Public sitting held on Tuesday 13 June 2000, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Document Number
087-20000613-ORA-02-00-BI
Document Type
Number (Press Release, Order, etc)
2000/14
Date of the Document
Bilingual Document File
Bilingual Content

Non-Corrigé

Uncorrected

InternationalCourt Cour internationale
ofJustice de Justice

THEHAGUE LAHAYE

YEAR2000

Publicsitting

heldon Tuesday13June 2000,ut3p.m, utthePeacePalace,

PresidentGuillaumepresiding

in the caseconcerningMaritimeDelimitationand TerritorialQuestionsbetween
Qatar andBahrain(Qatarv.Bahrain)

VERBATIM RECORD

ANNEE2000

Audiencepublique

tenuele mardi13juin 2000,5heures,auPalaisdelaPaix,

sous laprésidendeM. Guillaume,président

en l'affairedelaDélimitation maret desquestionsterritorialesentreetBahreïn
(Qatarc.Bahreïn)

COMPTE RENDUPresent: President Guillaume
Vice-President Shi
Judges Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer

Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Pm-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh

Buergenthal
Judgesad hoc TorresBernbdez
Fortier

Registrar CouvreurPrésent: M. Guillaume,président
M. Shi,vice-président
MM. Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh

Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek

Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal,juges
MM. TorresBembrdez
Fortier,juges ad hoc

M. Couvreur,greffierTheStateof Qatar isrepresentedby:

H.E. Dr. Abdullahbin AbdulatifAl-Muslemani,Secretary-General fthe Cabinet,

asAgentand Counsel;

Mr. AdelSherbini,LegalAdviser,
Mr. SamiAbushaikha,Legal Expert,

asCounsel;

Mr. EricDavid,Professorof International Law, Université re Bruxelles,
Dr.AlibinFetaisAl-Meri, DirectorofLegalDepartment,DiwanAmiri,
Mr. Jean-PierreQuéneudec, Professor of International Lawat the University of Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
Mr. Jean Salmon,Professor emeritusof International L, niversité librede Bruxelles,Member
of theInstitutde droit international,
Mr.R. K. P. Shankardass, Senior Advocate, SupremeCourt of India, Former President of the

InternationalBar Association,
SirIanSinclair,K.C.M.G., Q.C.,arristeratLaw,Memberofthe InstituteofInternationalLaw,
SirFrancisVallat,G.B.E.,K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,Professor ementusof InternationalLaw,Universityof
London,Member ementusoftheInstitutde droitinternational,
Mr.RodmanR. Bundy,Avocat à la Cour d'appel de Paris, emberof the NewYork Bar,Frere
Cholmeley/EvershedsP, aris,
MsNanetteE.Pilkington,Avocatàla Courd'appel deParisF ,rereCholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,

as Counsel and Advocates;

Ms Cheryl Dunn, Member ofthe StateBarofCalifornia,FrereCholmeley/EvershedsP, aris,
Ms InesSabineWilk, Lawyer beforethe GermanCourt of Appeal, Memberof the Charnber of
LawyersofBerlin,Gerrnany,

as Counsel;

Mr. ScottB.Edmonds,Directorof CartographieOperations, MapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland
(UnitedStatesof America),
Mr. RobertC.Rizzutti, ProjectManager, MapQuest.com, ColumbiaM , aryland (United States of
Amenca),
Ms Stephanie K.Clark, SeniorCartographer,MapQuest.com,Columbia,Maryland (United States
ofAmerica),

asExperts;

H.E.SheikhHamadbin JassimbinJabor Al-Thani, Ministef rorForeign Affairs,
H.E. Mr.Ahmedbin AbdullahAl-Mahmoud,Ministerof State forForeignAffairs,

as Obsewers.

TheStateofBahrain isrepresentedby:

H.E.Mr.JawadSalimAl-Arayed,Ministerof Stateof theStateof Bahrain,

asAgent;L'Etatde Qatarest represéntépar :

S.Exc.M. Abdullahbin AbdulatiA f l-Muslemani,secrétaigénérad lu gouvernement,

commeagentetconseil;

M.AdelSherbini,conseillerjuridique,
M. SamiAbushaikha,expertjuridique,

comme conseils;

M.Eric David,professeurde droit internatioàl'universitélibre deBruxelles,
M.Alibin FetaisAl-Meri, directeurdesaffairesjuridiquesduconseildel'émir,
M.Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur de droit international à l'université de Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),

M.Jean Salmon,professeur émérid tedroitinternationalàl'universitélibre de Bruxelles,membre
de1'Institutdedroitinternational,
M.R. K.P. Shankardass, avocat principaà la Cour suprêmede l'Inde, ancien président de
l'AssociationinternationaleduBarreau,
SirIan Sinclair,K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,avocat, membredel'Institutdedroit international,
SirFrancisVallat,G.B.E.,K.C.M.G., Q.C.p,rofesseurémérite de droit internationaluniversité
de Londres,membreéméritd eel'Institutde droit international,

M.RodmanR.Bundy,avocatàlaCour d'appel de Paris,membre du barreaude NewYork,cabinet
FrereCholmeleyEversheds,Paris,
Mlle Nanette Pilkington,avocaà la Courd'appelde Paris,cabinet FrereCholrneley/Eversheds,
Paris,

commeconseils et avocats;

Mme Cheryl Dunn, membre du barreau de lYEtat de Californie, cabinet Frere
Cholmeley/EvershedsP, aris,
MmeInèsSabine Wilk,avocatprèsd'une courd'appeld!Allemagne,membrede la chambredes
avocatsàBerlin,Allemagne,

commeconseils;

M.Scott B.Edmonds, directeur du service des levéscartographiques,sociétéMapQuest.com,
Columbia,Maryland (Etats-Unis d'Amérique),
M.Robert C. Rizzutti, administrateurde projet, sociétéMapQuest.com, Columbia,Maryland
(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),
Mme Stephanie K. Clark, cartographehors classe, sociMapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland
(Etats-Unis d'Amérique),

comme experts;

S.Exc.le cheikhHamadbin JassimbinJaborAl-Thani,ministredes affairesétrangères,
S.Exc. M. AhmedbinAbdullahAl-Mahrnoudm , inistred7Etatauxaffaires étrangères,

comme observateurs.

L'EtatdeBahreïnestrepresentépar :

S.Exc. M.JawadSalimAl-Arayed,ministredYEtad te17Etadt eBahrein,

comme agent;Dr.FathiKemicha,Member of the Barof Paris,Kernicha & Associés(Tunis),
ProfessorSirElihuLauterpacht,Q.C.,C.B.E.,HonoraryProfessorof theUniversityof Cambridge,
Memberof the Institut dedroitinternational,
Mr. Jan Paulsson,Freshfields,Paris, Member oftheBars of Paris andthe Districtof Columbia,
Professor MichaelReisman, Myres S. McDougalProfessor ofInternationalLaw of Yale Law
School,Memberof the Barof Connecticut, Associate of the Institderoitinternational,
Mr. RobertVolterra,Freshfields,London,Memberof theBarofUpperCanada,

Professor ProsperWeil,Emeritus Professor at the University of ParIiIs(Panthéon-A, ember
of the Académiedes sciencesmorales etpolitiques (Institut de Fra, emberof theInstitut
de droitinternational,

as CounselandAdvocates;

SheikhKhalidbin AbmedAl-Khalifa,First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairsf the Stateof
Bahrain,

CommanderChristopherCarleton,M.B.E., Head of the Law of the Sea Divisionof the United
KingdomHydrographieOffice,
Dr.HongwuChen,Freshfields,Paris, Memberof theBarsof Paris andBeijing,
Mr. Graham Coop,Freshfields,Paris,Barristerand SolicitoroftheHighCourt ofNewZealandand
Solicitorof the SupremeCourt ofEnglandandWales,
Mr. AndrewNewcombe, FreshfieldsP ,aris,Memberof the Bar of British Columbia,
Dr.BethOlsen,Advisor,Ministryof Stateofthe Stateof Bahrain,

Dr. John Wilkinson, FormerReader at the University ofOxford, Emeritus Fellow, St.Hugh's
College, Oxford,

asAdvisors;

H.E.SheikhMohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, Minister forForeiA gfnfairs,Stateof Bahrain,
H.E. Sheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, Arnbassadorof the State of Bahrain to the
Netherlands,

H.E. Dr.MohammedJaberAl-Ansari, Advisorto HisHighness,theArnirof Bahrain,
Mr. GhaziAl-Gosaibi,Under-Secretaryof Foreign Affairs, Statef ahrain,
Her Excellency Sheikha Haya Al Khalifa, Arnbassador of the State of Bahrain to the French
Republic,
Mr. YousefMahmood,Directorof theOffice oftheForeign Minister,Stateof Bahrain,

Mr. Jon Addison,Ministry of Stateof the Stateof Bahrain,
MsMaisoon Al-Arayed, Ministry of Stateof the StateofBahrain,
Mr. NabeelAl-Rumaihi, Ministryof Stateofthe StateofBahrain,
Mr. Hafedh Al-Qassab, Ministrof Stateofthe StateofBahrain,
MsAneesaHanna,EmbassyofBahraininLondon,
Ms JeanetteHarding,Ministryof Stateofthe StateofBahrain,

MsVanessaHarris,Freshfields,
Ms Iva Kratchanova,Ministryof Stateof theStateof Bahrain,
Ms SonjaKnijnsberg,Freshfïelds,
Mr. KevinMottram,Freshfields,
Mr.YasserShaheen,SecondSecretary,Ministry ofForeignAffairsofthe StateofBahrain,

asAdministrativeStasM. Fathi Kemicha,membredubarreau de Paris, cabinetKemicha& Associés,Tunis,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht,Q.C.,C.B.E.,professeur honoraireniversitéde Cambridge, membre de
l'Institut de droit international,
M. Jan Paulsson, cabinet Freshfields, Paris, membre des baneaux de Paris et du district de
Columbia,
M.MichaelReisman,professeurde droit internationàll'universitéde Yale, titulairede la chaire
Myres S.McDougal, membre du barreau du Connecticut, associéde l'Institut de droit

international,
M.RobertVolterra,cabinetFreshfields, Londres,membrdubarreau du Haut Canada,
M.Prosper Weil, professeur émériteà l'universitéde Paris II (Panthéon-Assas), membre de
l'Académie des sciences oraleset politiques (Institutde France),membre de l'Institut dedroit
international,

commeconseilset avocats;

Le cheikh Khalidbin AhrnedAl-Khalifa,premiersecrétaire,ministèredes affairesétrangères de
1'Etatde Bahreïn,
Lecapitainede frégate Christopher CarleM, .B.E.,directeurde la divisiondu droitmaritimedu
bureau hydrographiqueduRoyaume-Uni,
M. HongwuChen,cabinetFreshfïelds,Paris, membredesbarreauxde Pariset de Beijing,
M.Graham Coop, cabinet Freshfields, Paris, avocatet conseil de la High Court de
Nouvelle-Zélandeetconseillerdela Coursuprêmed'Angleterreet duPaysde Galles,

M. AndrewNewcombe,cabinet Freshfields, Paris, membrdubarreaudela Colombiebritannique,
Mme Beth Olsen,conseiller,ministèred'Etatde1'Etatde Bahreïn,
M. John Wilkinson, ancienmaître de conférenceà l'Universitéd'Oxford, membre émérid tu
CollègeSaintHugh, Oxford,

commeconseillers;

S. Exc.le cheikhMohammedbinMubarakAlKhalifa,ministredes affairesétrangèresdB eahreïn,
S.Exc.le cheikh Abdul-Azizbin Mubarak Al Khalifa, ambassadeur de 1'Etatde Bahreïn aux
Pays-Bas,
S. Exc.M. MohammedJaberAl-Ansari,conseillerde SonAltesse l'émir de Bahreïn,
M. GhaziAl-Gosaibi,sous-secrétaid'Etatauxaffairesétrangèresde1'Etatde Bahreïn,
S.Exc.la cheikha Haya Al Khalifa, ambassadeur de1'Etatde Bahreïn auprès dela République
française,

M.YousefMahmood,directeurdubureauduministredes affairesétrangèred se Bahreïn,

commeobservateurs;

M.Jon Addison,ministèred'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
MmeMaisoonAl-Arayed,ministèred'Etatde1'Etatde Bahreïn,
M.Nabeel Al-Rumaihi,ministèred'Etatde1'Etatde Bahreïn,

M.Hafedh Al-Qassab,ministèred'Etatde1'EtatdeBahreïn,
MmeAneesa Hanna,ambassadede Bahreïn, Londres,
MmeJeanetteHarding,ministère d'Etatde 1'EtatdeBahreein,
MmeVanessaHarris,cabinetFreshfields,
MmeIva Kratchanova,ministère d'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
Mme SonjaKnijnsberg,cabinet Freshfields,
M.Kevin Mottram,cabinetFreshfields,
M.YasserShaheen, second secrétaire, ministres affairesétrangèresdeEtatdeBahreïn,

commepersonneladministratiJ: Le PRESIDENT :Veuillez vousasseoir. La séancestouverteetje donne laparoleau nom

de 1'EtatdeBahrëinà SirElihuLauterpacht.

SirElihuLAUTERPACHT:Thankyou, Mx- .residentandMembersoftheCourt.

M APS

1.It fallsto me to respond toQatar'scase onthemaps. 1shall berelativelybnef. It is true

that Bahrainhasnot presented manymapsto the Courtandthat, in contrast,Qatar has produced a

handsomeatlas,perhaps moreelegant thanpotent,containingsome 102maps. Butthe explanation

of thatdifferenceis that Bahrainesnotreallyneed mapsto supportitscase, whileQatarneedsto

introduceeveryshredofmaterialit canin an attemptto supportitsposition.

2. Therearetwo issuesin the temtorialpart of the case towhich Qatarsuggeststhat themap

evidence could be relevant. Both are expressed in one sentence ofMr.Bundy'sstatementon

31May(CR200017,p. 23,para.69):

"maps have an important role toplay in this case in so far as they constitute
confirmatoryevidence ofan historicalnaturepointingto a widespreadrecognition,or

generalrepute,that thepolitical entityof Qatar coveredthe entirepeninsulaincluding
the HawarIslandsand Zubarah".

Thusthe twoissues are: first,thepoliticalstatusof Qatar; second,the question whetherthe Hawar

Islandshavebeenregardedasbelongingto BahrainorQatar.

3. Inrelationto bothof them1would invoke thehighlypertinentobservation ofJudgeHuber

in the Palmas case. "Iftherbitratoris satisfied asto the existenceof legallyrelevantfactswhich

contradictthe statements ofcartographerswhose sources ofinformation arenot known, he can

attach no weight to the maps, however numerous and generally appreciated they may be."

(UNRIAAV , ol.II, pp. 852-853;judges'folders,tab1,topofp. 853.)

4. Thesameconsiderationis implicitin thewell-knownobservationsof the Chamberof this
5
Court in the BurkinaFaso/Mali case (I.C.J. Reports 1986,pp. 582-583, paras. 54-56), recently

recalled by the Court as a whole in theKasikili case (BotswanaLVamibiaI,.C.J. Reports 1999,

para.84).

5. Bahrain's contentionis that there is more than a sufficiencyof legally relevant facts

available inthiscase to establishBahrain'stitle, andQatar'slackof title, to theHawars without theuse of maps. Equally devoid of factual supportis Qatar'sclaim to any significantstatus as a

"political entity" in the nineteenth century and the earlier part of the twentieth century. In

consequence, even granting themaps a relevance andquality they do not possess, theycannot

depriveBahrainof the legaltitle to the Hawar Islandsthat it has had since the eighteenth century

and has maintainedby possessionandcontrol eversince. As regards thestatus of Qatar,many of

the mapsproducedby Qatar notonlydonot supportits positionbutindeedflatlycontradict it.

6. Before going further, 1 should respondto one highly questionable statement madein

Mr.Bundy'sopeningremarks. Hementionedthedate 1868,"bywhich time",he said,"theseparate

entitiesof Qatarand Bahrainhad beenrecognized". Thisstatementappears intendedto convey the

impressionthat in some way fiom 1868onwardsBahrainand Qatar wereentities of equal status.

Even thoughmy colleagueshave alreadystatedthatthatis a grossexaggerationof Qatar'sposition

in the nineteenthcentury, therepetition ofthe pointrequiresthe repetitionof its rejection. In 1868

Qatar was in no way comparable toBahrain as an entity. Bahrain was an established political

authority with which Britain had some seven years previously,in 1861, concluded a Fnendly

Conventionand whose territorial authority Britainhad politically recognized by undertakingto

supportthe Rulerin the maintenanceofthe securityofhispossessions. Qatar,by contrast,wasnot

an entity but at best a geographical areaof a size whichvaried according towhatevermap one

might lookat. ThetreatywhichBritainmadewiththeChiefof El Katrin 1868andonwhich Qatar

now relies as recognitionof its statusas an independentStatereallydoes little morethan tell the

Chiefto retumto Doha "and reside peaceablyin thatport". It doesnot acknowledgeany right on

his partto moveabout freelywithin the peninsula:go homeandstay there,is whatitreally says.

