INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
VOLUME II OF THE ANNEXES TO THE REPLY
SUBMITTED BY UKRAINE
29 APRIL 2022
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
OF THE VOLUME II OF THE ANNEXES TO THE REPLY
B. DECLARATIONS AND FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS
Page
Signed Declaration of Artem Mineev, Witness Interrogation Protocol
(16 November 2014)
1
Signed Declaration of Igor Boiko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (22
November 2014)
5
Signed Declaration of Sergey Bashlykov, Suspect Interrogation
Protocol (16 March 2015)
9
Signed Declaration of Victor Tetutskiy, Suspect Interrogation
Protocol (16 March 2015)
23
Signed Declaration of Volodymyr Dvornikov, Suspect Interrogation
Protocol (20 March 2015)
31
Transcript of Covert Investigative Action Concerning V. Dvornikov,
drafted by Lieutenant Colonel O.V. Diaghilev, Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine in the Kharkiv Region (25 March 2015)
45
Transcript of Covert Investigative Action Concerning V. Tetutskiy,
drafted by Lieutenant Colonel O.V Diaghilev, Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine in the Kharkiv Region (25 March 2015)
53
Signed Declaration of Volodymyr Oleksiyovych Lytvynchuk, Victim
Interrogation Protocol (2 February 2017)
57
Signed Declaration of Valentyna Vasilievna Babenko, Victim
Interrogation Protocol (3 February 2017)
61
Signed Declaration of Anna Aleksandrovna Buzhynskaya, Victim
Interrogation Protocol (4 February 2017)
65
Signed Declaration of Olga Nikolaevna Dyuzhikova, Victim
Interrogation Protocol (4 February 2017)
69
Signed Declaration of Vira Mykolaivna Bespalova, Victim
Interrogation Protocol (4 February 2017)
73
Signed Declaration of Viktor Volodymyrovych Dzhyuba, Victim
Interrogation Protocol (6 February 2017)
77
Signed Declaration of Hanna Mykolayivna Fandeeva, Witness
Interrogation Protocol (15 February 2017)
81
Signed Declaration of Anna Vyacheslavovna Gulchevskaya, Victim
Interrogation Protocol (19 February 2017)
85
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Signed Declaration of Oleksandr Victorovych Povarnitsyn, Property
Inspection Protocol (19 February 2017)
89
Signed Declaration of Viktor Ivanovych Palash, Victim Interrogation
Protocol (19 February 2017)
93
Signed Declaration of Oksana Vladimirovna Povarnitsyna, Victim
Interrogation Protocol (20 February 2017)
97
Signed Declaration of Viktor Ivanovych Palash, Property Inspection
Protocol (20 February 2017)
101
Intentionally Omitted
C. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION DOCUMENTS
Page
U.N. Police, Peacekeeping PDT Standards for Formed Police Units
(2015)
109
Intentionally Omitted
D. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
Page
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, art. 205(1) 137
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Rules of Firing and
Fire Control of Artillery (PSiUO-2011) (2011)
141
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Manual for the Study
of the Rules of Firing and Fire Control of Artillery (PSiUO-2011)
(2014)
161
Irina A. Pankratova and Mikhail V. Kolinchenko, CFT Department of
Rosfinmonitoring, Certain Aspects of Application of New Anti-
Terrorism Legislation as it Pertains to Freezing (Restraining)
Terrorist and Extremist Assets, Financial Security (2015)
177
E. TREATIES, CHARTERS, AND MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
Page
Protocol to the Minsk Convention on Legal Aid and Legal Relations
on Civil, Family and Criminal Matters of 1993 (28 March 1997)
189
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F. THIRD-STATE JUDICIAL DECISIONS, LEGISLATION, AND GOVERNMENT
DOCUMENTS
Page
United States Department of the Army, Military Operations on
Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), Field Manual 90-1 (15 August 1979)
193
United States Department of the Army, An Infantryman’s Guide to
Combat in Built-up Areas, Field Manual 90-10-1 (12 May 1993)
201
Second Amended Complaint, Schansman v. Sberbank of Russia
PJSC, Civ. No. 19-CV-2985 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y. 5 October 2020)
217
Schansman v. Sberbank of Russia PJSC, Civ. No. 19-CV-2985
(ALC), 2021 WL 4482172 (S.D.N.Y. 30 September 2021)
243
Intentionally Omitted
G. SCHOLARLY AUTHORITIES
Page
Sir Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts, Interpretation of Treaties, in
OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: VOLUME 1 PEACE (Robert
Jennings & Arthur Watts, eds., Oxford University Press 9th ed.
2008)
257
A.P. Ryjakov, Commentary to Art. 140, in Commentary to the
Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation (9th rev. ed.
2014)
263
Nils Melzer, The Principle of Distinction Between Civilians and
Combatants, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
ARMED CONFLICT (Andrew Clapham & Paola Gaeta, eds., Oxford
University Press 2014)
271
Richard Gardiner, TREATY INTERPRETATION (Oxford University Press
2d ed., 2015)
277
Jutta Brunnée, Harm Prevention, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Lavanya Rajamani &
Jacqueline Peel, eds., 2d ed. 2021)
287
Intentionally Omitted
H. PRESS REPORTS
Page
Oksana Polishuk, Feel the Difference: Who Ukraine Gives to Free
From Captivity, Ukrinform (27 December 2019)
305
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Ukrinform, The Prosecution Explained Why People Sentenced for a
Terrorist Act in Kharkiv Were Released (28 December 2019)
311
Hanna Sokolova, Terrorist Attack During the “March of Dignity” in
Kharkiv. How Three Defendants Were Sentenced to Life Sentence
and Immediately Released (29 December 2019)
315
Novynarnia, “Separam - Freedom”: Whom Ukraine Released to
ORDLO at the Big Exchange in 2019. List, (30 December 2019)
319
Intentionally Omitted
I. OTHER DOCUMENTS
Page
Sun-Tzu, The Art of Warfare (Roger Ames., 1993) 325
Interfax, The DPR Opened a Criminal Case on the Fact of the
Shelling of a Bus Near Volnovakha (14 January 2015)
339
Lt. Col. (Retired) Matthew Whittchurch, Lessons from Soviet Urban
Operations 1945, British Army Review Special Report (Winter 2019)
345
RT, RAW: Footage from Shelled Mariupol in Southeastern Ukraine
(video)
351
RT, Ukraine: Mariupol Hit by Heavy Shelling, Streets Devastated
(video)
353
Intentionally Omitted
Intentionally Omitted
Intentionally Omitted
Intentionally Omitted
Intentionally Omitted
III. CERD ANNEXES
A. UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
Page
Law of Ukraine No. 1636-VII “On Establishing Free Economic Zone
‘Crimea’ and on Specifics of Conducting Economic Activity in the
Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine” (12 August 2014)
355
Law of Ukraine No. 2145-VIII “On Education” (5 September 2017) 369
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Law of Ukraine No. 463-IX “On Complete General Secondary
Education” (16 January 2020)
375
Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine No. 2077-IX "On
Certain Issues of Protection of the Right to Freedom of Conscience
and Religion of Believers of the Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church (Orthodox Church of Ukraine) and Preservation of
the Premises of the Cathedral of St. Volodymyr and St. Olha” (17
February 2022)
381
B. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
Page
Russian Federation, Federal Law No. 433-FZ of 28 December 2013,
‘On Amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation’
385
Russian Federation, Federal Law No. 299-FZ of 31 July 2020, ‘On
Amendments to Article 1 of the Federal Law “On Counteracting
Extremist Activity”’
389
Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 1-11/2020,
Decision, 10 December 2020 (Ukraine’s Additional Translation of
Russia’s Counter-Memorial Part II, Annex 430)
393
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 201 “On
Amendments to the List of Border Territories Where Foreign
Citizens, Stateless Persons and Foreign Legal Entities Cannot Own
Land Plots, Approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian
Federation of January 9, 2011, No. 26” (20 March 2020)
415
List of Registered Media Outlets, Federal Service for Supervision in
the Sphere of Communications, Information Technology and Mass
Communications (8 April 2022)
421
Ruling of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 310-
ES19-8542 (19 June 2019)
445
Ruling of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 310-
ES18-18876 (23 November 2018)
451
Default judgement of Yevpatoria City Court in Case No. 2-2176/2019
(6 November 2019)
457
The Center for Counter-Extremism, The Ministry of Interior for the
Republic of Crimea (8 February 2022)
467
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C. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION REPORTS
Page
Crimean Human Rights Group, Overview of the Situation with
Respect for Human Rights and Norms of the International
Humanitarian Law in Crimea for 2020 (January 2021)
471
Crimean Tatar Resource Center, In Crimea, Parents of Students are
Forced to Refuse to Study in the Crimean Tatar Language at School
(5 April 2021)
481
Crimean Human Rights Group, Statement of Implementation Report
Russian Federation International Legal Commitments in the Field
Protection of Human Rights in the Occupied Territory of Crimea and
Sevastopol (November 2021)
485
International Renaissance Foundation, Information on Illegal
Archeological Excavations: List of Objects of Destruction of
Monuments of Crimea (2021)
493
Crimean Tatar Resource Center, Analysis of Human Rights
Violations in the Occupied Crimea in 2021 (presentation) (25
January 2022)
501
Intentionally Omitted
Annex 37
Signed Declaration of Artem Mineev, Witness Interrogation Protocol (16 November
2014)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 37
Signed Declaration of Artem Mineev, Witness Interrogation Protocol (16 November
2014)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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11
Signed Declaration
of a Witness Interrogation
the city of Kharkiv 16 November 2014
1. Last, First, and Middle Name: Mineev Artem Sergiovych
2. Date and Place of Birth 9 July 1984, the city of Kharkiv
[. . .]
[signature]
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• d
22
[. . .]
Approximately at the end of September - beginning of October 2014, my aunt (my mother's
sister) - Kovtun (birth name - Kleva) Marina Anatolyevna, born on June 9, 1967, contacted me
with a request to use my garage. M.A. Kovtun told me that she needed garage to store "trash";
she did not say what exactly it would be. Per her request, I gave her keys and I did not check
the garage. A few days later, M.A. Kovtun handed me two new keys and said that she had
changed the locks in the garage because they were old. I took the keys from M.A. Kovtun, but
I did not check the garage itself and the integrity of the locks.
[. . .]
On 16 November 2014, the SSU officers called me and asked me to give some explanations
about my aunt - M.A. Kovtun, as well about my garage. After my interview with the SSU
when I learned about illegal activities of M.A. Kovtun, I voluntarily gave my consent to the
SSU officers to conduct a search in my garage to seize illegal items that my aunt kept there.
During the search, AK-74 assault rifles (one with a grenade launcher, the other two without),
anti-tank mines, grenades, and 5.45 caliber cartridges were found. I was very shocked with
items found in my garage, because I had nothing to do with them. According to M.A. Kovtun,
the weapons and ammunition belong to her, and she placed them in the garage for storage.
- 4 -
Annex 38
Signed Declaration of Igor Boiko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (22 November
2014)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 38
Signed Declaration of Igor Boiko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (22 November
2014)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 5 -
- 6 -
11
Signed Declaration
of a Suspect Interrogation
the city of Kharkiv 22 November 2014
1. Last Name Boiko
2. First Name Igor
3. Middle Name Vitiliovych
4. Date and Place of Birth 25 March 1972, the city of Kharkiv
[. . .]
[signature]
- 7 -
3
"clapper]" "don't casualties." "we." "device," car's [• • • - "clapper]." "clapper]" 22
[. . .]
M.M. Sazonov did not introduce the mentioned person, but he said that this man would
give me something that I need to deliver to I.P. Umanets who would have to hide it. On my
questions what exactly the man would give me, M.M. Sazonov responded that it was “hlopalka
[clapper]” and added, “we don’t need casualties.” He did not clarify who he meant by “we.” I
understood that he was referring to a sort of “explosive device,” but I decided not to clarify this
further.
Together with the unknown man, I passed through the park to street Shytalova Dacha
and approached a beige car VAZ (2015 or 2017). I do not remember the car’s plate number or
the region number. The man opened the car and got out from under the front passenger seat a
folded plaid bag. When he opened the bag, I saw a green rectangular object approximately
4x10x20 centimeters in size that had a fuse with a ring installed. There was also a small metal
object with screw thread that I thought was supposed to be installed into the object.
The man told me that the object could stick as a magnet and for its detonation it is
necessary to pull out the pin and it explodes in 5 minutes.
[. . . ]
I put the bag in the trunk of my car (or on back passenger seat, I do not remember), got
into the car and drove to I.P. Umanets who lives at the address: Dehtiarevskiy region, vil.
Beruki, st. Ulianova 11. I do not remember if I called I.P. Umanets (his cell 099-174-40-02)
on my way.
I arrived to I.P Umanets around 3:00 – 4:00 p.m. the same day and gave him the
“hlopalka [clapper].” I passed to him the words of M.M. Sazonov concerning no casualties
and added from myself that it would be better to burry this “hlopalka [clapper]” and forget
about it.
I.P. Umanets put the bag with the object on a bed in his summer kitchen and escorted
me to my car. We say goodbyes and I left.
- 8 -
Annex 39
Signed Declaration of Sergey Bashlykov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16 March
2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 39
Signed Declaration of Sergey Bashlykov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16 March
2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 9 -
- 10 -
11
COPY
TRANSCRIPT
Of an interview with a suspect
The city of Kharkiv March 16, 2015
Interview commenced at: 4:10 P.M.
Interview completed at: 6:45 P.M.
Senior Lieutenant of Justice Pidgirny K.O., Senior Investigator of Investigative Department at SBU Field Office in
Kharkiv Province, due to the pre-trial investigation in the criminal matter No. 420152200000000115, in the presence of
the Defense Counsel Lipchansky V.V., and in compliance with the requirements of Articles 42, 95, 104, 106, 223 and
224 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine, has interviewed the following suspect at the office of Investigative
Department of SBU Field Office in Kharkiv Province:
1. Last name Bashlykov
2. First name Sergiy
3. Paternal Name Oleksandrovych
4. Date and place of birth 10.27.1986, Kharkiv
5. Nationality Ukrainian
6. Citizenship Ukraine
7. Education Junior College (graduated from Kharkiv Lyceum of
Construction and Roadways in 2005)
8. Marital status single
9. Place of employment and position unemployed
10. Residence 10 Dostoyevsky St., Apt. 4, Kharkiv
11. Criminal record no criminal records, according to his own statement
12. Are you a legislator not a legislator
13. Proof of identity
Ukrainian passport series MN number 756273 issued on
05.04.2005 by Chervonozavodsky District Office of Kharkiv
Municipal Field Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Ukraine in Kharkiv Province
[. . .]
- 11 -
22
[. . .]
Question: Do you remember what you were wearing on February 22, 2015 and what Dvornikov V.M. and Tetyutsky
V.V. were wearing? When and where did you meet them?
Answer: Yes, I remember how I was dressed on 22.02.2015 and I can also testify what V.N. Dvornikov and V.V.
Tetyutsky had on. I can testify as follows. I met V.N. Dvornikov and V.V. Tetyutsky in the Opel car owned by V.V.
Tetyutsky when they drove me to O. Maselsky Metro Station. They went in the said car to the Kiev Movie Theater area.
On 22.02.2015, I was dressed in a black coat, which was down approximately to the middle of my hip, black trousers,
black shoes, and a black cap. I also had black gloves on my hands. I was wearing the said clothes the entire day including
the time when I was at Marshal Zhukov Avenue. Specifically, I was at Yuryev's Park at the time of explosion.
V.N. Dvornikov was also all dressed in black. Specifically, he was wearing a black sport jacket, which was down
approximately to his belt, black sport pants, black sneakers, and a black cap. I didn't see any words or labels on V.N.
Dvornikov's clothes.
As far as I remember, V.V. Tetyutsky was also dressed in black sport clothes. Specifically, he was wearing a black
sport jacket, black sport pants, black sneakers, and a black fabric cap. I didn't see any labels or words on V.V. Tetyutsky's
clothes.
Question: Could you clarify how did you get to Marshal Zhukov Metro Station on February 22, 2015, where did
you come from, and the time frame when this happened?
Answer: I took a ride from O. Maselsky Metro Station to Marshal Zhukov Metro Station. I went down into the
metro at about 12:30 on 22.02.2015 and I went through a turnstile using my own Kharkiv metro magnetic card. I didn't
have any bag or backpack with me. I came out Marshal Zhukov Metro Station at approximately 12:45 P.M. I came out
of Marshal Zhukov station through the exit near Chashka cafe. Then, I walked up along the sidewalk to a cigarette stall
near building No. 3 on Yuryev Boulevard. Afterwards, I went to Kiev Movie Theater.
- 12 -
33
Question: Please take a look at the video recording of February 22, 2015 made by a video surveillance camera
installed in the lobby of O.S. Maselsky Metro Station (the file "Maselsky akp 1 lobb. (at 12.11.08s)"). Do you
recognize any people recorded on this video between 12:10 and 12:50 time frame? If yes, who specifically are those
people, what are the timestamps on the recording, and what are the features that made you recognize that person?
Answer: I indeed was provided the video record "Maselsky akp 1 lobb. (at 12.11.08s)". According to the timestamp
on this image, it is 12:49:21 P.M. on February 22, 2015 and the video shows me walking into the lobby of Maselsky
Metro Station. On the image, I am dressed in a black coat, black jeans, and black classical shoes. Upon entering the
lobby, I took off my gloves and put them into a coat pocket. After passing through a turnstile, I came down the stairs
onto the platform.
Question: Please take a look at the video recording of February 22, 2015 made by video surveillance cameras
installed at Marshal Zhukov Metro Station (files: "Zhukov dist. hall (at 12.24.20s.)," "Zhukov bottom of escalator, 3.4.
(at 12.24.30s.)," and "Zhukov top of escalator, 1.2. (at 12.24.48s.)). Do you recognize any people recorded on these
videos between 12:50 and 13:05 time frame? If yes, who specifically are those people, what are the timestamps on the
recording, and what are the features that made you recognize that person?
Answer: I was indeed provided these video records to review them. I also recognize myself on this recording.
According to the timestamp on the image, it's 1:03 P.M. on February 22, 2015 (the "Zhukov dist. hall" video). I came
out of a train and proceeded to the escalator towards the exit of this metro station.
On the video designated as "Zhukov bottom of escalator 3.4. (at 12.24.30s)," at 1:03:11, I again recognize myself
moving up on the escalator towards the exit of the metro station.
On the video designated as "Zhukov top of escalator 1.2. (at 12.24.48s)," at 1:03:20, I recognize myself moving up
on the escalator at the lobby entrance of Marshal Zhukov Metro Station, in the direction of the exit.
Question: Please take a look at the video recording of 22.02.2015 made by a video surveillance camera installed at
the Digma supermarket (Kharkiv, Ordzhonikidze Ave., file "201502222130000-20150222141711.mp.4"). Do you
recognize any people recorded on the said video between 13:20 and 13:25 time frame? If yes, who specifically are those
people, what are the timestamps on the recording, and what are the features that made you recognize that person?
- 13 -
44
Answer: I indeed was indeed provided the video record "20150222130000-20150222141711" to review it.
According to the timestamp on this image, it is 1:24 P.M. on February 22, 2015. I recognize the dark blue car Opel
Omega owned by Tetyutsky Victor Victorovich, who was at the wheel at that time. Vladimir Nikolaevich Dvornikov
gets out of that car through the front passenger door. I recognized him by his appearance (gait and constitution) and
clothes. He is dressed in a black jacket, blue jeans, black running shoes, and a black cap.
Question: Please take a look at the video recordings of 22.02.2015 made by a video surveillance camera installed
at a parking lot of the Digma supermarket (Kharkiv, Ordzhonikidze Ave., files "2150222130556-20150222133554.
mp.4", "20150222133555-20150222134236. mp.4" and "20150222134237-141936. mp.4"). Do you recognize any
people recorded on the said videos between 13:25 and 13:50 time frame? If yes, who specifically are those people, what
are the timestamps on the recording, and what are the features that made you recognize such person?
Answer: I was indeed provided these video records to review them. According to the timestamp, it is 1:25 P.M. on
February 22, 2015. V.N. Dvornikov appears on the left side of the video. He is dressed in a black jacket, blue jeans, and
a black cap. I recognized V.N. Dvornikov by his clothes, his specific gait, and constitution. V.N. Dvornikov continues
to stand near the Digma supermarket between 1:25 and 1:47 P.M. and then he leaves.
The interview transcript has a photo table with screenshots attached with the following videos: "Maselsky akp 1
lobb. (at 12.11.08s.)," "Zhukov dist. hall (at 12.24.20s.)," "Zhukov bottom of escalator, 3.4. (at 12.24.30s.)," "Zhukova
top of escalator, 1.2. (at 12.24.48s.)," "20150222130000-20150222141711," "20150222130556-20150222133554," and
"20150222133555-20150222134236"; 7 pages.
[. . .]
- 14 -
55
[Photo Picture]
Photo: Bashlykov S.O. exits a train at the Marshal Zhukov Metro Station and walks towards the escalator to go outside.
[Photo Picture]
Photo: Bashlykov S.O. is in front of the escalator facing the exit from Marshal Zhukov Metro Station.
- 15 -
0. 66
[Photo Picture]
[Photo Picture]
Photo: Bashlykov S.O. enters the lobby of O. Maselsky Metro Station.
- 16 -
lot.
77
[Photo Picture]
Photo: Bashlykov S.O. steps down from the escalator and walks toward the exit from Marshal Zhukov Metro Station.
[Photo Picture]
Photo: A car with Tetyutsky V.V. and Dvornikov V.M. turns from Ordzhonikidze Avenue and enters the Digma
supermarket parking - 17 -
8
[Photo Picture]
Photo: A car with Tetyutsky V.V. and Dvornikov V.M. stops at the Digma supermarket parking lot.
[Photo Picture]
Photo: Dvornikov V.M. gets out of the V.V. Tetyutsky's car.
- 18 -
9
[Photo Picture]
Photo: Dvornikov V.M. walks away from the V.V. Tetyutsky's car towards the Digma supermarket.
[Photo Picture]
Photo: Dvornikov V.M. appears on the left side of the video recording, in front of the Digma store.
- 19 -
10
[Photo Picture]
Photo: 22.02.2015, Dvornikov V.M.
stands near the entrance of the Digma supermarket.
[Photo Picture]
Photo: 22.02.2015, Dvornikov V.M.
stands near the entrance of the Digma supermarket.
- 20 -
11
[Photo Picture]
Photo: 22.02.2015, Dvornikov V.M. leaves the area near the Digma supermarket.
[. . .]
- 21 -
- 22 -
Annex 4o
Signed Declaration of Victor Tetutskiy, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16 March
2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 40
Signed Declaration of Victor Tetutskiy, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16 March
2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 23 -
- 24 -
11
COPY
TRANSCRIPT
Of an interview with a suspect
The city of Kharkiv March 16, 2015
Interview commenced: 15:53
Interview completed: 16:50
Senior Lieutenant of Justice Berezhny A.Yu., Senior Investigator at SV USBU in Kharkiv Province, due to the
pre-trial investigation in the criminal matter, which is recorded in the Unified Registry of Pre-Trial Investigations in
Kharkiv Province as No. 42015220000000115, dated 22.02.2015, and in compliance with the requirements of Articles
42, 95, 104, 106, 223 and 224 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine, has interviewed the following suspect in
SV USBU office No. 11:
1. Last, first, and patronymic names: Tetyutsky, Victor Viktorovich
2. Date and place of birth: 05.05.1982, Zhovte Village, Slavic-Serbian District, Luhansk Province
3. Nationality: Ukrainian
4. Citizenship: Ukraine
5. Marital status: married, wife: Tetyutska, Yana Mykolaivna, DOB July 18, 1985
- underage children: Tetyutsky, Igor Viktorovich, DOB October 21, 2005
6. Education: junior college degree, graduate of Starosaltivsky Agrarian Lyceum, 2011
7. Employed, position (or goes to school) at: no official employment
8. Place of registration: 20 Marshall Batytsky St., Apt. 501, Kharkiv
- place of residence, phone: Vovchansky County, Stary Saltiv Township, 49 Zhovtneva St., Apt. 53, 098-23-65-
640
9. Criminal record: none
10. Is he/she an elected legislator (state legislative body): not applicable
11. Information about passport or other ID: identity confirmed.
[. . .]
- 25 -
22
[. . .]
In response to the substance of these questions, the suspect testified as follows:
Question: Please take a look at the video record designated as "20150222130000-20150222141711." Do you
recognize anyone on this video record?
Answer: Yes, I was indeed provided the video record to review it, which is designated as "20150222130000-
20150222141711." According to the timestamp on this image, it is 1:24 P.M. on February 22, 2015. I recognize my
car, Opel Omega, dark blue color, license plate No. No. AX5266EH, which stops at a parking place near a lamppost. I
also see on this video how a man dressed in a black jacket, blue jeans, and a black cap exits my car from the front
passenger door. I recognize this man. This is Vladimir Nikolayevich Dvornikov. I recognized V.N. Dvornikov by his
clothes, gait, and constitution. The video shows how V.N. Dvornikov is moving towards the right side from my car.
At that same time, I leave the parking lot, enter Ordzhonikidzhe Avenue, and turn left. Subsequently, I proceed
towards Moskovsky Avenue and then towards home. These events have occurred on February 22, 2015 when I was
giving a ride to V.N. Dvornikov after the explosion, from the yard of building No. 9/1 on Marshal Zhukov Avenue to
Digma supermarket.
Question: Please take a look at the video record designated as "20150222130556-20150222133554." Do you
recognize anyone on this video record?
Answer: Indeed. I was indeed provided the video record "20150222130556-20150222133554" to review it.
According to the timestamp, it is 1:25 P.M. on February 22, 2015. V.N. Dvornikov appears on the left side of the
video. He is dressed in a black jacket, blue jeans, and a black cap. I recognized V.N. Dvornikov by his clothes, his
specific gait, and constitution. V.N. Dvornikov continued to stand near the Digma supermarket from 1:25 P.M. until
the end of the video.
Question: Please take a look at the video record designated as "20150222133555-20150222134236." Do you
recognize anyone on this video record?
Answer: I was indeed provided for review the video record "20150222133555-20150222134236," which shows V.N.
Dvornikov, as I recognize him. He walks along the area near the Digma supermarket on 22.02.2015. I recognized V.N.
Dvornikov by the features described above. According to the timestamp of this video record, V.N. Dvornikov leaves
the area near the Digma supermarket at 1:47 P.M. on 22.02.2015.
The interview transcript has a photo-table attached with screenshots of video images "20150222130000-
20150222141711", "20150222130556-20150222133554", "20150222133555-20150222134236"; 4 pages.
I have reviewed the transcript. Everything is stated correctly. No additions or notes were made.
[. . .]
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lot.
33
[Photo Picture]
Picture: the car with V.V. Tetyutsky and V.N. Dvornikov drives off of Ordzhonikidze Avenue onto the Digma
supermarket parking [Photo Picture]
Picture: the car with V.V. Tetyutsky and V.N. Dvornikov stops at the Digma supermarket parking lot.
- 27 -
4
[Photo Picture]
Picture: V.N. Dvornikov goes out of the car while V.V. Tetyutsky remains inside.
[Photo Picture]
Picture: V.N. Dvornikov walks from the car of V.V. Tetyutsky to the Digma supermarket.
- 28 -
55
[Photo Picture]
Picture: V.N. Dvornikov appears on the left side of the video record.
[Photo Picture]
Picture: V.N. Dvornikov is near the Digma supermarket. 22.02.2015.
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6
[Photo Picture]
Picture: V.N. Dvornikov is near the Digma supermarket. 22.02.2015.
[Photo Picture]
Picture: V.N. Dvornikov leaves the area near the Digma supermarket. 22.02.2015.
- 30 -
Annex 41
Signed Declaration of Volodymyr Dvornikov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (20
March 2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 41
Signed Declaration of Volodymyr Dvornikov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (20
March 2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 31 -
- 32 -
11
COPY
TRANSCRIPT
Of an interview with a suspect
The city of Kharkiv March 20, 2015
Interview commenced: 4:25 P.M.
Interview completed: 6:02 P.M.
Senior Lieutenant of Justice Berezhny A.Yu., Senior Investigator at SV USBU in Kharkiv Province, due to the
pre-trial investigation in the criminal matter, which is recorded in the Unified Registry of Pre-Trial Investigations in
Kharkiv Province as No. 42015220000000115, dated 22.02.2015, and in compliance with the requirements of Articles
42, 95, 104, 106, 223 and 224 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine, has interviewed the following suspect in
SV USBU office No. 11:
1. Last, first, and patronymic names: Dvornikov, Volodymyr Mykolayovych
2. Date and place of birth: 13.06.1978, Kharkiv
3. Nationality: Russian
4. Citizenship: Ukraine
5. Marital status: married, wife: Dvornikova, Nataliya Volodymyrivna, DOB 09.12.1977
- underage children: Dvornikova, Svitlana Volodymyrivna, DOB February 6, 2009
6. Education: high school
7. Employed, position (or goes to school) at: Dvornikov V.M., Sole Proprietor
8. Place of registration: 32 Seventeenth Party Congress St., Apt. 193, Kharkiv
- place of residence, phone: same place, 099-048-05-64
9. Criminal record: no (according to his own statement)
10. Is he/she an elected legislator (state legislative body): not applicable
11. Information about passport or other ID: passport series CT #404488 issued on 17.04.2014 by Ordzhonikidze
District Department of Kharkiv Municipal Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.
[. . .]
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or in the morning of February 21,
number, which I haven't services provider, and for Life, is
night on 22
[. . .]
In response to the substance of these questions, the suspect testified as follows:
Question: Please clarify how the phone and SIM card that you attached to the explosive device were activated (the socalled
"initiating phone")?
Answer: The Samsung mobile phone and MTS SIM card, i.e. "the initiating phone", I activated at home on
19.02.2015, after it was purchased. Then later the same day I have left the said phone in Victor's car during my
meeting with V.V. Tetyutsky. And Victor returned Samsung to me on the 20th 2015. I want to add that I also "taxied around" on 21.02.2015, I drove around Kharkov. Specifically: from my house,
from HTZ, I drove along Traktorostroiteley Ave., Saltovskoye Highway, 50th Anniversary of the USSR Avenue (or
maybe the 50th Anniversary of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League Avenue, I mix their names), and
across Saltovka. From there, down on Academician Pavlov St., towards the downtown. As far as I can remember,
during this drive around the city, the main phones I always use (063-769-94-32, 099-048-05-64, and also the Kyivstar
been using for a long time and I don't remember very well: it starts with the area code 068), I
didn't take them with me. The phone that holds SIM cards for MTS, my main phone faulty: it periodically switches off by itself.
I didn't take with me any other phones except for the "initiating" one during the planting of the explosive device at
February 22, 2015.
Question: Please take a look at the 22.02.2015 video recording made by the surveillance camera mounted in the
lobby of A.S. Maselsky Metro Station (the file "Maselsky akp 1 lobb. (at 12.11.08 s)". Do you recognize anyone on
this video record?
Answer: I indeed was provided the video record "Maselsky akp 1 lobb. (at 12.11.08s.)". According to the
timestamp on this image, it is 12:49:21 P.M. on February 22, 2015. I recognize the person, who looks like Bashlykov
S.A., walking through a turnstile. This person appears to me to be Bashlykov S.A. based on his appearance: height,
sporting gait, movements of hands. Also, on 22.02.2015 Bashlykov S.A. was dressed in a black short coat, black
jeans, and black shoes, just like the person in the video. At the specific time, Bashlykov S.A. was supposed to travel
from A.S. Maselsky Metro Station to Marshal Zhukov Metro Station and then walk over the venue where Euromaidan
was held.
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20150222141711." S.A.
"20150222133555-20150222134236." Do you
33
Question: Please take a look at the video recording made on 22.02.2015 by surveillance cameras mounted at
Marshal Zhukov Metro Station (files: "Zhukov dist. hall (at 12.24.20s)", "Zhukov bottom of escalator 3.4. (at
12.24.30s)," "Zhukov top of escalator 1.2 (at 12.24.48s)". Do you recognize anyone on these video records?
Answer: I was indeed provided these video records to review them. According to the timestamp on the image, it's
1:03 P.M. on February 22, 2015 (the "Zhukov dist. hall (at 12.24.20s)" video and also on the video designated as
"Zhukov bottom of escalator 3.4. (at 12.24.30s.)," at 13: 3:11 P.M., and on the video designated as "Zhukov top of
escalator 1.2. (at 12.24.48s)" at 1:03:20, I recognize Bashlykov S.A., who is dressed like I described above, and who
walks along the metro station platform, then steps on the escalator and enters the lobby.
Question: Please take a look at the video record designated as "20150222130000-20150222141711." Do you
recognize anyone on this video record?
Answer: Yes, I was indeed provided the video record to review it, which is designated as "20150222130000-
According to the timestamp on this image, it is 1:24 P.M. on February 22, 2015. I recognize the
exterior of the car, which appears to be very similar to V.V. Tetyutsky's Opel Omega. I don't remember its license
plate number. This car stops at a parking lot near a lamp post. I also see on this video how a man dressed in a black
jacket, blue jeans, and a black cap exits this car. I recognized that this man is me. These events occurred on
22.02.2015 at the parking lot when V.V. Tetyutsky dropped me off in his car and went home. Then, I went to the
Digma store area to wait for Bashlykov S.A., as we agreed earlier.
Question: Please take a look at the video record designated as "20150222130556-20150222133554." Do you
recognize anyone on this video record?
Answer: I indeed was indeed provided the video record "20150222130556-20150222133554" to review it.
According to the timestamp, it is 1:25 P.M. on February 22, 2015. A man appears on the left side of the video. I
recognize that this man is me. The video shows how I walk along the area near the Digma store waiting for Bashlykov
Question: Please take a look at the video record designated as recognize anyone on this video record?
- 35 -
ICharkiv 44
Answer: Yes, I was indeed provided the video record to review it, which is designated as "20150222133555-
20150222134236." According to the timestamp of this video, it is 1:47 P.M. on 22.02.2015. I'm leaving the Digma
store area without meeting Bashlykov S.A. and I'm going home.
The interview transcript has a photo table attached with the videos: "20150222130000-20150222141711,"
"20150222130556-20150222133554," "20150222133555-20150222134236," "Zhukov dist. hall (at 12.24.20s.),"
"Zhukov bottom of escalator, 3.4. (at 12.24.30s.)," "Zhukov top of escalator, 1.2. (at 12.24.48s.)," "Maselsky akp 1
lobb. (at 12.11.08s.)," 7 pages.
Suspect [Signature] Dvornikov V.N.
(Last, first, and patronymic names)
Defense Counsel [Signature] O.O. Lmudenko
(Last, first, and patronymic names)
Senior Investigator of Investigative Department of the SBU Field Office in Kharkiv Province
Senior Lieutenant of Justice [Signature] A.Yu. Berezhny
- 36 -
0. [. • .1
55
[Photo Picture]
Photo: Bashlykov S.O. enters the lobby of O. Maselsky Metro Station.
[. . .]
- 37 -
[. • .1
66
[Photo Picture]
Photo: Bashlykov S.O. exits a train at the Marshal Zhukov Metro Station and walks towards the escalator to go
outside.
[Photo Picture]
Photo: Bashlykov S.O. is in front of the escalator facing the exit from Marshal Zhukov Metro Station.
[. . .]
- 38 -
parking lot.
[. • .1
77
[Photo Picture]
Photo: Bashlykov S.O. steps down from the escalator and walks toward the exit from Marshal Zhukov Metro Station.
[Photo Picture]
Photo: A car with Tetyutsky V.V. and Dvornikov V.M. turns from Ordzhonikidze Avenue and enters the Digma
supermarket [. . .]
- 39 -
[. • .1
8
[Photo Picture]
Photo: A car with Tetyutsky V.V. and Dvornikov V.M. stops at the Digma supermarket parking lot.
[Photo Picture]
Photo: Dvornikov V.M. gets out of the V.V. Tetyutsky's car.
[. . .]
- 40 -
[. • .1
9
[Photo Picture]
Photo: Dvornikov V.M. walks away from the V.V. Tetyutsky's car towards the Digma supermarket.
[Photo Picture]
Photo: Dvornikov V.M. appears on the left side of the video recording, in front of the Digma store.
[. . .]
- 41 -
[. • .1
10
[Photo Picture]
Photo: 22.02.2015, Dvornikov V.M. stands near the entrance of the Digma supermarket.
[Photo Picture]
Photo: 22.02.2015, Dvornikov V.M. stands near the entrance of the Digma supermarket.
[. . .]
- 42 -
[. • .1
11
[Photo Picture]
Photo: 22.02.2015, Dvornikov V.M. leaves the area near the Digma supermarket.
[. . .]
- 43 -
- 44 -
Annex 42
Transcript of Covert Investigative Action Concerning V. Dvornikov, drafted by
Lieutenant Colonel O.V. Diaghilev, Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in
the Kharkiv Region (25 March 2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 45 -
- 46 -
COPY
Sealed
Unsealed
[Seal: illegible; Filed Office in Kharkiv Province]
TRANSCRIPT
of covert investigative action (search):
audio and video recording in a public place
The city of Kharkiv March 25, 2015
Commencing time: 10:00 A.M.
Completion time: 2:55 P.M.
Lieutenant Colonel O.V. Diaghilev, Head of Sector No. 2 of the 1st Department of GV ZND USBU in Kharkiv
Province, acting in his office at Kharkiv Province Security Service of Ukraine, following the requirements of Articles
103-107, 252 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine, hereby made this transcript as follows:
between March 2, 2015 and March 24, 2015, and using UOTZ GU MVS of Ukraine in Kharkiv Province, and in order
to address the request Justice Major Ryzhylo A.V., Senior Investigator of OVS Investigative Department at USBU in
within the framework of the criminal matter registered in the Unified Registry of Pre-Trial Investigations as No.
42015220000000115, pursuant to a criminal offense Part 3, Article 258 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, and following
the ruling made by Piddubny R.M., an investigating judge at the Court of Appeals in Kharkiv Province, No. 2712, dated
27.02.2015, and the provisions of Article 270 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine,
have conducted an undercover investigative action: audio and video recording inside a public place, the premises of
Kharkiv Detention Center (99 Poltavsky Shlyakh, Kharkiv) without notifying individuals present during the action,
Dvornikov, Volodymyr Mykolayovych, a citizen Ukraine, DOB June 13, 1978, born in Kharkiv, residing at: 32
Seventeenth Party Congress St., Apt. 193, Kharkiv.
The covert investigative action/search has resulted in recording a number of conversations and some of them appear
to contain references to a very serious criminal offense, no video was recorded due to a lack of opportunities). It included:
04.03.2015 at 10:09:06, Dvornikov V.M. (hereinafter referred to as "O"), who talks with other men ("M" and "M1") at
Kharkiv Detention Center. The conversation:
"M" - I don't get it, did you blew up this shit or didn't you? Just tell me.
"O" - I blew it up
"M" - Some tiger, shit, it would be better if you'd blow up this building, fuck, and Topaz home, shit, to have
that dick gone.
I got it yesterday that you blew it up because I told "MN-100" what it is, and you know the meaning right away, what
it is and how it is. Well, some regular guy said it, well, the hell, some bomb, I'm shocked."
"O" - (UI), they would have said it, (UI).
"M" - Well, yeah (laughs). I don't know, the whole thing should have been blown up. Put in some 100 kg of
TNT. It would go bang, go bang.
"O" - Well, it didn't turn out as expected, on the one hand, and on the other hand, it turned out bad.
ent. 2775
31.03.15
- 47 -
COPY
"M" - Because of that fucking van they were showing?
"O" - Yes, because of the van, it wasn't visible what was going on. They were overtaken by the van.
"M" - Well, if it wasn't for the van, they all would have been greased.
"O" - The front rows, fucking shit, in the front rows, the battalions with chevrons, in that uniform.
"M" - Well, yeah
"O" - In the uniform. And pedos came out, 15-year old boy and some 18-year old dick, they came out to get
some dough, for that shit. Where were their parents?
"M" - A fuckup!
"O" - I feel sorry for them, a fuckup.
"M" - But what can you do, they are fuck-heads.
"O" - It was an accident. I just (UI)
"M" - You have victims, I got it, you had those fighters, the victims, some tiger, shit.
"O" - Yes, I planted it so that those pedos would be smashed.
"M" - (interrupts) Did you really, use those screws to load it, as they say in the news?
"O" - It was already loaded. It is a factory-made mine. (UI) 4 sides (UI) impact elements (UI) flying from
above.
"M" - Well, in a nutshell, it would have been flying that way.
"O" - Yes
"M" - (laughs) I would throw such thing to Topaz's home.
"O" - I planted it, not like (UI)
"M" - Well, yeah, to get people.
"O" - Yes, planted it, the wire, I pulled it.
"M" - (interrupts) And what is the effective range, how far would it strike?
"O" - The range is 120 meters, anything alive.
"M" - (laughs) Some shit, bang.
"O" - (UI) the Ukrainians were banged in Volnovakha. Did you hear about the bus blown up in Volnovakha?
"M" - Well, yes.
"O" - (UI) the whole bus was done.
"M" - Some shit.
"O" - Women, children.
"M" - Faggots!
"O" - (UI) and on the video there, "Glory to Ukraine! Glory to heroes! The Russians (UI) bang! Uh
(drawling)! Oh (drawling)! (UI), the main Euromaidan protester was hit, (UI) in his heart (UI).
(Sound of opening lock)
"M1" - Get your stuff, to the County Division.
"M" - Get your stuff, to the County Division.
Shit, you are a taiga tiger, I swear.
"O" - But you just... with your own kind.
2
- 48 -
"M" - (interrupts) I know, not a soul! No way, way to go, shit (UI) that dick, fuck it, a tiger indeed, with all my
heart! For Lozovsky, with all my heart!
Got him. Yes, but sorry for those lads.
"O" - It is a pity! They came to get some 100 grivnas. Well, I didn't see them, shit. I was already
"M" - (interrupts) But what could you do when it has already banged. It wasn't you that was shooting.
"O" - But I was initiating it
"M" - (interrupts) Really?
"O" - With a phone. I looked, those fighters, here is the column and those fighters are in front, and they went,
and there was a slight delay then, shit, and at that time the van overtakes it, and these suckers, I didn't see them, shit.
"M" - Damn it, if it wasn't for the van, they all would have been creamed, those suckers, that's it.
"O" - Well, yeah, and then I also
"M" - (interrupts) We saw it on TV, the fuck, that fucking van, we were sitting in a house, or damn, bad luck
for the guys, they were aiming and aiming, and then that fucking van.
The same conversation starting at 7:22 timestamp:
"O" - It is unknown what that request will bring... shitty lists... SBU lists… shit, people who were involved.
"M" - Did they find those who are in Russia?
"O" - They didn't find, he sent a request, shit, and I (UI) where would I get such information?
"M" - Well, yeah
"O" - And I am like... And they fuck...
"M" - Yes, fuck it, make it like, say that the instructions came from above, who the fuck knows where they
are. They sent it to me, they saw what I was writing in a forum. That's it. It started.
"O" - Well, that's how I do it. That's how I say. Why me, shit, the request, (UI) personal, that's not my
personal assignment.
"M" - You just tell me, will there be an offensive on Kharkiv? Will we be released or not?
"O" - I don't know. At least I hope so. Well, it is hard for me to realize that I, like fucking crap, will be serving
all my life.
04.03.2015 at 10:18:09, Dvornikov V.M. ("O") talks with other men ("M" and "M1") at Kharkiv Detention Center.
The conversation:
"M" - Shit, but why didn't you put in more plastique? To make the explosion bigger.
"O" - Why the fuck? The explosive power was already 2 kg of TNT. It banged like shit.
"M" - We watched it on video, it wasn't such a huge bang.
"O" - Well, you can't see it well on video. That march, crap, the "Maidan protesters", (UI), fucking fed up with
their marching, the country is in an asshole but they keep marching.
(The end of conversation)
3
- 49 -
05.03.2015 at 18:59:40, Dvornikov V.M. ("O") talks with other men ("M" and "M1") at Kharkiv Detention Center.
The conversation:
"M" - Hey, are you native of Kharkiv?
"O" - Yes.
"M" - From where?
"O" - From the Tractor Factory.
"M" - Hey, fucking crap. You were freaking out, you live in Kharkiv and blow up people! Or is it necessary?
(Silence).
"M" - Vova?
"O" - Yes.
"M" - Is it necessary?
"O" - Certainly.
"M" - Why, the fuck?
"O" - Bro, we didn't start this war... Really, not us. Do you see what kind of shit is going on? What is
happening in the country? The war, fucking shit. The fighters say it's already almost 50 guys who died in Donbass,
shit. The infrastructure, the dollar is 40, damn it. My parents' pension is less than 1,100. 2,200 for the two of them.
What can you do with it? Really! And they are marching around mocking at us!
"M" - Well, I'm with you, on one hand.
"O" - And, certainly, I'm sorry for the youngsters, those who were not involved, sorry for them. But a gunner
also doesn't see shit when he is given coordinates to shoot shells.
"M" - How old are you?
"O" - 36.
"M1" - Well, you are in such huge cross-hairs that it is unreal.
"O" - I know. A special convict. I am monitored, driven around the city in a convoy (UI).
05.03.2015 at 19:03:36, Dvornikov V.M. ("O") talks with other men ("M" and "M1") at Kharkiv Detention Center.
The conversation:
"M1" - Hey, what is going to happen?
"O" - I have a brother in Mariupol. I think Mariupol will be taken, shit.
"M1" - Then, politically, they will probably change those in power.
"M1" - Well, will they take Kharkiv?
"O" - I don't know. I can't tell.
"M1" - Then why the fuck to blow up in Kharkiv?
"M" - Well, do you have any family?
"O" - Yes.
"M" - A wife and kids?
"O" - Yes, a wife, a six-year old daughter, I sent her to Belgorod. Managed to do it in time in January.
"M" - Why didn't you leave?
"O" - I was going to leave. Didn't leave.
4
- 50 -
05.03.2015 at 19:13:33, Dvornikov V.M. ("O") talks with other men ("M" and "M1") at Kharkiv Detention Center.
The conversation:
"M" - Were it you fucking it?
"O" - Yes.
"M1" - And how did they find you?
"O" - How the hell I know?
"M" - Somebody fucking squealed?
"O" - Yeah, somebody on the inside has squealed.
"M1" - Just one, uh?
"O" - The first one has started.
"M" - And where your third accomplice?
"O" - Well, somewhere over here.
05.03.2015 at 19:31:56, Dvornikov V.M. ("O") talks with other men ("M" and "M1") at Kharkiv Detention Center.
The conversation:
"M" - And have you plead guilty?
"O" - Yes.
"M1" - So, how many years would it be?
"O" - Well, maybe a life sentence.
05.03.2015 at 20:05:25, Dvornikov V.M. ("O") talks with other men ("M" and "M1") at Kharkiv Detention Center.
The conversation:
"O" - It wasn't as if it was done without thinking. There's a road, an avenue goes there, and it was planted, this
shit was aimed at a 30-degree angle so that it targets the center of the road. And the back part would fly straight into a
tree right behind it. And the front part was aimed at the road.
"M1" - And who did all this shit?
"M" - Um, the combinations of all those roads?
"O" - Well, as they say, we all are self-educated.
"M1" - Hey, did they pay for it? Or why the fuck do you need it?
"O" - Well, all this is just an idea! Primarily an idea. Well, there was compensation.
"M" - A lot of shit?
"O" - I think at least a tenner.
"M1" - For a one time, right?
"O" - It is a pity that those 15-year old suckers... Guys went to get some money and pushed themselves into a
front row.
"M1" - One hundred rubles, right?
"O" - Probably! I was working, and "Kharkiv-1" voluntary battalion was walking in front, which was sent to
Donbass to ATO. I was after them. They were walking in front, I was sure that it was the chevrons walking. So, I
banged it. It turned out I banged the Deputy Chief of Lozovsky County Division. Well, shit, it wasn't us who started
this damn war.
5
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05.03.2015 at 20:10:06, Dvornikov V.M. ("O") talks with other men ("M" and "M1") at Kharkiv Detention Center.
The conversation:
"O" - SBU hacked my email account and found that Russians were interested in the lists of SBU and police
staff who were involved in ATO. And they were shocked that, perhaps, their lists are already…
"M" - And how did you get in touch with the Russians?
"O" - We did it ourselves, we found the Russians.
"M" - You?
"O" - Yes.
"M" - And they didn't have time to pay the money?
"O" - No, there didn't have time. They were supposed to give it to us in a week or two. It is not a quick shit,
it's not like you went and get cash.
05.03.2015 at 20:49:31, Dvornikov V.M. ("O") talks with other men ("M" and "M1") at Kharkiv Detention Center.
The conversation:
"M1" - Hey, and who is your leader in this case?
"O" - Myself.
"M1" - You are the leader?! Fucking shit.
"M1" - So, this crap was framed on his accomplices, do they admit it?
"O" - No, one of them started to speak. Everything was put together, there were two days of witness
confrontation.
Well, generally speaking, it was put together well…
(The end of conversation)
The conversations recorded during this covert investigative action were recorded on laser disk No. 2925/GVZND and
attached to this transcript. Number of files on the disk - 11, disk volume - 66.4 MB.
Attached: DVD-R No. 2925/GV ZND, sealed.
Report written by:
Chief of the 2nd Sector, , 1st Department of GV ZND
Kharkiv Province Field Office of the Ukrainian Security Service
Lieutenant Colonel [Signature] O. Dyagilev
70/5 -5967
26/03/15
6
- 52 -
Annex 43
Transcript of Covert Investigative Action Concerning V. Tetutskiy, drafted by
Lieutenant Colonel O.V Diaghilev, Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in
the Kharkiv Region (25 March 2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 53 -
- 54 -
Secret
Counterpart
No. 1
CO
PY
[illegible seal]
TRANSCRIPT
of covert investigative activity
(audio and video surveillance conducted in a publicly accessible place)
Kharkiv March 25,
2015
Start time: 3:08 PM
End time: 4:58 PM
Lieutenant Colonel O.V. Diaghilev, head of the 2nd Division, 1st Department, Main
Department for the Defense of National Statehood, Kharkiv Regional Directorate of the Security
Service of Ukraine [SBU], drew up this transcript at the offices of the Kharkiv Regional
Directorate of the SBU, pursuant to Articles 103-107 and 252 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Ukraine, based on covert investigative activity (audio and video surveillance of a publicly
accessible place, specifically the premises of the Kharkiv Pre-Trial Detention Center located at 99
Poltavskyi Shlyakh, Kharkiv) without the knowledge of the persons present therein, in relation to
Ukrainian citizen Viktor Viktorovych Tetyutskyi, born in Zhovte, Slovyanoserbsk District,
Luhansk Region on 05/05/1982 and residing at 20 vul. Batytskoho, Kharkiv, with the help of the
Department of Operational and Technical Measures of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs of Ukraine for the Kharkiv Region, on the instructions of Major of Justice A.V.
Ryzhylo, a senior special investigator with the Investigations Department of the Kharkiv Regional
Directorate of the SBU (No. 70/6-825t dated 02/27/2015), as part of the criminal case file recorded
in the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations under No. 42015220000000115, based on
elements of a criminal offense provided for by Article 258(3) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine,
pursuant to Ruling No. 2713 of Investigating Judge of the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal R.M.
Piddubnyi dated 02/27/2015 and Article 270 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.
The covert investigative activity resulted in a recording of various conversations, some of
which contain indications of a serious criminal act (no video recording was made due to a lack of
technical capability), including the following:
03/05/2015, start of conversation at 21-23, conversation from 06:47. V.V. Tetyutskyi
(hereinafter “O”) converses with another man (“M”) at the Kharkiv Pre-Trial Detention Center.
M: But how did they bust you? I don’t get it at all. Were they listening to you or something?
O: I don’t get it either yet.
M: Well, they busted you last. Yeah, it seems they busted the chief himself first.
O: They busted the young guy first. They busted him on the evening of the 25th. And then
everyone else after that.
M: That’s the guy in the 100 Series.
O: Yes, I believe that’s the one. Then he pointed out all the others. Because I’m not
registered anywhere. They could have found me, but it was too targeted and too fast.
Ref. 2775, 03/31/15
- 55 -
[illegible]
CO
PY
M: So, what is he thinking? He’s thinking that they’ll forgive him for you-know-what, or
that he played the most insignificant role.
O: Well, it all depends. I haven’t even had a chance to speak with him yet. On the first
night he was trying to pin the fuse on IVS.
M: What are they even charging him with?
O: So far we’re being prosecuted under the same article.
M: Well, shit, what role did he even play? You were to bring it, the other one was to
detonate it, and what about him?
O: He was a lookout while it was being planted and gave a signal when the column started
moving.
M (interrupts): And he gave a signal when the column started moving. Yes, that’s the one.
O: Yes.
M: So, I used that thing, the teevee, when your top boss…
O: Yes.
M: He gave me, basically, a signal.
O: That’s him, the small-fry!
M: That the column started moving and he activated the explosive device.
O: Uh-huh.
M: OK, it all makes sense.
The conversations recorded during the covert investigative activity were saved onto a disk
for laser reading systems No. 2922/GVZND and are enclosed with this transcript. Number of files
on disk: 6, disk volume: 87.4 Mb.
Enclosed: DVD-R No. 2922/GV ZND, secret.
Transcript prepared by:
Head of the 2nd Division, 1st Department, Main Department for the
Defense of National Statehood, Kharkiv Regional Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine
Lieutenant Colonel [signature] O.V. Diaghilev,
[stamp:] [illegible] 70/5- 5966, 03/26/15
2
- 56 -
Annex 44
Signed Declaration of Volodymyr Oleksiyovych Lytvynchuk, Victim Interrogation
Protocol (2 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Signed Declaration of Volodymyr Oleksiyovych Lytvynchuk, Victim Interrogation
Protocol (2 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 57 -
- 58 -
[...]
RECORD
of victim questioning
City of Avdiivka 06.02.2017
Questioning began at 09 hr. 40 min.
Questioning ended at 10 hr. 20 min.
An Investigator of the Investigations Unit of Avdiivka Police Unit of Pokrovskyi
Police Division of the Main Department of the National Police in Donetsk region M. Zhosin,
having reviewed materials of the pre-trial investigation entered in the Unified Register of Pre-
Trial Investigations under No. 12017050140000093 of 06.02.2017, in the facility of Avdiivka
Police Unit of Pokrovskyi Police Division of the Main Department of the National Police in
Donetsk region, having complied with requirements of articles 55, 56, 95, 104, 106, 223, 224
of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, questioned a victim:
1. Last name, first name and patronymic Lytvynchuk Volodymyr Oleksiyovych
2. Date and place of birth 22.04.1970
3. Nationality Ukrainian
4. Citizenship of Ukraine
5. Education Vocational
6. Place of work (study) Does not work
7. Type of work and position Retired
8. Place of residency (registration) Avdiivka, 16 Donetska St.
9. Criminal charges
10. Council membership No
11. Information about passport or other form of identification document […] .
It was explained to the victim that he was called for questioning in the criminal
proceeding for open theft of property.
[…]
I have been living at the above address since 2008.
On February 4, 2017, at about 05:30, I went out into the courtyard of the house where
I live, took out the ashes from the stove. I heard explosions that were coming at intervals of
about 20 seconds. The third explosion was heard in my yard.
Coming out from behind the house, I saw a shell crater that damaged my property, in
particular: a fence made of a metal profile, windows of outbuildings, a garage roof, and a
plastic siding of the house.
I reported the incident to the police.
It is written down correctly based on my words, and verified by me.
[Signed] Litvinchuk V.A. 05.02.2017
Investigator of Kramatorsk Police Unit
- 59 -
Captain of police [Signed] Yavrik Y.V.
05.02.2017
Compiled by Investigator of Avdiivka Police Unit
[Signed] M. Zhosin
- 60 -
Annex 45
Signed Declaration of Valentyna Vasilievna Babenko, Victim Interrogation Protocol
(3 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Signed Declaration of Valentyna Vasilievna Babenko, Victim Interrogation Protocol
(3 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 61 -
- 62 -
[...], [...]
Stamp: SAME AS THE ORIGINAL
Investigator of the Investigations Unit of the Second Department of the Main
Department of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk
Region
[Signed]
RECORD
of victim questioning
Town of Avdiivka 03.02.2017
Questioning began at 12 hr. 00 min., ended at 12 hr. 20 min.
An Investigator of the Investigations Unit of Avdiivka Police Unit of Pokrovskyi
Police Division of the Main Department of the National Police in Donetsk region Lieutenant
of police S. Y. Polonsky, having reviewed materials of the pre-trial investigation entered in
the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations under No. 100-170-87 of 02.03.2017, at the
place of residence, at presence of persons who were explained the requirements of p. 2 art. 66
of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine regarding their obligation not to share
information regarding the completed procedural action […], having complied with
requirements of articles 55, 56, 95, 104, 106, 223, 224 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Ukraine, questioned a victim:
1. Last name, first name and patronymic Babenko Valentyna Vasilievna
2. Date of birth 6.06.1950
3. Place of birth city of Avdiivka
4. Citizenship of Ukraine
5. Education Vocational
6. Place of work (study) Retired
7. Place of residency (registration)
city of Avdiivka, 42 Donetska St.
8. Tel.
[…]
9. Criminal charges
10. Council membership No
11. Information about passport or other form of identification document
[…] .
[…]
The victim was warned about the criminal liability based on art. 384 of the Criminal
Code of Ukraine (Known false testimony).
Victim [Signed]
On the merits of the questions that I was asked, I can explain that I live at the address:
the city of Avdeevka, 42 Donetskskaya St., where on February 2, 2017 at about 20:00
shelling took place. A shell exploded near my house, causing damage to my place of
residence - the front door, two plastic window blocks were destroyed, the doors in the
kitchen, the shed were broken, glass was broken in all buildings. I have nothing more to add.
It is written down correctly based on my words, and verified by me.
3.02.2017 [Signed]
Babenko V.B.
Investigator of Avdiivka Police Unit [Signed] S.U. Polonsky
- 63 -
- 64 -
Annex 46
Signed Declaration of Anna Aleksandrovna Buzhynskaya, Victim Interrogation
Protocol (4 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 46
Signed Declaration of Anna Aleksandrovna Buzhynskaya, Victim Interrogation
Protocol (4 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 65 -
- 66 -
[...], [...]
Stamp: SAME AS THE ORIGINAL
Investigator of the Investigations Unit of the Second Department of the Main
Department
of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk Region
[Signed]
RECORD
of victim questioning
Town of Avdiivka 04.02.2017
Questioning began at 10 hr. 00 min., ended at 10 hr. 20 min.
An Investigator of the Investigations Unit of Avdiivka Police Unit of Pokrovskyi
Police Division of the Main Department of the National Police in Donetsk region Captain of
police M. Zhosin, having reviewed materials of the pre-trial investigation entered in the
Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations under No. 12017050040000088 of 04.03.2017, at
the place of residence, at presence of persons who were explained the requirements of p. 2
art. 66 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine regarding their obligation not to share
information regarding the completed procedural action […], having complied with
requirements of articles 55, 56, 95, 104, 106, 223, 224 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Ukraine, questioned a victim:
1. Last name, first name and patronymic
Anna Aleksandrovna Buzhynskaya
2. Date of birth
26.05.1963
3. Place of birth
village of Umanskaya, Yasinovatskiy district
4. Citizenship
of Ukraine
5. Education
Vocational
6. Place of work (study)
FLP
7. Place of residency (registration)
city of Avdiivka, 24 Nezavisimosti St.
8. Tel.
9. Criminal charges
No
10. Council membership
No
11. Information about passport or other form of identification document verified.
The victim was explained that she is called for questioning in the criminal proceeding
based on p. 2 art. 258 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
[…]
The victim was warned about the criminal liability based on art. 384 of the Criminal
Code of Ukraine (Known false testimony).
Victim [Signed]
I live at the indicated address with my family, daughter and child, born in 2005.
On 03.02.2017, at about 11:00 p.m., I was at home when the shelling of the city of
Avdiivka began, at the end of which a shell hit my yard, as a result of which the wall of the
summer kitchen, the slate roof of the garage, and the slate covering of the house from the side
of the explosion were damaged. Glasses (double-glazed windows) of plastic windows were
damaged from the side of the explosion. As a result of the explosion, the body of a Mercedes
Sprinter, state number AH5419CK, was damaged. It was warped, shrapnel cut the body and
glass of the car.
