Non Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2010/20
Cour internationale International Court
de Justice of Justice
LAAYE THAEGUE
ANNÉE 2010
Audience publique
tenue le mercredi 20 octobre 2010, à 10 h 40, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
en l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime
(Nicaragua c. Colombie)
Requête du Honduras à fin d’intervention
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
YEAR 2010
Public sitting
held on Wednesday 20 October 2010, at 10.40 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada presiding,
in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicaragua v. Colombia)
Application by Honduras for permission to intervene
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________ - 2 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
viceMpra,ident
KoMroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Crinçade
Yusuf
XuMe mes
Dojnogshue,
CotMM.
jugesaja, ad hoc
Cgeffrrr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presdmekta
Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Xue
Donoghue
Judges ad hoc Cot
Gaja
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
Le Gouvernement du Nicaragua est représenté par :
S.Exc.M.CarlosJoséArgüelloGómez, ambassadeur du Nicaragua auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme agent et conseil ;
S. Exc. M. Samuel Santos,
ministre des affaires étrangères du Nicaragua ;
M. Alex Oude Elferink, directeur adjoint de l’Ins titut néerlandais du droit de la mer de l’Université
d’Utrecht,
M.Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de ParisOuest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre et ancien
président de la Commission du droit internatio nal, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
M.PaulReichler, avocat au cabinetFoley Hoag LLP, WashingtonD.C., membre des barreaux de
la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,
M.AntonioRemiroBrotóns, professeur de droi t international à l’Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M.RobinCleverly, M.A., D.Phil, C.Geol, F.G.S., consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
M.JohnBrown, R.D., M.A., F.R.I.N., F.R.G.S., consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
comme conseillers scientifiques et techniques ;
M. César Vega Masís, directeur, direction des affaires juridiques, de la souveraineté et du territoire,
ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Julio César Saborio, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Walner Molina Pérez, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseils;
Mme Clara E. Brillembourg, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et de New York,
Mme Carmen Martinez Capdevila, docteur en droit international public à l’Universidad Autónoma
de Madrid,
Mme Alina Miron, chercheur au Centre de droit in ternational de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
M.EdgardoSobenesObregon, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade du Nicaragua au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme conseils adjoints. - 5 -
The Government of Nicaragua is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambassador of Nicaragua to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Agent and Counsel;
H.E. Mr. Samuel Santos,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua;
MrA. lexOudeElferink, Deputy-Director, Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea,
Utrecht University
Mr.AlainPellet, Professor at the University ParisOuest, Nanterre-La Défense, Member and
former Chairman of the International Law Co mmission, associate member of the Institut de
droit international,
Mr.PaulReichler, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., Member of the Bars of
the United States Supreme Court and the District of Columbia,
Mr.AntonioRemiroBrotóns, Professor of Intern ational Law, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid;
Member of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr.RobinCleverly, M.A., DPh., CGEOL., F.G.S., Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
Mr.JohnBrown, R.D., M.A., F.R.I.N., F.R.G.S., Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
as Scientific and Technical Advisers;
Mr. César Vega Masís, Director of Juridical Affairs, Sovereignty and Territory, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Julio César Saborio, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affai
rs,
Mr. Walner Molina Pérez, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Counsel;
Ms Clara E. Brillembourg, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and
New York,
Ms Carmen Martínez Capdevila, Doctor of Public International Law, Universidad Autónoma,
Madrid
MsAlinaMiron, Researcher, Centre for International Law (CEDIN), University ParisOuest,
Nanterre-La Défense,
Mr. Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, First Secretary, Embassy of Nicaragua in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
as Assistant Counsel. - 6 -
Le Gouvernement de la Colombie est représenté par :
S. Exc. Julio Londoño Paredes, professeur de relations internationales à l’Université del Rosario de
Bogotá,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Guillermo Fernández de Soto, président du comité juridique interaméricain, membre de
la Cour permanente d’arbitrage et ancien mini stre des affaires étrangères de la République de
Colombie,
comme coagent ;
M.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat,
M.RodmanR.Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de NewYork,
cabinet Eversheds LLP (Paris),
M. Marcelo Kohen, professeur de droit internationa l à l’Institut de hautes études internationales et
du développement de Genève, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Francisco José Lloreda Mera, ambassadeur de la République de Colombie auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas, représentant permanent de la Colombie auprès de l’OIAC, ancien
ministre d’Etat de la République de Colombie,
M. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, membre de la Commission du droit international,
S. Exc. Mme Sonia Pereira Portilla, ambassadeur de la République de Colombie auprès de la
République du Honduras,
M. Andelfo García González, professeur de droit inte rnational, ancien ministre adjoint des affaires
étrangères de la République de Colombie,
Mme Victoria E. Pauwels T., ministre-conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
République de Colombie,
M. Julián Guerrero Orozco, ministre-conseiller à l’ambassade de la République de la Colombie aux
Pays-Bas,
MmeAndreaJiménezHerrera, conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères de la République de
Colombie,
comme conseillers juridiques ;
M. Thomas Fogh, cartographe, International Mapping,
comme conseiller technique. - 7 -
The Government of Colombia is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Julio Londoño Paredes, Professor of International Relations, Universidad del Rosario,
Bogotá,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Guillermo Fernández de Soto, Chair of the Inter-American Juridical Committee, Member
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Colombia,
as Co-Agent;
Mr.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, Member of the Institute of International Law, Barrister,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris , Member of the NewYork Bar,
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
Mr.MarceloKohen, Professor of International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, Geneva; associate member of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Francisco José Lloreda Mera, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, Permanent Representative of Colombia to the OPCW, former Minister of
State,
Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Member of the International Law Commission,
H.E. Ms Sonia Pereira Portilla, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Republic of
Honduras,
Mr. Andelfo García González, Professor of Interna tional Law, former Deputy Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Colombia,
Ms Victoria E. Pauwels T., Minister-Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Colombia,
Mr. Julián Guerrero Orozco, Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Colombia in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Andrea Jiménez Herrera, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia,
as Legal Advisers;
Mr. Thomas Fogh, Cartographer, International Mapping,
as Technical Adviser. - 8 -
Le Gouvernement du Honduras est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Carlos López Contreras, ambassadeur, conseiller national au ministère des affaires
étrangères,
comme agent ;
SirMichaelWood, K.C.M.G., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, membre de la Commission du
droit international,
Mme Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Genève,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Julio Rendón Barnica, ambassadeur, ministère des affaires étrangères,
S. Exc. M. Miguel Tosta Appel, ambassadeur, président de la commission hondurienne de
démarcation au ministère des affaires étrangères,
S. Exc. M. Sergio Acosta, chargé d’affaires a.i. à l’ambassade du Honduras au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Richard Meese, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris,
M. Makane Moïse Mbengue, docteur en droit, maître de conférences à l’Université de Genève,
Mlle Laurie Dimitrov, élève-avocat, barreau de Paris, cabinet Meese,
M. Eran Sthoeger, faculté de droit de la New York University,
comme conseils ;
M. Mario Licona, ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseiller technique. - 9 -
The Government of Honduras is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Carlos López Contreras, Ambassador, National Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Asgent;
SirMichaelWood, K.C.M.G., member of the E nglish Bar, member of the International Law
Commission,
Ms Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Professor of International Law at the University of Geneva,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Julio Rendón Barnica, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
H.E. Mr. Miguel Tosta Appel, Ambassador, Chairman of the Honduran Demarcation Commission,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
H.E. Mr. Sergio Acosta, Chargé d’affaires a.i. at the Embassy of Honduras in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr. Richard Meese, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris,
Dr. Makane Moïse Mbengue, Senior Lecturer at the University of Geneva,
Miss Laurie Dimitrov, pupil barrister, Paris Bar, Cabinet Meese,
Mr. Eran Sthoeger, Faculty of Law, New York University,
Csounsel;
Mr. Mario Licona, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Technical Adviser. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: We now come to the first round of oral argument of Colombia and I give
the floor to His Excellency Ambassador Julio Londoño Paredes, the Agent of Colombia.
Mr. LONDOÑO: Thank you, Mr. President.
1. Mr. President and distinguished Judges, it is a great honour for me to address the Court, as
Agent for the Republic of Colombia in these hearings on the Application for permission to
intervene submitted by the Republic of Honduras on 10June2010, in the case concerning
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), within the framework of Article 62 of
the Statute of the Court, and also invoking Article 36, paragraph 1, thereof.
2. In its Application,
“Honduras seeks the Court’s permission to intervene as a party in the current
proceedings in order to settle conclusive ly, on the one hand, the dispute over the
delimitation line between the endpoint of the boundary fixed by the Judgment of
8October2007 and the tripoint on the boundary line in the 1986 Maritime
Delimitation Treaty, and, on the other hand, the determination of the tripoint on the
boundary line in the 1986 Maritime Deli mitation Treaty between Colombia and
Honduras.” 1
In the alternative, Honduras requests to be allowe d to intervene as a non-party, so as to inform the
Court of its rights and legal interests that may be affected by a decision of the Court in the present
case.
3. During the first round presentation in the present proceedings, Honduras requested to be
authorized to intervene as a Party, in order to achieve “a final settlement, based on international
2
law, to [the outstanding] maritime delimitation dispute” with Nicaragua . Honduras also
maintained, in the alternative, its request to be allowed to intervene as a non-party, so as to inform
the Court of its rights and legal interests that may be affected by a decision in the present case.
4. Pursuant to the Court’s communication, my Government submitted its Observations with
regard to the Application on 2 September 2010.
5. At the outset, Colombia has taken not e that the Application expressly excludes the
territorial aspect of the dispute before the Court and is limited to the maritime delimitation in so far
1
Application of Honduras, para. 36.
2CR 2010/18, p. 45, para. 47 (Wood). - 11 -
as it concerns areas located north of parallel 14°59' 08"and west of the meridian 79°56'00"and
west of the rest of the line established in the 1986 Treaty.
6. Honduras’s request to be accepted as a pa rty raises matters concerning the Judgment of
8October2007 that are exclusively related to its bilateral relationship with Nicaragua. Since
Colombia was not a party to that case, it will not express any views on those issues.
7. However, Honduras’s request also refers to the dispositif of the 2007 Judgment, according
to which: “From point F, [the boundary line] shall continue along the line having the azimuth of
70°14'41.25" until it reaches the area where th e rights of third States may be affected.” ( I.C.J.
Reports 2007 (II), p. 763.) Colombia is such a third State and does have rights in the area situated
immediately east of the 82nd meridian.
8. As for Honduras’s request to be admitted to intervene as a non-party, in light of the fact
that it is evidently bound by a valid international treaty in force, concluded with Colombia in 1986,
Colombia considers that the rights resulting from this Treaty constitute an interest of a legal nature
that may be affected by the decision in this case and that therefore Honduras has satisfied the
requirements of Article 62 of the Statute.
Colombia’s sovereignty and jurisdiction over the cays and maritime areas
north of the 15th parallel
9. As explained in detail in Colombia’s wr itten pleadings in the case, since the nineteenth
century Colombia has been exercising peaceful a nd uninterrupted sovereignty over each and every
of the islands and cays of the San Andrés archipelago, including Serranilla Cays.
10. That jurisdiction likewise continued to be exercised over the adjacent economic zone and
continental shelf areas, including those located nor th of the 15th parallel due to the entitlements of
Providencia Island and the other islands and cays of the San Andrés archipelago.
