Audience publique tenue le lundi 11 mars 2002, à 15 heures, sous la présidence de M. Guillaume, président

1 Uncorrectel
.l

Cour internationale InternationalCourt
de Justice ofJustice

LAHAYE THEHAGUE

Audience publique

tenue lelundi mars2002,à15heures,auPalaisdelaPaix,

sous laprésidenceM. Guillaume,président,

en 1'affairedelaFrontière terrestreetmaritime entrele Cameroun etleNigéria
(Camerounc.Nigéria;Guinééquatoriale(intervenani))

COMPTE RENDU

YEAR 2002

PublicSitting

heldonMondayII March 2002,at3p.m., atthePeacePalace,

PresidentGuillaumeesiding,

in the caseconcerningtheLandand MaritimeBoundarybetweenCameroonandNigeria
(Cameroonv.Nigeria: Equatorial Guintervening)

VERBATIMRECORI)Présents:M. Guillaume, président
M. Shi, vice-président
MM. Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma

Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Elaraby,juges

MM. Mbaye
Ajibola,juges ad hoc

M. Couvreur,greffierPresent: President Guillaume
Vice-President Shi
Judges Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma

Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Elaraby

Judgesad hoc Mbaye
Ajibola

Registrar CouvreurLe Gouvernementde laRépubliquedu Camerounest représenté par :

S.Exc. M.Amadou Ali, ministred7Etatchargé delajustice, gardedes sceaux,

commeagent;

M. MauriceKamto, doyende la faculté dessciences juridiques et politiques de l'université de
YaoundéII,membrede la Commissiondudroit international,avocatau barreaude Paris,

M. Peter Y.Ntamark, professeur àla facultédessciencesjuridiques et politiques de l'Université de
YaoundéII, Barrister-ut-Law,membrede 171nneT remple, ancien doyen,

commecoagents,conseilset avocats;

M.Alain Pellet, professeurà l'universitéde Paris X-Nanterre,membre et ancien président de la

Commission du droit international,

commeagent adjoint,conseilet avocat;

M. Joseph Marie Bipoun Woum, professeur à la facultédes sciences juridiques et politiquesde
l'universitédeYaoundéII,ancien ministre,ancien doyen,

commeconseillerspécialet avocat;

M. Michel Aurillac, ancien ministre, conseid'Etathonoraire,avocatenretraite,

M.Jean-Pierre Cot, professeuràl'universitédeParis 1(Panthéon-Sorbonne), ancien ministre,

M.MauriceMendelson,Q. C., professeur émérid tee l'Universitéde Londres,Barrister-at-Law,

M. Malcolm N.Shaw, professeur à la facultéde droit de l'universitéde Leicester, titulairede la
chairesir Robert Jennings,Barrister-at-Law,

M. Bruno Simrna, professeur à l'université de Munich, membre de la Commission du droit
international,

M. Christian Tomuschat, professeurà l'universitéHumbold de Berlin, ancienmembre et ancien
présidentde la Commission dudroit international,

M. OlivierCorten, professeuràlaFacultéde droitde l'universitélibrede Bruxelles,

M.DanielKhan, chargé de cours àl'Institutdedroit internationalde l'université deMunich,

M.Jean-Marc Thouvenin, professeur à l'université deParisX-Nanterre, avocat au barreau de
Paris, société d'avocats Lysias,

commeconseils etavocats;TheGovernmentof theRepublicof Cameroonis representedby:

H.E. Mr. AmadouAli,Ministerof Stateresponsiblefor Justice,Keeperof the Seals,

asAgent;

Mr. Maurice Kamto,Dean, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Universityof Yaoundé II,
memberof the InternationalLawCommission,Avocat atthe Paris Bar, LysiasLaw Associates,

Mr. Peter Y.Ntamark, Professor,Faculty of Law and Political Science, Universityof Yaoundé II,
Barrister-at-Law,member oftheInner Temple,formerDean,

as Co-Agents,CounseIandAdvocates;

Mr. AlainPellet, Professor, University ofParisX-Nanterre,member and former Chairman of the
InternationalLawCommission,

asDeputyAgent, CounselandAdvocate;

Mr. Joseph-MarieBipoun Woum,Professor, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Universityof
Yaoundé II, formeMr inister, formerDean,

asSpecialAdviser andAdvocate;

Mr. MichelAurillac, formerMinister, HonoraryConseillerd'État,retiredAvocat,

Mr. Jean-Pierre Cot,Professor,UniversityofParis 1(Panthéon-Sorbonne), formeMr inister,

Mr. Maurice Mendelson, Q.C.E , meritusProfessor Universityof London, Barrister-at-Law,

Mr. Malcolm N. Shaw, Sir Robert Jennings Professor of International Law,Faculty of Law,
Universityof Leicester, Barrister-at-Law,

Mr. Bruno Simma, Professor, Universityof Munich, member of the International Law
Commission,

Mr. Christian Tomuschat, Professor, Humboldt University of Berlin, former member and

Chairman, InternationalLawCommission,

Mr. OlivierCorten,Professor, Facultyof Law,Université librde Bruxelles,

Mr. DanielKhan, Lecturer, InternationalLawInstitute, University ofMunich,

Mr. Jean-Marc Thouvenin, Professor, Universityof Paris X-Nanterre,Avocat at the Paris Bar,

LysiasLaw Associates,

as CounselandAdvocates;SirIan Sinclair, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Barrister-at-Law, ancienmembre de la Commission du droit
international,

M.EricDiamantis,avocataubarreau deParis, Moquet, Bordes & Associés,

M. Jean-PierreMignard, avocatau barreaude Paris, sociéd'avocatsLysias,

M. Joseph Tjop,consultantà la sociétd'avocatsLysias, chercheurau Centrede droit international
deNanterre(CEDIN),Université Paris X-Nanterre,

commeconseils:

M.Pierre Semengue,général d'armée, contrôleur généraa lrmes es,ancienchef d'état-majordes
armées,

M. James Tataw, générad l e division, conseiller logistique, chef d'état-major dl'arméede

terre,

S.Exc. MmeIsabelleBassong, ambassadeur du Cameroun auprès des pays du Benelux et de
l'Unioneuropéenne,

S.Exc.M.BiloaTang, ambassadeurdu Camerounen France,

S.Exc. M.MartinBelingaEboutou, ambassadeur, représentan ptermanent du Cameroun auprèsde
l'organisation des NationsUnieà New York,

M. Etienne Ateba, ministre-conseiller,chargé d'affairesa.i. à l'ambassade du Cameroun,
à La Haye,

M. Robert Akamba, administrateur civil principalc,hargéde mission au secrétariatgénérde la
présidencede la République,

M.Anicet Abanda Atangana, attaché au secrétariat générallade présidencede la République,
chargéde coursa l'universitédeYaoundéII,

M.Ernest BodoAbanda, directeurducadastre, membre de lacommissionnationaledes frontières,

M.OusmaneMey, anciengouverneurde province,

Le chef SamuelMoka LiffafaEndeley, magistrat honoraire,Barrister-at-Law, membredu Middle
Temple (Londres),ancienprésidentde la chambreadministrativede laCoursuprême,

MeMarc Sassen,avocat etconseiljuridique, société Petten,deman & Sassen(La Haye),

M.Francis Fai Yengo, ancien gouverneur de province, directeurde l'organisation du territoire,
ministèrede l'administration territoriale, *

M.Jean Mbenoun, directeurde l'administration centralau secrétariatgénérale la présidencede

laRépublique,Sir Ian Sinclair, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Barrister-at-Law, former member of the International Law
Commission,

Mr. Eric Diamantis,vocat attheParisBar,Moquet,Bordes & Associés,

Mr.Jean-Pierre Mignard,Avocatatthe ParisBar, LysiasLaw Associates,

Mr. Joseph Tjop, Consultant to Lysias Law Associates, Researcher at the Centre de droit
internationaldeNanterre (CEDIN),Universityof Paris X-Nanterre,

as Counsel;

GeneralPierre Semengue,Controller-Generalof the Armed Forces,former Head of Staff of the
ArmedForces,

Major-GeneralJamesTataw, LogisticsAdviser,FormerHeadof Staffof the Amy,

H.E.Ms IsabelleBassong,Ambassadorof Cameroon to the BeneluxCountriesandto the European
Union,

H.E. Mr.Biloa Tang, Ambassadorof Cameroonto France,

H.E. Mr. MartinBelinga Eboutou, Ambassador, PermanentRepresentative of Cameroon to the
UnitedNationsinNew York,

Mr. Etienne Ateba, Minister-Counsellor,Chargéd'affaires a.i. at the Embassy of Cameroon,
The Hague,

Mr. Robert Akamba, Principal Civil Administrator, Charée mission, GeneralSecretariat of the
Presidency oftheRepublic,

Mr. AnicetAbandaAtangana,Attaché to theGeneralSecretariat ofthe Presidencyof the Republic,
Lecturer, Universityof Yaoundé II,

Mr. Ernest Bodo Abanda, Director of the Cadastral Survey, member, National Boundary

Commission,

Mr. Ousmane Mey,formerProvincial Governor,

Chief Samuel Moka Liffafa Endeley, Honorary Magistrate, Barrister-at-Law,member of the
Middle Temple(London), former President of the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme

Court,

Maître MarcSassen,Advocateand LegalAdviser,Petten,Tideman & Sassen (TheHague),

Mr. Francis FaiYengo,formerProvincial Governor, Directo, rganisationdu Territoire,Ministry
of Territorial Administration,

