Audience publique tenue le mardi 22 mars 2011, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Owada, président, en l'affaire relative à l'Application de l'accord intérimaire du 13 septemb

Document Number
142-20110322-ORA-01-00-BI
Document Type
Number (Press Release, Order, etc)
2011/6
Date of the Document
Bilingual Document File
Bilingual Content

Non corrigé
Uncorrected

CR 2011/6

International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice

THHEAGUE LAAYE

YEAR 2011

Public sitting

held on Tuesday 22 March 2011, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,

President Owada presiding,

in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995
(the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)

________________

VERBATIM RECORD
________________

ANNÉE 2011

Audience publique

tenue le mardi 22 mars 2011, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,

sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,

en l’affaire relative à l’Application de l’accord intérimaire du 13 septembre 1995
(ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine c. Grèce)

____________________

COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -

Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presdenkta

Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham

Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade

Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue

Judges ad hoc Roucounas
Vukas

Registrar Couvreur

⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -

Présents : M. Owada,président
vceMpra,ident

KoroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham

Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Crnçade

Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue mes
Djngogshue,

RoMcou.nas
juVeskas, ad hoc

Cgoefferr,

⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -

The Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is represented by:

H.E.Mr.Antonio Miloshoski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia,

as Agent;

H.E.Mr.Nikola Dimitrov, Ambassador of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,

as Co-Agent;

Mr.Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of Law, Un iversity College London, Barrister, Matrix
Chambers, London,

Mr.Sean D.Murphy, Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law, George Washington
University,

Mrs. Geneviève Bastid Burdeau, Professor of Law, University of Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne,

Mr.Pierre Klein, Professor of International Law, Director of the Centre of International Law,
Université Libre de Bruxelles,

Ms Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,

as Counsel;

Mr. Saso Georgievski, Professor of Law, University Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje,

Mr. Toni Deskoski, Professor of Law, University Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje,

Mr. Igor Djundev, Ambassador, State Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr.GoranStevcevski, State Counsellor, International Law Directorate, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,

MsElizabetaGjorgjieva, Minister Plenipoten tiary, Deputy-Head of Mission of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the European Union,

Ms Aleksandra Miovska, Head of Co-ordination Sector, Cabinet Minister for Foreign Affairs,

as Advisers;

Mr. Mile Prangoski, Research Assistant, Cabinet of Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Remi Reichold, Research Assistant, Matrix Chambers, London,

as Assistants; - 5 -

Le Gouvernement de l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Antonio Miloshoski, ministre des affaires étrangères de l’ex-R épublique yougoslave de
Macédoine,

comme agent ;

S. Exc. M. Nikola Dimitrov, ambassadeur de l’ ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,

comme coagent ;

M.PhilippeSands, Q.C., professeur de droit au Un iversity College de Londres, avocat, Matrix
Chambers, Londres,

M.SeanD.Murphy, professeur de droit à la George Washington University, titulaire de la chaire
de recherche Patricia Roberts Harris,

Mme Geneviève Bastid Burdeau, professeur de droit à l’Université Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne,

M.PierreKlein, professeur de droit internationa l, directeur du centre de droit international de
l’Université Libre de Bruxelles,

Mme Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, avocat, Matrix Chambers, Londres,

comme conseils ;

M. Saso Georgievski, professeur de droit à l’Université Saints-Cyrille-et-Méthode de Skopje,

M. Toni Deskoski, professeur de droit à l’Université Saints-Cyrille-et-Méthode de Skopje,

M. Igor Djundev, ambassadeur, conseiller d’Etat au ministère des affaires étrangères,

M.GoranStevcevski, conseiller d’Etat au minist ère des affaires étrangè res, direction du droit
international,

Mme Elizabeta Gjorgjieva, ministre plénipotentiaire, chef adjoint de la mission de l’ex-République
yougoslave de Macédoine auprès de l’Union européenne,

MmeAleksandraMiovska, chef du département de la coordination au cabinet du ministre des

affaires étrangères,

comme conseillers ;

M. Mile Prangoski, assistant de recherche au cabinet du ministre des affaires étrangères,

M. Remi Reichold, assistant de recherche, Matrix Chambers, Londres,

comme assistants ; - 6 -

Ms Elena Bodeva, Third Secretary, Embassy of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,

as Liaison Officer with the International Court of Justice;

Mr. Ilija Kasaposki, Security Officer of the Foreign Minister. - 7 -

MmeElenaBodeva, troisième secrétaire à l’ ambassade de l’ex-République yougoslave de
Macédoine au Royaume des Pays-Bas,

comme attaché de liaison auprès de la Cour internationale de Justice ;

M. Ilija Kasaposki, agent chargé de la sécurité du ministre des affaires étrangères. - 8 -

The Government of the Hellenic Republic is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Georges Savvaides, Ambassador of Greece,

MsMariaTelalian, Legal Adviser, Head of the Public International Law Section of the Legal
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

as Agents;

MrG. eorgeAbi-Saab, Honorary Professor of In ternational Law, Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva, member of the Institut de droit international,

Mr.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international,

Mr.AlainPellet, Professor of International Law, University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
member and former Chairman of the Interna tional Law Commission, associate member of the
Institut de droit international,

Mr.MichaelReisman, Myres S. McDougal Professor of International Law, Yale Law School,
member of the Institut de droit international,

as Senior Counsel and Advocates;

Mr.ArghyriosFatouros, Honorary Professor of International Law, University of Athens, member
of the Institut de droit international,

Mr. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Professor of International Law, University of Athens,

Mr. Evangelos Kofos, former Minister-Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specialist on
Balkan affairs,

Csounsel;

Mr.TomGrant, Research Fellow, Lauterpacht Ce ntre for International Law, University of
Cambridge,

Mr.AlexandrosKolliopoulos, Assistant Legal Advi ser, Public International Law Section of the
Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Michael Stellakatos-Loverdos, Assistant Legal Adviser, Public International Law Section of
the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

MsAlinaMiron, Researcher, Centre de droit inte rnational de Nanterre (CEDIN), University of

Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,

Asdvisers;

H.E. Mr. Ioannis Economides, Ambassador of Greece to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

MsAlexandraPapadopoulou, Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of the Greek Liaison Office in
Skopje, - 9 -

Le Gouvernement de la République hellénique est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Georges Savvaides, ambassadeur de Grèce,

MmeMariaTelalian, conseiller juridique, chef de la section de droit international public du
département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,

comme agents ;

M.GeorgesAbi-Saab, professeur honoraire de droit international à l’Institut universitaire des
hautes études internationales de Genève, membre de l’Institut de droit international,

M.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international,

M.AlainPellet, professeur de droit international à l’Université ParisOuest, Nanterre-LaDéfense,
membre et ancien président de la Commission du droit international, membre associé de
l’Institut de droit international,

M. Michael Reisman, professeur de droit internationa l à l’Université de Yale, titulaire de la chaire
Myres S. McDougal, membre de l’Institut de droit international,

comme conseils principaux et avocats ;

M.Arghyrios Fatouros, professeur honoraire de dr oit international à l’Université nationale
d’Athènes, membre de l’Institut de droit international,

M. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, professeur de droit international à l’Université nationale d’Athènes,

M. Evangelos Kofos, ancien ministre-conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères, spécialiste des
Balkans,

comme conseils ;

M.TomGrant, collaborateur scientifique au La uterpacht Centre for International Law de
l’Université de Cambridge,

M. Alexandros Kolliopoulos, conseiller juridique adjoint à la secti on de droit international public
du département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,

M. Michael Stellakatos-Loverdos, conseiller juridique adjoint à la section de droit international
public du département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,

MmeAlinaMiron, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université

Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,

comme conseillers ;

S. Exc. M. Ioannis Economides, ambassadeur de Grèce auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,

Mme Alexandra Papadopoulou, ministre plénipotentiaire, chef du bureau de liaison de la Grèce à
Skopje, - 10 -

Mr. Efstathios Paizis Paradellis, First Counsellor, Embassy of Greece in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,

Mr.EliasKastanas, Assistant Legal Adviser, P ublic International Law Section of the Legal
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Konstantinos Kodellas, Embassy Secretary,

as Diplomatic Advisers;

Mr. Ioannis Korovilas, Embassy attaché,

Mr. Kosmas Triantafyllidis, Embassy attaché,

as Administrative Staff. - 11 -

M. Efstathios Paizis Paradellis, premier conseiller à l’ambassade de Grèce au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,

M.EliasKastanas, conseiller juridique adjoint à la section de droit international public du
département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,

M. Konstantinos Kodellas, secrétaire d’ambassade,

comme conseillers diplomatiques ;

M. Ioannis Korovilas, attaché d’ambassade,

M. Kosmas Triantafyllidis, attaché d’ambassade,

comme personnel administratif. - 12 -

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open. I know that Judge Skotnikov, for

reasons made known to me, as yesterday, remains una ble to take his seat on the Bench today. The

Court meets today for the continuation of the fi rst round of presentation of the former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia. Thus, let me invite Professor Pierre Klein to take the floor.

M. KLEIN :

LA REQUÊTE EST PLEINEMENT RECEVABLE ET AUCUNE RAISON D ’OPPORTUNITÉ NE S ’OPPOSE
À CE QUE LA C OUR RENDE UN ARRÊT DANS LA PRÉSENTE AFFAIRE

1. Je vous remercie Monsieur le président. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs

les Membres de la Cour, il me revient ce matin de traiter d’un dernier ordre d’argument avancé par

l’Etat défendeur pour inviter la Cour à ne pas exercer ses pouvoirs à l’égard du présent différend.

Selon la Partie adverse, la demande présentée dans la requête introductiv e d’instance serait d’une

nature telle qu’elle se heurterait aux «limitations inhérentes à l’exercice par la Cour de sa fonction

1
judiciaire» . La Cour devrait de ce fait refuser de se prononcer sur la demande dont elle est saisie.

Au fil des développements de l’argumentation de l’Etat défendeur sur cette question, ses arguments

se sont articulés sur trois axes principaux. Première ment, la Cour devrait s’abstenir de rendre une

décision qui serait condamnée à être dépourvue de tout effet pratique. En deuxième lieu, la Cour

devrait exercer sa «réserve judiciaire» à l’égard du présent différend. A défaut, elle interférerait

dans un processus de négociation mené sous la supervision des organes politiques des

Nations Unies. Enfin, la réserve de droit formulée par l’Etat requérant en vue d’une modification

et d’une extension éventuelle des termes de sa requê te serait en tout état de cause irrecevable. On

ne s’attardera pas davantage sur cette dernière que stion dans le cadre de la présente plaidoirie,

puisqu’aucune extension de ce type n’a été demandée à ce stade de la procédure.

2. L’argumentation relative aux «limitations inhérentes à l’exercice par la Cour de sa

fonction judiciaire» a initialement été avancée par l’ Etat défendeur de façon très succincte dans la

partie de son contre-mémoire consacrée à la réfutation des mesures de réparation sollicitées par

2
l’Etat requérant . Cette question a ensuite pris une proportion beaucoup plus significative dans

1
Duplique («RR»), p. 63 et suiv.
2Contre-mémoire («RCM»), par. 9.9-9.16. - 13 -

l’argumentation du défendeur, qui lui a consacré un chapitre entier dans sa duplique, en en faisant

une exception ⎯ ou plutôt un ensemble d’exceptions ⎯ d’irrecevabilité 3. Ces efforts, pourtant, ne

changent pas grand chose au poids de cet argument . Qu’il soit développé en deux, en quatorze, ou

en quarante pages, il est loin d’emporter la convict ion. Ici encore, l’argumentation de la Partie

adverse présente de sérieuses difficultés tant sur le pl an factuel que sur le plan juridique. Le même

constat s’impose, on va le voir, pour les deux principaux arguments d’irrecevabilité avancés par

l’Etat défendeur.

A. Un arrêt rendu par la Cour dans la présente affaire emporterait
des effets juridiques concrets

3. Selon le premier de ces arguments, un arrêt rendu par la Cour ne pourrait avoir aucun effet

concret. Il en serait ainsi en raison du fait que la requête de l’Etat demandeur viserait,

premièrement, à faire déclarer qu’il aurait dû être admis au sein de l’OTAN et, deuxièmement, à

faire constater que la décision de cette organisation de ne pa s accepter l’adhésion du demandeur

en2008 constituait un acte internationalement illicite engageant la responsabilité de l’Etat

défendeur 4. Ce dernier insiste sur le fait que cette décision est le fruit d’un processus collectif

mené au sein de l’organisation, et qu’il ne dispose d’aucun pouvoir de décider lui-même de

l’invitation du requérant à devenir membre de l’OTAN 5. Il serait donc vain pour la Cour de lui

6
adresser une injonction en ce sens .

4. De la même façon, selon l’Etat défendeur, la demande de l’Etat requérant de restaurer le

statu quo ante ⎯c’est-à-dire de le replacer dans la s ituation où il aurait dû se trouver si l’acte

reproché au défendeur n’avait pas été commis ⎯ serait tout aussi dépourvue de sens. Le statut du

requérant préalablement au sommet de Bucarest était celui d’Etat candidat à l’admission au sein de

l’OTAN. Ce statut est demeuré inchangé, et l’Etat requérant reste à l’heure actuelle candidat à

3
RR, chap. 4 ; pour la qualification, voir par. 4.3.
4
RCM, par. 9.4.
5 RR, par. 4.6.

6 Ibid., par. 9.11. - 14 -

l’admission au sein de cette organisation . Une décision de la Cour ne changerait dès lors rien à cet

état de choses.

5. Il est manifeste que l’objection relative à la portée pratique d’un arrêt de la Cour, telle que

cette objection est soulevée par le défendeur, ne saurait avoir de poids que si la description de

l’objet de la demande de l’Etat requérant était co rrecte. Or, ce n’est pas le cas. Une nouvelle fois,

ce n’est qu’en livrant une présentation tronquée de l’ objet de cette demande que l’Etat défendeur

peut prétendre qu’un arrêt de la Cour ne pourrait a voir d’effet concret dès lors que l’Etat défendeur

est impuissant à modifier une décision collective de l’OTAN. Mais ⎯ on y a déjà insisté hier et on

le répétera aujourd’hui ⎯ ce n’est pas la décision prise par cette organisation en 2008 qui est visée

par la requête. C’est un acte propre au défendeur, autonome et préalable à cette décision, même si

8
ces deux actes sont liés par un lien de cause à effet évident . Le défendeur ⎯ et c’est sa stratégie

constante ⎯ nie tantôt la réalité tantôt la portée juridique de cet acte propre. Il y a pourtant là une

vérité à laquelle il ne peut échapper. Cet ac te existe, il a été posé et même revendiqué avec

beaucoup de fierté par les autorités gouvernementa les de l’Etat défendeur, comme nous l’avons vu

hier. C’est cet acte qui a conduit à la décision prise par l’OTAN à son sommet de Bucarest. Et

c’est cet acte dont l’Etat requérant demande à la Cour de constater l’ illicéité au regard de

l’article 11 de l’accord intérimaire de 1995. Il n’est pas question ⎯ et il n’a jamais été question ⎯

de requérir de la Cour qu’elle impose à l’Etat défendeur de fair e rapporter la décision prise par

l’OTAN en 2008. Il est parfaitement évident que la Cour n’en a pas le pouvoir, et qu’une décision

de sa part en ce sens ne saurait produire un effet juridique pratique quelc onque. Personne ne le

conteste. Et c’est bien pour cette raison que ce n’est pas ce que demande l’Etat requérant.

