Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2007/23
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2007
Public sitting
held on Friday 9 November 2007, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, Acting President, presiding
in the case concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh,
Middle Rocks and South Ledge
(Malaysia/Singapore)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2007
Audience publique
tenue le vendredi 9 novembre 2007, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Al-Khasawneh, vice-président,
faisant fonction de président
en l’affaire relative à la Souveraineté sur Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh,
Middle Rocks et South Ledge
(Malaisie/Singapour)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, Acting President
Judges Ranjeva
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Buergenthal
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc Dugard
Sreenivasa Rao
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Al-Khasawneh, vice-président, faisant fonction de président en l’affaire
RaMjev.
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Buergenthal
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Sjoteiskov,
Dugard.
Sreenivasa Rao, juges ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Malaysia is represented by:
H.E.Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Mohamad, Ambassado r-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Malaysia, Adviser for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister,
as Agent;
H.E. Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, Ambassador of Malaysia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
H.E. Dato’ Seri Syed Hamid Albar, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malaysia,
Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail, Attorney-General of Malaysia,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C., Honorary Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit inte rnational, member of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration,
Mr.James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr.Nicolaas Jan Schrijver, Professor of Public In ternational Law, Leiden University, associate
member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Marcelo G. Kohen, Professor of International La w, Graduate Institute of International Studies,
Geneva, associate member of the Institut de droit international,
Ms Penelope Nevill, college lecturer, Downing College, University of Cambridge,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Datuk Azailiza Mohd Ahad, Head of Interna tional Affairs Division, Chambers of the
Attorney-General of Malaysia,
Datin Almalena Sharmila Johan Thambu, Deputy Head 1, International Affairs Division, Chambers
of the Attorney-General of Malaysia,
MsSuraya Harun, Senior Federal Counsel, Inte rnational Affairs Division, Chambers of the
Attorney-General of Malaysia,
Mr. Mohd Normusni Mustapa Albakri, Federal Coun sel, International Affairs Division, Chambers
of the Attorney-General of Malaysia,
Mr. Faezul Adzra Tan Sri Gani Patail, Federal C ounsel, International Affairs Division, Chambers
of the Attorney-General of Malaysia,
MsMichelle Bradfield, Research Fellow, Lauterpach t Centre for International Law, University of
Cambridge, Solicitor (Australia),
Coausnsel; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la Malaisie est représenté par :
S. Exc.M. Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Mohamad, ambass adeur en mission extrao rdinaire, ministère des
affaires étrangères de la Malaisie, conseille r auprès du premier ministre pour les affaires
étrangères,
comme agent ;
S. Exc.Mme Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, ambassadeur de la Malaisie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
S. Exc. M. Dato’ Seri Syed Hamid Albar, ministre des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
M. Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail, Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C., professeur honorai re de droit international à l’Université de
Cambridge, membre de l’Institut de droit inte rnational, membre de la Cour permanente
d’arbitrage,
M. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de dr oit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Nicolaas Jan Schrijver, professeur de droit international public à l’Université de Leyde, membre
associé de l’Institut de droit international, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,
M. Marcelo G. Kohen, professeur de droit interna tional à l’Institut universitaire de hautes études
internationales de Genève, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
Mme Penelope Nevill, chargée de cours au Downing College de l’Université de Cambridge,
comme conseils et avocats ;
Datuk Azailiza Mohd Ahad, chef du département des affaires internationales, cabinet de
l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
Mme Datin Almalena Sharmila Johan Thambu, pr emière adjointe au chef du département des
affaires internationales, cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
Mme Suraya Harun, conseiller fédéral principal au département des affaires internationales, cabinet
de l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
M. Mohd Normusni Mustapa Albakri, conse iller fédéral au départ ement des affaires
internationales, cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
M. Faezul Adzra Tan Sri Gani Patail, conseiller fédéral au département des affaires internationales,
cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
Mme Michelle Bradfield, Research Fellow au Lauterpacht Research Center for International Law
de l’Université de Cambridge, Solicitor (Australie),
comme conseils ; - 6 -
Dato’ Haji Abd. Ghaffar bin Abdullah, Deputy State Secretary of Johor (Administration),
Mr.Abd. Rahim Hussin, Under-Secretary, Maritime Security Policy Division, National Security
Council, Department of the Prime Minister of Malaysia,
Mr.Raja Aznam Nazrin, Under-Secretary, Adjudi cation and Arbitration, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Malaysia,
Capt. Sahak Omar, Director General, Department of Hydrography, Royal Malaysian Navy,
Mr. Tuan Haji Obet bin Tawil, Deputy Director 1, Land and Mines Office of Johor,
Dr.Hajah Samsiah Muhamad, Director of Acqui sition, Documentation and Audiovisual Centre,
National Archives,
Cdr. Samsuddin Yusoff, State Officer 1, Department of Hydrography, Royal Malaysian Navy,
Mr.Roslee Mat Yusof, Director of Marine, Nort hern Region, Marine Department Peninsular
Malaysia,
Mr.Azmi Zainuddin, Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of Malaysia in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Sarah Albakri Devadason, Principal Assistant Secretary, Adjudication and Arbitration Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia,
Mr. Mohamad Razdan Jamil, Special Officer to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malaysia,
MsHaznah Md. Hashim, Principal Assistant Secr etary, Adjudication and Arbitration Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia,
as Advisers;
Professor Dato’ DrS. haharil Talib, Head of Special Research Unit, Chambers of the
Attorney-General of Malaysia,
as Consultant;
Mr.Tan Ah Bah, Director of Survey (Boundary Affairs Section), Department of Survey and
Mapping,
Professor Dr.Sharifah Mastura Syed Abdullah, Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and
Humanities, National University of Malaysia,
Professor Dr. Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, Director of the Institute for Malaysian and International
Studies, National University of Malaysia,
Mr. Ahmad Aznan bin Zakaria, Principal Assistant Director of Survey (Boundary Affairs Section),
Department of Survey and Mapping, - 7 -
M. Dato’Haji Abd. Ghaffar bin Abdullah, secrétaire d’Etat adjoint du Johor (administration),
M. Abd. Rahim Hussin, sous-secrétaire au département de la politique de sécurité maritime, conseil
de la sécurité nationale, services du premier ministre de la Malaisie,
M. Raja Aznam Nazrin, sous-secrétaire au département de la justice et de l’arbitrage, ministère des
affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
Le capitaine Sahak Omar, directeur général du service hydrographique de la marine royale
malaisienne,
M. Tuan Haji Obet bin Tawil, premier directeu r adjoint du bureau du territoire et des mines du
Johor,
M. Hajah Samsiah Muhamad, directeur des acquisitions, centre de documen tation audiovisuel des
archives nationales,
Le commandant Samsuddin Yusoff, premier officier d’état-major du service hydrographique de la
marine royale malaisienne,
M. Roslee Mat Yusof, directeur de la marine pour la région septentriona le, département de la
marine de la Malaisie péninsulaire,
M. Azmi Zainuddin, ministre conseiller à l’ambassade de la Malaisie au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Sarah Albakri Devadason, secrétaire adjointe pr incipale au département de la justice et de
l’arbitrage, ministère des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
M. Mohamad Razdan Jamil, assistant spécial du ministre des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
Mme Haznah Md. Hashim, secrétaire adjointe prin cipale au département de la justice et de
l’arbitrage, ministère des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
comme conseillers ;
M. Dato’ Shaharil Talib, professeur, directeur du service des études spéciales du cabinet de
l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
comme consultant ;
M. Tan Ah Bah, directeur de la topographie, ser vice des frontières, département de la topographie
et de la cartographie,
Mme Sharifah Mastura Syed Abdullah, professeur, doyenne de la faculté des sciences sociales et
humaines de l’Université nationale de la Malaisie,
M. Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, professeur, directeur de l’Institut d’études malaisiennes et
internationales de l’Université nationale de la Malaisie,
M. Ahmad Aznan bin Zakaria, directeur adjoint pr incipal de la topographie, service des frontières,
département de la topographie et de la cartographie, - 8 -
Mr.Hasnan bin Hussin, Senior Technical Assist ant (Boundary Affairs Section), Department of
Survey and Mapping,
as Technical Advisers.
The Government of the Republic of Singapore is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Tommy Koh, Ambassador-at-Large, Mini stry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Singapore, Professor of Law at the National University of Singapore,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Anil Kumar s/o N T Nayar, Ambassador of the Republic of Singapore to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
H.E. Mr. S. Jayakumar, Deputy Prime Minister, Co -ordinating Minister for National Security and
Minister for Law, Professor of Law at the National University of Singapore,
Mr. Chan Sek Keong, Chief Justice of the Republic of Singapore,
Mr. Chao Hick Tin, Attorney-General of the Republic of Singapore,
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., member of the English Bar, Chairman of the United
Nations International Law Commission, Emeritus Chichele Professor of Public International
Law, University of Oxford, member of the Institu t de droit international, Distinguished Fellow,
All Souls College, Oxford,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris X-Nanterre, member and former Chairman of
the United Nations International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de droit
international,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, member of the New York Bar,
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
Ms Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la Cour d’ap pel de Paris, member of the Rome Bar,
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. S. Tiwari, Principal Senior State Counsel, Ch ambers of the Attorney-General of the Republic
of Singapore,
Mr. Lionel Yee, Senior State Counsel, Chambers of the Attorney-General of the Republic of
Singapore,
Mr. Tan Ken Hwee, Senior Assistant Registrar, Supreme Court of Singapore
,
Mr. Pang Khang Chau, Deputy Senior State Counsel, Chambers of the Attorney-General of the
Republic of Singapore,
Mr. Daren Tang, State Counsel, Chambers of the Attorney-General of the Republic of Singapore, - 9 -
M.Hasnanbin Hussin, assistant technique principal du service des frontières, département de la
topographie et de la cartographie,
comme conseillers techniques.
Le Gouvernement de la République de Singapour est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Tommy Koh, ambassadeur en mission ex traordinaire (ministère des affaires étrangères
de la République de Singapour), professeur de droit à l’Université nationale de Singapour,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Anil Kumar s/o N T Nayar, ambas sadeur de la République de Singapour auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
S. Exc. M. S. Jayakumar, vice-premier ministre, mini stre coordinateur pour la sécurité nationale et
ministre de la justice, professeur de droit à l’Université nationale de Singapour,
M. Chan Sek Keong, Chief Justice de la République de Singapour,
M. Chao Hick Tin, Attorney-General de la République de Singapour,
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, président de la
Commission du droit international des Nations Un ies, professeur émérite de droit international
public (chaire Chichele) à l’Univer sité d’Oxford, membre de l’In stitut de droit international,
Distinguished Fellow au All Souls College d’Oxford,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de ParisX-Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international des Nations Unies, membre associé de l'Institut de droit
international,
M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
Mme Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de Rome, cabinet
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. S. Tiwari, Principal Senior State Counsel au cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la République de
Singapour,
M. Lionel Yee, Senior State Counsel au cabinet de l’ Attorney-General de la République de
Singapour,
M. Tan Ken Hwee, premier greffier adjoint de la Cour suprême de Singapour,
M. Pang Khang Chau, Deputy Senior State Counsel au cabinet de l’ Attorney-General de la
République de Singapour,
M. Daren Tang, State Counsel au cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la République de Singapour, - 10 -
Mr. Ong Chin Heng, State Counsel, Chambers of the Attorney-General of the Republic of
Singapore,
Mr. Daniel Müller, Researcher at the Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University
of Paris X-Nanterre,
as Counsel;
Mr. Parry Oei, Chief Hydrographer, Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore,
Ms Foo Chi Hsia, Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Singapore,
Mr. Philip Ong, Assistant Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Singapore,
Ms Yvonne Elizabeth Chee, Second Secretary (Political), Embassy of the Republic of Singapore in
the Netherlands,
Ms Wu Ye-Min, Country Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Singapore,
as Advisers. - 11 -
M. Ong Chin Heng, State Counsel au cabinet de l’ Attorney-General de la République de
Singapour,
M. Daniel Müller, chercheur au centre de droit in ternational de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris X-Nanterre
comme conseils ;
M. Parry Oei, hydrographe en chef de l’autorité maritime et portuaire de Singapour,
Mme Foo Chi Hsia, directeur adjoint au ministère des affaires étrangères de la République de
Singapour,
M. Philip Ong, sous-directeur au ministère des affaires étrangères de la République de Singapour,
Mme Yvonne Elizabeth Chee, deuxième secrétaire (affaires politiques) à l’ambassade de la
République de Singapour aux Pays-Bas,
Mme Wu Ye-Min, chargée de mission au ministère des affaires étrangères de la République de
Singapour,
cocomnseillers. - 12 -
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Please be seated. The sitting is open. Before
giving the floor to Mr.Bundy, I should like to bring to your attention that JudgeOwada, for
reasons duly communicated to me, is unable to sit w ith us this morning. Mr. Bundy, you have the
floor.
Mr. BUNDY: Thank you, Mr. President.
THE STRAITS LIGHTS SYSTEM
12 (a). Mr. President, Members of the Court, before the Court rose for lunch yesterday, I had
begun to discuss the Straits Lights System which concerned a number of lighthouses in the region,
and my starting point was the legal basis on which each of the lights was established.
12 (b). As I explained yesterday, when the British proposed to build a lighthouse on territory
belonging to a local Malay ruler, such as the 1860 lighthouse at CapeRachado and the 1886
lighthouse at Pulau Pisang, a specific written agre ement to this effect was concluded. The
agreement and documents covering the Cape Rachad o lighthouse may be found at tab39 of your
folders and the written indenture concluded with the Ruler of Johor with respect to the
Pulau Pisang lighthouse is at tab 40.
12 (c). In contrast, when lights were establishe d by the British, either on the high seas, as
was the case with the One-Fathom Bank light established in 1852, or on territory not belonging to a
local Malay ruler, such as the lighthouse on Pedra Branca, there is no such written agreement.
12 (d). I now propose to continue with my chronology of the lights that I started yesterday
morning.
13. In 1900, the same year that the indentur e was concluded with respect to the Pulau Pisang
lighthouse, the Government of the Straits Settle ments in Singapore also considered building a
lighthouse on the island of Pulau Aur, the location of which can be seen on the screen.
[Slide showing Pulau Aur]
14. To that end, on 20February1900 the deputy of the Officer Administering the
Government of the Straits Settlements wrote a lette r to the Sultan of Johor in which he enquired
whether, given the fact that the island of Pulau Aur lay within the territory of Johor, the Sultan - 13 -
desired to erect a lighthouse on the island himsel f or, alternatively, whether the Sultan would
permit the Government of the Straits Settlements to establish and erect a lighthouse there instead
(CMS, Ann. 24).
15. On 25April1900, the Sultan of Johor r esponded to that query. After indicating that
Johor did not desire to undertake the erection of the lighthouse on Pulau Aur itself, the Sultan
stated that he would be willing to grant to the Go vernment of the Straits Settlements a site for the
proposed work. The Sultan’s letter went on to suggest that the arrangements for such a light would
be the same as those that were made for the lighthouse on Pulau Pisang ⎯ namely, a grant of land
by the Sultan sufficient for the lighthouse and a roadway leading up to the lighthouse.
16. Now, ultimately, the Government of the Straits Settlements decided not to proceed with
that light. Nonetheless, this episode is relevant for a number of reasons. First, it confirmed once
more that the practice of the authorities in Singa pore was to seek the written permission of a local
Malay ruler when they sought to build a lighthouse situated on territory belonging to that ruler. In
contrast, as Professor Pellet explained, the British Crown never sought the Sultan’s permission for
the construction of the lighthouse on Pedra Branca. Secondly, with respect to the PulauAur
lighthouse, the Sultan’s response in 1900 was that he was willing to enter into the same kind of
detailed arrangements for a light on Pulau Aur as existed with respect to the lighthouse on
PulauPisang, where there was a written indenture. The fact that the Sultan made no mention at
that time of having agreed similar arrangements for the lighthouse at Pedra Branca is further
confirmation of the fact that no such arrangements existed for Pedra Bra
nca.
