Audience publique tenue le mardi 24 février 2004, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Shi, président

CR 2004/3

International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice

THHEAGUE LHAAYE

YEAR 2004

Public sitting

held on Tuesday 24 February 2004, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,

President Shi presiding,

on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall

in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
(Request for advisory opinion submitted by the General Assembly of the United Nations)

________________

VERBATIM RECORD
________________

ANNÉE 2004

Audience publique

tenue le mardi 24 février 2004, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,

sous la présidence de M. Shi, président,

sur les Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur
dans le Territoire palestinien occupé
(Demande d’avis consultatif soumise par l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies)

____________________

COMPTE RENDU

____________________ - 2 -

Present: Presidenit
Vice-Presidejetva

Guillauueges
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins

Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh

Buergenthal
Elaraby
Owada
Simma

Tomka

Couvgisurar

 - 3 -

PrØsents : M. Shi,président
Ricejpra,ident

GuiMllu. e
Koroma
Vereshchetin
HigMgmse

Parra-A.anguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh

Buergenthal
Elaraby
Owada
Simma

juges ka,

Cgoefferr,

 - 4 -

Palestine is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Nasser Al-Kidwa, Ambassador, Perman ent Observer of Palestine to the United
Nations;

Mr. Georges Abi-Saab, Professor of Internationa l Law, Graduate Institute of International

Studies, Geneva, Member of the Institute of International Law, Counsel and Advocate;

Mr. James Crawford, Whewell Professor of International Law, University of Cambridge;

Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Chichele Professor of International Law, University of Oxford, Counsel
and Advocate;

Mr. Jean Salmon, Professor Emeritus of Interna tional Law, Université libre de Bruxelles,
Member of the Institute of International Law, Counsel and Advocate;

Mr. Pieter Bekker, Member of the Bar of New York, Senior Counsel;

Mr. Anis Kassim, Member of the Bar of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Senior Counsel;

Mr. Raja Aziz Shehadeh, Barrister at law, Ramallah, Palestine, Senior Counsel;

Ms Stephanie Koury, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Counsel;

Mr. Jarat Chopra, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Professor of International Law,
Brown University, Counsel;

Mr. Rami Shehadeh, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Counsel;

H.E. Mr.Yousef Habbab, Ambassador, General Delegate of Palestine to the Netherlands,
Adviser;

Mr. Muin Shreim, Counsellor, Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United
Nations, Adviser;

Ms Feda Abdelhady Nasser, Counsellor, Perm anent Observer Mission of Palestine to the

United Nations, Adviser;

Mr. Michael Tarazi, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Adviser/Media Co-ordinator;

MsKylie Evans, Lauterpacht Research Cent re for International Law, University of
Cambridge;

Mr. François Dubuisson, Centre de droit international de l’Université libre de Bruxelles;

Mr. Markus W. Gehring, Yale University;

Mr. Jafer Shadid, delegation of Palestine in the Netherlands. - 5 -

The Republic of South Africa is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Aziz Pahad, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Leader of the Delegation;

H.E. MsP. Jana, Ambassador of the Repub lic of South Africa to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands and diplomatic representative to the International Court of Justice;

H.E. Mr. D. S. Kumalo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa to the
United Nations;

Mr. M. R. W. Madlanga, S.C.;

MsJ.G.S. de Wet, Acting Chief State La w Adviser (International Law), Department of
Foreign Affairs;

Mr. A. Stemmet, Senior State Law Adviser (International Law) Department of Foreign
Affairs;

Ms T. Lujiza, State Law Adviser (International Law) Department of Foreign Affairs;

Mr. I. Mogotsi, Director, Middle East Department of Foreign Affairs.

The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Noureddine Djoudi, Ambassador of Algeria to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;

Mr. Ahmed Laraba, Professor of International Law;

Mr. Mohamed Habchi, Member of the Constitutional Council;

Mr. Abdelkader Cherbal, Member of the Constitutional Council;

Mr. Merzak Bedjaoui, Director of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Fawzi A. Shubokshi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations in New York, Head of Delegation;

Mr. Hazim Karakotly, Minister plenipotentiary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Riyadh;

Mr. Sameer Aggad, First Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Riyadh;

Mr. Saud Alshawaf, Legal Counsellor;

Mr. Ziyad Alsudairi, Legal Counsellor;

Mr. Muhammed Omar Al-Madani, Professor Emeritus of International Law, Legal
Counsellor;

Mr. Khaled Althubaiti, Legal Counsellor;

Mr. David Colson, Legal Counsellor;

Mr. Brian Vohrer, Assistant Legal Counsellor. - 6 -

The People's Republic of Bangladesh is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Liaquat Ali Choudhury, Ambassador of Bangladesh to the Netherlands;

Ms Naureen Ahsan, First Secretary at the Embassy of Bangladesh in The Hague.

Belize is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Bassam Freiha, Permanent Representative of Belize to Unesco;

Mr. Jean-Marc Sorel, Professor at the Université de Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne);

Ms Mireille Cailbault.

The Republic of Cuba is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Abelardo Moreno Fernández, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs;

H.E. Mr. Elio Rodríguez Perdomo, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands;

Mr. Enrique Prieto López, Minister Counsellor at the Embassy of Cuba in the Netherlands;

Mrs. Soraya E. Alvarez Núñez, Official of the Multilateral Affairs Division, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.

The Republic of Indonesia is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Mohammad Jusuf, Ambassador the Republic of Indonesia to the Kingdom of the

Netherlands, Head of Delegation;

Ms Nuni Turnijati Djoko, Minister, Deputy Chief of Mission, member;

Mr. Mulya Wirana, Counsellor (Political Affairs), member;

Col. A Subandi, Defence Attaché, member;

Mrs. Kusuma N. Lubis, Counsellor (Information Affairs), member;

Mr. Sulaiman Syarif, First Secretary (Political Affairs), member;

Mr. Daniel T. S. Simanjuntak, Third Secretary (Political Affairs), member.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is represented by:

H.R.H. Ambassador Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, Head of the Delegation and Permanent

Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations, New York;

H.E. Mr. Mazen Armouti, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands;

Sir Arthur Watts, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Senior Legal Adviser to the Government of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; - 7 -

Mr. Guy Goodwin-Gill, Legal Adviser to the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan;

Mr. Bisher Al Khasawneh, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Mahmoud Al-Hmoud, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Samer Naber, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Ashraf Zeitoon, Political Adviser;

Ms Diana Madbak, Support Staff.

The Republic of Madagascar is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Alfred Rambeloson, Permanent Representative of Madagascar to the Office of the
United Nations at Geneva and to the Specialized Agencies, Head of Delegation;

Mr. Odon Prosper Rambatoson, Inspector, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Malaysia is represented by:

H.E. Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar, Foreign Minister of Malaysia, Head of Delegation;

Datin Seri Sharifah Aziah Syed Zainal Abidin, wife of the Minister for Foreign Affairs;

H.E. Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi Abdul Razak, Secretar y-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Malaysia;

H.E. Dato’ Rastam Mohd Isa, Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations;

H.E. Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, Ambassa dor of Malaysia to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands;

Mr. John Louis O’hara, Head, International Affairs Division, Attorney-General’s Chambers;

Professor Nico Schrijver, Professor of Interna tional Law, Free University, Amsterdam and
Institute of Social Studies, The Hague; Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration;

Professor Dr. Marcelo G. Kohen, Professor of In ternational Law, The Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva;

Mr. Ku Jaafar Ku Shaari, Undersecretary, OIC Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

Mr. Hasnudin Hamzah, Special Officer to the Foreign Minister;

Mr. Zulkifli Adnan, Counsellor, Embassy of Malaysia in the Netherlands;

Mr. Ikram Mohd. Ibrahim, Firs t Secretary, Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United

Nations;

Mr. Mohd. Normusni Mustapa Albakri, Federa l Counsel, International Affairs Division,
Attorney-General’s Chambers. - 8 -

The Republic of Senegal is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Saliou Cissé, Ambassador of the Republic of Senegal to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, Head of Delegation;

Mr. Cheikh Niang, Minister-Counsellor, Pe rmanent Mission of Senegal to the United

Nations;

Mr. Cheikh Tidiane Thiam, Director of Legal and Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.

The Republic of the Sudan is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Abuelgasim A. Idris, Ambassador of the Sudan to the Netherlands;

Mr. Ali Al Sadig, Deputy Head of Mission at the Embassy of the Sudan in the Netherlands.

The League of Arab States is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Amre Moussa, Secretary General of the League of Arab States;

Mr. Michael Bothe, Professor of Law, Head of the Legal Team;

Ms Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Professor of Law;

Mr. Yehia El Gamal, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Salah Amer, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Mohammed Gomaa, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Mohamed Redouane Benkhadra, Legal Adviser of the Secretary General, Head of the
Legal Department, League of Arab States.

The Organization of the Islamic Conference is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Abdelouahed Belkeziz, Secretary Ge neral of the Organization of the Islamic

Conference;

Ms Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, Professor of Public Law, University of
Paris VII-Denis Diderot, as Counsel;

Mr. Willy Jackson, chargØ de cours , University of ParisVII-DenisDiderot, as Assistant to
Counsel;

H.E. Mr. Babacar Ba, Ambassador, Permanent Ob server of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference to the Office of the United Nations at Geneva. - 9 -

La Palestine est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Nasser Al-Kidwa, ambassadeur, obser vateur permanent de la Palestine auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies;

M.Georges Abi-Saab, professeur de droit in ternational à l’Institut de hautes études

internationales, Genève, membre de l’Institut de droit international, conseil et avocat;

M.James Crawford, professeur de droit interna tional à l’Université de Cambridge (chaire
Whewell), conseil et avocat;

M.Vaughan Lowe, professeur de droit internat ional à l’Université d’Oxford (chaire
Chichele), conseil et avocat ;

M.Jean Salmon, professeur émérite de droit inte rnational à l’Université libre de Bruxelles,
membre de l’Institut de droit international, conseil et avocat;

M. Pieter Bekker, membre du barreau de New York, conseil principal;

M. Anis Kassim, membre du barreau du Royaume hachémite de Jordanie, conseil principal;

M. Raja Aziz Shehadeh, Barrister at Law à Ramallah, Palestine, conseil principal;

Mme Stephanie Koury, membre du groupe d’appui aux négociations, conseil;

M.Jarat Chopra, membre du groupe d’a ppui aux négociations, professeur de droit
international à la Brown University, conseil;

M. Rami Shehadeh, membre du groupe d’appui aux négociations, conseil;

S.Exc. M. Yousef Habbab, ambassadeur, dé légué général de la Palestine aux Pays-Bas,
conseiller;

M. Muin Shreim, conseiller à la mission perm anente d’observation de la Palestine auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies, conseiller;

Mme Feda Abdelhady Nasser, conseillère à la mission permanente d’observation de la
Palestine auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies;

M.Michael Tarazi, membre du groupe d’a ppui aux négociations, coordonnateur pour les

médias;

Mme Kylie Evans, Lauterpacht Research Cent re for International Law, Université de
Cambridge;

M. François Dubuisson, Centre de droit international de l’Université libre de Bruxelles;

M. Markus W. Gehring, Université de Yale;

M. Jafer Shadid, délégation de la Palestine aux Pays-Bas. - 10 -

La République sud-africaine est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Aziz Pahad, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères, chef de la délégation;

S. Exc. Mme P. Jana, ambassadeur de la République sud-africaine auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas;

S. Exc. M.D. S. Kumalo, représentant perman ent de la République sud-africaine auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies;

M. M.R.W. Madlanga, juge;

Mme J. G.S. de Wet, conseiller juridique en chef a.i. (droit international), ministère des
affaires étrangères;

M.A. Stemmet, conseiller juridique principa l (droit international), ministère des affaires
étrangères;

Mme T. Lujiza, conseiller juridique (droit international), ministère des affaires étrangères;

M. I. Mogotsi, directeur, direction du Moyen-Orient, ministère des affaires étrangères.

La République algérienne démocratique et populaire est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Noureddine Djoudi, ambassadeur d’Algérie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas;

M. Ahmed Laraba, professeur de droit international;

M. Mohamed Habchi, membre du conseil constitutionnel;

M. Abdelkader Cherbal, membre du conseil constitutionnel;

M. Merzak Bedjaoui, directeur des affaires juridiques au ministère des affaires étrangères.

Le Royaume d’Arabie saoudite est représenté par :

S.Exc. M. Fawzi A. Shubokshi, ambassad eur et représentant permanent du Royaume
d’Arabie saoudite auprès de l’Organisation d es NationsUnies à NewYork, chef de la
délégation;

M. Hazim Karakotly, ministre plénipotentiaire au ministère des affaires étrangères à Riyad;

M. Sameer Aggad, premier secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères à Riyad;

M. Saud Alshawaf, conseiller juridique;

M. Ziyad Alsudairi, conseiller juridique;

M. Muhammed Omar Al-Madani, professeur émér ite de droit international, conseiller
juridique;

M. Khaled Althubaiti, conseiller juridique;

M. David Colson, conseiller juridique;

M. Brian Vohrer, conseiller juridique adjoint. - 11 -

La République populaire du Bangladesh est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Liaquat Ali Choudhury, ambassadeur du Bangladesh auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas;

Mme Naureen Ahsan, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade du Bangladesh auprès du Royaume

des Pays-Bas.

Le Belize est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Bassam Freiha, ambassadeur délégué permanent du Belize auprès de l’Unesco;

M. Jean-Marc Sorel, professeur à l’Université de Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne) ;

Mme Mireille Cailbault.

La République de Cuba est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Abelardo Moreno Fernández, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères;

S.Exc. M. Elio Rodríguez Perdomo, ambassad eur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire auprès

du Royaume des Pays-Bas;

M. Enrique Prieto López, ministre conseiller à l’ambassade de Cuba aux Pays-Bas;

Mme Soraya E. Alvarez Núñez, fonctionnaire à la direction des affaires multilatérales du
ministère des affaires étrangères.

La République d’Indonésie est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Mohammad Jusuf, ambassadeu r de la République d’Indonésie auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas, chef de la délégation;

Mme Nuni Turnijati Djoko, ministre, chef de mission adjoint, délégué;

M. Mulya Wirana, conseiller (affaires politiques), délégué;

Le colonel A. Subandi, attaché de défense, délégué;

Mme Kusuma N. Lubis, conseiller (affaires de presse), délégué;

M. Sulaiman Syarif, premier secrétaire (affaires politiques), délégué;

M. Daniel T. S. Simanjuntak, troisième secrétaire (affaires politiques), délégué.

Le Royaume hachémite de Jordanie est représenté par :

S. A. R. Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, ambassadeur, chef de la délégation, représentant

permanent du Royaume hachémite de Jo rdanie auprès de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies;

S. Exc. M. Mazen Armouti, ambassadeur du Royaume hachémite de Jordanie aux du

Royaume des Pays-Bas;

Sir Arthur Watts, K.C.M.G., Q.C., conse iller juridique principal du Gouvernement du
Royaume hachémite de Jordanie; - 12 -

M.Guy Goodwin-Gill, conseiller juridique du Gouvernement du Royaume hachémite de
Jordanie;

M. Bisher Al Khasawneh, conseiller juridique;

M. Mahmoud Al-Hmoud, conseiller juridique;

M. Samer Naber, conseiller juridique;

M. Ashraf Zeitoon, conseiller politique;

Mme Diana Madbak, personnel administratif.

La République de Madagascar est représentée par :

S.Exc. M. Alfred Rambeloson, représentant permanent de Madagascar auprès de l’Office
des Nations Unies et des institutions spécialisées à Genève, chef de délégation;

M. Odon Prosper Rambatoson, inspecteur au ministère des affaires étrangères.

La Malaisie est représentée par :

S. Exc. Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar, ministre des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie, chef
de la délégation;

Mme Datin Seri Sharifah Aziah Syed Zainal Abidin, épouse du ministre des affaires
étrangères;

S. Exc. Tan sri Ahmad Fuzi Abdul Razak, se crétaire général du ministère des affaires

étrangères;

S. Exc. Dato’ Rastam Mohd. Isa, représentant permanent de la Malaisie auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies;

S. Exc.Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, ambassadeur de la Malaisie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas;

M. John Louis O’hara, directeur de la divi sion des affaires internationales, bureau de
l’Attorney-General;

M. Nico Schrijver, professeur de droit international à l’Université libre d’Amsterdam et à
l’Institut d’études sociales de La Haye, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage;

M. Marcelo G.Kohen, professeur de droit inte rnational à l’Institut universitaire de hautes

études internationales, Genève;

M. Ku Jaafar Ku Shaari, sous-secrétaire à la division de l’Organisation de la Conférence
islamique, ministère des affaires étrangères;

M. Hasnudin Hamzah, conseiller spécial auprès du ministre des affaires étrangères;

M. Zulkifli Adnan, conseiller de l’ambassade de la Malaisie aux Pays-Bas;

M. Ikram Mohd. Ibrahim, premier secrétaire de la mission permanente de la Malaisie auprès
de l’Organisation des Nations Unies; - 13 -

M.Mohd. Normusni Mustapa Albakri, conseil (Federal Counsel) , division des affaires
internationales, bureau de l’Attorney-General.