6. Pour autant, ce qu’il demande ⎯ le constat d’une violation de l’article 11 de l’accord à la

suite d’un acte propre au défendeur et le rétablissement du statu quo ante ⎯ est-il susceptible

d’avoir une portée pratique? Ou ne s’agira it-il que d’un prononcé pur ement théorique, comme

l’affirme l’Etat défendeur, dès lors que l’Etat requérant était en position de candidat à l’admission

en2008, et se trouve encore exactement dans la même position à l’heure actuelle? En suggérant

que cette situation est inchangée ⎯ que le statu quo ante a, en quelque sorte, toujours existé ⎯, le

7
RCM, par. 9.15 ; RR, par. 4.10.
8
Voir entre autres, dans le contexte des questions abordées ici, réplique («AR»), par. 6.8. - 15 -

défendeur omet un élément de taille. Le constat d’une violation de l’article 11 de l’accord aurait en

effet pour résultat de remettre l’Etat requérant en position de candidat à l’admission au sein de

l’OTAN sans risquer de se voir une nouvelle fo is opposer une objection fondée sur des motifs

9
autres que celui prévu dans l’accord intérimaire . Seuls seraient pris en compte, aux fins

d’évaluer les mérites de cette candidature, les critères fixés par l’organisation elle-même pour

l’admission de nouveaux membres. Et aucune interférence ne pourrait être exercée dans ce

processus par l’Etat défendeur pour des motifs autres que celui permis par l’article11. La

différence, on en conviendra, est loin d’être négl igeable. Et elle confirme au-delà de tout doute

qu’une décision de la Cour dans la présente instance aurait bien des effets juridiques concrets. Il en

serait d’ailleurs d’autant plus ainsi que cette hypothèque ⎯la menace d’une objection de l’Etat

défendeur fondée sur des motifs non admissibles ⎯ serait levée dans le contexte des demandes

d’admission présentées à l’avenir par l’Etat requéra nt auprès d’autres organisations internationales

dont l’Etat défendeur est membre. Si l’on me permet cette image, s’interroger sur l’impact

juridique concret d’un prononcé de la Cour dans l’ affaire qui lui est soumise aujourd’hui, c’est un

peu comme demander à Damoclès si cela a un impact pratique pour lui d’avoir ⎯ ou non ⎯ une

épée suspendue à un crin de cheval au-dessus de sa tête…

7. De façon plus générale, il est manifeste que l’obtention d’un cons tat de violation d’une

disposition d’un accord bilatéral en vigueur entre les Parties à l’instance représente, en soi, un

objectif parfaitement légitime et approprié dans le cadre d’une procédure judiciaire. La Cour n’a

pas, par ailleurs, à s’exprimer sur les conséquences futures de la décision qu’elle est appelée à

rendre.

8. Le fondement juridique de l’argumentati on développée par l’Etat défendeur sur ce point

ne s’avère pas plus convaincant. Selon cette argumentation, la Cour se trouverait ici dans la même

situation que celle à laquelle elle était confrontée dans l’affaire du Cameroun septentrional, où elle

avait refusé de statuer au fond sur la demande qui lui était soumise 1. Le motif de ce refus était

double. D’une part, la Cour estimait qu’elle ne se trouvait pas dans une situation où, une fois

l’arrêt rendu, «l’une ou l’autre partie ou les deux parties s[eraie]nt en fait à même de prendre des

9
Voir AR, par. 6.22.
10
Ibid., par. 9.12. - 16 -

mesures visant le passé ou l’avenir, ou de ne p as en prendre, de sorte qu’il y ait soit exécution de

l’arrêt…s,oit refus d’exécution» ( Cameroun septentrional (Cameroun cR . oyaume-Uni),

11
exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1963 , p. 37-38) . La Cour avait alors estimé devoir

sauvegarder sa fonction judiciaire en refu sant de rendre une décision sans objet ( ibid., p. 38). Tel

serait également le cas dans la présente instance, puisque la Cour ne pourrait imposer à l’Etat

défendeur des mesures qu’il ne serait pas habilité à prendre ⎯ en l’occurrence modifier la décision

12
de l’OTAN . D’autre part, dans l’affaire du Cameroun septentrional, la Cour avait estimé que «ce

que le requérant demande à la Cour, c’est d’appréci er certains faits et d’arriver, à l’égard de ces

faits, à des conclusions s’écartant de celles qu’a énoncées l’Assemblée générale dans sa

résolution 1608 (XV)» (Cameroun septentrional (Cameroun cR .oyaume-Uni), exceptions

préliminaires, arrêt, p.32) 13. Or, la Cour avait indiqué à cet égard qu’un arrêt rendu par elle ne

14
pourrait «infirm[er] … les décisions de l’Assemblée générale» ( ibid., p.33) . Selon la Partie

adverse, la même conclusion s’imposerait ici, puisque le but ultime de l’Etat requérant serait en fait

15
de réformer la décision prise par l’OTAN en 2008 . On se trouverait donc là confronté à un

précédent judiciaire bien lourd de conséquences. Qu’en est-il vraiment ?

9. En réalité, la situation à laquelle la Cour se trouvait confrontée dans le précédent du

Cameroun septentrional est fondamentalement différente de celle qui lui est soumise aujourd’hui.

L’objet central du différend entre le Royaume-Uni et le Cameroun était constitué par une allégation

de l’Etat requérant, le Cameroun, selon laquelle le défendeur avait manqué à des obligations que lui

imposait l’accord de tutelle qui le liait à l’Organisation des Nations Unies (Cameroun septentrional

(Cameroun c. Royaume-Uni), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1963, p. 26). En vertu

de la résolution1608(XV) de l’Assemblée généra le, cet accord de tutelle avait pris fin le

1erjuillet 1961, soit deux jours après le dépôt de sa requête par l’Etat demandeur (ibid. , p. 25-26).

Ces seuls faits suffisent évidemment à expliquer plei nement la conclusion atteinte par la Cour en

l’espèce, selon laquelle, même si elle «devait poursuiv re l’affaire et déclarer toutes les allégations

11Cité in RCM, par. 9.12.
12
RCM, par. 9.15 ; duplique, par. 4.12.
13
Cité in RR, par. 4.14.
14Cité in RR, par. 4.15.

15RR, par. 4.16. - 17 -

du demandeur justifiées au fond, elle n’en serait pas moins dans l’impossibilité de rendre un arrêt

effectivement applicable» (ibid., p. 33). La raison fondamentale de cette impossibilité est exposée

en des termes très simples par la Cour: «[l’]arrê t ne remettrait pas en vigueur et ne ferait pas

revivre l’accord de tutelle» (ibid.). On ne retrouve à l’évidence nulle ment ce type de circonstances

dans la présente espèce. Il ne s’agit aucunement ici de «faire revivre» d’une manière ou d’une

autre un instrument juridique qui aurait cessé de produire des effets de droit. Il s’agit au contraire

pour la Cour de se prononcer sur l’interprétation et la portée d’une disposition d’un accord bilatéral

qui lie les Parties à l’instance et dont nul ne conteste qu’il est bien en vigueur.

10. Comme l’indiquait encore la Cour dans son arrêt de 1963, «[l’]arrêt de la Cour doit avoir

des conséquences pratiques en ce sens qu’il doit pouvoir affecter les droits ou obligations

juridiques existants des parties, dissipant ainsi toute incertitude dans leurs relations juridiques»

(ibid., p.34). N’est-ce pas exactement à ce résultat que nous serions confrontés en la présente

instance? L’arrêt que rendra la Cour affectera indéniablement les droits de l’Etat requérant de

demander son admission au sein d’organisations inte rnationales sans que l’Etat défendeur puisse y

faire objection, si ce n’est dans le seul cas prévu à l’article 11 de l’accord intérimaire. Et cet arrêt

aura un effet pour l’Etat défendeur, en précisant qu’il ne peut émettre d’objection en dehors de la

seule hypothèse visée dans cette disposition.

11. L’arrêt rendu par la Cour dans l’affaire du Cameroun septentrional est donc loin d’être

dépourvu de pertinence dans la présente instan ce. Mais s’il montre une chose, ce n’est

certainement pas que la Cour serait en l’espèce da ns l’incapacité de rendre un arrêt qui aurait des

conséquences juridiques concrètes. Tout au contraire, les critères mêmes qui ont été énoncés par la

Cour en 1963 pour définir les situations dans l esquelles ses prononcés entraient bien dans le cadre

de l’exercice de ses fonctions judiciaires sont pleinement rencontrés ici, comme on vient de le voir.

On voit donc décidément très mal quelles «limitatio ns inhérentes à l’exercice par la Cour de ses

fonctions judiciaires» l’empêcheraient de rendre un arrêt dans la présente affaire. - 18 -

B. En exerçant ses pouvoirs dans le cadre de la présente instance, la Cour n’interférerait

en rien dans le processus de négociation diplomatique visant à résoudre
le différend relatif au nom

12. Selon la deuxième exception d’irrecevabilité soulevée par l’Etat défendeur, la Cour ne

pourrait rendre une décision en l’espèce car cel a la conduirait à ignorer le devoir qui lui

incomberait de faire preuve de «réserve judiciaire » à l’égard de la demande dont elle est saisie.

L’Etat défendeur affirme à cet égard qu’un arrêt par lequel la Cour accepterait de se prononcer sur

la requête portée devant elle interférerait avec le processus de négociation diplomatique requis par

le Conseil de sécurité dans la résolution817 (1993) et accepté par les Parties dans l’accord

intérimaire de 1995 16. Si elle acceptait l’une quelconque des demandes de l’Etat requérant, la Cour

imposerait de ce fait aux Parties ⎯et spécialement à l’Etat défendeur ⎯ une position dont le

Conseil de sécurité a indiqué qu’elle devrait être atteinte par un processus de négociation 17. En

rendant par hypothèse une décision favorable à l’Etat requérant, la Cour apporterait son appui aux

tentatives de cet Etat d’imposer sur le plan inte rnational un nom qui n’aurait pas fait l’objet de

18
négociation ni été accepté par l’Etat défendeur .

13. Il convient tout d’abord de relever que ce dernier argument n’a été avancé pour la

première fois par le défendeur que dans sa duplique , au stade ultime de la procédure écrite. On

peut certainement s’interroger sur la conformité de cette façon de procéder aux règles relatives à la

présentation des exceptions préliminaires devant la Cour et l’Etat requérant réserve tous ses droits à

cet égard. En tout état de cause, le procédé apparaît une nouvelle fois symptomatique du caractère

fluctuant de l’argumentation de l’Etat défendeur et de sa volonté de faire feu de tout bois, en

recourant, à tous les stades de la procédure, aux arguments les plus divers pour échapper aux

conséquences de ses actes.

14. Quoi qu’il en soit, même si la Cour accep te d’examiner cet argument, il s’avère lui aussi

bien léger, tant sur le plan des faits que sur celui du droit. En évoquant de prétendues

«interférences» entre la demande présentée par l’Etat requérant et le processus de négociation sur le

nom, l’Etat défendeur entretient une fois encore délibérément la confusion quant à la portée de la

16
RR, par. 4.23.
17
Ibid.
18Ibid., par. 4.26. - 19 -

demande initiale. La Cour n’est nullement appelée à se prononcer sur le différend relatif au nom de

l’Etat demandeur. Comme l’exposera de façon détaillée dans quelques instants mon collègue le

professeur Sean Murphy, la seule chose que prétend l’ Etat requérant, c’est que pas plus l’article 11

de l’accord intérimaire de1995 que la résolu tion817(1993) ne l’empêchent de se référer à

lui-même par son nom constitutionnel, y compris dans les enceintes des organisations

internationales dont il fait partie. Que la Cour tranche cette question ne reviendrait nullement à

priver de leur objet les négociations visant à régler le différend sur le nom, ni à défavoriser la Partie

adverse dans ce processus de négociation. L’objet de la demande de l’Etat requérant, et celui du

processus de négociation, sont entièrement distinct s. Se prononcer sur la première n’implique

nullement de trancher la «divergence» sur le nom, que les Parties ont été invitées à régler par la

voie des négociations. Si la Cour accueille la prétention de l’Etat requérant, cela signifiera

simplement qu’aucune violation de la résolution817 (1993) et de l’accord intérimaire ne peut lui

être reprochée au titre de la pratique qui consis te pour cet Etat à utiliser son nom constitutionnel

dans ses relations avec des tiers. Cela ne reviendra pas à imposer pour autant l’usage de ce nom à

ces tiers. L’objet des négociations ⎯c’est-à-dire, la recherche d’un accord sur la façon dont les

deux Parties pourront s’entendre pour désigner l’Etat requérant ⎯ sera de ce fait laissé

parfaitement intact.

15. Sur le plan plus strictement juridique, il convient sans doute de rappeler à ce stade que la

Cour s’est déjà prononcée en des termes très nets sur le fait que l’existence d’un processus de

négociation entre les Parties à l’instance n’était nullement de nature à l’empêcher d’exercer ses

fonctions judiciaires. En particulier, dans l’affaire Nicaragua, la Cour a souligné que «l’existence

même de négociations actives auxquelles les deux Parties pourraient participer ne doit empêcher ni

le Conseil de sécurité ni la Cour d’exercer les f onctions distinctes qui leur sont conférées par la

Charte et par le Statut» ( Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci

(Nicaragua c.Etats-Unis d’Amérique), compétence et recevabilité, arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1984 , - 20 -

p. 440, par. 106). Dès lors, la thèse de l’interfé rence qu’entraînerait un prononcé de la Cour sur le

processus de négociation sur le nom s’avère mani festement aussi dépourvue de fondement sur le

plan juridique qu’elle l’était sur le plan factuel.