Mr. Jean Mbenoun,Director, Central Administration, GeneralSecretariatof the Presidency of the
Republic, M.Edouard Etoundi, directeurde l'administrationcentrale au secrétariat général de la présidence
de la République,

M.Robert Tanda,diplomate,ministèredes relationsextérieures

comme conseillers;

M. Samuel BetahSona, ingénieur-géologue, expec rtnsultantde l'Organisationdes NationsUnies
pour le droitde la mer,

M.Thomson Fitt Takang, chef de service d'administrationcentrale au secrétariat général d lae
présidencedela République,

M.Jean-JacquesKoum, directeurde l'exploration,société nationaledeshydrocarbures(SNH),

M.Jean-Pierre Meloupou, capitaine de frégate,chef de la division Afrique au ministère de la
défense,

M.Paul Moby Etia,géographe,directeur del'Institutnational de cartographie,

M.AndréLoudet,ingénieurcartographe,

M. AndréRoubertou, ingénieur généd rell'armement, hydrographe,

commeexperts;

MmeMarie Florence Kollo-Efon, traducteur interprète principal,

comme traducteurinterprète;

Mlle CélineNegre,chercheurau Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris X-Nanterre

Mlle SandrineBarbier, chercheurau Centrede droit internationalde Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
de Paris X-Nanterre,

M. Richard Penda Keba, professeur certifiéd'histoire, cabinet du ministre de la justice, ancien
proviseur delycées,

comme assistantsde recherche;

M.Boukar Oumara,

M. Guy Roger Eba'a,

M.Aristide Esso,

M.Nkende Forbinake,

M.Nfan Bile,Mr. Edouard Etoundi, Director, Central Administration, GeneraS lecretariat of the Presidency of
the Republic,

Mr. Robert Tanda,diplomat,Ministq of Foreign Affairs,

as Advisers;

Mr. SamuelBetah Sona,Geological Engineer,ConsultingExpertto the UnitedNationsfor the Law
of the Sea,

Mr. Thomson Fitt Takang, Department Head, Central AdministrationG , eneral Secretariat of the

Presidencyof the Republic,

Mr. Jean-JacquesKoum, Directorof Exploration,National HydrocarbonsCompany(SNH),

CommanderJean-PierreMeloupou,Headof AfricaDivisionatthe Ministryof Defence,

Mr. Paul MobyEtia, Geographer, Director,Institutnational decartographie,

Mr. AndréLoudet,CartographieEngineer,

Mr. AndréRoubertou,Marine Engineer, Hydrographer,

as Experts;

Ms Marie Florence Kollo-Efon, Principal Translator-Interpreter,

Ms CélineNegre, Researcher, Centred'étudesde droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
Universityof Paris X-Nanterre,

Ms Sandrine Barbier, Researcher, Centre d'étudesde droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
Universityof Paris X-Nanterre,

Mr. Richard Penda Keba, Certified Professor of History, cabinet of the Minister of State for
Justice, formerHead ofHigh School,

as Research Assistants;

Mr. Boukar Oumara,

Mr. Guy RogerEba'a,

Mr. AristideEsso,

Mr.Nkende Forbinake,

Mr.Nfan Bile, M. EithelMbocka,

M. OlingaNyozo'o,

commeresponsablesdela communication;

MmeRenée Bakker,

MmeLawrencePolirsztok,

Mme MireilleJung,

M.NigelMcCollum,

MmeTeteBéatriceEpeti-Kame,

commesecrétairesde la délégation.

Le Gouvernementdela République fédérale du Nigériaest représentpar :

S. Exc.l'honorableMusaE. Abdullahi, ministredYEtat,ministre de la Justice du Gouvernement
fédéradlu Nigéria,

comme agent;

Le chefRichard AkinjideSAN, ancien Attorney-General de la Fédérationm , embre du barreau
d'Angleterreet dupays deGalles, ancienmembrede la Commission du droit international,

M.AlhajiAbdullahi IbrahimSAN, CON, commissaire pour les frontières internationales,

commission nationale desfrontièresduNigéria,ancienAttorney-Generalde la Fédération,

commecoagents;

MmeNella Andem-Ewa, Attorney-Generae lt commissaireà lajustice,Etat de CrossRiver,

M. IanBrownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., membre de la Commission du droit international, membredu
barreau d'Angleterre, membrede l'Institutde droit international,

SirArthurWatts, K.C.M.G., Q.C., membredu barreau d'Angleterre,membre de l'Institut de droit
international,

M. JamesCrawford,S.C.,professeurde droit internationalàl'universitéde Cambridge, titulairede
la chaire Whewell, membredes barreaux d'Angleterreet d'Australie, membrede l'Institut de
droit international,

M. GeorgesAbi-Saab, professeur honoraire à l'Institut universitaire de hautes études
internationales de Genève, embre del'Institutdedroit international,

M. Alastair Macdonald, géomètre, ancien directeuerlYOrdnanceSuwey,Grande-Bretagne,

comme conseilset avocats;

M. Timothy H. Daniel, associé,abinet D.J. Freeman,Solicitors,Cityde Londres,Mr. EithelMbocka

Mr. Olinga Nyozo'o,

as MediaOfJicers;

Ms RenéBakker,

Ms LawrencePolirsztok,

MsMireilleJung,

Mr.Nigel McCollum,

Ms Tete BéatriceEpeti-Kame,

as Secretaries.

TheGovernmentof the FederaR l epublicofNigeriais representedby:

H.E.the HonourableMusaE. Abdullahi,Minister ofStateforJustice ofthe FederalGovernmentof
Nigeria,

asAgent;

Chief Richard Akinjide SAN, Former Attorney-Generalof the Federation, Memberof the Bar of

Englandand Wales,formerMemberof the International Law Commission,

AlhajiAbdullahi IbrahimSAN,CON, Commissioner, International Boundaries N,ational Boundary
Commissionof Nigeria, Former Attorney-Generao l fthe Federation,

as Co-Agents;

Mrs.Nella Andem-Ewa, Attorney-Generaland Commissioner for Justice,CrossRiver State,

Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., Memberof the International Law CommissionM , ember of the
EnglishBar,Memberof the Instituteof International Law,

Sir Arthur Watts, K.C.M.G., Q.C.,Member of the English Bar, Member of the Institute of
InternationalLaw,

Mr. James Crawford, S.C., WhewellProfessor of International Law, Universityof Cambridge,
Memberofthe Englishand AustralianBars,Memberof the Instituteof InternationalLaw,

Mr. Georges Abi-Saab, Honorary Professor,Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva,
Member ofthe Instituteof International Law,

Mr.Alastair Macdonald,Land Surveyor,FormerDirector,OrdnanceSurvey, GreatBritain,

as CounselandAdvocates;

Mr.TimothyH. Daniel, Partner,D.J. Freeman,Solicitors, Cityof London,M. AlanPerry, associé, cabineDt . J. Freeman,Solicitors,Cityde Londres,

M.David Lerer,solicitor, cabinetD. J. Freeman,Solicitors,Cityde Londres,

M. ChristopherHackford, solicitor,cabinet D.J. Freeman,Solicitors,CitydeLondres,

Mme CharlotteBreide, solicitor,cabinetD.J. Freeman, Solicitors,City de Londres,

M.NedBeale,stagiaire, cabinetD. J.Freeman, Solicitors, Cityde Londres,

M. Geoffrey Marston, directeur du départemen dtes étudesjuridiques au Sidney Sussex College,
Université deCambridge,membredubarreau d'Angleterre ed tu Pays de Galles,

M. Maxwell Gidado, assistant spécial principal du présidep ntur les affaires juridiques et
constitutionnelles, ancienAttorney-Generaelt commissaireàla Justice,Etat d'Adamaoua,

M. A. O. Cukwurah, conseil adjoint, ancien conseiller en matièree frontières(ASOP) auprèsdu
Royaumedu Lesotho, ancien commissaire pour les frontières inter-Etats, commission nationale
des frontières,

M. 1.Ayua,membrede l'équipe juridique du Nigéria,

M. K.A. Adabale,directeurpourle droit international et le drtomparé,ministèrede lajustice,

M. JalalArabi, membrede l'équipe juridiqud euNigéria,

M. Gbola Akinola,membrede l'équipe juridique duNigéra,

M. K.M. Tumsah, assistant spéciad lu directeur général de lcaommissionnationale des frontières
et secrétairede l'équipejuridique,

commeconseils;

S. Exc.l'honorable DubemOnyia, ministred'Etat,ministre desaffaires étrangères,

M.AlhajiDahiruBobbo, directeur général, commission nationadle es frontières,

M. F.A. Kassim,directeurgénéral du service cartographique l daeFédération,

M. AlhajiS.M. Diggi, directeurdes frontières internationale,ommissionnationaledesfrontières,

M. A. B.Maitama,colonel,ministèrede la défense,

M.Aliyiu Nasir, assistantspécial du minisd'Etat,ministrede la Justice,

commeconseillers;

M. ChrisCarleton, C.B.E., bureau hydrographique du Royaume-Uni,

M.DickGent,bureau hydrographiqueduRoyaume-Uni,

M. CliveSchofield,unitéde recherche surles frontières internationales, Universée Durham,

M. ScottB. Edmonds, directeurdesopérations cartographiques I,nternational MappingAssociates,Mr. Alan Perry,Partner,D.J. Freeman, Solicitors,City of London,