The Treaty of 2 August 1986
11. In the late 1970s Honduras claimed rights to maritime areas located north of the
aforesaid parallel. With the purpose of settling their differences, following a negotiation process,
Honduras and Colombia signed a maritime delimitation treaty on 2 August 1986, establishing a line
starting at the 82º W meridian, along parallel 14°59' 08" N up to meridian 79° 56' 00" W where the - 12 -
boundary continues to the north until reaching the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea generated by
Serranilla Cays. It continues along the border of a 12-mile arc of circle, corresponding to the
western section of the territorial sea of Serran illa Cays, until it reaches the parallel at latitude
16º 04' 15" N.
12. The Treaty was approved by the Honduran Assembly on 30 November 1999 and by the
Colombian Congress on 13 December of the same year. The exchange of ratification instruments
took place in New York on 20 December 1999. The Treaty was registered with the United Nations
Secretary-General on 21December of that year and has been strictly complied with by both
Colombia and Honduras since the very moment of its signature in 1986.
13. The basic and essential procedure foreseen in international law to effect maritime
delimitations between States is the agreement of the parties. In the 1986Treaty, vis-à-vis
Honduras, Colombia agreed to limit its continenta l shelf and exclusive economic zone entitlements
generated by Providencia Island and the other islands and cays of the San Andrés archipelago.
Obviously, such concession was predicated on bilateral issues negotiated between the parties to the
Treaty and is not applicable vis-à-vis Nicaragua.
The observance and legal force of treaties
14. Taking into account that the observance of treaties is the cornerstone of peace and
stability in international relations, let this be an opportunity to reiterate once again, the well-known
and unwavering position of Colombia throughout its existence as an independent nation, of the
faithful observance of international treaties.
The Court’s Judgment of 8 October 2007 and its lack of effects on Colombia’s rights
15. Colombia understands that the Court, by th e references included in paragraph 316 of its
Judgment of 8 October 2007, has in no way purported to prejudice Colombia’s rights north of the
15th parallel 3and west of meridian 79°56'00"W, also fully recognized in the 1986Treaty, an
instrument concluded within the framework of international law.
3The 1986 Treaty actually refers to latitude 14° 59' 08", but the Parties’ arguments in that case generally referred
to the 15th parallel. - 13 -
16. Evidently, the Court, ever vigilant in its judgments to avoid affecting the rights of third
States, only referred in the Judgment of 8October2007 to the obligations of Nicaragua and
Honduras, since they were the only Parties involved in that case.
17. Colombia further understands that the Court has in no way prejudiced its rights with
respect to Nicaragua in the pr esent case, since they are also protected under Article59 of the
Statute of the Court.
The Judgment of 2007 vis-à-vis Nicaragua
18. Within the framework of its unwaveri ng conduct with regard to the respect for
international treaties, Colombia has stated its respect for the 1986 Treaty concluded with Honduras.
19. Indeed, since in the 1986Treaty Colombia and Honduras only agreed to establish a
maritime delimitation between the two of th em, Colombia is not precluded from upholding its
rights vis-à-vis Nicaragua and claim its rights nor th of the 15thparallel and west of meridian
79° 56' 00" and west of the rest of the line fixed in that Treaty.
20. The Colombian presentation continues w ith Mr.RodmanBundy who will address the
Court with the purpose of clarifying certain aspect s of the legal interests that Honduras considers
may be affected by a decision of the Court, the historical context, the existing treaties and
agreements in the area and some issues regardi ng the Judgment of October 2007. Mr. Bundy will
be followed by ProfessorKohen who will discuss the impact of the 1986Treaty on Honduras’s
request to intervene, and by ProfessorCrawford who will deal with Honduras’s Application to
intervene as a party.
I thank the Court for having allowed me the pr ivilege of opening Colombia’s oral argument
in these proceedings on behalf of my Government. I would now ask you, Mr. President, to give the
floor to Mr. Rodman Bundy. - 14 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Your Excellency AmbassadorJulioLondoñoParedes.
Before I call the next speaker on the side of the Republic of Colombia, namely,
Mr. Rodman Bundy, I believe it is an appropriate time for the Court to have a short break for coffee
of about 10 minutes.
Thyou.
The Court adjourned from 11 a.m. to 11.15 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Now I give the floor to Mr. Rodman Bundy.
Mr. BUNDY:
T HE CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH H ONDURAS ’S APPLICATION ARISES AND THE QUESTION
OF ITS LEGAL INTEREST
A. Introduction
1. Thank you very much, Mr.President, Me mbers of the Court. I have the honour to
continue with Colombia’s first round oral presentation on the Application to intervene submitted by
Honduras.
2. Now in its Application Honduras makes two a lternative requests. Its principal request is
to be permitted to intervene as a party in ordr to settle what Honduras says is the dispute that
exists over the delimitation line between the terinal point of the boundary between itself and
Nicaragua resulting from the Court’s 2007Judgmen t and the tripoint involving Colombia.
Subsidiarily, and in the event the Court does noaccede to Honduras’s request to intervene as a
party, Honduras requests permission to intervene as a non-party in the case (Application of
Honduras, para. 36).
3. These matters have a bearing on the manner in which Honduras has described the precise
object of its intervention in its Application,which Honduras says is threefold (Application,
para. 33).
(i) The first is to protect, generally, the righ ts of Honduras in the Caribbean Sea by all legal
means available, including the procedure provided for in Article 62 of the Statute. - 15 -
(ii) The second is to inform the Court of the natu re of its rights and interests of a legal nature
that could be affected by a decision of the Court, taking into account the maritime
boundaries claimed by the Parties in the main case that had been submitted to the Court.
Now these two objects relate both to Honduras’s main request to intervene as a party and to its
subsidiary request to intervene as a non-party. And provided that Honduras can show the requisite
interest of a legal nature that may be affected by a decision in the case, both objects appear to be
legitimate. The first reflects an object which a number of States have previously referred to in their
intervention requests, and as to which the Court has never indicated that such a request is improper,
with respect to non-party intervention. And the second has been confirmed to be a proper object of
intervention by the Court on sev eral occasions, including in the El Salvador/Honduras case, the
Cameroon v. Nigeria case and the Indonesia/Malaysia case.
(iii) The third object, as articulated in Hondur as’s Application, is the request for Honduras to
be authorized to intervene in a capacity of a party which, if accepted, would result in
Honduras recognizing the binding effect of the decision that will be rendered.
Obviously, if such a request — this third object — is not accepted by the Court, Honduras repeats
its subsidiary request to be permitted to intervene as a non-party.
4. In its Written Observations on the App lication, filed on 2September2010, Colombia
indicated that it has no objection to Honduras’s request to intervene as a non-party. With respect to
Honduras’s request to intervene in the capacity of a party, Colombia’s position was more nuanced.
5. This aspect of Honduras’s Application rai ses a number of issues relating to the bilateral
delimitation between Nicaragua and Honduras which was addressed in the 2007Judgment. As
Colombia’s Agent has indicated, Colombia was not a party to that case, and it did not consider it
appropriate to express a view on those issues. And that is why Colombia’s Written Observations
indicated that the request to inte rvene as a party fell to the Court to decide in accordance with its
discretion under Article 62, paragraph 2, of the Stat ute: and this is a matter that will be discussed
further by Professor Crawford later this morning.
6. For my part, I shall elaborate the reasons underlying Colombia’s Written Observations on
the non-party intervention point during the course of my presentation this morning. But, first,
however, I would like to place Honduras’s Applica tion in context by reviewing the geographic - 16 -
scope of that Application and its relationship to the delimitation situ ation that exists in the area:
and following this, I shall address the question of whether Honduras has an interest of a legal
nature which may be affected by a decision in the case.
*
* *
B. The scope of Honduras’s Application
7. Honduras makes it clear that it is not seeking to intervene in any of the territorial matters
that are at issue in the main case (Application, para.16). Honduras has, in fact, previously
recognized Colombia’s sovereignty over the islands and cays comprising the SanAndrés
archipelago in particular, by virtue of the treaty it entered into with Colombia in 1986.
8. The Application is limited to a request fo r permission to intervene only in relation to a
part of the delimitation area between Nicaragua and Colombia in the main case. To be more
precise, and as now is going to be illustrated on th e screen, and you saw this earlier this morning,
Honduras has indicated that the mar itime area within whic h it claims to have interests of a legal
nature that may be affected by a decision in the case is situated within a rectangle which is bounded
by the coordinates that have been mentioned earlier, resulting in the circumscribed figure on the
screen (Application para. 17).
9. Given that the test under Article62 of the Statute is whether the applicant State has an
interest of a legal nature that may be affected by a decision in the case, two initial questions need to
be addressed in order to determine whether Honduras has met the requirements of Article 62:
(i) The first is, can Honduras point to the existen ce of an interest of a legal nature within the
relevant part of the rectangle that it has identified?
(ii) And secondly, if so, if it can point to such an interest, is the delimitation of any part of the
maritime area subsumed within that rectangle in dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua
such that a decision in the case may affect Honduras’s legal interests? - 17 -
It is only if the answer to both of those questions is positive that a third question arises, which is
namely:
(iii) whether the appropriate mode for Honduras’s intervention is as a non-party or a party.
10. To answer the first two questions, it is necessary to examine how the legal interests of the
various States in the region have evolved through the delimitation of maritime areas in this part of
the Caribbean Sea prior to the filing of Honduras’s Application.
*
* *
C. The historical context
11. Since its independence, Colombia has been exercising sovereignty and sovereign rights
over all of the islands comprising the San Andrés archipelago and their waters, which includes the
northern islands. Colombia possesses 200-nautical-mile entitlements measured from the baselines
of the islands within the archipelago, including from Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo located north of the
15th parallel, as well as from Provi dencia and Serrana located further south. In 1978, Colombia
enacted a law promulgating a 200-nautical-mile EEZ and referring to its continental shelf rights
(referred to in para. 3.33 of Nicaragua’s Memorial).
12. At the end of the 1970s, Honduras claimed rights over maritime areas lying north of the
15thparallel and, for the first time ever, over Serranilla. Colombia immediately rejected any
notion of Honduran rights over Serranilla: and th ereafter, Colombia and Honduras engaged in a
process of extensive negotiations in order to agree on their maritime boundary. During this
process, Nicaragua announced no claims over Serranilla and its surrounding waters, as the
distinguished Agent for Honduras confirmed on Monday [CR2010/18, p.15, para.8 (López
Contreras)]. And nor was Serranilla in dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the case that
was decided in 2007. - 18 -
13. The negotiations between Colombia and Honduras culminated in the signing of a
maritime boundary agreement on 2August1986 (Counter-Memorial of Colombia, Ann.10;
judges’ folder tab 9). The 1986 Treaty represented a compromise, as most delimitation agreements
do ⎯ a point that was brought out by Sir Michael Wood earlier this week [CR 2010/18, pp. 33-34,
para.10]. Honduras effectively renounced its s overeignty claim over Serranilla. Colombia, in
turn, agreed not to press the full extent of itmaritime entitlements generated by Providencia and
Serrana and, to the north-west, of Serranilla Isla nd, although Serranilla did maintain its full rights
elsewhere around the island. The maritime bounda ry that was agreed thus fell between the
Honduran coast and Colombia’s islands.
