Non Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2010/13
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2010
Public sitting
held on Wednesday 13 October 2010, at 9.30 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada presiding,
in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicaragua v. Colombia)
Application by Costa Rica for permission to intervene
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2010
Audience publique
tenue le mercredi 13 octobre 2010, à 9 h 30, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
en l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime
(Nicaragua c. Colombie)
Requête du Costa Rica à fin d’intervention
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presdenkta
Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Xue
Donoghue
Judges ad hoc Cot
Gaja
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
viceMpra,ident
KoMroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Crinçade
Yusuf
XuMe mes
Dojnogshue,
CotMM.
jugesaja, ad hoc
Cgeffrrr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Nicaragua is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambassador of Nicaragua to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Agent and Counsel;
MrA. lexOudeElferink, Deputy-Director, Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea,
Utrecht University,
Mr.AlainPellet, Professor at the University ParisOuest, Nanterre-La Défense, Member and
former Chairman of the International Law Co mmission, associate member of the Institut de
droit international,
Mr.PaulReichler, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., Member of the Bars of
the United States Supreme Court and the District of Columbia,
Mr.AntonioRemiroBrotóns, Professor of Intern ational Law, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid;
Member of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr.RobinCleverly, M.A., DPhil, CGeol, F.G.S., Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
Mr. John Brown, Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty Consultancy Services,
as Scientific and Technical Advisers;
Mr. César Vega Masís, Director of Juridical Affairs, Sovereignty and Territory, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Julio César Saborio, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affai
rs,
Mr. Walner Molina Pérez, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Counsel;
Ms Clara E. Brillembourg, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and
New York,
Ms Carmen Martinez Capdevila, Doctor of Public International Law, Universidad Autónoma,
Madrid,
MsAlinaMiron, Researcher, Centre for International Law (CEDIN), University ParisOuest,
Nanterre-La Défense,
Mr. Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, First Secretary, Embassy of Nicaragua in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
as Assistant Counsel. - 5 -
Le Gouvernement du Nicaragua est représenté par :
S.Exc.M.CarlosJoséArgüelloGómez, ambassadeur du Nicaragua auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme agent et conseil ;
M. Alex Oude Elferink, directeur adjoint de l’Ins titut néerlandais du droit de la mer de l’Université
d’Utrecht,
M.Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de ParisOuest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre et ancien
président de la Commission du droit internatio nal, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
M.PaulReichler, avocat au cabinetFoley Hoag LLP, WashingtonD.C., membre des barreaux de
la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,
M.AntonioRemiroBrotóns, professeur de droi t international à l’Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M.RobinCleverly, M.A., D.Phil, C.Geol, F.G.S., consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
M. John Brown, consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty Consultancy Services,
comme conseillers scientifiques et techniques ;
M. César Vega Masís, directeur, direction des affaires juridiques, de la souveraineté et du territoire,
ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Julio César Saborio, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Walner Molina Pérez, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseils ;
Mme Clara E. Brillembourg, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et de New York,
Mme Carmen Martinez Capdevila, docteur en droit international public à l’Universidad Autónoma
de Madrid,
Mme Alina Miron, chercheur au Centre de droit in ternational de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
M.EdgardoSobrenesObregon, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade du Nicaragua au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme conseils adjoints. - 6 -
The Government of Colombia is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Julio Londoño Paredes, Professor of International Relations, Universidad del Rosario,
Bogotá,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Guillermo Fernández de Soto, Chair of the Inter-American Juridical Committee, Member
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and former Minister of Foreign Affairs,
as Co-Agent;
Mr.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, Member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris , Member of the NewYork Bar,
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
Mr.MarceloKohen, Professor of International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, Geneva; associate member of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Francisco José Lloreda Mera, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, Permanent Representative of Colombia to the OPCW, former Minister of
State,
Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Member of the International Law Commission,
H.E. Ms Sonia Pereira Portilla, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Republic of
Honduras,
Mr.AndelfoGarcíaGonzález, Professor of Intern ational Law, former Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs,
Ms Victoria E. Pauwels T., Minister-Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Julián Guerrero Orozco, Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Colombia in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Andrea Jiménez Herrera, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Legal Advisers;
Mr. Thomas Fogh, Cartographer, International Mapping,
as Technical Adviser. - 7 -
Le Gouvernement de la Colombie est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Julio Londoño Paredes, professeur de relations internationales à l’Université del Rosario
de Bogotá,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Guillermo Fernández de Soto, président du comité juridique interaméricain, membre de
la Cour permanente d’arbitrage et ancien ministre des affaires étrangères,
comme coagent ;
M.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat,
M.RodmanR.Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de NewYork,
cabinet Eversheds LLP à Paris,
M. Marcelo Kohen, professeur de droit internationa l à l’Institut de hautes études internationales et
du développement de Genève, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Francisco José Lloreda Mera, ambassadeur de la République de Colombie auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas, représentant permanent de la Colombie auprès de l’OIAC, ancien
ministre d’Etat,
M. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, membre de la Commission du droit international,
S. Exc. Mme Sonia Pereira Portilla, ambassadeur de la République de Colombie auprès de la
République du Honduras,
M. Andelfo García González, professeur de droit inte rnational, ancien ministre adjoint des affaires
étrangères,
Mme Victoria E. Pauwels T., ministre-conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Julián Guerrero Orozco, ministre-conseiller à l’ambassade de la République de la Colombie aux
Pays-Bas,
Mme Andrea Jiménez Herrera, conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseillers juridiques ;
M. Thomas Fogh, cartographe, International Mapping,
comme conseiller technique. - 8 -
The Government of Costa Rica is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Edgar Ugalde Álvarez, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the Republic of Colombia,
as Agent;
Mr. Coalter G. Lathrop, Lecturing Fellow at Duke University School of Law, member of the North
Carolina State Bar, Special Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Sergio Ugalde, Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Senior Adviser to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Member of the Costa Rican Bar,
Mr. Arnoldo Brenes, Senior Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Member of the Costa Rican
Bar,
Mr. Carlos Vargas, Director of the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Jorge Urbina, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Michael Gilles, Special Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Ricardo Otarola, Minister and Consul General of Costa Rica to the Republic of Colombia,
Mr. Christian Guillermet, Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the
United Nations Office at Geneva,
Mr. Gustavo Campos, Consul General of Costa Rica to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Shara Duncan, Counsellor at the Embassy of Costa Rica in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Leonardo Salazar, National Geographic Institute of Costa Rica,
as Advisers. - 9 -
Le Gouvernement du Costa Rica est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Edgar Ugalde Álvarez, ambassadeur de la République du Costa Rica auprès de la
République de Colombie,
comme agent ;
M. Coalter G. Lathrop, Lecturing Fellow à la faculté de droit de Duke University, membre du
barreau de l’Etat de Caroline du Nord, conse iller spécial auprès du ministère des affaires
étrangères,
M.SergioUgalde, membre de la Cour perman ente d’arbitrage, conseiller principal auprès du
ministère des affaires étrangères, membre du barreau du Costa Rica,
M.ArnoldoBrenes, conseiller principal auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères, membre du
barreau du Costa Rica,
M. Carlos Vargas, directeur du département juridique du ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Jorge Urbina, ambassadeur du Costa Rica auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Michael Gilles, conseiller spécial auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Ricardo Otarola, ministre et consul général du Costa Rica en République de Colombie,
M. Christian Guillermet, ambassadeur, représentant permanent adjoint du Costa Rica auprès de
l’Office des Nations Unies à Genève,
M. Gustavo Campos, consul général du Costa Rica au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Shara Duncan, conseiller à l’ambassade du Costa Rica aux Pays-Bas,
M. Leonardo Salazar, Institut géographique national du Costa Rica,
comme conseillers. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is now open. This morning the Court will
hear the first round of oral argument of Nicaragua. Later this morning it will hear Colombia’s first
round of oral argument. It is going to be one sitting in the whole morning which will be
unfortunately longer than usual. It will take about four hours. So in between, after the presentation
by Nicaragua, the President proposes to have a very short coffee break for about ten minutes and
then come back and hear the presentation by Colombia ’s first round of oral argument. I first give
the floor to His Excellency Dr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Agent of the Republic of Nicaragua.
Mr. ARGUELLO GOMEZ:
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, good mo rning. It is always with a sense of great
honour that I appear before you but on this occasion I do so with a sad heart. This is the first time
in the 26 years in which I have pleaded before y ou in seven main cases without having the benefit
of the late SirIanBrownlie being beside me. In the practice of international law, no one of his
generation was involved as counsel and advocate in so many cases before this Court. His
contributions to public international law have been prodigious. His absence is a loss to all of us.
2. Before beginning my short presentation I wo uld also like to welcome and pay tribute to
the two new Members of the Court and wish them a most successful and fruitful exercise of their
new functions.
3. Mr. President, it is not the first time that Nicaragua is before this Court pleading in a case
involving an application for permission to intervene under Article 62 of the Statute.
4. When Nicaragua came before this Court in 1989 applying to intervene under Article 62 of
the Statute in a case between El Salvador and Hondu ras, the two previous applications by States to
intervene had not prospered. The reference naturally is to the requests for intervention of Malta in
the Tunisia/Libya case and that of Italy in the Malta/Libya case.
5. After studying these precedents and the geographical circumstances and claims of the
Parties, Nicaragua decided to apply to intervene. It is well to recall the circumstances of this case
since it was the first time that a State was allowed to intervene under Article 62. The situation was
that one of the States party to the case was reques ting delimitation inside and outside the waters of
the Gulf of Fonseca. The other Party opposed an y delimitation, and claimed that there was no - 11 -
delimitation possible in the waters inside the Gu lf since they were in condominium by the three
States. The Gulf of Fonseca is a relatively small gulf that, at its opening to the sea, separates the
coasts of Nicaragua and El Salvador by less than 20miles. As we can appreciate in the graphics
(N-CRCAG1), Honduras was requesting the Court to draw the delimitation line between its
claimed areas and those of El Salvador without Nicaragua being a party to the case. The question
was whether this delimitation could take place ab sent Nicaragua. In the event, Nicaragua was
allowed to intervene, but only on the question of the juridical status of the waters of the Gulf, that
is, whether they were subject to the special régi me of condominium or some other special status.
But what is most relevant for the present circ umstances is that the Court denied Nicaragua’s
Application to intervene in the question of the de limitation of the areas inside the Gulf and out to
the sea.
6. The Gulf of Fonseca is a minute area in comparison to the area under delimitation between
Nicaragua and Colombia. The delimitation invo lved in the Gulf of Fonseca was a lateral
delimitation in which three parties had claims to part of the 19 miles of the closing line of the Gulf,
out of which would also be traced the delimitation lines seawards. The effects on Nicaragua of any
such delimitation can easily be appreciated, and yet Nicaragua was not allowed to intervene. If the
geographic circumstances of that case did not warrant, in the Court’s view, intervention by
Nicaragua on the issue of delimitation, the same result must even more so appertain in this new
case.
