Traduction

Non-Corrigé Traduction
Unco rrected Translation1

CR2002/17(traduction)

CR2002/17(translation)

Mardi 12mars2à10heures

Tuesday 12March2002 at 10018 The PRESIDENT: Pleasebe seated. The sittingis openand 1give the flooronbehalfof the

Republic of Cameroonto ProfessorAlainPellet.

Mr. PELLET::

VII. THEMARITIME BOUNDARY -INTRODUCTION

Theroleof theoil practice

1. Mr. President,Membersof the Court, itseemed to us that it wouldbe judicious to follow

the oral argument on the land boundary with my fiiend ChristianTomuschat's cornrnentson

responsibilitysince, essentially, internationally wrongful acts incurring Nigeria's responsibility

were committed on the mainland and culminatedin the region of LakeChad and at Bakassi. But

we are not blindto the arbitrarinessofthis approach: the attacks on Bakassioften came fromthe

sea and Nigeria didnot hesitateto use the most reprehensiblemeasuresto prevent Cameroonfrom

peacefully enjoying its natural maritime resources. Furthermore,the delimitation of the land

boundary and the delimitation of the maritime areas belonging to the two countries are closely

interlinked- which is why it would have beenabsurdto accedeto Nigeria's insistencethat these

two aspects be dissociated. Indeedyou declinedto do this, Members of the Court, and rightly so.

Despite the diversity of legal and factual problemswhich this case raises, it cannot be overstated

that itrepresentsasingle whole.

2. This being so, 1shall concentratethis moming on the sea alone and, in particular,on the

role which Nigena believes shouldbe accordedto the oilpractice. But, before doing so, letmeay

a fewwords aboutNigeria's generalapproachto the maritimedelimitation.

1.Nigeria's general approachto the maritimedelimitation

3. There arefour introductorypoints1shouldlike to raise. 1shall mention them in telegram

style, the time allocated by the Court for this second round being decidedly "tigh... In fact, .

these are points which are anything but secondary, but above al1concem elements of Ourfirst

round of oral argumentwhichNigena did nottroubleto answer. 4. But 1shall beginwith a remark of a different order,namely, that our opponents had the
r 019

discourtesyto "retum to the attack" with a vengeanceregardingthe errorswe made in the graphic

representationof the equitableline (CR 2002113,pp. 18-22,paras.2-14). In telegramstylethen:

- yes, wewere at fault;

- we haveapologized;

- the sinwas,after all,a relatively venialone: it concemed (inthe Replyat any rate)the tracing

on amapof the proposedline,notthe courseofthe line; and

- Nigeria, whose representatives have written (at least) four times to the Registrar with

corrections to their written pleadings (letter of 28 March2001), to their Annexes (letter of

14September1999)or to their sketch-maps (letters of 5 October 1999 and 31 January2001)

wouldperhaps dowellto pondertheir ownmistakesfirst.

5. 1would also pointout, forthe record, that Professor Crawfordfound it necessaryto state

that, in one of my oral arguments, 1had said "things to the Court in the absence of Equatorial

Guinea" (CR2002112,p. 57, para. 2). 1 confess that it had never occurred to me that that was

reprehensible: the State intervening, whose representatives present in this Hall todayit is my

pleasure to welcome,obviously followsal1our oral arguments,which are available on the Intemet

as soon as theyhave beendelivered. But 1must Say1soonrealized that this new sin of which we

were accusedcould not be al1that serious as, the following day, my accuser committedthe same

sin himself (CR2002113,pp. 26-29, paras. 33-40). Having slept on it, Mr. Crawfordno doubt

realized that it is difficult toeak of a maritime delimitation in the Gulf of Guinea without

refening to the presence ofthe islandof Bioko off Cameroon. In view of that, we willyield to his

entreaties and will this morning, as far as possible, minimize aspects involving the rights and

interestsofEquatorialGuineapendingnext week'shearings.

6. A third point, Mr.President, concems an extraordinary lacuna in the oral argument of

Nigeria, which stilldoes not appear to have realized that there are two maritime sectors, raising

quite differentproblems- even leavingasidethe Maroua Declaration. In that (legallyuntenable)

O O case, the delimitationoftheterritorial seaon theone hand, andof the exclusiveeconomiczone and

the continentalshelf on the other, would necessarily haveto be examined separately. Nigeria, which (wrongly) objects to the existence of a treaty delimitation, stubbomly persists in not

refemng to this elementarydistinction.

7. My fourthand lastintroductorypoint, Mr.President,isthe line whichNigeria isproposing .

to you- or notproposing. Letme, ifyouwill, revertto telegramstyle:

(1) On 22 February 1 was concerned to know what the delimitation line defended by Nigeria

really was(CR200215, pp.49-50, paras.38-39);

(2) Our opponentsaffect to adhere to the line in diagrarn 13.9ofthe Rejoinder(p. 524bis),which

was reproduced under tab S in thejudges' folderof 7 March;

(3) But none of them has at any time bothered tojustiQ that line in any way whatever; at the

most, ProfessorCrawfordremembered,in extremis,that the "card" Nigeriawas playingwas a

line starting fiom the Riodel Rey, to which the Professorevotes a brief paragraph of his

lengthy finaloral argumentof7 March(CR 2002113,p. 71, para.68);

(4) It istrue that it is no easy matter for him first, there is the sand island, so opportunely

discovered, which does not feature on any map, but which has the merit of miraculously

causing the line proposedto veer westwards- extremely disadvantageousfor Nigeria,but it

saves the lineproposedfiom furtherridicule;

(5) And lastly, this line doesnot closely,or even remotely, correspond toany past or presentoil

practice, regardlessofhowit is defined.

8. Mr. President, Nigeria's argument can be summed up in one word, at least where the

maritime delimitationis concerned- butthis may wellalso be theword whichinspires itsdreams

ofterrestrial conquest,namely,oil.

( O 2 1 2. The role oftheoil practice

9. Mr. President,1nowcome to a finalpoint; but shall dwellon it at greater length. Thisis

the potential roleof the oil concessions and,more widely, oil practice in the maritime delimitation

underconsideration.

10. This questionis ofuite particularinterest. First because,as no onecan fail to be aware,

the Gulf of Guinea,which-Pace Nigeria- constitutesthe generalframeworkof the delimitation

you are asked to make, is rich in oil deposi-s table 131 in the judges' folder provides somedetails of this- and consulting it, one cannot help but be struck by the "lion's share" Nigeria

carves out for itself- this is a simple fact- it forms part of the context. From a more legal

perspective,this questioncannotbe glossedover becauseof the special- whatdo 1mean special?

Exclusive! - importanceattachedto itbyNigeria.

11. However,this can only be read between the lines of the oral arguments weheard last

week. For it must besaid, our opponentsdid not tell us a great dealwhich wasnot alreadyin their

writtenpleadings. But they didtell us four things; the first two in considerabledetail, the other

two almost in passing:

- firstly,the onshore oil practicehas no significanceat al1as regards sovereigntyover a territory

(CR200219,pp. 45-47,paras. 132-142,Mr. Brownlie; CR 2002112,pp. 61-64,paras. 13-19);

- secondly, both onshore and offshoreoil practices are subject to entirely different rules, and

produce entirely different, even diametrically opposite effects (CR2002113, pp. 25-26,

paras.30-31,Mr.Crawford);

- thirdly, offshore, by contrast with therules applicableon the mainland, the oil practice is "a

relevant circumstance", since it is "cIear, sustained and consistent" (CR2002113, p. 69,

para.62, Mr. Crawford,quotingI.C.J.Chamber, Judgmentof 12October 1984,Gulfof Maine,

I.C.J.Reports 1984,p. 309,para. 146);

- andfourthly,this is supposedly the casehere (CR2002113,pp. 22-25, paras. 17-28).

12. With great respectto my leamed friends, Mr.President, "they've got it al1wrong". 1

propose to show this by examining in tum the last three of these four propositions; my fiiend

MauriceMendelson spokeatsufficientlengthyesterdayonthe first.

13. But a general remark to begin with: it is difficult to form a precise idea of Nigeria's

position solely on the basis of the oral argument, as ProfessorsBrownlie and Crawford,the only

counselof Nigeria to have spoken of the oil practices, did so as it were by paralipsis,as though it

was an argument to be ashamed of. .. Listening to them, 1rather had the impressionthat they

were consciously putting into practice the precept: "think of it always; speak of it as little as

possible".

14. Mr. Crawford may well have concluded his oral argument last Thursday with the

assertionthat "the oil practice of the Partiesand the very substantial character of the vestedghtsexisting on both sides... is determinative" (CR 2002113, p. 71, para. 69). But this is only a pale

reflection of the importance attached by Nigeria to the preservation of what it calls the "acquired

rights"- withoutany concern forhow theybecame acquired.

15. Nigeria was clearer in its Rejoinder, in which it expressed indignation that "[tlhe

Cameroonclaim-linewould requireareaswhichare the subject of long-standing concessions,to be

transferred fiom Nigeria, or respectively Equatorial Guinea, to Cameroon" (p.613,

para. 23.18(iii)), concludingthat:

"It is inconceivablethat the Court should Saythat large areas affected by this
settled pattern of arrangements, expectations and vested rights should now be
effectively transferred to another State, with al1 the regulatory, fiscal and other
consequencesthat wouldentail." (Ibid)

Mr. President, it is only inconceivableif these rights exist; if they were acquired in compliance

with international law; if Nigeria conceded them in ifsmaritime area! Can one imagine what

would happen in domestic law if 1 gave a farmer the nght to till the field belonging to my

neighbour? To a fisherman the right tofish in a stretch of water which did not belongme? It is

placing the cart beforethe horse,orto use another English expression,it "begs the question". The

question is to ascertain and only to ascertai- where the respective rights of the Parties stop;

only when this question hasbeen answeredwill it be possibleto discuss rights, whether acquired

ones ornot.

16.With thebenefit ofthatremark, 1 shallnow revert toNigeria'sthreepropositions.

A. Onshore and offshore oil practices are subject to entirely different rules and produce
entirelydifferenteffects

17. The first proposition is that onshore and offshore oil practices are subject to entirely

differentrules andproduce entirelydifferent effects. This,it mustbe said, is a very curioustheory,

highlighted by the equally curious contrast betweenthe oral argument of ProfessorBrownlie on

1Marchand of ProfessorCrawfordon 7 March.

18.Accordingto Mr. Brownlie,who in support of his positioncites the recent arbitrationin

the Eritreaflernencase, and pointsout that the Tribunal devotedmuch effortto the examination of

the granting of concessions,"the outcomewas characterizedby a degree of caution on the part of

the Tribunal" (CR 200219, p. 46, para. 141); to put it plainly, rny opponent denies that the oil concessionshave any relevanceat al1 - that is, of course,the onshore concessions. But not his

colleague. For Mr. Crawfordconsiders, as 1indicated a moment ago, that, at sea, oil practice is

determinative. This is particularly striking because they each base themselves on the same fact:

both of thempoint out thatthe concessionsgrantedby one Party werenot protested againstby the

other:

- Mr. Brownlie, on 1March: "The absence of protests is, of course, irrelevant given that the

petroleum-related activities were inconclusive in thecontext of the incidence of title to

temtory" (ibid., p. 46,para. 137);

- but, six days later, Mr.Crawford madegreat issue of the fact that "except on points of detail,

neither Party protested the oil licensingand exploitation activities of the ot(CR 2002113,

p. 59,para.32; seealsop. 24, para.26 or pp.69-70, paras.61-62).

19.Inthis Nigerio-Nigeriandoctrinaldispute, it is Mr.Brownlie 1think who is right (at least

as regards the irrelevanceof the oil practice)but..with respect to maritime delimitationandnot

withrespectto sovereigntyover theland tenitory ashe wouldhave us believe.

20. But let us retum to the Eritreanemen case, on which my learned friendrelies. As we

know, it gaverise not to onebut to two arbitral awards, the former of 9 October 1998on territorial

O 2 4 sovereignv; the latter of 17December 1999,on maritime delimitation. It wasin theformer, the

onerelating rosovereigns overthe disputedislandsthat the arbitral tribunaltook account- rather

more than Mr.Brownlie says- of oil practice. Indeed, after an exhaustive examination of it

(Award, pp. 101-115,paras.389-435),the Tribunalconcluded,as pointedout by counselofNigeria

(CR 2002/9. p. 46, para 140)that the oil practice failed, in that case, "to establish or significantly

strengthentheclaims of eitherParty to sovereigntyover the disputed islands". Fromthis it maybe

deduced a contrario that a determinativeoil practicecan constitute an "eflectivité"which may be

taken into considerationin the context of a conflict relating to the attribution of a tenitory. As

Professor Mendelson showedyesterday, Cameroonmay rightly invoke the concessions itgranted

on the Bakassi Peninsula, even if, 1hasten to point out, for us it is no more than an element

providing confirmation,anda rather secondaryoneat that.

21.Now, what do we find in the latter award,the Eritreanemen Award, of 1999,this time

relating to maritimedelimitationandnot mentionedby eitherMr. Brownlie orMr. Crawford? That is highlyregrettable moreover, asit isjust as instructive- but, apparently, in the opposite sense:

in that Award, the Tribunal very clearly indicatesthat the oil concession line it had used to

determinesovereigntyoverthe disputedislands (andwhich moreor less correspondedto a median

line) "can hardly be taken as governing once that sovereignty has been determined" (Award of

17December 1999,p. 25, para. 83).

22.To sumup then: on land,the oil practiceconstitutesa perfectly admissible"efectivité",

despitewhat OuropponentsSay- with, of course,al1the usual caveats when effectivités are under

discussion: provided it doesnot conflictwith atreatytitle, etc. On the otherhand, this practice is

not arelevantcircumstancefor thepurposesof maritimedelimitation.

