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Uncorrected Translation

CR 2002122(traduction)

CR 2002122(translation)

Mardi 19mars2002à 10heures

Tuesday 19March2002 at 10a.m. The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open,and 1amgoing to givethe floorto
4)18
the Republic of Cameroonto presentits observationson thesubject-matterof EquatorialGuinea's
.

observationsin this case. 1give thefloorto ProfessorAlainPellet.

Mr. PELLET: Mr.President,Membersofthe Court.

1.INTRODUCTION -THE EFFECTSOFTHEINTERVENTION

1. The situation is clear. If anyone had been in doubt, the statements yesterday by our

fiiends fiom EquatorialGuinea have removed al1ambiguity: EquatorialGuinea is interveningin

this case atNigeria'side; it is inthe same interest,regardless,moreover,of the excellentrelations

between Cameroonand the intervening State. As stated by the Agent of Equatorial Guinea, its

"concem" relates- and appears to relate exclusively- to the line claimed by Cameroon

(CR 2002121,pp. 18-19,para. 4). Onthe Nigerian side, it ismore than happy, if 1maySayso,with

thetreaty it concludedon23 September2000.

2. Admittedly, Equatorial Guinea is fully aware that this treaty is more advantageous to

Nigeria thanto itself: it departs fiomthe equidistancelineinfavour ofNigeria andendorsesthe oil

practice which, itself, tended to favour Nigeria (CR 2002121,pp. 32-33, para. 10, Mr. Colson).

Essentially,EquatorialGuinea is exchangingtenitory (orwhat it considersto be such)for security

(or what ithopes is such). And itmay,Membersof the Court,regard thisas "equitable", even if it

is an apparently unequal equity since, after all, the law of the sea does not require an equal

apportionment of maritime areas, any more than, in general, it gives full effect to an island,

regardlessofwhich oneit is.

3. Thereal problem is not the inequalityresulting fiomthe line onwhich EquatorialGuinea

and Nigeria have agreed- to paraphrase counselof EquatorialGuinea, if that wasl1it was, it

would not concem us. Unfortunately, itdoes concem us, asthis exclusively "bilateral" line takes

no accountof Cameroon's rights. EquatorialGuinea has agreedwith Nigeria to confineCameroon

within an exiguous maritime area, which cannot pass as equitable in the eyes of an impartial

observer,regardlessofthe parametersused.
I 019
4. Whatwe areasking aboveall,Membersof the Court,is for "equityto be givena chance".

[Startof projectionof sketch-mapNo. 145- "the height ofiniquity".] This wouldnot be the case if you allowed yourselves to become obsessed by the "little yellow line", on which Equatorial

Guinea soughtto focus attentionyesterday. Youare not in the position of Bergotte in fiont of "the

little piece of yellow wall" in the View of Delft in TimeRegainedby Marcel Proust. The little

yellow linemustnot makeyou losesight of the blue line, the one of the treaty between Equatorial

Guinea and Nigeria, or the red line, the equitableline, which Cameroon is proposing to you, and

which the interveningStatewould likeyou to reject. Imagine,Mr. President,if the Court acceded

to the implicitdemands of EquatorialGuinea and,implicitly or explicitly,ixed the tripoint at the

western end of the yellow line on which Ouropponentssought to focus attention yesterday. The

sketch-mapwhich is projectedbehindme, and whichis No. 145 in thejudges' folder, shows what

the situation wouldbe onthe assumption - whichnevertheless 1 take the liberty ofmaking- that

Bakassi belonged to Cameroon. A mere glanceat this map shows that it would be the height of

iniquity.

5. Mr.President,weare goingto cover theseaspects ingreater detailsin the followingorder:

- Jean-PierreCot willdealwith therelevant geographicalanddiplomaticcontext;

- Maurice Kamto will then showwhy the methodused by Carneroonto draw the equitable line

does notmeritthe accusationslevelledatitbyEquatorialGuinea;

- Lastly, MauriceMendelsonwill demonstratethat it is certainlynot yourtask to fix the tripoint

but that, if you did so, itor rather they (as there would be two)- would certainlynot be

situatedonthe little yellow line. [Endof projection.]

6. Before that, 1 shall respond to my friend Pierre-MarieDupuy on the effects of the

interventionby EquatorialGuinea and, consequently,the Court'stask in this case. And 1shalldo

sofollowingthethree-pointplanwhichhe himselfadopted yesterday.

3 d)2 8 1. The allegedcontradictionsinCarneroon'sconceptionofintervention

7. Equatorial Guineaopts to begin by denouncingthe "contradictions" whichit allegedly

finds in what it tems "Cameroon's conception of intervention" (CR 2002121, pp. 54-56,

paras. 9-14).

8. Cameroon7sposition is wellknown: in Ourview, to make a completedeterrninationin a

maritime delimitationcase, in which a legal interest appertaining to a third partyis at issue, theCourtcannot rule unless that third party intervenes. On the otherhand, we considerthat if this is

the case, in otherwords if this third party intervenes,the Court,fully informed ofthis interest by

thatthird party,may make a completedetermination onthe submissionsof theparties, duly taking 8

accountof the legalinterestin question(see WrittenObservationsof Cameroon on the Application

by Equatorial Guinea for permission to intervene (OCGE), pp. 16-21, paras.50-64; and

CR2002/6,pp. 65-67, paras. 29-35).

9. My opponentsees "rhetorical cunning" (CR 2002121, p.54, para. 10)in this nevertheless

"reasonable" (a word the intervener is fond of) position for, he tells us, if that were so, the third

party"would no longerbe a third State!"(ibid.,para. 11). In otherwords, wewouldbe askingyou,

Membersof the Court, to make a complete determination"by propounding a claim which denies

thethird State'srights" (dixitcounselof EquatorialGuinea).

10. I fear our opponentmayhave misread ormisunderstoodou oral argumentsover the past

weeks, and in particular the one 1 devoted to the preservation of the rights of third parties on

25February. In that oral argument 1gavethe clearestpossible indication- and it is embarrassing

forme to quotemyself - that "[nlo one is more convincedthanthe Republic of Cameroonof the

needto preserve carefullythe rights of third parties inany maritime delimitation,includingwhere

such delimitation, for lack of an agreement, is effected through contentious

proceedings"(CR200216,p. 41, para.3), and 1 also said that the "final, complete and equitable

solutionwhich your Judgmentwill impose on the Parties and on them alone" must be arrived at

"onthe basis of full respect for the rightsof thirdparties, including,of course,those of Equatorial

Guinea" (ibid., p. 57, para.51). This obviously means that, when determining the maritime

boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (not between either of the Parties and Equatorial

Guinea), the Court will have to take account of the legal interest which Equatorial Guinea has

persuaded the Court may be affected. Furthermore, in that case, and in the unlikely event that,

despitewhat Cameroonhas alreadysaid- to whichmy colleagueswill revertthis morning-the

Courtwere to considerthat theequitableline prejudicesthat interest,it wouldhave to modifi that

line, or,perhaps evento thatextentrefkainfiom makinga ruling- but onlytothat extent.

11.There is no trompe-l'Œilin this argument,which isbothreasonableand in line with your

settledcase law - to whichthere is perhaps noneedto revert; a lot has already beensaid aboutit (see OCGE,pp. 17-19,paras. 52-59or CR200216,pp. 66-67, paras.31-32). Onthe 0th hand, let

me in a friendly way (in a friendly bfirm way) Sayto Professor Dupuy that he is engagingin

veritablesleight ofhandwhen claimingthat,ifthe Courtdid not stop wellshortofal1of theclaims

of Equatorial Guinea, as Guinea itself defines them that "sovereign State [would] witness the

delimitation of its own territory without its consent" (CR2002/21, p. 56, para. 14(2)). This is

wrong on two counts. Firstly, the Court would be in no way delimiting the tenitory of the

intervening State,whichwould not be boundbythejudgment. Secondlythis argumentassumesin

principlethat EquatorialGuinea is "at home"where it says it is at home;hat "its territory" is

such asit defines it itself: In so doing, it emptiesintervention under Article62 of al1substance.

And this leads me to the second point addressedyesterday by my leamed fiiend (CR2002121,

pp. 56-60,paras. 15-8),namely:

2. Thescope of intervention proceedingsunderArticle62 of theStatute

12.One onlylendsto therich, Mr. President- and 1amnot surethat Cameroonis asrich as

al1that- but, in any case, Equatorial Guinealends us a great deal (on paper),no doubt al1the

better toeprive us of Ourwealth in concreto. Professor Dupuy thus set out no less than four

propositions- falseones accordingto him- to describe, it would appear, what is allegedto be

our conceptionofinterventionunderArticle62,andhe relûtes them inthe followingterms:

"Interventionis not a proceduralmeans for institutingnew proceedings; nor is
it a form ofjoinder; nor isit a miracleanswer to the so-called 'indispensableparty'

argument; lastly,interventiondoes not constitutean exceptionto the principle of the
consensualbasisof the Court'sjurisdiction." (CR2002/21,p. 56,para. 15).
O 2 2
I We have now movedfrom Proustto Cervantés,as my learned fiend is here tilting at windmills:

we agree with al1that. It is the conclusions he draws, here and there, fromthese very sensible

propositionsthatwedisagreewith.

13.Mr. Dupuytells us:

"[wlhere the rights of C are liable to be affected by the legal solution of a dispute
between A and B, it is true that intervention will enable the Court to deliver its
judgment infullknowledgeof the factsandwithoutrisking darnageto therights ofthe

third State through lack of information" (CR2002121,p. 58, para. 15.2; emphasis
added).Quite. But the rightsof C (here EquatorialGuinea) must still be capableof being affected. And

thanks to the interventionof Equatorial Guinea,the Courtis in a positionfullyto appreciatethis, in

full knowledge of the facts. As 1 said a moment ago, if,after the very exhaustive information

supplied to you by the interveningStateon what it considersto be its rights, you were to consider,

Members of the Court, thatthose rights are threatened by the claims of either of the Parties, you

could eitheradopt a differentsolution,which preservesthem, or refrainfiom ruling on the point or

points which strike you as problematical. Whichever of these solutionsyou adopted,you would

not be adjudicating in any shape or fiom on the rights of Equatorial Guinea; you would only be

noting thatthose rightshavenot beenaffected.

14.It ishus hardlynecessary to addressthe questionwhether interventionmightrepresenta

solution tothe absenceof the "indispensable party" (alwaysassumingthat this theory has practical

significance). Some authorsdeny that this could be so; others think it could. But, in any event,

there is no question of the Court rulinon the rights of Equatorial Guinea; it only has to rule (or

even refrainfi-omruling)having regardto thoserights.

15.Mr. Dupuy makes great issue - and rightly so- of the approachto interventiontaken

by the Court"since," he says, "its Judgmentof 1990"(CR 2002121, pp.58-59, para. 15(3)). 1 am

not sure that this approachmarks a new departureby comparisonwith that previously prevailing,

which the Court adopted in the cases involvingthe interventionsof Malta and Italy in 1981and

1984. But let us consider the Judgment of 1990 on the intervention of Nicaragua in the case

between ElSalvadorandHonduras. Whatdid the Chamberof the Courtdecide? That Nicaragua

was authorizedto intemeneto the extentthat itmight be affected"by .. .[the Chamber's]decision

on the legalrégimeof the waters ofthe Gulfof Fonseca" (Judgment of 13September 1990,I.C.J.

Reports1990,p. 137,para. 105); andin its Judgment of 1992,it foundthat Nicaraguahad, in fact,

rights of "joint sovereignty"over the watersof the Gulf on theamebasis as the other two Parties

(1C..J. Reports1992,p. 601, para. 404; seealso pp. 616-617, para. 432.1). The Chamber did not

therefore in any way allowitself to be impeded by theidea that, in so doing, it was ruling on or

settlingtherights ofNicaragua.

