INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
VOLUME VI OF THE ANNEXES
TO THE MEMORIAL
SUBMITTED BY UKRAINE
12 JUNE 2018
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Annex 144
Annex 145
Annex 146
Annex 147
Annex 148
Annex 149
Annex 150
Annex 151
Annex 152
Annex 153
Annex 154
Annex 155
Annex 156
Record of Inspection of Lieutenant of Justice S.V.Frunze, Military Prosecutors
Office (3 December 2015)
Indictment in the Criminal Case Against Vasyl Vitaliyovych Pushkariov
Registered in the Uniform Register of Pretrial Investigations Under No.
22015220000000431 on 22 December 2015
National Police, Main Donetsk Regional Administration of the National
Police Letter No. 1812/04/18-2016 to the Main Military Prosecutor™s Office,
Prosecutor General™s Office of Ukraine (18 March 2016)
National Police, Main Donetsk Regional Administration of the National Police
Letter No. 1812/04/18-2016 to the Main Military Prosecutors Office,
Prosecutor Generals Office of Ukraine (18 March 2016)
Case No. 757/21825/16-k, Order of the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv
regarding temporary access to and seizure of document copies from TOV
Lifecell (dated 11 May 2016)
Case No. 757/21828/16-k, Order of the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv
regarding temporary access to and seizure of document copies from PrAT
MTS (dated 11 May 2016)
Expert Report, drafted by Serhiy Onikeyenko, Investigations Department
Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine, and Viktor Levchenko, Lieutenant Colonel of
the Ukrainian Armed Forces ( 1 June 2016)
Expert Report, drafted by Serhiy Onikeyenko, Investigations Department
Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine, and Viktor Levchenko, Lieutenant Colonel of
the Ukrainian Armed Forces ( 1 June 2016)
Case No. 757/21811/16-k, Order of the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv
regarding temporary access to and seizure of document copies from TOV
Lifecell (10 June 2016)
Case No. 757/28210/16-k, Order of the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv
regarding temporary access to and seizure of document copies from PrAT
MTS (11 June 2016)
SSU Counterintelligence Department Letter No.212/8-28412 of 11 August
2016 to the Prosecutor Generals Office of Ukraine
Ukrainian Military Intelligence Summary of Cross-Border Weapons Transfers
(September 2016 to December 2016).
Record of the results of a search operation conducted by the Department of
Surveillance of the SSU, prepared by R.O. Narusevych, field agent with the
8th sector of the 2nd directorate of the Criminal Investigations Department of
the SSU (16 September 2016
- ii -
Annex 157 Record of inspection conducted by I.V. Budnyk, Captain of Justice and Senior
Investigator with the 5th Investigative Office at the 1st Pretrial Investigation
Directorate of the Central Investigative Directorate of the SSU (26 September
2016)
Annex 158 SSU Counterintelligence Department Letter No. 212/8-33394 of 4 October
2016 to the Pretrial Investigation Directorate of the Central Investigative
Directorate of the SSU
Annex 159 Crime scene examination record prepared by A.S. Bakovsky, Major of Justice
and Senior Investigator with the 3rd Office of the 1st Pretrial Investigation
Directorate at the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine (dated 20 Janu
Annex 160 Extract from Criminal Proceedings No. 12017050140000085
Annex 161 Records of Site Inspection, drafted by A. Zaychik (1 February 2017)
Annex 162 Records of Site Inspection, drafted by N. Protsyk, Senior Investigator (1
February 2017)
Annex 163 Records of Site Inspection, drafted by Y. Ponomarenko, Senior Investigator (1
February 2017)
Annex 164 Extract from Criminal Proceedings No. 12017050140000081 (6 February
2017)
Annex 165 Record of Inspection of the Internet Pages, Carried by D.V. Zyuzia, Lt.
Colonel of Justice and Senior Special Investigator, Section 1 of Department 5,
Pre-Trial Investigations, Directorate 1 at the Main Directorate for
Investigations of the Security Servi
Annex 166 Record of Inspection of Materials Obtained As a Result of a Covert Detective
Activity, Carried by D.V. Zyuzia, Lt. Colonel of Justice and Senior Special
Investigator, Section 1 of Department 5, Pre-Trial Investigations, Directorate
1 at the Main Directora
Annex 167 Expert Conclusion No. 77, drafted by M. Ustymenko and A. Pavlenko,
Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic
Expert Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine (3 March 2017)
Annex 168 Expert Conclusion No. 78, drafted by M. Ustymenko and A. Pavlenko,
Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic
Expert Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine (3 March 2017)
Annex 169 Expert Conclusion No. 79, drafted by M. Ustymenko and A. Pavlenko,
Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic
Expert Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine (3 March 2017)
Annex 170 Expert Conclusion No. 80, drafted by M. Ustymenko and A. Pavlenko,
Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic
Expert Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine (3 March 2017)
Annex 171 Expert Conclusion No. 81, drafted by M. Ustymenko and A. Pavlenko,
Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic
Expert Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine (3 March 2017)
- iii -
Annex 172 Record of examination of a CD performed by S.O. Husarov, Senior Lieutenant
of Justice and Senior Investigator of the 1st Office of the 5th Department at
the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate of the Central Investigative
Directorate of the SSU (4 May
Annex 173 Expert Opinion No. 19/11-1/11-8-3/9-14/1/3-CE17, State Scientific Research
Forensic Expert Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (17 May
2017)
Annex 174 Expert Opinion No. 76/4, Ukrainian Research Institute for Special-Purpose
Equipment and Forensic Examinations of the Security Service of Ukraine (31
July 2017)
Annex 175 Ukrainian Military Intelligence Summary of Cross-Border Weapons Transfers
(September 2017 to December 2017).
Annex 176 Expert Opinion No. 120-B/1818-X, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
Odesa Expert Criminal Forensic Research Center (24 November 2017)
Annex 177 Record of Incident Scene Inspection, drafted by Major of Justice A. S.
Bakhovsky, Senior Special Investigator, Security Service of Ukraine (20
December 2017)
Annex 178 Record of inspection of websites performed by M.V. Kalyta, Lieutenant of
Justice and Investigator with the 5th Office of the 1st Pretrial Investigation
Directorate of the Central Investigative Directorate of the SSU (1 February
2018)
Annex 179 State Service of Ukraine for Extraordinary Situations, Ukrainian
Hydrometereological Center Letter No. 01-20/419 (30 March 2018)
Annex 180 Record of inspection of websites performed by O.O. Kryvoruchko, Captain of
Justice and Serior Investigator with the 5th Office of the 1st Pretrial
Investigation Directorate of the Central Investigative Directorate of the SSU
(15 May 2018)
Annex 181 Record of inspection of websites performed by D.H. Davyd, Major of Justice
and Senior Criminal Investigator with the 5th Office of the 1st Pretrial
Investigation Directorate at the Central Investigative Directorate of the SSU
(16 May 2018)
Annex 182 Ukraine Main Directorate of Intelligence Letter No. 222/4D/535 (17 May
2018) (attaching Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate
of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/90/09 (2 January 2015 at
9:00 a.m.)
Annex 183 Ministry of Interior of Ukraine, Main Department of the National Guard of
Ukraine Letter No. 27/6/2-3553 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
(31 May 2018)
Annex 184 Confirmation of Authenticity, Senior Special Investigator with the Second
Branch of the First Pre-Trial Investigations Department at the Main
Investigations Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine (4 June 2018)
Annex 185 Statement of Authentication, Volodymyr Piven, Senior Investigator, Main
Investigation Office, Security Service of Ukraine (5 June 2018)
Annex 186 Ukrainian Prosecutors Office File on GROM-E2 (multiple dates)
- iv -
Annex 187 Sample Minister of Defense of Ukraine Armament Investigation Reports and
Inspection Certificates (multiple dates)
Annex 188 Transcript of Video Declaration of Petr Khokhlov, Suspect Interrogation
(published 27 August 2014)
Annex 189 Signed Declaration of Yevhen Kaliberda, Suspect Interrogation Protocol ( 21
October 2014)
Annex 190 Signed Declaration of Aleksandr Bondarenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol
(23 October 2014)
Annex 191 Signed Declaration of Andrii Baranenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (23
October 2014)
Annex 192 Signed Declaration of Oleg Serachov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (5
November 2014)
Annex 193 Signed Declaration of Mykailo Ozerov, Witness Interrogation Protocol (10
November 2014)
Annex 194 Signed Declaration of Roman Chernenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (10
November 2014)
Annex 195 Signed Declaration of Valentin Datsenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (11
November 2014)
Annex 196 Signed Declaration of Marina Kovtun, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16
November 2014)
Annex 197 Signed Declaration of Konstantin Morev, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (18
November 2014)
Annex 198 Signed Declaration of Mykola Varva, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (18
November 2014)
Annex 199 Signed Declaration of Pavlo Korostyshevskiy, Suspect Interrogation Protocol
(18 November 2014)
Annex 200 Signed Declaration of Andreii Bessarabov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (19
November 2014)
Annex 201 Signed Declaration of Andrey Bozhko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (19
November 2014)
Annex 202 Signed Declaration of Stanislav Kudrin, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (19
November 2014)
Annex 203 Signed Declaration of Gennadiy Shmorovoz, Witness Interrogation Protocol
(17 December 2014)
Annex 204 Signed Declaration of Artem Kalus, Witness Interrogation Protocol (17
January 2015)
Annex 205 Signed Declaration of Yaroslav Maksymov, Witness Interrogation Protocol
(17 January 2015)
Annex 206 Signed Declaration of Anton Ovcharenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (18
January 2015)
- v -
Annex 207 Signed Declaration of Oleg Stemasov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (9
December 2014)
Annex 208 Signed Declaration of Sergey Cherepko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (20
January 2015)
Annex 209 Signed Declaration of Oleksandr Pavlenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol
(23 January 2015)
Annex 210 Signed Declaration of Oleksandr Pavlenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol
(23 January 2015)
Annex 211 Signed Declaration of Nataliya Mykhaylivna Nikolaeva, Victim Interrogation
Protocol (24 January 2015)
Annex 212 Signed Declaration of Oksana Olexandrivna Ivanova, Victim Interrogation
Protocol (24 January 2015)
Annex 213 Signed Declaration of Valerii Kirsanov, Witness Interrogation Protocol (25
January 2015)
Annex 214 Signed Declaration of Olena Demchenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (24
January 2015)
Annex 144
Record of Inspection of Lieutenant of Justice S.V.Frunze, Military Prosecutors Office
(3 December 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
RECORD OF INSPECTION
City of Kyiv December 3, 2015
Inspection commenced at 12:40 p.m.
Inspection ended at 2:00 p.m.
Lieutenant of Justice S.V. Frunze, Prosecutor with the Military Prosecutors Office of
the Kyiv Garrison, having reviewed the files of the pretrial investigation of Criminal
Case No. 42014000000000457, conducted an inspection of weapons and ammunition
seized from illegal paramilitary groups, which are stored at Military Unit A0222 (Kyiv,
at 19-A Dehtyarivska Street. The inspection was conducted on the premises of
Warehouse No. [blank] of Military Unit A0222 at 19-A Dehtyarivska Street, Kyiv, under
mixed lighting conditions, pursuant to Articles 98, 100, 104, 105, 106, 223, and 237 of
the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.
In the presence of attesting witnesses:
1) Soldier Vladyslav Olexandrovych Stashevskyi, d.o.b. September 13, 1994, Kryve
Ozero, Mykolaiv Oblast, 12 Klary Tsetkin Street, 068-94-5358 [Signature]
(Last name, first name, patronymic, date of birth, address of residence)
2) Soldier Oleksandr Mykhaylovych Dekiy, d.o.b. February 15, 1995, 19 Ukrayinska
Street, Myrhorod, Vinnytsia Oblast [Signature]
(Last name, first name, patronymic, date of birth, address of residence)
Prior to the start of the inspection, it was explained to the above-mentioned
individuals that they have a right to be present during all activities conducted in the
context of the inspection and make comments that must be reflected in the record.
The individuals participating in the inspection also had explained to them the
requirements of Part 3 of Article 66 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine
regarding their obligation to refrain from disclosing information about the procedural
activity conducted, and also about the use of recording equipment, the conditions and
procedure of their use:
Lenovo S580 mobile phone S.V. Frunze [Signature]
(Parameters of recording equipment and data media used during the procedural activity, signatures of individuals)
INSPECTION FINDINGS:
The inspection of weapons is conducted with the participation of Major Oleksandr
Anatoliyovych Khoroshun, Chief of the Missile and Artillery Equipment Service, and
Sergeant Serhiy Viktorovych Antoshchuk, superintendent of the firearms, grenade
launchers, and sighting devices storage facility.
According to O.A. Khoroshun, these weapons arrived at military unit A0222 after an
exhibition of WWII weapons in Kyiv, where they were showcased to civilians.
Among the weapons presented by officers of military unit A0222, the following
weapons have been identified:
1) 52 mm mortar plate No. STV 8047
2) 52 mm mortar plate No. 031287 (52 MP832)
3) 52 mm mortar tripod with the number worn away beyond recognition
1) Soldier O.S. Stashevskyi [Signature]
2) Soldier O.M. Dekiy [Signature]
[Seal: For Documents * Main Military Prosecutors Office of the Prosecutor Generals Office of Ukraine]
[Stamp: A true copy. Department prosecutor at the Main Military Prosecutors Office of the Prosecutor
Generals Office of Ukraine]
3) Shoulder-fired anti-tank grenade launcher RPG-7 without a handle No. MP438, caliber 40
mm; other details are unknown because the handle is missing
4) Shoulder-fired anti-tank grenade launcher RPG-7M2 with a handle No. VA747, made in
1981 in the USSR
5) Shoulder-fired anti-tank grenade launcher RPG-7M2 with a handle No. VA862, made in
1981 in the USSR
6) Shoulder-fired anti-tank grenade launcher RPG-7M2 with a handle No. AG794, made in
1985 in the USSR
7) Shoulder-fired anti-tank grenade launcher RPG-7D1 with a handle No. PG390, made in
1989 in the USSR
8) Shoulder-fired anti-tank grenade launcher RPG-7M1 with a handle No. VT605, made in
1978 in the USSR
9) Shoulder-fired anti-tank grenade launcher RPG-26 (tube) No. 254-12-87, OP 7B20, 533-07-
87, 7/1 TR, made in 1987 in the USSR
10) Shoulder-fired anti-tank grenade launcher RPG-18 (tube) No. V-659, 533-1-74, MUKHA
254-3-74, OKFOL PPK-5, K-3-74, made in 1974 in the USSR
11) Shoulder-fired anti-tank grenade launcher RPG-26 (tube) No. 254-17-91, OKFOL, 7B-20,
533-09-91, 070030, made in 1991. Manufacturer unknown
12) Shoulder-fired anti-tank grenade launcher RPG-26 (tube) No. 254-6-91, OKFOL, 7B-20,
533-03-91, 7/1, TR VA 2-91-K
13) Shoulder-fired anti-tank grenade launcher RPG-22 (tube) No. 254-4-84, OL, VP-22, 533-
L33-83, 7/1, TR B/1, made in 1983. Manufacturer unknown
14) Flamethrower (tube) MRO-A, MO.1.10.00, year of manufacture and manufacturer unknown
(MO.1.10.01.1-6, 3311-2008)
15) Flamethrower (tube) MRO-A, MO.1.10.00, No. 30.1.10.01-16, 42-75-2008, year of
manufacture and manufacturer unknown
16) Anti-tank guided missile container No. 9M113, 03-89-536, 1313, 50-892, year of
manufacture and manufacturer unknown
17) Flamethrower (tube) with a handle (plastic) No. MO.102-00, 400, 973, year of manufacture
and manufacturer unknown
18) Flamethrower (tube) with a handle (plastic) No. MO.1.02-00, 32-02; other markings are
worn away and impossible to read; year of manufacture and manufacturer unknown
19) Flamethrower (tube) with a handle (plastic) No. MO.1-02-00, 33-02, 4004, year of
manufacture and manufacturer unknown
20) Flamethrower (tube) with a handle (plastic) No. MO.102-00, 4-00, 10-18, year of
manufacture and manufacturer unknown
21) Flamethrower (tube) with a handle (plastic) No. MO.102-00, 5-02-223, 31-02, 3912, year
of manufacture and manufacturer unknown
22) Mounted grenade launcher SPG-9 No. E-434, year of manufacture and manufacturer
unknown. Shows clear signs of charring on the barrel. The grenade launcher comes with a
damaged mount. Mount No. R-256.
23) Mounted grenade launcher SPG-9 No. T-196, year of manufacture and manufacturer
unknown. The grenade launcher comes with a damaged mount. Mount No. K-805
1) Soldier O.S. Stashevskyi [Signature]
2) Soldier O.M. Dekiy [Signature]
[Seal: For Documents * Main Military Prosecutors Office of the Prosecutor Generals Office of Ukraine]
[Stamp: A true copy. Department prosecutor at the Main Military Prosecutors Office of the Prosecutor
Generals Office of Ukraine]
24) Mounted grenade launcher SPG-9 No. L-536, year of manufacture and manufacturer
unknown. The grenade launcher comes with a damaged mount. Mount No. S-221
25) IGLA surface-to-air missile launcher container No. 9P39-1, 01-92-2, 01-10-28, 01-92-2, OF
OK SNAR, year of manufacture and manufacturer unknown
26) IGLA surface-to-air missile launcher container No. 9P39-1, 01-89-2, 01861, 9M39, OF OK
SNAR, bearing a magic marker inscription on the barrel This is for Medved; year of
manufacture and manufacturer unknown
27) GROM shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile launcher (tube) No. 62.0.0.000E2, 1134,
2107, GROM-E2, E2707-21, 1134, F-LED, year of manufacture and manufacturer unknown
28) Launching mechanism for the IGLA surface-to-air missile launcher No. 9P516, 5625289000,
year of manufacture and manufacturer unknown
29) Launching mechanism for the GROM shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile launcher No.
64.000.64.0.0.0.000, 182-01-05-21, year of manufacture and manufacturer unknown
30) Training container for the IGLA shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile launcher, UG-61,
75-2, 102
31) Anti-tank rifle PTRS No. M4D-67, made in 1944, manufacturer unknown
32) Anti-tank guided missile PTUR (tube) No. K.941314, 01-89-04, OKFOL, 9M-113, 04-90-III,
0275, 04-90-III, year of manufacture and manufacturer unknown
33) FAGOT launching system No. 9P-36M, EB-81-03-91, year of manufacture and manufacturer
unknown
34) FAGOT launching system No. 9P-36M, EB-85-08, damaged, year of manufacture and
manufacturer unknown
35) Unknown metal item bearing the markings BBB.526.009, 63-21-83, 3M, 38, year of
manufacture and manufacturer unknown
36) KPVT machine gun, 14.5 mm, IP-351, made in 1975 in the USSR
37) KPVT machine gun barrel with a shield, without a flame arrester, No, 3P326-2, year of
manufacture and manufacturer unknown. KPVT machine gun barrel caliber: 14.5 mm
38) Barrel for 12.7 mm NSVT, No. 114349644 XM, year of manufacture and manufacturer
unknown
39) Barrel for the DShK machine gun, No. V 598-2, made in 1947 in the USSR
40) Automatic grenade launcher AGS-17, 30 mm, No. UN-305, made in 1989 in the USSR,
damaged
41) Mount for AGS-17 grenade launcher, 30 mm, No. GT-1866, year of manufacture and
manufacturer unknown
According to the Chief of the Missile and Artillery Equipment Service, the condition of these
weapons is unsatisfactory.
1) Soldier O.S. Stashevskyi [Signature]
2) Soldier O.M. Dekiy [Signature]
[Seal: For Documents * Main Military Prosecutors Office of the Prosecutor Generals Office of Ukraine]
[Stamp: A true copy. Department prosecutor at the Main Military Prosecutors Office of the Prosecutor
Generals Office of Ukraine]
It is readily apparent that these weapons are damaged. The weapons are imprinted with
Russian-language operator instructions exclusively.
Chief of the Missile and Artillery Equipment Service of Military Unit A0222 [Signature]
Major O.A. Khoroshun (Mobile: 093-589-88-90)
Superintendent of the firearms, grenade launchers, and sighting devices storage facility
Sergeant S.V. Antoshchuk [Signature] (Mobile: 093-040-60-09)
These weapons were sealed with a seal of packets of the Military Prosecutors Office of the Kyiv
Garrison and left to be stored at the empty containers storage facility, Gate No. 1, of Military
Unit A0222 at 19-A Dehtyarivska Street, Kyiv.
The record has been read: no comments
(Comments from the inspection participants)
The inspection ended at 5:00 p.m.
Attesting witnesses:
1. O.S. Stashevskyi [Signature]
(Initials, last name) (Signature)
2. O.M. Dekiy [Signature]
(Initials, last name) (Signature)
Inspection conducted by:
Prosecutor with the Military Prosecutors Office
of the Kyiv Garrison
Lieutenant of Justice [Signature] S. Frunze
[Seal: For Documents * Main Military Prosecutors Office of the Prosecutor Generals Office of Ukraine]
[Stamp: A true copy. Department prosecutor at the Main Military Prosecutors Office of the Prosecutor
Generals Office of Ukraine]
Annex 145
Indictment in the Criminal Case Against Vasyl Vitaliyovych Pushkariov Registered in
the Uniform Register of Pretrial Investigations Under No. 22015220000000431 on
22 December 2015
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1
APPROVED by
Prosecutor with Department 04/4 of
Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutors Office
Councilor of Justice
[ . . . ]
INDICTMENT
in the criminal case against Vasyl Vitaliyovych Pushkariov,
who is accused of having committed criminal offenses falling under Part 2 of
Article 110, Part 2 of Article 201, Part 2 of Article 28, Part 1 of Article 263, Part
1 of Article 258-3, Part 2 of Article 258, Part 5 of Article 27, Part 2 of Article
258, Part 2 of Article 201, Part 2 of Article 28, Part 1 of Article 263, Part 1 of
Article 258-3, Part 3 of Article 15, Part 2 of Article 258, Part 1 of Article 263 of
the Criminal Code of Ukraine;
Oleh Valentynovych Doroshenko, who is accused of having committed criminal
offenses falling under Part 2 of Article 110, Part 1 of Article 258-3, Part 2 of
Article 201, Part 2 of Article 28, Part 1 of Article 263, Part 3 of Article 15, Part
2 of Article 258 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine,
registered in the Uniform Register of Pretrial Investigations under No.
22015220000000431 on December 22, 2015.
Vasyl Vitaliyovych Pushkariov, born on July 28, 1977
in Kharkiv, a citizen of Ukraine, with his registered
address of residence at 179 Krasnodarska Street,
apartment 133, Kharkiv, and his actual address of
residence at 3-A Matyushenko Street, apartment 21,
Kharkiv, higher education, married, supporting an
underage child, temporarily unemployed, with no
prior record of convictions,
was notified on December 23, 2015 about a change of the previously announced suspicion of his
having committed criminal offenses punishable under Part 2 of Article 110, Part 2 of Article 201,
Part 2 of Article 28, Part 1 of Article 263, Part 1 of Article 258-3, Part 2 of Article 258, Part 5 of
Article 27, Part 2 of Article 258, Part 2 of Article 201, Part 2 of Article 28, Part 1 of Article 263,
Part 1 of Article 258-3, Part 3 of Article 15, Part 2 of Article 258, Part 1 of Article 263 of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine.
[ . . . ]
At around 2:40 a.m., while acting on a criminal plan with the intention of bringing the crime
to completion, V.V. Pushkariov used a MRO-A compact rocket-propelled flame thrower bearing
the markings MRO-MO.1.10.02 BB-03-08 OKFOL U-505 B 533-1-08 and the inscription For
Odesa charged with a rocket-propelled grenade with a thermobaric payload containing 1 kg of the
TBS OM-100MI-3LO thermobaric mixture and an explosive shell, to fire a shot at the above-
mentioned building of Privatbank Commercial Bank (private joint-stock company) and left a
container of the above-mentioned flame thrower at the crime scene, thereby committing a criminal
offense in collusion with V.V. Chyzh and M.V. Rieznikov.
2
[ . . . ]
On July 28, 2014, during an examination of the crime scene, the forensic team detected and
seized the container of a MRO-A compact rocket-propelled flame thrower with a trigger and firing
mechanism and a sighting device bearing the markings KL 4214 29 08" MRO-
-63715-2008. The belt has a pocket fashioned from a green cloth. It was
found to contain two white ear plugs for noise suppression, which were impregnated with a light-
yellow substance.
Cells with kernels were detected on the surface of the ear plugs and their genetic features
(DNA profiles) determined (Table 1.1, Attachment 1). Surfaces of the container of the compact
rocket-propelled flame thrower (specifically the rubber eyepiece of the sighting device and the
handle) were found to be covered in solitary cells with kernels whose genetic features (DNA
profiles) have not been determined due to an insufficient amount of genetic material, as evidenced
by Molecular Genetic Forensic Expert Examination Opinion No. 20-588 of August 22, 2014.
Annex 146
National Police, Main Donetsk Regional Administration of the National Police Letter
No. 1812/04/18-2016 to the Main Military Prosecutor™s Office, Prosecutor
General™s Office of Ukraine (18 March 2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
A.L. Leshchenko:
to be taken into account
during the criminal
proceeding
61
NATIONAL POLICE
MAIN DONETSK REGIONAL
ADMINISTRATION OF THE NATIONAL POLICE
86 pr. Nakhimova, Mariupol 87517
March 18, 2016 No. 1812/04/18-2016 In response to No. 1457 of 3/2/2016
S.M. Onikeyenko:
For the criminal case file and for organizing
[illegible]
[signature] Leshchenko 3.30.16
S.M. Onikeyenko
Senior Investigator
Main Military Prosecutors Office
Prosecutor Generals Office of Ukraine
13/15 vul. Riznytska, Kyiv-11 01011
Dear Serhiy Mykolayevych,
I hereby inform you of the following with respect to the pretrial investigation in criminal
proceeding No. 220155050000000021 of 1/13/2015 concerning elements of a criminal offense
provided for by Article 258(3) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
It will not be possible to send the Prosecutor Generals Office of Ukraine video recordings
from the fixed video surveillance camera located on the roof of fixed post No. 5 of the State Traffic
Inspectorate Administration of the Main Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Ukraine for the period from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on January 13, 2015, due to the fact
that the Kyiv-2 special-purpose battalion was stationed at the fixed post. All of the video
surveillance cameras and recordings made by them belong to and are being held by the leadership
of that battalion. The same applies to information concerning persons who crossed, in either
direction, the temporary checkpoint controlled by the Kyiv-2 special-purpose battalion. The Armor
registration database was not checked due to the fact that no such database is available.
- the category and purpose of the N-20 Slovyansk-Donetsk-Mariupol road: category 1, has
4 lanes for vehicular traffic
- the equipping and infrastructure of the road: road signs, road surface markings, metal
barriers, bus stops
- the intensity of traffic and vehicle load: 3,027 vehicles per day
- the existence of cameras along the entire length of the road, including at filling stations and
other infrastructure facilities (video recording mode): none
- the existence of road signs near fixed and temporary posts (warning signs, yield signs,
restrictive sings, guiding signs, information signs, service signs, etc.): a temporary
checkpoint controlled by the Kyiv-2 Special-Purpose Battalion
10/4-947 incoming-16 m2 Prosecutor Generals Office of Ukraine
62
was set up at the 178-km-000 mark, equipped with road signs
- the existence of video surveillance cameras and special road maintenance equipment on
the N-20 road - none.
The existence of regular traffic routes, including routes for passenger service, and the
intensity thereofregulated by the Department of Transportation of the Military-Civilian
Administration of the Donetsk Region.
Equipping of fixed post No. 5, Road Patrol Service Battalion of the Donetsk Regional
Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, January 13, 2015, as well as: procedures
for patrol duty by the law-enforcement agencies, installation of video surveillance and procedures
for patrol duty since the beginning of the Counterterrorism Operation and during its prosecution:
officers of the State Traffic Inspectorate Administration of the Donetsk Regional Directorate of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine were not involved in supervising road traffic at fixed
post No. 5; the Kyiv-2 special-purpose battalion was stationed there.
It will not be possible to provide any information concerning the operation of fixed post
No. 5 on January 13, 2015, since fixed post No. 5 was controlled by the Kyiv-2 special-purpose
battalion.
Sincerely,
Deputy Head
Police Colonel [signature] V.S. Filashkin
Prepared by: A.O. Melnikov, 067-718-10-79
Annex 147
National Police, Main Donetsk Regional Administration of the National Police Letter
No. 1812/04/18-2016 to the Main Military Prosecutors Office, Prosecutor Generals
Office of Ukraine (18 March 2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
A.L. Leshchenko:
to be taken into account
during the criminal
proceeding
61
NATIONAL POLICE
MAIN DONETSK REGIONAL
ADMINISTRATION OF THE NATIONAL POLICE
86 pr. Nakhimova, Mariupol 87517
March 18, 2016 No. 1812/04/18-2016 In response to No. 1457 of 3/2/2016
S.M. Onikeyenko:
For the criminal case file and for organizing
[illegible]
[signature] Leshchenko 3.30.16
S.M. Onikeyenko
Senior Investigator
Main Military Prosecutors Office
Prosecutor Generals Office of Ukraine
13/15 vul. Riznytska, Kyiv-11 01011
Dear Serhiy Mykolayevych,
I hereby inform you of the following with respect to the pretrial investigation in criminal
proceeding No. 220155050000000021 of 1/13/2015 concerning elements of a criminal offense
provided for by Article 258(3) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
It will not be possible to send the Prosecutor Generals Office of Ukraine video recordings
from the fixed video surveillance camera located on the roof of fixed post No. 5 of the State Traffic
Inspectorate Administration of the Main Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Ukraine for the period from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on January 13, 2015, due to the fact
that the Kyiv-2 special-purpose battalion was stationed at the fixed post. All of the video
surveillance cameras and recordings made by them belong to and are being held by the leadership
of that battalion. The same applies to information concerning persons who crossed, in either
direction, the temporary checkpoint controlled by the Kyiv-2 special-purpose battalion. The Armor
registration database was not checked due to the fact that no such database is available.
- the category and purpose of the N-20 Slovyansk-Donetsk-Mariupol road: category 1, has
4 lanes for vehicular traffic
- the equipping and infrastructure of the road: road signs, road surface markings, metal
barriers, bus stops
- the intensity of traffic and vehicle load: 3,027 vehicles per day
- the existence of cameras along the entire length of the road, including at filling stations and
other infrastructure facilities (video recording mode): none
- the existence of road signs near fixed and temporary posts (warning signs, yield signs,
restrictive sings, guiding signs, information signs, service signs, etc.): a temporary
checkpoint controlled by the Kyiv-2 Special-Purpose Battalion
10/4-947 incoming-16 m2 Prosecutor Generals Office of Ukraine
62
was set up at the 178-km-000 mark, equipped with road signs
- the existence of video surveillance cameras and special road maintenance equipment on
the N-20 road - none.
The existence of regular traffic routes, including routes for passenger service, and the
intensity thereofregulated by the Department of Transportation of the Military-Civilian
Administration of the Donetsk Region.
Equipping of fixed post No. 5, Road Patrol Service Battalion of the Donetsk Regional
Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, January 13, 2015, as well as: procedures
for patrol duty by the law-enforcement agencies, installation of video surveillance and procedures
for patrol duty since the beginning of the Counterterrorism Operation and during its prosecution:
officers of the State Traffic Inspectorate Administration of the Donetsk Regional Directorate of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine were not involved in supervising road traffic at fixed
post No. 5; the Kyiv-2 special-purpose battalion was stationed there.
It will not be possible to provide any information concerning the operation of fixed post
No. 5 on January 13, 2015, since fixed post No. 5 was controlled by the Kyiv-2 special-purpose
battalion.
Sincerely,
Deputy Head
Police Colonel [signature] V.S. Filashkin
Prepared by: A.O. Melnikov, 067-718-10-79
Annex 148
Case No. 757/21825/16-k, Order of the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv regarding
temporary access to and seizure of document copies from TOV Lifecell (dated 11 May
2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Translation from Ukrainian
/Rectangular stamp: Lifecell, a limited liability company. Our ref. # 13165 BK. May 12, 2016/
Handwritten phone numbers: 044-233-90-01
063-544-35-89
PECHERSKY DISTRICT COURT OF KYIV
Case # 757/21825/16-k
COURT DECISION
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
On May 11, 2016 Tsokol, L.I., an investigating judge of the Pechersky District Court of the city of Kyiv, with
Storozhuk, E. Yu., a court secretary, participating, having examined in an open court session and in the building of
the court a request submitted by Onikeyenko, S.M., a senior major case investigator of the Chief Military
Prosecutors Office at the Office of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine, concerning temporary access to documents,
DETERMINED
Onikeyenko, Serhiy Mykolayovych, a senior major case investigator of the Chief Military Prosecutors
Office at the Office of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine, having examined the materials of criminal proceedings #
22015050000000021 of January 13, 2015, and having received an approval of prosecutor Scherbak, A., turned to
the court with a request, which he upheld at the time of its examination.
In accordance with Part 2 of Article 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine the person who
possesses the information, was not summoned to be present at the court session.
It was determined that the investigation section of the department investigating crimes against the
fundamental security of the Ukrainian state, as well as crimes against peace, safety of mankind and international
rule of law of the Chief Military Prosecutors Office at the Office of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine was carrying
out a pretrial investigation for criminal proceedings # 22015050000000021 initiated on January 13, 2015 regarding
the commission of a deadly act of terror with elements of a criminal act referred to in Part 3, Article 258 of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine.
Based on the materials of the criminal proceedings it appears that on January 13 at 2:25 PM individuals
who were not identified in the course of the pretrial investigation, being located at the north-eastern suburb of the
city of Dokuchayivsk, Donetsk oblast, using 120 mm free-flight highly explosive fragmentation shells -21
(product 9 M 22) launched from no less than three multiple launch rocket systems -21 Grad, attacked by fire
the territory of the checkpoint of the Military Forces of Ukraine organized on Slavyansk Mariupol H-20
motorway in the vicinity of fixed security station # 5 of the Road Traffic Police under the Senior Administration of
Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Donetsk oblast.
As a result of that attack by fire a commuter bus I-VAN Tata A0718, state matriculation # AH 0985 AA,
shuttling between Zlatoustovka and Donetsk, was damaged, 12 people who had been wounded by shell fragments
were killed and 19 other people (including an officer of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine) got injuries of
various severity.
As a result of the examination of the scene carried out on January 16, 2015 it was determined that the
holes, discovered near the checkpoint, had been formed by shells, probably launched from the north-eastern
suburb of the city of Dokuchayivsk, Donetsk oblast.
The individuals that had been interrogated in connection with the explosion as well as witnesses reported
that, judging by the sound, the shells that blew up near the bus, were flying from the north-east, having possibly
been launched from the territory controlled by the DPR military group.
To provide for a complete, objective and comprehensive investigation of all circumstances related to the
carrying out of this act of terror that caused death of people, as well as to identify those involved in the carrying
out of the said act of terror, there arose a requirement to get an access to the information about the mobile base
stations of the corresponding mobile operators that were functioning (providing for the coverage) in the north-
eastern suburb of the city of Dokuchayivsk, Donetsk Oblast, within the zone from which the said shells had been
launched.
Thus, in the course of the pretrial investigation related to the said criminal proceedings it became
necessary that information on the specific mobile base stations of the corresponding mobile operators that were
functioning (covered) in the said territory during the period from January 12, 2015 to January 13, 2015 be
provided.
Taking into account and considering the fact that the materials of the criminal proceedings refer to
sufficient grounds to consider that the said documents are of substantial value when it comes to identification of
important circumstances in the criminal proceedings, therefore, for the submitted request to be efficiently
executed it should be recognized as grounded and as such subject to being satisfied.
Therefore, on the grounds of the aforementioned and based on Articles 160-166 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of Ukraine the investigating judge
DECIDED:
To give the Onikeyenko, Serhiy Mykolayovych, a senior major case investigator of the Chief Military
Prosecutors Office at the Office of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine, or to other investigators from the
investigating group appointed/delegated by him, a temporary access and a permission to turn to Lifecell, a Limited
Liability Company, situated at the address as follows: 12, Amosova Str., Kyiv, 03680, and to obtain therefrom the
hard and soft copies of documents containing information on the specific mobile base stations of the
corresponding mobile operator that were functioning (covered) in the in the north-eastern suburb of the city of
Dokuchayivsk, Donetsk Oblast, within the zone from which the said shells had been launched, namely in the
territory lying within the following grid points: (latitude: N47.761890 = 47045.71 = 4704542.8, longitude:
E37.67890 = 37040.73 = 3704044; latitude: N47.763040 = 47045.78 = 4704546.9, longitude: E37.703960 =
37042.24 = 3704214.3; latitude: N47.744810 = 47044.69 = 4704441.30, longitude: E37.700870 = 37042.05 =
370423.1; latitude: N47.745560 = 47044.73 = 47044440, longitude: E37.678640 = 37040.72 = 3704043.1)
during the period from January 12, 2015 to January 13, 2015.
To determine the validity period of the decision as twenty working days, which should begin on the day of
the investigating judges pronouncing the decision.
Should the present order concerning the temporary access to the materials and documents not be
fulfilled, the investigating judge, the court as per the request of the criminal proceedings party that has been
granted such an access to the materials and documents based on the order, is entitled to enact another regulation
sanctioning a search in accordance with the regulations of this Code in order to find and collect the said materials
and documents. The order/decision shall not subject to any appeal.
Investigating Judge L.I. Tsokol (signed) [illegible] L.I. Tsokol
Executed in 2 copies
Note 1 case # 757/21825 /16-k
Note 2 investigator Onikeyenko, S.M.
Copy Lifecell, LLC, 12, Amosova Str., Kyiv
Executed by: L.I. Tsokol, May 11, 2016
Round seal: /Ukraine. Pechersky District Court of the City of Kyiv. Identification code 02896745/
Pechersk District Court of the City of Kyiv
Tsokol [barcode]
*2606*16585114*1*1*
LIFECELL Lifecell, Limited Liability Company
11 - A, Solomyanska Str., Kyiv 03110, Ukraine
Phone: +38 (044) 233-31-31, fax: +38 (044) 594-40-90
Email: [email protected]; web: www.lifecell.com.ua
Reg. code: 22859846
Our ref : 003516, of June 06, 2016 Attn. : Onikeyenko, S. M., a senior major case investigator of
the Chief Military Prosecutors Office at the Office of the
General Prosecutor of Ukraine
13/15, Riznitska Str., 01601 Kyiv
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
In compliance with the order of investigating judge of Pechersky District Court of the City of Kyiv of May 11, 2016
as per case # 757/21825/16-k related to mobile base station of Lifecell, a telecommunication operator, that could
function (be covered) in the territory of the north-eastern suburb of the city of Dokuchayivsk, Donetsk oblast,
during the period from January 12, 2015 to January 13, 2015 we hereby provide the following information:
SITE ID CELL ID ADDRESS LAC CID
DO0302 DO03021 Donetsk oblast, Volnovakha district, city of Dokuchayivsk,
88 Tsentralna Str., GSM-1800
20505 3021
DO0302 DO03025 Donetsk oblast, Volnovakha district, city of Dokuchayivsk,
88 Tsentralna Str., GSM-900
20505 3025
DO0427 DO04276 Donetsk oblast, Volnovakha district, city of Dokuchayivsk,
40 Kosmonavtiv Str., GSM-900
20505 4276
DO0427 DO04275 Donetsk oblast, Volnovakha district, city of Dokuchayivsk,
40 Kosmonavtiv Str., GSM-900
20505 4275
DO0301 DO03012 Donetsk oblast, Volnovakha district, city of Dokuchayivsk,
53 Lenina Str., GSM-1800
20505 3012
DO0301 DO03016 Donetsk oblast, Volnovakha district, city of Dokuchayivsk,
53 Lenina Str., GSM-900
20505 3016
DO0302 DO03022 Donetsk oblast, Volnovakha district, city of Oleksandrivka,
174 Lenina Str., GSM-1800
20505 3022
DO0302 DO03026 Donetsk oblast, Volnovakha district, city of Dokuchayivsk,
88 Tsentralna Str., GSM-900
20505 3026
DO0301 DO03012 Donetsk oblast, Volnovakha district, city of Dokuchayivsk,
53 Lenina Str., GSM-1800
20505 3012
DO0301 DO03016 Donetsk oblast, Volnovakha district, city of Dokuchayivsk,
53 Lenina Str., GSM-900
20505 3016
DO0302 DO03022 Donetsk oblast, Volnovakha district, city of Dokuchayivsk,
88 Tsentralna Str., GSM-1800
20505 3022
DO0302 DO03026 Donetsk oblast, Volnovakha district, city of Dokuchayivsk,
88 Tsentralna Str., GSM-900
20505 3026
Head of Relations and Communications Dept.
of Lifecell, LLC
(signed) [illegible] R.V. Andriyenko
Address for correspondence
Phone: 0 800 20 5433, phone: (044) 233 3131, fax: (044) 594 4090
12 Amosova Str., Gorizont Park Center, Kyiv 03680
www.lifecell.com.ua
Stamp: Confidential
Mobile communication services, licence of the National Radio-communications Committee # 222715 of November 17, 2005.
Lifecell, Limited Liability Company, 11 - A, Solomyanska Str., Kyiv 03110, Ukraine, network codes: 63, 73, 93
Annex 149
Case No. 757/21828/16-k, Order of the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv regarding
temporary access to and seizure of document copies from PrAT MTS (dated 11 May
2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Translation from Ukrainian
105
MTC Ukraine
May 12, 2016
Our ref.: GD 16 - 15548
PECHERSKY DISTRICT COURT OF KYIV
Case # 757/21828/16-k
COURT DECISION
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
On May 11, 2016 Tsokol, L.I., an investigating judge of the Pechersky District Court of the city of Kyiv, with
Storozhuk, E. Yu., a court secretary, participating, having examined in an open court session and in the building of
the court a request submitted by Onikeyenko, S.M., a senior major case investigator of the Chief Military
Prosecutors Office at the Office of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine, concerning temporary access to documents,
DETERMINED
Onikeyenko, Serhiy Mykolayovych, a senior major case investigator of the Chief Military Prosecutors
Office at the Office of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine, having examined the materials of criminal proceedings #
22015050000000021 of January 13, 2015, and having received an approval of prosecutor Scherbak, A., turned to
the court with a request, which he upheld at the time of its examination.
In accordance with Part 2 of Article 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine the person who
possesses the information, was not summoned to be present at the court session.
It was determined that the investigation section of the department investigating crimes against the
fundamental security of the Ukrainian state, as well as crimes against peace, safety of mankind and international
rule of law of the Chief Military Prosecutors Office at the Office of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine was carrying
out a pretrial investigation for criminal proceedings # 22015050000000021 initiated on January 13, 2015 regarding
the commission of a deadly act of terror with elements of a criminal act referred to in Part 3, Article 258 of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine.
Based on the materials of the criminal proceedings it appears that on January 13 at 2:25 PM individuals
who were not identified in the course of the pretrial investigation, being located at the north-eastern suburb of the
city of Dokuchayivsk, Donetsk oblast, using 120 mm free-flight highly explosive fragmentation shells -21
(product 9 M 22) launched from no less than three multiple launch rocket systems -21 Grad, attacked by fire
the territory of the checkpoint of the Military Forces of Ukraine organized on Slavyansk Mariupol H-20
motorway in the vicinity of fixed security station # 5 of the Road Traffic Police under the Senior Administration of
Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Donetsk oblast.
As a result of that attack by fire a commuter bus I-VAN Tata A0718, state matriculation # AH 0985 AA,
shuttling between Zlatoustovka and Donetsk, was damaged, 12 people who had been wounded by shell fragments
were killed and 19 other people (including an officer of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine) got injuries of
various severity.
As a result of the examination of the scene carried out on January 16, 2015 it was determined that the
holes, discovered near the checkpoint, had been formed by shells, probably launched from the north-eastern
suburb of the city of Dokuchayivsk, Donetsk oblast.
The individuals that had been interrogated in connection with the explosion as well as witnesses reported
that, judging by the sound, the shells that blew up near the bus, were flying from the north-east, having possibly
been launched from the territory controlled by the DPR military group.
To provide for a complete, objective and comprehensive investigation of all circumstances related to the
carrying out of this act of terror that caused death of people, as well as to identify those involved in the carrying
out of the said act of terror, there arose a requirement to get an access to the information about the mobile base
stations of the corresponding mobile operators that were functioning (providing for the coverage) in the north-
eastern suburb of the city of Dokuchayivsk, Donetsk Oblast, within the zone from which the said shells had been
launched.
Thus, in the course of the pretrial investigation related to the said criminal proceedings it became
necessary that information on the specific mobile base stations of the corresponding mobile operators that were
functioning (covered) in the said territory during the period from January 12, 2015 to January 13, 2015 be
provided.
Taking into account and considering the fact that the materials of the criminal proceedings refer to
sufficient grounds to consider that the said documents are of substantial value when it comes to identification of
important circumstances in the criminal proceedings, therefore, for the submitted request to be efficiently
executed it should be recognized as grounded and as such subject to being satisfied.
Therefore, on the grounds of the aforementioned and based on Articles 160-166 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of Ukraine the investigating judge
DECIDED:
To give the Onikeyenko, Serhiy Mykolayovych, a senior major case investigator of the Chief Military
Prosecutors Office at the Office of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine, or to other investigators from the
investigating group appointed/delegated by him, a temporary access and a permission to turn to Lifecell, a Limited
Liability Company, situated at the address as follows: 12, Amosova Str., Kyiv, 03680, and to obtain therefrom the
hard and soft copies of documents containing information on the specific mobile base stations of the
corresponding mobile operator that were functioning (covered) in the in the north-eastern suburb of the city of
Dokuchayivsk, Donetsk Oblast, within the zone from which the said shells had been launched, namely in the
territory lying within the following grid points: (latitude: N47.761890 = 47045.71 = 4704542.8, longitude:
E37.67890 = 37040.73 = 3704044; latitude: N47.763040 = 47045.78 = 4704546.9, longitude: E37.703960 =
37042.24 = 3704214.3; latitude: N47.744810 = 47044.69 = 4704441.30, longitude: E37.700870 = 37042.05 =
370423.1; latitude: N47.745560 = 47044.73 = 47044440, longitude: E37.678640 = 37040.72 = 3704043.1)
during the period from January 12, 2015 to January 13, 2015.
To determine the validity period of the decision as twenty working days, which should begin on the day of
the investigating judges pronouncing the decision.
Should the present order concerning the temporary access to the materials and documents not be
fulfilled, the investigating judge, the court as per the request of the criminal proceedings party that has been
granted such an access to the materials and documents based on the order, is entitled to enact another regulation
sanctioning a search in accordance with the regulations of this Code in order to find and collect the said materials
and documents. The order/decision shall not subject to any appeal.
Investigating Judge L.I. Tsokol (signed) [illegible] L.I. Tsokol
Executed in 2 copies
Note 1 case # 757/21825 /16-k
Note 2 investigator Onikeyenko, S.M.
Copy Lifecell, LLC, 12, Amosova Str., Kyiv
Executed by: L.I. Tsokol, May 11, 2016
Round seal: /Ukraine. Pechersky District Court of the City of Kyiv. Identification code 02896745/
Pechersk District Court of the City of Kyiv
Tsokol [barcode]
*2606*16585114*1*1*
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
For Temporary Access to Materials and Documents
City (village): Kyiv, June 6, 2016
Onikeyenko, Serhiy Mykolayovych, a senior major case investigator of the Chief Military Prosecutors Office at
the
Office of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine
(investigator, position, agency name, initials, last name)
during the period from 12:00 PM till __: __, being on the premises of MTC, a Private Joint-Stock Company, located
at the address as follows: 15, Leiptsigska, based on Articles 103-107, Article 165 pf the Code of Criminal Procedure
of Ukraine, in the presence of a person representing MTC, a Private Joint-Stock Company,
Mr. Kurbatov, Mykola Pavlovych
(the person indicated in the decision of the investigating judge, court concerning the temporary access to
materials and documents as an owner of these materials and documents)
(senior specialist [illegible] of MTC Ukraine)
[illegible]
with attesting witnesses participating, to whom the requirements of Part 3, Article 66 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of Ukraine concerning their responsibility to abstain from disclosing ant information about these
procedural actions was explained: NOT APPLICABLE
having in advance informed the participants of the use of registration devices as well as of the procedures and
conditions of their use:
(no registration devices have been used)
based on the decision of the Pechersky District Court of the City of Kyiv, justice Tsokol, L.I., of May 11, 2016
concerning the temporary access to materials and documents, has familiarized himself / herself with:
information, made accessible by virtue of the decision of the Pechersky District Court of the City of Kyiv on May 11,
2016 in case 757/21828/16-k, that is laid out on 1 sheet of paper bearing an indication of [illegible] CD/KI-680
on May 16, 2016.
Before the beginning of the procedural action, the representative of MTC, a Private Joint-Stock Company, Mr.
Kurbatov, Mykola Pavlovych
(the person indicated in the decision of the investigating judge, court concerning the temporary access to materials
and documents as an owner of these materials and documents)
(senior specialist [illegible] of MTC Ukraine)
was shown the original of the said court determination, given its copy and provided with explanations to the effect
that in accordance with Article 166 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine in case the present order
concerning the temporary access to the materials and documents not be fulfilled, the investigating judge, the court
as per the request of the criminal proceedings party that has been granted such an access to the materials and
documents based on the order, is entitled to enact another regulation sanctioning a search in accordance with the
regulations of this Code in order to find and collect the said materials and documents.
During the examination of the information it was determined that:
information, made accessible by virtue of the decision of the Pechersky District Court of the City of Kyiv on May 11,
2016 in case 757/21828/16-k, that is laid out on 1 sheet of paper bearing an indication of [illegible]
CD/KI-16/6880 on May 16, 2016.
(description of materials and documents)
The owner was given the list of the material and documents collected, the copy of the list is attached hereto.
The present Report of Proceedings was read and understood: the Report of Proceedings was read out, a list of
materials and documents that were withdrawn by virtue of the decision of the Pechersky District Court of the City of
Kyiv on May 11, 2016 in case 757/21828/16-k was given to the representative of MTC,
a Private Joint-Stock Company.
Due to the fact that the person that took part in the procedural actions refused to sign the Report of Proceedings,
he/she was given the right to give written explanations of the reasons of this refusal: NOT APPLICABLE
The fact of giving (or refusing to give) written explanations of reasons as to the refusal to sign the present Report
of Proceedings is certified by the signature of the persons attorney (official representative), and in case of absence
of such an official by witnesses: NOT APPLICABLE.
Due to the fact that the person is physically invalidated or that, for any other reasons, he/she is not able to sign the
Report of Proceedings himself/herself, the review of the present Report will take place in the presence of the
persons attorney (official representative), who shall certify by his/her signature that the person is unable to sign
the Report of Proceedings: NOT APPLICABLE.
Owner of the documents: M.P. Kurbatov (signed) [illegible]
Witnesses: NOT APPLICABLE
Report of Proceedings executed by: Onikeyenko, Serhiy Mykolayovych, a senior major case investigator of the
Chief Military Prosecutors Office at the Office of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine
(investigator, position, agency name, initials, last name)
(signed) [illegible]
ANNEX TO REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
Concerning Temporary Access
to Materials and Documents
Of June 6, 2016
DESCRIPTION
of Materials and Documents that were Collected Based on the Court Decision
Information, made accessible by virtue of the decision of the Pechersky District Court of the City of Kyiv, judge
Tsokol, L.I., on May 11, 2016 in case 757/21828/16-k, that is laid out on 1 sheet of paper bearing an indication of
[illegible] CD/KI-6/6880 on May 16, 2016.
Copy of the list given to:
Senior Specialist in [illegible]
Of MTC Ukraine, Private Joint-Stock Company
Kurbatov, M.P. (sihned) [illegible]
Onikeyenko, Serhiy Mykolayovych, a senior major case investigator of the Chief Military Prosecutors Office at
the Office of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine
(investigator, position, agency name, initials, last name)
(signed) [illegible]
-GD/KI-/16/6880 CONFIDENTIAL
May 16, 2016
LAC CI Azimuth Angle Base Station Address
62470 9231 40 Dokychayivsk, Donetsk oblast (Avangard Stadium)
62470 9232 180 Dokychayivsk, Donetsk oblast (Avangard Stadium)
62470 9233 310 Dokychayivsk, Donetsk oblast (Avangard Stadium)
62470 14231 40 Dokychayivsk, Donetsk oblast (Avangard Stadium)
62470 14232 180 Dokychayivsk, Donetsk oblast (Avangard Stadium)
62470 14233 310 Dokychayivsk, Donetsk oblast (Avangard Stadium)
62470 42871 60 Dokychayivsk, Donetsk oblast, 96, Lenina Str. (Boiler-house pipe)
62470 42872 160 Dokychayivsk, Donetsk oblast, 96, Lenina Str. (Boiler-house pipe)
62470 42873 320 Dokychayivsk, Donetsk oblast, 96, Lenina Str. (Boiler-house pipe)
62470 17531 75 Dokychayivsk, Donetsk oblast, 96, Lenina Str. (Boiler-house pipe)
62470 17532 180 Dokychayivsk, Donetsk oblast, 96, Lenina Str. (Boiler-house pipe)
62470 17533 330 Dokychayivsk, Donetsk oblast, 96, Lenina Str. (Boiler-house pipe)
62470 15261 160 Dokychayivsk, Donetsk oblast, 41, Dzerzhinskogo Str. (Store # 19)
62470 15262 250 Dokychayivsk, Donetsk oblast, 41, Dzerzhinskogo Str. (Store # 19)
62470 15263 340 Dokychayivsk, Donetsk oblast, 41, Dzerzhinskogo Str. (Store # 19)
62470 42861 150 Dokychayivsk, Donetsk oblast, (Dokychayivsk Dolomitic Lime Fluxes Combine)
62470 42862 320 Dokychayivsk, Donetsk oblast, (Dokychayivsk Dolomitic Lime Fluxes Combine)
62470 42865 150 Dokychayivsk, Donetsk oblast, (Dokychayivsk Dolomitic Lime Fluxes Combine)
62470 42866 320 Dokychayivsk, Donetsk oblast, (Dokychayivsk Dolomitic Lime Fluxes Combine)
Stamp: Copy
Round seal: /MTC Ukraine. City of Kyiv. Ukraine. Private Joint-Stock Company. ID # 14333937/
Annex 150
Expert Report, drafted by Serhiy Onikeyenko, Investigations Department
Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine, and Viktor Levchenko, Lieutenant Colonel of the
Ukrainian Armed Forces ( 1 June 2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
[signature]
REVIEW REPORT
The City of Kyiv June 1, 2016
The review started at 12:00 p.m.
The review ended at 2:50 p.m.
Senior special investigator at the Investigations Department at the Main Military Prosecutor's
Office of the Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine Serhiy Mykolayovych Onikeyenko in connection with
the pretrial investigation in criminal case no. 22015050000000021 of January 13, 2015 on grounds of
criminal offenses covered by articles 258 (3) and 438 (2) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine in
accordance with articles 104, 105, 106, 223, 234, and 237 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Ukraine,
With the participation of an expert: a senior officer from the organization and planning
department at the staff of the Missile and Artillery Troops of the Ground Troops Command of the
Ukrainian Armed Forces, Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Mykolayovych Levchenko, born on December
1, 1980, military unit A0105 (t. m. 096-96-08-048), who was advised of his rights and obligations
under Article 71 (4-5) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.
The person taking part in the review was also advised of the requirement outlined in Art. 66 (3)
of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine concerning the obligation not to disclose any information
pertaining to the procedural action.
During the investigation proceedings, expert V. M. Levchenko received for his perusal the
materials of criminal case no. 22015050000000021 of January 13, 2015, namely:
- the scene inspection report (on the damaged bus and the civilians who died in it) of January 13,
2015, with annexes thereto, a layout diagram, and photoboards on 29 sheets (volume 1, 9-37);
- the scene inspection report (on the surrounding area, the craters at the scene from where metal
objects had been removed) of January 13, 2015 with a layout diagram attached on 6 sheets (volume
1, 38-43);
- the inspection report (on the craters at the scene and metal objects removed from them) of
January 14, 2015, with annexes thereto, a layout diagram, and photoboards on 8 sheets (volume 1,
71-78);
- the inspection report (all the craters that were formed in the area adjacent to the checkpoint) of
January 16, 2015 without annexes on 11 sheets (volume 1, 118-128);
- the inspection report (specifying the angle of the entry of the shells with the participation of an
expert from a missile and artillery battalion, military unit number A 2167, S. V. Dmitriyev) of
January 16, 2015 with an area map attached on which the expert indicated the trajectory flown by the
shells on 6 sheets (volume 1, 129-134);
- the report on the inspection of video recordings and the viewing of the video recordings made
by surveillance cameras and materials pertaining to the conducted forensic examinations.
Having studied the aforesaid materials, expert V. M. Levchenko stated that the fragments that had
been removed from the explosion site were fragments of an M 21 OF high-explosive fragmentation missile
projectile and its component parts.
The metal fragments depicted on the photoboards attached to the inspection reports and the
conclusion of an explosives expert no. 63 of January 18, 2015 were parts of the aforesaid shells tail.
During the review, expert V. M. Levchenko, using
- an aiming circle AK-4;
- a ruler MPL-50;
- a range table for firing M-21 OF high-explosive fragmentation missile shells (published by the
USSR Defense Ministrys Military Publishing House, 1975);
[signature]
- a Samsung tablet operating on the Army SOS software and a pencil reported the following:
Considering the place where the high-explosive fragmentation missile shells exploded and the front
of those shells explosions, the shell explosion (crater) is taken to be the middle of the explosion front,
which is marked in the scene inspection report of January 16, 2015 with the participation of expert S. V.
Dmitriyev as no. 2 (with coordinates x-6678, y-89,821) and the explosions grid azimuth 6-32. The shell
entered the ground at 52-55 degrees, with the average taken to be 53 degrees.
As per the regulations, high-explosive fragmentation missile shells can be fired from a BM-21
(combat vehicle) as follows: 1) without a locking ring, 2) with a small locking ring, and 3) with a large
locking ring.
If a high-explosive fragmentation missile shell is used without a locking ring, its flight (fire) range
will be 19 kilometers 200 meters. Taking into account explosion no. 2 (taken to be the middle of the
explosion front), its grid azimuth (6-32), its angle of fall (53 degrees), which corresponds to a range of 19
kilometers 200 meters in the Range Table, it is possible to calculate (using rulers and a Samsung tablet
operating on the Army SOS software) the location of the likely firing position from which the high-
explosive fragmentation missile shells were fired.
The coordinates of the firing position will probably be as follows: x-91914 and y-01640, the height
of 139 meters. On the area map, it is located in the eastern part of the town of Dokuchayevsk.
If a high-explosive fragmentation missile shell is used with a small locking ring, its flight (fire)
range will be 15 kilometers 200 meters. Taking into account explosion no. 2 (taken to be the middle of the
explosion front), its grid azimuth (6-32), and its angle of fall (53 degrees), which corresponds to a range of
15 kilometers 200 meters in the Range Table, it is possible to calculate (using rulers and a Samsung tablet
operating on the Army SOS software) the location of the likely firing position from which the high-
explosive fragmentation missile shells were fired.
The coordinates of the firing position will probably be as follows: x-88776 and y-99177, the height
of 147 meters. On the area map, it is located in the south-western part of the town of Dokuchayevsk.
If a high-explosive fragmentation missile shell is used with a large locking ring, its flight (fire)
range will be 11 kilometers 470 meters. Taking into account explosion no. 2 (taken to be the middle of the
explosion front), its grid azimuth (6-32), its angle of fall (53 degrees), which corresponds to a range of 11
kilometers 470 meters in the Range Table, it is possible to calculate (using rulers and a Samsung tablet
operating on the Army SOS software) the location of the likely firing position from which the high-
explosive fragmentation missile shells were fired.
The coordinates of the firing position will probably be as follows: x-85836 and y-96883, the height
of 180 meters. On the area map, it is located two kilometers to the south-east of the town of
Novotroyitske.
The location of firing positions no. 2 and no. 3 would be the closest to the contact line between the
Ukrainian Armed Forces and illegal armed groups, and therefore, they are unlikely.
I would like to note that the most probable firing position is firing position no. 1, because it is
located the furthest away from the deployment area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and, therefore, the
firing position of the shooters could not be quickly identified and response fire could not be opened.
In order to install locking rings one does not need the knowledge of combat calculations or additional
time. Moreover, in addition, in order to provide "cover" for and ensure the personal safety of the
shooters," they used the civilian infrastructure of the town of Dokuchayivsk. The aforesaid firing
position does not need to be immediately rolled up and abandoned unlike the other two firing positions
located on open terrain, where they could be quickly detected by the reconnaissance capabilities of the
Ukrainian Armed Forces and inevitably attacked by response fire, which would have caused a
significant loss of military equipment and personnel.
Since, in the course of the review of the provided materials of the criminal case, no items were
identified with an external appearance similar to that of metal fragments of locking rings, one can assume
that they were not used.
I would like to note that the BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launcher has 40 guides. Since, according
to the inspection report of January 16, 2015, there are 88 points of impact in the area adjacent to the
checkpoint, one can conclude that the aforesaid shells had been fired from at least three BM-21 Grad
multiple rocket launchers.
[signature]
Having inspected the damaged i-
can assume that such damage is typical of damage caused by an M-21 OF high-explosive fragmentation
missile shell.
The inspection was conducted in Office no. 316 of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office of the
Prosecutor General of Ukraine located at the address: Kyiv, vul. Klovsky Spusk, 36/1.
The report has been read, printed correctly, no comments received from a participant in the
investigation proceedings.
The expert:
[signature:] V. M. Levchenko [signature]
(surname, patronymic) (signature)
June 1, 2016
The inspection was conducted by:
Senior special investigator at Main Military Prosecutor's Office
of the Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, Colonel of Justice
[signature] S. Onikeyenko
Annex 151
Expert Report, drafted by Serhiy Onikeyenko, Investigations Department
Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine, and Viktor Levchenko, Lieutenant Colonel of the
Ukrainian Armed Forces ( 1 June 2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
[signature]
REVIEW REPORT
The City of Kyiv June 1, 2016
The review started at 12:00 p.m.
The review ended at 2:50 p.m.
Senior special investigator at the Investigations Department at the Main Military Prosecutor's
Office of the Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine Serhiy Mykolayovych Onikeyenko in connection with
the pretrial investigation in criminal case no. 22015050000000021 of January 13, 2015 on grounds of
criminal offenses covered by articles 258 (3) and 438 (2) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine in
accordance with articles 104, 105, 106, 223, 234, and 237 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Ukraine,
With the participation of an expert: a senior officer from the organization and planning
department at the staff of the Missile and Artillery Troops of the Ground Troops Command of the
Ukrainian Armed Forces, Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Mykolayovych Levchenko, born on December
1, 1980, military unit A0105 (t. m. 096-96-08-048), who was advised of his rights and obligations
under Article 71 (4-5) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.
The person taking part in the review was also advised of the requirement outlined in Art. 66 (3)
of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine concerning the obligation not to disclose any information
pertaining to the procedural action.
During the investigation proceedings, expert V. M. Levchenko received for his perusal the
materials of criminal case no. 22015050000000021 of January 13, 2015, namely:
- the scene inspection report (on the damaged bus and the civilians who died in it) of January 13,
2015, with annexes thereto, a layout diagram, and photoboards on 29 sheets (volume 1, 9-37);
- the scene inspection report (on the surrounding area, the craters at the scene from where metal
objects had been removed) of January 13, 2015 with a layout diagram attached on 6 sheets (volume
1, 38-43);
- the inspection report (on the craters at the scene and metal objects removed from them) of
January 14, 2015, with annexes thereto, a layout diagram, and photoboards on 8 sheets (volume 1,
71-78);
- the inspection report (all the craters that were formed in the area adjacent to the checkpoint) of
January 16, 2015 without annexes on 11 sheets (volume 1, 118-128);
- the inspection report (specifying the angle of the entry of the shells with the participation of an
expert from a missile and artillery battalion, military unit number A 2167, S. V. Dmitriyev) of
January 16, 2015 with an area map attached on which the expert indicated the trajectory flown by the
shells on 6 sheets (volume 1, 129-134);
- the report on the inspection of video recordings and the viewing of the video recordings made
by surveillance cameras and materials pertaining to the conducted forensic examinations.
Having studied the aforesaid materials, expert V. M. Levchenko stated that the fragments that had
been removed from the explosion site were fragments of an M 21 OF high-explosive fragmentation missile
projectile and its component parts.
The metal fragments depicted on the photoboards attached to the inspection reports and the
conclusion of an explosives expert no. 63 of January 18, 2015 were parts of the aforesaid shells tail.
During the review, expert V. M. Levchenko, using
- an aiming circle AK-4;
- a ruler MPL-50;
- a range table for firing M-21 OF high-explosive fragmentation missile shells (published by the
USSR Defense Ministrys Military Publishing House, 1975);
[signature]
- a Samsung tablet operating on the Army SOS software and a pencil reported the following:
Considering the place where the high-explosive fragmentation missile shells exploded and the front
of those shells explosions, the shell explosion (crater) is taken to be the middle of the explosion front,
which is marked in the scene inspection report of January 16, 2015 with the participation of expert S. V.
Dmitriyev as no. 2 (with coordinates x-6678, y-89,821) and the explosions grid azimuth 6-32. The shell
entered the ground at 52-55 degrees, with the average taken to be 53 degrees.
As per the regulations, high-explosive fragmentation missile shells can be fired from a BM-21
(combat vehicle) as follows: 1) without a locking ring, 2) with a small locking ring, and 3) with a large
locking ring.
If a high-explosive fragmentation missile shell is used without a locking ring, its flight (fire) range
will be 19 kilometers 200 meters. Taking into account explosion no. 2 (taken to be the middle of the
explosion front), its grid azimuth (6-32), its angle of fall (53 degrees), which corresponds to a range of 19
kilometers 200 meters in the Range Table, it is possible to calculate (using rulers and a Samsung tablet
operating on the Army SOS software) the location of the likely firing position from which the high-
explosive fragmentation missile shells were fired.
The coordinates of the firing position will probably be as follows: x-91914 and y-01640, the height
of 139 meters. On the area map, it is located in the eastern part of the town of Dokuchayevsk.
If a high-explosive fragmentation missile shell is used with a small locking ring, its flight (fire)
range will be 15 kilometers 200 meters. Taking into account explosion no. 2 (taken to be the middle of the
explosion front), its grid azimuth (6-32), and its angle of fall (53 degrees), which corresponds to a range of
15 kilometers 200 meters in the Range Table, it is possible to calculate (using rulers and a Samsung tablet
operating on the Army SOS software) the location of the likely firing position from which the high-
explosive fragmentation missile shells were fired.
The coordinates of the firing position will probably be as follows: x-88776 and y-99177, the height
of 147 meters. On the area map, it is located in the south-western part of the town of Dokuchayevsk.
If a high-explosive fragmentation missile shell is used with a large locking ring, its flight (fire)
range will be 11 kilometers 470 meters. Taking into account explosion no. 2 (taken to be the middle of the
explosion front), its grid azimuth (6-32), its angle of fall (53 degrees), which corresponds to a range of 11
kilometers 470 meters in the Range Table, it is possible to calculate (using rulers and a Samsung tablet
operating on the Army SOS software) the location of the likely firing position from which the high-
explosive fragmentation missile shells were fired.
The coordinates of the firing position will probably be as follows: x-85836 and y-96883, the height
of 180 meters. On the area map, it is located two kilometers to the south-east of the town of
Novotroyitske.
The location of firing positions no. 2 and no. 3 would be the closest to the contact line between the
Ukrainian Armed Forces and illegal armed groups, and therefore, they are unlikely.
I would like to note that the most probable firing position is firing position no. 1, because it is
located the furthest away from the deployment area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and, therefore, the
firing position of the shooters could not be quickly identified and response fire could not be opened.
In order to install locking rings one does not need the knowledge of combat calculations or additional
time. Moreover, in addition, in order to provide "cover" for and ensure the personal safety of the
shooters," they used the civilian infrastructure of the town of Dokuchayivsk. The aforesaid firing
position does not need to be immediately rolled up and abandoned unlike the other two firing positions
located on open terrain, where they could be quickly detected by the reconnaissance capabilities of the
Ukrainian Armed Forces and inevitably attacked by response fire, which would have caused a
significant loss of military equipment and personnel.
Since, in the course of the review of the provided materials of the criminal case, no items were
identified with an external appearance similar to that of metal fragments of locking rings, one can assume
that they were not used.
I would like to note that the BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launcher has 40 guides. Since, according
to the inspection report of January 16, 2015, there are 88 points of impact in the area adjacent to the
checkpoint, one can conclude that the aforesaid shells had been fired from at least three BM-21 Grad
multiple rocket launchers.
[signature]
Having inspected the damaged i-
can assume that such damage is typical of damage caused by an M-21 OF high-explosive fragmentation
missile shell.
The inspection was conducted in Office no. 316 of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office of the
Prosecutor General of Ukraine located at the address: Kyiv, vul. Klovsky Spusk, 36/1.
The report has been read, printed correctly, no comments received from a participant in the
investigation proceedings.
The expert:
[signature:] V. M. Levchenko [signature]
(surname, patronymic) (signature)
June 1, 2016
The inspection was conducted by:
Senior special investigator at Main Military Prosecutor's Office
of the Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, Colonel of Justice
[signature] S. Onikeyenko
Annex 152
Case No. 757/21811/16-k, Order of the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv regarding
temporary access to and seizure of document copies from TOV Lifecell (10 June
2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
PECHERSKY DISTRICT COURT OF KYIV
Case No. 757/28211/16-k
ORDER
On June 10, 2016, S.Sh. Babenko, Investigating Judge at the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv, with the
minutes kept by court clerk V.Yu. Kravchenko, with the participation of a party to the criminal proceedings
S.M. Onikiyenko, Senior Investigator of High-Profile Cases at the Central Military Prosecutor's Office of
Ukraine, having examined in an open court hearing in the courtroom of the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv
the motion filed by S.M. Onikiyenko, Senior Investigator of High-Profile Cases at the Central Military
Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, and approved by A.H. Voyevoda, Department Prosecutor at the Central
Military Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, requesting temporary access to items and documents containing
secret information protected under law,
HAS ASCERTAINED THE FOLLOWING:
As part of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 22015050000000021 of January 13, 2015, the investigating
judge of the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv received a motion filed by S.M. Onikiyenko, Senior Investigator
of High-Profile Cases at the Central Military Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, and approved by A.H.
Voyevoda, Department Prosecutor at the Central Military Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, requesting
temporary access to items and documents containing secret information protected under law, i.e. a request
to review and receive copies of documents in electronic and hardcopy form stored by the mobile telecom
operator Lifecell LLC (registered office address: 11-A Solomyanska Street, Kyiv, 03100, with its place of
business at 12 Mykoly Amosova Street, Kyiv, 03680), which contain information about telecom services
provided to mobile subscribers who established connections via base stations of the mobile telecom
operator Lifecell LLC with the following parameters: LAC (local area code) - 20505, CID - 3021, 3025, 4276,
4275, 3012, 3016, 3022, 3026, 3012, 3016, 3022, 3026 - for the period from January 12, 2015 to January
13, 2015.
The party to the criminal proceedings has substantiated the motion by citing the fact that the Investigative
Office with the Directorate for Investigation of Crimes Against the Fundamentals of National Security of
Ukraine, Peace, Safety of Mankind, and International Law and Order at the Central Military Prosecutor's
Office of Ukraine is conducting a pretrial investigation in Criminal Case No. 22015050000000021 of
January 13, 2015 involving an act of terrorism that resulted in human fatalities, a violation of the laws and
customs of war in combination with homicide, which exhibits elements of criminal offenses punishable
under Part 3 of Article 258 and Part 2 of Article 438 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
It follows from the files of the criminal case that an artillery attack was committed at 2:25 p.m. on January
13, 2015 by individuals unidentified by the pretrial investigation. The attack came from the direction of the
northeastern outskirts of Dokuchaevsk, Donetsk Oblast, with the use of 120-mm unguided rocket-propelled
high-explosive fragmentation projectiles M-21 OF (Model 9M22U) fired by at least three -21 GRAD
multiple rocket launchers. The attack targeted 2 commuter buses with civilians on the N-20 motorway
connecting Slovyansk with Mariupol, at the exit from the town of Volnovakha.
This artillery attack damaged the commuter bus I-VAN Tata
from Zlatoustovka to Donetsk and inflicted shrapnel wounds on civilians, resulting in 12 fatalities among
civilians, with 19 more individuals (including one officer of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs)
sustaining wounds of varying degrees of severity.
[Kyryliuk *2606*17203672*1*1*]
LIFECELL
Limited Liability Company
Incoming Ref. No. 16485-VK
June 15, 2016
It has been further noted that the documents and items containing said information are at the disposal of the
telecom operator Lifecell LLC with its place of business at 12 Mykoly Amosova Street, Kyiv. In and of
themselves and in combination with other items and documents of the criminal proceedings, they are
instrumental to verifying the above-mentioned factual information.
Information received from the mobile operator can be used to prove facts and circumstances that have to be
proven in the context of the criminal proceedings. In particular, it would be possible to identify mobile
phones used by individuals unidentified by the investigation, who performed the attack, as well as their
owners or users.
The investigator has requested that the motion be granted in order to ensure a full, objective, and
comprehensive examination of all circumstances surrounding the act of terrorism that resulted in human
casualties, and also to identify the individuals complicit in this criminal offense.
The investigator asserted the motion during the court hearing, claiming that there are enough reasons to
believe that there is a real danger that the relevant information can be altered or destroyed.
The judicial examination has ascertained that the Investigative Office with the Directorate for Investigation
of Crimes Against the Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine, Peace, Safety of Mankind, and
International Law and Order at the Central Military Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine is conducting a pretrial
investigation in Criminal Case No. 22015050000000021 of January 13, 2015 involving an act of terrorism
that resulted in human fatalities, a violation of the laws and customs of war in combination with homicide,
which exhibits elements of criminal offenses punishable under Part 3 of Article 258 and Part 2 of Article 438
of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
Under Article 159 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, temporary access to items and documents
involves a process by which the person or entity in possession of said items or documents enables a party
to the criminal proceedings to review them, make copies of them, and seize them.
Temporary access to electronic data systems or parts thereof and mobile terminals of telecom systems is
exercised by making a copy of data stored in such electronic data systems or parties thereof and mobile
terminals of telecom systems without seizing them.
Temporary access to items and documents is exercised pursuant to an order of the investigating judge.
It follows from Clause 7 of Part 1 of Article 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine that secret
information protected under law and contained in items and documents include information at the disposal
of telecom operators and providers about calls, subscribers, telecom services provided, including telecom
services used, their duration, content, transmission routes, etc.
Pursuant to Part 6 of Article 163 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, the investigating judge shall
issue an order granting temporary access to items and documents containing secret information protected
under law if a party to criminal proceedings can prove that information contained in such items and
documents can be used as evidence as well as the fact that the circumstances to be proven using said
items and documents cannot be proven otherwise.
After hearing the arguments of the party to the criminal proceedings and considering the circumstances of
the alleged criminal offense the way they are presented in the motion filed by the prosecutor as well as the
legal substantiation of the motion, and having concluded that information about the subscribers mentioned
in the motion can be instrumental to ascertaining the circumstances to be proven as part of the criminal
proceedings, the investigating judge has concluded that the motion should be granted.
Guided by Articles 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 166, and 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, the
investigating judge
HAS DECIDED:
To grant the motion.
To grant S.M. Onikiyenko, Investigator of High-Profile Cases at the Central Military Prosecutor's Office, in
the context of Criminal Case No. 22015050000000021 of January 13, 2015 (with the right to delegate this
authority to another field office pursuant to Part 3 of Article 40 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine)
temporary access to the documents containing secret information protected under law, which are at the
disposal of the mobile operator Lifecell LLC (registered office address: 11-A Solomyanska Street, Kyiv,
03100, with its place of business at 12 Mykoly Amosova Street, Kyiv, 03680), which contain information
about telecom services provided to mobile subscribers who established connections via base stations of
the mobile telecom operator Lifecell LLC with the following parameters: LAC (local area code) - 20505, CID
- 3021, 3025, 4276, 4275, 3012, 3016, 3022, 3026, 3012, 3016, 3022, 3026 - for the period from January
12, 2015 to January 13, 2015.
To grant temporary access to documents containing information about the following:
addresses of base stations and azimuths;
types of connections (incoming and outgoing calls, SMS, MMS, GPRS, call forwarding);
dates, times and duration of connections;
addresses of the locations of mobile phone subscribers at the time of each incoming and outgoing
telephone connection, incoming and outgoing SMS and MMS messages;
IMSI numbers of the SIM card, IMEI);
identifying attributes of the terminal with which the communication session is established (Party B),
zero duration connections.
To establish the effective term of the order as one month, which shall run from the date of the order issued
by the investigating judge.
In the event of noncompliance with the order granting temporary access to items and documents, the
investigating judgefollowing a motion from the party to the criminal proceedings that has been granted
access to such items or documents by an ordermay issue an order authorizing a search in accordance
with the provisions of this Code in order to locate and seize said items and documents.
This order is not subject to appeal.
Investigating Judge [Signature] S.Sh. Babenko
[Seal: Pechersky District Court of Kyiv, Ukraine]
The order has been drawn up in duplicate.
Copy 1 is kept in the file of judicial proceedings No. 757/28211/16-k.
Copy 2 has been made available to investigator S.M. Onikiyenko.
Investigating Judge [Signature] S.Sh. Babenko
[Seal: Pechersky District Court of Kyiv, Ukraine]
[Kyryliuk *2606*17203672*1*1*]
Annex 153
Case No. 757/28210/16-k, Order of the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv regarding
temporary access to and seizure of document copies from PrAT MTS (11 June 2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
[Stamp: MTS UKRAINE. June 15, 2016. No. SD-16-19352]
[Handwriting: Anatoliy Adolfovych Savchuk, phone: (050) 110-34-49; call after lunch]
PECHERSKY DISTRICT COURT OF KYIV
Case No. 757/28210/16-k
ORDER
On June 10, 2016, S.Sh. Babenko, Investigating Judge at the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv, with the
minutes kept by court clerk V.Yu. Kravchenko, with the participation of a party to the criminal proceedings
S.M. Onikiyenko, Senior Investigator of High-Profile Cases at the Central Military Prosecutor's Office of
Ukraine, having examined in an open court hearing in the courtroom of the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv
the motion filed by S.M. Onikiyenko, Senior Investigator of High-Profile Cases at the Central Military
Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, and approved by A.H. Voyevoda, Department Prosecutor at the Central
Military Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, requesting temporary access to items and documents containing
secret information protected under law,
HAS ASCERTAINED THE FOLLOWING:
As part of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 22015050000000021 of January 13, 2015, the investigating
judge of the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv received a motion filed by S.M. Onikiyenko, Senior Investigator
of High-Profile Cases at the Central Military Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, and approved by A.H.
