Non-Corrigé Traduction
Unco rrected Translation1
CR2002/17(traduction)
CR2002/17(translation)
Mardi 12mars2à10heures
Tuesday 12March2002 at 10018 The PRESIDENT: Pleasebe seated. The sittingis openand 1give the flooronbehalfof the
Republic of Cameroonto ProfessorAlainPellet.
Mr. PELLET::
VII. THEMARITIME BOUNDARY -INTRODUCTION
Theroleof theoil practice
1. Mr. President,Membersof the Court, itseemed to us that it wouldbe judicious to follow
the oral argument on the land boundary with my fiiend ChristianTomuschat's cornrnentson
responsibilitysince, essentially, internationally wrongful acts incurring Nigeria's responsibility
were committed on the mainland and culminatedin the region of LakeChad and at Bakassi. But
we are not blindto the arbitrarinessofthis approach: the attacks on Bakassioften came fromthe
sea and Nigeria didnot hesitateto use the most reprehensiblemeasuresto prevent Cameroonfrom
peacefully enjoying its natural maritime resources. Furthermore,the delimitation of the land
boundary and the delimitation of the maritime areas belonging to the two countries are closely
interlinked- which is why it would have beenabsurdto accedeto Nigeria's insistencethat these
two aspects be dissociated. Indeedyou declinedto do this, Members of the Court, and rightly so.
Despite the diversity of legal and factual problemswhich this case raises, it cannot be overstated
that itrepresentsasingle whole.
2. This being so, 1shall concentratethis moming on the sea alone and, in particular,on the
role which Nigena believes shouldbe accordedto the oilpractice. But, before doing so, letmeay
a fewwords aboutNigeria's generalapproachto the maritimedelimitation.
1.Nigeria's general approachto the maritimedelimitation
3. There arefour introductorypoints1shouldlike to raise. 1shall mention them in telegram
style, the time allocated by the Court for this second round being decidedly "tigh... In fact, .
these are points which are anything but secondary, but above al1concem elements of Ourfirst
round of oral argumentwhichNigena did nottroubleto answer. 4. But 1shall beginwith a remark of a different order,namely, that our opponents had the
r 019
discourtesyto "retum to the attack" with a vengeanceregardingthe errorswe made in the graphic
representationof the equitableline (CR 2002113,pp. 18-22,paras.2-14). In telegramstylethen:
- yes, wewere at fault;
- we haveapologized;
- the sinwas,after all,a relatively venialone: it concemed (inthe Replyat any rate)the tracing
on amapof the proposedline,notthe courseofthe line; and
- Nigeria, whose representatives have written (at least) four times to the Registrar with
corrections to their written pleadings (letter of 28 March2001), to their Annexes (letter of
14September1999)or to their sketch-maps (letters of 5 October 1999 and 31 January2001)
wouldperhaps dowellto pondertheir ownmistakesfirst.
5. 1would also pointout, forthe record, that Professor Crawfordfound it necessaryto state
that, in one of my oral arguments, 1had said "things to the Court in the absence of Equatorial
Guinea" (CR2002112,p. 57, para. 2). 1 confess that it had never occurred to me that that was
reprehensible: the State intervening, whose representatives present in this Hall todayit is my
pleasure to welcome,obviously followsal1our oral arguments,which are available on the Intemet
as soon as theyhave beendelivered. But 1must Say1soonrealized that this new sin of which we
were accusedcould not be al1that serious as, the following day, my accuser committedthe same
sin himself (CR2002113,pp. 26-29, paras. 33-40). Having slept on it, Mr. Crawfordno doubt
realized that it is difficult toeak of a maritime delimitation in the Gulf of Guinea without
refening to the presence ofthe islandof Bioko off Cameroon. In view of that, we willyield to his
entreaties and will this morning, as far as possible, minimize aspects involving the rights and
interestsofEquatorialGuineapendingnext week'shearings.
6. A third point, Mr.President, concems an extraordinary lacuna in the oral argument of
Nigeria, which stilldoes not appear to have realized that there are two maritime sectors, raising
quite differentproblems- even leavingasidethe Maroua Declaration. In that (legallyuntenable)
O O case, the delimitationoftheterritorial seaon theone hand, andof the exclusiveeconomiczone and
the continentalshelf on the other, would necessarily haveto be examined separately. Nigeria, which (wrongly) objects to the existence of a treaty delimitation, stubbomly persists in not
refemng to this elementarydistinction.
7. My fourthand lastintroductorypoint, Mr.President,isthe line whichNigeria isproposing .
to you- or notproposing. Letme, ifyouwill, revertto telegramstyle:
(1) On 22 February 1 was concerned to know what the delimitation line defended by Nigeria
really was(CR200215, pp.49-50, paras.38-39);
(2) Our opponentsaffect to adhere to the line in diagrarn 13.9ofthe Rejoinder(p. 524bis),which
was reproduced under tab S in thejudges' folderof 7 March;
(3) But none of them has at any time bothered tojustiQ that line in any way whatever; at the
most, ProfessorCrawfordremembered,in extremis,that the "card" Nigeriawas playingwas a
line starting fiom the Riodel Rey, to which the Professorevotes a brief paragraph of his
lengthy finaloral argumentof7 March(CR 2002113,p. 71, para.68);
(4) It istrue that it is no easy matter for him first, there is the sand island, so opportunely
discovered, which does not feature on any map, but which has the merit of miraculously
causing the line proposedto veer westwards- extremely disadvantageousfor Nigeria,but it
saves the lineproposedfiom furtherridicule;
(5) And lastly, this line doesnot closely,or even remotely, correspond toany past or presentoil
practice, regardlessofhowit is defined.
8. Mr. President, Nigeria's argument can be summed up in one word, at least where the
maritime delimitationis concerned- butthis may wellalso be theword whichinspires itsdreams
ofterrestrial conquest,namely,oil.
( O 2 1 2. The role oftheoil practice
9. Mr. President,1nowcome to a finalpoint; but shall dwellon it at greater length. Thisis
the potential roleof the oil concessions and,more widely, oil practice in the maritime delimitation
underconsideration.
10. This questionis ofuite particularinterest. First because,as no onecan fail to be aware,
the Gulf of Guinea,which-Pace Nigeria- constitutesthe generalframeworkof the delimitation
you are asked to make, is rich in oil deposi-s table 131 in the judges' folder provides somedetails of this- and consulting it, one cannot help but be struck by the "lion's share" Nigeria
carves out for itself- this is a simple fact- it forms part of the context. From a more legal
perspective,this questioncannotbe glossedover becauseof the special- whatdo 1mean special?
Exclusive! - importanceattachedto itbyNigeria.
11. However,this can only be read between the lines of the oral arguments weheard last
week. For it must besaid, our opponentsdid not tell us a great dealwhich wasnot alreadyin their
writtenpleadings. But they didtell us four things; the first two in considerabledetail, the other
two almost in passing:
- firstly,the onshore oil practicehas no significanceat al1as regards sovereigntyover a territory
(CR200219,pp. 45-47,paras. 132-142,Mr. Brownlie; CR 2002112,pp. 61-64,paras. 13-19);
- secondly, both onshore and offshoreoil practices are subject to entirely different rules, and
produce entirely different, even diametrically opposite effects (CR2002113, pp. 25-26,
paras.30-31,Mr.Crawford);
- thirdly, offshore, by contrast with therules applicableon the mainland, the oil practice is "a
relevant circumstance", since it is "cIear, sustained and consistent" (CR2002113, p. 69,
para.62, Mr. Crawford,quotingI.C.J.Chamber, Judgmentof 12October 1984,Gulfof Maine,
I.C.J.Reports 1984,p. 309,para. 146);
- andfourthly,this is supposedly the casehere (CR2002113,pp. 22-25, paras. 17-28).
12. With great respectto my leamed friends, Mr.President, "they've got it al1wrong". 1
propose to show this by examining in tum the last three of these four propositions; my fiiend
MauriceMendelson spokeatsufficientlengthyesterdayonthe first.
13. But a general remark to begin with: it is difficult to form a precise idea of Nigeria's
position solely on the basis of the oral argument, as ProfessorsBrownlie and Crawford,the only
counselof Nigeria to have spoken of the oil practices, did so as it were by paralipsis,as though it
was an argument to be ashamed of. .. Listening to them, 1rather had the impressionthat they
were consciously putting into practice the precept: "think of it always; speak of it as little as
possible".
14. Mr. Crawford may well have concluded his oral argument last Thursday with the
assertionthat "the oil practice of the Partiesand the very substantial character of the vestedghtsexisting on both sides... is determinative" (CR 2002113, p. 71, para. 69). But this is only a pale
reflection of the importance attached by Nigeria to the preservation of what it calls the "acquired
rights"- withoutany concern forhow theybecame acquired.
15. Nigeria was clearer in its Rejoinder, in which it expressed indignation that "[tlhe
Cameroonclaim-linewould requireareaswhichare the subject of long-standing concessions,to be
transferred fiom Nigeria, or respectively Equatorial Guinea, to Cameroon" (p.613,
para. 23.18(iii)), concludingthat:
"It is inconceivablethat the Court should Saythat large areas affected by this
settled pattern of arrangements, expectations and vested rights should now be
effectively transferred to another State, with al1 the regulatory, fiscal and other
consequencesthat wouldentail." (Ibid)
Mr. President, it is only inconceivableif these rights exist; if they were acquired in compliance
with international law; if Nigeria conceded them in ifsmaritime area! Can one imagine what
would happen in domestic law if 1 gave a farmer the nght to till the field belonging to my
neighbour? To a fisherman the right tofish in a stretch of water which did not belongme? It is
placing the cart beforethe horse,orto use another English expression,it "begs the question". The
question is to ascertain and only to ascertai- where the respective rights of the Parties stop;
only when this question hasbeen answeredwill it be possibleto discuss rights, whether acquired
ones ornot.
16.With thebenefit ofthatremark, 1 shallnow revert toNigeria'sthreepropositions.
A. Onshore and offshore oil practices are subject to entirely different rules and produce
entirelydifferenteffects
17. The first proposition is that onshore and offshore oil practices are subject to entirely
differentrules andproduce entirelydifferent effects. This,it mustbe said, is a very curioustheory,
highlighted by the equally curious contrast betweenthe oral argument of ProfessorBrownlie on
1Marchand of ProfessorCrawfordon 7 March.
18.Accordingto Mr. Brownlie,who in support of his positioncites the recent arbitrationin
the Eritreaflernencase, and pointsout that the Tribunal devotedmuch effortto the examination of
the granting of concessions,"the outcomewas characterizedby a degree of caution on the part of
the Tribunal" (CR 200219, p. 46, para. 141); to put it plainly, rny opponent denies that the oil concessionshave any relevanceat al1 - that is, of course,the onshore concessions. But not his
colleague. For Mr. Crawfordconsiders, as 1indicated a moment ago, that, at sea, oil practice is
determinative. This is particularly striking because they each base themselves on the same fact:
both of thempoint out thatthe concessionsgrantedby one Party werenot protested againstby the
other:
- Mr. Brownlie, on 1March: "The absence of protests is, of course, irrelevant given that the
petroleum-related activities were inconclusive in thecontext of the incidence of title to
temtory" (ibid., p. 46,para. 137);
- but, six days later, Mr.Crawford madegreat issue of the fact that "except on points of detail,
neither Party protested the oil licensingand exploitation activities of the ot(CR 2002113,
p. 59,para.32; seealsop. 24, para.26 or pp.69-70, paras.61-62).
19.Inthis Nigerio-Nigeriandoctrinaldispute, it is Mr.Brownlie 1think who is right (at least
as regards the irrelevanceof the oil practice)but..with respect to maritime delimitationandnot
withrespectto sovereigntyover theland tenitory ashe wouldhave us believe.
20. But let us retum to the Eritreanemen case, on which my learned friendrelies. As we
know, it gaverise not to onebut to two arbitral awards, the former of 9 October 1998on territorial
O 2 4 sovereignv; the latter of 17December 1999,on maritime delimitation. It wasin theformer, the
onerelating rosovereigns overthe disputedislandsthat the arbitral tribunaltook account- rather
more than Mr.Brownlie says- of oil practice. Indeed, after an exhaustive examination of it
(Award, pp. 101-115,paras.389-435),the Tribunalconcluded,as pointedout by counselofNigeria
(CR 2002/9. p. 46, para 140)that the oil practice failed, in that case, "to establish or significantly
strengthentheclaims of eitherParty to sovereigntyover the disputed islands". Fromthis it maybe
deduced a contrario that a determinativeoil practicecan constitute an "eflectivité"which may be
taken into considerationin the context of a conflict relating to the attribution of a tenitory. As
Professor Mendelson showedyesterday, Cameroonmay rightly invoke the concessions itgranted
on the Bakassi Peninsula, even if, 1hasten to point out, for us it is no more than an element
providing confirmation,anda rather secondaryoneat that.
21.Now, what do we find in the latter award,the Eritreanemen Award, of 1999,this time
relating to maritimedelimitationandnot mentionedby eitherMr. Brownlie orMr. Crawford? That is highlyregrettable moreover, asit isjust as instructive- but, apparently, in the opposite sense:
in that Award, the Tribunal very clearly indicatesthat the oil concession line it had used to
determinesovereigntyoverthe disputedislands (andwhich moreor less correspondedto a median
line) "can hardly be taken as governing once that sovereignty has been determined" (Award of
17December 1999,p. 25, para. 83).
22.To sumup then: on land,the oil practiceconstitutesa perfectly admissible"efectivité",
despitewhat OuropponentsSay- with, of course,al1the usual caveats when effectivités are under
discussion: provided it doesnot conflictwith atreatytitle, etc. On the otherhand, this practice is
not arelevantcircumstancefor thepurposesof maritimedelimitation.
