Non-Corrigé Traduction
Uncorrected Translation
CR 2002122(traduction)
CR 2002122(translation)
Mardi 19mars2002à 10heures
Tuesday 19March2002 at 10a.m. The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open,and 1amgoing to givethe floorto
4)18
the Republic of Cameroonto presentits observationson thesubject-matterof EquatorialGuinea's
.
observationsin this case. 1give thefloorto ProfessorAlainPellet.
Mr. PELLET: Mr.President,Membersofthe Court.
1.INTRODUCTION -THE EFFECTSOFTHEINTERVENTION
1. The situation is clear. If anyone had been in doubt, the statements yesterday by our
fiiends fiom EquatorialGuinea have removed al1ambiguity: EquatorialGuinea is interveningin
this case atNigeria'side; it is inthe same interest,regardless,moreover,of the excellentrelations
between Cameroonand the intervening State. As stated by the Agent of Equatorial Guinea, its
"concem" relates- and appears to relate exclusively- to the line claimed by Cameroon
(CR 2002121,pp. 18-19,para. 4). Onthe Nigerian side, it ismore than happy, if 1maySayso,with
thetreaty it concludedon23 September2000.
2. Admittedly, Equatorial Guinea is fully aware that this treaty is more advantageous to
Nigeria thanto itself: it departs fiomthe equidistancelineinfavour ofNigeria andendorsesthe oil
practice which, itself, tended to favour Nigeria (CR 2002121,pp. 32-33, para. 10, Mr. Colson).
Essentially,EquatorialGuinea is exchangingtenitory (orwhat it considersto be such)for security
(or what ithopes is such). And itmay,Membersof the Court,regard thisas "equitable", even if it
is an apparently unequal equity since, after all, the law of the sea does not require an equal
apportionment of maritime areas, any more than, in general, it gives full effect to an island,
regardlessofwhich oneit is.
3. Thereal problem is not the inequalityresulting fiomthe line onwhich EquatorialGuinea
and Nigeria have agreed- to paraphrase counselof EquatorialGuinea, if that wasl1it was, it
would not concem us. Unfortunately, itdoes concem us, asthis exclusively "bilateral" line takes
no accountof Cameroon's rights. EquatorialGuinea has agreedwith Nigeria to confineCameroon
within an exiguous maritime area, which cannot pass as equitable in the eyes of an impartial
observer,regardlessofthe parametersused.
I 019
4. Whatwe areasking aboveall,Membersof the Court,is for "equityto be givena chance".
[Startof projectionof sketch-mapNo. 145- "the height ofiniquity".] This wouldnot be the case if you allowed yourselves to become obsessed by the "little yellow line", on which Equatorial
Guinea soughtto focus attentionyesterday. Youare not in the position of Bergotte in fiont of "the
little piece of yellow wall" in the View of Delft in TimeRegainedby Marcel Proust. The little
yellow linemustnot makeyou losesight of the blue line, the one of the treaty between Equatorial
Guinea and Nigeria, or the red line, the equitableline, which Cameroon is proposing to you, and
which the interveningStatewould likeyou to reject. Imagine,Mr. President,if the Court acceded
to the implicitdemands of EquatorialGuinea and,implicitly or explicitly,ixed the tripoint at the
western end of the yellow line on which Ouropponentssought to focus attention yesterday. The
sketch-mapwhich is projectedbehindme, and whichis No. 145 in thejudges' folder, shows what
the situation wouldbe onthe assumption - whichnevertheless 1 take the liberty ofmaking- that
Bakassi belonged to Cameroon. A mere glanceat this map shows that it would be the height of
iniquity.
5. Mr.President,weare goingto cover theseaspects ingreater detailsin the followingorder:
- Jean-PierreCot willdealwith therelevant geographicalanddiplomaticcontext;
- Maurice Kamto will then showwhy the methodused by Carneroonto draw the equitable line
does notmeritthe accusationslevelledatitbyEquatorialGuinea;
- Lastly, MauriceMendelsonwill demonstratethat it is certainlynot yourtask to fix the tripoint
but that, if you did so, itor rather they (as there would be two)- would certainlynot be
situatedonthe little yellow line. [Endof projection.]
6. Before that, 1 shall respond to my friend Pierre-MarieDupuy on the effects of the
interventionby EquatorialGuinea and, consequently,the Court'stask in this case. And 1shalldo
sofollowingthethree-pointplanwhichhe himselfadopted yesterday.
3 d)2 8 1. The allegedcontradictionsinCarneroon'sconceptionofintervention
7. Equatorial Guineaopts to begin by denouncingthe "contradictions" whichit allegedly
finds in what it tems "Cameroon's conception of intervention" (CR 2002121, pp. 54-56,
paras. 9-14).
8. Cameroon7sposition is wellknown: in Ourview, to make a completedeterrninationin a
maritime delimitationcase, in which a legal interest appertaining to a third partyis at issue, theCourtcannot rule unless that third party intervenes. On the otherhand, we considerthat if this is
the case, in otherwords if this third party intervenes,the Court,fully informed ofthis interest by
thatthird party,may make a completedetermination onthe submissionsof theparties, duly taking 8
accountof the legalinterestin question(see WrittenObservationsof Cameroon on the Application
by Equatorial Guinea for permission to intervene (OCGE), pp. 16-21, paras.50-64; and
CR2002/6,pp. 65-67, paras. 29-35).
9. My opponentsees "rhetorical cunning" (CR 2002121, p.54, para. 10)in this nevertheless
"reasonable" (a word the intervener is fond of) position for, he tells us, if that were so, the third
party"would no longerbe a third State!"(ibid.,para. 11). In otherwords, wewouldbe askingyou,
Membersof the Court, to make a complete determination"by propounding a claim which denies
thethird State'srights" (dixitcounselof EquatorialGuinea).
10. I fear our opponentmayhave misread ormisunderstoodou oral argumentsover the past
weeks, and in particular the one 1 devoted to the preservation of the rights of third parties on
25February. In that oral argument 1gavethe clearestpossible indication- and it is embarrassing
forme to quotemyself - that "[nlo one is more convincedthanthe Republic of Cameroonof the
needto preserve carefullythe rights of third parties inany maritime delimitation,includingwhere
such delimitation, for lack of an agreement, is effected through contentious
proceedings"(CR200216,p. 41, para.3), and 1 also said that the "final, complete and equitable
solutionwhich your Judgmentwill impose on the Parties and on them alone" must be arrived at
"onthe basis of full respect for the rightsof thirdparties, including,of course,those of Equatorial
Guinea" (ibid., p. 57, para.51). This obviously means that, when determining the maritime
boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (not between either of the Parties and Equatorial
Guinea), the Court will have to take account of the legal interest which Equatorial Guinea has
persuaded the Court may be affected. Furthermore, in that case, and in the unlikely event that,
despitewhat Cameroonhas alreadysaid- to whichmy colleagueswill revertthis morning-the
Courtwere to considerthat theequitableline prejudicesthat interest,it wouldhave to modifi that
line, or,perhaps evento thatextentrefkainfiom makinga ruling- but onlytothat extent.
11.There is no trompe-l'Œilin this argument,which isbothreasonableand in line with your
settledcase law - to whichthere is perhaps noneedto revert; a lot has already beensaid aboutit (see OCGE,pp. 17-19,paras. 52-59or CR200216,pp. 66-67, paras.31-32). Onthe 0th hand, let
me in a friendly way (in a friendly bfirm way) Sayto Professor Dupuy that he is engagingin
veritablesleight ofhandwhen claimingthat,ifthe Courtdid not stop wellshortofal1of theclaims
of Equatorial Guinea, as Guinea itself defines them that "sovereign State [would] witness the
delimitation of its own territory without its consent" (CR2002/21, p. 56, para. 14(2)). This is
wrong on two counts. Firstly, the Court would be in no way delimiting the tenitory of the
intervening State,whichwould not be boundbythejudgment. Secondlythis argumentassumesin
principlethat EquatorialGuinea is "at home"where it says it is at home;hat "its territory" is
such asit defines it itself: In so doing, it emptiesintervention under Article62 of al1substance.
And this leads me to the second point addressedyesterday by my leamed fiiend (CR2002121,
pp. 56-60,paras. 15-8),namely:
2. Thescope of intervention proceedingsunderArticle62 of theStatute
12.One onlylendsto therich, Mr. President- and 1amnot surethat Cameroonis asrich as
al1that- but, in any case, Equatorial Guinealends us a great deal (on paper),no doubt al1the
better toeprive us of Ourwealth in concreto. Professor Dupuy thus set out no less than four
propositions- falseones accordingto him- to describe, it would appear, what is allegedto be
our conceptionofinterventionunderArticle62,andhe relûtes them inthe followingterms:
"Interventionis not a proceduralmeans for institutingnew proceedings; nor is
it a form ofjoinder; nor isit a miracleanswer to the so-called 'indispensableparty'
argument; lastly,interventiondoes not constitutean exceptionto the principle of the
consensualbasisof the Court'sjurisdiction." (CR2002/21,p. 56,para. 15).
O 2 2
I We have now movedfrom Proustto Cervantés,as my learned fiend is here tilting at windmills:
we agree with al1that. It is the conclusions he draws, here and there, fromthese very sensible
propositionsthatwedisagreewith.
13.Mr. Dupuytells us:
"[wlhere the rights of C are liable to be affected by the legal solution of a dispute
between A and B, it is true that intervention will enable the Court to deliver its
judgment infullknowledgeof the factsandwithoutrisking darnageto therights ofthe
third State through lack of information" (CR2002121,p. 58, para. 15.2; emphasis
added).Quite. But the rightsof C (here EquatorialGuinea) must still be capableof being affected. And
thanks to the interventionof Equatorial Guinea,the Courtis in a positionfullyto appreciatethis, in
full knowledge of the facts. As 1 said a moment ago, if,after the very exhaustive information
supplied to you by the interveningStateon what it considersto be its rights, you were to consider,
Members of the Court, thatthose rights are threatened by the claims of either of the Parties, you
could eitheradopt a differentsolution,which preservesthem, or refrainfiom ruling on the point or
points which strike you as problematical. Whichever of these solutionsyou adopted,you would
not be adjudicating in any shape or fiom on the rights of Equatorial Guinea; you would only be
noting thatthose rightshavenot beenaffected.
14.It ishus hardlynecessary to addressthe questionwhether interventionmightrepresenta
solution tothe absenceof the "indispensable party" (alwaysassumingthat this theory has practical
significance). Some authorsdeny that this could be so; others think it could. But, in any event,
there is no question of the Court rulinon the rights of Equatorial Guinea; it only has to rule (or
even refrainfi-omruling)having regardto thoserights.
15.Mr. Dupuy makes great issue - and rightly so- of the approachto interventiontaken
by the Court"since," he says, "its Judgmentof 1990"(CR 2002121, pp.58-59, para. 15(3)). 1 am
not sure that this approachmarks a new departureby comparisonwith that previously prevailing,
which the Court adopted in the cases involvingthe interventionsof Malta and Italy in 1981and
1984. But let us consider the Judgment of 1990 on the intervention of Nicaragua in the case
between ElSalvadorandHonduras. Whatdid the Chamberof the Courtdecide? That Nicaragua
was authorizedto intemeneto the extentthat itmight be affected"by .. .[the Chamber's]decision
on the legalrégimeof the waters ofthe Gulfof Fonseca" (Judgment of 13September 1990,I.C.J.
Reports1990,p. 137,para. 105); andin its Judgment of 1992,it foundthat Nicaraguahad, in fact,
rights of "joint sovereignty"over the watersof the Gulf on theamebasis as the other two Parties
(1C..J. Reports1992,p. 601, para. 404; seealso pp. 616-617, para. 432.1). The Chamber did not
therefore in any way allowitself to be impeded by theidea that, in so doing, it was ruling on or
settlingtherights ofNicaragua.