7. The present case is about a frontal delimita tion involving the extensive continental coasts
and shelves of Nicaragua and Colombia. There is no question of a lateral delimitation that could
result in the attribution of any areas alleged to po ssibly appertain to Costa Rica. As will be clear
from the explanation provided later by Mr. Reichler, there is no possibility that the Judgment of the
Court in this case will affect the legal interests of Costa Rica.
8. It is very difficult for anyone in Nicaragua to conceive that if its Application to
intervene
was denied in the very restricted area involved in the Gulf of Fonseca, any consideration could be
given to that of Costa Rica in the greatly more extensive waters of the Caribbean Sea. If Costa
Rica by simply alleging that it is near the delimitation area involved in the case of Nicaragua v.
Colombia is allowed to intervene, the right of in tervention under Article 62 would from now on be - 12 -
available to all States located in the same general area of any delimitation case. In fact, it would be
difficult to imagine a maritime delimitation in which an application for intervention could be
denied.
9. Nicaragua considers that the door for universal interventions should not be left wide open
or even left ajar. The present case gives a good example. There are enormous costs involved for
Nicaragua not only because of the delays it causes on the continuation of the merits of the principal
case but also in the level of attention and resources that it must employ on these hearings since its
interests are at stake, whilst those for Costa Rica ⎯ that does not want the consequences of being a
party to the case ⎯ are minimal. Furthermore, the State applying to intervene is allowed to address
what amounts to the merits of the main case from whatever partial angle best serves its interests.
10. Thus, during the present hearings Costa Rica has made certain assertions and presented
certain documents that are contrary to the facts and prejudice the position of Nicaragua in the main
case. For example, the document put on the public screen and included in the judges’ folders as
sketchmap No.8 purports to show the “maritime boundary between Honduras and Nicaragua on
the Caribbean”. (N-CR CAG3) It is a reproducti on of a sketch-map by the Court that only shows
an enlarged partial section of the delimitation. The complete sketch-map is shown on the screen
(N-CRCAG4). Costa Rica chose to present the Court’s direction line as stopping short of the
82nd meridian when the Court’s own line did not.
11. Another graphic included in the judges’ folders as sketch-map No .5 also misrepresents
the facts. It refers to “Nicaragua’s proposed Colombian enclaves”, whic h includes an enclave on
Quitasueño Bank. Nicaragua has not proposed such an enclave in a Bank that is part of its
continental shelf (N-CR CAG5).
12. Mr.President, in your opening remarks last Monday, you summarized the history of
these proceedings and recalled that between 2003 and 2006 the Governments of Honduras,
Jamaica, Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela asked to be furnished, and were furnished, with
copies of the pleadings and documents annexed produ ced in this case. You further recalled that it
was until 22September2008 that Costa Rica also aske d to be furnished with such copies. What
first impresses in this recount is that for a State to now be before the Court claiming dire
consequences for its legal interests if not allowed to intervene, it is surprising that it waited more - 13 -
than six years after this case star ted to even worry about requesting copies of the pleadings in the
case. Even much more distant States such as Chile, Peru and Ecuador showed a more active
interest.
13. My esteemed colleague the Agent of Cost a Rica referred on Monday to the “délai
octroyé pour la présentation de la requête à fin d’ intervention” and went on to explain that this
delay was due to the fact that there had been an electoral process in Costa Rica that finalized in
February of this year. He pointed out that in any case the Application had been filed within the
limits fixed by Article81 of the Rules of Court. In the Written Observations of Nicaragua there
was no claim that the Application was extemporan eous. It was simply pointed out that after
waiting for six years to make this application, Costa Rica had failed to clearly identify in its
Application any interest it may have of a legal nature that might be affected by the decision in this
case. A simple and telling detail is that no map or sketch or graphic was included in the
Application with an indication of the areas it cons idered might be affected until it was done in the
pleadings of last Monday.
14. The reason for this is very simple. It is very difficult to show, and much less so on a
map, how a frontal delimitation between Nicaragua and Colombia that does not involve the fixing
of lateral limits could possibly affect a State situated laterally. Whatever claim Costa Rica might
have to a lateral delimitation with Nicaragua, the decision of the Court on this case could not
possibly have any effect on it. Of course, with all the time in the world to prepare a data show, its
visual effects have at least a better chance of causing a satisfactory first impression. Although
hard-pressed for time, it will be Mr.Reichler’s t ask to, in a figurative sense, turn on their heads
these sketches and graphics contained in the data show to which Nicaragua only had access last
Monday.
15. The Application of Costa Rica in paragraph13 claimed that the Treaty of maritime
delimitation it signed with Colombia in 1977 arose from two basic assumptions: first, that
Colombia had an agreed boundary with Nicara gua running along the 82nd°meridianW longitude
and, second, that the Colombian insular territory in the south-western Caribbean was entitled to full
weight in a delimitation. This was again re iterated by Mr.Lathrop during the pleadings on - 14 -
Monday . The point is of no relevance to the legal interests of Costa Rica that allegedly may be
affected by a decision on this case and its purpo se only seems to indirectly support some of the
Colombian arguments in the main case.
16. For this reason, Nicaragua’s Written Observations analyse these so-called assumptions in
order to show that they lacked any merit. Thus, it was pointed out that in 1977 Costa Rica was
aware that Nicaragua did not accept the 82nd meridi an as a line of delimitation and that it did not
accept that Colombia had sovereignty over all th e banks, reefs and islands it claimed in the
south-western Caribbean. On the screen (N-CR CAG6) is the text of a diplomatic Note sent by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica dated 18October 1972 ⎯ that is, fiveyears before the
1977 Treaty was signed ⎯ in which he states, with instructions from the President of the Republic
of Costa Rica, that his Government “considers that the cays and islets called Quitasueño, Roncador
and Serrana are located in the continental shelf of the Republic of Nicaragua”. Please note on the
screen that these features are located on the continen tal shelf of Nicaragua considerably to the east
of the 82nd meridian (N-CR CAG7). Naturally, there cannot be any so-called assumption that the
82nd meridian was a line of delimitation when the continental shelf of Nicaragua is recognized as
extending at least up to where these features are situated around the 80th meridian. There can even
be less of an assumption that these features had to be accorded full weight to Colombia’s benefit.
17. Another fact pointed out in the Written Observations is that the 1977 Treaty itself does
not follow the 82nd meridian but is located further west of the same (N-CR CAG7). Where does
that leave Costa Rica’s alleged assumption that Nicaragua had accepted the 82nd meridian at the
moment Costa Rica signed this Treaty?
18. Counsel for Costa Rica, Mr.Brenes 2, asserted that “in consideration of Nicaragua’s
requests that Costa Rica not ratify the Treaty until the dispute with Colombia has been resolved,
Costa Rica, acting out of good neighbourliness, has abstained from doing so”. This is disingenuous
and ironic in view of the evident intention of th ese proceedings. Quite to the contrary to this
assertion, it is well known that Costa Rica has not ratified this Treaty precisely because it gives
equal weight to the island of San Andrés and to the continental coast of Costa Rica.
1
CR 2010/12, pp. 35-36, paras. 13-15 (Lathrop).
2Ibid., p. 22, para. 8 (Brenes). - 15 -
19. In the well-known publication International Maritime Boundaries edited by Charney and
Alexander, we find the following observation on th e reasons why Costa Rica had not ratified the
1977 Treaty several years after its signature in 1983: “Costa Rica’s Assembly faced a strong lobby
against the agreement. Some of its opponents ar gued that the San Andres Archipelago should only
3
be granted a 12 n.m. mile territorial sea in the light of the Channel Islands Award.”
20. In this respect it might be recalled th at there were well-known negotiations going on
between France and the United Kingdom on the questi on of the effect of the Channel Islands on a
delimitation that dated back from 1964. Also, that a treaty submitting this question to arbitration
was signed in 1975 and an award was rendered in 1 977 giving these very important islands limited
effects. Costa Rica was naturally well aware of th is. The reason it agreed to give full effects to
San Andrés was due to the fact that a small uninhabited island of Costa Rica located in the Pacific
Ocean was recognized as producing fu ll effects in another delimitation agreement with Colombia.
Thus in the same Charney and Alexander publi cation we read that “while Costa Rica did not
benefit economically from the Caribbean delimitation, the areas accorded to Isla del Coco on the
Pacific side were considered rich in migratory species; a sort of a compensatory action,
4
resource-wise” .
21. Counsel for Costa Rica, Mr.Brenes, sp ent some time explaining why Nicaragua could
not rely or even cite the “Agreements that Costa Rica has ratified with Panama and signed with
Colombia” 5, since these are res inter alios acta for Nicaragua. Then later during the hearings
counsel for Costa Rica, Mr.Ugalde, spent a good part of the noon hour explaining why even if
Article 59 of the Statute protected third States from the effects of judgments to which they were not
parties, nonetheless there were circumstances in whic h this judgment might not be equivalent to a
res inter alios acta.
22. The quick way of covering this subject is fairly simple without submitting the Court to a
scholarly dissertation. An agreement between third States is a res inter alios acta for a State not
3
J. Charney, and L. Alexander (eds), International Maritime Boundaries, 1993, Vol. I, pp. 465-466.
4
Ibid; p. 467.
5CR 2010/12, pp. 25-26, paras. 19-22 (Brenes). - 16 -
Party to the agreement in the sense that that agre ement cannot be imposed on that third State. But
good faith and the conduct subsequent to that treaty can have definite effects erga omnes.
23. Similarly, a judgment by the Court is a res inter alios acta for States not parties to the
case in accordance with Article59, but it nonetheless may have legal consequences for third
parties, and that is why Article62 was put in place. But in order to effectively invoke Article62
and be accepted to intervene, a State must establis h that the decision by the Court will affect its
legal interests. Costa Rica has as of now only made clear that it considers that it has a legal
interest ⎯ and that has been sufficient to open the door to these hearings ⎯ but it has yet to start to
prove that its legal interests will be affected by the Court’s decision.
24. The assertion made by Nicaragua in its Written Observations that Costa Rica has an
independent means of invoking the jurisdiction of the Court was not aimed at stating that this
precludes it from invoking Article 62, as was claimed by counsel of Costa Rica. In fact, Article 81
of the Rules of Court provides that the party applying to intervene should indicate any basis of
jurisdiction that might exist as between the app licant State and the parties to the case. This
provision of Article 81 is not pure surplusage. It was added because the extent of the jurisdictional
links existing between the claimant third State and the parties to the main case help determine the
extent of the intervention to be granted. If Co sta Rica wants to intervene, it could come in as a
party, if it can prove that the issues sub judice affect its interests. But this it could only do if the
case between Nicaragua and Colombia required the fixi ng of a tripoint with Costa Rica and this is
not so. If the Judgment of the Court is favourable to the Nicaraguan claims, the only effect of this
is that Costa Rica could attempt to claim a delimitation vis-à-vis Nicaragua that would extend
beyond the limits it accepted with Colombia. If Colombia is favoured, well, Costa Rica already has
a clear understanding with that State.
