Audience publique tenue le mardi 21 avril 2015, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Abraham, président, dans les affaires relatives à Construction d'une route au Costa Rica le

Document Number
152-20150421-ORA-01-00-BI
Document Type
Number (Press Release, Order, etc)
2015/10
Date of the Document
Bilingual Document File
Bilingual Content

Corrigé
Corrected

CR 2015/10

International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice

THE HAGUE LA HAYE

YEAR 2015

Public sitting

held on Tuesday 21 April 2015, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,

President Abraham presiding,

in the cases concerning Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River
(Nicaragua v. Costa Rica); Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua
in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)

____________________

VERBATIM RECORD
____________________

ANNÉE 2015

Audience publique

tenue le mardi 21 avril 2015, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,

sous la présidence de M. Abraham, président,

dans les affaires relatives à Construction d’une route au Costa Rica le long du fleuve San Juan
(Nicaragua c. Costa Rica) ; Certaines activités menées par le Nicaragua
dans la région frontalière (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua)

________________

COMPTE RENDU
________________ - 2 -

Present: President Abraham
Vice-President Yusuf

Judges Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue

Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Robinson
Gevorgian
Judges ad hoc Guillaume
Dugard

Registrar Couvreur

 - 3 -

Présents : M. Abraham, président
M. Yusuf, vice-président

MM. Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Mmes Xue
Donoghue

M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
MM. Bhandari
Robinson
Gevorgian, juges
MM. Guillaume
Dugard, juges ad hoc

M. Couvreur, greffier

 - 4 -

The Government of Nicaragua is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambass ador of the Republic of Nicaragua to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands,

as Agent and Counsel;

Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Professor of International Law at the University of the Pacific,
McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento, former Member and former Chairman of the
International Law Commission,

Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre- La Défense, former Member
and former Chairman of the International Law Commission, member of the Institut de droit
international,

Mr. Paul S. Reichler, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the United States
Supreme Court and the District of Columbia,

Mr. Andrew B. Loewenstein, Attorney- at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,

as Counsel and Advocates;

Mr. César Vega Masís, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Director of Juridical Affairs,
Sovereignty and Territory, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Walner Molina Pérez, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Julio César Saborio, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

as Counsel;

Mr. Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, Counsellor, Embassy of Nicaragua in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,

Ms Claudia Loza Obregon, First Secretary, Embassy of Nicaragua in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,

Mr. Benjamin Samson, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University
of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,

Ms Cicely O. Parseghian, Attorney -at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,

Mr. Benjamin K. Guthrie, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,

Mr. Ofilio J. Mayorga, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the Republic of
Nicaragua and New York,

as Assistant Counsel; - 5 -

Le Gouvernement du Nicaragua est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Carlos José Argüello Gómez , ambassadeur de la République du Nicaragua auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,

comme agent et conseil ;

M. Stephen C. McCaffrey, professeur de droit international à la McGeorge Schoo l of Law de
l’Université du Pacifique à Sacramento, ancien membre et ancien président de la Commission
du droit international,

M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Paris Ouest, Nanterre- La Défense, ancien membre et
ancien président de la Commissio n du droit international, membre de l’Institut de droit
international,

M. Paul S. Reichler, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux de la Cour suprême
des Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,

M. Andrew B. Loewenstein, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau du
Commonwealth du Massachusetts,

comme conseils et avocats ;

M. César Vega Masís, ministre adjoint des affaires étrangères, directeur des affaires juridiques, de
la souveraineté et du territoire au ministère des affaires étrangères,

M. Walner Molina Pérez, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,

M. Julio César Saborio, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,

comme conseils ;

M. Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, conseiller à l’ambassade du Nicaragua au Royaume des Pays-Bas,

Mme Claudia Loza Obregon, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade du Nicaragua au Royaume des

Pays-Bas,

M. Benjamin Samson, chercheur, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,

Mme Cicely O. Parseghian, avocate au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau du
Commonwealth du Massachusetts,

M. Benjamin K. Guthrie, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau du
Commonwealth du Massachusetts,

M. Ofilio J. Mayorga, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux de la République
du Nicaragua et de New York,

comme conseils adjoints; - 6 -

Mr. Danny K. Hagans, Principal Earth Scientist at Pacific Watershed Associates, Inc.,

Mr. Robin Cleverly, Geographical and Technical Consultant,

Ms Blanca P. Ríos Touma, Ph.D., Assistant Professor at Universidad Tecnología Indoamérica in
Quito, Ecuador,

Mr. Scott P. Walls, Master of Landscape Architecture  Environmental Planning, Sole Proprietor
and Fluvial Geomorphologist at Scott Walls Consulting, Ecohydrologist at cbec ecoengineering,

Inc., and Chief Financial Officer and Project Manager at International Watershed Partners,

Ms Victoria Leader, Geographical and Technical Consultant,

as Scientific Advisers and Experts.

The Government of Costa Rica is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Manuel A. González Sanz, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Republic of
Costa Rica;

H.E. Mr. Edgar Ugalde Álvarez, Ambassador on Special Mission,

as Agent;

H.E. Mr. Sergio Ugalde, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Member of
the Permanent Court of Arbitration,

as Co-Agent, Counsel and Advocate;

Mr. Marcelo Kohen, Professor of International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, Geneva, member of the Institut de droit international,

Mr. Samuel Wordsworth, Q.C., member of the English Bar, member of the Paris Bar, Essex Court
Chambers,

Mr. Arnoldo Brenes, Senior Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, member of
the Costa Rican Bar,

Ms Kate Parlett, Solicitor admitted in Queensland, Australia, and in England and Wales,

Ms Katherine Del Mar, member of the English Bar, 4 New Square, Lincoln’s Inn,

as Counsel and Advocates;

Mr. Simon Olleson, member of the English Bar, 13 Old Square Chambers,

as Counsel; - 7 -

M. Danny K. Hagans, spécialiste principal des sciences de la terre de Pacific Watershed
Associates, Inc.,

M. Robin Cleverly, consultant dans les domaines géographique et technique,

Mme Blanca P. Ríos Touma, Ph.D., professeur adjoint à l’Universidad Tecnología Indoamérica
de Quito (Equateur),

M. Scott P. Walls, titulaire d’une maîtrise en architecture paysagère et en planification de
l’environnement, propriétaire unique et géomorphologue fluvial de Scott Walls Consu lting,

spécialiste en écohydrologie de cbec ecoengineering, Inc., directeur financier et chef de projet
pour International Watershed Partners,

Mme Victoria Leader, consultante dans les domaines géographique et technique,

comme conseillers scientifiques et experts.

Le Gouvernement du Costa Rica est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Manuel A. González Sanz, ministre des affaires étrangères et des cultes de la
République du Costa Rica ;

S. Exc. M. Edgar Ugalde Álvarez, ambassadeur en mission spéciale,

comme agent ;

S. Exc. M. Sergio Ugalde, ambassadeur du Costa Rica auprès du Royaume des Pays -Bas, membre

de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,

comme coagent, conseil et avocat ;

M. MarceloKohen, professeur de droit international à l’Institut de hautes étude s internationales
et du développement de Genève, membre de l’Institut de droit international,

M. Samuel Wordsworth, Q.C., membre des barreaux d’Angleterre et de Paris, Essex Court

Chambers,

M. Arnoldo Brenes, conseiller principal auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères et des cultes,
membre du barreau du Costa Rica,

Mme Kate Parlett, solicitor (Queensland (Australie), Angleterre et pays de Galles),

Mme Katherine Del Mar, membre du barreau d’Angleterre, 4 New Square, Lincoln’s Inn,

comme conseils et avocats;

M. Simon Olleson, membre du barreau d’Angleterre, 13 Old Square Chambers,

comme conseil ; - 8 -

Mr. Ricardo Otarola, Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship,

Ms Shara Duncan, Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship,

Mr. Gustavo Campos, Minister Counsellor and Consul General of Costa Rica to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,

Mr. Rafael Saenz, Minister Counsellor at the Costa Rican Embassy in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,

Ms Ana Patricia Villalobos, Official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship,

as Assistant Counsel;

Ms Elisa Rivero, Administrative Assistant at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship,

as Assistant. - 9 -

M. RicardoOtarola, conseiller auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères et des cultes,

Mme Shara Duncan, conseillère auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères et des cultes,

M. Gustavo Campos, ministre-conseiller et consul général du Costa Rica auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,

M. Rafael Saenz, ministre-conseiller à l’ambassade du Costa Rica au Royaume des Pays-Bas,

Mme Ana Patricia Villalobos, fonctionnaire du ministère des affaires étrangères et des cultes,

comme conseils adjoints ;

Mme Elisa Rivero, assistante administrative au ministère des affaires étrangères et des cultes,

comme assistante. - 10 -

Le PRESIDENT: Veuillez vous asseoir. L’audience est ouverte. La Cour se réunit ce matin

pour entendre la fin du premier tour de plaidoiries du Nicaragua. Je donne la parole à M. Reichler.

Mr. REICHLER:

T HE EVIDENCE : P ART TWO

T HE HARM TO N ICARAGUA

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I wish you another good morning. My role today is

to present the evidence that Costa Rica’s construction of the road has caused significant harm to

Nicaragua.

2. I will focus on the harm c aused to Nicaragua by virtue of the accumulation of sediment

from the road in the Lower San Juan River. That is where the sediment build-up, in the form of

shoals, sandbars and levees, already impedes navigation and diminishes the flow of fresh water to

the wetlands downstream, especially during the dry season. In the Lower San Juan, the

road-derived sediment materially and measurably exacerbates these problems. After I conclude,

Mr. Loewenstein will discuss harm to the ecological balance and aquatic spe cies of the

San Juan River, upper and lower branches, caused by the delivery of sediment from the road into

the river. Because Costa Rica did not conduct an e nvironmental impact assessment prior to

commencing work on this major construction project, as it was internationally obligated to do,

these and other significant harms, and foreseeable risks of harm, were never properly evaluated,

and still have not been evaluated, including the potential harms to the river from the agricultural,

commercial and human development of the area, that, as Professor Sheate explained yesterday ,

will inevitably follow completion and operation of the road. The harms and risks for Nicaragua,

resulting from Costa Rica’s breach of its international obligations in regard to EIA, will be

addressed by Professor McCaffrey.

3. I now turn to the significant harm that Nicaragua has suffered, and is continuing to suffer,

from the accumulation of road-derived sediment in the Lower San Juan.

1CR 2015/9, pp. 45-46 (Sheate). - 11 -

4. Nicaragua’s case in regard to sediment de posit in the Lower San Juan River is based on

eight propositions, all of which are either agreed by the P arties or supported by evidence that is

now beyond dispute.

5. Proposition 1. The construction of the road has caused massive amounts of sediment to be

delivered to the San Juan River, upstream from the bifurcation between t he Colorado River and the

2
Lower San Juan. Costa Rica calculates that the road deposits 75,000 tons of sediment annually ;

Nicaragua, as explained yesterday by Professor Kondolf, and as supported in the summary report of

3
Professor Weaver, puts the figure between 190,000 and 250,000 tons . Nicaragua stands by the

conclusions of its experts, as explained by Professor Kondolf yesterday.

6. Proposition 2. The sediment from the road is transported downstream by the current to the

bifurcation, where Dr. Kondolf, Dr. Andrews and ICE, Costa Rica’s agency, agree that 10 per cent

4
of the river’s water, and a larger proportion of its sediment, enter the Lower San Juan . This is

based on the most recent calculations undertaken and provided by ICE and accepted by

Nicaragua’s experts.

7. Proposition 3. Of the sediment entering the Lower San Juan, approximately 20 per cent is

coarse and 80 per cent is fine. The breakdown is also based on the m ost recent information
5
provided by Costa Rica and accepted by Nicaragua . According to Dr. Andrews, all of the coarse

sediment and 60 per cent of the fine sediment accumulate in the Lower San Juan 6.

8. Proposition 4. Most of that sediment accumulates at , and enlarges, the shoals and

sandbars in the Lower San Juan, which already inhibit navigation, especially in the dry season

2
Rejoinder of Costa Rica (RCR), para. 2.61.
3CR 2015/9, pp. 13-14 (Kondolf); Weaver Summary Report, 15 Mar. 2015, para. 52.

4CR 2015/9, pp. 19-20 (Kondolf) and p. 27 (Andrews); Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), “Secon d
Report on Hydrology and Sediments for the Costa Rican River Basins draining to the San Juan River,” Dec . 2014, RCR,
Vol. III, Ann. 5 (hereinafter “ICE 2014 Report”), pp. 30-31, figs. 6.6-6.7.
5
CR 2015/9, pp. 26-27 (Andrews); ICE 2014 Report, p. 53.
6CR 2015/9, pp. 26, 30 (Andrews); Andrews Summary Report, 15 Mar. 2015, paras. 26, 33. - 12 -

when they render the river unnavigable , according to Professor Thorne. This is also agreed by

7
Professors van Rhee and Andrews .

9. Proposition 5. The accumulation of se diment at these shoals and sand bars lowers the

river’s depth, and its capacity to transport sediments downstream which, in turn, results in even

higher amounts of sediment reaching the Lower San Juan and accumulatin g at these locations. As

Professor van Rhee explained, and Costa Rica’s expert accepts, the process is a perpetual one, with

the rate of accumulation constantly in creasing as the shoals and sand bars increase in size and the

transport capacity of the river, as a consequence, diminishes steadily 8.

10. Proposition 6. The accumulation of sediment at the shoals and sandbars in the

Lower San Juan makes dredging an absolute necessity in order to maintain navigability, even by

small boats with drafts of a mere 1 m, and dredging is equally necessary to maintain a sufficient

supply of fresh water to the wetlands downstream. Professors van Rhee and Thorne agree on this,

as well 9.

11. Proposition 7. For these reasons, Nicaragua has been dredging this section of the river

since 2011. Despite this, sediment has continued to accumulate faster than Nicaragua has been

able to dredge it out. The best Nicaragua has been able to do, despite its maximum effort with the

limited resources available, is to slow the rate of a ccumulation. As a result, what it has

accomplished by its dredging is not to increase the flow of the Lower San Juan, but to reduce the

10
rate by which the flow is decreasing. Again, this is agreed by the experts of both Parties .

12. Proposition 8. Sinc e Nicaragua is alrea dy required to dredge the Lower San Juan, it

follows that any addition of sediment to the river, such as that supplied by Costa Rica’s road, adds

to the amount of sediment that accumulates , especially at shoals and sand bars, and consequently

adds to the amount of sediment that Nicaragua must dredge out of those places. But, since

sediment is already accumulating at these locations faster than Nicaragua is able to dredge it, this is

7Van Rhee Summary Report, 15 Mar . 2015, paras. 4-6; CR 2015/3, p. 25 (Thorne); Thorne, “Report:

Assessment of the physical impact of works carried out by Nicaragua since October 2010 on the geomorphology,
hydrology and sediment dynamics of the San Juan River and the environmental i mpacts on Costa Rican territory ”,
Oct. 2011; Memorial of Costa Rica (M CR) in Certain Activities case, App. 1 (hereinafter “Thorne (2011)”), p. II-27;
CR 2015/9, pp. 31-32 (Andrews).
8Van Rhee Summary Report, 15 Mar. 2015, para. 4; Thorne (2011), pp. II-27-28.

9Ibid., paras. 6-11; Thorne (2011), p. II-28.
10
CR 2015/6, pp. 33-36 (Van Rhee); CR 2015/3, p. 43 (Thorne). - 13 -

not only a case of Nicaragua’s dredging burden being increased, but, to the extent Nicaragua lacks

capacity to dredge more than it is currently dredging, the result is that the additional sediment

derived from the road is not dredged from the river but steadily accumulates at, and enlarges, the

existing obstacles to navigation, and reduces the flow of fresh water beyond them to the wetlands

downstream.

13. In Nicaragua’s view, the harm caused by enlargement of these obstacles to navigation

and to the downstream flow which, as mentioned, continually expands geometrically because every

enlargement of a sandbar or shoal increases the future accumulation of sediment at these sites, and

thus their further enlargement and obstructiveness, is necessarily significant. Anything that

exacerbates the existing obstacles to navigation, or that causes even more of a reduction in flow, is

self-evidently significant.

14. Mr. President, for Costa Rica, this is a numbers game. So let’s look at the numbers. Let

us assume, for this purpose, that the sediment delivered to the San Juan River by Costa Rica’s road

is at the low end of the Kondolf/Weaver calculation: 190,000 tons annually. It is accepted by both

Parties that 20 per cent of the coarse sediment and 16 per cent of the fine sediment is transported

11
past the bifurcation to the Lower San Juan . Of that sediment load, all of the coarse sediment, and

60 per cent of the fine sediment accumulates there 12. That is 7,600 tons of coarse sediment 13, and

14
14,592 tons of fine sediment , per year, or a total of 22,192 tons that accumulate in the Lower San

Juan annually.

15. In 2014, the evidence shows that Nicaragua dredged from the Lower San Juan

approximately 260,000 tons of sediment 15. The contribution from the road represents therefore

approximately 8.5 per cent of the amount of sediment Nicaragua has been required, and able, to

11CR 2015/9, pp. 19-20 (Kondolf) & p. 27 (Andrews); ICE 2014 Report, pp. 30-31, figs 6.6 (b) & 6.7 (b).
12
CR 2015/9, pp. 26, 30 (Andrews); Andrews Summary Report, 15 March 2015, paras. 26, 33.
1320 per cent of 190,000 tons = 38,000 tons of coarse sediment reaching the River from the road annually;

20 per cent of that, 7,600 tons, would be the amount that continues to the Lower San Juan and accumulates each year.
1480 per cent of 190,000 tons = 152,000 tons of fine sediment reaching the River from the road annually;
16 per cent of that , 24,320 tons, would be the amount that continues to the Lower San Juan, 60 per cent of which
(14,592 tons) accumulates each year.

