮􀀮􀀭􀀫􀀺􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀪􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀩􀀫􀀺􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀩􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀁􀀽􀀩􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀩􀀹􀀁􀀪􀀸􀀵􀀱􀀭􀀴􀀁
􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀪􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀫􀀵􀀴􀀺􀀰􀀴􀀻􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀴􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀹􀀺􀀭􀀴􀀫􀀭􀀁􀀩􀀴􀀬􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀰􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀶􀀭􀀸􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀁􀀩􀀻􀀺􀀵􀀳􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀫􀀩􀀲􀀲􀀿􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀼􀀰􀀼􀀭􀀹􀀁
􀀧􀀵􀀴􀀨􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀹􀀺􀀵􀀸􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀁􀀶􀀭􀀩􀀫􀀭􀀆􀀌􀀐􀀏
􀀋􀀘􀀛􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁚􀁄􀁜􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀔􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀔􀀯􀀩􀀸􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀤􀀴􀀰􀀺􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀞􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀹􀀆􀀌􀀐􀀐
􀀋􀀘􀀜􀀌􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀂿􀁆􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀃
􀀖􀀾􀀩􀀳􀀶􀀲􀀭􀀹􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀫􀀯􀀁􀀺􀀸􀀭􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀹􀀁􀀰􀀴􀀫􀀲􀀻􀀬􀀭􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀉􀀐􀀐􀀐􀀁􀀔􀀵􀀴􀀼􀀭􀀴􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀁􀀪􀀭􀀅
􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀐􀀫􀁘􀁑􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀏􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀏􀀃􀀪􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀥􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀏􀀃
􀀬􀁗􀁄􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁓􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀷􀁘􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃 􀁑􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀶􀁘􀁈􀁝􀀃 􀀦􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀋􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃
􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀌􀀞􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀕􀀕􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀱􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀨􀁏􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀀋􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀑􀀃 􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀞􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀔􀀜􀀃 􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀠􀀭􀀩􀀫􀀭􀀁 􀀪􀀭􀀺􀀽􀀭􀀭􀀴􀀁 􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁 􀀒􀀲􀀲􀀰􀀭􀀬􀀁 􀀩􀀴􀀬􀀁 􀀒􀀹􀀹􀀵􀀫􀀰􀀩􀀺􀀭􀀬􀀁 􀀠􀀵􀀽􀀭􀀸􀀹􀀁 􀀩􀀴􀀬􀀁
􀀘􀀭􀀸􀀳􀀩􀀴􀀿􀀁 􀀂􀀣􀀸􀀭􀀩􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀮􀀁 􀀥􀀭􀀸􀀹􀀩􀀰􀀲􀀲􀀭􀀹􀀃􀀁 􀀩􀀹􀀁 􀀰􀀺􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀲􀀩􀀺􀀭􀀹􀀁 􀀺􀀵􀀁 􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁 􀀛􀀰􀀭􀀲􀀁
􀀦􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀋􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀛􀀓􀂱􀀖􀀛􀀙􀀌􀀞􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀵􀁰􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀞􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀚􀀚􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁐􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀞􀀌􀀐􀀑􀀁
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀚􀀚􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀱􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀀩􀀴􀀬􀀁􀀟􀀶􀀭􀀸􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀠􀀩􀀴􀀩􀀳􀀩􀀁􀀔􀀩􀀴􀀩􀀲􀀆􀀌􀀑􀀈
􀀋􀀙􀀓􀀌􀀃 􀀦􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀕􀀔􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀵􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀱􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁚􀁄􀁜􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀀺􀀯􀀩􀀺
􀀾􀁗􀁀􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀴􀀭􀀻􀀺􀀸􀀩􀀲􀀹􀀁􀀰􀀴􀀁􀀺􀀰􀀳􀀭􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀁􀀽􀀩􀀸􀀆􀀁􀀣􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀢􀀺􀀩􀀺􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀁􀀹􀀯􀀩􀀲􀀲􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀵􀀽􀀭􀀼􀀭􀀸􀀄􀀁􀀫􀀵􀀴􀀺􀀰􀀴􀀻􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀴􀀁􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀫􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀴􀀁
􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁗􀀑
􀀂􀀎􀀉􀀃􀀁 􀀣􀀯􀀭􀀁 􀀉􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀁 􀀔􀀵􀀴􀀼􀀭􀀴􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀁 􀀵􀀴􀀁 􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁 􀀜􀀩􀀽􀀁 􀀵􀀮􀀁 􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁 􀀞􀀵􀀴􀀅
􀁑􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀸􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀜􀀝
􀀉􀀜􀀢􀀔􀀠􀀜􀀐􀀢􀀘􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀚􀀁 􀀤􀀐􀀢􀀔􀀠􀀒􀀝􀀣􀀠􀀡􀀔􀀡􀀁 􀀐􀀜􀀓􀀁 􀀘􀀜􀀡􀀢􀀐􀀚􀀚􀀐􀀢􀀘􀀝􀀜􀀡􀀁 􀀘􀀜􀀁 􀀢􀀘􀀛􀀔􀀁 􀀝􀀕􀀁 􀀐􀀠􀀛􀀔􀀓􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗
􀀌􀀐􀀏􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁗􀁝􀁐􀁄􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀋􀁉􀁒􀁒􀁗􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀔􀀘􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀔􀀙􀀑
􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀭􀀁􀀡􀀆􀀁􀀡􀀆􀀁􀀓􀀩􀀾􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀄􀀁􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁚􀁄􀁜􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀀂
􀀢􀀘􀀒􀀣􀀚􀀐􀀠􀀁 􀀌􀀔􀀖􀀐􀀠􀀓􀀁 􀀢􀀝􀀁 􀀉􀀜􀀢􀀔􀀠􀀝􀀒􀀔􀀐􀀜􀀘􀀒􀀁 􀀇􀀐􀀜􀀐􀀚􀀡􀀏􀀃 􀀦􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁕􀁌􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃 􀀋􀀰􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁖􀀌􀀏􀀃
􀀙􀀩􀀸􀀼􀀩􀀸􀀬􀀁􀀤􀀴􀀰􀀼􀀭􀀸􀀹􀀰􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀠􀀸􀀭􀀹􀀹􀀄􀀁􀀉􀀑􀀎􀀌􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀈􀀍􀀆
􀀌􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁗􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀧􀀑􀀦􀀑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀚􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀚􀀚􀀏􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀀅
􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀹􀀄􀀁􀀎􀀠􀀔􀀐􀀢􀀥􀀁􀀍􀀔􀀠􀀘􀀔􀀡􀀄􀀁􀀼􀀵􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀊􀀐􀀈􀀄􀀁􀀞􀀵􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀉􀀈􀀐􀀎􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀆􀀁􀀋􀀆􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀭􀀁􀀩􀀲􀀹􀀵􀀁􀀚􀀜􀀝􀀄􀀁􀀼􀀵􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀎􀀁
􀀂􀀉􀀑􀀏􀀏􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀈􀀊􀀊􀀆
􀀌􀀑􀀈􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁗􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀧􀀑􀀦􀀑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀚􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀚􀀚􀀏􀀃􀀬􀀯􀀰􀀏􀀃􀁙􀁒􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀃
􀀂􀀉􀀑􀀏􀀏􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀈􀀌􀀈􀀆
􀀚􀀴􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀴􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀩􀀲􀀁 􀀽􀀩􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀫􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀹􀀭􀀹􀀁 􀀩􀀴􀀬􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀲􀀩􀀺􀀭􀀬􀀁 􀀰􀀴􀀹􀀺􀀩􀀲􀀲􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀹􀀄􀀁 􀀮􀀩􀀫􀀰􀀲􀀰􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀹􀀁 􀀩􀀴􀀬􀀁
􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀁖􀀃 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀀩􀀴􀀬􀀁 􀀸􀀻􀀲􀀭􀀹􀀁 􀀵􀀮􀀁 􀀰􀀴􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀴􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀩􀀲􀀁 􀀲􀀩􀀽􀀁 􀀩􀀶􀀶􀀲􀀰􀀫􀀩􀀪􀀲􀀭􀀁 􀀰􀀴􀀁 􀀰􀀴􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀴􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀩􀀲􀀁 􀀩􀀴􀀬􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀴􀀅
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃
􀀶􀀸􀀰􀀴􀀫􀀰􀀶􀀲􀀭􀀹􀀁􀀩􀀴􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀻􀀲􀀭􀀹􀀆
􀀋􀀙􀀕􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀑
􀀂􀀰􀀃􀀁 􀀎􀀠􀀔􀀐􀀢􀀘􀀔􀀡􀀁􀀠􀀔􀀚􀀐􀀢􀀘􀀜􀀖􀀁􀀢􀀝􀀁􀀐􀀟􀀣􀀘􀀕􀀔􀀠􀀡􀀁􀀐􀀜􀀓􀀁􀀠􀀔􀀚􀀐􀀢􀀔􀀓􀀁
􀀘􀀜􀀡􀀢􀀐􀀚􀀚􀀐􀀢􀀘􀀝􀀜􀀡􀀁􀀐􀀜􀀓􀀁􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀘􀀚􀀘􀀢􀀘􀀔􀀡
􀀂􀀎􀀋􀀃􀀁 􀀢􀀰􀀳􀀰􀀲􀀩􀀸􀀁 􀀫􀀵􀀴􀀹􀀰􀀬􀀭􀀸􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀹􀀁 􀀽􀀵􀀻􀀲􀀬􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀀭􀀳􀀁 􀀺􀀵􀀁 􀀩􀀶􀀶􀀲􀀿􀀁
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀰􀀴􀀹􀀺􀀩􀀲􀀲􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀹􀀁􀀩􀀴􀀬􀀁􀀮􀀩􀀫􀀰􀀲􀀰􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀹􀀆􀀁􀀘􀀸􀀵􀀻􀀴􀀬􀀽􀀩􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀫􀀵􀀴􀀹􀀺􀀰􀀺􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀹􀀁􀀩􀀪􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀑􀀏􀀁 􀀶􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀫􀀭􀀴􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀮􀀁 􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁 􀀽􀀵􀀸􀀲􀀬􀁁􀀹􀀁 􀀮􀀸􀀭􀀹􀀯􀀁 􀀽􀀩􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀹􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀫􀀭􀀹􀀆􀀁 􀀢􀀵􀀳􀀭􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀱􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁑􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀸􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃 􀀋􀀙􀀔􀀌􀀃
􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃
􀀲􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁚􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃
􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀹􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀁􀀲􀀰􀀺􀀺􀀲􀀭􀀁􀀢􀀺􀀩􀀺􀀭􀀁􀀶􀀸􀀩􀀫􀀺􀀰􀀫􀀭􀀆􀀁􀀚􀀴􀀁􀀰􀀺􀀹􀀁􀀽􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀴􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀲􀀩􀀽􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀁
􀀺􀀸􀀩􀀴􀀹􀀪􀀵􀀻􀀴􀀬􀀩􀀸􀀿􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀻􀀰􀀮􀀭􀀸􀀹􀀄􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀔􀀵􀀳􀀳􀀰􀀹􀀹􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀁􀀯􀀩􀀹􀀁􀀬􀀭􀀳􀀵􀀴􀀹􀀺􀀸􀀩􀀺􀀭􀀬􀀁
􀀽􀀯􀀩􀀺􀀁􀀰􀀹􀀁􀀩􀀫􀀯􀀰􀀭􀀼􀀩􀀪􀀲􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀴􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀰􀀹􀀁􀀩􀀸􀀭􀀩􀀆􀀌􀀑􀀉􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁅􀁒􀁇􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁚􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁜􀀑􀀌􀀑􀀊
􀀂􀀎􀀌􀀃􀀁 􀀓􀀩􀀹􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀵􀀴􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀩􀀫􀀺􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀩􀀺􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀔􀀵􀀳􀀳􀀰􀀹􀀹􀀰􀀵􀀴􀁁􀀹􀀁􀀬􀀸􀀩􀀮􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀸􀀺􀀅
􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀀃
􀀶􀀸􀀵􀀼􀀰􀀹􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀹􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀉􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀁􀀔􀀵􀀴􀀼􀀭􀀴􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀁􀀵􀀴􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀜􀀩􀀽􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀞􀀵􀀴􀀅
􀁑􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀸􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃
􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃
􀀩􀀷􀀻􀀰􀀮􀀭􀀸􀀹􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀻􀀰􀀮􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀹􀀿􀀹􀀺􀀭􀀳􀀹􀀁􀀩􀀴􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀲􀀩􀀺􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀰􀀴􀀹􀀺􀀩􀀲􀀲􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀹􀀄􀀁􀀮􀀩􀀫􀀰􀀲􀀅
􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀶􀀸􀀰􀀴􀀫􀀰􀀶􀀲􀀭􀀹􀀁􀀩􀀴􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀻􀀲􀀭􀀹􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀁􀀰􀀴􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀴􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀩􀀲􀀁􀀲􀀩􀀽􀀁􀀩􀀶􀀶􀀲􀀰􀀫􀀩􀀪􀀲􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀴􀀁􀀰􀀴􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀅
􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃
􀀺􀀵􀀁􀀪􀀭􀀁􀀻􀀹􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀰􀀴􀀁􀀼􀀰􀀵􀀲􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀹􀀭􀀁􀀶􀀸􀀰􀀴􀀫􀀰􀀶􀀲􀀭􀀹􀀁􀀩􀀴􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀻􀀲􀀭􀀹􀀆􀀌􀀑􀀋
􀀋􀀙􀀘􀀌􀀃 􀀤􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀀶􀀸􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀫􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀺􀀁􀀳􀀩􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀪􀀭􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀁􀀫􀀲􀀭􀀩􀀸􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀩􀀺􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀹􀀁􀀩􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀫􀀭􀀹􀀹􀀩􀀸􀀿􀀁
􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀺􀀵􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀻􀀰􀀮􀀭􀀸􀀹􀀁􀀩􀀴􀀬􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀲􀀩􀀺􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀰􀀴􀀹􀀺􀀩􀀲􀀲􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀹􀀁􀀩􀀴􀀬􀀁􀀮􀀩􀀫􀀰􀀲􀀰􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀹􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀩􀀺􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀁
􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁘􀁏􀀅
􀀴􀀭􀀸􀀩􀀪􀀰􀀲􀀰􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀻􀀰􀀮􀀭􀀸􀀹􀀁􀀩􀀴􀀬􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀺􀀵􀀁􀀶􀀸􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀫􀀺􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀽􀀩􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀹􀀁
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀴􀀭􀀫􀀭􀀹􀀹􀀩􀀸􀀿􀀁􀀰􀀳􀀶􀀲􀀰􀀫􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀁􀀫􀀵􀀴􀀺􀀰􀀴􀀻􀀩􀀴􀀫􀀭􀀆
􀀋􀁍􀀌􀀃 􀀎􀀠􀀔􀀐􀀢􀀘􀀔􀀡􀀁􀀤􀀗􀀘􀀒􀀗􀀁􀀐􀀠􀀔􀀁􀀒􀀝􀀜􀀡􀀢􀀘􀀢􀀣􀀔􀀜􀀢􀀁􀀘􀀜􀀡􀀢􀀠􀀣􀀛􀀔􀀜􀀢􀀡􀀁􀀝􀀕􀀁
􀀘􀀜􀀢􀀔􀀠􀀜􀀐􀀢􀀘􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀚􀀁􀀝􀀠􀀖􀀐􀀜􀀘􀀦􀀐􀀢􀀘􀀝􀀜􀀡
􀀋􀀙􀀙􀀌􀀃 􀀰􀁒􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁈􀁖􀀅
􀀺􀀩􀀪􀀲􀀰􀀹􀀯􀀭􀀬􀀁 􀀪􀀿􀀁 􀀺􀀸􀀭􀀩􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀌􀀑􀀌􀀁 􀀫􀀵􀀳􀀳􀀵􀀴􀀲􀀿􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀮􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀭􀀬􀀁 􀀺􀀵􀀁 􀀩􀀹􀀁 􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁
􀀌􀀑􀀉􀀁􀀘􀀭􀀴􀀭􀀸􀀩􀀲􀀁 􀀒􀀹􀀹􀀭􀀳􀀪􀀲􀀿􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀹􀀵􀀲􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀁 􀀎􀀋􀀇􀀉􀀊􀀌􀀁 􀀵􀀮􀀁 􀀉􀀉􀀁 􀀕􀀭􀀫􀀭􀀳􀀪􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀊􀀈􀀈􀀐􀀄􀀁
􀀩􀀴􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀣􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀺􀀭􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀬􀀸􀀩􀀮􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀸􀀺􀀰􀀫􀀲􀀭􀀹􀀁􀀵􀀴􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀲􀀩􀀽􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀁􀀺􀀸􀀩􀀴􀀹􀀪􀀵􀀻􀀴􀀬􀀩􀀸􀀿􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀻􀀰􀀮􀀭􀀸􀀹􀀁
􀀽􀀰􀀺􀀯􀀁􀀫􀀵􀀳􀀳􀀭􀀴􀀺􀀩􀀸􀀰􀀭􀀹􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀀺􀀵􀀁􀀰􀀹􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀶􀀸􀀵􀀬􀀻􀀫􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀰􀀴􀀁􀀏􀀔􀀐􀀠􀀑􀀝􀀝􀀙􀀁􀀧􀀁􀀄􀀃􀀃􀀅􀀄􀀁􀀼􀀵􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀚􀀚􀀁
􀀂􀀠􀀩􀀸􀀺􀀁􀀣􀀽􀀵􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀩􀀸􀀩􀀆􀀁􀀍􀀋􀀆
􀀌􀀑􀀊􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀃􀀥􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁋􀁌􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀮􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁏􀁈􀁐􀀏􀀃􀀈􀀠􀀝􀀣􀀜􀀓􀀤􀀐􀀢􀀔􀀠􀀁􀀘􀀜􀀁􀀉􀀜􀀢􀀔􀀠􀀂
􀀜􀀐􀀢􀀘􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀚􀀁 􀀊􀀐􀀤􀀆􀀁 􀀇􀀝􀀛􀀞􀀘􀀚􀀐􀀢􀀘􀀝􀀜􀀁 􀀝􀀕􀀁 􀀎􀀠􀀔􀀐􀀢􀀘􀀔􀀡􀀁 􀀐􀀜􀀓􀀁 􀀋􀀢􀀗􀀔􀀠􀀁 􀀊􀀔􀀖􀀐􀀚􀀁 􀀉􀀜􀀡􀀢􀀠􀀣􀀛􀀔􀀜􀀢􀀡􀀄􀀁
􀀡􀀵􀀳􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀀗􀀒􀀟􀀇􀀤􀀞􀀖􀀢􀀔􀀟􀀄􀀁 􀀊􀀈􀀈􀀍􀀄􀀁 􀀶􀀆􀀁 􀀉􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀀭􀀁 􀀩􀀲􀀹􀀵􀀁 􀀚􀀜􀀝􀀄􀀁 􀀼􀀵􀀲􀀆􀀁 􀀌􀀈􀀄􀀁 􀀞􀀵􀀆􀀁 􀀊􀀁
􀀂􀀝􀀩􀀸􀀫􀀯􀀁􀀊􀀈􀀈􀀉􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀆􀀁􀀋􀀊􀀉􀀆
􀀌􀀑􀀋􀀁􀀢􀀭􀀭􀀁􀀩􀀸􀀺􀀰􀀫􀀲􀀭􀀁􀀉􀀐􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀬􀀸􀀩􀀮􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀸􀀺􀀰􀀫􀀲􀀭􀀹􀀁􀀵􀀴􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀲􀀩􀀽􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀁􀀺􀀸􀀩􀀴􀀹􀀪􀀵􀀻􀀴􀀬􀀩􀀸􀀿􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀻􀀰􀀮􀀭􀀸􀀹􀀁􀀩􀀬􀀵􀀶􀀺􀀭􀀬􀀁􀀪􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀔􀀵􀀳􀀳􀀰􀀹􀀹􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀁􀀰􀀺􀀹􀀁􀀹􀀰􀀾􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀹􀀹􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀄􀀁􀀏􀀔􀀐􀀠􀀑􀀝􀀝􀀙􀀁􀀧􀀁
􀀄􀀃􀀃􀀅􀀄􀀁􀀼􀀵􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀚􀀚􀀁􀀂􀀠􀀩􀀸􀀺􀀁􀀣􀀽􀀵􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀶􀀆􀀁􀀌􀀊􀁀􀀌􀀋􀀆
􀀌􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀅
􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀔􀀵􀀳􀀳􀀰􀀹􀀹􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀁􀀰􀀺􀀹􀀁􀀫􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀭􀀴􀀺􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀹􀀹􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀄􀀁􀀫􀀯􀀩􀀶􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀥􀀄􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀫􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀁􀀖􀀊􀀄􀀁􀀩􀀪􀀵􀀼􀀭􀀆
􀀃 􀀨􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀁 􀀂􀀃􀀄
􀂳􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀂴􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀀨􀀲􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀣􀀴􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀪􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀧􀀭􀀤􀀧􀀲􀀳􀀆􀀋􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀅
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀀅
􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀅
􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀁖􀀃 􀀋􀀛􀀌􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀀋􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀀃 􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁖􀀃
􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀑􀀋􀀐􀀍􀀁􀀖􀀮􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀦􀀧􀀲􀀮􀀁􀀧􀀲􀀣􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀲􀀧􀀁􀀪􀀳􀀁􀀳􀀥􀀣􀀮􀀴􀀁
􀀧􀀶􀀪􀀦􀀧􀀮􀀥􀀧􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀰􀀲􀀣􀀥􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀧􀀁􀀴􀀯􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀥􀀯􀀮􀀴􀀲􀀣􀀲􀀹􀀆􀀁􀀞􀀩􀀪􀀳􀀁􀀪􀀳􀀁􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀵􀀬􀀣􀀲􀀬􀀹􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁉􀁘􀁏􀀃
􀀳􀀧􀀴􀀴􀀬􀀧􀀭􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀦􀀪􀀳􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀧􀀳􀀆
􀀋􀀙􀀚􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃
􀀷􀀩􀀪􀀥􀀩􀀁 􀀪􀀮􀀥􀀬􀀵􀀦􀀧􀀁 􀀪􀀴􀀳􀀁 􀀥􀀯􀀮􀀳􀀴􀀪􀀴􀀵􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀁 􀀪􀀮􀀳􀀴􀀲􀀵􀀭􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀄􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀁 􀀴􀀯􀀁 􀀣􀀮􀀥􀀪􀀬􀀬􀀣􀀲􀀹􀀁
􀀱􀀵􀀧􀀳􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀳􀀁􀀳􀀵􀀥􀀩􀀁􀀣􀀳􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀥􀀯􀀮􀀴􀀪􀀮􀀵􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀪􀀰􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀪􀀴􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀧􀀭􀀅
􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀅
􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑
􀀂􀀫􀀃􀀁 􀀖􀀫􀀟􀀛􀀭􀀣􀀟􀀬􀀁 􀀫􀀟􀀥􀀛􀀭􀀣􀀧􀀡􀀁 􀀭􀀨􀀁 􀀭􀀢􀀟􀀁 􀀣􀀧􀀭􀀟􀀫􀀧􀀛􀀭􀀣􀀨􀀧􀀛􀀥􀀁 􀀬􀀟􀀭􀀭􀀥􀀟􀀦􀀟􀀧􀀭􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁉􀁘􀁏􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁅􀁌􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀬􀀟􀀭􀀭􀀥􀀟􀀦􀀟􀀧􀀭
􀀋􀀙􀀛􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁄􀁓􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀑􀀃
􀀦􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁐􀁖􀀃
􀀨􀀯􀀲􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀰􀀧􀀣􀀥􀀧􀀨􀀵􀀬􀀁􀀳􀀧􀀴􀀴􀀬􀀧􀀭􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀴􀀧􀀲􀀮􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀣􀀬􀀁􀀦􀀪􀀳􀀰􀀵􀀴􀀧􀀳􀀆􀀋􀀐􀀏􀀁􀀖􀀮􀀁
􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀀅
􀀥􀀬􀀵􀀦􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀨􀀯􀀲􀀧􀀁􀀡􀀯􀀲􀀬􀀦􀀁􀀡􀀣􀀲􀀁􀀖􀀁􀀷􀀧􀀲􀀧􀀁􀀣􀀰􀀰􀀬􀀪􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀴􀀯􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀣􀀲􀀤􀀪􀀴􀀲􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀳􀀁
􀀥􀀯􀀮􀀥􀀧􀀲􀀮􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀣􀀨􀀴􀀧􀀲􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀡􀀣􀀲􀀆
􀀋􀀙􀀜􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀀥􀀯􀀮􀀶􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀣􀀬􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀳􀀴􀀲􀀵􀀭􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀮􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀴􀀧􀀲􀀮􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀣􀀬􀀁􀀳􀀧􀀴􀀴􀀬􀀧􀀭􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀁􀀰􀀲􀀯􀀅
􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀅
􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃 􀀩􀀟􀀫􀀁 􀀬􀀟􀀄􀀁 􀀴􀀯􀀁
􀀋􀀐􀀌􀀁􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀀂
􀀭􀀣􀀨􀀧􀀬􀀁􀀋􀁖􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁒􀁗􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀙􀀜􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀘􀀞􀀃􀀏􀀧􀀭􀀟􀀫􀀩􀀫􀀟􀀭􀀛􀀭􀀣􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀨􀀠􀀁􀀭􀀢􀀟􀀁􀀊􀀡􀀫􀀟􀀟􀀦􀀟􀀧􀀭􀀁􀀨􀀠􀀁
􀀆􀀇􀀁􀀒􀀛􀀫􀀝􀀢􀀁􀀅􀀈􀀇􀀅􀀁􀀜􀀟􀀭􀀯􀀟􀀟􀀧􀀁􀀭􀀢􀀟􀀁􀀙􀀎􀀓􀀁􀀛􀀧􀀞􀀁􀀍􀀡􀀰􀀩􀀭􀀁􀀂􀀳􀀧􀀧􀀁􀀨􀀯􀀯􀀴􀀮􀀯􀀴􀀧􀀁􀀍􀀎􀀁􀀣􀀤􀀯􀀶􀀧􀀃􀀄􀀁
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀚􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁘􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀅
􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀌􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀑􀀟􀀡􀀛􀀥􀀣􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀨􀀠􀀁􀀭􀀢􀀟􀀁
􀀸􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀱􀁘􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀀺􀁈􀁄􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀀂􀀳􀀧􀀧􀀁􀀨􀀯􀀯􀀴􀀮􀀯􀀴􀀧􀀁􀀍􀀏􀀁
􀀣􀀤􀀯􀀶􀀧􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀎􀀏􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀣􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀌􀀆
􀀋􀀐􀀍􀀁􀀝􀀧􀀧􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀏􀀌􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀳􀀯􀀬􀀵􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀖􀀮􀀳􀀴􀀪􀀴􀀵􀀴􀀧􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀖􀀮􀀴􀀧􀀲􀀮􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀣􀀬􀀁􀀗􀀣􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀅
􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀙􀀝􀀃 􀂳􀀤􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁉􀀅
􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀃
􀀂􀀖􀀮􀀳􀀴􀀪􀀴􀀵􀀴􀀧􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀖􀀮􀀴􀀧􀀲􀀮􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀣􀀬􀀁􀀗􀀣􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀚􀀟􀀛􀀫􀀜􀀨􀀨􀀤􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀯􀀬􀀆􀀁􀀍􀀈􀀄􀀁􀀛􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀁􀀖􀀖􀀁􀀂􀀨􀀯􀀯􀀴􀀮􀀯􀀴􀀧􀀁􀀋􀀇􀀈􀀁
􀀣􀀤􀀯􀀶􀀧􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀃􀀆
􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀁􀀠􀀪􀀧􀀮􀀮􀀣􀀁􀀓􀀯􀀮􀀶􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀁􀀯􀀮􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀜􀀧􀀰􀀲􀀧􀀳􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀝􀀴􀀣􀀴􀀧􀀳􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀪􀀲􀀁􀀜􀀧􀀬􀀣􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀲􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀜􀀚􀀘􀀌􀀏􀀃
􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀣􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀊􀀋􀀃􀀆
􀀋􀀐􀀏􀀁􀀝􀀧􀀧􀀁􀀝􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀆􀀁􀀘􀀥􀀖􀀮􀀴􀀹􀀲􀀧􀀄􀀁􀀑􀀟􀀡􀀛􀀥􀀁􀀍􀀠􀀠􀀟􀀝􀀭􀀁􀀨􀀠􀀁􀀙􀀨􀀫􀀥􀀞􀀁􀀙􀀛􀀫􀀁􀀏􀀏􀀁􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀖􀀫􀀟􀀛􀀭􀀣􀀟􀀬􀀁􀀨􀀠􀀁
􀀭􀀢􀀟􀀁􀀗􀀧􀀣􀀭􀀟􀀞􀀁􀀕􀀭􀀛􀀭􀀟􀀬􀀏􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀁄􀁊􀁘􀁈􀀏􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁖􀀃􀀱􀁌􀁍􀁋􀁒􀁉􀁉􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀘􀀛􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀚􀀗􀂱􀀛􀀙􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀘􀀥􀀙􀀣􀀪􀀲􀀄􀀁 􀀖􀀢􀀟􀀁 􀀑􀀛􀀯􀀁 􀀨􀀠􀀁 􀀖􀀫􀀟􀀛􀀭􀀣􀀟􀀬􀀁 􀀂􀀨􀀯􀀯􀀴􀀮􀀯􀀴􀀧􀀁 􀀋􀀇􀀍􀀁 􀀣􀀤􀀯􀀶􀀧􀀃􀀄􀀁 􀀰􀀆􀀁 􀀎􀀉􀀇􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀧􀀧􀀁 􀀣􀀬􀀳􀀯􀀁
􀀘􀀆􀀁 􀀚􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀵􀀦􀀳􀀯􀀮􀀄􀀁 􀀖􀀢􀀟􀀁 􀀔􀀟􀀫􀀦􀀛􀀧􀀟􀀧􀀭􀀁 􀀋􀀨􀀮􀀫􀀭􀀁 􀀨􀀠􀀁 􀀏􀀧􀀭􀀟􀀫􀀧􀀛􀀭􀀣􀀨􀀧􀀛􀀥􀀁 􀀐􀀮􀀬􀀭􀀣􀀝􀀟􀀁 􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀱
􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀕􀀄􀀁􀀙􀀧􀀷􀀁􀀢􀀯􀀲􀀫􀀄􀀁􀀘􀀣􀀥􀀭􀀪􀀬􀀬􀀣􀀮􀀄􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀊􀀆
􀁐􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀋􀀠􀀃􀀁􀀂􀀞􀀲􀀧􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀧􀀳􀀁􀀨􀀯􀀲􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀅
􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀀮􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀥􀀬􀀵􀀦􀀧􀀁􀀴􀀲􀀧􀀣􀀴􀀹􀀁􀀭􀀧􀀥􀀩􀀣􀀮􀀪􀀳􀀭􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀰􀀧􀀣􀀥􀀧􀀨􀀵􀀬􀀁􀀳􀀧􀀴􀀴􀀬􀀧􀀭􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀁􀀨􀀯􀀲􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁅􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁇􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃 􀀋􀀟􀀃􀀁 􀀣􀀳􀀁
􀂳􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀑
􀀋􀀚􀀓􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃
􀀨􀀣􀀶􀀯􀀵􀀲􀀧􀀦􀀁 􀀤􀀹􀀁 􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀁 􀀐􀀁 􀀯􀀨􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁 􀀰􀀲􀀧􀀳􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀁 􀀦􀀲􀀣􀀨􀀴􀀁 􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀳􀀁
􀀋􀀱􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃
􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀁖􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀋􀀚􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀁􀀐􀀃􀀆
􀀂􀀬􀀃􀀁 􀀖􀀫􀀟􀀛􀀭􀀣􀀟􀀬􀀁􀀫􀀟􀀥􀀛􀀭􀀣􀀧􀀡􀀁􀀭􀀨􀀁􀀞􀀣􀀩􀀥􀀨􀀦􀀛􀀭􀀣􀀝􀀁􀀛􀀧􀀞􀀁􀀁
􀀝􀀨􀀧􀀬􀀮􀀥􀀛􀀫􀀁􀀫􀀟􀀥􀀛􀀭􀀣􀀨􀀧􀀬
􀀂􀀎􀀈􀀃􀀁 􀀒􀀬􀀳􀀯􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀥􀀬􀀵􀀦􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀦􀀪􀀥􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀶􀀧􀀁􀀬􀀪􀀳􀀴􀀁􀀣􀀲􀀧􀀁􀀴􀀲􀀧􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀧􀀳􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀅
􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀺􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀀮􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀷􀀧􀀬􀀬􀀁􀀦􀀯􀀥􀀵􀀭􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀧􀀦􀀄􀀁􀀪􀀴􀀁􀀪􀀳􀀁􀀮􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀵􀀮􀀵􀀳􀀵􀀣􀀬􀀁􀀨􀀯􀀲􀀁􀀧􀀭􀀤􀀣􀀳􀀳􀀪􀀧􀀳􀀁􀀴􀀯􀀁
􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀰􀀲􀀯􀀶􀀪􀀳􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀠􀀪􀀧􀀮􀀮􀀣􀀁􀀓􀀯􀀮􀀶􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀁􀀯􀀮􀀁􀀔􀀪􀀰􀀬􀀯􀀭􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀁􀀜􀀧􀀅
􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃
􀀖􀀮􀀦􀀧􀀧􀀦􀀄􀀁 􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀁 􀀉􀀋􀀁 􀀯􀀨􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀣􀀴􀀁 􀀓􀀯􀀮􀀶􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀁 􀀰􀀲􀀯􀀶􀀪􀀦􀀧􀀳􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀣􀀴􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁
􀀣􀀲􀀥􀀩􀀪􀀶􀀧􀀳􀀁􀀣􀀮􀀦􀀁􀀦􀀯􀀥􀀵􀀭􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀭􀀪􀀳􀀳􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀁􀀳􀀩􀀣􀀬􀀬􀀁􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀶􀀪􀀯􀀬􀀣􀀤􀀬􀀧􀀁
􀂳􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀂴􀀞􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁓􀁋􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀙􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀳􀀁 􀀓􀀯􀀮􀀨􀀧􀀲􀀧􀀮􀀥􀀧􀀁 􀀯􀀮􀀁 􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁 􀀗􀀣􀀷􀀁 􀀯􀀨􀀁 􀀞􀀲􀀧􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀧􀀳􀀁 􀀪􀀮􀀁 􀀯􀀲􀀦􀀧􀀲􀀁 􀀴􀀯􀀁
􀀭􀀣􀀫􀀧􀀁􀀪􀀴􀀁􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀣􀀲􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀣􀀴􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀶􀀪􀀯􀀬􀀣􀀤􀀪􀀬􀀪􀀴􀀹􀀁􀀥􀀯􀀮􀀴􀀪􀀮􀀵􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀧􀀶􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁
􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀁􀀚􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀲􀀁􀀰􀀲􀀯􀀶􀀪􀀳􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀳􀀄􀀁􀀨􀀯􀀲􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀣􀀭􀀰􀀬􀀧􀀁􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀬􀀧􀀁􀀋􀀋􀀁
􀀯􀀮􀀁􀀨􀀣􀀥􀀪􀀬􀀪􀀴􀀪􀀧􀀳􀀁􀀨􀀯􀀲􀀁􀀦􀀧􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀴􀀵􀀲􀀧􀀄􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀥􀀬􀀵􀀦􀀧􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀷􀀯􀀲􀀦􀀳􀀁􀀻􀀧􀀶􀀧􀀮􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀁􀀥􀀣􀀳􀀧􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀂴􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀘􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃
􀀰􀀲􀀯􀀶􀀪􀀦􀀧􀀳􀀁􀀣􀀳􀀁􀀨􀀯􀀬􀀬􀀯􀀷􀀳􀀑
􀀖􀀨􀀁 􀀦􀀪􀀰􀀬􀀯􀀭􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀁 􀀲􀀧􀀬􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀳􀀁 􀀣􀀲􀀧􀀁 􀀤􀀲􀀯􀀫􀀧􀀮􀀁 􀀯􀀨􀀨􀀁 􀀤􀀧􀀴􀀷􀀧􀀧􀀮􀀁 􀀴􀀷􀀯􀀁 􀀝􀀴􀀣􀀴􀀧􀀳􀀄􀀁 􀀯􀀲􀀁 􀀪􀀨􀀁 􀀣􀀁
􀀭􀀪􀀳􀀳􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀁􀀪􀀳􀀁􀀰􀀧􀀲􀀭􀀣􀀮􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀬􀀹􀀁􀀯􀀲􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀭􀀰􀀯􀀲􀀣􀀲􀀪􀀬􀀹􀀁􀀲􀀧􀀥􀀣􀀬􀀬􀀧􀀦􀀑
􀀂􀀛􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀏􀀃 􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀁊􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀞
􀀂􀀜􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁇􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀁊􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀞
􀀂􀀝􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀝􀀴􀀣􀀴􀀧􀀆
􀀋􀀚􀀕􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃
􀀥􀀯􀀭􀀭􀀧􀀮􀀴􀀣􀀴􀀯􀀲􀀳􀀆􀀌􀀇􀀇􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀂿􀁆􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀀅
􀃀􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁑􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀀷􀀣􀀳􀀁􀀦􀀧􀀳􀀥􀀲􀀪􀀤􀀧􀀦􀀁􀀪􀀮􀀁􀀧􀀭􀀰􀀩􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀁􀀴􀀧􀀲􀀭􀀳􀀁􀀤􀀹􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀖􀀮􀀴􀀧􀀲􀀮􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀣􀀬􀀁􀀓􀀯􀀵􀀲􀀴􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀗􀀧􀀣􀀭􀀟􀀞􀀁􀀕􀀭􀀛􀀭􀀟􀀬􀀁􀀌􀀣􀀩􀀥􀀨􀀦􀀛􀀭􀀣􀀝􀀁
􀀛􀀧􀀞􀀁􀀋􀀨􀀧􀀬􀀮􀀥􀀛􀀫􀀁􀀕􀀭􀀛􀀠􀀠􀀁􀀣􀀧􀀁􀀖􀀟􀀢􀀫􀀛􀀧􀀆􀀁􀀖􀀮􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀷􀀯􀀲􀀦􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀓􀀯􀀵􀀲􀀴􀀑
􀀞􀀩􀀧􀀁 􀀲􀀵􀀬􀀧􀀳􀀁 􀀯􀀨􀀁 􀀦􀀪􀀰􀀬􀀯􀀭􀀣􀀴􀀪􀀥􀀁 􀀬􀀣􀀷􀀄􀀁 􀀪􀀮􀀁 􀀳􀀩􀀯􀀲􀀴􀀄􀀁 􀀥􀀯􀀮􀀳􀀴􀀪􀀴􀀵􀀴􀀧􀀁 􀀣􀀁 􀀳􀀧􀀬􀀨􀀅􀀥􀀯􀀮􀀴􀀣􀀪􀀮􀀧􀀦􀀁
􀁕􀁰􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁜􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀀨􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁑􀁝􀁄􀀏􀀃􀀌􀀣􀀩􀀥􀀨􀀦􀀛􀀭􀀣􀀝􀀁􀀑􀀛􀀯􀀉􀀁􀀋􀀨􀀦􀀦􀀟􀀧􀀭􀀛􀀫􀀰􀀁􀀨􀀧􀀁􀀭􀀢􀀟􀀁􀀘􀀣􀀟􀀧􀀧􀀛􀀁􀀋􀀨􀀧􀀂
􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀀧􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃 􀀵􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀄􀀁 􀀊􀀲􀀦􀀁 􀀧􀀦􀀆􀀄􀀁 􀀚􀀸􀀨􀀯􀀲􀀦􀀁 􀀟􀀮􀀪􀀶􀀧􀀲􀀳􀀪􀀴􀀹􀀁 􀀛􀀲􀀧􀀳􀀳􀀄􀀁
􀀉􀀇􀀇􀀏􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀆
􀀌􀀇􀀇􀀁􀀝􀀧􀀧􀀁􀀨􀀯􀀲􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀣􀀭􀀰􀀬􀀧􀀁􀀓􀀆􀀁􀀘􀀆􀀁􀀓􀀩􀀪􀀮􀀫􀀪􀀮􀀄􀀁􀀻􀀓􀀲􀀪􀀳􀀪􀀳􀀁􀀣􀀮􀀦􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀰􀀧􀀲􀀨􀀯􀀲􀀭􀀣􀀮􀀥􀀧􀀁􀀯􀀨􀀁
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀝􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁎􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀂴􀀏􀀃􀀖􀀢􀀟􀀁􀀚􀀛􀀥􀀟􀀁
􀀐􀀨􀀮􀀫􀀧􀀛􀀥􀀁 􀀨􀀠􀀁 􀀙􀀨􀀫􀀥􀀞􀀁 􀀔􀀮􀀜􀀥􀀣􀀝􀀁 􀀓􀀫􀀞􀀟􀀫􀀄􀀁 􀀶􀀯􀀬􀀆􀀁 􀀎􀀁 􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀏􀀇􀀺􀀈􀀐􀀏􀀈􀀃􀀄􀀁 􀀰􀀰􀀆􀀁 􀀈􀀎􀀎􀀁 􀀟􀀭􀀁 􀀬􀀟􀀪􀀃􀀄􀀁
􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀗􀂱􀀔􀀜􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀝􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁈􀂴􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁐􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀀂􀀨􀀯􀀯􀀴􀀮􀀯􀀴􀀧􀀁􀀊􀀏􀀐􀀁􀀣􀀤􀀯􀀶􀀧􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀣􀀲􀀣􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀍􀀆
􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀁 􀀉􀀌􀀕􀀔􀀖􀀘􀀁􀀔􀀍􀀁􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀁􀀇􀀓􀀘􀀌􀀖􀀓􀀊􀀘􀀏􀀔􀀓􀀊􀀑􀀁􀀈􀀊􀀙􀀁􀀆􀀔􀀒􀀒􀀏􀀗􀀗􀀏􀀔􀀓􀀁􀀔􀀓􀀁􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀁􀀙􀀔􀀖􀀐􀀁􀀔􀀍􀀁􀀏􀀘􀀗􀀁􀀗􀀏􀀚􀀘􀀛􀀂􀀘􀀎􀀏􀀖􀀋􀀁􀀗􀀌􀀗􀀗􀀏􀀔􀀓
􀀶􀀱􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀲􀀮􀀱􀀯􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀁􀀯􀀬􀀵􀀵􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀄􀀁􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀱􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀴􀀄􀀁􀀪􀀱􀀴􀀩􀀵􀀩􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀬􀀴􀀁􀀲􀀱􀀵􀀵􀀬􀀦􀀮􀀩􀀁􀀥􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀩􀀁
􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀂿􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁄􀁅􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃 􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁈􀁉􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁏􀁐􀁒􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀯􀀬􀀵􀀵􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀀹􀀬􀀮􀀮􀀁 􀀬􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀀴􀀥􀀧􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀩􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀲􀀩􀀮􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀁 􀀲􀀩􀀴􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀀬􀀰􀀁 􀀫􀀬􀀵􀀁 􀀱􀀹􀀰􀀁 􀀬􀀰􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀩􀀵􀀶􀀄􀀁
􀀶􀀱􀀁 􀀨􀀩􀀲􀀥􀀴􀀶􀀁 􀀥􀀶􀀁 􀀱􀀰􀀧􀀩􀀆􀀁 􀀒􀀷􀀶􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀲􀀴􀀬􀀰􀀧􀀬􀀲􀀮􀀩􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀬􀀰􀀸􀀬􀀱􀀮􀀥􀀦􀀬􀀮􀀬􀀶􀀻􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀲􀀩􀀴􀀅
􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃 􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀀐􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁰􀁊􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀩􀀸􀀱􀀮􀀷􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀹􀀫􀀬􀀧􀀫􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀶􀀴􀀥􀀨􀀬􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀘􀀵􀀮􀀥􀀯􀀁 􀀯􀀥􀀨􀀩􀀁 􀀥􀀁 􀀵􀀷􀀦􀀵􀀶􀀥􀀰􀀶􀀬􀀥􀀮􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀶􀀴􀀬􀀅
􀀦􀀷􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀟􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀪􀀷􀀰􀀨􀀥􀀯􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀥􀀮􀀁􀀧􀀫􀀥􀀴􀀥􀀧􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀬􀀰􀀧􀀬􀀲􀀮􀀩􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀸􀀬􀀱􀀮􀀥􀀦􀀬􀀮􀀬􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀬􀀵􀀄􀀁
􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀗􀀗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀗􀀘􀀃
􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀣􀀡􀀬􀀩􀀰􀀰􀀥􀀁􀀓􀀱􀀰􀀸􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀔􀀬􀀲􀀮􀀱􀀯􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀁􀀝􀀩􀀮􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀤􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀧􀀪􀀆􀀁􀀥􀀮􀀵􀀱􀀁
􀀑􀀴􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀮􀀩􀀵􀀁􀀉􀀍􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀉􀀎􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀣􀀡􀀬􀀩􀀰􀀰􀀥􀀁􀀓􀀱􀀰􀀸􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀓􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀷􀀮􀀥􀀴􀀁􀀝􀀩􀀮􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀤􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀙􀀖􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀨􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀀨􀀬􀀲􀀮􀀱􀀯􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀮􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀱􀀵􀀩􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀬􀀵􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀳􀀷􀀬􀀴􀀩􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀁􀀦􀀱􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀸􀀬􀀱􀀮􀀥􀀦􀀬􀀮􀀬􀀶􀀻􀀁
􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀯􀀩􀀯􀀦􀀩􀀴􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀥􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀲􀀮􀀱􀀯􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀁􀀯􀀬􀀵􀀵􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀩􀀯􀀬􀀵􀀩􀀵􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀲􀀩􀀴􀀶􀀻􀀁
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀑􀀌􀀇􀀈
􀀂􀀎􀀊􀀃􀀁 􀀟􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀡􀀬􀀩􀀰􀀰􀀥􀀁 􀀓􀀱􀀰􀀸􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀔􀀬􀀲􀀮􀀱􀀯􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀁 􀀝􀀩􀀮􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁
􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀈􀀁􀀹􀀥􀀵􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀪􀀱􀀴􀀧􀀩􀀁􀀪􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀦􀀱􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀘􀀴􀀥􀀰􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀠􀀰􀀬􀀶􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀞􀀶􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀵􀀆􀀁
􀀘􀀰􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀻􀀁􀀩􀀸􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀓􀀱􀀷􀀴􀀶􀀁􀀯􀀥􀀨􀀩􀀁􀀬􀀶􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀥􀀦􀀮􀀻􀀁􀀧􀀮􀀩􀀥􀀴􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁
􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀂴􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁌􀂿􀁆􀁄􀀅
􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀮􀀥􀀹􀀆􀀌􀀇􀀉
􀀋􀀚􀀗􀀌􀀃 􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁕􀁈􀀅
􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃
􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀀃
􀀩􀀸􀀩􀀰􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀸􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀵􀀩􀀸􀀩􀀴􀀥􀀰􀀧􀀩􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀨􀀬􀀲􀀮􀀱􀀯􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀧􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀮􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀌􀀇􀀊􀀁􀀟􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀬􀀵􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀊􀀁􀀡􀀬􀀩􀀰􀀰􀀥􀀁
􀀓􀀱􀀰􀀸􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀓􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀷􀀮􀀥􀀴􀀁 􀀝􀀩􀀮􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁 􀀬􀀰􀀨􀀬􀀧􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀁 􀀬􀀶􀀵􀀁 􀀥􀀲􀀲􀀮􀀬􀀧􀀥􀀅
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀀯􀀩􀀯􀀦􀀩􀀴􀀵􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀷􀀮􀀥􀀴􀀁 􀀲􀀱􀀵􀀶􀀄􀀁 􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁 􀀱􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀴􀀵􀀄􀀁 􀀪􀀱􀀴􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀬􀀴􀀁 􀀨􀀩􀀅
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀂳􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀀅
􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀂴􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃 􀀕􀀚􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀏􀀃
􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀓􀀟􀀜􀀤􀀘􀀗􀀁 􀀑􀀤􀀔􀀤􀀘􀀣􀀁 􀀊􀀜􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀞􀀔􀀤􀀜􀀖􀀁 􀀔􀀟􀀗􀀁 􀀉􀀠􀀟􀀣􀀥􀀝􀀔􀀢􀀁 􀀑􀀤􀀔􀀙􀀙􀀁 􀀜􀀟􀀁 􀀒􀀘􀀛􀀢􀀔􀀟􀀄􀀁 􀀍􀀥􀀗􀀚􀀂
􀀞􀀘􀀟􀀤􀀄􀀁􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀃􀀍􀀃􀀁􀀐􀀘􀀡􀀠􀀢􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀅􀀇􀀆􀀄􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀄􀀁􀀥􀀶􀀁􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀥􀀴􀀥􀀆􀀁􀀏􀀍􀀆
􀀌􀀇􀀉􀀁􀀌􀀕􀀜􀀗􀀃􀀏􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀘􀀞􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀔􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀓􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀜􀀣􀀡􀀠􀀣􀀜􀀤􀀜􀀙􀀃􀀁􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀋􀀋􀀄􀀁
􀀲􀀥􀀴􀀥􀀆􀀁􀀐􀀌􀀆
􀀌􀀇􀀊􀀁􀀙􀀆􀀁 􀀟􀀆􀀁 􀀙􀀩􀀩􀀄􀀁 􀀉􀀠􀀟􀀣􀀥􀀝􀀔􀀢􀀁 􀀎􀀔􀀦􀀁 􀀔􀀟􀀗􀀁 􀀏􀀢􀀔􀀖􀀤􀀜􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀁 􀀉􀀰􀀨􀀁 􀀩􀀨􀀆􀀄􀀁 􀀛􀀺􀀪􀀱􀀴􀀨􀀄􀀁
􀀓􀀮􀀥􀀴􀀩􀀰􀀨􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀜􀀴􀀩􀀵􀀵􀀄􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀈􀀈􀀆
􀂳􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀂴􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀦􀀻􀀁􀀓􀀫􀀬􀀰􀀭􀀬􀀰􀀆􀀌􀀇􀀋
􀀋􀀚􀀘􀀌􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀓􀀟􀀜􀀤􀀘􀀗􀀁􀀑􀀤􀀔􀀤􀀘􀀣􀀁􀀊􀀜􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀞􀀔􀀤􀀜􀀖􀀁􀀔􀀟􀀗􀀁􀀉􀀠􀀟􀀣􀀥􀀝􀀔􀀢􀀁􀀑􀀤􀀔􀀙􀀙􀀁􀀜􀀟􀀁􀀒􀀘􀀛􀀢􀀔􀀟􀀄􀀁
􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁋􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃􀀹􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁑􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀀅
􀀸􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀈􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀍􀀊􀀁􀀂􀀵􀀩􀀩􀀁􀀲􀀥􀀴􀀥􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀎􀀉􀀃􀀁􀀥􀀦􀀱􀀸􀀩􀀃􀀆
􀀂􀀎􀀍􀀃􀀁 􀀟􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀡􀀬􀀩􀀰􀀰􀀥􀀁􀀓􀀱􀀰􀀸􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀓􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀷􀀮􀀥􀀴􀀁􀀝􀀩􀀮􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀹􀀥􀀵􀀁
􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀪􀀱􀀴􀀧􀀩􀀁􀀪􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀦􀀱􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀘􀀴􀀥􀀰􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀠􀀰􀀬􀀶􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀞􀀶􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀵􀀆􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀴􀀩􀀱􀀸􀀩􀀴􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁
􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁇􀁌􀀅
􀂿􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀂴􀀑􀀌􀀇􀀌
􀀋􀀚􀀚􀀌􀀃 􀀵􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀓􀀥􀀮􀀬􀀪􀀱􀀴􀀰􀀬􀀥􀀁 􀀓􀀱􀀷􀀴􀀶􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀑􀀲􀀲􀀩􀀥􀀮􀀁 􀀂􀀕􀀬􀀴􀀵􀀶􀀁 􀀔􀀬􀀵􀀶􀀴􀀬􀀧􀀶􀀃􀀁 􀀯􀀥􀀻􀀁 􀀦􀀩􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁
􀀬􀀰􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀩􀀵􀀶􀀆􀀁􀀟􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀟􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀕􀀴􀀬􀀩􀀰􀀨􀀵􀀫􀀬􀀲􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀱􀀯􀀯􀀩􀀴􀀧􀀩􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀓􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀷􀀮􀀥􀀴􀀁
􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀀃
􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀉􀀊􀀌􀀇􀀍􀀁􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁛􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁌􀁏􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀦􀀻􀀁 􀀩􀀥􀀧􀀫􀀁 􀀞􀀶􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀁 􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀴􀀬􀀶􀀱􀀴􀀻􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀱􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀴􀀆􀀁 􀀟􀀥􀀺􀀩􀀵􀀁 􀀹􀀩􀀴􀀩􀀁
􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃 􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀀶􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁝􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃
􀀮􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀴􀀁􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀕􀀩􀀨􀀩􀀴􀀥􀀮􀀁􀀖􀀱􀀸􀀩􀀴􀀰􀀯􀀩􀀰􀀶􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀱􀀱􀀭􀀁􀀱􀀸􀀩􀀴􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀩􀀯􀀬􀀵􀀩􀀵􀀁
􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀓􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀷􀀮􀀥􀀶􀀩􀀁 􀀖􀀩􀀰􀀩􀀴􀀥􀀮􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀖􀀩􀀴􀀯􀀥􀀰􀀻􀀁 􀀬􀀰􀀁 􀀞􀀥􀀰􀀁 􀀕􀀴􀀥􀀰􀀧􀀬􀀵􀀧􀀱􀀆􀀁
􀀟􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀓􀀬􀀶􀀻􀀁 􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁 􀀓􀀱􀀷􀀰􀀶􀀻􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀞􀀥􀀰􀀁 􀀕􀀴􀀥􀀰􀀧􀀬􀀵􀀧􀀱􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀶􀀩􀀰􀀨􀀩􀀨􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀁
􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀉􀀊􀀁􀀟􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀫􀀥􀀨􀀁􀀮􀀥􀀲􀀵􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀱􀀴􀀁􀀦􀀩􀀩􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀷􀀵􀀲􀀩􀀰􀀨􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀥􀀵􀀁􀀥􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀵􀀷􀀮􀀶􀀁
􀀱􀀪􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀦􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀭􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀢􀀱􀀴􀀮􀀨􀀁􀀢􀀥􀀴􀀁 􀀘􀀘􀀆􀀁 􀀗􀀱􀀹􀀩􀀸􀀩􀀴􀀄􀀁 􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁 􀀓􀀱􀀷􀀴􀀶􀀁 􀀱􀀪􀀁
􀀑􀀲􀀲􀀩􀀥􀀮􀀁􀀪􀀱􀀷􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀥􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀟􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀩􀀯􀀲􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀬􀀨􀀩􀀨􀀁
􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀂳􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁛􀁄􀀅
􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀴􀀩􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀬􀀨􀀩􀀨􀀁􀀹􀀥􀀵􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀶􀀁􀀬􀀰􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀲􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀦􀀮􀀩􀀁􀀹􀀬􀀶􀀫􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀬􀀵􀀶􀀅
􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀂴􀀑􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁉􀂿􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀪􀀴􀀬􀀩􀀰􀀨􀀵􀀫􀀬􀀲􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀯􀀩􀀴􀀧􀀩􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀉􀀊􀀁􀀟􀀴􀀩􀀥􀀶􀀻􀀁􀀥􀀮􀀵􀀱􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀧􀀩􀀴􀀰􀀩􀀨􀀁
􀀧􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀷􀀮􀀥􀀴􀀁􀀴􀀩􀀮􀀥􀀶􀀬􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀁􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀁􀀫􀀩􀀰􀀧􀀩􀀁􀀯􀀥􀀻􀀁􀀵􀀩􀀴􀀸􀀩􀀁􀀥􀀵􀀁􀀩􀀸􀀬􀀨􀀩􀀰􀀧􀀩􀀁􀀱􀀪􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁
􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀌􀀇􀀎
􀀌􀀇􀀋􀀁􀀓􀀫􀀬􀀰􀀭􀀬􀀰􀀁􀀂􀀪􀀱􀀱􀀶􀀰􀀱􀀶􀀩􀀁􀀌􀀇􀀇􀀁􀀥􀀦􀀱􀀸􀀩􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀼􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀆􀀁􀀞􀀩􀀩􀀁􀀥􀀮􀀵􀀱􀀁􀀽􀀟􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀩􀀪􀀪􀀩􀀧􀀶􀀵􀀁
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀝􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁈􀂴􀀏􀀃
􀀯􀀩􀀯􀀱􀀴􀀥􀀰􀀨􀀷􀀯􀀁􀀦􀀻􀀁􀀶􀀫􀀩􀀁􀀞􀀩􀀧􀀴􀀩􀀶􀀥􀀴􀀬􀀥􀀶􀀁􀀂􀀪􀀱􀀱􀀶􀀰􀀱􀀶􀀩􀀁􀀊􀀏􀀐􀀁􀀥􀀦􀀱􀀸􀀩􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀥􀀴􀀥􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀍􀀆
􀀌􀀇􀀌􀀁􀀓􀀟􀀜􀀤􀀘􀀗􀀁 􀀑􀀤􀀔􀀤􀀘􀀣􀀁 􀀊􀀜􀀡􀀝􀀠􀀞􀀔􀀤􀀜􀀖􀀁 􀀔􀀟􀀗􀀁 􀀉􀀠􀀟􀀣􀀥􀀝􀀔􀀢􀀁 􀀑􀀤􀀔􀀙􀀙􀀁 􀀜􀀟􀀁 􀀒􀀘􀀛􀀢􀀔􀀟􀀁 􀀂􀀵􀀩􀀩􀀁
􀁉􀁒􀁒􀁗􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀀘􀀓􀀔􀀃 􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀌􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀀑􀀃 􀀕􀀗􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃 􀀗􀀘􀀞􀀃 􀁓􀀑􀀃 􀀗􀀔􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃 􀀜􀀓􀀞􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀋􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀗􀀜􀀣􀀡􀀠􀀣􀀜􀀤􀀜􀀙􀀃􀀁􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀋􀀋􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀥􀀴􀀥􀀆􀀁􀀐􀀌􀀆
􀀌􀀇􀀍􀀁􀀞􀀩􀀩􀀁􀀪􀀱􀀱􀀶􀀰􀀱􀀶􀀩􀀁􀀋􀀌􀀏􀀁􀀥􀀦􀀱􀀸􀀩􀀆
􀀌􀀇􀀎􀀁􀀈􀀢􀀠􀀦􀀟􀀘􀀝􀀝􀀁􀀸􀀆􀀁􀀉􀀜􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀔􀀟􀀗􀀁􀀉􀀠􀀥􀀟􀀤􀀧􀀁􀀠􀀙􀀁􀀑􀀔􀀟􀀁􀀋􀀢􀀔􀀟􀀖􀀜􀀣􀀖􀀠􀀁􀀂􀀵􀀩􀀩􀀁􀀪􀀱􀀱􀀶􀀰􀀱􀀶􀀩􀀁􀀋􀀋􀀋􀀁
􀀥􀀦􀀱􀀸􀀩􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀆􀀁􀀋􀀊􀀊􀀆
Annex 288
International Law Commission, The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (aut dedere aut
judicare): Final Report of the International Law Commission (2014)