6
25. Counsel of Costa Rica, Mr.Brenes, presented a chronicle of the meetings of the
bilateral (Nicaragua-Costa Rica) Sub-Commis sion on Limits and Cartography which began
sessions in September2002. The mandate of this Commission was technical and did not involve
political level negotiations regarding delimitation in the Caribbean Sea. In this respect the
6
CR 2010/12, pp. 23-24, paras. 11-18 (Brenes). - 17 -
chronicle is largely irrelevant to these proceedings and Nicaragua will simply generally reserve its
position on the subject and limit its comments to a few points. Mr. Brenes indicates that in the first
of the meetings of this Sub-Commission it was d ecided to postpone any question of delimitation in
the Caribbean until after the present case between Co lombia and Nicaragua was over. If there is
any pertinence in this information it would only be to ask why Costa Rica did not point out to
Nicaragua in 2002 that this case could affect its inte rests. Why did it wait six years to even ask for
a copy of the pleadings?
26. Mr.Brenes further indicated that these meetings of the Sub-Commission were
discontinued by Nicaragua after August2005. It is well to recall the circumstances. Costa Rica
had been claiming extensive rights in the San Juan river, including policing rights and other
jurisdictional rights on the river. After Costa Rica filed an Application against Nicaragua before
this Court on 29September2005 there was very little incentive to continue with these obviously
futile meetings.
27. One final clarification on another statemen t made by Mr.Brenes. It is not correct to
assert that Nicaragua accepted an equidistance line of delimitation with Costa Rica in the Pacific
coast. There has not been any ag reement in that regard, and the purpose of making this statement,
without any obvious relevance to the matter before these hearings, throws further light on the real
intention of Costa Rica in these proceedings.
28. Mr.President, Costa Rica has so far failed to establish that it has an interest of a legal
nature which may be affected by the decision of the Court in this case. Therefore, up to the present
stage of the pleadings Nicaragua sees no reason to change the conclusions it submitted to the Court
in its Written Statement.
29. Mr. President, the rest of the pleadings will be divided in two sections.
ProfessorAntonio Remiro will address “Le préte ndu intérêt juridique du Costa Rica dans la
délimitation maritime entre le Nicaragua et la Co lombie : aspects généraux” and Mr. Paul Reichler
will conclude with “Costa Rica has no legal interest that would be affected by the Court’s decision
in this case”.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, thank you for your kind attention.
Mr. President, may it please you to call Professor Antonio Remiro. - 18 -
The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency Dr. CarlosJoséArgüello Gómez, the Agent of
the Republic of Nicaragua for his presentation.
I now call Professor Antonio Remiro Brótons.
M. REMIRO :
L E PRÉTENDU INTÉRÊT JURIDIQUE DU C OSTA R ICA DANS LA DÉLIMITATION MARITIME ENTRE
LE N ICARAGUA ET LA C OLOMBIE : ASPECTS GÉNÉRAUX
Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, permettez-moi de dire pour
commencer que je suis très honoré de m’adresser aujourd’hui à vous. En même temps, avec la
même sincérité, je dois vous confier mon inquié tude parce que, exception faite de quelques esprits
privilégiés, encore qu’un peu extravagants, réclam er l’attention sur des questions afférentes aux
incidents de la procédure peut provoquer des accès de mélancolie, même de la part de
professionnels expérimentés, si on exagère le traitement. Avec cette précaution, j’en viens à
évoquer les principes fondamentaux applicables à l’intervention.
Le «noyau dur» de l’intervention
1. Conformément à l’article 62, paragraphe 1, du Statut de la Cour : «Lorsqu’un Etat estime
que, dans un différend, un intérêt d’ordre juridique est pour lui en cause, il peut adresser à la Cour
7
une requête à fin d’intervention» La Cour, ajoute le paragraphe 2, «décide».
2. Le Règlement de la Cour énonce dans s on article81 les conditions qu’une requête à fin
d’intervention doit remplir. Sp écifier l’intérêt d’ordre juridique qui, selon l’Etat demandant à
8
intervenir, est pour lui en cause est la première de ces conditions
3. Comme on vient de le dire, le Statut requi ert l’existence d’un intérêt d’ordre juridique, ce
qui exclut les intérêts de tout autre ordre, qu’ ils soient politiques, économiques, géostratégiques ou
tout simplement matériels, sauf s’ils sont liés à un intérêt juridique.
4. Exprimer une prétention juridique ne suffit pas pour accéder à une requête à fin
d’intervention. Il est nécessaire, absolument n écessaire, que cette prétention, propre, réelle et
actuelle, puisse être mise en cause par la décision que la Cour rendra un jour pour trancher le
7
«An interest of a legal nature whic h may be affected by the decision in the case». La version anglaise fut
rédigée à partir du texte français.
8Article 81.2 a), du Règlement de la Cour. - 19 -
différend porté devant elle. Ceci est le «noyau dur», comme le disait le professeur Prosper Weil, de
l’institution de l’intervention 9. L’Etat qui demande à entrer dans le procès doit démontrer que ses
droits peuvent être affectés, au vu des éléments de l’affaire en cours et du petitum des Parties à
l’instance. Il s’agit dans une certaine mesure d’une spéculation, mais construite sur la base
d’arguments plausibles soumis à l’avis de la Cour.
5. Mais il y a une autre condition qui, étant évidente, passe inaperçue : l’objet de la requête
doit être l’«intervention» et rien d’autre. C’est justement pour cel a que le Règlement de la Cour
impose que la requête indique «l’objet précis de l’intervention» et, en plus, «toute autre base de
10
compétence» qui existerait entre lui et les Parties à l’instance .
6. Il y a soixante ans, dans l’affaire Haya de la Torre , la Cour a déclaré: «[T]oute
intervention est un incident de procédure; par conséquent, une déclaration déposée à fin
d’intervention ne revêt, en droit, ce caractère que si elle a réellement trait à ce qui est l’objet de
l’instance en cours» ( Haya de la Torre (Colombie/Pérou), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1951 , p. 76) ; de
cette manière la Cour a précisé le domaine de ce que l’on devait entendre comme une intervention
véritable conformément au Statut. Cependant, ce critè re semble avoir été perdu de vue après.
Dans la décennie des années quatre-vingt du dernier siècle, les arrêts de la Cour concernant les
11 12
requêtes à fin d’intervention soumises, d’abord, par Malte , et après, par l’Italie , ont reflété un
certain degré de confusion et d’hésitation sur le chemin à suivre par rapport à l’objet de
l’intervention, l’exigence ou pas d’ un lien juridictionnel particulier et la condition ou pas de partie
au procès de l’Etat demandant à intervenir une fois accepté l’intervention. Toutefois, on peut dire
que, à partir de l’interprétation de l’article62 du Statut faite par la Chambre de la Cour dans son
13 14
arrêt du 13septembre1990 , que la Cour a confirmé dans l’ordonnance du 21octobre1999 et
9 Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (E l Salvador/Honduras), requête à fin d’interventiCn,
4/CR 90/3 du 6 juin 1990, p. 15.
10 Article 81.2 b) et c), du Règlement de la Cour.
11 Voir Plateau continental (Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe li byenne), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1981, p. 3.
12 Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984,
p. 3.
13 Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 92.
14
Frontière terrestre et maritime en tre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c.Nigéria), requête à fin
d’intervention, ordonnance du 21 octobre 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 1029. - 20 -
dans l’arrêt du 23octobre2001 15, l’intervention a acquis des traits plus nets: l’intervention
véritable, statutaire, ne permet pas de greffer une nou velle affaire à l’affaire en cours, ni de
transformer cette affaire en une affaire différente, ni d’y ajouter de nouvelles questions; elle ne
permet pas non plus à l’Etat demandant à inte rvenir de réclamer la reconnaissance de ses
prétentions comme des droits.
7. L’intervention est liée à l’affaire principale. Elle ne peut pas survivre sans elle, encore
moins aller à son encontre. Le di fférend, tel qu’il a été défini par les Parties, est le moule dans
lequel l’intervention doit se fonder. L’objet statutaire de l’intervention basée sur l’article62 du
Statut est la protection des intérêts juridiques de l’Etat demandant à intervenir susceptibles d’être
affectés par la décision que rendra la Cour da ns l’affaire pendante. Il s’agit d’un moyen
d’autoprotection de nature préventive. A une telle fin, l’Etat qui utilise cette procédure demande
qu’il lui soit permis de porter ses intérêts ⎯ ses intérêts juridiques ⎯ à la connaissance de la Cour
pour que celle-ci en tienne compte; ainsi, dans le cas où la Cour les considère pertinents, elle
évitera que l’arrêt les mette en cause. Ceci im plique aussi la précision des points ou aspects du
différend qui ont à voir avec lesdits intérêts.
8. On ne demande certes pas à l’Etat requérant , le CostaRica dans notre cas, de démontrer
que ses prétendus intérêts juridiques seront affectés par la décision de la Cour, mais on lui demande
de démontrer de façon concluante qu’ils pourraient l’être. A cette fin, le requérant doit présenter
lesdits intérêts d’une façon précise. Au stade de la procédure incidente où nous en sommes il ne
s’agit pas d’anticiper l’in tervention proprement dite, mais on ne peut pas non plus se contenter de
formulations vagues ou génériques. On n’est pas da ns la course, mais on est quand même dans les
séries de qualification. L’Etat qui souhaite intervenir ne doit pas être exhaustif ni épuiser
l’argumentation au fond, mais il faut établir les inté rêts concrets et partic uliers qu’il invoque de
manière à ce que la Cour ait les éléments nécessaires pour admettre ou rejeter la requête
d’intervention, en raison du caractère plausible tant de l’intérêt juridique invoqué que des chances
⎯ ou des risques ⎯ de sa mise en cause par l’arrêt 16.
15
Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan (Indonésie/Malaisie), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 575.