B. Oilpracticeisnot a relevantcircumstanceforthepurposesof maritimedelimitation
23. This is my secondpoint. Professor Crawfordput forwardthe contraryproposition: "oil
practice... is undoubtedly a relevant circurnstance,and for a number of reasons" (CR2002/13,
p. 69,para. 61). However, although Ouropponent had announced that he was going to list this
O 2 5 "numberof reasons", he did not do so. The most he did was to mention the TunisidLibya case
(ibid.,para. 62) in passing. Moreover,it is true that, in that case,the Courttook intoconsideration
the defacto line constitutedby the oilconcessionsgrantedby each of the two Parties(cf. Judgrnent
of24February 1982,I.C.J.Reports 1982,p. 84,para. 117); butit took great careto makeit clear
"[tlhat the Court is not here making a finding of tacit agreement between the
Parties- which, in view of the more extensiveand firmlymaintained claims, would
not be possible - nor is it holding that they are debarred by conduct from pressing
claims inconsistent with such conduct on some such basis as estoppel" (ibid.,
para. 118).
In otherwords, even in the very particular circumstancesofthe 1982 case, the Court sees the de
facto line asjust one ofthe "indicia...availableof the line.. .which the Parties themselvesmay
have considered equitable or acted upon as such" (ibid., emphasis added); and this only in the
sectoradjacentto the Coastand naturallywhere the concessionsof both Parties followedthe same
line.
24. 1would add that the 1982Judgment is a "borderline case" and that in general,your case
law, like that of the arbitral tribunals which have had toule on problems of this kind, displays
great reluctance about granting any importance whatever to oil practice (cf. Judgment of 20 February 1969,North Sea ContinentalShelJ;I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 52,para. 97; Judgment of
12October 1984, Gulf of Maine, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 342, para. 237; Arbitral Award of
14February 1985, Delimitation of the Guinea and Guinea-Bissau Maritime Boundary,
RGDIP 1985,p. 513, para.63; Arbitral Awardof 10June 1992,St Pierre and Miquelon,RGDIP
1992,p. 706,para. 89; etc.). On thispoint,may 1refer you, Members of the Court, to the relevant
passagesin Cameroon's [email protected],paras. 9.99-9.105).
25. It is true that Professor Crawfordakesmuch of an expression in the Judgmentof the
Chamber of the Court in the Gulf of Maine case, which he takes out of context: the only
requirement,he tells us, for a.practice to be taken into consideration is that it "was sufficiently
clear, sustained,and consistent" (CR2002113,p. 69,para. 62, Mr.Crawfordquoting the Judgment
of 12October 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984,p. 309, para. 146). Butmy learned fiend forgets a few
things, suchas:
jS 026 - first,to quotethe endofthe sentenceconcemed- as the Court addsthat the conducthad to be
sufficientlyclear, sustainedandconsistent"to constituteacquiescence"(ibid.);
- secondly,to state that the Chamberwas actually referring to the decision in the Grisbadarna
case,whose relevanceit considereddoubtful(ibid.); and
- lastly,to specifj thatthere is a furthermajor element ofdoubt inthe presentcase.
26. Indeed, as Maurice Kamto pointed out in the first round (CR200217, pp. 22-24,
para. 13-18),Cameroon and Nigeria had agreed to inform one another of the oil activities in the
area. ProfessorCrawfordblithely dismissed thisargument asking you, Members of the Court, to
read the documents in question, narnely, the Minutes of the Experts' Meeting in Abuja in
December 1991 and Yaoundéin August 1993 (CR2002113, p.25, para. 28; see also CR200219,
p. 46, para. 138, Mr. Brownlie). May 1too invite you to do so? You will see that, although in
those documents, the two Parties reaffirmedtheir "fieedom ...to develop [their] resources along
the frontierline", as our opponentpointsout, they had also undertaken- a phrase whichseems to
have escaped him- "to tak[e] care to inform the other side. .." (Memorial of Cameroon,
Ann.313 and Preliminary Objectionsof Nigeria, Ann. 55). Having not done what Cameroonhad
expecteditto do,Nigeriais in no positionto rely onCameroon'stacit agreement. C.Theoil practiceof the Parties- legalconsequences
27. Mr. President,Nigeria aims to convincethe Court that it should determine its maritime
boundary with Cameroon exclusivelyon the basis of the oil practices of the States in the region
and, first and foremost,of its own. Despitethe very limited relevance,in law, of oil practicesto
maritime delimitation,1 must therefore consider these practices in an attempt to detemine their
possible relevancefor the rules1havejust identified.
28. This cannotbe doneal1in onepiece, as though there wereonly one boundary sector,as
Nigeriastubbornlypersists in claiming. There are undoubtedlytwo sectors: one up to pointG, is
delimitedby theMarouaAgreement; the other,beyond it,must bedelimitedbythe Court.
027 (a)UptopointG
29. [Projection No. 1- coincidence of the oil concessions and the Maroua line.] Up to
point G, ade facto line may be said to exist, in that the oil concessionsgranted by each Party
followa line notunfamiliarto you, Membersof the Court. This isquite simplythe Maroualine.
30. We find ourselves here in a case which, although not identical to the one in the
Tunisia/Libyacase, is nevertheless somewhatsimilar. The concessions grantedby Cameroonon
the one hand and by Nigeria on the other follow the Treaty line without overlapping. [End of
projectionNo. 1.]
31. In this connection,1should point out that, onthe basis ofthe detailsgiven byNigeriain
its Counter-Mernorial (cf. Counter-Memorial of Nigeria, p. 565, paras. 20.16 and 20.17, and
sketch-maps20.4 and 20.5, p. 566bis and 566ter), we indicated major overlaps, bothnorth and
southof point G (cf. Reply of Cameroon,p. 271,paras.9.110 and9.111 and sketch-mapsR24 and
R25). But wherethe first ofthese sectorsis concemed,north ofpointG,thesedetails provedto be
wrong: both HISmaps of 1996 and 2001, for example, show no overlap north of pointG; the
relevantextracts fiom Cameroon'sandNigeria's2001sheets, reducedin your folders, Membersof .
the Court, areNos. 133and 134and 1havetried to superimposethem; yes, itworks.
32. Moreover,in his oralargumentof 7 March, Mr. Crawfordseeks to minimizethepossible
areasof overlap: "the area of overlap is a limitedone" (CR 2002/13,p. 23, para. 19). It is not "a
limited one", Mr.President - there is quite simply no overlap, contrary to what Nigeria would have usbelieve andwhich, 1confess,we didfoolishlybelieve, withoutrealizingthatOuropponents
were intenton armingthemselveswith argumentsin supportof their claims onBakassi.
33. It can therefore be acknowledged,Mr. President,that what we have here is a "defacto
line". But this seemsto meto be of minorinterest: it correspondsvery preciselyto a dejure line,
that fixedby the MarouaAgreementof 1June 1975,which it thus merely confirms. And, as in the
Tunisia/Libyaor Eritreanemen cases, there is certainly nothing to prevent the oil practice of the
0 2 8 Parties from confirming a line effectivelydrawn, in accordance with the applicable principles of
the lawof the seaor, afortiori, as is thecasehere, atreatyline.
34. [ProjectionNo. 2- Kita Marine.] There is further proof that the oil practice supports
the treaty title (and not the reverse). My friend Mr. Karnto alluded to it on 26 February
(CR200215, p. 61, para. 25). Here are the facts: in 1972, Elf Serepca sank a well called
Kita-Marine1. This well, which is indicated bya red circle on sketch-mapNo. 135in thejudges'
folder,revealed the existence- you cannotsee it very well on the projection but you can in the
folder- of oil andgas.
It was shortof the equidistanceline onthe Cameroonian side,but on the "wrong side" of the
Maroua line (1mean, on the Nigerian side ...). In accordancewith its word andthe principle of
respectfor treaties,arneroonabandonedthis well to Nigeria on 27 May 1976. The practicewas
therefore brought into line with the law; not the contrary as Nigeria would wish. [End of
projectionNo. 2. ]
35.Mr.President,as 1was sayingyesterday,theParties areat last in agreementonthetreaty
line of the boundary, not just the land but also the maritime boundary, up to point G. And
ultimatelyit matterslittle that they reachthe same result by different methods-since, and 1 am
anxious to make this absolutely clear and unequivocal, for Our part, we regard the Maroua
agreementas a probative conventionaltitleand as sufficientin itself. Sir Ian Sinclairwillrevert to
thisina few minutes.
(b)Beyondpoint G
36. Beyond point G, on the other hand, Mr. President, thesituation is no longer at al1the
sameas inthe Tunisia/Libyacase,partlybecausewe aremuch furtherfrom the coastsof theParties and partly because there is no defacto line: in the vicinity of point G, there is a great deal of
overlap; further away, the only line which exists is a unilateral one, stemming fiom Nigerian
practicealone.
37. A few words now on each of these aspects- beginning with the sector immediately
south ofpoint G.
029 38.1 had beenplanning to representona sketch-mapthevery obviousareasof overlapofthe
concessions grantedby the three countries, Cameroon, Equatorial Guineaand Nigeria, in the area
immediately south ofpoint G. Unfortunately,we ran out oftime and this consolidated sketch-map
could not be got ready. However, one has onlyto refer, forexample,to diagrams 20.4 or 20.5 in
the Counter-Memorial of Nigeria, or 10.2, 10.5, 10.6, 10.8 or 13.5 in the Rejoinder- 1 am
referring here to the written pleadingsof Nigeria,which has focusedmuch morethan we have on
oil practice, not to mention the series of sketch-maps in the appendix to Chapter 10 of the
Rejoinder (whose probative value is doubtful incidental1y)- one has only to refer to al1these
sketch-maps,to al1these diagrams,to realize thatthere is no consensualline of oilpracticesin this
area; al1there is areirreconcilable,unilateral,competinglines.
39. A very clear, indisputable, "inevitable" consequence flows from this overlapping of
incompatible concessions: there is clearly no defactoline here which could serve as a basis for
delimitation,whetheras an "indication"or a "method",not to mentiona"relevant circumstance".
40. Of course Nigeria is of the opposite opinion. Indeed, it draws a subtle distinction
between the concessions on the one hand and the wells and boreholes which, on their own,
supposedly constitute the "oil practice" on which it relies (cf. CR 2002113, pp. 23-24,
paras. 18-21).Threeremarks on thispoint Mr.President:
- letme observe firstof al1that itis very difficultto drawa delimitationline basedon practiceas
so defined: concessions followlines; wellsare points which may overlap; think for example
of theproblems posed by the Kita Marine well which 1 referred to a few moments ago,or the
famousEkanga well, which Nigeria succeededin obtaining - 1was about to Sayextorting -
fiom EquatorialGuinea and whichhas already beendiscussedat length;
- secondly, it is quite correct, if we confine ourselves to the wells, that Nigeria comes out "on
top", as shown bythe many diagrarnsaccompanying its writtenpleadings andoral argument. 1 hope you will allowme, Membersof the Court,not toembark upon that course,not to project
sketch-maps ofthatkind. In fact, there is a regrettableexplanationfor the disproportion- in
favourof Nigeria andto the detrimentof CameroonandEquatorial Guineaprior to 2000 - in
the number of wells in the areas of overlap: through intimidation, threats made to the oil
companies concemed, Nigeriasucceeded in dissuading them fiom sinking boreholes in the
areas it claims; on the other hand, it had nocompunction aboutcommissioningboreholes,or
evenoil extraction operationsin those areas,despiteknowingthey were claimedby Cameroon
orEquatorial Guinea; 1 am stillspeakingofprior to 2000;
- at al1events - andthis is my third and last remark- it is hard to see Nigeria'sjustification
for claiming to exclude concessions fiom the oil practice to which it attaches so much
importance. Even inthe 1982Judgment in the Tunisia/Libyacase, the only one which gives
any semblance of credibilityto the Nigerian argumentin this respect,the Courtbased itself on
"the defacto line between the concessions" (I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 84, para. 118; see also
p. 71, para. 96 and pp. 83-84,para. 117) and it is obviously logical therefore that, a1 have
alreadyemphasized,it is a matternot of acceptinga faitaccompli,asNigeria wouldhave it,but
of basing oneselfonthe concessionsas "indicia. ..ofthe line ... which the Partiesthemselves
mayhave consideredequitableor acteduponas such"(ibid.,p. 84,para. 118).
41. Mr. President, as regards, lastly, the area further south, there can be no questionof a
defacto Iinehere- fora simplereason: Cameroonrefiained fiom granting any concessionsthere;
initially because the two States were in negotiationto that end; later because, as the matter was
beforethe Court, Cameroonfelt itwould be discourteous,to Saythe least,to try andpresent it with
a fait accompli in this way. As we know, Nigeria didnot have any such scruples: not only did it
hasten to create a practice; it alsosought to "juridicize" that practiceby concluding a, for itself,
particularly advantageous treaty with EquatorialGuinea- but this is a matter1 am sure we will
have occasionto revertto next week.
42. For now, 1 can therefore stop at this point and confine myself to surnmarizing my
conclusionswith respectto the oilpractice,including theconcessions,of course:
(1) thispractice cannot,in law,justie a maritime delimitationlineof anykind; (2) at the very most, it may be one element confirming a maritime boundary effectively
0 3 1
establishedin conformitywith the principlesof the law of the sea applicable in the territorial
sea or beyondit;
(3) this applies,afortiori, when a line fixedbytreaty is involved,as is the case of the line adopted
by the Marouaagreementof 1June 1975; and
(4) in this case, the line of the concessions grantedby the Parties in fact corresponds in every
respect to the line resulting from the MarouaDeclara...about whichmy eminent friend
Sir Ian Sinclair is now going to speak, if you would kindly give the floor to him,
Mr. President.
Thankyou ver- muchforyour attention Members of theCourt.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Pellet. Je donne maintenant la parole à
sirIan Sinclair.
Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie, Monsieurle professeu1.now give the floor to Sir Ian
Sinclair.
