Non corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2011/6
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2011
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 22 March 2011, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada presiding,
in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995
(the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2011
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 22 mars 2011, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de l’accord intérimaire du 13 septembre 1995
(ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine c. Grèce)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presdenkta
Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Judges ad hoc Roucounas
Vukas
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
vceMpra,ident
KoroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Crnçade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue mes
Djngogshue,
RoMcou.nas
juVeskas, ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is represented by:
H.E.Mr.Antonio Miloshoski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia,
as Agent;
H.E.Mr.Nikola Dimitrov, Ambassador of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr.Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of Law, Un iversity College London, Barrister, Matrix
Chambers, London,
Mr.Sean D.Murphy, Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law, George Washington
University,
Mrs. Geneviève Bastid Burdeau, Professor of Law, University of Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne,
Mr.Pierre Klein, Professor of International Law, Director of the Centre of International Law,
Université Libre de Bruxelles,
Ms Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,
as Counsel;
Mr. Saso Georgievski, Professor of Law, University Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje,
Mr. Toni Deskoski, Professor of Law, University Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje,
Mr. Igor Djundev, Ambassador, State Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr.GoranStevcevski, State Counsellor, International Law Directorate, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
MsElizabetaGjorgjieva, Minister Plenipoten tiary, Deputy-Head of Mission of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the European Union,
Ms Aleksandra Miovska, Head of Co-ordination Sector, Cabinet Minister for Foreign Affairs,
as Advisers;
Mr. Mile Prangoski, Research Assistant, Cabinet of Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Remi Reichold, Research Assistant, Matrix Chambers, London,
as Assistants; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Antonio Miloshoski, ministre des affaires étrangères de l’ex-R épublique yougoslave de
Macédoine,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Nikola Dimitrov, ambassadeur de l’ ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M.PhilippeSands, Q.C., professeur de droit au Un iversity College de Londres, avocat, Matrix
Chambers, Londres,
M.SeanD.Murphy, professeur de droit à la George Washington University, titulaire de la chaire
de recherche Patricia Roberts Harris,
Mme Geneviève Bastid Burdeau, professeur de droit à l’Université Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne,
M.PierreKlein, professeur de droit internationa l, directeur du centre de droit international de
l’Université Libre de Bruxelles,
Mme Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, avocat, Matrix Chambers, Londres,
comme conseils ;
M. Saso Georgievski, professeur de droit à l’Université Saints-Cyrille-et-Méthode de Skopje,
M. Toni Deskoski, professeur de droit à l’Université Saints-Cyrille-et-Méthode de Skopje,
M. Igor Djundev, ambassadeur, conseiller d’Etat au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M.GoranStevcevski, conseiller d’Etat au minist ère des affaires étrangè res, direction du droit
international,
Mme Elizabeta Gjorgjieva, ministre plénipotentiaire, chef adjoint de la mission de l’ex-République
yougoslave de Macédoine auprès de l’Union européenne,
MmeAleksandraMiovska, chef du département de la coordination au cabinet du ministre des
affaires étrangères,
comme conseillers ;
M. Mile Prangoski, assistant de recherche au cabinet du ministre des affaires étrangères,
M. Remi Reichold, assistant de recherche, Matrix Chambers, Londres,
comme assistants ; - 6 -
Ms Elena Bodeva, Third Secretary, Embassy of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Liaison Officer with the International Court of Justice;
Mr. Ilija Kasaposki, Security Officer of the Foreign Minister. - 7 -
MmeElenaBodeva, troisième secrétaire à l’ ambassade de l’ex-République yougoslave de
Macédoine au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme attaché de liaison auprès de la Cour internationale de Justice ;
M. Ilija Kasaposki, agent chargé de la sécurité du ministre des affaires étrangères. - 8 -
The Government of the Hellenic Republic is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Georges Savvaides, Ambassador of Greece,
MsMariaTelalian, Legal Adviser, Head of the Public International Law Section of the Legal
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Agents;
MrG. eorgeAbi-Saab, Honorary Professor of In ternational Law, Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr.AlainPellet, Professor of International Law, University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
member and former Chairman of the Interna tional Law Commission, associate member of the
Institut de droit international,
Mr.MichaelReisman, Myres S. McDougal Professor of International Law, Yale Law School,
member of the Institut de droit international,
as Senior Counsel and Advocates;
Mr.ArghyriosFatouros, Honorary Professor of International Law, University of Athens, member
of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Professor of International Law, University of Athens,
Mr. Evangelos Kofos, former Minister-Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specialist on
Balkan affairs,
Csounsel;
Mr.TomGrant, Research Fellow, Lauterpacht Ce ntre for International Law, University of
Cambridge,
Mr.AlexandrosKolliopoulos, Assistant Legal Advi ser, Public International Law Section of the
Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Michael Stellakatos-Loverdos, Assistant Legal Adviser, Public International Law Section of
the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
MsAlinaMiron, Researcher, Centre de droit inte rnational de Nanterre (CEDIN), University of
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Asdvisers;
H.E. Mr. Ioannis Economides, Ambassador of Greece to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
MsAlexandraPapadopoulou, Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of the Greek Liaison Office in
Skopje, - 9 -
Le Gouvernement de la République hellénique est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Georges Savvaides, ambassadeur de Grèce,
MmeMariaTelalian, conseiller juridique, chef de la section de droit international public du
département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme agents ;
M.GeorgesAbi-Saab, professeur honoraire de droit international à l’Institut universitaire des
hautes études internationales de Genève, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M.AlainPellet, professeur de droit international à l’Université ParisOuest, Nanterre-LaDéfense,
membre et ancien président de la Commission du droit international, membre associé de
l’Institut de droit international,
M. Michael Reisman, professeur de droit internationa l à l’Université de Yale, titulaire de la chaire
Myres S. McDougal, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils principaux et avocats ;
M.Arghyrios Fatouros, professeur honoraire de dr oit international à l’Université nationale
d’Athènes, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, professeur de droit international à l’Université nationale d’Athènes,
M. Evangelos Kofos, ancien ministre-conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères, spécialiste des
Balkans,
comme conseils ;
M.TomGrant, collaborateur scientifique au La uterpacht Centre for International Law de
l’Université de Cambridge,
M. Alexandros Kolliopoulos, conseiller juridique adjoint à la secti on de droit international public
du département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Michael Stellakatos-Loverdos, conseiller juridique adjoint à la section de droit international
public du département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
MmeAlinaMiron, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
comme conseillers ;
S. Exc. M. Ioannis Economides, ambassadeur de Grèce auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Alexandra Papadopoulou, ministre plénipotentiaire, chef du bureau de liaison de la Grèce à
Skopje, - 10 -
Mr. Efstathios Paizis Paradellis, First Counsellor, Embassy of Greece in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr.EliasKastanas, Assistant Legal Adviser, P ublic International Law Section of the Legal
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Konstantinos Kodellas, Embassy Secretary,
as Diplomatic Advisers;
Mr. Ioannis Korovilas, Embassy attaché,
Mr. Kosmas Triantafyllidis, Embassy attaché,
as Administrative Staff. - 11 -
M. Efstathios Paizis Paradellis, premier conseiller à l’ambassade de Grèce au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M.EliasKastanas, conseiller juridique adjoint à la section de droit international public du
département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Konstantinos Kodellas, secrétaire d’ambassade,
comme conseillers diplomatiques ;
M. Ioannis Korovilas, attaché d’ambassade,
M. Kosmas Triantafyllidis, attaché d’ambassade,
comme personnel administratif. - 12 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open. I know that Judge Skotnikov, for
reasons made known to me, as yesterday, remains una ble to take his seat on the Bench today. The
Court meets today for the continuation of the fi rst round of presentation of the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia. Thus, let me invite Professor Pierre Klein to take the floor.
M. KLEIN :
LA REQUÊTE EST PLEINEMENT RECEVABLE ET AUCUNE RAISON D ’OPPORTUNITÉ NE S ’OPPOSE
À CE QUE LA C OUR RENDE UN ARRÊT DANS LA PRÉSENTE AFFAIRE
1. Je vous remercie Monsieur le président. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs
les Membres de la Cour, il me revient ce matin de traiter d’un dernier ordre d’argument avancé par
l’Etat défendeur pour inviter la Cour à ne pas exercer ses pouvoirs à l’égard du présent différend.
Selon la Partie adverse, la demande présentée dans la requête introductiv e d’instance serait d’une
nature telle qu’elle se heurterait aux «limitations inhérentes à l’exercice par la Cour de sa fonction
1
judiciaire» . La Cour devrait de ce fait refuser de se prononcer sur la demande dont elle est saisie.
Au fil des développements de l’argumentation de l’Etat défendeur sur cette question, ses arguments
se sont articulés sur trois axes principaux. Première ment, la Cour devrait s’abstenir de rendre une
décision qui serait condamnée à être dépourvue de tout effet pratique. En deuxième lieu, la Cour
devrait exercer sa «réserve judiciaire» à l’égard du présent différend. A défaut, elle interférerait
dans un processus de négociation mené sous la supervision des organes politiques des
Nations Unies. Enfin, la réserve de droit formulée par l’Etat requérant en vue d’une modification
et d’une extension éventuelle des termes de sa requê te serait en tout état de cause irrecevable. On
ne s’attardera pas davantage sur cette dernière que stion dans le cadre de la présente plaidoirie,
puisqu’aucune extension de ce type n’a été demandée à ce stade de la procédure.
2. L’argumentation relative aux «limitations inhérentes à l’exercice par la Cour de sa
fonction judiciaire» a initialement été avancée par l’ Etat défendeur de façon très succincte dans la
partie de son contre-mémoire consacrée à la réfutation des mesures de réparation sollicitées par
2
l’Etat requérant . Cette question a ensuite pris une proportion beaucoup plus significative dans
1
Duplique («RR»), p. 63 et suiv.
2Contre-mémoire («RCM»), par. 9.9-9.16. - 13 -
l’argumentation du défendeur, qui lui a consacré un chapitre entier dans sa duplique, en en faisant
une exception ⎯ ou plutôt un ensemble d’exceptions ⎯ d’irrecevabilité 3. Ces efforts, pourtant, ne
changent pas grand chose au poids de cet argument . Qu’il soit développé en deux, en quatorze, ou
en quarante pages, il est loin d’emporter la convict ion. Ici encore, l’argumentation de la Partie
adverse présente de sérieuses difficultés tant sur le pl an factuel que sur le plan juridique. Le même
constat s’impose, on va le voir, pour les deux principaux arguments d’irrecevabilité avancés par
l’Etat défendeur.
A. Un arrêt rendu par la Cour dans la présente affaire emporterait
des effets juridiques concrets
3. Selon le premier de ces arguments, un arrêt rendu par la Cour ne pourrait avoir aucun effet
concret. Il en serait ainsi en raison du fait que la requête de l’Etat demandeur viserait,
premièrement, à faire déclarer qu’il aurait dû être admis au sein de l’OTAN et, deuxièmement, à
faire constater que la décision de cette organisation de ne pa s accepter l’adhésion du demandeur
en2008 constituait un acte internationalement illicite engageant la responsabilité de l’Etat
défendeur 4. Ce dernier insiste sur le fait que cette décision est le fruit d’un processus collectif
mené au sein de l’organisation, et qu’il ne dispose d’aucun pouvoir de décider lui-même de
l’invitation du requérant à devenir membre de l’OTAN 5. Il serait donc vain pour la Cour de lui
6
adresser une injonction en ce sens .
4. De la même façon, selon l’Etat défendeur, la demande de l’Etat requérant de restaurer le
statu quo ante ⎯c’est-à-dire de le replacer dans la s ituation où il aurait dû se trouver si l’acte
reproché au défendeur n’avait pas été commis ⎯ serait tout aussi dépourvue de sens. Le statut du
requérant préalablement au sommet de Bucarest était celui d’Etat candidat à l’admission au sein de
l’OTAN. Ce statut est demeuré inchangé, et l’Etat requérant reste à l’heure actuelle candidat à
3
RR, chap. 4 ; pour la qualification, voir par. 4.3.
4
RCM, par. 9.4.
5 RR, par. 4.6.
6 Ibid., par. 9.11. - 14 -
l’admission au sein de cette organisation . Une décision de la Cour ne changerait dès lors rien à cet
état de choses.
5. Il est manifeste que l’objection relative à la portée pratique d’un arrêt de la Cour, telle que
cette objection est soulevée par le défendeur, ne saurait avoir de poids que si la description de
l’objet de la demande de l’Etat requérant était co rrecte. Or, ce n’est pas le cas. Une nouvelle fois,
ce n’est qu’en livrant une présentation tronquée de l’ objet de cette demande que l’Etat défendeur
peut prétendre qu’un arrêt de la Cour ne pourrait a voir d’effet concret dès lors que l’Etat défendeur
est impuissant à modifier une décision collective de l’OTAN. Mais ⎯ on y a déjà insisté hier et on
le répétera aujourd’hui ⎯ ce n’est pas la décision prise par cette organisation en 2008 qui est visée
par la requête. C’est un acte propre au défendeur, autonome et préalable à cette décision, même si
8
ces deux actes sont liés par un lien de cause à effet évident . Le défendeur ⎯ et c’est sa stratégie
constante ⎯ nie tantôt la réalité tantôt la portée juridique de cet acte propre. Il y a pourtant là une
vérité à laquelle il ne peut échapper. Cet ac te existe, il a été posé et même revendiqué avec
beaucoup de fierté par les autorités gouvernementa les de l’Etat défendeur, comme nous l’avons vu
hier. C’est cet acte qui a conduit à la décision prise par l’OTAN à son sommet de Bucarest. Et
c’est cet acte dont l’Etat requérant demande à la Cour de constater l’ illicéité au regard de
l’article 11 de l’accord intérimaire de 1995. Il n’est pas question ⎯ et il n’a jamais été question ⎯
de requérir de la Cour qu’elle impose à l’Etat défendeur de fair e rapporter la décision prise par
l’OTAN en 2008. Il est parfaitement évident que la Cour n’en a pas le pouvoir, et qu’une décision
de sa part en ce sens ne saurait produire un effet juridique pratique quelc onque. Personne ne le
conteste. Et c’est bien pour cette raison que ce n’est pas ce que demande l’Etat requérant.