Mr. David Lerer, Solicitor,D.J. Freeman, Solicitors, CitLondon,

Mr. ChristopherHackford,Solicitor,D.J. Freeman, Solicitors,City ofLondon,

Ms CharlotteBreide, Solicitor,D. J.Freeman,Solicitors,Cityof London,

Mr.Ned Beale,Trainee,D.J. Freeman, Solicitors,City of London,

Dr. GeoffreyMarston, Fellowof Sidney Sussex College, Universityof Cambridge; Memberofthe
Bar of Englandand Wales,

Mr. Maxwell Gidado,Senior Special Assistant tothe President (Legal and Constitutional Matters),
FormerAttorney-Generaland Commissioner forJustice, AdamawaState,

Mr. A. O. Cukwurah, Co-Counsel, FormerUN (OPAS) Boundary Adviser to the Kingdom of

Lesotho,Former Commissioner, Inter-StateBoundaries,NationalBoundaryCommission,

Mr. 1.Ayua,Member, Nigerian LegalTeam,

Mr. K. A. Adabale,Director(International andComparative Law)Ministryof Justice,

Mr.Jalal Arabi,Member,Nigerian LegalTeam,

Mr. Gbola Akinola, Member, Nigerian LegaT l eam,

Mr. K. M. Tumsah, Special Assistantto Director-General, NationalBoundary Commission and
Secretarytothe LegalTeam,

as Counsel;

H.E.the Honourable DubemOnyia,Minister ofState forForeign Affairs,

Alhaji DahiruBobbo, Director-General, NationalBoundary Commission,

Mr.F. A. Kassim, Surveyor-Generalofthe Federation,

Alhaji S. M.Diggi,Director(International Boundaries), National Boundaryommission,

ColonelA. B.Maitama,Ministry of Defence,

Mr.Aliyu Nasir,SpecialAssistant tothe Ministerof State forJustice,

asAdvisers;

Mr. Chris Carleton, C.B.E., UnitedKingdomHydrographic Office,

Mr.Dick Gent,United KingdomHydrographic Office,

Mr. Clive Schofield, International Boundaries Research Unit, Universiofurham,

Mr. Scott B.Edmonds,Directorof CartographieOperations,InternationalMappingAssociates,M. Robert C.Rimtti, cartographeprincipal,International MappingAssociates,

M.Bruce Daniel,International MappingAssociates,

MmeVictoriaJ. Taylor,International MappingAssociates,

Mme StephanieKim Clark,International Mapping Associates,

M. Robin Cleverly,ExplorationManager,NPAGroup,

MmeClaireAinsworth,NPAGroup,

commeconseillersscientifiqueset techniques;

M. Mohammed Jibrilla,experten informatique,commissionnationaledes frontières,

MmeCoralieAyad, secrétairec,abinet D.J.Freeman,Solicitors,Cityde Londres,

MmeClaire Goodacre, secrétaire,abinetD.J. Freeman,Solicitors,City de Londres,

Mme SarahBickell, secrétaire,abinet D.J. Freeman,Solicitors,Cityde Londres,

Mme MichelleBurgoine, spécialisteen technologie de l'information, cabinetD. J.Freeman,
Solicitors,Cityde Londres,

commepersonnel administratif;

M. GeoffreyAnika,

M.MauOnowu,

M.Austeen Elewodalu,

M. UsmanMagawata,

commeresponsablesde la communication.

Le Gouvernementde la République deGuinéeéquatoriale,qui estautorisée à intervenirdans
l'instance,estreprésenpar :

S.Exc. M. RicardoMangue ObamaN'Fube, ministre dYEtat,ministre du travail et de la sécurité
sociale,

commeagent et conseil;

S.Exc. M. RubénMayeNsueMangue, ministre de la justice et des cultes, vice-présidentde la
-
commissionnationaledesfrontières,

S.Exc. M. CristobalMaiianaElaNchama,ministre desmines et del'énergie,vice-présidentde la
commissionnationaledesfrontières,

M.DomingoMbaEsono, directeur national de la société nationale de pétrole de
Guinéeéquatoriale, membrede la commission nationaledes frontières,Mr.Robert C. Rizmtti, SeniorMapping Specialist, Internationl apping Associates,

Mr.Bruce Daniel, International Mapping Associates,

MsVictoriaJ. Taylor,InternationalMappingAssociates,

MsStephanieKim Clark,International Mapping Associates,

Dr.Robin Cleverly, Exploration Manager,NPAGroup,

MsClaire Ainsworth, NPA Group,

as Scientific and TechnicalAdvisers;

Mr.MohammedJibrilla, Computer Expert,NationalBoundary Commission,

MsCoralieAyad, Secretary,D. J. Freeman, Solicitors,Cityof London,

MsClaire Goodacre, Secretary,D.J. Freeman,Solicitors, Cityof London,

MsSarahBickell, Secretary,D. J. Freeman, Solicitors,Cityof London,

MsMichelleBurgoine,IT Specialist,D. J. Freeman,Solicitors,City of London,

as Administrators,

Mr.GeoffreyAnika,

Mr.Mau Onowu,

Mr.Austeen Elewodalu,

Mr.Usman Magawata,

as Media Oflcers.

TheGovernmentoftheRepublicofEquatorial Guinea, whichhas beenpermitted tointervenein
the case,is representedby:

H.E.Mr. RicardoMangueObamaN'Fube,Ministerof Statefor Laborand Social Security,

as Agentand Counsel;

H.E. Mr. Rubén MayeNsue Mangue, Minister of Justiceand Religion, Vice-President of the
National Boundary Commission,

H.E. Mr. Cristobal Mafiana Ela Nchama, Minister of Mines and Energy, Vice-Presidentof the
National Boundary Commission,

Mr. Domingo Mba Esono, National Director of the Equatorial Guinea National Petroleum
Company, MemberoftheNational Boundary Commission,M.Antonio Nzambi Nlonga, Attorney-General,

commeconseillers;

M.Pierre-MarieDupuy, professeur dedroit international public à l'université de Paris
(Panthéon-Assase)tà l'Institutuniversitaire européen de Florence,

M.DavidA. Colson, membre du cabinet LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P.,
Washington,D.C., membre du barreaude 1'Etatde Californie et du barreau du district de
Columbia,

commeconseilset avocats;

SirDerek Bowett,

commeconseilprincipal,

M.DerekC. Smith, membre du cabinet LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P.,
Washington,D.C., membre du barreau du district de Columbia et du barreau de lYEtat
deVirginie,

commeconseil;

Mme JannetteE.Hasan, membre du cabinet LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P.,

Washington, D.C., membredu barreau du district deColumbia et du barreau de lYEtatde
Floride,

M.Hervé Blatrym, embre du cabinetLeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene& MacRae,L.L.P.,Paris, avocatàla
Cour, membredu barreaude Paris,

commeexpertsjuridiques;

M. CoalterG.Lathrop, SovereignGeographic Inc.,Chape1Hill, CarolineduNord,

M. AlexanderM.Tait, Equator Graphics, SilverSpring, Maryland,

commeexpertstechniques.Mr. Antonio Nzambi Nlonga, Attorney-General,

asAdvisers;

Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor of Public International Law at the University of Paris
(Panthéon-Assas)and attheEuropean UniversityInstituteinFlorence,

Mr. DavidA. Colson, LeBoeuf, Lamb,Greene & MacRae, L.L.P., Washington,D.C., member of
the CaliforniaStateBarandDistrictofColumbiaBar,

as Counseland Advocates;

SirDerek Bowett,

as Senior Counsel;

Mr. DerekC. Smith, LeBoeuf,Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P.,Washington,D.C., memberof the

District ofColumbiaBarand VirginiaState Bar,

as Counsel;

Ms Jannette E. Hasan, LeBoeuf,Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P., Washington,D.C., member of
the District ofColumbiaBarand FloridaStateBar,

Mr. Hervé Blatry, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Green& MacRae,L.L.P., Paris, Avocatà la Cour, member of
theParisBar,

as Legal Experts;

Mr.Coalter G.Lathrop, SovereignGeographicInc.,Chape1Hill,North Carolina,

Mr.Alexander M.Tait, EquatorGraphics,Silver Spring, Maryland,

as TechnicalExperts. LePRÉSIDENT : Veuillezvous asseoir. La séanceest ouverteetje donnelaparole, aunom

de la RépubliqueduCameroun,auprofesseurMalcolmShaw.

Mr. SHAW: Jevous remercie, Monsieurle président.

IV.BAKASSI

The situationbefore1961

1.Mr. Presidentand Membersof the Court, the distinguishedAgent forNigeriaaffirmedin

his address that Bakassi is "the main focus of this case" (CR200218,p. 18). Indeedit is. In this

pleading, the question of title to Bakassi up to and including the process by which British

Cameroons became independentbyjoining respectivelyNigeriaand Carneroonon 1October 1961

will be addressed. Issues afterthisdatewillbe discussedby ProfessorMendelson.

2. In so far as the long pre-independenceperiod is concerned,Nigeria's casehangs on one

simple and single thread, andthat is the sovereignstatus of the Kings and Chiefsof Old Calabar.

Not just sovereign status, but sovereign territorial rights on the international plane erga omnes.

Anything less than this will not do to maintain Nigeria's thesis. As counsel for Nigeria starkly

declared: "Cameroon invites you to agree that a State can, without express authority from the

owner, give away some other State7s temtory" (CR200218, p. 55). Note the wording,

Mr. President,"someother State's territory".