16. And moreover, in its first Judgment, that of 1990, the Court again asked whether

Nicaragua's legal interestin this case constituted"the very subject-matter"of the decision it wascalled uponto make, "in the sensein which thatphrase was usedin the case concemingMonetary

Gold Removedfrom Rome in 1943 to describe the interests of Albania" (I.C.J. Reports 1990,

p. 122,para.73). And it concludedin the negative, pointingout that,while findingthat therewas

no condominiumor "communityof interests"between the three States,"such a decisionwould . . .

evidently affectan interest of a legal nature ofNicaragua", though it would not prevent it fiom

taking a decision (ibid.). The sameapplies here: whetherthe Court concludes that the equitable

line encroaches,or doesnot encroach,or risks encroaching,on therights of Equatorial Guinea,the

legal interestsof that country willnecessarilybe affected,but not inuch a way as to preventthe

Court from passingjudgment. And still lessbecause Equatorial Guinea has intemened than if it

hadnot intemened. For intervening must havesome significance.

17. For this, Mr. President,is the paradox of the position of our fiiends fiom Equatorial

Guinea: theyare interveningnot,asthey claim,in orderto enableyouto passjudgment, but onthe

contrary,to try and preventyou fiomdoing so. And this leads meto my considerationof the third

step in the argument setout yesterdayby Pierre-MarieDupuy: what are

3. The conclusionsto be drawn from the intervention in thiscase?

18.To inform theCourt, the interveningState tells us. Thereis no doubtthat this is correct

and Cameroon never considered that it was not appropriate. Butwhat is this information for?

Equatorial Guinea'sreply: so thatyou willnotmake a completerulingon the disputebeforeyou.

19.But if thatwas all,Members of theCourt, you would haveno need of Equatorial Guinea:

the Courthas shown us, inthe "Libyan"cases,that it wasfully able notto rule onthe claimsof the

Parties when such a mling risked violating the rights of a State absent fiom the case (see the

decisionsreferredto and commented uponby Carneroon inthe WrittenObservationsof Cameroon

on the Application by Equatorial Guineafor permission to intervene (OCGE, pp.17-21,

paras. 52-62). But ifthe Court displayedsuchprudence, as clearly indicated by sketch-map10E

reproduced in Equatorial Guinea7sjudges' folder of yesterday, it is because the interventions of

Malta and Italy werenot allowed. Cameroonhas also discussedthis at length (ibid.; see also

CR200216,pp. 66-67,paras. 31-33); 1shall notgo overthis again,but it is particularlyimportant;

and, wisely, my opponentdid notdwell on it. 20. Moreover, in the passage from your Judgment of Il June 1998, to which

Professor Dupuy also alluded in passing,but without quotingit (CR 2002121,pp. 60-61,para. 21),

it was clearly this situation you were referring to when statingthat "[wlhether suchthird States

[EquatorialGuinea andSao Tome andPrincipe in the event], would chooseto exercisetheir rights

to intervene in these proceedings pursuantto this Statute remains to be seen", whichwould have

justified Nigeria's eighth preliminary objection having to be "upheld at least in part" (I.C.J.

Reports 1998, p. 324, para. 116) and which would therefore have justified the Court's declaring

Cameroon's claim beyond point G inadmissible, at least partly so (see the text of the eighth

preliminaryobjection,ibid., p. 289).

21.But, Mr. President, EquatorialGuinea,in its concernto fully inform you of its position,

has intervened. Where it is concerned inany case, the questiontherefore no longer arises: you

may rule on Cameroon'sclaim, completely,whilepreservingthe rights of Equatorial Guinea, also

completely. Itbeing understoodthat:

(1) you will need to assess the substanceof the rights claimedby EquatorialGuinea, andnotjust

"prima facie", as Professor Dupuyseemsto think (CR2002/21,p. 62, para. 27)'since for this

latterpurpose, interventionis absolutelyuseless; on the otherhand,

(2) you need only make this assessment inorder to determine whether, yes or no, the solution

proposed to you by the Parties- in the event, Cameroon's equitableline, sinceEquatorial

Guinea is in the same interest asNigeria- whether, then,the equitable line affectsthe rights

of the interveningState; not to settle a dispute between theintervening State andCameroon,

whichisnot beforeyou;

(3) since Equatorial Guinea is not an intemening party, it will not be legally bound by this

assessment,eventhough there isno doubt that,as a law-abiding State,it will takethe greatest

possible account of the reasoning underlyingyour decision- but, 1repeat, it would remain

whollyprotected by Article 59inthis respectand would, asit were,find itself inthe situation

of the State which is the object of an advisory opinionfor example,not in the situationof a

partybound by thejudgment to bedelivered;

(4) 1donot claim that,should you findthe argumentpresentedto you by Equatorial Guineapartly

or totallygroundless,this wouldnot createproblems for it,notably in its relationswith certain oil companies; but this would merely be the consequence of the legal situation objectively

assessedby an impartial third party (without thetterbeing adjudicated)and, above all, it is

the "risk ofthe law", thatEquatorial Guineahastaken by intervening; in exchangefor which,

it has been able torovideyou with a completeand detailed expositionof the situation from

its own perspectiveand it has the assurancethat you willnot allow anyoneto encroach upon

its rights; on the otherhand,andlastly,

(5) if you were to concludethat the equitable line in some way affectsthe rights of Equatorial

Guinea- which 1 am only assuming for the sake of argument- it would be your duty to

preserve the rights of the intervening Statein toto, while adopting an equitable solution

compatiblewith thoserights.

22. On that hypothesis,Equatorial Guinea sees only one solution: not to establish a line

(CR2002,'21, p. 61, para.22). My leamed and skilful fiend - 1 am still speaking of

ProfessorDupuy - then goes on to tell us that: "internationaldecisions have always been made

not merel' 'subjectto the rights ofthe third State',but have refrained fromencroaching on those

rights" (I~IJ,p. 61, para. 24; see also pp. 38-41,paras. 26-35, Mr. Colson).e backs up this

assertionb! quoting your decisionsin the FrontierDispute (BurkinaFaso/Republicof Mali )nd

Lih?J .\~J/Icases:

O 2 6 - in theformercase, the Charnberofthe Courtstated that: "a court dealingwith a request forthe

dclirni:ationof a continentalshelf must decline,even if soauthorized by the disputantparties,

to ruleupn rights relatingto areasin which thirdStateshave. ..claims"(I.C.J.Reports 1986,

p 5-b. para.47; emphasisadded);

- in the laner case, you declared that "the Court has not been endowed with jurisdiction to

detcrmine . . whetherthe claimsof the Parties...prevailover the claimsof thosethird States

in thercgion"(I.C.J.Reports1985,p. 26,para.21).

23. Al1this is perfectly correct,but merelyconfirms something whichCameroon - as we

havewritten,saidand saidagain- has never disputed: the Courtcannotruleon the rights of third

States. But this tells us nothingabout the scope ofan intervention (in thosetwo Judgments, the

Court adopts its customary stance, that wherethe interested third States do not intervene), nor

abouthow therights of intervenersmustand canbeprotected. 24. Whatever Equatorial Guinea may Say, as 1 showed on 25February (CR200216,

pp. 68-72, paras. 38-48), there is not just one single way of protecting these rights, there are

several. To begin with, of course- and you will not be surprised that this is undoubtedly the

solutionwe favour- the Courtmay quitesimply find, aswe also see it, that the equitableline in

no way affects the rights of Equatorial Guinea which, therefore, do not need to be specially

preserved. If this wasnot thecase, you could,Membersofthe Court,for example:

- movethe linetaking fullaccount ofthoserights; or

- refrain from ruling on the delimitation requested by the Parties in the area in which there

seemedto you tobe a problem(this isthe"white square"solution); or

- rule that the maritime boundq between Cameroon and Nigeria is a discontinuous one, a

possibility 1referred to in passing withoutactually wanting you to avail yourselves of it, but

whichis not precludedbyany legal principle (ibid.,p.71, paras.45-46); or

- fromwhateverpoint you regard as appropriate,you could confine yourselvesto indicatingthe

directionof theboundary withoutrulingon a terminalpoint.

I 027 25. Al1 these possibilities, to which ProfessorMendelson will to some extent revert

presently,preservethe rightsof Equatorial Guinea in toto. It seemsto us thatthe choiceyou have

to make as between them must be based on two considerations. First, you will have to try,

Members of the Court, to provide as completea solution as possible to the dispute between the

litigantsand you are in a positionto adopta complete solutionthanks, among other things,to the

interventionof EquatorialGuineaand, second,this solutionmust be equitablefor al1concemed.

26. On the other hand, two things areimpossible for you. First, as Maurice Mendelsonwill

also show, you cannot fix a tripoint, of anykind, among other things because Equatorial Guinea

has declinedto become an intervening party. Secondly, and more broadly, yoù cannot settle any

dispute between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea since, as so excellently put by Pierre-Marie

Dupuy,to whom1leave the lastword:

"Quite clearly, the delimitationbetween the maritime areas of Cameroon and
those of Equatorial Guineamust be negotiatedbetween themwith a viewto achieving
an equitable solution,andonly if thosenegotiationsled to an impasse couldthosetwo
States, if need be,decideto come back to the Court to settle their dispute. Butthat
wouldbe anothercase." (CR 2002121,p. 60, para. 18.) 27. For the moment, it is a dispute between CameroonandNigeria which it is yourtask to

settle, Members of the Court; and you must find an equitable solution to it, one respectingthe

rights ofal1parties; of Equatorial Guinea,of course; of Nigeria, of course; but also, let us not

forget,of Cameroon.

Thank youmost sincerelyfor your attention. May 1ask you, Mr. President,to givethe floor

to Jean-PierreCot.

The PRESIDENT: Thankyou, Mr.Pellet. 1nowgive the floorto Mr. Jean-PierreCot.

Mr. COT: Mr. President,1am beingaccorded a title that1once bore forjust a fewmonths,
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and certainlydidnot deserve.

II. THEGEOGRAPHICALANDDIPLOMATICCONTEXT

1. Mr. President, Membersof the Court, 1 have to explain to you the geographicaland

diplomatic contextof EquatorialGuinea's intervention.

2. What 1am seekingto do is to persuadeyou to give equitya chance. We are in a situation

which clearly calls, over and above strict equidistance, for the intervention of considerations of

equity. Geographysuggestsit; positive lawrequires it.

3. Equatorial Guinea has intemened in order to ask you to see that its rights are not

jeopardized. That isa principlewith whichyou are boundto comply,and we asknothing else. But

1would like to expand upon its terms. It is your task, Mr. President, to ensure that you do not

prejudge a dispute of which you are not seised. You recalled this recently in regard to the

Applicationfor permissionto intervene by the Philippinesin the case concemingSovereignty over

PulauLigitan and Pulau Sipadan (~ndonesia/~ala~sia)'.You have to take care not to prejudice

the rights of the parties incha case. That clearly appliesto the rights of EquatorialGuinea. It

appliesalso to the rights of Cameroon,to thextent thatthey are concemed by a delimitationwith

a thirdState,hereEquatorialGuinea.

'~ud~rnentof23 October 2001,paraand54.Some legalgeography

4. 1 now corneto the legal geography, and 1 will be brief. A few words, though. The

geographical situation of the Gulf of Guinea, as fashioned by history, hasaccumulated a whole

series of handicaps which operateto the detrimentof Cameroon. It is practically a textbookcase.

As you can see from this outline map, which you may perhaps recognize. [Start projection-

tab 146.1

5. The markedconcavity of the Camerooniancoastline is comparableto that of Germanyin

the NorthSea ContinentalShelfcase. In thatcase, theCourt introducedconsiderationsof equityin

order, as you will recall, significantlyto modiQ the delimitationwhichwould have resulted from

strict application oftheequidistanceline. Thatis thefirstclear handicap.

6. The second, Cameroon7senclavement,precluding it fiom access to a continental shelf

which nonetheless represents the natural prolongationof its land mass. That enclavementis to

some estent reminiscent of the Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon case. In that case, the ArbitralTribunal

found 3 solution whichgave Saint-Pierreequitable accessto the continental shelfwithout involving

any breahin continuity.