15EPN 2014 Annual Report, p. 20, Ann. 1 to letter from Nicaragua to the ICJ, ref. HOL -EMB-0035, 9 Mar. 2015
(reporting 158,109.78 m of sediment dredged in 2014, which converts to some 264,043 tons). - 14 -

dredge in the past year. As Dr. Andrews testified yesterday, this is a “large amount of material” 16.

And it means an additional 8.5 per cent increase, not just once, but every year  building on itself,

like compound interest.

16. Is the road’s contribution of 22,192 tons , and higher, annually to the Lower San Juan,

already plagued by major obstacles to navigation, “significant”? That is the question for the Court

to decide. How should the Court decide this question? What is significant, in this context?

17. The last three words, Mr. President, are key, in Nicaragua’s view: “in this context”. As

Dr. Kondolf explained yesterday, and as should be obvious even without the authority of an expert,

17
what is significant depends on the context . This, of course, is well recognized in international

environmental law and practice, as Professor McCaffrey will elaborate later this morning. In

particular, the significance of an impact frequently does not equate with the magnitude of the

stimulus. It depends as well, and sometimes mainly, on the sensitivity of the receiving

environment. This is the point Dr. Kondolf made in one of his responses to Mr. Wordsworth: “It is

important . . . not to confuse magnit ude with significance.” 18 As applied to this case, Dr. Kondolf

testified as follows in response to Mr. Wordsworth’s question “[W]hat are the significant harms?”

“Dr. Kondolf: . . . Nicaragua has a dredging programme which both Professors Thorne and

van Rhee have indicated is barely keeping up with the excess sedimentation . . . So, any further

sediment delivered to the river and deposited in the Lower Rio San Juan adds to that dredging

burden.” 19

18. And t his is how Professor Kondolf put it in response to a question from

Judge Greenwood: “I think the principle is simply that there is so much sediment coming into that

part of the river that, to the extent you add to that sediment, you are adding to the impact and the

burden to dredge.” 20 I think it may be us eful for me to recall for the Court that Professor Kondolf

is experienced in assessing environmental impacts on fluvial geomorphology and human -river

16
CR 2015/9, 20 April 2015, p. 31 (Andrews).
17
CR 2015/8, pp. 42-43 (Kondolf).
18Ibid., p. 42 (Kondolf).
19
Ibid., p. 43.
20
CR 2015/9, p. 18 (Kondolf). - 15 -

interactions, and he served on the Environmental Advisory Board to the US Army Corps of

21
Engineers .

19. Judge Greenwood asked another very interesting, and I would say, important question.

Referring to Nicaragua’s dredging programme, he asked: “If taking 200,000 cubic metres of

sediment out of the Lower San Juan has an insignificant environmental impact, why does putting

200,000 cubic metres of sediment in to the Upper Rio San Juan have a serious environmental

22
impact?” The answer, Nicaragua, suggests, is context. It is not simply a comparison of how

much is being taken out, and how much is being put in. The fact that the numbers may

approximate one another only addresses magnitude, not necessarily impact. As Nicaragua showed

last week, the dredging of the Lower San Juan causes no adverse environmental impacts; it does

not materially affect the flow of C osta Rica’s Colorado River, as Costa Rica has alleged; and it

does not harm the wetlands downstream. To the contrary, both Professor van Rhee and Professor

Thorne have stated that the dredging is helpful to those wetlands, and that more dredging by

23
Nicaragua would be even more helpful to them . In his answer to Judge Owada’s question last

week, Professor Thorne said about Nicaragua’s dredging programme that: “if you are going to do

any good to the river environmentally, you need to do much more than that . . .” 24.

20. By contrast, putting sediment into the river does have an adverse impact. Not primarily

in the Upper San Juan River, as Judge Greenwood asked, but in the Lower San Juan, where a

significant amount of the sediment deposited in the Upper San Juan is transported. When it gets to

the Lower San Juan, as Nicaragua’s experts and Professor Thorne have stated, it accumulates,

enlarges the existing shoals and sandbars that obstruct navigation, and causes the already -low flow

of the river to diminish further, both adding to Nicaragua’s dredging burden and hastening the

drying up of the river. Professor Kondolf answered Judge Greenwood’s question thusly:

“[B]ecause there is already too much sediment, there is already a problem, so you are simply

adding to that.” 25 In regard to the environmental impact of Nicaragua’s dredging , he answered:

2Kondolf Summary Report for Certain Activities case, 16 March 2015, para. 1.
22
CR 2015/9, p. 19 (Greenwood).
2Van Rhee Summary Report, 15 March 2015, paras. 10- 11.

2CR 2015/3, p. 43 (Thorne).
25
CR 2015/9, p. 19 (Kondolf). - 16 -

“The dredging seems not to be creating a permanent change now because it keeps filling in so it is

26
not changing significantly the character of the river there.”

21. Mr. President, Nicaragua views the cross- examination of Dr. Andrews as especially

instructive on this point. Dr. Andrews, you will recall, served as a hydrologist for the United States

Geological Survey for 34 years. He held overall responsibility for the agency’s water resources,

geomorphology and sediment transport program mes 27. His cross -examination yesterday

established at least two things in particular. First, that Costa Rica’s entire approach now is to

equate significance of impact with the percentage contributed by the road to the overall sediment

load in the river. Second, that Costa Rica’s approach is wrong. “Mr. Wordsworth: But we are still

talking, relatively speaking, about a very small percentage, aren’t we, compared to the total

percentage? Mr. Andrews: It is still a large amount of material . . . Mr. Wordsworth: Yes, I don’t

28
think we should be debating the question of actual material.” Why not, Mr. President? It is the

“actual material” that accumulates in the Lower San Juan River and enlarges the obstructions to

navigation, not a mere statistic.

22. “Mr. Wordsworth: The question is whether it leads to significant impact. The question

that I am putting to you is: given that, on your evidence, only between 0.5 per cent to 2 per cent of

the amount that is actually being dredged by Nicaragua comes from the road, can that be regarded

as significant?” 29 Before getting to Dr. Andrews’ s answer, it is worth noting that

Mr. Wordsworth’s question is based on an incorrect assumption. As previously shown, in 2014,

the amount of sediment that came from the road was approximately 8.5 per cent of the amount

dredged by Nicaragua. Now for Dr. Andrews’s answer:

“[T]he assumption in your question that it is spread evenly, and it is not spread

evenly, it is disproportionately deposited in the channel around bars, river bars,
sandbars, that are relatively shallow and have low flow. It cannot be transported
anymore, it gets deposited there, and that is exactly where the navigational
obstructions occur.” 30

26CR 2015/9, p. 19 (Kondolf).
27
Andrews Summary Report, 15 March 2015, pa ras. 1-2.
28CR 2015/9, p. 31.

29CR 2015/9, p. 31 (Wordsworth).
30
CR 2015/9, p. 31 (Andrews). - 17 -

23. Then Mr. Wordsworth asked Dr. Andrews if he could point to any evidence that the

sediment that , quoting Mr. Wordsworth, “comes from the road . . . is spread out along the

sandbars” . Mr. President, I am sure my good friend Mr. Wordsworth knows where to find this

evidence without Dr. Andrews’ s assistance. I t was provided by Costa Rica’s own expert,

Professor Thorne. In his report of October 2011, annexed to Costa Rica’s Counter -Memorial,

Professor Thorne stated that when the sediment from upstream reaches the Lower San Juan it is

“deposited in and along the (mainly meandering) channel in the form of shoals, islands, point bars

32
and natural levees” . And that is Professor Thorne’s testimony.

24. In his testimony yesterday, Dr. Andrews addressed the significance of this critical

evidence:

“In talking about, or considering, obstructions to navigation, it does not mean

that through a reach of a few k ilometres and such that every metre would be, you
would be unable to navigate your boat. All you need is an obstruction every few
hundred yards, or so, and it makes it, or you would only need one, in the entire 2 or

3 km reach.33f you cannot get your boat through that one stretch, you cannot get it
through.”

25. And that . Mr. President, is why Nicaragua is right about significant harm. It is

undisputed, at least between the P arties’ experts, that the sediment carried to the Lower San Juan,

including the sediment from the road, is “deposited in and along the . . . channel in the form of

34
shoals, sandbars, point bars and natural levees” , which obstruct navigation. In 2014, as I said, the

road contributed 22,192 tons of sediment mainly to the enlargement of these obstructions. Counsel

35
to Costa Rica advise you not to debate “the question of actual material” , and we say the reason

they don’t want to debate this is because they have no answer to it. It is, as Dr. Andrews described

36
it, “a large amount of material” , and its impact is significant for the reasons explained by

31CR 2015/9, p. 31 (Andrews).
32
Thorne (2011), p. II-27.
33CR 2015/9, pp. 32-33 (Andrews).

34Thorne (2011), p. II-27.
35
CR 2015/9, p. 31 (Wordsworth).
36CR 2015/9, p. 31 (Andrews). - 18 -

Drs. Andrews 37and Kondolf , and which should be self -evident. It adds more than 22,000 tons

annually mainly to the obstructions to navigation. And it has to be dredged out by Nicaragua.

26. Mr. President, Costa Rica avoids the “actual material”  those 22,000 tons contributed

by the road to the shoals and sandbars in the Lower San Juan annually  in favour of a false

paradigm, or, more accurately, two false paradigms. At the hearings on provisional measures, in

November 2013, Costa Rica told you that the sediment from the ro ad spread out evenly across the

entire river bottom, hence its impact on the depth of the river was no more than the width of a few

grains of sand 39. We know now, especially from their own expert, Professor Thorne, that this is not

the case. Still less wo uld it be appropriate to assume that the sediment contributed by the road

disperses evenly across the bed of the much longer Upper San Juan River, alongside that 108 km of

the road that are close to the bank, especially since Nicaragua’s claim of significant harm, in terms

of obstruction to navigation and reduction of flow, applies principally to the Lower San Juan,

which is less than a third as long.

27. So Costa Rica has come up with a second paradigm, equally false. Given that the overall

sediment load of the river is very high, they emphasize that the percentage  the percentage 
40
contributed by the road is very small . Again, they prefer not to discuss the “actual material”,

because, as Dr. Andrews said, it is “a large amount” 41. We say, it is the am ount of sediment that

determines its impact, in the context of an environment that, because of its already high sediment

load, is especially sensitive to additional quantities of sediment. Significance is not strictly a

numbers, or a percentages, game, as Costa Rica would have it. Magnitude alone is relevant, but it

is not determinative of significance. A very large stimulus can have a negligible impact in an

environment that is capable of accommodating the stimulus. We have an example here: the much

larger and more powerful Colorado River is not obstructed by sediment accumulation, and

therefore is unaffected by the sediment it receives from the road. Dr. Andrews says that the

37
CR 2015/9, pp. 30-33 (Andrews).
38CR 2015/8, pp. 42-43 (Kondolf).

39CR 2013/29, p. 10, para. 10 (Ugalde) and p. 28, para. 14 (Wordsworth); CR 2013/31, p. 18, para. 6
(Wordsworth) and p. 22, para. 22 (c) (Wordsworth).
40
E.g., RCR, paras. 1.4, 2.10, 2.80, 2.117 (b).
41
CR 2015/9, p. 31 (Andrews). - 19 -

stimulus received by the Lower San Juan is a “large amount of material” 42. But even a small

stimulus can be significant in an environment that is incapable of accommodating it. In this regard,

it is worth recalling Professor Thorne’s statement that the Lower San Juan River is “unable to

43
accommodate” the sediment load it receives from upstream . In this environment, the “large

amount of [actual] material” contributed by the road to the Lower San Juan must therefore be

significant.

28. This is not an unusual situation. To the contrary, it is how environmental regulatory

agencies around the world assess significance of impact. Many States and international bodies

regulate rivers with high levels of pollution, including sediments. They are not in the practice of

allowing more sediments to be contributed because the river is already in such a bad way that it

can’t do any significant harm to make it worse. To the contrary, riverine environmental r égimes

commonly set maximum allowable limits on the pollutants, including sediments, that the

watercourse may permissibly contain at any given time. Once those limits are reached, any

additions above them, even in small amounts, are considered significant and are prohibited.

29. In the United States, for example, under our Clean Water Act, state-level environmental

authorities identify r ivers threatened by cumulative water pollution, calculate a maximum daily

load of pollutants that the river can sustain, and then prohibit discharges above the maximum load

44
amount . The United States EPA has specifically identified sediment pollution as an appropriate

subject of a total maximum daily load 45.

30. In the E uropean Union, the Water Framework Directive takes a similar approach, as

member States are obligated to review river basins within their territory for adequate progress

46
toward “good water status” . Follow -up directives have identified 45 different pollutants and

established for each an “environmental quality standard” , which is the level of concentration of a

given pollutant that must not be exceeded. Member States calibrate their permitting and other

42
CR 2015/9, p. 31 (Andrews).
43Thorne (2011), p. II-27.

4433 USC para. 1313 (d) (1).
45
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), “Protocol for Developing Sediment TMDLs”,
Oct. 1999, p. 2-1, available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/sediment/pdf/sediment.pdft accessed 21 April 2015).
46
Water Framework Directive, 2000/60/EC. - 20 -

requirements around these standards, prohibiting the addition of any pollutants above a certain

47
level even in very polluted bodies of water .

31. Mr. President, since I spend much of my life advocating on behalf of small States, some

of whic h are located in what used to be called the Third World, I am very pleased to hear

Judge Bhandari’s interest in whether any Latin American States have similar environmental

policies. The answer is that they do. Because of time-limits, I will cite just on e example, but it is

an important one, and one that the Court may recall. In the Pulp Mills case, Argentina and

Uruguay had formed a bi-national commission to control pollution in their shared watercourse, the

Uruguay River, which constituted the boundary between the two States. CARU, as the commission

was known by its Spanish acronym, regulated a long list of pollutants. How? By setting maximum

allowable concentration levels. Once the level was reached for a given pollutant, neither State was

permitted to discharge, or license the discharge, of any additional quantity of that pollutant into the

48
river .

32. Of particular interest, especially in the context of this case, is the treatment of

phosphorous. CARU did not regulate it because the p arties could not agree on an allowable limit.
49
But Uruguayan law imposed a maximum allowable limit on phosphorous discharge . If the limit

was reached, Uruguay forbade new discharges, in any amount, unless it was offset by reducing the

50
level of phosphorous in the river in the same or a greater amount than was being added .

33. The evidence in that case showed that more than 19,000 tons of phosphorous were

emitted into the river each year from all sources. The annual emission of phosphorous by the pulp

mill licensed by Uruguay was a mere 15 tons, that is, less than 0.1 per cent of the total annual

51
phosphorous load . Nevertheless, the emission was still prohibited under Uruguayan law. As a

consequence, Uruguay licensed the mill on the strict condition that it take a ction elsewhere along

47
Directive 2013/39/EU; Directive 2008/105/EC.
48
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 94, para. 242.
49Ibid., p. 95, para. 245.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid., p. 94, para. 240. - 21 -

the river to reduce other discharges of phosphorous by an amount equal to or greater than the

15 tons it would be contributing . And that is what the mill operators did.

34. The Court upheld Uruguay’s licensing of the mill in these circumstances, citing what it

called Uruguay’s “compensation” for the mill’s discharge of phosphorous into the river. Even

though “the amount of total phosphorus discharge into the river that may be attributed to the . . .

mill is insignificant in propor tionate terms as compared to the overall total phosphorus in the river

53
from other sources”, by itself it still would have v iolated the applicable water quality standard .

But there was no violation of Uruguay’s international obligations, according to the Court, “taking

into account the action being taken by Uruguay by way of compensation” 5. And that is an

interesting point for present purposes. Uruguay avoided liability by compensating for the

additional phosphorous it allowed to be deposited in the rive r by removing an equal or greater

amount of the substance and thereby preventing any net addition  even one as low as

0.1 per cent  to the total phosphorous load.

35. In this case, Mr. President, there is no compensation, no offset, provided by Costa Rica

for its discharge of sediment into Nicaragua’s river.

36. That river, especially in its lower reaches, after the bifurcation, is like the Uruguay River

except that: (1) it is not a shared river but belongs exclusively to Nicaragua; and (2) it is

overloaded with sediment rather than phosphorous. Costa Rica acknowledges that the river’s

sediment load already exceeds its maximum conveyance capacity, a nd that it is drying up.

Costa Rica’s expert agrees that the river requires constant dredging by Nicar agua, even to allow

small boats to pass. Costa Rica nevertheless argues that the harm caused by the road is

insignificant. Insignificant to whom? Not to Nicaragua, which has to dredge out the large amount

of material Costa Rica puts in.

37. As explained by Professor Andrews: “[W]hether or not sediment from the Road is a

large or small percentage of the overall total load does not alter the fact that, because the existing

52
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 96, para. 246.
53Ibid., para. 247.
54
Ibid., para. 247. - 22 -

load is high, any additional sediment contributed by the Road will lead to deposi tion and require

55
additional dredging.”