- 67 -
Recorded correctly.
A.A. Buzhanskaya [Signed]
Investigator
M. Zhosin [Signed]
Stamp: SAME AS THE ORIGINAL
Investigator of Police Unit of the Second Department of the Main Department
of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk Region
[Signed]
- 68 -
Annex 47
Signed Declaration of Olga Nikolaevna Dyuzhikova, Victim Interrogation Protocol
(4 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Signed Declaration of Olga Nikolaevna Dyuzhikova, Victim Interrogation Protocol
(4 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 69 -
- 70 -
[...], [...]
Stamp: SAME AS THE ORIGINAL
Investigator of the Investigations Unit of the Second Department of the Main
Department of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk
Region
[Signed]
RECORD
of victim questioning
Town of Avdiivka 04.02.2017
Questioning began at 13 hr. 00 min., ended at 13 hr. 40 min.
An Investigator of the Investigations Unit of Avdiivka Police Unit M.A. Gybonenko,
having reviewed materials of the pre-trial investigation entered in the Unified Register of Pre-
Trial Investigations under No. 12001705014000011 of 04.02.201[7], at the place of
residence, at presence of persons who were explained the requirements of p. 2 art. 66 of the
Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine regarding their obligation not to share information
regarding the completed procedural action […], having complied with requirements of
articles 55, 56, 95, 104, 106, 223, 224 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, questioned
a victim:
1. Last name, first name and patronymic Olga Nikolaevna Dyuzhikova
2. Date and place of birth 01.12.1985, city of Avdiivka
3. Nationality Ukrainian
4. Citizenship of Ukraine
5. Education Vocational
6. Place of work (study) on maternity leave
7. Type of work and position
8. Place of residency (registration) city of Avdiivka, 73/64 Sobornaya St..
9. Criminal charges No
10. Council membership No
11. Information about passport or other form of identification document
.
[…]
The victim was warned about the criminal liability based on art. 384 of the Criminal
Code of Ukraine (Known false testimony) [Signed]
[…]
On the merits of the questions that I was asked, I can explain that my apartment is located on
the 3rd floor. On 03.02.17 at about 22:00 during the shelling of the city of Avdiivka, a shell
hit the floor slab panel between my apartment and the 4th floor, into the ceiling of my
apartment, as a result of which the following was damaged: a wall, windows flew out, glass
on the balcony flew out, and wall in the toilet. The extractor hood, gas stove, and refrigerator
were shuttered by shrapnel. I and my family members were not injured. There is nothing
more to add.
It is written correctly from my words, and read by me.
[Signed]
Investigator [Signed] M.A. Gybonenko
- 71 -
- 72 -
Annex 48
Signed Declaration of Vira Mykolaivna Bespalova, Victim Interrogation Protocol (4
February 2 0 17)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 48
Signed Declaration of Vira Mykolaivna Bespalova, Victim Interrogation Protocol (4
February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 73 -
- 74 -
[...], Stamp: SAME AS THE ORIGINAL
Investigator of the Investigations Unit of the Second Department of the Main
Department of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk
Region
[Signed]
RECORD
of victim questioning
Town of Avdiivka 04.02.2017
Questioning began at 9 hr. 30 min., ended at 9 hr. 50 min.
An Investigator of the Investigations Unit of Avdiivka Police Unit of Pokrovskyi
Police Division of the Main Department of the National Police in Donetsk region Captain of
police M. Zhosin, having reviewed materials of the pre-trial investigation entered in the
Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations under No. 12017050040000088 of 04.03.2017, at
the place of residence, at presence of persons who were explained the requirements of p. 2
art. 66 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine regarding their obligation not to share
information regarding the completed procedural action […], having complied with
requirements of articles 55, 56, 95, 104, 106, 223, 224 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Ukraine, questioned a victim:
1. Last name, first name and patronymic
Vira Mykolaivna Bespalova
2. Date of birth
07.01.1952
3. Place of birth
Kyiv region
4. Citizenship
of Ukraine
5. Education
Vocational
6. Place of work (study)
Retired
7. Place of residency (registration)
city of Avdiivka, 84 Soborna St.
8. Tel.
[…]
9. Criminal charges
10. Council membership
No
11. Information about passport or other form of identification document verified
.
The victim was explained that she is called for questioning in the criminal proceeding
based on p. 2 art. 258 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
[…]
The victim was warned about the criminal liability based on art. 384 of the Criminal
Code of Ukraine (Known false testimony).
Victim [Signed]
I explain that I live at the address: city of Avdiivka, 84 Sobornaya St.. On February 3,
2017, at about 23:00, the city of Avdiivka was shelled. A shell flew into my yard, next to the
house, and caused destruction of the facade, property was damaged, glass was broken, the
onduline roof and slab blocks were damaged, the walls of the house were hit with fragments,
the doors were damaged, and the electric meter was shattered. The damage that was caused to
me is significant.
It is written down correctly. V.M. Bespalaya [Signed]
[Signed] M. Zhosin
- 75 -
- 76 -
Annex 49
Signed Declaration of Viktor Volodymyrovych Dzhyuba, Victim Interrogation
Protocol (6 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Signed Declaration of Viktor Volodymyrovych Dzhyuba, Victim Interrogation
Protocol (6 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 77 -
- 78 -
[...]
RECORD
of victim questioning
City of Avdiivka 06.02.2017
Questioning began at 11 hr. 30 min.
Questioning ended at 11 hr. 50 min.
An Investigator of the Investigations Unit of Avdiivka Police Unit of Pokrovskyi
Police Division of the Main Department of the National Police in Donetsk region M. Zhosin,
having reviewed materials of the pre-trial investigation entered in the Unified Register of Pre-
Trial Investigations under No. 12017050140000093 of 06.02.2017, in the facility of Avdiivka
Police Unit of Pokrovskyi Police Division of the Main Department of the National Police in
Donetsk region, having complied with requirements of articles 55, 56, 95, 104, 106, 223, 224
of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, questioned a victim:
1. Last name, first name and patronymic Viktor Volodymyrovych Dzhyuba
2. Date and place of birth 23.12.1947, city of Avdiivka
3. Nationality Ukrainian
4. Citizenship of Ukraine
5. Education Vocational
6. Place of work (study) Disability of the 2nd category
7. Type of work and position
8. Place of residency (registration) Avdiivka, 146 Pervomayska St.
9. Criminal charges No
10. Council membership No
11. Information about passport or other form of identification document person has
been verified .
It was explained to the victim that he was called for questioning in the criminal
proceeding for open theft of property.
[…]
The victim, V.V. Dzhyuba, was warned about the criminal liability based on art. 384
of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Known false testimony).
[…]
I have been living at the above address since I was born.
On 03.02.2017 I was at my place of residence. Around 21:00 I went to bed.
Around 11:40 pm I woke up to the sound of shell explosions.
Hearing a blow to the wall of the house and leaving the hall into the living room, I
saw that the metal-plastic window that overlooks the courtyard of the house was damaged
and in its lower right corner there was a metal object that looked like a component part of the
projectile.
- 79 -
Since I am a disabled person of the 2nd category, and I also do not have a telephone,
on 05.02.2017 I asked my neighbors to report the incident to the police.
I did not touch the above-mentioned object, which looked like a component part of
the projectile, until the police arrived.
It is written down correctly based on my words, and verified by me.
V.V. Dzhyuba [Signed]
Questioned by [Signed] M. Zhosin
- 80 -
Annex 50
Signed Declaration of Hanna Mykolayivna Fandeeva, Witness Interrogation
Protocol (15 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 50
Signed Declaration of Hanna Mykolayivna Fandeeva, Witness Interrogation
Protocol (15 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 81 -
- 82 -
Strictly
Confidential
Testimony of Hanna Mykolayvna Fandeeva
1. I am Hanna Mykolayvna Fadeeva, born on July 23, 1941. I am a resident of
Avdiivka, a town in the East of Ukraine located close to the northern borders of
Donetsk. I have been living in Avdiivka for 51 years since 1965. I am 76 years of
age. I worked for the railway and on top of that for an agricultural enterprise
trying to make enough money to build my own home. Now I am retired. My
pension is approximately UAH 1300.00 per month.
2. I live in my own house located at the following address: 86 Kolosova (formerly
Kirova), Avdiivka. I live alone.
3. Several days before January 30, 2017, the shelling began in Avdiivka. Starting
from the evening of January 30, 2017, the shelling intensified; I could hear it. It
was very scary.
4. During the night between the 30th and 31st of January, 2017, I was at home
asleep. Closer to 4 am I heard the sound of glass breaking and [walls] collapsing. I
woke up and realized that there had been an explosion and I had to hide. I ran into
another room. After the explosion subsided I saw that I was trapped in my own
house and could not get out. The shelling continued and I was very scared when I
realized that at that time I could not get out of the building and was trapped.
Because it was the rear part of the building that collapsed it took my neighbors
some time to realize what had happened to me.
5. After the explosion I spent nearly 2 hours in the part of the building that remained
intact. The outside temperature at the time was close to minus 17 degrees
centigrade. My neighbors helped to rescue me; they partially removed the debris
and helped me out of the building, they pulled me out. After the attack I was left
without a roof over my head. My warm house in which I had everything I needed
to live had been destroyed. As a result of the shelling there was a hole in the outer
wall of the house, everything inside the building that I needed for my everyday
life had been destroyed: the toilet, the bathroom, the gas boiler that I used to heat
up the house, my dishes. As a result of the attack I was forced to stay with my
neighbors for three days. Also the roof of the summer kitchen was entirely
destroyed and the doors and windows were broken.
6. During the same night I saw that the shelling also damaged a number of other
houses of my neighbors who lived in the same street.
7. After the explosion destroyed my house my blood pressure shot up and I have
been suffering from constant headaches. For several days I was
Testimony of Hanna Mykolayvna Fandeeva
1. I am Hanna Mykolayvna Fadeeva, born on July 23, 1941. I am a resident of
Avdiivka, a town in the East of Ukraine located close to the northern borders of
Donetsk. I have been living in Avdiivka for 51 years since 1965. I am 76 years of
age. I worked for the railway and on top of that for an agricultural enterprise
trying to make enough money to build my own home. Now I am retired. My
pension is approximately UAH 1300.00 per month.
2. I live in my own house located at the following address: 86 Kolosova (formerly
Kirova), Avdiivka. I live alone.
3. Several days before January 30, 2017, the shelling began in Avdiivka. Starting
from the evening of January 30, 2017, the shelling intensified; I could hear it. It
was very scary.
4. During the night between the 30th and 31st of January, 2017, I was at home
asleep. Closer to 4 am I heard the sound of glass breaking and [walls] collapsing. I
woke up and realized that there had been an explosion and I had to hide. I ran into
another room. After the explosion subsided I saw that I was trapped in my own
house and could not get out. The shelling continued and I was very scared when I
realized that at that time I could not get out of the building and was trapped.
Because it was the rear part of the building that collapsed it took my neighbors
some time to realize what had happened to me.
5. After the explosion I spent nearly 2 hours in the part of the building that remained
intact. The outside temperature at the time was close to minus 17 degrees
centigrade. My neighbors helped to rescue me; they partially removed the debris
and helped me out of the building, they pulled me out. After the attack I was left
without a roof over my head. My warm house in which I had everything I needed
to live had been destroyed. As a result of the shelling there was a hole in the outer
wall of the house, everything inside the building that I needed for my everyday
life had been destroyed: the toilet, the bathroom, the gas boiler that I used to heat
up the house, my dishes. As a result of the attack I was forced to stay with my
neighbors for three days. Also the roof of the summer kitchen was entirely
destroyed and the doors and windows were broken.
6. During the same night I saw that the shelling also damaged a number of other
houses of my neighbors who lived in the same street.
7. After the explosion destroyed my house my blood pressure shot up and I have
been suffering from constant headaches. For several days I was
Strictly
Confidential
- 83 -
Strictly
Confidential
treated in a local hospital and took a sedative; they gave me shots. I suffer from
memory loss, I am constantly shaking, my hands are trembling, [and] I started
forgetting words and letters when I write. During the night from the 14th to 15th
of February 2017 when I heard the sound of shelling again I had to take sedative
and plug my ears so that I would not hear the shooting.
8. When my house was destroyed the police came to inspect the scene. Since it had
happened during the night I do not know which kind of weapons were used to
damage my house, who was shooting, and from which direction. A part of the
shell that was pulled out of the house is still lying next to my damaged home.
The photos of the damage, which were made on February 15, 2017, have been
enclosed with this testimony.
The above is an accurate account of my statement.
15 February 2017 Signature [signature]
Avdiivka
Fandeeva Anna Nikolaevna
treated in a local hospital and took a sedative; they gave me shots. I suffer from
memory loss, I am constantly shaking, my hands are trembling, [and] I started
forgetting words and letters when I write. During the night from the 14th to 15th
of February 2017 when I heard the sound of shelling again I had to take sedative
and plug my ears so that I would not hear the shooting.
8. When my house was destroyed the police came to inspect the scene. Since it had
happened during the night I do not know which kind of weapons were used to
damage my house, who was shooting, and from which direction. A part of the
shell that was pulled out of the house is still lying next to my damaged home.
The photos of the damage, which were made on February 15, 2017, have been
enclosed with this testimony.
The above is an accurate account of my statement.
15 February 2017 Signature [signature]
Avdiivka
Fandeeva Anna Nikolaevna
Strictly
Confidential
- 84 -
Annex 51
Signed Declaration of Anna Vyacheslavovna Gulchevskaya, Victim Interrogation
Protocol (19 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 51
Signed Declaration of Anna Vyacheslavovna Gulchevskaya, Victim Interrogation
Protocol (19 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 85 -
- 86 -
[...], [...]
[...]
Stamp: SAME AS THE ORIGINAL
Investigator of the 2nd Investigations Unit
(located in the city of Mariupol of Donetsk region)
of the Main Department of the Security Service of
Ukraine
in Donetsk and Luhansk Region
[Signed] V.V. Burykin
RECORD
of victim questioning
Town of Avdiivka 19.02.2017
Questioning began at 11 hr. 00 min.
Questioning ended at 11 hr. 43 min.
An Investigator of the Investigations Unit of Avdiivka Police Unit Senior Lieutenant
of police O.L. Kulikov, having reviewed materials of the pre-trial investigation entered in the
Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations under No. 120-170-125 of 18.02.2017, at the
place of residence, at presence of persons who were explained the requirements of p. 2 art. 66
of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine regarding their obligation not to share
information regarding the completed procedural action […], having complied with
requirements of articles 55, 56, 95, 104, 106, 223, 224 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Ukraine, questioned a victim:
1. Last name, first name and patronymic
Anna Vyacheslavovna Gulchevskaya
2. Date and place of birth
22.03.1960, Donetsk region
3. Nationality
Ukrainian
4. Citizenship
of Ukraine
5. Education
Vocational
6. Place of work (study)
Avdiivka Central City Library
7. Type of work and position
librarian
8. Place of residency (registration)
Donetsk region, city of Avdiivka, 67 Chistyakova
St..
9. Criminal charges
No
10. Council membership
No
11. Information about passport or other form of identification document
.
[…]
The victim, A.V. Gulchevskaya, was warned about the criminal liability based on art.
384 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Known false testimony) [Signed]
[…]
Based on the asked questions, the victim, A.V. Gulchevskaya, provided the following
testimony: I have been living at the above address for a long time together with my son,
Denis Vladimirovich Gulchevskiy, born in 1986. Thus, on February 18, 2017, at about 22:30
during shelling 7 windows were damaged on the territory of my household.
It is written correctly from my words, and read by me.
[Signed]
Investigator of Avdiivka Police Unit [Signed] O.L. Kulikov
- 87 -
- 88 -
Annex 52
Signed Declaration of Oleksandr Victorovych Povarnitsyn, Property Inspection
Protocol (19 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 52
Signed Declaration of Oleksandr Victorovych Povarnitsyn, Property Inspection
Protocol (19 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 89 -
- 90 -
Thor [...]
[...]
Stamp: SAME AS THE ORIGINAL
Investigator of the Investigations Unit of the Second Department of the Main
Department of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk
Region
[Signed] B.E. Averin
RECORD OF INSPECTION
The city of Avdiivka 19.02.2017
Inspection began at 11 hr. 30 min
Inspection ended at 11 hr. 41 min
Investigator of Avdiivka Police Unit, Senior Lieutenant of Police D.L. Kulikov, having
complied with articles 104, 105, 106, 234, 237, 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine:
In presence of witnesses:
1) Serhiy Petrovych Volkov, born on 20.12.1964, the city of Avdiivka, 69A Chystiakova St.,
2) Ihor Ihorovych Symonchuk, born on 18.09.1949, the city of Avdiivka, 17 Gagarina St., who
were explained their rights and responsibilities in accordance with articles 11, 13, 15, 2223 of
the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine
[…]
With participation of Oleksandr Victorovych Povarnitsyn, born on 30.11.1971, the city
of Avdiivka, at 57 Chystiakova St.
[…]
The following was established based on the inspection: The place of inspection is a private
household at the address: the city of Avdiivka city, 57 Chistyakova St.. The territory is fenced.
There is a car garage at the entrance to the territory of the household on the right side. At the
time of the inspection, the roof of the garage was destroyed. There is an ALFA ROMEO car in
the garage, on which the roof of the garage fell. The car is also damaged inside. Next to the
garage is a one-story house, with one damaged window on the right side. The fragments also
damaged the wall and the roof of the house. Present at the inspection O.V. Povarnitsyn
explained that the damage occurred on February 18, 2017 at 11:40 pm during the artillery
shelling of the city. There are no victims.
[…]
The inspection was conducted during day time, in the natural light at the temperature of - 1
degree Celsius.
The record is read, there are no objections.
(objections of the inspection participants)
Participants:
1. O.V. Povarnitsyn [Signed]
2.
Witnesses:
1. S.P. Volkov [Signed]
2. I.I. Symonchuk [Signed]
Inspection conducted by:
- 91 -
IInnvveessttiiggaattoorr ooff AAvvddiiiivvkkaa PPoolliiccee UUnniitt [[SSiiggnneedd]] DD..LL.. KKuulliikkoovv
- 92 -
Annex 53
Signed Declaration of Viktor Ivanovych Palash, Victim Interrogation Protocol (19
February 2 0 17)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 53
Signed Declaration of Viktor Ivanovych Palash, Victim Interrogation Protocol (19
February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 93 -
- 94 -
[...], identified.
[...]
[...]
Stamp: SAME AS THE ORIGINAL
Investigator of the 2nd Investigations Unit
(located in the city of Mariupol of Donetsk region)
of the Main Department of the Security Service of
Ukraine
in Donetsk and Luhansk Region
[Signed] V.V. Burykin
RECORD
of victim questioning
Town of Avdiivka 19.02.2017
Questioning began at 13 hr. 00 min., ended at 13 hr. 07 min.
An Investigator of the Investigations Unit of Avdiivka Police Unit Major of police
V.A. Polevoy, having reviewed materials of the pre-trial investigation entered in the Unified
Register of Pre-Trial Investigations under No. 12017050140000125 of 18.02.2017, at the
place of residence, at presence of persons who were explained the requirements of p. 2 art. 66
of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine regarding their obligation not to share
information regarding the completed procedural action […], having complied with
requirements of articles 55, 56, 95, 104, 106, 223, 224 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Ukraine, questioned a victim:
1. Last name, first name and patronymic
Viktor Ivanovych Palash
2. Date of birth
09.11.1938
3. Place of birth
city of Avdiivka
4. Citizenship
of Ukraine
5. Education
higher education
6. Place of work (study)
does not work, retired
7. Place of residency (registration)
city of Avdiivka, 97 Pionerska St..
8. Tel.
[…]
9. Criminal charges
No
10. Council membership No
11. Information about passport or other form of identification document the person has
been identified .
The victim was explained that he was called for questioning in the criminal provision
based on the fact of a terrorist act.
[…]
The victim was warned about the criminal liability based on art. 384 of the Criminal
Code of Ukraine (Known false testimony)
Victim [Signed]
[…]
I live at the above address with my wife, Palash Valentina Nikiforna, born in 1947. I
also own a household located at: the city of Avdiivka, 126 L. Ukrainka (Parkhomenko) St.,
which I inherited from my parents.
No one lives in this household and I sometimes visit there.
On the night of February 17, 2017 to February 18, 2017, our area came under artillery
fire.
- 95 -
can't On February 18, 2017, at about 10:00 am, I came to this household, where I
discovered that an artillery shell had exploded in the yard.
The residential building was intact, however, as a result of the explosion, an adobe
outbuilding located behind the residential building, a wooden shed and a wooden summer
shower located behind the outbuilding were destroyed.
The summer kitchen, located to the right of the destroyed outbuilding, was also
damaged - the entrance wooden door was knocked out in it and the wooden window located
to the right of the front door was broken.
On February 19, 2017, on behalf of my wife, I reported the incident to the police
hotline, and my wife had previously went to our children in the city of Pokrovsk.
I can’t say for sure who carried out the shelling, but I think it was done by members
of a gang, the so-called DPR.
I cannot name the exact material damage.
It is written correctly from my words, and read by me.
[Signed]
Questioned by: [Signed] V.A. Polevoy
Stamp: SAME AS THE ORIGINAL
Investigator of the 2nd Investigations Unit
(located in the city of Mariupol of Donetsk region)
of the Main Department of the Security Service of
Ukraine
in Donetsk and Luhansk Region
[Signed] V.V. Burykin
- 96 -
Annex 54
Signed Declaration of Oksana Vladimirovna Povarnitsyna, Victim Interrogation
Protocol (2o February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Signed Declaration of Oksana Vladimirovna Povarnitsyna, Victim Interrogation
Protocol (20 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 97 -
- 98 -
[...], [...]
[...]
Stamp: SAME AS THE ORIGINAL
Investigator of the Investigations Unit of the Second Department of the Main
Department of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk
Region
[Signed] B.E. Averin
RECORD
of victim questioning
Town of Avdiivka 20.02.2017
Questioning began at 12 hr. 00 min.
Questioning ended at 12 hr. 10 min.
An Investigator of Avdiivka Police Unit Senior Lieutenant of Police O.L. Kulikov,
having reviewed materials of the pre-trial investigation entered in the Unified Register of Pre-
Trial Investigations under No. 12017050140000126 of 20.02.2017, at the place of residence,
at presence of persons who were explained the requirements of p. 2 art. 66 of the Criminal
Procedure Code of Ukraine regarding their obligation not to share information regarding the
completed procedural action […], having complied with requirements of articles 55, 56, 95,
104, 106, 223, 224 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, questioned a victim:
1. Last name, first name and patronymic
Oksana Vladimirovna Povarnitsyna
2. Date and place of birth
26.04.1973, Donetsk region
3. Nationality
Ukrainian
4. Citizenship
of Ukraine
5. Education
Vocational
6. Place of work (study)
AKKhZ
7. Type of work and position
boiler stoker driver
8. Place of residency (registration)
Donetsk region, city of Avdiivka, 57
Chistyakova St., cell phone […]
9. Criminal charges
No
10. Council membership
No
11. Information about passport or other form of identification document
[…] .
[…]
The victim, O.V. Povarnitsyna, was warned about the criminal liability based on art.
384 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Known false testimony) [Signed]
Based on the asked questions, the victim, O.V. Povarnitsyna, provided the following
testimony: I have lived at the above address all my life. I currently live with my spouse,
Aleksander Viktorovich Povarnitsyn, born in 1971. Thus, on February 18, 2017, I was at
home with my spouse. Approximately at 22:30 on February 18, 2017, during the shelling
there was a direct hit at the territory of my household, namely the garage, which is located in
my yard, more specifically, on the roof of the garage. I can add that there was an Alfa Romeo
164 car, state number AN1705-MI in the garage. I can also add that 12 windows were broken
and the roof of the house was shuttered.
It is written correctly from my words.
I have read it. [Signed]
Investigator [Signed] O.L. Kulikov
- 99 -
Stamp: SAME AS THE ORIGINAL
Investigator of Police Unit of the Second Department of the Main Department
of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk Region
[Signed] B.E. Averin
- 100 -
Annex 55
Signed Declaration of Viktor Ivanovych Palash, Property Inspection Protocol
(20 February 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 101 -
- 102 -
Stamp: SAME AS THE ORIGINAL
Investigator of the 2nd Investigations Unit
(located in the city of Mariupol of Donetsk region)
of the Main Department of the Security Service of Ukraine
in Donetsk and Luhansk Region
[Signed] V.V. Burykin
RECORD OF INSPECTION
of the place of event
The city of Avdiivka 20.02.2017
Inspection began at 07 hr. 10 min
Inspection ended at 07 hr. 50 min
Temporary acting Investigator of Avdiivka Police Unit, of Pokrovske Police Unit of the
Main Department of the National Police on Donetsk region, Major of Police V.A. Polevoy, having
complied with articles 104, 105, 106, 234, 237, 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine,
in presence of witnesses:
1) Mykola Ivanovych Kiyko, born on 29.11.1962, who lives in the city of Avdiivka, 17/116
Molodizhna St.,
2) Olha Anatoliivna Kiyko, born on 206.08.1964, who lives in the city of Avdiivka, 17/116
Molodizhna St., who were explained their rights and responsibilities in accordance with articles
11, 13, 15, 2223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine
[…]
With participation of the owner (user) of a facility of other personal property Viktor
Ivanovych Palash
[…]
It was established during the inspection that: the place of inspection is the household at the address:
Donetsk region, the city of Avdiivka, 126 L. Ukrainky (Parkhomenko) St., owned by V.I. Palash.
The perimeter of the household is fenced with a wooden picket fence. Entrance to the territory of
the household is through a metal gate.
In the yard of the household there is a 1-story residential house, which is not damaged. Behind the
residential house there is an outbuilding, a wooden barn, and a wooden summer shower an
outbuilding destroyed by an artillery shell. To the right of the ruined outbuilding there is a 1-story
summer kitchen with damaged wooden front door and a window to the right of the entrance.
As explained by V.I. Palash, the destruction of the household occurred on the night of February
17, 2017 to February 18, 2017, as a result of artillery shelling and an artillery shell having hit the
yard of the household.
The inspection was conducted in cloudy, dry weather, under natural light.
1) [Signed] 2) [Signed]
- 103 -
Stamp: SAME AS THE ORIGINAL
Investigator of the 2nd Investigations Unit
(located in the city of Mariupol of Donetsk region)
of the Main Department of the Security Service of Ukraine
in Donetsk and Luhansk Region
[Signed] V.V. Burykin
Nothing was removed from the scene.
No statements or comments were received during the inspection.
The record was read aloud, it is written correctly.
Signatures of witnesses: 1) [Signed]
2) [Signed]
Participant: [Signed]
The record was prepared by temporary acting Investigator of Avdiivka Police Unit, of Pokrovske
Police Unit Major of Police [Signed] V.A. Polevoy
- 104 -
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Stamp: SAME AS THE ORIGINAL
Investigator of the 2nd Investigations Unit
(located in the city of Mariupol of Donetsk region)
of the Main Department of the Security Service of Ukraine
in Donetsk and Luhansk Region
[Signed] V.V. Burykin
PHOTO CHART
to the Record of inspection of the place of event
Photo No. 1. Entry to the territory of the household located at the address: Donetsk region, the
city of Avdiivka, 126 L. Ukraink y St..
Photo No. 2. The yard of the household (the resi dential house is located on the left).
[Signed]
- 105 -
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Stamp: SAME AS THE ORIGINAL
Investigator of the 2nd Investigations Unit
(located in the city of Mariupol of Donetsk region)
of the Main Department of the Security Service of Ukraine
in Donetsk and Luhansk Region
[Signed] V.V. Burykin
Photo No. 3. The destroyed outbuilding, located behind the residential building.
Photo No. 4. Similar to photo No. 3.
[Signed]
- 106 -
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Stamp: SAME AS THE ORIGINAL
Investigator of the 2nd Investigations Unit
(located in the city of Mariupol of Donetsk region)
of the Main Department of the Security Service of Ukraine
in Donetsk and Luhansk Region
[Signed] V.V. Burykin
Photo No. 5. Similar to photos No.No. 3-4.
Photo No. 6. Destroyed wooden barn and summer shower, located behind the destroyed
outbuilding.
[Signed]
- 107 -
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Stamp: SAME AS THE ORIGINAL
Investigator of the 2nd Investigations Unit
(located in the city of Mariupol of Donetsk region)
of the Main Department of the Security Service of Ukraine
in Donetsk and Luhansk Region
[Signed] V.V. Burykin
Photo No. 7. Destroyed entry to the summer kitchen, located to the right from the destroyed
outbuilding.
Photo No. 8. Similar to photo No. 7.
The photo chart was prepared by
temporary acting Investigator of Avdiivka Police Unit,
of Pokrovske Police Unit Major of Police [Signed] V.A. Polevoy
- 108 -
Annex 57
U.N. Police, Peacekeeping PDT Standards for Formed Police Units (2015)
- 109 -
- 110 -
UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards for Formed Police Units, 1st edition 2015
POLICE TACTICS & TECHNIQUES
Checkpoints
- 111 -
Police Tactics & Techniques
Checkpoints
1
UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards for Formed Police Units, 1st edition 2015
Background
Members of an FPU are likely to have to carry out checkpoints in both executive and
non-executive missions, in the former, as part of their general duties in maintaining
the peace and in the latter in their role of protecting UN Staff and facilities where
checkpoints will be situated at the entrance to UN buildings to control access.
There are various different types of checkpoint, from those that are fixed to those
that are temporary, and they need to be capable of dealing with pedestrians or
vehicles or both. The modules on searching suspects and searching vehicles should
be used as revision for this topic.
Aim
To familiarize the FPU members with planning and safely conducting checkpoint
operations
Learning outcomes
At the end of this module the students will be able to:
Explain the goal of a checkpoint
Identify tactical considerations
Describe the different zones of a checkpoint
Conduct vehicle and pedestrian checkpoints
React to incidents at checkpoints
Training sequence
The material in this module is designed to be delivered over a 40 minute classroom
based theory lesson followed by 4 hours of practice, which should include at least
one hour for assessment. This is on the assumption that the students have received
no previous training in this subject.
Duration
Minimum Session
time
Lecture/Presentation Question/Assessment Session Activities
4 hours 40 mins 40 mins 1 hour 3 hours
Additional
Options
Mission Specific Optional film Optional activity
- 112 -
Police Tactics & Techniques
Checkpoints
2
UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards for Formed Police Units, 1st edition 2015
Methodology
This module contains a PowerPoint theory presentation to explain and show the
various techniques, however, the majority of this module should be taught in a
practical manner using the format:
- Explanation by the instructor
- Demonstration by the instructor
- Imitation by the students (with instructor correcting where necessary)
- Practice by the students until the technique is perfected
At the end of the final stage the instructor will be able to assess if the student is
competent in the technique having carried out continuous assessment throughout
the preceding lessons.
The instructor should inform participants of the content, format and timing. Knowing
what to expect, participants can improve their ability to focus on the subject and
benefit better from the session.
Theory of barricades (40 minute classroom lesson)
Practice (4 hours of practical lessons)
A number of the practical periods should be conducted in the form of exercises
which should be carried out in as realistic situation as possible with the use of other
officers acting as pedestrians and road users
Instructors are encouraged to add practical examples and mission specific
information related to the specific deployment of participants, if known.
Instructor Profile
This module is best presented by an instructor who has practical experience in
peacekeeping operations and who could share his/her experience with the group. He
must be practiced and skilled to be able to demonstrate the technique correctly. If
there is more than one instructor, at least one of them should have practical
experience as trainer in either domestic policing or a peacekeeping mission.
Instructor Preparations
Required Readings
· DPKO Policy on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
· FPU Training Handbook
· Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials
- 113 -
Police Tactics & Techniques
Checkpoints
3
UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards for Formed Police Units, 1st edition 2015
General Preparations
Equipment:
1. Computer and PowerPoint slides for lesson 1
2. Projector and Screen for lesson 1
3. Vehicles
Training Area:
The initial lesson should be carried out in the classroom; however subsequent
lessons will need a large open area where students can construct checkpoints as an
FPU section and platoon. Once the basic tactics have been grasped by the students
the FPU will need to practice their tactics in a more urban situation, for this purpose
a ‘ghost town’ or public order village is ideal.
- 114 -
Police Tactics & Techniques
Checkpoints
4
UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards for Formed Police Units, 1st edition 2015
Lesson 1 – Checkpoints (Theory)
Contents:
Slide 1
Slide 2
Session notes
- 115 -
Police Tactics & Techniques
Checkpoints
5
UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards for Formed Police Units, 1st edition 2015
Slide 3
Slide 4
- 116 -
Police Tactics & Techniques
Checkpoints
6
UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards for Formed Police Units, 1st edition 2015
Slides 5 and 6
A checkpoint is an area where vehicles and/or persons are stopped, identities are
verified, possessions searched, and a decision is made whether or not to detain the
persons/ vehicles or to allow them to pass. Checkpoints aim at controlling an area, to
allow a “safe area” to protect from outside influence, to deny hostile intelligence
gathering opportunities and to be effective they must not be able to be bypassed.
Vehicle or pedestrian can be run separately or jointly, dependant on the reason for
their being constructed. In all UN missions they will normally be at the entrance to
major UN facilities and will aim to protect the building from attack therefore they will
be for both pedestrians and vehicles. Trainees ‘attention should be drawn to the fact
that references should be made to the UN DPKO/DFS interim SOP on Detention
and, to the SOP on Arrest and Detention developed at the mission level.1
1 Detention in United Nations Peace Operations: Approved by: Alain Le Roy, USG/DPKO, Approval date: 25
January 2010
- 117 -
Police Tactics & Techniques
Checkpoints
7
UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards for Formed Police Units, 1st edition 2015
Slide 7
When considering the use of a checkpoint the Commander will have to consider
various factors that will affect the lay out and will have a bearing on if it is a suitable
location.
The checkpoint is set up in order to control an area or to create an interposition
layout between two opponent groups. Its goal is to stop the freedom of movement of
goods and persons.
The establishment of the checkpoint may be thus in contrast with one of the most
fundamental liberties and has to be realized in the framework of the mandate or of
the local laws (when in support of local security/defense forces).
A checkpoint can be only set up upon the initiative of the UN police/military forces
when it aims to control the accesses of a UN base and to protect its personnel.
It can also be set up without the involvement local security forces if the UN mandate
recommends it and when the local security forces are not present in the area of
operation or are not operational (case of CAR or Kosovo, Mitrovica Bridge).
The unit commander should conduct a terrain study to identify avenues of approach.
This also implies setting up the checkpoint with traffic going uphill to slow down
vehicles as they approach, or at crossroads, for a similar reason, and to locate them
on a one-way street. It is also important that the CP is far enough away from
sensitive areas and where possible Entry/Exit routes should be located side by side.
Conditions, visibility and risks are different at night; therefore the Commander must
be aware of the procedures for night operations.
Majority of the information about dangerous or wanted people will come from the
JMAC (Joint Mission Analysis Centre) in the form of photos, guidance, and daily
register book. This register book should be kept at the checkpoint. The access to the
computer database is critical either directly or by radio.
The FPU Commander must be aware of the advantages and disadvantages of
conducting Checkpoint operations.
- 118 -
Police Tactics & Techniques
Checkpoints
8
UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards for Formed Police Units, 1st edition 2015
It will be an obvious show of force to the local population and at the same time will
give the officers conducting the checkpoint to gauge the attitude of the local
population, to both the UN’ s presence and also to the use and sitting of the
checkpoint. As well as controlling access to an area, it also has the ability to gather
intelligence, both from the local population and also by collating the statistics and
details of the vehicles and pedestrians passing through.
However the disadvantage is that they are resource intensive particularly if they are
to be staffed 24 hours a day. They may be unpopular with the local population and
therefore become a tangible target for local protest and they may be vulnerable to
attack, either by crowds of demonstrators of by terrorist or criminal gangs.
Another consideration is how the unit’s resources are deployed. Crew served
weapons should be emplaced to oversee the checkpoint, and Snipers can also be
deployed for the same purpose. Once in position the unit should conduct security
patrols in the locality to ensure that the Checkpoint is not being reconnoitred or
targeted. The defence of the checkpoint should be assessed on and improved on a
daily basis.
The strength of the FPU and the equipment are to be available and in accordance
with the operation.
The following equipment is necessary:
- Pre-signalisation means (road signs, traffic lights…)
- Fixed and heavy road blocks for the deceleration zone
- Mobile road blocks to avoid the escape from the checkpoint area (dragon teeth,
barbed wire, vehicles…)
- Armoured vehicles with crew machine guns ready to react to any vehicle forcing
the checkpoint
- Search equipment (mirror, projectors, torch lights, handcuffs…)
The positioning of fire support elements, the armament of the FPU and their shooting
capacity, the distance between the various elements of the checkpoint, lighting and
weather conditions are also to be considered.
The strength of the unit should be proportionate to the different positions to be filled
on the checkpoint.
The checkpoint comprises at least 5 different types of element:
- Pre-signalisation element
- Selection element
- Control element
- Mobile protection element
- Intervention element (reaction)
The commander needs to be aware of local issues that may affect the checkpoint
and it is always beneficial to have officers or interpreters that speak the local
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language, especially if it is different to the Mission language.
Distances for observations have to be lengthened, the number of people checked at
the same time lowered and a strict allocation of watching tasks per officer assigned
in order to avoid people overwhelming the officers guarding the check point.
Having a lot of light on a checkpoint is important but it is almost as important as to
light up the surrounding areas, in order to avoid people sneaking in or out of the
deployment.
Slide 8
There are two types of checkpoint: mobile and fixed.
The mobile checkpoint responds to an immediate operational need and can be
removed immediately after the execution of the operation without having an impact
on the security of the concerned area, the population living in it and the personnel
deployed for the operation.
An immediate CP is one that is set up under dynamic circumstances, following a
serious robbery when the perpetrators are thought to still be making their escape.
Short term CPs may be set up to combat crime, e.g. through collecting intelligence
related to a certain road used by criminals or terrorists.
A selective checkpoint is a random control of vehicles and/or people based on
intelligence or upon the initiative of the selection element.
A systematic checkpoint will be a permanent or semi-permanent structure
encompassing all the principles already discussed. It will allow for a complete and
comprehensive check of all persons and vehicles.
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A fixed checkpoint can be permanent or temporary and it takes places where a
decision has been taken to carry out checks on a regular even daily basis. As a
result, it can be permanent, (as for instance to deal with a division between ethnic
groups or the entrance to an IDP camp), or it may be set up to control the entry of
persons into a restricted area. If permanent, then it will be designed according to the
specifications later explained in this lesson. Temporary CPs can be set up when
required. If it is in a regular location and part or all of the specifications listed can be
built to accommodate the CP when it is activated.
Any CP can be in either or both directions; this will depend on the reasons for
placing the CP and the circumstances at the time. The method of conducting any CP
will be similar, although there are some factors that differ between the two types of
CPs in terms of duration and equipment.
It will normally take at least a Platoon to operate a systematic Checkpoint.
Slide 9
These are normally set up as a result of intelligence received that certain activity will
happen at a certain point at a certain time. However, they can also be set up in
insecure areas to reassure the local population that the UN is in control of the area.
In case of spontaneous threat or sudden event triggering security threats, a mobile
checkpoint can be set up to respond to this threat. The decision may be taken at the
mission’s level in case of threats against UN premises or personnel or coordinated
when intervening in support of the local security forces. One example from the
instructor: CAR - checkpoint established in order to control the road between the IV
and VII district; attacks were organized by Anti-balaka living in the IV and looting
houses in the VII. The local security forces did not have the capacity to assign to this
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task.
As for the duration of the checkpoint, please refer to Slide 8.
When setting-up a checkpoint, utmost importance has to be given to the location
which must always ensure the security of personnel and the control of the whole
sector. As there will not be the same facilities and equipment available to set up the
checkpoint everywhere, the commander will need to place it in a location where a
person or vehicle cannot easily escape, preferably using narrow streets to funnel
pedestrians and vehicles. The natural flow of people and traffic will determine when
and where to set it up (intelligence based).
Most of the mobile CPs aim at controlling vehicles. In case of control of both
pedestrians and vehicles, separate areas of control, search and retention should be
foreseen and set up.
It will be tasked by Chain of Command and pre-planned during the order. The time
and location should be carefully considered. These will depend on the
circumstances, but there is little point in holding a checkpoint on a quiet road in the
countryside in the middle of the night unless there is specific intelligence that
indicates something will happen.
As for the initiative, in executive UN missions or while supporting local security
forces in non-executive UN missions, the Chief of patrol can decide to establish a
mobile checkpoint in order to prevent delinquency and crime and to detect possible
offences, including offences to traffic rules.
Duration of Checkpoint set up by initiative is usually no longer than 30 min to remain
efficient.
Slide 10
Pedestrian checkpoints are a good way to control movement, gather intelligence and
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deter criminal or terrorist behaviour. The principles applied to Pedestrian checkpoints
are similar to those for a VCP. Where the checkpoint is on a road and in conjunction
with a VCP it is important to separate pedestrians from vehicles to ensure the safety
of those crossing through. One of the best ways to do this is with barriers to regulate
flow. The level of insulations of the two inspection lines is contingent of the level of
threat, (is there a terrorist risk, with suicide bombers or not…)
Keep numbers of people in line to a minimum, where possible and it may be
necessary to establish more than one inspection line dependant on the amount of
pedestrian traffic, this may also relate to the time of day.
If possible have a sign or communicate to those approaching the type of
documentation that the police will need to see to enable the public cross through.
There will need to be partitioned or isolated areas for detailed personnel searches
and search teams will have to be nominated (male & female). The search is always
performed in a methodical way and with high vigilance.
Please refer to the lesson on body search techniques.
Nevertheless, police officers may face two types of situation:
- when performing the body search in order to “dissuade” any person to cross with
dangerous or illegal objects;
- when performing a “detailed” body search in a dedicated room (remove clothes,
check all of them…).
Special equipment such as, metal detectors or arches, flexi cuffs may be useful for
securing detained persons, and gloves (heavy duty, reinforced or rubber).
A reserve party can also be organised, in order to address either specific security
matters or a sudden increase of people wanting to cross the check point.
Slide 11
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Particularly in a hostile area, security of the checkpoint is critical. To this end, cut off
and security teams are positioned covertly. The unit must ensure all round security at
all times and conduct isolation and security patrols. In a non-executive mandated
mission, they must be conducted alongside the local police.
In order to ensure the security of UN personnel, vehicle checkpoints must be set up
respecting the defined zones as described in Slide 12.
Checkpoint should be set up so that approaching vehicles cannot see it until they
pass the cut off teams. Obstacles or parked vehicles should be set up to funnel and
slow down approaching vehicles. As already mentioned, vehicle inspection lines
must be separated from pedestrians.
A Section leader will be nominated to question the drivers of vehicles and they will
be accompanied by a Buddy Team to carry out the searching. This should be a male
& female team to deal with both sexes. Vehicle occupants should exit vehicle and
also be searched. The search teams should always be professional and be careful
not to escalate the situation, particularly when in a hostile area.
As mentioned for pedestrian CPs, specific equipment should be made available to
conduct vehicle CPs.
The criteria for vehicles to be searched will come from Commander/HQ and will
normally be dependent on intelligence received. A random, snap or short term
checkpoint is more likely to be selective with regard to the vehicles /personnel
stopped and this will normally be intelligence based. This, in turn, allows for greater
through put.
Failure of a vehicle to stop will trigger Use of Force. The level of force will be
proportionated to the level of threat.
The FPU must be trained and competent in carrying out short term or hasty CPs, the
conduct of rehearsals prior to setting up the checkpoint is essential.
As discussed earlier, these types of checkpoint require practice so that a routine is
established for searching; screening will be for specific threats and interference with
daily activity of the local population will be kept to a minimum.
Consequently, a smaller number of trained operators will be necessary.
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Slide 12
Natural or artificial obstacles should be used to funnel vehicles into one lane, signs
should be placed forward of the checkpoint to advise drivers. Once the vehicles
arrive in the funnelling zone there should be no way out.
The next zone contains barriers to force vehicles to decelerate, making slow hard
turns what implies that the obstacles must be capable of stopping a vehicle. The
following can be used for this purpose: Downed trees, Dragons Teeth, Debris, Large
rocks, Concertina Wire, Abatis, Tires & Road Cratering.
The vehicle that arrives at the Search Zone where vehicles can be directed out of the
main lane to a secure area where they can be checked searched and detained if
necessary. Once in the Search zone, there should be a blocking obstacle to deny
entry/exit, so that once the vehicle is in the Search Zone it cannot escape. Vehicles
should be isolated from others during the search and an over-watch position with a
crew served weapon should be set up to monitor all vehicles in the Search Zone.
The Search zone is further subdivided into three subordinate areas, a Personnel
search zone, a Vehicle search zone and a Reaction force zone. For all of these there
will be both police & civilians so the potential for cross fire and all round security are
key considerations.
There should be the ability to rapidly remove detainees and vehicles if necessary
and there must be proper coordination between the zones and a reporting procedure
to the Checkpoint commanding officer.
Finally there is a Safe Zone; this is for the officers deployed on the checkpoint duties,
and this is the assembly area for the VCP and an area where the staff can stand
down, eat or sleep in relative security.
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Slide 13
Slide 14
Slides 13 and 14 illustrate the principles highlighted in the earlier slides to show a
layout suitable for a checkpoint on one ways.
Instructors note: The pictures are not to scale and this should be pointed out,
particularly the ‘Safe Area’ which would normally be in a secure location away from
traffic lanes or other zones. However, it has been shown on the diagram as it is an
important feature of the Checkpoint.
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Slide 15
Slide 15 illustrates the principles highlighted in the earlier slides to show a layout
suitable for a checkpoint on two ways.
Instructors note: The pictures are not to scale and this should be pointed out,
particularly the ‘Safe Area’ which would normally be in a secure location away from
traffic lanes or other zones. However, it has been shown on the diagram as it is an
important feature of the Checkpoint.
Slide 16
The local police must be present in non-executive mandates as it is unlikely that UN
Police will have the mandate to stop or search vehicles without them unless it is for
accessing a UN building.
The principles of searching vehicles have been covered in an earlier lesson,
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however as a reminder:
Have driver shut off engine and release the hood (bonnet) and trunk (boot).
Tell driver to get out of the vehicle, the driver must be present during the
search of the vehicle. Have the driver keep his/her hands visible.
Remove other occupants of the vehicle; they should be taken and watched to
a holding area while search is conducted.
Use mirrors to look into difficult areas.
The Checkpoint officers should have a signal to alert the rest of the team that the
occupants of the vehicle will not notice if they become suspicious or find something
illegal so that the remainder of the officers is alert.
Ask for drivers ID and relevant documents, details of which should be recorded,
much intelligence can be gained from routine stops at checkpoints.
If a suspect is detained, do not let the passengers take the vehicle; it should be
impounded, by the local police if in a non-executive mandate. However, once the
vehicle is cleared, allow occupants to get back into the vehicle and proceed and
thank them for their cooperation.
Slide 17
The Checkpoint team must be rotated on a regular basis to prevent complacency.
The unit must also deploy for all contingencies therefore they must be able to defend
themselves from attack by terrorists and insurgents as well as having the capability
to defend the checkpoint from less violent protest such as an angry local mob. The
availability of riot control measures is as important as the deployment of heavy
weapons. The need for rehearsals has already been highlighted.
According to the nature of the mission, searching team will be made of mixed UNlocal
police personnel or UN personnel only, as this is the case for UN premises. All
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vehicles and pedestrians approaching the checkpoint must be checked. Presence of
local police representatives is essential in a non-executive mandate, in order to
provide a supportive legal framework to the operation.
Operating officers must be aware of the procedures to follow in case of unauthorised
vehicles approaching the CP.
Over watch is vital to the security of any systematic or permanent checkpoint. It must
be able to cover the entire Checkpoint since permanent checkpoints are an obvious
target for criminals and terrorists.
Signals must be established, as already covered in this lesson.
Slide 18
Slide 19
Fixed Positions with Crew Served or APC
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Single point of entry and exit for pedestrian
Rolling or movable dragoon teeth or spike belt
FPU Direct drivers and pedestrians to approach inspection point while vehicle
remains fixed
Vehicle stopped, occupants exit and all doors, hood, trunk remain open
FPU member with driver returns to examine vehicle and then authorizes it to
continue through checkpoint
At no point do UN FPU personnel remain in between the fixed positions and
the vehicle inspection zone unless required to do so. Extremely vulnerable to
attacks
Slide 20
Slide 19 gives a list of the potential attachments that should be considered by the
commander.
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Slide 21
There are a number of incidents checkpoints are at risk from. The following
Immediate Action drills (IAs) are suggested.
Slide 22
For example, a hostage or innocent party has been told to deliver a bomb, normally
in a vehicle, although it could be strapped to the individual or in a holdall or suitcase
in his/her possession.
Firstly direct them to a safe area if possible or isolate the threat, ensuring that if the
bomb is detonated there will be the least possible danger to other members of the
Checkpoint and members of the population crossing through.
Sharing information is a top priority to all people on the CP and report up the chain of
command to Headquarters. It will alert it in order to start the process of obtaining
explosives experts, bomb disposal teams etc. It is also possible that such attempt
would be part of a larger scheme which may require Mission’s leadership to increase
the overall level of alert.
If a suspect does not comply with the orders, use of force can be applied. If the
officer believes that they and others in the checkpoint are under mortal threat then
deadly force can be used. However, the officer using it will have to justify his action
at subsequent enquiries or trials.
Freeze the situation, once the suspect person/vehicle/package is secured, do
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nothing, do not open any compartments to release the driver, don’t allow him/her to
touch anything and keep his/her hands visible.
Watch around if any other suspect situation is developing, the proxy may be a
diversionary tactic, or it may be set off by a third party who will need to be able to
see what is happening (example of camp entrance in Kidal: checkpoint guarded by
the military component and attacked by an VBIED).
Once everything is isolated, wait for the explosive experts.
Do not use any electric/electronic devices close to the person/vehicle (no cell phone,
radio etc.) as most of these devices are set off by radio control or mobile signal,
which can be confused with the officer’s radio or mobile phone.
It is also possible to activate radio jammers on the checkpoint, in order to avoid the
bomb to be detonated from “outside” through radio signal (cell phone…).
Slide 23
Fixed checkpoints become targets for rebel units, terrorists and insurgents. When
they have the capability, they may use light or heavy artillery to shell them from a
distance. There is little the FPU can do in this instance other than reduce the risk as
much as possible.
Initially, all personnel should seek cover wherever possible. The highest risk is from
shrapnel, sandbagged emplacements are safest. Stay in position until directed
otherwise.
Raise alarm, report up the chain of command and if possible note the direction from
which the shelling is coming. If it is close enough and the FPU has the resources
then deploy a unit to counter attack, however this must be coordinated with the HQ
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and the Commander will also need to consider if the shelling is just the start of a
major attack on the checkpoint in which case they will need to keep all their officers
with them.
Any wounded must be given first aid and evacuated as soon as it is safe to do so.
Slide 24
IEDs may be found on persons being searched or, if the checkpoint is occasional,
they may be left in the form of booby traps for the next occasion that the unit move
into the CP.
Firstly raise the alarm, freeze the situation and isolate the potential threat. Inform the
chain of command and notify headquarters.
Confirm the device as safely as possible, note a description including size and
colours, letters, figures… as this will be useful information for the bomb disposal unit.
Ensure that it is in a secure location where it will do as little damage as possible if it
is initiated.
Cordon off the area to a safe distance; this will depend of the size of the IED and all
personnel should be moved to safer areas.
Await the arrival of bomb disposal units.
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Slide 25
As with shelling, the first important safety concern is to seek cover. If the location of
the sniper can be ascertained then the correct cover can be sought.
Raise alarm, within the unit, on the radio and up the chain of command
Locate the sniper using the checkpoints observation posts.
Deploy personnel in a counter sniper role, make use of smoke to screen movement,
if it is safe to do so, send out a unit to arrest or neutralise the sniper.
Any wounded person must be given first aid and evacuated as soon as it is safe to
do so.
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Slide 26
The officers should be given a summary of the key points of the lesson before being
asked if they have any questions.
Slide 27
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Lesson 2: Checkpoints (practical element)
There are four hours of practice recommended for this subjects which should be
carried out at the discretion of the instructor. The practice should be in a realistic
situation for an urban environment a public order village or ‘ghost town’ would be
useful, alternately an area where the unit can create a full checkpoint, although this
will take time and resources.
A number of officers/instructors will be required to act as role players so that the unit
can practice various drills and Immediate Actions.
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Annex 59
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, art. 205(1)
This excerpt has been translated from its original language
into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to
Rules of the Court, Article 51. A copy of the whole document
has been deposited with the Registry.
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THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
Adopted by the State Duma on 24 May, 1996
Approved by the Council of Federation on 5 June 1996
Article 205. Terrorist act
(Title as amended by Federal Law No. 153-FZ of July 27, 2006)
1. The commission of an explosion, arson or other acts that frighten the population and
create a risk of loss of human life, causing significant property damage or occurrence of other
serious consequences, for the purpose of destabilizing activities of the authorities or international
organizations or influencing their decision-making, as well as the threat of taking these actions
for the purpose of influencing decision-making by the authorities or international organizations -
(As amended by Federal Laws No. 130-FZ of May 5, 2014; No. 501-FZ of December 31, 2017)
is punishable by imprisonment for a term of ten to fifteen years. (As amended by Federal Laws
No. 377-FZ of December 27, 2009; No. 352-FZ of December 9, 2010; No. 375-FZ of July 6,
2016)
(Part as amended by Federal Law No. 153-FZ of July 27, 2006)
Moscow, Kremlin
13 June 1996
No. 63-FZ
Source: http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody&nd=102041891
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Annex 60
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Rules of Firing and Fire Control of
Artillery (PSiUO-2011) (2011)
This excerpt has been translated from its original language
into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to
Rules of the Court, Article 51. A copy of the whole document
has been deposited with the Registry.
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MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
For official
use
Ex. No.___
PROJECT
APPROVE
commander in chief
ground forces
colonel general
A. Postnikov
"___" January 2011
RULES OF FIRING
AND FIRE CONTROL OF ARTILLERY
(PSiUO-2011)
PART 1
DIVISION, BATTERY, PLOT, GUNS
Commissioned by order of the commander-in-chief
Ground Forces _________________________
MOSCOW
2011
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The Rules for Firing and Fire Control of Artillery set out the methods of preparation and
performance of various fire missions by artillery subunits* of the Armed Forces, as well as the basic
provisions for fire control of these subunits.
With the release of these rules, the Rules for Firing and Controlling Artillery Fire become
invalid. Division, battery, platoon, gun, part 1, ed. 2001
A subunit is understood as a division (including a separate brigade division) battery, platoon, gun crew.
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SECTION ONE
MAIN PROVISIONS. FIRE PREPARATION AND FIRE CONTROL
Chapter I
MAIN PROVISIONS
1. The defeat of the enemy by artillery fire is the main content of its combat operations.
Artillery fire must be effective.
Efficiency artillery fire is achieved by timeliness, accuracy, suddenness of fire, the use of
high-precision ammunition, the correct choice of means of destruction, the appointment of an expedient
order of firing to kill and the method of shelling the target.
Timeliness of fire is achieved:
- constant readiness of artillery units to perform fire missions;
- maintaining continuous interaction with combined arms units (units);
- continuous reconnaissance of the enemy and observation of the actions of their troops;
- timely planning of fire and maneuver of artillery units and timely setting (clarification) of
tasks for them;
- advance determination of installations for firing at the largest possible number of local objects
in a possible target area;
- operational, sustainable and covert fire control.
The accuracy of the fire is achieved:
- careful implementation in full of measures for the preparation of firing and fire control;
- using the most accurate methods for determining shooting settings;
- adjusting fire during shooting to kill.
The suddenness of fire is achieved:
- covert deployment of artillery units in battle formation and maneuver during the battle;
- stealth preparation of fire;
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- opening fire to kill without zeroing or on time, to ensure the simultaneous detonation of
shells of all guns at the target;
- choosing the most expedient time for opening fire;
- compliance with the rules of covert command and control of troops.
The suddenness of fire is of particular importance in the defeat of manpower and highly maneuverable
targets.
2. In the course of combat operations, artillery subunits perform fire missions to destroy various
targets, remote mining, lighting support for combat operations of combined arms subunits and
firing artillery at night, smoke the enemy, spread propaganda material, and create hotbeds of mass
fires.
Targets of shooting to kill can be: destruction, destruction, suppression, and exhaustion.
The destruction of the target consists in inflicting such losses (damage) on it, in which it
completely loses its combat capability.
The destruction of the target is to bring it into a state unsuitable for further use.
Suppression of a target consists in inflicting losses (damage) on it or in creating conditions
by fire under which it is temporarily deprived of its combat capability, its maneuver is limited, or
control is disturbed.
Exhaustion consists in the moral and psychological impact on the enemy's manpower by
conducting harassing fire with a limited number of guns and ammunition for a set time.
With remote mining , the task of firing may be to restrict freedom of maneuver, disrupt the
organized advancement and deployment of enemy military units (subunits), inflict damage on the
enemy by laying covering and fettering minefields.
In the case of lighting support for combat operations of combined arms units and artillery
firing at night, the objectives of firing may be to illuminate the area, dazzle observation posts (electronic-
optical means) and enemy fire weapons, and set up light landmarks (targets).
When the enemy is filled with smoke , the tasks of firing may be to set up smoke screens,
smoke the enemy's fire weapons, his command and observation posts.
When shooting with propaganda projectiles , the task of shooting is to deliver and distribute
propaganda material at the enemy's location.
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When creating centers of mass fires , the task of firing may be the destruction of manpower,
fire weapons, military equipment, warehouses, as well as the prohibition of maneuver of enemy
troops.
When performing fire missions, artillery subunits fire from closed or open firing positions.
3. When performing fire missions, artillery subunits independently use the following types of
fire :
- division - concentrated fire (SO), single mobile barrage (PZO) and single fixed barrage
(NZO);
- battery - single NZO, concentrated fire;
- platoon or gun (mortar, rocket artillery combat vehicle) 1- fire on a separate target.
In addition, the division can participate in concentrated and barrage fire of an artillery unit, in
massive fire (MOg) of the artillery of an association (operational command), a fire barrage (OgV)
and sequential concentration of fire (PSO).
4. The number of batteries (platoons, guns) involved in the performance of a fire mission
depends on the nature, importance and size of the target, the range of fire, the mode of fire, the firing
task, the required consumption of shells, as well as on the time available and other conditions for the
performance of the fire mission.
To increase efficiency and reduce the time of firing to kill, it is advisable to involve the maximum
possible number of batteries (platoons, guns) in the given conditions.
5. The projectile 2, fuse and its installation are selected based on the nature of the target and
the task of firing.
Fire missions are performed by shells of the main purpose: fragmentation, high-explosive
fragmentation and high-explosive projectiles (mines) with impact (with installation for fragmentation,
high-explosive or delayed action), remote or radio fuses, projectiles with lethal arrow-shaped
elements (projectiles with a remote tube), guided projectiles, cluster and corrected projectiles (mines
), incendiary shells (mines), armor-piercing, cumulative, sub-caliber and concrete-piercing shells, as
well as special purpose: shells with anti- tank mines , lighting, smoke and propaganda shells (mines).
1What has been said about the gun, if there is no special reservation, also applies to the mortar, the rocket artillery combat
vehicle.
2What has been said about the projectile, if there is no special reservation, also applies to the mine.
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6 . The type of firing and charge are selected taking into account the firing range, the type
of projectile, the type and installation of the fuse, the nature of the target and its position on the ground
in such a way that the greatest damaging effect of the projectile on the target is ensured, and there is
a range margin necessary to complete the adjustment or use the adjusted amendments. When shooting
in the mountains, in addition, take into account the possibility of shooting through the ridge of the
shelter.
When firing from guns, flat (at elevation angles up to 20º), mounted (at elevation angles from
20 to 45º) and mortar trajectory (at elevation angles greater than 45º) are used.
To obtain ricochets, a flat trajectory and a charge are always assigned to ensure their receipt.
In case of flat and mounted firing, the largest or close to it charge is assigned when hitting
openly located armored targets (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, selfpropelled
guns, etc.), as well as when firing shells with a remote fuse (tube) and radio fuse. In other
cases, the smallest charge is assigned.