7. Finally, thethird and major handicap,the presenceof a largeisland off its Coast,blocking

the seaHard projectionof the landand intempting the course of the lines of maritimedelimitation;

a similarsituation layat the heartof the dispute over theMer d'Iroise. Despitethe presenceofthe

hea\ il!populated Channel Islands (130,000 inhabitantsa ,s againstaround 100,000for the island of

B~OLO'J. the Court of Arbitration in that case reduced the island's effect for purposes of the

mantirnc delimitationbetween the two parties,so as to allow for considerationsof equity. [Endof

projrct~on.]

S However, as 1 well appreciate,Mr.President,no one maritime delimitation caseis truly

comparable with another. 1note, nonetheless, thatin each of those casespresenting an element of

resemblance with thepresent case,the Court wasable to take accountof the circumstancesof the

case inorder to introducea measureof equity intothe solutionadopted.

'~ritten statementof EquatorialGuinea,p.9, para.21. 9. In Ourrelations with EquatorialGuinea, we are not asking the Court to take account of

equity. More modestly, we are asking it not to exclude it. 1 am now done with these

considerations,which 1have called legalgeography,andturnnextto the diplomaticcontext.

The diplomatic context

10. Equatorial Guinea's counselhas painted the specific diplomaticbackgroundto Ourcase

with a somewhat broad brush. He has given you to understand that Cameroon made a firm

cornmitmentto a delimitation based on equidistance and on the definition of a tripoint, before

abruptly changingtack and putting forward its own equitable line. That, Mr. Colson,is to argue

without taking account of the uncertaintiesand vacillationsof the partiesto the negotiations. It is

above al1to disregardthe changes in the general diplomatic and legal context over the periodin

question.

11.You yourselves,Mr. President, Membersof the Court,recalled in your Judgrnenton the

Preliminary 0bjections3,that the negotiationsbetweenCameroonand Nigeria related to the whole

maritimedelimitationbetweenthe twocountries. Thosenegotiationsfailed,since theparties could

not agree on the effect of the Maroua Agreement andhence on the startingpoint forthe maritime

delimitationproper. In those circumstances,thevarious discussionsand reports resultingfromthe

negotiations provide interesting indications in regardto the state of mind of the Parties. They

cannot, however, be cited as evidence against one Party, uniess they embody an international

agreement,whichwould be quite anothermatter. For the rest, internationaljurisprudence is clear.

In these circumstances, the communiquéssummarizing the terms of the discussions merely

represent interimreports, nomore thanthat.

12. The bilateral discussions, both by Cameroon with Nigeria and by Cameroon with

Equatorial Guinea, manifest a certainhesitation, an ambiguity,which arereflected in the terms of

the communiqués. TheMontego Bay negotiations were in progress during the first stage of

negotiationsbetweenCarneroon andNigeria in the1970s. The status of the parties interms ofthe

relevant Conventions, the question whether the Montego Bay Convention or of the Geneva

Conventionsapplied,depended on theparties' respectiveratification procedures. Thus Equatorial

31. .J.Repor1998,p.322,para.110. Guinea ratified the Montego Bay Conventionon 21 July 1997,three years after the last contact

betweenthe delegationsofCameroonandEquatorialGuineain regardto the maritime delimitation.

In these circumstancesthe uncertaintyofthe negotiatorsis readilyunderstandable. Whichwas the

instrument applicablebetween the two parties at the time? Geneva? Montego Bay? What did

customary law have to Sayon the matter? It was evolving rapidly, as you will recall. Seen from

Yaoundé,orfromMalabo,the answerswereby nomeans clear.

13. With reference more particularly to the negotiations between Equatorial Guinea and

Cameroon, thesewere begunat a late stageand were limited to discussionsin 1993. Theyresulted

f 6) 3 1 in the communiquéof 3 August 1993,which Mr.Colson included inthejudges' folder- you will

find an extract at tab 147 in our folder-but which he did not read to you. 1 will add to his

statement on two points. First, Cameroon agreed at that time to give the CO-ordinatesof the

baselines by reference to which the maritime delimitation was to be carried out. Those

CO-ordinateswere transmittedto Equatorial~uinea~. Secondly, the parties agreed tofinalize at a

later date, at Malabo, this outline maritime delimitation. For they lackedone essentialpiece of

information, the definition of the starting point of the proposed delimitation. In these

circumstances,the 1993 communiquédoes not represent a delimitation agreement,but atmost a

"programmatic"pre-agreement,to citeaterm alreadyused herebyNigeria.

14.1 wouldadd that, by referringto theontegoBay principles,which nowhereprovide,as

you know, for recourse to equidistancein order to delimit the continental shelf or the exclusive

economic zone,the Cameroon-EquatorialGuinea negotiatorshad introduced into the languageof

the communiquéan ambiguity which required to be removed before an agreement could be

reached.

15.Andit is againstthisbackground,Mr. President,Membersof the Court, thatthe question

of thetripointhasto be viewed. Contraryto whatEquatorialGuinea'scounseltold you, Cameroon

does not exclude a tripoint. As things currently stand, the sketch-maps presented by Cameroon

even show two, which you can see on the map currently projected on the screen. These are

pointsH" and I', which you will also find in the judges' folder at tab 148. You will note that

4~rittenstatementof Equatl uinea,AnnEGSW 4, p.A-27.pointsH" and 1' lie a very long way fiom the yellow banana which so appeals to Mr.Colson.

Mr.President, you would need al1the powers of imaginationof Alain Pellet at 3 o'clock in the

morningto discem here the tinysliver of yellow wallso dear to Vermeer and toProust. To me, it

looks more like a Magritte, which might be called: "This is Not a Tripoint". In any event, the

problemof the tripoint onlyconcemsthe Court in so far as it represents a limitbeyond which the

rightsof third parties couldbeaffected.

16. Suffice it to note at this point, Mr. President, that the reference to a tripoint in the

Cameroon-EquatorialGuineaJoint Communiquéof 3 August 1993links the determinationof the

tripoint to the Montego Bay Convention [end projection]: "Both parties have proceeded ... to

adopt a methodology that would allowfor the determination of the boundary point called the

'tripoint' (Cameroon,Nigeriaand Equatorial Guinea)according to the MontegoBay Convention

onthe Law of theSea of 1982."

17.The methodologyforthe determinationofthetripoint,to quote the expressionused inthe

Communiqué, was thus intended, in the minds of its signatories, to enable them "to achieve an

equitable solution"- that is the languageof Articles74 and 83 of the MontegoBay Convention

on the Law of the Sea. Moreover, aswe know, therecould be no question of fixing that tripoint,

given the current uncertainty in regard to the course of the delimitation between Nigeria and

Cameroon.

18.Equatorial Guineanotesthat Carneroondidnot protest when EquatorialGuinea adopted

its Act of 12November 1984,which provided for application ofthe equidistancepnnciple in the

definitionof maritime areasunder EquatorialGuineansovereignty,nor againstthe DecreeLaw of

6April 1999 implementing the 1984Act. 1 would remind my leamed fiiends fiom Equatorial

Guineathat neither did theyprotest in 1974, when Cameroonadopted its statuteextendingits own

territorial watersto50 miles fiom its coastline, before ultimately acceptingthe 12-milerule laid

down bythe MontegoBay Convention.

The truth is, Mr. President, thatAfncan Statesrarely issueprotests abouttheir neighbours'

domestic legislation, fearing that that would be regarded as an unfiiendly act. Moreover,

Equatorial Guinea's legislation did not prevent the Malabo authorities fiom concluding an internationalagreement with Nigeria fixingthe maritimeboundary betweenthe two Statesa long

way insidethe median line.

19. 1 now come, Mr.President, to those international maritime delimitation agreements

which havebeen signedin respect ofareaswithin the Gulfof Guinea. In no way do they confirm

an equidistancepractice. Quitethe contrary. Nigeria pridesitself onthe agreements ithassigned,

on the basis of neighbourly relations,withthether Statesof the ~ula. We feel that this rush to

enter intosuch agreements,just monthsfiom the decisionon the ments that you will be rendering,

is not an appropriatepolicy. Some mightsee in it an attempt to force your hand,to present you

f 0 3 3 with a faitaccompli. Whateverthe tmth of the matter,what 1wouldask you to note is thatthose

agreementsare far fiom beingbased onthe equidistanceprinciple, theyare far from respectingthe

medianline.

20.1 would remindyouthatNigeria isresponsibleforthe vastmajority - 1was goingto Say

the lion'sshare- both of productionandof reserves of crude in the Gulf of Guinea, as you can

see fiomthetable in your folderat tab 149,which we already producedin ourearlier statements.

21. 1 come now to the agreements. First and foremost [projection1501the Treaty of

23 September2000 between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea. This Treaty increases Nigeria's

temtory by some 1,750 km2in comparisonwith the medianline. That is the area colouredmauve

on the map. Malabo was no doubt perfectly entitled to give up that maritime area which would

have accmed to it if the equidistance doctrine had been applied. Under the Treaty,

EquatorialGuinea renounces any claimof sovereignty beyond the Treaty line. That is to Say, a

longwayshort of the equidistanceline. 1quote Article4:

"North and West of the maritime boundary established by this Treaty, the
Republic of Equatorial Guinea shall not claim or exercise sovereign nghts or
jurisdiction overthe watersor seabedand subsoil."

22. EquatorialGuinea's written pleadings providetwo further items of informationwhich

enlargeonthe text of the Treaty. First,welem that Nigeriahad designson theoil deposits,and in

particularthe Zafiro field, situated on Equatorial Guinea'sside of the median line6. It finallysaw

fit to abandonthose claims at a late stage inthe negotiations. Inpart,at least, sinceit reta1ned,as

'CR 2002/13,p28,para.4(MT . rawford)
6~inancialTimes,26 Sept.2000,qubyNigeria,RejoinderofNigeria,Ann.175,vol.VIII,p. 1511would remind you, the Ekanga quadrilateral. Second, Nigeria took the view that, in the

equidistance calculation, the length of its coastline should be weighted by reference to its

population. EquatorialGuineaacceptedtheNigeriancalculation,but rejected thereasons forit. As

faras Equatorial Guineawas concemed,thiswasa simplepolitical agreement7. A point ofwhich 1

wouldaskyou to takenote. [Endprojection.]

23. 1 now come to the preliminary agreement signedbetween Nigeria and Sao Tome and

Principeon 28 August2000, on the occasionof the visit of President Obasanjo. That preliminary

agreement departs still fùrtherfiom the medianline. The Final CommuniquéStates(you will find

itattab 152in yourfolders) - there are tworelevantparagraphs:

"5. Concerningthe negotiations on the delimitation of the Maritime boundary
between thetwo countries,the two Presidentsagreed on an appropriateformulaof one
third (113)lineeffect,that is, betweenthe equidistanceandproportionalitylines. This
is without prejudiceto subsequentnegotiationson a final delimitationof the maritime

boundarybetween bothcountries.

6. They also agreedon the establishmentof a Joint-DevelopmentZonebetween
the 113 effect and equidistance lines, to be managed by a Joint Development
Commissionon the basisof sixty percent(60%)to Nigeria and fortypercent (40%) to
Sao Tome and Principe. This zone will bejointly exploited, protectedand defended
by both countries."

24. Thus, accordingto thecommuniquéand to the preliminary agreement, the whole of the

Joint Development Zone is to be incorporated into Nigerian territory under the preliminary

delimitation agreementand as a result of the application of the 113line effect between the

equidistanceandproportionality lines. [Beginprojection.] And you now see on the screen- you

willfind this in yourolder attab 153-the Zonein question. True,under an interimagreement,a

Treaty of 21 February 2001, Nigeria consents to the forma1 embodiment of the overlapping

territorialclaims and to the implementationof the Joint Developmentzone8. Al1fine and dandy!

But Sao Tome should beware: perhaps the day of reckoning has simply beenpostponed. Nigeria

has not given up the idea of grabbing for itself some 38,000 km2 lying beyond the median line.

[Endprojection.]

