Audience publique tenue le mardi 1er avril 2014, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Tomka, président, en l'affaire relative à l'Application de la convention pour la prévention

Document Number
118-20140401-ORA-01-00-BI
Document Type
Number (Press Release, Order, etc)
2014/25
Date of the Document
Bilingual Document File
Bilingual Content

Corrigé
Corrected

CR 2014/25

International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice

THE HAGUE LA HAYE

YEAR 2014

Public sitting

held on Tuesday 1 April 2014, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,

President Tomka presiding,

in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia)

________________

VERBATIM RECORD
________________

ANNÉE 2014

Audience publique
er
tenue le mardi 1 avril 2014, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,

sous la présidence de M. Tomka, président,

en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention

et la répression du crime de génocide (Croatie c. Serbie)

____________________

COMPTE RENDU

____________________ - 2 -

Present: President Tomka

Vice-President Sepúlveda-Amor
Judges Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade

Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari

Judges ad hoc Vukas
Kreća

Registrar Couvreur

 - 3 -

Présents : M. Tomka, président

M. Sepúlveda-Amor, vice-président
MM. Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade

Yusuf
Greenwood
Mmes Xue
Donoghue
M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
M. Bhandari, juges

MM. Vukas
Kreća, juges ad hoc

M. Couvreur, greffier

 - 4 -

The Government of the Republic of Croatia is represented by:

Ms Vesna Crnić-Grotić, Professor of International Law, University of Rijeka,

as Agent;

H.E. Ms AndrejaMetelko-Zgombić, Ambassador, Director General for EU Law, International Law
and Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Zagreb,

Ms Jana Špero, Head of Sector, Ministry of Justice, Zagreb,

Mr. Davorin Lapaš, Professor of International Law, University of Zagreb,

as Co-Agents;

Mr. James Crawford, A.C., S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, Member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,

Mr. PhilippeSands, Q.C., Professor of Law, University College London, Barrister, Matrix
Chambers, London,

Mr. Mirjan R. Damaška, Sterling Professor Emeritus of Law and Professorial Lecturer in Law,
Yale Law School, New Haven,

Mr. Keir Starmer, Q.C., Barrister, Doughty Street Chambers, London,

Ms Maja Seršić, Professor of International Law, University of Zagreb,

Ms Kate Cook, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London

Ms Anjolie Singh, Member of the Indian Bar, Delhi,

Ms Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London

as Counsel and Advocates;

Mr. Luka Mišetić, Attorney at Law, Law Offices of Luka Misetic, Chicago,

Ms Helen Law, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London

Mr. Edward Craven, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,

as Counsel;

H.E. Mr. Orsat Miljenić, Minister of Justice of the Republic of Croatia,

H.E. Ms Vesela Mrđen Korać, Ambassador of the Republic of Croatia to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, The Hague,

as Members of the Delegation; - 5 -

Le Gouvernement de la République de Croatie est représenté par :

Mme Vesna Crnić-Grotić, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Rijeka,

comme agent ;

S. Exc. Mme Andreja Metelko -Zgombić, ambassadeur, directeur général de la division de droit
communautaire et international et des affaires consulaires du ministère des affaires étrangères et
des affaires européennes,

Mme Jana Špero, chef de secteur au ministère de la justice,

M. Davorin Lapaš, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Zagreb,

comme coagents ;

M. James Crawford, A.C., S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Univers ité de
Cambridge, titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat,

Matrix Chambers (Londres),

M. Philippe Sands, Q.C., professeur de droit, University College de Londres, avocat,
Matrix Chambers (Londres),

M. Mirjan R. D amaška, professeur de droit émérite de l’Université de Yale (chaire Sterling),
chargé d’enseignement à l’Université de Yale,

M. Keir Starmer, Q.C., avocat, Doughty Street Chambers (Londres),

Mme Maja Seršić, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Zagreb,

Mme Kate Cook, avocat, Matrix Chambers (Londres),

Mme Anjolie Singh, membre du barreau indien (Delhi),

Mme Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, avocat, Matrix Chambers (Londres),

comme conseils et avocats ;

M. Luka Mišetić, avocat, Law Offices of Luka Misetic (Chicago),

Mme Helen Law, avocat, Matrix Chambers (Londres),

M. Edward Craven, avocat, Matrix Chambers (Londres),

comme conseils ;

S. Exc. M. Orsat Miljenić, ministre de la justice de la République de Croatie,

S. Exc. Mme Vesela Mrđen Korać, ambassadeur de la République de Croatie auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas,

comme membres de la délégation ; - 6 -

Mr. Remi Reichhold, Administrative Assistant, Matrix Chambers, London,

Ms Ruth Kennedy, LL.M., Administrative Assistant, University College London,

as Advisers;

Ms Sanda Šimić Petrinjak, Head of Department, Ministry of Justice,

Ms Sedina Dubravčić, Head of Department, Ministry of Justice,

Ms Klaudia Sabljak, Ministry of Justice,

Ms Zrinka Salaj, Ministry of Justice,

Mr. Tomislav Boršić, Ministry of Justice,

Mr. Albert Graho, Ministry of Justice,

Mr. Nikica Barić, Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb,

Ms Maja Kovač, Head of Service, Ministry of Justice,

Ms Katherine O’Byrne, Doughty Street Chambers,

Mr. Rowan Nicholson, Associate, Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Unive rsity of
Cambridge,

as Assistants;

Ms Victoria Taylor, International Mapping, Maryland,

as Technical Assistant.

The Government of the Republic of Serbia is represented by:

Mr. Saša Obradović, First Counsellor of the Embassy of the Republic of Serbia in the Kingdom of

the Netherlands, former Legal Adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

as Agent;

Mr. William Schabas, O.C., M.R.I.A., Professor of International Law, Middlesex University
(London) and Professor of International Criminal Law and Human Rights, Leiden University,

Mr. AndreasZimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), Professor of International Law, University of
Potsdam, Director of the Potsdam Centre of Human Rights, Member of the Permanent Court of

Arbitration,

Mr. Christian J. Tams, LL.M., Ph.D. (Cambridge), Professor of International Law, University of
Glasgow, - 7 -

M. Remi Reichhold, assistant administratif, Matrix Chambers (Londres),

Mme Ruth Kennedy, LL.M., assistante administrative, University College de Londres,

comme conseillers ;

Mme Sanda Šimić Petrinjak, chef de département au ministère de la justice,

Mme Sedina Dubravčić, chef de département au ministère de la justice,

Mme Klaudia Sabljak, ministère de la justice,

Mme Zrinka Salaj, ministère de la justice,

M. Tomislav Boršić, ministère de la justice,

M. Albert Graho, ministère de la justice,

M. Nikica Barić, Institut croate d’histoire (Zagreb),

Mme Maja Kovač, chef de département au ministère de la justice,

Mme Katherine O’Byrne, Doughty Street Chambers,

M. Rowan Nicholson, Associate au Lauterpacht Center for International Law de l’Université de
Cambridge,

comme assistants ;

Mme Victoria Taylor, International Mapping (Maryland),

comme assistante technique.

Le Gouvernement de la République de Serbie est représenté par :

M. Saša Obradović, premier conseiller à l’ambassade de la République de Serbie au Royaume des

Pays-Bas, ancien conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,

comme agent ;

M. William Schabas, O.C., membre de la Royal Irish Academy, professeur de droit international à
la Middlesex University (Londres) et professeur de droit pénal international et des droits de
l’homme à l’Université de Leyde,

M. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Université de Harvard), professeur de droit international à
l’Université de Potsdam, directeur du centre des droits de l’homme de l’Université de Potsdam,
membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,

M. Christian J. Tams, LL.M., Ph.D. (Université de Cambridge), professeur de droit international à
l’Université de Glasgow, - 8 -

Mr. Wayne Jordash, Q.C., Barrister, Doughty Street Chambers, London, Partner at Global Rights
Compliance,

Mr. Novak Lukić, Attorney at Law, Belgrade, former President of the Association of the Defense
Counsel practising before the ICTY,

Mr. Dušan Ignjatović, LL.M. (Notre Dame), Attorney at Law, Belgrade,

as Counsel and Advocates;

H.E. Mr. Petar Vico, Ambassador of the Republic of Serbia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

Mr. Veljko Odalović, Secretary-General of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, President of
the Commission for Missing Persons,

as Members of the Delegation;

Ms Tatiana Bachvarova, LL.M . (London School of Economics and Political Science), LL.M.
(St. Kliment Ohridski), Ph.D. candidate (Middlesex University), Judge, Sofia District Court,