16. And moreover, in its first Judgment, that of 1990, the Court again asked whether
Nicaragua's legal interestin this case constituted"the very subject-matter"of the decision it wascalled uponto make, "in the sensein which thatphrase was usedin the case concemingMonetary
Gold Removedfrom Rome in 1943 to describe the interests of Albania" (I.C.J. Reports 1990,
p. 122,para.73). And it concludedin the negative, pointingout that,while findingthat therewas
no condominiumor "communityof interests"between the three States,"such a decisionwould . . .
evidently affectan interest of a legal nature ofNicaragua", though it would not prevent it fiom
taking a decision (ibid.). The sameapplies here: whetherthe Court concludes that the equitable
line encroaches,or doesnot encroach,or risks encroaching,on therights of Equatorial Guinea,the
legal interestsof that country willnecessarilybe affected,but not inuch a way as to preventthe
Court from passingjudgment. And still lessbecause Equatorial Guinea has intemened than if it
hadnot intemened. For intervening must havesome significance.
17. For this, Mr. President,is the paradox of the position of our fiiends fiom Equatorial
Guinea: theyare interveningnot,asthey claim,in orderto enableyouto passjudgment, but onthe
contrary,to try and preventyou fiomdoing so. And this leads meto my considerationof the third
step in the argument setout yesterdayby Pierre-MarieDupuy: what are
3. The conclusionsto be drawn from the intervention in thiscase?
18.To inform theCourt, the interveningState tells us. Thereis no doubtthat this is correct
and Cameroon never considered that it was not appropriate. Butwhat is this information for?
Equatorial Guinea'sreply: so thatyou willnotmake a completerulingon the disputebeforeyou.
19.But if thatwas all,Members of theCourt, you would haveno need of Equatorial Guinea:
the Courthas shown us, inthe "Libyan"cases,that it wasfully able notto rule onthe claimsof the
Parties when such a mling risked violating the rights of a State absent fiom the case (see the
decisionsreferredto and commented uponby Carneroon inthe WrittenObservationsof Cameroon
on the Application by Equatorial Guineafor permission to intervene (OCGE, pp.17-21,
paras. 52-62). But ifthe Court displayedsuchprudence, as clearly indicated by sketch-map10E
reproduced in Equatorial Guinea7sjudges' folder of yesterday, it is because the interventions of
Malta and Italy werenot allowed. Cameroonhas also discussedthis at length (ibid.; see also
CR200216,pp. 66-67,paras. 31-33); 1shall notgo overthis again,but it is particularlyimportant;
and, wisely, my opponentdid notdwell on it. 20. Moreover, in the passage from your Judgment of Il June 1998, to which
Professor Dupuy also alluded in passing,but without quotingit (CR 2002121,pp. 60-61,para. 21),
it was clearly this situation you were referring to when statingthat "[wlhether suchthird States
[EquatorialGuinea andSao Tome andPrincipe in the event], would chooseto exercisetheir rights
to intervene in these proceedings pursuantto this Statute remains to be seen", whichwould have
justified Nigeria's eighth preliminary objection having to be "upheld at least in part" (I.C.J.
Reports 1998, p. 324, para. 116) and which would therefore have justified the Court's declaring
Cameroon's claim beyond point G inadmissible, at least partly so (see the text of the eighth
preliminaryobjection,ibid., p. 289).
21.But, Mr. President, EquatorialGuinea,in its concernto fully inform you of its position,
has intervened. Where it is concerned inany case, the questiontherefore no longer arises: you
may rule on Cameroon'sclaim, completely,whilepreservingthe rights of Equatorial Guinea, also
completely. Itbeing understoodthat:
(1) you will need to assess the substanceof the rights claimedby EquatorialGuinea, andnotjust
"prima facie", as Professor Dupuyseemsto think (CR2002/21,p. 62, para. 27)'since for this
latterpurpose, interventionis absolutelyuseless; on the otherhand,
(2) you need only make this assessment inorder to determine whether, yes or no, the solution
proposed to you by the Parties- in the event, Cameroon's equitableline, sinceEquatorial
Guinea is in the same interest asNigeria- whether, then,the equitable line affectsthe rights
of the interveningState; not to settle a dispute between theintervening State andCameroon,
whichisnot beforeyou;
(3) since Equatorial Guinea is not an intemening party, it will not be legally bound by this
assessment,eventhough there isno doubt that,as a law-abiding State,it will takethe greatest
possible account of the reasoning underlyingyour decision- but, 1repeat, it would remain
whollyprotected by Article 59inthis respectand would, asit were,find itself inthe situation
of the State which is the object of an advisory opinionfor example,not in the situationof a
partybound by thejudgment to bedelivered;
(4) 1donot claim that,should you findthe argumentpresentedto you by Equatorial Guineapartly
or totallygroundless,this wouldnot createproblems for it,notably in its relationswith certain oil companies; but this would merely be the consequence of the legal situation objectively
assessedby an impartial third party (without thetterbeing adjudicated)and, above all, it is
the "risk ofthe law", thatEquatorial Guineahastaken by intervening; in exchangefor which,
it has been able torovideyou with a completeand detailed expositionof the situation from
its own perspectiveand it has the assurancethat you willnot allow anyoneto encroach upon
its rights; on the otherhand,andlastly,
(5) if you were to concludethat the equitable line in some way affectsthe rights of Equatorial
Guinea- which 1 am only assuming for the sake of argument- it would be your duty to
preserve the rights of the intervening Statein toto, while adopting an equitable solution
compatiblewith thoserights.
22. On that hypothesis,Equatorial Guinea sees only one solution: not to establish a line
(CR2002,'21, p. 61, para.22). My leamed and skilful fiend - 1 am still speaking of
ProfessorDupuy - then goes on to tell us that: "internationaldecisions have always been made
not merel' 'subjectto the rights ofthe third State',but have refrained fromencroaching on those
rights" (I~IJ,p. 61, para. 24; see also pp. 38-41,paras. 26-35, Mr. Colson).e backs up this
assertionb! quoting your decisionsin the FrontierDispute (BurkinaFaso/Republicof Mali )nd
Lih?J .\~J/Icases:
O 2 6 - in theformercase, the Charnberofthe Courtstated that: "a court dealingwith a request forthe
dclirni:ationof a continentalshelf must decline,even if soauthorized by the disputantparties,
to ruleupn rights relatingto areasin which thirdStateshave. ..claims"(I.C.J.Reports 1986,
p 5-b. para.47; emphasisadded);
- in the laner case, you declared that "the Court has not been endowed with jurisdiction to
detcrmine . . whetherthe claimsof the Parties...prevailover the claimsof thosethird States
in thercgion"(I.C.J.Reports1985,p. 26,para.21).
23. Al1this is perfectly correct,but merelyconfirms something whichCameroon - as we
havewritten,saidand saidagain- has never disputed: the Courtcannotruleon the rights of third
States. But this tells us nothingabout the scope ofan intervention (in thosetwo Judgments, the
Court adopts its customary stance, that wherethe interested third States do not intervene), nor
abouthow therights of intervenersmustand canbeprotected. 24. Whatever Equatorial Guinea may Say, as 1 showed on 25February (CR200216,
pp. 68-72, paras. 38-48), there is not just one single way of protecting these rights, there are
several. To begin with, of course- and you will not be surprised that this is undoubtedly the
solutionwe favour- the Courtmay quitesimply find, aswe also see it, that the equitableline in
no way affects the rights of Equatorial Guinea which, therefore, do not need to be specially
preserved. If this wasnot thecase, you could,Membersofthe Court,for example:
- movethe linetaking fullaccount ofthoserights; or
- refrain from ruling on the delimitation requested by the Parties in the area in which there
seemedto you tobe a problem(this isthe"white square"solution); or
- rule that the maritime boundq between Cameroon and Nigeria is a discontinuous one, a
possibility 1referred to in passing withoutactually wanting you to avail yourselves of it, but
whichis not precludedbyany legal principle (ibid.,p.71, paras.45-46); or
- fromwhateverpoint you regard as appropriate,you could confine yourselvesto indicatingthe
directionof theboundary withoutrulingon a terminalpoint.
I 027 25. Al1 these possibilities, to which ProfessorMendelson will to some extent revert
presently,preservethe rightsof Equatorial Guinea in toto. It seemsto us thatthe choiceyou have
to make as between them must be based on two considerations. First, you will have to try,
Members of the Court, to provide as completea solution as possible to the dispute between the
litigantsand you are in a positionto adopta complete solutionthanks, among other things,to the
interventionof EquatorialGuineaand, second,this solutionmust be equitablefor al1concemed.
26. On the other hand, two things areimpossible for you. First, as Maurice Mendelsonwill
also show, you cannot fix a tripoint, of anykind, among other things because Equatorial Guinea
has declinedto become an intervening party. Secondly, and more broadly, yoù cannot settle any
dispute between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea since, as so excellently put by Pierre-Marie
Dupuy,to whom1leave the lastword:
"Quite clearly, the delimitationbetween the maritime areas of Cameroon and
those of Equatorial Guineamust be negotiatedbetween themwith a viewto achieving
an equitable solution,andonly if thosenegotiationsled to an impasse couldthosetwo
States, if need be,decideto come back to the Court to settle their dispute. Butthat
wouldbe anothercase." (CR 2002121,p. 60, para. 18.) 27. For the moment, it is a dispute between CameroonandNigeria which it is yourtask to
settle, Members of the Court; and you must find an equitable solution to it, one respectingthe
rights ofal1parties; of Equatorial Guinea,of course; of Nigeria, of course; but also, let us not
forget,of Cameroon.
Thank youmost sincerelyfor your attention. May 1ask you, Mr. President,to givethe floor
to Jean-PierreCot.
The PRESIDENT: Thankyou, Mr.Pellet. 1nowgive the floorto Mr. Jean-PierreCot.
Mr. COT: Mr. President,1am beingaccorded a title that1once bore forjust a fewmonths,
028
and certainlydidnot deserve.
II. THEGEOGRAPHICALANDDIPLOMATICCONTEXT
1. Mr. President, Membersof the Court, 1 have to explain to you the geographicaland
diplomatic contextof EquatorialGuinea's intervention.
2. What 1am seekingto do is to persuadeyou to give equitya chance. We are in a situation
which clearly calls, over and above strict equidistance, for the intervention of considerations of
equity. Geographysuggestsit; positive lawrequires it.
3. Equatorial Guinea has intemened in order to ask you to see that its rights are not
jeopardized. That isa principlewith whichyou are boundto comply,and we asknothing else. But
1would like to expand upon its terms. It is your task, Mr. President, to ensure that you do not
prejudge a dispute of which you are not seised. You recalled this recently in regard to the
Applicationfor permissionto intervene by the Philippinesin the case concemingSovereignty over
PulauLigitan and Pulau Sipadan (~ndonesia/~ala~sia)'.You have to take care not to prejudice
the rights of the parties incha case. That clearly appliesto the rights of EquatorialGuinea. It
appliesalso to the rights of Cameroon,to thextent thatthey are concemed by a delimitationwith
a thirdState,hereEquatorialGuinea.
'~ud~rnentof23 October 2001,paraand54.Some legalgeography
4. 1 now corneto the legal geography, and 1 will be brief. A few words, though. The
geographical situation of the Gulf of Guinea, as fashioned by history, hasaccumulated a whole
series of handicaps which operateto the detrimentof Cameroon. It is practically a textbookcase.
As you can see from this outline map, which you may perhaps recognize. [Start projection-
tab 146.1
5. The markedconcavity of the Camerooniancoastline is comparableto that of Germanyin
the NorthSea ContinentalShelfcase. In thatcase, theCourt introducedconsiderationsof equityin
order, as you will recall, significantlyto modiQ the delimitationwhichwould have resulted from
strict application oftheequidistanceline. Thatis thefirstclear handicap.
6. The second, Cameroon7senclavement,precluding it fiom access to a continental shelf
which nonetheless represents the natural prolongationof its land mass. That enclavementis to
some estent reminiscent of the Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon case. In that case, the ArbitralTribunal
found 3 solution whichgave Saint-Pierreequitable accessto the continental shelfwithout involving
any breahin continuity.
