Traduction

BHY

CR 2006/29 (traduction)

CR 2006/29 (translation)

Mardi 28 mars 2006 à 10 heures

Tuesday 28 March 2006 at 10 a.m. - 2 -

10 Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président : Veuillez vous asseoir. L’audience est

ouverte. Le président Higgins ne pourra être des nôtres ce matin en raison d’un rendez-vous

important. Elle m’a chargé de présider cette audience. Le juge Parra-Aranguren vient de

m’informer qu’il ne serait pas non plus en mesure d’assister à l’audience.

La Cour entendra maintenant la déposition du prochain témoin produit par la

Serbie-et-Monténégro, M.Dragoljub Mi ćunović. Le témoin peut être introduit dans la salle

d’audiences.

[Le témoin entre et prend place à la barre.]

Mons Mieiur ćunović, je vous invite à faire la déclaration solennelle prévue pour les témoins,

dont l’énoncé figure à l’alinéa a) de l’article 64 du Règlement de la Cour.

MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : Je déclare solennellement, en tout honneur et

en toute conscience, que je dirai la vérité, toute la vérité et rien que la vérité.

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant foncti on de président: Monsieur Stojanovi ć, je vous invite

maintenant à commencer l’interrogatoire du témoin. Je demanderai au témoin de s’interrompre

régulièrement pour permettre l’interprétation consécutive du serbe.

SMT. JANOVI Ć [interprétation du serbe] : Je vous remercie. J’invite maintenant

Monsieur Mićunović à donner lecture de sa déposition à la Cour.

MIr. ĆUNOVIĆ [interpretation from Serbian] : Mr. Vice-President, Members of the

Court, let me say what a great honour it is to testify before this honourable Court. I was born in

1930 in Toplica in southern Serbia. In 1960 I was appointed professor in the faculty of philosophy

in Belgrade. I was expelled from the University in 1975, with a group of eight other professors, for

my commitment to democratic values and freedom of thought and expression and for criticizing the

government, which was suppressing human rights in th e Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia.

In the 1980s I was a member of the Yugoslav Forum for Human Rights and I defended political

opponents of the régime, as well as the terrorizeMuslim peasantry in the village of Mosevci,

because repression by the régime was very strong at the time. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and

the establishment of a pluralistic system in Yugos lavia, a group of intellectuals and I created the

11 Democratic Party, which was active throughout Y ugoslavia. I was elected Deputy at the first - 3 -

pluralistic elections, and from then on I have been a Deputy in the Serbian Assembly, the Yugoslav

Assembly or the Assembly of Serbia and Monteneg ro. After the defeat of Milosevic in the 2000

elections I was elected President of the Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and I held

that office until 2004. Mr. Vice-President, I can testify, as regards events that are of importance in

the present proceedings, in my capacity as a politician who was in opposition throughout the

régime of Slobodan Milosevic. Under the Constitution that was then in force, and under the current

Constitution of Serbia, consent to the declarati on of war and for war ha s to be given by the

Assembly. No mention of this was made to the Assembly. The response to the call for

mobilization by the Yugoslav People’s Army durin g the conflicts in Croatia was very poor, the

poorest in the history of Serbia. According to info rmation to which I had access, this response was

about 30percent. Several hundred young men em igrated from Serbia at the beginning of the

1990s expressly to avoid the call-up. The Democratic Party, which I had led since its creation,

sought to ensure that Yugoslavia was kept safe and that conflicts that would have led to the

dismantling of the State were avoided. In the Serbian Assembly, in canvassing public opinion and

as part of our international activities the party str ove to prevent conflicts from breaking out. As a

party committed to peace and civilian values, with organizations in all the republics of the former

Yugoslavia, we severely criticized the policy of the Government of the Republic of Serbia because

it was not doing enough and was not acting with suffi cient vigour in preventing conflicts. As part

of these activities in the National Assembly we called for the resignation of the President of Serbia,

Slobodan Milosevic, and a civil initiative was launc hed seeking his removal from office, in the

course of which some 700,000 citizens’ signatures were collected. Followi ng the failure of the

agreement by the Presidents of the six republics of the former Federal Socialist Republic of