38. In its Order of 13 December 2013 denying Nicaragua’s request for provisional measures,

the Court considered that

“Nicaragua has not established in the current proceedings that the ongoing
construction works led to a substantial increase in the sediment load in the r iver. It

notes that Nicaragua did not contest the statement of Costa Rica’s expert,
Professor Thorne, that , even according to . . . Professor Kondolf, the construction
activities are only contributin g 1 to 2 per cent of the total sediment load . . . and 2 to
3 per cent in the lower San Juan River.”

The Court at that time considered this “too small a proportion to have a significant impact on the

river in the immediate future” . It thus concluded that: “Nicaragua has not shown that there is any

57
real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights it invokes” .

39. This of course was not a finding on the merits. Indeed, as is always the case on

provisional measures, it was without prejudgment of the merits. The Court had already

determined, in an earlier paragraph in its Order, that construction of the road had been suspended

by Costa Rica, and that Costa Rica had given assurances that it w ould not be resumed before

late 2014 or early 2015, so it found that there was no urgency to Nicaragua’s request for a cessation

of construction activities 58. It was in this context that the Court also found that, absent ongoing

construction activity and given the small proportion of sediment contributed by the road to the

overall amount that is already in the river, there would be no significant impact on Nicaragua’s

rights “in the immediate future”.

40. Mr. President, if you will kindly forgive the cliché, a lot of water has passed under the

bridge since December 2013. The hearings on provisional measures were held less than a month

before Costa Rica filed its Counter -Memorial. It therefore had a mass of evidence at its disposal,

including expert reports, which Nicaragua had not yet seen, and had literal ly overnight to respond

to. It was not until August 2014, when Nicaragua filed its Reply, that it was fully able to answer

55
Andrews Summary Report, 15 Mar. 2015, para. 4.
56Construction of a Road along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Order of 13 December 2013,
I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 407, para. 34; emphasis added.

57Ibid., para. 35.
58
Ibid., para. 33. - 23 -

Costa Rica, and demonstrated with evidence of its own, including Dr. Andrews’ s first report, that

the impact of road-related sediment on the Lower San Juan was significant.

41. In his first report, Dr. Andrews, to be conservative in his estimates of sediment

accumulation in the Lower San Juan, relied on measuremen ts taken by ICE, the Costa Rican

Government agency, in 2013. In 2014, ICE produced new measurements, which indicated a

substantially higher accumulation of road- derived sediment in the Lower San Juan. Dr. Andrews

recalculated his estimates of impact based on ICE’s updated calculations 59. Interestingly,

Mr. Wordsworth, during cross-examination, insisted on questioning Dr. Andrews about the lower

60
estimates in his earlier report, based on ICE’s earlier and lower measurements , which, as

Dr. Andrews explained, were superseded by his estimates based on ICE’s more recent

61
2014 report . Why not question Dr. Andrews about his more recent evidence, based on ICE’s

updated calculations? Here again, Costa Rica is playing with the numbers, or in this case, the

percentages.

42. In sum, Mr. President, it is a false paradigm to measure t he impact of the road by means

of the proportion of sediment it contributes to an already overly- sedimented river. It is the context

that determines the significance of the impact. Magnitude is indeed important, and the magnitude,

we say, is “large” here, according to Nicaragua’s experts, including Dr. Andrews, if one looks at

the “actual material”  which Costa Rica asks you not to do. But magnitude must also be

considered in the context of the sensitivity of the receiving environment. In this case, th at

environment is the Lower San Juan River, and it is already, in Professor Thorne’s words, “unable

to accommodate” its sediment load. How then, can the addition of the “large” amount of “actual

material” not be significant? In Nicaragua’s view, when the river cannot even accommodate its

existing sediment load, any measurable addition is necessarily significant , as is the harm it causes,

in the context of an environment that Costa Rica itself accepts as especially sensitive.

43. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this concludes my presentation. I thank you again

for your patient attention, and I ask that you call my colleague, Mr. Loewenstein, to the podium.

59
CR 2015/9, p. 27 (Andrews).
6Ibid., p. 29 (Wordsworth).
61
Ibid., pp. 27, 29 (Andrews). - 24 -

Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur Reichler. Je donne maintenant la parole à

Monsieur Lowenstein.

Mr. LOEWENSTEIN:

E COLOGICAL IMPACTS AND RISK ASSESSMENT

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, good morning. I will continue Nicaragua’s

presentation on the harmful impacts of Route 1856. I will first show that Costa Rica has placed the

ecology of the San Juan River  a Nicaraguan Ramsar site  at risk. I will then show that

Costa Rica has chosen no t to assess the risks that the r oad poses to this wetland of international

importance, and address the consequences for Nicaragua of that decision.

Ecological harm to the San Juan River

2. I begin with ecological impacts. The harmful effects of sediment are not limited to the

formation of shoals, sandbars and other types of accumulations. Sediment can also adversely

impact a watercourse’s aquatic organisms. Costa Rica’s expert, ProfessorThorne, lists many such

harms. A few of them are:

 “loss of aquatic vegetation;

 reduced primary productivity;

 loss of periphyton [with] consequent impact on the food chain;

 loss or reduction of macroinvertebrate populations;

 clogging and damaging thegills of fish; and

62
 alteration of the balance of fish species.”

3. Costa Rica’s own e nvironmental diagnostic assessment, or EDA, of November 2013 and

its January 2015 follow -up, demonstrate that the San Juan’s ecological health has been place d at

risk by sediment from the r oad. These studies were prepa red at the request of the Costa Rican
63
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for use in this proceeding and authored by scientists affiliated with

6Thorne Summary Report for Certain Activities case, Mar. 2015, p. 15, para. 5.8.
63
Centro Científico Tropical (CCT), Follow -up and Monitoring Study Route 1856 Pro-EDA Ecological
Component, Jan. 15; Rejoinder of Costa Rica (RCR), Ann. 14, p. 10. (“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship of
the Government of Costa Rica commissioned the services of the Tropical Science Center (‘TSC’carry out the
EDA . . .”) - 25 -

64
Costa Rica’s Tropical Science Center . They agree that “high levels of sedimentation in aquatic

bodies” is one of the “main problems that lead[s] to the loss of aquatic diversity” 65. To determine

whether the r oad is causing these effects, the study sampled ten Costa Rican tributaries of th e

San Juan at locations very close to where the y flow into the river. The EDA explains that in each

tributary “two sampling points were located, one upstream” of where Route 1856 crosses the

tributary, where there was “no direct influence” from the r oad, and “another one downstream” of

66
that tributary, where the road did have “direct influence” .

4. The Tropical Science Center collected macroinvertebrates at the upstream and

downstream sampling sites. These were chosen because they are “bio -indicators” of water

quality 67. This is standard; the European Water Framework Directive, for instance, requires that

68
macroinvertebrates be used for that purpose . In addition, macroinvertebrates are important in

their own right as a critical link in the food chain 69. Th e macroinvertebrates were analysed to

determine their abundance, that is, the number of individual organisms collected at each location,

70
and their richness, that is, the number of taxa present at each location .

5. The results were reported in the 2013 EDA. The road’s impact on aquatic life is clear

from the data it presents. Five of the ten sites had both fewer organisms, and fewer species,

downstream of the road than upstream 71.

6. The EDA interpreted these data to evaluate the r oad’s impact on water quality. It used a

Costa Rican index that defines six categories of water quality, ranging from “ex cellent” to

“extremely polluted”. Based on the collected data, the Tropical Science Center categorized water

quality both upstream and downstream of the road. Five of the ten sites had lower water quality

downstream of the r oad than upstream. The EDA reports: “At sites 1, 3, 5, 6 and 9, the quality

6Centro Científico Tropical (CCT), Follow -up and Monitoring Study Route 1856 Project -EDA Ecological
Component, Jan. 15; RCR, Ann. 14, p. 2.
65
Counter-Memorial of Costa Rica (CMCR), Ann. 10, EDA, p. 111.
66
CMCR, Ann. 10, EDA, p. 89.
6Ibid., p. 87.

6Reply of Nicaragua (RN), Ann. 4, Ríos Report, sections 1 (b) and 4 (c), citing D.O.C.E., 2000.
69
CMCR, Ann. 10, EDA, p. 109.
70
Ibid., p. 17.
7Ibid., p. 242. - 26 -

went down in the downstream sites (with influence of the route) with a moderate to bad

72
classification and from bad to very bad in comparison to control sites found upstream . . .”

7. In regard to the sites in the stretch between the Río Infiernito and the mouth of the

San Carlos, which it “classified as impacted” from the road due to active sedimentation pr ocesses,

the EDA observed that, “the quality of water was influenced by the works conducted in the Route,

73
as were the richness and abundance of the communities” . The study accepted that this

demonstrated that the road poses a risk. It concluded that the “deterioration of the quality of the

habitat” and the “decrease in richness of taxa” could be attributable to what it called “activities and

processes conducted during and after the construction of the Route, such as the movement of earth,

74
tree cutting, erosion and sedimentation” .

8. The 2013 EDA set out 27 recommendations that, it said, should be included in a

programme for “prevention, mitigation and improvement of environmental conditions in the area of

the path of Route 1856” 75. These included recommendations to:

 “[C]lean up all accumulated sediments to allow the free path of water t hrough natural drainage

systems;

 Improve the drainage structures and landfills to avoid alterations to wetlands;

 Continue with civil works for the protection of slope surf aces through the application of

geo-textiles and the improvement of slope angles and drainage systems; and

 Consolidate civil works to stabilize slopes as soon as possible, especially those considered

unstable, to avoid sedimentation of aquatic environments.”

76
9. One year later, the Tropical Science Center carried out a follow -up study . Among its

stated objectives was to evaluate the “effectiveness” of the EDA’s “environmental

72
CMCR, Ann. 10, EDA, p. 99.
73CMCR, Ann. 10, EDA, p. 100.

74CMCR, Ann. 10, EDA, p. 100.
75
CMCR, Ann. 10, EDA, p. 161.
76Centro Científico Tropical (CCT), Follow -up and Monitoring Study Route 1856 Project -EDA Ecological
Component, Jan. 15; RCR, Ann. 14. - 27 -

77
recommendations” . The results are reported in the EDA Follow -up, which was annexed to the

Rejoinder.

10. Were the recommendations effective? As the Court heard yesterday from Mr. Reichler,

Costa Rica did not meaningfully remediate the Road. So it will come as no surprise that the answer

is: N o. In fact, the ecological impacts became more widespread. While in 2013, five of the

10 tributaries had lower macrointervebrate abundance and richness downstream of the Road than

78 79
upstream , by 2014, the number of tributaries showing these adverse impacts had risen to seven .

In some locations, the decline in richness between the upstream and downstream sampling sites

was dramatic. As may be seen in tab 7 of the judge’s folder, at Site 6, the number of taxa declined

from 20 to 9. The decline at Site 2 was from 18 taxa to 9. At Site 10, the number fell from 7 to 3.

At site 9, it went from 12 to just 2. The EDA Follow -up accepted that this documented risk. The

study concluded that Route 1856 “might be causing a decrease at the downstream points” 80.

11. The same negative trend is eviden t in how the Tropical Science Center interpreted these

data in regard to water quality. This can be seen at t ab 8. Whereas in 2013 there had been a

decline in water quality between upstream and downstream of the Road at five sampling sites 8,

82
in 2014, the number rose to nine of the 10 . Site 6, for instance, which had only “moderate

pollution” upstream of the Road, became “very polluted” downstream. The water quality at Site 9

went from “polluted” upstream to “extremely polluted” downstream. The authors of the EDA

Follow-up considered Road-derived sediment to present a risk; they concluded that the “localized

83
decrease[s] in the quality of water” were “especially due to sedimentation processes” .

12. These Road-induced impacts demonstrate why sediment conveyed to the San Juan by its

Costa Rican tributaries is a serious concern. The EDA Follow -up characterizes every sampled

77
Centro Científico Tropical (CCT), Follow -up and Monitoring Study Route 1856 Project -EDA Ecological
Component, Jan. 15; RCR, Ann. 14, p. 12.
78CMCR, Ann. 10, EDA, p. 242.

79Centro Científico Tropical (CCT), Follow -up and Monitoring Study Route 1856 Project -EDA Ecological
Component, Jan. 15; RCR, Ann. 14, p. 49.

80Ibid., p. 80.
81
CMCR, Ann. 10, EDA, pp. 99-100.
82Centro Científico Tropical (CCT), Follow -up and Monitoring Study Route 1856 Project -EDA Ecological

Component, Jan. 15; RCR, Ann. 14, pp. 98-99.
83Ibid., p. 80. - 28 -

tributary entering the San Juan, save one, as having water quality that is “polluted”, “very

polluted”, or “extremely polluted”. Of these, only one is “polluted”, five are “very polluted”, and

three are “extremely polluted”. In nearly all of them, the water quality is worse downstream of the

Road than upstream. The tributary with the best water quality  with “best” being very much a

relative term  had “moderate pollution,” and even then, its water quality was barely above the

threshold for being “polluted”.

13. In any event, the central point is that, even according to the Costa Rican studies that were

prepared for this proceeding, the data demonstrate that aquatic life and water quality in the

tributaries leading into the San Juan are being adversely impacted by sediment from the Road, and

that the impacts are getting worse. If nothing else, this demonstrates that there is a risk of harm to

the San Juan, a conclusion that is reinforced by the sampling in the San Juan itself, where

macroinvertebrates and periphyton were found to be more abundant and diverse on the

non-impacted north side of the river than on the impacted, south bank 84.

14. To be sure, the EDA asserts that the water quality impacts it detects are not transposable

to the San Juan. But the risk to the San Juan cannot be assumed away. These tributaries flow

directly into the San Juan, and the marked decrease in water quality is measured just before they

debouche into the River. The seriousness of the risk is underscored by the potential for cumulative

impacts of sediment pollution entering the San Juan via its many Road -impacted tributaries.

Although Costa Rica sampled only 10 tributaries, the scientists who authored the EDA accept there

85
are 30 more tributaries that were not sampled . Even this understates the risk of cumulative

impacts because Dr. Mende, Costa Rica’s expert on stream -crossings, reports there are no fewer

86
than 127 tributaries, each capable of conveying Road-derived sediment directly into the San Juan .

The Need for EIA

15. Mr. President, I turn now to Costa Rica’s failure to carry out a prior environmental

impact assessment and the consequences for Nicaragua of that choice.

84
Blanca Ríos Touma, “Ecological Impacts of the Route 1856 on the San Juan River, Nicaragua”, July 2014,
p. 16; NR, Vol.II, Ann. 4.
85CMCR, Ann. 10, EDA, p. 69.
86
Andreas Mende, “Inventory of Slopes and Water Courses related to the Border Road N1856 between Mojón
II and Delta Costa Rica”: Second Report, Dec. 2014, p. 29; RCR, Vol. II, Ann. 3. - 29 -

16. I can be brief because the relevant facts are largely undisputed. Costa Rica accepts that it

did not perform an EIA prior to commencing construction of Route 1856. Although Costa Rica has

at times suggested an EIA might not have been required, that argument has been overtaken by the

report of its EIA expert, Professor Neil Craik, which Costa Rica annexed to the Rejoinder.

Professor Craik states that “under Costa Rican law, in the absence of an emergency, a road of this

kind would have been subject to an EIA” 87.

17. Professor McCaffery will address the inapplicability of the emergency exception . F or

now, the point is that Costa Rica’s expert on EIA accepts that the construction of Route 1856

would ordinarily have required a prior risk assessment. In other words, it presented by definition a

risk of significant harm. It follows that there is also a risk of significant harm to Nicaragua, which

is just metres away from the construction site and hydrologically connected to it . These risks

required assessment. The fact that the immediately adjacent part of Nicaragua is a Ramsar site

confirms EIA was needed . Professor Sheate explain ed in his summary report: “It seems

inconceivable that an EIA would not normally be required, ta king into consideration the various

factors that need to be considered in deciding whether significant environmental effects are

likely.”88

18. Mr. President, among the consequences of Costa Rica’s failure to carry out an EIA prior

to constructing Route 1856 is that Costa Rica cannot now tell whether the Road is harming the

River. Professor Thorne is candid about this. He states: “it is currently impossible for any

scientific study to demonstrate the possibility of there being adverse ecological impacts on the

89
Rio San Juan due to construction of the Road” . Professor Thorne explains why. He says:

“This is because to do so would require the establishment of threshold levels for

tolerance, morbidity and mortality of key species in the River with regard to sediment
and sedimentation, a process that has not been undertaken to date and which would
take several years to complete.” 90

87
Professor Neil Craik, “The Requirement to Perform a Prior Environmental Impact Assessment”, Jan . 2015,
para 4.7; RCR, Vol. II, Ann.1.
88Sheate, Summary Report, 15 March 2015, para. 11.
89
Thorne, “Assessment of the Impact of the Construction of the Border road in Costa Rica on the San Juan
River”, Dec. 2013, CMCR, App. A, p. 108, para. 10.20.
90
Thorne, “Assessment of the Impact of the Construction of the Border road in Costa Rica on the San Juan
River”, December 2013, CMCR, App. A, p. 108, para. 10.20. - 30 -

19. Nicaragua agrees. Professor Thorne has identified the precise problem. Prior to

construction of the road, Costa Rica made no attempt, as Professor Thorne puts it, to establish the

“threshold levels for tolerance, morbidity and mortality of key species in the River with regar d to

sediment and sedimentation” 9. The consequence is that Costa Rica cannot determine whether, as

Professor Thorne also puts it, there are “adverse ecological impacts on the R ío San Juan due to
92
construction of the Road” . Nicaragua would also add that because no ex ante assessment was

undertaken, Costa Rica foreclosed the possibility of designing the pr oject so as to avoid or

minimize the risk of crossing these thresholds, or of developing mitigation strategies that would

achieve the same result after the road had been built.