7. 1must also observepreliminarilythat virtuallyal1of the commercialmaps producedby

Qatar, and even the official ones, have been on a very small scale. Whereas maps adduced in

temtorial and boundarydisputesare normallyon a largescale in the range of 1:5000to 1:50000,

the bulk of themaps in the QatariMap Atlas attachedto its Reply rangebetween 1:4millionand

1:16million. So small is the scale that 81 out of 102maps in the Atlas require massive

enlargementif eventhe sharpest judicialeye is to identiQ their supposedlyrelevant content; and

this enlargement can cany with it a distortion ofcolour which renders the maps totally

untrustworthy. With the computer techniquesnow used to make enlargements, variations incolourscreep in alrnostinescapablyin theprocessof enlargingor copyingthe maps. 1shallretum

to thismatter towardsthe endof my argument. Here1need onlyobservethat the Tribunalin the

Eritredemen case thoughtit necessaryto enter a qualificatioasto the evaluationofthe colourof A

maps(FirstAwardintheEritredYemencase; para.370).

8. In drawingtheir maps on a very small scale, it is improbablein the extreme that any

map-maker, commerciao l rfficial,wouldhavehad soughtor comeacross sufficientinformation

to leadhim to dealspecificallywiththe question oftitleto the Hawars. The onlyexceptionmight

havebeen the Ottomanand theBritishmap-makers. Asregardsthe Ottomans,Qatarpresentsone

large-scalernap whichhas turnedout tobe a forgery. Bahrain has produced Izzet'srnap of 1878

(Mernorialof Bahrain,Vol. 1,pp. 6-7),the probativevalue of which Mr. Paulssondiscussedlast

Friday. Theotherlarge-scalernapalreadypresented tothe Courthasbeen the 1935Oil Concession

Map,the effectofwhich wasalsoexplainedtotheCourtby Mr. PaulssonlastFriday.

9. That said,1can turnto someof the maps, spokenof by Mr. Bundyon 31May. As you

willsee, most ofthese,far fiom showinga politicalentitycalled Qatar,in fact showno morethan

the geographicalareacorrespondingto the peninsulanow called"Qatar"undera variety of names

asa westwardandnorth-westward extension oa fnarea called"Oman".

10. Take the frst rnap put upby Qatar, 1875,Justus PerthesInstitute, said to have been

draftedby AugustusPetermann(Replyof Qatar, MapAtlasNo.5). This waspresentedto support

the view that Qatar and Bahrainwere "distinctentities" (CR200017,paras. 18-22),with Qatar

beingshown by colourcoding asencompassingthe entirepeninsulaand as includingthe Hawars.

Perhapsthe rnap does show this, but at ascaleof 1:7.5million itcannot in itself be particularly

significant. However, whateversignificanceit may have is considerablyreduced when it is

comparedwith thenextrnap adducedbyQatar,onthe sarnescale,alsoattributedtothe experthand

ofAugustusPetermann.Thisis referredto inMr.Bundy's statemena ts havingbeenmade in 1884,
b
16years after Qatar'sallegedpromotionto statehood. No referencewas givenby Mr.Bundy for

thisrnapbut presumablyit is the onlyone ofthatyear listedinthe QatarMap Atlas. So it must be

No. 11 there. 1 do not dispute that it again distinguishesBahrainand a peninsulawhich at its

southemend caniesthe word "Katar".Butwhatthisrnapshowsthatits predecessordoes not show

istheword irnmediatelybelow "Katar",whichincapitalletters is "OMAN". Thereisno boundarydrawn between "OMAN" and "Katar". The inescapable inference is that in the view of

AugustusPetermann "Katar" wasno more than a part of alarger entity called "OMAN". This

manifestlydoesnot supportthe idea thatas a matterof generalrepute,Qatarwas as a result of the

1868Treatya separate,recognized State.

11. The picture looks even bleaker for Qatarwhen we examine the next rnap invokedby

Qatar,the 1890edition ofthe Atlas de GéographieModerne,publishedby LibrairieHachetteof

Paris, describedby Qataras a highlyreputable institutio- a descriptionwhichthere is no good

reasonto contradict. This is Map 13in the QatarMap Atlas. Oncemore, it is on the miniscule

scaleof 1:7.5million. Andwhatyou seein frontof you,of course,is not the originalrnapbut the

enlargementthat appearsnomally on the left-handside of the Map Atlas when it is opened out.

Qatar says thatthe HawarIslands appearin thesamegreencolour as Qatar,in contrastto the grey

colouringof Bahrain. 1confessthat 1do not recognizethis differentiationin the basicsizeversion

of thernapwhichappearsin the Map Atlas. The enlargementon the oppositepage in this respect

leaves much to the imagination. Qatar has providedno explanationof the hint of yellow that

appearsto havewashedup thesouthemportion ofthe Qatarpeninsula'swestCoast.

12.However, colouris not alone whatmatters here. Whatdoes attract attentionis the fact

that, because the rnap extendsa lot more to the south than Petemann's rnap of 1884, it shows

"Katar" even more clearlyasan unseparated part of "OMAN". Furthermore,it isworthreadingthe

legendon the map: '%esCapitalesdlEtatsont soulignéesdeuxfois. Les chefs-lieuxdeprovince

unefois". 1can seeno Dohaunderlined. Nor is "El Bidda" - sometimes confusedwith Doha-

underlined. So Dohaor ElBidda,is neither a capital of aStatenor the chiefplace of a province.

Yet,accordingto Mr.Bundy,Qatarbecamea State22years previouslyandDohawas its capital.

13.It is truethatasregards Bahrain,nounderliningappearsbelowManama. Thus it appears

that in the eyes of Librairie Hachette,Manamawas no more significant than El Bidda. But there

are nonetheless two differences between Bahrain and Katar.First, Bahrain is for a reason not

explained given its own separate colour which is not so visibly distinct fiom that of the

HawarIslands. Second, and moreto the point,that very separatenessof colour thatdistinguishes

Bahrainboth fiom the Qatar peninsula andfiom theterritoryto thewest describedandmisspeltas

"El-Ahsa",demonstratesthat Bahrain was acknowledge ashavinga quitedistinctand independentstatusfrom thatof Katarwhichwas againseenas part of Oman. There wasno equalityof status

between Bahrainand Qatar. The absenceof underliningbelow Manama does not downgrade

Manarnato thelevel of El Bidda. It merely demonstratesthe map-maker's lack of knowledgeof

the politicaldetailsof thearea.

14.Thenextrnap introducedby Qataris the Russianrnapof 1894on a scaleof 1:3.6million

(CR200017,p. 13, para.28; Reply of Qatar, Map AtlasNo.20). Mr.Bundy suggested that

"Russianofficiaisatthis timerecognizedQatarandBahrainas distinctpoliticalentitiesand that the

temtorialextentof Qatarmatchedthat as describedin Qatar'spleadings". That Bahrainis distinct

fromQataris quite clear, butthe suggestionthat Qatarwas a politicalentity and thatits territorial

extent matched the descriptionin Qatar'spleadings is clearly wrong. The Russianwords that

describeQatarhave been translatedby Qataronthe faceof the enlargementnot as "Qatar" butas

"Qatar Peninsula" - obviously a geographical not a politicadlescription. The politics of the

situation,as understoodby the map-maker,are shownin thetreatmentof the peninsulaagain as a

westward extension of Oman. The colour of Bahrain can hardly be distinguishedfrom the

colouringofthe HawarIslands.

15.Qatar'snext citationis to a Polishrnap of 1904,on a scaleof 1:8million(CR200017,

p. 14,para.30; Reply ofQatar, MapAtlasNo. 32). While-Bahrainis colouredand theHawars are

not, the interestingaspectof this rnapis that yetinit includesQatarin the westwardextension

ofOman.

16.Qatar followsthisrnapwithanEnglishoneby GeorgePhilipon a scaleof69.16milesto

1degree,whichis about 1:4million. Thoughthere is a differencein colouringbetweenBahrain

andtheHawars,thernaprunsagainstQatar'scase fortworeasons. First,Qatar isagainrepresented

as a westwardextension of Oman. Secondly,the Hawar Islandsare called "WardensIslands".

Nowthe earliestsourceinwhich Philipcouldhave foundthat namerecorded fortheislandswould

have been in the report of Lieutenant Brucks and hischart of 1829. There, it will be recalled,

Brucks said that the islands belongedto Bahrain. So,on a correct interpretation,this map, by

implication,showstheHawarsasbeingBahrain's.

17.Mr.Bundythenturnedto officialmaps. Hedevoted specialattentionto arnapwhich,he

stated,hadbeen included ina memorandum preparedin 1920by the BritishForeignOffice. Thisis described on its face as a portion of Chart748-B of 1917 (Reply of Qatar, Anns., Vol.3,

Ann.111.38,p. 215; Reply of QatarMap Atlas, Map No.58, scale 20 sea miles to 1inch).
The

rnap is now up on the screen. Mr. Bundy used it to support his contention that "the Hawar

Islands... werelocatedinsidethe [red] lineandthus were consideredto appertainto the adjacent

mainland" - inother words,to Qatar. Hecontinued:

"Bahrain,as isclear fiomthemap,was carefullyandspecifically excludedfiom
this definitionby virtueof the factthat itwascarefullyenclavedby a separateredline
which did not include the Hawar Islands, and this was emphasizedby underlining,
althoughit is difficult toread,the word 'Bahrain'ned, there onthemap. Therecan

thus be no doubt [1am still quoting Mr.Bundy]that Britain considered the Hawar
Islandsand Zubarahto formpart of Qatar'sterritoryat the time." (CR200017, p.16,
paras. 40-4.)

18.1must askthe Courtto bear with me while 1enter into sufficientdetail to demonstrate

that theremust be serious doubtsas to whetherthis rnap cm, or evenwas intended to,carry the

interpretationwhichMr. Bundy placesuponit.

19. It is necessary to study this rnap in conjunction withthe British Foreign Office

memorandumto whichit wasallegedto relate(ReplyofQatar, Ann. III.38,Vol. 3,p. 217).

20. 1may Sayin passing that Mr. Bundy'sstatement(CR200017,p. 16, para.38) that the

memorandumin question"included" (that wasthe verb he used) arnapis not borne out,so far as1

canmakeout,by anythingin the text ofthememorandumitself. Thereis a drafiTreaty relating to

the settlementof the Arabianpeninsula whichis attachedto the memorandum. Article 2 ofthis

TreatycontainsreferencestovariousAdmiraltychartsinthe description ofthe linesaidto embrace

Arabia. However,the numbers ofthese charts do not correspond with the number 748Bthat

appearson MapNo. 58 in theQatariMapAtlasandMap36 in the Qatarijudges' folders.Nor has

the originalbeendepositedwiththe Registry.

21. But1returnnow to the ForeignOfficeMemorandumin which Mr. Bundysaidthe rnap

wasincluded (Replyof Qatar,Vol. 3,p. 215, Ann. 111.38;Bahrainjudges'folder,tab 61). Thereis

a document entitled"ForeignOfficeMemorandumonArabian Policy". Althoughit bearsno date,

the date of 1920suggested for it by Qatar would appearto be consistentwith its content. The

substantive importanceof someof the contentof theMemorandum hasalreadybeen mentionedby

Professor Reisman(CR 2000112, p4 . 9, para. 17). But1wantto lookat it nowto see ifit providesany explanationof the circledrawnaroundthe main Bahrain Islandsin such a way as to support

Mr.Bundy'ssuppositionthat the circle represents adeliberateseparationof the main Bahrain

Islandsfromthe HawarsandanattachrnentoftheHawarsto Qatar.

22. As the Courtwill see, the Memorandumbegins with a statement that a more detailed

descriptionof what is definedas the peninsula ofArabiawill befoundin its Appendix (A)(ibid.,

para. 1). As 1have alreadysaid,the Memorandumitselfthencontinueswith alist of the ten main

sub-divisionsofArabia. Thelistincludes Bahrainwithan indication thattheindividualto be dealt

with there is the Sheikhof Bahrain. The list does not include Qatarby name. Perhaps itwas

consideredto be coveredby the heading "TrucialCoast". In that case no singleindividualwas

namedasthepersonto bedealtwith. Instead therewasa blanketreferenceto "PettyChiefs". And

this, we recall, was written in 1920, inthe ForeignOffice,by which yearQatar'scounselwould

haveus thinkthatQatarhadfor52yearsbeenan independent State of equalstatuswithBahrain.

23. Attachedto theMemorandum as AnnexA was a draft treatydealing withthe settlement

of the Arabian peninsula. Articlestatedthatforthe "purposeof the treatythe ArabianPeninsula

included(1)al1tenitories otherthantheKingdomof HedjazandtheBritishProtectorate overAden

and its surroundingterritorialzone; an(2)the islands,whether previouslyBntish ornot, which

liewithinthe linewhichis definedhereafter".

24. Therethenfollows a descriptionof the line insix sections,by referenceto sevennarned

points identifiedby their CO-ordinatss they appear on Bntish Admiraltycharts. None of the

nurnbersonthesechartscorrespondswiththenurnberon QatariMap58. Thereis no mentionof a

line around Bahrain and no explanationof it is given, either in the draft Treaty or in the

Memorandumtowhichthe draftTreatyisattached.

25.1 willnot speculateas to whatthe circle aroundBahrainmay signi@. It isevenopento

question whetherthe circlewasdrawnat the sametime,by thesamehandor with thesamepenas .

the linesurrounding Arabia. But theres certainlynojustificationforQatar's asserthatbecause

the Hawar Islandswere separatedfiom Bahrain main islandby the circle andwere locatedinside

the defined lines they "were thus consideredto appertainto the adjacent mainland-in other

words, to Qatar". Theonlyreferenceinthe drafitothe effectofadjacencyof islandsis tobe found

in the finalparagraphof the descriptionof Arabia inArticle2 of draf Ttreaty. Thedescriptionconcludes thus: "The islands in the Red Sea lying within this line shall be placedunder the

sovereignty of the independent chiefs of the mainland, subject, however, to provisions of

Article8." [Emphasis added.] The fact that no such specific words appear in relation tothe

Persian Gulf islands (I use the terminologyon the map) suggeststhat the drafisman saw the

identification ofsovereignty overthose islands- and there were quite a nurnberof them- as

possiblybeingtoocomplexa matterto beresolvedby sosimple a formula.

26. ThereremainsoneMer point tobe made inconnection withthis mapwhichillustrates

the strange, if not misleading,methodology followedby Qatar in the considerationof maps

generally. The Courtwas told that "there is a firther important pointwith respectto this map

which, 1 (that is counsel for Qatar) would suggest underlinesits significance in this case"

(CR200017,p. 17,para.42). Thispointwas thatthe samemaphadbeen furnishedto the Tribunal

in the EritredYemenproceedings. That Tribunal,it was stated, appearedto have observedthe

effect of the Red Line in attributingthe islands lyingto the east of it to Yemen,thethen local

chiefdom. Qatarthenwentonto suggest"thatexactlythe samesituationpertainsherewithrespect

to theHawarIslands".

27.But counselfor Qatar failedto point to the paragraphaccompanyingthe description of

the Red Line in the 1920 draft Treaty which 1 read to you a moment ago and which States

specificallyin relationto the Red Seathat "TheIslandsin the Red Sealyingwithinthe Red Line

shall be placedunder the sovereignty ofthe individual chiefsof the mainland". There was no

comparableprovisionrelating tothe islands in thePersianGulf; there was, thereforeno basison

which Qatar couldvalidly equatethe two positions- at any rate not without explaining whatit

wasdoingandthe likelylimitationonthe validityof itsproposition.

28. Generally speaking, Mr.President, there is something odd about this Map58,

particularlythe unrnentionedand unexplainedring aroundBahrain,as well as the failure of the

nurnbersto tie upwiththosegiveninthe ForeignOfficedrafiTreaty. 1hopethatcounselforQatar

will inhisreplybe abletoprovidetheCourtwith some explanations.

29. Qatar cited no otherofficia1map thattakesmatters anyMer thanthe mapsthat 1have

alreadyconsidered. BAHIZAIN MASPS

30. So 1turnnow to maps supportiveof Bahrain'sposition. As 1have alreadysuggested,

Bahrainneedsno mapsto supportits position. Mr. Bundyhas saidthat Bahrainhas assertedthat

its authority over the Hawars andZubarah followingthe 1868Agreementis said to be "well

docurnented'land "overwhelming",and he continuesthat therefore: "one would expect such

ambitious assertionstobe backedup by the rnapevidence(CR 200017,p. 19,para.52). Whyso,

Mr. Bundy did not explain. In Bahrain's submissionthe facts speak for themselves. The

accumulation-or, indeed,theabsence - of supportivemapsdoesnotmatter.