When firing mortars from guns and firing from mortars, the charge is selected according to
the instructions in the Firing Tables.
The ballistic version of the rocket and guided projectile is chosen, guided by the instructions
of the Firing Tables.
7. Installation of sighting devices and a fuse (tube) on which they open fire are called shooting
rigs.
Methods for determining shooting settings :
- full preparation;
- use of adjusted amendments;
- reduced training;
- eye preparation;
- visual transfer of fire.
Installations on which shooting to kill are carried out are called installations for shooting to
kill.
Ways to determine settings for shooting to kill :
- full preparation;
- target shooting;
- use of adjusted amendments;
- reduced preparation.
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7
Full training is the main way to determine the settings for shooting to kill in preparation for
combat operations. It ensures the speed and surprise of opening fire to kill. Its use is independent of
weather and visibility conditions.
Zeroing in on a target is the most accurate way to determine target shooting settings. Zeroing
in is used in conditions of low enemy fire resistance, when hitting targets unable to change location
in a short time, and also if the suddenness of the opening of fire is not of decisive importance.
Zeroed corrections are used in determining the settings for shooting to kill in cases where
there is a previously zeroed target (benchmark), and zeroing for some reason is impossible or impractical,
and also for zeroing the target.
Reduced training is used when opening fire on a target for its subsequent zeroing in, creating
(zeroing in) a benchmark, and in some cases for shooting at group targets by a division.
Visual preparation is used to open fire, followed by zeroing in on a target if it is impossible
to use a more accurate method.
Visual transfer of fire is used when determining settings for opening fire in the shortest possible
time for zeroing in on a target, creating (zeroing in) a benchmark.
In all combat conditions, the division (battery) commander must be prepared to determine the
installations for firing to kill in a way that ensures the greatest effectiveness of fire.
The commander of an artillery subunit is obliged to clarify the settings for firing to kill as
more accurate information is obtained about the position of the firing position, command and observation
post, target and conditions of firing, as well as in the course of firing to kill.
eight. When determining the order of shooting to kill , the following is established:
- total time of impact on the target;
- the number of fire raids and fire observations, their duration and time distribution;
- distribution of shells between fire raids and fire observations;
- the order of firing: fire with single shots, methodical fire (a series of methodical fire), rapid
fire (a series of rapid fire), fire in volleys.
Fire raid - fire for a limited time, characterized by a sudden opening and great density. It can
be either rapid fire (when the duration of the fire raid is not set), or start with a series of rapid fire and
continue with methodical fire (when the duration of the fire raid is set).
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8
In all cases, fire raids begin with volleys of batteries. When performing a fire mission by a
battalion, if the situation allows, the salvo time of each battery is determined taking into account the
flight time of the shells, based on their simultaneous detonation at the target.
Targets are hit by one or more fire raids.
One fire raid is assigned when firing to destroy or suppress highly maneuverable, openly located
targets, as well as to perform other tasks determined by the conditions of the situation. During
the battle, targets are usually hit with one fire raid. When firing at the destruction or suppression of
highly maneuverable and openly located targets, as well as at targets that must be hit in the shortest
possible time, a fire raid is carried out with rapid fire.
If after a fire raid on an artillery (rocket, mortar, anti-aircraft) battery (platoon) or a separate
target (launcher, gun, etc.) it is established that the target continues its fire activity, then the fire raid
is repeated with the same consumption of shells , making corrections if necessary.
Several fire raids on one target are assigned, as a rule, when firing to suppress covered targets,
the maneuver of which is impossible or limited. Fire raids in this case can be of a fixed duration or
be carried out by rapid fire. The number of fire raids is set depending on the conditions of the situation
so that they are distributed over the time during which the target must be in a suppressed state. The
duration of fire raids is set depending on the task of firing and the prevailing situation.
Fire observation - fire in the intervals between fire raids with the task of preventing the resumption
of the target's activity. It is conducted by methodical fire, series of rapid (methodical) fire,
or a combination of them.
Fire observation is carried out when the interval between fire raids on a target exceeds 15
minutes. As a rule, one battery is involved in conducting fire observation, which fires at the center of
the target on one goniometer installation with a fan assigned for a fire raid.
A series of quick (methodical) fire - a limited number of shots (2...4 per gun) fired by quick
(methodical) fire without changing the settings for shooting to kill.
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9
A series of rapid fire begins with a salvo of all guns involved in firing, and continues at the
maximum rate (taking into account the mode of fire) until the specified amount of ammunition is used
up.
A series of methodical fire also begins with a volley of all guns and continues in turn with gun
shots from each battery at a set interval (tempo).
9. When performing fire missions, the division uses the following methods of target shelling
:
- batteries overlaid;
- batteries scale;
- with the distribution of target sections from the composition of the group (line) or individual
targets between the batteries.
When performing a fire mission by a division with overlay batteries, cannon artillery batteries
fire at an observed target with a fan along the width of the target, at one sight setting, determined at
batteries fire at three sight settings, one or two goniometer settings. Batteries of rocket artillery fire
at the center of the target on one sight setting and one protractor setting.
When performing a fire mission by a division with batteries on a scale , each battery fires at
one sight setting at its aiming point and one goniometer setting with a fan along the width of the
target.
When performing a fire mission by a division with the distribution of target areas (line) or
individual targets from the group between batteries, the batteries fire as if performing a fire mission
independently.
When performing a fire mission on its own, a cannon artillery battery fires at one or three
sight installations and one or two goniometer installations. A rocket artillery battery (platoon, combat
vehicle) fires on one goniometer installation. In this case, the battery fires at one or two (when firing
by platoons with a scale) sight settings, and the platoon - at one or more (according to the number of
combat vehicles in the platoon when firing by combat vehicles with a scale) sight settings.
When assigning a method of firing a target with a battery , determine:
- number of sight settings;
- the magnitude of the jump of the sight (scale) and the scale of the fuse (tube);
- number of goniometer settings;
- fan interval;
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10
- consumption of shells per gun-installation (BM MLRS) .
10. To ensure the safety of his troops, when firing at targets located near them, the division
(battery) commander must:
- apply the most accurate ways to determine the settings for shooting;
- appoint shells and charges that provide the least dispersion;
- avoid switching from one charge to another and firing different batches of charges;
- start zeroing in with a smoke projectile, if any;
- start zeroing in with the expectation of getting the deviation of the first explosion from the
target in the direction opposite to own troops;
- conduct continuous monitoring of firing and advanced units of own troops, especially when
maintaining a barrage of fire and consistently concentrating fire;
- to immediately cease or transfer fire upon receipt of an appropriate signal or when troops
leave for a safe distance.
11. When opening fire , the safe distance ( L ) of friendly troops from the target (near
border of the group target) depends on the errors in determining the settings for firing, dispersion of
projectiles, and the radius of dispersion of fragments. When firing high-explosive fragmentation projectiles
with an impact fuse L , it is determined by the formula:
2 2
L 5 max .
Values for safe distances for average conditions when determining settings for firing by the
full training method are given in the Manual for the study of NSR.
The values of the median errors in determining the settings for firing in range E and the
maximum radius of scattering of lethal fragments max r are given in the Handbook for the Study of the
Rules of Fire, and the median deviations in the dispersion of projectiles in range B are in the Firing
Tables.
When conducting accompanying fire, the safe removal of attacking subunits from bursts of
12. Solid knowledge and skillful application of the methods and techniques set forth in these
Rules ensure the effective performance of fire missions. The justified use of other methods and techniques
that ensure the effective fulfillment of fire missions in specific conditions of a combat situation
is not ruled out.
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142
the goniometer are determined by the intermediate sight.
The sight correction (taking into account the sign) is added to the intermediate sight and the
calculated sight setting is obtained. The directional correction is added to the intermediate turn and
the calculated turn is obtained.
According to the calculated sight setting in the Firing Tables, a tabular setting of the fuse
(tube) is found, to which is added (taking into account the sign) an amendment to the installation of
the tube taken from the graph of calculated corrections, and the calculated setting of the fuse (tube)
is obtained.
Chapter XVII
SHOOTING TO HIT
HEATING FIXED NON-OBSERVED AND OBSERVED GROUND TARGETS
405. Fixed unobserved and observed targets are hit by rocket artillery, as a rule, with one
volley. The number of batteries (platoons, BM) involved in the performance of the fire mission is
assigned depending on the nature and size of the target, its importance, the task and conditions of
firing, the type of projectile and the required ammunition consumption (Appendix 12, tables 16 and 17).
As a rule, no less than a battery is used to destroy stationary unobserved and observed targets.
406. Batteries (platoons) of self-propelled armored guns (mortars) strike with medium-range
and long-range medium-caliber rocket artillery fire, involving at least a division in firing.
To destroy batteries (platoons) of self-propelled unarmoured and towed guns, as well as rocket
launchers, at least a division is involved.
Shooting is carried out with projectiles with a radio fuse or an impact fuse with a fragmentation
action, and to destroy towed batteries and fragmentation cluster projectiles.
407. Manpower, fire weapons and unarmored targets located openly are hit by fragmentation
cluster projectiles, projectiles with a radio fuse or impact fuse when set to fragmentation action.
To destroy infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers located openly, as well as
infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, fire weapons, unarmored targets and manpower
located in trenches without overlapping, shells with a radio fuse and an impact fuse are used
when installed on a fragmentation action.
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143
Manpower and firepower located in trenches with ceilings, in dugouts and solid buildings are
hit by high-explosive fragmentation (high-explosive) shells with the fuse set to high-explosive action.
Tanks and armored personnel carriers located in waiting (source) areas that are not equipped
with trenches with ceilings are struck by shells with a percussion fuse when set to fragmentation
action.
408. The dimensions of a group target assigned to destroy the division and battery with fire
should not exceed the dimensions indicated in table 5.
Table 5
Maximum group target sizes
rocket artillery
Projectile
type
Target Dimensions
for battery for the division
front depth front depth
Medium caliber (BM-14)
high-explosive
fragmentation
300 300 400 400
Large caliber (BM-24) 500 200 600 500
Medium caliber medium
range ("Grad" -1)
700 400 900 900
Medium-caliber long-range
(BM-21)
500 400 800 700
Large-caliber long-range
("Hurricane")
high-explosive
fragmentation
700 500 1000 1000
Fragmentation
cassette
800 600 1200 1200
409. The minimum dimensions of a group and individual target along the front and depth,
when assigning the expenditure of shells and the method of shelling it, are taken equal to:
- 300 m - for medium-caliber rocket artillery;
- 200 m - for large-caliber rocket artillery;
- 400 m - for medium-range and long-range rocket artillery of medium caliber;
- 500 m - for long-range large-caliber rocket artillery when firing high-explosive fragmenta-
410. When firing at a target whose frontal and depth dimensions do not exceed the minimum,
the battalion fires overlay batteries on one sight setting with a concentrated fan. A battery that performs
a fire mission on such a target on its own also fires on one sight setting with a concentrated
fan.
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217
Appendix 12
Projectile consumption rates
Table 15
(to Art. 316)
Names of targets hit by artillery fire, and their nature, transmitted in
commands to open fire
No.
p/p
Target name
The nature of the target transmitted in commands
to open fire
one Launcher UR or NUR, located openly Launcher
2 Battery (platoon) of self-propelled armored guns
Armored battery
armored platoon
3 Battery (platoon) of self-propelled unarmored guns
Self-propelled battery
Platoon self-propelled
4 Battery (platoon) of sheltered towed guns
Battery covered
Covered artillery platoon
5 Battery (platoon) of openly located towed guns
Artillery battery
Artillery Platoon
6 Battery (platoon) of sheltered rocket launchers
Battery reactive sheltered
Reactive sheltered platoon
7 Battery (platoon) of openly located rocket launchers
Reactive battery
jet platoon
eigh
t
Battery (platoon) of sheltered towed (portable) mortars
Covered mortar battery
Covered mortar platoon
9
Battery (platoon, section) of openly located towed (portable) mortars
mortar battery
mortar platoon
10 Platoon (section) of self-propelled armored mortars armored mortar platoon
elev
en
Platoon of self-propelled missiles with a single guidance system SAM platoon
12 Battery of towed missile launchers with a single guidance system SAM battery
thirteen
Installation of missiles (ZSU) with an autonomous guidance system Installation of missiles
14
Radar station for field artillery, air defense (ABM) or aviation; radio
engineering station; car radio station
Radar station
15 Ground reconnaissance radar Ground reconnaissance radar
sixteen
Group of radar stations or radio stations on vehicles Group of radar stations
17
Sheltered manpower and firepower in positions, in the area of concentration,
waiting or starting area, located in trenches without overlap
Infantry covered
eigh
teen
Sheltered manpower and firepower in positions, in the area of concentration,
waiting or starting area, located in trenches with ceilings
strong point
nine
teen
Openly located manpower and firepower Infantry
twe
nty
Command post or control post located in dugouts or covered
trenches (trenches) Command post hidden
21
Command post or control post located openly (in uncovered cars,
buses) Command post
22
Tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers in the
concentration area, waiting area or starting area
Tanks (Armored personnel carriers)
Table 15 continued
No.
p/n
Target name
The nature of the target transmitted in commands
to open fire
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218
23 Helicopter on landing site Helicopter
24 Helicopter unit on the landing site Helicopter group
25
Unarmored ATGM installation
Anti-tank gun or other single unarmored target
ATGM installation
Anti-tank gun (or the name of another single unarmored
target)
26 Armored ATGM mount or other single armored target
Armored ATGM installation
Tank (or name of other single armored target)
27
A column of towed artillery, vehicles or lightly armored vehicles,
as well as a foot column
Column (Column on foot)
A column of tanks, self-propelled armored guns, mortars or other
armored vehicles
Armored column
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219
Table 16
(to Art. 188, 220, 302, 405)
Consumption rates of projectiles for hitting stationary unobserved targets
Caliber, mm
Battery (platoon)
of sheltered
towed guns
(mortars )
RLS, a group of
RLS or radio stations
on vehicles,
batteries (platoons)
of selfpropelled
missiles
with a single
guidance system,
located in the
open
Manpower and
firepower, covered
command
posts; tanks and,
infantry fighting
vehicles, armored
personnel
carriers in the
area of concentration
Living force located
in the
open
Command posts
on vehicles located
in the open
Separate unarmored
target
(anti-tank rocket
installation, antitank
gun, etc.) located
in the open
Suppression Destruction
on target on target on 1 hectare on 1 hectare on 1 hectare on target
Rifled guns
76 540 450 450 90 150 900
85 480 400 400 85 120 800
100 360 300 300 55 80 350
120 200 160 150 35 50 300
122 240 200 180 40 50 300
130 220 180 160 40 50 300
152 180 (60) 150 (50) 120 (–) 25 (8) 40 (15) 300 (100)
203 180 (60) 100 (30) 40(-) 20 (7) 30 (10) -
Mortars
82 - - 700 95 100 500
120 300 180 200 25 60 350
160 300 80 100 20 20 200
240 150 40 50 15 20 -
Rocket artillery
BM-14 450 300 300 60 60 -
BM-24 300 one hundred 90 25 25 -
Grad-1. 400 150 120 25 25 -
BM-21 500 240 160 35 40 -
Hurricane 180 (40) 120 (80) 15 (-) 7(1) 10(3) -
Notes
1. The table shows the consumption of high-explosive fragmentation shells, in parentheses - the consumption of
fragmentation cluster shells, a dash means that shooting to kill is impractical.
Projectile consumption rates are given for the following conditions:
- firing range up to 10 km inclusive, settings for firing to kill are determined by the method of full training or
using data from the zeroing in gun, and for rocket artillery - by the method of full or reduced training;
- when shooting at a distance of more 10 km the shell consumption is increased by 1/10 for each subsequent
kilometer of range over 10 km (except for rocket artillery). For cannon artillery and mortars, the norms are given for
shells (mines) with a three-digit digital index, when firing shells (mines) with a two-digit digital index, batteries (platoons)
of sheltered towed guns and armored targets are hit with the indicated consumption, when other targets are hit, the consumption
of shells ( mines) is reduced by 1.5 times.
2. When determining the settings for shooting to kill the zeroed in target, using the zeroed in corrections of own
battery, or in cases where fire is corrected, shooting to kill, the consumption of shells is reduced by 1/4 (except for rocket
artillery) .
When determining the settings for firing to kill by the method of reduced training, the consumption of shells is
increased by 1.5 times (except for rocket artillery).
3. If an unarmored target is hidden, the projectile consumption is increased by 3 times.
If the battery (platoon) of towed guns (mortars) is located in the open, the consumption of shells is reduced by 3
times.
4. When destroying targets for which the norms for suppression firing are given, the consumption of shells is
increased by 3 times; when suppressing targets for which the norms for shooting to destroy are given, the consumption
of shells is reduced by 3 times.
5. When firing at an armored radio location station or a separate armored target, the command post on an armored
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220
personnel carrier, the consumption of projectiles set for the corresponding targets is increased by 3 times.
6. When firing with 120-mm active-rocket mines and 152-mm active-rocket shells, the consumption of mines
(shells) is increased by 1.4 times.
Table 17
(to Art. 188, 302, 405)
Consumption rates of projectiles for hitting columns and highly maneuverable targets
Caliber, mm
(MLRS system)
columns
Batteries (platoons) Launchers, batteries (platoons)
and individual
rocket launchers, missile
launchers (ZSU) with an
autonomous guidance system,
helicopters (helicopter)
on landing sites located
openly
Self-propelled
armored guns
(mortars)
Self-propelled
unarmored guns
Delay or play
movable
suppression Destruction Destruction
Rifled guns
76 twenty - - -
85 sixteen - - -
one hundred 10 sixteen sixteen eighteen
120 6 12 12 9
122 eight sixteen sixteen 10
130 eight 10 10 10
152 6 (6) 10 10 8 (8)
rocket artillery
BM-14 One salvo - - -
BM-24 One salvo - - 12
Grad-1 One salvo One salvo One salvo twenty
BM-21 One salvo One salvo One salvo thirty
"Hurricane" One salvo - 16 (10) 16 (16)
Notes:
1 The table shows the consumption of high-explosive fragmentation shells, in parentheses - fragmentation cluster
shells. A dash means that shooting is inappropriate.
2 Norms, consumption of shells are given in pieces per gun (shares of a volley per combat vehicle), regardless
of the firing range.
3 For firing at armored columns, at least a reactive battalion is involved, at unarmored columns - at least a
battery. For firing at highly maneuverable targets, no less than a reactive battery is involved.
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264
RULES FOR FIRING AND ARTILLERY FIRE CONTROL
Part 1
Division, battery, platoon, gun
Prepared by a team of authors led by
Major General V.V. Dyatlova
Responsible executors A.V. Karpovich, A.G. Musin
- 159 -
- 160 -
Annex 61
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Manual for the Study of the Rules of
Firing and Fire Control of Artillery (PSiUO-2011) (2014)
This excerpt has been translated from its original language
into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to
Rules of the Court, Article 51. A copy of the whole document
has been deposited with the Registry.
- 161 -
- 162 -
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
MANUAL
FOR THE STUDY OF THE RULES OF FIRING
AND FIRE CONTROL OF ARTILLERY
(PSiUO-2011)
PART 1
Commissioned by the Chief of Missile Forces and Artillery of the
Ground Forces in 2011
2014
MOSCOW
DIVISION, BATTERY, PLOT, GUNS
DEPARTMENT OF ROCKET TROOPS AND ARTILLERY OF GROUND FORCES
Ex. No.
For official
___
use
- 163 -
Content
2
118
SECTION ONE. MAIN PROVISIONS. PREPARATION
Ballistic training …………………………………….…….….…. 49
Full preparation …………………………….…………………………..… 87
Helicopter shooting ………………………………………..…
Eye preparation ……………………………………………..……… 98
64
Chapter I. Basic Provisions………………………………………………………. 6
125
apparatus ………………………………………………………………………….
ricochets ………………………………………………………………….…
108
Reconnaissance and determination of target coordinates …………………………….……
Organization of fire control ……………………………………….…… SECTION TWO.
DEFINITION OF SHOOTING SETTINGS…….. 87
44
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………… 5
126
134
Chapter III. Determination of installations for shooting in full
Zeroing with the help of coupled observation ………………….……
Technical training ………………………………………....…….……
SHOOTING AND FIRE CONTROL …………………………………… 6
Abbreviated training …………………….……….……………………… 97
Topogeodetic preparation ……………………………………..……… 37
Sighting with a stopwatch …………………………………….……
Zeroing with the help of the RNDC radar ……………....
131
fire……………………………………………………………………….…… 87
Zeroing on the observation of signs of breaks ……………………….……
Organization of determination of installations for shooting ……………….…...… 67
Chapter IV. Target zeroing………………………………………………………….. 98
Chapter II. Preparation of shooting and fire control…………………………...…. thirty
Zeroing with the help of a sound reconnaissance unit ……………....
Peculiarities of aiming targets during mortar firing and shooting at
Zeroing with a remotely piloted aircraft
Zeroing with the help of the ROP radar station ……………….. 129
thirty
84
Shooting with a rangefinder …………………………………..………
134
113
Meteorological preparation …………………………….………………
(abbreviated, visual) preparation and visual transfer
Page
131
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DIVISIONS………………………………………………………… 29
cluster shells (mines) …………………………………………....
Determination of shooting settings using POR data ... ..
SECTION THREE. SHOOTING TO HIT ……………………………….. 169
254
Chapter VII. Defeat motionless observed targets……………………..… 195
Chapter V. Determination of settings for shooting using
“POR Bulletin” ……………………………………………………………….
Chapter XIII. Setting fire missions and monitoring their implementation………………. 237
Chapter XVI. Preparation of firing and fire control, determination of installations
3
The defeat of the columns …………………………………………………….…….
Creation (zeroing) of a benchmark ..………………..………………………………
144
radio fuse, remote fuse or tube and
corrections in the battery ………………………………………………………………
HEADING…………………………………………………………….…... 241
153
Definition of adjusted amendments …………………………………….… 149
Determination of shooting settings using data
Peculiarities of sighting by batteries equipped with ASUNO …………….
Chapter VI. Defeat stationary unobserved ground targets…………... 169
Chapter IX. Accompanying light………………………………………………… 218
Page
Chapter XI. General provisions………………………………………………………… 229
Chapter XV. Fire control when performing fire missions by direct firing
166
SECTION FOUR. ARTILLERY FIRE CONTROL
135
Chapter VIII. Defeat moving ground targets……………………………….. 212
adjusted amendments…………………………………..………………..
SECTION FIVE. SHOOTING AND FIRE CONTROL DIRECT
SECTION SIX. SHOOTING AND FIRE CONTROL JET
for shooting……………………………………………………………..….. 258
ARTILLERIES………………………………………………………………… 258
Chapter XIV. Defeat stationary and moving targets……………………… 241
144
144
212
Chapter X. Shooting with smoke and propaganda shells………………….…... 222
Determination of settings for shooting using sighted
163
Peculiarities of zeroing targets when firing projectiles with
aiming………………………………………………………………..……..
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CONDITIONS…………………………………………………………………….. 276
HIGH -PRECISION AMMUNITION……………………………... 317
309
Annex 1. Values of conversion factors in determining
4
SECTION SEVEN. SHOOTING AND FIRE CONTROL IN SPECIAL
FIRE WHEN PERFORMING FIRE MISSIONS
Annex 2. Mode of fire of guns (mortars, BM)…………………….. 327
Chapter XXIV. Shooting to kill……………………………………………….. 321
Annex 3. The procedure for determining the norms of the regime of fire according to the tables .... 336
conditions of limited visibility………………………….…………..… 276
Chapter XIX. Features of shooting and fire control at night and in other
Chapter XXIII. General Provisions………………………………………….……….… 317
Chapter XXI. Shooting and fire control in the defense of the sea coast ... ..
324
Chapter XX. Shooting and fire control in the mountains…………………..…………….. 285
Applications:
SECTION EIGHT. FEATURES OF SHOOTING AND CONTROLS
Chapter XXII. Shooting and fire control during combat in a populated area………... 314
Chapter XVIII. Fire control……………………………………….…………….. 274
V0sum for unshot numbers of charges……………………………….. 325
Chapter XVII. Shooting to kill………………………………..…..…………... 265
Page
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Introduction
fire at night and in other conditions of limited visibility, shooting and fire control
modern artillerymen the basis for knowing their profession, understanding the real
artillery fire.
various conditions. The duties of fire control division officials have been clarified,
5
aiming, shooting and fire control of rocket artillery, shooting and control
state of affairs and forecasting directions for further development of the art of management
ammunition, as well as on fire control of artillery units in
clarified the rationale for a number of basic provisions on shooting and direct fire control
The study of the issues of shooting and fire control of artillery is for
shooting and fire control when performing fire missions with high-precision
in the mountains, shooting and fire control in the defense of the sea coast, features
In the manual for the study of the Rules of firing and fire control,
on setting fire missions and monitoring their implementation.
- 167 -
CHAPTER I. MAIN PROVISIONS
Artillery fire is the more effective, the more losses inflicted on the enemy, the more
Artillery firing is a set of actions of artillery commanders,
6
for remote mining, lighting support for hostilities
constitutes the destruction of the enemy by fire.
FIRE
SECTION D E L P E R V Y
more reliably and for a longer time it is suppressed, the more significant the destruction,
To Art. one
dissemination of propaganda material, creation of hotbeds of mass fires,
headquarters and subunits in the performance of fire missions to defeat various targets,
combined-arms units and artillery firing at night, the smoke of the enemy,
creation (shooting) of benchmarks, target designation. The main contents of artillery firing
caused to its firing or engineering structures.
The effectiveness of fire depends on many interrelated factors.
Practically all tasks performed by artillery commanders, headquarters and
units, directly or indirectly should be directed to the skillful use
these factors to achieve the maximum possible under the given conditions
fire efficiency.
A fire is well-timed if it is opened before the target changes its
location, if its results can be used by combined arms
subdivisions to perform assigned tasks with the least losses. This
achieved by continuous reconnaissance of the enemy and observation of his actions,
maintaining continuous interaction with combined arms units
(in parts). Early determination of installations for firing at the largest possible
the number of local objects in a possible target area allows you to prepare fire on
goals as soon as possible.
The accuracy of the fire depends on the timeliness, completeness and
thoroughness of the execution of measures for the preparation of firing and fire control, on
the method used for determination of settings for firing and the possibility of their
refinement in the course of firing. The accuracy decreases as the errors in determining
the settings for shooting for defeat increase.
MAIN PROVISIONS. SHOOTING PREPARATION AND CONTROLS
- 168 -
material and moral damage. In practice, it is usually required to know the expected
obtaining a predetermined efficiency as a result of firing, which can be
charge, type of fuse and its settings, as well as the purpose of the consumption of shells.
7
specific conditions for performing a fire mission.
the results of each individual shooting before it starts, or create conditions for
As a result of artillery fire, the enemy inflicts losses in the form of
expressed through the values of performance indicators. Target fire efficiency
The selected means should provide the greatest efficiency of fire in the given
To Art. 2, 3
However, when the accuracy is reduced to certain limits, the efficiency of fire can be
maintained at the required level by changing the method of firing at the target, attracting more
guns to firing, and increasing the consumption of projectiles. Significant errors in the
determination of settings for firing with the recommended methods of shelling a target cannot
be compensated for by any number of guns involved in firing and consumed projectiles.
Therefore, when performing a fire task, it is required to use the most accurate methods for
determining settings for firing and to correct fire in the course of firing to kill.
The suddenness of artillery fire is intended to take the enemy by surprise - outside
shelters, not ready to apply means of protection and to resist. Wherein,
as a rule, it is possible to inflict much greater losses on the enemy than in the absence of
suddenness, and, in addition, to exert the strongest morale on his manpower
psychological impact, which makes it difficult for the enemy to recover
combat capability. An important factor in ensuring the surprise of fire is
opening fire to kill without shooting.
The use of high-precision munitions allows you to hit targets from closed
firing positions with one or more shots. Precision munitions
it is advisable to use to defeat observed highly maneuverable targets
(tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, anti-tank systems, anti-tank guns), as well as individual
fire weapons in wood-and-earth structures and structures made of prefabricated structures,
destruction of which under similar conditions requires a significant expenditure
high-explosive fragmentation projectiles.
The choice of means for performing a fire mission is the most important responsibility
artillery commanders and headquarters and includes the choice of artillery system,
the appointment of the number of guns (batteries) involved in firing, the choice of the type of projectile,
- 169 -
Fire raid when hitting moving targets at one meeting point,
The defeat of the columns is carried out with the task of delaying or preventing their movement, and
aiming.
shooting at openly located unarmored targets is 50 m. This value
carrying out a fire raid with a high density of fire for a short time,
columns. When columns of armored vehicles are hit in order to increase
shooting at multiple aiming points in range and direction. How
based on the calculation that at an average speed of 15 ... 20 km / h during this time
the same fan interval (50 m), it is recommended to involve at least two
212
no less than an artillery battalion.
gaps of at least 80%, the distance between the aiming points in range should
To Art. 241…252
development of special recommendations on the method of shelling it and the choice of points
To chapter VIII. HEAT MOVING GROUND TARGETS
is moving, has practically only one size (length) and can move
also inflicting losses on them. The fulfillment of the specified tasks can be achieved
To ensure that the column is covered by the shelling area, the division must lead
the interval of the fan is also accepted in case of defeat of columns of unarmored vehicles and foot
firing at armored targets) would lead to a reduction in the size of the area
aiming currents, as calculations show, the requirement of uniformity is not violated
determined by the duration of no more than 2 minutes. This duration is defined
In the explanations to Art. 175, it is shown that the most advantageous fan interval for
area of discontinuities.
show calculations to ensure the probability of covering the column with an area
uniformity and density of breaks in each section of the column, to maintain that
the column will leave the zone of fire for at least half of its length, or
which can be achieved when a company (battery) column is hit by firing
Features related to the nature of the goal and consisting in the fact that the goal
be at least 100m, and in the direction of at least 50m. With such distances between
divisions overlay. Narrowing the fan interval to 25 m (as recommended when
in any direction relative to the plane of fire, necessitate
distribution of projectile impact points within the firing zone.
shelling along the front, and consequently, to reduce the likelihood of covering the column
The defeat of the columns
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Shooting rules.
Don't waste time changing settings.
reconnaissance serving shooting. This distance averages 2.5…3 km.
taking into account the adopted method of shelling the target and the values of the reduced median deviations
one fire raid, based on the mode of fire of the guns with the duration of the fire
the values of the reduced median deviations of dispersion during the shooting of the division
(battery) columns, the length of each of which is 500 ... 1000 m or more. From here
determine and introduce corrections for the deviation of the centers of the volleys of the division from the points
uniform dispersion of battalion shell explosions, when firing batteries
213
divisions.
length, so to defeat it, you will need to attract several
division according to the planned goal and the time required to set tasks for the means
a fire raid on a column, the division must conduct rapid fire, with batteries on a scale, so that
spread out (increase the distance between cars). Therefore, further management
it must be carried out at several meeting points. Distances between points
The consumption rates of projectiles for destroying columns are determined for one gun per
The column of a battalion (division) has at least three company
scattering. At long ranges of fire, typical for the destruction of columns,
with frontal movement of the column lfr=2(ÿÿ+4Vdo)=520…680m;
Minimum distances between points at which fire is being prepared
If the defeat of the column is carried out at several points of the meeting, then it is necessary
overlapping areas of shelling by neighboring divisions. They can be calculated with
it follows that the column of a battalion (division), as a rule, has a significant
are 40...60 m in range and 10...20 m in direction. Then the length of the zone
encounters when columns are hit at previous encounter points
flight time 2 min, regardless of the number involved in the fire mission
To increase the effectiveness of the fire impact on the column, fire raids
divisions.
scale will be
meetings are scheduled based on the speed of the columns, the time limits for opening fire
divisions (aiming points) should be such that it excludes
with flank movement of the column lfl=2(2.5Iv+4Vbo)=330…410m;
fire on the column at the same meeting point is impractical. It also follows from this that
for the case of the oblique movement of the column, the distance between the
aiming points lobl=( lfr2+ lfl2 ) 0.5= 620...800 m, or an average of 700 m, which is recorded in
- 171 -
artillery is based on the fact that the target was hit with the expenditure of a full volley. Wherein
When assigning a target to a rocket artillery unit for destruction, including
divisions.
fuse from fragmentation to high-explosive and vice versa requires considerable time. This
(124)
highly maneuverable targets are hit, as a rule, after their additional reconnaissance. This is explained
When assigning the amount of reactive
rings and distance tube values.
Chapter XVII. SHOOTING TO HIT
in some cases, it can be much more than the receiver, which is explained
take into account the minimum and maximum target sizes for the attracted quantity
case when the shells are already loaded into the package, it should be borne in mind that changing the setting
calculated by the formulas:
(125)
265
associated with the need to extract shells and reload them.
Batteries (platoons) of self-propelled armored guns (mortars) and others
the fact that the time of readiness of rocket artillery units for unplanned targets in
the need to determine the wind at the OUT before shooting, the installation of brake
To Art. 408-411
When justifying the minimum size of a group target for rocket artillery units, it is
assumed that the dispersion of rocket projectiles is large. Even when shooting at the
same sight setting and a concentrated line of fire, the projectile spread zone will be
large.
The dimensions of the zone of uniform dispersion of rocket projectiles can be
To Art. 405-407
u min = (4...5) Bd0;
Ф c min = (4...5) Bb0.
Table. 55 contains the minimum possible sizes of a group target for a division
and a battery when firing at medium ranges calculated according to the above
formulas (124) and (125).
- 172 -
Table 55
266
Minimum possible sizes of a group target when firing by division and battery
Table 55 data analysis shows that the minimum possible group target sizes for medium-range
and long-range medium caliber systems can be combined into one group. In addition, in order to
simplify practical recommendations, their values for the division and battery along the front and depth
can be taken the same.
The results of similar calculations show that the minimum size of a group target for a division
and a battery is also valid for a platoon. Therefore, the Shooting Rules contain uniform (averaged) and
range-independent values of the minimum size of a group target.
At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the minimum dimensions of targets serve not
only to determine the method of shelling the target, but also to determine the consumption of shells
when its rate is set per 1 hectare of the target area, and the actual dimensions of the latter are smaller.
The consumption of projectiles for such targets is taken equal to the consumption calculated for the
target of minimum size.
As calculations show, in this case it significantly exceeds the consumption obtained based on
the actual size of the target, which leads to an overrun of shells. So, for example, when assigning a
target expenditure of 300 by 300 (9 ha), for long-range medium-caliber artillery, the dimensions of the
target must be taken as 400 by 400 (16 ha). At this, the consumption of shells increases by almost 2
times. From this follows the conclusion that
Battery
Same
560...700
240...360
220...270
220...280
200...250
380...475
560...700
360...450
320...400
Battery
Division
Battery
Division
380...475
500...620
440...550
Front
600 x 600
Battery
Subdivision
200 x 200
Minimum possible
target dimensions, m
260...390
240...360
Division
320...400
Division
Battery
Division
Battery
Division
400 x 400
320...400
280...350
300 x 300
Minimum
target dimensions
adopted
in the PSiUO,
(front x depth), m
440...500
570...700
420...525
400 x 400
Large-caliber longrange
("Hurricane")
320...400
420...525
Missile system Projectile type
Medium caliber
(BM-14)
Large caliber
(BM-24)
Medium caliber
medium range
("Grad-1")
Medium caliber long
range
(BM-21)
500...625
Same
Fragmentation
cassette
Depth
Same
igh-explosive
fragmentation
Same
460...575
500 x 500
- 173 -
(126)
267
(127)
If the size of the group target exceeds the minimum, then the shooting should be carried out
with a scale and with the distribution of aiming points along the front. If, in this case, the value of
the scale and interval of the line of fire would not exceed the values determined by formulas (124)
and (125), then a uniform distribution of shell bursts will be achieved within the shelling area.
The minimum target dimensions in depth, as follows from the data in Table 55 are at the
same time the maximum depth of the area on which a uniform distribution of projectiles is achieved
when firing at one sight setting, i.e. in this case, the minimum and maximum target dimensions in
depth are the same.
When determining the maximum size of the target, it is proceeded from the same
provisions as for cannon artillery: the maximum zone of uniform dispersion of projectiles, taking into
account their destructive effect. These dimensions can be calculated using the formulas:
Let us determine the possible values of the maximum sizes of a group target for a division
when firing at medium ranges and the sizes of the area corresponding to these ranges, on which
the suppression of openly located manpower is achieved. The calculation results that are given in
table 56 show that, in most cases, the maximum size of a group target turns out to be so large that
it exceeds the fire capabilities of a division (battery) even when suppressing the most vulnerable
target (openly located manpower). Therefore, when determining them, it is proceeded from the
requirement that the suppression of a group target of maximum size can be achieved with one
salvo of a subunit.
it is advisable to use rocket artillery to hit targets that are larger than the minimum size for a
particular system.
An increase in the consumption of shells is achieved by attracting an additional number of units
(combat vehicles). In practice, it is done as follows: the required number of units for firing at the
target with the consumption of a full salvo gets involved, while assessing the achieved degree of
target destruction, depending on the proportion of the projectile consumption rate.
- 174 -
Table 56
268
Maximum possible sizes of a group target when firing by a division
Similar calculations carried out when determining the maximum size of a group target for
a battery show that the patterns noted above are also observed in this case. In addition, when
firing with a battery on one sight setting, the maximum depth of a group target cannot be greater
than its minimum value for a battery (see explanation to Table 55). Therefore, the maximum
dimensions of the depth of a group target for a battery are taken equal to the minimum, and its
dimensions along the front are assigned in such a way that the target area does not exceed the
firing capabilities of the battery. The same is done when determining the maximum
When firing rocket artillery at medium ranges, dispersion in range and direction differs
slightly. From the above calculations, it can be seen that when firing by a division, the maximum
dimensions of a group target along the front are twice its maximum dimensions in depth. When
firing with a battery at one sight setting, this ratio will be even greater. But, as an analysis of the
size of targets assigned to rocket artillery units shows, their front and depth usually differ
insignificantly. Therefore, when determining the maximum size of a group target assigned to a
division, they mainly proceed from the most characteristic ratio of its parameters, taking into
account the fire capabilities of the division.
1000 x 1000
("Grad-1")
380
800 x 700
Same
fire
1200
Large
caliber long
range
High-explosive
Same 2340...3120
Front
750
980
1710...2280
750
1125...1500
Depth
The maximum dimensions of the target, calculated from
Same
Medium
caliber
long range
1080...1440
Missile
system
("Hurricane")
Same
2520...3360
980
400x400
the possibility of uniform
distribution of shell bursts, m
720...960
1710...2280
600 x 500
2520...3360
1200
580...780
Projectile type
(BM-21)
550
900
Medium
caliber (BM-14)
900 x 900
Suppression
Same
Fragmentation
Cassette
1260...1680
Same
range
380
1125...1500
capabilities
of division, m
990...1320
Same
Same
900
Large
caliber (BM-24)
Medium caliber
medium
1200 x 1200
Same
550
Front Depth
adopted in the
dimensions
target
Maximum
PSiUO,
(front x depth), m
Task of
fire
- 175 -
division).
The solution to the problems of delaying and preventing the movement of columns is achieved by creating
corresponds to the size of the full dispersion ellipse of a battery salvo (platoon) and is
fire is required to attract at least a battery, and when firing at columns of armored
To Art. 412-415
The size of the firing zone must not be less than those specified in the rules
The length of the column hit by shooting at one aiming point is approximately
installation of a sight and a fan concentrated (batteries overlaid when firing
on the routes of their movement of a high density of shell explosions, for which
269
If, however, the battery is conducting fire to kill on a scale, then the depth of the area within
which a uniform distribution of shell explosions is achieved approximately doubles. Accordingly, the
maximum depth of the group target assigned to the battery can be increased, but at the same time,
the capabilities of the battery along the front are reduced in the same proportion so as not to
exceed its firing capabilities.
equipment (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, etc.) - at least a division.
From the data in Table 56, it also follows that when a large-caliber rocket artillery battalion
fires long-range fragmentation cluster shells, the maximum size of the target during destruction is
determined by the fire capabilities of the unit - approximately 150 hectares. Therefore, if the dimens
ions of the target exceed the dimensions indicated above, then it is impossible to defeat it as a
single target. In this case, if the position of the individual elements of the group target is known,
explicit groups of these elements are combined into several group targets, the dimensions of which
should not exceed the maximum dimensions of the group target for a battery (platoon).
Aiming points for batteries (platoons) are assigned to the centers of these elements. If
there is no data on the position of individual elements of a group target, then its area is divided bet
ween batteries (platoons), taking into account the fire capabilities of the subunits.
destruction of columns by cannon artillery, which is achieved by firing a battery on one
the size of the group target assigned to the platoon. If the dimensions of the target do not exceed
the minimum in depth, and no more than the maximum along the front, then the division fires with
batteries overlaid, i.e. on one sight setting, determined by the center of the target, with a line of fire
across the width of the target.
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Annex 62
Irina A. Pankratova and Mikhail V. Kolinchenko, CFT Department of
Rosfinmonitoring, Certain Aspects of Application of New Anti-
Terrorism Legislation as it Pertains to Freezing (Restraining)
Terrorist and Extremist Assets, Financial Security (2015)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
- 177 -
- 178 -
- 179 -
no. 8 march 2015 3
Contents
- 180 -
no. 8 march 2015 5
DeAR ReADeRs!
Rosfinmonitoring Director
Yury Chikhanchin
- 181 -
no. 8 march 2015 29
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF APPLICATION OF NEW
ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION AS IT PERTAINS
TO FREEZING (RESTRAINING) TERRORIST AND
EXTREMIST ASSETS
Irina A. Pankratova
- 182 -
30 no. 8 march 2015
- 183 -
no. 8 march 2015 31
- 184 -
32 no. 8 march 2015
or Terrorism
- 185 -
no. 8 march 2015 33
The term “freezing (restraining) of funds or other assets” means:
- 186 -
34 no. 8 march 2015
Posts information about the
decision on its official website
(including individual entrepreneurs)
compare customer identification data
with the information posted on the
official website
- 187 -
- 188 -
Annex 63
Protocol to the Minsk Convention on Legal Aid and Legal Relations on Civil, Family
and Criminal Matters of 1993 (28 March 1997)
This excerpt has been translated from its original language
into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant
to Rules of the Court, Article 51. A copy of the whole
document has been deposited with the Registry.
- 189 -
- 190 -
PROTOCOL
of 28 March 1997
TO THE CONVENTION ON LEGAL AID AND LEGAL RELATIONS ON CIVIL,
FAMILY AND CRIMINAL MATTERS OF 22 JANUARY 1993
The States Parties to the Convention on Legal Aid and Legal Relations on Civil, Family and
Criminal Matters of 22 January,1993
agreed to make the following amendments and additions to the said Convention:
. . .
7. Article 19 shall be amended as follows:
“Article 19
Refusal in granting legal aid
The request about granting legal aid may be rejected partially or entirely, if granting such aid may
inflict damage to the sovereignty or security, or contradicts the legislation of the requested
Contracting Party. If the request for legal assistance is denied, the requesting Contracting Party
shall be promptly notified of the reasons for the denial.”.
[. . .]
- 191 -
- 192 -
Annex 64
United States Department of the Army, Military Operations on
Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), Field Manual 90-1 (15 August 1979)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
- 193 -
- 194 -
- 195 -
- 196 -
- 197 -
- 198 -
- 199 -
- 200 -
Annex 65
United States Department of the Army, An Infantryman’s Guide to
Combat in Built-up Areas, Field Manual 90-10-1 (12 May 1993)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
- 201 -
- 202 -
*FM 90-10-1
- 203 -
C1, FM 90-10-1
- 204 -
FM 90-10-1
iii
- 205 -
FM 90-10-1
iv
- 206 -
C1, FM 90-10-1
v
- 207 -
C1, FM 90-10-1
- 208 -
Cl, FM 90-10-1
Washington, DC, 3 0ctober 1995
1. Change FM 90-10-1, 12 May 1993, as follows:
Remove old pages Insert new pages
J-1 through J-10
K-1 through K-24
L-1 through L-4
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release;
DISTRIBUTION:
- 209 -
*PREFACE
The urban growth in all areas of the world has changed the face of the
battlefield. Military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) constitute the
The probability is great that United States forces will become engaged by
enemy forces who are intermingled with the civilian population. Therefore,
warfare. Infantry commanders and staffs should concentrate on the skills
This manual provides the infantryman with guidelines and techniques for
separated from the civilian population. Some techniques for dealing with
best address these issues are FM 7-98 and FM 90-8. This manual does not
address any techniques for missions that require the restoration of order to
urban areas. Information and techniques to accomplish this mission are
The proponent of this publication is the US Army Infantry School. Send
US Army Infantry School, ATTN: ATSH-ATD, Fort Benning, Georgia
31905-5410; E-mail DURANTEA @ Benning-emh2.army.mil; FAX DSN
835-7500; and DSN 835-7114/4539 or commercial 1-706-545-7114/4539.
- 210 -
Section I. BACKGROUND
Friendly and enemy doctrine reflect the fact that more attention must be
given to urban combat. Expanding urban development affects military operations
as the terrain is altered. Although the current doctrine still applies,
the increasing focus on operations short of war, urban terrorism, and civil
disorder emphasizes that combat in built-up areas is unavoidable.
1-1. AIRLAND BATTLE
AirLand Battle doctrine describes the Army’s approach to generating and
applying combat power at the operational and tactical levels. It is based on
securing or retaining the initiative and exercising it aggressively to accomplish
the mission. The four basic AirLand Battle tenets of initiative, agility,
depth, and synchronization are constant. During combat in built-up areas,
the principles of AirLand Battle doctrine still apply—only the terrain over
which combat operations will be conducted has changed.
1-2. DEFINITIONS
MOUT is defined as all military actions that are planned and conducted
on terrain where man-made construction affects the tactical options
available to the commander. These operations are conducted to defeat
an enemy that may be mixed in with civilians. Therefore, the rules of
engagement (ROE) and use of combat power are more restrictive than
in other conditions of combat. Due to political change, advances in
technology, and the Army’s role in maintaining world order, MOUT now
takes on new dimensions that previously did not exist. These new conditions
affect how units will fight or accomplish their assigned missions.
The following definitions provide clarity and focus for commanders
conducting tactical planning for MOUT. The terms “surgical MOUT
operations” and “precision MOUT operations” are descriptive in nature
a. Built-Up Area. A built-up area is a concentration of structures, faciliing
area. The four categories of built-up areas are large cities, towns and
b. Surrggical MMOUUTT.. These operations are usually conducted by joint
special operation forces. They include missions such as raids, recovery
only. These are conditions of MOUT, not doctrinal terms.
- 211 -
operations, rescues, and other special operations (for example, hostage
rescue).
c. Precision MOUT. Conventional forces conduct these operations to
defeat an enemy that is mixed with noncombatants. They conduct these
through strict ROE. It also requires specific tactics, techniques, and procedures
for precise use of combat power (as in Operation Just Cause). (See
Appendix G for more detailed information.)
1-3. CITIES
Cities are the centers of finance, politics, transportation, communication,
industry, and culture. Therefore, they have often been scenes of important
battles (Table 1-1).
a. Operations in built-up areas are conducted to capitalize on the strategic
and tactical advantages of the city, and to deny those advantages to the
enemy. Often, the side that controls a city has a psychological advantage,
which can be enough to significantly affect the outcome of larger conflicts.
b. Even in insurgences, combat occurs in cities. In developing nations,
control of only a few cities is often the key to control of national resources.
Domingo, Caracas, Belfast, Managua, and Beirut indicate the many situations
that can result in combat operations in built-up areas.
1-2
- 212 -
FM 90-10-1
c. Built-up areas also affect military operations because of the way they
alter the terrain. In the last 40 years, cities have expanded, losing their
well-defined boundaries as they extended into the countryside. New road
systems have opened areas to make them passable. Highways, canals, and
railroads have been built to connect population centers. Industries have
grown along those connectors, creating “strip areas.” Rural areas, although
retaining much of their farm-like character, are connected to the towns by
a network of secondary roads.
d. These trends have occurred in most parts of the world, but they are
to form one vast built-up area. Entire regions assume an unbroken built-up
character, as is the case in the Ruhr and Rhein Main complex. Such growth
patterns block and dominate the historic armor avenues of approach, or
decrease the amount of open maneuver area available to an attacker. It is
estimated that a typical brigade sector in a European environment will
include 25 small towns, most of which would lie in the more open avenues
of approach (Figure 1-1).
e. Extensive urbanization provides conditions that a defending force can
exploit. Used with mobile forces on the adjacent terrain, antitank forces
defending from built-up areas can dominate avenues of approach, greatly
improving the overall strength of the defense.
f. Forces operating in such areas may have elements in open terrain,
tactics, task organization, fire support, and CSS.
1-4. THE THREAT IN BUILT-UP AREAS
doctrine have traditionally devoted much of their training to urban combat
exercises. Indications are that they believe such combat is unavoidable in
1-3
- 213 -
to former Soviet doctrine. Throughout many Third World countries, the
possibility of combat in built-up areas exists through acts of insurgents,
guerrillas, and terrorists. (Information on operations in this environment is
found in the reference list.)
Section II. CHARACTERISTICS AND CATEGORIES
OF BUILT-UP AREAS
One of the first requirements for conducting operations in built-up areas is
to understand the common characteristics and categories of such areas.
1-5. CHARACTERISTICS
block movement of troops, especially mechanized troops. Thick-walled
control.
a. Streets are usually avenues of approach. However, forces moving
along streets are often canalized by the buildings and have little space for
off-road maneuver. Thus, obstacles on streets in towns are usually more
effective than those on roads in open terrain since they are more difficult to
b. Subterranean systems found in some built-up areas are easily overlooked
but can be important to the outcome of operations. They include
1-4
- 214 -
FM 90-10-1
1-6. CATEGORIES
Built-up areas are classified into four categories:
Villages (population of 3,000 or less).
Strip areas (urban areas built along roads
connecting towns or cities).
Towns or small cities (population up to 100,000
and not part of a major urban complex).
Large cities with associated urban sprawl (population in
the millions, covering hundreds of square kilometers).
Each area affects operations differently. Villages and strip areas are commonly
encountered by companies and battalions. Towns and small cities
involve operations of entire brigades or divisions. Large cities and major
Section III. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Several considerations are addressed herein concerning combat in built-up
areas.
1-7. BATTLES IN BUILT-UP AREAS
Battles in built-up areas usually occur when—
The seizure of a city contributes to the
attainment of an overall objective.
The city is in the path of a general advance
and cannot be surrounded or bypassed.
Political or humanitarian concerns require
the seizure orretention of a city.
1-8. TARGET ENGAGEMENT
In the city, the ranges of observation and fields of fire are reduced by
structures as well as by the dust and smoke of battle. Targets are usually
light and medium antitank weapons, automatic rifles, machine guns, and
hand grenades. Opportunities for using antitank guided missiles are rare
because of the short ranges involved and the many obstructions that inter-
1-9. SMALL-UNIT BATTLES
Units fighting in built-up areas often become isolated, making combat a
series of small-unit battles. Soldiers and small-unit leaders must have the
their parent units. A skilled, well-trained defender has tactical advantages
over the attacker in this type of combat. He occupies strong static positions,
whereas the attacker must be exposed in order to advance. Greatly reduced
line-of-sight ranges, built-in obstacles, and compartmented terrain require
the commitment of more troops for a given frontage. The troop density for
both an attack and defense in built-up areas can be as much as three to five
1-5
- 215 -
- 216 -
Annex 66
Second Amended Complaint, Schansman v. Sberbank of Russia PJSC,
Civ. No. 19-CV-2985 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y. 5 October 2020)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
- 217 -
- 218 -
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
THOMAS SCHANSMAN, individually, as surviving
Parent of QUINN LUCAS SCHANSMAN, and as
legal guardian on behalf of X.S., a minor, and
CATHARINA TEUNISSEN, individually, as
surviving Parent of QUINN LUCAS SCHANSMAN,
and as personal representative of the ESTATE OF
QUINN LUCAS SCHANSMAN, and
NERISSA SCHANSMAN, individually, as surviving
Sibling of QUINN LUCAS SCHANSMAN,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
SBERBANK OF RUSSIA PJSC, THE WESTERN
UNION COMPANY, WESTERN UNION
FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., MONEYGRAM
INTERNATIONAL, INC., MONEYGRAM
PAYMENT SYSTEMS, INC., and VTB BANK
PJSC,
Defendants.
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Civil No. 19-cv-02985-ALC
Plaintiffs Thomas Schansman, individually, as surviving parent of Quinn Lucas
Schansman, and as legal guardian on behalf of minor plaintiff X.S.; Catharina Teunissen,
individually, as surviving parent of, and as personal representative of the Estate of, Quinn Lucas
Schansman; and Nerissa Schansman, individually, as surviving sibling of Quinn Lucas Schansman,
by and through their attorneys, allege upon knowledge as to themselves and their own actions and
upon information and belief as to all other matters, as follows:
NATURE OF THIS ACTION
1. On July 17, 2014, the Donetsk People’s Republic (“DPR”), a terrorist group
operating in eastern Ukraine, launched a surface-to-air missile from territory that it acquired and
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controlled through brute force, intimidation, and violent acts. The DPR fired that missile at
Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (“MH17”), a civilian passenger plane traveling from Amsterdam to
Kuala Lumpur, killing all 298 passengers on board, including 80 children, and murdering Quinn
Lucas Schansman (“Quinn”), a young American.
2. Quinn’s family, the Plaintiffs in this action, bring this lawsuit to hold
accountable those who provided material support and financing to the murderers of their son and
brother.
3. Defendants are corporate entities that provided ongoing and essential financial
support to the DPR from around the world, including the United States, for the explicit purpose of
purchasing tactical and lethal equipment that was necessary (1) for the DPR to acquire and
maintain control over the territory from which it launched the missile that took down the MH17
passenger plane, and (2) to carry out its terrorist activities, including the missile attack on MH17.
4. Defendants provided their services directly to prominent DPR leaders and DPR
fundraisers who were unambiguous about their intent: to arm and equip the DPR to carry out
terrorist acts in service of undermining the Government of Ukraine, intimidating and coercing
civilians, increasing the Russian Federation’s control over territory in eastern Ukraine, and
ultimately advancing a political and ideological agenda to reestablish the “Russian Empire”
through the creation of “Novorossiya” (New Russia).1
1 Novorossiya (or “Novorossia”) refers both to an aspirational geographical territory (akin to the
Islamic State’s (“ISIS”) aspirational “Caliphate”) as well as a violent extremist political
movement. The term is today associated with an effort to create a pro-Russia confederated state
through the forceful acquisition of power and control in eastern Ukraine and re-establish a
Russian Empire in the area north of the Black Sea in what is now much of southern and eastern
Ukraine.
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5. As with any terrorist group, the DPR is comprised of and funded by individuals
and entities who sponsor and use violence, intimidation, and coercion to achieve political ends (in
this case, the creation of so-called “Novorossiya”). At all relevant times, in the months leading
up to the attack on MH17, some of the most prominent leaders of the DPR were Igor Strelkov, the
“commander-in-chief” of the DPR; Pavel Gubarev, the “governor” of the DPR; and Ekaterina
Gubareva, the “foreign minister” of the DPR.
6. At all relevant times, in the months leading up to the attack on MH17, some of
the DPR’s most prominent fundraisers were Alexander Zhuchkovsky, Boris Rozhin (also known
as “Colonel Cassad”), and Alexey Markov (also known as “RedRat”).
7. The DPR’s leadership worked closely with these and other DPR members to
raise funds for the DPR’s terrorist activities through a group of coordinated DPR entities, including
Center for New Russia, Humanitarian Battalion, Veche, Rospisatel, Essence of Time, Save
Donbass, ICORPUS, The Voice of Sevastopol, Sputnik & Pogrom, World Crisis, Women’s
Battalion of People’s Militia Donbass, and People’s Militia of New Russia (together, the “DPR’s
fundraisers”). The DPR’s fundraisers were essential both for the DPR to fund its terrorist activities
and obfuscate its sources and methods.
8. Collectively, the DPR’s leaders, members, entities, financial supporters, and
fundraisers constitute the DPR.
9. Defendants provided banking and money transfer services for the DPR while
the world’s governments and media were intently focused on the DPR’s horrific and systematic
abuses perpetrated in the name of advancing its vision of Novorossiya. In the months leading up
to the MH17 attack, the DPR’s occupation of eastern Ukraine and its killing and torture of civilians
constituted perhaps the most significant international news event in the world. It was the subject
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of nearly constant commentary by highly visible officials including the President of the United
States, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the President of France, the Chancellor of
Germany, and nearly every major media outlet in the world.
10. The DPR’s campaign of terror fundamentally changed the regional order and
constituted a major challenge to international security. Despite this sea change in circumstances
for governments around the world and civilians in the region, Defendants Sberbank of Russia,
Western Union, MoneyGram, and VTB Bank continued to go about their activities, even when it
was clear that they were actively providing critical financial resources to a terrorist group (the
DPR) for the explicit purpose of buying lethal equipment—equipment that was ultimately used to
carry out the attack that killed Quinn.
11. Plaintiffs are the parents and siblings of Quinn, a United States citizen, who was
killed when he was just eighteen years old as he was traveling aboard MH17 to meet his parents
for a family vacation. Quinn’s parents, Thomas and Catharina, both suffered and continue to suffer
deep and debilitating psychological and emotional distress due to the senseless murder of their son.
Quinn’s siblings, Nerissa and X.S., both suffered and continue to suffer deep and debilitating
psychological and emotional distress due to the murder of their brother.
12. Defendants are companies that knew, or exhibited deliberate indifference to the
fact, that they provided material support to the DPR—a group that openly engaged in terrorist
activity and was condemned by governments around the world—and that the support they provided
to the DPR would be used to finance the DPR’s terrorist actions.
13. The support Defendants provided to the DPR allowed the DPR to acquire lethal
equipment, which was used to commit violent acts that endangered human life and appeared
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intended to intimidate or coerce civilians and influence the Ukrainian government and other
governments seeking to contain Russian aggression.
14. Defendants’ provision of material support to the DPR was a substantial factor
in the DPR’s ability to launch a missile from territory it controlled—an attack that killed Quinn
and 297 other innocent victims.
15. By this lawsuit, Plaintiffs challenge Defendants’ actions under the
Antiterrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq. (the “ATA”), which Congress enacted in 1992 in
response to the terrorist hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro as well as the bombing of Pan
Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988.
16. In adopting the ATA, Congress recognized that “reluctant courts and . . .
jurisdictional hurdles” had often stymied the ability of victims of international terrorism to obtain
redress for their injuries. (136 Cong. Rec. S4568-01 (1990).)
17. According to the ATA’s legislative history, “By its provisions for
compensatory damages, treble damages, and the imposition of liability at any point along the
causal chain of terrorism,” the Act was intended to “interrupt, or at least imperil, the flow of money”
to groups engaged in acts of international terrorism that injure American citizens. (S. Rep. No.
102-342, at 22 (1992).)
18. As stated by Senator Charles Grassley, Congress enacted the ATA to strike at
“the resource that keeps [international terrorists] in business – their money.” (138 Cong. Rec.
S17252-04 (1992) (statement of Sen. Grassley).)
19. As recently as January 2019, Senator Grassley explained, “The ATA gives U.S.
victims of international terrorism their day in court against those who carry out or support terrorism.
It provides some semblance of justice and compensation for Americans whose lives have been
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forever impacted by terrorism. Equally important, the ATA sends an unambiguous message to
deter international terrorism—those who support terrorism will face the full force of the U.S.
justice system.”2
20. Defendants are companies that deliberately ignored what the rest of the world,
including the President of the United States, was deeply intent on addressing.
21. The ATA does not permit companies such as Defendants to hide behind
invocations of neutrality in their provision of banking and money transfer services in an effort to
abdicate responsibility for their role in causing acts of terror.
22. The aim of this lawsuit is to ensure that, as Congress intended, the companies
whose conduct resulted in the death of an innocent American at the hands of terrorists are held
responsible for their actions.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
23. This is a civil action under the Antiterrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq.
24. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 2333(a) as a civil action brought by the estate, survivors, or
heirs of a United States citizen injured by reason of an act of international terrorism.