La République du Sénégal est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Saliou Cissé, ambassadeur du Sénégal aux Pays-Bas, chef de la délégation ;

M.Cheikh Niang, ministre-conseiller à la mission permanente du Sénégal auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies;

M.Cheikh Tidiane Thiam, directeur des affaires juridiques et consulaires au ministère des
affaires étrangères.

La République du Soudan est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Abuelgasim A. Idris, ambassadeur du Soudan aux Pays-Bas ;

M. Ali Al Sadig, chef de mission adjoint à l’ambassade du Soudan aux Pays-Bas.

La Ligue des Etats arabes est représentée par :

S.Exc. M. Amre Moussa, Secrétaire général de la Ligue des Etats arabes;

M. Michael Bothe, professeur de droit, chef de l’équipe juridique;

Mme Vera Gowlland-Debbas, professeur de droit;

M. Yehia El Gamal, conseiller juridique;

M. Salah Amer, conseiller juridique;

M. Mohammed Gomaa, conseiller juridique;

M. Mohamed Redouane Benkhadra, conseiller juridique du Secrétaire général, chef du
département des affaires juridiques de la Ligue des Etats arabes.

L’Organisation de la Conférence islamique est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Abdelouahed Belkeziz, Secrétaire général de l’Organisation de la Conférence
islamique;

Mme Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, professeur de droit public à l’Université
Paris VII - Denis Diderot, conseil;

M. Willy Jackson, chargé de cours à l’Univer sité Paris VII – Denis Diderot, assistant du
conseil;

S. Exc. M. Babacar Ba, ambassadeur, obser vateur permanent de l’Organisation de la

Conférence islamique auprès de l’Office des Nations Unies à Genève. - 14 -

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open.

The Court meets this morning to hear the following participants on the question submitted to

the Court: Belize, Cuba, Indonesia and Jordan.

Thus, I shall now give the floor to Professor Jean-Marc Sorel who will speak for Belize.

M. SOREL: Monsieur le président, Madame, Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, c’est un

grand honneur pour moi de me présenter de nouveau devant votre juridiction. Plus d’une décennie

après l’affaire qui avait opposé le Tchad et la Li bye et, c’est également un grand honneur pour moi

de présenter les observations orales du Belize qui inte rvient pour la première fois devant votre

Cour.

1. Tout d’abord il faut saluer la célérité av ec laquelle la Cour a organisé la procédure de

1
manière à permettre que l’avis sur cette question soit rendu effectivement rapidement . Ceci

prouve à quel point la haute juridiction peut  et doit  être sollicitée pour répondre aux grandes

interrogations juridiques qui apparaissent dans notre monde contemporain. C’est la première fois

qu’une juridiction internationale  la plus ancienne et la plus prestigieuse d’entre-elles  peut se

prononcer sur les aspects juridiques de ce différend qui dure depuis plus d’un demi-siècle et qui a

entraîné, de part et d’autre, d’innombrables sou ffrances. On mesure ainsi l’importance du moment

que nous vivons actuellement.

2. Et c’est la raison pour laquelle le Gouvernement du Belize a souhaité s’exprimer lors de ce

débat et remercie la Cour de l’honneur qui lui est fait d’apporter sa modeste contribution à cette

importante question. Sa volonté de s’exprimer est motivée à la fois par sa position en faveur d’un

règlement pacifique du différend, et également par sa sensibilité multiethnique qui en fait un Etat

au carrefour de plusieurs civilisations.

3. Le Belize a voté en faveur de la résolu tion du 8 décembre 2003 car il est persuadé que la

Cour peut apporter et peut contribuer positivem ent à l’instauration d’un dialogue fructueux entre

1Notamment par l’ordonnance du 19 décembre 2003 qui organi se promptement la procédure, ainsi que par ses
sages décisions de laisser la Palestine, mais aussi la Ligue des Etats arabes et l’Organisation de la Conférence islamique,
présenter des exposés écrits et oraux. Le dossier réunissant les textes pertinents en vertu de l’article 65, paragraphe 2, du
Statut de la Cour, disponible dès le 19 ja nvier 2004, permet également de saluer la précieuse aide aux Etats apportée par
la Cour. - 15 -

les protagonistes de ce conflit par une réponse éclairée et impartiale à la question qui lui est posée.

Et il adhère pleinement à l’affirmation contenue dans le préambule de la résolution selon laquelle :

«Il est nécessaire de mettre fin au conf lit sur la base d’une solution permettant
aux deux Etats, Israël et la Palestine, de vivr e côte à côte dans la paix et la sécurité et
dans le respect de la li gne d’armistice de1949, conformément aux résolutions

pertinentes du Conseil de sécurité et de l’Assemblée générale.»

Il lui apparaît, en l’espèce, qu’il faut mettre fi n à l’ignoble terrorisme qui sévit en Israël, reconnaît

que cet Etat est en droit de prendre des mesures pour sa sécurité , mais que la construction du mur 3

est une mauvaise réponse, aussi bien politique que juridique, dans l’objectif de parvenir à une

pacification réelle du conflit.

4. Le Belize n’ayant pas déposé d’exposé écr it sur cette demande d’avis consultatif, il

reprendra ici quelques arguments généraux sur la qu estion posée à la lumière de ce qui lui apparaît

pertinent puisqu’il s’agit pour lui de la seule occasion de s’exprimer.

5. Au préalable, le Belize souhaite faire remar quer qu’il appartiendra à la Cour d’envisager

d’une manière sereine les différents arguments juridiques nécessaires pour répondre à la question

posée en dehors de la passion que suscite cette affaire. Et c’est justement parce que la Cour est, par

excellence et par sa fonction, l’organe capable d’une telle dissociation que le Belize souhaite

présenter les arguments juridiques qui lui semblent pertinents. Pour ce faire, il évoquera

essentiellement trois points. Le premier point concerne des questions préalables à la réponse que la

Cour devra donner, question qui porte sur des aspects de procédure (compétence et recevabilité) ou

sur un aspect substantiel qui est le statut du territoire (I). Ensuite le Belize envisagera le cŒur de la

question, à savoir les conséquences en droit de la construction du mur (II). Et enfin très

brièvement, il s’agira d’envisager les conséquences de la reconnaissance de ce que le Belize pense

être une illicéité dans cette construction du mur, conséquences qui se situent en aval de la question

posée (III).

2 Comme cela a été reconnu par la Palestine dans sa position mentionnée dans l’annexe 2 au rapport du Secrétaire
général établi en application de la résolution ES-190/13 de l’Assemblée générale, A/ES-10/248.

3 Nous utilisons ici le mot «mur» retenu par l’Assemblé générale sans ignorer (cf. infra) que des expressions  à
forte valeur symbolique  sont utilisées pour qualifier cette constrution dénommée «Clôture de défense (ou de
sécurité)», puis «Barrière de défense» par Israël. - 16 -

I. LES QUESTIONS PRÉALABLES À LA RÉPONSE DE LA C OUR

6. Monsieur le président, Madame, Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, voyons tout d’abord

les questions préalables à la réponse de la Cour. Et la première question qui se pose, c’est la

question de la compétence de la Cour et de la recevabilité de la demande.

A. Les questions procédurales préalables : la compétence de la Cour
et la recevabilité de la question posée

1. La Cour est compétente

7. Pour le Belize, il ne fait pas de doute que la Cour est compétente.

8. Du point de vue procédural, la demande d’avis provient bien de l’Assemblée générale et il

ne peut être question de s’appesantir sur le vote de la résolution du 8 décembre 2003, celle-ci ayant

bien recueilli la majorité nécessaire. De plus la question posée entre directement dans le champ des

préoccupations de l’Assemblée générale telle s qu’énoncées à l’article11 de la Charte des

Nations Unies. Au surplus, la restriction de l’article 12 concernant les situations dont le Conseil de

sécurité se serait saisi ne peut faire écran puisque si le Conseil s’est bien prononcé sur plusieurs

aspects de ce différend, il n’a en revanche pris aucune décision sur la question du mur. Comme

chacun le sait, le projet de résolution sur cette question n’ayant pas abouti. Il en résulte que comme

pour toute résolution de l’Assemblée générale, il pèse bien une présomption de validité sur celle du

8 décembre 2003.

4
9. Israël a pourtant dénié cette compétence de la Cour dans son exposé écrit , dont l’essentiel

est consacré à cette question, parce que cette requête serait ultra vires et parce qu’elle émanerait

5
d’une résolution adoptée lors d’une session extraordinaire d’urgence . Or, ni la Charte des

Nations Unies, ni le Statut de la Cour, n’opère de distinction entre les résolutions adoptées dans ce

cadre et celles adoptées lors de sessions ordinaires. Il n’y a donc pas lieu de considérer qu’une

demande d’avis sur la base d’une recommandati on adoptée lors d’une session extraordinaire

rendrait la Cour incompétente.

10. D’autre part, l’article 96 de la Charte des Nations Unies indiquant que la Cour peut

répondre à «toute question juridique», il revient na turellement à celle-ci de s’interroger sur la

nature juridique de la question posée.

4
Voir l’exposé écrit déposé par Israël, p. 55 et suiv.
5Sessions prévues par l’article 20 de la Charte «lorsque les circonstances l’exigent». - 17 -

11. Le seul énoncé de la question posée ne lai sse guère de doutes sur la nature juridique de

celle-ci puisqu’il est demandé à la Cour un avis sur les conséquences «en droit» de l’édification du

mur, et ceci «compte tenu des règles et principes du droit international, notamment de la quatrième

convention de Genève, et les résolutions consacrées à la question par le Conseil de sécurité et

l’Assemblée générale». Non seule ment la base de la question est juridique, mais les instruments

proposés pour y répondre sont incontestablement juridiques.

12. La Cour sera donc amenée à le constater en la présente espèce, comme elle l’a toujours

fait en dégageant les aspects juridiques d’un e situation qui apparaît aujourd’hui comme

globalement politique. Elle a eu l’occasion de le rappeler d’ailleurs avec force dans son avis

de1996 où elle citait sa propre jurisprudence: «En fait, lorsque des c onsidérations politiques

jouent un rôle marquant il peut être particulière ment nécessaire à une organisation internationale

d’obtenir un avis consultatif de la Cour sur l es principes juridiques applicables à la matière en

6
discussion…» Nul ne contestera que la présente situation mérite cet éclaircissement.

13. De plus, du point de vue général, imaginer que l’on puisse isoler les aspects juridiques de

leurs soubassements politiques est illusoire. Le droit est bien le reflet de la politique et son rôle de

régulateur social l’ancre dans une réalité qui est à la fois politique, économique et sociale sans

laquelle il ne serait rien. C’est donc en toute logique que la Cour isole et doit isoler en l’espèce les

aspects juridiques d’un contexte plus large. Pour Belize, la Cour apparaît totalement compétente.

2. La demande d’avis est recevable

14. Au surplus, cette demande d’avis nous a pparaît recevable. En effet, nous savons que

l’article 65 du Statut de la Cour permet à celle-c i de conserver sa liberté de répondre ou non à une

question même définie comme juridique par elle. Autrement dit, de la juger recevable ou non une

fois établie sa compétence. Or, tout dans sa ju risprudence en matière d’avis consultatif demandé

par l’Assemblée générale indique qu’elle ne peut rejeter cette demande d’avis que sur une base

objective relevant soit d’une demande incorrect ement parvenue, soit d’une demande qui ne

concernerait pas une question juridique. Une fois de plus, il faut nous fier à l’avis de 1996 qui sur

la base d’une abondante jurisprudence précise: «en pr incipe, l’avis ne devrait pas être refusé», et

6Avis de 1980 sur l’ InterprØtation de l’accord du 25 mars 1951 entre l’OMS et l’Egypte , C.I.J. Recueil 1980,
p. 87, par. 33, cité dans l’avis de 1996, C.I.J. Recueil 1996, p. 234, par. 13. - 18 -

qui indique également: «Aucun refus, fondé sur le pouvoir discrétionnaire de la Cour, de donner

suite à une demande d’avis consultatif n’a été en registré dans l’histoire de la présente Cour.» 7 Au

surplus, la question aujourd’hui posée est très préci se, ce qui renforce l’idée «qu’il n’existe aucune

«raison décisive» pour qu’elle use de son pouvoir discrétionnair e de ne pas donner cet avis» 8. Il

apparaît donc que cette demande est recevable et que la Cour est bien compétente.

B. La question substantielle préalable : le statut du territoire
sur lequel se trouve le mur en construction

15. En effet, la question posée par l’Assemblée générale semble laisser dans l’ombre celle de

la construction du mur lui-même sa licéité au regard du droit international  puisqu’il s’agit

seulement de déterminer les conséquences de sa construction. Mais les conséquences juridiques

dépendent de la licéité de sa c onstruction en liaison avec l’emplac ement où se trouve ce mur. Il

suffit d’imaginer que ce mur est construit entière ment sur le territoire reconnu à Israël. Cette

construction serait probablement tout aussi criti quable politiquement, mais ne souffrirait pas de

contestations juridiques en vertu de la souveraineté territoriale. Donc, si la construction même du

mur est une question d’opportunité, son emplacement et son tracé méritent d’être étudiés. Cette

question préliminaire semble au Belize incontournable.

16. Or, la construction de ce mur se situe presque entièrement sur le Territoire palestinien dit

«occupé», c’est-à-dire à l’intérieur de la ligne définie de facto par les armistices du 3avril1949

(autrement dit ce qui est qualifié de «Ligne verte») 9. Il n’appartient pas à la Cour de définir la

nature de cette «Ligne verte», autrement dit d’en définir le caractère frontalier on non, puisque

cette question ne lui est pas posée. En revanche, il lui appartient de constater que de larges portions

de ce mur se trouvent à l’intérieur d’un territoire dit «occupé», ce qui implique un régime juridique

spécifique d’occupation et surtout l’affirmation, à rebours, que ce mur ne peut constituer une

frontière.

7
Avis de 1996, C.I.J. Recueil 1996, p. 235, par. 14.
8Ibid, p. 238, par. 19.

9Sur la tracé précis du mur, voir le rapport du Secrétaire général annexé à la résolution ES-10/14 précité, ou les
explications détaillées données dans l’exposé écrit de la Palestine (app. 2 et 3), et dans celui de la Jordanie (notamment la
carte à la suite de la page 25). - 19 -

17. Quelle que soit la teneur juridique de ce statut, nul ne conteste désormais que le territoire

palestinien fait l’objet d’une occupation militair e au sens du droit de la guerre et du droit

humanitaire.

18. Israël, après avoir pendant longtemps te nté d’échapper à cette qualification, ne semble

plus nier qu’une telle qualification lui soit opposable . Néanmoins, de l’avis du Belize, une telle

qualification d’une manière préalable mérite d’être confirmée par la Cour. Et si le statut

d’occupation militaire implique des droits et obliga tions spécifiques, Israël paraît filtrer ces droits

et ces obligations applicables au territoire pa lestinien en décalage avec le droit général  de la

guerre ou humanitaire  qui est applicable en la matière. De plus, d’une manière qui n’est pas

précisée, Israël, dans le même résumé de sa position estime: «Le statut légal du Territoire

10
palestinien occupé demeure contesté.» Cette affirmation est ambiguë mais se réfère

probablement à la situation légale du territoire en dehors de son occupation supposée temporaire,

autrement dit lorsque ce statut d’occupation aura pris fin.

19. Il n’empêche que la Cour serait avisée de définir précisément le statut du territoire sur

lequel ce mur se construit, de manière à pouvoir pleinement répondre à la question exacte qui lui

est posée à savoir les conséquences en droit de la construction de ce mur au regard du statut du

territoire sur lequel il se trouve. C’est le deuxi ème point que je souhaite rais aborder. Nous

sommes là donc au cŒur de la question.

II. LES CONSÉQUENCES EN DROIT DE LA CONSTRUCTION D UN MUR AU REGARD
DU STATUT DU TERRITOIRE SUR LEQUEL IL SE TROUVE

20. Ce mur, dont la construction a été décidée, Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs

de la Cour, en avril 2002, a débuté en juin et qui devrait, nous ne l’espérons pas, s’achever en 2005,

11
s’étendrait sur une longueur qui varie selon les estimations de 720 à 788 kilomètres . Peu importe

les détails de ce mur, dont vous trouverez bien sûr tous les éléments dans les nombreux écrits, mais

il provoque ce que l’on peut qualifier comme un processus de ghettoïsation par l’enfermement

10Ibid. Voir aussi l’exposé écrit d’Israël, p. 11, par. 2.9.