3. Nigeria argues that "Bakassi was part of the territory of the Kings and Chiefs of Old

Calabar" who had in 1884 "internationaltreaty-making capacity" so that "Great Britain acquired

only the limited rights conferredy the termsof the Treaty of Protection, andthoserights did not

include either sovereigntyover the territory of Old Calabaror the right or powerto give awayits

territory". Accordingly, Great Britain "had no legal title to Bakassi and no legal authority to

transferBakassito GermanybytheTreaty ofMarch 1913",so that Germany wasableto acquire no

good titlenor wereanyof its successorsincludingCameroon. Further,"at al1timesup to 1960title

to Bakassi consequentlyremainedwith the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar and,thereafter, with

Nigeria" and "while the Treaty of Protection remained in force Great Britain lackedal1authority

unilaterallytovary itsboundaries"(CR 200218,p. 65, andsee CR 200219,p. 19). 4. Nigeria'sthesis is a simple one,simply wrong. Nigeriaasks the Court to acceptthat the

Treaty of Protectionof 1884 was betweentwo international personsunder international lawat the

time and it had the effect of recognizing the intemationaltemtorial rights over Bakassi until

independenceandbeyond: this bothin respect tosovereigntitle and territorial extent ergaomnes.

Al1instruments, agreements, activities and processecsontrary to this perception areof necessity

wrongand ineffectivein law.

5. We are asked to consider a long line of legal error. Great Britain's effort to establisha

boundary with Germany regarding the Bakassb iy the Treaty of March 1913- was wrong.

Germanyin acceptingthis boundary - was wrong. The establishmentof the mandateandlaterthe

trust over the BritishCameroonsas including Bakassi- was wrong. British practice throughout

themandate and trust periodsshowing,by legislativeactivity and officialbehaviouronthe ground,

that Bakassi was part of the Southern Cameroons- was wrong. The supervisory activity of the

League of Nations and the United Nations organswith regard to the temtory which, as shown

consistently in, forxample, official maps presentedto them by Britain, includesBakassi- was

wrong. The plebiscite processas supervisedby the United Nations and which included Bakassi

with Southern Cameroons voting districts- was wrong. The General Assembly resolution

officially and legally terminating thetrusteeship on the basis of the plebiscite process-was

wrong. Not least,Nigerian practice at thtime andfor a coupleof decadesthereafter, recognizing

Bakassias part of Cameroon,was also wrong. Onemight be tempted to concludethat never have

somany madethe samemistakeso oftenand oversucha longperiodof time.

6. But, of course, Mr.President, Members ofthe Court,there was no such mistake. On the

contrary,what wehave is a consistent practiceby the colonial andthen administeringpower, other

interested States, international supervisory organUenitedNations and,up to relatively recently,

Nigeria itself,l1affinning that Bakassi was partof what isnow Cameroon. 1tum now to deal in

more detail withNigeria'ssingleandnow rapidlyunravellingthread.

Theinternational legal status and territorialxtent of the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar

7. No onedeniesthat the inhabitantsof the CalabarRiverregion, includingits varioustowns,

settlements and outposts, included at the timeder consideration manyenterprisingtraders andmerchants, who engaged in avariety of commercial activitiesand travelled far and wide. The

question at issue, however, is not that, but whether in 1884 and thereafter, there existed an

international legalerson with full sovereignand territorialrights under internationallaw and thus

capableofmaintainingan internationallyvalidterritorial titleergaomnesuntil the dateofNigeria's

independence. Forit is only onthis basis thatNigeria's threadmay remain suspendedand support

its assertions.

8. While it is not disputedthat variouspeoples operatedin the area in question at thetime in

question, Nigeria has provided no evidence that any State in the international community

recognizedor dealt withthe Kings and Chiefsof Old Calabaras a sovereign entityin international

law. Thatis a key question. Whatwe have is atreaty,theTreaty of Protectionof 1884,the point at

which forNigeria history ends. We need, however, to take a look at this Treaty andthe context

both localand international.

9.Nigeria offersus a choice. Either the treatywas with a "myth", as Nigeria so caricatures

Cameroon's argument (CR200218,p. 43), so that the territory in question was in effect terra

nullius or the Treaty was one with a sovereign Stateas that term was understood under

internationallaw at the time. This is a falsechoice. It is an issue dealt with in both theIsland of

Palmas case (2 RIAA, p. 829) and by the Courtin the Western Sahara case (I.C.J. Reports 1975,

p. 12). Whatwe aresayingis not new,but it is correct.

10. Judge Huber in the Island of Palmas case noted that agreements (what he termed

contracts)between Statesand "native princesor chiefs ofpeoples not recognized as members of

the community of nations" were "notin the international law sense,treaties or conventionscapable

of creatingrights and obligationssuch as may, in international law,arise out of treaties". They

were notdevoid of effect, however, since: "if they donot constitute titlesin internationallaw, they

are nonethe less factsof whichthat lawmust incertain circumstancestake account" (atp. 858). In

the WesternSahara case, this Courtbuilt uponJudgeHuber's approachand emphasizedthat State

practice accepted that "territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social or political

organization were not regarded as terrae nullius", rather sovereignty was acquired by colonial

powers "through agreements with local rulers" (at p. 39).At no stage, didthe Court suggest thatsuch localmlers were sovereignStatesrecognized assuchby the international community, northat

such agreementsconstitutedtreaties inthe sense of agreementsbetween sovereignStates.

11.It is fùlly accepted that the rangeof protectorate agreements signedby Britain with local

mlers in the area in question precluded the acquisition of titleby occupation of terrae nullius and

indeed established a position relative to third States that was accepted by them in the colonial

scramble. But thisis far fi-omsaying that such agreementswere made necessarily with sovereign

Statesgenerally, and particularly so with regard to the Kings andChiefs of OldCalabar. But there

is another problemwith regard to this entity. Trying to ascertain its nature is rather like trying to

graspjelly.

12. In its Counter-Mernorial, Nigeria termed theKings and. Chiefs of Old Calabar "an

acephalous federation" (Counter-Memorial of Nigeria, p. 67), rather a headless concept in

international law. It later referred to Old Calabar as "apparently a compendious name for the

various kings and chiefs in the area of the Calabar River" (ibid., p. 93). Counsel for Nigeria

accepted that: "we are not talking of a single unitary entity, butrather of a grouping of political

units, effectivelyseparate City States", who, it is argued, "over time came to act together as the

Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar" (CR200218, p. 43). A good effort at trying to work up a

conclusion of internationallegalstatus, but one which is hardlyconvincing. As the noted Nigerian

writer J. C. Anene points out, Major Macdonald, appointedCommissioner to the Niger Districts in

1889, explored the area and "made his way to Old Calabar where he found a congeries of

independent 'kingdoms' and 'dukedoms"' (Southern Nigeria in Transition1885-1906: Theoryand

Practice ina Colonial Protectorate, 1966,p. 124).

13. Another rather unconvincing effortis that devoted to establishing the territorial domain

of Old Calabar. First, the precise relationship between Bakassiand the Kings and Chiefs of Old

Calabar is rather difficult to discem. Nigeria argues both that Old Calabar had original title to

Bakassi and that Bakassi was a dependency (Counter-Memorialof Nigeria, pp. 74-75). The two

are not identical terms. Further, nowherein the 1884Treatyis Bakassi actuallymentioned.

14. Secondly, the question of the territorial extent of Old Calabar is posed. What does

Nigeria assert? [ProjectNigerianmap NCM,No. 281 You see one of Nigeria's sketch-mapson the

screen, Mr. President, Members ofthe Court,and is tobe found atjudges' folder,tab 125. Counsel forNigeria declared that,basinghimself uponConsulJohnston's 1890 report to the Foreign Office:

whilethe territory totheWestof the River Ndian "belonged'undoubtedly'to OldCalabar,Bakassi

and the Rio del Rey, are demonstrablyto the west of the Ndian" (CR 200218,p. 41). But what

about the temtory between the Rio del Rey andthe Ndian, Mr. President? By the same token, it

should be regarded as part of the domain of the Kings and Chiefsof Old Calabar and now,

therefore,part of Nigeria. Counsel continueda little laterby citing another British Consul ofthe

era, EdwardHydeHewett, as noting in the express contextof the 1884Treaty of Protection,that

"the Chiefs of TomShot country, of EfÙt,the country aboutRio delRey, and of Idombi, the

country aboutthe River Rumby,made declarationsthat theywere subjectto Old Calabar". As you

can see, we are now far beyond Bakassi andthe whole logic of Nigeria's single thread argument

demandsthat the territorial extentof Old Calabarat 1884passedto Nigeria in 1960and is subject

to its claim, whethermade now or perhapsin the future. And if not, how was the boundary

established atthe Riodel Rey as far asNigeriaargues? Ifthis was achievedby British action prior

to the 1913Treaty, then this would validate Britain's territorialcompetence which would in turn

validatethe 1913cession. If not, then- what? Counsel for Nigeria triedto retrievethe situation

by claiming in a later pleading that, "in the absence of effective agreements, one must have

recourse to the customary boundary, whichis the RiodelRey. Historically ... the territorial

authority of the Kings and Chiefs ofOld Calabar extended at leastas far east as that watenvay"

(CR2002111,p. 60). At least asfar- yes, butmuch morethan this, asNigeria has itself claimed.