6. Pour autant, ce qu’il demande ⎯ le constat d’une violation de l’article 11 de l’accord à la
suite d’un acte propre au défendeur et le rétablissement du statu quo ante ⎯ est-il susceptible
d’avoir une portée pratique? Ou ne s’agira it-il que d’un prononcé pur ement théorique, comme
l’affirme l’Etat défendeur, dès lors que l’Etat requérant était en position de candidat à l’admission
en2008, et se trouve encore exactement dans la même position à l’heure actuelle? En suggérant
que cette situation est inchangée ⎯ que le statu quo ante a, en quelque sorte, toujours existé ⎯, le
7
RCM, par. 9.15 ; RR, par. 4.10.
8
Voir entre autres, dans le contexte des questions abordées ici, réplique («AR»), par. 6.8. - 15 -
défendeur omet un élément de taille. Le constat d’une violation de l’article 11 de l’accord aurait en
effet pour résultat de remettre l’Etat requérant en position de candidat à l’admission au sein de
l’OTAN sans risquer de se voir une nouvelle fo is opposer une objection fondée sur des motifs
9
autres que celui prévu dans l’accord intérimaire . Seuls seraient pris en compte, aux fins
d’évaluer les mérites de cette candidature, les critères fixés par l’organisation elle-même pour
l’admission de nouveaux membres. Et aucune interférence ne pourrait être exercée dans ce
processus par l’Etat défendeur pour des motifs autres que celui permis par l’article11. La
différence, on en conviendra, est loin d’être négl igeable. Et elle confirme au-delà de tout doute
qu’une décision de la Cour dans la présente instance aurait bien des effets juridiques concrets. Il en
serait d’ailleurs d’autant plus ainsi que cette hypothèque ⎯la menace d’une objection de l’Etat
défendeur fondée sur des motifs non admissibles ⎯ serait levée dans le contexte des demandes
d’admission présentées à l’avenir par l’Etat requéra nt auprès d’autres organisations internationales
dont l’Etat défendeur est membre. Si l’on me permet cette image, s’interroger sur l’impact
juridique concret d’un prononcé de la Cour dans l’ affaire qui lui est soumise aujourd’hui, c’est un
peu comme demander à Damoclès si cela a un impact pratique pour lui d’avoir ⎯ ou non ⎯ une
épée suspendue à un crin de cheval au-dessus de sa tête…
7. De façon plus générale, il est manifeste que l’obtention d’un cons tat de violation d’une
disposition d’un accord bilatéral en vigueur entre les Parties à l’instance représente, en soi, un
objectif parfaitement légitime et approprié dans le cadre d’une procédure judiciaire. La Cour n’a
pas, par ailleurs, à s’exprimer sur les conséquences futures de la décision qu’elle est appelée à
rendre.
8. Le fondement juridique de l’argumentati on développée par l’Etat défendeur sur ce point
ne s’avère pas plus convaincant. Selon cette argumentation, la Cour se trouverait ici dans la même
situation que celle à laquelle elle était confrontée dans l’affaire du Cameroun septentrional, où elle
avait refusé de statuer au fond sur la demande qui lui était soumise 1. Le motif de ce refus était
double. D’une part, la Cour estimait qu’elle ne se trouvait pas dans une situation où, une fois
l’arrêt rendu, «l’une ou l’autre partie ou les deux parties s[eraie]nt en fait à même de prendre des
9
Voir AR, par. 6.22.
10
Ibid., par. 9.12. - 16 -
mesures visant le passé ou l’avenir, ou de ne p as en prendre, de sorte qu’il y ait soit exécution de
l’arrêt…s,oit refus d’exécution» ( Cameroun septentrional (Cameroun cR . oyaume-Uni),
11
exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1963 , p. 37-38) . La Cour avait alors estimé devoir
sauvegarder sa fonction judiciaire en refu sant de rendre une décision sans objet ( ibid., p. 38). Tel
serait également le cas dans la présente instance, puisque la Cour ne pourrait imposer à l’Etat
défendeur des mesures qu’il ne serait pas habilité à prendre ⎯ en l’occurrence modifier la décision
12
de l’OTAN . D’autre part, dans l’affaire du Cameroun septentrional, la Cour avait estimé que «ce
que le requérant demande à la Cour, c’est d’appréci er certains faits et d’arriver, à l’égard de ces
faits, à des conclusions s’écartant de celles qu’a énoncées l’Assemblée générale dans sa
résolution 1608 (XV)» (Cameroun septentrional (Cameroun cR .oyaume-Uni), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, p.32) 13. Or, la Cour avait indiqué à cet égard qu’un arrêt rendu par elle ne
14
pourrait «infirm[er] … les décisions de l’Assemblée générale» ( ibid., p.33) . Selon la Partie
adverse, la même conclusion s’imposerait ici, puisque le but ultime de l’Etat requérant serait en fait
15
de réformer la décision prise par l’OTAN en 2008 . On se trouverait donc là confronté à un
précédent judiciaire bien lourd de conséquences. Qu’en est-il vraiment ?
9. En réalité, la situation à laquelle la Cour se trouvait confrontée dans le précédent du
Cameroun septentrional est fondamentalement différente de celle qui lui est soumise aujourd’hui.
L’objet central du différend entre le Royaume-Uni et le Cameroun était constitué par une allégation
de l’Etat requérant, le Cameroun, selon laquelle le défendeur avait manqué à des obligations que lui
imposait l’accord de tutelle qui le liait à l’Organisation des Nations Unies (Cameroun septentrional
(Cameroun c. Royaume-Uni), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1963, p. 26). En vertu
de la résolution1608(XV) de l’Assemblée généra le, cet accord de tutelle avait pris fin le
1erjuillet 1961, soit deux jours après le dépôt de sa requête par l’Etat demandeur (ibid. , p. 25-26).
Ces seuls faits suffisent évidemment à expliquer plei nement la conclusion atteinte par la Cour en
l’espèce, selon laquelle, même si elle «devait poursuiv re l’affaire et déclarer toutes les allégations
11Cité in RCM, par. 9.12.
12
RCM, par. 9.15 ; duplique, par. 4.12.
13
Cité in RR, par. 4.14.
14Cité in RR, par. 4.15.
15RR, par. 4.16. - 17 -
du demandeur justifiées au fond, elle n’en serait pas moins dans l’impossibilité de rendre un arrêt
effectivement applicable» (ibid., p. 33). La raison fondamentale de cette impossibilité est exposée
en des termes très simples par la Cour: «[l’]arrê t ne remettrait pas en vigueur et ne ferait pas
revivre l’accord de tutelle» (ibid.). On ne retrouve à l’évidence nulle ment ce type de circonstances
dans la présente espèce. Il ne s’agit aucunement ici de «faire revivre» d’une manière ou d’une
autre un instrument juridique qui aurait cessé de produire des effets de droit. Il s’agit au contraire
pour la Cour de se prononcer sur l’interprétation et la portée d’une disposition d’un accord bilatéral
qui lie les Parties à l’instance et dont nul ne conteste qu’il est bien en vigueur.
10. Comme l’indiquait encore la Cour dans son arrêt de 1963, «[l’]arrêt de la Cour doit avoir
des conséquences pratiques en ce sens qu’il doit pouvoir affecter les droits ou obligations
juridiques existants des parties, dissipant ainsi toute incertitude dans leurs relations juridiques»
(ibid., p.34). N’est-ce pas exactement à ce résultat que nous serions confrontés en la présente
instance? L’arrêt que rendra la Cour affectera indéniablement les droits de l’Etat requérant de
demander son admission au sein d’organisations inte rnationales sans que l’Etat défendeur puisse y
faire objection, si ce n’est dans le seul cas prévu à l’article 11 de l’accord intérimaire. Et cet arrêt
aura un effet pour l’Etat défendeur, en précisant qu’il ne peut émettre d’objection en dehors de la
seule hypothèse visée dans cette disposition.
11. L’arrêt rendu par la Cour dans l’affaire du Cameroun septentrional est donc loin d’être
dépourvu de pertinence dans la présente instan ce. Mais s’il montre une chose, ce n’est
certainement pas que la Cour serait en l’espèce da ns l’incapacité de rendre un arrêt qui aurait des
conséquences juridiques concrètes. Tout au contraire, les critères mêmes qui ont été énoncés par la
Cour en 1963 pour définir les situations dans l esquelles ses prononcés entraient bien dans le cadre
de l’exercice de ses fonctions judiciaires sont pleinement rencontrés ici, comme on vient de le voir.
On voit donc décidément très mal quelles «limitatio ns inhérentes à l’exercice par la Cour de ses
fonctions judiciaires» l’empêcheraient de rendre un arrêt dans la présente affaire. - 18 -
B. En exerçant ses pouvoirs dans le cadre de la présente instance, la Cour n’interférerait
en rien dans le processus de négociation diplomatique visant à résoudre
le différend relatif au nom
12. Selon la deuxième exception d’irrecevabilité soulevée par l’Etat défendeur, la Cour ne
pourrait rendre une décision en l’espèce car cel a la conduirait à ignorer le devoir qui lui
incomberait de faire preuve de «réserve judiciaire » à l’égard de la demande dont elle est saisie.
L’Etat défendeur affirme à cet égard qu’un arrêt par lequel la Cour accepterait de se prononcer sur
la requête portée devant elle interférerait avec le processus de négociation diplomatique requis par
le Conseil de sécurité dans la résolution817 (1993) et accepté par les Parties dans l’accord
intérimaire de 1995 16. Si elle acceptait l’une quelconque des demandes de l’Etat requérant, la Cour
imposerait de ce fait aux Parties ⎯et spécialement à l’Etat défendeur ⎯ une position dont le
Conseil de sécurité a indiqué qu’elle devrait être atteinte par un processus de négociation 17. En
rendant par hypothèse une décision favorable à l’Etat requérant, la Cour apporterait son appui aux
tentatives de cet Etat d’imposer sur le plan inte rnational un nom qui n’aurait pas fait l’objet de
18
négociation ni été accepté par l’Etat défendeur .
13. Il convient tout d’abord de relever que ce dernier argument n’a été avancé pour la
première fois par le défendeur que dans sa duplique , au stade ultime de la procédure écrite. On
peut certainement s’interroger sur la conformité de cette façon de procéder aux règles relatives à la
présentation des exceptions préliminaires devant la Cour et l’Etat requérant réserve tous ses droits à
cet égard. En tout état de cause, le procédé apparaît une nouvelle fois symptomatique du caractère
fluctuant de l’argumentation de l’Etat défendeur et de sa volonté de faire feu de tout bois, en
recourant, à tous les stades de la procédure, aux arguments les plus divers pour échapper aux
conséquences de ses actes.
14. Quoi qu’il en soit, même si la Cour accep te d’examiner cet argument, il s’avère lui aussi
bien léger, tant sur le plan des faits que sur celui du droit. En évoquant de prétendues
«interférences» entre la demande présentée par l’Etat requérant et le processus de négociation sur le
nom, l’Etat défendeur entretient une fois encore délibérément la confusion quant à la portée de la
16
RR, par. 4.23.
17
Ibid.
18Ibid., par. 4.26. - 19 -
demande initiale. La Cour n’est nullement appelée à se prononcer sur le différend relatif au nom de
l’Etat demandeur. Comme l’exposera de façon détaillée dans quelques instants mon collègue le
professeur Sean Murphy, la seule chose que prétend l’ Etat requérant, c’est que pas plus l’article 11
de l’accord intérimaire de1995 que la résolu tion817(1993) ne l’empêchent de se référer à
lui-même par son nom constitutionnel, y compris dans les enceintes des organisations
internationales dont il fait partie. Que la Cour tranche cette question ne reviendrait nullement à
priver de leur objet les négociations visant à régler le différend sur le nom, ni à défavoriser la Partie
adverse dans ce processus de négociation. L’objet de la demande de l’Etat requérant, et celui du
processus de négociation, sont entièrement distinct s. Se prononcer sur la première n’implique
nullement de trancher la «divergence» sur le nom, que les Parties ont été invitées à régler par la
voie des négociations. Si la Cour accueille la prétention de l’Etat requérant, cela signifiera
simplement qu’aucune violation de la résolution817 (1993) et de l’accord intérimaire ne peut lui
être reprochée au titre de la pratique qui consis te pour cet Etat à utiliser son nom constitutionnel
dans ses relations avec des tiers. Cela ne reviendra pas à imposer pour autant l’usage de ce nom à
ces tiers. L’objet des négociations ⎯c’est-à-dire, la recherche d’un accord sur la façon dont les
deux Parties pourront s’entendre pour désigner l’Etat requérant ⎯ sera de ce fait laissé
parfaitement intact.
15. Sur le plan plus strictement juridique, il convient sans doute de rappeler à ce stade que la
Cour s’est déjà prononcée en des termes très nets sur le fait que l’existence d’un processus de
négociation entre les Parties à l’instance n’était nullement de nature à l’empêcher d’exercer ses
fonctions judiciaires. En particulier, dans l’affaire Nicaragua, la Cour a souligné que «l’existence
même de négociations actives auxquelles les deux Parties pourraient participer ne doit empêcher ni
le Conseil de sécurité ni la Cour d’exercer les f onctions distinctes qui leur sont conférées par la
Charte et par le Statut» ( Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci
(Nicaragua c.Etats-Unis d’Amérique), compétence et recevabilité, arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1984 , - 20 -
p. 440, par. 106). Dès lors, la thèse de l’interfé rence qu’entraînerait un prononcé de la Cour sur le
processus de négociation sur le nom s’avère mani festement aussi dépourvue de fondement sur le
plan juridique qu’elle l’était sur le plan factuel.
*
16. On voit donc qu’il n’existe aucune «limita tion inhérente à l’exercice par la Cour de ses
fonctions judiciaires» qui l’empêcherait de rendre un arrêt au fond dans la présente affaire.
Contrairement à ce qu’affirme l’Etat défendeur, une décision de la Cour aurait bel et bien des effets
juridiques concrets et serait loin de constituer un prononcé purement théorique. Par ailleurs, la
Cour, en exerçant sa compétence, n’«interférerait» nullement dans le processus de négociation sur
la question du nom, qui possède un objet clairement distinct de celui du différend porté devant la
Cour. La Cour est donc pleinement en mesure de se prononcer sur le fond du litige et aucun des
arguments avancés par le défendeur, que ce soit au titre de la compétence à proprement parler ou
des limites à l’exercice de sa fonction judiciaire, n’y fait obstacle.