11Voir néanmoins l’estimation très précise de l’exposé écrit de la Palestine (p. 107-109) pour les secteurs prévus.
Voir également les appendices 2 et 3 avec des exemples précis de conséquences de cette construction dans certaines
zones, ainsi que le détail, jour par jour, de sa construction. - 20 -

d’une population à l’intérieur d’un périmètre défini do nt les conditions de sortie sont draconiennes.

Au sens général, il s’agit d’une forme de «recul de l’histoire» vers ses heures les plus sombres.

21. L’expression même de «mur» est contestée par Israël qui le qualifie de «clôture» ou de

12
«barrière» . De l’avis du Belize, cette distinction ne semble pas pertinente. Qu’il s’agisse d’une

construction en béton prenant la forme d’un véritable mur, ou de rangées de barbelés, tels que ceux

qui ont été récemment déplacés, les effets restent similaires quelles que soient les appellations

utilisées.

22. A partir de ce préalable, il nous semble que la Cour pourrait établir troisconstats

successifs concernant les conséquences en droit de la construction de ce mur. Tout d’abord, il

existe un statut d’occupation militaire qui est détour né et bafoué. Ensuite il existe clairement une

violation du droit humanitaire et des normes fondamentales en matière de protection des droits de

l’homme. Et enfin, il nous semble qu’aucune ci rconstance ne peut justifier l’illicéité de cette

situation, donc on ne peut exclure cette illicéité.

A. Un statut d’occupation militaire détourné et bafoué

23. A titre préliminaire, il n’est peut-être pas i nutile de rappeler que le statut d’occupation

militaire d’un territoire fut envisagé lors de son établissement comme temporaire. Or, l’occupation

du territoire palestinien dure depuis1967, soit une période qui dépasse largement tous les «délais

raisonnables» envisageables, mais qui surtout pe rmet de lire différemment les textes qui s’y

rapportent.

24. La question posée à la Cour lui laisse t oute latitude dans son raisonnement pour inclure

toutes les normes ou les instruments généraux du droit international, ainsi que les accords

particuliers 13. Les conséquences de l’édification du mur nous convient donc à une relecture des

bases du droit international.

12Voir l’exposé écrit d’Israël qui distingue au sein de cette «barrier», les portions qualifiées de «wall» et d’autres
de «fence», p. 11, par. 2.8.

13Comme l’accord de Taba du 28 septembre 1995 ou la «feuille de route» établie par le Quatuor constitué par des
représentants de l’ONU, de l’Union europé enne, de la Fédération de Russie et des Etats-Unis, présentée en avril 2003 et
approuvée par la résolution du Conseil de sécurité 1515 du 1novembre 2003 qui impose la «normalisation» de la vie
des Palestiniens, le respect des normes humanitaires ou legel des implantations de col onies. La liste des accords
depuis 1993 entre Israël et l’OLP ou la Palestine peut être consultée dans l’exposé écrit de la Palestine, p. 169-170. - 21 -

25. Or, les conséquences de l’édification de ce mur en rapport avec le statut d’occupation

militaire nous imposent de constate r que la spoliation des terres ainsi que d’autres actions qui se

situent donc à la suite de la construction de ce mur sont contraires au principe de l’interdiction de

l’acquisition de territoires par la force au droit à l’autodétermin ation des Palestiniens, dont la

souveraineté permanente sur les ressources naturelle s est reniée, que ce mur au surplus induit une

opération de facto d’annexion, quand ce n’est pas une opération juridiquement reconnue

d’annexion et bafoue la souveraineté territorial e d’un peuple qui est appelé à devenir un Etat.

Autant de conséquences contraires au statut d’ occupation militaire. Et comme le rappelait le

rapporteur spécial de la Commission des droits de l’homme, M.JohnDugard : «L’affirmation du

Gouvernement israélien selon laque lle le mur représente uniquement une mesure de sécurité ne

visant aucunement à modifier les frontières politiq ues n’est tout simplement pas étayée par les

faits.»14

26. Alors que le Gouvernement israélien soutient, contre toute évidence, que le mur n’est pas

15
une frontière et qu’il s’agit d’une s ituation temporaire et «amovible» , il serait pour le moins

nécessaire que la Cour objecte pour l’avenir que ces déclarations pour le moment sans

fondements  constituent autant d’engagements unilatéraux au regard desquels Israël ne pourra se

dédire. La Cour a parfaitement su opposer à la France ses propres engagements, et leur donner une

force juridique, dans les affaires des Essais nuclØaires qui l’opposait à la Nouvelle-Zélande et à

l’Australie en 1973-1974 16. Rien n’empêche la Cour d’adopter une attitude comparable.

27. Néanmoins, les affirmations du Gouve rnement israélien concernant l’absence de

frontières ne règlent pas la question de l’annexion  cette fois-ci juridiquement confirmée dans le

17
droit interne israélien  de Jérusalem-Est, ou celle de la colonisation qui s’avère inadmissible, y

compris dans le cadre de l’annexion. La questi on posée à la Cour isole d’ailleurs les conséquences

du mur à Jérusalem-Est, ce qui permet de pointer une sorte de contradiction dans l’argumentaire du

14
E/CN.4/2004/6, p. 6-9.
15Voir le rapport du Secrétaire général annexé à la résolution ES-10/14, par. 29.

16C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 253 et 457.
17
C’est la loi israélienne du 30 juillet 1980 qui fait de Jérusalem la capitale de l’Etat d’Israël, loi contre laquelle a
réagi la résolution 478 (1980) du 20 août 1980 du Conseil de sécur ité qui reconnaît une violation du droit international et
affirme que cette annexion n’entrave pas l’ application de la quatrième convention de Genève, ainsi que dans le reste des
territoires occupés. - 22 -

Gouvernement israélien. En effet, le mur, même s’il ne constitue pas une «frontière», est conforme

à la vision par Israël de sa future limite avec la Palestine, et particulièrement à Jérusalem-Est où

coïncide l’acte d’annexion et ce que l’on peut qua lifier, pour la circonstance, de «mur-frontière».

Cette situation crée une présomption qu’il est diffic ile d’ignorer pour le reste de la délimitation,

tout en sachant qu’Israël ne pourrait selon ses propr es affirmations revendiquer une «frontière»

constituée par le mur à Jérusalem-Est, tout en c onfirmant également son acte d’annexion dont la

limite passe par ce mur. Voilà une équation bien difficile à résoudre.

28. Il faut ajouter que ces actes se doublent de l’inadmissible colonisation des territoires

occupés contraire aux conventions de Genève et désormais sanctionnée comme crime de guerre par

18
le statut de la Cour pénale internationale . Pour reprendre l’article 49 de la quatrième convention

de Genève: «La puissance occupante ne pourra pr océder à la déportation ou au transfert d’une

partie de sa propre population civile dans le territoire occupé par el le.» Or, la construction du mur

isole clairement certaines colonies à l’extérieur de ce mur, de manière à les protéger.

29. De même, même si nous ne pouvons guère nous y appesantir longuement, la construction

du mur entraîne l’impossibilité pour le peuple pa lestinien d’exercer correctement son droit à

l’autodétermination. Soumis à une modificati on de sa population, privé de sa souveraineté sur ses

ressources naturelles, amputé d’une partie de son territoire, cette construction très clairement,

renforce l’isolement et les amputations diverses qui créent autant d’entraves à l’expression du

peuple palestinien à sa libre détermination.

30. Voilà donc autant de violations de normes juridiques que la construction du mur renforce

ou révèle, et qui peuvent être qualifiées de viola tions de normes particulièrement obligatoires pour

la communauté internationale, autrement dit de normes impØratives au sens de la convention de

Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des traités. Pour le moins, il est indéniable, comme la Cour l’a reconnu

pour le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes dans l’affaire du Timor oriental, qu’il s’agit de la

violation de droits opposables erga omnes.

18Qui vise à son article 8, viii) : «Le transfert, direct ou indirect, par une puissance o ccupante d’une partie de sa
population civile, dans le territoire qu’ elle occupe, ou la déportation ou le tr ansfert à l’intérieur ou hors du territoire
occupé de la totalité ou d’une partie de la population de territoire.» C’est sans doute de cette manière qu’il faut
comprendre l’affirmation de la Palestine dans le résumde ses positions selon laquelle les actions consécutives à la
construction du mur «engagent la respons abilité pénale du Gouvernement israélie n» (annexe 2 du rapport du Secrétaire
général, A/ES-10/248) puisqu’il ne peut être question de responsabilité de l’Etat lui-même mais simplement de ses
dirigeants. - 23 -

31. Très clairement, Israël, par la construction de ce mur, renforce la confusion maintes fois

constatée entre «l’occupation militaire» qui impose le respect de droits stricts en faveur des

populations, et les «actions militaires» qui constituent autant de justifications à des actions qui sont

théoriquement ponctuelles et exceptionnelles et qui permettraient des dérogations au droit commun

de l’occupation militaire. Israël se prévaut expressément de l’article 23 g) du règlement de

LaHaye de1907 qui interdit de détrui re ou de saisir des propriétés ennemies, «sauf» —et c’est

cette partie qui semble intéresser le Gouvernement israélien— «sauf dans le cas oø ces saisies

seraient impØrieusement commandØes par les nØcessitØs de la guerre». Simplement l’exceptionnel

 les nécessités de la guerre  devient la norme et la construc tion du mur en est une illustration.

Ce statut d’occupation militaire est donc très largement bafoué.

B. La violation du droit humanitaire et des normes de protection en matière
de droits de l’homme consécutive à la construction du mur

32. L’absence d’application du droit humanitaire et des normes fondamentales en matière de

protection des droits de l’homme n’est pas apparue avec la construction de ce mur. Cette situation

préjudiciable au peuple palestinien est une cons tante depuis l’occupation des territoires en1967.

Néanmoins, la construction du mur a clairement amplifié ce constat au point que les violations sont

devenues flagrantes et généralisées.

33. Concernant l’applicabilité du droit humanita ire et des droits de l’homme, il faut rappeler

que, dans son argumentaire, le Gouvernement is raélien estime que la qua trième convention de

19
Genève de 1949 n’est pas applicable en raison de sa non-incorporation dans son droit interne . Cet

argument n’est pas recevable pour plusieurs raisons. D’une part, la législation interne israélienne

ne constitue qu’un simple fait au regard du droit international qui n’empêche pas, comme chacun le
20
sait, la qualification d’une situa tion comme internationalement illicite . D’autre part, le droit

humanitaire tel que consigné dans les conventions de Genève a acquis un caractère largement

coutumier comme la Cour l’a elle-même affirmé à la fois dans ses arrêts et dans ses avis

consultatifs, et notamment une fois de plus da ns celui de 1996 où elle considère que ce droit

19Voir le résumé de la position du Gouvernement is raélien annexé au rapport du Secrétaire général

(A-ES/10/248). Argument également avancé pour le règlement de la convention de La Haye dont Israël utilise, non sans
un certain cynisme, l’article 23 g) qu’il estime applicable pour justifier la saisie de propriétés.
20Position admise depuis longtemps par la jurisprudence et qui trouve un écho dans l’article 3 du projet d’articles
de la CDI sur la responsabilité des Etats annexé à la résolution 56/83 de l’Assemblée générale du 12 décembre 2001. - 24 -

s’impose à tous les Etats, qu’ils aient ratifié ou non les instruments, parce qu’il reflète «des

21
principes intransgressibles du droit international coutumier» . Il n’est guère douteux que la Cour

soit ici amenée à réitérer cette affirmation. Il en résulte que ce droit est applicable, qu’il ait été

incorporé ou non dans le droit interne israélien, et indépendamment du caractère pour le moment

nonétatique de l’entité palestinienne. Peu im porte donc que la Palestine ne puisse arguer du

caractère étatique puisqu’il s’ag it d’un droit où le principe de r éciprocité est inopérant et dont

l’applicabilité est universelle indépendamment du statut du territoire.

34. Cet aspect permet d’ailleurs de balayer la suite de l’objection israélienne concernant

l’absence de souveraineté de la Palestine avant son annexion par l’Egypte et la Jordanie, qui

empêcherait cette entité d’être partie aux conventions de Genève. Ajoutons au surplus que la Cour

suprême israélienne, dans une ju risprudence récente, reconnaît elle-même l’applicabilité du droit
22
humanitaire, et notamment de la quatrième convention de Genève .

35. Israël est donc bien lié par les instrument s généraux du droit humanitaire, et notamment

par la quatrième convention de Genève dont on rappellera l’article 53 :

«Il est interdit à la puissance occupant e de détruire des biens mobiliers ou
immobiliers, appartenant individuellement ou collectivement à des personnes privées,
à l’Etat ou à des collectivités publiques, à des organisations sociales ou coopératives,

sauf dans les cas où ces destructions seraient rendues absolument nécessaires par les
opérations militaires.»

On constate que cet article53 fait le pendant de l’article23 du règlement de LaHaye. Si ce droit

est applicable, il est néanmoins consta mment violé. La construction du mur sans qu’il soit

nécessaire de rappeler de nombreux détails que la Cour a par ailleurs déjà connus  entraîne des

conséquences humanitaires et en matière des droits de l’homme très importantes: implications

économiques (spoliation des terres, séparation du lieu de travail et du lieu d’habitation),

23
conséquences sociales (séparation des familles, contrôle pour l’accès au mur ), conséquences pour

l’accès à l’eau, conséquences en matière d’éducat ion (école située de l’autre côté du mur),

21Avis du 8 juillet 1996: LicØitØ de la menace ou de l’emploi d’armes nuclØaires, C.I.J. Recueil 1996, p.257,

par.79. Voir aussi dans ce sensl’arrêt du 27 juin 1986:ActivitØs militaires et param ilitaires au Nicaragua et contre
celui-ci, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 113, par. 218.
22Jugement du 3 septembre 2002 : HCJ 7015/02 et 7019/02, Ajuri v. IDF Commander, 2002 – IsLR.

23Le dernier paragraphe de la position du Gouvernemen t israélien annexée au rapport du Secrétaire général
(A/ES-10/248) est à cet égard éloquent puis qu’il explique la manière dont les perm is de passage seront octroyés en
fonction des professions (par exemple, un cultivateur d’olives verra son permis limité aux «besoins saisonniers»), le tout
sous réserve de la «situation sécuritaire» dont on sait que l’appréciation tient parfois de l’arbitraire. - 25 -

conséquences en matière sanitaire (accès aux soins rendu difficile, voire impossible), conséquences

culturelles (la destruction de que lques sites archéologiques) ou même environnementales (puisque

le mur défigure une région qui est déjà confinée et entraîne la suppression de terres agricoles et de

forêts). Ces violations sont autant de viola tions flagrantes, répétées et inadmissibles de la

quatrième convention de Genève qui se situent même au-delà de ce qu’il paraît utile de rappeler à

travers les conventions tant il s’agit de considérations élémentaires d’humanité.

36. Néanmoins, Israël semble quelque peu se contredire concernant la question du droit

humanitaire. En effet, pour objecter à l’applicati on des normes en matière de protection des droits

de l’homme, le Gouvernement israélien a affirmé da ns son argumentaire : «le droit humanitaire est

le type de protection qui convient dans un conflit tel qu’il existe en Cisjordanie et dans la bande de

Gaza, tandis que les instruments relatifs aux droits de l’homme ont pour objet d’assurer la
24
protection des citoyens vis-à-vis de leur propre gouvernement en temps de paix» . Ceci signifie

que le droit humanitaire selon le Gouvernement is raélien peut s’appliquer puisqu’il objecte que les

normes en matière de droits de l’homme ne peuvent pas l’être mais que le droit humanitaire peut

l’être.

37. Concernant les normes en matière de droits de l’homme, il faut rappeler qu’Israël a signé

et ratifié, le 3 octobre 1991, les deux pactes interna tionaux relatifs aux droits civils et politiques, et

aux droits économiques et sociaux de 1966. Rappe lons brièvement que l’article 2 du pacte relatif

aux droits civils et politiques impose que l’Etat garantisse les droits à tous les individus «relevant

de leur compétence», ce qui apparaît bien être la situation des territoires occupés. Le fait que le

Gouvernement israélien ait souhaité bénéficier de la dérogation au titre de l’article 9 sur la question

du droit à la liberté et à la sécurité des personnes ne paraît pas de nature à modifier les obligations

fondamentales d’Israël, telles que rappelées d’ailleurs par l’article 4, paragraphe 1, du pacte relatif

aux droits civils et politiques 25.