17. In the light of these facts, the differen ce in legal treatment between the CapeRachado
and Pulau Pisang lighthouses and the proposed light on Pulau Aur, all of which were situated on
Malaysian territory and thus subject to written agre ements granting to Singapore the right to build
and maintain lighthouses located thereon, and th e situation with respect to the lighthouse on
Pedra Branca, which was not located on Malay territory and which therefore was subject to no such
agreement, that contrast, that difference in treatment could not be clearer. In those instances where
Singapore built and managed a light located on the territory of Malaysia, an express agreement was
concluded to this end. But where, however, th e authorities from Singapore built and maintained a - 14 -
light on territory not under the sovereignty of a Malay ruler, no such ag reement was needed and
none exists.
18. And it is the complete absence of an ag reement for the British activities on Pedra Branca
from 1847 to 1851, activities which culminated in the construction of the lighthouse on
PedraBranca, that is a fundamental defect in Malaysia’s case. The plain and simple truth is that
Malaysia has been unable to produce any written agreement dealing with the lighthouse on Pedra
Branca as it did with respect to the lighthouses at Cape Rachado and Pulau Pisang, and as was
proposed for the lighthouse on PulauAur. The obvious explanation for this glaring gap in
Malaysia’s case is that neither Malaysia, nor its predecessor Johor, ever considered Pedra Branca to
be under its sovereignty.
19. It is this lack of any written agreemen t concerning the lighthouse on Pedra Branca which
also distinguishes the present case from the examples of lighthouse practice elsewhere in the world
that Malaysia has sought to rely on in its writte n pleadings. Malaysia’s thesis is that lighthouses
are frequently built and maintained by an en tity which does not possess sovereignty over the
territory on which the light is situated, and that Pedr a Branca is simply an example of this practice.
But let me examine the authorities that Malaysia has cited and on which it relies to support this
proposition.
20. I have already mentioned in my first pr esentation yesterday that Malaysia itself concedes
in its written pleadings that the construction and maintenance of lighthouses is usually a matter for
the State on whose territory the light is situated. It is also worth noting that one of the authorities
that Malaysia relies on, this is Judgeva nEysinga’s concurring opinion in the 1937 Lighthouses
case, emphasized exactly the same point ⎯ namely, that “the administration of lighthouses is a
service which in most States belongs to their domestic jurisdiction”.
21. It is true that Judge van Eysinga did go on to say in his separate opinion that there were
examples where the State possessing sovereignty over a particular territory was not in a position to
provide for the administration of a lighthouse on that territory and, as a result, as the judge noted in
his opinion:
[Slide] - 15 -
“It sometimes happens that the Maritime Powers come to an agreement with the
territorial State in regard to the operating of a lighthouse.” ( 1937, P.C.I.J., Series A/B,
No. 71, p. 24.)
22. That is precisely what happened with r espect to the lighthouses at Cape Rachado and
Pulau Pisang and with respect to the proposed light that was never built ⎯ but which was proposed
in correspondence with Johor— with respect to Pula uAur. The parties came to an agreement or
they foresaw that such an agreement was necessary. It is also what happened in the other examples
cited in Malaysia’s written pleadings.
23. Take the situation involving the Cape Spartel lighthouse, which was built and maintained
by an international commission on Moroccan territo ry. Malaysia referred to the CapeSpartel
Convention of 31May1865 in its written pleadin gs, but curiously did not actually annex the
document and the Convention, which Singapore theref ore provided in Annex18 to its Reply, and
which the judges can also find at tab 41 of the judg es’ folder. Now, as Singapore pointed out in its
Reply, when the provisions of that Convention ar e examined, it becomes clear that the Sultan of
Morocco, on whose territory the light was situated , expressly consented to the construction of the
lighthouse by the other contracting parties. Indeed, the CapeSpartel Convention contained the
following important proviso in its Article 1:
[Slide]
“It is well understood that this delegati on [in other words, permission to build
the lighthouse] does not import any encroachment on the rights proprietary and of
sovereignty of the Sultan, whose flag alone shall be hoisted on the tower of the
Pharos.” (RS, Ann. 11.)
24. I need scarcely repeat the fact that no agre ement of this kind exists with respect to the
lighthouse on Pedra Branca. Moreover, I would also recall that it has been the Singapore ensign
and flag, not the Malaysian flag, which has ope nly been flown on Pedra Branca ever since the
lighthouse was constructed up to the present. And this is another factor which distinguishes Pedra
Branca from the CapeSpartel light and renders th e CapeSpartel example of no assistance and of
no use to Malaysia.
25. Now, a similar comment can be made a bout Malaysia’s reference to a lighthouse called
the Cape Race lighthouse in Newfoundland. And as Singapore explained in some detail in its
Counter-Memorial, not only was this light administered by Britain with the consent of - 16 -
Newfoundland, it was not an international tran saction, in any event, since Newfoundland was
already a British colony under British sovereignty at the time the relevant arrangements were
entered into.
26. Nor does Malaysia’s reliance on the Re d Sea lighthouse practice at issue in the
Eritrea/Yemen arbitration assist its position. As the Arbitral Tribunal very clearly noted in its
Award in the first phase of that arbitration, th e operation of the Red Sea light was subject to a
specific understanding between the relevant colonial Powers at the time ⎯ Great Britain and
Italy ⎯ that was without prejudice to questions of s overeignty. And no such understanding exists
with respect to our case.
27. At the end of the day, of course, each case must be assessed on its own facts. In the
present case, the record shows th at the British authorities sought and obtained permission from
local Malay rulers to establish lights on territory belonging to those rulers ⎯ such as at
Cape Rachado and Pulau Pisang, and with respect to the proposed light at Pulau Aur ⎯ but Britain
did no such thing when it came to the lighthou se on Pedra Branca, and Malaysia can scarcely find
any support for its arguments in these facts.
2. The relevance of various funding proposals for the Straits lights
28. Mr.President, I would now like to turn to the questi on of how the lighthouses in the
region were funded, and the relevance of Malaysia’s conduct in this respect.
29. Originally, the lighthouse on Pedra Branca, after it had been commissioned, as well as
other lights subsequently put into operation in the region, were financed by the levying of tolls on
vessels passing through the Straits of Singapore. And after 1912, these tolls were abolished and the
States concerned defrayed the costs of the lights on a co-operative basis. So, up to this point,
therefore, the funding alone for lighthouse operations in the region was “sovereignty neutral”.
30. However, there are two important devel opments that occurred after 1912 relating to
funding issues, which show in a really quite stri king manner how Malaysia viewed the question of
sovereignty in connection with how the lights in the region were to be financed.
31. The first such development occurred in 1913, after tolls had ceased to be levied on ships
under the 1854 Act. In July 1913, the Chief Secr etary to the Government of the Federated Malay - 17 -
States tabled a motion before its Federal Council to appropriate some $20,000 to meet the costs of
lighthouse upkeep. What is significant about this episode is that the Chief Secretary’s proposal was
for these monies to be appropriated to meet a share of the costs of maintaining only the
OneFathom Bank light off the coast of Sengalore and the Cape Rachado light located on the
Malaysian mainland. The rationale behind this proposal of the Chief Secretary was explained in
the following way ⎯ this is coming from the Malaysian side:
[Slide]
“I think it is an international obligation that each country should bear the cost of
maintaining all lights considered necessary on its coasts, and I think there can hardly
be any question now that we should not be doing our duty if we did not come forward
and offer to maintain these two very useful light-houses.” (MM, Ann. 65.)
“these two” lighthouses being One Fathom Bank and Cape Rachado on the Malaysian mainland.
32. Now, clearly, at this point, the Chief Secretary did not consider that the light on Pedra
Branca was situated on Malay territory or within its jurisdiction. Hence, the proposal did not
suggest that the Federated Malay States should also contribute to the costs of maintaining the
lighthouse, or assume the costs of maintaining the lighthouse, on Pedra Branca. The proposal was
limited to One Fathom Bank and the Cape Rachado lighthouse.
33. Malaysia is rightly concerned about the adverse implications this funding proposal gives
rise to with respect to Malaysia’s claim of an historic title over Pedra Branca. Malaysia, in its
written pleadings, therefore, tries to explain away the fact that Pedra Branca was not mentioned in
the Chief Secretary’s proposal of 1913 by asserting that the Horsburgh lighthouse ⎯ the one on
Pedra Branca ⎯ as well as the light on Pulau Pisang, was situated on the territory of Johor and that
Johor, at that time, was not one of the Federated Malay States. And then, in its written pleadings,
Malaysia goes on to assert that it is not clear whether Johor ever made any separate proposal to
contribute to the upkeep of the lighthouse either on Pedra Branca or on Pulau Pisang.
34. But the facts are clear, they are very clear and they have been documented. As
Singapore documented in its Memorial in September1952, the Director of Marine of the
Federation of Malaya, which by that time encomp assed Johor, wrote to the Master Attendant of
Singapore specifically offering to assume responsibility for the light on Pulau Pisang, but making
no such offer with respect to the Horsburgh lighthouse on Pedra Branca. The relevant part of the - 18 -
Director of Marine’s letter is worth quoting. It also can be found at tab 42 of the judges’ folder. In
it the Director stated the following ⎯ this is the Director of Marine of the Federation of Malaya
saying this:
[Slide]
“I have the honour to raise the subject of maintenance of Pulau Pisang
Lighthouse and to say that as it is close to the coast of the Federation it would seem
appropriate that it should be a commitment of this Government, and to suggest that
responsibility for it should be assumed by us, in the same way we have assumed
responsibility for Pulau Merambong.” (MS, Ann. 89.)
[Slide]
Just for reference, the Court will see from th e map that is now on the screen the location of
Pulau Merambong, which was also clearly in Malays ian territory. So, we have an offer here in
1852 from the relevant authorities on the Malays ian mainland encompassing Johor to fund the
lighthouse at Pulau Pisang but not a word about Pedra Branca.
35. And once again, we have a clear pattern of Malaysian conduct showing that Malaysia did
not consider itself as possessing sovereignty over Pedra Branca. Because how else can Malaysia
explain why it made offers to fund lighthouses on its territory at Cape Rachado and at Pulau Pisang
or just off its coast on the One Fathom Bank, and the One Fathom Bank remember was not vested
in the British Crown under the 1854Act; how can Malaysia have made offers to fund those
lighthouses but made no similar offer with respect to the lighthouse on Pedra Branca? Malaysia’s
absence of title over Pedra Branca is further confirmed by the fact that its offer in 1952 to assume
responsibility for the lighthouse at Pulau Pisang on its own territory, but once again not on
Pedra Branca, came just one year before its official disclaimer of ownership over Pedra Branca that
will be discussed by Professor Pellet in a few minutes.
3. Malaysia’s conduct with respect to Pulau Pisang and Pedra Branca
36. Having reviewed the elements of the Straits Lights System which undermine Malaysia’s
case, I would now like to conclude this part of Singapore’s presentation by recalling a number of
fundamental differences that exist with respect to the Parties’ conduct relating to Pulau Pisang,
where Malaysia held title, as compared to the Par ties’ conduct with respect to Pedra Branca, where
title was vested in Singapore. As I trust the Court will appreciate, these differences are very telling. - 19 -
They all go to show how Malaysia recognized that it possessed no sovereign rights over
Pedra Branca.
37. First, we have the clear indenture issued by the local Malay ruler granting Singapore
permission to construct and mainta in the lighthouse on Malaysian te rritory at Pulau Pisang. We
have no such indenture with respect to Pedra Branca ⎯ a fundamental difference.
38. Second, as I discussed yesterday, Malaysia insisted that Singapore lower its flag and
ensign on Pulau Pisang because it might give rise to an inference that the island belonged to
Singapore. Malaysia made no such request rega rding the absolutely identical Singapore ensign
flown on Pedra Branca.
39. Third, Singapore exercised continuous control over access to Pedra Branca and even, as I
pointed out yesterday, Malaysian officials sought permission from Singapore to visit the island.
Singapore exercised no such control over access to Pulau Pisang since it was Malaysian territory
and Malaysian nationals could travel there freely.
40. Fourth, Singapore government officials made frequent visits to Pedra Branca in the
normal course of business all of which are docum ented in amongst other sources by the logbook
kept with respect to Pedra Branca. In contr ast, when Singapore officials visited Pulau Pisang,
which they only did on very very rare occasions, they were advised to carry their passports and
travel documents with them because they were travelling to Malaysian territory.
41. Fifth, Singapore was the only Party which i ssued permits for nationals of third States to
visit Pedra Branca and to carry out surveys or scientific research on the island and within its
territorial waters. Singapore took no such steps with respect to Pulau Pisang because it was not
Singapore territory.
42. Sixth, Singapore routinely collected meteorological data on Pedra Branca, but not on
Pulau Pisang, and Malaysia’s own official mete orological publications described the station on
Pedra Branca as being located in Singapore.
43. Seventh, Malaysia issued a whole series of official maps depicting Pedra Branca as
belonging to Singapore. As MsMalintoppi will show later this morning, the same series of
Malaysian maps never showed Pulau Pisang as belonging to Singapore even though Singapore
maintained the light on Pulau Pisang. - 20 -
44. Eighth, Singapore installed military communications equipment and other non-lighthouse
facilities on Pedra Branca, made full use of th e island as you could see from the photograph and
undertook various public works on the island. It undertook no similar activities on Pulau Pisang.
Singapore also designated a specific naval patrol ar ea in the vicinity of Pedra Branca, while it
undertook no such action around Pulau Pisang because Pulau Pisang appertained to Malaysia.
45. Ninth, Singapore investigated shipping incidents and accidental deaths on Pedra Branca
and within its territorial waters. It had no jurisdiction over Pulau Pisang and thus carried out no
similar activities there.
46. Tenth, Malaysia made offers for the funding and the assumption of the responsibility for
the lighthouse on Pulau Pisang. It made no similar offer with respect to the lighthouse on
Pedra Branca.
47. Eleventh, and last, Malaysia expressly disclaimed “ownership” over Pedra Branca.
Singapore, in contrast, obviously never disclaime d “ownership” over Pedra Branca, and it never
claimed sovereignty over Pulau Pisang.
*
* *
48. Since this last element ⎯ Malaysia’s official disclaimer over Pedra Branca ⎯ will be the
subject of the next part of Singapore’s presentation, I would ask, Mr. President, if you would now
give the floor to Professor Pellet who will address this important aspect of the case. Thank you
very much.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Tha nk you Mr.Bundy for your statement. I
now give the floor to Professor Pellet. - 21 -
M. PELLET : Thank you very much.
LA RENONCIATION (DISCLAIMER ) EXPRESSE DE J OHOR À TOUTE
REVENDICATION SUR P EDRA B RANCA
1. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, alors que Singapour a présenté de manière
approfondie les circonstances dans lesquelles Johor a expressément renoncé, en1953, à toute
1
prétention sur Pedra Branca , la Malaisie s’est montrée d’une grande discrétion sur cet épisode
crucial2. Crucial, je m’empresse de le préciser, non pas parce que cette renonciation fonderait le
titre de Singapour sur l’île, mais parce qu’elle confirme, de manière éclatante, que la Malaisie
n’avait aucune revendication sur Pedra Branca. J’indique au passage, notamment à l’attention des
interprètes, que le mot anglais «disclaimer» traduit sans doute mieux la réalité juridique de
l’épisode en question ⎯ mais que malheureusement, il n’a pas d’équivalent exact en français.