Voyevoda, Department Prosecutor at the Central Military Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, requesting
temporary access to items and documents containing secret information protected under law, i.e. a request
to review and receive copies of documents in electronic and hardcopy form stored by the mobile telecom
operator MTS Ukraine private joint-stock company with the following parameters: LAC (local area code) -
62470, CID - 9231 (azimuth 40), 9232 (azimuth 180), 9233 (azimuth 310), 14231 (azimuth 40), 14232
(azimuth 180), 14233 (azimuth 310), 42871 (azimuth 60), 42872 (azimuth 160), 42873 (azimuth 320),
17531 (azimuth 75), 17532 (azimuth 180), 17533 (azimuth 330), 15261 (azimuth 160), 15262 (azimuth
250), 15263 (azimuth 340), 42861 (azimuth 150), 42862 (azimuth 320), 42865 (azimuth 150), 42866
(azimuth 320) - for the period from January 12, 2015 to January 13, 2015.
The party to the criminal proceedings has substantiated the motion by citing the fact that the Investigative
Office with the Directorate for Investigation of Crimes Against the Fundamentals of National Security of
Ukraine, Peace, Safety of Mankind, and International Law and Order at the Central Military Prosecutor's
Office of Ukraine is conducting a pretrial investigation in Criminal Case No. 22015050000000021 of
January 13, 2015 involving an act of terrorism that resulted in human fatalities, a violation of the laws and
customs of war in combination with homicide, which exhibits elements of criminal offenses punishable
under Part 3 of Article 258 and Part 2 of Article 438 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
It follows from the files of the criminal case that an artillery attack was committed at 2:25 p.m. on January
13, 2015 by individuals unidentified by the pretrial investigation. The attack came from the direction of the
northeastern outskirts of Dokuchaevsk, Donetsk Oblast, with the use of 120-mm unguided rocket-propelled
high-explosive fragmentation projectiles M-21 OF (Model 9M22U) fired by at least three -21 GRAD
multiple rocket launchers. The attack targeted 2 commuter buses with civilians on the N-20 motorway
connecting Slovyansk with Mariupol, at the exit from the town of Volnovakha.
This artillery attack damaged the commuter bus I-VAN Tata A0718 (number
from Zlatoustovka to Donetsk and inflicted shrapnel wounds on civilians, resulting in 12 fatalities among
civilians, with 19 more individuals (including [...]
To grant the motion.
To grant S.M. Onikiyenko, Investigator of High-Profile Cases at the Central Military Prosecutor's Office, in
the context of Criminal Case No. 22015050000000021 of January 13, 2015 (with the right to delegate this
authority to another field office pursuant to Part 3 of Article 40 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine)
temporary access to the documents containing secret information protected under law, which are at the
disposal of the mobile operator MTS Ukraine private joint-stock company (15 Leipzigzka Street), which
contain information about telecom services provided to mobile subscribers who established connections via
base stations of the mobile telecom operator MTS Ukraine PJSC with the following parameters: LAC (local
area code) - 62470, CID - 9231 (azimuth 40), 9232 (azimuth 180), 9233 (azimuth 310), 14231 (azimuth 40),
14232 (azimuth 180), 14233 (azimuth 310), 42871 (azimuth 60), 42872 (azimuth 160), 42873 (azimuth
320), 17531 (azimuth 75), 17532 (azimuth 180), 17533 (azimuth 330), 15261 (azimuth 160), 15262
(azimuth 250), 15263 (azimuth 340), 42861 (azimuth 150), 42862 (azimuth 320), 42865 (azimuth 150),
42866 (azimuth 320) - for the period from January 12, 2015 to January 13, 2015, inclusive, specifically:
information about addresses of base stations and azimuths;
types of connections (incoming and outgoing calls, SMS, MMS, GPRS, call forwarding);
dates, times and duration of connections;
addresses of the locations of mobile phone subscribers at the time of each incoming and outgoing
telephone connection, incoming and outgoing SMS and MMS messages;
IMSI numbers of the SIM card, IMEI);
identifying attributes of the terminal with which the communication session is established (Party B),
zero duration connections, with the possibility to seize them in both hardcopy and electronic
versions.
To establish the effective term of the order as thirty days, which shall run from the date of the order issued
by the investigating judge.
This order is not subject to appeal.
Investigating Judge [Signature] S.Sh. Babenko
[Seal: Pechersky District Court of Kyiv, Ukraine]
The order has been drawn up in duplicate.
Copy 1 is kept in the file of judicial proceedings No. 757/28210/16-k.
Copy 2 has been made available to investigator S.M. Onikiyenko.
[Kyryliuk *2606*17203949*1*1*]
Appendix to the record of temporary access
to items and documents
dated July 7, 2016
DESCRIPTION
of items and documents seized pursuant to an order of the investigating judge
City of Kyiv July 7, 2016
In pursuance of the June 10, 2016 order of the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv in Case
No. 757/28210/16-k issued by investigating judge S.Sh. Babenko, an authorized
representative of MTS Ukraine private joint-stock company, A.A. Savchuk, has provided
information on a data medium (disk) bearing the following lettering: TOK CD-R. Serial
number 5L 24 No. 27 BD 23123 and the following inscription: MTS Ukraine, No.
757/28210/16-k; CD/R/ 16/92521.2 07.07.2016
(Listing of items and documents seized pursuant to the order of the investigating judge,
including their individual features)
Receipt of the original list of items acknowledged by
MTS Ukraine representative [Signature] A.A. Savchuk
Senior Investigator of High-Profile Cases
at the Central Military Prosecutors Office
of the Prosecutor Generals Office of Ukraine [Signature] S. Onikiyenko
(Investigator, job title, name of authority, signature, last name, initials)
Annex 154
SSU Counterintelligence Department Letter No.212/8-28412 of 11 August 2016 to the
Prosecutor Generals Office of Ukraine
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
[Handwriting: S.M. Onikiyenko. To be verified in the course of the pretrial investigation. August 18, 2016]
Copy No. 1
SECURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Counterintelligence Department
33 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601.
Phone: (044) 256-92-73
Email: [email protected]
Code in the Uniform State Register of Businesses
and Organizations of Ukraine [EDRPOU]: 00034074
August 11, 2016, No. 2/2/8-28412
Re: No. 10/4/1-4408-15 of July 11, 2016
General Prosecutors Office of Ukraine
13/15 Riznytska Street, Kyiv, 01011
Regarding implementation of the investigators instructions
(in follow-up to No. 2/2/8-28127 of August 8, 2016)
After conducting investigative (detective) activities requested by the Central Military Prosecutor's Office of
the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine on July 11, 2016 via Letter No. 10/4/1-4408-15
(Counterintelligence Department Incoming Ref. No. 3074-u and No. 3075-u of July 16, 2016) in the context
of Criminal Case No. 22015050000000021 of January 13, 2015, the Department of Counterintelligence has
additionally ascertained a series of telephone numbers of the mobile operators Vodafone Ukraine PJSC
and Lifecell LLC, which were recorded in the area of the northeastern outskirts of Dokuchaevsk, Donetsk
Oblast, which is presumably the area from which the artillery attack came on January 13, 2015 on 2
commuter buses with civilians on the N-20 motorway connecting Slovyansk with Mariupol at the exit from
the town of Volnovakha. More specifically:
1. Telephone numbers served by the mobile operator Vodafone Ukraine private joint-stock company:
380950436115, 380950817142, 380957048103, 380957563243, 380507796796,
380996293676, 380506937121, 380506244470, 380507008740, 380997688711,
380994597631, 380660952048, 380959102036, 380951227800, 380950434566,
380502682652, 380997121264, 380502378870, 380503280362, 380668506134,
380501935803, 380992727538, 380950863685, 380509061264, 380953557201,
380665229328, 380991233110, 380956006788, 380997018999, 380997198587,
380664361913, 380967395008, 380958837719, 380505248224, 380951009388,
380665131336, 380502537351, 380505567609, 380507011287, 380507076554,
380507649125, 380508116936, 380508140403, 380508440132, 380508455163,
380508746689, 380508812717, 380953424508, 380508795971, 380660821511,
380502208587, 380663445441, 380994854978, 380951492588, 380507566968,
380953244944, 380997171924, 380999259910, 380994481426, 380954243139,
380999081744, 380504731406, 380958626959, 380508818538, 380997612861,
380509170296, 380663419062, 380951113705, 380994705784, 380509604816,
380662362864, 380951726404, 380662033211, 380505411083, 380990478333,
380956261697, 380661271550, 380956497364, 380506138195, 380994125088,
380951349633, 380952590461, 380950435664, 380662130855, 380954041312,
380954519656, 380950371186, 380669127641, 380507056511, 380503265643,
380502180196, 380953144919, 380957591317, 380508877886, 380502830551,
380509692336, 380669496875, 380956136953, 380663768690, 380992508026,
380509854948, 380660760582, 380953894678, 380953471522, 380660099367,
380506472767, 380999504616, 380953108720, 380501673294, 380507405360,
[Handwriting: 10/4-2503-vkh-16, August 18, 2016]
[Stamp: M2 13/1/1(incoming Ref. No. 184356-16 of August 18, 2016]
380955270597, 380662009997, 380958538883, 380953167121, 380669185331,
380952525685, 380958157673, 380663645102, 380502817600, 380953532266,
380505901248, 380505549512, 380999844430, 380505650352, 380953894780,
380506364493, 380501711058, 380506033731, 380502058108, 380956141421,
380666635084, 380502227874, 380955614123, 380506439964, 380953464139,
380506066075, 380507058935, 380958773832, 380995325525, 380993190713,
380505378890, 380991804175, 380508640720, 380667307905, 380666187382,
380668410967, 380993953294, 380669826276, 380669336424, 380993648609,
380663328063, 380509643100, 380665254666, 380502021931, 380952035712,
380662746238, 380664593340, 380506144100, 380666317857, 380952217331,
380957484410, 380954684409, 380665615266, 380999218535, 380669982599,
380506906608, 380662322593, 380950611332, 380509159049, 380952201597,
380506256620, 380505044299, 380992057244, 380950976824, 380500648570,
380992694957, 380958430317, 380956601439, 380991106956, 380501329373,
380957896939, 380507480911, 380505512742, 380958480090, 380994547860,
380666331003, 380667812683, 380953868595, 380664144697, 380500208619,
380507557603, 380997927044, 380502037087, 380956420051, 380505617305,
380951081525, 380955459925.
2. Telephone numbers served by the mobile operator Lifecell limited liability company:
380637735409 380635044393, 380635045391, 380635219827, 380638805575,
380637067276 380734577353, 380639195586, 380939141279, 380634684508,
380939557311 380637904125, 380734508670, 380639393703, 380636867616,
380637109673 380938415139, 380637166345, 380632544174, 380939520272,
380637523625 380636790727, 380734533038, 380639279762, 380633031845,
380734539060 380930418910, 380638511766, 380936375400, 380938668498,
380938705403 380635284341, 380632959228, 380638659897, 380635206678,
380935974395 380634991833, 380639696745, 380634886762, 380933387179,
380939805773 380635508756, 380937511951, 380934451786, 380939467627,
380933984940 380634877304, 380634981272, 380634308931, 380639841642,
380931485952 380631203710, 380938926075, 380932722051, 380938767480,
380639547933 380635100110, 380635575479, 380635557558, 380938897275,
380632939315 380633882330, 380635658508, 380638712889, 380637816336,
380934473424 380936522107, 380930568881, 380936067825, 380933959862,
380632053748 380631579545, 380632413206, 380931317921, 380632715274,
380635572708 380637634943, 380637490719, 380637154585, 380632317132,
380939559339 380939244397, 380637433505, 380632205594, 380634883017,
380932270528 380935625889, 380639918541, 380635001632, 380639706925,
380936748907 380635585443, 380635585442, 380936270804, 380930591053,
380638035106 380638036883, 380930055871, 380637367942, 380638833585,
380637626311 380638833728, 380638833727, 380930054867, 380930055891,
380934414504 380638036229, 380638036228, 380637808660, 380637404921,
380936634299 380637109486, 380633895029, 380932707747, 380635972043.
Users of said phone numbers can be complicit in the above-mentioned crime.
We provide this information to enable further procedural decision-making.
First Deputy Chief of Department
Colonel [Signature] V. Het
Annex 155
Ukrainian Military Intelligence Summary of Cross-Border Weapons Transfers
(September 2016 to December 2016).
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
3
It has been found that weapons, military equipment, material, and fuel and
lubricants have been supplied from Russian Federation territory to the temporarily
occupied territories of Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast and that the [Ukrainian]
border has been crossed by militia groups (during the period between September
and December 2016) identified in intelligence and reconnaissance reports of the
Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.
Item
No.
Date
documented
Supply flows and
destination/ crossing points
Ways/ methods
of supply
Quantity of weapons, military equipment,
material, and fuel and lubricants and
personnel numbers
1
Sep. 02,
2016
ROVENKY By rail
Five (5) tank cars loaded with fuel and
lubricants (250 metric tons)
2 ILOVAYSK By rail
Four (4) tank cars loaded with diesel fuel
(200 metric tons); three (3) rail cars loaded
with ammunition; two (2) T!72 tanks
loaded on flat cars; two (2) trucks
3
Sep. 06,
2016
Via SNIZHNE
to DONETSK
By road Up to 450 armed service personnel
4
Sep. 07,
2016 KHARTSYZK By rail
Four (4) tank cars loaded with diesel fuel
(200 metric tons), three (3) tank cars loaded
with gasoline (150 metric tons)
5 ILOVAYSK By rail
Eight (8) BTR!80 armored personnel
vehicles and 122 mm Gvozdika self-
propelled artillery pieces loaded on flat cars;
four (4) refrigerator cars carrying provisions
6
Sep. 09,
2016
ROVENKY By rail
Twelve (12) tank cars loaded with fuel and
lubricants (600 metric tons)
7 SNIZHNE By rail
Eight (8) T!80 tanks, ten (10) armored
personnel vehicles, and five (5) trucks
loaded on flat cars
8
Sep. 10,
2016
ROVENKY By rail
Six (6) tank cars loaded with fuel and
lubricants (300 metric tons)
9 KHARTSYZK By rail
Two (2) self-propelled artillery pieces, three
(3) armored infantry carriers, and two (2)
trucks loaded on flat cars; three (3) tank cars
loaded with fuel and lubricants (150 metric
tons)
10 ANTRATSIT By road Up to 80 armed service personnel
11
SHCHERBAK
(Novoazovskyi Raion [an
administrative district and
a part of an oblast])
By road Up to 90 armed service personnel
12
Sep. 13,
2016
Via IZVARYNE
in the direction of
LUHANSK
Mixed convoy
Armored infantry carriers, armored
personnel vehicles, and trucks, including
those carrying artillery guns on trailers
13 ILOVAYSK By rail Five (5) rail cars loaded with ammunition:
4
Item
No.
Date
documented
Supply flows and
destination/ crossing points
Ways/ methods
of supply
Quantity of weapons, military equipment,
material, and fuel and lubricants and
personnel numbers
two (2) rail cars loaded with 80 and 120 mm
mortar projectiles; two (2) rail cars loaded
with 122 and 152-mm rocket projectiles;
one (1) car loaded with rocket projectiles for
BM-21
14 KHARTSYZK By rail
Three (3) Grad multiple rocket launchers;
two (2) T-72 tanks; three (3) infantry
fighting vehicle
15 ROVENKY By rail
Twelve (12) tank cars loaded with fuel and
lubricants
16
Sep. 17,
2016 DEBALTSEVE By rail
70 metric tons of ammunition for multiple
rocket launchers and 150 metric tons for
self-propelled artillery pieces
17
Sep. 20,
2016
NOVOASOVSK By road Up to 100 armed service personnel
18
Sep. 26,
2016
KHARTSYZK By rail
Six (6) tank cars loaded with fuel and
lubricants (300 metric tons: four (4) tank
cars loaded with diesel fuel and two (2) with
gasoline); three (3) T!80 tanks, two (2) Tigr
armored vehicles, and two (2) military
communications vehicles (KamAZ-
mounted)
19
In the direction of
DONETSK and
AMVROSIYIVKA
Mixed convoys
Up to 50 pieces of military equipment,
including three (3) multiple rocket launchers
20
Oct. 03,
2016
ROVENKY By rail
Six (6) tank cars loaded with fuel (300
metric tons)
21 ILOVAYSK By rail
Three (3) T!80 tanks loaded on flat cars; six
(6) tank cars loaded with fuel and lubricants
(four (4) with diesel fuel and two (2) with
gasoline, for a total of 300 metric tons);
three (3) covered rail cars
22 SVERDLOVSK By rail
Two (2) 122 mm Grad multiple rocket
launchers and three (3) armored infantry
carriers loaded on flat cars; six (6) tank cars
loaded with fuel and lubricants (300 metric
tons); three (3) covered rail cars
23
Oct. 06,
2016
MARKYNE By road
Twenty-five (25) pieces of military
equipment, including 122 mm D!30
howitzers, self-propelled artillery pieces,
and Osa anti-aircraft missile systems
24 HUSELSHCHIKOVE By road Up to 80 armed service personnel
25
Oct. 08,
2016
SVERDLOVSK By rail
Eight (8) tanks loaded on flat cars; ten (10)
rail cars loaded with ammunition (400
metric tons) and spare parts for armored
combat vehicles
26 ILOVAYSK By rail
Twenty (20) tanks and five (5) 122 mm
Grad multiple rocket launchers loaded on
5
Item
No.
Date
documented
Supply flows and
destination/ crossing points
Ways/ methods
of supply
Quantity of weapons, military equipment,
material, and fuel and lubricants and
personnel numbers
flat cars; eight (8) tank cars loaded with fuel
and lubricants (400 metric tons)
27
Oct. 12,
2016
SVERDLOVSK By rail
Two (2) 122 mm Grad multiple rocket
launchers and three (3) armored infantry
carriers loaded on flat cars; six (6) tank cars
loaded with fuel and lubricants (300 metric
tons); three (3) freight rail cars
28 KHARTSYZK By rail
Six (6) tank cars loaded with diesel fuel
(300 metric tons) and two (2) with gasoline
(100 metric tons)
29
Oct. 17,
2016
To DOVZHANSKA
NOVA railroad station
(DOVZHANSK Raion)
By rail
Six (6) tank cars loaded with fuel and
lubricants (300 metric tons);
two freight rail cars
30 LUHANSK By rail
Eleven (11) tank cars loaded with fuel and
lubricants (550 metric tons)
31 ILOVAYSK By rail
Six (6) BMP!2 armored infantry carriers
and six (6) BMD!2 airborne assault vehicles
loaded on flat cars
32
Oct. 21,
2016
Via ILOVAYSK,
after unloading,
in the direction of
MOSPINE and DONETSK
By rail, by road
Ten (10) rail cars loaded with ammunition
(400 metric tons)
33
Oct. 21,
2016
AMVROSIYIVKA By rail
Four (4) rail cars loaded with ammunition
(160 metric tons)
34
Nov. 07,
2016
KADIYIVKA By rail
Two (2) rail cars loaded with 122 mm
rocket projectiles
35 ILOVAYSK By rail
Twelve (12) military equipment pieces
loaded on flat cars
36 KHARTSYZK By rail
Fourteen (14) freight rail cars:
five (5) loaded with ammunition;
three (3) loaded with spare parts for
armored combat vehicles;
one (1) loaded with batteries;
three (3) loaded with cold-weather military
uniforms
37
Nov. 09,
2016
DOKUCHAYEVSK By rail
Five (5) rail cars loaded with ammunition
(200 metric tons)
38
Nov. 14,
2016 To DOVZHANSKA
NOVA railroad station
(DOVZHANSK Raion) in
the direction of
SOROKINE
By rail, by road
Two (2) tanks
39
Via PEREVALSK in the
direction of LUHANSK
By road Up to 80 armed service personnel
6
Item
No.
Date
documented
Supply flows and
destination/ crossing points
Ways/ methods
of supply
Quantity of weapons, military equipment,
material, and fuel and lubricants and
personnel numbers
40
Nov. 18,
2016
To DOVZHANSKA
NOVA railroad station
(DOVZHANSK Raion)
By rail
Five (5) tanks, seven (7) 122 mm Grad
multiple rocket launchers, and two (2)
command and staff vehicles loaded on flat
cars
41 YASYNUVATA By rail
Eighteen (18) tank cars loaded with fuel and
lubricants (900 metric tons)
42
Nov. 22,
2016
KHARTSYZK By rail
Nine (9) tank cars loaded with fuel and
lubricants (450 metric tons);
three (3) rail cars loaded with tank spare
parts
43 ILOVAYSK By rail
Six (6) rail cars loaded with ammunition
(240 metric tons)
44
Dec. 10,
2016
YASYNUVATA By rail Four (4) tanks loaded on flat cars
Main Intelligence Directorate of
the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Annex 156
Record of the results of a search operation conducted by the Department of
Surveillance of the SSU, prepared by R.O. Narusevych, field agent with the 8th sector
of the 2nd directorate of the Criminal Investigations Department of the SSU (16
September 2016
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1
Schedule No. 1
RECORD
Of the Results of a Technical Investigations Event
City of Kyiv September 16, 2016
Began at 9 a.m. on 09.16.2016 Ended at 11:30 a.m. on 09.16.2016
I, the authorized operative of Section 8, 2nd Directorate (Counterintelligence) of the Security Service of
Ukraine, Senior Lieutenant R.O. Narusevych, in the service office No. 415-1 (5/7 Patorzhynskogo Street),
pursuant to the provisions of Article 7(6) of the Law of Ukraine On Counterintelligence Operations and
in accordance with the decisions of the Deputy Chairman of the Kyiv Court of Appeal M.V. Pryndyuk,
dated 10.15.2014, No. 01-8509TsT (from 10.15.2014 to 12.15.2014); dated 12.10.2014, No. 01-10470TsT
(from 12.10.2014 to 02.10.2015); dated 02.04.2015, No. 01-1060TsT (from 02.04.2015 to 04.04.2015);
dated 03.26.2015, No. 01-2433TsT (from 03.26.2015 to 05.26.2015); dated 05.20.2015, No. 01-3995TsT
(from 05.20.2015 to 07.20.2015); dated 07.07.2015, No. 01-5443TsT (from 07.07.2015 to 09.07.2015);
decisions of the investigative judge of the Kyiv Court of Appeal Ya.V. Glynyany dated 08.27.2015, No. 01-
6838TsT (from 08.27.2015 to 10.27.2015 ) and 12.9.2015, No. 01-9576TsT (from 12.9.2015 to
02.09.2016); decisions of the investigative judge of the Kyiv Court of Appeal Ya.V. Golovachov dated
10.19.2015, No. 01 -8317TsT (from 10.19.2015 to 12.19.2015 ) and 01.29.2016, No. 01-453TsT (from
01.29.2016 to 03.29.2016), during the period from 12.27.2014 to 03.15.2016; decision of the
investigative judge of the Kyiv Court of Appeal M.V. Pryndyuk dated 10.15.2014, No. 01-8511TsT (from
10.15.2014 to 12.15.2014 ), during the period from 12.07.2014 to 12.14.2014, as per the results of the
technical investigations measures by the Security Service of Ukraine across the communications systems
and channels, while looking for signs and facts of terrorist and other unlawful activities during the period
from 27.12.2014 to 15.03.2016, put together this record to the effect that in the course of conducting
said measures specific data was gathered that, in accordance with Article 10(1) of the Law of Ukraine
On Investigative Operations and Article 256(1) of Ukraines Code of Criminal Procedure could be used
for the purposes of pre-trial investigations in Criminal Case No. 22015050000000021 of 01.13.2016 with
respect to the unidentified person with the call sign of Yust belonging to the terrorist organization
DNR (Donetsk People's Republic) who used the mobile phone No. 380509604816 (mobile phone number
of the cellular operator MTS).
Materials of the technical investigations event were obtained from the technical investigations
action by the Security Service of Ukraine on a DVD-R disk, register Nos. 3849 and 3852 of 04.11.2016 (to
incoming DKR No. 10691 of 09.05.2016) designated as secret (declassified as per acts No. 2/2/8-
16915v and 16916v of 09.14.2016).
1. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Subjectunidentified party.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 10:31:35, a call was made from the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust
[stamp:] Main Investigations Directorate
Of the Security Service of Ukraine
To Incoming No. 7600
09.20.2016
2
to the mobile No. 380635045391 used by an unidentified person; the subscribers had the following
conversation (duration: 00 min 52 sec):
Subject: Yes.
Yust: Comrade Colonel, are you anywhere near Dokuchayevsk?
Subject: Will be in a moment, why?
Yust: Why dont you drive by the commanders office, Ill show you a tanker who is f*cking blue in the
ass.
Subject: Oh, I am gonna
Yust: With weapons, [but] in civvies.
Subject: Yura, I am gonna go pick up a tanker.
Yust: Uh-huh.
Subject:
The political officer or whoever, and bring them over. Hold him right there. I am gonna swing
by the commanders office, yes.
Yust: Understood, Comrade Colonel.
Subject: Uh-huh.
2. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Batyushka (Priest)
unidentified party using the call sign of Batyushka; Male Voiceunidentified party.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 11:07:43, a call was made to the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust from the mobile phone No. 380508746689 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Batyushka; the subscribers had the following conversation
(duration: 2 min 09 sec):
Yust: Yes, Batyushka.
Batyushka: Look, the first one that you dictated to me [is] 9492. Did you dictate it right?
Yust: Yes, yes.
Batyushka: You dictated 92-94.
Yust: 94-92.
Batyushka: (talking away from the receiver) He is saying 94 is first.
Yust: Yes.
Batyushka: So it appears we are standing behind Berezovy.
Yust: Yes, yes.
Batyushka: The tractor and equipment depot, behind Berezovy, but not the turnoff to Dokuchayevsk at
all.
Yust: Yes, yes.
Batyushka: Behind Berezovy, shooting at a farm.
Yust: Yes.
Batyushka: [Its] all good [then], lets go to work.
Yust: Yes, look, the first there is a township, by the name of Slavnoye too, it seems (unintelligible).
Batyushka: I am gonna whack [it], here
fretting around.
Male voice: Hello, the thing is that, look
what [you] transmitted, if you read it in the same order you
transmitted it, then the first target we have is not the checkpoint at all, but rather 2 kilometers away;
there, behind Berezovy, [there is] a tractor and machinery depot, and the second target then appears to
3
be in the middle of Dokuchayevsk rather than Slavnoye; I suspect you mixed them up (unintelligible)
the first target [is] 9294.
Yust: What do you mean I mixed them up?
Male voice: Look, I am going to read it [back] to you, but you look it up on the map yourself [too].
Yust: Slavnoye
Male voice: Slavnoye
Yust: Slow down then, I want to say something too.
Male voice: Yes, yes.
Yust: As you go down from Berezovy, the first turn is to Dokuchayevsk.
Male voice: The first turn is to Dokuchayevsk; so if thats the 92-94 square, and Slavnoye is the 01-93
square.
Yust: 92-94 and the beginning of Slavnoye.
Male voice: All right, I got the 01-93 square, thats it, good.
Yust: Take care.
3. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Subjectunidentified party.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 11:42:45, a call was made from the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust to the mobile phone No. 380508440132 used by an
unidentified party; the subscribers had the following conversation (duration: 0 min 17 sec):
Yust: Yes.
Subject: San-Sanych
Yust: Huh?
Subject: Get me connected to the mortarmen right away. Let them dial me ASAP.
4. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Volk (Wolf)unidentified
party using the call sign of Batyushka [sic].
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 11:47:43, a call was made to the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust from the mobile phone No. 380662362864 used by an
unidentified party using the call sign of Volk; the subscribers had the following conversation (duration:
0 min 37 sec):
Volk: Hello, Yuri Nikolayevich, this is Volk.
Yust: Do you have everything ready?
Volk: Yes, by one oclock they will be completely ready.
Just: Give them my phone number, to the battery commander.
Volk: One second.
Yust: Let him call me and report when ready.
Volk: Understood. Right now, right?
Yust: Well not right now (unintelligible) call.
4
Volk: Got it, will do now.
5. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Batyushka (Priest)
unidentified party using the call sign of Batyushka.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 11:48:35, a call was made to the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust from the mobile phone No. 380951726404 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Batyushka; the subscribers had the following conversation
(duration: 00 min 46 sec):
Yust: Yes, speaking.
Batyushka: Hello.
Yust: Yes.
Batyushka: So, I am in a tank, to check things out, about to move out to the firing line and do some
spotting.
Yust: Yes, Batya, go right ahead, but dont you forget you have to be on the drill ground at one [oclock].
Batyushka: Well I am here, I am in command at this (unintelligible).
Yust: Yes, go ahead.
Batyushka: Only [we] had to move out to the green, where the little gifts were; [they] will guide us
[from] there and [do] the work.
Yust: Go ahead, we will be [there?] at one [oclock] too.
Batyushka: All right, will report.
Yust: Go ahead.
Batyushka: Everything OK.
6. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Subjectunidentified party.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 11:53:02, a call was made to the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust from the mobile phone No. 380637490719 used by an
unidentified party; the subscribers had the following conversation (duration: 0 min 20 sec):
Yust: Yes, speaking.
Subject: (unintelligible) We are ready to start.
Yust: Got it. Wait for me, [Ill] be there soon.
7. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Subjectunidentified party.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 11:54:54, a call was made from the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust to the mobile phone No. 380662033211 used by an
unidentified party; the subscribers had the following conversation (duration: 0 min 31 sec):
5
Subject: Speaking, Comrade (unintelligible)
Yust: Where the f*ck is communications with Stas? Where the f*ck is communications with Eyes?
Subject: Let me check.
Yust: Get me connected.
8. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Subjectunidentified
party.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 11:55:32, a call was made from the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust to the mobile phone No. 380505411083 used by an
unidentified party; the subscribers had the following conversation (duration: 0 min 34 sec):
Subject: Hello, yes.
Yust: Yes, speaking.
Subject: Commander, this (unintelligible) deuce of mine is ready.
Yust: All right, I got it, and where the f*ck is it?
Subject: Whats that?
Yust: Did you come out with the eyes or not?
Subject: No, I have no such eyes.
Yust: All right, I got it.
Subject: I will now
Yust: All right, all right, I got it. Take care.
Subject: Uh-huh.
9. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Stasunidentified party
using the call sign of Stas.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 11:56:55, a call was made from the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust to the mobile phone No. 380990478333 used by an
unidentified party using the call sign of Stas; the subscribers had the following conversation (duration: 2
min 21 sec):
Stas: Speaking.
Yust: Uh-huh, greetings (unintelligible).
Stas: Yes.
Yust: Are you there?
Stas: No, not there. We have just come. That car gave us the jitters like no ones business.
Yust: Oh, f*ck, Stas, you out of your f*cking minds there or something?
Stas: Hello, commander, I cant figure this f*cking sh*t out myself either, what the f*ck is going on. No
time for anything.
Yust: Let the f*cking arties (artillerists) get working, I need coordinates, f*ck and frack your mothers.
Stas: F*ck!
Yust: F*ck, Stas, when did you get the order?
6
Stas: Well, I did get it, with those f*cking reports, but those f*cking tanks, Ive had it with them. Total
f*cking horror!
Yust: Where are you now?
Stas: At Omunalny already. Loading up and leaving.
Yust: On the f*cking double, get there; half a f*cking hour delay; I will hold the f*cking fire.
Stas: Understood, and where do I meet the guide (unintelligible)?
Yust: Hello?
Stas: Do I meet the guide at the passing point?
Yust: Come again?
Stas: Do I meet the guide at the passing point?
Yust: Get the f*ck going, to Yasnoye, on the f*king double.
Stas: All right, be there momentarily.
10. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Subjectunidentified
party.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 12:00:07, a call was made from the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust to the mobile phone No. 380637490719 used by an
unidentified party; the subscribers had the following conversation (duration: 0 min 45 sec):
Subject: Yes, speaking.
Yust: Yes, I hear you.
Subject: Hello.
Yust: Yes, yes, speaking.
Subject: Battery ready to start working at 13:00 hours.
Yust: Got it.
Subject: Do we open up when ordered, or do we wait?
Yust: Yes, when ordered. Wait, I am coming now.
Subject: Understood, standing by on the line, locked and loaded.
11. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Subjectunidentified
party.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 12:13:25, a call was made to the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust from the mobile phone No. 380956497364 used by an
unidentified party; the subscribers had the following conversation (duration: 0 min 29 sec):
Yust: Yes.
Subject: Hello, battalion commander, look, there was this bus with officers moving, I had a report [it]
turned towards Berezovo.
Yust: Understood. We are going to start working now. All movements stop at my order.
Subject: Understood, battalion commander. Just dont forget to let us know when to halt all traffic.
7
Yust: All right, take care.
Subject: All right.
12. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Opasny (Dangerous)
unidentified party using the call sign of Opasny.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 12:16:35, a call was made to the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust from the mobile phone No. 380661271550 used by an
unidentified party using the call sign of Opasny; the subscribers had the following conversation
(duration: 1 min 16 sec):
Opasny: Hello, Opasny?
Yust: Opasny, whats your wavelength?
Opasny: (unintelligible)
Yust: Come again?
Opasny: 136-122-upper.
Yust: One second.
Opasny: Select 136-100.
Yust: One second (turning on the radio in the background), 136-100 selected (talking into the radio:
Checking, attention! Open up on my order).
13. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Subjectunidentified
party.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 12:19:08, a call was made from the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust to the mobile phone No. 380637490719 used by an
unidentified party; the subscribers had the following conversation (duration: 0 min 30 sec):
Subject: Yes.
Yust: Hello.
Subject: Yes.
Yust: Lets get started!
Subject: Received (in the background: Load them up!)
14. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Opasny (Dangerous)
unidentified party using the call sign of Opasny.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 12:23:06, a call was made from the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust to the mobile phone No. 380637490719 used by an
unidentified party using the call sign of Opasny; the subscribers had the following conversation
(duration: 0 min 56 sec):
8
Opasny: Speaking.
Yust: (unintelligible)
Opasny: Hello.
Yust: (unintelligible)
Opasny: Hold on, one more time, Yust told me to stand by.
Yust: I did not say stand by, I said lets get started. Thats me, Yust. I say get started.
Opasny: We are standing by for orders. Now its let [them] pass, now its open up. We will begin later
Yust: Are you Opasny?
Opasny: Yes.
Yust: F*ck, I (illegible) your number, sorry. We are all waiting until the artillery is done.
Opasny: Waiting until the artillery is done, then we will get started.
Yust: Yes.
15. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Batyushka (Priest)
unidentified party using the call sign of Batyushka.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 12:24:19, a call was made from the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust to the mobile phone No. 380508746689 used by the
unidentified party using the call sign of Batyushka; the subscribers had the following conversation
(duration: 7 min 27 sec):
Yust: Batyushka, lets get started.
Batyushka: All right, do you want the first ranging [shot]?
Yust: Yes, first ranging [shot], go ahead. Ill be watching.
Batyushka: Go (away from the receiver: Go, Igoryok, send the first ranging [shot], Igoryok), 38 seconds.
Yust: Batya, correct 100 to the right.
Batyushka: (Away from the receiver: 100 to the right, go one, Igoryok).
Yust: Batya, gimme two volleys here.
Batyushka: (Away from the receiver: two volleys there, please!) So how does it look there?
Yust: One sec.
Batyushka: So how is it?
Yust: Batya, now lets move a little further than 100.
Batyushka: (Igoryok, minus 100)
Yust: 150 further.
Batyushka: 150 further. Just one or all of them?
Yust: Gimme all.
Batyushka: Entire battery.
Yust: Go!
Batyushka: What, 2 batteries?
Yust: Hello (unintelligible).
Batyushka: Yes.
Yust: Whats there?
Batyushka: One by one or another [volley]?
9
Yust: One by one, Opasny [sic]. Whats the holdup?
Batyushka: Whats there?
Yust: One second. All right, Opasny, oh, I mean Batyushka, gimme 300 to the left.
Batyushka: 300 to the left.
Yust: (unintelligible) off it went, you hear?
Batyushka: So how does it look, tell me.
Yust: Well, [you] hit something BK.
Batyushka: Aimed for BK, hit BK.
Yust: Uh-huh.
Batyushka: I sent my bird up, the bird is there with you too. Look, [I] sent some more.
Yust: Exit 3, (unintelligible) 4.
Batyushka: [Is it] all right?
Yust: Yes.
Batyushka: I have three [tubes] working, I can do a double, or I could also do eight and nine.
Yust: Hello, Batyushka, put three volleys there and go.
Batyushka: (away from the receiver: 3 volleys there, and [then we are] leaving.)
16. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Subjectunidentified
party.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 12:32:29, a call was made to the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust from the mobile phone No. 380956497364 used by an
unidentified party; the subscribers had the following conversation (duration: 0 min 13 sec):
Yust: Bars, cut it off!
Subject: Yes, commander.
17. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Opasny (Dangerous)
unidentified party using the call sign of Opasny.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 12:46:06, a call was made from the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust to the mobile phone No. 380637490719 used by an
unidentified party using the call sign of Opasny; the subscribers had the following conversation
(duration: 1 min 00 sec):
Opasny: Yes, speaking.
Yust: Hello.
Opasny: Yes.
Yust: Opasny, when you are ready for target No. 2, call me.
Opasny: Wind it up, we are leaving.
Yust: I am saying call me when you are ready at your second firing position.
Opasny: Give me the number, it shows private subscriber, I dont have your number.
Yust: Oh f*ck, do you have a pencil?
10
Opasny: We are loading up [and] pulling up stakes.
Yust: One second, I am gonna send you a blank sms.
Opasny: Got it.
Yust: 48-16 are my last digits.
Opasny: Got it.
18. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Subjectunidentified party.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 13:54:11, a call was made from the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust to the mobile phone No. 380637490719 used by an
unidentified party; the subscribers had the following conversation (duration: 0 min 51 sec):
Subject: Yes, speaking.
Yust: So what have you got there?
Subject: [We are] loading.
Yust: No eyes, so well have to make do with the sights.
Subject: All right, have a go at it, at the station.
19. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Batyushka (Priest)
unidentified party using the call sign of Batyushka.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 13:55:14, a call was made from the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust to the mobile phone No. 380508746689 used by the
unidentified party using the call sign of Batyushka; the subscribers had the following conversation
(duration: 4 min 16 sec):
Batyushka: Yes.
Yust: Batyushka, you ready?
Batyushka: I am.
Yust: All right, give me two cucumbers, I am watching.
Batyushka: All right, here they come, watch (away from the receiver: Igoryok (unintelligible) watch).
Two right away, or maybe one ranging [shot] first?
Yust: All right, [lets] do one.
Batyushka: (away from the receiver: give me one, ranging) explosion
off it goes, just you look at it.
Yust: I am watching, wheres the explosion, where? That was just the sound.
Batyushka: I can feel that explosion.
Yust: Oh, wait-wait-wait, I see it now. Batyushka, give me one a little closer.
Batyushka: How much?
Yust: 200?
Batyushka: (away from the receiver: minus 200)
Yust: Yes. Oops, and heres one coming for us.
Batyushka: (unintelligible)
Yust: It went elsewhere, but I dont see no f*cking explosions.
11
Batyushka: Where are you at?
Yust: At Mukhomolny.
Batyushka: Got it (unintelligible).
Yust: Whats the story with the eyes out front? Were gonna dial the second [pair of] eyes, Batya.
Batyushka: Do that.
Yust: Ill call you right back.
20. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Batyushka (Priest)
unidentified party using the call sign of Batyushka.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 14:02:14, a call was made from the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust to the mobile phone No. 380508746689 used by the
unidentified party using the call sign of Batyushka; the subscribers had the following conversation
(duration: 0 min 34 sec):
Batyushka: Yes.
Yust: Now wait, it went close to the town, you need to put them further [away], Batyushka. Lets make it
plus 150.
Batyushka: Shit, guys, you better give me the corrections pronto, I cant sit here long.
Yust: Its the bad comms, comms, commms, Batyushka. Give me plus 150, they started moving. You
have a radio?
(In the background: Gun!)
Yust: Batyushka, to Yust.
Batyushka: Yes, yes.
Yust: Hello.
Batyushka: Yes, yes.
Yust: All right, shoot now (unintelligible).
Batyushka: You want to contact me on the radio? You have to get up on the roof to try to contact me.
Theres iron everywhere [here], it blocks the signal.
Yust: None of it is good (away from the receiver: Send two volleys to the same spot.)
Yust: Send two volleys to the same spot.
Batyushka: Two volleys to the same spot.
(On the radio, in the background: Tell Batyushka 350 to the left).
Yust: 350 to the left.
Voice in the background: 350 to the left, one volley.
Batyushka: 1 volley there.
Yust: Yes.
Batyushka: What is it? Speak!
Voice on the radio in the background: (unintelligible)
Yust: Batyushka, cease fire!
Batyushka: Battery, unload!
12
21. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Subjectunidentified
party.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 14:12:53, a call was made to the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust from the mobile phone No. 380632317132 used by an
unidentified party; the subscribers had the following conversation (duration: 1 min 01 sec):
Yust: Speaking.
Subject: Listen, battalion commander, we are at the hill, [and] we have tanks and automatic grenade
launchers firing on us. Mortars fell short of them.
Yust: Fell short?
Subject: They did.
Yust: All right, I got it, hold on.
Subject: They are behind the 198th, if [you are] facing them now, its across the field.
Yust: We see them, we do.
Yust: Dangerous to Yust.
(In the background: (unintelligible)).
Yust: What is the approximate distance?
Subject: Well, the filed is a kilometer two.
Yust: (speaking to Opasny on the radio) Opasny, increase distance by 1 kilometer.
Opasny in the background: 1 km.
22. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Angelunidentified party
using the call sign of Angel.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 14:31:52, a call was made from the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust to the mobile phone No. 380662033211 used by the
unidentified party using the call sign of Angel; the subscribers had the following conversation
(duration: 0 min 23 sec):
Angel: Speaking, comrade major!
Yust: Angel, get in touch with Spas. Let him contact me ASAP.
Angel: Received.
23. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Spasunidentified party
using the call sign of Spas.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 14:35:36, a call was made to the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust from the mobile phone No. 380956261697 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Spas; the subscribers had the following conversation
(duration: 0 min 37 sec):
Yust: Yes, speaking.
13
Spas: Hello.
Yust: (unintelligible)
Spas: Commander, this is Spas.
Yust: Yes, Spas, get yourself (unintelligible)
Spas: I have wheels.
Yust: Get yourself to the commanders office ASAP.
Spas: Understood. On my way.
24. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Maremanunidentified
party using the call sign of Mareman.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 14:36:19, a call was made from the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust to the mobile phone No. 380508818538 used by the
unidentified party using the call sign of Mareman; the subscribers had the following conversation
(duration: 0 min 37 sec):
Mareman: Hello.
Yust: Yes, Mareman, go ahead.
Mareman: So, Nikolayevich, I am taking my people off combat readiness, the ones that are standing
[by]?
Yust: Yes, go ahead, let them stand down.
Mareman: Uh-huh, good.
25. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Opasny (Dangerous)
unidentified party using the call sign of Opasny.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 14:43:47, a call was made from the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust to the mobile phone No. 380637490719 used by an
unidentified party using the call sign of Opasny; the subscribers had the following conversation
(duration: 0 min 38 sec):
Opasny: Speaking.
Yust: Yes, Opasny, speak.
Opasny: (Unintelligible) Tulchiki [people from Tula? Tr. Note] need to be picked up. How are they out
there, where are they?
Yust: Yes, yes, yes.
Opasny: Should I send a vehicle to the crossing?
Yust: Say it again, I didnt get that.
Opasny: Should I send a vehicle for them to the crossing?
Yust: Yes.
Opasny: All right, we are at the base. Everyones here (unintelligible) 22.
Yust: Yes, all right.
Opasny: Over and out.
26. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Subjectunidentified
party.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
14
On 01.13.2015, at 14:51:46, a call was made to the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust from the mobile phone No. 380956497364 used by an
unidentified party; the subscribers had the following conversation (duration: 0 min 26 sec):
Yust: Yes, speaking.
Subject: Hello, battalion commander, should I let people through?
Yust: Yes, yes, let them through.
Subject: All right, fine.
27. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Subjectunidentified
party.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 14:52:27, a call was made from the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust to the mobile phone No. 380956261697 used by an
unidentified party; the subscribers had the following conversation (duration: 0 min 32 sec):
Subject: Speaking.
Yust: Hello, hello.
Subject: Speaking.
Yust: And wheres Spas?
Subject: Spas is here. Who is this?
Yust: Yust.
Subject: Oh, I see. [He] has just driven up.
Yust: Are you here already, at the commanders office?
Subject: Yes, yes, [I] have just arrived.
Yust: All right, take care.
28. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Subjectunidentified
party.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 15:29:09, a call was made to the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust from the mobile phone No. 380502180196 used by an
unidentified party; the subscribers had the following conversation (duration: 0 min 44 sec):
Yust: Yes, honey.
Subject: How are you? Are you all right?
Yust: Yes.
Subject: You busy?
Yust: Hello.
Subject: Hello.
Yust: I am driving now, I am on my way to the base.
Subject: Oh, all right, I see.
15
Yust: [We] blew a Ukropian checkpoint to hell.
Subject: Which one?
Yust: For the guys (unintelligible) Ukrops.
Subject: Blew it up? Good boys!
Yust: Ill be back soon and tell you about it.
Subject: Please do, and heres to you, my sweet.
29. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Subjectunidentified
party.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 16:14:49, a call was made to the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust from the mobile phone No. 380632317132 used by an
unidentified party; the subscribers had the following conversation (duration: 0 min 35 sec):
Subject: With your permission, can I go home for like, an hour and a half, to do my laundry?
Yust: From what unit?
Subject: That was us just pulling back, to Slavnoye. This is Surgeons platoon.
Yust: So let the platoon commander call Sergey Vasilyevich and make a note of it.
Subject: Uh-huh, fine.
30. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Subjectunidentified
party.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 16:28:29, a call was made to the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust from the mobile phone No. 380950436115 used by an
unidentified party; the subscribers had the following conversation (duration: 0 min 54 sec):
Yust: Speaking, Comrade Colonel!
Subject: Yura, have you left yet?
Yust: Well, I am leaving in about 15 minutes. [Ill] just get the keys
(unintelligible).
Subject: So what about that Batyushka there? How many guns does he have?
Yust: I dont even know, Comrade Colonel, but I think he was using three guns today.
Subject: And who is he?
Yust: I dont even know (unintelligible).
Subject: All right, I am waiting for you at my place.
Yust: Working with Batyushka. I didnt get that.
Subject: All right, I am waiting for you at my place.
Yust: Got it.
31. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Subjectunidentified
party.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 16:54:08, a call was made from the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust to the mobile phone No. 380635045391 used by an
16
unidentified party; the subscribers had the following conversation (duration: 0 min 33 sec):
Subject: Yura!
Yust: Yes, speaking, Comrade Colonel.
Subject: Who is that f*cking Batyushka who shelled Volnovakha from Dokuchayevsk today, that sh*t?
Yust: Ill be at the boss [office] soon. The commander has already asked me. Ill be there in 10 minutes.
Subject: All right, I am about to come back from the Headquarters, Ill call you then. Take care.
Yust: Got it.
32. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Subjectunidentified
party.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.13.2015, at 17:49:08, a call was made to the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust from the mobile phone No. 380635045391 used by an
unidentified party; the subscribers had the following conversation (duration: 0 min 15 sec):
Subject: Where are you?
Yust: At my place.
Subject: Go [see] the commander, now.
Yust: Understood. On my way.
33. LEGEND: Yustunidentified party using the call sign of Yust; Opasny (Dangerous)
unidentified party using the call sign of Opasny.
Summary of the information obtained during the measures conducted:
On 01.14.2015, at 10:51:01, a call was made from the mobile phone No. 380509604816 used by
the unidentified party using the call sign of Yust to the mobile phone No. 380637490719 used by an
unidentified party using the call sign of Opasny; the subscribers had the following conversation
(duration: 1 min 27 sec):
Opasny: Yes, speaking.
Yust: Hello, Opasny.
Opasny: Yes.
Yust: Sound the alarm for three crews, man the main firing position and open up on the checkpoint that
we gave a workout to yesterday.
Opasny: Uh-huh.
Yust: This intersection here.
Opasny: Uh-huh.
Yust: Take 1.5 km to the left.
Opasny: 2 km?
Yust: Come again?
Opasny: Well (unintelligible) to the left
how many [mortar] rounds should we take? Hello
hello!
17
Yust: 60
Opasny: 60 rounds.
Yust: Discharge 60, report when ready.
Opasny: Time for manning the position?
Yust: Right now, get going ASAP. Battle stations, and then remain on standby. Take a reserve, another
60.
Opasny: Received.
Yust: A total of 120, discharge 60 when ready and keep 60 in reserve.
Opasny: Received.
Yust: Take care.
Additionally, the disks have other materials that are of relevance for ascertaining the
circumstances of the crime and identifying the perpetrators.
Addendum: 2 (two) DVD-Rs, register Nos. 3849, 3852 of 04.11.2016, declassified.
Authorized Operative of Section 8,
2nd Directorate (Counterintelligence)
of the Security Service of Ukraine,
Senior Lieutenant [signature] R.O. Narusevych
September 16, 2016
Register No. 2/2/8-31825
Annex 157
Record of inspection conducted by I.V. Budnyk, Captain of Justice and Senior
Investigator with the 5th Investigative Office at the 1st Pretrial Investigation
Directorate of the Central Investigative Directorate of the SSU (26 September 2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
RECORD OF
EXAMINATION
City of Kyiv September 26, 2016
Examination started at 09:20 a.m.
Examination ended at 11:20 a.m.
Captain of Justice Ihor Volodymyrovych Budnyk, Senior Investigator with the 5th Investigative
Office of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate at the Central Investigative Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine, examined web pages on the world wide web (the Internet) located
at the following addresses in his office No. 307 at the Central Investigative Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine as part of the pretrial investigation of Criminal Case No.
22015050000000021 of January 13, 2015 in keeping with the requirements of Articles 104, 105,
106, 107, 223, and 237 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine:
https://www.facebook.com/%D0%A3%D0%B4%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F-
%D0%93%D1%80%D1%83%D0%BF%D0%BF%D0%B0-
%D0%94%D0%BE%D0%BD%DQ%B1%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%81%D0% B0-
649030605187825/;
https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id100003972898539&fref=pb&hc_location=profile_brows
er:
https://vk.com/newsdnr.
Brief description:
The unit has been formed to protect civilians against armed aggression by the Junta and
criminal gangs.
Output data:
You can join the unit or receive information on how to help the unit by calling this number:
+380509604816.
Our account details:
Sberbank of Russia
Sort Code [MFO]: 320627
Acc. 26255000958920
Yandex.Money wallet: 410012319532538
Wallets of the Strike Force of Donbas
R996149854922 roubles
Z264583773501 dollars
euros
U392980192863 hryvnias
The wallets can be topped up at any payment terminal.
Western Union transfer: Yuriy Nikolaevich Shpakov
Detailed description: The unit has been formed to protect civilians against armed aggression by
the Junta and criminal gangs. It is tasked with organizing the efforts of all anti-fascist groups and
coordinating charitable organizations capable of assisting peaceful civilians of Donbas.
Annex 158
SSU Counterintelligence Department Letter No. 212/8-33394 of 4 October 2016 to
the Pretrial Investigation Directorate of the Central Investigative Directorate of the
SSU
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Mr. I. Ye. Yanovskyi
[signature] October 6, 2016
SECURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Counterintelligence Department
Second Division
33 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601
Tel. (044) 256-9273
Copy No. 1
Attention: Colonel of Justice V. V. Sychevskyi
Director, First Pretrial Investigation Department
Main Investigation Directorate
Security Service of Ukraine
No. 212/833394 of October 04, 2016
Re. No. 6/5647R of September 05, 2016
Mr. D. V. Zyuzya
[signature] October 07, 2016
R. O. [illegible]
[signature] October 05, 2016
Re. Execution of Investigating Officers Instructions
Dear Vitaliy Viktorovych:
The Second Division of the Counterintelligence Department has reviewed Instructions No. 6/5647R
issued on September 05, 2016 by the First Pretrial Investigation Department, Main Investigation
Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, in criminal proceeding No. 22015050000000021
registered on January 13, 2015 in the Unified Registry of Pretrial Investigations based on the elements of
criminal offenses under Article 258 (3) and Article 438 (2) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
Based on the results of the investigative procedures performed, it has been found that the call signs
identified in the Investigating Officers Instructions are used by the following members of the 5th Separate
Motor Rifle Brigade, Oplot [Stronghold], of the 1st Army Corps of the Donetsk Peoples Republic
(DPR) terrorist organization who may be involved in the commission of the aforesaid criminal offenses:
1. The call sign Tykhon is used by Mykhaylo Hennadiyovych Tikhonov, a
citizen of Ukraine, born on August 04, 1967 in the urban-type settlement of
Komsomolske, Zmiyivskyi Raion [administrative district], Kharkiv Oblast
[administrative region] and registered at the following address: number 33 Frunze
Street, Apt. 24, Komsomolske Urban-type Settlement, Zmiyivskyi Raion, Kharkiv
Oblast, possibly residing at number 104 Tkachenka Street, City of Donetsk, passport
of a citizen of Ukraine MK 416447 issued by Zmiyivskyi Raion Office of the
Kharkiv Oblast Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, Taxpayer
ID 2468705579, uses (used) the following mobile phone numbers: 380950436115, 380635219827,
380957048103, 380506906608, 380950817142, 380950434573, 380957048106, 380713015217 and e-
mail address at [email protected].
In November of 2015, M. H. Tikhonov was elected to the so-called Peoples Council of the DPR
terrorist organization. In 2015, he held the position of Commanding Officer of the 5th Separate Motor
Rifle Brigade, Oplot, of the 1st Army Corps of the DPR terrorist organization. On June 29, 2015, by
Order No. 269 issued by O. V. Zakharchenko, Head of the DPR terrorist organization, M. H. Tikhonov
was removed from the aforesaid position and appointed Director of the military educational institution
called Donetsk Higher Combined Services Command Academy of the DPR Armed Forces. He holds
the military rank of colonel with the DPR terrorist organization.
2. The call sign Yust is used by Yuriy Mykolayovych Shpakov, a citizen
of Ukraine, born on May 31, 1979 in the City of Donetsk and registered at the
following address: number 13 Henerala Kozyrya Street, Apt. 52, City of Donetsk,
Taxpayer ID 2900501878, uses (used) the following mobile phone numbers:
380509604816 and 380632544174.
[stamp:] [illegible] No. 8052 dated October 05, 2015 [illegible] 2 [illegible]
As of February 2015, the aforesaid citizen held the position of the so-called Military Commandant
of the City of Dokuchayevsk, Donetsk Oblast, temporarily occupied by the militants of the DPR
terrorist organization. As of July 2015, he held the position of Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion of
the DPR terrorist organization.
3. The call sign Volk [Wolf] is used by Oleh Viktorovych Bardashevskyi, a citizen of Ukraine,
born on July 21, 1979 in the urban-type settlement of Romaniv, Zhytomyr Oblast, registered at the
following address: number 18 Lesi Ukrayinky Street, Apt. 33, Taxpayer ID 2905621733, uses (used) the
following mobile phone numbers: 380683167385, 380679298580, 380508312187, 380639841830,
380731643332, 380975115572 as well as Internet accounts with the following URLs:
https://vk.com/id173148801 and https://ok.ru/profile/558755952766. Owns (uses) the following motor
vehicles: a grey Volkswagen Polo, VIN xw8zz61zdg057678, license plate number AM 3253 AK, and
Honda Civic.
As of December 2015, O. V. Bardashevskyi has been appointed to the position of support platoon
leader, 5th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade, Oplot, of the 1st Army Corps of the DPR terrorist
organization.
4. The call sign Zakhar is used by Anatoliy Oleksandrovych Zakharchenko, a citizen of the
Russian Federation (Republic of Bashkortostan), who uses (used) the following mobile phone numbers:
380635045391 and 380938767480, as of May 2015 member of the 5th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade,
Oplot, of the 1st Army Corps of the DPR terrorist organization. Married to Halyna Dmytrivna
[Zakharchenko], with daughter Yuliya (who is studying at the State Medical University of Novosibirsk)
and son Oleksiy (currently serving in the military in Novosibirsk).
5. The call sign Batyushka [Father] is possibly used by Anatoliy Vasylyovych Hukov, a citizen
of Ukraine, born on January 01, 1943, who uses (used) the following mobile phone number:
380951726404.
6. The call sign Boroda [Beard] is possibly used by Oleksandr Oleksandrovych Bulashev, a
citizen of Ukraine, born on October 18, 1977, who uses (used) the following mobile phone number:
380508440132.
7. The call sign Opasnyi [Dangerous] is possibly used by Vitaliy Anatoliyovych Poroshyn, a
citizen of Ukraine, born on January 21, 1988, who uses (used) the following mobile phone number:
380637490719.
8. The call sign Udav [Constrictor] is possibly used by Yevhen Oleksiyovych Melnyk, a citizen
of Ukraine, born on September 04, 1988, who uses (used) the following mobile phone number:
380956432144.
9. The call sign Batya [Daddy] is possibly used by Yuriy Veniaminovych Chaykovskyi, a
citizen of Ukraine, born on December 29, 1969, who uses (used) the following mobile phone numbers:
0951726404, 0734133951, and 0956261697.
As for identification of the members of the 5th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade, Oplot, of the 1st Army
Corps of the DPR terrorist organization using the call signs Bars [Snow Leopard], Spas [Savior],
Angel [Angel], Karas [Carp], Tor [Thor], Mariman [Mariner], and Khirurg [Surgeon], we will
inform you additionally.
Respectfully,
[signature]
Colonel O. Shvaykovskyi
Deputy Director of the Department
Annex 159
Crime scene examination record prepared by A.S. Bakovsky, Major of Justice and
Senior Investigator with the 3rd Office of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate at
the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine (dated 20
Janu
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1
[signatures]
RECORD OF INCIDENT SCENE
INSPECTION
City (village) Kyiv January 20, 2017
Inspection started at 21:06. Inspection finished at 22:19
Senior special investigator, section 3, directorate 1 of pre-trial investigations at the Main Directorate for
Investigations of the Security Service of Ukraine
Major of Justice A.S. Bakhovsky
on the grounds of a pre-trial investigation in criminal proceedings No 22016000000000466
(indicate judicial order in the case of residential or other personal property inspections, or, in the case
of criminal proceedings, refer to an incident report)
pursuant to Articles 104, 105, 106, 234, 237, 223 of the Criminal Procedures Code of Ukraine:
In the presence of witnesses:
1) Roman Mykolayovych Olekha, DOB 07.28.1996
(full name, date of birth, address)
registered at Apartment 8, 13 vul. Gagarina, Voloshevka village, Kyiv Region
2) Vladyslav Yuriyovych Faychuk, DOB 11.25.1995
(full name, date of birth, address)
Registered at Apartment 139, 31 vul. Zakrevskogo, Kyiv
who have been advised of their rights and obligations under Articles 11, 13, 15 and 223 of the Criminal
Procedures Code of Ukraine.
[signature] [signature]
With the participation of the victim
---//-----
(full name, date of birth, address)
who has been advised of their rights and obligations under Article 56 Part 1, 2 and Article 57 of the Criminal
Procedures Code of Ukraine _____________________
With the participation of suspect: [signatures]
S.V. Zhirenko DOB 03.01.1980, D.D. Yakob DOB 11.01.1978
(full name, date of birth, address)
who have been advised of their rights and obligations under Article 42 Parts 3, 5, 6 and 7 of the Criminal
Procedures Code of Ukraine _____________________
With the participation of defense attorney:
---//-----
(full name, date of birth, address)
who has been advised of their rights and obligations under Articles 46 and 47 of the Criminal Procedures Code
of Ukraine. _____________________
With the participation of representative:
---//-----
(full name, date of birth, address)
who has been advised of their rights and obligations under Articles 44 Part 5, Article 58 Part 4 and Article 59
Part 2 of the Criminal Procedures Code of Ukraine. _____________________
With the participation of expert:
Y.V. Valynevych, DOB 03.23.1991, M.Y. Ustymenko, DOB 11.05.1972
(full name, date of birth, address)
who has been advised of their rights and obligations under Article 71, Parts 4 and 5 of the Criminal Procedures
Code of Ukraine [signature]
2
[signatures]
[signature]
With the participation of the owner (user) of the accommodation or other personal property
SBU employees V.L Fesenko, A.O. Patsalay, I.V. Budnyk
(full name, date of birth, address)
Prior to the inspection, the above individuals were advised of their right to be present during every
action taken in the course of an inspection and to make statements which are subject to mandatory inclusion in
the record. The persons participating in the inspection were also advised of their duty not to disclose the details
of this procedural action as required by Article 66 Part 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine and of the
recording equipment used and the terms and procedure of their use:
Photography with telephone serial No R586503VKIZ
(details of recording or storage devices used during procedural action, signatures of individuals)
Samsung SM-6925F
The inspection has established the following:
(indicate address of residential accommodation or other personal property)
The scene of the incident is the backyard of the building located at 16A vul. Ivana Kudri, Kyiv.
Found near the doors of the first entrance (from left to right) in this courtyard were citizens of Ukraine
Svyatoslav Valeriyovych Zhirenko, DOB 03.01.1980 registered at Apartment 2, 18 vul. Lenina, Kirovske,
Donetsk Region and Dmytro Dmytrovych Yakob, DOB 11.01.1978 registered at Apartment 80, 24 vul. Sudaksa,
Alushta, Autonomous Republic of Crimea.
Found next to the above citizens were a black bag and a white plastic bag bearing the logo of the
Ashan supermarket and the slogan Hit the prices.
S.V. Zhirenko reported that the above black bag belongs to him and consented to its inspection. The
following was found later in the bag:
1. An employment termination letter No ARK 05271 addressed to S.V. Zhirenko, 1 page;
2. Vehicle registration certificate No F836244 (Lithuanian Republic)
3. Power of attorney for driving the Skoda reg JHC-615 car, 1 page
4. Documents in a foreign language for the Skoda reg JHC-615 car No 364067, 1 page
5. 300 (three hundred) US dollars
6. 976 (nine hundred and seventy-six) hryvnias
3
[signatures]
7. Holder for SIM card tel no +79107360794
Next, the leading specialist of department 6, forensic and special analysis center No. 4 (ISTE SBU),
Senior Lieutenant Yevhen Valeriyovych Valynevych (3 vul. Vasylenka, Kyiv) and expert consultant at
department 6, forensic and special analysis center No 4 (ISTE SBU) Maksym Yevhenovch Ustymenko conducted
an inspection and analysis of the above plastic bag both visually and with the aid of a portable X-ray scanner,
Scanna W550SU, serial No X0331772.
During the inspection and analysis, it was established that the plastic bag contained the following: a
roll of brown scotch tape and a plastic food container measuring 14 x 10 x 6 cm approximately. The following
was found inside the container when opened: a plastic grey and yellow substance (about 300400 g in weight).
Inside the substance was a cylindrically shaped magnet (5 cm in diameter and 2 cm in height) and a brown
cylindrical object 7 cm in diameter and 0.9 cm approximately in height) that looked like an electric detonator
with two white wires protruding at one end. The end of one of the wires was connected to a metal cylindrically
shaped object.
In order to avoid a possible uncontrolled explosion, the cylindrical object that looked like an electric
detonator and the magnet were removed separately from the plastic substance. In addition, the cylindrically
shaped metal object located at the end of the electric detonator wire was cut off from the object that looked like
an electric detonator, and the two wire ends were joined together. The above actions were performed by
specialist M.Y. Ustymenko. The specialists said that the plastic substance, magnet and electric detonator bore
the characteristics of an improvised explosive device.
1. In the course of the incident scene inspection, the objects named in points 1-7 were retrieved and
4
[signatures]
placed into Bag No 1 sealed with Seal No 88 For Bags, Security Service of Ukraine (hereinafter: sealed)
2. The plastic container with a grey and yellow plastic substance and the magnet were retrieved and
placed into sealed Bag No 2.
3. The object that looks like an electric detonator and the metal object at the end of the wire were
retrieved and placed into sealed Bag No 3.
4. The roll of scotch tape and the white plastic bag were retrieved and placed into sealed Bag No 4.
A copy of this record was handed to S.V. Zhirenko and D.D. Yakob.
S.V. Zhirenko and D.D. Yakob refused to sign the record of incident scene inspection on the basis of Article 63
of the Constitution of Ukraine.
Refusal to sign was witnessed by:
[signatures]
5
[signatures]
Found during inspection noted in the text of the record
(indicate traces and objects found during inspection)
Retrieved during inspection: noted in the text of the record
(indicate what was found and sealed and in which order)
Technical devices used during inspection: photography
(indicate use of photography or video recording, other technical and specialist devices and their tech. features)
The record has been read and recorded no statements, comments or additions received
(comments from participants in the inspection)
Participants:
1. S.V. Valynevych /[signature]/
(full name) (signature)
2. M.Y. Ustymenko /[signature]/
(full name) (signature)
I.V. Budnyk [signature]
V.L. Fesenko [signature]
[signature]
Witnesses:
1. R.M. Olekha /[signature]/
(full name) (signature)
2. V.Y. Faychuk /[signature]/
(full name) (signature)
Inspection conducted by:
Senior special investigator
Main Directorate for Investigations,
Major of Justice A. Bakhovsky
Annex 160
Extract from Criminal Proceedings No. 12017050140000085
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1
Extract from criminal proceedings No. 12017050140000085
No. 1
Date statement or information was received or discovered from another source: 02.01.2017
Claimant or victim: report from companies, institutions, organizations or officials (code)
Date of entry in the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations: 02.01.2017 22:52:21
Outcome of investigation:
Legal qualification: (Criminal Code of Ukraine 2001) Article 258 Part 3
Description:
In the shelling of Avdiyivka city, Donetsk Region on 02.01.2017 the following servicemen of the
72nd Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were wounded: V.M. Malinovsky, V.V.
Donik, I.V. Demydov, I.A. Bokhmut, R.Y. Matyushenko, V.O. Karpov, A.D, Skobanyuk, S.A.
Fedorenko, V.M. Khmylorchuk, S.A. Kvitko, A.P. Mykhaylyuk and Morozov. Also wounded were
civilians O.V. Gordeyev, V.P. Tarasov and Ye.Ye. Gordeyeva. Servicemen of the 72nd
Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces L.V. Dergach and R.V. Bublienko received
multiple shrapnel wounds which caused their death, also civilian K.Kh. Volkova received
multiple shrapnel wounds which have caused her death. In addition, the shelling of Avdiyivka
city, Donetsk Region on 02.01.2017 caused the following damage: to No. 39 in Sverdlova
Street, No. 64, 65, 66, 67, 75, 84 and 126 in Turgeneva Street, No. 68, 89, 95, 96, 97, 101, 103,
113, 105, 107, 108 in Krasnoarmiyska, No. 192, 194a, 204, 204a, 239 and 265a in Kolosova,
No. 51 in Yasynuvatsky Lane, No. 74 and 9 in Lermontova Street, No. 45 in Zelena Street, No.
75, 80, 84a, 100, 96, 92, 102, 98 and 83 in Zavodska Street and No. 64a in Metalurgiv Street;
No. 96 in Zakhidna Street has been destroyed, a garage at 68 Krasnoarmiyska Street is
damaged; an outbuilding at 57 vul. Shevchenko is destroyed, a garage at 10 vul. Bilenkogo is
damaged; damage has been also caused to No. 204, 257a, 224, 208, 200, 214, 226 and 269 in
Kirov Street and to No. 86 at Pushkin Street; and an unexploded shell has been discovered on
the roof of No. 59 vul. Sportyvna.
Suspect notified of a suspicion, outcomes of investigation and information about any special
pre-trial investigation with regard to this person:
Legal entity subject to criminal proceedings and legal entity representative:
Pre-trial investigation authority: Avdiyivsky police precinct of the Pokrovsky police department,
Main National Police Directorate in Donetsk Region
Investigator: Y.Y. Ponomarenko
Prosecutor: D.O. Panasenko
Registrar signature [signature] O.M. Ustymenko
Deputy head of investigations department
02.03.2017
2
Annex 161
Records of Site Inspection, drafted by A. Zaychik (1 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1
[....]
The inspection has established the following: ________________________________
(please state the address of the house or other private property)
The object of the inspection is the outdoor section of the site at 97 vul. Metallurgov,
Avdiyivka. The inspection established the following: damage to the [illegible] (throughout).
The wall of the house is destroyed and there is damage to the roof. There is also extensive
damage to the grounds.
This concludes the inspection. No comments have been received.
Participants: [signature] A.L. Zaychik
Investigator [signature] Y. Ponomarenko
Annex 162
Records of Site Inspection, drafted by N. Protsyk, Senior Investigator (1 February
2017)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1
[....]
The inspection has established the following: A one-story building No 100
(please state the address of the house or other private property)
at Zavodska Street in Avdiyivka, Donetsk Region. The following damage was found in the
course of the inspection:
The wooden windows are missing glass, there is damage to the roof where some of the tiles
are missing, the front door is misshapen and there is damage to the brickwork. The wooden
entrance from the house to the veranda is damaged. The brickwork of the outdoor kitchen is
damaged along the perimeter, its roof is destroyed and windows smashed, the shed is
destroyed.
Aleksandr Nikolayevich Khodeyev [signature]
Sr investigator [signature] N.N. Protsyk
1
[....]
The inspection has established the following: A one-story building at No 96
(please state the address of the house or other private property)
In Zavodska Street, Avdiyivka, Donetsk Region.
The inspection revealed the following damage: the house is completely destroyed, the
outbuildings are completely destroyed.
D.A. Khodeyev [signature]. This is an accurate record.
Sr investigator [signature] N.N. Protsyk
Annex 163
Records of Site Inspection, drafted by Y. Ponomarenko, Senior Investigator (1
February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1
[....]
The inspection has established the following: ________________________________
(please state the address of the house or other private property)
The object of the inspection is the outdoor section of the site at 101 vul. Metallurgov,
Avdiyivka. The following was established after an inspection of the grounds: damage to two
bedroom windows with metal frames, the sauna behind the house is destroyed, the PVC
window in the attic is smashed and the shed roof is destroyed.
No other damage has been found. A pet dog at the above address has been killed.
This concludes the inspection.
Participants: [signature]
Investigator [signature] Y. Ponomarenko
1
[....]
The inspection has established the following: ________________________________
(please state the address of the house or other private property)
The object of the inspection is the outdoor section of the site at 105 vul. Metallurgov,
Avdiyivka. The inspection established the following damage: two windows have been
smashed in the hallway; also the shed roof has been damaged. There are multiple shell
craters in the vegetable garden.
This concludes the inspection.
Participants: 1) [signature]
Investigator [signature] Y. Ponomarenko
1
[....]
The inspection has established the following: _The object of the inspection is a private house
(please state the address of the house or other private property)
at 64A vul. Metallurgov, Avdiyivka. An inspection of the grounds established the following: to
the right of the entrance there is a crater measuring 90 cm x 50 cm. There is a cylindrically
shaped metal object stuck in the crater. The inspection of the grounds also established the
following damage: the veranda is destroyed, the windows in the house are smashed, the shed
and the roof of the house are destroyed.
Photos have been taken. Some of the shell fragments hit a tree.
Participants: 1) [signature]
Investigator [signature] Y. Ponomarenko
1
[...]
I would like to say that own a house at 107 Metallurgov Street which is unoccupied.
Around 0700 on 02.01.2017 a Grad shell hit the ground in front of my house. The fragments
and the shock front smashed 5 windows in the house. The front porch is destroyed, and the
fragments damaged the roof.
The wooden shed has collapsed and the gate has been damaged by fragments. Four windows
have been smashed in the outdoor kitchen, and its roof is also damaged.
Nobody was hurt as a result.
This is an accurate record of my oral statement. I have read this record.
[signature]
Investigator [signature] Y.Y. Ponomarenko
Annex 164
Extract from Criminal Proceedings No. 12017050140000081 (6 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Extract from criminal proceedings No. 12017050140000081
1
No 1
Date statement or information was received or discovered from another source: 01.30.2017
Claimant or victim: report from companies, institutions, organizations or officials (code)
Date of entry in the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations: 01.30.2017 3:38:59 p.m.
Outcome of investigation:
Legal qualification: (Criminal Code of Ukraine 2001) Article 258 Part 3
Description:
On 01.30.2017 the duty unit at the Avdiyivsky police precinct of the Pokrovsky police
department, Main National Police Directorate in Donetsk Region, received a message from
the Avdiyivka city commandant that soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Yaroslav
Yaroslavovych Pavlyuk and V.V. Shamray were killed in action on 01.30.2017 in the
morning during a battle in the Industrial Zone of the city of Avdiyivka. Also the following
were wounded: I.Ye. Voloshyn, V.V. Mushyn, V.M. Mishchuk, O.O. Nikolayev, A.V.
Mukhin, A.A. Plesunov, V.I. Melnyk, M.O. Tyshchenko, V.V. Zubko, P.I. Kachur, D.V.
Krynytsyn, D.V. Chernets, P.P. Ryabykh, S.O. Parkhomenko and D.V. Malyshko. The
following buildings were damaged in the city of Avdiyivka: 94 in Kolosova Street, 72 and 79
in Lermontova street, 31 in Komunalna Street, 2/31 Kvartal Budivelnykiv and 42, 44 in
Zelena Street. Electric cables supplying power to Avdiyivka were also damaged.
Suspect notified of a suspicion, outcomes of investigation and information about any special
pre-trial investigation with regard to this person:
Legal entity subject to criminal proceedings and legal entity representative:
Pre-trial investigation authority: Avdiyivsky police precinct of the Pokrovsky police
department, Main National Police Directorate in Donetsk Region
Investigator: O.M. Ustymenko
Prosecutor: D.O. Panasenko
Registrar signature [signature] O.M. Ustymenko
Deputy head of investigations department
02.06.2017
Annex 165
Record of Inspection of the Internet Pages, Carried by D.V. Zyuzia, Lt. Colonel of
Justice and Senior Special Investigator, Section 1 of Department 5, Pre-Trial
Investigations, Directorate 1 at the Main Directorate for Investigations of the
Security Servi
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1
Record of inspection
Kyiv February 9, 2017
Inspection started at “14”:“15”
Inspection finished at “17”:“30”
Senior special investigator, section 1 of department 5, pre-trial investigations
directorate 1 at the Main Directorate for Investigations of the Security Service of Ukraine, Lt-
Col of Justice D.V. Zyuzia, acting in connection with a pre-trial investigation in criminal
proceedings No 22015050000000021 concerning elements of the crimes provided for under
Article 258 Part 3, Article 2583 Part 1 and Article 438 Part 2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine
and entered into the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations on 1/13/2015, with the
purpose of gathering evidence as well as finding and recording information about the
circumstances in which the criminal offences were committed and pursuant to Articles 104,
105, 106, 223 and 237 of the Criminal Procedures Code of Ukraine carried out an inspection
of internet pages in Room No 104 of the Main Directorate for Investigations of the Security
Service of Ukraine at 4 vul. Iryninska, Kyiv.
The inspection was conducted using personal computer PEOM No 19957. The system
block is connected to the internet via a modem and is located in the internet studio of the
Main Directorate for Investigations of the Security Service of Ukraine at 4 vul. Iryninska,
Kyiv.
The inspection established the following:
The object of inspection is 7 internet pages at the following addresses:
1. http://penza.rfn.ru/rnews.html?id=25936&cid=7
2. http://penza.rfn.ru/rnews.html?id=25828&cid=7
3. http://www.pravdanews.ru/topic/5537.html
4. http://www.penzapress.ru/lentanovostei/2011/02/21/13313524
5. http://gostorgi.ru/441998052
6. http://pravdanews.ru/topic/5623.html
7. http://tv-express.ru/news_info/16635/
The Opera browser was launched to enable viewing these on a computer, the address
of web page no 1 from the above list was pasted into the address field after which the Enter
button was pressed. Once the first web page was loaded, the other web pages listed above
were opened in the same manner in the subsequent windows of the web browser.
Loading the first web page at http://penza.rfn.ru/rnews.html?id=25936&cid=7
establishes that it is the information portal of the Penza state broadcasting company
2
[…]
Opening the fourth window of the web browser with the fourth web page at
http://www.penzapress.ru/lentanovostei/2011/02/21/13313524 establishes this to be the
internet version of the Penza Press news agency which has a news article entitled “Anatoly
Sinelnikov heads Penza military commissariat.”
A detailed viewing of the article establishes that it was published on 2/21/2011. The
above article says that Anatoly Sinelnikov, 47, was appointed on February 11 as the Penza
Region military commissar. Sinelnikov previously served in various posts in the military
units of Siberia, the Urals and the Far East, with the latest post being that of a brigade
commander in Yekaterinburg. Also, while viewing the article it was established that Anatoly
Sinelnikov holds service awards and an Order of Courage.
[…]
Screenshot of the internet page
The fifth web browser window opens to web page 5 loaded from
http://gostorgi.ru/441998052, establishing that this is a page from the internet newspaper
Konkursnye Torgi [Competitive Bidding] which contains information on the customer in a
tender for the purchase of timber and construction materials.
A detailed viewing of the web page establishes that the customer in the tender quoted
as 44-1998052 of 11/21/2014 is Russian Federation military unit No. 3280 whose contract
manager is Aleksei Anatoliyevich Sinelnikov. The above internet page also lists A.A.
Sinelnikov’s telephone number as +79222962689.
Internet newspaper
Konkursnye Torgi
Tenders Search Quote 223-F3 Purchase Plans Archive Reports
Quotations / List of quotations / Quote 44-1998052 Log in | Sign up | Forgot password?
Subscriber suite
Set your subscriber
profile
Registration
Register to pay and
access new tenders
Pay subscription fee
View bill, enter
payment number
Tender (quote request) 44-1998052 of 11/21/2014
Timber and building materials Description of
purchased item is given in the specification attached to
quote documentation
Region 66 – Sverdlovsk Region
Customer level – Federal
Contract lot price (million rubles) – 0.089
General information
Notification number: 0362100028014000049
Name of purchased item: Timber and building materials Description of
purchased item is given in the specification attached to quote documentation.
How will supplier (contractor) be determined?