16Voir Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras), requête à fin d’intervention,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 117, par. 61. - 21 -
9. L’Etat intervenant participe à la procédure mais, par définition, n’est pas partie à
l’instance et, pour cette même raison, l’article81 du Règlement, qui définit la compétence de la
Cour pour se prononcer sur sa requête, est inclus dans la partie du Statut consacrée aux procédures
incidentes par rapport à l’affaire principale s’entend. Celle-ci constitue une base de compétence
suffisante. Naturellement, la situation change si l’intervention n’est pas une intervention au sens
17
propre, une «véritable intervention» , une intervention prévue dans le Statut de la Cour, mais un
prétexte pour traiter d’extorquer à la Cour la r econnaissance de certains droits ou une décision sur
un différend autre que celui porté de vant la Cour par les Parties ou, encore, si on cherche à travers
cette procédure à devenir une nouvelle Partie plutôt qu’un Etat intervenant 18.
Le Costa Rica n’a pas démontré l’existence d’un intérêt d’ordre juridique, propre, direct,
concret et actuel…
10. Le Costa Rica est justement dans cette situation : il n’a pas pu démontrer l’existence d’un
intérêt d’ordre juridique susceptible d’être mis en cause par la décision que la Cour devra prendre
dans le différend entre le Nicaragua et la Co lombie comme mon collègue PaulReichler le
démontrera dans quelques minutes. Le CostaRi ca n’a même pas réussi à démontrer l’existence
d’un intérêt d’ordre juridique propre, direct, concre t et actuel, ce qui est une prémisse nécessaire à
toute intervention. Il n’a pas réussi à démontrer cette existence dans le ca dre du différend entre le
Nicaragua et la Colombie.
11. Evidement le CostaRica a des intérêts juridiques dans la délimitation avec le voisin
Nicaragua. Ses plaidoiries de lundi ont confirmé qu’il se présente comme une partie ⎯ non pas au
différend qui oppose le Nicaragua à la Colombie ⎯ mais à un différend entre lui-même et le
Nicaragua concernant la délimitation maritime en tre les deux pays. Mais celui-ci est un autre
différend que le Costa Rica ne peut pas «glisser» subrepticement dans le rôle de la Cour par le biais
de l’intervention. Bien souvent, lors de la plaidoirie du Costa Rica lundi dernier on a eu
l’impression que le Costa Rica plaidait au sujet de la délimitation latérale de ses espaces maritimes
17Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984,
p. 13, par. 18, p. 23, par. 37. Voir aussi affaire Haya de la Torre (Colombie/Pérou), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 77.
18Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 133-135, par. 97-101 ; Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan (Indonésie/Malaisie),
requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 588-589, par. 35-36. - 22 -
avec ceux du Nicaragua et non pas de la menace prét endue que ferait peser sur ces intérêts l’issue
du procès opposant le Nicaragua et la Colombie 19.
12. En ce qui concerne l’affaire pendante deva nt la Cour, le simple voisinage entre le
CostaRica et le Nicaragua et l’absence d’une ligne de délimitation maritime latérale ne suffisent
pas à justifier un intérêt pertinent pour intervenir dans la délimitation entre les côtes opposées du
Nicaragua et de la Colombie. Y-a-t-il autre chose?
13. Selon le Costa Rica, l’intérêt d’ordre juridique qui pourrait être mis en cause par la
décision de la Cour est «l’intérêt du Costa Rica à exercer ses droits souverains et sa juridiction dans
la région maritime dans la mer des Caraïbes que le droit international lui reconnaît en vertu de sa
20
côte dans cette mer» . Cet intérêt ne peut pas, toutefois, être défini indépendamment des traités
signés par le CostaRica pour délimiter les espace s maritimes soumis à sa souveraineté et à sa
juridiction dans la mer des Caraïbes.
14. Le Costa Rica prétend avoir un intérêt juridique à ce que soient respectées les limites
acceptées par son gouvernement, dans un traité si gné, mais non ratifié, comme celui de 1977 avec
la Colombie; mais, en même temps, il situe ces intérêts au-delà de cette limite conventionnelle.
Bref, on dirait que son désir est de tuer ce traité sans tirer un seul coup, ce qui serait d’ailleurs
conforme à sa tradition pacifiste.
15. L’article62 du Statut fait référence aux intérêts d’ordre juridique, non aux illusions
même si elles prétendent s’insérer dans cet ordre. En tout cas, la Cour n’est pas le magicien qui
doit transformer les rêves du Costa Rica en réalité. Toute considération que le Costa Rica souhaite
faire sur les principes et les règles de droit in ternational applicables à une délimitation maritime
dans une mer présentant les caractéristiques de la mer des Caraïbes est étrangère à l’intervention, si
elle n’est pas rattachée à des intérêts juridiques propres, directs, concrets et actuels 21.
19 Voir CR 2010/12, p. 23-24, par. 11-18 (Brenes) ; ibid., p. 36-40, par. 17-29 (Lathrop).
20 «Costa Rica’s interest in the exercise of its sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the maritime area in the
Caribbean Sea to which it is entitled under internatinal law by virtue of its coast facing that sea» Application for
Permission to Intervene, par. 11). Voir aussi CR 2010/12, p. 17, par. 10 (Ugalde).
21 Voir Plateau continental (Tunisie-Jamahiriya arabe libyenne), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1981, p. 12, par. 19 ; Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d ’intervention,
arrêt, opinion individuelle du juge Mbaye, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 35. - 23 -
… susceptible d’être mis en cause
16. En tout cas, même si, aux seules fins de la discussion, on fait abstraction de l’effet
limitatif des traités conclus ou signés par le Co sta Rica et on pense à lui comme à un pays sans
obligations juridiques particulières, qui essaie de projeter sur les eaux, les fonds marins et le
sous-sol des Caraïbes, toute la potentialité de sa s ouveraineté sur la côte, on ne rencontre pas dans
la requête du Costa Rica d’éléments qui permettent d’identifier où, jusqu’à quel point et de quelle
façon, ses intérêts d’ordre juridique pourraient êt re affectés par les prétentions du Nicaragua dans
des zones qui, comme mon collègue PaulReichler va le démontrer, semblent étrangères à de tels
intérêts et ont peu ou rien à voir avec l’établisseme nt de la ligne qui devra être tracée, d’une façon
négociée, entre le Nicaragua et le CostaRica à part ir du point final de leur frontière terrestre, en
tenant compte de la décision que rendra la Cour dans l’affaire qui oppose le Nicaragua et la
Colombie.
17. Dans cet ordre d’idées, on doit noter que la Cour, d’ailleurs avec le consentement des
Parties, a donné au CostaRica toutes facilités pour fa ire valoir ses prétentions dans le différend
entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie, en mettant à sa disposition tous les docum ents de la procédure
écrite. Sa situation n’est donc pas comparable à celles de Malte, en 1981, de l’Italie, en 1984, ou
des Philippines, en 2001, Etats dont les demandes dans ce sens avaient été rejetées par la Cour du
fait de l’objection élevée par l’une ou les deux Par ties et qui se sont trouvés obligés de «plaider à
l’aveuglette», sans pouvoir se fonder sur cette précieuse information 22. Le CostaRica a qualifié,
23
lui-même, sa situation comme étant privilégiée .
18. L’une des caractéristiques les plus remarqua bles de la jurisprudence de la Cour sur les
procédures incidentes concernant l’autorisation d’inte rvenir a été le caractère strict et rigoureux de
ses exigences concernant la preuve de l’intérêt en cause. Comme il a été rappelé par l’agent, quand
le Nicaragua a demandé à intervenir dans le vol et maritime du différend territorial entre la
République d’ElSalvador et la République du Honduras, la Chambre de la Cour a rejeté
l’intervention en ce qui concernait une éventuelle décision sur la délimitation des espaces
22Voir Plateau continental (Tunisie-Jamahiriya arabe libyenne), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, opinion
individuelle du juge Schwebel, C.I.J.Recueil 1981, p.35; Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte),
requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, opinion individuelle du juge Nagendra Singh, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 33 ; Souveraineté
sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan (Indonésie/Mala isie), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêopinion dissidente du
juge Oda, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 619, par. 15.
23Voir la requête à fin d’intervention du Costa Rica, par. 4. - 24 -
maritimes dans le golfe de Fonseca et au-delà de sa ligne de fermeture. Le Nicaragua a allégué
qu’on n’avait qu’à jeter un coup d’Œil sur une carte pour se rendre compte que toute délimitation
faite dans une aire aussi réduite que celle du golfe, à ses points extrêmes terrestres sous la
souveraineté respective d’ElSalvador et du Nicaragua, non seulement pouvait affecter, mais
affecterait inévitablement ces intérêts.
19. Mais ce qui était évident aux yeux du Nicaragua, ne l’a pas été aux yeux de la Chambre,
qui a considéré que ce pays avait failli à démontre r l’existence d’un intérê t juridique susceptible
d’être mis en cause par un arrêt établissant la ligne de délimitation entre les Parties, soit à
l’intérieur soit à l’extérieur du golfe, même si ce la entraînait la fin du voisinage maritime entre
24
El Salvador et le Nicaragua ; d’où, au fait, il en résulte que, malgré ce que l’agent du Costa Rica a
fait valoir, «la modification ou l’élimination de la relation de voisinage existant entre la Colombie
et le Costa Rica dans la mer des Caraïbes» ne cons titue pas un intérêt d’ordre juridique au sens de
25
l’article62 du Statut . «Il arrive souvent en pratique», a déclaré la Chambre de la Cour dans
l’arrêt du 13 septembre 1990,
«qu’on doit tenir compte, pour procéder à une délimitation entre deux Etats, de la côte
d’un Etat tiers, mais le fait de tenir comp te…ne signifie aucunement que l’intérêt
d’un troisième Etat…soit susceptible d’êt re affecté en raison même de cette
délimitation… De toute façon, c’est à l’Et at demandant à intervenir...qu’il incombe
d’établir de manière satisfaisante…que tel serait effectivement le cas en l’espèce.»
(Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras), requête
à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 92, p. 124-125, par. 77.)
20. En conséquence, on ne peut pas donner pour acquis un intérêt d’ordre juridique du
CostaRica susceptible d’être mis en cause par une décision de la Cour dans le différend entre le
Nicaragua et la Colombie, du seul fait que le Cost a Rica soit riverain d’une mer semi-fermée où il
n’y a pas d’espaces maritimes échappa nt à la projection des riverains et qu’il prétende à une ligne
de partage tracée conformément au principe d’équidistance 26. Ceci explique peut-être un intérêt,
un intérêt de fait, mais pas un intérêt d’ordre juri dique et, encore moins, son éventuelle mise en
cause par une délimitation faite par la Cour. Il faut démontrer que, au cas où la Cour accède aux
24
Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 127-128, par. 84.
25
CR 2010/12, p. 19, par. 18 (Ugalde).