2. A vrai dire, si je devais m’en tenir à ce qu’en dit la Partie malaisienne dans sa réplique,
cette plaidoirie pourrait être fort brève : mise à pa rt la réitération de ses positions antérieures sous
forme de simples affirmations ⎯ auxquelles Singapour a d’ores et déjà répondu ⎯, elle se borne à
voir une «contradiction flagrante» («a glaring non sequitur») entre, d’une part, la base du titre de
Singapour sur Pedra Branca ⎯ la prise de possession de 1847 suivie de la construction du phare ⎯
3
et, d’autre part, l’invocation des échanges de correspondance de 1953 .
3. Il me semble aller de soi, Monsieur le président, qu’il n’y a aucune contradiction entre les
deux argumentations, qui sont différentes mais complémentaires, que fait valoir Singapour.
4. Comme l’a montré M.Brownlie avant-hi er, la Grande-Bretagne a acquis le titre auquel
Singapour a succédé en prenant possession de Pedra Branca, île inhabitée et sans maître, en 1847 et
en y construisant le phare Horsburgh. Elle a, par la suite, constamment administré l’île à titre de
souverain, sans la moindre contestation et sans que, pour sa part, la Malaisie puisse faire état du
moindre acte d’administration, de quelque nature qu’il soit, de la part de Johor. Ceci suffit
1Voir MS, chap. VII, «Johor’s Express Disclaimer of T itle to Pedra Branca», p. 161-178 ; CMS, chap. VII, «The
1953 Correspondence Confirms Singapore’s Title», p.181-199,RS, chap.VII, «Malaysia’s Formal Disclaimer of
Title», p. 221-232.
2Voir MM, chap. 7, sect. C iii), «The 1953 Correspondence», p. 107-110, par. 235-244 ; CMM, chap. 9, sect. C,
«The 1953 Correspondence», p.235-239, par. 503-514, et R, chap. 5, sect. Avi), «The 1953 Correspondence»,
p. 172-174, par. 368-370.
3RM, p. 173-174, par. 370. - 22 -
amplement à établir la souveraineté de Singapour sur l’île; et il n’est pas nécessaire de se
demander si les effectivités, nombreuses, cohére ntes et diversifiées, que nous avons décrites
pourraient tenir lieu de titre, alors même qu’e lles constituent, à n’en pas douter, «un exercice
4
pacifique et continu de l’autorité» ( Statut juridique du Groënland oriental, arrêt, C.P.J.I.
série A/B n° 53, p. 45), particulièrement convainquant eu égar d en particulier à la petite taille et au
caractère inhospitalier de l’île. Elles ne font ici que confirmer le titre de Singapour. Tous ces
éléments témoignent, pour reprendre l’expression utilisée à plusieurs repri ses par la Cour dans
l’affaire Cameroun c. Nigéria à propos de l’appartenance de la souveraineté sur Bakassi ( Frontière
terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Ni géria (Cameroun c.Nigéria; Guinée équatoriale
(intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil2002 , p.409-412, par.213-217), d’une «communauté de vues
entre les Parties» quant à la souveraineté sur Pedra Branca.
5. Il en va, à vrai dire, de même des écha nges de correspondance de 1953 : ils participent de
cette «communauté de vues». Et il n’est pas vraime nt utile de se poser la question de savoir si, en
l’absence d’autre titre, cette correspondance ⎯et, en particulier, la lettre du secrétaire d’Etat par
5
intérim de Johor en date du 21 septembre 1953 ⎯ pourraient, en elles-mêmes, constituer un titre
territorial: ce titre existe indépendamment de ces échanges de correspond ance. Elles ne s’y
substituent pas mais elles le confirment.
o
Projection 1 - Lettre n SSJ.1120/53/6 du 21 septembre 1953 adressée au secrétaire colonial
de Singapour par M. Seth Bin Saaid, secrétaire d’Etat par intérim de Johor (MS, vol.6,
annexe 96) (dossier de plaidoiries, onglet n 43).o
Ou, plus exactement, la lettre du secrétaire d’Etat établit l’absence de titre de Johor (et, par
suite, de son successeur, la Malaisie) : «le Gouvern ement de Johore ne revendique pas la propriété
de Pedra Branca» («the Johore Government does not claim ownership of Pedra Branca») et, par la
même occasion, cette lettre établit l’existence du titre de Singapour, puisque aucun Etat tiers n’a
jamais émis la moindre prétention sur l’île.
6. A vrai dire, la Malaisie ne conteste sérieus ement ni le déroulement, ni la portée de cet
épisode. Mais il nous paraît suffisamment important et significatif pour mériter tout de même que
4
Cf. CPA, Ile de Palmas, Max Huber, sentence arbitrale du 4 avril 192RGDIP 1935, p.164, 177, 185-186,
197-199 ou 201.
5MS, vol. 6, annexe 96. - 23 -
l’on s’y attarde à nouveau quelques instants. Un bref rappel des faits d’abord si vous le voulez
bien, Monsieur le président.
I. Les échanges de correspondance de 1953
7. Toute l’affaire trouve son point de départ dans une demande adressée le
23 septembre 1952 par le directeur de la marine de la Fédération de Malaya au Master Attendant de
la colonie de Singapour sur la situation de Pulau Pisang 6, dont Rodman Bundy vient de longuement
parler. La réponse du Master Attendant, en date du 29septembre indique d’une part que le
Land Office (l’administration des domaines) a été chargé de faire des investigations à ce sujet et,
d’autre part, que l’enquête a été étendue à Pedra Branca ⎯ qui n’était pas mentionnée dans la lettre
du directeur de la marine de la Fédération 7. Pour sa part, dans une note du 7 octobre 1952 intitulée
«Horsburgh Lighthouse» («le phare Ho rsburgh»), le géomètre en chef (Chief Surveyor) fait savoir
au commissaire des domaines de la colonie de Singapour que
«[w]hen Singapore Territorial Waters we re being discussed in 1937 there seems to
have been no mention of Horsburgh but in a minute of 14.7.52 to S.E.A. [that is «the
Secretary for Economic Affairs»] in CSO.11293/52, I gave my opinion that Singapore
8
should claim a 3 mile limit round this point» .
8. Quatre mois plus tard, le 6février1953, le Master Attendant s’inquiétait des suites
données à cette proposition dans une lettre au secrétaire colonial. Après avoir cité la note que je
viens de lire, il demandait : «In the light of the a bove, may I please be informed if any decision has
9
been arrived at» . C’est à la suite de cette relance ⎯sur laquelle la Malaisie garde un prudent
silence dans le cadre de la présente procédure ⎯ que, le 12juin1953, le Master Attendant,
J. D. Higham, s’enquit, au nom du secrétaire col onial, auprès du conseiller britannique de Johor (le
British Adviser ), du statut juridique du «rock some 40 miles from Singapore known as
PedraBranca on which the Horsburgh Lighthouse stands» 10. He stresses ⎯and this is an
important indication ⎯ that: «The matter is relevant to the determination of the boundaries of the
6 MS, vol. 6, annexe 89.
7
MS, vol. 6, annexe 90.
8
Cité dans MS, vol. 6, annexe 91.
9 Ibid.
10MS, vol. 6, annexe 93. - 24 -
Colony’s territorial waters.» Copie de cette lettr e avait été adressée au secrétaire principal de la
Fédération de Malaya.
9. Higham estime que le statut juridique de Pulau Pisang ⎯ construit sur une autre île bien
plus grande que ce lle qui nous occupe ⎯ est «très clair» («quite clear»): elle relève de la
souveraineté de Johor. Il s’interr oge en revanche sur le statut de Pedra Branca au sujet duquel il
donne un certain nombre d’informations inégalement fiables :
⎯ La première est exacte: l’île est située en dehors des limites de la cession consentie à la
Compagnie des Indes orientales en 1824 (je soul igne que la Malaisie fait grand cas de ce
point 11, mais que nous ne le contestons en aucune manière).
[Fin de la projection 1.]
Projection 2 — Extrait d’une dépêche du 28/ 11/1844 adressée au gouverneur général du
Bengale par le gouverneur de Singapour (MS, a nnexe 93, app.B) (dossier de plaidoiries,
onglet n 44)
⎯ La deuxième est fausse : Pedra Branca n’est pas «mentioned in a despatch from the Governor
of Singapore on 28th November 1844». L’extrait de la dépêche en question qui est joint à la
lettre est rédigé ainsi: «This Rock is part of a territory of the Rajah of Johore who with the
12
Tumunggong has willingly consented to cede it gratuitously to the East India Company.» Il
ne comporte pas le nom de Pedra Branca, qui a été rajouté à la main dans des circonstances non
élucidées, mais ce rajout est clairement erroné ; le rocher dont il s’agit («this Rock») ne peut
être Pedra Branca. Et, d’abord, pour une rais on évidente: l’auteur de la dépêche, le
gouverneur de Singapour Butterworth, indiquait que celui-ci illustrait la position du «Rock
therein alluded» ⎯du rocher dont il parlait ⎯ «with reference to Pedra Branca» ⎯ par
rapport à Pedra Branca; or, on ne peut positio nner un endroit par rapport à lui-même… Si
vous m’expliquez comment me rendre au Palais de la Paix en situant celui-ci par rapport au
Palais de la Paix, je n’ai aucune chance de le trouver ! Il est vrai que je connais à peu près le
chemin… Il est regrettable que le schéma précisant la position du rocher que Butterworth avait
joint à sa dépêche semble perdu, mais, de toute façon, comme Singapour l’a montré d’une
11
MM, par. 8, 92, 188, 238 ; CMM, par. 39-42, 158.
12MS, vol. 6, annexe 93, annexe B. - 25 -
13
manière qui paraît assez difficilement contestab le, il ne pouvait s’agir que de Peak Rock . Et
j’ajoute que, curieusement, la Malaisie n’a ja mais produit sa copie de la lettre de Higham
⎯c’est fort dommage car la consultation de l’original aurait peut-être permis de mieux
comprendre l’origine de la mention manuscrite erronée, qui demeure une énigme.
[Fin de la projection 2 – Retour à la projection 1.]
⎯ En revanche, la troisième et dernière in formation donnée par Higham dans sa lettre du
12juin1953, est indiscutablement exacte, même si la conséquence qu’il en tire est
prudemment incertaine: «The lighthouse was bu ilt in 1850 by the Colony Government who
have maintained it ever since. This by inte rnational usage no doubt confers some rights and
obligations on the Colony»; mais cette pruden ce s’explique par le fait qu’il ne disposait
d’aucun document et ne pouvait être sûr qu’il n’en existait pas; si les archives de Singapour
avaient été complètes, cette demande eût été san s objet (comme, d’ailleurs, la démarche même
de la colonie).
10. La suite est connue :
⎯ le secrétaire du conseiller britannique à Johor transmet la demande de clarification au secrétaire
d’Etat de Johor et précise que celui-ci «will doub tless wish to consult with the Commissioner
for Lands and Mines and Chief Surveyor and any existing archives before forwarding the
views of the State Government to the Chief Secretary» 14;
⎯ c’est donc après une enquête soigneuse que le secrétaire d’Etat par intérim répondit, le
21 septembre 1953, donc après s’être donné le te mps de la réflexion : «I have the honour … to
15
inform you that the Johore Government does not claim ownership of Pedra Branca» ;
⎯ fort de cette réponse, aussi l aconique que dépourvue d’ambiguïté ⎯n’en déplaise à nos amis
malaisiens, l’ Attorney-General de Singapour estima que, sur cette base, «nous pouvons
revendiquer Pedra Branca comme faisant partie du territoire de Singapour» («we can claim
Pedra Branca as Singapore territory» 16) ; et
13
Voir notamment MS, par. 5.40-5.41 ; CMS, par. 5.48-5.50. Voir aussi MS, vol. 2, annexe 13 ou CR 2007/21,
p. 31, par. 62 (Pellet).
14
MS, annexe 95.
15MS, annexe 96.
16MM, annexe 70. - 26 -
17
⎯ et le secrétaire colonial fit connaître cette décision au Master Attendant le 13 octobre 1953 .
[Fin de la projection 1.]
II. La signification juridique de la «renonciation» («disclaimer») de Johor
11. Monsieur le président, la Malaisie s ouligne que «the letter from the Acting State
Secretary, Johor, of 21September1953 is not a model of clarity» 18. C’est un moyen commode
⎯ mais peu convaincant ⎯ de s’en débarrasser car il ne suffit pas qu’un texte ne soit pas conforme
à la thèse que soutient la Partie malaisienne pour ma nquer de clarté. Et celui-ci, au contraire, est
limpide : «the Johore Government does not claim ownership of Pedra Branca» («le Gouvernement
de Johore ne revendique pas la propriété de Pedra Branca»). Le texte est clair ; les circonstances et
le contexte dans lesquels la le ttre du secrétaire d’Etat de Johor a été envoyée sont clairs; sa
signification juridique est claire.
a) Le texte
12. La Malaisie fait un certain cas du mot «propr iété» («ownership») utilisé dans la lettre du
21 septembre 1953 1. Singapour ne conteste nullement que la propriété d’un phare puisse être
dissociée de la souveraineté s’exer çant sur le territoire sur lequel il est érigé et ceci découle très
clairement de la plaidoirie de M.Bundy. Ma is, en l’occurrence, il ne fait aucun doute que le
secrétaire d’Etat de Johor visait non pas la propriété du phare mais la souveraineté sur l’île.
13. La «propriété» en question concerne, précisé ment, l’île elle-même, pas le phare. Et la
Malaisie est la première à faire la distinction dans ses écritures 20, de façon d’ailleurs souvent
21
discutable . Ici en tout cas, il est tout à fait clair que les autorités de Johor (non seulement le
secrétaire d’Etat, mais aussi le commissaire à l’aménagement du territoire et aux mines et le
géomètre en chef de Johor, qui ont tous été consultés) ont compris que l’information recherchée par
Singapour concernait bien l’île dans son ensemble et pas simplement le phare. Du reste, dans ses
écritures, la Malaisie n’hésite pas, elle non plus, à utiliser le mot «propriété» («ownership»), alors
17MS, annexe 97.
18
MM, p. 110, par. 243 ; voir aussi, CMM, p. 239, par. 514.
19
Voir MM, p. 110, par. 243 ou RM, p. 173, par. 369.
20Cf. CMM, p. 168, par. 349, p. 196, 401, p. 203, par. 419 ou p. 204-205, par. 424-425.
21Cf. RS, p. 133-135, par. 4.90-4.94, p. 153-154, par. 4.144-4.145 ou RS, p. 154-155, par. 4.146. - 27 -
22
qu’elle se réfère indiscutablement à la souveraineté sur l’île en tant que telle et vous trouverez des
exemples de ceci dans les verbatims.
14. Cette assimilation ne résulte pas seulement du membre de phrase: «the Johore
Government does not claim ownership of Pedra Bran ca» ; elle découle aussi de celui qui précède :
th
«I have the honour to refer to your letter … dated 12 June 1953 … on the question of the status of
Pedra Branca Rock some 40 miles from Singapore». Ce faisant d’ailleurs, le secrétaire d’Etat ne
fait que reprendre les termes mêmes qu’avait u tilisés Higham au nom du secrétaire colonial de
Singapour : «Il y a lieu à présent de clarifier le statut de Pedra Branca» («It is how [probably : now]
23
desired to clarify the status of Pedra Branca» ). De Pedra Branca, et non du phare Horsburgh. Et
si le moindre doute pouvait encore s ubsister sur le sens de la questi on (et, par suite, de la réponse),
on peut encore relever qu’Higham avait, si je puis dire, «mis les points sur les ‘i’» en indiquant que
l’information qu’il recherchait ét ait liée à la détermination des limites de la mer territoriale de
Singapour : «La question est d’importance pour la dé limitation des eaux territoriales de la colonie»
(«The matter is relevant to th e determination of the boundaries of the Colony’s territorial
waters» 24). Ceci ne laissait aucun doute sur l’objet de l’enquête : la propriété d’un phare ne génère
aucune mer territoriale contrairement à la souveraineté sur une île.