B. Oilpracticeisnot a relevantcircumstanceforthepurposesof maritimedelimitation

23. This is my secondpoint. Professor Crawfordput forwardthe contraryproposition: "oil

practice... is undoubtedly a relevant circurnstance,and for a number of reasons" (CR2002/13,

p. 69,para. 61). However, although Ouropponent had announced that he was going to list this

O 2 5 "numberof reasons", he did not do so. The most he did was to mention the TunisidLibya case

(ibid.,para. 62) in passing. Moreover,it is true that, in that case,the Courttook intoconsideration

the defacto line constitutedby the oilconcessionsgrantedby each of the two Parties(cf. Judgrnent

of24February 1982,I.C.J.Reports 1982,p. 84,para. 117); butit took great careto makeit clear

"[tlhat the Court is not here making a finding of tacit agreement between the
Parties- which, in view of the more extensiveand firmlymaintained claims, would
not be possible - nor is it holding that they are debarred by conduct from pressing
claims inconsistent with such conduct on some such basis as estoppel" (ibid.,
para. 118).

In otherwords, even in the very particular circumstancesofthe 1982 case, the Court sees the de

facto line asjust one ofthe "indicia...availableof the line.. .which the Parties themselvesmay

have considered equitable or acted upon as such" (ibid., emphasis added); and this only in the

sectoradjacentto the Coastand naturallywhere the concessionsof both Parties followedthe same

line.

24. 1would add that the 1982Judgment is a "borderline case" and that in general,your case

law, like that of the arbitral tribunals which have had toule on problems of this kind, displays

great reluctance about granting any importance whatever to oil practice (cf. Judgment of 20 February 1969,North Sea ContinentalShelJ;I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 52,para. 97; Judgment of

12October 1984, Gulf of Maine, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 342, para. 237; Arbitral Award of

14February 1985, Delimitation of the Guinea and Guinea-Bissau Maritime Boundary,

RGDIP 1985,p. 513, para.63; Arbitral Awardof 10June 1992,St Pierre and Miquelon,RGDIP

1992,p. 706,para. 89; etc.). On thispoint,may 1refer you, Members of the Court, to the relevant

passagesin Cameroon's [email protected],paras. 9.99-9.105).

25. It is true that Professor Crawfordakesmuch of an expression in the Judgmentof the

Chamber of the Court in the Gulf of Maine case, which he takes out of context: the only

requirement,he tells us, for a.practice to be taken into consideration is that it "was sufficiently

clear, sustained,and consistent" (CR2002113,p. 69,para. 62, Mr.Crawfordquoting the Judgment

of 12October 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984,p. 309, para. 146). Butmy learned fiend forgets a few

things, suchas:

jS 026 - first,to quotethe endofthe sentenceconcemed- as the Court addsthat the conducthad to be

sufficientlyclear, sustainedandconsistent"to constituteacquiescence"(ibid.);

- secondly,to state that the Chamberwas actually referring to the decision in the Grisbadarna

case,whose relevanceit considereddoubtful(ibid.); and

- lastly,to specifj thatthere is a furthermajor element ofdoubt inthe presentcase.

26. Indeed, as Maurice Kamto pointed out in the first round (CR200217, pp. 22-24,

para. 13-18),Cameroon and Nigeria had agreed to inform one another of the oil activities in the

area. ProfessorCrawfordblithely dismissed thisargument asking you, Members of the Court, to

read the documents in question, narnely, the Minutes of the Experts' Meeting in Abuja in

December 1991 and Yaoundéin August 1993 (CR2002113, p.25, para. 28; see also CR200219,

p. 46, para. 138, Mr. Brownlie). May 1too invite you to do so? You will see that, although in

those documents, the two Parties reaffirmedtheir "fieedom ...to develop [their] resources along

the frontierline", as our opponentpointsout, they had also undertaken- a phrase whichseems to

have escaped him- "to tak[e] care to inform the other side. .." (Memorial of Cameroon,

Ann.313 and Preliminary Objectionsof Nigeria, Ann. 55). Having not done what Cameroonhad

expecteditto do,Nigeriais in no positionto rely onCameroon'stacit agreement. C.Theoil practiceof the Parties- legalconsequences
27. Mr. President,Nigeria aims to convincethe Court that it should determine its maritime

boundary with Cameroon exclusivelyon the basis of the oil practices of the States in the region

and, first and foremost,of its own. Despitethe very limited relevance,in law, of oil practicesto

maritime delimitation,1 must therefore consider these practices in an attempt to detemine their

possible relevancefor the rules1havejust identified.

28. This cannotbe doneal1in onepiece, as though there wereonly one boundary sector,as

Nigeriastubbornlypersists in claiming. There are undoubtedlytwo sectors: one up to pointG, is

delimitedby theMarouaAgreement; the other,beyond it,must bedelimitedbythe Court.

027 (a)UptopointG
29. [Projection No. 1- coincidence of the oil concessions and the Maroua line.] Up to

point G, ade facto line may be said to exist, in that the oil concessionsgranted by each Party

followa line notunfamiliarto you, Membersof the Court. This isquite simplythe Maroualine.

30. We find ourselves here in a case which, although not identical to the one in the

Tunisia/Libyacase, is nevertheless somewhatsimilar. The concessions grantedby Cameroonon

the one hand and by Nigeria on the other follow the Treaty line without overlapping. [End of

projectionNo. 1.]

31. In this connection,1should point out that, onthe basis ofthe detailsgiven byNigeriain

its Counter-Mernorial (cf. Counter-Memorial of Nigeria, p. 565, paras. 20.16 and 20.17, and

sketch-maps20.4 and 20.5, p. 566bis and 566ter), we indicated major overlaps, bothnorth and

southof point G (cf. Reply of Cameroon,p. 271,paras.9.110 and9.111 and sketch-mapsR24 and

R25). But wherethe first ofthese sectorsis concemed,north ofpointG,thesedetails provedto be

wrong: both HISmaps of 1996 and 2001, for example, show no overlap north of pointG; the

relevantextracts fiom Cameroon'sandNigeria's2001sheets, reducedin your folders, Membersof .

the Court, areNos. 133and 134and 1havetried to superimposethem; yes, itworks.

32. Moreover,in his oralargumentof 7 March, Mr. Crawfordseeks to minimizethepossible

areasof overlap: "the area of overlap is a limitedone" (CR 2002/13,p. 23, para. 19). It is not "a

limited one", Mr.President - there is quite simply no overlap, contrary to what Nigeria would have usbelieve andwhich, 1confess,we didfoolishlybelieve, withoutrealizingthatOuropponents

were intenton armingthemselveswith argumentsin supportof their claims onBakassi.

33. It can therefore be acknowledged,Mr. President,that what we have here is a "defacto

line". But this seemsto meto be of minorinterest: it correspondsvery preciselyto a dejure line,

that fixedby the MarouaAgreementof 1June 1975,which it thus merely confirms. And, as in the

Tunisia/Libyaor Eritreanemen cases, there is certainly nothing to prevent the oil practice of the

0 2 8 Parties from confirming a line effectivelydrawn, in accordance with the applicable principles of

the lawof the seaor, afortiori, as is thecasehere, atreatyline.

34. [ProjectionNo. 2- Kita Marine.] There is further proof that the oil practice supports

the treaty title (and not the reverse). My friend Mr. Karnto alluded to it on 26 February

(CR200215, p. 61, para. 25). Here are the facts: in 1972, Elf Serepca sank a well called

Kita-Marine1. This well, which is indicated bya red circle on sketch-mapNo. 135in thejudges'

folder,revealed the existence- you cannotsee it very well on the projection but you can in the

folder- of oil andgas.

It was shortof the equidistanceline onthe Cameroonian side,but on the "wrong side" of the

Maroua line (1mean, on the Nigerian side ...). In accordancewith its word andthe principle of

respectfor treaties,arneroonabandonedthis well to Nigeria on 27 May 1976. The practicewas

therefore brought into line with the law; not the contrary as Nigeria would wish. [End of

projectionNo. 2. ]

35.Mr.President,as 1was sayingyesterday,theParties areat last in agreementonthetreaty

line of the boundary, not just the land but also the maritime boundary, up to point G. And

ultimatelyit matterslittle that they reachthe same result by different methods-since, and 1 am

anxious to make this absolutely clear and unequivocal, for Our part, we regard the Maroua

agreementas a probative conventionaltitleand as sufficientin itself. Sir Ian Sinclairwillrevert to

thisina few minutes.

(b)Beyondpoint G

36. Beyond point G, on the other hand, Mr. President, thesituation is no longer at al1the

sameas inthe Tunisia/Libyacase,partlybecausewe aremuch furtherfrom the coastsof theParties and partly because there is no defacto line: in the vicinity of point G, there is a great deal of

overlap; further away, the only line which exists is a unilateral one, stemming fiom Nigerian

practicealone.

37. A few words now on each of these aspects- beginning with the sector immediately

south ofpoint G.

029 38.1 had beenplanning to representona sketch-mapthevery obviousareasof overlapofthe

concessions grantedby the three countries, Cameroon, Equatorial Guineaand Nigeria, in the area

immediately south ofpoint G. Unfortunately,we ran out oftime and this consolidated sketch-map

could not be got ready. However, one has onlyto refer, forexample,to diagrams 20.4 or 20.5 in

the Counter-Memorial of Nigeria, or 10.2, 10.5, 10.6, 10.8 or 13.5 in the Rejoinder- 1 am

referring here to the written pleadingsof Nigeria,which has focusedmuch morethan we have on

oil practice, not to mention the series of sketch-maps in the appendix to Chapter 10 of the

Rejoinder (whose probative value is doubtful incidental1y)- one has only to refer to al1these

sketch-maps,to al1these diagrams,to realize thatthere is no consensualline of oilpracticesin this

area; al1there is areirreconcilable,unilateral,competinglines.

39. A very clear, indisputable, "inevitable" consequence flows from this overlapping of

incompatible concessions: there is clearly no defactoline here which could serve as a basis for

delimitation,whetheras an "indication"or a "method",not to mentiona"relevant circumstance".

40. Of course Nigeria is of the opposite opinion. Indeed, it draws a subtle distinction

between the concessions on the one hand and the wells and boreholes which, on their own,

supposedly constitute the "oil practice" on which it relies (cf. CR 2002113, pp. 23-24,

paras. 18-21).Threeremarks on thispoint Mr.President:

- letme observe firstof al1that itis very difficultto drawa delimitationline basedon practiceas

so defined: concessions followlines; wellsare points which may overlap; think for example

of theproblems posed by the Kita Marine well which 1 referred to a few moments ago,or the

famousEkanga well, which Nigeria succeededin obtaining - 1was about to Sayextorting -

fiom EquatorialGuinea and whichhas already beendiscussedat length;

- secondly, it is quite correct, if we confine ourselves to the wells, that Nigeria comes out "on

top", as shown bythe many diagrarnsaccompanying its writtenpleadings andoral argument. 1 hope you will allowme, Membersof the Court,not toembark upon that course,not to project

sketch-maps ofthatkind. In fact, there is a regrettableexplanationfor the disproportion- in

favourof Nigeria andto the detrimentof CameroonandEquatorial Guineaprior to 2000 - in

the number of wells in the areas of overlap: through intimidation, threats made to the oil

companies concemed, Nigeriasucceeded in dissuading them fiom sinking boreholes in the

areas it claims; on the other hand, it had nocompunction aboutcommissioningboreholes,or

evenoil extraction operationsin those areas,despiteknowingthey were claimedby Cameroon

orEquatorial Guinea; 1 am stillspeakingofprior to 2000;

- at al1events - andthis is my third and last remark- it is hard to see Nigeria'sjustification

for claiming to exclude concessions fiom the oil practice to which it attaches so much

importance. Even inthe 1982Judgment in the Tunisia/Libyacase, the only one which gives

any semblance of credibilityto the Nigerian argumentin this respect,the Courtbased itself on

"the defacto line between the concessions" (I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 84, para. 118; see also

p. 71, para. 96 and pp. 83-84,para. 117) and it is obviously logical therefore that, a1 have

alreadyemphasized,it is a matternot of acceptinga faitaccompli,asNigeria wouldhave it,but

of basing oneselfonthe concessionsas "indicia. ..ofthe line ... which the Partiesthemselves

mayhave consideredequitableor acteduponas such"(ibid.,p. 84,para. 118).

41. Mr. President, as regards, lastly, the area further south, there can be no questionof a

defacto Iinehere- fora simplereason: Cameroonrefiained fiom granting any concessionsthere;

initially because the two States were in negotiationto that end; later because, as the matter was

beforethe Court, Cameroonfelt itwould be discourteous,to Saythe least,to try andpresent it with

a fait accompli in this way. As we know, Nigeria didnot have any such scruples: not only did it

hasten to create a practice; it alsosought to "juridicize" that practiceby concluding a, for itself,

particularly advantageous treaty with EquatorialGuinea- but this is a matter1 am sure we will

have occasionto revertto next week.

42. For now, 1 can therefore stop at this point and confine myself to surnmarizing my

conclusionswith respectto the oilpractice,including theconcessions,of course:

(1) thispractice cannot,in law,justie a maritime delimitationlineof anykind; (2) at the very most, it may be one element confirming a maritime boundary effectively
0 3 1
establishedin conformitywith the principlesof the law of the sea applicable in the territorial

sea or beyondit;

(3) this applies,afortiori, when a line fixedbytreaty is involved,as is the case of the line adopted

by the Marouaagreementof 1June 1975; and

(4) in this case, the line of the concessions grantedby the Parties in fact corresponds in every

respect to the line resulting from the MarouaDeclara...about whichmy eminent friend

Sir Ian Sinclair is now going to speak, if you would kindly give the floor to him,

Mr. President.

Thankyou ver- muchforyour attention Members of theCourt.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Pellet. Je donne maintenant la parole à

sirIan Sinclair.

Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie, Monsieurle professeu1.now give the floor to Sir Ian

Sinclair.