SirIan SINCLAIR
VIII. LE PREMIERSECTEUR MARITIME
1.Monsieurle président, Madameet Messieursde la Cour,c'est un grand honneur pourmoi
que de m'adresser nouveau à vous au nom du Camerounàl'occasion des plaidoiries sur le fond
de l'affaire de laontièreterrestre et maritimeentre le Cameroun etle NigériaCe matin, ma
tâche consisteraà répondre auxarguments que le Nigériaa formulésdans son premier tourde
plaidoiries au sujet du tracéde la frontièremaritime entre les deux Etatsjusqu'auGpet, en
particulier,au sujet du maintien en vigueur et de l'effet obligatoire dela déclaration deMarouade
1975.
1.La déclarationde Marouadu 1"juin 1975
2. Commecertainsde mes collèguesl'ontdéjà dit- et la Cour le déploreracertainement-,
le conseil du Camerounet celui de la Partie adverse semblentengagésdansun dialogue de sourds,
en particulier au sujet du maintien en vigueur de ce que, pour la commodité,nous appelleronsles ((dispositionsrelativàsBaicassi))du traitéanglo-allemand du 11 mars 1913, et de la question
distincte mais connexe du maintien en vigueur de la déclarationde Maroua du le'juin 1975.
Comme M. Tomuschatl'a expliqué à la Courle 25 février(CR200216,p. 18-27),la déclarationde
Maroua a étéle fiuit d'une longue séried'entretiens et de négociations bilatérales entre le
032
Cameroun et le Nigéria, dontle Cameroun a relatéen détaill'historique dans saréplique. La
dernièreréunionde cette série a eulieuà Maroua du 30 mai au 1" juin 1975; elle réunissaitles
chefsd'Etatdu Cameroun (leprésidentAhidjo)et duNigéria(le généraG l owon), accompagnésde
leurs délégationsde haut nivearespectives. Vu lesévénementq sui ont suivi, il y a peut-être lieu
de noter que la délégatinehaut niveau quiaccompagnaitlegénéral Gowon à Maroua comprenait
notamment les gouverneurs militaires de deux régions nigérianes (MCv,ol. VI, annexe 250); le
général Gowon étad it nc entouré decertainsde ses collègues militaires ainsique de conseillers
spécialisés drang élevé.La réunion aproduit deuxinstruments importants. Le premier étaitun
((communiqué conjoint))signépar les deuxchefsdYEtatq, ui mettaitparticulièrementl'accentsur la
délimitation maritime définiticonvenue entre les deux chefs dYEtatet qui faisait allusiànla
déclaration portantla mêmedate (le'juin 1975), en expliquant que celle-ci consacrait un accord
conclu sans réserve parles deux chefs d'Etat. En effet, le communiqué précisait q(([Ilesdeux
chefs dYEtat...se sont mis entièrement d'accordsur le tracéprécisde la frontièremaritimetelle
que la définit la déclaraneMaroua du 1"juin 1975et son annexe))(MC,vol. VI, annexe250).
3. Mais c'est biensûr la déclarationde Maroua elle-même(MC, vol. VI, annexe MC251),
c'est-à-dire le second instrument adoptà cette réunion,qui définit de manièreméticuleusela
((frontièremaritime))du point 12 au point à,l'aide de coordonnées géographiquep srécises. Le
contenu de la déclaration, confirmpar l'indicationclaire, dans le communiqué conjoint, que les
deux chefs dYEtatétaient ((entièrementd'accord)), sufft établir que sousl'angle du droit des
traités, les termes de la déclaratide Maroua équivalaient à la conclusion, sous une forme
simplifiée,d'un accord international.l est presque certain que la déclaration deMaroua auràit
elle seule eu cet effet, mais le communiquéconjoint notait également queles deux chefs dYEtat
étaientpleinement d'accordsur le tracéexact de la ligne frontière précieans la déclarationde
Marouaelle-même. 4. Trèspeu detemps aprèsl'adoptionde la déclarationqui,je mepermetsde le préciser,était
accompagnéede la signaturedes deux chefs d7Etatsur l'exemplairede lacarteno3343 sur laquelle
étaitreprésentéle tracéprécisde la ligne jusqu'au point, le Cameroun a découvertune erreur
technique dans le calcul des coordonnéesdu point B sur la nouvelle ligne convenue. En
conséquence,le présidentAhidjo a, le 12 juin 1975, adresséune lettre au généralGowon dans
033 laquelle il signalait l'erreur technique et proposait que,si le général marquaiston accord avec les
coordonnées rectifiées du point B, sa réponse, jointeà la lettre envoyéeà l'origine par le
présidentAhidjo le 12juin 1975,soient considéréescomme des annexes valables à la déclaration
de Maroua.
5. Le général Gowon a répondu à cette communicationle 17juillet 1975pour convenir que
l'erreur enquestion avait bien éfaite et accepter la propositiondu présidentAhidjo quant la
manièredont il convenaitde la rectifier.
6. Le Camerounmaintient sa position,à savoir que cet échange ultériere lettres entre le
présidentAhidjo et le général owon confirmesans l'ombre d'un doute que lesdeux chefs d7Etat
qui ont signésolennellement la déclaration de Maroule lerjuin 1975 estimaientque celle-ciétait
entréeen vigueur à la date de son adoption. L'échange delettres qui a suivi,eût étédépourvude
sens si les deux chefs d'Etat n'avaient pas été decet avis et n'avaient pas convaincus que
l'erreurtechnique quecomportaitl'accorddevaitêtrerectifiée séancetenante.
2. Lacontestationparle Nigériade la validité dela déclaration
7. Que dit leNigéria en réponsà cette définitionclaire et précise dupremiersegment dela
frontièremaritime, consacréepar la déclaration de Maroqui témoigne de l'accordconclupar les
deuxchefsd7Etat àce sujet? LeNigériaplaidetout simplementque legénéral Gowone,ntant que
chef d7Etatdu Nigériaen 1975, n'avait pas compétencepour conclure un accord international
obligatoire avec le Cameroun sans l'accord du conseil militaire suprême. Examinoncet aspect
d'unpeuplus près.
8.M. Brownlie,dans sa plaidoirie du 1" mars 2002 devant la Cour (CR 200219,par. 101),
soutientque la déclarationde Maroua
((neliait pasjuridiquement le Nigériacar, aux termes de la constitutionde 1963 qui
était alors en vigueur, le généralGowon n'avait pas le pouvoir d'engager son gouvernement sans l'approbation du conseil militaire suprêmequi constituait le
Gouvernementnigérian.Les texteslégislatifspertinentsque l'administrationmilitaire
a adoptésen 1966 et 1967 n'ont pas abrogéla constitution de 1963 et plusieurs de
leurs dispositions renvoienà la constitutionde 1963en tant que Grundnorm(norme
fondamentale).))
9.Monsieurleprésident, rienne permetd'affirmerqu'il s'agitlà d'une descriptionexactedu
pouvoirduchef d'Etatnigérian àl'époque;en effet, laCoura certainementrelevéque M.Brownlie
ne mentionnenulle part les dispositions spécifiquesde laconstitutionde 1963,telle que modifiée
par la suite par les décretsdu gouvernementmilitaire, qui sont à la base de son argumentation.
A cet égard, le Cameroun se permet de rappeler à la Cour la partie de la plaidoirie de
M. Mendelson d'hieraprès-midi,dans laquelle celui-cia attiré l'attention sdesextraitspertinents
de l'annexeMC 275 du mémoire duCameroun, extraitsqu'il adu reste inclus dans le dossierdes
juges sousla cote 13015. Unde ceux-cirévèleque les autoritésnigérianes ont, en 1985,reçu d'un
fonctionnaire de haut niveau du ministère fédérad le lajustice l'avis juridique catégoriqselon
lequel le motif invoqué parle Nigériapourrejeter la déclarationde Maroua étaitindéfendable en
droit international.
3. La prétenduedispositionde la constitutionnigérianeentréeen vigueurle le' juin 1975
interdisant auchef de 1'Etatde déclarer leNigérialié parun traitésans l'accord du
conseilmilitairesuprême
10.Monsieur le président, depuisla plaidoirie de M. Brownlie, le 1" mars, le Cameroun a
effectué des recherches complémentaires sur la situation au 1" juin 1975 au regard de la
constitution,en ce qui concerne le pouvoirdu chef d'Etatde l'époque (quiétaiten mêmetemps le
présidentdu conseilmilitaire suprêmed )econcluredesaccords internationauxsansl'accordformel
dudit conseil. La constitutionnigériane originalede1963conféraitauprésident le pouvoir exécutif
dans la fédération(art. 84). Ce pouvoir exécutifenglobaittoutes les questions au sujet desquelles
le parlementétait habiliàépromulguerdeslois (art. 85). Un conseil des ministresde la fédération
avait pour fonction de conseiller le président(art. 89). Hormis certaines exceptions sans rapport
avec ce qui nous occupe ici, le président était tede suivre l'avis de son conseildes ministres
(art93). Sauf erreur, le Cameroun n'a pas relevél'existence,dans la constitution de 1963,d'une
dispositionspécifique limitant directementle pouvoirduprésidentde conclure,aunom duNigéria,
des traitésavec d'autresEtats. 11. Tout cela a évidemmentétéradicalement modifiéen 1966, après l'instauration du
gouvernement fédéram l ilitaire. Le décretno1 de ce gouvernement,datédu 17janvier 1966,
a abrogé expressémenltes articles 84, 85, 89 et 93 de la constitution de 1963, c'est-à-dire les
dispositions queje viens de mentionner. Le texte de la constitutionnigérianede 1963, du décret
no1du 17janvier 1966et du décretno28 de 1970,auxquelsje reviendraidans un instant, sontdes
documents publics,et le Camerouns'étonnequele Nigérian'aitpasjugé utilede fournir à la Cour
des copies de ces documents constitutionnelset d'autres sur lesquels il tente de s'appuyer. Nous
t 035:
croyons savoir que le Nigéria adéposé auprès dela Cour un exemplairedu décretde 1975relatif
aux dispositionsfondamentalesde laconstitution,mais ce texte n'est paspertinent. En effet, bien
qu'il ait un effet rétroactif,cet effet ne remonte pas jusqu'à la signature de la déclaration de
Maroua. Le paragraphe 1 de l'article 8 du décretno1 précisait quele Nigériaétaitdotéd'un
conseil militaire suprêmeet d'un conseilexécutiffédéral.Le paragraphe 2 de I'article8 fixait la
composition du conseil militaire suprêmeet en confiait la présidenceau chef du gouvernement
fédéral militaire. Le paragraphe 3 de l'article8 prévoyait quele conseil exécutif fédéral serait
composéen grande partie des mêmes personnes mais qu'il ne comprendraitpas les gouverneurs
militairesdes régions duNigériaseptentrional,oriental, occidental etdu centre-ouest. L'annexe2
au décret no1 de 1966 déclareen son paragraphe 2 que((toute mention du présidentou du
premier ministre,ou du présidentou du premierministre agissantsur avis d'unepersonne ou d'un
organe quelconque, doit êtreinterprétéecomme désignantle chef du gouvernement fédéral
militaire)). Cettedisposition doit être lue conjointement avecle paragraphe 1 de l'article 7 du
décretno1, qui préciseque «[l]epouvoir exécutifde la Républiquefédérale du Nigéria appartient
au chef du gouvernement fédéram l ilitaire et peut être exerpar lui soit directement, soitpar
l'intermédiaire depersonnesoud'autorités qui lus iont subordonnées..» [Traductiondu Greffe.]
12. Les choses sont rendues plus complexes encore du fait de l'existence de deux autres
décrets de 1967 : le décret portant suspension et modification de la constitution de 1967
(décret no8 de 1967)'et le décret portant abrogationet rétablissementde la constitutionde 1967
(décretno13 de 1967). Ce dernierdécretest publiédans le recueil de Blaustein et Flanz intitulé
Constitutionsof Countriesof the World(1972). Il me suffitde me référer au secondde ces décrets,
à savoir le décretno13de 1967,puisque, grâceau ciel sansdoute pour tous ceux d'entrenous quisont concernés,le premier,à savoir le décretno8 de 1967,a été abrogéL . e décretno13 de 1967a
eu pour effetde rétablirlasituation constitutionnelle crear la constitutionde 1966et les décrets
modificatifs nos 1 à 10 (je me permets de signaler en passant que j'ai épargné à la Cour la
description des décretsno" à 10, puisque, en substance, ils sont sans intérêt ans le présent
contexte). L'effet du décret no13 de 1967 étaitde conférerle pouvoir législatifet exécutifau
conseil exécutiffédéraelt non au conseil militaire suprême. laustein etFlanz,àquinous devons
le recueil quej'ai cité, concluentque le décreto13 de 1967a effectivementretiréle pouvoir au
conseil militaire suprêmeet l'a rendu au conseilexécutiffédéralc,ommele prévoyaitl'article 12
du décretno1de 1966.
13. Enfin (et je prie ici la Cour de m'excuser pour la complexitéde cet exposésur la
situation constitutionnelle du Nigéria pendant cette période mouvementé dee son histoire), j'en
viens au décretde 1970consacrantlaprimautéet les pouvoirsdu gouvernement militairefédérali;l
s'agit du décretno28 de 1970, quej'ai déjàcité. Il avait pour effet de rendre impossible endroit
tout contrôlejuridictionnel de la constitutionnadesmesuresprises parlegouvernementmilitaire
fédéral. Toutefoisl,e paragraphe 1 de l'article premier de ce décretconfirmeson préambuleet le
déclarepartie intégrantedu décret;le premier paragraphedu préambuleénonce solennellement ce
qui suit:
((Considérantquela révolution militairequi a eu lieu le 15janvier 1966et qui a
été suivied'une autre révolutionle 29 juillet 1966a effectivementmis fin àl'ordre
juridique existant alors au Nigéria,sauf pour ce qui a étépréservépar le décret
de 1966(no 1)portantprimautéet amendementde laconstitution...)) [Traduction du
Grefe.1
Il s'agià l'évidencedu décretno1du gouvernement militairefédéralde 1966. Par conséquent,il
semble que ce décretde 1970 a eu pour effet de rétablir,autant que nécessaire,la situation
constitutionnelle telle qu'elle existait en vertu du décret 1 promulguépar le gouvemement
fédéral militairlee 17janvier 1966,dontj'ai fait état précédemment (vopar.8 ci-dessus).