20. The same point applies with respect to detecting adverse impacts to the S an Juan’s fish

populations. Costa Rica’s expert on fish  Professor Ian Cowx  accepts there are families of

fish found in the San Juan, species of which are vulnerable to elevated levels of sediments. He also

accepts that there are no data on whether the particular species in the San Juan are vulnerable. This

caused Professor Thorne to acknowledge that “no data are available for the R ío San Juan in the

93
reach adjacent to the Road” , and to summarize Professor Cowx’s opinion as being that “it would

require intense research using specialist equipment over a protracted period to identify the

species-specific adaptations of the fish living in the River” 94. In other words, Costa Rica cannot

determine whether the r oad is adversely impacting fish in the San Juan because it is not known

whether the fish in the relevant part of the river are sensitive to sediment, and if so, at what levels.

Put simply, EIA is needed.

21. Costa Rica’s EDA, which was prepared three years after the start of construction , does

not remedy the failure to carry out a prior EIA. Dr. Sheate explains:

“As a post -construction exercise, [the EDA] can only seek to identify and
recommend ways to mitigate and remediate impacts after the event. An EIA, by
contrast, seeks to identify possible impacts before they have occurred. An EIA would

also have led to carefully considered answers to questions such as: What design

91
Thorne, “Assessment of the Impact of the Construction of the Border road in Costa Rica on the San Juan
River”, Dec. 2013, CMCR, App. A,p. 108, para. 10.20.
92Ibid.

93Thorne, “Assessment of the Impact of the Construction of the Border Road in Costa Rica on the San Juan River:
Reply report”, Feb. 2015, RCR, App. A, p. 112, para. 6.17.
94
Ibid., para. 6.10. - 31 -

standard is the Road to be built to? Where is the spoil and debris as a result of the
construction to be disposed of and how can the environmental effects of these

activities be avoided or minimized through the design or location of the Road. These
and similar issues are not addressed in the EDA, which is therefore not a substitute for
EIA, nor in any way equivalent.” 95

22. One of the reasons why Costa Rica’s EDA is not an EIA is expressed by the authors of

the EDA itself. Here is what they say in the study’s conclusions concerning aquatic biology:

“In order to be able to evaluate with greater certainty if the construction . . . of

the Route [1856] created a level of sedimentation that could generate an effect on the
aquatic fauna of the San Juan River, and the tributary streams of the study area, it is
first necessary to determine and validate the thresholds of sedimentation that could
affect the species found in these rivers, due to the fact that there exists no information
96
for the aquatic organisms in the study area.”

23. The EDA’s authors then state:

“It would also be necessary to determine and validate the thresholds of mortality
and morbidity for the species found in those rivers, as well as the . . . tolerance to
sedimentation, to better evaluate if the construction of Route 1856 has an effect on the
aquatic fauna of the San Juan River. This is due to the fact that there is no information
97
on the aquatic organisms of the study area.”

24. In other words, according to the EDA’s own authors, the EDA could not determine

whether sediment from the road is harming aquatic organisms in the San Juan because, as they put

98
it, “there is no information on the aqua tic organisms of the study area ” . The information they

found wanting is what would have been obtained during an EIA, had one been carried out.

25. In short, the consequence for Nicaragua, of Costa Rica’s failure to carry out an EIA, is

that Costa Rica cannot determine whether Route 1856 is having impact to Nicaragua, including its

Ramsar site; cannot design the road’s much -needed mitigation in a way that gives assurance that

such impacts will be minimized or avoided; and cannot plan the road’s completion so that it is

built, and used, in a manner that does not cause further harm to Nicaragua.

26. Mr. President, this concludes my presentation. Thank you for your kind attention. I ask

that you call Nicaragua’s next speaker, Professor McCaffrey, to the podium.

95
Sheate Summary Report, March 2015, para. 43.
96CMCR, Ann. 10, EDA, p. 158.

97Ibid., p. 158.
98
Ibid., p. 11. - 32 -

Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur Loewenstein. Je vais demander au

professeur McCaffrey de venir à la barre et de commencer sa plaidoirie que je serai sans doute

obligé d’interrompre un peu plus tard, à un moment opportun, pour faire une pause. Mais,

Monsieur le professeur McCaffrey, veuillez commencer maintenant votre plaidoirie, s’il vous plaît.

Mr. McCAFFREY : Merci, Monsieur le président.

C OSTA R ICA’S BREACHES OF ITS ENVIRONMENTAL OBLIGATIONS

1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, my task this morning is to establish

that Costa Rica’s conduct in constructing Route 1856, which I will oft en refer to simply as the

“road”, breaches environmental obligations owed to Nicaragua.

2. My presentati on will address the following points: first, Costa Rica’s invocation of an

emergency under its national law does not excuse its violations of international law; second,

Costa Rica breached its obligation to prepare, in advance, an environmental impact assessment

concerning its road project; third, Costa Rica breached its obligation to notify Nicaragua prior to

beginning construction of the road project; fourth, the way in which Costa Rica constructed the

road resulted in breaches of Costa Rica’s obligat ion not to cause significant transboundary harm to

Nicaragua; and fifth, Costa Rica breached treaties to which both States are parties due to the

manner in which the road was, and is still being, constructed.

3. Mr. President, as a preliminary matter, th e Court heard me explain last week that , in the

view of Nicaragua, many of the environmental obligations invoked by Costa Rica in the Certain

Activities case did not apply there because of the lex specialigoverning the Parties’ relations in

respect of the San Juan River. How can I then, it might be wondered, turn around and invoke many

of those same obligations against Costa Rica in this case?

4. Mr. President, the answer is simple and straightforward. This case, unlike Certain

Activities, does not involve claims by Costa Rica concerning Nicaragua’s dredging of the San Juan

River, cleaning caños, or anything of the sort, all of which were dealt with by President Cleveland

in his 1888 Award. Instead, it involves, as you have heard yesterday and this mor ning, the

breathtakingly careless construction of a road, much of which is perched above the San Juan River,

resulting in massive quantities of sediment and debris being washed into the river, and hence into - 33 -

Nicaraguan sovereign territory. Certainly the 1 858 Treaty is relevant, precisely because it

establishes that the river is Nicaragua’s sovereign territory. But neither the treaty nor the arbitral

awards conflict in any way with the environmental obligations applicable to Costa Rica in respect

of its road project.

5. Mr. President, reading between the lines of Costa Rica’s written pleadings, Nicaragua’s

neighbour seems to view the problem of sediment and debris delivery into the river dismissively as

a mere “invasion by dirt ”, in sharp contrast to a mil itary invasion or the like. But however much

Costa Rica may belittle the situation  and it is easy for it to do so because it is not on the

receiving end of the mess that it has created  it poses real problems for, and thus causes real and

significant h arm to, Nicaragua, as my colleagues have shown most recently this morning. It

therefore falls outside the coverage of the lex specialis and squarely within the applicable principles

of international environmental law.

1. Costa Rica’s invocation of an emergency under its national law
does not excuse its violations of international law

6. Mr. President, first to Costa Rica’s invocation of an emergency and its lack of effect in

excusing Costa Rica’s breaches.

7. On 21 February 2011, the Costa Rican Governm ent issued an Executive Decree entitled

“To Declare that the Situation brought about by the Violation of Costa Rican Sovereignty by

Nicaragua constitutes a State of Emergency” 9. This declaration provided the legal basis under

Costa Rican domestic law for the construction of the r oad without complying with the normal

requirements of its own domestic law. The Costa Rican government also attempted to use the

declaration to excuse Costa Rica’s violations of international law resulting from the construction of

the road. I will discuss later the obvious question the title of this decree raises, namely, how was

Nicaragua’s cleaning of the caño with hand tools related to the construction of a road that ended far

from the caño and the disputed territory.

8. At the outset, Mr. President, let me assure the Court that Nicaragua of course recognizes

that international law must make allowances for situations in which genuin e emergencies actually

9Memorial of Nicaragua (MN), Ann. 11. - 34 -

prevent S tates from complying with their international obligations. These situations do arise

occasionally of course and international law must effect a balance between recognizing that the

affected S tate is overwhelmed and should be excused temporarily from complying with its

otherwise applicable obligations  between that consideration and the injury suffered by the State

or States to which the obligation is owed. International law has generally dealt with such situations

through the law of State Responsibility and, in particular, circumstances precluding wrongfulness.

9. The ILC emphasizes in the commentaries to its Articles on State Responsibility that , as

you noted in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case 100, circumstances precluding wrongfulness

“do not annul or terminate the obligation; rather they provide a justification or excuse for

non-performance while the circumstance in question subsists” 10. Thus, in the present case, even if

Costa Rica could successfully make out a defen ce based on a circumstance precluding

wrongfulness  which it has not attempted to do, and in Nic aragua’s view, it could not do 

Costa Rica’s obligations would only be suspended for so long as the circumstance subsisted.

10. In this case, the “circumstance”, and I put that word in quotation marks, is the purported

emergency. The question for Costa Rica would be , is there any circumstance precluding

wrongfulness for emergencies declared by a government? Do such emergencies suspend the

international obligations of the State declaring them?

11. The answer , Mr. President, to the first question is “no” . There is no circumstance

precluding wrongfulness entitled “emergency”. But perhaps a State’s declaration of an emergency

could fit into one of the circumstances that are recognized. So, Mr. President, let me briefly review

the most likely candidates.

102
12. First, self-defence . This is a circumstance that p recludes the wrongfulness of a State’s

use of force where the strict requirements of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter are met. This

circumstance is thus not applicable to Costa Rica’s attem pt to exempt itself from the EIA

requirement and its other obligations owed to Nicaragua.

100
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 39, para. 48.
10Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentarYearbook of the
International Law Commission, 2001 , V ol. II, Part Two,p. 71, para. 2 (commentary on Chap. V, Circumstances
Precluding Wrongfulness); annexed to General Assembly resolution 56/83 of 12 Dec . 2001 (hereinafter “State
Responsibility articles”).
102
State Responsibility articles, Art. 21. - 35 -

13. Second, countermeasures in respect of an internationally wrongful act 10. It may be

tempting at first blush to find this circumstance applicable in light of Costa Rica’s statements that

the pell-mell construction of the r oad was a response to Nicaragua’s purported “invasion” of its

territory in the disputed area. The ILC’s commentary explains that “the commission by one State

of an internationally wrongful act may justify another State injured by that act in taking

non-forcible countermeasures in order to procure its cessation and to achieve reparation for the

104
injury” . As the chapter of the ILC’s Articles on countermeasures makes clear, two import ant

prerequisites for lawful countermeasure are thus, first, “the existence of an internationally wrongful

act which injured the State taking the countermeasure” 10, and second, that “the countermeasure [s]

be taken . . . in order to induce [the responsible] State to comply with its obligations of cessation

and reparation” 106.

14. Neither of these prerequisites is met in the present case. First, it will not be settled

whether Nicaragua has committed an internationally wrongful act by cleaning the caño until the

Court renders its Judgment in the joined cases. And second, Costa Rica’s construction of the road

has absolutely nothing to do with an effort by that S tate to induce Nicaragua to comply with its

obligations of cessation and reparation  to say nothing of the fact that it will only be clear if

Nicaragua has such obligations when, again, the Court renders its Judgment in the joined cases. So

much, then, for precluding the wrongfulness of Costa Rica’s breaches on the ground that its

conduct constituted a countermeasure.

15. A third possible circumstance precluding wrongfulness that may be applicable in this

case is necessity, état de nécessité in French. In view of the significant pos sibility of abuse of this

defence, the Commission and the State practice that its draft reflects are quite cautious about its

availability, concluding that: “On balance, State practice and judicial decisions support the view

that necessity may constitute a circumstance precluding wrongfulness under certain very limited

conditions . . .” 107 Indeed, the Commission’s commentary states that “necessity will only rarely be

103State Responsibility articles, Art. 22.
104
Ibid., p. 75.
105Ibid., p. 130.

106Ibid.
107
Ibid., p. 83, para. 14. - 36 -

available to excuse non -performance of an obligation and . . . it is subject to strict limitations to

108
safeguard against possible abuse” .

16. But there being no circumstance prec luding wrongfulness for an “emergency” per se,

necessity would seem to be the circumstance that is closest to what Costa Rica is claiming as a

ground for exempting itself from its international obligations. Cost a Rica, however, vehemently

insists that it “has not invoked [necessity] and it is not incumbent upon it to do so” 109. Costa Rica

has perhaps avoided invoking necessity because it was well aware of the exacting requirements for

doing so, requirements it knew it could not hope to meet.

17. The Commi ssion’s commentary does observe that necessity has been invoked to

“preserv[e] the very existence of the State and its people in time of public emergency . . .” “But”,

the commentary states, “stringent conditions are imposed before any such plea is allowe d” 110. As

111
Nicaragua has noted , the ILC indicates that to successfully invoke necessity to preclude the

wrongfulness of its conduct in constructing the r oad, Costa Rica would have to establish that

invoking an “emergency” “is the only way for a State to saf eguard an essential interest against a

grave and imminent peril . . .” 112. This Costa Rica has not even attempted to do and, in fact, could

not do.

18. Mr. President, as I have already noted, there is no separate circumstance precluding

wrongfulness for em ergencies, presumably because this would simply be too broad a category.

Nicaragua does not believe that any of the circumstances recognized by the ILC is applicable in

this case. Instead, as indicated in its written pleadings, Nicaragua believes the rushed, unplanned

and environmentally disastrous construction of the road along the San Juan River was a misguided

reaction, perhaps for domestic political purposes, to Nicaragua’s modest dredging and

caño-cleaning projects, which took place far from the term inus of the 140- km-long road at the

Colorado River. I will return to the genuineness of the purported “emergency” in a moment.

108State Responsibility articles, p. 80, para. 2.
109
Counter-Memorial of Costa Rica (CMCR), p. 113, para. 5.15.
110State Responsibility articles, p. 83, para. 14.

111Reply of Nicaragua (RN), p. 183, para. 6.10.
112
State Responsibility articles, Art. 25, para. 1 (a). - 37 -

19. Rather than invoking a state of necessity, Costa Rica says that its “domestic legislation

does not require the conduct of a n environmental impact assessment in an emergency situation,

113
while international law comprises a renvoi to domestic law” . Three comments on this statement,

Mr. President: First, apparently, once Costa Rica has declared an emergency, its domestic

legislation  though not, interestingly, its law on environmental impact assessment  waives not

only the environmental impact assessment process, but virtually everything else, as well. Second,

whatever Costa Rica’s, or any S tate’s, domestic law says cannot override its obligations under

international law  a point to which I will return in a moment. And third, related to this, what

does Costa Rica mean when it says “international law comprises a renvoi to domestic law”? I will

deal with this latter question when I address Costa Rica’s failure to conduct an EIA in relation to its

road project.

20. Significantly, Mr. President, Costa Rica has not so much as attempted to fit its

emergency declaration within one of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness recogn ized by

international law. Instead, it takes the position that it is solely within its discretion to declare an

emergency under its domestic law. This is, of course, not problema tic, in itself. But then

Costa Rica goes further, and says this discretionary declaration of emergency under its domestic

law also relieves it from its relevant obligations under international law. This is what is a problem

for Nicaragua.

21. Perhaps most strikingly, [ slide 1 on] on 13 December 2011 then-President Chinchilla of

Costa Rica declared, in response to Nicaragua’s repeated requ ests for information about the r oad

project, that Costa Rica  and this is on your screens now  had “issued an emergency decree

due to national necessity and it is on that basis that we have de veloped the projects. We ar e not
114
taking even one step back.” She stated that therefore, Costa Rica has “no reason to offer

explanations to the Government of Nicaragua” 115.

22. It is this position of Costa Rica, not the emergency decree itself, that Nicar agua believes

is clearly unjustifiable under international law, Mr. President. [Slide 1 off] It flies in the face of

113
CMCR, p. 113, para. 5.15.
11El País, Costa Rica “Chinchilla defends highway criticized by Nicaragua, rejects dialogue14 Dec. 2011,
MN, Vol. II, Ann. 24.
115
Ibid. - 38 -

the principle reflected, inter alia, in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

[Slide 2 on] Article 27 provides:

“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its
failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46.” 116

Article 46 deals with “Provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties”, which

is not at issue here. [Slide 2 off: slide 3 on] The same principle is refl ected more generally in

Article 32 of the State Responsibility Articles, entitled “Irrelevance of internal law” 117. It reads as

follows, and is now on the screen:

“The responsible State may not rely on the provisions of its internal law as
justification for failure to comply with its obligations under this Part.” 118 [Slide 3 off]

23. Mr. President, these two Articles, when combined with Costa Rica’s wil fully not having

invoked necessity or any other circumstance precluding wrongfulness, leave precious little room

for Costa Rica to escape from its obligations toward Nicaragua that arise from the shoddy

construction of the road and its consequences. The Costa Rican Government may have succeeded

in insulating itself from responsibility under Costa Rican internal law, but it has failed to do so

under international law.

24. Mr. President, it remains for me to deal very briefly, in the interest of time, with other

matters arising from Costa Rica’s emergency declaration, if you wish me to continue? Thank you.

25. First, Costa Rica has failed to provide any evidence that anything about the situation,

except for President Chinchilla’s declaration itself, indicated there was an emer gency requiring

Costa Rica to construct the border road.