Yugoslavia regarding the constitutiona l rearrangement of the country, the first conflicts broke out

between armed groups in Croatia. These flared up later into a real war, involving territorial

defence forces, the police, the Yugoslav People’ s Army and volunteers organized as paramilitary

units. We in the Democratic Party had understood that we had to react quickly in order to prevent
12
the conflict from spreading to the territory of Bosn ia and Herzegovina; we knew that this was the

most dangerous of the possible scenarios because of the extensive ethnic and religious

intermingling there. Our idea was to attempt to exercise pressure for a p eaceful solution to the - 4 -

constitutional differences, by way of parliamentaria ns who were closer to the citizens than the

Presidents of the republics were. We thought ⎯ and later this proved to be correct ⎯ that the

Presidents of the republics ⎯ all of them the same, Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovic ⎯ were

completely incapable of solving the problems and preventing conflicts from breaking out. With a

view to putting this idea into practice, I wrote a le tter to all the leaders of parliamentary groups in

all six parliaments in which I suggested a joint me eting to seek a common solution. Almost all of

them, 36 out of 38 to be precise, accepted this invitation. This encouraged us, and in accordance

with the principal idea of preventing the war from spreading, I proposed that the conference be held

in Banja Ilidza, not far from Sarajevo. Our idea in choosing this site for the meeting was to send a

clear message that all those attending the meeting were agreed that the war should not spread to

Bosnia and Herzegovina. To give the conference greater status, we also invited international

observers from Liberal International and Deputi es from the Netherlands, Greece and elsewhere,

most of whom responded positively to our invitation. A large number of journalists from the

country and abroad also attended the conference. The conference, entitled “The possibility of a

peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis”, was inaugurated on 21 August 1991 in Ilidza, near

Sarajevo, and lasted for two days. The atmosphere at the conference was one of tolerance, and on

the first day we launched an appeal for p eace aimed at public opinion and all competent

institutions. At the end of the conference a letter was drafted calling for the immediate cessation of

hostilities and suggesting the urgent implementation of preventive measu res to check the spread of

conflicts. In accordance with the decision of the conference I handed this letter personally to

MrS.tipMesic, the President of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, to

Mr.AnteMarkovic, the President of the Gove rnment of the Federal Socialist Republic of

13 Yugoslavia, to Mr.SlobodanGligorijevic, the Presi dent of the Assembly of the Federal Socialist

Republic of Yugoslavia, and to Ge neral Veljko Kadijevic, the Minister of Defence of the Federal

Government.

Having regard to the situation prevailing in the country, it was decided at the conference that

it should reconvene in Sarajevo in 15 days with the same participants. The purpose of this second

meeting was to allow each parliamentary party in Yugoslavia to put forward its plan for solving the - 5 -

Yugoslav State crisis, and so that we could imme diately adopt those points on which we were in

agreement, leaving contentious matters to subsequent discussions.

At this second meeting, held on 6 and 7 Sept ember 1991 in Sarajevo in the premises of the

Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, most of the parties came with a programme for a way out

of the crisis. The final document from this conf erence was also harmonized with the initial efforts

of the international community to re-establish pe ace in the territory of the Federal Socialist

Republic of Yugoslavia.

Unfortunately, Mr. Vice-President, these sustained efforts by the parliamentarians to prevent

war breaking out failed, and soon what we most feared happened: war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Even after conflicts had begun on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic

Party continued to make great efforts domestica lly and internationally in pursuit of a peaceful

solution to the Yugoslav crisis. Of course, the s ituation was different now. The Federal Socialist

Republic of Yugoslavia had just disintegrated, wh ile the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had just

come into being. This State was not at war with Croatia or with Bosnia and Herzegovina, but was

to suffer sanctions because of its support for the Serb people beyond its frontiers.

14 I also cite the activities of the Democratic Party in accordance with this policy concerning

the examination and acceptance of the Vance-Owen peace plan during 1993, which was just one of

the attempts to put an end to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pursuant to our efforts in the

Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, it was decided that the Vance-Own plan was an acceptable

solution for ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In accordance with this decision and with our consistent policy of peace, our support for the

Vance-Owen plan was always placed at the forefro nt in the direct discussions. Unfortunately,

despite the decision by the Assembly of the Repub lic of Serbia and despite the pressure to accept

the plan exerted at the time by public opinion within Serbia on Republika Srpska, it was rejected in

the latter’s Assembly and in the referendum held later in Republika Srpska, with the result that this

peace initiative was aborted.