17. En réalité, ce que l’Etat défendeur tent e manifestement de faire par les différentes
exceptions qu’il invoque, c’est d’agiter devant la Cour le risque d’interférence avec des processus
politiques, comme un chiffon rouge. Processus ⎯ éminemment ⎯ politique d’admission au sein
d’une organisation interna tionale telle que l’OTAN, tout d’abord. Processus ⎯ clairement ⎯
politique de négociation et de médiation sur la question du nom ensu ite. La ficelle, permettez-moi
de le dire, est un peu grosse. L’argument a été invoqué ⎯ en vain, faut-il le rappeler ? ⎯ dans un
nombre considérable d’affaires portées devant la Cour . Et s’il a si souvent été rejeté, c’est parce
que la ligne de démarcation entre ce qui relève de la fonction judiciaire et ce qui lui échappe ⎯ en
particulier ce qui relève du «politique» ⎯ a été tracée avec netteté, et il y a déjà bien longtemps
déjà. En témoigne par exemple l’analyse que faisait de cette question, il y a près de
quarante-cinq ans, un auteur particulièrement émin ent que je suis personne llement très heureux de
retrouver parmi nos contradicteurs aujourd’hui : - 21 -
«si la Cour considère que ce qui lui est demandé dépasse ou est incompatible avec sa
fonction judiciaire, notamment lorsqu’il lui est demandé d’effectuer un choix politique
ou de rendre un jugement qui ne peut donnelieu qu’à des effets politiques, la Cour
déclinera d’accéder à de telles demandes» .
Sommes-nous, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, confrontés
à une telle situation dans la présente instance? Le dossier, me semble-t-il, parle de lui-même.
Rien de ce qui est demandé à la Cour dans la prése nte affaire ne lui impose de sortir de son rôle
judiciaire, ni d’interférer dans des processus po litiques, quels qu’ils soient. Seul un prononcé sur
une question juridique, clairement identifiée et clairement circonscrite, est sollicité en l’espèce par
l’Etat requérant.
Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieursles Membres de la Cour, je vous remercie
pour votre attention. Je vous prie, Monsieur lprésident, de bien vouloir maintenant céder la
parole à mon collègue, le professeur Sean Murphy.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor Pierre Klein for his statement. Now I invite
Professor Sean Murphy to take the floor.
MMUr. PHY:
THE RESPONDENT HAS BREACHED ARTICLE 11OF THE NTERIM A CCORD
INTRODUCTION
1. Thank you, Mr. President.
2. Members of the Court, yesterday I presented to you in some depth a factual account of the
events leading up to the Bucharest Summit in April 2008. The purpose of my presentation today is
to explain why the Respondent’s conduct violated its obligation under Article11(1) of the
1995 Interim Accord. To do so, my presentation will focus on three points.
3. First, under Article11(1) of the Interim Accord, the Respondent had an unequivocal
obligation not to object to the Applicant’s accesto international organizations. The relevant
language there is simple, direct, and unadorned. By its conduct w ith respect to the Applicant’s
accession to NATO, the Respondent deliberately violated that obligation.
19Georges Abi-Saab, Les exceptions préliminaires dans la procédure de la Cour internationale, Paris,
Pedone, 1967, p. 165. - 22 -
4. Second, Article11(1) carves out one ⎯ and only one ⎯ circumstance where the
Respondent is allowed to object: the Respondent ma y object to the Applicant’s membership in an
international organization if the Applicant “is to be referred to in such organization or institution
differently than in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution 817 (1993)”. In this
instance, the Applicant’s membership in NAT O would have been on the same terms as its
membership in the United Nations under resoluti on817; indeed, the Applicant was already
participating in NATO programmes on the basis of th at provisional reference. Consequently, the
Respondent had no basis under Article 11 (1) to object and should have declined to object just as it
has in many other international organizations since 1995.
5. Third, the Respondent occasionally lapses in to arguing certain other reasons for why it
was entitled to object under Article 11 (1). One of those reasons ⎯ the lack of the resolution of the
name difference on terms acceptable to the Respondent ⎯ is the true reason for the Respondent’s
objection. Other reasons, such as the Applican t’s alleged “lack of good neighborliness” or
“irredentism”, have no basis in any facts or evidence before this Court. Yet, most importantly for
this Court, none of those other reasons is a permitted basis in Article11(1) for objecting to the
Respondent’s membership in NATO.
I.THE R ESPONDENT DID “OBJECT ” TO THE APPLICANT ’S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FIRST CLAUSE OF ARTICLE 11 (1)
6. Mr. President, I turn to the first part of my argument, which is to demonstrate that, under
Article11(1) of the 1995 Interim Accord, the Respondent had an unequivocal obligation not to
object to the Applicant’s accession to international or ganizations and, further, that the Respondent
violated that obligation with respect to the Applicant’s pursuit of membership in NATO.
7. As Professor Sands indicated in his presentation yesterday, the 1995 Interim Accord was a
major diplomatic and legal achievement, in which the two States presently before you agreed to set
aside their difference over the name in order to resolve certain key issues in their bilateral
relationship. While both States would continue to seek a good faith resolution of the name issue,
they agreed in 1995 that they would, in the inte rim, not allow that unresolved dispute to preclude
diplomatic relations and co-operation in certain key areas. - 23 -
8. One of those key areas concerned the ability of the Applicant to join international
organizations. In 1993, as the Court knows, the Respondent had objected to the Applicant joining
the United Nations under its constitutional name. Consequently, a provisional solution was devised
20
by the three European Community member s on the Security Council at that time . Under the
solution, the Applicant was able to join the United Nations in 1993, but was to be referred to in that
organization by the provisional reference “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.
9. After the Applicant’s admission to the United Nations, the Respondent continued to object
to the Applicant’s admission to other interna tional organizations of which the Respondent was
already a member, notably the Council of Eu rope and the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), claiming that, be fore the Applicant could join, the Respondent’s
position on the name difference had to be accepted. The Respondent’s objections succeeded in
blocking the Applicant’s admission in all n on-United Nations organizations of which the
Respondent was a member, where unanimity or consensus was required for admission. This stance
by the Respondent in the early 1990s was a major problem for a fledgling State that sought full
entry into the community of nati ons, including those international organizations that could assist
the Applicant in building democratic institutions and the rule of law.
10. Against that backdrop, the Applicant’s ability to secure membersh ip in international
organizations formed a particularly important part of the negotiations in 1994 and 1995 that
ultimately led to the signing of the Interim Accord. The various drafts of the agreement that
ultimately became the Interim Accord contained formulations that spoke to this problem 21. For the
Applicant, this was a critical issue in 1995 and it remains a critical issue before you today.
11. Ultimately, the issue was addressed in Pa rtC of the Interim Accord, which is entitled
“International, Multilateral and Regional Institutions”. I direct the Court’s attention to tab 1 of the
judges’ folder, where you do find the 1995Interi m Accord, and on pages4 and 5 you will find
Part C. Within Part C, there is a single article, Article 11. The fact that Article 11 was granted by
the drafters an entire “Part” to itself, of a six-pa rt agreement, makes clear that this was one of the
key components of the agreement. Now the Res pondent at times mischaracterizes our position by
20
AM, para. 2.17.
2RCM, Ann. 148. - 24 -
saying that we view Article 11 as the only important component of the Interim Accord or the only
part that must be fulfilled. That is not our position; the entire Interim Accord is binding and
contains a number of important elements. But it is our position that Article11 was one of the
important elements of the Interim Accord.
12. [Plate 1 on] Turning to the text of Artic le11, the first paragraph contains two clauses,
which the Respondent characterizes as the “non-objection” clause and the “safeguard” clause. The
first clause of Article 11 (1) reads as follows:
“Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of th e First Part agrees
not to object to the application by or the membership of the Party of the Second Part in
international, multilateral a nd regional organizations and institutions of which the
Party of the First Part is a member . . .”
13. There are several points about this first clause upon which the Parties agree. Both Parties
agree that the Interim Accord entered into force, thus activating the obligation set forth in this
clause. Both Parties agree that, since entry into force, Article11(1) has not been terminated or
suspended. Both Parties agr ee that since the Interim Acco rd was registered with the
United Nations 22 Article11(1) may be invoked by the Applicant before this Court. Further both
Parties both accept that the references in Article 11(1) to “Party of the First Part” means the
Respondent, while references to “Party of the Second Part” means the Applicant.
14. Both Parties also agree, or at least the Respondent does not dispute, that the term
“international, multilateral and regional organizations and institutions” includes NATO and the
European Union, of which the Respondent is a member of both. The Parties also agree that the text
imposes an obligation on the Respondent. And conse quently, both Parties agree that this clause
established an obligation upon the Respondent not to object to the application or membership of the
Applicant in NATO.
15. Where the Parties differ on this first clau se of Article11(1) is that the Respondent
contends that its conduct in 2007 and 2008 did not constitute an “obj ection” within the meaning of
the clause. The Respondent’s argument here is not always clear and has shifted a bit in its written
pleadings. However, we believe it can be distilled into three basic assertions: first, that the word
“object” in Article11(1) is extremely narrow and essentially limited to an obligation upon the
22
United Nations doc. S/1995/794 (1995), UNTS, Series No. 32193; see also United Nations Charter, Art. 102. - 25 -
Respondent not to vote against admission as a part of a formal voting procedure; second, that the
Applicant’s interpretation of this clause must be wrong because it would encompass “vast and
ill-defined” conduct by the Respondent; and third that , in any event, the inability of the Applicant
to join NATO was due to conduct by NATO, not conduct by the Respondent. Allow me to address
each of those propositions in turn.
16. First, the Respondent looks at this initial clause of Article11(1) and sees a phrase ⎯
“not to object” ⎯ that requires very specific actions, such as ⎯ and here I quote from some of the
Respondent’s language ⎯ a “formal protest[]” or “ démarche[] adopted in unambiguous language
and joined with [an] actual vote[] under the par liamentary procedures of [the] organization . . .” 23.
Since accession decisions at NATO are determined on the basis of consensus, rather than a formal
vote ⎯ as we discussed yesterday ⎯ the Respondent asserts that “Greece was never put in a
position of having to lodge an objection.” 24 Indeed, the Respondent goes so far as to characterize
the obligation “not to object” as comparable to an obligation not to cast a negative vote at the
United Nations Security Council, and references incidents involving such votes 25.
17. In our view, that is not the standard set by Article 11 (1). But even if it were the standard
set by Article11(1), the Respondent without ques tion violated that standard. As we established
yesterday, the Respondent did formally protest against the Applicant’s accession to NATO. The
Respondent did formally démarche NATO members in opposition to the Applicant’s accession.
Indeed, as I indicated yesterday, the Respondent sent an aide mémoire to all NATO members
saying that, in addition to the normal accession crite ria, satisfactory resolution of the name was a
sine qua non for the Respondent’s support. The Responde nt is repeatedly on the record as saying
that it “contacted foreign leaders” and engaged in “Greek diplomac y” for the purpose of blocking
26
the Applicant’s entry into NATO . The facts before this Court, as we discussed yesterday, show
that the Respondent formally presented its position to NATO members, in Brussels, in Bucharest 27,
that they fought hard for many months and during the Bucharest meeting itself, with strong
23RR, para. 5.31.
24
Ibid., para. 6.27.
25
RCM, para. 7.13; RR, paras. 5.27, 5.31.
26See AR, para. 2.8.
27Ibid. - 26 -
28
arguments that were clearly stating their positions and intentions . As I indicated yesterday, these
were not “casual expressions of dissatisfacti on or political declarations for atmospherics” 29; they
were official communications by senior officials of the Respondent.
18. Moreover, those steps were directly “joi ned” with the formal decision process of NATO
on accession. Indeed, in numerous of those public statements by senior officials of the Respondent,
those officials trumpeted the fact that the Respondent had “vetoe d” the Applicant’s accession to
NATO. Now, that is another way of saying that the Respondent single-handedly prevented a
consensus decision in favour of that accession. The matter did not reach a point where the
Respondent formally cast a “no” vote but, as we explained yesterday, NATO’s procedures never
30
result in such a vote . Instead, matters are decided by consen sus, and the historical record makes
absolutely clear that the Respondent refused to join that consensus. It did so by objecting to the
Applicant’s membership in the months leading up to Bucharest, and it did so by maintaining that
objection at the Summit itself.
19. But the narrow standard that the Respondent advocates for Article11(1) ⎯ one that
limits it to conduct solely taken as part of a formal parliamentary-style vote ⎯ is wrong. The text
contains no limiting language that says “object” means casting a negative vote or even filing a
formal démarche. No such language appears in this clause. The language is simple,
straightforward, unrestricted. The term “not to object” may not require the Respondent to lobby in
favour of the Applicant’s admission to internati onal organizations, nor re quire the Respondent to
refrain from publicly stating that the name difference has not been resolved 31. But it clearly
encompasses the vigorous campaigning, bilaterally and multilaterally, against the Applicant’s
admission to the relevant international organization. It certainly precludes informing other States
that the Respondent will not join in a consensus in favour of the Applicant’s admission. Especially
when read in context, this first clause of Article11(1) has a clear and plain meaning: the
Respondent is not to use its position as a member of an international organization to oppose
28See AR, para. 2.9.
29
RR, para. 5.31.
30AR, para. 2.37.
31RR, para. 6.34. - 27 -
admission by the Applicant. Yet the Respondent’s conduct ⎯ I outlined it in detail yesterday and
it is also in our pleadings ⎯ did just that.
20. Moving beyond the text of Article11 (1), the Respondent’s extreme and narrow
interpretation would defeat Article11(1)’s very object and purpose. Under the Respondent’s
interpretation, the Respondent is entitled to lobb y strenuously all members of NATO in bilateral
and multilateral settings, signa lling vehemently its opposition and unwillingness to join a
consensus in favour of the Applicant’s admission to NATO. If that is so, then what did the
Applicant gain by entry into force of Article 11 (1 )? Nothing. Under the Respondent’s theory, all
that the Applicant gained was the Respondent’s obligation to abstain from voting or to vote “yes”
when the Applicant’s request for admission was formally voted on at NATO, as a part of a process
in which no such voting occurs 32. Thus, for one of the key international organizations that the
Applicant wished to join, Article11(1) has absolu tely no meaning. Such an interpretation is, we
submit, nonsensical.