7. Finally, thethird and major handicap,the presenceof a largeisland off its Coast,blocking
the seaHard projectionof the landand intempting the course of the lines of maritimedelimitation;
a similarsituation layat the heartof the dispute over theMer d'Iroise. Despitethe presenceofthe
hea\ il!populated Channel Islands (130,000 inhabitantsa ,s againstaround 100,000for the island of
B~OLO'J. the Court of Arbitration in that case reduced the island's effect for purposes of the
mantirnc delimitationbetween the two parties,so as to allow for considerationsof equity. [Endof
projrct~on.]
S However, as 1 well appreciate,Mr.President,no one maritime delimitation caseis truly
comparable with another. 1note, nonetheless, thatin each of those casespresenting an element of
resemblance with thepresent case,the Court wasable to take accountof the circumstancesof the
case inorder to introducea measureof equity intothe solutionadopted.
'~ritten statementof EquatorialGuinea,p.9, para.21. 9. In Ourrelations with EquatorialGuinea, we are not asking the Court to take account of
equity. More modestly, we are asking it not to exclude it. 1 am now done with these
considerations,which 1have called legalgeography,andturnnextto the diplomaticcontext.
The diplomatic context
10. Equatorial Guinea's counselhas painted the specific diplomaticbackgroundto Ourcase
with a somewhat broad brush. He has given you to understand that Cameroon made a firm
cornmitmentto a delimitation based on equidistance and on the definition of a tripoint, before
abruptly changingtack and putting forward its own equitable line. That, Mr. Colson,is to argue
without taking account of the uncertaintiesand vacillationsof the partiesto the negotiations. It is
above al1to disregardthe changes in the general diplomatic and legal context over the periodin
question.
11.You yourselves,Mr. President, Membersof the Court,recalled in your Judgrnenton the
Preliminary 0bjections3,that the negotiationsbetweenCameroonand Nigeria related to the whole
maritimedelimitationbetweenthe twocountries. Thosenegotiationsfailed,since theparties could
not agree on the effect of the Maroua Agreement andhence on the startingpoint forthe maritime
delimitationproper. In those circumstances,thevarious discussionsand reports resultingfromthe
negotiations provide interesting indications in regardto the state of mind of the Parties. They
cannot, however, be cited as evidence against one Party, uniess they embody an international
agreement,whichwould be quite anothermatter. For the rest, internationaljurisprudence is clear.
In these circumstances, the communiquéssummarizing the terms of the discussions merely
represent interimreports, nomore thanthat.
12. The bilateral discussions, both by Cameroon with Nigeria and by Cameroon with
Equatorial Guinea, manifest a certainhesitation, an ambiguity,which arereflected in the terms of
the communiqués. TheMontego Bay negotiations were in progress during the first stage of
negotiationsbetweenCarneroon andNigeria in the1970s. The status of the parties interms ofthe
relevant Conventions, the question whether the Montego Bay Convention or of the Geneva
Conventionsapplied,depended on theparties' respectiveratification procedures. Thus Equatorial
31. .J.Repor1998,p.322,para.110. Guinea ratified the Montego Bay Conventionon 21 July 1997,three years after the last contact
betweenthe delegationsofCameroonandEquatorialGuineain regardto the maritime delimitation.
In these circumstancesthe uncertaintyofthe negotiatorsis readilyunderstandable. Whichwas the
instrument applicablebetween the two parties at the time? Geneva? Montego Bay? What did
customary law have to Sayon the matter? It was evolving rapidly, as you will recall. Seen from
Yaoundé,orfromMalabo,the answerswereby nomeans clear.
13. With reference more particularly to the negotiations between Equatorial Guinea and
Cameroon, thesewere begunat a late stageand were limited to discussionsin 1993. Theyresulted
f 6) 3 1 in the communiquéof 3 August 1993,which Mr.Colson included inthejudges' folder- you will
find an extract at tab 147 in our folder-but which he did not read to you. 1 will add to his
statement on two points. First, Cameroon agreed at that time to give the CO-ordinatesof the
baselines by reference to which the maritime delimitation was to be carried out. Those
CO-ordinateswere transmittedto Equatorial~uinea~. Secondly, the parties agreed tofinalize at a
later date, at Malabo, this outline maritime delimitation. For they lackedone essentialpiece of
information, the definition of the starting point of the proposed delimitation. In these
circumstances,the 1993 communiquédoes not represent a delimitation agreement,but atmost a
"programmatic"pre-agreement,to citeaterm alreadyused herebyNigeria.
14.1 wouldadd that, by referringto theontegoBay principles,which nowhereprovide,as
you know, for recourse to equidistancein order to delimit the continental shelf or the exclusive
economic zone,the Cameroon-EquatorialGuinea negotiatorshad introduced into the languageof
the communiquéan ambiguity which required to be removed before an agreement could be
reached.
15.Andit is againstthisbackground,Mr. President,Membersof the Court, thatthe question
of thetripointhasto be viewed. Contraryto whatEquatorialGuinea'scounseltold you, Cameroon
does not exclude a tripoint. As things currently stand, the sketch-maps presented by Cameroon
even show two, which you can see on the map currently projected on the screen. These are
pointsH" and I', which you will also find in the judges' folder at tab 148. You will note that
4~rittenstatementof Equatl uinea,AnnEGSW 4, p.A-27.pointsH" and 1' lie a very long way fiom the yellow banana which so appeals to Mr.Colson.
Mr.President, you would need al1the powers of imaginationof Alain Pellet at 3 o'clock in the
morningto discem here the tinysliver of yellow wallso dear to Vermeer and toProust. To me, it
looks more like a Magritte, which might be called: "This is Not a Tripoint". In any event, the
problemof the tripoint onlyconcemsthe Court in so far as it represents a limitbeyond which the
rightsof third parties couldbeaffected.
16. Suffice it to note at this point, Mr. President, that the reference to a tripoint in the
Cameroon-EquatorialGuineaJoint Communiquéof 3 August 1993links the determinationof the
tripoint to the Montego Bay Convention [end projection]: "Both parties have proceeded ... to
adopt a methodology that would allowfor the determination of the boundary point called the
'tripoint' (Cameroon,Nigeriaand Equatorial Guinea)according to the MontegoBay Convention
onthe Law of theSea of 1982."
17.The methodologyforthe determinationofthetripoint,to quote the expressionused inthe
Communiqué, was thus intended, in the minds of its signatories, to enable them "to achieve an
equitable solution"- that is the languageof Articles74 and 83 of the MontegoBay Convention
on the Law of the Sea. Moreover, aswe know, therecould be no question of fixing that tripoint,
given the current uncertainty in regard to the course of the delimitation between Nigeria and
Cameroon.
18.Equatorial Guineanotesthat Carneroondidnot protest when EquatorialGuinea adopted
its Act of 12November 1984,which provided for application ofthe equidistancepnnciple in the
definitionof maritime areasunder EquatorialGuineansovereignty,nor againstthe DecreeLaw of
6April 1999 implementing the 1984Act. 1 would remind my leamed fiiends fiom Equatorial
Guineathat neither did theyprotest in 1974, when Cameroonadopted its statuteextendingits own
territorial watersto50 miles fiom its coastline, before ultimately acceptingthe 12-milerule laid
down bythe MontegoBay Convention.
The truth is, Mr. President, thatAfncan Statesrarely issueprotests abouttheir neighbours'
domestic legislation, fearing that that would be regarded as an unfiiendly act. Moreover,
Equatorial Guinea's legislation did not prevent the Malabo authorities fiom concluding an internationalagreement with Nigeria fixingthe maritimeboundary betweenthe two Statesa long
way insidethe median line.
19. 1 now come, Mr.President, to those international maritime delimitation agreements
which havebeen signedin respect ofareaswithin the Gulfof Guinea. In no way do they confirm
an equidistancepractice. Quitethe contrary. Nigeria pridesitself onthe agreements ithassigned,
on the basis of neighbourly relations,withthether Statesof the ~ula. We feel that this rush to
enter intosuch agreements,just monthsfiom the decisionon the ments that you will be rendering,
is not an appropriatepolicy. Some mightsee in it an attempt to force your hand,to present you
f 0 3 3 with a faitaccompli. Whateverthe tmth of the matter,what 1wouldask you to note is thatthose
agreementsare far fiom beingbased onthe equidistanceprinciple, theyare far from respectingthe
medianline.
20.1 would remindyouthatNigeria isresponsibleforthe vastmajority - 1was goingto Say
the lion'sshare- both of productionandof reserves of crude in the Gulf of Guinea, as you can
see fiomthetable in your folderat tab 149,which we already producedin ourearlier statements.
21. 1 come now to the agreements. First and foremost [projection1501the Treaty of
23 September2000 between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea. This Treaty increases Nigeria's
temtory by some 1,750 km2in comparisonwith the medianline. That is the area colouredmauve
on the map. Malabo was no doubt perfectly entitled to give up that maritime area which would
have accmed to it if the equidistance doctrine had been applied. Under the Treaty,
EquatorialGuinea renounces any claimof sovereignty beyond the Treaty line. That is to Say, a
longwayshort of the equidistanceline. 1quote Article4:
"North and West of the maritime boundary established by this Treaty, the
Republic of Equatorial Guinea shall not claim or exercise sovereign nghts or
jurisdiction overthe watersor seabedand subsoil."
22. EquatorialGuinea's written pleadings providetwo further items of informationwhich
enlargeonthe text of the Treaty. First,welem that Nigeriahad designson theoil deposits,and in
particularthe Zafiro field, situated on Equatorial Guinea'sside of the median line6. It finallysaw
fit to abandonthose claims at a late stage inthe negotiations. Inpart,at least, sinceit reta1ned,as
'CR 2002/13,p28,para.4(MT . rawford)
6~inancialTimes,26 Sept.2000,qubyNigeria,RejoinderofNigeria,Ann.175,vol.VIII,p. 1511would remind you, the Ekanga quadrilateral. Second, Nigeria took the view that, in the
equidistance calculation, the length of its coastline should be weighted by reference to its
population. EquatorialGuineaacceptedtheNigeriancalculation,but rejected thereasons forit. As
faras Equatorial Guineawas concemed,thiswasa simplepolitical agreement7. A point ofwhich 1
wouldaskyou to takenote. [Endprojection.]
23. 1 now come to the preliminary agreement signedbetween Nigeria and Sao Tome and
Principeon 28 August2000, on the occasionof the visit of President Obasanjo. That preliminary
agreement departs still fùrtherfiom the medianline. The Final CommuniquéStates(you will find
itattab 152in yourfolders) - there are tworelevantparagraphs:
"5. Concerningthe negotiations on the delimitation of the Maritime boundary
between thetwo countries,the two Presidentsagreed on an appropriateformulaof one
third (113)lineeffect,that is, betweenthe equidistanceandproportionalitylines. This
is without prejudiceto subsequentnegotiationson a final delimitationof the maritime
boundarybetween bothcountries.
6. They also agreedon the establishmentof a Joint-DevelopmentZonebetween
the 113 effect and equidistance lines, to be managed by a Joint Development
Commissionon the basisof sixty percent(60%)to Nigeria and fortypercent (40%) to
Sao Tome and Principe. This zone will bejointly exploited, protectedand defended
by both countries."
24. Thus, accordingto thecommuniquéand to the preliminary agreement, the whole of the
Joint Development Zone is to be incorporated into Nigerian territory under the preliminary
delimitation agreementand as a result of the application of the 113line effect between the
equidistanceandproportionality lines. [Beginprojection.] And you now see on the screen- you
willfind this in yourolder attab 153-the Zonein question. True,under an interimagreement,a
Treaty of 21 February 2001, Nigeria consents to the forma1 embodiment of the overlapping
territorialclaims and to the implementationof the Joint Developmentzone8. Al1fine and dandy!
But Sao Tome should beware: perhaps the day of reckoning has simply beenpostponed. Nigeria
has not given up the idea of grabbing for itself some 38,000 km2 lying beyond the median line.
[Endprojection.]
25. Mr. President, EquatorialGuinea objectedto the use of the word "threat" in relationto
Nigeria's attitudeto its neighbours. The wordisperhaps excessive, 1 fieely admit it. But1donot
'~ritten Statementof EquatorialGuinea, p. 15,note28.