Further, how was this customary boundary established and where is the requisite evidenceof

practiceto found suchan assertion? [Endprojection]

15. Mr. President, the more one looks atNigeria's claim,the more one is reminded of a

Magritte painting. At first sight, logical and clear and commonplaceb ,ut at second sight wholly

illogicaland senseless. A house inthe dark withthe skyabovebright blueand sunny.

The protectorate

16. At this point, we turn to consider the question of the protectorate established in the

Treaty of 1884. To treat this as if it wereakin to the classic international protectorate over

protectedStates isto fly from reality. Therealityis that theconceptofprotectorates inso far asthesub-Saharanregionof Afiica in the latenineteenthcentury wasconcemed mutatedinto a variation

of straightfonvardcolonialismwith no implication of sovereignty with regard to the target territory.

Authorssuch as Lindley(TheAcquisitionand GovernmentofBackward Territoryin International

Law, 1926, pp. 183, 187 and203), and Alexandrowicz (The European-African Confrontation,

1973,pp. 69-70) andothers (e.g., Crawford, Creationof StatesinInternational Law, 1979,pp. 198

et seq.), pointedto this colonial protectorateas one where the international community accepted

that the protecting State acquired extemal sovereignty, notwithstandinga certain variance in the

levelof purely intemalsovereignty.

17. As Hubernoted in the Island of Palmas case with regardto the notion of the colonial

protectorate:

"It is not an agreement between equals; it is rather a form of interna1

organisationof a colonial territory, on the basiof autonomyfor the natives. In order
to regularise the situation as regards other States, this organisation requires to be
completedby the establishment of powers toensure the fulfilment ofthe obligations
imposed by international law on every State in regard to its own territory. Andthus
suzeraintyoverthe native Statebecomes the basisof territorialsovereignty astowards
other membersof the community of nations."(P. 858.)

Thus Crawford writes that as a result of internationalpractice by virtue of the General Act of the

BerlinConference 1885: "theprotecting State had international full powers:it was competent, for

example,to cedeprotected temtory without consentand in breachof the protectorate agreements"

(op.cit., p. 200, andsee furtherReplyof Cameroon,pp. 262 etseq.).

18. In sucha context,it was irrelevantto issuesof extemalsovereigntemtorial title that the

domestic law of the colonial power ascnbed a different status to such protectorates as compared

withcolonies. Whether different nationality provisions applied tto he inhabitants in question and

whetherthe form oflegislation adopted fellundertheForeign Jurisdiction Actor not are interesting

issues, but simplynot relevant to the key issue of territorial titleerga omnes. As Lord Lugard

wrote: "We amve, then, at the general conclusion that'for purposesof municipal lawan Afiican

protectorate is not, but for purposes of internationallaw must be treated as if it were, a part of

British dominions'."(The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 5th ed., 1965, p. 35, and see

furtherReply of Cameroon,pp. 270 etseq.) 19. Nigeria has failed to provide any evidence as to the claimed international statusof

sovereign Old Calabar. No international acceptance of the sovereign status now claimed for Old

Calabarhas been evidenced, norany referenceto international recognitionof its territorial title,still

less of its territorial extent. This matters notonly for the purposes of general internationallaw

regarding statehood, but also because the international law of the Berlin Conference period

predicatedthe effective occupationof colonialand protectorate territories upon notification to, and

essentially acceptance by, third States. To this extent, any international recognitionof the Kings

and Chiefs of Old Calabar as a sovereign entityunder international lawwould have foreclosedthe

issueunder consideration.

20. But what was British practice? Here, Nigeria would haveus believe that the 1884Treaty

of Protection markedthe end of history until Nigerian independencein 1960. Not so. In fact,

practicedemonstratesthat withina very shorttime of this protectorate agreement, the constitutional

and territorial situation affecting this area was altered and was further changed on several

subsequent occasions. However,we must first put the 1884 agreement into its context and this

context wasthe raceto acquire territory inthis whole areaof West Afiica.

21. Hertslet in his classic work, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd ed., 1909, 3 vols.,

reprinted in 1967) refers to the truly extensive number oftreaties entered into between 1884 and

1892 more or less in standard predetermined form. In particular, Hewett in 1884 concluded a

number of agreements with "native Chiefs of the Niger District" by which these territories were

placed under British protection (Vol. 1,p. 116). Hertslet lists some 350 to 400 of these (pp. 131

et seq.). Essentially these prevented any correspondence or agreement with any foreign power

without British sanction and in return Great Britain extended its protection. The OldCalabar

Treaty was thus one small Stone in a large edifice marking the extension of British control

throughout the Niger delta region. To assert that Britain recognized the sovereign status in

international law andinternational territorialtitle of each of thelers with whom such agreements

were signedwould be pushing reality into fantasy.

22. At this stagewe need to look a littleat the 1884agreement itself. Nigeria maintains that

it was minimalist, simply restricting OldCalabar's powers to contact foreign States and extending

British protection (CR200218,p. 46). Nigeria's counselgoes no further in his analysis than this.Wiselyso for his own case. In fact, he declares, after notingthe provisionsin Articles 1andIIjust

mentioned, that: "And so far as is relevant for Ourpresent purposes,that is al1it said." (Ibid.,

p. 48.) Oh really? 1don't think so. Becauseif we delve a little more deeply, a totally different

pictureemerges. Let us look atsome of the other provisions- you should findthis on the screen

behindme and in thejudges' folderat tab 126 [project text,Counter-MemonalofNigeria, Ann.23,

p. 1101. ArticleIII provides for full and exclusive civiland criminaljurisdiction over British

subjects and foreign subjects enjoying British protectionto be reserved to British consular and

other officers. Not entirely incompatible with international personality, bu ltt us proceed.

ArticleIV provides that al1disputes between theKings and Chiefs of OldCalabaror between them

and Britishor foreigntraders or betweenthemand neighbouringtribeswho were, inthe absenceof

amicable settlement, to be submitted to British officials for arbitration and decision or for

arrangement. Arbitration anddecision, no less; no advisory service here, Mr.President. Indeed,

Lindleyuses the example of precisely such a provisionto demonstratean implied relationshipof

paramountcyor protection(ibid.,p. 185). Here,of course,there is no need forimplication,but the

basic pointis clear. We continue.

23.Article V is a generalclause oftrulystrikingscope. It providesthat the Kings and Chiefs

engagedto act uponthe adviceof the British consularor otherofficials

"in matters relating to theadministrationofjustice, the developmentof the resowces
of the country,the interests of commerce,or in any other matter in relation to peace,
orderand goodgovernment,andthe general progressof civilisation".

Well, apretty conclusivelist of governmental activities, one might think. And note,the obligation

is notjustto seek British advice,it is tact uponthat advice. There is a right of appeal againstthe

decisions of such British officers, but, Mr.President, to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for

ForeignAffairs [end projection] .

24. Mr. President, Membersof the Court,this is hardly a declaration of independence.It is

hardly arecognitionof independence. It markedan acceptanceof a degreeof British control thatis

simply not consistent with any level of independence that may be required for international

sovereignty. To Say, as does counsel for Nigeria, that "[tlhe CO-contractingparties were

international persons,equalin law; they weremanifestlyagreeingto certaindispositionswithinthe

framework of international law" (CR 200218,p. 46) reveals a gift for fantasy that J. R.Tolkienhimself woulddoubtlesshave envied. And the Courtwill be well awarethatNigeria'scase outside

of an asserted post-independence historical consolidation restssolely and exclusivelyupon this

Treaty .

25. The large number- thelarge number- of protectorate agreementssigned with the

local chiefsdid not mark the end of history. On the contrary, a process of rearrangement and

consolidation took place almost immediately. In June 1885, less than one year after Our

protectorate agreement, a British protectorate was established over the Niger Districts (or Oil

Rivers Protectorate), definedas the area between the British Protectorateof Lagos and the right

bank of the mouth of the Rio del Rey. Two yearslater the areas subjectto the government ofthe

Royal Niger Companywere included. In 1893 thearea under protectionwas renamed the Niger

Coast Protectorate. On 27 December 1899, an Order in Council was adopted constituting the

Protectorateof Southern Nigeria comprisingthe Niger Coast Protectorateand certain temtories

formerly administered bythe Royal Niger Company and regulating itsadministration. This

constituteda much larger area than heretofore. This Order was, in turn, revoked by one dated

16February 1906which defined the area of the Protectorate ofSouthem Nigeriamore extensively

to include the whole area of southern Nigeria excluding the Colony of Southem Nigeria (see

Hertslet,op. cit., pp. 117 etse).

26. We have seen no evidence at al1that the British Govemmentfelt constrained by the

several hundred protectorate agreements (includingOur 1884 Old Calabar agreement) in so

changing these interna1boundaries and administrative arrangements. We have seen no evidence

that the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabarprotested at the consequential violation ofwhat is now

claimed to be their sovereign status. In fact, practice with regard to Nigeria is remarkably

consistentin demonstratingthat the colonial powerwas fully able to alter the territorial extent of

thevariousprotectoratesalmost atwill.

27. We should finally note thaton 1 January 1914, the Colony and Protectorateof Southern

Nigeria and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria were amalgamated to form the Colony and

Protectorate ofNigeria, an arrangementthat continued until independence in 1960- 1960. But

1960 brings us to one further problem for Nigeria's thesis. And that is how- and that is thequestion - how the sovereignKings and Chiefs of Old Calabar,with international sovereign and

temtorial rights remember, cameto join Nigeria.