SirIan SINCLAIR

VIII. LE PREMIERSECTEUR MARITIME

1.Monsieurle président, Madameet Messieursde la Cour,c'est un grand honneur pourmoi

que de m'adresser nouveau à vous au nom du Camerounàl'occasion des plaidoiries sur le fond

de l'affaire de laontièreterrestre et maritimeentre le Cameroun etle NigériaCe matin, ma

tâche consisteraà répondre auxarguments que le Nigériaa formulésdans son premier tourde

plaidoiries au sujet du tracéde la frontièremaritime entre les deux Etatsjusqu'auGpet, en

particulier,au sujet du maintien en vigueur et de l'effet obligatoire dela déclaration deMarouade

1975.

1.La déclarationde Marouadu 1"juin 1975

2. Commecertainsde mes collèguesl'ontdéjà dit- et la Cour le déploreracertainement-,

le conseil du Camerounet celui de la Partie adverse semblentengagésdansun dialogue de sourds,

en particulier au sujet du maintien en vigueur de ce que, pour la commodité,nous appelleronsles ((dispositionsrelativàsBaicassi))du traitéanglo-allemand du 11 mars 1913, et de la question

distincte mais connexe du maintien en vigueur de la déclarationde Maroua du le'juin 1975.

Comme M. Tomuschatl'a expliqué à la Courle 25 février(CR200216,p. 18-27),la déclarationde

Maroua a étéle fiuit d'une longue séried'entretiens et de négociations bilatérales entre le
032
Cameroun et le Nigéria, dontle Cameroun a relatéen détaill'historique dans saréplique. La

dernièreréunionde cette série a eulieuà Maroua du 30 mai au 1" juin 1975; elle réunissaitles

chefsd'Etatdu Cameroun (leprésidentAhidjo)et duNigéria(le généraG l owon), accompagnésde

leurs délégationsde haut nivearespectives. Vu lesévénementq sui ont suivi, il y a peut-être lieu

de noter que la délégatinehaut niveau quiaccompagnaitlegénéral Gowon à Maroua comprenait

notamment les gouverneurs militaires de deux régions nigérianes (MCv,ol. VI, annexe 250); le

général Gowon étad it nc entouré decertainsde ses collègues militaires ainsique de conseillers

spécialisés drang élevé.La réunion aproduit deuxinstruments importants. Le premier étaitun

((communiqué conjoint))signépar les deuxchefsdYEtatq, ui mettaitparticulièrementl'accentsur la

délimitation maritime définiticonvenue entre les deux chefs dYEtatet qui faisait allusiànla

déclaration portantla mêmedate (le'juin 1975), en expliquant que celle-ci consacrait un accord

conclu sans réserve parles deux chefs d'Etat. En effet, le communiqué précisait q(([Ilesdeux

chefs dYEtat...se sont mis entièrement d'accordsur le tracéprécisde la frontièremaritimetelle

que la définit la déclaraneMaroua du 1"juin 1975et son annexe))(MC,vol. VI, annexe250).

3. Mais c'est biensûr la déclarationde Maroua elle-même(MC, vol. VI, annexe MC251),

c'est-à-dire le second instrument adoptà cette réunion,qui définit de manièreméticuleusela

((frontièremaritime))du point 12 au point à,l'aide de coordonnées géographiquep srécises. Le

contenu de la déclaration, confirmpar l'indicationclaire, dans le communiqué conjoint, que les

deux chefs dYEtatétaient ((entièrementd'accord)), sufft établir que sousl'angle du droit des

traités, les termes de la déclaratide Maroua équivalaient à la conclusion, sous une forme

simplifiée,d'un accord international.l est presque certain que la déclaration deMaroua auràit

elle seule eu cet effet, mais le communiquéconjoint notait également queles deux chefs dYEtat

étaientpleinement d'accordsur le tracéexact de la ligne frontière précieans la déclarationde

Marouaelle-même. 4. Trèspeu detemps aprèsl'adoptionde la déclarationqui,je mepermetsde le préciser,était

accompagnéede la signaturedes deux chefs d7Etatsur l'exemplairede lacarteno3343 sur laquelle

étaitreprésentéle tracéprécisde la ligne jusqu'au point, le Cameroun a découvertune erreur

technique dans le calcul des coordonnéesdu point B sur la nouvelle ligne convenue. En

conséquence,le présidentAhidjo a, le 12 juin 1975, adresséune lettre au généralGowon dans

033 laquelle il signalait l'erreur technique et proposait que,si le général marquaiston accord avec les

coordonnées rectifiées du point B, sa réponse, jointeà la lettre envoyéeà l'origine par le

présidentAhidjo le 12juin 1975,soient considéréescomme des annexes valables à la déclaration

de Maroua.

5. Le général Gowon a répondu à cette communicationle 17juillet 1975pour convenir que

l'erreur enquestion avait bien éfaite et accepter la propositiondu présidentAhidjo quant la

manièredont il convenaitde la rectifier.

6. Le Camerounmaintient sa position,à savoir que cet échange ultériere lettres entre le

présidentAhidjo et le général owon confirmesans l'ombre d'un doute que lesdeux chefs d7Etat

qui ont signésolennellement la déclaration de Maroule lerjuin 1975 estimaientque celle-ciétait

entréeen vigueur à la date de son adoption. L'échange delettres qui a suivi,eût étédépourvude

sens si les deux chefs d'Etat n'avaient pas été decet avis et n'avaient pas convaincus que

l'erreurtechnique quecomportaitl'accorddevaitêtrerectifiée séancetenante.

2. Lacontestationparle Nigériade la validité dela déclaration

7. Que dit leNigéria en réponsà cette définitionclaire et précise dupremiersegment dela

frontièremaritime, consacréepar la déclaration de Maroqui témoigne de l'accordconclupar les

deuxchefsd7Etat àce sujet? LeNigériaplaidetout simplementque legénéral Gowone,ntant que

chef d7Etatdu Nigériaen 1975, n'avait pas compétencepour conclure un accord international

obligatoire avec le Cameroun sans l'accord du conseil militaire suprême. Examinoncet aspect

d'unpeuplus près.

8.M. Brownlie,dans sa plaidoirie du 1" mars 2002 devant la Cour (CR 200219,par. 101),

soutientque la déclarationde Maroua

((neliait pasjuridiquement le Nigériacar, aux termes de la constitutionde 1963 qui
était alors en vigueur, le généralGowon n'avait pas le pouvoir d'engager son gouvernement sans l'approbation du conseil militaire suprêmequi constituait le
Gouvernementnigérian.Les texteslégislatifspertinentsque l'administrationmilitaire
a adoptésen 1966 et 1967 n'ont pas abrogéla constitution de 1963 et plusieurs de
leurs dispositions renvoienà la constitutionde 1963en tant que Grundnorm(norme
fondamentale).))

9.Monsieurleprésident, rienne permetd'affirmerqu'il s'agitlà d'une descriptionexactedu

pouvoirduchef d'Etatnigérian àl'époque;en effet, laCoura certainementrelevéque M.Brownlie

ne mentionnenulle part les dispositions spécifiquesde laconstitutionde 1963,telle que modifiée

par la suite par les décretsdu gouvernementmilitaire, qui sont à la base de son argumentation.

A cet égard, le Cameroun se permet de rappeler à la Cour la partie de la plaidoirie de

M. Mendelson d'hieraprès-midi,dans laquelle celui-cia attiré l'attention sdesextraitspertinents

de l'annexeMC 275 du mémoire duCameroun, extraitsqu'il adu reste inclus dans le dossierdes

juges sousla cote 13015. Unde ceux-cirévèleque les autoritésnigérianes ont, en 1985,reçu d'un

fonctionnaire de haut niveau du ministère fédérad le lajustice l'avis juridique catégoriqselon

lequel le motif invoqué parle Nigériapourrejeter la déclarationde Maroua étaitindéfendable en

droit international.

3. La prétenduedispositionde la constitutionnigérianeentréeen vigueurle le' juin 1975
interdisant auchef de 1'Etatde déclarer leNigérialié parun traitésans l'accord du
conseilmilitairesuprême

10.Monsieur le président, depuisla plaidoirie de M. Brownlie, le 1" mars, le Cameroun a

effectué des recherches complémentaires sur la situation au 1" juin 1975 au regard de la

constitution,en ce qui concerne le pouvoirdu chef d'Etatde l'époque (quiétaiten mêmetemps le

présidentdu conseilmilitaire suprêmed )econcluredesaccords internationauxsansl'accordformel

dudit conseil. La constitutionnigériane originalede1963conféraitauprésident le pouvoir exécutif

dans la fédération(art. 84). Ce pouvoir exécutifenglobaittoutes les questions au sujet desquelles

le parlementétait habiliàépromulguerdeslois (art. 85). Un conseil des ministresde la fédération

avait pour fonction de conseiller le président(art. 89). Hormis certaines exceptions sans rapport

avec ce qui nous occupe ici, le président était tede suivre l'avis de son conseildes ministres

(art93). Sauf erreur, le Cameroun n'a pas relevél'existence,dans la constitution de 1963,d'une

dispositionspécifique limitant directementle pouvoirduprésidentde conclure,aunom duNigéria,

des traitésavec d'autresEtats. 11. Tout cela a évidemmentétéradicalement modifiéen 1966, après l'instauration du

gouvernement fédéram l ilitaire. Le décretno1 de ce gouvernement,datédu 17janvier 1966,

a abrogé expressémenltes articles 84, 85, 89 et 93 de la constitution de 1963, c'est-à-dire les

dispositions queje viens de mentionner. Le texte de la constitutionnigérianede 1963, du décret

no1du 17janvier 1966et du décretno28 de 1970,auxquelsje reviendraidans un instant, sontdes

documents publics,et le Camerouns'étonnequele Nigérian'aitpasjugé utilede fournir à la Cour

des copies de ces documents constitutionnelset d'autres sur lesquels il tente de s'appuyer. Nous
t 035:

croyons savoir que le Nigéria adéposé auprès dela Cour un exemplairedu décretde 1975relatif

aux dispositionsfondamentalesde laconstitution,mais ce texte n'est paspertinent. En effet, bien

qu'il ait un effet rétroactif,cet effet ne remonte pas jusqu'à la signature de la déclaration de

Maroua. Le paragraphe 1 de l'article 8 du décretno1 précisait quele Nigériaétaitdotéd'un

conseil militaire suprêmeet d'un conseilexécutiffédéral.Le paragraphe 2 de I'article8 fixait la

composition du conseil militaire suprêmeet en confiait la présidenceau chef du gouvernement

fédéral militaire. Le paragraphe 3 de l'article8 prévoyait quele conseil exécutif fédéral serait

composéen grande partie des mêmes personnes mais qu'il ne comprendraitpas les gouverneurs

militairesdes régions duNigériaseptentrional,oriental, occidental etdu centre-ouest. L'annexe2

au décret no1 de 1966 déclareen son paragraphe 2 que((toute mention du présidentou du

premier ministre,ou du présidentou du premierministre agissantsur avis d'unepersonne ou d'un

organe quelconque, doit êtreinterprétéecomme désignantle chef du gouvernement fédéral

militaire)). Cettedisposition doit être lue conjointement avecle paragraphe 1 de l'article 7 du

décretno1, qui préciseque «[l]epouvoir exécutifde la Républiquefédérale du Nigéria appartient

au chef du gouvernement fédéram l ilitaire et peut être exerpar lui soit directement, soitpar

l'intermédiaire depersonnesoud'autorités qui lus iont subordonnées..» [Traductiondu Greffe.]

12. Les choses sont rendues plus complexes encore du fait de l'existence de deux autres

décrets de 1967 : le décret portant suspension et modification de la constitution de 1967

(décret no8 de 1967)'et le décret portant abrogationet rétablissementde la constitutionde 1967

(décretno13 de 1967). Ce dernierdécretest publiédans le recueil de Blaustein et Flanz intitulé

Constitutionsof Countriesof the World(1972). Il me suffitde me référer au secondde ces décrets,

à savoir le décretno13de 1967,puisque, grâceau ciel sansdoute pour tous ceux d'entrenous quisont concernés,le premier,à savoir le décretno8 de 1967,a été abrogéL . e décretno13 de 1967a

eu pour effetde rétablirlasituation constitutionnelle crear la constitutionde 1966et les décrets

modificatifs nos 1 à 10 (je me permets de signaler en passant que j'ai épargné à la Cour la

description des décretsno" à 10, puisque, en substance, ils sont sans intérêt ans le présent

contexte). L'effet du décret no13 de 1967 étaitde conférerle pouvoir législatifet exécutifau

conseil exécutiffédéraelt non au conseil militaire suprême. laustein etFlanz,àquinous devons

le recueil quej'ai cité, concluentque le décreto13 de 1967a effectivementretiréle pouvoir au

conseil militaire suprêmeet l'a rendu au conseilexécutiffédéralc,ommele prévoyaitl'article 12

du décretno1de 1966.

13. Enfin (et je prie ici la Cour de m'excuser pour la complexitéde cet exposésur la

situation constitutionnelle du Nigéria pendant cette période mouvementé dee son histoire), j'en

viens au décretde 1970consacrantlaprimautéet les pouvoirsdu gouvernement militairefédérali;l

s'agit du décretno28 de 1970, quej'ai déjàcité. Il avait pour effet de rendre impossible endroit

tout contrôlejuridictionnel de la constitutionnadesmesuresprises parlegouvernementmilitaire

fédéral. Toutefoisl,e paragraphe 1 de l'article premier de ce décretconfirmeson préambuleet le

déclarepartie intégrantedu décret;le premier paragraphedu préambuleénonce solennellement ce

qui suit:

((Considérantquela révolution militairequi a eu lieu le 15janvier 1966et qui a
été suivied'une autre révolutionle 29 juillet 1966a effectivementmis fin àl'ordre
juridique existant alors au Nigéria,sauf pour ce qui a étépréservépar le décret
de 1966(no 1)portantprimautéet amendementde laconstitution...)) [Traduction du

Grefe.1

Il s'agià l'évidencedu décretno1du gouvernement militairefédéralde 1966. Par conséquent,il

semble que ce décretde 1970 a eu pour effet de rétablir,autant que nécessaire,la situation

constitutionnelle telle qu'elle existait en vertu du décret 1 promulguépar le gouvemement

fédéral militairlee 17janvier 1966,dontj'ai fait état précédemment (vopar.8 ci-dessus).

