Non- Corrigé
Uncorrected
InternationalCourt Cour internationale
of Juotice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
Public si t ting
held on Monday 7 mrch 1994, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Bedjaoui presiding
in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions
Between Qatar and Bahrain
(Qatar v. Bahrain)
VERBATIM RECORD
ANNEE 1994
Audience publique
tenue le lundi 7 mars 1994, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
SOUS la présidence de M. Bedjaoui, Président
en l'affaire de la Délimitation maritime et des questions territoriaiee
entre le Qatar et Bahrein
(Qatar c. Bahreïnl
COMPTE RENDU President Bedjaoui
Vice-President Schwebel
Judges Oda
Ag0
Sir Robert Jennings
Judges Tarassov
Guillaume
Shahabuddeen
Aguilar Mawdsley
Weeramantry
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Judges ad hoc Valticos
Ruda
Registrar ~aiencia-OspinaPrésents : M. Bedjaoui, Président
M. Schwebel, Vice-président
MM. Oda
Ag0
sir Robert Jennings
MM. Tarassov
Gui1laume
Shahabuddeen
Aguilar Mawdsley
Weeramantry
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma, juges
MM. Valticos,
Ruda, juges ad hoc
M. Valencia-Ospina, GreffierThe Government of Qatar is be represented by:
H.E. Dr. Najeeb Al-Nauimi, Minister LegalAdviser,
as Agent and Counsel;
Mr. Adel Sherbini, Legal Expert,
as Legal Adviser;
Mr. Sami Abushaikha, Legal Expert,
as Legal Adviser;
Mr. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, Professor of InternationalLaw at the
University of Paris 1,
Mr. Jean Salmon, Professor at the Université libre de Bruxelles,
Mr. R. K. P. Shankardass, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court ofIndia,
Former Presidentof the InternationalBar Association,
Sir Ian Sinclair, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Barrister at Law, Member of the
Institute of InternationalLaw,
Sir Francis Vallat, G.B.E.,K.C.M.G., Q.C., Professor emeritus of
International Law at the Universityof London,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Richard Meese, Advocate, partner in Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
Miss Nanette E. Pilkington, Advocate, Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
Mr. David S. Sellers, Solicitor, Frere Cholmeley, Paris.
The Government of Bahrain is represented by:
H.E. Dr. Husain Mohammed Al Baharna, Minister of State for Legal
Affairs, Barrister at Law, Member of the International Law
Commission of the United Nations,
as Agent and Counsel ;
2 .
Mr. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor emeritus
ln the University of Cambridge,
Mr. Keith Highet, Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and --
New York, -5-
Le Gouvernement du Qatar est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Najeeb Al-Nauimi, ministre conseiller juridique,
comme agent et conseil;
M. Adel Sherbini, expert juridique,
comme conseil 1er juridique;
M. Sami Abushaikha, expert juridique,
comme conseiller juridique;
M. Jean-PierreQuéneudec, professeur dedroit international à
l'université de Paris 1,
M. Jean Salmon, professeur à l'université librede Bruxelles,
M. R. K. P. Shankardass, SeniorAdvocate à la Cour suprême
de l'Inde, ancien président de l'International Bar Association,
Sir Ian Sinclair, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Barrister at Law,membre de
l'Institut de droit international,
Sir Francis Vallat, G.B.E., K.C.M.G., Q.C., professeur éméritede
droit international à l'universitéde Londres,
comme conseils et avocacs;
M. Richard Meese, avocat, associé du cabinet Frere Cholmeley à Paris,
Mlle Nanette E. Pilkington,avocac, du cabinet Frere Cholmeley à
Paris,
M. David S. Jellers, Solicitor, du cabinet Frere Cholmeley à Paris.
Le Gouvernement de Bahrein est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Husain Mohammed Al Baharna, ministre d'Etat chargé des
affaires juridiques,Barrister at Law,membre de la Commission du
droit international del'organisationdes Nations Unies,
comme agent et conseil;
M. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., professeur émérite, ancien
titulaire de la chaire Whewell à l'universitéde Cambridge,
M. Keith Highet, membre des barreaux du district de Columbia et de
New York,Mr- Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, Professor of InternationalLaw at
the Law School, Catholic University, Montevideo, Uruguay,
Mr. Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C., Honorary Professorof
InternationalLaw and Director of the Research Centre for
InternationalLaw, University of Cambridge; Member of the Institut
de droit international,
Mr. Prosper Weil, Professor emeritus at theUniversitb de droit,
d 'économie et de sciences social es de Paris,
as Counsel and Advoca tes;
Mr. Donald W. Jones, Solicitor, Trowers & Hamlins, London,
Mr. John H. A. McHugo, Solicitor, Trowers & Hamlins, London,
Mr. David Biggerstaff, Solicitor,Trowers & Hamlins, London,
as Counsel .M. Eduardo Jiménez deAréchaga, professeur de droitinternational à
la faculté de droit de l'universitécatholique de Montevideo,
Uruguay,
M. Elihu Lauterpacht,C.B.E., Q.C., professeur honoraire de droit
internationalet directeur du Research Centre for International Law
de l'universitéde Cambridge; membre de l'institut de droit
international,
M. Prosper Weil, professeur émérite à l'universitéde droit,
d'économie et de sciences sociales de Paris,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Donald W. Jones, Solicitor, du cabinet Trowerset Hamlins à
Londres,
M. John H. A. McHugo, Solicitor, du cabinet Trowers et Harnlins à
Londres,
M. David Biggerstaff,Solicitor, du cabinet Trowers et Hamlins à
Londres,
comme conseils. -8-
THE PRESIDENT: Je vous prie de vous asseoir. La Cour reprend ce
matin ses audiences pour entendreles représentantsde Bahreîn dans la
suite de leurs plaidoiriesen l'affaire de la Délimitation maritimeet
des questions territoriales entre Qata et Bahrein, compétenceet
recevabilité. J'appelle à la barre le professeur Lauterpacht.
PROFESSOR LAUTERPACHT:
SECTION 1 - THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE 1990 MINUTES
Thank you Mr. President. Mr. Presidentand Members of the Court.
You will recall that 1 concluded my argumenton Friday by suggesting
that, although Qatar might attempt to distort the significance of the
Bahrain ForeignMinisteris statement by pointing out that it was made
long after the relevant events,the fact remained thatQatar has put in
no evidence to contradictit. In such circumstances, 1 submitted, the
Court is entitled to pay regard to what the Minister said as regards his
intentions or more pertinently, the intentionsof Bahrain during the Doha
discussions.
Evidential value of statementsby Foreign Ministers
1 have been unable to find any case in which this Court orany other
international tribunal has rejected the evidence submittedby a Foreign
Minister as excluding his intention to enter into a cornmitmentbinding
his State. There is certainly no a priori reason for excludingsuch
relevant and uncontradictedevldence. At one point (CR 94/2, p. 66)
Professor Quéneudec appearedto be arguing that such evidence was
irrelevant because reliance upon it, as he said, tlamounts to forgetting that an agreement between Statesis not
necessarily made on the basis of the intentions of this or that
party but only on the basis of a written formulationof what
appears to be the expression of the cornmonintention of the
authors of the text".
That is what Professor Quéneudecsaid. However that may be, the real
point in this case is that the statementof the Minister stands as the
clearest evidence of the absence of a common intention. Herewe are
concerned not with stating a common intention regardingthe meaning of
certain words used in a text. We are concerned with the very opposite.
Where the sole representativeof one of the Parties says in relation to a
particular episode: "1 had no intentionof binding my country to the
possibility of unilateral submissionto the Courtu, that entirely
excludes the existence of the requisite common intentionto bring such a
commitment into existence
In this same connectlon, it is also necessaryto respond to the
proposition advanced an behalf of Qatar that the Foreign Minister's
statement cannotbe taken lnto account as an item of travaux
préparatoires in determinlng the meaning of the Minutes. That argument
mlstakes the use thaz Bahraln makes of the Foreign Minister's statement
It 1s not introduced as itself beinq part of the travauxpréparatoires
For one thing, since Bahrain argues that theMinutes are nota treaty,
the concept of travauxpréparatoiresas an aid to treaty interpretation,
as such is not relevant. But in so far as travauxpréparatoires are
relevant as a common sense aid to identifyingthe nature of the
situation, the statement is introduced as evidence of the travaux
préparatoires - a very differentthing. The replacementin the Minutes
of the words "either of the two parties' by the words "the partiesw is an - 10 -
objective fact. The Foreign Ministerls statement is merely themeans by
which that point is proved anda meaning is put upon the alteration.
The legal status of the 1990 Minutes
1 now turn, Mr. president,to the considerations which support
Bahrainls submission that the 1990 Minutes do not amount to a binding
treaty or other agreement. The relevant part of Qatar's argument in the
contrary sense was presented bymy learned friend, SirIan Sinclair. 1
shall, therefore,begin by inviting the Court to scrutinize closely the
relevant pages of the Courtls record, CR 94/2. The material pages are
those between pages 24 and 38. It is there, if anywhere, that one must
expect to find the most vital part of Qatar's case - the proof of the
assertion that the 1990 Minutes constitutea treaty. If the Court isnot
persuaded by this sectionof Qatar's argument, the whole of the rest of
Qat?.rlscase fails. Everyone who has spoken on behalf of Qatar has
proceeded on the assumption that the 1990 Minutes are aninternational
agreement. Only Sir Ian Sinclair sets about trying to prove it.
Leaving aside Sir Ian's examination ofdoctrine on the subject, the
real question is, how does he treat the facts of this case so as to reach
the conclusion that ne see~s? Where 1s the evidence that Bahrain
intended to create a binding legal relationship with Qatar operating
between them withinthe sphere of international law?
Designation of 1990 Minutes in eame terms as the Minutee of 1988
Permit me to go rapidly through thepages of the relevant sectionof
Sir Ian's argument. First, at page 27, he observes that "the fact that
the Doha Minutes are designated as 'minutes1is, of course, far £rom
being evidence that they do not constitutean internationalagreementT1. - 11 -
As a purely theoreticalpoint, 1 would not quarrel with that. But we are
not in a purely theoretical sphere. Here weare in the realm of hard
facts. And the relevantfacts are that in Arabic the 1990 Minutes carry
the same titles as the Minutes of the Tripartite Committeemeetings held
on 17 January and 7 December 1988 - the title was "Minutes of a Meeting".
If, therefore, the title given to the 1990 Minutes is to be given the
same weight as an indicator of intention as is given to the same title in
the earlier Minutes of 1988, signed by the two sides, the title "Minutes
of Meeting" by itself is emphaticallynot an indication that the minutes
are intended to be legally binding - in the sense of a final agreement.
Like other "Minutes"they record provisionally agreed stepsen route to a
final agreement.
Failure of Qatar to establish treaty character of the 1990 Minutes
So what does counsel for Qatar next introduce as proof that the Doha
Minutes were intended tobe legally binding? Fourelements are listed in
the middle of page 30 of the CR.
The first 1s an examination ofthe terms used to express the
intentionsof the Parties. Thls immediately becomes not ademonstration
of "intention"but an indicationof some operative provisionsof the
minutes - the reaffirmationof what had previously been agreed; the
statement that theParties would be at liberty tosubmit the matter to
the Court after 15 May 1991; and the acceptance by Qatar of the Bahraini
formula. Those items are describedby Qatar as "self-evidentlya
commitment of a legal character" and "self-evidentlythe written
expression of a legal commitmentundertakenby Qatar". But to speak in
this way of something being "self-evidently"a "legal comrnitment~ - 12 -
involves assuming preciselythe conclusion that Qatar must prove. One
must bear in mind that the mere fact that something is written dom in a
document, even with the use of the verb "agreedU,does not create a
legally binding agreement. This, so 1 am told, is particularly so in
Background and circumstances of 1990 Minutee do not establish their
treaty character
Next, counsel for Qatar presentsthe "backgroundagainst which the
text was negotiatedw as confirming the legal character of the cornmitment
of the two Parties (p. 31). But when carefully read it will be seen that
the subject-matterof the passage in which this point is pursued has no
bearing on the alleged legalcharacter of the commitment. The paragraph
contains the following four items said to be "of particular significance
in ascertaining the object and purpose of the Treatyu: the failure of
Saudi Arabia to secure a solution to the dispute: SaudiArabials
initiative leadingto the conclusion of the 1987 Agreement; the setback
to the process of referring the disputed mattersto the Court; and the
subsequent lack of progress by Saudi Arabia in 1989 and 1990. My learned
friend's conclusion on this "background" -which we must remember was
introduced by him as a contribution towards "confirmingthe legal
character of the comrnitments of the Parties" was as follows:
"Our notional observer would no doubt have anticipated in these
circumstances that a major effortwould be made at the GulfCo-
operation Council summit meeting in Doha in 1990 to breathe new
life into the agreed proposa1 that the matters in dispute
between Bahrain and Qatar shouldbe referred to this Court; and
Our notional observer would not have been mistaken".
But how do words such as these secure the conversion of these
background matters into proof that the Minutes wereintended to be a - 13 -
legally-bindingtreaty? And whois Our "notionalobserverw? For the
purposes of this discussion there cannotbe a "notional"observer. He
has to be an actual participant and that can only be Shaikh Mohammed, the
Bahraini Foreign Minister. Andhe would not have anticipated anysuch
developmentat the Doha meeting because he would haveknown that in the
course of the meeting held in early Decernber 1990 to fix the summit
agenda a decision had been taken to exclude the dispute £rom discussion.