The obligation to extradite or prosecute
(aut dedere aut judicare)
Final Report of the International Law Commission
2014
Copyright © United Nations
2014
Adopted by the International Law Commission at its sixty-sixth session, in 2014,
and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering
the work of that session (at para. 65). The report will appear in Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 2014, vol. II (Part Two).
2
The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)
Final report on the topic
65. This report is intended to summarize and to highlight particular aspects of the work of the
Commission on the topic “The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)”, in order to
assist States in this matter.
1. Obligation to fight impunity in accordance with the rule of law
(1) The Commission notes that States have expressed their desire to cooperate among themselves, and
with competent international tribunals, in the fight against impunity for crimes, in particular offences of
international concern,420 and in accordance with the rule of law.421 In the Declaration of the High-level
Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, the Heads of
State and Government and heads of delegation attending the meeting on 24 September 2012 committed
themselves to “ensuring that impunity is not tolerated for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity
and for violations of international humanitarian law and gross violations of human rights law, and that such
violations are properly investigated and appropriately sanctioned, including by bringing the perpetrators of
any crimes to justice, through national mechanisms or, where appropriate, regional or international
mechanisms, in accordance with international law …”.422 The obligation to cooperate in combating such
impunity is given effect in numerous conventions, inter alia, through the obligation to extradite or
prosecute.423 The view that the obligation to extradite or prosecute plays a crucial role in the fight against
impunity is widely shared by States;424 the obligation applies in respect of a wide range of crimes of serious
concern to the international community and has been included in all sectoral conventions against
international terrorism concluded since 1970.
(2) The role the obligation to extradite or prosecute plays in supporting international cooperation to
fight impunity has been recognized at least since the time of Hugo Grotius, who postulated the principle of
aut dedere aut punire (either extradite or punish): “When appealed to, a State should either punish the
guilty person as he deserves, or it should entrust him to the discretion of the party making the appeal.”425
The modern terminology replaces “punishment” with “prosecution” as the alternative to extradition in order
to reflect better the possibility that an alleged offender may be found not guilty.
420 See, e.g., General Assembly resolution 2840 (XXVI) of 18 December 1971 entitled “Question of the
punishment of war criminals and of persons who have committed crimes against humanity”; General Assembly resolution 3074
(XXVIII) of 3 December 1973 on the “Principles of international cooperation in the detection, arrest, extradition and
punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity”; and principle 18 of Economic and Social Council
resolution 1989/65 of 24 May 1989 entitled “Effective prevention and investigation of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary
executions”.
421 General Assembly resolution 67/1 of 24 September 2012.
422 Ibid., para. 22.
423 See Part 3 below. In the case concerning Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite
(Belgium v. Senegal), the International Court of Justice states: “… Extradition and prosecution are alternative ways to combat
impunity in accordance with Art. 7, para 1 [of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment of 1984]. ….” (Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 422, at p. 443, para. 50). The Court adds that the States parties to the Convention against
Torture have “a common interest to ensure, in view of their shared values, that acts of torture are prevented and that, if they
occur, their authors do not enjoy impunity” (ibid., p. 449, para. 68). The Court reiterates that the object and purpose of the
Convention are “to make more effective the struggle against torture by avoiding impunity for the perpetrators of such acts ”
(ibid., p. 451, para. 74 and cf. also para. 75).
Special Rapporteur Zdzislaw Galicki’s fourth report dealt at length with the issue of the duty to cooperate in the
fight against impunity. He cited the following examples of international instruments which provide a legal basis for the duty to
cooperate: Art. 1 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the preamble to the
1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and guideline XII of the Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe on eradicating impunity for serious human rights violations, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on
30 Mar. 2011, A/CN.4/648, paras. 26–33.
424 For example, Belgium (A/CN.4/612, para. 33); Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden
(A/C.6/66/SR.26, para. 10); Switzerland (ibid., para. 18); El Salvador (ibid., para. 24); Italy (ibid., para. 42); Peru (ibid., para.
64); Belarus (A/C.6/66/SR. 27, para. 41); Russian Federation (ibid., para. 64); and India (ibid., para. 81).
425 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Book II, chapter XXI, section IV (English translation by Francis W.
Kelsey (Oxford/London: Clarendon Press/Humphrey Milford, 1925), pp. 527–529 at 527).
3
2. The importance of the obligation to extradite or prosecute in the work of the International
Law Commission
(3) The topic “The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)” may be viewed as
having been encompassed by the topic “Jurisdiction with regard to crimes committed outside national
territory” which was on the provisional list of fourteen topics at the first session of the Commission in
1949.426 It is also addressed in articles 8 (Establishment of jurisdiction) and 9 (Obligation to extradite or
prosecute) of the 1996 Draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind. Article 9 of the
Draft code stipulates an obligation to extradite or prosecute for genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes
against United Nations and associated personnel, and war crimes.427 The principle aut dedere aut judicare
is said to have derived from “a number of multilateral conventions”428 that contain the obligation. An
analysis of the draft code’s history suggests that draft article 9 is driven by the need for an effective system
of criminalization and prosecution of the said core crimes, rather than actual State practice and opinio
juris.429 The article is justified on the basis of the grave nature of the crimes involved and the desire to
combat impunity for individuals who commit these crimes.430 While the draft code’s focus is on core
crimes,431 the material scope of the obligation to extradite or prosecute covers most crimes of international
concern, as mentioned in (1) above.
3. Summary of work
(4) The following summarizes several key aspects of the Commission’s work on this topic. In the
past, some members of the Commission, including Special Rapporteur Zdzislaw Galicki, doubted the use of
the Latin formula “aut dedere aut judicare”, especially in relation to the term “judicare”, which they
considered as not reflecting precisely the scope of the term “prosecute”. However, the Special Rapporteur
considered it premature at that time to focus on the precise definition of terms, leaving them to be defined
in a future draft article on “Use of terms”.432 The report of the Commission decided to proceed on the
understanding that whether the mandatory nature of “extradition” or that of “prosecution” has priority over
the other depends on the context and applicable legal regime in particular situations.
(5) The Commission considered useful to its work a wide range of materials, particularly: the Survey
of multilateral conventions which may be of relevance for the Commission’s work on the topic “The
426 United Nations, The Work of the International Law Commission, Eighth edition (New York: United Nations
2012), vol. 1, p. 37.
427 “Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of an international criminal court, the State P arty in the territory of which
an individual alleged to have committed a crime set out in article 17 [genocide], 18 [crimes against humanity], 19 [crimes
against United Nations and associated personnel] or 20 [war crimes] is found shall extradite or prosec ute that individual”. See
also the Commission’s commentary on this article (Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement
No. 10 (A/51/10), chap. II).
428 Draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind, art. 8, pa ra. (3) (ibid.).
429 Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/49/10), p. 80, para. 142.
430 Draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind, art. 8, paras. (3), (4) and (8) and art. 9, para.
(2) (ibid., Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/51/10)).
431 At the first reading in 1991, the draft code comprised the following 12 crimes: aggression; threat of aggression;
intervention; colonial domination and other forms of alien domination; genocide; apar theid; systematic or mass violations of
human rights; exceptionally serious war crimes; recruitment, financing and training of mercenaries; international terrorism;
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs; and wilful and severe damage to the environment. At its sessions in 1995 and 1996, the
Commission reduced the number of crimes in the final draft code to four crimes: aggression; genocide; war crimes; and crimes
against humanity, adhering to the Nuremberg legacy as the criterion for the choice of the crimes cov ered by the draft code. The
primary reason for this approach appeared to have been the unfavourable comments by 24 Governments to the list of 12 crimes
proposed in 1991. A fifth crime, crimes against United Nations and associated personnel, was added at th e last moment on the
basis of its magnitude, the seriousness of the problem of attacks on such personnel and “its centrality to the maintenance of
international peace and security” (A/CN.4/448 and Add.1).
The crime of aggression was not subject to the provision of art. 9 of the draft code. In the Commission’s
opinion, “[t]he determination by a national court of one State of the question of whether another State had committed
aggression would be contrary to the fundamental principle of international law par in parent imperium non habet. … [and] the
exercise of jurisdiction by the national court of a State which entails consideration of the commission of aggression by anot her
State would have serious implications for international relations and international peace and security.” (Draft code of crimes
against the peace and security of mankind, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 10
(A/51/10), p. 30, para. 14).
432 A/CN.4/603, paras. 36–37. In his preliminary report, the Special Rapporteur discussed various Latin formulas
relevant to this topic; namely: aut dedere aut punire; judicare aut dedere; aut dedere aut prosequi; aut dedere, aut judicare, aut
tergiversari; and aut dedere aut poenam persequi (A/CN.4/571, paras. 5–8). See also: Raphäel van Steenberghe, “The
Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute: Clarifying its Nature” (Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 9 (2011), p. 1089 at
pp. 1107–8, on the formulas aut dedere aut punire, aut dedere aut prosequi, and aut dedere aut judicare.
4
obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)” conducted by Secretariat433 (hereinafter
“Secretariat’s Survey (2010)”), which identified multilateral instruments at the universal and regional levels
that contain provisions combining extradition and prosecution as alternatives for the punishment of
offenders; and the Judgment of 20 July 2012 of the International Court of Justice in the case concerning
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal).
(a) Typology of provisions in multilateral instruments
(6) The Secretariat’s Survey (2010) proposed a description and a typology of the relevant instruments
in light of these provisions, and examined the preparatory work of certain key conventions that had served
as models in the field. For some provisions, it also reviewed any reservations made. It pointed out the
differences and similarities between the reviewed provisions in different conventions and their evolution,
and offered overall conclusions as to: (a) the relationship between extradition and prosecution in the
relevant provisions; (b) the conditions applicable to extradition under the various conventions; and (c) the
conditions applicable to prosecution under the various conventions. The Survey classified conventions that
included such provisions into four categories: (a) the 1929 Convention for the Suppression of
Counterfeiting Currency and other conventions that have followed the same model; (b) regional
conventions on extradition; (c) the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol I; and (d)
the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft and other conventions that
have followed the same model.
(7) The 1929 Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency and other conventions that
have followed the same model434 typically: (a) criminalize the relevant offence, which the States parties
undertake to make punishable under their domestic laws; (b) make provision for prosecution and
extradition which take into account the divergent views of States with regard to the extradition of nationals
and the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the latter being permissive rather than compulsory; (c)
contain provisions which impose an obligation to extradite, with prosecution coming into play once there is
a refusal of extradition; (d) establish an extradition regime by which States undertake, under certain
conditions, to consider the offence as extraditable; (e) contain a provision providing that a State’s attitude
on the general issue of criminal jurisdiction as a question of international law was not affected by its
participation in the Convention; and (f) contain a non-prejudice clause with regard to each State’s criminal
legislation and administration. While some of the instruments under this model contain terminological
differences of an editorial nature, others modify the substance of the obligations undertaken by States
Parties.
(8) Numerous regional conventions and arrangements on extradition also contain provisions that
combine options of extradition and prosecution,435 although those instruments typically emphasize the
obligation to extradite (which is regulated in detail) and only contemplate submission to prosecution as an
alternative to avoid impunity in the context of that cooperation. Under that model, extradition is a means to
ensure the effectiveness of criminal jurisdiction. States parties have a general duty to extradite unless the
request fits within a condition or exception, including mandatory and discretionary grounds for refusal. For
instance, extradition of nationals could be prohibited or subject to specific safeguards. Provisions in
subsequent agreements and arrangements have been subject to modification and adjustment over time,
particularly in respect of conditions and exceptions.436
433 A/CN.4/630.
434 E.g., (a) 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs; (b) the 1937
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism; (c) the 1950 Convention for the Suppression of the Tra ffic in
Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others; (d) the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs; and (e) the
1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.
435 These instruments include: (a) the 1928 Convention on Private International Law, also known as the
“Bustamante Code”, under Book IV (International Law of Procedure), Title III (Extradition); (b) the 1933 Convention on
Extradition; (c) the 1981 Inter-American Convention on Extradition; (d) the 1957 European Convention on Extraditio n; (e) the
1961 General Convention on Judicial Cooperation (Convention générale de coopération en matière de justice); (f) the 1994
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Extradition; and (g) the London Scheme for
Extradition within the Commonwealth.
436 It may also be recalled that General Assembly has adopted the Model Treaty on Extradition (resolution 45/116,
annex) and the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (resolution 45/117). See also the 2004 Model Law on
Extradition prepared by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Available at
5
(9) The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 contain the same provision whereby each High Contracting
Party is obligated to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed,
grave breaches, and to bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. However, it
may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with its domestic legislation, hand such persons over for trial to
another High Contracting Party concerned, provided that the latter has established a prima facie case.437
Therefore, under that model, the obligation to search for and submit to prosecution an alleged offender is
not conditional on any jurisdictional consideration and that obligation exists irrespective of any request for
extradition by another party.438 Nonetheless, extradition is an available option subject to a condition that the
prosecuting State has established a prima facie case. That mechanism is made applicable to Additional
Protocol I of 1977 by renvoi.439
(10) The 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, stipulates in
article 7 that “[t]he Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does
not extradite him, be obliged without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed
in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution”. This “Hague
formula” is a variation of the Geneva Conventions formula and has served as a model for several
subsequent conventions aimed at the suppression of specific offences, principally in the fight against
terrorism, but also in many other areas (including torture, mercenarism, crimes against United Nations and
associated personnel, transnational crime, corruption, and enforced disappearance).440 However, many of
those subsequent instruments have modified the original terminology which sometimes affect the substance
of the obligations contained in the Hague formula.
(11) In his Separate Opinion in the Judgment of 20 July 2012 of the International Court of Justice in
the case concerning Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal),
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/model_law_extradition.pdf. See also Revised Manuals on the Model Treaty on Extradition and on the
Model Treaty on Extradition and on the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, available at:
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/model_treaty_extradition_revised_manual.pdf (visited on 3 June 2014).
437 Arts. 49, 50, 129, and 146, respectively, of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Geneva Conventions. The
reason these Geneva Conventions use the term “hand over” instead of “extradite” is explained in the Secretariat’s Survey (2010)
at para. 54.
According to Claus Kreβ (“Reflection on the Iudicare Limb of the Grave Breaches Regime” Journal of
International Criminal Justice, vol. 7 (2009), p. 789), what the judicare limb of the grave breaches regime actually entails is a
duty to investigate and, where so warranted, to prosecute and convict.
438 See Jean S. Pictet (ed), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary, vol. IV (International
Committee of the Red Cross 1958) p. 593.
439 Art. 85 (1), (3) and art. 88 (2) of Additional Protocol I of 1977.
440 These include, inter alia,: (a) the 1971 Organization of American States (OAS) Convention to Prevent and
Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International
Significance; (b) the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation; (c) the 1973
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomat ic
Agents; (d) the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism; (e) 1977 Organization of African Unity Convention
for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa; (f) the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages; (g) the
1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; (h) the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; (i) the 1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture; (j) the
1987 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and the
2004 Additional Protocol thereto; (k) the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation; (l) the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation; (m) the
1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances; (n) the 1989
International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries; (o) the 1994 Inter -American
Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons; (p) the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated
Personnel and its 2005 Optional Protocol; (q) the 1996 Inter-American Convention against Corruption; (r) the 1997 Inter-
American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other
Related Materials; (s) the 1997 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions; (t) the 1997 International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; (u) the 1998 Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law; (v)
the 1999 Criminal Law Convention on Corruption; (w) the 1999 Second Protocol to the Convention for t he Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict; (x) the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism; (y) the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution
and child pornography; (z) the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols; (aa)
the 2001 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime; (bb) the 2003 African Union Convention on Preventing and Co mbating
Corruption; (cc) the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption; (dd) the 2005 International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; (ee) the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism; (ff) the
2006 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; (gg) the 2007 Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Convention on Counter-Terrorism; (hh) 2010 Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; and (ii) the 2010 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to
International Civil Aviation.
6
Judge Yusuf also addressed the typology of “treaties containing the formula aut dedere aut judicare” and
divided them into two broad categories.441 The first category of international conventions contained clauses
which impose an obligation to extradite, and in which submission to prosecution becomes an obligation
only after the refusal of extradition. Those conventions are structured in such a way that gives priority to
extradition to the State in whose territory the crime is committed. The majority of those conventions do not
impose any general obligation on States parties to submit to prosecution the alleged offender, and such
submission by the State on whose territory the alleged offender is present becomes an obligation only if a
request for extradition has been refused, or some factors such as nationality of the alleged offender exist.
Examples of the first category are article 9, paragraph 22 of the 1929 International Convention for the
Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, article 15 of the African Union Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption, and article 5 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.
The second category of international conventions contains clauses which impose an obligation to
submit to prosecution, with extradition being an available option, as well as clauses which impose an
obligation to submit to prosecution, with extradition becoming an obligation if the State fails to do so. Such
clauses in that category can be found in, for example, the relevant provisions of the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949, article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft, and article 7, paragraph 1 of the Convention against Torture.
(12) In light of the above, the Commission considers that when drafting treaties, States can decide for
themselves which conventional formula on the obligation to extradite or prosecute best suits their objective
in a particular circumstance. Owing to the great diversity in the formulation, content, and scope of the
obligation to extradite or prosecute in conventional practice, it would be futile for the Commission to
engage in harmonizing the various treaty clauses on the obligation to extradite or prosecute.442
(13) Although the Commission finds that the scope of the obligation to extradite or prosecute under the
relevant conventions should be analysed on a case-by-case basis, it acknowledges that there may be some
general trends and common features in the more recent conventions containing the obligation to extradite or
prosecute. One of the most relevant trends appears to be the use of “Hague formula” that serves “as a
model for most of the contemporary conventions for the suppression of specific offences”.443 Of the
conventions drafted on or after 1970, approximately three-quarters follow the “Hague formula”. In those
post-1970 conventions, there is a common trend that the custodial State shall, without exception, submit the
case of the alleged offender to a competent authority if it does not extradite. Such obligation is
supplemented by additional provisions that require States parties: (a) to criminalize the relevant offence
under its domestic laws; (b) to establish jurisdiction over the offence when there is a link to the crime or
when the alleged offender is present on their territory and is not extradited; (c) to make provisions to ensure
that the alleged offender is under custody and there is a preliminary enquiry; and (d) to treat the offence as
extraditable.444 In particular, under the prosecution limb of the obligation, the conventions only emphasize
that the case be submitted to a competent authority for the purpose of prosecution. To a lesser extent, there
441 Separate Opinion of Judge Yusuf in the case concerning Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or
Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 422, at pp. 567–568, paras. 19–22. See also Secretariat survey
(2010), para. 126. Cf. also Belgium’s comments submitted to the Commission in 2009, where Belgium identified two types of
treaties: (a) treaties which contain an aut dedere aut judicare clause with the obligation to prosecute conditional on refusal of a
request for extradition of the alleged perpetrator of an offence; and (b) treaties which contain a judicare vel dedere clause with
the obligation on States to exercise universal jurisdiction over perpetrators of the offences under the treaties, without making
this obligation conditional on refusal to honour a prior extradition request (A/CN.4/612, para. 15), quoted by Special
Rapporteur Galicki in his fourth report (A/CN.4/648, para. 85 and fn. 56).
442 As the Secretariat’s Survey (2010) concludes (A/CN.4/630, para. 153):
“… The examination of conventional practice in this field shows that the degree of specificity of the various
conventions in regulating these issues varies considerably, and that there exist very few conventions that adopt identical
mechanisms for the punishment of offenders (including with respect to the relationship between extradition and
prosecution). The variation in the provisions relating to prosecution and extradition appears to be determined by several
factors, including the geographical, institutional and thematic framework in which each convention is negotiated … and
the development of related areas of international law, such as human rights and criminal justice. It follows that, while it is
possible to identify some general trends and common features in the relevant provisions, conclusive findings regarding the
precise scope of each provision need to be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the formulation of the
provision, the general economy of the treaty in which it is contained and the relevant preparatory works. ”
443 Ibid., para. 91.
444 Ibid., para. 109.
7
is also a trend of stipulating that, absent prosecution by the custodial State, the alleged offender must be
extradited without exception whatsoever.
(14) The Commission observes that there are important gaps in the present conventional regime
governing the obligation to extradite or prosecute which may need to be closed. Notably, there is a lack of
international conventions with this obligation in relation to most crimes against humanity,445 war crimes
other than grave breaches, and war crimes in non-international armed conflict.446 In relation to genocide, the
international cooperation regime could be strengthened beyond the rudimentary regime under the
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. As explained by the
International Court of Justice in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), article VI of
the Genocide Convention only obligates Contracting Parties to institute and exercise territorial criminal
jurisdiction as well as to cooperate with an “international penal tribunal” under certain circumstances.447
(b) Implementation of the obligation to extradite or prosecute
(15) The Hague formula. The Commission views the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in
the case concerning Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) to
be helpful in elucidating some aspects relevant to the implementation of the obligation to extradite or
prosecute. The Judgment confines itself to an analysis of the mechanism to combat impunity under the
Convention against Torture. In particular, the Judgment focuses on the relationship between the different
articles on the establishment of jurisdiction (article 5), the obligation to engage in a preliminary inquiry
(article 6), and the obligation to prosecute or extradite (article 7).448 While the Court’s reasoning relates to
the specific implementation and application of issues surrounding that Convention, since the relevant
prosecute-or-extradite provisions of the Convention against Torture are modelled upon those of the “Hague
formula”, the Court’s ruling may also help to elucidate the meaning of the prosecute-or-extradite regime
under the 1970 Hague Convention and other conventions which have followed the same formula.449 As the
445 The 2006 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance follows the
Hague formula, and refers to the “extreme seriousness” of the offence, which it qualifies, when widespread or systematic, as a
crime against humanity. However, outside of this, there appears to be a lack of international conventions with the obligation to
extradite or prosecute in relation to crimes against humanity.
446 The underlying principle of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 is the establishment of universal jurisdiction
over grave breaches of the Conventions. Each Convention contains an article describing what acts constitute grave breaches that
follows immediately after the extradite-or-prosecute provision.
For the First and Second Geneva Conventions, this article is identical ( arts. 50 and 51, respectively): “Grave
breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against pers ons
or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, i ncluding biological experiments, wilfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not jus tified
by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.”
Art. 130 of the Third Geneva Convention stipulates: “Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates
shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wil ful
killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war
of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.”
Art. 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides: “Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates
shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the p resent
Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compell ing a
protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair an d
regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of prope rty,
not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.”
The four Conventions and the Additional Protocol I of 1977 do not establish an obligation to extradite or
prosecute outside of grave breaches. No other international instruments relating to war crimes have this obligation, either.
447 I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, at pp. 226–227 and 229, paras. 442, 449. Art. VI reads: “Persons charged with
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a compete nt tribunal of the State in the territory of
which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracti ng
Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.” The Court at para. 442 did not exclude other bases when it observed that
“Article VI only obliges the Contracting Parties to institute and exercise territorial criminal jurisdiction; while it certain ly does
not prohibit States, with respect to genocide, from conferring jurisdiction on their criminal courts based on criteria other than
where the crime was committed which are compatible with international law, in particular the nationality of the accused, it d oes
not oblige them to do so.”
448 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2012, p. 422, at pp. 450–461, paras. 71–121.
449 The Court notes that art. 7 (1) of the Convention against Torture is based on a similar provision contained in the
1970 Hague Convention (ibid., para. 90). As Judge Donoghue puts it: “The dispositive paragraphs of today’s Judgment bind
8
Court also holds that the prohibition of torture is a peremptory norm (jus cogens),450 the prosecute-orextradite
formula under the Convention against Torture could serve as a model for new prosecute-orextradite
regimes governing prohibitions covered by peremptory norms (jus cogens), such as genocide,
crimes against humanity, and serious war crimes.
(16) The Court determines that States parties to the Convention against Torture have obligations to
criminalize torture, establish their jurisdiction over the crime of torture so as to equip themselves with the
necessary legal tool to prosecute that offence, and make an inquiry into the facts immediately from the time
the suspect is present in their respective territories. The Court declares: “These obligations, taken as a
whole, might be regarded as elements of a single conventional mechanism aimed at preventing suspects
from escaping the consequences of their criminal responsibility, if proven”.451 The obligation under article
7, paragraph 1, “to submit the case to the competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution”, which the
Court calls the “obligation to prosecute”, arises regardless of the existence of a prior request for the
extradition of the suspect. However, national authorities are left to decide whether to initiate proceedings in
light of the evidence before them and the relevant rules of criminal procedure.452 In particular, the Court
rules that “[e]xtradition is an option offered to the State by the Convention, whereas prosecution is an
international obligation under the Convention, the violation of which is a wrongful act engaging the
responsibility of the State”.453 The Court also notes that both the 1970 Hague Convention and the
Convention against Torture emphasize “that the authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as
in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of the State concerned”.454
(17) Basic elements of the obligation to extradite or prosecute to be included in national legislation.
The effective fulfilment of the obligation to extradite or prosecute requires undertaking necessary national
measures to criminalize the relevant offences, establishing jurisdiction over the offences and the person
present in the territory of the State, investigating or undertaking primary inquiry, apprehending the suspect,
and submitting the case to the prosecuting authorities (which may or may not result in the institution of
proceedings) or extrading, if an extradition request is made by another State with the necessary jurisdiction
and capability to prosecute the suspect.
(18) Establishment of the necessary jurisdiction. Establishing jurisdiction is “a logical prior step” to the
implementation of an obligation to extradite or prosecute an alleged offender present in the territory of a
State.455 For the purposes of the present topic, when the crime was allegedly committed abroad with no
nexus to the forum State, the obligation to extradite or prosecute would necessarily reflect an exercise of
universal jurisdiction,456 which is “the jurisdiction to establish a territorial jurisdiction over persons for
extraterritorial events”457 where neither the victims nor alleged offenders are nationals of the forum State
and no harm was allegedly caused to the forum State’s own national interests. However, the obligation to
extradite or prosecute can also reflect an exercise of jurisdiction under other bases. Thus, if a State can
exercise jurisdiction on another basis, universal jurisdiction may not necessarily be invoked in the
fulfilment of the obligation to extradite or prosecute.
only the Parties. Nonetheless, the Court’s interpretation of a multilateral treaty (or of customary international law) can have
implications for other States. The far-reaching nature of the legal issues presented by this case is revealed by the number of
questions posed by Members of the Court during oral proceedings. ….” (Declaration of Judge Donoghue in Questions relating
to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 422, at p. 590, para. 21.)
450 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2012, p. 422, at p. 457, para. 99.
451 Ibid., p. 455, para. 91. See also pp. 451–452 and 456, paras. 74–75, 78, 94.
452 Ibid., pp. 454–456, paras. 90, 94.
453 Ibid., p. 456, para. 95.
454 Art. 7, para. 2 of the Convention against Torture and art. 7 of the Hague Convention of 1970, ibid. para. 90.
455 Report of the AU-EU Technical ad hoc Expert Group on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction (8672/1/09/
Rev.1), annex, para. 11. The International Court of Justice in the case concerning Questions relating to the Obligation to
Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) holds that the performance by States parties to the Convention against Torture of
their obligation to establish universal jurisdiction of their courts is a necessary condition for enabling a preliminary inqu iry and
for submitting the case to their competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution (Questions relating to the Obligation to
Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 422, at p. 451, para. 74).
456 According to one author, “The principle of aut dedere aut judicare overlaps with universal jurisdiction when a
State has no other nexus to the alleged crime or to the suspect other than the mere presence of the person within its territo ry.”
(Mitsue Inazumi, Universal Jurisdiction in Modern International Law: Expansion of National Jurisdiction for Prosecuting
Serious Crimes under International Law (Intersentia, 2005), p. 122).
457 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 3, Joint
Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, p. 75 para. 42.
9
Universal jurisdiction is a crucial component for prosecuting alleged perpetrators of crimes of
international concern, particularly when the alleged perpetrator is not prosecuted in the territory where the
crime was committed.458 Several international instruments, such as the very widely ratified four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the Convention against Torture, require the exercise of universal jurisdiction over
the offences covered by these instruments, or, alternatively to extradite alleged offenders to another State
for the purpose of prosecution.
(19) Delay in enacting legislation. According to the Court in the case concerning Questions relating to
the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), delay in enacting necessary legislation in
order to prosecute suspects adversely affects the State party’s implementation of the obligations to conduct
a preliminary inquiry and to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purposes of prosecution.459
The State’s obligation extends beyond merely enacting national legislation. The State must also actually
exercise its jurisdiction over a suspect, starting by establishing the facts.460
(20) Obligation to investigate. According to the Court in the case concerning Questions relating to the
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), the obligation to investigate consists of several
elements.
As a general rule, the obligation to investigate must be interpreted in light of the object and
purpose of the applicable treaty, which is to make more effective the fight against impunity.461
The obligation is intended to corroborate the suspicions regarding the person in question.462 The
starting point is the establishment of the relevant facts, which is an essential stage in the process of the fight
against impunity.463
As soon as the authorities have reason to suspect that a person present in their territory may be
responsible for acts subject to the obligation to extradite or prosecute, they must investigate. The
preliminary inquiry must immediately be initiated. This point is reached, at the latest, when the first
complaint is filed against the person,464 at which stage the establishment of the facts becomes imperative.465
However, simply questioning the suspect in order to establish his/her identity and inform him/her
of the charges cannot be regarded as performance of the obligation to conduct a preliminary inquiry.466
The inquiry is to be conducted by the authorities who have the task of drawing up a case file and
collecting facts and evidence (for example, documents and witness statements relating to the events at issue
and to the suspect’s possible involvement). These authorities are those of the State where the alleged crime
was committed or of any other State where complaints have been filed in relation to the case. In order to
fulfil its obligation to conduct a preliminary inquiry, the State in whose territory the suspect is present
should seek cooperation of the authorities of the aforementioned States.467
An inquiry taking place on the basis of universal jurisdiction must be conducted according to the
same standards in terms of evidence as when the State has jurisdiction by virtue of a link with the case in
question.468
458 It should be recalled that the “Obligation to extradite or prosecute” in art. 9 of the 1996 draft code is closely
related to the “Establishment of jurisdiction” under art. 8 of the draft code, which requires each State party thereto to take such
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes against United
Nations and associated personnel, and war crimes, irrespective of where or by whom those crime s were committed. The
Commission’s commentary to art. 8 makes it clear that universal jurisdiction is envisaged (Official Record of the General
Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/51/10), para. 7).
459 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2012, p. 422, at pp. 451–452, paras. 76, 77.
460 Ibid., p. 453, para. 84.
461 Ibid., p. 454, para. 86.
462 Ibid., p. 453, para. 83.
463 Ibid., pp. 453–454, paras. 85–86.
464 Ibid., p. 454, para. 88.
465 Ibid., p. 454, para. 86.
466 Ibid., pp. 453–454, para. 85.
467 Ibid., p. 453, para. 83.
468 Ibid., p. 453, para. 84.
10
(21) Obligation to prosecute. According to the Court in the case concerning Questions relating to the
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), the obligation to prosecute consists of certain
elements.
The obligation to prosecute is actually an obligation to submit the case to the prosecuting
authorities; it does not involve an obligation to initiate a prosecution. Indeed, in light of the evidence,
fulfilment of the obligation may or may not result in the institution of proceedings.469 The competent
authorities decide whether to initiate proceedings, in the same manner as they would for any alleged
offence of a serious nature under the law of the State concerned.470
Proceedings relating to the implementation of the obligation to prosecute should be undertaken
without delay, as soon as possible, in particular once the first complaint has been filed against the
suspect.471
The timeliness of the prosecution must be such that it does not lead to injustice; hence, necessary
actions must be undertaken within a reasonable time limit.472
(22) Obligation to extradite. With respect to the obligation to extradite:
Extradition may only be to a State that has jurisdiction in some capacity to prosecute and try the
alleged offender pursuant to an international legal obligation binding on the State in whose territory the
person is present.473
Fulfilling the obligation to extradite cannot be substituted by deportation, extraordinary rendition
or other informal forms of dispatching the suspect to another State.474 Formal extradition requests entail
important human rights protections which may be absent from informal forms of dispatching the suspect to
another State, such as extraordinary renditions. Under extradition law of most, if not all, States, the
necessary requirements to be satisfied include double criminality, ne bis in idem, nullem crimen sine lege,
speciality, and non-extradition of the suspect to stand trial on the grounds of ethnic origin, religion,
nationality or political views.
(23) Compliance with object and purpose. The steps to be taken by a State must be interpreted in light
of the object and purpose of the relevant international instrument or other sources of international
obligation binding on that State, rendering the fight against impunity more effective.475 It is also worth
recalling that, by virtue of article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which reflects
customary international law, a State party to a treaty may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.476 Besides, the steps taken must be in accordance with the
rule of law.
469 Cf. also Chili Komitee Nederland v. Pinochet, Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, 4 Jan. 1995 Netherlands
Yearbook of International Law, vol. 28 (1997), pp. 363–365, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Dutch Public Prosecutor
did not err in refusing to prosecute former Chilean President Pinochet while visiting Amsterdam because Pinochet might be
entitled to immunity from prosecution and any necessary evidence to substantiate his prosecution would be in Chile with which
the Netherlands had no cooperative arrangements regarding criminal proceedings. See Kimberley N. Trapp, State Responsibility
for International Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011), p. 88, fn. 132.
470 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2012, p. 422, at pp. 454 and 456, paras. 90, 94.
471 Ibid., paras. 115, 117.
472 Ibid., paras. 114, 115. Cf. Separate Opinion of Judge Çancado Trindade in that case at pp. 546–548, paras. 148,
151–153; Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Sur in the same case at p. 620, para. 50; and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Xue, at
p. 578, para. 28.
473 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2012, p. 422, at p. 461, para. 120.
474 Cf. Draft article 12 of the draft articles on the expulsion of aliens adopted by the Commission on second
reading in 2014, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-ninth Session, Supplement 10 (A/69/10), chap. IV and
European Court of Human Rights, Bozano v. France, Judgment of 18 December 1986, Application No. 9990/82, paras. 52–60,
where the European Court of Human Rights has held that extradition, disguised as deportation in order to circumvent the
requirements of extradition, is illegal and incompatible with the right to security of person guaranteed under art. 5 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.
475 See the reasoning in the case concerning Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite
(Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 422, at pp. 453–454, paras. 85–86. Therefore, the Court rules that
financial difficulties do not justify Senegal’s failure to comply with the obligations under the Convention against Torture ( ibid.,
para. 112). Likewise, seeking guidance from the African Union does not justify Senegal ’s delay in complying with its obligation
under the Convention (ibid.).
476 Ibid., para. 113.
11
(24) In cases of serious crimes of international concern, the purpose of the obligation to extradite or
prosecute is to prevent alleged perpetrators from going unpunished by ensuring that they cannot find refuge
in any State.477
(25) Temporal scope of the obligation. The obligation to extradite or prosecute under a treaty applies
only to facts having occurred after the entry into force of the said treaty for the State concerned, “unless a
different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established”.478 After a State becomes party to a
treaty containing the obligation to extradite or prosecute, it is entitled, with effect from the date of its
becoming party to the treaty, to request another State party’s compliance with the obligation to extradite or
prosecute.479 Thus, the obligation to criminalize and establish necessary jurisdiction over acts proscribed by
a treaty containing the obligation to extradite or prosecute is to be implemented as soon as the State is
bound by that treaty.480 However, nothing prevents the State from investigating or prosecuting acts
committed before the entry into force of the treaty for that State.481
(26) Consequences of non-compliance with the obligation to extradite or prosecute. In Belgium v.
Senegal, the Court found that the violation of an international obligation under the Convention against
Torture is a wrongful act engaging the responsibility of the State.482 As long as all measures necessary for
the implementation of the obligation have not been taken, the State remains in breach of its obligation.483
The Commission’s articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts stipulate that the
commission of an internationally wrongful act attributable to a State involves legal consequences, including
cessation and non-repetition of the act (art. 30), reparation (arts. 31, 34–39) and countermeasures (arts. 49–
54).
(27) Relationship between the obligation and the “third alternative”. With the establishment of the
International Criminal Court and various ad hoc international criminal tribunals, there is now the possibility
that a State faced with an obligation to extradite or prosecute an accused person might have recourse to a
third alternative – that of surrendering the suspect to a competent international criminal tribunal.484 This
third alternative is stipulated, for example, in article 11, paragraph 1 of the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 2006.485
(28) In her dissenting opinion in the case concerning Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute
or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judge Xue opines that had Senegal surrendered the alleged offender to
an international tribunal constituted by the African Union to try him, they would not have breached their
obligation to prosecute under article 7 of the Convention against Torture, because such a tribunal would
have been created to fulfil the purpose of the Convention, and this is not prohibited by the Convention itself
or by State practice.486 Of course, if “a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established”487 so as not to permit the surrender of an alleged offender to an international criminal tribunal,
477 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2012, p. 422, at p. 461, para. 120. As also explained by Judge Cançado Trindade,
“… The conduct of the State ought to be one which is conducive to compliance with the obligations of result (in
the cas d’espèce, the proscription of torture). The State cannot allege that, despite its good conduct, insufficiencies or
difficulties of domestic law rendered it impossible the full compliance with its obligation (to outlaw torture and to prosecute
perpetrators of it); and the Court cannot consider a case terminated, given the allegedly ‘good conduct’ of the State concerned.”
(Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade in the case concerning Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or
Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 422, at p. 508, para. 50 and see also his full reasoning at pp.
505–508, paras. 44–51.)
478 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2012, p. 422, at pp. 457–458, paras. 100–102, citing art. 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which reflects
customary international law.
479 Ibid., p. 458, paras. 103–105.
480 Ibid., p. 451, para. 75.
481 Ibid., p. 458, paras. 102, 105.
482 Ibid., p. 456, para. 95.
483 Ibid., pp. 460–461, para. 117.
484 Art. 9 of the 1996 Draft code of Crimes against the Peace of Mankind stipulates that the obligation to extradite
or prosecute under that article is “[w]ithout prejudice to the jurisdiction of an international criminal court”.
485 “The State party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed an offence of
enforced disappearance is found shall, if it does not extradite that person or surrender him or her to another State in accordance
with its international obligations or surrender him or her to an international criminal tribunal whose jurisdiction it has
recognized, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.”
486 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Xue, at p. 582, para. 42 (dissenting on other points).
487 Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
12
such surrender would not discharge the obligation of the States parties to the treaty to extradite or prosecute
the person under their respective domestic legal systems.
(29) It is suggested that in light of the increasing significance of international criminal tribunals, new
treaty provisions on the obligation to extradite or prosecute should include this third alternative, as should
national legislation.
(30) Additional observation. A State might also wish to fulfil both parts of the obligation to extradite or
prosecute, for example, by prosecuting, trying and sentencing an offender and then extraditing or
surrendering the offender to another State for the purpose of enforcing the judgment.488
(c) Gaps in the existing conventional regime and the “third alternative”
(31) As noted in paragraph (14) above, the Commission reiterates that there are important gaps in the
present conventional regime governing the obligation to extradite or prosecute, notably in relation to most
crimes against humanity, war crimes other than grave breaches, and war crimes in non-international armed
conflict. It also notes that it had placed on its programme of work in 2014 the topic “Crimes against
humanity”, which would include as one element of a new treaty an obligation to extradite or prosecute for
those crimes.489 It further suggested that, in relation to genocide, the international cooperation regime could
be strengthened beyond the one that exists under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide.490
(32) Instead of drafting a set of model provisions to close the gaps in the existing conventional regime
regarding the obligation to extradite or prosecute, the Commission recalls that an obligation to extradite or
prosecute for, inter alia, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes is already stipulated in article 9
of the 1996 Draft Code, which reads:
“Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of an international criminal court, the State Party in the territory of
which an individual alleged to have committed a crime set out in article 17 [genocide], 18 [crimes against
humanity], 19 [crimes against United Nations and associated personnel] or 20 [war crimes] is found shall
extradite or prosecute that individual.”491
(33) The Commission also refers to the “Hague formula”, quoted in paragraph (10) above. As noted in
that paragraph, the “Hague formula”, has served as a model for most contemporary conventions containing
the obligation to extradite or prosecute,492 including the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime and the United Nations Convention against Corruption which have been mentioned by
several delegations in the Sixth Committee in 2013 as a possible model to close the gaps in the
conventional regime. In addition, the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the case concerning
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) is helpful in construing
the Hague formula.493 The Commission recommends that States consider the Hague formula in undertaking
to close any gaps in the existing conventional regime.
(34) The Commission further acknowledges that some States494 have inquired about the link between
the obligation to extradite or prosecute and the transfer of a suspect to an international or special court or
tribunal, whereas other States495 treat such a transfer differently from extradition. As pointed out in
488 This possibility was raised by Special Rapporteur Galicki in his preliminary report (A/CN.4/571), paras. 49–50.
489 Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/68/10), Annex B.
490 Ibid., Annex A, para. 20. A study by the Chatham House suggested that the Commission’s future work on this
topic should concentrate on drafting a treaty obligation to extradite or prosecute in respect of core international crimes an d
emulate the extradite-or-prosecute mechanism developed in Article 7 of the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft and incorporated in the 1984 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment and Punishment and, most recently, in the 2006 International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance. See Miša Zgonec-Rožej and Joanne Foakes, “International criminals: Extradite or
Prosecute?” Chatham House Briefing Paper, Doc. IL BP 2013/01, Jul. 2013.
491 See also the Commission’s commentary on this article in Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first
Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/51/10), chap. II.
492 Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/68/10), Annex A, para.
16 and accompanying footnote 28.
493 Ibid., paras. 21–22.
494 Chile, France, and Thailand.
495 Canada and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
13
paragraph (27) above, the obligation to extradite or prosecute may be satisfied by surrendering the alleged
offender to a competent international criminal tribunal.496 A provision to this effect appears in article 11,
paragraph 1, of the 2006 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, which reads:
“The State party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed [an act of
genocide/a crime against humanity/a war crime] is found shall, if it does not extradite that person or
surrender him or her to another State in accordance with its international obligations or surrender him or
her to a competent international criminal tribunal or any other competent court whose jurisdiction it has
recognized, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.”
(35) Under such a provision, the obligation to extradite or prosecute may be satisfied by a “third
alternative”, which would consist of the State surrendering the alleged offender to a competent international
criminal tribunal or a competent court whose jurisdiction the State concerned has recognized. The
competent tribunal or court may take a form similar in nature to the Extraordinary African Chambers, set
up within the Senegalese court system by an agreement dated 22 August 2012 between Senegal and the
African Union, to try Mr. Habré in the wake of the Judgment in the case concerning Questions relating to
the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal)497 This kind of “internationalization” within
a national court system is not unique. As a court established by the agreement between Senegal and the
African Union, with the participation of national and foreign judges in these Chambers, the Extraordinary
African Chambers follow the examples of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the
Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
(36) The above examples highlight the essential elements of a provision containing the obligation to
extradite or prosecute, and may assist States in choosing the formula that they consider to be most
appropriate for a particular context.
(d) The priority between the obligation to prosecute and the obligation to extradite, and
the scope of the obligation to prosecute
(37) The Commission takes note of the suggestion made by one delegation498 to the Sixth Committee in
2013 to analyze these two aspects of the topic. It also notes the suggestions of other delegations499 that the
Commission establish a general framework of extraditable offences or guiding principles on the
implementation of the obligation to extradite or prosecute. It wishes to draw attention to the Secretariat
Survey (2010) and paragraphs (6)–(13) above, which have addressed these issues.
(38) To recapitulate, beyond the basic common features, provisions containing the obligation to
extradite or prosecute in multilateral conventions vary considerably in their formulation, content and scope.
This is particularly so in terms of the conditions imposed on States with respect to extradition and
prosecution and the relationship between these two courses of action. Although the relationship between
the obligation to extradite and the obligation to prosecute is not identical, the relevant provisions seem to
fall into two main categories; namely, (a) those clauses pursuant to which the obligation to prosecute is
only triggered by a refusal to surrender the alleged offender following a request for extradition; and (b)
those imposing an obligation to prosecute ipso facto when the alleged offender is present in the territory of
the State, which the latter may be liberated from by granting extradition.
496 See also the Council of Europe, Extradition, European Standards: Explanatory notes on the Council of Europe
convention and protocol and minimum standards protecting persons subject to transnational criminal proceedings (Council of
Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 2006), where it is stated that: “… In the era of international criminal tribunals, the principle [ aut
dedere aut judicare] may be interpreted lato sensu to include the duty of the state to transfer the person to the jurisdiction of an
international organ, such as the International Criminal Court” (ibid., p. 119, footnote omitted).
497 The Extraordinary African Chambers have jurisdiction to try the person or persons most resp onsible for
international crimes committed in Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990. The Trial Chamber and the Appeals
Chamber are each composed of two Senegalese judges and one non-Senegalese judge, who presides over the proceedings. The
Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber are each composed of two Senegalese judges and one non -Senegalese judge, who
presides over the proceedings, see Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers, articles 3 and 11, International Legal
Materials, vol. 52, (2013), pp. 1020–1036).
498 Mexico.
499 Cuba and Belarus, respectively.
14
(39) Instruments containing clauses in the first category impose on States Parties (at least those that do
not have a special link with the offence) an obligation to prosecute only when extradition has been
requested and not granted, as opposed to an obligation ipso facto to prosecute the alleged offender present
in their territory. They recognize the possibility that a State may refuse to grant a request for extradition of
an individual on grounds stipulated either in the instrument or in national legislation. However, in the event
of refusal of extradition, the State is obliged to prosecute the individual. In other words, these instruments
primarily focus on the option of extradition and provide the alternative of prosecution as a safeguard
against impunity.500 In addition, instruments in this category may adopt very different mechanisms for the
punishment of offenders, which may affect the interaction between extradition and prosecution. In some
instances, there are detailed provisions concerning the prosecution of offences that are the subject of the
instrument, while in other cases, the process of extradition is regulated in greater detail. The 1929
International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency and subsequent conventions
inspired by it501 belong to this first category.502 Multilateral conventions on extradition also fall into this
category.503
(40) Clauses in the second category impose upon States an obligation to prosecute ipso facto in that it
arises as soon as the presence of the alleged offender in the territory of the State concerned is ascertained,
regardless of any request for extradition. Only in the event that a request for extradition is made does the
State concerned have the discretion to choose between extradition and prosecution.504 The clearest example
of such clauses is the relevant common article of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which provides that each
State party “shall bring” persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, grave
breaches to those Conventions, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts, but “may also, if it
prefers”, hand such persons over for trial to another State party concerned.505 As for the Hague formula, its
500 Secretariat Survey (2010), para. 132. In effect, these conventions appear to follow what was originally forese en
by Hugo Grotius when he referred to the principle aut dedere aut punire. Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Book II, chapter
XXI, section IV (English translation by Francis W. Kelsey, Oxford/London, Clarendon Press/Humphrey Milford, 1925), pp.
527–529, at p. 527.
501 E.g., the 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs; the 1937 Convention
for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism; the 1950 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others; the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs; and the 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances. See also Secretariat Survey (2010), para. 29.
502 The overall structure of the mechanism for the punishment of offenders in these conventions is based on the
idea that the State in whose territory the crime was committed will request the extradition of the offender who has fled to
another State and that extradition should, in principle, be granted. These conventions, howeve r, recognise that States may be
unable to extradite in some cases (most notably when the individual is their national or when they have granted asylum to him )
and provide for the obligation to prosecute as an alternative. Secretariat Survey (2010), para. 133 and fn. 327 citing Marc
Henzelin, Le principe de l’universalité en droit penal international. Droit et obligation pour les Etats de poursuivre et de juger
selon le principe de l’universalité (Basel/Geneva/Munich/Brussels, Helbing&Lichtenhahn/Faculté de droit de Genève/Bruylant,
2000), p. 286, who qualifies the system as primo dedere secundo prosequi.
503 E.g., the 1981 Inter-American Convention on Extradition; the 1957 European Convention on Extradition; the
1961 General Convention on Judicial Cooperation (Convention générale de coopération en matière de justice); the 1994
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Extradition; and the London Scheme for Extradition
within the Commonwealth. These conventions are based on the general undertaking by States Parties to surrender to one another
all persons against whom the competent authorities of the requesting Party are proceeding for an offence or who are wanted fo r
the carrying out of a sentence or detention order. However, the obligation to extradite is subject to a number of conditions and
exceptions, including when the request involves the national of the requested State. When extradition is refused, the
conventions impose an alternative obligation to prosecute the alleged offender as a mechanism to avoid impunity. See also
Secretariat Survey (2010), para. 134.
504 Secretariat Survey (2010), para. 127, and fn. 307. Those opining that the accused must be present in the
territory of the State concerned as a precondition of the assertion of universal jurisdiction include Judges Higgins, Kooijmans
and Buergenthal (Joint Separate Opinion in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium),
I.C.J .Reports 2002, p. 80, para. 57). See also Separate Opinion of Judge Guillaume, ibid., para. 9 and Gilbert Guillaume,
“Terrorisme et droit international”, Recueil des cours de l’Académie de droit international, vol. 215, 1990, pp. 368–369.
However, Marc Henzelin (supra note 502, p. 354) argues that the presence of the alleged offender in the territory of the State is
not required for prosecution under the relevant provision of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
505 While this provision appears to give a certain priority to prosecution by the custodial State, it also recognises
that this State has the discretion to opt for extradition, provided that the requesting State has made out a prima facie case.
Secretariat Survey (2010), para. 128, citing Declan Costello, “International Terrorism and the Development of the Principle Aut
Dedere Aut Judicare”, The Journal of International Law and Economics, vol. 10, 1975, p. 486; M. Cherif Bassiouni and Edward
M. Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law (Dordrecht/Boston/London,
Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), p. 15; and Christian Maierhöfer, “Aut dedere – aut judicare”. Herkunft, Rechtsgrundlagen und Inhalt
des völkerrechtlichen Gebotes zur Strafverfolgung oder Auslieferung (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2006), pp. 75–76. Authors
who emphasize the priority attributed to prosecution in the 1949 Geneva Conventions are said to include Luigi Condorelli, “Il
sistemadella repression dei crimini di Guerra nelle Convenzioni di Ginevra del 1949 e nel primo protocollo addizionale del
1977”, in P. Lamberti Zanardi & G. Venturini, eds., Crimini di guerra e competenza delle giurisdizioni nazionali: Atti del
Convegno, Milano, 15–17 maggio 1997 (Milan, Giuffrè, 1998), pp. 35–36; and Henzelin, supra, p. 353 (who qualifies the
model of the 1949 Geneva Conventions as primo prosequi secundo dedere). C.f. also art. 88 (2) of Additional Protocol I to the
1949 Geneva Conventions, which calls on States Parties to “give due consideration to the request of the State in whose territory
15
text does not unequivocally resolve the question of whether the obligation to prosecute arises ipso facto or
only once a request for extradition is submitted and not granted.506 In this regard, the findings of the
Committee against Torture and the International Court of Justice in the case concerning Questions relating
to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), in relation to a similar provision
contained in article 7 of the 1984 Convention against Torture,507 are instructive. The Committee against
Torture has explained that:
“… the obligation to prosecute the alleged perpetrator of acts of torture does not depend on the
prior existence of a request for his extradition. The alternative available to the State party under
article 7 of the Convention exists only when a request for extradition has been made and puts the
State party in the position of having to choose between (a) proceeding with extradition or (b)
submitting the case to its own judicial authorities for the institution of criminal proceedings, the
objective of the provision being to prevent any act of torture from going unpunished.”508
(41) Likewise, in the case concerning Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite
(Belgium v. Senegal), the International Court of Justice considered article 7 (1) of the Convention against
Torture as requiring:
“the State concerned to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution,
irrespective of the existence of a prior request for the extradition of the suspect. That is why
Article 6, paragraph 2, obliges the State to make a preliminary inquiry immediately from the time
that the suspect is present in its territory. The obligation to submit the case to the competent
authorities, under Article 7, paragraph 1, may or may not result in the institution of proceedings, in
the light of the evidence before them, relating to the charges against the suspect.
However, if the State in whose territory the suspect is present has received a request for
extradition in any of the cases envisaged in the provisions of the Convention, it can relieve itself
of its obligation to prosecute by acceding to that request. …”509
(42) Accordingly, it follows that the choice between extradition and submission for prosecution under
the Convention did not mean that the two alternatives enjoyed the same weight. Extradition was an option
offered to the State by the Convention while prosecution was an obligation under the Convention, the
violation of which was a wrongful act resulting in State responsibility.510
(43) With respect to the Commission’s 1996 Draft Code, article 9 provides that the State Party in
whose territory an individual alleged to have committed these crimes is found “shall extradite or prosecute
that individual”. The commentary to article 9 clarifies that the obligation to prosecute arises independently
from any request for extradition.511
(44) The scope of the obligation to prosecute has already been elaborated in paragraphs (21) to (26)
above.
the alleged offence has occurred”, thus implying that prosecution by the latter State would be preferable.
506 Art. 7 of the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft provides that “[t]he
Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged … to
submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution”.
507 Art. 7 states: “The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed any
offence referred to in article 4 is found shall in the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit the case
to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.”
508 Guengueng et al. v. Senegal, Merits, Decision of the Committee Against Torture under Art. 22 of the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 36th Sess., Doc
CAT/C/36/D/181/2001 dated 19 May 2006, para. 9.7.
509 In the case concerning Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 422, at p. 456, paras. 94–95.
510 Ibid., p. 456, para. 95.
511 The custodial State has an obligation “to take action to ensure that such an individual is prosecuted either by the
national authorities of that State or by another State which indicated that it was willing to prosecute the case by requesting
extradition”. Para. 3 of the commentary to art. 9, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1996, vol. II (Part Two), p. 31.
Reference should also be made to the commentary to art. 8 (whereby each State party “shall take such measures as may be
necessary to establish its jurisdiction” over the crimes set out in the Draft Code “irrespective of where or by whom those crimes
were committed”).
16
(e) The relationship of the obligation to extradite or prosecute with erga omnes
obligations or jus cogens norms
(45) The Commission notes that one delegation512 to the Sixth Committee in 2013 raised the issue of
the impact of the aut dedere aut judicare principle on international responsibility when it relates to erga
omnes obligations or jus cogens norms, such as the prohibition of torture. The delegation suggested an
analysis of the following questions: (a) in respect of whom the obligation exists; (b) who can request
extradition; and (c) who has a legal interest in invoking the international responsibility of a State for being
in breach of its “obligation to prosecute or extradite”.
(46) Several members of the Commission pointed out that this area was likely to concern the
interpretation of conventional norms. The statements of the International Court of Justice in this regard in
the case concerning Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal)
must be read within the specific context of that particular case. There, the Court interpreted the object and
purpose of the Convention against Torture as giving rise to “obligations erga omnes partes”, whereby each
State Party had a “common interest” in compliance with such obligations and, consequently, each State
Party was entitled to make a claim concerning the cessation of an alleged breach by another State Party.513
The issue of jus cogens was not central to this point. In the understanding of the Commission, the Court
was saying that insofar as States were parties to the Convention against Torture, they had a common
interest to prevent acts of torture and to ensure that, if they occurred, those responsible did not enjoy
impunity.
(47) Other treaties, even if they may not involve jus cogens norms, may lead to erga omnes obligations
as well. In other words, all States Parties may have a legal interest in invoking the international
responsibility of a State Party for being in breach of its obligation to extradite or prosecute.
(48) The State that can request extradition normally will be a State Party to the relevant convention or
have a reciprocal extradition undertaking/arrangement with the requested State, having jurisdiction over the
offence, being willing and able to prosecute the alleged offender, and respecting applicable international
norms protecting the human rights of the accused.514
(f) The customary international law status of the obligation to extradite or prosecute
(49) The Commission notes that some delegations to the Sixth Committee opined that there was no
obligation to extradite or prosecute under customary international law, whereas others were of the view that
the customary international law status of the obligation merited further consideration by the Commission.515
(50) It may be recalled that in 2011 the then Special Rapporteur Galicki, in his Fourth Report, proposed
a draft article on international custom as a source of the obligation aut dedere aut judicare.516
512 Mexico.
513 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2012, p. 422, at pp. 449–450, paras. 67–70. See also Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, pp. 527–529, paras. 104–
108, and Declaration of Judge Donoghue, pp. 586–589, paras. 9–17. C.f. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Xue, pp. 571–577, paras.
2–23, and Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Sur, pp. 608 and 610–611, paras. 13, 19–20. Cf. also the Separate Opinion of
Judge Skotnikov, pp. 482–485, paras. 9–22.
514 See, e.g., Council of Europe, note 496 above, Chap. 4: Material human rights guarantees as limitations to
extradition; Danai Azaria, Code of Minimum Standards of Protection to Individuals Involved in Transnational Proceedings ,
Report to the Committee of Experts on Transnational Criminal Justice, European Committee on Crime Problems, Council of
Europe, PC-TJ/Docs 2005/PC-TJ (2005) 07 E. Azaria], Strasbourg, 16 Sept. 2005.
515 A/CN.4/666, para. 60.
516 A/CN.4/648, para. 95. The draft article read as follows:
“Article 4
International custom as a source of the obligation aut dedere aut judicare
1. Each State is obliged either to extradite or to prosecute an alleged offender if such an obligation is deriving from the
customary norm of international law.
2. Such an obligation may derive, in particular, from customary norms of international law concerning [serious
violations of international humanitarian law, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes].
3. The obligation to extradite or prosecute shall derive from the peremptory norm of general international law accepted
and recognized by the international community of States (jus cogens), either in the form of international treaty or
international custom, criminalizing any one of acts listed in paragraph 2.”
17
(51) However, the draft article was not well received either in the Commission517 or the Sixth
Committee.518 There was general disagreement with the conclusion that the customary nature of the
obligation to extradite or prosecute could be inferred from the existence of customary rules proscribing
specific international crimes.
(52) Determining whether the obligation to extradite or prosecute has become or is becoming a rule of
customary international law, or at least a regional customary law, may help indicate whether a draft article
proposed by the Commission codifies or is progressive development of international law. However, since
the Commission has decided not to have the outcome of the Commission’s work on this topic take the form
of draft articles, it has found it unnecessary to come up with alternative formulas to the one proposed by
Mr. Galicki.
(53) The Commission wishes to make clear that the foregoing should not be construed as implying that
it has found that the obligation to extradite or prosecute has not become or is not yet crystallising into a rule
of customary international law, be it a general or regional one.
(54) When the Commission adopted the Draft Code in 1996, the provision on the obligation to
extradite or prosecute thereunder represented progressive development of international law, as explained in
paragraph (3) above. Since the completion of the Draft Code, there may have been further developments in
international law that reflect State practice and opinio juris in this respect.
(55) The Commission notes that in 2012 the International Court of Justice in the case concerning
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) ruled that it had no
jurisdiction to entertain Belgium’s claims relating to Senegal’s alleged breaches of obligations under
customary international law because at the date of Belgium’s filing of the Application the dispute between
Belgium and Senegal did not relate to breaches of obligations under customary international law.519 Thus,
an opportunity has yet to arise for the Court to determine the customary international law status or
otherwise of the obligation to extradite or prosecute.520
(g) Other matters of continued relevance in the 2009 General Framework
(56) The Commission observes that the 2009 General Framework521 continued to be mentioned in the
Sixth Committee522 as relevant to the Commission’s work on the topic.
517 Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/66/10), paras. 320–326.
518 In particular, some States disagreed with the conclusion that the customary nature of the obligation to extradite
or prosecute could necessarily be inferred from the existence of customary rules proscribing specific international crimes.
Topical summary of the discussion held in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly during its Sixty -sixth Session, prepared
by the Secretariat (A/CN.4/650), para. 48. See also the positions of Argentina, in A/C.6/62/SR.22, para. 58 and the Russian
Federation, in A/CN.4/599, para. 54, respectively.
519 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 422, paras. 53–55, 122 (2), with Judge Abraham and Judge ad hoc Sur
dissenting on this point (ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Abraham, pp. 471–476, paras. 3–20; Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad
hoc Sur, p. 610, para. 17).
520 Judge Abraham and Judge ad hoc Sur concluded that the Court, if it had found jurisdiction, would not have
upheld Belgium’s claim of the existence of the customary international law obligation to prosecute or extradite. In his Separate
Opinion, Judge Abraham considered there was insufficient evidence, based on State practice and opinio juris, of a customary
obligation for States to prosecute before their domestic courts individuals suspected of war crimes or crimes against humanit y
on the basis of universal jurisdiction, even when limited to the case where the suspect was present in the territor y of the forum
State. (ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Abraham, pp. 611–617, paras. 21, 24–25, 31–39).
In his Dissenting Opinion, Judge ad hoc Sur said that despite the silence of the Court, or perhaps because of
such silence, ‘it seems clear that the existence of a customary obligation to prosecute or extradite, or even simply to prosecute,
cannot be established in positive law’ (ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Sur, p. 610, para. 18).
By contrast, the Separate Opinions of Judge Cançado Trindade (ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado
Trindade, p. 544, para. 143) and of Judge Sebutinde (ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Sebutinde, p. 604, paras. 41–42) both
stressed that the Court only found that it had no jurisdiction to address the merits o f the customary international law issues
given the facts presented in the case.
In any case, any reference to the existence or non-existence of the customary law obligation in the case
concerning Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), was to the obligation in the
cases of crimes against humanity and war crimes in internal armed conflicts. It did not touch upon such obligation in the
context of genocide, war crimes in international armed conflicts, or other cr imes of international concern like acts of terrorism.
521 For ease of reference, the 2009 General Framework is reproduced here. It reads as follows:
List of questions/issues to be addressed
(a) The legal bases of the obligation to extradite or prosecute
(i) The obligation to extradite or prosecute and the duty to cooperate in the fight against impunity;
18
(ii) The obligation to extradite or prosecute in existing treaties: Typology of treaty provisions; differences and
similarities between those provisions, and their evolution (cf. conventions on terrorism);
(iii) Whether and to what extent the obligation to extradite or prosecute has a basis in customary international law;*
(iv) Whether the obligation to extradite or prosecute is inextricably linked with certa in particular “customary
crimes” (e.g. piracy);*
(v) Whether regional principles relating to the obligation to extradite or prosecute may be identified.*
(b) The material scope of the obligation to extradite or prosecute
Identification of the categories of crimes (e.g. crimes under international law; crimes against the peace and security
of mankind; crimes of international concern; other serious crimes) covered by the obligation to extradite or prosecute
according to conventional and/or customary international law:
(i) Whether the recognition of an offence as an international crime is a sufficient basis for the existence of an
obligation to extradite or prosecute under customary international law;*
(ii) If not, what is/are the distinctive criterion/criteria? Relevance of the jus cogens character of a rule criminalizing
certain conduct?*
(iii) Whether and to what extent the obligation also exists in relation to crimes under domestic laws?
(c) The content of the obligation to extradite or prosecute
(i) Definition of the two elements; meaning of the obligation to prosecute; steps that need to be taken in order for
prosecution to be considered “sufficient”; question of timeliness of prosecution;
(ii) Whether the order of the two elements matters;
(iii) Whether one element has priority over the other – power of free appreciation (pouvoir discrétionnaire) of the
requested State?
(d) Relationship between the obligation to extradite or prosecute and other principles
(i) The obligation to extradite or prosecute and the principle of universal jurisdiction (does one necessarily imply
the other?);
(ii) The obligation to extradite or prosecute and the general question of “titles” to exercise jurisdiction
(territoriality, nationality);
(iii) The obligation to extradite or prosecute and the principles of nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine
lege;**
(iv) The obligation to extradite or prosecute and the principle non bis in idem (double jeopardy);**
(v) The obligation to extradite or prosecute and the principle of non-extradition of nationals;**
(vi) What happens in case of conflicting principles (e.g.: non-extradition of nationals v. no indictment in national
law? obstacles to prosecute v. risks for the accused to be tortured or lack of due process in the State to whi ch extradition is
envisaged?); constitutional limitations.**
(e) Conditions for the triggering of the obligation to extradite or prosecute
(i) Presence of the alleged offender in the territory of the State;
(ii) State’s jurisdiction over the crime concerned;
(iii) Existence of a request for extradition (degree of formalism required); Relations with the right to expel
foreigners;
(iv) Existence/consequences of a previous request for extradition that had been rejected;
(v) Standard of proof (to what extent must the request for extradition be substantiated);
(vi) Existence of circumstances that might exclude the operation of the obligation (e.g. political offences or political
nature of a request for extradition; emergency situations; immunities).
(f) The implementation of the obligation to extradite or prosecute
(i) Respective roles of the judiciary and the executive;
(ii) How to reconcile the obligation to extradite or prosecute with the discretion of the prosecuting authorities;
(iii) Whether the availability of evidence affects the operation of the obligation;
(iv) How to deal with multiple requests for extradition;
(v) Guarantees in case of extradition;
(vi) Whether the alleged offender should be kept in custody awaiting a decision on his or her extraditio n or
prosecution; or possibilities of other restrictions to freedom?;
(vii) Control of the implementation of the obligation;
(viii) Consequences of non-compliance with the obligation to extradite or prosecute.
(g) The relationship between the obligation to extradite or prosecute and the surrender of the alleged
offender to a competent international criminal tribunal (the “third alternative”)
To what extent the “third” alternative has an impact on the other two.
[* It might be that a final determination on these questions will only be possible at a later stage, in particular after a careful
analysis of the scope and content of the obligation to extradite or prosecute under existing treaty regimes. It might also be
advisable to examine the customary nature of the obligation in relation to specific crimes.
** This issue might need to be addressed also in relation to the implementation of the obligation to extradite or prosecute ( f).]
522 At the Sixth Committee debate in 2012, Austria, the Netherlands, and Vietnam considered the 2009 General
Framework a valuable supplement to the work of the Commission. In the Netherlands’ opinion, the work of the Commission
should eventually result in presenting draft articles based on that General Framework. At the Sixth Commit tee debate in 2013,
Austria reiterated the usefulness of the 2009 General Framework to the work of the present Working Group.
19
(57) The 2009 General Framework raised several issues in relation to the obligation to extradite or
prosecute that are covered in the preceding paragraphs, but some issues have not, namely: the obligation’s
relationship with the principles of nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege and the principle non
bis in idem (double jeopardy); the implications of a conflict between various principles (e.g. nonextradition
of nationals versus no indictment in national law; obstacles to prosecution versus risks for the
accused to be tortured or lack of due process in the State to which extradition is envisaged); constitutional
limitations; circumstances excluding the operation of the obligation (e.g. political offences or political
nature of a request for extradition; emergency situations; immunities); the problem of multiple requests for
extradition; guarantees in case of extradition; and other issues related to extradition in general.
(58) The Commission notes that the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has prepared the 2004
Model Law on Extradition, which addresses most of these issues.523 The Secretariat Survey (2010) has also
explained that multilateral conventions on extradition usually stipulate the conditions applicable to the
extradition process.524 Nearly all such conventions subject extradition to the conditions provided by the law
of the requested State. There may be grounds of refusal that are connected to the offence (e.g. the expiry of
the statute of limitations, the failure to satisfy requirements of double criminality, specialty, nullum crimen
sine lege and nulla poena sine lege or non bis in idem, or the fact that the crime is subject to death penalty
in the requesting State) or not so connected (e.g. the granting of political asylum to the individual or the
existence of humanitarian reasons to deny extradition). The degree of specificity of the conditions
applicable to extradition varies depending on factors such as the specific concerns expressed during the
course of negotiations (e.g. non-extradition of nationals, application or non-application of the political
exception or fiscal exception clauses), the particular nature of the offence (e.g. the risk of refusal of
extradition based on the political character of the offence appears to be more acute with respect to certain
crimes), and drafting changes to take into account problems that may have been overlooked in the past (e.g.
the possible triviality of the request for extradition or the protection of the rights of the alleged offender) or
to take into account new developments or a changed environment.525
(59) The relationship between the obligation to extradite or prosecute and other principles as
enumerated in the 2009 General Framework belongs not only to international law, but also to the
constitutional law and domestic law of the States concerned. Whatever the conditions under domestic law
or a treaty pertaining to extradition, they must not be applied in bad faith, with the effect of shielding an
alleged offender from prosecution in or extradition to an appropriate criminal jurisdiction. In the case of
core crimes, the object and purpose of the relevant domestic law and/or applicable treaty is to ensure that
perpetrators of such crimes do not enjoy impunity, implying that such crimes can never be considered
political offences and be exempted from extradition.526
523 Available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/model_law_extradition.pdf. See also Revised Manuals on the Model
Treaty on Extradition and on the Model Treaty on Extradition and on the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters, available at: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/model_treaty_extradition_revised_manual.pdf (visited on 3 June 2014).
524 Secretariat Survey (2010), para. 139.
525 Ibid., para. 142.
526 A good example is art. 1 of the Additional Protocol, dated 15 Oct. 1975, to the 1957 European Convention on
Extradition, which reads:
“For the application of Article 3 [on political offences] of the Convention, political offences shall not be considered
to include the following:
(a) the crimes against humanity specified in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide adopted on 9 December 1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations;
(b) the violations specified in Article 50 of the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Article 51 of the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked members of Armed Forces at Sea, Article 130 of the 1949 Geneva Convention
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Article 147 of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War;
(c) any comparable violations of the laws of war having effect at the time when this Protocol enters into force and
of customs of war existing at that time, which are not already provided for in the above -mentioned provisions of the Geneva
Conventions” (Council of Europe Treaty Series No. 086).

Annex 289
Briefing by ASG Ivan Šimonovi􀃼 to the UN Security Council (16 April 2014)

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􀀢􀀘􀀎􀀄􀀤􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀝􀀋􀀑􀀟􀀖􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀑􀀣􀀠􀀘􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀫􀀠􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀟􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀝􀀝􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀠􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀞􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀪􀀩􀀘􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀠􀀏􀀝􀀋􀀉􀀄
􀀑􀀣􀀠􀀖􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀣􀀏􀀞􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀖􀀞􀀑􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀢􀀘􀀎􀀄􀀤􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀔􀀬􀀖􀀜􀀋􀀘􀀦􀀡􀀒􀀖􀀭􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀡􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀐􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀖􀀩􀀄􀀑􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀞􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀆
􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀠􀀄􀀆􀀟􀀖􀀉􀀋􀀩􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀋􀀦􀀦􀀣􀀠􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀞􀀣􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀦􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀂􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀜􀀑􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀞􀀋􀀘􀀩􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀢􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄
􀀤􀀎􀀈􀀝􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀆􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀞􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀅􀀣􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀦􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀞􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀪􀀩􀀘􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀟􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀤􀀎􀀘􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀤􀀄􀀅􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀄􀀩􀀆􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀋􀀦􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀣􀀤
􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀪􀀃􀀖􀀮􀀠􀀞􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀯􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀜􀀣􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀣􀀘􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀜􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀪􀀩􀀘􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀒
􀀗􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀠􀀉􀀆􀀄􀀉􀀟􀀖􀀭􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀄􀀞􀀏􀀡􀀋􀀆􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀘􀀣􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀰􀀐􀀎􀀈􀀩􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀢􀀄􀀉􀀅􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀦􀀡􀀘􀀣􀀈􀀎􀀦􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀞􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀆
􀀇􀀎􀀣􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀪􀀩􀀘􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀟􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀋􀀎􀀝􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀦􀀠􀀘􀀘􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀠􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀂􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀒
􀀗􀀐􀀞􀀣􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀎􀀘􀀝􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀣􀀏􀀠􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀪􀀩􀀘􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀏􀀣􀀘􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀠􀀈􀀝􀀄􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀣􀀇􀀄􀀘􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀮􀀠􀀌􀀄
􀀝􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀋􀀘􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀋􀀘􀀝􀀆􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀋􀀝􀀄􀀫􀀠􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀦􀀦􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀢􀀋􀀆􀀎􀀦􀀖􀀆􀀣􀀦􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀘􀀇􀀎􀀦􀀄􀀆􀀟􀀖􀀋􀀉􀀉􀀘􀀎􀀢􀀠􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀣
􀀦􀀣􀀘􀀘􀀠􀀏􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀞􀀎􀀆􀀞􀀋􀀈􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀞􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀟􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀞􀀣􀀈􀀌􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀠􀀈􀀝􀀄􀀘􀀐􀀑􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀤􀀋􀀦􀀉􀀣􀀘􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀋􀀎􀀝􀀋􀀈
􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀊􀀘􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀘􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀱􀀑􀀎􀀇􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀆􀀅􀀄􀀏􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀦􀀘􀀣􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀠􀀈􀀉􀀘􀀑􀀖􀀤􀀘􀀣􀀞􀀖􀀃􀀣􀀇􀀄􀀞􀀢􀀄􀀘
􀀙􀀚􀀔􀀲􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀳􀀄􀀢􀀘􀀠􀀋􀀘􀀑􀀖􀀙􀀚􀀔􀀛􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀋􀀐􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀏􀀰􀀘􀀣􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀝􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀆􀀤􀀋􀀦􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀣􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀤
􀀪􀀩􀀘􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀒
􀀴􀀎􀀣􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀖􀀢􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀦􀀠􀀘􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀤􀀣􀀘􀀦􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀌􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀰􀀂􀀠􀀘􀀣􀀏􀀄􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀋􀀦􀀄􀀤􀀠􀀐􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀱􀀑􀀎􀀇􀀖􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀲􀀚
􀀃􀀣􀀇􀀄􀀞􀀢􀀄􀀘􀀖􀀙􀀚􀀔􀀲􀀟􀀖􀀦􀀘􀀄􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀣􀀠􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀝􀀎􀀦􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀦􀀐􀀋􀀆􀀡􀀄􀀆
􀀢􀀄􀀉􀀅􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀏􀀣􀀐􀀎􀀦􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀵􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀦􀀠􀀘􀀉􀀋􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀄􀀝􀀣􀀞􀀆􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀏􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝
􀀋􀀆􀀆􀀄􀀞􀀢􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀡􀀋􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀎􀀞􀀏􀀠􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀢􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀣􀀐􀀎􀀦􀀄􀀟􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀠􀀆􀀡􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀘􀀣􀀠􀀌􀀡􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀯􀀋􀀝􀀋􀀖􀀎􀀈
􀀞􀀎􀀝􀀰􀀖􀀶􀀋􀀈􀀠􀀋􀀘􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀣􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀦􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀢􀀑􀀖􀀆􀀣􀀞􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀝􀀎􀀦􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀐􀀒
􀀊􀀘􀀣􀀌􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀢􀀄􀀖􀀞􀀋􀀝􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀢􀀘􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀷􀀠􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀦􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀘􀀏􀀄􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀣􀀘􀀆􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀣􀀠􀀆􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀞􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀆
􀀇􀀎􀀣􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀞􀀞􀀎􀀉􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀝􀀠􀀘􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀣􀀝􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀋􀀎􀀝􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀍􀀠􀀘􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀟􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀘􀀄
􀀔􀀙􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀘􀀆􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀩􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀣􀀇􀀄􀀘􀀖􀀔􀀚􀀚􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀘􀀆􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀞􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀠􀀈􀀋􀀦􀀦􀀣􀀠􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀤􀀣􀀘􀀒􀀖􀀸􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀹􀀄􀀈􀀄􀀘􀀋􀀐
􀀊􀀘􀀣􀀆􀀄􀀦􀀠􀀉􀀣􀀘􀀺􀀆􀀖􀀻􀀤􀀤􀀎􀀦􀀄􀀖􀀡􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀦􀀘􀀎􀀞􀀎􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀦􀀄􀀄􀀝􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀞􀀏􀀣􀀘􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀠􀀘􀀄
􀀋􀀦􀀦􀀣􀀠􀀈􀀉􀀋􀀢􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀘􀀏􀀄􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀣􀀘􀀆􀀒
􀀍􀀠􀀘􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀋􀀎􀀝􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀟􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀣􀀞􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀏􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀟􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀦􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀣􀀘􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀎􀀌􀀎􀀣􀀠􀀆􀀖􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀝
􀀢􀀑􀀖􀀆􀀣􀀞􀀄􀀖􀀌􀀘􀀣􀀠􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀝􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀝􀀠􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀥􀀣􀀞􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀉􀀉􀀋􀀦􀀩􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀌􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀉􀀡􀀈􀀎􀀦􀀖􀀯􀀠􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀞􀀞􀀠􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀟􀀖􀀎􀀈
􀀏􀀋􀀘􀀉􀀎􀀦􀀠􀀐􀀋􀀘􀀖􀀄􀀉􀀡􀀈􀀎􀀦􀀖􀀯􀀠􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀤􀀤􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀤􀀣􀀘􀀞􀀄􀀘􀀖􀀹􀀣􀀇􀀄􀀘􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀟􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀣􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀏􀀣􀀘􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀒
􀀮􀀣􀀅􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀘􀀟􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀎􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀘􀀖􀀆􀀑􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀞􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀦􀀖􀀈􀀣􀀘􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀝􀀄􀀆􀀏􀀘􀀄􀀋􀀝􀀒􀀖􀀸􀀡􀀄􀀑􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀣􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀦􀀎􀀝􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀡􀀎􀀦􀀡
􀀅􀀄􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀋􀀌􀀌􀀄􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀘􀀣􀀠􀀌􀀡􀀖􀀆􀀣􀀞􀀄􀀖􀀢􀀎􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀞􀀄􀀝􀀎􀀋􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀏􀀣􀀘􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀖􀀤􀀠􀀄􀀐􀀐􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀤􀀄􀀋􀀘􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀦􀀠􀀘􀀎􀀉􀀑
􀀋􀀞􀀣􀀈􀀌􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀉􀀡􀀈􀀎􀀦􀀖􀀯􀀠􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀞􀀞􀀠􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀒
􀀔􀀁􀀲
􀀸􀀡􀀄􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀡􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀣􀀖􀀢􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀆􀀣􀀞􀀄􀀖􀀦􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀦􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀞􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀞􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀤􀀘􀀣􀀞􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀌
􀀄􀀓􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀞􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀌􀀘􀀣􀀠􀀏􀀆􀀟􀀖􀀆􀀠􀀦􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀣􀀰􀀦􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀯􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀖􀀥􀀄􀀦􀀉􀀣􀀘􀀒􀀖􀀳􀀄􀀋􀀘􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀦􀀠􀀘􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀢􀀘􀀄􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀅􀀡􀀄􀀈
􀀎􀀈􀀦􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀞􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀝􀀟􀀖􀀝􀀎􀀆􀀦􀀘􀀎􀀞􀀎􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀣􀀘􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀣􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀈􀀣􀀉􀀖􀀦􀀠􀀘􀀉􀀋􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀝􀀒􀀖􀀭􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀘􀀄􀀤􀀣􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀦􀀘􀀠􀀦􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀎􀀆
􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀠􀀄􀀖􀀢􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀝􀀝􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀞􀀋􀀉􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀎􀀣􀀘􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀭􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀦􀀣􀀞􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀘􀀄􀀋􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀠􀀈􀀝􀀄􀀘􀀉􀀋􀀩􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀢􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄
􀀹􀀣􀀇􀀄􀀘􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀊􀀘􀀣􀀆􀀄􀀦􀀠􀀉􀀣􀀘􀀖􀀹􀀄􀀈􀀄􀀘􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀻􀀤􀀤􀀎􀀦􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀪􀀩􀀘􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀏􀀠􀀢􀀐􀀎􀀦􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀈􀀝􀀄􀀞􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀄
􀀋􀀈􀀑􀀖􀀆􀀠􀀦􀀡􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀭􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀓􀀉􀀟􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀦􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀘􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀠􀀈􀀋􀀦􀀦􀀄􀀏􀀉􀀋􀀢􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀣􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀝􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀦􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀎􀀝􀀋􀀉􀀄
􀀦􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀆􀀖􀀡􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀤􀀣􀀐􀀐􀀣􀀅􀀄􀀘􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀋􀀘􀀞􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀞􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀤􀀄􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀂􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀣􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀠􀀈􀀉􀀘􀀑􀀟􀀖􀀅􀀡􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀣􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀘􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀢􀀄􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀈
􀀢􀀄􀀦􀀋􀀠􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀡􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀏􀀣􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀦􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀜􀀣􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀣􀀘􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀇􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀤􀀑􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀣􀀠􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀒
􀀜􀀋􀀝􀀋􀀞􀀖􀀊􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀝􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀟
􀀜􀀑􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀤􀀘􀀣􀀞􀀖􀀙􀀔􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀙􀀙􀀖􀀜􀀋􀀘􀀦􀀡􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀞􀀣􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀦􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀧􀀘􀀎􀀞􀀄􀀋􀀖􀀢􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀈􀀎􀀣􀀘􀀖􀀪􀀃􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀤􀀎􀀦􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀒
􀀍􀀠􀀘􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀞􀀑􀀖􀀞􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀟􀀖􀀭􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀋􀀦􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀝􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀐􀀣􀀦􀀠􀀉􀀣􀀘􀀆􀀟􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀦􀀐􀀠􀀝􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀐􀀣􀀦􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀠􀀉􀀡􀀣􀀘􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀟
􀀦􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀐􀀖􀀆􀀣􀀦􀀎􀀄􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀏􀀄􀀦􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀦􀀉􀀎􀀞􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀞􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀸􀀡􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀣􀀅􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀞􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀣􀀢􀀉􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀤􀀎􀀘􀀆􀀉􀀰􀀡􀀋􀀈􀀝
􀀎􀀞􀀏􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀠􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀒
􀀸􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀞􀀄􀀝􀀎􀀋􀀖􀀞􀀋􀀈􀀎􀀏􀀠􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀌􀀈􀀎􀀤􀀎􀀦􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀈􀀉􀀘􀀎􀀢􀀠􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀦􀀐􀀎􀀞􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀤􀀄􀀋􀀘􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀦􀀠􀀘􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄
􀀏􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀣􀀝􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀄􀀦􀀄􀀝􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀤􀀄􀀘􀀄􀀈􀀝􀀠􀀞􀀒
􀀸􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀏􀀋􀀘􀀋􀀞􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀘􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀆􀀣􀀖􀀦􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀤􀀰􀀝􀀄􀀤􀀄􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀖􀀌􀀘􀀣􀀠􀀏􀀆􀀟􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀣􀀐􀀝􀀎􀀄􀀘􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀠􀀈􀀎􀀤􀀣􀀘􀀞
􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀡􀀣􀀠􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀌􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀟􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀈􀀣􀀉􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀈􀀝􀀠􀀦􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀇􀀎􀀘􀀣􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀅􀀡􀀎􀀦􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀆􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀠􀀐􀀝􀀖􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀄􀀘􀀦􀀎􀀆􀀄
􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀎􀀘􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀣􀀐􀀝􀀖􀀣􀀏􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀤􀀘􀀄􀀄􀀝􀀣􀀞􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀏􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀝􀀠􀀘􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀤􀀄􀀘􀀄􀀈􀀝􀀠􀀞􀀖􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀔􀀕
􀀜􀀋􀀘􀀦􀀡􀀒􀀖􀀸􀀡􀀄􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀦􀀘􀀄􀀝􀀎􀀢􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀡􀀋􀀘􀀋􀀆􀀆􀀞􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀟􀀖􀀋􀀘􀀢􀀎􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀘􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀘􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀘􀀉􀀠􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀢􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀆􀀄
􀀌􀀘􀀣􀀠􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀋􀀘􀀌􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀋􀀦􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀷􀀣􀀠􀀘􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀡􀀣􀀖􀀝􀀎􀀝􀀖􀀈􀀣􀀉􀀖􀀆􀀠􀀏􀀏􀀣􀀘􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀤􀀄􀀘􀀄􀀈􀀝􀀠􀀞􀀒
􀀼􀀡􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀹􀀗􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀣􀀐􀀠􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀕􀀽􀀁􀀙􀀕􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀘􀀎􀀉􀀣􀀘􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀌􀀘􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀪􀀩􀀘􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀟􀀖􀀭􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄
􀀣􀀢􀀐􀀎􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀠􀀉􀀡􀀣􀀘􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀧􀀘􀀎􀀞􀀄􀀋􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀏􀀄􀀦􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀞􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀈􀀣􀀘􀀞􀀆􀀒
􀀭􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀣􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀘􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀔􀀔􀀖􀀗􀀏􀀘􀀎􀀐􀀟􀀖􀀋􀀠􀀉􀀡􀀣􀀘􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀧􀀘􀀎􀀞􀀄􀀋􀀖􀀡􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀠􀀆􀀡􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀝􀀣􀀏􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀅
􀀦􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀉􀀠􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀸􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀧􀀘􀀎􀀞􀀄􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀸􀀋􀀉􀀋􀀘􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀷􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀡􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀎􀀞􀀏􀀣􀀘􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀞􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀘􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀢􀀣􀀠􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄
􀀉􀀣􀀉􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀦􀀩􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀏􀀠􀀢􀀐􀀎􀀦􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀢􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀦􀀐􀀠􀀆􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀧􀀘􀀎􀀞􀀄􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀸􀀋􀀉􀀋􀀘􀀆􀀖􀀤􀀘􀀣􀀞􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀘􀀋􀀤􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀦􀀄􀀆􀀆
􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀉􀀠􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀧􀀣􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀘􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀣􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀠􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀢􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀡􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀘􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀦􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀾􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀡􀀎􀀏􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀠􀀄􀀆􀀟
􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀏􀀋􀀘􀀉􀀎􀀦􀀠􀀐􀀋􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀣􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀡􀀣􀀖􀀝􀀣􀀖􀀈􀀣􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀦􀀦􀀄􀀏􀀉􀀖􀀯􀀠􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀦􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀾􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀡􀀎􀀏􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀏􀀣􀀘􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀤􀀋􀀦􀀄􀀖􀀞􀀋􀀈􀀑
􀀣􀀢􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀦􀀐􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀌􀀠􀀋􀀘􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀎􀀘􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀏􀀄􀀘􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀆􀀟􀀖􀀋􀀦􀀦􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀄􀀝􀀠􀀦􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀡􀀄􀀋􀀐􀀉􀀡􀀦􀀋􀀘􀀄
􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀷􀀣􀀑􀀞􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀣􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀘􀀖􀀦􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀏􀀣􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀦􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀆􀀒
􀀜􀀋􀀝􀀋􀀞􀀖􀀊􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀝􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀟
􀀼􀀡􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀭􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀈􀀖􀀪􀀩􀀘􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀜􀀋􀀘􀀦􀀡􀀟􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀠􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀘􀀄􀀋􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀇􀀄􀀘􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀋􀀈􀀅􀀡􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀟􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄
􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀠􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀡􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀌􀀈􀀎􀀤􀀎􀀦􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀣􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀒
􀀯􀀄􀀏􀀣􀀘􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀐􀀑􀀟􀀖􀀋􀀘􀀞􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀰􀀯􀀠􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀦􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀢􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀡􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀿􀀊􀀄􀀣􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀺􀀆􀀖􀀯􀀄􀀏􀀠􀀢􀀐􀀎􀀦􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀍􀀣􀀈􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀩􀀺􀀟􀀖􀀉􀀋􀀩􀀎􀀈􀀌
􀀦􀀣􀀈􀀉􀀘􀀣􀀐􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀈􀀠􀀞􀀢􀀄􀀘􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀹􀀣􀀇􀀄􀀘􀀈􀀞􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀢􀀠􀀎􀀐􀀝􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀘􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀦􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀍􀀣􀀈􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀩􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀟􀀖􀀠􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀌
􀀇􀀎􀀣􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀟􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀦􀀐􀀠􀀝􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀋􀀌􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀅􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀤􀀣􀀘􀀦􀀄􀀞􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀤􀀎􀀦􀀄􀀘􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀭􀀈􀀖􀀵􀀠􀀡􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀩􀀟􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀰􀀯􀀠􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀆
􀀙􀀁􀀲
􀀦􀀣􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀠􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀣􀀦􀀦􀀠􀀏􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀐􀀣􀀦􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀢􀀠􀀎􀀐􀀝􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀦􀀠􀀘􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀘􀀇􀀎􀀦􀀄􀀆􀀟􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀱􀀡􀀋􀀘􀀩􀀎􀀇􀀖􀀏􀀋􀀘􀀉􀀎􀀦􀀎􀀏􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀋
􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀰􀀪􀀩􀀘􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀉􀀉􀀋􀀦􀀩􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀢􀀄􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀢􀀑􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀰􀀯􀀠􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀞􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀣􀀘􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀡􀀣􀀖􀀢􀀘􀀣􀀩􀀄
􀀉􀀡􀀘􀀣􀀠􀀌􀀡􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀣􀀐􀀎􀀦􀀄􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀘􀀝􀀣􀀈􀀟􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀠􀀐􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀆􀀣􀀞􀀄􀀖􀁀􀀚􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀘􀀆􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀢􀀄􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀷􀀠􀀘􀀄􀀝􀀒
􀀻􀀈􀀌􀀣􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀦􀀎􀀝􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀦􀀐􀀋􀀆􀀡􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀢􀀄􀀉􀀅􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀇􀀋􀀘􀀎􀀣􀀠􀀆􀀖􀀌􀀘􀀣􀀠􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀆􀀟􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀡􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀦􀀠􀀘􀀎􀀉􀀑
􀀤􀀣􀀘􀀦􀀄􀀆􀀟􀀖􀀋􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀣􀀠􀀆􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀘􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀼􀀡􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀏􀀣􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀝􀀎􀀦􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀈􀀠􀀞􀀢􀀄􀀘􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀆􀀟􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀦􀀐􀀠􀀝􀀎􀀈􀀌
􀀆􀀣􀀞􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀄􀀝􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀤􀀘􀀣􀀞􀀖􀀣􀀠􀀉􀀆􀀎􀀝􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀟􀀖􀀡􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀈􀀣􀀉􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀌􀀈􀀎􀀤􀀎􀀦􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀦􀀘􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀝􀀰􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀏􀀄􀀋􀀩􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀣􀀤
􀀋􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀠􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀣􀀠􀀆􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀰􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀣􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀏􀀣􀀘􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀋􀀘􀀞􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀆􀀖􀀡􀀋􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀸􀀡􀀎􀀆
􀀡􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀌􀀈􀀎􀀤􀀎􀀦􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀞􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀞􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀦􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀒
􀀼􀀡􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀰􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀞􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀣􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀢􀀄􀀖􀀠􀀘􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀇􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀤􀀎􀀄􀀝􀀟
􀀆􀀄􀀦􀀠􀀘􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀤􀀣􀀘􀀦􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀞􀀠􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀎􀀘􀀖􀀘􀀣􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀞􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀏􀀠􀀢􀀐􀀎􀀦􀀖􀀣􀀘􀀝􀀄􀀘􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀦􀀦􀀣􀀘􀀝􀀋􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀡􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀞􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀆
􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀋􀀘􀀝􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀸􀀡􀀄􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀦􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀘􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀢􀀄􀀉􀀅􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀅􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀦􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀢􀀄􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀝􀀄􀀘􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀄􀀘􀀦􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀣
􀀏􀀄􀀋􀀦􀀄􀀤􀀠􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀆􀀄􀀞􀀢􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀣􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀢􀀄􀀡􀀋􀀇􀀎􀀣􀀘􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀋􀀘􀀞􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀮􀀣􀀅􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀘􀀟􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀦􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀆􀀟
􀀆􀀄􀀦􀀠􀀘􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀤􀀣􀀘􀀦􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀡􀀣􀀠􀀐􀀝􀀖􀀈􀀣􀀉􀀖􀀠􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀤􀀣􀀘􀀦􀀄􀀖􀀠􀀈􀀈􀀄􀀦􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀋􀀘􀀎􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀣􀀘􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀦􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀒
􀀸􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀠􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀟􀀖􀀎􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀣􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀝􀀄􀀫􀀠􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀝􀀝􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀞􀀋􀀉􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀎􀀣􀀘􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀟􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀆􀀩􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀣􀀠􀀆􀀐􀀑
􀀝􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀢􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀾􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀠􀀈􀀉􀀘􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀅􀀡􀀣􀀐􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀸􀀡􀀣􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀡􀀣􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀄􀀘􀀦􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀤􀀐􀀠􀀄􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀇􀀄􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀠􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀆􀀡􀀣􀀠􀀐􀀝
􀀉􀀋􀀩􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀞􀀞􀀄􀀝􀀎􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀦􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀡􀀋􀀐􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀣􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀸􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀘􀀞􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀎􀀘
􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀤􀀣􀀘􀀞􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀫􀀠􀀋􀀆􀀎􀀰􀀖􀀏􀀋􀀘􀀋􀀞􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀘􀀑􀀖􀀤􀀣􀀘􀀦􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀞􀀠􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀢􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀣􀀏􀀏􀀄􀀝􀀒􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀑􀀣􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀦􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀣􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝
􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀇􀀎􀀝􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀋􀀘􀀞􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀆􀀖􀀦􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀢􀀄􀀖􀀡􀀄􀀐􀀝􀀖􀀋􀀦􀀦􀀣􀀠􀀈􀀉􀀋􀀢􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀤􀀣􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀠􀀐􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀌􀀎􀀦􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀫􀀠􀀄􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀆􀀒
􀀭􀀈􀀖􀀣􀀘􀀝􀀄􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀆􀀦􀀋􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀦􀀘􀀣􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀠􀀈􀀉􀀘􀀑􀀟􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀏􀀋􀀘􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀡􀀣􀀠􀀐􀀝􀀖􀀢􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀦􀀣􀀠􀀘􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀘􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀈
􀀎􀀈􀀦􀀐􀀠􀀆􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀟􀀖􀀆􀀠􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀞􀀄􀀋􀀈􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀤􀀠􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀝􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀣􀀌􀀠􀀄􀀖􀀢􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀏􀀄􀀦􀀉􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀣􀀢􀀐􀀎􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀆
􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀪􀀩􀀘􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀠􀀈􀀝􀀄􀀘􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀞􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀘􀀄􀀋􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀤􀀎􀀄􀀝􀀒􀀖􀀥􀀠􀀦􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀣􀀦􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀡􀀣􀀠􀀐􀀝
􀀉􀀋􀀩􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀝􀀄􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀘􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀣􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀡􀀣􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀪􀀩􀀘􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀟􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀦􀀐􀀠􀀝􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀞􀀎􀀈􀀣􀀘􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀟􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝
􀀋􀀝􀀝􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀠􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀠􀀦􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀠􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀦􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀦􀀣􀀠􀀈􀀉􀀘􀀑􀀒
􀀳􀀎􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀑􀀟􀀖􀀭􀀖􀀦􀀋􀀈􀀈􀀣􀀉􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀣􀀠􀀌􀀡􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀞􀀏􀀣􀀘􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀘􀀣􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀦􀀦􀀠􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀞􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀏􀀣􀀘􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀦􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀑
􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀣􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀦􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀤􀀠􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀨􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀘􀀝􀀋􀀑􀀟􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀖􀀡􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀠􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀣􀀠􀀘􀀖􀀤􀀎􀀘􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀏􀀣􀀘􀀉􀀖􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄
􀀡􀀠􀀞􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀠􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀪􀀩􀀘􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀟􀀖􀀢􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀞􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀅􀀣􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀤􀀎􀀘􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀞􀀣􀀈􀀉􀀡􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀞􀀋􀀈
􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀞􀀣􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀣􀀘􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀒􀀖􀀼􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀣􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀠􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀠􀀘􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀦􀀣􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀏􀀣􀀘􀀉􀀖􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀔􀁀􀀖􀀜􀀋􀀑􀀒􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀑􀀣􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀡􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀇􀀋􀀈􀀉
􀀎􀀈􀀤􀀣􀀘􀀞􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀣􀀈􀀖􀀡􀀠􀀞􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀡􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀣􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀡􀀣􀀠􀀐􀀝􀀖􀀆􀀡􀀋􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀡􀀖􀀠􀀆􀀟􀀖􀀆􀀣􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀖􀀦􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀇􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀤􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀟􀀖􀀤􀀠􀀘􀀉􀀡􀀄􀀘
􀀎􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀤􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀦􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀋􀀘􀀑􀀟􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀝􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀦􀀐􀀠􀀝􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀣􀀠􀀘􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀓􀀉􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀏􀀣􀀘􀀉􀀒
􀀸􀀡􀀋􀀈􀀩􀀖􀀑􀀣􀀠􀀟􀀖􀀜􀀋􀀝􀀋􀀞􀀖􀀊􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀝􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀒
􀀲􀀁􀀲

Annex 290
U.N. Security Council, Records of 7165th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7165 (29 Apr. 2014)

􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀢􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿 􀀧􀀇􀀤􀀪􀀆􀀏􀀉􀀎􀀍
􀀄􀀇􀀅􀀆􀀞􀀦􀀤􀀴􀀱􀀪􀀳􀀷􀀁􀀓􀀯􀀴􀀮􀀤􀀪􀀬
􀀧􀀵􀁄􀁀􀁅􀀅􀀺􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀴􀀁􀁅􀀱􀀭􀀾
􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳
􀀨􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁􀀊􀀑􀀁􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁􀀊􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀄􀀁􀀍􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀁􀀼􀀆􀀹􀀆􀀁
􀀢􀀱􀁃􀀁􀀬􀀻􀀾􀀷
􀀌􀀠􀀞􀀤􀀙􀀡􀀙􀀞􀀝􀀑􀀛
􀀌􀀠􀀕􀀡􀀙􀀔􀀕􀀝􀀢􀀒 􀀡􀀾􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀣􀀳􀁃􀁁􀀁􀀁􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀂􀀢􀀵􀀳􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀭􀀃
􀀉􀀕􀀜􀀒􀀕􀀠􀀡􀀒 􀀕􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀁􀀁􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀡􀀾􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀤􀀱􀀾􀀯􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀸
􀀕􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀭 􀀁􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀥􀁁􀀵􀀺􀀸􀀭􀀺
􀀗􀀴􀀭􀀰 􀀁􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀡􀀭􀀺􀀳􀀭􀀾􀀭􀀸
􀀗􀀴􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀁􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀖􀀭􀀾􀀾􀀻􀀿
􀀗􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀁 􀀁􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀠􀀵􀁁􀀁􀀞􀀵􀀱􀀅􀁅􀀵
􀀚􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱 􀀁􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀾􀀭􀁁􀀰
􀀞􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀭􀀺 􀀁􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀹􀀻􀁁􀀰
􀀠􀀵􀁀􀀴􀁁􀀭􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀰􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁘􀁕􀁐􀁒􀁎􀁄􀁌􀁗􀆡
􀀠􀁁􀁄􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀳􀀁􀀁􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀡􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀠􀁁􀀯􀀭􀀿
􀀦􀀱􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀟􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀭 􀀁􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀡􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀤􀀭􀀵􀀷􀀁􀀞􀀵􀀅􀀭􀀴
􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀁􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀗􀀴􀁁􀀾􀀷􀀵􀀺
􀀦􀁃􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀭 􀀁􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀢􀀰􀁁􀀴􀁁􀀺􀀳􀀵􀀾􀀱􀀴􀀱
􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀟􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀰􀀻􀀹􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀛􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀖􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀢􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀝􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀁􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀧􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀡􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀁􀀠􀁅􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀛􀀾􀀭􀀺􀁀
􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀕􀀹􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀁􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀆 􀀡􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀤􀀻􀁃􀀱􀀾
􀀑􀀨􀀦􀀮􀀥􀀢
􀀠􀀱􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀊􀀐􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀮􀀾􀁁􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀊􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀤􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀦􀀱􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀢􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀰􀀰􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀤􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁􀀂􀀧􀀇􀀊􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀇􀀉􀀋􀀎􀀃
􀀨􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀱􀁄􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀱􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀸􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀙􀀺􀀳􀀸􀀵􀀿􀀴􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀼􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀱􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀸􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀺􀀳􀁁􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀱􀁄􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀋􀀖􀀖􀀙􀀓􀀙􀀑􀀛􀀁􀀍􀀕􀀓􀀞􀀠􀀔􀀡􀀁
􀀞􀀖􀀁􀀢􀀘􀀕􀀁􀀎􀀕􀀓􀀣􀀠􀀙􀀢􀀦􀀁􀀇􀀞􀀣􀀝􀀓􀀙􀀛􀀆􀀁􀀗􀀻􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀮􀀹􀀵􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀺􀀳􀁁􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁
􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀻􀀾􀀼􀀻􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀼􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀭􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀗􀀴􀀵􀀱􀀲􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀪􀀱􀀾􀀮􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀁􀀦􀀱􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀾􀀻􀀻􀀹􀀁􀀩􀀅􀀍􀀈􀀎􀀆
􀀧􀀞􀀡􀀠􀀞􀀡􀀟􀀟􀀧
􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀊􀀁􀀂􀀙􀀃
􀀉􀀆􀀈􀀐􀀁 􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀊
􀀞􀀆􀀛􀀡􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀉􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋
􀀏􀀘􀀕􀀁􀀜􀀕􀀕􀀢􀀙􀀝􀀗􀀁􀀥􀀑􀀡􀀁􀀓􀀑􀀛􀀛􀀕􀀔􀀁􀀢􀀞􀀁􀀞􀀠􀀔􀀕􀀠􀀁􀀑􀀢􀀁􀀄􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀁􀀟􀀂􀀜􀀂
􀀑􀀥􀀯􀀰􀀳􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀁􀀯􀀧􀀁􀀳􀀩􀀦􀀁􀀢􀀨􀀦􀀮􀀥􀀢
􀀏􀀘􀀕􀀁􀀑􀀗􀀕􀀝􀀔􀀑􀀁􀀥􀀑􀀡􀀁􀀑􀀔􀀞􀀟􀀢􀀕􀀔􀀂
􀀘􀀦􀀳􀀳􀀦􀀱􀀁􀀥􀀢􀀳􀀦􀀥􀀁􀀉􀀏􀀁􀀔􀀦􀀣􀀱􀀴􀀢􀀱􀀷􀀁􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀭􀀁􀀳􀀩􀀦􀀁􀀁
􀀛􀀦􀀱􀀭􀀢􀀮􀀦􀀮􀀳􀀁􀀝􀀦􀀰􀀱􀀦􀀲􀀦􀀮􀀳􀀢􀀳􀀪􀀵􀀦􀀁􀀯􀀧􀀁􀀠􀀫􀀱􀀢􀀪􀀮􀀦􀀁􀀳􀀯􀀁􀀳􀀩􀀦􀀁
􀀠􀀮􀀪􀀳􀀦􀀥􀀁􀀚􀀢􀀳􀀪􀀯􀀮􀀲􀀁􀀢􀀥􀀥􀀱􀀦􀀲􀀲􀀦􀀥􀀁􀀳􀀯􀀁􀀳􀀩􀀦􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀦􀀲􀀪􀀥􀀦􀀮􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀧􀀁􀀁
􀀳􀀩􀀦􀀁􀀞􀀦􀀤􀀴􀀱􀀪􀀳􀀷􀀁􀀓􀀯􀀴􀀮􀀤􀀪􀀬􀀁􀀂􀀞􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋􀀆􀀈􀀊􀀍􀀃
􀀟􀀩􀀦􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀦􀀲􀀪􀀥􀀦􀀮􀀳􀀒􀀁 􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀾􀁁􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀋􀀏􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀾􀁁􀀸􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀱􀀰􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀼􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆
􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀾􀁁􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀋􀀑􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀁌􀀿􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀾􀁁􀀸􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀱􀀰􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁 􀀞􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀾􀀱􀁅􀀁
􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀅􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀤􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀕􀀲􀀲􀀭􀀵􀀾􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀼􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀆
􀀝􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀁􀀳􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀸􀀻􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀆
􀀙􀀱􀀅􀀁􀀔􀀦􀀬􀀳􀀭􀀢􀀮􀀒􀀁􀀫􀀴􀀱􀀺􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀹􀀱􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀯􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁
􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀉􀀎􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀂􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀁 􀀧􀀇􀀤􀀪􀀆􀀏􀀉􀀍􀀏􀀃􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀳􀀸􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀴􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀵􀀾􀀿􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀱􀀷􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀁃􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀅􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀷􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀻􀁃􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀆
􀀨􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀾􀀳􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀿􀀼􀀵􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀉􀀏􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀼􀀻􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀳􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀲􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀼􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁁􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀼􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁 􀀾􀀴􀀱􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀲􀁁􀀾􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀰􀁅􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀳􀀴􀀁
􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀡􀀱􀀭􀀺􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀆
􀀣􀀺􀀁􀀊􀀍􀀁􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀣􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀼􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀲􀀲􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀼􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀸􀁀􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁅􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀢􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁁􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀲􀀲􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁
􀀝􀀁􀁁􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀲􀀸􀁁􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀁁􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁂􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀆􀀁􀀠􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀆􀀁
􀀛􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀯􀀵􀁂􀀵􀀸􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀺􀁁􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁁􀀼􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀾􀀻􀀿􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀹􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀾􀀻􀀭􀀰􀀮􀀸􀀻􀀯􀀷􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀿􀀴􀁁􀁀􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀲􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀄􀀁
􀀷􀀵􀀰􀀺􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀿􀀴􀀱􀀿􀀆
􀀙􀀭􀀾􀀸􀀵􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀅􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀠􀁁􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀆􀀁􀀞􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀲􀀱􀁃􀀁􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀻􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀁
􀀴􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀽􀁁􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀲􀀵􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀭􀁁􀁀􀀻􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀁
􀁃􀀱􀀭􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀻􀁃􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀿􀁀􀁁􀀺􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀺􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁
􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀙􀀭􀀾􀀸􀀵􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀭􀀁 􀀺􀁁􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀭􀀰􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀆􀀁
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀠􀁁􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀆
􀀬􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁􀀊􀀏􀀁􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀄􀀁􀀜􀀱􀀺􀀺􀀭􀀰􀀵􀁅􀀁􀀟􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀭􀁅􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀟􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀵􀁂􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀷􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀭􀀵􀀸􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁
􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀅
􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀸􀀻􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀟􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀺􀁀􀁅􀀺􀀵􀁂􀀷􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀘􀀻􀀺􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀷􀀁 􀀻􀀮􀀸􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀘􀀻􀀺􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀷􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀅􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀱􀀺􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁
􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀮􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀯􀀴􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀊􀀏􀀁􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀟􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀵􀁂􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀿􀀴􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀀮􀀱􀁀􀁃􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀌􀀈􀀈􀀁􀀻􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀍􀀈􀀈􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀈􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀻􀀷􀀱􀀁􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁁􀀸􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀺􀁁􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀶􀁁􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀆
􀀫􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀀶􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀮􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀻􀀼􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁
􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀲􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀻􀀼􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀁􀁁􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀆
􀀝􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀢􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀁁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀅􀀮􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀁂􀀭􀀵􀀸􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀴􀁁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀳􀀴􀀅􀀸􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀁􀀱􀀺􀀳􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀁌􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁁􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀳􀀻􀀻􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀼􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀭􀀮􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀾􀀱􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀼􀀸􀀻􀀹􀀭􀀯􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁
􀀝􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀼􀀵􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀷􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀾􀀱􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀱􀁄􀁀􀀁
􀁃􀀱􀀱􀀷􀀆
􀀕􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁅􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄
􀁊􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀁􀁃􀀭􀁅􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀼􀀵􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀁
􀀱􀁄􀀴􀀵􀀮􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀉􀀏􀀁􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀼􀀸􀀻􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀸􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀰􀁁􀀱􀁋􀀆
􀀨􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀠􀀱􀁀􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀷􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀱􀁄􀀼􀀱􀀰􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀸􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀻􀁃􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆
􀀟􀀩􀀦􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀦􀀲􀀪􀀥􀀦􀀮􀀳􀀒􀀁􀀝􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀷􀀁􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆
􀀝􀀁 􀀿􀀴􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀁 􀀳􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀸􀀻􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀆
􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀊􀀁 􀀊􀀆􀀈􀀐
􀀉􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀞􀀆􀀛􀀡􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌
􀁁􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀲􀀸􀁁􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀺􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀲􀁁􀀾􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀸􀀭􀁅􀀆
􀀣􀀺􀀁 􀀉􀀏􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀷􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀁀􀁃􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀯􀀯􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀰􀁁􀀯􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀟􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀰􀀻􀀹􀀁
􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀖􀁁􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀿􀀼􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀧􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀉􀀏􀀁􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀺􀀁
􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀡􀀻􀀿􀀯􀀻􀁃􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀆􀀁 􀀠􀀱􀁀􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀆
􀀚􀀵􀀾􀀿􀁀􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀻􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀚􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀁅􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀯􀀷􀀼􀀻􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁁􀀼􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀁁􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀵􀁀􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁅􀀆􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀻􀀱􀁁􀁂􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀴􀀱􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀆
􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀭􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀹􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀀁 􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀡􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀧􀀽􀁁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀺􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀅􀀰􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁
􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀭􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀆􀀁􀀖􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀯􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀀴􀀱􀀭􀁂􀀵􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀭􀁁􀁀􀀻􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀾􀀵􀀲􀀸􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀷􀀱􀁀􀀅􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀺􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀆
􀀨􀀴􀀵􀀾􀀰􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁 􀀼􀀸􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀁂􀀭􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁
􀀿􀁅􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀾􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀡􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀭􀀰􀁁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀿􀀴􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆􀀁 􀀖􀁅􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀲􀀸􀁁􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀆􀀁􀀝􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀄􀀁
􀀚􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀁􀀡􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀠􀀭􀁂􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀊􀀋􀀁􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁
􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀼􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀰􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁
􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁂􀀭􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀾􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀾􀀻􀀭􀀰􀀮􀀸􀀻􀀯􀀷􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁
􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀵􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀺􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀆
􀀚􀁁􀀾􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀼􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀾􀀭􀀲􀁀􀀁􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀤􀀭􀀾􀀸􀀵􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀹􀀺􀀱􀀿􀁀􀁅􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁 􀁂􀀭􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀸􀀭􀁅􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀭􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀤􀀭􀀾􀀸􀀵􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀭􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁
􀀞􀀪􀀱􀀁 􀀙􀀢􀀱􀀫􀀁 􀀘􀀷􀀢􀀬􀀬􀀁 􀀕􀀱􀀢􀀮􀀳􀀁 􀀂􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀟􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀰􀀻􀀹􀀃􀀒􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀀭􀀹􀀁
􀀳􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀅􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀟􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀰􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀽􀁁􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀮􀀱􀀯􀀭􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀱􀀼􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀉􀀏􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀁅􀀱􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀵􀀱􀁂􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀮􀀶􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁂􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁
􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀸􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀯􀀾􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀱􀀽􀁁􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀁁􀀮􀁀􀀸􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀺􀀁
􀀲􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀁁􀀾􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀳􀀱􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁
􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀀰􀀵􀀾􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀟􀀾􀀭􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁
􀀠􀁁􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀶􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀻􀀼􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀵􀀾􀀿􀀼􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁
􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀁁􀀾􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀱􀁄􀀱􀀾􀀯􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀆􀀁
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀁􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀼􀁀􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀾􀀴􀀱􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀤􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀦􀀱􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀚􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀅􀀰􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀕􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀍􀀉􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀗􀀴􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀁌􀀿􀀁
􀀰􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀺􀀱􀁃􀀁􀀸􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀀺􀀻􀀁􀀶􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀿􀀻􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀻􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀕􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀍􀀉􀀆􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀁉􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀺􀁁􀀹􀀱􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁
􀀻􀀯􀀯􀀭􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀜􀁁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀦􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀡􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀡􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀡􀀵􀀺􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁 􀀂􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀃􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀀱􀀼􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀵􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀴􀀱􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀁
􀀮􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀱􀁄􀁀􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀲􀁁􀀾􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀿􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀳􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆
􀀕􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁁􀀸􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀁌􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀁
􀀲􀁁􀀾􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀡􀀾􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀶􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀀿􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀟􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀰􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀰􀁁􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀳􀁁􀀺􀀼􀀻􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀁 􀀪􀀵􀀱􀀺􀀺􀀭􀀁
􀀘􀀻􀀯􀁁􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀭􀀹􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀁁􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀱􀀺􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀭􀀲􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀭􀀹􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁
􀀋􀀆􀀈􀀐􀀁 􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀊
􀀞􀀆􀀛􀀡􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀉􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋
􀀧􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀮􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀗􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁 􀀂􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀃􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀁
􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀊􀀍􀀁􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀸􀀭􀁅􀀆􀀁􀀣􀀺􀀁
􀀧􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀁅􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀟􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀵􀁂􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀾􀀳􀀱􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀺􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀮􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀼􀀸􀀭􀀺􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀳􀁁􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀆􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀹􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀧􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀻􀀄􀀁􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀻􀀸􀁂􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀗􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀤􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀳􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀲􀀱􀁃􀀁 􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀿􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀆􀀁 􀀢􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀁁􀀮􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁
􀀚􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀱􀀽􀁁􀀵􀁂􀀻􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁
􀁁􀀺􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀱􀀼􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀼􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀸􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀷􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀁃􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀶􀀻􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀉􀀏􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁃􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀁃􀀭􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁃􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁
􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀻􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀁀􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀯􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀼􀀸􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀭􀀹􀀺􀀱􀀿􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀁅􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀱􀁄􀀯􀀱􀀼􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀵􀁂􀀵􀀰􀁁􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀮􀀸􀀻􀀻􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀿􀀆􀀁
􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁
􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀸􀀭􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀳􀀻􀀻􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀄􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀿􀀴􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁅􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀷􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀼􀀸􀀭􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁
􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀻􀁃􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀆
􀀜􀀻􀁃􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀰􀀻􀀼􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀁀􀁃􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀣􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀳􀀻􀀻􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀰􀀾􀀭􀀲􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀹􀀺􀀱􀀿􀁀􀁅􀀁
􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀄􀀁􀀸􀀭􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀹􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀸􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀾􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀆􀀁􀀝􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀝􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀼􀀻􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀵􀀹􀀭􀀳􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀻􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁅􀀆
􀀣􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀺􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀉􀀏􀀁􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁
􀀺􀀻􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀀼􀀭􀁃􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀺􀀱􀁃􀀁􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀺􀀻􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀯􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀀁 􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀅􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀱􀁄􀀱􀀾􀀯􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀁃􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀅􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀮􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀉􀀉􀀁􀀷􀀵􀀰􀀺􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀹􀀁􀀿􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀶􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀹􀁁􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀸􀀻􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀁃􀀻􀀁􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀸􀀻􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀼􀀱􀀻􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀼􀀸􀀻􀀾􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀻􀀻􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁅􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀡􀀭􀁅􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀟􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀵􀁂􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀳􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀼􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀁
􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆
􀀚􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀳􀁁􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀼􀀻􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀆􀀁
􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀺􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀳􀁁􀀭􀀾􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀺􀀳􀁁􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀅􀀧􀀱􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀿􀀹􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁄􀀱􀀺􀀻􀀼􀀴􀀻􀀮􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀾􀀴􀀱􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀼􀀁 􀁁􀀼􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁
􀀲􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀺􀀳􀁁􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀅􀀧􀀱􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀆
􀀫􀀴􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀁅􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁 􀀯􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀵􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀆􀀁 􀀜􀀭􀁂􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀺􀀱􀁄􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀗􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀄􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀸􀀭􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀻􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀁁􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆􀀁 􀀖􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀰􀀵􀀼􀀸􀀻􀀹􀀭􀀯􀁅􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀁁􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀳􀀱􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀾􀀿􀁁􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁􀁁􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀆
􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀁄􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀁁􀀸􀁀􀀁 􀀯􀀵􀀾􀀯􀁁􀀹􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁
􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀵􀁂􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁃􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀳􀀾􀀭􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀻􀀯􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀻􀀹􀀵􀀯􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀸􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀳􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀾􀀾􀁁􀀼􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀆􀀁􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀿􀁁􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀁆􀀱􀀾􀀻􀀅􀀿􀁁􀀹􀀁􀀳􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀁
􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀿􀀓􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀻􀁃􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀻􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀁁􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀁁􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀮􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀆
􀀙􀀱􀀅􀀁 􀀑􀀱􀀢􀀴􀀥􀀁 􀀂􀀚􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀃􀀁 􀀂􀀡􀀟􀀞􀀚􀀕􀀁 􀀙􀀝􀀁 􀀈􀀠􀀕􀀝􀀓􀀘􀀃􀀒􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀷􀀁
􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆
􀀧􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀸􀁅􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁
􀀯􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀲􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀿􀁅􀀺􀀯􀀴􀀾􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁
􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀀻􀀮􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀗􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀵􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁
􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀊􀀁 􀀌􀀆􀀈􀀐
􀀉􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀞􀀆􀀛􀀡􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀼􀁀􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀜􀀱􀀺􀀺􀀭􀀰􀀵􀁅􀀁􀀟􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀡􀀭􀁅􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀟􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀵􀁂􀀄􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀅􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀯􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁
􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁 􀀂􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀃􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀲􀀲􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀆
􀀫􀀴􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀶􀀻􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀉􀀏􀀁􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀻􀀸􀁂􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀁􀁀􀀻􀁃􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀁􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀳􀀵􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀁁􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁
􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀻􀁃􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀼􀀸􀀭􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀲􀀵􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀼􀁁􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀶􀀻􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆
􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀦􀁃􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀁀􀁅􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀳􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀵􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀵􀀾􀀹􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀯􀀷􀀼􀀻􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀆􀀁
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀵􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁 􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀱􀁄􀀱􀀾􀀯􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀆􀀁
􀀢􀀻􀀺􀀱􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀭􀀁􀀹􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀮􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀿􀁁􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁂􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀀁 􀀳􀀱􀀺􀁁􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀭􀀁􀁂􀀵􀀱􀁃􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀺􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀱􀀽􀁁􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀅􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆
􀀨􀀻􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀵􀀱􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀁃􀀭􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁂􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀱􀁄􀀱􀀾􀀯􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀲􀀸􀁁􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀻􀀸􀁂􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀺􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀼􀀸􀀻􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀲􀀸􀀵􀀯􀁀􀀆
􀀙􀀱􀀲􀀅􀀁 􀀛􀀦􀀱􀀤􀀦􀀵􀀢􀀬􀀁 􀀂􀀕􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀃􀀁 􀀂􀀡􀀟􀀞􀀚􀀕􀀁 􀀙􀀝􀀁 􀀎􀀟􀀑􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀘􀀃􀀒􀀁 􀀝􀀁
􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀷􀀁􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁁􀀼􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀰􀀵􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀁁􀀸􀁀􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆
􀀝􀀁 􀀭􀀹􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁 􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀷􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀁅􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀁁􀀸􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀻􀁁􀀮􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀸􀁀􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀀁􀀝􀀁􀀷􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀟􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀰􀀻􀀹􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀹􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀼􀀻􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀼􀀭􀁀􀀾􀀵􀀻􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀶􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀸􀀆􀀁􀀚􀀭􀀾􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀻􀀷􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀻􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁
􀀜􀀻􀁃􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀺􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀁅􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀸􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀻􀀱􀁁􀁂􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀮􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀾􀁁􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀵􀀾􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀳􀀱􀀺􀁁􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀷􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀭􀀾􀀯􀀴􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀀸􀀻􀀻􀀰􀁅􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁃􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀴􀁅􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀭􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀯􀀴􀀻􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀭􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁 􀀬􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀳􀀱􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁
􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀰􀀻􀀼􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀺􀀱􀁃􀀁􀁀􀀭􀀾􀀳􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀭􀀺􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀝􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀁃􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀯􀀴􀀱􀁀􀀁􀁁􀀼􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀭􀀺􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀆􀀁
􀀨􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀣􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀳􀀻􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀺􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀊􀀍􀀁􀀡􀀭􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀳􀀻􀀻􀀰􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀁁􀀯􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁
􀀳􀁁􀀭􀀾􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀆􀀁
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀻􀀯􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀱􀁄􀀱􀀾􀀯􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀁
􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀱􀀼􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁
􀀱􀀺􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁
􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀁁􀀼􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀲􀁁􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀺􀀁
􀀴􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀳􀀱􀀻􀀳􀀾􀀭􀀼􀀴􀁅􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀾􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀮􀀱􀁀􀁃􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀻􀀯􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀄􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀺􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀳􀀱􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀸􀁁􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆
􀀙􀀱􀀅􀀁􀀚􀀥􀀴􀀩􀀴􀀮􀀨􀀪􀀱􀀦􀀩􀀦􀀁􀀂􀀦􀁃􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀃􀀒􀀁􀀝􀀁􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀷􀀁
􀁅􀀻􀁁􀀄􀀁 􀀡􀀭􀀰􀀭􀀹􀀁 􀀤􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀺􀀯􀁅􀀁
􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁 􀀞􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀾􀀱􀁅􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀅
􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀤􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀕􀀲􀀲􀀭􀀵􀀾􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀻􀀼􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀵􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀁃􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀻􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀀶􀁁􀀰􀀳􀀱􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀺􀁁􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁
􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀀺􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀮􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀻􀁃􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀲􀀸􀁁􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀼􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁂􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀺􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀿􀀸􀀻􀁃􀀸􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀻􀀸􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀱􀁅􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀝􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀻􀀼􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀲􀀱􀁃􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀱􀀷􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀼􀀸􀀻􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀁 􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀿􀀁
􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀐􀀁 􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀊
􀀞􀀆􀀛􀀡􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀉􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀯􀀵􀁀􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀿􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀟􀀱􀀾􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀿􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀉􀀏􀀁􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀄
􀁊􀀕􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁂􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁
􀀳􀀻􀀻􀀰􀀁 􀀰􀀭􀁅􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀷􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀭􀁅􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀷􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀰􀁁􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀰􀁁􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀰􀁁􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀲􀀵􀀾􀀿􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀺􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁁􀀸􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀰􀁁􀀯􀀱􀀆􀁋
􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀟􀀱􀀾􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀚􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀁􀀡􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀀠􀀭􀁂􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀚􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀁 􀀡􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀵􀀱􀁂􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀅􀀺􀀱􀀳􀀻􀁀􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀧􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀳􀀻􀀻􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀆􀀁 􀀦􀀱􀀳􀀾􀀱􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀁
􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆
􀀕􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀄􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀗􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁􀀂􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀃􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀱􀁄􀀯􀀱􀀼􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀘􀀻􀀺􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀠􀁁􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀧􀀸􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀅􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀁅􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀁 􀀸􀀻􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀼􀀁􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀆
􀀞􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀅􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁
􀀮􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀮􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀠􀁁􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀹􀁁􀀺􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀼􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀯􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁
􀀨􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀁁􀀳􀀳􀀱􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀯􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀯􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀯􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀘􀀻􀀺􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀷􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀸􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀆
􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀰􀀰􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀁅􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀁃􀀻􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀱􀀷􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀳􀁁􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀷􀀵􀀰􀀺􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀠􀁁􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀀘􀀻􀀺􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀅􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀁁􀀳􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀮􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁
􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀼􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀅􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀶􀁁􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀉􀀍􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀘􀀻􀀺􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀅􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀉􀀏􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀸􀀱􀁂􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀮􀀾􀀻􀀭􀀰􀀯􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀆
􀀝􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀭􀁅􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀷􀀵􀀰􀀺􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁
􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀶􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀌􀀈􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀢􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀮􀁅􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀁
􀀮􀀻􀀰􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀾􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁃􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀁁􀀺􀀹􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀼􀀴􀁅􀀿􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀓􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁
􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀸􀀻􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀉􀀑􀀁 􀁅􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀅
􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀅􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀁁􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀆􀀁 􀀬􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀳􀁁􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀀁
􀁁􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀳􀀱􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀝􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀷􀀁􀀹􀁅􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀽􀁁􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁
􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀵􀀱􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀮􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆􀀁􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀽􀁁􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀤􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁 􀀚􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀷􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀲􀀱􀁃􀀁 􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀻􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁 􀀬􀀭􀁀􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁅􀁁􀀷􀀁 􀁉􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁁􀀼􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀁉􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀳􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀹􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁
􀀿􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀆
􀀕􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀼􀀁 􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁
􀀹􀀵􀀿􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀔􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀀭􀀹􀀁 􀀯􀀱􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀁􀀹􀁅􀀁􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀁􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀾􀀹􀀁
􀁀􀁃􀀻􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁂􀀵􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀾􀁁􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀼􀀸􀀻􀀹􀀭􀀯􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀉􀀏􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁
􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀭􀀁􀁂􀀵􀀱􀁃􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀱􀁄􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁
􀀭􀀁􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀺􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀭􀁃􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀺􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀭􀁃􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀿􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀆􀀁
􀀨􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀻􀁃􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁􀁁􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀾􀀱􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀾􀁁􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀁁􀀸􀁀􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀯􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁂􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀵􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀆􀀁􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀵􀀯􀁀􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀗􀀴􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀢􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀁 􀀶􀁁􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀰􀀵􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀻􀀹􀀵􀀯􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀰􀁅􀀁􀀿􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀿􀀭􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀆
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀶􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀻􀀸􀁂􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀁃􀀻􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀺􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀁
􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀡􀀭􀁅􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀟􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀵􀁂􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀄􀀁
􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀽􀁁􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀄􀀁􀀕􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀿􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀣􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀗􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀆
􀀕􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀳􀀻􀀻􀀰􀀁
􀀲􀀭􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀰􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀼􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀀰􀀵􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀁁􀀸􀁀􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀵􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀻􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀆
􀀙􀀲􀀅􀀁 􀀛􀀯􀀶􀀦􀀱􀀁 􀀂􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀕􀀹􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀃􀀒􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀷􀀁
􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀅􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆
􀀣􀀺􀀁 􀀉􀀏􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀄􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀿􀁁􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀶􀀻􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁􀁁􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀳􀀱􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀸􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀸􀁀􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀻􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁
􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀊􀀁 􀀎􀀆􀀈􀀐
􀀉􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀞􀀆􀀛􀀡􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌
􀀉􀀏􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀱􀁄􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀭􀁃􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀉􀀏􀀁􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀒􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀼􀁀􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀾􀀁􀁁􀀼􀀁􀁀􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀭􀀲􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀰􀀰􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁
􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀵􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀲􀀵􀀸􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀆
􀀝􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀳􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁁􀀼􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀭􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀵􀀺􀀽􀁁􀀵􀀿􀀴􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀝􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀄􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀲􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀲􀁁􀀱􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀭􀁂􀀵􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀹􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀆􀀁􀀝􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀀰􀀰􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀀶􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀱􀀺􀀳􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀹􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀮􀁁􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀱􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀆
􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀀱􀀹􀀼􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀗􀀴􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁁􀀼􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀳􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀷􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀄􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀻􀀯􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀀰􀁂􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁁􀀼􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀼􀀸􀀻􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀀮􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀲􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀶􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀾􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀁
􀀭􀀮􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀳􀁁􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁
􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀯􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀯􀀭􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀾􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀽􀁁􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀆
􀀙􀀱􀀅􀀁 􀀘􀀪􀀴􀀁 􀀗􀀪􀀦􀀷􀀪􀀁 􀀂􀀗􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀃􀀁 􀀂􀀡􀀟􀀞􀀚􀀕􀀁 􀀙􀀝􀀁 􀀇􀀘􀀙􀀝􀀕􀀡􀀕􀀃􀀒􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀿􀀴􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀷􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀅􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁁􀀸􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀁄􀀁
􀀲􀀭􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀼􀀻􀀾􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀁
􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀻􀀁
􀁀􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀸􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀾􀀻􀀻􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀮􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁂􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀱􀁀􀀴􀀺􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁
􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀭􀀁􀁂􀀵􀀱􀁃􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀵􀀱􀁂􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀸􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀆
􀀚􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀄􀀁􀁂􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀗􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀄􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀁂􀀵􀀳􀀻􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀱􀀺􀀳􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀼􀁁􀀿􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀷􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀁀􀁃􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀿􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀵􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀯􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀧􀀸􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀁 􀀦􀀻􀀹􀀭􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀡􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀻􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀒􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀿􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀸􀀅􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀹􀀼􀀭􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀱􀁄􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀿􀁁􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀆
􀀚􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀷􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀅􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀘􀀻􀀺􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀷􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀷􀀵􀀰􀀺􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀪􀀵􀀱􀀺􀀺􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀯􀁁􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀡􀁅􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀶􀀻􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀁅􀁃􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁
􀀱􀁄􀀴􀀵􀀮􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀆
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀪􀀵􀀱􀀺􀀺􀀭􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀯􀁁􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁁􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁
􀀍􀀏􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀼􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀿􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀺􀀯􀁅􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁
􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀯􀀭􀀼􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀁁􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀪􀀵􀀱􀀺􀀺􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀯􀁁􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀼􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀲􀀵􀀾􀀹􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀰􀁁􀀯􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀴􀀭􀀸􀀲􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆
􀀧􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀉􀀏􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀳􀀻􀀻􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀭􀀰􀀹􀀵􀀾􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀲􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁 􀀯􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀁􀀯􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀡􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀾􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀣􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀙􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀵􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁
􀁂􀀻􀀸􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀅􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀹􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀄􀀁
􀀯􀀴􀀻􀀻􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁
􀀼􀀱􀀻􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀁 􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀻􀁃􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁
􀀡􀀻􀀿􀀯􀀻􀁃􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀰􀀁 􀁂􀀻􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀱􀁀􀀴􀀺􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀆
􀀝􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀰􀀰􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀤􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀡􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀬􀀭􀁀􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁅􀁁􀀷􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀾􀀅􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀺􀀳􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀅
􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀳􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀁􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀁁􀀿􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀺􀀳􀁁􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁
􀀵􀁀􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀺􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀿􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀹􀀺􀀱􀀿􀁀􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁
􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀿􀀆
􀀕􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀼􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀹􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀴􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀾􀀭􀀳􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁
􀀏􀀆􀀈􀀐􀀁 􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀊
􀀞􀀆􀀛􀀡􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀉􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋
􀀝􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀸􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀻􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀾􀁁􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀵􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁
􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁
􀀕􀀿􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀁃􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀡􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁
􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀱􀀺􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀲􀀭􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀲􀀸􀁁􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀾􀀹􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁 􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀁀􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀳􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆
􀀙􀀲􀀅􀀁 􀀘􀀴􀀤􀀢􀀲􀀁 􀀂􀀠􀁁􀁄􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀳􀀃􀀁 􀀂􀀡􀀟􀀞􀀚􀀕􀀁 􀀙􀀝􀀁 􀀈􀀠􀀕􀀝􀀓􀀘􀀃􀀒􀀁 􀀝􀀁
􀀶􀀻􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀕􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀤􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀕􀀲􀀲􀀭􀀵􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀞􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀾􀀱􀁅􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀻􀀼􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁
􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀟􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀵􀁂􀀄􀀁
􀀠􀁁􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀘􀀻􀀺􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀷􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀱􀀼􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀅􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀊􀀍􀀁􀀡􀀭􀁅􀀆
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀵􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀺􀁁􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀸􀀻􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀼􀁁􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀿􀀁
􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀰􀁅􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀶􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁􀁅􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀭􀁂􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀅􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀮􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀮􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀘􀀻􀀺􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀷􀀆􀀁
􀀨􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀁 􀀴􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀅􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀰􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁌􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀠􀁁􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀭􀀾􀀳􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀲􀀵􀀳􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀹􀁁􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀜􀀻􀀾􀀸􀀵􀁂􀀷􀀭􀀁 􀀯􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀻􀀾􀀄􀀁
􀀪􀀻􀀸􀀻􀀰􀁅􀀹􀁅􀀾􀀁 􀀦􀁅􀀮􀀭􀀷􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀁃􀀱􀀱􀀷􀀁 􀀺􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀁 􀀧􀀸􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀳􀀱􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀁅􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀿􀁀􀁁􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀄􀀁 􀀬􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁅􀀁 􀀤􀀻􀀼􀀾􀀭􀁂􀀷􀀻􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀳􀀴􀀁
􀀸􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀬􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀁅􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀟􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀵􀁂􀀄􀀁
􀀜􀀱􀀺􀀭􀀰􀀵􀁅􀀁 􀀟􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀾􀀳􀀱􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀼􀁀􀀁 􀁉􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀲􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀼􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀦􀀱􀀳􀀾􀀱􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀅
􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀁂􀀱􀀴􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀿􀀭􀀺􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀸􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀺􀀱􀀳􀀻􀁀􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆
􀀗􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀷􀀱􀀱􀀼􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀾􀀻􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀼􀀵􀀯􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀱􀁀􀀴􀀺􀀵􀀯􀀁
􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁁􀀸􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀰􀁅􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀿􀀴􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀁
􀀭􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀵􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀰􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀻􀀼􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀀿􀀻􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀆
􀀗􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀭􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀽􀁁􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀮􀀶􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀚􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁂􀀱􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀺􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀄􀀁 􀀗􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀷􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀁁􀀯􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀗􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀁􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀼􀀸􀀭􀁅􀀁
􀀭􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀾􀁁􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀿􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀷􀀿􀀆
􀀙􀀲􀀅􀀁􀀛􀀢􀀪􀀫􀀁􀀗􀀪􀀄􀀢􀀩􀀁􀀂􀀦􀀱􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀟􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀃􀀒􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀦􀀱􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀟􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀱􀀼􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀘􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀉􀀏􀀁􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁃􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀺􀀻􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀯􀁁􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀻􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁
􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀷􀀱􀁅􀀁
􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀼􀁀􀀁
􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀡􀀭􀁅􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀯􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀟􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀵􀁂􀀆
􀀕􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀻􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀴􀀱􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀯􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀆􀀁
􀀕􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀷􀀱􀁅􀀁
􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁􀁂􀀭􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁
􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀗􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁􀀂􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀲􀀲􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀯􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀵􀀿􀀹􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀻􀀸􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀁁􀀺􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀱􀀼􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀾􀀳􀀱􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀮􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁
􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁂􀀻􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁
􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀀭􀀲􀀱􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀺􀀱􀀸􀀁􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀳􀁁􀀭􀀾􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀆
􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀊􀀁 􀀐􀀆􀀈􀀐
􀀉􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀞􀀆􀀛􀀡􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌
􀀼􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀁃􀀻􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀱􀀷􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀁
􀀮􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁅􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀅􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀻􀀷􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀸􀀱􀁂􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀘􀀻􀀺􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀷􀀆􀀁
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀁 􀀦􀀱􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀚􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀡􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁
􀀰􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀧􀁘􀁑􀁍􀁄􀀃 􀀰􀁌􀁍􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁙􀁌􀃼􀀏􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃
􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀶􀀻􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀳􀀴􀀸􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁 􀀸􀀵􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀲􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀻􀀹􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀱􀀼􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀆
􀀢􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀸􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀾􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀮􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁
􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀱􀁀􀁃􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀡􀀻􀀿􀀯􀀻􀁃􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀼􀀸􀀻􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀁
􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀱􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀝􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀱􀀽􀁁􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀱􀁅􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀉􀀏􀀁􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀸􀀱􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀸􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀯􀁁􀀸􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀱􀀽􀁁􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆
􀀙􀀱􀀅􀀁􀀖􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀥􀀁􀀂􀀞􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀃􀀁􀀂􀀡􀀟􀀞􀀚􀀕􀀁􀀙􀀝􀀁􀀆􀀠􀀑􀀒􀀙􀀓􀀃􀀒􀀁􀀝􀀁􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀷􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀅􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀞􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀾􀀱􀁅􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀱􀁄􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆
􀀞􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀾􀀹􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀳􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀯􀀵􀁀􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁
􀀨􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀴􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀆􀀁
􀀫􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀸􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀻􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁
􀀱􀁄􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀻􀀼􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀵􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀭􀀯􀁅􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆
􀀞􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀁􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀧􀀸􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀣􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀗􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀆􀀁
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀉􀀏􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀰􀀾􀀭􀁃􀀁
􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀳􀀱􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀱􀀯􀀴􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀁁􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀭􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀷􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀁
􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀺􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀴􀁁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀿􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀺􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀱􀀼􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀼􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀝􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀳􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀁅􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀲􀁁􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀆
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁃􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀺􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁁􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀵􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀲􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀱􀁀􀀁􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀰􀀻􀀼􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀉􀀏􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀹􀀺􀀱􀀿􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀁅􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀸􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀰􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀸􀀭􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀴􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀆
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀱􀁄􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁
􀀱􀁄􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀲􀀸􀁁􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀀹􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁂􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀷􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀲􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁
􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀆􀀁
􀀚􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀰􀀾􀀭􀁃􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀮􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀷􀀵􀀰􀀺􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀺􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀧􀀸􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀊􀀍􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀭􀀹􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀼􀀸􀀻􀁅􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀊􀀈􀀉􀀉􀀁 􀀪􀀵􀀱􀀺􀀺􀀭􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀯􀁁􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁 􀀂􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀃􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀼􀀻􀀾􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀊􀀏􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀄􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀁃􀀻􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀁
􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀬􀀱􀀺􀀭􀀷􀀵􀁅􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀭􀀲􀀱􀁀􀁅􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀮􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀼􀀸􀀻􀁅􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀁅􀁃􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀀺􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀁
􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀲􀀵􀀸􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀲􀀸􀁁􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀅􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀹􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀼􀁀􀀸􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀼􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀲􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁
􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀺􀀱􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀼􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀹􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀵􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀻􀀹􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀱􀁄􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀶􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀈􀀇􀀆􀀈􀀐􀀁 􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀊
􀀞􀀆􀀛􀀡􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀉􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋
􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀸􀀭􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀿􀀴􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀺􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀁀􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀳􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀚􀁁􀀾􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀳􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀡􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀳􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀆
􀀣􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁
􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀾􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀄􀀁
􀀭􀀮􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀵􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁
􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀕􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀎􀀐􀀇􀀊􀀎􀀊􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁
􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀺􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀁁􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀄􀀁􀀴􀁁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀲􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀻􀀹􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀸􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀆
􀀝􀀁􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀱􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀱􀁄􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀹􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀳􀀻􀀻􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁
􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀯􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀷􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀁁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀁
􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀿􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀰􀁁􀀯􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀼􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀯􀀸􀀵􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀁁􀀯􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀊􀀍􀀁􀀡􀀭􀁅􀀆
􀀙􀀱􀀅􀀁􀀜􀀴􀀪􀀮􀀬􀀢􀀮􀀁􀀂􀀕􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀭􀀃􀀒􀀁􀀝􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀷􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀅􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅
􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀾􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀆􀀁􀀕􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀿􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀺􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀳􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀁁􀀼􀀅􀁀􀀻􀀅􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀹􀁁􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀱􀁂􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀉􀀏􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀀲􀁁􀀾􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀻􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀵􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀻􀀼􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀰􀁁􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀷􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀁃􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀼􀀸􀀻􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀆
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀸􀀵􀁂􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁁􀀼􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁
􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀮􀀹􀀵􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀤􀀭􀀾􀀸􀀵􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀾􀀭􀀲􀁀􀀁􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀹􀀺􀀱􀀿􀁀􀁅􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀭􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀁 􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀭􀀁
􀀮􀀾􀀻􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀮􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀳􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀁􀀾􀀭􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀹􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀗􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀾􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁
􀀢􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀊􀀈􀀉􀀋􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀊􀀊􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀮􀀾􀁁􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀊􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀿􀀭􀀺􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀭􀀯􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀿􀀴􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀭􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀭􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀯􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀺􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀭􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀴􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀵􀀺􀀳􀁁􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀰􀁁􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀡􀀭􀁅􀀁􀀊􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀆
􀀙􀀱􀀅􀀁􀀒􀀢􀀱􀀱􀀯􀀲􀀁􀀂􀀗􀀴􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀃􀀁􀀂􀀡􀀟􀀞􀀚􀀕􀀁􀀙􀀝􀀁􀀎􀀟􀀑􀀝􀀙􀀡􀀘􀀃􀀒􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀅􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆
􀀧􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀯􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀂􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀁 􀀧􀀇􀀤􀀪􀀆􀀏􀀉􀀍􀀏􀀃􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀯􀁁􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀘􀀻􀀺􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀟􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀵􀁂􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀠􀁁􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁
􀀻􀁃􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀆
􀀗􀀴􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀱􀁄􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀭􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀱􀀽􀁁􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀷􀀵􀀰􀀺􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀣􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁
􀀂􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀃􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀲􀀲􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁
􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀼􀀴􀁅􀀿􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀀿􀁅􀀯􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀻􀀳􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀴􀀱􀀭􀀸􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀆
􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀵􀀮􀁁􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀻􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀁄􀀵􀀹􀁁􀀹􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀁁􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀲􀀸􀁁􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀼􀀼􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀆􀀁
􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁁􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀰􀁁􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀼􀀵􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀁂􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁
􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀷􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀉􀀏􀀁􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀶􀀻􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀡􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀚􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀁 􀀕􀀲􀀲􀀭􀀵􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀜􀀵􀀳􀀴􀀁 􀀦􀀱􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀚􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀁 􀀕􀀲􀀲􀀭􀀵􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁
􀀤􀀻􀀸􀀵􀀯􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀸􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀗􀀴􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀵􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀰􀁁􀀯􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀵􀁀􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁
􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁂􀀭􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁
􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀵􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀱􀀽􀁁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀮􀀾􀀻􀀭􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀊􀀁 􀀈􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀐
􀀉􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀞􀀆􀀛􀀡􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌
􀀿􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀁂􀀻􀀵􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀸􀀻􀀻􀀰􀀿􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀱􀀼􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀶􀁁􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀰􀀵􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀝􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀗􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀾􀁀􀀁 􀀂􀀝􀀗􀀗􀀃􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀀢􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀁅􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀮􀀾􀁁􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀊􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀆􀀁
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀁁􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀱􀁄􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀝􀀗􀀗􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀶􀁁􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀰􀀵􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀱􀁅􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀝􀀗􀀗􀀁􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀱􀀆
􀀚􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀁃􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁
􀀿􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀳􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀯􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀻􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁
􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀺􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀁁􀀾􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀲􀀵􀀾􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀆
􀀨􀀻􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀕􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀻􀁃􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁
􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀊􀀍􀀁 􀀡􀀭􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁
􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀮􀀿􀁀􀀾􀁁􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀁
􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀱􀁄􀀱􀀾􀀯􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀲􀀸􀁁􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀁃􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀁􀁂􀀱􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀳􀀱􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀳􀀱􀀺􀁁􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀆
􀀙􀀱􀀅􀀁 􀀓􀀩􀀴􀀱􀀫􀀪􀀮􀀁 􀀂􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀃􀀁 􀀂􀀡􀀟􀀞􀀚􀀕􀀁 􀀙􀀝􀀁
􀀍􀀣􀀡􀀡􀀙􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀒􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀅􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀿􀀼􀁁􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁
􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀸􀀅􀁃􀀵􀀿􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀁁􀀮􀀮􀀻􀀾􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀼􀁁􀀿􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀷􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁
􀀯􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀿􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀅􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀲􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀰􀀁
􀀭􀀯􀁀􀁁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀰􀁁􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀡􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀺􀀁
􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀴􀀭􀀼􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀆
􀀣􀀺􀀁 􀀉􀀏􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁􀁀􀁅􀀼􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀄􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀻􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀻􀁃􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀶􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀹􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀿􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁁􀀹􀀼􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀅􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀅
􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀁁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀼􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀁉􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀅􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀄􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀼􀀸􀀻􀁅􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀉􀀍􀀄􀀈􀀈􀀈􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁
􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀺􀀱􀀸􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀷􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁂􀀱􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀸􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀾􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀵􀀾􀀯􀀾􀀭􀀲􀁀􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀮􀀰􀀵􀁂􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀦􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀖􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀲􀀵􀀾􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀼􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀅􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀮􀀅􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀲􀀲􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀆􀀁􀀣􀀺􀀱􀀁
􀀹􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀀿􀁅􀀯􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀻􀀳􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀅􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀻􀁃􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀭􀀿􀀷􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀱􀀺􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀳􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀆
􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁 􀀿􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀳􀁁􀀭􀀾􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀺􀀳􀁁􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀆􀀁
􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁄􀀱􀀺􀀻􀀼􀀴􀀻􀀮􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀅􀀧􀀱􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀿􀀹􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀳􀁁􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀳􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀰􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀵􀀮􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀅􀀧􀀱􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀲􀀸􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀘􀀻􀀺􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀷􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀯􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀁅􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁂􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀣􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁
􀀂􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀃􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀷􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆
􀀖􀁁􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀉􀀏􀀁􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀺􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁
􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀔􀀁􀀘􀀵􀀿􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀱􀁂􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀯􀀴􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀳􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁
􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁅􀀆􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀁌􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀀺􀀻􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀺􀀯􀁅􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀲􀀸􀁁􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁
􀀯􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀁 􀀻􀀮􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀊􀀍􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀼􀀸􀀻􀀾􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀯􀁅􀀺􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀺􀀱􀀸􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀯􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀷􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀺􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀁄􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀻􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀻􀀱􀁁􀁂􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀮􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀹􀁁􀀸􀁀􀀵􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀿􀀼􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀵􀀾􀀯􀀾􀀭􀀲􀁀􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀺􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀼􀀸􀀻􀀾􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀀴􀀻􀀻􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀊􀀐􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀡􀀭􀁅􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀟􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀵􀁂􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀰􀁁􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀷􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀜􀀻􀀾􀀸􀀵􀁂􀀷􀀭􀀁 􀀗􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀸􀀅􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀠􀁁􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀸􀀻􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀼􀁁􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀅􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀶􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁
􀀼􀀱􀀻􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀷􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀆
􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀵􀀾􀀯􀁁􀀹􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀺􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀺􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀯􀀵􀁀􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁅􀀆􀀁􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀱􀁄􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀻􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀮􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀁
􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀺􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀁁􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀵􀀾􀀯􀁁􀀹􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀀘􀀱􀀼􀁁􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀡􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀚􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀁 􀀕􀀲􀀲􀀭􀀵􀀾􀀿􀀁
􀀠􀁁􀀮􀀷􀀵􀁂􀀿􀀷􀁅􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀰􀁁􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀊􀀍􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀻􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀻􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀯􀀵􀁂􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀈􀀐􀀁 􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀊
􀀞􀀆􀀛􀀡􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀉􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋
􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀶􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀯􀀭􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀺􀀰􀁁􀀹􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀗􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁 􀀂􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀃􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀲􀀵􀀾􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀁 􀀱􀀺􀀳􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀁
􀀴􀁁􀀺􀀳􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀛􀁁􀀮􀀭􀀾􀀱􀁂􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀾􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀣􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀷􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀀴􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀱􀁄􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀡􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀯􀀯􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀿􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀘􀀻􀀺􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀷􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀰􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀀉􀀈􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀹􀀻􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀷􀀵􀀰􀀺􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀻􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀆
􀀣􀀺􀀁 􀀊􀀐􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀸􀀵􀀲􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀼􀁁􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀁅􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀟􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀵􀁂􀀄􀀁 􀀜􀀱􀀺􀀺􀀭􀀰􀀵􀁅􀀁 􀀟􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀡􀁅􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀟􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀰􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀀾􀁁􀀿􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀿􀀭􀁅􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀅􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀼􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀳􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀠􀀱􀁀􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀶􀁁􀀰􀀳􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀁀􀀁
􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀾􀁁􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁 􀀟􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀷􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀴􀀭􀀻􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀸􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀁀􀁃􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀹􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀴􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀅􀀱􀀺􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀣􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀁 􀁉􀀁 􀀊􀀐􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀁉􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀟􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀵􀀾􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀄􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀸􀀭􀀺􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀸􀀻􀀯􀀷􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀰􀀁
􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀸􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀹􀀼􀀭􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀱􀀁
􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀣􀀸􀀱􀀴􀀁
􀀨􀀿􀀭􀀾􀀱􀁂􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁
􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀿􀀭􀀾􀀱􀁂􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀵􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀼􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀸􀀱􀁂􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀮􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀱􀁄􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀷􀀁
􀀭􀀮􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁􀀺􀀭􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀹􀀼􀀭􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀻􀀹􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀱􀁄􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀵􀁂􀀵􀀸􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀔
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀷􀀱􀁅􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀻􀀭􀀰􀀁
􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀱􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁁􀀼􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀖􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀔􀀁 􀀕􀀯􀀯􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀁
􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀬􀀭􀁀􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁅􀁁􀀷􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀮􀀹􀀵􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀦􀀭􀀰􀀭􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀰􀀾􀀭􀀲􀁀􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀯􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀁􀀴􀀻􀁃􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁
􀀫􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀝􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀤􀀭􀀾􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀦􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀱􀁄􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀻􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀾􀀭􀀲􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀯􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀦􀀭􀀰􀀭􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀰􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀿􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀷􀀱􀁅􀀁 􀀽􀁁􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀁃􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀲􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀁􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁
􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀻􀁃􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀻􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀺􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀻􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀜􀀻􀁃􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀹􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀻􀁃􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀭􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀯􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀰􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀀶􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀰􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀊􀀉􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀮􀀾􀁁􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀆􀀁
􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀀮􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀮􀀸􀀻􀀻􀀰􀀿􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁
􀀩􀀺􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀁁􀀸􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀷􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀲􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀭􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀅􀀱􀀺􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀧􀁂􀀻􀀮􀀻􀀰􀀭􀀁 􀀤􀀭􀀾􀁀􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀿􀁁􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀁆􀀵􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀭􀀮􀀻􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀞􀁁􀀺􀀱􀀁
􀀉􀀑􀀌􀀉􀀆􀀁 􀀤􀁁􀀾􀀿􀁁􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀁
􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀭􀀮􀀻􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀜􀀵􀁀􀀸􀀱􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀿􀀴􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀺􀀱􀁃􀀁
􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀭􀀮􀀻􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀻􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀖􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀁􀀷􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀞􀀱􀁃􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀤􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀧􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀱􀁀􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀮􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀿􀁁􀀮􀀿􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀮􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀿􀀸􀀻􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀱􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆
􀀝􀀺􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀁
􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀶􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀱􀁄􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀹􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀻􀁃􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀦􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀀖􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀁅􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀭􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀀴􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀖􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀁅􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀻􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀘􀀺􀀱􀀼􀀾􀀆􀀁 􀀢􀀱􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁
􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀁆􀀵􀀁 􀀿􀀸􀀻􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀾􀀭􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀻􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀣􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀮􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀺􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁􀀘􀀺􀀱􀀼􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀘􀀻􀀺􀀮􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀷􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀜􀀻􀁃􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁂􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁂􀀭􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀧􀀸􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁
􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀮􀀰􀀵􀁂􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀀻􀀅􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀛􀁁􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀲􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀦􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀆
􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁
􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁 􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀁉􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀻􀁃􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀡􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁉􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀮􀀸􀀻􀀯􀀷􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀼􀀸􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀁􀁉􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀆􀀁􀀢􀀻􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀀸􀀵􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀁅􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀀫􀀭􀀿􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀁀􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀀘􀀆􀀗􀀆􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁
􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀭􀁅􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀄􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁
􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀖􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀹􀀔􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁
􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀆
􀀝􀀺􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁
􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀹􀀺􀀱􀀿􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀜􀀻􀁃􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀄􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀤􀀱􀀻􀀼􀀸􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀘􀀻􀀺􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀤􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀁􀀛􀁁􀀮􀀭􀀾􀀱􀁂􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁
􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀰􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀭􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀱􀀁
􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀊􀀁 􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀈􀀐
􀀉􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀞􀀆􀀛􀀡􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌
􀀝􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀁􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀿􀀭􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀲􀀱􀁃􀀁􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀿􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀁁􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀆
􀀣􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀧􀀸􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀽􀁁􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀻􀁃􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀻􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀅􀀰􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀯􀁁􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀲􀀵􀀾􀀹􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀁁􀀿􀀔􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀱􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀻􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁
􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀶􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀁁􀀼􀀵􀀰􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀁅􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀰􀁅􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀰􀁁􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀭􀀸􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆
􀀫􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁅􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀹􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀀴􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀕􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁􀀠􀀵􀁀􀀴􀁁􀀭􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁􀀤􀀻􀀸􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀖􀀸􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀭􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀕􀀹􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀁􀁂􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀸􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀆􀀁 􀀬􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀁁􀀯􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀱􀁄􀀱􀀾􀀯􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀖􀁁􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀁􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀁􀁁􀀼􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀱􀁄􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀁃􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀿􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀷􀀱􀀱􀀼􀀁
􀀭􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀻􀀸􀀁 􀀴􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀀱􀀺􀀳􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀷􀀸􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀻􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀅􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀄􀀁
􀁃􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀯􀀵􀁀􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀸􀀆
􀀰􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀰􀁘􀁕􀁐􀁒􀁎􀁄􀁌􀁗􀆡􀀃 􀀂􀀠􀀵􀁀􀀴􀁁􀀭􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀃􀀒􀀁 􀀠􀀱􀁀􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀷􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀢􀀵􀀳􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀀯􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀄􀀁
􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀀯􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀶􀁁􀀰􀀳􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀝􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀚􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀝􀀁􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀷􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅
􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀞􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀾􀀱􀁅􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆
􀀕􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁁􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀀸􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀳􀀴􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀉􀀏􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁
􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀖􀁁􀁀􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀷􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀶􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀯􀁁􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀰􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁃􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀸􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀁌􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀀿􀁁􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀜􀀱􀀸􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀷􀀵􀀁 􀀚􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀕􀀯􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀉􀀑􀀑􀀉􀀁 􀀕􀀸􀀹􀀭􀁀􀁅􀀁
􀀘􀀱􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀖􀁁􀀰􀀭􀀼􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀡􀀱􀀹􀀻􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀰􀁁􀀹􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀉􀀑􀀑􀀌􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀨􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀚􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀿􀀴􀀵􀀼􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀁀􀁃􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀉􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀗􀀴􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀢􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀆
􀀘􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁃􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀻􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀺􀁁􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀻􀁃􀀁 􀁁􀀼􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀆􀀁 􀀖􀀭􀀾􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀡􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀧􀀽􀁁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀹􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀹􀁅􀀁
􀀚􀀾􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀺􀁁􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀝􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀛􀀻􀀻􀀳􀀸􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀩􀀿􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀸􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀮􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁􀁀􀁅􀀼􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀻􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀹􀁁􀀺􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀼􀀭􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀻􀁃􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀿􀁁􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀁁􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀺􀀳􀁁􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁂􀀱􀀰􀀔
􀀗􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀔􀀁􀀝􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀱􀀺􀁁􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀷􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁
􀀭􀀮􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀭􀀰􀁂􀀱􀀺􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀹􀀄􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁁􀀼􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀿􀀭􀀺􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀸􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀰􀁁􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀤􀀱􀀾􀀴􀀭􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀀲􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀮􀁁􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀲􀁁􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁉􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀻􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀆
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁁􀀸􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀀰􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀯􀁁􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀆􀀁􀀣􀁁􀀾􀀁
􀀫􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀲􀀵􀀾􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁 􀀕􀀹􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀄􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀄􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁂􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁁􀀼􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀳􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁
􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀯􀁁􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀯􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀸􀁅􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀀯􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀵􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀆
􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁂􀀱􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀁁􀀸􀁀􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁁􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀴􀀭􀀻􀀿􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀯􀀸􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀆􀀁 􀀖􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀆􀀁 􀀤􀀱􀀻􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁
􀀿􀀯􀀱􀀺􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀳􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀭􀀯􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀁􀁁􀀼􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀻􀀸􀀵􀀳􀀭􀀾􀀯􀀴􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁 􀀳􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀮􀀻􀀰􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁
􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀹􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀼􀁁􀀺􀀵􀀿􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀁁􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁
􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀷􀀁 􀁀􀁃􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀺􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀸􀀵􀀲􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀯􀀵􀁂􀀵􀀸􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀲􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁
􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀁 􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁 􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀸􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀄􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀼􀀭􀀷􀀭􀀺􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁
􀀼􀀸􀀭􀁅􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀯􀁁􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀁 􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀿􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀻􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀅
􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀻􀁃􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀷􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁉􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀹􀀿􀀱􀀸􀁂􀀱􀀿􀀆
􀀈􀀋􀀆􀀈􀀐􀀁 􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀊
􀀞􀀆􀀛􀀡􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀉􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋
􀀭􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀁅􀀱􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀿􀁁􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀾􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁
􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀕􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀁄􀀱􀀾􀀯􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀯􀀭􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀸􀁀􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁅􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀮􀀸􀀻􀀻􀀰􀀮􀀭􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀭􀀁􀁂􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀰􀀁􀀯􀀭􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆
􀀚􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀝􀀲􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁
􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀾􀀾􀁅􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀼􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀮􀀭􀀮􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀙􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀢􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀻􀀁 􀀱􀁄􀀭􀀳􀀳􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀱􀁄􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀳􀀻􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀸􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀁅􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀱􀁄􀀭􀀳􀀳􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁
􀀣􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀰􀀾􀀭􀁃􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀿􀀁
􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀵􀀸􀀄􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀱􀀸􀀿􀀱􀀁􀁉􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀁􀀹􀁁􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀿􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀁀􀁅􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀵􀀾􀀹􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀶􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀁌􀀿􀀁􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀼􀁀􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁂􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁
􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀅􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀷􀀱􀀱􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁
􀀕􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀄􀀁
􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀷􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀁􀀮􀀱􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀱􀁄􀀼􀀸􀀻􀀵􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀷􀀱􀀱􀀼􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁁􀀼􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀁄􀀼􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀿􀀆
􀀢􀀻􀁃􀀁􀀝􀀁􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀴􀁁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀣􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀗􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁 􀀂􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀃􀀁 􀀦􀀱􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀚􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃􀀰􀁕􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁘􀁑􀁍􀁄􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁍􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁙􀁌􀃼􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀀭􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀶􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁
􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀅􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀀶􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀱􀀽􀁁􀀵􀀼􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀿􀀹􀀭􀀿􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀮􀀭􀀮􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁
􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀶􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀳􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀷􀀵􀀰􀀺􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀷􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀹􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀼􀀱􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀶􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀱􀁄􀁀􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀢􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁
􀀴􀁁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁
􀀵􀀿􀀿􀁁􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀰􀀅􀀡􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀰􀀰􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁃􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀴􀁁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀴􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀰􀁁􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀸􀀻􀀻􀀷􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀴􀁁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀗􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀿􀀁
􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀲􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀿􀀁􀀝􀀁􀀿􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀾􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀹􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀟􀀵􀁅􀁂􀀁􀀯􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀰􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀅􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀀲􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀄􀀁
􀀟􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀷􀀆
􀀝􀀹􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀁁􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀺􀀳􀁁􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀹􀀺􀀱􀀿􀁀􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀸􀀵􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀤􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀁌􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀻􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀼􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁃􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀁀􀀆􀀁
􀀝􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀕􀀹􀀮􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀭􀀰􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀗􀀴􀁁􀀾􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀸􀀵􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀯􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀤􀀭􀀾􀀸􀀵􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀶􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀮􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁
􀀖􀁁􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀀶􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀮􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀿􀀹􀀁
􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀻􀀯􀀾􀀭􀀯􀁅􀀆􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀭􀀺􀀵􀀹􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀱􀀼􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀼􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀻􀀯􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀯􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀺􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀻􀀸􀁂􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀼􀁁􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀀮􀀱􀀯􀀭􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀲􀀲􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀸􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀼􀁁􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆
􀀣􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀿􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀯􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀄􀀁􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀯􀀷􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀸􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀻􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀤􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀲􀁁􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀺􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀶􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀿􀀻􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀴􀀆􀀁􀀤􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀼􀀸􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀊􀀍􀀁􀀡􀀭􀁅􀀆
􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀱􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀭􀁁􀀸􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀰􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀸􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀺􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀼􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀿􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀸􀀵􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁 􀁅􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀁 􀀿􀀭􀁃􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀿􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀠􀁁􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀸􀀿􀀱􀁃􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁉􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀡􀁅􀀷􀀻􀀸􀀭􀀵􀁂􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀟􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀺􀁀􀁅􀀺􀀵􀁂􀀷􀀭􀀁􀁉􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀮􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀀹􀀭􀀿􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀻􀁃􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀅
􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀻􀁆􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀶􀁁􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀅􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀁 􀀲􀀱􀁃􀀁 􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀻􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀻􀀼􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀷􀀱􀁀􀀅􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀺􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀁
􀁃􀀱􀀭􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀅􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀁉􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁􀁉􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀮􀁁􀁅􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀸􀀻􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀱􀁀􀀆􀀁
􀀨􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀿􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀔
􀀘􀀵􀀿􀀼􀀸􀀭􀁅􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀮􀀾􀁁􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀷􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀅􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀭􀀵􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀀾􀁁􀀸􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀴􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀽􀁁􀀵􀀯􀀷􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀊􀀁 􀀈􀀌􀀆􀀈􀀐
􀀉􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀞􀀆􀀛􀀡􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌
􀀣􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀿􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀰􀀰􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀸􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀅􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀀹􀀄􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀀭􀀹􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀀴􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀯􀀭􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀳􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀯􀀱􀀺􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀆
􀀡􀁅􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀱􀁄􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀲􀁁􀀾􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀳􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀄􀀁
􀀿􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀺􀁁􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀼􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀭􀀲􀀲􀀭􀀵􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀸􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀁁􀀼􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀗􀀴􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀢􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀆
􀀙􀀱􀀅􀀁 􀀙􀀢􀀮􀀨􀀢􀀱􀀢􀀬􀀁 􀀂􀀗􀀴􀀭􀀰􀀃􀀁 􀀂􀀡􀀟􀀞􀀚􀀕􀀁 􀀙􀀝􀀁 􀀈􀀠􀀕􀀝􀀓􀀘􀀃􀀒􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁
􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀷􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀅􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀤􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀕􀀲􀀲􀀭􀀵􀀾􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆
􀀗􀀴􀀭􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀡􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀱􀁄􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀚􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀻􀁃􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀹􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀻􀁃􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀺􀀱􀁃􀀁
􀀯􀀵􀀾􀀯􀁁􀀹􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀷􀀵􀀰􀀺􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀼􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀁅􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀟􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀵􀁂􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁
􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀠􀁁􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀸􀀿􀀱􀁃􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀅􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀗􀀴􀀭􀀰􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁
􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀱􀀳􀀻􀁀􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀗􀀴􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀿􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀹􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀆
􀀛􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀀗􀀴􀀭􀀰􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀲􀀸􀁁􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀭􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀳􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀱􀁀􀁃􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀹􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁂􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀳􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀄􀀁􀀿􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁
􀀼􀁁􀀾􀀿􀁁􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀗􀀴􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀻􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀁁􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀯􀁁􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀻􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁
􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀾􀀿􀁁􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁀􀁃􀀻􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀀯􀀸􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀳􀀱􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀸􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀴􀁁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀯􀁁􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆
􀀟􀀩􀀦􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀦􀀲􀀪􀀥􀀦􀀮􀀳􀀒􀀁􀀝􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀹􀁅􀀁
􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀼􀀭􀀯􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆
􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀗􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀨􀀭􀁀􀀭􀀾􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀡􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀲􀀭􀀁
􀀘􀁆􀀴􀀱􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀱􀁂􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀗􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀹􀀻􀁁􀀲􀀸􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀅􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀨􀀭􀁀􀀭􀀾􀀁 􀀕􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀲􀀸􀀭􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀾􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀀰􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀗􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀨􀀭􀁀􀀭􀀾􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀳􀀾􀀭􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀗􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀸􀀱􀁂􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀸􀀻􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀭􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀯􀀭􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀷􀀱􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀴􀀵􀀼􀀆
􀀕􀀁 􀀺􀀱􀁃􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀵􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀊􀀍􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁
􀀷􀀵􀀰􀀺􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀢􀀻􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁
􀁃􀀴􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀷􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀽􀁁􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀀭􀁅􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁 􀀺􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀷􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀼􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁
􀀡􀁅􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀷􀀵􀀰􀀺􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀁁􀀺􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀺􀀱􀀸􀀆􀀁 􀀧􀁁􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀸􀀁
􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀷􀀁 􀀸􀀻􀁁􀀰􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀾􀁁􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀷􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀾􀁁􀀼􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀮􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀁􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀲􀀸􀁁􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀲􀀵􀀾􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁
􀀺􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀢􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀻􀀰􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀿􀁁􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀳􀁁􀀭􀀾􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀭􀀲􀀱􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀻􀁃􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀻􀀹􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁅􀀆
􀀕􀀿􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀊􀀍􀀁 􀀡􀀭􀁅􀀁 􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀅􀁃􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁
􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀄􀀁
􀀿􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀳􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀻􀀁
􀀽􀁁􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀅􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀻􀀼􀀸􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁􀀹􀀭􀁅􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁
􀀪􀁅􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀿􀀸􀀭􀁂􀀁 􀀤􀀻􀀺􀀻􀀹􀀭􀀾􀀱􀁂􀀄􀀁 􀁊􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀺􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁
􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀸􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀅􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀁋􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀴􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀷􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀰􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀰􀀻􀀄􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀒􀀁􀁊􀀫􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀮􀀻􀀰􀁅􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀹􀀁􀁁􀀼􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀸􀀄􀀁􀁅􀀻􀁁􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀔􀁋
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀁􀁉􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁􀀾􀀱􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀺􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀭􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀭􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀅􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀮􀀻􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀾􀀾􀁁􀀼􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀾􀁁􀀸􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀁁􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀱􀁂􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁􀀤􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀄􀀁􀀬􀀭􀀺􀁁􀀷􀀻􀁂􀁅􀀯􀀴􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁􀀲􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀳􀀾􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀰􀀰􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀿􀁁􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀯􀀵􀀻􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀻􀀹􀀵􀀯􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀻􀀼􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀯􀀭􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀸􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀯􀀵􀀻􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀻􀀹􀀵􀀯􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀼􀁁􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁
􀀈􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀐􀀁 􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀊
􀀞􀀆􀀛􀀡􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀉􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀳􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀭􀀹􀀆􀀁􀀠􀀱􀁀􀀁􀁁􀀿􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀭􀀸􀁀􀀴􀀄􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀭􀁅􀀁􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆
􀀝􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁁􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀁁􀀺􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀤􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀆
􀀝􀀁􀀳􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀸􀀻􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆
􀀙􀀱􀀅􀀁􀀞􀀦􀀱􀀨􀀦􀀷􀀦􀀵􀀁􀀂􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀃􀀒􀀁􀀝􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀷􀀁􀁅􀀻􀁁􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀄􀀁􀀡􀀭􀀰􀀭􀀹􀀁􀀤􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀭􀀰􀀰􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁 􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀷􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀅􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀲􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁
􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀆
􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀺􀀱􀁄􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀗􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀄􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀮􀀾􀁁􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀆􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁
􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀁􀁀􀀭􀀾􀀳􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀭􀁆􀀱􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀲􀀲􀀭􀀵􀀾􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀚􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀁􀀡􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀉􀀏􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀮􀀱􀀭􀀹􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀼􀀸􀀻􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆
􀀝􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀻􀀷􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀺􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀶􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁
􀁃􀀱􀀱􀀷􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀅􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀮􀀶􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀯􀀵􀁂􀀵􀀸􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀆􀀁􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀼􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀸􀀻􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀰􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀄􀀁
􀀿􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀱􀀹􀀼􀀻􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀸􀀻􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀵􀀯􀁀􀀁
􀀸􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀁 􀀰􀀾􀀭􀀲􀁀􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀹􀀺􀀱􀀿􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀼􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀁁􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁
􀁃􀀱􀀭􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀯􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀰􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁
􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀱􀁄􀀯􀀱􀀼􀁀􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀸􀀵􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀭􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀤􀀭􀀾􀀸􀀵􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀹􀀻􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀰􀁁􀀹􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀁅􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀡􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀝􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀕􀀲􀀲􀀭􀀵􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀁃􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀹􀀼􀀭􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀿􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀼􀁁􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀎􀀄􀀈􀀈􀀈􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀭􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀸􀁅􀀆􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁
􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀾􀁁􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁
􀀝􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀶􀀻􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀅􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀤􀀻􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀕􀀲􀀲􀀭􀀵􀀾􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁁􀀼􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀷􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀲􀁁􀀾􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀹􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆􀀁􀀩􀁀􀀹􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀱􀀺􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀳􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀁
􀀯􀀵􀁂􀀵􀀸􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀝􀀲􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀲􀀸􀀵􀀯􀁀􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀾􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀁅􀁃􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀻􀁃􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀷􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀷􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀁃􀀻􀀁
􀁃􀀱􀀱􀀷􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀻􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀁀􀁃􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀩􀀺􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆
􀀕􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀯􀀵􀁀􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀰􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀻􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀧􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁
􀀵􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀁􀀰􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁂􀀭􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁
􀀳􀀾􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀹􀀺􀀱􀀿􀁀􀁅􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀵􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀱􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀀯􀀱􀀺􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀳􀀸􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀴􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀅􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀼􀁀􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀯􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀳􀀸􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀀭􀀹􀀁 􀀭􀀲􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀄􀀁
􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁 􀀱􀁅􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀁅􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀯􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀀾􀀻􀀿􀀿􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀼􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁 􀀂􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀃􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁
􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀱􀁄􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀼􀀸􀀭􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀷􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀱􀁃􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀲􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀅􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁
􀁃􀀻􀀾􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀻􀁃􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁
􀀰􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁁􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀲􀀸􀁁􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀭􀀼􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀆
􀀕􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀲􀀸􀀵􀀯􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁃􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀸􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁
􀀮􀀱􀁀􀁃􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀭􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀼􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀰􀁅􀀁
􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀁂􀀱􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀸􀀵􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀾􀀳􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀱􀀰􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁􀁂􀀱􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀸􀀻􀀯􀀷􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀆􀀁
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁
􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀊􀀁 􀀈􀀎􀀆􀀈􀀐
􀀉􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀞􀀆􀀛􀀡􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀮􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁅􀀱􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀺􀀭􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀝􀀺􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁂􀀻􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀱􀁄􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁
􀀹􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀻􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀓􀀁􀀺􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀡􀀻􀀿􀀯􀀻􀁃􀀆
􀀫􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀰􀀹􀀵􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀁉􀀁 􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀸􀀱􀁂􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁
􀀡􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀵􀁀􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀼􀀸􀀭􀁅􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀏􀀘􀀕􀀁􀀊􀀕􀀥􀀁􀀐􀀞􀀠􀀚􀀁􀀏􀀙􀀜􀀕􀀡􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀟􀁁􀀮􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀗􀀻􀀿􀀿􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀁􀀡􀀻􀁆􀀴􀀭􀀱􀁂􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀰􀀁
􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀗􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀸􀀆
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀅􀀱􀀺􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁
􀀱􀁂􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁌􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀻􀀸􀁂􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁
􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀮􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁
􀀕􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀹􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀮􀀾􀁁􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀪􀀻􀀸􀀻􀀰􀁅􀀹􀁅􀀾􀀁􀀦􀁅􀀮􀀭􀀷􀀄􀀁
􀀭􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀜􀀻􀀾􀀸􀀵􀁂􀀷􀀭􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀗􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀬􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁅􀀁
􀀤􀀻􀀼􀀾􀀭􀁂􀀷􀀻􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀉􀀑􀀅􀁅􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀅􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀀹􀀭􀀾􀁀􀁅􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀮􀀻􀀰􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀀹􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀨􀀻􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀦􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁂􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀆􀀁􀀪􀀻􀀸􀀻􀀰􀁅􀀹􀁅􀀾􀀁􀀦􀁅􀀮􀀭􀀷􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀉􀀏􀀁 􀀕􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀜􀀻􀀾􀀸􀀵􀁂􀀷􀀭􀀁 􀀭􀀲􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀁌􀀁 􀀲􀀸􀀭􀀳􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀜􀀻􀀾􀀸􀀵􀁂􀀷􀀭􀀁 􀀗􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁
􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀻􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀷􀀵􀀰􀀺􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀻􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀼􀀴􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀼􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀅􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀹􀀭􀁅􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀧􀀸􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁 􀀪􀁅􀀭􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀿􀀸􀀭􀁂􀀁 􀀤􀀻􀀺􀀻􀀹􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀻􀁂􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀝􀀳􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀧􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀷􀀻􀁂􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀻􀀸􀁂􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀁁􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀾􀁁􀀱􀀁
􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀿􀀴􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀀗􀀻􀀸􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀸􀀁 􀀝􀀳􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀛􀀵􀀾􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀸􀀸􀀵􀀳􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀄􀀁
􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀡􀀻􀀿􀀯􀀻􀁃􀀆
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀁅􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀰􀀭􀁅􀁌􀀿􀀁􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀼􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀡􀀭􀁅􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀟􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀵􀁂􀀄􀀁
􀀜􀀱􀀺􀀺􀀭􀀰􀀵􀁅􀀁􀀟􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀳􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀻􀀯􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀁
􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀼􀀱􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁
􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁
􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁅􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀼􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀗􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀆􀀁 􀀜􀀻􀁃􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁 􀀤􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀤􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀁 􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀭􀀰􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀴􀁁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀅􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆
􀀫􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁
􀀰􀀻􀀯􀁁􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀔􀀁 􀀝􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆􀀁 􀀖􀀱􀀯􀀭􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀼􀁁􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀺􀀱􀁃􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀁅􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀄􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀯􀀭􀀾􀀾􀁅􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀺􀁁􀀹􀀱􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀻􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀳􀀴􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀅􀀿􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀁁􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀺􀀱􀁃􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁
􀀭􀀳􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀴􀀵􀀼􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀼􀁁􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀻􀀯􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀻􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀱􀁁􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁁􀀾􀀳􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀁅􀀁
􀀰􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀼􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀰􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁
􀀮􀁁􀀵􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀶􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀁌􀀁􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁄􀀱􀀺􀀻􀀼􀀴􀀻􀀮􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀅􀀧􀀱􀀹􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀿􀀹􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀺􀁅􀀁􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀼􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁
􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁃􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀼􀁁􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀸􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀆
􀀣􀁁􀀾􀀁 􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀱􀁄􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀀳􀁁􀀭􀀾􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀜􀀻􀁃􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁
􀁃􀀴􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀭􀁂􀀵􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀲􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀅􀀱􀀺􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀰􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀷􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀀯􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀸􀁅􀀆􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀅􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀿􀀹􀀁􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀭􀀾􀀳􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀱􀁄􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀯􀀵􀁂􀀵􀀸􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀡􀀱􀀭􀀺􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀄􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀅􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀁅􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀵􀁂􀀵􀀸􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀼􀀻􀀼􀁁􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀁃􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀴􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀁁􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀮􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀴􀁁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀆
􀀝􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀸􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀁃􀀅
􀀱􀀺􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀮􀀰􀁁􀀯􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁 􀀮􀀾􀁁􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀄􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁
􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀼􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀀮􀀸􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀲􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀁 􀀶􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀿􀁅􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀷􀀵􀀰􀀺􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀰􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀶􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀻􀁃􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀕􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀻􀀼􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀻􀁅􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀅􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀂􀀡􀀕􀀢􀀤􀀕􀀘􀀃􀀁 􀀳􀁁􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀝􀁀􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀻􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁
􀀯􀀭􀀺􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀁅􀀁 􀀡􀀕􀀢􀀤􀀕􀀘􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀴􀀻􀀼􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀦􀀱􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁 􀀂􀀣􀀧􀀗􀀙􀀃􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀧􀀸􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀈􀀏􀀆􀀈􀀐􀀁 􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀊
􀀞􀀆􀀛􀀡􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀉􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋
􀀩􀀺􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀱􀀼􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀀯􀀱􀀺􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀭􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀕􀀮􀀷􀀴􀀭􀁆􀀵􀀭􀀆􀀁
􀀨􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀿􀀯􀀱􀀺􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀿􀀆
􀀧􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀒􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀀹􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀸􀀻􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀼􀀭􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀀿􀁁􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀅􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀹􀀁
􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀅􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀢􀀻􀁂􀀻􀀾􀀻􀀿􀀿􀀵􀁅􀀭􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀮􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁
􀀤􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀤􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀵􀀱􀁃􀀆􀀁􀀫􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀸􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀰􀁅􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀁􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀘􀀻􀀺􀀱􀁀􀀿􀀷􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀸􀀻􀁂􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀷􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁
􀀟􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀷􀀵􀁂􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁂􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀶􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀸􀀻􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀼􀀻􀀼􀁁􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀗􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀵􀁀􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆
􀀧􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀁􀁀􀁃􀀻􀀒􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀳􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁁􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀧􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀆
􀀧􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀒􀀁 􀁁􀀼􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀽􀁁􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀺􀀱􀁃􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀅
􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀯􀀸􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀳􀁁􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀷􀀱􀀱􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀅􀀰􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀆
􀀩􀀺􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀀭􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀿􀀯􀀱􀀺􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀴􀀱􀀭􀁂􀁅􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀁂􀀱􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀸􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀿􀀼􀀻􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀺􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁
􀀮􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀀳􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁊􀀤􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀷􀀱􀀱􀀼􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀡􀀵􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀁋􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀸􀀭􀀺􀀳􀁁􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁
􀀱􀁄􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀕􀀮􀀷􀀴􀀭􀁆􀀵􀀭􀀆􀀁 􀀣􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁
􀀼􀁁􀀾􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀿􀀯􀀱􀀺􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀾􀁁􀀼􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀿􀀯􀀴􀀱􀀰􀁁􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀊􀀍􀀁􀀡􀀭􀁅􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀼􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀻􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀻􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆
􀀠􀀱􀁀􀀁 􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀹􀀁 􀁁􀀼􀀁 􀀹􀁅􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁
􀀿􀀴􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀁃􀀱􀀸􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀰􀁅􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀿􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀁁􀁀􀀹􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀅􀀱􀀿􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁 􀀣􀁁􀀾􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀸􀀱􀀰􀀳􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀼􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀣􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀙􀁁􀀾􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀻􀀸􀁂􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆
􀀜􀀻􀁃􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀸􀁂􀀱􀀰􀀔􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀿􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀀿􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀒􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁
􀀚􀀵􀀾􀀿􀁀􀀄􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀰􀀾􀀭􀁃􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀁅􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁
􀀮􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀧􀀱􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀳􀀴􀀅􀀸􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁
􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀁇􀀳􀁇􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀱􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀴􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁂􀀭􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀀰􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀝􀁀􀀁
􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁂􀀵􀀻􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀵􀁀􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀰􀀵􀀿􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀻􀀯􀀵􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀁 􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀯􀀴􀀁
􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀵􀀾􀀰􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀁 􀀿􀀴􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀼􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀾􀀅􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀴􀀱􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀾􀁁􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀯􀀵􀁂􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀆􀀁
􀀠􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀄􀀁􀀮􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀄􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀹􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀹􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁 􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀻􀀵􀀿􀀹􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁁􀀯􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀲􀁁􀀸􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀼􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀁁􀀺􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀗􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀁
􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀿􀁁􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀁􀀿􀀼􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀀴􀀻􀀺􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀿􀀼􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀺􀁁􀀹􀀱􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀲􀁁􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁂􀀻􀀸􀁂􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀾􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀵􀁆􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀳􀁁􀀵􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁
􀀡􀀻􀀿􀀯􀀻􀁃􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀁅􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀼􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀶􀁁􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀆
􀀚􀁁􀀾􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁃􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀰􀀱􀀹􀀻􀀺􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀾􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀮􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀺􀁁􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀆􀀁
􀀠􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀱􀀷􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀾􀀴􀀱􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀯􀀁
􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀻􀀾􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀲􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀤􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀤􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀄􀀁
􀀡􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀠􀀭􀁂􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀡􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀧􀀴􀀻􀀵􀀳􀁁􀀄􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀁂􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁 􀀼􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀱􀁄􀁀􀀿􀀆􀀁 􀀘􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀡􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀧􀀴􀀻􀀵􀀳􀁁􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀺􀀱􀁃􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀱􀁄􀀱􀀾􀀯􀀵􀀿􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀮􀀭􀁀􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀁
􀀳􀀾􀀻􀁁􀀼􀀿􀀁􀀲􀀾􀀻􀀹􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁃􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀵􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀺􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀁊􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁋􀀆􀀁
􀀫􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀲􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀲􀀵􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁
􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀹􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁀􀀭􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀺􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀮􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀼􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀺􀁀􀀴􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀺􀀭􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀮􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀰􀀵􀀾􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀸􀁅􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀸􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀻􀀼􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀁃􀀵􀁀􀀴􀀰􀀾􀀭􀁃􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀺􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀀡􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀧􀀴􀀻􀀵􀀳􀁁􀀁
􀁅􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀾􀁁􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀮􀀿􀀱􀀾􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀿􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀁􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀮􀀻􀀾􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀆
􀀡􀁅􀀁 􀀖􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀿􀀴􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀳􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀹􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀭􀀮􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀾􀀭􀀺􀀳􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀼􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀺􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀻􀀁 􀀿􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀿􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀮􀀭􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀁁􀀾􀀺􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀁌􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀅􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀄􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀹􀀮􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁂􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀯􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀳􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀤􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀪􀀸􀀭􀀰􀀵􀀹􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀤􀁁􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀚􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀸􀀿􀀻􀀁􀀿􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀰􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀸􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀿􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀷􀀱􀀱􀀼􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀾􀀻􀀻􀀼􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀕􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀅􀀰􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀕􀀾􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀍􀀉􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀗􀀴􀀭􀀾􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀩􀀺􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀢􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀄􀀁 􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀁁􀀿􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀰􀁁􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀲􀀸􀀵􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀗􀀭􀁁􀀯􀀭􀀿􀁁􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀊􀀈􀀈􀀐􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀅􀀰􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀁅􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀁁􀀺􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀔􀀁
􀀠􀀱􀁀􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀵􀀹􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀁􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀸􀀆􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀸􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀼􀀱􀀭􀀯􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀀲􀁀􀀁 􀀭􀀸􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀴􀀵􀀳􀀴􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀁 􀀸􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀯􀁅􀀺􀀵􀀯􀀵􀀿􀀹􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀵􀀳􀀴􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀀿􀀱􀀸􀀲􀀅􀀰􀀱􀀲􀀱􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀁 􀀭􀀁
􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀻􀀾􀀄􀀁
􀀴􀀭􀁂􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀻􀀯􀀯􀁁􀀼􀀵􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀗􀀾􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀭􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀾􀁁􀁀􀀭􀀸􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀲􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀭􀀲􀀲􀀭􀀵􀀾􀀿􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀮􀀵􀀸􀀵􀁆􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀾􀁅􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀯􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀱􀁄􀀼􀀸􀀻􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆
􀀉􀀌􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀌􀀊􀀊􀀁 􀀈􀀐􀀆􀀈􀀐
􀀉􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀇􀀈􀀋􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀞􀀆􀀛􀀡􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌
􀁂􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁁􀀹􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀀵􀁀􀁁􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀆􀀁􀀣􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀭􀀳􀁁􀀱􀀁
􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀼􀀵􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀭􀀿􀁀􀀵􀀯􀀁􀀿􀀯􀀱􀀺􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀴􀀻􀁃􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀁂􀀵􀀱􀁃􀀿􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀲􀁁􀀾􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁􀀰􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀸􀀻􀀼􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀲􀀻􀀸􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆􀀁
􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀁 􀀿􀀯􀀱􀀺􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀝􀀁 􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁 􀁃􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀴􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀁 􀁉􀀁 􀀮􀁁􀁀􀀁
􀀰􀀻􀀁 􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁 􀁉􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀱􀀿􀀁 􀀳􀀱􀀺􀁁􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀁 􀀱􀀲􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁
􀀭􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀺􀀱􀁂􀀭􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀯􀁁􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀆􀀁
􀀡􀀾􀀆􀀚􀀱􀀸􀁀􀀹􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀮􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀿􀀭􀁅􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁 􀁂􀀭􀀾􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀼􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀯􀁁􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀰􀀻􀀯􀁁􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀵􀀿􀀁 􀀿􀀻􀀁
􀀿􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀼􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀮􀀱􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀺􀀱􀀁􀀮􀁁􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀆􀀁􀀠􀀱􀁀􀀁􀁁􀀿􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀆􀀁􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀸􀀼􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀰􀀾􀀭􀁃􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀁁􀀼􀀆􀀁􀀖􀁁􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀁􀁁􀀼􀀁􀀺􀀱􀀱􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁
􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀺􀀄􀀁􀀲􀀵􀀾􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀹􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀄􀀁􀀮􀁅􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀭􀁁􀁀􀀴􀀻􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀟􀁅􀀵􀁂􀀄􀀁􀀵􀀲􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀵􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀁅􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀆􀀁􀀩􀀺􀀲􀀻􀀾􀁀􀁁􀀺􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀸􀁅􀀄􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀵􀀾􀀁􀀸􀀭􀀯􀀷􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁
􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀝􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀸􀀵􀀱􀀾􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀰􀀭􀁅􀀆
􀀟􀀩􀀦􀀁􀀛􀀱􀀦􀀲􀀪􀀥􀀦􀀮􀀳􀀒􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀻􀀁􀀹􀀻􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀭􀀹􀀱􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀿􀀯􀀾􀀵􀀮􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀹􀁅􀀁 􀀸􀀵􀀿􀁀􀀆􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀁁􀀿􀀁 􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀸􀁁􀀰􀀱􀀰􀀁
􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀯􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀭􀀳􀀱􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀆
􀀏􀀘􀀕􀀁􀀜􀀕􀀕􀀢􀀙􀀝􀀗􀀁􀀠􀀞􀀡􀀕􀀁􀀑􀀢􀀁􀀅􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀟􀀂􀀜􀀂
􀀭􀀵􀀹􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀭􀁀􀀁􀁁􀀺􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀹􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀊􀀍􀀁􀀡􀀭􀁅􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀵􀀰􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀱􀀸􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁
􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀆
􀀫􀀱􀀁 􀀯􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀁 􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀧􀀱􀀯􀁁􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀁 􀀗􀀻􀁁􀀺􀀯􀀵􀀸􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀳􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀀿􀀱􀀾􀀵􀀻􀁁􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀿􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀯􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀮􀁅􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀳􀀭􀀾􀀰􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁 􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀱􀀄􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀁀􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀹􀀻􀀿􀁀􀀁
􀀰􀀱􀀯􀀵􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀱􀀼􀀿􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀿􀁀􀀻􀀼􀀁 􀀵􀁀􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀳􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀿􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀼􀀼􀀱􀁀􀀵􀁀􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀼􀀾􀀻􀁀􀀱􀀯􀁀􀀁􀀩􀀷􀀾􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀾􀀵􀁀􀀻􀀾􀀵􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀳􀀾􀀵􀁀􀁅􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁
􀀯􀀴􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀱􀀺􀀳􀀱􀀰􀀁􀀻􀀺􀀯􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀆
􀀟􀀩􀀦􀀁 􀀛􀀱􀀦􀀲􀀪􀀥􀀦􀀮􀀳􀀒􀀁 􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀾􀀱􀀼􀀾􀀱􀀿􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀁂􀀱􀀁 􀀻􀀲􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁
􀀚􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁 􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁 􀀭􀀿􀀷􀀱􀀰􀀁 􀀲􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁 􀀲􀀸􀀻􀀻􀀾􀀁 􀁀􀀻􀀁 􀀹􀀭􀀷􀀱􀀁 􀀭􀀁 􀀲􀁁􀀾􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀁
􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀆
􀀙􀀱􀀅􀀁 􀀓􀀩􀀴􀀱􀀫􀀪􀀮􀀁 􀀂􀀦􀁁􀀿􀀿􀀵􀀭􀀺􀀁 􀀚􀀱􀀰􀀱􀀾􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀃􀀁 􀀂􀀡􀀟􀀞􀀚􀀕􀀁 􀀙􀀝􀀁
􀀍􀀣􀀡􀀡􀀙􀀑􀀝􀀃􀀒􀀁􀀝􀀁􀀯􀀱􀀾􀁀􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀸􀁅􀀁􀀰􀀻􀀁􀀺􀀻􀁀􀀁􀁃􀀭􀀺􀁀􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁􀀼􀀾􀀻􀀸􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀱􀁀􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀁
􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀵􀀿􀀁􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀺􀀵􀀺􀀳􀀆􀀁􀀨􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀵􀀹􀀼􀀸􀀱􀀿􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀿􀁃􀀱􀀾􀀿􀀁􀁃􀀻􀁁􀀸􀀰􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀁􀁀􀀻􀀁
􀀭􀀳􀀭􀀵􀀺􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀭􀀰􀀁􀁀􀀴􀀱􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀁􀀝􀀁􀀹􀀭􀀰􀀱􀀁􀀱􀀭􀀾􀀸􀀵􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁􀁃􀀴􀀵􀀯􀀴􀀁􀀾􀀱􀀲􀀸􀀱􀁀􀀯􀁀􀀿􀀁
􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁􀁂􀀵􀀿􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀆􀀁􀀜􀀻􀁃􀀱􀁂􀀱􀀾􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀸􀀸􀀻􀁃􀀁􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀁􀁂􀀱􀀾􀁅􀀁􀀮􀀾􀀵􀀱􀀲􀀁
􀀯􀀻􀀹􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀆
􀀕􀀁􀀳􀀾􀀱􀀭􀁀􀀁􀀰􀀱􀀭􀀸􀀁􀀴􀀭􀀿􀀁􀀮􀀱􀀱􀀺􀀁􀀿􀀭􀀵􀀰􀀁􀀴􀀱􀀾􀀱􀀁􀀭􀀮􀀻􀁁􀁀􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀹􀀱􀀁􀀿􀀻􀀾􀁀􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁
􀁃􀀾􀀻􀀺􀀳􀀁􀀵􀀺􀁀􀀱􀀾􀀼􀀾􀀱􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀁􀀻􀀲􀀁􀀻􀁁􀀾􀀁􀀼􀀻􀀿􀀵􀁀􀀵􀀻􀀺􀀿􀀁􀀭􀀺􀀰􀀁􀀿􀁀􀀭􀁀􀀱􀀹􀀱􀀺􀁀􀀿􀀁􀀵􀀺􀀁

Annex 291
Press Statement by the ASG Ivan Simonovic, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Launch of the Second Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 May 2014)

􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀁􀀄􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀁􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀇􀀁􀀃􀀌􀀍􀀅􀀇􀀁􀀎􀀏􀀇􀀐􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀓􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀔
􀀕􀀒􀀏􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀙􀀗􀀚􀀌􀀒􀀗􀀛􀀜􀀘􀀝
􀀞􀀌􀀟􀀏􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀍􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀑􀀅􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀖
􀀡􀀢􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀠􀀒􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀏􀀣􀀟􀀗􀀉􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀋􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀥􀀦􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀅􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀊􀀧􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀇􀀋􀀌􀀣􀀋􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀧􀀣􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀇􀀓􀀗􀀩􀀋􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀏􀀊􀀧􀀏􀀟􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀆􀀏􀀋􀀢􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀑􀀌􀀪􀀊􀀧􀀢􀀗􀀫􀀒􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅
􀀬􀀨􀀨􀀏􀀧􀀅􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀥􀀊􀀏􀀋􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀭􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀗􀀮􀀤􀀠􀀠􀀏􀀇􀀇􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀗􀀭􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀯􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀇􀀅􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅
􀀢􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀋􀀪􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀥􀀦􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀅􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀢􀀏􀀧􀀢􀀗􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀫􀀌􀀇􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀨􀀏􀀊􀀟􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀥􀀄􀀗􀀭􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀯􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇
􀀚􀀤􀀊􀀏􀀋􀀤􀀣􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀇􀀇􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀥􀀦􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀅􀀓􀀗􀀡􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀑􀀌􀀒􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀪􀀋􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀐􀀣􀀤􀀍􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀇􀀗􀀠􀀌􀀟􀀅􀀖􀀗􀀫􀀪􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀑􀀇􀀤􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀧􀀪􀀣􀀣􀀅􀀊􀀋
􀀢􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀧􀀢􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀅􀀊􀀍􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀥􀀦􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀅􀀖􀀗􀀐􀀌􀀣􀀋􀀏􀀧􀀪􀀑􀀌􀀣􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀂􀀤􀀪􀀋􀀢􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀪􀀊􀀋􀀣􀀒􀀓
􀀰􀀅􀀇􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀟􀀌􀀒􀀖􀀗􀀩􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀤􀀐􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀪􀀊􀀏􀀋􀀒􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀟􀀏􀀇􀀧􀀪􀀇􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀏􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀧􀀤􀀠􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀟􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀆􀀏􀀋􀀢
􀀱􀀤􀀉􀀅􀀣􀀊􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀨􀀏􀀧􀀏􀀌􀀑􀀇􀀖􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀬􀀠􀀫􀀪􀀟􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀣􀀇􀀤􀀊􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀉􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀧􀀏􀀉􀀏􀀑􀀗􀀇􀀤􀀧􀀏􀀅􀀋􀀒􀀓
􀀚􀀒􀀗􀀟􀀏􀀇􀀧􀀪􀀇􀀇􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀅􀀊􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀋􀀣􀀪􀀧􀀋􀀏􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀆􀀅􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀅􀀊􀀗􀀌􀀫􀀑􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀅􀀔􀀧􀀢􀀌􀀊􀀍􀀅􀀗􀀉􀀏􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀌
􀀊􀀪􀀠􀀫􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀧􀀣􀀅􀀋􀀅􀀗􀀆􀀌􀀒􀀇􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀆􀀢􀀏􀀧􀀢􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀱􀀤􀀉􀀅􀀣􀀊􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀧􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀌􀀦􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀠􀀠􀀅􀀟􀀏􀀌􀀋􀀅􀀗􀀇􀀋􀀅􀀐􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀏􀀠􀀐􀀑􀀅􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀋
􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀇􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀠􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀌􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀧􀀤􀀠􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀟􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀓􀀗􀀩􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀇􀀋􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀇􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀌􀀋􀀗􀀏􀀋􀀗􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀧􀀣􀀏􀀋􀀏􀀧􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀱􀀤􀀉􀀅􀀣􀀊􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀌􀀧􀀋
􀀏􀀠􀀠􀀅􀀟􀀏􀀌􀀋􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀧􀀤􀀠􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀟􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀤􀀣􀀟􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀋􀀣􀀏􀀫􀀪􀀋􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀟􀀅􀀲􀀅􀀇􀀧􀀌􀀑􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀅􀀊􀀇􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇
􀀌􀀢􀀅􀀌􀀟􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀐􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀏􀀟􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀅􀀑􀀅􀀧􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀓
􀀡􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀨􀀏􀀣􀀇􀀋􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀗􀀏􀀇􀀇􀀪􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀫􀀒􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀬􀀨􀀨􀀏􀀧􀀅􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀥􀀊􀀏􀀋􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀭􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀗􀀮􀀤􀀠􀀠􀀏􀀇􀀇􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀗􀀭􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊
􀀯􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀘􀀳􀀗􀀴􀀐􀀣􀀏􀀑􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀌􀀇􀀗􀀫􀀌􀀇􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀠􀀒􀀗􀀋􀀆􀀤􀀗􀀐􀀣􀀅􀀉􀀏􀀤􀀪􀀇􀀗􀀠􀀏􀀇􀀇􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀨􀀏􀀣􀀇􀀋􀀗􀀆􀀅􀀅􀀦􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀠􀀤􀀊􀀏􀀋􀀤􀀣􀀏􀀊􀀍
􀀫􀀒􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀥􀀄􀀗􀀭􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀯􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀚􀀤􀀊􀀏􀀋􀀤􀀣􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀇􀀇􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀥􀀦􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀅􀀓􀀗􀀵􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀣􀀏􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀨􀀑􀀅􀀧􀀋􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀑􀀌􀀣􀀍􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀐􀀏􀀧􀀋􀀪􀀣􀀅􀀖
􀀨􀀤􀀧􀀪􀀇􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀣􀀤􀀤􀀋􀀗􀀧􀀌􀀪􀀇􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀢􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀉􀀏􀀤􀀑􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀖􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀧􀀑􀀪􀀟􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀑􀀤􀀊􀀍􀀲􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀠􀀗􀀨􀀌􀀏􀀑􀀪􀀣􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀧􀀋
􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀣􀀪􀀑􀀅􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀑􀀌􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀑􀀌􀀧􀀦􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀌􀀧􀀧􀀤􀀪􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀫􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀋􀀒􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀇􀀅􀀧􀀪􀀣􀀏􀀋􀀒􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀧􀀅􀀇􀀖􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀣􀀣􀀪􀀐􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀖􀀗􀀠􀀏􀀇􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀌􀀍􀀅􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀏􀀋􀀇
􀀏􀀠􀀐􀀌􀀧􀀋􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀅􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀤􀀠􀀏􀀧􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀇􀀤􀀧􀀏􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀓􀀗􀀵􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀑􀀇􀀤􀀗􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀇􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀠􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀌􀀊􀀧􀀅􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀌􀀧􀀧􀀤􀀪􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀫􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀋􀀒􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣
􀀚􀀌􀀏􀀟􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀐􀀣􀀤􀀋􀀅􀀇􀀋􀀲􀀣􀀅􀀑􀀌􀀋􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀉􀀏􀀤􀀑􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀤􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀢􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀉􀀏􀀤􀀑􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀋􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀏􀀠􀀅􀀖􀀗􀀅􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀧􀀏􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀏􀀊
􀀮􀀣􀀏􀀠􀀅􀀌􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀡􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀐􀀣􀀅􀀉􀀏􀀤􀀪􀀇􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀑􀀇􀀤􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀶􀀪􀀏􀀋􀀅􀀗􀀫􀀣􀀤􀀌􀀟􀀖􀀗􀀇􀀢􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀖􀀗􀀑􀀤􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀠
􀀣􀀅􀀧􀀤􀀠􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀟􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀓
􀀩􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀇􀀅􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀖􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀑􀀅􀀌􀀇􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀟􀀌􀀒􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀅􀀗􀀨􀀏􀀣􀀇􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀅􀀠􀀤􀀇􀀋􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀧􀀪􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀧􀀪􀀣􀀣􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀢􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊
􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀧􀀢􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀅􀀊􀀍􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀂􀀤􀀪􀀋􀀢􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀥􀀦􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀅􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀟􀀅􀀉􀀅􀀑􀀤􀀐􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀆􀀏􀀋􀀢􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀍􀀌􀀣􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀤
􀀣􀀅􀀧􀀤􀀠􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀟􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀠􀀌􀀟􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀨􀀏􀀣􀀇􀀋􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀩􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀑􀀇􀀤􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀏􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀆􀀊􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀧􀀣􀀅􀀋􀀅􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀧􀀤􀀠􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀟􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀖
􀀆􀀢􀀏􀀧􀀢􀀗􀀌􀀣􀀅􀀗􀀅􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀧􀀏􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀏􀀠􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀌􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀢􀀅􀀌􀀟􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀢􀀧􀀤􀀠􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀐􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀏􀀟􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀅􀀑􀀅􀀧􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀓
􀀡􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀗􀀟􀀅􀀇􀀧􀀣􀀏􀀫􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀟􀀅􀀅􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀟􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀪􀀣􀀫􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀟􀀅􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀏􀀤􀀣􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀢􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀋􀀪􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅
􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀂􀀤􀀪􀀋􀀢􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀪􀀊􀀋􀀣􀀒􀀷􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀧􀀣􀀅􀀌􀀇􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀊􀀪􀀠􀀫􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀌􀀣􀀠􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀍􀀣􀀤􀀪􀀐􀀇􀀗􀀪􀀊􀀟􀀅􀀣􀀋􀀌􀀦􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀅􀀍􀀌􀀑
􀀌􀀧􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀸􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀭􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀯􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀚􀀤􀀊􀀏􀀋􀀤􀀣􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀇􀀇􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀥􀀦􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀅􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀇􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀅􀀊􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀠􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀘􀀘􀀛􀀗􀀧􀀌􀀇􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀨
􀀪􀀊􀀑􀀌􀀆􀀨􀀪􀀑􀀗􀀟􀀅􀀋􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀖􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀆􀀢􀀏􀀧􀀢􀀗􀀆􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀣􀀅􀀗􀀇􀀋􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀧􀀅􀀣􀀊􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀆􀀢􀀅􀀣􀀅􀀌􀀫􀀤􀀪􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀟􀀏􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀝􀀹
􀀐􀀅􀀤􀀐􀀑􀀅􀀓􀀗􀀂􀀪􀀧􀀢􀀗􀀌􀀫􀀪􀀇􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀧􀀑􀀅􀀌􀀣􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀟􀀏􀀧􀀌􀀋􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀫􀀣􀀅􀀌􀀦􀀟􀀤􀀆􀀊􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀑􀀌􀀆􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀤􀀣􀀟􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀐􀀌􀀣􀀋􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀪􀀊􀀋􀀣􀀒􀀓
􀀩􀀊􀀗􀀌􀀟􀀟􀀏􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀧􀀧􀀤􀀣􀀟􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀤􀀪􀀣􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀠􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀤􀀫􀀋􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀣􀀤􀀪􀀍􀀢􀀗􀀱􀀤􀀉􀀅􀀣􀀊􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀧􀀏􀀉􀀏􀀑􀀗􀀇􀀤􀀧􀀏􀀅􀀋􀀒
􀀇􀀤􀀪􀀣􀀧􀀅􀀇􀀖􀀗􀀟􀀪􀀣􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀉􀀏􀀤􀀑􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀧􀀑􀀌􀀇􀀢􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀇􀀅􀀧􀀪􀀣􀀏􀀋􀀒􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀑􀀌􀀆􀀗􀀅􀀊􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀧􀀅􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀤􀀐􀀅􀀣􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀋
􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀂􀀤􀀪􀀋􀀢􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀛􀀺􀀗􀀐􀀅􀀤􀀐􀀑􀀅􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀅􀀊􀀗􀀦􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀅􀀟􀀓􀀗􀀡􀀢􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀟􀀅􀀅􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀟􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀪􀀣􀀫􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀓
􀀘􀀁􀀝
􀀵􀀢􀀒􀀗􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀅􀀊􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀻􀀗􀀴􀀑􀀋􀀢􀀤􀀪􀀍􀀢􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀊􀀪􀀠􀀫􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀐􀀣􀀤􀀋􀀅􀀇􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀇􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀇􀀗􀀊􀀤􀀋􀀗􀀇􀀢􀀌􀀣􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀧􀀣􀀅􀀌􀀇􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀲􀀗􀀆􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀣􀀅
􀀇􀀋􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀌􀀦􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀌􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀪􀀐􀀑􀀅􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀤􀀪􀀇􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀇􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀌􀀗􀀨􀀅􀀆􀀗􀀧􀀏􀀋􀀏􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀲􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀣􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀣􀀅􀀗􀀠􀀤􀀣􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀠􀀤􀀣􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀣􀀠􀀅􀀟
􀀐􀀅􀀤􀀐􀀑􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀣􀀤􀀪􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀇􀀪􀀧􀀢􀀗􀀐􀀣􀀤􀀋􀀅􀀇􀀋􀀇􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀠􀀤􀀣􀀅􀀗􀀆􀀅􀀌􀀐􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀉􀀌􀀏􀀑􀀌􀀫􀀑􀀅􀀓
􀀴􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀤􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀋􀀅􀀊􀀖􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀐􀀤􀀑􀀏􀀧􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀅􀀏􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀅􀀨􀀨􀀏􀀧􀀏􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀤􀀣􀀗􀀋􀀌􀀦􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀊􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀋􀀅􀀐􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀐􀀣􀀅􀀉􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀧􀀑􀀌􀀇􀀢􀀅􀀇􀀓􀀗􀀩􀀊􀀗􀀬􀀟􀀅􀀇􀀌􀀖
􀀏􀀋􀀗􀀇􀀅􀀅􀀠􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀋􀀣􀀏􀀫􀀪􀀋􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀣􀀌􀀍􀀏􀀧􀀗􀀅􀀉􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀌􀀒􀀓􀀗􀀡􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀟􀀅􀀌􀀋􀀢􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀝􀀼􀀗􀀐􀀅􀀤􀀐􀀑􀀅􀀗􀀇􀀢􀀤􀀪􀀑􀀟􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟
􀀧􀀤􀀪􀀑􀀟􀀖􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀅􀀊􀀗􀀐􀀣􀀅􀀉􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀅􀀟􀀓􀀗􀀩􀀗􀀌􀀠􀀗􀀧􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀪􀀋􀀢􀀤􀀣􀀏􀀋􀀏􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀉􀀅􀀇􀀋􀀏􀀍􀀌􀀋􀀅􀀗􀀆􀀢􀀤􀀗􀀌􀀣􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀟􀀏􀀣􀀅􀀧􀀋
􀀐􀀅􀀣􀀐􀀅􀀋􀀣􀀌􀀋􀀤􀀣􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀦􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀇􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀆􀀢􀀒􀀗􀀇􀀅􀀧􀀪􀀣􀀏􀀋􀀒􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀧􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀟􀀏􀀟􀀗􀀊􀀤􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀧􀀋􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀌􀀗􀀠􀀤􀀣􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀏􀀠􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀟􀀅􀀧􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀉􀀅
􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀣􀀷􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀣􀀌􀀍􀀅􀀟􀀒􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀶􀀪􀀏􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀨􀀪􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀧􀀑􀀌􀀣􀀏􀀋􀀒􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀫􀀣􀀤􀀌􀀟􀀗􀀌􀀧􀀧􀀤􀀪􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀫􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀋􀀒􀀓􀀗􀀩􀀊􀀗􀀌􀀗􀀊􀀪􀀠􀀫􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀤􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀣􀀖
􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀪􀀊􀀌􀀋􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀑􀀅􀀇􀀇􀀗􀀟􀀣􀀌􀀠􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀧􀀗􀀧􀀌􀀇􀀅􀀇􀀖􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀑􀀌􀀧􀀦􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀌􀀗􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀧􀀏􀀨􀀏􀀧􀀗􀀑􀀌􀀆􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀍􀀪􀀑􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀅􀀔􀀅􀀣􀀧􀀏􀀇􀀅􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅
􀀨􀀣􀀅􀀅􀀟􀀤􀀠􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀌􀀇􀀇􀀅􀀠􀀫􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀅􀀔􀀌􀀧􀀅􀀣􀀫􀀌􀀋􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀋􀀪􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀒􀀗􀀑􀀏􀀠􀀏􀀋􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀐􀀑􀀌􀀧􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀨􀀣􀀅􀀅􀀟􀀤􀀠􀀗􀀤􀀨
􀀌􀀇􀀇􀀅􀀠􀀫􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀧􀀤􀀠􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀋􀀗􀀋􀀏􀀠􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀣􀀫􀀏􀀋􀀣􀀌􀀣􀀒􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀪􀀇􀀗􀀠􀀤􀀣􀀅􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀋􀀣􀀤􀀉􀀅􀀣􀀇􀀏􀀌􀀑􀀓􀀗􀀭􀀤􀀆􀀅􀀉􀀅􀀣􀀖􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀣􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀗􀀧􀀑􀀅􀀌􀀣
􀀟􀀏􀀨􀀨􀀅􀀣􀀅􀀊􀀧􀀅􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀋􀀆􀀅􀀅􀀊􀀗􀀐􀀅􀀌􀀧􀀅􀀨􀀪􀀑􀀗􀀌􀀇􀀇􀀅􀀠􀀫􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀆􀀢􀀌􀀋􀀗􀀧􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀗􀀧􀀢􀀌􀀣􀀌􀀧􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀏􀀇􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀌􀀇􀀗􀀉􀀏􀀤􀀑􀀅􀀊􀀧􀀅􀀖
􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀋􀀏􀀋􀀪􀀋􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀌􀀗􀀧􀀑􀀅􀀌􀀣􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀣􀀅􀀌􀀋􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀅􀀧􀀪􀀣􀀏􀀋􀀒􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀐􀀪􀀫􀀑􀀏􀀧􀀗􀀤􀀣􀀟􀀅􀀣􀀓􀀗􀀃􀀅􀀌􀀧􀀅􀀨􀀪􀀑􀀗􀀟􀀅􀀠􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀋􀀣􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀠􀀪􀀇􀀋􀀗􀀫􀀅
􀀐􀀅􀀣􀀠􀀏􀀋􀀋􀀅􀀟􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀗􀀠􀀌􀀋􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀊􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀑􀀌􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀑􀀌􀀆􀀗􀀅􀀊􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀧􀀅􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀨􀀏􀀧􀀅􀀣􀀇􀀗􀀠􀀪􀀇􀀋􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀧􀀅􀀏􀀉􀀅
􀀌􀀟􀀅􀀶􀀪􀀌􀀋􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀑􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀣􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀐􀀣􀀤􀀋􀀅􀀇􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀑􀀏􀀊􀀅􀀗􀀆􀀏􀀋􀀢􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀊􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀢􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇
􀀇􀀋􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀌􀀣􀀟􀀇􀀓􀀗􀀬􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀤􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀖􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀪􀀇􀀅􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀧􀀅􀀗􀀫􀀒􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀱􀀤􀀉􀀅􀀣􀀊􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀢􀀅􀀊􀀗􀀌􀀫􀀇􀀤􀀑􀀪􀀋􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀊􀀅􀀅􀀟􀀅􀀟􀀖􀀗􀀏􀀇
􀀇􀀋􀀣􀀏􀀧􀀋􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀍􀀪􀀑􀀌􀀋􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀫􀀒􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀊􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀑􀀌􀀆􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀇􀀋􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀌􀀣􀀟􀀇􀀓
􀀩􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀋􀀖􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀣􀀅􀀗􀀇􀀅􀀅􀀠􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀗􀀠􀀪􀀋􀀪􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀏􀀊􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀧􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀅􀀨􀀨􀀅􀀧􀀋􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀋􀀆􀀅􀀅􀀊􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀋􀀅􀀗􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀅􀀧􀀢􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀧􀀏􀀋􀀏􀀊􀀍
􀀉􀀏􀀤􀀑􀀅􀀊􀀧􀀅􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀅􀀊􀀇􀀪􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀉􀀏􀀤􀀑􀀅􀀊􀀧􀀅􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀢􀀏􀀧􀀢􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀊􀀗􀀇􀀅􀀣􀀉􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀗􀀽􀀪􀀇􀀋􀀏􀀨􀀏􀀧􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀗􀀨􀀪􀀣􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀋􀀅􀀗􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀅􀀧􀀢􀀓
􀀡􀀢􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀗􀀉􀀏􀀧􀀏􀀤􀀪􀀇􀀗􀀧􀀒􀀧􀀑􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀌􀀋􀀗􀀠􀀪􀀇􀀋􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀗􀀫􀀣􀀤􀀦􀀅􀀊􀀓􀀗􀀂􀀏􀀊􀀧􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀍􀀏􀀊􀀊􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀧􀀣􀀏􀀇􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀥􀀦􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀅􀀖􀀗􀀍􀀤􀀏􀀊􀀍
􀀫􀀌􀀧􀀦􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀚􀀌􀀏􀀟􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀐􀀣􀀤􀀋􀀅􀀇􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀾􀀨􀀣􀀤􀀠􀀗􀀄􀀤􀀉􀀅􀀠􀀫􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀛􀀜􀀘􀀿􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀁀􀀅􀀫􀀣􀀪􀀌􀀣􀀒􀀗􀀛􀀜􀀘􀀝􀁁􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀧􀀑􀀪􀀟􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅
􀀇􀀏􀀋􀀪􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀮􀀣􀀏􀀠􀀅􀀌􀀖􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀧􀀪􀀣􀀣􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀅􀀍􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀌􀀧􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀣􀀠􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀍􀀣􀀤􀀪􀀐􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀐􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀅􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅
􀀇􀀅􀀧􀀪􀀣􀀏􀀋􀀒􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀑􀀌􀀆􀀗􀀅􀀊􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀧􀀅􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀤􀀐􀀅􀀣􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀅􀀌􀀇􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀊􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀍􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀇􀀗􀀆􀀅􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀌􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀌􀀒􀀗􀀉􀀏􀀤􀀑􀀅􀀊􀀧􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀊
􀀬􀀟􀀅􀀇􀀌􀀗􀀸􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀥􀀄􀀗􀀭􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀯􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀚􀀤􀀊􀀏􀀋􀀤􀀣􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀇􀀇􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀇􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀧􀀅􀀏􀀉􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀠􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀌􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀫􀀤􀀪􀀋􀀗􀀛􀀳􀀜
􀀐􀀅􀀤􀀐􀀑􀀅􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀅􀀊􀀗􀀦􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀅􀀟􀀖􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀧􀀑􀀪􀀟􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀑􀀤􀀧􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀏􀀟􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀇􀀖􀀗􀀊􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀇􀀅􀀧􀀪􀀣􀀏􀀋􀀒􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀧􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀌􀀣􀀠􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀍􀀣􀀤􀀪􀀐􀀇􀀓
􀀴􀀊􀀒􀀗􀀨􀀪􀀣􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀌􀀣􀀠􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀐􀀣􀀤􀀋􀀅􀀇􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀏􀀣􀀗􀀋􀀣􀀌􀀊􀀇􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀠􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀐􀀌􀀣􀀌􀀠􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀋􀀌􀀣􀀒􀀗􀀍􀀣􀀤􀀪􀀐􀀇􀀗􀀠􀀪􀀇􀀋
􀀏􀀠􀀠􀀅􀀟􀀏􀀌􀀋􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀇􀀋􀀤􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀴􀀣􀀠􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀍􀀣􀀤􀀪􀀐􀀇􀀗􀀇􀀢􀀤􀀪􀀑􀀟􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀗􀀪􀀣􀀍􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀟􀀏􀀇􀀌􀀣􀀠􀀅􀀟􀀓􀀗􀀴􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀆􀀢􀀤􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀨􀀑􀀪􀀅􀀊􀀧􀀅􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀇􀀅
􀀌􀀣􀀠􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀍􀀣􀀤􀀪􀀐􀀇􀀗􀀇􀀢􀀤􀀪􀀑􀀟􀀗􀀪􀀇􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀏􀀣􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀨􀀑􀀪􀀅􀀊􀀧􀀅􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀋􀀣􀀪􀀧􀀋􀀏􀀉􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀤􀀣􀀟􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀐􀀣􀀅􀀉􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀨􀀪􀀣􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀉􀀏􀀤􀀑􀀅􀀊􀀧􀀅􀀓
􀀵􀀢􀀤􀀅􀀉􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀧􀀏􀀋􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀉􀀏􀀤􀀑􀀅􀀊􀀧􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀌􀀣􀀠􀀇􀀗􀀐􀀣􀀤􀀋􀀅􀀇􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀇􀀖􀀗􀀋􀀣􀀌􀀊􀀇􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀠􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀠􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀐􀀌􀀣􀀌􀀠􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀋􀀌􀀣􀀒􀀗􀀋􀀣􀀤􀀤􀀐􀀇􀀖􀀗􀀧􀀌􀀊
􀀫􀀅􀀗􀀢􀀅􀀑􀀟􀀗􀀌􀀧􀀧􀀤􀀪􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀫􀀑􀀅􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀣􀀌􀀍􀀏􀀧􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀅􀀶􀀪􀀅􀀊􀀧􀀅􀀇􀀓
􀁀􀀣􀀤􀀠􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀍􀀏􀀊􀀊􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀖􀀗􀀩􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀊􀀪􀀤􀀪􀀇􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀇􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀊􀀅􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀪􀀣􀀍􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀧􀀪􀀣􀀫􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀪􀀇􀀅􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀋􀀅
􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀅􀀧􀀢􀀓􀀗􀀡􀀢􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀧􀀤􀀠􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀟􀀤􀀪􀀫􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀏􀀠􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀌􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀢􀀅􀀌􀀟􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀢􀀧􀀤􀀠􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀃􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀏􀀟􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀅􀀑􀀅􀀧􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀛􀀳
􀀚􀀌􀀒􀀓􀀗􀀩􀀗􀀌􀀠􀀗􀀧􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀃􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀏􀀟􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀧􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀏􀀟􀀌􀀋􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀪􀀇􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀟􀀌􀀒􀀇􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀠􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀪􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀑􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀃􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀏􀀟􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀌􀀑
􀀅􀀑􀀅􀀧􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀅􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀠􀀅􀀇􀀇􀀌􀀍􀀅􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀐􀀅􀀌􀀧􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀧􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀐􀀅􀀤􀀐􀀑􀀅􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀥􀀦􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀅􀀓
􀀮􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀋􀀏􀀋􀀪􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀌􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀟􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀌􀀋􀀗􀀆􀀅􀀣􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀊􀀤􀀪􀀊􀀧􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀋􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀟􀀏􀀇􀀧􀀪􀀇􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀠􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀣􀀤􀀪􀀍􀀢
􀀊􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀪􀀑􀀋􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀣􀀤􀀌􀀧􀀢􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀟􀀅􀀲􀀅􀀇􀀧􀀌􀀑􀀌􀀋􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀅􀀊􀀇􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀧􀀣􀀅􀀌􀀋􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀌􀀋􀀠􀀤􀀇􀀐􀀢􀀅􀀣􀀅
􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀟􀀪􀀧􀀏􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀠􀀐􀀑􀀅􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀱􀀅􀀊􀀅􀀉􀀌􀀗􀀌􀀍􀀣􀀅􀀅􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀭􀀤􀀆􀀅􀀉􀀅􀀣􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀇􀀗􀀧􀀏􀀉􀀏􀀑􀀗􀀇􀀤􀀧􀀏􀀅􀀋􀀒
􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀉􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀆􀀢􀀤􀀠􀀗􀀩􀀗􀀠􀀅􀀋􀀗􀀒􀀅􀀇􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀟􀀌􀀒􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀉􀀅􀀒􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀠􀀅􀀖􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀇􀀅􀀗􀀊􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀪􀀑􀀋􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀇􀀢􀀤􀀪􀀑􀀟􀀗􀀫􀀅
􀀏􀀊􀀧􀀑􀀪􀀇􀀏􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀤􀀐􀀅􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀧􀀏􀀉􀀏􀀑􀀗􀀇􀀤􀀧􀀏􀀅􀀋􀀒􀀖􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀧􀀑􀀪􀀟􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀐􀀅􀀌􀀧􀀅􀀨􀀪􀀑􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀉􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀨􀀣􀀤􀀠􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀋􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅
􀀧􀀤􀀪􀀊􀀋􀀣􀀒􀀖􀀗􀀧􀀣􀀏􀀋􀀏􀀧􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀱􀀤􀀉􀀅􀀣􀀊􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀓
􀀛􀀁􀀝
􀀡􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀱􀀤􀀉􀀅􀀣􀀊􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀇􀀗􀀆􀀅􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀌􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀊􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀠􀀠􀀪􀀊􀀏􀀋􀀒􀀖􀀗􀀇􀀢􀀤􀀪􀀑􀀟􀀗􀀇􀀅􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀌􀀗􀀧􀀑􀀅􀀌􀀣􀀗􀀠􀀅􀀇􀀇􀀌􀀍􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀌􀀋
􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀣􀀅􀀗􀀆􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀧􀀧􀀤􀀪􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀫􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀋􀀒􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀗􀀧􀀣􀀏􀀠􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀠􀀠􀀏􀀋􀀋􀀅􀀟􀀖􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀍􀀌􀀣􀀟􀀑􀀅􀀇􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀅􀀋􀀢􀀊􀀏􀀧􀀏􀀋􀀒􀀗􀀤􀀣􀀗􀀐􀀤􀀑􀀏􀀋􀀏􀀧􀀌􀀑
􀀌􀀨􀀨􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀐􀀅􀀣􀀐􀀅􀀋􀀣􀀌􀀋􀀤􀀣􀀇􀀓􀀗􀀩􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀧􀀪􀀣􀀣􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀋􀀪􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀅􀀉􀀅􀀣􀀒􀀤􀀊􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀑􀀤􀀇􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀷􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀒􀀗􀀅􀀋􀀢􀀊􀀏􀀧
􀀥􀀦􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀏􀀌􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀣􀀗􀀯􀀪􀀇􀀇􀀏􀀌􀀊􀀇􀀖􀀗􀀯􀀪􀀇􀀇􀀏􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀤􀀣􀀗􀀥􀀦􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀏􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀌􀀦􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀏􀀋􀀢􀀗􀀆􀀏􀀟􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀊􀀅􀀍􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀍􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀌􀀑
􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀅􀀶􀀪􀀅􀀊􀀧􀀅􀀇􀀓􀀗􀀭􀀤􀀆􀀅􀀉􀀅􀀣􀀖􀀗􀀩􀀗􀀨􀀏􀀣􀀠􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀑􀀏􀀅􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀌􀀋􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀐􀀤􀀏􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀊􀀤􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀋􀀪􀀣􀀊􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀇􀀗􀀊􀀤􀀋􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀅􀀊􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀌􀀧􀀢􀀅􀀟􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟
􀀆􀀅􀀗􀀧􀀌􀀊􀀊􀀤􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀤􀀆􀀗􀀏􀀋􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀌􀀧􀀢􀀅􀀟􀀓􀀗􀀡􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀥􀀄􀀗􀀇􀀋􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀇􀀗􀀆􀀏􀀋􀀢􀀗􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀥􀀦􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀏􀀌􀀊􀀇􀀖􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀍􀀌􀀣􀀟􀀑􀀅􀀇􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀏􀀣
􀀅􀀋􀀢􀀊􀀏􀀧􀀏􀀋􀀒􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀐􀀤􀀑􀀏􀀋􀀏􀀧􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀌􀀨􀀨􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀲􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀢􀀅􀀑􀀐􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀐􀀣􀀅􀀉􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀇􀀪􀀧􀀢􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀤􀀪􀀋􀀧􀀤􀀠􀀅􀀓
􀀡􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀑􀀇􀀤􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀗􀀧􀀢􀀌􀀐􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀋􀀪􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀮􀀣􀀏􀀠􀀅􀀌􀀖􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀑􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀥􀀄􀀗􀀱􀀴􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀤􀀑􀀪􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊
􀀙􀀼􀀁􀀛􀀙􀀛􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀣􀀏􀀋􀀤􀀣􀀏􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀋􀀅􀀍􀀣􀀏􀀋􀀒􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀥􀀦􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀅􀀓􀀗􀁀􀀣􀀤􀀠􀀗􀀌􀀗􀀢􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀐􀀅􀀣􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀧􀀋􀀏􀀉􀀅􀀖􀀗􀀏􀀋􀀗􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀅􀀇􀀇􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀌􀀑
􀀋􀀢􀀌􀀋􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀏􀀟􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀮􀀣􀀏􀀠􀀅􀀌􀀗􀀌􀀣􀀅􀀗􀀊􀀤􀀋􀀗􀀊􀀅􀀍􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀉􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀌􀀨􀀨􀀅􀀧􀀋􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀫􀀒􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀠􀀐􀀑􀀏􀀧􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀧􀀢􀀌􀀊􀀍􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀅􀀨􀀨􀀅􀀧􀀋􀀏􀀉􀀅
􀀑􀀅􀀍􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀨􀀣􀀌􀀠􀀅􀀆􀀤􀀣􀀦􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀏􀀣􀀗􀀢􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀓􀀗􀀄􀀤􀀗􀀠􀀌􀀋􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀏􀀣􀀗􀀧􀀏􀀋􀀏􀁂􀀅􀀊􀀇􀀢􀀏􀀐􀀖􀀗􀀐􀀅􀀤􀀐􀀑􀀅􀀗􀀆􀀢􀀤􀀗􀀑􀀏􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀮􀀣􀀏􀀠􀀅􀀌
􀀇􀀢􀀤􀀪􀀑􀀟􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀅􀀶􀀪􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀌􀀧􀀧􀀅􀀇􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀅􀀠􀀐􀀑􀀤􀀒􀀠􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀖􀀗􀀅􀀟􀀪􀀧􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀖􀀗􀀢􀀅􀀌􀀑􀀋􀀢􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀤􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀇􀀤􀀧􀀏􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀇􀀅􀀣􀀉􀀏􀀧􀀅􀀇􀀓
􀀂􀀐􀀅􀀧􀀏􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀌􀀋􀀋􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀇􀀢􀀤􀀪􀀑􀀟􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀗􀀐􀀌􀀏􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀋􀀪􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀮􀀣􀀏􀀠􀀅􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀡􀀌􀀋􀀌􀀣􀀗􀀐􀀅􀀤􀀐􀀑􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀏􀀣􀀗􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀇
􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀟􀀏􀀍􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀪􀀇􀀗􀀐􀀅􀀤􀀐􀀑􀀅􀀓􀀗􀀰􀀅􀀇􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀟􀀌􀀒􀀗􀀩􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀤􀀐􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀪􀀊􀀏􀀋􀀒􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀌􀀦􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀚􀀣􀀓􀀗􀁃􀀅􀀠􀀏􀀑􀀏􀀅􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀢􀀏􀀇􀀋􀀤􀀣􀀏􀀧􀀌􀀑
􀀡􀀌􀀋􀀌􀀣􀀗􀀑􀀅􀀌􀀟􀀅􀀣􀀓􀀗􀀩􀀋􀀗􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀢􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀏􀀠􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀌􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀌􀀋􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀏􀀣􀀗􀀺􀀜􀀋􀀢􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀊􀀏􀀉􀀅􀀣􀀇􀀌􀀣􀀒􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀠􀀠􀀅􀀠􀀤􀀣􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀏􀀣􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀧􀀅􀀨􀀪􀀑
􀀟􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀨􀀣􀀤􀀠􀀗􀀮􀀣􀀏􀀠􀀅􀀌􀀖􀀗􀀇􀀧􀀢􀀅􀀟􀀪􀀑􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀗􀀘􀀼􀀗􀀚􀀌􀀒􀀖􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀠􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀧􀀌􀀑􀀠􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀌􀀋􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀏􀀣􀀗􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀨􀀣􀀅􀀅􀀟􀀤􀀠􀀗􀀤􀀨
􀀌􀀇􀀇􀀅􀀠􀀫􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀨􀀪􀀑􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀧􀀋􀀅􀀟􀀓􀀗􀀴􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀤􀀇􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀉􀀤􀀑􀀉􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀇􀀢􀀤􀀪􀀑􀀟􀀗􀀪􀀇􀀅􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀋􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀋􀀷􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀋􀀪􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀑􀀣􀀅􀀌􀀟􀀒
􀀟􀀏􀀨􀀨􀀏􀀧􀀪􀀑􀀋􀀗􀀅􀀊􀀤􀀪􀀍􀀢􀀓
􀀬􀀉􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀊􀀅􀀔􀀋􀀗􀀨􀀅􀀆􀀗􀀟􀀌􀀒􀀇􀀖􀀗􀀩􀀗􀀐􀀑􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀋􀀣􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀑􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀎􀀤􀀊􀀅􀀋􀀇􀀦􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀬􀀟􀀅􀀇􀀌􀀖􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀅􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀋􀀪􀀣􀀊􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀕􀀒􀀏􀀉􀀗􀀤􀀊
􀀘􀀹􀀗􀀚􀀌􀀒􀀓􀀗􀀡􀀢􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀆􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀅􀀊􀀌􀀫􀀑􀀅􀀗􀀠􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀑􀀑􀀤􀀆􀀲􀀪􀀐􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀇􀀤􀀠􀀅􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀇􀀅􀀣􀀏􀀤􀀪􀀇􀀗􀀢􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀉􀀏􀀤􀀑􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀌􀀋
􀀢􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀫􀀅􀀅􀀊􀀗􀀢􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀑􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀅􀀟􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀇􀀗􀀆􀀅􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀌􀀇􀀗􀀇􀀤􀀠􀀅􀀗􀀢􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀧􀀅􀀣􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀌􀀋􀀗􀀢􀀌􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀌􀀣􀀏􀀇􀀅􀀊
􀀇􀀏􀀊􀀧􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀙􀀗􀀚􀀌􀀒􀀗􀀲􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀧􀀪􀀋􀀲􀀤􀀨􀀨􀀗􀀟􀀌􀀋􀀅􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀥􀀄􀀗􀀭􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀯􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀚􀀤􀀊􀀏􀀋􀀤􀀣􀀏􀀊􀀍􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀇􀀇􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀓
􀀩􀀋􀀗􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀢􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀏􀀠􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀌􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀋􀀤􀀗􀀟􀀏􀀨􀀨􀀪􀀇􀀅􀀗􀀋􀀅􀀊􀀇􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀨􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀪􀀊􀀑􀀌􀀆􀀨􀀪􀀑􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀨􀀅􀀣􀀅􀀊􀀟􀀌􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀍􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀎􀀤􀀊􀀅􀀋􀀇􀀦
􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀞􀀪􀀢􀀌􀀊􀀇􀀦􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀌􀀢􀀅􀀌􀀟􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀐􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀏􀀟􀀅􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀅􀀑􀀅􀀧􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀓
􀀡􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀊􀀅􀀔􀀋􀀗􀀐􀀪􀀫􀀑􀀏􀀧􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀣􀀋􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀢􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀥􀀦􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀇􀀗􀀟􀀪􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀁃􀀪􀀊􀀅􀀓􀀗􀀩􀀋􀀗􀀆􀀏􀀑􀀑􀀖􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀗􀀌􀀑􀀏􀀌􀀖􀀗􀀢􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀑􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀒
􀀐􀀣􀀤􀀍􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀇􀀗􀀠􀀌􀀟􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀢􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀇􀀏􀀋􀀪􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀇􀀗􀀆􀀅􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀌􀀇􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀒􀀗􀀊􀀅􀀍􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀅􀀶􀀪􀀅􀀊􀀧􀀅􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅
􀀐􀀤􀀑􀀏􀀋􀀏􀀧􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀇􀀅􀀧􀀪􀀣􀀏􀀋􀀒􀀗􀀋􀀅􀀊􀀇􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀗􀀤􀀊􀀗􀀇􀀤􀀧􀀏􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀅􀀧􀀤􀀊􀀤􀀠􀀏􀀧􀀗􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀤􀀇􀀅􀀗􀀆􀀢􀀤􀀗􀀑􀀏􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀥􀀦􀀣􀀌􀀏􀀊􀀅􀀖
􀀅􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀧􀀏􀀌􀀑􀀑􀀒􀀗􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀋􀀗􀀤􀀨􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀧􀀤􀀪􀀊􀀋􀀣􀀒􀀓
􀀡􀀢􀀌􀀊􀀦􀀗􀀒􀀤􀀪􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀩􀀗􀀇􀀋􀀌􀀊􀀟􀀗􀀣􀀅􀀌􀀟􀀒􀀗􀀨􀀤􀀣􀀗􀀒􀀤􀀪􀀣􀀗􀀶􀀪􀀅􀀇􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀓
􀀈􀀄􀀎􀀂
􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀉􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀉􀀔􀀁􀀕􀀕􀀁􀀖􀀉􀀋􀀒􀀉􀀁􀀎􀀉􀀒􀀁􀀃􀀐􀀍􀀕􀀉􀀌􀀗􀀘􀀐􀀍􀀙
􀀚􀀍􀀃􀀗􀀛􀀁􀀁􀀜􀀙􀀗􀀢􀀋􀀋􀀐􀀇􀀷􀀁􀀁􀀆􀀆􀀆􀀓􀀨􀀌􀀧􀀅􀀫􀀤􀀤􀀦􀀓􀀧􀀤􀀠􀀁􀀪􀀊􀀏􀀋􀀅􀀟􀀊􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀢􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗
􀀝􀀖􀀐􀀑􀀑􀀗􀀄􀀙􀀗􀀢􀀋􀀋􀀐􀀷􀀁􀀁􀀋􀀆􀀏􀀋􀀋􀀅􀀣􀀓􀀧􀀤􀀠􀀁􀀥􀀄􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀆􀀏􀀣􀀅􀀗
􀀞􀀁􀀁􀀆􀀕􀀗􀀟􀀗􀀍􀀐􀀑􀀪􀀇􀀓􀀋􀀤􀀁􀀪􀀊􀀏􀀋􀀅􀀟􀀊􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀤􀀊􀀇􀀢􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗
􀀠􀀁􀀋􀀝􀀋􀀛􀀗􀀙􀀗􀀢􀀋􀀋􀀐􀀷􀀁􀀁􀀆􀀆􀀆􀀓􀀒􀀤􀀪􀀋􀀪􀀫􀀅􀀓􀀧􀀤􀀠􀀁􀀥􀀄􀀬􀀭􀀮􀀭􀀯􀀗
􀀡􀀑􀀁􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀢􀀙􀀉􀀢􀀋􀀋􀀐􀀷􀀁􀀁􀀇􀀋􀀤􀀣􀀏􀀨􀀒􀀓􀀧􀀤􀀠􀀁􀀥􀀄􀀣􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀆􀀏􀀣􀀅
􀀮􀀢􀀅􀀧􀀦􀀗􀀋􀀢􀀅􀀗􀀥􀀊􀀏􀀉􀀅􀀣􀀇􀀌􀀑􀀗􀀭􀀪􀀠􀀌􀀊􀀗􀀯􀀏􀀍􀀢􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀩􀀊􀀟􀀅􀀔􀀷􀀗􀀢􀀋􀀋􀀐􀀷􀀁􀀁􀀪􀀢􀀣􀀏􀀓􀀤􀀢􀀧􀀢􀀣􀀓􀀤􀀣􀀍􀀁􀀅􀀊
􀀿􀀁􀀝
􀀝􀀁􀀝
Annex 292
OHCHR, UN Official Cites ‘Worsening’ Human Rights Situation in Southern, Eastern Regions
(21 May 2014)

􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀆􀀈􀀉􀀃􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀃􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀃􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀈􀀐􀀃􀀏􀀆􀀑􀀓􀀊􀀌􀀃􀀌􀀆􀀊􀀔􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀆􀀐
􀀌􀀄􀀔􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀏􀀐􀀖􀀃􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀐􀀃􀀏􀀋􀀑􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀌
􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀇􀀈􀀄􀀉􀀊􀀗􀀏􀀋􀀘􀀄􀀏􀀊􀀗􀀔􀀙􀀏􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀋􀀗􀀔􀀐􀀚􀀄􀀅􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀆􀀈􀀉􀀚􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀚􀀎􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀚􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀈􀀐􀀚􀀏􀀆􀀑􀀓􀀊􀀌􀀚􀀌􀀆􀀊􀀔􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀚􀀌􀀄􀀔􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀏􀀐􀀚􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀐􀀚􀀏􀀋􀀑􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀌
􀀛􀀜􀀃􀀝􀀈􀀞􀀃􀀛􀀟􀀜􀀠􀀃􀀡􀀃􀀢􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀌􀀄􀀔􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀏􀀐􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀐􀀃􀀏􀀋􀀑􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀆􀀌􀀆􀀌􀀚􀀏􀀈􀀇􀀙􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀁􀀙􀀏􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀋􀀃􀀈􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀐􀀄􀀎􀀃􀀈􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀓
􀀆􀀐􀀃􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀋􀀐􀀋􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀋􀀏􀀄􀀔􀀌􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀋􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀆􀀉􀀉􀀋􀀑􀀈􀀉􀀃􀀣􀀋􀀊􀀋􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀣􀀔􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀖􀀃􀀈􀀃􀀌􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀏
􀀁􀀐􀀆􀀊􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀈􀀐􀀃􀀏􀀆􀀑􀀓􀀊􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀆􀀈􀀉􀀃􀀎􀀈􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀊􀀄􀀣􀀈􀀞􀀖􀀃􀀐􀀄􀀊􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀈􀀊􀀃􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀓􀀈􀀣􀀃􀀣􀀆􀀌􀀇􀀔􀀌􀀌􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀊􀀓􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋
􀀘􀀈􀀏􀀊􀀆􀀋􀀌􀀃􀀌􀀄􀀕􀀋􀀃􀀏􀀆􀀑􀀓􀀊􀀌􀀚􀀤􀀈􀀌􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀈􀀐􀀆􀀊􀀈􀀏􀀆􀀈􀀐􀀃􀀣􀀋􀀚􀀋􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀔􀀏􀀋􀀌􀀥
􀀦􀀢􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀈􀀐􀀃􀀏􀀆􀀑􀀓􀀊􀀌􀀃􀀌􀀆􀀊􀀔􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀊􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀇􀀄􀀔􀀐􀀊􀀏􀀞􀀃􀀓􀀈􀀌􀀃􀀎􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀋􀀐􀀋􀀣􀀥􀀃􀀢􀀓􀀋􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀈􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀕􀀄􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀈􀀏􀀕􀀌
􀀤􀀋􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀌􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀈􀀌􀀃􀀎􀀋􀀉􀀉􀀃􀀈􀀌􀀃􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀋􀀏􀀄􀀔􀀌􀀃􀀧􀀆􀀄􀀉􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀤􀀋􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀇􀀄􀀕􀀕􀀆􀀊􀀊􀀋􀀣􀀖􀀨􀀃􀀩􀀧􀀈􀀐􀀃􀀪􀀆􀀕􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀧􀀆􀀫􀀖􀀃􀀬􀀌􀀌􀀆􀀌􀀊􀀈􀀐􀀊
􀀭􀀋􀀇􀀏􀀋􀀊􀀈􀀏􀀞􀀚􀀮􀀋􀀐􀀋􀀏􀀈􀀉􀀃􀀅􀀄􀀏􀀃􀀯􀀔􀀕􀀈􀀐􀀃􀀰􀀆􀀑􀀓􀀊􀀌􀀖􀀃􀀊􀀄􀀉􀀣􀀃􀀏􀀋􀀘􀀄􀀏􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀌􀀃􀀅􀀄􀀉􀀉􀀄􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀓􀀆􀀌􀀃􀀤􀀏􀀆􀀋􀀅􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀊􀀄􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀭􀀋􀀇􀀔􀀏􀀆􀀊􀀞
􀀱􀀄􀀔􀀐􀀇􀀆􀀉􀀃􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀓􀀆􀀌􀀃􀀉􀀈􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀊􀀃􀀏􀀋􀀘􀀄􀀏􀀊􀀃􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀌􀀆􀀊􀀔􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀇􀀄􀀔􀀐􀀊􀀏􀀞􀀃􀀈􀀌􀀃􀀎􀀋􀀉􀀉􀀃􀀈􀀌􀀃􀀓􀀆􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀋􀀇􀀋􀀐􀀊􀀃􀀧􀀆􀀌􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀊􀀄􀀃􀀲􀀞􀀆􀀧
􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀌􀀊􀀏􀀆􀀅􀀋􀀚􀀊􀀄􀀏􀀐􀀃􀀳􀀄􀀐􀀋􀀊􀀌􀀙􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀴􀀣􀀋􀀌􀀌􀀈􀀥
􀀢􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀵􀀶􀀚􀀘􀀈􀀑􀀋􀀃􀀏􀀋􀀘􀀄􀀏􀀊􀀃􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀋􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀜􀀶􀀃􀀝􀀈􀀞􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀆􀀌􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀌􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀊􀀄􀀃􀀤􀀋􀀃􀀘􀀏􀀄􀀣􀀔􀀇􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀤􀀞􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀁􀀂
􀀯􀀔􀀕􀀈􀀐􀀃􀀰􀀆􀀑􀀓􀀊􀀌􀀃􀀝􀀄􀀐􀀆􀀊􀀄􀀏􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀝􀀆􀀌􀀌􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀖􀀃􀀤􀀈􀀌􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀃􀀅􀀆􀀧􀀋􀀃􀀁􀀙􀀏􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀆􀀈􀀐􀀃􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀋􀀌􀀖􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀇􀀄􀀧􀀋􀀏􀀌􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀘􀀋􀀏􀀆􀀄􀀣
􀀅􀀏􀀄􀀕􀀃􀀛􀀃􀀬􀀘􀀏􀀆􀀉􀀃􀀊􀀄􀀃􀀶􀀃􀀝􀀈􀀞􀀥􀀃􀀩􀀊􀀃􀀣􀀄􀀇􀀔􀀕􀀋􀀐􀀊􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀃􀀷􀀈􀀉􀀈􀀏􀀕􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀨􀀃􀀣􀀋􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀆􀀄􀀏􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀈􀀐􀀃􀀏􀀆􀀑􀀓􀀊􀀌
􀀌􀀆􀀊􀀔􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀃􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀙􀀏􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀋􀀖􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀇􀀉􀀔􀀣􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀆􀀄􀀔􀀌􀀃􀀘􀀏􀀄􀀤􀀉􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀋􀀏􀀑􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀃􀀱􀀏􀀆􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀃􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀐􀀑
􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀋􀀏􀀄􀀔􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀸􀀈􀀕􀀘􀀉􀀋􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀊􀀈􀀏􀀑􀀋􀀊􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀙􀀆􀀉􀀉􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀌􀀖􀀃􀀊􀀄􀀏􀀊􀀔􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀤􀀋􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀌􀀖􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀕􀀆􀀣􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀌􀀄􀀕􀀋􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀋􀀌
􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀌􀀋􀀸􀀔􀀈􀀉􀀃􀀓􀀈􀀏􀀈􀀌􀀌􀀕􀀋􀀐􀀊􀀖􀀃􀀇􀀄􀀕􀀕􀀆􀀊􀀊􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀕􀀄􀀌􀀊􀀉􀀞􀀃􀀤􀀞􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀚􀀮􀀄􀀧􀀋􀀏􀀐􀀕􀀋􀀐􀀊􀀃􀀑􀀏􀀄􀀔􀀘􀀌􀀥
􀀷􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀈􀀃􀀏􀀋􀀌􀀔􀀉􀀊􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀧􀀆􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀐􀀇􀀋􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀊􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀌􀀄􀀔􀀊􀀓􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀇􀀄􀀔􀀐􀀊􀀏􀀞􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀹􀀃􀀘􀀋􀀄􀀘􀀉􀀋􀀃􀀓􀀈􀀧􀀋􀀃􀀣􀀆􀀋􀀣􀀖􀀨􀀃􀀌􀀈􀀆􀀣􀀃􀀝􀀏􀀥
􀀪􀀆􀀕􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀧􀀆􀀫􀀃􀀊􀀄􀀣􀀈􀀞􀀖􀀃􀀋􀀇􀀓􀀄􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀏􀀋􀀘􀀄􀀏􀀊􀀒􀀌􀀃􀀅􀀆􀀐􀀣􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀆􀀉􀀉􀀋􀀑􀀈􀀉􀀃􀀣􀀋􀀊􀀋􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀣􀀔􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀖
􀀋􀀌􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀆􀀈􀀉􀀉􀀞􀀃􀀈􀀅􀀅􀀋􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀺􀀄􀀔􀀏􀀐􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀌􀀊􀀌􀀃􀀈􀀌􀀃􀀎􀀋􀀉􀀉􀀃􀀈􀀌􀀃􀀕􀀋􀀕􀀤􀀋􀀏􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀋􀀉􀀋􀀇􀀊􀀄􀀏􀀈􀀉􀀃􀀇􀀄􀀕􀀕􀀆􀀌􀀌􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀖􀀃􀀷􀀎􀀓􀀆􀀇􀀓
􀀕􀀈􀀙􀀋􀀃􀀋􀀉􀀋􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀊􀀃􀀕􀀄􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀣􀀆􀀅􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀔􀀉􀀊􀀥􀀦
􀀱􀀄􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀐􀀔􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀃􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀌􀀈􀀆􀀣􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀈􀀊􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀊􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀇􀀄􀀔􀀐􀀊􀀏􀀞􀀖􀀃􀀈􀀘􀀈􀀏􀀊􀀃􀀅􀀏􀀄􀀕􀀃􀀌􀀋􀀇􀀔􀀏􀀆􀀊􀀞􀀃􀀇􀀓􀀈􀀉􀀉􀀋􀀐􀀑􀀋􀀌􀀖􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋
􀀌􀀆􀀊􀀔􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀓􀀈􀀌􀀃􀀎􀀄􀀏􀀌􀀋􀀐􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀣􀀔􀀋􀀃􀀊􀀄􀀃􀀇􀀄􀀕􀀕􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀆􀀕􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀞􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀆􀀊􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀆􀀌􀀋􀀥􀀃􀀩􀀐􀀃􀀈􀀣􀀣􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀖􀀃􀀌􀀄􀀇􀀆􀀈􀀉􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀣
􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀕􀀆􀀇􀀃􀀏􀀆􀀑􀀓􀀊􀀌􀀃􀀈􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀤􀀋􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀈􀀅􀀅􀀋􀀇􀀊􀀋􀀣􀀖􀀃􀀈􀀉􀀊􀀓􀀄􀀔􀀑􀀓􀀃􀀌􀀄􀀇􀀆􀀈􀀉􀀃􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀧􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀌􀀃􀀣􀀄􀀃􀀎􀀄􀀏􀀙􀀃􀀷􀀤􀀔􀀊􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀊􀀓􀀃􀀌􀀄􀀕􀀋
􀀣􀀆􀀌􀀏􀀔􀀘􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀥􀀨􀀃􀀻􀀋􀀊􀀖􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀆􀀌􀀃􀀈􀀃􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀆􀀄􀀔􀀌􀀃􀀣􀀈􀀐􀀑􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀈􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀔􀀇􀀓􀀃􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀧􀀆􀀇􀀋􀀌􀀃􀀇􀀄􀀔􀀉􀀣􀀃􀀤􀀏􀀋􀀈􀀙􀀃􀀣􀀄􀀎􀀐􀀖􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀆􀀅􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋
􀀄􀀧􀀋􀀏􀀈􀀉􀀉􀀃􀀌􀀆􀀊􀀔􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀣􀀋􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀆􀀄􀀏􀀈􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀃􀀅􀀔􀀏􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀏􀀖􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀆􀀌􀀃􀀈􀀃􀀉􀀆􀀙􀀋􀀉􀀆􀀓􀀄􀀄􀀣􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀈􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀔􀀇􀀓􀀃􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀏􀀋􀀈􀀙􀀣􀀄􀀎􀀐􀀃􀀇􀀄􀀔􀀉􀀣􀀃􀀌􀀘􀀈􀀏􀀙
􀀈􀀃􀀕􀀈􀀌􀀌􀀆􀀧􀀋􀀃􀀄􀀔􀀊􀀘􀀄􀀔􀀏􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀘􀀋􀀄􀀘􀀉􀀋􀀃􀀅􀀏􀀄􀀕􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀏􀀋􀀑􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀥
􀀬􀀌􀀃􀀅􀀄􀀏􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀌􀀆􀀊􀀔􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀃􀀴􀀣􀀋􀀌􀀌􀀈􀀖􀀃􀀎􀀓􀀋􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀏􀀋􀀘􀀄􀀏􀀊􀀋􀀣􀀉􀀞􀀃􀀇􀀉􀀈􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀌􀀃􀀈􀀊􀀃􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀏􀀈􀀣􀀋􀀃􀀔􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀤􀀔􀀆􀀉􀀣􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋
􀀼􀀉􀀈􀀇􀀙􀀃􀀭􀀋􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀞􀀃􀀌􀀘􀀈􀀏􀀙􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀈􀀃􀀅􀀆􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀈􀀊􀀃􀀙􀀆􀀉􀀉􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀎􀀄􀀔􀀐􀀣􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀣􀀄􀀽􀀋􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀘􀀋􀀄􀀘􀀉􀀋􀀃􀀋􀀈􀀏􀀉􀀆􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀆􀀌􀀃􀀕􀀄􀀐􀀊􀀓􀀖
􀀝􀀏􀀥􀀃􀀪􀀆􀀕􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀧􀀆􀀫􀀃􀀌􀀈􀀆􀀣􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀈􀀊􀀃􀀎􀀓􀀈􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀋􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃􀀊􀀄􀀃􀀤􀀋􀀃􀀷􀀤􀀋􀀞􀀄􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀣􀀄􀀔􀀤􀀊􀀃􀀆􀀌􀀃􀀐􀀄􀀎􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀐􀀔􀀕􀀤􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀧􀀆􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀕􀀌􀀾􀀃􀀠􀀿
􀀧􀀆􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀕􀀌􀀃􀀡􀀃􀀌􀀆􀀸􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀕􀀃􀀡􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀈􀀉􀀉􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀕􀀃􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀏􀀄􀀚􀀁􀀙􀀏􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀆􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀖􀀃􀀣􀀆􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀅􀀏􀀄􀀕􀀃􀀑􀀔􀀐􀀌􀀓􀀄􀀊
􀀎􀀄􀀔􀀐􀀣􀀌􀀥􀀨
􀀷􀀢􀀓􀀈􀀊􀀃􀀓􀀈􀀘􀀘􀀋􀀐􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀘􀀏􀀋􀀧􀀆􀀄􀀔􀀌􀀉􀀞􀀃􀀣􀀔􀀏􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀅􀀉􀀆􀀇􀀊􀀌􀀃􀀤􀀋􀀊􀀎􀀋􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀊􀀎􀀄􀀃􀀑􀀏􀀄􀀔􀀘􀀌􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀇􀀋􀀐􀀊􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋
􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀞􀀖􀀨􀀃􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀌􀀈􀀆􀀣􀀖􀀃􀀋􀀸􀀘􀀉􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀈􀀊􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀄􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀧􀀆􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀕􀀌􀀃􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀚􀀮􀀄􀀧􀀋􀀏􀀐􀀕􀀋􀀐􀀊􀀃􀀘􀀏􀀄􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀌􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀈􀀊􀀃􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀋
􀀋􀀆􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀢􀀏􀀈􀀣􀀋􀀃􀀁􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀤􀀔􀀆􀀉􀀣􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀈􀀊􀀃􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀈􀀅􀀅􀀋􀀇􀀊􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀤􀀞􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀅􀀆􀀏􀀋􀀖􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀃􀀘􀀋􀀄􀀘􀀉􀀋􀀃􀀎􀀓􀀄􀀃􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀋
􀀺􀀔􀀕􀀘􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀅􀀏􀀄􀀕􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀤􀀔􀀆􀀉􀀣􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀊􀀄􀀃􀀋􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀘􀀋􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀋􀁀􀀔􀀋􀀐􀀇􀀋􀀌􀀥
􀀜􀀗􀀛
􀀷􀀬􀀤􀀄􀀔􀀊􀀃􀁁􀀊􀀓􀀋􀁂􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀔􀀌􀀋􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀅􀀆􀀏􀀋􀀖􀀃􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀆􀀌􀀃􀀤􀀋􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀋􀀸􀀈􀀕􀀆􀀐􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀆􀀊􀁃􀀌􀀃􀀧􀀋􀀏􀀞􀀃􀀊􀀋􀀇􀀓􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀃􀀓􀀄􀀎􀀋􀀧􀀋􀀏􀀖􀀃􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀆􀀌
􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀄􀀃􀀤􀀋􀀞􀀄􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀣􀀄􀀔􀀤􀀊􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀈􀀊􀀃􀀝􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀊􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀇􀀄􀀇􀀙􀀊􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀌􀀃􀀓􀀈􀀧􀀋􀀃􀀤􀀋􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀏􀀄􀀎􀀐􀀃􀀤􀀞􀀃􀀤􀀄􀀊􀀓􀀃􀀌􀀆􀀣􀀋􀀌􀀖􀀃􀀅􀀉􀀞􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀅􀀏􀀄􀀕􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋
􀀤􀀔􀀆􀀉􀀣􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀊􀀄􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀤􀀔􀀆􀀉􀀣􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀦􀀃􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀌􀀈􀀆􀀣􀀖􀀃􀀊􀀋􀀉􀀉􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀏􀀋􀀘􀀄􀀏􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀌􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀈􀀊􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀅􀀆􀀧􀀋􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀧􀀋􀀌􀀊􀀆􀀑􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀌
􀀔􀀐􀀣􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀎􀀈􀀞􀀃􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀋􀀧􀀋􀀐􀀊􀀌􀀖􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀇􀀉􀀔􀀣􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀃􀀤􀀋􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀏􀀏􀀆􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀄􀀔􀀊􀀃􀀤􀀞􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀈􀀉􀀃􀀈􀀔􀀊􀀓􀀄􀀏􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀋􀀌􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀃􀀲􀀞􀀆􀀧
􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀤􀀞􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀣􀀋􀀘􀀋􀀐􀀣􀀋􀀐􀀊􀀃􀀤􀀄􀀣􀀆􀀋􀀌􀀥
􀀬􀀌􀀙􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀎􀀓􀀋􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀣􀀆􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀣􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀓􀀈􀀣􀀃􀀌􀀘􀀄􀀙􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀏􀀆􀀑􀀓􀀊􀀃􀀈􀀊􀀕􀀄􀀌􀀘􀀓􀀋􀀏􀀋􀀃􀀅􀀄􀀏􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋
􀀓􀀄􀀉􀀣􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀋􀀉􀀋􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀖􀀃􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀌􀀈􀀆􀀣􀀃􀀷􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀆􀀌􀀃􀀇􀀋􀀏􀀊􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀉􀀞􀀃􀀐􀀄􀀊􀀃􀀈􀀃􀀅􀀈􀀧􀀄􀀔􀀏􀀈􀀤􀀉􀀋􀀃􀀇􀀉􀀆􀀕􀀈􀀊􀀋􀀨􀀃􀀤􀀔􀀊􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀈􀀐
􀀏􀀆􀀑􀀓􀀊􀀌􀀃􀀊􀀋􀀈􀀕􀀃􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀃􀀐􀀄􀀊􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀧􀀄􀀉􀀧􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀈􀀇􀀊􀀔􀀈􀀉􀀃􀀘􀀄􀀉􀀉􀀌􀀥􀀃􀀷􀁄􀀋􀀃􀀄􀀤􀀌􀀋􀀏􀀧􀀋􀀃􀀧􀀆􀀄􀀉􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀏􀀋􀀉􀀈􀀊􀀋􀀣􀀃􀀊􀀄
􀀋􀀉􀀋􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀥􀀨
􀀩􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀈􀀊􀀃􀀏􀀋􀀑􀀈􀀏􀀣􀀖􀀃􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀌􀀈􀀆􀀣􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀈􀀊􀀃􀀈􀀃􀀷􀀌􀀊􀀏􀀆􀀙􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀃􀀋􀀸􀀈􀀕􀀘􀀉􀀋􀀨􀀃􀀓􀀈􀀣􀀃􀀤􀀋􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀈􀀤􀀣􀀔􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀕􀀋􀀕􀀤􀀋􀀏􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋
􀀋􀀉􀀋􀀇􀀊􀀄􀀏􀀈􀀉􀀃􀀇􀀄􀀕􀀕􀀆􀀌􀀌􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀃􀀷􀀆􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀕􀀆􀀣􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀁁􀀊􀀓􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀆􀀈􀀉􀀌􀁂􀀖􀀃􀀎􀀓􀀆􀀇􀀓􀀃􀀐􀀋􀀑􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀧􀀋􀀉􀀞􀀃􀀆􀀕􀀘􀀈􀀇􀀊􀀌􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋
􀀘􀀄􀀌􀀌􀀆􀀤􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀞􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀄􀀏􀀑􀀈􀀐􀀆􀀽􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀋􀀉􀀋􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀊􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀋􀀃􀀇􀀄􀀔􀀐􀀊􀀏􀀞􀀥
􀀛􀀗􀀛
Annex 293
OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 June 2014)