14. S'agissant de la situation constitutionnelleextrêmementcomplexe instauréeau Nigéria

à partir du 1"juin 1975,l'interprétationdu Cameroun estque, en vertu du décretno1 promulgué

par le gouvemement fédéralmilitaire en 1966, le chef de ce gouvemement pouvait agir dans

l'exercicedu pouvoir quiétait lesien de concluredes traitéssans l'avis formel de quelque organe

que ce soit, compris duconseil militaire suprême.4. La questionde savoir si le Nigériapeut invoquerl'article46 de la convention de Vienne
surle droit des traitédansles conditionsactuelles

15.En tout étatde cause,je tienà rassurerla Cour: ellen'aura pasàse prononcerde façon

définitivesur l'interprétation de dispositionsaussi ésotériqueset obscures que celles de la

ConstitutionduNigériaquiétaienten vigueur au 1"juin 1975. Comme laCour le sait, l'article46

de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traitésénonce,en des termes négatifs, larègle

fondamentaleconcernantla compétence pour concluredestraités.La dispositionest la suivante

«Le fait que le consentementd'un Etatà êtreliépar un traitéa étexpriméen
violation d'une disposition de son droit interne concernant la compétence pour

concluredes traitésnepeut êtreinvoqué parcet Etat commeviciant sonconsentement,
àmoins que cette violation n'ait été manifese anifeste]et ne concerneune règlede
son droitinterne d'importance fondamentale.))

Le paragraphe 2 du mêmearticle dispose que : ((une violation est manifeste si elle est

objectivement évidentepour tout Etat se comportant en la matière conformément à la pratique

habituelle etdebonne foi)).

16. Cela dit,à supposer mêmepour l'instant que M.Brownlie ait peut-être raisondans

l'analyse qu'il faitde I'applicabilitéen 1975 de la Constitution de 1963 (applicabilité quele

Camerounnie absolument),il ne s'ensuit bienévidemmentpasque le Nigériaest fondé à invoquer

l'article46 de la conventionde Vienne pour invaliderle consentementinconditionneldonnépar le

généraG l owon à la déclarationde Maroua. La question est en fait de savoir si la prétendue

violationdes dispositions du droit internedu Nigéria concernantla compétencepour concluredes

traitésétait ((manifesteaux yeux du présidentdu Cameroun au moment de la signature de la

déclarationde Maroua. Monsieur leprésident,tout le monde sait que l'onne peut attendre d'un

ressortissant d'un Etat, quel que soit son rang, qu'il connaisseparfaitement la législationet la

pratique constitutionnelle d'un autre Etat. M.Brownlie semble en avoir conscience puisqu'il

consacre un certain temps àtenter de montrer que M. Ahidjo,le présidentdu Cameroun, devait,

en 1975, êtreau courant des limites constitutionnellesdansle cadre desquellesle général owon

exerçaitson autorité. Malheureusement,M. Brownlie vendlamèchelorsqu'ilcite le paragraphe3

de lalettre envoyéele 23 août 1974au présidentAhidjopar le général Gowon,neuf mois environ

avantla déclaration deMaroua. M. Brownlie soutientque cette lettre «revêt ne très fortevaleur

probante))(CR200219, p. 37, par. 104). Pour une fois, je suis d'accord. C'est surla dernière phrase de cette citation queje voudrais particulièrement attirervotre attention. Elle se lit comme

sui: «JYaitoujours cru que nous pourrions réexaminer tous lesdeux ensemble la situation et

parvenir sur cette questioà une décision judicieuseet acceptable.)) (LegénéraGl owon fait ici

allusion aux problèmessoulevéspar les documentsétablispar les experts le 4 avril 1971 sur la

suite du tracé de la frontimaritime.) Le généraG l owon dit donc ici au président Ahidjoque

l'un et l'autre devraient réexaminer ensemblela situation, et il est convaincu qu'ensemble le

généraelt le président pourraientadopter une décisionsur la question qui serait acceptablepour

l'un et l'autre. Pasquestion ici d'une approbation ultérieure ou distinctedu ((Gouvernement

nigérian)). La déductionlogique -et mêmela seule déductionlogique- à en tirer est que le

généraGl owon laisse entendreau président Ahidjoqu'ils pourraientréglerle problème euxdeux

038 (cela se passe six mois seulementavant le débutde la réunion deMaroua, fixéau 30 mai 1975).

Ainsi,même si legénéraG l owon avaitvioléune dispositiondu droit internenigérian concernantla

compétencepour concluredestraités, cetteviolationn'étaitcertainement pas((manifeste))auxyeux

du présidentAhidjo. Elle nepouvait tout simplementpas être((manifeste))étantdonnél'opacité

des dispositionsconstitutiomelles relatiàela conclusionde traités au Nigéràal'époque(si tant

est d'ailleurs qu'il yeût de telles dispositions), étantdonnéaussi que le génél owon laisse

entendredans sa lettre du3août 1974que les deuxchefs dYEtat pouvaientréglerla difficulté.En

effet, la dernière phrasedu paragraphe3 de la lettre du général Gowopeut quasiment êtrelue

comme incitant le présidentAhidjo à penser que le généraG l owon serait prêt à accepter un

compromisraisonnablesur letracédelaligne.

5. Ladéclarationde Marouane contientpasdedispositionsurla ratification

17. La Cour constateraen outreque la partienigériane n'a pas proposà, Maroua,que soit

intégréeàla déclarationunedispositionprévoyantqueladite déclaration seratatifiéeetn'entrerait

en vigueur qu'à la suitede l'échange d'instruments de ratification. S'ilt eu véritablementun

obstacleconstitutionnel,ousi le Nigériaavait souhaitéavoir l'occasiond'examinerplusloisir les

effets de la déclarationde Maroua, une telle dispositionaurait constituéune précaution naturelle.

Mais l'onn'a pas priscetteprécaution. 18. Dans ce contexte, Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs de la Cour, j'ai été

légèrement Gchépar la façondont M. Brownlietronque parfois ses citations. La citationtronquée

a eu l'effet trompeur maximumavec l'article7 de la conventionde Vienne sur le droit destraités,

dans lequel M. Brownlieometcertains mots qui ne cadrent pas bien avec l'argumentqu'il défend.

Par opposition à la version tronquéecitée par M.Brownlie dans sa plaidoirie sur ce sujet, le

paragraphe 2a) de l'article de la conventionde Viennese lit en faitcomme suit :

((2.En vertu de leurs fonctionset sans avoià produirede pleins pouvoirs,sont
considéréscommereprésental neturEtat:

a) Les chefs d'Etat, les chefs de gouvernement et les ministres des affaires
étrangères,pourtousles actesrelatifsàla conclusiond'untraité.))

Je répète:((pourtous les actes relatifàla conclusion d'un traité):ce sont lesmots qui ontsauté

dansla citation faitepar M. Brownlie. Or,parmi les actes relatifsla conclusiond'un traitéfigure

nécessairement l'expressiondu consentementde 1'Etat à êtreliépar ledit traité. Il n'est doncpas

r O toutà fait exactde soutenir, commele faitM. Brownlie (CR2002/9,par. 110)'que l'article7 de la

convention de Vienne ((viseuniquementla manière d'établirla fonction d'une personneen qualité

de représentantd'un Et&». L'article traite aussi,du moins jusqu'à un certain point, de l'étendue

despouvoirs de laditepersonne,et I'onconstateraqu'un chefd'Etatdoit être considére énvertude

ses fonctions commereprésentant sonEtat auxfins de tous les actes relatifs à la conclusion d'un

traité,y compris l'expressiondu consentementde I'Etatintéressé a être lipar le traité.L'article7

doit bien sûr êtrelu en liaison avec l'article46. Mais il n'est pas sans intérêdte constater,dans le

contexte particulierde la présente affaire, que,dans le commentaire de ce qui est aujourd'hui

l'article46 de la convention de Vienne, la Commission du droit international avait expressément

rejetél'idéeque desdispositionsde droit internelimitant le pouvoir dont sontinvestis desorganes

de 1'Etat pour signer un traitépuissent rendre annulable un consentement donné au niveau

internationalenviolationd'unerestriction constitutionnelleLaCommissiona déclaré :

«Si I'on devait admettrece point de vue, il s'ensuivraitque les autres Etatsne

pourraient pas fairefond sur le pouvoird'engager1'Etatque possèdentapparemment,
aux termes de l'article [7], les chefsd7Etat,premiers ministres, ministresdes affaires
étrangèrese,tc.; ils devraientvérifier pareux-mêmesd, ans chaque cas, qu'il n'y a pas
de violation des dispositions de la constitution de l'autreEtat, ou courir le risque de
constater ensuite que le traité est nul.)) (Annuaire de la Commission du droit
international, 1966,vol.II, p. 262.) 19.On constateradonc que la Commissiondu droit international-qui estàl'originede la

version finale des projets d'articlessur le droit des traités,c'est-à-dire du texte de base qui sera

examiné a la conférencede Viennesur le droit des tra-téétait certaineque l'on ne devraitpas

beaucoup s'écarterde la règlenégative énoncédeésormaisau paragraphe 1 de l'article46 de la

conventionde Vienne.

6. La capacitédu Nigéria àconcluredestraités à l'époquepertinente

20. Monsieur le président,il faut bien constater que la constitution nigériane,mêmeaprès

avoir étéamendée parle décretno1 du 17janvier 1966, ne dit absolument rien quanà la façon

dont 1'Etatdoit exercer sa capaciàéconclure des traités. De toute évidence,ce n'étaitpas au

conseil militaire suprême, tant que collectivité,qu'il appartenaitd'exercer ce pouvoir,puisque

ce conseil étaitconstituédefonctionnairesnommés,détenteursde douzehautes fonctionsde7Etat,

dont le caractère était essentiellement mils,i je puis dire. Les membres du conseil militaire

suprêmedevaient-ils êtrtous tenus collectivement responsablesde la façon dontle Nigériagérait

ses relations internationa?eA qui les ambassadeurs étrangersprésentaient-ils leurslettres de

840 créanceà leur arrivée dans lacapitalenigériane durantcettepér?odAucune réponse n'a encore

été donnée à ces questions, ni à celles qu'a posées M.Tomuschat le 25 février

(CR 200216,p. 23-24, par. 15-16).

21. Je comprends parfaitementque cette question metterownlie mal àl'aise. Il existe

dans la langueanglaise un proverbe qu'ilconnaît sûrement et qui dit qu'«on ne peut pas faire de

briques sans paille)) (son équivalentfrançais sera«à l'impossible nul n'est tenu»).On a

malheureusement assignéà M.Brownliela tâche de construireune argumentation imposante sans

l'aide d'un seul fétu depaille. Aucune preuvedigne de foine permet d'établirque la constitution

empêchait le général owon se rendantàMaroua, à la findumois de mai 1975,en qualitéde chef

du gouvernement militaire fédéraelt de présidentdu conseil militaire suprême,d'exprimer le

consentement du Nigériaà êtreliépar un instrument conventionneltel que l'accord correspondant

à la déclaration de Maroua.En outre, mêmesi laConstitutionle lui interdisait,il est parfaitement

clair qu'en signant la déclarationde Maroua au nom du Nigéria,il ne commettait pas deviolation

«manifeste»des dispositionsdu droit internenigérianrelatiàela compétencepour conclure des traitéspuisqu'en 1975,laposition adoptée parlaconstitutionduNigéàice sujet était,au basmot,

extrêmemenc tonfuse et opaque. On pouvait difficilements'attendree que le président Ahidjo

duCameroun fûtmieux informéde cesquestionsque le généraGl owon lui-même.

22. Fairevaloir la nullitéde l'accordinternationalcorresponàala déclarationde Maroua

du le'juin 1975et du communiquéconjointqui l'accompagnaitau motif que ces instruments n'ont

jamais été ratifiés palre conseil militaire suprême,c'est égalementun argument dénuéde tout

fondement. Aucunde ces instrumentsne stipulaitque leur entréeen vigueur étaitsubordonnéà

un échange d'instrumentsde ratification. En conséquence,en vertu du droit des traités, ces

instruments appartenaienà la catégorie bienconnue des ((traitésen forme simplifiée)) qui,sauf

disposition contraire du traitélui-même, entn vigueur aumoment de leur signature. Le droit

des traités n'énonce pade règle supplétivej,e dis bien, pas de règle supplétiveimposant la

ratificationuntraitéquin'est pas expressémentoumis àratification. Sinon,toute cettenotionde

«traité en forme simplifiée)) -un outil très utile pour les relations internationales

contemporaines- disparaîtrait purement et simplement et la communauté internationaleserait

privée d'un précieux moyede conclure rapidementdes traités.

0 4 1 7. Le rapport entreles questions relativeàla frontière maritime et les questionselativeà
la frontièreterrestre

23. Aprèsavoir examiné ceque M. Brownlieavait à diresur le tracéde la frontièremaritime

jusqu'au point,je vais passeà cequeM. Crawfordavait àdire sur le mêmesujet, commeilnous

l'a exposéle6 mars. Ce matin-là,M. Crawforda consacréune partie de sa plaidoiàila relation

entreles questionsqui onttraita frontièremaritimeet cellesqui onttràla frontièreterrestre;il

a présentéà cette occasion un certain nombre de propositions que l'on pourrait qualifier de

singulières. Plusieurs de mescollèguesont d'ailleurs déjàfait quelques brefs commentàices

sujet. Je dois vous dire qu'alorsqueje réfléchisàala manièred'y répondreà mon tour,je ne

pouvais m'empêcher de penser à un échangequi eut lieu à la Chambre des communes - la

Chambre des communes britannique - entre Sheridan, le célèbre dramaturge anglaisqui fut

ministre dans l'un des nombreux gouvernements qui siégèràtLondres à la fin du XVIIIesiècle,

et son adversaire politique de l'époque,un certainDundas. En réponse à un discours de M.