26. If there had been a bona fide emergency requiring a transit route along the river, one

would have expected Costa Rica to have constructed at least a rudimentary, but drivable, route to

and from the caño and the disputed territory. The actual road, (a) is not, even now, drivable, some

four and a half years after construction on it began, and (b) stops well short of the disputed area, at

or before the delta, where the Río Colorado branches off from the San Juan proper. Even if it were

drivable it would not allow personnel to travel to the area in dispute. In addition, there have been

116
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 United Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS), 331,
Art. 27.
11State Responsibility Articles, Art. 32, p. 94.
118
Ibid. - 39 -

long periods in which virtually no construction activity on the road was taking place, apparently for

budgetary re asons, indicating that it was not a governmental priority. This is not the way

governments normally deal with emergencies.

27. In addition, the relationship between the r oad project and the emergency declaration is

objectively doubtful based on the evide nce. Construction of the r oad began before the emergency

declaration was issued. Construction began in December 2010; the President did not issue her

emergency decree until 21 Februa ry 2011. Justification of the r oad project on grounds of an

emergency thus seems to have been an afterthought.

28. Finally, Costa Rica, taking it at its own word, initiated construction of the r oad in

December 2010, in response to Nicaragua’s caño -cleaning activities in October of t hat year. This

was after Costa Rica had r equested provisional measures from this Court when it filed the

Certain Activities case in November of the same year. Thus, Costa Rica took matters into its own

hands by initiating construction of the road after it had requested that the Court grant it pr ovisional

measures concerning the same situation invoked by it to justify construction of the road.

President Chinchilla issued her emergency decree after hearings had been held on Costa Rica’s

provisional measures request and, as Nicaragua’s Agent noted, one day before the Court issued its

preliminary measures O rder. This Court disapproved of such unilateral self -help measures being

taken after a dispute has been submitted to it in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in

Tehran case 11. Yet this seems to have been Costa Rica’s modus operandi.

29. But, Mr. President, even if there had been a bona fide emergency, and even if Costa’s

response of constructing the road was appropriate, quad non, Costa Rica remained under

obligations of prior notific ation, environmental impact assessment, and prevention of significant

harm to Nicaragua since, as I have discussed, its compliance with these obligations would not have

been excused. It is to these obligations that I would like to turn next, perhaps after a break,

Mr. President? Thank you.

Le PRESIDENT : Oui, merci, Monsieur le profess eur. En effet, c’est le moment approprié

de faire une pause de 15 minutes. La Cour va donc à présent se retirer. L’audience est suspendue.

11United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), I.C.J. Reports 1980,
p. 3. - 40 -

L’audience est suspendue de 11 h 35 à 11 h 55

Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. Monsieur le professeur, je vous rends la parole

pour la suite de votre plaidoirie.

Mr. McCAFFREY : Merci, Monsieur le président.

2. Costa Rica breached its obligation to prepare, in advance, an Environmental

Impact Assessment concerning its Road project

30. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I will turn next to environmental impact

assessment. B oth Parties accept that there is an obligation under general international law to

prepare a transboundary environmental impact assessment, or EIA, as this Court found in the Pulp

Mills case 12. But Costa Rica makes three claims in support of its contention that it was under no

obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment of its Road project. Fir st, it says an

emergency under domestic law is an exception to the international obligation to prepare an EIA.

Second, it observes that “the 1858 Treaty does not regulate road infrastructure works on

Costa Rican territory” 121. And third, it points out that the construction work was “conducted

122
exclusively within Costa Rica’s territory” . I will deal with these contentions in turn.

31. First, Costa Rica argues that its emergency declaration under domestic law exempts it

123
from the obligation to conduct a transboundary EIA . (Parenthetically, Mr. President, Costa Rica

says the emergency declaration exempts it from EIA requirements under its domestic law, as well,

124
but as we heard from Professor Sheate yesterday , there is no exemption under the Costa Rican

EIA law for emergencies.) Costa Rica arrives at its remarkable conclusion about the effect of its

domestic emergency regulation on its international obligations essentially by arguing that this

Court in your Pulp Mills Judgment didn’t say a domestic emergency declaration wasn’t an

exception, therefore it must be an exception 12. Specifically, Costa Rica says in its Rejoinder, “No

12Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 83, para. 204.
121
Counter-Memorial of Costa Rica (CMCR), para. 4.4.
12Ibid.

12Rejoinder of Costa Rica (RCR), pp. 95-101.
124
CR 2015/9, p. 38 (Sheate).
12Ibid., p. 95. - 41 -

inference against the determination of an emergency situation under domestic law as an exception

to the obligation to conduct an EIA can be made from paragraph 205 of the Court’s Judgment in

the Pulp Mills case.” 126 That is the paragraph in which you stated the transboundary EIA

requirement. It supposedly follows from this that an emergency declared under domestic law is an

exception to the transboundary EIA requirement under general international law found by the

Court. Well, Mr. President, one can only admire Costa Rica’s breathtaking logical gymnastics.

32. Costa Rica proceeds to cite a number of sources, from Antarctica to Espoo, f rom Kyiv to

Canada, recognizing emergency exemptions. And this is all well and good. The problem for

Costa Rica, a problem that it doesn’t confront, is that as shown by Professor Sheate, all of these

exemptions are part of carefully crafted EIA r égimes, whether on the domestic or on the

international plane, that are designed to ensure that projects likely to have significant

environmental effects are assessed before the authorization is given to proceed with them. The

assessment is then to be taken into account in the decision-making process relating to the proposed

project 12. Even given these safeguards, according to Professor Sheate, emergency exemptions

“are rarely used, and for good reason, since otherwise it would be too easy to circumvent the

128
purpose of EIA. . .” . Quite so, in the present case.

33. Professor Kohen made much of Professor Sheate’s recognition that many, if not most,

prominent EIA régimes contain some sort of carefully regulated emergency exemption. But that

does not help Costa Ric a. First, Costa Rican law does not contain such an exemption. Second,

these r égimes cautiously limit the exemption to the immediate situation, provide d that the

exemption is lifted as soon as the situation permits, and often provide for some substitute

assessment process, often running concurrently with the project. Not so with Costa Rica’s

emergency decree or Costa Rica’s conduct following its declaration of an emergency. And third,

Costa Rica does not establish that the domestic law r égimes it cites exempt the S tate in question

from its EIA obligations under international law. Yet this is precisely what Costa Rica needs to

establish.

126
CR 2015/9, p. 38 (Sheate), para. 3.32.
12William R. Sheate, Summary Report, 15 March 2015, p. 11, para. 31.
128
Ibid. - 42 -

34. Professor Sheate’s Summary Report cites an example of a real emergency, one that was

absolutely devastating to the natural and human environment. It is a particularly interesting

illustration, because despite the massive scale of the event and its effects, an EIA was prepared at

the same time as remedial work was being undertaken. This was the eruption of the Mt. St. Helens

volcano in the US s tate of Washington, now depicted on the screen and at tab 12 of your folders.

[Slide 4 on] As Professor Sheate explains, the eruption, which killed 57 people:

“caused major flooding, river sedimentation, and adverse effects on fish and wildlife
as well as on human settlements. The US Army Corps of Engineers  the lead

federal agency to respond  invoked the ‘special arrangements’ provision of
[National Environmental Policy Act] regulations, under which they were allowed to
proceed immediately with certain river dredging and other emergency work while at
the same time conducting an accelerated EIA process.” 129

35. Professor Sheate observes that this example illustrates the fact that:

“There are inevitably occasions when it is simply impossible to undertake EIA

because of the need to put in place action or infrastructure to save lives or prevent the
immediate destruction of the environment. But in recognition of the value of EIA,
such an exemption is limited to dealing with the immediate urgency, and as soon as
possible, an alternative assessment process should be undertaken.” 130 [Slide 4 off]

36. If an EIA can be prepared while dealing with a disaster of these proportions,

Mr. President, surely Costa Rica could have prepared one for its Road project.

37. Mr. President, I turn now to the second and third justifications offered by Costa Rica for

not preparing a transboundary EIA. The Court will recall that these were that “the 1858 Treaty

does not regulate road infrastructure works on Costa Rican territory” 131, and that the construction

132
work was “conducted exclusively within Costa Rica’s territory” . These are truisms, but advance

the ball not an inch toward justifying Costa Rica’s failure to prepare a transboundary EIA.

38. The silent but obvious implication of these propositions, Mr. President, is that Costa Rica

believes it can do whatever it wants within its territory, without any regard whatsoever for

transboundary consequences. One would have thought that this idea went out with the resounding

133
rejection of the Harmon Doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty of 1895 .

12William R. Sheate, Summary Report, 15 March 2015, p. 11, para. 32; emphasis added.
130
Ibid., pp. 11-12.
13CMCR, para. 4.4.

13Ibid.
133
21 Op. Att’y Gen. 274 (1895). See RN, pp. 155-157. - 43 -

39. In fact, the proposition for w hich Costa Rica contends has long since ceased to hold

water, and Nicaragua has placed before the Court 13, if there was any need to do so, decisions from

135 136
1928 to 2013 confirming this, from the Island of Palmas award and the Corfu Channel case to

the Trail Smelter 137and Kishenganga 138 awards.

40. But of course even if we look only at Costa Rica’s conduct with respect to its o wn

territory, we see blatant violations of multilateral treaty obligations it has undertaken, that are

139
expressed in such agreements as the Biological Diversity and Ramsar Conventions . As to the

latter, an agreement much prized by Costa Rica in the Certain Activities case and to which I will

return briefly later, several listed Ramsar wetlands of international importance in Costa Rica lie in

the vicinity of the Road project and have undoubtedly been affected by it, as discussed in

Professor Sheate’s report 140.

41. As I mentioned earlier, Mr. President, Costa Rica contends that it is under no obliga tion

to prepare an EIA for its r oad projects because its “domestic legislation does not require the

conduct of an environmental impact assessment in an emergency situation”  Costa Rica has

evidently not read its own EIA law  “while international law comprises a renvoi to domestic

law” 14. Nicaragua has shown this argument to be confused and entirely without merit. I will

reprise this explanation briefly.

42. First, as a matter of general principle, one must question whether Costa Rica has thought

this remarkable proposition through. If it were indeed the case that international law leaves entirely

to domestic law the question whether or not to prepare an environm ental impact assessment, how

should this Court’s finding in the Pulp Mills case concerning the obligation under general

134See, e.g., RN, pp. 152-153.

135Arbitral Award, 4 April 1928, Island of Palmas (Netherlands v. United States of America), United Nations ,
Reports of International Arbitration Awards ( UNRIAA), Vol. II, p. 839.

136Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1949, p. 22.
137
Arbitral Award, 11 March 1941, Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States of America v. Canada), UNRIAA,
Vol. III, p. 1965.
138
Partial Award, 18 February 2013, Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India), available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1392.
139
See William R. Sheate, “Comments on the Lack of EIA for the San Juan Border Road in Costa Rica”,
July 2014, Section 5; RN, Vol. II, Annex 5.
140Ibid.

141CMCR, p. 113, para. 5.15. - 44 -

international law to prepare an EIA be understood? [Slide 5 on] I have now on the screen and at
142
tab 13 is your passage from the Pulp M ills case that is by now very well-known and, in the

interest of time, I will not read it out. You do find a requirement under general international law to

prepare a transboundary environmental impact assessment.

43. Try as I might, Mr. President, I cannot find anything in that statement by your Court that

says anything about a “ renvoi to domestic law”. [Slide 5 off] What you did say in that case was

the following: [slide 6 on] “it is the view of the Court [this is at tab 14] that it is for each State to

determine in its domestic legislation or in the authorization process for the project, the specific

content of the environmental impact assessment required in each case” 143. I will stop there again

for reasons of time, but the full quote is in your judges’ folder.

44. Thus, Mr. President, it is the content of an EIA that is determined by the domestic law of

the State in which the project is undertaken, not the question whether an EIA should be undertaken

at all. The latter question is governed by inte rnational law, as you made crystal clear in the first

passage from your Pulp Mills Judgment that I showed on your screens a moment ago.

45. In addition, you made clear that “an environmental impact assessment must be conducted

prior to the implementation of a project”, and that even after “operations have started and, where

necessary, throughout the life of the project, continuous monitoring of its effects on the

environment shall be undertaken”. Thus you required that an EIA must be undertaken ex ante and

that the project must be monitored throughout its life. Costa Rica does not dispute that it failed to

meet the former requirement; it has provided little evidence to indicate that it is diligently

complying with the latter. [Slide 6 off]

46. Yet Cos ta Rica tries, Houdini -like, to escape the obligation to prepare an EIA on yet

another ground, which it deploys in respect of other obligations as well. Unfortunately for

Costa Rica, it is no Houdini; this attempt, too, is unavailing.

47. Costa Rica’s a rgument is in essence that while it accepts the obligations under the

Biodiversity Convention and what it characterizes as “three central obligations: . . . to conduct an

environmental impact assessment . . .; [to provide] notification; and . . . to [avoid] caus[ing] . . .

14Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 83, para. 204.

14Ibid., pp. 83-84, para. 205; emphasis added. - 45 -

144
transboundary harm” , they do not apply in this case. Why? Because, according to Costa Rica,

the “threshold” for their application is not met. That threshold is stated by Costa Rica to be a “risk

145
of significant adverse impact” . Cos ta Rica says the quantities of sediment and debris washed

into the San Juan from the road project are not “significant” in comparison with the river’s already

heavy sediment load, and therefore the threshold for these obligations to be triggered is not met .

But that threshold, Mr. President, is in fact met by virtue of the road meeti ng the requirements

under Costa Rica’s own EIA law for a full environmental impact study, a category A road with

“high potential environmental impact”. By definition, even acc ording to Costa Rican law, this

project poses a risk of environmental harm and therefore a risk of transboundary harm given that

Nicaragua is only metres away.

48. Mr. President, in light of the testimony we heard yesterday from Professors Kondolf and

Andrews, and the presentations of my colleagues Mr. Loewenstein and Mr. Reichler, this

contention can be dealt with in short order. In a word, Costa Rica confuses magnitude with

significance, and fails to consider the context of the challenges facing Nicar agua in respect of the

Lower San Juan.

49. By the calculations of Professor Thorne, Costa Rica’s own expert, the road is responsible

for adding 75,000 tons of sediment to the San Juan River, Nicaragua’s territory, each year 146.

75,000 tons . Dr. Andrews told us that would form a column of sediment filling the Great Hall and

projecting upward the length of a football field. And Nicaragua’s calculations indicate that the

quantity is much larger. But even taking Costa Rica’s figures, and bearing in mind tha t

Nicaragua’s dredging programme is unable to keep up with the transported sediment in the Lower

San Juan 147, this means that Nicaragua will have to work harder, will have to devote more human,

capital and financial resources, to a dredging programme that is already struggling. This is why the

Court should find that Costa Rica should at least have been aware of the possibility that there was

what you called a “risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse im pact

144
CMCR, p. 109, para. 5.6.
14Ibid., p. 195, para. 6.30.

14Written Statement of Colin Thorne, March2015, p. 6, para. 3.2.
147
See generally Cornelis van Rhee, Written Statement, 15 March 2015. - 46 -

in a transboundary context”. And why the Court should also find that this risk continues today, and

will continue until the problem is corrected, if that is in fact possible. This underscores the

importance of Costa Rica’s undertaking what this Court called “continuous monitoring of [the

project’s] effects on the environment”.

50. Mr. President, one additional point before turning to Costa Rica’s breach of the

obligation to notify. As Nicaragua has stated in its pleadings and as Professor Sheate makes clear,

if the Court finds that the preparation of even a summary transboundary EIA was not possible due

to a bona fide emergency situation, S tate practice indicates that Costa Rica should at least have

assessed the environmental impact of the r oad while construction was und erway and provided all

relevant information to Nicaragua. For the reasons given by my colleague Mr. Loewenstein,

Costa Rica’s “Environmental Diagnostic Assessment” (EDA) does not satisfy this requirement and

Professor Sheate testified yesterday that Costa Rica’s EDA is in no way equivalent to an EIA.

3. Costa Rica breached its obligation to notify Nicaragua prior to beginning

construction of the Road project

51. Mr. President, turning to the obligation to notify, I have already noted that there is no

disagreement between the P arties as to the existence of the obligation and Costa Rica does not

dispute the existence of it . It says rather, as already indicated, that the obligation has not been

triggered for it because the threshold of “significance” has n ot been met. On this , Mr. President, I

can be brief.

52. Once again, Costa Rica confuses magnitude with significance, as explained by my

colleague Mr. Reichler. Nicaragua has demonstrated significant harm and a risk of significant

harm to itself, in terms of burdens on human, material and financial resources, and to the river and

its aquatic environment. Costa Rica therefore had an obligation to notify Nicaragua of its road

project, which it failed to do.

4. Costa Rica breached its obligation not to cause significant
transboundary harm to Nicaragua

53. I turn next, Mr. President, to Costa Rica’s breach of its obligation not to cause significant

transboundary harm to Nicaragua. As before, Costa Rica accepts this obligation, contesting only

its violation of it. Now that we know that the risk posed by the road project has materialized,in the - 47 -

form of at least 75,000 tons of sediment annually, which amounts to 325,000 tons over the more

than four years since construction began  and I would remind the Court that this is Costa Rica’s

estimate, which Nicaragua believes to be quite conservative  Nicaragua is of the view that this is

significant, causes Nicaragua significant harm, and poses what you called “a risk that the proposed

industrial activity”  in this case, an actual one  “may have a significant adverse impact in a

transboundary context” in the future, as well. My colleague Mr. Reichler has amply demonstrated

that Costa Rica’s road project cause s significant harm to the Lower San Juan, by adding t o the

sediment deposits already obstructing navigation and diminishing the flow of fresh water to the

wetlands downstream that depend on it for their ecological balance. And I would recall that this is

especially true in view of the inability of Nicaragua ’s dredges to keep up with the rate of sediment

deposition in the first place, as noted by my colleague Paul Reichler earlier.