3
Request quote
Who is the purchaser: Customer
Contact information
Organization name: military unit 3280
Correspondence address: 6 Dzerzhinskogo, Novouralsk, Sverdlovsk Region,
624131, Russian Federation
Physical location: 6 Dzerzhinskogo, Novouralsk, Sverdlovsk Region, 624131,
Russian Federation
Responsible official: Boris Mikhailovich Zemlyanov
Email address: [email protected]
Contact telephone No: 7-912-6202387
Fax: 7-34370-98769
Information about contract service and contract manager:
Contract manager: A.A. Sinelnikov. Official responsible for drafting
documentation: B.M. Zemlyanov military unit 3280
Registered address: 6 ul. Dzerzhinskogo, Novouralsk, Sverdlovsk Region,
624131, Russian Federation. Correspondence address: 6 ul. Dzerzhinskogo,
Novouralsk, Sverdlovsk Region, 624131, Russian Federation Telephone (fax):
8 (34370) 9-87-69. Email: [email protected]
Additional information: +79222962689 Aleksei Anatoliyevich Sinelnikov
Screenshot of internet page
The sixth web browser window opens to web page 6 loaded from
http://pravdanews.ru/topic/5623.html, establishing that it is a news center called Penzenskaya
Pravda featuring the news article “Retired Colonel Anatoly Sinelnikov takes up post of
military commissar.”
A detailed viewing of the article establishes that it was published on 2/24/2011 at 3:48
p.m. The article says Anatoly Sinelnikov and his wife were born in Shemysheyka District,
Penza Region and that three of his family are in the army—he, his wife and his son—while
his daughter is at school.
[…] Retired Colonel Anatoly Sinelnikov takes up post of military commissar
February 24, 2011, 3:48 p.m. Print version
And he found the time to meet the regional media.
At his first news conference, he said the military commissariat was open to cooperation with the press:
— “If you have any questions, please contact us directly for comment, but please don’t use unverified
4
information.”
Anatoly Aleksandrovich said there would be events held in the near future aimed at raising the department’s
profile. Call-up work remains a priority. Young people should realize that army service is not only a duty, but an
honorable obligation. This requires efforts to step up patriotic education.
The new military commissar said that no reshuffle was being planned in the leadership of the military
commissariat.
— “The staff are doing their work. Only those shirking their duties may lose their jobs.”
Journalists asked what Anatoly Aleksandrovich thought of the new army uniform designed by Valentin
Yudashkin.
— “The old guard are better used to the old uniform, but young people like the new one. Personally, I really like
the new parade uniform,” he confessed.
Journalists were curious about the military commissar’s private life. Anatoly Sinelnikov said he and his wife
were both born in Shemysheyka District, Penza Region. Three members of his family are in the army, including
his son and his wife. His daughter is at school.
Screenshot of the internet page.
The seventh web browser window opens to web page 7 loaded from http://tvexpress.
ru/news_info/16635/, establishing that it is the site of the Express broadcasting
company, News from Penza and Region, featuring the article “New regional military
commissar Anatoly Sinelnikov meets journalists.”
[...]
given in the specification attached to quote documentation”, size 176 kB; Retired Colonel
Anatoly Sinelnikov takes up post of military commissar_News_News from Penza and Region
– Penzenskaya Pravda” size 656 kB; “New regional military commissar Anatoly Sinelnikov
meets journalists – EXPRESS TV”, size 200kB.
After the inspection, the above files were copied onto a “Verbatim” CD-R optical disc
appended to this record.
The inspection took place in mixed artificial and natural light.
Appendix:
1. “Verbatim” CD-R optical disc
Inspection conducted, record compiled by:
Senior special investigator, section 1
Department 5, pre-trial investigations directorate 1,
Main Directorate for Investigations,
Security Service of Ukraine
Lieutenant-Colonel of Justice [signature] D. Zyuzia
Annex 166
Record of Inspection of Materials Obtained As a Result of a Covert Detective Activity,
Carried by D.V. Zyuzia, Lt. Colonel of Justice and Senior Special Investigator, Section
1 of Department 5, Pre-Trial Investigations, Directorate 1 at the Main Directora
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1
RECORD
of inspection of materials obtained as a result of a covert detective activity
Kyiv February 18, 2017
Inspection started: 09:05 a.m.
Inspection finished: 06:30 p.m.
Senior special investigator, department 5, pre-trial investigations directorate 1 at the Main
Directorate for Investigations of the Security Service of Ukraine, Lt-Col of Justice D.V. Zyuzya, acting
in connection with a pre-trial investigation in criminal proceedings No 22015050000000021 concerning
elements of crimes provided for under Article 258 Part 3, Article 2583 Part 1 and Article 438 Part 2 of
the Criminal Code of Ukraine and entered into the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations on
1/13/2015, with the purpose of gathering evidence as well as finding and recording information about
the circumstances in which the criminal offences were committed and pursuant to Articles 104, 106,
223 and 237 of the Criminal Procedures Code of Ukraine, carried out an inspection of materials obtained
as a result of a covert detective activity, in Room No 104 of the Main Directorate for Investigations of
the Security Service of Ukraine at 4 vul. Iryninska, Kyiv. The said materials are stored on a Verbatim
DVD-R device, registered as No 4602 on 11/21/2016, which is appended to the outcome of covert
detective activity record No 2/2/8-3629nt of February 15, 2017.
The inspection was conducted using personal computer PEOM No 19957. After loading the
disc into the optical drive it was established that the disc has a total of 13,295 files with the total volume
of 2394859215 bytes. The audio files have been listened to, with selected content of conversations
included in this record.
1. Designations: “Zakhar” – Colonel of the Russian Armed Forces A.A. Sinelnikov, “Yust” – the
commandant of Dokuchayevsk, Maj Yury Mykolayovych Shpakov.
Information obtained during the activity:
At 10:08:44 a.m. on 1/18/2015 (session duration: 00:01:38), the mobile telephone number
380509604816 used by “Yust” received a phone call from “Zakhar” using mobile telephone number
380635045391. The callers had the following conversation:
“Yust”: Go ahead, Colonel, Sir.
“Zakhar”: Well, what’s the situation? Go ahead and report. Can you see a fucking thing over there?
“Yust”: They’re throwing ammonite on over there.
“Zakhar”: Ah.
“Yust”: They’re throwing on ammonite from the slag heap.
“Zakhar”: They’re using ammonite?
“Yust”: Yes, only they’re throwing it on from the slag heaps. We can't get close.
“Zakhar”: Understood, understood.
“Yust”: They’ve set up some surprises.
“Zakhar”: Ok, get those people under cover. They’re just fucking distracting you. Hold the (inaudible),
that’s the first thing. And second, it’s inactive – a road of dust, an inactive factory.
“Yust”: They’re not showing themselves.
“Zakhar”: Huh?
“Yust”: They’re not showing themselves over there. They’re not shelling from there.
“Zakhar”: But step up the surveillance. The most important thing right now is surveillance.
7
[…]
At 12:32:57 p.m. on 1/19/2015 (session duration 00:00:44), the mobile telephone number 380635045391
used by “Zakhar,” received a call from “Wife” using mobile telephone number 79374339293. The callers had
the following conversation:
“Zakhar”: Hello.
“Wife”: Hello.
“Zakhar”: Hi. Happy holiday.
“Wife”: Hi. Thanks. You too.
“Zakhar”: How are things?
“Wife”: All right. So far, so good.
“Zakhar”: Well, you’re doing great.
“Wife”: I’m in the city. I arrived with Kolya this morning.
“Zakhar”: Yes, I know. Kolya called me.
“Wife”: Uh-huh.
“Zakhar”: Well, Ok. So, is everything all right?
“Wife”: Yes, everything is fine
“Zakhar”: Ok then. I’ll call you in the evening.
“Wife”: Uh-huh. Ok.
“Zakhar”: Bye.
8. Designations: “Zakhar” – Colonel of the Russian Armed Forces A.A. Sinelnikov, “Valera” – an
unidentified person named Valera.
Information obtained during the activity:
At 8:50:31 p.m. on 1/19/2015 (session duration 00:04:39), the telephone number 380635045391 used
by “Zakhar” received a call from an unidentified person named Valera “Valera,” mobile telephone number
79055897802. The callers had the following conversation:
“Valera”: Hi.
“Zakhar”: Hi. Happy [Orthodox] Epiphany.
“Valera”: You too. Did you manage to take a dip at least?
“Zakhar”: Yes, in the wash basin. In the wash basin, you hear?
“Valera”: Well, that’s ok, too.
“Zakhar”: So, did you drive somewhere?
“Valera”: Where? For a dip?
“Zakhar”: Yes, yes.
“Valera”: No, I only did it in the bath myself.
“Zakhar”: Well done, anyway. After midnight all water is holy.
“Valera”: Yeah, I just got back from work and took a dip. The water was warm, not cold, but still…
“Zakhar”: Well done. So how is the weather?
“Valera”: It’s around zero or one above. Freezing.
“Zakhar”: It’s a madhouse, Valera.
“Valera”: Is it all pretty serious over there?
“Zakhar”: It’s all so damn unclear. People are just killing each other.
“Valera”: Who’s killing whom?
“Zakhar”: It isn’t clear. Some say this many, others say that many.
“Valera”: Yeah.
“Zakhar”: Yeah, they’re torturing each other with information. They’re trying to stir things up, engaging
in incitement.
“Valera”: I see.
“Zakhar”: So there you have it.
“Valera”: So, are you going to be stuck there a long time?
“Zakhar”: I don’t think it will be long. I don’t want to stay here long. I realized that it’s just the usual
fucked up situation here.
“Valera”: As far as your situation is concerned.
9
[…]
“Zakhar”: Are you getting ready?
“Wife”: Yes, I’m making “Olivier” salad. We’re going to make French-style potatoes in the oven. I’m
about to put it in.
“Zakhar”: Uh-huh, have you got it down already?
“Wife”: Yes, I’m peeling the potatoes now, and I’ll put them in at 5:00.
“Zakhar”: And for the leg? Did they bring it yet?
“Wife”: No, not yet.
“Zakhar”: Call Slava. Let Slava call. Tell that Belov guy.
“Wife”: Ruslan called me himself when I was in Yekaterinburg.
“Zakhar”: Uh-huh.
“Wife”: He asked me to take a precise measurement and send it to him. So I did.
“Zakhar”: Ok, good. What else?
“Wife”: How are you doing?
“Zakhar”: So far, so good.
“Wife”: Everything’s fine. The bills came for the apartment. I went and paid the electricity, the rent, and
the Internet bill.
“Zakhar”: All right, Dmitriyevna. Give me a call in the evening if anything comes up.
“Wife”: Ok, when Yulka gets here we'll give you a call.
“Zakhar”: After 8:00, ok?
“Wife”: Uh-huh, ok.
“Zakhar”: Ok, I’m sending you hugs and kisses. Bye.
10. Designations: “Zakhar” – Colonel of the Russian Armed Forces A.A. Sinelnikov, “Wife” – his wife
Valentina, “Daughter” – his daughter Yulia.
Information obtained during the activity:
At 8:21:00 p.m. on 1/20/2015, the telephone number 380635045391 used by “Zakhar” received a call
from “Wife”, using mobile telephone number 79374339293. During the conversation, “Wife” passed the mobile
telephone to daughter Yulia. The callers had the following conversation:
“Wife”: Hello
“Zakhar”: Hello, girls.
“Wife”: Hi.
“Zakhar”: How are things with you, my girls?
“Wife”: Fine. We had dinner already. Everything is fine.
“Zakhar”: Without the boys?
“Wife”: Yes, without them, for Yule.
“Daughter”: Hello. Hi, Papa.
“Zakhar”: Hi, honey. How are you?
“Daughter”: How are things?
“Zakhar”: So far, so good, daughter.
“Daughter”: What are you up to?
“Zakhar”: Nothing, really. Watching TV.
“Daughter”: Watching TV?
“Zakhar”: Uh-huh. Over the Internet.
“Daughter”: Ah. Have you blown all the money on your iPhone over there?
“Zakhar”: Not really. What am I supposed to do?
“Daughter”: I just think you’re going to blow it all.
“Zakhar”: How are things on the personal front?
“Daughter”: Fine.
“Zakhar”: Is it love, my daughter? Is it love or what?
“Daughter”: What love? Give me a break.
“Zakhar”: You seem to see each other pretty often. It’s probably love.
“Daughter”: Love? What are you talking about?
Annex 167
Expert Conclusion No. 77, drafted by M. Ustymenko and A. Pavlenko, Ukrainian
Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic Expert
Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine (3 March 2017)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Translation of excerpt from Ukrainian
Expert conclusion No. 77 of March 3, 2017 based on materials of the criminal case No.
120170514000000074, in particular the documents related to the explosion at 86 Kolosova
Str., Avdiivka and objects that resemble parts of a Grad projectile collected at the said site.
CONCLUSIONS:
1. Based on the results of site inspection and collected objects it is established that the
reason for explosion was detonation of a unmanaged high-explosive fragmentation projectile M-
21 OF.
2. Based on the results of site inspection and inspection of the collected objects it is possible
to identify a particular kind and type of ammunition, which is a 122 mm unmanaged high-explosive
fragmentation projectile M-21 OF (product 9M22U). This projectile was shoot from a multiple
rocket launching system BM 21 Grad.
3. The objects that were collected during site inspection and provided for expert
examination have the following markings: 10 -, K 50 B C H, K 78 B C H 7, 469, T 1 G
GR. It does not appear possible to answer the question about the meaning of these markings due
the reasons described in the research part [of this expert conclusion].
4. Objects No.No. 1 - 5, and 8 are parts of a body of a 122 mm unmanaged high-explosive
fragmentation projectile M-21 OF (product 9M22U); object No. 6 is part of a standard package of
a stabilization unit of an unmanaged high-explosive fragmentation projectile M-21 OF (product
9M22U), the purpose of which is to stabilize projectile flight; object No. 7 is a nozzle cover of a
stabilization unit of an unmanaged high-explosive fragmentation projectile M-21 OF.
5. The capacity of one unit of ammunition (unmanaged high-explosive fragmentation
projectile M-21 OF) is 9.344 kg in the TNT [trinitrotoluol] equivalent.
6-7. Based on the information from the record of inspection of February 21, 2017, in which
a specialist participated, copies of the chart of site inspection at 86 Kolosova Str., Avdiivka
(addendum to the record of inspection of February 21, 2017) it is established that:
- the directional (horizontal) angle of a trajectory of fall of the projectile (unmanaged high-
explosive fragmentation projectile M-21 OF) is 140-145°;
- it is impossible to identify the angle of impact of the projectile (unmanaged high-
explosive fragmentation projectile M-21 OF), because of significant deformation of the site of
projectile impact due to the fact that a considerable period of time has passed after the shelling (the
shelling took place on January 27, 2017, and the site inspection took place on February 21, 2017);
- the shelling was likely conducted from the territory of the Budyonivskyi District of the
city of Donetsk, Donetsk Region from the distance of no less than 10,000 meters.
Experts: M. Ustymenko
A. Pavlenko
[Seal and signatures]
Annex 168
Expert Conclusion No. 78, drafted by M. Ustymenko and A. Pavlenko, Ukrainian
Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic Expert
Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine (3 March 2017)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Translation of excerpt from Ukrainian
Expert conclusion No. 78 of March 3, 2017 based on materials of the criminal case No.
120170514000000074, in particular the documents related to the explosion at 85 Zavodska
Str., Avdiivka.
CONCLUSIONS:
1. Based on the results of site inspection it is established that the likely reason of explosion
was detonation of a piece of ammunition - an unmanaged high-explosive fragmentation projectile
M-21 OF (product 9M22U). This projectile was shoot from a multiple rocket launching system
BM 21 Grad.
2. Based on the results of the site inspection it was established that the shelling was likely
conducted from the territory of the airport of the city of Donetsk, Donetsk Region from the distance
of no less than 10,000 meters.
3. Based on the results of the site inspection it is established that the directional (horizontal)
angle of a trajectory of fall of the projectile (unmanaged high-explosive fragmentation projectile
M-21 OF) is 140-145°; it is impossible to identify the angle of impact of the projectile, because of
significant deformation of the site of projectile impact due to the fact that a considerable period of
time has passed after the shelling (the shelling took place on January 27, 2017, and the site
inspection took place on February 21, 2017).
Experts: M. Ustymenko
A. Pavlenko
[Seal and signatures]
Annex 169
Expert Conclusion No. 79, drafted by M. Ustymenko and A. Pavlenko, Ukrainian
Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic Expert
Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine (3 March 2017)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Translation of excerpt from Ukrainian
Expert conclusion No. 79 of March 3, 2017 based on materials of the criminal case No.
120170514000000074, in particular the documents related to the explosion at 83 Zavodska
Str., Avdiivka.
CONCLUSIONS:
1. Based on the results of site inspection it is established that the likely reason of explosion
was detonation of a piece of ammunition - an unmanaged high-explosive fragmentation projectile
M-21 OF (product 9M22U). This projectile was shoot from a multiple rocket launching system
BM 21 Grad.
2. Based on the results of the site inspection it was established that the shelling was likely
conducted from the territory of the Budyonivskyi District of the city of Donetsk, Donetsk Region
from the distance of no less than 10,000 meters.
3. Based on the results of the site inspection it is established that the directional (horizontal)
angle of a trajectory of fall of the projectile (unmanaged high-explosive fragmentation projectile
M-21 OF) is 140-145°; it is impossible to identify the angle of impact of the projectile, because of
significant deformation of the site of projectile impact due to the fact that a considerable period of
time has passed after the shelling (the shelling took place on January 27, 2017, and the site
inspection took place on February 21, 2017).
Experts: M. Ustymenko
A. Pavlenko
[Seal and signatures]
Annex 170
Expert Conclusion No. 80, drafted by M. Ustymenko and A. Pavlenko, Ukrainian
Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic Expert
Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine (3 March 2017)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Translation of excerpt from Ukrainian
Expert conclusion No. 80 of March 3, 2017 based on materials of the criminal case No.
120170514000000074, in particular the documents related to the explosion at 96 Zavodska
Str., Avdiivka.
CONCLUSIONS:
1. Based on the results of site inspection it is established that the likely reason of explosion
was detonation of a piece of ammunition - an unmanaged high-explosive fragmentation projectile
M-21 OF (product 9M22U). This projectile was shoot from a multiple rocket launching system
BM 21 Grad.
2. Based on the results of the site inspection it was established that the shelling was likely
conducted from the territory of the Budyonivskyi District of the city of Donetsk, Donetsk Region
from the distance of no less than 10,000 meters.
3. Based on the results of the site inspection it is established that the directional (horizontal)
angle of a trajectory of fall of the projectile (unmanaged high-explosive fragmentation projectile
M-21 OF) is 140-145°; it is impossible to identify the angle of impact of the projectile, because of
significant deformation of the site of projectile impact due to the fact that a considerable period of
time has passed after the shelling (the shelling took place on January 27, 2017, and the site
inspection took place on February 21, 2017).
Experts: M. Ustymenko
A. Pavlenko
[Seal and signatures]
Annex 171
Expert Conclusion No. 81, drafted by M. Ustymenko and A. Pavlenko, Ukrainian
Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic Expert
Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine (3 March 2017)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Translation of excerpt from Ukrainian
Expert conclusion No. 81 of March 3, 2017 based on materials of the criminal case No.
120170514000000074, in particular the documents related to the explosion at 8 Mendeleev
Str., Avdiivka.
CONCLUSIONS:
1. Based on the results of site inspection it is established that the likely reason of explosion
was detonation of a piece of ammunition - an unmanaged high-explosive fragmentation projectile
M-21 OF (product 9M22U). This projectile was shoot from a multiple rocket launching system
BM 21 Grad.
2. Based on the results of the site inspection it was established that the shelling was likely
conducted from the territory of the Kyivskyi or Voroshylovskyi Districts of the city of Donetsk,
Donetsk Region from the distance of no less than 10,000 meters.
3. Based on the results of the site inspection it is established that the directional (horizontal)
angle of a trajectory of fall of the projectile (unmanaged high-explosive fragmentation projectile
M-21 OF) is 140-145°; it is impossible to identify the angle of impact of the projectile, because of
significant deformation of the site of projectile impact due to the fact that a considerable period of
time has passed after the shelling (the shelling took place on January 27, 2017, and the site
inspection took place on February 21, 2017).
Experts: M. Ustymenko
A. Pavlenko
[Seal and signatures]
Annex 172
Record of examination of a CD performed by S.O. Husarov, Senior Lieutenant of
Justice and Senior Investigator of the 1st Office of the 5th Department at the 1st
Pretrial Investigation Directorate of the Central Investigative Directorate of the SSU
(4 May
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
RECORD OF EXAMINATION
City of Kyiv May 04, 2017
Examination began at 2 PM
Examination ended at 4:16 PM
Senior Lieutenant of Justice Serhiy Oleksandrovych Husarov, Senior Investigating Officer of Unit 1,
5th Department of Pretrial Investigations of the Main Investigation Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine, in criminal proceeding No. 22015050000000021, in Office No. 104 of the Main Investigation
Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine located at number 4 Irynynska Street, City of Kyiv, acting
in compliance with Articles 104, 105, 106, 223, and 237 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, has
examined a black CD-R compact disk marked by hand MTS Ukrayina, No. 757/40989/16-K and
GD/K-P/16/11394 of September 15, 2016, collected as a result of temporary access to objects and
documents at MTS Ukrayina Private Joint Stock Company.
The examination has shown the following:
A black CD-R compact disk marked by hand MTS Ukrayina, No. 757/40989/16-K and GD/K-
P/16/11394 of September 15, 2016. An examination of said compact disk has shown that it contains an
Excel file named 25803.xlsx.
The file named 25803.xlsx contains information on communications of subscriber Yuriy
Mykolayovych Shpakov [at number] 380509604816, provision of telecommunications services at
telephone numbers over the period from January 01, 2015 to March 01, 2015, on 254 spreadsheets (out of
10692 spreadsheets), including information on services received, their duration, transmission routes,
IMEI of mobile terminals, and transceiver locations.
Number 380509604816
Date and time Duration Tel. A IMEI Location Tel. B
Jan. 13, 2015
10:31 AM
32 380509604816 35201806783917 CITY OF DOKUCHAYEVSK,
DONETSK REGION (AVANGARD
STADIUM)
380635045
391
Jan. 13, 2015
11:08 AM
108 380509604816 35201806783917 CITY OF DOKUCHAYEVSK,
DONETSK REGION (AVANGARD
STADIUM)
380508746
689
Jan. 13, 2015
11:42 AM
9 380509604816 35201806783917 CITY OF DOKUCHAYEVSK,
DONETSK REGION (AVANGARD
STADIUM)
380508440
132
Jan. 13, 2015
11:47 AM
28 380509604816 35201806783917 CITY OF DOKUCHAYEVSK,
DONETSK REGION (AVANGARD
STADIUM)
380662362
864
Jan. 13, 2015
11:48 AM
38 380509604816 35201806783917 CITY OF DOKUCHAYEVSK,
DONETSK REGION (AVANGARD
STADIUM)
380951726
404
Jan. 13, 2015
11:53 AM
9 380509604816 35201806783917 CITY OF DOKUCHAYEVSK,
DONETSK REGION (AVANGARD
STADIUM)
380637490
719
Jan. 13, 2015 11 380509604816 35201806783917 CITY OF DOKUCHAYEVSK, DONETSK 380662033
[signature]
Continued: Record of Examination of May 04, 2017
11:55 REGION (AVANGARD STADIUM) 211
13.01.2015
11:55 AM
24 380509604816 35201806783917 CITY OF DOKUCHAYEVSK,
DONETSK REGION (AVANGARD
STADIUM)
380505411
083
13.01.2015
11:58 AM
65 380509604816 35201806783917 CITY OF DOKUCHAYEVSK,
DONETSK REGION,
OKTYABRSKAYA ST. (CORPORATE
SWITCHBOARD, DOKUCHAYEVSK
FLUX DOLOMITE WORKS)
380990478
333
13.01.2015
12:00 PM
26 380509604816 35201806783917 CITY OF DOKUCHAYEVSK,
DONETSK REGION, 96 LENINA ST.
(BOILER ROOM SMOKESTACK)
380637490
719
13.01.2015
12:13 PM
23 380509604816 35201806783917 YASNOYE VILLAGE, CITY OF
DOKUCHAYEVSK, DONETSK
REGION (DONBASSAGRO LLC
PRODUCTION FACILITY)
380956497
364
13.01.2015
12:16 PM
54 380509604816 35201806783917 YASNOYE VILLAGE, CITY OF
DOKUCHAYEVSK, DONETSK
REGION (DONBASSAGRO LLC
PRODUCTION FACILITY)
380661271
550
13.01.2015
12:19 PM
13 380509604816 35201806783917 BERYOZOVOYE VILLAGE,
MARYINSKYI DISTRICT, DONETSK
REGION (TRACTOR CREW)
380637490
719
13.01.2015
12:23 PM
42 380509604816 35201806783917 YASNOYE VILLAGE, CITY OF
DOKUCHAYEVSK, DONETSK
REGION, (DONBASSAGRO LLC
PRODUCTION FACILITY)
380637490
719
13.01.2015
12:24 PM
436 380509604816 35201806783917 YASNOYE VILLAGE, CITY OF
DOKUCHAYEVSK, DONETSK
REGION, (DONBASSAGRO LLC
PRODUCTION FACILITY)
380508746
689
13.01.2015
12:32 PM
5 380509604816 35201806783917 YASNOYE VILLAGE, CITY OF
DOKUCHAYEVSK, DONETSK
REGION, (DONBASSAGRO LLC
PRODUCTION FACILITY)
380956497
364
13.01.2015
12:46 PM
35 380509604816 35201806783917 CITY OF DOKUCHAYEVSK,
DONETSK REGION, 96 LENINA ST.
(BOILER ROOM SMOKESTACK)
380637490
719
13.01.2015
1:54 PM
32 380509604816 35201806783917 OLENOVKA URBAN-TYPE
SETTLEMENT, VOLNOVAKHSKYI
DISTRICT, DONETSK REGION, 147
POCHTOVAYA STREET (BREAD
PRODUCTS FACILITY)
380637490
719
13.01.2015
1:55 PM 232 380509604816 35201806783917
LUGANSKOYE VILLAGE,
MARYINSKYI DISTRICT, DONETSK
REGION, 1 LAZO STREET
(LUGANSKOYE LLC)
380508746
689
13.01.2015 266 380509604816 35201806783917 CITY OF DONETSK, DONETSK
REGION, 25 ELEKTROVOZNAYA
STREET (SMOKESTACK 380508746
2
Senior Investigating Officer [signature] S. Husarov
Continued: Record of Examination of May 04, 2017
01.03.2015
11:11 PM
0 380509604816 35201806783917 CITY OF DONETSK, DONETSK
REGION, 10 ZHOVTNYA STREET
(COMMUNITY CENTER)
380953144
919
01.03.2015
11:32 PM 1658 380509604816 35201806783917
CITY OF DONETSK, DONETSK
REGION, 86 KVITNEVA STREET
(COKE AND CHEMICAL
EQUIPMENT PLANT OPEN JOINT
STOCK COMPANY)
MTS.INTE
RNET
Examination performed and record executed by:
[signature]
Senior Lieutenant of Justice
Senior Investigating Officer of Unit 1
5th Department of Pretrial Investigations
Main Investigation Directorate
Security Service of Ukraine S. Husarov
68
Annex 173
Expert Opinion No. 19/11-1/11-8-3/9-14/1/3-CE17, State Scientific Research Forensic
Expert Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (17 May 2017)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
190
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE
STATE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CENTER
OF FORENSIC EXPERTS
10 Bohomoltsya Street, Kyiv, 01024
Tel. (044) 405-74-69
[email protected]
EXPERT OPINION
May 17, 2017 City of Kyiv No. 19/11-1/1183/9
14-1/3SE/17
On January 24, 2017, the Explosives Analysis Unit of the Explosives Laboratory; the Physical and
Chemical Analysis Unit of the Material, Substance, and Product Analysis Laboratory; and the Trace
Evidence and Fingerprint Examination Sector of the Trace Evidence and Fingerprint Examination and
Analysis Unit of the Forensic Analysis Laboratory of the State Scientific Research Center of Forensic
Experts [SSRCFE] of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine received an order dated January 24,
2017, for performing an explosives and fingerprint analysis, issued by Major of Justice O. V. Stukovenko,
Senior Investigator, in a criminal proceeding registered on December 18, 2016, with the Unified Registry
of Pretrial Investigations under No. 22016000000000466, accompanied by cover letter No. 6/399 of
January 24, 2017, from Unit 3 of the First Pretrial Investigation Department of the Main Investigation
Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.
A comprehensive explosives and fingerprint analysis was assigned to [the following individuals]:
Vasyl Petrovych Moroz, Director, Explosives Analysis Unit of the Explosives Laboratory of the SSRC
FE for the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, who has degrees in both engineering and law, is a
licensed forensic expert authorized to perform explosives analyses per Expert Specialty 5.2 Analysis of
Explosive Devices and Explosion Residue and Circumstances (Certificate No. 14759 issued on
September 07, 2016, by the Expert Qualification Commission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Ukraine), and has served as an expert from 2005 to 2011 and since 2016; Oleksandr Vyacheslovovych
Morodetskyi, Principal Forensic Expert for the Physical and Chemical Analysis Unit of the Material,
Substance, and Product Research Laboratory of the SSRCFE for the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Ukraine, who has a degree in chemistry, is a licensed forensic expert authorized to perform explosives
analyses per Expert Specialty 5.1 Analysis of Explosive Substances and Explosion and Shot Products
(Certificate No. 13800 issued on May 13, 2015, by the Expert Qualification Commission of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs of Ukraine), and has served as an expert since 2010; Vitaliy Yevhenovych
Nepomnyashchyi, Forensic Expert for the Physical and Chemical Analysis Unit of the Material,
Substance, and Product Research Laboratory of the SSRCFE for the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Ukraine, who has a degree in physics, is a licensed forensic expert authorized to perform material,
substance, and product analyses per Expert Specialty 8.9 Analysis of Metals and Alloys (Certificate No.
14327 issued on February 22, 2016, by the Expert Qualification Commission of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Ukraine), and has served as an expert since 1994; . . . [text cut off], Deputy Head of the Trace
Evidence and Fingerprint Examination and Analysis Unit, Head of the Trace Evidence and Fingerprint
Examination Sector, [...]
[seal:] FOR EXPERT OPINIONS
Explosives Analysis Unit, Explosives Laboratory
SSRCFE for the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
Forensic Experts: [signature] V. P. Moroz [signature] O. V. Morodetskyi
[signature] V. Ye. Nepomnyashchyi [signature] A. V. Shchavelev
Expert Opinion No. 19/11-1/118-3/914-1/3SE/17 dated May 17, 2017 Page 50 of 128
[seal:] FOR EXPERT OPINIONS
Explosives Analysis Unit, Explosives Laboratory
SSRCFE for the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
Forensic Experts: [signature] V. P. Moroz [signature] O. V. Morodetskyi
[signature] V. Ye. Nepomnyashchyi [signature] A. V. Shchavelev
23
[
] of Ukraine No. 0177716, marked 5.1 Expert Opinion No. 19/11-1/118-3/914-1/3SE/17 dated
May 17, 2007 [sic], criminal proceeding No. 22016000000000466 Forensic Expert /signature/ O. V.
Morodetskyi (Images Nos. 150153 of the Illustrative Table) and shall be returned to the initiator of the
forensic analysis together with the Expert Opinion.
The following is enclosed with the Expert Opinion:
1. Illustrative Table on 75 sheets.
2. Special Packets Nos. 2158563, 0315141, and 0177716 of the Expert Service of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs of Ukraine.
3. Two (2) Hazard Category Confirmation Letters, each on 1 sheet.
OPINION REPORTS:
Forensic Analysis of Explosive Devices and Explosion Residue and Circumstances:
1) The adhesive tape roll, the plastic container, the PVV-5A plastic-based explosive substance, the
neodymium magnet and the YeD-K3-5PM electric detonator with a portion of a male connector electric
contact connected to one of the wires, which have been provided to the experts for analysis, could all
constitute components of an improvised explosive device.
2) Each individual object provided for analysis (the 0.5 L plastic food storage container; the PVV-
5A plastic-based explosive substance; the uncased cylindrical neodymium magnet; the YeD-K3-5PM
protective, short time-delay electric detonator; and a portion of a male connector electric contact) has
been manufactured industrially. Some of them have been modified by hand (see the analytical section).
However, if used as components of an explosive device, the latter should be classified as an improvised
explosive device.
3) The objects provided to the experts include an industrially manufactured plastic-based explosive
substance, PVV-5A, which is classified as a normal-strength blasting explosive. As received by the
experts, the substance weighed 281 g. However, based on the materials provided to the experts, it should
be noted that before samples were taken for analysis the PVV-5A plastic-based explosive substance
weighed 282 g.
4) A brown cylindrical object with wires, featuring a cylindrical metal object connected to the end of
one of the wires, is a YeD-K3-5PM protective, short time-delay electric detonator (containing the
explosive substance hexogen [3, 12]) with a portion of a male connector electric contact connected
manually to one of the wires (also known as a portion of a cylindrical contact pair).
5) If an explosive device were to be built using the objects provided for analysis, such device would
consist of the following:
a case for housing the device components, i.e., the 0.5 L plastic food storage container;
Expert Opinion No. 19/11-1/118-3/914-1/3SE/17 dated May 17, 2017 Page 51 of 128
[seal:] FOR EXPERT OPINIONS
Explosives Analysis Unit, Explosives Laboratory
SSRCFE for the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
Forensic Experts: [signature] V. P. Moroz [signature] O. V. Morodetskyi
[signature] V. Ye. Nepomnyashchyi [signature] A. V. Shchavelev
24
an explosive charge, i.e., the industrially manufactured plastic-based explosive substance,
PVV-5A;
a blasting fuze, i.e., the YeD-K3-5PM electric detonator with a portion of the contact
assembly;
a device to be used for securing to surfaces attracted by a magnetic field, i.e., the uncased
cylindrical neodymium magnet;
a reliable means of holding the body together and securing the magnet to it, i.e., a brown
polymer-based single-coated adhesive tape (Scotch tape).
The above improvised explosive device is based on the following operating principle: when a flow of
direct current of at least 1 A is used to energize the electric detonator wires, the electric detonator is
fuzed, which, in turn, causes a blast of the explosive charge. The method used to set off such a potential
improvised explosive device will be electrical. In other words, in order to make sure that the device does
set off (explode), a source of electric current will be required so that a flow of direct current of at least
1 A is used to energize the electric detonator wires.
6) The individual who has fabricated the explosive device (or prepared the structural elements
required to put together the explosive device) had certain skills; however, such skills can hardly be
described as systematic professional or special skills of a demolition expert.
7) If an explosive device were to be built using the objects provided for analysis (the 0.5 L plastic
food storage container; the PVV-5A plastic-based explosive substance; the uncased cylindrical
neodymium magnet; the YeD-K3-5PM protective, short time-delay electric detonator; and a portion of a
male connector electric contact), such device would be sufficient to ensure an explosion subject to
availability of an electric current source to energize the electrical wires of the YeD-K3-5PM electric
detonator with an electric current of at least 1 A.
8) Based on the results of the experimental explosions performed, it can be asserted that if a device
like that were to be attached to the exterior surface of the bottom of a motor vehicle, the vehicle would
sustain serious damage that would make its further operation impossible. Human injury or death can be
caused by a high-explosive blast at a distance of up to 1 m, with a lethal injury potentially inflicted on a
human being at a distance of up to 0.62 m. The impact of shock wave hazards on human health, with an
explosive charge like that blasted in an open terrain in the absence of any fragmentation effect, will carry
on at a distance of up to 10.2 m from the explosion site. Even though the explosive device itself has no
fragmentation effect, if exploded under the bottom of a motor vehicle (installation of an explosive device
at a place like that is brought about by a combination of its structural elements (see the analytical
section)), both the life and health of any individuals located inside the vehicle could be threatened by the
so-called secondary fragments caused by the rupture of structural elements at the bottom of the vehicle
and by the effect of the shock wave.
9) Nokia 105 mobile phone (Object No. 7) with a battery (Object No. 8) and a suitable SIM card
provided by the mobile communications operator
Expert Opinion No. 19/11-1/118-3/914-1/3SE/17 dated May 17, 2017 Page 52 of 128
[seal:] FOR EXPERT OPINIONS
Explosives Analysis Unit, Explosives Laboratory
SSRCFE for the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
Forensic Experts: [signature] V. P. Moroz [signature] O. V. Morodetskyi
[signature] V. Ye. Nepomnyashchyi [signature] A. V. Shchavelev
24
may be used as a component part of improvised explosive devices. Clarification of matters related to the
suitability of SIM card No. 2300387603136 provided with the telephone falls outside the scope of the
experts competence.
Forensic Analysis of Explosive Substances and Explosion and Shot Products:
1) The fragments of fingernail plates identified in the order for performing an analysis as Fingernail
Clippings from S. V. Zhyrenkos Right and Left Hands and provided for analysis show traces of a
hexogen-based plastic explosive substance containing polyisobutylene and distillate petroleum oil. This
component composition is characteristic of PVV-5A plastic-based explosive substance.
The fragments of fingernail plates identified in the order for performing an analysis as Fingernail
Clippings from D. D. Yakobs Right and Left Hands and provided for analysis show no traces of
explosive substances.
The gauze swab identified in the order for performing an analysis as Wipe Samples from Citizen
S. V. Zhyrenkos Hands and provided for analysis show traces of a hexogen-based explosive substance
and traces of distillate oil.
The gauze swab identified in the order for performing an analysis as Wipe Samples from Citizen
D. D. Yakobs Hands and provided for analysis show traces of a hexogen-based explosive substance and
traces of distillate oil.
The black mittens provided for analysis show traces of a hexogen-based explosive substance and
traces of distillate petroleum oil and a residual petroleum product.
2) The substance whose traces have been identified in the order for performing an analysis as
Fingernail Clippings from S. V. Zhyrenkos Right and Left Hands and provided for analysis is of the
same generic type as the substance identified in the order for performing an analysis as Grayish Yellow
Plastic-based Substance in a Plastic Container Collected in the Process of Examination on January 20,
2017 and provided for analysis.
Identification of the common generic type of the light-yellow substance provided for analysis and the
substance whose traces have been identified in the order for performing an analysis as Wipe Samples
from Citizen S. V. Zhyrenkos Hands and Wipe Samples from Citizen D. D. Yakobs Hands has been
impossible due to the inadequate amount of the substance identified in the traces left on the aforesaid
gauze swabs.
Forensic Analysis of Fingerprints:
1) The interior surfaces of the container collected on January 20, 2017, in the process of
examination of the scene outside number 16-A Ivana Kudri Street in the City of Kyiv show no papillary
patterns and unidentifiable hand prints have been discovered on the interior surface of the container cover
under analysis.
2) No answer to the question, Were the hand prints left on the plastic container containing a grayish
yellow substance left by Svyatoslav Valeriyovych Zhyrenko, born on March 1, 1980,
Expert Opinion No. 19/11-1/118-3/914-1/3SE/17 dated May 17, 2017 Page 53 of 128
[seal:] FOR EXPERT OPINIONS
Explosives Analysis Unit, Explosives Laboratory
SSRCFE for the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
Forensic Experts: [signature] V. P. Moroz [signature] O. V. Morodetskyi
[signature] V. Ye. Nepomnyashchyi [signature] A. V. Shchavelev
24
Dmytro Dmytrovych Yakob, born on November 1, 1978, or any other persons? can be given due to the
fact that no papillary hand patterns were found on the interior surfaces of the container, while hand prints
of an unidentifiable person were found on the interior surface of the container under analysis.
[seal:] FOR EXPERT OPINIONS
Explosives Analysis Unit, Explosives Laboratory
SSRCFE for the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
Forensic Experts: [signature] V. P. Moroz
[signature] O. V. Morodetskyi
[signature] V. Ye. Nepomnyashchyi
[signature] A. V. Shchavelev
Annex 174
Expert Opinion No. 76/4, Ukrainian Research Institute for Special-Purpose
Equipment and Forensic Examinations of the Security Service of Ukraine (31 July
2017)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
SECURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of
Special Technologies and Forensic Experts
EXPERT OPINION
July 31, 2017 City of Kyiv No. 76/4
Copy No. 1
The following experts of the 4th Center (Center of Forensic and Special Experts) of the Ukrainian Scientific
Research Institute of Special Technologies and Forensic Experts of the Security Service of Ukraine:
Nataliya Anatoliyivna Kovalchuk, with a degree in languages and literature and qualified as forensic
expert for examination of phonoscopic documents, who has served as an expert since 2013, licensed
to perform phonoscopic examinations per Specialty 7.3 Linguistic Analysis of Oral Speech,
certificate No. 539 of April 23, 2014 (valid until April 23, 2019);
Vitaliy Mykolayovych Mahera, with a degree in engineering and qualified as forensic expert for
examination of phonoscopic documents, who has served as an expert since 1989, licensed to perform
phonoscopic examinations, certificates No. 322 of April 16, 2008 per Specialty 7.2 Speaker Analysis
Based on Physical Parameters of Oral Speech, Acoustic Signals, and the Environment (valid until
March 13, 2018), and No. 323 of April 16, 2008 per Specialty 7.1 Technical Analysis of Video and
Audio Recording Materials and Tools (valid until March 13, 2018);
acting on the basis of order dated May 25, 2017 to perform examination of video and audio recordings
issued by Lt. Col. of Justice D. V. Zyuzya, Senior Investigating Officer in Major Cases of Unit 5 of the
First Pretrial Investigation Department of the Main Investigation Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine based on the materials of criminal proceeding No. 22015050000000021 registered on January 13,
2015 in the Unified Registry of Pretrial Investigations based on the elements of criminal offense under
Article 27 (3), Article 258 (3), Article 2583 (1), and Article 437 (2) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, and
on the elements of crime under Article 438 (2) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, have performed an
expert examination of audio recording materials.
I have been advised of the criminal liability for making deliberately misleading reports under Article
384 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine and for failure, without good reason, to perform my obligations
under Article 385 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine:
[signature] N. A. Kovalchuk ` [signature] V. M. Mahera
[illegible seal and stamp]
Expert Opinion No. 76/4 of July 31, 2017
The following questions were posed to the experts (cited from the order):
Does Anatoliy Oleksandrovych Sinelnikov, a citizen of the Russian Federation, born in 1964,
participate in the conversations recorded in the audio recordings identified as the following files:
18_01_2015_10_08_44_r37pnm_P24-267r1_(SBD)19133664_00.wav,
18_01_2015_10_21_35_r37pnm_P24-267r1_(SBD)19139485_00.wav,
18_01_2015_11_18_51_r37pnm_P24-267r1_(SBD)19210_00.wav,
28_01_2015_07_51_38_r37pnm_P24-267r1_(SBD)162740457_00.wav,
29_01_2015_13_15_47_r37pnm_P24-267r1_(SBD)163154423_00.wav,
30_01_2015_11_56_08_r37pnm_P24-267r1_(SBD)165420138_00.wav
(recorded on DVD-R data media, addendum to the record of covert investigations of February 15, 2017)?
If so, what words and phrases did he utter in the aforesaid audio recordings?
The facts of the proceedings are known to the experts within the scope of information provided in the
order to perform an expert examination.
Taking into account that establishing the truth in the case in hand will require special knowledge in
the area of phonoscopy and pursuant to the requirements of Articles 110, 242, and 243 of the Criminal
Procedure Code of Ukraine, a forensic phonoscopic expert examination was ordered to be performed by
the experts of the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Special Technologies and Forensic Experts of
the Security Service of Ukraine.
Together with the order to perform an expert examination, the experts were provided the following
materials:
Record of the results of covert investigation dated February 15, 2017, Main Investigation Directory,
Security Service of Ukraine incoming No. 1328 of February 17, 2017, on 29 sheets, with an addendum
one (1) DVD-R disk;
Record of examination of January 05, 2017, on 12 sheets, with an addendum one (1) Verbatim
optical CD-R disk.
ANALYSIS
1. EXTERNAL REVIEW OF THE MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR ANALYSIS:
According to Letter No. 6/3069-R of May 26, 2017, materials in the form of two (2) optical disks
were provided for analysis.
Descriptions of the materials submitted for analysis and their photos are submitted in Addendum 1 to
the Expert Opinion.
[illegible seal and stamp]
[signature]
2
Expert Opinion No. 76/4 of July 31, 2017
5. WORD-FOR-WORD IDENTIFICATION OF THE CONTENT OF THE CONVERSATIONS
In order to answer the question posed in the order regarding which words and phrases were uttered by
A. O. Sinelnikov, the content of the conversations submitted for analysis has been identified word for
word. Identification of the content of the conversations was performed at an auditory level of perception
by an expert using a set of techniques for lowering the level of interference and noises.
Phonograph software for phonogram analysis and processing was used to establish the content of the
conversations.
Addendum 2 sets forth the word-for-word content of the conversations submitted for analysis.
Experts: [signature] N. A. Kovalchuk
[signature] V. M. Mahera
CONCLUSIONS
The speech of A. O. Sinelnikov is present in the conversations recorded in the files (see Table 8
below):
Table 8
DF No. File
DF1 18_01_2015_10_08_44_r37pnm_P24-267r1_(SBD)19133664_00.wav
DF2 18_01_2015_10_21_35_r37pnm_P24-267r1_(SBD)19139485_00.wav
DF3 18_01_2015_11_18_51_r37pnm_P24-267r1_(SBD)19210_00.wav
DF4 28_01_2015_07_51_38_r37pnm_P24-267r1_(SBD)162740457_00.wav
DF5 29_01_2015_13_15_47_r37pnm_P24-267r1_(SBD)163154423_00.wav
DF6 30_01_2015_11_56_08_r37pnm_P24-267r1_(SBD)165420138_00.wav
The words and phrases uttered by A. O. Sinelnikov are set forth in Addendum 2 to the Expert
Opinion under D1 Index.
Addenda: 1. Illustrative Table of materials submitted for analysis, on 2 sheets.
2. Word-for-word content of the conversations, on 4 sheets.
Experts: [signature] N. A. Kovalchuk
[signature] V. M. Mahera
18
Annex 175
Ukrainian Military Intelligence Summary of Cross-Border Weapons Transfers
(September 2017 to December 2017).
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Appendix 3
Summary data regarding confirmed deliveries of weapons, military hardware,
military supplies, fuel and lubricants from Russian Federation territory to the
temporarily occupied territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions and border
crossings by armed formations during the period from January 1 to December 31,
2017
No.
Date of
documen-
tation
Delivery direction,
destination (crossing)
points
Means
(methods) of
delivery
Quantity of armaments, military
hardware, military-use materials,
fuel and lubricants, and
personnel
Supporting
evidence
1. 01/12/17
via IZVARYNE to
LUHANSK
rail
seven tank cars of fuel and
lubricants
(350 tonnes)
2. 01/1516/17 ROVENKY rail
14 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(700 tonnes)
3. 01/18/17 ILOVAYSK rail
17 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(280 tonnes of gasoline and 570
tonnes of diesel fuel)
4. 01/20/17 DEBALTSEVE rail
three freight cars (90 tonnes)
of ammunition
5. 01/20-23/17 YASYNUVATA rail 2000 tonnes of fuel and lubricants
6. 01/25/17 ROVENKY rail
seven tank cars of fuel and
lubricants
(around 350 tonnes)
7. 01/27/17 ROVENKY rail
eight tank cars of fuel and
lubricants
(around 400 tonnes)
8. 01/29/17 ILOVAYSK rail
10 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(around 500 tonnes)
9. 01/29/17 LUHANSK rail
20 railroad tank cars of fuel and
lubricants
10. 02/06/17
LARYNE Railway
Station (southeastern
outskirts of DONETSK)
rail
10 freight cars of ammunition
(300 tonnes)
11. 02/07/17
via DOVZHANSKYI
in the direction of
LUHANSK
motor vehicle
two 122-mm Grad multiple rocket
launchers, one infantry fighting
vehicle, six trucks
12. 02/07/17
via DMYTRIVKA in the
direction of
STEPANIVKA
motor vehicle
six 152-mm Akatsiya self-
propelled guns
and 10 trucks
13. 02/07/17
via SOROKYNE to the
Kruhlyk firing range
motor vehicle
25 tanks, eight APCs, two 122-mm
Gvozdyka self-propelled guns
14. 02/08/17
via IZVARYNE in the
direction of LUHANSK
motor vehicle
eight KamAZ-63968 Typhoon-K
armored trucks
15. 02/08/17
via MAKSYMIV to
NOVOAZOVSK
motor vehicle
four 122-mm Grad multiple rocket
launchers
16. 02/08/17 AMVROSIYIVKA rail
echelon with military hardware
(seven flat cars, tented hardware)
17. 02/10/17 KHARTSYZK rail
two flat cars
with military hardware (tented)
2
18. 02/10/17 ILOVAYSK rail
10 freight cars (300 tonnes)
of ammunition for
120-mm mortars
and 122/152-mm artillery systems
19. 02/10/17
DOVZHANSK via
VOZNESENIVKA
motor vehicle
two refuelers and four trucks of
ammunition.
20. 02/16/17 KHARTSYZK rail
five freight cars of ammunition:
one with with shells for 203-mm Pion
self-propelled guns, one with 152-mm
artillery systems, and one with 122-
mm Grad multiple rocket launchers,
as well as two freight cars
with rounds for tanks.
21. 02/21/17 DOVZHANSK motor vehicle
seven trucks
of ammunition
22. 02/21/17 DOVZHANSK motor vehicle
two 122-mm Gvozdyka self-propelled
guns on on rollers
23. 02/21/17 ROVENKY rail
12 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(720 tonnes)
24. 02/23/17 ILOVAYSK rail
19 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(1140 tonnes)
25. 02/27/17
via LEONOVE in the
direction of ROVENKY
motor vehicle
column of military hardware
(up to 50 trucks with trailers)
26. 03/03/17
via IZVARYNE in the
direction of LUHANSK
motor vehicle
ten trucks
with personnel and eight infantry fighting
vehicles on towing vehicles
27. 03/11/17
via IZVARYNE to
LUHANSK
rail 10 tank cars with diesel fuel (600 tonnes)
28. 03/12/17 ILOVAYSK rail
nine tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(540 tonnes)
29. 03/13/17
via IZVARYNE to
LUHANSK
rail
seven tank cars with diesel fuel (420
tonnes)
30. 03/13/17
via GUKOVO (RF) to
DOVZHANSK
motor vehicle
five 122-mm Grad multiple rocket
launchers
and two trucks
of ammunition for them
31. 03/12-13/17
DYAKOVE in the
direction of
DEBALTSEVE
motor vehicle
12 trucks of ammunition
(three with 125-mm shells
and 120-mm mines; six
with 82-mm mines)
32. 03/17-18/17
via DIBRIVKA
in the direction of
DMYTRIVKA
motor vehicle
eight trucks
of ammunition (20 tonnes)
33. 03/21/17 ROVENKY rail
eight tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(480 tonnes)
34. 03/23/17 ILOVAYSK motor vehicle
two tank cars (112 tonnes) and seven
refuelers (117 tonnes)
of fuel and lubricants
35. 03/24/17 ILOVAYSK rail
eight tanks and five infantry fighting
vehicles on flat cars
36. 03/24/17 ROVENKY rail
nine tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(540 tonnes)
37. 03/24/17
Via IZVARYNE and
USPENKA
motor vehicle
63rd humanitarian convoy
(40 motor vehicles,
including 10 support vehicles;
over 500 tonnes of cargo)
38. 03/27/17
via IZVARYNE and
USPENKA
motor vehicle
three trucks
with artillery ammunition.
3
39. 03/27/17
from DOVZHANSK in
the direction of
LUHANSK
motor vehicle
two trucks of ammunition and two buses
with personnel (affiliation being
verified)
40. 03/31/17 ILOVAYSK rail
20 tank cars of fuel and lubricants (1200
tonnes) and five freight cars with artillery
ammunition (150 tonnes)
41. 04/05/17
via IZVARYNE to
LUHANSK
rail
12 tank cars with diesel fuel (720
tonnes)
42. 04/08/17
via IZVARYNE to
LUHANSK
rail
ten tank cars
of fuel and lubricants (600 tonnes)
43. 04/15/17 USPENKA rail 16 armored vehicles on rollers
44. 04/20/17 ROVENKY rail
14 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(up to 840 tonnes)
45. 05/06/17 ILOVAYSK rail
nine tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(up to 515 tonnes) and
eight freight cars with supplies
46. 05/07/17 DOVZHANSK motor vehicle two trucks with 152-mm artillery shells
47. 05/07/17
via GUKOVO in the
direction of LUHANSK
motor vehicle
ten 122-mm Grad multiple rocket
launchers
48. 05/12/17 DOVZHANSK motor vehicle
two with cartridges for small firearms,
anti-tank and mortar shells
49. 05/16-17/17 ILOVAYSK rail
54 freight cars with supplies: motors and
spare parts for armored vehicles
50. 05/22/17 DONETSK rail
over 20 freight cars and flat cars
(artillery systems, including 122-mm
Grad multiple rocket launchers and
ammunition for them)
51. 05/24/17 ILOVAYSK rail
nine railroad freight cars
of ammunition
52. 05/26-28/17 ROVENKY rail
nine tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(540 tonnes)
53. 05/26-28/17 via DYAKOVE rail
30 units of military hardware,
including tanks, APCs, and 152-mm
Giatsint-B self-propelled guns
54. 05/30/17 ILOVAYSK rail
nine freight cars of ammunition (270
tonnes)
55. 05/31/17 MOSPYNE rail
11 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(660 tonnes) and three freight cars with
components for
weapons and military hardware
56. 06/07/17 ILOVAYSK rail
10 freight cars of ammunition
(300 tonnes)
57. 06/13/17 ILOVAYSK rail
10 freight cars of ammunition
(300 tonnes)
58. 06/13/17 IZVARINE-LUHANSK motor vehicle
two Pantsir-S1 missile systems,
bus with personnel
59. 06/14/17 ILOVAYSK rail
five freight cars of ammunition (150
tonnes)
4
60. 06/15/17
NOVOAZOVSK,
LUHANSK,
ALCHEVSK,
BRYANKA,
KADIYIVKA
motor vehicles
consisting of 66th
humanitarian
convoy
19 Granat-1 and Granat-2-type UAVs
from Navodchik-2 complexes
61. 07/05/17 LUHANSK motor vehicle
four trucks of fuel and lubricants and
three trucks of ammunition
62. 07/05/17 DEBALTSEVE rail
seven freight cars, flat cars
with ammunition and military
hardware, two tank cars
with diesel fuel (120 tonnes) and
railway crane
63. 07/05/17 KHARTSYZK rail
four tank cars with diesel fuel (240
tonnes) and four flat cars with military
hardware (two self-propelled guns
and two 122-mm Grad multiple rocket
launchers)
64. 07/04/17 VOZNESENIVKA rail
12 freight cars with military property
and spare parts for weapons and
military hardware
65. 07/07/17 MAKIYIVKA rail
six freight cars of ammunition (180
tonnes)
66. 07/07/17 ILOVAYSK rail
seven flat cars with military hardware:
three infantry fighting vehicles-1, four
launchers, probably 220-mm Uragan
multiple rocket launchers
67. 07/11/17 DEBALTSEVE rail
two freight cars of ammunition
(60 tonnes)
68. 07/17/17 ILOVAYSK rail
five freight cars of ammunition
(150 tonnes)
69. 07/19/17 ROVENKY motor vehicle three trucks of ammunition
70. 07/19-21/17 DOVZHANSK motor vehicle trucks with 120-mm mortar shells
71. 07/22/17 via VOZNESENIVKA rail
12 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(690 tonnes)
72. 07/27/17 DOVZHANSK motor vehicle two trucks with 120-mm shells
73. 07/29/17 ROVENKY rail
11 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(660 tonnes)
74. 07/29/17 DOVZHANSK motor vehicle
two 122-mm Grad multiple rocket
launchers
75. 07/30/17 ROVENKY rail
10 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(582 tonnes)
76. 07/31/17 ILOVAYSK rail
8 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(480 tonnes) and 4 infantry fighting
vehicles-2
77. 08/03/17 ROVENKY rail
21 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(1260 tonnes)
78. 08/05/17 ROVENKY rail
13 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(780 tonnes)
79. 08/07/17 ILOVAYSK rail
10 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(600 tonnes) and 10 freight cars
of ammunition (300 tonnes)
80. 08/09/17 ROVENKY rail
10 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(600 tonnes)
81. 08/15/17 ILOVAYSK rail
six tank cars of fuel and lubricants (360
tonnes) and three freight cars with spare
parts for armored vehicles
82. 08/15/17 DOVZHANSK rail
three -72 tanks,
122-mm Grad multiple rocket launchers
5
83. 08/15/17 MYKHAYLIVKA rail
two freight cars
of ammunition (60 tonnes)
84. 08/19/17 ROVENKY rail
19 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(1140 tonnes)
85. 08/20-21/17 LUHANSK rail
13 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(780 tonnes)
86. 08/21/17 ROVENKY rail
13 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(780 tonnes)
87. 08/23/17 ROVENKY rail
9 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(540 tonnes)
88. 08/22-24/17
fromDOVZHANSK
in the direction of
LUHANSK and
DONETSK
rail
3 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(180 tonnes),
five -72 tanks
89. 08/27/17 ROVENKY rail
8 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(480 tonnes)
90. 09/03/17 DONETSK rail 24 tank motors and spare parts
91. 09/2-3/17 DONETSK rail
around 20 motors and other
components for the repair of tanks and
other heavy hardware
92. 09/07/17 ROVENKY rail
11 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(660 tonnes)
93. 09/10/17 ROVENKY rail
eight tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(480 tonnes)
94. 09/14-15/17 ROVENKY rail
five tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(300 tonnes)
95. 09/14-15/17 DOVZHANSK motor vehicle
four Ural trucks with personnel
(up to 100 persons)
96.
09/15, 17,
19/17
ROVENKY rail
27 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(1620 tonnes)
97. 09/22/17
via USPENKA
in the direction of
AMVROSIYIVKA
motor vehicle
five tanks, three infantry fighting
vehicles, six Kamaz trucks
98. 09/24/17
via IZVARYNE in the
direction of LUHANSK
motor vehicle
three -72 tanks,
three trucks
of ammunition for them
99. 09/29/17 ROVENKY rail
four tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(240 tonnes), five trucks on flat cars
100. 10/02/17 DONETSK motor vehicle
twenty 12.7-mm
sniper rifles and ammunition for them
101. 10/02/17 SUKHODILSK rail
10 freight cars of ammunition
(300 tonnes)
102. 10/09-10/17 ILOVAYSK rail
three freight cars of ammunition
(90 tonnes)
103. 10/12/17 KHARTSYZK rail
six freight cars of ammunition
(180 tonnes) and five tank cars
of fuel and lubricants (300 tonnes)
104. 10/14/17
via Chervona Mohyla
Railway Station
(VOZNESENIVKA)
rail
12 tank cars of fuel and lubricants
(715 tonnes)
105. 10/21/17
via IZVARYNE to
VEDMEZHE
rail
two 122-mm
Grad multiple rocket launchers
106. 10/23/17 ILOVAYSK rail
echelon with military hardware (four Ural
trucks) and freight cars with winter
uniforms and food products
6
107. 11/13/17 LUHANSK motor vehicle
three R-142NMR combined radio sets,
two 1V172-2 unified command and
observation vehicles
108. 12/17/17
DONETSK (Mushketove
Station)
rail six freight cars with supplies
109. 12/23-24/17 DOVZHANSK motor vehicle
14 Kamaz trucks
(12 with personnel and two with 122/152-
mm shells)
110. 12/23-24/17 DOVZHANSK motor vehicle
four 122-mm Grad multiple rocket
launchers
111. 12/23-24/17 DOVZHANSK rail
echelon including flat cars with five 122-
mm Grad multiple rocket launchers and
two infantry fighting vehicles-2
112. 12/25/17 via AMVROSIYIVKA rail
echelon with weapons and military
hardware
(42 flat cars),
including ten 122-mm Grad multiple
rocket launchers
Department of Information and Analytical Support at the Main Intelligence
Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Annex 176
Expert Opinion No. 120-B/1818-X, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Odesa
Expert Criminal Forensic Research Center (24 November 2017)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Forensic experts: [signature] S.V. Pogorily [signature] V.I. Yetoshkin
[seal:] Odessa Expert Criminal Forensic Research Center
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
No 20: for expert conclusions
65538
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE
ODESA EXPERT CRIMINAL
FORENSIC RESEARCH CENTER
35 vul.Prokhorovska, Odesa, 65005
Tel. (0482) 34-76-25
[email protected]
EXPERT CONCLUSION
11. 24.2017 Odesa No 120-B/1818-X
The Odesa Expert Criminal Forensic Research Center of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Ukraine received on 09.13.2017 a resolution dated 07.27.2017 issued by senior
forensic investigator Senior Lieutenant of Justice M.I. Kasadzhik of the investigations
department at the Odesa Regional directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, as part of
criminal proceedings entered in the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations on 07.24.2017
as No 12017160500004222, and accompanied by letter No 68/16/4633 of 07.27.2017 from
the investigations department of the Odesa Regional Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine, requesting a comprehensive forensic explosives analysis and an analysis of
explosive substances.
The task of forensic analysis was assigned to the chief forensic explosives expert of
the explosives and fire forensics sector at the Odesa Expert Criminal Forensic Research
Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, Sergiy Viktorovich Pogorily, who has a
higher education degree in engineering and is a qualified forensic expert certified to conduct
forensic analysis according to expert specialism No 5.2. Investigation of explosive devices,
traces and circumstances of an explosion (forensic expert qualification certificate No 14425
issued by the Expert Qualifications Commission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Ukraine on 04.07.2016) and employed as an expert since 1998; and the deputy head head of
the physics and chemistry research sector, department of materials, substances and devices
research at the Odesa Expert Criminal Forensic Research Center of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Ukraine, Vasyl Ivanovych Yeshtokin, who has a higher education degree in
chemical technology and is a qualified forensic expert certified to conduct forensic analysis
according to expert specialism No 5.1 Investigation of explosive substances and products of
explosion and gunfire (certificate of conformity No 1306 issued by the Expert Qualifications
Commission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine on 12.15.2015) and employed as
an expert since 1996.
They have been advised of the criminal liability for a deliberately false conclusion
under Article 384 and unjustified refusal to perform assigned duties under Article 385 of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine.
[signature] S.V. Pogorily
[signature] V.I. Yetoshkin
Expert conclusion of 11.24.2017 No 120-B/1818-X page 2 of 48
Forensic experts: [signature] S.V. Pogorily [signature] V.I. Yetoshkin
[seal:] Odessa Expert Criminal Forensic Research Center
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
No 20: for expert conclusions
39
Background on the case: (known from the investigators resolution to request a
forensic analysis, style and spelling as per original): the pre-trial investigation has established
that, on 07.24.2017, a VAZ model 2101 car, reg 882-87AH, which was parked at the curbside
in front of 30 Zhukovskogo Street, Odesa, exploded around 10:30.
Among the items found during an inspection of the scene of the incident on
07.24.2017 was a metal canister, fire debris, electrical components in the form of wires, a
light diode and an inductor, fragments of a mobile phone, distilled and dry residue, car
fragments and metal components.
The pre-trial investigation requires ascertaining whether the above items refer to
ammunition, explosives, explosive substances or explosive devices and whether they contain
traces of explosive substances.
The following was submitted for forensic analysis:
A sealed plastic bag of the VTS NP of Ukraine No AB 003599 containing a
cabin fragment from the VAZ model 2101 car, reg 882-87AH with thermal
damage;
A sealed plastic bag of the VTS NP of Ukraine No AB 042019 containing a
metal canister from the trunk of the VAZ model 2101 car, reg 882-87AH;
A sealed plastic bag of the VTS NP of Ukraine No AB 018831 containing a
residue solution from the bodywork of the VAZ model 2101 car, reg 882-
87AH;
A sealed plastic bag of the VTS NP of Ukraine No AB 018832 containing dry
residue from the left rear fender of the VAZ model 2101 car, reg 882-87AH;
A sealed plastic bag of the VTS NP of Ukraine No AB 018833 containing a
distilled water residue from the left rear fender of the VAZ model 2101 car,
reg 882-87AH;
A sealed plastic bag of the VTS NP of Ukraine No AB 018835 containing
metal fragments and three wire fragments joined together;
A sealed plastic bag of the VTS NP of Ukraine No AB 018836 containing
fragments of spectacles;
A sealed plastic bag of the VTS NP of Ukraine No AB 018965 containing
metal fragments collected from the damaged floor of the VAZ model 2101
car, reg 882-87AH;
A sealed plastic bag of the VTS NP of Ukraine No AB 018979 containing an
ash tray found near the building at 20 vul. Zhukovskogo, Odesa;
A sealed plastic bag of the VTS NP of Ukraine No AB 018980 containing
plastic and metal fragments from the road in Zhukovskogo Street;
Expert conclusion of 11.24.2017 No 120-B/1818-X page 3 of 48
Forensic experts: [signature] S.V. Pogorily [signature] V.I. Yetoshkin
[seal:] Odessa Expert Criminal Forensic Research Center
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
No 20: for expert conclusions
40
A sealed plastic bag of the VTS NP of Ukraine No AB 003691 containing
fragments of paper found in the VAZ model 2101 car, reg 882-87AH;
A sealed plastic bag of the VTS NP of Ukraine No AB 003696 containing fire
debris from the left rear fender of the VAZ model 2101 car, reg 882-87AH;
A sealed plastic bag of the VTS NP of Ukraine No AB 018825 containing
three batteries and parts of an electronic device;
A sealed plastic bag of the VTS NP of Ukraine No AB 018824 containing
fragments of a plate found in the drivers seat in the VAZ model 2101 car, reg
882-87AH;
A sealed plastic bag of the VTS NP of Ukraine No AB 003692 containing
books found in the VAZ model 2101 car, reg 882-87AH;
A sealed plastic bag of the VTS NP of Ukraine, seal No 1072429 containing
lining from the rear left section of the VAZ model 2101 car, reg 882-87AH;
A sealed plastic bag of the VTS NP of Ukraine, seal No 1072431 containing
fire debris;
A copy of the incident scene inspection record of 07.24.2017 with an
appendix, on 17 pages;
A copy of M.V. Melnyks statement of 07.26.2017, on 10 pages.
The following questions were put forward for investigation:
1. Do the objects submitted for investigation (fragments, debris, shards, fire debris)
contain traces of explosive substances, and if yes, which ones?
2. Was the VAZ model 2101 car, reg 882-87AH parked at the curbside in front of 30
Zhukovskogo Street, Odesa blown up around 10:30 on 07.24.2017, and if yes, what explosive
device was detonated, what is its design mass in the trotyl (TNT) equivalent and what are its
typical destructive effects?
3. What were the structural components of the explosive device detonated around
10:30 on 07.24.2017 in the VAZ model 2101 car, reg 882-87AH which was parked at the
curbside in front of 30 Zhukovskogo Street, Odesa (explosive charge, means of initiating the
explosive substance, activation method, casing, detonation method, etc) and how was it
manufactured (was it industrial or improvised)?
4. Are the objects submitted for investigation parts of an explosive device?
5. If the explosion was caused by ammunition, what type is it (grenades, mines, shells
etc.)?
Expert conclusion of 11.24.2017 No 120-B/1818-X page 4 of 48
Forensic experts: [signature] S.V. Pogorily [signature] V.I. Yetoshkin
[seal:] Odessa Expert Criminal Forensic Research Center
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
No 20: for expert conclusions
41
The investigation used forensic analysis methods and the following reference
sources:
1. V.N. Aginsky, S.V. Vladimirov, V.I. Galyashin. Forensic investigation of
explosive substances. Edited by N.M. Kuzmin, M. Kuzmin, All-USSR Research
Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 85. Registration code 1.5.15
2. Methodology for the comprehensive analysis of explosive devices, explosive
substances and traces of explosion. Registration code 1.0[sic].12.
3. Y.M. Dildin, V.V. Martynov, A.Y. Semenov, A.A. Shmyrev. Scene of explosion
as an object of forensic investigation: a practical study guide. M:. All-USSR Research
Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, 1989. - 72 pages.
4. Y.M. Dildin, V.V. Martynov, A.Y. Semenov, A.A. Shmyrev. Industrially made
explosive devices and their forensic investigation. M.: Expert Forensic Center of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. 1991, 120 pages, 25 tables, 101
illustrations, bibliography.
5. Y.M. Dildin, V.V. Martynov, A.Y. Semenov, A.A. Shmyrev. Fundamentals of
the forensic investigation of improvised explosive devices: Study guide. M.: All-
USSR Forensic Research Center of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1991. 94
pages, 55 illustrations, 7 tables, bibliography.
6. Explosive ammunition. Book 3. Voenizdat, Ministry of Defense of the USSR. -
M.: 1979. - 224 pages, illustrated.
7. Internet resource: www.uk.wikipedia.org
INVESTIGATION
Inspection of objects submitted for investigation
Conducted by forensic expert S.V. Pogorily
The objects were delivered to the Odesa Expert Criminal Forensic Research Center by
courier and packed according to the rules which prevent their loss in transit. The investigated
objects are packed in four plastic bags, hereinafter: packages. The packages show no signs of
tampering.
[
]
Expert conclusion of 11.24.2017 No 120-B/1818-X page 5 of 48
Forensic experts: [signature] S.V. Pogorily [signature] V.I. Yetoshkin
[seal:] Odessa Expert Criminal Forensic Research Center
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
No 20: for expert conclusions
[
]
CONCLUSIONS
1. The objects submitted for investigation a cotton wool pad with residue from the
bodywork of VAZ model 2101 car, reg 882-87AH; plastic and metal fragments from the road
in Zhukovskogo Street; metal fragments collected from the damaged floor of the VAZ model
2101 car, reg 882-87AH; and fragments of paper found in the VAZ model 2101 car, reg 882-
87AH were found to contain traces of a brisant explosive substance: trotyl (TNT).
2. An explosive device placed inside the VAZ model 2101 car, reg 882-87AH was
detonated at the scene of the incident in front of 30 vul. Zhukovskogo, Odesa.
It does not appear possible to answer the part of the investigators question: what is the
design mass of the explosive device in the trotyl (TNT) equivalent?
The explosive device used has the following typical destructive effects: the brisant
effect penetration of the car cabin, the fougasse effect and shock wave effect destruction,
deformation and fragmentation of cabin components, and the thermal effect: the ignition and
burning of car fuel.
3-4. The explosive device used consisted of the casing of the explosive device the
casing of a TM-62P3 antitank mine, the explosive charge trotyl (TNT), the detonation
device an EDP (EDP-r) electric detonator, the executive mechanism (target sensor) a
modified mobile (cell) phone and an electricity source a Krona battery marked 6LR61.
The activation method was electric and the manufacturing method was improvised.
5. An improvised explosive device was used at the scene of the incident, activated by
electric means.
Forensic experts: [signature] S.V. Pogorily
[signature] V.I. Yetoshkin
[seal:] Odesa Expert Criminal Forensic Research Center
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine:
No 20: for expert conclusions
Annex 177
Record of Incident Scene Inspection, drafted by Major of Justice A. S. Bakhovsky,
Senior Special Investigator, Security Service of Ukraine (20 December 2017)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1
[signatures]
RECORD OF INCIDENT SCENE
INSPECTION
City (village) Kyiv January 20, 2017
Inspection started at 21:06. Inspection finished at 22:19
Senior special investigator, section 3, directorate 1 of pre-trial investigations at the Main Directorate for
Investigations of the Security Service of Ukraine
Major of Justice A.S. Bakhovsky
on the grounds of a pre-trial investigation in criminal proceedings No 22016000000000466
(indicate judicial order in the case of residential or other personal property inspections, or, in the case
of criminal proceedings, refer to an incident report)
pursuant to Articles 104, 105, 106, 234, 237, 223 of the Criminal Procedures Code of Ukraine:
In the presence of witnesses:
1) Roman Mykolayovych Olekha, DOB 07.28.1996
(full name, date of birth, address)
registered at Apartment 8, 13 vul. Gagarina, Voloshevka village, Kyiv Region
2) Vladyslav Yuriyovych Faychuk, DOB 11.25.1995
(full name, date of birth, address)
Registered at Apartment 139, 31 vul. Zakrevskogo, Kyiv
who have been advised of their rights and obligations under Articles 11, 13, 15 and 223 of the Criminal
Procedures Code of Ukraine.
[signature] [signature]
With the participation of the victim
---//-----
(full name, date of birth, address)
who has been advised of their rights and obligations under Article 56 Part 1, 2 and Article 57 of the Criminal
Procedures Code of Ukraine _____________________
With the participation of suspect: [signatures]
S.V. Zhirenko DOB 03.01.1980, D.D. Yakob DOB 11.01.1978
(full name, date of birth, address)
who have been advised of their rights and obligations under Article 42 Parts 3, 5, 6 and 7 of the Criminal
Procedures Code of Ukraine _____________________
With the participation of defense attorney:
---//-----
(full name, date of birth, address)
who has been advised of their rights and obligations under Articles 46 and 47 of the Criminal Procedures Code
of Ukraine. _____________________
With the participation of representative:
---//-----
(full name, date of birth, address)
who has been advised of their rights and obligations under Articles 44 Part 5, Article 58 Part 4 and Article 59
Part 2 of the Criminal Procedures Code of Ukraine. _____________________
With the participation of expert:
Y.V. Valynevych, DOB 03.23.1991, M.Y. Ustymenko, DOB 11.05.1972
(full name, date of birth, address)
who has been advised of their rights and obligations under Article 71, Parts 4 and 5 of the Criminal Procedures
Code of Ukraine [signature]
2
[signatures]
[signature]
With the participation of the owner (user) of the accommodation or other personal property
SBU employees V.L Fesenko, A.O. Patsalay, I.V. Budnyk
(full name, date of birth, address)
Prior to the inspection, the above individuals were advised of their right to be present during every
action taken in the course of an inspection and to make statements which are subject to mandatory inclusion in
the record. The persons participating in the inspection were also advised of their duty not to disclose the details
of this procedural action as required by Article 66 Part 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine and of the
recording equipment used and the terms and procedure of their use:
Photography with telephone serial No R586503VKIZ
(details of recording or storage devices used during procedural action, signatures of individuals)
Samsung SM-6925F
The inspection has established the following:
(indicate address of residential accommodation or other personal property)
The scene of the incident is the backyard of the building located at 16A vul. Ivana Kudri, Kyiv.
Found near the doors of the first entrance (from left to right) in this courtyard were citizens of Ukraine
Svyatoslav Valeriyovych Zhirenko, DOB 03.01.1980 registered at Apartment 2, 18 vul. Lenina, Kirovske,
Donetsk Region and Dmytro Dmytrovych Yakob, DOB 11.01.1978 registered at Apartment 80, 24 vul. Sudaksa,
Alushta, Autonomous Republic of Crimea.
Found next to the above citizens were a black bag and a white plastic bag bearing the logo of the
Ashan supermarket and the slogan Hit the prices.
S.V. Zhirenko reported that the above black bag belongs to him and consented to its inspection. The
following was found later in the bag:
1. An employment termination letter No ARK 05271 addressed to S.V. Zhirenko, 1 page;
2. Vehicle registration certificate No F836244 (Lithuanian Republic)
3. Power of attorney for driving the Skoda reg JHC-615 car, 1 page
4. Documents in a foreign language for the Skoda reg JHC-615 car No 364067, 1 page
5. 300 (three hundred) US dollars
6. 976 (nine hundred and seventy-six) hryvnias
3
[signatures]
7. Holder for SIM card tel no +79107360794
Next, the leading specialist of department 6, forensic and special analysis center No. 4 (ISTE SBU),
Senior Lieutenant Yevhen Valeriyovych Valynevych (3 vul. Vasylenka, Kyiv) and expert consultant at
department 6, forensic and special analysis center No 4 (ISTE SBU) Maksym Yevhenovch Ustymenko conducted
an inspection and analysis of the above plastic bag both visually and with the aid of a portable X-ray scanner,
Scanna W550SU, serial No X0331772.
During the inspection and analysis, it was established that the plastic bag contained the following: a
roll of brown scotch tape and a plastic food container measuring 14 x 10 x 6 cm approximately. The following
was found inside the container when opened: a plastic grey and yellow substance (about 300400 g in weight).
Inside the substance was a cylindrically shaped magnet (5 cm in diameter and 2 cm in height) and a brown
cylindrical object 7 cm in diameter and 0.9 cm approximately in height) that looked like an electric detonator
with two white wires protruding at one end. The end of one of the wires was connected to a metal cylindrically
shaped object.
In order to avoid a possible uncontrolled explosion, the cylindrical object that looked like an electric
detonator and the magnet were removed separately from the plastic substance. In addition, the cylindrically
shaped metal object located at the end of the electric detonator wire was cut off from the object that looked like
an electric detonator, and the two wire ends were joined together. The above actions were performed by
specialist M.Y. Ustymenko. The specialists said that the plastic substance, magnet and electric detonator bore
the characteristics of an improvised explosive device.
1. In the course of the incident scene inspection, the objects named in points 1-7 were retrieved and
4
[signatures]
placed into Bag No 1 sealed with Seal No 88 For Bags, Security Service of Ukraine (hereinafter: sealed)
2. The plastic container with a grey and yellow plastic substance and the magnet were retrieved and
placed into sealed Bag No 2.
3. The object that looks like an electric detonator and the metal object at the end of the wire were
retrieved and placed into sealed Bag No 3.
4. The roll of scotch tape and the white plastic bag were retrieved and placed into sealed Bag No 4.
A copy of this record was handed to S.V. Zhirenko and D.D. Yakob.
S.V. Zhirenko and D.D. Yakob refused to sign the record of incident scene inspection on the basis of Article 63
of the Constitution of Ukraine.
Refusal to sign was witnessed by:
[signatures]
5
[signatures]
Found during inspection noted in the text of the record
(indicate traces and objects found during inspection)
Retrieved during inspection: noted in the text of the record
(indicate what was found and sealed and in which order)
Technical devices used during inspection: photography
(indicate use of photography or video recording, other technical and specialist devices and their tech. features)
The record has been read and recorded no statements, comments or additions received
(comments from participants in the inspection)
Participants:
1. S.V. Valynevych /[signature]/
(full name) (signature)
2. M.Y. Ustymenko /[signature]/
(full name) (signature)
I.V. Budnyk [signature]
V.L. Fesenko [signature]
[signature]
Witnesses:
1. R.M. Olekha /[signature]/
(full name) (signature)
2. V.Y. Faychuk /[signature]/
(full name) (signature)
Inspection conducted by:
Senior special investigator
Main Directorate for Investigations,
Major of Justice A. Bakhovsky
Annex 178
Record of inspection of websites performed by M.V. Kalyta, Lieutenant of Justice and
Investigator with the 5th Office of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate of the
Central Investigative Directorate of the SSU (1 February 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Record of Examination
City of Kyiv February 1, 2018
Examination started at 4:30 p.m.
Examination ended at 4:45 p.m.