26Requête à fin d’intervention, par. 9, 14-19 et 22. - 25 -
prétentions des Parties, telles qu’elles ont été exprimées, cela pourrait impliquer la négation des
prétentions plausibles du tiers qui demande à intervenir justement pour protéger ses prétentions
vis-à-vis de toute décision. Il ne s’agit pas de porter à l’extrême l’exigence de la preuve du titre ou
du fondement de telles prétentions, mais celles-ci doivent être quand même raisonnables au regard
des prétentions des Parties à l’affaire principale.
Ce que révèle l’expérience : à propos de l’article 59 du Statut
21. La plupart des requêtes à fin d’intervention soumises jusqu’à présent ont concerné des
différends sur la délimitation d´espaces maritimes dans des mers fermées ou semi-fermées ou dans
des golfes où se trouvaient des côtes et des îles de plus de deux Etats dont la projection maritime
pouvait se superposer 27. A une exception près, celle de la Guinée équatoriale, aucune de ces
requêtes n’a prospéré.
22. Celui de la Guinée équatoriale était un cas très spécial. Tandis qu’une des Parties, le
Cameroun, prétendait établir une ligne d’équidistance, ligne qui à partir d’un certain point pénétrait
dans des espaces que la Guinée équatoriale pouvait re vendiquer en raison de la localisation de l’île
de Bioko, l’autre Partie, le Nigéria, a essayé de se servir de la doctrine du «tiers indispensable»
comme base d’une exception préliminaire à la compétence 28. La Cour a décidé de statuer sur cette
exception dans l’arrêt sur le fond et en même temps a invité pratiquement les Etats voisins
29
insulaires, notamment la Guinée équatoriale, à intervenir dans ce volet de l’affaire . La Guinée a
profité de l’invitation ; les parties ne s’y sont pas opposées. Il n’y a donc pas eu d’audiences orales
sur la requête et la Cour a accepté l’interv ention à l’unanimité. La singularité du cas a été
soulignée par le fait que la décision de la Cour s’est traduite par une ordonnance et non par un
27 Voir Plateau continental (Tunisie-Jamahiriya arabe libyenne), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1981, p. 3 ; Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d ’intervention, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 3 ; Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras), requête à fin
d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 92 ; Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria, requête
à fin d’intervention, ordonnance du 21 octobre 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999, p. 1029.
28 Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c.Nigéria), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 275.
29Ibid. - 26 -
30
arrêt . Finalement, la Cour a rejeté l’exception pré liminaire du Nigéria et elle a protégé en même
31
temps les intérêts guinéens qu’elle a considérés justifiés .
23. Tous les Etats qui invoquent l’article62 du Statut pour demander à intervenir dans une
affaire pendante devant la Cour s’efforcent de me ttre en relief les limitations de l’article59 du
Statut pour protéger efficacement les intérêts juridiques des tiers au cas où la Cour n’accepterait
pas leurs requêtes, et le Costa Rica ne fait pas exception 32. Souligner les vertus de l’article 59 pour
protéger ces droits est aussi un lieu commun des pa rties qui s’opposent aux requêtes. La Cour
33
semble avoir évolué de la foi aveugle dans ces vertus à l’acceptation de l’idée, motivée par les
opinions critiques de certains juges 34, selon laquelle l’article59 peut être insuffisant dans certains
35
cas . Cependant, cette observation ne change en rien les paramètres d’exigence que l’article 62 du
Statut impose pour apprécier les conditions d’ acceptation par la Cour d’une requête à fin
d’intervention. La Cour ne doit pas accepter l’inte rvention au rabais. Le test de l’intervention,
comme la Cour l’a dit lorsqu’elle s’est prononcée sur la requête de l’Italie, «n’est pas de savoir si la
participation de l’Italie peut êt re utile ou même nécessaire à la Cour; elle est de savoir, à supposer
que l’Italie ne participe pas à l’ instance, si l’intérêt juridique de l’Italie est en cause ou s’il est
susceptible d’être affecté par la décision» ( Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte),
requête à fin d ’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p.25, par.40). L’Etat demandant à
intervenir n’a rien à redouter de l’arrêt de la Cour dès lors que celle-ci a estimé que celui-ci ne
portera pas atteinte à ses soi-disant intérêts juridi ques. Et, par définition, sans un intérêt juridique
en jeu on n’a rien du tout sur lequel informer la Cour.
30
Frontière terrestre et maritime en tre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c.Nigéria), requête à fin
d’intervention, ordonnance du 21 octobre 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999, p. 1029.
31
Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria; Guinée équatoriale
(intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 303.
32
CR 2010/12, p. 49-56, par. 2-27 (Ugalde).
33Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984,
p. 26, par. 42.
34Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984,
opinion dissidente du juge Oda, p. 109, par. 37, opinion dissidente du juge Jennings, p. 157, par. 27.
35Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 122, par. 73 ; Différend frontalier terrestre, insula ire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras;
Nicaragua (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p.609-610, par.421-424; Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le
Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria; Guinée équatoriale (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil2002 , p.421,
par. 238. - 27 -
24. Sur cette base, on peut faire plusieurs rema rques. La première est que l’on demande à
intervenir ou pas, que la requête soit acceptée ou pas, la Cour est tenue statutairement à ne pas se
prononcer si elle considère que sa décision peut re mettre en cause les droits d’un tiers, ce qui la
conduirait à restreindre sa portée 36.
25. Deuxième remarque: on peut penser que si la Cour s’est montrée rigoureuse face aux
requêtes à fin d’intervention c’est, au moins en par tie, parce qu’elle considérait que le déroulement
de la procédure incidente, lorsque l’objection d´ une ou des deux Parties rendait nécessaire la tenue
de ces audiences, satisfaisait l’objectif d’attirer l’at tention de la Cour sur les intérêts juridiques
invoqués par l’Etat tiers, évitant ainsi que, par mégarde ou manque d’information, la Cour ne
prenne une décision susceptible de les mettre en cause. Comme le disait le juge NagendraSingh
en 1984 :
«Si le but ainsi recherché était de signaler les zones intéressant l’Italie à la Cour,
en donnant à celle-ci les informations pr éalables nécessaires pour que son arrêt
n’empiète pas sur les droits souverains et l es prétentions de l’Italie, il semble que ce
but ait été effectivement atteint par la pro cédure qui a suivi la décision de la Cour,
prise conformément à l’article62 du Statut , d’entendre non seulement l’Italie, mais
aussi les Parties au différend. Il est hors de doute que la Cour a maintenant pleine
connaissance de l’existence des intérêts ita liens et de leur étendue, et qu’il est donc
impossible qu’elle empiète par sa décision sur les prétentions et les intérêts de l’Italie
ou qu’elle les compromette, fût-ce par mégarde.» ( Plateau continental (Jamahiriya
arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, opinion
individuelle du juge Nagendra Singh, p. 31.)
26. Le plus extraordinaire est ⎯et c’est la troisième remarque ⎯ que les Etats dont les
requêtes d´intervention ont échoué ont, eux-aussi, reçu une protection similaire à celle de la
Guinée équatoriale. Le cas de l’Italie a été retentissant. L’Italie a régné une fois morte. La Cour a
rejeté sa requête d´intervention, car à son avis, l’Italie ne visait pas la protection de ses intérêts
juridiques, mais la reconnaissance de ses droits , ce qui dépassait les limites de l’intervention
envisagée à l’article62 du Statut 37; cependant la Cour a averti qu ’elle allait sauvegarder dans
38
l’arrêt sur le fond les intérêts juridiques des Etats tiers ; ainsi, un an plus tard, lorsqu’elle a statué
sur le fond, la Cour a bien tenu compte des intérê ts juridiques invoqués par l’Italie au cours de la
36
L’Italie dans l’affaire du Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d ’intervention,
arrêt, C.I.. ecuel984 , p.6, pa.2-43; Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 25-26, par. 21.
37 Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984,
p. 3.
38Ibid., p. 26-27, par. 42-43. - 28 -
procédure incidente, comme d’un fait qui obligeait à soustraire à la délimitation entre la Libye et
Malte les zones où l’Italie avait invoqué des intérêts juridiques plausibles 39. La Cour s’est d’abord
vue poussée à immoler la requête sur l’autel du co nsentement des Parties, pour essayer ensuite de
satisfaire à la prétention raisonnable du requérant déçu en réduisant de manière draconienne l’objet
du litige. Pour l’Italie, échouer à l´intervention a été une bonne affaire.
27. A la limite, et c’est la quatrième remarque, l’effet relatif de la décision de la Cour qui,
d’après l’article 59 du Statut, «n’est obligatoire que pour les parties en litige et dans le cas qui a été
décidé», contribue à protéger les intérêts de tout ordre des Etats tiers.
28. Finalement, et c’est ma dernière remarque, le Costa Rica figure parmi les Etats qui ont la
chance d’initier une action à titre principal contre l’ une ou l’autre des Parties dans cette affaire, car
il a les bases de compétence nécessai res. Le Costa Rica est partie au pacte de Bogotá, au même
titre que la Colombie et le Nicaragua. Le Costa Ri ca interprète de manière étonnante la portée de
40
cette constatation factuelle faite par le Nicaragua . Il ne s’agit pas du tout de priver les Etats qui
ont une base autonome de juridiction de leur facu lté de demander à la Cour l’intervention en
conformité avec l’article 62 du Statut. Ce que le Nicaragua a voulu noter est que le Costa Rica ne
se trouve pas dans une situation id entique à celle des Etats qui n’ont pas d´alternative à la requête
d’intervention (tel qu’était le cas de Malte, de l’Italie, du Nicaragua lui-même, de la
Guinéeéquatoriale, des Philippines). Saisir la Cour à titre principal permet de passer de la
protection à la reconnaissance des intérêts juridiques et, en même temps, évite la nécessité d’une
analyse immédiate et rigoureuse de la nature de ces intérêts et de son éventuelle mise en cause par
l’arrêt futur que requiert la procédure incidente d’intervention, test exigeant que la demande du
41
Costa Rica ne passe pas .
Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie de votre attention
et ayant achevé mon exposé je vous prie, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir appeler à cette
barre M. Paul Reichler.
39
Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 26, par. 21.
40CR 2010/12, p. 56-58, par. 28-41 (Ugalde).
41Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984,
p. 23, par. 37. - 29 -
Le PRESIDENT: Je vous remercie, Monsieur le professeur Antonio Remiro Brotóns, pour
votre intervention. I now invite Mr. Paul Reichler to take the floor.
RMEr. HLER
C OSTA RICA HAS NO LEGAL INTERESTS THAT WOULD BE AFFECTED
BY THE C OURT ’S DECISION IN THIS CASE
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, good morning.
2. Some things are so blindingly obvious that they go undetected by even the most astute
observers. Ironically, they go unobserved precisely because they are so obvious.
3. This is illustrated by the exchange between the great English detective, Sherlock Holmes,
and Dr. Watson. While investigating a crime late in to the night on an isolated Scottish heath, they
decided to set up a tent to shelter them while they slept.
