Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
InternationalCourt Cour internationale
ofJustice de Justice
THEHAGUE LAHAYE
YEAR2000
Publicsitting
heldon Tuesday13June 2000,ut3p.m, utthePeacePalace,
PresidentGuillaumepresiding
in the caseconcerningMaritimeDelimitationand TerritorialQuestionsbetween
Qatar andBahrain(Qatarv.Bahrain)
VERBATIM RECORD
ANNEE2000
Audiencepublique
tenuele mardi13juin 2000,5heures,auPalaisdelaPaix,
sous laprésidendeM. Guillaume,président
en l'affairedelaDélimitation maret desquestionsterritorialesentreetBahreïn
(Qatarc.Bahreïn)
COMPTE RENDUPresent: President Guillaume
Vice-President Shi
Judges Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Pm-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Judgesad hoc TorresBernbdez
Fortier
Registrar CouvreurPrésent: M. Guillaume,président
M. Shi,vice-président
MM. Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal,juges
MM. TorresBembrdez
Fortier,juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur,greffierTheStateof Qatar isrepresentedby:
H.E. Dr. Abdullahbin AbdulatifAl-Muslemani,Secretary-General fthe Cabinet,
asAgentand Counsel;
Mr. AdelSherbini,LegalAdviser,
Mr. SamiAbushaikha,Legal Expert,
asCounsel;
Mr. EricDavid,Professorof International Law, Université re Bruxelles,
Dr.AlibinFetaisAl-Meri, DirectorofLegalDepartment,DiwanAmiri,
Mr. Jean-PierreQuéneudec, Professor of International Lawat the University of Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
Mr. Jean Salmon,Professor emeritusof International L, niversité librede Bruxelles,Member
of theInstitutde droit international,
Mr.R. K. P. Shankardass, Senior Advocate, SupremeCourt of India, Former President of the
InternationalBar Association,
SirIanSinclair,K.C.M.G., Q.C.,arristeratLaw,Memberofthe InstituteofInternationalLaw,
SirFrancisVallat,G.B.E.,K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,Professor ementusof InternationalLaw,Universityof
London,Member ementusoftheInstitutde droitinternational,
Mr.RodmanR. Bundy,Avocat à la Cour d'appel de Paris, emberof the NewYork Bar,Frere
Cholmeley/EvershedsP, aris,
MsNanetteE.Pilkington,Avocatàla Courd'appel deParisF ,rereCholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Ms Cheryl Dunn, Member ofthe StateBarofCalifornia,FrereCholmeley/EvershedsP, aris,
Ms InesSabineWilk, Lawyer beforethe GermanCourt of Appeal, Memberof the Charnber of
LawyersofBerlin,Gerrnany,
as Counsel;
Mr. ScottB.Edmonds,Directorof CartographieOperations, MapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland
(UnitedStatesof America),
Mr. RobertC.Rizzutti, ProjectManager, MapQuest.com, ColumbiaM , aryland (United States of
Amenca),
Ms Stephanie K.Clark, SeniorCartographer,MapQuest.com,Columbia,Maryland (United States
ofAmerica),
asExperts;
H.E.SheikhHamadbin JassimbinJabor Al-Thani, Ministef rorForeign Affairs,
H.E. Mr.Ahmedbin AbdullahAl-Mahmoud,Ministerof State forForeignAffairs,
as Obsewers.
TheStateofBahrain isrepresentedby:
H.E.Mr.JawadSalimAl-Arayed,Ministerof Stateof theStateof Bahrain,
asAgent;L'Etatde Qatarest represéntépar :
S.Exc.M. Abdullahbin AbdulatiA f l-Muslemani,secrétaigénérad lu gouvernement,
commeagentetconseil;
M.AdelSherbini,conseillerjuridique,
M. SamiAbushaikha,expertjuridique,
comme conseils;
M.Eric David,professeurde droit internatioàl'universitélibre deBruxelles,
M.Alibin FetaisAl-Meri, directeurdesaffairesjuridiquesduconseildel'émir,
M.Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur de droit international à l'université de Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
M.Jean Salmon,professeur émérid tedroitinternationalàl'universitélibre de Bruxelles,membre
de1'Institutdedroitinternational,
M.R. K.P. Shankardass, avocat principaà la Cour suprêmede l'Inde, ancien président de
l'AssociationinternationaleduBarreau,
SirIan Sinclair,K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,avocat, membredel'Institutdedroit international,
SirFrancisVallat,G.B.E.,K.C.M.G., Q.C.p,rofesseurémérite de droit internationaluniversité
de Londres,membreéméritd eel'Institutde droit international,
M.RodmanR.Bundy,avocatàlaCour d'appel de Paris,membre du barreaude NewYork,cabinet
FrereCholmeleyEversheds,Paris,
Mlle Nanette Pilkington,avocaà la Courd'appelde Paris,cabinet FrereCholrneley/Eversheds,
Paris,
commeconseils et avocats;
Mme Cheryl Dunn, membre du barreau de lYEtat de Californie, cabinet Frere
Cholmeley/EvershedsP, aris,
MmeInèsSabine Wilk,avocatprèsd'une courd'appeld!Allemagne,membrede la chambredes
avocatsàBerlin,Allemagne,
commeconseils;
M.Scott B.Edmonds, directeur du service des levéscartographiques,sociétéMapQuest.com,
Columbia,Maryland (Etats-Unis d'Amérique),
M.Robert C. Rizzutti, administrateurde projet, sociétéMapQuest.com, Columbia,Maryland
(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),
Mme Stephanie K. Clark, cartographehors classe, sociMapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland
(Etats-Unis d'Amérique),
comme experts;
S.Exc.le cheikhHamadbin JassimbinJaborAl-Thani,ministredes affairesétrangères,
S.Exc. M. AhmedbinAbdullahAl-Mahrnoudm , inistred7Etatauxaffaires étrangères,
comme observateurs.
L'EtatdeBahreïnestrepresentépar :
S.Exc. M.JawadSalimAl-Arayed,ministredYEtad te17Etadt eBahrein,
comme agent;Dr.FathiKemicha,Member of the Barof Paris,Kernicha & Associés(Tunis),
ProfessorSirElihuLauterpacht,Q.C.,C.B.E.,HonoraryProfessorof theUniversityof Cambridge,
Memberof the Institut dedroitinternational,
Mr. Jan Paulsson,Freshfields,Paris, Member oftheBars of Paris andthe Districtof Columbia,
Professor MichaelReisman, Myres S. McDougalProfessor ofInternationalLaw of Yale Law
School,Memberof the Barof Connecticut, Associate of the Institderoitinternational,
Mr. RobertVolterra,Freshfields,London,Memberof theBarofUpperCanada,
Professor ProsperWeil,Emeritus Professor at the University of ParIiIs(Panthéon-A, ember
of the Académiedes sciencesmorales etpolitiques (Institut de Fra, emberof theInstitut
de droitinternational,
as CounselandAdvocates;
SheikhKhalidbin AbmedAl-Khalifa,First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairsf the Stateof
Bahrain,
CommanderChristopherCarleton,M.B.E., Head of the Law of the Sea Divisionof the United
KingdomHydrographieOffice,
Dr.HongwuChen,Freshfields,Paris, Memberof theBarsof Paris andBeijing,
Mr. Graham Coop,Freshfields,Paris,Barristerand SolicitoroftheHighCourt ofNewZealandand
Solicitorof the SupremeCourt ofEnglandandWales,
Mr. AndrewNewcombe, FreshfieldsP ,aris,Memberof the Bar of British Columbia,
Dr.BethOlsen,Advisor,Ministryof Stateofthe Stateof Bahrain,
Dr. John Wilkinson, FormerReader at the University ofOxford, Emeritus Fellow, St.Hugh's
College, Oxford,
asAdvisors;
H.E.SheikhMohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, Minister forForeiA gfnfairs,Stateof Bahrain,
H.E. Sheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, Arnbassadorof the State of Bahrain to the
Netherlands,
H.E. Dr.MohammedJaberAl-Ansari, Advisorto HisHighness,theArnirof Bahrain,
Mr. GhaziAl-Gosaibi,Under-Secretaryof Foreign Affairs, Statef ahrain,
Her Excellency Sheikha Haya Al Khalifa, Arnbassador of the State of Bahrain to the French
Republic,
Mr. YousefMahmood,Directorof theOffice oftheForeign Minister,Stateof Bahrain,
Mr. Jon Addison,Ministry of Stateof the Stateof Bahrain,
MsMaisoon Al-Arayed, Ministry of Stateof the StateofBahrain,
Mr. NabeelAl-Rumaihi, Ministryof Stateofthe StateofBahrain,
Mr. Hafedh Al-Qassab, Ministrof Stateofthe StateofBahrain,
MsAneesaHanna,EmbassyofBahraininLondon,
Ms JeanetteHarding,Ministryof Stateofthe StateofBahrain,
MsVanessaHarris,Freshfields,
Ms Iva Kratchanova,Ministryof Stateof theStateof Bahrain,
Ms SonjaKnijnsberg,Freshfïelds,
Mr. KevinMottram,Freshfields,
Mr.YasserShaheen,SecondSecretary,Ministry ofForeignAffairsofthe StateofBahrain,
asAdministrativeStasM. Fathi Kemicha,membredubarreau de Paris, cabinetKemicha& Associés,Tunis,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht,Q.C.,C.B.E.,professeur honoraireniversitéde Cambridge, membre de
l'Institut de droit international,
M. Jan Paulsson, cabinet Freshfields, Paris, membre des baneaux de Paris et du district de
Columbia,
M.MichaelReisman,professeurde droit internationàll'universitéde Yale, titulairede la chaire
Myres S.McDougal, membre du barreau du Connecticut, associéde l'Institut de droit
international,
M.RobertVolterra,cabinetFreshfields, Londres,membrdubarreau du Haut Canada,
M.Prosper Weil, professeur émériteà l'universitéde Paris II (Panthéon-Assas), membre de
l'Académie des sciences oraleset politiques (Institutde France),membre de l'Institut dedroit
international,
commeconseilset avocats;
Le cheikh Khalidbin AhrnedAl-Khalifa,premiersecrétaire,ministèredes affairesétrangères de
1'Etatde Bahreïn,
Lecapitainede frégate Christopher CarleM, .B.E.,directeurde la divisiondu droitmaritimedu
bureau hydrographiqueduRoyaume-Uni,
M. HongwuChen,cabinetFreshfïelds,Paris, membredesbarreauxde Pariset de Beijing,
M.Graham Coop, cabinet Freshfields, Paris, avocatet conseil de la High Court de
Nouvelle-Zélandeetconseillerdela Coursuprêmed'Angleterreet duPaysde Galles,
M. AndrewNewcombe,cabinet Freshfields, Paris, membrdubarreaudela Colombiebritannique,
Mme Beth Olsen,conseiller,ministèred'Etatde1'Etatde Bahreïn,
M. John Wilkinson, ancienmaître de conférenceà l'Universitéd'Oxford, membre émérid tu
CollègeSaintHugh, Oxford,
commeconseillers;
S. Exc.le cheikhMohammedbinMubarakAlKhalifa,ministredes affairesétrangèresdB eahreïn,
S.Exc.le cheikh Abdul-Azizbin Mubarak Al Khalifa, ambassadeur de 1'Etatde Bahreïn aux
Pays-Bas,
S. Exc.M. MohammedJaberAl-Ansari,conseillerde SonAltesse l'émir de Bahreïn,
M. GhaziAl-Gosaibi,sous-secrétaid'Etatauxaffairesétrangèresde1'Etatde Bahreïn,
S.Exc.la cheikha Haya Al Khalifa, ambassadeur de1'Etatde Bahreïn auprès dela République
française,
M.YousefMahmood,directeurdubureauduministredes affairesétrangèred se Bahreïn,
commeobservateurs;
M.Jon Addison,ministèred'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
MmeMaisoonAl-Arayed,ministèred'Etatde1'Etatde Bahreïn,
M.Nabeel Al-Rumaihi,ministèred'Etatde1'Etatde Bahreïn,
M.Hafedh Al-Qassab,ministèred'Etatde1'EtatdeBahreïn,
MmeAneesa Hanna,ambassadede Bahreïn, Londres,
MmeJeanetteHarding,ministère d'Etatde 1'EtatdeBahreein,
MmeVanessaHarris,cabinetFreshfields,
MmeIva Kratchanova,ministère d'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
Mme SonjaKnijnsberg,cabinet Freshfields,
M.Kevin Mottram,cabinetFreshfields,
M.YasserShaheen, second secrétaire, ministres affairesétrangèresdeEtatdeBahreïn,
commepersonneladministratiJ: Le PRESIDENT :Veuillez vousasseoir. La séancestouverteetje donne laparoleau nom
de 1'EtatdeBahrëinà SirElihuLauterpacht.
SirElihuLAUTERPACHT:Thankyou, Mx- .residentandMembersoftheCourt.
M APS
1.It fallsto me to respond toQatar'scase onthemaps. 1shall berelativelybnef. It is true
that Bahrainhasnot presented manymapsto the Courtandthat, in contrast,Qatar has produced a
handsomeatlas,perhaps moreelegant thanpotent,containingsome 102maps. Butthe explanation
of thatdifferenceis that Bahrainesnotreallyneed mapsto supportitscase, whileQatarneedsto
introduceeveryshredofmaterialit canin an attemptto supportitsposition.
2. Therearetwo issuesin the temtorialpart of the case towhich Qatarsuggeststhat themap
evidence could be relevant. Both are expressed in one sentence ofMr.Bundy'sstatementon
31May(CR200017,p. 23,para.69):
"maps have an important role toplay in this case in so far as they constitute
confirmatoryevidence ofan historicalnaturepointingto a widespreadrecognition,or
generalrepute,that thepolitical entityof Qatar coveredthe entirepeninsulaincluding
the HawarIslandsand Zubarah".
Thusthe twoissues are: first,thepoliticalstatusof Qatar; second,the question whetherthe Hawar
Islandshavebeenregardedasbelongingto BahrainorQatar.
3. Inrelationto bothof them1would invoke thehighlypertinentobservation ofJudgeHuber
in the Palmas case. "Iftherbitratoris satisfied asto the existenceof legallyrelevantfactswhich
contradictthe statements ofcartographerswhose sources ofinformation arenot known, he can
attach no weight to the maps, however numerous and generally appreciated they may be."
(UNRIAAV , ol.II, pp. 852-853;judges'folders,tab1,topofp. 853.)
4. Thesameconsiderationis implicitin thewell-knownobservationsof the Chamberof this
5
Court in the BurkinaFaso/Mali case (I.C.J. Reports 1986,pp. 582-583, paras. 54-56), recently
recalled by the Court as a whole in theKasikili case (BotswanaLVamibiaI,.C.J. Reports 1999,
para.84).
5. Bahrain's contentionis that there is more than a sufficiencyof legally relevant facts
available inthiscase to establishBahrain'stitle, andQatar'slackof title, to theHawars without theuse of maps. Equally devoid of factual supportis Qatar'sclaim to any significantstatus as a
"political entity" in the nineteenth century and the earlier part of the twentieth century. In
consequence, even granting themaps a relevance andquality they do not possess, theycannot
depriveBahrainof the legaltitle to the Hawar Islandsthat it has had since the eighteenth century
and has maintainedby possessionandcontrol eversince. As regards thestatus of Qatar,many of
the mapsproducedby Qatar notonlydonot supportits positionbutindeedflatlycontradict it.
6. Before going further, 1 should respondto one highly questionable statement madein
Mr.Bundy'sopeningremarks. Hementionedthedate 1868,"bywhich time",he said,"theseparate
entitiesof Qatarand Bahrainhad beenrecognized". Thisstatementappears intendedto convey the
impressionthat in some way fiom 1868onwardsBahrainand Qatar wereentities of equal status.
Even thoughmy colleagueshave alreadystatedthatthatis a grossexaggerationof Qatar'sposition
in the nineteenthcentury, therepetition ofthe pointrequiresthe repetitionof its rejection. In 1868
Qatar was in no way comparable toBahrain as an entity. Bahrain was an established political
authority with which Britain had some seven years previously,in 1861, concluded a Fnendly
Conventionand whose territorial authority Britainhad politically recognized by undertakingto
supportthe Rulerin the maintenanceofthe securityofhispossessions. Qatar,by contrast,wasnot
an entity but at best a geographical areaof a size whichvaried according towhatevermap one
might lookat. ThetreatywhichBritainmadewiththeChiefof El Katrin 1868andonwhich Qatar
now relies as recognitionof its statusas an independentStatereallydoes little morethan tell the
Chiefto retumto Doha "and reside peaceablyin thatport". It doesnot acknowledgeany right on
his partto moveabout freelywithin the peninsula:go homeandstay there,is whatitreally says.