14. In the meantime, while it seems that Nicaragua and Honduras may have contemplated
commencing negotiations for the delimitation of their maritime boundary in 1977, those initiatives
broke down as a result of the change in government in Nicaragua that took place in July 1979. As
Nicaragua’s Memorial in the case with Honduras stated:
“the revolution that toppled the Nicaragua n Government in 1979 did not leave any
margin for the continuation of a negotiation that had scarcely begun with the
diplomatic notes exchanged in May 1977” (Memorial of Nicaragua in the
Nicaragua v. Honduras case, p. 38, para. 20).
15. Notwithstanding that negotiations betw een Honduras and Nicara gua had broken down,
Colombia still wanted to settle its dispute with Honduras, and to continue with its practice of
agreeing maritime boundaries that had started with the boundary agreements Colombia signed with
Costa Rica, Panama, Haiti and the Dominican Republic in the 1970s.
16. With respect to the delimitation s ituation between Colombia and Honduras, both
countries possessed maritime rights and entitlements north of the 15°parallel as the Honduras’s
Application correctly notes at paragraph11. Those rights were generated by the San Andrés
archipelago, on the one hand, and Honduras’s coast on the other. These respective entitlements
overlapped, a situation which gave rise to the need for delimitation.
(i) The 1986 Colombia-Honduras Agreement
17. As can be seen on the map now being projected on the screen, the Colombia-Honduras
Treaty delimited the maritime boundary in the following way. Starting at the 82°meridian, the
boundary runs along the 14°59'08"N parallel up to meridian 79°56'00"W. As the Honduran - 19 -
Government had officially stated at the ti me, the point at which the land boundary between
Nicaragua and Honduras reaches the sea was located at latitude 14º 59' 08" ⎯ hence the reason that
latitude was chosen. The boundary then continues to the north until reaching the 12-mile territorial
sea generated by Serranilla cays. It continues along the border ⎯ as you can see on the screen ⎯
of that 12-mile arc of circle ⎯ which corresponds to the western sector of the territorial sea of
Serranilla cays ⎯ until it reaches the tangent parallel on the external border of the arc of circle (at
lat. 16º04'15"N and long.79°50'32"). And from that point, the agreement stipulates that the
boundary continues eastwards along the same parallel “up to where the limits should be established
with a third State”, which was Jamaica. Serranilla was thus left with its full suite of maritime
entitlements to the south, south-east and east of the boundary line.
18. There was a tendency on the part of both Honduras’s distinguished Agent and
SirMichael, in their presentations on Monday, to emphasize that Honduras possesses maritime
claims to the north of the 15°parallel and east of the 82°meridian under the 1986Treaty
[CR 2010/18, pp. 14-15, para. 7 (Lopez); pp. 42-43, para. 38, and pp. 43-44, paras. 42-44 (Wood)].
I would simply recall that any Honduran rights under that Treaty are also bounded in the east by the
limits of the 1986delimitation line I have discu ssed, which largely coincides with Honduras’s
rectangle.
19. The Treaty between Colombia and H onduras was a purely bilateral delimitation
agreement. The agreement did not deal with any maritime claim that either party to it had with
third States in the region. In fact, Article II of the Treaty provided that the agreed delimitation line
would not prejudice the drawing of maritime boundaries already established or which may be
established with third States in the future, prov ided that such boundaries did not affect the
jurisdiction which either party recognized to the other under the treaty.
20. Now, unlike its practice with respect to the earlier maritime delimitation agreements
signed by Colombia, Costa Rica and Panama which were discussed last week ⎯ Nicaragua
promptly protested the 1986Treaty to Honduras and Colombia one month after it was signed
(Memorial of Nicaragua in the Nicaragua v. Honduras case, Ann. 70). This was, in fact, the only
boundary treaty ⎯ the only boundary treaty ⎯ signed by Colombia that Nicaragua ever protested. - 20 -
(ii)TheColombia-JamaicaAgreements
21. The second boundary agreement in the area is the Maritime Boundary and Joint Regime
Area signed between Colombia and Jamaica on 12 November 1993. It covered areas located to the
east of the Colombia-Honduras Treaty, as we will illustrate on the screen.
22. The treaty provided for a maritime boun dary between the two countries starting at
point 1 ⎯ which is being highlighted on the map. The boundary line, which was based on
equidistance principles, then extended eastwards through a series of three other points, beyond
which the boundary continued until it intercepted with a point, which was at that time unspecified,
where the Colombia-Haiti delimitation line intercep ted a delimitation line that still needed to be
decided between Jamaica and Haiti. Now this pa rt of the Colombia-Jamaica boundary lies beyond
the area of concern set out in Honduras’s Application and thus is not immediately relevant.
23. To the north-west of point 1 however, Colo mbia and Jamaica agreed to establish a Joint
Regime Area. And this is the area that is shown by shading on the map. Within that area, it was
agreed that both States, Colombia and Jamaica, were entitled to exercise sovereign rights to explore
for and exploit the natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil, and the su perjacent waters, and to
carry out other related activities. Third State activities in this area were not authorized, as
expressly recorded in the treaty. As SirMichael noted on Monday, the Joint Regime Area fully
respected the 1986Colombia-Honduras delimitation [CR2010/18, p.34, para.13]. By the same
token, Honduras has fully respected the 1993Colomb ia-Jamaica Treaty. In fact the limit of the
Joint Regime Area to the north of Serranilla starts at the end of the Colombia-Honduras boundary
line.
24. Prior to the signing of the 1993Treaty, Colombia and Jamaica had also concluded two
fishing agreements, in 1981 and 1984, in the same general area. Nicaragua never protested the
1993 Treaty, or either of the Fishing Agreements, or the activities carried out thereunder.
(iii) The Court’s 2007 Judgment
25. This brings me to the Nicaragua-Hondur as delimitation which was the subject of the
Court’s 2007Judgment. The location of the terminal point of that boundary is an issue that
Honduras raised in its Application and again in its first round of oral argument on Monday. And,
as I have said, because Colombia was not a party to that case, it will refrain from taking a position - 21 -
on that issue. On the map that now appears on the screen, we have simply placed an arrow on the
bisector to reflect what is said in the dispositif of the Court’s Judgment ⎯ namely:
“From pointF, it shall continue along the line having the azimuth of
70° 14' 41.25 [seconds] until it reaches the area where the rights of third States may be
affected.” (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 763, para. 321 (3).)
Now that is where the Court put an arrow in its sk etch-map8 in its Judgment. It did not put any
arrow at the end of the dashed line that Nicaragua showed you this morning. And I note that
Nicaragua’s illustrations this morning, not only h as Nicaragua placed in arrow, in fact a flashing
arrow at the end of the dash line, it has converted the dash line into a solid red line. But this is the
only arrow that appears on the Court’s sketch-map in the Judgment.
26. The Court’s decision in its dispositif is entirely consistent with a number of other
pronouncements made in its Judgment. For exampl e, in paragraph 312 of the Judgment, the Court
referred to the general principle that it “will not rule on an issue when in order to do so the rights of
a third party that is not before it, have firs t to be determined”, and the Court continued,
“[a]ccordingly, it is usual in a j udicial delimitation for the precise endpoint to be left undefined in
order to refrain from prejudicing the rights of third States” (para. 312).
27. Elsewhere, in the Judgment, when the Court referred to the relevance of the 82nd
meridian, which is at issue as part of the merits in the main case, the Court observed that it “will
avoid prejudicing those proceedings by its decision here” ⎯ that was in paragraph315. And in
paragraph318, the Court indicated that it had cons idered certain interests of third States resulting
from bilateral treaties in the region and the Court stated that “its consideration of these interests is
without prejudice to any other legitimate third party interests which may also exist in the area”. It
is therefore apparent from these passages that the Court accepted the fact that its delimitation in the
Nicaragua v. Honduras case should not prejudice the rights of a third State such as Colombia.
28. I might also note in passing that, in pa ragraph 319 of its Judgment, the Court observed
that:
“[I]n no case may the line be interpre ted as extending more than 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured; any
claim of continental shelf rights beyond 200 miles must be in accordance with
Article76 of UNCLOS and reviewed by the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf established thereunder.” - 22 -
29. I mention this point because there is a suggestion at paragraph26 of Honduras’s
Application that Honduras’s legislation provides for rights over the continental shelf extending
beyond 200 nautical miles. In fact, from the illustra tion that was put on the screen this morning by
Nicaragua showing an arrow at the end of the dashed line, that arrow seems to project and point to
areas lying beyond 200nautical miles of the coasts of Nicaragua and Honduras as well.
Honduras’s “rights” are said to be cast in term s that conform to rights that Honduras possesses
under Article 76 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of th e Sea. For its part, as the Court is aware,
Nicaragua’s main argument in the present case ⎯ at least after its Reply ⎯ depends on a purported
extension of the continental shelf in areas beyond 200 nautical miles from its coast.
30. Notwithstanding what Honduras’s legislation may say on the point, Colombia would
recall that Honduras became a party to the 1982 Convention on 5October1993, as the Honduran
Application points out itself at paragraph26. Since that time, Honduras has made no outer
continental shelf submission to the United Nati ons Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf, and the time-limit for the filing of any such submission has lapsed. Colombia does not
believe that there are any areas of outer continental shelf in this part of the Caribbean
Sea ⎯ certainly none have been submitted to and approved by the United Nations
Commission ⎯and that therefore such issues are legally irrelevant. In any event, fortunately
perhaps, the issue does not appear to be pe rtinent for purposes of considering Honduras’s
Application for permission to intervene since th e interests of a legal nature that Honduras has
advanced in these proceedings lie within the rectangle I d escribed earlier, all of which is situated
within 200 nautical miles of Honduras’s coast.
*
* * - 23 -
D. Honduras’s interests of a legal nature within the rectangle
31. Now that brings me back to the question whether Honduras has shown an interest of a
legal nature within that rectangle that may be affected by a decision in the case. For ease of
reference, the rectangle is again being superi mposed on the map in order to illustrate its
relationship to the previous delimitations that I have discussed.
32. The southern limit of the rectangle corresponds to the first segment of the boundary line
agreed in the 1986 Colombia-Honduras Treaty. On the east, Honduras’s rectangle is bounded by
the 80° meridian. This limit is just to the west of the segment of the Colombia-Honduras boundary
between Points2 and 3 ⎯ you can see a small gap there ⎯ and, north of Point 3, the rectangle
trespasses very slightly onto the area that was s ubject to the 1993 agreement between Colombia
and Jamaica. That area of overlap is relatively minor, and Colombia does not interpret Honduras’s
rectangle as challenging the validity of either the 1986 line or the 1993 Treaty: Honduras has never
had any problem with either of those instruments.
33. Maritime areas situated within the recta ngle and lying north of the bisector are not at
issue in the present case. As between Nicaragua and Honduras, the Court has ruled that those areas
appertain to Honduras.
34. South of the bisector the situation is different. In the first place, Honduras and Nicaragua
appear to have a difference regarding whether the Court fixed a terminal point on the bisector and
thereby only delimited a part of their boundary in its 2007 Judgment. Without entering into that
debate, Colombia nevertheless wishes to emphasi ze that the projection of the bisector beyond
pointF is not to affect third-States’ rights, as the Court so clearly held in paragraph321 of its
dispositif. Colombia also wishes to emphasize that it considers itself to be one such third State.