Bulgaria,

Mr. Svetislav Rabrenović, LL.M. (Michigan), Senior Adviser at the Office of the Prosecutor for
War Crimes of the Republic of Serbia,

Mr. Igor Olujić, Attorney at Law, Belgrade,

Mr. Marko Brkić, First Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Relja Radović, LL.M. (Novi Sad), LL.M. (Leiden(candidate)),

Mr. Georgios Andriotis, LL.M. (Leiden),

as Advisers. - 9 -

M. Wayne Jordash, Q.C., avocat, Doughty Street Chambers (Londres), associé du cabinet Global
Rights Compliance,

M. Novak Lukić, avocat, Belgrade, ancien président de l’association des conseils de la défense
exerçant devant le TPIY,

M. Dušan Ignjatović, LL.M. (Université Notre Dame), avocat, Belgrade,

comme conseils et avocats ;

S. Exc. M. Petar Vico, ambassadeur de la République de Serbie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,

M. Veljko Odalović, secrétaire général du Gouvernement de la République de Serbie, président de
la commission pour les personnes disparues,

comme membres de la délégation ;

Mme Tatiana Bachvarova, LL.M. (London School of Economics and Political Science),
LL.M. (Université St. Kliment Ohridski), doctorante (Middlesex U niversity); juge au tribunal

de district de Sofia (Bulgarie),

M. Svetislav Rabrenović, LL.M. (Université du Michigan), conseiller principal au bureau du
procureur pour les crimes de guerre de la République de Serbie,

M. Igor Olujić, avocat, Belgrade,

M. Marko Brkić, premier secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères,

M. Relja Radović, LL.M. (Université de Novi Sad), LL.M. (Université de Leyde (en cours)),

M. Georgios Andriotis, LL.M. (Université de Leyde),

comme conseillers. - 10 -

The PRESIDENT: Good morning. Please be seated. The Court meets this morning to hea r

Croatia’s response to Serbia’s counter-claims. I shall now give the floor to Sir Keir Starmer. You

have the floor, Sir.

Sir Keir STARMER:

S ERBIA ’S COUNTER -CLAIM : FACTS AND E VIDENCE

I. Introduction

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I will de al with the factual and evidentiary matters

arising from the Respondent’s counter-claim. Professor Sands will then deal with the legal issues

before the Agent of Croatia makes closing submissions.

II. Shelling did not target civilians

2. Mr. President, so far as the counter -claim is concerned the shelling or artillery attacks on

towns and villages in the Krajina has always been central to the Respondent’s case. But, h aving

carefully read and re-read the transcripts of proceedings in Court last Friday afternoon, one cannot

help concluding that the Respondent has lost confidence in its own counter-claim.

3. In its written pleadings, the Respondent always put its case by arguing  and I hope there

is a quote on your screens: [ plate on] “The Krajina Serbs were attacked by deliberate

indiscriminate shelling in order to be forced to flee their homes, towns and villages.”1 [Plate off]

That has been the constant backbone to the whole displacement theory.

4. On Friday, just one half se ntence was devoted by Pr ofessor Schabas in support of that

original position when he said, and this is how he put it : [Plate on] “Serbia is not making any

concession . . . its position is that the artillery bombardments were unlawful .” [Plate off] Neither

Mr. Jordash nor Mr. Obradović has spent any time trying to sustain the Respondent’s original

position.

1Rejoinder of Serbia (RS), para. 701; see also Counter-Memorial of Serbia (CMS), para. 1229.
2
CR 2014/24, p. 15, para. 16 (Schabas). - 11 -

5. Instead Professor Schabas devoted a considerable part of his speech to a proposition which

he sought to maintain was hypothetical . The proposition was as follows and, again, I hope this is

on your screen:

[Plate on]

“Even if the shelling was not unlawful, and even if the intent was not to

displace the Serbs forcibly  a point which Serbia raises only for the sake of
argument  those who schemed at Brioni may have concluded that lawful shelling
would be enough to effect the removal of the Serbs, at least from the four towns. If
that were their intent, regardless of the means they chose to employ, the conspiracy at
4
Brioni would still be criminal in nature.”

6. Mr. President, Members of the Court, w hat led Professor Schabas to devote no less than

eight paragraphs you will see in the transcript  of his final speech , on his final day, to flying

this  hypothetical  kite?

7. The answer in part , of course, is the decision of the Appeals Chamber in Gotovina. As I

demonstrated in my first round speech, unless this Court is tempted into some wholly

unconventional judge-ranking exercise, the decision of the Appeals Chamber in Gotovina that,

firstly, Operation Storm artillery attacks were not unlawful and , secondly, that no intent forcibly to

displace Serbs could be inferred are, and remain, “highly persuasive”. The point I made last time

and I do not repeat now is that that is, in effect, the end of the counter -claim, unless you are

persuaded to adopt a different approach to the ICTY findings.

8. But there is another reason why the Respondent has, in reality, abandoned its original

position. It is this.

9. Even if, contrary to my argument, you were persuaded by the Respondent to depart from

the approach to ICTY findings set out in the Bosnia case, the Respondent has, rather

embarrassingly, finished its case without setting out how you should approach your task in

assessing for yourselves whether the artillery attacks w ere unlawful. Mr. Obradović simply told

you that “this Court can form its own view on this issue” 5. That is the invitation from the

Respondent; this Court can form its own view on this issue. The issue, of course, being whether

3
CR 2014/24, p. 15, para. 18 (Schabas).
4CR 2014/24, p. 16, para. 21 (Schabas).
5
CR 2014/17, p. 30, para. 61 (Obradović). - 12 -

the artillery attacks we re legitimate and thus lawful, or indiscriminate and thus unlawful. As to

how, absent any assistance from Gotovina  which, of course, you are invited to put to one side 

the Court should form its own view, the Respondent is conspicuously silent.

10. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in reality, absent Gotovina, t here are only two real

options. Option one, if you abandon the Appeals Chamber in Gotovina, is that you could revert to

the 200-metre standard used at first instance to distinguish between legitimate and indiscriminate

artillery attacks. You could go back to that position, the first instance position. At least there was a

comprehensive analysis of where the missiles fell, and the employing of a 200 -metre standard to

determine whether they were legitimate or not, in terms of target. But, of course, the problem with

option one is that, on analysis, the 200-metre standard was found to be without any proper

foundation and did not allow for simple variations, such as the distance over which the missiles

travelled. So, it was plucked out of the air as a standard and it was applied without variation as to

the circumstances. For that reason, not only did all five judges in the ICTY Appeals Chamber rule

that it was evidentially groundless, but ev en the ICTY Prosecutor , by the appeals stage, had

abandoned reliance on it. And that, no doubt, is whythe Respondent has not invited you to go back

to the 200-metre standard. No one in their right mind would go back to that standard which has

been so heavily criticized by everybody who has looked at it subsequently.

11. But if not the abandoned 200- metre standard, then what? Option two, the only other

option left to this Court, is your own assessment on some other basis. But w hat evidence has the

Respondent put before you to advance its case that the artillery attacks were unlawful? To show

that the targets were not legitimate, some standard or yardstick is surely needed to distinguish

between legitimate and indiscriminate artillery attacks. That distinction has got to be made if the

proposition that they are unlawful, on the basis put, is to be sustained. So where is the standard,

where is the yardstick and, where is a suitably qualified expert faithfully applying the chosen

yardstick to the facts o f this case? Non -existent. No standard, no yardstick, no expert. So, in

summary, the Appeals Chamber in Gotovina does not help the Respondent and they urge you not to

follow it, not to treat it as highly persuasive because that ends their case. So the Appeals Chamber

does not help, the first instance chamber does not help, because they relied on the flawed 200-metre

standard, so you cannot go back to that, and the only other option is some standard of your own, - 13 -

which you are going to apply to the facts, without any help as to what the standard is or any expert

that takes you through the facts to give you findings that can be meaningful to determine whether

the targets were legitimate or indiscriminate. How can the Respondent possibly get home on

unlawful artillery attacks when they are the only options and none of them help the Respondent?

12. The simple fact of the matter is this. Gotovina or not, the Respondent ran this case on a

proposition, namely that the artillery attacks were unlawful because th ey were indiscriminate,

which is wholly unsupported on its own evidence. It is all very well inviting this Court to make its

own assessment, but on what basis? I reflected on that over the weekend.

13. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the dawning re ality is this: the hypothetical to

which Professor Schabas devoted so much time in closing is not a hypothetical at all. It is now the

Respondent’s case. They are so far from their original case, that it is impossible to bridge the gap

back home. That explains the considerable time and energy spent on the hypothetical, which on

any view is a curious way to end a case such as this.