Dundas particulièrement critiquàson égard, Sheridanaurait dit ce qui su:«M. Dundas peut remercier sa mémoirede luirappeler autantde plaisanteries,et son imagination,de produireautant

de faits)). Je n'ai rienire- vraimentrien - sur les plaisanteries deM. Crawford, maisje ne

peux que rendre hommage à son imagination pour les prétendus«faits» qu'il invoque et sur

lesquelsil prétendse fonder. Ainsi, M. Crawfordaffirmesansrougir que«les Partieà la présente

affairen'ontpas seulementconsidéré lesquestionsde délimitationmaritimecommesecondaires -

pour autant qu'elles lesaient même traité-, mais [qu'elles]les ont mêmeconsidérées comme

distinctes,les découplantdu litige relàtla presqu'îlede Balcassi))(CR2002112,par. 13). Mais

c'est tout bonnementfaux. Le Cameroun étaitdisposé ànégocieravec le Nigéria le tracéde la

frontière maritime endirectiondu large partir dupoint terminal situédans l'estuairede la rivière

Akwayafé,tel qu'il estdéfinià l'article 22 de l'accord du 11mars 1913,mais uniquement si les

parties convenaient defairepartir la frontièrede ce point précis. Le Nigériaa bel etbien accepté,

au début des années soixante-dix,qulea frontièremaritimeversle largeparte de cepoint précis;le

Cameroun l'a amplement répété et démontré dans ses écritures. Selon toute apparence,

M. Crawford n'a pas écoutéles plaidoiries de mes collèguesMM.Mendelson et Thouvenin,

le 22 février(CR200215,p. 18-33). Jevous renvoieen particulieràl'exposéde M. Thouvenin,de

cejour-là, parcequ'il insistesur les conséquencesqu'impliquepour la délimitationmaritime lefait

que le Nigériaa reconnu la validitéde l'accordnglo-allemanddu 11mars 1913. A cet égard,je

souligneraiune fois de plus la teneur de la note no570 en date du 27 mars 1962,par laquelle le
I 042
Nigéria reconnaît expressément quela frontière, lorsqu'elle approchede la -erje cit- «suit

le cours inférieurde la rivière Akwa-yafés,ans le moindre doute, puis elle débouche surl'estuaire

de la CrossRiver». La Cour elle-même, dans son arrê dut 11 juin 1998 sur les exceptions

préliminairesdu Nigéria, rappelleque les deux Etats onttentéà maintes reprises, avec plus ou

moins de succès,de définirla limite maritimeen direcriondu largàpartir du point terminalde la

frontière terrestre, qui a étéfixédans l'estuaire de la rivière Akwayafépar l'accord

du 11mars 1913(voir C.I.J.Recueil 1998,arrêt,p. 301-302, par. 52-53). Cette successiondefaits

nous montreque la délimitationde la frontièremaritime entreles deux Etatsprogressait lentement

mais sûrement jusqu'au moment où, en 1978, à l'occasion d'une réunion à Jos, le Nigériaa

soudainementannoncé qu'il dénonçalia t déclarationde Marouaqui remontaitàpeine àtrois ans. 24. Cela dit, Monsieurle président,je ne donne pas toàtM. Crawfordlorsqu'il déclareque

«lesnégociationsrelatives àla frontièrecôtièredans les années1970 ont portéessentiellementsur

desquestionsd'accèsmaritime))(CR2002112,p. 62); mais s'ilen est ainsi, c'est uniquementparce

que,jusqu'à la dénonciation unilatéralpear le Nigéria dela déclarationde Maroua, en 1978, les

deuxEtats s'accordaientpour prolonger la frontière côtière vele largeà partir du point terminal

de laligne établiepar l'accord du1mars 1913.

25. M. Crawford tente en toute innocence, apparemment,de dissocier le différend surle

maintiende la validitéde ladéclaration deMarouadu différendrelatif au titre sur la presqu'îlede

Bakassi; c'est ce qui ressort de manière flagrante du nouvel argument qu'il avance dans sa

plaidoirie du 6 mars, à savoir que «la conduite des Parties n'est compréhensibleque si l'on

considèreles deux questions comme distinctes))(CR 2002t12,par. 15). Les deux questionsdont

parleM. Crawfordsont à l'évidencel'octroi de permis d'exploitationpétrolièr, 'une part, et, de

l'autre, le différend relaàiBakassi. Mais il va de soi que la conduite des Parties en ce qui

concerneles concessionspétrolières dans la zone situéeau sud de Bakassi, dont M. Pellet vous a

parléce matin, s'explique d'elle-même dès lorsque l'on considèreque le Nigéria,jusqu'à 1978

aumoins, n'avait jamais remis en cause le titre camerounais sur Bakassi, pas plus qu'il n'avait

contestéla validitéde la déclarationdeMaroua;tel est entout cas le point de vuedu Cameroun.

26. Monsieur le président, j'ai encoredeux brèvesobservations à formuler concernant la

positiondu Nigériasur la délimitationmaritimejusqu'au pointG. La premièreest que, mêmesi le

I 043
Nigériaa fondé toute sathèse juridiquesur la prétendue invalidide la déclarationde Maroua, il

n'a apparemment pas contesté formellement la validité dlea déclarationde Yaoundé II. Cette

déclaration, adoptéepar les deux chefs dYEtatle 14 avril 1971 à Yaoundé,fixe le tracéde la

frontièrecôtièredu point terminal situédans l'embouchurede larivièreAkwayafé,tel que fixé par

l'article 22 du traitéanglo-allemand,jusqu'au point 12. Or, la nouvelle ligne que le Nigéria

propose pour la délimitation maritimeà proximitéde la côte et qu'il faitpartir du Rio del Rey

signifieimplicitement que leNigériadénonceégalementla validitéde la déclarationde Yaoundé

II, et c'est pourquoi le Cameroun démentla prétendue invaliditde cet instrument conventionnel.

Le Camerouns'appuie àcet effet sur les moyens dedroit qu'il a continuellementinvoqués,dans

sesécriturescommedans ses plaidoiries,pour démontrerque la déclarationdeMaroua est toujours valide, car il estime que ces moyens s'appliquentmutatis mutandisdès lorsquela validitéet le

maintiende l'applicabilité de ladéclarationde YaoundéII sontleur tour implicitementremisen

cause.

27. Mon second pointest que le Camerounne trouve aucunfondementjuridique, quel qu'il

soit,à l'appui dela nouvelle ligne partant d'un point situédans le Rio del Rey que le Nigéria

revendiquepour la délimitation maritime proximitéde la côte. Les premiers spécialistesqui ont

tracéla frontière,il y a environcent quinzeans, ont unanimementrejeté l'de situer le pointde

départà cet endroit lorsqu'ilsont découvertque le Rio del Rey ne faisait pas partie d'un système

fluvialprenant sa sourcel'intérieurducontinent. Laligne revendiquéepar leNigériaest d'autant

plus invraisemblableque sontracéen directiondu large suivrait l'orientation apparemmentdonnée

par un prétendubanc de sable,que leNigériaaffirmeavoir découvertmais quine figuresuraucune

carteofficiellede larégionautres quelessiennes.

28. Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, j'en ai terminé. Je vous

demanderai de bien vouloir maintenant,ou peut-êtreaprèsla pause-café,appeler àla barre mon

collègueM. Kamto, qui vous présentera,pour ce secondtour deplaidoiries l'exposédu Cameroun

sur lafrontièremaritimeau-delàdupoint G.

Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie beaucoup,sir Ian. La Cour suspendsa séancepourune

dizainede minutes.

L'audienceestsuspenduede II h25 à II h 35.

Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. Je donne maintenant la parole au doyen

MauriceKamto,au nom de laRépubliqueduCameroun.

f- 044 Mr. KAMTO:

IX. THE SECONDMARITIMESECTOR

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, 1should like to make some observations on

Nigeria's statements regardingthe equitableine proposed and claimed by Cameroon. They will

coverfourpoints:

(1) 1shallbegin withsomepreliminaryremarksonNigeria'soralpleadings onthis subject; (2) 1shall then showthat the premises of Nigeria's reasoningare false and that, consequently,its

conclusionsareinevitably falseas well;

(3) Next 1shall speakaboutthemethod of constructionofCameroon'sclaim linein order to show

why itis equitable;

(4) In conclusion, 1shall explainwhy the Court must reject Nigeria's claimsand why it should

allowthose of Cameroon.

1. Somepreliminaryremarks on Nigeria's ora plleadings

2. To begin with,somepreliminaryremarks,three in fact:

(1) Nigeria rebutsCameroon's reasoningnotbyargumentbut by incantation;

(2) Secondly,Nigeria has conjuredup a theoryof "exclusion" delimitationin order to concealits

aims;

(3) Thirdly, the sole objective of the Nigerian negotiations is the conquest of new maritime

temtories.

A. Incantationisnot argument

3. Mr. President, Nigeria has a very curious way of challenging Cameroon's arguments.

Cameroon's "treatment" of the islands? Nigeria's counsel find it "irrational"'; the method of

constructing the line? "~ar-fetcher2 and even "bi~arre"~because it is "the product of a fertile

I 4) 4 5 imaginati~n"~; the equitable solution proposed by Cameroon? "~xtrava~ant"~and "fanciful'";

Cameroon's positionon the oil concessions? "~bsurd"'; and Carneroon's pleadings, bothwritten

and oral? "~anciful"~again, naturally. The question is not whether fkomtime to time a party is

entitled to use a particular word todescribe some particular argumentof its opponents which it

considers inadequate. None ofthesewords istaboo, andthere have doubtlessbeeninstanceswhere

'CR2002113p , 33,para. 24,Mr.Abi-Saab.

21bid p.,0,para.54.

31bid p.,4,para.71.
4~bid p.,0,para.58.

'lbid p.,5,para.77.
6~bid p.,8,para. 88.

'CR2002112p , . 56,para. 1,Mr.Crawford.

'CR2002114p , .65,para. 2, Mr.Abdullahi,AgentofNigeria. counselfor Cameroonhave seenfit to employone ofthem. The objection stemsfiom the factthat

here systematic recourseto this kind of languageis madeto serve as a process of reasoning. It is a

novel processof "reasoning", based onthe beliefthat the opponent's argumentscanbe sweptaway

by a mere litany of words, by nomore than the endlessrepetition of certain adjectives. Thisis a

incantation,Mr. President,but itis not argument, becauseit proves nothing.

4. It is inherentin contentious proceedingsthat theparties' argumentsdiverge,because atthe

heart of every disputethere is a conflictof legal interests. But is does not sufficefor one partyto

describethe other's argumentsas "fanciful", "far-fetched","irrational", "extravagant", "bizarre" or

"absurd" in order to prove its case. It must still demonstrate legally the relevance of its own

arguments in order to invalidate those of its opponent. Nigeria is far fiom having done this, as 1

shall showin a moment.

B. Thetheory of"delimitationbyexclusion"

5.Accordingto Nigeria, the maritime delimitationline proposed by Cameroonfiom pointG

onwardsis an "exclusion linem9 designed to put Nigeriaout of the running, to excludeit fiom any

subsequent delimitationin the Gulf of ~uinea". But who is excluding whom? And from what?

Surelytalking of "exclusion" meansthat theNigerian approach tothe maritime zonein questionis

in keepingwith the "carve-up" approachit ascribesto Cameroon, andnot the delimitationapproach

maintained by the Applicant? Nigeria's insistencethat Cameroon should indicate the maritime

I
zone which it claims suggests the same thing too. For Nigeria wants to be in charge of the

carve-up,wants to knowwhat fallsto each Statein thezone,and doubtlessdecidewho getswhat.

6. The true problem is not therefore that the line proposed by Cameroon is legally and

technically debatable- indeed Nigeria's counsel said last Thursday that his criticisms addressed

"the actualpremises" ofthe line "rather thanits detailsandprecise path""; the problemis not even

that this line is not equitable. The only real problem is that it would exclude Nigeria from

boundary contacts with the other States in the Gulf of Guinea. This may well be a geostrategic

concem, conceivedinthe abstract and projectedont0the entire region,but it is no kind of legal,or

9~~ 2002113,p.30,para. 5, Mr.Abi-Saab;ibid.,p. 70,para.64, Mr. Crawford.

'Olbid.p.30, para.8, Mr. Abï-Saab.
"lbid., p. 29, para.3. even factual, argument. Because the mere fact of expressingthis concern does not tell us what

other Statein the Gulf of GuineaNigeriabelievesit essentialto have a maritimeboundarycontact

with, nor what legal reasons there are to justiQ its having one. At al1events, if there is any

exclusion - but Cameroondoes not see what the exclusion is,or what it is from, or by whomit is

done- itwouldbe the work of the lawand notthe decisionofCameroon.

C.The purposeofNigeria's maritime negotiations:maritimeconquest
7. Nigeria has concealed reasons for condemning whatit calls an "exclusion7y delimitation

and setting itself up as would-be guardian ofthe interests of Equatorial Guineaand Sao Tomeand

Principe: under cover of protecting the rights of these countriesin the maritime zone concemed,

what Nigeria is really seeking to preserve is the maritime conquests it has achieved at their

expense.

8. As my eminent colleague and fiiend ProfessorPelletpointed out in his statementin the

firstr~und'~,Nigeria, which is now clamouring for the application of a pure, strict and totally

unadjusted equidistance approach, did not agree to its application in any of the bilateral

delimitationswhich it effected either with EquatorialGuineaor with Sao Tome and Principe. In

both casesit rejected the equidistanceline in favourof a differentline which sanctifiedthe "oil fait

accompli"- a line far more favourable to it- to the detrimentof the other States concemed.

Cameroonrepeatsthat the treatieswhichNigeriasucceededinconcludingwith thosetwo Statesare

O not opposableto it, that it is not a party to them, and that they simply remain events- disputed

events moreover - whosesole meritis to revealthe intentionsofthe otherStatesconcemedby the

delimitationin the Bight ofBiafra.