25. Venue is also proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and (c)
and 18 U.S.C. § 2334(a) because Defendants conduct significant business operations in the State
of New York and within the Southern District of New York, are subject to the personal jurisdiction
2 Chuck Grassley, United States Senator for Iowa, “Grassley to Trump: State Dept. Should Put
American Victims of Terrorism ahead of PLO,” available at
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-trump-state-dept-should-putamerican-
victims-terrorism-ahead-plo
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of the courts in the Southern District of New York, and/or have agents within the Southern District
of New York.
26. Defendant The Western Union Company maintains a corporate office in
Manhattan, New York. Defendants The Western Union Company, Western Union Financial
Services, Inc., MoneyGram International, Inc., and MoneyGram Payment Systems, Inc. maintain
numerous agent locations that provide global money transfer services within the Southern District
of New York.
27. Defendants Sberbank of Russia PJSC (“Sberbank”) and VTB Bank PJSC
(“VTB Bank”) maintain offices through their subsidiaries in Manhattan, New York. At all relevant
times, Defendants Sberbank and VTB Bank deliberately and repeatedly routed U.S. dollardenominated
transactions, including transactions to or on behalf of the DPR, through
correspondent bank accounts located in Manhattan, New York.
THE PARTIES
28. Plaintiff Thomas Schansman is Quinn’s father. His son was killed by the DPR,
a violent terrorist group that received material support and financing from Defendants. He is a
citizen of the Netherlands, resides in this district, and is domiciled in the Netherlands. He brings
this action on behalf of himself, as a surviving parent of his son, Quinn, a United States citizen.
29. Plaintiff Catharina Teunissen is Quinn’s mother. Her son was killed by the
DPR, a violent terrorist group that received material support and financing from Defendants. She
is a citizen of the Netherlands and is domiciled in the Netherlands. She brings this action on behalf
of herself, as a surviving parent of, and as personal representative of the estate of, her son, Quinn,
a United States citizen.
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30. Plaintiff Nerissa Schansman is Quinn’s sister. Her brother was killed by the
DPR, a violent terrorist group that received material support and financing from Defendants. She
is a citizen of the Netherlands and is domiciled in the Netherlands. She brings this action on behalf
of herself, as the surviving sibling of her brother, Quinn, a United States citizen.
31. Plaintiff Thomas Schansman is also a plaintiff on behalf of his minor child, X.S,
Quinn’s half-brother. X.S. is a citizen of the Netherlands, resides in this district, and is domiciled
in the Netherlands.
The Russian State-Owned Bank Defendants
32. At all relevant times, the Government of the Russian Federation, led by
President Vladimir Putin, had an official policy of supporting the Novorossiya movement,
including the terrorist activities of the DPR.
33. Defendant Sberbank is a Russian state-owned banking institution. It has offices
and branches worldwide.
34. At all relevant times, Sberbank maintained offices in New York City through a
directly or indirectly controlled subsidiary, which was and is critical to Sberbank’s combined
corporate structure and operations.
35. Sberbank operates in the United States and New York through its subsidiary
Sberbank CIB USA Inc. (“Sberbank CIB”), which is located at 152 W. 57th Street, 46th Floor,
New York, New York 10019.
36. Sberbank advertises itself as an international “Group” covering 20 countries
with more than 11 million customers outside of Russia, and lists its New York office as a means
of contacting the Sberbank Group.
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photograph of Quinn. Quinn’s remains were finally returned to Plaintiffs a month after his death,
at which point Plaintiffs planned and held a second funeral for Quinn.
87. Plaintiffs each endured extraordinary emotional distress and anguish in the
aftermath of Quinn’s murder, and Quinn’s siblings continue to struggle with feelings of intense
anxiety when they or their parents travel by plane.
II. The DPR’s Violent Campaign of Intimidation and Coercion Against Civilians, the
Ukrainian Government, and Other Governments Seeking to Contain Russian
Aggression
88. Like other terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State (“ISIS”), the DPR and its
affiliates seek to advance an ideological agenda of Russian supremacy by creating a proto-state,
Novorossiya, through the control of territory in Ukraine acquired through acts of intimidation and
coercion.
89. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, there have been periodic
attempts by ideological extremists to recreate Novorossiya as a separate state, often buoyed by
support from former Soviet and current Russian officials. In 2005, Russian President Vladimir
Putin famously described the breakup of the Soviet Union as the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe
of the 20th century.”
90. The Novorossiya movement failed to gain much traction until a popular protest
movement managed to unseat then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, causing Russia to
seek to expand its influence in Ukraine.
91. In February 2014, pro-Russian Novorossiya-inspired demonstrations began in
the Ukrainian region of Crimea. On or about March 16, 2014, Russia purportedly annexed Crimea.
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92. In March 2014, demonstrations by pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian government
groups spread to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine. Together, those regions are
commonly referred to as the “Donbass.”
93. As early as March 3, 2014, Novorossiya-aligned terrorists occupied the Donetsk
regional legislative building. The terrorists were led by Pavel Gubarev, the founder of the socalled
“People’s Militia of Donbass,” who demanded that he be made the head of Donetsk’s
regional government. Gubarev soon thereafter proclaimed himself the “governor” of the DPR.
94. In announcing sanctions on Pavel Gubarev in 2014, the United States Treasury
Department explained that “Gubarev has been described as one of the three most prominent leaders
of the separatists in southeast Ukraine,” and noted that he “is responsible for or complicit in, or
has engaged in, actions or polices [sic] that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or
territorial integrity of Ukraine and is a leader of an entity that has, or whose members have,
engaged in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial
integrity of Ukraine.”14
95. Roughly contemporaneous with the inception of the DPR, pro-Russia armed
terrorists in the Luhansk region declared the creation of the Luhansk People’s Republic (“LPR”).
96. The DPR and the LPR, along with other similar groups, formed a cartel that
terrorized—and continues to terrorize—civilians to advance the violent agenda of the Novorossiya
political movement. The DPR and its affiliated groups are dedicated to using violent means to
achieve their goal of rebuilding the Russian Empire.
14 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Additional Ukrainian Separatists and
Russian Individuals and Entities,” available at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/
Pages/jl9729.aspx
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97. The DPR has publicly decried countries seeking to contain Russian aggression,
including the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”)—and in
particular the United States—as its enemies.
98. The DPR leader Igor Strelkov (Girkin) has himself described the work of the
DPR as carrying out violent acts intended to affect government policy and intimidate civilians
around the world, including in a post online titled, “The manifesto of the public movement
‘Novorossiya’ Igor Strelkov.”
99. In this “manifesto,” Strelkov wrote that “we are fighting for the preservation of
the Russian World, for the revival of Great, United Russia,” and that “[a]s part of the Movement,
we organize actions in support of the fighting New Russia in various regions of Russia and
beyond.” Strelkov further wrote that this political movement was fighting against a “foreign policy
enemy - NATO, led by the United States.”15
100. From its inception, the DPR and its affiliates, including the LPR and other
groups, have exhibited a pattern and practice of attacking and intimidating civilians. The DPR
engaged (and continues to engage) in violent acts of intimidation against the civilian population
and operated (and continues to operate) with no regard for civilian life, often murdering and
torturing civilians.
101. On June 12, 2018, Ukraine submitted a “Memorial” to the International Court
of Justice (“ICJ”) (hereinafter, “Government of Ukraine’s Brief”) regarding violations of the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, a treaty ratified by
15 Forum Novorossia, “The Manifesto of the Public Movement ‘Novorossiya’ Igor Strelkov,”
available at http://forum-novorossia.ru/index.php/topic/87-manifest-obschestvennogodvizheniia-%
C2%ABnovorossiia%C2%BB/
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the United States in 2002.16 As Ukraine explained: “From their earliest days, the DPR and the
LPR committed acts of violence and intimidation targeted at civilians in furtherance of their
political objectives and their attempt to consolidate control over areas of Ukrainian territory.
Terrorist acts form a key element of their modus operandi.” (Government of Ukraine’s Brief ¶ 42.)
102. For example, on April 17, 2014 the DPR abducted, tortured, and murdered
Volodymyr Rybak, a town councilor from Horlivka, after he attempted to raise the Ukrainian flag
outside of town hall. Igor Bezler, a high ranking DPR “commander,” ordered the abduction, and
Igor Strelkov ordered the disposal of the body. Mr. Rybak’s body was eventually found by a river,
alongside the body of Yuriy Propavko, a 19-year-old student and activist from Kyiv.17
103. The DPR’s reign of terror immediately became a prominent international crisis.
In the months that followed, international monitors and human rights organizations attributed
thousands of civilian deaths and injuries as well as widespread human rights abuses to the DPR
and its affiliated groups.
III. Prior to the DPR’s Terrorist Attack on MH17, Defendants Knew About the DPR’s
Terrorist Activities
A. Prior to the DPR’s Terrorist Attack on MH17, the DPR’s Terrorist Activities Were
Widely Known and Extensively Reported on by the International Media
104. Since 2014, the DPR has openly, publicly, and repeatedly carried out terrorist
attacks on civilians. The terrorist acts perpetrated by the DPR and its affiliates were widely
reported on and discussed by nearly every government in the world, as well as by international
media, multilateral entities, and human rights organizations. The DPR’s pattern and practice of
16 International Court of Justice, “Government of Ukraine’s Brief,” available at https://www.icjcij.
org/files/case-related/166/166-20180612-WRI-01-00-EN.pdf
17 The Daily Beast, “‘In Cold Blood’ in Ukraine,” available at
https://www.thedailybeast.com/in-cold-blood-in-ukraine
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carrying out terrorist attacks on civilians were therefore notorious and well-known to Defendants
and the general public.
105. On March 3, 2014, months before the attack that killed Quinn, the New York
Times reported on Pavel Gubarev’s role as a terrorist leader in the Donbass. A couple of months
later, on May 8, 2014, the Washington Post published an article profiling some of the leadership
of the DPR. Among those profiled were Gubarev, described as the self-declared “people’s
governor” of the DPR, and his wife, Ekaterina Gubareva, described as the “foreign minister of the
Donetsk People’s Republic.”18 At all relevant times, this information was available to Defendants
and the public at large.
106. A May 14, 2014 article in The Independent titled, “Ukraine crisis: Kidnappings
abound as the Donbass falls further into anarchy,” reported on a series of civilian abductions
perpetrated by the DPR and its affiliates in the Donbass, including dozens of political prisoners
kept in terrorist strongholds and used as media propaganda. The May 14, 2014 article includes
references to, and pictures of, the DPR possessing tactical and lethal equipment, including masks,
“combat uniforms,” and “Kalashnikov [rifles].” These are among the types of equipment that the
DPR expressly solicited funds to purchase with Defendants’ material support.
107. At all relevant times, this information was available to Defendants and the
public at large, including the fact that money raised with the Defendants’ material support was
being utilized to purchase lethal equipment that the DPR used to commit violent acts, or acts
dangerous to human life, intended to intimidate or coerce civilians and influence the Ukrainian
government and other governments seeking to contain Russian aggression.
18 Washington Post, “Meet the Nobodies Who Said No to Putin,” available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/05/08/meet-the-nobodies-whosaid-
no-to-putin/
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108. A June 18, 2014 article in The Telegraph titled, “Beaten and threatened: the
‘Donetsk People’s Republic turns on city’s priest,” reported that the DPR was persecuting clergy
members who did not follow the Russian Orthodox Church. The article recounted how one priest
was interrogated and repeatedly assaulted “with clubs and whips.” The DPR also “threatened to
break the priest’s fingers with a hammer.” Another priest was “kidnapped in broad daylight” and
interrogated, after which he fled Ukraine. The June 18, 2014 article includes references to, and
pictures of, the DPR possessing the types of equipment—including combat uniforms, guns, and
rifle scopes—which the DPR solicited funds to purchase with Defendants’ material support.
109. At all relevant times, this information was available to Defendants and the
public at large, including the fact that money raised with Defendants’ knowing material support
was being utilized to purchase lethal equipment that the DPR used to commit violent acts, or acts
dangerous to human life, intended to intimidate or coerce civilians and influence the Ukrainian
government and other governments seeking to contain Russian aggression.
110. A June 29, 2014 article in Al-Jazeera America titled, “The Donbass Battalion
prepares to save Ukraine from separatists,” reported that the DPR’s “tactics have included hostage
taking, storming and barricading buildings, and using civilians, such as international observers
from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as human shields.” The June 29,
2014 article includes references to the DPR possessing the types of equipment, including
Kalashnikov rifles, which the DPR solicited funds to purchase with Defendants’ material support.
111. At all relevant times, this information was available to Defendants and the
public at large, including the fact that money raised with Defendants’ knowing material support
was being utilized to purchase tactical and lethal equipment that the DPR used to commit violent
acts, such as using civilians as “human shields.”
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112. A July 10, 2014 article in The New York Times titled, “Shadowy Rebel Wields
Iron Fist in Ukraine Fight,” profiled the DPR leader Igor Strelkov, explaining that he “consolidated
control” over the DPR “by imposing a system of dark and ruthless justice.” At all relevant times,
this information was available to Defendants and the public at large.
B. Prior to the DPR’s Terrorist Attack on MH17, the DPR’s Terrorist Activities Were
Widely Known and Extensively Reported on by Governments and
Intergovernmental Organizations
113. The human rights abuses and terrorist acts perpetrated by the DPR were also
widely reported on by governmental entities and intergovernmental organizations. At all relevant
times, this information was available to Defendants and the public at large.
114. On March 21, 2014, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(“OSCE”) deployed a Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine following a request from Ukraine
and a consensus decision by all 57 participating OSCE countries. The OSCE is the largest regional
security organization in the world and is comprised of 57 participating countries from Europe,
Central Asia, and North America, including the United States.
115. The reports of the OSCE monitors in Ukraine were and are widely disseminated
and publicly available on its website at www.osce.org, including daily reports on the situation and
condition in most major Ukrainian cities in three languages (English, Ukrainian, and Russian). At
all relevant times, this information was available to Defendants and the public at large and
regularly reported in international media. The OSCE reports include, among other things, detailed
reports of the terrorist activities carried out by the DPR and its affiliates.
116. In March 2014, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights deployed a Human Rights Monitoring Mission (the “United Nations” or “UN”) to
evaluate and report on the human rights situation in Ukraine and to provide support to the
Ukrainian Government in the promotion and protection of human rights.
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117. As part of its work, the UN prepared (and continues to prepare) monthly reports
describing the human rights situation in Ukraine. These reports were and are widely disseminated
and publicly available on the United Nations in Ukraine website at www.un.org.ua and the website
of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights at www.ohchr.org in
English, Ukrainian, and Russian.
118. Eight human rights monitoring reports were released by the UN in 2014,
beginning in April 2014. At all relevant times, this information was available to Defendants and
the general public. They also featured prominently in open meetings of the United Nations
Security Council and garnered regular and extensive media attention across the globe.
119. The UN reported that the DPR and its affiliates operated with impunity,
terrorizing the civilian population in areas under their control, pursuing killings, abductions, torture,
ill-treatment, and other serious human rights abuses, including the destruction of housing and
seizure of property.
120. In a report issued on May 15, 2014, the UN detailed specific instances of
terrorist activity in the Donbass, including an April 28, 2014 attack by the DPR on participants of
a peaceful rally, which led to “dozens wounded, and five participants of the rally (reportedly
students) [being] abducted.” At all relevant times, this information was available to Defendants
and the public at large.
121. In a report issued on June 15, 2014, the UN stated that, in the spring of 2014,
the DPR and its affiliates had committed “an increasing number of acts of intimidation and
violence . . ., targeting ‘ordinary’ people who support Ukrainian unity or who openly oppose” the
so-called “people’s republics.” At all relevant times, this information was available to Defendants
and the public at large.
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122. In a July 4, 2014 press briefing, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Navi Pillay, noted a “disturb[ing] . . . message on the website of one leader of the self-proclaimed
‘Donetsk People’s Republic’, which state[d] that underage children and women are legitimate
targets and that the goal is to ‘immerse them in horror.’” (Government of Ukraine’s Brief ¶ 48.)
At all relevant times, this information was available to Defendants and the public at large.
123. In a report issued on July 15, 2014, two days before the attack on MH17, the
UN stated that “[e]gregious human rights abuses have been committed in the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions,” controlled by the DPR and the LPR, including “hundreds of abductions with many
victims tortured. Increasing numbers of civilians have been killed.” At all relevant times, this
information was available to Defendants and the public at large.
124. According to the Ukraine 2014 Human Rights Report issued by the U.S.
Department of State, the DPR and its affiliates had “launched violent attacks to establish their
authority against the Ukrainian government,” and “engaged in unlawful killings, abductions,
physical abuse, torture, and unlawful detention” aimed at the civilian population in the Donbass.
At all relevant times, this information was available to Defendants and the public at large.
125. Additionally, the nongovernmental organization Human Rights Watch issued
periodic reports in 2014 of attacks on civilians committed in the Donbass region by the DPR and
its affiliates. These reports were widely disseminated and available to Defendants and the general
public.
126. A May 23, 2014 news article on the Human Rights Watch website detailed a
series of terrorist attacks perpetrated by the DPR and its affiliates to intimidate and coerce the
civilian population. The article described one instance on May 8, 2014 where DPR forces “broke
into the home of a pro-Ukraine activist and terrorized and beat him and his father.” The article
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30
included references to the DPR possessing the types of equipment the DPR had solicited funds to
purchase with Defendants’ material support, including “sawed-off Kalashnikovs” used by the
terrorists to shoot up the home of their victims. At all relevant times, this information was available
to Defendants and the public at large.
127. In April 2014, the European Union sanctioned several DPR leaders, including
Igor Strelkov. The European Union’s sanctions were widely reported on in numerous prominent
media outlets, including the Washington Post and The Guardian. In July 2014, the European
Union (“EU”) sanctioned several additional DPR leaders, including Pavel Gubarev and Ekaterina
Gubareva.
128. In May 2014, the Ukrainian General Prosecutor Office formally and publicly
classified the DPR and its affiliate, the LPR, as “terrorist organizations.” First Deputy Prosecutor
General in Ukraine Mykola Holomsha stated: “Facts of the persecution of the civilians in eastern
Ukraine have been registered. . . . The purpose of the creation of these organizations is to
deliberately propagate violence, seize hostages, carry out subversive activity, assassination and
intimidation of citizens.” This information was available to Defendants and the general public and
was reported on by the media at the time.
C. Prior to the DPR’s Terrorist Attack on MH17, the United States Government
Expressly Sought to Stop the Flow of Material Support to the DPR and Its Affiliated
Terrorist Groups
129. Beginning on March 6, 2014, President Barack Obama issued a series of
Executive Orders in response to the violence in Ukraine. The March 6, 2014 order authorized the
United States Treasury Department to impose sanctions on individuals or entities “responsible for
or complicit in . . . actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in
Ukraine; [and] actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or
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98
MH17, Defendants’ conduct and actions were a substantial factor in the DPR’s ability to launch a
surface-to-air missile and to control territory, including the territory necessary to set up, operate,
and ultimately launch the missile system that brought down MH17; the DPR controlled this
territory utilizing weapons, tactical equipment, and ammunition procured with the material support
of Defendants.
397. Because they provided the DPR with access to critical funds in the days and
weeks leading up to the attack on MH17, it was reasonably foreseeable that Defendants’ provision
of material support to the DPR would make possible the DPR’s well-documented ongoing terrorist
attacks, including ultimately the attack on MH17.
398. The downing of the airplane carrying Quinn and 297 other innocent victims was
therefore enabled, facilitated, and proximately caused by Defendants’ conduct and actions
described herein.
399. Plaintiffs’ injuries and Quinn’s death are thus the direct and proximate result of
Defendants’ conduct and actions.
CLAIM I – PROVISION OF MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS
400. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs
1 through 399 as if fully set forth herein.
401. The actions of Defendants in providing financial services to the DPR, including
its fundraisers, and its affiliates and/or executing the money transfers that funded the DPR,
constituted “acts of international terrorism” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331.
402. As required by 18 U.S.C. § 2331, the actions of Defendants in providing
financial services to the DPR, including its fundraisers, and its affiliates and/or executing the
money transfers that funded the DPR, constituted a violation of the criminal laws of the United
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99
States, including, without limitation, the criminal provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which
prohibits the provision of material support to terrorists.
403. As required by 18 U.S.C. § 2331, Defendants’ actions in providing financial
services to the DPR, including its fundraisers, and its affiliates and/or executing the money
transfers that funded the DPR, were dangerous to human life, because the funds were raised
explicitly to purchase lethal and/or tactical equipment for the DPR, which was and remains a
violent terrorist organization that has murdered and tortured thousands of civilians since its
establishment and openly proclaims its intent to continue such acts of terror.
404. As required by 18 U.S.C. § 2331, the violent acts committed by the DPR
through Defendants’ material support, specifically the missile attack that brought down the MH17
airplane, transcended national boundaries in the means by which they were accomplished and the
persons they intended to intimidate or coerce. The missile was launched from DPR-held territory
in Ukraine and destroyed a Malaysian airplane that departed the Netherlands en route to Malaysia
carrying 298 victims of 11 different nationalities. Defendants’ actions in providing financial
services to the DPR, including its fundraisers, and its affiliates and/or executing the money
transfers that funded the DPR, also transcended national boundaries in the means by which they
were accomplished and the locales in which Defendants operated.
405. Defendants knowingly and intentionally provided financial services to the DPR,
including its fundraisers, and its affiliates and/or executed the money transfers that funded the DPR,
when they knew or were deliberately indifferent to the fact that the DPR, including its fundraisers,
and its affiliates were violent organizations dedicated to using terrorism to intimidate and influence
the conduct of the Ukrainian government and other governments seeking to contain Russian
aggression, and to intimidate and coerce the civilian population.
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406. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ provision of financial services
to the DPR, including its fundraisers, and its affiliates and/or execution of the money transfers that
funded the DPR, Plaintiffs suffered the harms described herein.
407. Defendants reasonably could have foreseen that persons, such as Plaintiffs and
Quinn, would be injured by Defendants’ conduct and actions described herein.
408. Due to the facts described above, including but not limited to the anti-American
sentiment associated with the DPR, and the U.S. Department of State warnings relating to the risk
to Americans of traveling in the Donbass region, Defendants reasonably could have foreseen that
their provision of financial services to the DPR would result in injury to one or more United States
citizens.
409. Defendants are therefore liable for all of Plaintiffs’ damages in such sums as
may hereinafter be determined, to be trebled pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).
CLAIM II – FINANCING OF TERRORISM
410. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs
1 through 399 as if fully set forth herein.
411. The actions of Defendants in providing financial services to the DPR, including
its fundraisers, and its affiliates and/or executing the money transfers that funded the DPR,
constituted “acts of international terrorism” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331.
412. As required by 18 U.S.C. § 2331, the actions of Defendants in providing
financial services to the DPR, including its fundraisers, and its affiliates and/or executing the
money transfers that funded the DPR, constituted a violation of the criminal laws of the United
States, including, without limitation, the criminal provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2339C, which prohibits
the financing of terrorism.
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101
413. As required by 18 U.S.C. § 2331, Defendants’ actions in providing financial
services to the DPR, including its fundraisers, and its affiliates and/or executing the money
transfers that funded the DPR, were dangerous to human life, because the funds were raised
explicitly to purchase lethal and/or tactical equipment for the DPR, which was and remains a
violent terrorist organization that has murdered and tortured thousands of civilians since its
establishment and openly proclaims its intent to continue such acts of terror.
414. As required by 18 U.S.C. § 2331, the violent acts committed by the DPR
through Defendants’ material support, specifically the missile attack that brought down the MH17
airplane, transcended national boundaries in the means by which they were accomplished and the
persons they intended to intimidate or coerce. The missile was launched from DPR-held territory
in Ukraine and destroyed a Malaysian airplane that departed the Netherlands en route to Malaysia
carrying 298 victims of 11 different nationalities. Defendants’ actions in providing financial
services to the DPR, including its fundraisers, and its affiliates and/or executing the money
transfers that funded the DPR, also transcended national boundaries in the means by which they
were accomplished and the locales in which Defendants operated.
415. Defendants knowingly and intentionally provided financial services to the DPR,
including its fundraisers, and its affiliates and/or executed the money transfers that funded the DPR,
when they knew or were deliberately indifferent to the fact that the DPR, including its fundraisers,
and its affiliates were violent organizations dedicated to using terrorism to intimidate and influence
the conduct of the Ukrainian government and other governments seeking to contain Russian
aggression, and to intimidate and coerce the civilian population.
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102
416. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ provision of financial services
to the DPR, including its fundraisers, and its affiliates and/or execution of the money transfers that
funded the DPR, Plaintiffs suffered the harms described herein.
417. Defendants reasonably could have foreseen that persons, such as Plaintiffs and
Quinn, would be injured by Defendants’ conduct and actions described herein.
418. Due to the facts described above, including but not limited to the anti-American
sentiment associated with the DPR, and the U.S. Department of State warnings relating to the risk
to Americans of traveling in the Donbass region, Defendants reasonably could have foreseen that
their provision of financial services to the DPR would result in injury to one or more United States
citizens, such as Quinn.
419. Defendants are therefore liable for all of Plaintiffs’ damages in such sums as
may hereinafter be determined, to be trebled pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demands judgment as follows:
a. awarding Plaintiffs compensatory damages in an amount to be determined
at trial for all injuries suffered as a result of Defendants’ wrongdoing;
b. awarding Plaintiffs treble damages pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333;
c. awarding Plaintiffs the costs of suit as incurred in this action and attorneys’
fees pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333;
d. awarding Plaintiffs any equitable relief to which they may be entitled;
e. awarding Plaintiffs pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the
maximum rate allowable by law; and
f. all other relief as may be appropriate.
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103
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury on all issues triable to a jury.
Dated: October 5, 2020
Respectfully submitted,
JENNER & BLOCK LLP
By: s/ David Pressman
David Pressman
Lee S. Wolosky
Jenner & Block LLP
919 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
Telephone: (212) 891-1600
Fax: (212) 891-1699
[email protected]
[email protected]
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Thomas Schansman,
individually, as the surviving parent of
Quinn Lucas Schansman, and as legal
guardian on behalf of X.S., a minor,
Catharina Teunissen, individually, as
surviving parent of Quinn Lucas
Schansman, and as personal representative
of the Estate of Quinn Lucas Schansman,
and Nerissa Schansman, individually, as the
surviving sibling of Quinn Lucas Schansman
Case 1:19-cv-02985-ALC-GWG Document 156 Filed 10/05/20 Page 103 of 103
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Annex 67
Schansman v. Sberbank of Russia PJSC, Civ. No. 19-CV-2985 (ALC),
2021 WL 4482172 (S.D.N.Y. 30 September 2021)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
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Footnotes
1 The DPR's leader, Igor Ivanovich Strelkov, took credit for the attack on the plane. Am. Compl. ¶ 77.
End of Document © 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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Annex 69
Sir Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts, Interpretation of Treaties, in
OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: VOLUME 1 PEACE (Robert Jennings &
Arthur Watts, eds., Oxford University Press 9th ed. 2008)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
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Oxford Public International Law
Content type: Book content
Product: Oxford Scholarly Authorities on International Law [OSAIL]
Published in print: 19 June 2008
ISBN: 9780582302457
Part 4 International transactions, Ch.14 Treaties,
Interpretation of Treaties
Sir Robert Jennings qc, Sir Arthur Watts kcmg qc
From: Oppenheim's International Law: Volume 1 Peace (9th Edition)
Edited By: Sir Robert Jennings QC, Arthur Watts KCMG QC
Subject(s):
Rules of treaty interpretation
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interpreted as producing and as intended to produce effects in accordance with
existing law and not in violation of it’. § 633 Supplementary means of interpretation
The application of the basic rule of interpretation laid down in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention will usually establish a clear and reasonable meaning: if such is the case, there
is no occasion to have recourse to other means of interpretation. In its opinion on the
Admission of a State to the United Nations the International Court said: ‘The (p. 1276)
Court considers that the text is sufficiently clear; consequently it does not feel that it should
deviate from the consistent practice of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
according to which there is no occasion to resort to preparatory work if the text of a
convention is sufficiently clear in itself’.1
However, having established a clear and reasonable meaning in accordance with the basic
rule, there is no objection to recourse to other, supplementary means of interpretation in
order to confirm that meaning:2 tribunals have often done this.3
If the application of the
basic rule leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or if it leads to a result which is
manifestly absurd or unreasonable,4
recourse may also be had to supplementary means of
interpretation.5
The supplementary means of interpretation which are permitted in these circumstances are
not rigidly separated from nor are they an alternative to, the means which form part of the
general rule. They are an aid to an interpretation governed by the principles contained in
the general rule.6
The supplementary means of interpretation include the various
‘discretionary’ aids to which reference was made earlier.7
Their value and relevance vary
from treaty to treaty, and the selection of the ‘right’ aids to apply in a particular case is to
some extent a matter of art as well as of science. Considerations which affect the choice
include any clear indications of the parties’ intentions as to the exclusion or inclusion of a
particular aid; whether the treaty is multilateral or bilateral; the subject matter of (p. 1277)
the treaty; the kind of language used; the arrangement of words and parts of the treaty; and
the circumstances of its conclusion. Mention may be made of the following supplementary
means of interpretation:
(1) travaux préparatoires — ie the record of the negotiations preceding the
conclusion of a treaty, the minutes of the plenary meetings and of committees of the
Conference which adopted a treaty, the successive drafts of a treaty, and so on — may
be resorted to. 9
The International Court of Justice and its predecessor have
frequently affirmed the usefulness of recourse to travaux préparatoires. 10
. The value
of preparatory work in shedding light on the meaning of a treaty will vary from case
to case. Often the records of treaty negotiations are incomplete, and do not
adequately cover compromises arrived at during the final stages of a conference or
those reached privately away from the negotiating table: the negotiating records
inevitably relate to matters taking place before the final expression of the parties’
intentions has been made. However, where a treaty has been negotiated with
thorough preparation and full deliberation, and an efficient and complete record (at
least so far as concerns the point at issue) has been kept, the value of the travaux
préparatoires may be great, 11
but even a full record will not necessarily (p. 1278)
produce conclusive evidence in support of one view or the other, and may rather
provide material to support a number of alternative views.
A particular problem arises where a state accedes to a treaty in the negotiation of
which it took no part. In the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of
the River Oder 12
case the Permanent Court refused to take the travaux préparatoires
into account because three of the states which were parties to the proceedings had
not participated in the negotiation of the treaty in question. This decision may not
23
8
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reflect a rule of customary law, at least if the travaux préparatoires are published
or, if not published, are accessible for inspection by an acceding state before it
accedes. In the Aerial Incident case the International Court of Justice referred to
the travaux préparatoires of the statute of the Court, without adverting to the fact
that neither state before the Court had participated in the negotiations.
(2) The circumstances of a treaty’s conclusion may be invoked to ascertain its
meaning, since a treaty is not concluded as an isolated act but as part of a
continuing series of international acts which shape and limit the circumstances with
which the treaty deals.
(3) The principle in dubio mitius applies in interpreting treaties, in deference to the
sovereignty of states. If the meaning of a term is ambiguous, that meaning is to be
preferred which is less onerous to the party assuming an obligation, or which
interferes less with the territorial and personal supremacy of a party, or involves less
general restrictions upon the parties. 16
However, in applying this principle regard
must be had to the (p. 1279) fact that the assumption of obligations constitutes the
primary purpose of the treaty, and that, in general, the parties must be presumed to
have intended the treaty to be effective (see (9) below). Further, it is usual for
courts to interpret strictly exceptions to a principal provision imposing obligations on
a state, notwithstanding that the principle in dubio mitius might suggest that the
exception be given a liberal interpretation. (4) If two meanings are admissible, the provision should be interpreted contra
proferentem, ie that meaning which is least to the advantage of the party which
prepared and proposed the provision, or for whose benefit it was inserted in the
treaty, should be preferred. (5) The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius has been followed in the
interpretation of treaties by international tribunals in a number of cases, (p. 1280) as
has the ejusdem generis rule of construction. Both are essentially grammatical
rules.
(6) Generalia specialibus non derogant is a maxim which has sometimes been applied
in order to resolve apparent conflicts between two differing and potentially applicable
rules. It is, however, not always easy to determine which of the two rules is the
general one and which the specific.
(7) If a state is commonly known to uphold the meaning of a term which is different
from the generally accepted meaning, another state concluding a treaty with it will be
assumed, unless the contrary is established, to have consented to that special
meaning. (8) If the meaning of a provision is ambiguous, and one of the parties at a time before
a case arises for the application of the provision makes known what meaning it
attributes to it, another party cannot, when a case for its application does occur, insist
upon a different meaning unless it has previously taken necessary steps (such as
protest) 23
to rebut the implication that it has acquiesced in the meaning put forward.
(9) The parties are assumed to intend the provisions of a treaty to have a certain
effect, and not to be meaningless: the maxim is ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Therefore, an interpretation is not admissible which would make a provision
meaningless, or ineffective. On the other hand, (p. 1281) the absence of a full
measure of effectiveness may be the direct result of the inability of the parties to
reach agreement on fully effective provisions; in such a case the court cannot
invoke the need for effectiveness in order in effect to revise the treaty to make good
the parties’ omission. The doctrine of effectiveness is thus not to be thought of as
13
14
15
17
18
19
20
21
22
24
25
26
27
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justifying a liberal interpretation going beyond what the text of the treaty justifies. Effectiveness is relative to the object and purpose of the treaty, a decision as to which
will normally first have to be made. (10) The rules commonly applied by national courts for the interpretation of
municipal laws are only applicable to the interpretation of treaties, and particularly of
law-making treaties, insofar as they constitute general rules of jurisprudence. (11) A treaty is to be interpreted in the light of general rules of international law in
force at the time of its conclusion — the so-called inter-temporal law. This follows
from the general principle that a juridical fact must be (p. 1282) appreciated in the
light of the law contemporary with it. Similarly, a treaty’s terms are normally to be
interpreted on the basis of their meaning at the time the treaty was concluded, and
in the light of circumstances then prevailing. Nevertheless, in some respects the interpretation of a treaty’s provisions cannot be
divorced from developments in the law subsequent to its adoption. Thus, even though
a treaty when concluded did not conflict with any rule of ius cogens, it will become
void if there subsequently emerges a new rule of ius cogens with which it is in
conflict. Similarly, the concepts embodied in a treaty may be not static but
evolutionary, in which case their ‘interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the
subsequent development of law …. Moreover, an international instrument has to be
interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at
the time of the interpretation’. While these considerations may in certain
circumstances go some way towards negating the application of the inter-temporal
law, that law will still, even in such circumstances, provide at least the starting point
for arriving at the proper interpretation of the treaty.
(p. 1283) § 634 Plurilingual treaties
Many treaties are now authentic in more than one language.The Vienna Convention
provides that in such a case the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the
treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall
prevail.Since it is fundamental that although there is more than one authentic text there is
only one treaty with one set of terms, the presumption is that the terms have the same
meaning in each authentic text:the normal means of interpretation4 must first be applied
to any ambiguity or obscurity in order to ascertain the intentions of the parties and to arrive
at a meaning which is the same for each text. Despite all reasonable efforts (p. 1284) to this
end, the application of the normal means of interpretation may still not remove a difference
of meaning disclosed by a comparison of the authentic texts: in that event, and unless the
parties have agreed that a particular text prevails, the meaning which best reconciles the
texts, having regard to the object and purposes of the treaty, is to be adopted.Footnotes:
1 Eg ‘it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation’ (Vattel, ii, § 263);
see also the UN Admissions (Competence of General Assembly) Case, ICJ Rep (1950), p 8;
The Lotus Case (1927), PCIJ, Series A, No 10, p 16; Italy v Federal Republic of Germany
(1959), ILR, 29, pp 442, 449.
The need for there to be some lack of clarity in a text before having recourse to
interpretative procedures has been much considered in the context of the requirement laid
upon national courts in states members of the EC to refer certain matters of Community law
to the European Court of Justice for preliminary rulings under Art 177 of the Treaty
establishing the EEC 1957. See on the ‘acte claire’ doctrine, Lagrange, CML Rev, 8 (1971),
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
1
2
3 4
5
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Annex 70
A.P. Ryjakov, Commentary to Art. 140, in COMMENTARY TO THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (9th rev. ed. 2014)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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"Comments to the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation" (itemized) (9th edition, revised) (A.P. Ryzhakov) (Prepared for the ConsultantPlus system, 2014)
COMMENTS TO THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
This material was prepared by using the legislation
effective as of September 16, 2014
9th edition, revised
A.P. RYZHAKOV
PART ONE. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section I. KEY PROVISIONS
Chapter 1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
[. . .]
PART TWO. PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS
Section VII. INITIATING A CRIMINAL CASE
Chapter 19. REASONS (INDICTABLE OFFENCES) AND GROUNDS NEEDED TO INITIATE
A CRIMINAL CASE
Chapter 140. Reasons (indictable offences) and grounds needed to initiate a criminal case
Comments to Article 140
1. Criminal proceedings, and also actions performed at the initial stage of criminal proceedings, the
stage when a criminal case is instituted, arise only when a reason and grounds are present, that is an
indictable office and grounds to institute criminal proceedings.
2. The commented article sets forth an exhaustive list of indictable offenses needed to initiate a
criminal case. It also describes actual grounds needed to initiate a criminal case. "To initiate a criminal
case" means to make a decision (a decision to initiate a criminal case), which completes (rather than
commences) the stage that bears the same name. Names of indictable offenses and general characteristic
of actual grounds are provided in the analyzed article. They do not start criminal proceedings but rather
complete its initial stage.
3.
4. In other words, to fully comprehend the gist of the commented article one definitely needs to
completely figure out each concept detailed in this standard of law. These are the following concepts:
- a reason needed to institute criminal proceedings;
- a reason needed to initiate a criminal case;
- actual grounds needed to institute criminal procedures;
- actual grounds needed to initiate a criminal case.
5.
.
7. After analyzing the wordings used by the legislator in Part 1 of the commented article, given the
content of Articles 21, 39, 40, 146, and 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, one should conclude that,
generally speaking, an indictable offense needed to initiate a criminal case is the first source of awareness
given to an investigator (a detective, etc.) regarding an offense that is prepared, committed or completed
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(or its consequences), which contain indictable criminal acts in any crime.
8. Authors of other comments to Article 140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sometimes think
that different aspects should be regarded as causes needed to initiate a criminal case. Specifically, A.N.
Shevchuk thinks that they should include "notices about crimes contained in a crime incident report,
voluntary self-disclosure, or other sources" 661. It is quite noticeable that, given such definition, the author
equalizes, at the very minimum, the form of a certain legal fact and the substance of another legal fact,
that is between a reason to initiate a criminal case and grounds to institute criminal proceedings.
--------------------------------
661 See: Comments to the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation. New edition. p.
263; etc.
9. It is commonly believed that reasons to start criminal proceedings are not different from reasons
to initiate a criminal case. Generally speaking, this is true. However, certain additional explanations are
needed. Indeed, the list of awareness sources provided in the commented article regarding a specific
action (consequences of an action) limits the scope of possible reasons to initiate a criminal case and to
institute criminal proceedings.
10. However, it is all but impossible to ignore the existing ties between the form and substance of
an event. In our case, the reason is the form and the grounds are the substance of an event, which is called
"a legal fact." In one case, a legal fact leads to instituting criminal proceedings and in the other case it
initiates a criminal case.
11. Actual grounds impose their specific features on reasons, or more precisely on the substance of
information that describes it. Whatever may be sufficient to institute criminal proceedings is often
insufficient to make a decision to initiate a criminal case.
12. If one to look at the external (formal, not substantive) characteristics, a reason to start criminal
proceedings and a reason needed to initiate a criminal case are the same thing. Moreover, reasons for
instituting criminal proceedings in some cases already contains grounds to initiate a criminal case
immediately (and, therefore, the grounds to institute criminal proceedings). In such situations,
undoubtedly, a reason (indictable offense) needed to initiate a criminal case is also, at the same time, a
reason to start criminal proceedings. Or the opposite: a reason to institute criminal proceedings is, at the
same time, a reason to initiate a criminal case.
13. In the introduction regarding initiating criminal cases, the legislator wants to specifically see
information regarding reasons to start criminal proceedings, that is who and when reported about a crime.
The fact that such information, according to the law, should be reflected in an order initiating a criminal
case, in and of itself, indicates that the legislator doesn't see significant differences between these two
concepts.
14. Therefore, one may conclude that Part 1 of the commented article provides an exhaustive list of
reasons not only for initiating criminal cases but also for instituting criminal proceedings. The general
requirements applied to the majority of reasons are set forth in Articles 141-143 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
15.
.
37. A reason for initiating a criminal case should be stated in one of the documents described in
Articles 141-143 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Based on this tenet, a report should made indicating
what elements of crime were detected in a situation that we review. Then, a prosecutor, provided there are
actual bases, is required to submit such report, as prescribed in Item 3, Part 1, Article 145 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, to a preliminary investigation agency of proper jurisdiction to perform a preliminary
confirmation a crime report, as provided in Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
38.
.
39. Now it would make sense to proceed to explaining the provisions of Part 2 of the commented
article. Based on literal interpretation of this standard, one may conclude that it deals with the grounds for
initiating criminal cases. However, it only speaks about actual grounds to initiate a criminal case. A legal
ground to initiate a criminal case is a properly executed order about initiating a criminal case. Article 146
of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides characteristics of such procedural documents. The law
provides no legal basis to institute criminal proceedings.
40. If the reasons to initiate or terminate a criminal case are equal concepts, then actual grounds to
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initiate a criminal case usually can't be the same as actual grounds to institute criminal proceedings.
41. Part 2 of the commented article literally states that: "existence of sufficient information
confirming the elements of a crime serves as the grounds to initiate a criminal case." In addition to the
need to differentiate actual grounds to initiate a criminal case and actual grounds to institute criminal
proceedings, the aforementioned concept also leads to two additional questions: what kinds of elements
does this Article's passage imply and what does "sufficient information" mean? Let's start with answering
the question about the concept of "elements of a crime" in the meaning used by the legislator in the
commented article.
42. Elements of a crime are a criminal concept that has two meanings: the elements of a crime, as
the general concept, and indicators of a crime. When the procedural buffs speak about the elements of a
crime to describe specifics of actual grounds used to initiate a criminal case, most often they mean
indicators of a crime. But it is consistent when this term is used without any additional details describing
specific features of actual grounds used to initiate a criminal case? It does not look right for two reasons.
Firstly, when the procedural buffs generally speak about the indicators of a crime, they make those who
applies the law think that a criminal case may only be initiated when such factor is present (the existence
of all element of a crime669). Secondly, the lack of specifics--what specific elements of a crime are we
talking about--leads to a nonsensical conclusion that the existence of sufficient information about any
elements of a crime provides valid grounds to initiate a criminal case.
--------------------------------
669 The fact that a criminal case should be brought only after confirming the existence of all
elements of a crime is a long-standing delusion of some procedural buffs. For example, see: K.A.
Sergeyev. Investigation planning / K.A. Sergeyev, L.A. Soya-Serko, N.A. Yakubovich. M., 1975. Page
60.
43. As we known, indicators of a crime are subdivided into four categories (by elements of a
crime): features of a subject, mental state, an object, and conduct. Moreover, if such elements as a subject
and mental state are identified without identifying a criminal act, this definitely may not provide grounds,
in and of itself, to initiate a criminal case. Otherwise the provisions of Part 2, Article 21 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, which are applied to investigators (detectives, etc.) and require them to take certain
steps every time when the elements of a crime are discovered, i.e. to take actions required by the Code of
Criminal Procedure to establish events surrounding a crime and discover people guilty of committing
such crime, could be interpreted as the need to apply the above measures in each uncovered case, which
means a person have reached the age when he/she may be criminally prosecuted.
44. Other scholars also indicate: "to initiate a criminal case, there is no need to have information
about a person who committed a crime, it can be completely absent." 670.
--------------------------------
ConsultantPlus: note.
Comments to the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation made by B.T. Bezlepkin
are included in the data bank as per the publication - Prospect, 2012 (11th edition, revised and
supplemented).
670 For example, see: Bezlepkin B.T. Comments to the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian
Federation. p. 176; etc.
45. When making a decision as to initiating a criminal case, the existence of a subject or mental
state are meaningless if they are not connected to a criminal act.
46. There should be no equality between the actual grounds to initiate a criminal case and the
existence of sufficient information about all indicators of a crime.
47. Such interpretation of Part 2, Article 140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 671 may lead to
negative impact in some cases when agencies in charge of initiating criminal cases, without making
proper decisions as to the initiation of criminal cases, would be dealing with preliminary investigation
matters, i.e. establishing all circumstances described in Article 73 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
--------------------------------
671 Or its predecessor, Part 1, Article 108 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
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48. Typically, there is not enough information regarding all elements of a crime at the initiation
stage in a criminal case. For example, a person who committed a crime is quite often unknown, state of
mind is unknown, etc. If we accept that the elements of a crime are actual grounds to initiate a criminal
case, than each instance of initiating a criminal case for unsolved crimes would become illegal. This is
because there is no indication yet who committed a crime, there is no subject, a required element in any
crime. It can easily turn out that a socially dangerous act was committed by a deranged person or a person
under 14 (16), etc.
49. The challenge of establishing a subject and mental element is for the stage that follows the
initiation of a criminal case, the preliminary investigation stage. Only after the production of investigative
actions is it permissible to speak of any degree of proof of a person’s guilt in committing a crime. It is
unacceptable to use agencies who verify crime reports in order to determine who committed a crime.
50. Likewise, one may conclude that part 2, Articles 140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure implies
that the grounds for initiating a criminal case are understood as sufficient data at the disposal of the
competent authority that indicate procedurally significant signs of the objective side of the crime. The
majority of procedural buffs adhere to such position regarding grounds for initiating a criminal case 672.
--------------------------------
ConsultantPlus: note.
Comments to the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation made by B.T. Bezlepkin
are included in the data bank as per the publication - Prospect, 2012 (11th edition, revised and
supplemented).
672 For example, see: Bezlepkin B.T. Comments to the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian
Federation. p. 176-177; etc.
51. At the same time, we need to note that we are not talking about all elements of a criminal act. In
other words, sufficient information about a criminal act in the elements of a crime do not always provide
actual grounds to initiate a criminal case.
52. Based on the structure of a criminal act, we may discuss features that characterize causes,
consequences, places, time, etc. of a committed crime. However, only the first two groups, that is
information available to the preliminary investigation agencies regarding the elements of a socially
dangerous act and the elements of socially dangerous consequences of it, may lead to the emergence of
any criminal procedure we are discussing.
53. Therefore, as a matter of criminal law, the concept of "elements of a crime" includes all
elements of a crime and, as a matter of criminal procedure law, as it is used in Part 2 of the commented
article, only the elements of a socially dangerous act and socially dangerous consequences are included.
However, neither an act nor consequences of a crime, in any case, and none of them separately, should
play an equally important role in making decisions regarding instituting criminal proceedings and even
less so in initiating a criminal case.
54. The existence of some of them, for example:
- a death of a person;
- a death of two or more people;
- large scale killing of animals;
- other serious consequences
despite any simultaneous discovery of other elements, in and of itself would predetermine that a
proper authority holding information about such event would be engaged in a criminal procedure.
Furthermore, having sufficient information about such matters provides actual grounds to initiate a
criminal case. Other authors who provide comments regarding Article 140 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure also point out to this forty-year old practice of preliminary investigation agencies. For
example, B.T. Bezlepkin notes that "practically speaking, in each large incident (fire that caused death, a
railroad, water or air transportation crash, etc.) would immediately initiate a criminal case" 673. We are
talking here about the so-called significant criminal acts that lead to consequences with criminal
procedures.
--------------------------------
ConsultantPlus: note.
Comments to the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation made by B.T. Bezlepkin
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are included in the data bank as per the publication - Prospect, 2012 (11th edition, revised and
supplemented).
673 See: Comments to the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation. M.: TK Velby. p.
208.
55. Other (insignificant) elements, as far as the criminal procedure is concerned, either acts or
consequences, provide actual grounds solely if they are fully proven and in certain combinations with
each other. Typically, consequences are deemed insignificant if they can't be treated as criminal acts
without establishing certain elements of such acts. And the opposite, sufficient information about
elements of an action almost never (if materially defined crime is alleged) is used as actual grounds to
initiate criminal cases, unless they are combined with elements provided in the criminal law. Some
examples of insignificant elements of crime, as far as criminal procedures are concerned:
- causing damage that doesn't reach the threshold to file criminal charges 674;
--------------------------------
674 This element is absent only when there is no doubt that the scope of damage and its miniscule
nature, in and of themselves, indicate the absence of proper elements of a crime.
- causing personal injury;
- traffic offense, etc.
56.
.
69. Now we need to figure out what does the term "sufficient information" stand for?
70. There is an opinion in scholarly legal papers that the grounds for initiating a criminal case are
"the actual information indicating that a crime was committed" 677. Proponents of this definition of actual
grounds for initiating a criminal place the existence of information at the very top, instead of sufficiency
of information. Such claim has holes.
--------------------------------
677 See: Bazhanov M.I. Investigations in Police Agencies / M.I. Bazhanov, A.D. Kogan. Kharkov,
1956. page 9; etc.
71. Information containing elements of a crime is also available when actual grounds exist before a
criminal case initiation stage is commenced. However, Part 2 of the commented article speaks about the
actual grounds at the end of the said stage, i.e. it is something quite different. Otherwise we will have to
equalize actual grounds existing at the beginning of a criminal case initiation stage with actual aground
existing at the beginning of the next stage in criminal proceedings, the preliminary investigation stage,
which doesn't sound right.
72. Indeed, a situation may occur early in criminal proceedings when proper authorities would be
having actual grounds to initiate a criminal case immediately. However, the existence of Article 144 in
the Code of Criminal Procedure, and also its language, indicate that the legislator has also provided some
other opportunity. We are talking about a situation when, in order to discover "sufficient information to
show elements of a crime"... "a detective, inquiry agency or investigator" is provided some time.
Accordingly, criminal proceedings in such case begin when there are still no actual grounds to initiate a
criminal case. However, but there are grounds to institute criminal proceedings. Based on preliminary
review of a complaint (notice) regarding a crime, actual grounds to initiate a criminal case may be
discovered. Still, they would only arrive after a preliminary review. This indicates that the legislator sees
a difference between actual grounds to institute criminal proceedings and actual grounds to initiate a
criminal case.
73. Grounds to initiate a criminal case, so to speak, are placed at a higher level in the rules of
criminal procedure. This level is not only defined by the availability of any information regarding a
possible crime but also by "sufficiency" of such information to initiate a criminal case.
74. Information becomes sufficient once an agency authorized to bring criminal charges gather
enough materials (evidence) to generate confidence in indisputable existence of procedurally significant
elements of a criminal act. Typically, sufficient information is generated during a preliminary review of
complaints (notices) about a crime. However, sometimes they can be contained directly in the reason for
instituting criminal proceedings.
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75. We have reviewed all elements of the concept "actual grounds to initiate a criminal case,"
which is discussed in Part 2 of the commented article. We still need to discuss several additional features
of the concept "grounds to institute criminal proceedings," which is a different thing.
76. In the Code of Criminal Procedure, the law does not provide legal foundations for a written
document to be used to institute criminal proceedings. The grounds to institute criminal proceedings
imply actual and appropriate grounds.
77. Actual grounds to institute criminal proceedings exist when there is a possibility that an
incident, which is described in the reason (cause of action), contains elements of a crime that are
significant, as far as criminal procedures are concerned. Any possible existence of a socially dangerous
act or socially dangerous consequences (if a reason provided in Part 1 of the commented article is present)
should lead to emergence of criminal procedures, which are culminated in a criminal trial (criminal case).
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Annex 71
Nils Melzer, The Principle of Distinction Between Civilians and Combatants,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT (Andrew
Clapham & Paola Gaeta, eds., Oxford University Press 2014)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is comprised of
such extracts of the whole document as are necessary for the purpose of
the pleading. A copy of the whole document has been deposited with the
Registry.
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- 272 -
From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Covington & Burling Library; date: 15 March 2022
Content type: Book content
Product: Oxford Scholarly Authorities on International Law [OSAIL]
Series: Oxford Handbooks in Law
Published in print: 13 March 2014
ISBN: 9780199559695
Part IV Key Concepts for Humanitarian Law, Ch.12
The Principle of Distinction Between Civilians and
Combatants
Nils Melzer
From: The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict
Edited By: Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta, Tom Haeck (Assistant Editor),
Alice Priddy (Assistant Editor)
Subject(s):
Combatants — Geneva Conventions 1949 — Armed conflict — Protected persons and property
- 273 -
From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Covington & Burling Library; date: 15 March 2022
3. Persons, other than members of a party to the conflict’s armed forces, who take a
direct part in the hostilities. They, however, temporarily lose their immunity from
attack while they assume a combatant’s role. In sum, as in the case of international armed conflict, a civilian in non-international armed
conflict is anyone not belonging to the ‘armed forces’ of a party to the conflict (Common
Article 3) or, respectively, to state ‘armed forces’, ‘dissident armed forces’ or other
‘organized armed groups’ of a party to the conflict (Article 1(1) of (p. 318) AP II).Where
persons directly participate in hostilities without being integrated into such organized
armed forces or groups, even if they intend to support one of the parties to the conflict,
they remain civilians and lose protection against direct attack only for such time as their
direct participation lasts.(iv) Combatants
(a) Combatant privilege
Treaty IHL governing non-international armed conflict does not use the notion of
combatant, nor does it provide for combatant privilege (ie immunity from prosecution for
lawful acts of war). While domestic legislation in most countries provides members of state
armed forces with protection from prosecution for lawful acts of state (ie a status
equivalent to combatant privilege), members of organized armed groups remain subject to
prosecution for violations of domestic law even if they comply with IHL. Although states can
hardly be expected to provide insurgents with immunity from prosecution for death, injury,
and destruction caused in rebellion against their government, the lack of any form of
combatant privilege for non-state belligerents is not unproblematic.
Most importantly, apart from the general encouragement to afford the ‘broadest possible
amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict’ at the end of hostilities,IHL does not provide members of organized armed groups with any incentive to respect
IHL and to distinguish themselves from the civilian population. This may contribute to a
destructive downward spiral, with non-state belligerents distancing themselves from their
obligations under IHL and, in turn, states stigmatizing non-state belligerents with blanket
labels such as ‘terrorists’ and ‘unlawful combatants’ and increasingly questioning the
appropriateness of the rights and protections afforded to them under IHL.
(b) Functional combatancy
The combatant privilege, which separates persons who are entitled to immunity from
domestic prosecution for lawful acts of war from persons who are not, must not be confused
with our discussion of the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants, which
separates persons who may lawfully be attacked from those who may not. Indeed, the
concept of combatancy in a strictly functional sense is anything but alien to IHL governing
non-international armed conflicts. Already the (p. 319) draft of Additional Protocol II
proposed by the ICRC in 1973 and the amended draft Protocol adopted by consensus in
Committee III of the Diplomatic Conference of 1974 to 1977 used the term combatant
without implying the existence of privileged combatancy in non-international armed
conflict. Draft Article 24(1) of AP II reads as follows:
In order to ensure respect for the civilian population, the parties to the conflict shall
confine their operations to the destruction or weakening of the military resources of
the adversary and shall make a distinction between the civilian population and
combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives.93
89
90
91
92
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Subscriber: Covington & Burling Library; date: 15 March 2022
When, in the last moment, this draft Article was discarded along with 23 others, the reason
was not that the contracting states wanted to dispense with the principle of distinction
between civilians and combatants in non-international armed conflict but, rather, their fear
that the use of the term combatant in the treaty text could be misconstrued as indicating
the legitimacy of an insurgency or would otherwise encourage insurrection.
(c) International jurisprudence
The concept of combatancy has also been used in international jurisprudence dealing with
situations of non-international armed conflict. In the , for instance, the ICTY
referred to ‘an individual who cannot be considered a traditional “non-combatant” because
he is actively involved in the conduct of hostilities by membership in some kind of
resistance group’,thus permitting no other conclusion than that the individual in question
is a combatant. Significantly, in the view of the Tribunal, the decisive element for
combatancy appears to be ‘membership’ in some kind of an organized armed force or
group. Further, in its Country Report on Colombia (1999), the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights made clear that combatants must be distinguished from civilians directly
participating in hostilities. Thus, according to the Commission, ‘[i]t is important to
understand that while these persons forfeit their immunity from direct attack while
participating in hostilities, they, nonetheless, retain their status as civilians. Unlike ordinary
combatants, once they cease their hostile acts, they can no longer be attacked, although
they may be tried and punished for all their belligerent acts’.(d) State practice
As far as state practice is concerned, many military manuals use the term ‘combatant’, but
most were drafted with a view to international armed conflicts and (p. 320) do not
necessarily provide for the formal applicability of the same categories in non-international
armed conflicts. An instructive example of national practice referring specifically to noninternational
armed conflicts is the 2009 US Field Manual on ‘Tactics in
Counterinsurgency’ (FM 3-24.2) which ‘establishes doctrine […] for tactical
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations’ and is based ‘on lessons learned from historic
counterinsurgencies and current operations’.According to the manual, an insurgent
organization normally consists of five elements, namely leaders, guerrillas, underground,
auxiliaries, and mass base.The four non-combatant categories are defined as follows:
Leaders provide direction to the insurgency. They are the ‘idea people’ and the
planners. […] Generally, they convey the ideology of the insurgency into objectives
and direct the military efforts of the guerrillas.The underground is a cellular organization of active supporters of the insurgency
[…]. They are more engaged than the auxiliaries are and may at times be guerrillas,
if they use weapons or conduct combat operations. […] Members of the
underground often continue in their normal positions in society, but lead second,
clandestine lives for the insurgent movement. […] The underground may: Spread
propaganda; Support sabotage, assassination and subversion; Support intelligence
and counterintelligence operations; Run safe houses; Provide transportation;
Manufacture and maintain arms and explosives.[…] Auxiliaries are active sympathizers who provide important logistical services
but do not directly participate in combat operations. If they participate in guerrilla
activities, they become guerrillas. […] Examples of support that auxiliaries provide
include: Store weapons and supplies; perform courier operations; provide passive
intelligence collection; give early warning of counterinsurgent movements; acquire
funds from lawful and unlawful sources; provide forged or stolen documents;
promote and facilitate desertion of security forces; recruit and screen new
94
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98
99
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Subscriber: Covington & Burling Library; date: 15 March 2022
members; create and spread propaganda; provide medical support; manufacture
and maintain equipment.The mass base consists of the population of the state who are sympathetic to the
insurgent movement. […] This mass base, by default, passively supports the
insurgency. As occasions arise, they may provide active support. […]Most relevant for the present discussion, however, is the description of guerillas
(combatants) and of certain activities associated with combatant function:
A guerrilla is any insurgent who uses a weapon of any sort and does the actual
fighting for the insurgency. They may conduct acts of terror, guerrilla warfare,
criminal activities, or conventional operations. They are often mistaken for the
movement or insurgency itself; but they are merely the foot soldiers of the
movement or insurgency […].102(p. 321)
Guerrillas may continue in their normal positions in society and lead clandestine
lives for the insurgent movement. Guerrillas tend to organize themselves based
upon the activity they will be conducting. Those focused on using terrorism usually
operate individually or in small cells and are often armed with explosives instead of
weapons.In sum, the Field Manual on Tactics in Counterinsurgency makes clear that there are
several levels of support for an insurgent party to the conflict, which range from general
and political support to movement leadership, and that only persons assuming actual
fighting function are regarded as combatants (guerrillas).
(e) Generic use of the term ‘combatant’ for all persons subject to lawful attack
As has been shown above, the ICRC’s study on customary IHL comes to the conclusion that,
even in situations of non-international armed conflict, ‘[t]he parties to the conflict must at
all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed
against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians’.The study
emphasizes that the term combatant in this rule is used in its generic meaning, that is to
say, that it does not imply an entitlement to combatant privilege or POW-status but
describes persons who do not enjoy civilian protection against attack.According to this
interpretation, the notion of combatant would not only include members of state armed
forces and organized armed groups (regular and functional combatants), but also civilians
directly participating in hostilities. While the terminology chosen by the ICRC is perfectly
justified in the generic context in which it is used, it should not be misunderstood as a
technical definition of combatancy. The danger of using the term ‘combatant’ in this
expansive sense is that it implies a continuous status or function. Describing civilians
directly participating in hostilities as ‘combatants’, therefore, is likely to lead to their
targeting not only while they are actually carrying out an act amounting to direct
participation in hostilities, but even in the interval between specific hostile acts. This would
be contrary to customary and treaty IHL, according to which civilians lose protection
against direct attack only ‘for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities’.106
The
description of civilians directly participating in hostilities as combatants also contradicts
the very formulation of the principle of distinction, according to which civilians and
combatants must be mutually exclusive categories. It (p. 322) is therefore generally
preferable to restrict the use of the term ‘combatant’ to state armed forces and organized
armed groups and exclude civilians directly participating in hostilities.