So, what cornesnext in the Qatari chronicleof matters said to
demonstrate the legal character of the Minutes? On page 32 there begins
a section with the words: "This brings me to a considerationof the
circumstances inwhich the textof the Doha Minutes was ad~pted.~~ But
the fact that this sectionis presented aspart of an argument that the
Doha Minutes are legally binding seems then to have been overlooked, in
my learned friend's speech. First, there are paragraphs about 'Othe
strange episode ofthe appearance of Dr. Al-Baharna at Doha" - to which
the Agent has already replied. Then the suggestion is put forward
(p.33) that it is astonishing thatBahrain made noattempt to secure the
inclusion in the Minutes of a reference to the continuing needfor a
Special Agreement. Astonishing ornot, it is difficult to seehow the
absence of such an attempt constitutesproof that the Minutes are a
legally-binding agreement. Inany case, given that the Parties had
previously agreed to proceedvia a special agreement, the reaffirmation
of that agreement ln paragraph 1 of the Minutes was a sufficient
statement of their intention.
The next point (at p. 35) is described by Sir Ian as "more generalM.
There he stresses the "importanceof the history of the negotiation ofa
compromissory clausein the contextof a challenge by a State to the - 14 -
jurisdictionof the Court basedon that compromissoryclause1@. Once
again, it is impossible to discernin this point any contribution to the
proof of the proposition that the 1990 Minutes werea legally binding
agreement.
Subeequent conduct does not establieh treaty statue of the 1990 Minutes
Finally, Sir ïan commences (at p. 35) a paragraph on the subsequent
behaviour of the parties. This, he says, uconfirmsthe Qatari analysis
of the significance of the Doha Minutesn. What is the subsequent conduct
thus invoked? Sir Ian cites the conduct ofQatar in giving the King of
Saudi Arabia in May and June 1991 noticeof Qatar's intention to
institute proceedings unilaterally against Bahrain in July. The
paragraph concludes"that Saudi Arabia did not seek to dissuade Qatar
from giving effect to its stated intention after 26 June 1991". For
reasons that 1 shall give later, towards the end of my argument, it is
scarcely possibleto regard thls eplsode as evidence that Saudi Arabia
regarded the 1990 Minutes as ~indinq. But even if it were, ~t would
still do nothing to show that Bahraic must have understood sixmonths
earlier that the Minutes were intended to be legally binding.
With that item Qatar concludes its proof, so-called, that the 1990
Minutes were intendedto be legally binding. No reference is made by
Qatar to the Saudi Arabian draft joint agreement of September 1991 - a
text which can hardly be reconciled withany suggestion that Saudi Arabia
regarded the 1990 Minutes as bindingin the sensr asserted by Qatar.
1 realize, Mr. Presidentand Members of the Court, that, at the speed
1 am obliged to proceed, it may not have been easyfor the Court to
follow me through thisprocess of showing just how Qatar's counsel@s - 15 -
demonstrationof the legal quality of the 1990 Minutes is, in truth, no
demonstrationat all. But 1 would earnestly invite theCourt, when it
has the time to do so, to retrace in a more deliberate way the ground
that 1 have just covered. My submission isthat it will not find in
this central sectionof Sir Ianls argument the proof upon which Qatar has
rested its case.
Other Qatari arguments not conceded
This, of course, is not the end ofthe points made by Qatar in
support of its position on the treaty status of the 1990 Minutes. But
limitationsof time oblige me to leave aside such interesting matters as
the treatmentof international agreementsin the Bahraini Constitution,
the law relating to the entry into force of treaties and the significance
of Qatar's failure to register the 1987 Agreement and the 1990 Minutes
until the last possible moment. But ln leaving those matters untouched,
1 should not be taken as admitting the correctnessof what Qatar has
said. 1 respeccfïllyrefer the C3ür: Co the Bahraini written pleadings
on these points.
The importance attached by Qatar to the treaty status of the 1990 Minutes
1 conclude my arguments relating to the legal status of the 1990
Minutes by venturingto emphasize the cardinal importancethat attaches
to Sir Ian's attempt to establish that the 1990 Minutes have the quality
of a treaty or internationalagreement. In its written pleadings,
Qatar's treatment of the subject was, to Say the least, slender. No
effort was madepositively to show that the 1990 Minutes possessed the
legal quality attributed to them by Qatar. It is to the credit of
Sir Ian that he has recognized theneed to Say something more on the - 16 -
subject. But in so doing, he has, of course, admitted the need for the
discussion. He must show that the 1990 Minutes have the legalquality
that he says they have. He has, moreover, indirectly invited the kind of
detailed scrutinyof his arguments on which 1 have embarked this morning.
The threshold question which, 1 suggest, the Court should ask is this:
How could any negotiator on behalf of Bahrain have known between 23 and
25 December 1990 that the document he was discussing was to be regarded
as in any way legally different fromearlier documents bearing exactly
the same title, introduced by virtually the same words and signed by the
same people in exactly the same way? A specific answermust be given to
this question if Qatar is even to begin to move forward with its case.
In my submission,Mr. President, Qatar has not provided a sufficient
answer to the question. As a close readingof the arguments of al1 those
who have spoken on behalf of Qatar shows, the process of reasoning
required to prove Qatar's assertion that the 1990 Minutes are a treaty
has been replacedby a process of repetition. It is alrnostas if Qatar
had taken the view that if everyone on its side simply assumed the treaty
quallty of the 1990 Minutes and constantly assertedthat assumption as a
received truth, the Court might be so hypnotized as eventually to accept
it as an article of faith. That is why, Mr. President, 1 have felt it
necessary to subject my learned friend's presentation to so close an
examination and 1 respectfully submitthat the Court should findthat the
1990 Minutes do not have the legal qualityof a treaty and cannot form
the basis forany recourse to the jurisdictionof the Court under
Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute. - 17 -
The 1990 Minutes as a step in an evolving diplomatic process
The reality is that the 1990 Minutes are not a treaty. They are,
like the earlierMinutes of the Tripartite Committee,simply steps
towards the ultimate goal of a Special Agreement. They record
provisional points of agreement which should eventually find a place in a
final comprehensive,legally binding, Special Agreement. Clearly, Qatar
provisionallyagreed to acceptthe Bahraini formula. Both sides pledged
themselves, if circumstancesso dictated, to resume good faith
negotiations towards a SpecialAgreement. Both sides reaffirmed their
adhesion to their earlier provisional agreements reachedin the 1987
Agreement andduring the work of the Tripartite Committee. Moreover,it
is certain that, in specificallyamending the Omanidraft, Bahrain
excluded any possibility of it being understood that Bahrain was
consenting,even provisionally,to unilateral seisinof the Court by
either Party.
Ali of this is clear from the verynature of the Minutes. It is
equally clear from the actuai words used, and it is to these that 1 now
turn.
SECTION 2 - THE WORDING OF THE 1990 MINUTES
Mr. President and Members ofthe Court, 1 will now examine the final
matter on which 1 wish to address you - the wording of the central
provision of paragraph 2 of the 1990 Minutes.
The present dispute
The Court hardly needs tobe reminded that the core of the
disagreement between Bahrain and Qatar in the present proceedings is that
Qatar maintainsthat the proceedingsmay be cornmenced unilaterallyby an - 18 -
application and Bahrain contends that the proceedings can be begun only
by the notification to the Court of a joint submission by the two Parties
together.
Paragraph 2 of the 1990 Minutes
At the centre of this disagreement is the wordingof paragraph 2 of
the 1990 Minutes. For the moment it is sufficient to use the English
translation appendedby Qatar to its Application. This is the middle
column in No. 8 of your Hearing Book. There you will see the vital words
in the second sentenceof paragraph 2
"After the end of this period [that is the period till
May 19911, the parties may submit the matter to the
InternationalCourt of Justice in accordance with the Bahraini
Formula, which has been acceptedby Qatar, and the proceedings
arising therefrom ..."
The issue, in its barest terms, is whether the words "the parties"
means "either of the parties" or "both the parties together"
The need to give a meaning to words in the Arabic language
The Minutes were, of course, prepared in Arabic and the relevant
words in Arabic are "al-tarafan". Now, 1 realize that it is a rare task
for the Court to have to attribute a meaning to words in a language which
is not one of the official languages of the Court, but 1 shall try to
keep the matter as uncomplicatedas possible. The fact that this
exercise is undertaken by one who does not speak Arabic will demonstrate
that we are not facedhere with an impenetrableand incomprehensible
mystery - or, at least, 1 hope it will.
Approaches to the problem
In theory, the problem can be approached in two ways. - 19 -
One is to try and establisha correct translationinto English ofthe
vital words. The other is to worry less about an exact translationand
more about thereal sense of the words as they appear in their context,
both locally within the body of the Minutes and more remotelyas they
have been used in the prior and subsequentpractice of the Parties and of
others concerned inthe matter, including Saudi Arabia and Oman.
In Bahrain's submission,both approacheslead to the same conclusion,
namely, that the only way in which the case can be brought to the Court
is by the joint action of both the Parties together.
Again, in theory, there are two ways in which the problemof
identifying the realsense of the word may be approached. One is
analytical. The other is historical. And, 1 believe that it will be
easier for the Courtto follow my argument if 1 begin by recalling the
manner in which the relevant words hadbeen used prior to 1990, that is,
by putting them in an historical context. 1 do so because, as
Professor Bowett hasshown, the 1990 Mlnutes were not the first occasion
on which the need had arisen to describe the Parties in the context of a
submission to the~urisdlctionof Che Court.
The historical context: the emergence of a pattern of usage
.
- Qatari draft,March 1988
The first occasion was at the very beginning ofthe discussions in
the Tripartite Committeein 1988. When the Committee began its work each
side prepared a draft agreement to reflect theirshared idea that the
proceedings would becommenced by a joint submission. The Qatari draft
dated 15 March 1988 appears as Item 2 in your Hearing Book. In
Article 1, as may be seen from the Englishversion, there appear the - 20 -
words "the Parties" to describe the actors in relation to the verb
"submit": "The parties submit the questions ..." It is not disputed
between the two sides that the intention was to provide for a joint
submission. The words used in the Arabic textare @@al-tarafan",
equivalent to "the parties" or "the two parties1@. The word for
"togetheru - "mavan" - does not appear in the text.
- Bahraini draft, March 1988
The same is true of the Bahraini draft of 19 March 1988, Item 3 in
your Hearing Book. Therewe find the words "The Partiesu appearing at
the begiming both of Article 1 - "The Parties shall submit the question
..." and also of Article II - "The Parties requestthe Court ...". In
both situationsthe Arabic words are "al-tarafan". The word "mavan" -
"together" - does not appear.
- Qatari draft, June 1988
1 pass to the next relevantitem in chronologicalorder, the Draft
Agreement presentedby Qatar on 28 June 1988 (Item 14 in your Hearing
Book) (this is to be found in a volume filedby Qatar with its Memorial
and relating to the meetlngs of the Tripartite Cornmittee, p. 187). In
this proposa1 Qatar provldes ln Article II, paragraph 2, that "the
Parties request the Court todecide ... the following questions ...". In
the Arabic original, the words "the Parties" is representedby again
"al-tarafan"without the use of the word "matanW.
- The Bahraini formula, October 1988
And now we can now move to the Bahraini formula itself, presented on
26 October 1988 (HearingBook, Item 4). The formula begins with the
words "The Parties request the Court to decide ...". In the Arabic - 21 -
original the corresponding words are"al-tarafan"without the word
"ma'anualtogether.
These are the principal items of record which demonstratethe use of
Mal-tarafan"to describe "the Parties" in a context where action by both
of them jointly was contemplated. 1 Say this in reliance uponthe
content of each document and the evidentunderstandingof-the two sides
on each occasion. The pattern of usage,if 1 may put it thatway, the
pattern of usage of the words nal-tarafanlf in the context of drafts
relating to the submissionof this case to the Court had become fixedor
crystallized, as al-tarafan"meaning the "two Parties togetheru not
emphaticallynot "either of the two Parties".
Evolution of the 1990 Minutes
We can now pass, Mr. President, to the process by which the 1990
Minutes evolved between 23 and 25 December 1990 in the corridors orside
rooms of the Doha Summit Meetlng. In approachingthis matter, I suggest
that we should bear in mind the pattern of usage that 1 have just
mentioned.
Now for what actually happened at Doha we have, in terms of
firsthand,persona1 evidence, only the statement of the Bahraini Foreign
Minister, Shaikh Mohammed. Qatar has done nothing more in its Mernorial
and Reply than put forward a brief narrative ofwhat happened. Where
there is any discrepancy between the versions of the two sides,
elementary principlesof evldence require that thestatement of
Shaikh Mohammed should be preferred to those in the Qatari written
pleadings. And for an account of what actually happened at the opening
plenary meetingof the Heads of States on 23 December we rnustagain relyon Shaikh Mohammed. Please recallthat at this point in the story of the
relationship betweenthe Partieswhat we are looking for is some
indication that the established pattern of the usageof "al-tarafan" as
meaning the Parties togetherwas, as Qatar would haveus believe, about
to be radically altered, looking fora sign of change.