15. En d’autres termes :
⎯ en dépit de l’éloignement (le secrétaire d’Etat de Johor reprend la formule: le «rocher Pedra
Branca à quelque 40milles de Singapour» («Pedra Branca Rock 40miles from Singapore»)),
formule qui aurait pu faire hésiter sur l’attribution de la souveraineté sur Pedra Branca ;
⎯ Johor décline formellement celle-ci, il «ne revendique pas la propriété de Pedra Branca» («does
not claim ownership of Pedra Branca») ;
⎯ de Pedra Branca, donc de l’ensemble de l’île (et pas simplement du phare qui y est construit) ;
⎯ tout ceci, en réponse à une question qui ne laissait subsister aucun doute sur son objet: il
s’agissait de déterminer le statut juridique de l’île afin de fixer l’étendue des eaux territoriales
22
Voir, par exemple, RM, p. 46, par. 99 (in fine), p. 90, par. 183 (in fine) et 185.
23
MS, annexe 93, par. 3.
24Ibid., par. 1. - 28 -
de Singapour, c’est-à-dire de résoudre un problème de pur droit international public et, en
aucun cas, contrairement à ce que la Malaisie veut faire accroire, de propriété de droit privé.
b) Les circonstances et le contexte
16. Monsieur le président, le contexte dans lequel s’inscrit la réponse de Johor ⎯ que j’ai
essayé de décrire de manière concise tout à l’heure ⎯, ne laisse aucun doute sur l’évidence de cette
interprétation, que l’on considère les épisodes qui l’ont précédée ou ceux qui l’ont suivie.
17. «En amont» (avant la lettre), deux éléments méritent d’être notés :
1) la démarche de Singapour s’inscrit dans un souci plus général de détermination des eaux
territoriales de la colonie à la suite de l’arrêt de la Cour de céans dans l’affaire des Pêcheries
norvégiennes 25 ; ce souci est, en outre, sans doute égal ement lié à la demande initiale du
directeur de la marine de la Fédération de Malaya concernant Pulau Pisang 26 ; et
2) la lettre du 12 juin 1953, écrite par Higham au nom du secrétaire colonial, témoigne sans doute
d’une incertitude (sinon, toute enquête eût été inutile), mais elle ne montre certainement pas,
contrairement à ce qu’écrit la Ma laisie dans sa réplique, que Si ngapour «avait conscience que
Pulau Batu Puteh faisait partie du Sultanat de Johor» («was aware that PBP was part of the
27
Sultanate of Johor») .
18. Certes, le fait même que cette demande eût été formulée établit que Singapour, ou, en
tout cas, certaines autorités administratives coloniales, souhaitaient s’assurer que la souveraineté de
la colonie sur Pedra Branca n’était pas contest ée et que Singapour pouvait revendiquer des eaux
territoriales autour de l’île. Dès juillet 1952, le gé omètre en chef avait clairement pris position en
ce sens et s’était déclar é d’avis que Singapour devrait revendi quer une mer territoriale de 3 milles
28
marins autour de l’île . Toutefois, en l’absence d’instruments probants dans un sens ou dans
l’autre (contrairement à ce qui était le cas pour Pulau Pisang ou Pulau Merambong) 29, les autorités
coloniales, tout en se déclarant convaincues que la construction et l’entretien du phare depuis 1950
25
Cf. MM, annexe 68, lettre de A. G. B. Colton au secr étaire colonial au commissaire général adjoint pour les
affaires coloniales, Singapour, juillet 1953.
26
Voir MS, annexe 89 et plus haut, par. 7.
27
RM, p. 173, par. 369 ; voir aussi MM, p. 108, par. 237.
28 Voir MS, annexe 91 et plus haut, par. 8.
29 Voir MS, annexes 89 et 90. - 29 -
«par l’usage international, confère[nt] sans doute à la colonie certains droits et obligations» («by
30
international usage no doubt [confer] some rights and obligations on the Colony») , estiment que
le statut de Pedra Branca devait être confirmé.
19. Elles le font, je viens de le rappeler, sur la base d’une erreur ⎯puisque Higham, se
fondant sur une mystérieuse adjonction manuscrit e, interprète la dépêche de Butterworth du
28novembre1844 comme concernant Pedra Branca alors qu’elle visait Peak Rock. Mais la
réponse n’en est que plus révélatrice: malgré cette erreur, qui aurait constitué une «perche»
tentante pour une revendication de souveraineté si celle-ci avait eu la moindre vraisemblance, Johor
décline: «the Johore Government does not claim ownership of Pedra Branca»… Or, cela mérite
d’être également noté, Johor, à cette époque en tout cas, ne se désintéresse nullement de l’extension
exacte de sa souveraineté territoriale comme le montre clairement la réaction du conseiller
britannique à Johor, qui affirme qu’avant de répondre à la lettre de Higham du 12 juin 1953, «[t]he
State Secretary will doubtless wish to consult with the Commissioner for Lands and Mines and
Chief Surveyor and any existing archives…» 31.
20. Que déduire de tout ceci, Monsieur le président? «[T]hat in June1953 Singapore did
not have any sense that PBP was part of the territory of Singapore» 32 comme le prétend la
Malaisie ? C’est, sans aucun doute, très excessif. Le géomètre en chef et, apparemment, le Master
Attendant, c’est-à-dire les deux administrateurs colonia ux les plus au fait des conditions effectives
d’administration de l’île, semblaient n’avoir auc un doute quant à la souveraineté de Singapour sur
Pedra Branca. De leur côté, les autorités supérieures, soucieuses de ne pas empiéter sur la
souveraineté territoriale de Johor, souhaitaient s’ entourer de toutes les précautions nécessaires
avant de procéder à la délimitation des eaux territoriales de la colonie ⎯ dont il ne faut pas oublier
qu’une partie des archives avaient été détruit es durant la guerre, ce dont ces autorités étaient
conscientes. Et il semble que ceci a été fait tr ès systématiquement puisque, s’agissant de Pulau
Pisang par exemple, le Master Attendant de Singapour ne se rallie aux vues du directeur de la
marine de la Fédération de Malaya qu’après que «it has been possible to trace an indenture in the
30MS annexe 93, par. 1.
31
MS, annexe 95.
32RM, p. 173, par. 369 ; voir aussi MM, p. 108, par. 237. - 30 -
th 33
Johore Registry of Deeds dated 6 October, 1900» . Les autorités de la colonie procèdent de la
même manière en ce qui concerne Pedra Bran ca mais avec un résultat inverse puisqu’elles
obtiennent confirmation que «the Johore Government does not claim ownership of Pedra Branca».
21. J’ajoute qu’il est pour le moins paradoxal que la Malaisie s’obstine à affirmer que «this
correspondence also indicates that the Singapore Colonial Secretary had a clear understanding of
the extent of Singapore’s sovereignty» 34. Sans doute, la lettre de Higham du 12juin1953
montre-t-elle qu’il était conscient que Pedra Branca était située en dehors des limites fixées par le
traité Crawfurd de 1824, mais il n’en déduit nu llement que l’île n’appartient pas à Singapour:
c’est, justement, compte tenu de ce fait, qu’il interroge Johor pour savoir s’il existerait un
document quelconque qui permettrait de déterminer son statut juridique. La réponse du secrétaire
d’Etat du sultanat montre que tel n’est pas le cas puisque ⎯ on ne le répétera jamais trop ! ⎯ à la
suite des recherches qu’il a effectuées, «the Johore Government does not claim ownership of Pedra
Branca».
22. Voici, Monsieur le président, l’interpré tation raisonnable que l’on doit donner de ce qui
s’est passé «en amont» de la réponse de Johor du 21septembre1953. Et cela confirme en tous
points les enseignements que l’on peut tirer du texte même de cette lettre. Il en va de même des
«circonstances d’aval», c’est-à-dire des suites qui ont été données à celles-ci, même s’il y a moins
de choses à en dire.
23. Il est clair que la réponse du secrétaire d’Etat de Johor a levé toutes les incertitudes. Dès
lors que le sultanat n’a pas de revendication sur Pedra Branca, les autorités de Singapour en tirent
les conséquences et, comme le fait savoir aussitôt l’ Attorney-General, «on the strength of [the
35
answer from Johor] we can claim Pedra Branca as Singapore territory» . Il va de soi que cette
conclusion ne confirme nullement, comme le préte nd la Malaisie, «that it was not, even at that
36
point, Singapore’s view that PBP was at that time already a part of Singapore’s territory» . Elle
montre simplement que les scrupules de certains fonctionnaires coloniaux consciencieux ⎯ et
33MS, annexe 93 ; voir aussi MS, annexe 91.
34
RM, p. 173, par. 369 ; voir aussi MM, p. 108-109, par. 238-239.
35Cf. MM, annexe 70.
36RM, p. 173, par. 369 ; voir aussi MM, p. 109, par. 241 - 31 -
conscients du caractère incomplet des archives sauvées de la destruction pendant la guerre ⎯ sont
claires: Singapour, en l’absence de toute revendi cation de Johor, exerce bien sa souveraineté sur
l’île.
24. C’est aussi ainsi que l’entend le secrétaire colonial qui, dans sa réponse finale, en date du
13 octobre 1953, à la question du Master Attendant du 6 février 37, se réfère à la réponse de Johor et
38
transmet la conclusion que l’Attorney-General en a tirée . En outre, cette note confirme, elle
aussi, ce que je disais il y a quelques instants au sujet de la signification du mot «ownership» qui
figure dans la lettre du secrétaire d’Etat de Johor du 21septembre: «the State Secretary, Johore,
states that the Johore Government does not claim the ownership of Pedra Branca Rock on which
the Horsburgh Lighthouse stands» (les italiques sont de nous). C’est bien de l’île qu’il
s’agit ; pas
du phare.
c) La portée juridique des échanges de correspondance de 1953
25. Jusqu’à présent, Monsieur le président, ma démonstration a été «analytique» et je me suis
efforcé d’étudier la portée de chacun des documen ts dont nous disposons pris isolément. Avant
d’en terminer avec cet important épisode, je voudr ais, avec votre permission, rappeler, de façon
plus synthétique, la portée juridique globale qu’il convient de lui attribuer ⎯ne fût-ce que parce
que, «lorsque l’on apprécie l’effet de ces notes, il convient de ne pas attacher trop d’importance à
telle ou telle expression employée. La corres pondance doit être jugée comme un tout...» ( Statut
o
juridique du Groënland oriental, arrêt, 1933, C.P.J.I. série A/B n 53, p. 54 ; voir aussi p. 60.)
26. En réfléchissant à cet aspect de notre affaire, on ne peut qu’être frappé par les similitudes
qu’elle présente avec celle du Groënland oriental, tranchée par la Cour permanente. Dans son arrêt
du 5 avril 1933, celle-ci reconnaît le titre danois su r le territoire contesté du fait de l’exercice
pacifique et continu de l’autorité étatique exercé par ce pays ( ibid., notamment p.51, 54 ou 64),
mais ceci n’empêche pas la Cour de s’interroger sur la portée juridique de «certains engagements
[norvégiens] portant reconnaissance de la s ouveraineté danoise sur l’ensemble du Groënland»
37
MS, annexe 91.
38MS, annexe 97. - 32 -
(ibid., p. 64). Parmi ceux-ci, la fameuse «déclaration Ihlen» qui est intéressante pour nous à plus
d’un titre.
27. Aux termes de celle-ci, Ihlen, ministre des affaires étrangères de la Norvège, avait dit «au
ministre du Danemark que le Gouvernement norvégien ne ferait pas de difficultés au règlement de
cette affaire», c’est-à-dire qu’il ne s’opposerait pas «à ce que le Gouvernement danois étendît à
l’ensemble du Groënland ses intérêts politiques et économiques» ( ibid., p.70). Sans qu’il soit
besoin de trancher la question ⎯ qui passionne la doctrine ⎯ de savoir si la Norvège était en
l’espèce liée par un accord verbal avec le Danemark ou par un acte unilatéral, la Cour a considéré
«comme incontestable qu’une telle réponse à une démarche diplomatique d’une puissance
étrangère, faite par le ministre des affaires ét rangères au nom du gouvernement, dans une affaire
qui est de son ressort, lie le pays dont il est le ministre» ( ibid., p. 71 ; voir aussi Essais nucléaires
(Australie c. France) (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1974 , p. 267, par. 43;
p.472, par. 46 ou Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (nouvelle requête: 2002)
(République démocratique du Congo c. Rwanda), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2006, p. 28, par. 49-50).
28. Mutatis mutandis, il en va de même en l’espèce : un organe compétent de la Colonie de
Singapour saisit le Gouvernement de l’Etat voisin et l’interroge sur le statut juridique d’un
territoire. La réponse est sans ambiguïté («the Government does not claim ownership of Pedra
Branca»). Il est tout aussi incontestable que, sans qu’il y ait lieu de s’attarder sur la qualité
particulière de l’auteur de la réponse dès lors que celui-ci avait incontestablement qualité pour
engager l’Etat (ibid., p. 27-28, par. 47-48), une telle réponse lie Johor : son auteur n’est rien moins,
selon la Constitution de Johor de 1948, que «le plus haut fonctionnaire en charge des affaires
administratives de l’Etat» («the principal officer in charge of the administrative affairs of the
State») (MS, annexe 88, art. VI (1)).
29. La comparaison peut d’ailleurs être poussée pl us loin. Il est certain que, pas plus que la
déclaration Ihlen ne constituait «une reconnaissance formelle de la souveraineté danoise» sur
l’ensemble du Groënland ( C.P.J.I., Série A/B, n° 53, p. 69), la lettre du secrétaire d’Etat de Johor
ne reconnaît expressément la souverain eté de Singapour sur Pedra Branca ⎯ce que nous ne
prétendons pas et ce que n’avait d’ailleurs pas demandé Higham. En revanche, de même qu’à
raison de l’engagement im pliqué dans la déclaration Ihlen de 1919, la Norvège se trouvait dans - 33 -
l’obligation de ne pas contester la souveraineté danoise sur l’ensemble du Groënland (Statut
o
juridique du Groënland oriental, arrêt, 1933, C.P.J.I. série A/B n 53, p. 73), de même la Malaisie,
successeur de Johor, ne peut opposer, aujourd’hui, à Singapour un titre territorial ⎯ que le
secrétaire d’Etat de Johor a reconnu ne pas exister en 1953.
30. En effet, et cela va plus loin que la déclaration Ihlen, le secrétaire d’Etat de Johor ne fait
pas part d’une simple déclaration d’intention face à un projet, il énonce un fait: «the Johore
Government does not claim ownership of Pedra Bran ca». Il s’agit là d’une constatation, qui se
suffisait à elle-même et n’appelait aucune réaction de la part de Singapour. Pour reprendre la
formule de la Cour dans les affaires des Essais nucléaires, «[d]ans ces conditions, aucune
contrepartie n’est nécessaire pour que la déclar ation prenne effet, non plus qu’une acceptation
ultérieure ni même une réplique ou une réaction d’autres Etats» ( Essais nucléaires (Australie c.
France) (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974 , p. 267, par. 43 ; p. 472, par. 46).
Et je ne peux m’empêcher, Monsieur le pr ésident, de citer à nouveau, la célèbre opinion
individuelle jointe par le vice-président Alfa ro à l’arrêt de la Cour dans l’affaire du Temple de
Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande) : peu importe la dénominati on technique de ce principe,
son
«effet juridique … est toujours le même: la partie qui par sa reconnaissance, sa
représentation, sa déclaration, sa conduite ou son silence, a maintenu une attitude
manifestement contraire au droit qu’elle prétend revendiquer devant un tribunal
international est irrecevable à réclamer ce droit ( venire contra factum proprium non
valet)» (fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 40).