21. In our Reply, we pointed to the practice of the Parties before and after the 1995 Interim
Accord, in which the Respondent first opposed the Applicant’s admission to certain key
international organizations, notably the Counc il of Europe and the OSCE, and then, after
33
conclusion of the Interim Accord, stopped doing so . To us, that practice demonstrates the
purpose of Article 11 (1). The purpose was not merely to avoid a negative vote by the Respondent
before, for example, the Council of Europe’s Commi ttee of Ministers. The point was to have the
Respondent stop lobbying within the Council of Eu rope and other international organizations
against the Applicant’s admission; to stand down fr om its vigorous and systematic efforts in that
regard, even though the name dispute had not ye t been resolved, because Greece’s efforts were
stymieing accessions by the Applicant to those organizations.
22. And in the aftermath of the entry into for ce of the Interim Accord, that is exactly what
happened. The Respondent stopped objecting to the Applicant’s admission to international
organizations, allowing the Applicant to accede, fo r example, to the OSCE on 12 October 1995, to
the Council of Europe on 9November1995, an d to enter into NATO’s PfP Programme on
32
AR, para. 2.36.
3Ibid., para. 4.19. - 28 -
15November1995; all happening right in the aftermath of the entry into force of the Interim
Accord on 13 October 1995. That practice confirms the meaning and purpose of the first clause of
Article 11 (1).
23. The Respondent seeks to draw support for its theory from the negotiating history of
Article 11 3. Different language was indeed used in di fferent drafts of what became the Interim
Accord, but none of the formulations, such as not to “hamper” or not to “impede”, indicates any
intention that the term “not to object” means exclusively something like “not to formally vote
against”. Rather, the different formulations are all designed to capture the simple and effective
idea that the Respondent is not to use its position as a member of an international organization to
oppose admission of the Applicant.
24. Second, in advancing its implausible theory of Article 11 (1), the Respondent maintains
that the ordinary meaning of Article11(1) must be wrong because it would encompass “vast and
35
ill-defined” conduct by the Respondent . Here, the Respondent shows some desperation by
wholly mischaracterizing our position. We are not asserting that Article11(1) imposes upon the
Respondent an “open-ended obligation” to support the Applican t’s admission to international
organizations, if by that is meant an obligation to lobby in favour of such admission or to “bring
about the concrete result” of such admission 36. Likewise, we are not asserting that the failure of
37
the Applicant to be admitted to NATO, standing alone, means that Article11(1) was violated .
And we are not maintaining that “inactivity” by the Respondent with respect to admission by the
38
Applicant violates Article11(1) , unless inactivity alone is capable of directly blocking
admission.
25. We do maintain, however, that the actua l conduct by the Respondent in 2007 and 2008,
involving a vigorous, active campaign ⎯ bilaterally, multilaterally, publicly, against the
Applicant’s admission to NATO ⎯ unambiguously falls within the sc ope of Article11(1). Such
conduct does not constitute “inactivity”, it certain ly does not constitute a simple “failure to
34RR, para. 5.21.
35
Ibid., para. 5.29.
36
Ibid., paras. 5.20, 5.22, 5.27.
37Ibid., para. 5.20.
38Ibid., para. 5.29. - 29 -
support” the Applicant’s accession. Rather, it constitutes a blatant, unambiguous, systematic
diplomatic effort to prevent the Applicant’s accession.
26. The Respondent appears to be arguing that, in order to apply Article11(1), this Court
must establish its exact contours ⎯ must determine exactly what kinds of conduct by the
Respondent are permissible and what kinds are not. Because of the alleged difficulty in doing so,
the ordinary meaning of Article11(1) should be set aside in favour of the Respondent’s much
39
more restricted interpretation .
27. This Court, of course, has never proceeded in that fashion. It has never felt obliged when
interpreting a provision of a treaty, in a contentious case or in an advisory opinion, to consider and
decide upon the entire range of conduct that might arise with respect to a particular provision, and
to then opine upon which conduct is permissible and which is not. Rather, the Court takes the facts
in the case before it, and applies the treaty at ha nd to those facts, with a strong emphasis on the
importance of maintaining the stability of treaty relations (Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project
(HungarylSlovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 65, para. 104). Doing so in this case leads
to an inescapable conclusion: the Respondent’s conduct in 2007-2008 violated its obligation under
Article 11 (1) not to object.
28. The third way that the Respondent tries to press its interpretation of this first clause, is
that it says the first clause could not be violated because the conduct at issue is NATO’s conduct,
not the conduct of the Respondent. The Respondent argues that this “case at heart concerns the
requirements for NATO expansion and the application of those requirements in 2008” 40.
41
29. The Respondent is entirely wrong . This case is, at its heart, about the Respondent’s
conduct and about the Respondent’s obligation under Article 11 (1) of the Interim Accord. Though
the Respondent points repeatedly to a statement by the Applicant’s President that Europe gave a
42
“cold shoulder” to the Applicant at Bucharest , that statement is simply acknowledging that the
Respondent’s objection actually worked; other NATO member States allowed the objection to
39RR, para. 5.29.
40
Ibid., para. 6.3.
41See, e.g., AR, paras. 4.28-4.31.
42See, e.g., RR, para. 6.23. - 30 -
preclude the Applicant’s admission to NATO. It do es not mean that there was no objection by the
Respondent. What matters here is the Respondent’s conduct, not the conduct of third States, not
the conduct of NATO as an organization.
30. Even after the Bucharest Summit 4, it is commonly accepted among NATO members
that the invitation for the Applicant’s accession does not have to wait for another summit; it can be
extended at any North Atlantic Council meeting, which meets weekly in Brussels, as soon as the
44
Respondent agrees . In other words, the problem for th e Applicant in joining NATO does not lie
with NATO members generally or with NATO as an institution or even with the continuing
inability to resolve the name difference 45; the problem lies with the Respondent’s objection.
31. If the Respondent’s argument on this point is accepted, Article11(1) becomes entirely
meaningless. For, reduced to its core, the ar gument is that the Respondent’s objection cannot
possibly violate Article11 when it successfully convinces an international organization not to
admit the Applicant, since that transforms the conduct into conduct not of the Respondent but of
the international organization. If that were true, then the Respondent would only violate
Article11(1) when its objection does not succeed, which makes no sense at all. Article11(1)
simply cannot be regarded as a meaningful obligatio n only in situations where its violation has no
effect. Consequently, we submit that, when assessing Article11(1) ⎯ the first clause ⎯ the
Court’s focus should be on the conduct of the Respondent, not the conduct of NATO or of other
NATO members. [Plate 1 off]
32. In sum, the Respondent had an unequivocal obligation in Article 11 (1) ⎯ first clause ⎯
not to object to the Applicant’s accession to inte rnational organizations, an obligation that the
Respondent violated in 2007-2008 with respect to the Applicant’s pursuit of membership in NATO.
43The Respondent points to two post-Bucharest Summit statements at RR, para. 6.10.
44
Cable from US Embassy London to US Dept. of State, entitled “HMG Looking Forward to Building on
Gains of NATO Bucharest Summit,” 9Apr.2009, cable No.08LONDON1017, para.1, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/london-wikileaks/830501…-
FORWARD-TO-BUILDING-ON-GAINS-OF-NATO-BUCHAREST-SUMMIT.html (reporting that:
“PM Brown was deeply disappointed that the Greeks would not move on a
compromise name, and wants to re-energize UN, Brussels and bilateral processes. The
UK agrees with the U.S. position that thenvitation does not have to wait for another
summit; it can be extended at any NAC as soon as the Greeks agree. HMG is also
determined not to let the name issue inrfere with Macedonian progress towards EU
membership.”).
45RR, paras. 6.11-6.13. - 31 -
II.SINCE THE A PPLICANT WAS NOT TO BE REFERRED TO IN NATO DIFFERENTLY THAN
PROVIDED FOR IN RESOLUTION 817, THE R ESPONDENT ’S OBJECTION CANNOT
BE JUSTIFIED UNDER THE SECOND CLAUSE OF A RTICLE 11 (1)
33. Mr.President, I now turn to the second part of my presentation, which addresses the
second clause of Article 11 (1). That clause carves out one ⎯ and only one ⎯ circumstance where
the Respondent is allowed to object to the Applicant’s admission to international organizations.
[Plate 2 on] The second clause of Article 11 (1) reads as follows:
“however, the Party of the First Part reserves the right to object to any membership
referred to above if and to the extent the Party of the Second Part is to be referred to in
such organization or institution differentlthan in paragraph 2 of United Nations
Security Council resolution 817 (1993)”.
34. Like the first clause of Article11(1), tis clause has a straightforward meaning. The
Respondent can object to the Applicant’s admission to an international organization if the
Applicant is to be admitted unde r conditions other than those that applied in its admission to the
United Nations. So long as the Applicant is to join an international organization under the same
conditions as it was admitted to the United Nations, there is no lawful basis for the Respondent to
object.
35. In fact, the Applicant pursued membership in NATO in circumstances involving exactly
the same conditions as exist for the Applicant at the United Nations. As I noted yesterday, for both
the PfP and MAP programmes at NATO, the Applicant’s communications to NATO consistently
used the constitutional name, while NATO uses the provisional reference of “the former Yugoslav
46
Republic of Macedonia.
36. In pursuing full-fledged NATO membership, the Applicant has never sought to change
that approach, nor has the Respondent itself alleged that the Applicant sought to change that
approach. As such, there was and is no basis for the Respondent to invoke the second clause of
Article 11 (1) as a means of avoiding its obligation under the first clause.
37. What, then, is the Respondent’s argument for why it may invoke the second clause of
Article11(1)? The Respondent maintains in its pleadings that it could object to the Applicant’s
accession to NATO because the Applicant, when itself communicating with NATO as a NATO
member State, will call itself “Republic of Mace donia” rather than using the provisional reference
46
See AM, para. 2.50. - 32 -
“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. In other words, it is the Respondent’s contention
that the phrase here “is to be referred to in such organization or institution” encompasses not just
the manner in which NATO will refer to the Applicant as a member State, such as in
communications by the NATO Secretariat, but also encompasses the Applicant’s own
47
self-description when it communicates with NATO .
38. Even more remarkably, if one reads th e Respondent’s pleadings closely, it becomes
apparent that the Respondent asserts that its ability to object is triggered by any anticipated use of
the constitutional name, including in bilateral communications be tween the Applicant and other
States, even when they occur wholly outside the context of NATO 48. For the Respondent, the
second clause “covers all cases of practice whic h would tend to undermine the negotiations on the
name difference” 49 and in all circumstances requires the Applicant to “support the use of the
50
Security Council name pending an agreed resolution of the difference” .
39. This is an astoundingly broad theory, wh ich pervades all of the Respondent’s pleadings
before the Court, and it finds absolutely no support in the facts or in the law. So allow me to
address each of those in turn.
A. The Respondent’s theory as to the meaning of the second clause of Article 11 (1),
even if correct, has no relation to the actual facts
of the Respondent’s objection
40. With respect to the facts, one searches in vain for any indication in 2007 or 2008 that the
Respondent objected to the Applicant’s accession to NATO because of a concern about how the
Applicant would call itself in communications with NATO. The Respondent made many
statements ⎯ I reviewed them for you yesterday ⎯ many statements where it objected to and even
“vetoed” the Applicant’s accession to NATO, but none of them even begins to link that objection
to any concern that the Applicant would call itsel f “Republic of Macedonia” in its dealings with
47
RR, para. 5.40.
48Ibid., para. 5.36 (“The FYROM has insisted in virtually a ll of its relations that the non-agreed name be used,
and, as a result, that name has proliferated, notwithstanding the FYROM’s continuing obligation to settled the difference
over the name through the agreed modality of bilateral negotiation.”).
49Ibid., para. 5.40.
50RR, para. 6.34. - 33 -
51
NATO, as it had been doing for over a decade . Instead, the Respondent’s numerous statements
show a quite consistent pattern of linking its objection to the inability to conclude the “name
dispute” on terms acceptable to the Respondent, precisely the basis for objecting that Article11
52
was designed to prevent .
41. In response, the Respondent asserts that all of its diverse statements “identified factors
supporting the judgment that” the Applicant would be referred to in NATO differently than
stipulated in Article11(1) 53. That simply is not true. None of this Respondent’s statements in
2007-2008 say anything at all about the Applicant’s u se of its constitutional name in relations with
NATO. None of those statements by the Respondent says, in effect, “if you agree to stop using
your constitutional name, [in communications with NATO] we will not object”, or something to
that effect. Rather, these statements are best summarized as saying “agree to our preferred name
for you and then we won’t object to your admission to NATO”. Those are the facts.
42. So, on the factual basis alone, there is no reason whatsoever to accept that the
Respondent’s objection was actually undertaken for the reason now asserted, a reason only asserted
after this case was filed with the Court. The Respondent laments that we are trying to impose a
“procedural requirement” on its ability to invoke th e second clause of Article11(1), by insisting
that the Respondent issue a “formal declaration” that it is invoking the clause 54. Well, certainly
there is reason to argue that any time a State plans to transgress an express obligation under a treaty
by invoking an exception in that tr eaty, the State should inform the other party to that effect, as
55
doing so coheres with good faith performance of the treaty .
43. But we do not raise this factual point as a means of implying a procedural requirement in
Article11(1). We raise it because the failure at the time to assert that the objection was for the
reason permitted in Article 11 (1), in conjunction with the Respondent’s assertion at that time of an
entirely different reason for the objection, unequivocally demonstrates that the Respondent was not
objecting to the Applicant’s admission to NATO for the reasons it now maintains before this Court.
51AR, paras. 4.38-4.39.
52
Ibid., paras. 4.70-4.72.
53
RR, para. 6.29.
54Ibid., para. 5.34.
55Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 26, 1155 UNTS 331. - 34 -
The Respondent has latched onto this reason ⎯ this other reason ⎯ as a means of trying to meet a
contorted interpretation of the second clause of Article11(1), because the real reason for the
objection cannot fit even that contorted interpretati on. Yet, in its prior decisions, this Court has
used the failure of a party, at the time of th e wrongful conduct, to explain its behaviour by
reference to a justification ⎯ or “safeguard” ⎯ under a treaty, as a means of doubting that the
purported justification is credible.