25. Mr. President, EquatorialGuinea objectedto the use of the word "threat" in relationto

Nigeria's attitudeto its neighbours. The wordisperhaps excessive, 1 fieely admit it. But1donot

'~ritten Statementof EquatorialGuinea, p. 15,note28.
8~bservationsofNigeria,1Note 2, Text depositedwith the Registry. know why,1cannot helpthinking ofthe fable ofthe lion dividingthe killinto fourparts. Youmay

recall it,perhaps, Mr. President. Hegives himselfthe firstshare:use1 am calledLion". He

gets the second shareecause he is the stronges"As thefiercest, claim the third share. And

anyonewhotouches thefourth share,1shall stranglethem."g Mr. President,1trustyouwill not see

anysimilaritybetweenthebeasts inthe fable andthe Statesofthe GulfofGuinea.

26. To return to the diplomatic practice, it should be noted that not one of the maritime
t 035
delimitationagreementsconcludedinrespectofthe Gulf of Guineaespousesthe medianline. Why

should Cameroon, no doubt the least blessed by geography of the Gulf s States, be obliged to

followa precept which appeals to no one else there? 1seenothing unreasonableor extravagantin

Cameroon's positiononthis.

27. Mr. President, Membersofthe Court,thankyou foryour kindattention. Mr.President,1

shouldbe grateful ifyouwould kindlycal1Professor MauriceKamto tothepodium. 1do not know

if you want to take a break at this point or if you would ratherhear Maurice Kamtofirst. It is, of

course,entirelya matterforyou; and1thank you.

ThePRESIDENT: Thank youProfessor,and 1now givethe floorto Dean MauriceKamto.

Mr.KAMTO

111.THE DELIMITATIONMETHOD -

THE EQUITABLELINEANDTHE RIGHTS OF EQUATORIA GLUINEA

1.Mr. President, Membersof theCourt, Cameroonwelcomesthe interventionof Equatorial

Guinea, whichwill enable a better informed Court to rule on Ourclaim in full awareness of the

facts. But1must dispelsome misunderstandingsand, if possible, reassure EquatorialGuinea that

its rights in the area will be taken into consideration. Indeed, a great many things were said

yesterdayabout the inequitable and excessivenature of the line proposed by Cameroon, aboutthe

threatit wouldpose totheinterests ofEquatorialGuineaor aboutthe extravaganceofitsirn~'~.

2. In order to do so, 1shall firstexplainhowthe delimitationmethodfollowedby Cameroon

takes Bioko Island into account and makes it possibleto honour Equatonal Guinea'srights in the

'~aFontaine,"ThePartnershipbefweentheHem, theGoat,theSheepand"heLion.
''CR2002121,p. 21,para. 12(N'Fube). zone to be delimited; secondly,1shallshowwhy,in view ofthegeographical circumstancesofthe

area, an equitableresult must be sought.

, 0 3 8 1. Delimitation method and effectof Bioko Island

(a) Non-existenceofa customaryboundarybased on equidistance

3. Accordingto EquatorialGuinea,the boundary relationship betweenCameroonand itself

is "based on a rnedian line"" so firmly established that Cameroon "isno longer entitled to

challenge" itI2. In short, a customary boundary based on equidistance is said to have been

establishedbetweenthesetwo countries.

4. Thisidea is incorrect,and 1shallfirst showthis by placingthe significanceofCameroon's

reference to equidistancein the properperspective,andthen byshowingthe relative importanceof

oilpractice inthearea.

(1) Equidistance

5. Myfiiend and eminent colleague,ProfessorCot, remindedus a moment agoofthe context

in which the joint communiquéof 1993 was produced, in particular of the doubts which still

characterizedthe Parties' approach and their choice of a delimitation method atthat time. Allow

me, if you will,Mr. President,to addthe followingremarks tothose observations.

Cameroon does not seek to rule out the equidistancemethod in principle. Where the two

States- Equatorial Guineaand Cameroon,1mean - considerduring the coming phases of their

negotiationsthat equidistancemakes for an equitableresult, there will be nothing to prevent them

from adopting itas the delimitationmethod in the sector concemed; but where an equitableresult

can only be achieved by adjusting equidistance, they will have to forgo the automatic and

unbending applicationof equidistance. Hence,this method cannotbe applied acrossthe board in

the delimitation of the maritime boundary between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon, just as it

cannot be in the delimitation of the boundary with Nigeria,for reasons which Cameroon has

explained at length in connectionwith the principal case. Here,equidistance must be adjusted to

"CR 200211,p.28,para32(N'Fube).
"lbid p.,7, para. 29(N'Fube).take account of the particular geographical contextof the area where the delimitation is to take

place.

6. Moreover,EquatorialGuineaitself acceptsthat the applicationof pure equidistancewould

be malapropos in the geographical contextconcemed, probably because it is aware that it would

produce a disastrous result. Indeed, one of Equatorial Guinea's advocates,

Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy, concludedhis statementyesterday'3by referring to your Judgment

in the Qatarv. Bahraincase, pointing out, quotingthe Court,that "it is in accord with precedents

to begin with the median line as a provisional line and then to ask whether 'special

circumstances' ...require anyadjustmentor shiftingof that line".

7. However, he does not draw any practical conclusionfrom this for the present case.

Indeed, it is as though Equatorial Guinea were stuck in the first phase of the method, namely,

provisional application of equidistance, completely forgetting the second phase, adjustrnent of

equidistance in the light of the relevant circumstances. 1sthere a geographical situation which,

more than that of the Gulf of Biafra, requiresthatrelevant circumstancessuch as the concaviq of

the coasts and their general orientation should be taken into account and that, as a result, pure

equidistanceshouldbe abandoned,oratany rate adjusted?

(2) Theoil concessionspractice

8. On behalfof the interveningState,Mr.Colsonyesterdaystressedtherole of oilpracticein

the area for delimitationas proof of the existenceof an establishedline based on equidistance. In

this connection,he claimed that, on 22February last, Cameroon,speaking through me, concluded

that"the oil practiceof CarneroonandNigeriainthe area confirmsthat de~imitation"'~.

9. 1 should point out that these remarks were made in the context of Cameroon's oral

argument on the delimitationof the maritime boundary in the firstsector, the sector delimitedby

treav and which, in Cameroon's view, isnot based on oil concessionpractice. Furthermore,my

distinguished colleagueclearly forgot alsoto referto the indentwhich, inthe text of my statement,

precedeswhat he quoted, andwhere it is stated that "the 'faitaccompli'of the oil concessionshas

' 3 ~2002121,p. 63,para.29.
14CR 200215,p. 70,para.52, quoted byMr.Colson,CR2002121,p. 49,para. 58.no effect on this conventionaldelimitati~n"'~. 1 don't think one could more clearly state the role

which, in Cameroon's view,should be assigned to oil concessions in this case. In any event,

Cameroonhas never advocatedthe concessions line, Mr.President; it has merely indicated to the

Court thatthe line Nigeriawas claimingin the sector coincidedwiththe maritime boundarywhich

was fixed by the Maroua Agreement and, in this case, confirmed by the oil practice of the two

Parties.

10.But the intervening State goes fùrther on this question of oil concessions. Noting the

referencemade last Tuesdayby Professor Pelletto the lackof time forpreparingthemaps showing

the overlappingoil concessionsofCameroon,Nigeria andEquatorial Guineain the area concerned,

Equatorial Guinea's advocatesententiouslythrew in: "Maybethere was no time, but in al1events

the effort wouldhave failed."16

11.Our colleaguewas rathercarelesshere for, as 1am going to show you,there are indeed

areas of overlapin thiszone betweenCameroonand EquatorialGuinea.

[ProjectionNo. 154.1 The projection now on the screen shows a sketch-map of a

Cameroonianoil concessioncalled Moudi. Itwas grantedto Total andMobil in 1981and hasbeen

exploited since 1993byKelt, whichlaterbecame Perenco. This sketch-map,preparedon the basis

of a documentproduced byPerenco,showstwothings onthe southem boundaryofthe concession:

- firstly,this southernedge of theconcessiondid not respectthe median line orthe course which

wouldresult fromthe applicationof the Equatorial Guinean decree law of January 1999; the

resultis a clear overlapbetweenthat concessionandthe EquatorialGuinean concessionwhere

United Meridianoperatedinthepast;

- secondly,the Tsavorita-1and2 wells sunkin 1997by United Meridian pursuantto Equatorial

Guineanpermits were drilledin an area belonging to Carneroon. 1 should point out that the

two wellshit liquidhydrocarbonsand produce 1,800barrelsldayduring productiontests. [End

of projection.]

12. [Projection No. 155.1 The second sketch-mapon the screen, which you will easily

recognizesinceit wasshownyesterdayby EquatorialGuinea,identifiesthe Tsavonta-1and 2 wells

"CR 200215,p.69para.52.
I6cR2002121,p.48,para.57. 0 3 9 on Cameroon's concessionmap and showsthe overlaps producedby applicationof the concession

CO-ordinatesprovided by Nigeria. The intervening State nevertheless showedthis sketch-mapas

irrefutableevidenceofthe existenceofa concessionsline coincidingwiththe medianlineand,as it

were, constitutinga "customary boundary". Youhave alreadyheard this sanctuarynotioninvoked

so often over the last few weeks, a notion which, moreover,does not always refer to the same

reality. Here,this customaryboundarysimplyhasno basis inestablished localcustom.

13. Two conclusions may be drawn from this: firstly, there is indeed overlap between

Cameroon's concessionsandEquatorialGuinea's; secondly,the practice of the two countriesdoes

not strictly respect the median line, the limit of "oil" operations,which is a technical limit, being

different from a maritime boundary. Consequently, there is no customary boundary between

Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, just as equidistance does not represent as between them a

codified legalrule, adopted once and for al1and applicable independently of the geographical

circumstances.

(b) StatusofBioko and its influence onthedelimitation

14. Mr.President, the intervening State has pointedout on several occasions that Bioko

Island is the site of the capital of Equatorial Guinea,asghthis could have any impactat al1on

theisland's effect on the delimitationsoughtby Cameroonoronthe rights pertainingto the island.

Bioko is not an island Statebut an island dependency of EquatorialGuinea. Turning aroundthe

Court's reasoning in the Libya/Maltacase1',1would Saythat the relation between theCoastof

Bioko and those of its neighbours is not the same as if Bioko were an independent State. As

Professor Lucchini wrote in a course which he gave next door, at the Academy of International

Law in 2000: "The delimitation régimeis not identical for an island State and for a dependent,

isolated islandfallingnderthe sovereigntyof a state."18

15.As an island dependency of EquatorialGuinea, Biokocannot claim the full effectof its

projection in al1 directions of al1its coastal fronts. It is not entitled to the benefit of a radial
040
projection ofthem. In itsObservationson the Written Statementof Equatorial~uinea'~,Cameroon

"I.c.J. Reports 1985,p.42, para. 53.

'*RCADI2,000, Vol. 285,p. 329.
I9writtenObservationsof Camero4Juiy2001,pp.21-22, paras.91-92. stated that, in the absence of any jurisprudential guidance on this question, the position of

JudgesRuda, Bedjaoui and Jiménezde Aréchagain their joint opinion appendedto the Judgment

of3 June 1985in the caseconcerningthe ContinentalShelf(Libyan ArabJamahiriya/Malta) could

indicate a doctrinaltrendin thisea.

Bioko cannot be consideredin the abstractand be attributed a radical,absolute effect which

takes no account of the real situationin the Gulfof Biafra. It is in relationto the respectiverights

of the Parties, as recognized in positive law, thatany delimitation must be effected and that the

claims ofal1Parties mustbe considered.