It is also important to mention that, in add ition to the Democratic Party, most of the other

opposition parties had a peace-oriented programme. One particular area of activity involved civil

initiatives and action by non-governmental organizations, which, despite the war and the blockade, - 6 -

reached as far as Sarajevo, Tuzla and other towns under the control of Bosnian Muslim forces, so

as to express solidarity with the citizens who were living under the armed blockade. A number of

humanitarian organizations in Serbia continued th eir activities throughout the period of the war in

Bosnia and Herzegovina, seeking to ease the difficult situation of populations who were

experiencing serious shortages.

Following the victory of the Serbian democr atic opposition in the 2000 elections, and in my

capacity as president of the Assembly of the Fede ral Republic of Yugoslavia, I joined one of the

first delegations from our parliament in a visit to the parliament in Sarajevo and a meeting with the

most senior officials of Bosnia and Herzegovi na. The borders were being opened, economic

exchanges were growing steadily, and cultural exchanges too.

Mr.Vice-President, the war caused serious traumas which it will take a very long time to

heal. The most senior government leaders in Serbia have repeatedly expressed their deep regret for

all the victims of the war, and they have condemned all the crimes and demanded that the

perpetrators of those crimes, whatever side they come from, should be put on trial. I believe that

there are good and bad elements in every people and that progress is possible if individuals are

categorized in terms of their good character and not merely by national or religious affiliation.

Good people condemn all crimes and join together in building friendship and ensuring a better

future. Thank you for your attention.

15 The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you. Mr. Stojanović.

SMTr.JANOVI Ć [interpretation from Serbian] : Thank you, Mr.Vice-President. I have

only three questions to put to Mr. Mi ćunović. The first will refer to the last part of his statement.

During your visit to Sarajevo, you met the most senior government officials of Bosnia and

Herzegovina. Would you care to tell us what subjects you discussed?

MIr. ĆUNOVIĆ [interpretation from Serbian] : Mr.Vice-President, that visit was in a

sense a “trial” visit. The Milošević Government had just fallen and the visit was meant to represent

a chance for restoring relations. Even if some people felt that it was too soon to go there and that it

might be an unpleasant experience for me, I must say that my visit passed off very well. I was

given a friendly welcome, I had conversations w ith the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, - 7 -

with the Prime Minister and with the President of the parliament. And I held a press conference at

the end. So everything passed off very well. We discussed restoring trade, cultural and political

ties between the two States as quickly as possible. We concluded that companies from Bosnia and

Herzegovina which had been doing business in Serb ia and, conversely, Serbian companies which

had been in business in Bosnia and Herzegovina should re-establish their previous relations as

quickly as possible. We also discussed the possibility of dual nationality to enable the nationals of

both States to cross the border easily and exercise their rights in both countries. We also discussed

the need to establish a truth and reconciliation commission along the lines of those set up in certain

other countries, particularly South Africa, wher e there had been a conflict and reconciliation was

also required. In short, we reached agreement on the need for active mutual communication and

the peaceful settlement of any disputes that might arise.

SMTO.JANOVI Ć [interpretation from Serbian] : You mentioned the Vance-Owen plan

and a common assembly in which members of the parliaments of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia and Serbia participated together withrepresentatives of the parliament of Republika

16 Srpska and the parliament of the Republic of Krajina-Srpska. Could you tell us, Mr.Mi ćunović,

what transpired during that period? Why w as that assembly convened and what issues were

discussed?

MMIr. ĆUNOVIĆ [interpretation from Serbian] : Serbia had been hit hard by sanctions.

Public opinion and the entire political class felt that everything should be done to stop the war and

exert pressure on Republika Srpska for the latter to accept the plan, so that we could restore normal

relations with the international community.