35. In this respect, it is important to recall that maritime areas lying north of the 15° parallel
and east of the 82° meridian are at issue in the present case because Colombia can and does claim
maritime entitlements vis-à-vis Nicaragua in these ar eas. In fact, the same point was effectively
shown by Nicaragua’s figure 3.1 from its Reply th at counsel for Nicaragua displayed on the screen
this morning. You will remember, that is the delimitation area to be delimited between Colombia
and Nicaragua in the main case, as presented by Nicaragua. That map was presented on the - 24 -
screen ⎯ unless my copy is deficient, I do not believe it has been included in the judges’ folders ⎯
but the Court will be able to see that there is an area within that delimitation area proposed by
Nicaragua that falls north of the 15°parallel. In other words, part of the area to be delimited
between Colombia and Nicaragua in the main case, according to Nicaragua’s own figure, does
include areas north of the 15°parallel. Colo mbia’s equidistance-based maritime boundary claim
projects into that area. Obviously, the Court had no jurisdiction in the Nicaragua v. Honduras case
to rule on matters that are in dispute between Co lombia and Nicaragua. A point that I shall come
back to later.
36. Honduras’s Application recognizes Colombia’s entitlements in this area (in paragraph 11
of its Application). For his part, on Monday Sir Michael noted that in the main case, Colombia is
claiming that its bilateral obligations vis-à- vis Honduras do not prevent it from claiming in the
present proceedings rights and interests in the areas north of the 15th parallel and east of the 82nd
meridian as against Nicaragua [CR 2010/18, pp. 44-45, para. 46].
37. Honduras’s pleadings have emphasized th at, as between itself and Colombia, Honduras
also has rights in this area pursuant to the 1986 Treaty since the areas in question lie north of the
15th parallel and east of the 82° meridian.
38. And in the light of this situation, the position can usefully be summarized as follows:
⎯ in its 2007 Judgment, the Court could not, and di d not, decide on the legal rights of third States
not party to those proceedings;
⎯ the Court therefore did not make any ruling with respect to Colombia’s rights vis-à-vis
Nicaragua— and vice versa— bearing in mind that, in the pending case— this case— the
delimitation dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua includes areas located to the north of the
15° parallel;
⎯ by the same token, the Court also did not pronounce upon the legal rights of Colombia and
Honduras that were the subject-matter of the 1986Treaty — because the Treaty was not at
issue at that time, in the Nicaragua v. Honduras case, and Colombia was not a party to that
case ⎯ nor did the Court pronounce on the 1993 Colombia-Jamaica Treaty ⎯ because neither
party to that agreement was a party to the Nicaragua v. Honduras case either; - 25 -
⎯ the same considerations are at play in the present case by virtue of the fact that both Colombia
and Nicaragua claim as against each other areas which are covered by the 1986Treaty. As a
result of its interests of a legal nature reflected in the 1986Treaty, Honduras submits that it
should be permitted to intervene in these procee dings in order to inform the Court of its
interests and to protect those interests.
39. And it is in the light of that situation, and to revert to the first two questions I posed
earlier in my intervention, that Colombia appreciates why Honduras considers, first of all, that it
has an interest of a legal nature within areas circumscribed by the rectangle under the 1986 Treaty
and, secondly, why and how that interest may be affected by a decision in the case given that areas
within the rectangle are in dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua in the main proceedings.
40. It is for this reason that Colombia has not objected to Honduras being permitted to
present its views on these matters through the vehicle of intervention. Because as Colombia sees it,
other States have been permitted to intervene as non-parties in delimitation cases where a decision
in the main case may affect its legal interests.
41. Nicaragua’s Written Observations adopt a different position. One of the reasons
Nicaragua objects to Honduras’s intervention request is because Nicaragua considers that Honduras
is seeking to reopen matters be tween Nicaragua and Honduras that have already been decided by
the Court in its Judgment of 8October2007. Acco rding to Nicaragua, the Court determined that
the area between the 15th parallel and the bisector belonged to Nicaragua, not Honduras.
42. However, Nicaragua also maintains that Colombia, likewise, has no rights north of the
15°parallel (Written Observations of Nicaragua, para.12). Accordingly, Nicaragua argues that
there are no areas at issue in the main case which could affect any interests of a legal nature of
Honduras: and it is on this point that Colombia f undamentally disagrees. It is also on this point
that Nicaragua’s position is fundamentally inconsis tent with their figure 3.1 that was displayed on
the screen earlier. - 26 -
43. Now, because Nicaragua has raised this argument— the lack, or the alleged lack of
Colombian rights north of the 15°parallel— becau se Nicaragua has raised it in connection with
Honduras’s Application, Colombia has no choice but to respond here in order to make its position
clear. But by doing so, this in no way prejudices the fact that Colombia’s and Nicaragua’s claims
within this area are a matter that can only be resolved at the merits stage of the case.
44. Nicaragua’s Written Observations asserted that Honduras itself has argued in its
Application that the rectangular area cannot be cl aimed by Colombia by virtue of the 1986 Treaty
(Written Observations of Nicaragua, para.22) . But Colombia, however, reads Honduras’s
Application as actually saying exactly the opposite. Indeed, it is precisely because Honduras
recognizes that Colombia is entitled to claim maritime areas lying north of the 15thparallel as
against Nicaragua, and has done so in the main case, that Honduras considers that its interests of a
legal nature may be affected by a decision in the case.
45. The point was made clear in paragraph 10 of Honduras’s Application. There, Honduras
pointed out that it is Nicaragua, not itself, that contends that Colombia has renounced its rights
north of the 15thparallel by means of concluding the 1986Treaty with Honduras. But Honduras
goes on to note that the 1986Treaty in no way permits Nicaragua to maintain that it is only
Nicaragua that possesses rights north of the paralle l in the pending case since, to do so, would not
only make one of the Parties to this case disappear ⎯ Colombia ⎯ it would also run counter to the
principle that a third State cannot seek to rely on an agreement in force between two other States in
order to establish its own legal rights.
46. In Colombia’s view, the matter is straightforward. In their Treaty of 1986, Colombia and
Honduras agreed on the delimitation of their respective maritime entitlements only as between
themselves. And that agreement in no way precluded Colombia — or Honduras for that matter —
from advancing its own claims vis-à-vis Nicaragua. Stated another way, the fact that Colombia’s
maritime entitlements north of the 15th parallel we re bilaterally delimited with Honduras under the
1986Treaty based on factors that those two States— and only those two States— considered
relevant does not mean that Colombia’s lega l entitlements somehow cease to exist vis-à-vis
Nicaragua. While Colombia remains bound by th e 1986 Treaty in its relations with Honduras, and
vice versa, the treaty in no way binds Colombia with respect to Nicaragua: and that is why - 27 -
Colombia is fully entitled to advance a claim to maritime areas situated north of the 15thparallel
against Nicaragua in the pending case ⎯ all the more so in view of the fact that the areas to which
Colombia claims north of the 15thparallel vis-à- vis Nicaragua lie closer to Colombian territory
than they do to Nicaraguan territory. Now those are issues which obviously will need to be
addressed in greater detail at the merits phase of the proceedings.
47. For present purposes, given that these matte rs are in issue in the pending case between
Nicaragua and Colombia, and that Honduras also h as legal interests situat ed within the same
general area as reflected in the 1986Treaty, Colombia considers that Honduras has satisfied the
test to intervene as a non-party in the case under Article 62 of the Statute. And therefore Colombia
repeats what it said in its Written Observations ⎯that it has no objection to this aspect of the
Honduras’s Application.
48. Mr. President, Members of the Court, that concludes my presentation. I thank the Court
for its attention, and I would be grateful, Mr. President, if you could now call on Professor Kohen
to continue Colombia’s presentation.
The President: I thank Mr.RodmanBundy for his presentation. I now invite
Professor Kohen to the floor.
M. KOHEN :
L’ IMPACT DU TRAITÉ DE DÉLIMITATION MARITIME DE 1986 SUR LA REQUÊTE
HONDURIENNE À FIN D ’INTERVENTION
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, c’est un grand honneur de
comparaître devant votre haute juridiction au nom de la République de Colombie.
2. Il m’appartient d’examiner l’impact du tr aité de délimitation maritime conclu entre la
Colombie et le Honduras sur la requête à fin d’inte rvention déposée par ce dernier dans la présente
instance.
3. Vous connaissez déjà le tracé résultant de ce traité de délimitation maritime, tout comme
sa position par rapport à la ligne revendiquée par la Colombie dans cette affaire et la délimitation
établie par la Cour dans votre arrêt du 8 octobre 2007. Rappelons d’emblée que les trois Etats qui - 28 -
comparaissent devant vous sont d’accord pour reconnaître que votre arrêt n’a pas pu affecter les
droits des Etats tiers 4 . La Colombie, comme il est bien connu, n’a pas été partie à l’affaire du
Différend territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes.
4. Dans sa requête à fin d’intervention, le Honduras indique que «l’intervention qu’il sollicite
est limitée à la seule délimitation maritime dans la zone circonscrite par le traité de1986» 5. La
requête hondurienne consta te que la Colombie a fait valoir des revendications à l’égard du
e 6
Nicaragua au nord du 15 parallèle . Les observations écrites du Nicaragua examinent les
références faites par la Cour au traité de 1986. Le Nicaragua conclut que
«the Court has already ruled that Honduras has no rights or interests between the
bisector and the 15th parallel in this area, and observed that Colombia, likewise, has
no rights north of the 15th parallel. Thus , the Judgement of 8October2007 negates
the very «rights and interests that Hondur as’ application to intervene seeks to
7
protect.»
5. Ce matin, AlainPellet a donné pour ac quis que la Colombie n’a pas de titre aux
juridictions maritimes opposables au Nicaragua dans la zone du traité de 1986. Il a sans doute jugé
que les arguments développés par le Nicaragua vendredi dernier relatifs aux effets des traités de
délimitation étaient suffisants. La semaine de rnière, en effet, le Nicaragua a commencé à
s’intéresser aux matières relevant des audiences de cette semaine. Nous avons entendu une
argumentation plus que suspecte sur les prétendus effets erga omnes des traités bilatéraux, sur le
caractère prétendument «objectif » des traités de délimita tion ou encore une défense ⎯ assez
surprenante venant du Nicaragua, mais toujours la bienvenue ⎯ de l’importance du principe de
8
stabilité des frontières . Le but du Nicaragua est clair : par une pirouette juridique intelligente mais
néanmoins dépourvue de tout fondement, il prétend inférer des traités de délimitation maritime que
la Colombie et ses voisins ont conclus entre1976 et 1993 des droits en sa faveur, tout en niant
4 CR 2007/5, p. 23, par. 69 (Pellet) ; CR 2010/16, p. 21 et 23, par. 11 et 16 (Reichler) ; CR 2010/18, p. 41, par. 35
(Wood).
5 Requête à fin d’intervention du Honduras (RIH), par. 16. Traduction du Greffe : «the intervention for which it
requests permission is confined exclusively to the maritime delimitation in the zone delineated by the 1986 Treaty».
6
RIH, par. 18. Voir aussi CR 2010/18, p. 44, par. 46 (Wood).