7. 1must also observepreliminarilythat virtuallyal1of the commercialmaps producedby
Qatar, and even the official ones, have been on a very small scale. Whereas maps adduced in
temtorial and boundarydisputesare normallyon a largescale in the range of 1:5000to 1:50000,
the bulk of themaps in the QatariMap Atlas attachedto its Reply rangebetween 1:4millionand
1:16million. So small is the scale that 81 out of 102maps in the Atlas require massive
enlargementif eventhe sharpest judicialeye is to identiQ their supposedlyrelevant content; and
this enlargement can cany with it a distortion ofcolour which renders the maps totally
untrustworthy. With the computer techniquesnow used to make enlargements, variations incolourscreep in alrnostinescapablyin theprocessof enlargingor copyingthe maps. 1shallretum
to thismatter towardsthe endof my argument. Here1need onlyobservethat the Tribunalin the
Eritredemen case thoughtit necessaryto enter a qualificatioasto the evaluationofthe colourof A
maps(FirstAwardintheEritredYemencase; para.370).
8. In drawingtheir maps on a very small scale, it is improbablein the extreme that any
map-maker, commerciao l rfficial,wouldhavehad soughtor comeacross sufficientinformation
to leadhim to dealspecificallywiththe question oftitleto the Hawars. The onlyexceptionmight
havebeen the Ottomanand theBritishmap-makers. Asregardsthe Ottomans,Qatarpresentsone
large-scalernap whichhas turnedout tobe a forgery. Bahrain has produced Izzet'srnap of 1878
(Mernorialof Bahrain,Vol. 1,pp. 6-7),the probativevalue of which Mr. Paulssondiscussedlast
Friday. Theotherlarge-scalernapalreadypresented tothe Courthasbeen the 1935Oil Concession
Map,the effectofwhich wasalsoexplainedtotheCourtby Mr. PaulssonlastFriday.
9. That said,1can turnto someof the maps, spokenof by Mr. Bundyon 31May. As you
willsee, most ofthese,far fiom showinga politicalentitycalled Qatar,in fact showno morethan
the geographicalareacorrespondingto the peninsulanow called"Qatar"undera variety of names
asa westwardandnorth-westward extension oa fnarea called"Oman".
10. Take the frst rnap put upby Qatar, 1875,Justus PerthesInstitute, said to have been
draftedby AugustusPetermann(Replyof Qatar, MapAtlasNo.5). This waspresentedto support
the view that Qatar and Bahrainwere "distinctentities" (CR200017,paras. 18-22),with Qatar
beingshown by colourcoding asencompassingthe entirepeninsulaand as includingthe Hawars.
Perhapsthe rnap does show this, but at ascaleof 1:7.5million itcannot in itself be particularly
significant. However, whateversignificanceit may have is considerablyreduced when it is
comparedwith thenextrnap adducedbyQatar,onthe sarnescale,alsoattributedtothe experthand
ofAugustusPetermann.Thisis referredto inMr.Bundy's statemena ts havingbeenmade in 1884,
b
16years after Qatar'sallegedpromotionto statehood. No referencewas givenby Mr.Bundy for
thisrnapbut presumablyit is the onlyone ofthatyear listedinthe QatarMap Atlas. So it must be
No. 11 there. 1 do not dispute that it again distinguishesBahrainand a peninsulawhich at its
southemend caniesthe word "Katar".Butwhatthisrnapshowsthatits predecessordoes not show
istheword irnmediatelybelow "Katar",whichincapitalletters is "OMAN". Thereisno boundarydrawn between "OMAN" and "Katar". The inescapable inference is that in the view of
AugustusPetermann "Katar" wasno more than a part of alarger entity called "OMAN". This
manifestlydoesnot supportthe idea thatas a matterof generalrepute,Qatarwas as a result of the
1868Treatya separate,recognized State.
11. The picture looks even bleaker for Qatarwhen we examine the next rnap invokedby
Qatar,the 1890edition ofthe Atlas de GéographieModerne,publishedby LibrairieHachetteof
Paris, describedby Qataras a highlyreputable institutio- a descriptionwhichthere is no good
reasonto contradict. This is Map 13in the QatarMap Atlas. Oncemore, it is on the miniscule
scaleof 1:7.5million. Andwhatyou seein frontof you,of course,is not the originalrnapbut the
enlargementthat appearsnomally on the left-handside of the Map Atlas when it is opened out.
Qatar says thatthe HawarIslands appearin thesamegreencolour as Qatar,in contrastto the grey
colouringof Bahrain. 1confessthat 1do not recognizethis differentiationin the basicsizeversion
of thernapwhichappearsin the Map Atlas. The enlargementon the oppositepage in this respect
leaves much to the imagination. Qatar has providedno explanationof the hint of yellow that
appearsto havewashedup thesouthemportion ofthe Qatarpeninsula'swestCoast.
12.However, colouris not alone whatmatters here. Whatdoes attract attentionis the fact
that, because the rnap extendsa lot more to the south than Petemann's rnap of 1884, it shows
"Katar" even more clearlyasan unseparated part of "OMAN". Furthermore,it isworthreadingthe
legendon the map: '%esCapitalesdlEtatsont soulignéesdeuxfois. Les chefs-lieuxdeprovince
unefois". 1can seeno Dohaunderlined. Nor is "El Bidda" - sometimes confusedwith Doha-
underlined. So Dohaor ElBidda,is neither a capital of aStatenor the chiefplace of a province.
Yet,accordingto Mr.Bundy,Qatarbecamea State22years previouslyandDohawas its capital.
13.It is truethatasregards Bahrain,nounderliningappearsbelowManama. Thus it appears
that in the eyes of Librairie Hachette,Manamawas no more significant than El Bidda. But there
are nonetheless two differences between Bahrain and Katar.First, Bahrain is for a reason not
explained given its own separate colour which is not so visibly distinct fiom that of the
HawarIslands. Second, and moreto the point,that very separatenessof colour thatdistinguishes
Bahrainboth fiom the Qatar peninsula andfiom theterritoryto thewest describedandmisspeltas
"El-Ahsa",demonstratesthat Bahrain was acknowledge ashavinga quitedistinctand independentstatusfrom thatof Katarwhichwas againseenas part of Oman. There wasno equalityof status
between Bahrainand Qatar. The absenceof underliningbelow Manama does not downgrade
Manarnato thelevel of El Bidda. It merely demonstratesthe map-maker's lack of knowledgeof
the politicaldetailsof thearea.
14.Thenextrnap introducedby Qataris the Russianrnapof 1894on a scaleof 1:3.6million
(CR200017,p. 13, para.28; Reply of Qatar, Map AtlasNo.20). Mr.Bundy suggested that
"Russianofficiaisatthis timerecognizedQatarandBahrainas distinctpoliticalentitiesand that the
temtorialextentof Qatarmatchedthat as describedin Qatar'spleadings". That Bahrainis distinct
fromQataris quite clear, butthe suggestionthat Qatarwas a politicalentity and thatits territorial
extent matched the descriptionin Qatar'spleadings is clearly wrong. The Russianwords that
describeQatarhave been translatedby Qataronthe faceof the enlargementnot as "Qatar" butas
"Qatar Peninsula" - obviously a geographical not a politicadlescription. The politics of the
situation,as understoodby the map-maker,are shownin thetreatmentof the peninsulaagain as a
westward extension of Oman. The colour of Bahrain can hardly be distinguishedfrom the
colouringofthe HawarIslands.
15.Qatar'snext citationis to a Polishrnap of 1904,on a scaleof 1:8million(CR200017,
p. 14,para.30; Reply ofQatar, MapAtlasNo. 32). While-Bahrainis colouredand theHawars are
not, the interestingaspectof this rnapis that yetinit includesQatarin the westwardextension
ofOman.
16.Qatar followsthisrnapwithanEnglishoneby GeorgePhilipon a scaleof69.16milesto
1degree,whichis about 1:4million. Thoughthere is a differencein colouringbetweenBahrain
andtheHawars,thernaprunsagainstQatar'scase fortworeasons. First,Qatar isagainrepresented
as a westwardextension of Oman. Secondly,the Hawar Islandsare called "WardensIslands".
Nowthe earliestsourceinwhich Philipcouldhave foundthat namerecorded fortheislandswould
have been in the report of Lieutenant Brucks and hischart of 1829. There, it will be recalled,
Brucks said that the islands belongedto Bahrain. So,on a correct interpretation,this map, by
implication,showstheHawarsasbeingBahrain's.
17.Mr.Bundythenturnedto officialmaps. Hedevoted specialattentionto arnapwhich,he
stated,hadbeen included ina memorandum preparedin 1920by the BritishForeignOffice. Thisis described on its face as a portion of Chart748-B of 1917 (Reply of Qatar, Anns., Vol.3,
Ann.111.38,p. 215; Reply of QatarMap Atlas, Map No.58, scale 20 sea miles to 1inch).
The
rnap is now up on the screen. Mr. Bundy used it to support his contention that "the Hawar
Islands... werelocatedinsidethe [red] lineandthus were consideredto appertainto the adjacent
mainland" - inother words,to Qatar. Hecontinued:
"Bahrain,as isclear fiomthemap,was carefullyandspecifically excludedfiom
this definitionby virtueof the factthat itwascarefullyenclavedby a separateredline
which did not include the Hawar Islands, and this was emphasizedby underlining,
althoughit is difficult toread,the word 'Bahrain'ned, there onthemap. Therecan
thus be no doubt [1am still quoting Mr.Bundy]that Britain considered the Hawar
Islandsand Zubarahto formpart of Qatar'sterritoryat the time." (CR200017, p.16,
paras. 40-4.)
18.1must askthe Courtto bear with me while 1enter into sufficientdetail to demonstrate
that theremust be serious doubtsas to whetherthis rnap cm, or evenwas intended to,carry the
interpretationwhichMr. Bundy placesuponit.
19. It is necessary to study this rnap in conjunction withthe British Foreign Office
memorandumto whichit wasallegedto relate(ReplyofQatar, Ann. III.38,Vol. 3,p. 217).
20. 1may Sayin passing that Mr. Bundy'sstatement(CR200017,p. 16, para.38) that the
memorandumin question"included" (that wasthe verb he used) arnapis not borne out,so far as1
canmakeout,by anythingin the text ofthememorandumitself. Thereis a drafiTreaty relating to
the settlementof the Arabianpeninsula whichis attachedto the memorandum. Article 2 ofthis
TreatycontainsreferencestovariousAdmiraltychartsinthe description ofthe linesaidto embrace
Arabia. However,the numbers ofthese charts do not correspond with the number 748Bthat
appearson MapNo. 58 in theQatariMapAtlasandMap36 in the Qatarijudges' folders.Nor has
the originalbeendepositedwiththe Registry.
21. But1returnnow to the ForeignOfficeMemorandumin which Mr. Bundysaidthe rnap
wasincluded (Replyof Qatar,Vol. 3,p. 215, Ann. 111.38;Bahrainjudges'folder,tab 61). Thereis
a document entitled"ForeignOfficeMemorandumonArabian Policy". Althoughit bearsno date,
the date of 1920suggested for it by Qatar would appearto be consistentwith its content. The
substantive importanceof someof the contentof theMemorandum hasalreadybeen mentionedby
Professor Reisman(CR 2000112, p4 . 9, para. 17). But1wantto lookat it nowto see ifit providesany explanationof the circledrawnaroundthe main Bahrain Islandsin such a way as to support
Mr.Bundy'ssuppositionthat the circle represents adeliberateseparationof the main Bahrain
Islandsfromthe HawarsandanattachrnentoftheHawarsto Qatar.
22. As the Courtwill see, the Memorandumbegins with a statement that a more detailed
descriptionof what is definedas the peninsula ofArabiawill befoundin its Appendix (A)(ibid.,
para. 1). As 1have alreadysaid,the Memorandumitselfthencontinueswith alist of the ten main
sub-divisionsofArabia. Thelistincludes Bahrainwithan indication thattheindividualto be dealt
with there is the Sheikhof Bahrain. The list does not include Qatarby name. Perhaps itwas
consideredto be coveredby the heading "TrucialCoast". In that case no singleindividualwas
namedasthepersonto bedealtwith. Instead therewasa blanketreferenceto "PettyChiefs". And
this, we recall, was written in 1920, inthe ForeignOffice,by which yearQatar'scounselwould
haveus thinkthatQatarhadfor52yearsbeenan independent State of equalstatuswithBahrain.
23. Attachedto theMemorandum as AnnexA was a draft treatydealing withthe settlement
of the Arabian peninsula. Articlestatedthatforthe "purposeof the treatythe ArabianPeninsula
included(1)al1tenitories otherthantheKingdomof HedjazandtheBritishProtectorate overAden
and its surroundingterritorialzone; an(2)the islands,whether previouslyBntish ornot, which
liewithinthe linewhichis definedhereafter".
24. Therethenfollows a descriptionof the line insix sections,by referenceto sevennarned
points identifiedby their CO-ordinatss they appear on Bntish Admiraltycharts. None of the
nurnbersonthesechartscorrespondswiththenurnberon QatariMap58. Thereis no mentionof a
line around Bahrain and no explanationof it is given, either in the draft Treaty or in the
Memorandumtowhichthe draftTreatyisattached.
25.1 willnot speculateas to whatthe circle aroundBahrainmay signi@. It isevenopento
question whetherthe circlewasdrawnat the sametime,by thesamehandor with thesamepenas .
the linesurrounding Arabia. But theres certainlynojustificationforQatar's asserthatbecause
the Hawar Islandswere separatedfiom Bahrain main islandby the circle andwere locatedinside
the defined lines they "were thus consideredto appertainto the adjacent mainland-in other
words, to Qatar". Theonlyreferenceinthe drafitothe effectofadjacencyof islandsis tobe found
in the finalparagraphof the descriptionof Arabia inArticle2 of draf Ttreaty. Thedescriptionconcludes thus: "The islands in the Red Sea lying within this line shall be placedunder the
sovereignty of the independent chiefs of the mainland, subject, however, to provisions of
Article8." [Emphasis added.] The fact that no such specific words appear in relation tothe
Persian Gulf islands (I use the terminologyon the map) suggeststhat the drafisman saw the
identification ofsovereignty overthose islands- and there were quite a nurnberof them- as
possiblybeingtoocomplexa matterto beresolvedby sosimple a formula.
26. ThereremainsoneMer point tobe made inconnection withthis mapwhichillustrates
the strange, if not misleading,methodology followedby Qatar in the considerationof maps
generally. The Courtwas told that "there is a firther important pointwith respectto this map
which, 1 (that is counsel for Qatar) would suggest underlinesits significance in this case"
(CR200017,p. 17,para.42). Thispointwas thatthe samemaphadbeen furnishedto the Tribunal
in the EritredYemenproceedings. That Tribunal,it was stated, appearedto have observedthe
effect of the Red Line in attributingthe islands lyingto the east of it to Yemen,thethen local
chiefdom. Qatarthenwentonto suggest"thatexactlythe samesituationpertainsherewithrespect
to theHawarIslands".
27.But counselfor Qatar failedto point to the paragraphaccompanyingthe description of
the Red Line in the 1920 draft Treaty which 1 read to you a moment ago and which States
specificallyin relationto the Red Seathat "TheIslandsin the Red Sealyingwithinthe Red Line
shall be placedunder the sovereignty ofthe individual chiefsof the mainland". There was no
comparableprovisionrelating tothe islands in thePersianGulf; there was, thereforeno basison
which Qatar couldvalidly equatethe two positions- at any rate not without explaining whatit
wasdoingandthe likelylimitationonthe validityof itsproposition.
28. Generally speaking, Mr.President, there is something odd about this Map58,
particularlythe unrnentionedand unexplainedring aroundBahrain,as well as the failure of the
nurnbersto tie upwiththosegiveninthe ForeignOfficedrafiTreaty. 1hopethatcounselforQatar
will inhisreplybe abletoprovidetheCourtwith some explanations.
29. Qatar cited no otherofficia1map thattakesmatters anyMer thanthe mapsthat 1have
alreadyconsidered. BAHIZAIN MASPS
30. So 1turnnow to maps supportiveof Bahrain'sposition. As 1have alreadysuggested,
Bahrainneedsno mapsto supportits position. Mr. Bundyhas saidthat Bahrainhas assertedthat
its authority over the Hawars andZubarah followingthe 1868Agreementis said to be "well
docurnented'land "overwhelming",and he continuesthat therefore: "one would expect such
ambitious assertionstobe backedup by the rnapevidence(CR 200017,p. 19,para.52). Whyso,
Mr. Bundy did not explain. In Bahrain's submissionthe facts speak for themselves. The
accumulation-or, indeed,theabsence - of supportivemapsdoesnotmatter.