31.But thereis oneadditionalrnapthatexhibitsthe positive qualitiesthat shouldmark arnap

that is presentedin supportof alaim to title. It is a large-scalechart preparedby a qualified,

competentand experienced surveyor,GeorgeBrucks,at that time a lieutenant in theEast India

Company Marine Service, and later a Captain in the Indian Navy, on the basis of knowledge

acquiredat fvst hand. Referencewasmade to the descriptivereport of Capt.Brucksat twoplaces

in the Bahrain Memorial(paras.116and415)andby Mr. Paulssonon2 June; and inparticularto

Brucks'notesabouttheHawar Islands, and theywerereferred toagaintoday. The relevant partsof

his descriptivememoirwere reproducedin the Annexesto Bahrain'sMemorial (Ann.7, Vol.2,

p. 101)aswellasattab 6 andtab27of Bahrain's judges'folders. In 1829,Brucks placedthename

"WardensIslands" next to theHawars. He describesthe islandsand Statesthat theybelongedto

Bahrain. Dueto an oversight,forwhichBahrain apologizes,thechartwhich Bruckspreparedwas

notreproducedinBahrain's pleadings. Butthernapmaynow quiteproperlybeproducedsinceit is

a public documentthat has been reprinted in a series that is readily available and inaal1

likelihood,givenQatar'sdiligence,is alreadyknownto it. Theseriesis called "HistoricalMapsof

Bahrain 1817-18901'p,ublishedby ArchiveEditions. Anextractfiomthe rnap inthe originalscale

isin the Court'sjudges'folders,at tab 62. A copyof the rnapwasdepositedwiththe Registryon
.
Fridayand,asa matterof courtesy,wasalsothensenttothe Agent ofQatar.

32.As theCourt will irnrnediatelysee, ehartis a fineexampleof earlynineteenthcentury

chart-making. It demonstratesin every respect afirsthandexaminationof the area, includinga

large nurnber of depth soundings. Toward the south-east corner it shows theprincipal

HawarIslands,togetherwithJanan,next to thename"WardensIslands". As alreadystated, Brucksexpresslyattributedthe Warden Islandsto Bahrain. Evenmakingallowancesfor the factthat the

chart did not accompanythe BahrainMemorial,it must be said that the Brucks surveyreceived

rather peremptorytreatment in the QatarCounter-Memonal. There it was dismissedwith the

entirelyunsupportedallegationthat it was one of"many of theBritishsurveyscanied out at the

time shown to have been impreciseif not inaccurate" andwas said, without any supportive

references, to be contradictedby "Lorimer and other British authoritie... [and] also by the

numerousOttomansurveys"(Counter-Memorialof Qatar, para3 ..122). Theidentity ofheseother

surveys was never stated. The Court can now see the inaccuracy and unfaimess of those

cornrnents.

33. As 1 indicated atthe beginning,Bahrain has not bombardedthe Court with a large

numberof commercialor officia1maps supportive ofits position. Mr. Bundy hassaidthat "Qatar

wishes tomakeit veryclearthatit doesnot relyon cartographieevidenceas creative ofits titleto

the Hawar IslandsorZubarah". Andhe wasrightto offerthatdisclaimerbecausethe evidencethat

he hasproduced would certainly notsupportsucha claim. Thenotionof "widespreadrecognition

or generalrepute"that Qatar relieson (CR200017,p. 23, para.69) is one that has very limited

scope. While it has had some supportfiom Sir GeraldFitzmaurice and is mentioned in the

BeagleChannelAward,itmustberecalledthatthe maps towhichpartiesin other caseshaveinthe

past turned have beenones prepared byStatesthat have had a specificinterest in the issueand,

aboveall,havebeenon a scalesufficiently large to indicatthat thosewho preparedthem hadthe

specificissuein mindand wereseekingto reflect,on the basisof knowledge actuallypossessed,

what they objectivelythoughtto be the correct solution. Of that approach,not one of the maps

produced by Qatar can be cited as an example. "General repute", as fully acknowledgedby

SirGeraldFitzmaurice,canneverreplacerealevidenceof conductontheground.

34. May1 concludethis considerationof maps, Mr. President,with what 1 would cal1a

footnotetothe fewlines1expressedafewminutesagoregarding thecolour ofmaps.

35. TheCourtwillrecallthatin relationto virtuallyeverymapthat Qatar displayed,it made

the pointthat onthebasis of differencesin colour the Hawarscouldbeseenas beingpart of Qatar

and not part of Bahrain.1amboundto offerthe Court a warning againsr telianceupon colourforthe purpose just stated. Colours undergo significant distortion in the process of copying,

enlargementorreductionasthe case maybe. 1giveyou fourexamples.

36.Takefirstthe LibrairieHachetteMapof 1890,MapNo. 13in the QatarMap Atlas. The

enlargement ofthernap on the left-handpage ofthe Atlas showsthe seain a lightershadeof blue

than the smaller-scalernap on the right-handside. But whenone uses the computerto matchthe

blue on the enlargementmorecloselyto the blue on the small-scalemap,the effectis to givethe

Hawars acolour closerto thatof Bahrainthanto thatof Qatar.

37. Take, as another example,the rnap in Qatar'sjudges' folders attab No.34, said to

correspondto MapNo.49 (1919)in the MapAtlasin the Replyof Qatar. The differencebetween

the coloursin the versionin thejudges'foldersandthe twoversionsin the Map Atlasimmediately

Springsto the eye. What is the explanation? Itis that in the process of copying the various

versions of the map, especially in enlargingthem - and bear in mind the enormousamountof

enlargementinvolved- there isscope for subtlevariation or enhancementof depth of colour.

Thus the differencesin depth of colourof the border margins ofEl-Hasaand El Katarare much

more pronouncedin thejudges' foldersthan they are in the Map Atlas version. The non-enlarged

version is on so smalla scalethatitis impossibleto be surewhatare thecoloursoftheHawarsand

Bahrain and whetherthey arereally differentin colour.

38. As a thirdexamplewe maylookat the 1919rnapofArabiathatappearsas Map No.8 in

QatarMemorial,oppositepage71. Compare it withthe versionthat appearsas MapNo.62 inthe

QatarMapAtlas. They are bothdescribedas onginallyhaving been publishedby GeographiaLtd.

On the versionin the Memorial, the seais coloured yellow-green. In the Map Atlasit is coloured

blue. In the Memonal, Bahrain'scolour is enhancedto red, in seemingcontrast to the Hawars,

while in the Map Atlas, small-scale version,Bahrain appears colouredpink. It is clear fiom a

comparisonof therest of the rnapwiththe colourcodingin thebottomleft-hand cornerthatal1the

colours have not been uniformly reproduced. Indeed, on the large version of the map, on the

right-handsideof the Map Atlas, the wholeof TrucialOman,of which Qataris depictedas a part,

seemsnotdissimilarin colourtoBahrain.

39. The final example is Map41 in the Qatar Map Atlas. As the Court can now see, the

enlargement showsboth Katar andthe WardensIslands as being coveredwith the sarnerash ofdots, suggesting thatthe Wardens Islands belong toKatar. Now here is the sarne enlargement

producedin a straightforwardwayon a Bahrainicomputer - no rash and a colour very similar to

Bahrain. 1sitmagicoris it somethingelse?

40. In short,Mr. President and Membersof the Court,without the originals ofthe mapson

which Qatar so heavily relies, my respectful submissionis that you shouldpay these maps no

attentionat all. And evenif the originalsare produced,it ishrain'ssubmissionthat they make

no differenceto thecase.

41. Mr. President,Members ofthe Court, that concludesmy presentationon the maps. 1

thank you for your attentionand it wouldbe appreciated, Mr. President, if you would now cal1

uponMr.Paulsson.

The PRESIDENT :Thank you very much, Sir Elihu. Je donne maintenantla parole à

M.Jan Paulsson.

M.PAULSSON :Merci, Monsieurleprésident.

CARTESPETROLIÈRES

1. Il m'échoit aujourd'hui de traiter d'une sous-catégoriedes éléments depreuve

cartographiques,àsavoirles cartes-ou parfois plutôtdesébauchesgribouilléess,ij'ose dire,sur

le dos d'enveloppes- qui ont figuréi,ci ou là, au coursdesnégociationsentreBahreïn,Qatar,et

les explorateurspétroliers.

2. Quelleen seraitla pertinenc? Il s'agit desavoirsi ces cartes,ouesquisses, reflètent une

compréhensionde l'étenduegéographique dela souverainetéde Bahrein ou de celle de Qatar.

C'est un sujet d'apparence aride, mais dans notre affaire, vous le verrez, il recèle quelques

surprises.

3. Je vous propose donc encore unefois, avec votrepermission,un voyagedans le temps,

l'espace peut-être d'une demi-heure, pou passer en revue la manièredont les deux groupes

pétroliersconcurrents se sont positionnàl'époque.

Mon exposése divise,j'allais presquedire évidemmente ,n deuxparties,les annéesvingtet

les annéestrente. L'$TENDU DES DROITSC$D$S PAR BAHREI N ~SAVANT 1930

4. Souvenons-nous de ce personnage fantasque, haut en couleur qui est le

MajorFrank Holmes,Néo-zélandais qu'on a fini par surnommer«Abu ad Naft» - le pèredu

pétrole. Sa société,la Eastern & General Syndicate, obtient sa concession en 1925 du

cheikhHamadde Bahreïn. Selonles termes de cette concession, la Eas& General avaitledroit

de prospecter (Il (partout sur le tenitoire sous son contrôle))["throughoutthe whole of the

territories under his control'y (art.1, Bahrain Oil Concession, mémoire de Bahreï,ol. 3,

annexe90).

5. Ce documentne seréfêràeaucunecarte.

6. Vous vousrappelezqueleMajorHolmesétaitmalvu des autoritésanglaises. Il se faisait

conspuerpar les financiersondres. Il ne parvintpasàconvaincrel'hglo-Persian Oil Company

à prendreune participationdans son entreprise,cequi expliquel'arrivée sur ee la Standard

OilofCalifomia,par l'entremise de sa filialeà%,0la Bahrain Petroleum Compan(BAPCO).

7. La BAPCOreprésentedonc - ilfauts'ensouvenir- desintérêtsaméricai n100 %.

8. J'ouvre une parenthèse. Sir Chas elgrave,le conseillerdes émirsde Bahreïnpendant

trenteetun ans, est arrivéà Bahreïn en 1926. Quelle fut son attitude l'égardde la lutte

d'influences dans cette nouvelle indupétrolière Sesmémoiresne laissentaucun douteàcet

égard: ((L'histoiredes concessions pétrolières danlse golfe Persiqueest, du point de vue de la

Grande-Bretagne, untriste récit.))ehistoryof theoilconcessionsinthePersicGulfis,froma

Britishperspective,asadstory'7(Charles Belgrave,Persona1Column,p. 79(1960).

9. Belgrave fut au courantdu refus de l'hglo-Persian Oil Companyde s'associeravec le

Major Holmes, et écrit que :((Holmesfut souvent traité commepersona non grata par les

Britanniques))"Holmeswasfrequentlytreatedaspersonanongrata by theBritish'yalors que :

((jen'aijamais entenduune explicationconvaincantepourquoiles pétroliers britanniques nities

peuenclinsà entreprendre.))

10. En 1936,le cheikh Hamad de Bahreïn est en voyage officiel en Angleterre. L'émir

rencontrelord Cadman, présidente lahglo-Persian Oil Company - la grandesociétpétrolière

britannique, dont1'Etatdétenait%1desactions,et qui devaitpar la suiterebaptisée la British

Petroleum Company. Belgrave est présentà l'entrevue. Cadman se livre à un "non-stopmonologue",une heuredurant, surlesraisons pour lesquellessa société ne s'estpas intéresséàela

concession à Bahreïn,ce qui, commeBelgravel'écriraplustard, «futcertainementune chosebien

difflcileàexpliquen)["certainlya verydificult mattertoexplain")(ibid.p. 108).

11. En prenant congé delord Cadrnan,l'émirlui dit malicieusement - je cite toujours

Belgrave :«avec presqueun clind'Œil àmonintention :«unjour vousdevriezabsolument medire

pourquoivotre société n'a pas postulpourla concession de Bahreïn))['"withalmosta winkto me:

'someday you musttell me why your Companydid not competefor the Bahrain concession"%

(ibid.)

12.Commenousallonsle voir, la société AngloPersian a préférsé 'allier avec leconsortium

qui était alorsle pluspuissantdumonde, l'IraqPetroleum Company,et celui-ci a plutôt optépour

Qatar.

13.Fennonslaparenthèse.

14. Jusqu'en 1932, lorsque laBAPCO, contre l'attente de nombreux spécialistesf ,it la

premièredécouvertepétrolière du côtéarabedu Golfe,les activités duconcessionnaireaméricain

de Bahreïnn'étaienq t u'exploratoires.

15. La concessionde 1925, qui régissaitces activitésde la BAPCO, pouvait, selon ses

termes,se convertirenlicenced'exploitation, maisaveclacontrainte quele concessionnairedevait

selimiter àunezonede 100000acres(qu'ilpouvait lui-mêmechoisir).

16. Nos adversaires invoquentdeux projets de cartes, tracés avant lanégociation dela

concession de Bahreïn,pour essayer de fairecroire que les îles Hawarne furent pas considérées

comme faisantpartiede Bahreïn.

17.Avant d'allerplus loin,j'expnmerai au nom deBahreïndeuxsérieusesréserves.

18. Premièrement,la Cour ne manquera pas d'être frappée pa lr caractèreinsolite de

l'argumentairede Qataràcepropos.

19. Un hommevient avec un projet de contrat, cartede la zone convoitéecomprise. Le

conseil de Qatar croit utile de faireobserver commesi cela avait le moindre intérê -t que le

projet de contrat est, de manière unilatérale«dûment signé par FrankHolmes et sa signature

authentifiée))(CR 200016,trad.fi., p. 15,par.30) 20. Mais ce qui importe,c'est que le projet n'est pas acceptépar le souverain deBahreïn.

Les annéespassent,les décenniesaussi,et soixante-dix-septansplus tard on nous dit quece projet

de contrat, établi unilatéralemeptar un néo-zélandaisà l'égardduquel ce n'est pas une injure

de dire que sa seule motivation futcommerciale- on nous dit donc qu'il convientde donnerdu

poids à cette propositionjaunie et non retenue dans la détermination del'étendue desfrontières

d'une nation arabe contemporaine. Si la litote était demise, je dirais que ceci est plutôt

déconcertant.

21. Deuxièmementl ,eshommes del'ornoirn'ontjamais eula réputation d'êtd esenfants de

chŒur. Juger plutôt vous-mêmes d l'étatd'esprit dufameuxMajor Holmes lorsqu'il écrit à un

investisseuraméricain potentiel. Il s'agitde savoir si lesautoritésbritanniquesvont approuverune

nouvelleconcession àBahreïn au-delàdes 100000 acres. LesAméricainsne veulentpas montrer

leurscartesaux autoritésanglaises.Holmesmanifesteson désaccord comme suit:

«Il me paraît qu'il est préférable'être trèosuvert dans nos rapports avec le

Political Resident du golfe Persique afin d'éviter toutseuggestion que nous nous
cachons,ou que nous avons quelquechose à cacher;on fera bien de se rappeler que
ces fonctionnairesne sont pas des gens techniqueset que pour eux les cartes ne
veulent pas dire grand chose. Ceci expliquepourquoije n'ai pascherché à garder
secrètes les cartes de Bahremin.» (Lettre du 20 avril 1928, citéin T.E. Ward,
Negotiationsfor Oil Concession nBahrain,El Hasa, TheNeutra1Zone,Qatarand
Kuwait, p. 65 (1960)),BahrainSupplementaryDocumentssubmitted1March2000,

p. 166.)

22. Bref,montronsnos cartes,ilsn'ycomprendrontrien.

23. Mon propos est des plus sérieux. Est-cequ'on peut imaginer une seconde que la

souverainetéde 1'Etatde Bahreïndoit dépendre de documentsrestés lettre morte,préparés pad res

hommes d'affairesdont l'opacitéraffinée,semble-t-il,est une seconde nature - et qui ne furent

absolumentpas habilités àtrancher desquestions frontalières? La question estbien évidemment

rhétorique.

24. Cesréservesémises, poursuivons toud te même l'analysd ee ce que Qataressaye de faire

accroire.