24Ibid, position du Gouvernement israélien annexée au rapport du Secrétaire général, A/ES-10/248.
25
Rappelons que l’article 12 de ce pact e protège la liberté de circulati on des personnes qui paraît tout à fait
illusoire en l’espèce, et que cette liberté avait été rappelée par l’Assemblée générale (résolution56/111 du
14 décembre 2001) alors que les limitations étaient moins préoccupantes que dans la situation créée par la construction du
mur. Rappelons également que cette liberté est théoriquement protégée  ou, pour le moins, permise  par les accord
particuliers comme celui du 28 septembre 1995. - 26 -

38. Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, il est clair que le droit

humanitaire et la protection en matière de dr oits de l’homme doivent être envisagés comme

aboutissant à un même ensemble factuel dans la situ ation particulière des territoires occupés. La

division entre ces deux branches parfois possible me paraît ici inopérante.

C. L’impossible acceptation de circonstances qui permettraient d’exclure l’illicéité

39. En effet, nous l’avons constaté, que ce so it à travers l’article23g) du règlement de

La Haye de 1907, ou 53 de la quatrième conventi on de Genève de 1949, le Gouvernement israélien

utilise systématiquement les clauses dérogatoires pou r justifier de la non-a pplication de la norme

générale. Il convient donc de démontrer que l es circonstances invoquées par Israël lors de la

construction de ce mur ne sont pas recevables, et qu’elles ne peuvent justifier des entraves

manifestement disproportionnées aux mesures de défense nécessaires.

40. Rappelons que le mur lui-même est considéré comme une mesure défensive

exceptionnelle qui répondrait à une situation «temporaire», autrement dit à une action militaire ou à

une nécessité militaire. C’est donc l’ensemble du processus qui s’inscrit dans un cadre dérogatoire

qui exclurait l’illicéité des mesures prises et des conséquences qui en découlent en droit.

41. A cet égard, le Gouvernement israélien i nvoque très clairement la légitime défense qui

est expressément citée dans le résumé de sa pos ition. En effet, le point6 mentionne que la

construction du mur serait «conforme à l’article 51 de la Charte des Nations Unies, ainsi qu’à son

droit inhérent de légitime défense et aux réso lutions1368 (2001) et 1373 (2001) du Conseil de

sécurité».

42. L’article 51 de la Charte des Nations Unies qui est invoqué par Israël impose certaines

conditions qu’il est inutile de rappeler mais, notamment : une «agression armée», «jusqu’à ce que

le Conseil de sécurité ait pris les mesures nécessaires». La justification même de cette légitime

défense paraît donc pour le moins douteuse.

43. Au surplus, la légitime défense ne s’ envisage que sous la c ondition d’un critère de

proportionnalité qui doit accompagner la mesure décid ée par l’Etat agressé. La Cour a fermement

rappelé, à la fois au contentieux et dans ses avis consultatifs, cette exigence, qu’elle a qualifiée - 27 -

comme une exigence du droit international coutumier 26. En l’espèce, cette proportionnalité doit

être appréciée dans le cadre d’une occupation militaire qui donne naturellement un poids important

 plus important  à l’occupant, en précisant que la construction du mur, longuement réfléchie et

s’étalant sur une période de temps très longue, peut difficilement entrer dans le cadre de mesures

immédiates telles qu’on peut les imaginer en cas de légitime défense 27. Si les actes terroristes sont

hautement condamnables, l’enfermement d’une popu lation dans un mur de pl us de 700 kilomètres

ne semble ni une réponse adéqua te, ni une réponse proportionnelle. D’autant qu’il est alors peu

compréhensible que ce mur de «protection» se situ e à l’intérieur du territoire occupé. Si Israël

souhaite légitimement se protéger, il doit le faire à l’intérieur de son territoire, ou à l’extrême limite

sur la «Ligne verte».

*

44. Les conséquences en droit de l’édification du mur apparaissent ainsi contraires à la fois à

la Charte des NationsUnies, au droit interna tional général, au droit de la guerre, au droit

humanitaire, aux normes de protection des droits de l’homme et aux accords particuliers conclus

par Israël. S’il ne faut retenir qu’une conclusi on à cet ensemble de violations, le Belize souhaite

insister sur la modification profonde du statut du territoire opérée par cette construction. Notre

point de départ a été de constater que le statut du territoire sur lequel ce mur se construit est celui

d’un territoire militairement occupé. Or, le mur implique, comme nous l’avons ensuite constaté, un

morcellement de ce statut par le biais de dérogations permanentes, d’annexions en droit ou de

facto, par le renforcement, voire la protection de la colonisation, ou par l’impossible exercice du

droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes. Ce n’ est donc plus un simple territoire occupé dont il

s’agit tant les conditions à son occupation imposées par la construction du mur en ont modifié la

physionomie mais surtout le régime juridiqu e. Or, ces conséquences risquent de devenir

irréversibles si la Cour ne se prononce pas clairement sur cet ensemble de violations.

26Avis consultatif du 8 juillet 1996, C.I.J. Recueil 1996, p. 245, par. 41. Ceci se double d’un rappel par la Cour
d’une affirmation identique dans l’affaire dActivitØs militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci,
C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 94, par. 176 et p. 103, par. 194.

27Dans le point 7 du résumé de sa position (annexe 1 du rapport A/ES-10/248), le Gouvernement israélien
indique que les «réquisitions des terres pour permettre la construction du mu r sont proportionnelles, eu égard au nombre
de morts et de blessés dénombrés parmi les citoyens israéliens …». Il en découle une appréciation très difficile et pour le
moins arbitraire. - 28 -

III. LES EFFETS DE LA RECONNAISSANCE DE L ’ILLICÉITÉ DE LA SITUATION

PROVOQUÉE PAR LA CONSTRUCTION DU MUR

45. Le Belize ne souhaite pas s’étendre longue ment sur cette question mais, sous réserve

bien sûr de la position que la Cour sera amenée à adopter, il lui semble opportun de pointer

quelques conséquences qui découleraient de la logique reconnaissance de l’illicéité de la

construction de ce mur.

46. D’une part, il faut rappeler que l’avis de la Cour est, par définition, un avis «consultatif»

dont la portée n’est à priori pas contraignant e comme les médias l’ont d’ailleurs abondamment

rappelé ces derniers temps. Mais chacun sait que la Cour rend des avis qui sont très importants et

qui dépassent le cadre purement consultatif, ce qui si gnifie que ni l’organisation, ni l’Etat concerné

par l’avis, ne peut l’ignorer. Il ne fait donc pas de doute que les c onséquences de cet avis

entraîneront des mesures concrètes de la part de s organisations internationales, des entités ou des

Etats.

47. Comme le Belize l’espère ardemment, si la Cour admet que les conséquences en droit de

la construction du mur représentent des viola tions caractérisées des normes internationales

fondamentales, l’arrêt de la construction du mur et, à terme, la destruction des parties déjà en place

semblent s’imposer. Cette destruction impose non seulement des actes matériels bien évidemment,

mais également juridiques par l’abrogation de tous les actes pris dans le cadre de sa construction. Il

ne peut, d’autre part, être question de conditi onner cette destruction à des négociations futures

puisque les accords qui régissent ce processus (et en particulier l’actuelle «feuille de route» 28)

condamnent par avance les entraves que ce mur implique.

48. En admettant que cette destruction inc onditionnelle soit possible, il semble également

que des réparations soient nécessaires pour permettre d’ effacer l’illicéité de l’acte. A cet égard, le

Belize est persuadé que la simple remise en l’état ne peut suffire à titre de réparation et que des

indemnisations adéquates devront être envisagées, mais ces indemnisations ne peuvent, à l’inverse,

se substituer à la conservation du mur.

28Qui précise notamment que : «Israël prend toutes les dispositions nécessaires pour aider à normaliser la vie des
Palestiniens» ou encore : «gèle toutes les activités d’implantation de colonies». A cela s’ajoutent l’assouplissement de la
liberté des restrictions de circulation, l’arrêt de la de la destruction de biens ole respect de la «continuité
territoriale» de la Palestine (voir le document joit à la résolution du Conseil de sécurité1515 (2003) du
19 novembre 2003, S/2003/529). - 29 -

49. Enfin, pour reprendre les propres termes de l’avis de la Cour de1971 à propos de la

Namibie , la reconnaissance de l’illicéité doit s’accompagner, pour tous les Etats, d’une obligation

de ne pas reconnaître la situation créée.

*

* *

50. En conclusion, Monsieur le président, Ma dame et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, le

Belize voudrait souligner qu’au-delà de ses aspects juridiques, ce mur représente une illusion.

Depuis le mur d’Hadrien, en passant par la mura ille de Chine ou, plus près de nous, le mur de

Berlin, cette forme de séparation ne crée que l’ illusion de la sécurité alors qu’elle secrète un

30
profond traumatisme au sein des populations concernées . Il s’agit du creuset d’une violence qui

ne peut que s’accroître, et non l’inverse. La poursuite d’attentats nous conduit malheureusement à

constater qu’Israël vit ainsi dans l’illusion que cette séparation pourrait garantir sa sécurité. Aucun

mur n’est infranchissable et il est à craindre que celui construit en territoire occupé n’attise les

31
haines plus qu’il ne sécurise les populations de part et d’autre . Pour Israël, la sécurité ne peut

venir de la construction du mur, mais de la construction de la paix par le respect des droits

légitimes du peuple palestinien, par le respect des normes fondamentales du droit international, des

résolutions des Nations Unies et par la fin de l’occupation de la Palestine.

51. Enfin, au terme de cet exposé, le Beliz e tient à saluer l’Œuvre de la Cour dans le

règlement pacifique des différends. Il est indé niable que l’avis qu’elle va rendre est d’une

importance fondamentale, non seulement pour le cas de l’espèce, mais, plus largement, pour le

respect des principes fondamentaux du droit international qui permettent à tous les Etats ou entités,

au-delà de leur différence de taille ou de puissance, de bénéficier d’une égalité souveraine que la

29En l’espèce, la Cour demandait de : «s’abstenir de tous actes et en prticulier de toutes relations avec le
Gouvernement sud-africain … qui constitueraient une aide ou une assistance à son égard» (ConsØquences juridiques pour
les Etats de la prØsence continue de l’Afrique du Sud enNamibie (Sud-Ouest africain) nonobstant la rØsolution276
(1970) du Conseil de sØcuritØ, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1971, p. 58, par. 133.)

30Olivier Razac note dans son Histoire politique du barbelØ que : «Jamais une clôture ni une muraille ne se suffit
à elle-même. Il faudrait pour cela un rempart absolument indestructible, ce qui est impossible» ou encore: «Toute
utilisation du barbelé représente un coût politique d’autanus élevé que le symbole est fortement ressenti et que la
sensibilité publique à la violence politique ou sociale est aiguë»; Editions La Fabrique, Paris, 2000, p. 81, 95.

31Lors d’une récente allocution à l’occasion de la visite en France du président israélien, le président français
J.Chirac déclarait à propos du mur: «[il] créera de nouvelles frustrations et davant age de colère et [il] compromettra la
solution de deux Etats qui fait l’objet d’un consensus international», Le Monde, 14 février 2004. - 30 -

Charte des NationsUnies garantit. Aujourd’hui, la Palestine souffre sous le joug d’un Etat plus

puissant et mieux organisé, mais cette situation n’ a malheureusement pas vocation à être unique et

la mission de la Cour sera de poser, pour l’avenir, les jalons d’un ordre international qui empêche

cette situation de se reproduire partout dans le monde et envers n’importe quel Etat. L’impunité

face à un droit international bafoué doit cesser et la Cour a aujourd’hui la mission de le rappeler

fermement. Nul ne doute qu’elle sera entendue au-delà du cas d’espèce.

Monsieur le président, Madame et messieurs les Membres de la Cour, je vous remercie pour

l’attention que vous avez bien voulu porter à ces quelques observations du Belize.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Sorel. I now give the floor to His Excellency

Mr. Moreno Fernández of Cuba.

Mr. MORENO FERNÁNDEZ: Distinguished President, honourable judges: the Republic of

Cuba presented, on 30 January 2004, its written ar guments on the fundamental question placed by

the General Assembly of the United Nations befo re this august Court in compliance with its

resolution ES-10/14, of 8 December 2003, for the emission of a consultative opinion. Likewise, a

Cuban delegation appears before th is solemn audience as an expression of its genuine recognition

of the need for international peace and security, multilateralism and the rule of law in international

relations and as an expression of its historic and unconditional solidarity with the peoples subjected

to colonialism and foreign domination, in particular with the Palestinian people, which continue to

be denied its inalienable right to self-determination.

It is an honour to present the oral explanation of the facts and the legal analysis carried out

by Cuba arising from the construction of the Wall by Israel, the Occupying Power, in the Occupied

Palestinian Territory, in and around East Jer usalem, as described in the report of the

Secretary-General of the United Nations, and consid ering the norms and principles of international

law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and General

Assembly resolutions.

Honourable judges, the presentation by the Cuba n delegation on this issue is structured as

follows:

Part I, as an introduction, examines three essential elements: - 31 -

1. The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to emit a consultative opinion on the legal

question presented by the United Nations General Assembly;

2. The importance of the emission of a consultative opinion on the legal question of reference;

3. The position of the Republic of Cuba on the most significant facts related to the construction of

the Wall by Israel.

PartII describes the fundamental legal cons iderations and consequences derived from the

construction of the Wall, by examining the following elements:

1. The construction of the Wall by Israel, violat es fundamental principles and norms enshrined in

the Charter of the United Nations and international law (jus cogens norms);

2. The construction of the Wall violates resolu tions adopted by the United Nations General

Assembly and Security Council;

3. The construction of the Wall violates principles and norms of international humanitarian law,

particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, relative to the Protection of

Civilian Persons in Time of War.

In the analysis of this last element, the presentation by the Cuban delegation will especially

make reference to the following aspects:

(A) The applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory;

(B) The disproportionate and excessive use of the c oncept of the right to legitimate defence by the

Occupying Power and the disregard by Israel of the principles of proportionality and distinction

derived from the construction of the Wall.

Likewise, the presentation by the Republic of Cuba contains as PartIII, its final

considerations.

PART I

Honourable judges, regarding the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the

emission of a consultative opinion on the legal question presented by the General Assembly, the

Republic of Cuba considers that this august bod y is fully competent to emit the consultative

opinion requested. - 32 -

Article96 of the United Nations Charter conf ers the General Assembly and the Security

Council, the unconditional  and I must underline unconditional  right to request consultative

opinions to the Court on any legal question.

Article65, paragraph1, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice establishes that

the Court will emit consultative opinions regarding any legal question at the request by any organ

authorized to do so by the Charter.

In addition, the General Assembly, by reso lution ES-10/13, of 21 October 2003, established

that the construction of the Wall is an issue that h as clear implications for international law. Said

resolution, in its paragraph 1, “Demands that Israel stop and reverse the construction of the Wall in

the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, which is in departure

of the Armistice Line of 1949 and is in contradiction to relevant provisions of International Law”.

The General Assembly also clearly establis hed the applicable le gal framework for the

interpretation and application of the pertinent legal norms in the emission of the consultative

opinion on the legal question.

In spite of the so-called “considerations”, or “political elements”, involved in the negotiated

solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and th e request by several States that the Court make

discretional use of Article65, paragraph1, of its Statute, the Republic of Cuba considers that the

Court should not abstain from emitting a consulta tive opinion on this important question. In

Cuba’s view, any debate on the opt ional nature of Article65, paragraph1, of the Statute is

eminently theoretical in nature and can only be carried out in the light of the other Articles of said

Statute and of the United Nations Charter.

Likewise, although on occasions States have objected to the jurisdiction of the Court based

on the political nature of questions that have been placed before it, this has not prevented the Court

from emitting consultative opinions on said questions, circumscribing itself to the legal

consequences deriving from th em, and, thus, adhering to its competence according to the

internationally accepted instruments that govern its functioning.

It is Cuba’s contention that the emission of a consultative opinion regarding the question

presented by the General Assembly is based not on ly on Article96 of the Charter, but also on

Article 14, which establishes that the General As sembly is competent to recommend measures for - 33 -

the peaceful solution of any situation, irrespec tive of origin, even a situation arising from a

violation of the United Nations Charter itself.

Mention has been made in the written statements of the limitations imposed by Article 12 of

the Charter to the fulfilment by the General Assembly of the mandate conferred upon it by

Article 14. In Cuba’s view those limitations ar e not applicable in the cases involving requests for

consultative opinions to the Court. Article96 of the Charter, giving this faculty to the General

Assembly, is not qualified in any manner and, therefore, places no limitations whatsoever.