100
101
102
103
104
105
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Annex 72
Richard Gardiner, TREATY INTERPRETATION (Oxford University Press 2d ed.,
2015)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
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Oxford Public International Law
Content type: Book content
Product: Oxford Scholarly Authorities on International Law [OSAIL]
Series: Oxford International Law Library
Published in print: 01 June 2015
ISBN: 9780199669233
Part II Interpretation Applying the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, A The General
Rule, 7 The General Rule: (3) Relevant Rules of
International Law and Special Meanings
From: Treaty Interpretation (2nd Edition)
Richard Gardiner
Previous Edition (1 ed.)
Subject(s):
Rules of treaty interpretation — Authority of previous decisions (precedents) — Treaties, scope (temporal
and territorial)
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new standards given proper weight, not only when States contemplate new
activities but also when continuing with activities begun in the past. This need to
reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly
expressed in the concept of sustainable development …5. Special Meanings
5.1 Introduction
The notion of a special meaning includes two distinct categories. One is the meaning which
a term has in a particular area of human endeavour; the other is a particular meaning given
by someone using a term that differs from the more common meaning or meanings. The
former is essentially an ordinary meaning in the particular context. It may be a term of art,
but the context leaves no room for doubt once the term is recognized as such. Terms in the
second category require some indication from the user that their meaning differs from the
expected one.
The Vienna rules cover both situations; but courts and tribunals do not always make it clear
whether they are considering a meaning that is ‘ordinary’ in the particular context or
‘special’ because the intention of the user to give the term a particular meaning is apparent.
Article 31(4) of the Vienna Convention is most apt to cover the second category, referring to
what the parties intended, though it is broad enough to cover the first if it has not already
been taken into account under paragraph (1) of the article.
Article 31(4) presents two main issues: first, in what circumstances is reliance to be placed
on this provision if investigating a particular meaning of a term in a treaty, and, second,
how is the intention of the parties to be identified?
(p. 335) 5.2 History and preparatory work
The first formulation of the Vienna rules, in the Third Report of the Special Rapporteur
(Waldock), envisaged giving a meaning to a term of a treaty other than its natural and
ordinary meaning ‘if it is established conclusively that the parties employed the term in the
treaty with that special meaning’.Further provision was made for reference to ‘other
evidence or indications of the intentions of the parties and, in particular, to the preparatory
work of the treaty, the circumstances surrounding its conclusion and the subsequent
practice of parties’ in order to establish such special meaning.There was little debate in the ILC on these drafts. When the provision on special meanings
was consolidated into a separate draft article, the commentary recorded that some
members of the ILC doubted the need to include provision on this point, noting that
‘technical or special use of the term normally appears from the context and the technical or
special meaning becomes, as it were, the ordinary meaning in the particular context’ (the
first category of special meaning suggested above).The main reason given in favour of
including a specific provision on the point was to emphasize that the burden of proof lies on
the party invoking the special meaning of the term, and the strictness of the proof
required.This concern reflected the stress laid on this point in the two cases mentioned
in the commentary.On separation into a distinct draft article, the provision on special meanings lost its link
with preparatory work as a source of evidence. The Special Rapporteur (Waldock),
responding to a comment by a state, explained the proposed transfer of the provision to the
first draft article on interpretation in a way which introduced some uncertainty into what
had been an explicit reference to use of preparatory work as a possible source of evidence
of a special meaning:
157
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159
160
161
162
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The establishment of a ‘special meaning’ is not one of the purposes for which article
70 admits recourse to travaux préparatoires, and unless the ‘special meaning’ rule
is made part of article 69, means of interpretation necessary to establish a special
meaning may appear to be excluded.While this indicates that the primary means of establishing a special meaning was now to
be application of the general rule of interpretation, the reference to (p. 336) establishment
of a special meaning not being a purpose of the provision on recourse to preparatory work
may reasonably be taken as meaning that such establishment was not a purpose separate
from those of confirming or determining the meaning in the specified circumstances.
There was not very much debate about how a special meaning would be established. One
view was that, given the requirements that the proponent of a special meaning had the
burden of proving it, ‘there should be no need to resort to auxiliary means of interpretation
in order to establish that special meaning’.The Special Rapporteur (Waldock) gave his
own opinion that ‘where a special meaning could be established by special evidence, it was
very probable that that meaning would appear in the context of the treaty’.To the
suggestion that a provision on special meanings was unnecessary because any special
meaning given by the parties to a term would be an ordinary meaning in the context of the
treaty, he responded that ‘that proposition was too subtle to be understood by many of
those who would be likely to interpret treaties’ and that the proposed provision was
therefore necessary.In a manner that is rather more typical of treaty negotiations than deliberations of a group
of experts, the question how it could be established, without recourse to the further means
of interpretation, that the parties intended a term to have a special meaning was left to the
drafting committee.When the draft emerged, the debate was about where the provision
should be placed, without objection to the assumption of the initiator of the discussion who
had suggested:
… it might be better if paragraph 4 were placed immediately after paragraph 1; that
would show the process of interpretation more clearly. Paragraph 4 provided that a
special meaning should be given to a term if it was established that the parties so
intended. How was that intention to be established? Presumably by the rules of
interpretation set out in paragraphs 2 and 3, and in article 70 [ultimately
incorporated into article 32]. The purpose of interpretation was to ascertain which
of several ordinary meanings was the one intended or whether a special meaning
was given to a term.The hesitant inclusion of a place for the provision on special meanings at the end of the
general rule was effectively endorsed by the vote to accept the drafting committee’s
proposal on this after the observation that:
Paragraph 4, on the other hand, dealt with a minor point which was of limited
application; in fact, the Drafting Committee had even considered dropping that
provision altogether. It would therefore detract from the importance of paragraph 1
if the contents of paragraph 4 were incorporated in it or placed immediately after it
as a new paragraph 2. Such a change would also have the disadvantage of breaking
the continuity of the [general rule] …(p. 337) Thus the outcome of the work of the ILC was to change the original idea of a
special meaning derived principally from evidence of the intention of the parties, in
particular by reference to the preparatory work, to one which was centred on the primary
means of interpretation. This would leave as the most obvious cases of special meanings
those in a treaty’s definition provision, elsewhere in the context, or in any of the
instruments identified by application of the rest of the general rule.170
But it also leaves an
163
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165
166
167
168
169
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uncertain impression over the extent to which supplementary means can be invoked as
support for a special meaning. Applying the Vienna rules, this would only be permissible
within an interpretative exercise justifying reliance on supplementary means by reference
to article 32. However, such an exercise would envisage recourse to preparatory work ‘to
confirm’ any meaning that emerged in the course of interpretation without any prerequisite
of finding ambiguity. Hence if good evidence of an intended special meaning were produced
from preparatory work, this could trigger reassessment of the meaning reached by
application of the general rule.As a footnote to the preparatory work of article 31(4), one member of the ILC gave his view
that the reference to ‘the parties’ whose intention was to establish a special meaning should
be understood as meaning the parties which had participated in the authentication of the
treaty, not in its conclusion.However, article 2(1)(g) of the Vienna Convention defines a
party as a state ‘which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is
in force’. There seems no ground to displace such a clear definition by reference to a single
view expressed in the preparatory work, particularly as any consensus on a special meaning
recorded in the preparatory work would be admissible if the circumstances envisaged in
article 32 arose.5.3 Issues and practice
5.3.1 Special meaning and ordinary meaning distinguished
Selection of a particular meaning from a range of possible meanings by reference to the
context may lead to a particular sense being mandated by the subject matter—for example,
where a word is a term of art.This is the thought expressed by some members of the ILC
(considered in section 5.1 above). There appears, however, to be a reluctance on the part of
courts and tribunals to class a meaning (p. 338) as ‘special’ if there is any way it can be
justified as ‘ordinary’. The ILC Special Rapporteur (Waldock) noted that ‘in most cases in
which a special meaning of a term had been pleaded, the tribunals appeared to have
rejected the special meaning’.In Witold Litwa v Poland the ECHR preferred to use an
extended meaning of ‘alcoholics’ to include drinkers who are not addicted, rather than
accept Poland’s argument that the parties had intended a special meaning.In Georgia v
Russian Federation Russia had argued that the term ‘dispute’ should be given a special
meaning derived from the context of provisions distinguishing a ‘matter, ‘complaints’, and
‘disputes’, the latter being alleged to mean only matters or complaints which had proceeded
through the stages stipulated by the treaty for a dispute to crystallize.However, the ICJ
declined to ascribe a narrower interpretation than usually given to the word as generally
understood and as used in comparable compromissory clauses in treaties drawn up around
the same time as the one in issue.It is probably of no great consequence whether an interpreter finds the route to the
appropriate meaning through an understanding of what is an ‘ordinary’ meaning or whether
such a meaning is viewed as ‘special’. Provided the interpreter uses all appropriate
evidence to evaluate the probable meanings the correct result should be ascertainable.
5.3.2 Burden of establishing a special meaning
That the burden falls on the party urging a special meaning is clear; but which party this is
in given circumstances may not always be incontestable. In the frontier dispute between El
Salvador and Honduras (with Nicaragua intervening), one of the several provisions in the
special agreement listing issues for the ICJ to decide invited the Court ‘to determine the
legal situation of the … maritime spaces’.There was disagreement between the parties
whether or not this empowered the Court (which heard the case as a Chamber rather than
the full court) to delimit a maritime boundary. ‘Delimitation’ of areas is a well-recognized
term for entrusting to international courts and tribunals jurisdiction to mark out boundaries
or frontiers. It was the term that had been used in the present case in relation to land
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frontiers. In contrast, ‘determining the legal situation’ could have meant something
different. El Salvador claimed that the relevant waters were subject to a condominium in
favour of the three coastal states of the Gulf of Fonseca. Legal status of an area is different
from its extent. One of the arguments put by Honduras was that the constitution of El
Salvador did not permit delimitation of the waters of (p. 339) the Gulf, that the different
wording was to accommodate these sensibilities, and that it was for the Court to decide
whether the status of the waters left it open to it to make a delimitation. The majority of the
chamber of the ICJ construed the issue as putting an evidential burden on Honduras:
In essence, it is arguing that a special meaning—one comprising the concept of
delimitation—was intended by the Parties to attach to the phrase ‘determine the
legal situation of the … maritime spaces’. The onus is therefore on Honduras to
establish that such was the case.The Chamber found that to accept the contention of Honduras would be to accept that the
parties were not in complete agreement over jurisdiction, which it must therefore lack on
this issue.Judge Torres Bernárdez, dissenting on this point, started with analysis of the
Spanish term determinar for ‘determine’ in the phrase 'determine the legal situation. He
found that this word could convey the idea of setting limits, hence delimitation.The
majority had also regarded this as a possible meaning if the word was taken in isolation, but
the context and construction of the sentence had made it clear that what was being
determined was the legal situation, not the limits, of the waters.In contrast, Judge
Torres Bernárdez considered that once it was admitted that delimit could be an ordinary
meaning of determinar, the onus fell on El Salvador to establish, as a special meaning, that
it excluded delimitation.This example may be unusual in that neither party appears to have advanced a particular
special meaning which it could be required to establish. It suggests that there may remain
an unresolved issue whether article 31(4) offers a further way, within the general rule, of
selecting from a range of ordinary meanings or whether it is really to be viewed as a
particular rule to be brought into play when a meaning at odds with the normal processes
for selection of an ordinary meaning is being advanced.
5.3.3 Evidence required to establish a special meaning
In recommending inclusion of a provision on special meanings, Waldock noted that the PCIJ
‘had decided that evidence of the special meaning to be attached to a term was admissible
but that the burden of proof was upon the party desiring to establish that special
meaning’.He said that ‘he personally thought that where a special meaning could be
established by special evidence, it was very probable that that meaning would appear in the
context of the treaty’.186
The most common way in which a special meaning is indicated is
by including a definition article in a treaty. Beyond that there is little practice showing
clearly what would amount to the necessary ‘special evidence’. If no definition is provided it
is a matter of assessing the intent of the parties in the light of the available evidence.
(p. 340) A good example of the contrasting situations is given in the Roma Rights case (UK
House of Lords) concerning the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva,
1951 and its 1967 Protocol:
It is also noteworthy that article 31(4) of the Vienna Convention requires a special
meaning to be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. That
rule is pertinent, first, because the [Geneva] Convention gives a special, defined,
meaning to ‘refugee’ and, secondly, because the parties have made plain that
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‘refouler’, whatever its wider dictionary definition, is in this context to be
understood as meaning ‘return’.With regard to the second of these special meanings, it would not normally be the case that
a special meaning is to be linked with the treaty in one language only unless the meaning is
in doubt and the treaty specifies that that language is to prevail.In the present case,
however, the Convention itself provided evidence of how the English and French
understanding of the special meaning were to be aligned by including the French term in
the English title and text of article 33: ‘Prohibition of expulsion or return (“refoulement”) …
No contracting state shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee …’. Lord Bingham put it
this way:
… the French verb refouler and the French noun refoulement are, in article 33, the
subject of a stipulative definition: they must be understood as having the meaning
of the English verb and noun ‘return’.Where material is generally regarded as providing an authoritative interpretation of a
treaty, it seems plausible to accept from it a special meaning.Where a special meaning is
recorded in the preparatory work, its effect on interpretation is probably no different from
that of other statements or declarations in preparatory work, but confirmation of this is not
readily found.
(p. 341) 5.3.4 Special meanings and special regimes
It does not follow that because a rule or regime may be correctly characterized as a lex
specialis terms in a treaty establishing the rule or regime are to be viewed as having a
special meaning. This is apparent from the opinion of Lord Steyn in Mullen.Where a
conviction was set aside because the accused had been brought before the court by unjust
means rather than because his guilt was in doubt, was he entitled to compensation under
legislation giving effect to article 14(6) on ‘miscarriage of justice’ in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966? Lord Steyn considered that the Court of Appeal
had erred in relying on what had been described there as ‘the ordinary use of English’ and
in concluding that because the phrase ‘miscarriage of justice’ was wide enough to cover the
circumstances of the case (ie where the guilt of the claimant was not in doubt but he should
not have been unlawfully deported to stand trial in England), the Covenant required
compensation to be paid. Lord Steyn stressed that what was relevant was ‘the autonomous
meaning of the concept in article 14(6)’ of the Covenant.He considered that ‘the obvious
and sensible construction is that article 14(6) is a lex specialis’ to be read in the context of
the treaty (which did not require that a particular meaning be imputed to it in the light of
the presumption of innocence in article 14(2)).It can be seen that this is not to attribute
a special meaning to ‘miscarriage of justice’, but simply acknowledges that the term is to be
interpreted in the sense of the Covenant, rather than as it might be in English law.
In line with the freedom inherent in the right of states to draw up their treaties as they
wish, states (and international organizations) may include their own rules of interpretation.
It is also possible to see the principle underlying recognition that parties may attribute a
special meaning to a term that they use as supporting the possibility that parties to a treaty
may include special interpretative principles which differ from those in the Vienna rules, or
which place a different weight on one or more of the elements of interpretation, a
possibility which is also consistent with choosing the arbiters of interpretation. This
freedom is confirmed by the practice of states in their treaty making. There do not,
however, appear to be examples of wholesale displacement of the Vienna rules.
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A prominent example of a particular rule of interpretation in a treaty is article 22(2) of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002):
The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by
analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the
person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.194
(p. 342) It can readily be seen that inclusion of such a provision in a treaty dealing with
international criminal law properly provides a special rule appropriate to the subject
matter, rather than a wholesale replacement of the Vienna rules which are of a general
character and, in the interpretation of the Rome Statute, would apply to article 22 taking
account of the context as an element of the general rule.195
This is consistent with the
principle that general provisions do not derogate from special ones.196
A more general interpretative provision may be included in a treaty circumscribing the
interpretative role of an arbitral tribunal. For example, in the Indus Waters arbitration the
treaty included in an annexure providing for a Court of Arbitration:
Except as the Parties may otherwise agree, the law to be applied by the Court shall
be this Treaty and, whenever necessary for its interpretation or application, but
only to the extent necessary for that purpose, the following in the order in which
they are listed:
(a) International conventions establishing rules which are expressly
recognized by the Parties.
(b) Customary international law. 197
Such a provision clearly attempts to limit recourse to extraneous application of
international rules, perhaps to counter wide-ranging approaches such as those criticized
above in the ICJ’s Oil Platforms case.198
In the Indus Waters case, the Court followed the
Vienna rules applicable as customary law but took care in following its mandate on
applicable law as quoted above.199
6. Conclusions
The origins of article 31(3)(c) in attempts to incorporate the intertemporal rule into the
rules of interpretation became obscured as the provision was pared down to its somewhat
opaque final version. To the extent that the provision can bring (p. 343) into play obligations
of international law which have arisen after conclusion of the treaty, the time element is still
present; but use of this calls for fine judgement in assessing whether the proper
interpretation is that the treaty is one which envisaged interpretation in the light of the
circumstances at the time of its conclusion or, having been drawn up to endure and adapt,
requires account to be taken of later developments.
More specifically, roles for the rule in article 31(3)(c) may include:
(a) resolving time issues (including application of the intertemporal law);
(b) completing the legal picture, or filling gaps, in a treaty by reference to general
international law;
(c) deriving guidance from other treaty provisions;
(d) resolving conflicting obligations arising under different treaties;
(e) taking account of international law developments.
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Annex 73
Jutta Brunnée, Harm Prevention, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Lavanya Rajamani & Jacqueline Peel, eds., 2d ed. 2021)
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Content type: Book content
Product: Oxford Scholarly Authorities on International Law [OSAIL]
Series: Oxford Handbooks
Published in print: 12 August 2021
ISBN: 9780198849155
Part III Conceptual Pillars, Ch.16 Harm Prevention
Jutta Brunnée
From: The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (2nd
Edition)
Edited By: Lavanya Rajamani, Jacqueline Peel
Previous Edition (1 ed.)
Subject(s):
Precautionary principle
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(p. 269) Chapter 16 Harm Prevention
I. Introduction
International environmental law originates from and revolves around the harm prevention
rule. As a practical matter, it is difficult to argue with the proposition that the prevention of
harm should be the primary objective of international environmental law. However, it is
important to appreciate that the harm prevention rule finds its conceptual origins not in the
protection of the environment, but in the mutual limitation of sovereign rights to the use
and enjoyment of territory. Only gradually did its focus expand from transboundary
interferences to impacts on areas beyond the jurisdiction of states, and from harm to
sovereign rights to harm to the environment. And yet, state-centrism constrains the
status as general international law and its centrality in the field, ambiguities and conceptual
puzzles obscure its apparently straightforward message.
In this chapter, I focus on three points of contention, each related to the role of due
diligence in harm prevention, and each highlighted by recent judicial engagements with the
environmental harm is not absolute, but requires due diligence in the face of risk of
significant harm. However, it is unclear whether a failure to act diligently to avert harm on
the relationship between the procedural and substantive dimensions of the harm prevention
rule remains ambiguous. Third, there is some uncertainty as to where the line runs between
the harm prevention obligation and the precautionary principle, given the focus of both
notions on risk.
As I will go on to show, these inter-related conceptual questions affect the harm prevention
whether or not a breach of the rule presupposes causation of significant harm has
important implications for both the application of the law of state responsibility and the
(p.
270)
emergence, and distinctive features, of treaty-based approaches to regional and global
environmental concerns.
In exploring the development and traits of the harm prevention rule, I show that,
notwithstanding the conceptual puzzles, the harm prevention rule is the normative
cornerstone of international environmental law, both customary and treaty-based.
II. Conceptual Questions
A. Status as General International Law
Commentators generally trace the harm prevention rule in international environmental law
back to the 1941 arbitral award in the Trail Smelter case. The tribunal held that:
to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or
persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is
established by clear and convincing evidence.1
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The Trail Smelter award marked the first time that an international tribunal articulated the
harm prevention rule in relation to transboundary pollution.In so doing, the tribunal built
These duties, in turn, harken back to the conceptual necessity of balancing between the
rights of sovereign equals,as well as to principles such as sic (p. 271) utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas (use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another), abuse
of rights, and good neighbourliness.Today, it is beyond doubt that the harm prevention rule is binding under general
protect within their territories the rights of other states in the Corfu Channel case.However, only in 1996, in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, did the court
The ICJ reiterated this conclusion in the
case,the Pulp Mills case,and in the Costa Rica v Nicaragua/
Nicaragua v Costa Rica cases.The affirmation of the harm prevention rule by the ICJ followed the accelerating
development of international environmental law that began in the 1970s. The perhaps most
influential restatement of the rule is found in Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm
to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
The phrasing of Principle 21, reaffirmed in the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development,and in a series of multilateral environmental agreements
(MEAs),highlighted that harm prevention duties extend also to global commons.Furthermore, although Principle 21 did not stipulate a particular threshold (p. 272) of
According to the ICJ, the
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the harm prevention
all states are required to avert
significant transboundary environmental harm, wherever it may occur. Equally important is
assigning responsibility for harm, came to be complemented by a harm prevention principle
specific to international environmental law.To be sure, the older cases, including the Trail
Smelter case, revolved around instances of actual harm, prompting much of the early
scholarly debate to focus on questions of state responsibility.Nonetheless, as I suggest
diligently to prevent harm from occurring in the first place. Over time, as environmental
problems became more pressing and the need for proactive approaches better understood,
this preventive dimension assumed increasing importance in the environmental context.
The harm prevention rule in international environmental law thus represents a shift in
This is not to say that the
general rule and the one that operates in international environmental law are identical. The
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most significant difference is the focus of the latter on environmental harm, including in
particular harm to areas beyond state jurisdiction.(p. 273) B. The Role of Due Diligence
1. Harm prevention and the due diligence standard
When the ICJ, in its Pulp Mills decision, held that the harm prevention rule is intertwined
it confirmed a long-standing
view in the international environmental law literature.The Trail Smelter decision did not
explicitly address the standard of conduct required in harm prevention,nor did the
Stockholm and Rio Declarations several decades later.However, as we have seen, these
articulations of the environmental harm prevention duty built on broader principles that
encumber territorial sovereignty.It is directly relevant, therefore, that in the Corfu
Channel
other states was not absolute, but contingent on what they knew or should have known
about risks emanating from their territories.The court considered this proposition to be a
And, indeed, the idea that states owe one another
not harm prevention as such but due diligence had already found expression in earlier cases
revolving around duties in relation to potentially harmful conduct by various actors within a
The fact that the potentially harmful conduct frequently is not state
defining traits of international environmental law.In more than one sense, then, a
consistent line runs from these early cases to the Pulp Mills ruling, where the ICJ invoked
precisely its decision in the Corfu Channel case to anchor the environmental harm
prevention rule in the due diligence incumbent upon states under general international law.
In Pulp Mills, as well as in its subsequent decision in the Costa Rica v Nicaragua/Nicaragua
v Costa Rica cases, the ICJ expanded on what due diligence requires of states (p. 274) in the
adoption of appropriate rules and measures, but also a certain level of vigilance in their
enforcement and the exercise of administrative control applicable to public and private
In other
words, due diligence has substantive as well as procedural aspects. Due diligence is also an
inherently contextual standard. What is reasonable and appropriate depends in part on the
risks of harm that attach to a given activity. The required level of care may also change over
time, as risks or technological and regulatory standards evolve, and may differ as between
economically and technologically advanced countries and countries with capacity
limitations.
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities constitute the most detailed effort to date
to tease out the implications of the harm prevention rule and its attendant due diligence
requirements.
They also highlight a
crucially important point that follows from the very idea of harm prevention: the attendant
due diligence obligations are triggered not by significant harm, but when activities entail a
risk of such harm.The ICJ appears to agree. In Costa Rica v Nicaragua/Nicaragua v Costa
Rica
significant transboundary environmental harm, a State must, before embarking on an
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activity having the potential adversely to affect the environment of another State, ascertain
2. Procedure and substance
International environmental lawyers, and textbooks in the field, routinely distinguish
Substantive rules set out standards
environmental harm being one example. Procedural obligations include the duties to notify,
warn, inform, or consult states potentially affected by transboundary (p. 275) impacts, and
to undertake (transboundary) environmental impact assessments (EIA).The ICJ, in its
Pulp Mills and Costa Rica v Nicaragua/Nicaragua v Costa Rica decisions, followed this
categorization, in each case beginning the assessment of state conduct in relation to
procedural obligations and then turning to substance.In teaching and writing about international environmental law over the years, I had always
proceeded from the premise that, legally, these procedural obligations are both an element
of the harm prevention duty and independent of it as customary rules in their own right.41
This conclusion seemed obvious, because states do not owe an absolute duty to prevent
significant transboundary environmental harm, but a duty to take diligent measures to
avoid such harm. Thus, in addition to taking appropriate regulatory and policy measures,
states must undertake EIAs and notify, inform, or consult with potentially affected states, as
as the standard of conduct of the harm prevention rule, it actually gives rise to substantive
and procedural requirements. The ICJ says as much in Pulp Mills, not only tracing the harm
prevention rule back to the due diligence required of states, but also confirming that due
diligence entails substantive and procedural duties.42
The court makes the point perhaps
most explicitly in Costa Rica v Nicaragua/Nicaragua v Costa Rica, when it observes in
relation to EIA that:
[T]o fulfil its obligation to exercise due diligence in preventing significant
transboundary environmental harm, a State must, before embarking on an activity
having the potential adversely to affect the environment of another State, ascertain
if there is a risk of significant transboundary harm, which would trigger the
requirement to carry out an environmental impact assessment.43
Yet, notwithstanding its conclusion that a state would not act diligently if it failed to take
the appropriate procedural steps, the ICJ proceeded to hold in both Pulp Mills and Costa
Rica v Nicaragua/Nicaragua v Costa Rica that, absent actual transboundary harm, no
substantive breach had occurred.44
The court has been roundly criticized in the literature
for this approach to the harm prevention rule.45
Indeed, strongly worded (p. 276) separate
opinions in both decisions reveal that the court itself was divided on the issue, and on the
relationship between the procedural and substantive aspects of the harm prevention rule.46
between procedure and substance, and the core notion of due diligence, are far less settled
than one might have assumed.47
One might go further, however, and conclude that the
environmental law.48
After all, it is not primarily an obligation not to cause harm, but an
obligation to take diligent steps to prevent harm. It is, in other words, an obligation of
conduct.49
falls short of what due diligence requires. Furthermore, this result should obtain even if the
due diligence failures are procedural in nature.50
While it may seem counterintuitive at first
glance to suggest that a procedural failure might suffice to breach a substantive obligation,
this is precisely what the harm prevention rule entails. This result is entirely consistent with
the importance of prevention in environmental protection and, in turn, with the crucial role
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that procedural duties play in enabling harm prevention.These duties are central to the
environment.3. Prevention and precaution
A third area of ambiguity revolves around the boundary between the harm prevention rule
and the precautionary principle. Notionally, the harm prevention rule applies when a risk of
significant harm is foreseeable. By contrast, the precautionary principle is triggered even
when there is some uncertainty as to the existence of a risk of serious or irreversible
harm.But in practice, and even conceptually, it is difficult to draw a clear (p. 277) line
between prevention and precaution. For example, in defining the risk that triggers the harm
54
In its commentary, the ILC observes that the duty to act
abundant caution, even if full scientific certainty does not exist, to avoid or prevent serious
55
In so doing, the ILC invokes the most common formulation of the
precautionary principle, found in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration.The 2011 Advisory Opinion of the Seabed Chamber of the International Tribunal on the Law
of the Sea (ITLOS) on Responsibilities in the Area
and locates the ultimately fluid line between prevention and precaution in the notion of due
diligence.The ITLOS Chamber emphasizes the contextual nature of the due diligence
standard, which it considers may differ inter alia in light of the risks involved in a given
activity.The implication is that due diligence provides a bridge between the duty to
The due diligence obligation, which
situations where scientific evidence concerning the scope and potential negative impact of
the activity in question is insufficient but where there are plausible indications of potential
While this perspective seems sensible in many respects, it remains to be seen whether its
fluid approach to prevention and precaution, in addition to finding the support of expert
bodies,will be more widely embraced in international practice. The perhaps most
significant implication of this approach to prevention and precaution is the increased
importance that it accords to procedural obligations, including in particular EIA obligations,
and the lowering of thresholds that it entails for the triggering of these obligations. The ICJ
has remained cautious. It did not pick up on the approach, let alone (p. 278) the ITLOS
Costa Rica v Nicaragua/Nicaragua v Costa
Rica of due diligence and of the risk threshold necessary to trigger the EIA obligation.III. The Harm Prevention Rule as a Reference Point for
International Environmental Law
The conceptual questions explored in Section II
implications for the functioning of international environmental law. For example, whether or
not a breach of the rule presupposes causation of harm affects the application of the law of
state responsibility and the recourse to judicial processes. In turn, the harm prevention
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reference for the distinctive features of treaty-based approaches to international
environmental concerns.
A. The Law of State Responsibility
The law of state responsibility is triggered by breaches of a rule of international law.In
international environmental law, recourse to the law of state responsibility is most likely to
follow from a breach of the harm prevention rule or one of the associated procedural
obligations. That is because the harm prevention rule is uncontested as a rule of general
international law, such that any state that is exposed to a risk of significant transboundary
harm that emanates from activities in another state can invoke the rule against that state.The attendant procedural obligations will tend to play a central role in this context. They
are relevant in assessing whether the state in question made diligent efforts to prevent
transboundary harm. Furthermore, it is likely to be considerably easier to establish that
required procedural steps were not taken than it would be to show that regulatory or
oversight measures were inadequate. It is not surprising, therefore, that the recent ICJ
cases on transboundary environmental impacts revolved around the harm prevention rule
and, more specifically, the attendant procedural requirements, such as EIA, notification,
and consultation.
(p. 279) At first glance, one might assume that state responsibility for a breach of the harm
prevention rule would presuppose proof of the causation of significant transboundary
environmental harm, making it a legal long shot. Indeed, it could be quite difficult to
establish the causal links between activities in one state and particular harm in another,
especially when the states concerned are not immediate neighbours. But, as suggested in
Section II.B.2, successful invocation of the harm prevention rule does not in fact require
proof of actual or future harm.Since the harm prevention rule is not an obligation of
conduct falls short of what due diligence required.Hence, a plaintiff state must establish
a risk of significant transboundary harm and show that the other state failed to take the
preventive steps appropriate in light of that risk. In other words, the harm prevention rule
and the related procedural obligations are potentially powerful legal tools. They can help
ensure that states take the concrete steps that transboundary harm prevention requires in
practice.
Furthermore, the harm prevention rule could be consequential even in relation to complex
problems such as climate change.In invoking the rule, an island or coastal state would
damage to it from sea level rise. It would need to show risk and lack of diligent preventive
measures.
it should not be difficult to establish
the requisite risk. Indeed, we now live in a world of high probability of disastrous climate
harm,certainly as far as small island nations are concerned.
What would be gained by deploying the law of state responsibility in this way? Perhaps
counterintuitively, the primary objective of this approach would not be compensation for
harm, but confirmation and concretization of what diligence requires of states in the
context of climate change.The consequences that the law of state responsibility would
attach to a breach of the harm prevention rule explain why. Only if a state (p. 280) can show
would compensation be a possible remedy.By contrast, the most likely legal consequence
of a failure to exercise diligence, absent proof of harm, would be the obligation to cease the
internationally wrongful act, and thus to comply with the duty to take appropriate
preventive measures.Given the difficulties of establishing causation, for the purposes of
general international law, the development of more specific criteria for climate diligence,
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therefore, may well be the most valuable result of an invocation of the law of state
responsibility.Lest I be accused of undue optimism as to the potential of the harm prevention rule, a few
caveats are in order. First, so far the ICJ has been unwilling to fully embrace the preventive
logic of the harm rule.The Pulp Mills and Costa Rica v Nicaragua/Nicaragua v Costa Rica
decisions suggest that the ICJ distinguishes between the duty to take diligent steps to
prevent significant transboundary harm, which it then deals with under the rubric of
separate procedural obligations, and the duty to take diligent steps not to cause harm,
which it considers cannot be violated simply by a failure to act diligently.It appears, then,
as if the ICJ considers significant harm to be an element of the primary rule, rather than a
factor that is relevant in determining the legal consequences of and remedies for a breach.
Second, the flipside of the proposition that harm prevention entails a duty to act diligently
is that, even when significant harm results, the rule will not be violated as long as a state
can show that it has exercised due diligence.Third, to date, the harm prevention rule at
custom has been deployed only in cases involving immediately neighbouring states.
Although the notion of transboundary harm prevention should encompass any inter-state
situation,it has not been invoked in relation to risks of long-range or diffuse impacts.The least developed part of the harm prevention rule concerns impacts beyond the
jurisdiction of states. Yes, states are obligated to prevent harm to areas beyond national
jurisdiction, but is that obligation owed erga omnes
Clear state practice in relation to the
Prevention, for their part, are explicitly limited to (p. 281)
or in other places under the jurisdiction or control of a State other than the State of
B. Judicial Processes
When it comes to the avenues for giving legal effect to international environmental
protection goals, states must contend not only with the parameters provided by the harm
prevention rule and the law of state responsibility, but also with the procedural rules that
constrain recourse to international courts and tribunals. For present purposes, suffice it to
focus on the ICJ as a court of general jurisdiction. Contentious cases are contingent on the
consent of the states concerned.So far, this precondition has been met primarily in cases
rule. In line with the uncertainties surrounding the erga omnes effect of the harm
prevention rule, the ICJ has not pronounced itself on that aspect of the rule. It remains
unclear, therefore, whether and under what circumstances a state would have standing
under general international law to invoke the harm prevention rule in relation to risks to or
impacts on a commons.Some commentators rightly suggest that, outside of the transboundary context narrowly
conceived, an Advisory Opinion may be a more promising option for deploying the harm
Standing
issues would not arise in this context, and it would be possible to frame the question put to
the court in such a way as to sidestep the question of the role of harm in the primary rule,
and the need to prove causation. The focus could be squarely on what the harm prevention
rule requires of states, including what due diligence entails in relation to global issues such
as climate change. But the route to an Advisory Opinion is constrained by its own
procedural requirements. Specifically, the request for an Advisory Opinion must be made by
an organ of the United Nations,most commonly the General Assembly. While it has been
possible to carefully craft questions so as to secure the required majority of votes even for
highly contentious issues, the ICJ has not yet the opportunity to offer an Advisory Opinion
squarely focused on the harm prevention rule.An initiative by Palau to ask the court to
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80 81
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greenhouse gases do not harm other (p. 282) states was abandoned in the face of resistance
from key countries.It is worth noting that Palau had framed the proposed question in
terms of the inter-state aspect of the harm prevention rule, not the commons aspect, a
choice that underscores the enduringly state-centric practice relating to the rule.
C. Treaty-Based Approaches
So far, I have made the case that the harm prevention rule is not only the core rule of
customary international environmental law, but also provides a potentially promising legal
tool-kit for states in curbing transboundary environmental impacts. But for all its potential,
rule. Multifaceted collective action challenges that implicate multiple states with widely
ranging priorities and capabilities cannot be solved on the basis of a rule that remains
predominantly focused on inter-state impacts. Furthermore, notwithstanding the
importance of the due diligence standard as a background rule of conduct in general
international law, such an open-textured standard cannot support the finely calibrated
responses required to deal with large-scale problems like long-range transboundary air
pollution, ozone depletion, or climate change. The parameters of the harm prevention rule
illustrate, therefore, why treaty-based approaches were needed to address the vast majority
of international environmental concerns today. It is in this sense that the harm prevention
rule provides a reference point not only for general international law, but also for MEAs.
Treaty-based approaches typically invoke the harm prevention rule in general international
law as a background norm,90
but also provide tailored substantive and procedural duties to
information gathering, risk assessment, information exchange, and consultative duties.91
general international law, help prepare the ground for and further develop substantive
standard setting. While, at customary law, much of the substance of harm prevention is
furnished by the requirements that flow from the due diligence standard, in the treaty
context dedicated procedures exist for the elaboration of highly specific substantive
standards.92
For the most part, the substantive standards generated under the auspices of
MEAs, such as emission standards or reduction targets, provide obligations of result.93
Thus, whether or not a party acted diligently in meeting (p. 283) the standard will be
irrelevant in assessing its compliance with its commitments. Finally, MEAs can also provide
for mechanisms that are animated by the collective interest of all treaty parties in
promoting the widest possible compliance with treaty commitments.94
The enforcement of
the harm prevention rule at customary law, by virtue of the parameters and constraints
explored in the preceding sections, is bound to be highly selective. By contrast, treaty-based
compliance mechanisms can be designed with a view to systematic performance
assessment, while also enabling accommodation of and assistance to states with capacity
limitations.
IV. Conclusion
The harm prevention rule is the normative cornerstone of international environmental law.
It serves as a reference point for international environmental law in a number of
interrelated ways. First, it is the point of origin of international environmental law. Second,
notwithstanding the ambiguities that obscure its full preventive potential, the harm
prevention rule is central to the normative structure of customary international
environmental law. It provides the yardstick for a range of procedural obligations, whether
these are understood as independently existing rules of customary law or as anchored in
an obligation of conduct that requires states to exercise due diligence in the face of risks of
significant transboundary environmental harm. Fourth, conceiving of the rule in this way
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reveals that it provides a potentially strong basis for the invocation of the law of state
responsibility and recourse to international courts and tribunals, at least in the context of
inter-state impacts. Fifth, the potential of the harm prevention rule is more limited in
relation to environmental harm beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and in the context
of complex, polycentric environmental problems. Finally, the harm prevention rule has
nonetheless served as a baseline for multilateral approaches to international environmental
protection, and its inherent constraints help illuminate many of the key features of
contemporary environmental agreements.
Bibliography
Leslie-Anne Duvic-Paoli, The Prevention Principle in International
Environmental Law (CUP 2018)
Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law, 20/1 (2017): 28
(p. 284) Jutta Brunnée, Procedure and Substance in International
Environmental Law (vol 40, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of
International Law (Recueil des Cours), Brill 2020)
Landmark Cases in Public
International Law (Hart 2017) 159
and Shirley Scott (eds), International Law in the Era of Climate Change
(Edward Elgar 2012) 321
Footnotes:
Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States/Canada) (1938 and 1941) 3 RIAA 1905 (Trail
Smelter case) 1965.
See eg Leslie-Anne Duvic-Paoli, The Prevention Principle in International Environmental
Law ;
Landmark Cases in
Public International Law ; Timothy Stephens,
International Courts and Environmental Protection (CUP 2009) 123.
See Trail Smelter case (n 1) 1963.
See Alabama claims of the United States of America against Great Britain (Award
rendered on 14 September 1872 by the tribunal of arbitration established by Article I of the
Treaty of Washington of 8 May 1871) 29 RIAA 125 (Alabama Arbitration). This is referred to
in Trail Smelter case (n 1); see also British Property in Spanish Morocco (Spain/UK) (1925)
2 RIAA 615 (British property case); Island of Palmas Case (The Netherlands/US) (1928) 2
RIAA 829.
See eg
American Journal of International Law, 69/1 (1975): 50, 56.
See Duvic-Paoli (n 2 Jelena Bäumler, Das Schädigungsverbot im Völkerrecht
.
Corfu Channel case (UK/Albania) (Judgement) [1949] ICJ Rep 4 (Corfu Channel case).
8
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226
(Legality of Nuclear Weapons case) 242.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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Subscriber: Covington & Burling Library; date: 07 April 2022
9
(Judgement) [1997] ICJ Rep 7
10
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina/Uruguay) (Judgement) [2010] ICJ Rep 14
11
Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica/Nicaragua)
and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua/Costa Rica)
12
13
Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UN 1993)
vol I, annex I, principle 2. Principle 2 here restates principle 21 of Stockholm Declaration,
environmental and developmental
14
See
Sovereign States Overwhelmed by Obligations: Responsibility to React to Problems Beyond
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht,
77/2 (2017): 339, 342.
Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle, and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the
Environment (3rd edn, OUP 2009) 145 (speaking of obligations that, in this context, operate
erga omnes).
10) 83; Certain Activities case
(n 11 Ulrich Beyerlin and Thilo Marauhn, International Environmental Law
(Hart Publishing 2011) 41.
Pulp Mills case (n 10 11) (invoking, in both cases, its
judgement in the Corfu Channel case).
See Duvic-Paoli (n 2
The Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development: A Commentary (OUP 2015) 108; Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel,
Principles of International Environmental Law (distinguishing
But see also
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 39/1 (1990): 1, 18 (noting that the Trail
Smelter
See also Alexander Proel
Proel (ed), Internationales Umweltrecht (De Gruyter 2017) 69, 83; Birnie et al (n 15
150; Benoît Mayer, The International Law of Climate Change .
Note that in the Trail Smelter case (n 1
Pulp Mills case (n 10).
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
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Subscriber: Covington & Burling Library; date: 07 April 2022
23
See eg
Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law, 20/1 (2017): 28, 34; Beyerlin and
Marauhn (n 16) 42;
Brunnée, and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law
(1st edn, OUP 2008) 531, 538; Birnie et al (n 15
24
See French (n 2
25
But see eg Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities
with respect to activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion) [2011] ITLOS Rep 10
international law tend to be understood as due diligence obligations).
26
See nn and accompanying text.
27
Corfu Channel case (n 7) 22.
28
Ibid.
See eg Alabama Arbitration (n 4); British property case (n 4
Revue générale de droit .
et al, Handbook of IEL (n 23
Pulp Mills case (n 10
Ibid, 79.
See ILC draft articles on prevention (n 16
Responsibilities in the Area case (n 25) [117]; Birnie et al (n 15
ILC draft articles on prevention (n 16).
Ibid, 148, general commentary, para 1.
et al (n 15
Certain Activities case (n 11) 706.
See eg Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Jorge Viñuales, International Environmental Law (1st
edn, CUP 2015) 54; Beyerlin and Marauhn (n 16 et al (n 15
See
ESIL Reflections, 5/6 (2016) <http://esil-sedi.eu/?p=1344>
accessed 22 February 2019.
See Pulp Mills case (n 10
11
obligations).
See also Birnie et al (n 15
Pulp Mills case (n 10) 79.
Certain Activities case (n 11
activity is required, in conformity with its due diligence obligation, to notify and consult in
good faith with the potentially affected State
See Pulp Mills case (n 10) 101; Certain Activities case (n 11
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
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Subscriber: Covington & Burling Library; date: 07 April 2022
See eg Proel (n 20) 83;
Latin
America and the International Court of Justice: Contributions to International Law
(Routledge 2017) 309.
46
See eg Pulp Mills case (n 10) (Joint Dissenting Opinion Al-Khasawneh & Simma) 120
11) (Separate
significant transboundary harm can engage the responsibility of the State of origin even in
47
39).
48
See also Brent (n 23) 56.
49
See also Responsibilities in the Area case (n 25) [110]; Certain Activities case (n 11)
(Separate Opinion of Judge Donoghue) [9]; ILC draft articles on prevention (n 16) 154;
Birnie et al (n 15) 143; Proel (n 20) 77;
European Journal of International Law, 10/2 (1999): 375,
379.
50
See also Birnie et al (n 15) 177.
51
See also Maljean-Dubois and Richard (n 45).
52
See also French (n 2) 181.
53
See Duvic-Paoli (n 2
54
ILC draft articles on prevention (n 16) art 2(a).
55
Ibid, 155, commentary on art 3, para 14.
56
Ibid; and see Rio Declaration (n 13) principle 15.
57
Responsibilities in the Area case (n 25) [116].
58
Ibid [117].
59
See Rio Declaration (n 13) principle 15.
60
Responsibilities in the Area case (n 25) [131].
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
7B; commentary (supporting the approach).
64
See Certain Activities case (n 11
65
66
See ibid, art 42 (on invocation of responsibility).
67
See nn 36, 49, and accompanying text.
45
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From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Covington & Burling Library; date: 07 April 2022
68
See ILC draft articles on prevention (n 16
also (n 49);
Yearbook of International
Environmental Law .
69
See
Community Interests Across
International Law (OUP 2018) 151; Brent (n 23
70
See Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Lavanya Rajamani, International Climate
Change Law .
71
ILC draft articles on prevention (n 16) art 2(a).
72
See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
Special Report (2018) Summary for Policymakers.
73
Bodansky et al, ICCL (n 70);
Rosemary Rayfuse and Shirley Scott (eds), International Law in the Era of Climate Change
(Edward Elgar 2012) 321, 341.
74
See generally Sands and Peel (n 18
See Lefeber (n 73);
Journal of Environmental Law, 28/1 (2016): 19, 31.
See also
Arizona State Law Journal 49/3 (2017) 689,
709, 712.
See also Brent (n 23) 56.
39).
See Bodansky et al, ICCL (n 70
See ILC draft articles on prevention (n 16) 152, art 2(c).
However, Legality of Nuclear Weapons case (n 8) did involve such a context, suggesting
that the harm prevention rule could be invoked by affected states in comparable
circumstances.
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium/Spain) (New
Application: 1962) (Judgement) [1970] ICJ Rep 3 [33]; but see also [91] (requiring a
concrete treaty mechanism to provide standing). For a discussion, see Bodansky et al, ICCL
(n 70
ILC draft articles on prevention (n 16) art 2(c).
ICJ Statute, art 36.
69
76) 712; Sands (n 75).
UN Charter, art 96; see also art 18.3 (requiring a majority vote).
In the context of Legality of Nuclear Weapons case (n 8) the harm prevention rule was
recourse to nuclear weapons.
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
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89
See
Yale Journal of International Law Online, 37
(Spring 2012): 35;
Transnational
Environmental Law 3/1 (2014): 17, 26.
90
See Fitzmaurice (n 14).
91
69
92
Ibid
93
See eg Bodansky et al, ICCL (n 70) 172 (commenting on obligations of result in the
Kyoto Protocol); Mayer (n 20) 115. But note also that the Paris Agreement, to the extent
that it does provide substantive requirements, casts them as obligations of conduct. See
Questions of International Law, Zoom-In, 26 (24 March 2016): 20.
94
69
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- 304 -
Annex 75
Oksana Polishuk, Feel the Difference: Who Ukraine Gives to Free From Captivity,
Ukrinform (27 December 2019)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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- 306 -
Ukrinform
Multimedia foreign broadcasting platform of Ukraine
[...]
To bring its captured compatriots home, Ukraine is forced to give up real terrorists
and child murderers to the enemy. But is there any other way out?
We believe December 29th will be a holiday, at least for several dozen Ukrainian families: their
relatives and loved ones, who spent anywhere from a year to almost six years in captivity with the
occupiers and their henchmen, will return home. A large-scale prisoner swap is expected to take
place at the Mayorske checkpoint at 11:00 AM on Sunday. This time, however, the Kremlin does
not plan to return to us the Ukrainians being held as political prisoners at pre-trial detention centers
and prisons in Russia and annexed Crimea. The exact number of people to be included in the
exchange lists has not been specified. The initial figure was put at nearly 300 prisoners, which was
then reduced to “a little more than 200.” The parameters of the likely exchange were later refined
further: 80 to 130 (Donetsk/Kyiv 55/65, Luhansk/Kyiv 25/65).
Many experts, politicians, journalists and social media users, in anticipation of the exchange, have
written about how unfair it is: after all, Ukraine will get back people who defended their country
against the enemy in accordance with the Constitution and international law – people who
accidentally fell into the net set up by the FSB and its branches in the so-called “republics” and who
faced trumped-up charges that were “pulled out of thin air.” In exchange, we will give back to the
enemy actual terrorists, criminal murderers and treacherous traitors… “Russia wants to take back its
own people: child murderers, executioners of the unarmed, terrorists, traitors – all of the filth of the
‘Russian world’ that has become the ‘Russian hell’ in Donbas. A name-by-name comparison of the
exchange lists is a comparison of two different worlds: the world of Russian devils and the world of
human beings,” writes the editor-in-chief of Tsenzor.net, Yury Butusov. And this is true. But we
need to understand: Ukraine is doing this for the sake of freeing its citizens. Proponents of this step
cite the example of the exchange of Israeli corporal Gilad Shalit, whom Israel rescued from captivity
by releasing over a thousand jailed Palestinians with links to terrorism.
So what do we know about our compatriots who may be returning home as early as this Sunday, and
about the individuals Ukraine will be handing over to Putin and his henchmen in return? We have
analyzed some information from open sources.
WHO WE ARE GIVING UP: TERRORISTS, CHILD MURDERERS, AND “EX-BERKUT”
[...]
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Viktor Skripnik,
resident of Mariupol, born 1987.
Arrested
Evgeny Druzhinin,
resident of Mariupol, born 1975, nickname “Lis" [“Fox”]
Arrested
Aleksandr Strelnikovich,
resident of Mariupol, born 1992
Arrested
[...]
3. Kharkiv terrorists
On February 22, 2015, a homemade bomb filled with shrapnel was remotely detonated during the
March of Dignity in Kharkiv. Four people were killed in the explosion, including a police officer
and a minor, and nine more were wounded. Kharkiv Euromaidan leader Ihor Tolmachov and police
officer Vadym Rybalchenko died on the spot. Fifteen-year-old student Danylo Didyk succumbed to
his wounds on February 23, followed by 18-year-old student Mykola Melnychuk on February 24.
Most participants in the march were saved by a Gazel truck that happened to be standing between
the mine and the crowd.
Volodymyr Dvornikov, Viktor Tetyutskyi and Serhiy Bashlykov were later arrested. According to
law-enforcement officers, the men were members of the Kharkiv Partisans, an underground terrorist
group. The terrorists had been recruited by the Russian special services and had been trained in
Belgorod. They were supposed to receive $10,000 for carrying out the terrorist act.
They were supposed to be sentenced in the Frunzenskyi District Court of Kharkiv on December 28.
Earlier, relatives of those killed in the terrorist act, together with civil activists, held rallies outside
the Office of the President in Kyiv and several times in Kharkiv against the possibility of swapping
the accused (with Russia).
[...]
6. An actual Russian prisoner. For example.
According to various sources, among those whom the Ukrainian side plans to hand over to the
enemy is Russian tank operator Ruslan Gadzhiev. He was captured during the battle for altitude
307.5 outside Sanzharivka in the Donetsk Region. Eight Ukrainian defenders were killed at the time,
and two more were gravely wounded, leaving them disabled. Ukrainian infantry soldiers were able
- 308 -
to repel the attack by four enemy tanks. Three armored vehicles were destroyed and one was
damaged. Gadzhiev was the only crew member of the damaged tanks to survive.
[...]
The contract soldier was sentenced to 15 years in prison.
According to informed sources, the exchange lists include several other Russian contract soldiers
who were captured at one time or another in Donbas, as well as Ukrainian citizens who fought on
the side of the Luhansk/Donetsk People’s Republics.
[...]
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- 310 -
Annex 76
Ukrinform, The Prosecution Explained Why People Sentenced for a Terrorist Act in
Kharkiv Were Released (28 December 2019)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 311 -
- 312 -
[...]
The release from custody of three men convicted of the 2015 terrorist act near the Kharkiv Palace of
Sports, where four people died and nine others were injured, was done as part of Ukraine’s
fulfillment of its international obligations.
This is how prosecutor Volodymyr Lymar commented on the situation after the verdict was
announced, Ukrinform’s correspondent reports.
“This is very disappointing, but it is the only way Ukraine can fulfill its international obligations,”
the prosecutor said.
According to him, life imprisonment with confiscation of property was the legal verdict handed
down in Ukraine.
“The convicted men – Viktor Tetyutskyi, Serhiy Bashlykov, and Volodymyr Dvornikov – should
serve out their punishments in Ukraine. If there are circumstances where this possibility arises, they
will be taken into custody,” Lymar said.
Read also: Court considers appeal of ex-Berkut officers
According to him, the three convicts were at Kharkiv’s Pre-Trial Detention Center when the verdict
was announced. “It was done by video conference at their request,” the prosecutor explained.
As for the exchange, the prosecutor said he does not know the terms of the exchange or who is in
charge of it.
Meanwhile, Oleh Holovkov, the attorney representing the victims, told Ukrinform’s correspondent
that the relatives of those who were killed in the terrorist act by the Palace of Sports agree with the
life sentence for the accused but intend to appeal the court’s decision to replace detention in custody
with personal recognizance. “This is not a legal decision but a political one. The victims are ready to
appeal it through the Ukrainian courts and abroad. There are also questions about compensation for
the victims – specifically, who is going to pay it now?”
As Ukrinform previously reported, the Frunzenskyi District Court of Kharkiv on December 28
announced a life sentence with confiscation of property for the three men accused of committing the
terrorist act outside the Palace of Sports on February 22, 2015 – Viktor Tetyutskyi, Serhiy
Bashlykov, and Volodymyr Dvornikov. The court simultaneously replaced detention in custody with
personal recognizance.
On December 26, during oral arguments in the Frunzenskyi District Court of Kharkiv, Prosecutor
Volodymyr Lymar asked the court to release the accused for an exchange with the Russian
Federation, as he said a relevant agreement had been reached during the Normandy Format talks.
The prosecutor also filed a motion to replace the suspects’ pre-trial restriction in the form of
detention in custody with personal recognizance pending the verdict’s entry into force.
- 313 -
On February 22, 2015, during a march to commemorate the heroes of the Heavenly Hundred, there
was an explosion, later designated a terrorist act. Four people died in the attack, and nine others
were wounded.
On February 26, 2015, the SBU arrested three Kharkiv residents on suspicion of carrying out the
terrorist act: Volodymyr Dvornikov, Viktor Tetyutskyi, and Serhiy Bashlykov. All three were
charged under Article 258(3) (terrorist act) and Article 263(1) (illegal possession of weapons) of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine. According to the law-enforcement agencies, they had been recruited by
the Russian special services, had received training in Belgorod, and were supposed to receive
$10,000 for the terrorist act.
[...]
- 314 -
Annex 77
Hanna Sokolova, Terrorist Attack During the “March of Dignity” in Kharkiv. How Three
Defendants Were Sentenced to Life Sentence and Immediately Released, Grati (29
December 2019)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 315 -
- 316 -
Terrorist attack during the Dignity March in Kharkiv. Three defendants were given life sentences and were
immediately released
December 29, 2019, 1:36 P.M. Ganna Sokolova
"Guerrillas who acted alone"
In April 2015, the case was filed with the court. During the very first meeting, when the prosecutor announced the
indictment, Dvornikov, Tetyutsky... and published the results of covert investigative steps, listening to Dvornikov's
communication while in jail when he told about his crime to his cellmate. In April 2017, due to the changes in the court
panel, the case was re-initiated.
In the court, after the defendants withdrew their initial testimonies, they began to claim that it is possible that
Ukrainian intelligence services were involvement in the terrorist attack. "How could the terrorists possibly know when
and where to plant a bomb and when to detonate it, if the activists themselves weren't aware where they would be
marching, near the Shevchenko Monument, or near the Palace of Sports, or whether they would hold it at all. Only the
intelligence community could have had this information and they were following this event, said Vladimir Dvornikov in a
hearing held this October. - To confirm the involvement in this...
why the taxi car, which was standing in front of the place where the bomb was planted, didn't raise any interest for
the SBU investigators?
Having analyzed the chronology of events, it becomes obvious that everything possible was done to commit this
terrorist attack no matter what. And this is beyond the capabilities of any guerrillas acting alone."
In October, the prosecutor Volodymyr Lymar has announced the indictment again. Preparation details for the terrorist
attack were added to it, however, the charges for the crime were unchanged. Dvornikov, Tetyutsky, and Bashlykov are
accused of crimes under Part 3, Article 258, and Part 1, Article 263 of the Criminal Code: a criminal conspiracy to
commit a terrorist attack by a group of individuals, which caused death, and possession of explosives and ammunition.
The maximum penalty under these articles is life imprisonment.
"Abuse of power"
Back in 2015, Volodymyr Dvornikov, Viktor Tetyutsky, and Serhiy Bashlykov filed complaints about being tortured by
the prosecutor Volodymyr Lymar and SBU investigators. The court opened criminal proceedings under the articles
"abuse of power or official authority by a law enforcement officer" and "violation of the right to mount a defense." This
May, the court has ruled to deny the claim but the defendants appealed the ruling in November. The complaint was sent
for reconsideration to the military prosecutor's office.
"No exchange without a sentence"
In late September, the defendants' attorneys announced that they think their clients could be released in the next prisoner
exchange.
"It is a fact that such matter was raised and there were attempts to include them. Who are in the lists right now?
Nobody knows that, said Dmitry Tikhonenkov to reporters, who was still defending Viktor Tetyutsky at that time. - There
is a high probability, let's put it this way, that this could happen". Vladimir Dvornikov's attorney, Igor Nagorny, has
confirmed that all three defendants are included in the exchange lists.
Kharkiv Court of Appeals. They demanded that the accused shouldn't be released until sentenced. Activists were
chanting the slogan "Sentences to terrorists" and they left tires and a broken matryoshka doll near the courtroom door as a
symbol of the Russia's footprint in this case.
Since early October, activists have started to attend court hearings more often, confirmed one of the action organizers,
Valentyn Bystrychenko. They would came with national flags and posters: "Terrorists are a threat to everyone", "No
exchange without sentences" and "Unpunished evil returns." At one of the hearings, activists glued stickers to the floor of
the court corridor demanding "Sentences to terrorists".
"Terrorists must be sentenced before they can be exchanged," Valentin Bystrychenko told to Graty. - Those who
commit crimes while acting as a part of pro-Russian terrorist groups in Donbass should also be aware that they will
subsequently pay for any crime. We are here to support this viewpoint."
Relatives of the victims are also awaiting sentences and they do not support the exchange until a court verdict. "They (the
accused) were not very good people in the past, they were ready to commit a crime for money. And I think that the four
and a half years spent in a detention center did not make them better workers. Therefore, once they are released, they
would be the type ready to be used by the FSB. Who can guarantee they wouldn't do it again?" , said Andriy Didyk, the
father of 15-year-old Danylo who died during the terrorist attack.
- 317 -
During one of the hearings, Tetyutsky replied: "Nobody offered me anything, even theoretically." "What kind of
exchange are we talking about, if we really are innocent? To exchange one prison for another? What are you talking
about? - Sergiy Bashlykov was fuming.
"Filed as a matter of principle"
The next hearing on December 26 began with the prosecutor's announcement regarding the closure of the torture
case where Dvornikov, Tetyutky, and Bashlykov were named victims. The judge asked the accused to testify but Serhiy
Bashlykov wanted to complete his motions. The accused took a marker from his backpack and began to draw dots and
arrows on the wall of the glass holding area. The judge, who couldn't figure out what he was doing, asked him "to stop
acting for the media."
The sentence announcement took more than two hours. Volodymyr Dvornikov, Viktor Tetyutsky, and Sergiy
Bashlykov were not brought to the court. They were present by video conference. The court found them guilty of a
criminal conspiracy to commit a terrorist attack by a group of individuals, which caused death, and possessing explosives
and ammunition. They were sentenced to life imprisonment with their property seized. The court also has granted civil
claims brought by the victims. They were granted awards ranging from 100 thousand to two million hryvnias.
At the same time, Dvornikov, Tetyutsky, and Bashlykov were released from the detention center to take part in the
exchange. A spokesman for the victims, Oleg Golovkov, said that he would appeal this decision. "We believe this is a
political ruling and it's not based on law in any way. Let me remind you that Ukraine has no international treaties signed
under the Normandy format, Golovkov told to reporters. "If we cannot find grounds within our national judicial system,
we will turn to the international system."
- 318 -
Annex 78
Novynarnia, “Separam – Freedom”: Whom Ukraine Released to ORDLO at the Big
Exchange in 2019 List (30 December 2019)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 319 -
- 320 -
2/15/22, 5:07 PM
"Separatists get off scot-free": who was released to the Occupied Territories by Ukraine in the big 2019 exchange. LIST
Russia and the Occupied Territories do not disclose the names of 123 people who were released from Ukraine during the
exchange on December 29. However, some of these people, according to "Novynarnya", and there are already more than
60 of them, can be identified from reports published by the media, lawyers, and social media users.
According to Valentin Rybin, a pro-Russian lawyer who defends separatists, terrorists, and Russian mercenaries in
Ukraine, "there are no more political prisoners in Ukraine."