31. En d’autres termes, Monsieur le président, je reconnais bien volontiers que la lettre de
Johor du 21 septembre 1953 ne prouve pas, positivement, que c’est Singapour qui bénéficie du titre
territorial sur Pedra Branca. Mais elle exclut absolument que la souveraineté sur l’île appartienne à
la Malaisie. En l’absence de toute contestation de la part d’un Etat tiers , ceci ne peut que vous
conduire, Messieurs les juges, à constater la souveraineté de Singapour sur Pedra Branca.
Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie beaucoup de votre attention, et je vous prie, Monsieur
e
le président, de bien vouloir donner la parole à M Loretta Malintoppi.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT: Je vous remercie pour votre plaidoirie. I now give the floor to
Ms Malintoppi. - 34 -
Ms MALINTOPPI: Thank you, Mr President.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MAPS AND THIRD STATE RECOGNITION IN THE PRESENT CASE
Mr.President, Members of the Court, this presentation will address two separate issues:
first, I will deal briefly with the cartographic ev idence and its significance for the present case and,
second, I will address the recognition by third States of Singapore’s sovereignty over Pedra Branca,
Middle Rocks and South Ledge.
1. The cartographic evidence
1. Generally speaking, and depending on thei r accuracy, maps are the graphic representation
of certain geographic facts and ⎯ when it comes to providing ev idence for the attribution of
sovereign title ⎯ they cannot by themselves establish that title, save in exceptional circumstances,
such as when they are attached to or otherwise form part of a delimitation boundary agreement (see
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 582, para. 54). Singapore
and Malaysia agree that there are no maps in this case that have this kind of legal force, as
described by the Court in the Frontier Dispute case (RM, p.176, para.376) and reaffirmed most
recently by this Court in the Nicaragua v. Honduras Judgment where the Court underscored the
“extremely limited scope of maps as a source of sovereign title” ( Territorial and Maritime Dispute
between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment of
8 October 2007, para. 215).
2. In the present case, the evidence of Singapore’s sovereignty lies elsewhere. As my
colleagues have explained, Singapore’s title resu lts from the lawful possession of Pedra Branca by
Singapore’s predecessor in title, Great Britain, in the period 1847-1851. That title was thereafter
maintained by the continuous exercise of exclus ive authority over Pedra Branca and the other
disputed features by Singapore up to the present.
3. Nevertheless, the cartographic evidence still has a role to play in this case in two main
ways: first and foremost, as evidence that the o fficial view held by the Malaysian Government
itself prior to the emergence of the dispute was that Pedra Branca was under Singapore’s
sovereignty and, second, as corroborative evidence confirming the existence of Singapore’s title - 35 -
over the disputed islands, a title which Malaysia has tacitly accepted until the emergence of this
dispute.
2. The Malaysian maps as admissions against interest
4. I shall address first Malaysia’s own offi cial maps which recognize that Pedra Branca
belongs to Singapore. Malaysia, understandably, adopts a very defensive attitude with respect to
these maps. The issue has been debated at length in the Parties’ written pleadings, and so I shall
not dwell on it, except to reiterate a few points.
5. The six maps in question, which are all different editions of Sheet135 of Series L7010
(maps12, 13, 14 and 15 of Singapore’s Memorial ; and 38 and 41 of the atlas submitted by
Malaysia with its Memorial), are reproduced in the judges’ folders, at tab45. I call the Court’s
attention in particular to the four maps submitte d by Singapore with its Memorial. All these maps
are entitled “Pengerang”, from the region they depict . The first map which is now on the screen is
map 12, was published in 1962 by the Surveyor Gene ral of the Federation of Malaya, which is the
highest authority on maps in the Federation of Malaya. The map is on the screen. If we now zoom
onto the relevant portion, which shows Pedra Bran ca with the Malaysian translation, Pulau Batu
Puteh, we can see underneath it, in parentheses, firs t the word “Horsburgh” and further down, also
in parentheses but in capital letters, the word “Singapore”.
6. The attributions on the relevant portions of the other three maps ⎯ which are now on the
screen ⎯ are very similar, if not identical. The se cond map, which is map 13, is a second edition
of the first map, also published by the Surveyor General of the Federation of Malaya in 1962. The
third map (map14) was published in 1965 by the Director of National Mapping in Malaysia, the
official cartographic authority in Malaysia, and th e fourth map, also by the Director of National
Mapping of Malaysia, was published in 1974. The other two Malaysian maps reproduced in
Malaysia’s map atlas, published in 1970 and 1975, have the same annotations and were also issued
by the Director of National Mapping of Malaysia.
7. All these maps are entitled to significant pr obative weight: they represent statements by
the Malaysian official cartographic authority over a period of 14years, prior to the time when the
dispute arose, depicting Pedra Branca as belonging to Singapore. These cartographic statements - 36 -
are fundamentally inconsistent with the claim now advanced by Malaysia. To borrow the words of
the Arbitral Tribunal in the Beagle Channel arbitration, which are particularly apposite in the
present situation:
“[T]he cumulative impact of a large num ber of maps, relevant for a particular
case, that tell the same story ⎯ especially when some of them emanate from the
opposite party , or from third countries ⎯ cannot but be considerable, either as
indications of general or at least widespread repute, or belief, or else as confirmatory
of conclusions reached indepe ndently of the maps.” ( Beagle Channel Arbitration
(Argentina v. Chile), Award of 18 February 1977, 52 ILR 97, pp. 203-204, para. 139.)
8. This is precisely what happened here. Th ese official Malaysian maps individually and
cumulatively tell the same story. They mean what they say and they say what they mean: Pedra
Branca was regarded by Malaysia as belonging to Singapore. Nevertheless, Malaysia attempts to
dismiss these maps as “equivocal” and states th at “it does not accept that the maps can be
characterized as admissions against interest on its part” (RM, p. 187, para. 398). Whether Malaysia
likes it or not, it is difficult to see what is equivocal about these maps or how they could be
characterized as anything other than admissions ag ainst Malaysia’s own in terests and admissions
that Pedra Branca belongs to Singapore.
9. Malaysia even goes as far as questioning the attribution of Pedra Branca to Singapore
specified on the maps, and it states that “it is not at all clear what the notation [Singapore] is
intended to indicate” (RM, p. 189, para. 403). But what else could the map makers have intended
to indicate by the notation in capital letters “Singapore” other than the island belonged to
Singapore? Does Malaysia seriously contend that the annotations on the maps were intended to
specify that only the lighthouse on the island belonged to Singapore and not the island itself? Such
a proposition not only flies on the face of logic, but it is also belied by the maps themselves.
10. In order to illustrate the point, I would like to return to the first map of Malaysia’s
seriesL7010 compendium dating from 1962, which was on the screen earlier (MS, map12, also
reproduced as map32 of the Malaysian map atlas). [On the screen] This is only one example,
although exactly the same comments can be made about the other official Malaysian maps
published between 1962 and 1975.
11. As I have noted, Pedra Branca is clearly labelled “Singapore” on the map in capital
letters and in parentheses. If the Court now shifts its attention to another island depicted on the - 37 -
map ⎯ labelled “Pulau Tekong Besar” ⎯ it will see that the same word ⎯ exactly in the same
way ⎯ appears in parentheses with respect to this territory, “Singapore”. It is undisputed that
Pulau Tekong Besar is under Singapor e’s sovereignty. What is as significant as it is obvious from
the maps is that Pedra Branca is labelled “Si ngapore” in exactly the same way as the Singapore
island of Pulau Tekong Besar is. Clearly, both isla nds were regarded as belonging to Singapore.
There was no lighthouse on Pulau Tekong Besar, and thus there would have been no reason for the
Malaysian cartographic agency to use the word “Singapore” simply to designate who operated the
lighthouse, as Malaysia has suggested in an atte mpt to dispose and explain away the maps in
question.
12. This point is further confirmed by draw ing a comparison with the island of Pulau Pisang
which, as Mr.Bundy has explained, belongs to Malaysia, but on which stands a lighthouse
operated by Singapore.
13. The map which is now on the screen [CMS, map 25] is also at tab 47 of your folders, and
is from the same Malaysian series: it shows the island of Pulau Pisang in the bottom left corner. If
we enlarge the map to focus on this island, the Court would see that the word “Singapore” does not
appear on the island despite Singapore’s maintenance of the lighthouse there and the indication of
the lighthouse on the map. Contrary to Malaysia’s argument, this shows that the word “Singapore”
was not used on Malaysia’s maps simply to label a lighthouse operated by Singapore on Malaysian
territory. When Malaysia used the word “Si ngapore” on its maps, this clearly referred to the
relevant holder of title over the territory.
14. Having disposed of Malaysia’s first argument , I’d like to turn to Malaysia’s next point:
its assertion that the maps cannot be considered as admissions against interest because they carry
disclaimers. What Malaysia fails to point out is that these disclaimers state that the maps are not
authoritative for the delimitation of international or other boundaries . Thus, these disclaimers
have nothing to do with the attribution of te rritory, but rather concern the delimitation of
boundaries. This is an important distinction, because any deviation in the course of a boundary
(which may be due to cartographic inaccuracy or to limitations caused in the scale of the maps) is
of a fundamentally different character from the out right attribution of territory to a given country
by an unequivocal label. - 38 -
15. Even assuming, quod non, that the disclaimers also extended to attribution of territory,
however, this does not detract from the maps’ lega l value as admissions against the interests of
Malaysia. As the Boundary Commission in the Eritrea/Ethiopia case has observed, a disclaimer
does not relieve a State “adversely affected by a map” of the implication that the map gives rise to,
because, as the Commission noted:
“The map still stands as a statement of a geographical fact, especially when the
State adversely affected itself produced and disseminated it, even against its own
interest.” (Decision of 13April2002, reprinted in 41 International Legal Materials
1057 (2002), p. 28, para. 3.27.)
16. The publication of maps is a form of State conduct. When a government, as Malaysia
has done in this case, has published over a period of many years a series of maps consistently
showing an attribution of territory supporting the cl aim put forward by another State, that must be
relevant in representing the considered views of the government at the time as to where sovereignty
over the territory lay. The fact that Malaysia’s own official cartography is fully consistent with
Singapore’s position is a further fundamental defect in its case.
Mr.President, this could be a convenient time for me to stop and resume after the coffee
break if you so wish.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Tha nk you so much. I think we will take our
customary break now for ten minutes.
The Court adjourned from 11.20 to 11.35 a.m.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Please be seated. Please continue.
Ms MALINTOPPI: Thank you, Mr. President.
3. The early maps
17. Before the coffee break I described the o fficial maps issued by the Malaysian mapping
authorities, which attribute Pedra Branca to Singa pore. Malaysia seeks to minimize the relevance
of these maps. However, while downplaying the importance of its own official maps when they do
not suit its interests, Malaysia at the same time puts great stock in other elements of the
cartographic evidence. It has dealt with this issue extensively in its written pleadings: it has - 39 -
produced a map atlas and reproduced numerous maps and charts in its pleadings. Malaysia’s
arguments in respect of maps are based on two main strands: first, that early maps support its
claim to an original title based on immemorial possession, as they allegedly show a connection
between Pedra Branca and Johor or depict Pedra Branca within the British sphere of influence.
These maps, in other words, are said to illustrate th e view of third States that the island once was
part of Johor’s dominions.
18. The second strand of Malaysia’s arguments is based on two negative inferences: first,
that the maps do not show Singapore’s maritime boundaries in the area around Pedra Branca
(CMM, p. 264, para. 557), and second, that the existing maps do not suggest that Pedra Branca and
related features are not part of Malaysia (RM, p 176, para. 376). Naturally, Malaysia conveniently
forgets to mention or explain its own official maps, which show precisely the opposite of what
Malaysia contends.
19. The early cartography can be disposed of quickly. I refer the Court to the six maps from
the seventeenth to the mid-nine teenth centuries which were repr oduced by Malaysia with its
Memorial (map atlas, maps 1-6). These maps ar e highly generalized, incons istent and inaccurate:
even Malaysia admits, at paragr aph282 of its Reply, that the scale in the early maps is not
accurate. Consequently, they are of no releva nce for purposes of indicating sovereignty.
Moreover, none of them shows any specific attribution of Pedra Branca to Johor and can in no way
support Malaysia’s claim to sovereignty over Pedra Branca.
20. As for the alleged “close connection” between Pedra Branca and Johor, this is not shown
by these maps and remains unproven. As Singapore demonstrated in its Counter-Memorial, other
contemporary maps exist which show Pedra Branca as having no connection whatsoever with the
Johor mainland and some, like two maps of J ohor and dependencies issued in 1887 and 1893,
which do not depict Pedra Branca at all (maps No s. 9 and 10 of Singapore’s atlas). These two
maps are particularly significant. I will show on the screen now the 1887 map, which was the first
official map of Johor published under the author ity of the Sultan and was drawn up by a senior
Johor official ⎯ as you can see in the legend ⎯ known as “Dato Bintara Luar” ⎯ which I am told
means Minister for Foreign Affairs in Malay ⎯ after an extensive survey. The Sultan of Johor
officially presented this map to the Government of South Australia in 1887. - 40 -
21. The 1893 map of Johor, which also does not include Pedra Branca, was drawn by a
surveyor in the service of the Johor Government and published in 1894 in the Geographical
Journal of the Royal Geographic Society: and it wi ll serve to illustrate a paper entitled “Johore”.
Upon presentation of the paper at a gathering of the Royal Geographic Society on
12 February 1894, the Secretary of the Sultan of J ohor noted that this map may be “considered the
map of the day” (The Geographical Journal, Vol. III, No. 4, p. 298).
22. By contrast to these official Johor maps that do not depict Pedra Branca, the maps relied
on by Malaysia provide no evidence, and none is adduced, that any of the local rulers ever
commissioned or authorized their production. In the light of these considerations, no conclusion
can be drawn from these maps with regard to the perceptions as to sovereignty over Pedra Branca
and related features at the time. As stated by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Award in the first phase
in the Eritrea/Yemen case with respect to maps produ ced during the nineteenth century,
“Conclusions based on this material would be tenuou s at best.” (Award of 9 October 1998, p. 95,
para. 370.)
23. A similar reasoning applies to the post -1824 maps showing a division between British
and Dutch spheres of influence. These maps are said to be significant because they were issued
subsequently to the 1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty and they do not ⎯ Malaysia argues ⎯ attribute
Pedra Branca to the Dutch sphere of influence. Now quite aside from the fact that so-called
“spheres of influence” are not the same as sovereign title, these maps show no attribution of Pedra
Branca to any particular sovereign.
24. In the present case, title was firmly estab lished when the British authorities in Singapore
took possession of Pedra Branca in the period 1847 -1851. This is also confirmed by the Dutch
recognition of British sovereignty over Pedra Bran ca which took place in 1850 and to which I will
refer later in my intervention.
4. The twentieth century maps
25. I now turn to maps produced during the twentieth century. Malaysia argues that, since
certain charts and maps dating from this period do not show boundary lines in the area around
Pedra Branca, they must necessarily reflect th e perception that the island was not within - 41 -
Singapore’s maritime boundaries. In other words, Malaysia’s position is that the maps do not
support Singapore’s claim of title to the island and its related features.
26. Malaysia’s argument, however, is simply ineffectual when compared with Singapore’s
taking of possession and its impressive record of acting à titre de souverain on and around Pedra
Branca for over 150 years. Any negative inferences that might be drawn and which Malaysia seeks
to draw from these nautical charts and highly generalized maps are ultimately irrelevant and do not
advance its case. Whatever the maps may or may not show, they do not even begin to contradict
the pattern of activities and official visits to Pedra Branca in 1847-1851, the various manifestations
of Great Britain’s intention and will to act as s overeign and the maintenance of this title through a
variety of acts of peaceful and continuous administration carried out since 1851. And they
certainly cannot negate the express disclaimer of ownership over Pedra Branca made by the State
of Johor in 1953.