Lieutenant of Justice Mariya Viktorivna Kalyta, Investigator with the Central Investigative
Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, examined a web page on the Internet
located at the address http://uz.colomna.ru/rubric/theme/4882.html in connection with a
pretrial investigation of Criminal Case No. 22015050000000047 registered in the Uniform
Register of Pretrial Investigations on January 24, 2015, in order to gather evidence,
detect and document information about the circumstances of perpetration of criminal
offenses, pursuant to the requirements of Articles 104, 105, 106, 234, 237, and 223 of the
Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine in her Office No. 014 at the Central Investigative
Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine at 33 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv.
The examination was conducted using a personal computer with inventory number 4041.
The processor unit of the computer has an Internet connection via a modem and is
located in the Internet studio of the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security
Service of Ukraine at 33 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv.
Examination Findings:
The target of examination is an article on the Internet available at the following web
address: http://uz.colomoa.ru/rubric/theme/4882.html.
To view the article, the Google Chrome browser was loaded on the computer, the
above-mentioned address entered into its address bar, and the Enter key pressed.
An article titled Officer as a Calling was found on this page and was subsequently
downloaded.
On further examination, it was found that the article was published on the Ugol Zreniya
[Angle of View] portal on February 19, 2014 and is available at
http://uz.colomna.ru/rubric/theme/4882.html.
This article was downloaded to the computer in PDF format, printed out, and enclosed
with this record as Attachment No. 1.
The examination was conducted under artificial lighting.
Attachment:
Article titled Officer as a Calling on 3 pages.
Examination conducted and record prepared by:
Investigator with the 5th Department
of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate
at the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Lieutenant of Justice [Signature] M. Kalyta
Ugol Zreniya [Angle of Vision] Weekly Newspaper Officer as a Calling
Ugol Zreniya [Angle of Vision] Weekly Newspaper
16+
Warmer together
[Online newspaper navigation buttons and columns irrelevant to the article]
[Blue box contains a greeting from Kolomna Mayor for army veterans irrelevant to the
article]
Cover Issue: Officer as a Calling
Officer as a Calling
Issue No. 6 (684) of February 19, 2014
February 23 is a particularly festive day for those who chose to devote their life to the military profession.
Colonel Alexander Tsapliuk has been serving in Kolomna since 2004. Since 2005, he has headed Training
Center for Combat Use of Missile Forces and Artillery No. 1000. Over the years of his service he was stationed
in Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg, Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast, Germany, and the Northern Caucasus. As Fatherland
Defenders Day is upon us, we have interviewed Mr. Tsapliuk about the fate of a military man, duty and honor,
the past and present of the Russian and Soviet Army, and even took a quick peek into the future.
Alexander Iozhefovich, would you tell us how you became a military man? Perhaps it runs in the family?
No, I am the only military man in my family. I was born in Uzhhorod, Zakarpattia Oblast, into a family of blue-collar
workers. It was my childhood dream to join the military. I watched a lot of military shows on television. I particularly liked
the one called I Serve the Soviet Union. I planned on going to a flying school but in 1983 ended up enrolling at
Khmelnytsky Higher Artillery Command College named after Artillery Marshal N.D. Yakovlev. It was closer to home.
Did you ever regret joining the artillery forces?
No. Some say that only the smartest and most intelligent people serve in the artillery forces because this job involves
doing lots of calculations. In reality, it's nothing out of the ordinary. These are simple trigonometric functions. I believe
that I have done a good job mastering my profession and have succeeded at self-actualization.
What are your memories of your cadet years? How were cadets trained back then? Could you compare it with
how things are done today?
They did a pretty good job teaching us cadets. All graduates had the same level of competency. Our knowledge of our
profession was satisfactory, but no more than that. Following my assignment to a military unit, I realized that I was no
match for officers who had already served for several years. When I failed my first test, this struck a deep chord. This
was a shameful experience for me. We secretly competed at which college produced better graduates and whose
alumni are more competent. This was when I focused on self-improvement and ultimately succeeded. Todays colleges
offer the same level of education. Today's graduates are just like we used to be.
I know that you were involved in the Second Chechen Campaign.
It so happened that when I was assigned to the Northern Caucasus in 1999, the war had not broken out yet. When I
came to the army headquarters in Vladikavkaz to introduce myself, I saw television broadcasts of explosions as all
channels aired breaking news about a military campaign against militants. Prior to that, in 1988, I requested to be
dispatched to Afghanistan, but got a notice denying my request. I was frustrated. Perhaps they did not send me there
because I had a family and a little child at the time. I dont know.
http://uz.colomna.ru/rubric/theme/4882.html 1/3
How many years did you spend in Chechnya?
Five years. From 1999 to 2004.
Did you participate in combat operations?
The artillery forces are special in that they are not involved in combat operations directly. My subordinates joined
combat operations as forward observers as part of special weapons and tactics teams. Our regiment was stationed
outside of Shali, and we attacked the enemy from our firing positions. This did not require my personal involvement as
artillery regiment commander. I commanded the regiment, with over 1,000 subordinates.
Did natives of Kolomna serve in your regiment?
Yes, a third of all personnel: officers, graduates of Kolomna Higher Artillery Command College.
Where did you live over the course of those five years?
We lived in tents for three years before moving into modular homes. My wife and I lived there.
Was your wife beside you during this time?
Yes. Shes a sergeant. Between 2001 and 2004 she served as a telephone operator at the communication hub. Our
daughter stayed with her grandma in Mulino all this time.
Did you somehow support the morale of soldiers and officers during combat operations?
There was no need for that. All of them already came super-charged. People came prepared to do their duty. I should
mention that our regiment had minimal losses. To the extent practicable, we maintained communication with the
soldiers parents (back then the term of service was two years), wrote them letters, tried to alleviate their fears.
I see that you are decorated with orders. Would you tell us what you
received them for?
I received the Order of Military Merit in 2000 for eliminating a Wahhabi
group in the population centers of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi. I worked
as a representative of the missile forces and artillery headquarters of the
58th Army and commanded artillery fire of a group formed in Kodori Gorge
in this direction. In 2003, I was decorated with a medal of the Order for
Meritorious Service to the Fatherland of the 2nd degree for commanding
regiment artillery fire as part of counter-terrorist operation missions. They
originally sent my order to the Caucasus, but I had already returned to Kolomna by then. I received the medal here in
2004.
Let us discuss your training center. You have been working here for ten years now, eight of which have been
as its director. What are the objectives of the center?
We have three primary objectives: reskilling of officers (we receive new weapon models here and teach officers to
handle them), training of sergeants serving under contract, and training of conscripts. Other training centers are unable
to train that kind of professionals that we train. They include anti-tank warfare professionals, commanders of artillery
reconnaissance systems, crane operators, and so forth, or a total of 17 specialty areas.
Your professionals are involved in the testing of new weapon models. Does this mean that your center is
continuing the old tradition of the rifle proving ground located here?
Yes, we are a custodian of traditions of sorts. Incidentally, this year we will be marking the 110th anniversary of the rifle
proving ground. Outstanding rifle makers of the 20th century worked here, such as M.T. Kalashnikov, B.I Shavyrin, G.S.
Shpagin, I.I. Rakov, and N.V. Rukavishnikov. Last year we unveiled a memorial plaque on the building of the
headquarters, commemorating M.T. Kalashnikov, who worked here from 1942 to 1947. We have a museum that pays
tribute to all of this. Every serviceman goes to the museum as a mandatory requirement.
Alexander Iozhefovich, we have heard that you are leaving Kolomna and getting transferred to another
position. Is this true?
Yes. The Minister of Defense has already issued an order. I have been appointed Deputy Chief of Missile and Artillery
Forces of the Western Military Command Region. I will now be serving in St. Petersburg.
Congratulations. What are your impressions of Kolomna? After all, you spent 10 years of your life here.
This is the only place where we have stayed for such a long time. From day one, I was amazed by the city's beauty,
particularly that of its old part. It had an indelible impression on me. Kolomna has become my most favorite city, second
only to my native town where I was born. I visited many places and studied in St. Petersburg, but Kolomna is the best of
what I have seen.
http://uz.colomna.ru/rubric/theme/4882.html 2/3
I am sorry to be leaving. I will leave a piece of my heart here. But service is service. I will most certainly come and visit
here, popularize this training center and the city, and say that Kolomna is the best city there is.
Thank you and good luck in your new position!
Elena LIFANTYEVA
Comments (0)
Read in this section
No return from the mission
Prize for a good cause
Guest of honor
Open to dialog
Road to PyeongChang runs through Kolomna
All articles in this section
All rights to articles and news published on the uz.colomna.ru website are reserved under laws of the Russian
Federation. Original materials may be quoted only with permission from the copyright holder with mandatory attribution
via a direct hyperlink.
Copyright © 2012 OOO Garantiya
Website development: Copyright © 2012 Energo Group
http://uz.colomna.ru/rubric/theme/4882.html 3/3
Record of Examination
City of Kyiv February 1, 2018
Examination started at 5:30 p.m.
Examination ended at 5:45 p.m.
Lieutenant of Justice Mariya Viktorivna Kalyta, Investigator with the Central Investigative
Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, examined a web page on the Internet
located at the address
http://vamto.mil.ru/O_VUZe/Rukovodstvo/Rukovodstvo-filialov--akademii/item/6568/ in
connection with a pretrial investigation of Criminal Case No. 22015050000000047
registered in the Uniform Register of Pretrial Investigations on January 24, 2015, in order
to gather evidence, detect and document information about the circumstances of
perpetration of criminal offenses, pursuant to the requirements of Articles 104, 105, 106,
234, 237, and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine in her Office No. 014 at the
Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine at 33 Volodymyrska
Street, Kyiv.
The examination was conducted using a personal computer with inventory number 4041.
The processor unit of the computer has an Internet connection via a modem and is
located in the Internet studio of the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security
Service of Ukraine at 33 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv.
Examination Findings:
The target of examination is an article on the Internet available at the following web
address:
http://vamto.mil.ru/O_VUZe/Rukovodstvo/Rukovodstvo-filialov--akademii/item/6568/.
To view the article, the Google Chrome browser was loaded on the computer, the
above-mentioned address entered into its address bar, and the Enter key pressed.
An article titled ALEXANDER IOZHEFOVICH TSAPLIUK was found on this page and
was subsequently downloaded.
On further examination, it was found that the article was published on the portal of the
Military Logistics Academy named after Army General A.V. Khruliov and is available at
http://vamto.mil.ru/O_VUZe/Rukovodstvo/Rukovodstvo-filialov--akademii/item/6568/.
This article was downloaded to the computer in PDF format, printed out, and enclosed
with this record as Attachment No. 1.
The examination was conducted under artificial lighting.
Attachment:
Article titled ALEXANDER IOZHEFOVICH TSAPLIUK on 1 page.
Examination conducted and record prepared by:
Investigator with the 5th Department
of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate
at the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Lieutenant of Justice [Signature] M. Kalyta
Alexander Iozhefovich Tsapliuk Military Logistics Academy named after Army General A.V. Khruliov
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Military Logistics Academy named
after Army General A.V. Khruliov
ABOUT US DEPARTMENTS EDUCATION SCIENCE TRAINING RESOURCES FOR APPLICANTS MULTIMEDIA
Home page > About us > Administration > Administration of academy branches > Alexander Iozhefovich Tsapliuk
ALEXANDER IOZHEFOVICH TSAPLIUK
Phone:
Fax:
Email:
SHARE
PRINT VERSION
MAP OF WEBSITES OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
©2018 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Site map
About us
Departments
Education
Science
Training resources
For applicants
Multimedia
Search
Contacts
Ask question
Report error
Record of Examination
City of Kyiv February 1, 2018
Examination started at 18:00 a.m.
Examination ended at 18:15 a.m.
Lieutenant of Justice Mariya Viktorivna Kalyta, Investigator with the Central Investigative
Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, examined a web page on the Internet
located at the address
http://vamto.net/Filials/PFVAMTO/komandovanie-instituta/index.php?sphrase_id=30637
in connection with a pretrial investigation of Criminal Case No. 22015050000000047
registered in the Uniform Register of Pretrial Investigations on January 24, 2015, in order
to gather evidence, detect and document information about the circumstances of
perpetration of criminal offenses, pursuant to the requirements of Articles 104, 105, 106,
234, 237, and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine in her Office No. 014 at the
Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine at 33 Volodymyrska
Street, Kyiv.
The examination was conducted using a personal computer with inventory number 4041.
The processor unit of the computer has an Internet connection via a modem and is
located in the Internet studio of the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security
Service of Ukraine at 33 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv.
Examination Findings:
The target of examination is an article on the Internet available at the following web
address:
http://vamto.net/Filials/PFVAMTO/komandovanie-instituta/index.php?sphrase_id=30637
To view the article, the Google Chrome browser was loaded on the computer, the
above-mentioned address entered into its address bar, and the Enter key pressed.
An article titled INSTITUTE COMMAND was found on this page and was subsequently
downloaded.
On further examination, it was found that the article was published on the portal of the
Military Logistics Academy named after Army General A.V. Khruliov and is available at
http://vamto.net/Filials/PFVAMTO/komandovanie-instituta/index.php?sphrase_id=30637
.
This article was downloaded to the computer in PDF format, printed out, and enclosed
with this record as Attachment No. 1.
The examination was conducted under artificial lighting.
Attachment:
Article titled INSTITUTE COMMAND on 2 pages.
Examination conducted and record prepared by:
Investigator with the 5th Department
of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate
at the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Lieutenant of Justice [Signature] M. Kalyta
Penza Branch of the Military Logistics Academy
Federal State Publicly Funded Educational Institution of Higher Learning
Military Logistics Academy named after Army General A.V. Khruliov
of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION INFO
Home History Academy Faculties Departments Science Announcements Publications Multimedia Contacts
Military Logistics
Academy
- About institute
- Institute history
- Institute command
- Institute departments
- Institute faculties
- For applicants
- Institute documentary
- Postgraduate military studies
enrollment rules
- Offices and services
Institute command
Branch director
Major General
Alexander Iozhefovich
Tsapliuk
Branch deputy director
Cand. Tech. Sci.
Colonel
Gennady Alexandrovich
Khvatov
Branch deputy director for instruction
and academic work
Cand. Tech. Sci.
Associate Professor
Colonel
Ivan Ivanovich
Grachiov
Branch deputy director for inventory and logistics
chief of the inventory and logistics department
Colonel
Sergey Gennadyevich
Petrukhin
Search site
All news
Search
Navy Deputy
Commander-in-Chief, Vice
Admiral Fedotenkov hands out
awards to winners and
runners-up of the Junior Army
Readings
Academy science team begins
active preparations for the
International Olympiad of Cadets
of Educational Institutions of
Higher Learning
Penza residents commemorate
heroes of Leningrad under siege
St. Petersburg garrison
servicemen attend
commemorative events to mark
the end of the siege of Leningrad
Annex 179
State Service of Ukraine for Extraordinary Situations, Ukrainian
Hydrometereological Center Letter No. 01-20/419 (30 March 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Translated from Ukrainian
[Symbol of Ukraine]
Ukraine
State Service of Ukraine for Extraordinary Situations
Ukrainian Hydrometereological Center
(UkrHMC)
6B Zolotovoritska Str, city of Kyiv-30, 01601, tel/fax 279-10-80, 239-93-87, E-mail: [email protected]
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
March 30, 2018 No. 01-20/419 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
To the Deputy Minister for the Issues of
To No. 72/16-194/510-71 of March 22, 2018 European Integration
O.V. Zerkal
In response to your request No. 72/16-194/510-71 of March 22, 2018 we are informing
about the following:
Meteorological observations of weather conditions are conducted only at stationary posts
- meteorological stations.
Based on the operational data of the meteorological stations Mariupol, Volnovakha and
Bakhmut (the closest observations point to the city of Kramatorsk) the speed (m/s) and direction
of wind were the following on the indicated dates:
Station
name
Date Observations periods
02-00 05-00 08-00 11-00 14-00 17-00 20-00 23-00
Mariupol January
25, 2016
12
East
11
East
11
East
10
East
9
East
8
East
9
East
8
East
Volnovakha January
13, 2015
4
West
2
West
3
West
4
West
5
West
4
West
5
West
4
West
Bakhmut February
10, 2015
3
North
3
North
4
North
3
North
3
North
3
North
3
North
2
North
Observations of weather conditions at meteorological stations are conducted every three
hours.
Director of the Center [Signature and seal] M.I. Kulbida
Execut. Novikova
(044) 239-93-97
[Stamp of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
Department of General Secretariat
Incoming No. 25003
April 2, 2018]
Annex 180
Record of inspection of websites performed by O.O. Kryvoruchko, Captain of Justice
and Serior Investigator with the 5th Office of the 1st Pretrial Investigation
Directorate of the Central Investigative Directorate of the SSU (15 May 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
RECORD OF EXAMINATION
City of Kyiv May 15, 2018
Examination started at 10:20 a.m.
Examination started at 10:50 a.m.
Captain of Justice Oleksandr Oleksandrovych Kryvoruchyk, Senior Investigator with the
Operative Department of Investigations at the 5th Department of the 1st Pretrial
Investigation Directorate at the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine, examined a web page on the Internet located at the address
http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/10032 in connection with a pretrial investigation of Criminal
Case No. 22015050000000047 involving alleged crimes punishable under Part 3 of
Article 258 and Part 1 of Article 438 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, registered in the
Uniform Register of Pretrial Investigations on January 24, 2015, pursuant to the
requirements of Articles 104, 105, 106, 107, 223, and 237 of the Criminal Procedure
Code of Ukraine in his Office No. 307 at the Central Investigative Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine.
The examination was conducted under mixed lighting on a computer workstation at the
Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, which is connected to
the Internet via a Dynamix modem: Polaris computer, Intel-Celeron 700 processor
(operating system: Windows XP Professional with Microsoft Word 2010), connected to a
computer monitor LG FLATRON ez T 710BH, with a mouse, and an OKI printer, model
No. C5900DN. The Internet was accessed using the Mozilla Firefox browser.
Examination Findings:
The target of examination is an article on the Internet available at the following web
address: http://kremlin.m/acts/news/10032.
To view the article, the Mozilla Firefox browser was loaded on the computer, the
above-mentioned address entered into its address bar, and the Enter key pressed.
After the web page at the following address http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/10032 was
loaded, it was found that it was a resource hosting an article titled Staff Changes in the
Armed Forces.
This article contains information about staff changes in the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation authorized by the Russian President. Screenshots of the above-mentioned
web page were taken by pressing the Print Screen key and appended to this record.
The examination ended at this point.
Examination conducted and record prepared by:
Senior Investigator with the Operative Department of Investigations of the 5th Department
of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate
at the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Captain of Justice [Signature] O. Kryvoruchyk
Staff Changes in the Armed Forces
The President has authorized a few staff changes in the Armed Forces of the
Russian Federation.
January 9, 2011, 4 p.m.
The Commander-in-Chief has signed decrees appointing:
Rank 1 Captain Ildar Ferdinandovich Akhmerov as Deputy Commander of
the Maritime Flotilla of the All-Arms Forces of the Pacific Fleet;
Major General Vladimir Vladimirovich Derkach as Chief of Staff and First
Deputy Commander of the Cosmic Forces, relieving him of his position as
Deputy Commander of the Cosmic Forces;
Colonel Sergey Borisovich Ryzhkov as Commander of the 39th Separate
Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the Eastern Military Command Region;
Lieutenant General Nikolay Vasilyevich Bogdanovsky as Deputy
Commander-in-Chief of the Infantry and Chief of the Central Directorate for
Combat Training of the Infantry, relieving him of his position as Commander
of the Army of the Leningrad Military Command Region;
Colonel Yuriy Alexandrovich Popov as Commander of the 3rd Brigade of Air
and Cosmic Defense of the Baltic Fleet;
Major General Viktor Borisovich Astapov as Chief of Staff and First Deputy
Commander of the 49th Army, relieving him of his position as Deputy
Commander of the 41st Army;
[...] Logistics, relieving him of his position as Chief of Logistics and Deputy
Commander of the Army of the Leningrad Military Command Region in
Charge of Logistics;
Colonel Stepan Stepanovich Yaroshchuk as Chief of Missile and Artillery
Forces of the Southern Military Command Region;
Colonel Sergey Anatolyevich Bakaneyev as Chief of Missile and Artillery
Forces of the Eastern Military Command Region, relieving him of his position
as Commander of the 39th Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the Far
East Military Command Region;
Rear Admiral Yuriy Yuryevich Berdnikov as Chief of the Navy Directorate of
the Eastern Military Command Region, relieving him of his position as
Deputy Commander of Troops and Forces in the Northeast;
Rear Admiral Vladimir Nikolaevich Vdovenko as Deputy Commander of
Troops and Forces in the Northeast;
Colonel Andrey Alexandrovich Volkov as Chief of Radiation, Chemical, and
Biological Defense Forces of the Eastern Military Command Region,
relieving him of his position as Chief of Radiation, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Forces of the Siberian Military Command Region;
Colonel Vladimir Andryevich Voropaev as Deputy Chief of the Central
Directorate of Communications of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation, relieving him of his position as Chief of Communications and
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Volga-Urals Military Command Region in charge
of communications;
Colonel Alexander Vladimirovich Glushchenko as Chief of the Motor Service
of the Eastern Military Command Region, relieving him of his position as
Chief of the Motor Service of the Far East Military Command Region;
Major General Vladimir Vladimirovich Gorodnichiy as Deputy Commander of
the Troops of the Eastern Military Command Region in charge of inventory
and logistics, relieving him of his position as Chief of Armaments and Deputy
Commander of the Troops of the Siberian Military Command Region in
charge of armaments;
Major General Mikhail Gennadyevich Krasnov, Chief of the Branch of the
Strategic Missile Forces Military Academy (Serpukhov, Moscow Oblast);
Major General Sergey Leonidovich Melnikov, Chief of the Directorate of
Economics, Finance, and Accounting at the Federal Service for
Special-Purpose Construction of the Russian Federation;
Lieutenant General Alexey Nikolaevich Nemkov, First Deputy
Director of the Federal Agency for Special-Purpose Construction.
* * *
The President signed decrees discharging the following individuals from
military service:
Major General Igor Alexeyevich Fedotov;
Major General Yuriy Alexeyevich Gusev;
Major General Alexander Grigoryevich Bondarenko;
Major General Andrey Stepanovich Konyukhov.
Article status Published in the section: Documents
Date published: January 9, 2011, 4 p.m.
Link to article: kremlin.ru/d/10032
[Handwriting:
Senior Investigator with the Operative Department of Investigations of the 5th Department
of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate
at the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Captain of Justice [Signature] O. Kryvoruchyk]
City of Kyiv May 15, 2018
Examination started at 11:35 a.m.
Examination started at 12:10 p.m.
Captain of Justice Oleksandr Oleksandrovych Kryvoruchyk, Senior Investigator with the
Operative Department of Investigations at the 5th Department of the 1st Pretrial
Investigation Directorate at the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine, examined a web page on the Internet located at the address
http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/36819 in connection with a pretrial investigation of
Criminal Case No. 22015050000000047 involving alleged crimes punishable under Part
3 of Article 258 and Part 1 of Article 438 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, registered in the
Uniform Register of Pretrial Investigations on January 24, 2015, pursuant to the
requirements of Articles 104, 105, 106, 107, 223, and 237 of the Criminal Procedure
Code of Ukraine in his Office No. 307 at the Central Investigative Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine.
The examination was conducted under mixed lighting on a computer workstation at the
Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, which is connected to
the Internet via a Dynamix modem: Polaris computer, Intel-Celeron 700 processor
(operating system: Windows XP Professional with Microsoft Word 2010), connected to a
computer monitor LG FLATRON ez T 710BH, with a mouse, and an OKI printer, model
No. C5900DN. The Internet was accessed using the Mozilla Firefox browser.
Examination Findings:
The target of examination is an article on the Internet available at the following web
address: http://www.kremlin.m/acts/bank/36819.
To view the article, the Mozilla Firefox browser was loaded on the computer, the
above-mentioned address entered into its address bar, and the Enter key pressed.
After the web page at the following address
http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/36819 was loaded, it was found that it was a resource
hosting an article titled Decree No. 151 of the President of the Russian Federation dated
February 20, 2013.
This article contains information about military ranks conferred on servicemen of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Screenshots of the above-mentioned web page
were taken by pressing the Print Screen key and appended to this record.
The examination ended at this point.
Examination conducted and record prepared by:
Senior Investigator with the Operative Department of Investigations of the 5th Department
of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate
at the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Captain of Justice [Signature] O. Kryvoruchyk
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation
No. 151 of February 20, 2013
Conferring Military Ranks of Senior Officers on Servicemen of the Armed Forces of the
Russian Federation
pravo.gov.ru
DECREE
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Conferring Military Ranks of Senior Officers on Servicemen of
the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
To confer the following military ranks on the individuals listed below:
Army General
Arkadiy Viktorovich Bakhin
Valeriy Vasilyevich Gerasimov
Colonel General
Anatoliy Alexeyevich Sidorov
Admiral
Vladimir Ivanovich Koroliov
Lieutenant General
Vladimir Nikolaevich Berezhnyi
Ivan Alexandrovich Buvalydev
Yuriy Petrovich Petrov
Vladimir Ivanovich Popov
Alexander Vladimirovich Romanchuk
Andrey Nikolaevich Serdyuk
Vasiliy Petrovich Tonkoshkurov
Andrey Viktorovich Toporov
Evgeny Alexeyevich Ustinov
Alexander Alexandrovich Shevchenko
Vice Admiral
Leonid Viktorovich Sukhanov
Major General
Andrey Alexandrovich Volkov
Viktor Vladimirovich Voronov
Andrey Zaurovich Gagloev
Alexander Albertovich Glushchenko
Sergey Anatolyevich Dolotin
Alexander Vasilyevich Duplinskiy
Igor Nikolaevich Dylevsky
Dmitry Valeryevich Kasperovich
Igor Nikolaevich Klimov
Igor Evgenyevich Konashenkov
Vladimir Anatolyevich Kochetkov
Yuriy Vasilyevich Kuznetsov
Vladimir Nikolaevich Marusin
Viktor Stepanovich Miskovts
Igor Viktorovich Mishutkin
Alexander Ivanovich Novkin
Roman Olegovich Nogin
Alexey Nikolaevich Ragozin
Vasiliy Fiodorovich Sverdel
Alexander Vladimirovich Serzhantov
Mikhail Alexandrovich Smolkin
Igor Olegovich Khristoforov
Stepan Stepanovich Yaroshchuk
Rear Admiral
Alexander Vadimovich Karpov
Alexander Alexeyevich Moiseyev
Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation
Moscow, the Kremlin
Annex 181
Record of inspection of websites performed by D.H. Davyd, Major of Justice and
Senior Criminal Investigator with the 5th Office of the 1st Pretrial Investigation
Directorate at the Central Investigative Directorate of the SSU (16 May 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Record of Examination
City of Kyiv May 16, 2018
Examination started at 12:10 p.m.
Examination ended at 12:20 p.m.
Major of Justice Dmytro Hennadiyovych Davydov, Senior Investigator with the Operative
Department of Investigations / Criminal Investigator with the 5th Department of the 1st
Pretrial Investigation Directorate at the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security
Service of Ukraine, examined a web page on the Internet located at the address
http://archive.is/2wqYU in connection with a pretrial investigation of Criminal Case No.
22015050000000047 registered in the Uniform Register of Pretrial Investigations on
January 24, 2015, in order to gather evidence, detect and document information about
the circumstances of perpetration of criminal offenses, pursuant to the requirements of
Articles 104, 105, 106, 234, 237, and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine in
his Office No. 014 at the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine at 33 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv.
The examination was conducted using a personal computer with inventory number 4041.
The processor unit of the computer has an Internet connection via a modem and is
located in the Internet studio of the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security
Service of Ukraine at 33 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv.
Examination Findings:
The target of examination is an article on the Internet available at the following web
To view the article, the Google Chrome browser was loaded on the computer, the
above-mentioned address entered into its address bar, and the Enter key pressed. An
image was found at the specified address and subsequently downloaded.
The examination was conducted under artificial lighting.
Attachment:
Attachment No. 1 screenshot on 1 page.
Examination conducted and record prepared by:
Senior Investigator with the Operative Department of Investigations of the 5th Department
of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate
at the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Major of Justice [signature] D. Davydov
Attachment No. 1 to the Record of Examination dated May 16, 2018
Senior Investigator with the Operative Department of Investigations of the 5th Department
of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate
at the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Major of Justice [signature] D. Davydov
Vladimir Vlasov
Saved from:
Redirected from:
Save pages
Page
All screenshots from the www.ok.ru domain
Search May 6, 2018
Share Download zip Report
Vladimir Vlasov
62 years old, Chebarkul, Russia
Leading the formation is my elder son, Lieutenant Colonel M.V. Vlasov, Brigade Chief of Artillery. He is
followed by my younger son, Senior Lieutenant K.V. Vlasov, Battery Executive Officer of Battery 2S3M
Grigory Shimko
I am sincerely happy for you!
Annex 182
Ukraine Main Directorate of Intelligence Letter No. 222/4D/535 (17 May 2018)
(attaching Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/90/09 (2 January 2015 at 9:00 a.m.)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1
Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Ukraine for European
Integration Affairs
O.V. Zerkal
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
OF UKRAINE
MAIN DIRECTORATE
OF INTELLIGENCE
33 vul. Elektrykiv, Kyiv, 04176
Unified Register code 22990919
05/17/2018 No 222/ 4D/535
Dear Olena Volodymyrivna,
As part of the Ukrainian Sides preparation for the hearings at the UN International
Court, we enclose available information which may be used to strengthen Ukraines evidential
base as the Court considers the case of the Russian Federation violating the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
Enclosures: 1. Intelligence briefing from the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry
of Defense of Ukraine (as of 9:00 a.m., January 2, 2015), on 3 sheets, one
copy, addressee only.
2. Satellite images of the area 4 km southeast of Kuibyshevo (Rostov Region,
Russian Federation) of December 3, 2014, on 2 sheets, 1 copy, addressee
only.
3. Satellite images of the area 4 km southeast of Kuibyshevo (Rostov Region,
Russian Federation) of January 8, 2015, 2 sheets, 1 copy, addressee only.
4. Satellite images of the area 4 km southeast of Kuibyshevo (Rostov Region,
Russian Federation) of February 17, 2015, 2 sheets 1 copy, addressee only.
5. Satellite images of the area 4 km southeast of Kuibyshevo (Rostov Region,
Russian Federation) of February 20, 2015, 2 sheets 1 copy, addressee only.
6. Satellite images of the area 4 km southeast of Kuibyshevo (Rostov Region,
Russian Federation) of February 22, 2015, 2 sheets 1 copy, addressee only.
Sincerely,!
Acting Deputy Commander,
Military Unit No A0515,
Director of Department 4,
Colonel [signature] V.V. SKIBITSKY
Y.V. Yukhno 425 60 26
Zam. No 187-14
[stamp:] 0045053
[stamp:]
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT
Red. No. 38184
05 18 2018
2
[redacted]
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
OF UKRAINE
MAIN DIRECTORATE
OF INTELLIGENCE
33 vul. Elektrykiv, Kyiv, 04176
Unified Register code 22990919
01/02/2015 No 222/ 3D/90/09
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING
FROM THE MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
OF THE UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
(on January 2, 2015, at 9:00 a.m.)
Operational situation.
1.1. Concentrations of troops, arms and military equipment (A and ME) of the Russian
Armed Forces in the temporarily occupied territories and Russian regions adjacent to the
Ukrainian border.
According to operational reports and space intelligence data, the following has been
confirmed:
[redacted]
concentrations of Russian Armed Forces arms and equipment in the following areas:
Kuibyshevo (Rostov Region) the number of armored fighting vehicles has increased;
six 300-mm Smerch multiple rocket launchers and six mobile charging units are missing; also
missing are four 203-mm Pion self-propelled cannons (brought to the territory of Donetsk
Region on December 20, 2014);
Assessment: The change in the number of A and ME in Kuibyshevo area, in particular the
reduction in the number of artillery systems, is linked to their continued delivery to the Russian
Armed Forces and illegal military formations active in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions.
[redacted]
3
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING page 2
[redacted]
1.2. Reconnaissance by the Russian Armed Forces of sites in the territory of Ukraine.
Air reconnaissance involved the following:
Reconnaissance aircraft Su-24MR (Marinovka) in the air space (AS) of Volgograd and
Rostov Regions and over the Sea of Azov.
[redacted]
4
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING page 3
[redacted]
Main Directorate for Intelligence, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Annex 183
Ministry of Interior of Ukraine, Main Department of the National Guard of Ukraine
Letter No. 27/6/2-3553 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (31 May 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE
MAIN DIRECTORATE
OF THE NATIONAL GUARD
OF UKRAINE
vul. 9-A Narodnoho Opolchennya, Kyiv
03151, tel.: (044) 249-41-12, 249-41-13,
fax: (044) 249-41-97, email: [email protected],
http://ngu.gov.ua, EDRPOU code 08803498
May 31, 2018 No. 27/6/2-3553
In response to No. __________ dated _________
Re: Providing information about the location of National
Guard of Ukraine units in Mariupol on January 24, 2015
Department for Countering Threats from the
Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Ukraine
The Main Directorate of the National Guard of Ukraine hereby informs you that on January 24, 2015,
National Guard of Ukraine units were located in the city of Mariupol, where they were deployed in the Livoberezhnyi
[Left Bank] District and near the eastern part of the city. National Guard of Ukraine units were not deployed anywhere
else in Mariupol at that time. Moreover, no units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were deployed in Mariupol, as all
units were involved in military operations outside the city.
The headquarters of the National Guard of Ukraine subdivision (Mariupol Task Force of the NGU) is located
in the Livoberezhnyi District of Mariupol at 37-A Prospekt Peremohy. There were up to 80 National Guard servicemen
at this location. This National Guard of Ukraine unit was armed exclusively with automatic small arms and lightly
armored vehicles.
The aforementioned personnel were tasked with performing containment, restriction, patrol, and defense
functions.
In the eastern part of Mariupol, National Guard of Ukraine units were deployed at Checkpoint No. 4014,
which is located on the eastern edge of Mariupol, 100 meters east of the fork of vulytsya Olimpiyska and the M14
highway. The unit consisted of up to 100 servicemen. This National Guard of Ukraine unit was armed with automatic
small arms and armored personnel carriers.
Checkpoint 4014 is a structure where units perform tasks associated with, among other things, the passage
of vehicles and people, which includes monitoring vehicle traffic and checking people who are entering or leaving the
city. The functions and duties of the units that were posted at the checkpoint
2
included: monitoring the movement of people and vehicles; identifying and apprehending individuals suspected of
committing criminal offences; identifying stolen vehicles; checking personal identification; and temporarily restricting
vehicular traffic through the checkpoint.
National Guard units were also deployed at strongpoints outside the city. In particular, National Guard units
were located: at Company Position 4015 (center coordinates - 47°0529 north latitude, 37°4241 eastern longitude,
up to 86 servicemen were deployed there); at Company Position 4013 (center coordinates - 47°0821 north latitude,
37°4218 eastern longitude, up to 100 servicemen were deployed there); at Platoon Position 4014A (center
coordinates - 47°0634 north latitude, 37°4143 eastern longitude, up to 35 servicemen were deployed there).
First Deputy Commander
National Guard of Ukraine
(Chief of Staff)
Lieutenant-General [signature] O.V. Kryvenko
Annex 184
Confirmation of Authenticity, Senior Special Investigator with the Second Branch of
the First Pre-Trial Investigations Department at the Main Investigations Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine (4 June 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF
THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
Ukraine v. Russian Federation
STATEMENT OF CONFIRMATION OF AUTHENTICITY
I, Dmytro Volodymyrovych Fedirko, a senior special investigator with the Second Branch
of the First Pre-Trial Investigations Department at the Main Investigations Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine [SBU], am a member of the SBU investigative team responsible for
investigating criminal proceeding No. 22014000000000239 concerning the downing of Malaysian
Airlines Flight MH 17 on 17 July 2014, and a member of the Joint Investigation Team.
My functional powers include, inter alia, processing intercepted telephone conversations
obtained by the aforementioned investigative team:
- pursuant to Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine On Operational Investigative Activity and
in accordance with the procedures provided for by Article 7(6) of the Law of Ukraine On
Counterterrorism, based on the results of technical operations conducted by the SBU Department
of Technical Operations involving the capture of information from wiretaps, or
- pursuant to the requirements of Chapter 21 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.
For instance, I obtained, processed, and analyzed the following intercepted telephone
conversations:
2
1. A conversation between telephone numbers 380660827518 and 380500372376 begun at
13:09:27 on 17 July 2014;
2. A conversation between telephone numbers 380930721558 and 380962662006 begun at
11:30:47 on 8 June 2014;
3. A conversation between telephone numbers 380631213401 and 380639602502 begun at
19:09:20 on 16 July 2014;
4. A conversation between telephone numbers 380631213401 and 380665441455 begun at
09:22:19 on 17 July 2014;
5. A conversation between telephone numbers 380631213401 and 380665441455 begun at
09:08:26 on 17 July 2014;
6. A conversation between telephone numbers 380660827518 and 380505574532 begun at
21:32:39 on 17 July 2014;
7. A conversation between telephone numbers 380631213401 and 380660827518 begun at
07:41:06 on 18 July 2014.
I confirm that all of the aforementioned intercepted telephone conversations were obtained
and processed in compliance with the requirements of Ukrainian law and were therefore included
in the case files of criminal proceeding No. 22014000000000239. Among other things, I
established that the aforementioned telephone conversations actually took place between the
indicated telephone numbers and at the specified times.
I swear that the statement set forth above is true and accurate, and the materials I use therein
are obtained and processed in accordance with the requirements of applicable Ukrainian law.
Signed in Kyiv, Ukraine, on 4 June 2018
[signature]
Dmytro Volodymyrovych Fedirko
Annex 185
Statement of Authentication, Volodymyr Piven, Senior Investigator, Main
Investigation Office, Security Service of Ukraine (5 June 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM
AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF
ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
Ukraine against the Russian Federation
Statement of Authentication
I, Volodymyr Volodymyrovych Piven, senior investigator for especially important cases of the
Fifth Department of the First Office of the Preliminary Investigation of the Main Investigation Office
of the Security Service of Ukraine, am a member of the investigation group that is investigating
criminal proceedings No. 22015000000000047 on the fact of artillery shelling of Ordzhonikidzevskyi
residential microdistrict in Mariupol on January 24, 2015.
My functional authority, among other things, includes the processing of intercepted telephone
conversations that I receive:
- on the basis of the provisions of Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine On Investigative Activities
and in compliance with the procedures provided for by Clause 6 of Article 7 of the Law of Ukraine
On Counterintelligence Operations, as a result of the Department of Covert Surveillance by the
Security Service to take the information from transport telecommunications networks, or
- according to the requirements of Clause 21 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.
So, I received, processed and analyzed the intercepted telephone conversation between the phone
numbers 380936255484 and 380633427570 that started on January 24, 2015 at 11:04:21 a.m.
2
I confirm that this intercepted telephone conversation was received and processed in compliance
with the requirements of the current legislation of Ukraine and is accordingly attached to the materials
of criminal proceedings No. 22015000000000047. In particular, I found that this telephone
conversation did occur between the specified phone numbers and at certain time.
I swear that the above statement is true and accurate, the materials that I use in it are received
and processed in accordance with the requirements of the current legislation of Ukraine.
Signed in Kyiv, Ukraine on June 5, 2018,
________[signature]_________
Volodymyr Volodymyrovych Piven
Annex 186
Ukrainian Prosecutors Office File on GROM-E2 (multiple dates)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Annex 187
Sample Minister of Defense of Ukraine Armament Investigation Reports and
Inspection Certificates (multiple dates)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
2
A0120
True copy
Interim commander of Military Unit A0120
[illegible] [signature] Hrebenyuk
[seal:] Military Unit A0120
Code 22991203
INSPECTION CERTIFICATE No. 502/9/4/71
Issued to Military Unit A1815
(name of the military unit to which the certificate is issued)
as per the application (act) of the commander of Military Unit A1815
of ___ _______ 20__, No. ____ based on the decision by
________________________________________________________________________
(indicate who made the decision)
of ___ _______ 20__, No. ____ to write [the following] off the book of shortages and the book of
military property loss:
No. Military property, Manufacturers
No., year made
Unit Quantity Cost per unit Total amount,
UAH
Reason for loss
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 BM-21 Grad [Rocket] Artillery
System, Military No. 77-
Manufacturers No. 4296,
1969
piece 1 426,290.1 426,290.1 Lost in the Antiterrorist
Operation (ATO) Zone
2 BM-21 Grad [Rocket] Artillery
System, Military No. 77-
Manufacturers No. 4294,
1968
piece 1 426,290.1 426,290.1 Lost in the (ATO) Zone
3 BM-21 Grad [Rocket] Artillery
System, Military No. 77-
Manufacturers No. 4276,
1969
piece 1 426,290.1 426,290.1 Lost in the (ATO) Zone
4 122 mm 9MM22U rockets piece 90 72,403.37 72,403.37 Lost in the (ATO) Zone
The grand total [is] UAH 1,351,273.76 (one million three hundred fifty-one thousand two hundred
seventy-three hryvnias and seventy-six kopeks). Incoming No. 6422
06.03.18
APPROVED
Commander of Military Unit A4583
(position)
[signature] Major General V.A. Kravchenko
(rank, signature, initials, last name)
12/28/2017
[seal:] [illegible]
Code 26616313
[illegible]
[signature]
Out of the total amount of loss caused the State by the loss of said military property, the
amount of _____________________________________________________________________
(state the amount in words)
is to be charged to the persons responsible, and the remaining amount of UAH 1,351,273.76 (one million
three hundred fifty-one thousand two hundred seventy-three hryvnias and seventy-six kopeks)
(state the amount in words)
is authorized to be absorbed by the State.
Enclosure: Application for an inspection certificate and attachments thereto on ___ pages (only to copy
No. ___).
Interim Commander of Military Unit A1815
(state position, rank, signature, last name and initials of the applicant submitting inspection certificate for approval)
Colonel [signature] O.B. LYUTYK
____ ________ 20__
[seal:] Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Military Unit A1815
Code 0788066
COPY 1
To Commander of Military Unit B1688
Report
[I] hereby request your permission to conduct an internal investigation to ascertain the reasons
and circumstances for the loss on 04.09.2014, during a mission in the antiterrorist operation zone in the
territory of Donetsk and Lugansk Regions of rocket artillery pieces belonging to the division, and
specifically,
1. BM-21 Grad No. 77-63H3
2. BM-21 Grad No. 77-79H3
3. BM-21 Grad No. 77-91H3
March 3, 2017 Head of the Rockets and Artillery Weapons (RAO) Service
of Military Unit A1815
Major [signature] K.V. KONOPLICH
To Major O. Nasinnyk:
Conduct an internal investigation prior to 12.03.2017
Colonel [signature] O. A. Malenko
True to the original:
Interim chief of staff and first deputy commander
of Military Unit A1815
Lt. Colonel [signature] V.V. SHUPYK
[seal:] [illegible]
Code 07880688
[stamp:] [illegible] 1
COPY 2
MINSTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE
EXCERPT FROM THE ORDER
of the Commander of Military Unit B1688
(For General Service)
03.03.2017 Village of Honcharivske No. 37
21. To Major Oleskandr Fedorovych N[a]sinnyk, deputy commander for personnel of the rocket
artillery division of the brigade artillery group: conduct an internal investigation of the incidence of
destruction, in the antiterrorist operation zone, of the property of the rocket artillery weapons service,
namely, BM-21 Grad No. 77-63H3, BM-21 Grad No. 77-79H3 and BM-21 Grad No. 77-91H3, and submit
for approval an act of internal investigation and draft order, prior to March 12, 2017.
Grounds: Report, incoming No. 119.
Commander of Military Unit, field post office box B1688
Colonel S.A. MALENKO
Excerpt accurate
Interim general service head of the personnel department of the
headquarters of Military Unit, field post office box B1688
Junior Lieutenant [signature] S.O. LYTVYNENKO
[seal:] Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Military Unit [illegible]
True to the original
Interim chief of staff and first deputy commander
Of Military Unit A1815
Lt. Colonel [signature] V.V. SHUPYK
[seal:] Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Military Unit A1815 2
Code 07880688
COPY
MINSTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE
ORDER
Of the Commander of Military Unit, Field Post Office Box B1688
(For Primary Activities)
10.03.2017 Village of Honcharivske No. 233
On the Results
Of the Internal Investigation
As per the order of the Commander of Military Unit, Field Post Office Box B1688 (hereinafter,
Military Unit B1688), No. 37 of 03.03.2017 On Conducting an Internal Investigation, I, Major O.F.
Nasinnyk, deputy commander for personnel of the rocket artillery division, pursuant to the requirements
of the Disciplinary Regulations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; Provisions for Financial Liability of
Servicemen for Damage Caused to the State, as approved by Resolution No. 243/95 of 06.23.1995 by the
Supreme Rada of Ukraine; Temporary Guidelines for Accounting for Military Property in the Armed Forces
of Ukraine, as approved by Order No. 690 of 12.24.2010 (as amended) by the Minister of Defense of
Ukraine; [and] Instructions for Conducting Internal Investigations in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, No. 82
of 03.15.2004, have conducted an additional internal investigation to ascertain the reasons, conditions
and circumstances that led to the total loss of fighting vehicles BM-21 Grad No. 77-63H3, Manufacturers
No. 4296, manufactured in 1969; BM-21 Grad No. 77-79H3, Manufacturers No. 4294, manufactured in
1968 and BM-21 Grad No. 77-91H3, Manufacturers No. 4276, manufactured in 1969.
Said investigation was conducted on the basis of a report by the head of the rocket artillery
weapons service of Military Unit B1688 on the partial and subjective internal investigation conducted on
orders from the commander of Military Unit B1688, No. 306 of 04.27.2015, on account of the total loss of
weapons and equipment of Military Unit B1688s rocket artillery division [that occurred] in the
antiterrorist operation zone in the territory of Donetsk and Lugansk Regions, near the township of
Dmytrivka of Novoaydarivsky District of Lugansk Region.
In the course of the investigation into the reasons, conditions and circumstances that led to the
total loss of BM-21 Grad No. 77-63H3, Manufacturers No. 4296;
BM-21 Grad No. 77-79H3, Manufacturers No. 4294 and BM-21 Grad No. 77-91H3,
Manufacturers No. 4276, the following was established.
[seal:] Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Military Unit A1815
Code 07880688
11
COPY 12
In accordance with procurement order No. -126 of 07.07.2012, BM-21 Grad units,
Manufacturers Nos. 4296, 4294 and 4276, were received from Military Unit A0332 (copy of the entry
from the items logbook attached).
In accordance with order No. 157 of 07.20.2012 by the commander of Military Unit B1688, the
following numbers were assigned: fighting vehicle BM-21Grad, Manufacturers No. 4296 was assigned the
military No. 77-63H3; fighting vehicle BM-21Grad, Manufacturers No. 4294 was assigned the military No.
77-79H3; fighting vehicle BM-21Grad, Manufacturers No. 4276 was assigned the Manufacturers [sic] No.
77-91H3.
In accordance with order No. 162 of 07.24.2012 by the commander of Military Unit B1688, fighting
vehicles BM-21 Grad, Military Nos. 77-63H3 and 77-79H3 were assigned to the commander of the 2nd
rocket artillery battery of the rocket artillery division Captain P.O. Slisar.
In accordance with order No. 162 of 07.24.2012 by the commander of Military Unit B1688, fighting
vehicle BM-21 Grad, Military No. 77-91H3 was assigned to the commander of the 3rd rocket artillery
battery of the rocket artillery division Captain Yu.M. Pustovoyt.
In accordance with order No. 145 of 06.23.2014 by the commander of Military Unit B1688 On
the Composite Crews of Artillery Units, the following crew was assigned to operate and maintain BM-21
Grad, Military No. 77-63H3: soldier O.P. Kuptsov (commander), junior sergeant I.O. Chernopyatok (senior
gunner) and soldier S.O. Oleksandrovych (driver).
The following crew was assigned to BM-21 Grad, Military No. 77-79H3: junior sergeant R.I. Gorlach
(commander), senior soldier R.V. Sichko (senior gunner) and soldier S.I Sitnychenko (driver).
The following crew was assigned to BM-21 Grad, Military No. 77-91H3: senior sergeant P.M.
Chernychenko (commander), senior sergeant O.P. Koshkin (senior gunner) and soldier Ya.M.
Parkhomenko (driver).
According to encrypted telegram No. 116/2/1/0290 of 07.05.2014 from the Commander of the
Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and pursuant to order No. 144 of 07.06.2014 by the
commander of Military Unit B1688, fighting vehicles BM-21 Grad, Military Nos. 77-63H3, 77-79H3 and 77-
91H3 and their crews were assigned to participate in the ATO in the territory of Donetsk and Lugansk
Regions as part of the rocket artillery division of the battalion-strength tactical group.
On 09.07.2014, the composite 2nd rocket artillery battery commanded by Captain P.O. Slisar and
the composite 3rd rocket artillery battery commanded by Captain Yu.M. Pustovoyt took up firing positions
and remained on combat duty near the township of Shchastya (Happiness) in Lugansk Region.
In furtherance of the orders from the head of the A sector, the remainder of the artillery divisions
personnel and equipment, and specifically, the divisions command, the logistics platoon and the
command platoon, carried out their mission of providing logistical and technical support to the composite
rocket artillery batteries while being stationed at the base camp in the rear, near the township of
Dmytrivka in Novoaydarivsky District of Lugansk Region.
[seal:] Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Military Unit A1815
Code 07880688
12
COPY 13
On 08.22.2014, while on standby at the firing position of the 2nd composite rocket artillery battery,
the driver of BM-21 Grad, Military No. 77-63H3 soldier S.O. Oleksandrovych and the driver of BM-21 Grad,
Military No. 77-79H3 soldier S.I. Sitnychenko reported to Captain P.O. Slisar that said vehicles had
technical issues, and specifically, BM-21 Grad, Military No. 77-63H3 had to have the clutch disk replaced,
and BM-21 Grad, Military No. 77-79H3 had its engines torque converter out of order. Once Captain P.O.
Slisar reported these technical issues that could not be addressed in the absence of proper tools and
equipment to the rocket artillery divisions commander Lt. Colonel S.V. Honcharuk and obtained
permission to relocate these vehicles [and] their crews led by soldier O.P. Kuptsov (fighting vehicle,
Military No. 77-91H3) and sergeant R.I. Gorlach (fighting vehicle, Military No. 77-79H3), said vehicles
retreated to the base camp in the rear, located near the township of Dmytrivka in Novoaydarivsky District
of Lugansk Region.
On 08.27.2014, while on standby at the firing position of the 3rd composite rocket artillery battery,
the driver of BM-21 Grad, Military No. 77-91H3, soldier Ya.M. Parkhomenko reported to Captain Yu.M
Pustovoyt that the vehicle was having technical issues, and specifically, that the engine was leaking oil.
Once Captain Yu.M Pustovoyt reported these technical issues that could not be addressed in the absence
of proper tools and equipment to the rocket artillery divisions commander Lt. Colonel S.V. Honcharuk
and obtained permission to relocate this vehicle [and] its crew led by senior sergeant P.M. Chernychenko,
said vehicle retreated to the base camp in the rear, located near the township of Dmytrivka in
Novoaydarivsky District of Lugansk Region.
These vehicles were placed in [dugout] shelters that made use of the terrain and organic
equipment to camouflage them.
Said fighting vehicles were being repaired by the technical services squad of the rocket artillery
divisions logistics platoon assisted by the specialists of the repairs and refurbishing battalion of Military
Unit B1688.
On 09.04.2014, at around 3 hundred hours, the positions of the rocket artillery division of Military
Unit B1688 came under fire, most likely from MLRS Smerch (since after the attack fragments and
components of MLRS Smerch projectiles were found all over the territory). BM units sustained direct hits
and had their chassis damaged; [additionally], the launch rails with the rocket projectiles ready for firing
caught on fire, threatening the life and health of the servicemen that tried to put it out and made it
impossible to evacuate the equipment that remained intact. An ammunition carrier vehicle and the
ammunition dump also sustained direct hits by MLRS Smerch projectiles and exploded, resulting in passive
mining of the territory, which prevented evacuation or retreat of the equipment that remained intact.
Since the
[seal:] Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Military Unit A1815
Code 07880688
13
COPY 14
enemys MLRS barrage occurred at night and a fire started, clearing the camp territory of the mines
appeared to be impossible.
The fire in the camp and explosions of artillery rounds continued until 5 hundred hours.
As the morning of 09.04.2014 dawned, attempts were made to extinguish the fire, but as burning
ammunition kept exploding, these attempts were abandoned and the personnel retreated to maintain a
safe distance. It only became possible to safely enter the camp territory at 11 hundred hours on
09.04.2014.
By that time, the fighting vehicles had been completely destroyed.
As explained by soldier O.P. Kuptsov and soldier S.O. Oleksandrovych, at around 3 hundred hours
on 09.04.2014, the positions of the rocket artillery division of Military Unit B1688 came under fire, most
likely from MLRS Smerch, and, as a result of direct hits by rocket projectiles, BM-21 Grad, Military No. 77-
63H3, caught on fire, which caused a subsequent detonation of the vehicles rockets. As a result of this
detonation of the full complement of rockets, namely, 30 9M22U projectiles, BM-21 Grad, Military No.
77-63H3 was destroyed. Due to the fire at the base camp, this vehicle could not be evacuated.
As explained by senior soldier R.V. Sichko and soldier S.I. Sytnychenko [sic], at around 3 hundred
hours on 09.04.2014, the positions of the rocket artillery division of Military Unit B1688 came under fire
from MLRS Smerch, and, as a result of direct hits by rocket projectiles BM-21 Grad, Military No. 77-79H3,
caught on fire, which caused a subsequent detonation of the vehicles rockets. As a result of this
detonation of the full complement of rockets, namely, 30 9M22U projectiles, BM-21 Grad, Military No.
77-79H3 was destroyed. Due to the fire at the base camp, this vehicle could not be evacuated.
As explained by senior sergeant P.M. Chernychenko and soldier Ya.M. Parkhomenko, at around 3
hundred hours on 09.04.2014, the positions of the rocket artillery division of Military Unit B1688 came
under fire from MLRS Smerch, and, as a result of direct hits by rocket projectiles, BM-21 Grad No. 77-
91H3, caught on fire, which caused a subsequent detonation of the vehicles rockets. As a result of this
detonation of the full complement of rockets, namely, 30 9M22U projectiles, BM-21 Grad No. 77-91H3
was destroyed. Due to the fire at the base camp, this vehicle could not be evacuated.
As explained by Captain P.O. Slisar, on 09.04.2014, once the artillery attack on the positions of the
rocket artillery division was over, on orders from Lt. Colonel S.V. Honcharuk, the surviving equipment was
evacuated to an alternative position near the township of Novoaydar in Lugansk Region. Soldier S.O.
Oleksandrovych and soldier S.I. Sitnychenko also participated in the evacuation. During an inspection of
[seal:] Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Military Unit A1815
Code 07880688
14
COPY 15
the equipment, it was discovered that BM-21 Grad No. 77-63H3 and BM-21 Grad No. 77-79H3 had been
destroyed. Due to the fire at the base camp, this vehicle [sic] could not be evacuated.
A similar account was provided by the commander of the 3rd rocket artillery battery Captain Yu.M
Pustovoyt, who confirmed that once the artillery attack on the positions of the rocket artillery division
was over, on orders from Lt. Colonel S.V. Honcharuk, the surviving equipment was evacuated to an
alternative position near the township of Novoaydar in Lugansk Region. Soldier Ya.M. Parkhomenko and
senior sergeant P.M. Chernychenko also participated in the evacuation. During an inspection of the
equipment, it was discovered that BM-21 Grad No. 77-91H3 had been destroyed. Due to the fire at the
base camp, this vehicle could not be evacuated.
The fact of the artillery attack and damage sustained by the vehicles BM-21 Grad No. 77-63H3,
BM-21 Grad No. 77-79H3 and BM-21 Grad No. 77-91H3 is corroborated by entries in the combat duty
journal (copy attached).
According to the table of residual values, the total value of the property lost by the rocket artillery
weapons service, namely, 3 (three) BM-21 Grad vehicles, is UAH 1,278,870.39, and of 90 (ninety) 122 mm
M21OF rockets with MRVU 22-82-230 fusesUAH 72,403.37. The total amount of loss caused the State
by the loss of said property of the rocket artillery weapons service is UAH 1,351,273.76.
CONCLUSIONS:
The loss of weapons and military equipment became possible due to combat damage sustained
on a mission in the territory of the antiterrorist operation and shall be deemed irrecoverable. Personnel
have not been at fault for same. The total value of the property lost is UAH 1,351,273.76, including:
By the rocket artillery weapons serviceUAH 1,351,273.76.
Pursuant to paragraphs 1.3, 1.5 and 4.2 of the Procedure for Writing Off Military Property in the
Armed Forces of Ukraine, as approved by order No. 17 of 01.12.2015 by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
(registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 01.31.2015 as No. 118/26563), irrecoverable losses
shall be written off based on [corresponding] inspection reports.
To streamline accounting for Military Unit B1688s property, steps have been taken to write off
and replenish the property lost.
Personnel have not been at fault [for the loss]. The loss sustained shall be absorbed by the State
in its entirety.
Pursuant to paragraphs 1.3, 1.5 and 4.2 of the Procedure for Writing Off Military Property in the
Armed Forces of Ukraine, as approved by order No. 17 of 01.12.2015 by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
(registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 01.31.2015 as No. 118/26563), irrecoverable losses
shall be written off based on [corresponding] inspection reports.
To streamline accounting for the property of Military Unit B1688s RAO Service, steps have been
taken to write off and replenish the property lost.
[seal:] Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Military Unit A1815
Code 07880688
15
COPY 16
[I HEREBY] ORDER:
1. To have the combat losses caused the State while on a mission in the territory of the
antiterrorist operation, in the amount of UAH 1,351,273.76 (one million three hundred fifty-one thousand
two hundred seventy-three hryvnias and seventy-six kopeks), written off in full at the governments
expense;
2. To have the head of the Rockets and Artillery Weapons (RAO) Service of Military Unit B1688:
- record the loss in the amount of UAH 1,351,273.76 (one million three hundred fifty-one
thousand two hundred seventy-three hryvnias and seventy-six kopeks) in the book of property lost by the
Rockets and Artillery Weapons (RAO) Service of Military Unit, field post office box B1688;
- pursuant to the Procedure for Writing Off Military Property in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as
approved by order No. 17 of 01.12.2015 by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, duly prepare documents
and an application for an inspection certificate for writing off property, namely, BM-21 Grad No. 77-63H3,
Manufacturers No. 4296, manufactured in 1969; BM-21 Grad No. 77-79H3, Manufacturers No. 4294,
manufactured in 1968 and BM-21 Grad No. 77-91H3, Manufacturers No. 4276, manufactured in 1969,
valued at UAH 1,351,273.76 (one million three hundred fifty-one thousand two hundred seventy-three
hryvnias and seventy-six kopeks); submit applications to the logistics body to have the losses and
shortages replenished;
3. To have the assistant commander of Military Unit B1688 for finance and economics and the
head of the Finance and Economics Service duly write the property loss off the books and enter a loss of
UAH 1,351,273.76 (one million three hundred fifty-one thousand two hundred seventy-three hryvnias and
seventy-six kopeks) in the book of RAO Service losses of Military Unit B1688;
4. To cancel paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of order No. 306 of 04.27.2015 by the commander of Military
Unit, field post office box B1688;
5. To designate the chief of staff and first deputy commander of Military Unit B1688 as the person
responsible for seeing this order carried out;
6. To notify this order to the units personnel whom it concerns.
Commander of Military Unit, field post office box B1688
Colonel S.A. MALENKO
True to the original
Chief of staff and first deputy commander
of Military Unit, field post office box B1688
Lt. Colonel [signature] R.V. HUBA
[seal:] Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Military Unit A1815
Code 07880688
16
COPY
Excerpt from the Combat Log of the Fire Support Company
of Military Unit, Field Post Office Box B1688 (Inventory No. 367/r3)
p. 27
Date, time Subject matter
10 hundred
hours on
09.04.2014
At 3 hundred hours on 09.04.2014, [the following] combat vehicles were completely lost:
BM-21 Grad No. 77-63H3, Manufacturers No. 4296, manufactured in 1969; BM-21 Grad
No. 77-79H3, Manufacturers No. 4294, manufactured in 1968 and BM-21 Grad No. 77-
91H3, Manufacturers No. 4276, manufactured in 1969. Information was received at 10
hundred hours from Captain P.O. Slisar and Captain Yu.M. Pustovoyt.
Commander of the rocket artillery division
of Military Unit B1688
Lt. Colonel [signature] S.V. HONCHARUK
True to the original
Interim chief of staff and first deputy commander
of Military Unit, field post office box B1688
Lt. Colonel V.M. PADALKO
[seal:] [illegible]
True to the original
Interim chief of staff and first deputy commander
Of Military Unit A1815
Lt. Colonel [signature] V.V. SHUPYK
[seal:] Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Military Unit A1815
Code 07880688
51
Annex 188
Transcript of Video Declaration of Petr Khokhlov, Suspect Interrogation (published
27 August 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Coat of Arms
Letter Head of the Security Service of Ukraine
Copy. # 1
Personally
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Ukraine
February 27, 2017 # 10/-332/1-10
Re: P.S. Khokhlov
The Security Service of Ukraine within the scope of its duties on fight against terrorism
and illegal armed groups operating in Ukraine informs of the following.
On 14 of August 2014, the Ukrainian law enforcement authorities captured Petro
Sergiovych Khokhlov, a Russian national, during the antiterrorist operation in Luhansk oblast.
During interrogation of P. Khokhlov, carried out by members the Security Service of Ukraine,
P.Khokhlov informed that he serves in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
The Security Service of Ukraine published P. Khokhlov!s interrogation on Internet:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vwllmlGuMz0&feature=youtu.be. Attached herewith is a
transcript of P.Khokhlov!s interrogation carried out on 14 August 2014.
Attachment: mentioned on 4 pages.
Attachment is only for the addressee.
Chief of Stuff of the Head of
the Security Service of Ukraine (signed) O. Tkachuk
2
Transcript of Interrogation of Petr Khokhlov captured on 14 August 2014
[English translation from original Russian.]
I, citizen of the Russian Federation, Khokhlov Petr Sergeevich, was born in 1995, on February
8th, in the Saratov Region, in the city of Novouzensk. I was drafted to the army on May 22,
2013. After serving for 9 months, I signed a contract with the 9th Separate Motorized Rifle
Brigade, the Military Base 54046. After having served for a month and a half as a contractor, I
was transferred to the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion. Junior sergeant Ten was my squad leader,
lieutenant Sashenko was the platoon commander, lieutenant Polomatov was the company
commander, lieutenant Dultsev was the deputy company commander, captain Pashetov was the
commander of the battalion, and colonel Merkov was the commander of the brigade.
After two weeks we were woken up to the alarm, loaded into a train and sent to the Rostov
Region near the village of Krasnovka next to the village of Millerovo. We deployed into the
forest and set up tents. We were ordered to dig tranches for the IFVs [Infantry Fighting Vehicles]
and conceal them. We concealed them. After a month, the battalion commander lined us up and
ordered all the mechanics, drivers, gun pointers, operators to take the IFVs out and park them in
one line near the checkpoint, and destroy the machines! numbers, machine guns! numbers, throw
away" remove casings from the tanks, fix the machines.
After we fixed the machines, a KAMAZ truck with antitank guided missiles had arrived. We
loaded the machines, five antitank guided missiles to each. They were inspected in the evening.
At 4 pm colonel Brikov and captain Vasyura inspected the machines. At six.. at five o!clock the
march began, 14 machines left. The staff crew accompanied these machines - a squad leader,
driver-mechanic and a couple of officers. Those were the company commander lieutenant
Polomatov, the platoon commander lieutenant Sashenko and the deputy company commander
lieutenant Dultsev. Having left in the evening at 5 pm, they returned the next morning around 8
am. They told us that they had passed the machines to the Chechens. And these machines would
be given to the militants. They were being moved to the Russian Donetsk.
3
After the 14 machines were sent out, the battalion commander lined us up again and ordered us
to line up the remaining machines. The remaining machines were lined up, and, again, we began
destroying the machines! numbers, machine guns! numbers, cannons! numbers were taken off,
we checked the ammunition. We were told that another march would take place tomorrow. All
the machines were prepared, captain Vasyura walked by them, he is a deputy for technical
matters. He walked by, looked at them, all the machines! engines started to run well even when
cold, he said that the machines should run even with cold engine, he checked everything and
liked it. These machines were staying through the night. We were told that these machines would
take a route march the next day - these machines would also be taken to the Russian Donetsk,
and given to the militants.
The next morning we were told that the location where the IFVs were passed over was shelled
from mortar launchers. We were told that the march would take place the next day. We were
meddling with these machines, and it was going on like that for two-three weeks. We were
meddling with these machines for no reason, because at the end all the machines were lined up
and none of them left. On August 8, 2014 a friend told me that the militants are paid 150
thousand. My friend, private Dorofeev, and I decided to leave the Russian Army and to join the
militants.
We left on August 8, in the evening. We spent the night in the woods, woke up in the morning
and continued walking. We were walking for two days, in the fields. While we were walking in a
field, we were very thirsty. We saw a tower, like a guard tower. We thought that maybe there
were some people there, who we would ask for water. But there was no one there. We kept
walking. I told Dorofeev: $Let!s go into the woods%. We went into the woods, it felt humid. We
followed that humidity and reached a river. There was a steep cliff on our side. We went down,
filled ours bottles with water and drank. Then we sat, smoked and thought. We drank some more
water. Then took our clothing off, threw a log into the river, put our clothing on top of the log
and began swimming across the river. We had swum across the river. Our clothing was wet. We
took the clothing, and began walking out of the woods. The path was going upwards. We came
out to the road, it was going in both directions, to the left and to the right. We turned to the left.
My friend said: $Maybe we will make it somewhere this way%. We kept walking. My friend said:
4
$Let!s stop, sleep through the night here, dry out the clothing here%. We made a fire, dried out
the clothing, then woke up in the morning at 4-5 am and continued walking. We walked through
a field and heard sounds of motors, tractors. My friend (private Dorofeev) said: $Let!s go down%.
We went down the hill, which was pretty steep. There was a calf pen there, on the left side, but
there were no calves.
We walked out, and saw a nice highway going to the right. We went along that highway, and
saw a church, which was being restored. We thought - let!s walk in and ask for water. We
walked to the church, but it was closed. We then walked on the road and saw an elderly woman,
who was crossing the road with two buckets of water. We crossed the road and she let us fill the
bottle with water. We kept walking along the highway, stopped a $Zaporozhets% car and rode in
it for about twenty kilometers, then it turned to the right and we got out at a bus stop. We were
trying to stop a car, but no one stopped. Then we saw a foreign made car driving towards us.
There were militants in it with machine guns. We hid in the grass. After laying for about an hour
in the grass we stood up and kept walking on a paved road. We saw a field on the right side.
People working in it and growing cabbage. We thought - let!s approach them and ask for water.
A BMW car, 320 series, then arrived. Two militants jumped out of it. One of them was an older
man, about 50 years old, and other one was about 27 years old. They told us to get down to the
ground, faces down, and began searching our pockets. They found a few cigarettes, matches and
a broken compass. I broke the top of it while we were walking.
They loaded us up [into the car] and took us to their headquarters. It was located in the village of
Novosvetlovka. We were brought to the headquarters and put behind bars. There used to be a
police station there. They told us to wait until the evening when their chief would arrive. The
chief arrived, asked everything about us, where we are from, wrote everything down on a piece
of paper. Then he said to my friend Dorofeev: $I am going to give you a machine gun. Will you
shoot me?% He said: $No%. Then he asked me. I said: $No%.
He said: $OK, keep waiting, your commanders will arrive tomorrow%. Next day three Russian
officers arrived. They did not introduce themselves to us. We told them how, from which
military base we came from. They first asked me, but I lied to them. Then they asked my friend.
5
They scared him, and told him that he would spend seven years behind bars if he did not tell the
truth. He told them the truth. He was then taken to write an explanation letter. He wrote an
explanation letter. It had phrases like $I do not have any claims against the militants" against
the commanders, I was not beaten and I was fed%, like that. They called me next to write the
same. I wrote it. They gave us a few cigarettes and closed us in the jail again. There was this big
Russian officer there. He said: $Maybe we will come tomorrow and take you to Luhansk%. But
another officer, also Russian, an older one, said that next day yet another officer would arrive,
question us again, and we would leave with him.
The Russian officer arrived, questioned us, wrote everything down. They gave us an inflatable
mattress and a pump. And placed us in a separate room, so that we would not run away, they
said. We inflated the mattress and went to sleep.
We woke up in the morning. Those two were there. One had a nick name $Cheerful%, and I did
not know the second one. We saw him in the evening for the first time.
After we ate, we went to the bathroom to smoke, they did not guard us. So we kept going to the
bathroom to smoke. Those two officers were not there anymore. Then we were sitting, waiting,
walking and drinking tea. A message arrived on the radio transmittal that the offensive had
begun. I was given an ammunition vest, a Kalashnikov hand-held gun and a grenade, and was
seated in the Lada six series car. A sniper gun, three $Flies% RPG-18 and $Zinc% 545 were
already in the car, near the passenger seat. My friend was seated in the BMW. All of it was
happening in panic. They drove straight, but the three of us drove on the road to the left. Once
we reached the bridge, we turned around and drove back. We saw some buried gas cylinders.
We stopped near those gas cylinders and began leaving the vehicle, carrying our weapons.
The Ukrainian military were walking there, but one of us, the sniper, said: $Those are our
people%. They said: $Everyone on the ground, faces down%. They shot in the air. We laid down.
They looked inside the car and saw the sniper guns. The sniper began talking right away. They
asked him who is the sniper. He said: $I am the sniper%. He was taken away. We were put to the
ground. A big guy approached me, took off the ammunition vest and tore the army serial number
6
off. They told us to turn around and again put our faces down to the ground. Having spent about
15 minutes with our faces in the dirt, another car drove by, probably with the militants. When
they saw us, it slowed down rapidly and began driving backwards. They began shooting at the
car. I think they left and were not caught. All of us, who were detained, were placed in the store.
It was about 4 pm at that time.
Around 5 pm the militants began shooting at the civilian village, at the direction of this store,
from Grads and mine throwers.
Then we spent the night in the store. Consequently, we were transported to the Ukrainian
military, to the airport, were questioned there and taken to the base. We were questioned again
on the base, fed, and I was given some cigarettes"
Annex 189
Signed Declaration of Yevhen Kaliberda, Suspect Interrogation Protocol ( 21 October
2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
21
RECORD
of witness interrogation
Kharkiv October 21, 2014
Interrogation started at 16:20
Interrogation finished at 18:10
Captain of Justice A.O. Prosnyak, special investigator in section 1 of the investigations department
at the Kharkiv Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, in Room No. 12 of the
investigations department, in connection with criminal proceedings No. 22014220000000283 and
pursuant to articles 65, 66, 95, 103107, 223 and 224 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine,
interrogated the witness
1. Name Kaliberda
2. Name Yevhen
3. Patronymic Davydovych
4. Date and place of birth The surname, name and patronymic of the
witness have been changed, and his other
personal details are restricted on the basis
of Article 15 of the Law of Ukraine On
protecting persons involved in criminal
procedure and the investigators
resolution No. 70/6-3568 of 10.21.2014 on
applying protection measures to a witness.
The witness is summoned exclusively via the
protection authority.
5. Nationality
6. Education
7. Occupation and role
8. Place of residence
9. Identity document
The witness was advised that he is being interrogated in connection with criminal
proceedings No. 22014220000000283.
The witness was advised of the content of Article 63 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which
provides that a person may not be held liable for refusing to give testimony or explanations
concerning himself, members of his family or close relatives, as defined by law.
[signature]
(witness signature)
The witness was advised of the interrogation procedures and his rights and
obligations under Articles 65 and 66 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.
[...]
3
23
Continued: record of witness Y.D. Kaliberdas interrogation on 10.21.2014
[...]
I dont currently have a job, in 2012 I graduated from a trade and economics college as a
chef. I live at the above address with my mother Viktoria Yakovlevna Filatova, born in 1974,
my step-father, Vitaly Aleksandrovich Yakovlev, born in 1968, and my sister, Alina Vitalyevna
Yakovleva, born in 2008. Im not a member of any political parties and I dont embrace any radical
political views.
During the political crisis at the end of 2013 start of 2014 (the so-called Euromaidan), I
started getting interested in the events taking place in the country. Since November 2013, I had
been a supporter of Euro-integration, but some time later I changed my views and switched to the
so-called Anti-Maidan side.
From mid-February 2014, when the movement started up in Kharkov aimed at pulling
down the Lenin monument, I started going out onto Freedom Square in order to defend the
historical monument against this aggression. People were gathering on a regular basis on the square
and talking to one another about various topics, and they were united by a single common idea
their discontent with the actions of the authorities as regards pulling down the monument. Over
the time that I spent on Freedom Square (from 02.23.2014 onwards), I met various people who
included: Anatoly (a man who looked to be about 50, balding, of medium height), people called
him Uncle Tolik or Tol; Ilya (an alcoholic with a beard) VDV [paratrooper]; Anastasiya
Khudyakova (who subsequently became my girlfriend). I went to the square with my acquaintance,
Vitaly Svyatkov.
After the threat of the Lenin monument being pulled down subsided, in around May 2014,
I went to Crimea, where at one point I was in Yevpatoria, and participated in the opening of the
Flash café, and then worked in Koktebel.
I returned to Kharkov in around mid-July 2014. After arriving in Kharkov, I again went to
Freedom Square, where I met up with the supporters of the Anti-Maidan ideology. On one of these
days, I met the aforementioned Anatoly (Tol). We started talking about various topics, mainly
discussing the events taking place in Lugansk and Donetsk. I also said that I was trying to find a
job. During one of our subsequent meetings, Tol offered me an opportunity to earn some cash,
by going with him to the Kharkov Meat Packing Plant district. He did not talk about the specific
nature of the work, but I agreed.
[signature] 3
4
24
Continued: record of witness Y.D. Kaliberdas interrogation on 10.21.2014
After that, Tol and I travelled on public transport to this location, and entered the territory
of the metals warehouse located near the railway bridge over Prospekt Gagarina. We went into an
administrative building, where someone called Oleg (Sobchenko, as I subsequently learnt) was
waiting for us. There were also other people there whose names I dont know, in total there were
around 6 people. Judging by the way they were talking, Tol and Sobchenko were already
acquainted.
Oleg copied down my personal details and also said that an organization was being set up
to protect public order, which would be helping the militia. After this meeting, I went home.
Some time later, Tol phoned me on my mobile phone (I cant now remember the number,
I changed it often). He asked me where I was, and also said that he would come to my house, as
he needed to see me. Some time later, he came to where I was living, and we met in the courtyard
of the building. During our conversation, Tol asked me to hide two grenades in a safe place
and gave me a black bag. I looked inside the bag and saw 2 round green items with black lettering.
As I subsequently found out through the Internet, these items looked like RGD-5 grenades. Next
to them were 2 fuses.
I decided to hide this bag under the bridge on Akhsarov St. (the Alekseyevskaya metro
station district). I chose this location myself, as I knew that virtually no one went there. Upon
arriving under the bridge, I put the bag containing the grenades under a stone and concealed it with
plastic bottles, and also covered it up with leaves.
In the evening of that same day, Tol phoned me and asked, during our conversation,
Have you hidden the nuts? to which I said, Yes, Ive hidden everything. I understood this
question to mean had I hidden the grenades.
Around three days later, Tolik phoned me on my mobile phone and said that he would
come to my house, and that I should go down to the entrance hall when he phoned. After he arrived,
he and I talked about various matters, and during the conversation he proposed that I go to
Belgorod to have a look at the city at his expense. I agreed to this.
We went to Belgorod the next morning (I cant remember the date, it was July of 2014).
Tol and I met up at the Kharkov passenger station, found a taxi driver in a passenger car whose
registration plate I cant remember, which had a sign on the car saying Kharkov Belgorod, we
waited for there to be four of us and set off for Belgorod. Tol paid the taxi driver 500 rubles each
for himself and for me. We arrived in Belgorod at the railway station, where awaiting us were Oleg
Sobchenko, Vadim (Monastyrev as I subsequently learnt) and Sergey (whose surname I dont
know, he lives in Belgorod, I called him the Messenger, as he said in conversation that he worked
at the military post office).
Sergey took me to some café to have a bite to eat, whilst Sobchenko, Vadim Monastyrev
and Tol went off to talk. I dont know what they were talking about. They then came to the café
and we went off to a park, where Sobchenko and Monastyrev gave Tol cash (hryvnia, exactly
how much I dont know) for him to give to people according to an enclosed list. As Sobchenko
said to Tol as he handed over the money and the list This is for the families.
[signature]
5
25
Continued: record of witness Y.D. Kaliberdas interrogation on 10.21.2014
[signature]
After that, Sobchenko, Vadim Monastyrev and Sergey took Tol and me back to the
station and we left for Kharkov. Upon arriving in Kharkov we each went our separate ways. After
that, we didnt talk for about 2 weeks.
Tol then phoned me again and said that I needed to go to Belgorod again, as he put it
for training in political science, this was supposed to take 2 weeks, for which I was supposed to
be paid 1,000 hryvnia. I agreed.
I left sometime in early August 2014, I met up with Tol at Kharkov railway station, he
gave me 1,000 hryvnia for the journey, after which I went there in a taxi.
In Belgorod, the taxi dropped me at the railway station, where Vadim Monastyrev met me.
He took me to a rented apartment on Bogdan Khmelnitsky St. in Belgorod (I cant remember the
number of the building or the apartment, the apartment was on the ground floor, on the left, I
remembered the name of the street because I had called for a taxi to pick me up there). In the
apartment were Sobchenko with his son, aged around 6, and his wife (whose name I cant
remember), Andrey (whom I hadnt met previously, who looked to be about 27), Vyacheslav
(Monastyrev, as I learnt subsequently, Vadims son), Alina (who, as I subsequently learnt, was
Monastyrev Seniors daughter). I stayed in this apartment for around 2 days without doing
anything.
Sobchenko and Vadim Monastyrev then offered me work on a building site as a landscape
gardener, to which I agreed. From that day, Vyacheslav Monastyrev, Andrei and I would drive
into the countryside in some car, where we dug the ground (did landscape gardening). At the end
of the working day, we were paid 500 rubles each, on average.
During this work, Sobchenko told me that in addition to the courses that I had arrived for,
there were also courses in combat training, where the instructors taught people the art of war
shooting, tactics, etc. As he was telling me this, Sobchenko, along with Vadim Monastyrev and
Andrey, were looking at online maps of the area of the anti-terrorist operation, from which I
concluded that these courses had been specifically created for those fighting in the Donetsk and
Lugansk Regions.