54. As with the obligations of environmental impact assessmen t and prior notification,

Costa Rica admits that the r oad is respon sible for contributing what Nicaragua considers to be

massive quantities of sediment to the river. It simply says, once again, that these quantities pale

into insignificance when compared with the river’s already very heavy sediment load. Nicaragua

would have two responses to these contentions.

55. First, they are wide of the mark, since the issue is not magnitude, but significance in

context. My colleague Mr. Reichler has shown that the additional quantities of sediment and debris

that Costa Rica’s road project contributes to the river are, in fact, significant in context, when

measured not against the river’s total sediment load, but against the additional impediments to

navigation and harm to aquatic ecosystems, including wetlands, they cause, and aga inst the

additional resources Nicaragua must expend in order to try to deal with these additional sediment

loads.

56. Second, as demonstrated in Nicaragua’s Reply 148, Costa Rica, which admits to being

responsible for the vast majority of the sediment load c arried by the San Juan, much of which is

149
due to poor land- use practices countenanced by the Costa Rican G overnment , should not be

heard to contend that it should not be responsible for the additional 75,000 tons a year it says the

14RN, e.g., pp. 69-70.

14Ibid. - 48 -

road project is responsible for because it is such a small percentage of sediment in comparison to

that which it already contributes. Nicaragua trusts that the Court will see the inequities of this

argument of Costa Rica and not allow it to diminish the significance of the quant ities of sediment

contributed to the river by theroad project in this way.

57. For these reasons, Mr. President, Nicaragua submits that by contributing  by its own

measure  75,000 tons of sediment annually to the San Juan River, Nicarag ua’s sovereign

territory, Costa Rica has breached its obligation not to cause significant harm to Nicaragua.

5. Costa Rica breached treaties to which both States are parties due to the manner
in which the Road was, and is being, constructed.

58. Mr. President, I turn now, and finally  and also briefly  to Costa Rica’s breaches of

treaties to which both States are parties due to the m anner in which the r oad was, and is being,

constructed.

59. The treaties in question are the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Ra msar

Convention, the Central American Convention for the Protection of the Environment and other

Regional Instruments, and the bilateral Agreement on Border Protected Areas, known as the

“SI-A-PAZ” agreement. Costa Rica is dismissive of these agreements w hen they are asserted

against it, having embraced them warmly in asserting them against Nicaragua in Certain Activities.

Once again, rather than defending its compliance with the letter and spirit of the agreements,

Costa Rica seeks refuge in the “signifi cant harm” requirement, even as to multilateral agreements

that my colleague Professor Pellet has shown to apply to breaches wholly within Costa Rica’s

territory, namely, the Biodiversity and Ramsar Conventions. Nicaragua continues to maintain that

the manner in which Costa Rica has constructed, and continues to construct and manage the r oad,

violate these agreements. The contentions of Costa Rica that it has not breached the agreements

stand in striking contrast to the conclusion of the University of Cos ta Rica’s Environmental Law

experts regarding construction of the road, referred to by col league Paul Reichler yesterday, that

“Practically there is not a single one of our environmental laws that wasn’t violated.” 150

15CR 2015/8, p. 21 (Reichler). - 49 -

60. Mr. President, Members of the Court , that concludes my presentation. Thank you for

your kind and patient attention. I would be grateful, Mr. President, if you would now call my

colleague Professor Pellet to the podium.

Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur le professeur. Je donne la parole au professeurPellet.

M. PELLET : Merci, Monsieur le président. Comme l’a dit récemment dans une affaire

récente un de mes anciens et éminents collègues, mon équipe m’a donné beaucoup à faire mais m’a

laissé peu de temps pour le faire. Alors plutôt que de bâcler ma présentation et essayer de couper

un peu au hasard, je m’arrêterai quand l’heure fatidique sera venue et, si nécessaire, je reprendrai

les arguments que je n’aurai pu avancer aujourd’hui durant le second tour.

R EMÈDES

1. Monsieur le président, M esdames et Messieurs les juges, le Costa Rica a construit (fort

mal) une route le long du San Juan. Celle-ci s’étire sur quelque 160 kilomètres, dont 108 au plus

près du fleuve.

2. Le Costa Rica se donne beaucoup de mal pour établir qu’il a le droit de c onstruire les

routes qu’il veut sur son territoire et il martèle que : «Costa Rica’s sovereign right to develop its
151
own territory and to construct roads anywhere in its territory must be fully respected .» Nous ne

le contestons pas. Du moment que la rout e n’empiète pas sur le territoire d’un Etat voisin et ne lui

cause pas de préjudice (je laisse la question du qualificatif pour plus tard), dans ces conditions il

peut construire les routes les plus invraisemblables, dangereuses et inutiles qu’il désire  c’est en

principe une affaire entre l’Etat et sa population ou les usagers de ces voies. Mais le droit

international apporte une limite juridique à l’exercice de cette indiscutable compétence  celle-là

même dont nos amis de l’autre côté de la barre se so nt prévalus avec emphase dans le cadre de
152
l’autre affaire, relative à Certaines activités ; l’utilisation de son territoire par l’Etat doit être non

dommageable : «l’Etat est tenu de mettre en Œuvre tous les moyens à sa disposition pour éviter que

les activités qui se déroulent sur son territoire, ou sur tout espace relevant de sa juridiction, ne

151DCR, p. 140, par. 8 c) ; voir aussi : CMCR, p. 107, par. 5.3. ; p. 1, par. 1.2, p. 6, par. 1.11, p. 9, par. 1.16,
p. 18, par. 1.34, p. 96, par. 4.4, p. 96, par. 4.9 et DCR, p. 5, par. 1.12, p. 71, par. 2.108 et p. 140, par.8 c).

152Voir notamment MCR, p. 115-123, par. 5.1-5.32, ou CR 2015/3, p.45-48, par. 3-11 (Parlett). - 50 -

causent un préjudice sensible à l’environnement d’un autre Etat» 153. Comme nous l’avons dit la

154
semaine dernière , et comme le professeur McCaffrey l’a répété tout à l’heure, nous sommes en

plein accord tant avec le principe qu’avec les conséquences qui en sont tirées dans le droit

international contemporain ; je pourrais reprendre à mon compte presque mot pour mot la

présentation que Mme Parlett en a faite mardi der nier 155 : tout Etat a l’obligation de notifier à

l’avance à l’Etat ou aux autres Etats possiblement affectés les activités menées sur son territoire

comportant un risque significatif de dommage transfrontière. Dans ce cas, il doit mener une étude

d’impact environnemental (EIE).

3. Monsieur le président,

 le projet d’une route longeant sur 108 kilomètres un «territoire liquide» étranger comportait- il

un risque significatif de dommage transfrontière ? Réponse : évidemment oui ;

 le Costa Rica a-t-il notifié son projet au Nicaragua ? Réponse : non ;

 le Costa Rica a-t-il effectué une EIE ? Réponse : non.

4. Mes collègues ont excellemment établi le bien -fondé des trois réponses laconiques que je

viens de donner et je ne pourrais rien y ajouter d’utile. Cela montre à suffisance que la

responsabilité du Costa Rica est engagée : la construction de la route 1856 est sans aucun doute

attribuable au Costa Rica (qui ne prétend pas le contraire) et elle viole plusieurs des obligations

internationales de cet Etat 156. En outre, comme le professeur McCaffrey  de nouveau lui  l’a

montré, le Costa Rica ne peut se prévaloir de circonstances excluant l’illicéité, ce qui confirme que

la responsabilité du Costa Rica est engagée. Dès lors, on doit s’interroger sur les conséquen ces de

157
son ou de ses faits internationalement illicites .

5. Je ne vous apprendrai rien, Monsieur le président, en rappelant que, dans la conception

moderne, «post-Ago», dominante aujourd’hui, le dommage ne joue pas de rôle dans l’engagement

153 Usines de pâte à papier sur le fleuve Uruguay (Argentine c. Uruguay), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2010 (I), p. 55-56,
par. 101.

154Voir CR 2015/6, p. 36-40, par. 30-36 (Pellet) et CR 2015/8, p. 30, par. 25 et p. 34-35, par. 34 (McCaffrey).
155
CR 2015/3, p. 45-48, par. 3-11 (Parlett).
156Cf. les articles 1 et 2 des Articles de la CDI sur la responsabilité de l’Etat pour fait internationalement illicite

annexés à la résolution56/83 de l’Assemblée générale des NationsUnies en date du 12 décembre 2001.
157 Cf. l’article 28 des Articles de la CDI sur la responsabilité de l’Etat pour fait internationalement illicite
(Conséquences juridiques d’un fait internationalement illicite). - 51 -

de la responsabilité 158. En revanche, il tient le rôle principal lorsqu’on en vient au «Contenu de la

responsabilité», codifié par la deuxième partie des Articles de la Commission du droit international

de 2001 sur la responsabilité internationale de l’Etat pour fait in ternationalement illicite. D’où

l’importance des longues présentations que nous avons consacrées à établir l’existence et l’étendue

des dommages causés au fleuve San Juan par la construction de la route, ses malfaçons et sa

détérioration, à quoi s’ajoute l’absence de consultation et de production d’une EIE . Ce sont les

conséquences à tirer de la responsabilité du Costa Rica ainsi établie que je vais présenter pour

terminer notre premier tour de plaidoiries. Encore une fois, peut -être seulement certaines d e ces

conséquences.

6. Monsieur le président, il y a toujours un certain artifice, dans les affaires de responsabilité,

à plaider la réparation ou, plus largement les «remèdes». Comme il se doit, l’Etat requérant essaie

de vous convaincre que la Partie défenderesse doit se plier à l’ensemble des obligations découlant

de l’engagement de sa responsabilité, telles que les codifient les articles 28 à 39 des Articles de la

CDI ; et le défendeur expliquera que, puisqu’il n’a commis aucun manquement, la question ne se

pose pas...

7. A cet égard, notre affaire  ou plutôt nos affaires puisque vous les avez jointes pour,

ensuite, quasiment les disjoindre  sont singulières. Dans la première, celle que vous avez

intitulée Certaines activités menées par le Nicarag ua dans la région frontalière , le Nicaragua est

défendeur ; il est requérant dans la seconde, relative à la Construction d’une route au Costa Rica le

long du fleuve San Juan. Je me suis donc employé à montrer, vendredi dernier, que les activités

qui sont reprochées au Nicaragua dans la première n’appellent aucun «remède» puisqu’elles ne

sont pas internationalement illicites et n’entraînent donc pas sa responsabilité  alors qu’au

contraire il m’appartient de vous convaincre aujourd’hui qu’il est en droit d e vous demander

d’ordonner les remèdes d’usage du fait de la responsabilité du Costa Rica dans la seconde.

8. A ce stade, Monsieur le président, cette responsabilité du Costa Rica est bien établie : il a

sans aucun doute commis un ou plusieurs faits inte rnationalement illicites  il a violé nombre

158Cf. les articles 1 et 2 des Articles de la CDI sur la responsabilité de l’Etat. - 52 -

d’obligations lui appartenant en droit international, et il est évident aussi que ce ou ces faits ont

causé un grave préjudice au Nicaragua.

9. Il appartient à la Cour d’en tirer les conséquences et à moi d’expliquer qu’elles pourraient

être ces conséquences en détaillant les conclusions du Nicaragua. Ces conclusions sont

relativement complexes car la situation créée par la construction illicite de la route 1856 est

elle-même difficile et appelle des réponses adaptées. J’essaierai de justifier chacune de ces

conclusions séparément  pas forcément dans l’ordre dans lequel elles se présentent dans notre

réplique  mais de manière synthétique. Pour la commodité des juges et de la

Partie costa-ricienne, le texte écrit de ma plaidoirie comporte, pour chacune de ces conclusions, les

références aux principaux passages des écritures des Parties susceptibles d’éclairer ces éléments.

o
[Projection n 1 : Cessation des faits internationalement illicites de caractère conti nu commis

par le Costa Rica et exécution des obligations violées]

1. La cessation de la violation et la reprise des obligations violées 159

10. Monsieur le président, comme l’écrit la Commission du droit international dans son

commentaire de l’article 30 des Articles de 2001, «[l]a cessation du comportement en violation

d’une obligation internationale est la première condition à remplir pour éliminer les conséquences

160
du comportement illicite» . La cessation s’impose essentiellement, même si pas exclusivement ,

lorsque la violation est continue et, dans ce cas, elle doit conduire à la reprise de l’exécution de

161
l’obligation violée .

11. Mis à part les arguments «pavloviens» selon lesquels il n’a pas commis de fait

162
internationalement illicite , ni le Nicaragua s ubi de dommages du fait de la construction de la

route 1856, le Costa Rica s’appuie, dans sa duplique, sur un extrait de votre arrêt de 2009 selon

lequel

159 Voir MN, p. 231-234, par. 6.13-6.17 ; CMCR, p. 132, par. 6.9 ; RN, p. 255-257, par. 7.3-7.6 ; DCR,
p. 124-125, par. 4.11-4.13. Voir aussi, RN, p. 264-265, par. 7.17-7.18 ; DCR, p. 128-131, par. 4.18-4.24.

160Commentaire de l’article 30 des Articles de la CDI sur la responsabilité de l’Etat pour fait internationalement
illicite, par. 4, Annuaire 2001, vol. II, deuxième partie, p. 94.
161
Cf. l’article 29 des Articles de la CDI.
162
Voir DCR, p. 124-125, par. 4.11 et 4.13. - 53 -

«Il n’est pas nécessaire, et il n’est pas utile en règle générale, que la Cour
rappelle l’existence de cette obligation dans le dispositif des arrêts qu’elle rend : du
seul fait que la Cour constate l’existence d’une violation qui présente un caractère

continu, il découle de plein droit l’obligation de la faire cesser, à la charge de l’Etat
concerné.

La Cour peut estimer opportun, dans des circonstances spéciales, de mentionner
expressément ladite obligation dans le dispositif de son arrêt. Elle n’aperçoit pas de
raison particulière de le faire en l’espèce.» 163

12. J’avoue, avec tout le respect dû, que j ’ai quelque doute sur le principe même ainsi

énoncé, ne fût-ce que parce que le caractère continu d’un fait internationalement illicite peut être

164
douteux . Mais cela n’a pas d’importance en l’espèce. Dans notre affaire

 la violation est certainement continue ;

 elle continue évidemment à produire des effets préjudiciables ; et

 il y a assurément des raisons particulières pour que la Cour insiste sur l’obligation de cessation

dans le dispositif de son arrêt.

13. S’agissant du premier point (la violation cont inue), il faut garder à l’esprit que la

construction de la route a été entreprise en décembre 2010 165. Les travaux sont ensuite allés bon

train (c’est une litote) : en un an (c’est-à-dire à la date du dépôt de la requête, une centaine de

kilomètres de route avaient été bâclés plus que construits. Le 7 mars 2011, le

166
Gouvernement costa-ricien publia un décret instituant l’état d’urgence complété, en septembre,

167
par un autre décret réglementant cet état d’urgence ; tous deux visaient à tenter de justifier

ex post la précipitation avec laquelle la construction de la route avait été entreprise et conduite  je

ne sais si ces règles Potemkine peuvent avoir un effet exonératoire en droit interne comme le

Costa Rica l’affirme 168; elles ne sauraient en tout cas const ituer des «circonstances excluant

163
Différend relatif à des droits de navigation et des droits connexes (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 267, par. 148.
164
Cf. le commentaire de l’article 14 des Articles de la CDI de 2001, en particulier les paragraphes 4 et 5
(Annuaire 2001, vol. II, deuxième partie, p. 63).
165
Voir DCR, p. 102, par. 3.41 et CR 2013/29, p. 13, par. 6 et p. 14, par. 9 (Brenes).
166Costa Rica, décret n 36440 du 7 mars 2011 (année CXXXIII), La Gaceta n o46 (La Uruca, San José
(Costa Rica)) (MN, vol. II, annexe 11).

167Décision n 0362-2011, règlement du 21 septembre 2011 relatif aux procédures d’achat et de passation de
marchés sous un régime d’exception, conformément au décret no 36440 instituant l’état d’urgence (MN, vol. II,
annexe 12).

168CMCR, p. 22-27, par. 2.25-2.35 et DCR, p.61, par. 3.42. Voir aussi CR2015/3 (Parlett), p. 47, par. 10. - 54 -

l’illicéité» en droit international comme le professeur McCaffrey  toujours lui !  l’a montré

tout à l’heure.