Shaikh Mohammed's accourt of the Summit Meetingappears in
paragraphs 3 and 4 of his statement. After describingthe opening stages
of the discussion in rather general terms, the Foreign Minister recalls
that King Fahd of Saudi Arabia "stated that it was the duty of the
Tripartite Committeeto meet and finalize the procedure for the parties
to go to the InternationalCourt of Justice". Professor Bowett will
presently be considering the other implicationof this referenceto the
Tripartite Committee. ForOur present purposes,it would seem unlikely
that King Fahd would have referred to the work of the Committee in these
terms if by that moment in the course of the Summit discussions the Amir
of Qatar had said anything to suggest thatQatar was proposing to abandon
the Tripartite Committee and proceed unilaterally. So, at that stage no
sign of a change in the meanlng of the words
- Qatar's acceptanceof the Bahraini Formula relating to a joint
submission
Even more to the point, however, is the fact that theAmir of Qatar
stated that he was preparedto accept the Bahraini formula. At the risk
of over-repetition, 1 must of course remind theCourt that, as matters
then stood, the Bahraini formula was understood only asa contribution to
a special agreementproviding for a joint submission to the Court.
The words "al-tarafan"as there used couldonly mean "the Parties
together". That is al1 that can be gathered £rom Shaikh Mohammed's - 23 -
statement and frornthe written pleadingsof Qatar as to what little was
said at the Summit Meeting bearingon the rneaningof "al-tarafan". So up
to this point there was no indication of any proposed change in the
meaning of those words.
- Saudi draft Minutes
Yet there must have been somethingsaid which led SaudiArabia in
its first draft proposa1 (Item 5 in the Hearing Book) to include the
words "the question which will be presented to the Court by each of
themv, i.e., each of the Parties. In the Arabic original these words
were "min kullin minhuman. As the Court hasalready been told,
Shaikh Mohammed rejected theSaudi draft by reason of the presence of
those words.
- Omani draft Minutes
The next step in the evolution of the text is the arriva1 of the
Omani draft (Item 6 in the Hearing Book). The Omani draft used the words
"Either of the two Parties"
We have it on the authority of Sir Ian Sinclair (CR 94/2, pp. 32-33)
"that the text was put first to the Qatari delegation,since
there is clcar evidence that thephrase 'in accordance with the
Bahraini formula, which has beenaccepted by Qatar' was
inserted intothe original Ornanidraft on the initiative of
Mr. Sherbini, Legal Adviser to the Qatari delegation".
And this leads us to a particularly important point. Qatar, having
seen, as we are told, the Omani draft beforeit was presented to Bahrain
later on the same evening, permitted it to go forward containing the
words "either of the two Parties" - in Arabic, "ayyun min al-tarafaynu
- Aniendment of the Omani draft
~hy is this so important? Letus rernernbet rhat one of the most
importantpropositions inBahrain's case is that Bahrain rejected thewords "either of the two Partiest1 and ipsisted on "the two Partiesu so as
to exclude the possibility that either of the two Parties could commence
proceedings on its own. What is Qatar's answer to this "categorical
rejection" (to use once again the helpful words of Mr. Shankardass)his
categorical rejectionof the Omani proposal? The way 1 put it on Friday,
in commenting on the relevant passage in the Bahraini Foreign Ministerts
speech, was "what did Qatar think it was doing in accepting the changes
without making its position clear"?
The Agent of Qatar gave a direct answer to the question (CR9 4/3,
pp. 28-29):
"In Qatar's view the answer to this question is clear. In
procedural termsthe Omani draft mighthave been interpretedas
giving one State, effectively whichever was thefirst to act,
the obligation to submit the whole case to the Court in
accordance with the Bahraini formula. The change to
"al-tarafanIr reflected the fact that both Parties had their own
distinct claims to make under the Bahraini formula and that it
was inappropriateto allow one Party to submit the claims of
both States to the Court. That change [Iinterpret that change
£rom either of the two Parties to the two Parties]made clear
that both Bahrain and Qatarhad the right to submit their own
case on claimsto the Court in accordance with the Bahraini
formula. Qatar has exercised that right."
1 have read irouthat paragraph, Mr. President,because it represents
the whole of Qatar's explanation (apart £rom some technical linguistic
argument developed subsequently)of why it accepted in silence the change
insisted upon by Bahrain and by which Bahrain restored the consistent
pattern of language that had marked the jurisdictionaltexts previously
discussed between the Parties
well, some may Say, what iswrong with that explanation? The answer
is both simple and intrlguing. Qatar is saying that, having read the
Omani draft and having madeone change in it - namely the insertionof
the reference to the Bahraini formula - it then allowed the draft to be - 25 -
conveyed to Bahraincontaining wordswhich Qatar did not want, words
which Qatar now says might have been interpretedas giving the first
state to act the obligation to submitthe whole case to the Court. If
that was the interpretationthat Qatar was putting on the words
l'al-tarafanu it must have known that it was an interpretationquite
different from any interpretationput upon those words in the earlier
jurisdictionaltexts and, self-evidently,was not an interpretationwhich
could have occurred to Bahrain. If there was ever a case for a State to
have made itsunderstanding plain - whether before orafter the Omani
draft had been passed to Bahrain - that was undoubtedly it. The fact
that no clarificationwas offered is perhaps the most cogent indication
that the explanationnow given by the Qatari Agent never occurred to
Qatar at the time, but is an idea generatedat the last moment inthe
framework of the present proceedingsto meet what is, of course, perhaps
the rnosttelling argument in the Bahraini armoury. It will not be lost
on the Court that this Qatari explanationwas not presented in its
Mernorialand was accorded no more than a footnote in its Reply (RQ,
p. 76, n. 222).
- Other pertinent elements in the 1990 Minutes
If confirmation is needed of the conclusion to be drawn frornwhat 1
have just said then it is to be found in at least two other contextual
elements in the same paragraph of the 1990 Minutes.
- "Matter* in the singular
The first of these is the reference to "the matteru in the phrase
"the parties may submit the matter to the Court". Both in its
Counter-Memorialand in its Rejoinder Bahrainpointed out that the use of
the word "matter" in the singular ("al-mawdu"in the Arabic) is - 26 -
inconsistent with the Qatari contentionthat the 1990 Minutes foresawthe
possibility of two separate applications. Two separate applications
necessarily imply two separate cases. The reasonfor Qatar's insistence
on its right to make a unilateral applicationis that it does not wish to
bring Zubarah into its case. So if the question of sovereigiity over
Hawar, Jaradah and Dibal, as well as the determinationof the maritime
boundary can be seen as one case, the question of Zubarah is, for Qatar,
a distinct case.
Yet nowhere in the 1990 Minutes is there a suggestion that the word
"matter" in the singular can be converted from a singular disputeor
matter into plural disputes or.matters and can be dealt with in or as
separate cases. Both in the Qatari and the Bahraini translationsof the
preamble to the 1990 Minutes thereis a reference to "the existing
dispute" in the singular. Likewise in both translationsof paragraph 2,
the word "matter" appears in the singular.
In Bahrainos submission the use of these words in the singular is
quite inconsistentwith Qatar's ldea chat there can be two separate
applications or cases aboutone dlspute or matter.
What does Qatar have to Say in reply to this argument, which 1
venture to subrnit,is a cogent one? The answer is nothing. Absolutely
nothing - neither in its Mernorialor its Reply or in the Agent's speech.
Qatar had plenty of time for recondite linguisticanalysis and the Qatari
Agent cannotperhaps be blamed for having followed PrinceCharles and
Prince Edward on their journeys to and £rom Cambridge. But one of the
major contributions of the experts on both sides has been in establishing
that what divides us is not a matter of mere translation,but of
understanding wordsin their context. Bahrain is particularly grateful - 27 -
to its experts, to Professor Badawi, Dr. Holes, Professor Aboulmagd and
Mr. Amkhan, in this connection. The use of the word "matter' in the
singular is identifiedby Bahrain as a major reflection of the idea of a
singular proceeding,that is to Say, a proceeding broughtby the
two parties together,not proceedings brought by the parties
individually. YetQatar has at no stage been able to find tirneto
respond to this argument.
- Reference to the Bahraini formula
The second contextual matter within the body of paragraph 2 of the
1990 Minutes is the maintenance withoutchange of the reference to the
Bahraini formula. 1 can be quite brief about this. Enough has already
been said to establish that the Bahraini formula was proposed within the
frarnework of proposals for a joint subrnission and that its words reflect
that idea: "the Parties",not "either of the Parties".
- "In accordance withthe procedures consequenton it"
A third contextual matter is, of course, the phrase "in accordance
with the procedures consequenton IZ", that IS, consequent on the
Bahraini formula. Here agaln, 1 need not detain the Court. Enough has
been said on the Bahrainl slae to show that both in expression and in
intention those words reflectthe ldea that the implementationof the
Bahraini formula would require furthernegotiation with a view to the
submission of the case to the Court.
The negative context:the worde not ueed
There is a further point to be made in reference to the context of
"al-tarafanu. Untll now, 1 have been consideringwhat for convenience
may be called the "positive"context - the effect of other words and
phrases that are positively present within the Minutes. But there is - 28 -
also the matter of the "negativeWcontext - the words that are not there.
Qatar has chided Bahrain repeatedlyfor failing to introduce the word
'togetherN (llrnalan in the Arabic) into the phrase "the two parties" so
that it would have read "the two parties togetherv and thus have put
Bahrainls position beyond doubt. But Bahrain is bound to ask, why did
Qatarrnot retain the words "either of the Parties" or, for example,
introduce the adverb "separatelyubefore the verb "submit",so that the
phrase would have read "may separately submitB1?
An omission of this kind can be seen as being as much part of the
context as would be the presence of certain words. The Court may feel it
appropriate - without going intothe wider issue of the burden of proof
generally - to ask this question: Upon which Party rests the burden of
clarifying its position by the introductionof suitable words - is it
upon the Party which insistson retaining languagefor which there is an
established pattern of usage or is it upon the Party which, having failed
to secure a change in the vital words, then pretends that the retained
words have sornestrikingly different meaning? The question,
Mr. President, ln my submission, answers itself.
Subsequent use of language
There remalns then for relatively brief mention evidence of the use
of language by the Parties which can be regarded as part of the broader
contextual approach or, if one wishes, as part of their subsequent
conduct .
- Saudi draft agreement, September 1991
The first such item is the draft joint agreementprepared by Saudi
Arabia and received by Bahrain in Septernber 1991. And Qatar admits to
receiving the draft agreement but denies having received the accompanying - 29 -
memorandum. Both these are in the Hearing Book (Item 9). Qatar does not
go so far, however, as to deny that Saudi Arabia prepared and sent such a
memorandum, at least to Bahrain. Anyway, the point that matters about
the memorandumis not so much whether Qatar receivedit as that it was in
fact prepared by Saudi Arabia.
1 return to the draft agreement itself. Here, in Article 1, 'wefind
the expression "The Parties request the Court to decide any matter, [and
so on]". In Arabic the word used for "the Parties" is "al-tarafanW.
There is no additional wording like "togetherHor "jointlyv. The words
"al-tarafan"are even then deemed sufficientto create an obligation for
the Parties to act together. The accompanying memorandum makesit clear,
in its first sentence, that the draftforesees joint, not separate,
action: "with reference to the two draftagreements submittedby Qatar
and Bahrain, we [that is Saudi Arabia] have prepared the accompanying
draft on the basis of the provisions contained in each of the two drafts.
This is an attempt to reach a compromise between their texts in so far as
that is possible". So we have here notmerely evidenceof Saudi Arabia's
view of the continuationof its medlatory role, but a document prepared
by it which contains language that follows the pattern ofusage
prevlously established in the Tripartite Committee.
- Ornaniletter of 29 January 1994
1 pass now to a further itemof subsequent context or conduct which
1 believe it may be helpful to draw to the attention of the Court. And
that is the letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Oman of
29 January 1994 that was directly solicited by the Minister foF roreign
Affairs of Qatar by a letter of 23 January 1994. These letters were
submitted to the Court bythe Agent of Qatar on 10 February of this year. - 30 -
Bahrain has not objected to them and they are now Items 15 and 16 in the
Hearing Book.
The Qatari request to Oman cannot in any way be compared withthe
earlier exchange of correspondence between theArnirof Bahrain and the
King of Saudi Arabia. On 12 September 1993 the Amir of Bahrain wrote to
the King of Saudi Arabia the letter which you will find as No. 17 in the
Hearing Book. As you will see, the Amir's letter unlike the letter from
Qatar to Oman, did not invite the Mediatorto anticipate the role of the
International Courtof Justice. The letter did not ask the King to
answer the specific issuebefore the Court in the way in which Qatar
invited Oman to deal with it. The Amir of Bahrainls letter said only two
things: the first was that theAmir was preoccupied with the Qatari
unilateral application and wasinconvenienced byit; and, second, the
Arnirexpressed the hope that Qatar would reconsider Bahrainls request to
submit the case to the Court inthe form of a joint application. That
was back in Septernber 1993.
The King of Saudi Arabia dld not reply until Decernber. Hls answer
is No. 18 in the Hearing Book. The relevant sentence reads in part:
"the sincere attemptswe made called for an amicable
understanding betweenthe two srsterly States with the goal of
achieving a solution for this question in a brotherly spirit,
and including that the two slsterly countries submit, together,
a joint application to the International Court of Justice
containing al1 rnattersof difference ...".
The substantivepoint that 1 wish to make as to the correspondence
between Qatarand Oman, with which 1 have just been comparing the Saudi
Bahraini correspondence,has a direct bearingon the linguistic issue,
which is the theme of the present part of my address. First of all, the
Court will observe in the Qatari letter, which has clearly been framed to - 31 -
elicit a suitably favourable response£rom Oman, an example of the kind
of language that Qatar might have attemptedto introduce into the 1990
Minutes if it had thought that it could do so successfully. It appears
in the first and second lines of the second paragraph of theQatari
letter to Oman: I1webelieve that each of the States of Qatar and Bahrain
has the right to makea unilateral application ...". Those words are
quite clear and if Qatar had thoughtthat it could have achieved the
objective which it now says it did achieve in December 1990, those are
the words thatit should have tried to putinto the 1990 Minutes. That
specific phraseologyis a very far cry £rom the inexactitudeof the words
"al-tarafan"on which Qatar rests thewhole of its present case.