Furthermore, even if Article 12 were to be th eoretically applicable, limitations imposed by it

would not be an obstacle for the request of a c onsultative opinion by the General Assembly on this

issue. The fact is that the issue at hand was dea lt with by the General Assembly by virtue of the

United for Peace resolution resulting from a veto im posed by a Permanent Member of the Security

Council to an enabling resolution. Hence, this should be interpreted in the sense that, for all

practical purposes, the Security Council is not c onsidering the draft resolution presented to it and

the item involved, even if said issue were still on the Council’s agenda.

In addition, Cuba considers that the emissi on of a consultative opinion on the legal question

of reference is of significance in the present inte rnational context and for the negotiated solution of

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself and for the most recent efforts carried out in that direction.

A consultative issue should constitute an essential tool in the hands of the United Nations in

the fulfilment of its functions, particularly fo r the General Assembly of the United Nations,

according to Article 14 of the Charter. Likewise, it has also the role of contributing to clarify to the

international community as a whole the terri ble socio-humanitarian consequences for the

Palestinian people derived from the construction of the Wall and, particularly, for the exercise of its

right to self-determination and for the establishmen t of a sovereign and i ndependent Palestinian

State.

The emission of a consultative opinion on this question should also be a dissuasive element

for the Occupying Power geared at having it stop and revert the construction of the Wall in the

Occupied Palestinian Territory and it should, at least, be a strong call on the Occupying Power to

comply with the wishes of the United Nati ons General Assembly, as expressed in

resolution ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003. - 34 -

By the same token, the emission of a consultative opinion should also have the function of

contributing to avoid that, in the future, the Occupying Power intends to obtain international

recognition of the de facto situation created in the Occupied Pa lestinian Territory, including in and

around Jerusalem, with the construction of the Wall that alters the Armistice Line of 1949.

Honourable judges, with regard to the Republic of Cuba’s position on the most salient facts

derived from the construction of the Wall, my delegation wishes to reiterate that the situation in the

Occupied Palestinian Territory has always been a source of deep concern for my country. For

decades, Israel, the Occupying Power, has been resp onsible for continuous a nd flagrant violations

of human rights, of international humanitarian law and of international law in said territory and has

ignored resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

The Republic of Cuba accepts and upholds as fundamental reference for its presentation the

background and facts described in the report of th e United Nations Secretary-General contained in

document A/ES-10/248, presented by virtue of resolution ES-10/13 of the same body.

At present, according to available public information, the situation is even more critical. The

construction of the Wall supposes in the short-te rm a humanitarian catastrophe that could be

conducive to the extermination and genocide of th e Palestinian people, while, at the same time,

conditioning, from the physical point of view, the co-existence of two sovereign and independent

States in the region, Israel and Palestine.

Through its presentation, the Government of the Republic of Cuba reiterates inter alia, its

condemnation of acts of annexation, to the excessive use of force without establishing a distinction

between civilians and combatants, to the creation of a humanitarian crisis caused by the limitations

imposed on the circulation of goods and persons, to the inhuman treat ment of children, and to the

generalized destruction of goods, all of which are a direct consequence of the territorial expansion

of the Occupying Power through the construction of the Wall, and all of which have clear legal

consequences.

This situation must cease. Israel, the Occ upying Power, has the obligation to stop and to

revert the construction of the Wall, while the inte rnational community, on the other hand, has also

the obligation of not recognizing the control by th e Occupying Power of the Palestinian Territory

delimited by the Wall. - 35 -

PART II

Honourable judges, on the considerations and fundamental legal consequences derived from

the construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around

Jerusalem, this presentation will only examine the most serious legal consequences that, in the view

of the Republic of Cuba, would inevitably be considered in the context of the new de facto situation

intended with the construction of the Wall. In our respectful opinion, the analysis to be carried out

by the distinguished judges of this Court on this issue, should take into account the following

elements.

The construction of the Wall violates principles and norms of international law enshrined in

the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

It is a violation of the prohibition of the threat and use of force. In conformity with Article 2,

paragraph4, of the Charter, the Members of th e United Nations shall abstain in international

relations to resort to the threat or use of for ce against the territorial integrity or the political

independence of any State, or in any another fo rm incompatible with the purposes of the United

Nations.

If the layout of the Wall foreseen by the author ities of the Occupying Power is carried out, it

would deviate from the Armistice Line of 1949 (Green Line) up to 22km in several places,

annexing important zones of the West Bank and in and around Jerusalem.

The Occupying Power, with this act, would de facto establish a new border by means of

unilateral imposition and the use of the force, by means of a separation wall between the

Palestinian Territory occupied in the war of a ggression carried out by Israel in 1967, and its own

State. By virtue of international law, an aggressor State cannot acquire a territory by means of

unilateral annexation.

According to international law the prohibition of acquiring territories by force applies

independently of any other consideration. Th e Declaration on Principles of International Law

concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the

UnitedNations, that is resolution2625 of the Twenty-Fifth Session of the General Assembly

(24 October 1970), establishes that “the territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by

another State resulting from the threat or use of fo rce. No territorial acquisition resulting from the

threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal”. - 36 -

This non-recognition has been confirmed in a number of resolutions and international

agreements. Resolution 242 (1967) of the Secu rity Council and the Oslo Agreements, are

paradigmatic instruments accepted by the overwhelm ing majority of the international community.

The Oslo Agreement, for example, establishes that “the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

will not be changed pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations”.

The construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory also qualifies as an illicit

act of annexation in accordance with the provisions of resolutions 478 (1980) and 497 (1981) of the

United Nations Security Council, which declare that the acts of Israel geared at the annexation of

East Jerusalem and the Golan are null and void, and should not be recognized by States.

The construction of the Wall also ignores the principle of the equality of rights and

self-determination of peoples. The right to self-determination is founded on Article 1, paragraph 2,

and on Article55 of the United Nations Charter. It was sanctioned also in Article1 of the

Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Cultural, Social, and Economic Rights.

Likewise, the United Nations General Assemb ly has ratified this principle in numerous

resolutions. Among the most noteworthy, it is found in resolution 1514 (XV) of the fifteenth

session of the General Assembly, on the Declaration on the concession of independence to the

colonial countries and peoples, and in the aforementioned resolution 2625(XXV) of the

twenty-fifth session.

The right to self-determination is closely linked with the concept of territorial sovereignty.

A people can only exercise the right to self-determination within a territory. The amputation of the

Palestinian territory by means of the construction of a wall is a serious breach of the inalienable

right to self-determination of the Palestinian peopl e, since it considerably reduces the size of the

already small self-determination unit within which such right should be exercised.

The right to self-determination of the Palestin ian people cannot be alienated and it should be

realized on the basis of territorial integrity within the borders of an independent Palestinian State.

This right of the Palestinian people has been confirmed by the United Nations General Assembly in

numerous resolutions, and also recognized in th e different phases of the peace process in the

Middle East. - 37 -

The construction of the Wall goes against the principle of peaceful solution of disputes.

Article2, paragraph3, of the United Nations Ch arter establishes that States should resolve their

disputes by peaceful means. Thus, any delimitati on of borders should be negotiated between the

two parties concerned on the basis of equality and equity for both which clearly derives from this

principle. The parties should be placed on equal terms and each one of them should respect the

rights of the other in accordance with international law. The unilateral construction of the Wall by

the Occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinia n Territory, is in no way conducive to a climate

propitious to the peaceful and negotiated solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on equal terms.

Honourable judges, it is crystal clear that the construction of the Wall goes against the

provisions contained in a number of resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

The consideration of these resolutions also de monstrates that the systematic refusal by the

Occupying Power to comply with the provisions co ntained therein regarding the acts committed in

the Occupied Palestinian Territory, entails legal consequences for the Occupying Power.

In addition, the non-compliance by the Occupyin g Power of United Nations resolutions is in

conflict with the principle of good faith, one of the fundamental principles of international law.

The construction of the Wall in the Occupied Pa lestinian Territory is also in violation of

resolutions adopted by the United Nations bodies in the context of the Is raeli settlements in the

Occupied Palestinian Territory.

Furthermore, the construction of the Wall by the Occupying Power violates principles and

norms of international humanitarian law.

First and foremost, Cuba sustains that th e Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 regarding

the protection of civilian persons in times of wa r, the Fourth Geneva Convention, is fully

applicable to the Occupied Palestinian Territo ry, including in and ar ound East Jerusalem.

Reference should be made to the violations by Israel, the Occupying Power, of said Convention.

Though Israel has contended that the Fourth Geneva Convention is not applicable to the

Occupied Palestinian Territory as it is “not a te rritory of a High Contracting Party as required by

the Convention”, the applicability of this instrument to the Occupied Palestinian Territory enjoys

extensive international recognition. The written presentation delivered by the Republic of Cuba on

30 January 2004 to this Court, contains legal and factual elements confirming this assertion. At the - 38 -

same time, Israel, as Occupying Power, is al so legally bound by other consuetudinary norms

relating to occupation, according to the stipulati ons of the Rules annexed to the Hague Convention

on Laws and Customs of Land Wars of 18 October 1907.

Not to accept the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Palestinian

Territory, including East Jerusalem, would be tantamount to placing the Palestinian population

residing in that territory in a situation of de fencelessness against the actions of the Occupying

Power. Therefore, those persons should be c onsidered as “protected pe rsons”, according to the

definition of this condition in Article 4 of said Convention.

In the view of the Republic of Cuba, as a result of the construction of the Wall and of the

severe humanitarian and socio-economic conditions that this has entailed and will continue to entail

for the population of the Occupied Palestinian Te rritory, the Occupying Power incurs in a large

number of very serious violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

It violates the obligation emanating from Article1, common to the four Geneva

Conventions, according to which the “High Contrac ting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure

respect of said Convention in all circumstances”.

It must be recalled that, because of their special nature, the norms of international

humanitarian law establish obligations applicable to the international community as a whole.

Therefore, every member of the international co mmunity is entitled to demand that said norms be

respected.

The Occupying Power is up to now preventi ng 22Palestinian locations from access to

schools by impeding the free circulation of Palestin ians on both sides of the Wall, with which it is

violating the provisions of Article50, paragra ph1, according to which “the occupying Power

shall... facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of

children”.

On the other hand, the Occupying Power is up to now preventing 30Palestinian locations

from access to health services and eight from acces s to the primary sources of water provision by

impeding the free circulation of Palestinians on both sides of the Wall. With these actions, Israel is

violating the provisions of Article 56, according to which, inter alia, “the occupying Power has the - 39 -

duty of ensuring and maintaining .. . the medica l and hospital establishments and services, public

health and hygiene in the occupied territory . . .”.

With the destruction of dwellings, stores, cu ltivated lands and other goods belonging to the

Palestinian population by the construction of the Wall, the Occupying Power is violating Article 53

of the Fourth Geneva Convention according to which

“any destruction by the occupying Power of real estate or personal property belonging

individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public
authorities, or to social or cooperative orga nizations, is prohibited, except where such
destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations”.

In Cuba’s view, the exception foreseen in this Article is not applicable to this case.

As a result of the construction of the Wall and of the establishment of arbitrary restrictions to

the movement of Palestinian pe rsons and goods from one side of the Wall to the other, access by

the Palestinian population to their lands, jobs, ma rkets and other sources of subsistence has been

severely limited, with which the Palestinian economy has been severely affected and its population

subjected to unsustainable conditio ns. This situation clearly demonstrates that the Occupying

Power has not fulfilled its obligation to provide these persons with the opportunity to find paid

employment, according to provisions included in Ar ticle39, paragraph1, of the Fourth Geneva

Convention.

Likewise, the Occupying Power has not fulfilled the provisions of paragraph2 of said

Article 39, according to which

“where a Party to the conflict applies to a protected person methods of control which
result in his being unable to support himself, and especially if such a person is
prevented for reasons of security from finding paid employment on reasonable

conditions, the said Party shall ensure his support and that of his dependents”.

In this context, the Occupying Power has not fulfilled the provisions of Article55,

paragraph 1, of the Fourth Gene va Convention, according to which “the Occupying Power has the

duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of th e population; it should, in particular, bring in

the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the Occupied Territory

are inadequate”.

Keeping in mind the previously mentioned violations of the rights of the “protected

population”, in this case the Palestinian population resided in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,

the Occupying Power is also violating Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, according to - 40 -

which “protected persons who are in occupied terr itory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any

manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention . . .”.

All the violations of the provisions of th e Fourth Geneva Conven tion above described,

represent, furthermore, a humiliation to the Palest inian people by virtue of Article27 of said

instrument, according to which

“protected persons are entitled, in all circum stances, to respect for their persons, their

honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners
and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected
especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof . . .”

In all evidence, the construction of the Wall, w ith its concrete structure, its razor wire, its

towers of observation and its electronic monitoring means, creates a population of prisoners.

In addition to the above, the disproportionate and excessive use of the concept of the right to

legitimate defence by the Occupying Power, and the violation of the principles of proportionality

and distinction derived from the construction of the Wall should be also considered.

The Occupying Power intends to justify th e construction of a Wall in the occupied

Palestinian territory as being a security measure by virtue of the exercise by States of their right to

legitimate defence. In accordan ce with the United Nations Charter and international law, States

have the right to exercise said right individually or collectively in the case of an armed attack for

the protection of its legitimate security interest s, and in cases of strict military necessity.

Nevertheless, distinguished Members of the C ourt, those actions should be compliant with

international human rights norms and international humanitarian law.

The actions adopted by Israel, the Occupyin g Power, of building a wall in the Occupied

Palestinian Territory is not justified in any way whatsoever by military necessities.

It violates, furthermore, the principle of proportionality, as it is not proportionate with

legitimate security interests, moves away from m easures of that character and acquires the nature

of punishment, humiliation and conquest.

Though it is accepted that combatants participa ting in armed conflict be faced by situations

of mortal danger, international humanitarian law tries to limit the damages to be suffered by

civilians, by requiring that all parties in the conf lict respect the principle of distinction. This

principle, enunciated in Article48 of the Add itional ProtocolI to th e Geneva Conventions, - 41 -

establishes that “the Parties to the conflict sha ll at all times distinguish between the civilian

population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly

shall direct their operations only against military objectives”.

In addition, Article 51, paragraph 2, clearly st ates that “the acts or threats of violence whose

main purpose is to terrify the civilian population are forbidden”.

PART III

Honourable Members of the Court, finally, it is an honour for my delegation to present to the

consideration of this high judicial instance the conclusions derived from the analysis carried out by

the Republic of Cuba on the legal consequences of the construction of the Wall by Israel:

1. The Government of the Republic of Cuba considers without any shadow of doubt

whatsoever, that the International Court of Justic e is competent to emit a consultative opinion on

the legal question presented to it by the United Na tions General Assembly. Articles 14 and 96 of

the United Nations Charter and Article65, paragr aph1, of the Statute of the Court uphold said

competence. Is also our firm view that the emission of a consultative opinion on this important

issue is pertinent and timely.

2. The Government of the Republic of C uba also considers that the emission of a

consultative opinion on this important issue will not constitute an obstacle to the peace process but,

on the contrary, would be an important tool in the hands of the United Na tions General Assembly

and the United Nations as a whole for the fulfilment of its functions with rega rd to this conflict.

Likewise, it can contribute to clarify to the in ternational community the terrible socio-economic

consequences for the Palestinian people derived fro m the construction of the Wall, particularly for

the exercise of its inalienable right to self-determination.

3. The emission of a consultative opinion on this question should also encourage the

Occupying Power to comply with the wishes of the international community and should also play a

decisive role in preventing any future intenti on of the Occupying Power to obtain international

recognition of the de facto situation created in the Occupied Pa lestinian Territory as a result of the

construction of the Wall.

4. The Government of the Republic of Cuba cannot accept that the following elements may

be considered an answer proportionate to the per ception of security of the Occupying Power: the - 42 -

excessive use of force, the lack of distinction between combatants and civilians, the creation of a

humanitarian crisis as a consequence of the lim itations imposed on the circulation of goods and

persons, the death and the inhuman treatment of children, the generalized destruction of goods and,

ultimately, the territorial expansion by means of the construction of the Wall.

5. Israel, the Occupying Power, persists in ser ious violations of the provisions of the Fourth

Geneva Convention of 1949. It still refuses to accept the de jure applicability and even the

application of the Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, thus

demonstrating its refusal to respect the wish of the international community , that for more than

30 years has confirmed the applicability of this Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

6. Israel, as a State party to the Fourth Geneva Convention and, at the same time, as

Occupying Power, should comply with the oblig ation emanating from Article1, common to the

four Geneva Conventions, according to which th e High Contracting Parties undertake to respect

and to ensure respect of said Convention in all circumstances.