*

16. On voit donc qu’il n’existe aucune «limita tion inhérente à l’exercice par la Cour de ses

fonctions judiciaires» qui l’empêcherait de rendre un arrêt au fond dans la présente affaire.

Contrairement à ce qu’affirme l’Etat défendeur, une décision de la Cour aurait bel et bien des effets

juridiques concrets et serait loin de constituer un prononcé purement théorique. Par ailleurs, la

Cour, en exerçant sa compétence, n’«interférerait» nullement dans le processus de négociation sur

la question du nom, qui possède un objet clairement distinct de celui du différend porté devant la

Cour. La Cour est donc pleinement en mesure de se prononcer sur le fond du litige et aucun des

arguments avancés par le défendeur, que ce soit au titre de la compétence à proprement parler ou

des limites à l’exercice de sa fonction judiciaire, n’y fait obstacle.

17. En réalité, ce que l’Etat défendeur tent e manifestement de faire par les différentes

exceptions qu’il invoque, c’est d’agiter devant la Cour le risque d’interférence avec des processus

politiques, comme un chiffon rouge. Processus ⎯ éminemment ⎯ politique d’admission au sein

d’une organisation interna tionale telle que l’OTAN, tout d’abord. Processus ⎯ clairement ⎯

politique de négociation et de médiation sur la question du nom ensu ite. La ficelle, permettez-moi

de le dire, est un peu grosse. L’argument a été invoqué ⎯ en vain, faut-il le rappeler ? ⎯ dans un

nombre considérable d’affaires portées devant la Cour . Et s’il a si souvent été rejeté, c’est parce

que la ligne de démarcation entre ce qui relève de la fonction judiciaire et ce qui lui échappe ⎯ en

particulier ce qui relève du «politique» ⎯ a été tracée avec netteté, et il y a déjà bien longtemps

déjà. En témoigne par exemple l’analyse que faisait de cette question, il y a près de

quarante-cinq ans, un auteur particulièrement émin ent que je suis personne llement très heureux de

retrouver parmi nos contradicteurs aujourd’hui : - 21 -

«si la Cour considère que ce qui lui est demandé dépasse ou est incompatible avec sa
fonction judiciaire, notamment lorsqu’il lui est demandé d’effectuer un choix politique
ou de rendre un jugement qui ne peut donnelieu qu’à des effets politiques, la Cour
déclinera d’accéder à de telles demandes» .

Sommes-nous, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, confrontés

à une telle situation dans la présente instance? Le dossier, me semble-t-il, parle de lui-même.

Rien de ce qui est demandé à la Cour dans la prése nte affaire ne lui impose de sortir de son rôle

judiciaire, ni d’interférer dans des processus po litiques, quels qu’ils soient. Seul un prononcé sur

une question juridique, clairement identifiée et clairement circonscrite, est sollicité en l’espèce par

l’Etat requérant.

Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieursles Membres de la Cour, je vous remercie

pour votre attention. Je vous prie, Monsieur lprésident, de bien vouloir maintenant céder la

parole à mon collègue, le professeur Sean Murphy.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor Pierre Klein for his statement. Now I invite

Professor Sean Murphy to take the floor.

MMUr. PHY:

THE RESPONDENT HAS BREACHED ARTICLE 11OF THE NTERIM A CCORD

INTRODUCTION

1. Thank you, Mr. President.

2. Members of the Court, yesterday I presented to you in some depth a factual account of the

events leading up to the Bucharest Summit in April 2008. The purpose of my presentation today is

to explain why the Respondent’s conduct violated its obligation under Article11(1) of the

1995 Interim Accord. To do so, my presentation will focus on three points.

3. First, under Article11(1) of the Interim Accord, the Respondent had an unequivocal

obligation not to object to the Applicant’s accesto international organizations. The relevant

language there is simple, direct, and unadorned. By its conduct w ith respect to the Applicant’s

accession to NATO, the Respondent deliberately violated that obligation.

19Georges Abi-Saab, Les exceptions préliminaires dans la procédure de la Cour internationale, Paris,

Pedone, 1967, p. 165. - 22 -

4. Second, Article11(1) carves out one ⎯ and only one ⎯ circumstance where the

Respondent is allowed to object: the Respondent ma y object to the Applicant’s membership in an

international organization if the Applicant “is to be referred to in such organization or institution

differently than in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution 817 (1993)”. In this

instance, the Applicant’s membership in NAT O would have been on the same terms as its

membership in the United Nations under resoluti on817; indeed, the Applicant was already

participating in NATO programmes on the basis of th at provisional reference. Consequently, the

Respondent had no basis under Article 11 (1) to object and should have declined to object just as it

has in many other international organizations since 1995.

5. Third, the Respondent occasionally lapses in to arguing certain other reasons for why it

was entitled to object under Article 11 (1). One of those reasons ⎯ the lack of the resolution of the

name difference on terms acceptable to the Respondent ⎯ is the true reason for the Respondent’s

objection. Other reasons, such as the Applican t’s alleged “lack of good neighborliness” or

“irredentism”, have no basis in any facts or evidence before this Court. Yet, most importantly for

this Court, none of those other reasons is a permitted basis in Article11(1) for objecting to the

Respondent’s membership in NATO.

I.THE R ESPONDENT DID “OBJECT ” TO THE APPLICANT ’S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO

WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FIRST CLAUSE OF ARTICLE 11 (1)

6. Mr. President, I turn to the first part of my argument, which is to demonstrate that, under

Article11(1) of the 1995 Interim Accord, the Respondent had an unequivocal obligation not to

object to the Applicant’s accession to international or ganizations and, further, that the Respondent

violated that obligation with respect to the Applicant’s pursuit of membership in NATO.

7. As Professor Sands indicated in his presentation yesterday, the 1995 Interim Accord was a

major diplomatic and legal achievement, in which the two States presently before you agreed to set

aside their difference over the name in order to resolve certain key issues in their bilateral

relationship. While both States would continue to seek a good faith resolution of the name issue,

they agreed in 1995 that they would, in the inte rim, not allow that unresolved dispute to preclude

diplomatic relations and co-operation in certain key areas. - 23 -

8. One of those key areas concerned the ability of the Applicant to join international

organizations. In 1993, as the Court knows, the Respondent had objected to the Applicant joining

the United Nations under its constitutional name. Consequently, a provisional solution was devised

20
by the three European Community member s on the Security Council at that time . Under the

solution, the Applicant was able to join the United Nations in 1993, but was to be referred to in that

organization by the provisional reference “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.

9. After the Applicant’s admission to the United Nations, the Respondent continued to object

to the Applicant’s admission to other interna tional organizations of which the Respondent was

already a member, notably the Council of Eu rope and the Organization for Security and

Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), claiming that, be fore the Applicant could join, the Respondent’s

position on the name difference had to be accepted. The Respondent’s objections succeeded in

blocking the Applicant’s admission in all n on-United Nations organizations of which the

Respondent was a member, where unanimity or consensus was required for admission. This stance

by the Respondent in the early 1990s was a major problem for a fledgling State that sought full

entry into the community of nati ons, including those international organizations that could assist

the Applicant in building democratic institutions and the rule of law.

10. Against that backdrop, the Applicant’s ability to secure membersh ip in international

organizations formed a particularly important part of the negotiations in 1994 and 1995 that

ultimately led to the signing of the Interim Accord. The various drafts of the agreement that

ultimately became the Interim Accord contained formulations that spoke to this problem 21. For the

Applicant, this was a critical issue in 1995 and it remains a critical issue before you today.

11. Ultimately, the issue was addressed in Pa rtC of the Interim Accord, which is entitled

“International, Multilateral and Regional Institutions”. I direct the Court’s attention to tab 1 of the

judges’ folder, where you do find the 1995Interi m Accord, and on pages4 and 5 you will find

Part C. Within Part C, there is a single article, Article 11. The fact that Article 11 was granted by

the drafters an entire “Part” to itself, of a six-pa rt agreement, makes clear that this was one of the

key components of the agreement. Now the Res pondent at times mischaracterizes our position by

20
AM, para. 2.17.
2RCM, Ann. 148. - 24 -

saying that we view Article 11 as the only important component of the Interim Accord or the only

part that must be fulfilled. That is not our position; the entire Interim Accord is binding and

contains a number of important elements. But it is our position that Article11 was one of the

important elements of the Interim Accord.

12. [Plate 1 on] Turning to the text of Artic le11, the first paragraph contains two clauses,

which the Respondent characterizes as the “non-objection” clause and the “safeguard” clause. The

first clause of Article 11 (1) reads as follows:

“Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of th e First Part agrees

not to object to the application by or the membership of the Party of the Second Part in
international, multilateral a nd regional organizations and institutions of which the
Party of the First Part is a member . . .”

13. There are several points about this first clause upon which the Parties agree. Both Parties

agree that the Interim Accord entered into force, thus activating the obligation set forth in this

clause. Both Parties agree that, since entry into force, Article11(1) has not been terminated or

suspended. Both Parties agr ee that since the Interim Acco rd was registered with the

United Nations 22 Article11(1) may be invoked by the Applicant before this Court. Further both

Parties both accept that the references in Article 11(1) to “Party of the First Part” means the

Respondent, while references to “Party of the Second Part” means the Applicant.

14. Both Parties also agree, or at least the Respondent does not dispute, that the term

“international, multilateral and regional organizations and institutions” includes NATO and the

European Union, of which the Respondent is a member of both. The Parties also agree that the text

imposes an obligation on the Respondent. And conse quently, both Parties agree that this clause

established an obligation upon the Respondent not to object to the application or membership of the

Applicant in NATO.

15. Where the Parties differ on this first clau se of Article11(1) is that the Respondent

contends that its conduct in 2007 and 2008 did not constitute an “obj ection” within the meaning of

the clause. The Respondent’s argument here is not always clear and has shifted a bit in its written

pleadings. However, we believe it can be distilled into three basic assertions: first, that the word

“object” in Article11(1) is extremely narrow and essentially limited to an obligation upon the

22
United Nations doc. S/1995/794 (1995), UNTS, Series No. 32193; see also United Nations Charter, Art. 102. - 25 -

Respondent not to vote against admission as a part of a formal voting procedure; second, that the

Applicant’s interpretation of this clause must be wrong because it would encompass “vast and

ill-defined” conduct by the Respondent; and third that , in any event, the inability of the Applicant

to join NATO was due to conduct by NATO, not conduct by the Respondent. Allow me to address

each of those propositions in turn.

16. First, the Respondent looks at this initial clause of Article11(1) and sees a phrase ⎯

“not to object” ⎯ that requires very specific actions, such as ⎯ and here I quote from some of the

Respondent’s language ⎯ a “formal protest[]” or “ démarche[] adopted in unambiguous language

and joined with [an] actual vote[] under the par liamentary procedures of [the] organization . . .” 23.

Since accession decisions at NATO are determined on the basis of consensus, rather than a formal

vote ⎯ as we discussed yesterday ⎯ the Respondent asserts that “Greece was never put in a

position of having to lodge an objection.” 24 Indeed, the Respondent goes so far as to characterize

the obligation “not to object” as comparable to an obligation not to cast a negative vote at the

United Nations Security Council, and references incidents involving such votes 25.

17. In our view, that is not the standard set by Article 11 (1). But even if it were the standard

set by Article11(1), the Respondent without ques tion violated that standard. As we established

yesterday, the Respondent did formally protest against the Applicant’s accession to NATO. The

Respondent did formally démarche NATO members in opposition to the Applicant’s accession.

Indeed, as I indicated yesterday, the Respondent sent an aide mémoire to all NATO members

saying that, in addition to the normal accession crite ria, satisfactory resolution of the name was a

sine qua non for the Respondent’s support. The Responde nt is repeatedly on the record as saying

that it “contacted foreign leaders” and engaged in “Greek diplomac y” for the purpose of blocking

26
the Applicant’s entry into NATO . The facts before this Court, as we discussed yesterday, show

that the Respondent formally presented its position to NATO members, in Brussels, in Bucharest 27,

that they fought hard for many months and during the Bucharest meeting itself, with strong

23RR, para. 5.31.
24
Ibid., para. 6.27.
25
RCM, para. 7.13; RR, paras. 5.27, 5.31.
26See AR, para. 2.8.

27Ibid. - 26 -

28
arguments that were clearly stating their positions and intentions . As I indicated yesterday, these

were not “casual expressions of dissatisfacti on or political declarations for atmospherics” 29; they

were official communications by senior officials of the Respondent.

18. Moreover, those steps were directly “joi ned” with the formal decision process of NATO

on accession. Indeed, in numerous of those public statements by senior officials of the Respondent,

those officials trumpeted the fact that the Respondent had “vetoe d” the Applicant’s accession to

NATO. Now, that is another way of saying that the Respondent single-handedly prevented a

consensus decision in favour of that accession. The matter did not reach a point where the

Respondent formally cast a “no” vote but, as we explained yesterday, NATO’s procedures never

30
result in such a vote . Instead, matters are decided by consen sus, and the historical record makes

absolutely clear that the Respondent refused to join that consensus. It did so by objecting to the

Applicant’s membership in the months leading up to Bucharest, and it did so by maintaining that

objection at the Summit itself.

19. But the narrow standard that the Respondent advocates for Article11(1) ⎯ one that

limits it to conduct solely taken as part of a formal parliamentary-style vote ⎯ is wrong. The text

contains no limiting language that says “object” means casting a negative vote or even filing a

formal démarche. No such language appears in this clause. The language is simple,

straightforward, unrestricted. The term “not to object” may not require the Respondent to lobby in

favour of the Applicant’s admission to internati onal organizations, nor re quire the Respondent to

refrain from publicly stating that the name difference has not been resolved 31. But it clearly

encompasses the vigorous campaigning, bilaterally and multilaterally, against the Applicant’s

admission to the relevant international organization. It certainly precludes informing other States

that the Respondent will not join in a consensus in favour of the Applicant’s admission. Especially

when read in context, this first clause of Article11(1) has a clear and plain meaning: the

Respondent is not to use its position as a member of an international organization to oppose

28See AR, para. 2.9.
29
RR, para. 5.31.
30AR, para. 2.37.

31RR, para. 6.34. - 27 -

admission by the Applicant. Yet the Respondent’s conduct ⎯ I outlined it in detail yesterday and

it is also in our pleadings ⎯ did just that.