But the matter which is of particular interest is to be found in the
Omani response. In order to make the point which Qatar now presents as
favouring its interpretationof the 1990 Minutes, the Omani letter has to
use exactly the same wcrds as appeared in thedraft which it placed
before Bahrain on 24 December 1990 and which were rejected by Bahrain.
The words in the recent Omani letter are "allow either the State of Qatar
or the State of Bahrain to submit the dispute to the Court (in Arabic
"ayyunminv)". It is the words "ayyunmin" which Bahrain insistedon
taking out of the Omani draft of 24 December 1990 and replacing by the
words "the two Parties" (inArabic "al-tarafan") .
Perhaps 1 should add that if Oman had really wanted to lend full and
effective support to Qatarin this case, the relevant sentence of the
recent Omani letter should have read something likethis: "in Our
opinion, the words used in the Minutes, 'the two Parties' ('al-tarafan'),
were intended to allow, either Qatar or Bahrainto submit the dispute to
the Court". But Oman did not Say that - no doubt because, as the go- - 32 -
between in the Doha discussions, it knew that the words that were finally
used in the 1990 Minutes were deliberately introduced to exclude this
very situation.
- Qatar's 1991 letters to Saudi Arabia
There is, lastly, Mr. President, another point which is connected
with and reflects uponthe proper-interpretation -tobe put upon the word
"al tarafan". Qatar filed with its Memorial two letters dated
respectively 6 May 1991 and 18 June 1991 from the Amir of Qatar to the
King of Saudi Arabia. These are items 19 and 20 in the Hearing Book and
1 have already had occasion to mentionthem. In the first letter, of
6 May, Qatar referred to the 1990 Minutes, mentioned the periodwhich had
been laid down for the exercise of the Mediator's good offices and
concluded its description of the Minutes with the following sentence:
"Otherwise,the two Parties may, after this period, refer the dispute to
the InternationalCourt of Justice in accordance withBahrainls general
formula ...' The English words"the two" reflect the Arabic words
"al-tarafan". The letter concludes by saying that "In pursuance of the
above agreement, we intend to take the necessary measuresto subrnitthe
matter to the Courtat the end of the above-rnentioned period."
Qatar refers to this letter as an indicationthat it proposed to
start proceedingsat the end of the extension of the period of the
Mediator's mandate, and expresses surpriseand disbelief that Saudi
Arabia had not conveyed that message to Bahrain. What Qatar quite
overlooks is that Saudi Arabia wouldhave read the words ual-tarafanll in
this context in accordance with the establishedpattern of usage in the
established sense of the two parties togetherand would, therefore,not
have understoodthe letter to be a threat of unilateral action. The - 33 -
concluding sentence of theletter, "In pursuance of the above agreement,
we intend to take the necessarymeasures to submit the matter to the
Court at the end of the above-mentioned period" would also have been read
by Saudi Arabia asno more than an intimationthat Qatar would be taking
the necessary stepsjointly with Bahrain. The second letter, of 18 June,
is open to the same interpretation. In other words, one haç to read
those letters standing inthe shoes of Saudi Arabia, seeing the
expression "al-tarafan",understanding it inaccordance with the
establishedusage.
This is no doubt an explanationof why Saudi Arabia didnot convey
any warning to Bahrain. It read the letters as saying only that Qatar
would be resuming the necessary steps for "the Parties", both of them, to
resume the arrangements for submitting the matter to the Court.
The continuing relevanceof the technical linguistic arguments
Mr. Presl~ent,as the Coürt will have observed, 1 have not attempted
to follow the distinguishedAgent of Qatar into the technicalitiesof the
linguisticarguments. This 1s not because 1 think thathe is right in
whac he has said. But the highl},technical arguments about the Arabic
language and grammar - important and lnterestingas they are - do not
form the first line of Bahrain's position and timeis too short to pursue
thernnow. Bahrain adheresto the views expressedby its experts,
Professor Badawi, Professor Aboulmagd,Dr. Holes and Mr. Amkhan as set
out in their opinions annexedto the Bahraini Counter-Memorialand
Rejoinder.
Mr. President,this brings me to the end of my considerationof the
1990 Minutes, both as to their statusand their content. Thereis no - 34 -
need for me to venture a grandiloquent conclusion. 1 can only express
the hope that the points that 1 have made maybe of some assistance to
you in reaching the right view of these Minutes. In my submission,
whatever the legal status of the Minutes may be, their languageis quite
inconsistent with the idea thatBahrain could have given its consent to
the unilateral institutionof proceedings by Qatar.
Mr. President, if it pleases you, would you either cal1 upon
Professor Bowett now or, if the Court so wishes, take a coffee break.
Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Lauterpacht. 1 give the floor
to Professor Bowett.
Mr. BOWETT: Thankyou, Sir.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, what I would liketo do with
your permission - and it can be done quite briefly - is to piece together
the three phases in the negotiations, that is the 1987 Agreement, the
Tripartite Cornmittee, and Doha, to see what was really agreed between the
Parties.
We have to see the whole picture as a series of negotiations
designed to bring this dlspute before the Court. We cannot. ln my
submission, isolate Doha as a fresh start, with the Parties startingwith
a "clean slate" and, at Doha, establishing an independent basis for
jurisdiction.
The reason for this lies partly in commonsense - the Parties were
inherently unlikely to jettison what they had achieved in over three
years of negotiation - but also in the plain words of the Agreed Minutes - 35 -
of 25 December 1990. The Parties agreed "1. to reaffirm what was agreed
previously between thetwo Partiesn.
Now there cannot be any doubt what that meant! The Parties were nor
starting from scratch; on the contrary they endorsed and reaffirmed what
they had agreedto date. Whatever else was agreed at Doha, it was
additional, just one further agreed stepin the long sequence of
negotiations; and, we must assume, in no way inconsistentwith the
agreements reachedpreviously.
Obviously, Qatar does not wish to see matters in this light. Qatar
sees the reaffirmationof what had been agreed previouslyas confined to
the 1987 undertaking to go to the Court. Thus, for Qatar, the whole of
the progress of the Tripartite Committee was to be jettisoned. And Qatar
supports this view of the matter by saying that theTripartite Committee
was at an end.
But, Mr. President - and it is a rather largeBut - that is notwhat
the Doha Minutes Say. They do not Say that the Parties reaffirm their
1987 commitment in principle to go to the Court. They "reaffirmwhat was
agreed previouslyu,without restriction,so that they evidently intended
to preserve everythingthey had agreed thus far.
Nor is there any basis for saying that the Tripartite Committee was
at an end. Certainly,during the Fifth Meeting on 15 November 1988
Prince Saud reportedthat King Fahd "considersuthe date of the next
Summit meeting - in December 1988 - as the date for terminating thework
of the Committee. It was presumably a heavy hirt that they shouldget a
move on. But Bahrain's Foreign Minister, Shaikh Mohammed,expressed the
hope that he would be patient (Cm, Vol II, p. 102). And at the Sixth
Meeting on 6 December 1988 there is not a word in the signed Minutes of - 36 -
that Meeting about terminatingthe Tripartite Committee. On the
contrary, the signed Minutes disclose that Bahrain would be given time to
study Qatar's proposa1 for proceeding with the Bahraini formula and the
two Annexes. So the Tripartite Committee was not dead, and the
agreements it had reached thus far were not abandoned.
Indeed, it could scarcelybe otherwise. If, as Qatar says, the
1987 Agreement wasa treaty bindingon Qatar and Bahrain, how could
Saudi Arabia terminate paragraph 3 of that Treaty establishingthe
Tripartite Cornmitteewithout their consent? And, Mr. President, 1 cannot
find anywhere in the records anything to suggest that they did so
consent. Indeed, there was no actual proposa1 to terminatethe
Cornmittee,so there was nothing to which their consent wasrequired.
In fact the records show that, on the contrary, SaudiArabia itself
believed the Tripartite Committee was still in existence, and still with
work to do, at the timeof the Doha meeting. The ForeignMinister of
Bahrain, Shaikh Mohammed, recounts a meeting with King Fahd on
Sunday 23 December 1990 at Doha. This is what he says:
"Durinc the discussion, the Custodian of the Two Holy
Mosques, Klng Fahd brn Abdulaziz Al-Saud of Saudi Arabia, who
continued in hls role of Mediator betweenBahrain and Qatar,
stated that ~t was the duty of the Tripartite Committeeto meet
and finalize the procedure for the parties to go to the
International Courtof Justice." (CMB, Vol. II, p. 160.)
And Bahrain took the sarneview. The Foreign Minister of Bahrain is
on record as saying that, at Doha, "1 reiterated Bahrain's position that
we rnustcontinue with the existing procedure throughthe Tripartite
Committee ..." (CMB, Vol. II, p. 162).
So the story of the Tripartite Committeehaving been terminated, and
its work abandoned, is pure invention on the part of Qatar. - 37 -
It is important to keep all these previous agreementsin mind,
therefore. For if there is to be any doubt as to what, additionally,was
agreed at Doha, the elements previously agreedmust afford crucial
evidence as to what exactly was agreed at Doha. We must assume
consistency,and coherence, betweenthe elements of the agreement.
In short, the Parties could not conceivably have reaffirmed their
previous comrnitments, and in the same breath agreed somethingadditional
at Doha which was quite contrary to what had been previously agreed. We
must assume they were acting consistently.
Nqw what had been previously agreed?
First, that the Parties would go before the full Court.
Second, that the Parties would go before the Court pursuant to a
Special Agreement: that was to be the basis of the Court's jurisdiction.
Now there cannotbe any doubt about this. Bahrain always assumed this to
be so, and 1 have earlier taken the Court carefully through the records
of the Tripartite Committeeso that the Court can see that thiswas also
Qatar's intention.
If that is so, how can Qatar suggestthat at Doha the Parties
suddenly agreed that either Party could proceedby unilateral
application,without a Special Agreement? It is simply not possible.
You cannot, in one and the sarnebreath, reaffirm the agreement to proceed
under a Special Agreement and authorize eitherParty to proceed
unilaterallywithout such an agreement: it would not make any sense!
So, whatever the words "al-tarafan" may mean, and whatever Qatar may
or rnaynot have thought, it is simply not possible to read the Doha
Minutes as authorizing a unilateral application. That would be quite
contrary to the clear reaffirmationof the earlier agreements. - 38 -
1 do not Say that, at Doha, the Parties were not free to change
their minds. They could have reaffirmed their previous agreementswith
an express proviso. They could have said "except that, rather than
proceeding by Special Agreement, either Party may make a unilateral
application to the Court after the end of May 1991".
But they did not do so, and, absent clear words to indicate a
departure £rom their common intention to proceedby Special Agreement, we
must assume that the original agreement wasmaintained. And this must
have been the view of Saudi Arabia. Otherwise why shouldSaudi Arabia
have offered to both Parties a Saudi version of a Special Agreement in
September 1991? And that was certainly Dr. Al Baharna's intention in
adding thephrase "and the procedures arisingtherefrom". So two out of
the three Members of the Tripartite Committeebelieved the agreement to
seek a special agreementhad been maintained.
Third, the Parties had previously not entertained the idea of a
unilateral application even as an alternative: it was never discussed in
the Tripartite Committee. So we are encitled to assume that the Parties
agreed previouslythat seisin of the Court would not take place by that
route. It would have taken express words to overturn that understanding
Fourth, the Bahralnl formula was a possible solution to the
disagreement overArticle 11 - subject to further discussion of whether
it needed to be amplified in one, or two, Annexes, and in what terms.
Qatar's acceptance of the Bahraini formula at Doha seemed a
significant step forward. It seemed as though Qatarwas prepared to
accept it for Article II, without any annex and leaving it to each Party
to formulate its clairnswithin the broad ambit of that formula, as
Bahrain had originally intended. - 39 -
But, as Professor Weil will demonstratein detail, the mere
acceptance of theBahraini formula could not, of itself, provide a new
and sufficient basis for jurisdiction. It was never intended as such,
and could not operate as such. Nor - as Professor Jiménez de Aréchaga
will show - could the Bahraini formula be utilized within the framework
of a purely unilateral application. It was designed tobe used within
the frameworkof a special agreement,the essential idea beingthat,
under such a general and "neutral"formula, each Partywould be free to
formulate its own claims.
Fifth, the Parties had agreed to include Zubarah in the disputed
matters: that is quite clear from the Tripartite Committee meeting of
6 December 1988.
Certainly Qatar had reserved its positionover whether Qatarwould
agree to allow Bahrain to contest sovereignty - or only "private rights".
But in one form or another it had been agreed Zubarah wasto be included.
Qatar's argument, lucidly put by Professor Salmon on Wednesday
(CR 94/3, pp. 43-48), is chat Zubarah can be included. Al1 that is
necessary is for Bahrain to file a new Application in relation to
Zubarah, in effect flle a new case wnich the Court can then join.
But the Court has oc?y to noce the careful choiceof words by Qatar
to see that, for Bahrain, this is a trap. Qatar concedes only that the
Court has competence over Zubarah"prima facie". And Qatar reserves the
right to question its admissibility ("recevabilitéu). You can be certain
it will do so!
Well, Mr President, there you have precisely the reasonwhy Bahrain
was adamant that a joint submissionunder a special agreementwas needed.
