Audience publique tenue le mercredi 13 octobre 2010, à 9 h 30, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Owada, président, en l'affaire du Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie

Non Corrigé
Uncorrected

CR 2010/13

International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice

THHEAGUE LAAYE

YEAR 2010

Public sitting

held on Wednesday 13 October 2010, at 9.30 a.m., at the Peace Palace,

President Owada presiding,

in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicaragua v. Colombia)

Application by Costa Rica for permission to intervene

________________

VERBATIM RECORD

________________

ANNÉE 2010

Audience publique

tenue le mercredi 13 octobre 2010, à 9 h 30, au Palais de la Paix,

sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,

en l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime
(Nicaragua c. Colombie)

Requête du Costa Rica à fin d’intervention
____________________

COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -

Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presdenkta

Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham

Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov

Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Xue
Donoghue

Judges ad hoc Cot
Gaja

Registrar Couvreur

⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -

Présents : M. Owada,président
viceMpra,ident

KoMroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham

Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov

Crinçade
Yusuf
XuMe mes
Dojnogshue,

CotMM.
jugesaja, ad hoc

Cgeffrrr,

⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -

The Government of Nicaragua is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambassador of Nicaragua to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,

as Agent and Counsel;

MrA. lexOudeElferink, Deputy-Director, Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea,
Utrecht University,

Mr.AlainPellet, Professor at the University ParisOuest, Nanterre-La Défense, Member and

former Chairman of the International Law Co mmission, associate member of the Institut de
droit international,

Mr.PaulReichler, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., Member of the Bars of

the United States Supreme Court and the District of Columbia,

Mr.AntonioRemiroBrotóns, Professor of Intern ational Law, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid;
Member of the Institut de droit international,

as Counsel and Advocates;

Mr.RobinCleverly, M.A., DPhil, CGeol, F.G.S., Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty

Consultancy Services,

Mr. John Brown, Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty Consultancy Services,

as Scientific and Technical Advisers;

Mr. César Vega Masís, Director of Juridical Affairs, Sovereignty and Territory, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Julio César Saborio, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affai
rs,

Mr. Walner Molina Pérez, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Ms Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

as Counsel;

Ms Clara E. Brillembourg, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and
New York,

Ms Carmen Martinez Capdevila, Doctor of Public International Law, Universidad Autónoma,

Madrid,

MsAlinaMiron, Researcher, Centre for International Law (CEDIN), University ParisOuest,
Nanterre-La Défense,

Mr. Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, First Secretary, Embassy of Nicaragua in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,

as Assistant Counsel. - 5 -

Le Gouvernement du Nicaragua est représenté par :

S.Exc.M.CarlosJoséArgüelloGómez, ambassadeur du Nicaragua auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,

comme agent et conseil ;

M. Alex Oude Elferink, directeur adjoint de l’Ins titut néerlandais du droit de la mer de l’Université
d’Utrecht,

M.Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de ParisOuest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre et ancien

président de la Commission du droit internatio nal, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,

M.PaulReichler, avocat au cabinetFoley Hoag LLP, WashingtonD.C., membre des barreaux de

la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,

M.AntonioRemiroBrotóns, professeur de droi t international à l’Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid, membre de l’Institut de droit international,

comme conseils et avocats ;

M.RobinCleverly, M.A., D.Phil, C.Geol, F.G.S., consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty

Consultancy Services,

M. John Brown, consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty Consultancy Services,

comme conseillers scientifiques et techniques ;

M. César Vega Masís, directeur, direction des affaires juridiques, de la souveraineté et du territoire,
ministère des affaires étrangères,

M. Julio César Saborio, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,

M. Walner Molina Pérez, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,

Mme Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,

comme conseils ;

Mme Clara E. Brillembourg, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et de New York,

Mme Carmen Martinez Capdevila, docteur en droit international public à l’Universidad Autónoma

de Madrid,

Mme Alina Miron, chercheur au Centre de droit in ternational de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,

M.EdgardoSobrenesObregon, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade du Nicaragua au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,

comme conseils adjoints. - 6 -

The Government of Colombia is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Julio Londoño Paredes, Professor of International Relations, Universidad del Rosario,
Bogotá,

as Agent;

H.E. Mr. Guillermo Fernández de Soto, Chair of the Inter-American Juridical Committee, Member
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and former Minister of Foreign Affairs,

as Co-Agent;

Mr.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, Member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister,

Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris , Member of the NewYork Bar,
Eversheds LLP, Paris,

Mr.MarceloKohen, Professor of International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and

Development Studies, Geneva; associate member of the Institut de droit international,

as Counsel and Advocates;

H.E. Mr. Francisco José Lloreda Mera, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, Permanent Representative of Colombia to the OPCW, former Minister of
State,

Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Member of the International Law Commission,

H.E. Ms Sonia Pereira Portilla, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Republic of
Honduras,

Mr.AndelfoGarcíaGonzález, Professor of Intern ational Law, former Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs,

Ms Victoria E. Pauwels T., Minister-Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Julián Guerrero Orozco, Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Colombia in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,

Ms Andrea Jiménez Herrera, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

as Legal Advisers;

Mr. Thomas Fogh, Cartographer, International Mapping,

as Technical Adviser. - 7 -

Le Gouvernement de la Colombie est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Julio Londoño Paredes, professeur de relations internationales à l’Université del Rosario
de Bogotá,

comme agent ;

S. Exc. M. Guillermo Fernández de Soto, président du comité juridique interaméricain, membre de
la Cour permanente d’arbitrage et ancien ministre des affaires étrangères,

comme coagent ;

M.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat,

M.RodmanR.Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de NewYork,
cabinet Eversheds LLP à Paris,

M. Marcelo Kohen, professeur de droit internationa l à l’Institut de hautes études internationales et

du développement de Genève, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,

comme conseils et avocats ;

S. Exc. M. Francisco José Lloreda Mera, ambassadeur de la République de Colombie auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas, représentant permanent de la Colombie auprès de l’OIAC, ancien
ministre d’Etat,

M. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, membre de la Commission du droit international,

S. Exc. Mme Sonia Pereira Portilla, ambassadeur de la République de Colombie auprès de la
République du Honduras,

M. Andelfo García González, professeur de droit inte rnational, ancien ministre adjoint des affaires
étrangères,

Mme Victoria E. Pauwels T., ministre-conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères,

M. Julián Guerrero Orozco, ministre-conseiller à l’ambassade de la République de la Colombie aux
Pays-Bas,

Mme Andrea Jiménez Herrera, conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères,

comme conseillers juridiques ;

M. Thomas Fogh, cartographe, International Mapping,

comme conseiller technique. - 8 -

The Government of Costa Rica is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Edgar Ugalde Álvarez, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the Republic of Colombia,

as Agent;

Mr. Coalter G. Lathrop, Lecturing Fellow at Duke University School of Law, member of the North

Carolina State Bar, Special Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Sergio Ugalde, Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Senior Adviser to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Member of the Costa Rican Bar,

Mr. Arnoldo Brenes, Senior Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Member of the Costa Rican
Bar,

Mr. Carlos Vargas, Director of the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

as Counsel and Advocates;

H.E. Mr. Jorge Urbina, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

Mr. Michael Gilles, Special Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Ricardo Otarola, Minister and Consul General of Costa Rica to the Republic of Colombia,

Mr. Christian Guillermet, Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the
United Nations Office at Geneva,

Mr. Gustavo Campos, Consul General of Costa Rica to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

Ms Shara Duncan, Counsellor at the Embassy of Costa Rica in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

Mr. Leonardo Salazar, National Geographic Institute of Costa Rica,

as Advisers. - 9 -

Le Gouvernement du Costa Rica est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Edgar Ugalde Álvarez, ambassadeur de la République du Costa Rica auprès de la
République de Colombie,

comme agent ;

M. Coalter G. Lathrop, Lecturing Fellow à la faculté de droit de Duke University, membre du
barreau de l’Etat de Caroline du Nord, conse iller spécial auprès du ministère des affaires
étrangères,

M.SergioUgalde, membre de la Cour perman ente d’arbitrage, conseiller principal auprès du
ministère des affaires étrangères, membre du barreau du Costa Rica,

M.ArnoldoBrenes, conseiller principal auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères, membre du

barreau du Costa Rica,

M. Carlos Vargas, directeur du département juridique du ministère des affaires étrangères,

comme conseils et avocats ;

S. Exc. M. Jorge Urbina, ambassadeur du Costa Rica auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,

M. Michael Gilles, conseiller spécial auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères,

M. Ricardo Otarola, ministre et consul général du Costa Rica en République de Colombie,

M. Christian Guillermet, ambassadeur, représentant permanent adjoint du Costa Rica auprès de

l’Office des Nations Unies à Genève,

M. Gustavo Campos, consul général du Costa Rica au Royaume des Pays-Bas,

Mme Shara Duncan, conseiller à l’ambassade du Costa Rica aux Pays-Bas,

M. Leonardo Salazar, Institut géographique national du Costa Rica,

comme conseillers. - 10 -

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is now open. This morning the Court will

hear the first round of oral argument of Nicaragua. Later this morning it will hear Colombia’s first

round of oral argument. It is going to be one sitting in the whole morning which will be

unfortunately longer than usual. It will take about four hours. So in between, after the presentation

by Nicaragua, the President proposes to have a very short coffee break for about ten minutes and

then come back and hear the presentation by Colombia ’s first round of oral argument. I first give

the floor to His Excellency Dr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Agent of the Republic of Nicaragua.

Mr. ARGUELLO GOMEZ:

1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, good mo rning. It is always with a sense of great

honour that I appear before you but on this occasion I do so with a sad heart. This is the first time

in the 26 years in which I have pleaded before y ou in seven main cases without having the benefit

of the late SirIanBrownlie being beside me. In the practice of international law, no one of his

generation was involved as counsel and advocate in so many cases before this Court. His

contributions to public international law have been prodigious. His absence is a loss to all of us.

2. Before beginning my short presentation I wo uld also like to welcome and pay tribute to

the two new Members of the Court and wish them a most successful and fruitful exercise of their

new functions.

3. Mr. President, it is not the first time that Nicaragua is before this Court pleading in a case

involving an application for permission to intervene under Article 62 of the Statute.

4. When Nicaragua came before this Court in 1989 applying to intervene under Article 62 of

the Statute in a case between El Salvador and Hondu ras, the two previous applications by States to

intervene had not prospered. The reference naturally is to the requests for intervention of Malta in

the Tunisia/Libya case and that of Italy in the Malta/Libya case.