20. Moving beyond the text of Article11 (1), the Respondent’s extreme and narrow

interpretation would defeat Article11(1)’s very object and purpose. Under the Respondent’s

interpretation, the Respondent is entitled to lobb y strenuously all members of NATO in bilateral

and multilateral settings, signa lling vehemently its opposition and unwillingness to join a

consensus in favour of the Applicant’s admission to NATO. If that is so, then what did the

Applicant gain by entry into force of Article 11 (1 )? Nothing. Under the Respondent’s theory, all

that the Applicant gained was the Respondent’s obligation to abstain from voting or to vote “yes”

when the Applicant’s request for admission was formally voted on at NATO, as a part of a process

in which no such voting occurs 32. Thus, for one of the key international organizations that the

Applicant wished to join, Article11(1) has absolu tely no meaning. Such an interpretation is, we

submit, nonsensical.

21. In our Reply, we pointed to the practice of the Parties before and after the 1995 Interim

Accord, in which the Respondent first opposed the Applicant’s admission to certain key

international organizations, notably the Counc il of Europe and the OSCE, and then, after
33
conclusion of the Interim Accord, stopped doing so . To us, that practice demonstrates the

purpose of Article 11 (1). The purpose was not merely to avoid a negative vote by the Respondent

before, for example, the Council of Europe’s Commi ttee of Ministers. The point was to have the

Respondent stop lobbying within the Council of Eu rope and other international organizations

against the Applicant’s admission; to stand down fr om its vigorous and systematic efforts in that

regard, even though the name dispute had not ye t been resolved, because Greece’s efforts were

stymieing accessions by the Applicant to those organizations.

22. And in the aftermath of the entry into for ce of the Interim Accord, that is exactly what

happened. The Respondent stopped objecting to the Applicant’s admission to international

organizations, allowing the Applicant to accede, fo r example, to the OSCE on 12 October 1995, to

the Council of Europe on 9November1995, an d to enter into NATO’s PfP Programme on

32
AR, para. 2.36.
3Ibid., para. 4.19. - 28 -

15November1995; all happening right in the aftermath of the entry into force of the Interim

Accord on 13 October 1995. That practice confirms the meaning and purpose of the first clause of

Article 11 (1).

23. The Respondent seeks to draw support for its theory from the negotiating history of

Article 11 3. Different language was indeed used in di fferent drafts of what became the Interim

Accord, but none of the formulations, such as not to “hamper” or not to “impede”, indicates any

intention that the term “not to object” means exclusively something like “not to formally vote

against”. Rather, the different formulations are all designed to capture the simple and effective

idea that the Respondent is not to use its position as a member of an international organization to

oppose admission of the Applicant.

24. Second, in advancing its implausible theory of Article 11 (1), the Respondent maintains

that the ordinary meaning of Article11(1) must be wrong because it would encompass “vast and

35
ill-defined” conduct by the Respondent . Here, the Respondent shows some desperation by

wholly mischaracterizing our position. We are not asserting that Article11(1) imposes upon the

Respondent an “open-ended obligation” to support the Applican t’s admission to international

organizations, if by that is meant an obligation to lobby in favour of such admission or to “bring

about the concrete result” of such admission 36. Likewise, we are not asserting that the failure of

37
the Applicant to be admitted to NATO, standing alone, means that Article11(1) was violated .

And we are not maintaining that “inactivity” by the Respondent with respect to admission by the

38
Applicant violates Article11(1) , unless inactivity alone is capable of directly blocking

admission.

25. We do maintain, however, that the actua l conduct by the Respondent in 2007 and 2008,

involving a vigorous, active campaign ⎯ bilaterally, multilaterally, publicly, against the

Applicant’s admission to NATO ⎯ unambiguously falls within the sc ope of Article11(1). Such

conduct does not constitute “inactivity”, it certain ly does not constitute a simple “failure to

34RR, para. 5.21.
35
Ibid., para. 5.29.
36
Ibid., paras. 5.20, 5.22, 5.27.
37Ibid., para. 5.20.

38Ibid., para. 5.29. - 29 -

support” the Applicant’s accession. Rather, it constitutes a blatant, unambiguous, systematic

diplomatic effort to prevent the Applicant’s accession.

26. The Respondent appears to be arguing that, in order to apply Article11(1), this Court

must establish its exact contours ⎯ must determine exactly what kinds of conduct by the

Respondent are permissible and what kinds are not. Because of the alleged difficulty in doing so,

the ordinary meaning of Article11(1) should be set aside in favour of the Respondent’s much

39
more restricted interpretation .

27. This Court, of course, has never proceeded in that fashion. It has never felt obliged when

interpreting a provision of a treaty, in a contentious case or in an advisory opinion, to consider and

decide upon the entire range of conduct that might arise with respect to a particular provision, and

to then opine upon which conduct is permissible and which is not. Rather, the Court takes the facts

in the case before it, and applies the treaty at ha nd to those facts, with a strong emphasis on the

importance of maintaining the stability of treaty relations (Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project

(HungarylSlovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 65, para. 104). Doing so in this case leads

to an inescapable conclusion: the Respondent’s conduct in 2007-2008 violated its obligation under

Article 11 (1) not to object.

28. The third way that the Respondent tries to press its interpretation of this first clause, is

that it says the first clause could not be violated because the conduct at issue is NATO’s conduct,

not the conduct of the Respondent. The Respondent argues that this “case at heart concerns the

requirements for NATO expansion and the application of those requirements in 2008” 40.

41
29. The Respondent is entirely wrong . This case is, at its heart, about the Respondent’s

conduct and about the Respondent’s obligation under Article 11 (1) of the Interim Accord. Though

the Respondent points repeatedly to a statement by the Applicant’s President that Europe gave a

42
“cold shoulder” to the Applicant at Bucharest , that statement is simply acknowledging that the

Respondent’s objection actually worked; other NATO member States allowed the objection to

39RR, para. 5.29.
40
Ibid., para. 6.3.
41See, e.g., AR, paras. 4.28-4.31.

42See, e.g., RR, para. 6.23. - 30 -

preclude the Applicant’s admission to NATO. It do es not mean that there was no objection by the

Respondent. What matters here is the Respondent’s conduct, not the conduct of third States, not

the conduct of NATO as an organization.

30. Even after the Bucharest Summit 4, it is commonly accepted among NATO members

that the invitation for the Applicant’s accession does not have to wait for another summit; it can be

extended at any North Atlantic Council meeting, which meets weekly in Brussels, as soon as the

44
Respondent agrees . In other words, the problem for th e Applicant in joining NATO does not lie

with NATO members generally or with NATO as an institution or even with the continuing

inability to resolve the name difference 45; the problem lies with the Respondent’s objection.

31. If the Respondent’s argument on this point is accepted, Article11(1) becomes entirely

meaningless. For, reduced to its core, the ar gument is that the Respondent’s objection cannot

possibly violate Article11 when it successfully convinces an international organization not to

admit the Applicant, since that transforms the conduct into conduct not of the Respondent but of

the international organization. If that were true, then the Respondent would only violate

Article11(1) when its objection does not succeed, which makes no sense at all. Article11(1)

simply cannot be regarded as a meaningful obligatio n only in situations where its violation has no

effect. Consequently, we submit that, when assessing Article11(1) ⎯ the first clause ⎯ the

Court’s focus should be on the conduct of the Respondent, not the conduct of NATO or of other

NATO members. [Plate 1 off]

32. In sum, the Respondent had an unequivocal obligation in Article 11 (1) ⎯ first clause ⎯

not to object to the Applicant’s accession to inte rnational organizations, an obligation that the

Respondent violated in 2007-2008 with respect to the Applicant’s pursuit of membership in NATO.

43The Respondent points to two post-Bucharest Summit statements at RR, para. 6.10.
44
Cable from US Embassy London to US Dept. of State, entitled “HMG Looking Forward to Building on
Gains of NATO Bucharest Summit,” 9Apr.2009, cable No.08LONDON1017, para.1, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/london-wikileaks/830501…-
FORWARD-TO-BUILDING-ON-GAINS-OF-NATO-BUCHAREST-SUMMIT.html (reporting that:

“PM Brown was deeply disappointed that the Greeks would not move on a
compromise name, and wants to re-energize UN, Brussels and bilateral processes. The
UK agrees with the U.S. position that thenvitation does not have to wait for another
summit; it can be extended at any NAC as soon as the Greeks agree. HMG is also
determined not to let the name issue inrfere with Macedonian progress towards EU
membership.”).

45RR, paras. 6.11-6.13. - 31 -

II.SINCE THE A PPLICANT WAS NOT TO BE REFERRED TO IN NATO DIFFERENTLY THAN

PROVIDED FOR IN RESOLUTION 817, THE R ESPONDENT ’S OBJECTION CANNOT
BE JUSTIFIED UNDER THE SECOND CLAUSE OF A RTICLE 11 (1)

33. Mr.President, I now turn to the second part of my presentation, which addresses the

second clause of Article 11 (1). That clause carves out one ⎯ and only one ⎯ circumstance where

the Respondent is allowed to object to the Applicant’s admission to international organizations.

[Plate 2 on] The second clause of Article 11 (1) reads as follows:

“however, the Party of the First Part reserves the right to object to any membership
referred to above if and to the extent the Party of the Second Part is to be referred to in

such organization or institution differentlthan in paragraph 2 of United Nations
Security Council resolution 817 (1993)”.

34. Like the first clause of Article11(1), tis clause has a straightforward meaning. The

Respondent can object to the Applicant’s admission to an international organization if the

Applicant is to be admitted unde r conditions other than those that applied in its admission to the

United Nations. So long as the Applicant is to join an international organization under the same

conditions as it was admitted to the United Nations, there is no lawful basis for the Respondent to

object.

35. In fact, the Applicant pursued membership in NATO in circumstances involving exactly

the same conditions as exist for the Applicant at the United Nations. As I noted yesterday, for both

the PfP and MAP programmes at NATO, the Applicant’s communications to NATO consistently

used the constitutional name, while NATO uses the provisional reference of “the former Yugoslav

46
Republic of Macedonia.

36. In pursuing full-fledged NATO membership, the Applicant has never sought to change

that approach, nor has the Respondent itself alleged that the Applicant sought to change that

approach. As such, there was and is no basis for the Respondent to invoke the second clause of

Article 11 (1) as a means of avoiding its obligation under the first clause.

37. What, then, is the Respondent’s argument for why it may invoke the second clause of

Article11(1)? The Respondent maintains in its pleadings that it could object to the Applicant’s

accession to NATO because the Applicant, when itself communicating with NATO as a NATO

member State, will call itself “Republic of Mace donia” rather than using the provisional reference

46
See AM, para. 2.50. - 32 -

“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. In other words, it is the Respondent’s contention

that the phrase here “is to be referred to in such organization or institution” encompasses not just

the manner in which NATO will refer to the Applicant as a member State, such as in

communications by the NATO Secretariat, but also encompasses the Applicant’s own

47
self-description when it communicates with NATO .

38. Even more remarkably, if one reads th e Respondent’s pleadings closely, it becomes

apparent that the Respondent asserts that its ability to object is triggered by any anticipated use of

the constitutional name, including in bilateral communications be tween the Applicant and other

States, even when they occur wholly outside the context of NATO 48. For the Respondent, the

second clause “covers all cases of practice whic h would tend to undermine the negotiations on the

name difference” 49 and in all circumstances requires the Applicant to “support the use of the

50
Security Council name pending an agreed resolution of the difference” .

39. This is an astoundingly broad theory, wh ich pervades all of the Respondent’s pleadings

before the Court, and it finds absolutely no support in the facts or in the law. So allow me to

address each of those in turn.

A. The Respondent’s theory as to the meaning of the second clause of Article 11 (1),
even if correct, has no relation to the actual facts
of the Respondent’s objection

40. With respect to the facts, one searches in vain for any indication in 2007 or 2008 that the

Respondent objected to the Applicant’s accession to NATO because of a concern about how the

Applicant would call itself in communications with NATO. The Respondent made many

statements ⎯ I reviewed them for you yesterday ⎯ many statements where it objected to and even

“vetoed” the Applicant’s accession to NATO, but none of them even begins to link that objection

to any concern that the Applicant would call itsel f “Republic of Macedonia” in its dealings with

47
RR, para. 5.40.
48Ibid., para. 5.36 (“The FYROM has insisted in virtually a ll of its relations that the non-agreed name be used,

and, as a result, that name has proliferated, notwithstanding the FYROM’s continuing obligation to settled the difference
over the name through the agreed modality of bilateral negotiation.”).
49Ibid., para. 5.40.

50RR, para. 6.34. - 33 -

51
NATO, as it had been doing for over a decade . Instead, the Respondent’s numerous statements

show a quite consistent pattern of linking its objection to the inability to conclude the “name

dispute” on terms acceptable to the Respondent, precisely the basis for objecting that Article11

52
was designed to prevent .

41. In response, the Respondent asserts that all of its diverse statements “identified factors

supporting the judgment that” the Applicant would be referred to in NATO differently than

stipulated in Article11(1) 53. That simply is not true. None of this Respondent’s statements in

2007-2008 say anything at all about the Applicant’s u se of its constitutional name in relations with

NATO. None of those statements by the Respondent says, in effect, “if you agree to stop using

your constitutional name, [in communications with NATO] we will not object”, or something to

that effect. Rather, these statements are best summarized as saying “agree to our preferred name

for you and then we won’t object to your admission to NATO”. Those are the facts.

42. So, on the factual basis alone, there is no reason whatsoever to accept that the

Respondent’s objection was actually undertaken for the reason now asserted, a reason only asserted

after this case was filed with the Court. The Respondent laments that we are trying to impose a

“procedural requirement” on its ability to invoke th e second clause of Article11(1), by insisting

that the Respondent issue a “formal declaration” that it is invoking the clause 54. Well, certainly

there is reason to argue that any time a State plans to transgress an express obligation under a treaty

by invoking an exception in that tr eaty, the State should inform the other party to that effect, as

55
doing so coheres with good faith performance of the treaty .

43. But we do not raise this factual point as a means of implying a procedural requirement in

Article11(1). We raise it because the failure at the time to assert that the objection was for the

reason permitted in Article 11 (1), in conjunction with the Respondent’s assertion at that time of an

entirely different reason for the objection, unequivocally demonstrates that the Respondent was not

objecting to the Applicant’s admission to NATO for the reasons it now maintains before this Court.

51AR, paras. 4.38-4.39.
52
Ibid., paras. 4.70-4.72.
53
RR, para. 6.29.
54Ibid., para. 5.34.

55Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 26, 1155 UNTS 331. - 34 -

The Respondent has latched onto this reason ⎯ this other reason ⎯ as a means of trying to meet a

contorted interpretation of the second clause of Article11(1), because the real reason for the

objection cannot fit even that contorted interpretati on. Yet, in its prior decisions, this Court has

used the failure of a party, at the time of th e wrongful conduct, to explain its behaviour by

reference to a justification ⎯ or “safeguard” ⎯ under a treaty, as a means of doubting that the

purported justification is credible.

“At no time, up to the present, has the United States Government addressed to
the Security Council... the report which is required by Article51 of the United
Nations Charter... [T]he Court is justif ied in observing that this conduct of the

United States hardly conforms with the latter’s avowed conviction that it was acting in
the context of collective self-defence as consecrated by Article51 of the Charter.”
(Military and Paramilitary Activitie s in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United

States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 121, para. 235.)

We ask the Court in this case to do no less.

B. The ordinary meaning of the second clause of Article 11 (1) allows the Respondent
to use its constitutional name before international organizations

44. In addition to the lack of any fact ual predicate, for using the second clause of

Article 11 (1), the Respondent’s legal theory as to the meaning of that clause, also has no basis.

45. First, the ordinary meaning of the second clause of Article11(1) does not support the

contention that the Applicant must call itself by the provisional reference in dealings with NATO

or any other international organization. The Re spondent, in its pleadings, has much to say about

syntax and the passive voice and the verb tenses used in this second clause 56, but all of its points

57
are remarkably strained and unable to sustain the weight of its preferred interpretation .

46. It is certainly not eviden t that the phrase in this clause “is to be referred to in” must

58
cover, as the Respondent puts it, the manner in which “all possible actors” refer to the Applicant .

The absurdity of that interpretation is readily apparent given that the Respondent is essentially

reading the text to say that the Respondent may obj ect if it predicts that any NATO member State,

any non-NATO member State, any other international organization, any non-governmental

organization, or indeed any person, in its communications with NATO, might call the Applicant the

56RR, para. 5.35.
57
AR, paras. 4.52-4.53.
58RR, para. 5.35 (i). - 35 -

“Republic of Macedonia” or, more accurately, might refer to the Applicant by something other than

“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. Th at is reading a lot into a relatively simple

phrase, especially given the basic legal principl e that international agreements do not create

59
obligations or rights for third States without their consent . Given that the Respondent itself did

not refer to the Applicant in the Interim Accord by use of the provisional reference, using instead

the “Party of the Second Part”, I suppose we should be thankful that the Respondent is unlikely to

base an objection upon its own allegedly deviant conduct!

47. A much more natural interpretation of the phrase is that it is addressing the manner in

which the Applicant will be referre d to “in” the organization itself ⎯ meaning the way the

Applicant will be listed by NATO as a member of the organization, the way representatives from

the Applicant will be credentialed by NATO, th e term NATO will use in all official NATO

documents when referring to the Applicant, and so on. That, of course, is precisely how it has been

interpreted ⎯ this clause has been interpreted ⎯ by all those associated with the negotiations of

the Interim Accord, including Ambassador Nimetz.

48. A particular problem for the Respondent’s interpretation of the phrase here, is that it

detaches the second clause from the immediate circumstances of the Applicant’s request for

membership in the international organization. The second clause makes sense and works well in

the context of the Respondent being allowed to obj ect if the Applicant is to be admitted to NATO

as the “Republic of Macedonia”. If NATO were m oving toward membership for the Applicant on

those terms, then the Respondent could object and insist that NATO only accord membership

through NATO’s use of the provisional reference. Thus, the Respondent is wrong when it charges

that we see “virtually no situation as triggering the right to object” 60, for we do see such a situation.

On a proper interpretation of this clause of Article 11 (1), that situation is when the Applicant is to

be known in the international organization as “Republic of Macedonia”. If that happens, the

Respondent can object. To avoid the objection, the organization would need to make clear that the

Applicant will be referred to within the orga nization as “the former Yugoslav Republic of

59
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 34, 1155 UNTS 331.
6RR, para. 6.27. - 36 -

Macedonia”, and then the Applicant would have to agree or acquiesce to that approach. If it did,

then the Respondent would have to refrain from further objecting. All of that makes good sense.

49. By contrast, the Respondent’s interpretation of the second clause totally detaches the

ability to object from the circumstances of the Applicant’s impending membership. Rather than

look at the conditions under which the organization will actually grant membership to the

Applicant, the Respondent would give itself wide-ranging discretion to peer far into the future so as

to, as the Respondent puts it, “form an appreciation” 61 as to whether the Applicant might be

referred to by “all possible actors” as the “Republic of Macedonia”. So, if the Respondent thinks

that, five years after the Applicant joins NATO, it is possible that France or Botswana or Turkey ⎯

or for that matter the Hague Rotary Club ⎯ might, in a communication with NATO, call the

Applicant the “Republic of Macedonia”, then th e Respondent is entitled to object. It is a

breathtaking and utterly unconvincing interpretation of Article 11 (1).

50. In its Rejoinder, the Respondent charact erizes this wide-ranging discretion as a “margin

of appreciation” to which it is entitled, and in doi ng so makes reference to this Court’s Advisory

Opinion on the Conditions of Admission of a State to Membe rship in the United Nations (Article 4

62
of the Charter) . Yet, such arguments really are little more than smoke-and-mirrors, designed to

generate confusion and obfuscate a demonstrably weak set of arguments. The notion of “margin of

appreciation” in international law has never been construed as a licence for States to auto-interpret

the obligations they owe to other States under bilate ral treaties. Moreover, the issue before this

Court is not the discretion that should be accorded to the Respondent in applying general criteria

for admission of new members of international orga nizations, such as those set forth in Article 4 of

the United Nations Charter. Rather, if there is a lesson to be taken from the Conditions of

Admission Advisory Opinion, it is that States should not create new conditions for admission

beyond those set forth in the treaty instrument. By analogy to this case, the Respondent should not

be creating a new condition for a permissible objection not found in Article 11 (1).

61
Advisory Opinion, 1948, I.C.J. Reports 1947-1948; RR, para. 5.35 (iii).
6Ibid., paras. 5.44-5.46, 6.27, 6.30. - 37 -

51. In Article11(1) of the Interim Acco rd, the Respondent expressly and unambiguously

agreed to restrict its ability to object, subject to a single express and unambiguous exception.

Article 11 (1) does allow the Respondent to assess whether the Applicant is to be granted

membership in an international organization in circumstances where it will be known in that

organization as “Republic of Macedonia” and, if so, does allow the Respondent to object.

Article 11 (1), however, does not allow the Respondent to object for whatever other reasons the

Respondent believes fall within a “margin of appreciation” dictated by the Respondent itself.

52. Mr.President, it is now my intention to tu rn to the practice at the United Nations that

preceded the entry into force of Article11(1), wh ich sheds considerable light on the meaning of

the clause, but I note this may be a convenient time for the morning coffee break, if the Court so

pleases.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, ProfessorMurphy, for your suggestion. I think it is an

appropriate moment. We will have a coffee break of 15 minutes.

Mr. MURPHY: Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: We resume the session at 11.30 a.m.

The Court adjourned from 11.15 a.m. to 11.30 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Now, Professor Murphy, you can continue.

Mr. MURPHY:

C. Practice at the United Nations under resolution 817 prior to the Interim Accord does not
support the Respondent’s theory as to the meaning of the second clause of Article 11 (1)

53. Thank you, Mr.President, I was in the midst of discussing the interpretation of the

second clause of Article 11 (1) and, if all this C ourt had were the bald assertions by the two Parties

as to the meaning of this clause, your task might be harder. But there is much more before you

than just this, and all of it weighs against the Respondent’s interpretation.

54. Perhaps the most obvious place to look for further illumination as to the meaning of the

second clause of Article11(1) is the practice associated with the Applican t’s membership at the - 38 -

UnitedNations under resolution81 7. You will have noted that the second clause expressly

cross-references to resolution 817, saying that the Respondent may object to new membership in an

international organization if the A pplicant is referred therein “diffe rently than in paragraph 2” of

resolution 817.

55. Resolution 817 appears at tab 5 in your judges’ folder, in the event you wish to refer to it.

Paragraph 2 of that resolution recommends that th e General Assembly vote to admit the Applicant

as a United Nations Member State, but with the State “being referred to for all purposes within the

United Nations as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ pending settlement of the

difference that has arisen over the name of the State”.

56. So, the second clause of Article 11 (1) refers directly to the approach taken with respect

to the Applicant’s admission to the United Nations. In effect, it says that the Respondent can

object if the Applicant is to be admitted to an international organization, such as NATO, under

conditions different than those applied at the United Nations under resolution 817. So, the solution

that was employed was to allo w the Applicant to join the United Nations and its specialized

agencies and now this is to be employed under the Interim Accord which respect to whether or not

the Respondent can object for membership in other international organizations.

57. The Respondent appears to believe that resolution817 prohibited any use of the name

“Republic of Macedonia”; in various parts of its pleadings it refers to this as the “prohibited

63
name” . Yet the text of resolution817 contains no prohibition on the use of “Republic of

Macedonia”, it contains no requirement that the provisional reference be the “name” of the

Applicant, and it contains no requirement that th e Applicant use the provisional reference in its

communications with the United Nations 64. The resolution simply does not say any of those

things. Had the resolution prohibited use of the Applicant’s name, all sorts of consequences would

have followed, such as the need to amend the A pplicant’s Constitution, yet no such steps were

65
either expected or taken .

63See, e.g., RR, para. 7.23.
64
AM, para. 2.20; AR, paras. 4.40-4.41 and 4.45.
65Ibid., para. 4.40. - 39 -

58. In fact, the resolution is not even in th e form of a ChapterVII decision; it is a

recommendation to the General Assembly relating to the admission of a new Member State 66. In

issuing that recommendation, the Council proceeded on the basis of an Application that had been

submitted to the United Nations using the name “Republic of Macedonia”, which the Security

Council “examined” and acted upon favourably. Ther e is no evidence that the Members of the

Security Council believed they were imposing a name upon the Applicant. When the President of

the Security Council circulated the draft of resolu tion 817 containing the provisional reference, he

specifically stated that this “is not a matter of imposing a name on a new State, or conditions for its

admission to the UN, but it merely concerns the manner in which it will be provisionally referred to

in its activity in the United Nations (plaque , official documents, ‘bluebook’ . . .)” 67. As Professor

Sands noted yesterday, United Kingdom Amb assador Jeremy Greenstock confirms that

resolution 817 did not mean that the Applicant had to call itself by the provisional reference, either

68
generally or in its communications to the United Nations .

59. Ever since admission to the United Nations, the Applicant has regularly sent

communications to the United Nations on letterh ead entitled “Republic of Macedonia.” Those

communications have not been returned or rejected by the Secretariat or in any fashion treated as a

breach of resolution817 69. To the contrary, the Secretariat regularly circulates those

communications to all United Nations member States under cover of a United Nations document

that uses the provisional reference 7. The Applicant’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations,

located at 866 United Nations Plaza in New York, has always been “the Permanent Mission of the

Republic of Macedonia”. That mission and its staff have always been fully accredited to the

United Nations; they have not been shooed out of the building by the Secret ariat when they show

up with identification papers or passports saying “Republic of Macedonia”.

60. Nor has the Security Council rejected or commented upon the wrongfulness of the

Applicant’s communications; in the immediate af termath of the adoption of resolution817, the

66AM, para. 4.41.
67
AR, para. 4.42 and Ann. 12.
68
Ibid., para. 4.43.
69AM, para. 2.20.

70AR, paras. 4.47-4.48. - 40 -

Applicant continued sending communications to th e United Nations using its constitutional name,

which elicited no adverse reaction whatsoever from the Security Council 71.

61. In short, no one ⎯ other than the Respondent ⎯ regards the provisional reference as the

name of the Applicant. Rather, the provisional reference is exactly that: a “reference” to the

Applicant that is employed provisionally in the United Nations and other international

organizations.

62. From 1993 to 1995, the Applicant’s communi cations to the United Nations consistently

used “Republic of Macedonia” rather than the provisional reference. In 1995, when they concluded

the Interim Accord, both the Appli cant and the Respondent were well aware of this practice at the

United Nations. They were well aware of the basic compromise and logic that had emerged in

resolution817. They expressly agreed in Article5 of the Interim Accord to reserve all of their

rights relating to the name difference consistent with the obligations undertaken in the Interim

Accord. The language of the second clause of Article11(1) clearly seeks to extend the

resolution817 compromise to the Applicant’s memb ership in other international organizations.

There is absolutely nothing in the second clause to suggest that the Parties to the Interim Accord

agreed to diverge radically from the approach at the United Nations, and to go down the path

envisaged by the astoundingly broad theory now advanced by the Respondent. Indeed, if the

purpose of the second clause were to embark on a wholly new path, it would be ludicrous to

cross-reference to resolution 817, or at least to do so without clear and unambiguous language that

72
the United Nations practice was an unacceptable benchmark for Article 11 (1) .

63. Moreover, while the Respondent attempts to draw great significance from the use of the

73
word “in” as a part of the second clause of Article11(1) , the Respondent ignores the obvious

parallel to the language of resolution817. In resolution817, the Security Council said the

Applicant would be referred to for all purposes “within” the United Nations by the provisional

reference. Similarly, the second clause of Article11(1) says the Respondent can object if the

Applicant is to be referred to “in” an intern ational organization by something other than the

71
AR, para. 4.46.
72
Ibid., para. 4.55.
73RR, paras. 5.35 (ii), 5.38. - 41 -

provisional reference. There is simply no basis fo r arguing that the practice generated by the first

preposition ⎯ “within” ⎯ in which the Applicant is allo wed to use its constitutional name,

somehow changes due to the use of the second preposition ⎯ “in” ⎯ so as to preclude

communications when joining other international organizations. We submit the language strongly

indicates continuity with the past, not a break from the past.

64. Now the practice of the United Nations is the most relevant for present purposes.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that after admission to the United Nations, the same approach was

taken throughout the United Nations system at all the specialized agencies and at other

international organizations, including Unesco, the World Health Organization, the International

Labour Organization, the World Trade Organization, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and the

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 74. There is not a single international

organization anywhere in the world that requires th e Applicant, in its communications with that

organization, to use the provisional reference. Not a single one. And there is no State, other than

the Respondent, that has raised any concerns regarding the Applicant’s use of its constitutional

name in communications with international organizations. Again, not a single one.