Partial lists of people released to DNR/LNR militants in this exchange were published by the website Myrotvorets,
journalist Yuriy Butusov, Channel 24, and others.
"Based on the list of those who were demanded by Russia, it becomes absolutely clear who is behind all these terrible
terrorist attacks and crimes. This is what Russia has taken responsibility for, he wrote on Facebook on December 30.
//
Three residents in Kharkiv from Anti-Maidan, who were found guilty in court for a terrorist attack--blowing up those who
took part in a Ukrainian rally on February 22, 2015 in Kharkiv near the Palace of Sport. Four people were killed in that
terrorist attack: Danylo Didik, 15, Mykola Melnychuk, 18, Ihor Tolmachov, and Vadym Rybalchenko.
Tetyutsky, Bashlykov, and Dvornikov were involved in clashes on February 18, 2014 in Kyiv, in the Mariyinsky Park
area, where peaceful Maidan demonstrators were beaten.
They met each other at a hospital in Kharkiv and contacted Russian intelligence. They have detonated the MON-100
fragmentation mine.
A unique case: Frunze District Court in Kharkiv has sentenced the terrorists, Dvornikov, Tetyutsky, and Bashlykov, to life
imprisonment pursuant to Article 263, Part 1 (illegal use of weapons) and Article 258, Part 3 (terrorist attack) of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine. However, given the exchange planned by the country leadership, the court has immediately
changed its pre-trial restrictions from no bail to personal recognizance.
//
Ruslan Dzhupalovych Gadzhyev, a citizen of the Russian Federation, born in the village Levokumske, Stavropol Krai,
Russia, on February 10, 1973. Tank crewman, driver.
Came to Donbass on December 23, 2014 and joined the August battalion, which was part of the illegal armed groups of
the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.
//
Murat Dzhimiyev
A Russian from North Ossetia. DOB 11.01.1966
According to Media Initiative for Human Rights, he was detained due to involvement in the so-called Ossetian Terrorists
case. They were accused of plotting a terrorist attack during the protest outside of Verkhovna Rada, in the fall of 2017:
the accused allegedly acted at the behest of Russian intelligence and were supposed to bring 10 bottles of poisoned vodka
to the tent camp of activists."
Vladyslav Dolgosheya
Ruslan Dolgosheya
Mykola Kazansky
Kostyantyn Kalashnikov
Oleg Mazur
Mykola Selyatenko
Vadym Shved
- 321 -
//
Oleg Doronin
A citizen of Russia from Nizhnevartovsk. Reconnaissance man from the 1st Cossack Regiment of the 2nd Corps of the
Southern Military District of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation ("LPR").
He has a criminal record in Russia. He tried to enlist in the Russian Armed Forces but employees of Khanty-Mansiysk
Military Enlistment Office explained to him that, with a criminal record, he can't get a service contract until he serves in
the occupying forces in Donbas.
//
Valery Kirsanov
A resident of Mariupol, DOB August 24, 1975. A mercenary for the FSB of the Russian Federation, an accomplice of the
DNR militants. The call sign is "Traffic Cop." A former employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.
Kirsanov has been providing the militants information about the locations of Ukrainian soldiers, which the gangs used for
artillery shelling.
On January 24, 2015, Kirsanov was a forward observer to spot the occupiers' Grad volleys when shelling Mariupol. At
that time, missiles hit residential and other buildings in the Eastern neighborhood. 31 people were killed and 117 were
injured.
According to the verdict, firearms, ammunition, and explosives were found and seized during a search of the residence of
the accused.
In court, Kirsanov stated that he is not guilty of the charges against him. He also claimed that the prosecutor has failed to
prove his involvement with DNR, terrorist organizations or his contacts with any illegal groups.
On June 18, 2019, the Primorsky District Court of Mariupol, Donetsk Province, has found that Kirsanov is guilty of
spotting the shelling of the Eastern district and sentenced him to nine years in prison.
He served one half of his term and was released on August 15, 2019 under the Savchenko Law.
When he released, Mariupol residents threw paint at him and brought a coffin there.
//
- 322 -
Maryna Kovtun
Maryna Kovtun in court. Photo: UA: Kharkiv
DOB June 3, 1967. Sentenced by a trial court to 11 years of incarceration for her complicity in the terrorist attack on the
Stina pub in Kharkiv, on November 2014, and for illegal use of weapons. An appeal is pending in this case.
The explosion in the rock pub Stina on Rymarska Street in Kharkiv took place on November 9, 2014 at about 10:00 P.M.
The attackers detonated a magnet-actuated plastique bomb near the bar. 13 people were injured in that event.
The pub was just collecting aid for the Azov Volunteer Battalion.
On November 17, 2014, the SBU announced that the case was solved and 12 people were detained, who were part of a
sabotage/reconnaissance group operating in Kharkiv and its province. They were involved in the Stina pub explosion.
That's when Kovtun was detained.
Kalashnikov assault rifles, ammunition, grenades, detonators, booby-trap kits, and seven anti-personnel mines with
Russian manufacturing marks were seized from them.
In 2015, the majority of those who were suspects in the explosion were included in the exchange with the Occupied
Territories and were released. At the request of the Security Service of Ukraine and the provincial prosecutor, Kovtun
was left at a detention center.
The indictment against her was filed with the court on June 12, 2015. In July 2018, due to a dismissal of the presiding
judge, a new panel of judges began a new trial.
When the case was sent to the court, the former provincial prosecutor Yuriy Danilchenko described the investigation file
as follows: “Ms. Kovtun is a native of Russia. The investigators have determined that she was actively involved in pro-
Russian rallies in Kharkiv in the spring of 2014. Later in August she underwent training in propaganda, at first. In the fall,
she went through special training in mines/explosions, tactical operations, special medical training in Russia, and she
became a member of a terrorist organization called Kharkiv Guerrillas... She commanded one of the units. The
investigators have clear proof that it was she who brought the mine to Stina pub, activated it, and gave it directly to the
person who brought the mine into the pub”.
The accused pleaded not guilty and demanded a full acquittal.
A panel of judges chaired by Viktor Popras has been reading the verdict for more than four hours. The court has found
Maryna Kovtun guilty under Part 1, Article 263 (unlawful use of weapons, ammunition or explosives) and Part 5, Article
27, 258 (complicity in terrorist attack) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. Therefore, the accused was sentenced to 11 years
of imprisonment and property forfeiture.
The court has also granted civil claims brought by the victims for more than half a million hryvnias.
At the same time, the court has dismissed some charges brought against the accused, that is Article 110 (encroachment on
territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine), Article 258-3 (creation of a terror group or terror organization), and
Article 113 (sabotage) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
In addition to the explosion at the pub Stina, Maryna Kovtun was also accused of involvement in other explosions: the
collector of the Malyshev plant and [the explosion] near Britannia restaurant. In these incidents, the court has found that
Kovtun's guilt was not proven.
Kovtun filed an appeal in the Stina case.
- 323 -
//
Vasyl Kusakin
A Russian mercenary from Yakutsk, DOB March 29, 1976
A militant from the unlawful militant group Typhoon (DNR).
On August 11, 2017, Novomoskovsk Court in Dnipropetrovsk Province sentenced him to 8 years in prison under Article
258 (terrorism).
//
Shamil Muliyev
A Russian mercenary from DNR, a sniper. DOB 20.05.1965. From Kazan.
He was involved in the assaults on Debaltsevo, in February 2015.
//
Sergiy Petrov (?)
A Russian mercenary, call sign "Phase". DOB 11.04.1973. From Chelyabinsk. A retired captain of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs of Russia. He took part in the Chechen war.
In Ukraine, he fought in a sabotage group of LNR. A military retiree. He took part in the battles for Savur-Mohyla, in
June 2014.
Three years ago he was detained by the Security Service of Ukraine.
//
Mykola Pokusayev
A Russian mercenary from DNR, DOB June 2, 1970, born in the village Bankino, Weidelovsky County, Belgorod
Province of Russia.
He was detained by servicemen of the 57th Motorized Infantry Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on March 2,
2018, when he somehow crossed the demarcation line and wandered around in the area of Pisky.
In 2018, he was sentenced to four years in prison.
//
Maxym Slyvko
A Russian mercenary, DOB December 3, 1973.
He was arrested on September 3, 2015 in Kyiv in the case of the so-called Obolon Terrorists. He was charged under
Article 258, Part 2 and Article 263, Part 1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
According to police, he was preparing a terrorist attack in Kyiv. Slyvka was caught along with three other accomplices.
One of them was also a Russian citizen. During their detention, they detonated a grenade.
- 324 -
Annex 80
Sun-Tzu, The Art of Warfare (Roger Ames, 1993)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
- 325 -
- 326 -
- 327 -
- 328 -
- 329 -
- 330 -
- 331 -
- 332 -
- 333 -
- 334 -
- 335 -
- 336 -
- 337 -
- 338 -
Annex 81
Interfax, The DPR Opened a Criminal Case on the Fact of the Shelling of a Bus
Near Volnovakha (14 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 339 -
- 340 -
- 341 -
- 342 -
- 343 -
- 344 -
Annex 82
Lt. Col. (Retired) Matthew Whittchurch, Lessons from Soviet Urban
Operations 1945, British Army Review Special Report (Winter 2019)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
- 345 -
- 346 -
- 347 -
- 348 -
- 349 -
- 350 -
Annex 83
RT, RAW: Footage from Shelled Mariupol in Southeastern Ukraine (video)
- 351 -
- 352 -
Annex 84
RT, Ukraine: Mariupol Hit by Heavy Shelling, Streets Devastated (video)
- 353 -
- 354 -
Annex 90
Law of Ukraine No. 1636-VII “On Establishing Free Economic Zone ‘Crimea’ and on
Specifics of Conducting Economic Activity in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of
Ukraine” (12 August 2014)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 355 -
- 356 -
1 1
1
V
L AW O F U K R A I N E
10/09/2015
- 357 -
- 358 -
- 359 -
- 360 -
- 361 -
- 362 -
- 363 -
- 364 -
- 365 -
- 366 -
- 367 -
- 368 -
Annex 91
Law of Ukraine No. 145-VIII “On Education” (5 September 2017)
This excerpt has been translated from its original language
into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to
Rules of the Court, Article 51. A copy of the whole document
has been deposited with the Registry.
- 369 -
- 370 -
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- 374 -
Annex 92
Law of Ukraine No. 463-IX “On Complete General Secondary Education”
(16 January 2020)
This excerpt has been translated from its original language
into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to
Rules of the Court, Article 51. A copy of the whole document
has been deposited with the Registry.
- 375 -
- 376 -
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1+ HUbc_^c RU\_^WY^W d_ dXU Y^TYWU^_ec ‘U_‘\Uc _V M[bQY^U XQfU dXU bYWXd d_ bUSUYfU Q S_]‘\UdU
WU^UbQ\ cUS_^TQbi UTeSQdY_^ Y^ Q cdQdU) ]e^YSY‘Q\ _b S_b‘_bQdU UTeSQdY_^Q\ Y^cdYdedY_^ Y^ dXU \Q^WeQWU
_V dXU bUc‘USdYfU Y^TYWU^_ec ‘U_‘\U Q\_^W gYdX dXU cdQdU \Q^WeQWU+
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^QdY_^Q\ ]Y^_bYdi Q\_^W gYdX dXU cdQdU \Q^WeQWU+
3+ HUbc_^c RU\_^WY^W d_ dXU ^QdY_^Q\ ]Y^_bYdYUc _V M[bQY^U gX_cU \Q^WeQWUc QbU dXU _VVYSYQ\
\Q^WeQWUc _V dXU =eb_‘UQ^ M^Y_^ Q^T gX_ UhUbSYcU dXU bYWXd d_ cdeTi Y^ dXU bU\UfQ^d \Q^WeQWUc Y^ cdQdU)
]e^YSY‘Q\ _b S_b‘_bQdU UTeSQdY_^Q\ Y^cdYdedY_^c cXQ\\ _RdQY^7
RQcYS cUS_^TQbi UTeSQdY_^ Y^ dXU cdQdU \Q^WeQWU Y^ dXU Q]_e^d _V ^_d \Ucc dXQ^ /- ‘UbSU^d _V dXU
Q^^eQ\ Q]_e^d _V cdeTi dY]U Y^ dXU 2dX WbQTU gYdX Q^ Q^^eQ\ Y^SbUQcU _V ceSX Q]_e^d ’^_d \Ucc dXQ^ 1-
‘UbSU^d Y^ dXU 6dX WbQTU(8
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dXU Q]_e^d _V ^_d \Ucc dXQ^ 5- ‘UbSU^d _V dXU Q^^eQ\ Q]_e^d _V cdeTi dY]U+
LXU \Ycd _V ceRZUSdc ’Y^dUWbQdUT S_ebcUc( cdeTYUT Y^ dXU cdQdU \Q^WeQWU Q^T dXU \Q^WeQWU _V Q
^QdY_^Q\ ]Y^_bYdi Yc TUdUb]Y^UT Ri dXU UTeSQdY_^Q\ ‘b_WbQ] _V dXU UTeSQdY_^Q\ Y^cdYdedY_^ Y^
QSS_bTQ^SU gYdX dXU bUaeYbU]U^dc _V cdQdU cdQ^TQbTc Q^T dQ[Y^W Y^d_ QSS_e^d dXU ‘USe\YQbYdYUc _V dXU
\Q^WeQWU U^fYb_^]U^d+
4+ LXU bYWXd d_ UTeSQdY_^ Y^ dXU \Q^WeQWU _V dXU Y^TYWU^_ec ‘U_‘\U _b ^QdY_^Q\ ]Y^_bYdi _V M[bQY^U
Q\_^W gYdX dXU cdQdU \Q^WeQWU Yc UhUbSYcUT Y^ cU‘QbQdU S\QccUc gYdX UTeSQdY_^ Y^ dXU bU\UfQ^d \Q^WeQWU)
gXYSX QbU _‘U^UT Y^ QSS_bTQ^SU gYdX dXU bUaeYbU]U^dc _V dXYc DQg+
- 378 -
.*-/*--’ ,5.1 98 6=HML LB? @MEE A?G?J<E <N?J<A? ))) R @JHF ,1)+,)-+-+ S/1.(7; %:?PL @HJ IJCGL&
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- 379 -
- 380 -
Annex 93
Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine No. 2077-IX "On Certain Issues of
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Conscience and Religion of Believers of the
Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Orthodox Church of Ukraine)
and Preservation of the Premises of the Cathedral of St. Volodymyr and St. Olha”
(17 February 2022)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 381 -
- 382 -
RESOLUTION
of the Parliament of Ukraine
(the Verkhovna Rada)
On Some Issues of Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Thought and Religion of Believers of the Crimean Eparchy
of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Orthodox Church of
Ukraine) and Preservation of the Cathedral of Saints
Prince Volodymyr and Princess Olga
Given the temporary occupation by the Russian Federation of an integral part of Ukraine - the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol - which occupation was carried out as a
result of armed aggression against Ukraine, in connection with systematic illegal actions of the Russian
Federation against freedom of thought and religion of Ukrainian citizens, given the pressure from the
Russian Federation on the religious community of the Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church (Orthodox Church of Ukraine) and the Archbishop Clement of Simferopol and Crimea of the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Orthodox Church of Ukraine), in order to preserve cultural values relevant
to the formation of cultural space in the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as well as taking into account that in accordance with the Resolution
of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 15 March 2014 No. 891-VII "On Early Termination of Powers of
the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic" the powers of the Verkhovna Rada of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea have been prematurely terminated, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
resolves:
1. Temporarily, for the period of the Law of Ukraine "On Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of
Citizens and the Legal Regime in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine", to transfer from the
ownership of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to state ownership part of the property complex with
a total area of 1,475.7 square meters marked in the plan of household with letter "a", the building,
located at 17 Sevastopolska street, Simferopol, 95015, namely the Cathedral of the Holy Equal-to-the-
Apostles Prince Vladimir and Princess Olga.
2. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine shall take measures to transfer the Cathedral of the Holy
Equal-to-the-Apostles Prince Volodymyr and Princess Olga to state ownership.
3. This Resolution shall enter into force upon its adoption.
Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine R. STEFANCHUK
Kyiv
17 February 2022
No. 2077-GKh (in Ukrainian -
- 383 -
- 384 -
Annex 94
Russian Federation, Federal Law No. 433-FZ of 28 December 2013, ‘On
Amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation’
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 385 -
- 386 -
4/14/22, 7:30 PM Article 280.1. Criminal Code of the Russian Federation Public calls for the implementation of actions aimed at violating the territori…
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Article 280.1. Public calls for the implementation of actions aimed at
violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation
Federal Law No. 433-FZ of December 28, 2013 supplemented Chapter 29 with Article
280.1, which comes into force on May 9, 2014.
Article 280.1 . Public calls for the implementation of actions aimed at violating the
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation
See comments to Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
Part 1 changed from December 19, 2020 - Federal Law of December 8, 2020 N 425-FZ
See previous edition
1. Public calls to carry out actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation, committed by a person after he has been brought to administrative responsibility
for a similar act within one year, -
shall be punishable by a fine in the amount of 200 thousand to 400 thousand roubles, or in
the amount of the wage or salary, or any other income of the convicted person for a period of
one to two years, or by compulsory labor for a term of up to three years, or by arrest for a
term of four to six months, or by deprivation freedom for up to four years with the
deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for the same
period.
Federal Law No. 274-FZ of July 21, 2014 reworded Part 2 of Article 280.1
See the text of the part in the previous edition
2. The same acts committed with the use of mass media or electronic or information and
telecommunication networks (including the Internet), -
shall be punishable by compulsory works for a term of up to 480 hours, with deprivation of
the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three
years, or imprisonment for a term of up to five years, with deprivation of the right to occupy
certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years.
- 387 -
- 388 -
Annex 95
Russian Federation, Federal Law No. 299-FZ of 31 July 2020, ‘On Amendments to
Article 1 of the Federal Law “On Counteracting Extremist Activity”’
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 389 -
- 390 -
(
4/14/22, 7:29 PM Federal Law No. 299-FZ of July 31, 2020 "On Amendments to Article 1 of the Federal Law "On Counteracting Extremist Activity" | …
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Federal Law No. 299-FZ of July 31, 2020 "On Amendments to
Article 1 of the Federal Law "On Counteracting Extremist Activity"
Adopted by the State Duma on July 22, 2020
Approved by the Federation Council on July 24, 2020
Include in the second paragraph of paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Federal Law of July 25,
2002 N 114-FZ "On counteracting extremist activity" (Sobranie Zakonodatelstva Rossiyskoy
Federatsii, 2002, N 30, Art. 3031; 2006, N 31, Art. 3447, 3452 ; 2007, N 31, item 4008;
2012, N 53, item 7580; 2014, N 30, item 4237; 2019, N 49, item 6980) change, replacing the
words "and violation of the integrity of the Russian Federation" with the words " and (or)
violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation (including the alienation of a
part of the territory of the Russian Federation), with the exception of the delimitation,
demarcation, redemarcation of the State Border of the Russian Federation with neighboring
states.
President of Russian Federation V. Putin
Moscow Kremlin
July 31, 2020
N 299-FZ
Open a document in the GARANT system
- 391 -
- 392 -
Annex 96
Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 1-11/2020, Decision, 10 December
2020 (Ukraine’s Additional Translation of Russia's Counter-Memorial Part I, Annex 430)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 393 -
- 394 -
In addition, Islyamov L.E. on September 08, 2015, while at the "Ukrainian Crisis
Media Center" located at the address: Ukraine, Kiev, Khreshchatyk str., 2, taking part in a press
conference entitled "Civil blockade of Crimea", acting intentionally, motivated by political
hostility towards the Russian Federation and the fact that the Republic of Crimea became part
of it as a new subject of the Russian Federation, imbued with a persistent hostile and intolerant
attitude towards the Russian Federation, realizing the criminal nature of their actions, in order
to publicly influence the consciousness and will of an unlimited circle of people, as well as
inducing them to carry out extremist actions, in violation of Federal Law No. 25.07.2002114-
FZ "On Countering extremist Activities", publicly, in the presence of representatives of the
Ukrainian TV channel "5" and the Ukrainian Crimean Tatar TV channel "ATR", which are
mass media, appealed to the violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation with
the following content."..If we are a state, and if the community has a demand for its statehood,
the Crimea, gentlemen, must be returned. Therefore, I am glad that I was one of those who
made the decision on the blockade, that Ukraine, as a state, joins the sanctions of the leaders of
the Crimean Tatar people, global sanctions against Crimea. I'm glad of that. I believe that this
is the headquarters that has just been announced, which will be held at 22 Sedovtseva street, I
call on all patriots, Ukrainians, it doesn’t matter, these are Crimean Tatars, everyone, everyone
who is rooting for the statehood of Ukraine, everyone who believes that Ukraine should have
statehood, without Crimea, Ukraine will not have statehood. Therefore, I urge all patriots to
come to 22 Sedovtseva street - there will be a headquarters, we will prepare this action together
with all the patriots of Ukraine.", which contain statements calling for the implementation of
actions aimed at violating the integrity of the Russian Federation, including, rejection
(separation) of the Republic of Crimea from the Russian Federation and accession to Ukraine.
In the future, no later than September 10, 2015, the video materials of the specified
television program with the speech of Islyamov L.E., containing calls for the implementation
of actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, were placed in
free access on the information and telecommunication network "Internet" on the YouTube
resource at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PBPPjZ2uz-M&feature=youtu.be. under the
title “Crimean Tatars block Crimea on September 08, 2015” and on the website of the
“Ukrainian Crisis Media Center” at: http://uacrisis.org/ru/33187-krimski-tatari, under the title
"Civil blockade of Crimea. How it will look like. Ukrainian Crisis Media Center, 8-09-15",
access to which has an unlimited circle of people, as well as those who enjoy mass attendance
by citizens of Ukraine and residents of the Republic of Crimea.
*****
On November 21, 2015, Islyamov L.E., while on the territory of Ukraine, when taking
part in a television interview entitled "Broadcast from the Headquarters of the Civil Blockade
of the Crimea. November 21, 2015" of the Ukrainian Crimean Tatar TV channel "ATR", which
is a mass media, acting intentionally, motivated by political hostility towards the Russian
Federation and the fact of the Republic of Crimea joining it as a new subject of the Russian
Federation, imbued with a persistent hostile and intolerant attitude towards the Russian
Federation, realizing the criminal nature of his actions, intending to publicly influence the
consciousness and will of an unlimited circle of people, as well as to induce them to carry out
extremist actions, in violation of Federal Law No. 114-FZ of July 25, 2002 "On Countering
Extremist Activities", publicly appealed for the violation of the territorial integrity of the
Russian Federation as follows: "... We want political prisoners to be released. I know what the
government is watching right now,
*****
*****
Case No. 1-11/2020
DECISION
in the Name of the Russian Federation
10 December 2020 Simferopol
- 395 -
You are deeply mistaken. You, the Crimean Tatars, must liberate your homeland, with your
chest, with your face, with your head held high. We must enter the Crimea. Yes, a part of us
will suffer from this. I won't say how, but that's not the question, the question is that we will
all have the honor to be remembered in history. ..... Get up those people who think the same
way as I do, get up from the sofas and be next to us here, as here we are “buryat”, “peaceful”,
and we. Ukrainians, I am also addressing you, do not leave us, be with us always, we must
make Ukraine together, we must make a new Crimea together, after we liberate it. We have no
doubts that we will liberate it. We are already free now, because this is a free country, free
Ukraine. Together we will make a new country....", which contain linguistic signs of motivation
on the part of Islyamov L.E. to violate, change the territorial borders of the Russian Federation
(the return of Crimea to Ukraine by committing unspecified violent actions).
No later than November 23, 2015, the video materials of the mentioned television
interview of Islyamov L.E. titled "Broadcast from the Headquarters of the Civil Blockade of
Crimea. November 21, 2015", containing calls for actions aimed at violating the territorial
integrity of the Russian Federation, were posted on the Internet information and
telecommunications network at the following addresses:
https://www.youtube/com/watch?v= KFT8AF5Zfs and
https://atr.ua/ru/ncws/48/vklucenic-iz-staba-grazdanskoj-blokady-kryma-211115, to
which an unlimited number of people have access and which are pupular among citizens of
Ukraine and residents of the Republic of Crimea.
*****
He, no later than December 20, 2015, while on the territory of Ukraine, when taking
part in a television program conducted as part of a live broadcast on the Ukrainian TV channel
112 Ukraine, which is a mass media, acting intentionally, motivated by political hostility
towards the Russian Federation and the fact that the Republic of Crimea became part of it as a
new subject of the Russian Federation, imbued with a persistent hostile and intolerant attitude
towards the Russian Federation, aware of the criminal nature of their actions, aiming to publicly
influence the consciousness and will of an unlimited circle of people, as well as inducing them
to carry out extremist actions, in violation of Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25.07.2002 "On
Countering Extremist Activity", publicly appealed for the violation of the territorial integrity
of the Russian Federation, as follows: "... We already have more than a hundred people who
have already joined the battalion. So far it is being created on a voluntary basis... ... we hope
that after all, the Ministry of Defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine .... will do and allow the
Crimean Tatars to have their own national battalion inside the armed forces of Ukraine. The
battalion that will be trained on the administrative border with Crimea, and the one that,
together with all of Ukraine, will be in the forefront of liberating Crimea, will enter Crimea.
And then it will carry all the military, so to say, services that they have to carry here, the
Crimean Tatars inside the armed forces of Ukraine when in Crimea, protecting the border of
Ukraine, the one that is the real border. ... . I'm saying that we, as Crimean Tatars, should do
everything.. that i connected with the liberation of our motherland. Our homeland is Crimea.
... Therefore, we will be here and we will do everything possible to complicate the life of the
occupier who is on our territory, who has seized our territories. Therefore, we are here for this
and we will create a battalion in order to carry out certain operations, so that the occupier does
not dig in there....so that he does not suddenly become so bored and sad there that Ukraine does
nothing in terms of the liberation of Crimea. We will do it, we are starting and we are doing it
now... ....We believe that the electricity should not be supplied to Crimea in any way. And
Ukraine should not do this. Yes, if only in one case Mustafa Dzhemilev left the possibility of
- 396 -
supplying electricity to the Crimea. Where it will be written that electricity shall be supplied to
Crimea, to the occupied Crimea, which territory must under the Geneva Convention... be
supported by the occupying country, .... Then at least we will really know that we are doing
this for the sake of citizens, and not for the sake of the occupiers who are building on our
electricity, building military units for themselves, digging in, equipping and building their
mobile networks... I think that the electricity will no longer be supplied starting from January
1... I don't know, I don't know, maybe explosions, maybe they'll just fall on their own. ... now
the Law, Decree 4032a "On the free economic zone in Crimea" is working. Therefore, both the
border guards, and the SBU, and the police, and anyone else, in the legislative field cannot do
anything with the cargo that moves across the administrative border to the Crimea," which
contain public calls for armed action, which imply a violent breach of the integrity of the
Russian Federation.
In the future, on December 20, 2015, the video materials of this interview with the
speech of Islyamov L.E., containing calls for actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity
of the Russian Federation, were freely available on the Internet information and
telecommunications network on the YouTube resource (https://www.youtube.com ) under the
title "Islyamov about the Crimean- Tatar battalion, energy blockade and smuggling", to which
an unlimited number of people have access and which is also popular among citizens of
Ukraine and residents of the Republic of Crimea.
Also, Islyamov L.E., no later than December 28, 2015, while on the territory of
Ukraine, when taking part in a television program conducted as part of a live broadcast on the
Ukrainian TV channel Newsone, which is a mass media, acting intentionally, motivated by
political hostility towards the Russian Federation and the fact that the Republic of Crimea
became part of it as a new subject of the Russian Federation, imbued with a persistent hostile
and intolerant attitude towards the Russian Federation, aware of the criminal nature of their
actions, aiming to publicly influence the consciousness and will of an unlimited circle of
people, as well as inducing them to carry out extremist actions, in violation of Federal Law No.
114-FZ of 25.07.2002 "On Countering Extremist Activity", publicly appealed for the violation
of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, as follows: "... We will call the battalion
that will be on the border after Noman Chelebidzhikhan, that mufti, the first chairman of the
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, .... This is our... Crimean Tatar patriot, who was so ...,
died as a warrior in full vigor. And we believe that we should bear his name when we return
Crimea. Now what we have done, we have now called out to all those Crimean Tatars who are
in mainland Ukraine to gather here. Every day we accept Crimean Tatars into the battalion,
plus Ukrainians join us, who also want to be in this battalion. ... I hope that Ukraine will still
give us, the Ministry of Defense will give us the number of the military unit, so that we, like
the rest of Ukraine, can also be useful and necessary in the liberation of Crimea. By Crimea
liberation soldiers. We call soldiers “askers” in the Crimean Tatar language, so here it is the
asker battalion, which will stand here as a volunteer, and which will be the first to enter Crimea,
as we believe, and we will be the first to take the fight when we liberate Crimea. With this
volunteer battalion, we want the rest of Ukraine to feel our tragedy, which we are now
experiencing, after the loss of Crimea, and in no way try to close from Crimea. We also want
Ukraine to not to forget Crimea in any way or, even worse, not to reduce it to some international
level and somehow pass the solution of this issue, transfer it to,... other countries. No one but
us, the Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars themselves, will liberate Crimea. If we ourselves do not
liberate it, if we ourselves do not deal with this, no one else will come to us and will not liberate
it. Therefore, we are doing this, we are waiting for the number of the military unit from the
Ministry of Defense and those people who will help us in every possible way, because we want
it to be the armed forces of Ukraine, not ... the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And ... if the state
- 397 -
of Ukraine, represented by the Ministry of Defense, does not deem it necessary to see Crimean
Tatars in its ranks as a separate battalion that we are preparing here, we will do it ourselves,
because Crimea is our territory, and we will not allow anyone to decide the fate of Crimea
without us, without the Crimean... We already... have about two hundred people on the list...
one hundred and forty-seven to be exact. ... It is no longer on a national basis that everyone
comes here, everyone feels like Crimean Tatars, no matter who they are by nationality. They
come and say: "we want to serve in this battalion because we want to return Crimea back."...
Here is..., our main message that we are now... But you probably know that we don’t really like
battalions in Ukraine now, actually, because somehow, I feel that they want ... all of this,
quietly, to close this whole story and move this into political plane, and then just quietly move
on to such European integration, already without Crimea, without Donbass. ... And you know
what I'm talking about. But here is different story. It's a different story with the Crimean Tatars,
that's why we are here... We have tacit consent, too, something from the guarantor of the
Constitution, we understand. .... You know that there was a meeting, the day before yesterday
there was a meeting of Turkish President Erdogan in Ankara... and together with our leader
Mustafa Dzhemilev. And Erdogan also supported this idea, which was voiced by Mustafa
Dzhemilev on the creation of this battalion, and even more I will tell you that we .... will now
receive assistance from the Turkish government. Of course, they won’t give us a uniform,
clothes, weapons, until we have a military unit number, but everything is moving towards this,
..., slowly moving towards this. I think that we .... will make it so that we will stand here, and
then with all our ... forces and means we will do so that the enemy does not calm down there
on our territory. In order for him not to be bored there, we will entertain him in every possible
way with our various things that we can do, because, if you remember, there were a lot of
partisans in the Great Patriotic War in the Crimea. And, if you know that the partisans in the
Crimea harmed the enemy a lot and made it so that he could never close his eyes calmly, so as
to relax and feel that he had already achieved everything. So we'll make this enemy feel like
it's time for him to get out of here. Let him go, take his suitcase, go to the train station, and get
out of here to his Russia. Either alive, or in a zinc coffin, he will leave here... Yes, I have to tell
you, we already have Turkish citizens in our battalion. There are already, and they are ready to
fight for a free Ukraine and for the liberation... they will liberate Crimea with us. ..... Turkey
did not allow military aircraft to fly over its territory, and did not allow even a meter of airspace
to be violated. Do you know how many planes are flying over Crimea, military planes? And
this is everything for us, our airspace, this is our land and our air, and everything on the ground
and under water, everything is ours. ... we are standing next to each other now, we have the
Sea of Azov on our left side. We see how Russian warships inspect, sail, violate all international
treaties and sail, and search fishing schooners... They feel like masters here only because we
can't fight them back in a certain way now. With this....it is necessary to end this because we
have to deal with the liberation of the Crimea every day. We shoul be restoring our own
Ukrainian dignity... Of course, this naval blockade is being prepared. The naval blockade is a
separate project of Noman Celebijihan Battalion. A naval blockade is within this project. That
is, this is a separate project that is being prepared, people are being formed, we buy uniforms,
uniforms are brought to us. They bring us everything we need for the battalion. We are... getting
ready... to get a military unit number... We have found several places where we can deploy,
naturally, we expect from the armed forces of Ukraine that they can tell us how best to do it.
How ... exactly the battalion will look like. In what format can we better be represented in the
military units of Ukraine. To do this, we need to start such a dialogue ......”, which contain
public calls for armed actions, which imply the violent breach of the integrity of the Russian
Federation as their result.
In the future, no later than December 28, 2015, the video materials of this interview with
the speech of Islyamov L.E., containing calls for actions aimed at breaching the territorial
- 398 -
integrity of the Russian Federation, were freely available on the Internet on Youtube
(http://www.youtube.com) under the title "Lenur Islyamov on the Crimean Tatar battalion in
the Armed Forces of Ukraine December 20, 2015", which has access to an unlimited number
of people and which is also popular among citizens of Ukraine and residents of the Republic
of Crimea.
*****
The guilt of Islyamov L.E. in committing crimes under the circumstances
established by the court was confirmed by the evidence examined at the court session,
which were collected in accordance with the requirements of the law, permissible,
relevant, consistent with each other and in their totality sufficient for a comprehensive
and objective resolution of the case.
As regards the episode of public calls to commit actions aimed at violating the
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation on September 08, 2015, the guilt of
Islyamov L.E. is confirmed by the following evidence.
So, according to the testimony of the witness Osmanov N.A., on the Internet he saw a
video in which Islyamov L.E. at one of the press conferences, where Chubarov and Dzhemilev,
who were previously representatives of the Crimean Tatar people in Crimea, also took part,
called for the return of Crimea to Ukraine by force, it was about stopping or limiting the supply
of electricity and food to Crimea. He (Osmanov) took such calls negatively.
From the testimony of witness Nikolaenko M.N. It follows that he is the General
Director of LLC Crimean Information Company, which in turn is the founder of the
information agency Kryminform. On September 08, 2015, a press conference was held at the
Ukrainian Crisis Center. Islyamov also took part in it, it was about the upcoming civil blockade
of the Crimea. The press conference lasted less than an hour, they talked about their upcoming
actions, that on September 20 they were going to blockade Crimea, meaning the food blockade
of Crimea. On September 8, 2015, the Kryminform website published news titled “Ukrainian
people’s deputy, the Head of the Mejlis and the ex-vice prime minister of Crimea announced
the start of a trade blockade of the Crimean peninsula in September”, in which Islyamov’s
speech was indirectly quoted at this press release. conferences. The press conference was a
public event and the statements of its participants violated the legislation of the Russian
Federation. These were calls for de-occupation, the liberation of Crimea, and the violation of
the constitutional order of the Russian Federation established at that time. This was the subject
of the press conference.
Witness Kotranov A.N. stated that in 2015, before the power outage to Crimea, he
watched an online broadcast in which Chubarov, Islyamov and Dzhemilev took part. During
the conference, Islyamov said that it was necessary to turn off the electricity on the territory of
the Republic of Crimea, turn off the water, in order to call on the masses of dissatisfied people
so that Crimea was forced to return to Ukraine.
Witnesses Miller Ya.V. and Khamzin Sh.A. indicated about public appeals of
Islyamov L.E. during a press conference at the "Ukrainian Crisis Media Center", which
was also attended by such persons as Dzhemilev, Chubarov, about the forced return of
the Republic of Crimea to Ukraine.
*****
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Witness Maslennikov A.V. testified that he was invited by the operatives of the FSB of
Russia in the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol to participate as a public
representative in conducting a study of Youtube Internet resources. The study was conducted
in the building of the Federal Security Service of Russia for the Republic of Crimea and the
city of Sevastopol. The study was attended by a specialist and a second member of the public.
After explaining to them the procedural rights and obligations, they proceeded to the study. He
claimed that Lenur Islyamov, whom he had repeatedly seen in the media, was speaking on the
video.
From the testimony of the witness Maslennikov A.V., read out at the court session on the
basis of Part 3 of Article 281 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation,
who confirmed them in full, it follows that on October 22, 2015, a video with the title “Open
dialogue with activists of the civil blockade of Crimea on October 10, 2015”, at which Lenur
Islyamov from the tent of the so-called “Headquarters of the civil blockade of Crimea” called
for the return of Crimea to Ukraine. Later, it became clear to him that Lenur Islyamov was
hostile to Russia, for which he began the blockade of the Crimea and cut off the electricity
supply to the Crimea. (case file 98-100 volume 5).
*****
As regards the episode of public calls to commit actions aimed at violating the
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation on November 21, 2015, the guilt of
Islyamov L.E. is confirmed by the following evidence.
The protocol of inspection of objects, according to which 11.12.15 when viewing a file
called "Broadcast from the Headquarters of the Civil Blockade of the Crimea.
November 21, 2015", recorded on the optical disc "Verbatim DVD-R", serial number
"ZE5820-DVD-J47F4", it was found that it contains a video appeal by Islyamov L.E., which
begins with the words "... for you. We want political prisoners to be released..." and ends with
the words "....we must make a new Crimea together after we liberate it. We have no doubts that
we will liberate it. We are already free now, because this is a free country, free Ukraine.
Together we will be making a new country. I'm switching...". (case file 137-139 volume 10)
*****
The guilt of Islyamov L.E. in committing by him on the 20th of December 2015 calls
for actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation,
committed with the use of mass media both to 112 Ukraine TV channel and to the Crimean
News Agency (QHA) are confirmed by the following evidence.
From the testimony of witness Shigapova A.S. it follows that in the course of his public
activities, the FSB officers asked him to watch 4 videos and evaluate them. The videos recorded
the speech of Islyamov, whose identity he knows from the media, on a Ukrainian TV channel.
Islyamov called for the liberation of Crimea, spoke about the power outage in Crimea due to
the fact that "anything can happen to the power towers," and that he would form a volunteer
battalion that would liberate Crimea. In addition, Islyamov said that they are waiting until they
are officially registered in the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, and if
not, they will do whatever they want at the border. These videos were posted in the public
domain on youtube. In his presence, the viewed videos were copied, saved to disk and sealed.
He took Islyamov's words negatively, as they were calls that violate the legislation of the
Russian Federation.
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*****
As regards the episode of public calls no later than December 28, 2015 for the
actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, the guilt of
Islyamov L.E. was confirmed by the following evidence.
According to witness Shigapova A.A., he was engaged in social activities, interacted
with the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and coordinated various events with them.
The FSB officers asked him to view four videos and give them an assessment. The video
recordings showed a speech on a Ukrainian TV channel by citizen Islyamov, whose identity he
knows from the media. Islyamov called for the liberation of Crimea, spoke about the power
outage in Crimea due to the fact that "anything can happen to the power poles," and that he
would form a volunteer battalion that would liberate Crimea. In addition, Islyamov said that
they are waiting until they are officially registered in the structure of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Ukraine, and if not, they will do whatever they want at the border. These videos were
posted publicly on youtube, copied to certain addresses and saved to a disk that was sealed. He
took these words negatively, since he knows that such calls violate the legislation of the Russian
Federation. Several members of the public participated in the inspection. At the end of the
inspection, the relevant documents were drawn up, which were signed by all participants, there
were no comments on the preparation of documents.
*****
Taking into account the totality of the foregoing, the panel of judges concludes that the
evidence presented has found its full confirmation of the guilt of Islyamov L.E. in making
public appeals on September 8, 2015, October 17, 2015, November 21, 2015 and no later than
December 20, 2015 (interview with 112 Ukraine TV channel and Crimean News Agency
(QHA)) and no later than December 28 2015 to the actions aimed at violating the territorial
integrity of the Russian Federation.
This is evidenced in its entirety by the testimony of witnesses Shigapov, Maslennikov,
Miller, Khamzin, Kotranov and Nikolaenko, each of whom indicated that the appeals of
Islyamov L.E. through the media, such as the Crimean Tatar channel "ATR", Ukrainian
channels "5", "NewsOne", and subsequently published in the social network Internet caused
them to feel the aggression of Islyamov L.E. towards the Russian Federation and his rejection
of the fact that the Republic of Crimea became part of the Russian Federation. From the appeal
of Islyamov L.E., reviewed by the said witnesses, it became clear to them that Islyamov L.E.
calls on people to take action aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation and forcibly returning Crimea to another state.
The court has no grounds to question the reliability and objectivity of the testimonies of
these witnesses, the witnesses are not persons interested in the outcome of the case, moreover,
their testimonies regarding the subjective assessment of the appeals. of Islyamov L.E. fully
agree with the conclusions of linguistic examinations No.10/113 dated April 01, 2016, No. 135
dated July 16, 2016, No. 1463/9-1 dated August 30, 2016, No. 3/396 dated August 14, 2017,
conducted in the case, which conclusions established that the speeches of Islyamov L.E. at a
press conference at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Center entitled "Civil Blockade of Crimea, how
it will look like ...", in the television program "Open dialogue with activists of the civil blockade
of Crimea ...", in the interview "Broadcast from the Headquarters of the Civil Blockade of
Crimea ...", in the interview "Lenur Islyamov October 25, 2015" and "Islyamov about the
Crimean Tatar battalion, energy blockade and smuggling", as well as in the interview "Lenur
- 401 -
Islyamov about the Crimean Tatar battalion in the Armed Forces of Ukraine ..." contain public
calls for actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.
There are no doubts about the reliability and objectivity of both these examinations and
the complex photo-video-technical examinations carried out in the case, which established that
the video materials contain an interview with Islyamov L.E.
*****
In view of the above, the panel of judges concludes that the guilt of Islyamov L.E. as
regards episodes dated September 08, 2015, October 17, 2015, November 21, 2015, no later
than December 20, 2015 (interview with 112 Ukraine TV channel and Crimean News Agency
(QHA) and no later than December 28, 2015 in public calls to actions aimed at violating the
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and qualifies such actions Islyamova L.E. as
follows:
- the episode of September 08, 2015 as public calls for actions aimed at violating
the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, committed using the media, that is,
under part 2 of article 280.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation;
- the episode of October 17, 2015 as public calls for actions aimed at violating the
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, committed using the media, that is, under
Part 2 of Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation;
- the episode of November 21, 2015 as public calls for actions aimed at violating the
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, committed using the media, that is, under
part 2 of article 280.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation;
- the episode no later than December 20, 2015 (interview with the Crimean News
Agency (QHA) as public calls for actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the
Russian Federation, committed using the mass media, that is, under Part 2 of Article
280.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation;
- the episode no later than December 20, 2015 (interview to the 112 Ukraine TV
channel) as public calls for actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the
Russian Federation, committed with the use of mass media, that is, under Part 2 of Article
280.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation;
- the episode no later than December 28, 2015 as public calls for actions aimed at
violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, committed using the media,
that is, under Part 2 of Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
The arguments of the defense regarding the fact that Islyamov L.E. expressed his
personal point of view in these speeches, acted as a politician, the panel of judges finds it
untenable, since according to the above episodes, the statements of Islyamov L.E. did not
contain a statement of his point of view on the situation, but contained an appeal to the people
with calls aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, in violation of
part 3 of article 4 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, according to which the integrity
and inviolability of the state is one of the foundations of its constitutional system, after which
such calls were posted on the Internet to an indefinite circle of people to take actions aimed at
violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, namely: calls for the secession of
the Republic of Crimea, which is part of the Russian Federation as its subject, in accordance
with par. 1 of Part 1 of Article 65 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, on the basis of
the Agreement concluded on March 18, 2014 between the Russian Federation and the Republic
of Crimea on the admission of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the
formation of new subjects within the Russian Federation, ratified on March 21, 2014 by the
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Federal Law No. 36- FZ, from the Russian Federation and its accession to Ukraine.
Under such circumstances, the statements of Islyamov L.E. in the media cannot be
recognized as expressing his point of view.
As regards the episode of the creation of an armed formation, not provided for by
federal law, the guilt of Islyamov L.E. is supported by the following evidence.
Thus, witnesses Ablyazimov E.Ya., Osmanov A.N., Zaytullaev S.-I.E., Abduvaliev
S.E. pointed out that since the end of 2015, on the territory of the Kherson region of Ukraine,
in the area of the Chongar checkpoints, not far from the border between Russia and Ukraine,
there were four military tents, as well as a checkpoint and a trailer in which people lived, which
were part of the formation, which was originally created as the “Blockade of Crimea”, and later
became the basis of the military formation named after “Noman Chelebidzhikhan”. The callup
to this military formation was carried out through the mass media by Islyamov L.E., who
was personally present at the selection of members of the formation, repeatedly spoke to
members of the formation, signed contracts with fighters. The contract was a standard
document in which it was indicated that a soldier joining the battalion, after signing the
contract, would be given a uniform, a monetary allowance of UAH 8,000, and the duties of the
fighter were set out. The trailer housed the headquarters of Islyamov L.E., another tent housed
the TV channel "ATR", press conferences were held in this tent, in which Islyamov L.E.
participated. The soldiers were issued a reddish-sand-colored military uniform with a chevron
on the sleeve in the form of a rider with a saber over his head and the inscription "Noman
Chelebidzhikhan". Members of the formation were trained in military affairs, for this purpose,
appropriate instructors for military training made visits. The number of the battalion was about
150 people. 10-15 people lived in tents. The battalion had a daily routine, the territory of the
battalion was fenced off by appropriate trenches, which were built by members of the battalion.
The battalion had its own household unit, a kitchen, where food was delivered. All members
of the battalion, except for the personal guards of Islyamov L.E., were engaged in household
chores - digging trenches in the form of trenches behind the tent city, helping cooks in the
kitchen, carrying firewood, building.
All members of the battalion had call signs, names, surnames were hidden in order to
avoid problems with relatives of the battalion members. The passports of the members of the
battalion were taken away upon admission to the battalion.
By March 2016, the battalion consisted of 4 units: Chaplynka, Kalanchak, the
headquarters section on Chongar, in which Islyamov L.E. himself was, and the ASKER unit,
which was created in March 2016. Each division had its own location. In the ASKER division,
they studied border management and, together with the border guards of Ukraine, were on duty
daily at the border with Ukraine, inspecting cars. The ASKER unit had a black uniform.
In the unit located on Chongar, the first tent was a staff tent, in which meetings, press
conferences, video filming were held; the second tent "No. 2", in which members of the
formation were located; the third tent called "Texas" - young, newly arrived fighters were
quarantined in it for two weeks; the fourth tent was called the "Thirteenth District". The dining
room and utility rooms were located separately. The unit on Chongar was the headquarters,
where all members of the battalion from other units gathered on holidays. There were also two
checkpoints on Chongar - in front of the camp and behind it.
The battalion had two trailers: one contained uniforms, the second trailer was the
headquarters of Islyamov, it was divided in half and ammunition and weapons were stored in
one room of the trailer. The battalion was armed with AK-47 of 5.45 mm caliber in the amount
of 28 pieces, AKM of 7.62 mm caliber; PCM in the amount of 6 pieces; RPG-18 in the amount
of 10 pieces, RPG-26 in the amount of 11 pieces; AGS 17-1 piece; RPG 7 - 1 piece, a lot of F-
- 403 -
1 grenades.
On the territory of Chongar, behind the village, five homemade targets were located in
an open-air field, shooting was carried out there.
The battalion was directly led by Islyamov's deputy, who had the call sign "Shamil".
There were armed posts along the perimeter of the battalion, at 16-00 there was a
changing of the guards. "Shamil" was engaged in changing the guards and appointing them to
posts. "Shamil" gave instructions to the members of the formation who was doing what.
Islyamov L.E. proclaimed that the purpose of the creation and functioning of the battalion
was the armed seizure of the Republic of Crimea. Islyamov was the leader of the battalion, all
members of the battalion had to obey him unquestioningly. Islyamov L.E. set tasks, gave
instructions, including on the inspection of transport coming from Crimea. The soldiers of the
battalion inspected the transport, checked the documents, they acted independently without the
participation of law enforcement agencies.
*****
The arguments of the defense about the falsification of evidence in a criminal case and
the coercion of witnesses to testify, which incriminate Islyamov L.E. in the creation of an
illegal armed formation, with the lawyer's reference to the detention of witness Ilyasov R.R.
since December 2015 and, consequently, to the untruthfulness of his testimony, are found by
the panel of judges as unsupported. The said witness was taken into custody in another criminal
case unrelated to the events in question in 2016, as stated by the witness himself. Moreover,
there were no complaints from the witness Ilyasov R.R. regarding the influence exerted on him
by the preliminary investigation authorities during his interrogation in this criminal case, and
his statement that he was unreasonably convicted in another criminal case cannot testify to the
untruthfulness of his testimony against Islyamov L.E.
Moreover, in the testimony of witness Ilyasov R.R. does not contain any new data that
would not have been established from the testimony of other witnesses.
*****
According to the response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,
the N. Chelebidzhikhan battalion is a non-governmental volunteer armed formation. This
formation is independent and is not part of the structure of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry
of Internal Affairs or the National Guard of Ukraine. The purpose of the battalion, in addition
to the blockade of the Crimea from the Ukrainian border, is also to fight, including armed, for
the return of the peninsula to Ukraine. (case file 225-226, 233-234, 235 volume 11).
In accordance with the results of the operational-search activity provided on the basis
of the decision of January 18, 2016, in the course of the operational-search measures
“interrogation” and “inquiry”, carried out on behalf of the investigator on the performance of
certain investigative actions, information was received that on December 26, 2015 during an
interview with the TV channel "112 Ukraine" Islyamov L.E. announced the creation of a
volunteer battalion named after N. Chelebidzhikhan. According to the operational information
received, the battalion named after N. Chelebidzhikhan does not have a permanent place of
deployment; persons wishing to become its members are located in private residential premises
in the city of Genichesk, n.p. Novotroitskoye, Novoalekseevka, Chopgar, boarding houses
"Azov" and "Brigantina". According to Islyamov L.E. the strength of the paramilitary unit is
currently 250 people. Financing of the battalion named after N. Chelebidzhikhan is carried out
at the expense of voluntary donations of citizens, members of the Mejlis living in Ukraine and
the Crimean Tatar communities of Turkey. The incoming data indicate that some members of
- 404 -
the paramilitary group have firearms obtained in the course of participation in hostilities in the
south-east of Ukraine (case file 204-205, 206 volume 11).
*****
From the testimony of the witness V.A. Kuznetsov, read out by the court in accordance
with par. 5, Part 2, Article 281 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation, it
follows that since 2007, he, together with Malyshkin, has been engaged in telephone pranks of
public figures, both in the Russian Federation and abroad. outside. In September 2015, they
learned from the media that the leaders of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis - Dzhemilev M., Chubarov
R.A. and Islyamov L.E. organized a food blockade of the Republic of Crimea by Ukraine. On
the Internet at www.nutcall.com, they found Mustafa Dzhemilev's mobile phone number and
called him, having previously bought a Ukrainian SIM card from the Life mobile operator. He
spoke with M. Dzhemilev on behalf of Anton Gerashchenko and offered M. Dzhemilev
assistance in supporting the blockade of Crimea by providing material and military assistance
through the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.
They also asked Dzhemilev M. for the contacts of the direct coordinator of the blockade
on the spot - Lenur Islyamov. Having received the specified phone number from Dzhemilev
M., they called Lenur Islyamov and introduced themselves as Anton Gerashchenko. Mylyshkin
A.V. called Islyamov L. on behalf of Anton Gerashchenko, and he (Kuznetsov V.A.) spoke to
the indicated person on behalf of Arsen Avakov. In addition, he and Malyshkin A.V. during
the prank call, corresponded electronically with Lenur Islyamov and with the internal affairs
bodies of the Kherson region of Ukraine on behalf of allegedly Anton Gerashchenko, creating
a mailbox under the name [email protected]. During the correspondence,
Lenur Islyamov sent them a photograph of a sheet of paper with a handwritten text on which
he (L. Islyamov) put forward proposals to provide him with material and technical assistance
to continue the blockade of the Republic of Crimea.
The listed conversations were recorded on mobile phones, the records from which and
the electronic correspondence were copied to a flash drive. The results of the pranks were sent
to the electronic box of the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Crimea to give a legal
assessment of the activities of representatives of the Mejlis and their supporters. (case file 194-
198 volume 4).
*****
The totality of the above evidence examined by the court fully confirms the guilt of
Islyamov L.E. in the creation by him of an armed formation not provided for by federal law.
The panel of judges qualifies such actions of Islyamov L.E. under Part 1 of Article
208 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation as the creation of an armed formation
not provided for by federal law (as amended by Federal Law No. 13O-FZ dated May
05, 2014).
The court, when qualifying the actions of Islyamov L.E. in this way, takes into account
that the fact of the formation's creation and its direct creation by Islyamov L.E., as well as the
fact of its armament, is confirmed by the testimony of witnesses - participants of the illegal
armed formation Ablyazimov, Abduvaliev, Osmanov R.M., Zaitullaev, Osmanov A.N., whose
testimony has no significant contradictions regarding the the fact of the existence of a group of
people united by a single goal - the blockade of the Crimean peninsula from the Ukrainian
border, as well as the forcible change of the foundations of the constitutional system and
violation of the integrity of the Russian Federation, including through the implementation of
- 405 -
armed struggle aimed at the rejection of the Republic of Crimea from the Russian Federation;
the implementation of the central leadership of this association of people by Islyamov L.E.,
because each of witnesses personally communicated with Islyamov L.E. on the subject of
joining the battalion, motives, goals; the method of recruitment - by calling Islyamov L.E. in
the media, as well as through close relatives; regarding the presence in the association of the
daily routine, training, catering of all members of the battalion, the location of the headquarters
and the place of residence of those accepted in the association of persons, as well as regarding
the availability of weapons, the equipment of the place of storage of weapons - a trailer, which
also housed the office of Islyamov L.E., the presence of protection of the territory where the
tents of the members of the association were located, sand-colored uniforms with a chevron in
the form of a horseman with a saber thrown over his head; signing a contract with
Islyamov L.E. on joining battalion; names of the battalion.
Minor contradictions in the testimony of witnesses do not cast doubt on the reliability of
their testimony in these circumstances.
*****
Also, the evidence examined at the court session fully confirms the guilt of
Islyamov L.E. in committing sabotage by him.
*****
The relevance of such conversations specifically to events related to the undermining of
electrical poles, through which energy was supplied to the Republic of Crimea, is also
evidenced by interview of Islyamov L.E. as part of a live broadcast on the Ukrainian Crimean
Tatar TV channel "ATR" on October 17, 2015, where Islyamov L.E. stated that he had
organized a civil blockade of Crimea, which had been in place on the border area for a month
in the village of Chongar, Genichesk district, Kherson region, and indicated the following:
“Electricity will not be supplied to Crimea. We, as citizens of Ukraine, will do everything for
this. Therefore, everyone who is watching us, rest assured, the electricity supply to Crimea will
be turned off." In subsequent interviews, after the events of November 22, 2015, as part of the
live broadcast of the Crimean News agency, published on the Internet on November 26, 2015,
Islyamov L.E. also pointed out that the Crimean Tatar battalion named after
N.Chelebidzhikhan is carrying out a blockade of the Crimea, which consists of several parts,
as well as an energy blockade. In the same period, on the Ukrainian TV channel 112 Ukraine,
in a television program as part of a live broadcast, he stated that they made it possible to connect
one electric pole, that they had been near these electric poles for a long time, for more than
three months, and that the electricity should not in any way be supplied to Crimea.
These interviews were the subject of inspection during the preliminary investigation, as
a result of which protocols were drawn up for examining objects dated March 23, 2020, March
24, 2020 - inspection of optical discs with video files “Open dialogue with activists of the civil
blockade of Crimea on October 17, 2015 part 1”, “Lenur Islyamov October 25, 2015”,
“Islyamov about the Crimean Tatar battalion, energy blockade and smuggling” and Internet
resources. (case file 17-29, 36-41, 42-55, 56-58, 59 volume 10)
*****
The actions of Islyamov L.E. are qualified by the court according to paragraphs "a,
b" of Part 2 of Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation as the
commission of explosions aimed at destroying structures in order to undermine the
economic security and defense capability of the Russian Federation, organized by a group
- 406 -
that caused significant property damage.
Qualifying the actions of Islyamov L.E. Thus, the court takes into account that the
testimony of witnesses Kuznetsov V.A., Abduvaliev, Mamutov E.S., as well as the interview
of Islyamov L.E. fully confirm the organization by Islyamov L.E. of a group of people under
the action "Civil Blockade of Crimea" some of which subsequently became part of illegal
armed formation created by Islyamov L.E. and which, under the leadership of Islyamov L.E.,
blew up poles of 330 kV Kakhovka-Ostrovskoye No. 140 and 330 kV Kakhovka-Dzhankoy
No. 161 overhead lines, located in the area of Chaplynka, Kherson region. The presence of a
group of people under the leadership of Islyamov L.E. in the specified place during the period
from November 21 to 22, 2015 is also evidenced by the video of the ATR TV channel entitled
"Storming of the civil blockade of Crimea by Ukrainian security forces", from which it is clear
that it was a group of people organized by Islyamov L.E. on November 21, 2015 that obstructed
law enforcement officers and repair brigades to approach previously damaged poles for the
resumption of electricity supply to the Crimea. This fact is evidenced by the subordination of
this group to Islyamov L.E.; This is evidenced by the comments of Islyamov L.E. to the media
about ongoing events on behalf of this group; this and the subsequent instructions of
Islyamov L.E. to stop the supply of electricity to the Republic of Crimea on the terms
previously reached between the governments of Ukraine and Russia; these are the statements
of Islyamov L.E. that electricity will not be supplied to Crimea. This is also evidenced by the
subsequent interview of Islyamov L.E., in which he stated that the energy blockade is one of
the projects of the N.Chelebidzhikhan battalion, this fact also testifies to the stability of the
group organized by him, which committed sabotage, which subsequently became part of illegal
armed formations created by Islyamov L.E.
Regarding the goals of Islyamov L.E. - undermining the economic security and defense
capability of the Russian Federation - the object of damage itself testifies - structures through
which electricity was supplied to the territory of the Republic of Crimea, as a result of damage
to which 876 settlements of the Republic of Crimea were left without power supply, including
such important ones as economically, and for the purposes of defense of the country, the
organizations SUE RK "Krymenergo" and FSUE "102 Electric Grid Enterprise", whose tasks
are to provide electricity to the population, organizations and enterprises, the Ministry of
Emergency Situations, the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Crimea, the Black Sea Fleet
of the Russian Federation, whose tasks are to protect the population and the country in general,
protection of life and health of the population, ensuring law and order, State Unitary Enterprise
"Sevastopol Aviation Enterprise", whose task was to repair and maintain the technical
condition of aviation equipment, Beg LLC, State Unitary Enterprise of Sevastopol
"Management Company "Streletskaya Bay", GBU "Gorsvet", whose tasks were to ensure the
well-being of the population, food security, and which, as a result of the actions by groups of
persons, organized by Islyamov L.E., involved in blowing up electrical poles suspended their
activities, could not fully perform the functions assigned to them, suffered losses in the amount
of at least RUB 52,137,368.77, which is associated with the need to purchase additional
equipment - alternative sources of energy supply, commissioning equipment, purchase of fuel
and oils materials, additional involvement of persons in the performance of work to maintain
public order and the safety of citizens, Beg LLC and the Ministry of Health of the Republic of
Crimea suffered losses as a result of damage to products and medicines, respectively. Thus,
both state-owned enterprises, organizations, and private ones were limited in their ability to
perform their functions as a mechanism for the economic security of the state, and the executive
authorities, which were entrusted with the functions of the country's defense, acted in an
emergency mode to maintain the state's defense capability.
