BHY
CR 2006/29 (traduction)
CR 2006/29 (translation)
Mardi 28 mars 2006 à 10 heures
Tuesday 28 March 2006 at 10 a.m. - 2 -
10 Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président : Veuillez vous asseoir. L’audience est
ouverte. Le président Higgins ne pourra être des nôtres ce matin en raison d’un rendez-vous
important. Elle m’a chargé de présider cette audience. Le juge Parra-Aranguren vient de
m’informer qu’il ne serait pas non plus en mesure d’assister à l’audience.
La Cour entendra maintenant la déposition du prochain témoin produit par la
Serbie-et-Monténégro, M.Dragoljub Mi ćunović. Le témoin peut être introduit dans la salle
d’audiences.
[Le témoin entre et prend place à la barre.]
Mons Mieiur ćunović, je vous invite à faire la déclaration solennelle prévue pour les témoins,
dont l’énoncé figure à l’alinéa a) de l’article 64 du Règlement de la Cour.
MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : Je déclare solennellement, en tout honneur et
en toute conscience, que je dirai la vérité, toute la vérité et rien que la vérité.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant foncti on de président: Monsieur Stojanovi ć, je vous invite
maintenant à commencer l’interrogatoire du témoin. Je demanderai au témoin de s’interrompre
régulièrement pour permettre l’interprétation consécutive du serbe.
SMT. JANOVI Ć [interprétation du serbe] : Je vous remercie. J’invite maintenant
Monsieur Mićunović à donner lecture de sa déposition à la Cour.
MIr. ĆUNOVIĆ [interpretation from Serbian] : Mr. Vice-President, Members of the
Court, let me say what a great honour it is to testify before this honourable Court. I was born in
1930 in Toplica in southern Serbia. In 1960 I was appointed professor in the faculty of philosophy
in Belgrade. I was expelled from the University in 1975, with a group of eight other professors, for
my commitment to democratic values and freedom of thought and expression and for criticizing the
government, which was suppressing human rights in th e Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia.
In the 1980s I was a member of the Yugoslav Forum for Human Rights and I defended political
opponents of the régime, as well as the terrorizeMuslim peasantry in the village of Mosevci,
because repression by the régime was very strong at the time. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and
the establishment of a pluralistic system in Yugos lavia, a group of intellectuals and I created the
11 Democratic Party, which was active throughout Y ugoslavia. I was elected Deputy at the first - 3 -
pluralistic elections, and from then on I have been a Deputy in the Serbian Assembly, the Yugoslav
Assembly or the Assembly of Serbia and Monteneg ro. After the defeat of Milosevic in the 2000
elections I was elected President of the Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and I held
that office until 2004. Mr. Vice-President, I can testify, as regards events that are of importance in
the present proceedings, in my capacity as a politician who was in opposition throughout the
régime of Slobodan Milosevic. Under the Constitution that was then in force, and under the current
Constitution of Serbia, consent to the declarati on of war and for war ha s to be given by the
Assembly. No mention of this was made to the Assembly. The response to the call for
mobilization by the Yugoslav People’s Army durin g the conflicts in Croatia was very poor, the
poorest in the history of Serbia. According to info rmation to which I had access, this response was
about 30percent. Several hundred young men em igrated from Serbia at the beginning of the
1990s expressly to avoid the call-up. The Democratic Party, which I had led since its creation,
sought to ensure that Yugoslavia was kept safe and that conflicts that would have led to the
dismantling of the State were avoided. In the Serbian Assembly, in canvassing public opinion and
as part of our international activities the party str ove to prevent conflicts from breaking out. As a
party committed to peace and civilian values, with organizations in all the republics of the former
Yugoslavia, we severely criticized the policy of the Government of the Republic of Serbia because
it was not doing enough and was not acting with suffi cient vigour in preventing conflicts. As part
of these activities in the National Assembly we called for the resignation of the President of Serbia,
Slobodan Milosevic, and a civil initiative was launc hed seeking his removal from office, in the
course of which some 700,000 citizens’ signatures were collected. Followi ng the failure of the
agreement by the Presidents of the six republics of the former Federal Socialist Republic of
Yugoslavia regarding the constitutiona l rearrangement of the country, the first conflicts broke out
between armed groups in Croatia. These flared up later into a real war, involving territorial
defence forces, the police, the Yugoslav People’ s Army and volunteers organized as paramilitary
units. We in the Democratic Party had understood that we had to react quickly in order to prevent
12
the conflict from spreading to the territory of Bosn ia and Herzegovina; we knew that this was the