31.But thereis oneadditionalrnapthatexhibitsthe positive qualitiesthat shouldmark arnap
that is presentedin supportof alaim to title. It is a large-scalechart preparedby a qualified,
competentand experienced surveyor,GeorgeBrucks,at that time a lieutenant in theEast India
Company Marine Service, and later a Captain in the Indian Navy, on the basis of knowledge
acquiredat fvst hand. Referencewasmade to the descriptivereport of Capt.Brucksat twoplaces
in the Bahrain Memorial(paras.116and415)andby Mr. Paulssonon2 June; and inparticularto
Brucks'notesabouttheHawar Islands, and theywerereferred toagaintoday. The relevant partsof
his descriptivememoirwere reproducedin the Annexesto Bahrain'sMemorial (Ann.7, Vol.2,
p. 101)aswellasattab 6 andtab27of Bahrain's judges'folders. In 1829,Brucks placedthename
"WardensIslands" next to theHawars. He describesthe islandsand Statesthat theybelongedto
Bahrain. Dueto an oversight,forwhichBahrain apologizes,thechartwhich Bruckspreparedwas
notreproducedinBahrain's pleadings. Butthernapmaynow quiteproperlybeproducedsinceit is
a public documentthat has been reprinted in a series that is readily available and inaal1
likelihood,givenQatar'sdiligence,is alreadyknownto it. Theseriesis called "HistoricalMapsof
Bahrain 1817-18901'p,ublishedby ArchiveEditions. Anextractfiomthe rnap inthe originalscale
isin the Court'sjudges'folders,at tab 62. A copyof the rnapwasdepositedwiththe Registryon
.
Fridayand,asa matterof courtesy,wasalsothensenttothe Agent ofQatar.
32.As theCourt will irnrnediatelysee, ehartis a fineexampleof earlynineteenthcentury
chart-making. It demonstratesin every respect afirsthandexaminationof the area, includinga
large nurnber of depth soundings. Toward the south-east corner it shows theprincipal
HawarIslands,togetherwithJanan,next to thename"WardensIslands". As alreadystated, Brucksexpresslyattributedthe Warden Islandsto Bahrain. Evenmakingallowancesfor the factthat the
chart did not accompanythe BahrainMemorial,it must be said that the Brucks surveyreceived
rather peremptorytreatment in the QatarCounter-Memonal. There it was dismissedwith the
entirelyunsupportedallegationthat it was one of"many of theBritishsurveyscanied out at the
time shown to have been impreciseif not inaccurate" andwas said, without any supportive
references, to be contradictedby "Lorimer and other British authoritie... [and] also by the
numerousOttomansurveys"(Counter-Memorialof Qatar, para3 ..122). Theidentity ofheseother
surveys was never stated. The Court can now see the inaccuracy and unfaimess of those
cornrnents.
33. As 1 indicated atthe beginning,Bahrain has not bombardedthe Court with a large
numberof commercialor officia1maps supportive ofits position. Mr. Bundy hassaidthat "Qatar
wishes tomakeit veryclearthatit doesnot relyon cartographieevidenceas creative ofits titleto
the Hawar IslandsorZubarah". Andhe wasrightto offerthatdisclaimerbecausethe evidencethat
he hasproduced would certainly notsupportsucha claim. Thenotionof "widespreadrecognition
or generalrepute"that Qatar relieson (CR200017,p. 23, para.69) is one that has very limited
scope. While it has had some supportfiom Sir GeraldFitzmaurice and is mentioned in the
BeagleChannelAward,itmustberecalledthatthe maps towhichpartiesin other caseshaveinthe
past turned have beenones prepared byStatesthat have had a specificinterest in the issueand,
aboveall,havebeenon a scalesufficiently large to indicatthat thosewho preparedthem hadthe
specificissuein mindand wereseekingto reflect,on the basisof knowledge actuallypossessed,
what they objectivelythoughtto be the correct solution. Of that approach,not one of the maps
produced by Qatar can be cited as an example. "General repute", as fully acknowledgedby
SirGeraldFitzmaurice,canneverreplacerealevidenceof conductontheground.
34. May1 concludethis considerationof maps, Mr. President,with what 1 would cal1a
footnotetothe fewlines1expressedafewminutesagoregarding thecolour ofmaps.
35. TheCourtwillrecallthatin relationto virtuallyeverymapthat Qatar displayed,it made
the pointthat onthebasis of differencesin colour the Hawarscouldbeseenas beingpart of Qatar
and not part of Bahrain.1amboundto offerthe Court a warning againsr telianceupon colourforthe purpose just stated. Colours undergo significant distortion in the process of copying,
enlargementorreductionasthe case maybe. 1giveyou fourexamples.
36.Takefirstthe LibrairieHachetteMapof 1890,MapNo. 13in the QatarMap Atlas. The
enlargement ofthernap on the left-handpage ofthe Atlas showsthe seain a lightershadeof blue
than the smaller-scalernap on the right-handside. But whenone uses the computerto matchthe
blue on the enlargementmorecloselyto the blue on the small-scalemap,the effectis to givethe
Hawars acolour closerto thatof Bahrainthanto thatof Qatar.
37. Take, as another example,the rnap in Qatar'sjudges' folders attab No.34, said to
correspondto MapNo.49 (1919)in the MapAtlasin the Replyof Qatar. The differencebetween
the coloursin the versionin thejudges'foldersandthe twoversionsin the Map Atlasimmediately
Springsto the eye. What is the explanation? Itis that in the process of copying the various
versions of the map, especially in enlargingthem - and bear in mind the enormousamountof
enlargementinvolved- there isscope for subtlevariation or enhancementof depth of colour.
Thus the differencesin depth of colourof the border margins ofEl-Hasaand El Katarare much
more pronouncedin thejudges' foldersthan they are in the Map Atlas version. The non-enlarged
version is on so smalla scalethatitis impossibleto be surewhatare thecoloursoftheHawarsand
Bahrain and whetherthey arereally differentin colour.
38. As a thirdexamplewe maylookat the 1919rnapofArabiathatappearsas Map No.8 in
QatarMemorial,oppositepage71. Compare it withthe versionthat appearsas MapNo.62 inthe
QatarMapAtlas. They are bothdescribedas onginallyhaving been publishedby GeographiaLtd.
On the versionin the Memorial, the seais coloured yellow-green. In the Map Atlasit is coloured
blue. In the Memonal, Bahrain'scolour is enhancedto red, in seemingcontrast to the Hawars,
while in the Map Atlas, small-scale version,Bahrain appears colouredpink. It is clear fiom a
comparisonof therest of the rnapwiththe colourcodingin thebottomleft-hand cornerthatal1the
colours have not been uniformly reproduced. Indeed, on the large version of the map, on the
right-handsideof the Map Atlas, the wholeof TrucialOman,of which Qataris depictedas a part,
seemsnotdissimilarin colourtoBahrain.
39. The final example is Map41 in the Qatar Map Atlas. As the Court can now see, the
enlargement showsboth Katar andthe WardensIslands as being coveredwith the sarnerash ofdots, suggesting thatthe Wardens Islands belong toKatar. Now here is the sarne enlargement
producedin a straightforwardwayon a Bahrainicomputer - no rash and a colour very similar to
Bahrain. 1sitmagicoris it somethingelse?
40. In short,Mr. President and Membersof the Court,without the originals ofthe mapson
which Qatar so heavily relies, my respectful submissionis that you shouldpay these maps no
attentionat all. And evenif the originalsare produced,it ishrain'ssubmissionthat they make
no differenceto thecase.
41. Mr. President,Members ofthe Court, that concludesmy presentationon the maps. 1
thank you for your attentionand it wouldbe appreciated, Mr. President, if you would now cal1
uponMr.Paulsson.
The PRESIDENT :Thank you very much, Sir Elihu. Je donne maintenantla parole à
M.Jan Paulsson.
M.PAULSSON :Merci, Monsieurleprésident.
CARTESPETROLIÈRES
1. Il m'échoit aujourd'hui de traiter d'une sous-catégoriedes éléments depreuve
cartographiques,àsavoirles cartes-ou parfois plutôtdesébauchesgribouilléess,ij'ose dire,sur
le dos d'enveloppes- qui ont figuréi,ci ou là, au coursdesnégociationsentreBahreïn,Qatar,et
les explorateurspétroliers.
2. Quelleen seraitla pertinenc? Il s'agit desavoirsi ces cartes,ouesquisses, reflètent une
compréhensionde l'étenduegéographique dela souverainetéde Bahrein ou de celle de Qatar.
C'est un sujet d'apparence aride, mais dans notre affaire, vous le verrez, il recèle quelques
surprises.
3. Je vous propose donc encore unefois, avec votrepermission,un voyagedans le temps,
l'espace peut-être d'une demi-heure, pou passer en revue la manièredont les deux groupes
pétroliersconcurrents se sont positionnàl'époque.
Mon exposése divise,j'allais presquedire évidemmente ,n deuxparties,les annéesvingtet
les annéestrente. L'$TENDU DES DROITSC$D$S PAR BAHREI N ~SAVANT 1930
4. Souvenons-nous de ce personnage fantasque, haut en couleur qui est le
MajorFrank Holmes,Néo-zélandais qu'on a fini par surnommer«Abu ad Naft» - le pèredu
pétrole. Sa société,la Eastern & General Syndicate, obtient sa concession en 1925 du
cheikhHamadde Bahreïn. Selonles termes de cette concession, la Eas& General avaitledroit
de prospecter (Il (partout sur le tenitoire sous son contrôle))["throughoutthe whole of the
territories under his control'y (art.1, Bahrain Oil Concession, mémoire de Bahreï,ol. 3,
annexe90).
5. Ce documentne seréfêràeaucunecarte.
6. Vous vousrappelezqueleMajorHolmesétaitmalvu des autoritésanglaises. Il se faisait
conspuerpar les financiersondres. Il ne parvintpasàconvaincrel'hglo-Persian Oil Company
à prendreune participationdans son entreprise,cequi expliquel'arrivée sur ee la Standard
OilofCalifomia,par l'entremise de sa filialeà%,0la Bahrain Petroleum Compan(BAPCO).
7. La BAPCOreprésentedonc - ilfauts'ensouvenir- desintérêtsaméricai n100 %.
8. J'ouvre une parenthèse. Sir Chas elgrave,le conseillerdes émirsde Bahreïnpendant
trenteetun ans, est arrivéà Bahreïn en 1926. Quelle fut son attitude l'égardde la lutte
d'influences dans cette nouvelle indupétrolière Sesmémoiresne laissentaucun douteàcet
égard: ((L'histoiredes concessions pétrolières danlse golfe Persiqueest, du point de vue de la
Grande-Bretagne, untriste récit.))ehistoryof theoilconcessionsinthePersicGulfis,froma
Britishperspective,asadstory'7(Charles Belgrave,Persona1Column,p. 79(1960).
9. Belgrave fut au courantdu refus de l'hglo-Persian Oil Companyde s'associeravec le
Major Holmes, et écrit que :((Holmesfut souvent traité commepersona non grata par les
Britanniques))"Holmeswasfrequentlytreatedaspersonanongrata by theBritish'yalors que :
((jen'aijamais entenduune explicationconvaincantepourquoiles pétroliers britanniques nities
peuenclinsà entreprendre.))
10. En 1936,le cheikh Hamad de Bahreïn est en voyage officiel en Angleterre. L'émir
rencontrelord Cadman, présidente lahglo-Persian Oil Company - la grandesociétpétrolière
britannique, dont1'Etatdétenait%1desactions,et qui devaitpar la suiterebaptisée la British
Petroleum Company. Belgrave est présentà l'entrevue. Cadman se livre à un "non-stopmonologue",une heuredurant, surlesraisons pour lesquellessa société ne s'estpas intéresséàela
concession à Bahreïn,ce qui, commeBelgravel'écriraplustard, «futcertainementune chosebien
difflcileàexpliquen)["certainlya verydificult mattertoexplain")(ibid.p. 108).
11. En prenant congé delord Cadrnan,l'émirlui dit malicieusement - je cite toujours
Belgrave :«avec presqueun clind'Œil àmonintention :«unjour vousdevriezabsolument medire
pourquoivotre société n'a pas postulpourla concession de Bahreïn))['"withalmosta winkto me:
'someday you musttell me why your Companydid not competefor the Bahrain concession"%
(ibid.)
12.Commenousallonsle voir, la société AngloPersian a préférsé 'allier avec leconsortium
qui était alorsle pluspuissantdumonde, l'IraqPetroleum Company,et celui-ci a plutôt optépour
Qatar.
13.Fennonslaparenthèse.
14. Jusqu'en 1932, lorsque laBAPCO, contre l'attente de nombreux spécialistesf ,it la
premièredécouvertepétrolière du côtéarabedu Golfe,les activités duconcessionnaireaméricain
de Bahreïnn'étaienq t u'exploratoires.
15. La concessionde 1925, qui régissaitces activitésde la BAPCO, pouvait, selon ses
termes,se convertirenlicenced'exploitation, maisaveclacontrainte quele concessionnairedevait
selimiter àunezonede 100000acres(qu'ilpouvait lui-mêmechoisir).
16. Nos adversaires invoquentdeux projets de cartes, tracés avant lanégociation dela
concession de Bahreïn,pour essayer de fairecroire que les îles Hawarne furent pas considérées
comme faisantpartiede Bahreïn.
17.Avant d'allerplus loin,j'expnmerai au nom deBahreïndeuxsérieusesréserves.
18. Premièrement,la Cour ne manquera pas d'être frappée pa lr caractèreinsolite de
l'argumentairede Qataràcepropos.
19. Un hommevient avec un projet de contrat, cartede la zone convoitéecomprise. Le
conseil de Qatar croit utile de faireobserver commesi cela avait le moindre intérê -t que le
projet de contrat est, de manière unilatérale«dûment signé par FrankHolmes et sa signature
authentifiée))(CR 200016,trad.fi., p. 15,par.30) 20. Mais ce qui importe,c'est que le projet n'est pas acceptépar le souverain deBahreïn.
Les annéespassent,les décenniesaussi,et soixante-dix-septansplus tard on nous dit quece projet
de contrat, établi unilatéralemeptar un néo-zélandaisà l'égardduquel ce n'est pas une injure
de dire que sa seule motivation futcommerciale- on nous dit donc qu'il convientde donnerdu
poids à cette propositionjaunie et non retenue dans la détermination del'étendue desfrontières
d'une nation arabe contemporaine. Si la litote était demise, je dirais que ceci est plutôt
déconcertant.
21. Deuxièmementl ,eshommes del'ornoirn'ontjamais eula réputation d'êtd esenfants de
chŒur. Juger plutôt vous-mêmes d l'étatd'esprit dufameuxMajor Holmes lorsqu'il écrit à un
investisseuraméricain potentiel. Il s'agitde savoir si lesautoritésbritanniquesvont approuverune
nouvelleconcession àBahreïn au-delàdes 100000 acres. LesAméricainsne veulentpas montrer
leurscartesaux autoritésanglaises.Holmesmanifesteson désaccord comme suit:
«Il me paraît qu'il est préférable'être trèosuvert dans nos rapports avec le
Political Resident du golfe Persique afin d'éviter toutseuggestion que nous nous
cachons,ou que nous avons quelquechose à cacher;on fera bien de se rappeler que
ces fonctionnairesne sont pas des gens techniqueset que pour eux les cartes ne
veulent pas dire grand chose. Ceci expliquepourquoije n'ai pascherché à garder
secrètes les cartes de Bahremin.» (Lettre du 20 avril 1928, citéin T.E. Ward,
Negotiationsfor Oil Concession nBahrain,El Hasa, TheNeutra1Zone,Qatarand
Kuwait, p. 65 (1960)),BahrainSupplementaryDocumentssubmitted1March2000,
p. 166.)
22. Bref,montronsnos cartes,ilsn'ycomprendrontrien.
23. Mon propos est des plus sérieux. Est-cequ'on peut imaginer une seconde que la
souverainetéde 1'Etatde Bahreïndoit dépendre de documentsrestés lettre morte,préparés pad res
hommes d'affairesdont l'opacitéraffinée,semble-t-il,est une seconde nature - et qui ne furent
absolumentpas habilités àtrancher desquestions frontalières? La question estbien évidemment
rhétorique.
24. Cesréservesémises, poursuivons toud te même l'analysd ee ce que Qataressaye de faire
accroire.
25. Le premierprojetde cartequ'on vous amontré le30 mai dernier (CR 200016,trad. fr.,
p. 15, par. 30)se trouveannexé à un projetde concessionde 1923,que voici. Vous le trouverez
égalementau numéro 67 dudossierd'audience. 26. Selon Qatar,la zoneprévuepour la concession,telle que mise enrelief ici, indiquela
non-appartenance desîlesHawar à Bahreïn.