8~bservationsofNigeria,1Note 2, Text depositedwith the Registry. know why,1cannot helpthinking ofthe fable ofthe lion dividingthe killinto fourparts. Youmay
recall it,perhaps, Mr. President. Hegives himselfthe firstshare:use1 am calledLion". He
gets the second shareecause he is the stronges"As thefiercest, claim the third share. And
anyonewhotouches thefourth share,1shall stranglethem."g Mr. President,1trustyouwill not see
anysimilaritybetweenthebeasts inthe fable andthe Statesofthe GulfofGuinea.
26. To return to the diplomatic practice, it should be noted that not one of the maritime
t 035
delimitationagreementsconcludedinrespectofthe Gulf of Guineaespousesthe medianline. Why
should Cameroon, no doubt the least blessed by geography of the Gulf s States, be obliged to
followa precept which appeals to no one else there? 1seenothing unreasonableor extravagantin
Cameroon's positiononthis.
27. Mr. President, Membersofthe Court,thankyou foryour kindattention. Mr.President,1
shouldbe grateful ifyouwould kindlycal1Professor MauriceKamto tothepodium. 1do not know
if you want to take a break at this point or if you would ratherhear Maurice Kamtofirst. It is, of
course,entirelya matterforyou; and1thank you.
ThePRESIDENT: Thank youProfessor,and 1now givethe floorto Dean MauriceKamto.
Mr.KAMTO
111.THE DELIMITATIONMETHOD -
THE EQUITABLELINEANDTHE RIGHTS OF EQUATORIA GLUINEA
1.Mr. President, Membersof theCourt, Cameroonwelcomesthe interventionof Equatorial
Guinea, whichwill enable a better informed Court to rule on Ourclaim in full awareness of the
facts. But1must dispelsome misunderstandingsand, if possible, reassure EquatorialGuinea that
its rights in the area will be taken into consideration. Indeed, a great many things were said
yesterdayabout the inequitable and excessivenature of the line proposed by Cameroon, aboutthe
threatit wouldpose totheinterests ofEquatorialGuineaor aboutthe extravaganceofitsirn~'~.
2. In order to do so, 1shall firstexplainhowthe delimitationmethodfollowedby Cameroon
takes Bioko Island into account and makes it possibleto honour Equatonal Guinea'srights in the
'~aFontaine,"ThePartnershipbefweentheHem, theGoat,theSheepand"heLion.
''CR2002121,p. 21,para. 12(N'Fube). zone to be delimited; secondly,1shallshowwhy,in view ofthegeographical circumstancesofthe
area, an equitableresult must be sought.
, 0 3 8 1. Delimitation method and effectof Bioko Island
(a) Non-existenceofa customaryboundarybased on equidistance
3. Accordingto EquatorialGuinea,the boundary relationship betweenCameroonand itself
is "based on a rnedian line"" so firmly established that Cameroon "isno longer entitled to
challenge" itI2. In short, a customary boundary based on equidistance is said to have been
establishedbetweenthesetwo countries.
4. Thisidea is incorrect,and 1shallfirst showthis by placingthe significanceofCameroon's
reference to equidistancein the properperspective,andthen byshowingthe relative importanceof
oilpractice inthearea.
(1) Equidistance
5. Myfiiend and eminent colleague,ProfessorCot, remindedus a moment agoofthe context
in which the joint communiquéof 1993 was produced, in particular of the doubts which still
characterizedthe Parties' approach and their choice of a delimitation method atthat time. Allow
me, if you will,Mr. President,to addthe followingremarks tothose observations.
Cameroon does not seek to rule out the equidistancemethod in principle. Where the two
States- Equatorial Guineaand Cameroon,1mean - considerduring the coming phases of their
negotiationsthat equidistancemakes for an equitableresult, there will be nothing to prevent them
from adopting itas the delimitationmethod in the sector concemed; but where an equitableresult
can only be achieved by adjusting equidistance, they will have to forgo the automatic and
unbending applicationof equidistance. Hence,this method cannotbe applied acrossthe board in
the delimitation of the maritime boundary between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon, just as it
cannot be in the delimitation of the boundary with Nigeria,for reasons which Cameroon has
explained at length in connectionwith the principal case. Here,equidistance must be adjusted to
"CR 200211,p.28,para32(N'Fube).
"lbid p.,7, para. 29(N'Fube).take account of the particular geographical contextof the area where the delimitation is to take
place.
6. Moreover,EquatorialGuineaitself acceptsthat the applicationof pure equidistancewould
be malapropos in the geographical contextconcemed, probably because it is aware that it would
produce a disastrous result. Indeed, one of Equatorial Guinea's advocates,
Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy, concludedhis statementyesterday'3by referring to your Judgment
in the Qatarv. Bahraincase, pointing out, quotingthe Court,that "it is in accord with precedents
to begin with the median line as a provisional line and then to ask whether 'special
circumstances' ...require anyadjustmentor shiftingof that line".
7. However, he does not draw any practical conclusionfrom this for the present case.
Indeed, it is as though Equatorial Guinea were stuck in the first phase of the method, namely,
provisional application of equidistance, completely forgetting the second phase, adjustrnent of
equidistance in the light of the relevant circumstances. 1sthere a geographical situation which,
more than that of the Gulf of Biafra, requiresthatrelevant circumstancessuch as the concaviq of
the coasts and their general orientation should be taken into account and that, as a result, pure
equidistanceshouldbe abandoned,oratany rate adjusted?
(2) Theoil concessionspractice
8. On behalfof the interveningState,Mr.Colsonyesterdaystressedtherole of oilpracticein
the area for delimitationas proof of the existenceof an establishedline based on equidistance. In
this connection,he claimed that, on 22February last, Cameroon,speaking through me, concluded
that"the oil practiceof CarneroonandNigeriainthe area confirmsthat de~imitation"'~.
9. 1 should point out that these remarks were made in the context of Cameroon's oral
argument on the delimitationof the maritime boundary in the firstsector, the sector delimitedby
treav and which, in Cameroon's view, isnot based on oil concessionpractice. Furthermore,my
distinguished colleagueclearly forgot alsoto referto the indentwhich, inthe text of my statement,
precedeswhat he quoted, andwhere it is stated that "the 'faitaccompli'of the oil concessionshas
' 3 ~2002121,p. 63,para.29.
14CR 200215,p. 70,para.52, quoted byMr.Colson,CR2002121,p. 49,para. 58.no effect on this conventionaldelimitati~n"'~. 1 don't think one could more clearly state the role
which, in Cameroon's view,should be assigned to oil concessions in this case. In any event,
Cameroonhas never advocatedthe concessions line, Mr.President; it has merely indicated to the
Court thatthe line Nigeriawas claimingin the sector coincidedwiththe maritime boundarywhich
was fixed by the Maroua Agreement and, in this case, confirmed by the oil practice of the two
Parties.
10.But the intervening State goes fùrther on this question of oil concessions. Noting the
referencemade last Tuesdayby Professor Pelletto the lackof time forpreparingthemaps showing
the overlappingoil concessionsofCameroon,Nigeria andEquatorial Guineain the area concerned,
Equatorial Guinea's advocatesententiouslythrew in: "Maybethere was no time, but in al1events
the effort wouldhave failed."16
11.Our colleaguewas rathercarelesshere for, as 1am going to show you,there are indeed
areas of overlapin thiszone betweenCameroonand EquatorialGuinea.
[ProjectionNo. 154.1 The projection now on the screen shows a sketch-map of a
Cameroonianoil concessioncalled Moudi. Itwas grantedto Total andMobil in 1981and hasbeen
exploited since 1993byKelt, whichlaterbecame Perenco. This sketch-map,preparedon the basis
of a documentproduced byPerenco,showstwothings onthe southem boundaryofthe concession:
- firstly,this southernedge of theconcessiondid not respectthe median line orthe course which
wouldresult fromthe applicationof the Equatorial Guinean decree law of January 1999; the
resultis a clear overlapbetweenthat concessionandthe EquatorialGuinean concessionwhere
United Meridianoperatedinthepast;
- secondly,the Tsavorita-1and2 wells sunkin 1997by United Meridian pursuantto Equatorial
Guineanpermits were drilledin an area belonging to Carneroon. 1 should point out that the
two wellshit liquidhydrocarbonsand produce 1,800barrelsldayduring productiontests. [End
of projection.]
12. [Projection No. 155.1 The second sketch-mapon the screen, which you will easily
recognizesinceit wasshownyesterdayby EquatorialGuinea,identifiesthe Tsavonta-1and 2 wells
"CR 200215,p.69para.52.
I6cR2002121,p.48,para.57. 0 3 9 on Cameroon's concessionmap and showsthe overlaps producedby applicationof the concession
CO-ordinatesprovided by Nigeria. The intervening State nevertheless showedthis sketch-mapas
irrefutableevidenceofthe existenceofa concessionsline coincidingwiththe medianlineand,as it
were, constitutinga "customary boundary". Youhave alreadyheard this sanctuarynotioninvoked
so often over the last few weeks, a notion which, moreover,does not always refer to the same
reality. Here,this customaryboundarysimplyhasno basis inestablished localcustom.
13. Two conclusions may be drawn from this: firstly, there is indeed overlap between
Cameroon's concessionsandEquatorialGuinea's; secondly,the practice of the two countriesdoes
not strictly respect the median line, the limit of "oil" operations,which is a technical limit, being
different from a maritime boundary. Consequently, there is no customary boundary between
Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, just as equidistance does not represent as between them a
codified legalrule, adopted once and for al1and applicable independently of the geographical
circumstances.
(b) StatusofBioko and its influence onthedelimitation
14. Mr.President, the intervening State has pointedout on several occasions that Bioko
Island is the site of the capital of Equatorial Guinea,asghthis could have any impactat al1on
theisland's effect on the delimitationsoughtby Cameroonoronthe rights pertainingto the island.
Bioko is not an island Statebut an island dependency of EquatorialGuinea. Turning aroundthe
Court's reasoning in the Libya/Maltacase1',1would Saythat the relation between theCoastof
Bioko and those of its neighbours is not the same as if Bioko were an independent State. As
Professor Lucchini wrote in a course which he gave next door, at the Academy of International
Law in 2000: "The delimitation régimeis not identical for an island State and for a dependent,
isolated islandfallingnderthe sovereigntyof a state."18
15.As an island dependency of EquatorialGuinea, Biokocannot claim the full effectof its
projection in al1 directions of al1its coastal fronts. It is not entitled to the benefit of a radial
040
projection ofthem. In itsObservationson the Written Statementof Equatorial~uinea'~,Cameroon
"I.c.J. Reports 1985,p.42, para. 53.
'*RCADI2,000, Vol. 285,p. 329.
I9writtenObservationsof Camero4Juiy2001,pp.21-22, paras.91-92. stated that, in the absence of any jurisprudential guidance on this question, the position of
JudgesRuda, Bedjaoui and Jiménezde Aréchagain their joint opinion appendedto the Judgment
of3 June 1985in the caseconcerningthe ContinentalShelf(Libyan ArabJamahiriya/Malta) could
indicate a doctrinaltrendin thisea.
Bioko cannot be consideredin the abstractand be attributed a radical,absolute effect which
takes no account of the real situationin the Gulfof Biafra. It is in relationto the respectiverights
of the Parties, as recognized in positive law, thatany delimitation must be effected and that the
claims ofal1Parties mustbe considered.