28. Counselfor Nigeria sang in simple harmony. Very simple. One said that: "[tlhe chain

of identity from the Kings andChiefs of Old Calabar to present-day Nigeriais clear enough"

(CR200218, p.36). Another proclaimed that: "the link between today's Nigeria and yesterday's

Old Calabaris clear"(ibid., p. 39). A thirdcounsel saidthat: "The originaltitle of Old Calabar...

was eventuallyabsorbed in the emerging entity of Nigeria. At thetime of independencein 1960

the original title toBakassivested in Nigeriaas the successorto Old Calabar." (CR200219, p. 19.)

The same counsel referred further to "the original title to the Bakassi Peninsula inheritedby

Nigeria at the time of independence" (ibid., p.47). Perhaps, we inOurtum may be permittedto

ask: How was thistitle absorbed or vested or inherited? And by whom? And preciselywhen?

And bywhat mechanism?

29. In Nigeria's own terms, Old Calabar possessed international legal personality and

sovereign title toerritory. There existsin international lawa presumptionagainstthe incidentalor

accidental demise of States. So how did this claimed State lose formally its independent legal

personality? Wehave no evidence whatsoeveras to any processof succession bywhich the rulers

of the Kings and Chiefs of OldCalabar formally renounced statehoodand temtorial title in favour

ofNigeria. Perhapsthere wasa processoftransfer over the yearsduring the colonial period. But if

this is so, and Nigeria has not argued this, then would not also this prescriptive mechanism

consequentially transfer to Britain title tothe territory in question and thus validate the 1913

cession to Germany? A Treaty which Britain never denounced,never attacked, never criticized

with regardto Bakassi. Whichever way this is argued, Nigeria faces insuperable legalamers.

The Treatyof 11March 1913

30. The mention of the 1913 Treaty brings us to the legal core of Cameroon's case.

Nigeria'sapproach is basic. It argues thatit does not matter. It is irrelevantin so far as Bakassi is

concerned. The reason for this is, as claimed, Britain did not havethe competencein lawto cede

the areato Germany. There is no need nowto argue the validity ofthis Treatyin general. Nigeria

has in terms beforethis Courtaccepted it(e.g.,CR2002110,p. 41). Al1it seeks to do is to arguethat it is not applicableto Bakassi. Or rather thatthe Articles referringto the boundarywith regard

to this peninsula are somehow severable fiom the Treaty and void. And Professor Simma has

already addressed thisargument. Onlya couple of points will be made here.

31. First, there is no doubt andno dispute that the Bakassi Articlesdefine a boundary that is

congruent with Cameroon's claim. Nigeria does not claim that this lineis unclear or inconsistent

with Cameroon'sargument. It simplydisputes the legality of this line as introduced in the Treaty.

Secondly, neither side disputes that in this Treaty the effect of Articles XVIII to XXII is to cede

formally the BakassiPeninsula to Germany,however muchpractice was previously movingin that

direction. Thirdly, neither side disputesthat on the British side of the pre-March 1913 linesome

form of protectorate arrangement was in existence. Fourthly,there is a disagreementas to whether

this Treatywas accompanied byGerman effectivités.But ProfessorTomuschat has already shown,

using, inter alia, British documents, that there were German effectivitésin this pre-allied

occupationperiod withregard to Bakassi(CR 200213,pp. 61et seq.).

32. The question to be decided by the Court is whether the terms of the 1884 Treaty of

Protection were such as to preclude Britain fiom ceding the temtory in question. Nigeria's

argument is that sovereignty inheredin the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar and that included

international legal personality and international territorial title. Nigeprays in aidthe doctrine of

nemo da! quod non habet, stating that Great Britain acted "wholly in excess of anypowers which

she had ... as such it was wholly ineffectivein law to achieve the transfer of territory which it

purportedto effect" (CR200218, pp.55-56).

33. Cameroon has no argument with the doctrine of nemo dat- just its application here.

We have shown that thisargument is deeply flawed at several levels. First, it is, at the very least,

dubious that the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar constituted anindependent sovereign entity with

territorial rights under international law. Second, the Treaty of Protection of 1884 did not

recognize orconfirm, still less confer any such powers or rights. Third,British practiceduring and

after 1884 demonstrated that it did not feel constrained with regardto altering administrative

arrangements or changing territorial lines affecting the area in question. Fourth, no international

recognition or acceptance of any Old Calabar sovereign status or territorial competence was

forthcomingat any stageprior to, atthe time of, or subsequentto the agreement. Fifth,no evidenceof any suchrelevant activity on the part of the Kings and Chiefs has been presented. Sixth, while

both Germany and Britain explicitly affirmed the cornpetence of Britain to cede Bakassi, no

internationalprotest of any kind has been put fonvard in evidence. Seventh, international practice

is consistent in accepting that colonial protectorates in sub-SaharanAfiica during the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries permitted the colonial power to exercise full external

sovereignty with regard to the territory, including the rightto cede part of such territory. Eighth,

the processof replacing Germanauthority withBritish andFrench authority during the First World

War involvedno attemptto denounce or modifythe March 1913Treaty. At thispoint, we turn to

the mandateand trust periods.

The mandateand trustperiod

34.The practice of these periods was the subject of a specific pleading before the Court

(CR 200214,pp. 18 etseq.). In response, Nigeria provides the usual answer. Bakassi was not

German territory thereforethe practice of the mandate andtrust period is irrelevant. Counsel for

Nigeria tells us: "And that answer underminesCameroon's wholesubsequent case." (CR200218,

p. 61.) Throughout theperiod, andup to 1961,"the 1884Treaty of Protection wasstill in force and

still binding upon Great Britain" (ibid., p. 62). Well, Mr. President, nobody seems to have told

Britain, or the League of Nations, or the UnitedNations, or indeed the Kings and Chiefs of Old

Calabar.

35. Counsel for Nigeria accepts Cameroon's arguments with regardto the nature and scope

of mandatory powers and trusteeship administering authorities, but declares that, "Before these

limits to territorial authoritycan in any way berelevant, it has to be shown thatBakassi waspart of

the Mandate or Trusteeship territories" (ibid.,p. 63). We have addressed this point in somedetail

already; this will not be repeated (see CR 200214,pp. 18 et seq.). Suffice it to Saythat we have

shown that British officiais on the ground took the view that Bakassi was part of the mandated

territory (see,e.g., the 1922 Report on "The Fish Towns in the Rio del Rey Area", Reply of

Cameroon, Ann. 3, para. 6), as did the Governorof the Nigerian Protectorate himself in a letter of

1936(Counter-Memorialof Nigeria, Vol. VII,Ann. NC-M 133). 36. Even more clear and authoritative, is Britishlegislativepractice. The Northern Region,

WesternRegion and EasternRegion(Definition of Boundaries) Proclamation 1954 t, which later

Orders in Council referred, provides concerning the boundary betweenthe Eastern Region of

Nigeriaand Southern Cameroonsthat, "From thesea the boundary followsthe navigable channel

of the River Akpa-Yafe" (Memorialof Cameroon, Anns. 201and 202 and CR200214, pp. 31

etseq.). Thispositionis confirmedbythe evidenceof officialBritish mapsof the period presented

to the supewisory organs(see, e.g.,Memorialof Cameroon, Ann.383,maps36,38, 41, 43, 45 and

46); theCourt will recallthe presentationby Professor Cot (CR200214,pp. 58 etseq.).

37. To al1of this, Nigeria's reactionis dismissive. Counsel Statesbaldly: "AI1Britain's

actionsin the Mandate and Trusteeshipperiods which assumedthe alienationof Bakassi fkomthe

Protectorate or which might be construed as having that result were tainted in that way."

(CR200218,p. 64; emphasis in original)- that is, Britain lacks capacity. Simplyignore al1

relevant practice and repeat the mantra. It is, of course, curious thatNigeria, while relying so

heavilyin generalon claimed effectivitéand historical consolidation, shouso dismissal1of these

effectivités bthe legitimate administering power.

38. There isjust one furtherpoint before 1turn to the plebisciteprocess. On three separate

occasions,two of Nigeria's counsel have returnedto an old tune. In the first case,it was stated

that: "After the First World War the whole of the mandated territory ofthe British Cameroons

came to be administered as part of the Nigeria Protectorate" (CR 200218,p. 64). In the second

instance, until 1960"Bakassi was administered from and as part of Nigeria" (ibid., p.66). In the

third case, counsel notedas one of the elements ofhistorical consolidation, "The administratiof

Bakassias part of Nigeria in theperiod 1913 to the date of independence." (CR200219,p. 52.)

We really thought we had seen the end of this particular spurious claim. The key British

Cameroons Order in Council 1923 provided for the administration of the Northem British
*
Cameroons "as if it formed part of' the Northern Provinceof Nigeria; the Southem British

Cameroons"as if it formed part of' the Southern Province of Nigeria (Memorial oC fameroon,

Ann. 130). Not "as part of', but "as if it formedpart of'. Andinhese words"as if itformedpart"

lies a whole legal world. This critical provision was repeated to the League of Nations (ibid.,

Ann. 144) and the same situation continued throughthe trusteeship period. The insinuationbycounselthat the administration of Bakassias part of Nigeria during the mandate and trust period

was part of the process of the historical consolidation oftitle (CR200219,p. 52)is legally totally

wrong.