5. After studying these precedents and the geographical circumstances and claims of the

Parties, Nicaragua decided to apply to intervene. It is well to recall the circumstances of this case

since it was the first time that a State was allowed to intervene under Article 62. The situation was

that one of the States party to the case was reques ting delimitation inside and outside the waters of

the Gulf of Fonseca. The other Party opposed an y delimitation, and claimed that there was no - 11 -

delimitation possible in the waters inside the Gu lf since they were in condominium by the three

States. The Gulf of Fonseca is a relatively small gulf that, at its opening to the sea, separates the

coasts of Nicaragua and El Salvador by less than 20miles. As we can appreciate in the graphics

(N-CRCAG1), Honduras was requesting the Court to draw the delimitation line between its

claimed areas and those of El Salvador without Nicaragua being a party to the case. The question

was whether this delimitation could take place ab sent Nicaragua. In the event, Nicaragua was

allowed to intervene, but only on the question of the juridical status of the waters of the Gulf, that

is, whether they were subject to the special régi me of condominium or some other special status.

But what is most relevant for the present circ umstances is that the Court denied Nicaragua’s

Application to intervene in the question of the de limitation of the areas inside the Gulf and out to

the sea.

6. The Gulf of Fonseca is a minute area in comparison to the area under delimitation between

Nicaragua and Colombia. The delimitation invo lved in the Gulf of Fonseca was a lateral

delimitation in which three parties had claims to part of the 19 miles of the closing line of the Gulf,

out of which would also be traced the delimitation lines seawards. The effects on Nicaragua of any

such delimitation can easily be appreciated, and yet Nicaragua was not allowed to intervene. If the

geographic circumstances of that case did not warrant, in the Court’s view, intervention by

Nicaragua on the issue of delimitation, the same result must even more so appertain in this new

case.

7. The present case is about a frontal delimita tion involving the extensive continental coasts

and shelves of Nicaragua and Colombia. There is no question of a lateral delimitation that could

result in the attribution of any areas alleged to po ssibly appertain to Costa Rica. As will be clear

from the explanation provided later by Mr. Reichler, there is no possibility that the Judgment of the

Court in this case will affect the legal interests of Costa Rica.

8. It is very difficult for anyone in Nicaragua to conceive that if its Application to
intervene

was denied in the very restricted area involved in the Gulf of Fonseca, any consideration could be

given to that of Costa Rica in the greatly more extensive waters of the Caribbean Sea. If Costa

Rica by simply alleging that it is near the delimitation area involved in the case of Nicaragua v.

Colombia is allowed to intervene, the right of in tervention under Article 62 would from now on be - 12 -

available to all States located in the same general area of any delimitation case. In fact, it would be

difficult to imagine a maritime delimitation in which an application for intervention could be

denied.

9. Nicaragua considers that the door for universal interventions should not be left wide open

or even left ajar. The present case gives a good example. There are enormous costs involved for

Nicaragua not only because of the delays it causes on the continuation of the merits of the principal

case but also in the level of attention and resources that it must employ on these hearings since its

interests are at stake, whilst those for Costa Rica ⎯ that does not want the consequences of being a

party to the case ⎯ are minimal. Furthermore, the State applying to intervene is allowed to address

what amounts to the merits of the main case from whatever partial angle best serves its interests.

10. Thus, during the present hearings Costa Rica has made certain assertions and presented

certain documents that are contrary to the facts and prejudice the position of Nicaragua in the main

case. For example, the document put on the public screen and included in the judges’ folders as

sketchmap No.8 purports to show the “maritime boundary between Honduras and Nicaragua on

the Caribbean”. (N-CR CAG3) It is a reproducti on of a sketch-map by the Court that only shows

an enlarged partial section of the delimitation. The complete sketch-map is shown on the screen

(N-CRCAG4). Costa Rica chose to present the Court’s direction line as stopping short of the

82nd meridian when the Court’s own line did not.

11. Another graphic included in the judges’ folders as sketch-map No .5 also misrepresents

the facts. It refers to “Nicaragua’s proposed Colombian enclaves”, whic h includes an enclave on

Quitasueño Bank. Nicaragua has not proposed such an enclave in a Bank that is part of its

continental shelf (N-CR CAG5).

12. Mr.President, in your opening remarks last Monday, you summarized the history of

these proceedings and recalled that between 2003 and 2006 the Governments of Honduras,

Jamaica, Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela asked to be furnished, and were furnished, with

copies of the pleadings and documents annexed produ ced in this case. You further recalled that it

was until 22September2008 that Costa Rica also aske d to be furnished with such copies. What

first impresses in this recount is that for a State to now be before the Court claiming dire

consequences for its legal interests if not allowed to intervene, it is surprising that it waited more - 13 -

than six years after this case star ted to even worry about requesting copies of the pleadings in the

case. Even much more distant States such as Chile, Peru and Ecuador showed a more active

interest.

13. My esteemed colleague the Agent of Cost a Rica referred on Monday to the “délai

octroyé pour la présentation de la requête à fin d’ intervention” and went on to explain that this

delay was due to the fact that there had been an electoral process in Costa Rica that finalized in

February of this year. He pointed out that in any case the Application had been filed within the

limits fixed by Article81 of the Rules of Court. In the Written Observations of Nicaragua there

was no claim that the Application was extemporan eous. It was simply pointed out that after

waiting for six years to make this application, Costa Rica had failed to clearly identify in its

Application any interest it may have of a legal nature that might be affected by the decision in this

case. A simple and telling detail is that no map or sketch or graphic was included in the

Application with an indication of the areas it cons idered might be affected until it was done in the

pleadings of last Monday.

14. The reason for this is very simple. It is very difficult to show, and much less so on a

map, how a frontal delimitation between Nicaragua and Colombia that does not involve the fixing

of lateral limits could possibly affect a State situated laterally. Whatever claim Costa Rica might

have to a lateral delimitation with Nicaragua, the decision of the Court on this case could not

possibly have any effect on it. Of course, with all the time in the world to prepare a data show, its

visual effects have at least a better chance of causing a satisfactory first impression. Although

hard-pressed for time, it will be Mr.Reichler’s t ask to, in a figurative sense, turn on their heads

these sketches and graphics contained in the data show to which Nicaragua only had access last

Monday.

15. The Application of Costa Rica in paragraph13 claimed that the Treaty of maritime

delimitation it signed with Colombia in 1977 arose from two basic assumptions: first, that

Colombia had an agreed boundary with Nicara gua running along the 82nd°meridianW longitude

and, second, that the Colombian insular territory in the south-western Caribbean was entitled to full

weight in a delimitation. This was again re iterated by Mr.Lathrop during the pleadings on - 14 -

Monday . The point is of no relevance to the legal interests of Costa Rica that allegedly may be

affected by a decision on this case and its purpo se only seems to indirectly support some of the

Colombian arguments in the main case.

16. For this reason, Nicaragua’s Written Observations analyse these so-called assumptions in

order to show that they lacked any merit. Thus, it was pointed out that in 1977 Costa Rica was

aware that Nicaragua did not accept the 82nd meridi an as a line of delimitation and that it did not

accept that Colombia had sovereignty over all th e banks, reefs and islands it claimed in the

south-western Caribbean. On the screen (N-CR CAG6) is the text of a diplomatic Note sent by the

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica dated 18October 1972 ⎯ that is, fiveyears before the

1977 Treaty was signed ⎯ in which he states, with instructions from the President of the Republic

of Costa Rica, that his Government “considers that the cays and islets called Quitasueño, Roncador

and Serrana are located in the continental shelf of the Republic of Nicaragua”. Please note on the

screen that these features are located on the continen tal shelf of Nicaragua considerably to the east

of the 82nd meridian (N-CR CAG7). Naturally, there cannot be any so-called assumption that the

82nd meridian was a line of delimitation when the continental shelf of Nicaragua is recognized as

extending at least up to where these features are situated around the 80th meridian. There can even

be less of an assumption that these features had to be accorded full weight to Colombia’s benefit.

17. Another fact pointed out in the Written Observations is that the 1977 Treaty itself does

not follow the 82nd meridian but is located further west of the same (N-CR CAG7). Where does

that leave Costa Rica’s alleged assumption that Nicaragua had accepted the 82nd meridian at the

moment Costa Rica signed this Treaty?

18. Counsel for Costa Rica, Mr.Brenes 2, asserted that “in consideration of Nicaragua’s

requests that Costa Rica not ratify the Treaty until the dispute with Colombia has been resolved,

Costa Rica, acting out of good neighbourliness, has abstained from doing so”. This is disingenuous

and ironic in view of the evident intention of th ese proceedings. Quite to the contrary to this

assertion, it is well known that Costa Rica has not ratified this Treaty precisely because it gives

equal weight to the island of San Andrés and to the continental coast of Costa Rica.

1
CR 2010/12, pp. 35-36, paras. 13-15 (Lathrop).
2Ibid., p. 22, para. 8 (Brenes). - 15 -

19. In the well-known publication International Maritime Boundaries edited by Charney and

Alexander, we find the following observation on th e reasons why Costa Rica had not ratified the

1977 Treaty several years after its signature in 1983: “Costa Rica’s Assembly faced a strong lobby

against the agreement. Some of its opponents ar gued that the San Andres Archipelago should only

3
be granted a 12 n.m. mile territorial sea in the light of the Channel Islands Award.”

20. In this respect it might be recalled th at there were well-known negotiations going on

between France and the United Kingdom on the questi on of the effect of the Channel Islands on a

delimitation that dated back from 1964. Also, that a treaty submitting this question to arbitration

was signed in 1975 and an award was rendered in 1 977 giving these very important islands limited

effects. Costa Rica was naturally well aware of th is. The reason it agreed to give full effects to

San Andrés was due to the fact that a small uninhabited island of Costa Rica located in the Pacific

Ocean was recognized as producing fu ll effects in another delimitation agreement with Colombia.

Thus in the same Charney and Alexander publi cation we read that “while Costa Rica did not

benefit economically from the Caribbean delimitation, the areas accorded to Isla del Coco on the

Pacific side were considered rich in migratory species; a sort of a compensatory action,

4
resource-wise” .

21. Counsel for Costa Rica, Mr.Brenes, sp ent some time explaining why Nicaragua could

not rely or even cite the “Agreements that Costa Rica has ratified with Panama and signed with

Colombia” 5, since these are res inter alios acta for Nicaragua. Then later during the hearings

counsel for Costa Rica, Mr.Ugalde, spent a good part of the noon hour explaining why even if

Article 59 of the Statute protected third States from the effects of judgments to which they were not

parties, nonetheless there were circumstances in whic h this judgment might not be equivalent to a

res inter alios acta.

22. The quick way of covering this subject is fairly simple without submitting the Court to a

scholarly dissertation. An agreement between third States is a res inter alios acta for a State not

3
J. Charney, and L. Alexander (eds), International Maritime Boundaries, 1993, Vol. I, pp. 465-466.
4
Ibid; p. 467.
5CR 2010/12, pp. 25-26, paras. 19-22 (Brenes). - 16 -

Party to the agreement in the sense that that agre ement cannot be imposed on that third State. But

good faith and the conduct subsequent to that treaty can have definite effects erga omnes.