16.Even supposingthat, in this case, the western coast of Bioko were to be consideredas a
newcoastalfront interruptingthe "tête-à-tête" betweC eameroon andNigeria,this cannot produce
a new "tête-à-têteb "etween Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea by appropriation of the rights of
Cameroon. Carneroonmaintainsthat, by fixingthe maritime bounday betweenitself and Nigeria,
the Coun will indicate where Nigeria's eastward and south-eastward claims and Cameroon's
westuard and north-westward claims stop and will thus enable that country to negotiate with
EquatoririlGuineathe extentof themaritimeareato whichit is entitled.
i: According to Equatorial Guinea in its Written Statement of 4 Apri12001, "Equatorial
Guinca's entitlement to maritime space is the same as Cameroon7sor ~i~eria's"~'. Cameroon
agrees Hith this. In the area to be delimited,every State involved on one count or another in this
case.nanicl! Cameroon and Nigeria, but also the intervening third State, has "claims", butonly
claims. dnd conrraryto EquatorialGuinea7sassertion,the criterion ofdistanceorproximity cannot
alonc c$t~?:ishthe rightsof Equatorial Guinea andNigeria in the area to be delimited andjustifj
thedisregard or appropriationof the rights of Cameroon. To echo the exact wordsof the Courtin
the:Vurft:SLY JontinentalShelfcases, "it happensthat the claims of severalStatesconverge,meet
and intercross in iocalities where,despite their distance from the coast, the bed of the sea still
l O 4 3 unquesiionably consists of continental shelf"'. These claims will become established rights
between Cameroon andNigeria onlyupon themaritime delimitationwhichCameroonrespectfully
asks the Courtto make,and between Carneroon and EquatorialGuineaonlyupon conclusionofthe
'OwrittenStaternent ofthe Republicof Equatorial Guinea, p.16,para. 39.
"1.C.J.Reports 1969,p.49, para.89. negotiations which Cameroon and that country have embarked upon together and which will
certainlybe completedbythe end ofthepresentproceedings.
18.Moreover, Cameroon notes,not withoutsome surprise,that Equatorial Guineamakes no
reference to this prospect of bilateral negotiationswith Cameroon, a prospect on which it laid
particularstress in theirstround of itsoral argument2'in the case between it and Nigeria. Hence,
not only does the intervening State omitto take note of Cameroon'swillingnessto negotiate and
finalizewith itthe delimitationof theirjoint maritimeboundaryby agreement,but it assertsthatthe
maritime areas situated to the east of theequitablelineclaimedby Cameroonwould fa11entirely to
the latter23if the Court were to decidein favour of the lineproposed by the Applicant. And then
the Agent of Equatorial Guineaasks: "What happensto Equatorial Guinea'sinterest?'Then he
adds: "Cameroon has not yet answeredthat question in either ils oral arguments or ils written
pleadingsinthis case."24
19. Mr. President,if the lineproposedby Cameroonhasone good point, it is that it seeksto
take intoaccount the interestsof al1the States concemed: to avoid a markedcut-off of Nigeria's
relevant coastal front, to avoid entering or even interfering with the maritime area claimed by
SaoTomeand Principeandto preservethe rights of EquatorialGuinea eastof the equitable lineby
leaving the outcome entirely up to the negotiationswith a viewto a delimitationby an agreement
withthat country. Cameroonwishesto resume thenegotiationswith Equatorial Guineasuspended
since the Yaoundémeeting in August 1993,becausethe two countries have always negotiated in
good faith, inmutual respect and with a view to a fi-uitfulresult. It is not with al1its neighbours
042
that it finds itdifficult to negotiatein ansphereof calmandmutual trust.
20. But Carneroon mayperhapsnot have been sufficientlyclear on this subject. So 1hope
you willallowme to reiterateits position vis-à-vis EquatorialGuinea: the equitable lineproposed
by Cameroonseeks to establishthe limitof Nigeria'slegal interestseastwardsoff its coasts facing
the Gulf of Guinea, and Cameroon's interestswestwards of the zone concemed, with a view
subsequentlyto enablingthe two Statessituated in the middleof the Gulf,in the event Cameroon,
"CR 200217,p.31,para.42 (Kamto).
2 3 2002121,p. 37,para. (Colson).
24~bid,. 24, para.24(N'Fube).owing to its coastal presence in the hollow of the Gulf, and Equatorial Guinea, owing to the
positionof BiokoIsland,to negotiatetheirrespectivemaritime areas.
(c) Constructionof thefineand takingBioko intoaccount
21. Mr. President, Cameroon implementedthe two stages of the method at two different
times in the constructionof the equitableline, taking care to give an effect to Bioko to adjust the
equidistance,contraryto whatthe Agent of the intervening Statehas said. Thisline is not "drawn
as if... Bioko Island simplydid not existV2'.Quitethe contrary! [ProjectionNo. 156.1 To claim
that Cameroonhas constnictedits equitable line as though Biokodid not existundoubtedly shows
ignoranceof what a pure equidistanceline betweenCameroon andNigeria would have provided.
As shown by the sketch-map being projected, the course of this line would have reduced the
maritimearea offthe north-westcoast ofBioko. Indeed,we seea major reduction inthe maritime
areaon the westernflank of the island,which increasesas the equidistancelinemoves towardsits
south-westernpart.
22. Bioko'seffect on the constructionof the equitablelinewas reflectedin technicalterms at
thetime of the determinationof point 1. Indeed, to determinethispoint, whichalso influences the
orientationof segments IM and IIJ, Carneroon,as we discussedlastTuesday,took into accountthe
length of the southem coast of the island from Punta Oscura to Punta Siantago, in otherwords
some 29 km. As Cameroon explained during its oral argument inthe case between itself and
~i~eria~~t,his coastalsketch was not chosenarbitrarily; it is thecoastal frontof Bioko capableof
being projected furthest seawards. Secondly, it corresponds to the average of the greatest and
smallestwidth ofthe island,which are, respectively,35 and 26 km. Thirdly,this length is not very
differentfromthat of the northem coastof Bioko Island,which measuressome 25km between the
pointmarked FL(M25)andIslote Horacio.
23. As the relevant coast of Bioko, Cameroon could have taken its western coast from
Punta Oscura to FL (M25)through CaboRodondo, Punta Argelegosand Punta Achada,73km in
2 5 ~2002/21,p.20, para.10(N'Fube).
2 6 ~2002117,pp.59-60,para.46 (Kamto). length, but the cut-off effecton the projectionof Nigeria's relevantCoastwould have beenradical
and the result inequitable.
24. 1 should like to point out, Mr. President, that there is no standard method or single,
perfect technique of maritime delimitation; it is al1a matter of circumstancesand of the desired
result. As the Court said in its Judgrnentof20 February 1969,whenequity excludesthe useof the
equidistancemethod, "no objectionneed befelt to the idea of effectinga delimitationof adjoining
continentalselfareasby theconcurrentuse ofvariousmethods"*'.
25. Inthis case, whetherthe method ofthe proportionalityof the coastal lengths is used or
that of adjusted equidistance,the result isthe same,namely, that givinghalf effectto BiokoIsland
makes it possible to anive at an equitableline. This result, achieved bya combinationof the two
methods, merelybearsoutthetechnicalrigoremployedin constructingthis line.
26. If Equatorial Guinea adheres to this two-phase delimitationmethod enshrined by the
Court, as manifestly it does adhere to it, it will easily be able to agree with Cameroon that an
equitable solution should be given a chance- as my colleagues have already said- a solution
which would not result in the total deprivationof the rights of one of the Statesconcerned inthe
area for delimitation butwould only limit theirgeographical scopein orderto take accountof the
rights ofthe other States.
O 2. Pursuingan equitable result
27. To achieve a result in any delimitationin the Gulf of Biafra, Cameroon considersthat
two principles which are widely supportedby case law must be respected. First, the principleof
non-encroachment,which aimsto avoid thecut-off effect, and second,the need to take accountof
the competing rights resulting from the overlap of reciprocal claims. 1 shall examine these two
principles intum.
(1) Theprinciple ofnon-encroachment
28. The principle of non-encroachment, laiddown by the Courtin its 1969Judgment inthe
North Sea Continental Shelf cases28 and reiterated inter alia in its 1985Judgrnent in the
27~.~.R.eport1969,p.49,para.90.
28~.~.R.eport1969,p.53,para101.Libya/Malta case29,signifies, as noted in 1992 by the Court of Arbitration in the case conceming
the Delimitationof MaritimeAreasbetweenCanadaandthe FrenchRepublic,
"that the delimitation must leave to a State the areas that constitute the natural
prolongation or seaward extensionof its coasts, so that the delimitation must avoid
anycut-off effectof thoseprolongationsor seaward extension^"^^.
A certain cut-offof the projectionof the respective coastsof the States concernedin the areato be
delimitedis inherentin any delimitationin an area of competingclaims. In the present case, such
an effectis inherentin the merepresenceof Bioko Island,as was the case for Canadaowingto the
presence of the islands close to the Newfoundland coast3',or for France owingto the presence of
the Channel Islands close to its Channel coasts. In the Gulf of Biafra, there is one single
continental shelf. It cannot be regarded as exclusivelybelonging to Cameroon,or as exclusively
belonging to Equatorial GuineaorNigeria. Cameroonisawarethat even an equitable solutionwill
inevitablycut off part of what would have beenthe rightsof the various Statesif the geographical
configurationhad been different. But the geographical configurationis what it is, and leadsto a
natural limitation of each State'srights. [ProjectionNo. 157.1 What Carneroonwishes to avoid,
yet without prejudging the outcome of its negotiations with Equatorial Guinea, is a radical and
absolute cut-off of the projection of its coastal fiont, as shown by the sketch-map now being
projected, evenwherethis projectionis possiblewhile respecting thecompetingrights of the other
States. This maritimeprojectionof Cameroon's Coastis possible in this case in the part situated
north-east ofBioko far out to sea.
29.The systematicapplicationof equidistanceinthis case would result forCameroonin the
dreaded cut-offeffect. The cut-offwould be cripplingandnot partial or limitedinscope.
(2) A situationof overlappingcompetingrights
30.Involving,moreover, anarea wherethere areoverlapping claimsandrights, the effect of
the application of equidistance would be to "cause areas which are the natural prolongation or
29~.~.Reports 1985,pp. 39and46.
30~wardof 10June1992,inRGDIP, 1992-1993,p. 696,para.58; EnglishtranslationappearinginInternational
Legal MaterialsILW, Vol. 31, 1992,p.1167,para.58.
3'~bid. extensionofthe temtory of one Stateto be attributedto an~ther"~~t,o borrow the termsused by the
Court in its 1969Judgment. In Cameroon'scase, it would attribute al1these areasto other States,
in contraventionof the establishedulesof maritime delimitationlaw andState practice. Never in
the maritime delimitation cases they have had to deal with, have the Court and international
tribunals agreed to confine a coastal State soarrowly within the limits of its temtorial sea or
scarcelybeyond them. Nor have theyever applied pure equidistance.
31.Cameroon is asking the Courtin thiscase to determine thelimit of the respectiverights
of thetwo Parties to the case and to allow it to delimit, with the intervening State, their joint
maritime boundary through negotiation. In this way, Nigeria will know the maritime space
attributedto it within themaritime areafor delimitationandCameroonand EquatorialGuinea will
have to determineby agreement theirrespective areas in the remainder. By doing this,the Court
will settlethe dispute submitted to it without prejudicing thelegal interests of Equatorialea.
Any other approach, notably accedingto the wishes of the intervening State and the opposing
Party, which are urging the Court not to delimit, or better still to apply equidistance, wouldbe
tantamountto the Courtabandoningitsmissionto administer internationaljustice inthe interestsof
0 4 6 peace or applying an inequitable rnethod in this case. For it is not the geography which is
"unfavourable" in this case, but the mechanical applicationof pure equidistance. [End of the
projection.]
Thankyou, Mr.President, Membersof the Court, for your attention. May 1ask you to cal1
ProfessorMendelsontothe Bar, afiera shortbreakperhaps. Thank you,Mr. President.
ThePRESIDENT: Thank you,Professor Kamto. Thesitting issuspended fortenminutes.
The Courtadjournedffom 11.35a.m.to 11.45a.m.
Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. La séanceest reprise, et je donne maintenantla
parole à M.Maurice Mendelson.
32C.J Report1969,p. 1,para44 M. MENDELSON
IV. CONSIDÉRATION SSR LE TRIPOINT
1.Introduction
1. Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, j'aurai l'honneur de traiter
devantvous deux thèmes. Mes collèguesles ont déjàévoqués jusqu'àun certain point, mais je
penseque les éventuelles«zonesde chevauchement)) vous semblerontmineures.