27. Malaysia also argues that, if Singapore has sovereignty over Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks
and South Ledge, it should have included these features in its maps. There is an obvious answer to
that argument and that is provided by the physical distance between Pedra Branca and the
Singapore mainland. After all, the fact that the maps of France do not include Martinique or
Guadeloupe does not make these islands less French.
28. Malaysia then relies on certain maps show ing lines at sea which it contends show Pedra
Branca as falling within the territorial waters of Malaysia or its predecessors (maps 26-29
and 35-36 in Malaysia’s map atlas, and maps 7-15 in CMM, pp. 286-297).
29. Singapore has already responded in detail to Malaysia’s arguments for each one of these
maps in its Counter-Memorial and Reply, but st ill some remarks are warranted in light of the
extensive discussion contained in Malaysia’s Reply (pp. 183-187, paras. 389-398).
30. Maps 27, 28 and 29 of Malaysia’s atlas a ll contain similar dotted lines at sea. The map
shown on the screen as an example is map 28. On ei ther side of the line depicted on this map are
the annotations: “Federation of Malaya” and “Republic of Indonesia”, the other maps contain
similar lines and similar annotations, such as “British Malaya”, “Netherlands East Indies”. Map 27
was published by the British War Office in 1944, while maps28 and 29 were reprinted from
map 27 in 1950. - 42 -
31. For Malaysia, the significance of these charts lies in the fact that they show dotted lines
at sea as international boundary lines between Federa tion of Malaya and Republic of Indonesia or
British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies which allegedly place Pedra Branca and related
features in Johor waters. Malaysia also argues that, since none of these maps draws a line in the
area of Pedra Branca indicating its appurtenance to Singapore “the authors did not consider that
PBP fell in the Singapore (Malaya) province” (RM, p. 184, para. 391).
32. However, these charts contain no indication as to the attribution of sovereignty, and the
arguments advanced in Malaysia’s Reply do not change this state of things. All three maps depict
Pedra Branca and Middle Rocks as a lighthouse sy mbol surrounded by a cluster of rocks, and
identified by the label “Pedra Branca Horsburgh (Middle Rock)”. South Ledge is depicted as a
black dot with the label “Rock”, located about tw o miles south-west of Pedra Branca. The dotted
lines appearing in all three maps place South Ledge on the “Indonesian side” of the line. Maps 28
and 29 contain disclaimers and in map 27 the do tted line is labelled “British Malaya”, a term
which, at the time the map was produced, encompassed both Johor and Singapore. Thus, the line
represented on this chart provides no assistance in showing whether Pedra Branca appertained to
Singapore or Johor.
33. In sum, no conclusions on matters of sovereignty can be drawn from these military
charts. This is further confirmed by the arbitr ary nature of the dotted lines depicted on them and
the disclaimers they carry.
34. Likewise, maps 35 and 37 of Malaysia’s Memorial map atlas are similarly inconclusive,
and both contain a disclaimer stating that they ar e not an authority for boundaries. Malaysia’s
interpretation, i.e., that they are inconsistentwith Singapore’s sovereignty over Pedra Branca, is
thus based on pure wishful thinking.
35. Before I leave the subject of maps, I wish to discuss map 30 of Malaysia’s Memorial
map atlas, which can be seen on the screen. This is a compilation sheet of Johor, it is sheet No. 135
issued in 1957. Malaysia finds the map significant because it contains no specific attribution of
Pedra Branca to Singapore. In its Counter-Memor ial, Singapore made four points in response to
Malaysia’s statement that this map “was eviden tly carefully drawn and checked” (MM, p.148,
para. 319): - 43 -
⎯ first, there was no indication in the compilation sheet that Pedra Branca was attributed to Johor
or Malaysia (a point which is acknowledged by Malaysia in its Memorial (p.148, para.319)
and in the Reply (p. 186, para. 397));
⎯ second, in any event, inclusion of a prominent feature like Pedra Branca in a compilation sheet
of this nature carries no implications for matters of sovereignty;
⎯ third, it would have been possible to draw a compilation sheet without actually conducting a
field survey on Pedra Branca;
⎯ last, and most important, the 1957 compilation sh eet formed the basis on which the subsequent
map in which Malaysia expressly and unequivocally attributed Pedra Branca to Singapore was
compiled and published in 1962. We recall that this was sheet No. 135 of series L 7010.
36. In its Reply, Malaysia asserted that Pedra Branca was “key” to this survey of Johor and
stated that Malaysian surveyors had travelled to Pedra Branca and taken observations from this
island (RM, p. 186, para. 397). However, the te mporal sequence of Malaysia’s arguments does not
make sense: the survey on which Malaysia relies was carried out in 1959 and the compilation sheet
was issued in 1957. How could a survey conducted in 1959 have had any impact on a compilation
sheet drawn two years earlier?
37. As for the crucial point I mentioned, i.e., that the 1957 compilation sheet formed the
basis of Malaysia’s 1962 “admission against interest map”, Malaysia’s only defence is that “it is
not known whether this was in fact the case” (RM, p.187, para.398). However, this was indeed
the case as can be seen from materials on the record.
38. The short answer to Malaysia is that the 1957 compilation sheet is marked “Sheet 135”,
in other words it bears the same sheet number as the two 1962 “admission against interest” maps.
As explained by Singapore in its Counter-Memorial, further documentary proof of the fact that the
1957 compilation sheet formed the basis of the 1962 official maps can be found in the Annual
Reports of the Federation of Malaya Survey De partment, and I refer the Court to Singapore’s
Counter-Memorial, paragraph9.29 (pp.229-230) and footnote582, at page230, and also to
Annex 35 to Singapore’s Counter-Memorial. - 44 -
5. Third States’ recognition of Singapore’s sovereignty over Pedra Branca
39. I will now move to the final topic of my presentation: the recognition by third States of
Singapore’s sovereignty over Pedra Branca.
40. As is the case with the map evidence, th ird State recognition alone is not sufficient to
establish territorial title. Nevertheless, the fact that third States acknowledge the existence of a title
belonging to a particular State attests to its no toriety and may thus serve as confirmation of its
existence or represent evidence of general repute.
41. The various episodes that constitute the pa ttern of third-party recognition throughout the
years that Pedra Branca was under the sovereignty of Singapore have been extensively discussed
by Singapore in its written pleadings. Allow me to recall them briefly once again.
42. On 27 November 1850, only six months after the Horsburgh lighthouse foundation stone
ceremony at which ⎯ as Mr. Brownlie recalled ⎯ Pedra Branca was described as a dependency of
Singapore, the Dutch General Secretary in Batavi a expressly referred to “the construction of a
lighthouse at Pedra Branca on British territory”. This was done in a letter to the Dutch Resident in
Riau. The letter concerned the payment of grat uities to the commanders of Dutch gunboats who
had assisted Thomson in patrolling the waters be tween Riau and Singapore during the construction
of the lighthouse. The relevant passage is reproduced at tab 48 of the judges’ folder and it deserves
to be quoted in full. It is on the screen now:
[Place on screen]
“As commissioned, I have the honour of informing Your Excellency that the
government has found no grounds for granting gratuities to the commanders of the
cruisers stationed at Riau, as proposed in your despatch of 1 November 1850, number
649, on account of their shown dedication in patrolling the waterway between Riau
and Singapore, lending assistance to the construction of a lighthouse at Pedra Branca
on British territory. And they deserve it so much the less because the cruiser crews
have failed to perform their actual duties which is to cruise against pirates whose
brutalities have been repeatedly complained of in the vicinity of Lingga.” (RS, Ann. 8,
emphasis added.)
43. It should be emphasized that the Dutch General Secretary in Batavia was the highest
ranking civil servant in the Netherlands East Indies and ⎯ as secretary to the Governor-General of
the Netherlands East Indies ⎯ his letters carried the authority of the Governor-General. In
particular, the author of this letter, Mr.Vissch er, had occupied the position of General Secretary
since 1841. He thus held this job for nine years when he wrote this letter. Quite aside from the - 45 -
authority of his position, Mr.Visscher was clearly very experienced and knowledgeable in the
affairs of the region. His contemporary opinio n that Pedra Branca fell under British sovereignty
must therefore be entitled to considerable weight.
44. The second episode I wish to recall concerns a meeting among technical experts from
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, which occurr ed in May1983. At the meeting, Singapore
reported on two wrecks in the vicinity of Pedra Br anca and informed the delegates that Singapore
had issued Notices to Mariners notifying the position of the wrecks (MS, Vol. 7, Ann. 156).
45. No objection was raised at the meeting by any of the delegates as to Singapore’s conduct,
and yet ⎯ thanks to the Notices to Mariners issued by Singapore ⎯ there could be no question as
to the exact location where the incidents took place. Clearly, there was also no question in the
participants’ minds that the incidents occurred in Singapore’s waters.
46. As Mr.Bundy has already explained, in at least two instances Singapore granted
permission to nationals of third States to carry out activities on Pedra Branca and its territorial
waters: the first concerned a 1972 request by a member of the American Piscatorial Society to
study the migratory habits of certain fish sp ecies, and the second a 1981 request by a British firm,
RegisLtd., to the Hydrographic Department of the Port of Singapore, to conduct a scanner of
undersea areas six to tennautical miles north-east of Pedra Branca in connection with salvage
operations. In both cases, the requests were addressed to and granted by Singapore authorities.
47. Malaysia dismisses the first episode because the application was made by a private
individual and was addressed to the Chairman of the Singapore Light Dues Board, i.e., to the entity
responsible for the lighthouse. However, Malaysia’s objections are misplaced: the opinion of a
private individual, although it may not per se be determinative of the question of title, is
nevertheless evidence that a certain state of a ffairs was a matter of public knowledge. In the
present instance, Singapore’s conduct was consistent with that of the holder of the legal title over
territory and the conduct of the Applicant is evid ence of the notoriety of a state of affairs.
Furthermore, Malaysia’s comment does not detract from the significance of the fact that this
particular individual wrote to an agency of the Government of Singapore in order to obtain
permission to visit Pedra Branca, not to Malaysia, and that a Singapore government agency granted - 46 -
the request. This was an official act of a soverei gn nature, and it attests to the fact that it was a
matter of public knowledge that Singapore possessed sovereignty over the island.
48. The last, and most recent, episode took place on 4June2005 in connection with a
collision between two ships, the Uni Concord and the Everise Glory , in the vicinity of Pedra
Branca.
49. I would simply recall here that the press releases issued by the Philippines Department of
Foreign Affairs to comment on the death of a Filipino crew member, which resulted from the
incident, stated that the collision occurred: “at sea, off Pedra Branca, Singapore”. You can also, at
your leisure, look at Singapore’s Reply, Annex 61 and Annexes 59 to 66 for the relevant diplomatic
correspondence on this incident. Coming from a neighbouring State of Singapore and Malaysia,
which is presumably well informed of the state of affairs regarding sovereignty in the region, the
Philippines recognition merits particular attention and significance.
50. Finally, the map, which has been reprodu ced by Malaysia as map Annex 5 of the Reply,
a copy of which is also contained at tab 49 of the judges’ folders.
51. Malaysia introduces this map in an atte mpt to discredit the fact that the United States
Gazetteer has been listing Pedra Branca as belonging to Singapore since 1970 (CMS, p.233,
para.9.32). Malaysia describes this map as a “recently declassified United States Department of
State map of the area” (RM, p. 188, para. 400).
52. However, as admitted by Malaysia itself at footnote575, page188 of its Reply, this is
not a map drawn and published by the United States State Department, but a digital copy, stored in
the United States State Department database, of th e Joint Operations Graphic issued by the United
Kingdom Ministry of Defence and sent to the Singapore Government in draft form in 1993 for the
Singapore Government’s comments. As the Court will recall, Singapore formally protested this
map with the United Kingdom Government because the word “Malaysia” appeared and was added
under the legend “Pulau Batu Puteh (Horsburgh)”. Following Singapore’s protest of what appeared
to be a political attribution of Pedra Branca to Ma laysia, the first and only time that this was done
in this series of maps, the United Kingdom wit hdrew the map and never published it (see CMS,
pp. 234-235, paras. 9.35-9.36). - 47 -
53. It is not clear how Malaysia’s case could be advanced by a copy of an English map kept
in a United States digital database, not widely distributed or easily accessible. This map can hardly
be considered evidence of the opinion of the United States and even less of general repute.
Moreover, since the original map on which this copy is based had already been protested by
Singapore, neither the original English map, nor, a fortiori, its United States copy can have any
legal value in this respect. By contrast, it is clear from the 1970 Gazetteer that the United States
Board of Geographic Names, which is a federal entity composed of representatives from several
branches of the United States Government, attributed Pedra Branca to Singapore. In the
“Malaysia” section of the same Gazetteer, no entries can be found for Pedra Branca not even under
its Malay name, “Pulau Batu Puteh”.
54. In conclusion, none of the episodes, none of the arguments raised by Malaysia in an
attempt to belittle the significance of these episod es of third State recognition of Singapore’s
sovereignty over Pedra Branca has any merit. Th e fact of the matter is that all these episodes,
whether initiated by private individuals or emanating from States or State entities, testify to a
general recognition that Pedra Branca falls unde r Singapore’s sovereignty and that Singapore has
responsibility for activities conducted on and around the island. By contrast, and despite all of its
attempts, Malaysia has nothing to show regarding recognition of its presumed title over Pedra
Branca, Middle Rocks and South Ledge.
Thank you for your attention, Mr. President, Members of the Court. If I may ask you now to
give the floor to Professor Pellet to continue with Singapore’s presentation.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: I thank you, Ms Malintoppi, for your pleadings.
I give the floor to Professor Pellet.
M. PELLET : Merci beaucoup, Monsieur le préside nt. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les
juges, j’ai deux bonne nouvelles à vous donner. La première c’est que ceci est ma dernière
plaidoirie pour ce premier tour de Singapour et la seconde c’est qu’elle sera brève. - 48 -
M IDDLE R OCKS ET S OUTH L EDGE
1. Au paragraphe 419 de sa réplique, la Malais ie fait valoir que «[l]a présente affaire ne se
limite pas à la souveraineté sur Pulau Batu Puteh» («This case is not simply about sovereignty over
PBP»). Il est tout à fait exact que, l’article 2 du compromis prie la Cour
«de déterminer si la souveraineté sur
a) Pedra Blanca/Pulau Batu Puteh ;
b) Middle Rocks ;
c) South Ledge ;
appartient à la Malaisie ou à la République de Singapour».
2. Mais il n’en résulte pas que le sort de ces trois formations soit distinct. Certes, il pourrait
en aller ainsi si des éléments du dossier faisai ent apparaître qu’elles avaient fait l’objet d’un
traitement différent soit en droit, soit même en faiMais tel n’est pas le cas : comme la Malaisie
l’avait prudemment indiqué dès son mémoire : «It is true that as minor features not much separate
39
attention was paid to them» . C’est à vrai dire un «understatement», Monsieur le président: ni
Middle Rocks ni South Ledge n’ont jamais, sous quelque angle que ce soit, fait l’objet d’un
traitement distinct de celui de Pedra Branca. La Malaisie n’a pu invoquer aucun acte antérieur à la
date critique qui soit spécifiquement lié à l’une ou à l’autre de ces formations. Et si, pour sa part,
40
Singapour a pu en mentionner quelques-uns , il est clair qu’ils sont liés à sa souveraineté
territoriale sur Pedra Branca et, par voie de consé quence, sur les eaux adjacentes dans lesquelles se
trouvent Middle Rocks et South Ledge et qu’ils ne présentent aucune spécificité.