“At no time, up to the present, has the United States Government addressed to
the Security Council... the report which is required by Article51 of the United
Nations Charter... [T]he Court is justif ied in observing that this conduct of the
United States hardly conforms with the latter’s avowed conviction that it was acting in
the context of collective self-defence as consecrated by Article51 of the Charter.”
(Military and Paramilitary Activitie s in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 121, para. 235.)
We ask the Court in this case to do no less.
B. The ordinary meaning of the second clause of Article 11 (1) allows the Respondent
to use its constitutional name before international organizations
44. In addition to the lack of any fact ual predicate, for using the second clause of
Article 11 (1), the Respondent’s legal theory as to the meaning of that clause, also has no basis.
45. First, the ordinary meaning of the second clause of Article11(1) does not support the
contention that the Applicant must call itself by the provisional reference in dealings with NATO
or any other international organization. The Re spondent, in its pleadings, has much to say about
syntax and the passive voice and the verb tenses used in this second clause 56, but all of its points
57
are remarkably strained and unable to sustain the weight of its preferred interpretation .
46. It is certainly not eviden t that the phrase in this clause “is to be referred to in” must
58
cover, as the Respondent puts it, the manner in which “all possible actors” refer to the Applicant .
The absurdity of that interpretation is readily apparent given that the Respondent is essentially
reading the text to say that the Respondent may obj ect if it predicts that any NATO member State,
any non-NATO member State, any other international organization, any non-governmental
organization, or indeed any person, in its communications with NATO, might call the Applicant the
56RR, para. 5.35.
57
AR, paras. 4.52-4.53.
58RR, para. 5.35 (i). - 35 -
“Republic of Macedonia” or, more accurately, might refer to the Applicant by something other than
“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. Th at is reading a lot into a relatively simple
phrase, especially given the basic legal principl e that international agreements do not create
59
obligations or rights for third States without their consent . Given that the Respondent itself did
not refer to the Applicant in the Interim Accord by use of the provisional reference, using instead
the “Party of the Second Part”, I suppose we should be thankful that the Respondent is unlikely to
base an objection upon its own allegedly deviant conduct!
47. A much more natural interpretation of the phrase is that it is addressing the manner in
which the Applicant will be referre d to “in” the organization itself ⎯ meaning the way the
Applicant will be listed by NATO as a member of the organization, the way representatives from
the Applicant will be credentialed by NATO, th e term NATO will use in all official NATO
documents when referring to the Applicant, and so on. That, of course, is precisely how it has been
interpreted ⎯ this clause has been interpreted ⎯ by all those associated with the negotiations of
the Interim Accord, including Ambassador Nimetz.
48. A particular problem for the Respondent’s interpretation of the phrase here, is that it
detaches the second clause from the immediate circumstances of the Applicant’s request for
membership in the international organization. The second clause makes sense and works well in
the context of the Respondent being allowed to obj ect if the Applicant is to be admitted to NATO
as the “Republic of Macedonia”. If NATO were m oving toward membership for the Applicant on
those terms, then the Respondent could object and insist that NATO only accord membership
through NATO’s use of the provisional reference. Thus, the Respondent is wrong when it charges
that we see “virtually no situation as triggering the right to object” 60, for we do see such a situation.
On a proper interpretation of this clause of Article 11 (1), that situation is when the Applicant is to
be known in the international organization as “Republic of Macedonia”. If that happens, the
Respondent can object. To avoid the objection, the organization would need to make clear that the
Applicant will be referred to within the orga nization as “the former Yugoslav Republic of
59
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 34, 1155 UNTS 331.
6RR, para. 6.27. - 36 -
Macedonia”, and then the Applicant would have to agree or acquiesce to that approach. If it did,
then the Respondent would have to refrain from further objecting. All of that makes good sense.
49. By contrast, the Respondent’s interpretation of the second clause totally detaches the
ability to object from the circumstances of the Applicant’s impending membership. Rather than
look at the conditions under which the organization will actually grant membership to the
Applicant, the Respondent would give itself wide-ranging discretion to peer far into the future so as
to, as the Respondent puts it, “form an appreciation” 61 as to whether the Applicant might be
referred to by “all possible actors” as the “Republic of Macedonia”. So, if the Respondent thinks
that, five years after the Applicant joins NATO, it is possible that France or Botswana or Turkey ⎯
or for that matter the Hague Rotary Club ⎯ might, in a communication with NATO, call the
Applicant the “Republic of Macedonia”, then th e Respondent is entitled to object. It is a
breathtaking and utterly unconvincing interpretation of Article 11 (1).
50. In its Rejoinder, the Respondent charact erizes this wide-ranging discretion as a “margin
of appreciation” to which it is entitled, and in doi ng so makes reference to this Court’s Advisory
Opinion on the Conditions of Admission of a State to Membe rship in the United Nations (Article 4
62
of the Charter) . Yet, such arguments really are little more than smoke-and-mirrors, designed to
generate confusion and obfuscate a demonstrably weak set of arguments. The notion of “margin of
appreciation” in international law has never been construed as a licence for States to auto-interpret
the obligations they owe to other States under bilate ral treaties. Moreover, the issue before this
Court is not the discretion that should be accorded to the Respondent in applying general criteria
for admission of new members of international orga nizations, such as those set forth in Article 4 of
the United Nations Charter. Rather, if there is a lesson to be taken from the Conditions of
Admission Advisory Opinion, it is that States should not create new conditions for admission
beyond those set forth in the treaty instrument. By analogy to this case, the Respondent should not
be creating a new condition for a permissible objection not found in Article 11 (1).
61
Advisory Opinion, 1948, I.C.J. Reports 1947-1948; RR, para. 5.35 (iii).
6Ibid., paras. 5.44-5.46, 6.27, 6.30. - 37 -
51. In Article11(1) of the Interim Acco rd, the Respondent expressly and unambiguously
agreed to restrict its ability to object, subject to a single express and unambiguous exception.
Article 11 (1) does allow the Respondent to assess whether the Applicant is to be granted
membership in an international organization in circumstances where it will be known in that
organization as “Republic of Macedonia” and, if so, does allow the Respondent to object.
Article 11 (1), however, does not allow the Respondent to object for whatever other reasons the
Respondent believes fall within a “margin of appreciation” dictated by the Respondent itself.
52. Mr.President, it is now my intention to tu rn to the practice at the United Nations that
preceded the entry into force of Article11(1), wh ich sheds considerable light on the meaning of
the clause, but I note this may be a convenient time for the morning coffee break, if the Court so
pleases.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, ProfessorMurphy, for your suggestion. I think it is an
appropriate moment. We will have a coffee break of 15 minutes.
Mr. MURPHY: Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: We resume the session at 11.30 a.m.
The Court adjourned from 11.15 a.m. to 11.30 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Now, Professor Murphy, you can continue.
Mr. MURPHY:
C. Practice at the United Nations under resolution 817 prior to the Interim Accord does not
support the Respondent’s theory as to the meaning of the second clause of Article 11 (1)
53. Thank you, Mr.President, I was in the midst of discussing the interpretation of the
second clause of Article 11 (1) and, if all this C ourt had were the bald assertions by the two Parties
as to the meaning of this clause, your task might be harder. But there is much more before you
than just this, and all of it weighs against the Respondent’s interpretation.
54. Perhaps the most obvious place to look for further illumination as to the meaning of the
second clause of Article11(1) is the practice associated with the Applican t’s membership at the - 38 -
UnitedNations under resolution81 7. You will have noted that the second clause expressly
cross-references to resolution 817, saying that the Respondent may object to new membership in an
international organization if the A pplicant is referred therein “diffe rently than in paragraph 2” of
resolution 817.
55. Resolution 817 appears at tab 5 in your judges’ folder, in the event you wish to refer to it.
Paragraph 2 of that resolution recommends that th e General Assembly vote to admit the Applicant
as a United Nations Member State, but with the State “being referred to for all purposes within the
United Nations as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ pending settlement of the
difference that has arisen over the name of the State”.
56. So, the second clause of Article 11 (1) refers directly to the approach taken with respect
to the Applicant’s admission to the United Nations. In effect, it says that the Respondent can
object if the Applicant is to be admitted to an international organization, such as NATO, under
conditions different than those applied at the United Nations under resolution 817. So, the solution
that was employed was to allo w the Applicant to join the United Nations and its specialized
agencies and now this is to be employed under the Interim Accord which respect to whether or not
the Respondent can object for membership in other international organizations.
57. The Respondent appears to believe that resolution817 prohibited any use of the name
“Republic of Macedonia”; in various parts of its pleadings it refers to this as the “prohibited
63
name” . Yet the text of resolution817 contains no prohibition on the use of “Republic of
Macedonia”, it contains no requirement that the provisional reference be the “name” of the
Applicant, and it contains no requirement that th e Applicant use the provisional reference in its
communications with the United Nations 64. The resolution simply does not say any of those
things. Had the resolution prohibited use of the Applicant’s name, all sorts of consequences would
have followed, such as the need to amend the A pplicant’s Constitution, yet no such steps were
65
either expected or taken .
63See, e.g., RR, para. 7.23.
64
AM, para. 2.20; AR, paras. 4.40-4.41 and 4.45.
65Ibid., para. 4.40. - 39 -
58. In fact, the resolution is not even in th e form of a ChapterVII decision; it is a
recommendation to the General Assembly relating to the admission of a new Member State 66. In
issuing that recommendation, the Council proceeded on the basis of an Application that had been
submitted to the United Nations using the name “Republic of Macedonia”, which the Security
Council “examined” and acted upon favourably. Ther e is no evidence that the Members of the
Security Council believed they were imposing a name upon the Applicant. When the President of
the Security Council circulated the draft of resolu tion 817 containing the provisional reference, he
specifically stated that this “is not a matter of imposing a name on a new State, or conditions for its
admission to the UN, but it merely concerns the manner in which it will be provisionally referred to
in its activity in the United Nations (plaque , official documents, ‘bluebook’ . . .)” 67. As Professor
Sands noted yesterday, United Kingdom Amb assador Jeremy Greenstock confirms that
resolution 817 did not mean that the Applicant had to call itself by the provisional reference, either
68
generally or in its communications to the United Nations .
59. Ever since admission to the United Nations, the Applicant has regularly sent
communications to the United Nations on letterh ead entitled “Republic of Macedonia.” Those
communications have not been returned or rejected by the Secretariat or in any fashion treated as a
breach of resolution817 69. To the contrary, the Secretariat regularly circulates those
communications to all United Nations member States under cover of a United Nations document
that uses the provisional reference 7. The Applicant’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations,
located at 866 United Nations Plaza in New York, has always been “the Permanent Mission of the
Republic of Macedonia”. That mission and its staff have always been fully accredited to the
United Nations; they have not been shooed out of the building by the Secret ariat when they show
up with identification papers or passports saying “Republic of Macedonia”.
60. Nor has the Security Council rejected or commented upon the wrongfulness of the
Applicant’s communications; in the immediate af termath of the adoption of resolution817, the
66AM, para. 4.41.
67
AR, para. 4.42 and Ann. 12.
68
Ibid., para. 4.43.
69AM, para. 2.20.
70AR, paras. 4.47-4.48. - 40 -
Applicant continued sending communications to th e United Nations using its constitutional name,
which elicited no adverse reaction whatsoever from the Security Council 71.
61. In short, no one ⎯ other than the Respondent ⎯ regards the provisional reference as the
name of the Applicant. Rather, the provisional reference is exactly that: a “reference” to the
Applicant that is employed provisionally in the United Nations and other international
organizations.
62. From 1993 to 1995, the Applicant’s communi cations to the United Nations consistently
used “Republic of Macedonia” rather than the provisional reference. In 1995, when they concluded
the Interim Accord, both the Appli cant and the Respondent were well aware of this practice at the
United Nations. They were well aware of the basic compromise and logic that had emerged in
resolution817. They expressly agreed in Article5 of the Interim Accord to reserve all of their
rights relating to the name difference consistent with the obligations undertaken in the Interim
Accord. The language of the second clause of Article11(1) clearly seeks to extend the
resolution817 compromise to the Applicant’s memb ership in other international organizations.
There is absolutely nothing in the second clause to suggest that the Parties to the Interim Accord
agreed to diverge radically from the approach at the United Nations, and to go down the path
envisaged by the astoundingly broad theory now advanced by the Respondent. Indeed, if the
purpose of the second clause were to embark on a wholly new path, it would be ludicrous to
cross-reference to resolution 817, or at least to do so without clear and unambiguous language that
72
the United Nations practice was an unacceptable benchmark for Article 11 (1) .
63. Moreover, while the Respondent attempts to draw great significance from the use of the
73
word “in” as a part of the second clause of Article11(1) , the Respondent ignores the obvious
parallel to the language of resolution817. In resolution817, the Security Council said the
Applicant would be referred to for all purposes “within” the United Nations by the provisional
reference. Similarly, the second clause of Article11(1) says the Respondent can object if the
Applicant is to be referred to “in” an intern ational organization by something other than the
71
AR, para. 4.46.
72
Ibid., para. 4.55.
73RR, paras. 5.35 (ii), 5.38. - 41 -
provisional reference. There is simply no basis fo r arguing that the practice generated by the first
preposition ⎯ “within” ⎯ in which the Applicant is allo wed to use its constitutional name,
somehow changes due to the use of the second preposition ⎯ “in” ⎯ so as to preclude
communications when joining other international organizations. We submit the language strongly
indicates continuity with the past, not a break from the past.
64. Now the practice of the United Nations is the most relevant for present purposes.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that after admission to the United Nations, the same approach was
taken throughout the United Nations system at all the specialized agencies and at other
international organizations, including Unesco, the World Health Organization, the International
Labour Organization, the World Trade Organization, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 74. There is not a single international
organization anywhere in the world that requires th e Applicant, in its communications with that
organization, to use the provisional reference. Not a single one. And there is no State, other than
the Respondent, that has raised any concerns regarding the Applicant’s use of its constitutional
name in communications with international organizations. Again, not a single one.
D. The Interim Accord negotiating history does not support the Respondent’s theory
as to the meaning of the second clause
65. Likewise, the negotiating history of the Interim Accord provides no support for the
Respondent’s theory as to the meaning of the second clause. None of the drafts that eventually
became the Interim Accord give any hint that the goal here was to pr event the Applicant from
calling itself by its constitutional name before inte rnational organizations. On the contrary, both
States expressly reserved their rights on such issues in Article 5 of the Interim Accord.