2. Mon premier argumentest quela Cour n'estpas compétentepour fixer un tripointou une
quelconque«zone du pointtriple)). Le deuxièmeest que, pour desraisons que je vais exposer, la
Couresttout à fait en mesurede donnereffetà lalignedu Cameroun sansporter atteinteaux droits
ouintérêtd se laGuinée équatoriale.
3. Bien que liésdansune certainemesure, mesdeux argumentssontcependantdistincts. Car
même si la Cour faisait droit au premierelon lequelelle n'est pas compétentepour déterminer
un tripointou une zone dupoint trip-, elle pourraitnéanmoinsdécider,enthéorie,que le risque
subsisteque notre ligne empiètesur des eaux relevant, ou susceptiblesde relever, de la Guinée
équatoriale.Je montreraidonc égalementque a) la«zonedu pointtriple))de la Guinéeéquatoriale,
tellequ'elle est représentsur les cartes2à 9 quecette dernièrea jointes au dossier d'hier, n'a
pratiquementrien àvoir avec la ligne quele Camerounpropose comme frontièremaritimeavec le
Nigéria, etqueb) la plusgrandepartie dela ligne équitabletraverseen faitdes eaux quela Guinée
équatorialene revendiquepas. Pour ce qui est de lazone, limitée,dans laquelleil pourraity avoir
conflitentre lesrevendicationsduCamerounet cellesde la Guinéeéquatoriale,nous affirmonsque
cettedernièreest suffisammentprotégée par le fait qu'aucune décisionque cette Cour rendra en
l'espèce nepourra lui porter atteinte et que, de surcroît, si la Cour devaitestimer que la Guinée
équatorialene jouit pas d'une protection suffisante, les moyens existent de lui accorder toute la
protectionquecelle-cipourraitraisonnablementexiger.
2. La Cour n'est pas compétentepour fixer un tripoint
4. En premier lieu, donc, nous estimons que la Cour n'est pas compétentepour fixer un
tripoint.Il s'ensuit qu'ellene peut arrêtelra ligne fro-tila frontière entre leCamerounet le
Nigéria- à un tripoint, puisqu'ellene peut fixer ledit tripoint. Bien entendu, nous n'allons pas jusqu'à dire que, dans l'absolu,la Cour ne devrait pas tenir compte de l'existenced'un éventuel
tripoint lorsqu'elle détermineune ligne : c'est là un procédé courant qui a étéutilisétant par la
Cour que par les tribunaux d'arbitrage,et dans un grand nombred'affaires. M. Colson vous en a
cité quelques exemples hier33.Le Camerounen conclut toutefoisque la Courn'a pas compétence
*
pour fixer un tripoint (elle peut en tenir compte, s'il existe, mais pas le fixer), car c'est là une
conséquenceinéluctable desdispositionsdu Statut et du Règlementde la Cour - telle est en tout
cas l'interprétationconstante que celle-ci en a donnédans sa propre jurispmdence. La doctrine
appuie cette conclusion et la Guinée équatorialele reconnaît elle-même. Permettez-moi de
m'expliquer.
5.Monsieurle président, quellesquesoient lespossibilitésinitialementouvertespar l'article
62 duStatut, lajurisprudence dela Cour est désormaisclaire :un Etat autorisé àintervenirn'est en
aucun cas liépar l'arrêtqui sera finalement rendu s'il n'intervient pasen qualitéde partie à
l'instance. La Guinéeéquatoriales'est pleinement prévalue de son droit d'interveniren tant que
non partie, tantdans ses piècesécritesque lors de ses plaidoiries34.M. Dupuya particulièrement
insistt: sur le fait que ((l'arrêtde la Cour ne sera de toute façon pas opposable à la
Guinéeéquatoriale; enapplicationde l'article 59 de votre Statut,cet arrêtne saurait avoir d'effet
qu'entre les partieà l'instance». Il a d'ailleurs insistde nouveau sur ce point au paragraphe 15,
affirmantnotammentque ((l'interventionne constituepas une exception au principe du fondement
f 4)4 8 consensueldc la compétencede la courg5. Nombre de ses propos vont d'ailleurs dans le même
sens. 113 souligneque la Guinéeéquatorialene demandaitpas à la Cour de déterminersa frontière
maritimc a\cc le Cameroun -ce qu'elle pouvait faire elle-même,a-t-il dit, par voie de
négoîi~tion3'
6. Le Cameroun est entièrementd'accord avecla Guinéeéquatoriale : le fondement de la
cornpetencede la Cour est essentiellementconsensuel. Tel est ce qui ressort du paragraphe 1 de
l'article 36 du Statut; tel est ce qui ressort du paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 du Statut. Je doute,
'jCR2002121,p. 38-40, par.27-33.
j4Voir,parexemple,ibidp,. 27,par.29;p.37-38et40-41,par.25et35;p.52-53,par.4.et
j5Ibid .,56,par.15.
j6Ibid .,61,par.24.d'ailleurs, qu'ilfaillerappeleà la Cour qu'elle s'esttoujours opposéeà ce que des tierces parties
soient impliquées malgré ellesdans une instance sans y avoir consenti, ne serait-ce
qu'indirectement :voir par exemple l'affaire del'Or monétaire3',et mêmel'affaire de la Carélie
orientale3*,dans laquellela Cour permanentede Justice internationaleétaitappelée à exercer ses
attributions consultatives. C'est parce qu'il craignait de porter atteinte aux intérêtsde la
Guinéeéquatoriale que leCameroun s'est abstenude formuler une revendication contre cet Etat,
qu'il s'est abstenu de préciser l'étendue totalee ses espaces maritimes (car il aurait ce faisant
préjugé un éventueldifférend avec laGuinéeéquatoriale),et qu'il a demandé à la Cour de ne pas
procéder à une réaffectation globaledes espaces maritimes, mais simplement de déplacerla
branche nigérianede la pince, pour ainsi dire - en d'autres termes,il a demandé à la Cour de
tracerune ligne qui,compte tenu de la situationgéographiqued'ensemble dansle golfe de Guinée
et la baie deBonny,offre une solution équitableau Cameroun et au Nigéria,et uniquement àces
deuxEtats.
7. Mais c'est là,Monsieur leprésident,un argument à doubletranchant. Si la Courn'estpas
compétentepour rendre,sur la frontière entrele Camerounet la Guinée équatoriale une décision
qui soit contraignantepour cette dernière, alorselle nel'est pas non plusyr rendre une décision
sur cette même frontière qui obligerait le Cameroun vis-à-vis de la Guinée équatoriale.C'est
pourtantexactementce qui seproduiraitsi ellejugeaitqu'il existeun tripointentre lestroisEtats,et
à fortiori dans ce qu'on appellela «zone du point triple)),à laquelle la Guinéeéquatoriale s'est
constamment référéh eier, verbalement et sur les diagrammes qu'elle a présentés.Ce qu'elle a
commodémentappelé «la banane jaune)). Car un tripoint c'est, bien entendu, le point où trois
frontièrescoïncidentet convergent. Une frontière - entre la Guinéeéquatorialeet le Nigéria- a
déjàété presque intégralemenctonvenue dans ce secteur, pour autant que cela puisse nous
intéresseren l'affaire. La deuxième frontière -entre leCameroun et le Nigéria- est l'objet
mêmede la présenteinstance et doit encore être déterminée par vos soins, bien entendu. La
troisième frontièreest celle qui séparele Camerounet la Guinéeéquatoriale,et le conseil de la
Guinéeéquatoriale n'aeu de cesse de répéter qu'elln ee vous intéressaiten rien : les deux Etats
" C.I.J.Recue1954,p. 19.
'*C.P.J.I. série 5 (923). devrontladéterminerpar eux-mêmes, pav roiede négociation, aditle conseil-etje meréfère en
particulier la déclarationde monami M.Dupuy,auparagraphe24 (CR2002/21). Ce qu'ilvous a
dit en substance- mais de manière bien plus élégante, celava sans dire-, c'est que cette
troisième frontièrene vous regardait absolument pas. Cependant, si tel est le cas- et
malheureusementc'estbien le cas,étantdonnéque la Guinée équatorialeachoisi d'intervenir sans
pour autant devenir partiel'instanc-, alors Madameet Messieurs de la Cour, vous.ne pouvez
ni fixeruntripointprécis, ni mêmeger qu'ilexisteune zone où untripoint doit exister,parceque
celareviendraitàconsidérerune frontièrequisort du cadrede votre compétence.
8. Voilàun point, selonnous, trèsimportant,et surlequel nousne saurionstrop insister. Il
ne s'agit pas d'un simple@se dixit du Cameroun. C'est une conséquence inéluctabletant des
conclusions de la Guinée équatorialque du droit en matière d'interventiontel que la Cour l'a
développé. Il s'ensuit quela Guinéeéquatorialen'a pas le droit de demandàrla Cour de faire
descendre la ligneàpartir du poinH jusqu'à ce qu'elle appellela «zone du point triple)),ni de
s'abstenir de statuersur la ligne équiduCameroundans cetterégion parcrainte qu'ilsoitporté
atteinteauxdroitsde la Guinéeéquatoriale.
3. Leszones revendiquée(sounon)parlaGuinée équatoriale
9. Ce qui me mène à notre seconde conclusion, qui est que, pour les raisons que je
développerai dansun instant, la Cour est en mesure de confirmer la ligne revendiquéepar le
Camerounsansporteratteinteaux droits ni auxintérêtse la Guinée équatoriale.
10.Commençonspar signalerque, pourl'essentiel, la lignedu Camerounne traversepas les
eaux revendiquéespar la Guinée équatoriale.[Débutde la projection.] Vous voyez apparaître
devant vous un diagramme qui illustre mes conclusions, diagramme qui figure également à
l'onglet 158de votre dossier. A vrai dire, ce diagrammea déjàprojetéce matin. Je feraibien
de préciserqu'il aété établipartir du graphique quiporte le no7 dans le dossier d'audience que
vous a communiqué hierla Guinéeéquatoriale. Des chiffres et des lettres ont simplementété
ajoutésafin de présenterun tableau plus complet. Lespoints représensar des chiffresromains
r O 5 O
allant de i à x sont ceux indiqués à l'article 2 du traité de délimitation maritimeconclule23 septembre2000 entre le Nigériaet la Guinéeéquatoriale39.Les lettres sont celles du croquis
figurantà l'onglet 100du dossier d'audienceprésentépar le Cameroundans le cadre du différend
qui l'oppose au Nigéria, à ceci près que nous en avons ajouté trois - et je vous prierai de
m'excuserpour cette complication, encorequej'ose espérerque cette démarche serévèlera utile.
«A» représente l'extrémité orientale de ce que la Guinéeéquatoriale appelle la «zonedu point
triple)); NB))son extrémitéoccidentale; et «CHle point où la ligne médianeentre la Guinée
équatoriale et leNigériacroise la ligne conventionnelleétablieentre la Guinée équatoriaet Sao
Tomé-et-Principe.
11. Puis-je tout d'abord attirer votre attention sur les zones représentéespar des lignes
verticales vertes Je pense qu'elles apparaissent relativement clairementsur cette carte, et
peut-êtreplus clairement encore, du moins je l'espère,dans votre dossier. Vous verrez que ces
zones sont au nombre de deux, une à chaque extrémité, sijpuis m'exprimer ainsi. L'une d'elles
-celle situéeen haut à droite, au nord-e-t a pour base la ligne médiane; elleest délimitéepar
lespoints A-G-H-H'-B-A. [Montrer zone.] L'autre - au sud-ouest,ou à l'extrémité situéenbas
à gauche - a égalementpourbasela lignemédiane. Déterminesronétendueexactevers l'ouestet
le sud n'est pas chose aisée, enpartie enraison du changement d'angleau point C entre la ligne
médianeet la ligne conventionnelleentre laGuinéeéquatorialeet Sao Tomé-et-Principe m; ais aux
fins qui nous occupent actuellementpeu nous importe sa délimitationexacte, et l'on peutdire de
laditezone qu'elleest,grosso modo,circonscritepar les points"-C-K-J-1". [Montrerzone.]