3. Il est du reste significatif que, dans toutes ses écritures, la Malaisie ait constamment utilisé
les arguments qu’elle invoquait à l’appui de ses prétentions sur Pedra Branca pour tenter de
justifier celles qu’elle a sur Middle Rocks et South Ledge. Lorsque ses conseils ont rédigé sa
réplique, ils ont sans aucun doute réalisé qu’ils manquaient tout particulièrement d’arguments à cet
égard puisque l’expression: «PBP, Middle Rocks and/or South Ledge» y apparaît plus de
quatre-vingts fois (j’ai compté avec l’aide d es touches CTRL-F de mon ordinateur) dans la
39
MM, p. 132, par. 294.
40Cf. CMS, p. 212-213, par. 8.18-8.20. - 49 -
réplique ! La Partie malaisienne peut bien contester que ces trois formations constituent un groupe,
elle ne les traite pas moins comme tel tout au long de ses plaidoiries.
4. Au bénéfice de cette remarque préliminai re, je me propose, Monsieur le président, de
réfuter dans un premier temps les deux arguments que la Malaisie fait encore faiblement valoir en
sens contraire dans sa réplique. Puis je rappellerai, très brièvement, la position de Singapour en ce
qui concerne la souveraineté sur Middle Rocks et South Ledge.
5. Quoique de façon assourdie, la réplique de la Malaisie réitère sa thèse selon laquelle Pedra
Branca, Middle Rocks et South Ledge présenteraient des caractères distincts. Bien qu’elle y
consacre douze pages, elle ne fait valoir qu e deux arguments en ce sens, dont je dirai
successivement quelques mots :
1) les trois formations seraient séparées les unes des autres par des chenaux navigables ; et
2) South Ledge ⎯dont les Parties s’accordent à considérer qu’elle n’est pas susceptible
d’appropriation de manière autonome ⎯, se trouverait dans les eaux territoriales de Middle
Rocks et pas de Pedra Branca.
1. La question des chenaux navigables
6. La Malaisie se donne beau coup de mal pour tenter d’établir que des chenaux navigables
séparent Pedra Branca de Middle Rocks, d’une part, et ces derniers de South Ledge, d’autre part.
Outre que cette affirmation témoigne d’une conception assez singulière de ce qu’est un chenal
navigable, je vois mal, Monsieur le président, en quoi ceci avance la thèse malaisienne.
7. Pour étayer son affirmation quant à l’ex istence de chenaux «navigables», la Malaisie
s’appuie sur un «rapport» (que l’on peut considérer comme un affidavit), du capitaine
GohSiewChong, qui est annexé à sa réplique 41. Il en ressort que Pedra Branca est séparée de
Middle Rocks par un chenal profond d’au moins 10,1 mètres, et Middle Rocks de South Ledge par
un autre chenal dont la profondeur minimale est de 18,3 mètres 42. C’est à peu près exactement ce
qu’avait indiqué Singapour dans son mémoire sur la base d’une ét ude effectuée en2003 par la
Maritime and Port Authority 43.
41RM, appendice III, p. 235-245.
42
Ibid., p. 243, par. 5.5 et 5.6 ou RS, p. 195-196, par. 413.
43Voir MS, vol. 7, annexe 201 et p. 204, par. 8.6. - 50 -
Projection 1 - Extrait de la carte n° 2403 de l’ Amirauté britannique (dépliant inclus au dos
du CMM) (dossier des plaidoiries, onglet 51)
8. En résulte-t-il que l’on peut parler de chen al navigable? Oui, en ce sens que de petits
bateaux intrépides peuvent s’y aventurer à leurs ri sques et périls. Mais ceci ne présente qu’un
intérêt plus que limité pour la navigation comp te tenu du tirant d’eau relativement faible des
navires auxquels ces chenaux sont ouverts. L’extra it de la carte de l’Amirauté britannique qui est
projetée derrière moi le montre on ne peut plus clairement: Pedra Branca et Middle Rocks sont
entourés, ensemble, par une seule ligne en pointillés signalant un danger pour la navigation et
indiquant une profondeur de moins de 10 brasses (c’est la forme en blanc qui ressemble un peu à
Snoopy). De plus, de part et d’autre du groupe constitué par nos trois formations, on trouve des
chenaux autrement «plus navigables», comme le montrent le schéma et les cartes marines qui
figurent sous les onglets 50, 52 et 53 dans le dossier des juges. Du reste, aucune carte ne
mentionne l’existence d’un chenal navigable entre Pedra Branca et Middle Rocks, y compris ⎯ et
cela mérite d’être noté ⎯ la carte de l’Amirauté britannique 3831, dont le capitaine Goh indique
qu’elle a été établie pour l’essentiel sur la base des données recueillies par le HMS Dampier lors de
la campagne de1967 44. La Malaisie ne peut pas davantag e faire état du moindre guide ou de la
moindre instruction nautiques signalant l’existence d’un chenal navigable à cet emplacement: il
n’existe que dans l’imagination, quelque peu orientée, du capitaine Goh.
[Fin de la projection 1.]
9. Tout le but de l’exercice semble être pour la Malaisie de montrer que Pedra Branca,
Middle Rocks et South Ledge ne constituent pas un «groupe». Il s’agit là, à vrai dire, d’une notion
toute relative comme le note expressément le capitaine Goh dans son affidavit: «From a
hydrographic point of view there are no specific factors determining whether a cluster of islands
45
are a group of islands or otherwise.» Dira-t-on que puisque de petits bateaux peuvent naviguer
entre les trois formations celles-ci ne forment pas un groupe? Ou considèrera-t-on, au contraire,
que puisqu’elles sont enserrées entre deux chen aux autrement plus profonds, autrement plus
navigables, qui permettent de les contourner, e lles en constituent un? Je ne pense pas que la
44
RM, appendice III, p. 242, par. 5.2.
45RM, appendice III, p. 242, par. 5.1. - 51 -
question puisse recevoir une réponse indiscutable au point de vue juridique. Mais, surtout, je pense
que ceci n’a guère d’importance.
10. «Groupe» ou pas, le fait est, comme je l’ai rappelé il y a quelques instants, que les trois
formations ont toujours été considérées comme un tout et traitées comme tel. Et l’on pense dès lors
inévitablement à un passage de la sentence de Max Huber dans l’affaire de l’ Ile de Palmas que j’ai
cité il y a deux jours à propos de l’in trouvable titre de Johor sur Pedra Branca 46, passage dans
lequel l’illustre arbitre, après avoir exclu l’applica tion de la contiguïté en tant que principe de
règlement des litiges territoriaux, ajoute cependant :
«Pour ce qui est des groupes d’îles, il est possible qu’un archipel puisse, dans
certains cas, être regardé en droit comme une unité, et que le sort de la partie
principale décide du reste. Ici cependant il y a lieu de distinguer entre l’acte de prise
de possession initiale d’une part, qui peut difficilement s’étendre à toutes les parties du
territoire, et l’exercice de la souverainet é d’autre part qui, étant une manifestation
47
continue et prolongée, doit se déployer à travers tout le territoire.»
11. C’est très exactement ce qui se produit en l’espèce: la prise de possession initiale de
Pedra Branca par la Grande-Bretagne a fondé le titr e de Singapour sur l’île principale. Et, par la
suite, la colonie des détroits puis Singapour ont ex ercé leur souveraineté sur les petites formations
marines voisines dans la mesure où celles-ci, évidemment inhabitées et peu accessibles, s’y
prêtaient.
2. L’inclusion de South Ledge dans les eaux territoriales de Pedra Branca et de Middle Rocks
12. Monsieur le président, les deux Parties s’accordent pour considérer que, contrairement à
Middle Rocks, South Ledge constitue un haut-fond découvrant 48qui, en tant que tel, n’est pas
susceptible d’appropriation autonome (Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales entre Qatar
et Bahreïn (Qatar c. Bahreïn), fond, arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil2001 , p. 102, par. 207 ; voir aussi
Différend territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes
(Nicaragua c. Honduras) , arrêt du 8octobre2007, par.141). En conséquence, dans son
contre-mémoire, la Malaisie av ait fait valoir que «South Ledge se rattacherait donc à Middle
46Voir CR 2007/21, p. 26, par. 48.
47CPA, sentence arbitrale du 4avril1928, RGDIP, 1935, p.183 (texte anglais in RSANU, vol. II, p. 855) ; voir
aussi sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, «The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-4, Points of Substantive
Law ⎯ Part II», BYBIL 1955-1956, p. 73.
48Cf. MS, p.11, par.2.11, p.179, pa r. 9.4, p. 191, par. 9.37 ; MM, p. 131, par. 289 ; CMS, p. 202, par. 8.4 ;
CMM, p. 81, par. 161 ; RS, p. 264, par. 10.3 ; RM, p. 191, par. 406. - 52 -
Rocks, et non à Pulau Batu Puteh» («South Ledge would attach to Middle Rocks rather than to
49
PBP» ). Elle a développé ce thème dans sa réplique, dans laquelle elle explique que :
«It is unarguable that South Ledge is clo ser to Middle Rocks than it is to PBP.
Middle Rocks are just as capable in law of generating a territorial sea as is PBP. To
say that Middle Rocks and South Ledge lie within the territorial sea of Pedra Branca is
thus to say nothing at all. If the Cour t accepts Malaysia’s contention that PBP and
Middle Rocks are distinct features, it would follow that South Ledge would lie within
the territorial sea generated by Middle Rocks, not by PBP.» 50
13. Singapour accepte volontiers que Middle Ro cks génère, pour sa part, une mer territoriale
et il est, dès lors, exact que l’on peut considérer que, si Middle Rocks ne constitue pas un groupe
unique avec Pedra Branca, ou si ils relèvent d’un souverain différent, il serait plus exact de dire que
South Ledge se trouve inclus dans la mer territorial e de ceux-ci et non dans celle de Pedra Branca.
Le problème pour la Malaisie est qu’aucun de ces de ux «si» n’est avéré. Pour les raisons que je
viens de rappeler ⎯et qui ne font pas appel à la notion juridique de mer territoriale ⎯,
l’«archipel» que forment Pedra Branca et Middle Rocks constitue une unité et, dès lors,
South Ledge se trouve dans leur mer territoriale commune.
14. Au surplus, le raisonnement de la Partie malaisienne est très artificiel et formaliste. Les
rares actes accomplis par Singapour sur les deux fo rmations (je rappelle que la Malaisie n’en a
aucun à son actif) l’ont été parce que ces formations se trouvent à proximité immédiate de
Pedra Branca et dans les limites de ses eaux territoriales.
3. Bref rappel de la position de Singapour
15. Cette situation est d’ailleurs, Monsieur le président, la considération de simple bon sens
qui est à la base de la position de Singapour. Le sort de Pedra Branca d’une part, et de ses
minuscules dépendances que sont Middle Rocks et S outh Ledge d’autre part, est forcément lié. Si
la souveraineté sur Pedra Branca appartient à Singapour ⎯et c’est le cas ⎯ la souveraineté sur
l’une comme sur l’autre de ces formations maritime s appartient aussi, inévitablement, à Singapour,
alors même qu’elles présentent, en fait et en droit, des caractéristiques en partie distinctes : South
Ledge est un haut-fond découvrant, non susceptible d’appropriation autonome, alors que les
rochers qui forment Middle Rocks sont, juridique ment, des îles au sens de l’article121 de la
49
CMM, p. 82, par. 162.
50RM, p. 197, par. 418. - 53 -
convention sur le droit de la mer. Mais ces îles sont tellement petites, tellement inhospitalières,
tellement proches de Pedra Branca aussi, qu’il existe pour le moins, «une forte présomption» (pour
51
reprendre une expression figurant dans la sentence de 1998 dans l’affaire Erythrée/Yémen) en
faveur de leur rattachement à l’île principale. Ce ci en tout cas en l’absence de «meilleur titre» (de
52
better title) ⎯un meilleur titre, dont la Malaisie n’a pas apporté, ne fût-ce que l’esquisse d’un
début de commencement de preuve.
16. Il ne me paraît pas utile de reprendre ici tous les éléments qui concourent à cette
conclusion ; leur simple énumération suffit ; il s’agit
53
⎯ de la proximité des trois formations les unes des autres ;
54
⎯ de la géomorphologie ;
⎯ de la toponymie (South Ledge est définie par sa position par rapport à Pedra Branca ; Middle
55
Rocks ⎯ les «rochers du milieu» ⎯ le sont par leur position intermédiaire) ;
56
⎯ de la situation des trois formations entre Middle Channel et South Channel (alors que, je le
rappelle, il n’existe pas, entre elles, de chenal navigable digne de ce nom) ;
⎯ de la cartographie 57 ;
⎯ du traitement commun dont ces formations sont l’objet dans les guides et instructions
nautiques 58 ; et
⎯ de l’impossibilité de distinguer les actes de souveraineté accomplis sur South Ledge et Middle
Rocks, de ceux qui ont concerné Pedra Branca ⎯ étant rappelé que si Singapour a pu faire état
de quelques actes de ce genre ; la Malaisie ne l’a pas pu (et que les quatre «effectivités» qu’elle
51Sentence sur la première phase du différend, 9 octobre 1998, RSANU, vol. XXII, p. 317, par. 474.
52
Ibid., p. 313, par. 458.
53
MS, p. 183, par. 9.14 ; RS, p. 267-268, par. 10.10
54
MS, p. 183, par. 9.16, p. 195-196, par. 9.46-9.47 ; CMS, p. 203-205, par. 8.6-8.7 ; RS, p. 270, par. 10.13
55CMS, p. 208, par. 8.9 d).
56MS, p. 183, par. 9.15 ; CMS, p. 205-206, par. 8.8 ; RS, p. 270, par. 10.13.
57CMS, p. 208, par. 8.9 c) ; RS, p. 269-270, par. 10.12.
58
MS, p. 196-198, par. 9.48-9.49 ; CMS, p. 207, par. 8.8 a). - 54 -
invoque à cet égard 59 ⎯et qui n’en sont point ⎯ sont précisément les mêmes quatre (et
60
uniques) faits dont elle se prévaut à l’appui de sa revendication sur Pedra Branca) .
17. Cette énumération se suffit à elle-même, je crois, Monsieur le président : la souveraineté
sur Middle Rocks et South Ledge appartient à Si ngapour, au même titre que la souveraineté sur
Pedra Branca.
Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie très vive ment de votre attention renouvelée ; et je vous
prie, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir do nner la parole au vice-premier ministre de
Singapour, M. Jayakumar, qui résumera brièveme nt notre argumentation à l’appui de cette
conclusion.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Je vous remercie, Monsieur le professeur pour
votre plaidoirie. I shall now give the floor to Professor Jayakumar. You have the floor, Sir.
JMYr.AKUMAR:
Conclusion
1. Mr.President and Members of the Court, over these past four days, you have heard my
colleagues on the Singapore team explain Singapor e’s case in detail. I now have the honour to
make some concluding remarks to sum up the main elements of Singapore’s case, and to emphasize
the key points made by my colleagues on the Singapore team.
Johor had no original title to Pedra Branca
2. The first issue which we have dealt with is Malaysia’s claim that Johor had an “original
title” to Pedra Branca since time immemorial. Malaysia asserts that Pedra Branca was not
terra nullius. Malaysia is wrong. Singapore has shown that Johor never had title to Pedra Branca.
Pedra Branca, being an uninhabite d island which had never been the subject of any prior claim or
acts of ownership by any sovereign entity, was terra nullius.
59
CMS, p. 210, par. 8.13 ; RS, p. 271-272, par. 10.16.
60CMS, p. 210-211, par. 8.14-8.16 ; RS, p. 272, par. 10.16. - 55 -
3. Malaysia’s claim for an original title amounts to no more than saying that Pedra Branca
must belong to Johor because Johor was at one tim e an important Power in the region and Pedra
Branca is located near Johor. The non sequitur is clear.