27. Maisil n'en estrien. L'article 1du projet deconcession,reproduitdans votre dossier
d'audience,expliqueque cettemiseen reliefavait pour fonctionde définirunezone appelée"The
BahrainIslands". Rienne prouve que Holmesavaitneserait-ceque songéauxîlesHawar;il serait
absurdedeprétendre qu'ialvaituneidée précisseur leurappartenance.
28. Deuxièmement,le Qatar se référeà une carte presque identique qui porte la rubrique
"Mapprepared by Major Holmes". Vous en trouverezune copie au numéro68 du dossier
d'audience. Encoreune fois,cette cartene faitquemontrerles limites d'uneconcession potentielle
sur une partie duterritoire de l'émre Bahreïn. Elle n'avaitpas pour but d'indiquerles limites
territorialesde Bahreïn et son auteur n'avait certainementplautoritépours'yaventurer.
29. Mais il y abien plus grave. Le conseil Qatara déclaré devant cetteCour que cette
carte futétablieparHolmesen 1928,soit cinqans plustard»(CR200016,trad.fr.,p. 16,par.31)
que lapremièrecarte.
30. Puisqueles deuxcartes,selonQatar, sont identiquesbid.),il y auraitdoncconfirmation
que l'étenduegéographique de Bahreïnétaitcomprise,avantet aprèsla signaturedu contratde
concessionen 1925,comme excluant les Hawar.
31.Je suisauregret dedireàla Cour que l'affirmatiode Qatarest fausse. Cettedeuxième
carte n'étaitpas postérieure la signaturede la concessionen 1925,mais bien antérieure.Elle
date,en véritét,oujours, comme la première, de 19D.anssonouvrage Arabia 'Frontiers(1991)
M. Wilkinsonétablitlavéritéd'une manière très nettttrèssimple. Lacarteenquestionestparue
dans un livre publiéen 1928 (no69 de votre dossierd'audience) (A. Rihani, Ibn Sa'oud of
Arabia(1)),mais aveclamention explicitede sonorigineen 1923. Qatarprésentedoncdemanière
trompeuse la date de publicationcomme étant la dated'origine. Ce n'est pas, disons-le,très
sérieux. De toutemanière,comme onvient dele voir,ni l'uneni l'autre decescartesn'indiquent
queles Hawarnefontpaspartie deBahreïn.
32. Si Qatar estainsi absolumentincapablede prouverque les signatairesde la concession
de 1925 avaient à l'espritque lesHawarne relevaientpas de Bahreïn,pour sa part, Bahrein setrouvedans la positionavantageusedepouvoirprouverle contraire,et ce grâceàun documenttout
à faitdécisif.
33. Il s'agit d'unetroisièmecarte, que Qatar s'est bien gardéde vous montrer, celle-ci
reproduitedans un livre publiéen 1965par M. ThomasWard sous le titre Negotiationsfor Oil
Concessionsin Bahrain,El Hasa (SaudiArabia),the NeutralZone, Qatarand Kuwait (Bahrain
SupplementaryDocuments submitted1March2000,p. 166). M. Wardfut un proche collaborateur
du major Holmes à partir des annéesvingt. Il a notammentreprésenté ce dernier dans les
négociationsavec les sociétés pétrolièraséricainesqui ont frnipar racheter saconcession.Le
livre deM. Ward, longde 296 pages, démontrq eue sa collaborationavec le MajorHolmes fut
étroiteet de longue durée. Ajoutonqsue M. Wardlui-même fut un éminent industrielméricain,
commel'attestele fait qu'il aitétélumembredu Council of Foreign Relations des Etats-Unis,
ainsi que The American PetroleumInstitute. Mais ce qui m'intéresse le plus, c'est qu'il fut
également Fellowde la Royal Geographical Society d'Angleterreou les Américains n'ont jamais
étépléthoriques. Quant à la carte qui figure toutau début de son livre, ous la voyezici (et
égalemena tu no70de votredossier d'audience).Alorsque les deuxcartesprécédentes indiquaient
seulementque lesîles Hawar ne devaientpas êtreconcernéespar la concessionenvisagée, cette .
carteconsidèreclairementque les îlesHawarfont partie deBahreïn. Une notationsur cettecarte
nousexpliqueque :
«Ceciestune copiede la carte originalutiliséeau coursde la négociationdes
concessionspétrolièresà Bahreïn, à Hasa (Arabie saoudite),la Zone Neutre, et le
Koweït.)) (Lesitaliquessont demoi.)
["This is a copy ofthe originalmap used in the courseof negotiating, the
Bahrain,Hasa(SaudiArabia), Neutral Zone andKuwaitoilconcessions. '7
34. Ici une volonté d'indiquerl'appartenance desîles Hawar est manifeste. Elles
apparaissent indiscutablement comme unies à Bahreïn; elles figurentsans aucun doutepossible
commefaisantpartie d'une concession potentielloectroyéepar Bahreïn. Vousavezpu observerle
contrasteentreles Hawaret la péninsuldeQatar.
35. Commenosadversaireseux-mêmelsereconnaissent :
«Holmesconnaissaitintimementlarégion àcausede sonactivitédans lesecteur
pétrolier, etsonopiniona parconséquentun poidsconsidérable.» ["Holmeswas intimatelyfamiliarwith theareaas a resultof hisworkinthe oil
sector, and his views therefore have considerable weight." (Reply of
Qatar,para.4.105).
36. Il est à peine nécessairede soulignerque l'on s'attachera plus volontiersà ce que les
deux Parties avaientdevantleursyeuxlorsqu'ellesont conclu laconcessiondéfinitive, c'est-à-dire
celle de 1925, celle-làmêmequi fut la pierre angulairede toute l'industriepétrde Bahreïn,
qu'à ce que leMajorHolrnestout seul auraitpu penser ou ignorer dans un premier temps,
avantde négocier lconcession.
37. Unepetite parenthèse encor, aiscelle-ciest d'uneimportance primordiale.
38.Qatara oséaffier queBahre'ïna seulementconçul'idée de réclamerles îlesawar à la
suite de manŒuvresdolosives de sir CharlesBelgrave au milieu des annéestrente. Maisvous
venez de voir la preuveque les îles Hawar étaientlt bienconsidéréecsomme faisant partiede
Bahreïn dixans plus tôt à une époque oùlejeune Belgraven'avait pasencorefoulé lesol de
Bahreïn.
39. Ainsi sommes-nous confrontéàtroiscartesdont nouspouvons tirer uneconclusion très
peu surprenante:les zones d'une concession pétrolière ne correspondent pas nécessaireaent
limitesdutemtoire national.
40. En revanche, lorsque ceux qui ((connaissent intimement)ne régionnégocientavec
l'idée qu'un groupde'îles trèsdistincles îles Hawar peuvent faire partied'une concession,
ceci s'appelle unereconnaissance explicitequel'autoritéauteur dela concessionpotentielle estbel
et bienmaîtredes lieux.
ENSEIGNEMEN DETSNÉGOCIATIONS DESANNÉES TRENTE
41. La spectaculaire découveree 1932 au centre de la grandeîle de Bahre-n suscite
évidemment biendes convoitises. Tout le monde comprend qu'il y adeux zones où l'onpeut
imaginer de nouvellesconcessions
- d'une part,bien sûr la presqu'île de Qatar, où le cheikh Abdullah Al-Thani se trouve
rapidementenpourparlersavec1'Anglo-PersianOilCompanyqui s'estréveillée;
- mais d'autre part, il y a égalementune opportunité intéressantà Bahreeinmême,car la
concession octroyéen 1925au MajorHolmes,et maintenantcédée àla BAPCO,ne couvrait
pas la totalitéde Bahreïn; le concessionnaireattitrédevait choisir ses 100000 acres, laissant ainsi disponibletout le reste du territoire nationalue tout le monde afin par appeler
"theunallottedarea" (indiquons que la grandeîle de Bahreïn à elle seule représenteune
superficiede142000 acres).
42. Nous voyons à présent surgiune Anglo-PersianOil Companyqui ne (traîne plus les
pieds». Dansles quelques mois qui suivent l'éclatante découverte ldaeBAPCO à Bahreïn,
1'Anglo-Persianobtientun droitexclusifd'exploitationducheikhAbdullahde Qatar. Lepersonnel
de 1'Anglo-Persianne se préoccupepas trop des nuances frontalières. Le Political Agent
britanniquerelèveque :
«les explorateursde la Anglo-Persian au Qatar txaminé des endroitsoù le cheikh
deQatar n'avaitaucundroit de leslaisseraller»
['Theexplorers ofAnglo-Persianin Qatar haveexaminedplaces whichthe Rulerof
Qatarhadnoright to allowthemtogo'y
alorsque,comme ille note,
«il est dit que pas plus tard que l'an dernier(1932) lecheikh de Qatar a admis
publiquementque certainesrégions sula côte deQatarappartiennent Bahreïn))
["it is said thatas Iateas last year (1932)theRulerof Qataradmittedinpublic that
certainareas on theQatar coastpertain to Bahruin"(contre-mémoire de Bahreïn,
par.215;ibid.,vol. 2, annexe59).
43. Quantà la "unallottearea"deBahre'ïn,le cheikhHamedentamedesnégociations avec
la BAPCO. Mais en juin 1933,la société Anglo-Persia aussidéclareson désir depostulerpour
cettezonedisponibleàBahreïn.
44. Or, il est dans l'intdte la Grande-Bretagnequel'extensiondes droitsde la BAPCO
soit la plus réduitepossible. Une façon de restreindre l'américaine BAPCe st d'exclureles
îlesHawardel'extension qu'elleenvisage.
45. Le cheikh Harnad de Bahreïn acceptel'idéeque la BAPCO pourrait être exclu des
îles Hawar mais nelaisse aucundoute lorsqu'ilfait observàl'ActingPoliticalAgentque : «ces
îlessont des dépendancesde Bahreïn»["theseislandsarethedependenciesof Bahrain "J(message
du30juillet 1933,mémoire deQatar, annexe111.86v,ol.6,p.445).
46. Personnene demandealors à Bahreïnde confirmer sontitre.L'idéeque lerégimedes
Al-Thani à Doha pourrait revendiquer lesîles n'effleurepersonne,et ceci quandbien mêmela
sociétéAnglo-Persianaurait intérêtàce qu'ille fasse. Aprèstout, elle s'apprêà acquérirdesdroits sur l'ensemble duterritoireAl-Thani. Elle a donctout intéà faire admettreuneétendue
maximale du côté de Qatar - plutôt qued'êtretributaire d'une négociationncore incertainedu
côtéde Bahreïn, où ily a uneconcurrente.
47. Nous arrivons à la fin 1933. Bahreïn n'a signé niavec la BAPCO, ni avec
1Anglo-Persianpour la "unallottedarea". AinsiBahreïnn'a-t-il encoroctroyéaucundroitsur les
îlesHawar.
48. Sur ces entrefaites, laBAPCOexerceson optionselon la concession initiale-celle de
1925-et choisit 100000 acres, sans surprise, sur la grandeîle de Bahreïn où elle a déjà son
gisement. Lazonechoisiepar laBAPCOest celle-ci,quevous verrez également au numéro 7 du
dossier d'audience. Le reste de la grande île se trouve toujours disponible en tant que
"unallottedarea"-mais ceci est vrai aussi,et surtout,pour les autresdépendances terresetes
maritimesde Bahreïn,y comprislesîlesHawar.
49. En 1935,la société Anglo-Persian, présentesur le terrain Qatar depuis deux ans,
formalise saconcessionavecle cheikh AbdullahAl-Thanide Doha. Il est instructifde placercette
concessiondans son contextegéographique.J'attirel'attentionde la Coursur une noteécritepar
M. Rende1du Foreign Officeen 1934 (21février1934,contre-mémoire de Bahreïn, annexe 67,
vo1.2,p. 220)que voustrouverezaunuméro72 du dossierd'audience.
50. Premièrement,à la page221,nousvoyonsqu'ils'agitde «lYAnglo-Persian agissantpour
IPC»(Iraq Petroleum Company).
51. Deuxièmement,à la mêmepage 221, au paragraphe 4, M. Rende1note que lesseuls
dangerssont ceuxque constituentd'unepartIbn Saudetd'autre partdestribusde l'intérieur.
52. Troisièmement,à la page222,au coursd'une discussionsur les conséquences possibles
silaGrande-Bretagnen'offraitpassaprotection au cheikhAbdullah, M. Rende1écrit :
«dans la pratique, ilsera impossiblepour lui [le cheikh Abdullah]de protéger la
compagnie[pétrolière]de manièreefficaceàmoinsque nous le laissionsdévelopper
des forcesplus effectivesque celles dont il disposeprésent. Ceci serait de toute
manièreimpossible, car dece que noussavonsdu cheikh il n'est guèrequ'un grand
marchand et son temtoire est trèsfaiblement habitépar les tribus sur lesquelles il
paraît exerceruncontrôletrèslâche.»
53. Ce n'est pas Bahreïn quile dit- c'estM. Rendel. Et la descriptionne date pas du
XIXesiècle,maisde 1934. Quoiqu'ilensoit,la conclusionsetrouve àla finde cettenote: ((dansl'ensembledescirconstances["inal1thecircumstances'l], meilleureapproche
serait d'autoriser lePoliticalResidentdu golfe Persiqueà proposerau cheikh une
protectionintégraleecontrepartiede la concessiond'IPC[IraqPetroleum Company]
selonlapropositioninitiale)).
54. Voici sousquelle condition Qatarsigne en 1935. Or, ce contrat deconcessionne se
limiteàaucune zone spécifiquemais seréfêrà e((l'ensemblede la zonesous l'autorité du cheikh
ainsiqu'indiquéaunorddela lignetracée surla carteannexée au présent contrat))hewhole area
over whichthe Shaikhrules and whichis markedon the northof the line drawnon themap
attachedtothisAgreement'y(mémoire deBahreïn,vol. 3,annexes104et 105).
55. Voici la carteannexée quevous avez déjàvueplus d'une fois.Elle est remarquableà
deux titres. D'abord,la seulefrontièreest tracéeau sud dela péninsule.,eule cettefrontière a
été négociéeentre la Grande-Bretagneet lesAl-Thani,auxquelsle Gouvernementbritanniquea
promissa protectioncontretoute attaque d'Ibn Sauden contrepartie-justement - du choixdu
concessionnairebritannique.
56.Au nord decetteligne,la concessionest définie comme couvran le "areaonwhichthe
Sheikhrules". Or, queje sache, lesAl-Thanine furent maîtresni du Koweït,ni de l'îleprincipale
de Bahreïn-pourtant tousdeux setrouvent au nordde cette lign- et pas non plusmaîtresdes
îles Hawar. Cette observation futd'ailleurs aussicellede Rende1de l'IndiaOfficelorsqu'il a
répondu à M. John Skliros,le GeneralManagerdu concessionnairebritannique lorsquecelui-ci
voulaitfaire admettreen 1936 que lesHawarfaisaient partiede sa concessionàQatar; vendredi
dernierje vousailula réponsesèchede M. Rende1 :
"itsobject[of themapattachedto theQatarConcession] wasto definethesouthern
boundaryof theConcession. Incidentallyit marksthe BahrainIslandsas well as
Hawar"(mémoirede Bahreeina,nnexe248,vol.5,p. 1076).
57.Deuxièmeaspectqui retiendranotre attentionàpropos de cettecarte, le réseauroutier y
figurantconfirmed'une manière nette que laartiehabitéede Qatarétait concentrésur la côteest
duQatarloinde Zubarah,loin desîlesHawar.
58.La société Anglo-Persiancède presque immédiatemes nt concessionàune filialede la
puissanteIraq PetroleurnCompany - baséeà Londres - où sont réunies principalemendt'abord .
1'Anglo-Persianelle-mêmea,insi quela RoyalDutch Shell,la compagnie françaisede pétroles,et
un groupe américain. Cette filialede l'Iraq Petroleum Companys'appellera PetroleumConcessions Ltd.(ou PCL),c'est donc ce vocable «PCL» qui figure très souvent dans les
documents à partirde 1935.
59. Retenons queles seuls intérêtsnglais sont du côde PCL, la BAPCO étant à 100%
américaine.
60. A en croire les documents de l'époque,le GeneralManager de PCL, à savoir
M. Skliros,devait avoir uneénergieformidable,tant il semble être parptour faire avancerles
intérêts dsa société.Aussitôtqu'il a obtenula concessiondu côté duQatar disons ducôtédes
Al-Thani-il se porte candidat pour la "unallottedarea" de Bahreïn, donc y compris les
îles Hawar.