D. The Interim Accord negotiating history does not support the Respondent’s theory
as to the meaning of the second clause

65. Likewise, the negotiating history of the Interim Accord provides no support for the

Respondent’s theory as to the meaning of the second clause. None of the drafts that eventually

became the Interim Accord give any hint that the goal here was to pr event the Applicant from

calling itself by its constitutional name before inte rnational organizations. On the contrary, both

States expressly reserved their rights on such issues in Article 5 of the Interim Accord.

66. Nor do any of the statements made at the time of the Interim Accord suggest a movement

away from the practice that had developed with respect to the Applican t’s membership in the

United Nations. We have previously referenced the Nimetz statement, let me give you just a little

more context: at the press conference held at the time the Interim Accord was concluded,

AmbassadorNimitz, the Special Envoy of the United States to these negotiations, who was

74
AR, para. 4.49. - 42 -

intimately involved in the negotiations of the Inte rim Accord, said exactly the opposite of what the

Respondent would have predicted, based on their theory. Mr. Nimetz reiterated his understanding

that “the United Nations refers to the country as the former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia”,

and he goes on to say the country itself uses “the constitutional name” 7. If the Respondent was

correct in its theory, you would have expected AmbassadorNimetz to say something like “from

now on”, “from here forward, the country must call itself by the provisional reference in its

communications with international organizati ons if it wishes to join new international

organizations” or some such thing as that, but those sorts of statements are nowhere to be found in

the record. Nor is there any statement by the Respondent contemporaneous objecting to

Ambassador Nimetz’s characterization of the situation.

E. Practice subsequent to the Interim Accord does not support the Respondent’s
theory as to the meaning of the second clause

67. With no support for its theory in the actual text of the second clause of Article 11 (1), nor

in the United Nations practice to which it cross-references, nor in the practice of other international

organizations, nor in the negotiating history of th e Interim Accord, one might have expected the

Respondent to demonstrate through practice subsequent to the Interim Accord that the clause was

intended to foreclose the use by the Applicant of its constitutional name in dealings with

international organizations.

68. Yet no such practice exists. In the imme diate aftermath of the entry into force of the

Interim Accord, the Applicant was admitted to th e OSCE in circumstances where it did use its

constitutional name in communications with that organization. One month later, it was admitted to

the Council of Europe in circumstances where it used its constitutional name in communications

with that organization. Within days after th at, it joins NATO’s PfP Programme, again using its

constitutional name in communications with NATO. In none of those instances did the Respondent

invoke the second clause of Article11(1) and object to the Applicant’s admission. Perhaps the

Respondent would have us believe that it was simp ly choosing to look the other way rather than

exercise a right it was allowed to take under Article11(1). However, the far more plausible

75
AR, para. 4.57. - 43 -

interpretation is that the Respondent itself fully understood what the second clause meant, and

understood that it did not allow for an objection ba sed solely on the Applicant’s own use of its

constitutional name in relations with the organization.

F. Even in their bilateral relations, the Respondent accepts that the Applicant

is entitled to use its constitutional name

69. The Respondent’s theory as to the meani ng of the second clause is especially odd when

one considers the way the two States have structured their bilateral relationship.

70. One month after the conclusion of the Interim Accord, the two States conclude
d a

Memorandum on “Practical Measures” related to th e Interim Accord, including measures allowing

them to engage in diplomatic relations. In that Memorandum, the two States agreed that the

Applicant would call itself by its constitutional name in correspondence with the Respondent.

Thus, when the Applicant sends diplomatic Notes to the Respondent, it do es so from the “Republic

of Macedonia”. The Respondent has agreed to accep t and not to return such diplomatic Notes.

Conversely, when the Respondent sends its official correspondence to the Applicant, it refers to the

Applicant by the provisional reference. And the Applicant agrees to accept and not to return such

76
correspondence . That approach, of course, is completely analogous to the approach taken at the

United Nations under resolution 817 and is completely consistent with the ordinary meaning of the

second clause of Article 11 (1). The same general approach is taken by the two States with respect

to legal and judicial documents of each government relating to citizens or authorities of the other

77
government, and for ordinary mail, bills of lading, invoices and other trade documents .

71. Under the Respondent’s theory of the second clause, we are to believe that the

Respondent can receive communications from the Applicant in which the Applicant uses its

constitutional name, but the rest of the world ca nnot. Indeed, the Responde nt would apparently

have us believe that the Security Council in resolution817 ordered the Applicant to use the

provisional reference in all of its external relations, but that the Respondent was then entitled to set

aside the Council’s order through a bilateral agreement, apparently in casual disregard of

76
AM, para. 2.36; AM, Ann. 3, p. 3; AR, paras. 4.59-4.60.
7AM, Ann. 3, pp. 3-5. - 44 -

Articles 25 and 103 of the United Nations Charter. Again, all this renders the Respondent’s theory

yet more and more fantastic.

72. The Respondent’s arguments often revert to complaining about a “creeping use of the

non-agreed name” 78, which has somehow “changed” things in recent years 79such that the

Respondent may now object under Article11(1). Yet there is nothing “creeping” about the

Applicant’s use of its constitutional name. In co mplete continuity with its long-standing name as a

republic of the Yugoslav federation, the Appli cant in 1991 adopted the name “Republic of

80
Macedonia” . The Applicant has used that name in all its bilateral and multilateral

communications for the past 20years. The App licant has used the constitutional name in its

bilateral relations with the Respondent for 16 year s. There is nothing “creeping” about the use of

the constitutional name.

73. Now, in apparent recognition of this, the Respondent ultimately identifies the relevant

“change” as being the fact that many States now recognize the Applicant by the constitutional

81
name . There are, indeed, a very large number of States that recognize and use the constitutional

name in their bilateral relations with the Applicant. In our view, that fact reinforces the ordinary

meaning of Article11(1), which is that it is focused on the manner in which the relevant

international organization refers to the Applicant, not on the manner in which “all possible actors”

refer to the Applicant. Moreover, it highlights the extremity of the Respondent’s position; the

Respondent is saying that it is entitled to object unde r Article 11 (1) not because of anything to do

with the Applicant’s entry into the internati onal organization, but because the Respondent is

unhappy about political decisions reached by thir d States in recent years in their diplomatic

relations with the Applicant.

74. Allow me to conclude this second part of my presentation by noting that, in its Rejoinder,

the Respondent argues that our interpretation of Artic le 11 (1) results in a “fool’s bargain” for the

Respondent ⎯ a marché de dupes 82. Article11(1), however, was hardly a fool’s bargain. In it,

78RR, para. 6.34.

79Ibid., paras. 6.35, 6.38.
80
AM, para. 2.3.
81RR, para. 6.36.

82Ibid., para. 5.43. - 45 -

the Respondent preserved its ability to object to th e Applicant’s membership in any international

organization as the “Republic of Macedonia”. Rath er than a “fool’s bargain”, this approach

replicated the approach that was adopted by th e Security Council, the General Assembly, and the

Secretariat in the context of the Applicant’s admission to the United Nations. It was the approach

adopted by a wide range of United Nations specialized agencies and other international

organizations in the context of the Applicant’s admission to those organizations, and it was the

approach that was promoted by third-party me diators closely associated with the drafting and

conclusion of the Interim Accord. Even the Respondent expressly accepted in its bilateral relations

with the Applicant the basic terms that underlie wh at it now calls a “fool’s bargain”. With all due

respect, we suggest that there may be some “fooling” going on here, but it is not coming from the

Applicant.

III.O THER REASONS ASSERTED BY THE R ESPONDENT FOR WHY IT OBJECTED ALSO DO NOT
FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE SECOND CLAUSE OF A RTICLE 11 (1)

75. Mr.President, I turn to the third and fina l part of my presentation, which is to very

briefly address certain other reasons asserted by the Respondent for why it objected to the

Applicant’s admission to NATO.

76. Notably, the Respondent asserts that its “margin of appreciation” under Article11(1)

allows it to object because of the Applicant’s a lleged “efforts to entrench a non-agreed name

83
despite its commitment to negotiate an agreed resolution of the [name] difference” . Similarly, the

Respondent says it may object because of the A pplicant’s “creeping use of a non-agreed name

which is in violation of the obligation to negotiate” and because the Applicant is “going through the

motions of a diplomatic process, while vigorously pursuing a fait accompli in a manner which is

84
intended to render that process irrelevant and nugatory” . Or, more simply, the Respondent

candidly asserts at paragraph 6.30 of its Rejoinder that it is allowed to object under Article 11 (1)

85
because of the “failure to date to settle the name difference” . So, to put it another way, the

8RR, para. 5.46.
84
Ibid., para. 6.34.
8Ibid., para. 6.30. - 46 -

Respondent can object because the Applicant has not agreed to use a name in its diplomatic

relations that is acceptable to the Respondent.

77. In fact, this is the real reason that the Respondent objected to the Applicant’s admission

to NATO; the Respondent is upset that the name di fference has not yet been resolved on its terms.

Yet that is exactly what Article11(1) is designed to prevent; the two States agreed in

Article 11 (1) that, while the name difference persists, the Respondent would refrain from taking

certain steps. To the extent that this is th e real reason for the Respondent’s objection, it is

86
manifestly not a reason embraced by the second clause of Article 11 (1) .

78. Now in order to try to connect its legal theory about the meaning of the second clause of

Article 11 (1) to what it actually did, the best the Respondent can come up with is that its so-called

“margin of appreciation” theory allows it to “cons ider ‘any factor’ bearing a rational connection to

the specified condition” found in the second clause of Article11(1) 87. So, if we understand this

theory correctly, even though Article 11 (1) was d esigned precisely to take the name difference off

the table for the purposes of the Applicant’s admission to international organizations, the

Respondent is now able to put it back on th e table because the name difference has some

connection to Article11(1), a connection that also conveniently serves to deprive this Court of

jurisdiction. Again, this makes no sense, and it turns Article 11 (1) into meaningless gibberish.

79. Alternatively, the Respondent sometimes a sserts that its objection occurred because of

the Applicant’s lack of “good-neighbourly relations” 88, which allegedly exist because the

89
constitutional name has “irredentist potential in a region long-plagued by irredentist conflict” .

Lacking any factual proof of irredentism today other than its own self-serving statements, the

Respondent is reduced to pointing to certain statements from 1992 to 1993 90. It is certainly true

that in the early 1990s, as this Court is well awar e, there was considerable concern about stability

in the Balkans, and further true that everyone , the Applicant included, wished that the name

difference could be resolved. But it is a comple te distortion of that history to assert that the

86AR, paras. 4.70-4.72.
87
RR, para. 6.31.
88
Ibid., para. 5.46.
89Ibid., para. 6.19; see also ibid.., para. 6.30.

90Ibid., paras. 6.14-6.20. - 47 -

Applicant has ever advanced any territorial clai ms beyond its present borders; there is simply no

91
evidence of any kind to that effect . And as this Court will recall, the Badinter Commission

found, in its Opinion No.6 of 14 January 1992, that “the Repub lic of Macedonia has, moreover,

renounced all territorial claims of any kind”, and then it further found that “the use of the name

‘Macedonia’ cannot therefore imply any territorial claim against another State” 92.

80. Moreover, the compromise reached when the Applicant was admitted to the United

Nations, and the compromise that was enshrined in Article 11 (1), was to agree that the outstanding

name difference, as well as the Applicant’s own u se of its constitutional name, whatever might or

might not be its effects, was not an obstacle to the Applicant’s admission to international

organizations, even those ⎯ such as the United Nations ⎯ that expressly call for admission by

peace-loving States. The Respondent may believe that the existence of the constitutional name

suggests irredentism and should be changed; but that was not a basis for precluding the

Applicant’s admission to the United Nations in 199 3, not a basis for precluding the Applicant’s

admission to the OSCE and the Council of Europe in 1995, and not a basis for precluding the

Applicant’s admission to numerous other interna tional organizations within the United Nations

family and outside of it. It was also not a basis for precluding the Applicant’s admission to NATO

in 2008.

81. In any event, regardless of the factual ac curacy of those allegations, justifying an

objection based on a lack of “good neighborliness” gets the Respondent nowhere, for such a reason

is not envisaged in the second clause of Article 11 (1).

82. So to summarize my third point, the Respondent occasionally lapses into arguing certain

other reasons for why it was entitled to object under Article11(1), such as this “lack of good

neighborliness” or “irredentism”. Regardless of the factual accuracy of those types of allegations,

none of those reasons has any basis in Article 11 (1 ), and therefore cannot justify the Respondent’s

objection.

91
AR, paras. 4.80-4.88.
92See Arbitration Commission on the Conference on Y ugoslavia, Opinion No. 6 on the Recognition of the
Socialist Republic of Macedonia by th e European Community and its Member States, 14 Jan.1992, United Nations
doc. S/25855, Ann. III, para. 5, 28 May 1993; see also AM, paras. 2.13-2.14; AR, para. 4.81. - 48 -

IV. C ONCLUSION

83. Mr. President, I now conclude by making one final point.

84. In various parts of its pleadings, the Respondent maintains that the Applicant has

disrupted the status quo or the “balance of interests” of the Interim Accord by “unilaterally” using

93
and imposing its constitutiona l name without consent . No doubt we will hear from the

Respondent at great length along those lines.

85. But as we have tried to explain in our pleadings, our position on Article11(1) is not a

disruption of a balance of interests; rather, it is a straightforward effort to re-establish the balance

agreed upon by the Parties in 1995. Indeed, the in terpretation and application of Article 11 (1) that

we are urging upon the Court is hardly a one-sided victory for the Applicant. In Article 11 (1), the

Applicant is essentially being forced to become a member and participate in international

organizations in circumstances where it is to be referred to therein by a reference that is not the

name chosen by the Applicant. The Applicant, a fully sovereign State, has been placed in a

position where it must be designated in internationa l organizations by a reference everyone agrees

is not the Applicant’s constitutional name and is only provisional in nature, pending resolution of

the difference over the name.

86. Mr. President, this is like being invited to join a club here in The Hague, but being told

that you cannot use your given name and instead must use the temporary label “Mr.X”. Why is

that the case? Because an existing club member does not like your name and wants you to change

it. When you show up at the club, you call yourself “Sean Murphy”, because it is your name, but

when they call out the names of the members at the club, you are known as “Mr.X”, or

“Member X”, which appears as well on the card at your dinner table and in the note that the club

sends you at Christmas time or holiday time. That is hardly a unilateral victory for you.