4. Malaysia has not produced even one iota of evidence which attributed Pedra Branca to
Johor or which showed any sovere ign activities by Johor on the island. It is for this reason that
Malaysia has been forced to rely mainly on an anonymous newspaper item, which Professor Pellet
has shown to be unreliable and of no probative value at all.
5. As Singapore’s pleadings have document ed, Johor had been engaged in diplomatic
correspondence with European Powers since th e seventeenth century. In addition, the
Temenggong’s system of administration and record keeping in the nineteenth century was so
impressive that historian Carl Trocki, who was gi ven access to the Johor Royal Archives, was able
to write a comprehensive history of nineteenth century Johor using those documents 61. Yet, not a
single document could be found and adduced before this Court which attributed Pedra Branca to
Johor.
6. Malaysia’s claim is also contradicted by her own subsequent conduct. If Johor indeed had
original title, one might ask: why is it that Johor did not seek to issue a formal grant for the
lighthouse on Pedra Branca when it consciously made a point of doing so for Pulau Pisang
in 1900? If Johor had original title, why are there no Malaysian records attributing Pedra Branca to
Johor? And why is it that the relevant Malays ian records attribute Pedra Branca instead to
Singapore?
7. Faced with these insurmountable difficulties, Malaysia has resorted to supplementing its
arguments with reports from two historians, but neither of whom was willing to state, even
tentatively, that Pedra Branca belonged to Johor. When all is said and done, it is clear that no one
had ever regarded Pedra Branca as belonging to Johor ⎯ not the British officials of the nineteenth
century, and certainly not the Johor rulers and the Jo hor officials. The original title is but a mirage
conjured up by Malaysia, and it continues to be a mirage.
6Trocki C., Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore
1784-1885 (1979). - 56 -
No permission was granted by Johor
8. I now turn to the questions of permission a nd Malaysia’s inexplicable silence in the face
of Singapore’s conduct on Pedra Branca. As Pr ofessorPellet has explained, the British did not
seek permission from Johor or any other Power for their activities on Pedra Branca. Malaysia, on
the other hand, claims that permission was given by Johor to the British in relation to Pedra Branca.
Malaysia uses this alleged permissi on as a panacea for explaining away all of Malaysia’s
embarrassing silence and inaction since 1847, when the British first landed on Pedra Branca.
Whenever Singapore highlights Malaysia’s acquiescence in Singapore’s exercise of sovereign
authority on Pedra Branca, Malaysia can only repl y by saying that there was no need to protest
because Johor had already given permission for the use of this island.
9. But, where is there even a shred of evid ence of this all-encompassing permission entitling
Malaysia to remain silent for 130 years in the face of the vast range and number of administrative
acts undertaken by Singapore on Pedra Branca? The only document which Malaysia has produced
is a letter which makes no reference at all to Pedra Branca. This letter, written on
25 November 1844 by the Johor ruler, only refers to a location “near Point Romania . . . or any spot
deemed eligible”. As Professor Pellet has explaine d, this letter is a reply to a request from the
British Governor of the Straits Settlements. Alt hough no copy of the Governor’s request can be
found, it is obvious from the surrounding context that the request and the permission relate to Peak
Rock, not Pedra Branca. Malaysia has not produced a single document from British or other
sources which states or implies that Johor’s permission was needed in relation to Pedra Branca.
10. Malaysia then tries to argue that the 1844 letter is also applicable to Pedra Branca
because it was enclosed with voluminous docum ents sent along in subsequent correspondence
relating to Pedra Branca. However, in none of the subsequent correspondence did any British
official make even a passing reference to the 1844 letter.
11. Without a doubt, the British officials of the day did not think that Britain required
Johor’s permission for its activities on Pedra Branca.
Johor expressly disclaimed title to Pedra Branca in 1953
12. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in 1953, Johor made an express disclaimer of title.
Singapore expressly informed Johor that the purpose of the enquiry was to determine the - 57 -
boundaries of Singapore’s territorial waters, dete rmine the boundaries of Singapore’s territorial
waters. It was a very serious matter. Johor took time to consider the matter. They did not come to
the conclusion which Malaysia now urges upon the Court. Instead, they replied to Singapore that
“the Johore Government does not claim ownership of Pedra Branca”. Such a reply is totally
inconsistent with Malaysia’s theory that Johor officials believed that Pedra Branca belonged to
Johor. Instead, it is completely consistent with Singapore’s position, that Johor never regarded
Pedra Branca as belonging to it.
13. In her Reply, Malaysia claims: “Neither Malaysia nor Johor had occasion to question or
seek confirmation of the original position.” 62 But surely, surely the request from Singapore that
elicited the 1953disclaimer provided an excellent occasion, indeed an irresistible occasion, for
Johor to confirm her alleged original title, if i ndeed she had one. Instead, the State of Johor
confirmed the exact opposite of what Malaysia now maintains. Singapore, in her written pleadings,
also referred to many other occasions where Malays ia could have taken the opportunity, to use her
own words, “to question or seek confirmation of th e original position”. Malaysia did not act on
those occasions because it did not regard Pedra Branca as belonging to it. Malaysia’s conspicuous
silence in the face of Singapore’s activities must show that everything done by Singapore did not
come within the scope of Johor’s permission. Malaysia’s silence in the face of Singapore’s
activities is clear and unequivocal evidence that Malaysia has never regarded itself as having title
over Pedra Branca.
14. Mr. President, understandably, Malaysia is clearly embarrassed by the 1953 disclaimer of
title by Johor. Malaysia tries hard to discredit the disclaimer by arguing that “it is not a model of
clarity”63. Not “a model of clarity”? What can be clearer than these ten words: “the Johore
Government does not claim ownership of Pedra Branca”?
15. At the very minimum, this letter constitu tes clear, incontrovertible evidence that Johor
never had title to Pedra Branca and that Johor o fficials never regarded Pedra Branca as belonging
to Johor. But this letter is more than evidence of a fact or evidence of a state of mind. It is a
62
RM, p. 21, para. 44.
6MM, p. 110, para. 243; CMM, p. 239, para. 514. - 58 -
disclaimer of title given by the Johor Government. It is also a declaration that Johor would not, in
future, assert any claim on Pedra Branca. It is binding on Malaysia.
Britain acquired title to Pedra Branca in 1847-1851
16. On the second day, you heard Mr.Brown lie explain how the British Crown acquired
sovereignty over Pedra Branca. Malaysia’s written pleadings seek to discredit Singapore’s case on
three fronts.
17. First, Malaysia argues that “the mere construction and operation of a lighthouse does not
64
establish the sovereignty of the lighthouse operator” . As a proposition of law, this statement is
unexceptional. However, Singapore would also note th at this Court has repeatedly stated that the
“construction of navigational aids, on the other hand, can be legally relevant in the case of very
small islands” 65. The acquisition of sovereignty requires the confluence of an intention to act as
sovereign and actual display of State authority. Thus, the proposition put forth by Malaysia does
not assist her. The truth of the matter is, Singapore’s activities on Pedra Branca satisfy both criteria
and, in any event, involve much more than the “mere construction and operation of a lighthouse”.
18. Malaysia’s second line of attack is to argue that Britain did not have the intention to
acquire sovereignty. Malaysia says that there c ould be no intention to acquire sovereignty because
there was no flag-raising ceremony or proclamation of sovereignty. Malaysia seeks to support this
by pointing to some examples of acquisition of sovereignty which involved such acts. But, as
Mr.Brownlie has explained, these formalities are not a prerequisite, according to the authorities
which he cited.
19. Malaysia’s third line of attack is to criticize Singapore for relying on a series of acts
spanning from 1847 to 1851. Malaysia’s Counter-Memorial has this exclamation:
“This is the first time in the history of territorial litigation that a taking of
possession of an island is presented as a complex act lasting at least four years and
without a singl66manifestation during that period of the intention to acquire
sovereignty.”
64
RM, p. 21, para. 44.
65Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain) , Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2001, p.100, para. 197; Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 685, para. 147.
66CMM, p. 32, para. 61. - 59 -
However, it is well established that both under international law and that as a matter of British
practice that title may be acquired through a series of acts spanning several years. For the position
at international law, Mr.Brownlie has referred to the Clipperton Island case. For the relevant
British practice, Singapore’s written pleadings referre d to a number of authoritative works on the
subject and Mr. Brownlie drew the Court’s a ttention to a recent judgment of a British court ⎯ the
Pitcairn Island Court of Appeal ⎯ which stated unequivocally that it is not necessary to define with
accuracy the time at which the island became a British possession, nor is a formal act of acquisition
required 67. It is the intention of the Crown, gathered from its own acts and surrounding
circumstances, that determines whether a territory has been acquired.
20. Reduced to its essence, Malaysia argues that all acquisitions must comply with a
Malaysian-conceived format or procedure, and th at because the acquisiti on of Pedra Branca does
not neatly fall within her preconceived format, Singapore’s acquisition of title must necessarily be
flawed. But this argument itself is flawed. Facts differ from case to case, but whatever the factual
permutations, the task before this Court is the same . It is the application of legal principles to the
facts.
21. In the case of Pedra Branca, the relevant British officials exercised exclusive control of
the island from the outset. The East India Compan y, as the official organ of the British Crown,
made the decision to build the lighthouse. The entire process of planning, construction, naming
and commissioning the lighthouse was in the exclusive control of representatives of the British
Crown. Not only that, the British maintained public order and cut rain channels, made official
visits, and displayed the British marine ensign. Their acts of sovereignty, appropriate and
sufficient to acquire title, were deliberate, manifesting their intention to do so.
Singapore has openly and continuously displayed State authority over Pedra Branca after
1851
22. Let me turn to Singapore’s administrati on of Pedra Branca after the acquisition of
sovereignty, 1847-1851. Ma laysia’s position at the close of the written pleadings that “the only
6The Queen v. Seven Named Accused, judgment of Pitcairn Island Cour t of Appeal of 5 August 2004, 127 ILR,
pp. 232, 284. - 60 -
thing that Britain or Singapore ever did in re lation to the island was operate the lighthouse” 68 is
wholly erroneous. Mr.Bundy has explained that Singapore undertook a full range of State
activities on Pedra Branca and within its territori al waters. They included both lighthouse and
non-lighthouse activities. And they included: cont rolling access to the island, and regular visits to
the island by civil and military officials, re gular naval patrols around the island, and naval
enforcement action in Pedra Branca waters, enact ing legislation for the island, investigating
accidental deaths and shipping incidents in Pedr a Branca waters, flying the British and later the
Singapore marine ensign. Throughout this period , Singapore vetted applications for visits by
Malaysian officials in the same manner as for offi cials of other States, and granted permission for
Malaysian officials to undertake scientific surveys. All these activities, undertaken by Singapore
officials, represented more than 150years of continuous, open and effective display of State
authority.
23. Malaysia’s bold claim that the only thi ng which Singapore ever did was to operate the
lighthouse therefore does not bear scrutiny. In contrast, MsMalintoppi has shown, Malaysia
performed no sovereign acts and made no claim on title, repeatedly recognized Singapore’s title
over Pedra Branca, and consistently attributed Pedra Branca to Singapore in maps and
meteorological studies.
24. Malaysia’s written pleadings repeatedly attempt to minimize the significance of
Singapore’s activities after 1851, claiming at various pl aces, that they were merely peripheral. Far
from being peripheral, the post-1851 State activities form an important and integral part of this
case. They demonstrate the extent and intens ity of Singapore’s activities in confirmation and
maintenance of its title. They provide overwhelming confirmatory evidence of Singapore’s title to
Pedra Branca.
Singapore was already in possession of Sovereign ty over Pedra Branca by the time Malaysia
published its 1979 map
25. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the central question in this case is: who was in
possession of sovereignty over Pedra Branca when the dispute arose? Both Singapore and
68
RM, p. 205, para. 436 (d). - 61 -
Malaysia agree that the dispute was triggered by Malaysia’s controve rsial map of 1979. Did
Malaysia have title to Pedra Bran ca at the time when the 1979 ma p was issued? Or did Singapore
already have title to Pedra Branca when the 1979 map was published?
26. Up to that point, Malaysia’s actions ⎯ and inaction ⎯ were consistent with those of a
party which believed it had no claim to Pedra Bran ca, and of a party which had not the slightest
intention to claim it. In fact, as late as 1975 ⎯ that is well after both Malaysia and Singapore had
become separate countries ⎯ Malaysia published a map attributing Pedra Branca to Singapore.
Then, all of a sudden, there is sprung this Malaysian map for the first time in the form of the
1979map. This came after: 130years of silen ce; after 130years of failure to assert Malaysian
sovereignty; after 130years of conduct and admissions against its own interest, including an
express and unequivocal acknowledgment of Singapore’s title.
27. Let us also recall that Singapore’s Attorney -General drew our attention to the joint press
conference of May 1980 chaired by the Prime Ministers of Singapore and Malaysia. This was just
three months after Singapore sent a formal Note protesting Malaysia’s claim to Pedra Branca. A
journalist from the Asian Wall Street Journal asked whether the claims in Malaysia’s recently
published map had been discussed by the Prime Ministers. Here is a press conference where we
have journalists from the international media a nd media from Malaysia and Singapore. We would
expect the head of government of a country, which has just published a map claiming for the first
time an island as belonging to it, to give a clear and robust statement in support of his country’s
claim. Instead, he hedged and ambivalently said: “We are also looking into the question because
this is not very clear to us with regard to this island . . .” Not very clear to us!
28. Certainly, it is very clear. Both be fore and after the publication of the 1979 map,
Malaysia had no title to Pedra Branca. Indeed, there is no doubt that Singapore was in possession
of sovereignty over Pedra Branca. As for Middl e Rocks and South Ledge, as you have just heard
from ProfessorPellet, sovereignty over Middle Rocks and South Ledge must necessarily go
together with sovereignty over Pedra Branca.
29. Mr.President and Members of the Court, this is a straightforward case. Pedra Branca
was terra nullius. The British did not need permission to acquire it, nor did they ask for it at any
time. From 1847, they simply took possession and control of the island and displayed continuous - 62 -
State authority, with clear intent to exercise sovereignty. In 1850, Pedra Branca was described as a
dependency of Singapore at the official ceremony for the laying of the lighthouse foundation stone.
Ownership was so notorious that in November that year ⎯ that is 1850 ⎯ even the Dutch official
correspondence described Pedra Branca as British territory. By 1851, there was no doubt that
Pedra Branca had become British territory. After 1851, State authority was openly and
continuously displayed. In stark contrast, Malaysia performed no sovereign acts. Indeed, Malaysia
recognized Singapore’s jurisdiction in seeking pe rmission for access to Pedra Branca. Malaysia
attributed Pedra Branca to Singapore in maps and meteorological reports. In 1953, Johor made an
express disclaimer of title. In the light of all these facs that I have recalled, Malaysia’s sudden
publication of the map in 1979 in an attempt to claim Pedra Branca, was, to say the least,
extraordinary. This map could not alter the fact that Singapore has sovereignty over Pedra Branca,
Middle Rocks and South Ledge.
30. With that, Mr.President and Members of the Court, I have the honour to close
Singapore’s first round of presentations. My colleagues and I thank you for your patient attention.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: I thank you ProfessorJayakumar for your
arguments.
This marks the end of today’s sitting. It al so brings to an end the first round of oral
argument of Singapore. The Court will meet again, starting on Tuesday 13 November 2007, from
10 a.m. to 1 p.m., in order to hear the first round of oral argument of Malaysia. Malaysia will then
conclude its first round of oral arguments on Friday 16 November 2007, from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m.
With this the Court rises. Thank you.
The Court rose at 12.50 p.m.
___________
Audience publique tenue le vendredi 9 novembre 2007, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Al-Khasawneh, vice-président, faisant fonction de président en l'affaire relative à la Souveraineté sur Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks et South Ledge (Malaisie/Singapour)