61. Dansce contexte,la plus grande prudence s'imposeà Bahrein. Car tout en postulant
pour la "unallottedarea"de Bahrein,M. Skliros,si je puis dire, ne perd pas le nord; sans être
historien, sans avoir une ((connaissancetirne))de la région,sans avoir lu les rapports du
capitaineBrucks(de 1829)etduPoliticalResidentPrideaux(de 1909)àla suite deleursvisitessur
lesîlesHawar,sanslamoindreindicationqu'ily est allélui-même,M. Skiiros,danscettelettreque
nousavonsvue vendredi dernier (mémoir dee Qatar,annexe111.104,ol. 7, p. 21)'déclareque lui
et sa sociétésont d'avsueles îles Hawarappartenaientau cheikhde Qatar. Ceci auraitmisPCL
immédiatemend tans la positiond'avoirtouslesdroits surHawar,donc sans avoire préoccuper
de la concurrence de la BAPCO-contrairement à la situation dans les zones appartenantà
Bahrein.
62. Le Political Agent local ainsi que le Political Resident,c'est-à-direle plus haut
fonctionnaire britanniquedans le Golfe, se penchentsur la question. Ils concluent que les
souverains successifs de Bahreïn "exercisedactive jurisdiction"aux îles Hawar ((jusqu'à
aujourd'hui» (contre-mémoirede Bahreïn, par. 236). Le Gouvernementbritannique accepte
l'analyse deses représentant,t informeM. Skliros,qui avaitposéla question,que c'estBahrein
qui détient la souverainetur les îles Hawar(contre-mémoire deBahrein, par.253).En même
temps,la Grande-Bretagneprend la précautionde préciserque sa décisionn'avait qu'uneportée
limitée, ece sens qu'elle pourraitêtre modifsiun prétendant pouvaitrouver ses droits surles
îles (lettrede 1'IndiaOffiàePCL, 14septembre1936,contre-mémoire de Bahreïn,annexe 79).C'est une manièrede dire à M. Skliros que ce n'est pas à lui de se porter volontaire pour
revendiquerdesdroitsaunomd'un cheikh qui ne s'est pa encoremanifesté.
63. Au cours des trois annéesqui suivent, PCL se voit ainsi contrainte de traiter avec
Bahreïn,et en concurrenceavecla BAPCO. Toutle long deces négociationsl,es îlesHawarainsi
que les autreîles, récet eauxduGolfede Bahreïn sont considéré pasr tou- parBahreïn,parla
Grande-Bretagne,et par les deux groupes pétroliers- comme faisant partiede Bahreïn. Trois
illustrationsseulement:
- En 1937 et 1938, l'idéeest lancée que l'on pourrap itartager la "unallottedarea"entre la
BAPCOet PCL. Pour sa part,la BAPCOse verraitattribuerles zones,décrites aunuméro 73
du dossierd'audience,suret autourde la grandeîle deBahreaïn.Elles sontmises enreliefsur
cette carte de la BAPCO, préparée en 1938, qui figure égalem aentuméro74 du dossier
d'audience. Quant àPCL,ses droitscomprennentleszonesdécritesaunuméro 75du dossier
d'audience,lesquelles-vous le voyez à l'écran- s'étendent à partir de Janan, la plus
méridionale desîles Hawar, pourcouvrirFashtal Dibalet l'ensembledesîles, récifset eauxà
l'intérieudupérimètre constitué paletracé despointsa)jusqu'à 9.
- En second lieu,avec sonprojet delicence(draftlease)proposéàl'émirde Bahreïn(lettrede
1'IndiaOffice auPoliticalAgent,28 avril 1938,àlaquellesetrouventjointsle projetde licence
de PCL ainsique deuxcartes; mémoire de Bahreïn a,nnexe337),PCLsoumet lesdeuxcartes
que vous trouverez au numéro76 du dossier d'audienceainsi que sur l'écrandemèremoi.
PCLpropose maintenant eneffetdeuxzones, lapremièreau nord dela grande île de Bahreiïn,
la secondedans le Golfe de Bahreïn. Cette secondezone couvre lesîles Hawar, ycompris
Janan, FashtalDibal,et évidemmenQ t it'atJaradah,àl'ouest deDibal.
- Troisièmement,encore une autre proposition dePCL, celle-ci intitulée"1939 : TheLeased
Area: HawarIsland". Vous trouverezune copie de la cartejointe à cette propositionau
numéro77 du dossier d'audience. L'article1 du projet de concessiondéfinit lazone que
Bahreïndonneraitenconcession commeincluantlesîles Hawar, y compris Janan. Vousvoyez
sur la carte que Janan figure, sans discussionpossible, dans la zone qui serait concédée
(contre-mémoird ee Bahreïn,annexe 104). 64.Les négociations portansturla unallottedarea, y cornprislesHawar, entre Bahreïnet les
deux concurrentes, laBAPCO et PCL, se poursuiventen parallèle avec l'instruction,par les
autorités britanniques, du contentieux introduitercheikhAbdullahdeQatarenmai 1938.
65. En février 1939,Bahreïn décide que la propositionldaeBAPCO pourl'intégralité de la
unallottedarea est laplus avantageuse (contre-mémoirede Bahreïp na,r.279).
66. Prenant note de cette décision, le Gouvernement britannique déclare
précautionneusement àtous lesintéresséq sue la question desavoir si les îles Hawarfont partiede
la concessionde Bahreïn dépend de l'issue de la procédureengagéeau sujetde la souverainetésur
ces îles (contre-mémoire de Bahreïn, par. 281-287).Rappelons que si le Gouvernement
britannique avait eul'intention cyniquede déterminelasouverainetédesîlesHawaren fonctionde
sesintérêts propres,liels aurait logiquement accordéeasucheikh Abdullah de Qatar,qui avaitdéjà
octroyé àune sociétébritanniqueunc eoncessionexclusiveportantsurl'intégralitéde sonterritoire.
67. La décision britannique reconnaissan lt souverainetéde Bahreïn sur les îles Hawar
intervient aumois de juillet 1939. Onze moisplus tard, en juin 1940,les discussions entrela
BAPCOet Bahreïn aboutissentet la concessionde la BAPCOest modifiéede sorte quela société
américaine détiendra désormais un droit s lernsemble des territoires de Bahre'iny compris
évidemmentles îles Hawar.
68. Quelquesmotspour finirau sujet del'activitépétrolisurplace danslesîles Hawar.
69. L'exploration menép ear la BAPCOau coursdes annéesquaranteet jusqu'en 1949,y
comprisdes forages,n'arévélé aucune structuregéologiqueintéressante.
70. Cettedéception a mis un freinaux activités exploratoirejsusqu'en 1961,date àlaquelle
Le site des
les foragessont entreprisà nouveau. Un Geological Programme détaillé est arrêté.
foragesest établi sur Sawad Shamaliyah.
71. LessociétéC s onocoet SuperiorOil sont invitéesàparticiper;elles nonplus ne trouvent
aucun signe encourageant. Les recherches continuent jusqu'à aujourd'hui,dans l'espoir que lestechniques nouvelles de la géophysique vontmodifier les données,mais pour l'instant iln'y a
aucuneindicationqu'une reprisedeforagescoûteuxseraitjustifiée.
72. Si les îles Hawar figurent explicitementdans les zones couvertespar les concessions
octroyéespar Bahreïn,il paraît toutaussi significatifquecesîles, y comprisJanan, sonttout aussi
explicitementexcluesdesconcessionsdeQatarsignéesdepuisla sentencebritanniquede 1939.
73. Ainsi,la concession donnée la SouthEast Asia Oil and Gas Companyen 1970,je dis
bien 1970 (QatarSupplemental Document 30)exclut la "Hawar Area". Un gros plan dela zone
concédée autour des îles Hawar figure au numéro78 du dossier d'audience. L'annexeB
(ExhibitB) de la concession précise que leslimites de la Hawar Area sont approximatives,
"PendingFinal Agreemenw t ith BahrainGovernment".Vous avez cet extrait au numéro 79 du
dossierd'audience.
74. Exactementle même procédéfut employépar Qatardans une autre concession,celle-ci
de 1973. Encore une fois, la Hawar Areaest exclue "PendingFinalAgreementwith Bahrain
Government" (Memorialof Qatar, Vol.5, Annex11.66). Ce gros plan figure au numéro 80 du
dossier d'audience. L'annexe B(ExhibitB) répètla formuleque nousvenonsde voir; vous avez
cet extraitaunuméro 81du dossierd'audience.
CARTES PÉTROLIÈRES - CONCLUSIONS
Monsieurleprésident, Madame etMessieursles Membresdela Cour.
- Depuis les annéevingt,lesîlesHawaront été considéré cosmme partie intégranee Bahreïn
tant au cours desnégociatioavecles sociétés pétrolières quaens les accordsde concession
signés.
- Janana toujoursété considércéoemme partieintégrantedesîlesHawar.
- Au moins à partir des années trente, lesîles et récifs dugolfe de Bahreïn, y compris
Fasht alDibaletQit'atJaradah,ontété considérécosmmepartie intégrantedeBahreïn.
75. Ceci nous amène, Monsieurle président,à la fin de nos explicationssur les parties
terrestresdece différend.
76.11se trouveque la question descartespétrolièreseje viens d'examinerest unebonne
transition,car les activitéspétrolise déroulentbien sûr, égalementdans les zonesmaritimes.Elles ont égalementdes implications pour Fashtal Dibal et Qit'atJaradah. Je vous remerciede
l'attentionquevous avez bien voulu prêteàmes propos,et vous demande,à votre convenance,
peut-êtreaprèslapause, de donner la parole au profesr ichaelReisman.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercieMaîtrePaulsson. Laséanceestsuspendue pourun quart
d'heure.
L'audienceestsuspenduede 16 h20à 16h 45.
Le PRESIDENT :Veuillez vous asseoir. La séanceest reprise etje donne la parole au
professeurReisman.
Mr. REISMAN:
MARITIM 1E
1.Thankyou, Mr. President, Members ofthe Court. Bahrainnow comesto its presentation
of the maritimesectionsof its case.have been assigned the taskof reviewing thephysicaland
political geographyof Bahrain, its characterizationin internationalmaritime boundarylaw and
questionsof sovereignty.Thereafier,my colleague,ProfessorWeil,will elaboratethe generallaw
that govemsthispart of thedisputeand itspecificapplicationto the unusual featuresof thiscase,
along with our more detailed critique of Qatar'scase. When ProfessorWeil has concludedhis
presentation,1 will, with the indulgence of the Court, briefly set out the maritime boundary
submissionsofBahrain.
Specialfeaturesof thiscase
2. Thiscaseis unusual for a number ofreasons:
(a) The Courtmust delimita boundary between a continental Statend a multiple island Stateor,
as it is nowcalled, an archipelagicState,whenthe States arecoastally oppositeand adjacent.
Although the Parties disagree on whether certain maritime features are islands or parts of
islandsand,as a result, constitute partsof Bahrain, therehardly be controversyoverthe
factthatBahrainis factuallyanarchipelago and Qatar a contineltate.(b) The distancesbetweenthe two Statesin the southem or lower half ofthe delimitationarea
concem territorialwaters andthey are, moreover,very small. Therefore,in contrastto most
past cases,thereis very littleroomfor adjustment left tothe Court here.A slightadjustment
from the true medianline to the east movesfurtherinto Qatar'sclaimed territorial waters; a
slight adjustmentto the west moves Mer into Bahrain's claimed territoril atersor even
into Bahrainiinsular territory.
(c) The thirdunusualfeatureis thatthe 1947letters flitthroughthe case likea phantom. Though
they werenot anarbitralawardandneitherParty everaskedforor accepted them, Qatarrelies
on them fromtime to time in differentways; and they appearto have been assigned special
importanceinProfessor Salmon'spresentation.
(d) Fourth, the Court'sdispositionof the territorial issue- the Hawars and Zubarah- will
significantlyaffectthe maritimeboundary,as the cardinallegalprinciplehere is that the land
dominatesthe sea. Until the Courtdetermines to whom the land belongs, our submissions
must be made inthe alternative, each premisedon a different possible territorialcisionby
the Court. If the CourtrestoresZubarahto Bahrain,Bahrain'saggregatecoastwith respectto
Qatar would dictatea particularmaritime delimitationin the southern sector.But ifthe Court
were todecidenotto returnZubarah,Bahrain,depnvedofitscontinental possessions, couldi,f
it wished, be an archipelago within the meaning of Part IV of the 1982Law of the Sea
Convention or altematively, if Bahrain did not elect to take PartIV status under the
Convention,simply adefacto archipelagicStatewithnormalbaselines. Each oftheseoptions
requires consideration of different legalquestions,which, we understand,can be complex.
We wiIltryto makeit asclearaspossibleandweapologizeinadvanceforthetravail caused.
Determiningthe coasts
3. A fundamentalissuehereisthe coasts, or,asProfessor Quéneudes caid,"theidentification
ofthe pertinentcoasts"[((l'identificationdes côtsertinentes))]'.Howthis issueandthe question
of the pearling banks is decided will largely determine the location of the median line. The
goveminglegal principlesherearenotthoseproposedby Qatar. 4. Qatar, as 1 said, is a continental State. Given its geography,the determinationof the
daturnnecessary for delimitation of maritimeareas off its western coastis quite simple. Under
Article5 of the 1982Conventionand its predecessorsin the 1958Convention, itis the low-water
line along the coast. But in its maritime presentation,Qatar has shifted to the line of highest
astronomicaltide todescribeits owncoasts. Asthe Courtknows, thishasnot beendonebeforefor
thiskindof delimitationpurposeand hasnobasisinArticle5 ofthe 1982Convention.
5. Now international law allows a Statei,n determining its own coastline, to waive the
low-water line and, if it wishes, to set its coastlineat the high-water mark. Bahrain has no
objection,in principle,withthe unusualsystemQatarhas elected to describeits own coast. But
Bahrain must observe to the Courtthatthetheory oflawwhichQatar insistsrequiresthe use of the
highest astronomicaltide is without foundationin internationallaw and is explicitly against the
holdingsof this Court. Professor Quéneudec States,withoutany citationof authority, that«là où
n'existeas de laissedepleine mer,il nesauraitêtre questiondeparlerde ligne decôte»2:nohigh
water,no coastline. In the Anglo-NorwegianFisheriescase, the Court said "Whatmatters, what
really constitutes the Norwegian coast line, is the outer line of the ~skjaer~aard'."~If
Professor Quéneudew c erecorrect, therecouldbe nosuchouterline. Qatar'stacticalobjectivehere
is obvious: to drive thecoast of Bahrainas far west as-possible. There is no legal basis to its
theory. It is Article 5 that governs.Thelow-waterlineisdispositive.
6.Babrain,as1said,is a multiple islandStateor,as it is now called,an archipelagicState: a
groupof islands,including parts of islands, interconnectigatersandothernaturalfeatureswhich
are so closely interrelatedthat such islands, waters andother natural features form an intrinsic
geographical, economicandpolitical entity,or whichhavehistoricallybeen regarded as such. As
the Court well knows, internationallaw'sdefinitionof amultipleislandState oran archipelagoand
of the new legal statusof the "archipelagic State" hasevolved since the 1920s,in work by the
Institutde Droit International,the International Law Association, the Arnerican Law Institute, the
'lbid., atpara.18.
3~nglo-~orwegianFisheria 18IL86,90.HagueCodificationConference of1930andtheInternationalLawcommission4. Theconceptwas
reworkedby the Arbitral TribunalinIslandofPalmasand by theInternational Court of Justice in
Anglo-NorwegianFisheries,and it ultimately was embeddedin a specialoptionalrégimein the
1982Lawof the Sea Convention.By the timeof the Third Lawof the SeaConvention,the basic
concept ofthe archipelagicStatehad beenaccepted:
"agroup of islanris,includingparts of islands, interconnecting watersand other
naturalfeatures whichare so closelyinterrelatedthatsuchislands. watersandother
natural featuresfonn an intrinsic geographical, economicand political entity, or
which historicallyhave beenregardedassuch''.