87. The truth is that the Applicant, as we st and before you today, simply asks that the Court

keep the two States on the path they set for themsel ves in the Interim Accord. The bargain struck

in Article11(1) was fairly simple. The Res pondent partially succeeded because the Applicant

cannot be known or referred to in international organizations under its c onstitutional name. Until

the name difference is resolved, the Applicant remains “Member X”. At the same time, the

93
See, e.g., RR, paras. 6.30, 6.32. - 49 -

Applicant partially succeeded because it does get to join international organizations; the

Respondent cannot take steps to prevent the Applicant from joining the club or paying its dues on a

cheque on which its constitutional name appears. Moreover, the Applicant is not forced to entirely

jettison its constitutional name in relations with inte rnational organizations or member States; for

if that were the case, it would be a wholesale victory for the Respondent.

88. That is the bargain we struck in Article 11 (1), and that, Mr. President, is the bargain to

which the Court should hold us.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, ProfessorSean Murphy, for your presentation. Now, I call

Professor Philippe Sands to take the floor.

SANr.DS:

T HE R ESPONDENT ’S BREACH OF A RTICLE 11 (1)CANNOT BE EXCUSED

Introduction

1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, you have just heard from my colleague

Professor Murphy on the meaning and effect of Article 11 (1). The obligation there imposed not to

object, we say, is clear. It is equally clear that the Respondent did object, and clear also that it did

so for a reason not permitted by Article 11 (1).

2. Mr. President, there is one ⎯ and only one ⎯ circumstance in which the Respondent may

lawfully object: if the Applicant sought to jo in NATO under circumstances in which it would be

referred to in that organization differently thas provided in Security Council resolution817.

This was not the case, and there is no disput e before the Court that the Applicant sought

membership in NATO in the expectation that the practice in that organization would be the same as

that in the United Nations. So, the Respondent has had to go the extra mile. It has had to find

other ways to excuse its actions in law. And my task this morning is address the three excuses

that it has raised, and I will, with your pession, Mr.President, indicate a convenient moment

perhaps for a slightly early lunch today as we awell within time which, you will, I am sure, be

very pleased to hear - 50 -

3. First, the Respondent argues that there w as no breach of Article 11 because Article 22 of

the Interim Accord protects and preserves its rights as a NATO member and the duties it owes to

that organization and to all other NATO members. The argument is that these rights and duties

trump the obligations in Article 11. The second argument is that its breach can be justified on the

basis of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus. And the third argument, although it disclaimed any

intention of raising it in its Counter-Memorial, is that its objection can be excused as a lawful

countermeasure to a wrongful act by the Applican t. Now, I am going to address each of these in

turn, the first one perhaps before lunch, the othe r two after lunch. But, you will note immediately

that none of these justifications was raised before April 2008: they are all new, they are all ex post

facto explanations; they are all invented in the course of this litigation to justify patently unlawful

actions.

I. The Respondent’s breach of Article 11 (1) of the Interim Accord
cannot be justified on the basis of Article 22

4. So, let us turn to the first justification. The Respondent claims to be entitled to invoke

Article22 of the Interim Accord 94. We responded fully to this argument in ChapterV of our

95
Reply , and they have come back with a great deal more, so please excuse me if we have to spend

a little more time on this than we think is necessary. For the Respondent, this argument is a sort of

“get out of jail free” card; it enables the Responde nt to avoid an international obligation that has

become inconvenient. So let us look at wh at Article22 actually says. Words matter,

Mr. President. [Plate 1 on] It is part of the “Final Clauses”. It says:

“[t]he Interim Accord is not directed against any other State or entity and it does not
infringe on the rights and duties resulting from bilateral and multilateral agreements
already in force that the parties have c oncluded with other States or international
96
organizations” .

5. So, the Respondent argues that even if it had made an objection that violates Article11,

the objection is nevertheless made permissible ⎯ sort of legalized ⎯ because Article 22 preserves

94
RCM, paras. 7.26 et seq. and GR, paras. 5.7 et seq.
95AR, paras. 5.8-5.45.

96Judges’ folder, tab7, plate1. For the complete text of the Interim Accord see judges’ folder, tab1 and
Memorial, Vol. II, Ann. 1. - 51 -

the Respondent’s rights under other international agreements, including the right to object to a new

member in NATO. This approach, of course, renders Article 11 a dead letter, as we will see.

6. The Respondent’s argument is premised on two related contentions: the first is that

Article 22 preserves the rights and duties of the Respondent resulting from agreements in force with

third parties and other entities; the second is that the non-objection clause in Article11(1) is

subordinate to the Respondent’s rights and obligations which are allegedly protected by Article 22.

We say that both claims are patently without merit; that they run contrary to the plain meaning of

the text and to the principles and rules of treaty interpretation and the principle of pacta sunt

servanda.

A. Article 22 does not speak to the Respondent’s rights and duties

7. Article22, as you will recall, appears toward s the end of the Interim Accord, it is in the

“Final Clauses” section. It does have a purpose, a nd that is to protect the rights and duties of “any

other State or entity”. It is, in effect, an expressi on of the rule set forth in Article 34 of the Vienna

Convention, which confirms that “[a] treaty does no t create either obligations or rights for a third

State without its consent”. Article22 does not on its face create or reserve rights for the

Respondent, and it certainly does not alter or otherw ise affect other obligations set forth in the

Accord, including Article 11.

8. The Respondent claims that Article 22 speaks to the rights and duties of the Respondent.

Well, perhaps if the Respondent had invoked Article 22 at the time it acted in 2007 and 2008, or at

any time before, it could at least be said that th e argument was made in a timely manner, even if

erroneously. But it did not do so; it never i nvoked any rights under Article22: it raised the

argument for the first time in 2009, more than a year after it had violated Article11 and some

15years after the Interim Accord was adopted. Now, we have already heard, the Respondent’s

Foreign Minister of the time ⎯ MsBayokannis ⎯ was very conscious of the fact that her

Government’s act of objection was motivated by overt political considerations and she recognized - 52 -

that those actions would be inconsistent with the Interim Accord: the Accord ⎯ and in particular

its Article 22 ⎯ does not encompass a “political cowardice” exception, in the sense evoked by the

Foreign Minister, to limit the scope of obligations that would otherwise allow the Applicant to join

97
NATO .

9. The Respondent claims that Article 22 it self can be broken down into two elements: the

98
first is an assurance that the In terim Accord “is not directed against any other State or entity” .

Now that is straightforward and not in dispute, and it provides no assistance to the Respondent. It

is the second element, however, that the Respondent claims is of ⎯ as it puts it ⎯ “critical

importance” 99, the Respondent says that it is a “lethal” 100 argument, lethal to the Applicant’s

case ⎯ so lethal, it must be said, but not obviously lethal, since neither MsBayokannis or any

other official of the Respondent or any of its legal advisers at any point before 2009 actually

noticed it, and it was not until this case was up and running that it suddenly came to be found ⎯ so

its “lethal-ness” or “lethality” only then became apparent. The component, the element of the

argument here, is supposedly that the Interim Accord “does not infringe” on the Respondent’s

pre-existing rights and duties, including in relation to the North Atlantic Treaty. So the Respondent

claims that by Article 22, the Applicant “acknowle dges and accepts the fact that [the Respondent]

has prior rights and obligations” with third parties, and that this provision “super-ordinates” ⎯ that

is the word they use, I have personally not come across it before ⎯ rights and obligations in

relation to the Article11 obligation not to object 101. This curious interpretation cannot be said to

lack Alexandrian imagination.

10. On its face, it is difficult to see how the te xt of Article 22 could possibly be twisted and

strained in this way. Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention provides, as you know very well, that

“[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to

the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose”. The ordinary

97
Embassy of the Respondent in Washington, D.C., Interview of FM Ms Bakoyannis in Athens daily Kathimerini,
with journalist Ms D. Antoniou (Sunday, 14 October 2007), 15 October 2007, at AM, para. 2.60, footnote 121; and AM,
Ann. 73.
98
RCM, para. 6.61.
99
Ibid.
100RR, para. 3.26

101RCM, para. 6.61. - 53 -

meaning is clear. Article22 does not address the rights and duties of the Respondent: it merely

declares that the Interim Accord as a whole does not infringe on the rights and duties of third States

or other entities. Article 22 declares as a fact that the Accord is to operate consistently with rights

and duties in third party agreements; nothing more and nothing less. That is plain meaning.

11. What about object and purpose? This points in exactly the same direction. Yesterday I

102
addressed the object and purpose of the Accord as a whole . As you know, it was intended to

provide for the immediate normalization of relati ons between the two Par ties, and to allow the

Applicant to join international organizations. The very purpose of Article11(1) was for the

Respondent to relinquish its right to object, subject to the one, single, stated exception. Interpreting

Article22 to restore that right to object for an y other reason defeats a core object and purpose of

the Interim Accord.

12. But the argument is undermined by other provisions of the Accord that expressly address

the Respondent’s rights, conditioning the Respondent’s obligations under the Interim Accord.

[Plate 2 on] Let us have a look at some exam ples. Article14 provides for the “development of

friendly and good-neighbourly relations” between th e Parties and the promotion on a reciprocal

basis of, inter alia, road, rail, maritime and air transpor t and communication links. The Parties

recognized that this provision could conflict w ith the Respondent’s pre-existing obligations as a

member of the European Union. So the dr afters addressed that issue in Article14(2) ⎯ you can

see it highlighted in bold ⎯ which provides that negotiations shall “tak[e] into account the

obligations of [the Respondent] deriving from its membership of the European Union and other

103
international instruments . . .”.

So, in this way, Article 14 does reserve and protect the rights and duties of the Respondent

that arise from its membership of the European Un ion, and from other international instruments.

The Respondent’s approach to Article22 renders Article14(2) completely superfluous, it has no

practical meaning or effect. [Plate 2 off ⎯ plate 3 on] Now, the same is true of Article 19, which

conditions co-operation on business and tourist travel ⎯ you see the words in bold ⎯ so that it will

102
CR 2011/5, 21 March 2011 (Sands), especially paras. 16-17.
10Judges folder, tab 7, plate 2. - 54 -

be “consistent with the obligations of [the Respondent] arising from its membership in the

104
European Union and from relevant instruments of the Union . . .”.

So this provision too becomes a total irrelevance on the Respondent’s approach to Article 22.

These provisions would simply not be necessary if the Respondent’s interpretation of Article22

was correct. If indeed Article22 is designed to protect the Respondent’s rights and obligations

under other international agreements, why did the dr afters include the clauses I have just referred

you to in Articles 14 and 19? And we look forward to hearing something on that from the other

side. They would be completely meaningless. Wh en Article22 is read in this context, these

provisions confirm what we say is the true m eaning of Article22: it addresses the rights and

obligations of third States, not of the Respondent. [Plate 3 off]

13. I have already noted that Article11 contains no similar proviso to that found in

Articles14 and 19, one that explicitly addr esses the Respondent’s obligations under other

agreements. If the parties had wanted to draft Article 22 so as to allow the Respondent to be able

to invoke its “rights” or “duties” under third party agreements ⎯ sorry, I meant Article 11 ⎯ then

they could easily have included a similar clause. They did not do so, and the Respondent cannot

just read these provisos into the text by Article 22. We raised all of these points in our Reply. We

expected a response. We did not get one. Nothin g of substance. All they have to say is that

Articles14 and19 are “special provisions” deali ng with the EU and EU competence issues, and

105
that they have nothing to say “about Article 11 . . . [or] about Article 22” . On the Respondent’s

argument, then, it seems that Article 22 does not apply to EU matters at all, and an EU exclusion is

somehow to be read into Article 22. So, if that is true, one wonders whether exclusions of other

multilateral organizations, such as the OSCE, or the Council of Europe or NATO might not also be

read into Article22. Yet again our good friends read into the text words that are just not there.

And in that technique at least it may be said th at they have finally achieved some degree of

consistency. Article 22 simply does not address their rights and obligations.

14. The subsequent practice of the Parties conf irms that our interpretation has got to be the

correct one. Until 1995, the Respondent systematically objected to the Applicant’s efforts to join a

104
Judges’ folder, tab 7, plate 3.
10RR, para. 5.14. - 55 -

large number of organizations. The Accord was intended to bring that practice to an end, and it did

so efficiently, effectively and completely until Ap ril 2008. That was the purpose of Article 11, the

reason why the Applicant insisted on the inclusion of the non-objection provision. As soon as the

Interim Accord came into for ce in October 1995, the Respondent’s conduct changed, and it then

remained constant for 13 years. That would ha rdly be expected if the Respondent could invoke

Article22 to exercise its own “rights” and “ob ligations” under treaties establishing international

organizations. There is no evidence before this C ourt that it ever sought to do so. That it ever

sought even the possibility of doing so. Instead, the Respondent, by its behaviour, gave effect to

the plain meaning of the Article11 obligation; it complied, and we respect that, with the treaty

rule. That could not have occurred because the Respondent recognized and accepted that by

signing the Interim Accord it had greatly fettered its right to object. And in return, the Applicant

agreed to be referred to in the organization by the provisional designation. The quid pro quo and

practice makes clear that Article22, never i nvoked before the pleadings, never regarded as

addressing rights and obligations of the Respondent.

15. Article 22 was there for a reason. To confirm that the Accord does not affect the rights

and obligations of third parties. That is what it says, and that is what it means.

B. Interpreting Article 22 as speaking to the Respondent’s rights and obligations would
undermine the raison d’être of Article 11 (1)

16. Now, the Respondent’s approach to Article22 is erroneous for another reason; if

accepted, the argument would render Article 11 (1) meaningless, as the Respondent could object to

any membership of any organization at any time, si mply by invoking an alleged right or obligation

of the Respondent under another agreement. That would undermine the raison d’être of

Article 11 (1), and arguably many of the core provisions of the Interim Accord.