7. The extreme humanitarian crisis imposed by the Occupying Power on the Palestinian

population since the construction of the Wall, as de scribed in the report of the Secretary-General

and in other public sources, may be classified as a crime of extermination, as it constitutes the

intentional infliction of conditions of life, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a

population, in this case the Palestinian population.

8. The Government of the Republic of Cuba respectfully hopes that th e International Court

of Justice, while emitting the consultative opinion requested by the General Assembly, recognizes

that the construction of the Wall by Israel is ille gal and in violation of norms and principles of

international law, including the Fourth Geneva C onvention of 1949 and the relevant resolutions of

the Security Council and the General Assembly.

9. The Government of the Republic of Cuba e qually expects that the International Court of

Justice recognize the international responsibility derived for the Occupying Power by the illicit acts

previously expressed. Likewise, the Government of the Republic of Cuba considers that the

stopping of the process of construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory cannot be

postponed, and respectfully requests the Court to demand that the Wall be totally demolished and - 43 -

that the Occupying Power unrestrictedly fulfil its obligations under international law and

international humanitarian law.

10. Lastly, Cuba hopes that the Internationa l Court of Justice acts in a decisive and

unanimous manner in favour of peace and justice. The Wall of separation continues to accentuate

the illegal Israeli occupation, and perpetuates the sy stem of “apartheid” established by Israel in the

Occupied Palestinian Territory. Furthermore, w ith these actions, Israel moves the possibility of

reaching a negotiated, just and lasting solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict further along into

the future.

Honourable judges, thank you very much for your patience and attention.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Your Excellency. This is now the time for a break of ten

minutes. The Court will resume the hearing at 11.30 a.m.

The Court adjourned from 11.20 to 11.30 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. I give the floor to His Excellency

Mr. Mohammad Jusuf of Indonesia.

Mr. JUSUF:

1. Mr.President, honourable Members of the Court, it is an honour and privilege for me to

represent my Government before the Court in these proceedings. Let me also commence my

statement by underlining that the request for advi sory opinion on the legal consequences of the

construction of the Wall in the Occupied Pales tinian Territory, including in and around East

Jerusalem, would raise issues of profound signifi cance for the international community. As the

principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the Court’s response to the advisory opinion request

would reassert its considerable credibility among na tions. Its independent consideration of this

request would also be a true testimony to the validity of this trust.

2. In these oral proceedings, Indonesia would only focus on the issue of jurisdiction of the

Court and its judicial propriety to render its a dvisory opinion. Furthermore, Indonesia would like

to seize this opportunity to reassert its Written Statement’s argument by giving further detailed

information on the applicability of international humanitarian and human rights law in Occupied - 44 -

Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. In the last part of this statement, Indonesia will

reiterate the salient points of its written submission.

3. With regard to the competence of the Gene ral Assembly in requesting the Court to render

its opinion, as in the case of Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons , Indonesia is of the

view that the General Assembly has competence in any event to seise the Cour t. As stipulated in

Article 10 of the Charter, the General Assembly has competence relating to “any questions or any

matters within the scope of the present Charter”. Furthermore, the General Assembly has acted in

accordance with the recommendation of its “Agenda for Peace” that “United Nations organs turn to

the Court more frequently for advisory opinions” 32. And consecutive Presidents of the Court

33
appeal before the General Assembly for greater recourse to the advisory function of the Court .

4. The competence of the Court to issue its advisory opinion derives from Article96,

paragraph1, of the Charter and Article65, paragrap h1, of the Court’s Statute, which require that

the question on the subject-matter of the request should be a “legal question”. Indonesia believes

that the advisory opinion requested by the General Assembly indeed relates to a “legal question”

within the meaning of its Statute and the United Nations Charter. The Court has indicated on many

occasions  inter alia, the Western Sahara case  that legal questions “ framed in terms of law

and rais[ing] problems of international law . . . are by their very nature susceptible of a reply based

on law . . . [and] appear . . . to be questions of a legal character” 34. The present question is a legal

one since the Court is asked to rule on the compatibility of the question with the relevant principles

and rules of international law. In doi ng so, as the Court decided in the case of Legality of the

Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court will identify the existing principles and rules,

interpret them and apply them to the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,

therefore offering a reply to the question posed on law 35. As stated in the case of the Legality of the

Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons , the Court considered that even though there may be political

32
Agenda for Peace, 1992, p. 22.
33
See I.C.J Yearbook 1997-1998, p. 292.
34Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 18, para. 15.

35See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), para. 13. - 45 -

considerations in the request “the political implications that the opinion given might have are of no

relevance in the establishment of its jurisdiction to give such an opinion” . 36

5. Furthermore, Indonesia finds no “compe lling reasons” preventing the Court from giving

37
the advisory opinion requested by the United Nations General Assembly . Even though a State or

group of States might reject this advisory opinion or have stated their lack of consent to the

competence of the Court, however it cannot be a “co mpelling reason” for the Court not to give its

opinion. In the case of Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court confirmed that

“the Court’s Opinion is given not to the States, but to the organ which is entitled to request it” 38.

Moreover the Court conferred great respect for the process within the United Nations General

Assembly. The Court stated that “it is not for the Court itself to purport to decide whether or not an

advisory opinion is needed by the Assembly for the performance of its functions. The General

Assembly has the right to decide for itself on the usefulness of an opinion in the light of its own

needs.” 39 The Court disregarded the origins or the political history of the question in determining

whether there are any “compelling reasons” for it to re fuse. The Court stated: “the Court . . . will

not have regard to the origins or to the political history of the request, or to the distribution of votes

in respect of the adopted resolution” 40.

6. With regard to Article12 of the Charte r, let me refer to the opinion made by the

honourable JudgeBrunoSimma in his publication The Charter of the United Nations: A

Commentary that this Article has been gradually erode d. It is not uncommon that the General

Assembly has made recommendations even when the Security Council was dealing actively with

an issue. If the Security Council was not actually exercising its function at that moment, or if a

resolution was blocked by a veto, the General Assembly has assumed that it is free to make

41
recommendations, provided that these did not directly contradict a Security Council resolution .

36
Ibid.
37
Written Statement by the Government of the Republic Indonesia on the request for advisory opinion on the
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 29 January 2004, para. 3.
38Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 234, para. 14.

39Ibid., p. 237, para. 16.

40Ibid.
41
Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary , Oxford University Press, 2ndedition,
2002, p. 254. - 46 -

This view is traditionally legitimized by the Uniting for Peace Resolution Mechanism 42which

acknowledges that the failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities does not

deprive the General Assembly of its rights or re lieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter.

Having said that, Indonesia is of the view that the advisory opinion request falls, without any

doubt, within the scope of “functions” and “powers” of the General Assembly. The argument that

the advisory opinion request was ultra vires the competence of the General Assembly is therefore

unfounded.

7. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, a State or group of States might

oppose the rendering of an opinion by the Court on the ground that the Court’s opinion on this

question will jeopardize the negotiating process. On the contrary, the impartial legal views of the

Court will give a solid international legal gr ound to speed up the negotiating process. The

negotiating process cannot be a “compelling reason” for the Court not to give its opinion. There is

no precedent that the impartial legal opinion of the World Court would hamper the peace process or

create additional barriers for the negotiating process or make the “two-State” solution impossible.

Indonesia shares the view that the establishment of a Palestinian St ate, living side by side with

Israel must be realized through political dialogue. It consistently maintains that the interest of the

very fundamental principle of international law sh all not be compromised. As mentioned by the

distinguished Palestinian representative yesterday, the implementation of the peace process should

not be at the expense of the legal rights of the Pa lestinian people. In th is regard, the Indonesian

Government believes that the advisory opinion of the Court could contribute positively to the peace

process.

8. The positive contribution of the Court to the peace process has been expressed by a

Member of the Court, the former Judge and President, Mohamed Bedjaoui, before the Sixth

Committee on 16October 1995. In this case, I ndonesia also endorses the preventive nature of

advisory opinions. Since an advisory opinion c ould provide an authoritative and important guide,

advisory procedure appears to be an instrume nt of “preventive diplomacy”, as envisaged in

“Agenda for Peace”, which is a particularly su itable means for the Court to defuse tension and

ward off conflicts by the determination of law. In this connection, I would like to recall the

4United Nations General Assembly resolution 377 (V). - 47 -

positive contribution of the Court’s Opinion on Namibia to the establishment of the rule of

international law in south-western Africa. Within this context, Indonesia e xpects that an advisory

opinion on this particular issue would be a legal building block for the peace process in the Middle

East. The impartial legal opinion of the Court on this question would provide a solid international

legal ground ensuring that the negotiation process be fairly conducted in good faith.

9. The parties are therefore under an obliga tion to conduct themselves in order to have

meaningful negotiations as stated in the case of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project 43. The

construction of the Wall hampers a meaningful negotiation. According to General Assembly

resolution A/ES-10/248 of 24 November 2003 on the re port of the Secretary-General “the barrier’s

construction in the West Bank cannot, in th is regard, be seen as anything but a deeply

counterproductive act. The placing of most of the security structure on occupied Palestinian land

could impair future negotiations.” The negotiation is a matter of trust between two parties and the

construction of the Wall “undermines Palestinians’ trust in the road map process, as it appears to

prejudge final borders of a future of a Palestinia n State” as stated in th e Quartet Statement of

26 September 2003.

10. Mr.President, honourable judges, on the issue of legality, Indonesia strongly believes

44
that there is no legal justification for Israel to construct the Wall . The Wall is illegal because it is

meant to ensure control of the Palestinian Terr itories through various measures. By building the

Wall, the Israeli Government has ordered vast expropriations of land and has destroyed homes,

shops, schools, water networks a nd agricultural land. On the applicability of international

humanitarian law in the Occupied Palestinian Te rritory, the construction of the Wall and related

access arrangements fail to meet the requirements of international human rights and humanitarian

law.

11. Israel is a party to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Protection of

Civilian Persons in Time of War and two intern ational covenants which are the International

4See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, para. 141.
44
The construction also is against the relevant GeneAssembly and Security Council resolutions, particularly
General Assembly resolution A/RES/ES-10/13 on illegal actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory(OPT) of 21October2003; A/RES/58/ 21 on Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine of
3 December 2003; A/RES/58/98 on Israeli Settlements in the OPT, including East Jerusalem, the Occupied Syrian Golan
of 9 December 2003; A/RES/58/99 on Israeli Practices affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People in the OPT,
including East Jerusalem; and Secu rity Council resolutions S/RES/1073 of28September1996 and S/RES/465 of
1 March 1980. - 48 -

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) , and the International Covenant on Social,

Economical and Cultural Rights (ICSECR). However, time and again, Israel refuses to apply the

Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Pales tinian Territory even though the international

community called upon the Israeli Government to accept de jure application of the Fourth Geneva

45
Convention in Palestine . Also according to Article2 of the ICCPR Israel, as a party, must

undertake “to respect and to ensure to all indivi duals within its territory and subject to its

jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Co venant”. Since Palestinian Territories are not

part of Israel, it should strictly follow these prin ciples, not only towards its nationals but also in

protecting the rights of Palestinians. Israel s hould accept the applicability of international human

rights and humanitarian law. Israel should also incur international responsibilities arising from a

46
continuing violation of international obligations .

12. Honourable judges, Article47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention ensures that the

occupied population is entitled to certain rights that

“protected persons . . . shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever,
of the benefits the present convention by any change introduced, as the result of the
occupation of a territory, into the instituti ons or government of the said territory, nor

by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the
Occupying Power”.

International humanitarian law guarantees in Article 27 that

“Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons,

their honor, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their
manners and customs. They shall at a ll times be humanely treated, and shall be
protected especially against all acts of viol ence or threats thereof and against insults
47
and public curiosity.”

The Wall is a combined product of the settleme nts and closure policies. The Wall adds a

permanent barrier to the barriers already put in place through checkpoints. In addition, it is a

permanent expropriation of private property.

45See the United Nations Security Council resolution 681 (United Nations, 1990). Also see United Nations
General Assembly resolution 56/60 that United Nations reaffirmed that this Geneva Convention is applicable to Palestine

Territories.
46See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Pres ence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, para. 118.

47Article 27, “Provisions common to the territories of the pa rties to the conflict and to occupied territories”, the
Fourth Geneva Convention, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949). - 49 -

13. The “Bertini Report” 48has elaborated on the humanita rian situation in Palestine and

shown how closures, sieges, curfews and checkpoints are strategies that have affected the right to

the freedom of movement and property. The report states:

“Palestinians are subject to a variet y of closures, curfews, roadblocks and

restrictions that have caused a near-colla pse of the Palestine economy... and rising
dependency on humanitarian assistance. The restrictions affect almost all activities,
rendering most Palestinians unable to carry out any semblance of a normal life and
49
subject to daily hardships, deprivations and affronts to human dignity.”

The report also states “There is a consensus among all parties, and this report confirms, that the

current regime of closures and curfews is ha ving a devastating imp act on the Palestinian

50
population, both on their economy and the humanitarian situation.”

14. The International Committee of the Red Cr oss in its press release of 18February 2004,

stated inter alia its concern about the humanitarian impact of the West Bank barrier on many

Palestinians living in the Occupied Territory. The ICRC’s opinion is that the West Bank barrier, in

as far as its route deviated from the “Green Lin e” into Occupied Territory, is contrary to

international humanitarian law. The problems af fecting the Palestinian population in their daily

lives clearly demonstrate that it runs counter to Israel’s obligation under international humanitarian

law to ensure the humane treatment and well-be ing of the civilian population living under its

occupation. The measures taken by the Israeli au thorities linked to the construction of the barrier

in the Occupied Territory go far beyond what is permissible for an occupying power under

international humanitarian law. These findings are based on the ICRC’s monitoring of the living

conditions of the Palestinian population and on its analysis of the applicable international

humanitarian law provisions. The Israeli author ities have been regularly informed about the

ICRC’s humanitarian and legal concerns. And th e ICRC therefore calls on Israel not to plan,

construct, or maintain this barrier within the Occupied Territory.

Mr. President, honourable judges, I would now like to mention some provisions violated as a

consequence of the construction of the Wall by Israel.

48
Catherine Bertini, Personal Humanitarian Envoy of the Secr etary-General Mission Report 11–19 August 2002,
see at http://www.caabu.org/press/documents/bertini-report.html.
49
Ibid., Overview, para. 4.
50Ibid., Observations, para. 12. - 50 -

15. The Wall violates Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 2 of

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also makes it clear that “no distinction shall be made

on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which

a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation

of sovereignty”. This approach is also c onfirmed by United Nations General Assembly

resolution48/121 (1993) endorsing the “Vienna Declaration and Action Plan from the World

Conference on Human Rights”. It explicitly ensur es that effective international measures, to

guarantee and monitor the implementation of a human rights standard, should be taken in respect of

people under foreign occupation.

16. Although Article 12 of the ICCPR stated that freedom of movement can be restricted for

security reasons  but the restrictions should be limited to what is necessary and proportionate as
51
mentioned in General Comments No.27 adopted by the Human Rights Committee . The Wall

creates walled-in enclaves confining tens of thou sands of people. It sharply limits freedom of

movement except to a handful of permit-holde rs, and endangers Palestinians’ access to basic

services such as education and medical care and ot her access to work and water. The Israeli

Government cannot use security concerns for Israe lis living in illegal settlements to justify further

illegal changes to the Occupied Territory by cons tructing illegal barriers. To be permissible,

restrictions must be provided by law, must be necessary in a democratic society for the protection

52
of these purposes and must be consistent with all other rights recognized in the Convention .

Restrictive measures must conform to the principle of proportionality; they must be appropriate to

achieve their protective function; they must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which

might achieve the desired result; and they must be proportionate to the interest to be protected 5.

The construction of a wall does not fulfil the obligation under Article 12 of the ICCPR.

17. The Wall also infringes on other Palestinia n rights such as right to property as enshrined

in Article17 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article1 of the ICESCR, and

Article 1 of the ICCPR; the right to health as stated in Article 12 of the ICESCR and Article 56 of

51
See General Comments No.27 (67) on Article12 “Fr eedom of Movement” adopted by the Human Rights
Committee under Article 40, paragraph 4, of the ICCPR.
52
Ibid., para. 11.
53Ibid., para. 14. - 51 -

the Fourth Geneva Convention; the right to education as stated in Article3 of the ICESCR,

Article50 of the Fourth Geneva Convention; the right to work as enshrined in Article23 of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 6 of the ICESCR; the right to food and water

as stated in Article11 of the ICESCR; and lastly, the right to freedom of religion as stated in

Article 18 of the ICCPR, and Article 58 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

18. Honourable judges, as widely reported , the construction of the Wall has destroyed

schools, commercial buildings, homes, water netw orks and has made difficulties for teachers

reaching their classes when travelling. The shops and enterprises have been closed as a

consequence of the Wall. The restriction of m ovement also affects access to sacred places and

mosques. Regarding the right to food and water, the Israeli authority has taken food away from

farmers and the Wall has affected communities’ access to water. Israel, as Occupying Power, does

not fulfil its obligation to ensure the Palestinian right to health. As reported by the Bertini Report

there are “access restrictions... [which] prevent Pa lestinians in need of medical treatment from

54
reaching health services” .