2. Thepremisesof Nigeria's reasoning arefalse andconsequentlyits conclusionsare
inevitablyfalse

9. 1now corne to the grounds of Nigeria's argumentregarding the construction of the line

proposed by Cameroon,or rather to what Nigeria's counselhascalled the "deconstniction" of this

line. In orderto undo somethingyou must havesolid tools ofthe right kind. Thisis not the case

here, eitheras regards the geographyin the Bightof Biafra,orthe configurationof the coastlinein

' 2 200216,pp.57-59. the Bight, or the status of the islands, in this instancetheir effect on the delimitation. On these

threepoints the premises of Nigeria's reasoning are false, and quite obviously its conclusionsare

inevitably false as well. Today, however, 1 shall confine myself to the first two points. My

distinguishedcolleague,ProfessorCrawford, criticizedCameroonlast Thursdayfor havingsaid too

much about Equatorial Guinea in its absence in the first round of pleadings (for reasons which 1

found difficult to understand,since he himself did not hesitate to refer abundantly to Equatorial

Guinea inhis statements!). 1will nevertheless followhis prudent advice and Cameroon willnot

addressthis aspectof the questionuntil ithas heard the interveningState.

A.The geographyof the Bightof Biafraandthe relevant area

10. Mr.President, Members of the Court, in the first round Nigeria tried to refashion the

geographyof the Bight of Biafrato suit the purposesof its argument. It thus constructeda theory

ofa dividinglineconsisting of a string ofislands,disclosedthe existenceoftwo island Statesin the

Bight and utterly confused the geographically precise notions of relevant area and areas to be

delimited, indefiance of the international jurisprudenceon this subject. 1 should like to take up

thesedifferentpoints in tum.

I 048 (a) Thetheoryof a dividingline consistingof a string of islands in the relevantarea-the
non-existenceof twoislandStatesin theBightofBiafra

11. Nigeria has discovered in the Bight of Biafia a dividing line consisting of a string of

islandswhich divides it into "two relevant areas, with the islands having two relevant frontages,

one to the east and one to the west"13. This diagonal line of islands, it said, constitutes an

"impervious ~creen"'~,which Carneroon has pierced, as though it were some kind of burglar.

[ProjectionmapNo. 137.1

12. What exactly are we talking about here, Mr.President? What we see is a geophysical

phenomenon which, millions of years ago, gave birth to a mountain range running through

Cameroon from north to south, from the Mandara Mountains in the extreme north to Mount

Cameroon on the Atlantic, and continuing, underwaterthat is, so as to give rise to the islands of

- --

1 3 ~2002113,p. 39, para.49,Mr.Abi-Saab.

I4lbip d3,9,para. 53.Bioko, Principe, Sao Tome and Anobon. The question is whether these mountains and islands

form a continuous chain, unbrokenhowever far apart its links are, which forms a kind of natural

"wall" ofwhich Nigeriaclaims to be the guardian.

13.Quite obviouslynot, Mr.President. Everythingdependson how closetwo mountainsor

4
two islandsare to eachother, or how far apart,in the contextof the relevant area andlorthe area to

be delimited. In Ourcase,the sting of islandsformingthe screenis claimedto consistof the island

of Bioko,the islands of Principe and Sao Tome, whichform the archipelagic State of Sao Tome

and Principe, and, further offshore from continental Gabon, the island of Anobon, which also

belongs toEquatorial Guinea.

14.The fact is, as the sketchnow on the screen (tab 137 in the judges' folder) shows, the

land mass of the islandof Principe is at theuter limit of the relevant area definedby Cameroon,

and the islands of Sao Tome and Anobon are even much further offshore than that. What this

relevant areareally contains for the purposes of the maritimedelimitationbetween Cameroon and

Nigeria is the islandof Bioko and a smallpart of the maritime space belonging tothe archipelagic

State of Sao Tome and Principe. Between these two elements there is no unity, either

geographical- sincemore than 200km separatesthe islandof Bioko fiom Principe - or of legal

status, and only the island of Bioko significantly affects the delimitation in the Bight of Biafra.

And sincean islandis not a sting of islands,it cannot inthis case formthe impewious wall which

Nigeria is attemptingto erect. That is the geography,thephysical reality. The line which cutsthe

Bight in two is geometry - but geometry which gives thelie to the geography, geometry which

refashionsnature.

15.The continentalplateauxand shelvesof the Gulfof Guineadisplayno geomorphological

featurewhich mightsuggestthe possibilityof some kindof fault line. But even if there were one,

an argumentof this naturebased onthe ideaof a tectonicline wouldbe irrelevant. Both Libya and

Tunisiatried to propoundargumentsof this kindbased onplate tectonicsand the geomorphological

characteristics of the continental shelf in theunisia/Lic base", but unsuccessfully. [End of

'%c. RJe.ort1982,paras52-61,andespecially57,para66.

?.,projection.] Once this dividing lineconsistingof a string of islands disappears, then equallyyou

losetwoof the threerelevant areaswhich Nigeria claimsto have identifiedin the Bight ofBiafra.

16.But theNigeriandiscoveriesarenot confinedto the insulardividingline. They havealso

enableditto focuson"two island Stateswhichare atthe heart oftheproblem"'6.

17.1 presume thatNigeria is not claiming thatEquatorial Guinea is an archipelagic State.

There is no way itcould come into that categoryunderthe MontegoBay Convention. Thereis no

such legal category as an "island State"; Nigeria seeks to draw legal conclusions from a

non-existentconcept.

18. Infact, althoughEquatorialGuineapossessesan island,Bioko, and an islet, Anobon, it

remains a continental State. The fact that France exercises sovereignty over various islands

throughoutthe worlddoesnot make it anarchipelagicState oran islandState.

Of the total area of Equatorial Guinea, which is some 28,000km2, Bioko accounts for

2,000 km' or so, representing7per centofthe temtory. The continental partof the countryalone,

Rio Muni,covers26,000km2,or more than90 per centof the totalarea ofthe country. Admittedly

Bioko is a fairly substantial island with a population of approximately 100,000, but we must

remember that, in the case conceming the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (United

Kingdorn/France),the Channel Islands had approximately 130,000inhabitants, even thoughtheir

area was smaller,and yetthe court of arbitrationrefusedto attributeto them the full effect claimed

by GreatBritain and decidedthat they were an enclave lying totally withinthe French continental

plateau.

19. The imprecise use by Nigeria of the terms "island" and "island State" and the

misconceptionsit gives rise to are not fortuitous. No one can believethat the distinguishedcounsel

of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are unaware of the relevant provisions of the MontegoBay

Conventionon this subject. Their choiceof terminologyis part of an approachenabling Nigeria's

counsel to draw aradical legal conclusion fromthe presence of Bioko in the area to be delimited,

as 1 shallshow in a moment. First, though, 1 should like to demonstratethe mistaken nature,both

1 6 2002112,p.66,para27,Mr. Crawford. factuallyand legally,of the Nigerian conceptionof the relevant areaand the lengthof the relevant

coastlines.

(b) Relevant coastlines-relevant area-area to bedelimited

20. [Projectionmap No. 137.1According to Nigeria,the relevant coastline for the purposes

of the delimitationofthe maritime boundarybetween CarneroonandNigeria runs fromAkassoto a

point where the land boundary between thetwo countries ends in the estuary of the CrossRiver.

The two Parties therefore agree on what sector of the Nigerian coast has tobe taken into

consideration. Thisis not the case with the Camerooniancoast. In the view of Nigeria, theonly

sectorof coast relevant in the present case runs from the point wherethe land fi-ontierbetweenthe

two countries ends to DebundshaPoint north-eastof Bioko. The reason, accordingto Nigeria,is

that beyond DebundshaPoint "the course of the Cameroonian coastsouthwardsto the boundary

with Equatorial Guinea is ... blocked by the large island of ~ioko"". Nigeria's criticism of

Cameroon is not onlythat Carneroonincludesthispart of itscoastlinein what it considersto bethe

relevant area for theurposes of the delimitation,but "that it goes on to appropriateto itself the

entirecoastal façade of EquatorialGuinea, as wellas a goodpart ofthe coast oabo on"'^.

21. This description of the Cameroonian coast suggests that only a rectilinear or evenly

shaped and unindented coastlinecan be consideredto be a relevant coastline for the purposesof a

0 5 1 maritime delimitation. For, even before speakingof the blocking effect of the island of Bioko in

masking the south-eastem portion of the Camerooniancoastline fiom the Nigerian coastline,our

opponents explain that, as soon as one moves away fromthe rather narrow region where the two

coastlinesadjoin around Bakassi,"the Cameroonian coastundergoes a radical change of direction,

tuming sharply southwards". There certainly mustbe different conceptions of what constitutesa

"radical change" and a "sharp tum"! What is there in common between the sharp and radical

change in the Nigerian coast beyond Akasso and the curved shape of the Cameroonian coast,

whose only slight convexity [indicate this on the sketch on the screen] occurs only between

DebundshaPoint andNachtigalPoint?

"CR 2002113p, .33,para.22,Mr.Abi-Saab.
lslbid. 22. To exclude al1the rest of the Cameroonian coast,facing though it does the Bight of

Biafra and the relevant Nigeriancoast, on the pretext that it can only be taken into account at the

expenseof"piercing" the Bioko screen hasno convincinggeographicalbasis. France wouldnever

have had a maritime boundarywiththe UnitedKingdombeyondthe Channel Islandsif that kindof

argumenthadprevailed. Far frombeing a factor preventing maritimedelimitation,every maritime

formationsituated in the viciniv of a State'scoastline is a relevant circumstanceto be taken into

considerationin orderto achieve an equitableresult. Biokois in this situation in the present case,

and Cameroonhas takendue accountof itspresencein theproposed delimitation,as 1shaIlshow in

amoment [endof projectionandbeginningofprojectionofmap No. 1381.

23. As regards the relevant area (themap at present on the screen is at tab 138), Nigeria

claimsthat Cameroon doesnot seem "sureof its position"'9,and that it first definedthe area in the

form of a ccrectangle"in its Memorial,beforemoving on in its Reply to delimit it as a "triangular

aream2'.Cameroonis gratifiedthatNigeriahasfinally managedto read its Memorial, whichit filed

in 1995. Scantythoughmy knowledge of geometrymay be, 1 know ofno rectanglewhichhasonly

three sides. 1 Say this, Mr. President, in order to show that the broken line in the sketch on

I 0 5 2 page 544ofthe Memorialof Cameroon indicatedthe outer200nautical-mile limitof the exclusive

economic zone,as you can see on the sketchnow on the screen and shownto you very rapidlyby

Nigeria lastThursday [endof projection].

24. Let us, though, examine the Nigerian theory on the notion of relevant area in greater

detail. Nigeria dismisses the definition of the relevant area contained in Cameroon's written

pleadings21,but without offering a credible alternative. According toNigeria, "a relevant area is

determinedby, or is afunctionof,the relevantcoasts oftheparties to the delimitation; these coasts

arein turndefinedas 'adjacent'or '~~~osite"'~~.

25. Adjacent coasts, Mr.President, are coasts of two States which have a common land

boundary. Butthe notion of adjacency doesnotper se determine thelength of the relevant coasts.

191bid.,. 36, para.37.
'Olbid, .37, para.43.

2 ' ~2002113,pp.36-37,paras.40-43.
22~bid.,.38, para.45.In particular, it does not imply that account will only be taken of the coastlines closestto the end

point of the land boundary. Itis thegeneral configurationof the coastlinein the regionin which

the maritimedelimitationis being effectedwhichdeterminesthe length ofthe relevantcoasts. It is

Nigeria's unusual conception, to Say the least of it, of the relationship between the notion of

adjacency and the relevant coastwhich leads it to define a relevant zone"beginning in the region

where the Nigerian and Camerooniancoasts adjoineach otheron the horizontal leg ofthe triangle

inthe north ofthe Gulf ofGuinea",itsreason beinga changein directionofthe Camerooniancoast

beyond DebundshaPoint - or more precisely a "radical change", which, as 1have just shown,

doesnot in fact exist.

26. If it is the case that the Cameroonian coast does not radically change direction at

Debundsha, nothing prevents it from being taken into account al1the way to Campo. And if

Cameroon'srelevant coastdoes not stop at DebundshaPoint but at the boundary with Equatorial

Guinea or, as Cameroonshows, at Cap Lopezin Gabon, the relevant area defined by Nigeria- a

tiny stretchto the north ofBioko - disappearsautomatically. The two relevant areascreatedby a

non-existent dividingline disappear; the triangularrelevant area producedby a wronglyrelevant

coast disappears- and there is nothinglefi. There is somethingleft, though: the relevant areaas

defined by Cameroon in its Reply, and which it has no reason to alter brojection mapNo. 1391.

This area represents an area bounded by the actual coastlinefrom Akasso/Brasse in Nigeria to

CapLopez in Gabon,where it is closedoff by a straight linerunningthenceto AkassoinNigeria,a

linewhich correspondstowhat onemight cal1the natural lineclosingofftheBight ofBiafra.

27. And the relevant area as thus defined, which appears on the sketch-mapjust screened,

meets al1the geographicalcriteria enabling suchan area to be delimitedin the light ofthe practice

of international fora. It is, generally speaking,ageographicallyand hydrographicallyuniformarea

which takes account of al1the factors in the area concemed which might affect or influence the

proposed maritimedelimitation. Itslimits answerthat purposeand do not always coincidewith the

boundariesofthe States which the delimitationconcerns. TheBight of Biafrahas the geographical

and hydrographicalcharacteristicswhich 1havejust mentioned. The pronounced concavityof the

Atlantic coast in this areaakes it a homogeneousmaritime space whose delimitationis natural,

since a line drawn from a point situated in the vicinity of Akasso in Nigeriato one situatedat thetip of Cap Lopezin Gabonindicatesthe natural outerborder of this area withthe remainder of the

AtlanticOcean [endof projection].