4. After a couple of hours, it rained very hard and they both awoke drenched to the bone.
Holmes leaned over, nudged his companion. “Wat son”, he said, “look directly above us and tell
me what you see”. Watson put on his eyeglasses, looked up, and said: “I see a very dark sky, with
thick and ominous clouds, and lo ts of rain pouring down on t op of us.” “And what do you
conclude from that?” asked Holmes. Watson pondered for a minute, then said: “Meteorologically,
there is an abnormally low pressure system, with a major storm front and unseasonably strong
winds threatening record amounts of precipitation.” “What do you conclude, Holmes?”
5. The great detective, soaking wet, looked straight up into the night at the rain pouring down
on top of him, and said: “I conclude that someone has stolen our tent!”
6. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the conclusion in this matter is as obvious as that. It
needs no abstruse, technical or scientific explanatio n, or magical manipulation of maritime maps.
The conclusion to be drawn is as plain as day. But, like Dr.Watson, Costa Rica’s counsel have
looked right past it, even though it was staring them in the face.
7. On Monday, they gave us a visually impressive display of maps and charts, as well as a
complex analysis of theoretical entitlements, disput ed maritime areas and delimitation claims. But
it is perfectly obvious ⎯ from their own maps and charts no less ⎯ that the delimitation to be
carried out by the Court in this case cannot and will not affect Costa Rica’s legal interests. - 30 -
8. This conclusion is unavoidable for three reasons:
First, in a maritime delimitation case the Cour t cannot delimit an area in which a third State
may have a claim. This is patently obvious, and in any event the Court has said so many times, and
has always ⎯ always ⎯ avoided extending a delimitation line into areas claimed by third States 42.
Second, neither of the Parties has asked the Court to delimit any areas claimed by third
States, including areas claimed by Costa Rica; neither the boundary lines claimed by Nicaragua
nor those claimed by Colombia require, or even invite, the Court to delimit in areas claimed by
Costa Rica. So the Court is not even called upon to delimit in the areas in which Costa Rica claims
a legal interest.
Third, the Court is perfectly capable of deciding this case, and delimiting the boundaries
between Nicaragua and Colombia, without extending the delimitation lines in to areas claimed by
Costa Rica. There is neither necessity nor r eason for it to do so. The delimitation can and
inevitably will be effected without including the areas claimed by Costa Rica. If, as is obviously
the case, the decision will not affect Costa Rica’s legal interests, then Costa Rica has failed to
satisfy the main requirement for intervention under Article 62.
THE C OURT HAS BEEN DULY INFORMED OF THE LEGAL
INTERESTS C OSTA R ICA CLAIMS TO HAVE
9. Costa Rica has very helpfully informed the Court as to what it presently considers to be its
interests of a legal nature in the Caribbean Sea. According to its counsel, its interests are bounded
in the north by a putative equidistance line with Nicaragua, and in the east by a line that is
200 nautical miles from Costa Rica’s coast 43. Costa Rica claims, repeatedly, that the purpose of its
intervention is to inform the Court of these legal interests, so that the delimitation in this case will
not extend into that area. The Application to in tervene states: “It is the purpose of Costa Rica’s
intervention to inform the Court of Costa Rica’s legal interests and rights so that these may remain
42
See e.g., case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 18, para. 75,
p. 91, para. 130, p. 93, para. 133 (B) (1); Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2009, p. 129, paras. 208-209, p. 67, para.Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and
Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 , p.756, para.312 and p.759,
para. 319; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Ques tions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 109, para. 221; Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Application for Permission to
Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984 , p.27; Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1985, pp. 26-28, paras. 21-23.
4See Costa Rica’s judges’ folder, tab 10; CR 2010/12, pp. 33-39, paras. 4-29 (Lathrop). - 31 -
unaffected as the Court delimits the maritime boundary between Nicaragua and Colombia, the
44
parties to the case before it.” This was repeated several times in the first round by Costa Rica’s
Agent and counsel 45.
10. After the hearings on Monday, there can be no doubt that Costa Rica has accomplished
its purpose. It has made perfectly clear what it now considers its legal interests to be. The Court
and the Parties are aware of them, and as a result it has become even more obvious that those
interests cannot and will not be affected by the judgment to be given. In the Tunisia/Libya case,
where Malta’s Application to in tervene under Article62 was denied by the Court, it was argued
that: “the avowed object of Malta has in fact already been achieved by the hearings on the question
of intervention, in view of the explanations Malta has there been able to give of its preoccupations”
(Continental Shelf (Tunisia/ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) , Application to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1981, p.11, para.16). Like Malta, Costa Rica has made the Court aware of its
preoccupations. There is no further contribut ion it need be called upon to make to these
proceedings.
11. In this case, neither Party has asked the C ourt to delimit any part of the maritime area in
which Costa Rica now claims to have legal inte rests. Nicaragua certainly has made no such
request. To leave no doubt about its position, Ni caragua reiterates that it does not seek from the
Court any delimitation in the area in which Costa Rica now considers itself to have legal interests.
Nicaragua does not read Colombia’s written pleadings as calling for delimitation of, or within, the
areas in which Costa Rica has expressed an interest, either.
12. And since the Court itself is guided by its own Rules and precedents against delimiting in
areas claimed by third States, it is a given that th e decision in this case will not affect Costa Rica’s
legal interests. The Court having now been duly in formed of Costa Rica’s precise interests, it can
only note that they are insufficient to justify intervention in this case, and that no purpose would be
served by allowing Costa Rica to intervene. Cost a Rica itself offers none. As it has repeatedly
emphasized, its purpose in bringing this Application was to inform the Court of its legal interests.
44
Application for permission to intervene by the Republic of Costa Rica, 25 Feb. 2010, p. 2.
45See, e.g., CR 2010/12, p. 43, para. 40 (Lathrop); ibid., p. 45, paras. 45 and 46 (Lathrop). - 32 -
It has now done so. Mission accomplished. On th at happy note, Costa Rica, like the Cheshire cat
in Alice in Wonderland, can slowly fade away, leaving only its smile behind.
13. These points are confirmed by the maps and charts, including those displayed by Costa
Rica on Monday.
C OSTA R ICA ’S CLAIMED LEGAL INTERESTS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED
BY THE DECISION IN THIS CASE
[Slide 1: PSR1]
14. Here is how Costa Rica, at these hearings, describes its legal interests 46. Nicaragua
believes that Costa Rica’s true legal interests in the Caribbean are not this extensive, as I will come
to later in my speech. But this makes no di fference for purposes of determining whether Costa
Rica’s interests can be affected by the decision in this case. Even as broadly defined as they are
now, on this map, they cannot be affected by the Court’s decision. Here is why.
15. First, Nicaragua asks the Court to eff ect the delimitation with Colombia by enclaving
San Andrés, Providencia and any ot her islands or maritime features the Court awards to Colombia
[Slide 1: PSR1] . It cannot be argued— and Costa Rica does not argue— that its interests are
affected by these red delimitation lines. Nicaragua also asks the Court to delimit the continental
shelf boundary with Colombia [Slide 1: PSR1]. Th is line does not enter or encroach on any areas
in which Costa Rica has legal interests. Costa Rica does not claim that it does. In fact, Costa Rica
expressly claims that its legal interests extend no farther east than 200nautical miles from its
47
coast . The continental shelf boundary with Colombia lies more than 118nautical miles further
east of that limit. In its Application to intervene, Costa Rica admits that Nicaragua’s proposed
continental shelf boundary with Colombia is “beyond any area to which Costa Rica claims an
entitlement” 48.
16. To be absolutely clear, Nicaragua’s claim is merely that the line dividing the continental
shelf of Nicaragua from the continental shelf of Co lombia lies where Nicaragua has placed it. It
expresses no opinion as to the location of any lateral delimitation lines with Costa Rica or any other
46
Costa Rica’s judges’ folder, tab 8.
47
CR 2010/12, p. 26, para. 23 (Brenes).
4Application for permission to intervene by the Republic of Costa Rica, 25 Feb. 2010, p. 4. - 33 -
State west of that boundary line. It makes no claim in these proceedings, vis-à-vis Costa Rica or
any other third State, of entitlement to the waters west of this proposed boundary line.
17. So, it is plain that Nicaragua’s boundary claims do not encroach upon Costa Rica’s legal
interests, or require the Court to delimit areas claimed by Costa Rica.
18. To make it appear otherwise, Costa Rica resorts to two false arguments. First, Costa
Rica says that Nicaragua claims entitlement to all of the maritime area lying west of its proposed
continental shelf boundary with Colombia 49. “[W]hat it seeks from the Court” Costa Rica’s
counsel say about Nicaragua “is not merely the drawing of a boundary line with Colombia, but also
the recognition of the maritime areas bounded by that line as belonging to Nicaragua” 5. This is
simply not true. They say it anyway because it is the only way they can pretend to show how a
potential delimitation by the Court might affect th eir legal interests. But nowhere in its written
pleadings has Nicaragua made such a claim. And the Agent of Nicaragua has confirmed today that
Nicaragua does not claim in these proceedings, and does not ask the Court for delimitation in,
maritime areas west of the continental shelf boundary, ex cept for the enclaves it seeks around
Colombia’s insular possessions close to Nicaragua’s coast.
19. In support of its attribution to Nicara gua of an argument it never made, and now has
expressly abjured, Costa Rica’s counsel insist that, despite what Nicaragua says, its boundary claim
51
is actually reflected in its graphi cs showing its “potential EEZ entitlement” . This is no more
credible than claiming that Costa Rica’s legal interests extend to what its counsel called its
52
“Caribbean Maritime Entitlements in the Absence of Neighboring States Entitlements” [slide 2:
PSR2]. This is a Costa Rican chart displayed on Monday. As counsel made clear, this is not the
area actually claimed by Costa Rica or the area in wh ich it says it has legal interests. It is, in his
words, nothing more than “the hypothetical exte nt of Costa Rica’s maritime zones” presented “in
the abstract” 53. It is a starting point for an analytical process, consistent with the methodology
49
CR 2010/12, p. 41, para. 34 (Lathrop); p. 48, para. 13 (Ugalde).
50
Ibid.
51Application for permission to intervene by the Republic of Costa Rica, 25 Feb. 2010, para.17; CR 2010/12,
p. 48, para. 13 (Ugalde); ibid., p. 42, para. 36 (Lathrop). Referring to RN, figures 4-5, 6-5, 6-9, 6-10, and 6-11.