With the Bahraini formula as Article 2 of a special agreement, Bahrain's - 40 -
risk of having Zubarah excludedwould have been minimized. Now, on the
basis of two, successive,unilateral applications,Bahrain is at risk.
There is, in fact, still no genuine agreement betweenthe Parties as to
the subject-matterof this dispute, and Qatar will most certainly object
to Bahrain's claim over Zubarah.
There are, of course, other.thingswhich Bahrain loses by not having
a special agreement - for example, Article V and the right to examine the
agreement as a whole prior to ratification - my colleague Mr. Highet will
deal with these.
But, as a sovereign State, Bahrain is entitled to decide that its
preferred way of implementing the 1987 commitment in principle to go to
the Court was by wayof special agreement. Thereare sound reasonsfor
that decision in fact, but, irrespectiveof whether one agrees or
disagrees with those reasons, if that was Bahrain's decision it must be
respected. Mr President, that concludes my argument. 1 regret having
trespassed into the coffee break slightly. May 1 ask you, after coffee,
to cal1 on Professor Jiménez de Aréchaga.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Bowett. This will, 1
understand, be a convenlent moment forthe customary coffeebreak; the
Court will adjourn for 15 mlnutes.
The Court adjourned from 11.30 to 11.45 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. 1 give the floor to
Professor Jiménezde Aréchaga.
Mr. JIMENEZ de ARECHAGA: Mr. President,Mernbersof the Court, the
Qatari Memorial, at paragraph 4.12, makes an important admission on the - 41 -
question of consent, an admission which has not been mentioned by our
friends on the other side.
Under the title "The essential aspects of consentu, Qatar refers to
the need for consent to the existence ofjurisdictionof the Court and
examines this question from three points of view, distinguishingwhat it
calls "three essential aspects".
The Qatari MemorialStates:
"Three essential aspects of the consent given under the
1987 and the Doha Agreements needto be considered: first, the
consent of both States to refer the disputes to the Court;
second, their consentto the subject and scope of the disputes;
and, third, their consentto the seisin of the Court.'@
This significant admission by Qatar as to the need for a triple
consent is important because Bahrain contends that not a single one of
the three required consents is present in this case. Professors Bowett
and Lauterpacht have demonstrated that there is not in the present case
the first form or aspect of consent. After me, Professor Weil will show
that there is no consent by Bahrain to the unilateral seising of the
Court.
Consequently it is my task to concentrateon the absence in this
case of the second form or aspect of consent, namely, that concerning the
alleged consentby Bahrain to the "subjectand scopeu of the dispute, as
it has been brought unilaterallyby Qatar before the Court.
1 intend to demonstrate,Mr. President, that there was not, and
there is no consent by Bahrain regarding"the subject and scope of the
dispute" as it has been defined unilaterally byQatar in its Application
to the Court.
The fundamental consideration in support of my submission is that in
indicating to the Court the subject of the dispute, as is required by - 42 -
Article 40 of the Statute, Qatar unilaterally altered that subject by
restricting the scope of the dispute as it had been previously defined
during the mediation processin the 1988 Minutes, when "the two Parties
agreed" on £ive subjects as constitutingwhat the original Arabic texts
describe, in singular, as "the existing dispute" (1 refer to the 1990
Minutes, and the signedMinutes of 7 December 1988).
It follows from that infringement of what had been agreed, that the
Application filed byQatar is defective and consequently invalid and, as
such, incapable of embodying Bahrainus consent and thus incapable of
conferring jurisdiction to the Court.
In order to develop my argument, Mr. President,1 have to refer
again, but very briefly, to certain understandingsand agreements which
were reached in the negotiations betweenthe Parties under the aegis of
the Mediator.
Because the process of Mediation and negotiation conductedby the
Parties, under the aegis of the Mediator, with a view to concluding a
special agreement, was not entirely unfruitful,as Qatar has suggested.
On the contrary, in that process certain concretesteps were taken,
certain understandingswere reached and even some agreementswere
concluded opening the way for a loint subrnission of the case tothe
Court.
The first of these concrete stepswas the establishmentof the
"Principlesfor the Framework for reachinga settlernent", proposed in
1978 by the Mediator, and adopted by the Parties in 1983. The first of
these Principles reads:
"Al1 issues of dispute between the two countries, relating
to sovereignty over the islands, maritime boundaries and territorialwaters, are to be considered as complementary,
indivisible issues,to be solvedcomprehensively together."
It is true that, at the time of adoption of this principle, it only
applied to issues of sovereignty over islands and not in respect of
"terra firma". However, we will see that this First Principlelater
embraced other territorial issues,in particular that of Zubarah.
In the process of mediation a second,and important step towardsthe
conclusionof a special agreement wasthe understanding reachedby the
Parties, under the auspices of the Mediator, at the sixth Meeting of the
Tripartite Committee. There the Parties agreed on an enumeration of the
five items or issues which defined "the subject and scope of the dispute1!
to be submitted to the Court. WhileOur opponents have been entirely
silent with respect to thatdocument, the text of the relevant partof
the 7 December 1988 Minutes has been already referred to by
Professor Bowett. It has been presented to the Courtby both Parties
with their respectiveEnglish translations,which only differ in
insignificantand irrelevantdetails (seepage 112, volume II of the
Bahrain Counter-Memorial,and page 139 of the Rejoinder). 1 wiil read
again the Qatari translation of this document:
"1. There followed a discussion aimed at defining the subjects
to be submitted to the Court. which shall be confined to the
following subjects:
1. Hawar Islands, includingJanan Island
2. Dibal shoal and Qit'at Jaradah
3. Archipelago baselines
4. Zubarah
5. Fishing and Pearlingareas and any other matters related
to maritime boundaries."
And then, In paragraph 2 the Minutes stated that:
"2. The two parties agreed on these subjects."
This is an "agreedminute" if there ever was one. - 44 -
The introductoryphrase and the final statement tothe effect that
"the two parties agreedon these subjects" are underlinedin the Qatari
English text. Also, in the Qatari text the two paragraphs recording the
understanding are numbered as paragraphs 1 and 2, thus adding to the
forma1 character of this agreed minute.
Towards the end of thatmeeting, Qatar questioned the natureof the
clairnand the grounds to be invoked by Bahrain concerning Zubarah. The
late Dr. Hassen Kamel, for Qatar, stated that
"if the nature of the difference concerning Zubarahwas
connected with sovereignty overit, it would not be acceptable
that this should be listed within the matters raised to the
InternationalCourt of Justice. If, however, the content was
connected with private (or "special")rights in Zubarah, then
the State of Qatar would have no objection to thisv.
On his part, the representativeof Bahrain repliedthat "their claim
connected with Zubarahwhich would be referred to the InternationalCourt
of Justice would be the strongest possible claim without any limitation".
In the light of this exchange, itmay be concluded, that Qatar
raised a reservatlon with respect to Zubarah with referenceto the
grounds to be invoked by Bahrain ln support of thls claim
When in 1990, at Doha, Qatar acceptedthe Bahraini formula, one of
the consequences of that acceptance was thatQatar withdrew its
reservation with respect to the Bahraini claims concerning Zubarah. This
is so because by its acceptance of the Bahraini formula, Qatar agreed
that the Court could, and 1 quote £rom the formula, "decide any rnatterof
territorial right orother title or interest that rnaybe a matter of
difference between them". This wide formulation in the Bahraini formula
was clearly designedto embrace Bahrain's territorial clairnto Zubarah in
its full scope. - 45 -
Thus, the inclusionof Zubarah as one of the £ive items or issues
constituting the "subjectand scope" of the dispute, as defined on
7 December 1988, was no longer questioned by Qatar, whatever the object
of the claim that Bahrain could advance.
This rneansthat the understanding that had been reachedon
7 December 1988, as an agreed enumerationof -thesubject and scopeof the
dispute, was cornpletedand perfectedby the withdrawal of Qatar's
reservation. Itwas confirrnedand rnaintained as an indivisiblewhole, a
"package deal", in accordancewith the First Principle of the Framework
of the Mediation.
The convergenceof these three elernents, the First Principleof the
Framework of Mediation, the 7 December 1988 agreed enurneration of the
five items in dispute and the 1990 full acceptance of the questionof
Zubarah at Doha through Qatar's acceptance of the Bahraini formula, rnust
be considered together, since they influenceand support each other.
They are interdependentand interrelated elementsthat concur in defining
the subject and scope of the dispute thathad to be submitted to the
Court, in a cornp~ehenslve, srngle case and by means of some form of a
special agreement.
This is so because it 1s only through themethod of a joint
submissionbased on some form of special agreement, that the three
instruments 1 have referred tocould be implernented and compliedwith.
And the existence of these three agreementswas not ignored or
forgotten in 1990, at the Doha summit conference. On the contrary,these
agreementswere reaffirmedat the very beginning of the 1990 Doha surnmit
conference. - 46 -
The first paragraph of the Doha Minutes provides that the Parties
and the Mediator "reaffirmwhat was agreed previously betweenthe two
Partiesu. Thus, such a reaffirmation, as just indicated by
Professor Bowett, embraced al1 that had been agreed previously, not just
the 1987 Minutes, as contenàed here by Professor Quéneudec (CR 94/2
p. 76).
The indivisibilityof the £ive issues in dispute, resulting £rom the
First Principle of the Framework ofMediation, is confirmed by the 1987
Agreement which refers tottall the disputed matters". It is also
confirmed by the initialphrase of the 7 December 1988 Minutes,
containing the list of issues, which provides that the reference of
issues to the Court "shall be confined to the following subjects ...O.
This phrase means that the "subject and scope" of the dispute
comprised only those five issues, but at the sarnetirneit required the
sirnultaneous submission of al1 five Issues.
Otherwise, one of the Parties would be allowed to rnodifywhat had
been agreed by both; one of the Parties would becorneentitled to
redefine by itself the sub~ect of the dispute by restrictlngunilaterally
~ts agreed scope. So, the obligation was to subrnltto the Court only
those five questions, but at the sarnecime to submlt al1 five questions.
It would be an equal violation of the agreed Minutesof 1988 to add to
the list or to subtract from it.
Now, if we take the reaffirmed agreed Minutesof 1988, concerning
the five items or issuesin dispute and we compare them with the
Application filed by Qatar in these proceedings we can see clearly that
the Applicant State has engaged in a deliberate infringementof the
agreement previously reachedconcerning the "subjectand scope" of the dispute. - 47 -
Besides the question of maritime boundaries,Qatar indicates in its
submissions, in part 1 of its paragraph 41 of the Application, the
questions of "The Hawar islandstu and the "Dibal and Qitlat Jaradah
shoalsu, as the only "subject of the dispute".
Qatar omits al1 reference to archipelagic baselines, tofishing and
pearling areas, to Zubarah and to the island of Janan. None of the five
items enumerated in 1988 is respected. Thus, for instance, the agreed
list of 1988 did not characterizeJaradah as a shoal. Qatar, by
categorizing it as a shoal, seeks to prejudice its status. It will be
for the Court eventually to decide whether it is a shoal or an island, as
Bahrain contends. The four other items are either ignoredor mutilated,
as is the case with the omission of the specific mentionof the island of
Janan, which of course is part of the Hawar islands. Again, this
omission prejudices Bahrain's position, because in the list of issues of
1988 Qatar had accepted that the lsland of Janan should be included
within the Hawar islands, although it is not coveredby the British award
of 1947.
Of course, the explanatlon for these infringementsof the 7 December
1988 Minutes, particularly in respect to Zubarah, is that Qatar, as a
de facto occupant of this terrltory,does not want to see this situation
subjected to judicial scrutiny, while, on the other hand, the legitimate
and long-standingsovereigntyof Bahrain over the Hawar islands,
including Janan, is challenged by Qatar before the Court. But this
self-servingattitude cannotjustify the breach cf what had been
previously agreed, nor the detriment to Bahrainus position at the stage
of the rneritsresulting from the alterations 1 have indicated in the
agreed list. - 48 -
1 do not need to recall to the Court that both Article 40 of the
Statute and Article 38, paragraph 1, of the Rules require the Applicant
State to indicatein its Application "the subject of the dispute" which
is brought before the Court.
One of the reasons underlyingthis repeated requirementis the need
for the Court to verify whether the necessary consentof both parties
specifically and expressly extends or applies to the dispute submittedto
the Court.
This statutory requirementof the indicationof the subject of the
dispute, given the existence of the previous agreementof 1988, created
an insoluble problem for Qatar in its attempt to present itself as a
unilateral applicant, capable of setting in motion, on its own, the
present proceedings. Qatar tried to overcome this problemby an involved
and illegitimateprocedure.
In paragraph 40 of the Application, under the title Jurisdiction,
where one would normally expect to find the indication of the subject of
the dispute, Qatar does not mention the two geographical items of dispute
it tries to brin? before the Court. Qatar only refers to the Hawar
islands and to Dibal and Qit'at Jaradah, in Part 1 of its Application, at
paragraph 41. It refers to these two questions in the submissions,at
the very end of its Application, where it asks the Court to adjudge and
declare in its favour.
One may then ask the following question: what is the basis upon
which Qatar relies in order to indicate the subject of the dispute, so as
to allow the Court to determine the necessary consent by Bahrain to have
that particular disputedecided by the Court? That was theproblem Qatar
had to solve. - 49 -
Obviously, Qatar could not rely on the enumeration in the
7 December 1988 agreed Minutes because it was not complying with it.
The answer that Qatar found to its predicament was torely on the
Bahraini formula, a formula which was designed to play, within the
framework of a special agreement, an entirely different role.