16.Even supposingthat, in this case, the western coast of Bioko were to be consideredas a

newcoastalfront interruptingthe "tête-à-tête" betweC eameroon andNigeria,this cannot produce

a new "tête-à-têteb "etween Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea by appropriation of the rights of

Cameroon. Carneroonmaintainsthat, by fixingthe maritime bounday betweenitself and Nigeria,

the Coun will indicate where Nigeria's eastward and south-eastward claims and Cameroon's

westuard and north-westward claims stop and will thus enable that country to negotiate with

EquatoririlGuineathe extentof themaritimeareato whichit is entitled.

i: According to Equatorial Guinea in its Written Statement of 4 Apri12001, "Equatorial

Guinca's entitlement to maritime space is the same as Cameroon7sor ~i~eria's"~'. Cameroon

agrees Hith this. In the area to be delimited,every State involved on one count or another in this

case.nanicl! Cameroon and Nigeria, but also the intervening third State, has "claims", butonly

claims. dnd conrraryto EquatorialGuinea7sassertion,the criterion ofdistanceorproximity cannot

alonc c$t~?:ishthe rightsof Equatorial Guinea andNigeria in the area to be delimited andjustifj

thedisregard or appropriationof the rights of Cameroon. To echo the exact wordsof the Courtin

the:Vurft:SLY JontinentalShelfcases, "it happensthat the claims of severalStatesconverge,meet

and intercross in iocalities where,despite their distance from the coast, the bed of the sea still
l O 4 3 unquesiionably consists of continental shelf"'. These claims will become established rights

between Cameroon andNigeria onlyupon themaritime delimitationwhichCameroonrespectfully

asks the Courtto make,and between Carneroon and EquatorialGuineaonlyupon conclusionofthe

'OwrittenStaternent ofthe Republicof Equatorial Guinea, p.16,para. 39.
"1.C.J.Reports 1969,p.49, para.89. negotiations which Cameroon and that country have embarked upon together and which will

certainlybe completedbythe end ofthepresentproceedings.

18.Moreover, Cameroon notes,not withoutsome surprise,that Equatorial Guineamakes no

reference to this prospect of bilateral negotiationswith Cameroon, a prospect on which it laid

particularstress in theirstround of itsoral argument2'in the case between it and Nigeria. Hence,

not only does the intervening State omitto take note of Cameroon'swillingnessto negotiate and

finalizewith itthe delimitationof theirjoint maritimeboundaryby agreement,but it assertsthatthe

maritime areas situated to the east of theequitablelineclaimedby Cameroonwould fa11entirely to

the latter23if the Court were to decidein favour of the lineproposed by the Applicant. And then

the Agent of Equatorial Guineaasks: "What happensto Equatorial Guinea'sinterest?'Then he

adds: "Cameroon has not yet answeredthat question in either ils oral arguments or ils written

pleadingsinthis case."24

19. Mr. President,if the lineproposedby Cameroonhasone good point, it is that it seeksto

take intoaccount the interestsof al1the States concemed: to avoid a markedcut-off of Nigeria's

relevant coastal front, to avoid entering or even interfering with the maritime area claimed by

SaoTomeand Principeandto preservethe rights of EquatorialGuinea eastof the equitable lineby

leaving the outcome entirely up to the negotiationswith a viewto a delimitationby an agreement

withthat country. Cameroonwishesto resume thenegotiationswith Equatorial Guineasuspended

since the Yaoundémeeting in August 1993,becausethe two countries have always negotiated in

good faith, inmutual respect and with a view to a fi-uitfulresult. It is not with al1its neighbours
042

that it finds itdifficult to negotiatein ansphereof calmandmutual trust.

20. But Carneroon mayperhapsnot have been sufficientlyclear on this subject. So 1hope

you willallowme to reiterateits position vis-à-vis EquatorialGuinea: the equitable lineproposed

by Cameroonseeks to establishthe limitof Nigeria'slegal interestseastwardsoff its coasts facing

the Gulf of Guinea, and Cameroon's interestswestwards of the zone concemed, with a view

subsequentlyto enablingthe two Statessituated in the middleof the Gulf,in the event Cameroon,

"CR 200217,p.31,para.42 (Kamto).

2 3 2002121,p. 37,para. (Colson).
24~bid,. 24, para.24(N'Fube).owing to its coastal presence in the hollow of the Gulf, and Equatorial Guinea, owing to the

positionof BiokoIsland,to negotiatetheirrespectivemaritime areas.

(c) Constructionof thefineand takingBioko intoaccount
21. Mr. President, Cameroon implementedthe two stages of the method at two different

times in the constructionof the equitableline, taking care to give an effect to Bioko to adjust the

equidistance,contraryto whatthe Agent of the intervening Statehas said. Thisline is not "drawn

as if... Bioko Island simplydid not existV2'.Quitethe contrary! [ProjectionNo. 156.1 To claim

that Cameroonhas constnictedits equitable line as though Biokodid not existundoubtedly shows

ignoranceof what a pure equidistanceline betweenCameroon andNigeria would have provided.

As shown by the sketch-map being projected, the course of this line would have reduced the

maritimearea offthe north-westcoast ofBioko. Indeed,we seea major reduction inthe maritime

areaon the westernflank of the island,which increasesas the equidistancelinemoves towardsits

south-westernpart.

22. Bioko'seffect on the constructionof the equitablelinewas reflectedin technicalterms at

thetime of the determinationof point 1. Indeed, to determinethispoint, whichalso influences the

orientationof segments IM and IIJ, Carneroon,as we discussedlastTuesday,took into accountthe

length of the southem coast of the island from Punta Oscura to Punta Siantago, in otherwords

some 29 km. As Cameroon explained during its oral argument inthe case between itself and

~i~eria~~t,his coastalsketch was not chosenarbitrarily; it is thecoastal frontof Bioko capableof

being projected furthest seawards. Secondly, it corresponds to the average of the greatest and

smallestwidth ofthe island,which are, respectively,35 and 26 km. Thirdly,this length is not very

differentfromthat of the northem coastof Bioko Island,which measuressome 25km between the

pointmarked FL(M25)andIslote Horacio.

23. As the relevant coast of Bioko, Cameroon could have taken its western coast from

Punta Oscura to FL (M25)through CaboRodondo, Punta Argelegosand Punta Achada,73km in

2 5 ~2002/21,p.20, para.10(N'Fube).
2 6 ~2002117,pp.59-60,para.46 (Kamto). length, but the cut-off effecton the projectionof Nigeria's relevantCoastwould have beenradical

and the result inequitable.

24. 1 should like to point out, Mr. President, that there is no standard method or single,

perfect technique of maritime delimitation; it is al1a matter of circumstancesand of the desired

result. As the Court said in its Judgrnentof20 February 1969,whenequity excludesthe useof the

equidistancemethod, "no objectionneed befelt to the idea of effectinga delimitationof adjoining

continentalselfareasby theconcurrentuse ofvariousmethods"*'.

25. Inthis case, whetherthe method ofthe proportionalityof the coastal lengths is used or

that of adjusted equidistance,the result isthe same,namely, that givinghalf effectto BiokoIsland

makes it possible to anive at an equitableline. This result, achieved bya combinationof the two

methods, merelybearsoutthetechnicalrigoremployedin constructingthis line.

26. If Equatorial Guinea adheres to this two-phase delimitationmethod enshrined by the

Court, as manifestly it does adhere to it, it will easily be able to agree with Cameroon that an

equitable solution should be given a chance- as my colleagues have already said- a solution

which would not result in the total deprivationof the rights of one of the Statesconcerned inthe

area for delimitation butwould only limit theirgeographical scopein orderto take accountof the

rights ofthe other States.

O 2. Pursuingan equitable result

27. To achieve a result in any delimitationin the Gulf of Biafra, Cameroon considersthat

two principles which are widely supportedby case law must be respected. First, the principleof

non-encroachment,which aimsto avoid thecut-off effect, and second,the need to take accountof

the competing rights resulting from the overlap of reciprocal claims. 1 shall examine these two

principles intum.

(1) Theprinciple ofnon-encroachment

28. The principle of non-encroachment, laiddown by the Courtin its 1969Judgment inthe

North Sea Continental Shelf cases28 and reiterated inter alia in its 1985Judgrnent in the

27~.~.R.eport1969,p.49,para.90.

28~.~.R.eport1969,p.53,para101.Libya/Malta case29,signifies, as noted in 1992 by the Court of Arbitration in the case conceming

the Delimitationof MaritimeAreasbetweenCanadaandthe FrenchRepublic,

"that the delimitation must leave to a State the areas that constitute the natural
prolongation or seaward extensionof its coasts, so that the delimitation must avoid
anycut-off effectof thoseprolongationsor seaward extension^"^^.

A certain cut-offof the projectionof the respective coastsof the States concernedin the areato be

delimitedis inherentin any delimitationin an area of competingclaims. In the present case, such

an effectis inherentin the merepresenceof Bioko Island,as was the case for Canadaowingto the

presence of the islands close to the Newfoundland coast3',or for France owingto the presence of

the Channel Islands close to its Channel coasts. In the Gulf of Biafra, there is one single

continental shelf. It cannot be regarded as exclusivelybelonging to Cameroon,or as exclusively

belonging to Equatorial GuineaorNigeria. Cameroonisawarethat even an equitable solutionwill

inevitablycut off part of what would have beenthe rightsof the various Statesif the geographical

configurationhad been different. But the geographical configurationis what it is, and leadsto a

natural limitation of each State'srights. [ProjectionNo. 157.1 What Carneroonwishes to avoid,

yet without prejudging the outcome of its negotiations with Equatorial Guinea, is a radical and

absolute cut-off of the projection of its coastal fiont, as shown by the sketch-map now being

projected, evenwherethis projectionis possiblewhile respecting thecompetingrights of the other

States. This maritimeprojectionof Cameroon's Coastis possible in this case in the part situated

north-east ofBioko far out to sea.

29.The systematicapplicationof equidistanceinthis case would result forCameroonin the

dreaded cut-offeffect. The cut-offwould be cripplingandnot partial or limitedinscope.

(2) A situationof overlappingcompetingrights
30.Involving,moreover, anarea wherethere areoverlapping claimsandrights, the effect of

the application of equidistance would be to "cause areas which are the natural prolongation or

29~.~.Reports 1985,pp. 39and46.

30~wardof 10June1992,inRGDIP, 1992-1993,p. 696,para.58; EnglishtranslationappearinginInternational
Legal MaterialsILW, Vol. 31, 1992,p.1167,para.58.
3'~bid. extensionofthe temtory of one Stateto be attributedto an~ther"~~t,o borrow the termsused by the

Court in its 1969Judgment. In Cameroon'scase, it would attribute al1these areasto other States,

in contraventionof the establishedulesof maritime delimitationlaw andState practice. Never in

the maritime delimitation cases they have had to deal with, have the Court and international

tribunals agreed to confine a coastal State soarrowly within the limits of its temtorial sea or

scarcelybeyond them. Nor have theyever applied pure equidistance.

31.Cameroon is asking the Courtin thiscase to determine thelimit of the respectiverights

of thetwo Parties to the case and to allow it to delimit, with the intervening State, their joint

maritime boundary through negotiation. In this way, Nigeria will know the maritime space

attributedto it within themaritime areafor delimitationandCameroonand EquatorialGuinea will

have to determineby agreement theirrespective areas in the remainder. By doing this,the Court

will settlethe dispute submitted to it without prejudicing thelegal interests of Equatorialea.

Any other approach, notably accedingto the wishes of the intervening State and the opposing

Party, which are urging the Court not to delimit, or better still to apply equidistance, wouldbe

tantamountto the Courtabandoningitsmissionto administer internationaljustice inthe interestsof

0 4 6 peace or applying an inequitable rnethod in this case. For it is not the geography which is

"unfavourable" in this case, but the mechanical applicationof pure equidistance. [End of the

projection.]

Thankyou, Mr.President, Membersof the Court, for your attention. May 1ask you to cal1

ProfessorMendelsontothe Bar, afiera shortbreakperhaps. Thank you,Mr. President.

ThePRESIDENT: Thank you,Professor Kamto. Thesitting issuspended fortenminutes.

The Courtadjournedffom 11.35a.m.to 11.45a.m.

Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. La séanceest reprise, et je donne maintenantla

parole à M.Maurice Mendelson.

32C.J Report1969,p. 1,para44 M. MENDELSON

IV. CONSIDÉRATION SSR LE TRIPOINT

1.Introduction

1. Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, j'aurai l'honneur de traiter

devantvous deux thèmes. Mes collèguesles ont déjàévoqués jusqu'àun certain point, mais je

penseque les éventuelles«zonesde chevauchement)) vous semblerontmineures.