1
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights
Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
15 June 2014
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
II. METHODOLOGY 6
III. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 7
A. Investigations into human rights violations related to the Maidan protests 7
B. Investigations into human rights violations related to the violence in Odesa
on 2 May
9
C. Investigations into other human rights violations 17
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES 18
A. Rule of law 18
B. Freedom of peaceful assembly 22
C. Freedom of expression 23
D. Minority rights 23
E. Political rights 24
F. Internally displaced persons 25
V. PARTICULAR HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES IN THE EAST 27
A. Impact of the security situation on human rights 27
B. Right to life, liberty and security 32
C. Freedom of expression 37
D. Freedom of religion or belief 41
E. Economic, social and cultural rights 41
VI. PARTICULAR HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES IN CRIMEA 48
A. Civil and political rights of Crimean residents 48
B. Economic, social and cultural rights 53
C. Rights of indigenous peoples 55
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 55
3
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. The present report is based on findings of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights
Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) covering the period of 7 May – 7 June
2014. It follows two reports on the human rights situation in Ukraine released by the
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on 15 April and 16
May 2014.
2. During the reporting period, the human rights situation in the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions has continued to deteriorate. The 11 March “referendum” on “self-rule” held by
the self-proclaimed “Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic”,1
albeit without effect under international law, was seen by their representatives as the
first step to the creation of a “Novorossia”. In addition, armed groups have continued to
physically occupy most of the key public and administrative buildings in many cities
and towns of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and have declared virtual
“independence”, however, the provision of administrative services to the local
population remains with the State.
3. The presence of armed people and weapons in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk has
increased. Representatives of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” have recognised the
presence within their armed groups of citizens of the Russian Federation, including
from Chechnya and other republics of the North Caucasus. In the period following the
elections, the HRMMU observed armed men on trucks and armoured vehicles moving
around downtown Donetsk in daylight.
4. The escalation in criminal activity resulting in human rights abuses is no longer limited
to targeting journalists, elected representatives, local politicians, civil servants and civil
society activists. Abductions, detentions, acts of ill-treatment and torture, and killings
by armed groups are now affecting the broader population of the two eastern regions,
which are now marked by an atmosphere of intimidation and consequent fear. Armed
groups must be urged to stop their illegal activities and lay down their arms.
5. There has also been more regular and intense fighting as the Government has been
trying to restore peace and security over the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk
through security operations involving its armed forces. Local residents of areas affected
by the fighting are increasingly being caught in the cross-fire between the Ukrainian
military and armed groups, with a growing number of residents killed and wounded,
and damage to property. The HRMMU is concerned at the increasing number of reports
of enforced disappearances as a result of the security operations. The Government must
further use restraint of force, and ensure that its security operations are at all times in
line with international standards.2
6. As a result of these developments, residents of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions live in
a very insecure environment, coupled with social and economic hardships. Daily life is
more and more of a challenge. The HRMMU is gravely concerned that the combination
of the increased number of illegal acts by the armed groups, and the intensification of
fighting between armed groups and Ukrainian forces is raising serious human rights
1 Hereafter referred to as the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the “Luhansk People’s Republic”.
2 Human Rights Watch Letter to former Acting President Turchynov and President-Elect Poroshenko dated 6
June 2014, on the conduct of security operations in south-eastern Ukraine in light of the growing number of
credible reports regarding Ukrainian forces’ use of mortars and other weapons in and around populated areas,
and the recent intensifying of hostilities between Ukrainian forces and armed groups.
4
concerns, including but not limited to, the fate of the general population, especially
women and children, in the areas under the control of armed groups.
7. As of 6 June, the departments of social protection in Ukraine’s regions had identified
over 12,700 internally displaced persons (IDPs)3. However, the actual number of
people who have fled the violence and fighting in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk
is believed to be higher and increasing daily.
8. Freedom of expression continues to be threatened, particularly in the eastern regions,
where journalists face ongoing intimidation and threats to their physical security. Hate
speech, particularly through social media, continue to fuel tensions and to deepen
division between communities.
9. In Crimea, the introduction of Russian Federation legislation, in contradiction with the
United Nations General Assembly resolution 68/262 and applicable bodies of
international law, hampers the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It
has created a legislative limbo as, while Ukrainian legislation was supposed to remain
in force until 1 January 2015, the legal institutions and framework are already required
to comply with the provisions of legislation of the Russian Federation.
10. Residents in Crimea known for their “Pro-Ukrainian” position are intimidated. The
HRMMU is concerned that many may face increasing discrimination, particularly in
the areas of education and employment. Leaders and activists of the indigenous
Crimean Tatar people face prosecution and limitations on the enjoyment of their
cultural rights. During the reporting period, the situation of all residents of Crimea has
deteriorated with regard to their right to freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly,
association, religion or belief.
11. From 14 to 19 May, Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) for Human Rights Ivan
Šimonović travelled to Ukraine. During his visits to Kyiv, Donetsk and Odesa, he
discussed the 16 May report with the Government, regional and local officials, the
Ombudsperson and representatives of civil society, and the international community.
The ASG highlighted the importance of prompt follow-up to the recommendations
made in the OHCHR report as a means to de-escalate tensions, in particular ahead of
the Presidential elections.
12. The investigations under the Office of the Prosecutor General into the Maidan events
continued. On 28 May, a Kyiv court sentenced two police officers who subjected a
Maidan demonstrator to ill-treatment. On 15 May, relatives of those killed on Maidan,
dissatisfied with the perceived slowness of the official investigation, created an
initiative group to conduct their own investigation. The HRMMU remains in regular
contact with the Office of the Prosecutor General and emphasizes the need for the
investigation to be transparent, comprehensive and timely.
13. With respect to the incidents that took place in Odesa on 2 May, it should be noted that
six official investigations have been established. The main bodies undertaking such
investigations are the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the State Security Service in
Ukraine (SBU). It is with regret that the HRMMU reports a lack of cooperation from
both governmental bodies, particularly at the central level with the HRMMU, which
has been preventing the HRMMU from conducting a proper assessment of the progress
3 As of 16 June, UNHCR estimate there to be 34,336 IDPs in Ukraine.
According to the Russian Federation Federal Migration Service, as of 6 June, 2014, 837 persons had applied
and were granted refugee status; and 3,750 persons had applied and were granted Temporary Asylum.
Approximately 15% were minors under the age of 18. These figures do not include people from Crimea.
5
made. The HRMMU reiterates the need for prompt and thorough investigations into the
violent incidents on 2 May in Odesa. Some key questions must be addressed to ensure
confidence in the investigation and to guarantee accountability, due process and to
enable the communities to accept fully the results of such an investigation. Among
those questions are the conduct of the police on 2 May: why it, and the fire brigade,
either did not react, or were slow to react; what caused the fire in the Trade Union
building; who are the perpetrators of the killings in the afternoon and the fire in the
evening; and what measures are being taken to guarantee justice for the victims, and
due process for the people detained in connection with these events. Furthermore, the
Government must pay particular attention to ensure social media is not used for hate
speech or incitement to hatred.
14. A key development during the reporting period was the Presidential election held on 25
May 2014. There were 21 candidates officially on the ballot. On 3 June, the Central
Election Commission (CEC) confirmed that Mr. Petro Poroshenko had won with 54.7%
of the vote. In the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, attacks had taken place every day
during the week preceding the elections and multiplied on election day, with violent
obstruction of polling stations. The pattern of such attacks consisted of representatives
of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the “Luhansk People’s Republic” and armed
men entering the premises of the district election commissions, threatening staff and
sometimes beating and/or abducting them, often taking away voters’ lists, computers
and official documents. In some cases, the premises of these commissions were seized
and blocked; others had to close either because they became inoperative, or for security
reasons the staff were frightened to come back. Several attacks against district election
commissions and polling stations were reported just prior to, and on, the election day,
with armed men entering polling stations, forcing them to close and/or destroying or
stealing ballot boxes. These illegal acts prevented many people living in the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions to exercise their right to vote.
15. Residents of Crimea had to go to mainland Ukraine to vote. The HRMMU monitored
the situation in the Kherson region, where most of the Crimean voters had registered,
and spoke to representatives of the Crimean Tatars. As they crossed the administrative
border by car to go to vote, representatives of “self-defence forces” reportedly recorded
various personal details, including car license plates and passport numbers. The
HRMMU was informed that many Crimean Tatars did not go to vote due to the cost of
travelling, concerns about crossing the administrative border, and fear of reprisals by
the authorities in Crimea.
16. During the reporting period, the Government of Ukraine continued to implement the
Geneva Statement.4 National roundtables on constitutional reform, decentralization,
minority rights and the rule of law were held in Kyiv on 14 May, in Kharkiv on 17
May, and in Mykolaiv on 21 May. These meetings brought together former Presidents
Kravchuk and Kuchma, Prime Minister Yatsenyuk, political party leaders, members of
the business community and other civil society organizations. In Kharkiv, Prime
4 The Geneva Statement on Ukraine was issued on 17 April 2014 by representatives of the European Union,
United States, Ukraine and the Russian Federation. It sets out the agreed initial concrete steps to de-escalate
tensions and restore security for all: (1) All sides must refrain from any violence, intimidation or provocative
actions; (2) All illegal armed groups must be disarmed; all illegally seized buildings must be returned to
legitimate owners; all illegally occupied public offices must be vacated; (3) Amnesty should be granted to the
protestors who left seized buildings and surrendered weapons, with the exception of those found guilty of
capital crimes; and (4) The announced constitutional process will be inclusive, transparent and accountable
carried out through a broad national dialogue.
6
Minister Yatsenyuk declared that the Constitution should be amended in order to
provide a special status for the Russian language and national minority languages.
17. On 13 May, the Parliament adopted the Law “On amending some legislative acts in the
area of state anti-corruption policy in connection with the implementation of the
European Union (EU) Action Plan on the liberalisation of the visa regime for Ukraine”.
The Law provides for more stringent penalties for corruption offences committed by
individuals or legal entities.
18. On 20 May, Parliament adopted by resolution № 4904 the Memorandum of Concord
and Peace, which was drafted during the roundtable on national unity in Kharkiv on 17
May, and discussed on 21 May in Mykolaiv. Supported by 252 votes (all deputies
except the Communist Party of Ukraine and Svoboda), the document foresees that the
adoption of a constitutional reform package, including the decentralization of power
and a special status for the Russian language; judicial and police reform, and the
adoption of an amnesty law for anti-government protesters in the east who would
accept giving up weapons, except for those who have committed serious crimes against
life and physical integrity. The Parliament called on all to work together to protect,
promote and build a democratic Ukraine, and the peaceful coexistence of all
nationalities, religions and political convictions.
II. METHODOLOGY
19. The present report was prepared by the HRMMU on the basis of information collected
during the period of 7 May to 7 June 2014. During this period, the HRMMU continued
to operate pursuant to the objectives as set out at the time of its deployment in March
2014, and in accordance with the same methodology as outlined in its second monthly
report on the situation of human rights in Ukraine issued by OHCHR on 16 May.5 The
present report does not intend to present an exhaustive account of all human rights
concerns in Ukraine that have been followed by HRMMU during the reporting period.
It rather focuses on those violations and developments which represent particular
human rights challenges at the current juncture or demonstrate trends for potentially
longer-term human rights concerns in the country.
20. The HRMMU continued to work closely with the United Nations entities in Ukraine. It
is grateful for the support and contributions received for the report from the Office of
the United Nations Resident Coordinator, the Department for Political Affairs (DPA),
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health
Organisation (WHO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United
Nations Development Fund (UNDP), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the International Organisation
for Migration (IOM), and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA).
21. The HRMMU appreciates the close cooperation with international and national
partners, including among others, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE).
5 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/HRMMUReport15May2014.pdf
7
III. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
A. Investigations into human rights violations related to Maidan protests
22. Five separate initiatives are ongoing in connection with the investigations into human
rights violations committed during the Maidan events: (1) the official State
investigation is undertaken by the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine in
cooperation with the MoI; (2) a temporary “commission on the investigation of illegal
actions of the law enforcement bodies and individual officials and attacks on the rights
and freedoms, lives and health of citizens during the events connected with the mass
actions of political and civil protests that have been taking place in Ukraine since 21
November 2013” was established by Parliament on 26 December 2013; (3) the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe initiated, in December 2013, a threemember
International Advisory Panel to oversee that the investigations of the violent
incidents which have taken place in Ukraine from November 2013 onwards meet the
requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights and the case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights; (4) a Public Commission on the investigation and
prevention of human rights violations in Ukraine was created on 27 January 2014,
initiated by a group of Ukrainian legal academics; and (5) an initiative group
comprising family members of people who died on Maidan.
23. The Ukrainian Ombudsperson issued a special report on “Infringement of Human
Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine - The Events of November 2013 – February 2014’.6
Forceful dispersal of Maidan protesters on 30 November 2013
24. As noted in the previous reports, the violent dispersal of protesters on 30 November
was the first instance of the excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators, and
triggered further protests.
25. On 14 May, the Kyiv Pechersky Court postponed a hearing of Oleksandr Popov, former
Head of the Kyiv City administration, and of Volodymyr Sivkovych, former Deputy
Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, who are under suspicion of
being responsible for the forced dispersal of Maidan protesters on the night of 30
November 2013. The hearing was scheduled after the Kyiv city Court of Appeal
cancelled the decision of the Kyiv Pechersky Court of 31 January 2014 to amnesty
persons responsible for ordering the crackdown of demonstrators by the “Berkut” riot
police under the law of 19 December, which has since then been rescinded.
26. The hearing planned for 14 May eventually took place on 26 May but was followed by
an incident. About 15 members of the “Maidan self-defence” attacked Oleksandr Popov
after he left the court room. He was doused with water, alcohol and iodine, and
insulted. Members of the police, who were standing by, did not intervene.
27. During the following hearing, on 5 June, the plaintiffs (representing Maidan victims)
submitted a petition for the revocation of the judge considering the case. The petition
was accepted by the court, leading to the postponement of the hearings until a decision
on the revocation.
6 Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Report on ‘Infringement of Human Rights and
Freedoms in Ukraine - The events of November 2013 – February 2014’, issued on 28 February, 2014.
8
Criminal proceedings into the killings of 19-21 January and 18-20 February 2014
28. During 19-21 January 2014, fierce clashes broke out in central Kyiv between the police
and protesters, resulting in the first three casualties among demonstrators. The death
toll rose significantly between 18-20 February, with confrontations taking the lives of
dozens of persons, mostly protesters.
29. Different figures continue being reported regarding the number of deaths during the
protests in January and February. According to information from the Office of the
Prosecutor General communicated to the HRMMU on 27 May, 76 protesters were
killed as a result of firearm wounds on Hrushevskoho and Institutska streets due to
armed confrontations. On 21 May, the Ministry of Health announced that 106
demonstrators had died during the protests. Information from the NGO “Euromaidan
SOS”, dated 3 June, refers to 113 casualties among protesters (109 in Kyiv and 4 in the
regions).
30. There are also discrepancies concerning casualties among law enforcement officers: 14
according to the Office of the Prosecutor General; 17 according to the Investigation
Commission of the Parliament of Ukraine on the Maidan events; and 20 according to
the NGO “Euromaidan SOS”.
31. For investigation purposes, all the killings of protesters by firearms were merged by the
Office of the General Prosecutor into one criminal proceeding. As of 24 April, three
“Berkut” officers had been arrested and officially charged with Article 115 (Murder) of
the Criminal Code. The situation has not changed over the past month and a half. The
killing of law enforcement officers is being investigated by a separate team within the
Office of the Prosecutor General. As of 6 June, no suspects had been identified.
32. On 20 May, the deputy head of the Kyiv Department of the MoI, Sergiy Boyko,
declared that all documentation related to the activities of the special police unit
“Berkut” during Maidan had been destroyed upon the order of the unit commander in
the last days of February 2014.
33. On 5 June, the HRMMU met with a representative of an initiative group claiming to
represent about 320 relatives of people killed on Maidan. The group held its first
meeting on 15-16 May, and is planning to initiate an independent investigation into the
events, with the involvement of lawyers and journalists. They consider their initiative
as necessary as they are not satisfied with the ongoing investigations. The group, which
plans to register an NGO entitled “Family Maidan” also intends to support families of
Maidan victims.
34. On 21 May, the Head of the Parliamentary Investigation Commission on the Maidan
events reported that two persons who had participated in the protests were still missing.
Eleven persons suspected in the killing of demonstrators have been identified, of whom
three were arrested and eight remain at large, allegedly in the Russian Federation. The
Commission is seeking to obtain full and reliable information on violations during
Maidan and will forward evidence to the General Prosecutor’s Office. It has a one-year
mandate and must issue a report to Parliament no later than six months after its
establishment that is by 26 June 2014.
35. The International Advisory Panel (IAP) of the Council of Europe overseeing the
Maidan investigations held two working sessions in Strasbourg on 9-11 April and 5-7
May 2014. On 16 May, it issued guidelines for NGO submissions and requested input
by 11 June 2014. It also decided to request ‘certain authorities’ to submit information
9
mainly concerning the Maidan investigations. The first meetings of the IAP in Kyiv
will take place at the end of June 2014.
Torture and ill-treatment
36. On 28 May, the Kyiv Pechersky Court sentenced two police officers for abuse of power
and violence against a demonstrator, Mykhailo Havrylyuk, during the Maidan protests.
Mr. Havrylyuk had been stripped naked in the street by the police in freezing
conditions and forced to stand in the snow while being mocked, assaulted and filmed
with a mobile phone. During the hearings, the defendants pleaded guilty. One of them
was sentenced to three years of imprisonment with a probation period of one year, and
the other to two years, including a one-year probation period.
B. Investigations into human rights violations related to 2 May Odesa violence
Summary of events
37. The most serious single incident of significant loss of life in Ukraine since the killings
on Maidan occurred in Odesa on 2 May 2014.7 The events occurred on the same day
that a football match was due to take place between the Kharkiv football team
“Metallist” and the Odesa football team “Chernomorets”. On 1 May, the police
authorities issued an official statement announcing that due to possible disorder
because of the football game, an additional 2,000 police officers would patrol the
streets of Odesa.
38. Early in the morning of 2 May, at least 600 football fans arrived from Kharkiv. Football
fans from both teams are known to have strong “Pro-Unity”8 sympathies. A pre-match
rally for “United Ukraine” had been planned for 3.00 p.m. on Sobornaya square and
gathered, at least, 2,000 people, including supporters of the two football teams, Right
Sector activists, members of so-called self-defence units, and other “Pro-Unity”
supporters. Right Sector and “self-defence” unit supporters were observed by the
HRMMU wearing helmets and masks, and armed with shields, axes, wooden/metallic
sticks and some with firearms. By 3:00 p.m. the HRMMU had observed 15 police
officers on Sobornaya square and two buses of riot police officers parked nearby.
39. Meanwhile, the HRMMU observed that about 450 metres away from Sobornaya street,
“Pro-Federalism” activists, comprising approximately 300 activists from “Odesskaya
Druzhina” (radical “Pro-Federalism” movement), had also gathered one hour earlier.
They reportedly intended to prevent the “Pro-Unity” rally; and were wearing helmets,
shields, masks, axes, wooden/metal sticks and some of them with firearms.
40. The HRMMU observed an insufficient and inadequate police presence to manage and
ensure security, and crowd control of the “United Ukraine” march towards the football
stadium. The HRMMU noted that additional police officers arrived at the scene, but
were unable to stop the violent confrontation.
41. At 3.15 p.m., the “Pro-Federalism Odesskaya Drujina”, “Narodnaya Drujina” and other
activists approached the Sobornaya square and started to provoke the participants of the
“United Ukraine” rally. Clashes arose and quickly turned into mass disorder, which
7 See also OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 15 May 2014
(http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/HRMMUReport15May2014.pdf)
8 The terms “Pro-Unity” and “Pro-Federalism” are used in the context as describing the motivations and
orientation of the supporters / activists.
10
lasted for several hours until 6.30 p.m. Police officers and supporters from both sides
were injured during the afternoon. Six men were killed by gunshots fired by activists.
42. The HRMMU observed that following the clashes in the city centre, some “Pro-
Federalism” activists ran from the area chased by “Pro-Unity” supporters.
Approximately 60 “Pro-Federalism” activists took refuge in the “Afina” shopping
centre, which had been closed during the day. The “Afina” shopping centre was then
surrounded by “Pro-Unity” activists. Riot police (Special Forces “SOKOL”) arrived on
the scene, and reportedly took away 47 “Pro-Federalism” activists, while letting women
out of the complex. Other “Pro-Federalism” supporters ran from the clashes to the tent
camp at the Kulikovo Pole square, where approximately 200 supporters had gathered
(including all the “Pro-Federalism” leaders) during the afternoon.
43. Some “Pro-Unity” politicians called upon their supporters to march towards the
Kulikovo Pole square. At 7.00 p.m., the “Pro-Unity” supporters marched in that
direction, accompanied behind them by approximately 60 riot police.
44. The “Pro-Federalism” leaders were informed that “Pro-Unity” supporters were heading
towards the tent camp, and between 6.00 – 6.30 p.m., they decided to take refuge in the
nearby Trade Union Building.
45. At 7.30 p.m., when the “Pro-Unity” supporters reached Kulikovo Pole square, they
burned all the “Pro-Federalism” tents. The “Pro-Federalism” activists, who had hidden
in the Trade Union Building, and the “Pro-Unity” activists, then reportedly started
throwing Molotov cocktails at each other. Gunshots could reportedly be heard coming
from both sides. At around 8.00 p.m., the “Pro-Unity” activists entered the Trade Union
Building where the “Pro-Federalism” supporters had sought refuge.
46. During the evening a fire broke out in the Trade Union Building. At 7.43 p.m., the
HRMMU called the fire brigade, which has its base located 650 metres from the Trade
Union Building. Reportedly, the fire brigade only arrived 40 minutes after receiving the
first phone call about the fire. According to fire brigade officials, this was due to the
fact that the police did not create a safe and secure perimeter allowing the fire brigade
to easily access the Trade Union Building. The cause of the fire remains unclear at this
stage.
47. As a result of the fire, officially 42 people died: 32 (including 6 females) were trapped
and unable to leave the building and 10 (including one female and one minor) died
jumping from windows.
48. The HRMMU has received information from credible resources that some “Pro-Unity”
protesters were beating up “Pro-Federalism” supporters as they were trying to escape
the Trade Union Building, while others were trying to help them.
49. 247 other people were brought from the scene requiring medical assistance: 27 people
with gunshot wounds, 31 with stab wounds, 26 with burns and intoxication caused by
combustible products and 163 with injuries by blunt objects. Of these, 99 people were
hospitalised, including 22 policemen, with 35 in serious condition. According to
various sources, all those who died were Ukrainian citizens. There are no more official
reports of people missing in relation to 2 May events. Seven of those injured remain in
hospital. The HRMMU received allegations that many who were treated in hospitals
did not give their real names and addresses. Moreover, some people who were heavily
injured from the violence did not go to hospital for fear of retaliation.
11
50. During the evening, it was reported to the HRMMU that a bare minimum police force
was present at the Kulikovo Pole square. Even when the special riot police force
arrived at the scene, the officers did not intervene in the violence that took place on the
Kulikovo Pole square. The HRMMU was told by high ranking police officers that the
reason for this is that they did not receive any formal order to intervene.
Detentions
51. The HRMMU has noted slight discrepancies regarding the number of people
arrested/detained/transferred during, and in the aftermath of, the 2 May violence. The
Regional Prosecution Office and the Regional Ministry of Interior present different
figures relating to these events. For example, figures for those arrested in the centre of
town vary from 42 to 47 people, and figures for those arrested at the Trade Union
Building from 63 to 67 people.
52. Criminal investigations have been launched under the following articles of the Criminal
Code of Ukraine: Article 115/1 (Intentional homicide); Article 194/2 (Intentional
destruction or damage of property); Article 294/2 (Mass riots/unrest); Article 296
(Hooliganism); Article 341/2 (Capturing of the state or public buildings or
constructions); Article 345 (Threat or violence against a law enforcement officer),
Article 365 (Excess of authority or official powers) and Article 367 (Neglect of official
duty).
53. The 47 “Pro-Federalism” activists who took refuge in the “Afina” shopping centre were
taken away (for so-called protection reasons) by Police Special Forces “SOKOL” and
transferred to two police stations outside Odesa (Ovidiopol and Bilhorod-Dnistrovkyi)
where they were detained for two days.
54. During this 48 hour period in police custody, detainees were not given food or water on
a regular basis, nor were they provided a one-hour walk per day, as per internal MoI
regulations9.
55. On 4 May, all 47 detainees were transferred to Vinnitsa (424 km from Odesa).
According to information provided to the HRMMU by credible sources, during the
transfer, which lasted for 12 hours, they received neither food nor water, nor were they
allowed to use toilet facilities (they had to urinate in the detainees van). According to
Ukrainian internal regulations, detainees during transfer should receive food and water.
56. On 6 May, video court hearings of the “Pro-Federalism” activists were organised with
the Primorsky District Court of Odesa. All were charged with Article 294 (Mass riots)
and/or Article 115 (Intentional homicide) of the Criminal Code; and during the
following days some were given additional criminal charges of either: Article 194/2
(Intentional destruction or damage of property); Article 296 (Hooliganism); Article
341/2 (Capturing of the state or public buildings or constructions); or Article 345
(Threat or violence against a law enforcement officer). According to the court
decisions of the 47 arrested, 14 were placed in the Vinnitsa pre-trial detention centre.
Four of these, after appealing the court decision, were placed under house arrest and
have since reportedly returned to Odesa. 33 of the 47 individuals originally arrested
were placed under house arrest as of 10 June 2014. Late in the evening of 2 May, 67
people were arrested at the Trade Union Building and transferred to the Odesa City
Police Station, where they were detained for two days. On 2 and 3 May, all were
9 Ministry of Interior regulation Number 60 dated 20/01/2001: warm food three times per day, and one hour
walk per day.
12
charged with either Articles 115 (Intentional homicide) or Article 294 (Mass riots) of
the Criminal Code. On 4 May at 5.00 p.m., the Odesa City Police Station was stormed
by relatives and friends of the “Pro-Federalism” movement. Under unclear
circumstances all of the 67 detainees were “released” by the police.
57. In addition to those arrested on 2 May, the MoI arrested at least four other people. On 6
May, one of the leaders of the “Pro-Federalism” movement was arrested and charged
under Article 294 of the Criminal Code. He is currently detained in a pre-trial detention
centre. On 18 May, a “Pro-Unity” activist was arrested, accused of firing at, and
injuring several people in the city centre on 2 May, including police officers, “Pro-
Federalism” activists and journalists. He was first transferred to the Investigation
Department of Odesa Regional Police Office, before being transferred to Kyiv. He is
accused under Article 115 (Murder) and Article 294-2 (Mass riots) of the Criminal
Code and on 21 May, he was placed under house arrest in Odesa by the Kyiv Pechersky
District Court.
58. Of the arrests conducted between 2 May and 3 June, in connection with the
investigations into the 2 May violence, 13 persons remain in pre-trial detention centres
under the Penitentiary Services (either in Vinnitsa, Odesa or Kyiv) charged with one or
more of the following six articles of the Criminal Code: Article 115/1 (Intentional
homicide); Article 194/2 (Intentional destruction or damage of property); Article 294/2
(Mass riots/unrest); Article 296 (Hooliganism); Article 341/2 (Capturing of the state or
public buildings or constructions); and Article 345 (Threat or violence against law
enforcement officer).
59. In addition, reportedly 40 people were placed under house arrest in Odesa charged with
the following articles of the Criminal Code: Article 115/1 (Intentional homicide);
Article 194/2 (Intentional destruction or damage of property; Article 294/2 (Mass
riots/unrest); Article 296 (Hooliganism); Article 341/2 (Capturing of the state or public
buildings or constructions); and Article 345 (Threat or violence against law
enforcement officer).
60. Two cases concerning “Pro-Unity” activists suspected of shooting and killing persons
during the 2 May violence, were heard by the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv,
following the arrest of two suspects on 18 and 26 May. Both were given house arrest;
both are charged under Article 294 (Mass riots), and one has been additionally charged
under Article 115 (Murder) of the Criminal Code.
Due process rights during, and after, the 2 May violence
61. The HRMMU visited detainees held in the pre-trial detention centre in Odesa. The
Penitentiary Services administration fully cooperated with the HRMMU and granted
access to several detainees (including one female) with whom private interviews were
carried out. The detainees did not complain about their conditions of detention or
physical treatment in the pre-trial detention centre in Odesa. They confirmed they were
able to meet privately with their lawyers.
62. The HRMMU also met with lawyers, victims, witnesses, detainees and relatives with
regard to the 2 May violence. It also held numerous meetings with the
Ombudsperson’s team, as well as representatives of law enforcement agencies, mass
media, local politicians and officials, activists and local officials. Through its
monitoring, the HRMMU has identified various human rights concerns with regard to
the on-going criminal investigations, which include some of the following.
13
Timely notification of reasons for arrest and charges within short period of time
63. On 15 May, the SBU apprehended five additional people. Although this took place at
9.00 a.m., the official arrest time has been recorded as 11.50 p.m. – over 12 hours later.
According to Article 208/4 of the Criminal Procedure Code ‘a competent official who
apprehended the person, shall be required to immediately inform the apprehended
person, in a language known to him, of the grounds for the apprehension and of the
commission of what crime he is suspected’. Furthermore, the procedure applied for the
arrest was not in line with Articles 9.2 and 9.3 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR).
64. Similarly eight people apprehended by the SBU on 27 May at the Odesa railway station
did not receive prompt notification of the reasons for their arrest.
Right to a fair trial
65. Law enforcement agencies resorted to an illegal practice in order to prevent prompt
access to legal counsel. Indeed, during criminal interrogation procedures, police and
SBU officers summoned individuals as “witness” and later then substituted their status
as “suspect” and/or substituted their interrogation by interviewing. This resulted in
violating the persons’ right to see and consult a legal counsel (as provided for in Article
208/4 of the Criminal Procedural Code) and gave an opportunity to “delay” the official
time of apprehension.
66. For instance, the eight people who were arrested by the SBU at the Odesa railway
station were transferred to the SBU for an alleged “interview”. They were not informed
about their rights with regard to apprehension, nor were they provided with legal
counsel, nor could they contact their lawyers before and during interrogation.
67. The HRMMU observed, based on interviews with detainees and their relatives, that the
governmental Free Legal Aid scheme (established in connection with the new Criminal
Procedural Code of November 2012) encountered gaps in its system. For the legal
defence of detainees arrested during and after 2 May violence, the Free Legal Aid
system could not provide enough lawyers.
68. As of 4 June, the legal status of the 67 “detainees” released on 4 May from Odesa city
Police Station remained unclear. Due to procedural gaps following their alleged illegal
release (i.e. without a court decision), they remain suspects. The measure of restraint
was not applied to them as required in accordance with the Criminal Procedural Code.
Right to medical care
69. In Ovidiopol and Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi Police Stations medical care was not provided
to those among the 47 detainees who required such assistance due to illness. The
relatives of detainees placed in custody in the Vinnitsa pre-trial detention centre also
reported about the lack of medical care provided to their kin.
Personal data
70. Concerns have been raised with the HRMMU that on 19 May, the presumption of
innocence may have been violated during an official press conference of the MoI, by
the Deputy Minister of Interior/Head of Main Investigation Unit by disclosing personal
data of 12 detainees. The HRMMU reminds the authorities of the importance of
respecting international standards concerning the presumption of innocence and the
prohibition of arbitrary interference with one’s privacy or attacks upon his/her honour
and reputation.
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71. Also on 3 May, the SBU published the names and passports of three citizens from the
Russian Federation allegedly involved in the 2 May violence.
Legality of arrest
72. On 15 May, the SBU conducted an illegal search of an apartment from 8.00 p.m. to
3.00 a.m., without a search warrant and without preparing a report/protocol on the
search. During the search, they broke the door, forced the family, including a girl to lie
down on the floor. A woman (wife/mother) was subsequently arrested and taken to the
SBU Office. The next day she was transferred to the Odesa Police Station. On 17 May,
the Primorsky District Court placed her in custody under Articles 294 (Mass riots) and
110 (Trespass against territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine) of the Criminal
Code. She is currently detained in Odesa pre-trial detention centre.
Accountability: Update on investigations into the Odesa incidents
73. Six official investigations have been initiated to look into the incidents of 2 May in
Odesa and are ongoing: 1) a criminal investigation by the MoI; 2) an investigation of
the General Prosecution Investigation Unit into police conduct; 3) a criminal
investigation by the SBU into alleged state level crimes (including actions aimed at
forceful change or overthrow of the constitutional order); 4) an investigation by the
Ombudsperson; 5) an investigation by the Parliamentary Commission; and 6) an
investigation by a commission comprising civil society representatives under the
auspices of the Governor. During his visit in May, ASG Šimonović met with
interlocutors involved in these various investigations.
74. These parallel investigations by different bodies present a high risk of
miscommunication between the various law enforcement agencies’ commissions,
which may impact the integrity of the criminal investigations. Furthermore, there
appear to be widespread concerns among citizens regarding the ability of local law
enforcement agencies to conduct independent and thorough investigations due to the
politicisation of the 2 May events. The day after the violence, the former acting
President dismissed several local high-ranking officials on the grounds of Article 365
(Excess of authority or official powers) and Article 367 (Neglect of official duty) of the
Criminal Code). An interim government and new officials were appointed at the local
level: the Governor of Odesa, the Head of the Regional MoI, the Head of the Odesa
City Police, and the Head of the Regional Prosecution Office.
Governmental Commission on the issues of numerous deaths of people during
“Pro-Ukrainian” protests and fire in the Trade Union Building in Odesa City
75. During the late evening of 2 May, Vice-Prime Minister Vitalii Yarema was appointed
Head of the Governmental Commission on the issues of numerous deaths of people
during “Pro-Ukrainian” protests and the fire in the Trade Union Building in Odesa City,
which is responsible for overseeing the investigation carried out by the law
enforcement agencies at the Odesa regional and city level. The HRMMU has officially
requested to meet with this Commission, but had not received a response as of 7 June
2014.
Criminal investigation by the Ministry of Interior Investigation Unit
76. On 2 May, a criminal investigation was launched by the Odesa Regional Police
Investigation Department. On 6 May, the responsibility for the investigation was
transferred to the Main Investigation Department of the MoI in Kyiv (under the lead of
Deputy Minister of Interior). According to the law, the investigation process should be
15
completed in 60 days. Investigators from Kyiv, Odesa and other regions are
cooperating on this investigation, which has been launched under the following articles
of the Criminal Code of Ukraine: Article 115/1 (Intentional homicide); Article 194/2
(Intentional destruction or damage of property; Article 294/2 (Mass riots/unrest);
Article 296 (Hooliganism); Article 341/2 (Capturing of the state or public buildings or
constructions); and Article 345 (Threat or violence against law enforcement officer).
General Prosecution Investigation Unit regarding police duty performance
77. On 3 May, the Odesa Regional Prosecutor Office launched a criminal case against four
police officials under Article 365 (Excess of authority or official powers) and Article
367 (Neglect of official duty) of the Criminal code. On 6 May, this investigation was
transferred to the Investigation Unit of the General Prosecutor.
78. According to information provided to the HRMMU by credible sources, the regional
MoI did not enforce the special police tactical plan called “Wave” (“Khvylia”), which
would have allowed the use of special police means and forces, and ensured
coordination of all official emergency units (e.g. health, and the department of
emergency situations).
79. Furthermore, there are credible reports that during the 2 May violence, all high ranking
officials from the Regional MoI and Regional Prosecutor’s Office were holding a
meeting and were unavailable.
80. Since then, several criminal proceedings have been initiated against high-ranking police
officials and policemen. The Deputy Head of the Regional MoI was placed under house
arrest in relation with the 2 May violence and the “release” of the 67 detainees held in
the Odesa Police Station on 4 May. His current whereabouts remain unknown but he is
thought to be outside Ukraine. On 8 May, the Head of the Odesa City Police, the Head
of the Odesa Police Detention Centre and the duty officer were apprehended and
transferred to Kyiv. On 9 May, the Head of the Odesa City Police was released on bail.
Both The Head of the Odesa Police Detention Centre and the duty officer were also
released under obligations to make a personal commitment not to leave Ukraine.
Criminal investigation under the State Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)
81. In mid-March, the SBU initiated a criminal investigation throughout the country under
Articles 109 (Actions aimed at forceful change or overthrow of the constitutional order
or take-over of government) and 110 (Trespass against territorial integrity and
inviolability of Ukraine) of the Criminal Code in relation to threats to national security
and national integrity. As of 15 May, the SBU arrested several people in Odesa region.
According to the HRMMU informal sources, 18 people were placed under investigation
by the SBU and detained in the Odesa pre-trial detention centre between 2 May and 3
June.
82. On 15 May, the SBU arrested five people (four male and one female) who were
allegedly leaving the Odesa region to join armed groups in eastern Ukraine. The
woman was placed under house arrest. Later that day another female “Pro-Federalism”
supporter, allegedly the organiser of the expedition, was arrested and placed in pre-trial
detention in Odesa. One more person was arrested the following day in connection with
the same case. As of 7 June, the HRMMU had no information on his whereabouts.
83. On 27 May, eight men were arrested at the Odesa railway station from a train about to
depart for Moscow. The SBU stated that these people were planning to attend a
“paramilitary training” in Moscow before joining the armed groups in eastern Ukraine.
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On 29 May, the Primorsky District Court charged all of them under Articles 109
(Actions aimed at forceful change or overthrow of the constitutional order or take-over
of government) and 110 (Trespass against territorial integrity and inviolability of
Ukraine) of the Criminal Code. They have been placed in custody in the pre-trial
detention centre in Odesa. One more person was arrested the following day in
connection with the same case. As of 7 June, the HRMMU had no updated information
on his whereabouts.
84. On 28 May, three men, members of the NGO "Orthodox Cossacks", were arrested in
Odesa and on 31 May, they were charged by the Primorsky District Court under
Articles 109 and 110 of the Criminal Code, and placed in custody at the pre-trial
detention centre in Odesa.
Parliamentary Interim Commission of inquiry into the investigation of the death of
citizens in the cities of Odesa, Mariupol and other cities of the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions of Ukraine.
85. On 13 May, the Parliament adopted decision 4852 establishing an” Interim Inquiry
Parliamentary Commission on the investigation of the death of citizens in the cities of
Odesa, Mariupol and other cities of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine”,
further to a proposal by parliamentarians representing the Odesa region. The mandate
of this Commission expires on 15 June, by which date it is to submit its report to
Parliament.
86. The Commission informed the HRMMU that it had already gathered a lot of
information on the violence of 2 May in Odesa, which should be properly analysed and
processed. According to the Head of the Parliamentary Commission, its members met
with officials from Odesa, including the regional SBU divisions, MoI, Prosecutor’s
Office, independent experts, NGOs and suspects under house arrest. He believes many
people are still frightened by the events with some afraid to share important
information. Moreover, he highlighted that the situation in Odesa is not stable yet, and
it is important to optimise the activities of law enforcement bodies in the investigation.
According to him, the criminal investigation by the MoI had only conducted
approximately 7% of the necessary work. The perpetrators of the Odesa events have
still not been identified, with some suspects detained for a few days and then released
by courts. From information gathered by the Commission, there is much questioning
within local communities as to why this happened. There is also a fear that the local
population will use reprisals against suspected persons for the restoration of justice.
Thus, according to the Head of the Commission, the Special Interim Parliamentary
Commission has intensified its contacts with the local community representatives.
Investigation by the Ombudsperson’s Office
87. The Ombudsperson’s Office initiated an evaluation on human rights violations by law
enforcement agencies during the 2 May violence in Odesa. The Ombudsperson and her
team visited Odesa on several occasions and were provided with official documents
from all law enforcement agencies.10
10 The Ombudsperson submitted a report of her findings to the Prosecutor General on 10 June 2014. It is not a
public document.
17
Commission investigating the 2 May violence
88. A commission was established under the auspices of the Head of the Odesa Regional
State Administration (Governor). This commission, which includes civil society
activists, journalists and experts, is conducting its own investigation and intends to play
a public oversight role concerning the official investigation.
89. The commission members are undertaking their work through open sources, without
interfering with the official investigation. It is foreseen that their conclusions will be
published only if all members agree on its content. A first official briefing took place
on 30 May.
Specialised Headquarters providing assistance in the aftermath of 2 May
90. In the aftermath of the 2 May events, the former acting Mayor of Odesa established an
emergency headquarters (HQ) encompassing various departments of the City Council
Executive Committee. It provided assistance to victims and their relatives, such
healthcare, information, social services. It also ran an emergency hotline in the
aftermath of 2 May incidents. The HRMMU has been in daily contact with the staff on
follow-up required, and to enquire about the situation of the victims, particularly
medical care and the list of those declared missing. As of 7 June, the Social Welfare
Department remained the only operational part of this emergency HQ.
91. After the 2 May violence the HRMMU has been monitoring the criminal proceedings
launched by the Office of the General Prosecutor, the MoI and the SBU.
92. As the investigations continue, some key questions must be addressed to ensure
confidence in the investigation and to guarantee accountability, due process and to
enable the communities to fully accept the results of such an investigation. Issues to be
clarified include:
a. the identification of the perpetrators who were shooting at protesters during
the afternoon;
b. the conduct of the police on 2 May - why the police and the fire brigade either
did not react, or were slow to react and who ordered what action;
c. what happened in the Trade Union Building and what caused the fire there;
d. what was the cause of the deaths in the Trade Union Building;
e. the identification of the perpetrators of the incidents and violence surrounding
the fire in the Trade Union Building;
f. the need to guarantee justice for the victims and due process for the detainees.
92. The HRMMU regretfully reports the lack of cooperation from the MoI and the SBU at
the central level.
93. The HRMMU reiterates the need for prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into
the events so as to ensure accountability of all those concerned and to provide redress
and reparations for victims and their families. This process is critical to restore people’s
confidence in the authorities.
C. Investigation into other human rights violations
94. The HRMMU continues to follow closely the investigation into the human rights
violations that occurred in March in 2014 in Kharkiv, including into the “Rymarska
case”, a clash between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian organizations “Oplot” and
“Patriots of Ukraine” on 13 March. On 7 May, it was confirmed that the case had been
transferred from the police to the SBU. Investigations were opened in connection with
18
the role of the police in this case, as well as during the attack by protesters against the
ATN TV station on 7 April. On 5 June, the Deputy Head of the regional SBU informed
the HRMMU that the investigation into “Rymarska case” was ongoing - there were two
suspects, who still had to be detained. The challenging aspect of the investigation is that
many minors participated in the incident, which requires additional measures to ensure
due process.
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES
A. Rule of law
95. During the reporting period, the HRMMU monitored legal and policy developments
affecting human rights and the rule of law. These include the adoption of a
“Memorandum on Concord and Peace” resulting from national roundtable discussions;
legislative amendments to combat discrimination, corruption, and on the situation of
refugees; developments relating to amnesty, lustration of judges, language rights,
internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Crimea, ethnic policy, torture and illtreatment,
the media and the reform of law enforcement agencies.
Constitutional reform
96. Pursuant to an Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of 17 April 2014, debates were
organized on constitutional amendments proposing the decentralization of power to
regions. In accordance with the Geneva Statement of 17 April, roundtables on national
unity, co-organized by the Government of Ukraine and the OSCE, were held on 14, 17
and 21 May. At the first roundtable in Kyiv, the eastern regions of the country were
largely under-represented, with the only official being the Mayor of Donetsk, Mr.
Lukyanchenko (Party of Regions). During the roundtable in Kharkiv, acting Prime
Minister Yatsenyuk declared that the constitution should be amended in order to
provide a special status for the Russian language and national minority languages. With
more representatives present from the east, including local parliamentarians, various
perspectives were raised; at the same time, this brought to the fore an array of diverging
views on the way forward. The roundtable also prepared a Memorandum containing
provisions for a unified society, changes to the Constitution, increasing the local
authorities’ role, and decentralisation of state power.
97. On 20 May, through resolution 4904, Parliament adopted the “Memorandum of
Concord and Peace”, which was drafted during the second roundtable discussion in
Kharkiv. This document foresees the adoption by Parliament of a constitutional reform
package, including the decentralization of power, a special status for the Russian
language, judicial and police reform, and an amnesty law for anti-government
protesters in the east who accept to give up their weapons (except for the perpetrators
of serious crimes against life and physical integrity). The Parliament called on all to
work together to protect, promote and build a democratic Ukraine, and the peaceful
coexistence of all nationalities, religions and political convictions.
International Criminal Court
98. On 23 May, former acting President Oleksandr Turchynov requested the Constitutional
Court to assess whether the Constitution of Ukraine would preclude the ratification of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The document was signed
on 20 January 2000. On 25 February 2014, the Parliament recognised the jurisdiction of
the ICC for acts committed in Ukraine from 21 November 2013 to 22 February 2014.
19
On 9 April, Ukraine informed the Registrar of the Court about this decision. On 25
April, the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC announced a preliminary examination on
the situation in Ukraine to establish whether all the statutory requirements for the
opening of an investigation are met.
99. A Member of the Parliament of Ukraine from Odesa, Sergey Kivalov, registered on 15
May a draft resolution which aims to create the legal and institutional conditions for
those responsible for the deaths of dozens of people in Odesa, on 2 May, to be tried by
the ICC. As of 7 June, the draft resolution11 had not been considered by Parliament.
Crimea
100. On 5 June, Parliament adopted, on first reading, amendments to the Law of Ukraine
“On Securing Citizens’ Rights and Freedoms and the Legal Regime on the Temporary
Occupied Territory of Ukraine”. These amendments aim at making the registration
procedure for those displaced from Crimea easier and faster, especially for those who
wish to re-register their business. Thus, IDPs from Crimea in mainland Ukraine will no
longer need other documents than the national passport.
Amnesty
101. During the reporting period, no actual progress was made in adopting an amnesty law
in relation to the events in the east of the country. On 18 April 2014, the Cabinet of
Ministers prepared a draft law “On the prevention of harassment and punishment of
persons in relation to the events that took place during mass actions of civil resistance
which began on 22 February 2014". The text would exempt from criminal liability all
those who attempted to overthrow the legal government; took part in riots; seized
administrative and public buildings; and violated the territorial integrity of Ukraine,
provided they agreed to voluntarily cease all illegal actions and were not guilty of
“particularly serious crimes”. Four other so-called “amnesty laws” were registered in
Parliament by different political parties between 9 and 23 April. On 6 May, a draft
resolution was registered, calling on Parliament to make the draft law submitted by the
Cabinet of Minister the basis for the adoption of an amnesty law. During his
inauguration speech, on 7 June, President Poroshenko offered to amnesty protesters
who did not have “blood on their hands”.
Discrimination
102. On 13 May, Parliament adopted amendments to the Law “On preventing and
countering discrimination”. The amendments bring the definitions of direct and indirect
discrimination in line with Ukraine’s obligations under the ICCPR and other
international human rights instruments. They include, in particular, the prohibited
grounds listed in Article 2(1) of the Covenant (except “birth”). It should be noted,
however, that the amendments do not integrate the jurisprudence of the UN Human
Rights Committee on the prevention of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. The amendments also provide for criminal, civil and administrative liability
in case of discrimination. While these are positive changes, other legal texts, notably
the Criminal Code, must be brought in line with the anti-discrimination amendments in
11 Draft resolution “On the recognition by Ukraine of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
concerning crimes against humanity having led to very serious consequences, deliberate and planned of mass
killing of citizens in a particularly brutal and cynical way during the peaceful protests on 2 May 2014 in Odesa,
and concerning all perpetrators of these crimes, and on the request to the International Criminal Court to bring
the perpetrators to justice”.
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order to ensure effective remedies for victims and contribute to enhanced prevention of
discrimination.
Anti-corruption
103. On 13 May, Parliament adopted the Law "On amending some legislative acts Ukraine
in the area of state anti-corruption policy in connection with the implementation of the
EU Action Plan on the liberalisation of the visa regime for Ukraine”. The Law provides
for more stringent penalties for corruption offences committed by individuals or legal
entities. In particular, the liability for providing knowingly false data in the declaration
of assets, income and expenses is introduced to the Code on Administrative Offences.
The Law also strengthens the protection of persons reporting on corruption, for
instance, providing for anonymous phone lines for reporting corruption. An external
control of declarations of assets, income, expenses and financial obligations is also to
be introduced. While the amendments are welcome, the key to combatting corruption
lies in the readiness of all government institutions to effectively tackle this phenomenon
and to implement anti-corruption norms in place. In this regard, the HRMMU recalls
that in its concluding observations adopted in May 2014, the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights called on Ukraine to “make politicians, members
of parliament and national and local government officials aware of the economic and
social costs of corruption, and make judges, prosecutors and the police aware of the
need for strict enforcement of the law”.
Torture and ill-treatment
101. On 3 June, the Minister of Justice announced at a press-conference the establishment of
a Special Committee to carry out random inspections of penitentiary institutions, with
broad powers to check violations of human rights and the detention conditions of
prisoners. The Committee will be a permanent body and is to produce monthly reports.
It will comprise representatives of the Ministry of Justice and representatives of civil
society.
102. While welcoming this step, the HRMMU notes that the Ombudsperson was designated
by law as the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) against torture, in line with the
Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Torture. As such, it is
entrusted to conduct visits to places of deprivation of liberty, with the involvement of
civil society, and with a view to preventing human rights violations affecting detainees
or contributing to their elimination. Due to the obvious similarities between mandates
of the Special Committee and the NPM, proper coordination and consultations between
these bodies will be required to ensure the effectiveness of efforts to combat torture and
ill-treatment.
Lustration
103. The Interim Special Commission on the vetting of judges was established on 4 June,
pursuant to Article 3 of the Law "On the restoration of trust in the judiciary in
Ukraine”, which entered into force on 10 May. The Commission consists of five
representatives from the Supreme Court, the Parliament and the Governmental
Commissioner on the Issues of the Anti-Corruption Policy. Legal entities and
individuals will have six months from the date of advertisement of the establishment of
the Commission in the newspaper "Voice of Ukraine" to request examination (vetting)
of judges. Public information about the activities of the Interim Special Commission
will be published on the official website of the High Council of Justice of Ukraine. The
HRMMU reiterates its concern that the immediate dismissal of judges by the Special
21
Commission may put in jeopardy the administration of justice. Any lustration initiatives
should be pursued in full compliance with the fundamental human rights of the people
concerned, including the right to individual review and the right of appeal.
Ethnic and national policy
104. The Minister of Culture stated on 4 June that the Cabinet of Ministers decided to
establish a ‘Council of interethnic consensus’ and to create the position of a
Government commissioner for ethnic and national policy. This official, who has not
been appointed yet, will reportedly be responsible for the implementation of the ethnic
and national policy developed by the Government.
Language
105. On 4 June, a draft law was submitted to Parliament “On the official status of the
Russian language in Ukraine”. The draft law proposes to give “official status” to the
Russian language without compromising the position of Ukrainian as the state
language. The bill proposes to introduce the wide usage of Russian language in state
institutions, courts, educational institutions, mass media, official publications of
legislation and by-laws, pre-trial investigation, advertising and labelling of goods.
Media
106. On 4 June, the Cabinet of Ministers instructed the State Committee on television and
radio broadcasting to prepare a draft law "On Amending Certain Legislative Acts of
Ukraine regarding resisting informational aggression of foreign states". Other
ministries and agencies that will participate in the drafting of the bill will include the
Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, MoI, State Security Service, the National Council on Television and
Radio Broadcasting, and the State Committee on Entrepreneurship of Ukraine. This
development comes after a Ukrainian court banned, in March 2014, broadcasting by
four Russian TV channels in Ukraine, and armed groups in the east having disrupted
broadcasting of Ukrainian channels.
107. The HRMMU is of the view that professional journalism and critical thinking, not
prohibition, are the proper answers to the attempts to distort or manipulate facts.
Everyone, in accordance with article 19 of the ICCPR, should have the right to hold
opinions without interference and to freedom of expression, which includes freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers.
Refugees
108. On 13 May, Parliament adopted amendments to the refugee Law extending the
definition of complementary protection to include persons fleeing armed conflict and
other serious human rights violations. This brings the definition of complementary
protection into line with international and European standards.
109. The HRMMU notes, that certain legal gaps remain, affecting particularly the quality of
due process in the asylum procedure and the reception conditions for asylum-seekers.
The quality of decision-making on asylum applications also remains of concern, as well
as the fact that State funding for asylum matters is inadequate.
Martial law
110. On 3 June, former acting President Oleksandr Turchynov signed decree № 936/2014
“About considering the question of the introduction of martial law in certain areas of
Ukraine”. The decree requests the Secretary of the Council of the National Security and
22
Defence of Ukraine to “immediately cooperate with the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine,
the Ministry of Interior of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, the Administration
of the State Border Service of Ukraine to consider the question about the need to
impose martial law in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions, where the security operation
is taking place, to prevent further development and ensure the ending of the armed
conflict on the territory of Ukraine, to prevent mass deaths of civilians, military
personnel and members of law enforcement agencies, to stabilize the situation and
restore normal life in these regions”.
Law enforcement sector reform
111. On 4 June, Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk instructed the Cabinet of Ministers to set
up a working group that will prepare legislation to reform the law enforcement system
by 1 August 2014. The working group will be headed by First Vice-Prime Minister,
Vitaliy Yarema, who stressed the need to develop draft laws on the police, the security
service and the prosecutor’s office. Experts from the European Commission and Poland
will assist the working group.
112. On 5 June, Parliament adopted the Law "On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine on
combating terrorism". The law provides a definition of a Counter-Terrorist Operation
(CTO), the authority of the CTO participants and other innovations. It also prescribes
the possibility of "physical elimination of the terrorists" in case of resistance. Speaking
at a press conference, the former acting Head of the Presidential Administration gave
his support to the introduction of martial law in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as
well as in the border areas of seven other regions of Ukraine.
B. Freedom of peaceful assembly
113. After the 2 May events in Odesa, a police presence has been highly visible during
peaceful assemblies in all major cities of Ukraine. However, the real or perceived
inaction of law enforcement is a further challenge to ensuring accountability at such
events such as demonstrations, rallies and pickets.
114. Ahead of 9 May (Victory Day), for instance, security was heightened with numerous
checkpoints on roads in several cities the programme of celebrations was changed in
order to avoid situations that could provoke unrests, for example by cancelling parades.
Public commemorations and rallies took place in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Lviv and in many
cities in western and central Ukraine. In Donetsk, a rally gathering 2,000 persons went
peacefully.
115. However, legislation is required to regulate the conduct of assemblies in line with
international standards, as previously recommended by the HRMMU.12
116. A trend of local administration requesting courts to take measures to prevent peaceful
assemblies illustrates the need for relevant legislation. For instance, on 4 June, the
Mykolaiv District Administrative court decided to ban until 30 June all rallies planned
in the city centre further to a request from the City Council. The Mykolaiv City Council
had requested such a prohibition after 2 June when the police intervened to prevent
clashes between participants of two rallies running in parallel. The court justified the
ban, arguing that the right to life and health was more important than the right to
peaceful assembly.
12 The OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine report, 15 April 2014, paras. 52-54.
23
C. Freedom of expression
117. The HRMMU remains concerned about the curtailment of freedom of expression,
including harassment and threats to targeting journalists working in Ukraine, mostly in
eastern regions (see section C, in Chapter V).
118. During the reporting period, a few isolated cases of obstruction to media work and
attacks on journalists were registered across Ukraine.
119. On 23 May, two journalists of “Russia Today”, who were travelling to Ukraine to cover
the elections, were denied entry at Odesa airport. The border officers reportedly forced
them to buy return tickets to Moscow and fly back, without providing any reason.
120. On 25 May and shortly after, journalists were prevented from filming the vote
counting. The HRMMU is aware of such cases having occurred in Sumy,
Dnipropetrovsk, Kremenchuk (Poltava region), Lviv, Mykolaiv, Uzhgorod and Kyiv.
To the knowledge of the HRMMU, none of these instances resulted in physical
violence or damage to equipment.
121. On 23 May, the holding “Multimedia invest group”, based in Kyiv, reported that the
accounts of the company were blocked and its building was searched by tax police.
The management sees this as pressure against its media outlets (newspaper and website
“Vesti”, TV Channel UBR and Radio Vesti) which are critical of the Government.
122. In general, the developments in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine and the large
number of casualties have generated an escalation of hate speech and tension between
the two rival sides. This is particularly obvious in social media.
D. Minority rights
123. The HRMMU regularly meets representatives of various minorities in Ukraine. In the
reporting period no major incidents and human rights violations were reported in that
regard.
National and Ethnic minorities
124. Ethnic minorities generally speak of positive relations and atmosphere conducive to
exercising their human rights, including cultural rights. Some communities, particularly
Russian, expressed concerns with the lack of financial allocations for the needs of
ethnic minorities or bureaucratic obstructions by local authorities, for example, in
establishing additional schools, churches, newspapers, etc.
125. On 20 May, during a press-conference, Josyf Zisels, the Head of the Association of the
Jewish Organisations and Communities of Ukraine, underlined that there was no
increase in anti-Semitism in Ukraine. He noted that the number of anti-Semitic
incidents is declining since 2007. While pointing out that in the first half of 2014 more
Ukrainian Jews had migrated to Israel compared to the previous year, he attributed this
to the social-economic impact of the situation in Crimea and in the eastern regions.
Linguistic rights
126. The guarantees of using one’s mother tongue freely in private and public life without
discrimination remain high on the public agenda. The Law “On the Basics of State
Language Policy” currently in force (provides for the introduction of a “regional
language” based on ethnic composition). However, the Government has recognised
that a new language law was needed, reflecting broad consensus as well as the
24
expectations of the Russian-speaking population. There have been attempts to amend
legislation and a draft law has been developed. The latest draft law was submitted on 4
June, which proposes to provide Russian language with “official status” through
extensive usage in State institutions and public documents (see section D, Chapter IV).
127. On 30 May, the Ministry of Education amended the framework curriculum and study
plans for secondary school students of grades 5-9 for the learning of minority
languages, such as Armenian, Bulgarian, Crimean Tatar, Gagauz, Greek, German,
Hebrew, Hungarian, Korean, Moldovan, Polish, Romanian, Russian and Slovak. The
Ministry also increased significantly the number of hours prescribed for learning of a
minority language in schools where the relevant language is the working one (it is now
equal to the hours of learning Ukrainian language).
Sexual minorities
128. The HRMMU continues to receive reports from the LGBT community regarding lack
of tolerance and daily discrimination based on their sexual orientation and gender
identity, mainly bullying at school/university, difficulties in finding and/or preserving
employment especially when persons disclose their sexual orientation and gender
identity; access to health services, particularly for transgender people; and physical
attacks.
129. On 7 May, the High Specialized Court of Ukraine for Civil and Criminal Cases issued a
letter (N 10-644/0/4-14) to appellate courts, explicitly prohibiting discrimination in
employment on the basis of sexual orientation. The Court stressed that, when
considering cases of labour discrimination, it is important to take into consideration the
existing anti-discrimination law, which prohibits discrimination on any basis.
E. Political rights
Human rights in the electoral process
130. On 25 May, the population of Ukraine voted to elect a new President among 21
candidates. On 3 June, the Central Election Commission (CEC) confirmed that Mr.
Petro Poroshenko had won with 54.7% of the vote.
131. The elections took place in a challenging political, economic and, in particular, security
environment, due to continued unrest and violence in the east of Ukraine, where armed
groups control some areas, and the Government has been conducting security
operations. This situation affected the general human rights situation and seriously
impacted the election environment, also obstructing meaningful observation.
132. Notwithstanding, elections were characterised by a 60% voter turnout and the clear
resolve of the authorities to hold elections in line with international commitments and
with a respect for fundamental freedoms in the vast majority of the country. The voting
and counting process were transparent, despite large queues of voters at polling stations
in some parts of the country.
133. Despite efforts of the election administration to ensure voting throughout the country,
polling did not take place in 10 of the 12 election districts in Luhansk region and 14 of
the 22 election districts in Donetsk region. This was due to illegal activities by armed
groups before, and on, the election day, including death threats and intimidation of
election officials, seizure and destruction of polling materials, as well as the
impossibility to distribute ballots to polling stations due to the general insecurity caused
25
by these groups (see Chapter V). The majority of Ukrainian citizens resident in these
regions were thus deprived of the right to vote. Elsewhere, a few isolated attempts to
disrupt voting were reported.
134. The HRMMU followed the participation of Crimean residents in the Presidential
elections. Simplified registration procedures were put in place to ensure that residents
of Crimea and persons who resettled from Crimea to other regions could take part in
the elections. According to the CEC, 6,000 Crimean residents voted on 25 May.
Political parties/ Freedom of association
135. On 7 May, several political parties were allegedly banned in Luhansk region by a
decision of the “people’s council”, including Batkivchyna, Udar, Svoboda and Oleg
Lyashko’s Radical Party, as well as Right Sector. It also inferred “extended powers” on
Valeriy Bolotov, the self-proclaimed “people’s governor”.
136. On 13 May, the Kyiv District Administrative Court banned the party Russian Bloc
based on the fact that the party leaders had called for the overthrow of the constitutional
order and violations of the territorial integrity of the country.13
137. It appears that the Communist Party of Ukraine is coming under increasing pressure.
On 7 May, the Communist faction of the Parliament was expelled from a closed-door
parliamentary hearing, which was denounced by the Party of Regions faction,
allegedly, because of the “separatist” statements by its head, Petro Symonenko. The
hearing was reportedly about the security operations in the east. Party of the Regions
pointed out that information on these security operations should be made public.
138. On 18 May, former acting President Turchynov called on the Ministry of Justice to
review documents gathered by the law enforcement bodies relating to the alleged illegal
and unconstitutional activities of the Communist Party of Ukraine aimed at violating
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, undermining State security and
illegal seizure of State power. On 19 May, the Ministry of Justice sent a request to the
General Prosecutor’s Office and the SBU to investigate possible crimes by the
leadership of the Communist Party of Ukraine.
F. Internally displaced persons
139. As of 6 June, the departments of social protection in the Ukrainian regions had
identified over 12,70014 internally displaced persons (IDPs)15. However, the actual
number of people who have fled the violence and fighting in the regions of Donetsk
and Luhansk is believed to be higher and increasing daily. According to various
estimates, around 64% are women; many are with children, including infants. The IDPs
live dispersed across the entire territory, with significant concentrations in Kyiv and
Lviv.
13 On 15 April, the Ministry of Justice filed a lawsuit to prohibit the activities of the political parties Russian
Bloc and Russian Unity in Ukraine. The activity of Russian Unity was banned on 30 April. According to
Ukrainian law, a court can ban the activities of a political party upon a request filed by the Ministry of Justice.
14 UNHCR estimated that, as of 16 June, there were 34,336 IDPs in Ukraine, with 15,200 located in the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions.
15 According to the Russian Federation Federal Migration Service, as of 6 June 2014, 837 persons had applied
and were granted refugee status; and 3,750 persons had applied and were granted Temporary Asylum.
Approximately 15% were minors under the age of 18. These figures do not include people from Crimea.
26
140. People have left Crimea for different reasons. The majority have economic,
professional or family ties within Ukraine and do not wish to acquire Russian
citizenship, which many feel compelled to do in order to continue a normal life in
Crimea. Some Crimean Tatars fear limitations to their religious and cultural expression.
Activists and journalists have been exposed to, or fear, harassment.
141. The main difficulties the IDPs from Crimea continue to face are: lack of temporary and
permanent housing; access to social allocations, medical and educational services;
access to bank accounts / deposits; possibility to continue entrepreneurship activity, and
employment opportunities.
142. Despite efforts made, some of these issues, particularly housing, are very difficult to
resolve without systemic changes and involvement of the Government. The HRMMU
has been made aware of some instances when IDPs had to return to Crimea, since their
basic needs could not be met in Ukraine.
143. Displacement from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions started in the days leading up to
the “referendum” held in both regions on 11 May. People have been trying to leave the
violence affected areas, particularly Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, after witnessing
violence on the streets. Armed groups and increasing criminality have generated fear.
144. The HRMMU interviewed several IDPs from the eastern regions, who reported that
apart from random violence, there were targeted attacks and intimidation of activists
and increasingly of “ordinary” residents, known for their “Pro-Ukrainian” stance. Local
NGOs confirmed that while seizing administrative buildings, armed groups obtained
access to personal data of activists who participated in rallies. The latter and their
families were reportedly being threatened and harassed.
145. One of the few interviewed activists reported being threatened and having to stay in a
friend’s house for nine days without food, as her own apartment was under
surveillance. Then other activists helped her escape and settle in another town. She has
no information about her family and suffers from insomnia and anxiety attacks.
146. Political activists and journalists began to feel pressure from the armed groups who
were consolidating their position in the region. After the “referendum” and with the
intensification of violence, other residents of the region have started leaving their
homes in areas affected by violence due to the illegal activities of armed groups and the
security operations, particularly in the areas of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. Many
remain within the eastern regions in rural areas, as IDPs have been reporting
harassment at checkpoints if they were perceived to be leaving the region to seek
protection.
147. The majority of international humanitarian actors, due to security reasons, are unable to
access persons displaced within the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and thus only some
very limited assistance has been provided. IDPs, who leave the eastern regions, have
generally maintained a low profile, fearing retribution against their relatives who have
remained at home.
148. There are considerable gaps in the State’s ability to protect IDPs. The central
authorities have not issued formal instructions regarding how to register and assist
persons displaced from Donetsk and Luhansk regions, leading to different practices
across the country. The system for registering the IDPs is rudimentary, so the number
and profile of IDPs and their needs remain largely invisible. As a result, the actual
number of displaced persons is difficult to estimate.
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149. Regional authorities are waiting for instructions on funding allocations for IDPs from
the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Temporary accommodation, while theoretically
available, cannot be paid for and is thus rationed in many regions. Several
administrative matters remain unresolved, hindering IDPs’ ability to resume a normal
life: many cannot obtain temporary residence registration; register business activities;
or in the case of IDPs from Crimea, who have not registered on the mainland, they may
find that they cannot access their personal savings in bank accounts in Crimea.
150. IDPs from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions describe leaving the region with few
personal belongings in order to disguise the purpose of their departure. Many report
having witnessed violence and experiencing feelings of fear. In dozens of interviews
with UNHCR, IDPs have reported significant deterioration of the humanitarian
situation in the areas affected by violence and the security operations. They are mostly
concerned about security: people report staying in cellars to keep away from the
fighting, facing harassment at checkpoints and fearing the increasingly common
abductions, threats and extortion. They have been reporting to UNHCR and the
HRMMU about the serious social and economic impact of the conflict. Families have
run out of money since jobs are lost, banks closed and pensions unpaid. Public utilities
like electricity and water work only intermittently. Thus, the IDPs from the eastern
regions are particularly vulnerable. There are multiple reports that thousands of people
are eager to escape the areas affected by violence and the security operations as soon as
they can safely move.
151. Many IDPs have exhausted their resources. Having originally been hosted by friends,
family or even generous strangers identified through social networks, they find
themselves under pressure to move out of these temporary housing arrangements, as
conditions are overcrowded and hospitality reaches its limits. Without sufficient
support to find jobs and housing, IDPs report increasing levels of frustration and
humanitarian needs. Increasingly, IDPs are trying to self-organise into NGOs to help
each other, as illustrated by Crimea SOS, Vostok SOS, the Unified Coordination Centre
of Donbas. On 23 May, the HRMMU attended the first all-Ukrainian meeting
organized by an initiative group of IDPs from Crimea to bring the problems faced by
IDPs to the attention of the Government and local authorities so as to develop joint
solutions.
V. PARTICULAR HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES IN THE EAST
A. Impact of the security situation on human rights
Deterioration of the security situation
152. The reporting period was marked by a significant deterioration in the security situation
in eastern Ukraine. The HRMMU received credible reports illustrating an escalation of
abductions, arbitrary detentions, ill-treatment, looting, as well as the occupation of
public and administration buildings (with certain fluctuations, as some buildings are
recovered by the Ukrainian military and law enforcement bodies, and some then again
re-seized by armed groups). The period since the Presidential elections can be
characterized by an increase of fighting in eastern Ukraine, with fluctuations in
intensity.
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153. The regularity and intensification of fighting between the armed groups and Ukrainian
armed forces raises serious human rights concerns, including but not limited to: the fate
of persons not involved in the fighting, especially children; the necessity and
proportionality of the use of force; and the large-scale destructions, which only add to
the social and economic hardship and a general lack of respect for international
humanitarian law, when and where applicable to the fighting.
154. Violence and lawlessness have spread in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. Having
gained access to deposits of weapons, including from the SBU building, the armed
groups increasingly started spreading violence. Abductions of persons not involved in
any fighting and related acts of arbitrary detentions, looting, and killings of persons not
involved in any fighting and other activities in violation of international law have been
carried out by the armed groups. Moreover there are reports of victims being subjected
to degrading treatment, random shooting and provocations, particularly near the
Ukrainian-Russian border. Increasingly, attacks target ordinary people, who take no
part in the fighting.
155. The security operations by the Government, with military and National Guard forces
particularly concentrated around the town of Slovyansk, are present in the regions of
Donetsk and Luhansk. With their superior manpower and military hardware, the
Ukrainian armed forces have controlled access to the cities through multiple layers of
check-points.
156. Skirmishes between armed groups and the Ukrainian military also saw the inclusion of
various territorial defence battalions under the command of the MoI.
157. The HRMMU observed an increasing presence of armed men on trucks and armoured
vehicles moving around the city of Donetsk during daylight. For the first time, the
HRMMU team members were stopped as they drove in their vehicle through Donetsk
by armed persons who demanded to see their identity.
158. In the two regions, the situation has been made complex as some of the armed groups
operating in the regions have reportedly slipped out of the control and influence of the
self-proclaimed republics and their leaders. Examples of this can reportedly be found
with the armed groups in the area surrounding the town of Horlivka16 in the Donetsk
region, and the armed groups operating in the border area of the Luhansk region near
the border with the Russian Federation. Moreover, on the “official” “Donetsk People’s
Republic” media outlet “Anna Info News”, the Slovyansk commander “Strelkov” Igor
Girkin referred to “criminal groups” operating in the regions and that the “Donetsk
People’s Republic” was lacking volunteers.
159. Regardless of the veracity of this information, the proliferation of armed groups has
clearly exacerbated threats to the security of the population, posing a further challenge
in ensuring the rule of law and accountability for the numerous illegal acts committed.
The “Donetsk People’s Republic” has reported the presence among them of citizens of
the Russian Federation, including from Chechnya and other republics in the North
Caucasus. A particular call for women to join the armed groups was made on 17 May
through a video released with Igor Girkin “Strelkov”, urging women of the Donetsk
region to enlist in combat units.
16 Now reportedly under the control of an armed group led by Igor Bezler.
29
“Referendum” on “self-rule” held in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions on 11 May
160. On 11 May, a “referendum” on “self-rule” that was neither in accordance with the
Constitution of Ukraine nor with effect under international law, took place in the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions. The following question was asked: “Do you support the act of selfrule
of the People’s Republic of Donetsk / People’s Republic of Luhansk?” The
Government of Ukraine deemed the “referendum” illegal.
161. Reports suggest that there were a limited number of polling stations for the two regions.
The official voter registration of the Central Election Commission was not used as a basis
for the vote. Media outlets and journalists observing the “referendum” reported a number
of violations (e.g. one person filling out several ballots; multiple voting; voting without
documentation).
162. In the aftermath of the “referendum” of 11 May, the level of violence by armed groups
intensified. At the same time, a new “government” was formed, and Alexander Borodai, a
Russian citizen, nominated as “prime minister” of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”. A call
was made for Ukrainian troops to leave the region.
Casualties due to the escalation in intensity of fighting as Government aims to gain
control of the territory
165. Reports illustrate that over the past month, attacks and fighting have been intensifying
with an increased number of casualties. Fighting remained concentrated in the northern
part of the Donetsk region and the border areas and south of the Luhansk region. In the
Kharkiv region, one Ukrainian serviceman was killed in an ambush, near the city of
Izyum, on the border with the Donetsk region, which serves as a basis for the security
operations of the Ukrainian forces.
166. On 3 June, the Prosecutor General Oleg Mahnіtsky announced that 181 people had been
killed since the start of the Government’s security operations on 14 April to regain control
of the eastern regions. Of those killed, 59 were Ukrainian soldiers; the others were
reported to be residents. 293 were wounded as a result of these security operations in the
Donetsk and Luhansk Regions. This is a considerable increase since 14 May, when the
Prosecutor General had announced 68 killed (servicemen and residents).
167. The HRMMU is trying to verify these allegations and to obtain disaggregated data on the
victims and perpetrators. This is, however, difficult to obtain due to either a lack of, or
contradictory, information.
168. On 13 May, a Ukrainian military unit was ambushed near Kramatorsk, killing seven
Ukrainian soldiers. On 22 May, 17 Ukrainian servicemen were killed and 31 injured near
Volnovakha (south of Donetsk); that same day another soldier was killed and two others
injured in an attack by armed men on a convoy of military vehicles near Rubizhne in the
Luhansk region. On 23 May, the territorial defence battalion “Donbas” was ambushed and
attacked by an armed group, reportedly controlled by Igor Bezler, near the town of
Horlivka close to Donetsk. Nine soldiers were wounded and detained by Bezler’s group;
one was reportedly killed. On 29 May, a Ukrainian military helicopter was shot down near
Slovyansk, which killed 12 service personnel who were on board, including a General.
169. On 26 May, fighting broke out for control of the Donetsk airport between the armed
groups and the Ukrainian military. Ukrainian military planes and helicopters were used
against the armed groups who eventually conceded control. The airport terminal and the
runway were damaged as a result of aerial bombing. According to the Interior Minister,
there were no losses within the Ukrainian military but according to various sources, the
30
armed groups suffered over 50 casualties, of these at least 31 volunteers were reportedly
from the Russian Federation, including from Chechnya and other republics in the Northern
Caucasus. Out of these casualties, 30 bodies of those fighting with the armed groups have
not been recovered.
170. During the fighting around Donetsk airport on 26 May, the Mayor called on the population
not to leave their apartments unless absolutely necessary. Notwithstanding, residents did
become victims. A woman was killed by a shell at a bus stop. A man was killed as a result
of an incoming explosion near the Children's Hospital, with a further six people wounded,
including a seven-year-old boy who was at home. A criminal case was opened under
Article 258, Part 3 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (“Terrorist act that led to the death of
a person”).
171. On 2 June, an explosion of an unknown nature took place at the occupied building of
Luhansk Regional State Administration. According to various accounts, it was either a
failed attempt by the local armed groups to hit a Ukrainian fighter plane, or the
bombardment of the occupied building by a Ukrainian plane. Seven people in, and around,
the occupied building were reported killed as a result of the shelling, including the
“minister of health” of the “Luhansk People’s Republic”, Nataliya Arkhipova.
172. The Ukrainian National Guard took control of the town of Krasnyi Liman (20 km North-
West of Slovyansk) after fierce fighting on 3 June. The town hospital was badly damaged
reportedly by shelling and most patients were evacuated to the basement of the hospital.
Two civilians were killed. The chief surgeon of the hospital was gravely wounded, and
died on 4 June.
173. IDPs from Slovyansk have described to the HRMMU the situation they have faced for the
past weeks. They claim that the Ukrainian air force was shelling the city and bombed a
kindergarten. They also said that for two months they did not receive any social benefits.
Some of them left male members behind, and/or their parents or grandparents. A hotline at
the disposal of IDPs or people who are considering leaving the areas affected by fighting
is run by a few Red Cross activists. Transport of people who come to the check points is
mostly organized by “Auto-Maidan” activists. Reception centres for arriving IDPs
organised the initial assistance they received, including psycho-social.
Widening protection gap and erosion of the rule of law
174. With the presence of armed groups in seized and occupied government buildings, and
checkpoints, which shift hands as they are taken over by armed groups or the Ukrainian
security and law enforcement units involved in the security operations, the human rights of
the residents of the northern part of Donetsk region and parts of the Luhansk region are
threatened.
175. With the demise of security, the rule of law and governance, the protection gap is
widening. Armed groups physically occupy key public and administrative buildings in
many cities and towns of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and have declared virtual
“independence”. However, they are not undertaking any governing responsibilities. In
addition, the atmosphere of fear and intimidation, particularly following the abductions
and killing of town councillors and public civil servants, prevent many local officials from
going to work.
176. Of particular concern is the continued erosion of the rule of law and the limited capacity of
the Government to protect residents from the ever increasing acts of violence. Many of the
attacks and abductions by armed groups target journalists, elected representatives and civil
31
society activists. The number of armed robberies and shootings of residents has also been
increasing.
177. The difficulty of providing public services impacts the daily life of residents of the
regions, including the disruption of public transport (airports remain closed and rail
services are disrupted); numerous checkpoints on the roads; lack of access to cash through
banks; and earlier reports of schools and kindergartens being repeatedly closed before the
summer holidays began in early June. Regional governments have endeavoured to make
the necessary arrangements so that local residents are able to carry on with their daily
lives. While this remains possible in the larger cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, and the less
affected southern part of the Donetsk region, this is a challenge in the northern part of the
Donetsk region. As a consequence, there are reportedly increased numbers of people
leaving the area, in particular in the areas of Slovyansk; primarily women with children
(see section B, Chapter V).
178. In the main cities, there were a few rallies supporting or opposing the self-proclaimed
republics. On 13 May, hundreds of local residents of the Luhansk region addressed a
petition to the Government of Ukraine, stating that they did not recognise the results of the
“referendum", and demanding more proactive and effective action to free the region from
“terrorists who do not allow us to live in peace” and to pay more attention to the concerns
of the population.
179. According to NGOs, the week preceding the “referendum” of 11 May, over 500
apartments were reportedly put up for sale in Donetsk in just a few days as people were
seeking means to leave. Since then, an average of 20 families leave the region every day.
Presidential elections
180. After the “referendum”, representatives of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” openly
declared their intention to obstruct the 25 May Presidential election. Physical attempts to
disrupt the election in these two regions were stepped up, with reports of attacks against
electoral commissions. As a result, the CEC stated that in 24 districts of the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions the election was obstructed due to illegal acts by armed groups and
supporters of the self-proclaimed “People’s Republics”. According to official CEC
figures, 82 % of the voters in the Donetsk region, and 88 % of voters in Luhansk region
were thus deprived of their right to vote. Elections of Mayors due to take place in
Antratsyt, Lisichansk and Severodonetsk in the Luhansk region also had to be cancelled
due to such illegal activities.
181. There was a similar pattern of attacks on District Election Commissions (DEC) and
Precinct Election Commissions (PEC). An armed group of between five to fifteen people
representing the “Donetsk People’s Republic” would come to a Commission or polling
station. Claiming that the Presidential election was illegal, they would seize office
equipment and DEC/PEC protocols and stamps. Generally, they would detain the head of
the commission for several hours or, in some cases for several days, subjecting individuals
to interrogation and reportedly at times ill-treatment and torture.
182. On 13 May, representatives of the “Donetsk People's Republic” reportedly entered a DEC
in Horlivka, demanding documents and office equipment and requesting that the staff
leave the premises. The electoral staff refused to obey this. Two hours later the men
returned, armed with baseball bats. The staff left, grabbing the most important documents
and official stamps. A similar incident occurred in a DEC in Starobeshevo (Luhansk
region) on 14 May. The DEC members were ordered to leave the building with threats to
their families, should they return.
32
183. On 7 May, unknown groups of people broke into a DEC in Kuybyshevskiy district, seizing
equipment containing electoral information. Upon arrival at the scene, the police did not
intervene. Other examples of attacks by armed groups on DECs and TECs include
incidents in Artemivsk, Donetsk and Metalist (near Amrosiyivka) on 20, 21 and 25 May.
184. Election commission members also faced attacks, with many abducted and detained. On 9
May, an armed group abducted a member of the DEC in Kramatorsk. He was taken to the
occupied City Council and released after being interrogated. On 20 May, a member of the
PEC in Mariupol was detained by armed persons, beaten up and then released.
185. Skirmishes around the electoral process included an incident on 25 May, when a group of
armed people of the “Luhansk People’s Republic” reportedly attacked and stole the ballots
from the PEC in Novoaydarsk in the Luhansk region. Ukrainian soldiers pursued the
armed group. A violent confrontation took place, during which two members of the armed
group were reportedly killed and three Ukrainian army servicemen were allegedly
wounded. 14 people were subsequently detained by the Ukrainian army. Other accounts
claim that three people were injured and one person was killed.
186. On the election day, five election commission members from Donetsk were detained by
armed persons and taken to the SBU building. Following an intervention by the HRMMU
with representatives of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” at the occupied SBU building,
they were released the next day.
187. Such attacks prevented DECs and PECs to continue their preparations for the Presidential
election, which led to widespread limitations to exercise of the right to vote in eastern
Ukraine, notably in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.
188. On 26 May, the “speaker” of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”, Denis Pushylin,
announced that a visit of the newly-elected President Petro Poroshenko to the Donbas
would “heat up” the situation in the Donetsk region, and that dialogue was possible only
through mediation by the Russian Federation. According to him, the “Donetsk People’s
Republic” had proclaimed “martial law” on “its” territory and that a curfew might be
imposed in certain areas.
B. Right to life, liberty and security
189. On 9 May, as reported by the MoI, some 60 men armed with automatic weapons stormed
and seized the Mariupol Department of the MoI. The security operations which involved
the National Guard, the special unit “Azov”, the special unit “Dnepr” and the armed forces
of Ukraine, tried to take back the building. As a result, nine people were killed and many
were wounded, primarily residents.
190. Unidentified armed persons reportedly started firing from the second floor of the building,
and the Ukrainian forces fired back. Reportedly, the National Guard servicemen who were
outside started firing at the building with machine guns and rocket propelled grenades. As
a result, a fire started in the building. The fire brigade arrived. Those who were inside
started running out the building and dispersing in the city.
191. In the early afternoon, while retreating, the special unit “Azov” came across local “Pro-
Russian” demonstrators who reportedly tried to stop them. Members of the special unit
“Azov” reportedly fired warning shots, first into the air, and then at people’s legs. The
HRMMU is verifying this information.
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192. After the armed forces left the military base in Mariupol, it was looted by “Pro-Russian”
activists, who reportedly took an unknown number of weapons, ammunitions and two
armoured vehicles. The Ukrainian security and law enforcement forces were relocated
outside the city in an effort to decrease tensions, and for the safety of residents.
193. According to the MoI, 20 armed persons were killed and four captured; while the Public
Health Department of the Donetsk Regional State Administration asserts that three
persons were killed. The Chief of the Traffic Police was confirmed killed; and the Chief of
Police was abducted and illegally detained. On his release on 11 May, confirmed by the
MoI, he was found to have multiple injuries. The HRMMU is trying to verify this
information.
194. Human rights activists from the NGO Memorial who visited Mariupol on 11 May reported
finding 15 wounded men at Mariupol City Clinic Hospital № 1. Six police officers were
hospitalised and the first civilian victims were brought later to the hospital. The Mariupol
Emergency Hospital received 10 wounded persons, of whom one (a police officer) died.
15 wounded people were brought to Mariupol City Clinic Hospital № 2. As reported to
the HRMMU by the human rights defenders, the majority of those wounded were not
involved in the fighting.
195. The HRMMU continues to highlight the need for a prompt and comprehensive
investigation into these events.
Abduction and detentions
196. In the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, a reported escalation of violence and violations of
international law (abductions and acts of arbitrary detention targeting persons not involved
in the fighting, intimidation and harassment, torture and killings) by armed groups
illustrated the growing erosion of law and order. The HRMMU is increasingly concerned
about guarantees for the protection of human rights of the general population. According
to the MoI, from April to 7 June 2014, armed groups in the eastern regions abducted 387
people, among them 39 journalists.
197. Below are some of the many cases reported to the HRMMU during the period covered by
the present report. The HRMMU is keeping track of reports of abductions and acts of
arbitrary detention targeting persons not involved in the fighting, intimidation and
harassment, torture and killings in eastern Ukraine. It is trying to verify such reports
through direct contacts with the victims and/or relatives or through other reliable sources.
From its own records, the HRMMU is aware of 222 cases of abductions and detentions by
armed groups since 13 April. Of these, 4 were killed; 137 released; and 81 remained
detained as of 7 June.
198. The pattern of abductions consists of groups of armed men taking people away and
detaining them in one of the buildings they occupy on the grounds that they are members
of the Right Sector and “spies”. Some are released after a few hours, some after a few
days, and there are numerous accounts of allegations of ill-treatment and torture.
199. According to local activists from Kramatorsk, on 9 May, about 40 residents of the city
were abducted by the “Donetsk People’s Republic”. On 10 May, three “Pro-Ukrainian”
female activists not involved in any fighting were abducted and detained by armed persons
in Kramatorsk. One of them was released the next day after being reportedly subjected to
torture during interrogation. She was subsequently hospitalised in Slovyansk, suffering
from broken ribs, a pierced liver, a head injury and multiple bruises. The other two women
were released on 13 May and placed under so-called “house arrest”, reportedly prohibited
from leaving Kramatorsk.
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200. On 8 May, a woman went to Slovyansk to try to secure the release of her son detained by
the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and was reportedly abducted by the same armed persons.
She has cancer and was undergoing chemotherapy. The whereabouts of a female
interpreter was unknown from 4 to 18 May. Upon her release, she reported having been
detained by armed groups in Donetsk and to having being subjected to ill-treatment and
sexual assault.
201. On 26 May, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) lost contact in the town of
Antrazyt, with one of its Donetsk-based teams, consisting of four persons. On 29 May,
contact was lost with another team of four in the Luhansk region. As of 7 June, the eight
remained detained and their whereabouts unknown. 11 other OSCE SMM members were
stopped on 28 May for a few hours at a checkpoint in Mariynka (Donetsk region) before
being able to return safely to Donetsk.
202. On 25 May, two officers of the SBU were reportedly detained by the “Luhansk People’s
Republic” while attempting to negotiate the release of their colleagues who were being
detained. Their current location remains unknown. On 2 June, three police officers of the
Amvrosievka District Department of the MoI were reportedly abducted; their whereabouts
remain unknown although there are reports they might be detained by armed groups in
Horlivka. Two senior police officers went to Horlivka to negotiate their release. They have
not returned and their whereabouts is also unknown.
203. The HRMMU was involved in efforts to negotiate the release of individuals detained by
the armed groups under the control of the “Donetsk People’s Republic and the “Luhansk
People’s Republic”. Following repeated interventions, several civic activists and members
of district election commissions were released from the SBU building in Donetsk on 27
May. During the night of 29-30 May, 20 civilians detained in the SBU building were
released following discussions between the HRMMU and representatives of the “Donetsk
People’s Republic”.
204. The HRMMU appealed to the leadership of the “Luhansk People’s Republic” on 26 May
for the release of two detained journalists at the occupied building of the SBU in Luhansk.
A similar release took place of a third journalist. They were all detained by armed groups
for having covered the elections in the Donetsk region. While in detention, two of the
journalists were badly beaten, and were hospitalised upon their release.
205. The emergence of ransom demands is a worrisome trend, following abductions of people
from their homes and in some cases accompanied by looting and stealing of valuables,
including cars. For example, on 9-10 May, an armed group together with police officers
allegedly abducted the parents of a local activist from “Svoboda”, from their home in the
village Khanzhenkovo (near Makyivka, Donetsk region). On 10 May, the home of an
activist from Kramatorsk was allegedly attacked and items stolen by armed persons.
Applicable international law prohibits the taking of hostages for purposes of demanding
ransom or political concessions, regardless of whether the victims are of the general
population or involved in the fighting.
206. On 26 May, three deputy prosecutors were abducted by armed men, but two were
immediately released. The third was subsequently exchanged for three supporters of the
“Donetsk People’s Republic” who were being detained in the Lukyanovskoe pre-trial
detention centre in Kyiv. That same day, a traffic police officer was taken hostage by an
armed group of “Cossacks” in Antratsyt in Luhansk region. The family was asked for a
ransom of one million UAH (approximately 80,000 USD).
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207. Although most of the persons detained are activists, journalists, and town councillors,
NGOs in Donetsk have highlighted to the HRMMU a growing pattern of the systematic
persecution against civil society. According to them, fear is spreading in the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions, with an increasing number of acts of intimidation and violence by armed
groups, targeting “ordinary” people who support Ukrainian unity or who openly oppose
the either of the two “people’s republics”.
208. Among cases brought to the attention of the HRMMU, on 14 May, four armed men in
camouflage reportedly abducted the principal of a school in Luhansk from the school
premises. Allegedly, she had opposed holding the “referendum” on the school premises.
She was released a few hours later, but refused to speak about the incident. The same day
in Kramatorsk, armed men came to the apartment of an employee and reportedly abducted
him. Reportedly they were looking for his 16-year old son, allegedly because of his active
“Pro-Ukrainian” position, including in the social media. Since the son was not to be found,
they took the father to the occupied building of the Kramatorsk City Council where he was
beaten. Allegedly, they eventually found the son and took him to the city council. Both
were released a few hours later, and the whole family left the region the same day.
Killings
209. Increasingly residents have been killed by armed groups. On 8 May, the burned body of
Valeriy Salo, a farmer and head of a local cultural organization known as a “Pro-Maidan”
activist, was found a day after he had been abducted by armed persons from his village.
There have also been several reports of killings at checkpoints held by armed groups. That
same day, an Orthodox priest was shot dead at a checkpoint near his hometown of
Druzhivka, and a couple was also shot dead in their car at a checkpoint in the Luhansk
region. Their daughter survived with head injuries. In the same region, on 23 May, a
woman who allegedly did not stop at a checkpoint died when heavy gun fire was opened
at her car.
210. The HRMMU is also concerned about reports of “summary executions” by representatives
of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”. On 18 May, in a village near Slovyansk an elderly
farmer was accused of bringing food to the Ukrainian forces, taken out of his house into
the yard, where according to witnesses a “sentence” was read in the name of the “Donetsk
People’s Republic” and shot dead, in front of his family and neighbours. Reportedly, on
26 May, by order of Igor Strelkov, Dmytro Slavov (“commander of a company of the
people’s militia”) and Mykola Lukyanov (“commander of a platoon of the militia of
”Donetsk People’s Republic”) were “executed” in Slovyansk, after they were “sentenced”
for “looting, armed robbery, kidnapping and abandoning the battle field”. The order,
which was circulated widely and posted in the streets in Slovyansk, referred to a decree of
the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR of 22 June 1941 as the basis for the
execution.
Torture
211. The HRMMU has been following cases of individuals who have been abducted and
detained by armed groups in eastern Ukraine. Several interviews conducted with persons
who were abducted provide vivid accounts of human rights abuses committed by
representatives of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the “Luhansk People’s Republic”,
including beatings, psychological torture and mock executions. There are instances of
relatives of detained persons, including women and children, having been threatened and
terrorised. Witnesses also mention having seen supporters of the “Donetsk People’s
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Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic” being detained and subjected to harsh
punishment for looting or insubordination.
212. Among the numerous cases reported to the HRMMU, a journalist from Lutsk who was
abducted by armed groups in Donetsk on 25 April, stated that during 23 days of his
detention, he suffered from permanent lack of drinking water. He was reportedly tortured
with electric shocks, beaten repeatedly over the head with a heavy book, and his captors
reportedly tried to cut off one of his fingers.
213. An activist of “Batkivschyna”, abducted on 22 May and detained by supporters of the
“Donetsk People’s Republic” in Donetsk, reported being subjected to torture and forced
labour while in detention. He stated that he only received food twice in the five days he
was detained. He was interrogated about affiliation with the “Right Sector”, with
“Euromaidan”, and trips to Kyiv. During one of the interrogations he was reportedly
subjected to a mock execution.
214. Three activists of a local human rights NGO were detained in Donetsk on 27 May and
released on 1 June. They were taken to the occupied building of the Makiyivka
Department of Organized Crime Control, and interrogated on a daily basis, accused of
being affiliated to the “Right Sector” and the Ukrainian military. Both of them allege
having been tortured.
Enforced disappearances
215. The HRMMU has received credible reports of individuals being detained in conditions
that amount to enforced disappearance, and has a list of 11 such cases.
216. On 10 May, units of the Ukrainian armed forces allegedly detained a streamer, who was
covering the activities of armed groups, in particular, the attacks on the government
buildings in Donetsk region. The HRMMU filed a request to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA), asking about the current location of the individual. On 15 May, the
HRMMU was informed by the MFA that a criminal case was opened by the MoI underhe
Article 115 (Murder) of the Criminal Code.
217. In an earlier case of concern, working with the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM),
the HRMMU was able to identify the location of an individual whose whereabouts had
been unknown for nine days. The location of an activist of the “Donetsk People’s
Republic” was identified on 26 May, after he had been allegedly detained by the National
Guard on 17 April in the area of Amvrosiyivka. After enquiries made by the NPM, the
activist was located in the pre-trial detention centre in Dnipropetrovsk. It remains
unknown who exactly arrested the activist and why access was not granted to him for nine
days. The NPM confirmed that he had no health complaints, besides having "a few minor
bruises" on his body. It is checking on access to legal counsel for him. It is also unclear
whether the activist has been officially charged.
218. This has put in motion a good practice for partnership with the NPM on such cases, which
was key in drawing attention to the case of the enforced disappearance for six days of two
LifeNews journalists, Oleg Sidyakin and Marat Saychenko. Both were detained on 18
May near Kramatorsk during a raid by Ukrainian forces against armed groups. The
whereabouts of the two journalists was unknown until their release on the evening of 24
May, when they were flown to Moscow via Grozny. All attempts by their lawyers to be in
contact with them, and gain some access to the two individuals, had failed. The HRMMU
worked with the lawyers of the two journalists, and with others including the
Ombudsperson, the NPM and the MFA. Through these institutions, requests were made on
the case to the General Prosecutor, MoI and SBU. Upon their release, the journalists
37
asserted that they were beaten in the first two days of their detention, initially held in a
hole, blindfolded with hands tied, and then transferred to Kyiv. For the period from 18
May to 24 May, the journalists were effectively held in conditions that amounted to
enforced disappearance.
219. The HRMMU was also looking into the detention conditions of supporters of the
“Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic” detained by the Ukrainian
forces during the security operations. Regular visits to places of detention take place,
including in Kyiv when persons arrested have been transferred to detention facilities in the
capital. The HRMMU actively cooperates with the Ombudsperson and the NPM to make
sure the human rights of detained persons are upheld, including from the point of view of
access to medication and to the services of a lawyer.
Children
220. The HRMMU is particularly concerned about the impact of the situation in eastern
Ukraine - especially in the area between Donetsk and Slovyansk - on the human rights of
women, and the most vulnerable persons - children and persons with disabilities, including
those in institutional care, older persons, and those needing medical assistance.
221. According to a rapid psychological assessment of 204 children conducted by the
UNICEF17 in four cities of the region of Donetsk from 15 to 22 May, nearly every second
child experienced fear, anger, sadness or problems with sleep. Other behavioural changes
were also observed in a number of children.
222. According to Donetsk Regional State Administration, in the period between 9 – 30 May,
seven children had been wounded as a result of the illegal activities of the armed groups.
According to credible reports received by the HRMMU, 14 children from the children’s
institution in Slovyansk have been evacuated from the city. An NGO in Kharkiv expressed
concern that there were no evacuation plans for persons with disabilities living in closed
institutions. On 7 June, the Ministry of Social Policy informed the HRMMU that out of
1,494 children who are in closed institutions (children’s institutions, shelters, and so forth)
in Donetsk region, 663 have been evacuated; in Luhansk region out of 760 children, 464
have been evacuated.
223. As fighting intensifies and with the end of the school year on 30 May, parents are
reportedly increasingly looking for ways to evacuate their children to safety. There is
information that a group of children from Slovyansk has arrived in Crimea and most
recently on 6 June to Odesa. On 30 May, various media outlets informed that a group of
148 children from Slovyansk was taken to a summer camp in Crimea. There were also
reports that on 31 May, a group of 21 children crossed into the Russian Federation on foot,
after having to disembark from their bus at the border. This information cannot be verified
by the HRMMU.
C. Freedom of expression
224. Journalists’ safety continues to be a serious issue in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions due
to fighting between the Government’s security forces and armed groups. On 24 May, an
Italian photojournalist, Andrea Rocchelli, and his interpreter, Andrey Mironov, Russian
citizen, were killed under mortar fire, while covering fighting between government forces
and armed groups in Andreyevka near Slovyansk, Donetsk region. On 9 May, it was
17 UNICEF, Rapid Psychosocial Assessment of Children in Donetsk Oblast, 2014.
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reported that a freelance cameraman of the video agency RUPTLY, which is part of the
TV channel Russia Today, was wounded while filming events in Mariupol. Reportedly, he
received necessary medical treatment and is in satisfactory condition.
225. The working environment for journalists has become increasingly dangerous, with the
threat of abduction and illegal detention by armed groups. On 7 May, it was reported that
armed groups in Luhansk offered a reward of USD 2,000-10,000 for each detained
journalist. The HRMMU continues to closely monitor cases of detentions of journalists in
Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Although all but one of the journalists abducted and known
to the HRMMU before 6 May (cut-off date of the previous report) have been released, the
HRMMU is aware of new cases abducted after that date. The HRMMU interviewed many
of the released journalists, who reported ill-treatment, beatings, and sexual harassment (of
women). They also confirmed the fact that other detainees were being kept in the seized
administrative buildings; but the exact number and their identities remain unknown.
226. Also, journalists and editorial offices continue to be threatened and intimidated by armed
groups. For instance, on 14 May, the HRMMU received credible reports that those
journalists who work in the region but refuse to comply with the orders of the “Donetsk
People’s Republic” are threatened and harassed. Reportedly, the state regional television is
in a particularly difficult situation; its office has been practically blocked by
approximately 100 heavily armed men. On 21 May, an unidentified man called the
editorial office of the Public television of Donetsk region and threatened its journalists.
227. Local journalists have reported having to flee Donetsk and Luhansk regions due to such
threats and intimidation. On 8 May, two journalists from Donetsk had to move to Lviv out
of fear of persecution and threats. On 13 May, an internet resource in Severodonetsk
(Luhansk region) announced the forced suspension of activities and advised its journalists
to leave the town because of growing pressure and threats against their lives from the
armed groups. On 27 May, the editorial office of another local web-based outlet was
forced to relocate to a different town, reportedly, due to threats from the self-proclaimed
“Army of the South-East”. On 26 May, it was reported that the publisher and editor in
chief of one of the local newspapers in Kramatorsk was forced to flee the region with his
family due to threats they were receiving after he had refused to publish materials armed
representatives of “Donetsk People’s Republic” demanded him to publish.
Arbitrary arrests of journalists
228. In the reporting period, Ukrainian and Russian journalists have been arbitrarily arrested;
this raises concerns about the possibility for journalists to conduct their professional
activities safely.
· On 10 May, a journalist of Russian TV channel Kuibishev 61, was allegedly
detained by the Ukrainian security forces at a checkpoint on the road between
Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. His whereabouts remain unknown to the family. On
22 May, the HRMMU sent an official inquiry to the MoI (via the MFA) about the
case. On 5 June, the HRMMU was informed that as of 15 May a criminal
investigation had been opened under Article 115 (Murder) of the Criminal Code.
The HRMMU has requested more information on this case.
· On 15 May, a journalist and cameraman of the ICTV Ukrainian channel were
arrested on the border (Kharkiv / Belhorod) while performing editorial tasks by
the Border Service and Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation,.
Reportedly, after more than 15 hours of questioning without water and food and
deleting all photo and video materials, the journalists were released.
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· Two LifeNews journalists, Oleg Sidyakin and Marat Saychenko, were detained on
18 May near Kramatorsk during a raid by Ukrainian forces against the armed
groups. They were released on 24 May (see section B, chapter V).
· The HRMMU also followed closely the case of a British journalist working for
Russia Today detained by the National Guard in Mariupol on 20 May for
allegedly filming military objects. He was released on 21 May and transferred to
the Consulate of the United Kingdom in Kyiv. After his release he tweeted details
of his detention, including that he had been treated fairly.
· On the night of 6 June, two journalists of the Russian TV station “Zvezda” were
detained by the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU) at a checkpoint near
Slovyansk. According to their driver, who was also initially detained and later
released, the journalists were cuffed, balaclavas were put on their heads, and they
were forced to kneel down in a ditch (allegedly, to protect them from possible
shooting). On 7 June, the NGU issued a statement saying that journalists were
suspected of monitoring and collecting information. The MFA of the Russian
Federation reportedly filed a note of protest to the MFA of Ukraine. On 8 June
2014, the TV station “Zvezda” received information from the SBU that the two
journalists were in good health. They were released on 9 June and transferred to
the Russian Federation.
Obstruction to lawful professional journalist activities
229. On 11 May, it was reported that Ukrainian journalists were not allowed to photograph or
film the voting process during the “referenda” in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
230. The same instances were reported prior and during the election day on 25 May. For
instance, the journalists of the Voice of America were warned not to film the seizure of
one of the polling stations in Donetsk.
Attacks on editorial offices and TV towers
231. In the reporting period, there has been a growing number of armed attacks on the editorial
offices of the local media outlets by armed men. Some of the examples are provided
below.
· On 7 May, the office of the local newspaper “Hornyak” in Torez (Donetsk Region)
was reportedly attacked and its equipment was broken and damaged.
· On 8 May, the independent newspaper “Provintsiya” in Kostyantynivka was
attacked by armed, masked men, allegedly members of the “Donetsk People’s
Republic”. The editors were told the paper was “closed” and taken to the “city
commander’s office” situated in the occupied building of the City Council, where
they were threatened and suggested to leave the town. The police was called, but
did not interfere or arrested the attackers. The editors did not file a complaint
because they do not trust the police will act and because they feel threatened and
fear for their lives.
· On 11, 13, 19 and 20 May, armed groups shelled the TV tower in Slovyansk,
which led to interruptions in broadcasting. On 14 May, in Kramatorsk, the armed
groups blocked the TV tower, which transmits the channels not only for
Kramatorsk, but also Slovyansk, Horlivka and Makiivka.
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Censorship / access to information
232. According to NGOs, freedom of media in the Donetsk region is severely curtailed, with
Ukrainian TV channels switched off by the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and replaced by
the its own media programmes and Russian TV. Some of the examples include the
following:
· On 8 and 25 May, armed group stormed the office of the local TV Channel
“Union” with demands to report about the activity of “Donetsk People’s Republic”
and declared their intent to control the activity of journalists. The target audience
of the channel is about 3 million people in nine towns of Donetsk region.
· On 8 May, under threat of physical violence from the armed groups, the company
“Vokar Holding” was forced to stop retransmission of Ukrainian TV Channels:
“Inter”, “Ukraine”, “1+1”, ICTV, STB, “New Channel”, “5th Channel”, “112
Ukraine”, and “TVI” in Severodonetsk, Luhansk region. Instead the Russian
channels were broadcasted. The same incidents occurred throughout May in
Luhansk and its region (Krasnyi Luch, Alchevsk).
· On 2 June, armed members of the so-called “Donbas People’s Militia” arrived at
the office of the newspapers “Donbas” and “Vecherniy Donetsk” and blocked all
entrances and exits. They abducted the editor-in-chief of the “Donbas” and his
deputy and the editor-in-chief of “Vecherniy Donetsk”. The armed men reportedly
used psychological pressure and death threats to change the editorial policy of the
newspapers and ensure more positive coverage of the “Donetsk People’s
Republic”. The three editors were eventually released on 3 June after which all the
“Donbas” employees were sent on leave and the newspaper stopped its publication.
Also, the HRMMU has noted specific hate speech on the “official” media outlet of
the “Donetsk People’s Republic” “Anna Info News”. On 20 May Oleksandr
Mozhayev, known as "Babai" (a fighter participating in the armed groups) referred
to the on-going operations as a “Holy War” and spoke of exterminating America.
· On 5 June, a local cable TV and Internet network provider in Donetsk terminated
the broadcast of Ukrainian channels: “1+1”, “Donbas”, “UBR” and “News24” at
the demand of “Donetsk People’s Republic” representatives.
Propaganda
233. The HRMMU reiterates the importance to counter misinformation, incitement to hatred,
discrimination, and violence. As an example, the “Donetsk People’s Republic” denied all
responsibility for the attack near Volnovakha, claiming that it was the National Guard
“paid by Kolomoiskiy” which perpetrated this attack on the Ukrainian military. On 27
May, LifeNews posted a photo of a wounded child stating he was shot in the Donetsk
International Airport; however the StopFake.org experts discovered that the photo was
from the Syrian city of Aleppo in April 2013. Although the original publication in twitter
was deleted, the photo was widely used for similar posts on alleged shootings of children.
A different photo with a dead boy's body in a coffin was used for similar messages of
alleged shooting of children in eastern Ukraine. The photo, however, was made in 2010, in
the Crimean city Dzhankoy, of a boy killed by a local criminal.
234. Similarly, various videos became viral, allegedly showing either atrocities by the
Ukrainian army, seizing of "Grad" complexes by armed groups, or of the use UN symbols
on Ukrainian helicopters used in the security operations. It was also demonstrated that
originals of such videos were also filmed earlier in the Russian Federation or in other
countries, and had nothing to do with the current events in Ukraine.
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235. Misinformation adds to the instability and fear which affect the lives of people in the
region, and all sides should refrain from using it, especially to the extent that it amounts to
advocacy to national hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence, which is prohibited under Article 20 of the ICCPR.
D. Freedom of religion or belief
236. On 15 May, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchy (UOC-KP)
condemned the violence and threats to the life and health of the clergy and the faithful of
eastern Ukraine by armed groups. The statement by the Holy Synod of the UOC-KP calls
for the Moscow Patriarchate to condemn collaboration with the supporters of the selfproclaimed
“people’s republics” and distance itself from it. The UOC-KP requested the
Government of Ukraine to protect the clergy and congregation of the Kyiv Patriarchy in
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions from the attacks and threats of the “criminals”.
237. In the statement, the Church also appeals to the international community and interreligious
social human right organizations to pay attention to the infringement of rights of
the believers of UOC-KP in the eastern parts of Ukraine and in Crimea.
238. In Donetsk, numerous attacks against the inter-religious Prayer Marathon (attended by all
major denominations except the Moscow Patriarchy) took place almost on a daily basis in
May, including heavy beatings of participants, the destruction of property, and threats to
organisers and volunteers. On 23 May, after a repeated attack by 15 representatives of the
“Donetsk People’s Republic”, in an attempt to discuss security arrangements for the
Prayer Marathon, its coordinator allegedly went to the occupied building of the Donetsk
Regional State Administration. While there he was allegedly heavily beaten and had to
seek medical assistance. The Prayer Marathon has continued gathering in June. No
incidents have been reported.
239. Reports have also been received of other denominations being attacked, for example,
Protestants.
E. Economic and social rights – impact of the violence
240. As background to the situation in the eastern regions and the current impact on economic
and social rights being faced by the local population, the HRMMU recalls that Ukraine is
a middle-income country, ranked 78 in the Human Development Index in 2013.
241. The recent evaluation of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ESCR) published on 23 May 2014, highlighted the positive steps of the Government in
ratification of, or accession to, various human rights instruments. At the same time the
Committee identified major problems that have an adverse impact on the enjoyment of all
human rights, including the large extent of corruption, discrimination against Roma and
Crimean Tatars, a low level of social standards, unemployment among youth, around 30%
gender pay gap, employment in the informal economy, a stable poverty rate of 24.7%,
absence of a health insurance system, and low expenditure on health care.
242. The Committee made related recommendations to address the root causes of the
aforementioned challenges.
243. The violence and security operations in the eastern regions has had a direct impact on the
existing level of enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, and has also influenced
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the State capacity to progressively realize the rights and comply with the Committee´s
recommendations in the areas struck by the conflict.
Right to education
244. Despite the efforts of the Donetsk Department of education and science, as well as school
administrations, studies had to be suspended in several towns of the Donetsk region in
May. In Slovyansk, Krasnyi Lyman and Krasnoarmiysk, 62 schools and 46 kindergartens
were not functioning, which affected 21,700 students and 5,600 children, respectively. On
28 May, it was reported that during the fights in Slovyansk two school buildings have
been damaged; no one was injured.
245. In other towns in the Donetsk region schools remained open, but attendance varied from
25% in Slovyansk district to 98% in Makiivka district.
246. Most schools in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions managed to complete the academic
year, which finished on 30 May. The main concern had been the organisation of the
“External Independent Assessment18” for the students of these eastern regions. On 29
May, the Ministry of Education announced that testing in these regions would be
postponed until 11 July to 27 July, and if necessary could be postponed again.
247. Following instructions issued by the Ministry of Education and Science, all universities in
the eastern regions had to ensure that foreign students finished their studies earlier, by 20
May, so that they could leave the country.19
248. Reportedly, school administrations have faced various forms of pressure from
representatives of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” including in the preparation and
holding of the “referendum” of 11 May, as well as establishing temporary “hideouts” in
school premises.
Right to health
249. Due to the growing number of wounded, hospitals are overcrowded and understaffed. As
of 28 May, in order to minimize the risk to life and security of patients, the Regional
Hospital of occupational diseases in Donetsk partially discharged patients whose medical
condition did not require in-ward treatment. A sanatorium for children with cerebral palsy
was closed in Donetsk due to its proximity to the occupied Security Service of Ukraine
building. On 26 May, Children’s Hospital Nr 1 and city hospital Nr 18 had to close due to
the proximity to Donetsk airport20.
250. Access to medical services, treatment and supplies for residents in areas most affected by
the fighting is becoming more and more challenging. This is of particular concern as more
residents are caught in the crossfire between the armed groups and Ukrainian forces. The
18 A final test for the high school students to enter universities in Ukraine.
19 On 29 and 30 April, The Ministry of Education and Science issued two letters Nr 1/9 - 228 and Nr 08.01-
47/12033 instructing all universities of Ukraine, particularly in the East, to terminate the studies of all foreign
students by 20 May, which is much earlier than usually. Reportedly, the decision was made upon request of the
embassies of foreign countries so that foreign students could complete exams and leave the country if they
wish so due to the security situation. Allegedly, at the end of April there were two attacks in eastern regions on
foreign students; however the HRMMU could not verify these facts.
20 On 26 May 2014, approximately 20-30 armed representatives of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” reportedly
arrived at Donetsk International Airport. According to the Press-Secretary of the Donetsk International Airport
Dmytro Kosinov, they demanded the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which were guarding the airport, to withdraw.
Fighting broke out at 7.00 a.m. and at that time the airport was closed. It was reported that it will stay out of
service till 30 June. According to some reports the main terminal was partially destroyed and some fighting is
still on-going there.
43
situation is most difficult in Slovyansk. The overcrowded, understaffed and under
resourced hospitals are only admitting those who are severely injured. Primary Health
Care services are overloaded and at times called to provide treatments and care that are
within their capacity. Patients from the Mental Health Hospital (229 persons) were
evacuated from Slovyansk. All emergency services have been relocated to the nearby
village of Mykolayivka, with a number of medical number units set up in Svyatohirsk
(location of a large Russian Orthodox monastery - the Lavra). Some patients were
transferred to Poltava region. Pharmacies are open only a few hours per day.
251. The delivery of supplies, particularly medicines, becomes more complicated every day;
especially with the Donetsk airport being out of service. Reports and requests sent to the
UN agencies indicate the lack of specific medications, including some antibiotics, painkillers,
vaccines and consumables. In Donetsk, insulin was distributed to various locations;
however, such deliveries are becoming more difficult. Supplies of food in hospitals are
running low.
252. There have been reported difficulties to ensure uninterrupted provision of opioid
substitution therapy (OST)21. This directly affects 759 persons (56% of whom are HIV
positive) in Donetsk region and 609 (13% are HIV positive) in Luhansk region. According
to the HIV/AIDS Alliance and the Wold Health Organisation, in a number of cities, such
as Slovyansk, the healthcare facilities providing OST are completely controlled by armed
groups. The fact that pharmaceuticals in the healthcare facilities in the districts have fallen
beyond the legitimate authorities’ control, is in its essence a certain risk factor for medical
staff and patients. On 30 May, OST treatment was stopped for more than 100 patients in
Mariupol, due to drugs not being delivered because of the security situation. As of 2 June,
HIV service organisations reported that for some patients such an interruption in treatment
had resulted in people using illegal drugs. In the long run, this may lead to an increase in
cases of HIV and hepatitis infections due to intravenous drug use. Due to the numerous
check-points and blocked roads, as well as interruptions in public transport, the specialized
hospital for HIV/AIDS patients in Yasynovata, Donetsk region, is practically inaccessible.
Conditions for treatment of patients
253. The conditions for the treatment of patients, including those who have been wounded in
fighting and violence, are precarious As the security situation deteriorates, so does the
access to hospital care and the quality that can be provided by medical professionals. For
example, in Slovyansk, medical personnel were already highlighting the problems with the
delivery of medical supplies to the city. In the regions affected by violence and the
ongoing security operations, hospitals are trying to allocate what funds they have to
purchase the medical supplies they require. In early June, some hospitals in Donetsk
discharged patients, except those in critical condition or those who were immobile, leaving
the hospitals almost empty.
254. Due to the lack of trust regarding law enforcement, both the medical personnel and
patients try to conceal the facts and nature of wounds (the standard protocol is that
medical institutions have to report any gunshot and/ stab wounds to the police). The
HRMMU has received credible reports that doctors are at times trying to ensure the
security of the wounded.
21 This has been an integral part of the widespread implementation of harm reduction programmes. These
programmes are an essential element in controlling HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases among injecting
drug users in Ukraine, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
44
255. Cooperation with local civil society and community volunteers is an important part of
treatment of those who suffered in the recent months. The volunteers, local NGOs,
political parties and priests donated money, clothes, food, and medical drugs and provided
psychological support. In some cases, when expensive purchases were necessary – such as
plates for head surgery – they were purchased by charitable organizations, which also
provided financial support to the victims after they were discharged from the medical
institutions – to receive rehabilitation treatment in sanatoria. In the local hospitals where
the wounded were brought – such as after the shooting on 22 May near Volnovakha in the
Donetsk region – there were instances when the local community cared and protected the
wounded, bringing them medical drugs, food and clothes.
256. Security in hospitals has been reported to the HRMMU as a concern with patients having
to be protected from potential abductions by armed groups. The officials from the Donetsk
Regional State Administration confirmed that such kidnappings of the wounded had taken
place, however there is no official record of such cases, thus no exact figure could be
provided. There is also an increased risk for healthcare professionals themselves,
particularly if it involves moving around in the case of ambulance medical teams.
Right to an adequate standard of living
257. Since 17 May, prices for basic commodities (including bread) have been rising by a
minimum 0.73 Hryvnia (UAH) and 1-2 UAH on average due to higher risks of production
and delivery of goods into the occupied towns through numerous checkpoints. Seasonal
vegetables and fruits are 4-5 UAH more expensive than usual.
258. Also, due to increased cases of looting, private businesses and retailers prefer to close
down, which creates scarcity of supply. Consequently, while the minimum set of products
is always available, the variety is much less. Often times there are interruptions in delivery
of dairy products, fruits and vegetables, and non-alcohol drinks.
Housing
259. The HRMMU is concerned when security operations take place in residential areas of
towns and villages of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. As of 30 May, there had been
reports of ruined residential buildings in Slovyansk, Kramatorsk and Donetsk.
Additionally, on 7 June, it was reported that nine houses were damaged by the Ukrainian
army shelling in Semyonovka near Slovyansk.
260. The HRMMU will raise this and other similar issues with the Ukrainian Government,
including advocating for monetary compensation to be awarded to the victims for damages
to their property in the course of these security operations.
Electricity and water supply
261. As of 18 May, in the Slovyansk region, 22 electrical sub-stations stopped functioning. As
a result, more than 2,000 households were left without access to electricity. According to
the Press-service of the company “Donetskoblenergo”, the company has all the necessary
material and human resources for reconstruction. However, repair crews are unable to
access the site due to the ongoing security operations.
262. In the northern part of the Donetsk region, the supply of water supply is increasingly under
threat, with regular interruptions. Moreover, as of 3 June, residents of Slovyansk,
Konstyantynivka, Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk (cities in Donetsk region) had no access to
running water, due to damage to the water supply reportedly as a result of the security
operations.
45
Social security (services and benefits)
263. Due to the deteriorating security situation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, it is a
growing challenge to ensure continuous work of State institutions. On 14 May, the
Pension Fund department resumed its work (after the seizure of its building on 5 May) in
Slovyansk, but the department’s office hours were cut. On 15 May, it was reported that the
National Bank of Ukraine suspended22 the operations of its office in Donetsk region due to
the threats by the representatives of the "Donetsk People's Republic”. On 15 May, the
Ministry of Revenue and Duties of Ukraine also evacuated the staff of its directorate and
tax inspections in the region.
264. On 7 June, the Ministry of Social Policy informed the HRMMU that all social payments
had been made to the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. However, there were major
challenges in delivering cash to Antratsyt in Luhansk region and Slovyansk and
Kramatorsk in Donetsk region. The Ministry has already addressed the MoI and SBU to
develop a mechanism of the safe delivery of cash to these regions if the situation remains
the same or aggravates.
265. On 30 May, the head of Department of Marketing Communications of the
Novokramatorskiy Machine-Building Plant Volodymyr Zhuliy spoke of the imminent
“humanitarian catastrophe” in Kramatorsk, due to the termination of the work of the city
department of the State Treasury of Ukraine since 20 May. In particular, Mr Zhuliy
mentioned that thousands of the city’s pensioners, local governance workers, educators
and public health workers were deprived of the means for existence. Reportedly, the
Treasury’s debt to the workers and pensioners in Kramatorsk for the payments due in May
already amounted to UAH 61.4 million.
Increased lawlessness resulting in loss of individual property
266. On 15 May, the Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights informed the HRMMU that
there are numerous incidents in Donetsk and Luhansk regions when the armed groups’
members seize personal phones and especially cars from ordinary citizens. The police
rarely intervene or take any action, as they are usually unarmed and thus unable to perform
their functions in the current situation. Consequently, although criminality is increasing,
there is nobody to apply to in case of an alleged crime, and no effective means to intervene
for police. It also becomes dangerous for persons to report about such crimes, so in most
cases they chose to leave the region. The increase in criminality is, in the view of some,
returning the regions to the “lawlessness of the 1990s”:
· For example, on 8 May, the private residence of a local activist was allegedly shot
at from a car; the attackers broke into the house and looted everything of value.
The police called by the neighbours, allegedly made several photos of the
location, but did not even walk into the building. Reportedly, the activist left the
region to Kharkiv with his family, due to previous threats to his life, including
attempted arson of his home with Molotov cocktails on 4 May.
· On 15 May, owners of car-dealerships in the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions formed rapid response groups to protect their businesses against attacks
aimed at robbery that have multiplied since the beginning of May.
· On 28 May, the HRMMU spoke to one of the local political leaders in the
Donetsk region. He reported that his legal firm’s office was ruined when attackers
took his computers, documentation on the legal cases and stole the firm’s car. He
22 The staff of the Bank was evacuated, and online banking in the region was reportedly suspended.
46
was also detained for 7-8 hours and subjected to life threats, inhumane treatment
and beating. After his release he fled the region together with his family.
Labour rights
267. There are growing concerns about the ability of enterprises in Donetsk and Luhansk
regions to continue functioning due to the on-going fighting, targeted attacks and
intimidations by the armed groups.
268. The presence of uncontrolled armed groups and rise of criminality obstruct the business
activity of entrepreneurs, which first of all affects small companies in the sphere of
services and retail (banks, logistic companies, stores, petrol stations, and bakeries).
269. On 20 May, the Mayor of Donetsk, Oleksandr Lukyanchenko, stated that a wide range of
enterprises do not work in full capacity and some of them suspend production, in
particular, “Donetsk Metallurgical Plant” employing approximately 2,100 persons.
270. On 29 May, the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Parliamentary Committee,
Sergey Kaplin, stated that due to the current events in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions,
approximately 60 % industrial enterprises of companies were forced to suspend their
work, leaving thousands of employees without regular income.
271. There also have been armed attacks on mining companies, which constitute the main share
of the regions’ economy. On 9 May, it was reported that local miners repelled an attack by
the pro-Russian supporters of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”, who attempted to take
down the Ukrainian flag and threatened the miners that they would throw explosives into
the mine’s shafts for their disobedience. Allegedly, the miners decided to organize their
own “self-defence” to protect themselves. On 19 May, there were armed attacks on the
operational and closed coal mines in Horlivka, Donetsk region. On 22 May, a group of
unidentified armed individuals allegedly captured four operating mines of the JSC
"Lysychanskvuhillya" in Luhansk region. All of the four attacked mines temporarily
suspended production activities. Reportedly the armed men pointed guns at the mines’
workers, demanding to supply them with explosives. The Ministry of Energy of Ukraine
appealed to the SBU demanding that necessary steps be taken to protect the mines.
Previously, on 26-27 May, due to pressure by the armed representatives of the “Donetsk
People’s Republic” on the “Donetsk Coal-Mining Company”, coal production was
suspended at several mines, including “Octyabrskiy Rudnik”, “E. Abakumov”, “A.
Skochinskogo” and “Trudovskaya”.
272. On 20 May, Denys Pushylin, “speaker” of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”, announced
the launch of the nationalization campaign in the region. According to their official
sources, Mr. Pushylin blamed the local oligarchs` unwillingness to pay taxes to the
“republic’s” budget, and their opposition to the interests of Donbas as the reason for the
adopted decision to start the nationalization. In particular, Mr Pushylin blamed Renat
Akhmetov, owner of the company System Capital Management.
The broader impact of the crisis in the eastern regions of Ukraine
273. Recent developments in the country have already negatively affected the financial and
banking system. In the first quarter of 2014, the national currency depreciated by 27%,
dramatically reducing incomes and salaries. Whereas the average monthly wage in
December stood at $453, by March it had dropped to $343. This also puts significant
pressure on those who have loans in foreign currencies.
47
274. After remaining quiescent for more than two years, inflation rates have shot up with a
6.8% increase in consumer prices reported for the beginning of May being the highest
year-on-year inflation rate recorded since 2011.
275. Food prices have increased by 8.2% above 2013 levels, bringing the socio-economic crisis
to many households in Ukraine. Large price hikes were reported for sugar (59%),
vegetables (33%), and dairy products and eggs (10%).
276. Other inflationary pressures are now gathering, for example in the form of increases in
communal service tariffs. Household gas prices shot up 56% on average in May; a 40%
increase in heating tariffs is scheduled for July. These higher tariffs are projected to
increase the numbers of low-income households from 1.4 to 4 million during this time.
277. Should these tariff increases be accompanied by a further weakening of the UAH,
Ukraine’s inflation rates could dramatically accelerate. Even in the best case scenario,
consumer and food price inflation rates seem likely to remain in double figures for the rest
of 2014, and going into 2015. These developments will place increased pressure, and
need, for Ukraine’s social welfare system to cushion the impact, particularly for the most
vulnerable.
278. The 63 billion UAH deficit recorded on the consolidated government budget in 2013
(some 9% of GDP) is regarded as unsustainable by both the Government and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Fiscal austerity in 2014 is therefore required.
Although a justified measure, it may do little to boost the country’s long term
competitiveness or development prospects. Already in the first quarter of 2014
Government expenditure23 in the health sector declined by 5%, and in the education sector
by 8%, compared to the budget allocations in 2013. At the same time, the Government has
been able to increase spending on social protection by 2% (which includes expenditures
on both social assistance and social insurance) for 2014, which may lessen the hardships
and pressures that many Ukrainian households are now facing.
279. The economy of the eastern region has already been in decline since April 2014, and it is
likely to deteriorate further in any protracted situation of violence and fighting. Business is
in decline in the region; personal income is decreasing; investments are dwindling.
Compared to 2013, in the first quarter of 2014 investments in the eastern regions had
significantly declined. In the annual rating Donetsk region moved from third place in 2013
to twenty-second place in 2014, and the Luhansk region from ninth to twenty-third.
280. Any exacerbation of the violence will lead to the further decline of industrial production in
the region and Ukraine as a whole. The industries of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions
account for 18.5% and 6.1% of all production in the country respectively. Such a decline
would therefore increase the imbalance between the income of the state budget from the
Donbas and expenditure provided to the region. This will augment the budget deficit. One
result could be that it would jeopardise compliance with the agreed parameters of the IMF
loan.
281. Official statistics released in May indicate that Ukraine’s GDP dropped 1% in the first
quarter of 2014. The recession is expected to worsen over the course of the year: IMF and
the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade forecast a 3% decline in GDP, while
other, more pessimistic forecasts point to 5-10% declines in output and income. The
largest decline in exports (70-85%—relative to the fourth quarter of 2013) has already
23 Changes are given in real terms: changes in nominal expenditure amounts divided by changes in the consumer
price index.
48
been recorded in the regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Cherkasy, and Khmelnitskyi, as well in
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Any collapse in exports could trigger a decline in
industrial output, and subsequently in household incomes and livelihoods. These trends
should be closely monitored.
282. There are concerns that if these macro-economic tendencies continue, the State will no
longer be able to guarantee existing social standards, which could lead to the social unrest
spreading throughout the country.
VI. PARTICULAR HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES IN CRIMEA
A. Civil and political rights of Crimean residents
283. Crimean residents faced difficulties in exercising their civil and political rights. A very
small number participated in the Presidential elections of 25 May. Simplified registration
procedures had been put in place to ensure that residents of Crimea and persons who
resettled from Crimea to other regions can take part in the vote. Ukrainian citizens living
in Crimea had to register in person at any polling station on the mainland no later than five
days prior to the elections. The HRMMU monitored the situation near Kherson, where
most of the Crimean voters had registered. Some 20 cars had left Crimea and were
welcomed by local authorities. They drove to the polling station in a column with Crimean
and Ukrainian flags. Prior to the election they had been summoned by the Crimean police
for “conversations" and issued ‘warnings’ about the unacceptability of ‘extremist
activities’. While the cars were crossing the administrative border, representatives of the
Crimean ‘self-defence’ reportedly wrote down license plates, passport numbers and
driving licenses' details. Among those who intended to vote, many allegedly did not do so
because of the cost of travelling, the uncertainty linked to having to cross the
administrative border and the fear of reprisals by the authorities in Crimea.
284. During its month-long monitoring of events in Crimea, the HRMMU noted a continuation
of worrying trends, including instances of enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions,
violence and ill-treatment committed by the so-called ‘Crimean self-defence’, often
targeting journalists, human rights defenders and political opponents, and impunity for
human rights violations. Furthermore the enforcement of the Russian Federation law on
the territory of Crimea, at variance with UN General Assembly resolution 68/262 and
applicable bodies of international law, is creating difficulties for Crimean residents to
enjoy their human rights, as there are many differences with Ukrainian laws.
Rule of law and the judiciary
285. The judicial system remains practically paralyzed. Ukrainian laws will be in effect in
Crimea until 31 December 201424. Nevertheless, the judicial system is already being
transformed to use Russian laws: restriction measures are implemented pursuant to the
Criminal Procedural Code of the Russian Federation, and judicial decisions are adopted in
the name of the Russian Federation. Pending cases that have not been decided by 18
March 2014 must be tried in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation. This
poses numerous problems in practice, especially in administrative and criminal cases,
when Russian and Ukrainian legislation differs on the existence, nature and scope of rights
24 Paragraph 2 of Article 23 of the Federal Constitutional Law of 21 March 2014 N 6-FCL “On Acceptance of
the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the Creation of the New Constituent Entity within the
Russian Federation - the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol”.
49
and obligations; and remedies and sanctions available. The outcome of court decisions that
are currently being appealed is unclear.
286. There are reports that, at least, 15,000 judicial cases are in legal limbo between Ukrainian
and Russian laws. The Ukrainian “Law on the occupied territories” allows the transfer of
judicial cases from the peninsula to Kyiv. However, in practice, this is unlikely to happen.
The HRMMU notes that the current situation has detrimental consequences affecting
access to justice, the right to fair trial and due process for Crimean residents.
Right to life, liberty and security
287. The Russian Security Service (FSB) confirmed on 30 May, the detention of four Ukrainian
citizens in Simferopol (Crimea), including film-maker Oleg Sentsov. The other three are
Aleksandr Kolchenko, Gennady Afanasiev and Aleksei Chyrnyi. The HRMMU spoke to
Mr. Sentsov’s lawyer who stated that while his client had been arrested on 11 May, he
managed to speak to him for the first time on 27 May. He also claims his client has been
tortured while in detention to confess to criminal intentions he did not have. According to
the FSB press release, the people detained are members of the Ukrainian ‘Right Sector’
party and were planning acts of sabotage and terrorism in Simferopol, Yalta and
Sevastopol. On 6 June, Sentsov was, according to his lawyer, officially charged with
terrorism and arms trafficking under Article 205, Part 2; Article 205.4, Part 2; and Article
222, Part 3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
288. On 26 May, Timur Shaimardanov (born in 1980) left his home in Simferopol and did not
return. He had participated in campaigns against Crimea becoming a part of the Russian
Federation. The day before he went missing, he allegedly said that the whereabouts of one
of his friends, Leonid Korzh, (born in 1990) had not been known for 3-4 days. On 30 May,
Seiran Zinedinov, who had been coordinating the efforts to find Korzk and Shaimardanov
also went missing.
289. Mr. Mustafa Dzhemilev, former head of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis (Assembly) who was
banned from the authorities in Crimea to enter the peninsula on 3 May, informed the
HRMMU that the “Crimean police” had brought to his Crimean house a summons for an
interrogation related to illegal possession of weapons. Dzhemilev assumes that this could
be an attempt to initiate a criminal case against him. Ms. Ella Panfilova, Ombudsperson of
the Russian Federation, announced that her office has requested from the relevant
Governmental bodies an explanation of the actions undertaken by officials towards
Mustafa Dzhemilev, particularly regarding his ban on entering Crimea.
290. The Head of the Kurultai (Congress) of the Crimean Tatars, Zayr Smedlyaev, informed
HRMMU that he had received a written “warning” from the Crimean police about the
"inadmissibility of extremist activities and unlawful assemblies", in line with Russian
legislation. The notice says that on 3 May, the leaders of the Mejlis publicly spoke in
support of ‘extremist statements’ by Mustafa Dzhemilev and provoked extremist
manifestations from people.
291. On 15 May, three houses of Crimean Tatars in Simferopol were searched by FSB officials.
Two houses belong to the head of the External Relations Department of the Mejlis, Ali
Khamzin. The searches were performed at his actual place of residence (Bakhchysarai)
and his place of registration (Strogonovka village, Simferopol region). FSB officials
explained that these persons were suspected of preparing terrorist attacks.
292. On 15 May, the “Chairman” of the Council of Ministers of Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov,
announced that the so-called “Crimean self-defence” would become regular and receive
budgetary support to ensure public security. The HRMMU underlines that such an
50
intention raises concern as the “Crimean self-defence” has reportedly been involved in
numerous human rights violations.
Accountability
293. The HRMMU is concerned that after more than two months of investigation of the murder
of 39year-old Reshat Ametov, the Crimean law-enforcement authorities have not yet
established the identities of perpetrators, although a video of the attackers is available that
would allow their identification. Crimean Tatar Reshat Ametov was abducted by
unidentified persons wearing military uniform in the centre of Simferopol in early March
during a picket near the Council of Ministers of Crimea. On 17 March, his corpse was
found with traces of torture in the Zemlyanichnoye village of the Belogorsk district.
294. The acting Prosecutor General of Ukraine reported on 27 May that an interagency
‘working group for legal issues relating to the temporarily occupied territory of Crimea’
had been established. The working group will coordinate the activities of the Ukrainian
authorities on a wide range of legal issues connected with the violations that took place
after the March “referendum”.
Citizenship
295. The HRMMU received worrisome information that, in some cases, Crimean residents
were forced to give up their Ukrainian citizenship, which may amount to arbitrary
deprivation of nationality. Judges of the Crimean Commercial Court in Simferopol and the
administrative staff, who were granted Russian citizenship on a priority basis, were
reportedly compelled to complete application forms renouncing Ukrainian citizenship. In
general, the procedure of issuing Russian passports is slow. According to different
calculations, providing passports to the whole population of Crimea will take up to 15
months while Russian laws allocated only three months for this procedure. Besides, it is
unclear how citizenship issues, applications for social benefits and payments and other
rights and entitlements are organised for persons in closed institutions: orphanages,
geriatric institutions, psycho-neurological hospitals, penitentiaries, and others.
296. The status of refugees and asylum seekers has not been regulated. Prior to the
“referendum” there were 18 refugees on the territory of Crimea. It is unclear how their
situation will be affected by the changed legal regime.
297. On 4 June, the President of the Russian Federation signed amendments to the law “On
citizenship of the Russian Federation”, introducing criminal responsibility for concealment
of dual citizenship. According to the amended law, those concealing their second
citizenship will be fined up to 200,000 Rubles ($5,700) or subjected to compulsory
community service of up to 400 hours in case of a failure to notify the Federal Migration
Service within two months from the date of the acquisition of the second citizenship. The
new provisions will become effective on 1 January 2016.
Freedom of expression
298. The HRMMU is alarmed by excessive limitations placed on freedom of information and
expression in Crimea. Journalists, human rights defenders and other individuals must be
able to freely exercise their right to freedom of expression, in accordance with article 19 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Any restrictions should comply
with the strict requirements of article 19, paragraph 3 of the Covenant.
299. On 15 May, a photojournalist of the "Crimean telegraph" newspaper Maksim Vasilenko
was briefly detained and ill-treated by members of the "self-defence of Crimea" in
Simferopol while preparing a report about the training of the special police forces before
51
the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Crimean Tatar Deportation. A
cameraman of the "FM" television channel was also attacked; his phone was taken and his
equipment was broken.
300. On 18 May, Osman Pashayev, Chief Editor of "Open Crimean Channel" internet project,
and his crew (correspondent, cameraman and driver) were detained by members of the
“Crimean self-defence” during the mourning events related to the anniversary of the
Crimean Tatar Deportation. They were deprived of their equipment, phones and personal
belongings, and subjected to physical and psychological pressure for four hours. No
reasons were given for the detention. After being brought to the central district police
station of Simferopol, they saw their lawyers and were released. Their money and personal
belongings were not returned. Russian Human Rights Ombudsperson Ella Pamfilova
condemned the incident, saying that the detention and interrogation of Pashayev and his
crew without the presence of a lawyer for several hours constituted a human rights
violation.
301. On 19 May, the “Crimean self-defence" detained for a short period of time Petr Ruzavin, a
correspondent of Russian television company "Dozhd", subjected him to violence and
damaged his equipment. According to Ruzavin, camouflaged people approached him
when he was filming the central square of Simferopol and they were filmed as well. They
requested him to delete his records, which he did. Ruzavin said he was beaten and his
equipment was damaged. After being interrogated he was released.
302. On 2 June, the “Acting Prosecutor” of Simferopol summoned the Chief Editor of the
Crimean Tatar newspaper “Avdet” Shevket Kaybullayev for questioning over possible
“extremist activity”. According to the notice, Kaybullayev had to appear on summons to
the Prosecutor’s Office. As written in the summons, the Prosecutor is investigating
violation of the Russian law “On counteraction to extremist activity”. The ‘Avdet’
newspaper is a press organ of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, published since 15
June 1990.
303. On 2 June, the Editor of the “Crimean Centre for Investigative Journalism”, Sergey
Mokrushyn, and his cameraman Vladlen Melnikov were attacked by members of the
“Crimean self-defence” in Simferopol, taken to their headquarters (on Kirova 26) and
beaten. They were eventually transferred to the police station for questioning, and released
without any explanation being given for their detention and or any protocol of detention
having been drawn up by the police.
304. The HRMMU recalls that acts of aggression, threats and intimidation against journalists
must be investigated, prosecuted and punished and victims provided with appropriate
remedies.
305. In the period of 12-25 May, the Russian Ministry of Communication and Mass Media and
the Federal Service for Supervision of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass
Communications held seminars for Crimean journalists to explain requirements of Russian
legislation with respect to the media. The HRMMU is concerned that the imposition of
Russian media legislation is already negatively impacting the conditions for journalists to
freely perform their functions. There is also concern that media representatives can be
subjected to criminal prosecution pursuant to Article 280 (Public calls for extremism),
Article 282 (Organisation of the activities of an extremist organisation) and Article 319
(Insult of a public servant) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which are too
broad and can be used to criminalize conduct that is protected under international human
rights law.
52
Freedom of movement
306. While air connections between other parts of Ukraine and Crimea were suspended in
March 2014, it still remains possible to travel by train and car. However, freedom of
movement is affected by a number of factors related to the status of Crimea and different
regulations - Russian Federation and Ukraine’s - being applied. This creates difficulties to
maintain personal and professional ties.
307. Pursuant to the Law of “On guaranteeing citizens’ rights and freedoms and legal regime in
the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine”, which entered into force on 10 May,
foreigners and stateless persons may enter and leave Crimea through security check-points
only subject to special permission. The procedure for obtaining such permission remains
unclear. On 16 May, the Press Secretary of the Chairman of the State Border Service of
Ukraine, Sergey Astakhov, confirmed that Ukrainian border guards around the Melitopol
checkpoint (in the Kherson region bordering Crimea) obliged persons going from Crimea
to continental Ukraine with Russian passports and Crimean residence permits to get off
trains. He reported that the Crimean residents with Russian passports are considered as
foreign citizens and, consequently, shall entry into Ukraine and leave it only through
special border points. According to him, the administrative border of Kherson and
established control line is not a border of Ukraine. Therefore, the foreign citizens,
including Russian citizens, may not be allowed via this line. He also noted that the
Crimean residents with Russian passports who wish to enter Ukraine shall go to the
Russian Federation first, for example, to Rostov-on-Don, and cross the borders there.
308. The Russian Federation illegally established its State border at the northern entrance to
Crimea on 25 April. Citizens of Ukraine who are not registered in Crimea are regarded as
foreigners and obliged to fill out an immigration card. Such a category also comprises the
people who permanently reside in Crimea, own real estate or are employed there, but
whose place of registration is mainland Ukraine. The Federal Immigration Service issued
warnings that foreign nationals must promptly (within 90 days) leave the territory of
Crimea and re-enter it pursuant to Russian laws applicable to foreign nationals. Inter alia,
such regulations will create inconveniences for students who study in other regions of
Ukraine and are temporarily registered there. While returning home to the territory of
Crimea during summer vacations, they will be regarded as foreigners with an admitted
stay of up to 90 days.
Freedom of association
309. Since the “referendum” on 16 March, many NGOs and human rights activists left Crimea
out of fear of being prosecuted, detained and subjected to ill-treatment. Legislation of the
Russian Federation - the so-called “foreign agents” law – has discouraged the activities
and development of NGOs. Besides, Crimea does not yet have an institution to register
civil society organisations; consequently, those that have not been registered before the
Crimean “referendum” are deprived of such a possibility.
Freedom of peaceful assembly
310. Dozens of Crimean Tatars have been summoned to courts for participating in protest
actions against the prohibition imposed on 3 May by the Crimean authorities on their
leader, Mustafa Dzhemilev, to enter the peninsula. As of 8 May, the courts of Crimea had
examined 55 cases related to those events. In 52 cases, the activists were fined on the basis
of Article 20.2.2 (Public disorder) of the Code on Administrative offences of the Russian
Federation.
53
311. On 16 May, the authorities in Crimea issued a decree prohibiting all mass events until 6
June. A similar prohibition was issued in Sevastopol. The degrees were motivated by
security developments in south-eastern Ukraine and the need to prevent "possible
provocations of extremists which can penetrate into the Republic of Crimea". The
HRMMU recalls that under Article 4 of the ICCPR, a derogation from the right to freedom
of assembly and association is only permissible “in time of public emergency” and “to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation” and would require immediate
notification to the other State Parties to the ICCPR through the UN Secretary-General.
Freedom of religion or belief
312. The HRMMU is concerned about reports of violations of freedom of religion and belief on
the territory of Crimea.
313. On 8 May, the League of Muslim Women “Insaf” informed the HRMMU that some 150
persons from Kirovskoye and Stary Krym, including women, were being called in for
interrogations. Reportedly, they were being invited to the local police stations for “a
conversation”. They were reportedly fingerprinted and photographed.
314. On 20 May, the Head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church made a statement
expressing concern for the safety of the Greek Catholic priests remaining in Crimea. He
reported that all five Crimean parishes had experienced pressure, allegedly from the
representatives of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.
315. On 1 June, men in Russian Cossack uniforms reportedly broke into the local Orthodox
church of the Kyiv Patriarchate in the village of Perevalnoe (Crimea), shouting and
terrorizing churchgoers. The car of the priest was allegedly damaged. The “Cossacks” said
they were seizing the building for the Moscow Patriarchate. After three hours, the
“Crimean self-defence” arrived with assault rifles and sided with the attackers. The police
were called but reportedly did not show readiness to properly investigate the incident. On
2 June, the local authorities of the city of Evpatoriya conducted a check of the church
documentation and called it an “illegal building”. In addition, the authorities in Crimea
significantly raised the rent for the main Ukrainian Orthodox Cathedral in Simferopol. The
rent increase has not affected Crimean Tatar mosques or Russian Orthodox churches.
Mosques and Russian churches on the peninsula either belong to the religious
communities (mosques) or to the Moscow Patriarchate (Russian churches) or are rented
for a token fee.
B. Economic, social and cultural rights
316. Crimean residents face serious challenges in realizing their rights under the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR). This can be attributed, in
part, to the complicated transition between two different legal systems, but also to the
absence of appropriate reactions of the authorities in Crimea to human rights violations
affecting certain communities. This concerns, in particular, the Ukrainian and Crimean
Tatar communities who are being harassed, assaulted and prosecuted for speaking
Ukrainian or Tatar languages in public places or using national symbols. Such conditions
are also reflected in the diminishing possibilities to receive education in another language
than Russian, particularly in Ukrainian.
Language and education
317. There are only two Ukrainian schools in Crimea: in Yalta and Simferopol. According to
the head of the Department of Education in Simferopol, three out of four classes in the
54
Simferopol gymnasium will now use the Russian language. The decision is motivated by
the decision of 86 % of the parents who reportedly decided to switch to Russian-language
studies. The director of the gymnasium was allegedly forced to resign. There is
information that the local authorities in Sevastopol are planning to close the only
Ukrainian boarding school/orphanage.
318. On 14 May, the press service of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian
Federation reported that teachers of the Ukrainian language and literature of general
educational institutions could be re-trained to become teachers of the Russian language
and literature. The Presidential Council for Civil Society Development and Human Rights
of the Russian Federation recommended to keep the study in the Simferopol Ukrainian
gymnasium in Ukrainian language and to resume the work of the Faculty of Ukrainian and
Crimean-Tatar Philology in the Tavrida National University.
319. In light of Article 27 of the ICCPR, the HRMMU recalls that all the national communities
in Crimea must be supported to preserve, develop and promote their identity, language and
culture, and to use their mother tongue in education and daily life.
Property rights
320. In early March, public notaries stopped documentation of property acquisition and sale
deals in Crimea, when Ukraine blocked access to the peninsula for the State Register of
Real Estate and Land Plots. Crimean residents face serious difficulties in exercising their
right to property due to the pending court decisions, transactions, and the privatisation
process. On 10 May, the Russian Minister of Crimean Affairs stated at a press conference
that the Russian authorities would deal with cases of unauthorized acquisition of land in
Crimea "with full responsibility and caution". On 28 May, a draft law “On the special
procedure for real estate registration in Crimea” was introduced in the Russian Parliament.
The text proposes to delegate to the local authorities, during a two-year transitional period,
the right to resolve land issues.
321. The HRMMU stresses that decisions concerning such important issues as land and
property must be taken through an inclusive, transparent and fair process that will
eliminate the risk of corruption and tensions.
Right to an adequate standard of living
322. On 13 May, the Ukrainian State Water Resources Agency stated that Ukraine shut off
water supplies to Crimea via the North-Crimean Canal, which accounts for 85% of all
fresh water on the peninsula. The Canal water is mostly used for irrigation purposes, and
its closure could severely impact agricultural land and the upcoming harvest. This
situation has reportedly had no negative implications for drinking water, according to the
‘First Deputy Chairman’ of the Council of Ministers of Crimea, Rustam Temirgaliyev.
Having no access to Crimea, the HRMMU does not have additional information about the
impact of the shut-off of water supplies on the economic and social rights of the Crimean
residents.
Banking
323. Access to banking services remains complicated for Crimean residents. On 7 May, the
National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) decided to suspend operations of Ukrainian banks in
Crimea until 6 June. However the activities of Ukrainian banks were terminated on 2 June,
by decision of the Central Bank of Russia motivated by the need to protect the interests of
depositors and customers. Compensation payments will reportedly be made by a nonprofit
organization, the “Depositor Protection Fund”, which acquired the rights to deposits.
55
C. The rights of indigenous peoples
324. The 18 May marked the 70th anniversary of the massive deportation of Crimean Tatars and
other minorities by the Soviet authorities. A Decree of the President of the Russian
Federation, in force on 21 April, had instructed the authorities in Crimea and Sevastopol to
support events commemorating the deportation. However, referring to security
considerations linked to the events in south-eastern Ukraine, the authorities in Crimea
issued on 16 May a decree prohibiting all mass events until 6 June. Eventually, the
“Council of Ministers” of Crimea decided on 17 May that the commemoration could go
ahead, although not in the centre of the capital of Crimea, Simferopol. The
commemorations passed without incidents, albeit with significant and sometimes
intimidating police presence.
325. On 29 May, the State archive of the SBU handed over the documents on Crimean Tatar
deportation from Crimea in 1944 to the representatives of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis. The
head of the SBU, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, and the former head of the Crimean Tatar
Mejlis, Mustafa Dzhemilev, participated in this event.
326. On 4 June, the Crimean Parliament adopted a Decree providing for social guarantees to
the people who were deported on an ethnic basis in 1941-1944 from the Crimean
Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic. The Decree will provide social benefits in the
form of one-time payments to the Crimean Tatars, Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks and
Germans, along with their families and children who were born in exile. This document
was adopted pursuant to a Decree signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin on 21 April
2014, rehabilitating formerly deported people from Crimea.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
327. During the reporting period, the HRMMU identified acute human rights concerns
particularly in the eastern regions, Crimea and in the aftermath of the Odesa 2 May
violence. They are symptomatic of the particular local contexts, not least involving the
presence of armed groups, the breakdown in law and order and on-going security
operations. As highlighted in the report issued on 15 April 2014 by OHCHR, short-term
human rights concerns should be addressed within the broader and longer term framework
that will see institutional reform and enable change that will impact on the enjoyment of
all rights – civil, cultural, economic, political, and social. The root causes of the current
crisis were initially due to the systematic and structural curtailment of human rights and
widespread corruption. The way out of the current crisis, to ensure reconciliation of
communities through peaceful and democratic means, will be through the accountability
for violations and the full respect and guarantee of all human rights for all.
328. With the election of President Poroshenko, there is the opportunity for the Government of
Ukraine to prioritise addressing these systemic and structural concerns through
institutional reform focusing on human rights challenges in the short-term, and
progressively paving the way for the establishment of a system that promotes and protects
human rights for all, ensures justice, good governance and the rule of law through
inclusive, non-discriminatory and participatory means. A comprehensive national human
rights action plan reflecting all recommendations from the international and regional
mechanisms is highly recommended, as well as the creation by the Government of a senior
level coordination mechanism of implementation open to state institutions, civil society
56
and having the combined support of the UN, regional organisations and the international
community.
329. Recommendations have been made below on Crimea to both the authorities in Crimea and
the Russian Federation, which exercises de facto control over the peninsula. With the
negative impact of the current situation, including the legal uncertainty, on the full
enjoyment of human rights by the residents of Crimea, the HRMMU is advocating for the
legal framework of Ukraine to remain in force, considering the adverse human rights
impact of legislative changes imposed and also bearing in mind UN General Assembly
resolution 68/262.
330. The recommendations should be read in conjunction with - and seen as complimentary to
– those outlined in the OHCHR reports on the human rights situation in Ukraine, issued on
15 April and 16 May 2014, which have not yet been fully implemented.
331. The HRMMU takes note of the joint report by the OSCE Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities
issued on 12 May 2014, and calls upon all relevant parties to implement its
recommendations.
To the Government of Ukraine and other stakeholders
a) There should be constitutional inclusive and meaningful consultations with all political
parties, regardless of their ideology, as well as representatives of civil society and
minority (national and ethnic, linguistic, religious and other) groups and indigenous
peoples in order to embrace all components of society, including women in the
dialogue for the new constitution, which will reflect the new reality of the country with
a full-fledged system of checks and balances. The peaceful population of the east
should participate in these consultations.
b) As a representative body of the country, the Parliament should reflect the new political
and social reality of the country; therefore there is a need for new parliamentary
elections.
c) All armed groups must immediately put an end to their violent activities and lay down
their arms.
d) The Government must ensure that its armed forces refrain from using excessive force,
and ensure that its ongoing security operations are at all times in line with the relevant
international standards applicable to different types of operations. In all circumstances,
it must ensure the protection of those who are not involved in the fighting.
e) All people detained in the context of the security operations should be treated in line
with international norms and standards and guaranteed their human rights under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other applicable bodies of
international law. In order to protect its security personnel and persons not involved in
the fighting, the Government should consider providing assurances that acts of
abduction and detention by armed groups will not be prosecuted provided that they do
not target people not involved in the fighting and the victims are treated humanely at all
times.
f) The role and position of the Ombudsperson and National Preventive Mechanism, as the
main bodies / institutions working towards the strengthening of the national human
rights system and the protection and guarantee of human rights for all, should be
enhanced.
57
g) All gaps of legislation should be brought in line with the recommendations of the
international human rights mechanisms (treaty bodies, universal periodic review and
special procedures); the Judiciary, Office of the Prosecutor General and the Bar
Association should operate in line with relevant international norms and standards in
order to ensure fair trial without which it is impossible to tackle corruption.
h) The Constitutional Court should be enhanced – legal, social and all other guarantees
need to be elaborated in order to ensure the genuine independence of the Constitutional
Court.
i) The State Migration Service should propose amendments to bring the refugee law in
line with international standards, and to allocate sufficient funds to ensure due process
in the asylum procedure, as well as reception conditions meeting humanitarian needs.
j) A language law should be adopted in line with international standards that enables the
promotion of the official national language as well as other languages.
k) A central authority should be established to respond to the humanitarian needs of IDPs,
including by establishing a comprehensive registration system, formulation of
legislative and regulatory acts to ease access to important social and economic rights,
establishing public assistance programmes, mobilization and coordination of civil
society-initiated relief efforts, and cooperation with international donors and technical
assistance.
l) All stakeholders should refrain from using messages of intolerance or expressions,
which may incite hatred, violence, hostility, discrimination or radicalisation.
m) Access for international organisations to the areas affected in eastern Ukraine by the
security operations (urban areas in the epicentre of the fighting) should be facilitated so
that the real needs of the population can be assessed and addressed.
n) Normative acts to ensure freedom of movement for residents of Crimea should be
enacted as soon as possible.
To the authorities in Crimea and the de facto governing authority of the Russian
Federation
o) Reaffirming UN General Assembly resolution 68/262, entitled “Territorial integrity of
Ukraine”, measures must be taken to protect the rights of persons affected by the
changing institutional and legal framework, including on issues related to citizenship,
right of residence, labour rights, property and land rights, access to health and
education.
p) Journalists, human rights defenders and individuals must be able to fully exercise their
right to freedom of expression, in accordance with Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
q) Ukrainian legislation should remain in force, considering the adverse human rights
impact of legislative changes imposed and also bearing in mind UN General Assembly
resolution 68/262.
r) Intimidation, harassment and abductions of residents must stop, with guarantees
ensured for the respect for the right to life, liberty and security
s) Criminal and administrative liability should not be used as a mechanism of intimidation
against Crimean Tatars and other residents of Crimea, but used in line with
international law.
58
t) Human rights violations should be independently, promptly and comprehensively
investigated and perpetrators brought to justice.
u) All forms of intimidation and harassment of religious communities must be put to an
end and all incidents, including those where there have been attacks on Ukrainian
Orthodox Church, Greek Catholic Church and the Muslim community must be properly
investigated, thus enabling the effective promotion and protection of the freedom of
religion or belief.
v) The promotion and protection of the rights of national minorities, including the
Crimean Tatars and other indigenous peoples must be ensured, enabling them to
participate fully and inclusively in public and political life.
w) The deployment of independent and impartial human rights monitors, including by the
HRMMU, should be agreed upon.
Annex 294
Statement of the Assistant Secretary General Ivan Šimonovi􀃼 at the Security Council meeting on
Ukraine (24 June 2014)