Having worked in this way for around 10 days, Sobchenko told me that there wouldnt be
any courses for the time being, that he would contact me in about 10 days and that I could go back.
That same day, Oleg Sobchenko gave me 500 rubles for the journey, after which
Vyacheslav Monastyrev, Andrey and I took a taxi to the Zhuravlevka checkpoint, where we were
met in the territory of Ukraine by friends of Andrey who I understood to be his godfather and his
[godfathers] wife. They took me in their car (a VAZ whose registration plate I cant remember)
to Pyatikhatok, where I got out and went home.
That evening, Andrey, Vyacheslav Monastyrev and my girlfriend Anastasiya came to my
house. Someone I hadnt met before by the name of Yaroslav, a friend of Andrey and Vyacheslav,
also came along. They stayed the night at my house, after which we went our separate ways.
Andrey returned that evening, and Yaroslav also came by to pick up the bag hed left at my house.
He said that he would be leaving the city.
I would also like to note that before our departure, Sobchenko told me to show Andrey
where I had hidden the aforementioned grenades. As I understood it, Tol had told Sobchenko about
this. Therefore, while Andrey was at my house, I explained to him where these grenades were. As
I understood it, this was in case anything happened to me and I wasnt able to get them. Andrey
then left my house and I didnt see him again.
In late August 2014 I received a call on my mobile phone from Tol, who told me I had
to go back to Belgorod to the aforementioned training course. He also proposed that I take my
6
26
Continued: record of witness Y.D. Kaliberdas interrogation on 10.21.2014
[signature]
girlfriend Anastasiya (whom I spoke about before) with me.
That same day, I met Tol at Kholodnaya Gora, with him were Sergey (whose surname I
dont know, his nickname was Prorab [Foreman]), whom I hadnt met before, and someone I
didnt know whose nickname was Ded [Grandpa]. We discussed our trip to Belgorod, these two
men were supposed to be our overseers. Tol also gave me 1,500 Russian rubles for the journey
and I went home. We had to leave the next day.
The next day, Anastasiya and I took a taxi from the Southern Station to Belgorod (through
Volchansk). Upon arriving at the station in Belgorod, we took a taxi to the aforementioned
apartment on Bogdan Khmelnitsky St. Ded, Prorab, Vadim Monastyrev and his daughter,
Sobchenko and his wife and son were there.
The next day, Sergey Messenger arrived and took us to another apartment on August 5th
St. (I cant remember the number of the building or the apartment, the apartment was on the 10th
or 11th floor, I cant remember for sure.) This was a rented apartment, and there was no one there
except Anastasiya, Messenger and me. We stayed there for around 2 weeks, not doing anything.
I then got a call from Sergey Messenger who told me to go urgently to the apartment on
Bogdan Khmelnitsky St. After that, Sobchenko, the Monastyrev father and son, Andrey and I set
out for a building with the sign Officers Club (or Officers Union, also on Bogdan
Khmelnitsky St.). There we changed into camouflage, put on balaclavas, and a video was recorded
in which the Monastyrevs, Andrey, Sobchenko and I are standing with our faces covered against
the backdrop of a wall, and Sobchenko made an appeal against fascism, that all the fascists in
Ukraine and Kharkov would be punished. He called us the Kharkov Partisans. After making the
recording we changed back into our clothes, and a few days later (perhaps a week or more elapsed,
as far as I remember it was September 18, 2014), Anastasiya and I took a taxi back to Kharkov.
Sobchenko gave us the money for our journey. Our accommodation and meals in Belgorod had
been paid for by Sobchenko. Subsequently, I saw this video on YouTube and VKontakte under
the name Kharkov Partisans.
Also during this trip, Vadim Monastyrev had created, for contact purposes, the e-mail
typeface, 1853 was the age of the youngest and oldest members of the group Anastasiya was
18 and Ded was 53). All those participating in the conversation knew the password to this mail
account. In order to contact someone, you had to save your message in the Drafts folder of the
mailbox and write your pseudonym in the title. After they were read, messages were deleted. I
used the pseudonym Ninzya [Ninja], Sergey used Prorab, Anastasiya used Vnuchka [grand-
daughter], Andrey used Said, Vyacheslav Monastyrev used Kong, Ded used Ded,
Sobchenko used Devyaty [Ninth].
The last day before we left Belgorod, Sobchenko and Vadim Monastyrev told me that I
was being sent on the aforementioned courses in the art of war and subversive activities (they
called it a sabotage and reconnaissance group). As I understood it from Monastyrev, his son,
Vyacheslav, had already undergone such training.
On 09.19.2014 I got into a fight, where I had my nose broken and I was also concussed; I
lay in Hospital No. 4 until September 24, 2014. Vyacheslav Monastyrev came to see me, he gave
me the phone number of Ded but didnt explain why. Then Ded, Anastasiya and Prorab
came to see me. Ded and Prorab took me to one side and told me that they had received a
consignment a few grenades and a sticky bomb.
7
27
Continued: record of witness Y.D. Kaliberdas interrogation on 10.21.2014
[signature]
On 09.25.2014 I discharged myself from the hospital, but was immediately admitted to
Hospital No. 30, where I continued to be treated until October 3 or 4, 2014.
After that, I left for Kiev, where I remained until 10.13.2014. Over this time, I did not
maintain contact with the aforementioned persons, I even avoided it, as I wanted to leave this
group.
On 10.16.2014, officers from the Security Service of Ukraine carried out a search of my
home. They did not find anything that could have attested to unlawful activity, but I realized that
the law-enforcement agencies were aware of the activities of the Kharkov Partisans, and therefore
decided to go and throw away the aforementioned grenades. Upon arriving at their location, I
discovered that they were not in the hiding place. Only Andrey could have picked them up, as only
he knew about the hiding place. After that, I decided to go to the Security Service of Ukraine and
tell them about everything that had happened.
Sobchenko and Vadim Monastyrev had also said repeatedly that, without thinking, they
would kill anyone who tried to turn them in, therefore I might be in danger.
I also want to say that during my final trip to Belgorod, in the apartment on Bogdan
Khmelnitsky St., Vadim Monastyrev and Sobchenko, whilst smoking in the kitchen, had been
saying that they needed to remove Bystrichenko (as far as I understood the Kharkov pro-
Ukrainian activist, Valentin Bystrichenko). They didnt say why this needed to be done. They also
said that they had a PBS to do this, and that Andrey was supposed to perform the task. As I
subsequently read online, this stands for special noiseless pistol. I heard this conversation
accidentally, when I went into the kitchen. After they saw me, they immediately changed the
subject.
In that same apartment, prior to my departure, Sobchenko and Vadim Monastyrev were
discussing which of their people had blown up the transmission towers at Bezlyudovka. As far as
I understood it from their conversation, this explosion had been orchestrated by one of the groups
under Sobchenkos control, although at that time there was no communication with them.
Sobchenko and Vadim Monastyrev also discussed the Leshy group having been taken in
Kharkov. They talked about this after reading a news item about how those responsible for an
explosion at the Kharkov Tank Factory had been detained in Kharkov.
In addition, sometime in June 2014, Tol introduced me to a girl named Svetlana, and
explained that she was a seamstress who was helping in their work. After I was discharged from
hospital, Svetlana contacted me and asked me to hand over to one of Sobchenkos people a USB
stick containing data, which she explained was a hello from Odessa. I went to her house (in the
region of the 23 Avgusta metro station, I have a visual recollection of the building and the
apartment), took the USB stick and then contacted Sobchenko by e-mail and he replied that Id get
a phone call and be told who to hand it over to.
2 hours after that, a man phoned my mobile from an unknown number, introduced himself
as Mikhail, and we agreed to meet in the region of the University metro station. I handed over
the USB stick to him at our meeting. I can also say that Id seen him prior to this in the Freedom
Square area, although I hadnt talked to him.
I can also report that during a few of my meetings with Tol, he was visited by someone
called Andrey, with the nickname Gosha, who drives a blue motorbike. Gosha had given Tol
the leaflets with the slogan Kharkov Partisans, and had also given him money.
I also wish to add that following a telephone conversation, I met up with Tol at the
Shevchenko park somewhere around 10.13.2014. During our conversation, he said that he was in
hiding and in fear of the law-enforcement agencies, and that in the event that an attempt was made
8
28
Continued: record of witness Y.D. Kaliberdas interrogation on 10.21.2014
[signature]
to hunt him down or detain him, he would go to Belgorod with Gosha and Vyacheslav
Monastyrev.
I have personally read this record. This is an accurate record of my oral statements. I have no
comments or objections.
Kaliberda 10.21.2014
Procedural action taken, record compiled by:
Special investigator, investigations department,
Kharkiv Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Captain of Justice A. Prosnyak [signature]
Annex 190
Signed Declaration of Aleksandr Bondarenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (23
October 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
3
[signature]
3
[...]
In response to the questions put to him, A.S. Bondarenko explained the following:
I, Aleksandr, Sergeyevich Bondarenko, am officially unemployed. I live with my wife,
Yanina Alekseyevna Bondarenko, d.o.b. 12/06/1979, my daughter, Viktoria Aleksandrovna
Bondarenko, d.o.b. 10/20/1997, and my son, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bondarenko, d.o.b.
12/26/2002, at the following address: Apt. 2, 10 ul. Kvitkinskogo, Kharkiv.
On February 23, 2014, I was walking in the downtown area when I saw crowds of people
walking down ul. Sumskoy, while a fence of some sort had been put up by the V.I. Lenin
monument, and a crowd of people were standing next to it. When I approached the fence, I bumped
into an old school friend of mine, Vitaly Zhuravel, who told me that some people had come in
from other regions and were planning to put things right in our city by removing the V.I. Lenin
monument. Zhuravel and I then walked over to the checkpoint that had been set up off to the side
of the monument and put our names on the relevant lists you had to do this if you wanted to pass
into the area beyond the fence, and also to receive food and cigarettes. I would like to point out
that we put our names and telephone numbers on these list (I gave them the telephone number I
have been using for about 10 years: +38 (067) 574-14-57), and they assigned us a number for the
day (the numbers were based on the order in which people passed through). After that, I kept
coming back to the monument for about 10 days. After Zhuravel stopped coming to the monument,
however, I lost interest in it and did not go back anymore. After that, in around April-May (I do
not remember exactly), a woman called me around midnight, introduced herself as Tatiana, and
asked me to come to the two-story white café next to Freedom Square at 9:00 the following
morning. She did not give me any specific reason why they were gathering people at that location.
On July 14, 2014 (I do not remember the exact time, but I remember that it was after lunch),
a man introducing himself as Oleg called me on my cellphone number, +38 (067) 574-14-57.
During our conversation, he told me he had seen me back in February when we were defending
the V.I. Lenin monument. He also told me he remembered that I did construction work. He asked
if I currently had a job and if I would like to go to the city of Belgorod in the Russian Federation
to make some money. I would like to point out that I did not personally know Oleg at this point
and had only seen him once during the defense of the monument. I had never actually spoken with
him, so I do not know how he knew what I do for a living. Since I was sitting at home without any
work at the time, I accepted Olegs offer. At the same time, I asked about the terms and conditions,
to which Oleg replied that I should come to the square opposite Kharkivs South Station at 8:15
AM on July 15, 2014, with a crew (4-6 people), which I could arrange myself. Oleg also told me
I would be well compensated for my work, but I would have to give him 10% of my crews earning.
After we had discussed all of these point, we said good-bye. That same
4
[signature]
4
day, I called my acquaintance, Pavel Govorov, and the father of my godchild, Viktor Alekseyevich
Larikov, and told them about Olegs offer. Govorov turned it down, as he was not in Kharkiv at
the time, but Larikov accepted the offer.
At around 7:30 AM on July 15, 2014, Larikov came over to my place, and the two of went
to the tram stop, where we got on the No. 3 tram. At around 8:05-8:10 AM on the same day, we
arrived at the square, where we stood under the train arrivals and departures board by the entrance
to the northern tunnel and waited for Oleg. A group of three people was standing next to us. After
a while, one of them came up to us and introduced himself as Gosha and asked whether we had
come for the job in Belgorod, to which I replied in the affirmative. I asked him where Oleg was,
and Gosha said Oleg would be arriving shortly. We then went up to the group and introduced
ourselves to the other guys. When of them introduced himself as Yarik, and the second as Sergei.
Oleg arrived literally about five minutes later. He gave Gosha some money and told him to go buy
tickets for the commuter train to Kazachya Lopan Station. He then said he was leaving Gosha in
charge of our group and left.
At around 8:40 AM on the same day, Gosha, Yarik, Serezha, and Larikov took our tickets
and got on the commuter train. We took it to Kazachya Lopan Station, where we bought tickets to
Naumovka in the Russian Federation. We then went through passport control, where Sergei was
unable to cross the Ukrainian-Russian border because his passport was too worn out.
At around 10:20 AM, our commuter train arrived in Naumovka, where Gosha used some
Russian rubles to buy tickets from the conductor to the city of Belgorod, Russian Federation.
At around 11:15-11:30 AM, we arrived at Belgorod Railway Station in the Russian
Federation. We went out to the main entrance, where Gosha told us we had to wait to be picked
up. He did not specify exactly who was supposed to pick us up. About two hours later, Oleg drove
up with some other man to the spot where we had been waiting. He arrived in a cherry red sedan
(it was either a Honda or a Hyundai; I do not remember the plate number). Oleg told us we had to
wait a bit. About five minutes later, another car pulled up a dark grey off-road vehicle (I do not
remember the make or plate number). The driver of this car was a man I had never met before.
Oleg then told us we should address him as Oleg Vasilyevich, and that we were now going to drive
over to the construction site, where he would set us up with jobs and see to our accommodations.
They drove us to the edge of Belgorod, to an area called Kreyda (it took us about 40 minutes to
get there). When we got there, Oleg Vasilyevich took us to the construction foreman, who told us
to go to the trailer and get settled in, after which Oleg Vasilyevich drove off.
5
[signature]
5
At the construction site, we did finishing work. I spent about a month and a half there in
total. Around the end of July - early August, they put another young man in the trailer with us. He
introduced himself as Slava. He hardly worked at all throughout the day. But he spoke with us. He
told us he had studied in Kharkiv for four years and wanted to work for the Security Service of
Ukraine (he did not mention, however, which school he had studied at). He also told us he was
going to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea the following day and wanted to get into some school
there (he did not say which one, but I understood from our conversation that he was planning to
apply to some Ministry of Internal Affairs academy). Slava spent just one night with us and left
the following morning.
In early August, Gosha traveled to Kharkiv to see his girlfriend and pick up his motorcycle.
He came back about three days later on his blue motorcycle (I do not know the make or model of
the motorcycle, nor do I remember the plate number, but I do recall that it had Ukrainian plates).
Two days after Gosha arrived, Slavik came back to the construction site (he said that he had not
been accepted, as he had not gotten a high enough score). He was accompanied by a man who
introduced himself as Andrei. That same day, Oleg Vasilyevich and another man who introduced
himself as Slaviks dad (I believe his name was Vadim Viktorovich) were also at the construction
site. They gathered us all together and offered to take us out to the forest one weekend for some
R&R specifically, to run around and do some shooting (at the same time, they did not specify
what kind of weapons we would be firing). We all (Larikov, Gosha, Yarik, Slavik, Andrei, and I)
agreed to this. Oleg Vasilyevich said that in that case he would arrange everything and let us know
which day the event was scheduled for. After that, Oleg Vasilyevich and Slaviks father drove off.
A week after these events, around the middle of August (it may have been closer to
Ukrainian Independence Day I do not recall the exact date), Oleg Vasilyevich called Gosha on
his cell phone and said that we should all turn in our tools and collect our wages, because they
would be coming to pick us up at 3:00 PM that same day take us to a different site. We then turned
in our tools, collected our things, and handed over the trailer, but we did not receive our wages,
because the pay period was not supposed to close for another two weeks, so they told us to come
back for our wages closer to the time.
After that, at around 3:00 PM that same day, Lavrov, Gosha, Yarik, Slavik, Andrei and I
left the construction site with our things and started waiting for them to pick us up. About 20
minutes later, Oleg Vasilyevich and Slaviks father, Vadim Viktorovich, pulled up in the cherry-
colored sedan (the one I mentioned earlier). They were also accompanied by a black Mercedes (it
had an old-style body with square headlights; I do not recall the vehicles plate number). The
car was driven by a man I had not met before.
6
[signature]
6
We then drove in these vehicles to Belgorod. We were on the road for about 20 minutes
and arrive at a construction site, where they were putting up some sort of building (there was a
sign on the front of the building that said Belgas). Oleg Vasilyevich and Vadim Viktorovich
then carried on to a park located not far from that building, where they met with some man. Their
meeting lasted about 20 minutes. I do not know what they talked about.
After that conversation, Oleg Vasilyevich and Slaviks father walked over and told us to
leave our things there, as we would not need them at the new site. They also told us to hand over
our passports, explaining that this way they would be kept safe and we would not need them at the
new job site anyway. They told us that our things would be stored in a garage and that nothing
would happen to them. After we handed over our bags with our things and gave our passports to
Oleg Vasilyevich (I gave him my passport together with all the others, since Gosha and Yarik had
previously worked with Oleg and said that he could be trusted), they gave us a bag with some
toiletries, specifically: toothpaste, toothbrushes, soap, shampoo, etc. hey then told us to get into
a brown truck with a tent that was parked in the courtyard where we had stopped. When we got
into the back of the truck, we saw a man in a camouflage uniform sitting there (the pattern on the
camouflage consisted of small round shapes, and the uniform itself was brownish) and a
camouflage hat the same color as the uniform. Next to this man there was also a large green
backpack. The man introduced himself as Slava and told us we mustnt smoke in the vehicle. He
also pointed to a place in the truck were there was some drinking water. As soon as everyone got
in, Slava (the one in military uniform) closed the tent over the back of the truck and we set off. We
could not see where we were going because of the tent. We were on the road for about four hours
in all. We stopped only once along the way to go to the bathroom and have a smoke. After that
stop, I also glanced out of the tent and saw that we were passing through some city, where there
were three mine shafts. After that, the truck turned off the road and we drove through some fields
to some sort of multi-level quarry. The truck stopped at one of the lower levels, and we got out.
I looked around and saw that we had arrived at some sort of camp, which consisted of the
following structures: a wooden bathroom and shower, a wooden pavilion, a small tent (with two
beds, and there were also two beds next to the tent), and a large tent (with ten beds inside). All the
beds were metal with mesh. There was also another tent there with a wooden table inside for eating
meals. Upon arriving at the camp, we were greeted by three men. They were also in military
uniform. One of them was wearing a solid green uniform (the fabric looked like burlap), and the
other two were wearing green camouflage uniforms (the pattern consisted of round shapes of
varying sizes). These people told us that they were guarding the camp and that we could go get
settled in the big
7
[signature]
7
tent, while they would go and speak with Slava (the one in the military uniform), who had driven
us there. They then issued us military uniforms like the ones worn by the men who greeted us.
They fed us and told us reveille would be at 6:00 AM. For food they gave us a dry ration, which
was packaged in a green box and was designed to feed one person: one pack a day.
The following morning we had breakfast and started our exercises, which consisted of
shooting theory and practice. We had shooting practice twice a day from a Kalashnikov assault
rifle and a Makarov pistol. They also showed us how to fire a grenade launcher. My godchilds
father also fired an anti-tank gun (it looked like an old WWII gun), while Gosha and Slava fired
sniper rifles (they were probable Dragunov sniper rifles). On the second day of our training, one
of the instructors asked who among us had done well in school specifically, which of us had a
good grasp of physics and electricity as he needed someone who could learn to use mines and
explosives, which would require good basic high school-level knowledge. I volunteered for this,
as I had gotten pretty decent grades in physics. I also did not want any of the other guys getting
funny ideas. My entire training in demolitions consisted primarily of theory and lasted three days.
Only on the final day did one of the instructors blow up a 200-gram stick of TNT in my presence
to show me what an actual explosion looked like. Our general training course in the camp lasted
five days. During our training, I did not ask any questions as to why we needed it or what they
were training us for, as one of the instructors had told us on the first day that everything that
happened here was a dream, and that when we went home we should forget about everything and
sit quietly at home.
On the fifth day of our training, a light grey off-road vehicle (I do not recall the make,
model or plate number) arrived in the camp. Behind the wheel sat a man I had not met before,
wearing black pants and a white shirt. Inside the vehicle were two men I had not met before,
wearing camouflage uniforms (these uniforms had special fasteners for attaching medals of
distinction). These men in uniform inspected us, spoke with our guards about something, then had
a word with Slava (the one who had brought us there in the truck). They had a quarrel about the
number of cartridges that had been issued to us. It is my understanding that Slava was complaining
that there were fewer cartridges than promised, and that he would definitely mention this in his
report. One of the men in uniform also said during a conversation with the other that he would
soon have to go back to the Directorate in Belgorod. About 20 minutes later, after the men who
had arrived in the off-road vehicle departed, they ordered us to get in the brown truck (the same
one in which we had arrived). Slava, who had driven there with us, also drove back with us. When
leaving the base, we also turned in the military uniforms we had received.
The journey back took about four hours. On the way, we stopped only once for 10 minutes
to have a smoke and answer natures call. Around 3:00-4:00 p.m. that same day, we arrived at the
8
[signature]
8
same construction site in the city of Belgorod where they had picked us up. There we were greeted
by Oleg Vasilyevich in the same cherry-red sedan. He took us in two trips to some apartment in
Belgorod (I do not know the address, but I can tell you it was in the Kargara neighborhood next to
a City Mall superstore). We spent two days at that apartment. During that time, we just relaxed,
and no one bothered us. On the evening of the first day, they brought us our personal belongings,
which we had handed over to them before leaving for the camp. The following day, they gave us
back our passports, money, and phones.
On August 29, 2014, i.e., on the third day of our stay in Belgorod after the camp, my friend
V.A. Larikov, headed back home to Kharkiv from Belgorod Railway Station. That same day, Oleg
Vasilyevich called Gosha on his cell phone and said that we (Slavik, Gosha, Yarik, Andrei, and I)
should go to ul. Michurina later that day to film a video. At around 10:30 a.m. that same day, we
arrived at the address indicated by Oleg Vasilyevich. There we were greeted by Oleg Vasilyevich
and Slaviks father. We then went to some building where there was a college, a travel agency,
and some other offices. We all went into a room in that building, where three men I had never met
before were waiting for us. Oleg Vasilyevich brought with him some sheets of A4 paper with some
printed text on them. After we went into the room, Oleg handed these sheets of paper to each of
the men who were there, who, after studying them closely, crossed out most of the text, leaving
about ten percent of the original wording. We were then given bags with uniforms and masks and
told to put them on. Slavik was given the edited text and told to read it, but because he kept
stumbling, Oleg took the text from him and started reading it himself. One of the guys who had
been waiting in the room filmed what Oleg was saying on a digital camera. I do not remember the
exact wording of the speech. I only remember that it started with some historical background, after
which Oleg introduced us as the Kharkiv Partisans and started threatening the so-called junta
regime.
That same day, after we filmed that video, I got on a private mini bus at a bus stop directly
opposite the building where we were and took it to the Nekhoteyevka crossing on the Russian-
Ukrainian border. I crossed the border through the pedestrian corridor, then took a taxi from the
[signature] Hoptivka checkpoint back to Kharkiv. I believe Slava and [handwritten:] Gosha went
by motorcycle to Graivoron. Slava submitted an application to some school in Belgorod (a couple
of days later he came back to Belgorod to take the entrance exams), while Yarik apparently
returned to Kharkiv like me, where he was supposed to go visit his girlfriend in Oleksiyivka first,
then go back to his parents house. I do not know where Andrei went. Prior to my departure, Vadim
Viktorovich had told me he had given his email address to my godchilds father, and we could use
it to contact him should the need arise.
9
[signature]
9
Upon arriving in Kharkiv, I did not go anywhere in particular and spent almost all my time
with my family. On September 1, 2014, I changed telephone numbers from +38 (067) 574-14-57
to another Kyivstar number, which I can no longer recall. About 6-7 days after my arrival, Andrei
came over to my place and offered me a side job planting flowers. The following day, my friend
V.A. Larikov came to see me. He said that shortly before we left, Slaviks father, Vadim
Viktorovich, had given him a piece of paper with the login and password for a mail.ru email
account and said that we should use this email if we needed to contact him or he wanted to pass
on some information. At the same time, he said we should not actually send any messages. Instead,
we should type them up and save them to drafts. Larikov entered the login and password, which
he saved on the computer, so that I would also have access to the email account. Later that evening,
Slavik came over to my place and told me that Oleg Vasilyevich wanted me to go back to Belgorod.
Slavik did not tell me why, however.
The day after these events, Lavrik and I took the commuter train from Kharkiv to Belgorod,
where we worked in the Belgorod Region for about two days at the job that Andrei had offered,
planting flowers in a flower bed. On the third day, because it started to rain, I did not go to work.
I therefore decided to go the Oleg Vasilyevichs apartment, which was not far from ul. Michurina
(I do not know the address, but remember visually where the building and apartment are located).
When I arrived at the apartment, I was greeted by Oleg Vasilyevich and Vadim Viktorovich.
During our conversation, Oleg Vasilyevich told me that Gosha could not be trusted, that Gosha
was a blabbermouth and would not be able to handle his duties. Oleg Vasilyevich then introduced
me to two men I had not met before, who had also come over to his apartment. The first, who was
bald, introduced himself as Serega Prorab [Foreman]; the second, who was all wrinkled and
kept coughing, introduced himself as Ded [Grandpa]. Oleg told me to travel with them to
Kharkiv. Vadim Viktorovich then said that he could give us a ride in his van to the border (he had
a Volkswagen van; I cannot remember the model or plate number, but I do remember that it had
Ukrainian plates). I told him I just need to pick up Larikov and would then be ready to go. That
evening, Larikov, Foreman, Grandpa and I got a ride in Vadim Viktorovichs vehicle to the
Russian-Ukrainian border. Larikov and Grandpa were dropped off by the Nekhoteyevka
crossing point on the Russian side of the border (Hoptivka on the Ukrainian side), while Foreman
and I were taken toward the Zhuralevka crossing point. Once we reached Ukrainian territory,
Foreman gave me USD 100 to pay for a taxi to Kharkiv. I was supposed to divide the rest of the
money between myself and Larikov. Larikov and Grandpa were supposed to take a taxi from
Hoptivka and pick me and Foreman up along the way. About 1520 minutes after Foreman
and I crossed the Ukrainian-Russian border,
10
[signature]
10
a taxi pulled up with Larikov and Grandpa inside. I paid the tax fare using the money I had
earned back in August working at the construction site.
The taxi dropped us off at Universitet metro station (the so-called piece of glass), after
which Larikov set off for Sovetskaya metro station, while Grandpa, Foreman and I took the
metro to Akademika Barabasheva station, where they said they wanted to show me something. We
took the trolley from Akademika Barabasheva station toward ul. Gvardeytsev Shironintsev, getting
out at the intersection of Prospekt 50-let VLKSM and ul. Gvardeytsev Shironintsev. After getting
off the trolley, we walked to the second nine-story building, specifically to the first entrance, up to
the eighth floor, to the apartment on the left by the exit from the elevator (the left-hand door in the
lobby). Slava was already in the apartment. He told us we were going to spend the night in the
apartment, and he would go right away to get some groceries. When Slava got back from the shop,
we had dinner and went to bed. The following day, Slava went to do some errands in the city,
while Grandpa, Foreman, and I remained in the apartment. Before he left, I gave Slava some
of the money (15,000 Russian rubles) I had earned at the construction site in Belgorod and asked
him to exchange it. That evening, Slavik came back to the apartment and gave me the money,
which he had converted into hryvnias. He also told me we were going to railway hub in
Novoselivka that evening. Grandpa pulled out a magnetic mine, and Slava told me I was
supposed to attach the mine to a tank car and blow it up. At around 10:00 p.m. that night,
Grandpa, Foreman, Slavik, and I left the apartment (Slavik was also carrying a pistol with a
silencer) and went down into the courtyard, where we got into a blue car (I believe it was a Dacia).
Grandpa got behind the wheel.
After we reached Novoselivka, I tried to attach the magnetic mine to the tank car of a
passing train, but because I was so nervous I failed. Meanwhile, Grandpa was sitting in the car.
Slavik was standing in front of me in the direction of the oncoming train, and Foreman was
standing behind me. They were supposed to warn me if any passers-by appeared. After I failed to
attach the mine to a second tank car, Grandpa said it was already too late (it was around 2:00
3:00 a.m.) and it was time to go home. They then gave me a ride in the aforementioned car to the
Cosmetology Clinic stop, and from there I went home on foot.
The next day, I saw on the Internet that someone had blown up a PrivatBank ATM on
Pyatikhatki. I called Slavik and asked him if they had done it, to which Slavik replied that he had
had nothing to do with it.
On September 15, 2014, we received an email in our email account from Oleg Vasilyevich,
saying that Larikov and Andrei needed to through some grenades over the fence into the courtyard
of the military enlistment office in the city of Lozova, Kharkiv Region. That same day, Slavik and
Gosha brought five grenades over to my place (I do not know where they got them), They gave
three of the grenades to my friend Larikov, who was visiting me at the time, and left two grenades
with me. I hid these grenades under the seat in the kitchen nook.
11
[signature]
11
On September 16, 2014, Andrei and my friend Larikov traveled to the city of Lozova,
where they threw two grenades into the courtyard of the military enlistment office that night.
Andrei then returned to Kharkiv, while Larikov went home to the village of Kozminivka,
Sakhnovshchyna District, Kharkiv Region. About two days after these events, Oleg Vasilyevich
emailed Larikov and told him either to bring the remaining grenade to Kharkiv or to blow it up, to
which Larikov replied that he would blow up the grenade when he went fishing.
Around the end of September, Slava came over to my place and said that Larikov and I
should have our own email accounts, as Oleg Vasilyevich believed someone was leaking
information, and this way he would check us. Slava gave me a new login and password for a
mail.ru email account. That same day, I tried to log into the account but was not able to. That
evening, Slavik called me and started telling me off. He asked why I was not checking the new
email account, to which I replied that I had simply not been able to log in. That same day, Slavik
came over again to check whether the email account was working, but he was also unable to get
in, after which he went away somewhere. When he came back, he gave me a new login and
password for a mail.ru email account, which we checked together and were able to open. After
that, Slavik left.
On October 9, 2014, an email was sent to our shared account and to my personal account,
saying that Gosha was supposed to meet with some girl by the name of Nastya, and she was
supposed to call some man and arrange a meeting with him, where Gosha was supposed to hand
over two grenades, while the man was supposed to give Gosha a pistol, which the latter was then
supposed to pass on to someone by the name of Sherkhan. That same day, Gosha came over to my
place and picked up the two grenades, which he had previously left with me for storage. I know
from what Gosha told me that he handed the grenades over and gave the pistol (which looked like
a Makarov with a silencer) to Sherkhan. That same day, Vadim Viktorovich emailed our shared
account to say that Gosha had done well and succeeded at his assignment.
On October 10, 2014, Oleg Vasilyevich emailed our shared account and my personal
account and called us all a bunch of retards. He threatened Gosha and the rest of us with physical
punishment and said an enforcer was already on his way over. Later that day, Gosha came over to
my place, showed me the email, and asked if he could spend the night, as he was afraid for his life.
The next day, Gosha went to stay with his girlfriend in the Oleksiyivka microdistrict.
On October 14, 2014, Andrei called me and proposed that we go out to the Kharkiv Tractor
Factory to meet with Foreman. He said that he had received this assignment via an email from
Belgorod. Later that day, after 3:00 p.m., we went out to the Kharkiv Tractor Factory area to meet
Foreman. We met up around 6:007:00 p.m. that evening on the square at the Kharkiv Tractor
Factory by a monument to some athlete. Foreman came to the meeting with a man who
introduced himself as Anton. The latter took down
12
[signature]
12
Andreis cellphone number so that we could stay in touch. We then went our separate ways, and I
went home,
On October 15, 2014, sometime after 2:00 p.m., Andrei and I went to Sovetskaya Armiya
metro station, where Foreman was waiting for us in a silver car (a Daewoo Lanos; I do not recall
the plate number). We drove in the car to the hospital located near ul. Kharkovskikh Diviziy, where
Anton was already waiting for us in the street. He said he had already settled in. He also told
Andrei to check his email more often, to which the latter replied that he did not have a device on
which to check his email. In the course of our conversation, Anton also said that since he did not
know that area, he was going to carry a pistol. He also said he was going to contact Andrei by
email twice a day. That evening, Andrei called me and told me to pack a backpack and go over to
his place (he lives in Novoselivka, in the residential area; I do not recall the house number or street
name), as he had received an email from Vadim Viktorovich saying that we should get out of our
houses. I met Andrei half way between my place and his. When we met, he said that he had called
Gosha and told him to park the motorcycle and walk over to the Zirka movie theater. We then
headed over to the theater ourselves, but we did not find Gosha there, and he did not answer our
telephone calls. Andrei then called Foreman and told him that we had left our apartments and
needed to find somewhere to spend the night, to which Foreman replied that we should go over
to Antons place and figure out what to do once we got there. When we reached the aforementioned
hospital, Foreman and Anton met us there, and during our conversation they said they did not
have any room for us at their places, but Foreman said that we could go out to the village of
Shestakove, where his father had a dacha. He told us how to get there and where to find the keys.
On the night of October 1516, 2014, we arrived at the aforementioned dacha, where we
stayed until October 22, 2014. Either I or Andrei periodically went out to the cities for groceries.
We also helped Foremans father, Sasha, around the house.
On the morning of October 22, 2014, Andrei and I went out to the city, as he said that
Anton had told him on October 21 that we needed to go to the bus stop in front of the hospital.
When we got to the stop, Anton met us and said that I should go to the tramway at Gorky Park,
where I should scope out the area by the new road linking Sumskaya and Novgorodskaya, by the
buildings under the Fireworks sign. I went to that address and did everything that Anton had
asked, then walked over to the intersection of ul. Novgorodskaya and Klochkovskaya, where
Andrei and Anton arrived about ten minutes later. During our meeting, I said that I had not noticed
anything unusual about the building I had scoped out, and there was no point in blowing anything
up there, to which Anton replied that we would have to blow it up anyway and that we would have
to plant the device later that night, setting the timer for 36 hours so that the bomb went off during
the day. I agreed to contact Anton by phone at 9:00 p.m. that night. After that, Andrei and I
3
3
walked around the city some more, and Andrei arranged for a car to pick us up by the star-shaped
monument on ul. Kharkovskikh Diviziy. On the way to the monument, while we were walking
along Moskovsky Prospekt, Andrei saw the car he had arranged, and we got into it, drove to a gas
station, and shortly afterwards were apprehended by officers of the Security Service of Ukraine.
I have read the transcript of the interview, and it is an accurate record of my testimony. I have no
comments or corrections and nothing further to add. [signature] A.S. Bondarenko
Interview conducted and transcript prepared by:
Special Investigator, Investigations Department
Kharkiv Regional Directorate of the SBU
Captain of Justice [signature] I.O. Yena
Annex 191
Signed Declaration of Andrii Baranenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (23 October
2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
[initials]
[signature]
1
I currently reside alone at the following address: Kharkov, 2 Psarevsky Lane. I own the house. For the past 5 years,
I have been working at the taxi service Sunshine, Favorite and Your Taxi. My last official place of work was Gardens of
Ukraine, Kharkov. (Office address: 3 or 5 Academic Proskura Street.)
In around 2009, while working at the taxi service, I met Vadim Monastyryev, whom I drove several times; since
then, I kept up a friendly relationship with him: we went fishing, took time off together, etc. As far as I could tell from
conversations with V. Monastyryev, the latter did not work anywhere officially; in 2009-2010 he was engaged in
contraband transportation of goods from Ukraine to Russia. As far as I know from what Monastyryev said, he has a wife
and two children and lives in a single-family home in the Zhuravlevka neighborhood of Kharkov.
In June-July 2014, during a meeting with Vadim Monastyryev, an acquaintance of Vadims arrived; his name was
Oleg Vasilyevich (bald, age 42-45, around 170 cm tall, limps on his left leg, lives near Kharkov
Sortirovochny, I would recognize the two-story building if I saw it).
After a while, Oleg called me; he knew that I worked as a taxi driver and he asked me to drive him to the border and drive
him around town because he had car trouble. I agreed. The next day, I drove Oleg to the Strelechye border checkpoint,
where he crossed the border from Ukraine to Russia. After a while, I picked up Oleg Vasilyevich and drove him back to
Kharkov to the addresses he gave me. I took him to several addresses, where he got out for a while and met with people
I had never seen before.
Later, Oleg Vasilyevich introduced me to the following persons:
man named Andrey (nickname Gosha, number 3 in our group, telephone number 097-565-03-38, worked
in construction in Belgorod, RF. I could recognize him if I saw him or a photograph of him.), who was a
biker.
man named Anatoly (nickname Tol, around 45 years old, short, heavy build. I could recognize him if I saw
him or a photograph of him.)
Mikheyenko
man named Sergey (drives a green VAZ 2013). When I met him, Sergey said he was an ardent opponent
of Ukraines new government and was prepared to fight against it. He also said that he had previous
convictions and had recently been released from prison.
When I met Oleg and Sergey, Oleg said that we needed to go and kill an ardent supporter of Euromaidan, Valery
Bystrichenko. Oleg gave us the address for the latter in Kharkov. Oleg also said that he would have to decide on our own
which of us would kill him. After a while, Sergey and I arrived at the address: Kharkov, 257/259 Druzhba Narodov Street
(or the opposite, 259/257, I cant remember exactly). Sergey and I studied the area around Bystrichenkos building and
decided not to kill him because there were lots of children and civilians around who could be hurt. The weapona pistol
was given to me by Vadim Monastyryev and I kept it with me. As far as I could tell, the weapon was a silencer-mounted
gun with a silencer. It looked like a PM [Makarov pistol], but more in terms of the size of the clip and the barrel. After that,
the pistol was kept at my residence until I committed the act of sabotage at the draft board in the following circumstances.
During a conversation with V. Monastyryev in July 2014, in connection with partial mobilization in Ukraine, the
latter asked about my feelings about military service, and later he suggested scaring the Kharkov Oblast draft board,
[initials]
[signature]
2
located on Kotlov Street in Kharkov, by throwing grenades, one by the gate and the second over the gate. I agreed to
Monastyryevs proposal but I said that I would only do it if there were no people around the draft board.
Oleg Vasilyevich also introduced me to Ruslan, who went by Leshy (resides at 92 Gagarin Street; I dont know the
apartment number: on the first floor, second entrance). Now I know his last namePanchuk.
While talking to Oleg Vasilyevich, I learned that he and the Kharkov-based journalist Perminov (who lives on Kirov
Street; I can point out which building) and Gennady Anishchenko had officially established an organization to protect
public order in Kharkov. Their office was located at Matallobaza-1 in Kharkov. Oleg Vasilyevich asked me to join the
organization, and I agreed. In order to join the organization, I went with Oleg Vasilyevich to Metallobaza-1, where G.
Anishchenko filled out a form for me listing all my personal data.
A while after my conversation with Vadim Monastyryev, Andrey (Gosha) set up a meeting with me. Oleg
Vasilyevich was also present at the meeting (V. Monastyryev may also have been there, but I cant remember). During the
conversation, Andrey (Gosha) told me to go in the evening (11:00 p.m. midnight) on the day chosen to the ATB store on
Yelizarov Street and to dress warmly. On the same day, around 11:00 p.m., I drove a Mercedes 190, registration number
773-64 KhK, to the location, where I was met by Andrey, who said that our task was to throw grenades into the Oblast
draft board; I was supposed to cover him with the pistol. That was referring to the pistol I had previously been given by
Vadim. After that, I drove my vehicle and Andrey rode a blue Suzuki motorcycle without a registration number on the ring
road toward Sortirovochnaya platform, through the private sector. When we reached the bridge over the Lopan River,
Andrey left his motorcycle in the bushes and got into my vehicle. After that, we drove down Podgornaya Street toward
the railroad bridge, went under it, reached Lugopark and then drove toward the Oblast draft board. We left the vehicle in
some trees and went to the draft board on foot. I want to state that Andrey was armed with two RGD-5 grenades that I
had given him that same day. I had previously received the two grenades along with the pistol from Vadim. Andrey and I
had already decided on our own who would do what during the operation: my role involved:
- Going on ahead and scouting out the area around the draft board;
- Taking up a concealed position 30-35 meters from the draft board and maintaining visual observation of the
locality;
- If strangers or witnesses arrived, scare them off and prevent our discovery by shooting in the air with the
pistol I had.
Andreys role involved:
- Approaching the gates of the draft board checkpoint without being detected;
- Throwing the grenades into the draft boards yard
After approaching the draft board, around 2 in the morning a taxi driver was parked there, so we waited for him
to leave. The taxi driver left around 3 in the morning; I hid in the bushes by the entrance with the pistol and Andrey ran
up to the gate, tossed one grenade and then immediately the other. Andrey and I were running from the draft board
building when we heard two explosions. After that, we got in my vehicle and drove to the dead-end bridge over the Lopan
River, where I let Andrey out and he walked to retrieve his motorcycle. While Andrey was riding with me, I gave him the
pistol. I went back to the ring road, but I got lost in the private sector and I had to make my way out along Dolgolevsky
Street near Lysaya Gora. In that area, near the ATB store, we met up and then parted ways. According to Andrey, he
needed to go to work in Belgorod the next morning (he traveled to that town on the commuter train: first to Kazachya
Lopan and then to Belgorod).
The next morning, near the McDonalds at Yuzhny Train Station in Kharkov, I met with Andrey, Oleg Vasilyevich,
two tall guys (I dont remember their names; I know they were construction workers the others called them avatars
because they were tall) and some other construction workers I didnt know. At the meeting, Andrey and Oleg Vasilyevich
[initials]
[signature]
3
told me that everything went fine and that no one was hurt. After talking, Oleg Vasilyevich and I went to the Strelechye
border crossing, where he crossed over to Russia again. That evening, I picked him up and drove him to Kharkov.
On the second day after the grenade explosions at the Oblast draft board, the journalist Perminov made a video
about the above-mentioned organization. I also took part in the filming of the video.
After that, I kept in communication with Oleg Vasilyevich, driving him to the Strelechye border crossing and driving
him around Kharkov.
On August 2, 2014, Ruslan (Leshy) called me and said that he needed to meet with me. At the meeting, Ruslan
said that he needed a taxi driver to take him and another man named Sergey (his son was named Valera) to the armed
tank factory on Kotlov Street to shoot at the factory. Since I couldnt take them, I asked my friend Valery Marenich to drive
some people in the evening and didnt tell him about the purpose of the trip. Valery Marenich agreed. That same evening,
V. Marenich came by my place in his VAZ 21099, after which we went to the house of Ruslan (Leshy). I told Valera not to
get out of the car and I opened the trunk. After that, Leshy and Sergey came out with big plaid bags that they loaded into
the trunk. After that, we drove toward Kotlov Street; I got out by the Lokomotiv Palace of Sports and drove with Gosha to
see the conditions in town. I didnt promise Marenich compensation of any kind.
Two weeks after filming the video, Vadim Monastyryev told me that it was getting dangerous to be in Kharkov
and that I should go to Belgorod, where I would be given a place to live and work. I was supposed to get a place to live
and work through Oleg Vasilyevich, who had a construction business in Belgorod. On the same day, I packed and went to
Belgorod, where I was met by Sergey (a construction worker from the firm, I worked with him on a project in the summer
of 2012), who set me up in a trailer at a site where some apartments were being built near Belgorod. At the site, I met a
man named
Alexander, nickname Doctor or Doc (around 185 cm tall, skinny, dark hair, age 34-38, call number 4, telephone
number 067-941-26-62),
Viktor, nickname Bullet last name Larionov (call number 2),
Yaroslav (I dont know his last name; he lives in Poltava Oblast, age 22-24, strong build, short, dark hair, call
number 8), who all at first just worked at the construction site. Later, our construction group was joined by
Vyacheslav Vadimovich Monastyryev (nickname Kong, call number 7), the son of Vadim Monastyryev.
For about a week we worked on the construction job, and then Vadim Monastyryev arrived and told us (the people
I listed) to prepare to meet with Igor (or Sergey), who would prepare us for military work. A few days later, Vadim
Monastyryev called his son and told us to go to the Rusich café, located near Belgorod. At the café, we were met by a man
who introduced himself as either Igor or Sergey (around 45 years old, short, gray hair, skinny, wears glasses); as far as I
could tell, he was an employee of the Russian FSB. During our talk, Igor (Sergey) warned us that no one should know of
the conversation; it will be a dream. After that, Igor (Sergey) went into the next room; we went in one at a time and he
talked to each of us while writing something in a notebook. Igor (Sergey) asked me for my last name, first name,
patronymic, place of birth, place of registration, place of residence, marital status, army service (branch of service, special
training), place of work, how I got involved with the group that was there, whether or not I did any sports, and he asked
about my political views. After the talk, we went back to the construction site, where we worked for about a week. During
our work, Vadim Monastyryev told us to go running in the mornings, so we did.
After that, Vadim Monastyryev called and told us to go to a certain part of Belgorod, where Igor (Sergey) met us
and put is in a green tented Ural; the license plate was covered with a rag. We rode around 4-5 hours toward Voronezh
or Kursk. After that, we arrived at a sand quarry where the training camp was. The camp consisted of three military tents,
a shower, a toilet, a guard post, and a firing ground. There were instructors (7-9 people) who wore camouflage uniforms
without insignia and called each other by their first names, which were always changing. At the training camp
[initials]
[signature]
4
we were taught demolition techniques, how to shoot with the PM, AKS 5.45 mm, Dragunov sniper rifle, and under-barrel
grenade launcher; they showed us an RPG and taught us how to fire it. The training lasted 5 days; we were given no specific
goal, and no group leader was chosen. During the training, they told us that they were teaching us so we could survive.
Other than myself, there were 5 people that were trained at the camp in the group with me:
Sasha (nickname Doc, call number 4), Viktor Larin (nickname Bullet, call number 2), Andrey (nickname Gosha,
Biker, call number 3), me (nickname Sayid, call number 5), Slava Monastyryev (nickname Kong, call number 7), Yarik
(nickname Beekeeper, call number 8). After the training, we were taken to Yesenin Street in Belgorod (10-minute walk
from the CityMall retail center) and put in an apartment on the 9th floor, where we stayed for about two weeks. That
whole time, we were given money by Oleg Vasilyevich or Vadim Monastyryev; they said that any day now we would be
going home to Kharkov and hinted that we should keep an eye on the railroad tracks with the goal of blowing them up.
Anton, nickname Ninja (age 20-22, lives in Kharkov at 48-a Ludwig Svoboda Street, first entrance after the arch,
10th floor, I dont remember the apartment number; its the building across from the post office; he was in emergency
hospital number 4 in October 2014 with a broken nose) was also brought to stay at the apartment. As far as I could tell,
he was a member of a different sabotage group. In Kharkov, Ninja engaged in hooliganism.
Two or three weeks after our arrival at the apartment, we began to depart for Kharkov one-by-one. Viktor Bullet
left first, and then the rest; I was among the last to leave, with Ninja and Vyacheslav Monastyryev. We returned to Kharkov
by taking a taxi to the border, and then we ordered another taxi from the border to Kharkov.
When we arrived in Kharkov, the three of us set up in the apartment of Anton Ninja. We spent two or three
nights there. After that, I went home. Before I went home, Ninja told me where the grenades were: near the bridge by
the summer cottages on Akhsarov Street. There was a total of two RGD-5 grenades. The grenades were hidden in a small
hole covered with a rock. The grenades were in a bag.
During the two days that I was with Ninja, I followed the instructions Oleg Vasilyevich gave me before I left to take
a look at 32a Danilevsky Street, where there was a humanitarian aid distribution point, with the goal of blowing it up; I
was also instructed to kill Bystrichenko. I was supposed to kill him whatever way was convenient. After a while, I told
[them] I wouldnt kill Bystrichenko because it wasnt possible, since he wasnt at his residence and I didnt know where he
was.
The next day, during a meeting with Gosha, Vitya Bullet, Doc and maybe Vyacheslav Monastyryev, we talked
about throwing grenades at the draft board in the city of Lozovaya, Kharkov Oblast. Why was Lozovaya chosen as the
siteI assume that Viktor Bullet chose the site because he lived in Lozovaya. For that reason, Viktor Bullet and I were
trusted with carrying out the assignment. In the evening, I retrieved the 2 grenades from the hiding spot by the bridge,
and then Gosha came on his motorcycle to meet me. We took the grenades to Doctor at his house (a single-family house
near October Revolution Street in Kharkov). In the morning, Viktor Bullet took three grenades from Doc (the two we
had brought and another one that had been brought by Vyacheslav Monastyryev) and we took the commuter train from
the Novoselovka platform and went to Lozovaya.
In Lozovaya, we were at the apartment of Viktor Bullets wife, where we left the grenades and went into the
city to inspect the area around the draft board. We moved around by shuttle bus. In the city, we met with Viktor Bullets
friend and decided that this friend would pick us up in the evening from home and take us to the draft board, and he
agreed to do it. I dont know Viktors friends name because he never told me (he was 30-35 years old, village accent,
medium height. I would recognize him if I saw him.). When we met him, Viktor told him about our assignment to blow up
the draft board in Lozovaya.
Then we went back to Viktors wifes apartment. That evening, around 11:00 p.m. midnight, Viktors friend came
and we drove toward the draft board. The car and driver remained behind the church building, and Viktor and I made our
way toward the draft board. After that, Viktor took two grenades, walked up to the gate of the draft board and tossed the
explosive devices over the gate. At that time, I took video of what was happening on my phone (as I had been instructed
by Vadim Monastyryev), but the video didnt show anything, all you could hear were the explosions.
[initials]
[signature]
5
After the explosions, we ran away from the draft board building. When we got in the car, it was obvious that the driver
was in shock and panicking. Viktors friend drove us to a village near Sakhnovshchina township as he was instructed by
Viktor. In the village, we spent the night with Viktors acquaintances and the next day I went back to Kharkov and Viktor
stayed in Lozovaya.
On September 26-27, 2014, when Slava Monastyryev was repairing Oleg Vasilyevichs car, he asked me to go with
him to the Pisaryevka border crossing (Sumy Oblast) to take the car there. At that time, we took the Toyota Corolla,
Kharkov license plate, to the Pisaryevka border crossing, where Konstantin met us near the border (I had seen him before
in Belgorod when I worked at the construction site). He took the car and drove it across the border. After that, we crossed
the border into the RF, where we were settled in the nearest village; Vadim Monastyryev said that my task was to scout
out a path for people to cross the border illegally. After spending two days there, I told Vadim Monastyryev that it was
impossible. From that village, I went to Belgorod, where I met with Sergey Mikheyenko (nickname Boss, Bald). After that,
from Belgorod Sergey and I took a taxi to Kharkov. After that, Sergey and I spent several days driving along the border of
Ukraine and Kharkov Oblast. After that, I used email account [email protected], password hrenvam14vam12345
to send a message to Oleg Vasilyevich and to Monastyryev in which I wrote I believe it is impossible to cross the border
because the border is reinforced.
After that, a few days later, two or three days later, on October 13 or 14, Sergey Bald introduced me to a guy who
introduced himself as Kostya. When we met, he said that we didnt need to know anything else about him. Our
introduction took place near the Kharkov Tractor Factory on a street between some private homes. At that meeting,
Kostya was with a man who went by Granddad; he was short, not yet 50, skinny, gray hair, and he drove a blue Geely. Doc
was also at the meeting, and Sergey also introduced him to Granddad. Kostya said that they had brought explosives to
Kharkov for new actions. Contact with Kostya was via a cell phone that I had saved in my phone under the letter A
0983579710, and we also used the email account above to communicate.
After that, around October 16-17, 2014, Kostya called me and said that we needed to meet. We met near the
Studencheskaya metro station in Kharkov. Both of us took the metro to get there. During the meeting, Kostya said that
the RF side was starting to pressure him and that we werent doing anything. Then he said that he had information that
warmongers were getting together and staying at one of the hotel complexes outside town. The complex was between
the villages of Solonitsevka and Peresechnoye. That day, we took public transportation to Zalyutino, where we got on a
regular bus headed to Olshany. We got out near Solonitsevka, and I stayed behind to wait for Kostya near the Kolunichi
store in the middle of the village, while Kostya headed to the hotel complex. When he returned about an hour later, he
said that there was nothing to do there; the roads [to the complex] were guarded and well-lit. On the same day, we
returned to Kharkov by the same means [of transportation]. We parted near Sovietskaya Street and agreed to talk by
phone at around 10-11 the next day. According to Kostya, he was supposed to go to the area near hospital no. 22, where
he lived. As far as I know, Bald Boss knows where Kostya lives because he put him there. I dont know exactly where. When
Kostya and I spoke by phone the next day, he told me that there was good news: that evening there would be money and
I needed to meet him near hospital no. 22 in Kharkov at 11:00 a.m. on October 21, 2014.
At the time specified, we met near hospital no. 22. I took public transportation. During our conversation, he gave
me 400 hryvnia, which he said was for my daily expenses. He also said that the next site that needed a bang was the
Pyrotex factory and the Pyrotechnics store next to it. He didnt tell me what kind of bang he hand in mind, but I understood
that he meant blowing up the site. After that, Kostya and I went to an area near 23 August Street in Kharkov, and after
that we inspected the area. For the same purpose, we rode the chair lift near Gorky Park. The idea to inspect
[initials]
[signature]
6
the area from the chair lift belonged to me. From the chair lift, we saw the location of the factory and the pyrotechnics
store. Kostya and I parted at the exit from Gorky Park. According to Kostya, I was supposed to go to the village of
Zhukovskoye, where I got on shuttle bus [illegible] and traveled to Barabashovo, after which I transferred to the 24 trolley
and traveled to the 602 neighborhood, where I got on a bus and went to Shestakovo.
On October 22, 2014, Alexander Bondarenko, nickname Doc, and I met with Kostya near clinic no. 22 at around
11:00 a.m. After that, the three of us took public transportation and went back to Gorky Park in Kharkov and did a visual
inspection. I dont know the exact spot Kostya chose. After that, we parted and agreed that about 8:00 p.m. that same
day I would call Kostya and he would tell me what to do. Doc and I went to Shestakovo to Balds summer cottage. At 8:00
p.m. on that same day, I called Kostya from my cell phone; he told me that everything was fine and that Doc and I should
go to the Zvezda monument on Kharkov Division Street that day. A man named Mikhail would be waiting there for us in a
blue Cherry Amulet. At the time specified, we arrived at the location and met Mikhail there. When we met, I told Mikhail
that we needed to go to Gorky Park, but that we needed to go pick up Kostya first from near hospital no. 22. Mikhail said
that we didnt have enough gas and would need to fill up. When we pulled into the gas station, our car was stopped and
blocked by another car. Afterwards, I learned that we had been stopped by officers of the USBU in Kharkov Oblast and
were unable to complete our intentions.
Question: Explain who participated in the two explosions at the Lozovaya draft board in Kharkov Oblast. Who organized
the operation, and who played what roles in the operation?
Response: Viktor and I participated in the explosion at the Lozovaya draft board; as far as I know, his last name is Larionov.
(Nickname Bullet, call number 2.) It was just the two of us. In addition, we were driven to the location of the explosion
and driven away from it after the explosion by Viktors friend whom I dont know anything about. The decision to blow up
that specific location was made by Viktor and me; we did not receive any instructions or assignment. The goal of the
operation was to frighten and stop the draft process in Lozovaya district and to show our leadersOleg Vasilyevich
Sobchenko and Vadim Viktorovich Monastyryevthat we were capable of carrying out tasks of that sort. To confirm our
participation, I filed the moment that Viktor threw the two grenades on my cell phone, after which I gave it to Vyacheslav
Monastyryev (nickname Kong) on a flash drive.
Question: Who participated in blowing up the power line supports on September 7, 2014 at Kharkov, 34 Bezlyudovskaya
Street? Who organized that operation, and who played what roles in that terrorist attack?
Response: According to Vadim (nickname Bald) and Oleg (I called him Uncle Oleg or Vasilyevich), when I was in Belgorod,
RF, I heard that the explosion under the power line supports was the work of a group directed by a man who went by Tol;
Anton (nickname Ninja) and a girl named Nastya nickname underage were also in that group. I dont have any other
information about that.
Question: Do you know who carried out the attack and shot the MRO-A at the law firm office at: Kharkov, 3 Lebedinskaya
Street? Who organized the operation, and who played what roles in that terrorist attack?
Response: I dont know anything about the explosion at the law firm office located at: Kharkov, 3 Lebedinskaya Street. I
didnt have anything to do with that.
Question: Do you know who used an MRO-A to attack the tanker car that was part of a train traveling from Zmiyev to
Zanki? Who organized the operation, and who played what roles in that terrorist attack?
Response: About the explosion and firing on the tanker car that was part of a train traveling from Zmiyev to Zanki, I can
state that it was the work of Leshys group (Ruslan Panchuk). I dont know how they traveled to the location of the
[initials]
[signature]
7
terrorist attack; I do know that it was Ruslan Panchuk (Leshy) who fired, as well as a father and sonSergey Shekhovtsov
(father) and Valery Shekhovtsov (son). Leshy told me about it when we met after the event. He did not tell me who
organized the operation.
Question: Do you know who carried out the attack at Kharkov Tank Factory using an MRO-A?
Response: About the attack at Kharkov Tank Factory, I can state that the attack was carried out by Leshys group (Ruslan
Panchuk) and that the father, Sergey Shekhovtsov, participated in it. I put them in the car near Leshys house and my
friend drove them to the area near the armored tank factory in circumstances that I described above.
Question: Do you know who carried out the attack on July 28, 2014, on the central branch of Privatbank PJSC (Kharkov, 2-
A Malomyasnitskaya Street) using an MRO-A?
Response: I dont know anything about the attack on July 28, 2014, on the central branch of Privatbank PJSC using an
MRO-A.
Question: Do you know who carried out the attack on August 15, 2014, on petroleum product storage tanks that belong
to Galnaftogaz (Kharkov, 36 Dragomanovskaya Street) using an MRO-A and RPG-26?
Response: I dont know anything about the attack on August 15, 2014 on petroleum product storage tanks that belong to
Galnaftogaz (Kharkov, 36 Dragomanovskaya Street).
Question: Do you know who carried out the attack on September 8, 2014, on the administrative building that houses the
Ordzhonikidze and Frunze district draft boards in Kharkov (Kharkov, 7 Sokolov Street) using an MRO-A?
Response: I dont know who carried out the attack on September 8, 2014, on the administrative building that houses the
Ordzhonikidze and Frunze district draft boards in Kharkov using an MRO-A.
Question: Do you know who detonated an explosive device on the rail line between Vodyanoye and Kolomak.
Response: I dont know who attacked the rail line between Vodyanoye and Kolomak.
Question: Do you know who attacked the draft board located on Kotlov Street in Kharkov using a grenade in July 2014?
Response: Andrey Tishchenko (nickname Biker) and I attacked the draft board. Andrey threw the grenades into the draft
boards yard and I covered him nearby.
This protocol was read to me. My words were recorded accurately. [illegible] I fully confess my guilt in the unlawful actions
in which I took part, which I have described above. I sincerely repent for what I have done. I have no other statements to
make. Baranenko A. V. [signature]
[illegible handwriting] [signature] V. M. Rayevska
questioned the protocol [illegible handwriting]
[illegible handwriting] VOVS SV USBU Ukraine [signature] V. S. Kaniya
Annex 192
Signed Declaration of Oleg Serachov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (5 November
2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
RECORD
OF AN INVESTIGATIVE EXPERIMENT
City of Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast November 5, 2014
Commenced at 4:10 a.m.
Ended at 7:55 p.m.
Captain of Justice Vitaliy Viacheslavovych Romanenko, Senior Investigator with the
Investigative Department of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine,
having reviewed the files of criminal case No.22013050000000299 in which O.S. Serachov is
suspected of having committed a crime falling under Part 1 of Article 263 of the Criminal Code
of Ukraine and a crime falling under Part 1 of Article 111 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine,
conducted an investigative experiment in keeping with Articles 104, 223, and 240 of the
Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine in the city of Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, under mixed
natural and artificial lighting, in order to verify and update information about the locations
where O.S. Serachov acquired and stored firearms and ammunition, as well as other
information relevant to ascertaining the objective truth in these criminal proceedings,
with the participation of the suspect: Oleh Serhiyovych Serachov, d.o.b. October 5, 1971,
who is being held in custody at the pretrial detention facility of Mariupol, who had his rights
and obligations explained to him under Parts 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Article 42 of the Criminal
Procedure Code of Ukraine as well as provisions of Article 63 of the Constitution of Ukraine,
[Signature]
(Signature)
in the presence of attorney Hennadiy Anatoliyovych Kutsobin, the defense attorney of the
suspect O.S. Serachov,
[Signature]
(Signature)
in the presence of attesting witnesses:
1. Volodymyr Mykhaylovych Zaytsev, d.o.b. August 20, 1995, residing at 16 Novorosiyska
Street, apartment 56, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast,
2. Vladyslav Oleksandrovych Baranchenko, d.o.b. February 20, 1995, residing at 6 Kvartal
Azovya, apartment 45, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast,
who had their rights and obligations explained to them under Articles 11, 13, 15, and 223 of
the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.
[Signature] [Signature]
(Signature)
The participants of the investigative experiment were warned in advance about the use of
recording equipment an Olympus digital camera with an SD 4G card and informed about
the conditions and procedure of its use.
[Signature] [Signature] [Signature]
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
Their obligation not to disclose information about the procedural activity was also explained
to them under Part 3, Article 66 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.
[Signature] [Signature] [Signature]
Findings of the investigative experiment:
This investigative activity began at the Mariupol Headquarters of the Donetsk Oblast
Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine at 77 Heorhiyivska Street, Mariupol, Donetsk
Oblast.
O.S. Serachov was offered a chance to name the location where he acquired firearms and
ammunition that were discovered on September 1, 2014 during a search of the domicile
located at 68 Kyivska Street, apartment 94, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast. O.S. Serachov agreed
and suggested that all participants of the investigative activity proceed to the apartment
located at 68 Kyivska Street, apartment 94, Ordzhonikidze District, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast,
which they did. Upon arriving at said address, O.S. Serachov testified that it was in this
apartment No. 94 at Kyivska Street of Mariupol (on the 6th floor) that he personally concealed
a firearm a Makarov pistol and 16 cartridges for it, unbeknownst to the residents of this
domicile the daughter of his common-law wife Yuliya Ihorivna Uralska and the latters
common-law husband Valeriy Valentynovych Liventsov and stored it there from early
September 2014 (he does not recall the exact date). O.S. Serachov obtained this pistol and
ammo for it on July 21, 2014 under the following circumstances. On July 21, 2014, while
working as a driver of a DAF truck (he does not recall the number plate), O.S. Serachov gave
a lift to an unknown man from Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast, to Kostiantynivka, Donetsk
Oblast, where representatives of the Peoples Donetsk Republic manning a roadblock (at the
entrance to Kostiantynivka) ordered this man to exit the vehicle and held him at this roadblock
to run some sort of verification. Upon arriving in Mariupol on his own on July 21, 2014, O.S.
Serachov found a firearm the Makarov pistol and 16 9-mm cartridges for it under the
passenger seat of said DAF truck. In his opinion, the above-mentioned hitchhiker left it under
the seat. O.S. Serachov kept this pistol and ammo. That same day he hid them in his garage
at Zhovtneva Street, Illichivsk District, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, since had no permit to carry
this weapon and ammo, where he stored them until early August 2014. In early August 2014
(O.S. Serachov does not recall the exact date), O.S. Serachov took this Makarov pistol and
16 cartridges for it to the apartment of the daughter of his common-law wife Yu.I. Uralska
and her common-law husband V.V. Liventsov and concealed them on the balcony of this
apartment. O.S. Serachov did so without informing Yu.I. Uralska or V.V. Liventsov or any
other individuals. Yu.I. Uralska previously granted O.S. Serachov unobstructed access to her
domicile. Officers of the Security Service of Ukraine discovered and seized this firearm and
ammo from O.S. Serachov during a search of this apartment on September 1, 2014.
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
O.S. Serachov then suggested they proceed to the site of his first meeting with Vadym
Vasyliovych Beloborod, specifically to the tank monument in the Illichivsk District of Mariupol,
which they did. Upon arrival at this site, it was established that this monument was located
at a crossroads of Karpinsky Street and Pokryshkin Street in the Illichivsk District of Mariupol.
According to O.S. Serachov, it was at this site that he first met V.V. Beloborod on March 7,
2014 during a meeting of volunteers of Mariupol, who expressed a desire to oppose the
individuals who, in their opinion, seized power in Ukraine in February 2014 following the so-
called Euromaidan revolution. V.V. Beloborod was elected to lead the group of such volunteers
in the Ordzhonikidze District of Mariupol. O.S. Serachov voluntarily joined this group, about
which he testified while being questioned as a suspect.
O.S. Serachov then suggested they proceed to a bus stop in the vicinity of the Drama Theater
of Mariupol, where on May 1, 2014 he and V.V. Beloborod boarded a bus on its way to the
Ordzhonikidze District of Mariupol, which they did. On arriving at this site, it was established
that it was the Drama Theater bus stop in Lenin Avenue of the Zhovtveny District of Mariupol
opposite the Order of Honor Donetsk Academic Russian Drama Theater of Mariupol between
Universytetska Street and Artema Street. O.S. Serachov stated that it was at this bus stop
that he and V.V. Beloborod boarded a bus on its way to their home district the Ordzhonikidze
District of Mariupol, after providing security for a rally devoted to Labor Day on May 1, 2014.
During the bus ride, V.V. Beloborod told O.S. Serachov that he and Oleh Anatoliyovych
Nedavniy had traveled to the Russian Federation where they established contact with the
Russian special services and had since been receiving missions from them and completing
them. V.V. Beloborod also told O.S. Serachov on this bus ride that representatives of the
Russian special forces opposed attempts by O.A. Nedavniy to forcibly capture state
administrative buildings in Mariupol.
O.S. Serachov then suggested they proceed to the tuberculosis early treatment and
prevention center of Mariupol, which they did. On arriving at this location, O.S. Serachov
showed a parking lot opposite Unit No. 1 of the Mariupol tuberculosis early treatment and
prevention center at 2 Pashkovskoho Street, Mariupol, and testified that it was at this location
that at around 5:00 p.m. on May 11, 2014 he, acting on orders from V.V. Beloborod, met
with Vladyslav Viktorovych Kilyanov and Ivan Fedorovych Stambulzhy in the matter of helping
provide security for the polling station of the Ordzhonikidze District of Mariupol during a
referendum conducted exclusively within Donetsk Oblast by representatives of the Donetsk
Peoples Republic to determine the future status of Donetsk Oblast whether it should remain
a part of Ukraine or become a separate state through public support of the act of national
independence of the Donetsk Peoples Republic.
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
To provide security, O.S. Serachov brought a less-than-lethal pistol, I.F. Stambulzhy brought
a pistol (O.S. Serachov does not recall the model and type) and a rifle (O.S. Serachov does
not recall the model and type). However, upon arriving at the specified location and after
meeting with the leadership of the polling station and receiving an assignment from them to
provide security for voting ballots during their transportation to Donetsk, V.V. Beloborod
ordered O.S. Serachov and others to go home after receiving information that the Ukrainian
Armed Forces planned to forcibly disband the referendum participants, which they did.
O.S. Serachov then suggested they proceed to the Mukhina bus stop in the Illichivsk District
of Mariupol, which they did. Upon arrival at this site, it was established that this bus stop is
located in the immediate vicinity of the crossroads of Zaozerna Street and Kalinovskoho
Street, Illichivsk District, Mariupol (located on the right relative to the flow of traffic through
Zaozerna Street from Illicha Avenue to the crossroads with Kalinovskoho Street). According
to O.S. Serachovs testimony, it was at this bus stop that he met with Sashko Akademik
and Sashko Pikhota at 6:00 p.m. on May 12, 2014 in order to travel to Donetsk to receive
firearms on instructions from V.V. Beloborod. According to O.S. Serachovs testimony, their
group received weapons and ammunition in Donetsk two AK-74 Kalashnikov assault rifles
with two magazines filled with cartridges and two additional magazines with cartridges for
them. On orders from V.V. Beloborod, on the way back O.S. Serachov acted as a guide,
choosing a path free from roadblocks of Ukrainian army units to prevent the detection of
weapons transported by this group. As a result, O.S. Serachov along with Sashko Pikhota
and Sashko Akademik, traveling in a VAZ-2111 car along the route chosen by O.S. Serachov
(Donetsk Notovtroitske Olhinka Volnovakha Mariupol) transported the above-
mentioned weapons to Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, and concealed them in the garage of Sasha
Pikhota.
O.S. Serachov then suggested they proceed to a parking lot next to the residential building
of V.V. Kilyanov, which they did. Upon arrival at this location, it was established that this
parking lot was located opposite the Irynka store in front of a block of flats at 75 Olimpiyska
Street, Mariupol. O.S. Serachov testified that it was at this location that he met with V.V.
Kilyanov on or around May 19, 2014 in order to travel to Donetsk on orders from V.V.
Beloborod to receive a cache of firearms. On orders from V.V. Beloborod, a group consisting
of O.S. Serachov, V.V. Kilyanov and other members Oleksiy Rozvidka, Bulldozer,
Zamat and V.V. Beloborod personally, went to the Vostok Battalion of the Donetsk Peoples
Republic to receive weapons. However, representatives of the battalion actually handed over
the weapons and ammo to O.A. Nedavniy.
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
Due to this fact, on the way back from Donetsk to Mariupol V.V. Beloborod spoke critically
about O.A. Nedavniy, insisted on breaking off contact with the latter, and said that V.V.
Beloborod no longer needed O.A. Nedavniy because V.V. Beloborod himself had an established
communication channel with representatives of the Russian special forces and that he no
longer needed to maintain contact with them through O.A. Nedavniy.
During each trip to Donetsk, O.S. Serachov (together with V.V. Kilyanov) visited (on O.S.
Serachovs initiative) a Donetsk Peoples Republic member who went by the code name of
Uzbek, whom O.S. Serachov asked to provide a magazine for the above-mentioned Makarov
pistol. However, after Uzbek agreed to provide the magazine on condition that O.S.
Serachov would give false testimony in criminal proceedings against Uzbek, which would
effectively provide an alibi for the latter, O.S. Serachov refused to broke off contact with
Uzbek.
In addition, O.S. Serachov stated that it was at this location (the parking lot opposite the
Irynka store) that he met with V.V. Kilyanov roughly in late May 2014 (he does not recall the
exact date) in order to perform a request from his Donetsk Peoples Republic associate Serhiy
Ivanovych Stambulzhy to transport one zinc container of ammo (a total of 1,280 5.45-mm
cartridges) to Donetsk from Mariupol from another Donetsk Peoples Republic member
Mykhaylo Oleksiyovych Zakharchenko. O.S. Serachov informed V.V. Kilyanov about this
request, who agreed to assist O.S. Serachov with transporting the above-mentioned ammo.
O.S. Serachov collected the zinc container with 1,280 5.45-mm cartridges (and additionally
some mobile phone) from the Donetsk Peoples Republic member who went by the code name
Zakhar outside the Meotida Greek Cultural Center in Mariupol, then distributed these
cartridges into packets with V.V. Kilyanov, concealed them in a VAZ-2101 car, and transported
them to Donetsk. On instructions from I.F. Stambulzhy, O.S. Serachov and V.V. Kilyanov
handed over these 1,280 cartridges and the above-mentioned mobile phone to other
representatives of the Donetsk Peoples Republic on the premises of the building of the
Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in Shchorsa Street, Donetsk.
As part of the investigative experiment, O.S. Serachov then suggested they proceed to the
Meotida Greek Cultural Center, which they did. Upon arrival at this location, it was established
that it was the Meotida Greek Cultural Center located at 127 Budivelnykiv Street, Mariupol.
O.S. Serachov testified that it was near this center that he received the above-mentioned zinc
container with 1,280 5.45-mm cartridges from the Donetsk Peoples Republic representative
who went by the code name Zakhar in order to transport them to Donetsk and hand them
over to other Donetsk Peoples Republic representatives.
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
O.S. Serachov then suggested they proceed to the domicile of a member of their group who
went by the code name Bulldozer in Lenina Avenue, Mariupol, which they did. Upon arrival
at this location, it was established that the domicile is located in the fourth (out of four)
sections in a block of flats at 111 Lenina Avenue, Mariupol. O.S. Serachov testified that it was
at this location that he and V.V. Kilyanov, acting on instructions from V.V. Beloborod, received
the above-mentioned firearms from another member of their group Bulldozer in late
May 2014 (he does not recall the exact date), which was transported on May 12-13, 2014
from Donetsk and packed in two bags; specifically: two Kalashnikov assault rifles, two
magazines for them filled with 5.45-mm cartridges, 3 packets containing 30 5.45-mm
cartridges each, a grenade with the detonator removed, a gas grenade, 2 engineers shovels,
and a coil of packaging film. O.S. Serachov and V.V. Kilyanov brought these items to O.S.
Serachovs garage in the village of Vynohradove, Novoazovsk District, Donetsk Oblast, at 32
Shevchenka Street, where they concealed them.
O.S. Serachov then suggested they proceed to Hretska Street in Mariupol, which they did.
Upon arrival at this location, specifically building No. 37 in Hretska Street of Mariupol, O.S.
Serachov testified that it was at this location that he, V.V. Kilyanov, V.V. Beloborod, and
Zamat gathered in late May 2014. At the time this place served as the headquarters of the
Mariupol cell of the terrorist organization Donetsk Peoples Republic, which was headed by a
man who went by the code name Chechen. They visited Chechen to find out why the
firearms intended for this group, which they went to collect in Donetsk, had been handed over
to O.A. Nedavniy under the above-mentioned circumstances. Chechen replied that he knew
nothing about the weapons of said group and suggested they join the Mariupol cell of the
Donetsk Peoples Republic headed by him, in which case they would receive firearms. V.V.
Kilyanov agreed to join the Mariupol cell of the Donetsk Peoples Republic and provided his
personal details. However, O.S. Serachov and other members of the group talked V.V.
Kilyanov out of joining this cell of the Donetsk Peoples Republic, which is why the latter
stopped short of joining this organization.
O.S. Serachov then suggested they proceed to the building of the construction college in the
Ordzhonikidze District of Mariupol, which they did. Upon arrival at this location, it was
established that the latter was a state institution of higher education called Mariupol
Construction College located at 90 Leninhradsky Prospect, Mariupol. O.S. Serachov testified
that it was at this location that he and V.V. Kilyanov and V.V. Beloborod met with Serhiy
Stambulzhy in late May 2014 (he does not recall the exact date). During this meeting, the
latter suggested that this group join him in attacking employees of a security company (he
did not say which company exactly) in Mariupol and seizing their firearms. The group agreed,
stating that they would not use firearms during this attack.
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
As part of this plan, that same day V.V. Kilyanov, V.V. Beloborod, and O.S. Serachov gathered
in the latters garage at 32 Shevchenka Street, vil. Vynohradove, Novoazovsk District,
Donetsk Oblast, to check the firearms stored by this group in this garage (the above-
mentioned two Kalashnikov assault rifles with ammo), and waited for a call from Stambulzhy,
who had to inform them about the location of the attack they were plotting. However,
Stambulzhy said that the attack would not happen.
O.S. Serachov then suggested they proceed to a parking lot next to the Zabiy Fitness Center
in the Ordzhonikidze District of Mariupol, which they did. Upon arrival at this location, it was
established that it was a parking lot next to the building of the Zabiy billiards club and the
Magneto fitness center at 48-a Kyivska Street in Mariupol. O.S. Serachov testified that he
met with V.V. Beloborod, V.V. Kilyanov, and Zamat at this location on May 28, 2014. During
this meeting, V.V. Beloborod said that the group he headed had an opportunity to complete
military training at a military camp in the Russian Federation. It was then that V.V. Beloborod
called I.F. Stambulzhy and Roma Khimik and shared the same information with them. It
was then that O.S. Serachov, V.V. Kilyanov, and Zamat agreed to complete military training
in the Russian Federation.
O.S. Serachov then suggested they proceed to a bus stop in Zhukov Avenue of Mariupol,
which they did. Upon arrival at this location, it was established that it was the M. Zhukova
bus stop at the intersection of Marshal Zhukov Avenue and May 9 Street in the Ordzhonikidze
District of Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast. S.O. Serachov testified that at this location he met with
V.V. Beloborod (who requested this meeting), V.V. Kilyanov, Zamat, and Roma Khimik on
May 30, 2014. During this meeting V.V. Beloborod said once again that there was an
opportunity to travel to Rostov-on-Don in the Russian Federation, where Russian military
personnel will train members of their group in handling weapons and combat tactics.
According to V.V. Beloborod, the trip would take 10 days and would be paid for by Russian
representatives. V.V. Beloborod said that those wishing to take this trip had to provide their
personal details for purposes of compiling a list which he would send to the Russian special
services in an encrypted form. Representatives of the Federal Security Service of Russia would
verify our data and either allow or not allow us to go to them to receive military training. It
was then and there that V.V. Beloborod, O.S. Serachov, V.V. Kilyanov, and Roma Khimik
agreed to go to the Russian Federation to receive military training, wrote down their personal
details in a list that V.V. Beloborod had to send to the Russian special services in encrypted
electronic form, while destroying the paper list. I.F. Stambulzhy called to say he would not
be going to Russia.
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
O.S. Serachov then suggested they proceed to a bus stop in Olimpiyska Street of the Skhidny
Residential Community, which they did. Upon arrival at this location, it was established that
the latter was the Provulok Liutnevy bus stop at the intersection of Olimpiyska Street and
Liutnevy Provulok in the Ordzhonikidze District of Mariupol. O.S. Serachov testified that he
met with V.V. Beloborod, V.V. Kilyanov, and Zamat, and Roma Khimik at this location on
June 1, 2014. During this meeting, Zamat confirm that he did not wish to go to the Russian
Federation for military training. S.O. Serachov made it known that I.F. Stambulzhy did not
wish to go to Russia either, to which V.V. Beloborod responded that he had already sent the
lists to the Russian special services and said that a group of 10 people was needed as
demanded by the Russian special services. Meanwhile, members of their group were deciding
not to go one by one.
O.S. Serachov then suggested they proceed to the bus station of Mariupol, which they did.