*****
- 407 -
In accordance with Part 3 of Article 69 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation,
on the basis of the totality of crimes, to finally sentence Islyamov Lenur Edemovich by partial
addition of the sentences imposed, determining to serve a sentence of nineteen (19) years in
prison with deprivation of the right to engage in activities related to performances in the
mass media, for a period of 2 years and restriction of freedom for a period of 1 year with
the following restrictions in accordance with Article 53 of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation: not to change the place of residence or stay without the consent of a specialized
state body that oversees the serving of sentences in the form of restriction of freedom, not to
travel outside the territory of the relevant municipality where the convicted person will live
after serving his sentence; to oblige to appear in the specified specialized state body once a
month for registration on the days established by this body.
The place of serving the punishment in the form of imprisonment by Islyamov L.E. shall
be a correctional colony of a strict regime.
*****
To satisfy the civil claim of Beg LLC in the amount of RUB 5,000,002.20, to recover
from Lenur Edemovich Islyamov RUB 5,000,002.20 in favor of Beg LLC as compensation for
property damages.
To satisfy the civil claim of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Emergency
Situations of Russia for the Republic of Crimea in the amount of RUB 40,671,826 by
recovering from Islyamov Lenur Edemovich RUB 40,671,826 in favor of the Main Directorate
of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia for the Republic of Crimea as compensation
for property damage.
To satisfy the civil claim of the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Crimea in the
amount of RUB 5,885,590 by collecting RUB 5,885,590 from Islyamov Lenur Edemovich in
favor of the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Crimea as compensation for property
damage.
To satisfy the civil claim of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in the
amount of RUB 217,810.98 by recovering RUB 217,810.98 from Islyamov Lenur Edemovich
in favor of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation as compensation for property damage.
To satisfy the civil claim of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Sevastopol
Aviation Enterprise" in the amount of RUB 297,689.93 by recovering RUB 297,689.93 from
Islyamov Lenur Edemovich in favor of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Sevastopol
Aviation Enterprise" as compensation for property damage.
To recognize the victims, namely the State Unitary Enterprise of the Republic of
Kazakhstan "Krymenergo", FSUE "102 [Enterprise of Electric Networks" of the
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and FSUE "Sevastopol Aviation
Enterprise" as regards compensation for lost profits the right to satisfy a civil claim by
submitting an Interrogation about the amount of compensation for consideration in civil
proceedings.
The verdict may be appealed to the Third Court of Appeal of General Jurisdiction
through the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea within ten days from the moment of its
proclamation, and if by the convicted person in custody – within the same period from the
moment of handing him a copy of the verdict.
*****
- 408 -
Case No. 55-116/2021
RULING ON APPEAL
Sochi April 8, 2021
The Judicial Collegium for Criminal Cases of the Third Court of Appeal of General
Jurisdiction, consisting of:
Presiding Judge Sutyagin K.I.,
Judges Totskaya Zh.G., Noskova A.A.,
with Assistant Judge Koroleva N.N.,
with the participation of prosecutors Ovchinnikov Yu.A., Gordeeva S.N.,
defense lawyer Polozov N.N.,
examined in open court hearing a criminal case on appeal submission filed by prosecutor
Lobova R.V. and on appeals of the defenders of the convicted person Islyamov L.E. - lawyer
Polozov N.N., lawyer Poluyanova T.N. against the verdict of the Supreme Court of the
Republic of Crimea dated December 10, 2020, by which
Islyamov Lenur Edemovich, born on January 1, 1966, a native of the city of Bekabad
of the Tashkent region of the UzSSR, a citizen of the Russian Federation, with no previous
convictions, was convicted under par. "a", "b" Part 2 of Article 281 of the Criminal Code of
the Russian Federation to fourteen (14) years in prison, under Part 1 of Art. 208 of the Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation to twelve (12) years in prison with restriction of freedom for
one (1) year, for six crimes under Part 2 of Art. 280.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation for each to one (1) year of imprisonment with deprivation of the right to engage in
activities related to speeches in the media for one (1) year, on the basis of Part 3 of Article 69
of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation by partial addition of the sentences imposed -
to a punishment of nineteen (19) years in prison with serving a sentence in a strict regime
correctional colony, with deprivation of the right to engage in activities related to speeches in
the media for two (2) years and restriction of freedom for one (1) year with the imposition of
restrictions and obligations.
*****
After hearing the report of Judge Noskova A.A., the speeches of the prosecutors who
supported the arguments of the appeal presentation, the defender of the convicted person who
supported the arguments of the appeals, the Judicial Collegium
established:
according to the court verdict, Islyamov L.E. was found guilty of organizing and
directing the commission of sabotage, that is, the commission of explosions aimed at destroying
structures in order to undermine the economic security and defense capability of the Russian
Federation, committed by an organized group that caused significant property damage; created
an armed formation not provided for by federal law; made public calls for actions aimed at
violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation using mass media on
September 08, 2015, October 17, 2015, November 21, 2015, no later than December 20, 2015
(Crimean News Agency and 112 Ukraine channel), no later than December 28, 2015.
- 409 -
These crimes were committed on the territory of Ukraine under the circumstances
detailed in the verdict.
In the appeal submission, Prosecutor Lobov R.V. seeks the verdict to be changed due to
violations of the law. He draws the court's attention to the changes made to Part 1 of Art. 280.1
of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation Federal Law No. 425-FZ of
December 08, 2020, according to which the criminal liability of a person for public calls for
actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation occurs only after
he has been brought to administrative liability for a similar act within one year. Due to the fact
that Islyamov L.E. was not brought to administrative liability for these acts, and also taking
into account the provisions of Article 54 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article
10 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation on the retroactive force of the criminal law,
he considers it necessary to exclude from the sentence an indication of Islyamov L.E.'s
conviction for six crimes provided for in Part 2 of Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code, and to
mitigate the sentence imposed on him in accordance with Part 3 of Article 69 of the Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation - up to 18 years of imprisonment, with restriction of freedom
for a period of 1 year.
In the appeal, the defender of the convicted person - lawyer Poluyanova T.N. points out
the illegality and groundlessness of the verdict. In substantiation of his position, she refers to
the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the norms of the criminal procedure law and the
clarifications contained in the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation No. 55 dated November 29, 2016 "On Court Verdict". She notes that the verdict
must be based on reliable evidence, it cannot be based on assumptions.
It appears that the court did not establish what actions were committed by Islyamov L.E.
on organizing the explosion of overhead power lines, when rendering the judgment, the court
referred to the testimony of the victims who had no information whatsoever about who
organized the explosion. In addition, the court unreasonably referred to the testimony of the
witness Abduvaliev S.E., obtained at the stage of the preliminary investigation, and not in court,
as well as the testimony of the witness Mamutov E.S., which do not agree with each other, are
contradictory, and their reliability is questionable. According to the defense, the testimony of
the witness Kuznetsov V.A. also does not confirm the guilt of Islyamov L.E. in the alleged
wrongdoing.
At the same time, she believes that there is also no evidence confirming the guilt of
Islyamov L.E. in creating an illegal armed formation. She notes that the convicted person in an
interview spoke about the creation of a battalion as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in the
testimony of witness Abduvaliev S.E. there are contradictions that have not been resolved by
the court, and the testimony of witnesses Ablyazimov E.Ya., Osmanova A.N, Zeytulaeva S.I.
cannot be used as the basis for the verdict, since these persons were on the territory of Ukraine
only in 2016.
In addition, the defender draws the attention of the court to the lack of signs of crimes in
the actions by Islyamov L.E. which signs are provided for in Part 2 of Article 280.1 of the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, since the convicted person did not call for specific
actions, but only expressed the idea of returning Crimea to the territory of Ukraine. Based on
the foregoing, she seeks that the verdict be canceled and Islyamov L.E. be discharged.
In the appeal and the addendum to it, the defender of the convicted person - lawyer
Polozov N.N. also expresses disagreement with the verdict, asks to cancel it, referring to the
illegality and groundlessness, inconsistency of the conclusions of the court with the actual
circumstances of the case. Referring to the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian
Federation, she draws the attention of the court that the application of the law shall be carried
- 410 -
out within the territorial jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. Citing judicial practice in the
petition, an analysis of the evidence used in the verdict as the basis for the accusation of
Islyamov L.E., the defense believes that the actions of his client are incorrectly qualified by the
court under Part 1 of Article 208 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation since the
armed formation was created outside the Russian Federation - on the territory of Ukraine, and
this part of the article does not provide for the extraterritorial effect of the norm. In addition,
there is no evidence in the case confirming that the battalion is recognized as a banned extremist
or terrorist organization in Russia or in other states. Under such circumstances, the court
incorrectly applied the criminal law: the analogy of the law was applied and objective
imputation was allowed within the meaning of the legislation.
She also draws the court's attention to the fact that the criminal case on six crimes under
Part 2 of Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation should be terminated
due to the decriminalization of the acts imputed to Islyamov L.E.
The defense, challenging the qualification of the actions of Islyamov L.E. according to
paragraph "a, b" of Part 2 of Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation,
believes that the prosecution has not proved, and the court has not properly established the guilt
of her client in this wrongdoing. To substantiate her position, when evaluating the evidence,
the advocate refers to the accusatory bias of the court when making a judgment, the
inconsistency of the evidence underlying the prosecution. She believes that the court did not
take into account the clarifications of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation No. 55 dated November 29, 2016 “On Court Verdict”, the practice of the European
Court of Human Rights, which is of significant importance in this case.
The court selectively based the charges against Islyamov L.E. on the testimony of
witness Abduvaliev S.E., the court took into account the testimony of the witness given at the
stage of the preliminary investigation, while not taking into account that the witness gave other
testimony during the court session, indicating the unreliability of his initial testimony.
Also, the verdict contains an incomplete and biased assessment of the testimony given in
court by the witness E.S. Mamutov. The court did not take into account the circumstance that
the witness was testifying about other events that had occurred earlier - before the overhead
power lines towers were blown up. According to the defense, the court unreasonably denied
the defense's motion to declassify the data of this witness and interrogate him under the
conditions of evidence. The defense side does not agree with the assessment of the reliability
of the testimony of Mamutov E.S., since they are in contradiction with the established
circumstances of the act qualified under paragraphs "a, b" of Part 2 of Article 281 of the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. The interrogation of the witness in conditions
excluding his visual observation deprived the defense side of the opportunity to assess his
auditory and visual abilities, and as a result to file a motion for an investigative experiment.
She notes that when comparing the testimony of Mamutov E.S. with the testimony of other
witnesses, obvious inconsistencies in them are revealed.
The advocate also disagrees with the fact that the verdict is based on the protocols of the
inspection of objects and the testimony of the witness Kuznetsov V.A. who received
information about the circumstances of the incriminated crimes by committing telephone
pranks. She believes that in the indicated evidence there is no information about any intentions
or actions aimed at the organization of sabotage by Islyamov L.E. She also notes that the
method of obtaining information by Kuznetsov V.A. has no legislative ground, therefore, the
possibility of their falsification is not excluded. The defense believes that since Islyamov L.E.
is a public figure, it will not be difficult to find a recording of his voice on the Internet and
process it. As it appears, the court did not assess the possible technical impact on the audio
recordings of conversations presented, and the question of conducting a forensic foposcopic
examination was not raised. She finds the conclusions of the court about the voluntary actions
- 411 -
of the specified witness, as well as about the objectivity and reliability of the evidence received
from him, unfounded. Referring to the norms of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian
Federation, international norms, the positions of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation,
the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and the European Court of Human Rights,
the advocate points to a gross violation of the right to defense. The court did not take all
exhaustive measures to summon the witness Kuznetsov V.A. before deciding on the
announcement of his testimony. Taking into account the specifics of the consideration of the
case in accordance with Part 5 of Article 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian
Federation, the defenders invited by Islyamov L.E. entered the case only at the stage of judicial
proceedings, which deprived the defense side of challenging the witness's testimony. She
believes that the prosecutor unreasonably refused to interrogate the witness Malyshkin A.V.,
which deprived Islyamov L.E. of the full realization of his right to defense.
In the arguments of the petition, the defense indicates that none of the interrogated
representatives of the victims provided the court with information indicating the involvement
of Islyamov L.E. in the organization of sabotage, and the information reported by them is well
known and confirms only the fact of a power outage. In addition, the testimony of other
witnesses also does not contain information about the involvement of Islyamov L.E. in the
organization of sabotage. Giving an assessment of the evidence of the involvement of
Islyamov L.E., the court committed violations of the criminal procedure law, since it did not
take into account the circumstances that were relevant to the conclusions of the court when
passing a verdict. Thus, the court established the circumstances of the explosion of power lines
that occurred 2 days before the event in which Islyamov L.E. is accused, as well as the activities
of a number of armed formations on the territory of the Kherson region of Ukraine, however,
an analysis of the relationship between the events of November 20, 2015, and
November 22, 2015, was not carried out, versions of the commission of sabotage by other
persons were not rejected.
The court, assessing the subjective side of the incriminated act, referred to the video
dated November 21, 2015. However, the defender does not agree that the court took into
account this evidence, since there is no causal relationship between the events that occurred
and the speech of Islyamov L.E. about his negative attitude towards the transition of Crimea to
Russia, as well as opposition to the repair work of the blown-up poles. Thus, the court has not
established sufficient and reliable evidence confirming the guilt of Islyamov L.E. in the
organization of sabotage.
As regards the conclusion of the court that in relation to Islyamova L.E. political
persecution is not carried out, the lawyer finds it untenable, since it is refuted by objective data.
In addition, during the investigation of the case against the convicted person, no actions were
carried out in accordance with Chapter 53 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian
Federation, neither the court nor law enforcement agencies sought legal assistance from the
authorized bodies of the state where, according to the investigation, crimes were committed.
The court has not established reliably that criminal prosecution in a foreign state is not carried
out against Islyamov L.E., which also confirms the political aspect of the criminal case.
Insisting on the accusatory bias of the court when passing the verdict, the defender seeks to
take into account the fact of the falsity of the testimony of witness Ilyasov R.R. which is
confirmed by the verdict of the Alushta City Court dated April 26, 2016.
On the basis of the above arguments, she seeks the court to cancel the verdict, to refuse
to satisfy civil claims, with respect to the accusation of Islyamov L.E. under Part 1 of Article
208 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, six crimes provided for in Part 2 of Article
280.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - to terminate the proceedings for the
absence of corpus delicti, and according to paragraph "a, b" of Part 2 Article 281 of the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation in connection with his non-involvement in the
- 412 -
incriminated act, in the absence of a crime event.
In the objections to the appeals of the defenders, the state prosecutor Lobov R.V.
expresses disagreement with their arguments, asks the court to dismiss them.
At the court session of the court of appeal, the prosecution supported the arguments of
the appeal petition, sought the court to cancel the verdict in part of the conviction of
Islyamov L.E. under Part 2 of Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code in connection with
decriminalization, to leave the verdict unchanged as regards the rest of the court verdict, the
defense side supported the arguments of appeal petitions, sought the court to cancel the verdict
and to discharge Islyamov L.E.
*****
On the basis of the above, guided by Articles 389.20, 389.21, 389.26 and Article 389.28
of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation, the judicial board
decided:
the verdict of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea dated December 10, 2020 in
relation to Lenur Edemovich Islyamov in terms of conviction under Part 2 of Art. 280.1, part
2 of Art. 280.1, part 2 of Art. 280.1, part 2 of Art. 280.1, part 2 of Art. 280.1, part 2 of Art.
280.1 of the Criminal Code cancel, and in accordance with Part. 2 Article. 24 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation, the proceedings in this part should be terminated
on the grounds provided for in paragraph 2 of part 1 of Art. 24 Code of Criminal Procedure,
for lack of corpus delicti.
The same sentence shall be changed, the indication of the following persons should be
excluded from the description of the criminal act: Ablyazimov E.Ya., Osmanova R.M.,
Osmanova A.N., Zaitullayeva S.I.E.
On the basis of Part 3 of Article 69 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation on
the totality of crimes provided for in Part 1 of Article 208 of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation, paragraph "a, b" of Part 2 of Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation, by partial addition of punishments, to finally convict Islyamov L.E. to eighteen
(18) years of imprisonment with serving a sentence in a high-security penal colony, with
restriction of freedom for a period of one (1) a year with the establishment of restrictions not
to change the place of residence or stay without the consent of a specialized state body
supervising the serving of a sentence in the form of restriction of freedom by a convicted
person, not to travel outside the territory of the relevant municipality where the convicted
person will reside after serving the deprivation of freedom; to oblige to appear in the specified
specialized state body once a month for registration on the days established by this body.
To leave the rest of the verdict against Islyamov L.E. unchanged, to dismiss the appeal
petition of the defender Poluyanova T.N., to partially satisfy the appeal petition of the defender
Polozov N.N., to fully satisfy the appeal petition of the prosecutor.
*****
Presiding Judge /signature/
Judges / signature / / signature /
- 413 -
- 414 -
Annex 97
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 201 “On Amendments to the List of
Border Territories Where Foreign Citizens, Stateless Persons and Foreign Legal Entities
Cannot Own Land Plots, Approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation
of January 9, 2011, No. 26” (20 March 2020)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 415 -
- 416 -
DECREE
PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
On Amendments to the List of Border Territories Where Foreign Citizens, Stateless
Persons and Foreign Legal Entities Cannot Own Land Plots, approved by Decree of the
President of the Russian Federation of January 9, 2011 No. 26
1. Include in the list of border territories where foreign citizens, stateless persons and foreign
legal entities cannot own land plots, approved by Decree of the President of the Russian
Federation of January 9, 2011 No. 26 "On approval of the list of border territories, on which
foreign citizens, stateless persons and foreign legal entities cannot own land plots" (Collected
Legislation of the Russian Federation, 2011, No. 2, Art. 268; 2016, No. 16, Art. 2199), the
following changes:
a) add the following section:
"Republic of Crimea
44 1 . Municipal formation Bakhchisaray district of the Republic of Crimea.
44 2 . Municipal formation Dzhankoysky district of the Republic of Crimea.
44 3 . Municipal formation Kirovsky district of the Republic of Crimea.
44 4 . Municipal formation Krasnoperekopsky district of the Republic of Crimea.
44 5 . Municipal formation Leninsky district of the Republic of Crimea.
44 6 . Municipal formation Nizhnegorsky district of the Republic of Crimea.
44 7 . Municipal formation Razdolnensky district of the Republic of Crimea.
44 8 . Municipal formation Saksky district of the Republic of Crimea.
44 9 . Municipal formation Simferopol region of the Republic of Crimea.
44 10 . Municipal formation Sovetsky district of the Republic of Crimea.
44 11 . Municipal formation Chernomorsky district of the Republic of Crimea.
44 12 . Municipal formation of the urban district of Alushta of the Republic of Crimea.
44 13 . Municipal formation of the urban district of Armyansk of the Republic of Crimea.
44 14 . Municipal formation of the urban district of Evpatoria of the Republic of Crimea.
44 15 . Municipal formation of the urban district of Kerch of the Republic of Crimea.
44 16 . Municipal formation of the urban district of Saki of the Republic of Crimea.
44 17 . Municipal formation of the urban district of Sudak of the Republic of Crimea.
44 18 . Municipal formation of the urban district of Feodosia of the Republic of Crimea.
44 19 . Municipal formation of the urban district of Yalta of the Republic of Crimea.
b) Clause 69 shall be declared invalid;
c) paragraphs 172 - 178 shall be declared invalid;
d) add paragraphs 178 1 - 178 24 as follows:
"178 1. Municipal formation "Closed administrative-territorial formation Znamensk of the
Astrakhan region".
- 417 -
178 2 . Municipal formation "City of Akhtubinsk".
178 3 . Municipal formation "Poselok Nizhniy Baskunchak".
178 4 . Municipal formation "Working settlement Liman".
178 5 . Municipal formation "Aksaray village council".
1786 . _ Municipal formation "Baibek village council".
178 7 . Municipal formation "Vatazhensky village council".
178 8 . Municipal formation "Zolotukhinsky village council".
178 9 . Municipal formation "Kalininsky village council".
178 10 . Municipal formation "Karalat village council".
178 11 . Municipal formation "Karaulinsky village council".
178 12 . Municipal formation "Kochkovatsky village council".
178 13 . Municipal formation "Mikhailovsky village council".
178 14 . Municipal formation "Multanovsky village council".
178 15 . Municipal formation "Mumrinsky village council".
178 16 . Municipal formation "Novokrasinsky village council".
178 17 . Municipal formation "Obraztsovo-Travinsky village council".
178 18 . Municipal formation "Razdorsky village council".
178 19 . Municipal formation "Sasykol village council".
178 20 . Municipal formation "Tambov village council".
178 21 . Municipal formation "Tishkovsky village council".
178 22 . Municipal formation "Udachensky village council".
178 23 . Municipal formation "Tsvetnovsky village council".
178 24 . Municipal formation "Chulpansky village council.";
e) clause 181 shall be stated as follows:
"181. Municipal formation Valuysky city district.";
f) clause 184 shall be stated as follows:
"184. Municipal formation Grayvoron city district.";
g) clause 187 shall be stated as follows:
"187. Municipal formation Shebekinsky city district.";
h) the section "Kaliningrad Region" shall be stated in the following wording:
"Kaliningrad region
206. Urban district "City of Kaliningrad".
207. Municipal formation "Bagrationovsky city district" of the Kaliningrad region.
208. Municipal formation "Baltic city district" of the Kaliningrad region.
209. Municipal formation "Guryev city district" of the Kaliningrad region.
210. Municipal formation "Zelenograd city district" of the Kaliningrad region.
211. Municipal formation "Krasnoznamensky city district" of the Kaliningrad region.
212. Municipal formation "Ladushkinsky urban district".
213. Municipal formation "Mamonovsky city district".
214. Municipal formation "Neman urban district" of the Kaliningrad region.
215. Municipal formation "Nesterovsky city district" of the Kaliningrad region.
216. Municipal formation "Ozersky city district" of the Kaliningrad region.
- 418 -
217. Municipal formation "Pioneer city district".
218. Municipal formation "Polessky urban district" of the Kaliningrad region.
219. Municipal formation "Pravdinsky city district" of the Kaliningrad region.
220. Municipal formation "Svetlovsky city district" of the Kaliningrad region.
221. Municipal formation "Svetlogorsk city district".
222. Municipal formation "Slavsky city district" of the Kaliningrad region.
223. Municipal formation "Soviet city district" of the Kaliningrad region.
224. Municipal formation "Yantarny urban district" of the Kaliningrad region. ";
i) Paragraph 286 shall be stated as follows:
"286. Municipal formation "City of Orsk" of the Orenburg region.";
j) add the following section:
"Sevastopol
354 1 . Intracity municipality of the city of Sevastopol Andreevsky municipal district.
354 2 . Intracity municipality of the city of Sevastopol Balaklavsky municipal district.
354 3 . Intra-city municipality of the city of Sevastopol Gagarinsky municipal district.
354 4. Intracity municipality of the city of Sevastopol Kachinsky municipal district.
354 5 . Intra-city municipality of the city of Sevastopol - Leninsky municipal district.
3546 . _ Intracity municipality of the city of Sevastopol Nakhimovsky municipal district.
354 7 . Intracity municipality of the city of Sevastopol Orlinovsky municipal district.
354 8 . The city of Inkerman, an intracity municipality of the city of Sevastopol.";
k) the note after the figures "168 - 171," shall be supplemented with the figures "178 1 ,".
2. This Decree shall enter into force on the day of its official publication.
President of the Russian Federation V. Putin
Moscow Kremlin
March 20, 2020
No. 201
- 419 -
- 420 -
Annex 98
List of Registered Media Outlets, Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of
Communications, Information Technology and Mass Communications (8 April
2022)
This excerpt has been translated from its original language
into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to
Rules of the Court, Article 51. A copy of the whole document
has been deposited with the Registry.
- 421 -
- 422 -
4/7/22, 11:49 AM Roskomnadzor - List of names of registered media
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
Black Sea showcase
Certificate number PI No. TU 91 - 00114
Date of registration 26.02.2015
certificate status the action was terminated on 10.12.2018
By the decision of the founders
Media name Black Sea showcase
Distribution form print media newspaper
Distribution area Republic of Crimea
Founders Didynsky B.N.; Gromov S.B.
Editorial address 297400, Crimea Rep., Evpatoria, st. Frunze, 28/41 a, of. 102
Languages English, Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=543310
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=543310&print=1 1/1
4/7/22, 11:48 AM Roskomnadzor - List of names of registered media
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
Scientific notes of the Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University. Series: Pedagogy. Psychology
Certificate
number
Date of
registration
certificate
status
PI No. TU 91 - 00199
06/16/2015
the action was terminated on 06/01/2021 By the decision of the founders
Media name Scientific notes of the Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University. Series: Pedagogy. Psychology
Distribution print media magazine
form
Distribution Republic of Crimea
area
Founders State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Education of the Republic of Crimea "Crimean
Engineering and Pedagogical University"
- 423 -
Editorial 295015, Crimea Rep., Simferopol, per. Educational, d. 8
address
Languages English, Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=576887
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=576887&print=1 1/1
4/7/22, 11:46 AM eee e e
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
Titan Media
Certificate
number
Date of
registration
certificate
status
PI No. TU 91 - 00139
03/24/2015
the action was terminated on 11.10.2019 By the decision of the founders
Media name Titan Media
Distribution print media newspaper
form
Distribution Republic of Crimea
area
Founders Limited Liability Company "Titanium Investments"
Editorial 296012, Crimea Rep., Armyansk, Northern industrial zone, Armenian branch of LLC "Titanium
address Investments" - "Crimean Titan"
Languages Russian Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=550822
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=550822&print=1 1/1
4/7/22, 11:45 AM Roskomnadzor - List of names of registered media
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
TV channel "KTV"
Certificate number EL No. FS 77 - 60751
- 424 -
:;trt
Date of registration 09.02.2015
certificate status terminated on 01/19/2021
Liquidation of a legal entity / association of citizens or death of an individual
Media name TV channel "KTV"
Distribution form TV channel
Distribution area Republic of Crimea
Sevastopol
Founders Limited Liability Company "RosKrymMedia Production"
Editorial address 295017, Crimea Rep., Simferopol, st. Kievskaya, 59/2, of. 21
Languages Russian, Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar, German, Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=538376
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=538376&print=1 1/1
4/7/22, 11:43 AM Roskomnadzor - List of names of registered media
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
Perspectives of modern psychology and pedagogy
Certificate
number
Date of
registration
certificate
status
PI No. TU 91 - 00184
06/08/2015
the action was terminated on 10/25/2019 By the decision of the founders
Media name Perspectives of modern psychology and pedagogy
Distribution print media compilation
form
Distribution Republic of Crimea
area
Founders State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Education of the Republic of Crimea "Crimean
Engineering and Pedagogical University"
Editorial 295015, Crimea Rep., Simferopol, per. Educational, d. 8
address
Languages English, Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=574647
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=574647&print=1 1/1
- 425 -
4/7/22, 11:39 AM eee e e
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
Our Newspaper Yalta
Certificate number PI No. TU 91 - 00224
Date of registration 09/10/2015
certificate status the action was terminated on 06/15/2018
By the decision of the founders
Media name Our Newspaper Yalta
Distribution form print media newspaper
Distribution area Republic of Crimea
Founders Limited Liability Company "Gorod 82"
Editorial address 298600, Republic of Crimea, Yalta, st. Embankment them. Lenina/Sadovaya, 3, floor 1
Languages Crimean Tatar, Russian, Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=588386
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=588386&print=1 1/1
4/7/22, 11:38 AM Roskomnadzor - List of names of registered media
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
Our Newspaper Feodosia
Certificate number PI No. TU 91 - 00226
Date of registration 09/10/2015
certificate status the action was terminated on 06/15/2018
By the decision of the founders
Media name Our Newspaper Feodosia
Distribution form print media newspaper
Distribution area Republic of Crimea
Founders Limited Liability Company "Gorod 82"
Editorial address 295006, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, st. A. Nevsky, 17, office 201
Languages Crimean Tatar, Russian, Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=588388
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=588388&print=1 1/1
- 426 -
4/7/22, 11:36 AM Roskomnadzor - List of names of registered media
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
Our Newspaper Simferopol
Certificate number PI No. TU 91 - 00212
Date of registration 07/20/2015
certificate status the action was terminated on 06/26/2018
By the decision of the founders
Media name Our Newspaper Simferopol
Distribution form print media newspaper
Distribution area Republic of Crimea
Founders Limited Liability Company "Gorod 66"
Editorial address 295006, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, st. A. Nevsky, 17
Languages Crimean Tatar, Russian, Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=583588
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=583588&print=1 1/1
4/7/22, 11:35 AM Roskomnadzor - List of names of registered media
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
Our Newspaper Kerch
Certificate number PI No. TU 91 - 00227
Date of registration 09/10/2015
certificate status the action was terminated on 06/15/2018
By the decision of the founders
Media name Our Newspaper Kerch
Distribution form print media newspaper
Distribution area Republic of Crimea
Founders Limited Liability Company "Gorod 82"
Editorial address 295006, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, st. A. Nevsky, 17, office. 201
Languages Crimean Tatar, Russian, Ukrainian
- 427 -
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=588389
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=588389&print=1 1/1
4/7/22, 11:34 AM eee e e
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
Our Newspaper Evpatoria
Certificate number PI No. TU 91 - 00225
Date of registration 09/10/2015
certificate status the action was terminated on 06/15/2018
By the decision of the founders
Media name Our Newspaper Evpatoria
Distribution form print media newspaper
Distribution area Republic of Crimea
Founders Limited Liability Company "Gorod 82"
Editorial address 295006, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, st. A. Nevsky, 17, office 201
Languages Crimean Tatar, Russian, Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=588387
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=588387&print=1 1/1
4/7/22, 11:32 AM Roskomnadzor - List of names of registered media
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
Our Newspaper Alushta
Certificate number PI No. TU 91 - 00223
Date of registration 09/10/2015
certificate status the action was terminated on 06/15/2018
By the decision of the founders
Media name Our Newspaper Alushta
Distribution form print media newspaper
Distribution area Republic of Crimea
- 428 -
Founders Limited Liability Company "Gorod 82"
Editorial address 295006, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, st. A. Nevsky, 17
Languages Crimean Tatar, Russian, Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=588385
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=588385&print=1 1/1
4/7/22, 11:29 AM Roskomnadzor - List of names of registered media
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
Literary children's world
Certificate number PI No. TU 91 - 00031
Date of registration 09/25/2014
certificate status the action was terminated on 19.09.2016
By decision of the founders.
Media name Literary children's world
Distribution form print media magazine
Distribution area Republic of Crimea
Founders Ogurtsova L.V.
Editorial address 295493, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, st. Gresovskaya, 8, apt. 29
Languages Crimean Tatar, Russian, Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=514353
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=514353&print=1 1/1
4/7/22, 11:02 AM Roskomnadzor - List of names of registered media
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
Literary Crimea
Certificate number PI No. TU 91 - 00099
Date of registration 12/31/2014
certificate status the action was terminated on 01/20/2017
By decision of the founders.
- 429 -
ict,tg=t,
Media name Literary Crimea
Distribution form print media newspaper
Distribution area Republic of Crimea
Founders Kilesa V.V.
Editorial address 295022, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, st. Kievskaya, 44, apt. eleven
Languages Crimean Tatar, Russian, Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=534187
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=534187&print=1 1/1
4/7/22, 10:31 AM Roskomnadzor - List of names of registered media
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (ROSKOMNADZOR)
Our newspaper Sevastopol
Certificate number PI No. TU 91 - 00217
Date of registration 07/20/2015
certificate status the action was terminated on 10.07.2018
By the decision of the founders
Media name Our newspaper Sevastopol
Distribution form print media newspaper
Distribution area Sevastopol
Founders Limited Liability Company "Gorod 66"
Editorial address 299053, Sevastopol, st. Vakulenchuk, 35-A
Languages Crimean Tatar, Russian, Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=583567
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=583567&print=1 1/1
4/7/22, 10:30 AM
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (ROSKOMNADZOR)
Omega Polis
Certificate number EL No. TU 91 - 00130
Date of registration 03/24/2015
certificate status terminated on 06/05/2020
Liquidation of a legal entity / association of citizens or death of an individual
Media name Omega Polis
Distribution form radio channel
Distribution area Sevastopol
Founders Limited Liability Company "TV RADIO COMPANY "SIAN"
Editorial address 295053, Sevastopol, st. Mate Zalki, 17
- 430 -
•~
Languages Russian Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=550813
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=550813&print=1 1/1
4/7/22, 10:29 AM Roskomnadzor - List of names of registered media
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (ROSKOMNADZOR)
Television company YUTV-Krym
Certificate number EL No. TU 91 - 00257
Date of registration 04.03.2016
certificate status the action was terminated on 18.05.2018
By decision of the founders
Media name Television company YUTV-Krym
Distribution form TV channel
Distribution area Sevastopol
Founders Limited Liability Company YuTV Television Company
Editorial address 428036, Chuvashskaya - Chuvashia Rep., Cheboksary, st. Mate Zalka, 13, apt. 105
Languages Crimean Tatar, Russian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=593571
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=593571&print=1 1/1
4/7/22, 10:27 AM a eee aI.1eaI.1 aeI.1I.1a
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
CT.FM
Certificate number EL No. FS 77 - 66105
Date of registration 06/20/2016
certificate status the action was terminated on February 10, 2020
By the decision of the founders
Media name CT.FM
Distribution form Online edition
Distribution area Russian Federation
foreign countries
Founders Individual entrepreneur Belitsky Sergey Petrovich
Editorial address 295021, Crimea Rep., Simferopol, per. Spartaka, 47
Languages English, Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian
Domain name SITIFM.RF
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=597747
- 431 -
~ R fi
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=597747&print=1 1/1
4/7/22, 10:26 AM a eee aI.1eaI.1 aeI.1I.1a
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
CT.FM
Certificate number EL No. FS 77 - 66019
Date of registration 06/20/2016
certificate status the action was terminated on February 10, 2020
By the decision of the founders
Media name CT.FM
Distribution form TV channel
Distribution area Russian Federation
foreign countries
Founders Individual entrepreneur Belitsky Sergey Petrovich
Editorial address 295021, Crimea Rep., Simferopol, per. Spartaka, 47
Languages English, Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=597497
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=597497&print=1 1/1
4/7/22, 10:20 AM Roskomnadzor - List of names of registered media
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (ROSKOMNADZOR)
SOUTHERN ALMANAC OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
Certificate number EL No. FS 77 - 69910
Date of registration 06/07/2017
certificate status the action was terminated on 10.12.2019
By the decision of the founders
Media name SOUTHERN ALMANAC OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
Distribution form Online edition
Distribution area Russian Federation
foreign countries
Founders Limited Liability Company "GLOBAL TRADE AND SERVICE"
Editorial address 299046, Sevastopol, Pobedy Ave., 76, apt. 97
Languages English Russian Ukrainian
Domain name yunia.ru
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=627932
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=627932&print=1 1/1
- 432 -
4/7/22, 10:18 AM
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (ROSKOMNADZOR)
Crewing Bulletin
Certificate number PI No. FS 77 - 59454
Date of registration 03.10.2014
certificate status the action was terminated on 28.08.2019
By the decision of the founders
Media name Crewing Bulletin
Distribution form printed media bulletin
Distribution area foreign countries
Russian Federation
Founders Ermakova E.A.
Editorial address 299045, Sevastopol, st. Dmitry Ulyanov, d. 1-A, office. 4
Languages English, Russian, Spanish, Italian, German, Ukrainian, French
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=514089
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=514089&print=1 1/1
4/7/22, 10:14 AM Roskomnadzor - List of names of registered media
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (ROSKOMNADZOR)
Information agency "Sevastopol"
Certificate number IA No. FS 77 - 58419
Date of registration 06/25/2014
certificate status the action was terminated on 25.09.2015
By decision of the founders.
Media name Information agency "Sevastopol"
Distribution form Information Agency
Distribution area foreign countries
Russian Federation
Founders Dokin V.V.
Editorial address 299007, Sevastopol, st. Lobanova, 21
Languages Russian Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=501909
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=501909&print=1 1/1
4/7/22, 10:12 AM Roskomnadzor - List of names of registered media
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
- 433 -
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (ROSKOMNADZOR)
All real estate in Crimea and prices
Certificate number PI No. FS 77 - 61544
Date of registration 04/24/2015
certificate status the action was terminated on 15.04.2019
By the decision of the founders
Media name All real estate in Crimea and prices
Distribution form print media newspaper
Distribution area the Russian Federation
Founders Zakharchenko I.I.
Editorial address 298600, Crimea Rep., Yalta, st. Kievskaya, 20, apt. one
Languages English Russian Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=555067
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=555067&print=1 1/1
4/6/22, 4:52 PM Roskomnadzor - List of names of registered media
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
Literary Crimea
Certificate number PI No. TU 91 - 00332
Date of registration 01/11/2018
certificate status the action was terminated on 28.05.2020
By the decision of the founders
Media name Literary Crimea
Distribution form print media newspaper
Distribution area Republic of Crimea
Founders "Union of Writers of the Republic of Crimea"
Editorial address 295022, Crimea Rep., Simferopol, st. Vinogradnaya, 22
Languages Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=653222
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=653222&print=1 1/1
4/6/22, 4:43 PM eee e e
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
- 434 -
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
Literary and art magazine "Crimea"
Certificate PI No. TU 91 - 00126
number
Date of 03/24/2015
registration
certificate status the action was terminated on 23.01.2019
By the decision of the founders
Media name Literary and art magazine "Crimea"
Distribution form print media magazine
Distribution area Republic of Crimea
Founders Basyrov V.M.
Editorial address 295022, Crimea Rep., Simferopol, st. Vinogradova, 22
Languages English, Russian, Armenian, Belarusian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar, German, Polish, Turkish,
Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=550809
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=550809&print=1 1/1
4/6/22, 4:16 PM eee e e
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
Historical, local history and literary and art journal "Share"
Certificate number PI No. TU 91 - 00127
Date of registration 03/24/2015
certificate status the action was terminated on 23.01.2019
By the decision of the founders
Media name Historical, local history and literary and art journal "Share"
Distribution form print media magazine
Distribution area Republic of Crimea
Founders Basyrov V.M.
Editorial address 295022, Crimea Rep., Simferopol, st. Vinogradova, 22
Languages English, Russian, Crimean Tatar, Polish, Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=550810
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=550810&print=1 1/1
- 435 -
4/6/22, 4:15 PM Roskomnadzor - List of names of registered media
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
emerald wave
Certificate number EL No. FS 77 - 64242
Date of registration 12/25/2015
certificate status the action was terminated on 12/13/2016
By a court decision.
Media name emerald wave
Distribution form radio channel
Distribution area Republic of Crimea
Sevastopol
Founders Limited Liability Company "RosKrymMedia Production"
Editorial address 295011, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, st. Kozlova, 45A
Languages Crimean Tatar, Russian, Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, German, Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=538377
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=538377&print=1 1/1
4/6/22, 4:13 PM Roskomnadzor - List of names of registered media
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
Pearl
Certificate number PI No. FS 77 - 61422
Date of registration 04/30/2015
certificate status the action was terminated on 10.12.2018
By the decision of the founders
Media name Pearl
Distribution form print media newspaper
Distribution area Republic of Crimea
St. Petersburg
Founders Gabitov M.M.
Editorial address 295011, Crimea Rep., Simferopol, st. Pushkin, 9
- 436 -
Languages Russian, Tatar, Ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=552833
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=552833&print=1 1/1
4/6/22, 4:11 PM Roskomnadzor - List of names of registered media
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR SUPERVISION IN THE SPHERE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
Nesil
Certificate PI No. TU 91 - 00359
number
Date of 04/05/2019
registration
certificate
status
Media name
Distribution
form
Distribution
area
the action was terminated on 09.02.2021 By the decision of the founders
Nesil
print media magazine
Republic of Crimea
Founders State Committee for Interethnic Relations and Deported Citizens of the Republic of Crimea; State Autonomous
Institution of the Republic of Crimea "Media Center named after Ismail Gasprinsky"
Editorial 295048, Crimea Rep., Simferopol, st. Trubachenko, d. 23A
address
Languages Russian, Crimean Tatar
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=724171
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=724171&print=1 1/1
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS MEDIA OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
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"Uyg'unlyk'. Harmony. Garmonia"
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Name of mass "Uyg'unlyk'. Harmony. Garmonia"
media
Form of distribution print media newspaper
- 437 -
Territory of Republic of Crimea
distribution
Founders State Budgetary Educational Establishment of Higher Education of the Republic of Crimea "Crimean
Engineering and Pedagogical University"
Address of the 295015, Krym Rep., Simferopol, Uchebny lane, 8
editorial office
Languages crimean tatar, russian, ukrainian
Article address: https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=574688
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS MEDIA OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
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"Northern Crimea"
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Name of mass media "Northern Crimea"
Form of distribution Television channel
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of the Republic of Crimea
Address of the 296012, Crimea Republic, Armyansk, General Vasiliev microdistrict, 1 (9th floor) editorial
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Languages russian, crimean tatar, ukrainian
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Tauride Journal of Psychiatry
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number
Date of
registration
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PI No. FS 77 - 61794
05/18/2015
the action was terminated on 03/04/2022 By the decision of the founders
- 438 -
Media name Tauride Journal of Psychiatry
Distribution print media magazine
form
Distribution the Russian Federation
area
Founders Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education "Crimean Federal University named
after V.I. Vernadsky"
Editorial 295006, Crimea Rep., Simferopol, bul. Lenina, d. 5/7
address
Languages English Russian Ukrainian
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World Literature at the Crossroads of Cultures and Civilizations
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Founders Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education "Crimean Federal University named
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Crimean archive
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Distribution
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PI No. FS 77 - 61818
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Crimean archive
print media magazine
Russian Federation
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Founders Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education "Crimean Federal University named
after V.I. Vernadsky"
Editorial 295007, Crimea Rep., Simferopol, Academician Vernadsky Avenue, 2, room. 216
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Languages Russian Ukrainian
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Dynamic systems
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Media name Dynamic systems
- 440 -
Distribution print media magazine
form
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Founders Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education "Crimean Federal University named
after V.I. Vernadsky"
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Issues of Russian literature
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the action was terminated on 03/04/2022 By the decision of the founders
Media name Issues of Russian literature
Distribution print media magazine
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Founders Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education "Crimean Federal University named
after V.I. Vernadsky"
Editorial 295007, Crimea Rep., Simferopol, Academician Vernadsky Avenue, 2, room. 216
address
Languages Russian Ukrainian
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Bulletin of the Institute of Physics and Technology of the Crimean Federal University named after V.I. Vernadsky
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05.10.2016
the action was terminated on 03/04/2022 By the decision of the founders
Media name Bulletin of the Institute of Physics and Technology of the Crimean Federal University named after V.I.
Vernadsky
Distribution print media magazine
form
Distribution the Russian Federation
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Founders Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education "Crimean Federal University named
after V.I. Vernadsky"
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address
Languages English Russian Ukrainian
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YEVPATORIA.FM
Certificate number EL No. TU 91 - 00115
Date of registration 26.02.2015
certificate status the action was terminated on 20.07.2021
By a court decision
Media name YEVPATORIA.FM
Distribution form radio channel
Distribution area Republic of Crimea
- 442 -
Founders Gromov S.B.
Editorial address 297400, Crimea Rep., Evpatoria, st. 60 years of October, 26
Languages Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian
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Review of Crimean Affairs
Certificate number PI No. TU 91 - 00008
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By court decision
Media name Review of Crimean Affairs
Distribution form print media newspaper
Distribution area Republic of Crimea
Founders Nikityuk A.N.
Editorial address Crimea Rep., Evpatoria, st. Demysheva, d. 100A, office. one
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https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/?id=506211&print=1 1/1
- 443 -
- 444 -
Annex 99
Ruling of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 310-ES19-8542
(19 June 2019)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 445 -
- 446 -
2=98:7 ;6 0=:5 ’." (&’. 8: 43<5 1;$ >-)#’.+.*%(&’,
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
SUPREME COURT OF THE RUSSIA FEDERATION
No. 310-ES19-8542
RULING
The city of Moscow
June 19, 2019
Judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation Borisova E.E., having studied the
cassation appeal of the Office of the Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the
Kyiv Patriarchate against the decision of the Arbitration Court of the Republic of Crimea of 19
September 19 in case No. A83-19694/2017, the decision of the Twenty-First Arbitration Court of
Appeal of 14 December 2018, the decision of the Central District Arbitration Court of 18 March
2019 in the same case
based on the claim of the Office of the Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of
the Kyiv Patriarchy against the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on the removal of
an obstacle in the use of the premises,
with the participation of third parties who do not declare independent claims regarding the
subject of the dispute: the Federal State Public Institution "Crimean Territorial Administration of
Property Relations", the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, the Orthodox Religious
Organization "Simferopol and Crimean Eparchy",
ESTABLISHED:
that by the decision of the Arbitration Court of the Republic of Crimea of 19 September 2018,
left unchanged by the decision of the Twenty-First Arbitration Court of Appeal of 14 December
2018, and the decision of the Central District Arbitration Court 18 March 2019, the claims were
dismissed.
In a cassation appeal filed with the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, the Office of the
Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchy seeks cancellation of
the appealed judicial acts, referring to the violation by the court of the norms of substantive and
procedural law.
- 447 -
In accordance with clause 1 of part 7 of Article 291.6 of the Arbitration Procedure Code of the
Russian Federation, based on the results of studying the cassation appeal, the judge of the
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation issues a ruling on the refusal to transfer the cassation
appeal for consideration in a judicial session of the Judicial Collegium of the Supreme Court of
the Russian Federation, if the arguments set forth in the cassation appeal do not confirm
significant violations of substantive law and ( or) the rules of procedural law that influenced the
outcome of the case, and are not sufficient grounds for reviewing judicial acts in cassation.
After examining the arguments set out in the cassation complaint, the court concluded that there
were no grounds for satisfying it.
When resolving a dispute, the courts, guided by the provisions of Articles 301 - 304 of the Civil
Code of the Russian Federation, clarifications given in paragraph 45 of the Resolution of the
Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the Plenum of the Supreme
Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation of 29 April 2010 No. 10/22 “On some issues arising
in judicial practice in resolving disputes related to the protection of property rights and other
rights in rem”, having examined and evaluated, in accordance with Article 71 of the Arbitration
Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, the evidence available in the case, establishing that
the owner of the disputed real estate is the Russian Federation represented by the Ministry of
Defense of the Russian Federation, the building in which the temple was previously located is
located on the territory of a military facility with restricted entry, reasonably came to the
conclusion that there were no grounds for satisfying the claims.
The arguments of the cassation appeal are similar to the arguments stated in the lower courts,
which were given a proper legal assessment, factually.
In view of the foregoing, the complaint is not subject to transfer for consideration in the judicial
session of the Judicial Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, since the
arguments given in it do not confirm the significant violations by the court of the norms of
substantive and procedural law that influenced the outcome of the case.
In view of the foregoing and guided by articles 291.6, 291.8 of the Arbitration Procedure Code
of the Russian Federation,
RULED:
to refuse to transfer the cassation appeal of the Office of the Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchy for consideration in a judicial session of the Judicial
Collegium for Economic Disputes of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.
Judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
E.E. Borisova
- 448 -
Court:
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (details)
Plaintiffs:
Office of the Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (more
details)
Defendants:
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (details)
Other entities:
Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea (details)
Federal State Institution "Crimean Territorial Administration of Property Relations" (details)
Orthodox "Simferopol and Crimean Eparchy" (details)
- 449 -
- 450 -
Annex 100
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Ruling of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 310-ES18-18876
(23 November 2018)
- 451 -
- 452 -
79021_1180948
COPY
SUPREME COURT
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
No. 310-ES18-18876
RULING
Moscow 23 November 2018
Judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation Mrs. Pronina M.V.,
having studied the cassation appeal dated 14 September 2018 of the Office of the
Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (the
"Office of the Crimean Eparchy") against the Decision of the Arbitration Court
of the Republic of Crimea dated 20 December 2017 in Case No. А83-
13977/2017, the Resolution of the Twenty-First Arbitration Court of Appeal
dated 19 April 2018 and the Resolution of the Arbitration Court of the Central
District dated 24 August 2018 in the same case
initiated upon the claim of the Office of the Crimean Eparchy to the
officials of the Department of Bailiffs for the Central District of Simferopol of
the Office of the Federal Bailiff Service for the Republic of Crimea (the "Central
Bailiff Service"), the Office of the Federal Bailiff Service for the Republic of
Crimea, seeking the recognition of the following as unlawful: the actions to enter
the premises of the building at 17-a Sevastopolskaya street, Simferopol and their
transfer to the Ministry of Property and Land Relations of the Republic of Crimea,
the obligation to return the mentioned premises and the property located in them,
with the participation of third parties that do not declare independent claims
regarding the subject of the dispute - Crimean Orthodox Spiritual Center Limited
Liability Company ("Crimean Orthodox Spiritual Center LLC"), the Ministry of
Property and Land Relations of the Republic of Crimea (the "Ministry"),
141
-453 -
established:
by the Decision of the Arbitration Court of the Republic of Crimea dated
20 December 2017, which was upheld by the Resolution of the Twenty-First
Arbitration Court of Appeal dated 19 April 2018 and the Resolution of the
Arbitration Court of the Central District dated 24 August 2018, the lawsuit was
dismissed.
In the cassation appeal filed with the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation, the Office of the Crimean Eparchy objects to the mentioned judicial
acts and seeks their cancellation, by referring to the violation by the courts of the
norms of substantive and procedural law, the incomplete clarification of the
circumstances of the case.
According to paragraph 1 of Part 7 of Article 291.6 of the Arbitration
Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, based on the results of studying the
cassation appeal, the judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation shall
render a ruling on the refusal to transfer the cassation appeal, its presentation for
consideration in a judicial session of the Judicial Board of the Supreme Court of
the Russian Federation, if the arguments stated in the cassation appeal or
submission provide no evidence of significant violations of substantive law
and/or procedural law that affected the outcome of the case, and cannot serve as
sufficient grounds for reviewing judicial acts in cassation proceedings and/or for
resolving the issue of awarding compensation for violation of the right to legal
proceedings within a reasonable time, as well as if these arguments are not
confirmed by the case file.
There are no grounds for reviewing the appealed judicial acts in the
cassation procedure based on the arguments of the statement of cassation appeal.
As seen from the judicial acts, on the basis of a writ of execution issued by
the Arbitration Court of the Republic of Crimea in Case No. А83-2142/2015, the
bailiff of the Central Bailiff Service initiated enforcement proceedings against
Crimean Orthodox Spiritual Center LLC on the obligation to transfer to the
ministry under the handover certificate the following property belonging to the
Republic of Crimea: non-residential premises with an area of 112.6 sq. m, located
on the ground floor of the building at the address: 17-a Sevastopolskaya street,
Simferopol, as well as pay a penalty in the amount of RUB 591,128.65 and court
costs in the amount of RUB 16,383.00.
As part of the enforcement proceedings, on 31 August 2017, the bailiff
visited the address of the debtor. The absence of the debtor at the address
specified in the enforcement document was established.
- 142
-454 -
On the same day, in the course of taking actions to execute the enforcement
document, the property was discovered that was included in the Act of Inventory
and Seizure of Property.
According to the Act dated 31 August 2017, the specified property, due to
the absence of the debtor, was transferred to the recoverer for safekeeping.
Enforcement proceedings were completed on 01 September 2017.
The Office of the Crimean Eparchy, not being a party to the enforcement
proceedings, however, pointing to the actual ownership of the disputed premises
and the ownership of the described property, appealed to the arbitration court with
a claim in the present case.
Having examined the circumstances of the case and assessed the available
evidence in accordance with Articles 65, 71, 198, 200, 201 of the Arbitration
Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, guided by Articles 64, 68, 80, 107 of
Federal Law No. 229-FZ dated 02 October 2007 "On Enforcement Proceedings",
the courts found the actions of the bailiff-executor to be legal and justified.
The courts considered that within the framework of Case No. A83-
2142/2015 it was established that the disputed premises are in the possession of
the Crimean Orthodox Spiritual Center LLC. By the Resolution of the Arbitration
Court of the Central District of 29 September 2016, the proceedings on the
cassation appeal of the Office of the Crimean Eparchy against judicial acts in the
said case, filed in accordance with Article 42 of the Arbitration Procedure Code
of the Russian Federation, were terminated. In this regard, the courts rejected the
statement of the Office of the Crimean Eparchy on the actual ownership of the
premises and concluded that the contested actions of the bailiff did not violate the
rights and interests of the Office.
It was also explained to the Office of the Crimean Eparchy that if it has any
legal claims against the property that was located in the disputed premises and
included in the inventory, it has the right to file a claim seeking the exclusion of
property from the inventory and from seizure. Within the framework of this
dispute, that is being considered under the rules of Chapter 24 of the Arbitration
Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, such claims cannot be considered.
In the cassation appeal, the Office of the Crimean Eparchy repeats its
position on the case, insisting that the enforcement actions were taken against an
improper person, as well as stating arguments regarding the merits of the dispute
that was considered in Case No. А83-2142/2015. In fact, the arguments of the
cassation appeal are aimed at re-evaluating the evidence in the case and
establishing new circumstances within its framework, including the recognition
of the right, which is not within the powers of the cassation instance of the
Supreme Court of the Russian
143
-455 -
Federation, as defined by Article 291.14 of the Arbitration Procedure Code of the
Russian Federation.
The courts allowed no significant violations of substantive law and
procedural law that could affect the outcome of the trial.
Guided by Articles 291.6, 291.8 of the Arbitration Procedure Code of the
Russian Federation, the Judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
ruled:
to refuse to transfer the cassation appeal to the Office of the Crimean
Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate for
consideration at a court session of the Judicial Board for Economic Disputes of
the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.
Judge of the Supreme
Court of the Russian
Federation
/signature/
/round seal: SUPREME COURT OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION/
/stamp: "TRUE" Leading Consultant of the Judicial
Board for Economic Disputes of the Supreme Court of
the Russian Federation.
Starostina
(Initials, surname)
27 11 20 18/
M. V. Pronina
- 144
-456 -
Annex 101
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Default judgement of Yevpatoria City Court in Case No. 2-2176/2019
(6 November 2019)
- 457 -
- 458 -
Case No. 2-2176/2019
91К80009-01-2019-003261-28
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
[judgment in absentia]
In the name of the Russian Federation
06 November 2019
Yevpatoria City Court of the Republic of Crimea consisting of:
Presiding Judge Lobanova G.B.,
the Secretary of the court session: Alferov K.I.,
with the participation of the representative of the Plaintiff Folomeeva A.N.,
having considered in an open court session a civil case based on a claim filed by the Administration of
the City of Yevpatoria of the Republic of Crimea against the Community in the Name of the Precious
Image of the Mother of God "The Burning Bush", the Office of the Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church, a third party – the Department of Municipal Control of the Administration of the
City of Yevpatoria of the Republic of Crimea, Okhtin Sergey Ivanovich, seeking the release of the
municipal land plot and the dismantling of the erected structure.
ESTABLISHED:
The Administration of the city of Yevpatoria of the Republic of Crimea filed a lawsuit against the
Community in the Name of the Precious Image of the Mother of God "The Burning Bush", the Office
of the Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, a third party –the Department of Municipal
Control of the Administration of the City of Yevpatoria of the Republic of Crimea, Okhtin Sergey
Ivanovich seeking to vacate the municipal land plot and to carry out works on the dismantling of the
erected structure. In support of its claims, the Administration noted that the Department of Municipal
Control of the Administration of the City of Yevpatoria of the Republic of Crimea carried out an
inspection in relation to the Community in the Name of the Precious Image of the Mother of God "The
Burning Bush" in terms of compliance with the use of the requirements of land and urban planning
legislation when using the land plot located at the following address: 133 Internatsionalnaya street,
Yevpatoria.
During the inspection, it was established that the Community in the Name of the Precious Image of
the Mother of God "The Burning Bush" on the indicated land plot carried out the filling of a strip
foundation, on which a structure of wooden beams (log house) with a height of more than 10 meters
was constructed.
Information about the construction of the mentioned structure by the Community in the Name of
the Precious Image of the Mother of God "The Burning Bush" is confirmed by the explanations of the
Archbishop Climent of Simferopol and Crimea dated 22 February 2019 who also explained that there
are no permits, project documentation for the implementation of these construction works, title and
confirming documents in relation to the constructed building, as well as by oral explanations of the
responsible person of the Community in the Name of the Precious Image of the Mother of God "The
Burning Bush" in the city of Yevpatoriya Okhtin S.I.
During the inspection, the Community in the Name of the Precious Image of the Mother of God
"The Burning Bush", did not provide the documents evidencing the right to use the specified land plot.
According to the information of the Department of Property and Land Relations of the
Administration of the city of Yevpatoria dated 6 March 2019 No. 723/09, there is no lease agreement
for the above land plot in the files of the Department.
According to information provided by the State Construction Supervision Service of the Republic
of Crimea dated 27 February 2019 No. 11-09/1293, starting from 1 January 2015 and until the present
time, no permit documents were registered or issued in relation to the following address: 133
Internatsionalnaya street, Yevpatoria.
- 459 -
For the period from 01 April 2014 to 31 December 2014, the Architectural and Construction
Inspectorate of the Republic of Crimea did not register or issue any permits for the above mentioned
address.
According to the information of the Department of Architecture and Urban Planning of the
Administration of the city of Yevpatoria of the Republic of Crimea dated 28 February 2019 No. 493/01-
09, urban planning conditions and building restrictions on the specified land plot were not issued. There
was also no application filed for the development of an urban development plan.
Based on the available information in the Department of Architecture and Urban Planning of the
Administration of the city of Yevpatoriya, no requests were received regarding the approval of the urban
design project at the above address.
The Community in the Name of the Precious Image of the Mother of God "The Burning Bush" did
not provide permits for construction work and the commissioning of this facility.
Also, during the inspection, the borders of the land plot arbitrarily used by the Community in the
Name of the Precious Image of the Mother of God "The Burning Bush" were measured using Makita
LD050P laser rangefinder, serial number 1445220890 (verification certificate No. 03.2107.18 valid
until 30 September 2019).
In the course of processing the measurement data, it was established that the Community in the
Name of the Precious Image of the Mother of God “The Burning Bush” arbitrarily uses a land plot with
a total area of 30.25 sq.m. (5.5 m x 5.5 m).
The Community in the Name of the Precious Image of the Mother of God "The Burning Bush" did
not provide title documents for the land plot.
In addition, it was established that the Community in the Name of the Precious Image of the Mother
of God "The Burning Bush" in violation of Article 55 of the Urban Planning Code of the Russian
Federation operates a capital construction facility located at the address: 133 Internatsionalnaya street,
Yevpatoria in the absence of permission for the commissioning of this facility.
In order to verify the implementation of Order No. 12 of 29 March 2019, previously issued by the
Department, on the basis of Instruction (Order) No. 154 dated 3 July 2019, a visit was made on 8 July
2019 to the inspected land plot, during which it was established that the specified Order within the
prescribed period was not performed by the Community in the Name of the Precious Image of the
Mother of God "The Burning Bush", in connection with which a protocol on an administrative offence
was drawn up in relation to the latter, under Part 1 of Article 19.5 of the Code of Administrative
Offenses of the Russian Federation, which was sent to the justice of the peace of court district No. 38
of the Yevpatoriya judicial district (Yevpatoria city district) of the Republic of Crimea for consideration
and rendering a judgment within its competence.
Construction and installation works on the territory of the household were carried out without
appropriate approvals from the local government and without permits from the State Construction
Supervision Service.
In the pre-trial stage, the Defendant did not provide evidence of the adoption of measures to
legalize the construction. The Plaintiff seeks the court to oblige the Defendant to vacate a municipal
land plot with a total area of 30.25 sq.m., located at 133 Internatsionalnaya street, Yevpatoria by
dismantling the structure erected on it, namely: the strip foundation and the structure erected on it using
wooden beams (log house) with a height of more than 10 meters. The Plaintiff also seeks to oblige the
Defendant to carry out works on the dismantling of the erected structure, namely: the strip foundation
and the structure erected on it using wooden beams (log house) of more than 10 meters high, located at
133 Internatsionalnaya street, Yevpatoria.
By the Ruling of the Yevpatoria City Court of 17 October 2019, the Office of the Crimean Eparchy
of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was brought into case as a co-Defendant, and Okhtin Sergey
Ivanovich was brought into case as a third party declaring no independent claims regarding the subject
of the dispute.