14. So let us examine the hypothetical again. You still have it I hope on your screens.

15. The points I make in respons e are so obvious that I did wonder about the wisdom of

making them at all:

(a) First, for the Respondent to end its case relying on a hypothetical is hardly a show of strength

in the arguments once made but now all but abandoned.

(b) Second, even on its own terms, just reading the words on the screen carefully, the highest the

Respondent puts it is that “those who schemed at Brioni may have concluded that lawful

shelling would be enough to effect the removal of the Serbs”. So they were conspiring , by

lawful means, to commit genocide. That is not an obvious proposition. I pause there. This

sinister intent has apparently been hidden so deeply that it was missed by the Prosecutor  the

Prosecutor before the ICTY relied on unlawful shelling  it was missed by the Prosecutor, it

was missed by the ICTY at first instance, they relied on unlawful shelling, it was missed by the

Appeals Chamber because they were analysing unlawful shelling, and it has been missed by

every commentator. It was only unearthed by Pr ofessor Schabas last Friday  18 years and

eight months after the Brioni meeting. Nobody else before then has suggested that you can

commit genocide by lawful shelling. That is the complete contrary of the way the case had - 14 -

been put. And just staying wit h the words on the page: “those who schemed may have

concluded that lawful shelling would be enough”. That is not even proof on the balance of

probabilities! I described it as flying a kite, this is flying a kite: if all else fails  which it now

has at this stage  try this as an idea.

(c) Third, the whole hypothetical is now based on some unarticulated idea that even if the attacks

were not indiscriminate or carried out with the intention to displace the Serbs, they were

unlawful in some other way. What other way? And on what evidence? If the shelling was not

indiscriminate, the basis upon which everybody has proceeded to date, what is the alternative

basis for unlawfulness? And why was it never articulated in the pleadings? [Plate off]

16. The Brioni Minutes do not help. The Respondent ended its case on Friday accepting, and

I quote: [Plate on] “Taken in isolation, the Brioni Minutes may indeed lend themselves to different

interpretations.” [Plate off]

17. Indeed. But how do artillery attack s which are not unlawful help the Respondent’s

preferred interpretation? Alternatively, how do minutes, capable even on the Respondent’s case of

bearing a number of interpretations, show that artillery attacks found by the Appeals Chamber not

to have been indiscriminate were otherwise unlawful? One unsustainable proposition does not gain

strength by being linked to another unsustainable proposition. To observe that the Respondent’s

case is hopelessly circular is to state the obvious.

III. No targeting of civilians in columns

18. Mr. President, Members of the Court, let us examine whether the Respondent’s case on

targeting civilians in the columns breaks the circle.

19. The Respondent claims that the Brioni Minutes should be viewed in light of the

subsequent alleged targeting of the columns. The Applicant responded to this allegation on

18 March this year, and the Respondent has offered nothing new in rebuttal. Croatia did not target

civilians in the columns, no plan to do so was discussed at Brioni, and the ICTY made no finding s

to this effect.

6CR 2014/24, p. 21, para. 39 (Schabas). - 15 -

20. Against that background, Professor Schabas suggested that this Court should infer that

7
Tuđman was “targeting civilians” at Brioni, when he insisted that an escape route should be left

for the retreating forces in order to minimi ze the losses that would have been occasioned by a

desperate fight to the death. Anyone who has read Sun Tzu’s The Art of War would realize that

leaving a way out to a surrounded enemy is one of most ancient and uncontroversial humanitarian

restrictions on warfare 8. It is certainly not a basis for inferring genocide.

21. But there is an equally profound problem for the Respondent on the facts. Although the

Respondent has not exercised any particular care in the way it puts its case in its oral pleadings, in

its written pleadings it relied on four alleged attacks on columns in the territory known as Sector

North, and a fifth in Bosnia and Herzegovina, near Petrovac 9. So five attacks, four in Sector North.

That is their case at its highest. But now, it is said to give rise to genocidal intent. Last Friday,

Professor Schabas told you that “as the events that took pl ace during Operation Storm suggest, the

refugee columns were deliberately ambushed, shelled and executed by the Croatian soldiers on the

way” 10. So deliberate ambushing, shelling, on the way. Four of the five attacks in Sector North.

Yet, when he opened the case before this Court, Mr. Obradović was at pains to point out that the

Croatian Army com mander in Sector North, General Stipetić, did not have any genocidal mens

rea 11. He emphasized that point. The only individual he singled out in that way. So t he

Respondent is inviting you to come to a finding of genocide on the basis of four attacks in Sector

North while itself disavowing mens rea on the part of the man in charge. That again is a curious

way to end your case.

IV. No genocidal campaign in the aftermath

22. Professor Schabas next claimed that the Brioni Minutes should be given a criminal

interpretation in light of the killings that took place in the weeks and months after Storm. He made

7
CR 2014/24, p. 22, para. 41 (Schabas).
8Sun Tzu, The Art of War , trans. Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, 1971, Chap. VII, p. 109, para. 31:
“To a surrounded enemy you must leave a way of escape . . . To encamp under the walls of a strong city and attack

rebels determined to fight to the death is not a good plan!”
9RS, para. 745.
10
CR 2014/24, p. 26, para. 51 (Schabas).
11
CR 2014/16, p. 28, para. 56 (Obradović), cited at CR 2014/19, p. 33, para. 34 (Singh). - 16 -

no attempt to explain how this argument is sustainable in light of the fact that murder and looting

were not discussed at Brioni, and in light of the ICTY Trial Chamber’s explicit finding that the

12
Brioni participants had no intention to commit murder, destruction or plunder . I anticipate that he

would invite you to take a different approach to the ICTY at first instance. I will not repeat the

submissions on that.

23. Professor Schabas claimed that most of the Serbs that stayed behind were killed 13,

that  and this is how he put it  [Plate on] “all of the Serb s who were found in the cities and

villages in August 1995 were killed by the Croatian Army”  all the Serbs  and that “[t]he

Croatian [soldiers] killed as many civilians as they were able to find or to lure out of hiding” and

then “all surviving Serbs in the Krajina, to the extent that Croat forces could find them, were

14
exterminated” . That is what you were told on Friday.

24. The facts are as follows. First, the numbers. On 21 December 1995, the United Nations

Secretary-General reported that accord ing to the ICRC, there were slightly more than 9,000 Serbs

15
in the former United NationsSectors North and South . For his part, Mr.Štrbac, the Respondent’s

expert witness, claims that 1,662 persons were allegedly killed by Croatian forces during Operation

16 17
Storm  total 1,662  of whom 1,513 were killed during the first week . So, on the

Respondent’s case, at its very highest, 149 people regrettably lost their life after the first week of

the Operation  149 out of 9,000.

25. Second, the Gotovina Trial Chamber cited evidence that 4,000 civilians who were found

by the Croatian a rmy in the Krajina region were taken to government -run reception centres to be

cared for 18 4,000  and 400 captured Serb combatants were taken to collection centres and

19
processed through the criminal justice system . Pausing there, and just looking again at the

screen, 4,000 were taken to a government -run reception centre, and 400 combatants were put

12Gotovina, Trial Judgement, para. 2321.
13
CR 2014/24, p. 27, para. 54 (Schabas).
14
CR 2014/24, pp. 28-19, paras. 57-58 (Schabas).
15Gotovina, TJ, para. 1712.

16Expert witness statement of Savo Štrbac,para. 6.3.2.
17
Ibid., para. 6.7.
18
Gotovina, TJ, para. 1648.
19Gotovina, TJ, para. 1653. - 17 -

through the criminal justice system. Look again at those three sweeping quotes from

Professor Schabas. All surviving Serbs in the Krajina, to the extent the Croat forces could find

them, were exterminated. How can that be right? [Plate off] Lest there be any suspicion that

civilians were taken to the reception centres for some nefarious purpose, we urge the Court to note

that the Trial Chamber concluded that civilians were free to leave the reception centres at any time,

and that they were not deprived of their liberty 20 an issue in the case.

26. Mr. Jordash also tried to support this claim of an organized killing campaign by claiming

that there was a “pattern of concealment” by the Croatian army, because of alleged restrictions on

21
the movement by United Nations personnel . What Mr. Jordash omitted to advise this Court is

that the ICTY Trial Chamber expressly rejected the claim of a pattern of concealment, finding “the

Trial Chamber further considers that concealment of crimes is not the only reasonable

interpretation of the general evidence regarding movement restrictions” 2. So again, raised in the

ICTY at first instance, dealt with by that Chamber and not accepted.

27. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the Respondent’s claims of an organi zed killing

campaign designed to exterminate the Krajina Serbs lacks any basis in evidence or in reality.

28. The Respondent further claims that the Applicant “ignored” the Respondent’s allegations

of “acts causing serious bodily and mental harm to members of the group of Krajina Serbs” 23. That

is actually wrong. The Applicant has repeatedl y noted the Gotovina Trial Chamber’s specific

findings that the Croatian leadership including President Tudjman not only did not intend this

24
destruction, but that they were opposed to it .

29. The Respondent’s reliance on reports of the ECMM and the Unite d Nations Military

Observers concerning the number of burned houses after Operation Storm is equally misplaced.

The ICTY had all of this evidence before it, including the documents the Respondent claims

25
support its case. The Trial Chamber did not accept them .

20Gotovina, TJ, para. 1668.
21
CR 2014/24, p. 52, paras. 74-76 (Jordash).
22
Gotovina, TJ, para. 2540.
23CR 2014/24, p. 29, para. 59 (Schabas).
24
Gotovina, TJ, para. 2313.
25
See Gotovina, TJ, para. 61. - 18 -

30. Finally, and in any event, however distressing, looting and burning of property is  and

of course it is  it is not of course an act that can of itself constitute genocide within the meaning

of Article II of the Convention.

V. Conclusion

31. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in conclusion, my submissions make clear that the

Respondent’s counter-claim based on alleged violations of the Genocide Convention during and

after Operation Storm cannot succeed on the facts and evidence presented. Neither the Brioni

transcript nor the events that follow it establish genocidal intent. In addition, there is not sufficient

evidence in respect of those events for this Court to be fully convinced that genocidal acts have

occurred.

32. On a final issue of evidence, we note that the Respondent’s earlier enthusiasm for the

discredited CHC Report and Veritas has somewhat diminished after our comprehensive exposure

of their deficiencies last week. Serbia ended its case, half-heartedly stating that “the CHC report

has not been completely discredited by the ICTY ”; and acknowledges that the Veritas report

26
contained “factual errors”  hardly ending on a high.

33. Mr. President, Members of the Court, thank you for your attention today, and in my

previous submissions. Can I now invite you to call on Professor Sands who will deal with the legal

issues.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir K eir Starmer. I now call on Professor PhilippeSands to

continue. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. SANDS:

S ERBIA ’S COUNTER -CLAIM : THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS

I. Introduction

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it falls to me to respond to the legal arguments, such

as they were, that the Respondent made in support of its c ounter-claim, last Friday afternoon. The

2CR 2014/24, p. 55, paras. 90 and 92. - 19 -

Court will have note d  certainly as did our side of the room  that those arguments were thin,

and somewhat novel.

2. Mr. President, Members of the Court, having devoted more than half of its opening round

to the counter-claim, the Respondent devoted far less time to the counter-claim in its second round.

And, Serbia plainly appears to recognize that its claim is, as we put it in the first round, hopeless. It

is without any legal authority. Professor Schabas and Mr. Jordash hardly advanced a positive legal

case that events over four days in August 1995 amounted to a genocide. Following the Gotovina

judgements and I use the term in the plural  it is difficult to see how it could do otherwise.

3. Professor Schabas was rather defensive in his tone. In opening, he announced that he

27
would address what he called “the limited relevance” of the Gotovina decision” . Yet: his first

25 footnotes were all Gotovina. Indeed, his speech compri sed 112 footnotes, of which 40 made

reference to judicial authorities, of those 40, 38 referred to Gotovina. He made a single reference

to this Court’s 2007 Judgment  which he and Serbia obviously do not consider to be helpful to

their counter-claim  and a single reference to another judg ement of the ICTY  the Prlić

28
case  which was to a finding of fact, not of law . Despite the fact that he urged this Court to

find that there was, as he put it “essential differences between the Gotovina case before the ICTY

and the subject -matter of the counter -claim” 29, the on ly case he dwelt on was Gotovina. He

30
complained about what he called a “gaping hole in the picture presented by the ICTY case law” ;

Mr. President, if there is a “gaping hole”, then it is in the Respondent’s counter-claim. It is

customary, in advancing one’s case, to cite to legal authorities that are supportive of the

propositions one makes; Professor Schabas was unable to invoke a single legal authority to support

Serbia’s counter-claim last Friday afternoon.

4. The Respondent is plainly aware that t he ICTY’s judg ements in the Gotovina case are

fatal to its counter-claim. It has chosen not to address at all the Trial Chamber’s findings

concerning the lack of intent by Croatia’s leaders to kill or injure Serbs, or to destroy their

27
CR 2014/24, p. 10, para. 1 (Schabas).
28See ibid., p. 17, footnote 27 and p. 22, footnote 36 (Schabas).

29CR 2014/24, p. 17, para. 25 (Schabas).
30
Ibid., p. 19, para. 32 (Schabas). - 20 -

property. Last Frid ay, Professor Schabas abandoned completely any continued attempt to argue

that the shelling in Operation Storm was unlawful, or that it targeted civilians. But he chose

instead, to advance a new theory for the c ounter-claim. A theory which is in our subm ission

nonsensical  as a matter of law  and totally undermined by the highly persuasive findings of

fact and law of the Trial and Appeals Chambers in Gotovina.

5. In a somewhat novel approach, he now rests his case on the argument that this Court

should find as a matter of law that the artillery bombardment of the Four Towns were genocidal in

character, notwithstanding a hypothesis  and I hesitate to use that word , Mr. President following

the Court’s Judgment yesterday  that the bombardment was, as he put it, “entirely consistent with

31
the laws or customs of war” and “in compliance with the law of armed conflict” . He posited that

even were one to assume  as the ICTY Appeals Chamber held, that “only military objectives

were targeted, and that the choi ce of weapons was proportionate, aimed at minimizing collateral

damage, in particular towards non- combatants” 32 this Court might somehow nevertheless be

able to rule that the shelling was genocidal. You are asked , as a court, to find that the Brioni

Minutes evidences the mens rea of genocide, “regardless of the means”, and regardless of the

lawfulness of the means, that the Croatian leadership chose to employ to regain control of Croatian

33
territory . On that logic  if it can be called logic  you are asked to believe  and to find 

that the lawful shelling by the Croatian a rmy during Operation Storm or, more specifically

34
perhaps, the “great fear” inspired by that lawful shelling in those present in the Four Towns 

constituted the actus reus of genocide.

6. Professor Schabas goes so far as to assert that he “do[es] not think this is a difficult
35
proposition” . Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is not a difficult proposition: it is a

hopeless proposition. It is legally and logically impossibl e as a proposition. It is also an

extraordinary proposition for Professor Schabas to attempt to advance before this Court. How can

an attack that complies with international humanitarian law be genocidal in nature? It surely

31CR 2014/24, p. 15, para. 16 (Schabas).
32
Ibid.
33Ibid., pp. 15-16, paras. 19-21 (Schabas).

34Ibid., p. 16, para. 20 (Schabas).
35
Ibid., para. 18 (Schabas). - 21 -

cannot constitute the actus reus of genocide. How could an attack be genocidal and yet comply

with the laws of war? It is a looking glass proposition: an attack that is both lawful and

genocidal  a notion as contradictory and nonsensical as it sounds.

7. This argument is also plainly at odds with the findings of the ICTY in Gotovina. Even in

relation to the Trial Chamber’s limited factual findings that were overturned by the Appeals

Chamber  namely its finding that the shelling of the Four Towns was indiscriminate, based on

the 200-metre standard  the Trial Chamber repeatedly found the Croatian army’s targeting of

36
military objectives to have been “in good faith” . Targeting of military objectives for the purpose

of expelling civilians  much less for the purposes of destroying an ethnic group, in whole or in

part  can never be conducted “in good faith”. These findings further  and fatally  undermine

Professor Schabas’s argument that lawful shelling was the actus reus of genocide. In the face of

those findings, all Professor Schabas can do is to boldly assert that the ICTY Appeals Chamber “is

37
wrong” . The Respondent’s recourse, once again, is to deny unhelpful ICTY findings, and to ask

this Court to go behind them.

8. Instead of a search for authorities, what we heard inst ead were unfortunate and highly

personalized unjustifiable attacks on the former President of Croatia, argument by ad hominem

assertion, which is unusual for any court of law, let alone this one. There was an expression of

surprise that somehow Croatia had not leapt to President Tudjman’s defence. The nature of those

arguments, if they can be called arguments , speak for themselves. It was unbecoming, in our

submission, for a sovereign State to associate itself with such assertions, and they are undeservi ng

of a response in a courtroom. Perhaps this was one element of the speech inserted, as

Professor Schabas candidly put it, “because the Agent for Serbia asked me to do this” 38.