23. Similarly, a judgment by the Court is a res inter alios acta for States not parties to the

case in accordance with Article59, but it nonetheless may have legal consequences for third

parties, and that is why Article62 was put in place. But in order to effectively invoke Article62

and be accepted to intervene, a State must establis h that the decision by the Court will affect its

legal interests. Costa Rica has as of now only made clear that it considers that it has a legal

interest ⎯ and that has been sufficient to open the door to these hearings ⎯ but it has yet to start to

prove that its legal interests will be affected by the Court’s decision.

24. The assertion made by Nicaragua in its Written Observations that Costa Rica has an

independent means of invoking the jurisdiction of the Court was not aimed at stating that this

precludes it from invoking Article 62, as was claimed by counsel of Costa Rica. In fact, Article 81

of the Rules of Court provides that the party applying to intervene should indicate any basis of

jurisdiction that might exist as between the app licant State and the parties to the case. This

provision of Article 81 is not pure surplusage. It was added because the extent of the jurisdictional

links existing between the claimant third State and the parties to the main case help determine the

extent of the intervention to be granted. If Co sta Rica wants to intervene, it could come in as a

party, if it can prove that the issues sub judice affect its interests. But this it could only do if the

case between Nicaragua and Colombia required the fixi ng of a tripoint with Costa Rica and this is

not so. If the Judgment of the Court is favourable to the Nicaraguan claims, the only effect of this

is that Costa Rica could attempt to claim a delimitation vis-à-vis Nicaragua that would extend

beyond the limits it accepted with Colombia. If Colombia is favoured, well, Costa Rica already has

a clear understanding with that State.

6
25. Counsel of Costa Rica, Mr.Brenes, presented a chronicle of the meetings of the

bilateral (Nicaragua-Costa Rica) Sub-Commis sion on Limits and Cartography which began

sessions in September2002. The mandate of this Commission was technical and did not involve

political level negotiations regarding delimitation in the Caribbean Sea. In this respect the

6
CR 2010/12, pp. 23-24, paras. 11-18 (Brenes). - 17 -

chronicle is largely irrelevant to these proceedings and Nicaragua will simply generally reserve its

position on the subject and limit its comments to a few points. Mr. Brenes indicates that in the first

of the meetings of this Sub-Commission it was d ecided to postpone any question of delimitation in

the Caribbean until after the present case between Co lombia and Nicaragua was over. If there is

any pertinence in this information it would only be to ask why Costa Rica did not point out to

Nicaragua in 2002 that this case could affect its inte rests. Why did it wait six years to even ask for

a copy of the pleadings?

26. Mr.Brenes further indicated that these meetings of the Sub-Commission were

discontinued by Nicaragua after August2005. It is well to recall the circumstances. Costa Rica

had been claiming extensive rights in the San Juan river, including policing rights and other

jurisdictional rights on the river. After Costa Rica filed an Application against Nicaragua before

this Court on 29September2005 there was very little incentive to continue with these obviously

futile meetings.

27. One final clarification on another statemen t made by Mr.Brenes. It is not correct to

assert that Nicaragua accepted an equidistance line of delimitation with Costa Rica in the Pacific

coast. There has not been any ag reement in that regard, and the purpose of making this statement,

without any obvious relevance to the matter before these hearings, throws further light on the real

intention of Costa Rica in these proceedings.

28. Mr.President, Costa Rica has so far failed to establish that it has an interest of a legal

nature which may be affected by the decision of the Court in this case. Therefore, up to the present

stage of the pleadings Nicaragua sees no reason to change the conclusions it submitted to the Court

in its Written Statement.

29. Mr. President, the rest of the pleadings will be divided in two sections.

ProfessorAntonio Remiro will address “Le préte ndu intérêt juridique du Costa Rica dans la

délimitation maritime entre le Nicaragua et la Co lombie : aspects généraux” and Mr. Paul Reichler

will conclude with “Costa Rica has no legal interest that would be affected by the Court’s decision

in this case”.

Mr. President, Members of the Court, thank you for your kind attention.

Mr. President, may it please you to call Professor Antonio Remiro. - 18 -

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency Dr. CarlosJoséArgüello Gómez, the Agent of

the Republic of Nicaragua for his presentation.

I now call Professor Antonio Remiro Brótons.

M. REMIRO :

L E PRÉTENDU INTÉRÊT JURIDIQUE DU C OSTA R ICA DANS LA DÉLIMITATION MARITIME ENTRE
LE N ICARAGUA ET LA C OLOMBIE : ASPECTS GÉNÉRAUX

Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, permettez-moi de dire pour

commencer que je suis très honoré de m’adresser aujourd’hui à vous. En même temps, avec la

même sincérité, je dois vous confier mon inquié tude parce que, exception faite de quelques esprits

privilégiés, encore qu’un peu extravagants, réclam er l’attention sur des questions afférentes aux

incidents de la procédure peut provoquer des accès de mélancolie, même de la part de

professionnels expérimentés, si on exagère le traitement. Avec cette précaution, j’en viens à

évoquer les principes fondamentaux applicables à l’intervention.

Le «noyau dur» de l’intervention

1. Conformément à l’article 62, paragraphe 1, du Statut de la Cour : «Lorsqu’un Etat estime

que, dans un différend, un intérêt d’ordre juridique est pour lui en cause, il peut adresser à la Cour

7
une requête à fin d’intervention» La Cour, ajoute le paragraphe 2, «décide».

2. Le Règlement de la Cour énonce dans s on article81 les conditions qu’une requête à fin

d’intervention doit remplir. Sp écifier l’intérêt d’ordre juridique qui, selon l’Etat demandant à

8
intervenir, est pour lui en cause est la première de ces conditions

3. Comme on vient de le dire, le Statut requi ert l’existence d’un intérêt d’ordre juridique, ce

qui exclut les intérêts de tout autre ordre, qu’ ils soient politiques, économiques, géostratégiques ou

tout simplement matériels, sauf s’ils sont liés à un intérêt juridique.

4. Exprimer une prétention juridique ne suffit pas pour accéder à une requête à fin

d’intervention. Il est nécessaire, absolument n écessaire, que cette prétention, propre, réelle et

actuelle, puisse être mise en cause par la décision que la Cour rendra un jour pour trancher le

7
«An interest of a legal nature whic h may be affected by the decision in the case». La version anglaise fut
rédigée à partir du texte français.
8Article 81.2 a), du Règlement de la Cour. - 19 -

différend porté devant elle. Ceci est le «noyau dur», comme le disait le professeur Prosper Weil, de

l’institution de l’intervention 9. L’Etat qui demande à entrer dans le procès doit démontrer que ses

droits peuvent être affectés, au vu des éléments de l’affaire en cours et du petitum des Parties à

l’instance. Il s’agit dans une certaine mesure d’une spéculation, mais construite sur la base

d’arguments plausibles soumis à l’avis de la Cour.

5. Mais il y a une autre condition qui, étant évidente, passe inaperçue : l’objet de la requête

doit être l’«intervention» et rien d’autre. C’est justement pour cel a que le Règlement de la Cour

impose que la requête indique «l’objet précis de l’intervention» et, en plus, «toute autre base de

10
compétence» qui existerait entre lui et les Parties à l’instance .

6. Il y a soixante ans, dans l’affaire Haya de la Torre , la Cour a déclaré: «[T]oute

intervention est un incident de procédure; par conséquent, une déclaration déposée à fin

d’intervention ne revêt, en droit, ce caractère que si elle a réellement trait à ce qui est l’objet de

l’instance en cours» ( Haya de la Torre (Colombie/Pérou), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1951 , p. 76) ; de

cette manière la Cour a précisé le domaine de ce que l’on devait entendre comme une intervention

véritable conformément au Statut. Cependant, ce critè re semble avoir été perdu de vue après.

Dans la décennie des années quatre-vingt du dernier siècle, les arrêts de la Cour concernant les

11 12
requêtes à fin d’intervention soumises, d’abord, par Malte , et après, par l’Italie , ont reflété un

certain degré de confusion et d’hésitation sur le chemin à suivre par rapport à l’objet de

l’intervention, l’exigence ou pas d’ un lien juridictionnel particulier et la condition ou pas de partie

au procès de l’Etat demandant à intervenir une fois accepté l’intervention. Toutefois, on peut dire

que, à partir de l’interprétation de l’article62 du Statut faite par la Chambre de la Cour dans son

13 14
arrêt du 13septembre1990 , que la Cour a confirmé dans l’ordonnance du 21octobre1999 et

9 Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (E l Salvador/Honduras), requête à fin d’interventiCn,

4/CR 90/3 du 6 juin 1990, p. 15.
10 Article 81.2 b) et c), du Règlement de la Cour.

11 Voir Plateau continental (Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe li byenne), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1981, p. 3.

12 Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984,
p. 3.

13 Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 92.
14
Frontière terrestre et maritime en tre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c.Nigéria), requête à fin
d’intervention, ordonnance du 21 octobre 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 1029. - 20 -

dans l’arrêt du 23octobre2001 15, l’intervention a acquis des traits plus nets: l’intervention

véritable, statutaire, ne permet pas de greffer une nou velle affaire à l’affaire en cours, ni de

transformer cette affaire en une affaire différente, ni d’y ajouter de nouvelles questions; elle ne

permet pas non plus à l’Etat demandant à inte rvenir de réclamer la reconnaissance de ses

prétentions comme des droits.

7. L’intervention est liée à l’affaire principale. Elle ne peut pas survivre sans elle, encore

moins aller à son encontre. Le di fférend, tel qu’il a été défini par les Parties, est le moule dans

lequel l’intervention doit se fonder. L’objet statutaire de l’intervention basée sur l’article62 du

Statut est la protection des intérêts juridiques de l’Etat demandant à intervenir susceptibles d’être

affectés par la décision que rendra la Cour da ns l’affaire pendante. Il s’agit d’un moyen

d’autoprotection de nature préventive. A une telle fin, l’Etat qui utilise cette procédure demande

qu’il lui soit permis de porter ses intérêts ⎯ ses intérêts juridiques ⎯ à la connaissance de la Cour

pour que celle-ci en tienne compte; ainsi, dans le cas où la Cour les considère pertinents, elle

évitera que l’arrêt les mette en cause. Ceci im plique aussi la précision des points ou aspects du

différend qui ont à voir avec lesdits intérêts.

8. On ne demande certes pas à l’Etat requérant , le CostaRica dans notre cas, de démontrer

que ses prétendus intérêts juridiques seront affectés par la décision de la Cour, mais on lui demande

de démontrer de façon concluante qu’ils pourraient l’être. A cette fin, le requérant doit présenter

lesdits intérêts d’une façon précise. Au stade de la procédure incidente où nous en sommes il ne

s’agit pas d’anticiper l’in tervention proprement dite, mais on ne peut pas non plus se contenter de

formulations vagues ou génériques. On n’est pas da ns la course, mais on est quand même dans les

séries de qualification. L’Etat qui souhaite intervenir ne doit pas être exhaustif ni épuiser

l’argumentation au fond, mais il faut établir les inté rêts concrets et partic uliers qu’il invoque de

manière à ce que la Cour ait les éléments nécessaires pour admettre ou rejeter la requête

d’intervention, en raison du caractère plausible tant de l’intérêt juridique invoqué que des chances

⎯ ou des risques ⎯ de sa mise en cause par l’arrêt 16.