Qatar States in paragraph 40 of the Applicationunder the title
NJurisdiction"the following:
"By virtue of Qatar's acceptance of the Bahraini formula
(seeAnnex s), the parties are now also agreed upon the subject
and scope of the disputes to be referred to the Court."
This is a mere assertion, unsupportedby the facts and the law. By
invoking the Bahraini formula, Qatar tries to take advantage of its
general and abstract character, since the formula refers to 'any matter
of dispute" without the concrete indication ofparticular divergences.
Qatar then attempts to combine this featureof the Bahraini formula with
the selection of only two of the £ive items of dispute which were defined
by the 7 December 1988 agreed Minutes.
What is Qatar's foundation for this alleged expression of consent by
Bahrain? 1 repeat; incapable of invoking the 7December 1988 Minutes,
Qatar had recourse to the Bahraini formula, as if it contained the
consent of Bahrain in having its undisputable sovereignty over the Hawar
Islands and Dibal and Qit'at Jaradah challenged and put in issue before
the Court.
But Bahrain has never consented, through the Bahraini formula or
otherwise, to subrnitto the Court its sovereign rightsover these
essentialparts of its territorywhich are the Hawar islands, and Dibal
and Qit'at Jaradah. By its formula, and relying on the 7 December 1988
Minutes, Bahrain was prepared to corneto Court only if and when its own - 50 -
claims with respect to Zubarah, the Janan island as part of the Hawar
group of islands, the archipelagic baselines and the pearling and fishing
areas, were equally considered and decided by the Court, at the same
time, within the same set of judicial proceedings and in a position of
equality before the Court. Bahrain is entitled to that singular set of
judicial proceedings not only on the basis of the 7 December 1988 Minutes
and the Bahraini formula, but also under the already mentioned First
Principle of the Framework of the Mediation, which demanded that "al1
issues of dispute" were "to be solved comprehensively together".
The abusive way in which Qatar utilizesthe Bahraini formula,
cornbined with the selection of only two of the five items of the 1988
Minutes, cannot be accepted ascontaining or as expressing Bahrain's
consent to have the particular disputes selectedby the Applicant
subrnittedto the Court.
Otherwise, the Applicant would be able to pick and choose those
subjects of dispute it wants to subrnitto the Court, while avoiding the
judicial determinationof those recognized subjects of dispute it does
not want to submit to the Court.
It is no answer to Say that the defendant rnaysubrnitan application
of its own or make a separate claim in the present proceedings. Thefact
is that the unilateral rnethodchosen by Qatar results inthe practical
irnpossibility of cornplying with the First Principleof the Frameworkof
Mediation, which provides that "al1 issues of dispute ... are to be
considered as cornplementary, indivisible issues, t~ be solved
cornprehensively together".
Moreover, Qatar's answer that, in its discretion, Bahrain rnayfile an
application and raise its clairnsshows that there is no cornpulsory - 51 -
jurisdiction in the present case. If the submission of the entire issues
in dispute, as required by Article 40 of the Statute, depends on a
subsequent,voluntary and discretionary actby Bahrain, this by itself
demonstrates that at this moment there is no compulsory jurisdictionin
this case, as based on the Qatari Application submitted tothe Court.
1t was never contemplatedby the Bahraini formula that Qatar, acting
unilaterally,would be entitled to "pick and choose" those particular
items or issues in dispute which it preferred to submit to the Court,
while remaining entitled to oppose the admissibilityof Bahrainus claims
and counter-claims. We al1 heard, on the third day, Professor Salmon
enurneratethe various objections Qatarwould raise against the
admissibilityof the Zubarah claim. This would constitute another
infringementof the 7 Decernber 1988 agreed enumeration of the five items
constituting the dispute. The main purpose and "raison d'êtren of such
an agreed enumeration1s the obligation of each Party not to oppose the
admissibilityof any of the enumerated questions. That would be an
unfair infringementof the qc-d prc qüc inherent in the Bahraini formula
together with the 1988 Minutes.
The proper utilizationof the Bahraini formula would have been to
insert it in a special agreement, followed by the agreed enumerationof
the five subjects of dispute, as Bahrain did in Article 2 of the draft
special agreement which was offered to Qatar on 20 June 1992 as a basis
for a joint submission to the Court.
This shows that theBahraini formula had to be completed, had to be
"filled in", either by adding the indication of the specific issues both
Parties had agreed to submit to the Court or by previously authorizing
jointly each Party to formulate its own claims, on a basis of absolute - 52 -
equality, in their respectiveand parallel Memorials. It is obvious that
such a process of completion of the Bahraini formula could not be
effected by a unilateral application, by only one of the Parties, since
the list of subjects of dispute had been establishedby both.
A link had to be established betweenthe Bahraini formula and the
£ive issues enumeratedin the 1988 December Minutes and that link could
only be establishedby some form of previous joint or agreed action, such
as the Act of Lima or the agreement that was concluded in the Beagle
Channel case.
Divergent interpretationshave been advancedby the Parties as to the
meaning of a phrase that Bahrain succeededin introducing, as one of its
two crucial amendments, to the two drafts presentedto it at theDoha
Summit Conference. That phrase referredto the need to comply with "the
procedures arisingtherefrom".
The distinguishedAgent for Qatar, acting as counsel, has dsserted
that this phrase means that "the Parties will rely on the Court's rules
to govern the proceedings" (CR 94/3 p. 3.9). This assertion actually
supports our case because these procedural steps would consist precisely
in the establishmentof a link, so as to complete the formula with the
enurneration of the issues ln dispute in order to comply with Articles 40
of the Statute and 38, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court. The absence
of that link, that results from Qatar's infringementof the
7 December 1988 agreed Minutes, determines the invalidityof the Qatari
Application, the absence of Bahraini consent concerningthe "subjectand
scope" of the dlspute and, consequently,the inexistenceof jurisdiction
in this case. - 53 -
Thank you, Mr.President, for your patienceand attention. 1 will
appreciate it if you can cal1 now my colleague ProfessorWeil.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci beaucoup Professeur Jiménezde Aréchaga, je
donne la parolemaintenant au Professeur ProsperWeil.
M. WEIL :
Monsieur le Président,Messieurs les Juges. Le Gouvernement de
1'Etat de Bahrein, et son agent, S. Exc. M. Al-Baharna, m'ontconfié la
mission d'examiner larequête du Qatar au regard de ce que la Chambre de
la Cour a appelé récemment le "principe généralde la juridiction
consensuelleu (Différendfrontalier terrestre,insulaire et maritime (El
Salvador/Hondurasl , C.1.J. Recueil 1991, p. 33, par. 94) . Je suis très
sensible à la confiance qu'ils m'ont témoignée,et je les remercie de
m'avoir donné ainsi le privilège de prendre la parole devant la Cour
aujourd'hui
Sous le titre : "Les trols aspects essentielsdu consentementw (The
Three Essential Aspects of Consent) le mémoire du Qatar énumérait - mon
érnlnentami le professeur Jrménez de Aréchaga vient dele rappeler :
"premièrement,le consentement des deuxEtats en ce qui concerne
la soumissiondes différends à la Cour (the consent of both
States to refer the disputes to the Court); deuxièmement, leur
consentement ence qui concerne l'objetet la portée des
di£férends (their consent to the subject and scope of the
disputes);et, troisièmement, leur consentement à la saisine de
la Cour (theirconsent to the seisin of the Court)" (mémoiredu
Qatar, par. 4.12).
Cette analyse,Monsieur le Président, étaittout à fait exacte. Pour
que la Cour soit compétente pourstatuer sur la requêtedu Qatar il - 54 -
faudrait que soit établi un triple accord : un accord, en premier lieu,
sur le règlement des différends par la Cour; un accord, ensuite, sur
l'objet et la portée des différends à lui soumettre; unaccord, enfin,
sur la possibilité pour chacune des deux Parties de saisir la Cour
unilatéralementpar le dépôt d'une requête. Ces trois composantes du
consentement sont indissociableset doivent être réunies toutes trois; si
l'une d'elles fait défaut, la Cour n'a pas compétence pour statuersur la
requête.
11 apparaît, pourtant, que c'est du bout des lèvres seulement quele
Qatar acceptaitainsi, dans son premier écrit, de voir dans le
consentement à la saisine une condition aussi essentielle à la compétence
de la Cour que le consentementau règlement judiciaire, d'une part, et le
consentement à l'objet et à la portée des différends,d'autre part.
Après tout, nous expliquera plus tard le Qatar, le choix de la méthode de
saisine n'est qu'une question procédurale,d'importancemineure. Dès
lors que les Parties sont d'accord sur ce qui est, selon lui, vraiment
l'essentiel - à savoir le princrpe du recours à la Cour et la
détermination des différends à lui soumettre -, est-il raisonnable
d'empêcher la Cour d'exercer sa compétence au nom de considérations
procédurales sans importance (cf. requête introductived'instance,
par. 40; mémoire du Qatar, par. 5.74; réplique du Qatar, par. 4.10) ?
Est-il nécessaire que la Cour vkrifie, de manière distincte et
spécifique,que les Parties ont consenti aussi à la saisine unilatérale ?
Du même coup, le Qatar en viendra à minimiser toujours davantage le
consentement à la saisine et à faire reposer toujours davantagetout le
poids de son argumentation surla prétendue réunion des deux autres
composantes du consentement : le consentementau règlement judiciaireet - 55 -
le consentement à l'objet et à la portée des différends. La formule
bahreinite, dans laquellele Qatar voudraitvoir un accord des Parties
sur l'objet et la portée desdifférends à soumettre à la Cour, occupera
dès lors une place centraledans son dispositif tactique, et c'est dans
cette formule qu'il prétendra trouver un titre de juridiction.
Je me propose, Monsieur le Président, d'articulermon exposé en deux
parties.
Dans la première, j'analyserailes trois composantesdu consentement
à la compétence identifiéespar le Qatar lui-même, en recherchant dans
quelle mesure chacune de ces conditionsse trouve ou non remplie. Je
serai très bref sur les deux premières, déjà évoquées parmes collègues,
et c'est à la troisième, c'est-à-direau consentement à la saisine, que
je m'attacheraiplus en détail.
Je me tournerai ensuite, dans une seconde partie, vers le titre de
juridiction surlequel le Qatar prétend fonder sa requête, à savoir une
formule bahreïnlte analysée à la fois comme quelquechose qui ressemble à
un cornpromls et comme quelque chose qui ressemble à une clause
compromissoire.
1. LES TROIS ASPECTS ESSENTIELS DU CONSENTEMENT A LA COMPETENCE
Je commenceraidonc par les trois éléments constitutifs du
consentement;et d'abord le consentementau règlement judiciaire. - 56 -
A. Le consentement au règlement judiciaire
La soumission d'un différend à la Cour est l'un des moyens de
règlement pacifique à la disposition des Etats;il n'est pas le seul
moyen, et le principe fondamental demeure celuidu libre choix, énoncé à
l'article 33 de la Charte des Nations Unieset dans d'innombrablesautres
instruments. La décision des deux Parties de choisir ce mode de
règlement, de préférence à tout autre, constitue donc la condition
nécessaire, sine qua non, de la compétence de la Cour.
Condition nécessairene veut toutefois pas dire condition suffisante.
Un accord de principe de deux gouvernements pour recourir à la voie
judiciaire reste désincarnéet insusceptibled'être mis en oeuvre aussi
longtemps que les Partiesne se sont pas misesd'accord sur l'objet du
différend à soumettre à la Cour et sur la question de savoir si ellesle
lui soumettront conjointementpar voie decompromis ou bien
unilatéralementpar voie derequête. Tout au plus est-on en présence de
ce que l'on pourrait appeler, en empruntant ce concept à un autre domaine
du droit international, un lnzhoate title, un titre de juridiction
imparfait. Dans le dernler état de sa pensée, le Qatar paraît d'ailleurs
accepter cette analyse (CR 94/1, p. 49).
Je ne m'attarderai pas davantage sur ce permier aspectdu
consentement,sur lequel mon ami le professeur Bowetts'est expliqué.
B. Le consentement à l'objet et à la portée
des différends à soumettre à la Cour
En ce qui concerne le second aspect essentieldu consentement - le
consentement à l'objet et à la portée des différends à soumettre à la
Cour -, le Qatar soutient que l'assentimentqu'il a donné à la formule
bahreinite a cincorporés celle-ci dans le soi-disant accord de Doha et - 57 -
que de cette uincorporationa,sur laquelle il insiste inlassablement
(voirpar exemple : mémoire du Qatar, par. 1.03, 4.51, 4.55, 5.69;
réplique du Qatar, par. 4.07; CR 94/1, p. 26 et 27), il résulte equ'aussi
bien lui-même que Bahrein ont donné leur consentement,dans l'accord de
Doha, en ce qui concerne l'objet et la portée des différends à soumettre
à la Cour2 (mémoiredu Qatar, par. 4.56).