most dangerous of the possible scenarios because of the extensive ethnic and religious
intermingling there. Our idea was to attempt to exercise pressure for a p eaceful solution to the - 4 -
constitutional differences, by way of parliamentaria ns who were closer to the citizens than the
Presidents of the republics were. We thought ⎯ and later this proved to be correct ⎯ that the
Presidents of the republics ⎯ all of them the same, Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovic ⎯ were
completely incapable of solving the problems and preventing conflicts from breaking out. With a
view to putting this idea into practice, I wrote a le tter to all the leaders of parliamentary groups in
all six parliaments in which I suggested a joint me eting to seek a common solution. Almost all of
them, 36 out of 38 to be precise, accepted this invitation. This encouraged us, and in accordance
with the principal idea of preventing the war from spreading, I proposed that the conference be held
in Banja Ilidza, not far from Sarajevo. Our idea in choosing this site for the meeting was to send a
clear message that all those attending the meeting were agreed that the war should not spread to
Bosnia and Herzegovina. To give the conference greater status, we also invited international
observers from Liberal International and Deputi es from the Netherlands, Greece and elsewhere,
most of whom responded positively to our invitation. A large number of journalists from the
country and abroad also attended the conference. The conference, entitled “The possibility of a
peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis”, was inaugurated on 21 August 1991 in Ilidza, near
Sarajevo, and lasted for two days. The atmosphere at the conference was one of tolerance, and on
the first day we launched an appeal for p eace aimed at public opinion and all competent
institutions. At the end of the conference a letter was drafted calling for the immediate cessation of
hostilities and suggesting the urgent implementation of preventive measu res to check the spread of
conflicts. In accordance with the decision of the conference I handed this letter personally to
MrS.tipMesic, the President of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, to
Mr.AnteMarkovic, the President of the Gove rnment of the Federal Socialist Republic of
13 Yugoslavia, to Mr.SlobodanGligorijevic, the Presi dent of the Assembly of the Federal Socialist
Republic of Yugoslavia, and to Ge neral Veljko Kadijevic, the Minister of Defence of the Federal
Government.
Having regard to the situation prevailing in the country, it was decided at the conference that
it should reconvene in Sarajevo in 15 days with the same participants. The purpose of this second
meeting was to allow each parliamentary party in Yugoslavia to put forward its plan for solving the - 5 -
Yugoslav State crisis, and so that we could imme diately adopt those points on which we were in
agreement, leaving contentious matters to subsequent discussions.
At this second meeting, held on 6 and 7 Sept ember 1991 in Sarajevo in the premises of the
Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, most of the parties came with a programme for a way out
of the crisis. The final document from this conf erence was also harmonized with the initial efforts
of the international community to re-establish pe ace in the territory of the Federal Socialist
Republic of Yugoslavia.
Unfortunately, Mr. Vice-President, these sustained efforts by the parliamentarians to prevent
war breaking out failed, and soon what we most feared happened: war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Even after conflicts had begun on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic
Party continued to make great efforts domestica lly and internationally in pursuit of a peaceful
solution to the Yugoslav crisis. Of course, the s ituation was different now. The Federal Socialist
Republic of Yugoslavia had just disintegrated, wh ile the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had just
come into being. This State was not at war with Croatia or with Bosnia and Herzegovina, but was
to suffer sanctions because of its support for the Serb people beyond its frontiers.
14 I also cite the activities of the Democratic Party in accordance with this policy concerning
the examination and acceptance of the Vance-Owen peace plan during 1993, which was just one of
the attempts to put an end to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pursuant to our efforts in the
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, it was decided that the Vance-Own plan was an acceptable
solution for ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In accordance with this decision and with our consistent policy of peace, our support for the
Vance-Owen plan was always placed at the forefro nt in the direct discussions. Unfortunately,
despite the decision by the Assembly of the Repub lic of Serbia and despite the pressure to accept
the plan exerted at the time by public opinion within Serbia on Republika Srpska, it was rejected in
the latter’s Assembly and in the referendum held later in Republika Srpska, with the result that this
peace initiative was aborted.