15
Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan (Indonésie/Malaisie), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 575.
16Voir Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras), requête à fin d’intervention,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 117, par. 61. - 21 -

9. L’Etat intervenant participe à la procédure mais, par définition, n’est pas partie à

l’instance et, pour cette même raison, l’article81 du Règlement, qui définit la compétence de la

Cour pour se prononcer sur sa requête, est inclus dans la partie du Statut consacrée aux procédures

incidentes par rapport à l’affaire principale s’entend. Celle-ci constitue une base de compétence

suffisante. Naturellement, la situation change si l’intervention n’est pas une intervention au sens

17
propre, une «véritable intervention» , une intervention prévue dans le Statut de la Cour, mais un

prétexte pour traiter d’extorquer à la Cour la r econnaissance de certains droits ou une décision sur

un différend autre que celui porté de vant la Cour par les Parties ou, encore, si on cherche à travers

cette procédure à devenir une nouvelle Partie plutôt qu’un Etat intervenant 18.

Le Costa Rica n’a pas démontré l’existence d’un intérêt d’ordre juridique, propre, direct,
concret et actuel…

10. Le Costa Rica est justement dans cette situation : il n’a pas pu démontrer l’existence d’un

intérêt d’ordre juridique susceptible d’être mis en cause par la décision que la Cour devra prendre

dans le différend entre le Nicaragua et la Co lombie comme mon collègue PaulReichler le

démontrera dans quelques minutes. Le CostaRi ca n’a même pas réussi à démontrer l’existence

d’un intérêt d’ordre juridique propre, direct, concre t et actuel, ce qui est une prémisse nécessaire à

toute intervention. Il n’a pas réussi à démontrer cette existence dans le ca dre du différend entre le

Nicaragua et la Colombie.

11. Evidement le CostaRica a des intérêts juridiques dans la délimitation avec le voisin

Nicaragua. Ses plaidoiries de lundi ont confirmé qu’il se présente comme une partie ⎯ non pas au

différend qui oppose le Nicaragua à la Colombie ⎯ mais à un différend entre lui-même et le

Nicaragua concernant la délimitation maritime en tre les deux pays. Mais celui-ci est un autre

différend que le Costa Rica ne peut pas «glisser» subrepticement dans le rôle de la Cour par le biais

de l’intervention. Bien souvent, lors de la plaidoirie du Costa Rica lundi dernier on a eu

l’impression que le Costa Rica plaidait au sujet de la délimitation latérale de ses espaces maritimes

17Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984,
p. 13, par. 18, p. 23, par. 37. Voir aussi affaire Haya de la Torre (Colombie/Pérou), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 77.

18Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 133-135, par. 97-101 ; Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan (Indonésie/Malaisie),
requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 588-589, par. 35-36. - 22 -

avec ceux du Nicaragua et non pas de la menace prét endue que ferait peser sur ces intérêts l’issue

du procès opposant le Nicaragua et la Colombie 19.

12. En ce qui concerne l’affaire pendante deva nt la Cour, le simple voisinage entre le

CostaRica et le Nicaragua et l’absence d’une ligne de délimitation maritime latérale ne suffisent

pas à justifier un intérêt pertinent pour intervenir dans la délimitation entre les côtes opposées du

Nicaragua et de la Colombie. Y-a-t-il autre chose?

13. Selon le Costa Rica, l’intérêt d’ordre juridique qui pourrait être mis en cause par la

décision de la Cour est «l’intérêt du Costa Rica à exercer ses droits souverains et sa juridiction dans

la région maritime dans la mer des Caraïbes que le droit international lui reconnaît en vertu de sa

20
côte dans cette mer» . Cet intérêt ne peut pas, toutefois, être défini indépendamment des traités

signés par le CostaRica pour délimiter les espace s maritimes soumis à sa souveraineté et à sa

juridiction dans la mer des Caraïbes.

14. Le Costa Rica prétend avoir un intérêt juridique à ce que soient respectées les limites

acceptées par son gouvernement, dans un traité si gné, mais non ratifié, comme celui de 1977 avec

la Colombie; mais, en même temps, il situe ces intérêts au-delà de cette limite conventionnelle.

Bref, on dirait que son désir est de tuer ce traité sans tirer un seul coup, ce qui serait d’ailleurs

conforme à sa tradition pacifiste.

15. L’article62 du Statut fait référence aux intérêts d’ordre juridique, non aux illusions

même si elles prétendent s’insérer dans cet ordre. En tout cas, la Cour n’est pas le magicien qui

doit transformer les rêves du Costa Rica en réalité. Toute considération que le Costa Rica souhaite

faire sur les principes et les règles de droit in ternational applicables à une délimitation maritime

dans une mer présentant les caractéristiques de la mer des Caraïbes est étrangère à l’intervention, si

elle n’est pas rattachée à des intérêts juridiques propres, directs, concrets et actuels 21.

19 Voir CR 2010/12, p. 23-24, par. 11-18 (Brenes) ; ibid., p. 36-40, par. 17-29 (Lathrop).

20 «Costa Rica’s interest in the exercise of its sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the maritime area in the
Caribbean Sea to which it is entitled under internatinal law by virtue of its coast facing that sea» Application for
Permission to Intervene, par. 11). Voir aussi CR 2010/12, p. 17, par. 10 (Ugalde).

21 Voir Plateau continental (Tunisie-Jamahiriya arabe libyenne), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1981, p. 12, par. 19 ; Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d ’intervention,
arrêt, opinion individuelle du juge Mbaye, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 35. - 23 -

… susceptible d’être mis en cause

16. En tout cas, même si, aux seules fins de la discussion, on fait abstraction de l’effet

limitatif des traités conclus ou signés par le Co sta Rica et on pense à lui comme à un pays sans

obligations juridiques particulières, qui essaie de projeter sur les eaux, les fonds marins et le

sous-sol des Caraïbes, toute la potentialité de sa s ouveraineté sur la côte, on ne rencontre pas dans

la requête du Costa Rica d’éléments qui permettent d’identifier où, jusqu’à quel point et de quelle

façon, ses intérêts d’ordre juridique pourraient êt re affectés par les prétentions du Nicaragua dans

des zones qui, comme mon collègue PaulReichler va le démontrer, semblent étrangères à de tels

intérêts et ont peu ou rien à voir avec l’établisseme nt de la ligne qui devra être tracée, d’une façon

négociée, entre le Nicaragua et le CostaRica à part ir du point final de leur frontière terrestre, en

tenant compte de la décision que rendra la Cour dans l’affaire qui oppose le Nicaragua et la

Colombie.

17. Dans cet ordre d’idées, on doit noter que la Cour, d’ailleurs avec le consentement des

Parties, a donné au CostaRica toutes facilités pour fa ire valoir ses prétentions dans le différend

entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie, en mettant à sa disposition tous les docum ents de la procédure

écrite. Sa situation n’est donc pas comparable à celles de Malte, en 1981, de l’Italie, en 1984, ou

des Philippines, en 2001, Etats dont les demandes dans ce sens avaient été rejetées par la Cour du

fait de l’objection élevée par l’une ou les deux Par ties et qui se sont trouvés obligés de «plaider à

l’aveuglette», sans pouvoir se fonder sur cette précieuse information 22. Le CostaRica a qualifié,

23
lui-même, sa situation comme étant privilégiée .

18. L’une des caractéristiques les plus remarqua bles de la jurisprudence de la Cour sur les

procédures incidentes concernant l’autorisation d’inte rvenir a été le caractère strict et rigoureux de

ses exigences concernant la preuve de l’intérêt en cause. Comme il a été rappelé par l’agent, quand

le Nicaragua a demandé à intervenir dans le vol et maritime du différend territorial entre la

République d’ElSalvador et la République du Honduras, la Chambre de la Cour a rejeté

l’intervention en ce qui concernait une éventuelle décision sur la délimitation des espaces

22Voir Plateau continental (Tunisie-Jamahiriya arabe libyenne), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, opinion
individuelle du juge Schwebel, C.I.J.Recueil 1981, p.35; Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte),
requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, opinion individuelle du juge Nagendra Singh, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 33 ; Souveraineté

sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan (Indonésie/Mala isie), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêopinion dissidente du
juge Oda, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 619, par. 15.
23Voir la requête à fin d’intervention du Costa Rica, par. 4. - 24 -

maritimes dans le golfe de Fonseca et au-delà de sa ligne de fermeture. Le Nicaragua a allégué

qu’on n’avait qu’à jeter un coup d’Œil sur une carte pour se rendre compte que toute délimitation

faite dans une aire aussi réduite que celle du golfe, à ses points extrêmes terrestres sous la

souveraineté respective d’ElSalvador et du Nicaragua, non seulement pouvait affecter, mais

affecterait inévitablement ces intérêts.

19. Mais ce qui était évident aux yeux du Nicaragua, ne l’a pas été aux yeux de la Chambre,

qui a considéré que ce pays avait failli à démontre r l’existence d’un intérê t juridique susceptible

d’être mis en cause par un arrêt établissant la ligne de délimitation entre les Parties, soit à

l’intérieur soit à l’extérieur du golfe, même si ce la entraînait la fin du voisinage maritime entre

24
El Salvador et le Nicaragua ; d’où, au fait, il en résulte que, malgré ce que l’agent du Costa Rica a

fait valoir, «la modification ou l’élimination de la relation de voisinage existant entre la Colombie

et le Costa Rica dans la mer des Caraïbes» ne cons titue pas un intérêt d’ordre juridique au sens de

25
l’article62 du Statut . «Il arrive souvent en pratique», a déclaré la Chambre de la Cour dans

l’arrêt du 13 septembre 1990,

«qu’on doit tenir compte, pour procéder à une délimitation entre deux Etats, de la côte
d’un Etat tiers, mais le fait de tenir comp te…ne signifie aucunement que l’intérêt
d’un troisième Etat…soit susceptible d’êt re affecté en raison même de cette

délimitation… De toute façon, c’est à l’Et at demandant à intervenir...qu’il incombe
d’établir de manière satisfaisante…que tel serait effectivement le cas en l’espèce.»
(Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras), requête

à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 92, p. 124-125, par. 77.)