25. Le premierprojetde cartequ'on vous amontré le30 mai dernier (CR 200016,trad. fr.,

p. 15, par. 30)se trouveannexé à un projetde concessionde 1923,que voici. Vous le trouverez

égalementau numéro 67 dudossierd'audience. 26. Selon Qatar,la zoneprévuepour la concession,telle que mise enrelief ici, indiquela

non-appartenance desîlesHawar à Bahreïn.

27. Maisil n'en estrien. L'article 1du projet deconcession,reproduitdans votre dossier

d'audience,expliqueque cettemiseen reliefavait pour fonctionde définirunezone appelée"The

BahrainIslands". Rienne prouve que Holmesavaitneserait-ceque songéauxîlesHawar;il serait

absurdedeprétendre qu'ialvaituneidée précisseur leurappartenance.

28. Deuxièmement,le Qatar se référeà une carte presque identique qui porte la rubrique

"Mapprepared by Major Holmes". Vous en trouverezune copie au numéro68 du dossier

d'audience. Encoreune fois,cette cartene faitquemontrerles limites d'uneconcession potentielle

sur une partie duterritoire de l'émre Bahreïn. Elle n'avaitpas pour but d'indiquerles limites

territorialesde Bahreïn et son auteur n'avait certainementplautoritépours'yaventurer.

29. Mais il y abien plus grave. Le conseil Qatara déclaré devant cetteCour que cette

carte futétablieparHolmesen 1928,soit cinqans plustard»(CR200016,trad.fr.,p. 16,par.31)

que lapremièrecarte.

30. Puisqueles deuxcartes,selonQatar, sont identiquesbid.),il y auraitdoncconfirmation

que l'étenduegéographique de Bahreïnétaitcomprise,avantet aprèsla signaturedu contratde

concessionen 1925,comme excluant les Hawar.

31.Je suisauregret dedireàla Cour que l'affirmatiode Qatarest fausse. Cettedeuxième

carte n'étaitpas postérieure la signaturede la concessionen 1925,mais bien antérieure.Elle

date,en véritét,oujours, comme la première, de 19D.anssonouvrage Arabia 'Frontiers(1991)

M. Wilkinsonétablitlavéritéd'une manière très nettttrèssimple. Lacarteenquestionestparue

dans un livre publiéen 1928 (no69 de votre dossierd'audience) (A. Rihani, Ibn Sa'oud of

Arabia(1)),mais aveclamention explicitede sonorigineen 1923. Qatarprésentedoncdemanière

trompeuse la date de publicationcomme étant la dated'origine. Ce n'est pas, disons-le,très

sérieux. De toutemanière,comme onvient dele voir,ni l'uneni l'autre decescartesn'indiquent

queles Hawarnefontpaspartie deBahreïn.

32. Si Qatar estainsi absolumentincapablede prouverque les signatairesde la concession

de 1925 avaient à l'espritque lesHawarne relevaientpas de Bahreïn,pour sa part, Bahrein setrouvedans la positionavantageusedepouvoirprouverle contraire,et ce grâceàun documenttout

à faitdécisif.

33. Il s'agit d'unetroisièmecarte, que Qatar s'est bien gardéde vous montrer, celle-ci

reproduitedans un livre publiéen 1965par M. ThomasWard sous le titre Negotiationsfor Oil

Concessionsin Bahrain,El Hasa (SaudiArabia),the NeutralZone, Qatarand Kuwait (Bahrain

SupplementaryDocuments submitted1March2000,p. 166). M. Wardfut un proche collaborateur

du major Holmes à partir des annéesvingt. Il a notammentreprésenté ce dernier dans les

négociationsavec les sociétés pétrolièraséricainesqui ont frnipar racheter saconcession.Le

livre deM. Ward, longde 296 pages, démontrq eue sa collaborationavec le MajorHolmes fut

étroiteet de longue durée. Ajoutonqsue M. Wardlui-même fut un éminent industrielméricain,

commel'attestele fait qu'il aitétélumembredu Council of Foreign Relations des Etats-Unis,

ainsi que The American PetroleumInstitute. Mais ce qui m'intéresse le plus, c'est qu'il fut

également Fellowde la Royal Geographical Society d'Angleterreou les Américains n'ont jamais

étépléthoriques. Quant à la carte qui figure toutau début de son livre, ous la voyezici (et

égalemena tu no70de votredossier d'audience).Alorsque les deuxcartesprécédentes indiquaient

seulementque lesîles Hawar ne devaientpas êtreconcernéespar la concessionenvisagée, cette .

carteconsidèreclairementque les îlesHawarfont partie deBahreïn. Une notationsur cettecarte

nousexpliqueque :

«Ceciestune copiede la carte originalutiliséeau coursde la négociationdes
concessionspétrolièresà Bahreïn, à Hasa (Arabie saoudite),la Zone Neutre, et le
Koweït.)) (Lesitaliquessont demoi.)

["This is a copy ofthe originalmap used in the courseof negotiating, the
Bahrain,Hasa(SaudiArabia), Neutral Zone andKuwaitoilconcessions. '7

34. Ici une volonté d'indiquerl'appartenance desîles Hawar est manifeste. Elles

apparaissent indiscutablement comme unies à Bahreïn; elles figurentsans aucun doutepossible

commefaisantpartie d'une concession potentielloectroyéepar Bahreïn. Vousavezpu observerle

contrasteentreles Hawaret la péninsuldeQatar.

35. Commenosadversaireseux-mêmelsereconnaissent :

«Holmesconnaissaitintimementlarégion àcausede sonactivitédans lesecteur
pétrolier, etsonopiniona parconséquentun poidsconsidérable.» ["Holmeswas intimatelyfamiliarwith theareaas a resultof hisworkinthe oil

sector, and his views therefore have considerable weight." (Reply of
Qatar,para.4.105).

36. Il est à peine nécessairede soulignerque l'on s'attachera plus volontiersà ce que les

deux Parties avaientdevantleursyeuxlorsqu'ellesont conclu laconcessiondéfinitive, c'est-à-dire

celle de 1925, celle-làmêmequi fut la pierre angulairede toute l'industriepétrde Bahreïn,

qu'à ce que leMajorHolrnestout seul auraitpu penser ou ignorer dans un premier temps,

avantde négocier lconcession.

37. Unepetite parenthèse encor, aiscelle-ciest d'uneimportance primordiale.

38.Qatara oséaffier queBahre'ïna seulementconçul'idée de réclamerles îlesawar à la

suite de manŒuvresdolosives de sir CharlesBelgrave au milieu des annéestrente. Maisvous

venez de voir la preuveque les îles Hawar étaientlt bienconsidéréecsomme faisant partiede

Bahreïn dixans plus tôt à une époque oùlejeune Belgraven'avait pasencorefoulé lesol de

Bahreïn.

39. Ainsi sommes-nous confrontéàtroiscartesdont nouspouvons tirer uneconclusion très

peu surprenante:les zones d'une concession pétrolière ne correspondent pas nécessaireaent

limitesdutemtoire national.

40. En revanche, lorsque ceux qui ((connaissent intimement)ne régionnégocientavec

l'idée qu'un groupde'îles trèsdistincles îles Hawar peuvent faire partied'une concession,

ceci s'appelle unereconnaissance explicitequel'autoritéauteur dela concessionpotentielle estbel

et bienmaîtredes lieux.

ENSEIGNEMEN DETSNÉGOCIATIONS DESANNÉES TRENTE

41. La spectaculaire découveree 1932 au centre de la grandeîle de Bahre-n suscite

évidemment biendes convoitises. Tout le monde comprend qu'il y adeux zones où l'onpeut

imaginer de nouvellesconcessions

- d'une part,bien sûr la presqu'île de Qatar, où le cheikh Abdullah Al-Thani se trouve

rapidementenpourparlersavec1'Anglo-PersianOilCompanyqui s'estréveillée;

- mais d'autre part, il y a égalementune opportunité intéressantà Bahreeinmême,car la

concession octroyéen 1925au MajorHolmes,et maintenantcédée àla BAPCO,ne couvrait

pas la totalitéde Bahreïn; le concessionnaireattitrédevait choisir ses 100000 acres, laissant ainsi disponibletout le reste du territoire nationalue tout le monde afin par appeler

"theunallottedarea" (indiquons que la grandeîle de Bahreïn à elle seule représenteune

superficiede142000 acres).

42. Nous voyons à présent surgiune Anglo-PersianOil Companyqui ne (traîne plus les

pieds». Dansles quelques mois qui suivent l'éclatante découverte ldaeBAPCO à Bahreïn,

1'Anglo-Persianobtientun droitexclusifd'exploitationducheikhAbdullahde Qatar. Lepersonnel

de 1'Anglo-Persianne se préoccupepas trop des nuances frontalières. Le Political Agent

britanniquerelèveque :

«les explorateursde la Anglo-Persian au Qatar txaminé des endroitsoù le cheikh
deQatar n'avaitaucundroit de leslaisseraller»

['Theexplorers ofAnglo-Persianin Qatar haveexaminedplaces whichthe Rulerof
Qatarhadnoright to allowthemtogo'y

alorsque,comme ille note,

«il est dit que pas plus tard que l'an dernier(1932) lecheikh de Qatar a admis
publiquementque certainesrégions sula côte deQatarappartiennent Bahreïn))

["it is said thatas Iateas last year (1932)theRulerof Qataradmittedinpublic that
certainareas on theQatar coastpertain to Bahruin"(contre-mémoire de Bahreïn,
par.215;ibid.,vol. 2, annexe59).

43. Quantà la "unallottearea"deBahre'ïn,le cheikhHamedentamedesnégociations avec

la BAPCO. Mais en juin 1933,la société Anglo-Persia aussidéclareson désir depostulerpour

cettezonedisponibleàBahreïn.

44. Or, il est dans l'intdte la Grande-Bretagnequel'extensiondes droitsde la BAPCO

soit la plus réduitepossible. Une façon de restreindre l'américaine BAPCe st d'exclureles

îlesHawardel'extension qu'elleenvisage.

45. Le cheikh Harnad de Bahreïn acceptel'idéeque la BAPCO pourrait être exclu des

îles Hawar mais nelaisse aucundoute lorsqu'ilfait observàl'ActingPoliticalAgentque : «ces

îlessont des dépendancesde Bahreïn»["theseislandsarethedependenciesof Bahrain "J(message

du30juillet 1933,mémoire deQatar, annexe111.86v,ol.6,p.445).

46. Personnene demandealors à Bahreïnde confirmer sontitre.L'idéeque lerégimedes

Al-Thani à Doha pourrait revendiquer lesîles n'effleurepersonne,et ceci quandbien mêmela

sociétéAnglo-Persianaurait intérêtàce qu'ille fasse. Aprèstout, elle s'apprêà acquérirdesdroits sur l'ensemble duterritoireAl-Thani. Elle a donctout intéà faire admettreuneétendue

maximale du côté de Qatar - plutôt qued'êtretributaire d'une négociationncore incertainedu

côtéde Bahreïn, où ily a uneconcurrente.

47. Nous arrivons à la fin 1933. Bahreïn n'a signé niavec la BAPCO, ni avec

1Anglo-Persianpour la "unallottedarea". AinsiBahreïnn'a-t-il encoroctroyéaucundroitsur les

îlesHawar.

48. Sur ces entrefaites, laBAPCOexerceson optionselon la concession initiale-celle de

1925-et choisit 100000 acres, sans surprise, sur la grandeîle de Bahreïn où elle a déjà son

gisement. Lazonechoisiepar laBAPCOest celle-ci,quevous verrez également au numéro 7 du

dossier d'audience. Le reste de la grande île se trouve toujours disponible en tant que

"unallottedarea"-mais ceci est vrai aussi,et surtout,pour les autresdépendances terresetes

maritimesde Bahreïn,y comprislesîlesHawar.

49. En 1935,la société Anglo-Persian, présentesur le terrain Qatar depuis deux ans,

formalise saconcessionavecle cheikh AbdullahAl-Thanide Doha. Il est instructifde placercette

concessiondans son contextegéographique.J'attirel'attentionde la Coursur une noteécritepar

M. Rende1du Foreign Officeen 1934 (21février1934,contre-mémoire de Bahreïn, annexe 67,

vo1.2,p. 220)que voustrouverezaunuméro72 du dossierd'audience.

50. Premièrement,à la page221,nousvoyonsqu'ils'agitde «lYAnglo-Persian agissantpour

IPC»(Iraq Petroleum Company).

51. Deuxièmement,à la mêmepage 221, au paragraphe 4, M. Rende1note que lesseuls

dangerssont ceuxque constituentd'unepartIbn Saudetd'autre partdestribusde l'intérieur.

52. Troisièmement,à la page222,au coursd'une discussionsur les conséquences possibles

silaGrande-Bretagnen'offraitpassaprotection au cheikhAbdullah, M. Rende1écrit :

«dans la pratique, ilsera impossiblepour lui [le cheikh Abdullah]de protéger la
compagnie[pétrolière]de manièreefficaceàmoinsque nous le laissionsdévelopper
des forcesplus effectivesque celles dont il disposeprésent. Ceci serait de toute
manièreimpossible, car dece que noussavonsdu cheikh il n'est guèrequ'un grand
marchand et son temtoire est trèsfaiblement habitépar les tribus sur lesquelles il
paraît exerceruncontrôletrèslâche.»

53. Ce n'est pas Bahreïn quile dit- c'estM. Rendel. Et la descriptionne date pas du

XIXesiècle,maisde 1934. Quoiqu'ilensoit,la conclusionsetrouve àla finde cettenote: ((dansl'ensembledescirconstances["inal1thecircumstances'l], meilleureapproche
serait d'autoriser lePoliticalResidentdu golfe Persiqueà proposerau cheikh une
protectionintégraleecontrepartiede la concessiond'IPC[IraqPetroleum Company]

selonlapropositioninitiale)).

54. Voici sousquelle condition Qatarsigne en 1935. Or, ce contrat deconcessionne se

limiteàaucune zone spécifiquemais seréfêrà e((l'ensemblede la zonesous l'autorité du cheikh

ainsiqu'indiquéaunorddela lignetracée surla carteannexée au présent contrat))hewhole area

over whichthe Shaikhrules and whichis markedon the northof the line drawnon themap

attachedtothisAgreement'y(mémoire deBahreïn,vol. 3,annexes104et 105).

55. Voici la carteannexée quevous avez déjàvueplus d'une fois.Elle est remarquableà

deux titres. D'abord,la seulefrontièreest tracéeau sud dela péninsule.,eule cettefrontière a

été négociéeentre la Grande-Bretagneet lesAl-Thani,auxquelsle Gouvernementbritanniquea

promissa protectioncontretoute attaque d'Ibn Sauden contrepartie-justement - du choixdu

concessionnairebritannique.

56.Au nord decetteligne,la concessionest définie comme couvran le "areaonwhichthe

Sheikhrules". Or, queje sache, lesAl-Thanine furent maîtresni du Koweït,ni de l'îleprincipale

de Bahreïn-pourtant tousdeux setrouvent au nordde cette lign- et pas non plusmaîtresdes

îles Hawar. Cette observation futd'ailleurs aussicellede Rende1de l'IndiaOfficelorsqu'il a

répondu à M. John Skliros,le GeneralManagerdu concessionnairebritannique lorsquecelui-ci

voulaitfaire admettreen 1936 que lesHawarfaisaient partiede sa concessionàQatar; vendredi

dernierje vousailula réponsesèchede M. Rende1 :

"itsobject[of themapattachedto theQatarConcession] wasto definethesouthern

boundaryof theConcession. Incidentallyit marksthe BahrainIslandsas well as
Hawar"(mémoirede Bahreeina,nnexe248,vol.5,p. 1076).

57.Deuxièmeaspectqui retiendranotre attentionàpropos de cettecarte, le réseauroutier y

figurantconfirmed'une manière nette que laartiehabitéede Qatarétait concentrésur la côteest

duQatarloinde Zubarah,loin desîlesHawar.

58.La société Anglo-Persiancède presque immédiatemes nt concessionàune filialede la

puissanteIraq PetroleurnCompany - baséeà Londres - où sont réunies principalemendt'abord .

1'Anglo-Persianelle-mêmea,insi quela RoyalDutch Shell,la compagnie françaisede pétroles,et

un groupe américain. Cette filialede l'Iraq Petroleum Companys'appellera PetroleumConcessions Ltd.(ou PCL),c'est donc ce vocable «PCL» qui figure très souvent dans les

documents à partirde 1935.

59. Retenons queles seuls intérêtsnglais sont du côde PCL, la BAPCO étant à 100%

américaine.

60. A en croire les documents de l'époque,le GeneralManager de PCL, à savoir

M. Skliros,devait avoir uneénergieformidable,tant il semble être parptour faire avancerles

intérêts dsa société.Aussitôtqu'il a obtenula concessiondu côté duQatar disons ducôtédes

Al-Thani-il se porte candidat pour la "unallottedarea" de Bahreïn, donc y compris les

îles Hawar.