2. Mon premier argumentest quela Cour n'estpas compétentepour fixer un tripointou une

quelconque«zone du pointtriple)). Le deuxièmeest que, pour desraisons que je vais exposer, la

Couresttout à fait en mesurede donnereffetà lalignedu Cameroun sansporter atteinteaux droits

ouintérêtd se laGuinée équatoriale.

3. Bien que liésdansune certainemesure, mesdeux argumentssontcependantdistincts. Car

même si la Cour faisait droit au premierelon lequelelle n'est pas compétentepour déterminer

un tripointou une zone dupoint trip-, elle pourraitnéanmoinsdécider,enthéorie,que le risque

subsisteque notre ligne empiètesur des eaux relevant, ou susceptiblesde relever, de la Guinée

équatoriale.Je montreraidonc égalementque a) la«zonedu pointtriple))de la Guinéeéquatoriale,

tellequ'elle est représentsur les cartes2à 9 quecette dernièrea jointes au dossier d'hier, n'a

pratiquementrien àvoir avec la ligne quele Camerounpropose comme frontièremaritimeavec le

Nigéria, etqueb) la plusgrandepartie dela ligne équitabletraverseen faitdes eaux quela Guinée

équatorialene revendiquepas. Pour ce qui est de lazone, limitée,dans laquelleil pourraity avoir

conflitentre lesrevendicationsduCamerounet cellesde la Guinéeéquatoriale,nous affirmonsque

cettedernièreest suffisammentprotégée par le fait qu'aucune décisionque cette Cour rendra en

l'espèce nepourra lui porter atteinte et que, de surcroît, si la Cour devaitestimer que la Guinée

équatorialene jouit pas d'une protection suffisante, les moyens existent de lui accorder toute la

protectionquecelle-cipourraitraisonnablementexiger.

2. La Cour n'est pas compétentepour fixer un tripoint

4. En premier lieu, donc, nous estimons que la Cour n'est pas compétentepour fixer un

tripoint.Il s'ensuit qu'ellene peut arrêtelra ligne fro-tila frontière entre leCamerounet le

Nigéria- à un tripoint, puisqu'ellene peut fixer ledit tripoint. Bien entendu, nous n'allons pas jusqu'à dire que, dans l'absolu,la Cour ne devrait pas tenir compte de l'existenced'un éventuel

tripoint lorsqu'elle détermineune ligne : c'est là un procédé courant qui a étéutilisétant par la

Cour que par les tribunaux d'arbitrage,et dans un grand nombred'affaires. M. Colson vous en a

cité quelques exemples hier33.Le Camerounen conclut toutefoisque la Courn'a pas compétence
*
pour fixer un tripoint (elle peut en tenir compte, s'il existe, mais pas le fixer), car c'est là une

conséquenceinéluctable desdispositionsdu Statut et du Règlementde la Cour - telle est en tout

cas l'interprétationconstante que celle-ci en a donnédans sa propre jurispmdence. La doctrine

appuie cette conclusion et la Guinée équatorialele reconnaît elle-même. Permettez-moi de

m'expliquer.

5.Monsieurle président, quellesquesoient lespossibilitésinitialementouvertespar l'article

62 duStatut, lajurisprudence dela Cour est désormaisclaire :un Etat autorisé àintervenirn'est en

aucun cas liépar l'arrêtqui sera finalement rendu s'il n'intervient pasen qualitéde partie à

l'instance. La Guinéeéquatoriales'est pleinement prévalue de son droit d'interveniren tant que

non partie, tantdans ses piècesécritesque lors de ses plaidoiries34.M. Dupuya particulièrement

insistt: sur le fait que ((l'arrêtde la Cour ne sera de toute façon pas opposable à la

Guinéeéquatoriale; enapplicationde l'article 59 de votre Statut,cet arrêtne saurait avoir d'effet

qu'entre les partieà l'instance». Il a d'ailleurs insistde nouveau sur ce point au paragraphe 15,

affirmantnotammentque ((l'interventionne constituepas une exception au principe du fondement

f 4)4 8 consensueldc la compétencede la courg5. Nombre de ses propos vont d'ailleurs dans le même

sens. 113 souligneque la Guinéeéquatorialene demandaitpas à la Cour de déterminersa frontière

maritimc a\cc le Cameroun -ce qu'elle pouvait faire elle-même,a-t-il dit, par voie de

négoîi~tion3'

6. Le Cameroun est entièrementd'accord avecla Guinéeéquatoriale : le fondement de la

cornpetencede la Cour est essentiellementconsensuel. Tel est ce qui ressort du paragraphe 1 de

l'article 36 du Statut; tel est ce qui ressort du paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 du Statut. Je doute,

'jCR2002121,p. 38-40, par.27-33.

j4Voir,parexemple,ibidp,. 27,par.29;p.37-38et40-41,par.25et35;p.52-53,par.4.et
j5Ibid .,56,par.15.

j6Ibid .,61,par.24.d'ailleurs, qu'ilfaillerappeleà la Cour qu'elle s'esttoujours opposéeà ce que des tierces parties

soient impliquées malgré ellesdans une instance sans y avoir consenti, ne serait-ce

qu'indirectement :voir par exemple l'affaire del'Or monétaire3',et mêmel'affaire de la Carélie

orientale3*,dans laquellela Cour permanentede Justice internationaleétaitappelée à exercer ses

attributions consultatives. C'est parce qu'il craignait de porter atteinte aux intérêtsde la

Guinéeéquatoriale que leCameroun s'est abstenude formuler une revendication contre cet Etat,

qu'il s'est abstenu de préciser l'étendue totalee ses espaces maritimes (car il aurait ce faisant

préjugé un éventueldifférend avec laGuinéeéquatoriale),et qu'il a demandé à la Cour de ne pas

procéder à une réaffectation globaledes espaces maritimes, mais simplement de déplacerla

branche nigérianede la pince, pour ainsi dire - en d'autres termes,il a demandé à la Cour de

tracerune ligne qui,compte tenu de la situationgéographiqued'ensemble dansle golfe de Guinée

et la baie deBonny,offre une solution équitableau Cameroun et au Nigéria,et uniquement àces

deuxEtats.

7. Mais c'est là,Monsieur leprésident,un argument à doubletranchant. Si la Courn'estpas

compétentepour rendre,sur la frontière entrele Camerounet la Guinée équatoriale une décision

qui soit contraignantepour cette dernière, alorselle nel'est pas non plusyr rendre une décision

sur cette même frontière qui obligerait le Cameroun vis-à-vis de la Guinée équatoriale.C'est

pourtantexactementce qui seproduiraitsi ellejugeaitqu'il existeun tripointentre lestroisEtats,et

à fortiori dans ce qu'on appellela «zone du point triple)),à laquelle la Guinéeéquatoriale s'est

constamment référéh eier, verbalement et sur les diagrammes qu'elle a présentés.Ce qu'elle a

commodémentappelé «la banane jaune)). Car un tripoint c'est, bien entendu, le point où trois

frontièrescoïncidentet convergent. Une frontière - entre la Guinéeéquatorialeet le Nigéria- a

déjàété presque intégralemenctonvenue dans ce secteur, pour autant que cela puisse nous

intéresseren l'affaire. La deuxième frontière -entre leCameroun et le Nigéria- est l'objet

mêmede la présenteinstance et doit encore être déterminée par vos soins, bien entendu. La

troisième frontièreest celle qui séparele Camerounet la Guinéeéquatoriale,et le conseil de la

Guinéeéquatoriale n'aeu de cesse de répéter qu'elln ee vous intéressaiten rien : les deux Etats

" C.I.J.Recue1954,p. 19.
'*C.P.J.I. série 5 (923). devrontladéterminerpar eux-mêmes, pav roiede négociation, aditle conseil-etje meréfère en

particulier la déclarationde monami M.Dupuy,auparagraphe24 (CR2002/21). Ce qu'ilvous a

dit en substance- mais de manière bien plus élégante, celava sans dire-, c'est que cette

troisième frontièrene vous regardait absolument pas. Cependant, si tel est le cas- et

malheureusementc'estbien le cas,étantdonnéque la Guinée équatorialeachoisi d'intervenir sans

pour autant devenir partiel'instanc-, alors Madameet Messieurs de la Cour, vous.ne pouvez

ni fixeruntripointprécis, ni mêmeger qu'ilexisteune zone où untripoint doit exister,parceque

celareviendraitàconsidérerune frontièrequisort du cadrede votre compétence.

8. Voilàun point, selonnous, trèsimportant,et surlequel nousne saurionstrop insister. Il

ne s'agit pas d'un simple@se dixit du Cameroun. C'est une conséquence inéluctabletant des

conclusions de la Guinée équatorialque du droit en matière d'interventiontel que la Cour l'a

développé. Il s'ensuit quela Guinéeéquatorialen'a pas le droit de demandàrla Cour de faire

descendre la ligneàpartir du poinH jusqu'à ce qu'elle appellela «zone du point triple)),ni de

s'abstenir de statuersur la ligne équiduCameroundans cetterégion parcrainte qu'ilsoitporté

atteinteauxdroitsde la Guinéeéquatoriale.

3. Leszones revendiquée(sounon)parlaGuinée équatoriale

9. Ce qui me mène à notre seconde conclusion, qui est que, pour les raisons que je

développerai dansun instant, la Cour est en mesure de confirmer la ligne revendiquéepar le

Camerounsansporteratteinteaux droits ni auxintérêtse la Guinée équatoriale.

10.Commençonspar signalerque, pourl'essentiel, la lignedu Camerounne traversepas les

eaux revendiquéespar la Guinée équatoriale.[Débutde la projection.] Vous voyez apparaître

devant vous un diagramme qui illustre mes conclusions, diagramme qui figure également à

l'onglet 158de votre dossier. A vrai dire, ce diagrammea déjàprojetéce matin. Je feraibien

de préciserqu'il aété établipartir du graphique quiporte le no7 dans le dossier d'audience que

vous a communiqué hierla Guinéeéquatoriale. Des chiffres et des lettres ont simplementété

ajoutésafin de présenterun tableau plus complet. Lespoints représensar des chiffresromains
r O 5 O

allant de i à x sont ceux indiqués à l'article 2 du traité de délimitation maritimeconclule23 septembre2000 entre le Nigériaet la Guinéeéquatoriale39.Les lettres sont celles du croquis

figurantà l'onglet 100du dossier d'audienceprésentépar le Cameroundans le cadre du différend

qui l'oppose au Nigéria, à ceci près que nous en avons ajouté trois - et je vous prierai de

m'excuserpour cette complication, encorequej'ose espérerque cette démarche serévèlera utile.

«A» représente l'extrémité orientale de ce que la Guinéeéquatoriale appelle la «zonedu point

triple)); NB))son extrémitéoccidentale; et «CHle point où la ligne médianeentre la Guinée

équatoriale et leNigériacroise la ligne conventionnelleétablieentre la Guinée équatoriaet Sao

Tomé-et-Principe.

11. Puis-je tout d'abord attirer votre attention sur les zones représentéespar des lignes

verticales vertes Je pense qu'elles apparaissent relativement clairementsur cette carte, et

peut-êtreplus clairement encore, du moins je l'espère,dans votre dossier. Vous verrez que ces

zones sont au nombre de deux, une à chaque extrémité, sijpuis m'exprimer ainsi. L'une d'elles

-celle situéeen haut à droite, au nord-e-t a pour base la ligne médiane; elleest délimitéepar

lespoints A-G-H-H'-B-A. [Montrer zone.] L'autre - au sud-ouest,ou à l'extrémité situéenbas

à gauche - a égalementpourbasela lignemédiane. Déterminesronétendueexactevers l'ouestet

le sud n'est pas chose aisée, enpartie enraison du changement d'angleau point C entre la ligne

médianeet la ligne conventionnelleentre laGuinéeéquatorialeet Sao Tomé-et-Principe m; ais aux

fins qui nous occupent actuellementpeu nous importe sa délimitationexacte, et l'on peutdire de

laditezone qu'elleest,grosso modo,circonscritepar les points"-C-K-J-1". [Montrerzone.]