19. On the basis of the additional arguments set out above, as well as already stated in

Indonesia’s Written Statement, Indonesia respectfull y, humbly, requests the august body of this

Court to respond to the request of the General Assembly:

1. The construction of the Wall by Israel in th e Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East

Jerusalem, departing from the Armistice Line of 1949, is illegal under relevant norms and

principles of international law and must be ceased and reversed.

2. Israel is under a legal obligation to restore land and private properties forcibly seized for the

construction of the Wall, to pay full compensati on, to annul all measures enacted regarding the

Wall, to cease restriction on freedom of movement in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,

including East Jerusalem.

3. Israel is under an obligation to fully and eff ectively respect the Fourth Geneva Convention, as

well as Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conve ntions to the Occupied Palestinian Territory,

including East Jerusalem.

5Catherine Bertini, Personal Humanitarian Envoy of the Secr etary-General Mission Report 11–19 August 2002,
Health, para. 34. - 52 -

4. All norms and principles as provided by inte rnational human rights conventions shall be

respected in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and therefore Israel

is under obligations to stop its grave breaches of international human rights law, and to bring

all the perpetrators of human rights atrocities to justice.

5. Last but not least, Israel is under an obligati on to co-operate with international humanitarian

organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Human Rights

Committee to respect the dignity of the Palestinian people.

Mr.President, honourable Members of the C ourt, thank you for your kind attention and

indeed for your patience.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Excellency. I now give the floor to His Royal Highness

Prince Al-Hussein of Jordan.

H.R.H. Prince AL-HUSSEIN: Mr.President and Members of the Court, I should like to

begin by reminding the Court of Jordan’s very direct historical and current interest in the issues

which are now before the Court. Both by virt ue of geography and Jordan’s past, the Kingdom

enjoys a unique relationship with Palestine and th e Palestinians, which we believe affords us a

special insight into developments there, beyond perhaps that which is possible for other States.

Moreover, with the exception of the Palestinians th emselves, we feel it is we, Jordanians, who are

the ones who could be most affected by Israel’s decision to place the Wall where it has, and where

it intends to do so in the near future.

Mr. President, in the written statements submitte d to the Court, considerable importance has

been attached in some quarters to Israel’s security concerns. Jordan has no wish to be dismissive of

any State’s concerns over its security. Jordan has repeatedly condemned the attacks mounted

against civilians in Israel, particularly where they have resulted in the loss of innocent life. Those

suicide bombings have indeed been nothing less than horrific. But, Mr. President, those events do

not stand by themselves. Israel’s argument, centred as it is on the sporadic suicide bombings of the

last three years in particular, must be weighed against almost four decades of Israel dominating

and, by virtue of its occupation, degrading, an entire civilian population; often unleashing practices - 53 -

which have been no less horrific, resulting in a huge number of innocent Palestinian deaths and

casualties.

But, Mr.President, those matters are not wh at these proceedings are about. The question

before the Court concerns a very specific situation. It concerns a wall. And not just “a” wall, but a

very specific wall. It is the “Wall being built by Israel... in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,

including in and around East Jerusalem”, as describ ed in the report of the Secretary-General of

24November2003. It is the specific characteristi cs of that particular Wall which are critical for

the issues which now confront the Court.

Two things about it are of crucial importance. First, much of the Wall now being built by

Israel is in territory which does not belong to Israel, but which is, rather, occupied territory 

territory which, as consistently acknowledged by th e international community for over 35 years, is

subject to a special régime in international law.

It is the fact that the Wall is being built on Occupied Territory which is at the heart of the

present case. If Israel has a security problem, then in principle Israel can protect itself by taking

suitable measures within its own territory. If the Wall had been constructed wholly within Israel’s

sovereign territory, these proceedings would not have come about.

The second crucial factor about the Wall is that it is a wall with the characteristics described

in the Secretary-General’s report. On the screen now (and at tab1 in the judges’ folders) is a

succession of photographs taken of the Wall. The C ourt can see that in physical terms the Wall is

not just a simple fence. It dominates its surroundings, separates homes from their lands, people

from their places of worship as well as from essential services and sources of water, it divides

communities, and cuts a swathe through towns and villages.

Those physical characteristics are supplemente d by an extensive system of administrative

controls. The Wall cannot be looked at on its own, but only in conjunction with the controls which

are an integral part of the whole system.

It is when one looks at the overall picture presented by the Wall and its accompanying

controls that one fears for the future of the Palestin ian inhabitants of the Occupied Territories. It is

consistent with what is known already of the Wa ll to see in its construction steps aimed at the

further assimilation of the Occupied Territories into Israel. - 54 -

The construction of the Wall has, apart from its legal consequences, major practical

consequences, particularly for Jordan. My co untry already hosts a huge number of refugees and

displaced persons; and Jordan is now faced with the threat of a new wave of refugees as a result of

the Wall’s construction.

A second major consideration referred to in a number of written statements is the impact

which the Court’s advisory opinion might have on ongoing international negotiations. This is said

to be a reason for the Court to abstain from gi ving an opinion. While this argument will be

addressed in greater detail by counsel for Jordan, there is, Mr. President and Members of the Court,

a general point I should like to make.

In its Written Statement Israel has emphasized how many attempts it has made to reach a

peaceful settlement of the Palestinian question since the Israeli-Palestinian talks in Oslo in 1993.

Mr.President, Israel has no monopoly of such attempts. We all want a peaceful settlement. My

country, together with the Palestinians, has been every bit as assiduous in its peace efforts.

The latest negotiations to hold centre stage re volve around the Quartet’s “Road Map” which,

in recognition of Jordan’s central contribution to it, was launched in Aqaba last year. But one must

be realistic, Mr.President. Although in princi ple ongoing, in practice those negotiations have

unfortunately made little or no progress in recent mo nths, and there seems little prospect that they

will make much progress in the near future  in large measure, precisely because of Israel’s

construction of the Wall.

Even in the best of circumstances the impact of an advisory opinion on ongoing negotiations

can only be speculative. But in circumstances when negotiations are at best quiescent, speculation

descends into mere guesswork. That cannot be a proper basis on which the Court should decline to

give an advisory opinion.

The request for an advisory opinion has co me from the General Assembly of the United

Nations. The Assembly has had long-standing responsibilities for the status of Palestine, ever since

the British Mandate for Palestine came to an end in 1948. It is still exercising that responsibility

today. And it is in exercising that responsibility th at the Assembly, in order to fulfil its functions,

needs the advisory opinion of the United Nations principal judicial organ as to the legal

consequences which flow from the construction of the Wall. - 55 -

The Assembly knew what it was doing when it decided to seek the Court’s opinion on a

specific legal question, and it took that course for reasons of which it was the best  and only 

judge.

Mr.President and Members of the Court, I should be grateful if you would now invite

SirArthurWatts, QC, counsel for Jordan, to addr ess the Court on certain more specifically legal

issues.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Your Royal Highness. I now give the floor to

Sir Arthur Watts.

Sir Arthur WATTS:

1. Mr. President and Members of the Court, it is an honour for me to appear before the Court

today and to do so on behalf of the Hashemite Ki ngdom of Jordan. Let me begin by reminding the

Court of some aspects of the Wall which these pr oceedings are all about. The representative of

Jordan has, just a moment ago, said something abou t the physical nature of the Wall. I should like

to add a few words about the route which the Wall takes.

2. The starting point has to be the line resulting from the 1949 Jordan-Israel Armistice

Agreement, the “Green Line”. That line is show n on the sketch-map on the screen now and it is at

tab 2 in the judges’ folders. Two things about it are not in the slightest doubt. First, the land lying

generally to the east of the Green Line is not part of Israel; second, ever since the 1967 war, those

lands have been overwhelmingly regarded as “occupied territories” in which Israel has only had the

limited authority of an “Occupying Power”. It is in those Occupied Territories that the Wall is

being built.

3. Certain parts of the Wall have already been completed or are currently under construction.

The sketch-map now on the screen (and it is at tab 3 in the folders) shows these sections. Although

in limited parts the Wall more or less follows the Gr een Line, for most of its length it runs well

within the Occupied Territories.

4. In addition, approval has already been gi ven for further sections of the Wall. The

sketch-map now on the screen (and at tab4 in th e folders) shows these planned stretches of the - 56 -

Wall, together with the stretches already constructed. Again, the planned stretches run for the most

part well within the Occupied Territories.
55
5. But there is still more. Further secti ons of the Wall are officially contemplated . The

sketch-map now on the screen (and it is at tab5) shows these further stretches of the projected

Wall, together with the stretches already completed and planned.

6. Mr.President, recent press reports of small changes to the Wall have no effect upon the

essentials of the Wall’s route as I have described it. Even if such changes are implemented (and

that is by no means certain), they affect only 8 km of the Wall’s eventual 720 km; and that small

section of the Wall is being dismantled only because a back-up wall is already in place behind it.

The great bulk of the Wall and its associated system of controls will remain precisely as they are at

present.

7. Returning, then, to the different sections of the Wall, they all come together to produce the

complete Wall project, as shown on the sketch-map now on the screen (and at tab 6 in the folders).

One thing immediately stands out. This Wall car ves up the Occupied Territories, and cuts off

Palestinian communities from each other and even from their own neighbouring lands.

8. And more than that, Mr. President, it obstructs the “permanent, free and unhindered access

to the Holy Places by all the people of all relig ions and nationalities”. That has been a major

element in United Nations policy on Palestine since resolutions 191(III) and 194(III) in 1948.

And it was reiterated by the General Assembly in resolution 57/111 of 2002.

9. The map, Mr.President, also shows something else. It shows that, despite arguments to

the contrary, this Wall is not primarily about the defence of Israel’s territory. One glance at the

route taken by the Wall gives the lie to that argument. If the Wall is no more than a security barrier

to protect the territory of Israel, why does it fo llow the path it does? How, for example, does a

Wall encircling Qalqilya help to defend nearby Israeli territory? What does the long finger of Wall

extending far into the West Bank in the region of Salfit have to do with the defence of Israel’s

territory? How can the projected eastern stretch of the Wall, from Jenin in the north to Hebron in

the south, be justified as a security barrier for the protection of Israel’s territory, when there is

already the whole stretch of the Wall over to the west to serve for that alleged purpose? If the Wall

5See Jordan, Written Statement, para. 3.7. - 57 -

defends anything, it is  as we shall see in a moment  the position of Israeli settlements in the

Occupied Territories: but no exceptional right of self-defence can be invoked, Mr.President, to

defend that which is itself unlawful. Had Israel built a wall wholly within its own territory, we

would not all be here today. And I would just observe that the Court has been given no cogent

reasons why it was necessary to build this Wall in Occupied Territory, and why a wall built within

Israel’s own territory would not have met the security concerns which are alleged to have provoked

it.

10. Now let me show one more sketch-map. S till on the screen is the complete route of the

Wall  constructed, planned and projected. Now on the screen (and at tab 7 in the folders) is that

same map, but superimposed on it are the locat ions of Israeli settlements in the Occupied

Territories. Although settlements are spread thro ughout the Occupied Territories, 80percent of

the settler population is concentrated in the wester n areas, now being pointed out. It is readily

apparent that the Wall brings the main groups of the settlements into effective contiguity with

Israel’s own territory; it strengthens, develops and consolidates Israel’s settlements.

56
11. Those settlements have long been regard ed by the international community as illegal .

And ever since the Wall began to be constructed, the international community has also regarded the

57
Wall as illegal . Mr.President and Members of the Court, that is the Wall about the legal

consequences of which the General Assembly has requested your opinion.

12. In relation to substantive issues raised by that question the various Written Statements

reveal no significant disagreement. Jordan feels no need to comment on these issues, and stands by

58
what it said in its Written Statement . But the Court’s jurisdiction and its discretionary powers in

relation to advisory opinions ha ve proved more contentious. Jordan has set out in its Written

Statement arguments to show that the Court has jurisdiction to give the requested advisory opinion,

and that there are no compelling reasons for the C ourt to decline to exercise that jurisdiction.

While maintaining those arguments, I should just like to add some comments in response to

arguments to the contrary which have been put forward.

56
See Jordan, Written Statement, para. 5.140.
57General Assembly resolution ES-10/ 13 (21October2003) (adopted 144-4-12); ten Members of the Security

Council, including three of the Permanent Members, also voted in that sense in October 2003.
58Especially at paras. 5.37-5.300. - 58 -

13. The starting point, Mr.President, has to be that (and here I quote from the relevant

General Assembly resolution) 59“the United Nations has a permanent responsibility towards the

question of Palestine until the question is resolved in all its aspects in a satisfactory manner in

accordance with international leg itimacy”. The General Assembly, as one of the principal organs

of the United Nations, shares (as does the Court, also one of the principal organs) that “permanent

responsibility” for the question of Palestine. In exercising that responsibility the Assembly is faced

with a fact  the construction of the Wall. It has to know what this implies for its future actions.

It has therefore asked the Court, as the Organization’ s principal judicial organ, to give an advisory

opinion on the legal consequences of that fact. Nothing could be more natural.

14. Yet it has been urged that the Court, notwithstanding its responsibilities as the United

Nations principal judicial organ, should leave the General Assembly without the advice it needs. In

Jordan’s submission, Mr.President and Members of the Court, for the reasons set out in Jordan’s

60
Written Statement that cannot be the right course for this Court to take. The Court has never

before exercised its discretion so as to decline to give an advisory opinion properly requested by an

authorized organ; and there is no cause for it to do so now.

15. One argument, Mr.President, recalls that the General Assembly’s resolution requesting

an advisory opinion was adopted within the framework of the “Uniting for Peace” resolution 6. It

is said that there had been no failu re by the Security Council to act  a prerequisite for action

under the resolution  since, shortly before the Assembly’s request was made, the Council had

adopted resolution 1515 endorsing the “Road Map”.

16. But Mr.President, the special conditi ons laid down in the “Uniting for Peace”

resolution  including the failure of the Security Counc il to act because of a lack of unanimity of

the Permanent Members  govern the convening of Emergency Special Sessions, not the extent of

the powers exercisable by the Assembly once the Session has been properly convened.

17. Moreover, although Security Council r esolution1515 dealt with general outlines for a

possible Middle East settlement  which had nothing to say about the Wall  it is more to the

59
General Assembly resolution 57/107 (3 December 2002).
60At paras. 5.1-5.36.

61General Assembly resolution 377 (V) (3 November 1950). - 59 -

point that the Council, only one month earlier, also considered the specific issue of the Wall  and

failed to act, precisely because of a veto by one Permanent Member . 62

18. Mr. President, the Assembly needs the opinion it has requested. In the language of the

Court in the Reservations case “the object of this request for an Opinion is to guide the United

63
Nations in respect of its own action” . It is precisely the Assembly’s own future decisions which

require that it should know the legal consequen ces of the building of the Wall: only then can it

properly decide what action to take.

19. The Court’s view of the matter has been remarkably consistent since its pronouncements

in that case. In the Namibia case the Court referred to a request being “put forward by a United

Nations organ with reference to its own decisi ons and it seeks legal advice from the Court on the

consequences and implications of these decisions” 6; in the Western Sahara case the Court said

that “an opinion given by the Court in the presen t proceedings will furnish the General Assembly

with elements of a legal character relevant to its further treatment of the decolonization of Western

65
Sahara” . Mutatis mutandis, Mr. President, that is exactly the situation in the present case.

20. The argument has also been made that since under the Charter the Security Council has

the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, therefore the

General Assembly may not take action which inte rferes with the Council’s exercise of its primary

responsibilities  upon which, in the present context, it has been actively engaged for many years

and is indeed currently engaged.

21. Mr.President, seeking an advisory opinion in no way interferes with the Council’s

primary responsibilities  especially when on the matter in hand the Council was unable to act

because of the negative vote of a Permanent Member. But in any event, the argument cannot stand.

It is startling in its implications, and without f oundation in the Charter. If accepted it would cast

serious doubt on the legality of much that the Gene ral Assembly has done over the past 37 years in

relation to the Occupied Territories. The Council and the Assembly have overlapping

competences, within the limits of Article12 of the Charter. But that Article only precludes the

62
Jordan, Written Statement, para. 5.88.
63
I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 19.
64I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 24, para. 32.