52Application for permission to intervene by the Republic of Costa Rica, Oral Proceedings, judges’ folder,
11 Oct. 2010, tab 3.
53CR 2010/12, p. 33, para. 5 (Lathrop). - 34 -
cited by the Court in numerous maritime delimitations, for ultimately arriving at justifiable, and
more limited, legal claims. This chart no more depicts the area in which Costa Rica claims a legal
interest, than Nicaragua’s chart of its “ potential EEZ entitlement” depicts its actual boundary
claims. As stated in Nicaragua’s Written Observations, all of the charts held up by Costa Rica in
its Application and again on Monday 54: “refer to the general area of the ‘potential EEZ
entitlement’, and do not imply, under any possible read ing, a claim to the entirety of the areas thus
roughly sketched” 55. It is disappointing that Costa Rica’ s counsel would seek to confuse these
Nicaraguan charts ⎯ the equivalent of those depicting Costa Rica’s expansive “hypothetical”
claims “in the abstract” ⎯ with the much more limited charts showing Nicaragua’s actual claims.
They have deliberately compared apples to ora nges in an attempt to sell the Court the wrong
fruit ⎯ and a rotten one at that.
20. The second false argument advanced by Costa Rica, to show a purported encroachment
by Nicaragua’s boundary claim, is the one depicted on Costa Rica’s chart No.10 in its judges’
folder. Here Costa Rica shows the claim line originally proffered in Nicaragua’s Memorial as
extending slightly into the area in which Costa Rica claims to have a legal interest [slide 3: PSR3].
May we have that line please? Thank you. The argument fails for two reasons. First, as made
clear in the Reply, this line no longer represents Nicaragua’s boundary claim; it therefore has no
relevance to Costa Rica’s Application to intervene. Second, the arrow at the southern tip of the line
is a standard indicator that the line is not intended to extend into areas claimed by third States; to
the contrary, the arrow indicates only the direction that the line follows up to, but not beyond, areas
claimed by another State. It proves the opposite of what Costa Rica contends: that Nicaragua is
seeking to avoid a delimitation affecting Costa Rica’s interests, or those of any other State.
21. Costa Rica is just as unsuccessful in its attempt to depict Colombia’s boundary claim as
encroaching on its legal interests [slide 3: PSR3]. On Monday, Costa Rica described its agreed
boundary with Colombia as consisting of two straight line segments forming a right angle at
54
Application for permission to intervene by the Republic of Costa Rica, 25 Feb. 2010, para.17; CR 2010/12,
p. 41, para. 36 (Lathrop).
5Written Observations of the Republic of Nicaragua on the Application for permission to intervene filed by the
Republic of Costa Rica, 26 May 2010, p. 12, para. 31. - 35 -
56
point B . These are shown in red. In the words of Costa Rica’s counsel, the line extending north
from point B has an arrow at the end to indicate that it “extends north to an unspecified point where
it would intersect with Nicaragua” 57. So here Costa Rica uses an arrow to indicate that its
delimitation line extends to, but not beyond, the ar eas claimed by a neighbouring State. Yet Costa
Rica chooses to ignore the arrow placed by Nicaragua at the end of its former delimitation line for
the same purpose.
22. Costa Rica contends that Colombia’s claimed boundary line with Nicaragua extends
south into its maritime area 58[slide 3: PSR3]. But here again, we see the well-recognized symbol,
the arrow, indicating the direction of Colombia ’s putative boundary line until it meets the area
claimed by a third State, in this case Costa Rica. It is plain from that arrow that Colombia does not
intend this line to extend into Costa Rica’s waters. Colombia even says this in its
Counter-Memorial, in a passage cited in Costa Rica’ s Application: “There is a question how far
the median line should be prolonged to the south given the potential interests of third States in the
region. To avoid any possible prejudice to such rights, Colombia has placed an arrow at the end of
59
the line . . .”
23. In this regard, it is worth commenting on the exegesis of the Court’s four most recent
decisions in maritime delimitation cases that was so eruditely presented on Monday by Costa
Rica’s counsel [slide 4: PSR4]. He very helpfully pointed out and showed graphically that in
Romania v. Ukraine, the Court terminated the delimitation line with a directional arrow, short of
60
the areas of the Black Sea where third States might have interests . Likewise, [slide 5: PSR5] he
cited Honduras v. Nicaragua, in which the Court used a dashed li ne to indicate the direction of the
61
delimitation line extending up to, but not beyond, areas claimed by third States . And, as counsel
also pointed out, in Cameroon v. Nigeria and Qatar v. Bahrain, the Court took pains to assure that
56
CR 2010/12, p. 22, para. 7 (Brenes).
57
Ibid.
58Application for permission to intervene by the Republic of Costa Rica, 25Feb. 2010, para.20; Costa Rica’s
judges’ folder, tab 10.
59Application for permission to intervene by the Repub lic of Costa Rica, 25 Feb. 2010, para.20 (citing CMC,
para. 9.34).
60CR 2010/12, p. 44, para. 42 (Lathrop). See, also, Costa Rica’s judges’ folder, tab 6.
61Ibid. See, also, Costa Rica’s judges’ folder, tab 7. - 36 -
the delimitation lines in those cases did not encr oach on areas claimed by Equatorial Guinea or
62
Sao Tomé in the former case, or Iran or Saudi Arabia in the latter .
24. As Costa Rica’s counsel concluded on Monday:
“The question of endpoints in the vicinity of third States... arises in the
majority of bilateral delimitations. Stat e practice and the practice of international
courts and tribunals indicate a strong concer n to63void entering areas in which third
States . . . might reasonably maintain an interest.”
25. We not only agree with counsel for Costa Rica about the holdings and import of these
cases; we submit that he has made our argument for us. He has provide d cogent and convincing
reasons why Costa Rica’s Applicati on to intervene should be disallowed. Simply put, consistent
with its past practice, the Court cannot and will not delimit in areas claimed by third States. The
Court has very studiously and very successfully avoided doing so in every prior case in which this
has been an issue ⎯ including as far back as Libya/Malta (Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985 , pp. 26-28, paras. 21-23). There is no risk that,
in this case, the Court will delimit in the areas in which Costa Rica has expressed its legal interests.
The Court simply cannot do so, and neither of the Parties has asked it to do so.
26. Since there is no risk that the Court’s d ecision will affect Costa Rica’s maritime claims,
the Application very obviously fails to satisfy the requirements of Article 62, and must be denied.
No other interests of a legal nature have been proffered by Costa Rica in support of its Application.
In its decision rejecting Nicaragua’s Application to intervene in the Land, Island and Maritime
Frontier Dispute, the Chamber said that Article62 requires the applicant to “ demonstrate
convincingly . . . the interest of a legal nature which it considers may be affected by the decision in
the case” ( Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Disput e (ElSalvador/Honduras), Application to
Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1990 , pp.117-118, para.61; emphasis added.) It is very
obvious that Costa Rica has failed to meet this test.
T HE LEGAL INTERESTS OF C OSTA R ICA, PROPERLY DEFINED
27. As I indicated earlier, Nicaragua does not ag ree that Costa Rica has legal interests in the
entire area described in its Application, or by its counsel on Monday. To the contrary, Nicaragua
62
CR 2010/12, p. 44, para. 42 (Lathrop).
6Ibid., p. 43, para. 41 (Lathrop). - 37 -
believes that Costa Rica’s legal interests are confined to a smaller area, an issue I will now address.
Of course, if the delimitation effected by the Cour t will not encroach on or affect the broader area
now claimed by Costa Rica, it must also be true that it will not impact the smaller area to which
Costa Rica’s interests are more appropriately confined.
28. Costa Rica defined its legal interests in the Caribbean Sea ⎯ as perceived by itself ⎯ in
its 1977 Treaty establishing a maritime boundary with Colombia, and its 1980 Treaty establishing a
maritime boundary with Panama. Under the term s of those treaties, the maritime boundaries of
Costa Rica are defined by the lines you see depicted on this sketch map. [Slide 6: PSR6.] For the
reasons I will now discuss, we say that Costa Rica’s legal interests in the Caribbean Sea remain as
described in its boundary treaties with Colombia of Panama, and that, these interests cannot be
affected by the decision of the Court in this case.
29. It is not uncommon for international tribuna ls to define a State’s maritime interests by
reference to its existing treaties. In the 2006 Award in the arbitration between Barbados and
Trinidad and Tobago, for example, the distinguished arbitral tribunal determined the scope of what
64
it characterized as the “maritime claims of Trinidad and Tobago” by reference to that State’s
treaty with Venezuela. As the tribunal stated:
“The maritime areas which Trinidad and Tobago has, in the 1990 Trinidad
Venezuela Agreement, given up in favour of Venezuela do not any longer appertain to
Trinidad and Tobago and thus the Tribunal could not draw a delimitation line the
65
effect of which is to attribute to Trinidad and Tobago areas it no longer claims.”
The same could be said, mutatis mutandis, with respect to Costa Rica here. Both by signing the
1977 Treaty with Colombia, and by its subsequent practice over a 33-year period, Costa Rica has
shown that it did not consider the areas beyond th e 1977 Treaty line as appertaining to itself, and
therefore any decision by the Court in regard to those areas could not affect its legal interests.
64Arbitration between Barbados and th e Republic of Trinidad and Tobagorelating to the delimitation of the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf be tween them, decision of 11Apr.2006, United Nations, Reports of
International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), Vol. XXVII, para. 347.
65Ibid. - 38 -
30. Costa Rica attempts to distinguish its situation on the ground that it has not yet ratified its
1977 Treaty with Colombia. On this basis, Costa Rica in effect asks the Court to ignore that treaty,
and to recognize interests of a legal nature now claimed by Costa Rica in areas that extend beyond
the limits fixed by that treaty.
31. This is a difficult position for Costa Rica to sustain in view of its own consistent course
of conduct following the execution of the 1977 Treat y. Costa Rica has al ways manifested its
intention to comply with the provisions of that treaty, and the limits of its maritime jurisdiction set
forth therein. In its Application to intervene it states that it “has, in good faith, refrained from acts
which would defeat the object and purpose of this agreement” 66, echoing of course the requirement
of Article18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in regard to unratified treaties to
which States intend to be bound.
32. Costa Rica’s intention to comply with th e 1977 Treaty was made even more explicit in
its formal, bilateral communications with Colombia . In 1996, the Costa Rican Foreign Minister
sent his Colombian counterpart a diplomatic Note stating:
“[I] inform Your Excellency that... the Government of Costa Rica’s view, in
full harmony with international norms as embodied in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, the Treaty on Maritime Delimitation between Colombia and Costa
Rica has been complied with, is being complied with and will continue to be complied
with, as a show of good faith of the Parties.” 67
33. It is also of some significance that the 1977 Treaty is not a stand-alone instrument. Some
of its provisions have been incorporated in to two other maritime boundary treaties that have been
ratified by Costa Rica. The first treaty is Costa Rica’s 1980 Treaty with Panama, which was
ratified by Costa Rica the following year 68. In Article1, paragraph1, of the 1980Treaty, Costa
Rica’s maritime boundary with Panama is defined by a straight line drawn from the land boundary
66
Application for permission to intervene by the Republic of Costa Rica, 25 Feb. 2010, para. 12.