14. L’introduction de la requête du Nicaragua a freiné l’ardeur bâtisseuse du

Gouvernement costa-ricien  qui explique le ralentissement, voire la suspension des travaux par le

169
manque de fonds , à quoi semblent s’être ajoutés des problèmes de corruption et d’irrégularité

dans l’adjudication des contrats de travaux 170. Mais je ne peux m’empêcher de remarquer

d’intéressantes coïncidences entre les différentes étapes de la procédure et les annonces successives

du retardement de la reprise des travaux. Tout donne l’impression que le Costa Rica recule

périodiquement la reprise des travaux, je dirais pour «amadouer» vot re haute juridiction et éviter le

prononcé de mesures obligatoires tant qu’elle est saisie. Mais dès que la procédure sera achevée ou

votre arrêt rendu, le Costa Rica reprendra les travaux  qui n’ont jamais été officiellement

suspendus et encore moins ar rêtés. Et ce contexte justifie amplement que vous enjoignez le

Costa Rica de cesser  et de ne pas reprendre ses agissements illicites. Je relève d’ailleurs en

passant que les autorités costa- riciennes «jouent» très systématiquement avec le calendrier de la

procédure, puisque nouvelle coïncidence, M. Segnini, ministre costa-ricien des travaux publics et

des transports, a annoncé hier non pas la construction de nouveaux tronçons de route, mais des

travaux de remise en état de la route qu’il décrit comme ét ant «détériorée et abandonnée»

(deteriorada y abandonada) 17.

o o
[Fin de la projection n 1  Projection n 2 : Faute de remise en état le préjudice se poursuit]

15. Au demeurant, quand bien même le Costa Rica ne donnerait pas suite à son intention

proclamée de poursuivre la construction stricto sensu de la route, le principe même de l’utilisation

dommageable du territoire continuerait  que dis-je «continuerait» ?  continue à être violé aussi

longtemps que les malfaçons dans la conception et la réalisation de la route causent des dommages

au fleuve San Juan de Nicaragua. Je ne peux, Monsieur le président, rivaliser d’éloquence avec

169CR 2013/29 (Brenes), p. 17, par. 17.
170
Voir notamment R. Madrigal, «Works on the Trail Paralyzed while Waiting for Designs and Modular
Bridges», crhoy.com, 10 juillet 20 14 (RN, vol. II, annexe 21). Voir aussi La Nacion, 7 octobre 2014
(http://www.nacion.com/sucesos/poder-judicial/Fiscal-jefe-OIJ-chocan-tro…) et La Nació n,
5 février 2015 ( http://www.nacion.com/sucesos/poder-judicial/Llega-numero-imputados-tro…-
fronteriza_0_1467853357.html). Voir aussi ibid.
171
J. Bravo, «Costa Rica reinicia mejoramiento de carretera fronteriza», La Prensa , 20 avril 2015
(http://www.laprensa.com.ni/2015/04/20/nacionales/1818310-costa-rica-rei…). - 55 -

e
M Reichler qui a montré dans ses présentations d’hier et de ce matin combien le fleuve avait

souffert, et continuait de souffrir , des malfaçons de la route et des centaines de milliers de tonnes

de sédiments qui s’y sont déversées et continuent de s’y déverser. Il a montré aussi que les travaux

de remise en état, très partiels, intervenus jusqu’à présent, laissaient eux -mêmes souvent

grandement à désirer et n’avaient nullement mis fin aux atteintes à l’intégrité du fleuve et, pire,

que, dans bien des cas, le délabrement de la route auquel il n’a pas été remédié a été jusqu’à

aggraver la situation résultant de sa construction stricto sensu. J’aurais, si j’avais le temps, rappelé

un certain nombre de chiffres mais vous en avez eus suffisamment.

16. De toute façon, les chiffres ne sont sans doute pas l’essentiel . En lisant ses écritures, j’ai

eu l’impression que le Costa Rica voula it faire une lecture exclusivement «statistique» des

dommages ; d’où ces disputes interminables sur la densité de grains de sable au mètre ou au

kilomètre carré q ui ont conduit hier le président Tomka à sortir sa calculette. Mais à lire ou à

écouter les experts, il m’a semblé que ce n’était pas la bonne façon de poser le problème : les

sédiments ne se répartissent pas uniformément sur le lit du fleuve ; leur dépôt se concentre en des

lieux précis qui deviennent, très concrètement, des obstacles à la navigation du fleuve  à laquelle

le Costa Rica se montre par ailleurs si viscéralement attaché , et tout ceci accroît en particulier

l’ensablement du cours inférieur du San Juan.

17. Tout ceci a été confirmé par les experts consultés par le Nicaragua que vous avez pu

entendre et interroger hier. Comme l’a résumé avec force M. Weaver  que le Costa Rica n’a pas

jugé utile de contre-interroger:

«Four years after construction of the Road, widespread and effective mitigation

is not apparent. [. . .] The majority of watercourse crossings, cut slopes, and fill slopes
remain unstable, exhibit significant visible erosion, and have not been treated or fully
treated with appropriate stabilization and erosion control measures. The lack of
progress is striking, as is the amount of work that remains to be done.» 172

[Fin de la projection n 2]

18. Le caractère continu de la violation (et de ses effets préjudiciables) ne fait donc aucun

doute. Et il appartient au Costa Rica de la faire cesser . Mais il y a aussi d’excellentes «raisons

172Déclaration écrite de M.William E. Weaver, 15 mars 2015, p. 19, par. 50. - 56 -

particulières» pour que vous rappeliez avec force cette obligation dans votre ar rêt, Mesdames et

Messieurs les juges. Et j’en aperçois au moins trois :

 comme je l’ai dit il y a un instant, le Costa Rica, loin de s’engager à cesser la constr uction

litigieuse, proclame au contraire son intention de la reprendre ; tout au plus retarde -t-il

prudemment cette reprise à la période qui suivra le prononcé de votre arrêt ;

 ce faisant, le Costa Rica fait en sorte que la Cour ne puisse pas apprécier si ces nouveaux

travaux sont ou non conformes à ses obligations internationales  c’est d’ailleurs ainsi qu’il a

réussi à convaincre la Cour qu’il n’y avait pas urgence à se prononcer sur la demande en

indication de mesures conservatoires présentée par le Nicaragua dans son ordonnance

du 13 décembre 2013 ;

 moyennant quoi, même s’il retarde la repri se de la construction, le Costa Rica se garde bien de

prendre l’engagement de procéder différemment, en s’entourant, comme il le devrait, de toutes

les précautions requises pour que la construction de la route  et la route elle-même une fois

construite  ne causent pas de dommage significatif au fleuve San Juan de Nicaragua ; ceci est

aussi regrettable que logique puisqu’il s’obstine à ne pas reconnaître que les tronçons construits

l’ont été en violation de ses obligations en vertu du droit international ;

 seuls des travaux de réhabilitation et de remise en état de l’ensemble des portions déjà

construites, conçus de façon à éviter durablement toute atteinte au San Juan  c’est-à-dire à la

souveraineté territoriale du Nicaragua  seraient de nature à faire cesser le fait

internationalement illicite qui engage la responsabilité du Costa Rica ; or, maintes fois promise,

cette remise en état est à peine achevée au quart et les travaux supposés remédier aux

malfaçons actuelles ne réalisent bien souvent pas cet objectif.

19. Ceci étant, Monsieur le président, il faut s’entendre sur l’objet de la cessation que

demande le Nicaragua. Il ne s’agit évidemment pas que vous ordonn iez que toute construction de

route dans la région, et même le long du fleuve, cesse à jamais. Comme je l’ai dit, nous ne

contestons nullement le droit du Costa Rica de construire tout ce qu’il veut sur la rive droite du

fleuve; ce qui doit cesser c’est le projet actuel et ses intolérables conséquences. En ce sens, la

cessation que le Nicaragua vous demande d’ordonner est inséparable de la remise des choses en

l’état  la restitutio in integrum (j’ai toujours regretté que la CDI l’ait «délatinisé e» dans - 57 -

l’article 35 de ses Articles sur la responsabilité). Je pense que cet article vous est suffisamment

connu donc ; je ne vais pas le relire.

[Projection n 3 : Le rétablissement du statu quo ante]

2. La restitutio in integrum 173

20. Comme il l’a expliqué dans sa réplique , le Nicaragua n’exige pas que le rétablissement

du statu quo soit intégral  ce qui signifierait la destruction complète de la route 1856 et la

réinvention, ou la réhabilitation d’une situation géographique, morphologique et paysagère qui e st

probablement hors d’atteinte. Loin de s’en montrer reconnaissant, le Costa Rica s’indigne de cette

modération, pourtant conforme aux prescriptions de l’article 35. Il juge notre demande de

restitution confuse, inadaptée et incompatible avec notre demande d’indemnisation.
o o
[Fin de la projection n 3  Projection n 4 : Paragraphe 7.9 de la réplique du Nicaragua]

21. Pour ce qui est de la confusion alléguée, je me permets, Mesdames et Messieurs de la

Cour, de vous renvoyer au paragraphe 7.9 de notre réplique. Il est un peu long à lire mais il figure

à l’onglet 18 de nos dossiers. Il vous y est demandé de décider les choses suivantes :

 replanter des arbres dans les zones touchées par des abattages inconsidérés (pour rappel : la

construction de la route e st à l’origine de la destruction de plus de 83 hectares de forêt, dont

175
68,3 hectares de forêt primaire en zone humide protégée par la convention RAMSAR ) ;

 reconstruire et consolider les rives du fleuve là où elles ont été affectées par la construction mal

conçue et bâclée de la route, et, plus généralement ;

 procéder à une remise en état conforme aux règles de l’art.

Voici qui ne semble ni déraisonnable, ni hors de portée. Et le Costa Rica se montre tout d’un coup

bien ombrageux lorsqu’il s’indigne que nous ayons pu suggérer que, ce faisant, il devrait agir en

suivant les recommandations des experts (qu’ils soient d’ailleurs nommés par le Nicaragua, par la

Cour elle-même, voire éventuellement par lui -même (le Costa Rica)  à condition que ce ne soit

173
MN, p. 241-242, par. 6.31-6.32 ; RN, p. 257-258, par. 7.7-7.10 ; DCR, p. 122-123, par. 4.5-4.8 ; voir aussi, en
ce qui concerne le dragage du fleuve : MN, p. 252, par. 3 i) et ii) ; CMCR, p. 133-134, par. 6.10-6.11 ; RN, p. 277-279,
par. 7.44-7.47 ; DCR, p. 134-135, par. 4.34-4.35 ; voir également CMN ( Certaines activités menées par le Nicaragua
dans la région frontalière (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua), p. 455-456, par. 2 iii) et iv)).
174
Voir RN, p. 257-259, par. 7.8-7.10.
175 Costa Rica, centre de sciences tropicales, d iagnostic sur l’impact sur l’environnement de la

route 1856  volet écologique du projet  novembre 2013 (CMCR, Affaire de la Route, vol. II, annexe 10). - 58 -

pas exclusif  j’y reviendrai si j’ai le temps). Le professeur Kohen était moins sourcilleux sur les

limites de la compétence de la Cour lorsqu’il vous expliquait mercredi dernier, Mesdames et

Messieurs les juges, que vous pouviez, sans scrupule particulier, or donner l’abrogation ou la

176
modification du décret nicaraguayen de 2009 sur la navigation touristique sur le San Juan .
o o
[Fin de la projection n 4  Projection n 5 : Une déclaration selon laquelle le Nicaragua est

en droit de draguer le San Juan]

22. Par ailleurs, le Costa Rica se dit troublé par notre demande d’indemnisation en

compensation «for restoring the natural flow of the waters that flow through the south basin to the

San Juan River which has been modified as a consequence of the construction works which have

also modified the drainage of the surrounding wetlands in the lower San Juan and its delta». Je ne

pense pas, Monsieur le président , que ceci soit tellement troublant  mais il est vrai que cette

demande est, en quelque sorte, «à cheval» sur la restitutio et l’indemnisation. Je m’explique : il ne

peut faire de doute que le dragage du San Juan constitue un élément indispensable de la remise en

état ; ceci ressort notamment du rapport du professeur Andrews de juillet 2014 177 et de nombreux

178
documents scientifiques que vous avez eus sous les yeux . Toutefois, seul souverain sur le lit du

fleuve, le Nicaragua entend procéder lui-même à ces travaux qui ne peuvent être menés que sur son

territoire et il entend être indemnisé de leur coût par le Costa Rica. C’est bien de restitutio qu’il

s’agit et l’indemnisation attendue de l’autre Partie est destinée à compenser le coût de cette

restitution. Cela ne me paraît avoir rien d’inconsistant ou d’incohérent.

23. Le Costa Rica affirme en outre que la même demande aurait été rejetée par votre arrêt

de 2009 dans la première affaire du San Juan 179. Vous aviez relevé alors que la question

 abstraite et générale  du «droit [du Nicaragua] de draguer le San Juan afin de rétablir le débit

d’eau qui existait en 1858, même si cela modifie le débit d’autres cours d’eau récepteurs comme le

Colorado», avait été réglée

176Voir CR 2015/4, p. 37, par. 9.

177 Edmund D. Andrews, «Evaluation des méthodes, des calculs et des conclusions du Costa Rica concernant
l’apport et le transport de sédiments dans le bassin du fleuve San Juan», juillet 2014, section V)I (RN, vol. II, annexe 3).
178
Déclaration écrite de M. le professeur émérite Edmund D. Andrews, 15 mars 2015, p. 2, par. 3.
179
Voir CMCR, p. 133-134, par. 6.11. - 59 -

«dans le dispositif de la sentence Cleveland. Cette sentence a en effet décidé, dans les

points 4 à 6 de la troisième partie, que le Costa Rica n’est pas tenu de contribuer aux
dépenses nécessaires pour améliorer la navigation sur le fleuve San Juan et que le
Nicaragua peut exécuter les travaux d ’amélioration qu’il estime convenables, à

condition que lesdits travaux ne perturbent pas gravement 180navigation sur les
affluents du San Juan appartenant auCosta Rica» .

Mais ici, les circonstances sont toute différentes de ce que la Cour avait à l’esp rit à ce

moment-là : en l’espèce, le Nicaragua ne vous demande pas de confirmer le droit reconnu par la

sentence Cleveland dans l’abstrait, mais de déclarer très concrètement que, pour remettre les choses

en l’état, à titre de réparation, de restitutio in integrum, il peut procéder à un tel dragage ; et ceci

aux frais du Costa Rica, hypothèse qui n’est pas du tout celle de la sentence de 1888, qui est toute

différente de la nôtre : ce qui est en cause ici, c’est la responsabilité du Costa Rica dans la situation

qui est à l’origine de l’obligation de procéder au dragage . De même le Costa Rica proteste contre

181
le fait que nous aurions fait la même demande dans l’affaire relative à Certaines activités . Il est

exact que nous avions formulé dans cette affaire u ne demande reconventionnelle destinée en des

termes voisins de ceux utilisés dans les conclusions de la r éplique relative à la route 182. Mais je

rappelle que la Cour a rejeté notre demande reconventionnelle, cette demande reconventionnelle

du Nicaragua en r elevant qu’elle n’était «pas suffisamment liée aux demandes principales du

183
Costa Rica pour pouvoir être déclarée recevable sur la base de l’article 80 du Règlement» . Or, il

paraît évident que le lien de connexité factuelle et juridique, qui faisait défaut en 2013 à la demande

du Nicaragua, existe en la présente espèce  d’autant plus qu’il s’agit ici non pas d’invoquer (en

tout cas pas exclusivement) un droit conventionnel, mais il s’agit simplement d’une modalité selon

laquelle la restitutio in integrum pourrait et même devrait être réalisée.

[Fin de la projection n o5  Projection n 6 : Une indemnisation pour les dommages

susceptibles d’évaluation financière]

180 Différend relatif à des droits de navigation et des droits connexes (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 269, par. 155.
181
Voir CMCR, p. 133, par. 6.11, et DCR, p. 134, par. 4.34.
182
CMN (Certaines activités menées par le Nicaragua dans la région frontalière (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua) ),
p. 455-456, par. 2 iii) et iv).
183 Construction d’une route au Cost a Rica le long du fleuve San Juan (Nicaragua c. Costa Rica) ; Certaines
activités menées par le Nicaragua dans la région frontalière (Costa Rica cNicaragua), demandes reconventionnelles ,
ordonnance du 18 avril 2013, C.I.J.Recueil 2013, p. 214, par. 36 et 37 ; voir aussi p. 215, par. 38. - 60 -

3. L’indemnisation 184

24. Monsieur le président, pour les raisons que j’ai indiquées il y a quelques instants, le coût

du dragage nécessaire à la remise du fleuve en l’état doit être inclus dans l’indemnité que le

Nicaragua prie la Cour de bien vouloir fixer dans une phase ultérieure de la procédure

 conformément à la pratique bien établie dont le Costa Rica se réclame d’ailleurs dans l’affaire

relative à Certaines activités 185.

25. Nos contradicteurs n’ont pas eu grand- chose à dire sur l’indemnisation réclamée par le

Nicaragua dans la mesure où la réparation ne peut être pleinement assurée par la restitution . Dans

leur contre-mémoire comme dans leur duplique, ils se bornent à répéter : «the simple point is that

Nicaragua’s claim for compensation is not based on any showing of actionable damage. The

waters continues to flow from the south basin on C osta Rican territory to the San Juan River, as it
186
has always done .» Eh bien non, Monsieur le président, ce n’est malheureusement pas exact :

certes les eaux du bassin de la rive sud continuent à grossir le fleuve ; mais aux sédiments habituels

s’en ajoutent d’énormes quantités résultant de la construction de la route, mais également des

débris de ponts, des débris de ponceaux, qui entraînent une sédimentation tout à fait abusive du

fleuve, affecte la qualité de ses eaux et de sa faune, entraîne la formati on de deltas de sédiments

dont la dimension va croissant, et entraîne une limitation de plus en plus marquée de la navigabilité

du San Juan de Nicaragua  particulièrement dans le cours inférieur du fleuve (entre la bifurcation

avec le Colorado et l’embouchure) 187.