61. Dansce contexte,la plus grande prudence s'imposeà Bahrein. Car tout en postulant

pour la "unallottedarea"de Bahrein,M. Skliros,si je puis dire, ne perd pas le nord; sans être

historien, sans avoir une ((connaissancetirne))de la région,sans avoir lu les rapports du

capitaineBrucks(de 1829)etduPoliticalResidentPrideaux(de 1909)àla suite deleursvisitessur

lesîlesHawar,sanslamoindreindicationqu'ily est allélui-même,M. Skiiros,danscettelettreque

nousavonsvue vendredi dernier (mémoir dee Qatar,annexe111.104,ol. 7, p. 21)'déclareque lui

et sa sociétésont d'avsueles îles Hawarappartenaientau cheikhde Qatar. Ceci auraitmisPCL

immédiatemend tans la positiond'avoirtouslesdroits surHawar,donc sans avoire préoccuper

de la concurrence de la BAPCO-contrairement à la situation dans les zones appartenantà

Bahrein.

62. Le Political Agent local ainsi que le Political Resident,c'est-à-direle plus haut

fonctionnaire britanniquedans le Golfe, se penchentsur la question. Ils concluent que les

souverains successifs de Bahreïn "exercisedactive jurisdiction"aux îles Hawar ((jusqu'à

aujourd'hui» (contre-mémoirede Bahreïn, par. 236). Le Gouvernementbritannique accepte

l'analyse deses représentant,t informeM. Skliros,qui avaitposéla question,que c'estBahrein

qui détient la souverainetur les îles Hawar(contre-mémoire deBahrein, par.253).En même

temps,la Grande-Bretagneprend la précautionde préciserque sa décisionn'avait qu'uneportée

limitée, ece sens qu'elle pourraitêtre modifsiun prétendant pouvaitrouver ses droits surles

îles (lettrede 1'IndiaOffiàePCL, 14septembre1936,contre-mémoire de Bahreïn,annexe 79).C'est une manièrede dire à M. Skliros que ce n'est pas à lui de se porter volontaire pour

revendiquerdesdroitsaunomd'un cheikh qui ne s'est pa encoremanifesté.

63. Au cours des trois annéesqui suivent, PCL se voit ainsi contrainte de traiter avec

Bahreïn,et en concurrenceavecla BAPCO. Toutle long deces négociationsl,es îlesHawarainsi

que les autreîles, récet eauxduGolfede Bahreïn sont considéré pasr tou- parBahreïn,parla

Grande-Bretagne,et par les deux groupes pétroliers- comme faisant partiede Bahreïn. Trois

illustrationsseulement:

- En 1937 et 1938, l'idéeest lancée que l'on pourrap itartager la "unallottedarea"entre la

BAPCOet PCL. Pour sa part,la BAPCOse verraitattribuerles zones,décrites aunuméro 73

du dossierd'audience,suret autourde la grandeîle deBahreaïn.Elles sontmises enreliefsur

cette carte de la BAPCO, préparée en 1938, qui figure égalem aentuméro74 du dossier

d'audience. Quant àPCL,ses droitscomprennentleszonesdécritesaunuméro 75du dossier

d'audience,lesquelles-vous le voyez à l'écran- s'étendent à partir de Janan, la plus

méridionale desîles Hawar, pourcouvrirFashtal Dibalet l'ensembledesîles, récifset eauxà

l'intérieudupérimètre constitué paletracé despointsa)jusqu'à 9.

- En second lieu,avec sonprojet delicence(draftlease)proposéàl'émirde Bahreïn(lettrede

1'IndiaOffice auPoliticalAgent,28 avril 1938,àlaquellesetrouventjointsle projetde licence

de PCL ainsique deuxcartes; mémoire de Bahreïn a,nnexe337),PCLsoumet lesdeuxcartes

que vous trouverez au numéro76 du dossier d'audienceainsi que sur l'écrandemèremoi.

PCLpropose maintenant eneffetdeuxzones, lapremièreau nord dela grande île de Bahreiïn,

la secondedans le Golfe de Bahreïn. Cette secondezone couvre lesîles Hawar, ycompris

Janan, FashtalDibal,et évidemmenQ t it'atJaradah,àl'ouest deDibal.

- Troisièmement,encore une autre proposition dePCL, celle-ci intitulée"1939 : TheLeased

Area: HawarIsland". Vous trouverezune copie de la cartejointe à cette propositionau

numéro77 du dossier d'audience. L'article1 du projet de concessiondéfinit lazone que

Bahreïndonneraitenconcession commeincluantlesîles Hawar, y compris Janan. Vousvoyez

sur la carte que Janan figure, sans discussionpossible, dans la zone qui serait concédée

(contre-mémoird ee Bahreïn,annexe 104). 64.Les négociations portansturla unallottedarea, y cornprislesHawar, entre Bahreïnet les

deux concurrentes, laBAPCO et PCL, se poursuiventen parallèle avec l'instruction,par les

autorités britanniques, du contentieux introduitercheikhAbdullahdeQatarenmai 1938.

65. En février 1939,Bahreïn décide que la propositionldaeBAPCO pourl'intégralité de la

unallottedarea est laplus avantageuse (contre-mémoirede Bahreïp na,r.279).

66. Prenant note de cette décision, le Gouvernement britannique déclare

précautionneusement àtous lesintéresséq sue la question desavoir si les îles Hawarfont partiede

la concessionde Bahreïn dépend de l'issue de la procédureengagéeau sujetde la souverainetésur

ces îles (contre-mémoire de Bahreïn, par. 281-287).Rappelons que si le Gouvernement

britannique avait eul'intention cyniquede déterminelasouverainetédesîlesHawaren fonctionde

sesintérêts propres,liels aurait logiquement accordéeasucheikh Abdullah de Qatar,qui avaitdéjà

octroyé àune sociétébritanniqueunc eoncessionexclusiveportantsurl'intégralitéde sonterritoire.

67. La décision britannique reconnaissan lt souverainetéde Bahreïn sur les îles Hawar

intervient aumois de juillet 1939. Onze moisplus tard, en juin 1940,les discussions entrela

BAPCOet Bahreïn aboutissentet la concessionde la BAPCOest modifiéede sorte quela société

américaine détiendra désormais un droit s lernsemble des territoires de Bahre'iny compris

évidemmentles îles Hawar.

68. Quelquesmotspour finirau sujet del'activitépétrolisurplace danslesîles Hawar.

69. L'exploration menép ear la BAPCOau coursdes annéesquaranteet jusqu'en 1949,y

comprisdes forages,n'arévélé aucune structuregéologiqueintéressante.

70. Cettedéception a mis un freinaux activités exploratoirejsusqu'en 1961,date àlaquelle

Le site des
les foragessont entreprisà nouveau. Un Geological Programme détaillé est arrêté.

foragesest établi sur Sawad Shamaliyah.

71. LessociétéC s onocoet SuperiorOil sont invitéesàparticiper;elles nonplus ne trouvent

aucun signe encourageant. Les recherches continuent jusqu'à aujourd'hui,dans l'espoir que lestechniques nouvelles de la géophysique vontmodifier les données,mais pour l'instant iln'y a

aucuneindicationqu'une reprisedeforagescoûteuxseraitjustifiée.

72. Si les îles Hawar figurent explicitementdans les zones couvertespar les concessions

octroyéespar Bahreïn,il paraît toutaussi significatifquecesîles, y comprisJanan, sonttout aussi

explicitementexcluesdesconcessionsdeQatarsignéesdepuisla sentencebritanniquede 1939.

73. Ainsi,la concession donnée la SouthEast Asia Oil and Gas Companyen 1970,je dis

bien 1970 (QatarSupplemental Document 30)exclut la "Hawar Area". Un gros plan dela zone

concédée autour des îles Hawar figure au numéro78 du dossier d'audience. L'annexeB

(ExhibitB) de la concession précise que leslimites de la Hawar Area sont approximatives,

"PendingFinal Agreemenw t ith BahrainGovernment".Vous avez cet extrait au numéro 79 du

dossierd'audience.

74. Exactementle même procédéfut employépar Qatardans une autre concession,celle-ci

de 1973. Encore une fois, la Hawar Areaest exclue "PendingFinalAgreementwith Bahrain

Government" (Memorialof Qatar, Vol.5, Annex11.66). Ce gros plan figure au numéro 80 du

dossier d'audience. L'annexe B(ExhibitB) répètla formuleque nousvenonsde voir; vous avez

cet extraitaunuméro 81du dossierd'audience.

CARTES PÉTROLIÈRES - CONCLUSIONS

Monsieurleprésident, Madame etMessieursles Membresdela Cour.

- Depuis les annéevingt,lesîlesHawaront été considéré cosmme partie intégranee Bahreïn

tant au cours desnégociatioavecles sociétés pétrolières quaens les accordsde concession

signés.

- Janana toujoursété considércéoemme partieintégrantedesîlesHawar.

- Au moins à partir des années trente, lesîles et récifs dugolfe de Bahreïn, y compris

Fasht alDibaletQit'atJaradah,ontété considérécosmmepartie intégrantedeBahreïn.

75. Ceci nous amène, Monsieurle président,à la fin de nos explicationssur les parties

terrestresdece différend.

76.11se trouveque la question descartespétrolièreseje viens d'examinerest unebonne

transition,car les activitéspétrolise déroulentbien sûr, égalementdans les zonesmaritimes.Elles ont égalementdes implications pour Fashtal Dibal et Qit'atJaradah. Je vous remerciede

l'attentionquevous avez bien voulu prêteàmes propos,et vous demande,à votre convenance,

peut-êtreaprèslapause, de donner la parole au profesr ichaelReisman.

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercieMaîtrePaulsson. Laséanceestsuspendue pourun quart

d'heure.

L'audienceestsuspenduede 16 h20à 16h 45.

Le PRESIDENT :Veuillez vous asseoir. La séanceest reprise etje donne la parole au

professeurReisman.

Mr. REISMAN:

MARITIM 1E

1.Thankyou, Mr. President, Members ofthe Court. Bahrainnow comesto its presentation

of the maritimesectionsof its case.have been assigned the taskof reviewing thephysicaland

political geographyof Bahrain, its characterizationin internationalmaritime boundarylaw and

questionsof sovereignty.Thereafier,my colleague,ProfessorWeil,will elaboratethe generallaw

that govemsthispart of thedisputeand itspecificapplicationto the unusual featuresof thiscase,

along with our more detailed critique of Qatar'scase. When ProfessorWeil has concludedhis

presentation,1 will, with the indulgence of the Court, briefly set out the maritime boundary

submissionsofBahrain.

Specialfeaturesof thiscase

2. Thiscaseis unusual for a number ofreasons:

(a) The Courtmust delimita boundary between a continental Statend a multiple island Stateor,

as it is nowcalled, an archipelagicState,whenthe States arecoastally oppositeand adjacent.

Although the Parties disagree on whether certain maritime features are islands or parts of

islandsand,as a result, constitute partsof Bahrain, therehardly be controversyoverthe

factthatBahrainis factuallyanarchipelago and Qatar a contineltate.(b) The distancesbetweenthe two Statesin the southem or lower half ofthe delimitationarea

concem territorialwaters andthey are, moreover,very small. Therefore,in contrastto most

past cases,thereis very littleroomfor adjustment left tothe Court here.A slightadjustment

from the true medianline to the east movesfurtherinto Qatar'sclaimed territorial waters; a

slight adjustmentto the west moves Mer into Bahrain's claimed territoril atersor even

into Bahrainiinsular territory.

(c) The thirdunusualfeatureis thatthe 1947letters flitthroughthe case likea phantom. Though

they werenot anarbitralawardandneitherParty everaskedforor accepted them, Qatarrelies

on them fromtime to time in differentways; and they appearto have been assigned special

importanceinProfessor Salmon'spresentation.

(d) Fourth, the Court'sdispositionof the territorial issue- the Hawars and Zubarah- will

significantlyaffectthe maritimeboundary,as the cardinallegalprinciplehere is that the land

dominatesthe sea. Until the Courtdetermines to whom the land belongs, our submissions

must be made inthe alternative, each premisedon a different possible territorialcisionby

the Court. If the CourtrestoresZubarahto Bahrain,Bahrain'saggregatecoastwith respectto

Qatar would dictatea particularmaritime delimitationin the southern sector.But ifthe Court

were todecidenotto returnZubarah,Bahrain,depnvedofitscontinental possessions, couldi,f

it wished, be an archipelago within the meaning of Part IV of the 1982Law of the Sea

Convention or altematively, if Bahrain did not elect to take PartIV status under the

Convention,simply adefacto archipelagicStatewithnormalbaselines. Each oftheseoptions

requires consideration of different legalquestions,which, we understand,can be complex.

We wiIltryto makeit asclearaspossibleandweapologizeinadvanceforthetravail caused.

Determiningthe coasts

3. A fundamentalissuehereisthe coasts, or,asProfessor Quéneudes caid,"theidentification

ofthe pertinentcoasts"[((l'identificationdes côtsertinentes))]'.Howthis issueandthe question

of the pearling banks is decided will largely determine the location of the median line. The

goveminglegal principlesherearenotthoseproposedby Qatar. 4. Qatar, as 1 said, is a continental State. Given its geography,the determinationof the

daturnnecessary for delimitation of maritimeareas off its western coastis quite simple. Under

Article5 of the 1982Conventionand its predecessorsin the 1958Convention, itis the low-water

line along the coast. But in its maritime presentation,Qatar has shifted to the line of highest

astronomicaltide todescribeits owncoasts. Asthe Courtknows, thishasnot beendonebeforefor

thiskindof delimitationpurposeand hasnobasisinArticle5 ofthe 1982Convention.

5. Now international law allows a Statei,n determining its own coastline, to waive the

low-water line and, if it wishes, to set its coastlineat the high-water mark. Bahrain has no

objection,in principle,withthe unusualsystemQatarhas elected to describeits own coast. But

Bahrain must observe to the Courtthatthetheory oflawwhichQatar insistsrequiresthe use of the

highest astronomicaltide is without foundationin internationallaw and is explicitly against the

holdingsof this Court. Professor Quéneudec States,withoutany citationof authority, that«là où

n'existeas de laissedepleine mer,il nesauraitêtre questiondeparlerde ligne decôte»2:nohigh

water,no coastline. In the Anglo-NorwegianFisheriescase, the Court said "Whatmatters, what

really constitutes the Norwegian coast line, is the outer line of the ~skjaer~aard'."~If

Professor Quéneudew c erecorrect, therecouldbe nosuchouterline. Qatar'stacticalobjectivehere

is obvious: to drive thecoast of Bahrainas far west as-possible. There is no legal basis to its

theory. It is Article 5 that governs.Thelow-waterlineisdispositive.

6.Babrain,as1said,is a multiple islandStateor,as it is now called,an archipelagicState: a

groupof islands,including parts of islands, interconnectigatersandothernaturalfeatureswhich

are so closely interrelatedthat such islands, waters andother natural features form an intrinsic

geographical, economicandpolitical entity,or whichhavehistoricallybeen regarded as such. As

the Court well knows, internationallaw'sdefinitionof amultipleislandState oran archipelagoand

of the new legal statusof the "archipelagic State" hasevolved since the 1920s,in work by the

Institutde Droit International,the International Law Association, the Arnerican Law Institute, the

'lbid., atpara.18.
3~nglo-~orwegianFisheria 18IL86,90.HagueCodificationConference of1930andtheInternationalLawcommission4. Theconceptwas

reworkedby the Arbitral TribunalinIslandofPalmasand by theInternational Court of Justice in

Anglo-NorwegianFisheries,and it ultimately was embeddedin a specialoptionalrégimein the

1982Lawof the Sea Convention.By the timeof the Third Lawof the SeaConvention,the basic

concept ofthe archipelagicStatehad beenaccepted:

"agroup of islanris,includingparts of islands, interconnecting watersand other
naturalfeatures whichare so closelyinterrelatedthatsuchislands. watersandother
natural featuresfonn an intrinsic geographical, economicand political entity, or

which historicallyhave beenregardedassuch''.