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􀀬􀀋􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀴􀀖􀀩􀀡􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀧􀀪􀀫􀀨􀀒􀀖􀀞􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀮􀀜􀀎􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀞􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀏􀀜􀀗􀀇􀀎􀀭􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀡􀀏􀀭􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀵􀀆􀀖􀀴􀀖􀀩􀀡􀀈􀀄
􀀛􀀡􀀉􀀶􀀗􀀘􀀘􀀖􀀭􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀒
􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀡􀀉􀀐􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀭􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀗􀀏􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀛􀀛􀀡􀀜􀀜􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀜􀀎􀀗􀀭􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀜􀀗􀀡􀀌􀀙􀀖􀀋
􀀈􀀡􀀕􀀮􀀄􀀜􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀙􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀄􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀛􀀐􀀡􀀭􀀄􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀭􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀕􀀮􀀋􀀉
􀀭􀀎􀀆􀀛􀀜􀀎􀀕􀀎􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀜􀀜􀀡􀀏􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀭􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀗􀀏􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀗
􀀋􀀕􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀑􀀥􀀖􀀐􀀡􀀆􀀉􀀜􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀳􀀡􀀭􀀌􀀄􀀆􀀥􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀡􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀉􀀆􀀥􀀖􀀄􀀉􀀙􀀈􀀎􀀛􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀐􀀎􀀛􀀑􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀡􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀶􀀉􀀜􀀄􀀋􀀉􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄
􀀕􀀄􀀭􀀎􀀋􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀕􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀅􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀛􀀄􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀛􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀕􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀏􀀎􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈
􀀉􀀙􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀌􀀗􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀐􀀗􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀡􀀜􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀏􀀜􀀗􀀏􀀄􀀜􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀆􀀋􀀘􀀄􀀌􀀡􀀋􀀜􀀭􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀡􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀋􀀭􀀭􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀘
􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀉􀀖􀀛􀀋􀀡􀀆􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀛􀀜􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀆􀀒
􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀉􀀋􀀤􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀅􀀋􀀜􀀭􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀈􀀄􀀇􀀋􀀖􀀔􀀉􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉
􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀫􀀴􀀖􀀚􀀏􀀜􀀎􀀐􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀜􀀗􀀡􀀌􀀙􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀋􀀈􀀎􀀆􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀜􀀗􀀡􀀈􀀭􀀉􀀋􀀮􀀐􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀡􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀒􀀖􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀡􀀉􀀛􀀗􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀆􀀄
􀀜􀀗􀀡􀀈􀀭􀀉􀀋􀀮􀀐􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀜􀀎􀀮􀀡􀀉􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀊􀀋􀀜􀀐􀀎􀀋􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀵􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀭􀀗􀀏􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀧􀀪􀀖􀀬􀀋􀀑􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀗􀀐􀀡􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀉􀀐􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄
􀀷􀀬􀀄􀀕􀀗􀀜􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀡􀀕􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀢􀀗􀀈􀀛􀀗􀀜􀀭􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀊􀀄􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀸􀀒􀀖􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀬􀀄􀀕􀀗􀀜􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀡􀀕􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀭􀀗􀀏􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀋
􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀉􀀡􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀕􀀖􀀏􀀋􀀛􀀤􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀛􀀐􀀡􀀭􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀭􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀜􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀹􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀅􀀄􀀜􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀆􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀉􀀡􀀆
􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀲􀀡􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀡􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀺􀀖􀀳􀀡􀀭􀀎􀀛􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀐􀀎􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀕􀀺􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀕􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀅􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀶􀀌􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉
􀀏􀀜􀀗􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀜􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀅􀀙􀀗􀀖􀀅􀀗􀀡􀀐􀀭􀀖􀀋􀀌􀀜􀀄􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀌􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀋􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀥􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀛􀀐􀀡􀀭􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀗􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀙􀀗􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀇􀀄
􀀛􀀗􀀕􀀕􀀎􀀉􀀉􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀜􀀎􀀗􀀡􀀆􀀖􀀛􀀜􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀌􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀏􀀙􀀑􀀆􀀎􀀛􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀌􀀜􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀒
􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀊􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀭􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀛􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀗􀀤􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀧􀀻􀀖􀀬􀀋􀀑􀀥􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀙􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀅􀀖􀀙􀀡􀀕􀀋􀀈
􀀜􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀗􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀡􀀈􀀉􀀜􀀑􀀒􀀖􀀱􀀗􀀅􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀥􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀜􀀎􀀗􀀡􀀆􀀖􀀙􀀡􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀜􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀗􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀗􀀤􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈
􀀉􀀙􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀓􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀜􀀈􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀍􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀤􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀼􀀡􀀙􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀤􀀥􀀖􀀅􀀙􀀄􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀉􀀉􀀋􀀛􀀤􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀛􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈
􀀛􀀗􀀕􀀕􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀕􀀕􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀜􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀛􀀛􀀡􀀜􀀜􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀜􀀗􀀡􀀌􀀙􀀗􀀡􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀜􀀄􀀶􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀛􀀉􀀗􀀜􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀜􀀎􀀗􀀭􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀭􀀡􀀜􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄
􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀛􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀥􀀖􀀭􀀎􀀆􀀜􀀡􀀏􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀐􀀭􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀛􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀥􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀭􀀄􀀏􀀜􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀜􀀌􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀜􀀗􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀭􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘
􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀎􀀜􀀖􀀜􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀇􀀗􀀉􀀄􀀒
􀀫􀀁􀀨
􀀊􀀜􀀗􀀌􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀌􀀗􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀛􀀗􀀡􀀈􀀉􀀋􀀮􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀏􀀜􀀗􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀬􀀋􀀎􀀭􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀗􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀥􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀧
􀀬􀀋􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀛􀀎􀀭􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀰􀀭􀀄􀀆􀀋􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀕􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀆􀀐􀀗􀀅􀀒􀀖􀀖􀀔􀀗􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀽􀀄􀀜􀀤􀀡􀀉􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀋􀀤􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀥􀀖􀀮􀀡􀀉
􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀖􀀏􀀜􀀗􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀡􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀜􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀫􀀫􀀾􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀜􀀆􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀤􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀭􀀡􀀜􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀬􀀋􀀎􀀭􀀋􀀈
􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀉􀀅􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀃􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀕􀀮􀀄􀀜􀀖􀀧􀀪􀀫􀀾􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀿􀀄􀀮􀀜􀀡􀀋􀀜􀀑􀀖􀀧􀀪􀀫􀀨􀀒
􀁀􀀎􀀉􀀙􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀜􀀭􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀜􀀋􀀌􀀎􀀛􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀧􀀖􀀬􀀋􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀰􀀭􀀄􀀆􀀋􀀥􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀋􀀈􀀖􀁁􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀄􀀈
􀀐􀀋􀀡􀀈􀀛􀀙􀀄􀀭􀀒􀀖􀀰􀀡􀀜􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀥􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀜􀀥􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀅􀀋􀀜􀀭􀀆􀀖􀀌􀀜􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀋􀀛􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀥􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀜􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀙􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀭􀀡􀀛􀀉􀀖􀀖􀀗􀀈
􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀋􀀜􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀐􀀎􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀮􀀜􀀎􀀌􀀋􀀭􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀋􀀤􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀋􀀜􀀑􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀡􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀏􀀜􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄
􀀎􀀈􀀛􀀎􀀭􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀡􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀛􀀋􀀆􀀡􀀋􀀐􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀜􀀗􀀐􀀎􀀘􀀄􀀜􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀛􀀋􀀜􀀜􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀙􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀖􀀜􀀎􀀆􀀤􀀖􀀗􀀘
􀀕􀀎􀀆􀀛􀀗􀀕􀀕􀀡􀀈􀀎􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀄􀁂􀀡􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀋􀀕􀀎􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀎􀀭􀀄􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀛􀀤􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀜􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀏􀀋􀀜􀀄􀀈􀀛􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄
􀀎􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀜􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀞􀀉􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀜􀀡􀀛􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀋􀀜􀀜􀀎􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀗􀀡􀀉
􀀉􀀙􀀗􀀜􀀗􀀡􀀌􀀙􀀐􀀑􀀥􀀖􀀏􀀜􀀗􀀕􀀏􀀉􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀎􀀕􀀏􀀋􀀜􀀉􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀑􀀒
􀀞􀀖􀀆􀀙􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀅􀀖􀀉􀀡􀀜􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀡􀀈􀀉􀀜􀀑􀀥􀀖􀀅􀀙􀀄􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀜􀀎􀀗􀀡􀀆􀀖􀀙􀀡􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀜􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀉􀀆
􀀛􀀙􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀌􀀄􀀆􀀒􀀖
􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀖􀀙􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀐􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀋􀀏􀀎􀀭􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀭􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀜􀀎􀀗􀀜􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀱􀀗􀀅􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀆
􀀭􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀜􀀎􀀗􀀜􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀡􀀜􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀜􀀥􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀡􀀉􀀶􀀗􀀘􀀘􀀖􀀭􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀂􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀕􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀮􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀕􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈
􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀜􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀘􀀜􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀘􀀎􀀛􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀡􀀜􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀥􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀭􀀎􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀘􀀜􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀫􀀻􀀖􀀚􀀏􀀜􀀎􀀐􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀧􀀪􀀖􀀩􀀡􀀈􀀄􀀥􀀖􀀨􀀧􀀾􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀗􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀥􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀛􀀐􀀡􀀭􀀎􀀈􀀌
􀀆􀀄􀀜􀀇􀀎􀀛􀀄􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀛􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀥􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀤􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀭􀀒􀀖
􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀛􀀜􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀕􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀡􀀎􀀉􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀕􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀌􀀜􀀗􀀡􀀏􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀄􀀏􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄
􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀘􀀶􀀏􀀜􀀗􀀛􀀐􀀋􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀷􀀍􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀤􀀖􀀊􀀄􀀗􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀵􀀆􀀖􀀲􀀄􀀏􀀡􀀮􀀐􀀎􀀛􀀸􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀛􀀗􀀌􀀈􀀎􀀹􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀙􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀎􀀜􀀖􀀜􀀋􀀈􀀤􀀆
􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀕􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀌􀀜􀀗􀀡􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀹􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀲􀀡􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀿􀀄􀀭􀀄􀀜􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀥􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀛􀀐􀀡􀀭􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀘􀀜􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀢􀀙􀀄􀀛􀀙􀀈􀀑􀀋􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀗􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀜
􀀜􀀄􀀏􀀡􀀮􀀐􀀎􀀛􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀃􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀙􀀖􀀢􀀋􀀡􀀛􀀋􀀆􀀡􀀆􀀒
􀀚􀀮􀀭􀀡􀀛􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀭􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀮􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀕􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀌􀀜􀀗􀀡􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀕􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀅􀀗􀀜􀀜􀀑􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀜􀀄􀀈􀀭􀀒􀀖􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀅􀀐􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀆
􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀡􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀆􀀏􀀜􀀄􀀋􀀭􀀒􀀖􀀱􀀡􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀜􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀮􀀡􀀆􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀮􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀕􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀌􀀜􀀗􀀡􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀛􀀜􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀕􀀕􀀗􀀈
􀀛􀀜􀀎􀀕􀀎􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀜􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀒􀀖􀀖􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀱􀀲􀀬􀀬􀀣􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀛􀀗􀀜􀀭􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀧􀀧􀀧􀀖􀀛􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀋􀀮􀀭􀀡􀀛􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀭􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀮􀀑
􀀋􀀜􀀕􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀌􀀜􀀗􀀡􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀫􀀾􀀖􀀚􀀏􀀜􀀎􀀐􀀒􀀖􀀰􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀥􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀴􀀖􀀩􀀡􀀈􀀄􀀥􀀖􀀨􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀤􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀭􀀥􀀖􀁃􀀫􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀕􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈
􀀭􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀫􀀾􀀴􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀭􀀒
􀀞􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀓􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀵􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀡􀀜􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀗􀀏􀀄􀀜􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀛􀀜􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀆
􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀛􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀭􀀎􀀆􀀋􀀏􀀏􀀄􀀋􀀜􀀋􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀡􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀛􀀋􀀆􀀡􀀋􀀐􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀌
􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀄􀀜􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀏􀀡􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀍􀀄􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀡􀀜􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀜􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀥􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀗􀀜􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀛􀀎􀀭􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆
􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀜􀀋􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀕􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀙􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀒􀀖􀁀􀀙􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀉􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀭􀀄􀀐􀀎􀀮􀀄􀀜􀀋􀀉􀀄
􀀉􀀋􀀜􀀌􀀄􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀏􀀡􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀜􀀌􀀄􀀥􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀎􀀘􀀑􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀡􀀜􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀡􀀐􀀭􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀇􀀄
􀀉􀀋􀀤􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀡􀀜􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀜􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀡􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀏􀀜􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀛􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀋􀀆􀀡􀀋􀀐􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀕􀀡􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀡􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀆
􀀋􀀜􀀕􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀘􀀜􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀜􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀡􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀛􀀄􀀥􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀡􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀌􀀗􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀡􀀜􀀎􀀉􀀑
􀀗􀀏􀀄􀀜􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀉􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀙􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀇􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀜􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀙􀀡􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀜􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀋􀀜􀀭􀀆􀀒
􀀧􀀁􀀨
􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀏􀀡􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀥􀀖􀀏􀀋􀀜􀀉􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀭􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀋􀀜􀀥􀀖􀀮􀀡􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀡􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀗􀀜􀀆􀀄􀀈􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀘
􀀄􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀗􀀕􀀎􀀛􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀜􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀉􀀆􀀒􀀖
􀀰􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀄􀀤􀀆􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀞􀀍􀀊􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀏􀀡􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀭􀀗􀀡􀀮􀀐􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀡􀀈􀀉􀀜􀀑􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀙􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀜􀀌􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉
􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀗􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀶􀀖􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀕􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀫􀀻􀀥􀀧􀀪􀀪􀀖􀁄􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀙􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀍􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀤􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀼􀀡􀀙􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀤􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀚􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀧􀀾
􀀩􀀡􀀈􀀄􀀥􀀖􀀣􀀃􀀱􀀢􀀲􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀏􀀜􀀗􀀘􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀨􀁁􀀥􀀫􀀪􀀪􀀖􀀞􀀍􀀊􀀆􀀥􀀖􀀫􀀫􀀥􀀻􀀪􀀪􀀖􀀘􀀜􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀢􀀜􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀋􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀋􀀜􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀾􀀨􀀥􀁁􀀪􀀪
􀀘􀀜􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀞􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀮􀀆􀀄􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀕􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀜􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀆􀀑􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀕􀀥􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀌􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀕􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗
􀀆􀀗􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀮􀀑􀀖􀀙􀀡􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀜􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀏􀀋􀀜􀀉􀀈􀀄􀀜􀀆􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀈􀀡􀀕􀀮􀀄􀀜􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀞􀀍􀀊􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀤􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀄􀀜􀀒􀀖􀀖􀀯􀀙􀀄
􀀝􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀛􀀗􀀡􀀜􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀡􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀜􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀄􀀭􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀞􀀍􀀊􀀆􀀥􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀛􀀐􀀡􀀭􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀮􀀑
􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀮􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀕􀀏􀀜􀀄􀀙􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀜􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀆􀀑􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀕􀀥􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀕􀀡􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀌􀀡􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀗􀀜􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀉􀀆
􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀎􀀕􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀄􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀗􀀕􀀎􀀛􀀖􀀜􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀜􀀗􀀡􀀌􀀙􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀮􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀘
􀀏􀀡􀀮􀀐􀀎􀀛􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀜􀀗􀀌􀀜􀀋􀀕􀀕􀀄􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀬􀀗􀀮􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀹􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀗􀀜􀀭􀀎􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀛􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀐􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀄􀀉􀀑􀀶􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀐􀀎􀀄􀀘
􀀄􀀘􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀆􀀥􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀗􀀏􀀄􀀜􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀙􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀜􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀭􀀗􀀈􀀗􀀜􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀙􀀈􀀎􀀛􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀛􀀜􀀡􀀛􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀒
􀀖􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀭􀀎􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀬􀀋􀀑􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀡􀀭􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀭􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀡􀀆􀀏􀀄􀀈􀀭􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀥
􀀋􀀘􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀧􀀫􀀥􀀴􀀪􀀪􀀖􀀏􀀡􀀏􀀎􀀐􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀱􀀗􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀕􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀛􀀜􀀗􀀅􀀭􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀡􀀈􀀭􀀄􀀜􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀘􀀘􀀄􀀭􀀥􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀭􀀎􀀛􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀆􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀄
􀀐􀀗􀀅􀀥􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀮􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀬􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀜􀀑􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀋􀀐􀀉􀀙􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀡􀀏􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀫􀀪􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀅􀀖􀀛􀀐􀀗􀀆􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄
􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀜􀀈􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀿􀀗􀀗􀀭􀀖􀀏􀀜􀀎􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀤􀀑􀀜􀀗􀀛􀀤􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀭􀀒􀀖􀀔􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀗􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀇􀀄􀀌􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀮􀀐􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀅􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀖􀀨􀀖􀀉􀀗
􀀻􀀖􀀉􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀏􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀬􀀄􀀋􀀈􀀅􀀙􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀥􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀛􀀗􀀕􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀛􀀜􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀭􀀎􀀘􀀘􀀎􀀛􀀡􀀐􀀉􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀜
􀀮􀀡􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀗􀀏􀀄􀀜􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀗􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀌􀀗􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀅􀀗􀀜􀀤􀀒􀀖􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀕􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀋􀀉􀀉􀀋􀀛􀀤􀀆
􀀋􀀌􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀕􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀕􀀏􀀋􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀥􀀖􀀅􀀙􀀎􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀉􀀡􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀆􀀙􀀋􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀵􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀗􀀕􀀑􀀒
􀀚􀀮􀀗􀀡􀀉􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀐􀀘􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀏􀀡􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀍􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀤􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀏􀀄􀀜􀀎􀀄􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀜􀀗􀀮􀀐􀀄􀀕􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀙􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗
􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀜􀀒􀀖􀀔􀀎􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀄􀀤􀀥􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀔􀀐􀀗􀀇􀀑􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀤􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀖􀀜􀀡􀀈􀀈􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀜􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀭􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀗
􀀡􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀐􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀚􀀜􀀗􀀡􀀈􀀭􀀖􀁅􀀪􀁆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀅􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀅􀀖􀀛􀀡􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀘􀀖􀀘􀀜􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀛􀀉􀀜􀀎􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀒􀀖􀀊􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀭􀀗􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀉􀀖􀀅􀀗􀀜􀀤􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀆􀀉
􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀏􀀡􀀮􀀐􀀎􀀛􀀖􀀉􀀜􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀖􀀭􀀗􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀉􀀖􀀘􀀡􀀈􀀛􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀒
􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀳􀀗􀀡􀀜􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀋􀀜􀀕􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀒􀀖􀀯􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀢􀀗􀀡􀀈􀀛􀀎􀀐􀀖􀀜􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀉􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀭􀀄􀀕􀀈􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀤􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀎􀀈􀀌
􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀖􀀲􀀡􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀳􀀗􀀡􀀜􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀮􀀑􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀋􀀜􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀜􀀄􀀥􀀖􀀅􀀙􀀎􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀐􀀐􀀗􀀅􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀤􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀞􀀉􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀏􀀙􀀗􀀉􀀗􀀳􀀗􀀡􀀜􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀉
􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀲􀀡􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀜􀀏􀀜􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀜􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀧􀀨􀀖􀀬􀀋􀀑􀀒􀀖􀁀􀀙􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀜􀀏􀀄􀀉􀀜􀀋􀀉􀀗􀀜􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀉􀀉􀀋􀀛􀀤􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀑􀀄􀀉
􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀭􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀘􀀎􀀄􀀭􀀥􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀕􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀡􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀛􀀗􀀡􀀈􀀉􀀋􀀮􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀒
􀀬􀀜􀀒􀀖􀀊􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀭􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀥
􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀖􀀭􀀄􀀆􀀛􀀜􀀎􀀮􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀢􀀜􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀋􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀷􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀕􀀮􀀗􀀸􀀒􀀖􀀚􀀐􀀉􀀙􀀗􀀡􀀌􀀙􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀜􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀆
􀀆􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀗􀀆􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀕􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀛􀀄􀀥􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀛􀀗􀀜􀀭􀀋􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀙􀀖􀀝􀀚􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀗􀀐􀀡􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀁁􀁃􀀁􀀧􀁁􀀧􀀥􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀉􀀡􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈
􀀢􀀜􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀋􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀜􀀄􀀋􀀭􀀑􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀜􀀄􀁂􀀡􀀎􀀜􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀙􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀜􀀗􀀇􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀆􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀲􀀡􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈
􀀿􀀄􀀭􀀄􀀜􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀯􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀑􀀖􀀏􀀜􀀋􀀛􀀉􀀎􀀛􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀄􀀘􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀉􀀆􀀥􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀫􀀻􀀥􀀪􀀪􀀪􀀖􀀳􀀡􀀭􀀎􀀛􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀛􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀕􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀕􀀮􀀗
􀀮􀀄􀀉􀀅􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀜􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀲􀀡􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀅􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀆􀀑􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀕􀀆􀀒
􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀢􀀜􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀯􀀋􀀉􀀋􀀜􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀏􀀡􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀛􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀜􀀈􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀕􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀎􀀜􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀳􀀗􀀑􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉
􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀘􀀜􀀄􀀄􀀭􀀗􀀕􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀏􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀥􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀘􀀡􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀮􀀐􀀑􀀥􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀆􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀐􀀎􀀌􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀒􀀖
􀀾􀀁􀀨
􀀬􀀜􀀒􀀖􀀊􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀭􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀥􀀖􀀭􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀡􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀕􀀮􀀄􀀜􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀢􀀗􀀡􀀈􀀛􀀎􀀐􀀥􀀖
􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀃􀀖􀀱􀀲􀀬􀀬􀀣􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀜􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀑􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀕􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀜􀀗􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀭􀀄􀀘􀀡􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀜􀀗􀀡􀀌􀀙􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀆
􀀎􀀕􀀏􀀋􀀜􀀉􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀡􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀜􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀡􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀞􀀉􀀖􀀛􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀄􀁂􀀡􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀡􀀆􀀄􀀘􀀡􀀐􀀖􀀜􀀗􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀜􀀗􀀡􀀌􀀙
􀀙􀀡􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀜􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀙􀀡􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀜􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀘􀀎􀀭􀀄􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀮􀀡􀀎􀀐􀀭􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀡􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀖􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀃􀀖􀀱􀀲􀀬􀀬􀀣􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀜􀀄􀀋􀀭􀀑
􀀘􀀋􀀛􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀈􀀡􀀕􀀄􀀜􀀗􀀡􀀆􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀭􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀭􀀡􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀖􀀭􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀮􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀕􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀌􀀜􀀗􀀡􀀏􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀱􀀗􀀅􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀥􀀖􀀆􀀡􀀛􀀙
􀀕􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀡􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀙􀀗􀀡􀀐􀀭􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀖􀀮􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀛􀀎􀀏􀀜􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀭􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀭􀀡􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀜􀀮􀀎􀀉􀀜􀀋􀀜􀀎􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀭􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀮􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄
􀀋􀀡􀀉􀀙􀀗􀀜􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀕􀀡􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀮􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀭􀀥􀀖􀀎􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀐􀀶􀀘􀀗􀀡􀀈􀀭􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀮􀀋􀀆􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀕􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀕􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈
􀀭􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀚􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀃􀀖􀀱􀀲􀀬􀀬􀀣􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀋􀀛􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀭􀀄􀀆􀀥􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀡􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀆􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭
􀀘􀀋􀀛􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀡􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀒
􀀊􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀭􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀊􀀗􀀜􀀗􀀆􀀙􀀄􀀈􀀤􀀗􀀵􀀆􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀈􀀗􀀡􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀡􀀈􀀎􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀜􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀄
􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀏􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀜􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀉􀀖􀀭􀀎􀀜􀀄􀀛􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀞􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀛􀀗􀀡􀀜􀀋􀀌􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀜􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀑􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀜􀀭􀀋􀀑􀀵􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀈􀀗􀀡􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀮􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄
􀀋􀀜􀀕􀀄􀀭􀀖􀀌􀀜􀀗􀀡􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀑􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀗􀀮􀀆􀀄􀀜􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀜􀀄􀀖􀀡􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀐􀀖􀀿􀀜􀀎􀀭􀀋􀀑􀀒􀀖􀀯􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀛􀀜􀀄􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀭􀀗􀀅􀀖􀀗􀀘
􀀗􀀏􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀡􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀡􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀜􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀙􀀡􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀜􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀘􀀎􀀭􀀄􀀈􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀮􀀡􀀎􀀐􀀭􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀡􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀒
􀀽􀀄􀀑􀀗􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀕􀀕􀀄􀀭􀀎􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀜􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀥􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀉􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀙􀀡􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀜􀀎􀀌􀀙􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀑􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀖
􀀣􀀤􀀜􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀥􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀏􀀜􀀄􀀜􀀄􀁂􀀡􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀜􀀖􀀆􀀡􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀋􀀮􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀯􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀃􀀖􀀱􀀲􀀬􀀬􀀣􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀆􀀖􀀜􀀄􀀋􀀭􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀆􀀡􀀏􀀏􀀗􀀜􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀙􀀄
􀀝􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀜􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀣􀀤􀀜􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀥􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀛􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀐􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀄􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀇􀀋􀀜􀀎􀀗􀀡􀀆􀀖􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀌􀀜􀀗􀀡􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀕􀀋􀀤􀀄
􀀉􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀏􀀏􀀄􀀈􀀒
􀀖􀀖􀀯􀀙􀀋􀀈􀀤􀀖􀀑􀀗􀀡􀀖􀀬􀀜􀀒􀀖􀀊􀀜􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀭􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀒
􀀢􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀋􀀛􀀉􀀖􀀡􀀆
􀀊􀀆􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀇􀀐􀀋􀀅􀀃
􀀔􀀙􀀋􀀜􀀄􀀯􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀢􀀗􀀏􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀭􀀖􀀊􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀄
􀀨􀀁􀀨
Annex 295
OHCHR, Intensified Fighting Putting at Risk Lives of People in Donetsk and Luhansk — Pillay
(4 July 2014)

OHCHR | Intensified fighting putting at risk lives of people in Donetsk and Luhansk – Pillay
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14822&LangID=E[6/1/2018 7:18:09 PM]
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Intensified fighting putting at risk lives of people in Donetsk and Luhansk –
Pillay
GENEVA (4 July 2014) – Following the end of the ceasefire on 30 June in Ukraine, the UN human rights
monitoring mission in Ukraine has reported numerous cases of death of people in Donetsk and Luhansk
who are caught in the middle of the ongoing security operations, UN human rights chief Navi Pillay
warned on Friday.
“We have received numerous alarming reports of deaths in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, including
the killing of a five-year-old girl, due to the intensified security operations taking place since the
ceasefire ended on Monday," Pillay said. “There have also been reports of the use of landmines, which
have allegedly led to three deaths and left several people injured.”
Pillay said she was particularly disturbed by a message on the website of one leader of the selfproclaimed
‘Donetsk People’s Republic’, which states that underage children and women are legitimate
targets and that the goal is to ‘immerse them in horror’.
“Such blatant incitement to violence is utterly reprehensible and a clear violation of international human
rights law,” she said. “There has been strong hate speech from all sides. I am deeply concerned about
the safety of the people who remain trapped in Donetsk and Luhansk areas controlled by the armed
groups and are caught in the crossfire between armed groups and the Ukrainian Government. I remind
all those involved in the fighting that all measures must be taken to ensure that the fundamental human
rights – including the right to life – of residents of these two regions is scrupulously respected.”
In the month of June, the human rights monitoring team has documented the killing of five children in
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Orphaned children, many very young or with disabilities, in the two
regions have faced particular difficulties and have in some cases been evacuated.
“The Ukrainian Government has a duty to investigate every alleged extrajudicial killing and to bring the
perpetrators to justice,” Pillay stressed.
Pillay also noted that abductions by armed groups continue to be reported daily and that houses, schools
and infrastructure, including water and electricity plants, have been damaged – in some cases severely
enough to lead to power cuts. The UN human rights monitoring team in Ukraine has received reports that
armed groups are using the roofs of residential buildings to install anti-aircraft systems, and that they
are occupying private apartments to organise sniper positions, seriously endangering residents who are
not involved in the fighting. Shelling has also been reported in residential areas held by these armed
groups.
OHCHR | Intensified fighting putting at risk lives of people in Donetsk and Luhansk – Pillay
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14822&LangID=E[6/1/2018 7:18:09 PM]
“More and more residents of Luhansk and Donetsk regions are being forced to flee their homes, while
others are trapped in zones of heavy fighting, as their fundamental human rights are trampled upon and
a climate of insecurity and fear becomes increasingly pervasive,” Pillay said. “I urge all sides to put down
their arms, to engage in dialogue and to turn away from the destructive path towards which they are
leading the east of Ukraine.”
Pillay welcomed indications of the possible imminent resumption of a ceasefire, which she called upon all
sides to respect.
ENDS
For more information or media requests, please contact Ravina Shamdasani (+41 22 917 9769 /
[email protected] ) or Cécile Pouilly (+41 22 917 9310 / [email protected] )
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Annex 296
OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 July 2014)