7
Observations écrites du Nicaragua (OEN), par. 12. Traduction non officielle : «La Cour a déjà statué sur le fait
que le Honduras ne pouvait se prévaloir d’aucun droit ni intérêt particulier au regard dela zone comprise entre la
bissectrice et le 15 parallèle dans cette région, et a noté, de la même manière, que la Colombie ne possède aucun droit au
nord du 15eparallèle. Ainsi, l’arrêt du 8 octobre 2007 nie l’existence des «droits et intérêts que la requête du Honduras à
fin d’intervenir vise justement à protéger».»
8 CR 2010/16, p. 27-28, par. 32-34 (Reichler). - 29 -
l’essence même de ses traités, à savoir, qu’il s’agit de traités par lesquels les Parties ⎯ je souligne,
les Parties ⎯ se sont partagées les espaces maritimes relevant de leur juridiction dans des zones où
ces espaces se chevauchaient. Dans le cas qui nous occupe, il s’agit pour le Nicaragua de prétendre
se subroger au Honduras dans le traité de 1986.
6. Dans cet exposé, je vais traiter du caract ère infondé de ces arguments nicaraguayens. Je
me pencherai tout d’abord sur l’interprétation erronée que le Nicaragua fait des références au traité
de1986 que l’on trouve dans vot re arrêt du 8octobre2007. J’examinerai ensuite les arguments
nicaraguayens visant à déduire du traité de1986 des droits en sa faveur, ce qu’il fait en vue
d’écarter tout droit ou intérêt juridique dont les parties au traité elles-mêmes disposent dans la zone
pertinente.
A. Le Nicaragua interprète de manière erronée la référence faite
par la Cour au traité de 1986
7. La Colombie partage le point de vue exprimé lundi par le Honduras selon lequel votre
Cour ne s’est pas prononcée sur les effets juridiques du traité de1986 lia nt le Honduras et la
Colombie 9. J’ajoute que vous ne vous êtes pas non plus prononcés en2007 sur les effets de ce
traité par rapport aux Parties à la présente instan ce. Le Nicaragua fait pour sa part une lecture
diamétralement opposée ⎯ et j’ajoute erronée ⎯ de l’arrêt du 8 octobre 2007 en ce qui concerne le
traité de1986, et les effets et la portée de la délimitation opérée par l’a rrêt par rapport aux droits
des Etats tiers dans la région considérée.
8. Comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, selon les observations écrites du Nicaragua, ⎯ je cite ma
traduction ⎯ la Cour «a noté que la Colombie ne possède aucun droit au nord du 15 eparallèle».
La partie adverse «oublie» néanmoins quelques mots essentiels de l’arrêt de votre Cour. Je citerai
le texte complet :
«[La Cour]relève cependant qu’une éventuelle délimitation entre le Honduras
et le Nicaragua qui se prolongerait vers l’est au-delà du 82 eméridien et au nord du
15 parallèle (ce qui serait le cas de la bissectri ce retenue par la Cour) ne porterait en
réalité pas préjudice aux droits de la Colombie , dans la mesure où les droits de cette
9CR 2010/18, p. 40, par. 32 (Wood). - 30 -
e 10
dernière en vertu de ce traité ne s’étendent pas au nord du 15 parallèle.» (Différend
territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes
(Nicaragua c. Honduras), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 759, par. 316 (les italiques
sont de nous).)
9. Le Nicaragua a «oublié» les mots «en vertu de ce traité». Et cet «oubli» s’avère critique
dans la mesure où il remet en question le principe fondamental selon lequel la Cour ne peut exercer
11
sa juridiction qu’à l’égard d’un Etat qui y a consenti . La Cour n’aurait jamais pu trancher sur des
droits dont la Colombie dispose en vertu du droit international général, à l’égard du Nicaragua et à
propos des espaces maritimes dans la région, sans le consentement de la Colombie . La seule
explication possible de ce paragraphe de l’arrêt qui soit conforme au principe fondamental du
consentement des parties est la suivante: la Cour a estimé que, en vertu du traité de1986 , et ce,
uniquement à l’égard du Honduras , la Colombie ne dispose pas de droit dans la zone comprise au
nord du 15 e parallèle et à l’ouest de la ligne qui, partan t de ce parallèle, se dirige vers le nord. Le
traité ne prévoit pas autre chose. Il ne crée pas de droits en faveur du Nicaragua. Ainsi, la question
e
relative aux droits de la Colombie au nord du 15 parallèle relève de la compétence de la Cour dans
cette affaire, et non dans l’affaire Nicaragua c.Honduras . L’arrêt relatif à cette dernière affaire
précise indubitablement que votre Cour «se gardera de préjuger [de l’affaire Nicaragua
10
Texte anglais: «The Court nevertheless observes that any delimitation between Honduras and Nicaragua
extending east beyond the 82nd meridian and north of the 15th parallel (as the bisector adopted by the Court would do)
would not actually prejudice Colombia’s rights because Colo mbia’s rights under this Treaty do not extend north of the
15th parallel.»
11
Statut de la Carélie oriental e, avis consultatif du 23 juille t 1923, C.P.J.I., série B, n°5p. 27 ; Droits de
minorités en Haute- Silésie (écoles minoritaires), arrêt du 26 avril 1928, C.P.J.I., série A, n°15, p. 22 ;it de Corfou
(Royaume-Uni c.Albanie), exceptions préliminaires, arrê t du 25mars1948, C.I.J.Recueil1948 , p. 27 ; Réparation des
dommages subis au service des Nations Unies (1948-1949), avis consultatif du 11avril1949, C.I.J.Recueil 1949 ,
p. 178 ; Interprétation des traités de paix conclus avec la Bulg arie, la Hongrie et la R oumanie, avis consultatif du
30 mars 1950, C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 71 ; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (Royaume-Uni c. Iran), exception préliminaire, arrêt du
22 juillet 1952 C.I.J.Recueil1952 , p.103; Or monétaire pris à Rome en 1943 (Italie c. France, Royaume-Uni et
Etats-Unis), compétence de la Cour, arrêt du 15 juin 1954, C.I.J.Recueil 1954 , p. 32 ; Plateau continental (Jamahiriya
arabe libyenne/Malte) , requête de l’Italie à fin d’intervention, arrêt du 21 mars 1984, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 22, par. 34 ;
Applicabilité de la section22 de l’articleVI de la c onvention sur les privilèges et immunités des Nations Unies, avis
consultatif du 15 décembre 1989 , C.I.J.Recueil 1989 , p.189, par.31; Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et
maritime (ElSalvador/Honduras; Nicar agua (intervenant)), requête du Nicaragua à fin d’intervention, arrêt du
13septembre 1990, C.I.J.Recueil1990 , p. 133, par. 94 ; Certaines terres à phosphates à Nauru (Nauru c.Australie),
exceptions préliminaires, arrêt du 26 juin 1992, C.I.J.Recueil 1992 , p.260, par.53; Timor oriental (Portugal
c. Australie) arrêt du 30juin1995, C.I.J.Recueil1995 , p. 101, par. 26 ; 12 ; Compétence en matière de pêcheries
(Espagne c.Canada) , compétence de la Cour, arrêt du 4 décembre 1998, C.I.J.Recueil1998 , p. 456, par. 55 ;
Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur dans le Territoire palestinien occupé , avis consultatif du
9 juillet 2004, C.I.J. Recueil 2004, p. 157, par. 47; Activités armées sur le territoir e du Congo (nouvelle requête :2002)
(République démocratique du Congo c.Rwanda), compét ence et recevabilité, a rrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2006, p. 32, par. 64 ;
Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (nouvelle requête:2002) (Répub lique démocratique du Congo c.Rwanda),
compétence et recevabilité, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2006, p. 32, par. 65 ; Application de la convention pour la prévention et
la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Serbie-et-Monténégro), arrêt, 26 février 2007, p. 31, par. 76 ;
Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répre ssion du crime de génocide (Croatie c.Serbie), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2008, p. 423, par. 33 ; Certaines questions concernant l’entraide judiciaire en matière
pénale (Djibouti c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2008, p. 203, par. 60. - 31 -
c. Colombie] par sa décision en la présente espèce» ( Différend territorial et maritime entre le
Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la m er des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c.Honduras) , arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 758, par.315) 12. Ceci s’applique bien entendu aux deux Parties à la
présente instance.
10. La Cour a insisté sur la portée limitée de son analyse de la manière suivante :
«La Cour s’est ainsi penchée sur certains intérêts d’Etats tiers tels qu’ils
résultent de traités bilatéraux conclus entre pays de la région qui pourraient être
pertinents quant aux limites de la frontière maritime tracée entre le Nicaragua et le
Honduras. La Cour ajoute que l’examen auquel elle a procédé de ces divers intérêts
est sans préjudice de tous autres intérêt13légitimes d’Etats tiers dans la zone.» ( Ibid.,
par. 318 (les italiques sont de nous).)
11. Egalement négligé par le Nicaragua, il se trouve un autre élément dont l’examen est
nécessaire pour déterminer si la requête hondurienne à fin d’intervention est ou non recevable. Il
s’agit du fait que l’arrêt du 8 octobre 2007 détermine sans équivoque que la délimitation se poursuit
«jusqu’à atteindre la zone dans laquelle elle risque de mettre en cause les droits d’Etats tiers» (ibid.,
p. 763, par. 321, dispositif, 3). La Colombie est de fait un Etat tiers dont les droits risquent d’être
mis en cause. C’est là que s’arrête la délimitati on décidée par cet arrêt. Ce qui se passe au-delà de
cette jonction est une question que la Cour n’a bien entendu pas réglée dans l’arrêt
du8octobre2007. Compte tenu de l’existence d’un traité comme celui de1986, les intérêts du
Honduras au nord du 15 eparallèle et à l’ouest du 80 méridien pourraient indéniablement se trouver
affectés par une décision de la Cour dans la présente affaire.
B. La tentative nicaraguayenne pour déduire du traité de 1986 des droits en sa faveur
n’a aucun fondement juridique
12. Le Nicaragua accepte du bout des lèvr es que le traité de1986 ne lui confère
effectivement pas de droits et que la règle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt est en l’occurrence
applicable. Répétons-leen français: «les traités ne peuvent ni porter préjudice ni profiter à des
12Texte anglais: «The Court will avoid prejudicing those proceedings [Territorial and Ma ritime Dispute
(Nicaragua v. Honduras)] by its decision here.»
13Texte anglais : «The Court has thus considered certain interests of third States which result from some bilateral
treaties between countries in the region and which may be of possible relevance to the limits to the maritime boundary
drawn between Nicaragua and Honduras. The Court adds that its consideration of these interests is without prejudice to
any other legitimate third party interests which may also exist in the area.» - 32 -
sujets tiers». Le Nicaragua se refuse toutefois à accepter la deuxième partie de ce brocard bien
connu.
13. Voyons donc quels sont les modes détour nés que le Nicaragua utiliserait pour parvenir,
croit-il, à faire la démonstration de l’existence, dérivée du traité de 1986, de droits en sa faveur : la
prétendue «situation objective» créée par le traité ayant un caractère erga omnes, l’application du
principe de stabilité des frontières et une certaine jurisprudence arbitrale qui étaierait, selon ses
dires, sa position. Je passe à leur examen.
a) Les régimes «objectifs» opposables erga omnes
14. Intéressons-nous d’abord à la notion de «régimes objectifs» qui seraient opposables
erga omnes. Cette notion n’a pas été incorporée à la conve ntion de Vienne sur le droit des traités.