12. Ce qu'ont en commun ces deux zones,c'est donc d'être situées an uord de la ligne

médiane. La Guinée équatoriale vous a déjà confirmé que ses prétentions s'arrêtent la ligne

médiane :c'estce queprévoit saproprelégislation.Il s'ensuitque la ligne équitableduCameroun,

indiquéeen rouge, traverse, dans ces deux zones, des eaux qui ne sont aucunementrevendiquées

par la Guinéeéquatoriale.Vous constatereznotammentque le point H est fort éloignde la ligne

médiane, maiségalementde la zone dite du point triple, surlignéeen jaune. Autrement dit,les

zones portant des lignes verticales vertes ne sont nullement,je le répète, revendiquéepsar la

Guinéeéquatoriale.Etc'est là un pointqui ne semblepas être contesté.

39DN,vol.VIII,annexeDN 174,p1501. 13. J'en viens maintenant aux zones portant des rayures vertes horizontales. 11s'agit de
0 Q5f

zones situéesau sud de la ligne médiane. Quela Guinée équatorialn ee continue pas pourautantà

revendiquer. Car,vous le savez, la Guinéeéquatoriale aconcluen 2000 un accord de délimitation

avec le Nigéria. Commel'a relevémon ami M.Cot, le passagepertinent de l'article4 de ce traité
a
dispose :«Au nord et à l'ouest de la frontière maritimeétablie parle présenttraité,la République

de Guinéeéquatoriale ne revendiquera ni n'exercerd ae droits souverains ou son autoritésur les

eaux ni sur les fonds marinset le sous-sol.»Traductiondu Grefle.) Autrement dit, aunord de la

ligne bleu foncé- la ligne conventionnell- la Guinéeéquatorialea renoncé à ses droits. Hier,

mon amiM. Dupuy a tentéde nousconvaincreque la Guinée équatorialen'avaip tas renoncé à ses

prétentionssur ces eaux vis-à-visdu Cameroun. Mais, Monsieurle président,la nuancene ressort

nullementde ce traité,etje ne vois aucuneraisonde le récrire,-de récrireun libellétrès clair

à seule fin de corroborer la thèseque soutient aujourd'hui la Guinée équatoriale.Mon ami et

collègueM. Pellet a examiné dansle détailcettequestion le 25 février,etje ne reviendraipas sur

l'intégralitde son argumentation4'. Ainsiu, ne fois de plus, la ligne du Cameroun netraversepas

des eaux revendiquées par laGuinéeéquatoriale, -à une petite exception près, nous le

reconnaissons.

14. Cette exception, relativement mineure, concerne la zone circonscrite par les points

H7'-1-1'-vi-HY'-la régionmarquéeen rouge sur le graphique8 soumis par la Guinéeéquatoriale;

une zone de quelque 34 kilomètrescarrés. C'est une régionà propos de laquelle le conseil du

Cameroun a parléle 25 février, de chevauchement41 - légerlapsus, qui n'a certainementpas été

délibérémen trtompeur. Cela dit,la Guinée équatoriale toutà fait raiso:il ne s'agitpas au sens

strict d'une zone de chevauchementpuisqu'elle est situéeau nord de la ligne du Cameroun,de

sorte qu'elle n'est pas revendiquée par le Cameroun, mais par la Guinéeéquatoriale. Reste,

Monsieur le président,que mis à part ce tout petit segment- tout petit segment-, la ligne

avancéepar le Cameroun traverse dans son intégralité -nous le répétons- des eaux que la

Guinéeéquatorialn ee revendiquepas. Il s'agitdetoute la lignequi va dupoint G au poinK et au-

delà, abstraction faite du segment dont je viens de parler. Soit dit en passant, cela signifie

40CR200216, notammenatuxpages64-65,par.24-26.
41Ibid.,p.68,par.36.égalementque la zone des intérêtd se la Guinéeéquatorialeinvoquée par M.Dupuy, zone grisée

sur la carte19présentée hier, est inexacte dansla mesure où elle comprendles régionshachurées

surle diagrammedont nousnous occupons à présent.

15. Permettez-moide dire d'emblée quenous n'en avonspas fini pour autant. Pas du tout

fini, commeje le montrerai dans un instant. Mais c'est un fait capital qu'il convientde garder

présent àl'esprit:les eauxque traversela ligneéquitable nesont donc pasrevendiquées, fût-cepar

la Guinée équatoriale.Ellesle sontpeut-êtrepar leNigéria, mais celane concernepas la Guinée

équatoriale.Les six situationsfrontalièresévoquéeh sier par M.Colson et illustréesà l'onglet 10

de son dossier sont donc dans une autre catégorie. Dans chacune d'entre elles, prolonger la

frontièreentre les deux Partiesà l'instancerevenaità la faire passer dans des zones revendiquées

par un Etat riers (intervenant ou non): ainsi, dans l'affaire Qatar c. Barheïn, on risquait, en

prolongeant la ligne jusqu'à un éventuel point tripleavec l'Arabie saoudite, d'empiéter surdes

zones re\endiquéespar l'Arabie saoudite, mais tel n'est pas le cas en l'espèce. Sibien que les

prétendus interêtsde la Guinéeéquatorialene constituent pas uneraison suffisantepourmotiver, de

lapan de 13Cour, le refus deconfirmerla lignerevendiquéepar le Cameroun.

b Reste que le fait que la ligne du Camerountraverse des eaux non revendiquéespar la

Guinrteeqlistoriale, s'il est important, ne règlebien évidemment pasla question. Car la zone

figuric dan> un bleu plus vifsur notre diagramme(encoreplus vif dans votre dossier, Monsieur le

président)- ce sont leseauxqui entourentBioko(avec leursfonds marinset leur sous-sol) etdont

je parlc ii:-. cette zone est naturellement revendiquéepar la Guinée équatoriale. Déclare lr

ligne du C arncroun(ou toute autre ligne de même nature) valable erga omnesreviendrait, pour la

Cour. a an:i;iper les droitsrevendiquéspar la Guinéeéquatorialeet àleur porter atteinte. Mais le

Cameroun r.'aévidemment pas demandé à la Cour de se prononcer erga omnes; et la Guinée

équatorialeinsiste à bon droit sur le fait que la Cour n'est pas compétente pour rendrepareille

décisionquand elle-mêmen'a pas accepté sajuridiction. Sur cette question au moins, les trois

Etats qui comparaissent devant vous sont tout à fait d'accord. En résumé,si nous posons la

question : ((Confirmerla ligne du Cameroun implique-t-il que l'on considère automatiquement

l'ensembledes eaux situéesau sud de cette lignecomme camerounaises ?», la réponse est«non»,

catégoriquement«non». De même,confirmerla lignerevendiquée parle Cameroun (ou une ligne de mêmenature) n'empêche enaucun cas la Guinée équatorialede revendiquer les eaux

représentées sunrotre diagramme dansun bleu plus vif- c'est-à-dire les eaux entourant Bioko,

avec leursfondsmarins et leursous-sol.

17.Afin de dissiper toute équivoque,le Camerounsoulignequ'il n'acceptepas pour autant
.-
dansleurintégralitétoutesles demandes de la Guinéeéquatoriale.Mais comme1'Etatintervenant

s'est lui-mêmeévertué à vous le rappeler, il veut instamment réglercette questionpar lavoie des

négociations bilatéraless,ansrecourir au règlementjudiciare. Le Camerounest d'accord avec la

Guinéeéquatorialesur ce point, d'autantque le règlementpar tierce partie est impossible en

l'absence du consentement de la Guinéeéquatoriale. Et s'il doit y avoir des négociations

bilatérales et il faudra bien, tôt ou tard,en passer par-,àalors nul besoinpour le Cameroun

i O 5 3 de dévoiler sonjeu à l'avance. Je me permettrai cependant de dire à l'agent de la Guinée

équatorialequi a laisséentendreque le Cameroun revendiquerait un espace allantjusqu'au littoral

même del'île deioko~',qu'ila en l'occurrenceexagéré.La Guinéeéquatoriales'est enorgueillie,

danssesconclusions, de défendreune position rai~onnable~~E . llepeut comptersur un Cameroun

tout aussiraisonnableet sérieux.

18. Cela étant,je répèteque si vous confirmez formellement laligne que revendique le

Camerounface au Nigéria(ou une ligne semblable), cela n'empêche absolumenp tas la Guinée

équatorialede revendiquerl'un quelconquedes espaces maritimesqui sont ombrésen bleu vif sur

notrediagramme. C'est une évidencepourquiconqueconnaîtun tant soitpeule droit international

et sait que seules les parties sont liéespar la décisionqui est finalement rendue. Et il est peu

probableque la Guinée équatoriale doivele rappeler à des Etats tiers ouà des concessionnaires

éventuels- ni les uns, ni les autres ne sont assez naïfs. Le Camerouna toujours pris les tierces

parties pour ce qu'elles sont- de simples tierces parties- et n'a certainementjamais voulu

induirequiconqueen erreur - qu'il s'agissed'un Etatagissanten tant que tel ou d'un investisseur

potentiel- quantaux incidencesde l'arrêq tue le Cameroun espèrevoir la Courrendre finalement

sursafrontièremaritimeavec leNigéria. [Finde projection.]

42CR2002121p ,. 20,par.10.
43Voir,parex.ibid.,p.62,par.26. 19.Monsieur le président,il me reste un dernier point à évoqueravant de conclure. Etje

pèche ici par excès de prudence. Nous avons conclu que, pour les raisons que nous avons

exposées, rien n'empêchela Cour de confirmer la ligne équitabledans son intégralité. Cela

vaudrait également,mutatismutandis, pour touteligne similaire que la Cour voudrait finalement

retenir. Mais nous devonsaussi envisager lecas où la Courdéciderait, quellequ'en soit la raison,

de rejeternotre conclusionen partie, en disantque si certainssegmentsde la ligneprésentée parle

Camerounsont acceptables,d'autresne le sontpas. Parexemple,imaginonsque laCour estime, en

dépitdenos conclusions,que certainespartiesdenotre lignesont susceptiblesdeporter atteinteaux

droits et intérêtségitimesde la Guinéeéquatoriale. Monsieurle président,mon ami M.Pelleta

déjà dit, tout spécialementle 25 février,comment la Cour devrait, selon lui, régler un tel

problème44e ,t il a évoqué plusieurs possibilités. En particulier, il a dit que la Cour pourrait, en

pareil cas, laisser indéterminé un segment, - voire plusieurs segments - de la ligne45. En

réponse,le conseil duNigériaa accueillicettepropositionavec mépris,mais en réalitéil n'ya là

rien de fondamentalementimpossible ni de déraisonnable.Certes, le tracéd'une frontièreest en

général continu, mais il n'y arien d'illogiqueà considérerqu'une partie,une partie seulement,de

la frontièrepuisse être déterminée, à un moment donné,par une tierce partie. Par exemple, le

plateau continental entre la France et le Royaume-Uni n'aétédélimité que partiellement par le

tribunald'arbitrage46,lereste ayant été délimitéplus tard. Cette idéeest encore une fois illustrée

par les affaires de délimitationde frontièreque la Guinéeéquatoriale a citées hier,comme la

délimitationdes deux extrémitéd se la frontièreen l'affairetaret Bahreïn. L'onconstate queces

frontières sont,par définition, l'aboutissemendt'un longprocessus qui exige plusieurs étapes. Et

nous ne voyons pas pourquoilaisser un segmentnon déterminé dans la ligne camerouno-nigériane

causerait des problèmesinsurmontables, à fortiori vis-à-visde la Guinéeéquatoriale, lorsqu'ilest

communément admisque la frontière appelle des négociations. J'insiste cependant: nous

n'évoquonsce point quedans un soucid'exhaustivité.Pour le Cameroun,ce problèmene se pose

pas etne devrait pas seposer.

44CR200216,p. 68-72, par.36-48.