It is also important to mention that, in add ition to the Democratic Party, most of the other
opposition parties had a peace-oriented programme. One particular area of activity involved civil
initiatives and action by non-governmental organizations, which, despite the war and the blockade, - 6 -
reached as far as Sarajevo, Tuzla and other towns under the control of Bosnian Muslim forces, so
as to express solidarity with the citizens who were living under the armed blockade. A number of
humanitarian organizations in Serbia continued th eir activities throughout the period of the war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, seeking to ease the difficult situation of populations who were
experiencing serious shortages.
Following the victory of the Serbian democr atic opposition in the 2000 elections, and in my
capacity as president of the Assembly of the Fede ral Republic of Yugoslavia, I joined one of the
first delegations from our parliament in a visit to the parliament in Sarajevo and a meeting with the
most senior officials of Bosnia and Herzegovi na. The borders were being opened, economic
exchanges were growing steadily, and cultural exchanges too.
Mr.Vice-President, the war caused serious traumas which it will take a very long time to
heal. The most senior government leaders in Serbia have repeatedly expressed their deep regret for
all the victims of the war, and they have condemned all the crimes and demanded that the
perpetrators of those crimes, whatever side they come from, should be put on trial. I believe that
there are good and bad elements in every people and that progress is possible if individuals are
categorized in terms of their good character and not merely by national or religious affiliation.
Good people condemn all crimes and join together in building friendship and ensuring a better
future. Thank you for your attention.
15 The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you. Mr. Stojanović.
SMTr.JANOVI Ć [interpretation from Serbian] : Thank you, Mr.Vice-President. I have
only three questions to put to Mr. Mi ćunović. The first will refer to the last part of his statement.
During your visit to Sarajevo, you met the most senior government officials of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Would you care to tell us what subjects you discussed?
MIr. ĆUNOVIĆ [interpretation from Serbian] : Mr.Vice-President, that visit was in a
sense a “trial” visit. The Milošević Government had just fallen and the visit was meant to represent
a chance for restoring relations. Even if some people felt that it was too soon to go there and that it
might be an unpleasant experience for me, I must say that my visit passed off very well. I was
given a friendly welcome, I had conversations w ith the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, - 7 -
with the Prime Minister and with the President of the parliament. And I held a press conference at
the end. So everything passed off very well. We discussed restoring trade, cultural and political
ties between the two States as quickly as possible. We concluded that companies from Bosnia and
Herzegovina which had been doing business in Serb ia and, conversely, Serbian companies which
had been in business in Bosnia and Herzegovina should re-establish their previous relations as
quickly as possible. We also discussed the possibility of dual nationality to enable the nationals of
both States to cross the border easily and exercise their rights in both countries. We also discussed
the need to establish a truth and reconciliation commission along the lines of those set up in certain
other countries, particularly South Africa, wher e there had been a conflict and reconciliation was
also required. In short, we reached agreement on the need for active mutual communication and
the peaceful settlement of any disputes that might arise.
SMTO.JANOVI Ć [interpretation from Serbian] : You mentioned the Vance-Owen plan
and a common assembly in which members of the parliaments of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and Serbia participated together withrepresentatives of the parliament of Republika
16 Srpska and the parliament of the Republic of Krajina-Srpska. Could you tell us, Mr.Mi ćunović,
what transpired during that period? Why w as that assembly convened and what issues were
discussed?
MMIr. ĆUNOVIĆ [interpretation from Serbian] : Serbia had been hit hard by sanctions.
Public opinion and the entire political class felt that everything should be done to stop the war and
exert pressure on Republika Srpska for the latter to accept the plan, so that we could restore normal
relations with the international community.
I myself spoke at that session of the Serb ian Yugoslav parliament, and it was necessary to
exert pressure for the plan to be accepted. All the leading figures agreed on that plan, with a few
exceptions, such as the representative of the Radical Party, which was in opposition at the time, and
we resorted to a mediator, the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Mitsotakis. The session was
continued in Athens, where Radovan Karadžić initialled the plan.