39
9. Equally unhappy was Professor Schabas’s return to the events of January 1942 . It may

be that a retraction of sorts was made: “clumsy” and “inappropriate”, his words, might be said to

be words of understatement. But perhaps we were not alone in feeling discomforted by t he

36
Prosecutor v. Gotovina, IT-06-90-T, 15 April 2011, paras. 1899-1902, 1919, 1930, and 1931.
3CR 2014/24, p. 16, para. 21 (Schabas).

3CR 2014/23, p. 50, para. 26 (Schabas).
39
CR 2014/24, p. 21, para. 39 (Schabas). - 22 -

impression that what counsel gave with one hand he t hen took away with the other, with most

40 41
unfortunate references to “Tudjman’s ‘final solution’” , and “lebensraum” . Sir Keir Starmer has

said more than enough about the Brioni Minutes, and so has the ICTY.

10. About Mr. Jordash and legal authorities, he made one reference to your 2007 Judgment

last Friday afternoon, several references to the Gotovina judgement, and not a single reference to

any other ICTY judg ement. Even in dealing with the nine points of comparison that Croatia

made  and on which we respectfully submit he made not a dent, as Sir Keir has shown  in

respect of the section entitled “ICTY Findings” (point eight of the nine) he was unable to bring

himself to refer to a single judgement (other than a relevant passing reference to the Martić case) to

support the case he advanced. In short, the counter-claim made by Serbia is bereft of any, any,

supportive legal authorities.

Missing persons

11. We turn to something briefly about missing persons and the issue of continuing violation,

as Serbia has addressed th is issue in its counter-claim. Counsel for the Respondent claimed that

“the continuing violation argument” was, as he put it, nothing more than an “ill-conceived debating

42
ploy, cooked up over breakfast” . Actually, it was a respo nse to a question put by

Judge Cançado Trindade 4. Croatia addressed the issue of continuing violations in a manner that

was intended to be responsive and helpful to an inquiry from the Bench. It is true that neither party

had addressed that issue very extensively in its pleadings, but the questions having been put, and

the provisions of the Convention spe aking in the terms that it does, I refer you to Article 2 (b)

which refers to “serious . . . mental harm to members of the group”, the connection with a

continuing violation became rather clear. “It does not belong here”, counsel for Serbia said 44. But

why not? Just as with torture, the family of the missing person is a member of the same group, is

subject to a continuing mental harm, and it is equally t he situation that the failure to account for a

40CR 2014/24, p. 21, para. 39 (Schabas).
41
Ibid., p. 11, para. 5 (Schabas).
42CR 2014/23, p. 44, para. 12 (Schabas).

43CR 2014/18, p. 69 (question by Judge Cançado Trindade).
44
CR 2014/23, p. 45, para. 12 (Schabas). - 23 -

missing person, or to take reasonable steps to assist in the location of such a person, brings into

play the prohibition on acts proscribed by the Genocide Convention, including the obligation to

investigate.

12. Serbia too sought to respond to the questions put on missing persons that came from the

Bench. And i t offered a new list of missing persons. The document was not sourced, and came

with no proper accompanying explanation. Since the Agent of Serbia told the Court that he did

45
“not consider that list to be evidence” , nothing more need be said of it.

The 2007 Judgment and paragraph 373

13. Mr. President, I turn to the issue of inferring intent to destroy a group in whole or in part,

from a pattern of behaviour, a proposition raised by Professor Schabas in the counter-claim, as you

have just heard from Sir Keir Starmer. We might call th is the paragraph373 issue. You will of

course recall that I had made the submission, on Thursday 20 March, to the e ffect that no

international court or tribunal had applied the very high burden set out in paragraph 373, or had

followed the language adopted by this Court seven years ago. I also made the point that some

made clear  some court’s and tribunal’s made clear  that they did not consider themselves to

46
be bound by the approach that is said to have been followed by this Court in 2007 . In response to

that proposition, Professor Schabas claimed that despite extensive legal research he could not find

any instance of any court or tribunal saying it was not bound by the ICJ approach. We were a bit

puzzled by his submission, baffled even, because Professor Schabas himself expressly referred to

such instances in his speech on 10 March 2014 47. The examples he cited are manifold. For

example, in June 2012 the Trial Chamber in Karadžić , in its Rule 98 bis decision reinstating a

genocide charge, stated that the ICJ’s 2007 Judgment is “not binding in any way on the

48
Chamber” . Professor Schabas explicitly referred to this ruling in his speech, but a week after he

had done so, it seems he had forgotten all about that 49.

45CR 2014/24, p. 60, para. 6 (Obradović).
46
CR 2014/20, p. 24, para. 26 (Sands).
47CR 2014/13, pp. 18 et seq (Schabas).

48Prosecutor v. Karadžić Trial Chamber Rule 98 bis decision (IT-95-5/18), Transcript, 28 June 2012, pp. 28,763,
lines 20-24; emphasis added.
49
CR 2014/13, p. 45, para. 60 (Schabas). - 24 -

I would note  in parenthesis  that there appears to be quite a lot that Professor Schabas

chooses to forget last week he told you that your 2007 Judgment has provided “clarity and

stability” . Well, that is not what he said two years ago; two years ago he described the approach

taken by this Court in its 2007 Judgment as “incoherent”, because it rejected the genocide

qualification for most of the conflict in Bosnia , “yet applied it to one terrible event during t he war

51
that was of short duration and isolated in a geographic sense” . Therein the dangers of writing

blogs. Four years before that, in 2008, a year after your Judgment, he submitted an expert opinion

to the ICTY in the Popović case. What did he say in that expert opinion about the 2007 Judgment?

He did not welcome it, he did not say it provided clarity and stability, what he said was that your

52
judgment compels a “reassessment” of the law on genocidal intent .

14. Be that as it may, in July 2013 the I CTY Appeals Chamber in the Karadžić case, on the

same point as the Trial Chamber , stated that it was not bound by “legal determinations . . .

reached . . . by the ICJ” 53. Professor Schabas again seems to have forgotten that he told you, in his

speech on Monday 10 March 2014, that “the Trial Chamber began by stating that it was not bound

either by earlier findings during trials before the Tribunal or by the Judgment of the ICJ of

54
February 2007” .

15. The ICTY is not alone in distancing itself from the 2007 Judgment in relation to i ntent.

The ICTR has done the same thing. In Hategekimana 55, the ICTR Appeals Chamber did not

explicitly state that it is not bound by the ICJ Judgment, but this problem is a necessary implication

from the text of the Judgment and the standard that it did apply. The Appeals Chamber referred to

the test for inferring genocidal intent in the absence ofdirect evidence as follows: [screen on]

“a perpetrator’s intent to commit genocide may be inferred from relevant facts and
circumstances, including the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts
systematically directed against the same group, the scale of atrocities committed, the

50
CR 2014/23, p. 46, para. 16 (Schabas).
51Schabas, “One of the Genocide Counts against Karadzić is Dismissed”, Thursday 28 June 2012, available at:

http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.nl/2012/06/one -of-genocide-counts-against-karadzic.html
52Prosecutor v. Popović, IT-05-88-T, 1 May 2008, State Poli cy as an Element of the Crime of Genocide, Expert
Report by Prof. William A. Schabas (30 April 2008), p. 41.

53Prosecutor v. Karadžić (IT-95-5/18-AR98bis.l), Judgement, 11 July 2013, para. 94; emphasis added, footnotes
omitted.
54
CR 2014/13, p. 45, para. 60 (Schabas).
55Prosecutor v. Hategekimana (ICTR-00-55B-A), Appeal Judgement, 8 May 2012. - 25 -

systematic targeting of victims on account of their membership in a particular group,
or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts” . [Screen off]

16. The Appeals Chamber in that case cited authority in support from the ICTY and the

ICTR, but it did not cite the Bosnia Judgment of 2007. Nor did it refer to the requirement for

genocidal intent to be the “only” possible inference. It is plain from this, as I have already noted 57,

that the ICTR Appeals Chamber did not proceed on the basis that it was bound by the ICJ approach

to inference of genocidal intent as expressed at paragraph373 of the Bosnia Judgment.

17. So, Professor Schabas offered us another meander through the case law, we waited 

and we waited, and we waited, and we waited  for him to take us to any judgment or any

decision, of any court or tribunal  national or international  that had invoked paragraph373 or

the standard there set out. It never came. As far as we are aware, there is no such case.