28. The fact thatthe closing lineembracesthecoast of RioMuni, i.e.,the continentalportion

of Equatorial Guinea, and part of the coast of Gabon is not without precedent. In the

Guinea/Guinea-Bissaucase, the ArbitralTribunal took the view that a "valid method" consists of

"lookingatthe whole ofWest Africaand of seekinga solution whichwould take overall accountof

the shape of itscoa~tline"~~.The Tribunal went on: "Thiswould mean no longer restricting

considerationstoa short coastline butto a long c~astline.~~(The emphasisgiven to the two terms

isthe Tribunal's.) And in order to constructthis line,the Tribunalopted fora systemconsistingin

drawing a straight linejoining Almadies Point (Senegal) and Cape Shilling (SierraLeone) and

would thus involve two third tat tes"^^.t added: "The second system is better suited to the

circumstance chosen by the Tribunal, i.e., the overallconfigurationof the West African coastline,

andthe AlmadiesPoint-Cape Shillinglinereflectsthiscircurnstancemore faithfully."26

29. In the present case Cameroonhas not attemptedto extendthe relevant areato the entire

Gulf of Guinea, which naturally embraces Cameroonand Nigeria and extends to the waters off

Benin and Togo, since the geographyprevents it fromgoing further than Akasso in the west and

CapLopezinthe south-east.

30. This relevant area must be distinguishedfiom the area to be delimited [projectionmap

No. 1401. The latter takes account solely of the lengths of the coasts of Cameroon and Nigeria

whichare relevant forthepurposes ofthe maritime delimitationsought by Carneroon,and of those

two countries alone. As Carneroon has already explained to the Court, the support lines which

servedfor the construction ofthe equitableline havebeen reduced bythe lengthof the coast ofthe

continentalportion of EquatorialGuineaand by thatof the coastof Gabon, whicharenon-relevant

sectors. Those sectors are representedby the brokenportions of the support lines running from

Akassoto Cabo San Juanand fromAkassoto CapLopez. Thetransverseredline [indicatedonthe

23~warodf14Feb.1985,RGDIP, 1985-2p.528para .08.[ILMV,ol.5 (1986)p297.1

24~bid.
"~bid .,28-529para .10.[Ibidp.,98.1

261bid.screen] whichconnects Campoand the startingpoints of thepertinent sectorsof the support lines

used in the construction of the equitable line forms the south-eastem limit of the area to be

delimited, which is different fiom the relevant area, which isbounded on the north-west by the

sector of the Nigerian Coastthat runs fiom Akasso to the endpoint of the land boundary between
1
Cameroon andNigeria. It is this area to be delimited which reflects the general direction of the

coasts.

31.As canbe seen fiomthe sketchon the screen, the relevantcoastsofthe Bightof Biafra in

this areato be delimited showa slight eastto Westorientation,which explainsthe generaltrend of

the equitableline and shows,contrary to what Ouropponents contend, that its constructionmeets

thetechnicalrequirementscalledfor by a rigorousdelimitation.

B. Thecoastal configurationofthe Bightof Biafra

32. Nigeria considers that the geographical situationof the Cameroonian coastlineis not

"uniquely unfavo~rable"~' - Nigeria's expression,because it sees a precedent ina "very similar

case"28,that ofthe ContinentalShelf(TunisidLibya). This overlooksthe factthat the geographical

data in that caseand ours aredifferent. The situationof the Cameroonian coastlinein the Bight of

Biafra is more akin to that ofthe FederalRepublic of Germanyin the North Sea ContinentalShelf

cases than to Tunisia's in theTunisia/Libyacase. From another aspect, however, the area to be

delimiteddoesbear some similaritywiththe Tunisia/Libyacase. 1shall re-examinethesetwo cases

in turn.

(a) ContinentalShelf(TunisiaILibya)

33. [Projectionmap No. 141.] In this case, TunisidLibya,the position of the landboundary

between Tunisia and Libya vaguely suggeststhat of the land boundary between Cameroon and

Nigeria, since it lies more orlessin the hollowof thegulf whoseclosing limitsare RasTadjouraon

the east and RasKaboudia on the West. This, leaving aside the concaviy factor of the gulf s

coastline, is the only possible element of comparison with Cameroon's situation in the Gulf of

Guinea. As regards the remainder, "the geographical situation of Tunisia was not [merely]

-
"CR 2002113,p.48, para.88.

**1bi pd.,a.89. dissimilar to that of ~ameroon"~~t,o use the mild euphemismof Nigeria's counsel, it simplyhad

nothing to do with the situationof Cameroonin regard to thegeneral configurationof the coastline

in the relevantarea, in this casethe Bight ofia. For whereasTunisia andLibya"shared", soto

speak, the concavity of the coastline in theregion in which the delimitation of their common

maritime boundarywasto be effected, inOurpresent caseonly the Camerooniancoastline displays

any concavity.

34. Cameroon is situated at the head of the Gulf of Guinea,surrounded on the Westby

Nigeria and on the south-east by Equatorial Guinea. This is not the case with Tunisia, whose

coastline moves sharply away fiom the relevant area westwards, beyond RasKaboudia, turns

towards the Gulf of Hammamet,moves northwardsto CapBon and turns again into the Gulf of

Tunis beforeslopingwestwardsto the fiontierwith Algeria.

35. As you can see fiom the sketch on the screen,the pincer effect at the two ends of the

Carnerooniancoast mentioned by my distinguishedcolleague and friend Professor Mendelson in

O 5 6 his statementin the firn round does not existhere. Pincerswith two arms. At most there is only

one am. What is more, the concaviiy concernsonly part of the Tunisiancoast, the part between

the Gulf of Gabes and Ras Ajdir, and also its effect is attenuatedby the presence of a Tunisian

island, theisland ofDjerba. [Endofprojection.]

36. [Projection map No. 142.1 Nigeria insists on the similarity between the geographical

configurationsin thetwo casesbecause,in itsopinion,theydisplay"a concavecoasthemmedin by

foreign islandscloseoffshore"30.But where arethe "foreignislands close offshore"in the areato

be delimited in the Tunisia/Li case? The island of Djerba and the Kerkennah Islands are

indisputably Tunisian, while the Italian islands, Lampedusaand Linosa, are not just very far

offshore rather than "close offshore",but lie outside the area to be delimited, on the other side of

the Italo-Tunisian delimitation line. Inany case, you cannot Saythat a string of islands forms a

dividing line which cuts the coastline of the Gulf of Guinea into two large segments, andin the

same breathmaintain that this concave coast is "hemmed in" by that string of islands! Thusthat

situation bears no relationto the Bight of Biafia and Cameroon7sparticular positionwithin it [end

291bid,ara.90.
3 0 2002/13p.49,para.97.of projection]. In fact, to some extent Cameroon's situationis more reminiscent of that of

Gerrnanyin relation to the North Sea, as far as both its position in the Bight of Biafra andthe

configurationofits coastlineare concemed. ,

(b)North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germanymenmark; Federal a
RepublicofGermanymetherlands)

37. [ProjectionNo. 143.1 1now corne to the two NorthSea ContinentalShelfcases. We

have here the sketch appended to the Judgrnent handed down by the Court in this case in 1969,

whichhas already been screenedbyboth Parties. Itshowsthe situation ofthe Germancoastlineat

the head of a bight, adrnittedlya smaller one than the Bight of Biafra, but exhibitingthe same

concavity. This coastlineis trapped betweenthe boundary separating GermanyfromDenmark on

the north and that separating Germany fi-omthe Netherlands on the south. As is Cameroon's

coastlinebetweenNigeriato the Westand Equatorial Guineato the south. The Germancoastline is

a recessingCoast,markedly concave and situatedin the centre of the hollow as is the coastline of

Cameroon atthe head of the Gulf of Guinea, much deeper though that is than the bight between

Denmarkandthe Netherlands in theNorth Sea. What Cameroon wouldlike to make clear here is

thepincer effect of the bight andnot its depth- the pincer effectproduced bythe endpointsof the

land boundaries with Denmark on one side and the Netherlands on the other which

ProfessorMendelson explained so well in the first round3', an effect which has a quite striking

similarity with that produced by the endpoints of the Carneroon-Nigerialand boundary in the

estuaryof the Cross Riverand the Cameroon-EquatorialGuineaboundaryat Campo.

38. As my distinguishedcolleague explainedin the first round, this particular configuration

of the coastline between Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands and the concave coastline to

which it gives rise led the Court to relax the grip of the pincers, which othenvise would have

deniedthe German coastline any projection whatsoeverfurther seawards; there, in order to take

account of those "special circumstances",the Court preferred to apply an adjusted equidistance

formularather than the equidistance methodpure and simple. Having noted that "the claims of

severalStatesconverge,meet and intercross" theCourt stated: "A studyofthese convergences ...

3 1 ~200216,pp.47-49paras.7-11.showshowinequitablewouldbe the apparentsimplificationbroughtaboutby a delimitation which,

ignoring such geographical circumstances, was based solely on the equidistance methor3'.

Contrary to what counsel for Nigeria said, loosening the straitjacket of equidistance was not a

matter of "minor aesthetic surgery" aimedsolely at "mitigating the effects of minor feature~"~~.

What tookplace was a genuine equidistanceadjustmentwherebyGermany increasedits maritime

space by 37.5per cent by comparison with what the strict application of the equidistance rule

would havegiven it.

39. In the present case, the cut-off effect produced by the pincers on the projection of the

coastal fiont of Cameroonwould be even more pronounced,since the bight concemed is sharply

cwed and semi-circula and Cameroon is situated right in its hollow. As in the North Sea

ContinentalShelf cases, the application of the equidistance method would produce an equally

inequitable result. Cameroon, incidentally, is only asking for one am of the pincers to be

slackened,in order notto damagethe interestsofthirdparties. [Endofprojection.]

3. Theequitablenatureoftheline claimedby Cameroon

40. 1should like to show now why Cameroon maintainsthat the line which it proposes is

equitable, by going through the various stages in its construction. 1shall then addressNigeria's

criticisms regarding disregad of the criterion of proximity, on the one hand, and the role of

proximityonthe other.

A. The construction of the line: equidistance adjusted by reference to the relevant
circumstances

41. Mr.President, Nigeria explainedto you the way in which it understood the lawand the

method applicable in regardto delimitation. In the light of that statement,Cameroontakes it that,

despitethe disagreementsbetweenthe two Parties- in particular on therelevant areaand relevant

coastline, the effect of the presence of a third State in the area to be delimited, the role of the

criteria ofproximity andproportionalityand the role of equidistance - they agree on the factthat

geographymust not be refashioned,that any radical amputationcaused by a proposedline must be

32~.~.Reports1969,p. 49, para.89.
"CR 2002113,p. 44, para.73.avoidedand that any delimitationmustseek an equitableresult; and that, in orderto achieve it, the

most rigorous method is to take equidistanceas a starting point and adjust it in the light of the

relevant circumstances.

42. Mr. President, Nigeria referredto your statement to the Sixth Committee of the United
Z
Nations General Assembly in November2001, which showedthat this two-stage methodis now

the Court's established practice. Cameroonwas obviously awareof that important statement,but

thought it nght that the Judgmentof 16March 2001,which laysdown the Court'sjurisprudencein

this matter, should speak for itself. My fnend, ProfessorPellet mentioned the Judgrnent at the

beginning of Cameroon's oral pleadings34. 1 shouldlike to demonstratehow Cameroonappliedit

tothe actual construction ofthe line which itproposes.

43. [ProjectionNo. 144.1 The sketch at presenton the screen(tab 144in thejudges' folder)

shows, as a broken line, thepure equidistancelinebetween Cameroon and Nigeria,drawnwithout

taking any account ofBioko. As the sketch shows,the courseof this lineproduces a considerable

narrowing of the maritimespaceto the Westof Bioko and evenmore so towardsthe south-western

part of the island. The line also lies on an axis with Sao Tome and Principe and, if prolonged,

would cut intwothe maritimearea delimitedbythatcountry.

44. Let us now go to the startingpoint ofthe equitableline proposedby Cameroon. This is

pointG, determinedby the Maroua agreement. From that point,the boundarymoves horizontally

for a short distanceof barely 2 km to point H, which lies on the equidistanceline proposedby the

experts at the time of the negotiations whichresulted in the Maroua agreement. The lateral shift

frompoint G to pointH showsthat, in orderto constructthe equitableline,Cameroon madeapoint

of starting ffom the equidistance line, in accordance with the two-stage method which 1just

mentioned and whose importance the Presidentof the Court drew attention to in the address to

which 1have referred. This shift representsa retumto the equidistance line, butas a startingpoint

and not a fixed point, or endpoint, for the delimitation ofthe maritime boundary seawards. This

return to the equidistanceline is the first phase of the two-stagemethod. The second phaseis the

3 4 200215,p.44,para.20.adjustment of equidistance in order to take account of the relevant circurnstances, and this is

representedby a deflectionofthe linewestwardsas itmoves furtherout to sea.

45. The lateral shifi fiom G to H is therefore the sine qua non of the applicationof this

method, which gives expression to the latest state of the Court's jurisprudencein regard to the

delimitation of maritime boundaries,whether that delimitation takes place between States with

opposingcoasts or, as in the present case,between two States whose coasts are adjacent. It is the

primary condition, the indispensable condition, of any equitable maritime delimitationbetween

CameroonandNigeriabasedon that method.

46. Frompoint H onwards,the linegraduallydivergesfiom the equidistancelineas itmoves

towards point 1, in order to take account of the presence of the island of Bioko. In order to

determinepoint 1,Cameroontook accountof the lengthof the southem coast of that island fiom

Punta Oscura to Punta Santiago, some29 km; this is the coastal fiontage of Bioko which is

capableof projection furtherseawards. This length,which Cameroon considersto be thepertinent

sectorof the coast of Bioko for the purposesof the equitable delimitation,representsthe mean of

the maximum and minimumbreadths of theisland,whichare 35 and 26 km respectively. Taken in

relation to theBonnyICampoline, this pertinent sectorhas the effect of pushing the equidistance

line westwards to point1. If in fact, starting fiom pointH, we rotate the first part of the

equidistance line so as to make it coincidewith the line H-1,the result is the displacementof its

point of intersectionwith theBonnyICampoline by an amount equal to the averagebreadthof the

islandof Bioko, Le.,some30km.