7.The innovationof the 1982Convention wasnotthe recognitionoftheessentialreality and
unique legalrequirementsof multiple island Statesw , hich had already been accomplished,but
ratherthe provisionforthe largeorspatially extensive multiple island State that, hencefoth,uld
encloselarge areas of theretofore highseas by means of what were to be called"archipelagic"
baselinesthat it couldclaim. Bearin mind: waterslyinglandward of straight baselines ornormal
baselinesare intemalwaters,effectivelyassimilatedto the sovereigntyof the Stateand subjectto
no intemationaluser rights whatsoever. So the extensive multipleisland State,by intemalizing
vast maritime areas that were until then high seas or maritime zones still subject to major
internationaluser rights,could pose ahreattoother,equallyimportant transitpoliciesof thelawof
the sea. The optional régime ofPartIV is a compromise: a State that is geographically
archipelagicmay declare itself such, whereuponit may draw straight baselines of 100nautical
miles in length, 3 per cent of which mayextendto 125nauticalmiles, and it may encloselarge
oceanspaces up to an extremely generous9:1 ratio of oceanspaceto land, but - and this is an
extremelyimportant "but"-the waterssoenclosedare notinternal, subjectto thefull sovereignty
of the coastal State. The enclosed waters remain subject to a right of innocent passage and
archipelagic sea lanes passage for international users, and sovereignty over the waters is
subordinatedto the terms of the 1982Convention. So some multiple island States that could
become"archipelagicStates"withinthe meaningof the 1982Conventionmayfind thattheyhave
4~ee Certain LegalAspects Concerningthe Delimitationof the Temtorial Waters of Archipelagos
(AICONF1 . 3/18(1957)UNCLOS 1,OFF.Rec289); see alsoArchipelagic States:LegislativeHistotyofPartNof the
UnitedNations Convention onLawoftheSea(1990).
'~rt46, UnitedNationsLawoftheSeaConvention1982.more control over the waters in their State merelyby virtue of their geographical configuration
without resorting tothe option offeredby PartV; indeed,exercisingthat option would actually
give them less control and imposeconsiderablymore internationalresponsibilitieson them. A
multiple-island Statethat couldbutdoesnot declareitselfarchipelagicunderPartIVdoesnotcease
to be archipelagic forthat reason. Its archipelagicstatusis a geographicalfact, with whichit and
therest of theworldmust contend. Butwhen it comesto delimiting itsmaritime zones, itmay not
use archipelagicbaselines; itmust use what the 1982Convention calls, in Article5, "normal
baselines".
8. The legal coast of a multiple-island State is comprised of the lines connecting its
outermostislandsand othernaturalfeatures. This external perirneteris its legal coast. Thees
that producethe externalperimeterprovidethe baselinesfor its territorialsea. Relevanttemtorial
seabasepointsarealsoderivedfromthelegalcoastforpurposesof calculatingthe medianlinewith
an oppositeoradjacentState. 1emphasizethat theseare "normalbaselines"withinthe meaningof
Article 5andnot the permissive baselines of100to 125nautical miles,which wouldbe available
only to a multiple-island Statethat declared itself archipelagicunPar IV. So these normal
baselines areavailableto a multiple-islandState or what Qatar has called aacto archipelago,
which has not elected to declare itself "archipelagic"undePar IV. These normal, Article5,
baselines have to be used inorder to determine the legalcoast of a multiple-islandor defacto
archipelagicState.
Qatar'sobjectionstoBahrain'sarchipelagicstatusandfeatures
9. So,Mr. President, Membersof the Court,the cntical questionin determiningBahrain's
coast with respect to Qatar is what are its basepoints. But before wensider the elements of
defacto archipelago- againtouse Qatar's expression- and serveas its
Bahrainthatcompriseits
basepoints, letme correct a misstatementby Qatar aboutBahrain'smultiple-islandor defacto
archipelagicstatus. While Qatar acknowledgedin its Counter-Memonalthat Bahrainis a defacto
archipelago,it insistedthat the HawarIslands are not part of that archipelago. The demographic
and socio-political integration of the HawaIrslandsintothe Stateof Bahrainis aerof fact and
law. Bahrain basesits titletotheHawarson the 1939Award, itsexclusive long-term manifestation of sovereigntythat precededand accounted for thatdecisionand hascontinueduntil thepresent
day and the pnnciple of finality of inhented colonial boundariesuti possidetis juris. Qatar's
contention that "fiom a geographical point of view ... it is not possible to include the
HawarIslands in the 'Bahrainar~hi~ela~o"' i~incorrect but,even moreto the point,it is legally
irrelevant. Whetherthe HawarIslands are part of the Bahraini archipelago or a separate
archipelagoinno wayreduces the archipelagic character of thetateof Bahrain. A multiple-island
Statemay be compnsed of severalarchipelagosas Article46 (a) explicitlysays. So the State of
BahrainincludestheHawar Islands, whether theyarepartof theBahrainiarchipelagoor a separate
archipelago thatpertainsto Bahrainby virtue of long-term manifestation of sovereignty, thres
judicata consequenceof an arbitral awardor the principle of finality of prior decisions about
territory.
10.Mr. President, distinguished Judges, the fundamental legal postulaite that the land
dominates the sea, asmy fiiend ProfessorWeil will develop tomorow. Hence the juridical
progressionmustbe to determinethe componentsof the Bahrain archipelagobeforeweproceed to
the delimitationsbetween a multiple-island or defacto archipelagicState anda mainlandState.
So let me review the insularcomponentsof the Stateof Bahrain thattogethercompriseit without
consideringforthemomenttheimpact ofits mainlandcomponent,Zubarah.
Bahrain'srelevant islands and low-tideelevations
11.The Court will observethe largest islandof Bahrain, whichis sometimes referredto as
Al Awal and sometirnes as Bahrain, and the immediately adjacent islands of Sitrah and
A1Muharraq. In addition,there are otherislands, including the Hawars and ove2 r2 significant
low-tide elevations1 shouldnowlike todrawthe Court's attention to someof the specific islands
and othermaritime featureswhichare important forthe determination ofthe normal baselinesof a
multiple-islandState.
6~ounter-~emonal of Qatar,para. 6.61(emphasisadded). A. FashtalAzm
12.Fust, Fasht al Azm, which mustbe characterizedeitheras a part of SitrahIsland oras a
low-tide elevationfor purposes of determiningBahrain'sbaseline. In 1982,Bahrain dredged a
navigable waterway through FashtalAzm. Both Parties, 1 take it, agree that this action hasno
effect whatsoeveronthe legal status ofthe Fasht, any morethanthe Kiel Canalmakesthe seaward
segments that result fiom that engineering feat henceforth aseparate island or other maritime
feature. BothPartiesalso agree,1takeit, thatthe specificquestion, whose answerwillresolvethe
legalstatus of Fasht al Azm,is whether, inan areathat was landfilledalsoin 1982and which lies
to the west of the new artificialchannel, there hadbeen a natural permanentwaterwaybetween
Sitrahand FashtalAm that didnotdry at lowtide. Thephotograph,vintage 1958,whichyoucan
see,clearly shows thatthere wasno continuous waterwayas at that time. The secondphotograph,
vintage 1983clearlyshowsthe dredgedchannel.
13. If, priorto 1982,therewasno natural permanent waterway,then Fasht al Ani was and
is, asa legal matter,part of Sitrah Island. Conversely,if there wasa natural permanentwaterway
thatdid notdryat lowtide betweenSitrahand Fashtal Am, then,even though itwas landfilledin
1982,Sitrah Island legally terminatesat approximately 50' 38' longituderather than at 50' 55'
longitudeand,in sofaras Fashtal Azm plays a rolein maritimeboundarydelimitation, itwould be
asalow-tideelevationrather thanaspart of Sitrah Island.
14.Webelievethatit isveryimportanttobe clearas to the factual andlegal issueshere: the
questionis not whetherFasht alAzmis an islandin its ownright,part of which is abovewater at
hightide. High-watermark isrelevant for determining whether a maritime featureis an island; if
it is,theigh-watermarkhas performedits functionand is replacedby the low-water mark,which
is now used to determinethe coastlineof that islandor the existenceof a Low Tide Elevation,
which international law may allowas a basepointfor determination ofthe coast. Bahrainclaims,
notthat FashtalAzm is itselfanisland,but thatit ispartof SitrahIsland. Theoperationalquestion
is whetherFashtal Azm is dividedfiom Sitrahby a naturalchannel atlowtide,notwhether thereis
or are naturalchannelson theFashtthat are,theoretically, passablefor smallshallow-drafiboats at
various other levelsof the tide, eventhoughthe channelsdry at lowtide. If Fasht al Azm is not
partof Sitrah,it is a low-tide elevation, whi, y definition,is coveredby waterat hightide. Ofcoursetheremaybe channelsonFashtalAzmat differentlevelsof tide as there are likelyto beon
many low tide elevations, but these small "channels"dry at low tide and cease to be channels;
Fasht alAn is not a smooth feature. Unintentionally1,am sure,counselforQatarhaveconfused
this issue byvoluntarilyadoptingthe high-tide linefor thedeterminationof Qatar'sowncoastline.
Qataras 1havesaid, maydothisforitself, but it maynot change internationallaw for Bahrain. It
is the low-tideatum that is cnticalhere. Thequestionthenis whether, pnorto 1982,therewasa
permanentcontinuouschannel ut lowtid -e a channelthatdidnotdry anywhere alongitslengthat
low tide- dividingSitrahIslandand Fashtal Am.
15. Now, this is a factual question thatmust beresolved by geographicaland historical
evidence, predatingthe artificialcanal'sconstructionand the landfillof the allegednatural canal.
Oldchartsand,where possible,survivingwitnesstestimonymustbe relied upon. Marinersc 'harts
are particularlyimportant, fortheyprovideguidance for themenwho godownto the seain ships,
and whoselives depend on accuratecharts. Hencethe commissionto Commander Carleton,the
Head ofthe Law of the Sea Divisionof the United KingdomHydrographic Office'sAdmiralty
Consultancy Services, toprovidea scientificreport on this matter. By means of a number of
sources, most importantly older charts and Marine Pilots, theUnited Kingdom Hydrographic
OfficeStudyconcludedthatFashtal Azmis historicallypartof SitrahIslandand thatpriorto the
excavationof 1982,therewasnopermanent channel atlowtide betweenSitrahIslandand Fashtal
Azrn. In short,Fasht al Azmis part ofSitrahIsland. This evidenceis in the record andthe Court
will already have studied it, only extracts are in your folders. Andby this evidence,Bahrain
submitsthat ithas shiftedtheburdenofproofto Qatar.
16. TheUnited KingdomHydrographic OfficeStudy'sfindingshave been questionedby
Professor Thomas Rabenhorst, whose reportwas submittedby Qatar. Professor Quéneudec
provided a lively and entertainingsummaryof Professor Rabenhorst's study b,ut since we are
dealing with scientificatters, 1 propose to turn directly tothe Rabenhorst study rather than
Professor Quéneudec'c somments aboutit. My fiiend, Professor Quéneudec, wilk lnow that no
disrespectisintended.
17.ProfessorRabenhorstbases muchofhis evidenceona senes ofmaps, publishedin 1977.
This is a land-map seriesand not a hydrographicchart series. Forgiveme if 1state the obvious:maps aregraphicpresentationsof informationthat is useful,if not vital to theirusers. Land-maps
and hydrographic charts have entirely different functions anda ,s a consequence,focus on the
collection,verificationand presentationof different types of informationfor their very different
audiences andusers. Land-maps arefor landuse and concentrateon what is important totheir
users. Suchmaps cornmonlyput inwhattheir designerscal1an "approximate"low-waterline for
completeness,but this is not- anddoesnot haveto be-presented as an accurateindicationof
the low-waterline, as it wouldbeyforexample,in maritime charts,whose value dependscntically
on the most precise bathymetricreadings. As 1will explainin a moment, otherreadily available
data showthattheapproximatelow-waterlineon theland-maps thathavebeen adducedis, toputit
quite generously,very much an approximation. So Professor Rabenhorst's argument,based on
thesemaps,as opposedto hydrographiccharts, is,to Saythe least,curious,for it is likelookingina
Chinese-Chinesedictionaryto checkthe spellingof an Englishwordor lookingin the Bible for a
Confucianconcept and concluding,if onedoes not find it in the Bible, that it does not exist in
Confucianism.
18.Using the land mapsof 1977,Professor Rabenhorst finds a "channel".But, as 1said,
Fasht al Ani is not a smooth feature. It is, as it were, "cormgated,"with parts drying at Lowest
AstronomicalTide. As is the situationin manytidalareas withwhichMembers ofthe Courtwill
be familiar,a channelthat was passable forsmall boats athigh tide, andmarkedas such doesnot
indicatea permanently navigablechannel,that is to Say,onethatdoesnot dryat lowtide. The fact
is that no mentionis made of thepossibility of passagethrougha permanentchannelin anyof the
Adrniraltycharts or Pilots fiom the dateof the first publicationin 1862 to 1982 - not a single
mention in one of the charts or in one of the AdmiraltyPilots- even though the draftersof the
charts were plainly andunderstandablyon the look-out for channelsand, as a result, marked the
channel between SitrahandAl-Awal.
19.Butthere is a far more serious,1believe fatal,flawin ProfessorRabenhorst'sdata. The
Court will recallthat thecriticaldatumin determining whether, priorto 1982,a channelthat did
not dry at low-waterchannel dividedSitrah Islandfiom Fasht al Am is the low-water line,it is
internationallaw'sdecisive criterionfor determiningthe coastalperimeter of an island. The fact
that a channel may be intermittentlycreatedat higher water - and even be navigable at higherwater - is not relevant tothe dispositionof this question. Now ProfessorRabenhorstStatesthat
the Landsat image he selected for analysis was taken on 9 February1979 at 6.29GMT'. He
continues: "Tidal chartsfor theareashowthatonthis date, atthis timeof day, thetidewasonlya
matter of a few centimetres, at most,above low tide."* But if one runs Tidecalc, aprogram
developedby the United KingdomHydrographicOffice and widely used by hydrographersand
othermarinersto detenninetidallevelin specificareasandatprecisetimesg,onediscoversthat the
Tidecalcheight forSitrahIslandat 6:29 GMT onthe relevantday is0.81m, not afewcentimetres
but 0.81m or 2 ft, 8inaboveLowestAstronomicalTide (LAT). This, Mr. President, Members of
the Court,is considerablymore thanthe "fewcentimeters"that ProfessorRabenhorst mentions. In
otherwords,ProfessorRabenhorst'sdata - evenassurningthat he selectedtherightdata - arenot
low tide,but mid-tide. But evenwith this discrepancy, was ProfessorRabenhorstusingthe right
data? Hefailsto mentionthat he used neap tideandnot springtide, the level onewouldordinarily
look tosatelliteimagestopickthetruelow-waterline. So, MT. President, Membersofthe Court, is
it anywonderthat, with such data, Professor Rabenhorst wasable to find"channels"no one else
hadbeenableto findinthe AdmiraltyPilotsandAdmiraltychartsin the areasince 1862? 1sit any
wonderthathe can Say,onthe basis of his evidence,that "there are clearlysignificantexpansesof
openwater betweenSitrahIslandand Fasht alA'ni"'O .
aben en hRorstrt atp. 3.
9 "TIDECALC is a version of the tidal prediction program used by The United Kingdom
HydrographicOfficefor computingthe daily tidal predictionsn AdmiraltyTideTables. It has
beenadaptedforuseonanIBM PCandhasa worldwideapplication.
The sohare consists of one program disc (NP158)and a choice of 13areadiscs (NP158A1
to 13). Dises Al to A12each holdthe harmonicconstants for about 350 to 400portswhereasdiscA13
holdsthe harmonic constants for161offshore locationUKonContinentalShelf. The programis
availableon 1.Mb 3.5-inch floppydisc and is compatiblewith MS-DOSversion 4.0 or later. The
programruns on IBM286 compatiblecomputersor greateminimummemoryof 640Kisrequired.
TIDECALChas a number ofusefulfacilitiesto complementthe traditionalpresentationof times
andheightsofhigh andlowwater. Theseinclude achoiceof unitsforheight (metresor feet); allowance
fordaylight savingtimee.g. BST; anindicationof periodsof daylightand twilighttoinputption
ship'sdraught; andthecapability ofdisplayingheightsat specifiedtimesandtime intervals.
hedictions are also displayedgraphicallyas a continuous plot of height againsttime." [The
UnitedKingdom Hydrographic Office,AdmiraltyCharts and Publications, Taunton,Somerset, TA1
ZDN,UnitedKingdom,Tidecalc,APCbasedTidalPrediction System,H367A(Revised11/98).]
'kabenhorst Report at6 (QatarSupplementalDocuments). 20. ProfessorRabenhorst also finds some white markers on the 1977 map.
Professor Quéneudec rather boldly suggestt hsat the markers are "leadinglines" for a channel.
Bahrainhas beenunableto find out whythesemarker postswere erected nor whoca.rriedout the
work,but we believe that they wereprobablymarkinga high-tide channel toenablesmall barges
accesstothe petrochemical reclamation worksW . hatwe submit is significantis that the"channel"
foundby ProfessorRabenhorst could nothave been intendedfor permanentnavigation,even by
smallboats,becauseitwasnevermarkedonBahrainiorAdmiraltycharts.