18. So, Professor Schabas tried a different tack. In seeking to argue that “this Court’s

approach has been very generally accepted” 58 on that issue, notwithstanding the absence of any

supportive authorities, he said there was no difference between w hat the Court said at

paragraph 373 and what various ICTY Tribunals hav e done in practice. To make that point, he

took you to a passage of the judgement in the Tolimir case  paragraph 745  in which the Trial

Chamber stated that : “Indications of such intent are rarely overt, however, and thus it is

permissible to infer the existence of genocidal intent based on ‘all of the evidence, taken togeth er’,

59
as long as this inference is ‘the only reasonable [one] available on the evidence’.”

19. He said there was no difference between the two standards. “The Trial Chamber [in

Tolimir] did not cite the relevant statement by the ICJ, notably paragraph 3 73 of the

2007 Judgment”, “but it might well have done so” 60. Well, let us compare the two approaches, on

the screen. [Slide on]. At the top you can see, in English and in French, what this Court ruled in

2007: “for a pattern of conduct to be accepted as evidence of its existence, it would have to be

such that it could only point to the existence of such intent ”. And then below, coming up on the

screen now, we can see what the ICTY Trial Chamber said in Tolimir in 2012, and I will read it

5Prosecutor v. Hategekimana (ICTR-00-55B-A), Appeal Judgement, 8 May 2012, para. 133.
57
CR 2014/20, p. 21, para. 22 (Sands).
5CR 2014/23, p. 46, para. 16 (Schabas).

5Prosecutor v. Tolimir, IT-05-88/2-T, 12 Dec. 2012, para. 745, cited at CR 2014/23, p. 52, para. 39 (Schabas).
60
CR 2014/23, p. 53, para. 40 (Schabas). - 26 -

again: “it is permissible to infer the existence of genocidal intent based on ‘all of the evidence,
61
taken together’, as long as this inference is ‘the only reasonable [one] available on the evidence’” .

20. If I was in a classroom, which I am not, I might turn to my s tudents and say, if I was a

devotee of a hardline Socratic method: “Is there a difference between the two standards?” Well,

one or two of the students might say “No, Professor, we cannot see any difference between those

two standards” and I would turn around the room and I might say “Is there anyone here who does

not agree with that view? ” Some may eventually put their hands up and say “well, it is true that

there are similarities between the two”. Both formulations, for example, do use the word “only”.

That is obviously correct. I might then ask: “Is there anything to be found in the 2012 Tolimir

standard that is not to be found in the 2007 ICJ standard? ” If classes of this year and others are

anything to go by, there may be a long initial silence as the two texts were carefully looked at and

eventually, some hands would come up around the room and one student might say, in the front

row or in the far left, or wherever : “Well, actually, yes, there is a difference between the two

standards and the di fference is this: in Tolimir you find the word ‘ reasonable’ and in Bosnia you

do not.” That is obviously correct; and that is the nub of this.

21. What Professor Schabas is asking you to do is to conclude that the use of the word

“reasonable” is irrelevant. (I would note that. having sat in this courtroom yesterday, that word got

quite a lot of play.) But Professor Schabas’s approach is wrong. The standard of proof in criminal

matters, before the ICTY, the ICTR, the ICC, as well as many national legal systems, is not a

standard of “beyond doubt”, it is a standard of “beyond reasonable doubt”. The word “reasonable”

is not without importance. And that, in simple terms, is a difference, and it is a material difference.

Indeed, Professor Schabas himself accepts that: when he invited this Court to review de novo the

Brioni Minutes, he did not ask you to conclude that there was “no doubt” that those Minutes

reflected a desire to impose a “final solution”, as he so unhappily put it. No, he did not do that. He

invited you to conclude that there was “no reasonable doubt” 62. We say, of course, that you cannot

so conclude, but the point I make now is a different one: counsel for Serbia accepts that there is a

6Prosecutor v. Tolimir, IT-05-88/2-T, 12 Dec. 2012, para. 745.

6CR 2014/24, p. 23, para. 44 (Schabas); emphasis added. - 27 -

world of difference between “no doubt” on the one hand and “no reasonable doubt” on the other.

[Slide off]

22. Mr. President, we are not asking you to change the law, to rip it up, abandon it, as Serbia

claims. We are not asking the Court , certainly, to perform an act of “legal vandalism”, as

63
Mr. Jordash bluntly suggest ed . We are simply asking for a clarification of the standard in

paragraph 373, to bring it in line with the standard that appears to be applied everywhere else.

23. For the purposes of the c ounter-claim made by Serbia, their case is hopeless whichever

standard you apply, whether it is the one they say is reflected in paragraph 373, or the one that we

say might have been intended to have been reflected in paragraph 373, namely the Court’s ordinary

approach to conclusive evidence. The standard the Court has adopted is that it must be “ fully

convinced” that the crime of genocide has been committed, and that the acts are attributable to the

Respondent. The same standard applies to the proof of special intent or dolus specialis in

establishing genocide. The Applicant submits that the standard of proof required to prove

genocidal intent will be met where there may be other possible explanations for a pattern of

conduct  and indeed, there will almost certainly be various other motives and intentions, even,

behind a pattern of conduct  but nonetheless the Court is fully convinced, on the facts of the

particular case, including the destructive methods exhibited by that pattern, that the only reasonable

inference properly to be drawn is one of genocidal intent.

24. Which brings me to Žepa, that small town in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was the

subject of that part of the Tolimir judgement that Professor Schabas did not address in the first

round. The ICTY Trial Chamber did there find that the only reasonable infer ence was one of

genocidal intent. It did so in circumstances where just three individuals were killed  I say just, it

is regrettable, of course, that any were killed, but the number is not a large number . On Friday

morning Professor Schabas told the Court  in his address on actus reus  that to make the

killing of a small number of individuals capable of constituting genocide  and he mentioned a

figure of two  would make the definition of genocide in Article 2 of the Convention “very
64
simplistic and pr ofoundly unworkable” . That is not what the ICTY Trial Chamber found. On

6CR 2014/24, p. 42, para. 19 (Jordash).

6CR 2014/23, p. 40, paras. 2-3 (Schabas). - 28 -

Friday afternoon he did finally turn to the judg ement of the ICTY Trial Chamber in Tolimir , that

related to the Žepa situation, the very last moment of the entire case  it is a case they would

rather you did not turn your minds to  which ruled, of course, that the killing of just three people

constituted the mens rea and actus reus of genocide 65. A “dramatic departure”, he called it, from

66
the 2007 Judgment of this Court  that is a concession . Three people can be a “significant” part

of the group, he conceded 67. An “alternative to the criterion of substantiality”, he conceded 68.

Which brings him in line with the submissions we made in our first round on exactly th is point

where I started nearly a month ago.

25. Where does this leave us, Mr. President, and Members of the Court? For the

Respondent’s counter-claim to succeed, it would need to produce:

(a) direct evidence of a genocidal plan: it has no such evidence; the ICTY has conclusively

determined that the Brioni Minutes are not evidence of unlawfulness, and the Respondent has

wisely stepped away, wisely stepped away, from its attempt to treat those Minutes as being no

different from the minutes of the Wannsee Conference; and/or

(b) evidence of a pattern of attack from which genocidal intent could be inferred: it has simply not

done so in respect of the counter-claim. Despite Mr. Jordash and his heroic attempts to mimic

the clear pattern of attack adopted by Serbia in its campaign against Croatia  which does

evidence genocidal intent  the Respondent has failed to present any evidence on a pattern,

much less any pattern from which genocidal intent could be inferred.

26. There is a curious parallel between the Respondent’s counter-claim and its defence to

Croatia’s claim. In both cases, on the law, it seeks to deny the relevance and authority of final,

un-appealable ICTY findings. With respect to the claim, they argue that the appellate judg ements

in Mrkšić, Martić and Babić are “least probative”, whereas Trial Chamber judg ements in Stanišić

69
and Simatović are the “most relevant” . There is also a contradiction on the Serbian side: in its

counter-claim it seeks to persuade you of the merits of a first instance ICTY Trial Chamber

65CR 2014/23, p. 54, para. 43 (Schabas).
66
Ibid., para. 45 (Schabas).
67Ibid., para. 44 (Schabas).

68Ibid.
69
CR 2014/22, p. 51, para 21 (Jordash). - 29 -

decision  Gotovina, for example, or Stanišić  but in defending itself against Croatia’s claim , it

seeks to diminish the merits of a first instance ICTY Trial Chamber decision  in Tolimir. This

might be called a rather a la carte approach to authorities, but it is not one that can repair the fatal

weaknesses of Serbia’s counter-claim.

27. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I thank you once again for your kind attention, that

completes my presentation this morning . I invite you to call to the Bar, for our final presentation

this morning, the Agent of Croatia.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Sands. I will now call on the Agent of the Government

of Croatia, in this case: Professor Vesna Crnić-Grotić. You have the floor, Madam.

Ms CRNIĆ-GROTIĆ: Thank you.

S ERBIA S COUNTER -CLAIM : CLOSING REMARKS

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is a pleasure to address you once again on this

final day of hearings in which Croatia responds to issues r aised by the Respondent on its

counter-claim last week . In fact the counter -claim was submitted only after the jurisdiction

judgment was delivered by the Court. In the words of the then Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs

70
Mr. Jeremić, it was a “technical co unter-claim” . Mr. Tibor Varady, former Agent for the

Respondent in this case, explicitly said that there had been no genocide in Croatia against the

71
Serbs . Even Mr. Radoslav Stojanović, former Agent for the Respondent in the Bosnia case,

warned the authorities how futile the counter -claim was 7. Moreover, even Mr. Obradović

explained in 2010 that they had to submit the c ounter-claim in order to assume the role of plaintiff
73
in these proceedings . It seems that even today he does not believe that the c ounter-claim is

credible 7. Yet, despite these well-informed views, the counter-claim was brought to this Court.

70
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zftiq1xayts .
7Available at: http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Politika/1536575/Varadi%3A+Be…

+u+Hagu.html.
7Available at: http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php? yyyy=2009&mm=12&dd=26&nav_id=400521 .
73
Available at: http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Srbija/412841/Podneta+kontrat….
74
Available at: http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/obradovic-moguce-je-da-hrvatsku-ne-osud…. - 30 -

2. In these oral pleadings the Respondent has been trying to convince the Court that Croatia

75
brought its claim “as an attempt to paralyze cases against Croatians” before the ICTY .

Mr. President, Croatia’s claim has been pending for 13 years since the ICTY asserted jurisdiction

over Croatian cases. So, any assertion that Croatia has maintained this case for improper reasons is

plainly wrong . There is only one reason for the c laim  to establish the Respondent ’s

responsibility for the genocide committed against Croatians.

3. Last week, the Respondent told us again the same story and repeated the same

manipulative arguments. The Respondent produced a new list of people missing on the territory of

Croatia, in response to JudgeCançado Trindade’s question. It was submitted in the Cyrillic script,

so not in one of the official languages of the Court. The list sets out 1,747 people as missing. Is it

really necessary to invent new lists every time the question of the number of Serbian victims is

raised? The manipulations with numbers have to stop.

4. The Book of the Missing on the Territory of Croatia from 2012, submitted by Croatia to

76
the Court two weeks ago , is an authoritative publication on persons missing from the territory of

Croatia, including both Croats and Serbs . The data contained in this book has been consolidated

through co-operation with the Croatian Red Cross Tracing Service and the Administration of the

Detained and Missing Persons of the Croatian Ministry of Veterans, and cross-checked by the

International Committee of the Red Cross, the Red Cross of Serbia and the Commission for

Missing Persons of Serbia, and thus, this edition is the result of a joint effort of all these

stakeholders 77. It contains the names of all people who were last seen on Croatian territory and

who are still missing and it is the authoritative source for the numbers of the missing in Croatia.

We emphasized that the number of 865 missing, provided orally to the Court, related only to those

who disappeared in 1991-1992 and who are still missing 78. The current overall number of missing

79
persons, accurate as of 31 December last year , is 1,663 . This includes all those who were

75CR 2014/22, p. 11, para. 4 (Obradović).
76
CR 2014/20, pp. 34-35, para. 23 (Ní Ghrálaigh).
77Book of Missing Persons on the Territory of the Republic of Croatia, April 2012, p. 1 ; available at:
http://www.branitelji.hr/arhiva/p2515/dokument/1117/knjiga.nestalih-pdf….

78CR 2014/20, p. 35, para. 24 (Ní Ghrálaigh).
79
https://www.branitelji.hr/nestali. - 31 -

reported missing on the territory of Croatia from 1991- 1995, including Croats, Serbs and people of

other ethnicities and nationalities.

5. Last Thursday and Friday, you heard a series of unfounded, inflammatory al legations

against the Republic of Croatia. It is an indisputable fact that, for many years during and after the

wars of the 1990s, many in Serbia denied that Serbians committed crimes at all during the course of

the conflicts, as well as denied that they had committed crimes of the scale that occurred. Thus, it

was common in Serbia to argue that the Srebrenica massacre was a “myth” concocted by foreign

intelligence services, or that Vukovar was “liberated” by Serb forces in 1991, or that the massacres

of civilians in the shelling of Sarajevo was nothing but a staged production designed to “demonize

the Serbs”. You have heard some echoes of this in this Court.

6. With the work of the ICTY, however, these denials became less and less plausible. So

within the past five to ten years, Serbia has adopted a new approach : it no longer denies that

crimes were committed, but instead argues, that all sides suffer in war, and all sides commit crimes

80
in war , that is what we heard in this courtroom as well. We are told that no one has “clean hands”

from the break -up of Yugoslavia, and therefore you should simply condemn everyone with the

same broad brush, rather than singling out the Serbian leadership. It is an appealing proposition to

the uninformed observer. But it is not based on any facts . Mr. President, Members of the Court,

Serbia and its satellites in Croatia committed crimes, including genocidal crimes, as a matter of

deliberate governmental policy, to achieve the political goal of an ethnically pure Grea ter Serbia.

As we have explained during these proceedings, Croatia had no criminal policies towards Serbs at

any point in the wars of the 1990s  a point confirmed by the work of the ICTY. We are not “all

the same”, despite the Respondent’s protests to the contrary. The Respondent’s counter-claim will

not succeed in masking Serbia’s responsibility for its criminal policies.

Background to Operation Storm

7. Pursuing the strategy of equalization of guilt, on Thursday, Mr. Jordash told you that this

81
was “a complex war, with a multitude of actors and a myriad of intentions” . We were told,

8CR 2014/13, pp. 10-11, para. 3 (Obradović); CR 2014/23, p. 12, para. 13 (Jordash).

8CR 2014/22, p. 74, para. 130 (Jordash). - 32 -

82
“Tudjman wanted and provoked this terrible ethnic war” . Finally, Mr. Jordash told us that

Croatia’s perspective is “one dimensional” and is a “caricatured tale of the dissolution of the

former Yugoslavia and the genesis of the violence that begins with a James Bond villain in the

guise of Milošević. . .” He asserted that : “The problem, of course, with this account is that the

83
Applicant removes every trace of Tudjman’s poisonous regime.”

8. One needs look no further than the findings of the ICTY to determine the accurate account

as to the root causes of the conflict . Professor Schabas told this Court that the ICTY is a

specialized court set up to specifically investigate the events in t he wars of the former Yugoslavia,

and that the ICTY is “familiar with the details . . . in a way that, with respect, is beyond the reach

84
of the limited inquiry taken here by this Court” . So after 21 years, what does the work of the

ICTY tell us?

9. With respect to the conflict between Croatia and Serbia that occurred in 1991 and 1992,

the ICTY Prosecutor did not indict a single Croatian nor did it find any JCE in relation to the

conflict in Croatia involving any Croat, living or dead, including President Tudjman.

10. In contrast, on the Serbian side the ICTY indicted and convicted a number of Serbian

political and military leaders for the events in 1991 in Croatia . Many were found to have

participated in the JCE . This speaks volumes about the nature of the conflict in Croatia in 1991

and 1992, despite the Respondent’s protestations to the contrary.

11. Scholars also disagree with what Mr. Jordash claimed, that President Tudjman was

responsible for provoking the conflict . One such scholar who assists Croatia on this point is

Professor Schabas himself, who co -authored a book with Michael Scharf in 2002 entitled,

“Slobodan Milosevic on Trial : A Companion” 85. You might say that Professor Schabas’s own

book portrays Milošević as a “James Bond villain”, although the villain in Professor Schabas’ book

was all too real for his victims across the former Yugoslavia. Professor Schabas informs us in the

book that the root of the conflict lay in the 1986 S ANU Memorandum, which “became the

82
CR 2014/23, p. 19, para. 46 (Jordash).
8CR 2014/23, p. 11, paras. 11-12 (Jordash).

8CR 2014/15, p. 22, para. 33 (Schabas).
85
Michael P. Scharf and William A. Schabas, Slobodan Milosevic On Trial: A Companion. The Continuum
International Publishing Group Inc, 2002. - 33 -

manifesto of the Serb nationalist movement” and “pav[ed] the way for Slobodan Milosevic’s rise to

power” . According to Professor Schabas, from 23 September 1987,

“Milosevic, with the counsel of his wife, whipped Serbia into a nationalist frenzy that
ultimately contributed to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the economic and

physical destruction of Serbia . . . After succeeding Stambolić as president of Serbia
in 1989, Milosevic employed nationalist sentiment to wage war on the
independence-minded republics . . ” ,7

and as you can see all exactly as our expert witness Ms Sonja Biserko explained to you.