At the conference, I emphasized my opposition to the referendum, saying that it was still
fanning the flames, if I may use that term, and opening up the possibility of conflict. Those present
at that meeting of the Pale Assembly, at which th e agreement was to be ratified, that is, those who - 8 -
attended, were: PresidentJoci ć, of the Republic of Yugoslavia; PresidentMiloševi ć, of Serbia;
and then Mr. Mitsotakis and other guests. But th e pressure that was exerted did not bear fruit, and
the assembly of Republika Srpska rejected the plan.
STOr.JANOVI Ć [interpretation from Serbian]: I should like to ask a third question. This
is the last question. The Democratic Party proposed a number of initiatives to prevent, and
subsequently to stop, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Because of the little time available to us,
I would ask you to mention only the most important initiatives which were used, first, to prevent
the outbreak of war, and subsequently, to stop the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de prési dent: Je suis désolé de vous interrompre,
mais je crains que le temps réserv é à l’interrogatoire ne touche à sa fin, et je vous prierais donc de
bien vouloir être bref.
MMIr. ĆUNOVIĆ [interpretation from Serbian]: As regards the recognition of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, I objected to such recognition, because I thought that it was premature, and I
conveyed my thoughts to the United States Ambassador and to Mr.Boutros-Ghali, the
17 Secretary-General of the United Nations. Thus , my first objection concerned the date of
recognition, which was 6 April. This was the date when, in 1941, Hitler had ordered the bombing
of Yugoslavia and had destroyed the country, and the second objecti on was a more important one.
The status of the army in Bosnia and Herzegovi na had not been resolved. To use the cynical
expression of Carl Schmitt: power belongs to him who declares a state of emergency. And in my
view, it was not known who had that power, that capacity, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I proposed
that there should first be reforms of the army in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to ascertain who
would be given command responsibility, so as to prevent conflict between the army and the civilian
authorities. The arguments were not persuasive, the arguments to the effect that this army should
be treated exclusively as a forei gn army in Bosnia and Herzegovina . Because that army had been
stationed there since 1918.
I therefore made my objection known to the United States Secretary of State,
Mr.Eagleburger, during the visit and meeting that I had with Mr.Boutros-Ghali, and this is
something that I subsequently published, which wa s subsequently published, in the newspaper, the - 9 -
Baltimore Sun , where I accordingly stated that trecognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina⎯
which was premature ⎯ had fanned the flames of war.
STr.JANOVI Ć [interpretation from Serbian]: I am satisfied with the reply. Thank you.
I shall conclude with these remarks. Thank you, Mr. Vice-President.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président: Je vous remercie. Je donne
maintenant la parole à Mme Korner, pour son contre-interrogatoire.
Mme KORNER : Monsieur Mi ćunović, vous venez de dire que vous vous étiez opposé à la
reconnaissance de la Bosnie le 6 avril, car c’est un 6avril qu’avaient commencé les
bombardements allemands, en 1941. Une petite question historique, en passant : N’est-ce pas aussi
un 6 avril ⎯ le 6 avril 1945 ⎯ que Sarajevo a été libérée de l’occupation alleman?e
Contentez-vous de répondre par «oui» ou par «non».
MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : C’était le jour de la division, du démantèlement
d’un Etat. Il est vrai que c’est aussi un il, le 6 avril 1945, que les troupes de partisans ont
libéré Sarajevo, mais j’associe quant à moi cette date au démantèlement de notre Etat, parce que
c’est le 6 avril 1941 qu’il a été bombardé.
18 Mme KORNER: Comme je l’ai dit, il s’agissait là d’un point historique, en passant.
Monsieur Mićunović, j’ai très peu de questions à vous poser. Vous nous avez dit que vous aviez
fondé le parti démocratique, en 1989 ⎯ si je ne m’abuse. Est-ce exact ?
MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : C’est exact.
Mme KORNE:RL’avez-vous fondé avec M. Stojanovi ć, l’agent de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro ?
MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : En effet, c’était bien l’un des cofondateurs.
Mme KORNER : Et y en avait-il un troisième ?
MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : Nous étions treize.
Mme KORNER : Très bien. Vous nous avez dit avoir continué à siéger comme député tout
au long de la guerre, mais toujours dans l’opposition.
MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : C’est exact. - 10 -
Mme KORNER: Et vous êtes-vous opposé à toutes les guerres menées par le
gouvernement ?
MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : A toutes, oui.
Mme KORNER: Et puis-je déduire du fait que vous vous trouviez da ns l’opposition que
vous n’étiez pas au courant des opérations conjointes menées par les trois armées ?
MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : La Serbie est un petit pays, la Yougoslavie de
même, et les informations y circulent très rapidement. Et même si, dans ma position, je ne pouvais
prendre aucune décision officielle, je n’en avais pas moins autour de moi, en ma qualité d’homme
politique, des comités, des militants, et puis il y av ait aussi la population en général…autant de
sources dans lesquelles je pouvais puiser, et j’étais informé.
Mme KORNER : Puis-je vous donner un exemple ? Etiez-vous au courant d’une opération
menée dans la région de Bihać, appelée «opération PAUK» ?
MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : Non.
Mme KORNER: Une simple question: Saviez-vous, par exemple ⎯ ou plutôt,
ignoriez-vous que les soldes des membres de l’armée de la RepublikaSrpska étaient payés par
e e
l’intermédiaire des 30t 40 centres du personnel ?
19 MMI . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : Oui, je l’ignorais. Je n’étais pas dans le secret
des opérations financières de l’état-major.
Mme KORNER : Je vous remercie. Et enfin, une dernière question : vous avez indiqué avoir
exigé la démission de Miloševi ć. Tout d’abord, pouvez-vous nou s préciser combien de fois vous
l’avez fait ?
M I . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : Nous l’avons demandée très souvent, et de
différentes façons. Tout d’abord, nous l’avons demandée dans le cadre de l’Assemblée, puis nous
avons fait signer des pétitions et organisé des mnifestations et des formes de protestations
publiques.
Mme KORNER : Et vous l’avez fait régulièrement, entre 1990 et 2000 ?
M I . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : Oui, bien sûr, et nous avons aussi fait valoir
nos revendications avec force lors de la tenue d’élections. En1996, par exemple, lorsque
Milošević a tenté de truquer les élections locales, la population de Belgrade a défilé dans les rues - 11 -
pendant trois mois, jusqu’à ce qu’une commission de l’OSCE vienne sur place et constate que nous
étions dans le vrai. Et à cette période, l’ensemble des grandes vill⎯la capitale Belgrade, tout
d’abord, puis Niš, Novi Sad, Pirot, et une trentaine d’autres ⎯ sont de fait passées à l’opposition,
de sorte que, dès 1996, c’est nous qui détenions le pouvoir local.
Mme KORNER : Avez-vous notamment exigé la démission de Miloševi ć après que la Cour
devant laquelle nous nous trouvons aujourd’hui eu t, en avril1993, ordonné à la République
fédérale de Yougoslavie de cesser de prêter appui aux Serbes de Bosnie ?
MM I . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : En avril 1993, après sa tentative avortée à Pale,
et l’embarras éprouvé, Miloševi ć était mortifié, et l’opinion publique l’était aussi, et, à la suite de
cela, il a imposé à la Republika Srpska un embargo da ns tous les domaines, excepté celui de l’aide
humanitaire. Exiger sa démission était inutile à ce moment-là ⎯ au moment où, justement, il était
en train de faire pression sur la Republika Srpska pour l’amener à accepter le plan Vance-Owen.
Mme KORNER: Mais ces pressions ont fait long feu… Saviez-vous que la République
fédérale de Yougoslavie continua it à approvisionner les Serbes de Bosnie, et en particulier
l’armée ?
MM I . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : Eh bien, je me doute que c’était le cas, puisque
les guerres continuaient, et que l’ensemble des belligér ants recevaient des armes. Il est loisible de
20 supposer qu’ils étaient tous approvisionnés, par des voies officielles ou non, et que cette pratique
s’est poursuivie un certain temps après 1994.