14. S'agissant de la situation constitutionnelleextrêmementcomplexe instauréeau Nigéria
à partir du 1"juin 1975,l'interprétationdu Cameroun estque, en vertu du décretno1 promulgué
par le gouvemement fédéralmilitaire en 1966, le chef de ce gouvemement pouvait agir dans
l'exercicedu pouvoir quiétait lesien de concluredes traitéssans l'avis formel de quelque organe
que ce soit, compris duconseil militaire suprême.4. La questionde savoir si le Nigériapeut invoquerl'article46 de la convention de Vienne
surle droit des traitédansles conditionsactuelles
15.En tout étatde cause,je tienà rassurerla Cour: ellen'aura pasàse prononcerde façon
définitivesur l'interprétation de dispositionsaussi ésotériqueset obscures que celles de la
ConstitutionduNigériaquiétaienten vigueur au 1"juin 1975. Comme laCour le sait, l'article46
de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traitésénonce,en des termes négatifs, larègle
fondamentaleconcernantla compétence pour concluredestraités.La dispositionest la suivante
«Le fait que le consentementd'un Etatà êtreliépar un traitéa étexpriméen
violation d'une disposition de son droit interne concernant la compétence pour
concluredes traitésnepeut êtreinvoqué parcet Etat commeviciant sonconsentement,
àmoins que cette violation n'ait été manifese anifeste]et ne concerneune règlede
son droitinterne d'importance fondamentale.))
Le paragraphe 2 du mêmearticle dispose que : ((une violation est manifeste si elle est
objectivement évidentepour tout Etat se comportant en la matière conformément à la pratique
habituelle etdebonne foi)).
16. Cela dit,à supposer mêmepour l'instant que M.Brownlie ait peut-être raisondans
l'analyse qu'il faitde I'applicabilitéen 1975 de la Constitution de 1963 (applicabilité quele
Camerounnie absolument),il ne s'ensuit bienévidemmentpasque le Nigériaest fondé à invoquer
l'article46 de la conventionde Vienne pour invaliderle consentementinconditionneldonnépar le
généraG l owon à la déclarationde Maroua. La question est en fait de savoir si la prétendue
violationdes dispositions du droit internedu Nigéria concernantla compétencepour concluredes
traitésétait ((manifesteaux yeux du présidentdu Cameroun au moment de la signature de la
déclarationde Maroua. Monsieur leprésident,tout le monde sait que l'onne peut attendre d'un
ressortissant d'un Etat, quel que soit son rang, qu'il connaisseparfaitement la législationet la
pratique constitutionnelle d'un autre Etat. M.Brownlie semble en avoir conscience puisqu'il
consacre un certain temps àtenter de montrer que M. Ahidjo,le présidentdu Cameroun, devait,
en 1975, êtreau courant des limites constitutionnellesdansle cadre desquellesle général owon
exerçaitson autorité. Malheureusement,M. Brownlie vendlamèchelorsqu'ilcite le paragraphe3
de lalettre envoyéele 23 août 1974au présidentAhidjopar le général Gowon,neuf mois environ
avantla déclaration deMaroua. M. Brownlie soutientque cette lettre «revêt ne très fortevaleur
probante))(CR200219, p. 37, par. 104). Pour une fois, je suis d'accord. C'est surla dernière phrase de cette citation queje voudrais particulièrement attirervotre attention. Elle se lit comme
sui: «JYaitoujours cru que nous pourrions réexaminer tous lesdeux ensemble la situation et
parvenir sur cette questioà une décision judicieuseet acceptable.)) (LegénéraGl owon fait ici
allusion aux problèmessoulevéspar les documentsétablispar les experts le 4 avril 1971 sur la
suite du tracé de la frontimaritime.) Le généraG l owon dit donc ici au président Ahidjoque
l'un et l'autre devraient réexaminer ensemblela situation, et il est convaincu qu'ensemble le
généraelt le président pourraientadopter une décisionsur la question qui serait acceptablepour
l'un et l'autre. Pasquestion ici d'une approbation ultérieure ou distinctedu ((Gouvernement
nigérian)). La déductionlogique -et mêmela seule déductionlogique- à en tirer est que le
généraGl owon laisse entendreau président Ahidjoqu'ils pourraientréglerle problème euxdeux
038 (cela se passe six mois seulementavant le débutde la réunion deMaroua, fixéau 30 mai 1975).
Ainsi,même si legénéraG l owon avaitvioléune dispositiondu droit internenigérian concernantla
compétencepour concluredestraités, cetteviolationn'étaitcertainement pas((manifeste))auxyeux
du présidentAhidjo. Elle nepouvait tout simplementpas être((manifeste))étantdonnél'opacité
des dispositionsconstitutiomelles relatiàela conclusionde traités au Nigéràal'époque(si tant
est d'ailleurs qu'il yeût de telles dispositions), étantdonnéaussi que le génél owon laisse
entendredans sa lettre du3août 1974que les deuxchefs dYEtat pouvaientréglerla difficulté.En
effet, la dernière phrasedu paragraphe3 de la lettre du général Gowopeut quasiment êtrelue
comme incitant le présidentAhidjo à penser que le généraG l owon serait prêt à accepter un
compromisraisonnablesur letracédelaligne.
5. Ladéclarationde Marouane contientpasdedispositionsurla ratification
17. La Cour constateraen outreque la partienigériane n'a pas proposà, Maroua,que soit
intégréeàla déclarationunedispositionprévoyantqueladite déclaration seratatifiéeetn'entrerait
en vigueur qu'à la suitede l'échange d'instruments de ratification. S'ilt eu véritablementun
obstacleconstitutionnel,ousi le Nigériaavait souhaitéavoir l'occasiond'examinerplusloisir les
effets de la déclarationde Maroua, une telle dispositionaurait constituéune précaution naturelle.
Mais l'onn'a pas priscetteprécaution. 18. Dans ce contexte, Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs de la Cour, j'ai été
légèrement Gchépar la façondont M. Brownlietronque parfois ses citations. La citationtronquée
a eu l'effet trompeur maximumavec l'article7 de la conventionde Vienne sur le droit destraités,
dans lequel M. Brownlieometcertains mots qui ne cadrent pas bien avec l'argumentqu'il défend.
Par opposition à la version tronquéecitée par M.Brownlie dans sa plaidoirie sur ce sujet, le
paragraphe 2a) de l'article de la conventionde Viennese lit en faitcomme suit :
((2.En vertu de leurs fonctionset sans avoià produirede pleins pouvoirs,sont
considéréscommereprésental neturEtat:
a) Les chefs d'Etat, les chefs de gouvernement et les ministres des affaires
étrangères,pourtousles actesrelatifsàla conclusiond'untraité.))
Je répète:((pourtous les actes relatifàla conclusion d'un traité):ce sont lesmots qui ontsauté
dansla citation faitepar M. Brownlie. Or,parmi les actes relatifsla conclusiond'un traitéfigure
nécessairement l'expressiondu consentementde 1'Etat à êtreliépar ledit traité. Il n'est doncpas
r O toutà fait exactde soutenir, commele faitM. Brownlie (CR2002/9,par. 110)'que l'article7 de la
convention de Vienne ((viseuniquementla manière d'établirla fonction d'une personneen qualité
de représentantd'un Et&». L'article traite aussi,du moins jusqu'à un certain point, de l'étendue
despouvoirs de laditepersonne,et I'onconstateraqu'un chefd'Etatdoit être considére énvertude
ses fonctions commereprésentant sonEtat auxfins de tous les actes relatifs à la conclusion d'un
traité,y compris l'expressiondu consentementde I'Etatintéressé a être lipar le traité.L'article7
doit bien sûr êtrelu en liaison avec l'article46. Mais il n'est pas sans intérêdte constater,dans le
contexte particulierde la présente affaire, que,dans le commentaire de ce qui est aujourd'hui
l'article46 de la convention de Vienne, la Commission du droit international avait expressément
rejetél'idéeque desdispositionsde droit internelimitant le pouvoir dont sontinvestis desorganes
de 1'Etat pour signer un traitépuissent rendre annulable un consentement donné au niveau
internationalenviolationd'unerestriction constitutionnelleLaCommissiona déclaré :
«Si I'on devait admettrece point de vue, il s'ensuivraitque les autres Etatsne
pourraient pas fairefond sur le pouvoird'engager1'Etatque possèdentapparemment,
aux termes de l'article [7], les chefsd7Etat,premiers ministres, ministresdes affaires
étrangèrese,tc.; ils devraientvérifier pareux-mêmesd, ans chaque cas, qu'il n'y a pas
de violation des dispositions de la constitution de l'autreEtat, ou courir le risque de
constater ensuite que le traité est nul.)) (Annuaire de la Commission du droit
international, 1966,vol.II, p. 262.) 19.On constateradonc que la Commissiondu droit international-qui estàl'originede la
version finale des projets d'articlessur le droit des traités,c'est-à-dire du texte de base qui sera
examiné a la conférencede Viennesur le droit des tra-téétait certaineque l'on ne devraitpas
beaucoup s'écarterde la règlenégative énoncédeésormaisau paragraphe 1 de l'article46 de la
conventionde Vienne.
6. La capacitédu Nigéria àconcluredestraités à l'époquepertinente
20. Monsieur le président,il faut bien constater que la constitution nigériane,mêmeaprès
avoir étéamendée parle décretno1 du 17janvier 1966, ne dit absolument rien quanà la façon
dont 1'Etatdoit exercer sa capaciàéconclure des traités. De toute évidence,ce n'étaitpas au
conseil militaire suprême, tant que collectivité,qu'il appartenaitd'exercer ce pouvoir,puisque
ce conseil étaitconstituédefonctionnairesnommés,détenteursde douzehautes fonctionsde7Etat,
dont le caractère était essentiellement mils,i je puis dire. Les membres du conseil militaire
suprêmedevaient-ils êtrtous tenus collectivement responsablesde la façon dontle Nigériagérait
ses relations internationa?eA qui les ambassadeurs étrangersprésentaient-ils leurslettres de
840 créanceà leur arrivée dans lacapitalenigériane durantcettepér?odAucune réponse n'a encore
été donnée à ces questions, ni à celles qu'a posées M.Tomuschat le 25 février
(CR 200216,p. 23-24, par. 15-16).
21. Je comprends parfaitementque cette question metterownlie mal àl'aise. Il existe
dans la langueanglaise un proverbe qu'ilconnaît sûrement et qui dit qu'«on ne peut pas faire de
briques sans paille)) (son équivalentfrançais sera«à l'impossible nul n'est tenu»).On a
malheureusement assignéà M.Brownliela tâche de construireune argumentation imposante sans
l'aide d'un seul fétu depaille. Aucune preuvedigne de foine permet d'établirque la constitution
empêchait le général owon se rendantàMaroua, à la findumois de mai 1975,en qualitéde chef
du gouvernement militaire fédéraelt de présidentdu conseil militaire suprême,d'exprimer le
consentement du Nigériaà êtreliépar un instrument conventionneltel que l'accord correspondant
à la déclaration de Maroua.En outre, mêmesi laConstitutionle lui interdisait,il est parfaitement
clair qu'en signant la déclarationde Maroua au nom du Nigéria,il ne commettait pas deviolation
«manifeste»des dispositionsdu droit internenigérianrelatiàela compétencepour conclure des traitéspuisqu'en 1975,laposition adoptée parlaconstitutionduNigéàice sujet était,au basmot,
extrêmemenc tonfuse et opaque. On pouvait difficilements'attendree que le président Ahidjo
duCameroun fûtmieux informéde cesquestionsque le généraGl owon lui-même.
22. Fairevaloir la nullitéde l'accordinternationalcorresponàala déclarationde Maroua
du le'juin 1975et du communiquéconjointqui l'accompagnaitau motif que ces instruments n'ont
jamais été ratifiés palre conseil militaire suprême,c'est égalementun argument dénuéde tout
fondement. Aucunde ces instrumentsne stipulaitque leur entréeen vigueur étaitsubordonnéà
un échange d'instrumentsde ratification. En conséquence,en vertu du droit des traités, ces
instruments appartenaienà la catégorie bienconnue des ((traitésen forme simplifiée)) qui,sauf
disposition contraire du traitélui-même, entn vigueur aumoment de leur signature. Le droit
des traités n'énonce pade règle supplétivej,e dis bien, pas de règle supplétiveimposant la
ratificationuntraitéquin'est pas expressémentoumis àratification. Sinon,toute cettenotionde
«traité en forme simplifiée)) -un outil très utile pour les relations internationales
contemporaines- disparaîtrait purement et simplement et la communauté internationaleserait
privée d'un précieux moyede conclure rapidementdes traités.
0 4 1 7. Le rapport entreles questions relativeàla frontière maritime et les questionselativeà
la frontièreterrestre
23. Aprèsavoir examiné ceque M. Brownlieavait à diresur le tracéde la frontièremaritime
jusqu'au point,je vais passeà cequeM. Crawfordavait àdire sur le mêmesujet, commeilnous
l'a exposéle6 mars. Ce matin-là,M. Crawforda consacréune partie de sa plaidoiàila relation
entreles questionsqui onttraita frontièremaritimeet cellesqui onttràla frontièreterrestre;il
a présentéà cette occasion un certain nombre de propositions que l'on pourrait qualifier de
singulières. Plusieurs de mescollèguesont d'ailleurs déjàfait quelques brefs commentàices
sujet. Je dois vous dire qu'alorsqueje réfléchisàala manièred'y répondreà mon tour,je ne
pouvais m'empêcher de penser à un échangequi eut lieu à la Chambre des communes - la
Chambre des communes britannique - entre Sheridan, le célèbre dramaturge anglaisqui fut
ministre dans l'un des nombreux gouvernements qui siégèràtLondres à la fin du XVIIIesiècle,
et son adversaire politique de l'époque,un certainDundas. En réponse à un discours de M.