17. To achieve the purpose it seeks by this interpretation, what the Respondent has had to do

is to rewrite the text of the Interim Accord ⎯ Literally rewrite it. Not just once, but on three

occasions in its written pleadings the Respondent go es through the exercise of taking parts of the

first paragraph of Article11 ⎯ see that on the screen ⎯ then connecting it to parts of Article22, - 56 -

and then inserting the word “but” betw een the extracts on the two Articles 106. This exercise has

107
just been shown on the screen : [plate 4 on] so you start with the first part, the text of Article 11,

and then you add the relevant text of Article 22 at the bottom, whilst taking care to leave a gap and

then you insert the word “but”. Check the Count er-Memorial and the Reply for yourselves. The

word “but” doesn’t actually feature in the negotiate d text, so one marvels at the creativity of the

Respondent, and one is almost reminded of the va riation on the theme of the relationship between

the words “or” and “and” and what they may or may not mean: you just take the text of the treaty

as negotiated and adopted, but noticing that somethin g is missing, you claim the right to be free to

insert the word that completes the meaning you seek. Now we are not aware of any provision of

the 1969 Vienna Convention that allows you to insert ⎯ at your own instance ⎯ extra words. One

can think of how to do it, perhaps an addition to Article31(3), on interpretation, could read as

follows: “There shall be taken into account, together with context . . . (d) . . . the odd word or two

that has been inserted at the instance of any pa rty even if it contradicts or undermines the plain

meaning of the text.” Mr. President, the word “but ” is not to be found in Article 11 and it is not to

be found in Article22. We look forward to hear ing an explanation as to why this word has been

inserted. The effect of inserting it leads to the argument that the combined effect of Articles11

and 22 is that the Respondent’s rights under the No rth Atlantic Treaty and the obligations it owes

to NATO and its member States are to prevail over all other provisions in the Interim Accord, most

notably, in this case, the obligation not to object . But of course remove the word “but” and the

argument falls away. It is unjustifiable and unsupported also by the object and purpose of

Article 22. [Plate 4 off]

18. Let us now look more carefully at the practical effect of the Respondent’s approach of its

argument on Article11(1). All international orga nizations prescribe conditions for membership.

A prospective member State has to meet these cond itions in order for it to be able to join the

organization. Most commonly, it is the members of the organization that, through their votes or by

other means as described to you by Professor Murphy, decide whether or not to admit the aspiring

member State. If we are to take the Respondent’s interpretation of Article 22 at face value, acting

106
RCM, paras. 6.27 and 7.29; RR, para. 3.25.
10Judges’ folder, tab 7, plate 4. - 57 -

on its own it would always be entitled to circumvent Article 11 (1 ) by a unilateral decision that the

conditions of membership of a particular organization had not been met: that is all it would have to

do. Such an interpretation is patently absurd. That is all the more so where the Applicant plainly

does meet the requirements of NATO membership: as recently disclosed and publicly available

documents make clear, key NATO States have agreed that a decision to invite the Applicant to join

NATO does not have to wait another summit; it can be extended as soon as the Respondent

108
agrees . For each and every international orga nization that the Applicant has joined ⎯ and there

are many since 1995 and hopefully more to come ⎯ as well as for all those future applications, for

example and most significantly for the European Union ⎯ assuming Article22 applies to that

organization even though the Respondent seems today at least to believe that it may not ⎯ the

Respondent can simply assert that membership c onditions have not been met and in this way

Article 11 just becomes an irrelevance.

19. Article 11 is not an irrelevance. Until April 2008 it worked, and it worked well. Nothing

changed in the essential obligation, except that the Respondent grew tired of protracted

negotiations over the name issue. As MsBakoy annis put it, in explaining the objection to the

Applicant’s desire for NATO membership “o ur goal is for an issue that dates back 15 years . . . to

be resolved” 109. When it objected, the Respondent repeated ly said it did so because there was no

“solution” to the name difference; it said nothing about the need to exercise a right under NATO

that superseded its obligation under the Interim Accord: the interview that Ms Bakoyannis gave to

the journalist in October 2007 makes that abundantly clear, as do all the other statements we have

referred to you and the many more listed in our pleadings 110.

20. In support of its argument, therefore, the Respondent is forced to conjure up yet another

new distinction, between various categories of inte rnational organizations: so we learn that there

are organisations fermées , to which Article22 does apply, and then there are organizations of

10Cable from United States Embassy London to United States Dept. of State, entitled “HMG Looking Forward to
Building on Gains of NATO Bucharest Summit”, 9 Apr. 2009, Cable No. 08LONDON1017, para.1, available at:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/london-wikileaks/830501…
NG-ON-GAINS-OF-NATO-BUCHAREST-SUMMIT.html (accessed 16 Mar. 2011).
10Embassy of the Respondent in Washington, D.C., In terview of FM MsBakoyannis in Athens daily
Kathimerini, with journalist Ms D. Antoniou (Sunday, 14 Oct. 2007), 15 Oct. 2007, at AM, para. 2.60, footnote 121; and

AM, Ann. 73.
11Ibid. - 58 -

universal membership, to which it does not apply. So on the Respondent’s approach, really not

clearly explained, Article 22 applies to none of the universal organizations and to some, but not all,

organisations fermées, since it appears now that it does not apply to the European Union. Is there

any support for these distinctions in the text of Ar ticle 22? No, there is not. Does the Respondent

offer any criteria for the distinctions? No, it does not. Again, the Respondent is simply entitled to

insert exceptions into the text. So for those institutions that remain subject to Article22 ⎯ the

category of unspecified organisations fermées that conveniently includes NATO ⎯ the admission

of a new member requires “active participation of the existing members” so that the Respondent, as

a NATO member, has “legal obligations to both the other members of the organization and the

111
organization itself with respect to discharge of its rights and duties in the membership process” .

In other words, these NATO rules allow it, no require it, to exercise a veto to object.

21. The Respondent maintains that it is simply for it ⎯ it alone, acting unilaterally, without

notice, according to criteria that it has completely invented out of the air and that are nowhere

reduced into written form or otherwise available ⎯ to decide which organization falls into this

category. Now the argument suffers from many diffic ulties, but let me just mention three. First,

Article11 makes no distinction between different categories of international organizations.

Second, as I have already said, at no point befo re April 2008 did the Respondent make or invoke

such a distinction ⎯ it is an invention and it dates to 2009. Third, the distinction leads to a

manifestly absurd conclusion. On its approach , the Respondent cannot object to the Applicant’s

membership of a “universal” international organi zation in which the Respondent plays virtually no

role in the membership process, but it can always object in the case of some, but not all, “closed”

international organizations ⎯ where, conveniently, it has a role to play in the admissions process.

So, to put it simply, the Respondent has no right to object in situations where its objection would

have no effect, but it has a right to object where the objection would be effective. Now, in many

parts of the world ⎯ in particular, in the East End of London ⎯ this is known as a bootstraps

argument: you are prohibited from doing something, except in situations where you can do

something, because doing something would be effective. In other words, the right exists because it

111
RCM, para. 6.59. - 59 -

can be effectively applied. This is a very curious way to interpret Articles 11 and 22 of the Interim

Accord or, indeed, of any treaty provision. And the implications for treaty law are clear, and I do

not need to spell them out.

22. One might ask, then, what effect would the Respondent’s approach have on yet other

provisions of the Interim Accord? The Applicant would have negotiated and adopted an agreement

that would potentially be devoid of practical effect. All of the substantive obligations would have

to be read subject to the Respondent’s perverse approach to Article22 because, presumably, it

applies across the board.

23. Let us take an example. Article8(1) of the Interim Accord requires that both Parties

must “refrain from imposing any impediment to the movement of people or goods between their

territories . . .”. On the Respondent’s approach, it is perfectly free to assert ⎯ on a unilateral

basis ⎯ that it retains a “right” under Article224 of the Treaty of Rome to impose a unilateral

trade embargo on the Applicant, a non-EU member, and therefore it can do so pursuant to

Article22, assuming it to be applicable, even though such conduct is clearly prohibited by

Article8(1) of the Accord. Now that would be an astonishing result, yet that is what they are

arguing for. In short, the Respondent’s appro ach to interpreting Article22 as protecting the

Respondent’s rights renders Article11 meaningless. It introduces manifest instability into the

bilateral relationship under the Interim Accord, the very thing it sought to avoid.

C. The Respondent has identified no relevant “rights and duties” that may be invoked
under Article 22

24. The Respondent’s reasons for invoking Article 22, it says, is that its “rights” and “duties”

under the North Atlantic Treaty are protected by that provision, and this allows it to object to the

Applicant’s admission to NATO notwithstanding its Article11 obligation. So, this is the

Respondent’s argument:

“If we assume for purposes of argument that [the Respondent], as a member of
NATO, had concluded that it was bound ‘to object’ to the FYROM’s application
because of the unresolved ‘difference’, its judgment in this matter could not possibly
112
constitute a violation of the Interim Accord.”

Very clearly put, supporting all of the arguments I have just summarized.

112
RCM, para. 6.63. - 60 -

25. But, curiously, the Respondent has failed to identify any “rights” or “duties” under the

North Atlantic Treaty that entitled it to veto th e Applicant’s NATO member ship aspirations. The

only treaty provision invoked by the Respondent is Ar ticle 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. What

does Article 10 of the Treaty actually say? Let us have another look at it. This is what it says in its

entirety: [plate 5 on]

“The Parties may, by unanimous agreemen t, invite any other European State in
a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party

to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the
United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will
inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.” 113

26. So, this is the provision that the Respondent relies on to justify its breach of Article 11 of

the Interim Accord. It argues that Article10 of the North Atlantic Treaty imposes a “right” or a

114
“duty” for the Respondent to “express [its] views” with respect to the accession of new NATO

members, and that this right or duty was ex ercised when the Respondent objected to the

Applicant’s NATO accession. But it is plain that Ar ticle10, by its terms, says no such thing; it

simply indicates that a particular condition ⎯ unanimous agreement ⎯ must be met before a State

may join NATO. The text says nothing about a “right” or a “duty” of the Respondent. And so,

once again, the Respondent’s creative propensities allow it to insert text where none exists.

27. The Respondent does identify a basis for raising criteria for NATO membership. It

refers to the “requirement” that candidate Stat es “settle ethnic disputes or external territorial

disputes including irredentist claims or international jurisdiction disputes by peaceful means in

accordance with OSCE principles and . . . pursue good neighborly relations” 115. That is the criteria

they invoke. But wait a second; ask yourselves th e question. From where is this “requirement”

drawn? It is not in Article 10. In fact, it is not anywhere in the North Atlantic Treaty. So, where

did they find it? Well, they obviously had to look far and wide because what they dug up to justify

it is a 1999 NATO press release that sets out the Membership Action Plan through which aspiring

NATO candidate States may eventual ly accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. And this states that

113
Judges’ folder, tab 7, plate 5.
11RCM, paras. 7.33-7.34.

11Ibid., para.7.36; Press Release NAC-S(99)66, Memb ership Action Plan (MAP), 24Apr.1999; RCM .,
Ann. 21. - 61 -

116
“[a]spirants would also be expected . . . to settle ethnic disputes” . Is this a substantive criterion

of NATO membership, that the Respondent was bound by virtue of Article 10 of the North Atlantic

Treaty to invoke? The Respondent never explains how this might be, and we fail to see how a

press release can in this way create the basis for new criteria. [Plate 5 off]

28. Now, there is actually a very simple wa y that you can cut through this entire argument,

and that is by dealing with it on the facts. You do not even have to address any of these issues if

you do not want to. Why? Because the Responde nt, on its own admission made the objection on

the basis of a factor that it says was “in addition to” ⎯ and I emphasize the words “in addition

to” ⎯ NATO accession criteria. In other words, th e Respondent has conceded that the objection

was not a part of the NATO criteria themselves 117. It did the same thing in the run-up to Bucharest.

Look carefully at the aide mémoire circulated prior to the Bucharest Summit ⎯ you saw some of it

on the screen yesterday ⎯ the Respondent made clear in that document that the act of objection

was motivated by the need to bring to a satisfactor y conclusion the name issue, and that this is “in

118
addition to any accession criteria” . In other words, you do not even have to decide all of these

legal issues because they, on their own case, were not relying on NATO admission criteria, they

were relying on something else. The Article22 ar gument in this way just falls away completely

and very simply. [Plate 5 off]

29. Moreover, by agreeing not to object to Article11, the Respondent accepted that the

failure to resolve by negotiation the name diffe rence was not a basis for excluding the Applicant

from membership to international, multilateral and regional organizations; that such a dispute was

not, by itself, of a nature that should preclude the Applicant from joining organizations, including

those concerned with matters of peace and security . What reasons did the Respondent give in the

period before April 2008 for objecting to NATO memb ership? [Plate 6 on] Well, let us remember

again, what the then Prime Minister said on the very day of the Bucharest Summit:

116
RCM., Ann. 21
117
Ibid., para. 7.35.
11Respondent’s aide mémoire, Memorial, Ann. 129. - 62 -

“I had said to everyone ⎯ in every possible tone and in every direction ⎯ that
‘a failure to solve the name issue will impe de their invitation’ to join the Alliance.

And that is what I did. Skopje will be able to become a member of NATO only after
the name issue has been resolved.” 119

Did the Prime Minister raise any other factors? Did he invoke legal arguments or legal advice in

getting around Article11 of the Interim Accord? Did he raise rights under Article22? He did

none of these things. The Respondent is a well-functioning democracy with plenty of legal

advisers. One assumes they would have turned their mind to this issue. Is there any evidence

before the Court that Article22 was ever consider ed as being of any relevance before 2009? No

Mr. President, there is not. [Plate 6 off]

30. The Respondent itself has gone on the record, on numerous occasions, to state publicly

that the Applicant will be able to join NATO once the name issue is resolved 120. This has also been

121 122
recognized by other members of NATO and by the organization itself .

31. The evidence confirms that the Respondent’s objection was political ⎯ political. It had

nothing to do with a “right” or “duty” arising under the North Atlantic Treaty, and nothing to do

with membership criteria for NATO. For the reasons set out in our written pleadings, Article 10 of

the North Atlantic Treaty does not assist the Respondent an iota. Article10 of the NATO

Agreement does not accord to the Respondent any “right” ⎯ or impose any “duty” ⎯ to object to

the Applicant’s membership. By agreeing to Article 11 of the Interim Accord it recognized that it

no longer had a right to object to membership of international organiza tions provided the one

condition set forth in Article 11 was met. It cannot now get around that undertaking by invoking

Article 22.

Mr. President, that may be a good moment for a lunch break, with your permission.

11AM, Ann. 99; judges’ folder, tab 4.
120
See generally: CR 2011/5 (Murphy).
12AM, para. 2.53.

12Ibid., para. 2.55. - 63 -

The PRESIDENT: Thank you. Thank you, Professor Philippe Sands, for your presentation.

As Professor Sands made quite clear, he is still in the middle of his statement and we will continue

to hear his presentation this afternoon. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will conclude

its first round of oral argument this afternoon. The time given to the former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia is from 3.00 p.m. to 4.30 p.m. With that understanding, the sitting is closed.

The Court rose at 12.50 p.m.

___________

Document Long Title

Audience publique tenue le mardi 22 mars 2011, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Owada, président, en l'affaire relative à l'Application de l'accord intérimaire du 13 septembre 1995 (ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine c. Grèce)

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