MmeKORNER: Si vous aviez été dûment in formé que des armes continuaient d’être
livrées, en dépit de ce qu’affirmait Miloševi ć ⎯à savoir qu’il avait imposé un embargo sur
l’aide ⎯, auriez-vous redemandé sa démission ?
MM I . ĆUNOVIĆ [interprétation du serbe] : Bien sûr que oui, mais Miloševi ć s’est bien sûr
gardé de nous le faire savoir ⎯et il démentait bel et bien l’existence de tels liens. Et il faut bien
évidemment aussi tenir compte du fait qu’un embargo était alors en vigueur, et qu’embargo signifie
nécessairement contrebande. Et contrebande il y avait ⎯contrebande de tous types de
marchandises : d’essence, d’armes et de cigarettes. C’était là le lot commun.
Mme KORNER : Je vous remercie, Monsieur Mićunović. Je n’ai pas d’autre question. - 12 -
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant foncti on de présiden:tJe vous remercie.
Monsieur Stojanović, souhaitez-vous procéder à un nouvel interrogatoire ?
STO. JANOVI Ć [interprétation du serbe] : Non, cela n’est pas nécessaire. Je vous
remercie.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président : La Cour va maintenant se retirer pour
quinze minutes. Les Parties et le témoin sont néanmoins priés de demeurer à proximité de la
grande salle de justice.
Si la Cour souhaite poser des questions au témo in, elle le fera lorsqu’elle regagnera la salle
d’audiences. Dans le cas contraire, elle n’en retournera pas moins dans la salle d’audiences, car un
juge a exprimé le souhait de poser aux Parties ⎯et non au témoin ⎯ une question, comme l’y
autorise le paragraphe3 de l’article61 du Règl ement de la Cour. Je rappelle que la fin de
l’audition des témoins, des experts et des témoins experts marque aussi la fin du premier tour de
plaidoiries.
L’audience est à présent levée.
L’audience est suspendue de 11 h 10 à 11 h 35.
21 Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président: Veuillez vous asseoir. Ainsi que l’a
fait savoir le Greffe, aucun juge ne souhaite poser de question au témoin. Je voudrais donc
remercier M.Mićunović d’avoir bien voulu comparaître devant nous. Et voilà qui clôt l’audition
des témoins, experts et témoins-experts.
Le juge Tomka souhaite néanmoins soumettre une question à la Bosnie-Herzégovine. Vous
avez la parole.
Le juge TOMKA : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président en exercice.
Le 28février2006, le conseil de la Bosn ie-Herzégovine a indiqué que «[l]a Yougoslavie
[était] demeurée Membre des NationsUnies». Dans une lettre datée du 9août2005 adressée au
Secrétaire général adjoint de l’Organisation des NationsUnies à la gestion par le représentant
permanent de l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine et les charg és d’affaires par intérim de la
Bosnie-Herzégovine, de la Croatie, de la Serbie-et-Monténégro et de la Slovénie, ces cinq Etats - 13 -
⎯ au nombre desquels figurait donc le demandeur ⎯ ont indiqué que «[l]a République fédérale de
Yougoslavie, qui a vu le jour le 27 avril 1992, n’est devenue un Etat Membre de l’Organisation des
er
NationsUnies que le 1 novembre2000; c’est l’Etat actuellement connu sous le nom de
«Serbie-et-Monténégro»». Je serais heureux d’en tendre toute explication, ou tout commentaire,
que la Bosnie-Herzégovine pourrait souhaiter apporter sur cette dern ière déclaration. Je vous
remercie, Monsieur le président en exercice.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de préside nt: Je vous remercie. Le texte de cette
question sera communiqué dans les meilleurs déla is à la Bosnie-Herzégovine ainsi qu’à la
Serbie-et-Monténégro, pour son information. La Bosnie-Herzégovine est priée de bien vouloir y
répondre lors du second tour de procédure orale.
Je confirme que la Cour se réunira de nouveau le mardi18avril2006, à 10heures, pour
entendre les Parties en leur second tour de plaidoirie.
L’audience est maintenant levée.
L’audience est levée à 11 h 40.
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Translation