67
CMC, Ann. 69: Diplomatic Note No. DVM 103 from the Costa Rican Foreign Vice-Minister to the Colombian
Ambassador in Costa Rica, 23Mar.1997. See, also, Ann.69: Diplomatic Note No.DVM103 from the Costa Rican
Foreign Vice-Minister to the Colombian Ambassador in Cost a Rica, 23Mar.1997; Ann.217: Statement given by
Mr. Gonzalo J. Facio, Costa Rican signatory of the 1977 Treaty and former Foreign Minister, at the Costa Rican Foreign
Ministry, 27 Aug. 1998; Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto (2000-2001), p.4,
http://www.rree.go.cr/ministerio/files/Memoria%202000-2001.pdf.
68
See American Society of International Law, International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. I,
J.I.Charney & L.M.Alexander (eds.), 1996, p.537; Co sta Rica of Foreign Affairs, http://www.rree.go.cr/servicios/
index.php?Tipo=&stp=60&langtype=&SID=&Id=733&IdFicha=pan007&Country=&Tipo=Bilateral&Embajada=&User
Name=&str_table=tbl_pe_tratado_bilateral_esp. - 39 -
terminus to a point at sea located at 10º49'N by 81º26'08.2"W “where the boundaries of Costa
69
Rica, Colombia and Panama intersect” . This tripoint ⎯ where the boundaries of Costa Rica,
Colombia and Panama intersect ⎯ could only be such if there were pre-existing boundaries
recognized between Colombia and Costa Rica and between Colombia and Panama.
34. [Slide71: PSR7] On this slide, the Costa Rica/Colombia boundary from the 1977 Treaty
is shown in green. The Colombia/Panama boundary , agreed in 1976, is shown in blue. The
boundary between Costa Rica and Panama is shown in red. The tripoint referred to in the latter
treaty is circled in black. This tripoint between Costa Rica, Colombia and Panama is formed in
part by, and could not exist without, the agreed green boundary line between Costa Rica and
Colombia. What is plain from this tripoint is that the boundary line from the 1977 Costa
Rica/Colombia Treaty was taken as an agreed boundar y, and then incorporated into the boundary
established by the 1980 Costa Rica/Panama Treaty, which was ratified by Costa Rica in 1981.
35. The 1977 boundary line between Costa Rica and Colombia was acknowledged again in
the 1984 Treaty between Costa Rica and Colombia defining the maritime boundary in the Pacific
Ocean. This latter treaty was ratified by both States and entered into force in 2001. Paragraph 1 of
the Preamble to the 1984 Treaty states: “That the ‘Treaty on the Delimitation of Marine and
Submarine Areas and Maritime Cooperation’, signed on 17 March 1977, established ⎯ establació
in Spanish ⎯ the maritime boundary between the two States in the Caribbean Sea.” 70
36. This point is further reflected in the gr aphics Costa Rica displayed on Monday. Figure 4
in Costa Rica’s judge’s fold er bears the following caption: [slide 8: PSR8] “Costa Rica’s
Maritime Entitlements Are Limited by Agreements with Treaty Partners Panama and Colombia.”
We agree.
37. It is undisputed that Costa Rica has complied with the 1977Treaty ever since it was
executed, including to this day. Costa Rica says as much, and there is no reason to disbelieve it on
this point. There is no evidence that the 1977 Tr eaty leaves Costa Rica short-changed in terms of
69
Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/CRI.htm.
7Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/CRI.htm. - 40 -
its maritime interests. As Ambassador Argüello pointed out, citing Charney and Alexander, Costa
71
Rica achieved significant benefits from this agreement . According to Prosper Weil:
“It cannot be denied that a delimitation on which two States agree reflects their
view of the equity of both the method of delimitation and the result, since
governments are hardly likely to subscribe to a solution which they would consider
72
inequitable.”
38. Nicaragua recognizes that, absent ratificati on, Costa Rica may not be formally bound by
the 1977 Treaty. Our point is a different one. It is that the Treaty and Costa Rica’s consistent
conduct thereunder demonstrate what Costa Rica’s perception of its own legal interests truly are.
Costa Rica cannot simply invent new legal interests to suit its present purposes, and particularly in
order to intervene in these proceedings under Article 62. After 33 years of maintaining a consistent
and public view of its legal interests, and conducting itself in strict accordance with that view in all
respects, the Court should treat with some cauti on Costa Rica’s sudden effo rt to throw the entire
historical and geographical record out the window in order to claim a new, expanded set of
interests in regard to Nicaragua alone.
39. Costa Rica cannot escape the force of this argument by its repeated incantation of the
phrase res inter alios acta or its reliance on Article34 of th e Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Of course, Nicaragua derives no rights or obligations from the bilateral Treaty between
Costa Rica and Colombia per se. But the point is that, since the 1977 Treaty, Costa Rica has
consistently and openly defined its maritime boundary, and the limits of its maritime jurisdiction, in
a certain manner, and has publicly disclaimed en titlement to areas lying beyond that boundary.
Nicaragua submits that Costa Rica should be held to this disclaimer. At the very least, the Court is
entitled to take it into account in ascertaining, for the purpose of these proceedings, the true nature
of Costa Rica’s legal interests.
40. Costa Rica’s new definition of its legal interests is also problematical because it is
discriminatory. As its counsel made clear on Monday, Costa Rica’s view is, on the one hand, if the
maritime area immediately beyond the limits accepted by Costa Rica in the 1977 Treaty belongs to
Colombia, Costa Rica has no legal interests in that area. But, on the other hand, if the area beyond
71
American Society of International Law, International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. I, J. I. Charney &
L. M. Alexander (eds.), 1996, Vol. I, pp. 465-466.
72Prosper Weil, The Law of Maritime Delimitation: Reflections, 1989, p. 154. - 41 -
Costa Rica’s agreed limits belongs to Nicaragua , then Costa Rica claims legal interests in the
area 73. No further explanation is given. So much for good neighbourliness, at least in regard to
Nicaragua.
41. Costa Rica’s counsel said on Monday that the reason Costa Rica did not ratify the
1977 Treaty was out of deference to Nicaragua 74. In other words, Nicaragua brought Costa Rica’s
newly-expanded maritime claim upon itself by protes ting the treaty with Colombia which contains
a more modest claim. Costa Rica refrained from ratifying the Treaty with Colombia in deference
to Nicaragua’s protest? That is news to Nicaragua , as the Agent of Nicaragua pointed out. It will
also be news to Costa Rica’s Parliament, which has given a number of reasons for demurring on the
Costa Rican Government’s request for ratification of the Treaty ⎯ none of which included
75
Nicaragua’s protest . In 1998, Costa Rica’s Foreign Minister issued a public statement that the
Costa Rican Parliament should ratify the 1977 Treaty regardless of Nicaragua’s objection 76. So
much for deference to Nicaragua.
C ONCLUSIONS
42. [For the benefit of the worthy interpreters , I have moved to paragraph 45 in the interests
of saving time.] There is no mystery to Costa Rica’s strategy here. In 1977, Costa Rica knowingly
and intentionally made a deal with Colombia. In return for Colombia’s blessing of its maritime
claims, it entered an agreement in which it recogn ized Colombia’s jurisdiction over maritime areas
77
also claimed by Nicaragua . It has enjoyed the benefits of that bargain for 33 years, never
complaining about it. Now, all of a sudden, it senses an opportunity to lay claim to a larger
maritime area, at Nicaragua’s expense. Now, a ll of a sudden, the deal it made with Colombia
33years ago is not good enough. Now, all of a sudden, that agreement was based on mistaken
assumptions that Costa Rica has suddenly discovered 33 years down the road ⎯ late, but as far as
73
CR 2010/12, p. 36, para. 16 (Lathrop).
7Ibid., p. 22, para. 8 (Brenes).
7American Society of International Law, International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. I, J. I.. Charney &
L. M. Alexander (eds.), 1996, pp. 465-466.
7Ann.217: statement given by Mr. Gonzalo J. Facio, Costa Rican signatory of the 1977 Treaty and former
Foreign Minister, at the Costa Rican Foreign Ministry, 27 Aug. 1998.
7See American Society of International Law, International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. I, J. I. Charney &
L. M. Alexander (eds.), 1996, pp. 465-466. - 42 -
Costa Rica is concerned, not too late to attempt to abandon its long-held un derstanding of its legal
interests in the Caribbean, and invent new ones for the purpose of asserting them against
Nicaragua, and only against Nicaragua.
43. In Nicaragua’s view, this is an unsusta inable position, not least because the bases on
which Costa Rica attempts to break out of its long-accepted maritime limits ⎯ its alleged mistaken
assumptions ⎯ are insufficient both as an evidentiary and a legal matter to accomplish that
objective. The 1977 Treaty and Costa Rica’s cons istent conduct for more than 30years evidence
its legal interests in the Caribbean Sea, and limit them to the maritime area defined by that Treaty
and subsequent practice. That area, shown on th e screen behind me [slide 10: PSR10], cannot be
affected by the Court’s decision in this case. Not even Costa Rica argues that it could be affected
by the decision. If this area defines Costa Rica’s interests, then even Costa Rica concedes its
Application to intervene fails to satisfy Article 62.
44. But even if the Court were to take Costa Rica’s new definition of its legal interests into
consideration, the result would be the same, as I explained in some detail in the first part of my
speech. Even the expanded area now claimed by Cost a Rica as its area of legal interest cannot be
affected by the decision of the Court in this case, under any circumstances, because the Court
cannot and does not delimit in any area claimed by a third State. The Court has been duly informed
precisely of what Costa Rica now considers to be its legal interests in the Caribbean Sea. The
Parties do not seek delimitation in that expa nded area described by Costa Rica on Monday ⎯ in
fact, they expressly abjure it. It can therefore be concluded ineluctably that Costa Rica’s interests
will not ⎯ cannot ⎯ be affected by the decision in this case. As a result, the Application to
intervene cannot be justified under Article 62. It must be disallowed by the Court.
45. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, this concludes my presentation. It is
now time for me to fade away, leaving behind Ni caragua’s first round presentation. Thank you for
your patience and your courteous attention. - 43 -
The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr.PaulReichler for his presentation. This statement, as
Mr. Paul Reichler himself stated, brings to an end the first round of oral argument of Nicaragua.
As I announced earlier, the Court proposes that we have a short coffee break of 10 minutes
until 11.20 and then we come back to the first round of oral argument of Colombia.
The Court rose at 11.05 a.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Wednesday 13 October 2010, at 9.30 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) Application by Costa Rica for permission to intervene