Monsieur le Président,comme le professeurJiménez de Aréchaga vient
de le montrer, l'analyse de la formule bahreinite comme un accord des
Parties sur l'objet et la portée des différends à soumettre à la Cour
constitue un contresens,qui dénature complètement cette formule.
et
Non, la formule proposéepar Bahrein n'a pas eu pour objet,
l'assentimentdonné à cette formule par le Qatar n'a pas eu pour effet,
de déterminerd'une manière générale, in abstracto, les différends que
les Parties étaient convenues de soumettre à la Cour. Ce que Bahrein a
proposé en 1988, et ce que le Qatar a accepté en 1990, c'est une
rédaction pourl'article II du compromis en cours de discussion,article
destiné à définir les questions sur lesquellesle compromis inviterait la
Cour à se prononr:er. Il s'agissait,comme l'ontmontré mes collègues,
d'une formulation ingénieuse et cneutren qui exprimait enquelque sorte
un accord sur le désaccord quant aux questions à soumettre à la Cour. Si
un compromis incorporantla formule bahreïnite avait été conclu, la
situation aurait été similaire à celle de l'affairedu Canal de Beagle, à
une nuance près cependant : au lieu d'énoncer lui-même les questions
différentes des deux Parties comme cela a été le cas dans l'affaire du
Beagle, le compromis aurait autorlsé Bahreïn et le Qatar à poser chacun
les siennes au cours de la procédure. - 58 -
Cette vérité, on le comprend, gêne nos adversaires. Aussi ont-ils
tenté de l'occulter en soutenant que le texte de la formule bahreïnite
an'a jamais été inclus dans l'une quelconque des propositionsde
compromis présentéespar Bahrein à la commission tripartites (mémoire du
Qatar, par. 4, par. 54). Si la Cour veut biense reporter au récit que
le Qatar donne lui-même, dans ses écritures, de l'historiquedu
différend, elle constatera que la formule proposée par Bahrein pour
sortir la négociation de l'impasse a été discutée par la commission
tripartite au cours de ses cinquième et sixième réunions, en novembre et
décembre 1988, dans le cadre des négociationsen vue de l'élaboration
d'un compromis (mémoiredu Qatar, par. 3.48 et 3.50; réplique du Qatar,
par. 3.33 et 3.38). Le professeur Bowett a fait la lumière sur ce point.
Prétendre que la formule bahréinite n'apas de rapport direct avec la
négociation du compromis est une contre-véritéflagrante.
Aussi devons-nousnous féliciter que dans d'aucres passages de leurs
écritures nos adversairesaient admis que la formule bahréïnite était
destinée à être insérée dans unlnstruneutplus vasce, comme l'une des
dispositionsd'un compromis qul devait en comporter bien d'autres :
"the Bahraini Formula was flrst devised to be inserted ln a
special agreement",a reconnu le Qatar (mémoiredu Qatar,
par. 5.68; cf. réplique du Qatar, par. 3.50).
A vrai dire, c'est là le seul et le véritable objet dela formule
bahréinite. Prétendre, comme le font nos adversaires,que du fait de
l'assentimentdonné à Doha par le Qatar à la formule bahréinite les
Parties sont aujourd'huid'accord sur l'objet et la portée des différends
à soumettre à la Cour est à tout le moins un raccourci simplificateur qui
trahit la réalité. Encore moins, nous le verrons plus loin, le Qatar
n'est-il justifié à ériger la formule bahréinite enun accord se - 59 -
suffisant à lui-même (whichstands on its own) et qui pourrait constituer
un titre de juridiction.
J1en arrive ainsi, Monsieur le Président,au troisième élément du
consentement,le consentement à la saisine, et plus précisément à la
saisine unilatérale
C. Le consentement à la saisine unilaterale
1. Les thèses fluctuantes du Qatar : du consentement
implicite au consentement présumé, et du consentement
présumé au consentement inutile
Avec ce troisièmeaspect du consentement à la compétencele Qatar se
sent visiblement mal à l'aise.
D'un côté il soutient que les Parties se sontmises implicitement
d'accord à Doha sur la faculté pour chacune d'elles, à l'expirationd'un
moratoire de cinq mois destiné à donner une ultime chance à la médiation
du roi d'Arabie saoudite,de saisir laCour par voie de requête de ceux
des aspects du différend quil'intéressentplus particulièrement :
"the Doha Agreement, écrit le Qatar, records the Parties'
implicit consent to selsin of the Court inany manner allowed by
the Statute and Rules of the Court ..." (répliquedu Qatar,
par. 4.101) .
De cette thèsedu consentement implicite mais réel mes collègues ont
fait justice. Le Qatar souligne lui-même le fait que tout au long des
négociations postérieures à 1987 Bahreïn n'a cessé d'insister sur la
nécessité de conclureun compromis afin de pouvoir aller conjointement à
la Cour (CR 94/2, p. 34; cf. p. 17). Comment, Monsieur le Président,
l'échec complet, le "corrplete breakdown" (CR 94/1, p. 51) de la
négociation décrit par nos adversaires,de cette négociationvisant à la
conclusiond'un compromis,a-t-il pu miraculeusementse transformer à - 60 -
Doha en un accord, fût-il implicite, sur le droit de chacune des Parties
d'aller à la Cour séparément ? Comment imaginerun seul instant qu'une
novation aussi révolutionnaire par rapport au processus de négociation
suivi depuis la fin de 1987 ait pu être effectuée implicitement, parun
texte aussi discret et dépourvu de toute mention spécifique ? Comment
imaginer un seul instant que le Qatar aurait accepté qu'une concession
formidable de la part de Bahrein se traduise dans une formule d'une
aussi
pareille ambiguïté ?
Comment d'ailleursparler de consentement implicite à la saisine
unilatérale alors qu'à deux reprises, comme monami le professeur
Lauterpacht l'a rappelé, Bahreïn s'est explicitement opposé à Doha à une
proposition prévoyant quela Cour pourrait êtresaisie par l'une ou
l'autre Partie ? L'opposition de Bahrein à cette proposition, que le
Qatar ne conteste pas (répliquedu Qatar, par. 3.66 et 4.75) même si ses
plaidoiries ont cherché à en minimiser la portée (cf. CR 94/3, p. 201,
revêt à coup sûr une importancedécisive. Chacun saiten effet que les
clauses juridictionnellesde ce genre ne sont jamais adoptéespar aucun
gouvernement de nanière légère et inconsidérée : l'affaire de la
Compétence en matière de pêcheries en fournit uneillustration.
Non, vraiment, Monsleur le Président, rien ne plaide en faveurd'une
volte-face implicite de Bahrein à Doha et d'un consentement commun à la
saisine unilatérale. Paraphrasantl'arrêt sur le Plateau continental de
la mer Egée (C.I.J. Recueil 1978, p. 43, par. 105), je dirais volontiers
que rien dans les termes du procès-verbalde Doha ne traduit un
changement de position du Gouvernement dB eahreïn quant aux conditions
dans lesquelles ce gouvernement était prêt à accepter que le différend
soit porté devant la Cour. - 61 -
Tout en soutenant que le procès-verbalde Doha traduit le consentement
implicite mais réel des Parties à la saisine unilatérale,mais conscient
sans doute de la faiblesse de cette thèse, le Qatar a formulé
parallèlement, à titre de positions de repli en quelque sorte, deux
autres thèses complètementdifférentes : celle dlun consentement à la
saisine unilatéralequi serait simplementprésumé, et celle d'un
consentement à la saisine unilatérale quine serait pas exigépar le
droit, qui deviendrait juridiquement inutile. C'est à ces dernières
versions de la thèse adverse - celle du consentementprésumé et celledu
consentement juridiquement inutile - que je voudrais m'attacher à
présent.
La théorie de la soi-disant liberté de choix du mode de saisine
Ces deux versions ont un point de départ commun :la théorie du
silence valant libertéde choix. Les Parties peuvent certes, nous
explique Ic Qatar, prévair le règlement d'un différend par la Cour et en
même temps convenir du mode procédural desaisine. Mais, ajoute-t-il,
si elles se limitent à prévoir le règlement d'un différend par la Cour
sans ajouter de "dlspositlonspéciale" (specialprovision) (mémoiredu
Qatar, par. 4.64) prévoyazt le mode de saisine, le choix de la procédure
de saisine est laissé aux Parties : compromis et requête peuventalors
être utilisés l'un aussi bien que l'autre. Telle est, soutient le Qatar,
la situation dans notre affaire. Puisque l'accord de 1987 et le procès-
verbal de Doha n'ont pas spécifié par quelle procédure la Cour devait
être saisie,le choix du mode de saisine est, prétendent nos adversaires,
resté Ilentièrement ouvert" (entirelyopen), il a été ulaissé aux Partiesn
(left to the Parties), et le Qatar était, en conséquence,en droit de - 62 -
choisir la voie de la requête unilatérale aussi bienque celle du
compromis (voirpar ex. mémoire du Qatar, par. 4.64; 5.42; réplique du
Qatar, par. 3.02; 3.72; 4.43; 4.101; 6.07; 6.16; CR 94/2, pp. 62-63).
Pourquoi donc, Monsieur le Président, le silence des Parties quant au
mode de saisine leur laisserait-il le choix entre la voie conjointe et la
voie unilatérale ? Le Qatar n'apporte pas de reponse claire à cette
question et paraît hésiter entre deuxvoies.
Dans une première variante,il laisse entendrequ'en l'absence de
disposition spéciale prévoyant la conclusion d'un compromis, les Parties
sont présumées avoir accepté la possibilité d'une saisine unilatérale.
Il s'agirait en somme de l'application de l'adage du droit civil : "Qui
ne dit mot consent."
Mais le Qatar ne s'en tient pas là. Dans une secondeversion, plus
radicale, les amarres avec le principe du consentementsont entièrement
rompues : le consentementn'est plus présumé, il devient juridiquement
inutile. A tel point que lorsqu'il a évoqué à nouveau, dans sa réplique
écrite, le problème des aspectsessentiels du consentement qu'il avait
déjà étudié dansson mémoire, le Qatar a purement et simplement passé
sous silence le consentement à la saisine (répliquedu Qatar par. 4.86).
Et c'est la même attrtude desilence que slr Ian .Sinclaira adoptée il y
a quelques jourspuisque, s'il a traité en détaildu consentementdes
Parties au règlement judiciaire et de leur consentement à l'objet et à la
portée des différends (CR 94/1, p. 47 et 501, il n'a pas dit un mot - pas
un mot, je le répète - du consentement à la saisine.
Quant au professeur Quéneudec, il a, quant à lui, explicitement
affirmé que, je le cite, si ala compétence de la Cour dépend de la - 63 -
volonté des Parties*,le mode de saisine an'a pas nécessairement lamême
base volontariste» (CR 94/2, p. 63) .
La compétence, soutient leQatar, est régie par le principe de la
juridiction consensuellede l'article 36 du Statut, alors que la saisine
est gouvernée exclusivementpar l'article 40, lequel ne subordonne pas le
choix entre le compromiset la requête au consentementdes Parties. Ce
choix, soutient leQatar, est de caractère purementcprocéduralset
<formel» (procedural way, fonnal step), et puisque les Parties n'ont pas
expressémentprévu dans notre affaire à quel mode de saisine il convenait
de recourir,les deux voies prévues à l'article 40 ont pu être utilisées
indifféremmentl'une aussi bien que l'autre (mémoiredu Qatar,
par. 4.57-4.64; réplique du Qatar, par. 4.96-4.103). Cette théorie de la
question de la saisine, simple «questionde procédure», a été poussée par
mon ami M. Quéneudec jusqu'à un point extrême, puisqulil a soutenu qu'il
suffit que la sarsine unliatéraie ne solt pas «exclue», c'est le mot
qu'il a employé, pour qu'elle solt possible (CR 94/2, p. 62-64).
Bahrein, ai-le besoln de le réppter. n'accepte aucune des prémissesde
ce raisonnement. Mais suivons un instant, à titre d'hypothèse, le Qatar
dans son cheminement rntellectuel. Même s'il y avait eu accord
inconditionnel des Parties sur le règlement par la Cour, ce que Bahrein
nie, même s'il y avait eu accord des Parties sur la déterminationdes
différends, ce que Bahrein conteste, même si les Partiesn'avaient rien
envisagé au sulet du mode de saisine, ce que Bahrein n'accepte pas, même
alors, Monsieur le Président,on ne pourrait pas admettre la thèse du
Qatar selon laquelle le choix du modede saisine serait resté ouvert, et
moins encore quela saisine unilatérale aurait été possible du simple
fait qu'elle n'a pas été *exclue*. - 64 -
Une remarque s'impose à cet égard. Lorsquele Qatar évoque la liberté
de choix du mode de saisine, il présente le problèmed'une manière
abstraite et irréaliste. Il donne l'impressionque les deux modes de
saisine - compromis et requête - sont sur le même plan et que choisir
l'un est équivalent à choisir l'autre. Comment ne pas voir pourtant
qu'il n'en est rien et que l'équivalence que le Qatar voudrait accréditer
entre la saisine conjointeet la saisine unilatérale constitue une fausse
symétrie ?
Que signifie en effet concrètementcette liberté de choix dont nous
parle le Qatar ? Qu'après avoir décidé d'un commun accord de soumettre
un différend au Règlement de la Cour, deux parties puissent se mettre
d'accord sur les termes d'un compromis et saisir la Cour par la
notification de ce compromis, cela est évident et ne fait pas difficulté.
Concrètement,le problème est uniquement de savoirsi, en l'absence de
disposition spécialeprécisant le mode de saisine, l'une des parties peut
prendre le devant et porter le différend à la Cour unilatéralement. Ce
n'est pas le consentement à la saisine, de manière indifférenciée,qui
est en cause, c'est le consentement à la saisine par voie unilatérale.