The plebiscite periodand independence

39. The plebiscite process leadingto independence is critical, for it marks the active

The British Cameroons achieved
intervention of the UnitedNations in a binding capacity.

self-determinationunder the active supervisionof the United Nationsand as a direct consequence

of a General Assembly resolution defined by this Coura ts having "definitive legal effect"

(Northern Cameroons,I.C.J. Reports 1963,p. 32).

40. Counsel for Nigeria Statesthat the evidence does not support the assertion that the

plebiscite relatingto the Southem Cameroons encompassed Bakass(iCR 200219,p. 43). It is also

declared that there isno documentary evidence indicating that the population of Bakassi tookpart

in the plebiscite. Butsince the United Nations PlebisciteCommissioner'sReport 1961 provided

the voting details by voting district and since Bakassi was notan identified voting district, but

simply part of bigger units, it is not possible to produce now such figures. One is left with an

aggregated figure forthe districtsin question. But as the annexedmap clearly shows the relevant

districts included Bakassi, andso the problem assumes little significance [projectUnited Nations

plebiscite reportmap,judges' folder,tab 1271.

41. A wordneeds to be said about the map. Counsel for Nigeria pointsto the usual United

Nations disclaimernoting thatno officia1endorsement ofthe boundaries shownon the mapshould

be implied(CR200219,p. 44). Thatis correctas far asit goes,but the importanceof the map is not

as showing international boundariesas such,but as showingthe territorial framework within which

the United Nations supervised plebiscitestook place, a process that was approved in

resolution1608 which had "definitive legal effect" and for whichNigeria voted and which was

reaffirmed by Nigeriain itsAgreement of 29May 1961withthe United Kingdom.

42. The question of United Nations maps was addressedby the Tribunal in the

Eritrea/Yemencase (Phase 1). The Tribunal noted, in relation to a UnitedNations map of 1950

that: "Whether themap was attachedto the reportofthe United NationsCommission
for Eritreaas an officia1commission map,or as a compromise - or even as a merely
illustrativemap- seemsbesidethe point. Whatit bearswitnessto is that it wasused
and circulated- and received no objection. No protest was recorded in 1950or at
any latertime, andEthiopia itselfvoted in favour ofthereport with full knowledgeof

themap." (Para.378).

And the Tribunal drew conclusions fromthis (para.379). Unlike theEritrea/Yemencase, Nigeria

to Our knowledge at least has not contested the accuracy,provenance or authenticity ofthe

plebiscite map. The importance of this map is that it records the details of the plebiscite

arrangements,in terms of the divisionand identityof votingdistrictsand thus providesa definitive

analysisofthe territorialframeworkforthe conductof the United Nations supervised operation.

43. Letus look furtherat the map. We can see that Bakassi isincluded, in the main, within

Victoria South West voting districtbut also partly withinthe Kumba district, and you can see on

this map thatArchibong is clearlyidentified- Archibong,atown referredto on severaloccasions

as being part of Bakassi and Nigeria(e.g.,CR 2002/11,p. 60). So we dohave someexplicitproof

as to placenames. Further,the SouthemCameroons(Constitution)Order in Council Proclamation

of Constituencies 196 1, specifies that Archibong falls within specifically the Kumba area and

you canseethat atjudges' folder,tab 128[end projectionof map].

44. Toconclude: Nigeriahangs al1onthe one thread, thethread ofthe 1884Treaty. Butthat

thread cannot sustain these claims. The Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar did not possess

international legal personality and international territorial sovereignty.The terms of the Treaty

show that virtually al1meaningful control passedto Britain. The institution andpractice of the

colonialprotectorate entailedtheextemalsovereigntyof the colonial power, including the powerto

cede territory. The 1913Treaty with Germany validly passedtitle to Bakassi to Germany. The

establishment of the mandate and the trusteeship froze the existing international boundaries,

includingthe 19 13lineinBakassi. TheUnitedNationssupervisedplebiscitein 1961demonstrated

that Bakassi fell clearly within Southern Cameroons. The plebiscite process was affirmed by

resolution 1608, whichterminatedthe trusteeship. Nigeria through al1its dealingswith the British

authorities and the Cameroons territory was fully engaged in this independence process and

acceptedit by voting in favour of resolution 1608and by formallyendorsingit in the agreementof

29 May 196 1 (CR 2002/1, pp. 61 erseq.). It continued, as we shall see, to recognise BakassiasCameroonianafter independence. The thread snaps. In truth, it never really existed. And now it

asksyouinessenceandinpart tojudicially reviewthe acts of internationalorganizations.

45. 1finally retum to the map [projectUnited Nations plebiscitemap]. Mr.President and

Members of the Court, this represents the territorial contextof the plebiscite process. It proves

Bakassi waswithin the SouthemCameroonswhichjoined theRepublicof Cameroon. It is the map

of the colonial heritage. It is the photographoferritorial title of whichthe Charnberspoke in the

Burkina Faso/Republicof Mali case(I.C.J.Reports 1986,p. 568). Thatis the utipossidetis picture

at independence showingthat Cameroon had titleto Bakassi.

1 thank the Court for its kind attentionand would be grateful, Mr. President, if Professor

Mendelsoncouldnow becalled.

The PRESIDENT: Thankyouverymuch,ProfessorMalcolm Shaw.Je donne maintenant la

parole auprofesseurMaurice Mendelson.

Mr.MENDELSON: Merci,Monsieurleprésident.

V.BAKASSI

Thesituationsince 1961

1. Introduction

1.Mr. President,Members of the Court, itis my task during this round of oral argumentto

deal with matters conceming the Bakassi Peninsula followingthe integration of the Southem

Cameroons,includingthe peninsula,intotheRepublicof Cameroonin 1961.

2. The Nigerian oral argumentsof the last few days on this subjecthave been a mixture of

the startlinglynew andthe depressinglydéjà vu. Both, alas,were equallydevoid of any substance.

Let us beginwith thestartlingly new.

2. ''Theshockof the new": the population ofBakassi

3. In her oral argument, Mrs. Andem-Ewa toldus' how rich are the Bakassi waters in

plankton andaquatic life, and that the population largely liveson fishing. We were later told by

'CR 200218p.29,para. 5.my fiiend Professor Brownliethat the populationof the peninsula numberssome 156,000~.This

was not a slip of the tongue, since he and various other speakersused eitherthis figure of "more

than 150,000". Professor Pellet has touched on this surpnsing assertion in his introductory

remarks, but the matterbearscloserexaminationhere.

4. In paragraph 3.25ofthe Counter-Memorialof Nigeria ofMay 1999(that is, lessthanthree

years ago),we weretold that:

"Figures givenbythe NationalPopulation Commissionin Calabarstate thatthe
current populationofBakassiis estimatedto be in the regionof 37,500. This figureis
projected [my emphasis]fiom the last census, which was carried out by Nigeria in

1991."

"Projected"- that must meanto May 1999. In January 2001,just 18monthslater, the figurewas

already 100,000- it has gone up fiom 37,500 to 100,OO- according to the ~ejoinder~. And

today, a mere 13 months on, it is apparently 156,000. You are expectedto believe, it seems,

therefore, thatthepeople are even moreprolificthanthe fish,to have multipliedmore thanfourfold

in less than three years and by over 50per cent in the course of a year. These leaps to 156,000

today seem wholly implausible, and the Court will note that the figure is unsupported by any

evidence.

5. We were also told by counsel for Nigeriathat this is a "permanentpopulation'A.This is

again a surprisingtransformation, giventhat the population wasin the past always transient, being

governed not least by the weather,whichmade fishing in the rainy season impossible. Indeed,it

seems from Nigeria'sown evidencethat fishingwasnot only seasonal, but that itwas notthe same

people who came and fished every years. 1am refening to documentsin the Nigerian pleadings

themselves. Asone officia1put it:

"It cannot be too strongly emphasisedthat the inhabitants of these Fishing
Villages and settlements are a shifting population .. . The people have only one
purposewhenthey stayinthe Fishtownsandthat is to fishand to fishfast."6

Again,we aregivenno evidencefor theallegedstrikingchangeofbehaviour.

'CR 200219,p.45, para. 134.

'vol.1p. 166,para. 3.275.
4~~ 2002/8,p. 33, para.22.

'~ee, e.g., Counter-MernorialofNigeria, Ann. NC-M115,para.6; Ann.NC-M 117,p5.a.
6~nn.NC-M 12 1,para. 5. 6. And where is this huge permanent population to live? Accordingto counselfor ~i~eria~

"large areasof the peninsula areconduciveto habitation",large areas. How large, Mr. President?

For earlierin her speech,she told youthat "The vegetation in Bakassi isthick and dense,withthe

principal florabeing mangroves . .. Further inlandfiom the Coast,the mangrovesgiveway tovery

old and well-established rainforest." Indeeda , glance at plates 1 to 33 of the ~ounter-~emorial',

which areapparentlytakenfromthe self-servingNigerianvideothat youwere shownthe otherday,

confirmsthat impressionof dense vegetation. Hardly conducive to habitation,onemight think.