47. This adjustment of equidistance continues fiom 1 to J, but with Bioko being given a

half-effectand the configurationof the coastline a more Iimited effect, the resuIt of which is that

the equitable line leaves tothe west the theoretical equidistancelinebetween the westernfiontage

of Biokoand the relevantsector of theNigerian coast. The purpose of limitingthe effectattaching

to the relevant circumstancesin this sector of the line is to avoid the cut-off effect which the

relevant fiont of the Nigeriancoastwouldsuffer ifthosecircumstancesweregiven theirfulleffect.

48. From point J onwardsthe adjustmentof equidistance continueswith a somewhatmore

marked deflection of the equitable line between J andK, which this time leaves the theoretical

equidistanceline to the east- not to the west, but to the east- in order to take accountof the presence of the archipelago of Sao Tome and Principe. FromK onwards the line simply points

oceanwards,that is to Say,to the outer limit of the zones withinthe respective jurisdictionsof the

Partiesto the present case. [Endof projection.]

B. Role of thecriteriaof "proximity"and"proportionality"

49. The argumentbased onthe criteriaof "proximity"and "proportionality"has beensharply

criticizedby Nigeria. Argument basedon these criteria is not new. In the North Sea Continental

Shevcases, which concerned Stateswith adjacentcoastsas in the present case, the Court examined

the role playedby"proxirnity" in determiningwhetherpart of thecontinentalshelf belonged toone

State ratherhan another. Having foundthat there was no necessary, and certainly no complete,

identity betweenthe notions of "adjacency" and"proximity",the Court addedthat "the questionof

which parts of the continental shelf'adjacentto' a coastlinebordering more than one State fa11

C 0 6 1 withinthe appurtenanceof whichof them,remains to thisextentan open one,not to be detemined

on abasis exclusivelyof proximity". Andin equallycleartermsit continued:

"Even if proximity may afford one of the teststo be applied and an important
one in the right conditions,it may notnecessarilybethe only,nor in al1circumstances,

the most appropriate one. Hence it would seem that the notion of adjacency, so
constantly employed in continental shelf doctrine from the start, only implies
proximity in a general sense,and doesnot imply any fundamentalor inherentrule the
ultimate effect of which wouldbe to prohibit any State(othenvise than by agreement)
from exercising continental shelf rights in respect of areas closer to the Coast of
another tat te."^'

50. Commenting on this passage in the Judgment, the Court of Arbitration in the case

concemingtheDelimitation of ContinentalShev(United Kingdom/France)observed: "Thiswould

seem to state explicitly thatnder certain conditions proximity may bethe appropriatetest or

method for delimitingthe boundary of the continentalshelt but that in any case the valueto be

attached to proximity as a method of delimitationependson the individual circumstancesof the

case"36.And the Court of Arbitrationadded: "This Courtof Arbitrationseesno reason to adopt a

different viewof the role of 'proximity'in the circumstancesofthepresentasef13'.

3'C.J .eports1969,pp. 30-31,para.42.

36~ecisionof 30June1977,para.81.
37~bid. 51. Accordingly, like the Court in the North Sea ContinentalShelf cases, the Court of

Arbitration did not ascribe to "proximity" a role confined to the strict application of the

equidistance mle. As far as the ChannelIslandswere concerned,it decided against the application

of equidistancein orderto enclavethose islandswithinthe French continentalshelf. As to theMer

d'Iroise,the Court adjusted the equidistance line by attributing only a half-effect to the Isles of

Scilly. But the pointis whetherthe geographicalcircumstancesin thepresent case requirethat any

role shouldbe attributedto this criterionat all.

52. 1should liketo observethat, whatevergeophysical factoris given consideration- here

plate tectonics, geology or geomorphology - Bioko lies on the natural prolongation of the

Camerooniancontinental shelf,in the geological senseof the term, of course. That islandis closer

to the Cameroonian coastlinethan to that of any other State in the region, fiom whatever point on

the island the distance is measured. Because of this geographical proximity, there is what one

O
rnight term a gravitationalpull exerted by the continent on its landmass. Bothin terms of the

superjacentwaters surroundingthe island and of the continental shelfbounding it in the direction

of the hollow of the Gulf of Guinea, itanbe seen thatthe Camerooniancoastline forms a kind of

arc around the island. The equitable lineproposedby Carneroonthus limits vis-à-vis Nigeriathe

rights of Cameroon inthe maritime spaces adjacentto that concavecoastlineby taking accountof

the presenceof Bioko.

53. To turn now to proportionality, our opponents, despite the explanations given by

Cameroonin its Replyand in its oral pleadingsin the first round, persistin regarding thissolelyas

a matterof proportionalityof surfaceareas. Nigeriaadmits, however,that Cameroonis rightin law

in failing to define the area which the equitable line would generate. Having referred to

Cameroon'spersistencein refiaining fromdoingthat,Nigeria's counseladds: "And it [Cameroon]

is right, for it cannotdo this in the absenceof Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and ~rinci~e"~'.

Indeed,to refrain fromany approachwhichmight damagethe legalinterests of absent third States

3 8 ~2002113p 45para.79. is for Cameroonnot only a matterof conviction,but alsorepresents the strict applicationof a mle

establishedby thejurisprudenceofthe

54. What is more, proportionality of coastlinelengths, and proportionalityof surface areas i

are both relied on by courts in their decisions,as is abundantly demonstratedby the case lawcited
6
by Cameroon in its written pleadings, and also in its oral pleadings in the first round4'. 1 should

neverthelesslike to draw attentionon this pointto the terrnsof the Court of Arbitration'sdecision

in the caseconcerningthe Delimitationof ContinentalSheIf(United Kingdom/France), sincethey

indicate very aptly the role played by proportionalityin a delimitation operation, by pointing out

that it is not a mathematical criterion of rigorous accuracy. The Court stated that it "does not

consider that the courseof the boundarybetweenthe UnitedKingdom and the French Republicin

thatregiondepends on any nice calculationofproportionalitybased onconjecturesasto the course

O
of a prospectiveboundarybetwem the UnitedKingdomandthe Republicof lreland'"'. The Court

added, aftera painstakingexarninationof the roleof the criterionof proportionality:

"the element of 'proportionality'in the delimitationof the continentalshelf does not
relateto the totalpartition of the area of shelf amongthe coastal States concerned, its
role being rather that of a criterion to assess the distorting effects of particular
geographicalfeaturesandtheextent oftheresultingineq~ity7'42.

55. This is what Cameroon has sought to do in the present case, on the basis of the

proportionalityratios betweenthe different sectorsof therelevant coastlines and ofthe proportions

involved in the adjustrnent of equidistancein the light of the relevant circumstances, in order to

produce anequitableresult.

4. Conclusion

56. Mr. President, Membersof the Court,in conclusion Cameroon believesthat, for al1the

various reasons whichmy colleaguesand myselfhave put fonvard, the Court cannotdo otherwise

than dismissthe claimsof Nigeria. These, in so far as we understand them, consist in requesting

you to endorsethroughoutthe "oil practice line", as AlainPellet demonstrated atthe beginning of

39~eein particularMonetaryGoldRemovedfrom Rome in 1943,I.C.J. Reports 1954,p. 32; ContinentalShelf
(LibyaiMalta),I.C.J.Reports1984,p.1,para.88; EastTimor,I.C.J.Reports 1995,p. 105.

4 0 200216.
41~ecisioof30June1977,para.27.

42~bid.,ara.250. the moming. That positionis untenable. It is devoidof meaninginshore of point G, the sector in

which the boundary is delimited by a fully valid agreement, the Maroua Declaration, as

SirIan Sinclairhas so ablyshowed once again. Theallegedoilpractice linehas even lessmeaning

beyondpoint G,where itbecomestotallyunrealistic.

57. May 1also remindyou that Nigeria remains as ever tom between a maritime boundary

commencingat the estuaryof the CrossRiver, which already exists on the basis of valid treaties,

andan impossibleboundary starting atthe Rio del Rey- evenmodified asNigeria wouldwish -

but one it hasno faith in sinceit takesscanttroubleto plead itscause.

58. Cameroon, for its part, proposes a line constructed, 1 believe, with the necessary

technicalrigour and with the aim of achievinga result which respects the rights of al1the States

0 6 4 concemed, thatis to Say,anequitableresult. Thatisthe line which Cameroonrespectfully requests

the Court to establishas themaritimeboundary betweenitself andNigeria.

1thank you warmlyfor your attention and wouldask you, Mr. President, kindly to givethe

floorto the Agentof the Republicof Cameroon fora short statement.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, DeanKamto, and 1now give the floor to H.E.the Agent of

theRepublic ofCameroon.

Mr. ALI: Thank you,Mr. President,let mebegin by sayinghowhappy 1 am to takethe floor

thismoming inthe presenceof JudgeOda. Let ushope that,before the endof the proceedings,we

willalso havethe pleasure ofdoing sointhe presenceof JudgeVereshchetin.

Mr. President,Membersof theCourt,

1. Professor Kamto's statement brings to a close the second round of Cameroon's oral

argument, subject, of course,to what we will need to add after the statement byrneighbours

fiom EquatorialGuinea next week. Moreover, thisis why 1shall take advantage of the fact that

you yesterday authorized the Parties to summarizethe conclusions which we, at least, willdraw

fromthe fiveweeks of hearingsbringingthese longproceedingsto a close.

2. However, Mr. President, 1 noted that you wanted these final statements to be purely

summaries and not to add any new elements to the Parties' oral arguments. Wishing fully to

comply with thatinstruction,1have thereforedecidedto sharewith you today an idea culminatingin a concrete proposal, so that Nigeria can indicate its reaction to it. In general terms, this idea

concemsthe landand maritime delimitation.

Mr. President,

3. As statedseveraltimesin the lasttwo days,we welcomethe fact thatthe Federal Republic

of Nigeria now accepts the validity of the instrumentsrelied on fiom the outset by Cameroon,

which delimit the boundary between the two countries and which,in the view of some, are even

demarcation agreements. For the boundary separating Cameroon fiom Nigeria is not only

delimited throughoutits length but, in major portions, over more than 300km, is also precisely

demarcated, notably by the Obokurn Agreement of 1913, not to mention the 790km of river

boundary,which doesnot lenditself to demarcation.

4. The factremains that counsel for Nigeria have sought to demonstratethat, if not legally

debatable,these treaties were imprecise, obscure, deficient. On this point, Members ofthe Court,

werely entirely onyour decision.

5. In al1sincerity we are convincedthat there is a great deal of exaggerationin Nigeria's

positionon this. Many of the allegedly22border sectorswhich itconsidershavenot beenproperly

describedare fullydelimited,and sometimeseven demarcated. Otherallegeddefectsaremattersof

demarcation,thusinvolving technical studieson the ground, not readily replaceableby rulings in

abstracto; we have,moreover, indicated certain of them, whichmay be added to those identified

by Our opponents and there are probably others too. But let me repeat, should you find it

appropriate yourselvesto settle some of the problems raised by Nigeria- artificially so inur

view- we wouldhave no objectionat all. Our soleconcem is forthe boundaryto be determined

definitively, whatever meaning is given to that term, which in our view Our opponents are

stretchingtoo far.

6. Moreover,Mr. President,let me be perfectlyfrank:wewillaccept any decisionthe Court

takesand will implementit faithfully andin full. Wewill do soout of respect for your institution

and inthe name ofpeace. However,the Govemmentofthe Republicof Cameroonwould notwant

to be locked into bilateral discussionswith Nigeria in the contextof this case. We have hadtoo

many bitter experiences on that score; we have too often felt we have been "duped"; wehave

nurturedtoo manyhopes, subsequentlydashed,to be ready to attemptthe experienceagain. 7. If the Court were to find that it was not able to settle al1the technical points raised by

Nigeria,if its decision left someuncertainties,we are readyto complywith al1such decisions as a

body setup under the auspices of an impartialthird partymight take in carrying out thenecessary

demarcationof the bordersectorsoutstanding.

066 8.That body, which we shouldearnestlylike to seeset up by the Court, orunder its auspices

or, failing agreement between the Parties, by the UnitedNations, might, for example, besides

representativesof the Parties, also includerepresentativesiom Germany, France and the United

Kingdom. It wouldhave to be granted extendedpowers asregards demarcation,even in the broad

sense,ifthat were to prove necessary. But at the risk of repeating myself,letme stressthat, in this

case,wedonot believein the virtuesofbilateralism.

9. And what applies to the land boundary applies equally to the maritime delimitation

beyond point"G. We wellknowthat,between Statesofgoodwill, maritime delimitationnormally

takes place by agreement. But the unforninate thing is that, each time an agreement has been

reached - by dint ofpainstakingeffort- Nigeria hasquicklyrepudiatedit. Heretoo, we feel that

your decisionwill settlethe dispute fullyand finally. However, if for some unforeseenreason you

found you were unable to settlethe dispute completely,1should like to state, in the most forma1

manner, thatCameroon is at your disposa1for the completionof the maritime delimitationprocess

by anypeacefùlmeans, on thetwofold conditionthatit doesnot leaveus face to facewithNigeria

andthatitprovidesassurancesof areal result.

10.This, Members of the Court, is what 1wished to clarifj this moming and, as 1 said, 1

propose, with your permission, Mr. President,to take the floor again next week for some more

general comments.

11.On my own behalf, as on behalfof the entiredelegationof Cameroon,1thankyou most

sincerely,Mr.President,Membersofthe Court, foryourkind attention. Thankyou. The PRESIDENT: Thankyou, YourExcellency. Thismarksthe end ofthe secondround of

oral argument of the Republic of Cameroon. We will meet again on Thursday, 14March at

10.00a.m. for the secondroundof oral argumentof the FederalRepublic ofNigeria. The sittingis

closed.

TheCourtroseat 12.50p.m.