7.The innovationof the 1982Convention wasnotthe recognitionoftheessentialreality and

unique legalrequirementsof multiple island Statesw , hich had already been accomplished,but

ratherthe provisionforthe largeorspatially extensive multiple island State that, hencefoth,uld

encloselarge areas of theretofore highseas by means of what were to be called"archipelagic"

baselinesthat it couldclaim. Bearin mind: waterslyinglandward of straight baselines ornormal

baselinesare intemalwaters,effectivelyassimilatedto the sovereigntyof the Stateand subjectto

no intemationaluser rights whatsoever. So the extensive multipleisland State,by intemalizing

vast maritime areas that were until then high seas or maritime zones still subject to major

internationaluser rights,could pose ahreattoother,equallyimportant transitpoliciesof thelawof

the sea. The optional régime ofPartIV is a compromise: a State that is geographically

archipelagicmay declare itself such, whereuponit may draw straight baselines of 100nautical

miles in length, 3 per cent of which mayextendto 125nauticalmiles, and it may encloselarge

oceanspaces up to an extremely generous9:1 ratio of oceanspaceto land, but - and this is an

extremelyimportant "but"-the waterssoenclosedare notinternal, subjectto thefull sovereignty

of the coastal State. The enclosed waters remain subject to a right of innocent passage and

archipelagic sea lanes passage for international users, and sovereignty over the waters is

subordinatedto the terms of the 1982Convention. So some multiple island States that could

become"archipelagicStates"withinthe meaningof the 1982Conventionmayfind thattheyhave

4~ee Certain LegalAspects Concerningthe Delimitationof the Temtorial Waters of Archipelagos
(AICONF1 . 3/18(1957)UNCLOS 1,OFF.Rec289); see alsoArchipelagic States:LegislativeHistotyofPartNof the
UnitedNations Convention onLawoftheSea(1990).

'~rt46, UnitedNationsLawoftheSeaConvention1982.more control over the waters in their State merelyby virtue of their geographical configuration

without resorting tothe option offeredby PartV; indeed,exercisingthat option would actually

give them less control and imposeconsiderablymore internationalresponsibilitieson them. A

multiple-island Statethat couldbutdoesnot declareitselfarchipelagicunderPartIVdoesnotcease

to be archipelagic forthat reason. Its archipelagicstatusis a geographicalfact, with whichit and

therest of theworldmust contend. Butwhen it comesto delimiting itsmaritime zones, itmay not

use archipelagicbaselines; itmust use what the 1982Convention calls, in Article5, "normal

baselines".

8. The legal coast of a multiple-island State is comprised of the lines connecting its

outermostislandsand othernaturalfeatures. This external perirneteris its legal coast. Thees

that producethe externalperimeterprovidethe baselinesfor its territorialsea. Relevanttemtorial

seabasepointsarealsoderivedfromthelegalcoastforpurposesof calculatingthe medianlinewith

an oppositeoradjacentState. 1emphasizethat theseare "normalbaselines"withinthe meaningof

Article 5andnot the permissive baselines of100to 125nautical miles,which wouldbe available

only to a multiple-island Statethat declared itself archipelagicunPar IV. So these normal

baselines areavailableto a multiple-islandState or what Qatar has called aacto archipelago,

which has not elected to declare itself "archipelagic"undePar IV. These normal, Article5,

baselines have to be used inorder to determine the legalcoast of a multiple-islandor defacto

archipelagicState.

Qatar'sobjectionstoBahrain'sarchipelagicstatusandfeatures

9. So,Mr. President, Membersof the Court,the cntical questionin determiningBahrain's

coast with respect to Qatar is what are its basepoints. But before wensider the elements of

defacto archipelago- againtouse Qatar's expression- and serveas its
Bahrainthatcompriseits

basepoints, letme correct a misstatementby Qatar aboutBahrain'smultiple-islandor defacto

archipelagicstatus. While Qatar acknowledgedin its Counter-Memonalthat Bahrainis a defacto

archipelago,it insistedthat the HawarIslands are not part of that archipelago. The demographic

and socio-political integration of the HawaIrslandsintothe Stateof Bahrainis aerof fact and

law. Bahrain basesits titletotheHawarson the 1939Award, itsexclusive long-term manifestation of sovereigntythat precededand accounted for thatdecisionand hascontinueduntil thepresent

day and the pnnciple of finality of inhented colonial boundariesuti possidetis juris. Qatar's

contention that "fiom a geographical point of view ... it is not possible to include the

HawarIslands in the 'Bahrainar~hi~ela~o"' i~incorrect but,even moreto the point,it is legally

irrelevant. Whetherthe HawarIslands are part of the Bahraini archipelago or a separate

archipelagoinno wayreduces the archipelagic character of thetateof Bahrain. A multiple-island

Statemay be compnsed of severalarchipelagosas Article46 (a) explicitlysays. So the State of

BahrainincludestheHawar Islands, whether theyarepartof theBahrainiarchipelagoor a separate

archipelago thatpertainsto Bahrainby virtue of long-term manifestation of sovereignty, thres

judicata consequenceof an arbitral awardor the principle of finality of prior decisions about

territory.

10.Mr. President, distinguished Judges, the fundamental legal postulaite that the land

dominates the sea, asmy fiiend ProfessorWeil will develop tomorow. Hence the juridical

progressionmustbe to determinethe componentsof the Bahrain archipelagobeforeweproceed to

the delimitationsbetween a multiple-island or defacto archipelagicState anda mainlandState.

So let me review the insularcomponentsof the Stateof Bahrain thattogethercompriseit without

consideringforthemomenttheimpact ofits mainlandcomponent,Zubarah.

Bahrain'srelevant islands and low-tideelevations

11.The Court will observethe largest islandof Bahrain, whichis sometimes referredto as

Al Awal and sometirnes as Bahrain, and the immediately adjacent islands of Sitrah and

A1Muharraq. In addition,there are otherislands, including the Hawars and ove2 r2 significant

low-tide elevations1 shouldnowlike todrawthe Court's attention to someof the specific islands

and othermaritime featureswhichare important forthe determination ofthe normal baselinesof a

multiple-islandState.

6~ounter-~emonal of Qatar,para. 6.61(emphasisadded). A. FashtalAzm

12.Fust, Fasht al Azm, which mustbe characterizedeitheras a part of SitrahIsland oras a

low-tide elevationfor purposes of determiningBahrain'sbaseline. In 1982,Bahrain dredged a

navigable waterway through FashtalAzm. Both Parties, 1 take it, agree that this action hasno

effect whatsoeveronthe legal status ofthe Fasht, any morethanthe Kiel Canalmakesthe seaward

segments that result fiom that engineering feat henceforth aseparate island or other maritime

feature. BothPartiesalso agree,1takeit, thatthe specificquestion, whose answerwillresolvethe

legalstatus of Fasht al Azm,is whether, inan areathat was landfilledalsoin 1982and which lies

to the west of the new artificialchannel, there hadbeen a natural permanentwaterwaybetween

Sitrahand FashtalAm that didnotdry at lowtide. Thephotograph,vintage 1958,whichyoucan

see,clearly shows thatthere wasno continuous waterwayas at that time. The secondphotograph,

vintage 1983clearlyshowsthe dredgedchannel.

13. If, priorto 1982,therewasno natural permanent waterway,then Fasht al Ani was and

is, asa legal matter,part of Sitrah Island. Conversely,if there wasa natural permanentwaterway

thatdid notdryat lowtide betweenSitrahand Fashtal Am, then,even though itwas landfilledin

1982,Sitrah Island legally terminatesat approximately 50' 38' longituderather than at 50' 55'

longitudeand,in sofaras Fashtal Azm plays a rolein maritimeboundarydelimitation, itwould be

asalow-tideelevationrather thanaspart of Sitrah Island.

14.Webelievethatit isveryimportanttobe clearas to the factual andlegal issueshere: the

questionis not whetherFasht alAzmis an islandin its ownright,part of which is abovewater at

hightide. High-watermark isrelevant for determining whether a maritime featureis an island; if

it is,theigh-watermarkhas performedits functionand is replacedby the low-water mark,which

is now used to determinethe coastlineof that islandor the existenceof a Low Tide Elevation,

which international law may allowas a basepointfor determination ofthe coast. Bahrainclaims,

notthat FashtalAzm is itselfanisland,but thatit ispartof SitrahIsland. Theoperationalquestion

is whetherFashtal Azm is dividedfiom Sitrahby a naturalchannel atlowtide,notwhether thereis

or are naturalchannelson theFashtthat are,theoretically, passablefor smallshallow-drafiboats at

various other levelsof the tide, eventhoughthe channelsdry at lowtide. If Fasht al Azm is not

partof Sitrah,it is a low-tide elevation, whi, y definition,is coveredby waterat hightide. Ofcoursetheremaybe channelsonFashtalAzmat differentlevelsof tide as there are likelyto beon

many low tide elevations, but these small "channels"dry at low tide and cease to be channels;

Fasht alAn is not a smooth feature. Unintentionally1,am sure,counselforQatarhaveconfused

this issue byvoluntarilyadoptingthe high-tide linefor thedeterminationof Qatar'sowncoastline.

Qataras 1havesaid, maydothisforitself, but it maynot change internationallaw for Bahrain. It

is the low-tideatum that is cnticalhere. Thequestionthenis whether, pnorto 1982,therewasa

permanentcontinuouschannel ut lowtid -e a channelthatdidnotdry anywhere alongitslengthat

low tide- dividingSitrahIslandand Fashtal Am.

15. Now, this is a factual question thatmust beresolved by geographicaland historical

evidence, predatingthe artificialcanal'sconstructionand the landfillof the allegednatural canal.

Oldchartsand,where possible,survivingwitnesstestimonymustbe relied upon. Marinersc 'harts

are particularlyimportant, fortheyprovideguidance for themenwho godownto the seain ships,

and whoselives depend on accuratecharts. Hencethe commissionto Commander Carleton,the

Head ofthe Law of the Sea Divisionof the United KingdomHydrographic Office'sAdmiralty

Consultancy Services, toprovidea scientificreport on this matter. By means of a number of

sources, most importantly older charts and Marine Pilots, theUnited Kingdom Hydrographic

OfficeStudyconcludedthatFashtal Azmis historicallypartof SitrahIslandand thatpriorto the

excavationof 1982,therewasnopermanent channel atlowtide betweenSitrahIslandand Fashtal

Azrn. In short,Fasht al Azmis part ofSitrahIsland. This evidenceis in the record andthe Court

will already have studied it, only extracts are in your folders. Andby this evidence,Bahrain

submitsthat ithas shiftedtheburdenofproofto Qatar.

16. TheUnited KingdomHydrographic OfficeStudy'sfindingshave been questionedby

Professor Thomas Rabenhorst, whose reportwas submittedby Qatar. Professor Quéneudec

provided a lively and entertainingsummaryof Professor Rabenhorst's study b,ut since we are

dealing with scientificatters, 1 propose to turn directly tothe Rabenhorst study rather than

Professor Quéneudec'c somments aboutit. My fiiend, Professor Quéneudec, wilk lnow that no

disrespectisintended.

17.ProfessorRabenhorstbases muchofhis evidenceona senes ofmaps, publishedin 1977.

This is a land-map seriesand not a hydrographicchart series. Forgiveme if 1state the obvious:maps aregraphicpresentationsof informationthat is useful,if not vital to theirusers. Land-maps

and hydrographic charts have entirely different functions anda ,s a consequence,focus on the

collection,verificationand presentationof different types of informationfor their very different

audiences andusers. Land-maps arefor landuse and concentrateon what is important totheir

users. Suchmaps cornmonlyput inwhattheir designerscal1an "approximate"low-waterline for

completeness,but this is not- anddoesnot haveto be-presented as an accurateindicationof

the low-waterline, as it wouldbeyforexample,in maritime charts,whose value dependscntically

on the most precise bathymetricreadings. As 1will explainin a moment, otherreadily available

data showthattheapproximatelow-waterlineon theland-maps thathavebeen adducedis, toputit

quite generously,very much an approximation. So Professor Rabenhorst's argument,based on

thesemaps,as opposedto hydrographiccharts, is,to Saythe least,curious,for it is likelookingina

Chinese-Chinesedictionaryto checkthe spellingof an Englishwordor lookingin the Bible for a

Confucianconcept and concluding,if onedoes not find it in the Bible, that it does not exist in

Confucianism.

18.Using the land mapsof 1977,Professor Rabenhorst finds a "channel".But, as 1said,

Fasht al Ani is not a smooth feature. It is, as it were, "cormgated,"with parts drying at Lowest

AstronomicalTide. As is the situationin manytidalareas withwhichMembers ofthe Courtwill

be familiar,a channelthat was passable forsmall boats athigh tide, andmarkedas such doesnot

indicatea permanently navigablechannel,that is to Say,onethatdoesnot dryat lowtide. The fact

is that no mentionis made of thepossibility of passagethrougha permanentchannelin anyof the

Adrniraltycharts or Pilots fiom the dateof the first publicationin 1862 to 1982 - not a single

mention in one of the charts or in one of the AdmiraltyPilots- even though the draftersof the

charts were plainly andunderstandablyon the look-out for channelsand, as a result, marked the

channel between SitrahandAl-Awal.

19.Butthere is a far more serious,1believe fatal,flawin ProfessorRabenhorst'sdata. The

Court will recallthat thecriticaldatumin determining whether, priorto 1982,a channelthat did

not dry at low-waterchannel dividedSitrah Islandfiom Fasht al Am is the low-water line,it is

internationallaw'sdecisive criterionfor determiningthe coastalperimeter of an island. The fact

that a channel may be intermittentlycreatedat higher water - and even be navigable at higherwater - is not relevant tothe dispositionof this question. Now ProfessorRabenhorstStatesthat

the Landsat image he selected for analysis was taken on 9 February1979 at 6.29GMT'. He

continues: "Tidal chartsfor theareashowthatonthis date, atthis timeof day, thetidewasonlya

matter of a few centimetres, at most,above low tide."* But if one runs Tidecalc, aprogram

developedby the United KingdomHydrographicOffice and widely used by hydrographersand

othermarinersto detenninetidallevelin specificareasandatprecisetimesg,onediscoversthat the

Tidecalcheight forSitrahIslandat 6:29 GMT onthe relevantday is0.81m, not afewcentimetres

but 0.81m or 2 ft, 8inaboveLowestAstronomicalTide (LAT). This, Mr. President, Members of

the Court,is considerablymore thanthe "fewcentimeters"that ProfessorRabenhorst mentions. In

otherwords,ProfessorRabenhorst'sdata - evenassurningthat he selectedtherightdata - arenot

low tide,but mid-tide. But evenwith this discrepancy, was ProfessorRabenhorstusingthe right

data? Hefailsto mentionthat he used neap tideandnot springtide, the level onewouldordinarily

look tosatelliteimagestopickthetruelow-waterline. So, MT. President, Membersofthe Court, is

it anywonderthat, with such data, Professor Rabenhorst wasable to find"channels"no one else

hadbeenableto findinthe AdmiraltyPilotsandAdmiraltychartsin the areasince 1862? 1sit any

wonderthathe can Say,onthe basis of his evidence,that "there are clearlysignificantexpansesof

openwater betweenSitrahIslandand Fasht alA'ni"'O .

aben en hRorstrt atp. 3.

9 "TIDECALC is a version of the tidal prediction program used by The United Kingdom
HydrographicOfficefor computingthe daily tidal predictionsn AdmiraltyTideTables. It has
beenadaptedforuseonanIBM PCandhasa worldwideapplication.

The sohare consists of one program disc (NP158)and a choice of 13areadiscs (NP158A1
to 13). Dises Al to A12each holdthe harmonicconstants for about 350 to 400portswhereasdiscA13
holdsthe harmonic constants for161offshore locationUKonContinentalShelf. The programis
availableon 1.Mb 3.5-inch floppydisc and is compatiblewith MS-DOSversion 4.0 or later. The
programruns on IBM286 compatiblecomputersor greateminimummemoryof 640Kisrequired.

TIDECALChas a number ofusefulfacilitiesto complementthe traditionalpresentationof times
andheightsofhigh andlowwater. Theseinclude achoiceof unitsforheight (metresor feet); allowance
fordaylight savingtimee.g. BST; anindicationof periodsof daylightand twilighttoinputption
ship'sdraught; andthecapability ofdisplayingheightsat specifiedtimesandtime intervals.
hedictions are also displayedgraphicallyas a continuous plot of height againsttime." [The
UnitedKingdom Hydrographic Office,AdmiraltyCharts and Publications, Taunton,Somerset, TA1
ZDN,UnitedKingdom,Tidecalc,APCbasedTidalPrediction System,H367A(Revised11/98).]

'kabenhorst Report at6 (QatarSupplementalDocuments). 20. ProfessorRabenhorst also finds some white markers on the 1977 map.

Professor Quéneudec rather boldly suggestt hsat the markers are "leadinglines" for a channel.

Bahrainhas beenunableto find out whythesemarker postswere erected nor whoca.rriedout the

work,but we believe that they wereprobablymarkinga high-tide channel toenablesmall barges

accesstothe petrochemical reclamation worksW . hatwe submit is significantis that the"channel"

foundby ProfessorRabenhorst could nothave been intendedfor permanentnavigation,even by

smallboats,becauseitwasnevermarkedonBahrainiorAdmiraltycharts.