At the hearing, the representative of the Administration of the city of Yevpatoria of the Republic
of Crimea, acting on the basis of Power of Attorney No. 1189/02-29 dated 24 April 2019, Folomeeva
A.N. supported the claims, explained that the presence of unauthorized construction of the Defendants
on the land plot, the rightful owner of which is the Plaintiff, violate the rights and legitimate interests
of the Plaintiff in the case, as it creates obstacles to use this land plot in full, encumbers it with the
illegal rights of the owners of the unauthorized construction, therefore, she believes that their violated
- 460 -
right is subject to restoration by demolishing the object, and she asked to satisfy the lawsuit based on
the grounds mentioned therein.
Defendants, namely: Community in the Name of the Precious Image of the Mother of God "The
Burning Bush", and the Office of the Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church did not
appear at the court session, although they were duly notified. They did not provide any motions seeking
adjournment of the trial or confirming the inability to appear for good reasons, as well as they did not
provide any objections to the claim.
*****
The non-appearance of a person duly notified about the time and place of consideration of the case
is considered as such person's will that evidences the refusal to exercise its right to participate directly
in the trial of the case and other procedural rights, and therefore such non-appearance does not preclude
the court to consider the case on the merits. This conclusion does not contradict the provisions of Article
6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Articles 7, 8, 10
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. As the law grants equal scope of procedural rights listed in Article 35 of the Civil
Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, the absence of persons at the court session cannot be
regarded as a violation of the principle of competitiveness and equality of the parties.
For the above reasons, the court considers it possible, with the consent of the Plaintiff's
representative, to consider the case in the absence of the Defendants in the course of in absentia
proceedings, which meets the requirements of Article 233 of the Civil Procedure Code of the Russian
Federation.
Third parties, namely Department of Municipal Control of the Administration of the city of
Yevpatoria of the Republic of Crimea, and Okhtin S.I., did not appear at the court session, although
they were duly notified.
After having heard the representative of the Plaintiff and after having examined the case file, the
court concludes that there are legal grounds for satisfying the claims.
*****
In accordance with Article 22 of the Land Code of the Russian Federation, foreign citizens, as
well as stateless persons, may possess land plots located within the territory of the Russian Federation
on the basis of the right of lease, except for the cases provided for by this Code. Land plots, with the
exception of those specified in paragraph 4 of Article 27 of this Code, may be leased by their owners in
accordance with civil law and this Code.
*****
The court has established based on the case file that the Community in the Name of the Precious
Image of the Mother of God "The Burning Bush", having no reason to use the land plot from the public
lands at the address: 133 Internatsionalnaya street, Yevpatoria, installed a strip foundation and erected
on it a structure made of wooden beams (log house) with a height of more than 10 meters, which is
confirmed by the materials of the inspection of the Department of Municipal Control of the
Administration of the City of Yevpatoria of the Republic of Crimea.
Information about the construction of the mentioned building by the Community in the Name of
the Precious Image of the Mother of God "The Burning Bush" is confirmed by the explanations of the
Archbishop Climent of Simferopol and Crimea dated 22 February 2019 who also explained that there
- 461 -
are no permits, project documentation for the implementation of these construction works, title and
confirming documents in relation to the constructed building, as well as by oral explanations of the
responsible person of the Community in the Name of the Precious Image of the Mother of God "The
Burning Bush" in the city of Yevpatoriya Okhtin S.I.
At the time of consideration of the civil case, the records of the Department of Property and Land
Relations of the Administration of the City of Yevpatoria of the Republic of Crimea contain no
information about a lease or use of the land plot on which unauthorized buildings indicated in the subject
of the claim were constructed.
*****
During the inspection by the Department of Municipal Control of the Administration of the City
of Yevpatoria, the Community in the Name of the Precious Image of the Mother of God "The Burning
Bush" presented no documents confirming the right to use the specified land plot.
According to the information of the Department of Property and Land Relations of the
Administration of the city of Yevpatoria dated 6 March 2019 No. 723/09, there is no lease agreement
for the above land plot in the files of the Department.
According to the State Construction Supervision Service of the Republic of Crimea dated 27
February 2019 No. 11-09/1293 for the period from 1 January 2015 until the present time, no permit
documents were registered or issued in relation to the following address: 133 Internatsionalnaya street,
Yevpatoria.
For the period from 01 April 2014 to 31 December 2014, the Architectural and Construction
Inspectorate of the Republic of Crimea did not register or issue permits for the mentioned address.
According to the information of the Department of Architecture and Urban Planning of the
Administration of the city of Yevpatoria of the Republic of Crimea dated 28 February 2019 No. 493/01-
09, urban planning conditions and building restrictions on the specified land plot were not issued. There
was also no application for the development of an urban development plan.
Based on the available information in the Department of Architecture and Urban Planning of the
Administration of the city of Yevpatoriya, no requests were received regarding the approval of the urban
design project at the above address.
The Community in the Name of the Precious Image of the Mother of God "The Burning Bush" did
not provide permits for construction work and the commissioning of this facility.
Also, during the inspection, the borders of the land plot arbitrarily used by the Community in the
Name of the Precious Image of the Mother of God "The Burning Bush" were measured using Makita
LD050P laser rangefinder, serial number 1445220890 (verification certificate No. 03.2107.18 valid
until 30 September 2019).
In the course of processing the measurement data, it was established that the Community in the
Name of the Precious Image of the Mother of God “The Burning Bush” arbitrarily uses a land plot with
a total area of 30.25 sq.m. (5.5 m x 5.5 m).
*****
Thus, during the inspection, it was established that the Community in the Name of the Precious
Image of the Mother of God "The Burning Bush" uses a land plot with a total area of 30.25 sq.m, located
in the cadastral quarter 90:18:010141 in the absence of title and title documents for the land plot, which
is a violation of the requirements of part 1 of Article 26 of the Land Code of the Russian Federation.
In addition, it was established that the Community in the Name of the Precious Image of the
Mother of God "The Burning Bush" in violation of Article 55 of the Urban Planning Code of the Russian
Federation operates a capital construction facility located at 133 Internatsionalnaya street, Yevpatoria
in the absence of a permit for the commissioning of this facility.
*****
- 462 -
In order to verify the implementation of Order No. 12 of 29 March 2019, previously issued by the
Department, on the basis of Instruction (Order) No. 154 dated 3 July 2019, a visit was made on 8 July
2019 to the inspected land plot, during which it was established that the specified Order within the
prescribed period was not implemented by the Community in the Name of the Precious Image of the
Mother of God "the Burning Bush", in connection with which a protocol on an administrative offence
was drawn up in relation to the latter, under Part 1 of Article 19.5 of the Code of Administrative
Offenses of the Russian Federation, which was sent to the justice of the peace of court district No. 38
of the Yevpatoriya judicial district (Yevpatoria city district) of the Republic of Crimea for consideration
and rendering a judgment within its competence.
Construction and installation works on the territory of the household were carried out without
appropriate approvals from the local government and without permits from the State Construction
Supervision Service.
This object of unauthorized construction was created by the Defendant on a land plot not allocated
for the construction of capital construction projects. As a general rule, the legal regime of land is
determined on the basis of its belonging to a certain category of land with a specific designated purpose
and permitted use in accordance with the zoning of the territory and the requirements of the applicable
legislation. Zoning of territories for construction is governed by the Urban Planning Code of the Russian
Federation which defines the concept of specific types and composition of territorial zones, as well as
types of permitted use of land plots and capital construction projects. In this case, the Defendant did not
carry out the special allotment of the land plot for construction.
*****
According to paragraph 3 of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the right
of ownership of an unauthorized construction may be recognized by a court, and in cases provided for
by law in another manner established by law, in favor of a person who owns it, inherited it for life, who
has the right of permanent (unlimited) use of the land plot where the construction was carried out. In
this case, the person who has been recognized as the owner of the construction shall reimburse the
person who carried it out for the costs of the construction in the amount determined by the court. The
right of ownership of an unauthorized construction cannot be recognized in favor of the said person if
the preservation of the structure violates the rights and legally protected interests of other persons or
poses a threat to the life and health of citizens.
Thus, for the construction of a real estate object, it is necessary to allocate a land plot for
construction and obtain a permit from the relevant authority for such construction.
It follows from the content of the above legal norms that an unauthorized construction, as a
general rule, is subject to demolition. However, there are exceptions to this rule that allow, under certain
circumstances, to recognize the right of ownership of unauthorized construction.
The right of ownership to an unauthorized construction may be recognized by a court, and in
cases provided for by law in another manner established by law, in favor of a person who owns it,
inherited it for life, permanently (without expiration date) uses the land plot on which the construction
was made, while simultaneously observing the following conditions: if, in relation to the land plot, the
person who carried out the construction has the rights allowing the construction of this object on it: if,
on the day of applying to the court, the construction complies with the parameters established by the
territory planning documentation, land use rules: development or mandatory requirements for the
construction parameters contained in other documents; and also if the preservation of the construction
does not violate the rights and legally protected interests of other persons and does not pose a threat to
the life and health of citizens.
Paragraph 30 of Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
No. 10, of the Plenum of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation No. 22 dated 29
April 2010 "On Some Issues Arising in Practice in Resolving Disputes Related to the Protection of
Ownership Rights and Other Property Rights" provides that, in accordance with Article 130 of the Civil
Code of the Russian Federation, objects of construction in progress are classified by law as real estate.
Based on paragraph 1 of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, not only
residential construction, other construction, structure, may be recognized as unauthorized construction
- 463 -
but also other real estates. Consequently, an object of construction in progress as real estate can also be
recognized as an unauthorized construction. The right of ownership may be recognized for an object of
construction in progress as an unauthorized construction if there are grounds established by Article 222
of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.
*****
Evidence shall be presented by the parties and other persons participating in the case. The court
has the right to invite them to submit additional evidence. If it is not feasible for these persons to present
evidence, the court, at their request, shall assist in the collection and reclamation of evidence (Part 1 of
Article 57 of the Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federation).
While observing independence, objectivity and impartiality, the court, in accordance with Article
12 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation, provided the parties to the dispute with
equal opportunity to prove the circumstances to which the parties referred in substantiation of their legal
positions, all significant circumstances in the case were presented to parties for discussion as provided
for by Part 2 of Article 56 of the Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federation.
*****
By virtue of the principle of competitiveness provided for by Article 12 of the Civil Procedure
Code of the Russian Federation, the parties, if they wish to achieve the most favorable judgment for
themselves, are obliged to inform the court of legal facts that are essential to the case, present evidence
to the court confirming or refuting these facts, and also perform other procedural actions aimed at
convincing the court that they are right. The presented evidence allows the court to conclude that the
claims made by the Plaintiff seeking that the Defendant vacates the municipal land plot with a total area
of 30.25 sq.m., located at the address: 133 Internatsionalnaya street, Yevpatoria, are substantiated.
*****
In accordance with the provisions of Article 67 of the Civil Procedure Code of the Russian
Federation, the court shall evaluate the evidence according to its inner conviction, based on a
comprehensive, complete, objective and direct examination of the evidence in the case.
*****
In accordance with Article 56 of the Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, the
Defendants did not provide the court with evidence confirming the legitimate use of the land plot.
Having established that the Defendants have no legal grounds for placing the structure and the
strip foundation on a municipal land plot, the court obliges that they shall be demolished and dismantled.
Since the court obliges the Defendants to perform certain actions, it is necessary to establish a
time limit for their implementation. Given the specific circumstances of the case, the court believes that
it is reasonable, taking into account the interests of both parties, to establish a period of one (1) month
from the date the judgment enters into legal force.
*****
Based on the above and guided by Articles 233-235 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation,
the court
RULED:
To satisfy the claim of the Administration of the city of Yevpatoria of the Republic of Crimea
- 464 -
against the Community in the Name of the Precious Image of the Mother of God "The Burning Bush",
the Office of the Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the third party – the Department
of Municipal Control of the Administration of the city of Yevpatoria of the Republic of Crimea, Okhtin
Sergey Ivanovich, seeking the vacation of the municipal land plot and the dismantling of the erected
structure.
To oblige the Defendants, on a joint and several basis, to vacate the municipal land plot with a
total area of 30.25 sq.m., located at the address: 133 Internatsionalnaya street, Yevpatoria by
dismantling the structure erected on it, namely: the strip foundation and the structure erected on it from
wooden beams (log house) with a height of more than 10 meters.
To oblige the Defendants, on a joint and several basis, namely the Community in the Name of the
Precious Image of the Mother of God “The Burning Bush” and the Office of the Crimean Eparchy of
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, to carry out works to dismantle the erected structure, namely: the strip
foundation and the structure erected on it from wooden beams (log house) with the height of more than
10 meters located at the address: 133 Internatsionalnaya street, Yevpatoria within one (1) month from
the date of entry into force of the court judgment.
Collect, on a joint and several basis, from the Defendants, namely the Community in the Name of
the Precious Image of the Mother of God "The Burning Bush" and the Office of the Crimean Eparchy
of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church a state fee in the amount of RUB 600 in favor of the state.
The Defendant has the right to file a motion with the court seeking the cancellation of the default
judgment within seven days from the date of delivery of a copy of the default judgment.
The judgment may be appealed within one month from the date of expiration of the deadline for
filing a motion seeking to cancel the default judgment by filing an appeal petition to the Supreme Court
of the Republic of Crimea through the Yevpatoria City Court of the Republic of Crimea.
Judge /signature/ G.B. Lobanova
The judgment in its final form was made on 08 November 2019.
/round seal: Yevpatoria City Court of the Republic of Crimea/
/stamp: TRUE COPY, Yevpatoria City Court of the Republic of Crimea, Judge Lobanova
G.B./
/signature/
- 465 -
- 466 -
Annex 102
The Center for Counter-Extremism, The Ministry of Interior for the Republic of
Crimea (8 February 2022)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 467 -
- 468 -
THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA
We are serving Russia, serving the law!
The Center for Counter-Extremism
Head of the Center for Counter-Extremism, Colonel of Police
Oleg Borisovich Utkin
The main tasks of the Center are:
- identification, prevention, suppression and disclosure of crimes of a terrorist nature,
crimes and offenses of an extremist nature, as well as the identification and
identification of persons who prepare, commit or have committed them.
- protecting the legitimate interests of the individual, society and the state in the field of
countering extremist activity and in the course of the participation of the internal affairs
bodies of the Russian Federation in measures to counter terrorism.
- assistance to the territorial bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia at the
district level, subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of Crimea,
in organizing the prevention of crimes of a terrorist nature, crimes and offenses of an
extremist nature.
- 469 -
- 470 -
Annex 103
Crimean Human Rights Group, Overview of the Situation with Respect for Human Rights
and Norms of the International Humanitarian Law in Crimea for 2020 (January 2021)
This excerpt has been translated from its original language
into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to
Rules of the Court, Article 51. A copy of the whole document
has been deposited with the Registry.
- 471 -
- 472 -
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email: [email protected] website: crimeahrg.org
FOR 2020
AND NORMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITA RIAN LAW IN CRIMEA
OVERVIEW OF THE
SITUATION WITH RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
January 2021
Machine Translated by Google
- 473 -
Crimean Human Rights Group (CPG) is a non-governmental Ukrainian human rights organization of
Crimean human rights defenders and journalists whose activities are aimed at promoting human rights
protection in Crimea by drawing broad attention to human rights and international humanitarian law in
the occupied territories of Crimea and Sevastopol. . The CPG focuses on documenting and constantly
monitoring human rights violations and war crimes in connection with the occupation of the peninsula
by the Russian Federation.
In preparing and disseminating information, the CNG is guided by the principles of objectivity, reliability
and timeliness.
2
Machine Translated by Google
- 474 -
CONTENT
Searches and detentions ............................................... ....................................... 5
Freedom of association .............................................. ........................................... 10
to the occupied territory
5. INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS ON CRIMEA ............................................ .................. 20
Freedom of speech and expression ............................................. ...................... 7
.........................................................................................
11
to the army of the occupying state, as well as the promotion of service in the army
treatment or punishment
occupied territory
Persecution for freedom of expression ............................................. 7
......................
Politically motivated criminal prosecution ................................. 3
Blocking access to information .............................................. ..................... 8
....................
TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC IN CRIMEA
1. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ............................................ .......................... 2
on the territory of, as well as the movement of civilians from
............................................................................................
Freedom of assembly ................................................ .................................................. 9
IN THE CONDITIONS OF OCCUPATION OF CRIMEA AND SEVASTOPOL
Forced disappearances
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion ............................................ ................................. 5
2. VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
Article 51. Conscription of persons residing in the occupied territory, ....... 12
11
Torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, ........................................ 2
Legislative restrictions on freedom of speech .............................................. .............. 7
Article 64. Obligation to keep the legislation in force ................... 12
The right to liberty and security of person ............................................ .......... 3
and restricting the work of journalists
Convention (IV) for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
3. RESPONSE OF THE OCCUPYING AUTHORITIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ............................................ ..................13
Freedom of assembly and association ............................................ ..................................... 9
and imprisonment
Article 49. Deportation of Crimean residents from the occupied territory ........... 11
4. STATE POLICY OF UKRAINE IN THE FIELD OF PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ...................... 17
2
1
Machine Translated by Google
- 475 -
Monitoring of FM broadcasting in the north of
Crimea has shown that the signal of Ukrainian radio
stations is available only in 7 out of 19 settlements12.
The blocking of signals is due to the broadcasting of
the Crimean and Russian councils of stations on the
same frequencies as the licenses of Ukrainian
broadcasters. In addition, a new TV and radio tower
was installed next to the Chaplynka checkpoint in
the occupied territories, which is likely to be used to
strengthen the blocking of the Ukrainian signal13.
On January 18, the Kerch city administration sent
a statement to the local media threatening
administrative harassment for holding mass events
without the consent of the de facto authorities.
In December, under various contrived pretexts
(searching for stolen building materials, a missing
COVID-19 patient, checking home books, etc.),
Russian Interior Ministry officials came to the home
of Crimean Tatar activists who participated in
peaceful rallies to collect personal data and
information about members. family, place of work. In
some cases, Interior Ministry officials directly stated
that the reason for such a visit was active public
activity and participation in peaceful assemblies. For
example, Crimean Solidarity reported at least 25
such visits.
In the case of an "unauthorized" peaceful
assembly, the organizers and participants are
prosecuted under Art. 20.2 (Violation of the order of
holding meetings, rallies, demonstrations, marches
or pickets) and Art. 20.2.2 CAO RF (Organization of
mass simultaneous stay and (or) movement of
citizens in public places that led to a violation of
public order). In addition, to the participants of
peaceful assemblies in the Crimea, the Russian
authorities apply Art. 19.3 of the Administrative Code
(Failure to comply with the requirements of a police
officer) and Art. 20.1 (Petty hooliganism). In 2020,
the "courts" of Crimea and Sevastopol passed at
least 17 decrees on administrative penalties under
Articles 20.2 and 20.2.2 of the Administrative Code
for participation in peaceful assemblies without the
consent of the occupying authorities. Among them
are 8 decisions on imposing fines totaling 135,000
rubles, 6 decisions on 5-day administrative arrest.
Among the peaceful rallies, the organizers and
participants of which were brought to justice, were meetings in defense
The practice of intimidating activists continued
in 2020, threatening to prosecute them in the event
of an “uncoordinated” peaceful assembly. Police
officers hand out warnings to the authorities in
advance about the inadmissibility of holding rallies,
indicating the administrative and criminal articles
under which they may be prosecuted. The CPG has
documented at least 42 such warnings in 2020.
13 https://crimeahrg.org/uk/na-pivnochi-krimu-okupaczijna-vlada
obladnala-novu-vezhu-dlya-blokuvannya-signalu-ukra%d1%97nskih
fm-stanczij-2/
There is a permit system in Crimea, according to
which peaceful assemblies cannot be held without
prior permission from the local "administration".
Representatives of "administrations" in Crimea
usually refuse to hold rallies that may contain
criticism of the de facto government. The most
common reason for refusing to hold a peaceful
assembly is the allegation that at the same time and
place another organization allegedly applied for
another meeting.
The occupying power
installed a new TV and radio tower
territories of Ukraine
The signal of Ukrainian radio stations is blocked
in 12 of the 19 settlements in the north of Crimea
next to CPVV "Chaplinka"
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
Freedom of assembly
2020
Crimean Human Rights Group - 2021
crimeahrg.org
BLOCKING ACCESS TO INFORMATION
12 https://crimeahrg.org/uk/nova-hvilya-blokuvannya-ukra%d1%97nskogo fm-movlennya-na-pivnochikrimu-
okupaczijnoyu-vladoyu-monitoring /
9
11 providers in Crimea block at least 25
Ukrainian sites and sites of the Crimean
Tatar People's Majlis, Jehovah's
Witnesses, and the Ministry of
Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied
Machine Translated by Google
- 476 -
VHOOXVEOEIVdli
V>I9OVIlid>1
At least 42 warnings to activists about the
inadmissibility of holding peaceful rallies
administrative arrest
Crimean Solidarity Coordinator
Server Mustafayev sentenced to 14
years in a maximum security prison
At least 17 resolutions on administrative
penalties for participating in peaceful assemblies:
Participants of the Crimean Tatar battalion
named after N. Chelebidzhihan is imprisoned
Crimean Solidarity Activists Prosecuted
and Imprisoned on Hizb ut-Tahrir
Charges
At least 25 police visits to
Crimean Tatar activists
The current ban on the Crimean and
Tara Majlis Majlis
8 decisions on fines totaling
135,000 rubles 6 resolutions on 5-
day
14
VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
10
The highest representative body of the Crimean Tatar people.
Crimean Solidarity activists are subject to criminal and
administrative prosecution, more than 20 of them have
been victims of fabricated criminal cases on charges of
participating in Hizb ut-Tahrir, and Crimean Solidarity
coordinator Server Mustafayev was sentenced to 14 years
in prison in 2020. strict regime colonies.
In addition, the Russian authorities, through the
COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, introduced a ban on peaceful
assemblies and applied a new article to activists 20.6.1 of
the Administrative Code
Participants of the Crimean Tatar Battalion named after
Noman Chelebidzhikhan are persecuted under Part 2 of
Art. 208 of the Criminal Code (participation in illegal armed
groups). The declared investigation of the battalion's activity
against the interests of the Russian Federation is the
information in the media that the purpose of creating the
battalion was to deoccupy Crimea.
The Russian authorities continue to limit the number
of places for peaceful assemblies in Crimea, which is one
of the reasons for refusing to approve a peaceful assembly
if the venue announced by the organizer is not included in
this list.
holding a Friday prayer, a rally with the flags of Azerbaijan,
a rally with the Crimean Tatar flags, a rally of the Communist
Party, pickets criticizing the occupying power of the Russian
Federation.
(Failure to comply with the rules of conduct in case of
emergency or threat of its occurrence). The number of
decisions on the imposition of penalties under this article
in April 2020 exceeded 14,000. It is important to note the
episode of December 11, when Venus Mustafayev was
fined 1,000 rubles under Art. 20.6.1 of the Administrative
Code of the Russian Federation for holding a single picket
in support of his son, human rights activist, a participant in
the politically motivated "case of Crimean Muslims" Server
Mustafayev. On December 18, journalist Vilen Temeryanov
was fined 1,000 rubles for filming a rally in support of
people involved in the Crimean Muslim case.
Ignoring the ruling of the International Court of Justice
of April 19, 2017 on interim measures in the case of
"Application of the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russia"), Russia upheld
the Crimean Tatar Majlis as an "extremist organization."
2020 2020
Review of the situation with observance of human rights and norms of international humanitarian law in Crimea in 2020
Freedom of association
Machine Translated by Google
- 477 -
i
I
I
1 i
2. VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW
Criminal cases
Spring Autumn
for evasion of service
At least 28,044 men
from the Crimea were called to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
CONVENTION (IV) ON THE PROTECTION
OF CIVILIAN POPULATION DURING WAR
In addition, the Russian authorities have
consistently created conditions for the settlement of
the occupied territory of Ukraine by Russian citizens.
For example, the analysis of CNG data from the
website "Office of the Federal State Statistics Service
of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol" showed
that in 2020 at the end of November "interregional
migration movement" arrived in Crimea citizens of
Russia amounted to 33,137 people (20,763 - in the
Crimea for the period January-November 2020 and
12,374 - to the city of Sevastopol for the period
January-October 2020).
The Russian authorities do not abandon the
practice of forcible transfer of the Crimean population
from the occupied peninsula to the territory of the
Russian Federation. For example, prisoners are
regularly taken from Crimea to colonies and pre-trial
detention centers in Russia, conscripts are sent to
military units in Russia, and Ukrainian citizens who
have not received documents are deported from
Crimea in accordance with Russian migration legislation.
In total, during the occupation, the number of
Russian citizens who were in the Crimea was 205,559
(117,114 to the territory of the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea and 88,445 to Sevastopol). Keep in mind
that this may include relocation
crimeahrg.org
Crimean Human Rights Group - 2021
9 38 35
81
Article 49. DEPORTATION OF CRIMINAL RESIDENTS FROM THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORY TO THE TERRITORY OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, AS WELL AS THE MOVEMENT OF CIVILIAN POPULATION
FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY
ILLEGAL CALL OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS TO THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OCCUPIED CRIMEA
11
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
2020
Machine Translated by Google
- 478 -
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In 2020, the Russian authorities conducted two campaigns in
Crimea to recruit Crimean residents to the Russian army, and a total
of 12 mobilization campaigns were carried out during the occupation.
According to the Crimean Military Commissariat and the Russian
Ministry of Defense, in 2020 at least 6,300 conscripts were drafted
into the Russian army. 3,300 people - in the spring campaign and at
least 3,000 - in the autumn. Thus, a total of at least 28,044 people
were mobilized from the Crimea to the Russian army during the
occupation.
In 2020, the CPG sent juveniles of the Crimea to the Office of the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (communication
prepared jointly with the Prosecutor's Office of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol17
The facts of militarization of children and propaganda of service
in the armed forces of the Russian Federation among are documented
Russia still applies only the rules of Russian law in the occupied
territory of Ukraine. The administration of justice is also carried out
on the basis of the legislation of the Russian Federation.
residents from Sevastopol to the "Republic of Crimea" and in the
opposite direction, or moving outside the Crimea, and then back to
the peninsula. However, with this in mind, the total number of
displaced Russian citizens in the Crimea is much higher, as these
statistics do not take into account the military and law enforcement
officers.
The Russian authorities are carrying out a large-scale
propaganda campaign in the Russian army, in particular among
children of primary and secondary school age. They are taught how
to handle firearms - pistols, rifles and automatic firearms. Training
takes place both during mass events in schools and public places,
and in the conditions of special gatherings and children's camps for
military pre-conscription training. The Russian authorities have
organized and financed from the budget children's paramilitary
formations - units of the "Unarmy" and "Krympatriotsentr" 16.
In 2020, the CPG documented 81 new criminal cases for evasion
of service in the RF Armed Forces, submitted to the "courts" of
Crimea15. During the entire period of occupation, the CPG recorded
163 such cases, 153 of which have already been sentenced, and
another 10 are under consideration.
and the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child18.
16 https://crimeahrg.org/ru/iz-ukrainczev-v-rossiyan-skolko-rf-stoit
smena-identichnosti-molodezhi-v-krymu/
17 https://crimeahrg.org/uk/propaganda-zbrojnih-sil-rf-sered-krimskih
ditej-% d1% 94-elementom-primusu-do-sluzhbi-v-armi% d1% 97-
18 https://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ua_situacziya-z
pravami-ditej-v-krimu-u-konteksti-okupaczii%CC%88-pivostrova-rf-1.pdf
15 79 cases were i nitiated in 2 020, 2 - in 2 019. occupant /
Review of the situation with observance of human rights and norms of international humanitarian law in Crimea in 2020
12
Article 64. OBLIGATIONS TO REMAIN THE LEGISLATION
OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY
Article 51. CALL OF PERSONS LIVING IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORY TO THE ARMY OF THE OCCUPIING STATE,
AS WELL AS PROPAGANDA OF SERVICE IN THE ARMY
Machine Translated by Google
- 479 -
- 480 -
Annex 104
Crimean Tatar Resource Center, In Crimea, Parents of Students are Forced to Refuse to
Study in the Crimean Tatar Language at School (5 April 2021)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 481 -
- 482 -
3/29/22, 3:23 PM B KpblMy poweneVi 1p-emu's emHymilatoT OTKB3aTbCR OT o5reHHH Ha KpbmcKoTaTapcKom Fl3blKe B umone I CTRC
KPIAMCK0TATAPC1041
PECYPCHIalk CIENTO.
(/rU)
CRIMEAN TATAR
RESOURCE CENTER
CIT (Igl) I UA (ink) I EN (fen) I (hal.
+38 067 343 74 54 (tel:+380673437454)
+38 044 489 61 25 (tel:+380444896125) Search
Hoff / Neva(fro/ ..5) / In Crimea, parents of students ore forced to refuse teaching in the Crimean Tatar language at school
In Crimea, parents of students are forced to
refuse to study in the Crimean Tatar language at
school
April 5, 2021
In the occupied Crimea, teachers at the Municipal Budgetary Educational Institution "Verkhorechenskaya Secondary School" of the Bakhchisaray
District give parents a completed application form, where Russian is already entered instead of their native language. Activist Elmaz Kyrymly reports
this on her Facebook page.
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'In Crimean schools, parents are no longer simply °persuaded" to write a refusal to teach their children in their native Crimean Tatar language.
Now, as happened in the Verkhorechenskaya secondary school (Bakhchisarai district), teachers issue a completed application form, where
instead of NATIVE Crimean Tatar (and Ukrainian) as the language of instruction, the Russian language has already been entered. That is, there
is no choice, even though the list includes the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages. But this is so, an illusion of choice. After all, everything
has already been written for the parents," the message says.
Washington, DC Washington, DC
State House Apartments Spring Valley Apartments The Chase
Victims of the occupation of
Crimea
238 political prisoners and prosecuted in criminal
cases during the occupation of Crimea, 109 of them
are representatives of the Crimean Tatar people
• (Dowspensi n one... 1/5 D.
Chart is clic/cable
Show more diagrams (/rutzhartvyokkupacii)
Persons violating human rights in
Crimea
Classification
(1106 (Cnoppeate... DAM
rIpacypalyps Cyn.
• Ceaperap...
Carrpwiwn... Apaosana...
jElpyrme piconanoornsie maw (...
Chart is clickable
Test: are you subject to
sanctions?
TECT:
noppaipewb Jul Tbl
https://ctrcenter.org/ru/news/6605-v-krymu-roditelej-uchenikov-vynuzhdayut-otkazatsya-ot-obucheniya-na-krymskotatarskom-yazyke-v-shkole 1/4
- 483 -
3/29/22, 3:23 PM B KpblMy poweneVi 1p-emu's emHymilatoT OTKB3aTbCFI OT o6rieHHH Ha KpbmcKoTaTapcKom Fl3biKe B umone I CTRC
about 12 months ago
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94 25 252
Recall that earlier there was already a case when the leadership in Simferopol school No. B conducts conversations with the parents of students and
forces them to refuse to study the Crimean Tatar language.
N/
IIPABOBAA nomow,b
CHH3aTbCH C iopintrom online
Tweets
(https://vk.comishare.php?url=https%3A%2F%2Fctrcenter.org%2Fru%2Fnews%2F6605-v-loymu-roditelej-uchenikov-vynuzhdayut-otkazatsya-ot-obucheniya-na-kry rnskok
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Washington, DC Washington, DC
State House Apartments Spring Valley Apartments The Chase
Tweets by @ctrcontar
‘,,c Crimean Tatar Resource Center
@ctrcenter
Replying to @ctrcenter
ctrcentecorgfuldnews/7578-k...
Mar 25, 2022
Crimean Tatar Resource Center
@ctrcenter
Dear 5 ilirmetazyrtar 5 POTUS 5
RoyalFamily 5 RTErdogan 5 AndrzejDuda
5 jonasgahrstore MinPres 5 valstsgriba
5 presidential 5 OlafScholz , our children are
asking to save their home, their relatives, friends
and their lives. Shelter Ukrainian Sky! it
RussianUkrainianWar# ShelterUkrainianSky
Ukrainian Children call
445helter My Sky,.
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Facebook youtube
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Latest news (/ru/news)
The flag of fascist Russia cannot be next to the
flags of the countries of the world (fru/news/7579-
(fru/news/nille-fashistskoj-rossii-ne-mochebnahoditsya.
flag- ryadomw•flegamiwtran•mink)
fashistaimi-March 28, 2022
mssii-nemozhetnahoditsyaryadomsflagamistranmira)
Hundreds of Ukrainian children have joined the :a„}- children's campaign "Protect my sky!"
yruinews/Vrignews/7578-krc-prizyvaet-vseh-prisoedinitsyahttps://
ctrcenter.org/ru/news/6605-v-krymu-roditelej-uchenikov-vynuzhdayut-otkazatsya-ot-obucheniya-na-krymskotatarskom-yazyke-v-shkole 2/4
- 484 -
Annex 105
Crimean Human Rights Group, Statement of Implementation Report Russian Federation
International Legal Commitments in the Field Protection of Human Rights in the Occupied
Territory of Crimea and Sevastopol (November 2021)
This excerpt has been translated from its original language
into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to
Rules of the Court, Article 51. A copy of the whole document
has been deposited with the Registry.
- 485 -
- 486 -
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Machine Translated by Google
- 487 -
I. The rights of detainees, the right to a fair trial 4
4. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion 13
5. Prohibition of compulsory conscription 14
3. Freedom of peaceful assembly 11
2. Freedom of opinion and freedom of expression 9
Introduction 3
Crimean human rights group
CRIMEA
HUMAN RIGHTS
GROUP
CONTENT
Machine Translated by Google
- 488 -
65 https://crimeahrg.org/en/website-of-the-crimean-human-rights-group-blocked-in-crimea-for-undermining-of-security-of-the-rf/
61 https://crimeahrg.org/en/russian-occupation-authorities-radio-broadcasting-at-minimum-34-radio-frequencies/
57 https://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/crimean-human-rights-group_nov_en.pdf
66 https://crimeahrg.org/uk/u-krimu-czilkom-blokuyut-9-informaczijnih-sajtiv-novij-monitoring-kpg/
62 https://crimeahrg.org/uk/na-pivnochi-krimu-znovu-posilili-blokuvannya-signalu-ukra%d1%97nskih-fm-stanczij/
58 https://crimeahrg.org/en/occupation-authorities-of-crimea-jamming-ukrainian-fm-stations-in-the-south-of-kherson-region/
63 https://crimeahrg.org/en/at-least-12-crimean-providers-blocking-ukrainian-websites-in-crimea/
59 https://crimeahrg.org/en/russia-continues-to-block-fm-radio-broadcasting-in-northern-crimea/
64 https://crimeahrg.org/en/12-providers-blocking-27-ukrainian-websites-in-crimea/
60 https://crimeahrg.org/en/occupation-authorities-intensified-again-jamming-ukrainian-radio-signal-in-north-of-crimea/
Status of fulfillment by the Russian Federation of international legal
obligations in the field of human rights protection on the territory of Crimea
A monitoring of access to Internet resources conducted by KPG in June showed that 12 providers in 12 settlements
completely blocked 18 Ukrainian sites. Another 9 sites are available only in some settlements64. Since July, access
to the Crimean Human Rights Group's website has been blocked by many providers in Crimea "for encroaching on
Russia's security" 65.
Authorities use penalties for participating in group and individual pickets and filming such events. To ensure the
"legality" of detentions, formal grounds for detention may be used, such as non-compliance with quarantine
restrictions, although at the same time de facto government-organized events with mass congestion are being carried
out in Crimea.
In June the CPG witnessed a significant deterioration in the situation with the signal of Ukrainian radio stations.
Ukrainian broadcasting was available in June in 8 of 19 settlements. Moreover, the radio station of the Ministry of
Defense of the Russian Federation "Zirka" completely muffled the Ukrainian radio "NV" with its signal 60.
On November 26, Dlyaver Memetov , coordinator of the Crimean Solidarity Association, and Abdullah
Seidametov , a journalist with the Crimean Solidarity and Grani.ru publications , were detained near the Crimean
Garrison Military Court building . After their delivery to the Central Police Department, Abdullah Seidametov was
released57.
The CPG's monitoring of access to websites in September showed that 14 providers in 13 localities completely
blocked 9 information sites, and 19 sites were available to only one provider from the monitoring list66.
The KPG's monitoring of FM radio broadcasting in July showed that in 19 settlements in the south of the Kherson
region, Ukrainian radio stations were blocked by a Russian signal broadcast from the occupied Crimea. At least 34
Ukrainian FM frequencies are overlapped by the signal of 37 Russian radio stations61.
The Russian authorities use technical means to prevent the broadcasting of Ukrainian media in Crimea: During
the reporting period, the CPG conducted a number of monitoring of the Crimean population's access to Ukrainian
media, which showed a tendency to increasingly restrict such access by Russia:
Monitoring of radio broadcasting by the CPG in September in the north of Crimea showed that Ukrainian
broadcasting has been available in only 5 settlements since 1962.
1) Monitoring of FM broadcasting conducted by KPG in early February in 19 settlements of Kherson region
showed that the Russian authorities blocked the frequencies of Ukrainian radio stations in the territory controlled by
the Ukrainian government from the territory of the occupied Crimea by broadcasting Russian stations on these
waves58.
The right to peaceful assembly is recognized in Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. According to Art. 22 of the Covenant, everyone has the right to freedom of association with others. This right
is also established by Art. 11 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
2) Monitoring of access to Ukrainian Internet resources by the CPG in March among Crimean providers showed
that at least 12 providers in 12 Crimean settlements completely blocked the sites of 22 Ukrainian media and 5 sites
of religious or governmental organizations63.
3. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY
11
A monitoring of FM broadcasting in northern Crimea conducted by the KGB in March showed that 5 radio
stations had been blocked in the Chaplynka area and 640 in the Chongar area. Ukrainian broadcasting has
been available in a total of 13 settlements since 1959.
Machine Translated by Google
- 489 -
0
12
Crimean human rights group
69 https://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/crimean-human-rights-group_sep_en.pdf
68 https://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/crimean-human-rights-group_mar_en.pdf
70 https://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/october_en.pdf
67 https://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/crimean-human-rights-group_jan_2021_en.pdf
dej. In addition, Russian police in Crimea often personally warned activists in advance of their illegal
participation in planned rallies, as such rallies would allegedly violate Russian law on rallies and antiextremism
legislation.
- In January, employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation stopped white cars "for
inspection" on the Kerch bridge on the way from the Crimea to the Russian Federation. Cars in which Crimean Tatars
were, didn't pass. According to eyewitnesses, about 120 people were detained in this way, who were detained all night
allegedly for checking documents, after which they were banned from leaving Crimea without any grounds. All other
cars were passed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs without hindrance. Thus, the officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
of the Russian Federation prevented the acts of news and relatives from taking part in the action in support of the
participants of the "Crimean Muslim case", who were sentenced on January 12 in Rostov-on-Don67.
- In March, the court brought to justice Sevil Omerov for holding a single picket in support of her
husband, a participant in the detention of politically motivated Riza Omerov. Warnings were issued for
non-compliance with the rules of conduct in an emergency (quarantine). On a similar charge, a court fined
activist Mustafa Seydaliyev, who was holding a picket in support of Crimean political prisoners, for a
single picket68.
- On October 11, 25 and 29, mass detentions of people who came to open court hearings of arrested
Crimean Tatars took place in Crimea. There were at least 72 detentions in total, of which 24 were left in
solitary confinement overnight. At least 63 detainees were charged with non-compliance with quarantine
restrictions, violation of the order of organizing or holding a peaceful assembly and "organizing mass
simultaneous stay and (or) movement of citizens in public places, which caused a violation of public
order." Of these, 21 people were fined between 5,000 and 20,000 rubles, 7 were acquitted, and others
are awaiting trial in the Crimean "courts." Among those fined were two journalists who were members of
the Crimean Solidarity NGO, who were detained and carried out their professional duties. On October 25,
police officers barred Rustem Kyamilev's lawyer from detaining an activist during mass arrests for
disobeying police. Another lawyer, Edem Semedlyaev, was denied access to one of the detainees for
refusing to stretch in the ward70.
The Crimean Human Rights Group has documented numerous cases of restriction of freedom of
peaceful assembly and sentencing to administrative arrest and fines. The Russian authorities and their
controlled bodies in the occupied Crimea systematically obstruct peaceful measures in support of political
detainees, as well as other measures taken to criticize the actions of the authorities or to express a
position on the illegality of the annexation of Crimea. , in particular:
- In January 2021, there were mass detentions of protesters in support of Russian opposition politician
O. Navalny. In addition, on the eve of the rally, police officers handed out warnings to activists and their
potential participants about the ban on holding and attending rallies due to the introduction of a quarantine
regime in Crimea. In April, an activist holding a single picket in support of Navalny was fined 10,000 rubles.
- In September in Simferopol, police, Rosguard and riot police detained activists and relatives of those
arrested, along with Nariman Jelal, who had gathered at the FSB headquarters to find out the whereabouts
of those arrested. The CPG received information about at least 53 detainees at the event. They were
taken to the “police station, where they stayed for several hours, waiting for administrative reports to be
drawn up. Locals were detained for participating in a peaceful spontaneous rally. Two relatives of the
detainees were left in solitary confinement after being accused of disobeying the police and sentenced to
15 and 10 days in jail, respectively. At the end of October, the CPG recorded 43 court decisions imposing
fines ranging from 1,000 to 30,000 rubles on participants in the event. In October, journalist Ayder
Kadyrov, who videotaped the detention, was fined 5,000 rubles for violating quarantine requirements69.
Machine Translated by Google
- 490 -
73 https://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/crimean-human-rights-group_nov_ua.pdf
71 https://crimeahrg.org/uk/u-simferopoli-zatrimali-31-osobu-za-zustrich-advokata-edema-semedlya%d1%94va-z-itt/
72 https://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/crimean-human-rights-group_nov_en.pdf
Status of fulfillment by the Russian Federation of international legal
obligations in the field of human rights protection on the territory of Crimea
4. FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION
According to Art. 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, everyone has the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes freedom to hold and receive religion or belief of his
choice, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief in worship, practice, worship and observance. No one shall be subjected to coercion which undermines his
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. This article also states that freedom of religion or
belief is subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health or morals, as well as the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
Subsequently, in November, Semedlyaev was sentenced to 12 days in jail and fined 4,000 rubles. On November
23, the day Semedlyaev's arrest expired, police detained 31 people who came to meet a lawyer after his release
near the detention center. 17 people were sentenced to administrative arrest for 10 to 13 days. In addition, 6 people
were fined in the amount of 10 to 15 thousand rubles71.
According to Art. 9 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, everyone
has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief, and freedom to practice his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance, and practice
alone and in private, in public and in private.
The UN General Assembly called on Russia to respect freedom of thought, association and peaceful assembly,
as well as freedom of association and freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief without any discrimination
and to ensure unhindered access without any unreasonable restrictions on places of worship and assembly.
prayers and other religious practices. However, as recorded by the CPG and reflected in the draft resolution on the
human rights situation in Crimea at the 76th session of the UN General Assembly, Russia continues to restrict
freedom of conscience, religion and belief.
In addition, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is under constant pressure from the occupying authorities in Crimea
- There were also several mass detentions in November. On November 1, 19 people were detained in Crimea
for attending an open hearing in the "Crimean Muslim case." On November 23, 32 people were detained who came
to meet after the administrative arrest of lawyer Edem Semedlyaev. On November 26, two more people who came
to the hearing in the "Crimean Muslim case" were detained. In total, at least 53 Crimean Tatars were detained in
November as participants in peaceful assemblies, and at least 50 administrative proceedings were instituted
against them.72
During the reporting period, the CPG recorded numerous cases of persecution of people who practiced religious
organizations banned in Russia, mainly Jehovah's Witnesses.
The decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation ÿ AKPI17-238 of April 20, 2017 banned the
activities of religious organizations of Jehovah's Witnesses as extremist. The Russian authorities also extended
this ban to the occupied territory of Crimea. Ukrainian law does not prohibit the activities of Jehovah's Witnesses.
Despite the liquidation of the legal entities concerned, Jehovah's Witnesses are persecuted for organizing extremist
activities. The basis for such accusations is, as a rule, information about the conduct of religious ceremonies in
accordance with the views of Jehovah's Witnesses, not the continuation of the activities of banned organizations.
13
At the end of November 2021, 5 people were imprisoned in the Crimea as part of the persecution of Jehovah's
Witnesses. Another 9 are restricted in their movement: 7 are under house arrest, 2 are under a restraining order
73.
Machine Translated by Google
- 491 -
- 492 -
Annex 106
International Renaissance Foundation, Information on Illegal Archeological Excavations:
List of Objects of Destruction of Monuments of Crimea (2021)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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3/15/22, 1:52 PM Palace of Kalga-Sultan Akmejitsay and cultural layer of the ancient city of Akmejit
https://culture.crimea.ua/ua/palats-kalhasultana-akmedzhytsarai-ta-kulturnyi-shar-starodavnoho-mista-akmedzhyt-55b4cc25d73b171227f8be1e978dc… 1/5
Information on illegal archeological
excavations
list of objects of destruction of monuments of Crimea
Palace of Kalga-Sultan Akmejitsay and cultural layer of
the ancient city of Akmejit
Palace of Kalga-Sultan Akmejitsay and cultural layer of the ancient city of Akmejit
Russian colonial policy, wherever it takes place — whether in the Ukrainian-occupied Crimea or
in Russian Tatarstan — always uses three basic principles: oblivion, denial of the obvious, and
marginalization.
In this sense, the example of the archeological monument "Palace of the Kalga Sultan
Akmejitsaray and the cultural layer of the ancient city of Akmejit is illustrative.
(home.html)
PROJECTS ( PROJECT.HTML) MATERIALS JOIN (JOIN.HTML)
CONTACTS (CONTACT.HTML)
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3/15/22, 1:52 PM Palace of Kalga-Sultan Akmejitsay and cultural layer of the ancient city of Akmejit
https://culture.crimea.ua/ua/palats-kalhasultana-akmedzhytsarai-ta-kulturnyi-shar-starodavnoho-mista-akmedzhyt-55b4cc25d73b171227f8be1e978dc… 2/5
The city was founded no later than 1502, as evidenced by the building inscription of the oldest
building of Akmedjit, the Kebir Mosque. At the end of the XV century. Khan Mengli I Geray, the
great institutionalist of the Crimean Khanate, founded the post of Kalga Sultan - commander of
the army of the Crimean Khanate, the first heir to the khan's throne.
The residence of the Kalga Sultan was the city around the palace complex Akmejitsaray.
It should be understood that the historical part of Akmejit did not perish, but was simply
renamed by the Russians first in Simferopol, and then separated within the Old Town. At the
same time, the colonizers no doubt still believe that the history of Akmejit-Simferopol is a little
over 200 years old and before them there was a "scorched desert". The modern historical part
of Akmedjit-Simferopol is known, to put it mildly, as not the most prestigious area of the city.
Lack of communications, normal road surface, street lighting, and mountains of garbage
dominate the streets near the central square of Akmedzhit-Simferopol.
After the annexation of Crimea in 1783, Akmejit lost its main architectural and political dominant
- the palace of the Kalga Sultan. Built in the early XVI century. Akmejitsaray fell into disrepair at
the end of the XVIII century. when Russian troops were stationed there.
The archeological monument "Palace of Kalga-Sultan Akmejitsaray and the cultural layer of the
ancient city of Akmejit" also includes the archeological layers of the mosque complex of 1502.
Kebir-jami and archeological buildings of the Old Town of the late XV - early XX centuries.
It is difficult to come up with a more complete and vivid metaphor for the current fate and state
of Crimea than the history of Akmejitsaray. Now the location of the Kalga Sultan's palace is
called "Dog Beam" and is partly used as a landfill. In the former famous gardens of
Akmejitsaray, the temple of the Russian Orthodox Church is being built illegally, even in terms of
occupation "laws". And 500 meters from the ruins of the palace is the Kyiv District Court of
Akmedzhit-Simferopol - the main court for the Crimean Tatar and other political prisoners of the
Kremlin.
The impetus for the archaeological study of Akmejit and the Kalga Sultan's palace in 2017 was
the construction of a church of the Russian Orthodox Church on the territory of the former
brewery. In the course of construction works, the remains of the masonry of the palace walls
and the cultural layer of the final stage of the palace's existence were discovered. The public,
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3/15/22, 1:52 PM Palace of Kalga-Sultan Akmejitsay and cultural layer of the ancient city of Akmejit
https://culture.crimea.ua/ua/palats-kalhasultana-akmedzhytsarai-ta-kulturnyi-shar-starodavnoho-mista-akmedzhyt-55b4cc25d73b171227f8be1e978dc… 3/5
which has long insisted on archeological research, has called for an end to construction work,
which has led to a temporary halt and limited excavation, confirming information about the
location of Akmejitsaray.
Since 2019, illegal so-called "Protective" archaeological explorations throughout the Old Town
on new buildings. But the main threat to the ruins of Akmejitsaray and urban development of the
Khan's time are not excavations, as it seems at first glance.
The main problem is the direct disregard by the occupation authorities and the population of
Simferopol (ARC, Ukraine) of the historical and cultural layer of the Crimean Khanate . Instead
of stepping up efforts to protect and preserve archeological sites in the old part of Akmedjit-
Simferopol, the occupying authorities have opened a new niche to earn money on
"examinations" and illegal archeological excavations "under demolition", which began in the city
in 2019.
Thus, today the occupiers are not going to change their policy of transforming the second
capital of the Khanate either into a place of "Orthodox" holiness or a place of solid waste.
Map
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3/15/22, 1:52 PM Palace of Kalga-Sultan Akmejitsay and cultural layer of the ancient city of Akmejit
https://culture.crimea.ua/ua/palats-kalhasultana-akmedzhytsarai-ta-kulturnyi-shar-starodavnoho-mista-akmedzhyt-55b4cc25d73b171227f8be1e978dc… 4/5
Responsible persons
Seidaliyev Emil Isayevich - the so-called "Institute of Archeology of Crimea RAS"
Sources
Seidaliev EI EXPLORATIONS AT THE PLACE OF THE ASSUMED LOCATION OF
THE KALGA-SULTAN'S PALACE IN SIMFEROPOL // History and Archeology of
Crimea. Issue. VIII. Sevastopol: Kolorit, 2018. S. 110-113.
1
Additional files
No information available
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3/15/22, 1:52 PM Palace of Kalga-Sultan Akmejitsay and cultural layer of the ancient city of Akmejit
https://culture.crimea.ua/ua/palats-kalhasultana-akmedzhytsarai-ta-kulturnyi-shar-starodavnoho-mista-akmedzhyt-55b4cc25d73b171227f8be1e978dc… 5/5
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Annex 107
Crimean Tatar Resource Center, Analysis of Human Rights Violations in the
Occupied Crimea in 2021 (presentation) (25 January 2022)
This excerpt has been translated from its original language
into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to
Rules of the Court, Article 51. A copy of the whole document
has been deposited with the Registry.
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Page 1
Crimean Tatar Resource Center
Analysis of human rights violations in the occupied Crimea in 2021
https://ctrcenter.org/ru tel. +38 067 343 7454 https://facebook.com/CTRC2015
Page 2
Right to life, liberty and physical integrity
Illegal actions of the occupational authorities
Searches
[graph]
Total number of searches (53) Searches in Crimean Tatar households (33)
In 2021, 53 searches were recorded in the occupied Crimea, 33 of which were held in the homes
of Crimean Tatars. This figure is practically the same as the figure of the previous year. Then the
CTRC recorded 50 searches. Persecution trend for political and religious reasons remains
unchanged since the beginning of the occupation of the peninsula.
In January, 3 searches were recorded: at the wife of political prisoner Ivan Yatskin and at
suspects of "justifying terrorism in social media".
In February, the security forces conducted 10 searches in the case of Jehovah's Witnesses,
the case of Hizb ut-Tahrir and one in the home of activist Ludovicka Papadopoulou.
In March, 9 searches were recorded, which were related to the case of Jehovah's
Witnesses.
Page 3
In April, 6 searches were carried out: 4 in the houses of the Crimean Tatars Abduselyam
Selyametov, Seyran Taymazov, Eldar Fetlyaev, and Ruslan Ramazanov without serious
reasons, in the house of a brother of Enver Seitosmanov, who is charged in the case of Hizb
ut-Tahrir, as well as at a resident of Alushta for "calls for extremist activities."
4 searches were recorded in May: in the house of Ayub Rakhimov, in the dwelling of the
Gafarov family, where Ayub Rakhimov was present. And also in the homes of Crimean
Tatar activists: Zidan Adzhikelyamov and Muslim Zevriev.
In July, 2 searches were recorded: in the house of the parents of Gaide Rizayeva, an activist
and assistant to the People's Deputy of Ukraine and in the house of Abdulla Ibragimov in
the city of Evpatoria, who was arrested for three days.
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In August, 5 searches were registered in the case of Hizb ut-Tahrir.
In September, 7 searches were recorded: in the “case of sabotage”, as well as in the house
of Crimean activist Stanislav Krasnov.
In October, 3 searches were recorded: in the prison cells of defendants in the
Krasnogvardeisk Hizb ut-Tahrir case, while they were attending the trial. Personal items
of political prisoners were sized.
In November, in the occupied Crimea, Russian security forces searched parents’ house of
the former First Deputy Permanent Representative of the President in the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea Izet Gdanov.
In December, the Russian security forces carried out 3 searches: in Feodosia, in the house
of a Crimean Tatar Kurtumer Chalgozov, in the city of Stary Krym - in the house of the
Crimean Tatar Nariman Ametov, as well as in the house of 34-year-old Crimean Tatar
Rustem Ibadlaev.
During searches, security forces often violate the rights of victims. In particular, during the
penetration into the dwellings, cases of damages to property were recorded, or conducting a search
in the absence of the owner, or planting prohibited literature.
In addition, during the search in May, Ayub Rakhimov was killed. Occupiers claim that he resisted.
Page 4
Right to life, liberty and physical integrity
Illegal actions of the occupational authorities
Detentions
[graph]
Total number of detentions (366) Detentions of Crimean Tatars (330)
In 2021, 366 detentions/holdings were recorded in the occupied Crimea, 330 of which - in relation
to Crimean Tatars. Dynamics remain unchanged, in 2021 there were 364 detentions recorded.
A number of recorded detentions were made after the searches. Residents of Crimea were detained
on suspicion of involvement in the Hizb ut-Tahrir organization banned in the Russian Federation,
Jehovah's Witnesses, for evasion in the draft of the Russian Federation armed forces, for
“justifying terrorism in social media”, “supporting terrorism”, for “public treason”, for
“committing sabotage”. Detention on the administrative border also took place.
Page 5
Such a large number of violations in this category is also due to the fact that the occupiers
massively detained activists who were on their way from Crimea to the city of Rostov-on-Don for
the announcement of the verdict to defendants in the Belogorsk case of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Back then
126 detention were recorder, all in relation to Crimean Tatars.
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On September 4, 58 activists, who had gathered near the building of the “Department of the FSB
of Russia for Republic of Crimea and the Sevastopol” and demanded to provide information on
whereabouts of the detained Crimean Tatars Nariman Dzhelyalov, Aziz and Asan Akhtemov were
detained.
In October, Russian security forces detained at least 59 activists who had come to the “court”
building, where hearing in Krasnogvardeisk Hizb ut-Tahrir case was supposed to take place. 30
activists, who were waiting for the announcement of the verdict and put on white capes in support
of the defendants in the Hizb ut-Tahrir case from the so-called "third Bakhchisaray group" were
also detained.
On November 23, dozens of activists in the occupied Crimea came to meet the lawyer Edem
Semedlyaev, whose detention term at the temporary detention facility had expired. FSB officers
have already detained 31 people.
It is worth noting the detention of Vladislav Esipenko, a native of Krivyi Rig, who was detained
after the commemoration of the Taras Shevchenko birthday in Simferopol. Torture was used
against him: it is known that Vladislav was tortured with electricity for two days.
Also indicative are the detentions of Crimean Tatars Aziz and Asan Akhtemov, who were tortured
and threatened with death in order to obtain confessions.
Crimean Tatars Nariman Ametov and Kurtumer Chalrozov were also tortured during detentions.
They were detained on suspicion of “committing sabotage”, but later released. As it became
known, the invaders tortured Ametov with the electric current. Also they tied Chalrozov with tape
to a chair and began threatening him with chriminal charges in order to recruit him.
Page 6
Right to life, liberty and physical integrity
Illegal actions of the occupational authorities
Interrogations, Interviews, “Conversations”
[graph]
Total number of interrogations (366) Interrogations of Crimean Tatars (330)
In 2021, 366 cases of interrogation, questioning and “conversations” were recorded in the
occupied Crimea, 330 of which - in relation to Crimean Tatars. In 2021, 364 cases were
recorded.
Crimeans detained after searches were subjected to interrogations and interviews - on suspicion of
participation in such organizations as "Hizb ut-Tahrir" and "Jehovah's Witnesses", banned in the
Russian Federation, according to suspicion of allegedly “justifying terrorism in social networks”,
“facilitating terrorism”, “state treason”, “sabotage”. One interrogation was carried out by Russian
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security forces on the administrative border with the occupied Crimea. In addition, during the
reporting period, there were repeated cases of interrogations of relatives of political prisoners, and
activists who held solo pickets.
Page 7
Right to life, liberty and physical integrity
Illegal actions of the occupational authorities
Arrests
[graph]
Total number of arrests (210) Arrests of Crimean Tatars (167)
In 2021, 210 cases of arrests were recorded in the occupied Crimea, 167 of which involved
representatives of the indigenous people. Out of 210 cases: 28 - sentenced, 40 -
administrative arrests, 25 - new arrests, 118 - extension of detentions.
Last year, 197 cases of arrests were recorded.
During this period, the occupation courts sentenced:
defendants in the Belogorskiy Hizb ut-Tahrir case Enver Omerov to 18 years, Ayder
Dzhepparov to 17 years, Riza Omerov to 13 years in prison.
Pro-Ukrainian activist Oleg Prykhodko to 5 years in a maximum security prison with the
first year in jail.
political prisoner Medzhit Ablyamitov, suspected of allegedly “participating in the
battalion named after N. Chelebidzhikhan", to 6 years in a maximum security prison with
restriction of freedom for 1 year.
Galina Dovgopolaya to 12 years of imprisonment in a medium security prison with
restriction of freedom for 1 year.
Page 8
Viktor Stashevsko, suspected of being a member of the religious organization Jehovah's
Witnesses banned in Russia, to six and a half years in prison.
Lenur Islyamov, the owner of the Crimean Tatar TV channel ATR, to 18 years in prison,
serving the sentence in a maximum security prison, as well as 1 year of restriction of
freedom (the sentence was changed).
Ukrainian serviceman Yevhen Dobrinskiy to 3 years and 6 months in prison due to "illegal
border crossing" and "drug smuggling".
political prisoner Ivan Yatskin to 11 years in a maximum security prison with restriction
of freedom for 1 year.
a citizen of Ukraine for a period of 1 year, serving a sentence in a medium security
correctional prison for creating an "extremist community".
Chairman of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatar people Refat Chubarov to 6 years in a medium
security prison, a fine of 200 thousand rubles and 200 hours of correction works.
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Former political prisoner Edem Bekirov to 7 years in a medium security prison and a fine
of 150,000 rubles.
Two men to 8 years in prison for participating in the “Crimean Tatar volunteer battalion
named after Noman Chelebidzhikhan".
Crimean resident Nina (Latifa) Malakhova, who was detained on February 15, on charges
of "terrorism financing organization", to 4.5 years in a medium security prison.
Chairman of the Sudak Regional Mejlis Ilver Ametov to 8 months of restriction of freedom
under part 1 of Art. 222 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (illegal acquisition,
transfer, collection, storage, transportation or carrying of firearms, their main parts, and
ammunition).
defendants in the Hizb ut-Tahrir case Lenur Khalilov, Ruslan Mesutov, Ruslan Naraev,
Eldar Kantemirov.
Page 9
Ukrainian Konstantin Shiring to 12 years for alleged spying for the benefit of Kyiv (Article
276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation).
Igor Schmidt, who was accused of participating in a religious organization Jehovah's
Witnesses banned in Russia, to 6 years in a medium security prison.
defendants in the third Bakhchisaray case of Hizb ut-Tahrir Seytumer Seytumerov to 17
years of imprisonment in a maximum security prison, Osman Seytumerov - to 14 years,
Rustem Seitmemetov - to 13 years, and Amet Suleymanov - to 12 years. Political prisoners
have to spend the first three and a half years in jail.
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Volume II - Annexes 37-108