20. En conséquence, on ne peut pas donner pour acquis un intérêt d’ordre juridique du

CostaRica susceptible d’être mis en cause par une décision de la Cour dans le différend entre le

Nicaragua et la Colombie, du seul fait que le Cost a Rica soit riverain d’une mer semi-fermée où il

n’y a pas d’espaces maritimes échappa nt à la projection des riverains et qu’il prétende à une ligne

de partage tracée conformément au principe d’équidistance 26. Ceci explique peut-être un intérêt,

un intérêt de fait, mais pas un intérêt d’ordre juri dique et, encore moins, son éventuelle mise en

cause par une délimitation faite par la Cour. Il faut démontrer que, au cas où la Cour accède aux

24
Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 127-128, par. 84.
25
CR 2010/12, p. 19, par. 18 (Ugalde).
26Requête à fin d’intervention, par. 9, 14-19 et 22. - 25 -

prétentions des Parties, telles qu’elles ont été exprimées, cela pourrait impliquer la négation des

prétentions plausibles du tiers qui demande à intervenir justement pour protéger ses prétentions

vis-à-vis de toute décision. Il ne s’agit pas de porter à l’extrême l’exigence de la preuve du titre ou

du fondement de telles prétentions, mais celles-ci doivent être quand même raisonnables au regard

des prétentions des Parties à l’affaire principale.

Ce que révèle l’expérience : à propos de l’article 59 du Statut

21. La plupart des requêtes à fin d’intervention soumises jusqu’à présent ont concerné des

différends sur la délimitation d´espaces maritimes dans des mers fermées ou semi-fermées ou dans

des golfes où se trouvaient des côtes et des îles de plus de deux Etats dont la projection maritime

pouvait se superposer 27. A une exception près, celle de la Guinée équatoriale, aucune de ces

requêtes n’a prospéré.

22. Celui de la Guinée équatoriale était un cas très spécial. Tandis qu’une des Parties, le

Cameroun, prétendait établir une ligne d’équidistance, ligne qui à partir d’un certain point pénétrait

dans des espaces que la Guinée équatoriale pouvait re vendiquer en raison de la localisation de l’île

de Bioko, l’autre Partie, le Nigéria, a essayé de se servir de la doctrine du «tiers indispensable»

comme base d’une exception préliminaire à la compétence 28. La Cour a décidé de statuer sur cette

exception dans l’arrêt sur le fond et en même temps a invité pratiquement les Etats voisins

29
insulaires, notamment la Guinée équatoriale, à intervenir dans ce volet de l’affaire . La Guinée a

profité de l’invitation ; les parties ne s’y sont pas opposées. Il n’y a donc pas eu d’audiences orales

sur la requête et la Cour a accepté l’interv ention à l’unanimité. La singularité du cas a été

soulignée par le fait que la décision de la Cour s’est traduite par une ordonnance et non par un

27 Voir Plateau continental (Tunisie-Jamahiriya arabe libyenne), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1981, p. 3 ; Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d ’intervention, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 3 ; Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras), requête à fin
d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 92 ; Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria, requête

à fin d’intervention, ordonnance du 21 octobre 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999, p. 1029.
28 Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c.Nigéria), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 275.

29Ibid. - 26 -

30
arrêt . Finalement, la Cour a rejeté l’exception pré liminaire du Nigéria et elle a protégé en même

31
temps les intérêts guinéens qu’elle a considérés justifiés .

23. Tous les Etats qui invoquent l’article62 du Statut pour demander à intervenir dans une

affaire pendante devant la Cour s’efforcent de me ttre en relief les limitations de l’article59 du

Statut pour protéger efficacement les intérêts juridiques des tiers au cas où la Cour n’accepterait

pas leurs requêtes, et le Costa Rica ne fait pas exception 32. Souligner les vertus de l’article 59 pour

protéger ces droits est aussi un lieu commun des pa rties qui s’opposent aux requêtes. La Cour

33
semble avoir évolué de la foi aveugle dans ces vertus à l’acceptation de l’idée, motivée par les

opinions critiques de certains juges 34, selon laquelle l’article59 peut être insuffisant dans certains

35
cas . Cependant, cette observation ne change en rien les paramètres d’exigence que l’article 62 du

Statut impose pour apprécier les conditions d’ acceptation par la Cour d’une requête à fin

d’intervention. La Cour ne doit pas accepter l’inte rvention au rabais. Le test de l’intervention,

comme la Cour l’a dit lorsqu’elle s’est prononcée sur la requête de l’Italie, «n’est pas de savoir si la

participation de l’Italie peut êt re utile ou même nécessaire à la Cour; elle est de savoir, à supposer

que l’Italie ne participe pas à l’ instance, si l’intérêt juridique de l’Italie est en cause ou s’il est

susceptible d’être affecté par la décision» ( Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte),

requête à fin d ’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p.25, par.40). L’Etat demandant à

intervenir n’a rien à redouter de l’arrêt de la Cour dès lors que celle-ci a estimé que celui-ci ne

portera pas atteinte à ses soi-disant intérêts juridi ques. Et, par définition, sans un intérêt juridique

en jeu on n’a rien du tout sur lequel informer la Cour.

30
Frontière terrestre et maritime en tre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c.Nigéria), requête à fin
d’intervention, ordonnance du 21 octobre 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999, p. 1029.
31
Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria; Guinée équatoriale
(intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 303.
32
CR 2010/12, p. 49-56, par. 2-27 (Ugalde).
33Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984,

p. 26, par. 42.
34Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984,

opinion dissidente du juge Oda, p. 109, par. 37, opinion dissidente du juge Jennings, p. 157, par. 27.
35Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 122, par. 73 ; Différend frontalier terrestre, insula ire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras;

Nicaragua (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p.609-610, par.421-424; Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le
Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria; Guinée équatoriale (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil2002 , p.421,
par. 238. - 27 -

24. Sur cette base, on peut faire plusieurs rema rques. La première est que l’on demande à

intervenir ou pas, que la requête soit acceptée ou pas, la Cour est tenue statutairement à ne pas se

prononcer si elle considère que sa décision peut re mettre en cause les droits d’un tiers, ce qui la

conduirait à restreindre sa portée 36.

25. Deuxième remarque: on peut penser que si la Cour s’est montrée rigoureuse face aux

requêtes à fin d’intervention c’est, au moins en par tie, parce qu’elle considérait que le déroulement

de la procédure incidente, lorsque l’objection d´ une ou des deux Parties rendait nécessaire la tenue

de ces audiences, satisfaisait l’objectif d’attirer l’at tention de la Cour sur les intérêts juridiques

invoqués par l’Etat tiers, évitant ainsi que, par mégarde ou manque d’information, la Cour ne

prenne une décision susceptible de les mettre en cause. Comme le disait le juge NagendraSingh

en 1984 :

«Si le but ainsi recherché était de signaler les zones intéressant l’Italie à la Cour,
en donnant à celle-ci les informations pr éalables nécessaires pour que son arrêt
n’empiète pas sur les droits souverains et l es prétentions de l’Italie, il semble que ce

but ait été effectivement atteint par la pro cédure qui a suivi la décision de la Cour,
prise conformément à l’article62 du Statut , d’entendre non seulement l’Italie, mais
aussi les Parties au différend. Il est hors de doute que la Cour a maintenant pleine

connaissance de l’existence des intérêts ita liens et de leur étendue, et qu’il est donc
impossible qu’elle empiète par sa décision sur les prétentions et les intérêts de l’Italie
ou qu’elle les compromette, fût-ce par mégarde.» ( Plateau continental (Jamahiriya

arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, opinion
individuelle du juge Nagendra Singh, p. 31.)

26. Le plus extraordinaire est ⎯et c’est la troisième remarque ⎯ que les Etats dont les

requêtes d´intervention ont échoué ont, eux-aussi, reçu une protection similaire à celle de la

Guinée équatoriale. Le cas de l’Italie a été retentissant. L’Italie a régné une fois morte. La Cour a

rejeté sa requête d´intervention, car à son avis, l’Italie ne visait pas la protection de ses intérêts

juridiques, mais la reconnaissance de ses droits , ce qui dépassait les limites de l’intervention

envisagée à l’article62 du Statut 37; cependant la Cour a averti qu ’elle allait sauvegarder dans

38
l’arrêt sur le fond les intérêts juridiques des Etats tiers ; ainsi, un an plus tard, lorsqu’elle a statué

sur le fond, la Cour a bien tenu compte des intérê ts juridiques invoqués par l’Italie au cours de la

36
L’Italie dans l’affaire du Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d ’intervention,
arrêt, C.I.. ecuel984 , p.6, pa.2-43; Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 25-26, par. 21.
37 Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984,

p. 3.
38Ibid., p. 26-27, par. 42-43. - 28 -

procédure incidente, comme d’un fait qui obligeait à soustraire à la délimitation entre la Libye et

Malte les zones où l’Italie avait invoqué des intérêts juridiques plausibles 39. La Cour s’est d’abord

vue poussée à immoler la requête sur l’autel du co nsentement des Parties, pour essayer ensuite de

satisfaire à la prétention raisonnable du requérant déçu en réduisant de manière draconienne l’objet

du litige. Pour l’Italie, échouer à l´intervention a été une bonne affaire.

27. A la limite, et c’est la quatrième remarque, l’effet relatif de la décision de la Cour qui,

d’après l’article 59 du Statut, «n’est obligatoire que pour les parties en litige et dans le cas qui a été

décidé», contribue à protéger les intérêts de tout ordre des Etats tiers.

28. Finalement, et c’est ma dernière remarque, le Costa Rica figure parmi les Etats qui ont la

chance d’initier une action à titre principal contre l’ une ou l’autre des Parties dans cette affaire, car

il a les bases de compétence nécessai res. Le Costa Rica est partie au pacte de Bogotá, au même

titre que la Colombie et le Nicaragua. Le Costa Ri ca interprète de manière étonnante la portée de

40
cette constatation factuelle faite par le Nicaragua . Il ne s’agit pas du tout de priver les Etats qui

ont une base autonome de juridiction de leur facu lté de demander à la Cour l’intervention en

conformité avec l’article 62 du Statut. Ce que le Nicaragua a voulu noter est que le Costa Rica ne

se trouve pas dans une situation id entique à celle des Etats qui n’ont pas d´alternative à la requête

d’intervention (tel qu’était le cas de Malte, de l’Italie, du Nicaragua lui-même, de la

Guinéeéquatoriale, des Philippines). Saisir la Cour à titre principal permet de passer de la

protection à la reconnaissance des intérêts juridiques et, en même temps, évite la nécessité d’une

analyse immédiate et rigoureuse de la nature de ces intérêts et de son éventuelle mise en cause par

l’arrêt futur que requiert la procédure incidente d’intervention, test exigeant que la demande du

41
Costa Rica ne passe pas .

Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie de votre attention

et ayant achevé mon exposé je vous prie, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir appeler à cette

barre M. Paul Reichler.

39
Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 26, par. 21.
40CR 2010/12, p. 56-58, par. 28-41 (Ugalde).

41Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984,
p. 23, par. 37. - 29 -

Le PRESIDENT: Je vous remercie, Monsieur le professeur Antonio Remiro Brotóns, pour

votre intervention. I now invite Mr. Paul Reichler to take the floor.