1
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights
Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
15 July 2014
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
II. RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY,
AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY
7
III. RULE OF LAW 14
A. Impunity in the east 14
B. Constitutional amendments 16
C. Justice sector reforms 17
D. Legislative developments 19
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 20
A. Investigation into human rights violations related to the Maidan protests 21
B. Investigation into human rights violations related to the violence in Odesa 22
C. Investigations into other human rights violations 25
V. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 26
VI. FREEDOMS OF EXPRESSION, ASSOCIATION, PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY,
MOVEMENT, RELIGION OR BELIEF
29
A. Peaceful assembly 29
B. Freedom of association 30
C. Freedom of expression 30
D. Freedom of movement 31
E. Freedom of religion or belief 32
VII. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 33
VIII. MINORITY RIGHTS AND GROUPS FACING DISCRIMINATION 35
IX. POLITICAL RIGHTS 36
X. PARTICULAR HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES IN CRIMEA 37
XI. CONCLUSIONS 39
ANNEX I. COMPILATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS
MECHANISMS AND THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING MISSION
IN UKRAINE.
41
3
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. The continuing deterioration of the human rights situation in eastern Ukraine, the rapid
escalation of hostilities and the growing impact on the rest of the country have been the main
developments during the past month1.
2. Egregious human rights abuses have been committed in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of
eastern Ukraine, where armed groups supporting the self-proclaimed “Donetsk People’s
Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic” (DPR and LPR respectively) have, until
recently, controlled a large part of the territory, including most of the main population
centres. There have been hundreds of abductions with many victims tortured.2 Increasing
numbers of civilians have been killed.
3. The Ukrainian security operation, referred to as an ‘anti-terrorist operation’ (ATO), aimed at
regaining control of the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk held by these armed groups,
involves the army, the military police (National Guard), the National Security Service (SBU)
and volunteers’ battalions. In any law enforcement operation security forces must act
proportionally to the threat and must at all times respect the right to life. In addition, in the
conduct of hostilities all those involved in the hostilities must comply with principles of
distinction, proportionality and precautions. This is particularly important in an environment
in which armed groups and civilians are inter-mingled.
4. The current intense fighting using heavy weaponry in and around population areas, has
devastated towns and villages, demolishing residential buildings and killing an increasing
number of their inhabitants. Precautionary measures should be taken to avoid the deaths and
injury of civilians.3
5. There has been deliberate targeting by the armed groups of critical public utilities like water,
electricity and sewerage plants that have shut down essential supplies to the residents. Public
and private properties have been illegally seized and residences destroyed. Banks have been
robbed and coal mines attacked. Railways were blown up. Hospitals and clinics were forced
to shut down and essential medicines and emergency medical services became scarce or
totally unavailable. People were unable to leave their homes in some places, trapping older
persons or persons with disabilities. The rule of law no longer existed and was replaced by the
rule of violence. The increased level of fear, intimidation, harassment and fighting inflicted
on the population of the region resulted in an ever growing flood of internally displaced
persons fleeing, at latest count 86,6094 people.
6. Some regional and local officials were abducted and tortured. The regional government in
effect ceased to function in the two eastern regions. Some local authorities continued to work
but with greatly reduced control or were co-opted by the armed groups. Salaries, pensions and
other social welfare payments stopped in some places. The police and judiciary ceased to
1 This is the fourth report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation
of human rights in Ukraine, based on the work of the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in
Ukraine (HRMMU). It covers the period from 8 June to 15 July 2014.
2 Illegal acts committed by the armed groups include abductions, detentions, torture, murder, executions, extortion,
and destruction of property.
3 On 23 July, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) issued a News Release calling the fighting in
eastern Ukraine a ‘non-international armed conflict’ and urging all parties to comply with international
humanitarian law. This requires to impose restrictions on the means and methods of warfare and to distinguish at
all times between civilians and persons directly participating in the conflict. In particular, no attacks must be
directed against civilian objects such as homes, schools, medical facilities and places of worship, among others.
4 UNHCR, 15 July 2014.
4
function. Residents were left to cope in whatever way they could. Volunteers attempted to fill
the gaps.
7. In some places the situation was worse than in others. Slovyansk city (normal population
about 130,000 which by early July was down to less than half) in northern Donetsk region
was, since April, the stronghold and main base of operations for the armed groups. The
residents were particularly badly affected due to the almost constant shelling and fighting
there for weeks as the armed groups and Government forces clashed.
8. The professionalization of the armed groups fighting in the east has become openly
acknowledged and self-evident. Their leadership, many of whom are nationals of the Russian
Federation, are trained and hardened by experience in conflicts, such as in Chechnya (Russian
Federation) and Transnistria (Republic of Moldova). What was previously something of a rag
tag of armed groups with different loyalties and agendas is now being brought together under
the central command of these men. Heavy weaponry including mortars and anti-aircraft guns,
tanks and armoured vehicles, and landmines are now being used by them. As the ‘Minister of
Defence’ of the armed groups told the HRMMU on 8 July: “we are in the state of war”.
9. The armed groups from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions have themselves joined forces in a
self-proclaimed ‘People’s Republic of Novorossia’. They claimed to have adopted a
constitution and to be making other preparations for establishing an unlawful selfgovernment.
10. Throughout the reporting period, the Government of Ukraine pursued its “anti-terrorist”
operation (ATO), under the direction of the State Security Service, as it sought to regain
control of territory in the eastern regions. This security operation has intensified in the past
two weeks involving the use of heavy weaponry and airstrikes. Following the announcement
of a Peace Plan by the President of Ukraine on 20 June, the Government implemented a 10-
day ceasefire but this was reportedly breached at least 108 times, killing 27 Ukrainian soldiers
and wounding 69. At least 9 people not involved in the fighting were also killed, including
one eleven month old child. After the ceasefire ended on 30 June, the Government mounted
an intense offensive, recapturing territory including the main strategic base of the armed
groups in the Donetsk region - the city of Slovyansk - and stating it had regained control of
the Ukraine-Russian Federation border areas that had previously been under the control of the
armed groups. But the price was high with at least 30 civilian deaths, many wounded, and a
great deal of destruction to the recaptured villages, towns and cities. And the control was
tenuous, as evidenced by the continuing attacks by armed groups that have killed and
wounded soldiers and many civilians. Neither side expressed any public willingness to come
together to discuss a negotiated peace. The level of rhetoric and propaganda escalated, with
allegations of deliberately targeting civilians. The President, however, stated his readiness to
restore a ceasefire upon the following conditions: (i) all hostages should be released; (ii)
Governmental control over the border with the Russian Federation should be restored; and
(iii) armed groups should be disarmed.
11. The protection of civilians in the eastern regions has been of increasing concern. On 4 July,
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concern about the safety
of people caught in the crossfire between Ukrainian forces and the armed groups, and
reminded all those involved in the fighting of the need to scrupulously respect residents’
fundamental rights, including the right to life. The Government appeared to take notice and,
on 8 July, said it would give special attention to the prevention of civilian losses and would
not bombard the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, to which the armed groups had retreated.
Instead it would blockade those cities in an effort to force the armed groups to surrender. A
leader of one of the armed groups said it was prepared to start a full-scale guerrilla war.
5
12. Nevertheless people trapped in areas controlled by the armed groups continue to be killed as
the heavy shelling continues from both sides. Questions arise about the conformity of these
attacks with the rules governing the conduct of hostilities. It is essential that the authorities
conduct full and impartial investigations of all incidents where civilians have lost their lives
or been wounded.
13. Civilians continue to be abducted by the armed groups. Some people previously abducted and
recently released have reported being tortured by them. New allegations of executions by the
armed groups have arisen. There have also been cases reported of enforced disappearances of
people detained by Government forces, including in areas where the Ukrainian authorities
have regained control. The Government must guarantee accountability for all its actions,
curtailing impunity and ensuring the local population do not face reprisals. There is also
concern about the arbitrary detention of people who are suspected of being supportive of the
armed groups.
14. Meanwhile, the situation in the east has begun to impact the rest of Ukraine. Although most
people carried on their lives as normal outside the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, there are
already signs that violence in the east is having an impact elsewhere.
15. One of the most obvious and immediate impacts has been the increase in the number of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) – the majority of whom are women and children - having
to be accommodated in the rest of the country. Initially the Government was slow to react to
the growing flood of people fleeing the violence in the east, relying on volunteers and the
goodwill of the local receiving communities. But as the numbers increased and the lack of
coordination, planning and resources became evident, the State Service for Emergency
Services stepped in. However, many problems remained to be addressed, including the need
for a central registry to document the IDPs, and for the central government to ease access of
the IDPs to important social and economic rights. This was partly addressed in a decision in
June by the Cabinet. However, other concerns remain, including meeting the specific needs of
women and children, who make up the majority of the IDPs. Most IDPs are accommodated in
private homes, sanatoriums, student dormitories (that are currently vacant during the summer
holidays), or in other temporary situations. If the fighting and hostilities in the east continue,
there is concern about how this temporary accommodation will be maintained, especially as
the weather gets colder and if the summer sanatoriums are not winterized.
16. At the same time, there is concern that there might be a new wave of IDPs from Crimea in the
next few months because of tightening restrictions, the continuing harassment and
discrimination against ethnic Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars, and representatives of minority
groups in general, as well as stringent limitations of the rights of association, peaceful
assembly and expression.
17. A second impact of the worsening situation in the east, are the instances of use of hate speech.
High level public condemnations of such troubling developments are required. There are
reports of Russian-owned banks and some businesses having been targeted by activists who
charged them with ‘financing terrorism ’in the eastern regions. Steps have been taken to ban
the Communist Party. Negativity about IDPs has begun to surface, in particular on social
media, further dividing opinions between east and west.
18. Concerned about the lack of military equipment, families and local communities themselves
have provided basics such as flak jackets, ammunition, and food to new troops being sent to
the Government security operation. Local and regional authorities have tried to manage with
the growing need to provide social protection to the increasing number of local families who
6
have members serving in the security operation. As the number of military deaths rise, it can
be expected that there will be additional tensions.
19. In some places, tensions have risen for other reasons. In Odesa, there have been a series of
bomb hoaxes and violent incidents. This has further affected communities already
traumatised following the 2 May violence when 48 people were killed. Accountability for
such loss of life must be guaranteed, ensuring justice for the victims as well as perpetrators.
Regional and local authorities appear unwilling or unable to take steps to calm the current
situation. Arrests have started to be more frequent around the country of people accused of
being part of or linked to the armed groups in the east. Dissatisfaction with the lack of
accountability in the appointment of regional and other high-level officials, and with the
slowness of central government in effectively tackling corruption, has begun to come to a
head with confrontational demonstrations.
20. The social impact of the violence and fighting should not be underestimated. It is further
exacerbated by the propaganda war, alongside the rhetoric of hate speech that is fuelling
further violence. On the other hand, there were some positive developments. Citizens, both
individually and in groups have stepped in where their government has been unable to
respond quickly enough to rapidly changing events, assisting their communities in the east,
accommodating the people fleeing the fighting, and even providing support and equipment to
the armed forces. Perhaps this new civic spirit will help drive the next phase of the much
needed change in Ukraine.
21. On 27 June, President Poroshenko signed the trade agreement with the European Union (EU)
that completes the Association process. Recognising the significance of the occasion, the
President said after signing the agreement that this was the second most important event in
Ukrainian history after independence. As promised, the Government published on 2 July its
proposed amendments to the Constitution allowing for greater regional autonomy and for the
use of their own languages. Other important legislation was passed tackling corruption and
there were some institutional reforms, including the firing of staff who were found to be
inept, corrupt or had committed other violations. Most notable among these, in terms of the
large numbers involved, were the firing of 17,000 law enforcement offices and of 1,500
employees of the Office of the General Prosecutor, although the latter appeared to be more an
austerity measure. It is essential that in undertaking such action, the rights of the individuals
be fully respected.
22. With so much of its attention focused on the escalating security operation in the east and
responding to the increase of violence of the armed groups, other key aspects of reform are
beginning to receive less attention from the Government. Reform of the judiciary and the
system of justice remain to be addressed. Initial steps have been taken to reform law
enforcement with a pilot project to start in Lviv, the results from which will form the basis of
a reform package. Reform also needs to address the powers of the State Security Service
(SBU). The results of the investigations into the Maidan and Odesa violence are still awaited.
23. The unexpected cost of fighting an escalating security operation in the east, which could
amount to many millions of dollars, will impose a heavy economic burden on Ukraine. The
negative impact of this will be even greater given the current recessionary economic situation
in the country, as will the damage inflicted by the armed groups on the infrastructure of the
Donbas region, which houses a large part of Ukraine’s heavy industry.
24. As it reclaims territory in the east that was formerly held by the armed groups, the Ukraine
Government faces a daunting task of rebuilding communities ravaged by the months of
fighting, instances of intense violence against protesters and the polarizing impact of the on7
going propaganda war. Humanitarian assistance is already being provided by the international
community and a Donor’s Conference is being organized by the EU for later in the year. This
will provide resources for Ukraine to undertake necessary reform.
25. Corruption and mismanagement has existed for many years. The respect and promotion of
good governance, the rule of law and human rights, including through the introduction of
critical reforms, must continue as a priority as Ukraine seeks to fulfil its EU aspirations and
establish a democratic, pluralistic and prosperous society.
II. RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY, AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY
26. The rights to life, liberty and physical security are usually the first to be abused during
hostilities, such as that happening in eastern Ukraine. It is the responsibility of the
Government to ensure that civilians are never targeted and that all precautions are taken to
spare the loss of innocent lives. Detained persons must be treated humanely and provided
with all due process guarantees, starting with the right to counsel and information about the
reasons for the detention. Arbitrary detention and abduction, hostage taking and other human
rights abuses must be promptly investigated and the perpetrators brought to justice. In
addition, any allegations of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance must be duly
investigated and perpetrators brought to account. The armed groups fighting in the east must
abide by international law but unfortunately this has not been the case. Grave human rights
abuses have been committed by those armed groups. And it must be remembered that these
groups have taken control of Ukrainian territory and inflicted on the populations a reign of
intimidation and terror to maintain their position of control. The Government is undertaking
its security operation, within a legislative framework that includes anti-terrorism laws and the
criminal procedure code. It also needs to ensure respect for international law and the
protection of human rights for all those who live in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
27. All allegations of abduction, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, torture, ill treatment
and other human rights abuses must be investigated and the perpetrators held to account.
However, ensuring an impartial investigation of the multiple killings, detentions, cases of
torture and enforced disappearances and other reported violations and abuses has not been
possible until now because of the dangerous situation in the east and the limited control of the
Ukrainian Government in the territory.
Casualties
28. The number of casualties is hard to ascertain. However, based on the best data available
conservative estimates by the HRMMU and the World Health Organisation (WHO) are that at
least 1,000 people have died from mid-April until 15 July. This includes military and civilians
(including members of the armed groups). According to the Ministry of Health, as of 10 July,
478 civilians have been killed (441 men, 30 women and 7 children) and 1,392 injured (1,274
men, 104 women and 14 children) since the fighting began in eastern Ukraine in mid-April.
However, the Ministry withdrew these figures the same day they announced them, and have
issued no further data since. In addition, the Ministry’s figures only include those dead who
were delivered to morgues of medical establishments, or those wounded and who later died in
hospital. In fact, many dead were buried without being taken to morgues. The number of
casualties of the Ukraine armed forces is given as 258, with 922 wounded, according to the
Council for National Security and Defence on 15 July. The number of members of armed
8
groups who have been killed is unknown, but some may have been counted within the
numbers of civilians killed.
29. Since 10 July, there have been at least 44 more civilian casualties, including two children, for
a total of 522 people, as reported by civil medical establishments and regional administrations
in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Most of these recent have been the result of intense
shelling of villages, towns and cities, the so-called ‘collateral damage’ to the fighting that is
taking place in and around population centres.
30. In this report, the HRMMU has enumerated cases where people were killed by indiscriminate
shelling. However, of the figures above, the Government has said that most of the deaths
were by gunshot wounds.
31. The armed groups are locating their military assets in and conducting attacks from densely
populated areas thereby putting the whole civilian population at risk. Locating military
objectives within or near a densely populated area, and launching attacks from such areas
may constitute a violation of international humanitarian law.
32. Human Rights Watch and Memorial, sometimes accompanied by Ukrainian human rights
defenders, have visited the town of Krasny Liman, and the villages of Stanista-Luganskaya
and Staraya Kondrashovka to investigate the circumstances in which civilians have been
killed. In Stanista-Luganskaya and Staraya Kondrashovka, at least 11 people were killed
including 2 children on 2 July; in Krasny Liman, shelling hit the Railway Hospital, killing the
chief surgeon and wounding three others.
33. As the increasing number of casualties in the past few days attests, there has not been
sufficient precaution taken to preventing death and injury to civilians. Recent examples
include the shelling of the village of Maryinka and of the Petrovskiy district of Donetsk on 11
and 12 July when at least 16 people were killed, including one child. There was an air strike
on the town of Snizhne in the Donetsk region on 15 July, and at least 11 people were killed
from shrapnel wounds and eight more wounded, including one child. On 11 July, Ukrainian
forces claimed to have destroyed a camp of an armed group located in the premises of an
empty school in the village of Golmovsky, near Horlivka. The armed group claimed that one
civilian had been killed during that air strike. On 13 July, two civilians were killed in
Krasnogrovka in the Donetsk region. On 15 July, the Mayor of Luhansk announced that 17
Luhansk residents were killed in residential areas during attacks on 14 July and 73 people
received shrapnel and gunshot wounds during the fighting. On 15-16 July, one civilian died
and nine more were injured as a result of gunfire in Luhansk. During the hostilities,
paramedics reported responding to 160 calls.
34. However, not all of the deaths and injuries can be attributed to reported shelling or air strikes
of towns/villages. Some deaths had other causes. For example anti-personnel landmines have
killed at least three and injured two others; people have been killed when the passenger buses
they were travelling in were shot at; and people have been killed when travelling in their car.
Three traffic policemen were killed at close range and without warning, according to an
eyewitness, in Donetsk city on 3 July. A criminal investigation has been opened into the
police killings. A motorist was killed when armed groups stole the car he was driving in
Noviy Svit (Donetsk region). There have been reports of people being used as ‘human
shields’ by the armed groups, as for example in Horlivka on 14 June. In this incident, after
two people were killed and 8 injured, reportedly during an airstrike, the armed group then
threatened to organise “human shields”, by placing detainees on the roof of a city municipal
building, The detainees, included five servicemen from the Kirovograd region and two 25th
army brigade officers and their driver who were all from Dnepropetrovsk region.
9
Abduction and detention
35. According to the Ukrainian government5, since mid-April, 717 people have been abducted by
armed groups in eastern Ukraine. These included: 46 journalists, 112 police officers, 26
representatives of the OSCE, 22 deputies, members of political parties and heads of district
(town) councils, 5 employees of the prosecution office, 2 lawyers, 2 judges, 1 employee of
the penitentiary service and 481 other people (including 392 girls and women). The armed
groups also detained 91 servicemen and border guards as well as 4 Security Service officers.
437 people were released. The whereabouts of 375 people remains unknown.
36. The HRMMU has been following the cases of 400 people who were abducted since mid-
April. Of these, 4 people are dead (having been found dead with visible signs of torture), 211
are still detained, and 185 have been released. Of those still detained, 202 are men and 9 are
women.
37. The number of people abducted by the armed groups has significantly increased in Luhansk
city during the past 2 weeks. For example, a group of 13 employees of PrivatBank were
abducted on 7 July. Four were subsequently released and 9 remain in captivity.
38. Intimidation and violence by the armed groups against civilians in the east has continued,
with people being abducted and detained often for purposes of hostage taking. The armed
groups also carry out acts of ill-treatment, torture and murder.
39. Some of those detained by the armed groups are local politicians, public officials and
employees of the local coal mining industry; the majority are ordinary citizens, including
teachers, journalists, members of the clergy and students.
40. The motivation for the abductions and detentions by the armed groups appears to be: a)
exchange with detainees held by the Government; b) gain some influence on the situation; c)
extortion of property or money; d) source of labour for digging trenches and preparing
military barricades; e) opportunistic ‘arrests’ of people; and f) ‘internal discipline’ of the
armed groups themselves. With these acts, the armed groups continued to exercise their
power over the population in raw and brutal ways.
41. Examples of the 400 cases that the HRMMU has been following include the following: in
Donetsk, a free-lance cameraman was reportedly abducted in Slovyansk. In Soledar (Donetsk
region) the chairman of a Trade Union organization at the Artyomsol Company was
abducted. A professor at the Luhansk National University was abducted. A resident of
Pionerske village in the Luhansk region was reported missing. The Head of a company called
Agrovostok in Malarovo (Luhansk region) was abducted. According to unconfirmed reports,
the police chief of Severodonetsk (Luhansk region) was detained by armed persons. Two
university students were abducted in Donetsk allegedly for breaking the curfew and told they
would be drafted into the DPR army. They were later found in an occupied public building
and had been engaged in ‘forced labour’. A university professor was abducted by armed
persons ‘for questioning’ for allegedly taking photos and videos of the movements of armed
groups and posting them online. Two senior managers of a private company were abducted at
a checkpoint while driving at night near Karlivka (Donetsk region). A protestant pastor and
his wife were abducted and held in Druzhkivka (Donetsk region) by the ‘Donbas People’s
Militia’. Three drunk people driving a car in Luhansk were reported missing; two others who
were drinking with friends outside a café in downtown Luhansk were ‘arrested’ by armed
men after a fight broke out. An assistant of the Donetsk Regional Governor was abducted on
26 June and the chief of the Artemivsk pre-trail detention centre was abducted on the same
5 Ministry of the Interior figures as of 18 July.
10
day, when armed groups robbed the centre’s armoury. Reportedly, armed members of the
“Right Sector” abducted the Mayor of Kurakhovo and a deputy of the city council on 8 July
They later confirmed to the HRMMU that they were questioned about their collaboration with
the armed groups in Maryinka, and then were released on 9 July.
42. The length of period for those detained varies considerably – some are held for a few hours,
others for several months. In the majority of cases, release depends on factors such as whether
there is an exchange of some sort, e.g. money. However, there have also been occasions in the
past month of a number of detainees being released without any particular “exchange”.
Between 7-13 June, some 32 people were released by the armed groups. However, a pattern
emerged that no sooner were some people released than others were detained, reinforcing the
opportunistic and resource providing element to the abductions and detentions.
43. In addition to the abductions and detentions of local citizens, there were the cases of the eight
monitors (in two separate teams) from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission who were
abducted by armed groups in May. All eight were released over a period of a few days in
early July.
44. Other cases of detention include the former Mayor of Slovyansk, the current mayor of
Mykytivka (a village near Slovyansk), and the head of the Artyomivsk city department of the
Ministry of the Interior (MoI), all of whom were detained by armed groups. In a 25 June
meeting in Mariupol, the HRMMU learned that the acting Head of the Mariupol city
department of the MoI was conducting investigations into “pro-Russian” activities in
Mariupol in connection with the 9 May incidents. In addition some activists being detained
by Ukrainian law enforcement and voluntary battalions, allegedly committed crimes under
Article 258 (Act of terrorism) of the Criminal Code. No clarification has been provided to the
HRMMU on the exact whereabouts of those detainees. It was also reported that the Right
Sector in coordination with the Ukrainian military had detained a leader of one of the armed
groups in the Donetsk region on 25 June.
45. Since 5 June there have been instances when drug users (even those in remission) and people
living with HIV/AIDS who, because of their status, have been detained by armed groups.
Reportedly, some are being tortured and kept in basements. The relatives of the detained are
frequently required to pay a “fine” (ransom) ranging from 200 to 1,000 USD. Many detainees
are also forced to “work off their guilt” as forced labour or to fight on the front lines for 15
days. Those who cannot pay the ransom are given the option to “wash off their guilt with
blood”; in other words, they are sent to the front lines to fight on the side of the armed groups.
Evidently, the armed groups consider these actions to be “prevention measures for drug
addicts”. At the same time there were some cases of abduction reported in other regions of
Ukraine. For example, a local leader of a Right Sector chapter in Ivano-Frankivsk region was
reported abducted by unknown persons during the reporting period.
Torture and ill-treatment
46. In discussions with the HRMMU following their release, many detainees who were held by
armed groups report beatings, ill-treatment, sleep deprivation and very poor conditions while
in detention, and forced labour, including digging trenches on the front lines. As an
“alternative” to torture and ill-treatment, it was suggested that detainees join the ranks of
those fighting for the armed groups. Some, allegedly, are forced to participate in the
abduction of other people. The son of a man abducted in Donetsk on 7 July reported that his
father had been transferred by the armed groups to Snizhne where about 100 detainees, males
aged from 14 to 60 years old, were being held. He said that during the day the detainees were
forced to dig trenches near the Ukrainian-Russian Federation border, which has been on the
11
front lines of heavy fighting between the armed groups and the Ukraine forces. A Donetsk
Regional State Administration official was released from captivity in Horlivka on 10 July. He
had been held since 26 June and said he had been tortured.
Executions
47. Written records of execution orders authorized and signed personally by the ‘Commander-in-
Chief’ of the armed groups, Igor Girkin (known as Strelkov), as well as protocols of hearings
of a ‘military tribunal’ convicting people to death, were found in Slovyansk by a journalist
on 7 July. The convictions were apparently of people associated with armed groups, and a
common criminal. The HRMMU is verifying these records with relatives of the victims and a
witness.
Abduction of children
48. Children face particular hazards in the conflict zones. Orphans, many very young or with
disabilities, in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions have faced particular difficulties, sometimes
being used as pawns in the larger geo-political dispute. For example, in Donetsk, the chief
medical officer reported difficulty in evacuating children from an orphanage in Kramatorsk
city, because armed groups did not want to send Donbas children “to an enemy country,
Ukraine” and wanted them to go to the Russian Federation. All 32 children were eventually
evacuated safely to the Kharkiv region on 28-29 June thanks to the intervention of a Moscowbased
NGO. In so doing, one of their representatives faced some personal danger, including
being briefly detained by local armed groups on 25 June.
49. A group of 16 children and two chaperones, who were allegedly abducted and transferred to
the Russian Federation territory on 12 June by armed groups, were returned back to Ukraine
on 13 June.6 The Ombudspersons of Ukraine and the Russian Federation actively cooperated
to facilitate the return of the children.
50. On 7 July, the UN in Ukraine received an official communication from the Government of
Ukraine informing the UN of possible attempts by armed groups to forcefully transport 206
orphans from the Donetsk region to the Russian Federation, saying that it had informed the
Embassy of the Russian Federation in Ukraine about the above-mentioned situation and
called for the implementation of international obligations to guarantee the rights of children.
51. On 13 July, 54 children from a Maryinka orphanage were taken to Donetsk by armed groups
after attempts to transfer the children to the Russian Federation were unsuccessful. This was
in spite of intense pressure being placed on the directors of the orphanage. The children
remain in Donetsk.
Allegations of sexual violence
52. The HRMMU has received reports of allegations of sexual violence being committed against
individuals by members of the armed groups It has also received allegations concerning a
National Guard in Kramatorsk. The HRMMU is trying to verify such claims.
6 The Ministry of Foreign affairs (MFA) of Ukraine issued a statement on 12 June accusing the Russian Federation
of having allowed the illegal transfer to its territory of 16 orphans. The children were reportedly part of a group
of people abducted in the town of Snizhne by armed representatives of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”.
According to the MFA, the children did not have proper permits to cross the border, and that in such conditions
their transfer qualifies as an act of international abduction of children. The MFA sent a note verbale to the MFA
of the Russian Federation requesting urgent measures to be taken to ensure the immediate return of the children
in Ukraine and the prosecution of persons involved in the promotion of their illegal entry into the Russian
Federation.
12
Arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearances
53. Members of the Ukrainian territorial battalions and the National Guard are alleged to have
arbitrarily detained a number of suspected supporters of the armed groups and subjecting
them to enforced disappearances. The HRMMU is seeking verification on a number of cases.
54. On 11 June, the HRMMU with the Head of the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM)
visited the Headquarters of the Government’s security operation in the eastern regions, which
is based in Izyum, to gain information on the situation of those detained by the Government
armed forces in the context of the security operation. According to information provided to
the HRMMU, all persons detained by the Ukrainian armed forces during the security
operation are sent directly to the State Security Services of Ukraine (SBU).
55. On 27 June, the HRMMU met with the head of the Investigative Department of the SBU,
who said that in the current situation, detentions are often carried out in areas within close
proximity to the fighting, which sometimes does not allow for entire compliance with the
procedure of detention of the Criminal Procedure Code. Also, since in many towns of the two
eastern regions the police was not functioning, detainees had to be transferred to Kyiv, which
reportedly did not allow for timely notification of the relatives about the fact of detention.
The HRMMU was also told that none of the detainees kept in Kyiv by the SBU have been
tortured or ill-treated.
56. On 4 July, the Ministry of Interior stated to the HRMMU that if detentions are undertaken by
battalions subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior, they are carried out in accordance with
the law “On police”, which obliges battalions’ volunteers to fill out a protocol for detention,
and then they usually transfer detainees to the authorities (mostly in Kyiv). The HRMMU is,
however, concerned that such procedures are not respected, following reports it has received
on the situation of individuals detained in the course of the security operation. According to
the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, the detaining authority must immediately take steps
to ensure that a person arrested can benefit from the services of a counsel; in addition, the
person must appear before a court within 60 hours following his or her arrest in order to
determine the measure of restraint to be applied. The HRMMU has observed that these two
requirements were often not met because the security environment did not allow securing the
services of a defence lawyer and for the suspect to appear before court within the prescribed
deadline. In addition, the powers granted under Ukraine’s counter-terrorism legislation, place
emphasis on the collection of information, including interrogation of suspects. Thus, persons
detained as part of the security operation may often be victims of a protection gap, and
consequently suffer a violation of their rights, due to the application of provision of the
Criminal Procedure Code in a context characterized by active fighting and limitation of
movements.
57. Together with the NPM, the HRMMU is following up on cases of detention by the security
forces, a number of which are cause for concern, in particular those of enforced
disappearance.
58. For example, a Donetsk resident was detained by the SBU in the main Kyiv train station on
13 June. Information about the detention was published on the SBU website, which
mentioned that the individual was “an active member of the terrorist DPR”. However, the
SBU later denied having detained this individual who is currently unaccounted for. His
defence lawyer has been unable to contact him since the arrest took place.
59. Reports suggested that members of the Ukraine forces have been responsible for the illtreatment
and torture of detainees. On 18 June, the editor-in-chief of the local newspaper
"Vestnik Priazovya" was detained by armed men of one of the Ukraine battalions in
13
Mariupol. The HRMMU has received very contradictory information on this case of enforced
disappearance, and is now closely cooperating with the NPM to verify it.
60. On 10 July, unknown persons reportedly opened fire on the Artemovsk Pedagogical College,
in which the Ukrainian battalion “Donbass” was based. A soldier of the Battalion “Donbas”
was reportedly arrested by his own battalion as of 8 July and accused of transmitting
information about the deployment of the battalions to the supporters of the armed groups.
Reportedly he was beaten and taken to Izyum police department (the Ukrainian security
operation base in the Kharkiv region) and kept in solitary confinement. However, as of 15
July his whereabouts remain unknown.
Landmines and explosive remnants
61. The first indication of the use of landmines by the armed groups came on 2 July when
Ukraine forces regained control of the border area in Luhansk. In so doing, it discovered antitank
landmines, one of which blew up a Ukraine Border Control vehicle, wounding the six
border officials inside. Anti-personnel mines killed three civilians and wounded two more in
separate incidents near Luhansk and Kramatorsk; both towns were at that time controlled by
armed groups.
62. Ukraine is a party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction.
63. On 4 July, the Ministry of the Interior informed the HRMMU that the armed groups have
been using two types of blast land mines. One of the types is an anti-personnel nonremovable
land mine complex with two wires between the mines which makes it almost
impossible to safely de-activate. It was also reported that anti-tank mines are used in
combination with anti-personnel mines, which make them more dangerous, not only for the
armed forces, but also for the residents not involved in the fighting.
64. After Ukrainian forces regained control of Slovyansk, they discovered explosive remnants on
many roads, enterprises and buildings. The Ukrainian Defence Minister reportedly said on 8
July that many highways were mined, in particular the routes from Slovyansk to Kramatorsk
and from Slovyansk to Donetsk, saying “a lot of landmines and unexploded shells lie on the
sides of the roads” and that they were working to dispose of them. There were reports of more
civilian deaths from landmines on the outskirts of Donetsk city.
Other incidents
65. As the fighting has escalated in the east, there has been a concurrent rise in incidents and
‘preventive’ action by the authorities elsewhere in Ukraine. For example, in the
Dnipropetrovsk region, a woman who is allegedly the local coordinator for the armed groups
in the Marinski and Velikonovoselski districts was arrested on 20 June for allegedly inciting
people to disobey the Ukrainian Government and to support the “independence” of the
Donetsk region.
66. During the week of 7-13 July, the SBU in Kharkiv announced the arrest of two people it
alleged to be ‘terrorists’ participating in the armed groups in the east; the SBU also
announced the arrest of a resident of Dnipropetrovsk who is the alleged leader of a terrorist
group commissioned by the intelligence service of the Russian Federation to undertake
intelligence and subversive activities against Ukraine. According to the SBU Press centre on
6 July, in Kherson, one of the leaders of the armed groups was detained while trying to cross
from the Ukraine mainland into Crimea. In Odesa, the SBU on 10 July arrested two people
(including one citizen of the Russian Federation) in connection with an event at which, along
with 50 other people, they were allegedly planning to create an ‘Odesa People’s Republic’.
14
67. Bomb threats have plagued Odesa since June targeting public buildings and facilities such as
train stations and the courts. There were also a number of actual explosions and other
incidents. An explosion at a military unit on the night of 3 July was called a ‘terrorist act’ by
the Government. Two fires on 6 July at a bank and the office of a political party were
considered suspicious. Two branches of the PrivatBank were damaged by powerful
explosions on 13 July. No casualties were reported. A spokesperson of the bank said it was
another attempt to de-stabilize the city. Nevertheless, a week-long international film festival
in Odesa opened as planned on 11 July.
68. On 1 July the SBU blocked several streets in Odesa while arresting three individuals
suspected to be “rebel fighters”. In the Kherson region, border guards and the SBU arrested
two people trying to escape to Crimea who were wanted for allegedly participating in the
storming of a military unit in Mariupol.
69. In Odesa, the city Department of the Ministry of Justice appealed to the Odesa District
Administrative Court to ban a “pro-Russian” movement called ‘Molodizhna Ednist’ as being
contrary to Ukrainian law on civil organizations. In June, one leader of the organization was
arrested in March under Article 110 (Trespass against territorial integrity and inviolability of
Ukraine) of the Criminal Code and is being held in Kyiv; his brother has been in hiding since
the 2 May violence and is rumoured to have fled to the eastern region of Ukraine that is under
the control of the armed groups.
70. On 8 July, authorities in the Russian Federation announced that the former Ukrainian military
pilot, Nadiya Savchenko, who is being held in a pre-trial detention centre in Voronezh in the
Russian Federation7, was being charged with complicity in the killing of two Russian TV
journalists on 17 June near Luhansk. There has been a great deal of controversy surrounding
the circumstances of the capture of Ms. Savchenko, with the Russian authorities insisting she
crossed the border freely into its territory and was then arrested for having no documents and
pretending to be a refugee. The Ukrainian Government insists she was abducted in Luhansk
by the armed groups and was taken to the Russian Federation ‘as a result of an agreement or
joint operation between the terrorists and the Russian secret services.’ The Ukrainian
Government is appealing to the international community to help free Ms. Savchenko. On 19
June, the office of the Ukrainian Prosecutor General said a criminal investigation was being
undertaken into the circumstances leading to the death of 10 persons, including the 2 Russian
TV journalists, who were killed in a mortar attack near Luhansk on 17 June. On 10 July, the
HRMMU was informed this is now an investigation under Article 258 of the Criminal Code
(Terrorism) and the investigation is being handled by the SBU. On 10 July, the Luhansk
Ministry of the Interior opened a criminal investigation into the abduction of Ms. Savchenko
under Article 146 of the Criminal Code (Illegal confinement or abduction of a person).
III. RULE OF LAW
A. Impunity in the east
71. The armed groups do not recognize the authority of the Ukraine Government. In the areas of
the east that they control the rule of law has collapsed. The police are de facto under the
control of armed groups. Police investigations concerning crimes attributed to armed groups
7 The Government of Ukraine states that the Russian Federation did not allow a Ukrainian Consul to visit Ms.
Savchenko for several days. Her lawyer said she went on a hunger strike to protest this treatment. Ms.
Savchenko was allowed to see the Consul on 16 July.
15
are not conducted. During evening hours, the police do not respond to phone calls made on
the emergency line. Some courts continue operating, but even in these there have been
examples of hearings being interrupted by armed groups entering the courtroom.
72. Public buildings, such as those hosting the local or regional branches of the Ministry of the
Interior, the Office of the Prosecutor, the State Security Service (SBU) and local government
institutions, are occupied and are often used to detain and torture civic activists, journalists or
political opponents. Criminal proceedings or other legal measures initiated by the Ministry of
the Interior and the Prosecutor General of Ukraine remain a dead letter in territories
controlled by the armed groups.
73. The armed groups claim that they are putting into place parallel ‘institutions’. For example,
they claimed a ‘prosecution system’ had been set up, and that a ‘court martial’ temporarily
carried out (unlawful) judiciary functions. They claim that a special (illegal) ‘military police’
is in the process of being created as well as a Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code,
replicated from the Russian equivalents.
74. The Ukrainian security operation involves the army, the military police (National Guard), the
National Security Service (SBU) and a number of volunteers’ battalions.8 The involvement of
battalions of volunteers (Donbas, Azov, Aydar, Dnipro, Ukraina, etc.) raises important
questions. While they nominally operate under the command of the Ministry of the Interior or
the Ministry of Defence, they would appear to enjoy a large degree of autonomy in their
operation. There are allegations of human rights violations committed by these battalions.
Currently four types should be distinguished: operational assignment battalions, special police
forces battalions (both are under the Ministry of the Interior and function according to the law
“On Police”), battalions of territorial defence (under the Ministry of Defence), and selforganised
battalions who do not subordinate or report to State institutions. On 3 July, the
Ministry of the Interior created a special department, which will oversee the activity of its
battalions. However, the legal basis for the functioning of other battalions is not as clear. The
Ministry of the Interior said it was deeply concerned about these groups and planned to reach
out to as many of them as possible with a view to integrating them into existing battalions.
This would solve the question of their legality and would also allow for coordination of their
activities. It is imperative, for purposes of accountability, to clarify the legal framework
within which these battalions operate.
75. Heavy armament, including tanks, military aviation and helicopters were used in addition to
artillery. The armed groups also use heavy weaponry, including missiles and tanks. Incidents
involving civilian deaths have occurred without any possibility to ascertain beyond any doubt
whether the casualties were caused by Ukrainian forces or armed groups. Among them: a
five-year-old and his mother were killed by mortar shelling in Slovyansk on 20 June; two
Russian journalists were killed on 17 June during a mortar attack near Luhansk; 2 employees
of the Public Utility Company “Water of Donbas” were killed by shelling at the water canal
in the village of Semenivka on 10 June.
76. The authorities of Ukraine can legitimately claim they have a duty to restore law and order,
including, if necessary, by resorting to force. In any law enforcement operation security
forces must act proportionally to the threat and must at all times respect the right to life. In
addition, in the conduct of hostilities all those involved in the hostilities must comply with
8 The first volunteer battalions appeared in mid-April in the eastern regions of Ukraine as small groups of pro-
Ukrainian activists who wanted to protect their neighbourhoods from the lawlessness of armed groups.
Eventually more people joined. By the end of May, a number of battalions (each battalion is around 500 people)
were formed. As of July, some have already been officially integrated into the structure of relevant Ministries.
16
principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions. This is particularly important in an
environment in which armed groups and civilians are inter-mingled.
77. The use of heavy artillery and aviation, in particular, have increased the risks to civilians and
caused casualties. It is essential that the authorities conduct full and impartial investigations
of all incidents where civilians may have lost their lives or have been injured by the
Ukrainian forces since the launch of the security operation. Remedies must be available to
victims, if the damage to their property was done illegally.
78. The Ukrainian forces have regained several areas formerly controlled by armed groups since
5 July; it is essential to ensure that no reprisals are applied against civilians. The questioning
of people and verification of information conducted by Ukrainian forces in areas, formerly
controlled by the armed groups, must at all times uphold the presumption of innocence and
respect human rights and human dignity9. The Government needs to provide information on
how these activities are conducted and what human rights guarantees are attached to this
process. The HRMMU stresses the paramount importance to uphold the right to life and
ensure protection against arbitrarily deprivation of liberty, in accordance with Ukraine’s
obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and other
international instruments.
79. There are disturbing reports of cases, including journalists, politicians and of people allegedly
supporting the armed groups, of having been arrested by the Ukrainian forces but whose
whereabouts could not be ascertained for a long period of time or are still not known. These
cases constitute a violation of the right to liberty and security, which implies a prohibition of
arbitrary arrest or detention, and of the ‘minimum guarantees’, such as the right to a counsel,
that every person deprived of liberty is entitled to benefit from under international human
rights law.
B. Constitutional amendments
80. On 2 July, the Parliament registered a draft law (№ 4178а) initiated by the President of
Ukraine, proposing to amend the Constitution of Ukraine.
81. According to this document, Ukraine is to be divided into regions, districts and communities,
based on the principles of unity, integrity and decentralization. Local self-government
institutions with legislative and executive functions are to be created and local state
administrations abolished. Representatives of the President are to be appointed at local level
and entrusted with powers to suspend local decisions deemed to be in violation of the
constitution. The draft mentions that the division of power between the different levels of
self-governance is based on the principle of subsidiarity and that the President can revoke the
powers of the local self-government institutions. The provisions regulating self-government
institutions in Ukraine also apply to Crimea, but the function of the representative of the
President in Crimea is abolished. Other new provisions include the possibility to grant
“special status” to the Russian language and languages of other national minorities at the
level of villages, towns, districts and regions; increasing the powers of the parliament to
initiate or approve appointment of ministers and heads of state institutions; and abolishing the
power of the Prosecution to oversee compliance with fundamental rights and freedoms. It
should also be noted that the amendments do not contain provisions strengthening the
independence of the judiciary. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe was
9 In accordance with Article 10 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) for detainees as
well as the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment under Article 7 of ICCPR.
17
requested to present an opinion on the draft law and is expected to do so in the second half of
July.
82. The draft law is expected to be discussed in parliament and amendments are likely to be
proposed. The HRMMU insists on the importance of reaching out to the country in all its
diversity to ensure a process of transparency, and inclusive consultations. Debates must be
organized to enable the participation of a wide array of constituencies. Human rights
defenders, associations of legal professionals, media and other civil society organisations
including those representing women, children, minorities, indigenous peoples, refugees, and
stateless and displaced persons, and labour and business10 from all the regions of Ukraine
should be given a voice. To facilitate this, the draft Constitutional changes should be made
available in minority languages, such as Russian. Durable solutions to controversial issues
will only be found through an inclusive, open dialogue and readiness for compromise.
C. Justice Sector Reforms
Law enforcement reform
83. Initial steps have been taken by the Government of Ukraine to reform the law enforcement
system. An Expert Council “on the issues of human rights and reformation” was established
in the Ministry of the Interior on 4 April in order to develop a concept for the reform of law
enforcement bodies. On 1 July, the Minister of the Interior tasked the Expert Council to
prepare and implement a pilot project in Lviv seeking to analyse the work of the police, its
performance and cooperation with the local authorities, its relation to citizens, community
policing practices, and issues of transparency and accountability. The results of the pilot
project are expected to be presented at an Expert Council meeting in November 2014 and to
form the basis of a law enforcement reform package. The HRMMU recommends that this
pilot should be gender sensitive and ensure that it includes an assessment of how the police
deal with domestic violence, rape and other crimes that affect women disproportionally.
84. The HRMMU stresses the importance of reforming the law enforcement system, which as a
first step, should include the adoption of a new law on the police. The latter needs to move
away from a militarized structure into a civilian, professional public service. Reform also
needs to address the powers of the State Security Service (SBU). According to the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Recommendation 1402 (1999) the SBU
should be devoid of the authority for criminal investigation and arrest of persons11.
85. Training12 should be developed and conducted on all aspects of policing (including or e.g.
arrest, pre-trial detention, use of firearms, as well as gender sensitive issues as mentioned
above) and a lot remains to be done to ensure that they conform to international standards.
This should be another key element of the reform of the law enforcement system.
86. Currently, internal oversight mechanisms are not effective in reviewing incidents of injury or
loss of life resulting from the use of force by law enforcement personnel. In addition, the
police are generally distrusted and perceived as being corrupt and lacking professionalism.
For these reasons, it is important to create platforms, open to civil society and other nonpolice
actors, including women’s groups, to discuss the work of the police and its
10http://www.unrol.org/files/Guidance_Note_United_Nations_Assistance_to_Constitutionmaking_
Processes_FINAL.pdf
11 “The control of internal security services in the member states of the Council of Europe"; para. V.iіі
12 UPR recommendations from 2012 require Ukraine to provide training for staff of law enforcement bodies on the
rights of detainees.
18
performance and to put in place conditions for greater public accountability of law
enforcement officials.
Administration of justice reforms
87. As noted in previous reports, many of the concerns that led to the Maidan events and the
crisis in the east are systemic ones, rooted in a weak rule of law and the absence of effective
checks and balances. The law “On the restoration of the credibility of the judiciary in
Ukraine” developed a mechanism for the dismissal of judges who have discredited the
judiciary institution by violating professional and ethical standards or being corrupt. A
lustration procedure has been put in place to undertake a vetting of judges. However it does
not follow some generally recognized requirements in the area of judicial proceedings. For
example, past court decisions can be scrutinized by an ‘Interim Special Commission’, which
can decide to immediately dismiss judges. The Commission held its first session on 3 July,
elected its head and deputy head, but has not initiated any vetting yet. There is concern that
the implementation of the law could lead to unjustified and non-motivated dismissals of
judges and jeopardize the administration of justice. There is an urgent need to strengthen the
institutional independence of the judiciary. This can be done by ensuring, among other things,
that the appointment and dismissal of judges, as well as the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against them, leave no room for undue political or other pressure. On matters of
judicial self-administration, international standards require that any decision affecting the
selection, recruitment, appointment, career progress or termination of office of a judge should
be taken by an independent authority within which at least one half of those who sit are
judges elected by their peers. However, the High Council of Justice, which plays a central
role in the appointment judges, does not fulfil this requirement: only 3 out of 20 members are
appointed by the Congress of judges. In addition, when appointed, judges serve for a 5-year
trial period after which they can be elected by parliament to a lifetime position. This lengthy
trial period is of concern as it opens up the possibility for undue influence on the decisionmaking
of judges during that time. Legal and constitutional amendments should address
obstacles to an independent judiciary, namely the role and composition of the High Council
of Justice; the length of the trial period, and the role of Parliament in the appointment process.
The authorities must also ensure that the justice system is sufficiently funded from the state
budget. This would lower the dependency of the judiciary on public and private interests, and
minimize the risk of corruption.
88. No progress has been made in reforming the prosecution system, which is another pillar of
the justice system, and many recommendations have been made to that effect. The
prosecution used to have broad powers outside the criminal justice process. Legal
amendments in 2012 reduced them slightly by narrowing prosecutorial general supervision
over the application of laws and abolishing the power to issue orders that have the effect of
suspending an action undertaken/required. (“submissions”). In addition, the new Criminal
Procedure Code, in force since November 2012, gives the Prosecution Service a greater role
within the criminal justice process, which is a positive development. However, these
measures are insufficient. It is important to provide the prosecution with a clearer mandate
focused on leading pre-trial criminal investigations and prosecutions. Such changes can be
implemented by amending the law “On the Prosecutor’s Office” and possibly the
Constitution. It should also be noted that no progress has been made in establishing a State
Bureau of Investigation, as required by the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine and
recommendations from the Universal Periodic Review and the HRMMU.
89. The role of defence lawyers is critical to a well-functioning legal system and the fairness of
trials. A National Bar Association exists that serves as a body of self-administration.
19
However, the exercise of the profession and working conditions require enhanced protection.
Courts do not have any premises for defence lawyers; legislation does not regulate the right to
rest or social protection for defence lawyers. The current Criminal Procedure Code limits the
number of defence lawyers allowed to work on one case; in case of absence, a lawyer can be
replaced by a state-appointed lawyer. A law on the legal profession was adopted in 2012 and
draft amendments are under discussion. It would be necessary to ensure that the new
amendments create improved conditions of work for defence lawyers and a professional
environment conducive to a proper exercise of the right to defence. Equality of arms should
characterize the relationship between defence lawyers and prosecutors.
D. Legislative developments
90. An important number of laws, legal amendments or regulations adopted in recent months
have been dictated by the necessity to address topical issues in a difficult and evolving
context, characterized by the ‘referendum’ in Crimea13 and a grave deterioration of the
security situation in the east. They include: internally displaced persons; issues related to the
rights of those taking part in the security operation and their families; sanctions for criminal
actions threatening territorial integrity or aimed at overthrowing the government; the
introduction of new penalties for financing illegal activities; amendments to the anti-terrorism
law and others. The HRMMU is following these developments, which will be analysed and, if
necessary, reflected in future recommendations.
91. In some cases, the new legislation foresees increased compliance with international
instruments and recommendations of international human rights mechanisms. For example
the definition of complementary protection applying to refugees was extended to include
persons fleeing “international or internal armed conflict” and other serious human rights
violations, in line with international and European standards. On the issue of discrimination,
the definition, scope of prohibited ground, and range of sanctions have largely been aligned
with relevant international norms and standards. Finally, the terms applicable to persons with
disabilities in domestic legislation – such as "reasonable accommodation", “universal design
" and “discrimination on the basis of disability " - are used as defined in the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. However, the amendments to the anti-discrimination
law do not integrate the jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee and the European
Convention on Human Rights on the prevention of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.
Anti-corruption
92. The legislative basis for combating corruption has improved in recent months: bribery is now
classified as an offence under the Criminal Code and corruption in all its forms is treated as a
crime. Liability of companies (“legal persons”) has been introduced under the Criminal Code.
Regulations have been put in place concerning confiscation and seizure of proceeds of crime.
A government Commissioner for anti-corruption policy has been appointed to lead the
National Anti-Corruption Committee, established in 2010. However, the latter was not given
a sufficient level of independence to carry out a meaningful monitoring function of anticorruption
policies. The Government has indicated its intention to adopt a new anti-corruption
strategy for 2014. Eradicating corruption is also inextricably linked to improving the
functioning of other institutions. This includes amendments to the legal framework governing
the powers and work of the Prosecutor’s Office, public procurement procedures and
13 This referendum was ruled to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine; the UN General
Assembly declared the referendum to have no validity in its resolution 68/262.
20
reforming the public administration and civil service. In all these areas, no progress has been
made during the reporting period.
Asylum
93. On 30 May 2014, the amendments to the Refugee Law of Ukraine, which brought the
complementary protection and temporary protection definitions in line with international and
European standards, came into force. The definition of complementary protection now
includes persons fleeing armed conflict and other serious human rights violations14. Also, in
May 2014, asylum seekers were granted access to emergency medical care. Another recent
development is the beginning of practical implementation of the age assessment procedure for
unaccompanied children seeking asylum which was adopted by the State migration service in
2013. The first age assessment committee was convened in June 2014 in the Kyiv region.
94. However, numerous gaps remain in the current refugee law particularly affecting the quality
of due process in the asylum procedure and the reception conditions for asylum-seekers.
Asylum-seekers frequently have to find and pay for their own interpreters; if their
applications are rejected, they are not provided the reasons for rejection, yet have only five
days to file an appeal; asylum-seekers are frequently left undocumented because of gaps in
the asylum procedure. Without documentation, asylum-seekers cannot exercise their right to
temporary employment. Since reception conditions are generally poor (few spaces available
in Temporary Accommodation Centres, no social assistance available outside these centres),
many are compelled to work informally in order to meet their basic needs. This places them
at risk of exploitation, and given the general economic downturn in the country, their
livelihoods are extremely precarious.
95. The quality of decision-making on asylum applications remains a concern, as many persons
with genuine international protection needs continue to be rejected and at risk of refoulement.
For example, in 2013, 46% of Syrian asylum applicants received refugee status or
complementary protection.
96. State funding for asylum matters is inadequate. Low staffing levels and high turnover at
some migration service offices means that staff is frequently unavailable to perform regular
tasks, such as receiving asylum applications or renewing documents. For example, in early
May, one asylum-seeker had to approach the migration service on five different days in order
to file an application. This gap means that asylum-seekers are often undocumented and at risk
of detention. The state does not provide language classes, so asylum-seekers struggle to
adapt. Recognized refugees receive a one-time grant of only 17 UAH (less than $2), which is
clearly insufficient.
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
97. The state has a duty towards its citizens to ensure accountability for the violations of their
rights and freedoms. This is of paramount importance in the context of the situation in the
east. It is also essential in relation to events in Maidan and Odesa, which have struck a deep
chord within society.
14 On Amending Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine “On refugees and persons that require additional or temporary
protection”, available at http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1251-18
21
A. Investigation into human rights violations related to Maidan protests
98. Five months after the end of the Maidan protests, which started on 21 November 2013 and
ended with the arrival of a new Government on 22 February 2014, much remains to be done
to ensure accountability for human rights violations committed during this period.
99. As a result of violent clashes between demonstrators and representatives of different law
enforcement agencies, and the use of arms, an estimated 103 protesters (including three
women) and 20 law enforcement officers died. Hundreds more were wounded on both sides.
There have been numerous reports of violence, torture and ill-treatment of protesters, mainly
attributed to the ‘Berkut’ special police. In addition, according to a civil society organization
“EuroMaidan SOS”, 32 Maidan protesters (31 men and 1 woman) remain unaccounted for
as of 14 July.
100. The killings on Maidan occurred during two periods: on 19-21 January 2014 and on 18-20
February 2014. To this date, nobody has been sentenced. Three ‘Berkut’ police officers
accused of involvement in the killing of protesters have been detained under murder charges
and are held in pre-trial detention. Regarding the killing of law-enforcement officers, the
investigations have not led to the identification of suspects.
101. In relation to another incident, the violent dispersal of demonstrators by the riot police on
the night of 30 November 2013 which triggered the Maidan protest, a Kyiv court is to
decide whether two persons suspected of having ordered the dispersal are covered by an
amnesty law voted in December 2013. Hearings have been postponed several times.
102. The only sentences passed so far involve 3 police officers who confessed to having illtreated
a demonstrator who had been stripped naked in the street in freezing conditions and
was forced to stand in the snow while being mocked, assaulted and filmed. One of them was
sentenced to three years of imprisonment with a probation period of one year, and another to
two years, including a one-year probation period.
103. The Government of Ukraine submitted on 9 April a request to the International Criminal
Court (ICC) to investigate the events that occurred on Maidan from 21 November 2013 to
22 February 2014. The Registrar of the ICC received a declaration lodged by Ukraine
accepting the ICC jurisdiction. The declaration was lodged under article 12(3) of the Rome
Statute, which enables a non-party to the Statute to accept the exercise of jurisdiction of the
Court. The Prosecutor of the ICC has decided to open a preliminary examination into the
situation in Ukraine in order to establish whether the Rome Statute criteria for opening an
investigation are met. The government of Ukraine is currently considering the possibility to
ratify the Rome statute of the ICC.
104. Various interlocutors contacted by the HRMMU expressed their concern at the slowness and
inefficiently of the investigations. In particular, concerns were raised about the following:
(a) the collection and preservation of evidence and forensic examinations may not have been
systematic; (b) documentation related to the activities of the special police unit “Berkut”
during Maidan has been destroyed; (c) it is believed that some suspects could be involved in
the security operations in the east, hence the unwillingness to carry out meaningful
investigations at a sensitive time; (d) corruption and general inefficiency of the judicial and
law enforcement system were cited as obstacles to an impartial and comprehensive
investigation; (e) some witnesses may be afraid to talk.
105. Most families of Maidan victims, who have joined in an ‘initiative group’, are reported to
have received one-time social payments of 121,800 UAH (about USD 10,100). The
allocation of payments to all families should be completed by the end of July. The initiative
group is finalizing negotiations with the Ministry of Education to ensure that 52 children
22
from the families of people killed at Maidan will be entitled to education free of charge in
all pedagogical institutions.
106. Different groups which actively participated in the Maidan demonstrations, continued to
occupy buildings and facilities in central Kyiv that were taken over during the antigovernment
protests between December 2013 and February 2014. According to the Office
of the Kyiv City Prosecutor, an estimated 950 people affiliated with the Maidan "selfdefence",
the Right Sector and the Social National Assembly have established themselves in
and around 12 buildings, including the Ministry of Agriculture, the main post office, several
cultural and business centres, shops, bars, restaurants and banks. This presence has been
condemned by the Minister of Interior, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, the Prosecutor of
Kyiv, Mayor of Kyiv who have also called for the vacation of buildings. However, this has
not led to the vacation of the buildings.
B. Investigation into human rights violations related to the violence in Odesa
107. The violent incidents in Odesa on 2 May resulted in the deaths of 48 people, with over 200
injured. This appears to have hardened the resolve of those opposing the Government, and
deepened division between communities. There is a need for resolution to the violent events
of that day. The perpetrators must be brought to justice in a fair and non-selective manner.
108. More than two months after the 2 May violence in Odesa, the incidents still divide those
who live in the city. Six investigations, official and independent, have been initiated into the
killings of six people by gunshot that took place during the afternoon of 2 May, and the
deaths of 35 men and 7 women in the fire in the Trade Union building15. Considering the
number of investigations launched by law enforcement agencies and experts, there is a high
risk of miscommunication and contradictory information. The HRMMU follows these
criminal investigations and has received alarming information from different sources on
violations of human rights by law enforcement agencies and free legal aid incompetence. On
several occasions high ranking officials have disclosed information, which has since been
refuted. Overall, the communities in Odesa have no trust in the law enforcement
investigation independence. This negative atmosphere is deteriorating further due to the fact
that there has been little transparency within the framework of the investigations, limiting
access to information for the citizens of Odesa. Both the Ministry of the Interior (MoI)
Investigation Commission and the Special Parliamentary Commission have requested the
assistance of foreign experts.
109. The Deputy Minister of the Interior has requested international assistance in conducting the
investigation process, by written appeals to four embassies (Germany, Israel, the United
Kingdom and the United States). The Independent Commission has requested the assistance
of foreign experts from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the
Council of Europe. The Commission has officially requested expertise from the UN
Secretary General, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Human Rights
Monitoring Mission in Ukraine and the UN Resident Coordinator in Ukraine. It is felt that
such independent international experts would be able to receive more adequate answers
since witnesses would have more confidence in foreigners than in local officials. The
HRMMU recommends the following: (a) in the interest of the investigation, law
enforcement officials should refrain from spreading damaging rumours and disclosing
information; (b) all Commissions, within their mandates, should meet on a regular basis; (c)
the regional and local authorities, should work on strategies to deescalate tensions within
15 See HRMMU monthly report of 15 June 2014, paragraphs. 37 – 93.
23
the communities and to initiate dialogue focusing on reconciliation; (d) law enforcement
agencies should ensure the protection, fulfilment and promotion of human rights within their
criminal investigations; (e) the Governmental Free legal aid system should ensure the
competence of lawyers providing free legal defence.
Criminal investigation by the Ministry of the Interior Investigation Unit
110. The Main Investigation Department of the MoI in Kyiv (under the control of the Deputy
Minister of the Interior) is investigating the 2 May violence. According to the MoI, at the
expiration of the 60 days legally granted for investigation, the investigative team requested
an additional five (5) months. More time is needed to conduct the following investigative
proceedings: to identify all people involved in the mass riots and identify witnesses;
identify organisers of the Odesa “Euromaidan”, Right Sector, local Self-Defence, Odesa
“Narodnaya Druzhyna” and other participants; identify and interrogate policemen involved
with securing public order on 2nd and 4th May; identify and interrogate State Emergency
Service employees who received emergency fire calls and who dispatched fire brigades to
the various locations on 2 May; analyse the phone-call registry between city centre and
Kulikovo Pole; conduct a full-scale analysis of the video files; question victims claiming
material damage; question all Trade Union building employees present at work on 2 May.
111. The HRMMU conducted a number of meetings with defence lawyers in the 2 May violence
cases, who notified that the Investigation Commission requested a prolongation of measure
of restraint for all detainees (under custody or house arrest) for an additional 60 days. The
HRMMU received information that the investigation process, including the interrogation of
detainees, has been very limited so far. Some detainees since their apprehension on 2 May
have been questioned only twice.
112. The Primorsky District Court of Odesa has favourably satisfied all petitions presented by
the MoI.
113. The HRMMU has not had any obstacle in cooperating with the Commission of MoI. As of
12 July, the Investigation Commission provided the HRMMU with the following
information: 12 men remain in Pre-trial detention centres under the Penitentiary Services;
41 men are placed under house arrest; 53 persons were interrogated as suspects, 83 persons
were interrogated as victims; 430 persons were interrogated as witnesses; 242 forensic
examinations were appointed, of which 62 are still on-going; out of 42 men and 6 women
deceased, one man is still not identified; one injured man remains in hospital; five detainees
(all men) are reported to be foreign citizens.
114. None of the preliminary conclusions were made public by the Investigation Commission.
However, although the investigation is still ongoing, several controversial statements were
made by the MoI. In May, when the forensic examinations had just started, the deputy
Minister of Interior stated that people in the Trade Union building died from breathing
chloroform, which has never been confirmed. Furthermore, the Head of the Regional
Office for Forensic, at a public meeting with the Regional Council Investigation
Commission stated that none of the deceased at Kulikovo Pole were shot or beaten to death,
but that their death was caused by carbon-monoxide gas poisoning, some unidentified
chemical substance or by burns. In addition, he disclosed personal private information
regarding one deceased person without prior consent from the family. The Head of the
Regional Office for Forensic has regularly refused to provide information regarding the
cause of death, referring to the confidentiality of the investigation.
115. The Investigation Commission is in charge of investigating the actions of the Odesa
Regional Emergency Service (fire brigade). The Head of the Emergency Unit was accused
24
of negligence, due to improper performance of his official duties (i.e. delay in deploying
the fire brigade to the Trade Union building). For the purposes of the internal investigation
he was temporarily dismissed. The internal and criminal investigations remain on-going.
116. The Investigation Commission has provided internal investigation documentation to
families who have requested information regarding their deceased relatives. Following
meetings with victims, witnesses and relatives, the HRMMU has observed a growing
dissatisfaction regarding the lengthy and non-transparent investigation process. In general,
witnesses shared with the HRMUU their concern about revealing information regarding the
incidents. On 11 June, several claims regarding the insufficient and lengthy investigation
process were brought against the Government at the Kyiv District Administrative Court.
General Prosecution Investigation Unit regarding police duty performance
117. On 3 May the General Prosecution Investigation Unit launched a criminal case against
police officials based on article 365 (Excess of authority or official powers) and, article 367
(Neglect of official duty) of the Criminal Code.
118. The Regional Prosecution Office confirmed the allegation regarding the inaccessibility of
high ranking officials during the 2 May violence, noting that all were at the time attending
a closed meeting at the request of the Deputy General Prosecutor.
119. The investigation process into 2 May violence is challenged by the fact that the main
suspect, the former Deputy Head of the Regional MoI, is currently on a “wanted” list.
Criminal investigation under the State Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)
120. As of 15 July, the SBU had initiated several criminal investigations under article 109
(Actions aimed at forceful change or overthrow of the constitutional order or take-over of
government), article 110 (Trespass against territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine),
and article 258-2 (Public incitement to commit a terrorist act) of the Criminal Code. The
SBU arrested at least 35 people allegedly engaged in the above-mentioned criminal
activities, mostly activists and supporters of the “pro-Federalism” movement. The
HRMMU attended 6 court hearings and tried to establish contacts with the SBU
investigators. The HRMMU regretfully underlines the lack of working cooperation from
the Regional office of the SBU at the local level.
121. The Penitentiary Services administration fully cooperated with the HRMMU and has been
granting access to detainees recently arrested. The HRMMU has also met with detainees’
lawyers and relatives. The HRMMU has the following concerns about actions committed
by the SBU in the investigation, including violations of legal guarantees and ill treatment
during the investigation process, which are as follows: (a) excessive use of force during
arrest and house searches contravening fundamental human rights; (b) the illegal practice of
disclosing personal data in relation to arrested foreign citizens, which violates the
presumption of innocence; (c) the obligation to immediately inform the arrested person, in
detail and in a language he/she understands, of the reasons for his/her arrest and any
charges against him/her, as well as of the right to have the assistance of legal counsel,
receive medical assistance free of charge, not to be compelled to testify against him/herself
or confess guilt, inform promptly other persons about his/her arrest or detention and
whereabouts, in accordance with the provisions of applicable international human rights
law and the Ukrainian Criminal Procedure Code; (d) the failure to provide written notice of
charges to the arrested person within 24 hours after the apprehension in accordance with
article 278 of the Criminal Procedure Code; (e) the use of psychological intimidation and
threats (in some case sexual threats) in order to obtain information.
25
Special Parliamentary Commission Group
122. The Special Parliamentary Commission continues to investigate the facts of mass murder.
As of 15 July, it had held 9 sessions. The Head of the Commission informed the HRMMU
that the members met with witnesses, victims, relatives and doctors. In addition the
commission received a written statement from the former Deputy Head of the Odesa
Regional MoI), who remains at large. All the collected documentation has been shared with
the Office of the General Prosecutor. In addition, the request for foreign experts was raised.
The Commission plans to present its preliminary findings in September.
Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsperson Office)
123. The Ombudsperson’s Office has finalized its findings regarding the 2 May violence and
concluded that the positive obligations of Ukraine to protect human rights (the rights to life
and to liberty and security of the person and the freedom of peaceful assembly) were
violated during the 2 May incidents. Moreover, the Ombudsperson concluded that the Head
of the Regional MoI Odesa did not fulfil his mandatory duty to initiate the special police
tactical plan “Khvylia”. This neglect resulted in a high number of victims. The
Ombudsperson appealed to the Office of the General Prosecutor to investigate the law
enforcement agencies performance of duty during 2-4 May, and launch a criminal
investigation against responsible officials.
Independent Commission investigating the 2 May violence
124. The Independent Commission including civil society activists, journalists and experts,
continued to gather information on 2 May violence. Witnesses mentioned to the HRMMU
that they feel more comfortable to share information with this Commission. Several
conclusions of the Commission were already broadly publicised, including the chronology
of the events in the city centre, which tend to counter numerous rumours and allegations. In
the course of their investigation, the Commission members requested MoI, the State
Agency on Emergency Situation and the Centre of Forensic Examination for information,
with no success to date. The Commission intends to take legal action against these
agencies: in accordance with the law “On access to public information” (2939-17, dated
2011), information has to be shared.
Temporary Oversight Commission on the 2 May violence of Odesa Regional Council
125. The Temporary Oversight Commission on the 2 May violence has been working in close
cooperation with the Special Parliamentary Commission Group. Since its establishment,
this Commission held two hearings to monitor the criminal investigation process. Its
conclusions were presented to the Odesa Regional Council. It deplored the fact that the
SBU and the Regional Prosecution Office were not always fully cooperating. According to
the statement of this Commission, based on the MoI criminal investigation there are four
scenarios that triggered the 2 May violence: (1) actions committed by radical groups to
destabilize the situation in the Odesa region and in other regions of Ukraine; (2) attempts
by local authorities to discredit the Government; (3) uncontrolled football fans and law
enforcement negligence; (4) provocation by the “pro- Unity” movement in order to
intimidate the “pro-Federalism” movement.
C. Investigations into other human rights violations
126. The Parliamentary Committee investigating the events in Odesa is also in charge of
investigating the violence in Mariupol, which became the theatre of heavy fighting on 9
26
May. Nine people died when Ukrainian security forces fired into unarmed protesters and,
earlier that day, tried to dislodge armed protesters from a police station16.
127. The head of the Committee told the HRMMU that after having listened to many witnesses
it was now in possession of a very detailed factual description, including information about
the time and sequence of events, names of individuals who allegedly gave specific orders
or took key decisions that led to the tragic outcome. The Committee will interview the
persons mentioned by the witnesses and transfer the information collected to the
Investigative Department of the State Security Service of Ukraine. The deadline for the
Parliamentary Committee report, initially planned to be issued on 15 June, was extended
until 20 October 2014.
V. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS
128. As of 15 July, UNHCR reports there are 86,609 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from
Crimea and the eastern regions of Ukraine. The number of IDPs from the east has increased
dramatically since mid-June with a change in the composition of the IDP population - 85%
now coming from the east and 15% from Crimea. Given the large numbers of IDPs
reported as having left the eastern regions, it appears that there is a significant gap in the
registration of IDPs. The numbers may swell if these IDPs are registered in coming weeks.
Though disaggregated statistics on the age and gender breakdown of the IDP population are
not available, it is observed that the vast majority of IDPs appear to be women and
children.
129. IDPs from eastern Ukraine have left home predominantly due to security concerns,
including the risk of being caught in crossfire. Some IDPs express individual fear of
persecution for their political views, ethnicity or fear of being forcibly recruited into the
insurgent groups. IDPs also report having experienced or heard of incidents of abduction,
extortion and harassment in their neighbourhoods, leading them to take preventive flight.
Another reason that prompts people to flee is the material damage to housing and
infrastructure in the region, where the water and electricity systems were no longer
functioning. Given the insecurity in the region, delivery of basic goods is paralyzed to
many towns, and IDPs say that food supplies are erratic and expensive, and medicines are
frequently unavailable. With the breakdown in the banking system, many could not obtain
the cash they needed to purchase basic goods, even if they did become available. Many
IDPs are particularly vulnerable as they remain within the eastern regions, caught in the ongoing
fighting to which international humanitarian actors currently do not have access.
130. IDPs from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions report leaving the region with few personal
belongings, sometimes without time for preparation, in order to disguise the purpose of
their departure from the region, so they have few resources to establish themselves. IDPs
who leave the eastern regions generally maintain a low profile, since they report fearing
reprisals against family members who have remained at home. Many are psychologically
traumatized, having witnessed violence. For example, children are afraid of loud noises
and hide under furniture whenever they hear an airplane passing overhead.
131. IDPs from Crimea are mostly Tatars, but also include ethnic Ukrainians, ethnic Russians,
mixed families, refugees and foreigners married to Ukrainians citizens. Many IDPs from
Crimea are political activists and journalists who fear harassment, or those who have
16 A description of the case is provided in the HRMMU Monthly Report of 15 June 2014.
27
economic, professional or family ties within Ukraine, and, therefore, feel compelled to
leave to other parts of Ukraine in order to continue a normal life. Many Crimean Tatars fear
limitations on their religious and cultural expression. IDPs from Crimea live dispersed
across the entire territory of the country, but with significant concentrations in Kyiv and
Lviv. Ukrainian military from Crimea and their families are mainly staying in Odesa,
Mykolaiv and Kherson.
132. The State’s system to protect IDPs has significant gaps. Many IDPs leaving Donetsk and
Luhansk regions report that they do not have information about where to go or which
services are available. Despite the creation of governmental coordination mechanism, the
law on IDPs has not been adopted yet and there is no central information gathering system
or database on IDPs. The present registration mechanism system is ad hoc and rudimentary
which does not provide the accurate number of IDPs in Ukraine or individual needs of
those who approach the authorities for assistance. The government is currently developing
a list of available accommodation facilities for IDPs, but, so far, has allocated financial
resources only to cover the costs of accommodating those from Crimea. Owners of
sanatoriums and summer camps accommodating IDPs from the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions report being frustrated that they do not know when or if they will be compensated
for the expenses they are incurring for taking in IDPs. Several administrative matters
remain unresolved, hindering IDPs’ ability to start their new lives: many IDPs cannot
obtain residence registration, transfer employment record from places of displacement,
register their business activities and access their personal savings in bank accounts. There
are also the problems of access to day care, schools for the children and assistance for the
elderly to enable women to seek employment. Also, Ukraine’s legislation and policy of
imposing taxes on humanitarian aid and personal income precludes tax-free provision of
international aid to IDPs.
133. Many IDPs have exhausted the resources they had available. There are limited options for
most IDPs to secure long-term housing arrangements, in particular those who are currently
hosted by friends, family or volunteers, or placed in temporary accommodation centres
provided by regional authorities. Many IDPs are temporarily housed in summer camps or
hotels which are normally closed for the winter and therefore are not insulated or heated.
These facilities are generally in rural areas far from schools. Thus, this accommodation is
suitable only for the very short term; longer term planning is not yet underway.
Furthermore, given the high cost of heating, it is likely that many temporary
accommodation facilities will be unable to continue housing IDPs into the month of
October unless they receive financial support. Plans should also be developed to cover
shelter, clothing and heating needs, during the winter, in case a massive return to the areas
currently under conflict does not materialize before or during the winter months.
134. The Government was slow to respond to the rapidly growing number of IDPs coming from
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. For many weeks the authorities relied totally on
voluntary assistance and the goodwill of the receiving communities to respond to meeting
the IDPs accommodation and other needs. Most IDPs were accommodated in private
homes, public sanatorium or in other voluntary arrangements. By early July, many local
and regional authorities began to complain that they did not have the resources to cope with
the numbers of IDPs arriving. Lack of coordination, planning and resources was coupled
with growing concern about the need to provide social protection to the increasing number
of local families who had members fighting with the Government military and security
operation in the East. In Rivne, for example, as of 1 July there were 785 people mobilized
from that region to serve in the Government’s security operation, while it had received 584
IDPs.
28
135. In June the State Service for Emergency Situations was tasked with the responsibility for
coordinating the accommodation and other needs of IDPs throughout Ukraine. However,
because of the involvement of civil society, in the form of volunteer groups and a loose
association of concerned individuals that has provided the bulk of assistance so far to IDPs,
the authorities need to coordinate with them and work systematically together. The
HRMMU has been working to facilitate this.
136. Odesa became the destination of choice for IDPs with disabilities because it has a
sanatorium designed to accommodate persons with disabilities. However, much of the
sanatorium was already occupied by soldiers and their families from Crimea. Nevertheless,
Odesa has received more than 700 IDPs with disabilities. By early July, Odesa was
reporting it had reached capacity with 3,000 IDPs plus an additional 500 military and their
families, all housed in summer sanatorium. There were many other unregistered IDPs
staying privately with friends or family who were not reflected in that figure. IDPs continue
to arrive daily in Odesa.
137. Roma IDPs have faced unique problems. Roma families tend to be large and move in
groups, sometimes as large as 50 people, including many children, all of whom need to be
housed together. This is often impossible because of the lack of available collective
housing. Therefore some Roma camp in public parks or privately owned camping grounds
which has caused additional problems. For example, in the Kharkiv region, the owners of a
camping ground in Visoky, initially agreed to let a group of about 40 Roma from
Slovyansk stay, but then tried to evict them when, lacking any other means to cook, the
Roma families built cooking fires out in the open. The police were called to evict them and
the situation escalated: the Roma threatened to block the neighbouring road and the police
reportedly threatened to ‘plant narcotics’ on the group to make their problems harder. The
HRMMU intervened after being alerted to the situation by a volunteers’ group, calling the
Ombudsperson and some journalists. When the media showed interest in the situation, the
police left and the Roma and the camp owners worked out an agreement that the Roma
could stay until a more permanent solution is found. No suitable alternative
accommodation has yet been found by local authorities for this group who continue to stay
in the camp.
138. In addition to the practical problems, Roma also face negative attitudes from the public,
stereotyping, and bias. For example, in June, an outbreak of measles in Kharkiv, mostly
among unvaccinated people, caused public animosity towards Roma (expressed in social
media and publications), who accounted for about 40% of the measles cases, and who were
blamed by some people for spreading the disease. The Kharkiv Deputy Governor said that
the regional authorities are now working with the Roma communities in the Kharkiv region
to find a systematic solution of how to assist Roma IDPs.
139. Negative information of a more general nature about IDPs has also been spreading on
social media and through the internet. In Lviv, the authorities said the misinformation about
IDPs was deliberately planted to cause further divisions between people from the east and
west. Some of this misinformation related to the notion that male IDPs were shirking their
military duty to serve back where they came from. In Rivne, the city council decided to no
longer host IDP men of military conscription age. (Women make up two-thirds of all adult
IDPs). On the other hand, regional authorities, as for example in Volyn, started checking
male IDPs when they arrived in the west for fear that they might be ‘separatists’ posing as
IDPs, and the local population was encouraged to report any suspicious person or object.
29
VI. FREEDOMS OF EXPRESSION, ASSOCIATION, PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY,
MOVEMENT, RELIGION OR BELIEF
A. Peaceful assembly
140. Ukrainians with the exception of those living in the east were generally able to fully
exercise their freedom to peaceful assembly in a variety of ways: by gathering in ‘flash
mobs’, pickets, rallies, demonstrations and other groups to articulate publicly their
concerns. Peaceful demonstrations must be permitted, as a matter of international human
rights law, and also as a way for people to exercise their rights to the freedoms of
expression and peaceful assembly which are the foundation for a free and democratic
society. Mostly these gatherings were held without incident and without hindrance,
although almost always with a large police presence.
141. In Odesa, the HRMMU noticed that since June, most of the assemblies were prohibited by
court decisions. Generally the court referred to an alleged danger to public order which, in
accordance with Ukrainian legislation, was among the grounds justifying interference with
the right to peaceful assembly. In addition the court referred to the 2 May violence, and
recent arrests of people allegedly planning terrorist acts, as grounds for the potential threat
to public order.
142. No violence on the scale which occurred with the Maidan protests or in Odesa on 2 May
has occurred at peaceful assemblies held during the reporting period. However, those
seminal events continue to be a guiding concern for the authorities when approving
demonstrations: they appeared to prefer to ban one rather than be blamed for any violence it
triggered. In some places, public mass rallies were banned altogether, for example, in
Odesa on 22 June, although two peaceful rallies went ahead anyway. In other places it was
because the authorities thought the subject matter might incite violence. In Kyiv, for
example, this justification appeared to be behind the eventual cancellation of an LGBT
rights parade, to be held on 5 July, when police said they could not guarantee the safety of
participants. It is the job of law enforcement officers to facilitate peaceful assemblies and to
ensure the protection of the participants, irrespective of their political or other views. In
order to be able to do this, law enforcement must receive adequate training to be able to
handle rallies and protests, in line with international human rights standards.
143. Overall, law enforcement has managed to contain violent intent, although there have been
incidents of serious damage to property and some injuries. There have also been more
isolated scuffles and clashes that generally have been kept to a minimum by law
enforcement. Police have been criticized for sometimes not doing enough to stop violent
actions (as for example, when the trade unions meeting was violently disrupted in Kyiv on
26 June) and, conversely, for cracking down unnecessarily hard on demonstrators to
prevent any kind of possible public disorder from the very beginning. This was the concern
in Kharkiv on 22 June, when a large presence of law enforcement officers successfully kept
opposing groups apart but was later criticized by one side for abuse of power17. There
remains a need to adopt legislation and other measures to clarify the role and
responsibilities of law enforcement to ensure the principles of necessity, proportionality,
non-discrimination and accountability underpin the management of peaceful assemblies.
144. Currently a chilling trend has been observed where groups with different political agendas
have demanded the authorities not allow peaceful assemblies of people with opposing
17 The Prosecutor’s office has started an investigation on possible criminal responsibility of the police during the
two rallies held on 22 June in Kharkiv, for excessive use of force, under article 365 of the Criminal Code.
30
viewpoints to theirs. This illustrates once again, the need for national legislation in line
with international norms and standards.
145. In Crimea, the authorities would not allow the Crimean Tatars to hold their normal
celebration in the city centre of Flag Day on 26 June, but smaller gatherings took place
elsewhere.
146. The subject matter of the peaceful assemblies held during the reporting period covered a
broad spectrum of people’s current concerns and included: protests against specific cases of
alleged corruption; protesting the lack of consultation on the appointments of regional and
local officials; families of soldiers protesting military service and conditions; against
Russian-owned banks and business; for peace in the east; in observance of Crimean Tatar
Flag Day and Constitution Day; and in support of both sides of the ‘pro-Ukraine/pro-
Federalism’ debate (separate demonstrations). Since 8 June the Sunday ‘viche’ (people’s
assembly) has been held in Kyiv on Maidan and is now a regular weekly happening, having
taken root in public consciousness as a watchdog for Government accountability.
B. Freedom of association
147. Freedom of association is an essential condition for the effective exercise of the right to
vote and must be fully protected. It includes the freedom to engage in political activity
individually or through political parties and other organizations. In this regard, it is noted
that on 8 July the Government filed a lawsuit to ban the Communist party of Ukraine.
C. Freedom of expression
148. There were some worrying trends observed in the area of freedom of expression in both the
eastern and western parts of the country. As the severity of the violence increased in the
east and the crisis there dragged on, opinions became more polarized in Ukraine. As a
result, the level of hate speech has escalated dramatically, especially on social media, but
also in demonstrations and protests and even in Parliament18. Acts of hate speech must be
publicly condemned and prohibited by law19. Political leaders should refrain from using
messages of intolerance or expressions which may incite violence, hostility or
discrimination; but they also have a crucial role to play in speaking out firmly and promptly
against intolerance, discriminatory stereotyping and instances of hate speech.20 In an
indicative action, some news sites in Ukraine have started blocking comments to their
stories because of the virulent comments people were posting. The increasing level of hate
speech must be addressed by the country’s political leaders, who have yet to speak out
publicly against it.
149. There remains a need to combat intolerance and extremism and to prevent national, racial
or religious hatred that constitutes incitement. As armed groups fighting in the east are no
longer just local people wanting more regional autonomy or a separate autonomous state,
but are being organized by professional fighters not Ukrainian citizens, there has been an
increased ‘anti-Russia’ rhetoric with demonstrations targeting Russian-owned banks and
18 During a parliamentary session on 20 June, MP Ivan Stoyko made the following statement: ‘We are now at war
with the Mongoloid race, fascist Russia, which climbs on Ukraine like a locust in order to destroy our country,
our nation.’ Verbatim report.
19 Article 20 of the ICCPR; Article 4 of the ICERD.
20 Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. A/HRC/22/17/Add.4., appendix.
31
business on the grounds that they are ‘financing terrorists’. Some of these demonstrations
have resulted in the defacement of property.
150. Given the rise in Ukraine of instances of hate speech and other forms of intolerance
expressed through social media and the internet, it is worth noting here the report on
racism, the internet and social media, recently issued by the Special Rapporteur on
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance21.
In it he says that while the internet serves as a formidable vehicle for the exercise of free
speech, it also provides a powerful platform for the rapid dissemination of racist ideas,
ideologies and incitement to hatred. A comprehensive, multi-stakeholder approach is
necessary to effectively counter expressions of racism on the internet and social media.
151. Journalists, media professionals and human rights defenders need protection so that they
are able to do their jobs. Harassment, intimidation, manipulation and abductions of
journalists have continued to occur in the east, and at least five journalists have been killed
since the fighting began in April. None of these journalists was using any personal safety
equipment22. The circumstances around one of the latest cases were particularly horrifying.
In an operation led by an armed group on 30 June as the 10-day curfew ended, a bus of
civilians, including journalists and a group of women, was sent in the middle of the night to
a besieged Ukrainian military base, endangering the lives of the civilians during an attack
on the base. The journalists had been told that the women on the bus were mothers of
soldiers and their presence would ensure that the Ukrainian soldiers in the base would
surrender peacefully. However, one of the journalists on the bus reported later that he spoke
with the women and was told that none of them was a mother of any soldier. Gunfire broke
out as the bus approached the military base; the bus driver was wounded and one journalist
killed. The armed group has evidently ‘arrested’ one of its own activists for organizing this
staged provocation.
152. In the east, attempts at manipulation of the media have been especially egregious. Many
journalists previously working in the east have already fled after being abducted, harassed,
intimidated or otherwise threatened. Those that remain in Luhansk have been instructed by
the armed groups on how they should report the news. Words such as ‘separatist’ and
‘terrorist’ should not be used, they were told, and each Monday there would be a meeting
with the editors of local media to instruct them on what to cover and how. Media outlets
were threatened that if they did not cover the activities of the armed groups positively, their
equipment would be destroyed and employees put in danger. In Donetsk, all media outlets
are required to register with the armed groups’ ‘Ministry of Information and
Communications’. This extends to online resources, including individual bloggers, as well
as distributors of print media. Any outlet that does not register would be banned from all
media activities. Ukrainian television channel ICTV and the local municipal TV channel 12
in Donetsk were replaced by Russian TV channel broadcasts. On the other hand, four
Russian TV channels have already been banned from broadcasting in Ukraine and the
process is underway to ban three more following complaints about their content in
21 Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance. Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Racism/A-HRC-26-49.pdf.
22 On 3 June, the National Journalist Union announced that in cooperation with the OSCE, a special point was
opened where journalists could rent flak jackets and other personal safety equipment. On 15 July, the Ukrainian
NGO Institute of Mass Information informed the HRMMU that they collect and provide flak jackets to all
accredited journalists who work in the east. The accreditation is granted by the Security Service of Ukraine. So
far, all journalists who applied for accreditation have received it. The IMI is deeply concerned that many
Russian journalists work in Donbas without any accreditation or proper documents and without even basic
security training.
32
compliance with the national legislation, particularly related to the use of hate speech and
media.
153. The polarization and hardening of attitudes in Ukraine has resulted in some people
attempting to muzzle the press or intimidate media outlets in an attempt to influence their
editorial policy that they consider contrary to their own viewpoint. For example, the
newspaper offices of ‘Vesti’ in Kyiv were attacked twice within a week, on 28 June and
again on 5 July. In Chernivtsi, the local chapter of the National Council of Journalists has
appealed to the President and others concerning a number of recent judgments which the
organization says will impair journalists’ independence and force them to stop writing
about important issues and which, in the organization’s view, contravene European and
Ukrainian law.
D. Freedom of movement
154. Restrictions on the freedom of movement are a daily experience in areas of the east.
Roadblocks and ad hoc checkpoints manned by armed groups regularly stop people who
are then searched and valuables stolen or destroyed. Women and girls feel especially
vulnerable because of the violence and general lawlessness and, according to the testimony
of IDPs, do not go out. The ability of men to freely move in and out of areas controlled by
armed groups in the eastern regions is curtailed due to abductions, which at times, lead to
forced mobilisation to armed groups.
155. Ukrainian citizens continue to face restrictions and long delays crossing from Ukraine
mainland to Crimea and vice versa due to the Crimean border guards.
E. Freedom of religion or belief
156. The freedom of religion or belief has come under increasing pressure in the last weeks. A
disturbing number of incidents have been reported in the east and Crimea. The armed
groups have declared that the main religion in Donetsk region was Orthodox Christianity
(of the Moscow Patriarchate) and that sects were prohibited. This approach explains to a
large extent, the increasing number of attacks on Protestant, Mormon, and Roman Catholic
churches in the areas controlled by the armed groups. Religious leaders have been harassed,
threatened and abducted.
157. There have been reports of incidents in other parts of the country. For example, in Odesa,
law enforcement pre-emptively surrounded a synagogue that was to be a target of an anti-
Jewish demonstration thereby deterring the protestors and no gathering occurred.
158. In Kyiv, on 22 June, a more violent protest targeted a religious group perceived as being
affiliated with the Russian Federation. The demonstrators included men armed with
baseball bats and hammers, some wearing bulletproof vests and clearly intending to do
damage. However, once again a large law enforcement presence prevented any violence.
The demonstrators claimed the event, being held at the Orthodox Church, was an attempt
by ‘separatists’ to form a ‘Kyiv People’s Republic’.
159. This trend is particularly disturbing as Ukraine until now has demonstrated a general
tolerance for different beliefs and religions.
VII. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
33
160. The full enjoyment of social and economic rights by everyone throughout Ukraine was one
of the main aims of the civil society activists, experts and journalists who united after
Maidan to lobby for the necessary reforms. However, the new society that they hoped
would be created by the “reanimation package of reforms” is still far from reality.
161. The country’s economy remains in recession, with a consequent adverse impact on the right
to work. Unemployment increased from 8% to almost 9% in the first 6 months of this year,
the inflation rate has reached 16% and utility rates have increased by an average of 30%.
Meanwhile salaries and social benefits have been frozen since December 2013. The
majority of the registered unemployed are women (at 52.2%) and young people aged 15 to
35 (42.3%). According to the Federation of the Trade Unions of Ukraine, every third
person is employed illegally without any social guarantees or protection. There is a need to
align labour legislation with international standards23, in particular concerning the
strengthening of inspections and the protection of public servants, whose mid-level salaries
are 48% of the average salary in Ukraine and who lack guarantees of employment, often
being the first to be fired when a new administration comes to power.24
162. The trade unions are warning that because of these factors, coupled with the lack of
meaningful social dialogue or transparency in government, there may be major social
unrest in autumn.
163. The Government has proposed that in order to finance the security operation against the
armed groups in the east, as well as the repair and revitalization of the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions, the Ukraine budget would be amended. Currently the Government
estimates that repair of east Ukraine will cost 8 billion UAH (about 750 million USD).
Social programmes would be cut by 4.6 billion (about 420 million USD) while the defence
and security sectors would grow by 8 billion UAH (about 750 million USD). The budget
cuts would include a reduction of 2 billion UAH (about 180 million USD) in
unemployment and disability benefits; funding for education and health would also be cut.
The salaries of State employees would not be adjusted to keep pace with inflation
(currently at 16%).
164. The situation in the east is dire. As of now, 104 buildings remain seized by the armed
groups. Of these 24 are military premises, 16 are administrative and local authorities’
buildings, 16 are buildings of the Ministry of the Interior, 7 are Security Service buildings,
5 are prosecutor offices, 4 are of the emergency service of Ukraine, 1 is a tax
administration building, and 1 is a court. With banks, the Treasury and pensions funds
closed because of the violence and robberies, salaries and social security benefits have not
been paid regularly for more than two months. The situation has been especially critical in
Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Snizhne and Krasnyi Luch.
165. Women have been particularly affected in this situation. They make up about 80% of those
employed by the government (teachers, doctors, public servants) and were therefore hard
hit by the lack of government payments of salaries and social security benefits like child
support. Economically women already face a wage gender gap and discrimination in the
workplace. With a scarcity of money and food coupled with their responsibility for their
households and families, women in the east were further burdened by the constant fear for
their lives and security.
23 Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81) (would strengthen the institution of inspectors and allow ad-hoc
checks at enterprises) and Convention 151 - Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention (would protect rights
of public servants).
24 According to the Trade Union of public servants.
34
166. Negative impacts are also apparent on the right to health. Access to healthcare remains
limited in the east, as many hospitals of the region are not operational or are working below
their normal capacity, according to the Ministry of Health. The availability of heath care
staff has decreased, as doctors, especially specialists and surgeons have left. The lack of
fuel means the Emergency Medical Service is not operating properly, especially in
Slovyansk and Kramatorsk where medical help is mainly delivered by volunteer squads
from Kharkiv. Delivery of medicines, including insulin and ARV therapy, has been often
disrupted.
167. Due to threats and intimidation, many factories and businesses have had to shut down. For
example, in the Luhansk region, four coal mines owned by the DTEK Mining Company
were shut down on 10 July because of the risk to miner's lives. This followed an incident in
which four miners were killed and 16 wounded, including women, when a bus they were
travelling in came under fire. The company also closed its 2 coal enrichment factories.
These closures affect 4,500 employees. Armed groups have also seized warehouses and
factories, using the premises for such things as training camps or military repair shops.
Companies that produce materials that can be used to make weapons have also been seized
by the armed groups.
168. In addition, big industrial enterprises and mines are functioning under great risk of
sudden power cuts, which can occur anytime as a result of damage caused by shelling.
Especially in mines, such an emergency would result in miners being trapped under
ground, threatening their lives and their right to safe and healthy work conditions.
Numerous factories and other large enterprises use chemicals in their production and have
large storage areas of containment. In situations of shelling, these could be damaged
causing leakage of dangerous chemical substances, with a negative impact on the right to
health and environmental safety for the residents.
169. Eastern Ukraine is the centre for the country’s heavy industry. With the economic life of
Donetsk and Luhansk now crippled, the impact on the rest of the country will be severe.
170. The rights to an adequate standard of living and the quality of life for residents in the east
has been severely impacted and the damage to their towns and villages extensive. In some
places this has reached critical levels. For example, as of 15 July, because of damage to the
water systems, there was no water in Semenivka, Mykolaivka or Petrivka and residents of
Slovyansk were relying on well water which was turgid and with sediment and reaching its
limit. In Mykolaivka deliveries of water were being made daily but older persons and
people with disabilities had no way to get into town to get the water. There were no water
deliveries to Semenivka. In Luhansk, 28 villages were without electricity on 2 July; the
power was also cut to 34 cities and villages in the Donetsk region on 4 July because of the
fighting and repair work was in progress; according to the electricity company on 2 July,
power to healthcare facilities in Kramatorsk was disrupted; 200 people were reported
without gas when a gas pipe was damaged by shelling in the village of Vlasivka (Luhansk)
on 3 July. Fuel was reportedly in short supply with only one petrol station remaining open
to serve Kramatorsk and Slovyansk (15 miles away) on 4 July. On 27 June, the Donetsk
Mayor said the sewage pumping station was not operational in Slovyansk, causing all
sewage to flow untreated into the river which is relied on by people in downstream towns
for drinking water. Semenivka, in the suburbs of Slovyansk, has suffered so much damage
from the fighting it likely will not be repaired.
171. In the Donetsk and Luhansk regions there have been at least 24 explosions of railway lines,
bridges and freight trains since 19 June. There are concerns that these acts are part of the
armed group’s policy to control and raise corrupt profits from trade, as train transport is
35
harder to control than trucks. Meanwhile, in mid-July residents of Donetsk were reported to
be waiting for hours in order to catch a train to leave the area, anticipating the blockade
around their city that the Government had warned it would impose. Damage to public
transportation negatively affects the right to an adequate standard of living.
172. In Crimea, water supply through the North Crimean Canal was blocked by the Ukrainian
Department of the North Crimean Canal on 12 May. As much as 80% of Crimea’s water
reserves used to come from mainland Ukraine. While this situation will not affect drinking
water, the consequences of the decision to halt water supply have already started being felt
on the harvest of crops, particularly rice and potatoes, which was lower than in the previous
year.
VIII. MINORITY RIGHTS AND OTHER GROUPS FACING DISCRIMINATION
173. Despite the escalation of violence in the east and the rise of hate speech, particularly in
social media, incidents of actual harassments or violent attacks on minorities remain
isolated and rare.25 Representatives of ethnic and national groups who the HRMMU have
spoken to, do not report any systematic negativism or discrimination against them.
174. A few individual cases of hostility and anti-minority acts were reported to the HRMMU.
For example, on 25 June in Ivano-Frankivsk region, an activist of the Ukrainian Greek
Ethnic and Cultural Society had his property defaced with the Russian and armed groups’
flags. He believes it was done by the local Self Defence group who have threatened him
previously for questioning the lawfulness of their activities. He also believes there is a
connection to his Greek ethnic origin and perceives the situation as inciting hostile attitudes
in the region. On 3 July, in Mykolaiv, a monument commemorating Holocaust victims was
defaced with brilliant green dye.
175. Representatives of some ethnic communities raised specific concerns about intolerant
attitudes towards them. For instance, Roma activist mentioned to the HRMMU that Roma
IDPs are less likely to receive help, particularly accommodation; in several towns and
villages, local authorities requested Roma families to leave; some local residents were also
hostile. People belonging to the Chechen minority fear that because citizens of the Russian
Federation from the Republic of Chechnya are known to have participated in the fighting in
the eastern regions of Ukraine, people belonging to the Chechen minority in Ukraine might
eventually face threats and discrimination.
176. A few incidents of intolerance were based on sexual orientation and gender identity. On 8
June in Donetsk and on 6 July in Kyiv, LGBT clubs were attacked by armed men. The
attackers insulted visitors on the basis of their sexual orientation. Although the LGBT
rights parade ‘March of Equality’ planned for 5 July in Kyiv was cancelled, as reportedly
police could not guarantee participants’ safety, the organisers of the event still received
threats and numerous hate comments in social media.
177. In its previous recommendations, the HRMMU stressed the importance of ensuring
inclusivity and equal participation of all in public affairs and political life. The law “On
Minorities” adopted in 1992 is declarative and does not provide sufficient legal basis for
25 In her visit to Ukraine in April, the Special Rapporteur on minority issues reported that the country had a history
of harmonious inter-ethnic and inter-faith relations and a legislative, policy and social environment that is
generally conducive to the protection of their rights, including cultural and linguistic rights. Nevertheless it was
noted that some grievances do exist and that minority rights had become a highly politicized issue.
36
the active participation of minorities in decision-making processes. Unfortunately, no
particular efforts were made to develop a mechanism which could have facilitated
participation of all minorities and indigenous peoples in the recent national unity round
tables on the constitutional changes.
178. Among positive developments, on 18 June, the Cabinet of Ministers created a
Commissioner on Ethno-National Policy. The mandate, defined by the Decree of the
Cabinet of Ministers Nr. 164 as of 4 June, is to facilitate cooperation between authorities
and civil society to “ensure protection of ethnic and national minorities and indigenous
peoples, preserve inter-ethnic unity and concord in Ukrainian society”. The Commissioner
should develop and present the Cabinet of Ministers with measures to improve ethnonational
policy and to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts and acts of discrimination.
IX. POLITICAL RIGHTS
179. In the past few weeks there has been growing frustration expressed by citizens in many
different regions (e.g. Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil and Lviv) over the way regional and local
appointments are made without regard to public opinion. In numerous demonstrations and
meetings, people have demanded that they be consulted before such appointments are made
and that senior officials, usually appointed by central government, should be of local origin
and of people well trusted by the community. Sometimes these protests have been
effective in stopping a particular appointment. However, the public lack of trust in political
institutions and actors - the result of years of widespread corruption and mismanagement –
needs to be systematically addressed, in particular at the regional, district and local levels.
It remains to be seen if changes currently being drafted to the Constitution will sufficiently
address this issue.
180. Recommendations made in the previous report concerning the conduct of the Presidential
election held on 25 May and about the need for inclusive consultations, are pertinent to the
anticipated Parliamentary election. This election must be free, fair and transparent. Equally
important is the need for political parties and their supporters to refrain from intolerance
and hate speech, as well as from harassment or physical attack on candidates, all of which
were factors during the Presidential election. It is hoped that a new Parliament will reflect
the new political and social reality of the country.
181. Women hold less than 10% of the parliamentary seats in Ukraine and only one woman has
a Cabinet position. A draft law that provided for gender quotas, requiring political parties to
ensure that women comprised 30% of their party lists of candidates, languished after the
first reading last year.
182. There is also a need for inclusiveness and meaningful consultations with people from all
components of society (national, ethnic, linguistic, religious and other minorities, women,
indigenous people, representatives of civil society, all political parties and of the ‘peaceful
population’ of the east) about important government decisions. As previously reported, this
did not happen sufficiently in the development of the new constitutional amendments
which were finally published on 2 July.
183. Concerning consultations with the peaceful population of the east referred to above, this is
particularly meaningful since there appears to have been a lack of communication with
central government due in large part to the fighting and the consequent disruption of
regional and local government. This has been coupled with an increase in the level of fear,
37
intimidation, rhetoric and propaganda aimed at the residents of the east by the armed
groups that has escalated along with the fighting. As the Government regains control of
areas in the east, it should make every effort to include representative voices from the
peaceful population in decisions about the rebuilding and rehabilitation of their region.
Only through such inclusive and participatory dialogue will there be a de-escalation of
tensions and the restoration of law and order.
X. PARTICULAR HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES IN CRIMEA
184. In the previous three reports, the HRMMU made 17 recommendations relating to the
situation in Crimea, primarily addressed to the Russian Federation. They addressed ways
the authorities could protect and enhance the enjoyment of human rights for all residents of
Crimea. There has been no progress in implementing them. The HRMMU will continue
monitoring the situation.
185. According to UNHCR, as of 15 July 13,381 people have moved from Crimea. A new
Crimean “Ombudsperson” has been appointed, the first to occupy such a post. She was
appointed after a majority vote in the so-called Crimean Parliament/State Council of
Crimea on 9 July. In Lviv, a Crimean NGO warned that there could be a new wave of IDPs
during August-September. This would include business people who were having serious
difficulties with continuing to operate their businesses in Crimea; lecturers and teachers
because they fear they will be sacked at the beginning of the new academic year for holding
Ukrainian nationality or because they are Crimean Tatar; and families with sons of military
age who do not want to be called for service into the Russian Federation army.
186. In contravention of General Assembly resolution 68/262 on the territorial integrity of
Ukraine, the Russian Federation applies laws and regulations of the Russian Federation to
the people of this territory. This continues causing confusion, legal problems and
jeopardizing the rights of the residents of this region, in particular those who do not hold
Russian Federation citizenship. Prisoners in Crimea are facing specific challenges: they
could not leave the peninsula after the March “referendum”, as other residents chose to do.
In addition, the right to reject Russian citizenship within the specified timeframe of one
month from 16 March until 18 April 2014, was hampered by their deprivation of liberty.
187. All the issues previously reported on remain concerns. This is particularly true of
harassment and discrimination against ethnic Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars, representatives
of religious minorities, minority groups in general, and activists who opposed the 16 March
‘referendum’ in Crimea.26
188. The detention of Ukrainian filmmaker Oleg Sentsov, who was arrested in Crimea and
transferred to the Russian Federation on terrorism charges, was extended until 11 October.
Three other activists are also detained on the same grounds. Despite the fact that Sentsov is
a citizen of Ukraine, Federal Security Service (FSB) of the Russian Federation allegedly
wrote in the official investigation file that “Oleg Sentsov is a Russian citizen with a
Ukrainian passport”. According to Sentsov’s lawyer, his client has never applied for
Russian citizenship. It would appear that since Sentsov did not explicitly renounce
Ukrainian citizenship within the deadline provided under Russian legislation, he is
26 The UN General Assembly in Resolution 68/262 on 27 March, 2014, declared the ‘referendum’ held in Crimea on
16 March 2014 as having no validity.
38
automatically considered to have become a Russian citizen27. The head of the Crimean
centre of business and cultural cooperation "Ukrainian House", who currently lives in Kyiv,
was informed by his neighbours that his apartment in Crimea was sealed by the selfdefence
forces. A madrasa (Islamic religious school) in the village of Kolchugino was
searched on 24 June by men in camouflage uniforms who said they were officers of the
“centre for combating extremism” of the Russian FSB. During the search, several doors
and windows were broken. No reason was provided for the search.
189. Representatives of religious minorities are under pressure to leave Crimea. A pastor of the
Protestant Church from Simferopol and his family decided to leave Crimea after he was
told by FSB officers that he could ‘disappear’ like the three pro-Ukrainian activists who
went missing in May 2014. According to the pastor, it became dangerous even to wear
clerical cloths since the “Russian Cossacks” and representatives of other ‘pro-Russian’
groups were very aggressive. The Bishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (from the
Kyiv Patriarchate) in Crimea reported about increasing pressure on believers and the
church property being under threat.
190. The whereabouts of three pro-Ukrainian activists who disappeared in May 2014 are still
unknown. On 23 June, the director of a Crimean human rights organization was told by an
investigating officer from Crimea that the three were neither in a pre-trial detention centre
nor in an FSB facility. No less critical is the situation of people living with HIV/AIDS,
particularly drug addict patients and prisoners who do not have access to the substitution
maintenance therapy that they previously received; several patients have reportedly died
since 10 June due to the lack of necessary medication.
191. Movement to and from Crimea continued to be strictly controlled, and in some cases,
prohibitions have been imposed. Representatives of the Crimean Tatar community have
been targeted who opposed the March ‘referendum’. Thus, the authorities of Crimea have
barred on 5 July the head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Refat Chubarov, from
entering Crimea. A similar measure had been taken against the former head of the Mejlis,
Mustafa Dzhemiliev, in May 2014. In both cases, the decision was justified by alleged
‘extremist’ statements having been made. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry condemned the
ban and the Ombudsperson of Ukraine said it infringed international law and violated
fundamental rights and freedoms of the indigenous people of Crimea.
192. Restrictions continued to be placed on the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly. The
authorities in Simferopol rejected three proposals submitted by the representatives of the
Crimean Tatar community concerning the location to celebrate the Crimean Tatar Flag
Day, a festive event celebrated since 2009. The authorities insisted that the event be held
far from the city centre and in areas mainly populated by Crimean Tatars. The official
celebration, with about 500 people, eventually took place on 26 June in the district of
compact settlement of the Crimean Tatars instead of the central area of the capital of
Crimea. The police controlled the perimeter of the gathering and people were searched. No
significant incidents were reported. Several Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar media outlets are
under threat of closing. The editor’s office of “Krymskaya Svetlitsa”, the only Ukrainian
language newspaper in Crimea, received an order from the Crimean authorities to leave the
premises which they have been renting for years. The distribution network refuses to
distribute the newspaper in its newsstands and it has not been included in the subscription
catalogue. New laws have been rapidly introduced, without any prior consultation or notice
that may have significant implications for those affected. For example, for employment
27 In its second and third public reports, the HRMMU raised concerns that unclear procedures of acquiring and
renouncing citizenship would cause difficulties and violations of the right to citizenship.
39
purposes, Ukrainian nationals resident in Crimea who rejected Russian citizenship are now
considered foreigners, and may be employed only if their employer has a permit to employ
foreigners. A quota system providing the number of foreigners who may be employed in
Crimea is provided by the Russian Federation. Employers had very little notice of the need
to apply for a permit by 15 July, and those without could be fined 800,000 RUB (more than
22,000 USD). The effects of this law on Crimean residents who are Ukrainian nationals
have yet to be seen. 28
193. Russia and Ukraine have reached agreement on the price of electric power supplies to
Crimea but no official contacts have been established as regards water supply. The current
impact of water restrictions in Crimea is described earlier29. The Ukrainian Ministry of
Infrastructure announced the closure of its ports in Crimea (Evpatoria, Kerch, Sevastopol,
Feodosia, and Yalta) for international shipping, effective 15 July.
194. On 7 July 2014, the International Civil Aviation Organization officially confirmed that the
airspace over Crimea belongs to Ukraine and the organization denied that it had transferred
the management of the airspace to the Russian Federation. The Ukrainian Ministry of
Justice said it was seeking 1 million UAH per day (about 91,000 USD) compensation from
the Russian Federation for illegally providing air navigation services over Crimea and its
territorial waters (the 19-kilometer zone). Otherwise Ukraine will file a claim for the
expulsion of the Russian Federation from the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
195. The situation of people living with HIV/AIDS is difficult, particularly for prisoners. Due to
the differences in the approved schemes for HIV treatment in Ukraine and the Russian
Federation, patients in Crimea have been forced to change their medications. Drug users
have been put in a particularly vulnerable position, as they do not have access to the Opioid
Substitution Therapy30, which is prohibited by legislation of the Russian Federation. Since
10 June, 20 patients have reportedly died due to the lack of necessary medication and some
have allegedly returned to the usage of illegal drugs.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
196. Notwithstanding the challenges the Government faces trying to restore law, order and
security as well as combat armed groups in the east, it needs to address the wider systemic
problems facing the country with respect to good governance, rule of law and human rights.
This requires deep and badly needed reforms, especially as Ukraine seeks to fulfil its EU
aspirations and establish a democratic and pluralistic society.
197. It is thus imperative for the Government to ensure priority attention to addressing
comprehensively the recommendations made by international human rights mechanisms
(UN treaty bodies, special procedures, and the UPR).
198. Annex 1 to this report contains recommendations from the UN Human Rights mechanisms
and OHCHR based on the monitoring work of the HRMMU, which could form the basis of
28 In its second and third public reports, the HRMMU warned that imposed legislative changes over such a short
period of time would inevitably have an adverse impact on the possibility of residents to exercise the full scope
of their rights.
29 See Chapter VII.
30 World Health Organisation recognizes Opioid Substitution Therapy as one of the most effective harm reduction
programmes, which are widely used to control HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases among injecting drug
users.
40
a multi-year national human rights action plan to be developed and implemented – with
clear benchmarks and timelines – through a senior coordination mechanism led by the
Government of Ukraine, with the participation of key Ministries, relevant State Institutions,
including the Ombudsman, and civil society organisations. The international community
and the UN system stand ready to support Ukraine in the implementation of such a plan,
firmly convinced that it will be essential to ensuring the success and long-term
sustainability of on-going peace, security and development efforts.
41
Annex 1
Compilation of recommendations by the UN Human Rights Mechanism
and the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine
The following recommendations are a thematic compilation of recommendations from the UN Human
Rights mechanisms – treaty bodies, special procedures and the universal periodic review (UPR) – as well
as from the first three reports of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU).
A glossary of acronyms is on the last page of this Annex.
Theme 1: Rule of law, accountability and administration of justice
Treaty Bodies
􀂾 CAT (2011) reiterated its recommendation that the reform of the Prosecutor’s Office should
ensure its independence and impartiality and separate the criminal prosecution functions from
those of investigating alleged abuse. WGAD (2009) made similar observations.
􀂾 CRC urged the Government to put in place a juvenile justice system; ensure a restorative
juvenile justice system promoting alternative measures to deprivation of liberty and strengthen
the social support services. WGAD made similar recommendations.
􀂾 The HR Committee (2013) recommended the State party to take immediate and effective steps
to ensure that cases of death in custody are promptly investigated by an independent and
impartial body.
􀂾 The HR Committee urged the State party to adopt a law providing for clear procedures and
objective criteria for the promotion, suspension and dismissal of judges.
􀂾 The HR Committee also noted that Government should ensure that prosecuting authorities are
not involved in deciding on disciplinary actions against judges and that judicial disciplinary
bodies are neither controlled by the executive branch nor affected by any political influence.
Special Procedures
􀂾 WGAD (2009) recommended that Ukraine provide the legal and operational framework for an
independent and effective judiciary, including through appropriate recruitment.
􀂾 WGAD recommended that Ukraine amend the Criminal Procedure Code to the effect that
convictions exclusively based on confessions are inadmissible.
􀂾 WGAD recommended that Ukraine: (a) ensure that in practice all detainees have recourse to
lawyers from the moment of arrest and (b) legally enact a Bar Association with an independent
and effective mandate.
UPR recommendations (2012)
􀂾 Speed up the work to bring the Criminal Procedure Code in line with European standards, as
proposed by the Council of Europe.
􀂾 Fully implement the new Criminal Procedure Code, including necessary constitutional and
statutory reforms needed to limit the powers of the Prosecutor General’s office.
􀂾 Implement genuine measures ensuring truly independent judiciary, including establishing
transparent procedures and criteria regarding the appointment and dismissal of judges and the
use of disciplinary measures.
􀂾 Continue strengthening the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and guaranteeing
greater transparency of legal procedures, through measures such as the review of the Criminal
Code and of the Public Prosecutor’s Office.
􀂾 Provide the legal and operational framework for an independent judiciary, inter alia, by
establishing fair procedures and criteria regarding the appointment and dismissal of judges.
42
􀂾 Consider establishing enhanced procedures and transparent criteria regarding the appointment
and dismissal of judges, and the application of disciplinary measures in order to dispel concerns
of the international community regarding the independence of the judiciary.
􀂾 Provide the legal and operational framework for an independent and effective judiciary, and
undertake reform of the Prosecutor’s Office that ensures its independence and impartiality and
separate the criminal prosecution functions from those investigating alleged abuse.
􀂾 Further strengthening of the judiciary by investigating all allegations of human rights violations by
law enforcement officers and the police.
􀂾 Take concrete steps to improve the objectivity and independence of the criminal justice system
by incorporating the recommendations of the Venice Commission, implementing the judgments
of the European Court of Human Rights, and addressing concerns about selective justice.
􀂾 Fully implement the new Criminal Procedure Code, including necessary constitutional and
statutory reforms needed to limit the powers of the Prosecutor General’s office, and establish an
impartial and independent criminal justice system, in line with Ukraine’s obligations under the
ICCPR.
􀂾 Full implementation of the new criminal procedure code, and that the independency of judges is
strengthened, the role of the public prosecution is balanced and corruption in judiciary system is
tackled.
􀂾 Continue to make efforts with regard to reform in criminal proceedings, including enhancing the
independence and impartiality of the Prosecutor’s Office, as well as the updating of pre-trial
investigation procedures.
􀂾 Create an independent body to investigate cases of torture and guarantee compensation for
victims. Additionally, bring conditions of detention in line with international standards and ensure
respect for the judicial guarantees of detainees.
􀂾 Further pursue it effort to provide human rights training for police personnel to effectively fight
hate crimes.
􀂾 Issue a comprehensive anti-discrimination law and update the national action plan in order to
dedicate special attention to addressing the practices of law enforcement officials, as well as the
legal and practical measures needed to combat incitement and hate crimes.
􀂾 Provide training for staff of law enforcement bodies on the rights of detainees.
􀂾 Take urgent measures to prevent cases of ill-treatment and torture by police officers.
􀂾 Protect and promote effectively the right to a fair trial in accordance with internationally
established standards.
􀂾 Take the necessary steps to ensure that all allegations of mistreatment are impartially
investigated.
􀂾 Ensure non-selective prosecutions on its territory and a fair trial for persons being prosecuted, in
conformity with the standards as under article 14 of the ICCPR, including the right to appeal laid
down in paragraph 5.
􀂾 Urgently address the problem of the acceptance by the courts of evidence obtained as a result of
ill-treatment in detention.
􀂾 Consider stepping up efforts towards reform in juvenile justice.
􀂾 Strengthen and advance its efforts for establishing a juvenile justice system and promote
alternative measures to deprivation of liberty for juvenile offenders.
􀂾 Ensure that the new Criminal Procedure Code respects the human rights of those held in
custody, and that the statements informing migrants of the justification for their deportation is in
one of the languages that the deportee understands.
HRMMU 15 April 2014 Report
􀂾 Ensure the institutional independence of the State Bureau of Investigation, under Article 216 of
the new CCP, which provides for its creation within five years (as of 2012) to enable it to
investigate allegations of human rights violations committed by judges, law enforcement officers
43
and high-ranking officials. It will be very important to ensure that this new body is independent
from the Prosecutor’s Office. Public accountability and sufficient resourcing is essential to enable
it to function effectively, promptly, independently and impartially.
HRMMU 15 May 2014 Report
􀂾 The deterioration in the east of Ukraine – the unlawful activities of the armed groups, including
the seizure and occupation of public and administrative buildings, and numerous human rights
abuses, inter alia, unlawful detentions, killings, torture/ill-treatment and harassment of people –
remain the major factor in causing a worsening situation for the protection of human rights. A
prompt, impartial and comprehensive investigation should be undertaken into the events and
violence in the east.
􀂾 The violent clashes in Odesa on 2 May resulted in the deaths of 46 people, with over 200 injured
and 13 remaining missing. It appears to have hardened the resolve of those opposing the
Government, and deepened division between communities. There is a need for an independent
investigation into the violent events of that day. The perpetrators must be brought to justice in a
fair and non-selective manner.
HRMMU 15 June 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine and other stakeholders:
􀂾 All gaps of legislation should be brought in line with the recommendations of the international
human rights mechanisms (Treaty Bodies, Universal Periodic Review and Special Procedures);
the Judiciary, Office of the Prosecutor General and the Bar Association should operate in line
with relevant international norms and standards in order to ensure fair trial without which it is
impossible to tackle corruption.
􀂾 The Constitutional Court should be enhanced – legal, social and all other guarantees need to be
elaborated in order to ensure the genuine independence of the Constitutional Court.o the
authorities in Crimea and the de facto governing authority of the Russian Federation:
􀂾 Reaffirming UN General Assembly resolution 68/262, entitled “Territorial integrity of Ukraine”,
measures must be taken to protect the rights of persons affected by the changing institutional
and legal framework, including on issues related to citizenship, right of residence, labour rights,
property and land rights, access to health and education.
􀂾 Ukrainian legislation should remain in force, considering the adverse human rights impact of
legislative changes imposed and also bearing in mind UN General Assembly resolution 68/262.
􀂾 Criminal and administrative liability should not be used as a mechanism of intimidation against
Crimean Tatars and other residents of Crimea, but used in line with international law.
Accountability and Rule of Law:
HRMMU 15 April 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine:
􀂾 Ensure accountability for all human rights violations committed during the period of unrest,
through securing of evidence and thorough, independent, effective and impartial investigations,
prosecutions and adequate sanctions of all those responsible for these violations; ensure
remedies and adequate reparations for victims.
􀂾 Ensure that any lustration initiatives are pursued in full compliance with fundamental human
rights of persons concerned, including right to individual review and right of appeal.
To the authorities in Crimea:
􀂾 Act to re-establish the rule of law, including by the effective disbandment of any and all ‘selfdefence
forces’ and/or para-military groups. Reform the administration of justice system so that it
functions independently, impartially and effectively; reform the security sector so as to ensure
44
that it functions in full respect of international norms and standards; provide for full accountability
for human rights violations.
􀂾 Strengthen rule of law institutions so that they fully comply with relevant international and
regional human rights norms and recommendations of human rights mechanisms.
HRMMU 15 May 2014 Report
􀂾 All armed groups must disarm and their unlawful acts brought to an end, including the immediate
release all those unlawfully detained, and the vacation of occupied public and administrative
buildings, in line with the provisions of the 17 April Geneva Agreement. Those found to be arming
and inciting armed groups and transforming them into paramilitary forces must be held
accountable under national and international law.
HRMMU 15 June 2014 Report
To the authorities in Crimea and the de facto governing authority of the Russian Federation:
􀂾 Human rights violations should be independently, promptly and comprehensively investigated
and perpetrators brought to justice.
Judiciary
Treaty Bodies
􀂾 HR Committee (2013) – urges the State party to ensure that judges are not subjected to any form
of political influence in their decision-making and that the process of judicial administration is
transparent. The State party should adopt a law providing for clear procedures and objective
criteria for the promotion, suspension and dismissal of judges. It should ensure that prosecuting
authorities are not involved in deciding on disciplinary actions against judges and that judicial
disciplinary bodies are neither controlled by the executive branch nor affected by any political
influence. The State party should ensure that prosecutions under article 365 of the Criminal Code
fully comply with the requirements of the Covenant.
UPR Recommendations (2012)
􀂾 Take the necessary steps to ensure that all allegations of mistreatment are impartially
investigated.
􀂾 Implement genuine measures ensuring truly independent judiciary, including establishing
transparent procedures and criteria regarding the appointment and dismissal of judges and the
use of disciplinary measures.
􀂾 Continue strengthening the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and guaranteeing
greater transparency of legal procedures, through measures such as the review of the Criminal
Code and of the Public Prosecutor’s Office.
􀂾 Provide the legal and operational framework for an independent judiciary, inter alia by
establishing fair procedures and criteria regarding the appointment and dismissal of judges.
􀂾 Consider establishing enhanced procedures and transparent criteria regarding the appointment
and dismissal of judges, and the application of disciplinary measures in order to dispel concerns
of the international community regarding the independence of the judiciary.
􀂾 Provide the legal and operational framework for an independent and effective judiciary, and
undertake reform of the Prosecutor’s Office that ensures its independence and impartiality and
separate the criminal prosecution functions from those investigating alleged abuse.
􀂾 Take concrete steps to improve the objectivity and independence of the criminal justice system
by incorporating the recommendations of the Venice Commission, implementing the judgments
of the European Court of Human Rights, and addressing concerns about selective justice.
􀂾 Fully implement the new Criminal Procedure Code, including necessary constitutional and
statutory reforms needed to establish an impartial and independent criminal justice system, in
line with Ukraine’s obligations under the ICCPR.
45
􀂾 Full implementation of the new Criminal Procedure Code, and that the independency of judges is
strengthened, the role of the public prosecution is balanced and corruption in judiciary system is
tackled.
􀂾 Continue to make efforts with regard to reform in criminal proceedings, including enhancing the
independence and impartiality of the Prosecutor’s Office as well as the updating of pre-trail
investigation procedures.
􀂾 Urgently address the problem of the acceptance by the courts of evidence obtained as a result of
ill-treatment in detention.
HRMMU 15 May 2014 Report
􀂾 The Law “On the restoration of the credibility of the judiciary in Ukraine” must be brought in line
with international norms and standards.
Equality before the law, courts and tribunals
UPR Recommendations (2012)
􀂾 Fulfil its commitments on the use of minority language in justice, in both criminal and civil
procedures.
Right to a fair trial
UPR Recommendations (2012)
􀂾 Protect and promote effectively the rights to a fair trial in accordance to the internationally
established standards.
􀂾 Ensure a fair trial for persons being prosecuted, in conformity with the standards as under article
14 of the ICCPR, including the right to appeal laid down in paragraph 5.
HRMMU 15 June Report
To the Government of Ukraine and other stakeholders:
􀂾 The State Migration Service should propose amendments to bring the refugee law in line with
international standards, and to allocate sufficient funds to ensure due process in the asylum
procedure, as well as reception conditions meeting humanitarian needs.
Impunity
Treaty Bodies
􀂾 HR Committee (2013) - The State party should take immediate and effective steps to ensure that
cases of death in custody are promptly investigated by an independent and impartial body, that
sentencing practices and disciplinary sanctions against those found responsible are not overly
lenient, and that appropriate compensation is provided to families of victims.
UPR Recommendations (2012)
􀂾 Improve the legislation and its application in order to combat police impunity and to increase the
number of criminal investigations of suspected perpetrators accused of police brutality.
􀂾 Take sincere efforts to hold accountable those police and law enforcement officers responsible
for the torture and ill-treatment of detainees.
􀂾 Ensure police officers accountability for any criminal acts.
Juvenile justice
UPR Recommendations (2012)
􀂾 Consider stepping up efforts towards reform in juvenile justice.
􀂾 Strengthen and advance its efforts for establishing a juvenile justice system and promote
alternative measures to deprivation of liberty for juvenile offenders.
46
Law Enforcement
HRMMU 15 April 2014 Report
􀂾 Ensure that policies, practices and instructions applicable to the management of peaceful
assemblies are observed through rigorous training for the personnel involved. In particular,
effective internal oversight mechanisms must be put in place in order to review all incidents of
injury or loss of life resulting from the use of force by law enforcement personnel as well as all
cases of use of firearms during duty.
HRMMU 15 May 2014 Report
􀂾 Security and law enforcement operations must be in line with international standards and
guarantee the protection of all individuals at all times. Law enforcement bodies must ensure that
all detainees are registered and afforded legal review of the grounds of their detention.
􀂾 There is an increasing tendency in some critical urban areas for rallies of opposing groups to be
held simultaneously, often leading to violent confrontations and clashes. This trend can be
reverted by replacing incitement to hatred with the culture of tolerance and mutual respect for
diverging views. Peaceful demonstrations must be permitted, as a matter of international law,
and also as a way for people to express their opinion. Law enforcement agencies must facilitate
peaceful assemblies, ensuring the protection of participants, irrespective of their political views.
In this context, law enforcement officers must receive adequate training for handling rallies and
protests in line with the international human rights standards.
􀂾 The law enforcement reform package should aim to reinforce the rule of law; to de-politicise, demilitarise,
de-centralise and strengthen the structure of the law enforcement bodies through
accountability, transparency, and closer cooperation with the public and local communities, as
well as professionalising the staff.
Theme 2: Right to life, liberty and security of the person, torture and ill treatment
Treaty Bodies
􀂾 The HR Committee (2013) urged Ukraine to take immediate and effective steps to ensure that
cases of death in custody are promptly investigated by an independent and impartial body.
􀂾 HR Committee recommended Ukraine to adopt a new legislation on prevention of domestic
violence.
􀂾 CEDAW (2010) urged Ukraine to work towards a comprehensive approach to preventing and
addressing all forms of violence against women; ensure effective penalties in cases of domestic
violence and access of victims of domestic violence to shelters and social centres and to
immediate means of redress and protection.
􀂾 CRC (2011) urged Ukraine to step up its efforts to prevent and combat all forms of abuse and
neglect of children, adopt preventive measures and provide protection and services for their
recovery.
􀂾 CRC urged Ukraine to end all forms of corporal punishment in the home and other settings by
implementing the existing legislative prohibition.
􀂾 CRC urged Ukraine to eliminate exploitative child labour, in particular in the informal sector and
ensure effective enforcement of applicable sanctions against persons violating legislation on child
labour.
􀂾 CRC recommended that Ukraine develop a national strategy for the prevention of, support for
and social reintegration of such children and increase the number and quality of shelters and
psychosocial rehabilitation centres for children in street situations.
􀂾 CEDAW (2010) called upon Ukraine to address the root causes of trafficking, establish additional
shelters for rehabilitation and social integration of victims and ensure systematic investigation,
47
prosecution and punishment of traffickers. CRC also recommended that Ukraine seek technical
assistance from UNICEF, IOM and other partners.
Special Procedures
􀂾 WGAD (2009) recommended that Ukraine ensure a policy of zero-tolerance of torture and that
any related allegation is promptly and properly investigated. CRC made similar
recommendations.
UPR Recommendations (2012)
􀂾 Establish an independent national preventive mechanism in accordance with its obligations under
the OPCAT.
􀂾 Consider bringing national legislation relating to trafficking in and sale of children in line with the
Optional Protocol to the CRC, on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.
􀂾 In the realm of the new criminal procedure code, establish an independent mechanism for the
investigation of alleged cases of torture by officers of law-enforcement agencies independent
from the Ministry of the Interior and the Prosecutor’s Office.
􀂾 Pay due attention to the recommendations made by the Special Rapporteur on torture.
􀂾 Take further measures to ensure systematically safeguards against occurrence of torture or illtreatment
in particular in prison and detention facilities, while implementing also
recommendations of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture.
􀂾 Create an independent body to investigate cases of torture and guarantee compensation for
victims.
􀂾 Ensure that the right of victims of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment to obtain
reparation is respected.
􀂾 Continue to strengthen provisions to address domestic violence, and programmes to reinforce
mechanisms for the protection of women and children;
􀂾 Respect the principles and standards provided by the Council of Europe Convention on
preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, even prior to its
ratification and entry into force.
􀂾 Allocate adequate resources to ensure the effective implementation of the Combatting Trafficking
in Persons Act (2011).
􀂾 Step up the national efforts in the field of trafficking in persons through a victim-oriented
approach that attaches special focus on the protection of children from abuse and sexual
exploitation.
􀂾 Continue efforts in combating human trafficking and provide the necessary assistance to victims
of trafficking.
􀂾 Redouble its efforts in regard to combating trafficking in persons, particularly in combating the
trafficking of children for sexual and labour exploitation, including through addressing the root
causes of trafficking, establishing additional shelters for rehabilitation and social integration of
victims and ensuring systematic investigation, prosecution and punishment of traffickers.
􀂾 Give adequate training on the Law on combating trafficking in human beings to all those involved
in the fight against human trafficking, especially border guards.
􀂾 Continue its efforts aimed at fighting trafficking in persons, particularly children and women, and
at ensuring compensation and rehabilitation for trafficking victims.
􀂾 Improve the legislation and its application in order to combat police impunity and increase the
number of criminal investigations of suspected perpetrators accused of police brutality, as well as
provide training for staff of law-enforcement bodies on the rights of detainees.
􀂾 Ensure that the right of victims of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment to obtain
reparation is respected.
􀂾 Take sincere efforts to hold accountable those police and law enforcement officers responsible
for the torture and ill-treatment of detainees.
48
􀂾 Take urgent measures to prevent cases of ill-treatment and torture by police officers and ensure
their accountability for any criminal acts.
􀂾 Strengthen the effectiveness and the independence of the mechanisms to supervise the
observance of human rights of inmates and persons under police custody with the aim of
preventing ill-treatment.
Treaty Bodies
􀂾 HR Committee (2013) - The State party should reinforce its measures to eradicate torture and illtreatment,
ensure that such acts are promptly, thoroughly, and independently investigated, that
perpetrators of acts of torture and ill-treatment are prosecuted in a manner commensurate with
the gravity of their acts, and that victims are provided with effective remedies, including
appropriate compensation. As a matter of priority, the State party should establish a genuinely
independent complaints mechanism to deal with cases of alleged torture or ill-treatment. It should
also amend its Criminal Procedure Code to provide for mandatory video recording of
interrogations, and pursue its efforts towards equipping places of deprivation of liberty with video
recording devices with a view to discouraging any use of torture or ill-treatment.
HRMMU 15 June 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine and other stakeholders:
􀂾 All armed groups must immediately put an end to their violent activities and lay down their arms.
To the authorities in Crimea and the de facto governing authority of the Russian Federation:
􀂾 Intimidation, harassment and abductions of residents must stop, with guarantees ensured for the
respect for the right to life, liberty and security.
Right to life – excessive use of force
UPR Recommendations (2012)
􀂾 In the realm of the new Criminal Procedure Code, establish an independent mechanism for the
investigation of alleged cases of torture by officers of law enforcement agencies independent
from the Ministry of the Interior and the Prosecutor’s Office.
􀂾 Further strengthening of the judiciary by investigating all allegations of human rights violations by
law enforcement officers and the police.
HRMMU 15 June 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine and other stakeholders:
􀂾 The Government must ensure that its armed forces refrain from using excessive force, and
ensure that its on-going security operations are at all times in line with the relevant international
standards applicable to different types of operations. In all circumstances, it must ensure the
protection of those who are not involved in the fighting.
Arbitrary arrest and detention
UPR Recommendations (2012)
􀂾 Additionally, bring conditions of detention in line with international standards and ensure respect
for the judicial guarantees of detainees.
􀂾 Strengthen the effectiveness and the independence of the mechanisms to supervise the
observance of human rights of the inmates and the persons under police custody with the aim of
preventing ill-treatment.
􀂾 Ensure non-selective prosecutions on its territory.
􀂾 Ensure that the new Criminal Procedure Code respects the human rights of those held in
custody.
49
HRMMU 15 April 2014 Report
To the authorities in Crimea:
􀂾 Publicly condemn all attacks or harassment against human rights defenders, journalists or any
members of the political opposition; and ensure full accountability for such acts, including
arbitrary arrests and detentions, killings, torture and ill-treatment, through prompt, impartial and
effective investigations and prosecutions.
􀂾 Take all measures to ensure that the human rights of Ukrainian soldiers based in Crimea are also
fully respected.
􀂾 Take all needed measures to protect the rights of persons affected by the changing institutional
and legal framework, including on issues related to access to citizenship, right of residence,
labour rights, property and land rights, access to health and education.
HRMMU 15 May 2014 Report
To the authorities in Crimea:
􀂾 Reaffirming UN General Assembly resolution 68/262, entitled “Territorial integrity of Ukraine”,
measures must be taken to protect the rights of persons affected by the changing institutional
and legal framework, including on issues related to citizenship, right of residence, labour rights,
property and land rights, access to health and education.
HRMMU 15 June 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine and other stakeholders:
􀂾 All people detained in the context of the security operations should be treated in line with
international norms and standards and guaranteed their human rights under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other applicable bodies of international law. In order to
protect its security personnel and persons not involved in the fighting, the Government should
consider providing assurances that acts of abduction and detention by armed groups will not be
prosecuted provided that they do not target people not involved in the fighting and the victims are
treated humanely at all times.
Theme 3: Corruption
CESCR (2014)
􀂾 The State party should, as a matter of priority, address the root causes of corruption and adopt
all necessary legislative and policy measures to effectively combat corruption and related
impunity and ensure that public affairs, in law and in practice, are conducted in a transparent
manner. It also recommends that the State party make politicians, members of parliament and
national and local government officials aware of the economic and social costs of corruption, and
make judges, prosecutors and the police aware of the need for strict enforcement of the law.
HRMMU 15 April 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine:
􀂾 Put in place, as a matter of priority, all legislative and policy measures needed to effectively
eradicate corruption.
Theme 4: Equality and Non-Discrimination
Treaty Bodies
􀂾 The HR Committee (2013) recommended the State party to further improve its anti-discrimination
legislation to ensure adequate protection against discrimination in line with the Covenant and
other international human rights standards. The Committee noted that Government should
50
explicitly list sexual orientation and gender identity among the prohibited grounds for
discrimination and provide victims of discrimination with effective and appropriate remedies.
􀂾 The HR Committee urged the Government to state clearly and officially that it does not tolerate
any form of social stigmatization of homosexuality, bisexuality or trans-sexuality, or hate speech,
discrimination or violence against persons because of their sexual orientation or gender identity.
􀂾 The HR Committee urged that State party to strengthen its efforts to combat hate speech and
racist attacks, by, inter alia, instituting awareness-raising campaigns aimed at promoting respect
for human rights and tolerance for diversity. The State party should also step up its efforts to
ensure that alleged hate crimes are thoroughly investigated, that perpetrators are prosecuted
under article 161 of the Criminal Code and, if convicted, punished with appropriate sanctions,
and that victims are adequately compensated.
􀂾 CERD (2011) urged Ukraine to accelerate the adoption of an anti-discrimination act stipulating
the definition of direct/indirect and de facto/de jure discrimination.
􀂾 CEDAW (2010) recommended that Ukraine implement temporary special measures, including
quotas, to achieve gender equality in areas where women are underrepresented or
disadvantaged and for women suffering from multiple forms of discrimination, such as Roma
women.
􀂾 CEDAW called upon Ukraine to amend the Equal Rights and Opportunities Act to strengthen the
complaints and sanctions mechanisms and to bring the definition of discrimination against
women into conformity with the Convention, by encompassing both direct and indirect
discrimination. CEDAW recommended that Ukraine strengthen the national mechanism for the
advancement of women by raising its authority and provide it with adequate resources. CEDAW
also encouraged Ukraine to adopt a national plan of action with a comprehensive approach to
gender equality and to allocate sufficient resources for its implementation.
􀂾 Noting the adoption of the Plan of Action to Combat Xenophobia and Racial and Ethnic
Discrimination (2010-2012), CERD (2011) recommended that Ukraine establish institutional
mechanisms to counter racial discrimination and re-activate institutions which had ceased to be
operational, particularly the Inter-departmental Working Group against Xenophobia and Ethnic
and Racial Intolerance. Furthermore, it recommended that Ukraine mandate the Parliamentary
Commissioner for Human Rights with specific competence in the field of racial discrimination, in
particular to process complaints and take measures in response to the victims’ concerns of racial
discrimination and ensure their access to the Commissioner’s Office at the regional, district and
municipal levels.
􀂾 CERD recommended that Ukraine establish civil and administrative liability for racial
discrimination, including hateful opinions spread by the media and guarantee remedies and
compensation to victims. CERD urged Ukraine to: investigate hate crimes; ensure that the police
do not engage in racial or ethnic profiling and bring perpetrators to justice.
􀂾 CERD strongly recommended that the State party closely monitor the activities of extremist
organizations, and adopt legal and policy measures with the aim of preventing their registration
and disbanding their activities, as necessary, and ensuring the protection of foreigners and
members of “visible minorities” against all acts of violence.
􀂾 CRC (2011) urged Ukraine to ensure that all children enjoy their rights without discrimination on
any ground.
􀂾 The HR Committee (2013) recommended the State party to strengthen its efforts to combat hate
speech and racist attacks, by, inter alia, instituting awareness-raising campaigns aimed at
promoting respect for human rights and tolerance for diversity. The State party should also step
up its efforts to ensure that alleged hate crimes are thoroughly investigated, that perpetrators are
prosecuted under article 161 of the Criminal Code and, if convicted, punished with appropriate
sanctions, and that victims are adequately compensated.
51
Anti-discrimination legal framework
CESCR (2014)
The State party should expedite the adoption of amendments to its anti-discrimination legislation to
ensure adequate protection against discrimination in line with article 2(2) of the Covenant, taking also
into account the Committee’s general comment No. 20 (2009) on non-discrimination in economic,
social and cultural rights, inter alia by:
(a) explicitly including all the prohibited grounds for discrimination listed in article 2(2) of the
Covenant in its comprehensive anti-discrimination law;
(b) bringing the definitions of direct and indirect discrimination in line with the State party’s
obligations under the Covenant;
(c) prohibiting discrimination in both public and private spheres;
(d) providing for a reversal of the burden of proof in civil proceedings;
(e) adding provisions for access to redress in cases of discrimination, including through judicial and
administrative procedures, and providing for effective and appropriate remedies for victims of
discrimination.
Discrimination against Roma
The CESCR (2014) requests the State party to step up its efforts in combating discrimination against
Roma with a view to giving full effect to their Covenant rights in practice and, to this end:
(a) collect statistical data, on the basis of voluntary self-identification, on the number of Roma living in the
country and on their situation in the areas of employment, social security, housing, healthcare and
education with a view to formulating, implementing and monitoring targeted and co-ordinated
programmes and policies at national and regional levels aimed at improving their socio-economic
situation;
(b) simplify the procedure and remove existing obstacles to ensure that all Roma are provided with
personal documents, including birth certificates, which are necessary for the enjoyment of their rights
under the Covenant;
(c) ensure that the Action Plan for Roma provides for concrete measures aimed at addressing the
problems faced by Roma in accessing employment, social security, housing, healthcare and
education;
(d) establish quantitative and qualitative indicators to monitor the implementation of the Action Plan
nationwide and provide adequate financial resources for its effective implementation.
Discrimination against Crimean Tatars
􀂾 The State party should take measures to further improve the situation of Crimean Tatars and
ensure their de facto access to employment, housing, health care, social services and education.
Gender pay gap
The CESCR recommends that the State party, taking into account the Committee’s general comment No.
16 (2005) on the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural
rights:
(a) take steps to eliminate the persistent gender pay gap by combating vertical and horizontal segregation
in employment that results in women occupying lower paid jobs and facing obstacles in the enjoyment
of career opportunities on an equal footing with men;
(b) take measures to change society’s perception of gender roles, including through awareness-raising
campaigns on shared family responsibilities for men and women and about equal career opportunities
as a result of education and training in fields other than those traditionally dominated by either sex.
52
Special Procedures
􀂾 The Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression (2008) urged Ukraine to take action to thwart
the wave of racist violence.
UPR Recommendations (2012)
􀂾 Adopt a comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that would include also a definition of direct
and indirect discrimination and a comprehensive list of grounds for discrimination.
􀂾 Enact legislation which clearly prohibits child prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation,
consistently with the international obligations undertaken by the country, bearing in mind that the
Lanzarote Convention will enter into force as regards Ukraine on 1 December 2012.
􀂾 Adopt a comprehensive anti-discrimination law that addresses the worrying trend of incidents
based on gender, sexual orientation, racial and ethnic discrimination.
􀂾 Step up efforts to strengthen the national mechanism for the advancement of women and to
provide such mechanism with adequate resources.
􀂾 Take further measures against racism and extremism and encourage peaceful co-existence
between different ethnic groups.
􀂾 Continue moving forward with the adoption of effective measures that promote tolerance and
respect for foreigners and members of national, racial and ethnic minorities.
􀂾 Continue the promotion of the rights of national minorities, as well as governmental policy on
combating discrimination.
􀂾 Remove from the legislation discriminatory provisions based on race, sex or sexual orientation,
and adopt comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation.
􀂾 Continue its effort to combat discrimination and promote equality in accordance with international
treaties establishing guarantees of fundamental human rights and freedoms, and equality in the
enjoyment of such rights, without privileges or restrictions based on race, colour, political,
religious or other belief, gender, sexual orientation, ethnic or social origin, property status, place
of residence, language or other grounds.
􀂾 Take more effective procedures to counter discrimination and xenophobia.
􀂾 Continue efforts to combat different forms of discrimination and ensure respect for the rights of
ethnic minorities.
􀂾 Take further measures against racism and extremism and encourage peaceful co-existence
between different ethnic groups.
􀂾 Continue moving forward with the adoption of effective measures that promote tolerance and
respect for foreigners and members of national, racial and ethnic minorities.
􀂾 In line with the observation made by CERD, ensure proper investigation and continue its actions
to stop hate crimes.
􀂾 Continue its efforts to combat discrimination and ensure that manifestations of racial, ethnic and
religious hatred are promptly investigated and acted upon accordingly; and in this regard,
intensify its efforts in enacting anti-discrimination laws.
􀂾 Intensify its efforts to fight hate crimes and encourage senior State officials to take a clear
position against these crimes and to publicly condemn racist acts of violence and other offences
motivated by hatred.
􀂾 Further pursue its efforts to create appropriate institutional mechanisms to counter all forms of
discrimination and further pursue its efforts to provide human rights training for police personnel
to effectively fight hate crimes.
􀂾 Respect its international commitments on fundamental rights related to non-discrimination,
prevent the adoption of a law prohibiting freedom of expression with regards to homosexuality
and raise awareness of civil society on combating all forms of discrimination, including
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
53
􀂾 Study the possibility of expanding measures to combat discrimination, especially in the case of
children with disabilities and HIV.
􀂾 In line with the observation made by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
ensure proper investigation and continue its actions to stop hate crimes.
􀂾 Intensify its efforts to fight hate crimes and encourage senior State officials to take a clear
position against these crimes, and publicly condemn racist acts of violence and other offences
motivated by hatred.
Theme 5: Minorities and Indigenous Peoples
Treaty Bodies
􀂾 CERD (2011) urged Ukraine to adopt special measures to preserve the language, culture,
religious specificities and traditions of those communities.
􀂾 CERD recommended that Ukraine ensure the restoration of political, social and economic rights
of Tatars in the Crimea, in particular the restitution of property.
􀂾 CERD recommended that Ukraine provide education to Roma children, and on Roma language
and culture.
􀂾 CERD urged Ukraine to issue identification documents to all Roma to facilitate their access to the
courts, legal aid, employment, housing, health care, social security, education and other public
services. CRC made similar observations.
􀂾 CERD recommended that Ukraine respect the right of persons and peoples to self-identification
and consider the issue of the Ruthenians’ status, in consultation with their representatives.
􀂾 CERD urged Ukraine to adopt legislation to protect indigenous peoples and guarantee their
economic, cultural and social development.
CESCR (2014)
Linguistic rights of national or ethnic minorities
􀂾 The Committee recommends that the State party ensure the meaningful and comprehensive
participation of concerned minorities in the process of drafting the new language law with a view
to giving expression to the linguistic diversity of different minorities. It should further ensure that
the revised law conforms to the relevant international and regional standards for the protection of
the linguistic rights of national or ethnic minorities.
Cultural rights of Crimean Tatars
􀂾 The Committee recommends that the State party, taking into account the Committee’s general
comment no. 21 (2009) on the right of everyone to take part in cultural life, strengthen the
measures aimed at ensuring favourable conditions for Crimean Tatars to preserve, develop and
promote their identity, language and culture, inter alia by providing adequate financial support to
cultural organizations for their activities and creating more opportunities for Crimean Tatars to
promote and use their mother tongue in education and daily life.
UPR Recommendations (2012)
􀂾 Continue efforts to combat different forms of discrimination and ensure respect for the rights of
ethnic minorities.
􀂾 Take further measures against racism and extremism and encourage peaceful co-existence
between different ethnic groups.
􀂾 Continue moving forward with the adoption of effective measures that promote tolerance and
respect for foreigners and members of national, racial and ethnic minorities.
􀂾 Continue the promotion of the rights of national minorities, as well as governmental policy on
combating discrimination.
54
􀂾 Take further steps to promote education in the languages of the national minorities, including in
the areas where the number of students may be decreasing.
􀂾 Further ensure, in a sustainable way, the education in minority languages.
􀂾 Further improve the situation pertaining to minority issues, especially in the social and economic
fields for the disadvantaged groups, and promote equal opportunities for them to have access to
education and other related sectors at all levels.
􀂾 That no effort be spared for the improvement of the current status and living conditions of the
Crimean Tatars along with the other minorities.
􀂾 Take further action in ensuring and preserving the political, economic, social and cultural rights of
the Crimean Tatars, which would also be conducive to better inter-communal relations.
􀂾 Further improve the situation pertaining to minority issues, especially in the social and economic
fields for the disadvantaged groups, and promote equal opportunities for them to have access to
education and other related sectors at all levels.
􀂾 Take further steps to promote education in the languages of the national minorities, including in
the areas where the number of students may be decreasing.
􀂾 Further ensure, in a sustainable way, the education in minority languages.
HRMMU 15 April 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine:
􀂾 Ensure that legislation on minorities, in particular on linguistic rights, is adopted following full
consultation of all minorities concerned and according to relevant international and regional
human rights standards.
To the authorities in Crimea:
􀂾 Ensure the protection of the rights of all minorities and indigenous peoples in Crimea, in
particular Crimean Tatars.
HRMMU 15 May 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine:
􀂾 The announced national consultations on the discussion of the amendments to the Constitution
of Ukraine on the decentralization of state powers should be advanced in accordance with the
principle of equal inclusion of all, including national minorities and representatives of civil society,
and ensuring equal role for women. A system of checks and balances should be fully provided. If
conducted in a broad, consultative and inclusive manner, this may be a positive step leading to
the de-escalation of tensions and genuine national reconciliation.
􀂾 The adoption of measures, including making official public commitments on minority protection
and ensuring participatory and inclusive processes in public and political life - reassuring all
members of minorities regarding respect for their right to life, equality, political participation in
public affairs and public life, as well as their cultural and linguistic rights would significantly ease
tensions within the Ukrainian society.
To the authorities in Crimea:
􀂾 All acts of discrimination and harassment towards members of minorities and indigenous peoples
– in particular Crimean Tatars – and other residents who did not support the “referendum” must
come to an end, and all their human rights must be guaranteed.
HRMMU 15 June 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine and other stakeholders:
􀂾 A language law should be adopted in line with international standards that enable the promotion
of the official national language as well as other languages.
55
To the authorities in Crimea and the de facto governing authority of the Russian Federation:
􀂾 The promotion and protection of the rights of national minorities, including the Crimean Tatars
and other indigenous peoples must be ensured, enabling them to participate fully and inclusively
in public and political life.
Theme 6: Right to participate in public and political life
Treaty Bodies
􀂾 CEDAW (2010) urged Ukraine to increase the representation of women in elected and appointed
bodies through, inter alia, the implementation of temporary special measures.
UPR Recommendations (2012)
􀂾 Take appropriate measures aimed at increasing the number of women in decision-making
positions as well as address the issue of a persisting wage gap between men and women;
HRMMU 15 April 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine:
􀂾 Ensure inclusivity and equal participation of all in public affairs and political life, including
members of all minorities and indigenous peoples and establish a mechanism to facilitate their
participation.
HRMMU 15 June 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine and other stakeholders:
􀂾 There should be constitutional inclusive and meaningful consultations with all political parties,
regardless of their ideology, as well as representatives of civil society and minority (national and
ethnic, linguistic, religious and other) groups and indigenous peoples in order to embrace all
components of society, including women in the dialogue for the new constitution, which will
reflect the new reality of the country with a full-fledged system of checks and balances. The
peaceful population of the east should participate in these consultations.
Theme 7: Freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly
Treaty Bodies
􀂾 Concerned about the lack of a domestic legal framework regulating peaceful events, the HR
Committee (2013) urged Ukraine to adopt a law regulating freedom of assembly, imposing only
restriction that are in compliance with the strict requirements of article 21 of the Covenant.
􀂾 HR Committee recommended that State party ensure that journalists, human rights defenders
and individuals are able to freely exercise their right to freedom of expression, in accordance with
article 19 of the Covenant and the Committee’s general comment No. 34 (2011) on the freedoms
of opinion and expression. Any restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression should
comply with the strict requirements of article 19, paragraph 3, of the Covenant. Furthermore, the
State party should ensure that acts of aggression, threats and intimidation against journalists are
investigated, prosecuted and punished and victims provided with appropriate remedies.
􀂾 HR Committee urged the State party to ensure that individuals fully enjoy their right to freedom of
assembly. The State party should adopt a law regulating the freedom of assembly, imposing only
restrictions that are in compliance with the strict requirements of article 21 of the Covenant.
Special Procedures
􀂾 The Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression (2008) urged Ukraine to guarantee that crimes
against media professionals and opinion-makers will not go unpunished. The Special Rapporteur
also called for a broad and comprehensive revision of media legislation, especially on TV and
56
radio broadcasting, to increase TV and radio broadcasting bodies’ independence from political
lobbies.
􀂾 The Special Rapporteur urged Ukraine to ensure that human rights defenders do not face
harassment or discrimination and to create a safe environment conducive to their work.
UPR Recommendations (2012)
􀂾 Further promote freedom and pluralism of the media as key elements for enabling the exercise of
freedom of expression.
􀂾 Create an enabling environment for journalists and media professionals and ensure fully
transparent and impartial investigation and prosecution in all cases of attacks against them.
􀂾 Further develop measures to fully guarantee freedom of expression, particularly the protection of
the integrity of persons working in the media in the exercise of that right.
􀂾 Ensure better protection of journalists and combat abuse and violence to which they are subject.
􀂾 Pursue measures against State organs which attempt to limit media and journalists.
􀂾 Implement a law on freedom of assembly that complies with applicable standards under article
21 of the ICCPR.
􀂾 Adopt a law on bar association that recognizes the right of the bar to self-government and
guarantees a proper representativeness by regular elections and regional representation.
HRMMU 15 April 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine:
􀂾 Adopt legislation and other measures needed to ensure the right to peaceful assembly in
compliance with the requirements of article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. In particular, ensure that the principles of necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination
and accountability underpin any use of force for the management of peaceful assemblies.
􀂾 Prevent media manipulation by ensuring the dissemination of timely and accurate information.
Take action against deliberate manipulation of information, in compliance with international
standards of freedom of expression and in full respect of due process guarantees.
􀂾 Combat intolerance and extremism and take all measures needed to prevent advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence and punish such incitement or acts of violence, which is of fundamental importance. A
careful balancing act must however be maintained, with fully respecting the right to freedom of
expression.
􀂾 Take resolute steps to prevent negative stereotyping of minority communities in the media, while
fully respecting the freedom of the press. Efforts to train media professionals must be increased,
including by further promoting the visibility and effectiveness of the work of the national union of
journalists in this regard.
􀂾 Review legislation and policies applicable to the management of peaceful assemblies, and if
necessary, modify them to ensure their compliance with human rights standards. In particular,
these should specify that the principles of necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination and
accountability underpin any use of force for the management. In this regard, particular attention
should be paid to the 1990 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials.
To the authorities in Crimea:
􀂾 Investigate all allegations of hate speech and media manipulation, and take appropriate
measures to prevent them and take appropriate sanctions while fully ensuring and strengthening
freedom of expression.
HRMMU 15 May 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine:
57
􀂾 Primarily as a result of the actions of organised armed groups, the continuation of the rhetoric of
hatred and propaganda fuels the escalation of the crisis in Ukraine, with a potential of spiralling
out of control. Acts of hate speech must be publicly condemned and deterred. Political leaders
should refrain from using messages of intolerance or expressions which may incite violence,
hostility or discrimination; but they also have a crucial role to play in speaking out firmly and
promptly against intolerance, discriminatory stereotyping and instances of hate speech.
􀂾 There are increasing reports of harassment and intimidation of journalists. These should be
investigated and addressed in order to ensure accountability and protect fundamental human
rights and freedoms. Freedom of expression must be ensured allowing journalists the space and
security to carry out their work objectively.
To the authorities in Crimea:
􀂾 At variance with UN General Assembly resolution 68/262, the legislation of the Russian
Federation is being enforced on the territory. In addition, its differences in comparison with
Ukrainian laws already have and will continue having serious implications for the enjoyment of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression and media as well as
freedoms of peaceful assembly, association and religion.
HRMMU 15 June 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine and other stakeholders:
􀂾 All stakeholders should refrain from using messages of intolerance or expressions, which may
incite hatred, violence, hostility, discrimination or radicalisation.
To the authorities in Crimea and the de facto governing authority of the Russian Federation:
􀂾 Journalists, human rights defenders and individuals must be able to fully exercise their right to
freedom of expression, in accordance with Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
Theme 8: Freedom of Movement
HRMMU 15 June 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine and other stakeholders:
􀂾 Normative acts to ensure freedom of movement for residents of Crimea should be enacted as
soon as possible.
Theme 9: Freedom of Religion or Belief
HRMMU 15 June 2014 Report
To the authorities in Crimea and the de facto governing authority of the Russian Federation:
􀂾 All forms of intimidation and harassment of religious communities must be put to an end and all
incidents, including those where there have been attacks on Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Greek
Catholic Church and the Muslim community must be properly investigated, thus enabling the
effective promotion and protection of the freedom of religion or belief.
Theme 10: Right to health
Treaty Bodies
􀂾 CRC (2011) recommended that Ukraine develop specialized youth-friendly drug-dependence
treatment and harm-reduction services, ensure that criminal laws do not impede access to such
services and address root causes of substance use and abuse among children and youth.
58
CESCR (2014)
Health insurance system
􀂾 The State party should expedite the process of establishing a mandatory national health
insurance system in the context of ensuring a sustainable public social security system without
prejudice to maintaining the guaranteed universal health care services provided free of charge.
Health care system
The Committee recommends to the State party to:
(a) progressively increase the health care expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP)
with a view to giving practical expression to its obligation in fulfilling the right to health under the
Covenant and the State party’s Constitution;
(b) take measures to further improve the infrastructure of the primary health care system, including
dental care;
(c) take concrete measures to address the problem of the high health care costs, the shortage of certain
drugs and the limited availability of health care services, especially in rural areas, in order to ensure
de facto access to affordable, quality and timely health care and medical treatment for all segments
of the population, including disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups;
(d) reverse the current negative trend in vaccination coverage.
Mortality rates
􀂾 The Committee recommends that the State party step up its efforts with a view to further
reducing the high rate of infant, child and maternal mortality, including by improving the quality,
availability and accessibility of medical assistance throughout the country.
Access to emergency medical care for asylum-seekers
􀂾 The Committee recommends that the State party take all the necessary measures to guarantee
that asylum-seekers have full access to free emergency medical assistance.
HIV/AIDS
The State party should continue its efforts to prevent and combat HIV/AIDS, including through the
effective implementation of the National HIV/AIDS Programme 2014–2018, inter alia by:
(a) enhancing its national preventive strategy, including its awareness-raising activities, taking into
account the spread of HIV infection beyond the original risk groups and providing adequate funding
for its prevention activities, including for needle and syringe exchange (NSE) programmes;
(b) improving the coverage of adequate confidential testing throughout the country;
(c) enhancing its counselling and referral services;
(d) addressing shortages of antiretroviral drugs;
(e) providing for access to adequate laboratory monitoring for HIV-infected persons;
(f) progressively increasing the antiretroviral therapy coverage, including by considering the introduction
of generic-based antiretroviral drugs.
Tuberculosis
The Committee recommends that the State party step up its measures with a view to improving its
policies and strategies for disease prevention and detection, ensuring sufficiency and accessibility of
specialized tuberculosis treatment and medication and adequate service delivery for patients at the
primary health care level.
59
Drug use
The Committee recommends that the State party adopt a human rights-based approach in addressing
the problem of drug use, including by:
(a) conducting awareness-raising programmes about the serious health risks associated with drug use;
(b) addressing the discrimination against drug dependent persons;
(c) providing appropriate health-care, psychological support services and rehabilitation to such persons,
including effective drug dependence treatment such as opioid substitution therapy (OST);
(d) allocating financial resources for the proper operation of opioid substitution therapy (OST) and
needle and syringe exchange (NSE) programmes and increasing their coverage, ensuring inter alia
better access to such programmes in prison settings.
UPR Recommendations (2012)
􀂾 Continue to implement measures and programmes to promote and protect the rights of children,
in particular the right to education and the right to health.
􀂾 Take effective measures to increase budgetary allocation to the health sector.
􀂾 Continue to develop the national health sector, with special focus on access to health for poorer
segments of the population.
􀂾 Adopt effective measures to ensure access of all categories of citizens to treatment and
prevention of HIV.
􀂾 Take steps to reverse the negative trend of the decrease in vaccination coverage in Ukraine.
Theme 11: Right to social security and to an adequate standard of living
Treaty Bodies
􀂾 CEDAW (2010) recommended that Ukraine use a gender-sensitive approach in all poverty
alleviation programmes.
􀂾 CRC (2011) recommended that Ukraine ensure that poverty reduction reforms focus on social
assistance and benefit to low-income families and on child protection. It urged Ukraine to address
poverty in families with children in the Poverty Reduction and Prevention Programme.
CESCR (2014)
Unemployment
The Committee recommends that the State party step up its efforts to further reduce unemployment, in
particular youth unemployment and unemployment among persons with disabilities, Roma and
Crimean Tatars, including by:
(a) maintaining the incentives for employers who create new jobs for individuals who have been
unemployed for at least two years, including persons who have difficulty competing on the job
market, and ensuring that individuals so employed retain their jobs when such incentives are no
longer offered;
(b) reviewing the vocational education and training system to ensure it reflects the current labour
market demands;
(c) taking specifically targeted measures aimed at reducing youth unemployment;
(d) ensuring effective compliance by public and private companies and institutions with the 4 per cent
quota accorded to persons with disabilities, including by providing for dissuasive sanctions for
employers in case of non-compliance;
(e) ensuring equality of opportunity and treatment in employment for Roma and Crimean Tatars and
providing for sustainable income-generating opportunities, including by enhancing their skills
training.
60
Employment in the informal economy
􀂾 The Committee recommends that the State party take all appropriate measures with a view to
achieving the progressive reduction of the level of informal employment and access of persons
employed in the informal economy to basic services, social protection and other Covenant rights.
It also recommends that the State party systematically include the informal sector in the
operations of the labour inspection services, deal with regulatory obstacles to job creation in the
formal economy, and raise public awareness of the fact that labour rights and social protection
apply to the informal economy.
Wage arrears
The State party should step up measures to address the problem of wage arrears, including by:
(a) ensuring effective monitoring of the payment of wages;
(b) providing for appropriate and dissuasive sanctions in case of violations;
(c) ensuring that a wage guarantee institution is in place in order for workers to secure payment of their
wages when such payment cannot be made by the employer due to insolvency;
(d) ensuring that mechanisms of redress provide not only for the full payment of the overdue amounts,
but also for fair compensation for the losses incurred on account of delayed payment.
Social security
􀂾 The State party should take measures to progressively bring its State social standards in line with
its core obligations under articles 7, 9 and 11 of the Covenant and progressively increase their
amounts.
Poverty
􀂾 The Committee draws the State party’s attention to its statement concerning Poverty and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (E/C.12/2001/10) and
recommends that the State party strengthen its efforts to combat poverty, with a particular focus
on most disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups, and reduce the disparities
between rural and urban areas. The State party should guarantee that its social assistance
system is effectively targeting the poor and ensure that adequate financial resources are
allocated for the effective implementation of poverty reduction programmes and that these are
adjusted accordingly when measures taken do not bring the expected positive impact.
UPR Recommendations (2012)
􀂾 Further strengthen a gender-sensitive approach in all poverty alleviation programmes.
􀂾 Use a gender sensitive approach in all poverty alleviation programmes.
Theme 12: Right to adequate housing and right to food
Treaty Bodies
CESCR (2014)
Right to adequate housing and right to food
The State party should, taking into account Committee’s general comment no. 4 (1991) on the right to
adequate housing, adopt all appropriate measures to ensure access to adequate housing for Roma,
inter alia by ensuring that adequate resources are allocated to increase the supply of social housing
units and by providing appropriate forms of financial support, such as rental subsidies. The Committee
also recommends that the State party take steps to ensure that Roma communities are consulted
throughout the eviction procedures, are afforded due process guarantees and are provided with
alternative accommodation or compensation enabling them to acquire adequate accommodation,
taking into account the guidelines adopted by the Committee in its general comment no. 7 (1997) on
61
forced evictions. The Committee further recommends that the State party take effective measures to
secure access to adequate housing and food for asylum-seekers.
Theme 13: Right to education
Treaty Bodies
􀂾 CRC (2011) recommended that Ukraine ensure adequate funding for the public education
system; improve availability, accessibility and the quality of general education in rural areas; and
seek assistance from UNICEF and UNESCO.
􀂾 CRC urged Ukraine to develop a national plan of action for human rights education.
CESCR (2014)
Inclusive education for Roma
􀂾 The Committee recommends that the State party address the segregation of Roma children in
schools and their overrepresentation in special educations schools by ensuring the effective
enforcement of its anti-discrimination legislation and by raising teachers’ and the general public
awareness of these laws. It further recommends that the State party adopt an inclusive approach
to the education of Roma children.
UPR Recommendations (2012)
􀂾 Continue to implement measures and programmes to promote and protect the rights of children,
in particular the right to education and the right to health.
􀂾 Ensure adequate funding for the public education system and improve the availability,
accessibility and quality of general education in rural areas.
􀂾 Take further steps to promote education in the languages of the national minorities, including in
the areas where the number of students may be decreasing.
􀂾 Further ensure, in a sustainable way, the education in minority languages.
􀂾 Further improve the situation pertaining to minority issues, especially in the social and economic
fields for the disadvantaged groups, and promote equal opportunities for them to have access to
education and other related sectors at all levels.
Theme 14: Cooperation with UN mechanisms
Treaty Bodies
􀂾 HR Committee (2013). The State party should reconsider its position in relation to Views adopted
by the Committee under the First Optional Protocol. It should take all necessary measures to
establish mechanisms and appropriate procedures, including the possibility of reopening cases,
reducing prison sentences and granting ex gratia compensation, to give full effect to the
Committee’s Views so as to guarantee an effective remedy when there has been a violation of
the Covenant, in accordance with article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant.
HRMMU 15 April 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine:
􀂾 Closely cooperate with the HRMMU and act upon its recommendations and steps needed to
provide protection for persons at risk.
􀂾 Enhance cooperation with the UN human rights system, including collaboration with OHCHR, in
particular through the recently deployed United Nations HRMMU.
To the authorities in Crimea:
62
􀂾 Actively resolve cases of missing persons, and grant access to places of detention, including the
military facilities and offices in Simferopol and Sevastopol, to all international organisations
requesting it.
􀂾 Grant access to independent and impartial human rights monitors, including by OHCHR.
HRMMU 15 May 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine:
􀂾 Welcome steps taken to support the establishment of the HRMMU and encourage further
cooperation in order to support the Government in addressing human rights concerns. OHCHR
assures the Government of its on-going support in its efforts to address human rights concerns in
line with international standards, and within the framework of the UN General Assembly
resolution 68/262 and the Geneva Agreement of 17 April 2014.
To the authorities in Crimea:
􀂾 Agree to the deployment of independent and impartial human rights monitors, including by the
HRMMU.
HRMMU 15 June 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine and other stakeholders:
􀂾 Access for international organisations to the areas affected in eastern Ukraine by the security
operations (urban areas in the epicentre of the fighting) should be facilitated so that the real
needs of the population can be assessed and addressed.
To the authorities in Crimea and the de facto governing authority of the Russian Federation:
􀂾 The deployment of independent and impartial human rights monitors, including by the HRMMU,
should be agreed upon.
Theme 15: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Treaty Bodies
CESCR (2014)
􀂾 The Committee reminds the State party of its obligation under the Covenant to respect, protect
and fulfil economic, social and cultural rights progressively, using the maximum resources
available to it. While acknowledging that certain adjustments are at times inevitable, the
Committee draws the attention of the State party to its open letter on economic, social and
cultural rights and austerity measures during economic and financial crisis, dated 16 May 2012,
which outlines the requirements that any proposed policy change or adjustment by States parties
in reaction to the economic crisis must meet. The State party should also ensure that any
measures adopted with a view to stabilizing the current economic situation do not
disproportionately affect the most disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups and do
not lead to lowering the existing social protection standards below the minimum core content as
well as that its obligations under the Covenant are duly taken into account when negotiating
financial assistance projects and programmes, including with international financial institutions
such as the International Monetary Fund.
􀂾 The Committee recommends that the State party establish a statistical data collection system to
assess the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights situation by disadvantaged and
marginalized individuals and groups, including but not limited to Crimean Tatars, persons with
disabilities, persons living with HIV/AIDS and non-citizens, with due respect for the principles of
confidentiality, informed consent and voluntary self-identification of persons as belonging to a
particular group.
63
HRMMU 15 April 2014 Report
􀂾 Take concrete steps to redress disparities in standards of living and equal access to and quality
of health, education, employment, and social support structures for all, including marginalised
communities throughout the country.
HRMMU 15 June 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine and other stakeholders:
􀂾 A central authority should be established to respond to the humanitarian needs of IDPs, including
by establishing a comprehensive registration system, formulation of legislative and regulatory
acts to ease access to important social and economic rights, establishing public assistance
programmes, mobilization and coordination of civil society-initiated relief efforts, and cooperation
with international donors and technical assistance.
Theme 16: Additional Human Rights Instruments
Treaty Bodies
􀂾 The HR Committee (2013) recommends that the State party provide the Office of the
Commissioner for Human Rights with additional financial and human resources commensurate
with its expanded role, to ensure fulfilment of its current mandated activities and to enable it to
carry out its new functions effectively. It should also establish regional offices of the
Commissioner for Human Rights, as planned.
CESCR Report 2014
􀂾 The Committee encourages the State party to sign and ratify the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Committee also
encourages the State party to consider signing and ratifying the Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families and the International Convention
for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, as well as the individual
complaint mechanisms under various core human rights treaties which the State party has not
accepted with a view to further strengthening the protection of human rights by providing rights
holders with additional opportunities to claim their rights at the international level when domestic
remedies have been exhausted.
􀂾 The Committee requests the State party to disseminate the present concluding observations
widely among all levels of society, particularly among government officials, members of the
Verkhovna Rada and judicial authorities, and to inform the Committee on all steps taken to
implement them in its next periodic report. It also encourages the State party to engage nongovernmental
organizations and other members of civil society in the process of discussion at the
national level prior to the submission of its next periodic report.
􀂾 The Committee invites the State party to submit its common core document in accordance with
the harmonized guidelines on a common core document (HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6, chap. I).
HRMMU 15 April 2014 Report
􀂾 Ratify international human rights instruments to which Ukraine is not yet party. These include, the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; the
international Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
their families; the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights; the third optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court; the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons; and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.
􀂾 Implement recommendations of international human rights mechanisms. The recommendations
and concerns expressed in the past few years by several human rights mechanisms continue to
64
be of relevance and should be taken into account by the authorities when considering various
reforms that will greatly impact on the protection of human rights for all people in Ukraine:
a. In particular, the UN Human Rights Committee issued several important recommendations in
July 2013 when it considered the latest periodic report of Ukraine on the implementation of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
b. The recommendations adopted by the UN Human Rights Council following the Universal
Periodic Review of the human rights situation in Ukraine in October 2012 should also be taken
into consideration.
c. The report of the UN Sub-Committee on the Prevention of Torture following its visit to Ukraine
in 2011 should be made public immediately and taken into consideration by the authorities
when considering issues related to torture, ill-treatment, and detention related matters.
d. Ukraine has issued a standing invitation to special procedures. It should accommodate
requests for such visits.
􀂾 Encourage the development of a national human rights action plan, with clear timelines and
benchmarks, addressing every recommendation resulting from the international and regional HR
systems to be implemented within a certain time-frame - with the support of the international
community, regional and bilateral actors, and the UN system.
HRMMU 15 June 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine and other stakeholders:
􀂾 The role and position of the Ombudsperson and National Preventive Mechanism, as the main
bodies / institutions working towards the strengthening of the national human rights system and
the protection and guarantee of human rights for all, should be enhanced.
Theme 17: Elections
HRMMU 15 June 2014 Report
To the Government of Ukraine and other stakeholders:
􀂾 As a representative body of the country, the Parliament should reflect the new political and social
reality of the country; therefore there is a need for new parliamentary elections.
65
Glossary
CAT – Committee Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
CCP – Criminal Code Procedure
CEDAW – Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
CERD – Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
CESCR – Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
CRC – Committee on the Rights of the Child
HRC – Human Rights Council
HR Committee – Human Rights Committee
HRMMU – Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine
ICCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IOM – International Organization for Migration
OHCHR – Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OPCAT – Optional Protocol on the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund
UPR – Universal Periodic Review
WGAD – Working Group on Arbitrary Detention