66. Nor do any of the statements made at the time of the Interim Accord suggest a movement
away from the practice that had developed with respect to the Applican t’s membership in the
United Nations. We have previously referenced the Nimetz statement, let me give you just a little
more context: at the press conference held at the time the Interim Accord was concluded,
AmbassadorNimitz, the Special Envoy of the United States to these negotiations, who was
74
AR, para. 4.49. - 42 -
intimately involved in the negotiations of the Inte rim Accord, said exactly the opposite of what the
Respondent would have predicted, based on their theory. Mr. Nimetz reiterated his understanding
that “the United Nations refers to the country as the former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia”,
and he goes on to say the country itself uses “the constitutional name” 7. If the Respondent was
correct in its theory, you would have expected AmbassadorNimetz to say something like “from
now on”, “from here forward, the country must call itself by the provisional reference in its
communications with international organizati ons if it wishes to join new international
organizations” or some such thing as that, but those sorts of statements are nowhere to be found in
the record. Nor is there any statement by the Respondent contemporaneous objecting to
Ambassador Nimetz’s characterization of the situation.
E. Practice subsequent to the Interim Accord does not support the Respondent’s
theory as to the meaning of the second clause
67. With no support for its theory in the actual text of the second clause of Article 11 (1), nor
in the United Nations practice to which it cross-references, nor in the practice of other international
organizations, nor in the negotiating history of th e Interim Accord, one might have expected the
Respondent to demonstrate through practice subsequent to the Interim Accord that the clause was
intended to foreclose the use by the Applicant of its constitutional name in dealings with
international organizations.
68. Yet no such practice exists. In the imme diate aftermath of the entry into force of the
Interim Accord, the Applicant was admitted to th e OSCE in circumstances where it did use its
constitutional name in communications with that organization. One month later, it was admitted to
the Council of Europe in circumstances where it used its constitutional name in communications
with that organization. Within days after th at, it joins NATO’s PfP Programme, again using its
constitutional name in communications with NATO. In none of those instances did the Respondent
invoke the second clause of Article11(1) and object to the Applicant’s admission. Perhaps the
Respondent would have us believe that it was simp ly choosing to look the other way rather than
exercise a right it was allowed to take under Article11(1). However, the far more plausible
75
AR, para. 4.57. - 43 -
interpretation is that the Respondent itself fully understood what the second clause meant, and
understood that it did not allow for an objection ba sed solely on the Applicant’s own use of its
constitutional name in relations with the organization.
F. Even in their bilateral relations, the Respondent accepts that the Applicant
is entitled to use its constitutional name
69. The Respondent’s theory as to the meani ng of the second clause is especially odd when
one considers the way the two States have structured their bilateral relationship.
70. One month after the conclusion of the Interim Accord, the two States conclude
d a
Memorandum on “Practical Measures” related to th e Interim Accord, including measures allowing
them to engage in diplomatic relations. In that Memorandum, the two States agreed that the
Applicant would call itself by its constitutional name in correspondence with the Respondent.
Thus, when the Applicant sends diplomatic Notes to the Respondent, it do es so from the “Republic
of Macedonia”. The Respondent has agreed to accep t and not to return such diplomatic Notes.
Conversely, when the Respondent sends its official correspondence to the Applicant, it refers to the
Applicant by the provisional reference. And the Applicant agrees to accept and not to return such
76
correspondence . That approach, of course, is completely analogous to the approach taken at the
United Nations under resolution 817 and is completely consistent with the ordinary meaning of the
second clause of Article 11 (1). The same general approach is taken by the two States with respect
to legal and judicial documents of each government relating to citizens or authorities of the other
77
government, and for ordinary mail, bills of lading, invoices and other trade documents .
71. Under the Respondent’s theory of the second clause, we are to believe that the
Respondent can receive communications from the Applicant in which the Applicant uses its
constitutional name, but the rest of the world ca nnot. Indeed, the Responde nt would apparently
have us believe that the Security Council in resolution817 ordered the Applicant to use the
provisional reference in all of its external relations, but that the Respondent was then entitled to set
aside the Council’s order through a bilateral agreement, apparently in casual disregard of
76
AM, para. 2.36; AM, Ann. 3, p. 3; AR, paras. 4.59-4.60.
7AM, Ann. 3, pp. 3-5. - 44 -
Articles 25 and 103 of the United Nations Charter. Again, all this renders the Respondent’s theory
yet more and more fantastic.
72. The Respondent’s arguments often revert to complaining about a “creeping use of the
non-agreed name” 78, which has somehow “changed” things in recent years 79such that the
Respondent may now object under Article11(1). Yet there is nothing “creeping” about the
Applicant’s use of its constitutional name. In co mplete continuity with its long-standing name as a
republic of the Yugoslav federation, the Appli cant in 1991 adopted the name “Republic of
80
Macedonia” . The Applicant has used that name in all its bilateral and multilateral
communications for the past 20years. The App licant has used the constitutional name in its
bilateral relations with the Respondent for 16 year s. There is nothing “creeping” about the use of
the constitutional name.
73. Now, in apparent recognition of this, the Respondent ultimately identifies the relevant
“change” as being the fact that many States now recognize the Applicant by the constitutional
81
name . There are, indeed, a very large number of States that recognize and use the constitutional
name in their bilateral relations with the Applicant. In our view, that fact reinforces the ordinary
meaning of Article11(1), which is that it is focused on the manner in which the relevant
international organization refers to the Applicant, not on the manner in which “all possible actors”
refer to the Applicant. Moreover, it highlights the extremity of the Respondent’s position; the
Respondent is saying that it is entitled to object unde r Article 11 (1) not because of anything to do
with the Applicant’s entry into the internati onal organization, but because the Respondent is
unhappy about political decisions reached by thir d States in recent years in their diplomatic
relations with the Applicant.
74. Allow me to conclude this second part of my presentation by noting that, in its Rejoinder,
the Respondent argues that our interpretation of Artic le 11 (1) results in a “fool’s bargain” for the
Respondent ⎯ a marché de dupes 82. Article11(1), however, was hardly a fool’s bargain. In it,
78RR, para. 6.34.
79Ibid., paras. 6.35, 6.38.
80
AM, para. 2.3.
81RR, para. 6.36.
82Ibid., para. 5.43. - 45 -
the Respondent preserved its ability to object to th e Applicant’s membership in any international
organization as the “Republic of Macedonia”. Rath er than a “fool’s bargain”, this approach
replicated the approach that was adopted by th e Security Council, the General Assembly, and the
Secretariat in the context of the Applicant’s admission to the United Nations. It was the approach
adopted by a wide range of United Nations specialized agencies and other international
organizations in the context of the Applicant’s admission to those organizations, and it was the
approach that was promoted by third-party me diators closely associated with the drafting and
conclusion of the Interim Accord. Even the Respondent expressly accepted in its bilateral relations
with the Applicant the basic terms that underlie wh at it now calls a “fool’s bargain”. With all due
respect, we suggest that there may be some “fooling” going on here, but it is not coming from the
Applicant.
III.O THER REASONS ASSERTED BY THE R ESPONDENT FOR WHY IT OBJECTED ALSO DO NOT
FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE SECOND CLAUSE OF A RTICLE 11 (1)
75. Mr.President, I turn to the third and fina l part of my presentation, which is to very
briefly address certain other reasons asserted by the Respondent for why it objected to the
Applicant’s admission to NATO.
76. Notably, the Respondent asserts that its “margin of appreciation” under Article11(1)
allows it to object because of the Applicant’s a lleged “efforts to entrench a non-agreed name
83
despite its commitment to negotiate an agreed resolution of the [name] difference” . Similarly, the
Respondent says it may object because of the A pplicant’s “creeping use of a non-agreed name
which is in violation of the obligation to negotiate” and because the Applicant is “going through the
motions of a diplomatic process, while vigorously pursuing a fait accompli in a manner which is
84
intended to render that process irrelevant and nugatory” . Or, more simply, the Respondent
candidly asserts at paragraph 6.30 of its Rejoinder that it is allowed to object under Article 11 (1)
85
because of the “failure to date to settle the name difference” . So, to put it another way, the
8RR, para. 5.46.
84
Ibid., para. 6.34.
8Ibid., para. 6.30. - 46 -
Respondent can object because the Applicant has not agreed to use a name in its diplomatic
relations that is acceptable to the Respondent.
77. In fact, this is the real reason that the Respondent objected to the Applicant’s admission
to NATO; the Respondent is upset that the name di fference has not yet been resolved on its terms.
Yet that is exactly what Article11(1) is designed to prevent; the two States agreed in
Article 11 (1) that, while the name difference persists, the Respondent would refrain from taking
certain steps. To the extent that this is th e real reason for the Respondent’s objection, it is
86
manifestly not a reason embraced by the second clause of Article 11 (1) .
78. Now in order to try to connect its legal theory about the meaning of the second clause of
Article 11 (1) to what it actually did, the best the Respondent can come up with is that its so-called
“margin of appreciation” theory allows it to “cons ider ‘any factor’ bearing a rational connection to
the specified condition” found in the second clause of Article11(1) 87. So, if we understand this
theory correctly, even though Article 11 (1) was d esigned precisely to take the name difference off
the table for the purposes of the Applicant’s admission to international organizations, the
Respondent is now able to put it back on th e table because the name difference has some
connection to Article11(1), a connection that also conveniently serves to deprive this Court of
jurisdiction. Again, this makes no sense, and it turns Article 11 (1) into meaningless gibberish.
79. Alternatively, the Respondent sometimes a sserts that its objection occurred because of
the Applicant’s lack of “good-neighbourly relations” 88, which allegedly exist because the
89
constitutional name has “irredentist potential in a region long-plagued by irredentist conflict” .
Lacking any factual proof of irredentism today other than its own self-serving statements, the
Respondent is reduced to pointing to certain statements from 1992 to 1993 90. It is certainly true
that in the early 1990s, as this Court is well awar e, there was considerable concern about stability
in the Balkans, and further true that everyone , the Applicant included, wished that the name
difference could be resolved. But it is a comple te distortion of that history to assert that the
86AR, paras. 4.70-4.72.
87
RR, para. 6.31.
88
Ibid., para. 5.46.
89Ibid., para. 6.19; see also ibid.., para. 6.30.
90Ibid., paras. 6.14-6.20. - 47 -
Applicant has ever advanced any territorial clai ms beyond its present borders; there is simply no
91
evidence of any kind to that effect . And as this Court will recall, the Badinter Commission
found, in its Opinion No.6 of 14 January 1992, that “the Repub lic of Macedonia has, moreover,
renounced all territorial claims of any kind”, and then it further found that “the use of the name
‘Macedonia’ cannot therefore imply any territorial claim against another State” 92.
80. Moreover, the compromise reached when the Applicant was admitted to the United
Nations, and the compromise that was enshrined in Article 11 (1), was to agree that the outstanding
name difference, as well as the Applicant’s own u se of its constitutional name, whatever might or
might not be its effects, was not an obstacle to the Applicant’s admission to international
organizations, even those ⎯ such as the United Nations ⎯ that expressly call for admission by
peace-loving States. The Respondent may believe that the existence of the constitutional name
suggests irredentism and should be changed; but that was not a basis for precluding the
Applicant’s admission to the United Nations in 199 3, not a basis for precluding the Applicant’s
admission to the OSCE and the Council of Europe in 1995, and not a basis for precluding the
Applicant’s admission to numerous other interna tional organizations within the United Nations
family and outside of it. It was also not a basis for precluding the Applicant’s admission to NATO
in 2008.
81. In any event, regardless of the factual ac curacy of those allegations, justifying an
objection based on a lack of “good neighborliness” gets the Respondent nowhere, for such a reason
is not envisaged in the second clause of Article 11 (1).
82. So to summarize my third point, the Respondent occasionally lapses into arguing certain
other reasons for why it was entitled to object under Article11(1), such as this “lack of good
neighborliness” or “irredentism”. Regardless of the factual accuracy of those types of allegations,
none of those reasons has any basis in Article 11 (1 ), and therefore cannot justify the Respondent’s
objection.
91
AR, paras. 4.80-4.88.
92See Arbitration Commission on the Conference on Y ugoslavia, Opinion No. 6 on the Recognition of the
Socialist Republic of Macedonia by th e European Community and its Member States, 14 Jan.1992, United Nations
doc. S/25855, Ann. III, para. 5, 28 May 1993; see also AM, paras. 2.13-2.14; AR, para. 4.81. - 48 -
IV. C ONCLUSION
83. Mr. President, I now conclude by making one final point.
84. In various parts of its pleadings, the Respondent maintains that the Applicant has
disrupted the status quo or the “balance of interests” of the Interim Accord by “unilaterally” using
93
and imposing its constitutiona l name without consent . No doubt we will hear from the
Respondent at great length along those lines.
85. But as we have tried to explain in our pleadings, our position on Article11(1) is not a
disruption of a balance of interests; rather, it is a straightforward effort to re-establish the balance
agreed upon by the Parties in 1995. Indeed, the in terpretation and application of Article 11 (1) that
we are urging upon the Court is hardly a one-sided victory for the Applicant. In Article 11 (1), the
Applicant is essentially being forced to become a member and participate in international
organizations in circumstances where it is to be referred to therein by a reference that is not the
name chosen by the Applicant. The Applicant, a fully sovereign State, has been placed in a
position where it must be designated in internationa l organizations by a reference everyone agrees
is not the Applicant’s constitutional name and is only provisional in nature, pending resolution of
the difference over the name.
86. Mr. President, this is like being invited to join a club here in The Hague, but being told
that you cannot use your given name and instead must use the temporary label “Mr.X”. Why is
that the case? Because an existing club member does not like your name and wants you to change
it. When you show up at the club, you call yourself “Sean Murphy”, because it is your name, but
when they call out the names of the members at the club, you are known as “Mr.X”, or
“Member X”, which appears as well on the card at your dinner table and in the note that the club
sends you at Christmas time or holiday time. That is hardly a unilateral victory for you.