En tout état de cause, les situations envi sagées par cette notion n’ont rien à voir avec
l’établissement bilatéral de délimitations territoriales ou maritimes. Dans le domaine maritime, elle
vise notamment les engagements conventionnels par lesquels deux ou plusieurs Etats établissent un
régime de liberté de navigation dans les détroits ou canaux.
15. Selon la Commission du droit international, les hypothèses couvertes par la notion de
régimes «objectifs» créant des droits et obligations erga omnes tombent sous le coup soit des
articles35 et36 de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, soit de la règle énoncée à
l’article 38 qui prévoit la possibilité qu’une coutume ultérieure vie nne se greffer au traité, rendant
ainsi le droit ou l’obligation prévue par le traité opposable aux tiers 14. Aucune de ces dispositions,
appliquées au traité de 1986, n’aboutit au résultat prétendu par le Nicaragua.
16. Lorsque la Cour s’est référée à une situati on objective, elle l’a fait dans un contexte bien
différent. Il s’agissait de la création des Na tionsUnies par cinquante Etats et le fait que
l’Organisation jouissait ainsi d’une personna lité internationale objective, opposable erga omnes 15.
Toutes ces situations sont très éloignées de l’hypothèse avancée par le Nicaragua d’une situation
«objective» créée par des traités de délimitation qui permettraient à des Etats tiers de s’en prévaloir.
14
Annuaire de la Commission du droit international, 1966, vol. II, p. 251-252.
15Réparation des dommages subis au service des Nations Unies, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1949, p. 185. - 33 -
17. Si vous le permettez M onsieur le président, faisons un instant le jeu nicaraguayen.
Supposons même que, face à un traité qui détermine l’étendue des espaces maritimes de deux Etats,
les autres Etats se trouvent dans une situation créée par le traité qui serait opposable ⎯ favorable,
dirait le Nicaragua ⎯ erga omnes. Quelles en seraient les conséquences? Simplement que les
Etats tiers pourraient invoquer vis-à-vis du Honduras et de la Colombie le respect de leurs
obligations internationales dans leurs zones resp ectives découlant du traité. Cela n’a toutefois
aucune incidence sur la question de la délimitation qui demeure, quant à elle, du ressort exclusif
des Parties. «It is relational», comme dirait mon ami AlainPellet en citant mon autre ami
James Crawford.
b) Le Nicaragua invoque à tort le principe de stabilité des frontières
18. Venons-en maintenant au principe de stabilité des frontières. Ce principe n’implique en
aucun cas qu’un Etat tiers puisse se prévaloir d’une délimitation bilatérale établie par d’autres
Etats. Si ce principe a effectivement un but, c’est celui d’éviter la remise en cause par l’une ou
l’autre partie d’une frontière existante, du fa it de la découverte de prétendues erreurs ou pour
16
d’autres raisons, y compris du fait de l’éventuelle extinction du traité .
19. Tout en étant soumis à ce principe 17, il convient de relever que les traités de délimitation
maritime possèdent des caractéristiques qui leur sont propres. Ainsi, comme tout accord de
délimitation maritime, le traité de1986 exprime la conviction des parties qu’elles ont abouti à un
résultat équitable, comme l’exige le droit coutumie r, dont les articles 74 et 83 de la convention des
18
Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer sont l’expression .
20. Les raisons pour lesquelles deux Etats aboutissent à ce résultat équitable sont variées et
multiples. Le résultat équitable se mesure dans le contexte de cette relation bilatérale, qui constitue
un «unicum», pour emprunter la terminologie que votre Cour a utilisée dans l’arrêt du Golfe du
16 Interprétation de l’article 3, paragraphe 2, du traité de Lausanne, avis consultatif, 1925, C.P.J.I. série B n 12,
p. 20 ; Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1962 , p. 34 ; Différend territorial
(Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Tchad), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1994, p. 37, par. 72-73.
17 Plateau continental de la mer Egée (Grèce c. Turquie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1978, p. 36, par. 85.
18 Délimitation maritime et questions terr itoriales entre Qatar et Bahreïn (Qatar c.Bahreïn), fond, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 110-111, par. 226-230 ; Différend territorial et maritime entr e le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans
la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007, p. 740-741, par. 265-266, par. 270. - 34 -
Maine 19. Pour vous donner un exemple, Mmes et MM. les juges: il se peut que l’EtatA soit
disposé à faire davantage de concessions à l’Etat B, qui est prêt à négocier une délimitation
maritime et en même temps à renoncer à des revendi cations territoriales dans la même zone, et pas
à l’EtatC, qui, de son côté, rejette la validité même du traité bilatéral le plus important existant
entre eux et souhaite ainsi chasser l’EtatA d’une région dans laquelle ce dernier a une présence
bicentenaire !
21. Pour le reste, nous sommes en parfait accord avec le Nicaragua sur l’importance du
principe de stabilité des frontières, qu’elles soient terrestres ou maritimes. Dans cette affaire, c’est
précisément le Nicaragua qui a défié ce principe ta nt dans son aspect terrestre que maritime. Il l’a
fait de la manière la plus grave qui soit, en re jetant l’existence même du traité de1928/1930 par
une prétendue déclaration unilatérale de nullité. Il le fait encore, selon les prétentions gourmandes
et instables dont il fait montre dans cette affair e, en voulant bouleverser l’équilibre conventionnel
établi par tous les autres riverains de la mer des Caraïbes sud-occidentale.
c) Une jurisprudence arbitrale sans pertinence
22. J’arrive maintenant à la jurisprudence que le Nicaragua a citée à l’appui de sa thèse selon
laquelle l’abandon qu’un Etat ferait de son titre su r des espaces maritimes lors de la conclusion
d’un traité bilatéral le serait erga omnes.
23. Deux sentences arbitrales ont été citées à cet égard 20, lesquelles se réfèrent à des
situations totalement différentes de celles à l’exam en devant votre Cour. La première est celle
relative à la Délimitation maritime entre la Barbade et Trinité-et-Tobago. Le paragraphe cité par le
Nicaragua est le suivant :
19
Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la ron du golfe du Maine (Canada/Etats-Unis d’Amérique),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 290, par. 81.
20CR 2010/13, p. 37, par. 29 (Reichler), CR 2010/16, p. 28, par. 33. - 35 -
«The maritime areas which Trinidad a nd Tobago has, in the 1990 Trinidad
Venezuela Agreement, given up in favour of Venezuela do not any longer appertain to
Trinidad and Tobago and thus the Tribunal could not draw a delimitation line the 21
effect of which is to attribute to Trinidad and Tobago areas it no longer claims.»
24. Dans cette affaire, Trinité-et-Tobago ne revendiquait pas face à la Barbade les espaces
maritimes cédés au Venezuela. Il s’agissait de la prétention de Trinité-et-Tobago à faire valoir les
concessions qu’il avait faites au Venezuela en conc luant un traité de délimitation avec ce dernier,
aux fins d’obtenir une «compensation» lors de l’ établissement de sa délimitation avec la Barbade.
Trinité-et-Tobago prétendait que, du fait de son consentement à déplacer au nord sa ligne de
délimitation avec le Venezuela ⎯afin que ce dernier ait un accès à l’océan Atlantique ⎯, la
délimitation avec la Barbade devait en conséquence être elle-aussi déplac ée vers le nord. La
sentence arbitrale ne peut donc pas être lue co mme signifiant l’impossibilité d’opposer à un Etat
tiers un titre à des espaces maritimes, du fait de la conclusion d’un traité de délimitation avec un
autre Etat.
25. La deuxième sentence arbitrale présentée par le Nicaragua ne se référait pas à un conflit
maritime. Il s’agit de l’affaire Erythrée/Yémen, dans sa première phase, concernant la souveraineté
sur certaines îles. Le conseil du Nicaragua a seulement cité cette partie de la décision :
«Boundary and territorial treaties made between two parties are res inter alios
acta vis-à-vis third parties. But this special category of treaties also represents a legal
reality which necessarily impinges upon thir d states, because they have effect erga
omnes.» 22
26. Malheureusement, le conseil nicaraguayen a «oublié» de citer le passage qui suit et qui
montre clairement ce qui était ici en jeu. Je le ferai à sa place :
21
Arbitration between Barbados and th e Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, relating to the delimitation of the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf between them , decision of 11 April 2006, RSA, vol.XXVII, par.347
(CR 2010/13, p. 37, par. 29 (Reichler)). Traduction non officielle : «La zone maritime que Trinité-et-Tobago a cédée au
Venezuela en vertu de l’accord trinité-vénézuélien de 1990 nappartient plus à Trinité-et-Tobago de la sorte que le
Tribunal se trouve dans l’impossibilité d’établir une ligne de délimitation ayant pour effet d’attribuer à Trinité-et-Tobago
des zones sur lesquelles il ne peut plus faire valoir ses droits.»
22
Eritrea/Yemen, Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute , Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First
Stage, 9 October 1998, par.153 (CR2010/16, p.28, par.33 (Reichler). Texte fra nçais: «Les traités frontaliers et
territoriaux conclus entre deux parties sont res inter alios acta pour toute tierce partie. Ma is cette catégorie particulière
de traités représente aussi une réalité juridique qouche nécessairement les Etats tiers parce qu’ils ont efferga
omnes.» - 36 -
«If State A has title to territory and passes it to State B, then it is legally without
purpose for State C to invoke the principle of res inter alios acta , unless its title is
better than that of A (rather than of B). In the absence of such better title, a claim of
23
res inter alios acta is without legal import.»
27. En fin de compte, cette citation tronquée du Nicaragua fait la preuve de la futilité de son
argumentation. Car ce que cet exemple jurispr udentiel tend à démontrer est précisément le
contraire de ce qu’allègue le demandeur. Il y a là la confirmation de deux choses: la mise en
Œuvre de la règle «pacta tertiis» et la nécessité, en dernier ressort, de l’existence d’un meilleur titre
sur le territoire.
28. Mais permettez-moi, Monsieur le préside nt, une remarque additio nnelle. La première
sentence arbitrale Erithrée/Yémen avait trait au différend territorial. Dans ce genre de différend, ce
qui compte c’est d’établir qui des parties possède le titre sur le territoire en cause. Comme le
soulignait Prosper Weil :
«La délimitation maritime est d’une tout autre nature. Loin de reposer sur l’idée
qu’il ne saurait y avoir sur un espace donné qu’un seul titre juridique, elle postule la
concurrence, sur un même espace, de deux titres tout aussi valables l’un que l’autre…
Il s’agit d’imposer à chacun des deux titres qui pèsent le même poids un sacrifice
raisonnable, de manière à pouvoir réaliser une division de l’espace sur lequel ils
s’entrecroisent.» 24
C. L’attitude du Nicaragua face au traité de 1986 l’empêche d’invoquer
un quelconque droit en sa faveur
29. J’en viens maintenant à un autre ar gument majeur pour rejeter toute velléité
nicaraguayenne à se prévaloir du traité de1986. En effet, par son comportement et ses prises de
position à l’égard de la validité même du tr aité, le Nicaragua se trouve à présent dans
l’impossibilité de faire valoir, du fait de ce même traité, quelque droit ou situation que ce soit à son
avantage.