Professor Schabas then expressly states that Milošević started the war when he personally sent the

JNA first into Slovenia, and then into Croatia in the summer of 1991 88.

12. As for Croatia’s President, Professor Schabas writes that it was the rise of the hard line

nationalist government in Serbia that provoked anti -Serb nationalism in Slovenia and Croatia, and

not the other way around, as the Respondent would have it in this Court . Rather than portraying

President Tudjman as a war -monger, Professor Schabas writes that the Presidents of Croatia and

Slovenia “sought to convert Yugoslavia into a loose confederation where Serbian influence would

89
be diluted” .

13. The ICTY’s work is highly persuasive evidence that Croatia’s arguments are correct, and

Serbia’s are noth ing more than a tactical diversion from Serbia’ s responsibility. The views of

Milošević by Professor Schabas, version 2002, also find support in the work of the ICTY . The

views by Professor Schabas, version 2002, also finds support in the work of the ICTY. The views

espoused last week by Mr. Jordash and Professor Schabas, version 2014, finds support only in the

Serbian nationalist myth.

14. Let me also note that the ICTY did not convict a single Croatian concerning the war in

Croatia from 1991 to 1995 . This is no mistake. While there is no doubt that individual crimes

were perpetrated by Croatians against Serb civilians, these crimes did not occur as part of any State

policy.

86
Michael P. Scharf and William A. Schabas, Slobodan Milosevic On Trial: A Companion. The Continuum
International Publishing Group Inc, 2002, p. 18.
87Ibid., p. 11.

88Ibid., pp. 19-20.
89
Ibid., pp. 18-19. - 34 -

The Gotovina Trial Chamber findings

15. The Court will recall that in its f irst round response to the Respondent ’s counter-claim,

Croatia emphasized the Gotovina Trial Chamber ’s unanimous findings, not appealed by the

Prosecutor, that President Tudjman and the Croatian leadership did not intend to (1) murder Serbs,

(2) inflict cruel or inhuman treatment on Serbs, or (3) destroy the property of Serbs. We also noted

that the Trial Chamber found that it could not find a general policy of non- investigation of crimes

against Serbs, and that the parties in the Gotovina case all agreed that the Croatian authorities had

issued effective orders to protect Serbian churches and religious monuments . The task for the

Respondent’s legal team in round 2 was to explain to the Court how these highly persuasive

findings could possibly be consistent with the Respondent ’s claim that the Croatian leadership

harboured genocidal intent towards the Krajina Serbs in Operation Storm. Can leaders who do not

intend to kill or injure or destroy, and who protect religious institutions of an ethnic group,

nevertheless harbour genocidal intent towards that group?

16. Of course not. Perhaps this is why the Respondent ’s legal team chose to ignore these

Trial Chamber findings entirely. The closest they came to addressing these undisputed findings of

the Gotovina Trial Chamber was Mr. Jordash’s comment, made in passing , that Serbia “must live

with the controversy of the Gotovina judgement” . 90 However, there is absolutely nothing

controversial about these findings. The Gotovina Trial Chamber delivered them unanimously, they

were not appealed by the Prosecutor, and therefore these findings were not even in dispute during

the proceedings before the Appeals Chamber . How the Respondent reconciles the unanimous

ICTY view that President Tudjman and the Croatian leadership did not intend to kill or injure Serbs

or destroy their property, with the Respondent ’s claim that President Tudjman and the Croatian

leadership intended to destroy the Krajina Serbs , in whole or in part, is a mystery, and a mystery

unaddressed by Serbia in its second round. Croatia submits that the Respondent ’s silence on this

fundamental point is effectively a concession by Serbia that its counter-claim has no merit at all.

9CR 2014/24, pp. 55-56, para. 95 (Jordash). - 35 -

President Tudjman

17. Croatia has always believed that its role in these oral proceedings is to assist the Court in

its effort to resolve the legal issues in dispute between the P arties. To that end, we have avoided

discussions about oblique matters that only distract from the real issues. Unfortunately, our

colleagues on the other side have not done the same. Rather than providing useful assistance to the

Court  like, for instance, explaining why the Respondent believes the Gotovina Trial Chamber’s

findings are not fatal to the Respondent ’s c ounter-claim  the Resp ondent genera lly, and

Professor Schabas specifically, have used inflammatory rhetoric in an effort to play to the Serbian

audience back home . For Professor Schabas to lace his speech with loaded words like

“lebensraum”, “Wannsee”, and “Final Solution”, while simultane ously being unable to deal with

the Gotovina Trial Chamber’s findings on the lawful intent of the Croatian leadership, was telling.

18. Moreover, Professor Schabas seems eager to draw Croati a into a debate about

President Franjo Tudjman. To set the record straight : President Tudjman was a distinguished

partisan fighter in World War II. When he attended the 50th Anniversary of the Allied Victory in

Europe in World War II on 8 May 1995 in London (just days after Operation Flash ), he was the

only participating head of S tate who had actually fought in the defence of Europe against the

scourge of Nazi fascism. His resolve to base Croatia on an anti -fascist foundation is visible in the

preamble of the Croatian Constitution adopted in 1990 91.

19. As for hi s conduct during the war in Croatia, the ICTY record speaks for itself .

Concerning Operation Storm , President Tudjman was vindicated by both the Trial and Appeals

Chamber judgements in Gotovina. The Respondent nevertheless wants to draw Croatia into a

debate about President Tudjman, but the ICTY ’s findings  and the Respondent ’s complete

inability to address them  ended such debate well before these proceedings even began.

20. Let me repeat that Operation Storm was the operation that put an end to the criminal

enterprise of the “RSK”. It marked the beginning of the political end for those responsible for the

crimes in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, many of whom were subsequently convicted by the

ICTY. Operation Storm was the last resort for Croat ia facing the constant and well -documented

refusal by the “RSK” leaders to accept peaceful reintegration into Croatia. Croatia has clearly

9See Reply of Croatia (RC), p. 55, footnote 61. - 36 -

proved its willingness to peacefully reintegrate its occupied territories : it did so in 1998 with

Eastern Slavonia, when it was successfully reintegrated into Croatia in a peaceful manner . Finally,

Operation Storm made the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord possible and led to the end of the

war in the region.

21. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this brings me t o our concluding submissions in

relation to the c ounter-claim brought by Serbia . But before that, a llow me to thank the

distinguished members of the Serbian delegation ; I thank the Registry for its assistance ; I thank

the interpreters and the security staff for their services during these proceedings; and, finally,

Mr. President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your attention.

22. And now, if you allow me, I will read the final submissions of the Republic of Croatia in

relation to the Respondent’s counter-claim.

The PRESIDENT: Please proceed. It is even a requirement under the Rules.

Ms CRNIĆ-GROTIĆ: Thank you.

S UBMISSIONS

On the basis of the facts and legal arguments presented by the Applicant, it respectfully

requests the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:

That, in relation to the counter-claims put forward in the Counter-Memorial, the Rejoinder and

during these proceedings, it rejects in their entirety the sixth, the seventh, the eighth and the

ninth submissions of the Respondent on the grounds that they are not founded in fact or law.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Madam. The Court takes note of the final submissions

which you have now read on behalf of Croatia with respect to the counter -claims of Serbia, as it

took note on Friday 21 March of the final submissions of Croatia on its own claims, as well as on

Friday 28 March of the final submissions presented by Serbia on Croatia’s claims and Serbia’s

counter-claims.

This brings us to the end of the oral proceedings; I should like to thank the Agents, counsel

and advocates for their statements. - 37 -

In accordance with practice, I shall request the Agents of the Parties to remain at the Court’s

disposal to provide any additional information it may require. With this proviso, I now declare

closed the oral proceedings in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention

and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia).

The Court will now retire for deliberation. The Ag ents of the Parties will be advised in due

course of the date on which the Court will deliver its Judgment. As the Court has no other business

before it today, the sitting is closed.

The Court rose at 11.20 a.m.

___________

Document Long Title

Audience publique tenue le mardi 1er avril 2014, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Tomka, président, en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Croatie c. Serbie)

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