87. The truth is that the Applicant, as we st and before you today, simply asks that the Court
keep the two States on the path they set for themsel ves in the Interim Accord. The bargain struck
in Article11(1) was fairly simple. The Res pondent partially succeeded because the Applicant
cannot be known or referred to in international organizations under its c onstitutional name. Until
the name difference is resolved, the Applicant remains “Member X”. At the same time, the
93
See, e.g., RR, paras. 6.30, 6.32. - 49 -
Applicant partially succeeded because it does get to join international organizations; the
Respondent cannot take steps to prevent the Applicant from joining the club or paying its dues on a
cheque on which its constitutional name appears. Moreover, the Applicant is not forced to entirely
jettison its constitutional name in relations with inte rnational organizations or member States; for
if that were the case, it would be a wholesale victory for the Respondent.
88. That is the bargain we struck in Article 11 (1), and that, Mr. President, is the bargain to
which the Court should hold us.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, ProfessorSean Murphy, for your presentation. Now, I call
Professor Philippe Sands to take the floor.
SANr.DS:
T HE R ESPONDENT ’S BREACH OF A RTICLE 11 (1)CANNOT BE EXCUSED
Introduction
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, you have just heard from my colleague
Professor Murphy on the meaning and effect of Article 11 (1). The obligation there imposed not to
object, we say, is clear. It is equally clear that the Respondent did object, and clear also that it did
so for a reason not permitted by Article 11 (1).
2. Mr. President, there is one ⎯ and only one ⎯ circumstance in which the Respondent may
lawfully object: if the Applicant sought to jo in NATO under circumstances in which it would be
referred to in that organization differently thas provided in Security Council resolution817.
This was not the case, and there is no disput e before the Court that the Applicant sought
membership in NATO in the expectation that the practice in that organization would be the same as
that in the United Nations. So, the Respondent has had to go the extra mile. It has had to find
other ways to excuse its actions in law. And my task this morning is address the three excuses
that it has raised, and I will, with your pession, Mr.President, indicate a convenient moment
perhaps for a slightly early lunch today as we awell within time which, you will, I am sure, be
very pleased to hear - 50 -
3. First, the Respondent argues that there w as no breach of Article 11 because Article 22 of
the Interim Accord protects and preserves its rights as a NATO member and the duties it owes to
that organization and to all other NATO members. The argument is that these rights and duties
trump the obligations in Article 11. The second argument is that its breach can be justified on the
basis of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus. And the third argument, although it disclaimed any
intention of raising it in its Counter-Memorial, is that its objection can be excused as a lawful
countermeasure to a wrongful act by the Applican t. Now, I am going to address each of these in
turn, the first one perhaps before lunch, the othe r two after lunch. But, you will note immediately
that none of these justifications was raised before April 2008: they are all new, they are all ex post
facto explanations; they are all invented in the course of this litigation to justify patently unlawful
actions.
I. The Respondent’s breach of Article 11 (1) of the Interim Accord
cannot be justified on the basis of Article 22
4. So, let us turn to the first justification. The Respondent claims to be entitled to invoke
Article22 of the Interim Accord 94. We responded fully to this argument in ChapterV of our
95
Reply , and they have come back with a great deal more, so please excuse me if we have to spend
a little more time on this than we think is necessary. For the Respondent, this argument is a sort of
“get out of jail free” card; it enables the Responde nt to avoid an international obligation that has
become inconvenient. So let us look at wh at Article22 actually says. Words matter,
Mr. President. [Plate 1 on] It is part of the “Final Clauses”. It says:
“[t]he Interim Accord is not directed against any other State or entity and it does not
infringe on the rights and duties resulting from bilateral and multilateral agreements
already in force that the parties have c oncluded with other States or international
96
organizations” .
5. So, the Respondent argues that even if it had made an objection that violates Article11,
the objection is nevertheless made permissible ⎯ sort of legalized ⎯ because Article 22 preserves
94
RCM, paras. 7.26 et seq. and GR, paras. 5.7 et seq.
95AR, paras. 5.8-5.45.
96Judges’ folder, tab7, plate1. For the complete text of the Interim Accord see judges’ folder, tab1 and
Memorial, Vol. II, Ann. 1. - 51 -
the Respondent’s rights under other international agreements, including the right to object to a new
member in NATO. This approach, of course, renders Article 11 a dead letter, as we will see.
6. The Respondent’s argument is premised on two related contentions: the first is that
Article 22 preserves the rights and duties of the Respondent resulting from agreements in force with
third parties and other entities; the second is that the non-objection clause in Article11(1) is
subordinate to the Respondent’s rights and obligations which are allegedly protected by Article 22.
We say that both claims are patently without merit; that they run contrary to the plain meaning of
the text and to the principles and rules of treaty interpretation and the principle of pacta sunt
servanda.
A. Article 22 does not speak to the Respondent’s rights and duties
7. Article22, as you will recall, appears toward s the end of the Interim Accord, it is in the
“Final Clauses” section. It does have a purpose, a nd that is to protect the rights and duties of “any
other State or entity”. It is, in effect, an expressi on of the rule set forth in Article 34 of the Vienna
Convention, which confirms that “[a] treaty does no t create either obligations or rights for a third
State without its consent”. Article22 does not on its face create or reserve rights for the
Respondent, and it certainly does not alter or otherw ise affect other obligations set forth in the
Accord, including Article 11.
8. The Respondent claims that Article 22 speaks to the rights and duties of the Respondent.
Well, perhaps if the Respondent had invoked Article 22 at the time it acted in 2007 and 2008, or at
any time before, it could at least be said that th e argument was made in a timely manner, even if
erroneously. But it did not do so; it never i nvoked any rights under Article22: it raised the
argument for the first time in 2009, more than a year after it had violated Article11 and some
15years after the Interim Accord was adopted. Now, we have already heard, the Respondent’s
Foreign Minister of the time ⎯ MsBayokannis ⎯ was very conscious of the fact that her
Government’s act of objection was motivated by overt political considerations and she recognized - 52 -
that those actions would be inconsistent with the Interim Accord: the Accord ⎯ and in particular
its Article 22 ⎯ does not encompass a “political cowardice” exception, in the sense evoked by the
Foreign Minister, to limit the scope of obligations that would otherwise allow the Applicant to join
97
NATO .
9. The Respondent claims that Article 22 it self can be broken down into two elements: the
98
first is an assurance that the In terim Accord “is not directed against any other State or entity” .
Now that is straightforward and not in dispute, and it provides no assistance to the Respondent. It
is the second element, however, that the Respondent claims is of ⎯ as it puts it ⎯ “critical
importance” 99, the Respondent says that it is a “lethal” 100 argument, lethal to the Applicant’s
case ⎯ so lethal, it must be said, but not obviously lethal, since neither MsBayokannis or any
other official of the Respondent or any of its legal advisers at any point before 2009 actually
noticed it, and it was not until this case was up and running that it suddenly came to be found ⎯ so
its “lethal-ness” or “lethality” only then became apparent. The component, the element of the
argument here, is supposedly that the Interim Accord “does not infringe” on the Respondent’s
pre-existing rights and duties, including in relation to the North Atlantic Treaty. So the Respondent
claims that by Article 22, the Applicant “acknowle dges and accepts the fact that [the Respondent]
has prior rights and obligations” with third parties, and that this provision “super-ordinates” ⎯ that
is the word they use, I have personally not come across it before ⎯ rights and obligations in
relation to the Article11 obligation not to object 101. This curious interpretation cannot be said to
lack Alexandrian imagination.
10. On its face, it is difficult to see how the te xt of Article 22 could possibly be twisted and
strained in this way. Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention provides, as you know very well, that
“[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose”. The ordinary
97
Embassy of the Respondent in Washington, D.C., Interview of FM Ms Bakoyannis in Athens daily Kathimerini,
with journalist Ms D. Antoniou (Sunday, 14 October 2007), 15 October 2007, at AM, para. 2.60, footnote 121; and AM,
Ann. 73.
98
RCM, para. 6.61.
99
Ibid.
100RR, para. 3.26
101RCM, para. 6.61. - 53 -
meaning is clear. Article22 does not address the rights and duties of the Respondent: it merely
declares that the Interim Accord as a whole does not infringe on the rights and duties of third States
or other entities. Article 22 declares as a fact that the Accord is to operate consistently with rights
and duties in third party agreements; nothing more and nothing less. That is plain meaning.
11. What about object and purpose? This points in exactly the same direction. Yesterday I
102
addressed the object and purpose of the Accord as a whole . As you know, it was intended to
provide for the immediate normalization of relati ons between the two Par ties, and to allow the
Applicant to join international organizations. The very purpose of Article11(1) was for the
Respondent to relinquish its right to object, subject to the one, single, stated exception. Interpreting
Article22 to restore that right to object for an y other reason defeats a core object and purpose of
the Interim Accord.
12. But the argument is undermined by other provisions of the Accord that expressly address
the Respondent’s rights, conditioning the Respondent’s obligations under the Interim Accord.
[Plate 2 on] Let us have a look at some exam ples. Article14 provides for the “development of
friendly and good-neighbourly relations” between th e Parties and the promotion on a reciprocal
basis of, inter alia, road, rail, maritime and air transpor t and communication links. The Parties
recognized that this provision could conflict w ith the Respondent’s pre-existing obligations as a
member of the European Union. So the dr afters addressed that issue in Article14(2) ⎯ you can
see it highlighted in bold ⎯ which provides that negotiations shall “tak[e] into account the
obligations of [the Respondent] deriving from its membership of the European Union and other
103
international instruments . . .”.
So, in this way, Article 14 does reserve and protect the rights and duties of the Respondent
that arise from its membership of the European Un ion, and from other international instruments.
The Respondent’s approach to Article22 renders Article14(2) completely superfluous, it has no
practical meaning or effect. [Plate 2 off ⎯ plate 3 on] Now, the same is true of Article 19, which
conditions co-operation on business and tourist travel ⎯ you see the words in bold ⎯ so that it will
102
CR 2011/5, 21 March 2011 (Sands), especially paras. 16-17.
10Judges folder, tab 7, plate 2. - 54 -
be “consistent with the obligations of [the Respondent] arising from its membership in the
104
European Union and from relevant instruments of the Union . . .”.
So this provision too becomes a total irrelevance on the Respondent’s approach to Article 22.
These provisions would simply not be necessary if the Respondent’s interpretation of Article22
was correct. If indeed Article22 is designed to protect the Respondent’s rights and obligations
under other international agreements, why did the dr afters include the clauses I have just referred
you to in Articles 14 and 19? And we look forward to hearing something on that from the other
side. They would be completely meaningless. Wh en Article22 is read in this context, these
provisions confirm what we say is the true m eaning of Article22: it addresses the rights and
obligations of third States, not of the Respondent. [Plate 3 off]
13. I have already noted that Article11 contains no similar proviso to that found in
Articles14 and 19, one that explicitly addr esses the Respondent’s obligations under other
agreements. If the parties had wanted to draft Article 22 so as to allow the Respondent to be able
to invoke its “rights” or “duties” under third party agreements ⎯ sorry, I meant Article 11 ⎯ then
they could easily have included a similar clause. They did not do so, and the Respondent cannot
just read these provisos into the text by Article 22. We raised all of these points in our Reply. We
expected a response. We did not get one. Nothin g of substance. All they have to say is that
Articles14 and19 are “special provisions” deali ng with the EU and EU competence issues, and
105
that they have nothing to say “about Article 11 . . . [or] about Article 22” . On the Respondent’s
argument, then, it seems that Article 22 does not apply to EU matters at all, and an EU exclusion is
somehow to be read into Article 22. So, if that is true, one wonders whether exclusions of other
multilateral organizations, such as the OSCE, or the Council of Europe or NATO might not also be
read into Article22. Yet again our good friends read into the text words that are just not there.
And in that technique at least it may be said th at they have finally achieved some degree of
consistency. Article 22 simply does not address their rights and obligations.
14. The subsequent practice of the Parties conf irms that our interpretation has got to be the
correct one. Until 1995, the Respondent systematically objected to the Applicant’s efforts to join a
104
Judges’ folder, tab 7, plate 3.
10RR, para. 5.14. - 55 -
large number of organizations. The Accord was intended to bring that practice to an end, and it did
so efficiently, effectively and completely until Ap ril 2008. That was the purpose of Article 11, the
reason why the Applicant insisted on the inclusion of the non-objection provision. As soon as the
Interim Accord came into for ce in October 1995, the Respondent’s conduct changed, and it then
remained constant for 13 years. That would ha rdly be expected if the Respondent could invoke
Article22 to exercise its own “rights” and “ob ligations” under treaties establishing international
organizations. There is no evidence before this C ourt that it ever sought to do so. That it ever
sought even the possibility of doing so. Instead, the Respondent, by its behaviour, gave effect to
the plain meaning of the Article11 obligation; it complied, and we respect that, with the treaty
rule. That could not have occurred because the Respondent recognized and accepted that by
signing the Interim Accord it had greatly fettered its right to object. And in return, the Applicant
agreed to be referred to in the organization by the provisional designation. The quid pro quo and
practice makes clear that Article22, never i nvoked before the pleadings, never regarded as
addressing rights and obligations of the Respondent.
15. Article 22 was there for a reason. To confirm that the Accord does not affect the rights
and obligations of third parties. That is what it says, and that is what it means.
B. Interpreting Article 22 as speaking to the Respondent’s rights and obligations would
undermine the raison d’être of Article 11 (1)
16. Now, the Respondent’s approach to Article22 is erroneous for another reason; if
accepted, the argument would render Article 11 (1) meaningless, as the Respondent could object to
any membership of any organization at any time, si mply by invoking an alleged right or obligation
of the Respondent under another agreement. That would undermine the raison d’être of
Article 11 (1), and arguably many of the core provisions of the Interim Accord.