21. The United KingdomHydrographie Studyused Admiralty charts in determining that

therewasno permanentchanneldividingSitrahIslandfromFashtal Am, attherelevant time,thus

makingFashtalAm part of SitrahIsland. Professor Rabenhorstintroducesno other charts,but,

afterreviewingthe Admiralty charts, heStatesthat the Admiraltychartsprovide "no substantive

proof'. Yet consider,1beg you,thetenorofhiscriticism:

- "thechartsclearlyleaveopenthepossibilitythata passagemayhaveexisted"".

- "where soundingsare not present, dottedlineswould mostcertainlyrepresenta "bestguess"

withoutcon~irmation"'~.

- "atthat distance a naturalchannelpassagemayeasilyhavebeen~verlooked''~.

- "thereis nothinginthesemapsthatcandefinitelyruleoutthe existenceofa naturalfishermen's

channel ..."14.

- "thereis no reasonto doubtthata naturalchannelcould have existedprior to thereclamation

pr~ject''15.

22. 1sthis sequenceof "could be" and "might be" and "mighthave been overlooked" and

other conditional observations of this rather tendentioustenor a refutation of Bahraini and

Admiraltycharts? Neither Professor Rabenhorst nor Qatar adducesother contemporaneous maps

to refutethe clear implicationsthat the Bahrainiand Admiraltycharts make for Bahrain's case.

Instead ProfessorRabenhorst tries to undermine them by raising questions, as does

"lbid. at3.

abenh en Rhportt(Qatrupplemental ocuments)at3.
"lbid. at4.

I4lbid.at4-5.
ISlbid.a6.Professor Quéneudec. Bua tl1that Professor Rabenhorstcan Sayis that multiple contemporaneous

observationsthat activelylookedfora channel,whichwould have been mosteconomicanduseful,

that were reported and disseminatedwidely,that were based onlive observation, consistent with

each other, and relied upon by generations of mariners,ouldhave been wrong. Mr.President,

.
Members of the Court, this is simply not plausible. Thehydrographicsurveys on which these

chartswere based would havebeen conductedby means of small survey boats to carry out the

surveysclose to thereef How else wouldthe small drylngchannelto the Westof Sitrah Island,

whichis mentionedin the Pilotsandmarkedon the charts,have beenidentified? Why is thereno

channel mentioned in the east? It is most unlikely that a permanent channel usedby local

vessels- if it existe- would not have been reported by those who prepared the Adrniralty

charts.

23. Mr. President, Members ofthe Court: Bahrain has established thanto natural channel

existedin the pastbythe bestand onlyevidencethat exists: officialcharts,thechartsthatArticle5

ofthe 1982Law ofthe SeaConventioncallsfor. And lest anyonesuspect,evenfora moment, that

thesecharts werenotbased oncarefulandaccurateobservation,1would note thattheir findingsare

confirmedby the British Admiralty charts. The charts that the United Kingdom Hydrographic

OfficeStudy reliedon had beenpreparedby Britishnaval hydrographersovera period ofdecades.

Theyrepresentedthe state of the art. None of the hydrographershad an interestin favouringone

positionover another. Over decades,the chartswere reliedupon bymarinersand seafarers,who

wouldhave recordedif there had been discrepanciesbetweenthe publishedcharts and their own

observations,for theirlives and the lives oftheir fellowmarinersdependedupon accuratecharts.

Wehave no evidenceof such corrections. None has been adducedby Qatar. SurelyBahrain,by

assembling the best evidence available, has now established that no natural channel existed

separatingSitrahfromFasht alAzmandthat legallyFashtalAni is andalwayswaspartof Sitrah.

All Qatar can Sayis that the differentnaval hydrographers,who acted independentlyduringthat

earlierpenod and concurred in their results, may have been wrong, that they could have been t

wrong.

24. ProfessorQuéneudec speculates that Fashtal Azm may, in fact, be many different

low-tide elevations.But he submitsno evidencefor thisspeculation.Fasht alAm has, as1said,acorrugated rather than a smooth surface; a low-tide elevation hasone or the other. But for

centuriesBahrainishave referred to it as a single entity and so it appears on the independently

compiled Admiraltycharts.

25. Mr. President, Membersof the Court,Bahrainrespectfully submits thatit has adduced

ampleevidenceto showthatFashtalAni ispart of SitrahIsland.

B.Qit'atJaradah

26. Thelawgovemingthismatterisclear. Article121,paragraph1,of the 1982Convention

definesan islandas "anaturallyformedareaof land,sunoundedby water,whichis abovewater at

high tide"16. As many of the judges who participatedin the Third Law of the Sea Conference

know, this was a fundamentaland carefullydrafted policy decision, which, 1 might add, unlike

some other parts of Article 121, is identical in purport in the English and French texts.

Professor Quéneudec,in his treatment of Qit'at Jaradah, entertainingly implied adjectives and

qualifier5to Article121, paragraph 1,but there are none in the provision and that was quite

intentional. The specialprovision for"rocks", whichdo havea habitabilityandeconomic life test,

shows bytheir introductionthat no suchqualificationswereintended for Article 11,paragraph1.

It does not matter if it is a smallarea that is above high tide. The questionis whether an area of

landsurroundedby wateris abovewaterathightide.

27. The questionthen, quitesimply,is factual: whether Qit'atJaradahis abovewater ahigh

tide. To find the scientific answertothisquestion,Bahrainarrangedfor Dr.Lewis Alexander,the

former Geographer ofthe Departmentof Stateof theUnitedStates,to observeandverifLa survey

conductedof Qit'atJaradah. Dr. Alexander'smethodology is setout inhis reportand theCourtwill

alreadyhave studiedit - extractsare in thejudges'folders. Over a periodof six visits, dispersed

so as to encompass differentperiods of theyear, Dr. Alexanderconfied evidence ofdry sand

atopJaradahduringthe successivetimesofhigh-waterSprings,that is, the appropriatecritenonfor

thisdetemination. Dr.Alexanderconcluded:

"Article121(1) of the 1982[Law of the Sea] Convention stipulates three
criteriafor a featureto qualifLas an island. The fust is that it must be a naturally
formed areaof land. Jaradahfitsthis description; itis a cay,i.e. a sandbankatopa

I6~rticle121(l), United NaLawoftheSeaConvention1982. coral reef. The second critena is that it is surroundedby water. My observations
confirmthat Jaradahfits thisdescriptionalso. Thethirdandfinalcriteriais that the
feature isabovewaterat hightide. Myobservationsconfm that the highestareas
of Qit'atJaradahare above water at monthlyhigh water springs. Jaradahthus fits
the description ofanislandinArticle121(1)."'7

SoreportsDr.Lewis Alexander.

28. As against this evidence, in its submission of 1March2000, Qatar has subrnitteda

27-page report prepared forit by BrianMurphyandVictorPrescott. Once again,as we aredealing

with a scientificquestion,1propose to go directlyto Qatar's expert submission and only address

new evidenceor allegationsthat Professor Quéneudec mayhave introducedin hispresentation.

29.TheCourtwillhavenoted that75 percentof the Murphy-PrescottReportis irrelevant: a

long excursus on techniques for establishing spring high-water tides and an even longer

disquisitionon sand cays. Murphy and Prescott adduce no evidence oftheir own, but confine

themselves to commentingon the Alexander reportand raise a nurnber of objections about its

methodology. Letmeaddress thesepoints directly.

- First, Murphy and Prescott point out that British Admiralty charts do not characterize

Qit'atJaradahas an island. Thatis correct. Therewere inconsistentreports aboutthe statusof

Qit'atJaradah,due, wesurmise,to inclarityin the legalconception ofan islandand,of course,

the decapitationof the island in 1986. Thisis why Bahrain commissioned a study. There is

nowscientificevidence. Chartswillhenceforthindicatethat Qit'atJaradahis an island.

- Second, Murphyand Prescott question whetherDr. Alexanderwas entitled to rely on officia1

Tide Charts, becausethey are measuredat Mina Salmanand the time and amplitudeof the

highesttides may,they speculate,Varyin Qit'atJaradah. With respect,that speculation is,on

its ownterms, unpersuasive.Thetwositesare 15.4nauticalmilesapart. This distanceis most

unlikely to leadto anysignificantdifferencein time, or anydifferencewhateverin amplitude.

As regards anyminortime difference, Dr.Alexander,as any careful scientistengagedin this

type of activity,took care to arrive at Qit'atJaradah approximatelyan hour before the time

designated by the Tide Charts and remained for some time afterwards. As regards any

differencesin amplitude,not onlyis thismostunlikely tohave occurred,but if it did occur, it

would havebeen irrelevantto thepointat issue,which iswhetherQit'atJaradahis abovewater

''~e~l~ofBahrai, nn.13,p. 77 atpp.82-83.The methodology was that ofthe standard ofthe professionand the results of the Alexander

observations stand.As forthe speculationsby Murphyand Prescottto the effect that there may be

othergeologicalor geomorphological explanationf sorthe island character of Qit'atradah,those

ruminationsmay be of academic interest,but they areirrelevantfor this enquiry. The question
i.

quitesimplyis whether Qit'atJaradahqualifiesas an islandunderinternationallaw,and the answer

dependson a scientificenquiry: is the islandabove water athigh tide? It is, as the Alexander

reportestablishes,and Qataris not able torefute. Noneof the documentsthat Qatarhas invoked

wasbased ona systematic surveyat monthlyintervalsat high-watersprings,as was the studyby

Dr. Alexander. And,incidentally,al1Qatar would need to produce to sustain its position, is a

singlephotographof Qit'atJaradah,takenat anytimewhatever,showingit coveredby thetide. It

hassubrnittednoevidencewhatsoever.

31. Bahrain submits, Mr.President, Members ofthe Court, that the scientific evidence

conclusively rebuts the selected observationtsat Qatarhas madeto the effectthat Qit'atJaradahis

not abovewater athightide. Itis anislandininternationallaw.

32. Giventhat Qit'atJaradahis an island,the question becomeswhohas sovereigntyoverit.

The written subrnissions of Bahrain recountthe numerous acts of sovereignty thatBahrain

historicallyhas exercised over Qit'aJtaradah. The Courtwas sparedrecitationsof eflectivités by

Qatar, becauseit had noneto submit. Bahrain, incontrast, has innurnerable eflectivitésand 1fear

that the Courtis approaching a saturation point on them. So let me only categorize themost

relevant eflectivité, hichare set out indetailin the writtensubmissions. The acts ofsovereignty

include:

- Conductingsurveysandgrantingoil concessionsoverQit'at~aradah";

- Erectinga beacononQit'atJaradahin 193919;

- Ordenngthedrillingof anartesianwellonQit'atJaradahin 1940~';

- Conductingcoastguardpatrols aroundtheareaofQit'at~aradah*';

"MernoriaolfBahrain, ara.576.

'%lemonalofBahrainp, ara.586.
Z%lemonao lfBahrain, paras.84and586.

Z'~emorialofBahrain, paras.98-599. BahrCoastguardReport, nn.24, Vol.2,pp.148-151.- FishingtheareasaroundQit'atJaradahby Bahrainifi~hermen~~;

- Using Qit'atJaradahfor recreationalpurposes23.(And incidentally,1will not commenton the

innuendothatthe Government ofBahrainarrangedfor a fleetof pleasure boatsto assembleat

Qit'atJaradahfor a photograph thatwouldgivethe impressionthat thiswasa recreationalarea.

WhetherQatarlikes it ornot,thisactually happens most weekends, with boats gathering about

Qit'atJaradah.)

33. The Court will observe Fasht ad Dibal at approximately 50"55' latitude and

26"45' longitude. Fasht ad Dibal is a low-tide elevation, whichis approximately2.08 nautical

miles from the islandof Qit'atJaradah. This is a geographicalfact that will have important

implications for thedeterminationofbasepoints,in accordwithArticle 13of the 1982Convention,

a matterto which wewill return. In additionto its statusandboundary-delimitativepotentialityas

a low-tide elevation,Fasht ad Dibalhas historically beenviewedby States engagedpoliticallyin

the area, includingthe Ruler of Qatar, as susceptibleto acquisition as sovereign temtory. On

14 August 1937Belgravewroteto the Political Agent, indicating that Fasht ad Dibal, amongother

low-tide elevationswas part of Bahrain. As this important documentis in your folders,1willnot

review it here.

34.A list preparedby theLandDepartmentdownto 1939showsthat pillarswere erectedby

the Governent of Bahrain, intear lia, on Al Mu'tarid,Mashtan,Noon, Tighaylib,Al Hul, Qit'at

Jaradah,FashtadDibal,andFashtal'~ni~~.On 18June 1946Belgravewroteagainto the Political

Agent:

"In the year 1936 the Bahrain Government built beacons on the
Fasht-Al-Debal. One of the beaconswas builton the rock at the north end of the
Fashtwhichis abovewater. HislateHighnessShaikhHamadand the presentRuler
have alwaysregarded thisFashtas beingownedby Bahrain. The anchoragethere is
used exclusivelyby Bahrain boatmenand fishermen andthe Fasht is one ofthose

which areconsideredto belongto ~ahrain.''~~

22~emonalofBahrain,para.597.

13~eplyofBahrain, par3.36.

Ann.336, Vol.6,p. 1457.nd Department,Govt of Bahrain,of pillarserected 1938-1939,Memonal of Bahrain,

ette tfromCharles Belgrave,Adviserto the Govt. of Bahrato,BritishPoliticalAgent, 18June1946,
MemonalofBahrainA , nn.340,Vol.6,p. 1470. 35. In July 1946,the PoliticalAgentwroteto the respective Rulers of Bahrain and Qatar to

ask whether each Ruler considered Fasht ad Dibal and Qit'atJaradah to constiîutepart of his

respective tenitory. In the event of an affirmative answer,the Rulers were asked tostate the

grounds on which sovereigntywas ~laimed~~.The Ruler of Bahrain basedhis claim both on

Bahrain'shistoricalenjoymentof sovereignty overthe entireQatar peninsulaand the islandsand

othermaritimefeatureslyingbetween thepeninsularand Bahrain,aswellas on actsof sovereignty

by Bahraininrelation tothemaritime features. Bahrain's claim to sovereigntyreferredspecifically

to the constructionof artesianwells on Fasht ad Dibal and Qit'atJaradahand annexeda list of

cairnswhichhad been erectedby Bahrain duringthe 1930s2'.

36. The claimassertedby the Ruler ofQatarto Fashtad Dibaland Qit'atJaradahaccepted

without question thatboth formationscouldbe subjectto national sovereignty, he accepted that

they couldbe subjectedto national sovereignty. Buthe based his claimon the fact that it was

closer to him and he shouldget it as a consolation prize,becausehe had not been awardedthe

"Bahrain ...has no dependenciescontraryto Qatar whichis a largetemtory
and has dependencies,coasts, and islands. If we look into the questionfiom the
point view of equality, Qatar is to be entmsted with Deebil andJaradah Fashts
which aresituatedbetweenQatar and Bahrain,and they are nearer toQatar. You
see that Qatar hasbeen treatedunjustlyin her clear'rightin the question ofHawar
islands which 1 am still tenaciousto claim their ownership,then how about the

others!"29

Mr.President,thishasbeen a verylongday, and counselforBahrainareparticularlygrateful

to the Courtfor itssustainedattention. But1wonderif thismightnot beanappropriatemomentfor

us to pauseandto resumethispresentationtomorrow morning.

16see,forexample,letterfiom British Pol genttoRulerofQatar,9 July1946,Ann.341, Vol.6,p. 1471. *
le et tfrom CharlesBelgrave,Adviserto Govt. of Bahrain,to Political AgeJuly1946,Memorialof
Bahrain,Ann.342, Vol. 6,pp.1473and1474.
ette tfrom theRulerof Qatarto the BritishPolitical Agent18July1946,Memorialof Bahrain,Ann.343,
Vol.6,p. 1476.

'%etterfiom Rulerof Qatarto BritishPolitical Agent,18July 1946,Memorialof Bahrain,Ann.343, Vol. 6,
p. 1476. Le PRESIDENT :C'est comme vous l'entendez. Cela dépend td emps dont vous avez

besoindemainmatin. Sivous pouvez, demainmatin,dire ce quevous avez àdire dans la matinée,

il n'yapas d'objectiàceque nousnousarrêtionm s aintenant.

Mr. REISMAN: May 1 consultmycolleaguesfora moment, Mr. President?

ThePRESIDENT:Please.

Mr. REISMAN: Thankyou for allowing meto consultmy colleagues. No,my colleagues

arequitecomfortablewitha suspensionat this time. And wewishthe Courta welldeservedrest

fiomitslabourstoday. Thankyou, Mr. President.

Le PRESIDENT :Merci beaucoup de votreaimableattention. Laséance estlevée. Nous

nousretrouveronsdemain à 10heures.