RMEr. HLER

C OSTA RICA HAS NO LEGAL INTERESTS THAT WOULD BE AFFECTED
BY THE C OURT ’S DECISION IN THIS CASE

1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, good morning.

2. Some things are so blindingly obvious that they go undetected by even the most astute

observers. Ironically, they go unobserved precisely because they are so obvious.

3. This is illustrated by the exchange between the great English detective, Sherlock Holmes,

and Dr. Watson. While investigating a crime late in to the night on an isolated Scottish heath, they

decided to set up a tent to shelter them while they slept.

4. After a couple of hours, it rained very hard and they both awoke drenched to the bone.

Holmes leaned over, nudged his companion. “Wat son”, he said, “look directly above us and tell

me what you see”. Watson put on his eyeglasses, looked up, and said: “I see a very dark sky, with

thick and ominous clouds, and lo ts of rain pouring down on t op of us.” “And what do you

conclude from that?” asked Holmes. Watson pondered for a minute, then said: “Meteorologically,

there is an abnormally low pressure system, with a major storm front and unseasonably strong

winds threatening record amounts of precipitation.” “What do you conclude, Holmes?”

5. The great detective, soaking wet, looked straight up into the night at the rain pouring down

on top of him, and said: “I conclude that someone has stolen our tent!”

6. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the conclusion in this matter is as obvious as that. It

needs no abstruse, technical or scientific explanatio n, or magical manipulation of maritime maps.

The conclusion to be drawn is as plain as day. But, like Dr.Watson, Costa Rica’s counsel have

looked right past it, even though it was staring them in the face.

7. On Monday, they gave us a visually impressive display of maps and charts, as well as a

complex analysis of theoretical entitlements, disput ed maritime areas and delimitation claims. But

it is perfectly obvious ⎯ from their own maps and charts no less ⎯ that the delimitation to be

carried out by the Court in this case cannot and will not affect Costa Rica’s legal interests. - 30 -

8. This conclusion is unavoidable for three reasons:

First, in a maritime delimitation case the Cour t cannot delimit an area in which a third State

may have a claim. This is patently obvious, and in any event the Court has said so many times, and

has always ⎯ always ⎯ avoided extending a delimitation line into areas claimed by third States 42.

Second, neither of the Parties has asked the Court to delimit any areas claimed by third

States, including areas claimed by Costa Rica; neither the boundary lines claimed by Nicaragua

nor those claimed by Colombia require, or even invite, the Court to delimit in areas claimed by

Costa Rica. So the Court is not even called upon to delimit in the areas in which Costa Rica claims

a legal interest.

Third, the Court is perfectly capable of deciding this case, and delimiting the boundaries

between Nicaragua and Colombia, without extending the delimitation lines in to areas claimed by

Costa Rica. There is neither necessity nor r eason for it to do so. The delimitation can and

inevitably will be effected without including the areas claimed by Costa Rica. If, as is obviously

the case, the decision will not affect Costa Rica’s legal interests, then Costa Rica has failed to

satisfy the main requirement for intervention under Article 62.

THE C OURT HAS BEEN DULY INFORMED OF THE LEGAL
INTERESTS C OSTA R ICA CLAIMS TO HAVE

9. Costa Rica has very helpfully informed the Court as to what it presently considers to be its

interests of a legal nature in the Caribbean Sea. According to its counsel, its interests are bounded

in the north by a putative equidistance line with Nicaragua, and in the east by a line that is

200 nautical miles from Costa Rica’s coast 43. Costa Rica claims, repeatedly, that the purpose of its

intervention is to inform the Court of these legal interests, so that the delimitation in this case will

not extend into that area. The Application to in tervene states: “It is the purpose of Costa Rica’s

intervention to inform the Court of Costa Rica’s legal interests and rights so that these may remain

42
See e.g., case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 18, para. 75,
p. 91, para. 130, p. 93, para. 133 (B) (1); Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2009, p. 129, paras. 208-209, p. 67, para.Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and
Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 , p.756, para.312 and p.759,
para. 319; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Ques tions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 109, para. 221; Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Application for Permission to
Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984 , p.27; Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J.

Reports 1985, pp. 26-28, paras. 21-23.
4See Costa Rica’s judges’ folder, tab 10; CR 2010/12, pp. 33-39, paras. 4-29 (Lathrop). - 31 -

unaffected as the Court delimits the maritime boundary between Nicaragua and Colombia, the

44
parties to the case before it.” This was repeated several times in the first round by Costa Rica’s

Agent and counsel 45.

10. After the hearings on Monday, there can be no doubt that Costa Rica has accomplished

its purpose. It has made perfectly clear what it now considers its legal interests to be. The Court

and the Parties are aware of them, and as a result it has become even more obvious that those

interests cannot and will not be affected by the judgment to be given. In the Tunisia/Libya case,

where Malta’s Application to in tervene under Article62 was denied by the Court, it was argued

that: “the avowed object of Malta has in fact already been achieved by the hearings on the question

of intervention, in view of the explanations Malta has there been able to give of its preoccupations”

(Continental Shelf (Tunisia/ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) , Application to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J.

Reports 1981, p.11, para.16). Like Malta, Costa Rica has made the Court aware of its

preoccupations. There is no further contribut ion it need be called upon to make to these

proceedings.

11. In this case, neither Party has asked the C ourt to delimit any part of the maritime area in

which Costa Rica now claims to have legal inte rests. Nicaragua certainly has made no such

request. To leave no doubt about its position, Ni caragua reiterates that it does not seek from the

Court any delimitation in the area in which Costa Rica now considers itself to have legal interests.

Nicaragua does not read Colombia’s written pleadings as calling for delimitation of, or within, the

areas in which Costa Rica has expressed an interest, either.

12. And since the Court itself is guided by its own Rules and precedents against delimiting in

areas claimed by third States, it is a given that th e decision in this case will not affect Costa Rica’s

legal interests. The Court having now been duly in formed of Costa Rica’s precise interests, it can

only note that they are insufficient to justify intervention in this case, and that no purpose would be

served by allowing Costa Rica to intervene. Cost a Rica itself offers none. As it has repeatedly

emphasized, its purpose in bringing this Application was to inform the Court of its legal interests.

44
Application for permission to intervene by the Republic of Costa Rica, 25 Feb. 2010, p. 2.
45See, e.g., CR 2010/12, p. 43, para. 40 (Lathrop); ibid., p. 45, paras. 45 and 46 (Lathrop). - 32 -

It has now done so. Mission accomplished. On th at happy note, Costa Rica, like the Cheshire cat

in Alice in Wonderland, can slowly fade away, leaving only its smile behind.

13. These points are confirmed by the maps and charts, including those displayed by Costa

Rica on Monday.

C OSTA R ICA ’S CLAIMED LEGAL INTERESTS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED

BY THE DECISION IN THIS CASE

[Slide 1: PSR1]

14. Here is how Costa Rica, at these hearings, describes its legal interests 46. Nicaragua

believes that Costa Rica’s true legal interests in the Caribbean are not this extensive, as I will come

to later in my speech. But this makes no di fference for purposes of determining whether Costa

Rica’s interests can be affected by the decision in this case. Even as broadly defined as they are

now, on this map, they cannot be affected by the Court’s decision. Here is why.

15. First, Nicaragua asks the Court to eff ect the delimitation with Colombia by enclaving

San Andrés, Providencia and any ot her islands or maritime features the Court awards to Colombia

[Slide 1: PSR1] . It cannot be argued— and Costa Rica does not argue— that its interests are

affected by these red delimitation lines. Nicaragua also asks the Court to delimit the continental

shelf boundary with Colombia [Slide 1: PSR1]. Th is line does not enter or encroach on any areas

in which Costa Rica has legal interests. Costa Rica does not claim that it does. In fact, Costa Rica

expressly claims that its legal interests extend no farther east than 200nautical miles from its

47
coast . The continental shelf boundary with Colombia lies more than 118nautical miles further

east of that limit. In its Application to intervene, Costa Rica admits that Nicaragua’s proposed

continental shelf boundary with Colombia is “beyond any area to which Costa Rica claims an

entitlement” 48.

16. To be absolutely clear, Nicaragua’s claim is merely that the line dividing the continental

shelf of Nicaragua from the continental shelf of Co lombia lies where Nicaragua has placed it. It

expresses no opinion as to the location of any lateral delimitation lines with Costa Rica or any other

46
Costa Rica’s judges’ folder, tab 8.
47
CR 2010/12, p. 26, para. 23 (Brenes).
4Application for permission to intervene by the Republic of Costa Rica, 25 Feb. 2010, p. 4. - 33 -

State west of that boundary line. It makes no claim in these proceedings, vis-à-vis Costa Rica or

any other third State, of entitlement to the waters west of this proposed boundary line.

17. So, it is plain that Nicaragua’s boundary claims do not encroach upon Costa Rica’s legal

interests, or require the Court to delimit areas claimed by Costa Rica.

18. To make it appear otherwise, Costa Rica resorts to two false arguments. First, Costa

Rica says that Nicaragua claims entitlement to all of the maritime area lying west of its proposed

continental shelf boundary with Colombia 49. “[W]hat it seeks from the Court” Costa Rica’s

counsel say about Nicaragua “is not merely the drawing of a boundary line with Colombia, but also

the recognition of the maritime areas bounded by that line as belonging to Nicaragua” 5. This is

simply not true. They say it anyway because it is the only way they can pretend to show how a

potential delimitation by the Court might affect th eir legal interests. But nowhere in its written

pleadings has Nicaragua made such a claim. And the Agent of Nicaragua has confirmed today that

Nicaragua does not claim in these proceedings, and does not ask the Court for delimitation in,

maritime areas west of the continental shelf boundary, ex cept for the enclaves it seeks around

Colombia’s insular possessions close to Nicaragua’s coast.

19. In support of its attribution to Nicara gua of an argument it never made, and now has

expressly abjured, Costa Rica’s counsel insist that, despite what Nicaragua says, its boundary claim

51
is actually reflected in its graphi cs showing its “potential EEZ entitlement” . This is no more

credible than claiming that Costa Rica’s legal interests extend to what its counsel called its

52
“Caribbean Maritime Entitlements in the Absence of Neighboring States Entitlements” [slide 2:

PSR2]. This is a Costa Rican chart displayed on Monday. As counsel made clear, this is not the

area actually claimed by Costa Rica or the area in wh ich it says it has legal interests. It is, in his

words, nothing more than “the hypothetical exte nt of Costa Rica’s maritime zones” presented “in

the abstract” 53. It is a starting point for an analytical process, consistent with the methodology

49
CR 2010/12, p. 41, para. 34 (Lathrop); p. 48, para. 13 (Ugalde).
50
Ibid.
51Application for permission to intervene by the Republic of Costa Rica, 25 Feb. 2010, para.17; CR 2010/12,
p. 48, para. 13 (Ugalde); ibid., p. 42, para. 36 (Lathrop). Referring to RN, figures 4-5, 6-5, 6-9, 6-10, and 6-11.