Sous les apparences de la liberté de choix, la thèse du Qatar revienten
réalité à soutenlr que le silence des Parties quant aumode de saisine
implique, ou entraîne, la possibilitépour chacune des Parties de saisir
la Cour par voie unilatérale. 2. L'erreur de la thèse du Qatar : le principe général
de la juridiction consensuelle exige un consentement
enon équivoques et cindiscutables à la saisine
unilatérale
Pour mettre le doigt sur l'erreur fondamentalequi vicie la théorie du
Qatar, je commencerai par savariante la plus extrême, celle d'après
laquelle le choix de la méthode procédurale de-saisine serait indifférent
au regard du principe généralde la juridiction consensuelleet c'est
après cela seulement quej'aborderai la variante du consentement présumé.
Il est incontestable,je n'ai pas besoin d'insister là-dessus, que
juridictionet saisine sont deux concepts différents, comme lemontre
l'affaire Nottebohm (C.I.J. Recueil 1953, p. 111). C'est sur cette
distinctionque repose en particulierla doctrine du forum prorogatum,
selon laquelle laCour peut avoir été saisie valablementd'une requête
alors même que sa compétence pourse prononcer sur cette requêten'aurait
été acquise qu'ultérieurement,par l'assentimentdu défendeur. Mais de
là à soutenir, comme le fait la Partie adverse, que le mode de saisine
est une simple «questionde procéaure~et que, en tant que telle, elle ne
repose pas sur <la même base volontariste»que la compétence (CR 94/2,
p. 62-63), il y a un pas que rien n'autorise à franchir. Comme l'observe
sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,un tribunalqul a été saisi dans des conditions
irrégulièresn'a pas compétence pour statuer sur l'affaire (*if a
tribunal has not been duly seised, écrit-il, it is incompetent to hear
the case%; The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice,
Cambridge, Grotlus, 1986, vol. II, p. 440). C'est aussi simple que
cela : le consentement à la saisine est une condition de la compétence. - 66 -
Le choix du mode de saisine, décision politique et discrétionnaire
La thèse du Qatar, me semble-t-il,repose sur une méconnaissance
profonde de la philosophie du règlement judiciaire dans le système
international. La Cour me pardonnera peut-être une digressionde
caractère quelque peuacadémique,mais qui me semble toucher à
l'essentiel de notre affaire. Comme le disaitle juriste français
Maurice Hauriou, il y a de la philosophie derrière le pluspetit procès
de mur mitoyen.
En soutenant que le consentement à la saisine n'est pas exigé avec
autant de rigueur que le consentementau règlement judiciaireet le
consentement à l'objet et à la portée des différends, le Qatar méconnaît
le fondement et la raison d'être du principe de la juridiction
consensuelle. Même si les juristesont une inclinaison naturelle à
privilégier sur tous autres le règlement judiciaire,une vue réaliste des
choses conduit à se défaire de tout fétichisme judiciaireet à accepter
que d'autres modes de règlement pacifique coexistent avec le règlement
judiciaire. Selon la formule bien connue, le règlement judiciaireest
Kun succédané au règlement directet amiable>> des conflits entre les
parties (Zones franches, C.P.J. 1. série A/B no 42, p. 116) , une cvoie de
substitution,mais ayant toujoursune base consensuelle^(Délimitationde
la frontieremaritime dans la région du golfe du Maine,
C.I. J.
Recueil 1984, p. 292, par. 89; cf. Différend frontalier (BurkinaFaso
c. République du Mali), C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 577, par. 46). Aussi le
règlement judiciaire est-il entre les mains des parties : il intervient
lorsque les Etats le veulent, il intervient avecl'ampleur que les Etats
lui assignent, il intervient sous la forme que les Etats luidonnent. - 67 -
Le choix par un Etat du règlement judiciaire relèveen conséquence de
son pouvoir discrétionnaire. C'est un choix politique. La Cour a
rappelé récemment que les déclarations optionnellesde l'article 36,
paragraphe 2, de son Statut esont des engagements facultatifs,de
caractère unilatéral, que les Etatsont toute libertéde souscrire ou de
ne pas souscrire» (Activitésmilitaires et paramil-i taires au Nicaragua et
contre celui -ci (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis), C. 1.J. Recueil 1984, p. 418,
par. 59). Cette remarqueest valable pour tout consentement à la
juridictionde la Cour, que ce soit sur la base de l'article 36,
paragraphe 2, ou sur celle de l'article 36, paragraphe 1.
Décision discrétionnaire,relevant d'une option politique, ai-je dit à
l'instant en parlant de la décision de recourirau règlement par laCour
de préférence à tout autre mode de règlement. Mais - et nous arrivons là
au centre du débat - ce caractère politiqueet discrétionnairen'est pas
moins certain lorsqii'il s'agit pour un gouvernement de choisir entrela
saisine conjointe et la saisine milatérale. La souveraineté des Parties
est en jeu ici comme là et des cocsldérationsd'intérêt national peuvent
dicter la décision de chacunici comme là. Même s'il est de principe,
comme l'a rappelé la déclaration de Manille (résolution 37/10 du
15 novembre 19821, que le recours au règlement ludiciaire ne devrait pas
être considérécomme un acte d'inimitié,même si, comme l'a dit à juste
titre l'agent du Qatar, être exposé à la requête d'un autre Etat ne peut
en aucune manière être regardé comme un «déshonneurs (CR 94/1, p. 15; cf.
94/3, p. 42), il n'en reste pas moins qu'un gouvernement peutavoir des
raisons politiques~mpérieusespour préférer la saisine conjointe à la
saisine unilatérale. Tout Etat est libre de rechercher la solutiond'un
différend selon le procédé quilui paraît approprié. - 68 -
Le professeur Salmona tenté de convaincre la Cour que Bahreinn'a
rien à craindre d'une saisine unilatéraleet n'a aucune raisond'être
aussi irréductiblement attaché à la soumission conjointe (CR 94/3, p. 41
et suiv.). Le problème n'est pas là. Le choix de Bahrein relève de ses
prérogatives dlEtat souverain et ne se discute pas.
Monsieur le Président, les deux procédures,au demeurant, ne sont pas
équivalentes - mon ami M. Highet y reviendra. La saisine par compromis
implique un accord des parties sur les questions à soumettre à la Cour.
Et même lorsque les aspects dudifférend que lesdeux parties souhaitent
porter devant la Cour ne coïncidentpas entièrement, commec'est le cas
dans notre affaire, la saisine par compromis offre toute une gamme de
solutions permettantd'assurer chacune d'elles que ceux des aspects du
différend qui l'intéressentplus particulièrementseront effectivement
portés devant la Cour. Le compromis peut, par exemple, énumérer un à un
dans le détail tous les aspects du différend et les inclure tous, de
manière explicite, dans la question posée. Le compromis peutaussi, comme
cela a été le cas dansl'arbitragedu Canal de Beagle, mentionner deux
questions distinctes,posées l'une par l'une des parties, l'autre par
l'autre partie. Le compromis peut enfin, comme cela serait le cas si un
compromis incorporant la formule bahreinite étaitsigné dans notre
affaire, comporter une clause ouverte et flexible permettant à chaque
Partie de soumettre ceux des aspectsdu différend qui lui tiennent
particulièrement à coeur. Les formules de ce genre, plus inventivesles
unes que les autres, permettent toutesd'englober dans une procédure
contentieuse unlque les dlvers aspects d'un même différend.
La requête unilatérale, tout au contraire, conduit à laisser
essentiellementau demandeur le soin de dessiner, par ses conclusions, - 69 -
les contours du différend sur lequel la Cour va avoir à se prononcer. Le
Qatar soutient certes que laformule bahreïnite est assez large pour
englober les revendicationsfigurant dans sa requête et que liberté est
laissée à Bahreïn de soumettre à la Cour d'autres aspectsdu différend,
en particulier leproblème de Zubarah, en déposant luiaussi une requête
(mémoiredu Qatar, par. 1.04; 1.08; 4.42; 5.66; 5.78 - 5.82; requête du
Qatar, par. 4.115; CR 94/1, p. 26, 28; CR 94/3, p. 43 et suiv.). Ces
affirmations sont toutefois, le professeur Bowett l'a relevé,
accompagnéesde prudentes réservesquant à l'admissibilitéde telles
demandes (mémoiredu Qatar, par. 5.78; requête du Qatar, par. 5.04;
CR 94/3, p. 50).
De toutes manières, si Bahreïnavait déposé sa propre requête, ce
serait sur deux affairesdistinctes, fussent-ellesprocéduralement
jointes, que la Cour aurait eu à se prononcer, alorspourtant que l'âme
de la formule bahreïnite était précisémend te permettre à chaque Partie
de soumettre à la Cour cerzalns aspects du différenddans le cadre d'une
seule et même procédure.
Monsieur le Président, le Qatar ne cesse de jouer sur les mots,
entretenant systématiquement l'équivoque entre les questions distinctes
que les deux Partles auralent pu soulever sur la base d'un compromis
incluant la formule bahreïnite etles conclusions séparéesqu'elles
auraient pu soumettre dans deuxrequêtes distinctes. Puisque les Parties
étaient tombées d'accord à Doha pour envisager desquestions distinctes,
laisse entendrele Qatar, pourquoi s'opposerait-on à ce que ces questions
fassent l'objet de requêtes distlncres ?
Mais, Monsieur le Président, "deux questions"n'est pas synonymede
"deux requêtes". Formuler deux questionsdistinctes à l'intérieur et dans - 70 -
le cadre d'une procédure unique ouvertepar la notificationd'un
instrumentunique, ce n'est pas la même chose que formuler deux demandes
distinctes dans le cadre de deux procédures séparées, ouvertes par deux
requêtes introductivesd'instances autonomes - à moins, bien entendu,
qu'un tel scénario ait été mis au point d'un commun accord des Parties,
comme dans l'affairedu Droit d'asile et dans quelques autres affaires
dont j'aurai l'occasion de parler ultérieurement.
L'allégation inlassablement répétée par le Qatar que les demandes
formulées dans sa requête restent dans les limites de la formule
bahrelnite, que Bahreinest libre d'ajouterses propres demandes, en
particulier celle relative à Zubarah, à celles du Qatar en déposant sa
propre requête et que Bahrein a bien tort de "jouer les martyrs"
(CR 94/3, p. 43), cette allégation relève d'une fausse simplicité.Le
problème n'est pas seulementquantitatif,ajouter une demande à une
autre, il est aussi qualitatif.L'idée d'adjonctionperd tout sens
lorsqu'on envisage les demandesdu Qatar relatives à Dibal et Qit'at
Jaradah et à la délimitation maritime.En qualifiant Dibal et Qit'at
Jaradah de Mhauts-fondswet en demandant à la Cour de tracer la frontière
maritime "compte dûment tenu (wlth due regard) de la ligne de partagedes
fonds marins des deuxEtats décrite dans la déclsion britannique du
23 décembre 1947", la requête du Qatar préjugeet oriente le débat en
posant la question en des termesauxquels Bahreinn'a jamais consenti et
dont on ne peut pas dire qu'ilssont "within the formula" (mémoiredu
Qatar, par. 5.78).Le consentement à la saisine par voie de requête, composante à part
entière du principe général de la juridiction consensuelle
Des observationsque je viens de faire découle une conséquence
capitale : le choix de la méthode de saisine n'est pas une simple
"questionde procédure". C'est une question de compétence qui relèvedes
exigences du principe de la juridiction consensuelle.La saisine
unilatérale n'est possible que si les parties y ont consenti. Ce n'est
pas la saisine unilatéralequi est la solution"par défaut", comme
diraient les informaticiens dansleur jargon, c 'est la saisine conjointe;
et il faut une volonté claireet commune des deux parties pour autoriser
la saisine unilatérale.
On comprend dès lorsque la Cour ait toujourstraité la facultéde
recourir ou non à la saisine par voie de requête comme une question de
compétence de la Cour plutôt que commeune question de recevabilitéde la
requête. C'est ce qu'elle a fait, par exemple, dans l'affaire Nottebohm
(C.I. J. Rrcueii 1953, p. 122) . Et lorsque, dans l'affaire du Plateau
continental de la mer Egee, elle a eu à déterminer si la décision de la
Grèce et de la Turquie de falre régler leur différendpar la Cour
permettart à chaiune des Partiesde saisir la Cour par voie de requête,
elle ne s'est pas demandé si la requête déposée parla Grèce était
recevable; c'est sur le terrain de la compétence qu'elle s'est placée. Et
le dispositif de l'arrêt ne déclare pas quela requête de la Grèce est
irrecevable,mais que la Cour "n'a pas compétencepour [en] connaîtreu
(C.I.J. Recueil 1978, p. 45, par. 109). Mieux encore : dans l'arrêt
interprétatif en l'affaire Tunisie/Lybiela Cour a déclaré que
"les parties à des traitésou à des compromis sont libres
d'assortir leur consentement à la saisine de la Cour, et donc à
sa juridiction, de toutes conditions préalables compatibles avec le Statut dont ellespeuvent être convenues" (C.I.J. Recueil
1985 p. 216, par. 43) (les italiques sont denous).
On ne saurait être plus clair. Letraitement constant par la Cour du
consentement à la saisine unilatérale comme une question de compétence
méritait, me semble-t-il,d'être relevé.
Si vous le jugez utile, Monsieur le Président,je peux m'arrêter,
sinon je peux continuer. C'est comme vous le souhaitez.
Le PRESIDENT :Bien, je crois en effet que c'est l'heure de lever la
séance. Monsieur le Professeur, je vous remercie et la Cour reprendra
ses audiences demain matin à 10 heures, pour continuer à vous entendre.
Merci beaucoup.
M. WEIL : Je vous remercie Monsieur le Président.
L'audience est levée à 13 heures.
Audience publique tenue le lundi 7 mars 1994, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Bedjaoui, président