Dundas particulièrement critiquàson égard, Sheridanaurait dit ce qui su:«M. Dundas peut remercier sa mémoirede luirappeler autantde plaisanteries,et son imagination,de produireautant
de faits)). Je n'ai rienire- vraimentrien - sur les plaisanteries deM. Crawford, maisje ne
peux que rendre hommage à son imagination pour les prétendus«faits» qu'il invoque et sur
lesquelsil prétendse fonder. Ainsi, M. Crawfordaffirmesansrougir que«les Partieà la présente
affairen'ontpas seulementconsidéré lesquestionsde délimitationmaritimecommesecondaires -
pour autant qu'elles lesaient même traité-, mais [qu'elles]les ont mêmeconsidérées comme
distinctes,les découplantdu litige relàtla presqu'îlede Balcassi))(CR2002112,par. 13). Mais
c'est tout bonnementfaux. Le Cameroun étaitdisposé ànégocieravec le Nigéria le tracéde la
frontière maritime endirectiondu large partir dupoint terminal situédans l'estuairede la rivière
Akwayafé,tel qu'il estdéfinià l'article 22 de l'accord du 11mars 1913,mais uniquement si les
parties convenaient defairepartir la frontièrede ce point précis. Le Nigériaa bel etbien accepté,
au début des années soixante-dix,qulea frontièremaritimeversle largeparte de cepoint précis;le
Cameroun l'a amplement répété et démontré dans ses écritures. Selon toute apparence,
M. Crawford n'a pas écoutéles plaidoiries de mes collèguesMM.Mendelson et Thouvenin,
le 22 février(CR200215,p. 18-33). Jevous renvoieen particulieràl'exposéde M. Thouvenin,de
cejour-là, parcequ'il insistesur les conséquencesqu'impliquepour la délimitationmaritime lefait
que le Nigériaa reconnu la validitéde l'accordnglo-allemanddu 11mars 1913. A cet égard,je
souligneraiune fois de plus la teneur de la note no570 en date du 27 mars 1962,par laquelle le
I 042
Nigéria reconnaît expressément quela frontière, lorsqu'elle approchede la -erje cit- «suit
le cours inférieurde la rivière Akwa-yafés,ans le moindre doute, puis elle débouche surl'estuaire
de la CrossRiver». La Cour elle-même, dans son arrê dut 11 juin 1998 sur les exceptions
préliminairesdu Nigéria, rappelleque les deux Etats onttentéà maintes reprises, avec plus ou
moins de succès,de définirla limite maritimeen direcriondu largàpartir du point terminalde la
frontière terrestre, qui a étéfixédans l'estuaire de la rivière Akwayafépar l'accord
du 11mars 1913(voir C.I.J.Recueil 1998,arrêt,p. 301-302, par. 52-53). Cette successiondefaits
nous montreque la délimitationde la frontièremaritime entreles deux Etatsprogressait lentement
mais sûrement jusqu'au moment où, en 1978, à l'occasion d'une réunion à Jos, le Nigériaa
soudainementannoncé qu'il dénonçalia t déclarationde Marouaqui remontaitàpeine àtrois ans. 24. Cela dit, Monsieurle président,je ne donne pas toàtM. Crawfordlorsqu'il déclareque
«lesnégociationsrelatives àla frontièrecôtièredans les années1970 ont portéessentiellementsur
desquestionsd'accèsmaritime))(CR2002112,p. 62); mais s'ilen est ainsi, c'est uniquementparce
que,jusqu'à la dénonciation unilatéralpear le Nigéria dela déclarationde Maroua, en 1978, les
deuxEtats s'accordaientpour prolonger la frontière côtière vele largeà partir du point terminal
de laligne établiepar l'accord du1mars 1913.
25. M. Crawford tente en toute innocence, apparemment,de dissocier le différend surle
maintiende la validitéde ladéclaration deMarouadu différendrelatif au titre sur la presqu'îlede
Bakassi; c'est ce qui ressort de manière flagrante du nouvel argument qu'il avance dans sa
plaidoirie du 6 mars, à savoir que «la conduite des Parties n'est compréhensibleque si l'on
considèreles deux questions comme distinctes))(CR 2002t12,par. 15). Les deux questionsdont
parleM. Crawfordsont à l'évidencel'octroi de permis d'exploitationpétrolièr, 'une part, et, de
l'autre, le différend relaàiBakassi. Mais il va de soi que la conduite des Parties en ce qui
concerneles concessionspétrolières dans la zone situéeau sud de Bakassi, dont M. Pellet vous a
parléce matin, s'explique d'elle-même dès lorsque l'on considèreque le Nigéria,jusqu'à 1978
aumoins, n'avait jamais remis en cause le titre camerounais sur Bakassi, pas plus qu'il n'avait
contestéla validitéde la déclarationdeMaroua;tel est entout cas le point de vuedu Cameroun.
26. Monsieur le président, j'ai encoredeux brèvesobservations à formuler concernant la
positiondu Nigériasur la délimitationmaritimejusqu'au pointG. La premièreest que, mêmesi le
I 043
Nigériaa fondé toute sathèse juridiquesur la prétendue invalidide la déclarationde Maroua, il
n'a apparemment pas contesté formellement la validité dlea déclarationde Yaoundé II. Cette
déclaration, adoptéepar les deux chefs dYEtatle 14 avril 1971 à Yaoundé,fixe le tracéde la
frontièrecôtièredu point terminal situédans l'embouchurede larivièreAkwayafé,tel que fixé par
l'article 22 du traitéanglo-allemand,jusqu'au point 12. Or, la nouvelle ligne que le Nigéria
propose pour la délimitation maritimeà proximitéde la côte et qu'il faitpartir du Rio del Rey
signifieimplicitement que leNigériadénonceégalementla validitéde la déclarationde Yaoundé
II, et c'est pourquoi le Cameroun démentla prétendue invaliditde cet instrument conventionnel.
Le Camerouns'appuie àcet effet sur les moyens dedroit qu'il a continuellementinvoqués,dans
sesécriturescommedans ses plaidoiries,pour démontrerque la déclarationdeMaroua est toujours valide, car il estime que ces moyens s'appliquentmutatis mutandisdès lorsquela validitéet le
maintiende l'applicabilité de ladéclarationde YaoundéII sontleur tour implicitementremisen
cause.
27. Mon second pointest que le Camerounne trouve aucunfondementjuridique, quel qu'il
soit,à l'appui dela nouvelle ligne partant d'un point situédans le Rio del Rey que le Nigéria
revendiquepour la délimitation maritime proximitéde la côte. Les premiers spécialistesqui ont
tracéla frontière,il y a environcent quinzeans, ont unanimementrejeté l'de situer le pointde
départà cet endroit lorsqu'ilsont découvertque le Rio del Rey ne faisait pas partie d'un système
fluvialprenant sa sourcel'intérieurducontinent. Laligne revendiquéepar leNigériaest d'autant
plus invraisemblableque sontracéen directiondu large suivrait l'orientation apparemmentdonnée
par un prétendubanc de sable,que leNigériaaffirmeavoir découvertmais quine figuresuraucune
carteofficiellede larégionautres quelessiennes.
28. Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, j'en ai terminé. Je vous
demanderai de bien vouloir maintenant,ou peut-êtreaprèsla pause-café,appeler àla barre mon
collègueM. Kamto, qui vous présentera,pour ce secondtour deplaidoiries l'exposédu Cameroun
sur lafrontièremaritimeau-delàdupoint G.
Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie beaucoup,sir Ian. La Cour suspendsa séancepourune
dizainede minutes.
L'audienceestsuspenduede II h25 à II h 35.
Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. Je donne maintenant la parole au doyen
MauriceKamto,au nom de laRépubliqueduCameroun.
f- 044 Mr. KAMTO:
IX. THE SECONDMARITIMESECTOR
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, 1should like to make some observations on
Nigeria's statements regardingthe equitableine proposed and claimed by Cameroon. They will
coverfourpoints:
(1) 1shallbegin withsomepreliminaryremarksonNigeria'soralpleadings onthis subject; (2) 1shall then showthat the premises of Nigeria's reasoningare false and that, consequently,its
conclusionsareinevitably falseas well;
(3) Next 1shall speakaboutthemethod of constructionofCameroon'sclaim linein order to show
why itis equitable;
(4) In conclusion, 1shall explainwhy the Court must reject Nigeria's claimsand why it should
allowthose of Cameroon.
1. Somepreliminaryremarks on Nigeria's ora plleadings
2. To begin with,somepreliminaryremarks,three in fact:
(1) Nigeria rebutsCameroon's reasoningnotbyargumentbut by incantation;
(2) Secondly,Nigeria has conjuredup a theoryof "exclusion" delimitationin order to concealits
aims;
(3) Thirdly, the sole objective of the Nigerian negotiations is the conquest of new maritime
temtories.
A. Incantationisnot argument
3. Mr. President, Nigeria has a very curious way of challenging Cameroon's arguments.
Cameroon's "treatment" of the islands? Nigeria's counsel find it "irrational"'; the method of
constructing the line? "~ar-fetcher2 and even "bi~arre"~because it is "the product of a fertile
I 4) 4 5 imaginati~n"~; the equitable solution proposed by Cameroon? "~xtrava~ant"~and "fanciful'";
Cameroon's positionon the oil concessions? "~bsurd"'; and Carneroon's pleadings, bothwritten
and oral? "~anciful"~again, naturally. The question is not whether fkomtime to time a party is
entitled to use a particular word todescribe some particular argumentof its opponents which it
considers inadequate. None ofthesewords istaboo, andthere have doubtlessbeeninstanceswhere
'CR2002113p , 33,para. 24,Mr.Abi-Saab.
21bid p.,0,para.54.
31bid p.,4,para.71.
4~bid p.,0,para.58.
'lbid p.,5,para.77.
6~bid p.,8,para. 88.
'CR2002112p , . 56,para. 1,Mr.Crawford.
'CR2002114p , .65,para. 2, Mr.Abdullahi,AgentofNigeria. counselfor Cameroonhave seenfit to employone ofthem. The objection stemsfiom the factthat
here systematic recourseto this kind of languageis madeto serve as a process of reasoning. It is a
novel processof "reasoning", based onthe beliefthat the opponent's argumentscanbe sweptaway
by a mere litany of words, by nomore than the endlessrepetition of certain adjectives. Thisis a
incantation,Mr. President,but itis not argument, becauseit proves nothing.
4. It is inherentin contentious proceedingsthat theparties' argumentsdiverge,because atthe
heart of every disputethere is a conflictof legal interests. But is does not sufficefor one partyto
describethe other's argumentsas "fanciful", "far-fetched","irrational", "extravagant", "bizarre" or
"absurd" in order to prove its case. It must still demonstrate legally the relevance of its own
arguments in order to invalidate those of its opponent. Nigeria is far fiom having done this, as 1
shall showin a moment.
B. Thetheory of"delimitationbyexclusion"
5.Accordingto Nigeria, the maritime delimitationline proposed by Cameroonfiom pointG
onwardsis an "exclusion linem9 designed to put Nigeriaout of the running, to excludeit fiom any
subsequent delimitationin the Gulf of ~uinea". But who is excluding whom? And from what?
Surelytalking of "exclusion" meansthat theNigerian approach tothe maritime zonein questionis
in keepingwith the "carve-up" approachit ascribesto Cameroon, andnot the delimitationapproach
maintained by the Applicant? Nigeria's insistencethat Cameroon should indicate the maritime
I
zone which it claims suggests the same thing too. For Nigeria wants to be in charge of the
carve-up,wants to knowwhat fallsto each Statein thezone,and doubtlessdecidewho getswhat.
6. The true problem is not therefore that the line proposed by Cameroon is legally and
technically debatable- indeed Nigeria's counsel said last Thursday that his criticisms addressed
"the actualpremises" ofthe line "rather thanits detailsandprecise path""; the problemis not even
that this line is not equitable. The only real problem is that it would exclude Nigeria from
boundary contacts with the other States in the Gulf of Guinea. This may well be a geostrategic
concem, conceivedinthe abstract and projectedont0the entire region,but it is no kind of legal,or
9~~ 2002113,p.30,para. 5, Mr.Abi-Saab;ibid.,p. 70,para.64, Mr. Crawford.
'Olbid.p.30, para.8, Mr. Abï-Saab.
"lbid., p. 29, para.3. even factual, argument. Because the mere fact of expressingthis concern does not tell us what
other Statein the Gulf of GuineaNigeriabelievesit essentialto have a maritimeboundarycontact
with, nor what legal reasons there are to justiQ its having one. At al1events, if there is any
exclusion - but Cameroondoes not see what the exclusion is,or what it is from, or by whomit is
done- itwouldbe the work of the lawand notthe decisionofCameroon.
C.The purposeofNigeria's maritime negotiations:maritimeconquest
7. Nigeria has concealed reasons for condemning whatit calls an "exclusion7y delimitation
and setting itself up as would-be guardian ofthe interests of Equatorial Guineaand Sao Tomeand
Principe: under cover of protecting the rights of these countriesin the maritime zone concemed,
what Nigeria is really seeking to preserve is the maritime conquests it has achieved at their
expense.
8. As my eminent colleague and fiiend ProfessorPelletpointed out in his statementin the
firstr~und'~,Nigeria, which is now clamouring for the application of a pure, strict and totally
unadjusted equidistance approach, did not agree to its application in any of the bilateral
delimitationswhich it effected either with EquatorialGuineaor with Sao Tome and Principe. In
both casesit rejected the equidistanceline in favourof a differentline which sanctifiedthe "oil fait
accompli"- a line far more favourable to it- to the detrimentof the other States concemed.
Cameroonrepeatsthat the treatieswhichNigeriasucceededinconcludingwith thosetwo Statesare
O not opposableto it, that it is not a party to them, and that they simply remain events- disputed
events moreover - whosesole meritis to revealthe intentionsofthe otherStatesconcemedby the
delimitationin the Bight ofBiafra.