52Application for permission to intervene by the Republic of Costa Rica, Oral Proceedings, judges’ folder,
11 Oct. 2010, tab 3.

53CR 2010/12, p. 33, para. 5 (Lathrop). - 34 -

cited by the Court in numerous maritime delimitations, for ultimately arriving at justifiable, and

more limited, legal claims. This chart no more depicts the area in which Costa Rica claims a legal

interest, than Nicaragua’s chart of its “ potential EEZ entitlement” depicts its actual boundary

claims. As stated in Nicaragua’s Written Observations, all of the charts held up by Costa Rica in

its Application and again on Monday 54: “refer to the general area of the ‘potential EEZ

entitlement’, and do not imply, under any possible read ing, a claim to the entirety of the areas thus

roughly sketched” 55. It is disappointing that Costa Rica’ s counsel would seek to confuse these

Nicaraguan charts ⎯ the equivalent of those depicting Costa Rica’s expansive “hypothetical”

claims “in the abstract” ⎯ with the much more limited charts showing Nicaragua’s actual claims.

They have deliberately compared apples to ora nges in an attempt to sell the Court the wrong

fruit ⎯ and a rotten one at that.

20. The second false argument advanced by Costa Rica, to show a purported encroachment

by Nicaragua’s boundary claim, is the one depicted on Costa Rica’s chart No.10 in its judges’

folder. Here Costa Rica shows the claim line originally proffered in Nicaragua’s Memorial as

extending slightly into the area in which Costa Rica claims to have a legal interest [slide 3: PSR3].

May we have that line please? Thank you. The argument fails for two reasons. First, as made

clear in the Reply, this line no longer represents Nicaragua’s boundary claim; it therefore has no

relevance to Costa Rica’s Application to intervene. Second, the arrow at the southern tip of the line

is a standard indicator that the line is not intended to extend into areas claimed by third States; to

the contrary, the arrow indicates only the direction that the line follows up to, but not beyond, areas

claimed by another State. It proves the opposite of what Costa Rica contends: that Nicaragua is

seeking to avoid a delimitation affecting Costa Rica’s interests, or those of any other State.

21. Costa Rica is just as unsuccessful in its attempt to depict Colombia’s boundary claim as

encroaching on its legal interests [slide 3: PSR3]. On Monday, Costa Rica described its agreed

boundary with Colombia as consisting of two straight line segments forming a right angle at

54
Application for permission to intervene by the Republic of Costa Rica, 25 Feb. 2010, para.17; CR 2010/12,
p. 41, para. 36 (Lathrop).
5Written Observations of the Republic of Nicaragua on the Application for permission to intervene filed by the
Republic of Costa Rica, 26 May 2010, p. 12, para. 31. - 35 -

56
point B . These are shown in red. In the words of Costa Rica’s counsel, the line extending north

from point B has an arrow at the end to indicate that it “extends north to an unspecified point where

it would intersect with Nicaragua” 57. So here Costa Rica uses an arrow to indicate that its

delimitation line extends to, but not beyond, the ar eas claimed by a neighbouring State. Yet Costa

Rica chooses to ignore the arrow placed by Nicaragua at the end of its former delimitation line for

the same purpose.

22. Costa Rica contends that Colombia’s claimed boundary line with Nicaragua extends

south into its maritime area 58[slide 3: PSR3]. But here again, we see the well-recognized symbol,

the arrow, indicating the direction of Colombia ’s putative boundary line until it meets the area

claimed by a third State, in this case Costa Rica. It is plain from that arrow that Colombia does not

intend this line to extend into Costa Rica’s waters. Colombia even says this in its

Counter-Memorial, in a passage cited in Costa Rica’ s Application: “There is a question how far

the median line should be prolonged to the south given the potential interests of third States in the

region. To avoid any possible prejudice to such rights, Colombia has placed an arrow at the end of

59
the line . . .”

23. In this regard, it is worth commenting on the exegesis of the Court’s four most recent

decisions in maritime delimitation cases that was so eruditely presented on Monday by Costa

Rica’s counsel [slide 4: PSR4]. He very helpfully pointed out and showed graphically that in

Romania v. Ukraine, the Court terminated the delimitation line with a directional arrow, short of

60
the areas of the Black Sea where third States might have interests . Likewise, [slide 5: PSR5] he

cited Honduras v. Nicaragua, in which the Court used a dashed li ne to indicate the direction of the

61
delimitation line extending up to, but not beyond, areas claimed by third States . And, as counsel

also pointed out, in Cameroon v. Nigeria and Qatar v. Bahrain, the Court took pains to assure that

56
CR 2010/12, p. 22, para. 7 (Brenes).
57
Ibid.
58Application for permission to intervene by the Republic of Costa Rica, 25Feb. 2010, para.20; Costa Rica’s

judges’ folder, tab 10.
59Application for permission to intervene by the Repub lic of Costa Rica, 25 Feb. 2010, para.20 (citing CMC,
para. 9.34).

60CR 2010/12, p. 44, para. 42 (Lathrop). See, also, Costa Rica’s judges’ folder, tab 6.

61Ibid. See, also, Costa Rica’s judges’ folder, tab 7. - 36 -

the delimitation lines in those cases did not encr oach on areas claimed by Equatorial Guinea or

62
Sao Tomé in the former case, or Iran or Saudi Arabia in the latter .

24. As Costa Rica’s counsel concluded on Monday:

“The question of endpoints in the vicinity of third States... arises in the
majority of bilateral delimitations. Stat e practice and the practice of international

courts and tribunals indicate a strong concer n to63void entering areas in which third
States . . . might reasonably maintain an interest.”

25. We not only agree with counsel for Costa Rica about the holdings and import of these

cases; we submit that he has made our argument for us. He has provide d cogent and convincing

reasons why Costa Rica’s Applicati on to intervene should be disallowed. Simply put, consistent

with its past practice, the Court cannot and will not delimit in areas claimed by third States. The

Court has very studiously and very successfully avoided doing so in every prior case in which this

has been an issue ⎯ including as far back as Libya/Malta (Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab

Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985 , pp. 26-28, paras. 21-23). There is no risk that,

in this case, the Court will delimit in the areas in which Costa Rica has expressed its legal interests.

The Court simply cannot do so, and neither of the Parties has asked it to do so.

26. Since there is no risk that the Court’s d ecision will affect Costa Rica’s maritime claims,

the Application very obviously fails to satisfy the requirements of Article 62, and must be denied.

No other interests of a legal nature have been proffered by Costa Rica in support of its Application.

In its decision rejecting Nicaragua’s Application to intervene in the Land, Island and Maritime

Frontier Dispute, the Chamber said that Article62 requires the applicant to “ demonstrate

convincingly . . . the interest of a legal nature which it considers may be affected by the decision in

the case” ( Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Disput e (ElSalvador/Honduras), Application to

Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1990 , pp.117-118, para.61; emphasis added.) It is very

obvious that Costa Rica has failed to meet this test.

T HE LEGAL INTERESTS OF C OSTA R ICA, PROPERLY DEFINED

27. As I indicated earlier, Nicaragua does not ag ree that Costa Rica has legal interests in the

entire area described in its Application, or by its counsel on Monday. To the contrary, Nicaragua

62
CR 2010/12, p. 44, para. 42 (Lathrop).
6Ibid., p. 43, para. 41 (Lathrop). - 37 -

believes that Costa Rica’s legal interests are confined to a smaller area, an issue I will now address.

Of course, if the delimitation effected by the Cour t will not encroach on or affect the broader area

now claimed by Costa Rica, it must also be true that it will not impact the smaller area to which

Costa Rica’s interests are more appropriately confined.

28. Costa Rica defined its legal interests in the Caribbean Sea ⎯ as perceived by itself ⎯ in

its 1977 Treaty establishing a maritime boundary with Colombia, and its 1980 Treaty establishing a

maritime boundary with Panama. Under the term s of those treaties, the maritime boundaries of

Costa Rica are defined by the lines you see depicted on this sketch map. [Slide 6: PSR6.] For the

reasons I will now discuss, we say that Costa Rica’s legal interests in the Caribbean Sea remain as

described in its boundary treaties with Colombia of Panama, and that, these interests cannot be

affected by the decision of the Court in this case.

29. It is not uncommon for international tribuna ls to define a State’s maritime interests by

reference to its existing treaties. In the 2006 Award in the arbitration between Barbados and

Trinidad and Tobago, for example, the distinguished arbitral tribunal determined the scope of what

64
it characterized as the “maritime claims of Trinidad and Tobago” by reference to that State’s

treaty with Venezuela. As the tribunal stated:

“The maritime areas which Trinidad and Tobago has, in the 1990 Trinidad
Venezuela Agreement, given up in favour of Venezuela do not any longer appertain to
Trinidad and Tobago and thus the Tribunal could not draw a delimitation line the
65
effect of which is to attribute to Trinidad and Tobago areas it no longer claims.”

The same could be said, mutatis mutandis, with respect to Costa Rica here. Both by signing the

1977 Treaty with Colombia, and by its subsequent practice over a 33-year period, Costa Rica has

shown that it did not consider the areas beyond th e 1977 Treaty line as appertaining to itself, and

therefore any decision by the Court in regard to those areas could not affect its legal interests.

64Arbitration between Barbados and th e Republic of Trinidad and Tobagorelating to the delimitation of the

exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf be tween them, decision of 11Apr.2006, United Nations, Reports of
International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), Vol. XXVII, para. 347.
65Ibid. - 38 -

30. Costa Rica attempts to distinguish its situation on the ground that it has not yet ratified its

1977 Treaty with Colombia. On this basis, Costa Rica in effect asks the Court to ignore that treaty,

and to recognize interests of a legal nature now claimed by Costa Rica in areas that extend beyond

the limits fixed by that treaty.

31. This is a difficult position for Costa Rica to sustain in view of its own consistent course

of conduct following the execution of the 1977 Treat y. Costa Rica has al ways manifested its

intention to comply with the provisions of that treaty, and the limits of its maritime jurisdiction set

forth therein. In its Application to intervene it states that it “has, in good faith, refrained from acts

which would defeat the object and purpose of this agreement” 66, echoing of course the requirement

of Article18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in regard to unratified treaties to

which States intend to be bound.