I myself spoke at that session of the Serb ian Yugoslav parliament, and it was necessary to

exert pressure for the plan to be accepted. All the leading figures agreed on that plan, with a few

exceptions, such as the representative of the Radical Party, which was in opposition at the time, and

we resorted to a mediator, the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Mitsotakis. The session was

continued in Athens, where Radovan Karadžić initialled the plan.

At the conference, I emphasized my opposition to the referendum, saying that it was still

fanning the flames, if I may use that term, and opening up the possibility of conflict. Those present

at that meeting of the Pale Assembly, at which th e agreement was to be ratified, that is, those who - 8 -

attended, were: PresidentJoci ć, of the Republic of Yugoslavia; PresidentMiloševi ć, of Serbia;

and then Mr. Mitsotakis and other guests. But th e pressure that was exerted did not bear fruit, and

the assembly of Republika Srpska rejected the plan.

STOr.JANOVI Ć [interpretation from Serbian]: I should like to ask a third question. This

is the last question. The Democratic Party proposed a number of initiatives to prevent, and

subsequently to stop, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Because of the little time available to us,

I would ask you to mention only the most important initiatives which were used, first, to prevent

the outbreak of war, and subsequently, to stop the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de prési dent: Je suis désolé de vous interrompre,

mais je crains que le temps réserv é à l’interrogatoire ne touche à sa fin, et je vous prierais donc de

bien vouloir être bref.

MMIr. ĆUNOVIĆ [interpretation from Serbian]: As regards the recognition of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, I objected to such recognition, because I thought that it was premature, and I

conveyed my thoughts to the United States Ambassador and to Mr.Boutros-Ghali, the

17 Secretary-General of the United Nations. Thus , my first objection concerned the date of

recognition, which was 6 April. This was the date when, in 1941, Hitler had ordered the bombing

of Yugoslavia and had destroyed the country, and the second objecti on was a more important one.

The status of the army in Bosnia and Herzegovi na had not been resolved. To use the cynical

expression of Carl Schmitt: power belongs to him who declares a state of emergency. And in my

view, it was not known who had that power, that capacity, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I proposed

that there should first be reforms of the army in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to ascertain who

would be given command responsibility, so as to prevent conflict between the army and the civilian

authorities. The arguments were not persuasive, the arguments to the effect that this army should

be treated exclusively as a forei gn army in Bosnia and Herzegovina . Because that army had been

stationed there since 1918.

I therefore made my objection known to the United States Secretary of State,

Mr.Eagleburger, during the visit and meeting that I had with Mr.Boutros-Ghali, and this is

something that I subsequently published, which wa s subsequently published, in the newspaper, the - 9 -

Baltimore Sun , where I accordingly stated that trecognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina⎯

which was premature ⎯ had fanned the flames of war.

STr.JANOVI Ć [interpretation from Serbian]: I am satisfied with the reply. Thank you.

I shall conclude with these remarks. Thank you, Mr. Vice-President.

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président: Je vous remercie. Je donne

maintenant la parole à Mme Korner, pour son contre-interrogatoire.

Mme KORNER : Monsieur Mi ćunović, vous venez de dire que vous vous étiez opposé à la

reconnaissance de la Bosnie le 6 avril, car c’est un 6avril qu’avaient commencé les

bombardements allemands, en 1941. Une petite question historique, en passant : N’est-ce pas aussi

un 6 avril ⎯ le 6 avril 1945 ⎯ que Sarajevo a été libérée de l’occupation alleman?e

Contentez-vous de répondre par «oui» ou par «non».

MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : C’était le jour de la division, du démantèlement

d’un Etat. Il est vrai que c’est aussi un il, le 6 avril 1945, que les troupes de partisans ont

libéré Sarajevo, mais j’associe quant à moi cette date au démantèlement de notre Etat, parce que

c’est le 6 avril 1941 qu’il a été bombardé.

18 Mme KORNER: Comme je l’ai dit, il s’agissait là d’un point historique, en passant.

Monsieur Mićunović, j’ai très peu de questions à vous poser. Vous nous avez dit que vous aviez

fondé le parti démocratique, en 1989 ⎯ si je ne m’abuse. Est-ce exact ?

MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : C’est exact.

Mme KORNE:RL’avez-vous fondé avec M. Stojanovi ć, l’agent de la

Serbie-et-Monténégro ?

MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : En effet, c’était bien l’un des cofondateurs.

Mme KORNER : Et y en avait-il un troisième ?

MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : Nous étions treize.

Mme KORNER : Très bien. Vous nous avez dit avoir continué à siéger comme député tout

au long de la guerre, mais toujours dans l’opposition.

MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : C’est exact. - 10 -

Mme KORNER: Et vous êtes-vous opposé à toutes les guerres menées par le

gouvernement ?

MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : A toutes, oui.

Mme KORNER: Et puis-je déduire du fait que vous vous trouviez da ns l’opposition que

vous n’étiez pas au courant des opérations conjointes menées par les trois armées ?

MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : La Serbie est un petit pays, la Yougoslavie de

même, et les informations y circulent très rapidement. Et même si, dans ma position, je ne pouvais

prendre aucune décision officielle, je n’en avais pas moins autour de moi, en ma qualité d’homme

politique, des comités, des militants, et puis il y av ait aussi la population en général…autant de

sources dans lesquelles je pouvais puiser, et j’étais informé.

Mme KORNER : Puis-je vous donner un exemple ? Etiez-vous au courant d’une opération

menée dans la région de Bihać, appelée «opération PAUK» ?

MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : Non.

Mme KORNER: Une simple question: Saviez-vous, par exemple ⎯ ou plutôt,

ignoriez-vous que les soldes des membres de l’armée de la RepublikaSrpska étaient payés par
e e
l’intermédiaire des 30t 40 centres du personnel ?

19 MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : Oui, je l’ignorais. Je n’étais pas dans le secret

des opérations financières de l’état-major.

Mme KORNER : Je vous remercie. Et enfin, une dernière question : vous avez indiqué avoir

exigé la démission de Miloševi ć. Tout d’abord, pouvez-vous nou s préciser combien de fois vous

l’avez fait ?

M I . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : Nous l’avons demandée très souvent, et de

différentes façons. Tout d’abord, nous l’avons demandée dans le cadre de l’Assemblée, puis nous

avons fait signer des pétitions et organisé des mnifestations et des formes de protestations

publiques.

Mme KORNER : Et vous l’avez fait régulièrement, entre 1990 et 2000 ?

M I . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : Oui, bien sûr, et nous avons aussi fait valoir

nos revendications avec force lors de la tenue d’élections. En1996, par exemple, lorsque

Milošević a tenté de truquer les élections locales, la population de Belgrade a défilé dans les rues - 11 -

pendant trois mois, jusqu’à ce qu’une commission de l’OSCE vienne sur place et constate que nous

étions dans le vrai. Et à cette période, l’ensemble des grandes vill⎯la capitale Belgrade, tout

d’abord, puis Niš, Novi Sad, Pirot, et une trentaine d’autres ⎯ sont de fait passées à l’opposition,

de sorte que, dès 1996, c’est nous qui détenions le pouvoir local.

Mme KORNER : Avez-vous notamment exigé la démission de Miloševi ć après que la Cour

devant laquelle nous nous trouvons aujourd’hui eu t, en avril1993, ordonné à la République

fédérale de Yougoslavie de cesser de prêter appui aux Serbes de Bosnie ?

MM I . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : En avril 1993, après sa tentative avortée à Pale,

et l’embarras éprouvé, Miloševi ć était mortifié, et l’opinion publique l’était aussi, et, à la suite de

cela, il a imposé à la Republika Srpska un embargo da ns tous les domaines, excepté celui de l’aide

humanitaire. Exiger sa démission était inutile à ce moment-là ⎯ au moment où, justement, il était

en train de faire pression sur la Republika Srpska pour l’amener à accepter le plan Vance-Owen.

Mme KORNER: Mais ces pressions ont fait long feu… Saviez-vous que la République

fédérale de Yougoslavie continua it à approvisionner les Serbes de Bosnie, et en particulier

l’armée ?

MM I . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : Eh bien, je me doute que c’était le cas, puisque

les guerres continuaient, et que l’ensemble des belligér ants recevaient des armes. Il est loisible de

20 supposer qu’ils étaient tous approvisionnés, par des voies officielles ou non, et que cette pratique

s’est poursuivie un certain temps après 1994.