2. Thepremisesof Nigeria's reasoning arefalse andconsequentlyits conclusionsare
inevitablyfalse
9. 1now corne to the grounds of Nigeria's argumentregarding the construction of the line
proposed by Cameroon,or rather to what Nigeria's counselhascalled the "deconstniction" of this
line. In orderto undo somethingyou must havesolid tools ofthe right kind. Thisis not the case
here, eitheras regards the geographyin the Bightof Biafra,orthe configurationof the coastlinein
' 2 200216,pp.57-59. the Bight, or the status of the islands, in this instancetheir effect on the delimitation. On these
threepoints the premises of Nigeria's reasoning are false, and quite obviously its conclusionsare
inevitably false as well. Today, however, 1 shall confine myself to the first two points. My
distinguishedcolleague,ProfessorCrawford, criticizedCameroonlast Thursdayfor havingsaid too
much about Equatorial Guinea in its absence in the first round of pleadings (for reasons which 1
found difficult to understand,since he himself did not hesitate to refer abundantly to Equatorial
Guinea inhis statements!). 1will nevertheless followhis prudent advice and Cameroon willnot
addressthis aspectof the questionuntil ithas heard the interveningState.
A.The geographyof the Bightof Biafraandthe relevant area
10. Mr.President, Members of the Court, in the first round Nigeria tried to refashion the
geographyof the Bight of Biafrato suit the purposesof its argument. It thus constructeda theory
ofa dividinglineconsisting of a string ofislands,disclosedthe existenceoftwo island Statesin the
Bight and utterly confused the geographically precise notions of relevant area and areas to be
delimited, indefiance of the international jurisprudenceon this subject. 1 should like to take up
thesedifferentpoints in tum.
I 048 (a) Thetheoryof a dividingline consistingof a string of islands in the relevantarea-the
non-existenceof twoislandStatesin theBightofBiafra
11. Nigeria has discovered in the Bight of Biafia a dividing line consisting of a string of
islandswhich divides it into "two relevant areas, with the islands having two relevant frontages,
one to the east and one to the west"13. This diagonal line of islands, it said, constitutes an
"impervious ~creen"'~,which Carneroon has pierced, as though it were some kind of burglar.
[ProjectionmapNo. 137.1
12. What exactly are we talking about here, Mr.President? What we see is a geophysical
phenomenon which, millions of years ago, gave birth to a mountain range running through
Cameroon from north to south, from the Mandara Mountains in the extreme north to Mount
Cameroon on the Atlantic, and continuing, underwaterthat is, so as to give rise to the islands of
- --
1 3 ~2002113,p. 39, para.49,Mr.Abi-Saab.
I4lbip d3,9,para. 53.Bioko, Principe, Sao Tome and Anobon. The question is whether these mountains and islands
form a continuous chain, unbrokenhowever far apart its links are, which forms a kind of natural
"wall" ofwhich Nigeriaclaims to be the guardian.
13.Quite obviouslynot, Mr.President. Everythingdependson how closetwo mountainsor
4
two islandsare to eachother, or how far apart,in the contextof the relevant area andlorthe area to
be delimited. In Ourcase,the sting of islandsformingthe screenis claimedto consistof the island
of Bioko,the islands of Principe and Sao Tome, whichform the archipelagic State of Sao Tome
and Principe, and, further offshore from continental Gabon, the island of Anobon, which also
belongs toEquatorial Guinea.
14.The fact is, as the sketchnow on the screen (tab 137 in the judges' folder) shows, the
land mass of the islandof Principe is at theuter limit of the relevant area definedby Cameroon,
and the islands of Sao Tome and Anobon are even much further offshore than that. What this
relevant areareally contains for the purposes of the maritimedelimitationbetween Cameroon and
Nigeria is the islandof Bioko and a smallpart of the maritime space belonging tothe archipelagic
State of Sao Tome and Principe. Between these two elements there is no unity, either
geographical- sincemore than 200km separatesthe islandof Bioko fiom Principe - or of legal
status, and only the island of Bioko significantly affects the delimitation in the Bight of Biafra.
And sincean islandis not a sting of islands,it cannot inthis case formthe impewious wall which
Nigeria is attemptingto erect. That is the geography,thephysical reality. The line which cutsthe
Bight in two is geometry - but geometry which gives thelie to the geography, geometry which
refashionsnature.
15.The continentalplateauxand shelvesof the Gulfof Guineadisplayno geomorphological
featurewhich mightsuggestthe possibilityof some kindof fault line. But even if there were one,
an argumentof this naturebased onthe ideaof a tectonicline wouldbe irrelevant. Both Libya and
Tunisiatried to propoundargumentsof this kindbased onplate tectonicsand the geomorphological
characteristics of the continental shelf in theunisia/Lic base", but unsuccessfully. [End of
'%c. RJe.ort1982,paras52-61,andespecially57,para66.
?.,projection.] Once this dividing lineconsistingof a string of islands disappears, then equallyyou
losetwoof the threerelevant areaswhich Nigeria claimsto have identifiedin the Bight ofBiafra.
16.But theNigeriandiscoveriesarenot confinedto the insulardividingline. They havealso
enableditto focuson"two island Stateswhichare atthe heart oftheproblem"'6.
17.1 presume thatNigeria is not claiming thatEquatorial Guinea is an archipelagic State.
There is no way itcould come into that categoryunderthe MontegoBay Convention. Thereis no
such legal category as an "island State"; Nigeria seeks to draw legal conclusions from a
non-existentconcept.
18. Infact, althoughEquatorialGuineapossessesan island,Bioko, and an islet, Anobon, it
remains a continental State. The fact that France exercises sovereignty over various islands
throughoutthe worlddoesnot make it anarchipelagicState oran islandState.
Of the total area of Equatorial Guinea, which is some 28,000km2, Bioko accounts for
2,000 km' or so, representing7per centofthe temtory. The continental partof the countryalone,
Rio Muni,covers26,000km2,or more than90 per centof the totalarea ofthe country. Admittedly
Bioko is a fairly substantial island with a population of approximately 100,000, but we must
remember that, in the case conceming the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (United
Kingdorn/France),the Channel Islands had approximately 130,000inhabitants, even thoughtheir
area was smaller,and yetthe court of arbitrationrefusedto attributeto them the full effect claimed
by GreatBritain and decidedthat they were an enclave lying totally withinthe French continental
plateau.
19. The imprecise use by Nigeria of the terms "island" and "island State" and the
misconceptionsit gives rise to are not fortuitous. No one can believethat the distinguishedcounsel
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are unaware of the relevant provisions of the MontegoBay
Conventionon this subject. Their choiceof terminologyis part of an approachenabling Nigeria's
counsel to draw aradical legal conclusion fromthe presence of Bioko in the area to be delimited,
as 1 shallshow in a moment. First, though, 1 should like to demonstratethe mistaken nature,both
1 6 2002112,p.66,para27,Mr. Crawford. factuallyand legally,of the Nigerian conceptionof the relevant areaand the lengthof the relevant
coastlines.
(b) Relevant coastlines-relevant area-area to bedelimited
20. [Projectionmap No. 137.1According to Nigeria,the relevant coastline for the purposes
of the delimitationofthe maritime boundarybetween CarneroonandNigeria runs fromAkassoto a
point where the land boundary between thetwo countries ends in the estuary of the CrossRiver.
The two Parties therefore agree on what sector of the Nigerian coast has tobe taken into
consideration. Thisis not the case with the Camerooniancoast. In the view of Nigeria, theonly
sectorof coast relevant in the present case runs from the point wherethe land fi-ontierbetweenthe
two countries ends to DebundshaPoint north-eastof Bioko. The reason, accordingto Nigeria,is
that beyond DebundshaPoint "the course of the Cameroonian coastsouthwardsto the boundary
with Equatorial Guinea is ... blocked by the large island of ~ioko"". Nigeria's criticism of
Cameroon is not onlythat Carneroonincludesthispart of itscoastlinein what it considersto bethe
relevant area for theurposes of the delimitation,but "that it goes on to appropriateto itself the
entirecoastal façade of EquatorialGuinea, as wellas a goodpart ofthe coast oabo on"'^.
21. This description of the Cameroonian coast suggests that only a rectilinear or evenly
shaped and unindented coastlinecan be consideredto be a relevant coastline for the purposesof a
0 5 1 maritime delimitation. For, even before speakingof the blocking effect of the island of Bioko in
masking the south-eastem portion of the Camerooniancoastline fiom the Nigerian coastline,our
opponents explain that, as soon as one moves away fromthe rather narrow region where the two
coastlinesadjoin around Bakassi,"the Cameroonian coastundergoes a radical change of direction,
tuming sharply southwards". There certainly mustbe different conceptions of what constitutesa
"radical change" and a "sharp tum"! What is there in common between the sharp and radical
change in the Nigerian coast beyond Akasso and the curved shape of the Cameroonian coast,
whose only slight convexity [indicate this on the sketch on the screen] occurs only between
DebundshaPoint andNachtigalPoint?
"CR 2002113p, .33,para.22,Mr.Abi-Saab.
lslbid. 22. To exclude al1the rest of the Cameroonian coast,facing though it does the Bight of
Biafra and the relevant Nigeriancoast, on the pretext that it can only be taken into account at the
expenseof"piercing" the Bioko screen hasno convincinggeographicalbasis. France wouldnever
have had a maritime boundarywiththe UnitedKingdombeyondthe Channel Islandsif that kindof
argumenthadprevailed. Far frombeing a factor preventing maritimedelimitation,every maritime
formationsituated in the viciniv of a State'scoastline is a relevant circumstanceto be taken into
considerationin orderto achieve an equitableresult. Biokois in this situation in the present case,
and Cameroonhas takendue accountof itspresencein theproposed delimitation,as 1shaIlshow in
amoment [endof projectionandbeginningofprojectionofmap No. 1381.
23. As regards the relevant area (themap at present on the screen is at tab 138), Nigeria
claimsthat Cameroon doesnot seem "sureof its position"'9,and that it first definedthe area in the
form of a ccrectangle"in its Memorial,beforemoving on in its Reply to delimit it as a "triangular
aream2'.Cameroonis gratifiedthatNigeriahasfinally managedto read its Memorial, whichit filed
in 1995. Scantythoughmy knowledge of geometrymay be, 1 know ofno rectanglewhichhasonly
three sides. 1 Say this, Mr. President, in order to show that the broken line in the sketch on
I 0 5 2 page 544ofthe Memorialof Cameroon indicatedthe outer200nautical-mile limitof the exclusive
economic zone,as you can see on the sketchnow on the screen and shownto you very rapidlyby
Nigeria lastThursday [endof projection].
24. Let us, though, examine the Nigerian theory on the notion of relevant area in greater
detail. Nigeria dismisses the definition of the relevant area contained in Cameroon's written
pleadings21,but without offering a credible alternative. According toNigeria, "a relevant area is
determinedby, or is afunctionof,the relevantcoasts oftheparties to the delimitation; these coasts
arein turndefinedas 'adjacent'or '~~~osite"'~~.
25. Adjacent coasts, Mr.President, are coasts of two States which have a common land
boundary. Butthe notion of adjacency doesnotper se determine thelength of the relevant coasts.
191bid.,. 36, para.37.
'Olbid, .37, para.43.
2 ' ~2002113,pp.36-37,paras.40-43.
22~bid.,.38, para.45.In particular, it does not imply that account will only be taken of the coastlines closestto the end
point of the land boundary. Itis thegeneral configurationof the coastlinein the regionin which
the maritimedelimitationis being effectedwhichdeterminesthe length ofthe relevantcoasts. It is
Nigeria's unusual conception, to Say the least of it, of the relationship between the notion of
adjacency and the relevant coastwhich leads it to define a relevant zone"beginning in the region
where the Nigerian and Camerooniancoasts adjoineach otheron the horizontal leg ofthe triangle
inthe north ofthe Gulf ofGuinea",itsreason beinga changein directionofthe Camerooniancoast
beyond DebundshaPoint - or more precisely a "radical change", which, as 1have just shown,
doesnot in fact exist.
26. If it is the case that the Cameroonian coast does not radically change direction at
Debundsha, nothing prevents it from being taken into account al1the way to Campo. And if
Cameroon'srelevant coastdoes not stop at DebundshaPoint but at the boundary with Equatorial
Guinea or, as Cameroonshows, at Cap Lopezin Gabon, the relevant area defined by Nigeria- a
tiny stretchto the north ofBioko - disappearsautomatically. The two relevant areascreatedby a
non-existent dividingline disappear; the triangularrelevant area producedby a wronglyrelevant
coast disappears- and there is nothinglefi. There is somethingleft, though: the relevant areaas
defined by Cameroon in its Reply, and which it has no reason to alter brojection mapNo. 1391.
This area represents an area bounded by the actual coastlinefrom Akasso/Brasse in Nigeria to
CapLopez in Gabon,where it is closedoff by a straight linerunningthenceto AkassoinNigeria,a
linewhich correspondstowhat onemight cal1the natural lineclosingofftheBight ofBiafra.
27. And the relevant area as thus defined, which appears on the sketch-mapjust screened,
meets al1the geographicalcriteria enabling suchan area to be delimitedin the light ofthe practice
of international fora. It is, generally speaking,ageographicallyand hydrographicallyuniformarea
which takes account of al1the factors in the area concemed which might affect or influence the
proposed maritimedelimitation. Itslimits answerthat purposeand do not always coincidewith the
boundariesofthe States which the delimitationconcerns. TheBight of Biafrahas the geographical
and hydrographicalcharacteristicswhich 1havejust mentioned. The pronounced concavityof the
Atlantic coast in this areaakes it a homogeneousmaritime space whose delimitationis natural,
since a line drawn from a point situated in the vicinity of Akasso in Nigeriato one situatedat thetip of Cap Lopezin Gabonindicatesthe natural outerborder of this area withthe remainder of the
AtlanticOcean [endof projection].