L'audienceestlevéeà 17h 40. Non-Corrigé

Uncorrected

InternationalCourt Courinternationale
ofJustice deJustice

THE HAGUE LAHAYE

YEAR2000

Publicsitting

heldon Tuesday13June 2000,ut 3p.m., atthePeace Palace,

PresidentGuillaumepresiding

in the caseconcerningMaritimeDelimitation andTerritorialQuestionsbetween
QatarandBahrain(Qatarv.Bahrain)

VERBATIMRECORD

ANNEE 2000

Audiencepublique

tenuele mardi 13juin 20à015 heures,auPalaisdelaPaix,

sous laprésidencedeM. Guillaume,président

en l'affairede laDélimitationmaritimeet desquestionsterritorialesentreQataretBahreïn
(Qatarc.Bahreïn)

COMPTE RENDU [As a result of a technical problem, a paragraph, followingon from the sub-heading
"B. Qit'at Jaradah", was omittedin error on this page. Accordingly,this and the followingpages
replace pages45 to 51of CR2000114as previouslydistributed.]

corrugated rather than a smooth surface; a low-tide elevation has one or the other. But for

centuries Bahrainis have referred to it as a single entity and so it appears on the independently

compiled Admiraltycharts.

25. Mr. President, Members ofthe Court, Bahrainrespectfully submits that it has adduced

ample evidencetoshowthatFasht al Azm is partof Sitrah Island.

B. Qit'at Jaradah

26. Below the low-tide elevation of Fasht ad Dibal, at approximately 50° 55' latitude

and 26O10' longitude, the Court will observe the island of Qit'at Jaradah, which has long

been recognized as such. Belgrave wrote, on 14August 1937 to the British Political Agent,

referring to Qit'at Jaradah as "an i~land"'~. Nine other reports and communications from

1940 to 1959 confirm its island status. As these documents are in your folders, 1 wiil not

review them here. There are, however, a smaiier number of documents that are not

consistent with the majority of observations. The international legal conception of an island

did not crystallize until 1982. Moreover, after 1986,when bulldozers removed the portion of

Qit'at Jaradah above water at high tide, the formation certainly ceased to be an island and

would have been recorded as a low-tide elevation in the period immediately following 1986.

27. The lawgoverningthismatteris clear. Article 121,paragraph 1,ofthe 1982Convention

defmesan islandas "a naturallyformedarea of land,surroundedby water, whichis above waterat

high tide"". As many of the judges who participated in the Third Law of the Sea Conference

know, this was a fundamental and carefully drafted policy decision, which, 1might add, unlike

some other parts of Article 121, is identical in purport in the English and French texts.

Professor Quéneudec,in his treatment of Qit'at Jaradah, entertainingly implied adjectives and

qualifiers to Article 121, paragraph1, but there are none in the provision and that was quite

intentional. The specialprovision for"rocks",which do have a habitabilityand economiclife test,

I6~ernorialofBahrain, para. 581.
"~rticle 121(l), UnitedNations Lawof the SeaConvention 1982.showsby their introductionthat no suchqualificationswere intended for Article 121,paragraph 1.

It does not matter if it is a small areathat is above high tide. The question is whetheran area of

landsurroundedby water isabovewaterat hightide.

28. The questionthen, quite simply,is factual: whetherQit'atJaradahis abovewater at high

tide. To find the scientificanswerto this question,Bahrain arranged for Dr. Lewis Alexander,the

formerGeographerof the Departmentof Stateof the UnitedStates,to observe and verifya survey

conductedof Qit'atJaradah. Dr. Alexander'smethodologyis set out in his report andtheCourt will

alreadyhave studied it - extractsare in thejudges' folders. Over a period of six visits,dispersed

so as to encompass different periods of the year, Dr. Alexander confmed evidence of dry sand

atop Jaradah duringthe successivetimesof high-water springs,that is, the appropriatecritenon for

thisdetermination. Dr. Alexanderconcluded:

"Article 121(1) of the 1982 [Law of the Sea] Convention stipulates three
criteria for a feature to qualiQ as an island. The first is that it must be a naturally
formed area of land. Jaradah fitsthis description; itis a cay, i.e. a sandbankatopa
coral reef. The second criteriais that it is surroundedby water. My observations
confirm that Jaradah fits this description also. The third and finalcriteria is that the
feature is abovewater at high tide. My observationsconfirmthat the highest areas

of Qit'atJaradah are above water atmonthly high water springs. Jaradah thus fits
the descriptionof an island in Article 121(1)."18

Soreports Dr. LewisAlexander.

29. As against this evidence, in its submission of 1March 2000, Qatar has subrnitted a

27-pagereport prepared for itby Brian Murphyand Victor Prescott. Onceagain, as weare dealing

with a scientific question,1propose to go directly to Qatar'sexpert submission and only address

newevidence or allegationsthat ProfessorQuéneudecmayhave introducedinhis presentation.

30. The Courtwill havenotedthat 75 percent of the Murphy-PrescottReport isirrelevant: a

long excursus on techniques for establishing spring high-water tides and an even longer

disquisition on sand cays. Murphy and Prescott adduce no evidence of their own, but confine

themselves to comrnentingon the Alexander report and raise a nurnber of objections about its

methodology. Letme address thesepoints directly.

- First, Murphy and Prescott point out that British Admiralty charts do not characterize

Qit'atJaradahas an island. That is correct. There were inconsistentreports about thestatus of

'8~eplyofBahrain,Ann.13,p.77 atpp.82-83. Qit'atJaradah, due, we surmise,to inclarityin the legal conceptionof an island and, of course,

the decapitation of the islandin 1986. This is why Bahrain cornrnissioneda study. There is

now scientificevidence. Chartswillhenceforthindicatethat Qit'atJaradahis an island.

- Second, Murphy and Prescottquestionwhether Dr. Alexander was entitledto rely on officia1

Tide Charts, because they are measured at Mina Salman and the time and amplitude of the

highest tides may, they speculate, vary in Qit'atJaradah. With respect, that speculationis, on

itsown terms, unpersuasive. Thetwo sitesare 15.4nauticalmiles apart. This distanceis most

unlikely to lead to any significant differencein time, or anydifferencewhatever in amplitude.

As regards any minor time difference,Dr.Alexander, as any careful scientist engagedin this

type of activity, took care to arrive at Qit'atJaradah approximately an hour before the time

designated by the Tide Charts and remained for some time afterwards. As regards any

differencesin amplitude,not only is this most unlikely to have occurred,but if it did occur,it

would havebeen irrelevantto the pointat issue,which is whether Qit'atJaradahis abovewater

at al1states of the tide as experiencedut Qit'atJaradah. Whether this is higher, lower or the

sameas the high tide at MinaSalmanis besidethe point.

- Third, Murphy and Prescott question the October 1998 survey of Qit'atJaradah, because

Mr. G.C. Lindsay, the Survey Operations Manager, referredto high tide as "Apparent High

Water Mark", without, SayMurphy and Prescott, explaininghow that daturn is derived. The

answerto this questionis quite simple: Mr. Lindsaydid explain,in the text accompanying the

survey, that "the maximum height observed at Jaradah during the survey ... is 0.4meters

abovethe HighestAstronornicalTide calculatedfromtidal observationsforthe area". Because

the datumthat was used in Octoberwas men higherthan the officia1chart, Mr.Lindsay,with

appropriate scientific precision, referredto itas the "Apparent High Water Mark". If Qatar

wishes to rely on the Officia1 Chart, Qit'atJaradah was men more exposedat high tide than

Mr. Lindsay andDr.Alexanderreported.

- Fourth, Murphy and Prescott observethat the photographs produced by an officia1Bahraini

photographerarenot time- and date-stamped.Thatis correct. A camera withthat capacitywas

not availablewhen the observationswere made. Nonetheless,Dr. Alexanderhas careful notes

of the date and exact timewheneachof the photos was taken and is willing toproduce them or be deposedifthereis any questiononthismatter. The StateofBahrainneed hardlycerti@the

honesty and good faith of Dr. Alexander, a world-renownedfigure, the CO-authorof the

authoritative"InternationalMaritimeBoundaries", and a scientistof unquestioned reputation.

It is thetestimonyin thereportof Dr.Alexanderthat is submittedand it stands,withor without

thephotographs.

- Murphy and Prescott finally questionwhether there will be suficient sand sediment to

maintainQit'atJaradahas an island. Theissueis Qit'atJaradahatthis momentandnot in20or

30yearshence,whenmanyfactorsmayprecipitatemanyunpredictableeffectsonmanyislands

and manycoastal areas. Wellno onecanpredict the future,onepresumptionseemsrelatively

safe: there will be no shortageof sand intheregion. Messrs.Murphy and Prescottmayrest

easy on thatconcem.

31. Thus, Mr.President, Members of the Court, the problems that Murphy and Prescott

purportedto findin the Alexander reportprove, oncarefulexamination,to be forcedand artificial.

The methodologywas that of the standard ofthe profession and the results of the Alexander

observationsstand. As for thespeculationsby MurphyandPrescottto the effectthattheremaybe

other geologicalor geomorphological explanations for the islandcharacterof Qit'atJaradah,those

ruminationsmay be of academic interest,but they are irrelevantfor this enquiry. The question

quitesimplyis whether Qit'atJaradahqualifiesas an islandunderinternationallaw,andtheanswer

depends on a scientific enquiry: is the islandabove water at high tide? It isas the Alexander

report establishes,and Qatar isnot able to refute.one of the documentsthat Qatar hasinvoked

was based on a systematicsurveyat monthlyintervals at high-watersprings, as was the studyby

Dr.Alexander. And, incidentally,al1Qatar would need to produceto sustain its position,is a

singlephotograph ofQit'at Jaradah,takenat anytime whatever, showingit coveredby the tide. It

has submittednoevidencewhatsoever.

32. Bahrain submits, Mr.President, Members of the Court, that the scientific evidence

conclusivelyrebutsthe selectedobservationsthat Qatarhas madeto the effect thatQit'atJaradahis

not abovewaterathigh tide. Itis an islandin intemationallaw.

33. GiventhatQit'atJaradahis anisland,the questionbecomeswho hassovereignîyoverit.

The written submissions of Bahrainrecount the numerous acts of sovereignty that Bahrainhistorically has exercised over Qit'atJaradah. The Court was spared recitations of effectivités by

Qatar, because it had none to submit. Bahrain,in contrast,has innumerableeflectivitésand 1fear

that the Court is approaching a saturationpoint on them. So let me only categorize the most

relevant effectivités, hich are set out in detailin the writtensubmissions. The acts of sovereignty

include:

- Conductingsurveys and grantingoilconcessions over Qit'at~aradah'~;

- Erectinga beacononQit'atJaradahin 193g20;

- Orderingthe drillingof an artesianwellonQit'atJaradahin 1940~';

- Conductingcoastguard patrolsaroundthearea of Qit'at~aradah~~;

- Fishingthe areasaround Qit'atJaradahby Bahraini fi~hermen~~;

- Using Qit'atJaradahfor recreationalpurposes24.(And incidentally, 1will not commenton the

innuendothat the Govemmentof Bahrainarranged for a fleet of pleasureboats to assembleat

Qit'atJaradah for a photographthat wouldgive the impressionthat this was a recreationalarea.

Whether Qatar likes itor not, this actuallyhappens mostweekends,with boats gatheringabout

Qit'at Jaradah.)

34. The Court will observe Fasht ad Dibal at approximately 50' 55' latitude and

26"45' longitude. Fasht ad Dibal is a low-tide elevation, which is approximately 2.08nautical

miles from the island of Qit'atJaradah. This is a geographical fact that will have important

implicationsfor the determination of basepoints,in accordwith Article 13of the 1982Convention,

a matter to which we willretum. In additionto its statusandboundary-delimitativepotentialityas

a low-tide elevation, Fashtad Dibal has histoncally been viewed by States engaged politicallyin

the area, including the Ruler of Qatar, as susceptible to acquisition as sovereign temtory. On

14August 1937 Belgravewrote to the PoliticalAgent, indicatingthat Fasht ad Dibal, amongother

'9~emonalof Bahrain,para.576.
'%emorialof Bahrain,para.586.

21~emonalof Bahrain, aras.584and586.
22~emonalofBahrain,paras.598-599. BahrainCoastguardReport,Ann.24, Vol.2,pp. 148-151.

23~emorialofBahrain,para.597.
24~eplyof Bahrain,para.336.low-tideelevations was part of Bahrain. As this important documentis in your folders, 1 will not

reviewit here.

35. A list preparedby the Land Departmentdownto 1939shows thatpillars were erectedby

the Govemment of Bahrain, intea rlia, on Al Mu'tarid, Mashtan,Noon, Tighaylib, Al Hul, Qit'at

Jaradah,Fasht ad Dibal, andFashtal'hZ5. On 18June 1946Belgravewroteagainto the Political

Agent:

"In the year 1936 the Bahrain Govemment built beacons on the
Fasht-Al-Debal. One of the beacons was built on the rock atthe north end of the

Fasht which is abovewater. HislateHighnessShaikhHarnadand the present Ruler
have alwaysregarded thisFasht asbeingownedby Bahrain. The anchoragethere is
used exclusively by Bahrain boatmen and fishermenand the Fasht is one of those
which are consideredtobelongto ~ahrain."'~

36. In July 1946,the PoliticalAgent wrote to the respectiveRulers of Bahrain and Qatar to

ask whether each Ruler considered Fasht ad Dibal and Qit'atJaradah to constitute part of his

respective tenitory. In the event of an affirmative answer,the Rulers were asked to state the

grounds on which sovereignty was claimed2'. The Ruler of Bahrain based his claim bothon

Bahrain'shistorical enjoymentof sovereignty overthe entire Qatar peninsulaand the islands and

othermaritime featureslying between the peninsularand Bahrain,as well as on acts of sovereignty

by Bahrainin relationto themaritime features. Bahrain's claim to sovereignty referred specifically

to the construction of artesian wells on Fasht ad Dibal and Qit'atJaradah and annexed a list of

cairnswhich had been erectedby Bahrain duringthe 1930s2'.

37. The claim assertedby the Ruler of Qatar to Fasht ad Dibal and Qit'atJaradah accepted

without question that both formations could be subject to national sovereignty,he accepted that

they could be subjected to national sovereignty. But he based his claim on the fact that it was

25~istpreparedby LandDepartment,Govt. of Bahrain,of pillars erected1938-1939,Memorialof Bahrain,
Ann.336,Vol. 6,p. 1457.

26~etterfrom CharlesBelgrave,Adviserto the Govt. of Bahrain,to BritishPolitical Agent,18June1946,
Memorialof Bahrain,Ann.340,Vol.6,p. 1470.
27~ee,forexarnple,letterfromBritishPoliticalAgenttoRulerofQatar,9 July1946,Ann.341, Vol.6,p. 1471.

28~etterfrom CharlesBelgrave,Adviserto Govt. of Bahrain,to Political Agent,10July1946,Memorialof
Bahrain,Ann.342, Vol.6,pp. 1473and1474.closer to him and he should get it as a consolationprize, because he had not been awarded the

~awars'~!

"Bahrain . ..has no dependencies contrary toQatar which is a large temtory
and has dependencies, coasts, and islands. If we look into the question fiom the
point view of equality, Qatar is to be entrusted with Deebil and Jaradah Fashts
which are situated betweenQatar and Bahrain, and they are nearer to Qatar. You

see that Qatar has been treated unjustly in her clearright in the question of Hawar
islands which 1 am still tenacious to claim their ownership, then how about the
others!"30

Mr. President,this hasbeena very longday, andcounsel for Bahrainare particularlygrateful

to the Court forits sustainedattention. But1wonderif thismightnot bean appropriatemomentfor

us to pause andto resurnethis presentationtomorrowmoming.

Le PRESIDENT : C'estcomme vous l'entendez. Cela dépend du temps donv tous avez

besoin demain matin. Si vouspouvez,demainmatin, direce que vous avez à dire dans la matinée,

il n'ya pas d'objection ce quenousnous arrêtionsmaintenant.

Mr. REISMAN: May 1consultmy colleaguesfora moment,Mr.President?

The PRESIDENT: Please.

Mr. REISMAN: Thank you for allowing me to consultmy colleagues. No, my colleagues

are quite comfortablewith a suspension at thistirne. And we wish the Court awell deservedrest

from its labours today. Thankyou, Mr. President.

Le PRESIDENT :Merci beaucoup de votre aimableattention. La séance est levée.Nous

nous retrouveronsdemain à 10heures.

L'audienceestlevée à 17h 40.

'%etter frornthe Ruler of Qatar to the British Politi18July1946,Mernorial of Bahrain,Ann343,
Vol.6,p.1476.

%etter from Ruler of Qatar toBritish Political Agent,1946,Mernorialof Bahrain, An343, Vol.6,
p.1476.

Document Long Title

Public sitting held on Tuesday 13 June 2000, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Links