26. Face au mutisme obstiné de nos contradicteurs sur l’indemnisation, je me bornerai à

quelques remarques en style télégraphique :

184 Voir MN, p. 242-243, par. 6.32-6.34 ; CMCR, p. 134-136, par. 6.12-6.14 ; RN, p. 265-266, par. 7.19-7.21 ;
DCR, p. 123-124, par. 4.9-4.10.

185Voir CR 2015/4, p. 36-37, par. 7 (Kohen).
186
DCR, p. 123-124, par. 4.10.
187 Voir notamment : Déclaration écrite de M. William E. Weaver, 15 mars 2015 ; Déclaration écrite du

professeur G. Mathias Kondolf (Affaire de la Route), 16 mars 2015 ; RN, p. 47-48, par. 2.40 et p. 48, fig. 2.13. - 61 -

1) comme ceci est communément admis, une indemnité n’est due à titre de réparation que «dans la

188
mesure où le dommage n’est pas réparé par la restitution» ;

2) dans notre affaire, je l’ai dit, on ne peut tout attendre de la restitution, ne fût -ce que parce

qu’elle ne peut pas avoir d’effet rétroactif et effacer les dommages qui ont déjà été causés au

fleuve et à son ut ilisation par le Nicaragua (par le Costa Rica aussi d’ailleurs  mais ce n’est

pas le préjudice dont nous vous demandons réparation ici !) ;

3) il est d’autant plus impossible d’évaluer maintenant l’étendue des préjudices matériels subis par

le Nicaragua, que, faute de remise de la route en état, celle-ci  ou ses malfaçons  continuent

de causer au «territoire fluvial» du Nicaragua des dommages extrêmement substantiels ;

4) dans l’hypothèse où la consistance et l’étendue de ces dommages ne sembleraient pas

suffisamment établies par les rapports précis, détaillés, motivés, des experts que nous avons

consultés, nous continuons de souhaiter que la Cour désigne un ou des experts de son choix

pour établir d’une manière complètement objective et irréfutable l’existence de ces préjudices et

la chaîne de leur causalité ;

5) et enfin, comme j’ai eu l’occasion de le dire vendredi en discutant les réparations demandées

189
par le Costa Rica dans l’affaire relative à Certaines activités , il nous paraît aller de soi que si,

par impossible, vous estimiez qu’une réparation pécuniaire est due par le Nicaragua en

réparation du (très modeste) préjudice matériel que le creusement et le nettoyage, en 2013, de

deux petits caños par M. Pastora et ses ouvriers, cette réparation pécuni aire devrait être déduite

de la somme, assurément beaucoup plus importante, que le Costa Rica sera appelé à verser au

Nicaragua pour les dommages considérables dus à la construction de la route et qui n’auront pu

être réparés par la restitutio. Et ceci semble être une conséquence normale en outre de la

jonction des affaires.

188Article 36 des Articles de la CDI. sur la respon sabilité de l’Etat pour fait internationalement illicite et son
commentaire, Annuaire 2001, vol. II, deuxième partie, p. 105-113. Voir aussi notamment : Usine de Chorzów, fond,
arrêt n o 13, 1928, C.P.J.I. série A n o17, p. 47 ; Projet Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros (Hongrie/Slovaquie), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1997, p. 80, par. 149 ; Usines de pâte à papier sur le fleuve Uruguay (Argentine c. Uruguay), arrêt,

C.I.J. Recueil 2010 (I), p. 103, par. 273 ; Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (République de Guinée c. République démocratique du
Congo), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2010 (II), p. 691, p. 161 ou Immunités juridictionnelles de l’Etat (Allemagne c.Italie ;
Gerce (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil 2012 (I), p. 153, par. 137 ; ou Tribunal international du droit de la mer, arrêt du
1 juillet 1999, Affaire du navire Saïga (n° 2) (Saint-Vincent-et-les Grenadines c. Guinée), par. 170.
189CR 2015/7, p. 61, par. 43 (Pellet). - 62 -

o o
[Fin de la projection n 6  Projection n 7 : Une déclaration de la Cour constatant que le

Costa Rica a commis des faits internationalement illicites]

4. La constatation de la violation de ses obligations par le Costa Rica

27. Au demeurant, ni la restitution ni l’indemnisation ne sont de nature à réparer le préjudice

moral (ou «juridique») subi par le Nicaragua. C’est pourquoi celui -ci prie par ailleurs la Cour de

déclarer formellement que le Costa Rica a violé ses obligations internationales à son égard 190et, en

premier lieu sa souveraineté territoriale en déversant dans le fleuve San Juan de Nicaragua,

illicitement et sans consultation aucune avec le souverain territorial, d’énormes quantités de

sédiments, qui en altèrent le cours et en limitent la navigabilité . Il s’agit là d’une autre forme de

déclaration, plus directement réparatrice, qui relève de la satisfaction.

28. Le Costa Rica s’y oppose en affirmant n’avoir commis aucune violation  c’est la loi du

genre ! Par hypothèse, lorsque l’on discute les remèdes, il faut postuler le contraire, au moins aux

fins du débat  et l’absence de toute discussion par le Costa Rica sur cette demande

nicaraguayenne autre que cette défense passe- partout, montre, a contrario , qu’il admet que, si la

Cour constate qu’il a commis les violations dont le Nicaragua l’accuse, un tel jugement déclaratoire

est, en l’occurrence, justifié.

29. Il aurait, à vrai dire, mauvaise grâce à prétendre le contrai re. Certes, ces constatations

sont le support nécessaire de l’arrêt à intervenir mais, dans l’affaire relative à Certaines activités,

malgré les dommages infiniment moins graves qu’il a subis, le Costa Rica a formulé, sans les

justifier clairement, des demandes de déclarations comparables alors même que, dans cette

affaire-là, sa souveraineté est contestée. Dans celle qui nous occupe plus directement aujourd’hui,

la souveraineté territoriale du Nicaragua sur le San Juan n’est pas contestée, les atteintes que lui

porte la construction de la route sont avérées. Il s’agit là d’un dommage immatériel qui s’ajoute

aux préjudices matériels causés au fleuve et à son environnement et qui appelle une satisfaction .

Comme l’a noté la Commission du d roit international dans son commentaire de l’article 37 des

Articles de 2001, dans des cas de ce genre, «[u]ne des formes de satisfaction les plus

190MN, p. 229 -231, par. 6.10 -6.12 ; CMCR, p. 132, par. 6.8 ; RN, p. 268 -269, par. 7.24-7.26 ; DCR, p. 132,
par. 4.27-4.28. - 63 -

fréquentes ... est la déclaration d’illicéité faite par une cour ou un tribunal compétent» 19. C’est ce

que le Nicaragua vous demande.

30. J’ajoute que l’attitude systématiquement blessante et outrancière du Costa Rica justifie

en l’espèce tout particulièrement cette demande qui permettra de clarifier définitivement la

situation juridique avec l’autorité de la chose jugée  ce qui est toujours plus incertain si l’on doit

s’en remettre aux seuls motifs de l’arrêt . Et, sans que je crois utile de m’y appesantir,

permettez-moi, Monsieur le président, de donner deux exemples de ces attitudes costa-riciennes qui

expliquent l’amertume du Nicaragua et plaident, en l’espèce, en faveur d’un tel arrêt déclaratoire :

 il y a d’abord (encore une fois, ce ne sont que des exemples) le nom officiel de la route

(«JuanRafael Mora Porras – Route 1856») qui ravive des souvenirs amers dans la mémoire

collective nicaraguayenne : 1856 est l’année de l’invasion et de l’occupation du Nicaragua par

l’aventurier américain William Walker ; quant à Juan Rafael Mora Porras, s’il contribua à la

lutte contre Walker, son armée occupa en 1857 une partie du territoi re nicaraguayen et il

complota avec l’envoyé de l’homme d’affaire Cornelius Vanderbilt pour arracher le San Juan

192
au Nicaragua ;

 je mentionne aussi la réaction complètement disproportionnée du Costa Rica face à l’affaire

des caños transformée en une «occup ation de l’Isla Portillos» et qui est à l’origine de la

proclamation de l’état d’urgence et de la construction précipitée de cette route désastreuse...

Nous sommes convaincus qu’une exposition claire et autorisée, comme vos décisions le sont,

contribuerait à un apaisement nécessaire en clarifiant, dans le dispositif de votre arrêt, les

obligations et les droits respectifs des deux Parties.

o o
[Fin de la projection n 7  Projection n 8 : Autres réparations déclaratoires]

191Commentaire de l’article 37 des Articles de la CDI sur la responsabilité de l’Etat pour fait internationalement
illicite, par. 6, Annuaire2001, vol. II, deuxième partie, p.114. Voir notamment affaire du Détroit de Corfou
(Royaume-Uni c. Albanie), fond, arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil 1949, p. 35 et sentence arbitrale du 30 avril 1990, Affaire
concernant les problèmes nés entre la Nouvelle -Zélande et la France relatifs à l’interprétation ou à l’application de deux
accords conclus le 9 juillet 1986, lesquels concernaient les problèmes découlant de l’affaire duRainbow Warrior ,
Nations Unies, Recueil des sentences arbitrales(RSA.), vol. XX, p. 273, par. 123.

192 Arthur Mcmillan, Cornelius Vanderbilt 163 Success Facts - Everything you ne ed to know about
Cornelius Vanderbilt , Emereo Publishing, May 23, 2014 - Biography & Autobiography - 170 pages,
Google eBook  https://books.google.fr/books?id=ndgKBwAAQBAJ&pg=PT85&lpg=PT85&dq=juan+…
rras+%2B+vanderbilt&source=bl&ots=rsjlkFeu4h&sig=mPEuIDbro-8qQfXA6ZED9raPQjg&hl=en&sa=X&ei=9C00
VcbNDZLfaP6kgcAM&ved=0CDsQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=vanderbiltjuan%20rafael%20mora%20porras%20%20%2
0vanderbilt&f=false. Voir MN, p. 2, note 1 ; voir aussi CMN (Certaines activités menées par le Nicaragua dans la
région frontalière (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua)), p. 30-31, par. 2.25-2.27 et CMN (Différend relatif à des droits de

navigation et des droits connexes (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua)) , p. 31-33, par. 1.2.41-1.2.43. - 64 -

5. Autres réparations déclaratoires 193

31. Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, compte tenu des circonstances très particulières de

l’affaire, le Nicaragua prie en outre la Cour de décider

 d’une part, que le Costa Rica ne peut entreprendre d’activités nouvelles dans la région du

San Juan sans avoir préalablement préparé une EIE et l’avoir communiquée en temps utile au

Nicaragua ; et

 d’autre part, qu’il n’utilisera pas ni ne laissera utiliser la route 1856 pour le transport de

matières dangereuses.

32. Peut-être est-ce là ce que l’on appelle des «garanties de non -répétition» même si j’avoue

avoir peu d’inclinaison pour cette notion que les Articles de la CDI jumellent bizarrement (à mon

194
avis à tort) avec la cessation du fait internationalement illicite , que les Parties ont pris la

mauvaise habitude d’invoquer un peu à tort et à travers devant vous, même lorsque l’affaire qui

vous est soumise ne s’y prête à l’évidence pas. Celle relative à Certaines activités parexemple : le

Costa Rica exige de telles garanties mais se garde bien d’indiquer en quoi elles pourraient

consister 195.

33. Il en va différemment dans la présente espèce dans laquelle le Nicaragua a, je pense, de

bonnes raisons de vous prier d’ordonner ces deux mesures très concrètes qui sont des mesures de

sage précaution. Le CostaRica les rejette l’une et l’autre.

34. En ce qui concerne l’EIE préalable à toute nouvelle activité  présentant, cela va de soi,

196
un risque significatif de dommage transfrontière , comme c’était le cas pour la route, le

Costa Rica répond essentiellement «à côté de la question»  si vous me permettez de finir, j’en ai

pour trois minutes pour cette rubrique… :

 selon sa coutume, il affirme n’avoir violé aucune obligation internationale puisque la

construction de la route n’a causé aucun dommage au Nicaragua 197  je renonce à commenter

cela ;

193
Voir MN, p. 234-238, par. 6.18-6.25 ; RN, p. 258-263, par. 7.11-7.15 ; DCR, p. 125-126, par. 4.14
194Article 39 des Articles de 2001 : «Cessation et non-répétition».

195Voir CR 2015/7, p. 62, par. 46 (Pellet).
196
Voir MN, p. 233-236, par. 6.17 et p. 252, par. 2 iv) ; CMCR, p. 132, par. 6.9 ; RN, p. 269-273, par. 7.27-7.35 ;
DCR, p. 132-133, par. 4.29-4.31.
197
DCR, p. 132-133, par. 4.29. - 65 -

 il en irait d’autant plus ainsi en l’espèce que la déclaration instituant l’état d’urgence l’aurait

dispensé de l’obligation d’établir une EIE 198 ;

 de toute manière, il aurait finalement, produit l’ étude en question en ... novembre 2013, soit

plus de trois ans après le début des travaux ; et,

 n’en n’étant pas à une contradiction près  bien qu’il ait produit, dit -il, cette étude  le

Costa Rica affirme «that it would have been impossible for Costa Rica to conduct a

transboundary EIA since Nicaragua has systematically denied Costa Rica access to the

199
San Juan River»] !

35. C’est justement parce que tout ceci est inquiétant, Monsieur le président , qu’une ferme

déclaration de la part de la Cour semble s’imposer . Il est en effet passablement préoccupant que le

Costa Rica estime que la construction de la route 1856 ne comportait aucun risque de dommage

significatif au territoire du Nicaragua (en l’occurrence au fleuve San Juan) . Il est assez alarmant

que le Costa Rica persiste à s’abriter d errière son droit interne pour prétendre à la licéité

internationale de son comportement en la matière . Et il est proprement atterrant qu’il considère

qu’une EIE digne de ce nom peut intervenir trois ans après l’achèvement des travaux qui en sont

l’objet.

[Fin de la projection n 8  Projection n 9 : Imaginez un camion-citerne... (Sediment deltas

downslope from failing watercourse crossings and exposed slopes. Severely Eroding Area 9,

Kondolf (2014), March 2015)]

36. L’autre déclaration de précaution que le Nicaragua prie la Cour de bien vouloir faire est

surtout une affaire de bon sens  ici encore la réponse du Costa Rica ne fait qu’aviver nos

inquiétudes et nous conforter dans la conviction qu’il vous faut, Mesdames et Messieurs de la

Cour, déclarer que la route doit être fermée à la circulation des produits dangereux jusqu’à ce

qu’elle soit conforme aux règles de l’art et présente des garanties normales de sécurité 20, ce qui est

loin d’être le cas. Imaginez un camion-citerne s’aventurant sur le tronçon de route visible sur cette

photo...

198Ibid.

199DCR, p. 133, par. 4.31
200
Voir RN, p. 273-276, par. 7.36-7.43 ; DCR, p. 134, par. 4.32-4.33. - 66 -

Le PRESIDENT : Monsieur le professeur, vous n’avez plus que deux minutes.

M. PELLET : Je ne prends que trente secondes.

37. La Partie costa-ricienne écrit dans sa d uplique qu’il s’agit d’une simple spéculation et

que, de toute façon, la route 1856 n’est pas ouverte à la circulation de produits dangereux. Soit !

mais lorsque l’on voit la manière dont le Costa Rica laisse de côté sa propre législation

environnementale dont il se glorifie lorsqu’il invente un état d’ur gence suite à une contestation

frontalière mineure, il n’y a pas vraiment là de quoi être rassuré  le Nicaragua le serait bien

davantage par un clair prononcé judiciaire, qui devrait être d’autant plus acceptable par nos amis

costa-riciens qu’il correspondrait à l’état du droit national tel qu’ils le décrivent.

[Fin de la projection n o9]

Je renonce à vous expliquer, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, pourquoi nous souhaitons que

vous désigniez un ou plusieurs experts. Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président. Je m’excuse pour

les deux minutes ou trois minutes de retard.

Le PRESIDENT : Monsieur le professeur, nous arrivons au terme du premier tour de

plaidoiries du Nicaragua. L’un des membres de la Cour souhaiterait poser au Nicaragua une

question à laquelle le Nicaragua est invité à répondre lors de son second tour de plaidoiries dans la

présente affaire. Je donne la parole à Mme la juge Xue.

Judge XUE: Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to pose one question to Nicaragua after

the first round hearing.

“In order to possibly assess the intolerable level of sediments in the Lower San

Juan, could Nicaragua inform the Court during the second round of oral hearings
whether in the past century it has done dredging operations on the Lower San Juan; if
so, how frequently such operations have been done and, each time, approximately how
many tons of sediments they dredged, if such data is available?”

Thank you, Mr. President. - 67 -

Le PRESIDENT : Merci. Le texte écrit de cette question sera remis aux Parti es à bref délai.

La Cour se réunira de nouveau jeudi après -midi, de 15 heures à 18 heures, pour entendre le début

du premier tour de plaidoiries du Costa Rica. Je vous remercie. L’audience est levée.

L’audience est levée à 13 h 5.

___________

Document Long Title

Audience publique tenue le mardi 21 avril 2015, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Abraham, président, dans les affaires relatives à Construction d’une route au Costa Rica le long du fleuve San Juan (Nicaragua c. Costa Rica) ; Certaines activités menées par le Nicaragua dans la région frontalière (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua)

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