21. The United KingdomHydrographie Studyused Admiralty charts in determining that
therewasno permanentchanneldividingSitrahIslandfromFashtal Am, attherelevant time,thus
makingFashtalAm part of SitrahIsland. Professor Rabenhorstintroducesno other charts,but,
afterreviewingthe Admiralty charts, heStatesthat the Admiraltychartsprovide "no substantive
proof'. Yet consider,1beg you,thetenorofhiscriticism:
- "thechartsclearlyleaveopenthepossibilitythata passagemayhaveexisted"".
- "where soundingsare not present, dottedlineswould mostcertainlyrepresenta "bestguess"
withoutcon~irmation"'~.
- "atthat distance a naturalchannelpassagemayeasilyhavebeen~verlooked''~.
- "thereis nothinginthesemapsthatcandefinitelyruleoutthe existenceofa naturalfishermen's
channel ..."14.
- "thereis no reasonto doubtthata naturalchannelcould have existedprior to thereclamation
pr~ject''15.
22. 1sthis sequenceof "could be" and "might be" and "mighthave been overlooked" and
other conditional observations of this rather tendentioustenor a refutation of Bahraini and
Admiraltycharts? Neither Professor Rabenhorst nor Qatar adducesother contemporaneous maps
to refutethe clear implicationsthat the Bahrainiand Admiraltycharts make for Bahrain's case.
Instead ProfessorRabenhorst tries to undermine them by raising questions, as does
"lbid. at3.
abenh en Rhportt(Qatrupplemental ocuments)at3.
"lbid. at4.
I4lbid.at4-5.
ISlbid.a6.Professor Quéneudec. Bua tl1that Professor Rabenhorstcan Sayis that multiple contemporaneous
observationsthat activelylookedfora channel,whichwould have been mosteconomicanduseful,
that were reported and disseminatedwidely,that were based onlive observation, consistent with
each other, and relied upon by generations of mariners,ouldhave been wrong. Mr.President,
.
Members of the Court, this is simply not plausible. Thehydrographicsurveys on which these
chartswere based would havebeen conductedby means of small survey boats to carry out the
surveysclose to thereef How else wouldthe small drylngchannelto the Westof Sitrah Island,
whichis mentionedin the Pilotsandmarkedon the charts,have beenidentified? Why is thereno
channel mentioned in the east? It is most unlikely that a permanent channel usedby local
vessels- if it existe- would not have been reported by those who prepared the Adrniralty
charts.
23. Mr. President, Members ofthe Court: Bahrain has established thanto natural channel
existedin the pastbythe bestand onlyevidencethat exists: officialcharts,thechartsthatArticle5
ofthe 1982Law ofthe SeaConventioncallsfor. And lest anyonesuspect,evenfora moment, that
thesecharts werenotbased oncarefulandaccurateobservation,1would note thattheir findingsare
confirmedby the British Admiralty charts. The charts that the United Kingdom Hydrographic
OfficeStudy reliedon had beenpreparedby Britishnaval hydrographersovera period ofdecades.
Theyrepresentedthe state of the art. None of the hydrographershad an interestin favouringone
positionover another. Over decades,the chartswere reliedupon bymarinersand seafarers,who
wouldhave recordedif there had been discrepanciesbetweenthe publishedcharts and their own
observations,for theirlives and the lives oftheir fellowmarinersdependedupon accuratecharts.
Wehave no evidenceof such corrections. None has been adducedby Qatar. SurelyBahrain,by
assembling the best evidence available, has now established that no natural channel existed
separatingSitrahfromFasht alAzmandthat legallyFashtalAni is andalwayswaspartof Sitrah.
All Qatar can Sayis that the differentnaval hydrographers,who acted independentlyduringthat
earlierpenod and concurred in their results, may have been wrong, that they could have been t
wrong.
24. ProfessorQuéneudec speculates that Fashtal Azm may, in fact, be many different
low-tide elevations.But he submitsno evidencefor thisspeculation.Fasht alAm has, as1said,acorrugated rather than a smooth surface; a low-tide elevation hasone or the other. But for
centuriesBahrainishave referred to it as a single entity and so it appears on the independently
compiled Admiraltycharts.
25. Mr. President, Membersof the Court,Bahrainrespectfully submits thatit has adduced
ampleevidenceto showthatFashtalAni ispart of SitrahIsland.
B.Qit'atJaradah
26. Thelawgovemingthismatterisclear. Article121,paragraph1,of the 1982Convention
definesan islandas "anaturallyformedareaof land,sunoundedby water,whichis abovewater at
high tide"16. As many of the judges who participatedin the Third Law of the Sea Conference
know, this was a fundamentaland carefullydrafted policy decision, which, 1 might add, unlike
some other parts of Article 121, is identical in purport in the English and French texts.
Professor Quéneudec,in his treatment of Qit'at Jaradah, entertainingly implied adjectives and
qualifier5to Article121, paragraph 1,but there are none in the provision and that was quite
intentional. The specialprovision for"rocks", whichdo havea habitabilityandeconomic life test,
shows bytheir introductionthat no suchqualificationswereintended for Article 11,paragraph1.
It does not matter if it is a smallarea that is above high tide. The questionis whether an area of
landsurroundedby wateris abovewaterathightide.
27. The questionthen, quitesimply,is factual: whether Qit'atJaradahis abovewater ahigh
tide. To find the scientific answertothisquestion,Bahrainarrangedfor Dr.Lewis Alexander,the
former Geographer ofthe Departmentof Stateof theUnitedStates,to observeandverifLa survey
conductedof Qit'atJaradah. Dr. Alexander'smethodology is setout inhis reportand theCourtwill
alreadyhave studiedit - extractsare in thejudges'folders. Over a periodof six visits, dispersed
so as to encompass differentperiods of theyear, Dr. Alexanderconfied evidence ofdry sand
atopJaradahduringthe successivetimesofhigh-waterSprings,that is, the appropriatecritenonfor
thisdetemination. Dr.Alexanderconcluded:
"Article121(1) of the 1982[Law of the Sea] Convention stipulates three
criteriafor a featureto qualifLas an island. The fust is that it must be a naturally
formed areaof land. Jaradahfitsthis description; itis a cay,i.e. a sandbankatopa
I6~rticle121(l), United NaLawoftheSeaConvention1982. coral reef. The second critena is that it is surroundedby water. My observations
confirmthat Jaradahfits thisdescriptionalso. Thethirdandfinalcriteriais that the
feature isabovewaterat hightide. Myobservationsconfm that the highestareas
of Qit'atJaradahare above water at monthlyhigh water springs. Jaradahthus fits
the description ofanislandinArticle121(1)."'7
SoreportsDr.Lewis Alexander.
28. As against this evidence, in its submission of 1March2000, Qatar has subrnitteda
27-page report prepared forit by BrianMurphyandVictorPrescott. Once again,as we aredealing
with a scientificquestion,1propose to go directlyto Qatar's expert submission and only address
new evidenceor allegationsthat Professor Quéneudec mayhave introducedin hispresentation.
29.TheCourtwillhavenoted that75 percentof the Murphy-PrescottReportis irrelevant: a
long excursus on techniques for establishing spring high-water tides and an even longer
disquisitionon sand cays. Murphy and Prescott adduce no evidence oftheir own, but confine
themselves to commentingon the Alexander reportand raise a nurnber of objections about its
methodology. Letmeaddress thesepoints directly.
- First, Murphy and Prescott point out that British Admiralty charts do not characterize
Qit'atJaradahas an island. Thatis correct. Therewere inconsistentreports aboutthe statusof
Qit'atJaradah,due, wesurmise,to inclarityin the legalconception ofan islandand,of course,
the decapitationof the island in 1986. Thisis why Bahrain commissioned a study. There is
nowscientificevidence. Chartswillhenceforthindicatethat Qit'atJaradahis an island.
- Second, Murphyand Prescott question whetherDr. Alexanderwas entitled to rely on officia1
Tide Charts, becausethey are measuredat Mina Salmanand the time and amplitudeof the
highesttides may,they speculate,Varyin Qit'atJaradah. With respect,that speculation is,on
its ownterms, unpersuasive.Thetwositesare 15.4nauticalmilesapart. This distanceis most
unlikely to leadto anysignificantdifferencein time, or anydifferencewhateverin amplitude.
As regards anyminortime difference, Dr.Alexander,as any careful scientistengagedin this
type of activity,took care to arrive at Qit'atJaradah approximatelyan hour before the time
designated by the Tide Charts and remained for some time afterwards. As regards any
differencesin amplitude,not onlyis thismostunlikely tohave occurred,but if it did occur, it
would havebeen irrelevantto thepointat issue,which iswhetherQit'atJaradahis abovewater
''~e~l~ofBahrai, nn.13,p. 77 atpp.82-83.The methodology was that ofthe standard ofthe professionand the results of the Alexander
observations stand.As forthe speculationsby Murphyand Prescottto the effect that there may be
othergeologicalor geomorphological explanationf sorthe island character of Qit'atradah,those
ruminationsmay be of academic interest,but they areirrelevantfor this enquiry. The question
i.
quitesimplyis whether Qit'atJaradahqualifiesas an islandunderinternationallaw,and the answer
dependson a scientificenquiry: is the islandabove water athigh tide? It is, as the Alexander
reportestablishes,and Qataris not able torefute. Noneof the documentsthat Qatarhas invoked
wasbased ona systematic surveyat monthlyintervalsat high-watersprings,as was the studyby
Dr. Alexander. And,incidentally,al1Qatar would need to produce to sustain its position, is a
singlephotographof Qit'atJaradah,takenat anytimewhatever,showingit coveredby thetide. It
hassubrnittednoevidencewhatsoever.
31. Bahrain submits, Mr.President, Members ofthe Court, that the scientific evidence
conclusively rebuts the selected observationtsat Qatarhas madeto the effectthat Qit'atJaradahis
not abovewater athightide. Itis anislandininternationallaw.
32. Giventhat Qit'atJaradahis an island,the question becomeswhohas sovereigntyoverit.
The written subrnissions of Bahrain recountthe numerous acts of sovereignty thatBahrain
historicallyhas exercised over Qit'aJtaradah. The Courtwas sparedrecitationsof eflectivités by
Qatar, becauseit had noneto submit. Bahrain, incontrast, has innurnerable eflectivitésand 1fear
that the Courtis approaching a saturation point on them. So let me only categorize themost
relevant eflectivité, hichare set out indetailin the writtensubmissions. The acts ofsovereignty
include:
- Conductingsurveysandgrantingoil concessionsoverQit'at~aradah";
- Erectinga beacononQit'atJaradahin 193919;
- Ordenngthedrillingof anartesianwellonQit'atJaradahin 1940~';
- Conductingcoastguardpatrols aroundtheareaofQit'at~aradah*';
"MernoriaolfBahrain, ara.576.
'%lemonalofBahrainp, ara.586.
Z%lemonao lfBahrain, paras.84and586.
Z'~emorialofBahrain, paras.98-599. BahrCoastguardReport, nn.24, Vol.2,pp.148-151.- FishingtheareasaroundQit'atJaradahby Bahrainifi~hermen~~;
- Using Qit'atJaradahfor recreationalpurposes23.(And incidentally,1will not commenton the
innuendothatthe Government ofBahrainarrangedfor a fleetof pleasure boatsto assembleat
Qit'atJaradahfor a photograph thatwouldgivethe impressionthat thiswasa recreationalarea.
WhetherQatarlikes it ornot,thisactually happens most weekends, with boats gathering about
Qit'atJaradah.)
33. The Court will observe Fasht ad Dibal at approximately 50"55' latitude and
26"45' longitude. Fasht ad Dibal is a low-tide elevation, whichis approximately2.08 nautical
miles from the islandof Qit'atJaradah. This is a geographicalfact that will have important
implications for thedeterminationofbasepoints,in accordwithArticle 13of the 1982Convention,
a matterto which wewill return. In additionto its statusandboundary-delimitativepotentialityas
a low-tide elevation,Fasht ad Dibalhas historically beenviewedby States engagedpoliticallyin
the area, includingthe Ruler of Qatar, as susceptibleto acquisition as sovereign temtory. On
14 August 1937Belgravewroteto the Political Agent, indicating that Fasht ad Dibal, amongother
low-tide elevationswas part of Bahrain. As this important documentis in your folders,1willnot
review it here.
34.A list preparedby theLandDepartmentdownto 1939showsthat pillarswere erectedby
the Governent of Bahrain, intear lia, on Al Mu'tarid,Mashtan,Noon, Tighaylib,Al Hul, Qit'at
Jaradah,FashtadDibal,andFashtal'~ni~~.On 18June 1946Belgravewroteagainto the Political
Agent:
"In the year 1936 the Bahrain Government built beacons on the
Fasht-Al-Debal. One of the beaconswas builton the rock at the north end of the
Fashtwhichis abovewater. HislateHighnessShaikhHamadand the presentRuler
have alwaysregarded thisFashtas beingownedby Bahrain. The anchoragethere is
used exclusivelyby Bahrain boatmenand fishermen andthe Fasht is one ofthose
which areconsideredto belongto ~ahrain.''~~
22~emonalofBahrain,para.597.
13~eplyofBahrain, par3.36.
Ann.336, Vol.6,p. 1457.nd Department,Govt of Bahrain,of pillarserected 1938-1939,Memonal of Bahrain,
ette tfromCharles Belgrave,Adviserto the Govt. of Bahrato,BritishPoliticalAgent, 18June1946,
MemonalofBahrainA , nn.340,Vol.6,p. 1470. 35. In July 1946,the PoliticalAgentwroteto the respective Rulers of Bahrain and Qatar to
ask whether each Ruler considered Fasht ad Dibal and Qit'atJaradah to constiîutepart of his
respective tenitory. In the event of an affirmative answer,the Rulers were asked tostate the
grounds on which sovereigntywas ~laimed~~.The Ruler of Bahrain basedhis claim both on
Bahrain'shistoricalenjoymentof sovereignty overthe entireQatar peninsulaand the islandsand
othermaritimefeatureslyingbetween thepeninsularand Bahrain,aswellas on actsof sovereignty
by Bahraininrelation tothemaritime features. Bahrain's claim to sovereigntyreferredspecifically
to the constructionof artesianwells on Fasht ad Dibal and Qit'atJaradahand annexeda list of
cairnswhichhad been erectedby Bahrain duringthe 1930s2'.
36. The claimassertedby the Ruler ofQatarto Fashtad Dibaland Qit'atJaradahaccepted
without question thatboth formationscouldbe subjectto national sovereignty, he accepted that
they couldbe subjectedto national sovereignty. Buthe based his claimon the fact that it was
closer to him and he shouldget it as a consolation prize,becausehe had not been awardedthe
"Bahrain ...has no dependenciescontraryto Qatar whichis a largetemtory
and has dependencies,coasts, and islands. If we look into the questionfiom the
point view of equality, Qatar is to be entmsted with Deebil andJaradah Fashts
which aresituatedbetweenQatar and Bahrain,and they are nearer toQatar. You
see that Qatar hasbeen treatedunjustlyin her clear'rightin the question ofHawar
islands which 1 am still tenaciousto claim their ownership,then how about the
others!"29
Mr.President,thishasbeen a verylongday, and counselforBahrainareparticularlygrateful
to the Courtfor itssustainedattention. But1wonderif thismightnot beanappropriatemomentfor
us to pauseandto resumethispresentationtomorrow morning.
16see,forexample,letterfiom British Pol genttoRulerofQatar,9 July1946,Ann.341, Vol.6,p. 1471. *
le et tfrom CharlesBelgrave,Adviserto Govt. of Bahrain,to Political AgeJuly1946,Memorialof
Bahrain,Ann.342, Vol. 6,pp.1473and1474.
ette tfrom theRulerof Qatarto the BritishPolitical Agent18July1946,Memorialof Bahrain,Ann.343,
Vol.6,p. 1476.
'%etterfiom Rulerof Qatarto BritishPolitical Agent,18July 1946,Memorialof Bahrain,Ann.343, Vol. 6,
p. 1476. Le PRESIDENT :C'est comme vous l'entendez. Cela dépend td emps dont vous avez
besoindemainmatin. Sivous pouvez, demainmatin,dire ce quevous avez àdire dans la matinée,
il n'yapas d'objectiàceque nousnousarrêtionm s aintenant.
Mr. REISMAN: May 1 consultmycolleaguesfora moment, Mr. President?
ThePRESIDENT:Please.
Mr. REISMAN: Thankyou for allowing meto consultmy colleagues. No,my colleagues
arequitecomfortablewitha suspensionat this time. And wewishthe Courta welldeservedrest
fiomitslabourstoday. Thankyou, Mr. President.
Le PRESIDENT :Merci beaucoup de votreaimableattention. Laséance estlevée. Nous
nousretrouveronsdemain à 10heures.