28. The fact thatthe closing lineembracesthecoast of RioMuni, i.e.,the continentalportion
of Equatorial Guinea, and part of the coast of Gabon is not without precedent. In the
Guinea/Guinea-Bissaucase, the ArbitralTribunal took the view that a "valid method" consists of
"lookingatthe whole ofWest Africaand of seekinga solution whichwould take overall accountof
the shape of itscoa~tline"~~.The Tribunal went on: "Thiswould mean no longer restricting
considerationstoa short coastline butto a long c~astline.~~(The emphasisgiven to the two terms
isthe Tribunal's.) And in order to constructthis line,the Tribunalopted fora systemconsistingin
drawing a straight linejoining Almadies Point (Senegal) and Cape Shilling (SierraLeone) and
would thus involve two third tat tes"^^.t added: "The second system is better suited to the
circumstance chosen by the Tribunal, i.e., the overallconfigurationof the West African coastline,
andthe AlmadiesPoint-Cape Shillinglinereflectsthiscircurnstancemore faithfully."26
29. In the present case Cameroonhas not attemptedto extendthe relevant areato the entire
Gulf of Guinea, which naturally embraces Cameroonand Nigeria and extends to the waters off
Benin and Togo, since the geographyprevents it fromgoing further than Akasso in the west and
CapLopezinthe south-east.
30. This relevant area must be distinguishedfiom the area to be delimited [projectionmap
No. 1401. The latter takes account solely of the lengths of the coasts of Cameroon and Nigeria
whichare relevant forthepurposes ofthe maritime delimitationsought by Carneroon,and of those
two countries alone. As Carneroon has already explained to the Court, the support lines which
servedfor the construction ofthe equitableline havebeen reduced bythe lengthof the coast ofthe
continentalportion of EquatorialGuineaand by thatof the coastof Gabon, whicharenon-relevant
sectors. Those sectors are representedby the brokenportions of the support lines running from
Akassoto Cabo San Juanand fromAkassoto CapLopez. Thetransverseredline [indicatedonthe
23~warodf14Feb.1985,RGDIP, 1985-2p.528para .08.[ILMV,ol.5 (1986)p297.1
24~bid.
"~bid .,28-529para .10.[Ibidp.,98.1
261bid.screen] whichconnects Campoand the startingpoints of thepertinent sectorsof the support lines
used in the construction of the equitable line forms the south-eastem limit of the area to be
delimited, which is different fiom the relevant area, which isbounded on the north-west by the
sector of the Nigerian Coastthat runs fiom Akasso to the endpoint of the land boundary between
1
Cameroon andNigeria. It is this area to be delimited which reflects the general direction of the
coasts.
31.As canbe seen fiomthe sketchon the screen, the relevantcoastsofthe Bightof Biafra in
this areato be delimited showa slight eastto Westorientation,which explainsthe generaltrend of
the equitableline and shows,contrary to what Ouropponents contend, that its constructionmeets
thetechnicalrequirementscalledfor by a rigorousdelimitation.
B. Thecoastal configurationofthe Bightof Biafra
32. Nigeria considers that the geographical situationof the Cameroonian coastlineis not
"uniquely unfavo~rable"~' - Nigeria's expression,because it sees a precedent ina "very similar
case"28,that ofthe ContinentalShelf(TunisidLibya). This overlooksthe factthat the geographical
data in that caseand ours aredifferent. The situationof the Cameroonian coastlinein the Bight of
Biafra is more akin to that ofthe FederalRepublic of Germanyin the North Sea ContinentalShelf
cases than to Tunisia's in theTunisia/Libyacase. From another aspect, however, the area to be
delimiteddoesbear some similaritywiththe Tunisia/Libyacase. 1shall re-examinethesetwo cases
in turn.
(a) ContinentalShelf(TunisiaILibya)
33. [Projectionmap No. 141.] In this case, TunisidLibya,the position of the landboundary
between Tunisia and Libya vaguely suggeststhat of the land boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria, since it lies more orlessin the hollowof thegulf whoseclosing limitsare RasTadjouraon
the east and RasKaboudia on the West. This, leaving aside the concaviy factor of the gulf s
coastline, is the only possible element of comparison with Cameroon's situation in the Gulf of
Guinea. As regards the remainder, "the geographical situation of Tunisia was not [merely]
-
"CR 2002113,p.48, para.88.
**1bi pd.,a.89. dissimilar to that of ~ameroon"~~t,o use the mild euphemismof Nigeria's counsel, it simplyhad
nothing to do with the situationof Cameroonin regard to thegeneral configurationof the coastline
in the relevantarea, in this casethe Bight ofia. For whereasTunisia andLibya"shared", soto
speak, the concavity of the coastline in theregion in which the delimitation of their common
maritime boundarywasto be effected, inOurpresent caseonly the Camerooniancoastline displays
any concavity.
34. Cameroon is situated at the head of the Gulf of Guinea,surrounded on the Westby
Nigeria and on the south-east by Equatorial Guinea. This is not the case with Tunisia, whose
coastline moves sharply away fiom the relevant area westwards, beyond RasKaboudia, turns
towards the Gulf of Hammamet,moves northwardsto CapBon and turns again into the Gulf of
Tunis beforeslopingwestwardsto the fiontierwith Algeria.
35. As you can see fiom the sketch on the screen,the pincer effect at the two ends of the
Carnerooniancoast mentioned by my distinguishedcolleague and friend Professor Mendelson in
O 5 6 his statementin the firn round does not existhere. Pincerswith two arms. At most there is only
one am. What is more, the concaviiy concernsonly part of the Tunisiancoast, the part between
the Gulf of Gabes and Ras Ajdir, and also its effect is attenuatedby the presence of a Tunisian
island, theisland ofDjerba. [Endofprojection.]
36. [Projection map No. 142.1 Nigeria insists on the similarity between the geographical
configurationsin thetwo casesbecause,in itsopinion,theydisplay"a concavecoasthemmedin by
foreign islandscloseoffshore"30.But where arethe "foreignislands close offshore"in the areato
be delimited in the Tunisia/Li case? The island of Djerba and the Kerkennah Islands are
indisputably Tunisian, while the Italian islands, Lampedusaand Linosa, are not just very far
offshore rather than "close offshore",but lie outside the area to be delimited, on the other side of
the Italo-Tunisian delimitation line. Inany case, you cannot Saythat a string of islands forms a
dividing line which cuts the coastline of the Gulf of Guinea into two large segments, andin the
same breathmaintain that this concave coast is "hemmed in" by that string of islands! Thusthat
situation bears no relationto the Bight of Biafia and Cameroon7sparticular positionwithin it [end
291bid,ara.90.
3 0 2002/13p.49,para.97.of projection]. In fact, to some extent Cameroon's situationis more reminiscent of that of
Gerrnanyin relation to the North Sea, as far as both its position in the Bight of Biafra andthe
configurationofits coastlineare concemed. ,
(b)North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germanymenmark; Federal a
RepublicofGermanymetherlands)
37. [ProjectionNo. 143.1 1now corne to the two NorthSea ContinentalShelfcases. We
have here the sketch appended to the Judgrnent handed down by the Court in this case in 1969,
whichhas already been screenedbyboth Parties. Itshowsthe situation ofthe Germancoastlineat
the head of a bight, adrnittedlya smaller one than the Bight of Biafra, but exhibitingthe same
concavity. This coastlineis trapped betweenthe boundary separating GermanyfromDenmark on
the north and that separating Germany fi-omthe Netherlands on the south. As is Cameroon's
coastlinebetweenNigeriato the Westand Equatorial Guineato the south. The Germancoastline is
a recessingCoast,markedly concave and situatedin the centre of the hollow as is the coastline of
Cameroon atthe head of the Gulf of Guinea, much deeper though that is than the bight between
Denmarkandthe Netherlands in theNorth Sea. What Cameroon wouldlike to make clear here is
thepincer effect of the bight andnot its depth- the pincer effectproduced bythe endpointsof the
land boundaries with Denmark on one side and the Netherlands on the other which
ProfessorMendelson explained so well in the first round3', an effect which has a quite striking
similarity with that produced by the endpoints of the Carneroon-Nigerialand boundary in the
estuaryof the Cross Riverand the Cameroon-EquatorialGuineaboundaryat Campo.
38. As my distinguishedcolleague explainedin the first round, this particular configuration
of the coastline between Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands and the concave coastline to
which it gives rise led the Court to relax the grip of the pincers, which othenvise would have
deniedthe German coastline any projection whatsoeverfurther seawards; there, in order to take
account of those "special circumstances",the Court preferred to apply an adjusted equidistance
formularather than the equidistance methodpure and simple. Having noted that "the claims of
severalStatesconverge,meet and intercross" theCourt stated: "A studyofthese convergences ...
3 1 ~200216,pp.47-49paras.7-11.showshowinequitablewouldbe the apparentsimplificationbroughtaboutby a delimitation which,
ignoring such geographical circumstances, was based solely on the equidistance methor3'.
Contrary to what counsel for Nigeria said, loosening the straitjacket of equidistance was not a
matter of "minor aesthetic surgery" aimedsolely at "mitigating the effects of minor feature~"~~.
What tookplace was a genuine equidistanceadjustmentwherebyGermany increasedits maritime
space by 37.5per cent by comparison with what the strict application of the equidistance rule
would havegiven it.
39. In the present case, the cut-off effect produced by the pincers on the projection of the
coastal fiont of Cameroonwould be even more pronounced,since the bight concemed is sharply
cwed and semi-circula and Cameroon is situated right in its hollow. As in the North Sea
ContinentalShelf cases, the application of the equidistance method would produce an equally
inequitable result. Cameroon, incidentally, is only asking for one am of the pincers to be
slackened,in order notto damagethe interestsofthirdparties. [Endofprojection.]
3. Theequitablenatureoftheline claimedby Cameroon
40. 1should like to show now why Cameroon maintainsthat the line which it proposes is
equitable, by going through the various stages in its construction. 1shall then addressNigeria's
criticisms regarding disregad of the criterion of proximity, on the one hand, and the role of
proximityonthe other.
A. The construction of the line: equidistance adjusted by reference to the relevant
circumstances
41. Mr.President, Nigeria explainedto you the way in which it understood the lawand the
method applicable in regardto delimitation. In the light of that statement,Cameroontakes it that,
despitethe disagreementsbetweenthe two Parties- in particular on therelevant areaand relevant
coastline, the effect of the presence of a third State in the area to be delimited, the role of the
criteria ofproximity andproportionalityand the role of equidistance - they agree on the factthat
geographymust not be refashioned,that any radical amputationcaused by a proposedline must be
32~.~.Reports1969,p. 49, para.89.
"CR 2002113,p. 44, para.73.avoidedand that any delimitationmustseek an equitableresult; and that, in orderto achieve it, the
most rigorous method is to take equidistanceas a starting point and adjust it in the light of the
relevant circumstances.
42. Mr. President, Nigeria referredto your statement to the Sixth Committee of the United
Z
Nations General Assembly in November2001, which showedthat this two-stage methodis now
the Court's established practice. Cameroonwas obviously awareof that important statement,but
thought it nght that the Judgmentof 16March 2001,which laysdown the Court'sjurisprudencein
this matter, should speak for itself. My fnend, ProfessorPellet mentioned the Judgrnent at the
beginning of Cameroon's oral pleadings34. 1 shouldlike to demonstratehow Cameroonappliedit
tothe actual construction ofthe line which itproposes.
43. [ProjectionNo. 144.1 The sketch at presenton the screen(tab 144in thejudges' folder)
shows, as a broken line, thepure equidistancelinebetween Cameroon and Nigeria,drawnwithout
taking any account ofBioko. As the sketch shows,the courseof this lineproduces a considerable
narrowing of the maritimespaceto the Westof Bioko and evenmore so towardsthe south-western
part of the island. The line also lies on an axis with Sao Tome and Principe and, if prolonged,
would cut intwothe maritimearea delimitedbythatcountry.
44. Let us now go to the startingpoint ofthe equitableline proposedby Cameroon. This is
pointG, determinedby the Maroua agreement. From that point,the boundarymoves horizontally
for a short distanceof barely 2 km to point H, which lies on the equidistanceline proposedby the
experts at the time of the negotiations whichresulted in the Maroua agreement. The lateral shift
frompoint G to pointH showsthat, in orderto constructthe equitableline,Cameroon madeapoint
of starting ffom the equidistance line, in accordance with the two-stage method which 1just
mentioned and whose importance the Presidentof the Court drew attention to in the address to
which 1have referred. This shift representsa retumto the equidistance line, butas a startingpoint
and not a fixed point, or endpoint, for the delimitation ofthe maritime boundary seawards. This
return to the equidistanceline is the first phase of the two-stagemethod. The second phaseis the
3 4 200215,p.44,para.20.adjustment of equidistance in order to take account of the relevant circurnstances, and this is
representedby a deflectionofthe linewestwardsas itmoves furtherout to sea.
45. The lateral shifi fiom G to H is therefore the sine qua non of the applicationof this
method, which gives expression to the latest state of the Court's jurisprudencein regard to the
delimitation of maritime boundaries,whether that delimitation takes place between States with
opposingcoasts or, as in the present case,between two States whose coasts are adjacent. It is the
primary condition, the indispensable condition, of any equitable maritime delimitationbetween
CameroonandNigeriabasedon that method.
46. Frompoint H onwards,the linegraduallydivergesfiom the equidistancelineas itmoves
towards point 1, in order to take account of the presence of the island of Bioko. In order to
determinepoint 1,Cameroontook accountof the lengthof the southem coast of that island fiom
Punta Oscura to Punta Santiago, some29 km; this is the coastal fiontage of Bioko which is
capableof projection furtherseawards. This length,which Cameroon considersto be thepertinent
sectorof the coast of Bioko for the purposesof the equitable delimitation,representsthe mean of
the maximum and minimumbreadths of theisland,whichare 35 and 26 km respectively. Taken in
relation to theBonnyICampoline, this pertinent sectorhas the effect of pushing the equidistance
line westwards to point1. If in fact, starting fiom pointH, we rotate the first part of the
equidistance line so as to make it coincidewith the line H-1,the result is the displacementof its
point of intersectionwith theBonnyICampoline by an amount equal to the averagebreadthof the
islandof Bioko, Le.,some30km.