MmeKORNER: Si vous aviez été dûment in formé que des armes continuaient d’être

livrées, en dépit de ce qu’affirmait Miloševi ć ⎯à savoir qu’il avait imposé un embargo sur

l’aide ⎯, auriez-vous redemandé sa démission ?

MM I . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : Bien sûr que oui, mais Miloševi ć s’est bien sûr

gardé de nous le faire savoir ⎯et il démentait bel et bien l’existence de tels liens. Et il faut bien

évidemment aussi tenir compte du fait qu’un embargo était alors en vigueur, et qu’embargo signifie

nécessairement contrebande. Et contrebande il y avait ⎯contrebande de tous types de

marchandises : d’essence, d’armes et de cigarettes. C’était là le lot commun.

Mme KORNER : Je vous remercie, Monsieur Mićunović. Je n’ai pas d’autre question. - 12 -

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant foncti on de présiden:tJe vous remercie.

Monsieur Stojanović, souhaitez-vous procéder à un nouvel interrogatoire ?

STO. JANOVI Ć [interprétation du serbe] : Non, cela n’est pas nécessaire. Je vous

remercie.

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président : La Cour va maintenant se retirer pour

quinze minutes. Les Parties et le témoin sont néanmoins priés de demeurer à proximité de la

grande salle de justice.

Si la Cour souhaite poser des questions au témo in, elle le fera lorsqu’elle regagnera la salle

d’audiences. Dans le cas contraire, elle n’en retournera pas moins dans la salle d’audiences, car un

juge a exprimé le souhait de poser aux Parties ⎯et non au témoin ⎯ une question, comme l’y

autorise le paragraphe3 de l’article61 du Règl ement de la Cour. Je rappelle que la fin de

l’audition des témoins, des experts et des témoins experts marque aussi la fin du premier tour de

plaidoiries.

L’audience est à présent levée.

L’audience est suspendue de 11 h 10 à 11 h 35.

21 Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président: Veuillez vous asseoir. Ainsi que l’a

fait savoir le Greffe, aucun juge ne souhaite poser de question au témoin. Je voudrais donc

remercier M.Mićunović d’avoir bien voulu comparaître devant nous. Et voilà qui clôt l’audition

des témoins, experts et témoins-experts.

Le juge Tomka souhaite néanmoins soumettre une question à la Bosnie-Herzégovine. Vous

avez la parole.

Le juge TOMKA : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président en exercice.

Le 28février2006, le conseil de la Bosn ie-Herzégovine a indiqué que «[l]a Yougoslavie

[était] demeurée Membre des NationsUnies». Dans une lettre datée du 9août2005 adressée au

Secrétaire général adjoint de l’Organisation des NationsUnies à la gestion par le représentant

permanent de l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine et les charg és d’affaires par intérim de la

Bosnie-Herzégovine, de la Croatie, de la Serbie-et-Monténégro et de la Slovénie, ces cinq Etats - 13 -

⎯ au nombre desquels figurait donc le demandeur ⎯ ont indiqué que «[l]a République fédérale de

Yougoslavie, qui a vu le jour le 27 avril 1992, n’est devenue un Etat Membre de l’Organisation des
er
NationsUnies que le 1 novembre2000; c’est l’Etat actuellement connu sous le nom de

«Serbie-et-Monténégro»». Je serais heureux d’en tendre toute explication, ou tout commentaire,

que la Bosnie-Herzégovine pourrait souhaiter apporter sur cette dern ière déclaration. Je vous

remercie, Monsieur le président en exercice.

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de préside nt: Je vous remercie. Le texte de cette

question sera communiqué dans les meilleurs déla is à la Bosnie-Herzégovine ainsi qu’à la

Serbie-et-Monténégro, pour son information. La Bosnie-Herzégovine est priée de bien vouloir y

répondre lors du second tour de procédure orale.

Je confirme que la Cour se réunira de nouveau le mardi18avril2006, à 10heures, pour

entendre les Parties en leur second tour de plaidoirie.

L’audience est maintenant levée.

L’audience est levée à 11 h 40.

__________