12. Ce qu'ont en commun ces deux zones,c'est donc d'être situées an uord de la ligne
médiane. La Guinée équatoriale vous a déjà confirmé que ses prétentions s'arrêtent la ligne
médiane :c'estce queprévoit saproprelégislation.Il s'ensuitque la ligne équitableduCameroun,
indiquéeen rouge, traverse, dans ces deux zones, des eaux qui ne sont aucunementrevendiquées
par la Guinéeéquatoriale.Vous constatereznotammentque le point H est fort éloignde la ligne
médiane, maiségalementde la zone dite du point triple, surlignéeen jaune. Autrement dit,les
zones portant des lignes verticales vertes ne sont nullement,je le répète, revendiquéepsar la
Guinéeéquatoriale.Etc'est là un pointqui ne semblepas être contesté.
39DN,vol.VIII,annexeDN 174,p1501. 13. J'en viens maintenant aux zones portant des rayures vertes horizontales. 11s'agit de
0 Q5f
zones situéesau sud de la ligne médiane. Quela Guinée équatorialn ee continue pas pourautantà
revendiquer. Car,vous le savez, la Guinéeéquatoriale aconcluen 2000 un accord de délimitation
avec le Nigéria. Commel'a relevémon ami M.Cot, le passagepertinent de l'article4 de ce traité
a
dispose :«Au nord et à l'ouest de la frontière maritimeétablie parle présenttraité,la République
de Guinéeéquatoriale ne revendiquera ni n'exercerd ae droits souverains ou son autoritésur les
eaux ni sur les fonds marinset le sous-sol.»Traductiondu Grefle.) Autrement dit, aunord de la
ligne bleu foncé- la ligne conventionnell- la Guinéeéquatorialea renoncé à ses droits. Hier,
mon amiM. Dupuy a tentéde nousconvaincreque la Guinée équatorialen'avaip tas renoncé à ses
prétentionssur ces eaux vis-à-visdu Cameroun. Mais, Monsieurle président,la nuancene ressort
nullementde ce traité,etje ne vois aucuneraisonde le récrire,-de récrireun libellétrès clair
à seule fin de corroborer la thèseque soutient aujourd'hui la Guinée équatoriale.Mon ami et
collègueM. Pellet a examiné dansle détailcettequestion le 25 février,etje ne reviendraipas sur
l'intégralitde son argumentation4'. Ainsiu, ne fois de plus, la ligne du Cameroun netraversepas
des eaux revendiquées par laGuinéeéquatoriale, -à une petite exception près, nous le
reconnaissons.
14. Cette exception, relativement mineure, concerne la zone circonscrite par les points
H7'-1-1'-vi-HY'-la régionmarquéeen rouge sur le graphique8 soumis par la Guinéeéquatoriale;
une zone de quelque 34 kilomètrescarrés. C'est une régionà propos de laquelle le conseil du
Cameroun a parléle 25 février, de chevauchement41 - légerlapsus, qui n'a certainementpas été
délibérémen trtompeur. Cela dit,la Guinée équatoriale toutà fait raiso:il ne s'agitpas au sens
strict d'une zone de chevauchementpuisqu'elle est situéeau nord de la ligne du Cameroun,de
sorte qu'elle n'est pas revendiquée par le Cameroun, mais par la Guinéeéquatoriale. Reste,
Monsieur le président,que mis à part ce tout petit segment- tout petit segment-, la ligne
avancéepar le Cameroun traverse dans son intégralité -nous le répétons- des eaux que la
Guinéeéquatorialn ee revendiquepas. Il s'agitdetoute la lignequi va dupoint G au poinK et au-
delà, abstraction faite du segment dont je viens de parler. Soit dit en passant, cela signifie
40CR200216, notammenatuxpages64-65,par.24-26.
41Ibid.,p.68,par.36.égalementque la zone des intérêtd se la Guinéeéquatorialeinvoquée par M.Dupuy, zone grisée
sur la carte19présentée hier, est inexacte dansla mesure où elle comprendles régionshachurées
surle diagrammedont nousnous occupons à présent.
15. Permettez-moide dire d'emblée quenous n'en avonspas fini pour autant. Pas du tout
fini, commeje le montrerai dans un instant. Mais c'est un fait capital qu'il convientde garder
présent àl'esprit:les eauxque traversela ligneéquitable nesont donc pasrevendiquées, fût-cepar
la Guinée équatoriale.Ellesle sontpeut-êtrepar leNigéria, mais celane concernepas la Guinée
équatoriale.Les six situationsfrontalièresévoquéeh sier par M.Colson et illustréesà l'onglet 10
de son dossier sont donc dans une autre catégorie. Dans chacune d'entre elles, prolonger la
frontièreentre les deux Partiesà l'instancerevenaità la faire passer dans des zones revendiquées
par un Etat riers (intervenant ou non): ainsi, dans l'affaire Qatar c. Barheïn, on risquait, en
prolongeant la ligne jusqu'à un éventuel point tripleavec l'Arabie saoudite, d'empiéter surdes
zones re\endiquéespar l'Arabie saoudite, mais tel n'est pas le cas en l'espèce. Sibien que les
prétendus interêtsde la Guinéeéquatorialene constituent pas uneraison suffisantepourmotiver, de
lapan de 13Cour, le refus deconfirmerla lignerevendiquéepar le Cameroun.
b Reste que le fait que la ligne du Camerountraverse des eaux non revendiquéespar la
Guinrteeqlistoriale, s'il est important, ne règlebien évidemment pasla question. Car la zone
figuric dan> un bleu plus vifsur notre diagramme(encoreplus vif dans votre dossier, Monsieur le
président)- ce sont leseauxqui entourentBioko(avec leursfonds marinset leur sous-sol) etdont
je parlc ii:-. cette zone est naturellement revendiquéepar la Guinée équatoriale. Déclare lr
ligne du C arncroun(ou toute autre ligne de même nature) valable erga omnesreviendrait, pour la
Cour. a an:i;iper les droitsrevendiquéspar la Guinéeéquatorialeet àleur porter atteinte. Mais le
Cameroun r.'aévidemment pas demandé à la Cour de se prononcer erga omnes; et la Guinée
équatorialeinsiste à bon droit sur le fait que la Cour n'est pas compétente pour rendrepareille
décisionquand elle-mêmen'a pas accepté sajuridiction. Sur cette question au moins, les trois
Etats qui comparaissent devant vous sont tout à fait d'accord. En résumé,si nous posons la
question : ((Confirmerla ligne du Cameroun implique-t-il que l'on considère automatiquement
l'ensembledes eaux situéesau sud de cette lignecomme camerounaises ?», la réponse est«non»,
catégoriquement«non». De même,confirmerla lignerevendiquée parle Cameroun (ou une ligne de mêmenature) n'empêche enaucun cas la Guinée équatorialede revendiquer les eaux
représentées sunrotre diagramme dansun bleu plus vif- c'est-à-dire les eaux entourant Bioko,
avec leursfondsmarins et leursous-sol.
17.Afin de dissiper toute équivoque,le Camerounsoulignequ'il n'acceptepas pour autant
.-
dansleurintégralitétoutesles demandes de la Guinéeéquatoriale.Mais comme1'Etatintervenant
s'est lui-mêmeévertué à vous le rappeler, il veut instamment réglercette questionpar lavoie des
négociations bilatéraless,ansrecourir au règlementjudiciare. Le Camerounest d'accord avec la
Guinéeéquatorialesur ce point, d'autantque le règlementpar tierce partie est impossible en
l'absence du consentement de la Guinéeéquatoriale. Et s'il doit y avoir des négociations
bilatérales et il faudra bien, tôt ou tard,en passer par-,àalors nul besoinpour le Cameroun
i O 5 3 de dévoiler sonjeu à l'avance. Je me permettrai cependant de dire à l'agent de la Guinée
équatorialequi a laisséentendreque le Cameroun revendiquerait un espace allantjusqu'au littoral
même del'île deioko~',qu'ila en l'occurrenceexagéré.La Guinéeéquatoriales'est enorgueillie,
danssesconclusions, de défendreune position rai~onnable~~E . llepeut comptersur un Cameroun
tout aussiraisonnableet sérieux.
18. Cela étant,je répèteque si vous confirmez formellement laligne que revendique le
Camerounface au Nigéria(ou une ligne semblable), cela n'empêche absolumenp tas la Guinée
équatorialede revendiquerl'un quelconquedes espaces maritimesqui sont ombrésen bleu vif sur
notrediagramme. C'est une évidencepourquiconqueconnaîtun tant soitpeule droit international
et sait que seules les parties sont liéespar la décisionqui est finalement rendue. Et il est peu
probableque la Guinée équatoriale doivele rappeler à des Etats tiers ouà des concessionnaires
éventuels- ni les uns, ni les autres ne sont assez naïfs. Le Camerouna toujours pris les tierces
parties pour ce qu'elles sont- de simples tierces parties- et n'a certainementjamais voulu
induirequiconqueen erreur - qu'il s'agissed'un Etatagissanten tant que tel ou d'un investisseur
potentiel- quantaux incidencesde l'arrêq tue le Cameroun espèrevoir la Courrendre finalement
sursafrontièremaritimeavec leNigéria. [Finde projection.]
42CR2002121p ,. 20,par.10.
43Voir,parex.ibid.,p.62,par.26. 19.Monsieur le président,il me reste un dernier point à évoqueravant de conclure. Etje
pèche ici par excès de prudence. Nous avons conclu que, pour les raisons que nous avons
exposées, rien n'empêchela Cour de confirmer la ligne équitabledans son intégralité. Cela
vaudrait également,mutatismutandis, pour touteligne similaire que la Cour voudrait finalement
retenir. Mais nous devonsaussi envisager lecas où la Courdéciderait, quellequ'en soit la raison,
de rejeternotre conclusionen partie, en disantque si certainssegmentsde la ligneprésentée parle
Camerounsont acceptables,d'autresne le sontpas. Parexemple,imaginonsque laCour estime, en
dépitdenos conclusions,que certainespartiesdenotre lignesont susceptiblesdeporter atteinteaux
droits et intérêtségitimesde la Guinéeéquatoriale. Monsieurle président,mon ami M.Pelleta
déjà dit, tout spécialementle 25 février,comment la Cour devrait, selon lui, régler un tel
problème44e ,t il a évoqué plusieurs possibilités. En particulier, il a dit que la Cour pourrait, en
pareil cas, laisser indéterminé un segment, - voire plusieurs segments - de la ligne45. En
réponse,le conseil duNigériaa accueillicettepropositionavec mépris,mais en réalitéil n'ya là
rien de fondamentalementimpossible ni de déraisonnable.Certes, le tracéd'une frontièreest en
général continu, mais il n'y arien d'illogiqueà considérerqu'une partie,une partie seulement,de
la frontièrepuisse être déterminée, à un moment donné,par une tierce partie. Par exemple, le
plateau continental entre la France et le Royaume-Uni n'aétédélimité que partiellement par le
tribunald'arbitrage46,lereste ayant été délimitéplus tard. Cette idéeest encore une fois illustrée
par les affaires de délimitationde frontièreque la Guinéeéquatoriale a citées hier,comme la
délimitationdes deux extrémitéd se la frontièreen l'affairetaret Bahreïn. L'onconstate queces
frontières sont,par définition, l'aboutissemendt'un longprocessus qui exige plusieurs étapes. Et
nous ne voyons pas pourquoilaisser un segmentnon déterminé dans la ligne camerouno-nigériane
causerait des problèmesinsurmontables, à fortiori vis-à-visde la Guinéeéquatoriale, lorsqu'ilest
communément admisque la frontière appelle des négociations. J'insiste cependant: nous
n'évoquonsce point quedans un soucid'exhaustivité.Pour le Cameroun,ce problèmene se pose
pas etne devrait pas seposer.
44CR200216,p. 68-72, par.36-48.
4Ibid.,p. 70, p42.