47. This adjustment of equidistance continues fiom 1 to J, but with Bioko being given a
half-effectand the configurationof the coastline a more Iimited effect, the resuIt of which is that
the equitable line leaves tothe west the theoretical equidistancelinebetween the westernfiontage
of Biokoand the relevantsector of theNigerian coast. The purpose of limitingthe effectattaching
to the relevant circumstancesin this sector of the line is to avoid the cut-off effect which the
relevant fiont of the Nigeriancoastwouldsuffer ifthosecircumstancesweregiven theirfulleffect.
48. From point J onwardsthe adjustmentof equidistance continueswith a somewhatmore
marked deflection of the equitable line between J andK, which this time leaves the theoretical
equidistanceline to the east- not to the west, but to the east- in order to take accountof the presence of the archipelago of Sao Tome and Principe. FromK onwards the line simply points
oceanwards,that is to Say,to the outer limit of the zones withinthe respective jurisdictionsof the
Partiesto the present case. [Endof projection.]
B. Role of thecriteriaof "proximity"and"proportionality"
49. The argumentbased onthe criteriaof "proximity"and "proportionality"has beensharply
criticizedby Nigeria. Argument basedon these criteria is not new. In the North Sea Continental
Shevcases, which concerned Stateswith adjacentcoastsas in the present case, the Court examined
the role playedby"proxirnity" in determiningwhetherpart of thecontinentalshelf belonged toone
State ratherhan another. Having foundthat there was no necessary, and certainly no complete,
identity betweenthe notions of "adjacency" and"proximity",the Court addedthat "the questionof
which parts of the continental shelf'adjacentto' a coastlinebordering more than one State fa11
C 0 6 1 withinthe appurtenanceof whichof them,remains to thisextentan open one,not to be detemined
on abasis exclusivelyof proximity". Andin equallycleartermsit continued:
"Even if proximity may afford one of the teststo be applied and an important
one in the right conditions,it may notnecessarilybethe only,nor in al1circumstances,
the most appropriate one. Hence it would seem that the notion of adjacency, so
constantly employed in continental shelf doctrine from the start, only implies
proximity in a general sense,and doesnot imply any fundamentalor inherentrule the
ultimate effect of which wouldbe to prohibit any State(othenvise than by agreement)
from exercising continental shelf rights in respect of areas closer to the Coast of
another tat te."^'
50. Commenting on this passage in the Judgment, the Court of Arbitration in the case
concemingtheDelimitation of ContinentalShev(United Kingdom/France)observed: "Thiswould
seem to state explicitly thatnder certain conditions proximity may bethe appropriatetest or
method for delimitingthe boundary of the continentalshelt but that in any case the valueto be
attached to proximity as a method of delimitationependson the individual circumstancesof the
case"36.And the Court of Arbitrationadded: "This Courtof Arbitrationseesno reason to adopt a
different viewof the role of 'proximity'in the circumstancesofthepresentasef13'.
3'C.J .eports1969,pp. 30-31,para.42.
36~ecisionof 30June1977,para.81.
37~bid. 51. Accordingly, like the Court in the North Sea ContinentalShelf cases, the Court of
Arbitration did not ascribe to "proximity" a role confined to the strict application of the
equidistance mle. As far as the ChannelIslandswere concerned,it decided against the application
of equidistancein orderto enclavethose islandswithinthe French continentalshelf. As to theMer
d'Iroise,the Court adjusted the equidistance line by attributing only a half-effect to the Isles of
Scilly. But the pointis whetherthe geographicalcircumstancesin thepresent case requirethat any
role shouldbe attributedto this criterionat all.
52. 1should liketo observethat, whatevergeophysical factoris given consideration- here
plate tectonics, geology or geomorphology - Bioko lies on the natural prolongation of the
Camerooniancontinental shelf,in the geological senseof the term, of course. That islandis closer
to the Cameroonian coastlinethan to that of any other State in the region, fiom whatever point on
the island the distance is measured. Because of this geographical proximity, there is what one
O
rnight term a gravitationalpull exerted by the continent on its landmass. Bothin terms of the
superjacentwaters surroundingthe island and of the continental shelfbounding it in the direction
of the hollow of the Gulf of Guinea, itanbe seen thatthe Camerooniancoastline forms a kind of
arc around the island. The equitable lineproposedby Carneroonthus limits vis-à-vis Nigeriathe
rights of Cameroon inthe maritime spaces adjacentto that concavecoastlineby taking accountof
the presenceof Bioko.
53. To turn now to proportionality, our opponents, despite the explanations given by
Cameroonin its Replyand in its oral pleadingsin the first round, persistin regarding thissolelyas
a matterof proportionalityof surfaceareas. Nigeriaadmits, however,that Cameroonis rightin law
in failing to define the area which the equitable line would generate. Having referred to
Cameroon'spersistencein refiaining fromdoingthat,Nigeria's counseladds: "And it [Cameroon]
is right, for it cannotdo this in the absenceof Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and ~rinci~e"~'.
Indeed,to refrain fromany approachwhichmight damagethe legalinterests of absent third States
3 8 ~2002113p 45para.79. is for Cameroonnot only a matterof conviction,but alsorepresents the strict applicationof a mle
establishedby thejurisprudenceofthe
54. What is more, proportionality of coastlinelengths, and proportionalityof surface areas i
are both relied on by courts in their decisions,as is abundantly demonstratedby the case lawcited
6
by Cameroon in its written pleadings, and also in its oral pleadings in the first round4'. 1 should
neverthelesslike to draw attentionon this pointto the terrnsof the Court of Arbitration'sdecision
in the caseconcerningthe Delimitationof ContinentalSheIf(United Kingdom/France), sincethey
indicate very aptly the role played by proportionalityin a delimitation operation, by pointing out
that it is not a mathematical criterion of rigorous accuracy. The Court stated that it "does not
consider that the courseof the boundarybetweenthe UnitedKingdom and the French Republicin
thatregiondepends on any nice calculationofproportionalitybased onconjecturesasto the course
O
of a prospectiveboundarybetwem the UnitedKingdomandthe Republicof lreland'"'. The Court
added, aftera painstakingexarninationof the roleof the criterionof proportionality:
"the element of 'proportionality'in the delimitationof the continentalshelf does not
relateto the totalpartition of the area of shelf amongthe coastal States concerned, its
role being rather that of a criterion to assess the distorting effects of particular
geographicalfeaturesandtheextent oftheresultingineq~ity7'42.
55. This is what Cameroon has sought to do in the present case, on the basis of the
proportionalityratios betweenthe different sectorsof therelevant coastlines and ofthe proportions
involved in the adjustrnent of equidistancein the light of the relevant circumstances, in order to
produce anequitableresult.
4. Conclusion
56. Mr. President, Membersof the Court,in conclusion Cameroon believesthat, for al1the
various reasons whichmy colleaguesand myselfhave put fonvard, the Court cannotdo otherwise
than dismissthe claimsof Nigeria. These, in so far as we understand them, consist in requesting
you to endorsethroughoutthe "oil practice line", as AlainPellet demonstrated atthe beginning of
39~eein particularMonetaryGoldRemovedfrom Rome in 1943,I.C.J. Reports 1954,p. 32; ContinentalShelf
(LibyaiMalta),I.C.J.Reports1984,p.1,para.88; EastTimor,I.C.J.Reports 1995,p. 105.
4 0 200216.
41~ecisioof30June1977,para.27.
42~bid.,ara.250. the moming. That positionis untenable. It is devoidof meaninginshore of point G, the sector in
which the boundary is delimited by a fully valid agreement, the Maroua Declaration, as
SirIan Sinclairhas so ablyshowed once again. Theallegedoilpractice linehas even lessmeaning
beyondpoint G,where itbecomestotallyunrealistic.
57. May 1also remindyou that Nigeria remains as ever tom between a maritime boundary
commencingat the estuaryof the CrossRiver, which already exists on the basis of valid treaties,
andan impossibleboundary starting atthe Rio del Rey- evenmodified asNigeria wouldwish -
but one it hasno faith in sinceit takesscanttroubleto plead itscause.
58. Cameroon, for its part, proposes a line constructed, 1 believe, with the necessary
technicalrigour and with the aim of achievinga result which respects the rights of al1the States
0 6 4 concemed, thatis to Say,anequitableresult. Thatisthe line which Cameroonrespectfully requests
the Court to establishas themaritimeboundary betweenitself andNigeria.
1thank you warmlyfor your attention and wouldask you, Mr. President, kindly to givethe
floorto the Agentof the Republicof Cameroon fora short statement.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, DeanKamto, and 1now give the floor to H.E.the Agent of
theRepublic ofCameroon.
Mr. ALI: Thank you,Mr. President,let mebegin by sayinghowhappy 1 am to takethe floor
thismoming inthe presenceof JudgeOda. Let ushope that,before the endof the proceedings,we
willalso havethe pleasure ofdoing sointhe presenceof JudgeVereshchetin.
Mr. President,Membersof theCourt,
1. Professor Kamto's statement brings to a close the second round of Cameroon's oral
argument, subject, of course,to what we will need to add after the statement byrneighbours
fiom EquatorialGuinea next week. Moreover, thisis why 1shall take advantage of the fact that
you yesterday authorized the Parties to summarizethe conclusions which we, at least, willdraw
fromthe fiveweeks of hearingsbringingthese longproceedingsto a close.
2. However, Mr. President, 1 noted that you wanted these final statements to be purely
summaries and not to add any new elements to the Parties' oral arguments. Wishing fully to
comply with thatinstruction,1have thereforedecidedto sharewith you today an idea culminatingin a concrete proposal, so that Nigeria can indicate its reaction to it. In general terms, this idea
concemsthe landand maritime delimitation.
Mr. President,
3. As statedseveraltimesin the lasttwo days,we welcomethe fact thatthe Federal Republic
of Nigeria now accepts the validity of the instrumentsrelied on fiom the outset by Cameroon,
which delimit the boundary between the two countries and which,in the view of some, are even
demarcation agreements. For the boundary separating Cameroon fiom Nigeria is not only
delimited throughoutits length but, in major portions, over more than 300km, is also precisely
demarcated, notably by the Obokurn Agreement of 1913, not to mention the 790km of river
boundary,which doesnot lenditself to demarcation.
4. The factremains that counsel for Nigeria have sought to demonstratethat, if not legally
debatable,these treaties were imprecise, obscure, deficient. On this point, Members ofthe Court,
werely entirely onyour decision.
5. In al1sincerity we are convincedthat there is a great deal of exaggerationin Nigeria's
positionon this. Many of the allegedly22border sectorswhich itconsidershavenot beenproperly
describedare fullydelimited,and sometimeseven demarcated. Otherallegeddefectsaremattersof
demarcation,thusinvolving technical studieson the ground, not readily replaceableby rulings in
abstracto; we have,moreover, indicated certain of them, whichmay be added to those identified
by Our opponents and there are probably others too. But let me repeat, should you find it
appropriate yourselvesto settle some of the problems raised by Nigeria- artificially so inur
view- we wouldhave no objectionat all. Our soleconcem is forthe boundaryto be determined
definitively, whatever meaning is given to that term, which in our view Our opponents are
stretchingtoo far.
6. Moreover,Mr. President,let me be perfectlyfrank:wewillaccept any decisionthe Court
takesand will implementit faithfully andin full. Wewill do soout of respect for your institution
and inthe name ofpeace. However,the Govemmentofthe Republicof Cameroonwould notwant
to be locked into bilateral discussionswith Nigeria in the contextof this case. We have hadtoo
many bitter experiences on that score; we have too often felt we have been "duped"; wehave
nurturedtoo manyhopes, subsequentlydashed,to be ready to attemptthe experienceagain. 7. If the Court were to find that it was not able to settle al1the technical points raised by
Nigeria,if its decision left someuncertainties,we are readyto complywith al1such decisions as a
body setup under the auspices of an impartialthird partymight take in carrying out thenecessary
demarcationof the bordersectorsoutstanding.
066 8.That body, which we shouldearnestlylike to seeset up by the Court, orunder its auspices
or, failing agreement between the Parties, by the UnitedNations, might, for example, besides
representativesof the Parties, also includerepresentativesiom Germany, France and the United
Kingdom. It wouldhave to be granted extendedpowers asregards demarcation,even in the broad
sense,ifthat were to prove necessary. But at the risk of repeating myself,letme stressthat, in this
case,wedonot believein the virtuesofbilateralism.
9. And what applies to the land boundary applies equally to the maritime delimitation
beyond point"G. We wellknowthat,between Statesofgoodwill, maritime delimitationnormally
takes place by agreement. But the unforninate thing is that, each time an agreement has been
reached - by dint ofpainstakingeffort- Nigeria hasquicklyrepudiatedit. Heretoo, we feel that
your decisionwill settlethe dispute fullyand finally. However, if for some unforeseenreason you
found you were unable to settlethe dispute completely,1should like to state, in the most forma1
manner, thatCameroon is at your disposa1for the completionof the maritime delimitationprocess
by anypeacefùlmeans, on thetwofold conditionthatit doesnot leaveus face to facewithNigeria
andthatitprovidesassurancesof areal result.
10.This, Members of the Court, is what 1wished to clarifj this moming and, as 1 said, 1
propose, with your permission, Mr. President,to take the floor again next week for some more
general comments.
11.On my own behalf, as on behalfof the entiredelegationof Cameroon,1thankyou most
sincerely,Mr.President,Membersofthe Court, foryourkind attention. Thankyou. The PRESIDENT: Thankyou, YourExcellency. Thismarksthe end ofthe secondround of
oral argument of the Republic of Cameroon. We will meet again on Thursday, 14March at
10.00a.m. for the secondroundof oral argumentof the FederalRepublic ofNigeria. The sittingis
closed.
TheCourtroseat 12.50p.m.
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