32. Costa Rica’s intention to comply with th e 1977 Treaty was made even more explicit in

its formal, bilateral communications with Colombia . In 1996, the Costa Rican Foreign Minister

sent his Colombian counterpart a diplomatic Note stating:

“[I] inform Your Excellency that... the Government of Costa Rica’s view, in
full harmony with international norms as embodied in the Vienna Convention on the

Law of Treaties, the Treaty on Maritime Delimitation between Colombia and Costa
Rica has been complied with, is being complied with and will continue to be complied
with, as a show of good faith of the Parties.” 67

33. It is also of some significance that the 1977 Treaty is not a stand-alone instrument. Some

of its provisions have been incorporated in to two other maritime boundary treaties that have been

ratified by Costa Rica. The first treaty is Costa Rica’s 1980 Treaty with Panama, which was

ratified by Costa Rica the following year 68. In Article1, paragraph1, of the 1980Treaty, Costa

Rica’s maritime boundary with Panama is defined by a straight line drawn from the land boundary

66
Application for permission to intervene by the Republic of Costa Rica, 25 Feb. 2010, para. 12.
67
CMC, Ann. 69: Diplomatic Note No. DVM 103 from the Costa Rican Foreign Vice-Minister to the Colombian
Ambassador in Costa Rica, 23Mar.1997. See, also, Ann.69: Diplomatic Note No.DVM103 from the Costa Rican
Foreign Vice-Minister to the Colombian Ambassador in Cost a Rica, 23Mar.1997; Ann.217: Statement given by
Mr. Gonzalo J. Facio, Costa Rican signatory of the 1977 Treaty and former Foreign Minister, at the Costa Rican Foreign
Ministry, 27 Aug. 1998; Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto (2000-2001), p.4,
http://www.rree.go.cr/ministerio/files/Memoria%202000-2001.pdf.
68
See American Society of International Law, International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. I,
J.I.Charney & L.M.Alexander (eds.), 1996, p.537; Co sta Rica of Foreign Affairs, http://www.rree.go.cr/servicios/
index.php?Tipo=&stp=60&langtype=&SID=&Id=733&IdFicha=pan007&Country=&Tipo=Bilateral&Embajada=&User
Name=&str_table=tbl_pe_tratado_bilateral_esp. - 39 -

terminus to a point at sea located at 10º49'N by 81º26'08.2"W “where the boundaries of Costa

69
Rica, Colombia and Panama intersect” . This tripoint ⎯ where the boundaries of Costa Rica,

Colombia and Panama intersect ⎯ could only be such if there were pre-existing boundaries

recognized between Colombia and Costa Rica and between Colombia and Panama.

34. [Slide71: PSR7] On this slide, the Costa Rica/Colombia boundary from the 1977 Treaty

is shown in green. The Colombia/Panama boundary , agreed in 1976, is shown in blue. The

boundary between Costa Rica and Panama is shown in red. The tripoint referred to in the latter

treaty is circled in black. This tripoint between Costa Rica, Colombia and Panama is formed in

part by, and could not exist without, the agreed green boundary line between Costa Rica and

Colombia. What is plain from this tripoint is that the boundary line from the 1977 Costa

Rica/Colombia Treaty was taken as an agreed boundar y, and then incorporated into the boundary

established by the 1980 Costa Rica/Panama Treaty, which was ratified by Costa Rica in 1981.

35. The 1977 boundary line between Costa Rica and Colombia was acknowledged again in

the 1984 Treaty between Costa Rica and Colombia defining the maritime boundary in the Pacific

Ocean. This latter treaty was ratified by both States and entered into force in 2001. Paragraph 1 of

the Preamble to the 1984 Treaty states: “That the ‘Treaty on the Delimitation of Marine and

Submarine Areas and Maritime Cooperation’, signed on 17 March 1977, established ⎯ establació

in Spanish ⎯ the maritime boundary between the two States in the Caribbean Sea.” 70

36. This point is further reflected in the gr aphics Costa Rica displayed on Monday. Figure 4

in Costa Rica’s judge’s fold er bears the following caption: [slide 8: PSR8] “Costa Rica’s

Maritime Entitlements Are Limited by Agreements with Treaty Partners Panama and Colombia.”

We agree.

37. It is undisputed that Costa Rica has complied with the 1977Treaty ever since it was

executed, including to this day. Costa Rica says as much, and there is no reason to disbelieve it on

this point. There is no evidence that the 1977 Tr eaty leaves Costa Rica short-changed in terms of

69
Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/CRI.htm.
7Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/CRI.htm. - 40 -

its maritime interests. As Ambassador Argüello pointed out, citing Charney and Alexander, Costa

71
Rica achieved significant benefits from this agreement . According to Prosper Weil:

“It cannot be denied that a delimitation on which two States agree reflects their
view of the equity of both the method of delimitation and the result, since
governments are hardly likely to subscribe to a solution which they would consider
72
inequitable.”

38. Nicaragua recognizes that, absent ratificati on, Costa Rica may not be formally bound by

the 1977 Treaty. Our point is a different one. It is that the Treaty and Costa Rica’s consistent

conduct thereunder demonstrate what Costa Rica’s perception of its own legal interests truly are.

Costa Rica cannot simply invent new legal interests to suit its present purposes, and particularly in

order to intervene in these proceedings under Article 62. After 33 years of maintaining a consistent

and public view of its legal interests, and conducting itself in strict accordance with that view in all

respects, the Court should treat with some cauti on Costa Rica’s sudden effo rt to throw the entire

historical and geographical record out the window in order to claim a new, expanded set of

interests in regard to Nicaragua alone.

39. Costa Rica cannot escape the force of this argument by its repeated incantation of the

phrase res inter alios acta or its reliance on Article34 of th e Vienna Convention on the Law of

Treaties. Of course, Nicaragua derives no rights or obligations from the bilateral Treaty between

Costa Rica and Colombia per se. But the point is that, since the 1977 Treaty, Costa Rica has

consistently and openly defined its maritime boundary, and the limits of its maritime jurisdiction, in

a certain manner, and has publicly disclaimed en titlement to areas lying beyond that boundary.

Nicaragua submits that Costa Rica should be held to this disclaimer. At the very least, the Court is

entitled to take it into account in ascertaining, for the purpose of these proceedings, the true nature

of Costa Rica’s legal interests.

40. Costa Rica’s new definition of its legal interests is also problematical because it is

discriminatory. As its counsel made clear on Monday, Costa Rica’s view is, on the one hand, if the

maritime area immediately beyond the limits accepted by Costa Rica in the 1977 Treaty belongs to

Colombia, Costa Rica has no legal interests in that area. But, on the other hand, if the area beyond

71
American Society of International Law, International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. I, J. I. Charney &
L. M. Alexander (eds.), 1996, Vol. I, pp. 465-466.
72Prosper Weil, The Law of Maritime Delimitation: Reflections, 1989, p. 154. - 41 -

Costa Rica’s agreed limits belongs to Nicaragua , then Costa Rica claims legal interests in the

area 73. No further explanation is given. So much for good neighbourliness, at least in regard to

Nicaragua.

41. Costa Rica’s counsel said on Monday that the reason Costa Rica did not ratify the

1977 Treaty was out of deference to Nicaragua 74. In other words, Nicaragua brought Costa Rica’s

newly-expanded maritime claim upon itself by protes ting the treaty with Colombia which contains

a more modest claim. Costa Rica refrained from ratifying the Treaty with Colombia in deference

to Nicaragua’s protest? That is news to Nicaragua , as the Agent of Nicaragua pointed out. It will

also be news to Costa Rica’s Parliament, which has given a number of reasons for demurring on the

Costa Rican Government’s request for ratification of the Treaty ⎯ none of which included

75
Nicaragua’s protest . In 1998, Costa Rica’s Foreign Minister issued a public statement that the

Costa Rican Parliament should ratify the 1977 Treaty regardless of Nicaragua’s objection 76. So

much for deference to Nicaragua.

C ONCLUSIONS

42. [For the benefit of the worthy interpreters , I have moved to paragraph 45 in the interests

of saving time.] There is no mystery to Costa Rica’s strategy here. In 1977, Costa Rica knowingly

and intentionally made a deal with Colombia. In return for Colombia’s blessing of its maritime

claims, it entered an agreement in which it recogn ized Colombia’s jurisdiction over maritime areas

77
also claimed by Nicaragua . It has enjoyed the benefits of that bargain for 33 years, never

complaining about it. Now, all of a sudden, it senses an opportunity to lay claim to a larger

maritime area, at Nicaragua’s expense. Now, a ll of a sudden, the deal it made with Colombia

33years ago is not good enough. Now, all of a sudden, that agreement was based on mistaken

assumptions that Costa Rica has suddenly discovered 33 years down the road ⎯ late, but as far as

73
CR 2010/12, p. 36, para. 16 (Lathrop).
7Ibid., p. 22, para. 8 (Brenes).

7American Society of International Law, International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. I, J. I.. Charney &
L. M. Alexander (eds.), 1996, pp. 465-466.

7Ann.217: statement given by Mr. Gonzalo J. Facio, Costa Rican signatory of the 1977 Treaty and former
Foreign Minister, at the Costa Rican Foreign Ministry, 27 Aug. 1998.

7See American Society of International Law, International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. I, J. I. Charney &
L. M. Alexander (eds.), 1996, pp. 465-466. - 42 -

Costa Rica is concerned, not too late to attempt to abandon its long-held un derstanding of its legal

interests in the Caribbean, and invent new ones for the purpose of asserting them against

Nicaragua, and only against Nicaragua.

43. In Nicaragua’s view, this is an unsusta inable position, not least because the bases on

which Costa Rica attempts to break out of its long-accepted maritime limits ⎯ its alleged mistaken

assumptions ⎯ are insufficient both as an evidentiary and a legal matter to accomplish that

objective. The 1977 Treaty and Costa Rica’s cons istent conduct for more than 30years evidence

its legal interests in the Caribbean Sea, and limit them to the maritime area defined by that Treaty

and subsequent practice. That area, shown on th e screen behind me [slide 10: PSR10], cannot be

affected by the Court’s decision in this case. Not even Costa Rica argues that it could be affected

by the decision. If this area defines Costa Rica’s interests, then even Costa Rica concedes its

Application to intervene fails to satisfy Article 62.

44. But even if the Court were to take Costa Rica’s new definition of its legal interests into

consideration, the result would be the same, as I explained in some detail in the first part of my

speech. Even the expanded area now claimed by Cost a Rica as its area of legal interest cannot be

affected by the decision of the Court in this case, under any circumstances, because the Court

cannot and does not delimit in any area claimed by a third State. The Court has been duly informed

precisely of what Costa Rica now considers to be its legal interests in the Caribbean Sea. The

Parties do not seek delimitation in that expa nded area described by Costa Rica on Monday ⎯ in

fact, they expressly abjure it. It can therefore be concluded ineluctably that Costa Rica’s interests

will not ⎯ cannot ⎯ be affected by the decision in this case. As a result, the Application to

intervene cannot be justified under Article 62. It must be disallowed by the Court.

45. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, this concludes my presentation. It is

now time for me to fade away, leaving behind Ni caragua’s first round presentation. Thank you for

your patience and your courteous attention. - 43 -

The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr.PaulReichler for his presentation. This statement, as

Mr. Paul Reichler himself stated, brings to an end the first round of oral argument of Nicaragua.

As I announced earlier, the Court proposes that we have a short coffee break of 10 minutes

until 11.20 and then we come back to the first round of oral argument of Colombia.

The Court rose at 11.05 a.m.

___________