Upon arrival at this location, it was established that the latter was the bus station of Mariupol,
Donetsk Oblast, located at 115 Artema Street, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast. O.S. Serachov
testified that on or around June 1, 2014 V.V. Beloborod bought tickets at this bus station for
a bus from Mariupol to Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation, for the above-mentioned
members of their group who agreed to go to the Russian Federation for military training. Also,
V.V. Beloborod issued 1,000 Russian rubles to each member of this group, O.S. Serachov
included, to avoid arousing suspicion during border control at the state border between
Ukraine and Russia on account of having no funds.
Also, it was from this location the bus station of Mariupol that O.S. Serachov and V.V.
Kilyanov left in one bus and V.V. Beloborod and Roma Khimik in another bus on June 2,
2014 for military training provided by instructors of the Russian special services in Rostov-
on-Don (Russia). Oleksiy Rozvidka went to Rostov-on-Don separately from this group and
crossed the state border between Ukraine and Russia on foot.
O.S. Serachov was then offered a chance to show the place where they arrived after leaving
Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, on June 2, 2014. O.S. Serachov used the Google Maps electronic
global map (by accessing it on an Asus X551M laptop connected to the Internet via the Opera
web browser opened to the website https://www.google.com.ua/maps) to point to Rostov-
on-Don in the Russian Federation. O.S. Serachov testified that he and V.V. Kilyanov arrived
in this city on June 2, 2014 from Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, in a bus and exited the bus at the
bus station of Rostov-on-Don. V.V. Beloborod and Roma Khimik arrived at this bus stations
at the same time.
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
O.S. Serachov and V.V. Kilyanov met with V.V. Beloborod and Roma Khimik near the railway
station of Rostov-on-Don. O.S. Serachov pointed to his location on Google Maps, specifically
7 Pryvokzalna Ploshcha, Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation (with the coordinates 47.220887,
39.691298).
O.S. Serachov then used the Google Maps electronic map of the world in Street View Mode to
point to the Minplita resort (to which O.S. Serachov referred to as the Plita base during
questioning). O.S. Serachov testified that it was to this place that he and V.V. Kilyanov, V.V.
Beloborod, and Roma Khimik came on instructions from V.V. Beloborod on June 2, 2014
(who in turn received these orders by phone from a person unknown to O.S. Serachov) upon
arriving in Rostov-on-Don for subsequent military training provided by Russian special
services. According to Google Maps, this place is located at 61 Livoberezhna Street, Rostov-
on-Don, Russian Federation (with the coordinates 47.207160, 39.760056). At the same
location these people met with Oleksiy Rozvidka and two acquaintances of his named
Oleksandr and Maxim, as well as two men whom O.S. Serachov did not meet previously, who
introduced themselves as Botsman and Mayor.
According to O.S. Serachovs testimony, at this place the above-mentioned individuals sat for
individual interviews with representatives of the Russian special services on June 2, 2014.
One of the interviewees went by the code name Epifan. The interviews took place on the
second floor of a camping facility on the premises of the above-mentioned Minplita resort.
During the interview, these representatives of the Russian special services asked them about
their personal details (last name, first name, and patronymic, address of residence), military
specialty, place and time of military service, availability of a military record card, purpose of
arrival, to which O.S. Serachov replied that he wanted to master military skills in order to
defend the territory of Donetsk Oblast against people who usurped power in Ukraine in
February 2014. After the interviews, Epifan ordered O.S. Serachov, V.V. Kilyanov, V.V.
Beloborod, Roma Khimik, Oleksiy Rozvidka, Oleksandr, Maxim, Botsman, Mayor and
all others who arrived for military training to board a MAN bus that would take them directly
to a military camp for military training.
O.S. Serachov then used the Google Maps application to show an open tract of land in the
vicinity of the village of Kadamivsky, Zhovtnevy District, Rostov Oblast, Russian Federation,
with the coordinates 47.521759, 40.240317. O.S. Serachov testified that on June 2, 2014,
after V.V. Kilyanov, V.V. Beloborod, Roma Khimik, Oleksiy Rozvidka, Oleksandr, Maxim,
Botsman, Mayor and all others who arrived for military training, boarded the bus at the
Minplita resort, they were taken to a paratrooper military unit of the Russian Armed Forces
located approximately a 1.5 hours drive away from Rostov-on-Don (O.S. Serachov could not
recall the exact address) and then had them switch to a KamAZ military truck with black
number plates of the Russian Federation (consistent with the number plates of vehicles of
military units) with the region number 20. The sides of this truck were closed with curtains to
prevent other people from seeing who was being transported in this truck. In about 1 hour
we arrived at our destination the Kadamivsky Proving Grounds of the Russian Armed Forces.
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
According to O.S. Serachovs testimony, it was at this location that they were met by Roman
Yuriyovych Komissarov, an officer of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation,
who went by the code name Ramazan. He introduced himself as the commander of the
battalion where O.S. Serachov and other individuals mentioned above would receive their
military training. V.V. Beloborod had known Ramazan before. He said that Ramazan grew
up in Mariupol and his relatives lived in Zelinskoho Street. Ramazan appointed an officer of
the Central Investigative Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation named
Nikolai, who arrived from Moscow (Russia), as an instructor for the group consisting of O.S.
Serachov, V.V. Kilyanov, V.V. Beloborod, Roma Khimik, Oleksiy Rozvidka, Oleksandr,
Maxim, Botsman, and two natives of South Osetia. This group was assigned to a third tent
from left to right in the second (from left to right) row of tents at this military camp. According
to Google Maps, this tent had the coordinates 47.521297, 40.241411. In addition to the
above-mentioned group, this tent also housed mercenaries from different regions of Russia,
who received military training specifically in order to join combat operations on the Russian
side against Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in exchange for a fee of 100,000 Russian
rubles per month.
This camp followed the army routine. The evening roll call was conducted by the battalions
commander R.Yu. Komissarov who went by the code name Ramazan.
O.S. Serachov then used the Google Maps application to point to an open tract of land with
the coordinates 47.532298, 40.247179. O.S. Serachov stated that it is the precise location of
the military firing range where tactical army maneuvers were practiced. These proving
grounds had a watch tower and blast pens (engineering structures for flank fire in two
opposite directions). On instructions from R.Yu. Komissarov and under the direct supervision
of the officer of the Central Investigative Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian
Federation named Nikolai, O.S. Serachov, V.V. Kilyanov, and other members of their group
mentioned above in these proving grounds (to which they were transported in Russian
armored personnel carriers, among other vehicles) received firearms, ammo, and practiced
shooting in order to acquire shooting skills. In addition, back at the military camp Nikolai
taught O.S. Serachov, V.V. Kilyanov and other members of their groups how to move as part
of a sabotage group, engage in combat in exposed areas of terrain, in the woods, how to use
camouflage and repel attacks. He also showed how to rig trip wires.
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
O.S. Serachov testified that during his stay at this military camp V.V. Beloborod and Oleksiy
Rozvidka communicated (separately from the group members) with R.Yu. Komissarov. They
also made daily phone calls to a representative of the Federal Security Service of Russia who
went by the code name of Pasichnyk. According to them, he supervised sabotage activities
in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, on behalf of Russia.
O.S. Serachov testified that after several days of training at the military camp, R.Yu.
Komissarov informed O.S. Serachov, V.V. Kilyanov, V.V. Beloborod, Roma Khimik, Oleksiy
Rozvidka, Oleksandr, and Maxim that they would be shortly crossing the state border of
Russia into Ukraine together with other battalion members who practiced at the same camp,
specifically to the frontline to fight military units of Ukraine in order to join combat on the
side of the Russian Armed Forces against the Armed Forces of Ukraine participating in the
Anti-Terrorist Operation. However, members of this group were not morally prepared to
participate in actual combat, but instead trained to conduct subsequent sabotage operations
in Mariupol. In light of this, they informed R.Yu. Komissarov about their refusal. The latter,
accompanied by the battalion of mercenaries who received military training at this camp,
armed with firearms and ammo, went to Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts to participate in
combat against Ukraine, while O.S. Serachov, V.V. Kilyanov and other group members stayed
behind in this military camp until June 11, 2014, after which officers of the Russian special
services transported them from this camp to Rostov-on-Don, from where they left for
Mariupol.
While the above-mentioned pages of the Google Maps application were being viewed in the
Opera browser (https://www.google.com.ua/maps), the Print Screen command was used (by
pressing the Prt Sc key on the computer keyboard) to save the images in the file of a Microsoft
Word text editor and print them out on A4 paper sheets using a Canon MF3010 laser printer,
which were appended to this record of examination as Attachment No. 1.
Photographs were taken during the course of this investigative activity, which was brought to
the attention of all participants of the investigative activity and attesting witnesses before its
start. Once photos have been made, they will be appended to this record in the form of a
photo table. A schematic map is also appended to this record as an attachment.
All participants of the investigative activity were informed about the method of reviewing the
contents of the record, specifically by making the record available to be read in person.
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
All participants of the procedural activity familiarized themselves with the record by reading
it personally. They made no statements, complaints, or additions.
Participants:
3. [Signature] O.S. Serachov
Attesting witnesses:
1. [Signature] V.M. Zaytsev
2. [Signature] V.A. Baranchenko
Defense attorney [Signature] Kutsobin
Senior Investigator with the Investigative Department
of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Captain of Justice [Signature] V. Romanenko
ATTACHMENT TO THE RECORD OF INVESTIGATIVE EXPERIMENT
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
X68
X place where O.S. Serachov stored firearms and ammo
X place of the first meeting between V.V. Beloborod and O.S.
Serachov
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
X place where O.S. Serachov and V.V. Beloborod boarded the
bus for a ride during which the latter revealed his contacts with
the Russian special services
X place of the May 11, 2014 meeting between O.S. Serachov,
V.V. Kilyanov, and I.F. Stambulzhy
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
X place of the May 12, 2014 meeting between O.S. Serachov,
Sashko Akademik and Sashko Pikhota
X place of the May 19, 2014 meeting between O.S. Serachov and
V.V. Kilyanov
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
X place of the meeting between O.S. Serachov and M.O.
Zakharchenko
X domicile of a man who went by the code name Bulldozer
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
X place of the meeting between O.S. Serachov and the man who
went by the code name Chechen
X place of the meeting between O.S. Serachov, I.F. Stambulzhy,
V.V. Beloborod, and V.V. Kilyanov
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
X place of the meeting O.S. Serachov, V.V. Beloborod, and V.V.
Kilyanov
X place of the May 30, 2014 meeting between O.S. Serachov,
V.V. Beloborod, Zamat, and Roma Khimik
3. [Signature] O.S. Serachov
2. [Signature] V.O. Baranchenko
1. [Signature] V.M. Zaytsev
Defense attorney: [Signature]
Senior Investigator with the Investigative Department
of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Captain of Justice [Signature] V. Romanenko
X place of the June 1, 2014 meeting between O.S. Serachov,
V.V. Beloborod, Zamat, and Roma Khimik
Bus station of Mariupol, from which O.S. Serachov, V.V. Kilyanov,
V.V. Beloborod, and Roma Khimik left for Russia on June 2, 2014
ATTACHMENT TO THE RECORD OF INVESTIGATIVE EXPERIMENT
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
x bus station of Rostov-on-Don where O.S. Serachov, V.V.
Beloborod, Roma Khimik, and V.V. Kilyanov arrived on June 2,
2014
x location of the Minplita resort where O.S. Serachov, V.V.
Kilyanov, V.V. Beloborod and others sat for interviews with
representatives of the Russian special services on June 2, 2014
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
x Minplita resort where O.S. Serachov, V.V. Kilyanov, V.V.
Beloborod and others sat for interviews with representatives of the
Russian special services on June 2, 2014
x Minplita resort
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
X location of the military proving grounds where O.S. Serachov,
V.V. Kilyanov, and V.V. Beloborod received military training in June
2014 under the supervision of the Russian special services
X location of the military proving grounds
3. [Signature] 1. [Signature] 2. [Signature]
X location of the military camp where O.S. Serachov, V.V.
Kilyanov, and V.V. Beloborod and others received military training
X location of the military camp where O.S. Serachov, V.V.
Kilyanov, and V.V. Beloborod were stationed
3. [Signature] O.S. Serachov
2. [Signature] V.O. Baranchenko
1. [Signature] V.M. Zaytsev
Defense attorney: [Signature]
Senior Investigator with the Investigative Department
of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Captain of Justice [Signature] V. Romanenko
X site where O.S. Serachov, V.V. Kilyanov, and V.V. Beloborod
and others had shooting practice during military training
Annex 193
Signed Declaration of Mykailo Ozerov, Witness Interrogation Protocol (10 November
2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1
[....]
[
]
[
]
In response to the questions put to him, the witness gave the following testimony:
On March 12, 2012 I became the co-owner of the Stena rock pub located in the
basement of 13 vul. Rymarska, Kharkiv. This pub hosts live rock shows and meetings with
writers and poets. Overall, its a creative pub. The pub hosts performers both from Russia and
Ukraine. Lately, after the events in Ukraine, namely in the east of Ukraine, we (virtually all
those working at Stena) have been doing voluntary work, specifically helping refugees from
the east of Ukraine, orphans evacuated from the anti-terrorist operation area and, last but not
least, sending aid to the active military units fighting on the Ukrainian side. I associate the
explosion at the rock pub over the night of November 9-10, 2014 with the distinctly pro-
Ukrainian position of the staff and management here. I basically do not believe the version
that the blast had anything to do with the Stena rock pubs commercial business because we
go about our business with great integrity and do not engage in confrontation with
competitors. On the contrary, we try to maintain a close relationship with our competitors and
with those in Kharkiv who are in a similar line of business.
The Stena rock pub has many visitors. Some of our audience are regular customers
who have been coming here for a long time. Others dont come regularly, only sometimes, to
have a glass of beer and a chat, or to listen to live music.
As regards what happened at the pub on 11/09/2014, I can say the following. No live
performances were planned or taking place. Personally, I was at the pub around 12:00 p.m.,
meeting one of the co-owners, Dmytro Borysovych Savchenko. The meeting was in the pub
office. When we finished and left the office about 1:00 p.m., there was no-one at the pub.
[signature]
2
Next, around 2:30 p.m., Vlad Svyatashthe cousin of Member of Parliament Dmytro
Svyatashcame with his wife, Olga Svyatash. After this, the pub was visited by Donbass
evacuees whom I helped buy tickets to travel from Kharkiv to Kryvyi Rig, after which I left
the pub and went about my business.
I didnt return to the pub and spent the day dealing with personal matters. Around
5:30 p.m. I met up with a friend at the Thatcher pub (near 23rd Serpnya Street in Kharkiv).
During our get-together, around 9:40 p.m., I received a call from Dmytro Petrov (my friend
whose girlfriend was at the pub at the time of the blast) who told me that there had been an
explosion at the Stena pub. I almost dont remember anything about arriving at the pub,
probably because I was in a state of shock, after which I went to accident and emergency
hospital No 4 to visit those injured in the blast.
Investigators question: Have you ever received any threats from anyone about the
business or any personal threats?
Witness response: I have never received any threats about the business or any
personal threats, and I personally have not had any conflicts with anyone. At times, as in any
other place like this, there would be conflict situations when customers drink more than they
should and start causing a row. In these situations we usually call security and police, and the
situation is resolved.
This is an accurate record of my oral statement. I have no comments or additions to make.
________________[signature]______________________M.Y. Ozerov
Interrogated by:
Special investigator, Investigations department
Kharkiv Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Senior Lieutenant [signature] A. Isayev
Annex 194
Signed Declaration of Roman Chernenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (10
November 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
238
Transcript of interview with witness R.I. Chernenko dated 11/10/2014 (continued)
[signature]
1
[...]
In response to the questions put to him, the witness gave the following testimony:
I have been working as a bartender at an establishment called Stena [The Wall] Rock Pub
since March 2012. My job duties include selling drinks to customers at the bar and to the waiters
who serve the dining area, settling customers checks, recording and expanding the assortment of
drinks, collecting cash receipts and handing them over to the accountant.
Stena Rock Pub opened its doors in March 2012 (I have been working there since it
opened). It plays rock music and holds live concerts on Fridays and Saturdays. Sometimes you can
also watch soccer games there.
The original owners of the café were Ivan Markovich Panchenko and Dmitry Borisovich
Savchenko. I.M. Panchenko drowned last year (in early June), leaving D.B. Savchenko as the sole
owner. Early this month (around two weeks ago), D.B. Savchenko assigned the rights to this
establishment to a certain Denis (I do not know his last name), as he was not interested in the
business. I believe both D.B. Savchenko and Denis specialize in computers as their main business.
I do not know the details.
Mikhail Nikolayevich Kabanov has been the establishments manager since the day it
opened. He is also its artistic director (he handles the concert schedule). The café also employs
one waitress, Marina Yuryevna Ovcharenko (she was absent on the day of the incident, and I was
covering for her), two chefs, and another bartender, Yevgeny Yuryevich Serzhantov (who works
the opposite shift to mine). We did not have any conflicts among the staff. We are all like a family.
We are friends with each other and hang out together. I do not recall anyone being fired and leaving
on bad terms. I am also not aware of any conflicts between the owners.
I do not know anything about the establishments finances. That is Mr. Kabanovs
department. Times are tough for every establishment, but ours was making ends meet. I believe
the establishment also has an outstanding loan, which it took out when Mr. Panchenko was still in
charge, and it has not always managed to keep up on its payments.
Our establishment has nine tables indoors, as well as a summer veranda (which is currently
closed). In total, the venue has a capacity of around 40 people. During concerts, there might be as
many as 70 people. The establishment also has a bar capable of serving 9-10 people.
We have a fairly regular clientele. Many of them know each other. I also know a lot of the
patrons by sight. After the events on ul. Rymarskaya on March 14-15, 2014,
we also started to get more frequent visits from soccer fans. Sometimes (about once a week)
people in uniform with Azov volunteer battalion insignia also started coming in, but I can't say
that these people were a majority. ATO [anti-terrorist operation] personnel also came into the
establishment sometimes, but I can't say that this was a frequent occurrence (they didnt come in
any more often than the Azov guys). I can also say that a majority of our patrons had pro-
Ukrainian sentiments and often criticized the Russian leadership.
Our establishment was also collecting charitable aid for the Azov battalion (we had a
collection box) and for refugees from the ATO zone. This was well known. Mr. Kabanov was
responsible for collecting the aid money.
The work day is organized as follows at our establishment: we open at 10:00 AM (thats
when the waiters arrive). Either I or my shift replacement (we switch schedules every other week)
comes in at noon. Most people start coming in around 4:00 PM. The concerts (on Fridays and
Saturdays) start around 8:00-8:30 PM and last until around 10:00 PM. The establishment closes
239
Transcript of interview with witness R.I. Chernenko dated 11/10/2014 (continued)
2
around 11:00 PM 12:00 AM. I am usually the one who closes up, and before leaving I check to
make sure there are no people left inside and no forgotten items. I also turn on the alarm.
On the morning of November 9, 2014, I got to work around 9:30 AM. The waitress (M.Yu.
Ovcharenko) had requested the day off, so I had to arrive early and fill in for her. As far as I can
recall, she had said that she needed to spend some time with her family (she has a husband and a
5-year-old child), and the manager had given her the day off. She had also coordinated her day off
with me, as I was supposed to fill in for her. She had taken days off in the same manner before,
about 1-2 times a month.
When I arrived at work, the cleaning lady had just finished cleaning, so I saw there were
no foreign objects inside the establishment that morning.
The place started to get busy around 4:00 PM. Everyone was sitting at the tables, as there
were enough available seats in the dining area. At around that time, an acquaintance of mine, Igor
Ulezchenko, came in, sat at the bar, and started talking to me. No one had sat at the bar before him.
He took a stool there because he was waiting for the rest of his party. He was sitting on the left-
hand side of the bar (from my perspective, i.e., looking inward into the establishment).
After that, at around 7 PM I do not remember the exact time a person I had not seen
before walked into the establishment. He came up to the bar, stood right in the middle of it, and
asked me for a half-liter mug of dark beer (I do not remember the exact time of his arrival, but you
could find this out by looking at the time of the relevant order in the 1C accounting system installed
at the bar). I do not recall whether he was holding anything in his hands.
He immediately paid (with a 100-hryvnia note, if Im not mistaken, even though I had not
asked him to pay right away) and went past the bar stool opposite the second window on my right.
He was sitting with his back to the entrance. I could not see what he was doing at that moment.
After he had finished drinking his beer (about 20 minutes had passed), he got up from the
table and started walking toward the exit. I wasnt sure if he was stepping out to have a smoke or
if he was planning to leave the establishment. As he was passing by the last two bar stools on my
right, he butted into a conversation between the patrons who were sitting there.
I hadnt heard what they were talking about before he butted in, as they had been talking rather
quietly. Literally a minute later, they started shouting, and I realized that they had been talking
about the ATO (one of them, as I understood it, had returned from the ATO zone), and he had
butted into their conversation with some comment about how the people fighting on the
Ukrainian side were mercenaries.
This confrontation threatened to turn into a full-blown fight, so the manager, Mr. Kabanov,
went up to these people and asked the stranger to leave the premises and not to provoke a conflict.
To this he responded that he would be happy to leave, but he feared that he would be beaten
by the guys standing at the exit. To this the manager replied that he would make sure no one
touched him. After that, the patron left the premises and was followed out by the manager, who
made sure that no one touched him. I also went out after him myself. The patron went out onto ul.
Rymarskaya, started walking down the street toward Bursatsky Spusk, and disappeared from view
around the intersection of ul. Rymarskaya and per. Klassichesky.
About two minutes later, the party that had been harassed by the patron also left the
premises and headed up ul. Rymarskaya.
I can tell you that it was the first time I had ever seen the aforementioned person the one
who had gotten into the confrontation. As for the two patrons he had accosted, I had seen one of
them at the bar before.
I can describe the outward appearance of the aforementioned individuals as follows:
240
Transcript of interview with witness R.I. Chernenko dated 11/10/2014 (continued)
3
- the man who had ordered the beer and started the conflict was white, around 1.8 meters
tall, with dark unkempt hair, sporting a dark beard. He was dressed in dark jeans and a dark jacket.
He was of medium build with a somewhat oval face. I cannot describe any other features.
- the first of the patrons who had been accosted by this man was about 1.85 meters tall with
a heavy build and light brown hair, wearing a sweater and jeans. He had been in our establishment
before. I believe he knew the manager.
I do not recall the appearance of the second patron from that party.
After the aforementioned persons left the premises, two young men by the names of
Gennady and Nikita sat down at the bar, along with two girls by the names of Vladlena and Anna
(they were all inside at the time of the explosion).
About two hours after that, Gennady or Nikita (or possibly Roman) asked me about a
package that was lying under the bar. I replied that perhaps someone had stepped out for a smoke
and left their things (people often leave their things at our establishment when they step outside).
Literally 10-15 minutes later, an explosion rang out inside the building. I was standing behind the
bar at the time. The epicenter of the explosion was directly across from me, on the other side of
the bar. I understood that it was in the very spot where the patrons had noticed the aforementioned
package.
I would also like to point out that all of the persons who had been at the bar that day
(excluding the three persons involved in the altercation) remained inside the building at the time
of the explosion.
The blast wave from the explosion threw me backward. It seemed to me that I lay
unconscious for about 10 minutes (I based this conclusion on the fact that when I grabbed my
phone, it said the time was 10:00 PM). I left the premises through the service entrance and helped
drag one of the injured outside.
241
Transcript of interview with witness R.I. Chernenko dated 11/10/2014 (continued)
4
I did not notice any suspicious persons or vehicles near the establishment after the
explosion.
In addition, I can tell you that about a month ago I do not recall exactly when a conflict
broke out among some of our patrons during a concert, on nationalist grounds: one party shouted,
Glory to Ukraine, but one guy who was sitting at the bar near the restroom disagreed with this
cry and responded: Not glory. After that, they invited him to step outside, and this patron was
holding a screwdriver in his hand. I pointed this out to the other patrons, but they took him outside
anyway and beat him up.
I do not remember what that man looked like, and I cannot say whether it was the same
patron as yesterday.
Question: Did anyone inside the establishment make a video recording yesterday?
Answer: Not that I saw.
Question: Were any events planned at your establishment yesterday? Were any
servicemen or ATO troops expected?
Answer: Nothing like that was planned for yesterday. It was a routine day. No meetings
of servicemen were ever organized in my presence. I can only point out that there was an assembly
on Freedom Square that evening. Perhaps whoever was behind the explosion expected people to
come to our place after that.
I have read the transcript. My words have been accurately recorded. I have no comments and
nothing further to add.
[signature] R.I. Chernenko
The procedural action was carried out and the transcript prepared by:
Special Investigator, Investigations Department,
Kharkiv Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Captain of Justice [signature] A. Prosnyak
Annex 195
Signed Declaration of Valentin Datsenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (11
November 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
[illegible handwriting]
1
[...]
I currently reside at the above address with my husband, Valentin Petrovich Datsenko, and my sons, Ilya
and Daniil. I am a sole proprietor doing business as Ye.S. Datsenko. I specialize in real estate leasing.
In particular, the space that I lease out is located at 13 ul. Rymarskaya, Kharkiv. I have owned this space
since July 2006. I acquired it from the previous residents (their last name was Bondarenko), whose details
I cannot give you at the moment, as I do not remember. In 2008, I officially changed the status of this
space from residential to non-residential by order of the Dzerzhinsky District Court. Due to the economic
crisis that began in 2008, the space was not rented out and remained vacant.
Some tenants were found in 2012. They proposed to utilize the space as a café once they
made some refurbishments. These tenants were Ivan Markovich Panchenko, born in 1977, Dmitry Odin,
and Svetlana Gennadiyevna Kharlamova (D. Odins wife). The lease was drawn up in the names of Mr.
Panchenko and Ms. Kharlamova. By agreement with the tenants, the space was supposed to be used to set
up a café for rock music fans. The name itself, Stena [The Wall], came from a Pink Floyd music video
about tearing down the Berlin Wall. I was not opposed to this idea, particularly since I had no other lease
offers. Stena Rock Pub opened its doors on August 1, 2012. My duties as the owner of the premises
include making sure that the utilities are paid, preparing a report on electric power consumption, and
forwarding the utility bills to the actual occupants.
In the summer of 2013, Mr. Panchenko drowned while on a recreational visit to a water reservoir
in the village of Lozovenki outside Kharkiv. I am not aware of the circumstances of his death.
The lease documents were then re-registered in the name of Mikhail Nikolayevich Kabanov, who
had previously joined Mr. Panchenko and Mr. Odin in the business. I believe Mr. Kabanov was
responsible for organizing events at the rock pub (concerts, performances, etc.). Why the lease was
specifically re-registered in Mr. Kabanovs name I do not know. I am not aware of any conflicts among
the tenants. After Mr. Panchenkos death, the owners of Stena Rock Pub were also joined by Mikhail
Ozerov. I spoke with the latter a few times about replacing a water pipe and saw him from time to time at
the pub.
A lease agreement was entered into on 08/01/2013 with M.N. Kabanov and S.G. Kharlamova (as
I recall, S.G. Kharlamova got married and changed her last name, but I may be mistaken). From that
moment forward, I had no issues with the Stena Rock Pubs operations. Nor were there any complaints
from the law-enforcement agencies or neighbors.
I only visited Stena Rock Pub on business matters. I was not a regular customer or patron. Among
Stenas employees, I know the manager, Alena (I do not know any of her other details, and I deleted her
phone number after she was let go). I forwarded the utility bills to her. But she was let go in late August
2014 for reasons unknown to me. I also know the bartender, Roman (I do not know his other details), to
whom I sometimes gave the bills to be passed on to Alena. Sometimes, instead of Roman, there was
another bartender working at the bar (I do not know his details), to whom I also handed the bills. After
Alena was let go, she was replaced by a new manager, Yekaterina (I do not know her details, but her
telephone number is 913-13-52). I contacted her on multiple occasions about the utilities.
Stenas clientele consists mainly of young rock music fans. I have also heard from acquaintances
who live nearby that supporters of pro-Ukrainian, pro-Maidan ideas and the Right Sector gathered
there. I did not oppose such events, but I felt that they should not cause any damage to the venue. In the
summer of this year, during a visit to Stena, I noticed that a transparent donations box had been set up on
the bar to collect money for the army.
As far as political movements are concerned, I would like to point out that I did not participate in
such events on the side of either the Maidan or the anti-Maidan, such as when they took down the
Lenin monument. Nor did I participate in any volunteer work to collect funds or assistance for ATO
[antiterrorist operation] troops. I do not know anything about the political activity of my tenants at 13 ul.
Rymarskaya or their involvement in any social movements.
At around 10:00 p.m. on 11/09/2014, I received a phone call from the mother of my godchild,
Olga Gennadiyevna Trineva, who resides at Apt. 2, 6 ul. Kravtsova. She told me there had been an
[illegible handwriting]
TRANSCRIPT
2
explosion at Stena Pub. Due to the extreme circumstances, I did not know what to do. When I managed to
reach my husband on the phone, he said he was already on his way to the scene of the incident. At 11:30
PM that day, I received a phone call from the police I believe it was field officer Artur Karenovich,
from telephone number 068-994-54-54 who told me that as the owner I had a duty to go to the premises,
which I did. Before heading over there, I called Mr. Kabanov (on telephone number 099-075-84-09), but
he refused my request to meet me there. When I arrived at the scene (around midnight), the police were
there, the ambulances were already gone and Dmitry Odin was there, along with many people I did not
know. I was questioned by a police officer, after which my husband and I went home.
Question: Are you aware of the nature of the relationship among the owners of the Stena Rock Pub (the
tenants)? Are you aware of any conflicts among them? If so, among which of the owners did the conflicts
arise, and what were they about?
Answer: I do not know anything about any conflicts among the tenants. As far as I know, they did not
have any conflicts.
Question: Were there any conflicts between the tenants and yourself as the owner of the premises? If so,
with whom did you have such conflicts, and what were they about?
Answer: I did not have any conflicts with the tenants. We had a straightforward business relationship.
Question: Were there any disputes over the property rights to the premises located at 13 ul. Rymarskaya,
Kharkiv?
Answer: There were no such disputes, nor are there any presently.
Question: Please clarify whether you were aware that Stena Rock Pub was a gathering place for members
of the Right Sector, volunteer battalion fighters, and citizens with pro-Ukrainian sentiments.
Answer: I believe Stena Rock Pubs patrons included not only these people (Right Sector, battalion
fighters, etc.) but also people without any active political stance (passers-by, people with children, etc.). I
was told, however, that during the march on 10/14/2014, a lot of people had congregated outside Stena,
carrying the flags of Right Sector and other nationalistic organizations.
Question: Have you received any threats recently?
Answer: No, I have not received any threats.
Question: Do you know who was responsible for the terrorist act at the Stena Rock Pub on 11/09/2014?
Do you suspect anyone of involvement in the bombing?
Answer: I do not know who was responsible for the terrorist act, and I do not suspect anyone. I do not
even know the motive of the terrorist act.
Question: Would you like to add anything else?
Answer: No, I have nothing to add.
My testimony has been accurately recorded. I have personally read it. I have no comments and nothing
further to add.
[signature] Ye.S. Datsenko
Interviewed by Senior Investigator [signature] A.Yu. Berezhny
Annex 196
Signed Declaration of Marina Kovtun, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16 November
2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
2
Transcript of interview of M.A. Kovtun dated 11/16/2014 (continued)
[initials]
[
]
In response to the questions that were put to her, the suspect gave the following testimony:
I have resided at the above address since 1991. I live together with my son, Stanislav Leonidovich
Kudrin, born in 1988, and my daughter, Darya Sergeyevna Kovtun, born in 1995.
I was born in the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic but moved to Kharkiv at the age of 15
(in 1982) for school (I studied at the Kharkiv Textile Vocational School from 1982 to 1985), after which I
continued living here.
I have a secondary vocational education. I am officially unemployed, but I make some money on
the side as a seamstress working from home. I am not a member of any political party. Prior to 2014, I was
not involved in any mass protests.
When the Maidan started in Kyiv, I didnt really think much of it, as I was at my mothers house
in Stavropol Territory, Russia, at the time.
Around February 2014, my attitude toward these events changed, as I considered the overthrow of
the President to be unconstitutional. On March 1, 2014, I joined a protest march on Freedom Square in
Kharkiv, where I witnessed a speech by Gennady Kernes, as well as the seizure of the regional
administration. After that, I went to Freedom Square every weekend and spoke with likeminded people
who did not support the current regime in Ukraine.
In the course of these events, around the end of March - early April, I met someone by the name of
Vasily (I do not know his last name; his patronymic was Petrovich, but they called him Kapitonovich)
on the square. He also shared my views but did not take any active steps apart from going to the square.
Around April, or possibly May, I became a member of Anton Guryanovs Russian East
movement. They were signing people up right on the square. Some guys were standing there with a flag
and registering people. I did not know Guryanov himself at the time. I
118
117
3
Transcript of interview of M.A. Kovtun dated 11/16/2014 (continued)
[initials]
got to know him later. After that, I continued going to the square, but somewhat less frequently.
Russian East held training sessions in hand-to-hand combat. They were conducted by a man who
went by the nickname Bizon, near an abandoned military base at the Kharkiv Tractor Factory, closer to
the city of Rogan. I went there several times. These trainings were also attended by Nikolai Varva,
Konstantin Khimik [The Chemist], Andrei, and other persons.
In June, I went to stay with my mother in Russia again, spending about 20 days there. Upon
returning to Kharkiv, I went out to the square, where a woman by the name of Arina (I do not know her
other details; I had met her on the square before but did not know her well) invited me to travel to Belgorod
to study at a school specializing in politics and economics, so that I could help wage the information war
against Ukraines current authorities, since I was not happy with them.
She said that the program would last three days. It was free, and they would pay for my travel
expenses, plus a per diem of 500 rubles. I accepted this offer. Vasily, whom I mentioned earlier, also
received the same invitation. He and I discussed it and decided to go. We were supposed to make our own
way to Belgorod, after which we were supposed to meet at the Patriot Hotel.
We left Kharkiv somewhere around the middle of July. I do not remember exactly when, but it was
a Friday. We took a mini bus from South Station to Belgorod. Upon arrival, we headed to the
aforementioned hotel. There we were greeted by two young men, Ivan and Mikhail, whom we had not met
before. Appearance-wise, they looked like Jews. They booked us into rooms at the hotel. I got my own
room at first, but later they put a woman from Dnipropetrovsk in the same room with me. Her name was
Tatyana (I do not know her last name). When we first arrived, they entered our details (full names and
copies of our passports) into a computer. They also reimbursed us for the cost of the trip to Belgorod.
Classes began at 9:00 AM the following day at the DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for Assistance to
the Army, Air Force and Navy] center next to the hotel. We were divided into groups. Each group had its
own color, which changed each day. Each group consisted of around 20 people. Each group was in a
separate auditorium. Vasily and I were in the same group.
Classes were held in the form of lectures, which lasted until 5:00 PM with a break for lunch. There
were about ten lecturers in all. They talked about working with the mass media, working with the Internet
and messaging; they taught us how to anticipate how the situation would unfold in the near future; and they
talked about economics. The lecturers introduced themselves, but I do not remember their names. Some of
them had served time in prison for the Bolotnaya Square protests.
During these lectures, I was also introduced to Anton Guryanov. I met him by the hotel. I had seen
him on the square before, but we had never spoken. Now we spoke for about five minutes. We then met
again in the evening and spoke for about 15 minutes about events in Ukraine.
The lectures lasted for three days in all. At the end, they gave us our per diems and money for the
return trip. The money was handed out to us by a girl we had not met before, by the name of Darya. After
that, Vasily and I took a mini bus from the railway station to back to Kharkivs South Station. Upon
returning to Kharkiv, I went back to normal life. Sometimes I would go out to the square on Sundays.
Immediately before the trip to Belgorod, I also met a man by the name of Aleksandr (I do not
remember his last name) on Freedom Square in Kharkiv. He was short and wore glasses. He gave speeches
on the square using a microphone. We did not talk about anything substantive; we merely introduced
ourselves.
118
4
Transcript of interview of M.A. Kovtun dated 11/16/2014 (continued)
[initials]
Upon returning to Kharkiv, on around July 29, 2014, the aforementioned Aleksandr called me on
my cellphone from a Russian number and invited me and Vasily to come to Moscow. I agreed, even though
he had not explained why we needed to go there. He asked me for my debit card number so that he could
pay for the trip, but I said it would be better if they gave me the money in person in Moscow. I would also
like to point out that I had not given him my telephone number. I do not know where he got it.
I also invited my son Stas to travel with us, as I was afraid of being drawn into some risky venture.
He understands politics and could advise me.
We left Kharkiv around the end of July or beginning of August. We traveled to Belgorod by mini
bus and took the train from there to Moscow.
In Moscow, I bought a Russian SIM card and called Aleksandr. He told me to go to some metro
station (I do not recall exactly which one perhaps Park Kultury). There he met us, and together we went
to a library. There, on the second floor, was something resembling an office, where he introduced us to
Aleksei Petrovich. In the next room was the aforementioned Darya, who had given us the money in
Belgorod.
We then started talking (Sasha [short form of Aleksandr], Aleksei Petrovich, Vasily, and I; Stas
was told to stay in another room). During our conversation, Aleksandr introduced us as people from Kharkiv
who wanted to do something. They asked us which organizations we belonged to, to which I responded that
we were from Russian East. They then asked how many members we had, to which I replied that there were
ten of us. They then invited us to stay another day so that we could meet someone else.
We agreed, and they put us up in a monastery that night. The next morning, a man contacted us by
telephone, and we agreed to meet at 11:00 AM by the metro station (I do not recall the name of the station).
At the designated place, we (Vasily, Stas, and I) met with a man by the name of Roman, after which
we went to a nearby café, where we talked. He asked whether we had people who were prepared to travel
for firearms training. He explained that this training was necessary for future subversive activity in Ukraine.
He said that a per diem of USD 20 would be paid for attending the trainings, which would last ten days. To
this proposal I replied that we would have to speak with people in Kharkiv.
After this conversation, we met with Aleksei Petrovich. He gave me RUB 5,000 for the journey,
and we headed back to Kharkiv on the Moscow-Kryvyi Rih train.
We got back to Kharkiv on around August 3, 2014. I then headed over to the aforementioned
training site to propose that we make the trip for firearms training. Vasily, Bizon, Nikolai (last name
Varva), Konstantin (nickname Chemist), and Andrei were all there. Vasily and I told them about the
proposed trip, but no one agreed right away. They asked for time to think it over.
On Freedom Square, I also shared the invitation with a young man by the name of Pavel, whom I
knew from the square (he agreed without hesitation), and Nikolai (a member of the RNE [Russian National
Unity]), who also agreed.
Over the course of the following week, the aforementioned people agreed to make the trip. I also
invited my son, Stas, and younger nephew, Andrei Bozhko, to go with us. Bizon also brought some of
his own friends: Andrei,
120
119
5
Transcript of interview of M.A. Kovtun dated 11/16/2014 (continued)
[initials]
Vyacheslav, Sergei, and another Vyacheslav. Nikolai (from the RNE) also brought his own friend by the
name of Vitaly.
There were 15 of us in all. Somewhere around August 15, 2014, I called Roman in Moscow and
told him we had 15 people ready to make the trip at once. To this he replied that it was not a good time to
go, and that he would call when the time was right. About a week later, around August 20, Roman called
me and told me to go to Belgorod, where we were then supposed to get in touch by phone. Either during
that conversation or earlier in Moscow, he said that we should cross the border in small groups or one by
one.
I called all the people I had assembled myself. They then called the others. We agreed to meet at
the railway station in Belgorod by 2:00 PM. I dont recall the precise date. It was around August 20.
I got to Belgorod with Stas and Andrei (my nephew) by mini bus. When we met the rest of the
group at the designated spot, I called Roman, who said we would be picked up at 9:00 PM at the Patriot
Hotel. We all split up to go walk around the city until evening, agreeing to meet at the same spot in the
railway station at 7:00 PM.
After meeting up again, we walked over to the hotel, where we were picked up by a large long-
distance bus (I do not recall the make). When the bus pulled up to the hotel, another group came out of the
hotel and boarded it. I later found out that they were Kharkiv Cossacks. We were warned not to speak with
this group (Roman told me this by phone).
We rode the bus to the city of Tambov, where we were taken to a tent camp on the outskirts of
town. It was early in the morning. We were greeted by two men who introduced themselves as Viktor and
Sergei. They were wearing athletic gear, but I later learned that they were military men.
The camp where we stayed consisted of a fenced-in area with pitched tents there were about ten
large ones and five small ones in all, but they were empty. We were assigned two tents a big one for the
boys and a small one for me. The second group was placed in the third tent. There were no permanent
structures on the grounds. There was also a separate tent for the kitchen, where it seemed to me that soldiers
were working. There was also a latrine (it was a unisex one at first, but they later built me a separate one)
and a shower. The whole area measured about 500x500 meters. There was a concrete fence on one side and
a little fence on the other three sides that we were forbidden to cross. The entrance to the area was guarded
by watchmen. They also patrolled the grounds at night. The personnel wore military uniforms (spotted
camouflage), but without any insignia.
After getting us settled in, they fed us and let us rest until lunch. Then two instructors (Aleksandr
and Maksim) came to us and gave us an introductory lesson. About 2-3 days later, a specialist also came
and had us take a lie detector test. I was asked whether I had ever killed anyone, whether I worked for law
enforcement, and other questions that I do not recall.
On the following days they taught us navigation, medicine, firearms training, and demolitions. For
shooting practice, they took us to a shooting range at a different location (3-4 times in total). It seemed to
me there were soldiers shooting at the same range.
120
6
Transcript of interview of M.A. Kovtun dated 11/16/2014 (continued)
[initials]
At firearms training they showed us a Kalashnikov assault rifle, a Dragunov sniper rifle, a grenade
launcher, hand grenades, an under-barrel grenade launcher, and a machine gun. We were told to select a
sniper, for which I volunteered.
At shooting practice, I fired an assault rifle once and a grenade launcher once. As the sniper, I also
fired an assault rifle, firing off three magazines.
At demolitions, they showed us magnetic mines, MON anti-personnel mines, and bouncing
mines, as well as TNT sticks, detonators, and fuses. They showed us how to insert a detonator into a stick
and how to light fuses. Each of us was given a stick to blow up.
On subsequent days they taught us masking techniques. They also told us that we should film any
subversive actions we carried out and send them copies of the video.
The classes lasted a total of 13 days (i.e., three days more than planned). Viktor and Sergei, whom
I mentioned earlier, stayed with us the whole time. Before we left, methods of communication were
discussed. They asked if I could contact Roma, to which I replied in the affirmative. Then they told me that
no further communication was necessary. They discussed methods of communication with the rest of the
group as well, but they did not confide in each other. I can tell you, however, that Nikolai Varva later
showed me a sheet of paper with instructions about how we should wait for a signal, from which I drew the
conclusion that he had a channel of communication via computer.
Before we left, they also appointed a senior member of our group Nikolai Varva, who was the
oldest among us (Bizon had been the senior member until his departure).
I would also like to point out that my son and nephew left the camp on the 11th day, as Viktor and
Sergei had decided that this sort of activity was not for them. They were taken to the train station and put
on a bus for Belgorod. Around the 12th day (between my sons departure and our own), Bizon left the
camp together with the guys he had assembled, as well as Vitalik, whom Nikolai had brought from the
RNE. They said they were going to the Donbas region. It is my understanding that they were all selected
because they were athletes.
On the 14th day, we (i.e., the group that I had assembled, excluding my son, nephew, and Bizons
people) were put on a regular mini bus to Belgorod. Upon arriving in Belgorod, five of us (I do not
remember exactly who) got on a bus for Kharkiv. Three stayed behind to wait for the next bus, as there
werent enough seats. We returned to Kharkiv in early September. I do not recall the exact date.
After returning, I went back to normal life. I went out to the square a couple of times. I called
Roman a few times, but his phone was not working. I found out through Nikolai Varva that we had received
instructions to wait.
Around the end of September, Vasily contacted me and gave me a piece of paper with a Russian
telephone number (I do not remember whose) and a note that read, Contact with Anton. He said that
Guryanov had given us this paper. He probably drew this conclusion based on the note. I also thought that
it was Guryanovs telephone number.
I called the number and identified myself. The person on the other end asked whether I could come
to Belgorod, to which I replied in the affirmative. We agreed that I would come the following Wednesday
and call him on the same number.
On Wednesday, Vasily and I went to Belgorod by commuter train. Upon arrival, I called the
telephone number. I could tell from the voice on the other end that is wasnt Guryanov, but the man said it
did not matter. They said they would come to the train station.
122
121
7
Transcript of interview of M.A. Kovtun dated 11/16/2014 (continued)
[initials]
About an hour later, I met a man outside the station who introduced himself as Anton. We found
each other by phone. He then invited us to get into his car, where a man by the name of Vadim was waiting.
I had never met these people before.
We got into the car and started chatting about life. I understood from the conversation that they
knew we had been through training, but they did not disclose the source of this information.
We then went to a café for some coffee. During our conversation, they invited us to collaborate
with them, as they needed our help and could procure some weapons for us, but they did not provide any
further details. We agree to this proposal. They gave us each RUB 1,000 for tickets and told us to go home.
Upon arrival, I was supposed to buy a new SIM card, turn it on from time to time, and call Antons number.
We also agreed that if they succeeded in procuring the weapons, the code word would be potatoes, which
they would say on my phone. After that, I was supposed to activate a new card, to which they would text
me a telephone number that I was supposed to call in order to pick up the weapons.
We then returned to Kharkiv. There I bought a Kyivstar SIM card, from which I called Anton and
told him that this was my secret number.
Nothing happened until around October 23, 2014. Then an unknown man called me on my main
number from a Ukrainian number and said: You ordered potatoes. Ive brought them. I immediately
turned on my second number, on which I received an SMS with a telephone number. I then called the
number and asked for potatoes, in response to which the person on the other end offered to meet at
Industrialnaya metro station at 11:00 AM the same day.
Vasily and I set off toward Industrialnaya metro station in my VAZ-2109 car, plate number 0377
(I dont remember the letters). Then the person I had spoken to before called and asked me to continue on
toward the intersection of ul. 50 Let SSSR and Moskovsky Prospekt.
I did not know this area well, so Vasily showed me the way based on the description. When we
arrived at the designated location, there were some cars standing there, but we did not know which one we
needed. My secret phone was out of funds, so Vasily called from his own phone. The person on the other
end said to carry on to the area in front of Saltovsky Bridge. There we saw a grey Zhiguli car (I did not
notice the exact model or plate number). A tall, skinny young man in a dark blue hat and a light blue jacket
got out of the car. He asked whether I needed potatoes, to which I replied in the affirmative.
Then he pulled two checkered bags, a small white bag, and a bundle about one meter long out of
his trunk, and together we loaded it into mine. He did not say what was inside. I myself did not peek inside
right there, but I could guess that the bags contained mines, while the long bundle looked like assault rifles
(during the meeting in Belgorod that I described earlier, it had come out that Anton and Vadim would try
to get us some mines).
We then parted ways, and Vasily and I headed off toward downtown along pr. Moskovsky. I
dropped him off by the former Target store near Marshal Zhukov metro station and headed home.
I then called Anton and told him that I had received the package but made it clear that he had sent
too much. He replied that the rest could just lie in reserve.
I carried the package in several trips to the garage next to my house. There I unwrapped the bundle
and saw that they had given me mines (anti-personnel mines and magnetic mines, all of which we had
covered in the courses I described
122
8
Transcript of interview of M.A. Kovtun dated 11/16/2014 (continued)
[initials]
earlier), the exact number of which I did not count, as well as three Kalashnikov assault rifles and other
weapons. A users manual was attached to the mines. The small bag also contained a video camera with a
charger and one flash drive. I understood that the camera was meant for recording our actions.
That same day or the next, I went to see my nephew, Artem Mineyev, and asked him to lend me
his garage so I could move some junk out of my house. I actually wanted to move the package there, but
I did not tell him that. Artem agreed and gave me the keys.
The garage was located on ul. Akademika Lyapunova. Artem wasnt using it. I put my own lock
on it. Then I went home, and in my own garage I transferred the received weapons and explosives into
several bags and boxes, as the items were heavy. Then I moved everything to Artems garage. I did not tell
anyone about this and did everything myself.
Vasily and I then got the idea of setting off an explosion near the Malyshev Factory. Actually, we
got the idea immediately after arriving from Tambov, as we had been told to select locations for possible
subversive actions. Vasya [Vasily] and I immediately thought of the Malyshev Factory, as it makes
equipment for the Ukrainian military, and an explosion might divert the plants resources from supporting
the ATO. We went and scoped out the location a few times, driving around the whole area. Once we
received the mines, we had the means to put our plan into action.
Somewhere around November 6, 2014, Vasily and I went out on reconnaissance again, during
which we identified a manhole over the heating grid. There was a pipe in there next to which we could
place a mine. We decided to place one of the magnetic mines there. We did not agree in advance when we
would do it.
On Friday, November 7, 2014, Anton called my secret number and said that I had to give one of
the mines to a young man by the name of Dmitry, who was supposed to use it at the Stena Club. I had never
heard of this club before. Dmitry was supposed to call me on my secret number. Anton also said that
immediately afterwards, Dmitry would have to leave for the resort, which I understood to mean Russia.
On November 8, 2014, I arranged to meet with the people who had gone to Tambov for training
(Vasily, Nikolai Varva, Pavel, and Konstantin (Chemist)), as well as one new guy, at the same location
where we had previously trained with Bizon.We agreed to this over the phone. I took one of the magnetic
mines with me to the meeting.
At the designated location, we had a picnic and grilled some sausages. During our conversation, I
said that we had received a package and showed them the magnetic mine. We all remembered how to arm
it. I said that we could use these mines, but no one showed any desire to do so. Nikolai suggested we
consider the option of blowing up a gasoline tanker truck or seizing a checkpoint (to get more weapons).
Vasily and I suggested blowing up the aforementioned pipe at the Malyshev Factory. I also asked one of
the guys to assemble the mine in order to use it at Stena, but no one agreed. This conversation about Stena
and the Malyshev Factory was definitely heard by Vasily, Nikolai Varva, The Chemist, and Pavel.
In the end, we could not agree, and after the picnic ended at around 3:00 PM I suggested to Vasily
that we detonate the mine ourselves that same day by the pipeline we had discussed. He agreed with this
suggestion, and we then agreed to meet that evening by the factory.
124
125
9
Transcript of interview of M.A. Kovtun dated 11/16/2014 (continued)
[initials]
Before heading out, I opened the cap of the mines detonator and saw a red timer inside, which,
according to the accompanying table, corresponded to a delay of between 15 minutes and three hours
(depending on the air temperature the warmer the air, the shorter the delay). The mine was ready for use.
All that remained was to pull out the pin and lay the mine.
I arrived at the location around 9:00 PM in my own car, which I parked in the courtyard on ul.
Morozova. Vasily and I also met on ul. Morozova around 9:00 PM. We walked around the designated spot
a few times, and then, around 9:50 PM, we placed the mine in a cellophane bag and tied a rope to it. Then
Vasily pulled out the pin and lowered the mine to the bottom of the pipeline shaft, which was covered with
a grill. I did not see where exactly the mine ended up, but I thought it was up against the pipe. Meanwhile,
I was filming everything on the camera I mentioned earlier.
After placing the mine, we headed back to the car. I gave Vasily a ride to Moskovsky Prospekt and
continued on home. In the morning, I checked the Internet and found out from the Antimaidan website
that there had been an explosion in the Novyye Doma district at around 11:25 PM. I understood that our
mine had gone off. A short while later, I arrived at the scene of the incident, but they had changed the rails
on the road, so I was unable to approach and film the results of our action.
Then, on Sunday, I turned on my secret phone and called Anton. I told him that we had placed one
of the mines the day before. He praised us.
A short time later, that same day, a man by the name of Dmitry called me on my secret number,
and we agreed to meet at 4:00 PM by the dolphinarium in Shevchenko Park.
During our meeting, we talked about how I would give him a mine at 6:00 PM that same day. He
said that he needed the mine so that he could take it into the Stena Club and leave it there. I understood
that he wanted to blow the place up. He did not explain what sort of club it was or why the bombing had to
be carried out there in particular. He also said that he would need another mine the following day. I replied
that they had told me he would have to leave right away, to which Dmitry replied that he would need to
place another mine on a pipe by the Britannia Hotel in Zhuravlevsky Park.
In the end, we agreed that I would bring the mine at 6:00 PM to the rear side of the Kharkiv National
Academic Opera and Ballet Theater. We also agreed to meet at the same time the following day at the Rost
supermarket by Kyivska metro station.
I would also like to point out that Anton had previously asked me during our conversation not only
to bring him a mine, but also to get it ready. During our conversation, Dmitry also wondered if he would
have enough time to get away before the blast, and I reassured him that he would. I gathered from this that
Dmitry did not know much about mines.
I then went to the garage, took one of the mines, made sure the red element was there, placed it in
a white bag with polka dots, put it in my car, and headed toward the aforementioned theater.
There, at the agreed-upon time and place, I met Dmitry and gave him the bag. He put it inside
another bag a black one. Then I personally pulled the ring and pin out of the mine, i.e., armed it. I told
him he had at least 15 minutes to lay the mine. He said that would give him enough time to drink a cup of
coffee. He then headed down ul. Rymarskaya (before that, he told me that the club was located opposite
house No. 18, where some riots had taken place). I went back to my car, which was parked on ul.
Klochkovskaya, and headed
124
10
Transcript of interview of M.A. Kovtun dated 11/16/2014 (continued)
[initials]
home. On the way, somewhere near ul. Kotlova I do not remember exactly where I threw out the ring
from the mine.
At home, I had a cup of tea and did some housework, as I knew from previous experience that the
mine would go off a few hours later. I then headed downtown, where Vasily and I had agreed to meet at
9:00 PM to survey the aftermath (he had found out about it at the picnic).
Vasily and I met by the ramp from ul. Rymarskaya to the book market. I parked my car there, and
we started walking along ul. Rymarskaya. We went up Rymarskaya, then through the arch onto ul.
Sumskaya, then came out on Rymarskaya via per. Grabovskogo. We stood on the corner for a while, then
returned to ul. Sumskaya. We had been walking for about 30-40 minutes in total. As we were passing
through the arch by Pushok Tailors Shop, we heard the explosion. I wanted to go out onto ul. Rymarskaya
through the arch, but Vasily would not let me go. We went back to Sumskaya, walked down to per.
Grabovskogo, and came out onto ul. Rymarskaya again. Then I wanted to go up to the site of the explosion,
but Vasily would not let me. In the end, he stayed put, while I headed over to the scene of the incident.
When I arrived at the Stena, I saw explosion marks, people, broken glass, and an ambulance. I took
out the aforementioned camera, which I had specifically brought with me to film the aftermath, and took a
short video.
Then I went back to Vasily. We got in my car. I gave him a ride to Central Market metro station
and headed home. At home, Anton called me on my regular number and asked how many mines we had
left (he asked the question in a veiled manner, referring to the mines by some other name, but I immediately
understood what he meant), to which I replied that we had one left. He asked if I could give it to Dmitry,
to which I replied in the affirmative.
The following day, I went back to the garage, where I took the last magnetic mine, armed it with a
black timer (from one to nine hours, I believe there was no red element). At 6:00 PM, as agreed, I met
with Dmitry at Kyivska metro station. I gave him the mine it was in a dark (black or dark green) bag
and pulled out the pin, arming the mechanism. All Dmitry had to do was lay it. He had previously told me
there was a gas pipe and heating main at the site, but he did provide further details. Dmitry then headed to
the site, and I went back to my car, which was on the island between ul. Shevchenko and ul. Matyushenko.
On the way, I threw the ring and pin over a fence onto a nearby construction site.
After getting in my car, I decided to drive around and have a look. I saw Dmitry walking along ul.
Shevchenko toward the Britannia. I overtook him, made a U-turn, and parked on ul. Shevchenko. I cannot
explain exactly where I made the U-turn and parked, but I can show you at the site.
After some time, I saw Dmitry cross the road (ul. Shevchenko). Then he got on a tram and headed
toward Kyivska metro station. I headed in the same direction, bound for home.
When I was at home, around 8:30 PM, Dmitry called me (on my secret number, I think) and said
that he was at the railway station and there were no more trains or buses to Belgorod. I said that I could
give him a lift to Hoptivka and that he should come to the bridge by the Zheleznodorozhnik Cultural Center.
He immediately understood what I meant. Then I met him, and we headed for Hoptivka. While we were
passing through Ruska Lozova, I called Anton and told him that Dmitry had been unable to leave, and that
I was taking him to Hoptivka. Anton said he would meet him.
126
125
11
Transcript of interview of M.A. Kovtun dated 11/16/2014 (continued)
[initials]
I dropped Dmitry off right next to the customs post, and he headed off toward Russia on foot. I
turned around and headed home. He called me and said that he had passed through customs.
I would also like to point out that in one of my conversations with Anton, I said that I was about to
go and visit my mother in Russia via Belgorod. He said that we would meet up. I understood this to mean
that he would take my video camera with the recordings and might pay me something for the work I had
done.
Question: Why did you participate in the aforementioned bombings?
Answer: We carried out the bombing at the Malyshev Factory with the goal of disrupting the anti-
terrorist operation. As for the Stena, Anton said in our telephone conversation that it was a gathering place
for national guard members and degenerates (those may not have been his exact words, but it was
something along those lines). The bombings were also supposed to destabilize the situation in Kharkiv.
Question: What were you trying to achieve by participating in the aforementioned criminal acts?
Answer: I thought that Kharkiv should no longer remain part of Ukraine, and that the Kharkiv
Region should become part of a new country Novorossiya, consisting of the Donetsk, Luhansk,
Zaporizhzhya, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odessa Regions.
This is an accurate record of my testimony, which I have read. I have no comments and nothing further to
add. [signature] M.A. Kovtun
This procedural action was carried out and the transcript prepared by:
Special Investigator, Investigations Department,
Kharkiv Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Captain of Justice [signature] A. Prosnyak
[stamp:] [illegible] Security Service of Ukraine, Copy, No. ___ dated ____
126
Annex 197
Signed Declaration of Konstantin Morev, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (18
November 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
73
Transcript of interview of suspect K.V. Morev dated 11/18/2014 (continued)
[signature]
1
[...]
Regarding the questions that were put to him, K.V. Morev explained the following:
I, Konstantin Vladimirovich Morev, born on 2/22/1974, am registered and actually
reside, together with my wife, Viktoria Viktorovna Moreva, born on 4/19/1979, at the
following address: Apt. 63, 17 ul. Vtoroy Pyatiletki, Kharkiv. Since February 2014, I have
actively followed the political situation in the country, as I was opposed to the anti-
constitutional coup that took place in the city of Kyiv. I therefore started visiting Kharkivs
city center, specifically Constitution Square, where protests were being held and pamphlets
were being handed out. I would also like to point out that I was outraged by the seizure of
the Kharkiv Regional Administration (KRA) by supporters of the so-called Right Sector.
In March, when the KRA was being liberated from Right Sector, I met Kolya.
During and after the liberation of the KRA, I helped find people to provoke fights with both
the police and activists with other political views, and we later drew such provocateurs
fromthe administration building and themass protests. Later, during the protests on Freedom
Square, I also met a woman by the name ofMarina and her husband, who introduced himself
as Vova (nickname Bizon). These people, like me, were actively interested in
sociopolitical life in the city of Kharkiv, regularly took part in pro-Russian protests, and
collected various pamphlets, which they handed out on the square.
During a large protest on May 9, 2014, someone (I can no longer remember exactly
who) gathered people together for a so-called May Day rally, which was supposed to take
place the following weekend. I also volunteered to participate. A week after these events, on
either Saturday or Sunday (I do not remember exactly when), I met with Kolya at the circle
of trolley No. 46 (the Rogan district of Kharkiv), and together we went by trolley to an
abandoned military installation located in Roganthe so-called Military Department. In
total, about ten people came to this meeting, including Vova Bizon and Marina. There I
also met men by the names of Vasya and Andrei. During the meeting, we discussed the
sociopolitical situation in the country, after which Vova demonstrated several hand-to-hand
combat moves, which took about 3040 minutes. We then started a campfire, ate some
sausages, and went home. A similar meeting was held a week later at the same location.
About 1314 people came. In addition to myself, the people I knew there were Kolya,
Marina, Vasya, Andrei, and Vova. These meetings followed the same pattern: first we talked
about the sociopolitical situation in the city of Kharkiv, then Vova Bizon demonstrated a
couple of hand-to-hand combat moves, and in the end we started a campfire and ate some
sausages.
Around the beginning of June, I received a call-up notice from the military enlistment
office. I collectedmy things and went to the OrdzhonikidzeMilitary Enlistment Office. From
there I was sent, together with other people who had been mobilized, to some new army
brigade that was being formed. Upon our arrival in Kirovohrad, a lieutenant colonel came
74
Transcript of interview of suspect K.V. Morev dated 11/18/2014 (continued)
[signature]
2
out to us, as new arrivals, and asked whether anyone among us did not want to be mobilized.
I said that I did not want to serve in the army (since my wife and I had also received, at the
same time as my call-up notice, an invitation to participate in a state-run fertility program,
which we had long eagerly awaited). Two other people also expressed similar wishes. The
rest of the people said they were prepared to serve (there were around 7080 of them, but it
soon turned out that there were not enough military uniforms, tents and combat equipment
for everyone (the brigade was supposed to consist of around 1,500 people, but there were
only enough tents for 600, and of the 54 authorized units of combat equipment, they only
provided 12, of which only three were in working order). For these reasons, our entire group
was sent home from Kharkiv.
In July-August, nothing special happened. I pretty much stopped going to the square,
and just went to work (I was working as amill operator at the Tyazhmash factory). In August,
I went on vacation, and around August 2224, 2014, I received a call from Marina, who
proposed that we meet. During our meeting, she invited me to travel to the Russian
Federation for about ten days to learn how to shoot, in order to return to Kharkiv and wait
for the approach of Russian forces. Novorossiya forces. [signature]
On August 24, 2014, I took a mini bus from South Station to the railway station in
Belgorod (I crossed the Ukraine-Russian Federation border at Hoptivka). Upon arriving at
the aforementioned place, I met with Marina, who was already waiting for me by the main
entrance to the train station. We were then joined by other people. Among the people I
already knew were Kolya (whom I had met on the square), Vasya, and Andrei (both of whom
I had met at the May Day rallies). Among the people I saw for the first time (I learned their
names later) were Kolya, Vitalik, Pasha, Sergei (they called him Yakut, but he was later
given the call sign Latysh [Latvian]), and Slavik. We were then loaded onto a waiting bus
together with twenty Cossacks and taken in a direction I did not know. Our final point of
arrival was a military firing range of some sort, located outside the city of Tambov, Russian
Federation (I learned what city it was from the road sign on the approach). In Tambov itself,
our group was transferred to a bus, and the Cossacks were put on a covered truck.
As we drove into camp, there was a brick checkpoint at the entrance where a soldier
in Russian-style uniform was standing. Upon arrival at the camp, we were given military
uniforms and settled in. Our group and the Cossacks were kept separate (I would also like
to point out that during our stay at the camp, we hardly communicated with anyone). The
camp itself was a tent camp and was located in a mixed forest. The only permanent structures
were the checkpoint I mentioned earlier and a wooden bathhouse, store room, and restroom.
Throughout our stay at the camp, we had six firing sessions. They also gave us a navigation
class and one class in mines and explosives, during which they told us how to use mines,
TNT sticks, and trip wires. For shooting lessons, they took us in army Ural trucks to a
shooting range where we fired AK-74s, RPG-7s, Shmel rocket-propelled flamethrowers, and
Kalashnikov hand-held machine guns, while Marina and Yakut fired Dragunov sniper
rifles. The Cossacks also fired AGS-17 mounted grenade launchers.We were trained by two
75
Transcript of interview of suspect K.V. Morev dated 11/18/2014 (continued)
[signature]
3
instructors. I do not remember their last names and ranks. I only remember that one of them
was called Maksim (I do not know the other ones first name). We and the Cossacks also
had the same handler, who conducted various surveys among us and filled out some
questionnaires.We also received one visit from an instructor who gave us a class in first aid.
In addition to us, there were also some soldiers in the camp. My understanding is that they
were regular Russian Army soldiers, but they did not communicate with us at all.
The whole training lasted about ten days. On the morning of September 4, the handler
assembled our group and the Cossacks and suggested that we go to Luhansk to fight on the
side of the LPR [Luhansk Peoples Republic]. Vitalik, Vova Bizon, Slavik, Sergei
Yakut, Andrei, and I agreed to this proposal.
On September 5, Vitalik, Vova Bizon, Slavik, Sergei Yakur, Andrei, and I were
put on the mini bus that had brought us to the camp (before leaving, each of us was given
money in Russian rubles equivalent to USD 200). That same day, we arrived at a tent camp
outside Rostov, Russian Federation. Upon arriving at the camp, we were fed and bedded
down for the night. The following morning, they issued us military uniforms (I was issued a
bicolor Gorka tactical suit), AKM assault rifles, four magazines, and 100 spare cartridges
(five boxes of 20 cartridges each).
On September 78, our group was loaded onto a green KRAZ truck, which took us
into Ukrainian territory. I did not see exactly where or how we crossed the Russian-
Ukrainian border. There were also some boxes in the truck. I understood them to be boxes
of ammunition. Upon arrival, we were settled onto the grounds of a Luhansk school (on ul.
Ostraya Mogila), where we spent about 23 week. There were about 30 other people there
in addition to us.
About 23 weeks later, a man who introduced himself as Mongol came and said
that he was the commander of the Don battalion. He transferred the six of us over to a former
Interior Ministry post. There I spent about one week, after which I wrote a letter of
resignation and left for Kharkiv (as I needed to go to my wife, since we were taking part in
the state-run fertility program and she had completed all the necessary courses). I would like
to point out that I did not directly participate in any combat, did not go on any
reconnaissance, and did not serve at any checkpoints. When I resigned, I turned in my
uniform and weapon, after which I received UAH 300 in financial assistance.
I traveled from Luhansk to Kharkiv on the Luhansk-Moscow bus, making a transfer
in the city of Voronezh, Russian Federation, onto the Voronezh-Belgorod bus, and arriving
in Kharkiv on October 1113.
A week after my arrival, I received a call from Kolya. As far as I know, he had
learned of my departure from Russia to Ukraine from the guys who had remained in
Luhansk. I met with him by the Kulinichi restaurant, which is close to where I live. During
this meeting, we discussed sociopolitical topics and the situation in the city of Kharkiv.
Around the end of Octoberbeginning of November, I met a few times with Marina,
Vasya, and Pasha. During these meetings, I told them about Luhansk, and they told me about
76
Transcript of interview of suspect K.V. Morev dated 11/18/2014 (continued)
[signature]
4
the situation in Kharkiv.Marina said something had to be done to get Kharkiv to rise up, but
I did not take her words seriously. Vasya suggested blowing up the gas pipe by the Malyshev
77
Transcript of interview of suspect K.V. Morev dated 11/18/2014 (continued)
[signature]
5
Malyshev Factory. They also proposed attacking the Ukrainian military checkpoint by
Vasishchevo. I went out myself to see the pipe by the Malyshev Factory and the checkpoint
by Vasishchevo and reported back at our next meetings that the pipe by the Malyshev
Factory should not be touched under any circumstances, as there was a residential building
right next to it, while the checkpoint was well guarded and could not be taken without the
use of firepower. In any case, I warned them against taking such radical steps.
[signature]
Question: Did you have a call sign or nickname during your stay in the Luhansk Region?
Answer: Yes, after the events on Freedom Square in Kharkiv they gave me the nickname
Chemist. They gave me this nickname because I had attempted at one point to make an
explosive device and fuses on my own, but these attempts were unsuccessful. I would also
like to point out that I wanted to make the explosive device exclusively for self-defense.
[signature]
Question: What forces and resources did Marina, Vasya, and Pasha plan to use to blow up
the pipe by the Malyshev Factory and to attack the checkpoint by Vasishchevo?
Answer: I do not know how Marina, Vasya, and Pasha were planning to blow up the pipe
by the Malyshev Factory or to attack the checkpoint outside Volnovakha.
[signature]
Question: Did Marina, Vasya, and Pasha have any firearms, explosives, mines, grenades,
or other weapons?
Answer: I do not know anything about whetherMarina, Vasya, and Pasha had any firearms,
explosives, mines, grenades, or other weapons.
[signature]
Question: Why did you go out to the checkpoint located in the vicinity of Vasishchevo?
Answer: I went out to the checkpoint located near Vasishchevo in order to scope out the
situation there. Afterwards, I told Marina, Vasya, and Pasha about everything I had seen.
I have read the transcript of the interview. It is an accurate record of my testimony. I have
no comments or corrections and nothing further to add.
[signature] K.V. Morev
Interview conducted and transcript prepared by:
Senior Investigator, Investigations Department,
Kharkiv Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] O.B. Butyrin
[illegible handwriting]
Annex 198
Signed Declaration of Mykola Varva, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (18 November
2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Transcript of interview of suspect M.V. Varva dated 11/18/2014 (continued)
1
[...]
In response to the questions put to him, suspect M.B. Varva gave the following
testimony:
Question: Have your constitutional and procedural rights as a suspect been
explained to you, and do you understand them?
Answer: Yes, my rights as a suspect have been explained to me, and I fully
understand them.
Question: You are suspected of committing a crime under Article 258-3(1) of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine.
Do you understand the nature of the suspicion of which you have been informed?
If so, do you admit that you are guilty of the crime of which you are accused, do you wish
to give testimony in the course of this interview, and what can you tell us about the
suspicion of which you have been informed?
Answer: The essence of the allegations against me are entirely clear. I plead guilty
in part, as I took part in but did not commit any terrorist acts. I am ready to testify to the
pre-trial investigation body on a voluntary basis.
I, Nikolay Vasilyevich Varva, date of birth: 2/5/1955, am registered and actually
reside at Apt. 71, 168 Kosiora Prospekt, Kharkov. Living with me are my wife, Vera
Nikolayevna Varva (Balkina),
date of birth: 11/27/1956, my wifes daughter Yekaterina Yuryevna Samoylova, whose
date of birth I cant remember, and grandson, Yekaterinas son Rostislav Dmitriyevich
Samoylov, whose date of birth I cant remember either. My wife and I also have our own
daughter Vasilina Nikolayevna Varva, born in the summer of 1984, I cant remember the
exact date, who lives with her husband in the Alekseyevka district, virtually opposite the
Klass supermarket, I cant remember the exact address, although I can point it out at the
location. I also have a mother Nina Yakovlevna Yedykina, date of birth: 12/26/1913, who
is registered and resides at Apartment 57, 22a Sadovy Proyezd St., Kharkov.
Between 1978 and 1980 I did my compulsory military service in Serpukhov in the
Moscow Region in the construction corps, building residential buildings, a hospital
complex, etc. After the army, in 1985, I graduated from the Kharkov Polytechnic Institute,
majoring in electrical engineering. I worked as an electrical engineer in different places.
From around 2013 onwards, I had no direct orders for my work, namely for the
manufacture of truck and railway scales, and therefore found myself in a difficult financial
position, and what is more, I had two bank loans: one for my car with Brokbiznesbank, the
other for the manufacture of scales with Alfa-Bank, in hryvnia. Therefore, recently, I have
had to earn a living with casual earnings.
I believe what happened in Ukraine from November to February 2014 to be wrong,
as there were human victims and administrative buildings were captured, therefore all this
led to the complete destabilization of the situation within the country, which is why there
is a war at present in the east of the country. In connection with this, from early April 2014,
I started attending rallies on Freedom Square, near the Lenin monument, where people who
Transcript of interview of suspect M.V. Varva dated 11/18/2014 (continued)
2
did not agree with the current situation in the country would gather, along with people who
were for Russia. Whats more, I went to the rallies being of the view that the Russian
language should be recognized as the second state language, or at least as a regional
language, as it had been prior to the start of 2014. At these rallies, I met Kostya, Andrey,
Marina and Vladimir, who I subsequently learnt had the nickname Bison. We met up at
these rallies virtually every weekend, where leaflets and newspapers were distributed from
the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Russian East organization, on whose behalf
Anton Guryanov actively spoke, as did Alla Aleksandrovskaya and many others. Usually,
after the rallies, Kostya, Andrey, Marina, Vladimir and I would go to the Kulinichi café,
where we started to become friends. We exchanged phone numbers and, when these rallies
stopped being relevant, in around July, we would phone one another from time to time and
meet up near Kulinichi on Freedom Square.
Vladimir Bison also invited us to hand-to-hand combat lessons which he held in
the district of the former flying school which is located beyond the Rogan development, I
dont know the address although I can point it out at the location. I personally went to his
training sessions two or three times, where I once met Marina, I saw Kostya a couple of
times, but I didnt know the other people. In actual fact, I went there not for the training
sessions, but to talk to Vladimir about the political situation in the country. I also saw
Marinas son, Stas, there for the first time, who was taking part in the training sessions.
In around the second half of August, Marina phoned me and asked that we meet up.
We met in the square behind the Lenin monument. She told me that in around the middle
of August, a day or two before we met, she had been in Belgorod in the RF, and the proposal
had been put to her there that she gather together a group of eight to ten people for initial
military training and training in handling weapons in the Russian Federation, she didnt
say where exactly. From this conversation, I realized that she had access to some influential
people in Russia. I didnt immediately say anything in response to her proposal, and we
went our separate ways. Two days after this meeting, Marina phoned me again and said
that if Id decided to go to these training camps, then I should be at the railway station in
Belgorod at twelve noon the next day. She also said that there would be around fifteen
people there, and that the group would gather near the entrance to the railway station
between twelve and one in the afternoon.
After this conversation, I decided to take part in these training camps, and so the
next day, I dont remember the exact date, but it was either August 23 or 24, I gathered
together my belongings and went to the railway station in Kharkov, got on the fixed-route
taxi and went to Belgorod, to the railway station. When I arrived at the station, at around
midday Kiev time, I saw that already standing near the entrance to the railway station were
Marina, her son Stas, another young man I hadnt met previously, and also Kostya. Later,
over the course of an hour and a half, the remaining people came along: Kolya Tuz
[bigwig] together with Vitalik, Sergey, Andrey and Pavel. When we all got together,
Marina phoned someone on her mobile phone, after which she told us that we had to wait
around three hours to be picked up. Some of the group went for a walk around the city, but
Transcript of interview of suspect M.V. Varva dated 11/18/2014 (continued)
3
I went to the waiting room where I remained the entire time. At around six in the evening,
Andrey came up to me and said that we needed to go. We all walked away from the station
together for around 30 minutes, after which we went to a hotel whose name I cant
remember, we all sat down on a bench, and Marina left her bag and went up to a man who
was standing to the side of the hotel, he looked to be older than 50, of average build and
average height, with light, fair hair. Andrey, Kostya and I went into the shop, bought some
food and returned to the hotel around 20 minutes later. Marina was already sitting on the
bench, the man was no longer there, and she said we had to wait for the transport to arrive.
We sat there for around an hour and a half to two hours, and at around 8:00 in the evening,
a bus came along, as it had started to get dark, a group of around 19 men aged between 23
and 27 came out of the hotel, headed by the man that Marina had been talking to and a
second man of around 40, with a beard. Marina got up and went with them towards the bus.
They spent around ten minutes talking about something, and we then all started getting into
the bus and then we headed off.
Initially, Marina had told us, back at the station, that the training was supposed to
take place somewhere in the Greater Moscow Region, but during the journey it turned out
that we werent going in the direction of Moscow but in the direction of Voronezh, as Id
previously gone to Moscow several times, and had passed through Belgorod, Kursk, Oryol,
Tula, Serpukhov, then Moscow. But we were going in another direction. After about three
to four hours, I saw the turning to Voronezh, but we passed it, and I couldnt understand
where we were going, we asked where we were going but we were told that we would find
out upon arrival. It was already close to morning when we stopped, but it was still dark, we
got out of the bus, there was some sort of settlement and private dwellings nearby. We, that
is our group from Kharkov: Marina, her son Stas, some other relatives of hers called
Andrey, another Andrey, Kolya Tuz, Vitalik, Sergey, Pavel and I got into a PAZ bus,
and a group of young men that had joined us in Belgorod got into a covered vehicle, which
I think was a Ural vehicle, and set off. The blinds on the bus [windows] were pulled down
fairly tightly, we were asked not to move the blinds, the journey took around an hour. As
we were travelling, there was a pine forest on either side of us. Later, we arrived at some
gates with a boom gate, next to which there was a man in camouflage, we went through
the gates, travelled onwards for around ten minutes and stopped. When we got out of the
bus, we were met by someone in civilian clothing who introduced himself as Viktor and
Vladimir Bison with Slava [sic]. I saw that in front of us was a tent camp, and we were
told that we werent far from the city of Tambov. We were told that the group from
Kharkov should occupy one big tent, Marina had a separate small tent, and the group of
the men I described above had another big tent. When we had unpacked our belongings,
we were lined up and told that we could rest, that breakfast was at eight in the morning,
lunch at two in the afternoon and dinner at eight in the evening, that we would be told about
all the organizational issues later, and we were dismissed.
After wed had a rest, we were gathered together in a little square with benches,
and the man with the beard who had come out of the hotel in Belgorod introduced himself
as an ataman of the Cossack Hundred, and the people who had travelled with him as
Transcript of interview of suspect M.V. Varva dated 11/18/2014 (continued)
4
representatives of the Cossack Hundred. Then Viktor introduced himself, said that we
could address him by name and that if we had any questions, we should ask him. He then
demanded that we hand over all our mobile phones and other mobile devices, tables were
set out and we all put down these electronic devices and our documents, after which they
were gathered up. All the phones and documents were put into packages separately,
depending on who they belonged to, and put in a box. By then, it was time for lunch, after
which we were again sat down in the same place and introduced to two instructors who
said that it was they that would be working with us. The instructors were in camouflage
without any identifying insignia. They brought a table, placed on it an assault rifle, an SVD
rifle and started showing us how to take it apart, how to clean the weapons, and asked who
wanted to try themselves out as a sniper, and said that they themselves had decided who
would undergo this type of training.
The next day, after breakfast, they loaded the Cossacks into a covered goods vehicle
and took them somewhere, then this same vehicle came back for us and took us to a
shooting ground where we met the Cossacks. At the training ground were boxes containing
AK-74 assault rifles, in total there were 20 assault rifles, there were boxes containing tins,
in which were 5.45 cartridges. The first day we did only shooting practice until lunch, then
we returned for lunch, after which we cleaned weapons. Our training went on for two weeks,
from around August 24 until September 4, 2014. During the training, we all shot from:
AK-74 assault rifles, GP-25 grenade launchers, RPG-7, SVD rifles, an automatic grenade
launcher (AGL), which we called the snail. We also did ground navigation and
engineering exercises: we put wires on MON-50 mines, were shown how to handle a
detonator and place it in a TNT block, how to use Bickford fuses. Almost two days were
devoted to the rendering of first aid in the field: how to stem bleeding, how to treat a wound
sustained in the region of the lungs, and lots more. On one of the days, we all filled in forms
which contained columns similar to those in job application forms.