23
Eritrea/Yemen, Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute , Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First
Stage, 9October1998, par.153. Texte français: «Si l’Etat A détient le titre sur un certain territoire et le transfère à
l’Etat B, il est alors juridiquement sans objet pour l’Etat C d’invoquer le principe res inter alios acta sauf si le titre détenu
par lui est supérieur à celui de A (et non au titre de B). En l’absence d’un titre qui soit ainsi supérieur, il n’est d’aucune
utilité sur le plan juridique d’invoquer le principe res inter alios acta.»
24
ProsperWeil, Perspectives de la délimitation maritime (Paris: Pedone, 1988), p.99-100. Texte anglais:
«Nowadays maritime delimitation is quite different. Far from assuming that there can be only one legal title to a given
area, it postulates the existence of two equally valid titles in co mpetition with one another over the same area. It is not a
question of which proof is the more or less convincing, which title the weightier, but of requiring from each of the parties
with these equally well-founded titles areasonable sacrifice such as would make possible a division of the area of
overlap.» Prosper Weil, The Law of Maritime Delimitation ⎯ Reflections (Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limited,
1989), p. 91-92. - 37 -
30. Le Nicaragua s’est vigoureusement opposé à la conclusion du traité de1986. De
surcroît, il l’a considéré ⎯une fois n’est pas coutume! ⎯ comme étant «non valide», selon la
qualification employée par le conseil du Nicaragua devant vous le 8 mars 2007 lors des audiences
25
dans l’affaire Nicaragua c. Honduras .
31. Par ailleurs, dans sa note de protestation datée du 8 septembre 1986, le Nicaragua affirme
catégoriquement : «the Republic of Nicaragua re jects the treaty subscribed between Honduras and
Colombia on August2, 1986; it manifests that it does not recognize nor admits any effect
26
whatsoever of the referred instrument» .
32. Enfin, dans sa réplique dans l’affaire contre le Honduras, on peut lire : «Honduras fails to
explain how a treaty that has been protested by a third State upon its conclusion and which State
27
has continued to do so afterwards, could have any legal effects for that Third State.»
33. Comment un Etat qui considère un traité inva lide, et qui fait savoir aux Etats parties à ce
traité qu’il ne reconnaît à celui-ci aucun effet juridique peut-il prétendre par la suite que le traité a
pour effet la renonciation par la Colombie à des titres maritimes en sa faveur ? 28
Conclusions
34. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, j’arrive à ma conclusion. La
voici. Le Honduras est toujours partie au traité de 1986. Celui-ci demeure toujours en vigueur.
Dans la présente affaire, les interprétations que le Nicaragua fait des effets du traité de 1986 ne sont
pas partagées par les parties au traité. Cette in terprétation concerne des espaces qui sont en cause
dans la présente affaire. En tant que partie au traité, le Honduras a certainement un intérêt qui peut
être affecté par toute décision que la Cour prendra à cet égard.
35. Aux fins de cette phase de la procédure, je peux résumer la situation juridique relative au
traité de 1986 de la manière suivante :
25 CR 2007/4, p. 52, par. 11 (Pellet).
26 Différend territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua etle Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua
c. Honduras), mémoire du Nicaragua, vol.II, annexe70, p.162 (les italiques sont de nous). Traduction non officielle:
«la République du Nicaragua rejette le traité conclu le 2 oût 1986 entre le Honduras et la Colombie ; elle manifeste
qu’elle ne reconnaît ni n’admet aucun effet de quelque sorte que ce soit découlant de l’instrument susmentionné».
27 Ibid., réplique du Nicaragua, par.3.34 (les italiques sont de nous). Traduction non officielle: «Le Honduras
n’a pas su expliquer comment un traité peut avoir quelque effet juridique que ce soit à l’égard d’un Etat tiers qui a
protesté contre celui-ci dès sa signature et n’a cessé de le faire par la suite.»
28 Affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 40. - 38 -
Primo, le traité de 1986 n’a pas étab li des droits ou situations en faveur des Etats tiers et
certainement pas en faveur du Nicaragua.
Secundo, la notion controversée de régime «objectif» n’est pas applicable au traité de 1986,
et ce dernier n’a pas établi une délimitation dont les prétendus effets erga omnes permettraient à
des Etats tiers de s’en prévaloir.
Tertio , du fait du rejet par le Nicaragua du traité de 1986, cet Etat se voit dans l’impossibilité
de l’invoquer en sa faveur de quelque manière que ce soit.
Quarto , votre arrêt du 8 octobre 2007 ne peut pas êt re interprété dans le sens invoqué par le
Nicaragua, savoir, que votre Cour a disposé des droits de la Colombie dans une affaire à laquelle la
Colombie n’était pas partie.
36. La prétention du Nicaragua d’ôter toute pe rtinence au traité de1986 dans la présente
procédure n’est ainsi pas fondée. Dans la mesure où les parties à ce traité sont le Honduras et la
Colombie, dans la mesure où la Colombie invoque dans la présente procédure des droits vis-à-vis
du Nicaragua au regard de zones qui, en vertu du traité, relèvent de la juridiction du Honduras dans
la relation bilatérale qui unit la Colombie à ce dernier, et dans la mesure où le Nicaragua prétend
qu’aucune des deux parties au traité n’a de droits dans la zone maritime qui fait l’objet du présent
différend, il existe un intérêt juridique pour le Honduras pouvant être mis en cause dans la présente
affaire.
37. Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie de votre attention et vous prie,
Monsieur le président, de donner la parole au professeur James Crawford.
The PRESIDENT: I thank ProfessorMarceloKohen for his presentation. I now invite
Professor James Crawford to the floor. - 39 -
CMRA. WFORD:
H ONDURAS ’APPLICATION TO INTERVENE AS A PARTY
A. Introduction
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, in this brief presentation, I want to reflect on
Honduras’s Application to intervene as a part y in the present case between Nicaragua and
Colombia. Mr. Bundy has already described our position as “more nuanced”, and I want to explain
why.
B. A brief history of party intervention before the Court
2. Before doing so, however, I should say a word about the development of the intervention
of the State as a party to the main case under Article 62 of your Statute.
3. The drafters of the Permanent Court’s Stat ute were working on a clean sheet of paper and
there was no provision for discretionary intervention under what is now Article62 in either the
1899 or the 1907 Hague Conventions. What the Advi sory Committee of Jurists originally had by
way of a precedent for intervention concerned the interpretation of multilateral treaties: what is
now Article 63 started life as Article 56 of the 1899 Hague Convention, subsequently Article 84 of
the revised 1907 Convention 29.
4. Article 62 was thus an innovation, inserted in the Statute on a British initiative. In fact the
English text of Article62 referred to interventi on “as a third party”: the two language texts were
only reconciled, with the deletion of these words, in 1945.
5. The Report of the Advisory Committee of 1920 was clear that intervention under
Article62 was discretionary, that was limited to St ates having an interest of a juridical character,
un intérêt d’ordre juridique. The Advisory Committee expressed the view that there was one case:
“in which the Court cannot refuse a request to be allowed to intervene, that is in
questions concerning the interpretation of a Convention in which States, other than the
contracting parties, have taken part;.. . When collective treaties are concerned,
29Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, The Hague, 18 Oct. 1907, 6 League of Nations,
Treaty Series (LNTS) 54. - 40 -
general interpretations can 30us be obta ined very quickly by the mechanism of
Article 63 intervention.”
This suggests that the Advisory Committee did not have in mind the situation of a State intervening
as a party to the case by reason of its interest in that case. This would logically require that as a
party it is bound by the decision to the extent of its intervention.
6. No change was made to Articles62 and 63 as proposed by the Advisory Committee in
1920. Nor was any change made in 1945, save that the Drafting Committee deleted the words “as a
third party” in the English text, saying that this was a drafting amendment which did not “change
the sense” 31.
7. Turning from the drafting history to the law, Shabtai Rosenne is sweeping in his statement
of the obscurities and uncertainties associated with Article62. He says, and I quote: “There is
broad agreement that both provisions are full of wh at Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties . . . would regard as obscurities and ambiguities.” He then goes through a long list
of these and concludes “an imposing array of obs curities, ambiguities and lack of concordance
32
between the two language versions of the Statute” .
8. The Court may feel that with such an authority expressing such uncertainty, a rather
cautious attitude is called for, and so to an extent it is. But intervention is widely practised in legal
systems, and residual difficulties with the language of Article 62 can be resolved by the Court.
9. Indeed you did this in considering the Philippines’s request to intervene in Sipadan and
Ligitan, where you adopted a broad and facultative approach to the formula used in Article62
allowing intervention in respect of reasons which constituted necessary steps to the dispositif
(Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pu lau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia) , Application to
Intervene, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 596, para. 47).
30Permanent Court of International Justice, Procès-verbaux, 745 (1920) in S.Rosenne, The Law and Practice of
the International Court , Vol.III ⎯ Procedure, (4th ed.), 2006, p.1442. See, alsContinental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya), Application for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1981, p. 13, para. 22.
31Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, 1945, Vol. XIV, p. 676.
32“Report on the Draft Statute of an International Court of Justice” referred to in Chapter VII of the Dumbarton
Oaks Proposal (Jules Basdevant, Rapporteur) in Official Comments relating to the Statute of the Proposed International
Court of Justice, 14 UNCIO 387, p. 849; Rosenne, op. cit., p. 1446. - 41 -
10. Indeed it is clear that there are cases where intervention as a party is not merely desirable
or appropriate but actually legally necessary. Take as an example a case where some third State is
a necessary party to the proceedings in the sense of the Monetary Gold case, and assuming that the
jurisdictional conditions for party intervention are me t. Where the legal interests of the third State
“would not only be affected by a decision, but would form the very subject-matter of the decision”
(Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, Preliminary Question, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1954, p. 32), intervention by the third State as a party resolves the difficulty. And indeed it
was specifically provided for as a contingency in the Monetary Gold case itself, except that the
intervention did not happen. I do not suggest that intervention of a party under Article 62 is limited
to the Monetary Gold situation, but I do say it is a clear example of a case where intervention as a
party would be appropriate.
11. Furthermore the treatment of intervention as a party in the Court’s case law, despite the
fact that intervention as a party has never yet been allowed, does enable us to say some things with
a measure of assurance. I will mention five points.
12. First, unlike non-party intervention, a State which intervenes as a party must have a
relevant jurisdictional link with both the original parties to the case.
13. Secondly, intervention is an incidental procedure. As the Court said in the Haya de la
Torre case:
“every intervention is incidental to the pr oceedings in a case; it follows that a
declaration filed as an intervention only acqui res that character, in law, if it actually
relates to the subject-matter of the pending proceedings” (Haya de la Torre, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 76).
14. Thirdly, and as a corollary, intervention ma y not be used to tack on a new case, distinct
from the case that exists between the original parties. As this Court said in regard to Italy’s
requested intervention in the Libya/Malta case:
“if Italy were permitted to intervene in the present proceedings in order to pursue the
course it has itself indicated it wishes to pursue, the Court would be called upon, in
order to give effect to the intervention, to determine a dispute, between Italy and one
or both of the principal Parties” ( Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta),
Application for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984 , p.20,
para. 31). - 42 -
The Court reached a similar conclusion in the Libya/Tunisia case:
“The findings at which it arrives and the reasoning by which it reaches those
findings in the case between Tunisia and Libya will therefore inevitably be directed
exclusively to the matters submitted to the Court in the Special Agreement concluded
between those States . . . It follows that no conclusions or inferences may legitimately
be drawn from those findings or that reasoning with respect to rights or claims of other
States not parties to the case.” ( Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya),
Application for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports1981 , p.20,
para. 35.)