L'audienceestlevéeà 17h 40. Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
InternationalCourt Courinternationale
ofJustice deJustice
THE HAGUE LAHAYE
YEAR2000
Publicsitting
heldon Tuesday13June 2000,ut 3p.m., atthePeace Palace,
PresidentGuillaumepresiding
in the caseconcerningMaritimeDelimitation andTerritorialQuestionsbetween
QatarandBahrain(Qatarv.Bahrain)
VERBATIMRECORD
ANNEE 2000
Audiencepublique
tenuele mardi 13juin 20à015 heures,auPalaisdelaPaix,
sous laprésidencedeM. Guillaume,président
en l'affairede laDélimitationmaritimeet desquestionsterritorialesentreQataretBahreïn
(Qatarc.Bahreïn)
COMPTE RENDU [As a result of a technical problem, a paragraph, followingon from the sub-heading
"B. Qit'at Jaradah", was omittedin error on this page. Accordingly,this and the followingpages
replace pages45 to 51of CR2000114as previouslydistributed.]
corrugated rather than a smooth surface; a low-tide elevation has one or the other. But for
centuries Bahrainis have referred to it as a single entity and so it appears on the independently
compiled Admiraltycharts.
25. Mr. President, Members ofthe Court, Bahrainrespectfully submits that it has adduced
ample evidencetoshowthatFasht al Azm is partof Sitrah Island.
B. Qit'at Jaradah
26. Below the low-tide elevation of Fasht ad Dibal, at approximately 50° 55' latitude
and 26O10' longitude, the Court will observe the island of Qit'at Jaradah, which has long
been recognized as such. Belgrave wrote, on 14August 1937 to the British Political Agent,
referring to Qit'at Jaradah as "an i~land"'~. Nine other reports and communications from
1940 to 1959 confirm its island status. As these documents are in your folders, 1 wiil not
review them here. There are, however, a smaiier number of documents that are not
consistent with the majority of observations. The international legal conception of an island
did not crystallize until 1982. Moreover, after 1986,when bulldozers removed the portion of
Qit'at Jaradah above water at high tide, the formation certainly ceased to be an island and
would have been recorded as a low-tide elevation in the period immediately following 1986.
27. The lawgoverningthismatteris clear. Article 121,paragraph 1,ofthe 1982Convention
defmesan islandas "a naturallyformedarea of land,surroundedby water, whichis above waterat
high tide"". As many of the judges who participated in the Third Law of the Sea Conference
know, this was a fundamental and carefully drafted policy decision, which, 1might add, unlike
some other parts of Article 121, is identical in purport in the English and French texts.
Professor Quéneudec,in his treatment of Qit'at Jaradah, entertainingly implied adjectives and
qualifiers to Article 121, paragraph1, but there are none in the provision and that was quite
intentional. The specialprovision for"rocks",which do have a habitabilityand economiclife test,
I6~ernorialofBahrain, para. 581.
"~rticle 121(l), UnitedNations Lawof the SeaConvention 1982.showsby their introductionthat no suchqualificationswere intended for Article 121,paragraph 1.
It does not matter if it is a small areathat is above high tide. The question is whetheran area of
landsurroundedby water isabovewaterat hightide.
28. The questionthen, quite simply,is factual: whetherQit'atJaradahis abovewater at high
tide. To find the scientificanswerto this question,Bahrain arranged for Dr. Lewis Alexander,the
formerGeographerof the Departmentof Stateof the UnitedStates,to observe and verifya survey
conductedof Qit'atJaradah. Dr. Alexander'smethodologyis set out in his report andtheCourt will
alreadyhave studied it - extractsare in thejudges' folders. Over a period of six visits,dispersed
so as to encompass different periods of the year, Dr. Alexander confmed evidence of dry sand
atop Jaradah duringthe successivetimesof high-water springs,that is, the appropriatecritenon for
thisdetermination. Dr. Alexanderconcluded:
"Article 121(1) of the 1982 [Law of the Sea] Convention stipulates three
criteria for a feature to qualiQ as an island. The first is that it must be a naturally
formed area of land. Jaradah fitsthis description; itis a cay, i.e. a sandbankatopa
coral reef. The second criteriais that it is surroundedby water. My observations
confirm that Jaradah fits this description also. The third and finalcriteria is that the
feature is abovewater at high tide. My observationsconfirmthat the highest areas
of Qit'atJaradah are above water atmonthly high water springs. Jaradah thus fits
the descriptionof an island in Article 121(1)."18
Soreports Dr. LewisAlexander.
29. As against this evidence, in its submission of 1March 2000, Qatar has subrnitted a
27-pagereport prepared for itby Brian Murphyand Victor Prescott. Onceagain, as weare dealing
with a scientific question,1propose to go directly to Qatar'sexpert submission and only address
newevidence or allegationsthat ProfessorQuéneudecmayhave introducedinhis presentation.
30. The Courtwill havenotedthat 75 percent of the Murphy-PrescottReport isirrelevant: a
long excursus on techniques for establishing spring high-water tides and an even longer
disquisition on sand cays. Murphy and Prescott adduce no evidence of their own, but confine
themselves to comrnentingon the Alexander report and raise a nurnber of objections about its
methodology. Letme address thesepoints directly.
- First, Murphy and Prescott point out that British Admiralty charts do not characterize
Qit'atJaradahas an island. That is correct. There were inconsistentreports about thestatus of
'8~eplyofBahrain,Ann.13,p.77 atpp.82-83. Qit'atJaradah, due, we surmise,to inclarityin the legal conceptionof an island and, of course,
the decapitation of the islandin 1986. This is why Bahrain cornrnissioneda study. There is
now scientificevidence. Chartswillhenceforthindicatethat Qit'atJaradahis an island.
- Second, Murphy and Prescottquestionwhether Dr. Alexander was entitledto rely on officia1
Tide Charts, because they are measured at Mina Salman and the time and amplitude of the
highest tides may, they speculate, vary in Qit'atJaradah. With respect, that speculationis, on
itsown terms, unpersuasive. Thetwo sitesare 15.4nauticalmiles apart. This distanceis most
unlikely to lead to any significant differencein time, or anydifferencewhatever in amplitude.
As regards any minor time difference,Dr.Alexander, as any careful scientist engagedin this
type of activity, took care to arrive at Qit'atJaradah approximately an hour before the time
designated by the Tide Charts and remained for some time afterwards. As regards any
differencesin amplitude,not only is this most unlikely to have occurred,but if it did occur,it
would havebeen irrelevantto the pointat issue,which is whether Qit'atJaradahis abovewater
at al1states of the tide as experiencedut Qit'atJaradah. Whether this is higher, lower or the
sameas the high tide at MinaSalmanis besidethe point.
- Third, Murphy and Prescott question the October 1998 survey of Qit'atJaradah, because
Mr. G.C. Lindsay, the Survey Operations Manager, referredto high tide as "Apparent High
Water Mark", without, SayMurphy and Prescott, explaininghow that daturn is derived. The
answerto this questionis quite simple: Mr. Lindsaydid explain,in the text accompanying the
survey, that "the maximum height observed at Jaradah during the survey ... is 0.4meters
abovethe HighestAstronornicalTide calculatedfromtidal observationsforthe area". Because
the datumthat was used in Octoberwas men higherthan the officia1chart, Mr.Lindsay,with
appropriate scientific precision, referredto itas the "Apparent High Water Mark". If Qatar
wishes to rely on the Officia1 Chart, Qit'atJaradah was men more exposedat high tide than
Mr. Lindsay andDr.Alexanderreported.
- Fourth, Murphy and Prescott observethat the photographs produced by an officia1Bahraini
photographerarenot time- and date-stamped.Thatis correct. A camera withthat capacitywas
not availablewhen the observationswere made. Nonetheless,Dr. Alexanderhas careful notes
of the date and exact timewheneachof the photos was taken and is willing toproduce them or be deposedifthereis any questiononthismatter. The StateofBahrainneed hardlycerti@the
honesty and good faith of Dr. Alexander, a world-renownedfigure, the CO-authorof the
authoritative"InternationalMaritimeBoundaries", and a scientistof unquestioned reputation.
It is thetestimonyin thereportof Dr.Alexanderthat is submittedand it stands,withor without
thephotographs.
- Murphy and Prescott finally questionwhether there will be suficient sand sediment to
maintainQit'atJaradahas an island. Theissueis Qit'atJaradahatthis momentandnot in20or
30yearshence,whenmanyfactorsmayprecipitatemanyunpredictableeffectsonmanyislands
and manycoastal areas. Wellno onecanpredict the future,onepresumptionseemsrelatively
safe: there will be no shortageof sand intheregion. Messrs.Murphy and Prescottmayrest
easy on thatconcem.
31. Thus, Mr.President, Members of the Court, the problems that Murphy and Prescott
purportedto findin the Alexander reportprove, oncarefulexamination,to be forcedand artificial.
The methodologywas that of the standard ofthe profession and the results of the Alexander
observationsstand. As for thespeculationsby MurphyandPrescottto the effectthattheremaybe
other geologicalor geomorphological explanations for the islandcharacterof Qit'atJaradah,those
ruminationsmay be of academic interest,but they are irrelevantfor this enquiry. The question
quitesimplyis whether Qit'atJaradahqualifiesas an islandunderinternationallaw,andtheanswer
depends on a scientific enquiry: is the islandabove water at high tide? It isas the Alexander
report establishes,and Qatar isnot able to refute.one of the documentsthat Qatar hasinvoked
was based on a systematicsurveyat monthlyintervals at high-watersprings, as was the studyby
Dr.Alexander. And, incidentally,al1Qatar would need to produceto sustain its position,is a
singlephotograph ofQit'at Jaradah,takenat anytime whatever, showingit coveredby the tide. It
has submittednoevidencewhatsoever.
32. Bahrain submits, Mr.President, Members of the Court, that the scientific evidence
conclusivelyrebutsthe selectedobservationsthat Qatarhas madeto the effect thatQit'atJaradahis
not abovewaterathigh tide. Itis an islandin intemationallaw.
33. GiventhatQit'atJaradahis anisland,the questionbecomeswho hassovereignîyoverit.
The written submissions of Bahrainrecount the numerous acts of sovereignty that Bahrainhistorically has exercised over Qit'atJaradah. The Court was spared recitations of effectivités by
Qatar, because it had none to submit. Bahrain,in contrast,has innumerableeflectivitésand 1fear
that the Court is approaching a saturationpoint on them. So let me only categorize the most
relevant effectivités, hich are set out in detailin the writtensubmissions. The acts of sovereignty
include:
- Conductingsurveys and grantingoilconcessions over Qit'at~aradah'~;
- Erectinga beacononQit'atJaradahin 193g20;
- Orderingthe drillingof an artesianwellonQit'atJaradahin 1940~';
- Conductingcoastguard patrolsaroundthearea of Qit'at~aradah~~;
- Fishingthe areasaround Qit'atJaradahby Bahraini fi~hermen~~;
- Using Qit'atJaradahfor recreationalpurposes24.(And incidentally, 1will not commenton the
innuendothat the Govemmentof Bahrainarranged for a fleet of pleasureboats to assembleat
Qit'atJaradah for a photographthat wouldgive the impressionthat this was a recreationalarea.
Whether Qatar likes itor not, this actuallyhappens mostweekends,with boats gatheringabout
Qit'at Jaradah.)
34. The Court will observe Fasht ad Dibal at approximately 50' 55' latitude and
26"45' longitude. Fasht ad Dibal is a low-tide elevation, which is approximately 2.08nautical
miles from the island of Qit'atJaradah. This is a geographical fact that will have important
implicationsfor the determination of basepoints,in accordwith Article 13of the 1982Convention,
a matter to which we willretum. In additionto its statusandboundary-delimitativepotentialityas
a low-tide elevation, Fashtad Dibal has histoncally been viewed by States engaged politicallyin
the area, including the Ruler of Qatar, as susceptible to acquisition as sovereign temtory. On
14August 1937 Belgravewrote to the PoliticalAgent, indicatingthat Fasht ad Dibal, amongother
'9~emonalof Bahrain,para.576.
'%emorialof Bahrain,para.586.
21~emonalof Bahrain, aras.584and586.
22~emonalofBahrain,paras.598-599. BahrainCoastguardReport,Ann.24, Vol.2,pp. 148-151.
23~emorialofBahrain,para.597.
24~eplyof Bahrain,para.336.low-tideelevations was part of Bahrain. As this important documentis in your folders, 1 will not
reviewit here.
35. A list preparedby the Land Departmentdownto 1939shows thatpillars were erectedby
the Govemment of Bahrain, intea rlia, on Al Mu'tarid, Mashtan,Noon, Tighaylib, Al Hul, Qit'at
Jaradah,Fasht ad Dibal, andFashtal'hZ5. On 18June 1946Belgravewroteagainto the Political
Agent:
"In the year 1936 the Bahrain Govemment built beacons on the
Fasht-Al-Debal. One of the beacons was built on the rock atthe north end of the
Fasht which is abovewater. HislateHighnessShaikhHarnadand the present Ruler
have alwaysregarded thisFasht asbeingownedby Bahrain. The anchoragethere is
used exclusively by Bahrain boatmen and fishermenand the Fasht is one of those
which are consideredtobelongto ~ahrain."'~
36. In July 1946,the PoliticalAgent wrote to the respectiveRulers of Bahrain and Qatar to
ask whether each Ruler considered Fasht ad Dibal and Qit'atJaradah to constitute part of his
respective tenitory. In the event of an affirmative answer,the Rulers were asked to state the
grounds on which sovereignty was claimed2'. The Ruler of Bahrain based his claim bothon
Bahrain'shistorical enjoymentof sovereignty overthe entire Qatar peninsulaand the islands and
othermaritime featureslying between the peninsularand Bahrain,as well as on acts of sovereignty
by Bahrainin relationto themaritime features. Bahrain's claim to sovereignty referred specifically
to the construction of artesian wells on Fasht ad Dibal and Qit'atJaradah and annexed a list of
cairnswhich had been erectedby Bahrain duringthe 1930s2'.
37. The claim assertedby the Ruler of Qatar to Fasht ad Dibal and Qit'atJaradah accepted
without question that both formations could be subject to national sovereignty,he accepted that
they could be subjected to national sovereignty. But he based his claim on the fact that it was
25~istpreparedby LandDepartment,Govt. of Bahrain,of pillars erected1938-1939,Memorialof Bahrain,
Ann.336,Vol. 6,p. 1457.
26~etterfrom CharlesBelgrave,Adviserto the Govt. of Bahrain,to BritishPolitical Agent,18June1946,
Memorialof Bahrain,Ann.340,Vol.6,p. 1470.
27~ee,forexarnple,letterfromBritishPoliticalAgenttoRulerofQatar,9 July1946,Ann.341, Vol.6,p. 1471.
28~etterfrom CharlesBelgrave,Adviserto Govt. of Bahrain,to Political Agent,10July1946,Memorialof
Bahrain,Ann.342, Vol.6,pp. 1473and1474.closer to him and he should get it as a consolationprize, because he had not been awarded the
~awars'~!
"Bahrain . ..has no dependencies contrary toQatar which is a large temtory
and has dependencies, coasts, and islands. If we look into the question fiom the
point view of equality, Qatar is to be entrusted with Deebil and Jaradah Fashts
which are situated betweenQatar and Bahrain, and they are nearer to Qatar. You
see that Qatar has been treated unjustly in her clearright in the question of Hawar
islands which 1 am still tenacious to claim their ownership, then how about the
others!"30
Mr. President,this hasbeena very longday, andcounsel for Bahrainare particularlygrateful
to the Court forits sustainedattention. But1wonderif thismightnot bean appropriatemomentfor
us to pause andto resurnethis presentationtomorrowmoming.
Le PRESIDENT : C'estcomme vous l'entendez. Cela dépend du temps donv tous avez
besoin demain matin. Si vouspouvez,demainmatin, direce que vous avez à dire dans la matinée,
il n'ya pas d'objection ce quenousnous arrêtionsmaintenant.
Mr. REISMAN: May 1consultmy colleaguesfora moment,Mr.President?
The PRESIDENT: Please.
Mr. REISMAN: Thank you for allowing me to consultmy colleagues. No, my colleagues
are quite comfortablewith a suspension at thistirne. And we wish the Court awell deservedrest
from its labours today. Thankyou, Mr. President.
Le PRESIDENT :Merci beaucoup de votre aimableattention. La séance est levée.Nous
nous retrouveronsdemain à 10heures.
L'audienceestlevée à 17h 40.
'%etter frornthe Ruler of Qatar to the British Politi18July1946,Mernorial of Bahrain,Ann343,
Vol.6,p.1476.
%etter from Ruler of Qatar toBritish Political Agent,1946,Mernorialof Bahrain, An343, Vol.6,
p.1476.
Audience publique tenue le mardi 13 juin 2000, at 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Guillaume, président