Out of the Kharkov group, Marina and Sergey underwent special sniper training,
and out of the Cossacks, four guys were trained, but insofar as we didnt talk to them all, I
dont even know their names.
In addition, the training took place in groups, we were asked to split into groups of
four to six people, and to develop interaction within the group during a battle in the field,
and we had explained to us how to deploy the group, who should open fire first, who should
be in a support role, who should shoot and in which direction, including when someone
was reloading their weapons. I was in a group with Vladimir Bison, Andrey, Kostya and
Pavel, sometimes people in a group swapped with other groups, but our group mostly
remained the same, as we knew one another well from Kharkov and were of a similar age.
At 4:55 p.m. there was a break in the interview pursuant to Article 224(2)
of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.
About three or four days before we left the camp, Bison, who had just been talking
to Viktor (the overseer at the camp), came up to our group and said that a briefing had been
Transcript of interview of suspect M.V. Varva dated 11/18/2014 (continued)
5
received that whoever wanted to could go with him to Donetsk where combat operations
were underway. Everyone understood that we were to take part on the combat operations
on the side of the DPR. I hadnt initially been planning to take part in any combat operations,
so I rejected this offer, but Kostya, Vitaly, Sergey, Andrey and Slava, headed by Bison,
decided, upon completing their training, to go to Donetsk. Whats more, they left the camp
a day before us, a minibus arrived in the middle of the night, at about three in the morning,
and picked them and their things up. During this conversation, Bison told me in the
presence of the others to stop Marina from doing anything stupid and in general to keep
away from her.
That day, when Bison came up to us with this offer, Viktor had been holding a
talk with all of us, namely with the group from Kharkov, at which he told us that our
objective, upon arriving in Kharkov, should be guerrilla warfare in the event that the
combat operations should reach the Kharkov Region, in which case our group would have
to get instructions from him by e-mail, and he told us not to engage in any independent
action. I wrote down for him my two e-mail addresses: [email protected] (password:
Vasilinka, English layout, but typed in Russian letters), and [email protected] (password
05021955), and he told me to write an undertaking to read as follows:
Nikolay Vasiliyevich Varva
date of birth: 2/5/1955
resident in Kharkov
do hereby undertake not to disclose to anyone what I learnt and where I was in the
Russian Federation from 8/23/2014 to 9/2/2014.
date signature,
which I wrote, and as far as I am aware, the other members of our group from Kharkov
also wrote such an undertaking.
Before Bisons group left for Donetsk at night, during the daytime on that same
day, two young guys called Stas (Marinas son) and Andrey left the camp for Kharkov, and
two Cossacks left with them, although I dont know where they were going, but they were
on the same vehicle.
The next day, after Bisons group left, all the rest of us from Kharkov, namely:
Marina, Pasha, Kolya Tuz and I and the Cossacks remained at the camp. Following our
departure, I never saw any of the Cossacks again.
I want to add that Kolya had the nickname Tuz from the very start, as hed
allegedly done time in prison. Whats more, when Viktor was talking to everyone and
taking the aforementioned undertakings, he proposed that we choose ourselves a code name.
I chose the code name VAN, Marina chose ZED, Kostya chose KHIMIK
[CHEMIST], Vladimir chose BISON, Vitaly chose SCHMIDT. I dont know about
any of the others.
Transcript of interview of suspect M.V. Varva dated 11/18/2014 (continued)
6
We left the camp in a UAZ [vehicle], we were taken to the bus station in Tambov,
everyone was given a ticket for the bus to Belgorod and 500 (five hundred) Russian rubles
for the trip from Belgorod to Kharkov. We had been given our documents and mobile
phones back in the camp before our departure, but Viktor warned us not to turn them on
until we were in Kharkov. When we got to Belgorod and got out at the bus station, Kolya
Tuz said goodbye to us and left immediately, telling us that he had other things to attend
to in Belgorod. It was about one oclock in the morning, a bus came along, we got it and
each gave the driver 200 rubles for the journey and left for Kharkov. We arrived at the bus
station on Gagarin Prospekt in Kharkov at around four in the morning, after which we went
our separate ways home.
Following our arrival on September 4, we (Marina, Pasha and I) continued to phone
one another and we also met up at weekends near Kulinichi on Freedom Square, and
sometimes we met at the park named after T.G. Shevchenko. We also discussed the
political situation in the country. It was at these meetings that Marina started to give voice
to the active calls to action, [saying] that our group had to start doing something, prove
itself in some way, and basically saying what our overseers from Russia were thinking, but
we stopped her and said that we needed to await information from the overseers. Vasily
Petrovich, whom Marina brought with her, also started coming to these meetings. He said
that he was fed up with simply doing nothing, and that he wanted to go to Lugansk or
Donetsk to take part in the combat operations. Besides Vasily Petrovich, as far as I
remember, it was Marina that brought with her Anatoly, who I entered in my phone
contacts as Tolya Comp, as I think his work was connected to computers. I also learnt
during these meetings that Pasha worked or was working for the armor repair plant as a
video surveillance specialist.
At the end of September I got a call from Andrey in Lugansk, the one who had gone
away with Bison, who told me that Kostya was supposed to be coming to Kharkov and that
I should keep an eye on him as not all was well with his nerves. The day after this call, I
got a call from Kostya Khimik, who said that he was already in Kharkov. It therefore
works out that Kostya had spent a little over two weeks in the Donbass.
In the latter third of September, I got a call from Alexander, whom I havent
mentioned above, but whom I had also met on Freedom Square in around May 2014, with
whom I had also spoken on the phone from time to time and met up with a couple of times.
He asked to meet me. When he and I met near the fountain at the Kharkov State Academic
Opera and Ballet Theatre, he told me that one of his friends had gone to Belgorod and that
he had an acquaintance in some security agency or other, and that if he managed to agree
on a meeting, then it would be possible to go there, and he proposed that I went with him
to get funding for the sort of campaigns that were being written about online, namely that
financial aid would come from Russia for people distributing leaflets, painting fences,
painting over painted-on Ukrainian flags. I want to note that I wanted to get this financial
Transcript of interview of suspect M.V. Varva dated 11/18/2014 (continued)
7
aid to repay my loans. Alexander said that as soon as he got the call from Belgorod, he
would tell me immediately.
On 10/28/2014, Sasha [Alexander] phoned me and said that we were expected on
October 29 at noon at the railway station in Belgorod. In the morning of the next day, we
left, but Sasha also took with him an acquaintance called Sergey, whom Id never seen
before, and whom I never met again following our return. We arrived at the station just
after midday, Sasha phoned his friend and we began waiting. Around 2030 minutes later,
his friend arrived in a grey or silver Hyundai Tucson with Ukrainian registration plates,
although I cant remember what they were. He picked up Sergey first, and they returned
after around an hour and a half two hours. He then arrived on his own again, Sasha and I
got into his car and went somewhere around a fifteen minute drive away. I then got out of
the car and sat down on a bench where Sergey was already sitting, and Sashas friend
explained to Sasha where to go to get to the park and that he would be met there. He was
gone for about an hour, then came back and told me that I now had to go to the same place
in the direction of the park and talk to someone. When I approached the park, a man aged
around 2830, of average height and slim build, came up to me and said that his name was
Dmitry. He started the conversation talking about general matters and in a roundabout way,
then he started making inquiries about me. I said that there were a few people who could
engage in outreach work against what was going on in Kharkov, as by then several Lenin
monuments had already been brought down, that I was very upset about this, but that at
least some financial aid was required for this, because quite simply there wasnt enough
money for petrol. He listened to me and asked for my e-mail address, in response to this I
wrote my work e-mail address for him on a piece of paper: [email protected]. He also
said that he was the lower tier and that he therefore couldnt promise anything, but he
would have a talk about our issue, he didnt say with whom, and that he would e-mail me
the response. We then said goodbye, and I returned to Alexander and Sergey, after which
we went back to the railway station.
When we arrived at the station, we went into the café and saw that there was
someone sitting there with a laptop, and we sat down with him, as Alexander said that it
was an acquaintance of his friend who had met us in Belgorod that day. This person
introduced himself as Vadim Medvedev, said that he was currently living in Belgorod,
travelling to Moscow and would try to get funding for the projects associated with the
Anti-Maidan information war. I also understood from the conversation that he was from
Kharkov. I told him that I had a friend in Kharkov (meaning Pavel) who wanted to set up
an Anti-Maidan information center to gather together information and put it online, and
asked him whether, if it worked out for him to get financial support in Moscow, we could
also rely on this support. He said in response that he wasnt opposed to it, and that he would
raise this issue in Moscow, and asked me for my e-mail address. I gave him the address
[email protected]. We said goodbye, got our tickets for the bus to Kharkov and left.
We arrived at the Southern station in Kharkov that same day at about eleven at
night, after which we went our separate ways home. In early November, Pasha called me
and said that hed found people in the Rostov Region who could help in the creation of an
Transcript of interview of suspect M.V. Varva dated 11/18/2014 (continued)
8
information center, that is, they could provide financial support, but that we had to go to
them in the town of Millerovo in the Rostov Region and meet up. We decided that if they
helped us with the petrol for the trip, we could go. That was how this matter ended for me.
I dont know if Pasha phoned these people.
Before October 14, that is, before the day of the UNA-UPSD [Ukrainian National
Assembly Ukrainian Peoples Self-Defense] or the UIA [Ukrainian Insurgent Army],
Marina phoned me and said that we needed to meet up. We met at the embankment near
the Central Market. She told me that she had met people calling themselves the Kharkov
Partisans and that they had handed over to her: three Kalashnikov assault rifles, whose
model I dont know, and four magazines for each of them; three or five MON mines; two
grenades which, judging from her description, were smoke grenades; three mines with
sticky magnets. She also said that she had all of this already and that it had all been given
to her on the condition that it all had to be somehow used before the 14th or on the 14th,
as there was information that there would be an act of provocation by the Right Sector and
other radical organizations aimed at capturing the Orthodox churches in Kharkov, and in
particular the Cathedral of the Annunciation, to which I responded that these werent our
methods of combat, especially as peaceful civilians would get hurt and we ourselves would
get hurt. She was outraged by the stance I had expressed. We then went our separate ways.
We did not speak again for around a week after this.
Then, one weekend, she also came to our so-called get-togethers and, during the
conversation, she again raised the issue of the use of the weapons in her possession, and
the idea was raised of attaching the checkpoint between Bezlyudovka and Vasishchevo.
Her idea was supported by Vasily Petrovich, but Pasha, Kostya and I rejected this idea, and
she was again unhappy about this.
Our last meeting with Marina was on Sunday, 11/9/2014, in the open air, in the
region of the ring road near to the Rogan development, not far from where Bison had
held his training sessions. Also present at this meeting were Vasily Petrovich, Tolik Comp
and Kostya Khimik. Suddenly, she got a sticky mine out of the trunk of her dark-red
VAZ-2109 car, whose registration plate I cant remember. Tolik, who had never seen
anything like it before, immediately went up to Marina and asked what it was and how it
worked, and I told him that you had to take out the plastic plug and, in its place, screw in
the trigger element. Marina again started saying that something had to be done urgently,
otherwise it would be taken off her, to which I responded that it would be better if they
took it all away than if something were to happen. After that she went completely mad,
took Vasily Petrovich with her, and left.
I have read this record, it was correctly written down from my words, and I have nothing
to add to it.
[signature] N.V. Varva
Defense lawyer [signature] [illegible]
Investigator [signature] [illegible]
Annex 199
Signed Declaration of Pavlo Korostyshevskiy, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (18
November 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
138
138
[initials]
[
]
On the subject matter of the questions asked, suspect P.Ya. Korostyshevsky
testified as follows:
I, Korostyshevsky, Pavlo Yakovych, born 07.08.1987 in Kharkiv, am registered and
actually residing in Kharkov at 10 Marharynovy Lane. For some 9 years, I have used the
number 093-458-29-98; for some 5 years, I have used the number 050-28-046-28, and for
2 years, I have used the number 096-061-03-89. Mobile provider cards for said numbers
have been seized from me during the body search.
At the moment, I live in Kharkov at 10 Marharynovy Lane, together with my parents:
father, Yakov Leonidovich Korostyshevsky, b. 1964, and mother, Anna Vadimovna
Mospak, b. 1963, as well as my brother Gigoriy Yakovlevich Korostyshevsky, b. 1996,
and four sisters: Yekaterina, b. 1991; Anastasia, b. 1992; Daria, b. 1995 and Sofia, b. 2004.
I have secondary education, and I am not officially employed at the moment. Since
2007, I have been unofficially installing locks and CCTV systems. I did not get to serve in
the armyfirst, because I was the eldest son in a family with many children, and then for
health reasons.
I am not married and have no minor children.
In February 2014, I came to the Freedom Square in Kharkov since I had an interest in
what was going on. I have not taken any active part in the events transpiring and joined no
organizations.
At the Freedom Square in Kharkov, I just watched and talked to people. I would for
the most part remain in the vicinity of the Kulinichi café near the exit from the University
metro station in the Shevchenko Park.
On or around August 17 or 18, 2014, when I was in the vicinity of said Kulinichi café,
a woman named Marina approached me. I had not met her before, but I did see her a couple
of times at the Freedom Square.
She offered me participation in a training course in Moscow, the Russian Federation.
She explained it was going to be physical education training, with per diem of USD 20,
and they would also cover my transportation to the training location and back, [and
provide] free meals and accommodations. I took her up on that offer since money was tight
at the moment.
At that time, it never even occurred to me that after the training was complete, the
party conducting it would keep a close eye on me and require that I perform certain tasks
in the future.
I specifically asked if that training was a preparatory stage for a trip to Donbass, but
Marina said we would all come back to Kharkov. I did not know that training in the RF
would specifically be military in nature. I only expected physical education.
On August 21, 2014, Marina called my number and said I had to be in Belgorod on
August 22, 2014. My phone that has a Life card in it has a record of SMS messages from
Marina, but I have no record of her [calls] in my account.
139
139
[initials]
On August 22, 2014, I came to the Southern Train Station in Kharkov where I took a
shuttle bus to Belgorod, RF at the Northern Terminal.
We arrived at the train station in Belgorod where Marina was already waiting for me
as we had previously agreed upon. She had a few others with her, of whom I knew two:
Vassily whom I met at Kulinichi (known as Ded (Grandpa) or Farmer; his patronymic was
Petrovich) and Andrey, whom I met at the same place (his last name was Besarabov, or
something like that; I didnt know if he had any nicknames). There were 9 strangers too. I
eventually learned their names or monikers: Bison (Vladimir, I dont know the last name);
Konstantin (nicknamed Chemist, I dont know the last name), Nikolay (Ace, I dont
know the last name), Stas (Marinas son), Sergey (nicknamed Latvian, I dont know the
last name), Nikolay (Barbarian or Van, I dont know the last name), Konstantin (I
dont know his nickname or last name), Vladimir (I dont know his nickname or last name),
and Andrew the Bessarabian (I dont know his real last name).
Having met each other, we had a bite right there, at the station, and then stepped to the
side somewhere (I did not quite get what the place was since my navigation skills are not
so good). A large bus drove up to that place (I do not remember the make). At that moment,
yet another group arrived, which we had not seen before. It was my understanding that this
was a second group of people that came for the training.
Marina [mostly] talked to her son and nephews, and also Kolya whose last name was
Varva (Bison appointed him group leader) and Bison whose first name was Vova (I dont
know his last name). The man nicknamed Bison arrived at the camp under his own power
some time later, accompanied by yet another man. A few days later, they left for Donbass
in the same manner, all by themselves. As I learned from conversations with Bison, he used
to be a law enforcement officer, with the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) or the Ministry
of the Interior. Bison never told us where exactly it was he served, except that he served in
Afghanistan [too].
During training she communicated with the instructors on an equal footing with all the
other group members. I did not notice any condescension or additional privilege in the way
the instructors treated her.
Heres a description of the abovementioned man: Caucasian; height: 165 cm; of a lean
build; short, dark hair; dark, medium eyebrows; dressed in either an Adidas training suit or
camos with no insignia, such as chevrons, stars or collar insignia. The only thing there was,
was a belt buckle with a star on it. He had no [identifying] speech defects.
Upon returning to Kharkov from training, all group members went home, promising
to stay in touch by phone. The first time the group members had a call for a meeting, I was
absent. The first time I did meet with the group was at the Sovetskaya metro station, not
too far from the monastery, on the downhill run near the monasterys bakery. The person
who told me about the meeting may have been Kolya Varva, Marina or Andrey
Bessarabov. At that meeting, someone among the members suggested that in the event of
any vigorous action in the territory of Kharkov and Kharkov Region, the group had to be
equipped with radios and optical equipment, and also conduct reconnaissance to prevent
any such action from being taken. Group members bought radios with their own money.
140
140
[initials]
To the best of my knowledge, it was Marina who received weapons and explosive devices
from somewhere. I have no idea where she kept those weapons and explosive devices.
At the subsequent meetings, people began suggesting we blow things up in Kharkov.
I do not remember who exactly talked about it at that moment, but at the last meeting,
which took place last week (11.09.2014) in the territory of an old military unit located
behind the Proletarskaya Metro Station, Marina and Vassily Petrovich, aka Farmer or Ded
(Grandpa) bragged about a successful detonation they accomplished somewhere in the
vicinity of Kharkovs V.A. Malyshev Transport Machinery Manufacturing Plant. In
addition, during that meeting, Marina and Vassily Petrovich suggested we blow up some
kind of a café in Kharkov, but I refused to participate. After that, Marina and Vassily got
into a vehicle and left for some meeting, and on the same day, an explosion occurred at the
Stena (Wall) pub on Rymarskaya Street in Kharkov. Kolya Varva and Kolya the Chemist
were also present at that meeting.
I attended a total of four meetings, of which two took place in the Bavaria
neighborhood of Kharkov, and specifically, down near the bridge across the Uda River,
not far from the pet market. I was the one who suggested that place since it was close to
141
141
[initials]
home and there were few people there. At those meetings, Kolya Varva told us he was
trying to get in touch with the RF, but no orders were received from them, and no
equipment or devices for actions had been received. At the second meeting, he said the
connection was lost altogether, and no one was picking up.
I never informed law enforcement of any of this because I was not quite sure Marina
and Vassily Petrovich were in fact involved somehow, and that they were not simply
showing off to the rest of the group.
I do not know how those explosions were perpetrated. Our group leader was Kolya
Varva, and Marina handled logistics. Marina also called me and [sic].
Additionally, I have a VKontakte page, Antimaidan, where I reposted [things] from
other groups. That page also contains the number of the Sberbank of Russia bank card for
funding the militia and the Kharkov Partisans and creating an information center. However,
I used whatever funds were remitted there for my personal needs and never passed them
along to anyone. I obtained said bank card at the Sberbank of Russia branch in Belgorod,
RF sometime in June 2014. I took out that bank card to be able to receive funds for the
militia from Russia via Privat 24 and Sberbank Online, and posted the cards details on the
abovementioned page online. I used the login name +380960610389 to access that page
online and the password was pashapicasso or picassopasha.
Overall, over 6 months, I have received some 50,000 Russian rubles via that card. I
withdrew the funds received using cash machines in Kharkov or used the card to pay for
clothes at the Denim store (Kharkov, Heroes of Labor Street), the Dafi mall and at a
McDonalds.
I do not know anything about Gennady Vladimirovich Anishchenko, b. 1961;
Gennady Leonidovich Broder, b. 1969; Ruslan Anatolyevich Panchuk, b. 1972; Aleksandr
Viktorovich Rozlomiy, b. 1971; Valera Sergeyevich Shekhovtsev, b. 1992; Sergey
Vladimirovich Shekhovtsev, b. 1967; Valera Nikolayevich Marenich, b. 1988; Oleg
Sobchenko or Vadim Monastyryov.
I cannot say anything of substance about the explosion on the night of 11.10.2014
11.11.2014 near the Hydropark [and] Britannia café, except for what I heard or read on the
news. Nor do I know anything about the circumstances or persons who blew up train tracks
in Kharkov Region, fired on trains, fired on military commissariats in Kharkov, blew up
electric transmission towers near Bezlyudovka of Kharkov Region, fired on a law office at
3 Lebedinskaya Street in Kharkov, fired on tank cars with aviation fuel and the fuel storage
facilities in a military unit, or fired on PAO Privatbank on Malomyasnitskaya Street in
Kharkov. I have only learned about all of those events and other acts of terrorism from the
news.
As to the shooting at the Kharkov Tank Plant (GP HBTZ) located on Kotlov Street in
Kharkov, I can only say that I have learned about it from the news.
142
142
[initials]
During one of our groups meetings, which took place about a month ago, Marina and
Kolya Varva suggested we overrun some checkpoint at night, and that Marina would obtain
all necessary weapons and equipment for that. I refused to take part in anything like that,
and I have no knowledge of whether any such action has been taken. Additionally, I could
clarify that while talking to Marina, I learned that she had come by some kind of weapons
because she began to actively promote making attacks of some sort.
In addition, I would like to say that during training at that camp in Tambov Region of
the RF, they asked me to pick a call sign. I chose Picasso. I did so because that was my
nickname back in school because I liked drawing graffiti [sic] in pencil.
I could describe the woman I mentioned above, Marina, as follows: height: about 165
cm, sturdily built, medium-long hair (she may have dyed her hair a dark color after training,
because she was a blonde before), regular-sized and shaped nose. I could identify her if
need be.
And here is a description for Konstantin the Chemist: height: around 170 cm, round
face, hair closely cropped, a small belly. I could identify Stas (Marinas son) and her
nephew, but I am not quite sure which of them is which, so I would rather not describe
them because I could be mistaken. Here is a description of Nikolay the Barbarian, or Van
(I dont know his last name): of medium build, height: around 180 cm, a small beard, hair
combed back. Andrey the Bessarabian: of medium height, balding, of medium build. I
could definitely identify all of the above individuals.
I am also voluntarily attaching to this interrogation a [record] of encrypted
communications on the Antimaidan page with Slava Sladky. Slava Sladky made
gunpowder and improvised explosive devices. The communications included instructions
on the use of explosive devices that he could make and [information] for remitting funds.
I am attaching said correspondence on 17 pages to the record of this interrogation.
Suspect ___ P.Ya. Korostyshevsky ____ /[signature]/
(Last name, first name, patronymic) (signature)
Defender ___ S.G. Pozdnyakov ____ /[signature]/
(Last name, first name, patronymic) (signature)
Investigator:
Senior major crimes investigator of the Investigations
Department of the Directorate of the Security Service
of Ukraine for Kharkiv Region
Major of Justice [signature] A.V. Ryzhylo
Annex 200
Signed Declaration of Andreii Bessarabov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (19
November 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
153
[...]
In response to the questions put to him, suspect A.R. Bessarabov gave the following
testimony:
I, Andrei Rostislavovich Bessarabov, born in Kharkiv on 02/11/1962, am registered and
actually reside at Apt. 61, 29-a ul. Timurovtsev, Kharkiv. I have been using telephone number
067-380-86-20 since 2004, and 066-605-08-13 since 2009.
I currently reside in Kharkiv at Apt. 61, 29-a ul. Timurovtsev. I live together with my wife,
Svetlana Vasilyevna Bessarabova, born in 1964; my son, Denis Andreyevich Bessarabov, born in
1984, and my daughter, Elina Andreyevna Bessarabova, born in 1994.
[signatures]
I have a higher education and am currently employed as a lead engineer at Vestron LLC. I served
in the army in the Anti-Aircraft Missile Troops of the Air Defense Forces from 1984 to 1986.
I am married. I do not have any minor children.
In March 2014, I went to Freedom Square in Kharkiv, as I was interested in what was
happening. I myself did not actively participate in the events there and did not belong to any
organizations.
On Kharkivs Freedom Square I observed what was happening and supported the
protesters.
In April 2014, when I was near Kharkivs Freedom Square, I was approached by a woman
by the name of Marina. I had never met her before. She introduced me to a man by the name of
Kostya, who invited me to participate in gatherings of people who supported pro-Russian ideology
at a location by Proletarskaya metro station, where the 45th trolley line ends. At these gatherings
we did physical training, cooked shish-kebabs, and talked. These meetings were attended by
Marina, Nikolai, Kostya, Volodya Bizon, and Sergei Latysh [The Latvian]. The meetings
were held every Saturday and Sunday, but I did not attend them regularly. At a meeting in mid
August, however, Marina invited me to do some training in the Russian Federation. She explained
that it would consist of physical training under field conditions. I accepted her invitation, as I
wanted to do the training, particularly since some of the people I had been getting together with at
these meetings were also going.
I did not stop to think what the ramifications of consenting to this might be.
On August 21, 2014, Marina called me on my phone and said that I should be at the railway
station in Belgorod on August 22, 2014. Marinas number was saved in my phones contacts under
RV Marina.
On August 22, 2014, I arrived at Kharkivs South Station, where I got on a mini bus to the
city of Belgorod, Russian Federation.
I arrived at the railway station in Belgorod. Marina was already waiting for me there. We
had agreed on a meeting spot in advance. She was accompanied by several other people, two of
whom I knew: Vasily [handwritten:] [illegible] (I had met him on the square (people called him
Ded" [Grandpa] or Fermer [The Farmer], and his patronymic was Petrovich)),
[handwritten: illegible] Kolya Tuz [Ace"], Sergei Latysh [The Latvian], and Slavik Sokho.
154
Pasha Picasso later arrived as well. After we had all met up, Vasily and Marina drove us to some
dormitory, and a large commuter bus (I do not recall the make) pulled up outside. At that moment
a second group of people that I had not seem before approached the bus. I understood that this was
a second group of people who were also on their way to get training.
The second group consisted of Cossacks. They were led by an ataman, who, I believe, was
called Slavik. I realized that the second group were Cossacks by the fact that they were commanded
by a hetman and spoke like Cossacks. Marina was in charge of our group, and a man by the name
of Sergei was escorting the second group of Cossacks, who traveled on the bus with us to a
training camp outside of Tambov, Russian Federation.
Someone told us to get on the bus (I did not notice exactly who), and everyone belonging
to the two groups that had assembled by the bus got on board. Marina also got on the bus and
traveled with us. About 8-9 hours after departing from the hotel, which is located about 15 minutes
walk from the railway station in Belgorod, our bus arrived at the bus depot in Tambov, Russian
Federation. From the Tambov bus station, our two groups, together with Marina and a man I had
not met before (I believe his name was Viktor; I do not know who he worked for or what his job
was), transferred onto another bus, which took us to a base in the forest. Upon arrival at the base,
they collected all of our communications and other electronic devices, as well as our passports,
which they gave back to us after we completed the training and prior to our departure.
Upon our arrival at the base, after everyone had gotten off the bus, we were greeted by a
man who had traveled with us from the Tambov bus depot, as well as Marina and the man I had
not met before, who pulled up shortly after our arrival. These people told all of the new arrivals
where everything was in the camp. They showed us the tents and said that we would be staying in
them. They assigned us to the tents and gave us linen. We were given two forms one requesting
our personal data, and the other comprising an agreement not to disclose anything about our time
at the camp. There was no specific addressee in the agreement.
During our stay in the camp, we were trained in shooting, first aid, demolitions, and combat
tactics in groups of four. Special attention was paid to mines, various explosive devices, the
technical specifications of firearms and explosives, topography, navigation, partisan activity, and
demolitions. Upon arriving at the camp, I signed a statement promising not to disclose anything
about my stay at the camp. The goal of the training, according to our instructors, was subversive
activity against the existing authorities in Ukraine. I learned to be a sniper. Our future objective,
they said, would come in the form of orders conveyed through Kolya. They said that if anyone
wanted to return to Russia, they would be given all sorts of assistance. The training itself lasted
around 13 days. I personally only fired a Kalashnikov assault rifle and a Dragunov sniper rifle.
After completing the training, I personally was given around USD 260. At the end of the
training, the man who had met us at the bus depot in Tambov also said that upon returning home
we should go back to our normal lives and wait for specific orders. They also told us that we would
receive monetary compensation for each successfully completed operation, but the amount would
be discussed only upon confirmation of a successful act and its impact.
Prior to starting the training, I and the other members of the group also filled out some
questionnaires in which we provided information about ourselves and our family members. We
turned these questionnaires in to one of the instructors at the camp (I do not remember exactly
which).
Upon arriving in Kharkiv after the training, all the members of the group parted ways and
headed home, saying that we would stay in touch by phone. The first time the group members got
together after coordinating by phone. I was not present at that meeting. The first group meeting I
155
went to was at Sovetskaya metro station, not far from the monastery, on the slope by the
monasterys baked goods stand. I found out about this meeting from Kolya Varva, or perhaps it
was Marina or Andrei Bessarabov.
Upon arriving in Kharkiv, I continued attending our meetings. At the last meeting, it was
already being proposed that we carry out bombings in Kharkiv.
I do not know anything about Gennady Vladimirovich Anishchenko, b. 1961, Gennady
Leonidovich Broder, b. 1969, Ruslan Anatolyevich Panchuk, b. 1972, Aleksandr Viktorovich
Rozlomy, b. 1971, Valera Sergeyevich Shekhovtsov, b. 1992, Sergei Vladimirovich Shekhovtsov,
b. 1967, Valera Nikolayevich Marenich, b. 1988, Oleg Sobchenko, or Vadim Monastyrev.
I would also like to say that at the time of the training at the camp in the Tambov Region
of the Russian Federation, they asked me what call sign I would like to choose for myself. I selected
the call sign Moria, since that is the name of one of Indias northern provinces [sic], and I am a
Krishna Consciousness believer.
I can describe the woman by the name of Marina whom I mentioned earlier as follows:
about 1.65 meters tall, solid build, average length hair (she was blonde initially, but I believe she
colored her hair dark after the training), nose of normal size and shape. I would be able to identify
her if necessary.
We were talking about seizing the checkpoint at Bezlyudivka one night the following
weekend with a force of 3-4 people and three AK74 assault rifles. This suggestion came from
Kolya, call sign Vang. He got in touch with Marina. Marina had weapons and explosives. She
handled the supply of weapons. The group was supposed to consist of Kolya, Kostya, Marina,
Vasya, and Pasha. The goal was to seize the weapons.
Suspect [handwritten:] A.R. Bessarabov /[signature]/
(full name) (signature)
Defense counsel [handwritten:] [illegible] /[signature]/
(full name) (signature)
Interviewed by:
Senior Investigator, Kharkiv Regional Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine
Lieutenant [signature] S. Skibo
Annex 201
Signed Declaration of Andrey Bozhko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (19 November
2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Transcript of interview of suspect A.A. Bozhko dated 11/19/2014
2
[
]
I, Andrey Andreyevich Bozhko, born on 12/28/1992, reside in the city of Kharkov at 31
Vladivostokskaya Street. I make a living by renting out my apartment and have savings; I also
receive assistance from my parents who live separately. My mother, Larisa Anatolyevna Bozhko,
works as a cleaner in the Russian Federation and lives in Cherkessk, Karachay-Cherkess Republic,
Russian Federation; my father, Andrey Viktorovich Bozhko, born in 1963, is currently
[initials]
Transcript of interview of suspect A.A. Bozhko dated 11/19/2014
3
unemployed and resides in Kharkov at 1/3 Geroyev Stalingrada Ave., apt. 46; my brother, Roman
Andreyevich Bozhko, born on 06/02/1999, resides in Ordzhonikidzevskiy, Karachay-Cherkess
Republic.
As far back as February 23, 2014, when various rallies began in Kharkov, I took part in all
pro-Russian events, rallies and protests; my longtime friend (and cousin) Stanislav Leonidovich
Kudrin, who is four years older than me, accompanied me to these events along with his mother,
Marina Anatolyevna Kovtun, who came to these events from time to time. I took part in these
rallies and events for several reasons: firstly, it falls within my political views as I support
friendship with the Russian Federation, and secondly, many of my friends went to these rallies and
I spent time with them (most of the time, we just walked through Shevchenko Park in Kharkov).
We tried to visit these events all the time; besides, I also tried to join the people who defended the
monument to V.I. Lenin as I was against its demolition. I would also like to note that I was at the
rally preceding the capture of Kharkov Regional State Administration but right before the assault
on the Administration [building], my friends and I left the square and went to one of the cafeterias
nearby (Buffet Pizzeria on Lenin Avenue) so I did not take any part in the capture of the
Administration [building]. After one of the subsequent rallies (I do not remember when exactly
and under what circumstances), M.A. Kovtun invited me and some other guys (I do not remember
whom exactly) to practice hand-to-hand combat and improve my physical fitness and I accepted
the invitation. M.A. Kovtun told me to come to Proletarskaya Metro Station on the following
weekend and from there I took a trolleybus to a place located near Kulinichi, a garage cooperative,
and railway tracks; the place itself was an abandoned semi-oval hangar next to a square concrete
building. Our meetings were held in these buildings. I went to these training sessions about 4-5
times; they were attended by 7 to 10 people; in addition to myself, S.L. Kudrin and M.A. Kovtun
also came to these lessons. At these sessions, I also met Sergey and Kolya. During these meetings,
hand-to-hand combat techniques were shown by a man called Bison (I do not know his name).
However, I soon stopped attending these classes because we spent more time discussing the
political situation in the country than engaging in hand-to-hand combat and sports.
Around August 20th, M.A. Kovtun suggested (I do not remember exactly under what
circumstances) that I go to the Russian Federation to attend courses; she did not specify what the
courses would be, what we were going to do and what we were going to learn. Despite this, I
agreed because I thought that there would be some interesting courses with lectures and workshops
on politics, peaceful (legitimate) protest actions and the like.
I set off for the courses in late August; we traveled by shuttle bus from Kharkov Southern
Station to Belgorod, Russian Federation. About 15 people left Kharkov, including S.L. Kudrin,
[initials]
Transcript of interview of suspect A.A. Bozhko dated 11/19/2014
4
M.A. Kovtun, Kolya, Bison (I do not know the other people). On the same day, we entered the
Russian Federation through checkpoint Goptovka and proceeded to Belgorod on the same bus. In
Belgorod, we disembarked near the railway station; in the evening of the same day, a bus arrived
to pick us up and we went to Tambov, Russian Federation, via Voronezh. When we arrived in
Tambov (in the morning of the next day) we changed transport (there was a car, a truck and a bus;
I went by bus), which took us to a wooded area with a large number of tents. After we unloaded,
a man in military uniform said that we could rest until lunch. After we rested, all personal
belongings (including mobile phones) were taken away from us and we were issued military
uniforms (without insignia). During our stay in the camp, we were trained in shooting, first aid,
demolition techniques, combat tactics in groups of 4 people; special attention was paid to mines,
various explosive devices, specifications of small arms and explosives; there were also classes in
topography and land navigation and subversion. Besides us, there were other people in the camp
in uniforms without insignia; they mostly introduced themselves by first names and taught the
mentioned courses. On the very first day, we were gathered and explained that in the daytime we
would be studying warfare and sleeping tight at night; they did not go into details as to the purpose
of the training, and I did not ask any questions. Besides me, the people training in the camp whom
I can now remember were S.L. Kudrin, M.A. Kovtun, Vasiliy, Bison, Sergey, Andrey, Andrey
(with a mustache). Also during our training, a man in civilian clothes came to the camp and
interrogated us using a polygraph machine. As I recall, among other questions, he asked the
following: Do you feel danger being here? to which I replied Yes; Are you joining the militia
for the purpose of looting to which I replied No; Are you capable of betrayal if you and your
loved ones are in danger? to which I replied "Yes;" Are you collaborating with the SBU? to
which I replied No; Have SBU agents threatened you? to which I replied No. As far as I
know, everybody took a polygraph. After the polygraph, I signed a non-disclosure statement
stating that I pledge not to disclose information that I became aware of during the training period
in the camp.
Training in this camp was held for 13-14 days. At the end of the training, everyone was
asked what specialty he or she chose; I replied that I wanted to be a rifleman, but they told me that
there was no such specialty. Then I said that I would be a sapper. At the end of the training, they
summoned me, S.L. Kudrin and two other unknown men who were also training in the camp and
told us to return home; they said that we should live as before and not say a word to anyone about
[initials]
Transcript of interview of suspect A.A. Bozhko dated 11/19/2014
5
what happened to us here. We were given tickets home and money in US dollars at a rate of about
$ 20 per day of training. After that, we took a bus to the Belgorod Railway Station, and from there
S.L. Kudrin and I went to Kharkov on a shuttle bus. S.L. Kudrin and I returned to Ukraine in early
September (around the 3rd or 4th day of the month).
Upon arrival in Kharkov, from September to November, I had dealt solely with personal
matters and did not attend any rallies or actions, only occasionally communicating with S.L.
Kudrin and M.A. Kovtun. About three weeks ago, M.A. Kovtun gave me a flash drive with
information about mines and did not explain why she was giving it to me. I looked through only
one of the files on this flash drive (it actually contained information about mines); there were three
files with information on it. A couple of days after these events, I returned this flash drive to M.A.
Kovtun.
[initials]
Investigators question: Do you know an organization called Kharkov Partisans and if yes, from
where?
Suspects answer: I know about the Kharkov Partisans; I learned about them from the media and
their online message.
[initials]
Investigators question: Do you know any members of the Kharkov Partisans?
Suspects answer: I know nothing about who the members of the Kharkov Partisans are.
[initials]
Investigators question: Did you receive any other training in the Russian Federation except for
the case of the camp near Tambov that you described?
Suspects answer: Back in the spring, at the invitation of M.A. Kovtun and S.L. Kudrin, we went
to Belgorod in the Russian Federation to take courses where we were given lectures on history,
politics and economics. I stayed at these courses for five days; then I returned to Ukraine. At the
end of these courses, the people delivering the lectures gave me a flash drive that I brought back
with me.
[initials]
Investigators question: When you went to the training camp near Tambov, Russian Federation,
did M.A. Kovtun or any other persons promise you any monetary compensation?
Suspects answer: No, I was not promised any money; it was rumored that we could be paid some
money and this matter was mainly discussed on the way to the camp.
[initials]
Transcript of interview of suspect A.A. Bozhko dated 11/19/2014
6
Investigators question: Did you receive any nickname during the training or after completion?
Suspects answer: No, I was not given any pseudonyms, callsigns or nicknames.
[initials]
Investigators question: During training in the camp outside of Tambov, RF, did anyone tell you
anything about the purpose for which you were training?
Suspects answer: Nobody said anything specific about the purpose of our training in the camp
near Tambov.
[initials]
Investigators question: During the training in the camp near Tambov and the courses in
Belgorod, were any tasks or assignments given to you or the people who were with you?
Suspects answer: During the training in the camp near Tambov and the courses in Belgorod, I
personally did not receive any assignments, but I cannot say anything about the people around me.
[initials]
Investigators question: After completing the training in the camp near Tambov and the courses
in Belgorod, were any tasks or assignments given to you or the people who were with you?
Suspects answer: After completion of training outside Tambov and after the courses in Belgorod,
neither I nor any of the people who were with me received any tasks or assignments.
[initials]
Attorneys question: Do you know if any of your acquaintances own firearms, explosives
(including self-made weapons), mines, grenades or any other weapons?
Suspects answer: I do not know anything about any of my acquaintances owning firearms,
explosives (including self-made weapons), mines, grenades or any other weapons, and I did not
see any of the mentioned articles in their possession.
[initials]
Attorneys question: The Notice of Suspicion dated 11/19/2014 that was served upon you states
that you, among others, took part in discussing plans for further terrorist activities, namely,
arranging explosions near the Malyshev Plant, blasting the Rock Pub Wall cafe and capture of a
checkpoint in the Kharkov Region. What can you say about this?
Suspects answer: Regarding my Notice of Suspicion dated 11/19/2014, I can testify that I did
not take part in discussing plans for further terrorist activities, namely, arranging explosions near
[initials]
Transcript of interview of suspect A.A. Bozhko dated 11/19/2014
7
the Malyshev Plant, blasting the Rock Pub Wall cafe and capture of a checkpoint in the Kharkov
Region. Moreover, I want to note that I learned about these crimes from the media.
I have read the interrogation record.
I have no clarifications or additions.
[signature] A.A. Bozhko
Attorney [signature] V.N. Salo
Interrogated and drew up the record:
Senior Investigator for Major Cases of the
Investigative Department of the SBU Directorate in Kharkov Region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature] O.B. Buturin
Annex 202
Signed Declaration of Stanislav Kudrin, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (19
November 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Transcript of interview of suspect S.L. Kudrin dated 11/19/2014
1
[
]
Question: Have your constitutional and procedural rights as a suspect been
explained to you and do you understand them?
Answer: Yes, my rights as a suspect have been explained to me and I understand
them in full.
Question: You are suspected of committing an offense under Article 258-3, part 1
of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
Do you understand the nature of the suspicion that you have been notified of? If so, do
you plead guilty of committing the offense you are charged with, do you want to provide
evidence during this interrogation, and what can you say regarding the suspicion that you
have been notified about?
Answer: I understand the nature of the charges brought against me in full. I plead
guilty in part because I participated in, but did not commit the terrorist attacks. I am willing
to provide evidence to the pre-trial authority on a voluntary basis.
I currently reside at the above address together with my mother, Marina
Anatolyevna Kovtun, born on June 3 (I do not remember the year of birth), and my sister
Dariya Sergeyevna Kovtun, date of birth 10.10.1995. My father, Leonid Vasilyevich
Kudrin, lives separately from us in the village of Rzhavo, Kursk Region, Russian
Federation. My mother and sister have different last names because my mother married
Sergey Kovtun (I do not know his patronymic) who is my stepfather. He has not lived
with us since 2005. I also have a half brother on my fathers side Bogdan Leonidovich
Kudrin who lives with his father in Rzhavo. I do not communicate with my half brother
and have only seen him once in my life.
Furthermore, I have cousins on my mothers side, namely: my mothers younger
sister, Larisa Bozhko (my aunt), has two sons Andrey Andreyevich Bozhko and Roman
Andreyevich Bozhko. Andrey Bozhko lives in Kharkov on Vladivostokskaya Street (I do
not know the exact address). L.A. Bozhko and her son Roman live in the Caucasus the
village of Ordzhonikidze, Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Republic, Russian Federation.
As far as I know, Andrei Bozhko does not officially work anywhere and earns money in
the construction sector. I am on good terms with him.
The mothers older sister, Svetlana Anatolyevna Mineyeva (my second aunt), has
two sons Aleksandr Sergeyevich Mineyev (about 30-32 years old) and Artem
Sergeyevich Mineyev (about 30 years old) who live in Leninsky District of Kharkov, but
I do not know his exact address. As far as I know, Aleksandr Sergeyevich Mineyev lives
Transcript of interview of suspect S.L. Kudrin dated 11/19/2014
2
[signature]
somewhere in Kursk Region, RF. I have no other close relatives. Artem Mineyev has his
own garage and repairs cars; officially, he does not work anywhere.
The main source of our familys income are my occasional earnings and wages that
my mother received until recently. My mothers last place of employment was a sewing
workshop in Kharkov where she worked as a seamstress. My last employment was with
Industry Company in Kharkov as a leveler. I worked there from November 2012 to
November 2013. In addition, I worked unofficially making armor for chivalric
tournaments and selling it online. I worked in a garage located in our house. My last
official place of work was in the village of Pervomayskiy, Tambov Region, Russia,
building turkey coops. My employment was arranged by my older cousin Aleksandr. In
fact, I had stayed there from late September 2014 to November 12, 2014.
Since the beginning of active Maidan-related events in Ukraine, I have been their
overt opponent and have taken part in numerous rallies at a square in Kharkov under
Antimaidan slogans. Actually, the active Antimaidan stage began in Kharkov after the
capture of the regional administration building. I did not take part in the seizure of the
administration building, but I went there after it was captured. Later on, there were
numerous meetings of activists near the Lenin monument in Liberty Square. I went there
when there was an online call for a gathering to prevent provocations. Activists
communicated through social networks in Antimaidan Kharkov and Antimaidan groups.
I am registered in the VKontakte social network under the name Kudrin Stanislav,
login name [email protected], password Stas_1488.
My mother, Marina Anatolyevna Kovtun, accompanied me to the square on numerous
occasions. She spent more time at that square than I since she is also an active supporter
of the Antimaidan.
Around June 2014, my mother suggested that I go to Belgorod, Russia, to study and
listen to lectures on the political situation and politics in general. I agreed to the trip. There
were five us myself, my cousin Andrey Bozhko, Vladimir Mazurin (my friend, 27-28
years old, long hair, elongated face, about 180 cm tall, small beard), my mother M.A.
Kovtun, a man named Vasily (I can describe him as a man of medium build, 180 cm tall,
about 50 years old, without a beard and mustache, short, gray hair. I could easily identify
him); we were also accompanied by another man whom I did not know before and met at
the station; his name may have been Sergey. In addition, we met a guy named Aleksandr
at the Kharkov Railway Station who was our guide, as my mother explained to me.
We left Kharkov on a shuttle bus going to Belgorod, RF. We crossed the border
between Ukraine and RF at the Goptovka checkpoint. Having arrived in Belgorod, the
guy named Sasha who was our guide escorted us to the Patriot Hotel and checked us in. I
Transcript of interview of suspect S.L. Kudrin dated 11/19/2014
3
[signature]
stayed in a room together with Volodya and Andrey. On the next day and the following
days, lectures were held in the DOSAAF (Volunteer Society for the Promotion of the
Army, Navy and Air Force) building located near the hotel. I stayed there for a total of 5
days. My friend Volodya spent only 2 days in Belgorod and returned back to Kharkov
saying that he had to go to work. We listened to lectures on economics, forecasting of
events, psychological games, working with the press, conducting PR campaigns, and
information security. In addition, I also received a white flash drive with various
information (lectures and books). This flash drive is presently in my room at home. I
stayed in Belgorod for 5 days and then returned to Kharkov together with Andrey and my
mother.
After arriving in Kharkov, I did not do much of anything and continued to
communicate with Antimaidan activists via social networks. In addition, during this
period I learned from my mother that training in hand-to-hand combat and self-defense
was conducted in the Rogani District of Kharkov (near the airplane monument) in the
building of a ruined factory. I could participate if I wanted. I decided to go and see what
the training was all about. I went there with my mother and cousin Andrey. The exercises
were conducted by a guy nicknamed Bison. I did not see this man before. Vasya
attended the training sessions as well. No other friends or acquaintances of mine went to
these sessions. I visited the sessions two or three times.
Then my mother invited me to Moscow to listen to similar workshops and lectures.
I agreed to this offer. I went to Moscow around July 2014; I cannot recall the time more
accurately.
I was accompanied by my mother M.A. Kovtun and Vasily. We left Kharkov on a
shuttle bus to Belgorod, then by train from Belgorod to Moscow. After arriving in
Moscow, my mother phoned a man named Sasha who was supposed to meet us, as she
explained. Regarding this Alexander, I can say that he told me that he took part in
numerous rallies in Kharkov near the Lenin monument.
Near one of the metro stations, we were met by a guy who introduced himself as
Sasha (about 35-40 years old, short hair, 175 cm tall, lean physique, and wears glasses)
who accompanied us to the Writers House. This House was a three-story old building
with columns at the entrance. In this House, I saw several rooms; in one of them I saw
and recognized journalists and news anchors from DNR, LNR, Novorossia. We spent the
night in a church. We stayed there only one night. On the following day, we met with a
man whose appearance I do not remember who asked us about the situation in Kharkov
and whether anyone was willing to go for special training if necessary. My mother, Vasya
and I were present at the meeting with this man. There was nobody else. On the same day,
the three of us left for Kharkov by train. They gave us (my mother, Vasya and me) 5000
Transcript of interview of suspect S.L. Kudrin dated 11/19/2014
4
[signature]
rubles to cover pocket expenses for all of us and bought us train tickets. When leaving,
we each gave them our phone numbers because we were told that they would call us and
let us know when it was necessary to go to the camp for training. After arriving in
Kharkov, I did not do anything and waited for them to send orders to go to the camp.
After about 9-10 days, my mother told me that she received a call and that it was
necessary to pack and go to the camp for training. We were supposed to get to Belgorod,
where they would tell us where to go next. I arrived in Belgorod together with my mother,
Vasya and Andrey in early August 2014. In Belgorod, we came close the Patriot Hotel
and waited. At this time my mother called someone and spoke about something. She told
me that we were waiting for a bus to pick us up. In the evening of the same day, a bus
arrived at the hotel; my mother said that we should board it and go. There was another
group of about 20 people near the hotel who also boarded the bus. Near the railway station,
I met the guy nicknamed Bison who conducted exercises in hand-to-hand combat and
also joined our group. After boarding, one of the people on the bus who introduced himself
as Sergey told everyone to turn off their phones and the bus drove off. Nobody told us
where we were going. We rode the bus for about 10 hours and arrived in Tambov as I
learned later, where we changed vehicles one group went on a bus, and the other on a
military Ural truck. We rode for about 20-25 minutes to the outskirts of Tambov, entered
a forest and eventually arrived at a military base. I understood this because we passed
through a checkpoint. At the military base, our entire group of about 25 people, was
accommodated in two army tents equipped with double beds. I settled in the same tent
with Bison.
The following people lived in the tent together with me: Vasya, my cousin Andrey,
Pasha (a guy of lean physique; sharp nose; 175 cm tall; according to him, a resident of
Kharkov), Slavik (a cross-eyed guy; I saw him several times in training; 180 cm tall;
medium build; about 40 years old; according to him, a resident of Kharkov employed in
the IT sector), Andrey (40 years old; gray hair; lean; medium height; resident of Kharkov),
Sergey (up to 45 years old; short hair; no prominent physical characteristics), a guy named
Vitalik nicknamed Bolgar (medium build; 30-35 years old; 180 cm tall), an older man
named Nilolay (about 60 years old; stout and decrepit physique), a guy named Andrey
(30-35 years old, strong build, medium height), Bisons friend nicknamed Sailor (185
cm tall, lean physique, black hair). I chose the specialty of Mine Handling my mother
was trained under the Sniper program, Andrei as a Mine Handler, and Vasya as a
Machine Gunner. We were all issued BDUs. A few days after arriving in the camp, I
was checked on a polygraph with the following questions: whether I was a member of the
Right Sector, whether I collaborated with the SBU, whether I participated in attacks on
police officers in Kiev during the Maidan and other questions, which I do not remember.
Transcript of interview of suspect S.L. Kudrin dated 11/19/2014
5
[signature]
The combat training schedule and routine in the camp was as follows: wake up at
7:30, breakfast at 8:00 (in the mess at the military base), first class at 10:00, lunch at 14:00,
second class at 15:00, dinner at 19:00, and the lights were out at 22:00. There were a total
of two classes per day lasting up to three hours. Our team leader was a man of about 40
who, I understand, was a service member of the Russian army, I do not remember his
name. We were taught by two young guys named Maksim and Sasha. They wore BDUs
without insignia. I do not know anything else about them. We were taught firearms,
demolition, military medicine, navigation on the ground.
Since I chose the specialty of demolition, I remember this subject best. During the
training, they told me about the kinds of explosives plastic, TNT, types of mines and
their specifications, types of cords, types of detonators for explosion, demolition of
railways, rails, bridges and other buildings. Additionally, I was able to practice detonating
explosives using detonators.
Firearms training was also conducted. I fired an AK-74 chambered in 5.45 mm,
including underbarrel grenades; I also fired an RPG and PKM once. Shooting was
conducted at a range with special targets. Furthermore, psychologists worked with us in
the camp; they talked about why I came there, what I wanted, but did not give any
instructions. Also, while at the camp, I saw service members of the Russian army in blue
berets, so I assumed that we were with a Russian airborne unit.
Later on, in 10 days, the team leader summoned me, Andrey and two more guys
from the other group and said that our training was over and we should return to Kharkov
and wait for further instructions. He took our phone numbers once again, had us sign non-
disclosure statements concerning the fact that we underwent this military training in the
territory of the Russian Federation and said that upon arrival in Kharkov we should turn
on our phones and wait. And do nothing without orders. We came back from the camp in
the following way: the team leader took us to a bus station in Tambov, where he bought
us tickets to Belgorod. Then we went to Belgorod where we took a bus to Kharkov. They
gave us 200 US dollars each for the road. They said that should anything happen, we were
supposed to tell our relatives that we were working and earned this money.
After arriving in Kharkov, I stayed home and did not engage in any illegal activities.
A few days later, my mother called me and asked if everything was OK and if I got home
all right; I said that everything was alright. She returned a few days later. During the days
after my arrival, I socialized on my Kudrin Stanislav page in VKontakte with Vladimir
who was signed in as Svyatoslav Berkut. During one of the meetings, Vladimir Mazurin
told me that he made gunpowder at home. As far as I know, he did not make any use of it
and burned it outside.
Transcript of interview of suspect S.L. Kudrin dated 11/19/2014
6
[signature]
A month later, approximately in the middle of September, I went to my cousin
Aleksandrs place to build turkey coops in the village of Pervomaysky, Tambov Region.
I returned to Kharkov on November 12, 2014. I crossed the border through the
Goptovka checkpoint at 21:00. After crossing the border, I met my mother near the border
and we drove home.
At 6 pm, the interrogation was suspended for a break under Article 224(2)of the
Ukrainian Code of Criminal Procedure
Question: Please testify whether you know Ukrainian citizens Oleg Vasilyevich
Sobchenko (callsigns Vasilyevich, Nine) and Vadim Viktorovich Monastyryov; if
yes, when, and under what circumstances did you meet them, what are your relations?
What do you know about the role of these individuals in the activities of the Kharkov
Partisans and their involvement in terrorist acts in the territory of the Kharkov Region and
the city of Kharkov?
Answer: I do not know Oleg Vasilyevich Sobchenko (callsigns Vasilyevich,
Nine) and Vadim Viktorovich Monastyryov. I have never heard about them.
Transcript of interview of suspect S.L. Kudrin dated 11/19/2014
7
Question: What do you know about the activities of the Kharkov Partisans and
their members involvement in terrorist acts in the territory of the Kharkov Region and
the city of Kharkov?
Answer: I know about the activities of the Kharkov Partisans and their members
involvement in terrorist acts in the territory of the Kharkov Region and the city of Kharkov
only from the Internet and Antimaidan groups in VKontakte.
Question: Here is a geographical map of Tambov and surrounding areas taken from
the online Google Maps service. Can you show the location of the training camp?
Answer: Yes, I have been shown a map of Tambov and the surrounding areas. I
can show the location of the camp and its facilities on the map. (Annex No. 1 to the
Interrogation Record on three pages.)
Question: Do you want to add anything?
Answer: Yes, I wish to add that I have not participated in terrorist acts in the
territory of Ukraine and had no such intentions. I trained at the camp out of curiosity. I am
ready to provide full assistance to the pre-trial investigation.
I have read the interrogation record; it was recorded correctly from my words; I have
no remarks or additions.
[signature] S.L. Kudrin
Defense attorney [signature] O.G. Smorodskiy
Interrogated and drew up the record:
Senior Investigator for Major Cases of the
Investigative Department of the SBU Directorate in Kharkov Region
Major of Justice [signature] O.S. Zahumenniy
Annex 203
Signed Declaration of Gennadiy Shmorovoz, Witness Interrogation Protocol (17
December 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
138
1
[
]In response to the questions that were put to him. G.R. Shmoryvoz gave the following
testimony:
I learned about the existence of Stena Rock Pub from my friends about two and a half years
ago. My acquaintance Sergey Kordyuk first showed me the establishment. After that, I started
visiting the establishment from time to time and met many people there (including both the
management and other patrons). I visited the establishment about twice a week. I did so on various
days of the week, whenever I had the free time and desire.
Among the establishments managers, I know: Mikhail Kabanov, Mikhail Ozerov, Marina
Ovcharenko, Roma Chernenko, and Yevgeny Serzhantov. I also know two of the women from the
kitchen, but I do not know their names. Among the regular patrons, I know: Igor Ulezchenko,
Nikita Soloshenko, Sergey Kordyuk, Olga Vitushnyak, Kiril Marchenko, Dima Utkin, and Anton
Belousov, as well as other people whose names I do not recall.
Regarding Stena Rock Pub, I can tell you that the establishment does not have any clear,
specific orientation. It is frequented by soccer fans when soccer matches are on. It also hosts live
rock music, and fans of that kind of music often come to the establishment to hear it (to relax). As
for whether the establishment has a pro-Ukrainian orientation, I cannot tell you anything specific,
except that the establishments patrons are generally in favor of a unified and indivisible Ukraine.
That being said, no propagandistic events were held at the establishment.
Question: Do you know if the establishment is frequented by military servicemen from any
of the volunteer battalions?
Answer: I saw a man in uniform at the establishment literally a couple of times. I
understand from Marina that this person had been coming to the pub even before ATO [anti-
terrorist operation] started. After the armed conflict began, he signed up for a volunteer battalion
and still continued visiting the establishment. No meetings of military servicemen returning from
the ATO were held at the establishment. The establishment is the most typical one of its kind.
Question: Were there ever any conflicts at the establishment?
Answer: As far as I can recall, such conflicts were extremely rare (one or two incidents).
and they usually ended with management calling security.
Question: As far as you know, have the establishments managers had any conflicts with
patrons or other persons, including social activists (volunteers), supporters of a pro-Russian
orientation, etc.?
Answer: No, I am not aware of any such circumstances.
Question: Tell us about the day of the explosion at the establishment (11/09/2014).
Answer: At around 6:30 p.m., I met with the aforementioned Nikita Sovaloshenko by the
Sportivnaya metro station, after which we headed to Stena Rock Pub, as agreed in advance. We
continued on to Sovetskaya Station and walked to the pub from there. We arrived at the pub
around 6:50 p.m. Being by the entrance at that moment, we witnessed a man being escorted out
of the pub, I later learned that he had spoken ill of the Azov battalion. He initially came out
accompanied by the guests with whom he had had the altercation. They were then approached by
Mikhail Kabanov, who led the man away from the pub. The guests who had initially escorted the
man out I had seen before, but I do not know their names. As for the man who started the
conflict, I had never seen him before. After that, we went into the café and found somewhere to
sit by the bar.
While at the establishment, we drank and went out a couple of times to smoke. The first
time we went out was after about 30 minutes, followed by another three times (the last time was
right before the explosion). About ten minutes after we came back into the establishment for the
138
2
third time following a smoke, a man walked into the establishment and found a spot not far from
us, around the middle of the bar. He ordered a coffee Americano, drank his coffee for about 20
minutes, and then left the establishment. About 5 minutes before he left, the man smiled, turned to
me, and commented on my conversation with Nikita, something along the lines of: our jokes are
so cruel, to which I replied, I know. After that, the man got up and headed for the exit, adding,
were good friends. A couple of minutes later, we went out to have a smoke. When we came
back in, we sat down in our original spots again. About a minute and a half or two minutes later,
an explosion rang out inside the café.
Question: Can you give a detailed description of the man who was sitting next to you
drinking coffee?
Answer: The man was about 3035 years old. He was wearing a dark grey knit sweater
(possibly with a zipper), a thermal-lined, light-colored jacket, and a pair of jeans. I didnt notice
his shoes. He was of Slavic appearance with dark, slightly graying hair, a short haircut, and a bit
of stubble. He did not have any distinguishing features.
During his time there he was holding a telephone in his hands and pressing something on
the screen. The phone looked like an LG. Based on my interaction with the man, I got the
impression that he was friendly, so I did not become suspicious.
Question: Had you ever seen this man before?
Answer: No.
Question: Did he tell you his name?
Answer: No, we hardly spoke.
Question: Are you a member of any political parties, organizations, or social movements?
Answer: No, I am not.
Question: Would you be able to recognize the man you have described?
Answer: Yes, I would be able to recognize him.
Question: Can you tell us what happened after the explosion?
Answer: The blast threw me toward the exit, a bit to the left of the entrance. After that,
people dragged me outside, where I was put in the second ambulance (the first one had already
taken Nikita), which transported me to Hospital No. 4.
According to the medical reports, as a result of the explosion I received burns over
approximately 50% of my body, perforated eardrums, a fracture by the base of my skull with
discharge of cerebrospinal fluid through my ear, detachment of the last phalanx of the ring finger
on my right hand, numerous shrapnel wounds, pneumonia, a broken funny bone, and a fracture
of the petrous part of my temporal bone. The skull fracture also damaged my auditory nerve.
Question: The man you mentioned, who was drinking coffee was he holding anything in
his hands?
Answer: Not that I noticed.
Question: Did you notice a package in front of the bar?
Answer: Before the man who was drinking coffee arrived, there was no package, but after
he left, when we had already returned from our fourth smoke, one of the guests pointed out a
package that was lying in front of the bar. He asked the other patrons, including me and Nikita,
whether the package was ours, to which we responded that it was not. He looked inside and, seeing
that it contained nails and bolts, put it back where he found it.
Question: Can you indicate on a diagram the events that took place at the establishment:
the places where you, Nikita, the man who ordered coffee, and any other guests you know were
sitting?
Answer: Yes, I can show you that.
138
3
I have read the transcript, and it is an accurate record of my testimony. I have nothing
further to add and no comments or corrections to make. [signature] G.R. Shmoryvoz
Interview conducted and transcript prepared by:
Special Investigator, Investigations Department,
Kharkiv Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Captain of Justice [signature] I.O. Yena
4
Bar
Roma Chernenko
Mikhail
Kabanov
Nikita Me
Location
after the
blast
Man
with
coffee
Olya Sergey
Table
Table
Table
Tablle
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Window Window Window
Window
Igor
Café entrance
Restroom
G.R. Shmoryvoz
Investigator I.O. Yena
Exhibit to the interview transcript dated 21/17/2014
Annex 204
Signed Declaration of Artem Kalus, Witness Interrogation Protocol (17 January
2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1
RECORD
of witness questioning
Mariupol, Donetsk Region 01/17/2015
Questioning began at 2:30 PM
Questioning ended at 4:00 PM
Major of Justice D.I. Deyneha, a special investigator with the investigations section of the Donetsk
Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, based on the case file of the criminal
proceeding entered into the Unified Register of Pretrial Investigations as No. 22015050000000021
dated 01/13/2015, questioned the following person as a witness on the premises of the Main
Mariupol Office of the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in
accordance with the requirements of Articles 65, 66, 95, 104, 106, 223, 224 of the Criminal
Procedure Code of Ukraine:
1. Full name: Artem Oleksandrovych Kalus
2. Date and place of birth 03/25/1988, Mariupol, Donetsk Region
3. Ethnicity Greek
4. Citizenship Ukraine
5. Education higher
6. Place of employment (study) Main Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs of Ukraine
7. Type of work and job title: senior special investigator, Office for the Investigation of
Crimes against the Person, Criminal Investigation Department, Main Donetsk Regional
Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
8. Place of residence (registration) m.t. 380950423226, 32 vul. Italiyska, Mariupol, Donetsk
Region
9. Criminal convictions claims to have none
10. Member of Parliament
(specify which) claims not to be a member of parliament
11. Passport or other ID information official ID: VK No. 036480, issued by the Volnovakha
District Department of the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
of Ukraine on 06/26/2004
[redacted]
In response to the questions that were put to him, witness A.O. Kalus gave the following
testimony:
I have served as a senior special investigator with the Office for the Investigation of Crimes
against the Person at the Criminal Investigation Department of the Main Donetsk Regional
Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine since October 28, 2014.
Pursuant to an order of the Main Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Ukraine, the number of which I cannot recall at the moment, I was deployed to the
Volnovakha District Department of the Main Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs of Ukraine to carry out a field mission involving the fight against crime. Since the
Buhas checkpoint, which is located at the site of fixed post No. 5 of the State Traffic Inspectorate
as one leaves Volnovakha heading in the direction of Buhas, Donetsk Region, along the N-20
highway (Mariupol-Donetsk), falls within the service area of the Volnovakha District Department
of the Main Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, and I
2
needed to check the functioning of the Armor database, with the approval of Police Captain
Sarkhan Eyvazovych Guseynov, the senior district police inspector of the district police inspector
sector of the Volnovakha District Department of the Main Donetsk Regional Directorate of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, I arrived at said post at around 8:00 AM on 01/13/2015. I
cannot name any of the people who were serving at the post, as I do not know their profile data
and they addressed each other by their callsigns, which I also do not recall, as I was only at the
post for a short time.
At around 8:30 AM on 01/31/2015, I started working with the Armor database.
Specifically, I was checking the passport data of people who had passed through the checkpoint.
At 2:35 PM on 01/13/2015 I saw soldiers of the Kyiv-2 unit who were serving at the
checkpoint run into the corridor of the checkpoint building and hit the deck. At first I did not
understand what was happening, and I did not hear to explosions, but for the sake of my personal
safety I decided to do the same, so I lay on the floor next to a soldier from the Kyiv-2 unit. A few
seconds later I heard exploding shells, probably from a grad multiple-rocket launcher. There were
a lot of explosions. I heard more than ten of them.
After the sounds of exploding Grad shells stopped, the Kyiv-2 soldiers and I went outside.
There I saw a column of civilian buses, as well as two fixed-route buses with civilians heading
from Donetsk to Mariupol (a blue Yutong bus) and from Zlatoustovka to Donetsk (a yellow-orange
bus, probably an I-Van). The windows of these buses were gone. A ladder had been placed on the
left side by the gauge. I saw wounded people on the bus. At that moment I could not determine
which of them were alive and which had already perished. I focused on evacuating the wounded
from the site of the shelling. Some of the survivors from the buses made their way to the trenches
alongside the road. Some of the soldiers were providing medical assistance to wounded civilians
near the buses. Some of the other soldiers and I dragged a second [text cut off] the I-Van so that
we could pull the wounded civilians out of it. At that point they started bringing stretchers to the
site of the shelling, and medics started taking away the wounded civilians. I would like to clarify
that around 10 meters to the right of the I-Van bus I saw a shell crater that I assume was formed
by one of the Grad shells used in the shelling.
The heads of the law-enforcement agencies that served that area, as well as members of
field investigative groups, then started to arrive and carry out investigative actions to document
the incident.
At that point I started heading home in my personal vehicle, which had been parked next
to the checkpoint. Along the road, as I returned home, I saw numerous (more than ten) traces of
Grad shall explosion. Specifically, I saw one shell crater to the left on the median, approximately
100 meters from the checkpoints fortifications, while the rest of the craters were around 300-400
meters to the right of the checkpoint. I would like to clarify that I saw these traces and craters from
exploding Grad shells near the checkpoint on the Donetsk side.
Question: Can you tell us where exactly the shelling came from that resulted in civilian
casualties among the bus passengers on 01/13/2015?
Answer: Judging by what I saw and heard during the shelling, as well as the words of other
people who were at the checkpoint during the shelling, I know that the shelling came from the
direction of Dokuchayevsk, Donetsk Region. Since the territory of Dokuchayevsk, Donetsk
Region, is under the control of members of the Donetsk Peoples Republic, I assume the shelling
was carried out by members of armed formations of the Donetsk Peoples Republic.
3
Question: Could you tell us about the intervals between the shell explosions under the
circumstances you described earlier? Did the explosion that damaged the I-Van bus appear to be
separate?
Answer: I heard explosions at identical intervals. I did not hear any separate explosions.
Question: Did the I-Van and Yutong buses arrive at the aforementioned checkpoint on
01/13/2015 in damaged or undamaged condition?
Answer: The I-Van and Yutong buses, as well as other separate vehicles, arrived at the
checkpoint intact. I did not see any damage on them. I saw that the vehicles were undamaged.
[signature]
Question: Could you explain once more how the I-Van and Yutong buses were damaged?
Answer: Judging by what I saw, the I-Van and Yutong buses were damaged by the
explosion of Grad shells fired from the direction of Dokuchayevsk, Donetsk Region. During the
shelling on 01/13/2015, I only heard the explosions of Grad shells. I did not hear machine gun fire
or shots from other firearms or grenade launchers, or detonations of mines, grenades, or other
explosive devices. All of the explosions were uniform and occurred at equal intervals. The
Ukrainian servicemen located at the checkpoint did not return fire.
I have nothing further to add at this time.
The participants in the procedural action was told how they could review the content of the
report, specifically by personally reading the provided written record.
Having reviewed the text of the record of questioning from the participants in the
procedural action
The record has been read by me, my words are accurately recorded, and I have neither objections
nor anything else to add
(indicate whether a request was received to make changes to the record, as well as any additions
or objections)
Witness: A.A. Kalus / [signature] /
(full name) (signature)
Questioned by:
Major of Justice D.I. Deyneha, [signature]
Special Investigator with the Investigations Section of the Donetsk Regional
Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
Annex 205
Signed Declaration of Yaroslav Maksymov, Witness Interrogation Protocol (17
January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1
1
RECORD
of witness interrogation
City of Mariupol 01/17/2015
Interrogation commenced at [illegible]
Interrogation ended at 4:45 PM
Lieutenant D.V. Velichko, an investigator with the Investigations Department of the Donetsk
Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, having reviewed the files of Criminal
Proceeding No. 22015050000000021 dated 01/13/2015, on the premises of the Mariupol Central
Office of the Main Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, pursuant to the
requirements of Articles 65, 66, 95, 104, 106, 223 and 224 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Ukraine, questioned as a witness:
1. Full name: Yaroslav Gennadiyovych Maksymov
2. Date and place of birth: 12/02/1987, Volnovakha, Donetsk Region
3. Ethnicity: Ukrainian
4. Citizenship: Ukraine
5. Education: higher
6. Place of employment (study), position: police inspector of the Volnovakha District Office of the
Donetsk Main Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
7. Marital status: married
9. Place of residence (registration): Apt. 8, 8 vul. Lenina, Volnovakha, Donetsk Region
10. Criminal convictions: claims to have none
11. Is he/she a member of parliament (if so, which one)? no
12. Details of passport or other identity document: passport VN No. 753811 issued by the Selydove
City Office of the Main Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
on 10/28/2010
The witness was advised that he has been summoned to give testimony in a criminal
proceeding entered into the Unified Register of Pretrial Investigations as No. 22015050000000021
dated 01/13/2015 concerning elements of a criminal offense provided for by Article 258-3(1) of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine.
[signature]
The witness was advised of the content of Article 63 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which
provides that a person may not be held liable for refusing to give testimony or explanations
concerning himself, members of his family or close relatives, as defined by law.
[signature]
The witness was advised of the content of Article 18 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Ukraine concerning freedom from self-incrimination and the right not to testify against close
relatives or family members.
[signature]
2
2
The witness was advised of the interrogation procedures and his rights and obligations under
Article 66 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, according to which:
1. A witness shall be entitled:
1) To know what he is being questioned about, and in which criminal proceedings;
2) In the course of giving testimony and participating in other procedural actions, to use the legal
assistance of an attorney, whose powers shall be confirmed in accordance with the provisions of Article
50 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (specifically: 1) by a license to practice law; 2) by an
engagement letter or agreement with the defense attorney or a mandate provided by a body (institution)
authorized by law to provide free legal assistance);
3) to refuse to give testimony concerning himself, his close relatives or members of his family
that may incriminate him, his close relatives or members of his family, as well as testimony concerning
information that is not subject to disclosure according to the provisions of Article 65 of the said Code
(specifically, the following persons may not be questioned as witnesses: 1) a defense attorney, counsel for
a victim, civil claimant, or civil respondent, or legal representative of a victim or civil claimant in
criminal proceedings, regarding facts of which they became aware in connection with performing the
functions of a representative or defense attorney; 2) lawyers, regarding information protected by lawyer-
client privilege; 3) notaries, regarding information protected by notary-client confidentiality; 4) medical
workers and other persons who, through the performance of their professional or official duties, become
aware of an illness, a medical examination and the results thereof, or intimate and marital aspects of a
person's life, regarding information protected by doctor-patient confidentiality; 5) clergymen, regarding
information received by them through confession; 6) journalists, regarding confidential information
provided on the condition of non-disclosure of the authorship or source of the information; 7) professional
judges, people's assessors, and jury members, regarding the circumstances surrounding the discussion of
matters in the deliberation room that arose at the time of issuing of the court decision, except in the case
of criminal proceedings concerning a knowingly unlawful verdict or ruling issued by a judge (or judges);
8) persons who were involved in entered into and performing a settlement agreement in criminal
proceedings, regarding the facts of which they became aware by virtue of their involvement in entering
into and performing the settlement agreement; 9) persons against whom interim measures have been
imposed, regarding current information about their identity; 10) persons who possess information
concerning the current details of persons against whom interim measures have been imposed, regarding
such details. Persons with diplomatic immunity may not be questioned as witnesses without their consent
(and may refuse to give testimony), nor may employees of diplomatic missions without the consent of a
representative of the diplomatic mission);
4) to give testimony in his native language or in another language that he speaks fluently, and to
use the services of an interpreter;
5) to use notes and documents when giving testimony in cases where the testimony involves any
calculations or other information that is hard to keep in memory;
6) to be reimbursed for expenses associated with being summoned to give testimony.
7) to review the record of the interrogation and submit requests to make changes, additions or
comments to it, as well as to make such changes and comments by his own hand;
8) to request that provision be made for his personal security in cases provided for by law;
9) to request that the interpreter be replaced.
2. A witness must:
1) appear when summoned before an investigator, prosecutor, investigating judge, or judge;
2) give true testimony during a pretrial investigation or trial;
[signature]
3
3
3) not disclose without the permission of the investigator, prosecutor or judge any information
that directly pertains to the merits of the criminal proceedings or any procedural actions taken in the
course of the proceedings, of which the witness became aware in connection with the performance of his
duties.
3.[sic] A person involved in procedural actions during a pretrial investigation in the capacity of an
attesting witness or who has witnessed such actions shall not, at the request of the investigator or
prosecutor, disclose any information about the procedural action that was performed.
In addition, pursuant to Article 224(7) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, a questioned
person may, if he so wishes, set forth his testimony by his own hand. Additional questions may be
posed to the person regarding his written testimony.
[signature]
Pursuant to Article 67, the witness was advised of the criminal liability provided for by
Article 384 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Knowingly false testimony) and Article 385 of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine (A witness's refusal to testify).
[signature]
Having been familiarized with his rights, the witness stated that he speaks Ukrainian but
wishes to give his testimony in Russian, in which he is fluent and conversant, and that the does not
require an interpreter.
[signature]
In the course of giving testimony he declined to use the legal assistance of an attorney.
[signature]
Regarding the questions that were put to him, the witness gave the following testimony:
I, Yaroslav Gennadiyovych Maksymov, have been serving as a district police officer at the
Volnovakha District Department of the Main Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs of Ukraine since September 2014. In early December I started going on duty at
checkpoint No. 5 of the State Traffic Inspectorate, which is located on the road leading out of
Volnovakha toward the village of Buhas, Donetsk Region.
At 9:00 AM on January 13 I went on combat alert duty at the said checkpoint together with
district police officer Aleksei Chechel. Our duties included checking vehicles and persons passing
through the checkpoint.
At around 2:30 PM, after I had checked one of the vehicles passing through the checkpoint
and was about to head over to a yellow passenger bus bound for Zlatoustivka from Donetsk, standing
about 30 meters away from the front of the bus, I heard the sounds of exploding shells. A member of
the Kyiv-2 unit, or perhaps it was a border guard, shouted: "Shells!" I turned and looked toward
Donetsk and saw about 10 shell explosions 200 meters from our post. The shells were falling along
the road, approaching us from Donetsk, each explosion getting closer and closer to us. Seeing this, I
immediately jumped behind the border guards' "trailer", which was located 25 meters from the
yellow bus, on the other side of the road. I then heard the loudest and closest of the explosions. After
that explosion, everything went quiet, and I heard the cry of a Kyiv-2 serviceman
[signature]
4
4
with the call sign "Volk". He had received a shrapnel wound to the abdomen. I and another member
of the Kyiv-2 battalion, whose call sign I do not know, took "Volk" and carried him into the blindage
located thirty meters from the bus in the direction of Donetsk along the same side of the road where
the bus was standing. When I came out of the blindage, I saw that a panic had started at the
checkpoint. I could hear people screaming. Approaching the yellow passenger bus that had been
bound for Zlatoustivka from Donetsk, I saw that the explosion had knocked out all the windows
except the windshield. I also noticed that to the right of the bus toward the planted area, about 15
meters from the bus, a large black stain could be seen in the snow. As it later turned out (I returned to
this spot an hour after the incident to have a look), in the center of this black stain there was a crater,
which I understood to have been caused by the explosion of a Grad shell. Wounded, bloodied people
were getting off the bus. They were being led to the blindage, receiving medical assistance, being
loaded into cars and ambulances, and being taken to Volnovakha Central District Hospital. I took one
of the bus passengers by the arm he had been wounded in the shelling and took him over to the
blindage so he could get some assistance. By that time all of the injured passengers had already been
taken out, so I did not go back to the bus.
Question: Tell us about the interval between the explosions, as you described them above,
and exactly which direction the shells came from. Did the explosion that damaged the yellow
passenger look special, or was it consistent with the "general picture" of the explosions?
Reply: The intervals between the explosions were identical, with fractions of a second
between each explosion. In total I heard about 40 explosions, which lasted about ten seconds. As for
the direction of the shelling, I can say that the shells fell from the direction of Donetsk and were
heading toward our checkpoint. The explosion by the bus sounded the same as the previous ones, i.e.,
it did not stand out in any way. As far as I can recall, that explosion was one of the last, and it was
from that explosion that the bus got damaged.
Question: Was there any damage to the yellow passenger bus before the events described
above, or was the bus hit by gunfire?
Reply: No, the bus was whole before the checkpoint got shelled, and there was no gunfire.
There was no other firing or explosions.
Question: Could the bus have been damaged by a land mine?
Reply: No, it could not have been damaged by a mine, since after the shelling people ran
through the epicenter of the incident to the trench, which was located 50 meters down the road in the
field in front of the planted area, and if there had been mines there, then people simply would have
gotten blown up. There are also blindages, trenches and cover there along both sides of the road, and
as far as I know no mines were laid near the road.
The witness was advised how to review the content of the record, specifically: by personally
reading the provided written record.
Witness Ya.G. Maksymov / [signature] /
(full name) (signature)
My words were accurately recorded, and I have no comments or additions.
Interrogated by:
Investigator with the Investigations Department
of the Donetsk Regional Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine [signature] Lieutenant D.V. Velichko
Annex 206
Signed Declaration of Anton Ovcharenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (18
January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
2
3
Knowingly false testimonyA witness's refusal to testify
4
5
A.M. Ovcharenko
6
Annex 207
Signed Declaration of Oleg Stemasov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (9 December
2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
The witness, O.V. Stemasov, offered the following testimony in response to the questions
asked:
In 2012, I coordinated the Borotba [Struggle] movement in Kharkiv. One Sergey Kiriychuk
(who appears under the same name in the Terrorist Questionnaire) coordinated this movement in
Ukraine. Main tasks involved:
Recruiting members
Obtaining official registrations with the public authorities
Getting party members elected to various ranks of government
Resisting fascism
Nationalizing the means of production
Supporting LGBT communities
I left the party in 2013.