4OrganisationdesNations Unies,Recueildessentencesarbitrales(RSA),1977,XVIII p. 155. 4. Remarquesfinales
20. Voicimes observationsfinales. Nous avons essayéde démontrerqu'inéluctablement,le
faitque la Guinéeéquatorialeinterviennesans êtrepartie l'instance signifiequ'elle ne peut vous
demanderni de fixer un tripoint,ni une«zonedu point triple)),et encoremoins de tracerjusque
la ligne du Cameroun. Nous avons égalementconclu que rien,dans les faits de l'affaire,ne vous i
empêchede confirmer la ligne du Cameroun,non seulementen raison de l'article 59 du Statut,
mais égalementau vu des circonstancespropres àl'espèce,et tout particulièrementdu fait que la
lignecamerounaisene traversepas, pour l'essentiel,d'espacesmaritimes revendiquéspar la Guinée
équatoriale. Confirmerla ligne du Cameroun ne porteraitpas atteinte aux droits de la Guinée
équatorialelorsde ses futuresnégociationsavecle Camerounau sujet deseaux entourant Biokoet
laposition dela Guinéeéquatorialevis-à-vis d'autres Etatsn'en seraitpasaffaiblie.
21.Monsieur leprésident,Madameet Messieursde laCour, tout aulong de cette procédure,
le Camerouns'est montré respectueuxdu statutde la Guinéeéquatorialeen tant que non-partie à
l'instanceet il a scrupuleusementveilàéce querien ne porteatteinteàsesdroits ou intérêts.La
I 4)5 5 ligne équitablequ'il propose n'empêchepas la Guinée équatoriale de continuer a défendrece
qu'elle estime êtreses droits, et ne la désavantage pasnon plus dans les négociations,la voie
qu'elle veut suivre de préférencà celle de votrejuridiction. Le Camerounvous demande donc
respectueusementde confirmerla lignequ'ilpropose.
22. Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, je vous remercie de votre
bienveillanteattention. Voilàqui metn terme aux conclusionsdu Cameroundans cepremiertour
deparole consacré à l'intervention. A présent,je vous prie,Monsieur le président,de bien vouloir
appeler àla barre mon ami M.Thouvenin qui se penchera pendant une dizainede minutes sur les
demandesreconventionnellesdu Nigéria,commeconvenu.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you ver= much, ProfessorMendelson. That indeed closes 4
Carneroon'sfirst-round observations on Equatorial Guineaintervention. We shall now go on to
Cameroon's secondroundoforal argumentonNigeria'scounter-claims. ProfessorThouvenin,you
have thefloor. Mr. THOUVENIN: Thank you,Mr. President.
NIGERIA' CSOUNTER-CLAIMS
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, it falls to me to present Cameroon's final
observationsonNigeria'scounter-claims.
2. Last Thursday, ProfessorCrawford expressed regretat the fact that Cameroonhad failed
to follow him down the meandering pathof his firststatement, devotingjust afewminutes - one
eyeon the clock - to rebuttinghis arguments4'.
3. Our reply would doubtless have been a fuller one if Cameroonhad been faced with a
serious foray ont0 the terrain of the charges leviedagainst it, andtheir proof. But, in terrns of that
terrain, ProfessorCrawford'sfirst-round statementwas, on his own admission,barelymore than a
"little excursion into the realm of factYA8. And we can hardly criticize him for this; as Our
opponentshavemorethanonce pointedout: "a lawyer'sopinionis as good as his brief'"19.
I 056 4. In his reply, ProfessorTomuschatfirst soughtto dispelthe misleading impressioncreated
byNigeria's oral argument5'. That is why he retumed in particularto the 1981 incident. And that
proved to be not unhelpful for, ultimately, thedistinguished CO-Agentofthe Federal Republic of
Nigeria franklyadmittedto you lastThursdaythatthe incidentshad in fact taken place in Bakassi,
andnot on the Nigerian sideof the~kwa~afe~'.Thus it wasCameroonwho was right.
5. ProfessorTomuschatalsorepliedto certainargumentsconcemingthe evidentiaryvalueof
thedocumentsannexedtothe counter-claim. Thatwas too brieffor Nigerian counsel'staste. 1will
thereforeretm to this point, addressing,first,thewitness statementsof which Ouropponentsmake
somuch and,second,theirstatisticalestimatesofthe casualtieson eitherside.
4 7 ~2002120,p. 36, paras.2-4 (Crawford).
4 8 ~2002114,p. 54,para.22 (Crawford).
4 9 ~2002118, p. 23,para.24 (Akin;iCR 2002120,p. 67, para. 7(Abdullahi).
''CR 2002116,pp. 66-69,paras. 38-47(Tomuschat).
"CR 2002118,p. 26, para.34 (Akinjide).1. The witnessstatements
6. Mr.President, examining the annexes containing the witness statements which in
Professor Crawford7sview areso damningfor cameroon5*,thefirstthing wenote is that notone of
themwas made under oath.
7. Nigeria thus took the gamble that informai statements would suffice to found its
responsibilityclaims. It wasa risky gamble. It is perhaps not unhelpful to recall herethat, in the
caseof Flexi-VanLeasing,Inc. v. the Iran-United StatesClaims Tribunalrefusedto uphold
a liabilityclaimfounded on: "a vague affidavit,unexplainedbyoral testimony". AndtheTribunal
added: "To doso wouldbe arbitrary andimproper."54
8. But let us return to these informa1depositions. Thereare quite a few of them,and they
have clearly been prompted. Moreover, they present a certainuniformity, the majority of them
havingbeen draftedby a limitednumberofhands. That is notdeniedbyNigeria's co~nsel~~.
9. Butthatis al1weknow. We donotknow, for example,what werethe questionsput to the
witnesses. Were they "leading" questions, which automatically invitethe replies which the
questioner expectsS6. Were they posed in the over-militarized and somewhat oppressive
environmentdepictedin thenumerousphotographsof BakassiannexedbyNigeria to itspleadings?
Thatis a possibilitythat cannotbe discounted.
10.Al1themore so inasmuch asthestatementswere takenby individualswhoseidentityand
status are unknown. Moreover, Nigeria has been at pains not to take responsibility for those
persons' actions,to attest to their probity,or to guarantee the authenticity of their transcriptionof
the depositions. In short, al1the circumstances inwhich the "witness statements" were soughtout,
taken down andthen transmittedto theNigerianGovemmentremainmysterious.
11. But even supposing that the statementswere taken under proper conditions, it will be
clear to the Court that they al1corne from individuals claimingNigerian nationality. But: "We
8
5 2 2002114,p. 55, paras.25-26, p. 56, para.28 (Cra;fCR2002120,p. 36,paras.6-7 (Crawford).
L
53~lexi-~anLeasing, Inc. v. Iran, decisionNo. 259-36-1, Il Oct.1986, Iran-UnitedStates ClaimsTribunals
Reports, vol. 12, 1(12 Iran-U.S. C.T.R.), p. 335.
54~bid,.355.
5 5 2002114, p.55, para. 25 (Crawford).
%ee, for example, J.-CW.itenberg, La théoriedes preuves devant les juridictions internationales, RCADI
(1939-11).Vol. 56,pp. 1-105, paras.78-79. should never lose sight of the fact that the witness, however honest he may be, risks being
unconsciouslyinfluenced bypoorly understood considerationsof patriotism."57
12. It is thus with extreme caution- to Saythe least- that these statements should be
approached. In the case concerningMilitary andParamilitary Activitiesin and against Nicaragua,
the Courtmoreoverpointed outthat:
"two forms of testimony which are regarded as prima facie of superior credibility are,
first the evidence of a disinterested witness- one who is not a party to the
proceedings and stands to gain or lose nothing fiom its outcorne- and secondly so
much of the evidence of a party as is against its own interest" (I.C.J. Reports 1986,
p. 43, para. 69).
13.No witness statement meetingthese criteriahas beenproduced by Nigeria.
2. Thestatisticalargument
14.1 now have to Saya few words about the extraordinarystatistical argument urged on you
by Professorcrawford5*. TheCourt will recall that this involved estimates of the numbers of dead
and injured on eitherside since 1991.
I 058 15.1will not enter into anydiscussion of the figures,eventhough Cameroonregardsthem as
worthless. 1 only ask myself if they include, arnong the Nigerian deaths, Mr. OkongAsuqo,
alleged to have drowned in a boating accident5'. 1 note also that they do not include missing
persons. Yet AnnexRC211refers to 123missing onthe Cameroonian side. Finally, 1note that, in
AnnexOCDR46 alone, five Cameroonian deaths are attributed to Nigeria, whereas
Professor Crawford'stotal, fromal1annexes, has onlythree.
16. The statistical argument that he put to you is clearly worthless, even for indicative
purposes. Not only because the figuresare unverifiable, sincethe sources have not been disclosed,
but also because Nigeria's counsel stated that his calculation included allegations "without
admitting that they necessarily al1are trueV6O.If Nigeria does not believe in its own allegations,
how couldthe Court do so?
"~bid .,90.
"CR 2002114,p. 54, para.21and p. 57,para. 31 (Crawford); CR2002/20,pp. 37-38, paras. 9-12 (Crawford).
59~ejoinderofNigeria, p. 750,and Ann.NR 215.
6 0 2002114,p. 57, para. 31(Crawford). 17.The fact remains that the armed conflict has undoubtedly caused losses on both sides.
We mustalso deplorethe civilian victims,since, as canbe seen fiom the photographsproducedby
d
Ouropponents,in which soldiersso visiblymingle withthe civilian population,Nigeriahas chosen
not to removethe latterfiom the combatzone.
&
18.But the resultanthumantragediesare entirely attributable to Nigeria, which,since 1994,
has constantlyprovokedclashes.
19.Or rather,it has provokeda war. Thus it wasprisoners of war thattheParties exchanged
on 24 November 1998, under the supervision of the Red cross6'. The latter's role, as always
exemplary, has not, moreover, been facilitated by Nigeria. While the ICRC welcomed "the
constructive dialogue it was able to establish with the High Authorities of the Republic of
Cameroon", italso regretted the conduct of Nigeria, which too ofîen refused without reason its
legitimaterequests6'. This is confirrnedbythe letter fromthe ICRC, whichyouwill findattab 159
in yourfoider.
30 \!'ha1 then remains of the image of "wicked Carneroon" that Nigeria has sought to
i 059
creale? Siceria's strongestargumentis that it has alwaysbeen in peaceful possessionof ~akassi~~
and thal. in consequence, whatever wrongdoing that may have taken place is attributable to
Cameroon Butthat claim isgroundless.
2 I In 1993 itdid not evenoccurtotheNigerian ForeignMinisterto makesuch a claim. His
purposc at thar timewas to negotiate asexpensively as possible the withdrawal ofNigeriantroops
from BriLrissi The letter of 17March 1994which disclosesthis [tab 160in your folder]canies an
extremcl) high probativevalue; itis signedby a third partyto the conflict, the Egyptian Foreign
Ministcr" He writes that his discussionswith the NigerianForeign Minister have addressedthe
condiriorisof n.ithdrawa1of the Nigerian forces from Bakassi. Would Nigeria have held such
discussions ifirconsideredthat its forceswere present ontemtory of which it had alwaysbeen in
+
peaceful possession? Of course not. Itstroops were never entitled to be in Bakassi, and itknew
61~upplernentayocumentsfiledby Cameroonon 10 Jan.2002,Ann.C 23.
62~nn.OCDR 43,quoted inCR2002116, p.69,para.46 (Tomuschat).
6 3 ~2002120,p.20, par7.(Abi-Saab).
64~bse~ationsofCarneroon,Ann.17.this, atleast in 1994. But theirwithdrawaldidnot takeplace. As a result,it is clearlyupon Nigeria
that theentire responsibilityforthe fightingrests, andforthe resultantlosses.
22. Mr. President, Membersof the Court, thatconcludes my statement for this moming,
deliveredwith an eyeon the clock,and 1thankyou mostwarmly for your attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thankyou, Professor. That endsthis morning's sitting.The nextsitting
will be held this afternoon at 3 p.m. We will hear Nigeria's reply to Equatorial Guinea's
observationsinthisfirstround ofargument. Thesittingis closed.
TheCourtrose ut 12.25p.m.
Traduction