4Ibid.,p. 70, p42.
4OrganisationdesNations Unies,Recueildessentencesarbitrales(RSA),1977,XVIII p. 155. 4. Remarquesfinales

20. Voicimes observationsfinales. Nous avons essayéde démontrerqu'inéluctablement,le

faitque la Guinéeéquatorialeinterviennesans êtrepartie l'instance signifiequ'elle ne peut vous

demanderni de fixer un tripoint,ni une«zonedu point triple)),et encoremoins de tracerjusque

la ligne du Cameroun. Nous avons égalementconclu que rien,dans les faits de l'affaire,ne vous i

empêchede confirmer la ligne du Cameroun,non seulementen raison de l'article 59 du Statut,

mais égalementau vu des circonstancespropres àl'espèce,et tout particulièrementdu fait que la

lignecamerounaisene traversepas, pour l'essentiel,d'espacesmaritimes revendiquéspar la Guinée

équatoriale. Confirmerla ligne du Cameroun ne porteraitpas atteinte aux droits de la Guinée

équatorialelorsde ses futuresnégociationsavecle Camerounau sujet deseaux entourant Biokoet

laposition dela Guinéeéquatorialevis-à-vis d'autres Etatsn'en seraitpasaffaiblie.

21.Monsieur leprésident,Madameet Messieursde laCour, tout aulong de cette procédure,

le Camerouns'est montré respectueuxdu statutde la Guinéeéquatorialeen tant que non-partie à

l'instanceet il a scrupuleusementveilàéce querien ne porteatteinteàsesdroits ou intérêts.La

I 4)5 5 ligne équitablequ'il propose n'empêchepas la Guinée équatoriale de continuer a défendrece

qu'elle estime êtreses droits, et ne la désavantage pasnon plus dans les négociations,la voie

qu'elle veut suivre de préférencà celle de votrejuridiction. Le Camerounvous demande donc

respectueusementde confirmerla lignequ'ilpropose.

22. Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, je vous remercie de votre

bienveillanteattention. Voilàqui metn terme aux conclusionsdu Cameroundans cepremiertour

deparole consacré à l'intervention. A présent,je vous prie,Monsieur le président,de bien vouloir

appeler àla barre mon ami M.Thouvenin qui se penchera pendant une dizainede minutes sur les

demandesreconventionnellesdu Nigéria,commeconvenu.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you ver= much, ProfessorMendelson. That indeed closes 4

Carneroon'sfirst-round observations on Equatorial Guineaintervention. We shall now go on to

Cameroon's secondroundoforal argumentonNigeria'scounter-claims. ProfessorThouvenin,you

have thefloor. Mr. THOUVENIN: Thank you,Mr. President.

NIGERIA' CSOUNTER-CLAIMS

1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, it falls to me to present Cameroon's final

observationsonNigeria'scounter-claims.

2. Last Thursday, ProfessorCrawford expressed regretat the fact that Cameroonhad failed

to follow him down the meandering pathof his firststatement, devotingjust afewminutes - one

eyeon the clock - to rebuttinghis arguments4'.

3. Our reply would doubtless have been a fuller one if Cameroonhad been faced with a

serious foray ont0 the terrain of the charges leviedagainst it, andtheir proof. But, in terrns of that

terrain, ProfessorCrawford'sfirst-round statementwas, on his own admission,barelymore than a

"little excursion into the realm of factYA8. And we can hardly criticize him for this; as Our

opponentshavemorethanonce pointedout: "a lawyer'sopinionis as good as his brief'"19.

I 056 4. In his reply, ProfessorTomuschatfirst soughtto dispelthe misleading impressioncreated

byNigeria's oral argument5'. That is why he retumed in particularto the 1981 incident. And that

proved to be not unhelpful for, ultimately, thedistinguished CO-Agentofthe Federal Republic of

Nigeria franklyadmittedto you lastThursdaythatthe incidentshad in fact taken place in Bakassi,

andnot on the Nigerian sideof the~kwa~afe~'.Thus it wasCameroonwho was right.

5. ProfessorTomuschatalsorepliedto certainargumentsconcemingthe evidentiaryvalueof

thedocumentsannexedtothe counter-claim. Thatwas too brieffor Nigerian counsel'staste. 1will

thereforeretm to this point, addressing,first,thewitness statementsof which Ouropponentsmake

somuch and,second,theirstatisticalestimatesofthe casualtieson eitherside.

4 7 ~2002120,p. 36, paras.2-4 (Crawford).
4 8 ~2002114,p. 54,para.22 (Crawford).

4 9 ~2002118, p. 23,para.24 (Akin;iCR 2002120,p. 67, para. 7(Abdullahi).
''CR 2002116,pp. 66-69,paras. 38-47(Tomuschat).

"CR 2002118,p. 26, para.34 (Akinjide).1. The witnessstatements

6. Mr.President, examining the annexes containing the witness statements which in

Professor Crawford7sview areso damningfor cameroon5*,thefirstthing wenote is that notone of

themwas made under oath.

7. Nigeria thus took the gamble that informai statements would suffice to found its

responsibilityclaims. It wasa risky gamble. It is perhaps not unhelpful to recall herethat, in the

caseof Flexi-VanLeasing,Inc. v. the Iran-United StatesClaims Tribunalrefusedto uphold

a liabilityclaimfounded on: "a vague affidavit,unexplainedbyoral testimony". AndtheTribunal

added: "To doso wouldbe arbitrary andimproper."54

8. But let us return to these informa1depositions. Thereare quite a few of them,and they

have clearly been prompted. Moreover, they present a certainuniformity, the majority of them

havingbeen draftedby a limitednumberofhands. That is notdeniedbyNigeria's co~nsel~~.

9. Butthatis al1weknow. We donotknow, for example,what werethe questionsput to the

witnesses. Were they "leading" questions, which automatically invitethe replies which the

questioner expectsS6. Were they posed in the over-militarized and somewhat oppressive

environmentdepictedin thenumerousphotographsof BakassiannexedbyNigeria to itspleadings?

Thatis a possibilitythat cannotbe discounted.

10.Al1themore so inasmuch asthestatementswere takenby individualswhoseidentityand

status are unknown. Moreover, Nigeria has been at pains not to take responsibility for those

persons' actions,to attest to their probity,or to guarantee the authenticity of their transcriptionof

the depositions. In short, al1the circumstances inwhich the "witness statements" were soughtout,

taken down andthen transmittedto theNigerianGovemmentremainmysterious.

11. But even supposing that the statementswere taken under proper conditions, it will be

clear to the Court that they al1corne from individuals claimingNigerian nationality. But: "We

8

5 2 2002114,p. 55, paras.25-26, p. 56, para.28 (Cra;fCR2002120,p. 36,paras.6-7 (Crawford).
L
53~lexi-~anLeasing, Inc. v. Iran, decisionNo. 259-36-1, Il Oct.1986, Iran-UnitedStates ClaimsTribunals
Reports, vol. 12, 1(12 Iran-U.S. C.T.R.), p. 335.
54~bid,.355.

5 5 2002114, p.55, para. 25 (Crawford).

%ee, for example, J.-CW.itenberg, La théoriedes preuves devant les juridictions internationales, RCADI
(1939-11).Vol. 56,pp. 1-105, paras.78-79. should never lose sight of the fact that the witness, however honest he may be, risks being

unconsciouslyinfluenced bypoorly understood considerationsof patriotism."57

12. It is thus with extreme caution- to Saythe least- that these statements should be

approached. In the case concerningMilitary andParamilitary Activitiesin and against Nicaragua,

the Courtmoreoverpointed outthat:

"two forms of testimony which are regarded as prima facie of superior credibility are,

first the evidence of a disinterested witness- one who is not a party to the
proceedings and stands to gain or lose nothing fiom its outcorne- and secondly so
much of the evidence of a party as is against its own interest" (I.C.J. Reports 1986,
p. 43, para. 69).

13.No witness statement meetingthese criteriahas beenproduced by Nigeria.

2. Thestatisticalargument

14.1 now have to Saya few words about the extraordinarystatistical argument urged on you

by Professorcrawford5*. TheCourt will recall that this involved estimates of the numbers of dead

and injured on eitherside since 1991.

I 058 15.1will not enter into anydiscussion of the figures,eventhough Cameroonregardsthem as

worthless. 1 only ask myself if they include, arnong the Nigerian deaths, Mr. OkongAsuqo,

alleged to have drowned in a boating accident5'. 1 note also that they do not include missing

persons. Yet AnnexRC211refers to 123missing onthe Cameroonian side. Finally, 1note that, in

AnnexOCDR46 alone, five Cameroonian deaths are attributed to Nigeria, whereas

Professor Crawford'stotal, fromal1annexes, has onlythree.

16. The statistical argument that he put to you is clearly worthless, even for indicative

purposes. Not only because the figuresare unverifiable, sincethe sources have not been disclosed,

but also because Nigeria's counsel stated that his calculation included allegations "without

admitting that they necessarily al1are trueV6O.If Nigeria does not believe in its own allegations,

how couldthe Court do so?

"~bid .,90.

"CR 2002114,p. 54, para.21and p. 57,para. 31 (Crawford); CR2002/20,pp. 37-38, paras. 9-12 (Crawford).
59~ejoinderofNigeria, p. 750,and Ann.NR 215.

6 0 2002114,p. 57, para. 31(Crawford). 17.The fact remains that the armed conflict has undoubtedly caused losses on both sides.

We mustalso deplorethe civilian victims,since, as canbe seen fiom the photographsproducedby

d
Ouropponents,in which soldiersso visiblymingle withthe civilian population,Nigeriahas chosen

not to removethe latterfiom the combatzone.
&
18.But the resultanthumantragediesare entirely attributable to Nigeria, which,since 1994,

has constantlyprovokedclashes.

19.Or rather,it has provokeda war. Thus it wasprisoners of war thattheParties exchanged

on 24 November 1998, under the supervision of the Red cross6'. The latter's role, as always

exemplary, has not, moreover, been facilitated by Nigeria. While the ICRC welcomed "the

constructive dialogue it was able to establish with the High Authorities of the Republic of

Cameroon", italso regretted the conduct of Nigeria, which too ofîen refused without reason its

legitimaterequests6'. This is confirrnedbythe letter fromthe ICRC, whichyouwill findattab 159

in yourfoider.

30 \!'ha1 then remains of the image of "wicked Carneroon" that Nigeria has sought to
i 059
creale? Siceria's strongestargumentis that it has alwaysbeen in peaceful possessionof ~akassi~~

and thal. in consequence, whatever wrongdoing that may have taken place is attributable to

Cameroon Butthat claim isgroundless.

2 I In 1993 itdid not evenoccurtotheNigerian ForeignMinisterto makesuch a claim. His

purposc at thar timewas to negotiate asexpensively as possible the withdrawal ofNigeriantroops

from BriLrissi The letter of 17March 1994which disclosesthis [tab 160in your folder]canies an

extremcl) high probativevalue; itis signedby a third partyto the conflict, the Egyptian Foreign

Ministcr" He writes that his discussionswith the NigerianForeign Minister have addressedthe

condiriorisof n.ithdrawa1of the Nigerian forces from Bakassi. Would Nigeria have held such

discussions ifirconsideredthat its forceswere present ontemtory of which it had alwaysbeen in

+
peaceful possession? Of course not. Itstroops were never entitled to be in Bakassi, and itknew

61~upplernentayocumentsfiledby Cameroonon 10 Jan.2002,Ann.C 23.

62~nn.OCDR 43,quoted inCR2002116, p.69,para.46 (Tomuschat).
6 3 ~2002120,p.20, par7.(Abi-Saab).

64~bse~ationsofCarneroon,Ann.17.this, atleast in 1994. But theirwithdrawaldidnot takeplace. As a result,it is clearlyupon Nigeria

that theentire responsibilityforthe fightingrests, andforthe resultantlosses.

22. Mr. President, Membersof the Court, thatconcludes my statement for this moming,

deliveredwith an eyeon the clock,and 1thankyou mostwarmly for your attention.

The PRESIDENT: Thankyou, Professor. That endsthis morning's sitting.The nextsitting

will be held this afternoon at 3 p.m. We will hear Nigeria's reply to Equatorial Guinea's

observationsinthisfirstround ofargument. Thesittingis closed.

TheCourtrose ut 12.25p.m.