[Signature]
[Seal: FOR DOCUMENTS No. 5. General Prosecutors Office of Ukraine * Central
Military Prosecutors Office]
[True to original]
Continuation of the record of questioning of witness O.V. Stemasov dated
December 9, 2014
Sheet No. 4
I opposed the Euromaidan Revolution. When mass protests broke out in Kharkiv, I
voluntarily joined these protests that demanded a referendum that was expected to change the
status of Ukraines southeast either through splitting this part of the country from the rest of
Ukraine or changing the countrys territorial form of government to that of a federation. The rallies
took place between March and June 2014, and I participated in some 20 to 30 rallies. At one of the
rallies on June 23, 2014, I met with Dar (Vitaliy) and Iskander (Alexander, possible last name:
Zaytsev or Bobrov), whom I met previously in connection with my involvement in the Borotba
public movement. During the rally we were approached by a man named Vladimir (close to 45
years old, 175 cm tall, athletic build, dark hair, crew cut; appears under the name of Vladimir R.
in the Terrorist Questionnaire), who offered us an opportunity to earn some extra cash along with
a military profession in Rostov-on-Don, Russia. Specifically, he told us that we would be trained in
the art of war and return to Ukraine to fight against the Armed Forces of Ukraine, for which we
would be remunerated. Since the referendum failed at the official level, I decided to take Vladimir
up on his offer and fight against the Armed Forces of Ukraine after acquiring specialist skills.
According to Vladimir, in Rostov we would be met by one called Erik (45 to 50 years old,
180 cm tall, overweight, dark hair with streaks of gray, crew cut, Asian-shaped eyes, possibly of
Oriental origin), who would give us further instructions on what we must do next. Dar and I
agreed, while Iskander took some time to think about the offer but ended up declining it.
On June 25, 2014, Dar and I arrived in Rostov by train. At the railway station I called
Eriks number that Vladimir gave me. Erik arrived in a car (I dont remember the make; it was
light-colored) and took us to a training camp (the ride to the camp took some 40 minutes). As
previously advised by Vladimir, Dar and I located a man who went by the code name of Chekh
(to the best of my understanding, he was a citizen of Ukraine; he was in charge of the local
logistics; 35-40 years old, 180-183 cm tall, medium build, fair hair with streaks of gray, crew cut).
Chekh showed us our accommodations and signed us up for our food rations. According to him,
we had to wait for the complete group to form before our training could begin. There were 10 to
15 people at the camp at the time of our arrival. We stayed there for a little over one week. When
this time elapsed, there were close to 20 people:
I chose the code name Dzhigit for myself;
- Dar up to 30 years old, 187-190 cm tall, thin build, fair hair, crew cut, citizen of
Ukraine, studied in Kharkiv, infantry man, operator of shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile
launchers and anti-tank grenade launchers, formerly a member of Volgas group, participated in
combat missions in the town of Krasnodon, Luhansk Oblast, until recently stationed in the village
of Novaya Tavriya; I have no information about his involvement in combat missions after the
November 19, 2014 rotation.
[Signature]
[Seal: FOR DOCUMENTS No. 5. General Prosecutors Office of Ukraine * Central
Military Prosecutors Office]
[True to original]
Continuation of the record of questioning of witness O.V. Stemasov dated
December 9, 2014
Sheet No. 5
- Chekh 35-40 years old, 180-183 cm tall, medium build, fair hair with streaks of gray,
crew cut, a citizen of Ukraine, to the best of my understanding; was in charge of logistics at the
training camp outside Rostov;
- Chechen real name Vitaliy, 40 years old, 160-165 cm tall, athletic build, fair hair, crew
cut, wears a beard, infantry man, automatic grenade launcher operator, participated in combat
missions in the town of Krasnodon, Luhansk Oblast, got expelled from the group in August 2014 in
Sevastopol on account of his alcohol abuse;
- Chelya real name Artiom, a native of Chelyabinsk, up to 30 years old, 180 cm tall,
overweight, fair hair, crew cut, Russian citizen, was stationed in the village of Leninskoe, was
assigned to the headquarters;
- Monakh presumably a citizen of Ukraine, 25 years old, 160-170 cm tall, athletic build,
fair hair, crew cut, operator of shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile launchers, mortar man,
was stationed in the village of Leninskoe;
- Smolya presumably a citizen of Russia, up to 35 years old, 185 cm tall, thin build, fair
hair, crew cut, wears a beard, infantry man; I have no information about his involvement in
combat missions;
- Ded presumably a citizen of Ukraine, up to 50 years old, 190 cm tall, overweight, gray
hair, crew cut, infantry man, participated in combat missions in Krasnodon, Luhansk Oblast; as of
now I have no information about his involvement in combat missions;
- Moskva a citizen of Russia, 30-35 years old, 180 cm tall, thin build, dark hair, crew cut,
infantry man, grenade launcher operator, participated in combat missions in Krasnodon, Luhansk
Oblast; as of now I have no information about his involvement in combat missions;
- Oper presumably a citizen of Ukraine, 35 years old, 160 cm tall, stocky build, dark
hair, crew cut, stubble, infantry man, also trained to operate automatic grenade launchers,
participated in combat missions in Krasnodon, Luhansk Oblast; as of now I have no information
about his involvement in combat missions;
- Chekhov a citizen of Ukraine, a native of Odesa, 30 years old, 195 cm tall, thin build,
dark hair, crew cut, stubble, machine gun operator, trained to operate the Utios mounted machine
gun, participated in combat missions in Krasnodon, Luhansk Oblast, until recently stationed in the
village of Leninskoe, was assigned to the headquarters, acted as Volgas deputy; I have no
information about his involvement in combat missions after the November 19, 2014 rotation;
- Krym a citizen of Ukraine, a native of Odesa, 30 years old, 185 cm tall, medium build,
dark hair, crew cut, assistant to a machine gun operator, trained to operate the Utios mounted
machine gun, participated in combat missions in Krasnodon, Luhansk Oblast, until recently
stationed in the village of Leninskoe; I have no information about his involvement in combat
missions after the November 19, 2014 rotation;
[Signature]
[Seal: FOR DOCUMENTS No. 5. General Prosecutors Office of Ukraine * Central
Military Prosecutors Office]
[True to original]
Continuation of the record of questioning of witness O.V. Stemasov dated
December 9, 2014
Sheet No. 6
- Nik (appears under the same name in the Terrorist Questionnaire) a citizen of
Ukraine, a native of Luhansk, contraband smuggler, up to 30 years old, 180 cm tall, thin build, fair
hair, crew cut, operator of shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile launchers, participated in
combat missions in Krasnodon, Luhansk Oblast, manned a roadblock near the village of Novaya
Tavriya, Donetsk Oblast; I have no information about his involvement in combat missions after the
November 19, 2014 rotation;
- Neft presumably a citizen of Ukraine, 25 years old, 185 cm tall, medium athletic build,
fair hair, crew cut, infantry man, participated in combat missions in Krasnodon, Luhansk Oblast; as
of now I have no information about his involvement in combat missions.
We were issued camouflage uniforms (brown, made in Russia) and army boots. A tarpaulin
truck (possibly Ural) came to pick us up and took us to what we were told would be our training site
(it took us close to 24 hours to get there). We were taken out into a field where army tents were
set up. Chelya (who was appointed as our commander and who reported directly to Svat upon
arrival in Luhansk) collected our mobile phones, after which we retired for the night. The following
day we were arranged in a line and assigned various specializations. We were offered a chance to
choose a weapon and specialization: I chose the Igla shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile
launcher. We were then split up into groups by specialization (my group included Monakh, Dar,
Nik, and myself).
Our training began in early July 2014 at the campsite. Our instructors were apparently
representatives of the Main Investigative Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Ministry of
Defense. The instructor teaching us to operate the Igla shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile
launchers was a man who went by the code name of Petrovich (presumably a citizen of Russia,
50 years old, 183 cm tall, thin build, fair hair with streaks of gray, crew cut). The sniper instructor
was a man who went by the code name of Boyets (presumably a citizen of Russia, 30 years old,
180 cm tall, thin build, fair hair, crew cut, always clean-shaven). The Utios mounted machine gun
instructor was a man who went by the code name of Fomich or Ilyich (more likely Fomich)
(presumably a citizen of Russia, 35 years old, 185-187 cm tall, medium build, dark hair, crew cut).
I dont remember the code name of the automatic grenade launcher instructor; it was something
like Makedonets (presumably a citizen of Russia, 30-35 years old, 183-185 cm tall, athletic build,
dark hair, crew cut). The tactics instructor did not have a code name and introduced himself as
Viacheslav (30-35 years old, 185 cm tall, thin build, fair hair, crew cut). There was also an anti-tank
grenade launcher instructor whose code name I dont remember (presumably a citizen of Russia,
30-35 years old, 185-187 cm tall, overweight, dark hair, crew cut). The training lasted for about a
week. In addition to learning how to operate the Igla shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile
launcher, I was trained in combat using a Kalashnikov assault rifle and also received a crash course
in tactics. Afterwards, we were ordered to get in the back of two trucks and were told we were
going to Krasnodon, Luhansk Oblast, to a border crossing point under the control of militants
where we would receive our further combat orders.
[Signature]
[Seal: FOR DOCUMENTS No. 5. General Prosecutors Office of Ukraine * Central
Military Prosecutors Office]
[True to original]
Continuation of the record of questioning of witness O.V. Stemasov dated
December 9, 2014
Sheet No. 7
One of the trucks was driven by a militant who went by the code name of Runich. The other truck
was driven by Givi (a citizen of Ukraine, 50+ years old, 180 cm tall, thin build, dark gray hair,
crew cut, of Georgian ethnicity, driver). We crossed the border between the Russian Federation
and Ukraine after dark, bypassing the border crossing check points of the two countries. On
arriving at a military unit in Krasnodon, we were assigned to the barracks. We were tasked with
guarding the outer perimeter of this military unit (the group of guards was supervised by
Chelya). Two weeks later my group was redeployed to guard one of the schools in Krasnodon. To
the best of my understanding, we were posted at a line of defense and awaited our combat orders.
In Krasnodon we were joined by Petrovich (a citizen of Ukraine, 50 years old, 190-193 cm tall,
stocky build, slightly overweight, dark hair with streaks of gray, crew cut, a native of Krasnodon,
infantry man). In Krasnodon I met a man who went by the code name of Sova, who
subsequently changed this code name to Svat. Svat commanded the detachment, and
Chelya reported to him.
In late July 2014, my group (led by Chelya) was again taken in two trucks to the training
camp outside Rostov where we spent a little more than a week. The camp was a staging point, and
they gave us some time to rest. Russian citizens were allowed to go home but were ordered to
leave their numbers where they could be contacted by Chelya. At the camp I decided to practice
shooting the Igla shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile launcher. A group of volunteers was
formed (myself, Dar, Nik, Sheva (an infantry man; I lost contact with him in Sevastopol,
Autonomous Republic of Crimea), Koval, Monakh, Jurgen (an infantry man; I lost contact
with him in Sevastopol, Autonomous Republic of Crimea)) and we were taken to an active military
unit in the city of Eysk, Russian Federation, for practice, since this military unit had exercise
machines for practicing Igla shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile launcher shots. While en
route to the above-mentioned military unit, we were joined by militants of the Vostok battalion
(close to 10 people). On our arrival at the unit, we were welcomed by a uniformed man who had
the rank of captain; he wore a light-colored service uniform (35 years old, 180 cm tall, overweight,
dark hair, crew cut). I spent about a week at this military unit. The training was provided by one
Yuri Petrovich (he did not wear a uniform but was clearly a military man; 45-50 years old, 185 cm
tall, thin build, gray hair with a bald patch, military bearing, profound knowledge of
shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile launchers). A group that practiced operating anti-aircraft
guns was also present at the military unit. This group included militants of the Vostok battalion
(the instructor was referred to by his name as Petrovich or Andreyevich, 55-60 years old, 160 cm
tall, overweight, heavyset, gray hair, bald patches, crew cut).
In early August 2014, we were redeployed to Sevastopol, Autonomous Republic of Crimea,
to train for participation in operations designed to destabilize the situation in Odesa Oblast. Our
instructors informed us about this. Sova was our commander in Sevastopol. Our group was
transported in Ural trucks. We entered the Autonomous Republic of Crimea through Russian
territory: across the Kerch Strait to the peninsula. We crossed the border between Ukraine and
Russia bypassing border crossing check points.
[Signature]
[Seal: FOR DOCUMENTS No. 5. General Prosecutors Office of Ukraine * Central
Military Prosecutors Office]
[True to original]
Continuation of the record of questioning of witness O.V. Stemasov dated
December 9, 2014
Sheet No. 8
In Sevastopol, we stayed in the barracks of a military unit. They allowed us to rest for a few
days. Our training then began. I continued my previous specialization, i.e. combat with the use of
an Igla shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile launcher. Since there were no shoulder-launched
surface-to-air missile launchers on the camp grounds, I received tactical training, and more
specifically skills essential to moving through the territory in groups of 2, 3 or 20-25 people and
shooting.
During our training in Sevastopol we were joined by:
- Multik a citizen of Ukraine, 30-35 years old, 175 cm tall, medium build, fair hair, crew
cut, wears a beard, infantry man, group commander (the entire group consisted of natives of
Donetsk Oblast, presumably from Slovyansk): Kok, Balamut, Tyulen, Alan, reporting
directly to Svat;
- Kok a citizen of Ukraine, 30-35 years old, 180 cm tall, medium build, dark hair, crew
cut, infantry man;
- Balamut a citizen of Ukraine, 30 years old, 180 cm tall, overweight, dark hair, crew
cut, operator of grenade launchers and automatic grenade launchers;
- Tyulen a citizen of Ukraine, 40 years old, 180-185 cm tall, overweight, dark hair, crew
cut, machine gun operator, portable machine gun; in his own words, his father was a Chechen and
his mother a Ukrainian;
- Alan a citizen of Ukraine, 30 years old, 185 cm tall, medium build, dark hair, crew cut;
- Alushta, Sochi, Doberman I had no contact with them and cant say anything.
The training was provided by the following instructors (highly-skilled military men,
presumably representatives of the Main Investigative Directorate of the General Staff of the
Russian Ministry of Defense):
- Stalker a sniper instructor, 40 years old, 185 cm tall, athletic build, slightly
overweight, dark hair with streaks of gray, crew cut, wore a beard and mustache;
- Khomyak mines and explosives instructor, 30-35 years old, 160-165 cm tall,
overweight, fair hair, crew cut, prominent cheek bones;
- Rim large caliber machine gun instructor, 30 years old, 190 cm tall, athletic build, fair
hair, crew cut.
I met Giurza in Crimea. He is a native of Odesa. I gathered from conversations that he and
Svat had been acquainted before. Svat said that Giurza would possibly become our commander.
Giurza was Svats right-hand man. They said he was a native of Odesa. I can identify him.
Subsequently Giurza was also involved in combat missions against the Ukrainian Army outside
Novoazovsk. He opened fire on Ukrainian positions. Together with Svat, Giurza participated in
preparations of the roadblock terrorist attack in which a car exploded at a roadblock outside
Mariupol.
[Signature]
[Seal: FOR DOCUMENTS No. 5. General Prosecutors Office of Ukraine * Central
Military Prosecutors Office]
[True to original]
Continuation of the record of questioning of witness O.V. Stemasov dated
December 9, 2014
Sheet No. 9
After one week of training, we received 1,200 dollars each. With our weapons (I carried a
Kalashnikov assault rifle with an under-barrel grenade launcher and 5 magazines with ammo) we
got into two or three Ural tarpaulin trucks and left at night in the direction of Rostov for the training
camp at which we arrived in 24 hours. We entered Russia from Crimea through the Kerch Strait.
We stayed for about 2-3 days at the training camp, during which time we perfected our rifle
shooting skills and combat tactics. Then we set out in the direction of Novoazovsk. We bypassed
the border crossing check point in Russia, while the Novoazovsk check point was already under the
militants control. We were not told the reason why they did not send us to Odesa. They told us
that there were not enough people willing to join the coup in Odesa. We were then taken to a
crossroads between the villages of Dzerzhinskoe and Novaya Tavriya, where we were ordered to
dig trenches and assume a defensive position. We spent about a month at this position (from
September to early October 2014) and built a roadblock called Berkut. We were told it was 15
kilometers away from Mariupol. At the roadblock I was issued an Igla shoulder-launched
surface-to-air missile launcher and two missiles for it (a Ural truck would bring us weapons and
ammunition). A militant who went by the code name of Berkut was my direct superior. The
roadblock was tasked with:
Observing the manpower and resources of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
Screening vehicles;
Checking papers;
Engaging in combat if the roadblock got attacked.
The roadblock also had one tank in an emplacement, one anti-tank grenade launcher, and one
automatic grenade launcher under Berkuts command.
In early October 2014, the Berkut roadblock was reinforced by a group of militants (about
20) commanded by Malenkiy (a.k.a. Malyi a citizen of Russia, 30-35 years old, 202 cm tall,
thin build with a belly, fair hair, crew cut; he referred to himself as a Terek Cossack). The group
included militants with the following code names:
Shum;
Sekret;
Arbuz;
Matematik;
Filin;
I dont remember the others.
[Signature]
[Seal: FOR DOCUMENTS No. 5. General Prosecutors Office of Ukraine * Central
Military Prosecutors Office]
[True to original]
Continuation of the record of questioning of witness O.V. Stemasov dated
December 9, 2014
Sheet No. 10
After reinforcement, Berkut stayed behind to continue commanding the roadblock, while
a group of about 8 people, including myself, was redeployed to a roadblock in the village of Novaya
Tavriya (the roadblock was originally named Pripyat but was renamed Topol since November
5-7, 2014) and placed under the command of a militant who went by the code name of Britanets,
who reported back to Berkut (appears under the same name in the Terrorist Questionnaire; a
citizen of Ukraine, 35 years old, 185 cm tall, thin build, fair hair, crew cut). I stayed at this
roadblock from early October to mid-November 2014.
Iskander came to visit Berkut at the roadblock (appears under the same name in the
Terrorist Questionnaire; a citizen of Ukraine, a native of Kharkiv, 37 years old, 185 cm tall, stocky
build, fair hair with streaks of gray, crew cut, infantry man) and stayed there with us for about a
week. Afterwards, he came with us to the roadblock in Novaya Tavriya, where he stayed for 2-3
weeks. He left after this time, saying he intended to go to Kharkiv. In early November, while I was
keeping watch at the Topol roadblock, a signal flare went off in the nearest forest belt. I opened
fire from the assault rifle in the direction of the forest belt with the intention of killing enemy
personnel, since it was not to be ruled out that the flare marked the arrival of a sabotage and
reconnaissance group of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
On November 17-18, 2014, we were ordered to prepare our positions for a handover.
On November 19, 2014, we got into 2-3 Ural trucks and were taken in the direction of the
Novoazovsk border crossing check point where we handed in our weapons and received 400
dollars US each. Those who had civilian clothes changed into them and threw away our uniforms.
We then split up into groups and headed out in the direction of the Russian border crossing point
(a pillar with a boom gate) to cross the border. We were checked for any weapons. They did not
ask us any questions about the uniforms. I, Britanets, Nik, Berkut, Tyulen, Mel and a few
others flagged down a minivan and headed for the Kerch Strait with the intention of ferrying across
into the Republic of Crimea. After crossing the strait, Mel, Britanets, and I rented an apartment
to spend the night through a taxi driver. The following day I bought civilian clothes and a ticket for
a train to Kharkiv. On the night of November 23-24, 2014, I arrived in Kharkiv. When we parted our
ways, Britanets promised to get in touch with me to assemble a group to go to Odesa and sort
out the issue involving an extra payment for work in the amount of 1,600 dollars US.
I use the following social network and email accounts:
- VKontakte: login name - [email protected]
password [blank]
- email: login name - [email protected]
password [blank]
The following individuals in Kharkiv are associated with the Donetsk Peoples Republic:
Spartak (appears under the same name in the Terrorist Questionnaire) arrested to the
best of my knowledge.
[Signature]
[Seal: FOR DOCUMENTS No. 5. General Prosecutors Office of Ukraine * Central
Military Prosecutors Office]
[True to original]
Continuation of the record of questioning of witness O.V. Stemasov dated
December 9, 2014
Sheet No. 11
- Vitaliy (appears under the same name in the Terrorist Questionnaire); we spoke on the
phone only; he works at a gas station in Kharkiv; I have no other information on him.
As for Svat, I know that he is a native of Odesa, a military man who served in the landing
troops. We fired at positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces exclusively following a command from
Svat. Without his permissions, other field commanders could not give orders to open fire on their
own. Specifically:
- When I manned the Berkut roadblock, on September 15-16, 2014 a militant who went
by the code name of Elvis (a sniper who observed the operations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces
between the village of Leninskoe and the town of Mariupol and reported back directly to Svat and
Volga) contacted Svat on the radio and reported that signal flares went off in the sector
observed by him. Later Svat ordered (through Sanych, who was in charge of the mortar gun
details) mortar fire (6 mortars) to be opened at the location where the signal flares went off;
- When I manned the Berkut roadblock, in early September 2014 we came under attack
from a grenade launcher from the direction of the village of Kominternovo; Berkut requested
permission from Svat to open tank fire in the direction of the village of Kominternovo; after
permission was granted, a tank fired two shots in the direction of Kominternovo;
- Because signal flares went off frequently, Svat authorized Berkut, Volga, Sanych,
and Multik to open fire from the available weapons at their own discretion.
Svats detachment, of which I was a member, also included one of the commanders who
went by the code name of Volkodav. He reported only to Giurza and Svat. Volkodav was together
with his wife a sniper who went by the code name of Barsa, also a native of Odesa. I can
identify her. He is short, about 160 cm tall, stockily built, with a pockmarked face, dark hair, and
a neck tattoo. She also opened fire on Ukrainian positions. She carried a Dragunov sniper rifle. By
November 19, Svats detachment outside Mariupol included almost 180 people. The detachment
had 12 T-72 and T-64 tanks, 6 or 8 GRAD BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, four Uragan systems,
three 120-mm mortar guns, and six 82-mm mortar guns. After we redeployed to Novoazovsk we
took a delivery of 2 BTR-80 armored personnel carriers and 2 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles from
the Russian Federation. All vehicles were delivered from Russia. We also had 2 fully armored
KAMAZ command vehicles. The detachment was commanded by Svat.
Witness: O.V. Stemasov [Signature]
(Last name, first name, patronymic) (Signature)
I have read the record of questioning. My testimony has been written down accurately. I have no
comments or additions to make.
Witness: O.V. Stemasov [Signature]
(Last name, first name, patronymic) (Signature)
Questioned by:
Chief of the 1st Unit of the Investigative Department
[Signature]
[Seal: FOR DOCUMENTS No. 5. General Prosecutors Office of Ukraine * Central
Military Prosecutors Office]
[True to original]
Annex 208
Signed Declaration of Sergey Cherepko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (20 January
2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1 23
[signature]
RECORD
of witness interrogation
City of Mariupol January 20, 2015
Interrogation commenced at 11:40 AM
Interrogation ended at 1:25 PM
Captain of Justice V.V. Romanenko, Senior Special Investigator with the Investigations
Department of the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, having reviewed
the files of Criminal Proceeding No. 22015050000000021, entered into the Unified Register of
Pretrial Investigations on 01/13/2015, concerning elements of a crime provided for by Article 258(3)
of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, on the premises of the Mariupol Central Office of the Donetsk
Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, pursuant to the requirements of Articles 42,
95, 104, 106, 223 and 224 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, questioned as a witness:
1. Full name: Sergey Yakovych Cherepko
2. Date and place of birth: 11/09/1954, city of Volnovakha
3. Ethnicity: Ukrainian
4. Citizenship: Ukraine
5. Education: secondary
6. Place of employment (study), type of occupation and position: driver with Autoexpress
LLC
7. Marital status: married with two adult children
8. Place of residence (registration): registered at 92 vul. Chelyuskina, Volnovakha, Donetsk
Region; 0502041470
9. Criminal convictions: none
10. Is he/she a member of parliament? no
11. Details of passport or other identity documents: Ukrainian passport VS547608 issued
by the Volnovakha District Office of the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Ukraine on 11/16/2000
Witness S.Ya. Cherepko was advised of the requirements of Article 66, Part 3 of the
Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine concerning his duty not to disclose any information about the
completed procedural action. [signature]
The witness was advised that he has been summoned to give testimony in Criminal
Proceeding No. 22015050000000021 concerning elements of a crime provided for by Article 258(3)
of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
The witness was advised of the content of Article 63 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which
provides that a person may not be held liable for refusing to give testimony or explanations
concerning himself, members of his family or close relatives, as defined by law.
The witness was advised of the content of Article 18 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Ukraine concerning freedom from self-incrimination and the right not to testify against close
relatives or family members. [signature]
The witness was advised of the interrogation procedures, his rights and obligations under
Article 66 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, according to which:
1. A witness shall be entitled:
24
2
1) to know what he is being questioned about, and in which criminal proceedings;
2) in the course of giving testimony and participating in other procedural actions, to use the
legal assistance of an attorney, whose powers shall be confirmed in accordance with the provisions of
Article 50 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (specifically: 1) by a license to practice law;
2) by an engagement letter or agreement with the defense attorney or a mandate provided by a body
(institution) authorized by law to provide free legal assistance);
3) to refuse to give testimony concerning himself, his close relatives or members of his
family that may incriminate him, his close relatives or members of his family, as well as testimony
concerning information that is not subject to disclosure according to the provisions of Article 65 of
the said Code (specifically, the following persons may not be questioned as witnesses: 1) a defense
attorney, counsel for a victim, civil claimant, or civil respondent, or legal representative of a victim
or civil claimant in criminal proceedings, regarding facts of which they became aware in connection
with performing the functions of a representative or defense attorney; 2) lawyers, regarding
information protected by lawyer-client privilege; 3) notaries, regarding information protected by
notary-client confidentiality; 4) medical workers and other persons who, through the performance of
their professional or official duties, become aware of an illness, a medical examination and the
results thereof, or intimate and marital aspects of a person's life, regarding information protected by
doctor-patient confidentiality; 5) clergymen, regarding information received by them through
confession; 6) journalists, regarding confidential information provided on the condition of non-
disclosure of the authorship or source of the information; 7) professional judges, people's assessors,
and jury members, regarding the circumstances surrounding the discussion of matters in the
deliberation room that arose at the time of issuing of the court decision, except in the case of
criminal proceedings concerning a knowingly unlawful verdict or ruling issued by a judge (or
judges); 8) persons who were involved in entering into and performing a settlement agreement in
criminal proceedings, regarding the facts of which they became aware by virtue of their involvement
in entering into and performing the settlement agreement; 9) persons against whom interim measures
have been imposed, regarding current information about their identity; 10) persons who possess
information concerning the current details of persons against whom interim measures have been
imposed, regarding such details. Persons with diplomatic immunity may not be questioned as
witnesses without their consent (and may refuse to give testimony), nor may employees of diplomatic
missions without the consent of a representative of the diplomatic mission);
4) to give testimony in his native language or in another language that he speaks fluently, and
to use the services of an interpreter;
25
3
5) to use notes and documents when giving testimony in cases where the testimony involves
any calculations or other information that is hard to keep in memory;
6) to be reimbursed for expenses associated with being summoned to give testimony.
7) to review the record of the interrogation and submit requests to make changes, additions or
comments to it, as well as to make such changes and comments by his own hand;
8) to request that provision be made for his personal security in cases provided for by law;
9) to request that the interpreter be replaced.
2. A witness must:
1) appear when summoned before an investigator, prosecutor, investigating judge, or judge;
2) give true testimony during a pretrial investigation or trial;
3) not disclose without the permission of the investigator, prosecutor or judge any
information that directly pertains to the merits of the criminal proceedings or any procedural actions
taken in the course of the proceedings, of which the witness became aware in connection with the
performance of his duties.
3. A person involved in procedural actions during a pretrial investigation in the capacity of an
attesting witness or who has witnessed such actions shall not, at the request of the investigator or
prosecutor, disclose any information about the procedural action that was performed.
In addition, pursuant to Article 224(7) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, a
questioned person may, if he so wishes, set forth his testimony by his own hand. Additional questions
may be posed to the person regarding his written testimony.
[signature]
Pursuant to Article 67, the witness was advised of the criminal liability provided for by
Article 384 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Knowingly false testimony) and Article 385 of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine (A witness's refusal to testify).
[signature]
Having been familiarized with his rights, the witness stated that he wishes to give testimony
in Russian and on the record. He does not require the services of a translator, since he speaks both
Ukrainian and Russian. He does not wish to use the legal assistance of an attorney in the course of
giving testimony.
[signature]
26
4
Witness S.Ya. Cherepko gave the following testimony:
I have been working as a driver for Autoexpress LLC, which provides private transportation
services in the Donetsk Region, since around 1994. In 2009 I started driving a yellow i-Van Tata
A0718 for this company, with plate number AH0985AA. I work according to a schedule: two days
on, two days off. The second driver of this bus is Yury Sobol. According to the work schedule, I was
performing the functional duties of driving the said bus on 01/13/2015.
The route of the bus on 01/13/2015, as on other days, was as follows: Zlatoustivka
(Volnovakha District) Vesele Khlibodarivka Kalynyno Farm Shevchenko Oktyabrske
Dmytrivka Volnovakha Buhas Novotroyitske bus stop on the H-20 road near the city of
Dokuchayevsk Olenivka Dolya Andriyivka Donetsk.
On January 13, 2015, I had managed to complete the following route on the aforementioned
bus: I departed Zlatoustivka for Donetsk at 6:30 AM and departed Donetsk for Zlatoustivka at 9:20
AM.
I then departed Zlatoustivka at 1:00 PM, carrying passengers along the aforementioned route
to the city of Donetsk. Along the route, the following persons boarded the bus as passengers:
approximately 3 people in Zlatoustivka, 1 person in Khlibodarivka, and 1 person in Kalynyno. Upon
arriving at the Volnovakha bus station in the Donetsk Region at around 1:40 PM, the bus was
boarded by 21 people who occupied the passenger seats and an additional 17-18 passengers (I do not
recall the exact number) who remained standing on the bus. Thus, the total number of passengers in
the bus at time of its departure was around 43-44 (I do not recall the exact number).
In accordance with the established schedule, I departed at 1:50 PM behind the wheel of the
yellow i-Van Tata A0718 bus with plate number AH0985AA, from the Volnovakha bus station in the
Donetsk Region, carrying 43-44 passengers.
At around 2:10 PM I arrived at a checkpoint set up by the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the
territory of fixed post No. 5 of the State Traffic Control Directorate of the Ukrainian Interior
Ministry's Main Administration on the H-20 road between Slovyansk and Mariupol, Donetsk Region.
At the time of our arrival at the checkpoint, there were 2-3 buses waiting in line at the checkpoint to
go through passport control. In front of the bus that I was driving was a blue Yutong bus with plate
number AH9329CX, which also carries passengers along the Mariupol-Donetsk route.
The doors of the bus that I was driving were closed. At approximately 2:25 PM, while
waiting for my turn to go through passport control at the checkpoint, with only one bus the
aforementioned Yutong remaining ahead of me in line, I suddenly heard a whistling noise
approaching from roughly a northerly direction. I did not register exactly where it came from,
however, because it happened very fast. And a fraction of a second later, from the right side of the
bus (going from Volnovakha in the direction of Donetsk) I heard a loud boom, which sounded like an
exploding shell, and the windows of the bus simultaneously shattered, while metal fragments
damaged the body of the bus. These fragments penetrated the bodies of the passengers, as a result of
which several (I do not remember exactly how many) were killed and several more (I do not
remember exactly how many) were wounded.
The Ukrainian servicemen who were present at the checkpoint at that moment advised
everyone to take cover somewhere safe in the blindages that had been set up which most of the
passengers did.
The wounded survivors among the bus passengers were then taken by the servicemen to a
hospital (I do not know exactly which one) for medical treatment.
I do not know what exactly exploded, what its trajectory was, or how many explosions there
were, as I am not an expert in this area.
27
5
I do not know whether the explosion I mentioned before was followed by others, since
immediately after the first explosion, which damaged the bus and injured its passengers, I became
disoriented and was in a state of shock.
I myself did not receive any injuries from the blast.
Question: Did you know any of the passengers who were on the yellow i-Van Tata A0718
bus with plate number AH0985AA travelling from Zlatoustivka to Donetsk on 01/13/2015?
Reply: The only passenger I knew was Yury Bakhal, a resident of Buhas, whose arm was
injured in the incident. I did not know the other passengers.
I can tell you that among the passengers who departed Volnovakha on the aforementioned
bus at 1:50 PM on 01/13/2015, four people were bound for Olenivka (Donetsk Region), eight for
Buhas, and 5-6 for Donetsk. But I did not know any of these passengers.
I can also tell you that most of the passengers had come from territory controlled by the so-
called "Donetsk People's Republic", particularly from the cities of Donetsk and Volnovakha
(Donetsk Region), to re-register their pensions or withdraw their social benefits from ATMs. I know
this from the conversations I overheard among the passengers during the trip.
Question: Did the Yutong bus with plate number AH9329CX and its passengers sustain any
damage or injuries on 01/13/2015 on the territory of the checkpoint set up by the Armed Forces of
Ukraine in the vicinity of fixed post No. 5 of the State Traffic Control Directorate of the Ukrainian
Interior Ministry's Main Administration for the Donetsk Region?
Reply: I do not know whether the Yutong bus with plate number AH9329CX and its
passengers sustained any damage or injuries on 01/13/2015 on the territory of the checkpoint set up
by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the vicinity of fixed post No. 5 of the State Traffic Control
Directorate of the Ukrainian Interior Ministry's Main Administration for the Donetsk Region.
As I stated before, that bus was in front of the one that I was driving and was going through
passport control at the time of the blast. After the explosion, when I had already gotten off the bus, I
saw that the Yutong with plate number AH9329CX had turned around and was heading back in the
direction of Mariupol, Donetsk Region, with its passengers.
Question: Did you give any interviews to members of the mass media regarding the events
that occurred on 01/13/2015 on the territory of fixed post No. 5 of the State Traffic Control
Directorate of the Ukrainian Interior Ministry's Main Administration for the Donetsk Region?
Reply: No, I did not give any interviews to members of the mass media regarding the events
that occurred on 01/13/2015 on the territory of fixed post No. 5 of the State Traffic Control
Directorate of the Ukrainian Interior Ministry's Main Administration for the Donetsk Region.
I can tell you, however, that on 01/19/2015 I received a call on my phone (number
0502041470) from an unknown female caller (I do not remember her number, nor did I write it
down), who did not introduce herself but immediately asked me whether I was the driver of the bus
that had been hit by shellfire on 01/13/2015. After I answered in the affirmative i.e., told her that I
was indeed the driver of the yellow bus that had been struck under those circumstances she started
asking me additional questions about the shelling incident.
In response to her questions, I said that the bus I had been driving had been at the checkpoint
near Volnovakha, Donetsk Region, on 01/13/2015, and had been hit by an exploding shell. In
response to the woman's question as to what sort of shell it was and where it had come from, I said
that the shell had exploded to the right of the bus (as viewed from the direction of travel), but I did
not know where it had come from.
The woman did not ask me any more questions. Our conversation lasted about one minute.
I would like to point out that what I told the SBU [Security Service of Ukraine] investigators
during my interrogation is the truth. Nor did I lie to the woman described above. I told her exactly
what I stated above, including the fact that I did not know what kind of shell had exploded or where
it had come from.
28
6
I do not know who gave the woman my number. Apart from this one time, I did not speak
with her again.
Question: The Website http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3468394-vodytel-avtobusa-smerty-
nas-obstrelialy-so-storony-volnovakhu published an interview dated 01/19/2015, allegedly with the
driver of the bus that was shelled on the territory of a checkpoint near Volnovakha on 01.13.2015,
under the title "Driver of 'Bus of Death': We Were Shelled from the Direction of Volnovakha", which
contains the following passage:
"Korrespondent.net was the first to get an interview with the driver of the minibus
that was shelled at the Volnovakha checkpoint.
Korrespondent.net interviewed the driver of the minibus that was shelled at the
Volnovakha checkpoint.
Driver Sergey Cherenko, who came under the tragic shelling on January 13, received
light injuries on his finger and cheek. The man did not seek medical attention and
continues to work on the same route.
In his interview with Korrespondent.net, the driver stated that shelling of the
checkpoint came from the direction of Volnovakha, under the control of Ukrainian
forces, to the left of the bus, and that the passengers were not killed by a Grad shell but
by a fragmentation mine that exploded to the right of the bus.
- Sergey, how do you feel? What injuries did you receive from the shelling?
- I did not receive any injuries. I got slight cuts on my finger and cheek, but overall I am
alive and well. I have already worked two shifts on the bus.
- Are you scared to drive near the "flashpoints"?
- I have been a driver in general since 1972, and a bus driver for 21 years. I am used to
it already. Yesterday, for example, I was in Donetsk. But I had to leave because there
was some intense bombing there.
- How do they treat bus drivers at the checkpoints?
- They treat us well. I can't say they're rude to us or cause us any problems.
- Were you summoned by the law-enforcement agencies to discuss the tragedy
of January 13?
- I was summoned by the transit police in Volnovakha and by the SBU, where I gave
written testimony. They asked me how many passengers I was carrying.
- Can you describe the moment of the blast?
- A bus bound for Mariupol pulled into the checkpoint ahead of me, and they were
checking it. The guys from the National Guard beckoned me to drive up. I pulled up
behind. I was not allowed to open the doors yet, because the check was underway.
And suddenly there was a swish of some sort from the left side, a humming, and then
an explosion.
People were shouting: "Open the door!" But it was jammed. I push the buttons, but I
can't open either the front or the rear (doors editors). So I open the driver's door
and jump out. I ran out. The emergency window would not open, so I kicked open
the front door. Several of the passengers managed to run out through it.
I run over to the back door. I can't open it. I kick it and hit it with my hands, but it's no
use. Then, on the left side of the bus, the undamaged side, the passengers started
kicking the windows out. The National Guard soldiers put a ladder there, and people
were using it to get out.
- Which side do you think the shelling was coming from?
29
7
- They were firing in the path of the bus. I was travelling toward Donetsk, and the fire
was coming from the left side, from Volnovakha. This is what we call the "northern
area". Not from Dokuchayevsk.
- What do you think they were firing at you?
- The checkpoint itself was shelled by Grads. But if a Grad shell had landed next to us,
I would not be talking to you now. It just happens that there are also mines at the
checkpoint. And it was a mine that went off, specifically a fragmentation mine.
Did you give this interview, and are the facts laid out in the interview true?
Reply: As I indicated before, a woman called me on 01/19/2015, but she did not tell me she
was a journalist. Ninety percent of the information contained in the interview was made up by the
author. I never said anything of the sort to anyone.
I did indeed tell the woman described above the following things during our telephone
conversation on 05/19/2015. In response to her question: "Sergey, how do you feel? What injuries
did you receive from the shelling?", I replied: "I did not receive any injuries. I got slight cuts on
my finger and cheek, but overall I am alive and well. I have already worked two shifts on the
bus."
In response to her question: "Are you scared to drive near the 'flashpoints'?", I replied: "I
have been a driver in general since 1972, and a bus driver for 21 years. I am used to it already.
Yesterday, for example, I was in Donetsk. But I had to leave because there was some intense
bombing there."
In response to her question: "How do they treat bus drivers at the checkpoints?", I replied:
"They treat us well. I can't say they're rude to us or cause us any problems."
In addition, I told her that the shell that had damaged the bus and injured the passengers had
exploded to the right of the bus, but I did not know what kind of shell it was or where it had come
from.
All of the other information contained in the interview is untrue. I did not say such things to
anyone. For instance, the following portions of my alleged conversation with the journalist are
untrue:
"In his interview with Korrespondent.net, the driver stated that shelling of the
checkpoint came from the direction of Volnovakha, under the control of Ukrainian
forces, to the left of the bus, and that the passengers were not killed by a Grad shell but
by a fragmentation mine.
- Were you summoned by the law-enforcement agencies to discuss the tragedy
of January 13?
- I was summoned by the transit police in Volnovakha and by the SBU, where I gave
written testimony. They asked me how many passengers I was carrying.
- Can you describe the moment of the blast?
- A bus bound for Mariupol pulled into the checkpoint ahead of me, and they were
checking it. The guys from the National Guard beckoned me to drive up. I pulled up
behind. I was not allowed to open the doors yet, because the check was underway.
And suddenly there was a swish of some sort from the left side, a humming, and then
an explosion.
People were shouting: "Open the door!" But it was jammed. I push the buttons, but I
can't open either the front or the rear (doors editor). So I open the driver's door and
30
8
jump out. I ran out. The emergency window would not open, so I kicked open the front
door. Several of the passengers managed to run out through it.
I run over to the back door. I can't open it. I kick it and hit it with my hands, but it's no
use. Then, on the left side of the bus, the undamaged side, the passengers started
kicking the windows out. The National Guard soldiers put a ladder there, and people
were using it to get out.
- Which side do you think the shelling was coming from?
- They were firing in the path of the bus. I was travelling toward Donetsk, and the fire
was coming from the left side, from Volnovakha. This is what we call the "northern
area". Not from Dokuchayevsk.
- What do you think they were firing at you?
- The checkpoint itself was shelled by Grads. But if a Grad shell had landed next to us,
I would not be talking to you now. It just happens that there are also mines at the
checkpoint. And it was a mine that went off, specifically a fragmentation mine."
Question: What else can you add regarding the facts of the criminal proceedings?
Reply: I have nothing to add regarding the facts of the criminal proceedings.
The witness was advised how to review the content of the record, specifically: by personally
reading the provided written record.
Witness S.Ya. Cherepko / [signature] /
(full name) (signature)
I have personally read the record. My words were accurately recorded. I have no further comments
or additions. [signature]
S.Ya. Cherepko
Senior Special Investigator with the Investigations
Department of the Donetsk Regional Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine
Captain of Justice [signature] V.V. Romanenko
PASSPORT OF A CITIZEN OF UKRAINE
Ukrayina Printing Factory
Cherepko
Last name
Serhiy
First name
Yakovych
Patronymic
November 9, 1954
Date of birth
Volnovakha
Place of birth
Donetsk Region
[signature]
Passport holder's signature
Cherepko
Last name
Serhiy
First name
Yakovych
Patronymic
November 9, 1954
Date of birth
Volnovakha
Place of birth
Donetsk Region
Male
sex
Volnovakha District Department of the Donetsk
passport issued by
Main Regional Administration of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
[signature]
Official signature
November 16, 2000
Passport holder's signature
[seal:] Ministry of
Internal Affairs of
Ukraine, 05-63
2 3
10
Statement
On January 19, 2015, I received a telephone call from a woman who did not introduce herself
and asked me whether I was the driver of the bus that was shelled at the checkpoint on the road
from Volodymyr to Donetsk on January 13, 2015, to which I replied in the affirmative. The
woman then started asking me which direction the shell had come from. I said that the shell had
exploded to the right of the bus and did not tell her anything else.
I did not tell her (or anyone else) that the shell that damaged the bus and injured the passengers
had come from the direction of Volnovakha, or that the shell was in fact a mine.
I do not know what kind of shell exploded next to the bus or where it came from.
01.20.2015 [signature] Sergey Yakovlevich Cherepko, 11.09.1954 [text cut off]
11
[omitted:] advertisements and unrelated hyperlinks
Driver of 'Bus of Death': We Were Shelled from the Direction of Volnovakha"
Korrespondent.net, Yesterday, 5:33 PM
Photo: Kanal 112
Twelve people were killed and sixteen
wounded in the tragedy outside Volnovakha
Korrespondent.net was the first to get an interview with the driver of the minibus that was
shelled at the Volnovakha checkpoint.
Korrespondent.net interviewed the driver of the minibus that was shelled at the Volnovakha
checkpoint.
Driver Sergey Cherenko, who came under the tragic shelling on January 13, received light injuries on
his finger and cheek. The man did not seek medical attention and continues to work on the same
route.
In his interview with Korrespondent.net, the driver stated that shelling of the checkpoint came from
the direction of Volnovakha, under the control of Ukrainian forces, to the left of the bus, and that the
passengers were not killed by a Grad shell but by a fragmentation mine that exploded to the right of
the bus.
- Sergey, how do you feel? What injuries did you receive from the
shelling?
- I did not receive any injuries. I got slight cuts on my finger and cheek, but
overall I am alive and well. I have already worked two shifts on the bus.
- Are you scared to drive near the "flashpoints"?
- I have been a driver in general since 1972, and a bus driver for 21 years. I
am used to it already. Yesterday, for example, I was in Donetsk. But I had to
leave because there was some intense bombing there.
- How do they treat bus drivers at the checkpoints?
- They treat us well. I can't say they're rude to us or cause us any problems.
- Were you summoned by the law-enforcement agencies to discuss the tragedy of January 13?
- I was summoned by the transit police in Volnovakha and by the SBU, where I gave written
testimony. They asked me how many passengers I was carrying.
[signature] S.Ya. Cherepko
http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3468394-vodytel-avtobusa-smerty-nas-obstrelialy-so-storony-volnovakhu
Report: Bus of Death. What
Killed the Volnovakha Victims?
January 14, 2015, 2:02 PM
12
[illegible] January 2015 Driver of 'Bus of Death': We Were Shelled from the Direction of Volnovakha" Korrespondent.net
- Can you describe the moment of the blast?
- A bus bound for Mariupol pulled into the checkpoint ahead of me, and they were checking it. The
guys from the National Guard beckoned me to drive up. I pulled up behind. I was not allowed to
open the doors yet, because the check was underway. And suddenly there was a swish of some sort
from the left side, a humming, and then an explosion.
People were shouting: "Open the door!" But it was jammed. I push the buttons, but I can't
open either the front or the rear (doors - editor). So I open the driver's door and jump out.
I ran out. The emergency window would not open, so I kicked open the front door. Several
of the passengers managed to run out through it.
I run over to the back door. I can't open it. I kick it and hit it with my hands, but it's no use. Then, on
the left side of the bus, the undamaged side, the passengers started kicking the windows out. The
National Guard soldiers put a ladder there, and people were using it to get out.
- Which side do you think the shelling was coming from?
- They were firing in the path of the bus. I was travelling toward Donetsk, and the fire was coming
from the left side, from Volnovakha. This is what we call the "northern area". Not from
Dokuchayevsk.
- What do you think they were firing at you?
- The checkpoint itself was shelled by Grads. But if a Grad shell had landed next to us, I would not
be talking to you now. It just happens that there are also mines at the checkpoint. And it was a mine
that went off, specifically a fragmentation mine.
We remind our readers that the territory to the west of Volnovakha is controlled by the Ukrainian
security forces. Members of the DPR hold positions to the northeast.
The Security Service of Ukraine claims that the leadership of the self-proclaimed "Donetsk People's
Republic" gave direct orders to fire Grad rockets at the passenger bus outside Volnovakha, Donetsk
Region, on January 13.
According to a statement by a representative of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense of
Ukraine, the rockets were fired from the direction of Dokuchayevsk.
[signature]
Annex 209
Signed Declaration of Oleksandr Pavlenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (23
January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Witness O.M. Pavlenko offered the following testimony:
I permanently reside at 26/2 Oktyabrskaya Street in the village of
Sladkoe, Maryinka District, Donetsk blast.
Roughly in November 2014, I arrived in Donetsk seeking employment as
a miner in the Zasyadko Coal Mine. But upon my arrival in Donetsk I got
arrested by officers of the so-called police of the Donetsk Peoples Republic
(hereinafter DNR) for publicly drinking alcohol in the evening in the vicinity of
the Zolotoe Koltso shopping mall in the Voroshilovsky District of Donetsk. The
DNR police punished me with community service for this violation. Specifically,
from November 2014 to January 15, 2015, while being supervised by DNR
military personnel, I cleaned the streets in Donetsk, dug trenches at the
entrance to Donetsk from the side of Elenovka, Donetsk Oblast, and
subsequently cleaned those trenches to remove any garbage.
At around 10 a.m. on January 13, 2015, fighters of the Oplot battalion of
the Donetsk Peoples Republic terrorist organization (five individuals, two of
whom went by the code names Khirurg and Slip) took me and four more
detainees (just like me; among them I knew Vitaliy Viktorovich Vrobyev, a
native of Donetsk, as well as Andrey and Viktor) to clean DNR trenches at the
entrance to Elenovka, Donetsk Oblast, from the direction of Donetsk, where I
stayed until 5 p.m. on January 13, 2015.
I understood that those were fighters of the Oplot battalion by the fact
that they wore camouflage uniforms with insignia of this DNR unit images of
a rhinoceros inscribed with Spetsnaz Oplot. The militants called themselves
Oplotovsty [i.e. members of Oplot].
While cleaning the above-mentioned trenches, specifically the trench at
the entrance to Elenovka, Donetsk Oblast, from the side of Donetsk, near the
right-hand road shoulder (in the direction from Donetsk to Elenovka) during
lunchtime (around 12 p.m.), I saw three military vehicles Grad multiple
rocket launchers on URAL truck chassis (green) accompanied by black Jeep
cars with blue flashing lights in front of them and one more black passenger car
(I dont recall the model) drive on this road from the direction of Donetsk into
Elenovka.
Those vehicles proceeded at a rather high rate of speed approximately
80 km/h. The doors of the cabs of each one of the above-mentioned URAL
trucks with Grad multiple rocket launchers mounted on them were emblazoned
with the same emblem that was worn by Oplot battalion militants who watched
over me and other detainees. Specifically, it was a circle depicting a rhinoceros
inscribed with the words Spetsnaz Oplot. From this I gathered that those
three Grad systems also belonged to the Oplot battalion of the DNR.
At the entrance to Elenovka, where I was staying under the
above-mentioned circumstances, there was a roadblock of the Donetsk
Peoples Republic where militants implemented access control procedures,
flagging down each car passing the roadblock and checking the papers of all
passengers in them in order to prevent Ukrainian military or people fighting
against the Donetsk Peoples Republic from infiltrating the territory controlled
by the DNR. However, the DNR militants let the three above-mentioned URAL
trucks with GRAD systems and the cars escorting them pass the roadblock
even without stopping (without opening fire on them or doing anything else to
forcibly stop them). On the contrary, upon seeing those vehicles they waved
their hands at them, welcoming the people inside. This was further proof that
those military vehicles belonged to the Donetsk Peoples Republic and were
apparently involved in a planned maneuver, since the DNR militants knew they
would be passing the roadblock (which is why they did not stop them and did
not try to at least find out who was driving them DNR military personnel or
somebody else). I also noticed that about 15-20 minutes before those military
vehicles passed the roadblock, any kind of traffic though that roadblock
stopped and resumed only 30 minutes after those vehicles passed. Apparently,
DNR militants intentionally stopped civilian cars at other roadblocks to allow
the above-mentioned three Grad multiple rocket launchers and 2 cars
escorting them to pass without obstacles.
After passing the roadblock where I was cleaning the trenches at the
entrance to Elenovka, those three vehicles with Grad systems and two escort
cars proceeded further without stopping along the same road in the direction
of Dokuchaevsk, Donetsk Oblast. Then I lost sight of those vehicles.
I would like to remark that protective tarpaulins were removed from the
barrels each one of the Grad systems (the barrels from which missiles are
fired). The multiple rocket launchers normally travel with these tarpaulins.
This was an indication that those military vehicles were prepared to fire. Yet I
did not see if the barrels of those systems contained missiles because the
vehicles drove at very high rate of speed while I was on a road shoulder by the
trench.
I knew that the above-mentioned three vehicles were Grad multiple
rocket launchers on URAL truck chassis because I had previously seen such
vehicles in Donetsk, in person and on television.
Roughly 2 or 2.5 hours after this, between 2 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. on
January 13, 2015, I heard a noise and whining sounds of Grad missiles coming
from the direction of Dokuchaevsk, Donetsk Oblast. Judging by the sound,
they were probably fired in the southern direction.
However, I dont know exactly where they were fired from and at what targets
because at the time I was still in a trench outside Elenovka. This lasted for
about 10 minutes, which led me to conclude that the missiles were fired not
from a single Grad system, but 2 or 3 systems, because one system can fire up
to 40 shots. Meanwhile, the number of shots was 2-3 times more than 40 (I
don't recall the exact number).
I was also familiar with the sounds of Grad missiles, since I had spent a
long time in Donetsk prior to that, where I often heard such salvos.
I am not aware whether the DNR militants who were near me at the time
of the above-mentioned missile shots knew that those shots would be fired. I
did not notice anything unusual about their behavior. As always, when any
attack began (launched either by DNR militants or Ukrainian military), they
ordered all the detainees (including myself) to stay on the road, while our
supervisors hid in the trench. Apparently, their instructions required them to
hide in trenches whenever an attack came.
After returning from my trench cleaning duty at around 5 p.m. on
January 13, 2015, I learned from other detainees (who were held by Oplot
militants of the DNR together with me) that the same day, on January 13,
2015, a roadblock of the Ukrainian Armed Forces outside Volnovakha came
under attack. One of the missiles hit a bus with civilian passengers who were at
the roadblock at the time. Several people got killed. Meanwhile, the DNR
militants did not say anything about it. They did not even start a conversation
to address this subject.
Judging by the fact that I personally saw three trucks with Grad systems
bearing emblems of the Oplot battalion of the DNR leave Donetsk in the
direction of Dokuchaevsk (through Elenovka) at around 12 p.m. on January
13, 2015, and heard salvos from 2-3 Grad systems in the southern direction at
2 p.m. - 2:30 p.m. that same day, and the fact that the Ukrainian Army
roadblock came under fire during this time outside Volnovakha (which is
located in the southern direction relative to Dokuchaevsk), I believe that the
attack on the roadblock that killed bus passengers had been launched by the
Oplot battalion of the terrorist organization Donetsk Peoples Republic from
three Grad systems mounted on trucks (which I saw under the
above-mentioned circumstances) firing out of Dokuchaevsk, Donetsk Oblast.
I know nothing else about the January 13, 2015 attack on the roadblock
of the Ukrainian Armed Forces outside Volnovakha.
On January 15, 2015, I used the opportunity afforded by the fact that the
DNR militants who supervised me and other detainees got drunk on alcohol to
escape. I arrived at my home in the village of Sladkoe, Maryinka District,
Donetsk Oblast.
Question: What other information can you provide regarding the
criminal case?
Answer: I can add no further information relevant to this criminal case.
The witness was informed about the manner in which he can review the
contents of the record, specifically by reading the record personally.
Witness O.M. Pavlenko [Signature]
(Initials, last name) (Signature)
[hw:] I have read the record personally. My testimony has been written down
correctly. I have no complaints, statements, or additions to make.
[Signature] O.M. Pavlenko
Senior Investigator with the Operative Unit
of the Investigative Department
at the Donetsk Oblast Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine
Captain of Justice [Signature] V.V. Romanenko
Annex 210
Signed Declaration of Oleksandr Pavlenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (23
January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
Witness O.M. Pavlenko offered the following testimony:
I permanently reside at 26/2 Oktyabrskaya Street in the village of
Sladkoe, Maryinka District, Donetsk blast.
Roughly in November 2014, I arrived in Donetsk seeking employment as
a miner in the Zasyadko Coal Mine. But upon my arrival in Donetsk I got
arrested by officers of the so-called police of the Donetsk Peoples Republic
(hereinafter DNR) for publicly drinking alcohol in the evening in the vicinity of
the Zolotoe Koltso shopping mall in the Voroshilovsky District of Donetsk. The
DNR police punished me with community service for this violation. Specifically,
from November 2014 to January 15, 2015, while being supervised by DNR
military personnel, I cleaned the streets in Donetsk, dug trenches at the
entrance to Donetsk from the side of Elenovka, Donetsk Oblast, and
subsequently cleaned those trenches to remove any garbage.
At around 10 a.m. on January 13, 2015, fighters of the Oplot battalion of
the Donetsk Peoples Republic terrorist organization (five individuals, two of
whom went by the code names Khirurg and Slip) took me and four more
detainees (just like me; among them I knew Vitaliy Viktorovich Vrobyev, a
native of Donetsk, as well as Andrey and Viktor) to clean DNR trenches at the
entrance to Elenovka, Donetsk Oblast, from the direction of Donetsk, where I
stayed until 5 p.m. on January 13, 2015.
I understood that those were fighters of the Oplot battalion by the fact
that they wore camouflage uniforms with insignia of this DNR unit images of
a rhinoceros inscribed with Spetsnaz Oplot. The militants called themselves
Oplotovsty [i.e. members of Oplot].
While cleaning the above-mentioned trenches, specifically the trench at
the entrance to Elenovka, Donetsk Oblast, from the side of Donetsk, near the
right-hand road shoulder (in the direction from Donetsk to Elenovka) during
lunchtime (around 12 p.m.), I saw three military vehicles Grad multiple
rocket launchers on URAL truck chassis (green) accompanied by black Jeep
cars with blue flashing lights in front of them and one more black passenger car
(I dont recall the model) drive on this road from the direction of Donetsk into
Elenovka.
Those vehicles proceeded at a rather high rate of speed approximately
80 km/h. The doors of the cabs of each one of the above-mentioned URAL
trucks with Grad multiple rocket launchers mounted on them were emblazoned
with the same emblem that was worn by Oplot battalion militants who watched
over me and other detainees. Specifically, it was a circle depicting a rhinoceros
inscribed with the words Spetsnaz Oplot. From this I gathered that those
three Grad systems also belonged to the Oplot battalion of the DNR.
At the entrance to Elenovka, where I was staying under the
above-mentioned circumstances, there was a roadblock of the Donetsk
Peoples Republic where militants implemented access control procedures,
flagging down each car passing the roadblock and checking the papers of all
passengers in them in order to prevent Ukrainian military or people fighting
against the Donetsk Peoples Republic from infiltrating the territory controlled
by the DNR. However, the DNR militants let the three above-mentioned URAL
trucks with GRAD systems and the cars escorting them pass the roadblock
even without stopping (without opening fire on them or doing anything else to
forcibly stop them). On the contrary, upon seeing those vehicles they waved
their hands at them, welcoming the people inside. This was further proof that
those military vehicles belonged to the Donetsk Peoples Republic and were
apparently involved in a planned maneuver, since the DNR militants knew they
would be passing the roadblock (which is why they did not stop them and did
not try to at least find out who was driving them DNR military personnel or
somebody else). I also noticed that about 15-20 minutes before those military
vehicles passed the roadblock, any kind of traffic though that roadblock
stopped and resumed only 30 minutes after those vehicles passed. Apparently,
DNR militants intentionally stopped civilian cars at other roadblocks to allow
the above-mentioned three Grad multiple rocket launchers and 2 cars
escorting them to pass without obstacles.
After passing the roadblock where I was cleaning the trenches at the
entrance to Elenovka, those three vehicles with Grad systems and two escort
cars proceeded further without stopping along the same road in the direction
of Dokuchaevsk, Donetsk Oblast. Then I lost sight of those vehicles.
I would like to remark that protective tarpaulins were removed from the
barrels each one of the Grad systems (the barrels from which missiles are
fired). The multiple rocket launchers normally travel with these tarpaulins.
This was an indication that those military vehicles were prepared to fire. Yet I
did not see if the barrels of those systems contained missiles because the
vehicles drove at very high rate of speed while I was on a road shoulder by the
trench.
I knew that the above-mentioned three vehicles were Grad multiple
rocket launchers on URAL truck chassis because I had previously seen such
vehicles in Donetsk, in person and on television.
Roughly 2 or 2.5 hours after this, between 2 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. on
January 13, 2015, I heard a noise and whining sounds of Grad missiles coming
from the direction of Dokuchaevsk, Donetsk Oblast. Judging by the sound,
they were probably fired in the southern direction.
However, I dont know exactly where they were fired from and at what targets
because at the time I was still in a trench outside Elenovka. This lasted for
about 10 minutes, which led me to conclude that the missiles were fired not
from a single Grad system, but 2 or 3 systems, because one system can fire up
to 40 shots. Meanwhile, the number of shots was 2-3 times more than 40 (I
don't recall the exact number).
I was also familiar with the sounds of Grad missiles, since I had spent a
long time in Donetsk prior to that, where I often heard such salvos.
I am not aware whether the DNR militants who were near me at the time
of the above-mentioned missile shots knew that those shots would be fired. I
did not notice anything unusual about their behavior. As always, when any
attack began (launched either by DNR militants or Ukrainian military), they
ordered all the detainees (including myself) to stay on the road, while our
supervisors hid in the trench. Apparently, their instructions required them to
hide in trenches whenever an attack came.
After returning from my trench cleaning duty at around 5 p.m. on
January 13, 2015, I learned from other detainees (who were held by Oplot
militants of the DNR together with me) that the same day, on January 13,
2015, a roadblock of the Ukrainian Armed Forces outside Volnovakha came
under attack. One of the missiles hit a bus with civilian passengers who were at
the roadblock at the time. Several people got killed. Meanwhile, the DNR
militants did not say anything about it. They did not even start a conversation
to address this subject.
Judging by the fact that I personally saw three trucks with Grad systems
bearing emblems of the Oplot battalion of the DNR leave Donetsk in the
direction of Dokuchaevsk (through Elenovka) at around 12 p.m. on January
13, 2015, and heard salvos from 2-3 Grad systems in the southern direction at
2 p.m. - 2:30 p.m. that same day, and the fact that the Ukrainian Army
roadblock came under fire during this time outside Volnovakha (which is
located in the southern direction relative to Dokuchaevsk), I believe that the
attack on the roadblock that killed bus passengers had been launched by the
Oplot battalion of the terrorist organization Donetsk Peoples Republic from
three Grad systems mounted on trucks (which I saw under the
above-mentioned circumstances) firing out of Dokuchaevsk, Donetsk Oblast.
I know nothing else about the January 13, 2015 attack on the roadblock
of the Ukrainian Armed Forces outside Volnovakha.
On January 15, 2015, I used the opportunity afforded by the fact that the
DNR militants who supervised me and other detainees got drunk on alcohol to
escape. I arrived at my home in the village of Sladkoe, Maryinka District,
Donetsk Oblast.
Question: What other information can you provide regarding the
criminal case?
Answer: I can add no further information relevant to this criminal case.
The witness was informed about the manner in which he can review the
contents of the record, specifically by reading the record personally.
Witness O.M. Pavlenko [Signature]
(Initials, last name) (Signature)
[hw:] I have read the record personally. My testimony has been written down
correctly. I have no complaints, statements, or additions to make.
[Signature] O.M. Pavlenko
Senior Investigator with the Operative Unit
of the Investigative Department
at the Donetsk Oblast Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine
Captain of Justice [Signature] V.V. Romanenko
Annex 211
Signed Declaration of Nataliya Mykhaylivna Nikolaeva, Victim Interrogation
Protocol (24 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1
[...]
In response to the questions put to her, the victim, N.M. Nikolayeva, gave the following
testimony: I have been living at the above address alone for many years. At about 8:30 a.m. on
1/24/2015, I left the center of Mariupol on my way home from work, heading for the above address.
Around 9:15 a.m. I was already at Yasnyi Lane, heading home. Suddenly I heard shots and a
thundering noise. I started running towards the nearest pole to take cover from the shrapnel. When I
was near the pole, another woman ran up to me and said that my thigh was bleeding. Then,
suddenly, a young man came out of nowhere and took me to the Denys stop, then vanished. When I
was alone, I saw a young lady driving a car which I flagged to ask for help. She let me into her car
and took me to city hospital No. 4, from which I was moved to city hospital No. 2, where I stayed
from 1/24/2015 to 1/31/2015 as an inpatient diagnosed with a non-perforating shrapnel wound in
the left buttock. At the moment I am an outpatient at day clinic No. 2 in Zhovtnevyy district.
This is a true record of my oral testimony.
I have read this record.
[signature]
Investigator at the Zovtnevyy district investigations department [signature] (T.U. Tyschenko)
Annex 212
Signed Declaration of Oksana Olexandrivna Ivanova, Victim Interrogation Protocol
(24 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1
[...]
In response to the questions asked, the victim O.O. Ivanova gave the following testimony:
(please state the information received as a result of the procedural act of information gathering relevant to these criminal
proceedings)
I live at the above address with my husband, Oleksiy Anatolievych Scherbak, born in 1980,
and my child.
At 09:10 today, 01/24/15, I came to the Kyivsky market where I work, at 31 Kyivska Street,
Ordzhonikidze district in the city of Mariupol (Vostochnyi neighborhood). I work at the store
called Window Dressing at the market. When I approached the store to open the door,
approximately at 09:10, I heard the sound of shells dropping somewhere close, but it didnt
sound like this was in the grounds of the market. And in about one minute, as I started to look
around, shells began to drop nearby, on the premises of the Kyivsky market.
I would like to note that the shelling, which caused destruction and in which I was injured,
sounded like it was coming from the woodland area, from the direction of the town of
Novoazovka, rather than from the direction of Mariupol city.
2
After shells hit the center of the Kyivsky market, I felt pain in my legs, and I felt that my legs
were wounded. I was bleeding. I crawled to the nearby store, and I was helped into an
ambulance.
The ambulance car took me to the Matsuk city hospital No. 4, where I am currently being
treated as an inpatient at the trauma department. My diagnosis is: shrapnel wounds in the
lower limbs (both legs are wounded).
I cannot say who else was wounded or killed at the market. I did not see anyone wounded or
killed next to me. I was alone at the store I was about to open.
I will report the final amount of material damage caused to me by this crime, that is, the cost
of treatment and medication, at the end of my treatment.
The testimony was recorded on -
________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
(please describe the information storage device if using recording technology)
which is submitted along with this record.
As a result of using technology to record the statement, (no) requests have been
received (delete as appropriate) from participants in the proceedings to add text to the
interrogation record.
Participants in the proceedings have been advised on the manner in which they can review
the contents of the interrogation record, namely ___________________________________
(view a written copy of the record, or view or listen to content recorded on storage devices if recording technology has been
used)
Having reviewed the text of the interrogation record, participants in the proceedings have not
requested permission to make any changes, additions or comments. (Please specify request if
received).
Victim O.A. Ivanova O. A. Ivanova [signature]
(name in full) (signature)
Statement taken by:
Investigator [signature] V.A.Orlov
(investigator, title, name of organization, signature, surname and initials)
Annex 213
Signed Declaration of Valerii Kirsanov, Witness Interrogation Protocol (25 January
2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
RECORD
of suspect questioning
City of Kyiv January 25, 2015
Questioning commenced at 5:25 p.m.
Questioning ended at 6:05 p.m.
Captain of Justice D.M. Ovsianyk, Senior Investigator of High-Profile Cases at the Central
Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, having examined the files of the
pretrial investigation registered in the Uniform Register of Pretrial Investigations under No.
22014000000000395, questioned the following individual on the premises of the Central
Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine at 33 Volodymyrska Street, in the
presence of defense attorney O.V. Shapoval pursuant to Articles 42, 95, 104, 106, 223, 224 of the
Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine [...] [Participants were notified] about their obligation to refrain
from disclosing information about the procedural activity conducted and warned in advance about
the use of recording equipment, the conditions and procedure for their use:
1. First name, patronymic, last name: Valeriy Serhiyovych Kirsanov
2. Date and place of birth: August 24, 1975, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast
3. Citizenship: Ukrainian, citizens of Ukraine
4. Education (date of graduation and university,
college, secondary school, specialty):
secondary vocational education; graduated
from a vocational school in 1993 as a turning
lathe operator
5. Marital status (including any dependents; state the
last name, first name, patronymic, date of birth and
supporting documents):
Married. Son: Volodymyr Valeriyovych
Kirsanov, born on August 9, 1996. Wife: Olha
Volodymyrivna Kirsanova, born on March 18,
1976.
6. Place of employment, job title: temporarily unemployed
7. Address of registration and residence: Address of registration: 84 Prospect Marshala
Zhukova, apartment 113, Mariupol, Donetsk
Oblast. Address of residence: 44 Vavilova
Street, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.
8. Phone numbers used by the individual over the
past year (including mobile phone number):
067-302-62-85
9. Prior record of convictions (if convicted, by what
court and under what article). Did the suspect comply
with the conditions of pretrial restrictions, if any? Has
the suspect received a notice of suspicion of having
committed another criminal offense?
According to the suspect, he has no prior record
of convictions.
10. Is the individual a parliament member, judge,
jury member, lay judge, presidential candidate,
human rights ombudsman of the Ukrainian
Parliament, chairman of the Accounts Chamber,
member of a local council, or attorney?
The individual is not parliament member,
judge, jury member, lay judge, presidential
candidate, human rights ombudsman of the
Ukrainian Parliament, chairman of the Accounts
Chamber, member of a local council, or
attorney.
11. What is the individuals state of health? Is the
individual on sick leave or registered with any mental
disease or drug abuse prevention centers? What is
the physical state of the person (mute, deaf, blind)?
The state of health is good. The individual has
no complaints and is not registered with any
mental disease or drug abuse prevention
centers (and was not registered previously).
12. Identity documents:
Ordzhonikidze District Office of the Mariupol
City Department of the Central Directorate of
the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs in
Donetsk Oblast on January 16, 2001
[signature]
It was explained to the suspect that he was summoned to testify as part of Criminal Case No.
22014000000000395 in connection with a criminal offense committed by him under Part 1 of Article
258-3 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
The suspect, V.S. Kirsanov, had the meaning of Article 63 of the Constitution of Ukraine
explained to them to the effect that a person shall not be held accountable for refusing to offer
testimony or explanations regarding themselves, their family members or next of kin as defined by
law.
[Signature]
(Signature)
It was explained to the suspect, V.S. Kirsanov, that under Article 18 of the Criminal Procedure
Code of Ukraine he is free from self-incrimination and has the right not to testify against close
relatives and family members. The meaning of Article 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine
about the right to defense was also explained to the suspect.
[Signature]
(Signature)
The questioning procedure, rights and obligations under Article 42 of the Criminal Procedure
Code of Ukraine were explained to the suspect, V.S. Kirsanov. He also received a pamphlet listing
his procedural rights and duties received on January 25, 2015.
[Signature]
(Signature)
My rights and duties as well as the questioning procedure have been explained to me and
understood by me. I have received the pamphlet listing the procedural rights and duties of the
suspect.
Suspect: V.S. Kirsanov [Signature]
(Initials, last name, signature)
After reviewing his rights, the suspect stated that he wishes to testify and agrees to answer
questions in the Russian language (agrees, refuses).
During the questioning, V.S. Kirsanov expressed a wish to have the defense attorney, O.V.
Shapoval, present [Signature].
Wishes to testify in the Russian language.
Does not require the services of an interpreter.
(Requires, does not require)
After apprising the suspect of his rights, the investigator began using recording equipment and
asking questions to which the suspect gave answers.
The testimony offered during the questioning process was recorded on the Sony CMOS video
camera. The Lenovo ThinkCenter computer No. 77 was then used to record this information on a
CD-DVD-R optical disk that is enclosed with this record.
After the questioning process was recorded using equipment, participants of the procedural
activity did not request to make any changes to the text of the record of questioning.
The participants of the procedural activity were informed about the way in which they can
review the contents of the record, specifically by reading the written record and listening to the
audio recording. After the participants listened to the audio recording, it was placed inside a packet.
After reading the text of the record of questioning, the participants of the procedural activity did
not request any changes, additions or comments to be made. I choose not to review the record; I
have no other statements or requests to make.
Suspect V.S. Kirsanov [Signature]
(Initials, last name)
Participants Ovsianyk, Shapoval [Signature]
Questioning conducted and record prepared by:
Senior Investigator of High-Profile Cases
with the 3rd Office of the 1st Directorate of the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security
Service of Ukraine [Signature] D. Ovsianyk
Transcript of the record of questioning of Valeriy Serhiyovych Kirsanov,
born on August 24, 1975 in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast
Investigators question: Would you testify about the circumstances of the shelling of
the city of Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast on January 24, 2015?
Suspects answer: On January 24, 2015, I woke up to the sounds of shelling from
GRAD systems happening somewhere close by. I went to the kitchen and started
calling my parents who live nearby. They said they were not hurt. I went to collect
them.
Investigators question: Did you call anybody else?
Suspects answer: No, just my parents.
Investigators question: Prior to the events that happened on January 24, 2015, did
you notify representatives of the Donetsk Peoples Republic via SMS messages or by
phone about the locations of Ukrainian roadblocks in order to adjust their fire.
Suspects answer: Yes, several days prior to that, between January 20 and 22, 2015,
I provided the above-mentioned information to the representatives of the Donetsk
Peoples Republic, specifically Alexander who goes by the code name Pepel, via
SMS messages. I do not know who Alexander is. I know that he is a representative of
the armed artillery group of the Donetsk Peoples Republic.
Investigators question: Are you acquainted with Sergey Leonidovich Ponomarenko?
Suspects answer: Yes, I am acquainted with S.L. Ponomarenko. We met in
2008-2009. He was an active public figure and provided services to officers of the
State Traffic Inspectorate in his own car.
My communication with S.L. Ponomarenko was interrupted during the period when
administrative buildings in Donetsk Oblast were being taken over, specifically since
April 2014. Sometime in November-December, he called me and we began discussing
various topics at length. I learned that he was a representative of the Donetsk
Peoples Republic.
Since January 2015, S.L. Ponomarenko had been asking me to inform him about the
locations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which I did using a computer. I used the
Google Maps application to determine the coordinates and sent them to S.L.
Ponomarenko via SMS messages. However, I always intentionally gave him wrong
coordinates.
S.L. Ponomarenko also gave me the contact details of a terrorist who went by the code
name of Pepel and said that he would also be calling me with questions about the
locations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
S.L. Ponomarenko explained that he needed the coordinates to send recon scouts to
determine the number of vehicles onsite.
On January 21 and 22, 2014, I provided coordinates for the sites in Taganrogskaya
Street and Marshala Zhukova Street. However, those coordinates were wrong.
I am unaware how S.L. Ponomarenko used the coordinates that I provided via SMS
messages.
At around 10 a.m. on January 24, 2015, I got a call from S.L. Ponomarenko, who
asked where the missiles landed. I went and saw that the missiles hit residential
buildings and the market. I called S.L. Ponomarenko to ask him what they were
thinking firing at peaceful civilians. Also, at around 2 p.m. on January 24, 2015 I
received a call from S.L. Ponomarenko, who once again asked about what happened
in Mariupol. I told him about the victims once again, at which point he began using
offensive language directed at Pepel.
I am unaware if Pepel is a Russian citizen or an officer of the Russian intelligence
services.
Investigators question: Are you aware of Russias involvement [in the military
conflict] in Donetsk Oblast?
Suspects answer: I know about it only from the Internet. I also had telephone
conversations with a friend named Vladimir Korablev, who resides in the village of
Shirokino. He told me that Federal Security Service officers came to him and damaged
his property a Zhiguli 2106 car, because he was spotted during an artillery attack on
one of the Donetsk Peoples Republic roadblocks.
Attorneys question: What were your reasons for disclosing information to S.L.
Ponomarenko and why did you do it?
Suspects answer: I disclosed this information after S.L. Ponomarenko threatened me
during our meeting in the village of Shirokino ahead of the New Year that my family
could suffer unless I did what I was told. After this I decided to send them coordinates,
but only inaccurate ones.
Attorneys question: Were you aware that your actions could be dangerous to the
public and have severe consequences?
Suspects answer: No. Artillery attacks were never discussed. Only sabotage groups
were discussed.
Attorneys question: Then why did they need this information?
Suspects answer: I dont know exactly. For reconnaissance purposes.
Attorneys question: Who can confirm that you met with S.L. Ponomarenko in the
village of Shirokino?
Suspects answer: My friend Vladimir Anatolyevich Korablev. I dont recall his phone
number.
Attorneys question: What conclusions did you draw for yourself upon learning about
the artillery attack on Mariupol?
Suspects answer: I regret to have provided this information. I immediately called
S.L. Ponomarenko and said: What are you doing? You are firing at peaceful civilians,
houses, residential district, the market. He hung up on me illegitimately. It is my
understanding that S.L. Ponomarenko commanded the relevant units.
Attorneys question: Did you ever meet with Pepel?
Suspects answer: No, I have never seen him. I dont know his location apart from the
fact that it's somewhere near Mariupol. I came to this realization after what I heard
from S.L. Ponomarenko because he said that he was in Donetsk while Pepel was
somewhere near in the Novoazovsk area.
Attorneys question: Are you worried about your son and wife?
Suspects answer: Yes, they are all I have.
Attorneys question: Why didnt you go to the police after S.L. Ponomarenko began
threatening you and your family?
Suspects answer: What could they do if the Ukrainian authorities have no control
there whatsoever?
Attorneys question: How many times did S.L. Ponomarenko call you?
Suspects answer: Almost every day in January 2015. I was not rewarded in any way
for providing the coordinates.
Senior Investigator of High-Profile Cases
of the Central Investigative Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine [Signature] D. Ovsianyk
Annex 214
Signed Declaration of Olena Demchenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (24
January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official
language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only
an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further
compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the
full original-language document
1
[...]
[handwritten:] In response I would like to confirm that I reside at the above address with my
husband, Dmitry Petrovich Demchenko, DOB 05.24.1981 and with my daughter, Maria Dmitriyevna
Demchenko, DOB 04.03.2011. I have lived at this address for about 5 years.
On 05.24.1981 around 9:00 A.M. I left the house with my daughter to go to the Silpo grocery store.
About 10-15 minutes later, we were near our house at 19 9th May Street, building 1, residential
development Vostochny, city of Mariupol, when we heard shots fired. When we looked in the sky,
we saw a shell heading for the Afghans house, which is next to my house. This shell exploded
approximately on the sixth floor of the Afghans house at 9th May StreetI dont know the exact
house number. I took the child in my arms and ran in the direction of the Silpo store. On my way I
noticed a light injury in the palm of my childs right hand, which was bleeding. My childs hand had
been hit by a metal fragment. I would like to clarify that after the shell hit the Afghans house my
child and I ran home, not to the store as I previously said. Whilst at home I treated my childs wound.
I tried to call a cab, but didnt get through. Then my child and I went outside, where I saw a car
[signature]
2
[handwritten:] owned by a lady I knew whose name is Maria (I dont remember her surname or the
make and model of her car). Marias husband was at the wheel. I asked these people to take me to
city hospital No. 3, which they did. At the moment my child is being treated as an inpatient at the
trauma department of city hospital No. 3.
I have not suffered either material or moral damage. I do not wish to file a lawsuit.
Question: Please clarify where your husband was at the time of the shelling.
Answer: My husband went to Russia in early July 2014 to work in the town of Surgut, where he
works as a welder.
Question: Were any of your friends or relatives injured in the shelling?
Answer: I did not see any of my friends or relatives injured in the shelling. I would like to add that
during the shelling a man was passing by, who fell. I dont know whether he was killed or wounded.
This is a true written record of my oral statement, which I have read. [signature]
Investigator, investigations department at DTPSU, N.A. Makhonin.
Volume VI - Annexes 144-214