Annex 297
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2166, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2166, para. 11 (21 July 2014)

United Nations S/RES/2166 (2014)
Security Council
Distr.: General
21 July 2014
14-57995 (E)
*1457995*
Resolution 2166 (2014)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 7221st meeting, on
21 July 2014
The Security Council,
Deploring the downing of a civilian aircraft on an international flight,
Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, on 17 July in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine, with the loss
of all 298 passengers and crew on board,
Reaffirming the rules of international law that prohibit acts of violence that
pose a threat to the safety of international civil aviation and emphasizing the
importance of holding those responsible for violations of these rules to account,
Recalling its press statement of 18 July 2014,
Stressing the need for a full, thorough and independent international
investigation into the incident in accordance with international civil aviation
guidelines, noting in this regard the crucial role played by the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) in aircraft accident and incident investigations, and
welcoming the decision by ICAO to send a team to work in coordination with the
Ukrainian National Bureau of Incidents and Accidents Investigation of Civil Aircraft
in this investigation, following a request for assistance by Ukraine to ICAO and
others,
Expressing serious concern that armed groups in Ukraine have impeded
immediate, safe, secure and unrestricted access to the crash site and the surrounding
area for the appropriate investigating authorities, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine and
representatives of other relevant international organizations assisting the
investigation in accordance with ICAO and other established procedures,
1. Condemns in the strongest terms the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight
MH17 on 17 July in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine resulting in the tragic loss of
298 lives;
2. Reiterates its deepest sympathies and condolences to the families of the
victims of this incident and to the people and governments of the victims’ countries
of origin;
S/RES/2166 (2014)
2/2 14-57995
3. Supports efforts to establish a full, thorough and independent
international investigation into the incident in accordance with international civil
aviation guidelines;
4. Recognizes the efforts under way by Ukraine, working in coordination
with ICAO and other international experts and organizations, including
representatives of States of Occurrence, Registry, Operator, Design and
Manufacture, as well as States who have lost nationals on MH17, to institute an
international investigation of the incident, and calls on all States to provide any
requested assistance to civil and criminal investigations related to this incident;
5. Expresses grave concern at reports of insufficient and limited access to
the crash site;
6. Demands that the armed groups in control of the crash site and the
surrounding area refrain from any actions that may compromise the integrity of the
crash site, including by refraining from destroying, moving, or disturbing wreckage,
equipment, debris, personal belongings, or remains, and immediately provide safe,
secure, full and unrestricted access to the site and surrounding area for the
appropriate investigating authorities, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission and
representatives of other relevant international organizations according to ICA O and
other established procedures;
7. Demands that all military activities, including by armed groups, be
immediately ceased in the immediate area surrounding the crash site to allow for
security and safety of the international investigation;
8. Insists on the dignified, respectful and professional treatment and
recovery of the bodies of the victims, and calls upon all parties to ensure that this
happens with immediate effect;
9. Calls on all States and actors in the region to cooperate fully in relatio n
to the international investigation of the incident, including with respect to
immediate and unrestricted access to the crash site as referred to in paragraph 6;
10. Welcomes in this regard the statement on 17 July 2014 by the Trilateral
Contact Group of senior representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the
OSCE and demands that the commitments outlined in that statement be
implemented in full;
11. Demands that those responsible for this incident be held to account and
that all States cooperate fully with efforts to establish accountability;
12. Urges all parties to the Convention on International Civil Aviation to
observe to the fullest extent applicable, the international rules, standards and
practices concerning the safety of civil aviation, in order to prevent the recurrence
of such incidents, and demands that all States and other actors refrain from acts of
violence directed against civilian aircraft;
13. Welcomes the full cooperation of the United Nations offered by the
Secretary-General in this investigation, and requests the Secretary-General to
identify possible options for United Nations support to the investigation and to
report to the Security Council on relevant developments;
14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Annex 298
Statement to the Security Council by Ivan Šimonovi􀃼, Assistant Secretary-General for Human
Rights on the human rights situation in Ukraine (8 August 2014)

􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀁􀀄􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀁􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀁􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀆􀀁􀀍􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀑􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀒􀀋􀀆􀀏􀀓
􀀔􀀉􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀔􀀄􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀜􀀗􀀚􀀈􀀙􀀎􀀐􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀞􀀇􀀋􀀈
􀀟􀀎􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀗􀀇􀀎􀀠􀀡􀀖􀀢􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀔􀀄􀀙􀀛􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀛􀀑􀀣􀀤􀀄􀀈􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛
􀀦􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀧􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀚􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈
􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄
􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀖􀀪􀀗􀀛􀀩􀀡􀀖􀀫􀀖􀀢􀀚􀀌􀀚􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀬􀀭􀀮􀀯
􀀰􀀛􀀒􀀖􀀊􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀡􀀖
􀀍􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀚􀀎􀀆􀀘􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀰􀀄􀀕􀀝􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀔􀀄􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀜􀀗􀀚􀀈􀀙􀀎􀀐􀀡
􀀲􀀘􀀋􀀈􀀩􀀖􀀑􀀗􀀚􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀏􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀚􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀝􀀛􀀎􀀄􀀥􀀖􀀑􀀗􀀚􀀖􀀋􀀌􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀚􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀳􀀈
􀀬􀀫􀀖􀀴􀀚􀀐􀀑􀀡􀀖􀀳􀀦􀀜􀀦􀀧􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀚􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀚􀀛􀀉􀀘􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀘􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀨􀀃􀀖􀀦􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀧􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀰􀀗􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀰􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈
􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀡􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀎􀀙􀀘􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀎􀀗􀀱􀀖􀀥􀀛􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀫􀀖􀀴􀀚􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀮􀀵􀀖􀀴􀀚􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀬􀀭􀀮􀀯􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀗􀀱􀀋􀀑􀀡􀀖􀀞􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀐􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄
􀀛􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀶􀀆􀀖􀀩􀀄􀀑􀀖􀀥􀀎􀀈􀀱􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀞􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀙􀀚􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀋􀀏􀀎􀀱􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀎􀀗􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀚􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄
􀀙􀀗􀀚􀀈􀀉􀀛􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀇􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀖􀀚􀀏􀀱􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀮􀀵􀀖􀀴􀀚􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀬􀀭􀀮􀀯􀀒
􀀢􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀚􀀉􀀆􀀄􀀉􀀡􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀋􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀘􀀗􀀗􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀱􀀗􀀅􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀰􀀋􀀐􀀋􀀑􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀢􀀎􀀛􀀐􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀥􀀐􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀖􀀰􀀦􀀮􀀷􀀡􀀖􀀩􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀬􀀸􀀫
􀀏􀀄􀀗􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀡􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀎􀀙􀀘􀀖􀀗􀀙􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀛􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀮􀀷􀀖􀀴􀀚􀀐􀀑􀀡􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀆􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀗􀀚􀀛􀀖􀀚􀀈􀀋􀀈􀀎􀀕􀀗􀀚􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀛􀀛􀀗􀀅􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀆􀀑􀀕􀀏􀀋􀀉􀀘􀀑􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄
􀀇􀀎􀀙􀀉􀀎􀀕􀀆􀀶􀀖􀀥􀀋􀀕􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀚􀀛􀀖􀀗􀀚􀀉􀀛􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀹􀀘􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀱􀀗􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀋􀀑􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀉􀀚􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀛
􀀙􀀛􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀗􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀌􀀘􀀡􀀖􀀄􀀥􀀥􀀄􀀙􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀡􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀱􀀄􀀏􀀄􀀈􀀱􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀎􀀕􀀏􀀋􀀛􀀉􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀄􀀱􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀕􀀎􀀈􀀄
􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀋􀀙􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀙􀀎􀀛􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀙􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀙􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀅􀀖􀀚􀀈􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀅􀀋􀀑􀀡􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄
􀀃􀀄􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀐􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀗􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀱􀀡􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀱􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀚􀀛􀀝􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀛􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀇􀀗􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀚􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀛􀀋􀀆􀀘
􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀚􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀕􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀥􀀎􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀺􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀙􀀐􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄
􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀒􀀖􀀞􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀛􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀗􀀏􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄
􀀙􀀛􀀋􀀆􀀘􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀢􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀋􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀚􀀛􀀆􀀄􀀡􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀛􀀗􀀋􀀱􀀐􀀑􀀡􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀄􀀱􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀙􀀙􀀗􀀚􀀈􀀉􀀋􀀝􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛
􀀉􀀘􀀗􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀝􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀛􀀖􀀙􀀛􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀎􀀗􀀚􀀆􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀗􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀘􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀛􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀅􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱
􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀗􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀘􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀅􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀱􀀗􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀎􀀈􀀱􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀨􀀃􀀖􀀦􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀧􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆
􀀰􀀗􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀰􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀒
􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀍􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀩􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀻􀀚􀀘􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀩􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀉􀀛􀀄􀀕􀀄􀀐􀀑
􀀋􀀐􀀋􀀛􀀕􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀨􀀃􀀖􀀦􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀧􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀰􀀗􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀰􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀚􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀆􀀚􀀋􀀐􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱
􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀎􀀗􀀚􀀆􀀖􀀱􀀋􀀕􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀥􀀛􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀛􀀚􀀙􀀉􀀚􀀛􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀢􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀋􀀑􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀙􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀎􀀙􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀢􀀆􀀖􀀑􀀗􀀚
􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀅􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀡􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀥􀀎􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀙􀀐􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀄􀀥􀀥􀀄􀀙􀀉􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀮􀀭􀀖􀀱􀀋􀀑􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀥􀀛􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀬􀀭􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀼􀀭
􀀴􀀚􀀈􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀆􀀙􀀛􀀎􀀝􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀋􀀏􀀎􀀱􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀙􀀋􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀙􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀛􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀗􀀥
􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀙􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀥􀀎􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀽􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀎􀀙􀀘􀀡􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀗􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀮􀀭􀀭􀀖􀀉􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀞􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀋􀀏􀀎􀀱
􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀥􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀺􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀎􀀙􀀘􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀙􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀗􀀛􀀌􀀋􀀈􀀎􀀺􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀄􀀾􀀚􀀎􀀏􀀏􀀄􀀱
􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀘􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀋􀀇􀀑􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀋􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀛􀀑􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀎􀀛􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀙􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀕􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀛􀀑􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀘􀀎􀀏􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀙􀀐􀀚􀀱􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀝􀀚􀀉
􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀙􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀺􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀿􀀄􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀒
􀀮􀀁􀀵
􀀳􀀈􀀖􀀬􀀖􀀴􀀚􀀐􀀑􀀡􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀉􀀚􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀏􀀗􀀆􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀋􀀱􀀄􀀡􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀙􀀐􀀚􀀱􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀙􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀛􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀺􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀡􀀖􀀐􀀗􀀙􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀌􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀋􀀈􀀙􀀄
􀀆􀀉􀀛􀀚􀀙􀀉􀀚􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀇􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀚􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀚􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄
􀀕􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀙􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀆􀀏􀀄􀀋􀀩􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀏􀀚􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀚􀀈􀀉􀀛􀀑􀀒􀀖􀀰􀀄􀀋􀀈􀀅􀀘􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀡􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄
􀀘􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀚􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀎􀀗􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀌􀀈􀀎􀀥􀀎􀀙􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀙􀀩􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀻􀀚􀀘􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀩􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱
􀀍􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀩􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀎􀀙􀀘􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀛􀀗􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈
􀀚􀀈􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀉􀀋􀀩􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀗􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀒
􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀎􀀐􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀕􀀗􀀚􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀎􀀌􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀥􀀄􀀋􀀛􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀛􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀈􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀛􀀗􀀐􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄
􀀋􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀉􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀈􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀩􀀱􀀗􀀅􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀅􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀗􀀛􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥
􀀄􀀌􀀛􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀗􀀚􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀝􀀚􀀆􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀙􀀐􀀚􀀱􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀋􀀝􀀱􀀚􀀙􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀚􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀄􀀙􀀚􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈
􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀎􀀙􀀘􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀙􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀛􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀙􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀗􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀛􀀋􀀏􀀏􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀆
􀀘􀀗􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀰􀀗􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀚􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀖􀀱􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀉􀀄􀀙􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀈􀀗􀀙􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀗􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀝􀀛􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀏􀀄􀀉􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀆
􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀋􀀙􀀙􀀗􀀚􀀈􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀕􀀚􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀛􀀉􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀘􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀕􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀎􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀒
􀀔􀀎􀀈􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀢􀀏􀀛􀀎􀀐􀀡􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀸􀀬􀀯􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀗􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀝􀀱􀀚􀀙􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀙􀀐􀀚􀀱􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀫􀀮􀀮􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀙􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀡
􀁀􀀗􀀚􀀛􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀥􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀚􀀱􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀗􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀙􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀳􀀔􀀜􀀂􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀮􀀮􀀼
􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀇􀀎􀀙􀀄􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀡􀀖􀀕􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀛􀀑􀀖􀀝􀀗􀀛􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀌􀀚􀀋􀀛􀀱􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀗􀀈􀀈􀀄􀀐􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀱􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀎􀀌􀀚􀀛􀀄􀀆
􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀇􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀢􀀝􀀱􀀚􀀙􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀱􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀱􀀚􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀚􀀆􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀙􀀘􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀄
􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀙􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀥􀀛􀀄􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀕􀀝􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀁁􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀑􀀖􀀗􀀛
􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀉􀀑􀁁􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀚􀀛􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀝􀀗􀀚􀀛􀀖􀀽􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀱􀀎􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀙􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀝􀀋􀀛􀀛􀀎􀀙􀀋􀀱􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀙􀀐􀀗􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄
􀀄􀀏􀀎􀀙􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀗􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀙􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀔􀀗􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀇􀀚􀀐􀀈􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀝􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀚􀀙􀀘􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀘􀀖􀀦􀀞􀁂􀀖􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀱􀀛􀀚􀀌
􀀚􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀕􀀋􀀱􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀁃􀀅􀀗􀀛􀀩􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀎􀀛􀀖􀀌􀀚􀀎􀀐􀀉􀁄􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀝􀀗􀀚􀀛􀀖􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀥􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛
􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀄􀀩􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀛􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀧􀀄􀀙􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀑􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀛􀀗􀀐􀀖􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀥
􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀛􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀑􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀥􀀛􀀄􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀗􀀛
􀀛􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀌􀀘􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀌􀀗􀀉􀀎􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀝􀀚􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀵􀀖􀀢􀀚􀀌􀀚􀀆􀀉􀀡􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀝􀀗􀀚􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀯􀁅􀀵􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀗􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀕􀀋􀀎􀀈
􀀚􀀈􀀩􀀈􀀗􀀅􀀈􀀒
􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀚􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀙􀀘􀀎􀀐􀀱􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀥􀀥􀀄􀀙􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀥􀀐􀀎􀀙􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀏􀀋􀀛􀀉􀀎􀀙􀀚􀀐􀀋􀀛􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀅􀀗􀀛􀀛􀀑􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀾􀀚􀀎􀀛􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀛􀀄
􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀙􀀄􀀛􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀕􀀕􀀎􀀉􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀏􀀋􀀛􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀚􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀥􀀥􀀄􀀙􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀉􀀄􀀙􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀘􀀎􀀐􀀱􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀒
􀀹􀀘􀀎􀀐􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀄􀀕􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀝􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀥􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀚􀀈􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀉􀀋􀀩􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀋􀀙􀀚􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀘􀀎􀀐􀀱􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀥􀀛􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄
􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀙􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀱􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀳􀀕􀀝􀀚􀀱􀀆􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀗􀀈􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀝􀀗􀀚􀀉􀀖􀀼􀀭􀀭􀀖􀀙􀀘􀀎􀀐􀀱􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀕􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀎􀀈
􀀆􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀗􀀛􀀏􀀘􀀋􀀈􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀈􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀛􀀗􀀐􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀆􀀒􀀒􀀖􀀜􀀘􀀎􀀐􀀱􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀎􀀄􀀈􀀙􀀄
􀀆􀀏􀀄􀀙􀀎􀀥􀀎􀀙􀀖􀀇􀀚􀀐􀀈􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀝􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀓􀀉􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀋􀀝􀀱􀀚􀀙􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀋􀀉􀀉􀀄􀀕􀀏􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀝􀀱􀀚􀀙􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆
􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀚􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀿􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀋􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀮􀁅􀀖􀀙􀀘􀀎􀀐􀀱􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀖􀀙􀀘􀀋􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀗􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀛􀀄
􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀄􀀱􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀝􀀱􀀚􀀙􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀛􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀥􀀄􀀛􀀛􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀿􀀄􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀑􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀮􀀬􀀖􀀴􀀚􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀱
􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀉􀀚􀀛􀀈􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀋􀀙􀀩􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀮􀀼􀀖􀀴􀀚􀀈􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀞􀀖􀀋􀀕􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀙􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀄
􀀙􀀗􀀗􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀉􀀅􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀳􀀕􀀝􀀚􀀱􀀆􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀿􀀄􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀱
􀀆􀀚􀀙􀀙􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀥􀀚􀀐􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀥􀀋􀀙􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀋􀀥􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀉􀀚􀀛􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀘􀀎􀀐􀀱􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀒
􀀳􀀈􀀖􀀫􀀖􀀴􀀚􀀐􀀑􀀡􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀚􀀉􀀘􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀿􀀄􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀈􀀗􀀚􀀈􀀙􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀕􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀛􀀑
􀀏􀀎􀀐􀀗􀀉􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀱􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀄􀀣􀀉􀀛􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀙􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀿􀀄􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀅􀀗􀀚􀀐􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀘􀀋􀀛􀀌􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀘
􀀙􀀗􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀙􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀩􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀲􀁂􀀖􀁀􀀗􀀚􀀛􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀮􀀷􀀖􀀴􀀚􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀋􀀛􀀖􀀻􀀚􀀘􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀩􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀄
􀀙􀀎􀀛􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀙􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀏􀀉􀀚􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀛􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀐􀁆􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀚􀀉􀀘􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀆􀀘􀀄
􀀥􀀛􀀄􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀙􀀛􀀗􀀆􀀆􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀗􀀛􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀿􀀄􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀚􀀝􀀆􀀄􀀾􀀚􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀙􀀋􀀚􀀆􀀄
􀀆􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀱􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀖􀀱􀀗􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀕􀀋􀀆􀀾􀀚􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀱􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀥􀀚􀀌􀀄􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀆􀀋􀀑􀀆
􀀬􀀁􀀵
􀀆􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀝􀀱􀀚􀀙􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀻􀀚􀀘􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀩􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀋􀀩􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀿􀀄􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈
􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀗􀀛􀀱􀀎􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀙􀀛􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀇􀀎􀀙􀀄􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀜􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀚􀀐􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀆
􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀕􀀎􀀉􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀮􀁅􀀖􀀴􀀚􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀖􀀔􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀕􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀒
􀀿􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀏􀀚􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀙􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀚􀀐􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀋􀀇􀀑􀀖􀀐􀀗􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀥􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀑􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀌􀀈􀀎􀀥􀀎􀀙􀀋􀀈􀀉
􀀱􀀋􀀕􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀙􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀥􀀛􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀛􀀚􀀙􀀉􀀚􀀛􀀄􀀒􀀖􀁇􀀗􀀉􀀘􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀕􀀚􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀕􀀎􀀈􀀱􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀕􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀄
􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀙􀀉􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀋􀀩􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀄􀀙􀀋􀀚􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀎􀀱􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀋􀀉􀀘􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀎􀀈􀁀􀀚􀀛􀀑􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀙􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀆􀁆
􀀗􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀅􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀑􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀙􀀙􀀗􀀚􀀈􀀉􀀋􀀝􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀆􀀚􀀋􀀐􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀚􀀐􀀱􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀱
􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀨􀀃􀀖􀀦􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀧􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀰􀀗􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀰􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀹􀀗􀀛􀀐􀀱􀀖􀀦􀀄􀀋􀀐􀀉􀀘􀀖􀀳􀀛􀀌􀀋􀀈􀀎􀀺􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀕􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉
􀀝􀀄􀀉􀀅􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀥􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀕􀀎􀀱􀀣􀀢􀀏􀀛􀀎􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀷􀀖􀀢􀀚􀀌􀀚􀀆􀀉􀀡􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀮􀀡􀀵􀀯􀀼􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀗􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈
􀀩􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀡􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀙􀀐􀀚􀀱􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀙􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀛􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀕􀀝􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀯􀀡􀀼􀀸􀁅
􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀥􀀎􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀅􀀗􀀚􀀈􀀱􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀽􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀚􀀕􀀝􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀩􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀚􀀙􀀘􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀒
􀀔􀀗􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀱􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀙􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀗􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀈􀀈􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀉􀀚􀀛􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄
􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀛􀀗􀀐􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀨􀀃􀀖􀀦􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀧􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀰􀀗􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀰􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀱
􀀔􀀐􀀗􀀇􀀑􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀩􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀛􀀐􀀎􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀄􀀩􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀞􀀖􀀋􀀕􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀥􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀙􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀉􀀚􀀛􀀈􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀗
􀀈􀀗􀀛􀀕􀀋􀀐􀀒􀀖􀀹􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀡􀀖􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀙􀀉􀀛􀀎􀀙􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀌􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀸􀀵􀁈􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀄􀀇􀀎􀀗􀀚􀀆􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀏􀀋􀀙􀀎􀀉􀀑
􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀙􀀘􀀎􀀐􀀱􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀉􀀚􀀛􀀈􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀩􀀎􀀈􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀌􀀋􀀛􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀱􀀗􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀉􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀘􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀛􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀎􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀑
􀀕􀀗􀀛􀀄􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀙􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀱􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀙􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀰􀀋􀀑􀀗􀀛􀀒􀀖􀀦􀀗􀀅􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀱􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀚􀀛􀀝􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀱􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀑􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀕􀀋􀀱􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀋
􀀕􀀋􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀌􀀛􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀔􀀐􀀗􀀇􀀑􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀩􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀮􀀯􀀖􀀝􀀗􀀱􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀬􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀥􀀎􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀆
􀀋􀀝􀀱􀀚􀀙􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀕􀀝􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀐􀀗􀀙􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀙􀀘􀀚􀀛􀀙􀀘􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀔􀀐􀀗􀀇􀀑􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀩􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀨􀀃􀀖􀀦􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀧􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆
􀀰􀀗􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀰􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀆􀀏􀀗􀀩􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀋􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀅􀀗􀀖􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀥􀀎􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀱􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀱􀀚􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀗􀀖􀀆􀀋􀀎􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄
􀀙􀀘􀀚􀀛􀀙􀀘􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀕􀀝􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀈􀀚􀀕􀀝􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀗􀀙􀀙􀀋􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆
􀀝􀀄􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀝􀀱􀀚􀀙􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀚􀀛􀀖􀀙􀀘􀀚􀀛􀀙􀀘􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀕􀀝􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀫􀀖􀀴􀀚􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀑􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀥􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀎􀀛􀀖􀀙􀀘􀀚􀀛􀀙􀀘
􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀇􀀎􀀙􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀨􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀐􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀗􀀱􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀘􀀚􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀬􀀯􀀖􀀴􀀚􀀐􀀑􀀡􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀎􀀛􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀝􀀗􀀚􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀚􀀈􀀩􀀈􀀗􀀅􀀈􀀒
􀀢􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀑􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀛􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀛􀀗􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀕􀀚􀀆􀀉
􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀚􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀉􀀛􀀗􀀙􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀚􀀐􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀚􀀈􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀚􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀏􀀏􀀐􀀎􀀙􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀘􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈
􀀛􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀛􀀕􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀌􀀚􀀋􀀛􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀄􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀙􀀐􀀚􀀱􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀇􀀗􀀎􀀱􀀋􀀈􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀏􀀛􀀎􀀆􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀢􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀝􀀗􀀚􀀉
􀀋􀀛􀀝􀀎􀀉􀀛􀀋􀀛􀀑􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀝􀀚􀀆􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀙􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀚􀀏􀀗􀀈
􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀕􀀏􀀉􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀒
􀀞􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀆􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀕􀀖􀀑􀀗􀀚􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀨􀀃􀀖􀀦􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀧􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀳􀀥􀀥􀀎􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀙􀀄􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀖􀁃􀀹􀀘􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀖􀁇􀀗􀀗􀀩􀁄􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀄􀀱
􀀘􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀗􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀄􀀏􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀿􀀄􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀎􀀈􀀌
􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀎􀀗􀀱􀀖􀀥􀀛􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀛􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀢􀀏􀀛􀀎􀀐􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀕􀀎􀀱􀀣􀀴􀀚􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀬􀀭􀀮􀀯􀀡􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀎􀀙􀀘􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀇􀀎􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀒􀀖􀀔􀀗􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄
􀀙􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀱􀀑􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀥􀀐􀀄􀀙􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀄􀀇􀀎􀀗􀀚􀀆􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀨􀀃􀀖􀀦􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀧􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀰􀀗􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀈􀀌
􀀰􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀞􀀖􀀅􀀗􀀚􀀐􀀱􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀘􀀗􀀚􀀐􀀱􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀘􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈
􀀛􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀗􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀙􀀗􀀕􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀱􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀰􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀒
􀀞􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀢􀀚􀀉􀀗􀀈􀀗􀀕􀀗􀀚􀀆􀀖􀀧􀀄􀀏􀀚􀀝􀀐􀀎􀀙􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀜􀀛􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀋􀀡􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀛􀀋􀀆􀀆􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀱􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀛􀀎􀀕􀀎􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀥􀀎􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀌􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀉
􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀜􀀛􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀲􀀋􀀉􀀋􀀛􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀏􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀐􀀎􀀌􀀎􀀗􀀚􀀆􀀖􀀕􀀎􀀈􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀕􀀎􀀈􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈
􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀙􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀗􀀖􀀗􀀏􀀏􀀗􀀆􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀮􀁅􀀖􀀰􀀋􀀛􀀙􀀘􀀖􀁃􀀛􀀄􀀥􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀱􀀚􀀕􀁄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀒􀀖􀀨􀀃􀀦􀀜􀀧􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀕􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀆
􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀮􀀵􀀡􀀬􀀭􀀭􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀗􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀥􀀉􀀖􀀜􀀛􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀋􀀡􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀗􀀚􀀆􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀗􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀚􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗
􀀼􀀁􀀵
􀀥􀀐􀀄􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀡􀀖􀀝􀀛􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀉􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀈􀀚􀀕􀀝􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀱􀀎􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀙􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄
􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀮􀀮􀀷􀀡􀀸􀀮􀀭􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀙􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀱􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀨􀀃􀀦􀀜􀀧􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀵􀀖􀀢􀀚􀀌􀀚􀀆􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀎􀀐􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀈􀀚􀀕􀀝􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀗􀀥
􀀛􀀄􀀙􀀗􀀕􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀱􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀋􀀱􀀱􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀚􀀉􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀚􀀄􀀆􀀒
􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀝􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀄􀀛􀀙􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀎􀀛􀀖􀀥􀀛􀀄􀀄􀀱􀀗􀀕􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀏􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀆􀀗􀀙􀀎􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀡􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀋􀀙􀀄􀀥􀀚􀀐
􀀋􀀆􀀆􀀄􀀕􀀝􀀐􀀑􀀡􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀐􀀎􀀌􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀐􀀎􀀄􀀥􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀎􀀛􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀙􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀛􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀛􀀗􀀈􀀌􀀐􀀑
􀀋􀀥􀀥􀀄􀀙􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀙􀀛􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀞􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀡􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀛􀀎􀀙􀀉􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀉􀀋􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀱
􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀞􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀌􀀈􀀎􀀥􀀎􀀙􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀡􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀨􀀃􀀖􀀦􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀧􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀰􀀗􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀰􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀮
􀀢􀀚􀀌􀀚􀀆􀀉􀀡􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀔􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀗􀀱􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀩􀀖􀀽􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀙􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀬􀀬􀀖􀀴􀀚􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀣􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀛􀀄
􀀋􀀝􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀗􀀏􀀄􀀈􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀛􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀆􀀾􀀚􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀥􀀐􀀋􀀆􀀘􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀝􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀏􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀚􀀏􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀎􀀆
􀀅􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀎􀀛􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀆􀀚􀀙􀀘􀀖􀀛􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀗􀀅􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀰􀀋􀀛􀀙􀀘􀀒􀀖􀀦􀀗􀀅􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀡􀀖􀀅􀀗􀀛􀀛􀀑􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀱􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀙􀀐􀀚􀀱􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀎􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀄
􀀆􀀏􀀄􀀄􀀙􀀘􀀡􀀖􀀏􀀋􀀛􀀉􀀎􀀙􀀚􀀐􀀋􀀛􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀙􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀎􀀋􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀈􀀚􀀕􀀝􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀙􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀋􀀛􀀌􀀄􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀣􀀗􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀋􀀈􀀩􀀆
􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀚􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀈􀀱􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀄􀀱􀀐􀀑􀀖􀁄􀀥􀀎􀀈􀀋􀀈􀀙􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀛􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀆􀀕􀁄􀀒􀀖􀀿􀀛􀀄􀀄􀀱􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀗􀀥
􀀄􀀓􀀏􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀚􀀈􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀋􀀉􀀉􀀋􀀙􀀩􀀡􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀏􀀄􀀙􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀡􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀉􀀉􀀄􀀕􀀏􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀎􀀋
􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀎􀀏􀀚􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀏􀀄􀀙􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀄􀀌􀀛􀀄􀀌􀀎􀀗􀀚􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀑􀀖􀀚􀀈􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀛􀀗􀀐􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀆􀀒
􀀴􀀗􀀚􀀛􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀻􀀚􀀘􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀩􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀾􀀚􀀎􀀛􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀙􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀘􀀎􀀏􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀆
􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀑􀀖􀀰􀀗􀀈􀀱􀀋􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀱􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀚􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀅􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀗􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀗􀀖􀀱􀀎􀀱􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀉􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀛􀀄
􀀉􀀘􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀗􀀝􀀆􀀉􀀛􀀚􀀙􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀎􀀛􀀖􀀄􀀾􀀚􀀎􀀏􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀛􀀗􀀑􀀄􀀱􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀣􀀙􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀱􀀖􀁃􀀍􀀄􀀥􀀄􀀈􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀰􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀛􀁄􀀖􀀗􀀥
􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀥􀀣􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀙􀀐􀀋􀀎􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀖􀁃􀀍􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀩􀀖􀀊􀀄􀀗􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀶􀀆􀀖􀀧􀀄􀀏􀀚􀀝􀀐􀀎􀀙􀁄􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀘􀀎􀀝􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀁀􀀗􀀚􀀛􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀕􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱
􀀏􀀘􀀗􀀉􀀗􀀌􀀛􀀋􀀏􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀖􀀥􀀛􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀉􀀋􀀩􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀏􀀘􀀗􀀉􀀗􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀗􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀚􀀱􀀎􀀗􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀱􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀋􀀈􀀈􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀕􀀖􀀥􀀛􀀗􀀕
􀀅􀀗􀀛􀀩􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀕􀀝􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀺􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀥􀀛􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀓􀀎􀀕􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀘􀀖􀀕􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀛􀀑􀀖􀀗􀀝􀁀􀀄􀀙􀀉􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀢􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀚􀀐􀀉􀀡􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀈􀀚􀀕􀀝􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀗􀀥
􀁀􀀗􀀚􀀛􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀙􀀐􀀚􀀱􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀄􀀎􀀌􀀈􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀎􀀋􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀥􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀛􀀋􀀆􀀆􀀄􀀱􀀒􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀁀􀀗􀀚􀀛􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀆
􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀛􀀆􀀘􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀖􀀦􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀞􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀘􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀙􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀝􀀱􀀚􀀙􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀐􀀗􀀙􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀥􀀎􀀄􀀐􀀱􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀱􀀚􀀙􀀄􀀛
􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀜􀀃􀀃􀀡􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀗􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀋􀀩􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀥􀀛􀀗􀀕􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀉􀀄􀀐􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀍􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀩􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀬􀀬􀀖􀀴􀀚􀀐􀀑􀀡􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀱􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀯􀀖􀀱􀀋􀀑􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀈
􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀙􀀙􀀚􀀆􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀆􀀏􀀑􀀒
􀀞􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀕􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀋􀀛􀀉􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀥􀀐􀀎􀀙􀀉􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀥􀀎􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀑􀀖􀀗􀀚􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀕􀀚􀀛􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀆
􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀏􀀐􀀗􀀆􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀛􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀞􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀙􀀗􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀊􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀶􀀆􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀏􀀗􀀆􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀋
􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀋􀀐􀀩􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀥􀀎􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀥􀀎􀀛􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀢􀀖􀀥􀀎􀀛􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀄􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀱􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀰􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀩􀀖􀀗􀀈
􀀼􀀮􀀖􀀴􀀚􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀕􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀌􀀛􀀄􀀄􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀋􀀱􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀛􀀋􀀆􀀘􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀰􀀋􀀐􀀋􀀑􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈
􀀢􀀎􀀛􀀐􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀖􀁃􀀋􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀺􀀄􀀋􀀝􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀈􀀚􀀕􀀝􀀄􀀛􀁄􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀌􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀏􀀆􀀒
􀀰􀀗􀀛􀀄􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀡􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀙􀀛􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀗􀀐􀀇􀀄􀀱􀀡􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀄􀀏􀀖􀀏􀀆􀀑􀀙􀀘􀀗􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀎􀀙􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀆􀀙􀀋􀀛􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀐
􀀛􀀄􀀕􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀋􀀝􀀛􀀎􀀙􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀙􀀎􀀄􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀏􀀋􀀛􀀉􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀚􀀗􀀚􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀌􀀗􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀗􀀐􀀄􀀈􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱
􀀥􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀁁􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀕􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀆􀀏􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀱􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀝􀀚􀀎􀀐􀀱􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀱􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀆􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀈􀀋􀀛􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀛􀀱􀀄􀀈􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀗􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀶􀀆
􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀗􀀐􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀄􀀏􀀄􀀈􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀙􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀱􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀧􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀥􀀥􀀄􀀙􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀐􀀗􀀈􀀌􀀄􀀱
􀀥􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀕􀀋􀀑􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀏􀀆􀀑􀀙􀀘􀀗􀀐􀀗􀀌􀀎􀀙􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀝􀀚􀀎􀀐􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀎􀀛􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀏􀀋􀀛􀀉􀀎􀀙􀀚􀀐􀀋􀀛􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀙􀀘􀀎􀀐􀀱􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀒
􀀰􀀋􀀈􀀑􀀖􀀗􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀾􀀚􀀎􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀙􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀡􀀖􀀆􀀚􀀙􀀘􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀙􀀉􀀎􀀕􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀚􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀕􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀆􀀡
􀀄􀀆􀀏􀀄􀀙􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀗􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀱􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀐􀀗􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀛􀀎􀀗􀀱􀀆􀀒
􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀙􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀛􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀕􀀚􀀐􀀉􀀎􀀣􀀑􀀄􀀋􀀛􀀖􀀘􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀋􀀙􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀱
􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀙􀀗􀀕􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀱􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀨􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀃􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀘􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀙􀀘􀀋􀀈􀀎􀀆􀀕􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀗􀀛􀀩􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄
􀀦􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀧􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀰􀀗􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀗􀀛􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀰􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀞􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀙􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀙􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀕􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀋􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀙􀀗􀀕􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀱􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄
􀀋􀀈􀀈􀀄􀀓􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀋􀀛􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀂􀀨􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀕􀀖􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀱􀀋􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀕􀀕􀀚􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱
􀀯􀀁􀀵
􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀄􀀏􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀕􀀋􀁀􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀱􀀗􀀈􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀥􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀒􀀖􀀢􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀖􀀈􀀗􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄
􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀄􀀱􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀎􀀗􀀚􀀆􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀱􀀱􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀆􀀑􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀕􀀎􀀙􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀗􀀝􀀐􀀄􀀕􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀆􀀚􀀙􀀘􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀛􀀚􀀏􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀡
􀀥􀀋􀀙􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀚􀀈􀀉􀀛􀀑􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀘􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀏􀀄􀀙􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀌􀀗􀀗􀀱􀀖􀀌􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀋􀀈􀀙􀀄􀀡􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀚􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀐􀀋􀀅􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀘􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀄
􀀳􀀥􀀥􀀎􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀦􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀖􀀜􀀗􀀕􀀕􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀦􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀧􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀎􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀋􀀱􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀅􀀗􀀛􀀩􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀉􀀘􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄
􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀆􀀚􀀄􀀆􀀒
􀀜􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀐􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀙􀀎􀀄􀀉􀀑􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀑􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀇􀀎􀀉􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀛􀀗􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀏􀀗􀀛􀀉􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀆􀀙􀀛􀀎􀀝􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀗􀀅􀀖􀀙􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀺􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀄􀀏􀀏􀀄􀀱
􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀄􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀎􀀛􀀖􀀤􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀈􀀕􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀘􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀚􀀈􀀋􀀝􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀏􀀗􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀾􀀚􀀎􀀙􀀩􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀗􀀚􀀌􀀘􀀡􀀖􀀆􀀚􀀙􀀘􀀖􀀋􀀆
􀀋􀀙􀀙􀀗􀀕􀀕􀀗􀀱􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀗􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀐􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀥􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀒􀀖􀀊􀀄􀀛􀀘􀀋􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀖􀀙􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀙􀀖􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀛􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀘􀀄􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀱􀀛􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀓􀀉
􀀏􀀘􀀋􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀚􀀙􀀘􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀄􀀱􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀙􀀘􀀋􀀈􀀌􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀒
􀀢􀀐􀀐􀀗􀀅􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀙􀀐􀀚􀀱􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀆􀀉􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀥􀀎􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀋􀀙􀀄􀀥􀀚􀀐􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀐􀀚􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀛􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀉􀀚􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀒
􀀹􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀋􀀈􀀈􀀗􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀥􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀱􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀖􀀅􀀋􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀱􀀋􀀑􀀖􀀐􀀗􀀈􀀌􀀄􀀛􀀡􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀄􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀉􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀵􀀭􀀖􀀏􀀄􀀗􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀩􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀄􀀱􀀖􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀅􀀗􀀚􀀈􀀱􀀄􀀱
􀀄􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀑􀀖􀀱􀀋􀀑􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀎􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀏􀀋􀀎􀀱􀀖􀀝􀀑􀀖􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀚􀀐􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀥􀀐􀀎􀀙􀀉􀀖􀀎􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀀗􀀖􀀘􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀒
􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱􀀖􀀧􀀚􀀆􀀆􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀈􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀄􀀖􀀐􀀗􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀎􀀛􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀝􀀚􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀅􀀘􀀗􀀐􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀚􀀈􀀉􀀛􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀆
􀀏􀀋􀀑􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀛􀀎􀀙􀀄􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀥􀀐􀀎􀀙􀀉􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀋􀀖􀀛􀀄􀀆􀀚􀀐􀀉􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀉􀀄􀀛􀀎􀀗􀀛􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀙􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀇􀀎􀀙􀀄􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀏􀀗􀀐􀀎􀀉􀀎􀀙􀀋􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀈􀀱
􀀄􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀗􀀕􀀎􀀙􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀾􀀚􀀄􀀈􀀙􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀥􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀈􀀥􀀐􀀎􀀙􀀉􀀖􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀐􀀐􀀖􀀗􀀇􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀨􀀩􀀛􀀋􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀝􀀗􀀛􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀡􀀖􀀈􀀄􀀌􀀋􀀉􀀎􀀇􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀖􀀎􀀕􀀏􀀋􀀙􀀉􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀀗􀀈
􀀘􀀚􀀕􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀛􀀎􀀌􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀗􀀛􀀐􀀱􀀅􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀖􀀣􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀙􀀎􀀇􀀎􀀐􀀎􀀋􀀈􀀖􀀋􀀎􀀛􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀉􀀛􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀱􀀑􀀖􀀝􀀄􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀖􀁀􀀚􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀱􀀛􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀎􀀙􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀋􀀕􀀏􀀐􀀄􀀒
􀀞􀀖􀀉􀀘􀀋􀀈􀀩􀀖􀀑􀀗􀀚􀀖􀀥􀀗􀀛􀀖􀀑􀀗􀀚􀀛􀀖􀀋􀀉􀀉􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀎􀀗􀀈􀀒
􀀵􀀁􀀵