15. These dicta all reflect the basic requirement stated by the Chamber in 1990 when
Nicaragua sought to intervene in El Salvador/Honduras . The Chamber stressed that: “An
incidental proceeding cannot be one which transfor ms that case into a different case with different
parties.” ( Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Disput e (ElSalvador/Honduras), Application to
Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1990, p. 134, para. 98.)
16. Fourthly, although a successful intervener b ecomes a party to the original case, and as
such has important procedural rights ⎯ nonetheless it remains a case betw een the original parties,
to which the intervener is joined as a party. The intervener can, within the framework of the Rules
and the Court’s procedural orders, express its views on the matter or matters on which it is
permitted to intervene. It is bound by the decision of the Court on the substance of the case ⎯ to
the extent of its intervention. That must mean that remedies granted in the original case ⎯ e.g., by
way of declaration ⎯ can be made to apply to the intervener as a party, and that the intervener can
be the beneficiary of remedies granted against an original party. On the other hand, if the
intervener wishes to seek remedies of its own, ou tside the remedial framework of the main case, it
should do so in separate proceedings ⎯ proceedings which it will, by definition, be able to bring 33.
17. Fifthly, it seems undisputed that ⎯ just as with non-party intervention ⎯ an intervener
as a party may be authorized to intervene on cer tain issues only, in which case the rights to be
heard, etc., associated with the intervention will be correspondingly limited. This of course is what
the Chamber did in El Salvador/Honduras , in the context of what it held to be a non-party
34
intervention by Nicaragua .
33
See, e.g., Haya de la Torre, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 76. See, also, Rosenne, op. cit., p. 1465.
34Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal vador/Honduras), Application to Intervene,
Judgment,,I.C.J. Reports 1990, pp. 135-136, paras. 102-103. - 43 -
18. A point which is less clear is whether the sa me test of legal interest applies to requests to
intervene as a party as in the case of non-party inte rvention. Of course Article 62 makes no such
distinction ⎯ but then the underlying distinction between party and non-party intervention was not
present to the minds of the drafters of Article 62; it is a creation of your case law.
19. Even if the answer to that question is yes ⎯ that there is a single test for legal interest ⎯
the point remains that the application of that test to the facts of a given case will necessarily depend
35
on what is sought by the intervening State . The consent or objection to the intervention by the
original parties is relevant but not decisive: inte rvention is available under the Statute, and it is the
Court ⎯ not the parties ⎯ which decides on the application to intervene: this is emphasized by
Article 62, paragraph 2.
20. As you said in the Libya/Malta case:
“while the Court attaches great importance to the element of the will of States . . . it is
worth recalling that under paragraph2 of Ar ticle62, ‘it shall be for the Court to
decide’ upon a request for permission to intervene, and the opposition of the parties to
a case is, though very important, no more than one element to be taken into account by
the Court” ( Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Application to
Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 28, para. 46).
21. Moreover, you have said, the Court has no general discretion to qualify or disqualify an
intervener “for reasons simply of policy”. If the various conditions are met, permission to
intervene should normally follow (ibid., p. 12, para. 17). In this sense, intervention is an important
aspect of your judicial process under the Statute; it distinguishes this Court in an additional way
from arbitral tribunals.
C. The positions of the Parties and of Honduras in the present case
22. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I turn to consider the position of the Parties, and of
Honduras, in the present case.
23. In its Application, Honduras took the pos ition that the Court fixed the endpoint of its
boundary with Nicaragua in the 2007Judgment and, thus, only determined a part of the maritime
boundary (Application, para.7). SirMichael elaborated on this point by noting that, in its
2007 Judgment the Court did not indicate the precise point where the jurisdiction of a third State is
3Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), App lication to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1981,
p. 17, para. 29. - 44 -
reached [CR2010/18, p. 38, para. 25], or even the location of the area where the rights of third
States may be affected [ibid., p. 39, para. 27].
24. Honduras contended that, in the present cas e, Nicaragua continues to claim rights which
extend beyond the terminal point fixed by the Court (Application, para. 9). So, I interpolate, does
Colombia. It is in this context that Honduras refe rs to the “incertitude” that it says exists regarding
the fixing of maritime boundaries with Nicaragua north of the 15° parallel and east of the 82nd
meridian, and it adds that, if the 1986Treaty c oncluded with Colombia settled definitively the
question of the maritime limits of those two countries, “a difference over delimitation subsists
between Honduras and Nicaragua” (Application, paras. 13 and 18).
25. It is in this context that Honduras seek s to intervene as a party. As the Honduran
Application states (para. 22), it wishes to attach to the pending case the completion of the maritime
frontier between Honduras and Nicaragua, on the on e hand, and the tripoint between Honduras,
Nicaragua and Colombia, on the other, something the Court did not decide in 2007. In his
presentation on Monday, SirMichael left the tr ipoint floating by simply noting that the
2007 Judgment does not establish that there cannot be a maritime boundary between Nicaragua and
Honduras to the south of the bisector [CR 2010/18, p. 40, para. 31]. Honduras requests the Court
to determine the segment of the maritime boundary starting from the terminal point on the bisector
fixed in 2007 and running to the tripoint.
26. For its part, Nicaragua’s Written Observa tions maintain that the 2007Judgment settled
the entire Caribbean Sea boundary between Nicara gua and Honduras (with the exception of a very
small area in the territorial sea that is irrelevant for present purposes), and that the Court did not fix
a terminus on the bisector line (Written Observations of Nicaragua, paras. 3, 16 and 19). Nicaragua
also says that there is no tripoint between the three States (ibid., para. 11). So there is considerable
opposition between the positions, and the question for present purposes is whether the Court may
decide in favour of one position or the other; it is not a question of the merits of the case itself.
27. In its Written Observations, Colombia has considered it appropriate to leave Honduras’s
request to the Court’s discretion in accordan ce with the power granted under Article62,
paragraph2, of the Statute. I will revert to this shortly. Meanwhile you have heard Mr.Bundy - 45 -
setting out in more detail Colomb ia’s position with respect to the area identified by Honduras as
relevant and the rights claimed there. I will not repeat what he has sa
id.
D. Honduras’s claim to intervene as a party in the present case: issues for the Court under
Article 62, paragraph 2
28. Mr.President, Members of the Court, against that background of the law and the
positions of the Parties, I turn to consider Hondur as’s claim to intervene a nd set out certain issues
which the Court will need to consider, with respect . As SirMichael said on Monday, this is the
first time that there has been an express application under Article62 to intervene as a party 36,
though in the course of the proceedings in the El Salvador/Honduras case Nicaragua did offer to be
bound by the Chamber’s decision if allowed to intervene on the delimitation 37.
29. A number of aspects of Honduras’s request to intervene as a party either relate to
elements that concern only the bilateral mar itime boundary between Honduras and Nicaragua or
the meaning, scope and res judicata effect of the 2007 Judgment. At this stage of the proceedings,
Colombia does not consider that it is appropriate to express views on the meaning or scope of the
2007 Judgment. With respect to the Judgment’s effect, the governing provision is Article 59 of the
Statute, in accordance with which the Judgment has no binding effect on Colombia. That is why
Colombia’s Written Observations indicated that th e matter of intervention in accordance with the
Statute, should be left to the Court to decide. The question there is whether the object and purpose
of Honduras’s request in truth relates to intervention under Article62 in the main case between
Nicaragua and Colombia or whether it relates to a nother dispute not directly at issue in the main
case, and correspondingly whether Honduras’s principal request should be granted in whole or in
part or refused.
36
CR 2010/18, p. 31, para. 2 (Wood).
37Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dis pute (ElSalvador/Honduras), Application to Intervene, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1990, p. 131, para. 91. - 46 -
30. To repeat, Colombia has considered it appropriate to leave this request to your discretion
in accordance with Article 62, paragraph 2. In these circumstances, I will not attempt, at this stage,
to provide a complete appraisal of Honduras’s Application, still less to draw definitive conclusions.
I would simply make the following points which the Court may take into account in exercising its
powers.
31. First, as to jurisdiction, that problem does not arise here, since all three States are parties
to the Pact of Bogotá.
32. Secondly, as to intervention as an incidental procedure, an incident to the main case,
there are factors pointing both ways. Looked at globally, in the context of the dispute as a whole,
Honduras’s intervention is incidental. Looked at in its own terms, it might seem less clear,
although Honduras’s claims do seem to “relate[] to the subject-matter of the pending proceedings”,
in terms of the Haya de la Torre case (Haya de la Torre, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 76).
33. Thirdly, Honduras’s intervention may be seen to relate to the existing dispute between
Colombia and Nicaragua, though the gist of its claims is against Nicaragua rather than Colombia.
34. Fourthly, the balance between th e original claims of the parties inter se and the claims
sought to be introduced by Honduras requires co nsideration. The question may be posed in
remedial terms: Honduras seeks finality, but the qu estion is whether the intervener wishes to seek
remedies of its own, outside the remedial framework of the main case. That is a matter of
appreciation for the Court.
35. Fifthly, there is the question whether Honduras may be authorized to intervene on certain
issues only ⎯ that is another matter of appreciation.
36. As to the existence of an interest of a legal nature, Mr. Bundy has shown that this exists
here, in a way which is surely sufficient for the purposes of Article62, having regard to the
inherent contingency in appreciating in advance of a judicial decision which interest “may” be
affected by it.
37. On the other hand, there are perhaps special circumstances in this case which need to be
assessed when deciding the issue under Article62 of party intervention. One is the fact that on
closely associated issues, Honduras is bound by the res judicata of 2007, however far it may
extend, whereas Colombia, by virtue of Article 59 of the Statute, is not bound by that Judgment. - 47 -
E. Conclusion
38. Mr.President, Members of the Court, at the risk of inspiring a further question from
Judge Donoghue, I do not propose to go further at this stage. Colombia will listen attentively ⎯ as
I am sure will the Court ⎯ to Honduras’s presentation of these various factors tomorrow.
39. Nicaragua, for its part, denies outright that Honduras has any interest of a legal nature in
the area the subject of the dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia ⎯ or in any part of that area.
If that is right, there can be no intervention by Honduras whether as a party or otherwise. But my
colleague Mr.Bundy has shown it is not right and, that as a minimum, Honduras qualifies to
intervene as a non-party under Article 62. It is for the Court to go further, if it so decides.
Mr.President, Members of the Court, that concludes my presentation, and Colombia’s first
round oral argument.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor James Crawford for his presentation. That brings to an
end the first round of oral argument on Honduras’s App lication for permission to intervene. I wish
to thank Honduras and the Parties for the statemen ts presented in the course of this first round of
oral argument.
The Court will meet again tomorrow, from 3 p.m. to 4 p.m. to hear the second round of oral
argument of Honduras.
Thank you. The Court is adjourned.
The Court rose at 12.45 p.m.
___________
Audience publique tenue le mercredi 20 octobre 2010, à 10 h 40, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Owada, président, en l'affaire du Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie) - Requête du Honduras à fin d'intervention