65I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 37, para. 72. - 60 -

Assembly from making a recommendation with regard to a dispute or situation while the Council is

exercising its functions in respect of a dispute or situation: and in this case the Assembly made no

recommendation, only a request to another organ of the United Nations for an advisory opinion in

the exercise of its specific powers under Article 96 of the Charter.

22. The Assembly’s role in relation to th e maintenance of peace and security may be

secondary, but it is not non-existent. It retain s its normal competences under the Charter, and its

request for an advisory opinion falls fairly and squarely within them.

23. It is further argued that the constructi on of the Wall is part of an ongoing dispute

between Israel and Palestine, and that as such the Court should not consider it without the consent

of both parties  which consent Israel, for its part, does not give.

24. First, Mr. President, there is no specific , independent, actually pending, bilateral dispute

between Israel and Palestine about the Wall: none of the usual indicia of the actual existence of a

66
“dispute aris[ing] independent ly in bilateral relations” are on record in this case. And as the

Court said in the Namibia case 6, the existence of legal issues on which there are radically

divergent views between two parties and on which the Court may have to pronounce does not mean

that there exists a dispute.

25. In any event, Mr.President, in the Western Sahara case, in circumstances which are

68
strikingly similar to those of the present case , the Court rejected just such an argument about an

ongoing dispute and the consequent alleged need for consent. It is an argument which harks back

to the decision of the Permanent Court in 1923 in the case concerning the Status of Eastern

69
Carelia . But the circumstances of the present case are entirely different from those of the Eastern

Carelia case 70.

26. In the present case the non-consenting State  Israel  is a Member of the United

Nations, and a party to the Statute of the Court, and has thus agreed to the Court’s advisory

66Western Sahara, I.C.J. Reports 1975, pp. 28-29, para. 46.
67
I.C.J. Reports 1971, para. 34.
68See Jordan, Written Statement, para. 5.29.

691923, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 5.

70Jordan, Written Statement, para. 5.25. - 61 -

procedures. Moreover, Israel has actively par ticipated in these proceedings, both as regards the

composition of the Court and by submitting a written statement.

27. As regards the availability of facts, any f acts which Israel might be able to provide but

which, by its substantive non-participation, it has chosen not to provide do not greatly affect the

issue; indeed, Israel’s conduct in declining to assist the Court estops it from complaining about

alleged lack of facts. The relevant facts are limited  they concern only the construction of the

Wall and do not cover any other asp ects of Arab-Israeli problems in the Middle East. The route to

be taken by the Wall is known; as are the re gulatory controls which supplement the physical

effects of the Wall. All this has been spelled out in several recent independent and authoritative

reports 71. And they have also identified the impact which the Wall has on the local population, and

on local social and economic structures. More facts about the Wall have been set out in the Written

Statements submitted to the Court. And there is a voluminous public record of a kind which the

72 73
Court, in the Hostages and Nicaragua cases, has already accepted as evidence of matters before

it. The Court has more than enough information on which to base its advisory opinion. In the

Western Sahara case the Court set out the test to be met:

“The issue is whether the Court ha s before it sufficient information and
evidence to enable it to arrive at a judicial conclusion upon any disputed questions of

fact the determination of which is necessary74or it to give an opinion in conditions
compatible with its judicial character.” .

That test is amply met in the present case.

28. Moreover, Mr. President, the specific question put to the Court does not directly address

a legal question actually pending between two States. The Court’s advisory opinion will not settle

any existing bilateral dispute, since it will not deal with such a dispute: the Court’s opinion will

deal only with a particular request relating to certain legal consequences flowing from a given

situation; it will only be “advisory”, and it will only be addressed to the General Assembly.

29. The fact that the question put to the Court by the Assembly may have political aspects or

motivation, or that the Court’s opinion may when given to the Assembly have implications in the

71
Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights (8 September 2003); Report of the
Secretary-General (24 November 2003 and 29 January 2004); and the ICRC Report (19 February 2004).
72
I.C.J. Reports 1980, pp. 9-10, paras. 12-13.
73I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 40-41, paras. 62-63.

74I.C.J. Reports 1975, pp. 28-29, para. 46. - 62 -

wider political arena, is, as the Court has often indicated, a separate matter which does not affect

the Court’s ability to give its advisory opinion on what is clearly a legal question . It is significant

that, on every occasion when such an argument has been ra ised, the Court has rejected it. In the

Nicaragua case, in 1986, the Court noted that it “has never shied away from a case brought before

76
it merely because it had political implications...” . It has not done so subsequently, Mr.

President, and Jordan submits that it should not start doing so now.

30. Nor can the Court be regarded as being in some way politicized just because it fulfils its

judicial function by giving an advisory opinion on a matter with political implications: the Court,

Mr.President and Members of the Court, is a mo re robust institution than that suggestion would

imply. The issue is not the politicization of the Court, but rather emphasizing that the questions for

decision are purely legal.

31. It is particularly wrong, Mr. President, to treat the subject-matter of the Court’s advisory

opinion as essentially a bilateral dispute between Is rael and Palestine, when that subject-matter

directly concerns the international community as a whole, the United Nations in general, and the

General Assembly in particular. The legal issues before the Court touch not just on some bilateral

issue but on Israel’s obligations erga omnes 7. As for the United Nations, it has a “permanent

responsibility” for the question of Palestine until that question “is resolved . . . in accordance with

international legitimacy” 78. The problem to which the Wall has given rise is a problem between

one State  Israel  and the United Nations, two principal or gans of which have consistently and

frequently, over 37 years, determined that that State has only the limited authority of an Occupying

Power within areas characterized as Occupied Territories. It is be cause the Wall is being

constructed almost entirely in the Occupied Territo ries that the General Assembly has felt the need

for the Court’s opinion as to the legal consequences. The General Assembly has had a regular and

long-standing concern with Israel’s conduct in th e Occupied Territories. The issue before the

75
Jordan, Written Statement, paras. 5.8-5.14, 5.34.
76
I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 435, para. 96.
77See Switzerland, Written Statement, para. 17.

78General Assembly resolution 57/107 (3 December 2002); above, para. 13. - 63 -

Court is manifestly one “which arose during th e proceedings of the General Assembly and in

relation to matters with which it was dealing” . 79

32. It is suggested, Mr.President, that sin ce the General Assembly has already determined

that the building of the Wall is illegal, there is consequently no value in the Court giving its

advisory opinion on the same matter. But, Mr. President, a determination by the General Assembly

that a particular state of affairs is illegal is, while indicative of an opinio juris on the part of the

80
international community , it is nevertheless a determination by a political organ of the United

Nations: the confirmation, if so it be, of that determination by the United Nations principal judicial

organ does add something of legal value to what th e General Assembly has already said. The

argument in any event misrepresents the questi on on which the General Assembly has asked the

Court for its opinion. The General Assembly’s ques tion is not whether the Wall is illegal, but asks

about the legal consequences of constructing the Wall. Those consequences go much wider than

any finding of illegality. It is the wider conse quences, not yet addressed by the General Assembly,

upon which the General Assembly seeks the Court’s guidance. Finally  and this is perhaps the

overriding consideration  the General Assembly has asked for an advisory opinion on a matter on

which it believes it will be assisted by having the Court’s views before it: the Court is, indeed, well

placed to make a constructive contribution to a diffi cult situation at the heart of which lie issues of

international law. As the Court has already indi cated, it is for the General Assembly, and not for

the Court, to determine whether the General Asse mbly needs the advisory opinion which it has

sought and what use to make of it 81.

33. The General Assembly has also been said, Mr.President, to have wrongfully prejudged

the Court’s conclusions by formulating the questi on put to the Court in the way it has, by using

terms such as “occupied territories” and “Occ upying Power”. These terms, it is suggested,

inherently and implicitly give to the Green Line the character of a “presumptive and immutable

border of a putative Palestinian State” 8, thereby prejudicing, so it is said, the outcome of whatever

final territorial settlement might be reached.

79
Western Sahara, I.C.J. Reports 1975, pp. 28-29, para. 46.
80
See Jordan, Written Statement, para. 5.89 ff.
81Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 237, para. 16; and see Jordan, Written Statement, para. 5.33.

82Israel, Written Statement, para. 2.9. - 64 -

34. That argument has no merit. First, ever since Israel began its occupation of the

Palestinian Arab West Bank territories and East Jer usalem as a result of the June 1967 war, the

Security Council and General Assembly, often una nimously or by overwhelming majorities, and

including binding decisions of the Council, have ne ver faltered in their characterization of Israel’s

status as being that of an occupying power, a nd of the territories in question as being occupied

territories to which a special international legal régi me applies, including in particular that of the

Fourth Geneva Convention. Even the Road Map refers to “the occupation that began in 1967” 83.

That consistent record of the international community’s opinio juris cannot just be swept aside and

ignored.

35. Second, the argument misunderstands the significance of the Green Line. It is, in origin,

the Armistice Demarcation Line, laid down in Ar ticleV of the Jordan-Israel General Armistice
84
Agreement of 3April 1949 . But it was given additional significance by Security Council

resolution242 of 1967, which affirmed, unanimously, the principle of Israel’s withdrawal of its

armed forces “from territories occupied in the recent conflict”  and that meant, and could only

mean, territories on the non-Israeli side of the Green Line. Thus the Green Line is the starting line

from which is measured the extent of Israel’s o ccupation of non-Israeli territory; originating in

1949 as an armistice line, it beca me in 1967 the line to the Israeli side of which Israel had to

withdraw its forces, and on the non-Israeli side of which territory was “occupied” by Israel. The

terms of the General Assembly’s request for an advisory opinion reflect that consistent United

Nations position and involves no implication that the Green Line is to be a permanent frontier. It is

not the General Assembly’s implicit reference to th e Green Line which is prejudicial, but rather, as

many States have recognized 85, the departure of the Wall from the Green Line which prejudices

future negotiations because it pre-empts the boundaries of the envisaged two-State solution.

36. It is also suggested that for the Court to respond to the question put by the General

Assembly would prejudice progress in the current negotiations for a Middle East peace settlement,

83
Third paragraph.
84
United Nations doc. S/1302/Rev.1 (3 April 1949).
85E.g. statement by Italy on behalf of the EU and accession States, General Assembly, 8 December 2003. - 65 -

which are taking place on the basis of the “Road Map”, including certain issues known as

“permanent status” issues.

37. The arguments about the possible impact of the Court’s advisory opinion on the overall

peace process need disentangling.

38. At the outset one must not overlook two things. The first is that the General Assembly,

when requesting the Court’s opinion, was well awar e of the Road Map negotiations; it took them

into account and referred to them, directly or by reference, in resolutions ES-10/13 and ES-10/14.

The second is that one of the “Quartet” co-sponsoring the Road Map is the United Nations itself;

the General Assembly  the Organization’s principal deliberative organ  in putting the request

for an advisory opinion to the Court will not have ignored the possible effect of its actions upon

negotiations of which the United Nations itself was a co-sponsor.

39. Turning to the particular arguments, the fi rst I would refer to is to the effect that the

Israeli-Palestinian dispute over the Wall should be dealt with by negotiation within the framework

of the Road Map rather than by way of an advisory opinion.

40. But this argument elides the very particular question on which an opinion is being sought

with what is presented as a distinct Israeli-Pale stinian dispute. But as we have just seen, the

request for an opinion did not focus on some already-pending bilateral dispute; it focused on a

quite different question, about legal consequences, which is di rectly related to the General

Assembly’s future course of action.

41. Moreover, even if the question did relate to a bilateral dispute, which it does not, the

suggestion that it should be resolved within th e framework of the Road Map misunderstands the

nature of the “Road Map process”. It is a diploma tic plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

by negotiations 86. In legal terms it expresses little more than aspirations; at most it is a pactum de

contrahendo.

42. In particular it has no institutional cont ent which enables it to function as a dispute

settlement mechanism. It is not a vehicle for resolving specific legal issues  particularly disputes

about matters which do not in any event feature in the Road Map. Nowhere does the Road Map

8One of the principal proponents of the Road Map has saithat its “essence... is a negotiating process”, and
that it involves “a phased diplomatic framework for achieving a final a nd comprehensive settlement of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict”, and “a mechanism... forizing a vision” (US, Written Statement, paras.2.6, 2.4 and
5.1); another has said that it “involves a delicate process of mutual concessions” (UK, Written Statement, para. 3.25). - 66 -

use a term like “dispute”; and in the list of the various fields in which reciprocal steps by the

parties are to be taken  “political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building

fields”  there is no mention of “legal” matters.

43. Even if the Road Map did envisage settlement of a particular dispute through negotiation

(which it does not), such a process would, in any event, not be an exclusive vehicle for settling

disputes about particular matters such as the Wa ll. It in no way excludes concurrent action on

general or particular aspects of the Middle East problem by the General Assembly: indeed, since

the Road Map was promulgated the Assembly has c onsidered a host of matters directly arising out

of the Israeli-Palestinian problem, with no suggestion that it was thereby doing something

improper. It is, Mr.President and Members of the Court, the building of the Wall which is

inconsistent with the principles underlying the Ro ad Map and the Security Council resolution, not

the Assembly’s legitimate request for an a dvisory opinion. As the United Nations

Secretary-General said in his report last November, “In the midst of the Road Map peace

process . . . the Barrier’s construction in the West Bank cannot . . . be seen as anything but a deeply

counterproductive act.” 88

44. The next line of argument to be considered is that the giving of an advisory opinion

would be unhelpful to the broader peace process within the diplomatic framework of the Road Map

because, it is said, it would make the overall negotiating process more difficult.

45. But that is a matter about which one can only speculate. It must not be forgotten that the

Court is called upon in these proceedings to consid er only a very specific factual situation, on the

legal consequences of which the Assembly stands in need of the Court’s opinion. Speculation

about the political consequences which might follow for the peace process is a political matter into

which the Court should not allow itself to be drawn.

46. Moreover, the Court has already rejected the argument that because the giving of an

advisory opinion might have an impact on some current negotiating process therefore the Court

ought to refrain from giving an opinion properly requested of it. In the Nuclear Weapons case that

87
Para. 1 of the Introduction.
8A/ES-10/248, 24 November 2003, para. 29. - 67 -

argument was advanced, and the Court’s response was clear: “the Court cannot regard this factor

89
as a compelling reason to decline to exercise its jurisdiction” .

47. The alleged impact on the Road Map negotia tions of the Court’s future advisory opinion

is not only wholly speculative, it is also wholly im precise: all we have had is generalizations. The

Road Map is set out in some six-and-a-half pa ges of single-spaced print. The Court has seen

hundreds of pages of written statements. Yet not once has any State pointed to a single provision

in the Road Map, or the “permanent status” agenda , which would be directly affected by or need

changing as a result of the Court’s advisory opinion.

48. It may be that much of the concern felt about the possible impact of the Court’s opinion

is based on a fear that the Court might range far and wide over a myriad legal issues which might

be thought to be raised by the question put to the Court. But this is not so, Mr.President. The

Court, in answering the question put to it, will no doubt keep strictly to the issues raised directly by

that question. And being an advisory opinion, the Court has the possibility of saying only as much

about any particular aspect of the question put to it as it considers appropriate.

49. The further argument has been advanced th at the question put to the Court is so complex

and uncertain that it is not a legal question at all, and raises such complex issues of fact and law as

to be unsuitable for determination by an advisory opinion.

50. This argument has no substance. The rele vant facts are no more complex than the Court

has been faced with in other advisory opinions, an d in fact they are very limited in scope, as I have

already noted 90.

51. The focus for the Court’s opinion is also limit ed. It is also clear. The Court is asked to

give its opinion on “the legal c onsequences” of the construction of that Wall. There is nothing

uncertain about a question so phrased. There can be nothing inappropriate in asking a judicial

organ to give an opinion on th e legal consequences flowing from a specific situation about which

the facts are well known: indeed questions about the legal consequences of an act are

quintessentially legal questions since, in the words of the Court in the Western Sahara case, they

are “framed in terms of law and raise problems of international law... [and] are by their very

89
I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 237, para.. 17.
90See above, para. 27. - 68 -

nature susceptible of a reply based on law; indeed, they are scarcely susceptible of a reply

91
otherwise than on the basis of law” .

* *

52. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in the light of Jordan’s careful study of the Written

Statements submitted in these proceedings, Jordan confirms the submissions which it made at the

conclusion of its own Written Statement.

53. Mr. President and Members of the Court, that concludes my statement. I should like to

thank the Court for the courtesy with which it has heard my submissions on behalf of the

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir Arthur. This concludes the oral statements and

comments of Jordan.

The oral proceedings will resume this afternoon at 3 o’clock in order for Madagascar,

Malaysia and Senegal to be heard on the question submitted to the Court.

The sitting is closed.

The Court rose at 1.05 p.m.

___________

9I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 18, para. 15.