17. To achieve the purpose it seeks by this interpretation, what the Respondent has had to do
is to rewrite the text of the Interim Accord ⎯ Literally rewrite it. Not just once, but on three
occasions in its written pleadings the Respondent go es through the exercise of taking parts of the
first paragraph of Article11 ⎯ see that on the screen ⎯ then connecting it to parts of Article22, - 56 -
and then inserting the word “but” betw een the extracts on the two Articles 106. This exercise has
107
just been shown on the screen : [plate 4 on] so you start with the first part, the text of Article 11,
and then you add the relevant text of Article 22 at the bottom, whilst taking care to leave a gap and
then you insert the word “but”. Check the Count er-Memorial and the Reply for yourselves. The
word “but” doesn’t actually feature in the negotiate d text, so one marvels at the creativity of the
Respondent, and one is almost reminded of the va riation on the theme of the relationship between
the words “or” and “and” and what they may or may not mean: you just take the text of the treaty
as negotiated and adopted, but noticing that somethin g is missing, you claim the right to be free to
insert the word that completes the meaning you seek. Now we are not aware of any provision of
the 1969 Vienna Convention that allows you to insert ⎯ at your own instance ⎯ extra words. One
can think of how to do it, perhaps an addition to Article31(3), on interpretation, could read as
follows: “There shall be taken into account, together with context . . . (d) . . . the odd word or two
that has been inserted at the instance of any pa rty even if it contradicts or undermines the plain
meaning of the text.” Mr. President, the word “but ” is not to be found in Article 11 and it is not to
be found in Article22. We look forward to hear ing an explanation as to why this word has been
inserted. The effect of inserting it leads to the argument that the combined effect of Articles11
and 22 is that the Respondent’s rights under the No rth Atlantic Treaty and the obligations it owes
to NATO and its member States are to prevail over all other provisions in the Interim Accord, most
notably, in this case, the obligation not to object . But of course remove the word “but” and the
argument falls away. It is unjustifiable and unsupported also by the object and purpose of
Article 22. [Plate 4 off]
18. Let us now look more carefully at the practical effect of the Respondent’s approach of its
argument on Article11(1). All international orga nizations prescribe conditions for membership.
A prospective member State has to meet these cond itions in order for it to be able to join the
organization. Most commonly, it is the members of the organization that, through their votes or by
other means as described to you by Professor Murphy, decide whether or not to admit the aspiring
member State. If we are to take the Respondent’s interpretation of Article 22 at face value, acting
106
RCM, paras. 6.27 and 7.29; RR, para. 3.25.
10Judges’ folder, tab 7, plate 4. - 57 -
on its own it would always be entitled to circumvent Article 11 (1 ) by a unilateral decision that the
conditions of membership of a particular organization had not been met: that is all it would have to
do. Such an interpretation is patently absurd. That is all the more so where the Applicant plainly
does meet the requirements of NATO membership: as recently disclosed and publicly available
documents make clear, key NATO States have agreed that a decision to invite the Applicant to join
NATO does not have to wait another summit; it can be extended as soon as the Respondent
108
agrees . For each and every international orga nization that the Applicant has joined ⎯ and there
are many since 1995 and hopefully more to come ⎯ as well as for all those future applications, for
example and most significantly for the European Union ⎯ assuming Article22 applies to that
organization even though the Respondent seems today at least to believe that it may not ⎯ the
Respondent can simply assert that membership c onditions have not been met and in this way
Article 11 just becomes an irrelevance.
19. Article 11 is not an irrelevance. Until April 2008 it worked, and it worked well. Nothing
changed in the essential obligation, except that the Respondent grew tired of protracted
negotiations over the name issue. As MsBakoy annis put it, in explaining the objection to the
Applicant’s desire for NATO membership “o ur goal is for an issue that dates back 15 years . . . to
be resolved” 109. When it objected, the Respondent repeated ly said it did so because there was no
“solution” to the name difference; it said nothing about the need to exercise a right under NATO
that superseded its obligation under the Interim Accord: the interview that Ms Bakoyannis gave to
the journalist in October 2007 makes that abundantly clear, as do all the other statements we have
referred to you and the many more listed in our pleadings 110.
20. In support of its argument, therefore, the Respondent is forced to conjure up yet another
new distinction, between various categories of inte rnational organizations: so we learn that there
are organisations fermées , to which Article22 does apply, and then there are organizations of
10Cable from United States Embassy London to United States Dept. of State, entitled “HMG Looking Forward to
Building on Gains of NATO Bucharest Summit”, 9 Apr. 2009, Cable No. 08LONDON1017, para.1, available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/london-wikileaks/830501…
NG-ON-GAINS-OF-NATO-BUCHAREST-SUMMIT.html (accessed 16 Mar. 2011).
10Embassy of the Respondent in Washington, D.C., In terview of FM MsBakoyannis in Athens daily
Kathimerini, with journalist Ms D. Antoniou (Sunday, 14 Oct. 2007), 15 Oct. 2007, at AM, para. 2.60, footnote 121; and
AM, Ann. 73.
11Ibid. - 58 -
universal membership, to which it does not apply. So on the Respondent’s approach, really not
clearly explained, Article 22 applies to none of the universal organizations and to some, but not all,
organisations fermées, since it appears now that it does not apply to the European Union. Is there
any support for these distinctions in the text of Ar ticle 22? No, there is not. Does the Respondent
offer any criteria for the distinctions? No, it does not. Again, the Respondent is simply entitled to
insert exceptions into the text. So for those institutions that remain subject to Article22 ⎯ the
category of unspecified organisations fermées that conveniently includes NATO ⎯ the admission
of a new member requires “active participation of the existing members” so that the Respondent, as
a NATO member, has “legal obligations to both the other members of the organization and the
111
organization itself with respect to discharge of its rights and duties in the membership process” .
In other words, these NATO rules allow it, no require it, to exercise a veto to object.
21. The Respondent maintains that it is simply for it ⎯ it alone, acting unilaterally, without
notice, according to criteria that it has completely invented out of the air and that are nowhere
reduced into written form or otherwise available ⎯ to decide which organization falls into this
category. Now the argument suffers from many diffic ulties, but let me just mention three. First,
Article11 makes no distinction between different categories of international organizations.
Second, as I have already said, at no point befo re April 2008 did the Respondent make or invoke
such a distinction ⎯ it is an invention and it dates to 2009. Third, the distinction leads to a
manifestly absurd conclusion. On its approach , the Respondent cannot object to the Applicant’s
membership of a “universal” international organi zation in which the Respondent plays virtually no
role in the membership process, but it can always object in the case of some, but not all, “closed”
international organizations ⎯ where, conveniently, it has a role to play in the admissions process.
So, to put it simply, the Respondent has no right to object in situations where its objection would
have no effect, but it has a right to object where the objection would be effective. Now, in many
parts of the world ⎯ in particular, in the East End of London ⎯ this is known as a bootstraps
argument: you are prohibited from doing something, except in situations where you can do
something, because doing something would be effective. In other words, the right exists because it
111
RCM, para. 6.59. - 59 -
can be effectively applied. This is a very curious way to interpret Articles 11 and 22 of the Interim
Accord or, indeed, of any treaty provision. And the implications for treaty law are clear, and I do
not need to spell them out.
22. One might ask, then, what effect would the Respondent’s approach have on yet other
provisions of the Interim Accord? The Applicant would have negotiated and adopted an agreement
that would potentially be devoid of practical effect. All of the substantive obligations would have
to be read subject to the Respondent’s perverse approach to Article22 because, presumably, it
applies across the board.
23. Let us take an example. Article8(1) of the Interim Accord requires that both Parties
must “refrain from imposing any impediment to the movement of people or goods between their
territories . . .”. On the Respondent’s approach, it is perfectly free to assert ⎯ on a unilateral
basis ⎯ that it retains a “right” under Article224 of the Treaty of Rome to impose a unilateral
trade embargo on the Applicant, a non-EU member, and therefore it can do so pursuant to
Article22, assuming it to be applicable, even though such conduct is clearly prohibited by
Article8(1) of the Accord. Now that would be an astonishing result, yet that is what they are
arguing for. In short, the Respondent’s appro ach to interpreting Article22 as protecting the
Respondent’s rights renders Article11 meaningless. It introduces manifest instability into the
bilateral relationship under the Interim Accord, the very thing it sought to avoid.
C. The Respondent has identified no relevant “rights and duties” that may be invoked
under Article 22
24. The Respondent’s reasons for invoking Article 22, it says, is that its “rights” and “duties”
under the North Atlantic Treaty are protected by that provision, and this allows it to object to the
Applicant’s admission to NATO notwithstanding its Article11 obligation. So, this is the
Respondent’s argument:
“If we assume for purposes of argument that [the Respondent], as a member of
NATO, had concluded that it was bound ‘to object’ to the FYROM’s application
because of the unresolved ‘difference’, its judgment in this matter could not possibly
112
constitute a violation of the Interim Accord.”
Very clearly put, supporting all of the arguments I have just summarized.
112
RCM, para. 6.63. - 60 -
25. But, curiously, the Respondent has failed to identify any “rights” or “duties” under the
North Atlantic Treaty that entitled it to veto th e Applicant’s NATO member ship aspirations. The
only treaty provision invoked by the Respondent is Ar ticle 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. What
does Article 10 of the Treaty actually say? Let us have another look at it. This is what it says in its
entirety: [plate 5 on]
“The Parties may, by unanimous agreemen t, invite any other European State in
a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party
to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the
United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will
inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.” 113
26. So, this is the provision that the Respondent relies on to justify its breach of Article 11 of
the Interim Accord. It argues that Article10 of the North Atlantic Treaty imposes a “right” or a
114
“duty” for the Respondent to “express [its] views” with respect to the accession of new NATO
members, and that this right or duty was ex ercised when the Respondent objected to the
Applicant’s NATO accession. But it is plain that Ar ticle10, by its terms, says no such thing; it
simply indicates that a particular condition ⎯ unanimous agreement ⎯ must be met before a State
may join NATO. The text says nothing about a “right” or a “duty” of the Respondent. And so,
once again, the Respondent’s creative propensities allow it to insert text where none exists.
27. The Respondent does identify a basis for raising criteria for NATO membership. It
refers to the “requirement” that candidate Stat es “settle ethnic disputes or external territorial
disputes including irredentist claims or international jurisdiction disputes by peaceful means in
accordance with OSCE principles and . . . pursue good neighborly relations” 115. That is the criteria
they invoke. But wait a second; ask yourselves th e question. From where is this “requirement”
drawn? It is not in Article 10. In fact, it is not anywhere in the North Atlantic Treaty. So, where
did they find it? Well, they obviously had to look far and wide because what they dug up to justify
it is a 1999 NATO press release that sets out the Membership Action Plan through which aspiring
NATO candidate States may eventual ly accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. And this states that
113
Judges’ folder, tab 7, plate 5.
11RCM, paras. 7.33-7.34.
11Ibid., para.7.36; Press Release NAC-S(99)66, Memb ership Action Plan (MAP), 24Apr.1999; RCM .,
Ann. 21. - 61 -
116
“[a]spirants would also be expected . . . to settle ethnic disputes” . Is this a substantive criterion
of NATO membership, that the Respondent was bound by virtue of Article 10 of the North Atlantic
Treaty to invoke? The Respondent never explains how this might be, and we fail to see how a
press release can in this way create the basis for new criteria. [Plate 5 off]
28. Now, there is actually a very simple wa y that you can cut through this entire argument,
and that is by dealing with it on the facts. You do not even have to address any of these issues if
you do not want to. Why? Because the Responde nt, on its own admission made the objection on
the basis of a factor that it says was “in addition to” ⎯ and I emphasize the words “in addition
to” ⎯ NATO accession criteria. In other words, th e Respondent has conceded that the objection
was not a part of the NATO criteria themselves 117. It did the same thing in the run-up to Bucharest.
Look carefully at the aide mémoire circulated prior to the Bucharest Summit ⎯ you saw some of it
on the screen yesterday ⎯ the Respondent made clear in that document that the act of objection
was motivated by the need to bring to a satisfactor y conclusion the name issue, and that this is “in
118
addition to any accession criteria” . In other words, you do not even have to decide all of these
legal issues because they, on their own case, were not relying on NATO admission criteria, they
were relying on something else. The Article22 ar gument in this way just falls away completely
and very simply. [Plate 5 off]
29. Moreover, by agreeing not to object to Article11, the Respondent accepted that the
failure to resolve by negotiation the name diffe rence was not a basis for excluding the Applicant
from membership to international, multilateral and regional organizations; that such a dispute was
not, by itself, of a nature that should preclude the Applicant from joining organizations, including
those concerned with matters of peace and security . What reasons did the Respondent give in the
period before April 2008 for objecting to NATO memb ership? [Plate 6 on] Well, let us remember
again, what the then Prime Minister said on the very day of the Bucharest Summit:
116
RCM., Ann. 21
117
Ibid., para. 7.35.
11Respondent’s aide mémoire, Memorial, Ann. 129. - 62 -
“I had said to everyone ⎯ in every possible tone and in every direction ⎯ that
‘a failure to solve the name issue will impe de their invitation’ to join the Alliance.
And that is what I did. Skopje will be able to become a member of NATO only after
the name issue has been resolved.” 119
Did the Prime Minister raise any other factors? Did he invoke legal arguments or legal advice in
getting around Article11 of the Interim Accord? Did he raise rights under Article22? He did
none of these things. The Respondent is a well-functioning democracy with plenty of legal
advisers. One assumes they would have turned their mind to this issue. Is there any evidence
before the Court that Article22 was ever consider ed as being of any relevance before 2009? No
Mr. President, there is not. [Plate 6 off]
30. The Respondent itself has gone on the record, on numerous occasions, to state publicly
that the Applicant will be able to join NATO once the name issue is resolved 120. This has also been
121 122
recognized by other members of NATO and by the organization itself .
31. The evidence confirms that the Respondent’s objection was political ⎯ political. It had
nothing to do with a “right” or “duty” arising under the North Atlantic Treaty, and nothing to do
with membership criteria for NATO. For the reasons set out in our written pleadings, Article 10 of
the North Atlantic Treaty does not assist the Respondent an iota. Article10 of the NATO
Agreement does not accord to the Respondent any “right” ⎯ or impose any “duty” ⎯ to object to
the Applicant’s membership. By agreeing to Article 11 of the Interim Accord it recognized that it
no longer had a right to object to membership of international organiza tions provided the one
condition set forth in Article 11 was met. It cannot now get around that undertaking by invoking
Article 22.
Mr. President, that may be a good moment for a lunch break, with your permission.
11AM, Ann. 99; judges’ folder, tab 4.
120
See generally: CR 2011/5 (Murphy).
12AM, para. 2.53.
12Ibid., para. 2.55. - 63 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. Thank you, Professor Philippe Sands, for your presentation.
As Professor Sands made quite clear, he is still in the middle of his statement and we will continue
to hear his presentation this afternoon. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will conclude
its first round of oral argument this afternoon. The time given to the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia is from 3.00 p.m. to 4.30 p.m. With that understanding, the sitting is closed.
The Court rose at 12.50 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Tuesday 22 March 2011, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)