7. Of course, Cameroon does not claim that there is no dry land on Bakassi. Clearly, as

counsel forNigeria told you, thereis some, "severalmetres above sea levelV9,she said. But once

again, we have the objective reportsof British officials, deposited by Nigeria, who tell us, for

example,that

"The fishtowns .. .aremostly builton small stretchesof landappearingamong

the mangrove swamps. Water usually invades these stretches at high tide and some
timeseven enters the houses. The pervadingstenchof decayingfishrefuse, combined
withthat of the swamps, is tooterribleto des~ribe."'~

Indeed, paragraph 3.9 of the Counter-Mernorialadmits al1of this: it seems, however, thatin its

enthusiasmto inflateitscasebefore you, Nigeriahas now losteven remotecontactwiththe truth.

8. The fact is that by far thegreatest part,well over 90per cent,of the Bakassi Peninsula is

either too wet or too densely coveredby vegetation to be habitable, let alone pennanently

habitable. Once again, as so often in this case, 1 must acknowledge my debt to Nigeria for

providingevidence tocorroborateCameroon's claim. 1refer, for example,to the compositeaerial

photographsat tabs 6 to 8 of the atlasof the Counter-Memorial- 1will not take you to that now,

but 1shouldjust point out that the white patchesi,f you look,are not Settlementsbutclouds- and

1refer alsoto the Nigerianmap at tab 4 of theAnnex to the Counter-Memorial. And this is now

being projected, and for convenience can be found at tab 129 of your folders. Unfortunatelyon

your photocopies it is not very clearand it is not, 1 see, very clear on the projection but,on the

bottom leftof the legend, Membersof the Court,you will seethat there isa symbol third fiom the

'CR2002/8, p. 32, para. 19.
8~ol.XII.

9~~2002/11,p.63,para. 3.
'O~nn. C-M 114,para.XIV. SimilariyAnn. RC3, Vol. IV,p. 28,p7.a.bottomwhich says "mangrove", and that is what this is showing. It is showing virtually the whole

peninsula being covered by mangrove. Please bear in mind that further north this map does not

evenshow the dense rainforest which Mrs. Andem-Ewa toldus is to be found to the north, around

Akwa,for example.

9. So where indeed is this permanent populationto live? We were told that the total areaof

the peninsula is about 700 km2.Let us assume, probably far toogenerously, that 10per cent of it is

at al1 habitable, even temporarily. That makes 70km2to contain 156,000people. Simple

arithmetictells us that thisroduces a population densityof 2,229 inhabitantsper square kilometre.

Even the Netherlands, the most densely populated countryin Europe, has only 387.5 inhabitants

per square kilometre" - that is, only about one-sixth of the alleged permanent population of

Bakassi. How very surprising that it was only a few days ago, in this very courtroom, that the

world first leamed about a hitherto unknown Manhattan island on the west coast of Afiica [end

projection].

10.Mr. President, the factsspeakfor themselves. This is, 1am afraid, yet one more example

ofthetendency ofNigeria to inflate and fabricatethe facts to suit its case.

11. Before 1 leave the Nigerian video, which 1 mentioned and which is transparently

self-serving, a couple of other points should be made. Heavy reliance has been placed on the

Nigerian citizenshipof some of the inhabitantsof Bakassi, and- whichis not the same thing-

on the Nigerian ethnic affiliations of someothers (by no means all, by the way). Various counsel

for Cameroon have demonstratedwhy ties of citizenshipand ethnicity are irrelevantas a matter of

law and fact. In exchange for the self-serving Nigerian video,we would be pleased to offer Our

counterparts othervideos, taken by members ofthe Cameroonian delegation, whichshow similar

groups of happy Nigerians going about their daily lives in just the same way as on the video-

exceptthat there areno helmeted and life-jacketed soldiers to keep them in line, in Ourvideo. The

importance difference, though,is that these videos of Nigerians were taken in locations deep into

Cameroon, some ofthem even in francophoneareas. We have not bothered the Courtwith them.

"SourceS: tatistics Canada,www.statcan.calen~lish~Pedhi:Peo~lelPo .tu,8t3.20/d.emoO 12. The point is, Mr. President, thatas has already beens~bmitted'~,Carneroonhas long

given hospitalityto largenumbers ofNigerians andothers, without its ever havingbeen pretended

that this affectedits title to territory beforethe Nigerian claimsto the peninsula. And itisjust the

same in other partsof Africa. Thisis not just a legal or factual point, but a serioushuman one.

One would notlike to imaginethe humanconsequences ifStates in Africa and elsewhere thought

that the highest court in the world was telling them thatsovereign title can be jeopardized by

allowing foreignersto livewithin thehost State'sterritory,especiallyif closeto the frontier.

13. Itis of course true that Africa was carvedup by the colonial powers without always

paying much attentionto ethnic affinities. So, al1over Africaboundaries do divideethnic groups.

The leaders of the newly independent African Statesin the 1960sknew this very well. But they

also knew thatto try andtear up the colonial boundaries andrearrange thecontinent onethnic lines

would lead to endless warfare and chaos. And that is why they adopted the famous OAU

resolution enshrining the principle of uti possidetis, and which principle was so resoundingly

endorsedinthe BurkinaFaso/Republicof Mali case13,amongstothers. Nor, Mr. President,is this a

problemuniqueto Africa- important though theproblem is there. Today,throughoutthe world,

there are irredentistmovementswho would seek todestroy existingStateson thesevery groundsof

ethnicity. Cameroon hopes that this Court will treat such arguments with the disdain that they

deserve.

3. Nigeria's failureto engage, either adequatelyor in some cases at all, with Cameroon's
arguments

14. 1said at the outset of my presentationthat the Nigerian oralargument on sovereignty

over Bakassi,in the firstround, wasa combinationof the startlingly newand the déjàvu. So faras

concems the déjà vu,my friend and colleague Professor Pellethas already drawn attentionto Our

opponents' habitof simply repeatingin oral argument, andsometimes evenreading out,what they

had already said in writing, and of notengagingwith Ouroral arguments. This tendency is very

marked in theiroral submissionsonBakassi. Theinference tobe drawn is that Ourpointswerenot

answered - orwere notproperlyanswered- becausethey areunanswerable.

'2~.g.CR200214,pp.44-45, para. 20.

"I.c.J. Reports 1986,pp. 565-567,paras.20-26. 4. Nigerian acknowledgmentof Cameroon's title

15.1beginwith what 1shall loosely call, for convenience, "acknowledgmeno tf title", which

includes recognition and acquiescence and sometimes overlap wsith effectivités. It is, however,

logically prior to the question ofeffectivités. For even if there were, purely for the sake of

argument,any doubtabout Cameroon'stitle at the beginning of the post-plebiscite perioo dr atny

time thereafier, acknowledgment by Nigeriaof Cameroon'stitle would have resolved the matter

definitively in Cameroon's favour. This general proposition is not contested by Nigeria.

Nevertheless,it has ignored completely what we have submitted aboutsome of these instances that

we rely on, and has givena questionableor palpablyfalse account of others. Please allowme to

particularize.

(a) Nigeria'sdiplomatic NoteNo.570 of 1962

16. 1 refer, in the first place, to the Nigerian diplomatNote No. 570 of 27 March 1962,

which was dis~ussedby my friend Professor Thouveninin his oral argumenton 22 ~ebruaryl~.

(TheNote and accompanyingdiagramis alreadyin your folders,at tab 74, but 1need not take you

to it now.) Essentially,the point of the Nigeriandémarchewas that there was a small overlap of

offshore petroleum exploration zones to the south and south-westof Bakassi, which the Nigerian

Ministerfor Foreign Affairswantedto sort out. The letter- the diplomaticNote- recognizedin

terms that zoneN, which was offshore Bakassi, "is now off shore the Cameroon Republic", to

which,he said, it had reverted. He added"As shownon the map, the boundary followsthe Akpa

Yaferiver, wherethere appearsto be no uncertainty,and out intothe Cross River estuary". A line

onthe sketch-map(tab 73-2)showedthis. ProfessorThouvenin, relying onthe Eastern Greenland

and Minquiers and Ecrehos cases in particular, submitted that this Note constituted a forma1

acknowledgmentand recognition by Nigeria of Cameroon's title.In my own argumenton the

same day'', 1 drew your attention to the fact thatno less an authority than Dr. Elias, then

Attorney-Generalof Nigeria, cited this Note,as well as other documents, and concluded "The

principleof good faithin international relations demandthat Nigeriashould not disavow herword

1CR 200215,pp. 27-29,paras14.-
"lbid ..25,para. 19.of honouras evidenced bythe note of 1962." The report of his letter is already in your bundles, at

tab 72. 1mention it because 1mustpoint out thatthere has beenno reply to this argument.

(b) The premise of the agreementson maritime delimitationand of the granting of
hydrocarbon licences

17.There has, on the other hand, been a response- of sorts- to Professor Thouvenin's

other points,which concerned theYaoundé,Kano and Maroua Agreementsof 1971to 1975onthe

delimitation of the waters to the west of the Bakassi Peninsula,up to- eventually- point G'~.

Essentially,Nigeria's responsehas been to denythat GeneralGowon had the constitutional rightto

bind Nigeria to these agreements,and my fi-iendand colleague Sir Ian Sinclair will be dealing with

this matterin his oralargumenttomorrow. 1donot want to anticipatewhat he is going to Sayabout

the binding force of these treaties, but 1shouldjust like to make two points in the present context.

The firstisthat, quiteaside fiom their status asbinding treaties,these instruments reveal onceagain

the premise of both sides, which was that Bakassi belonged to Cameroon, irrespective of their

treaty status- it was the premise. The whole course of conduct ofthe two Parties in thismatter

was predicated upon thatvery fact. In the Land, Maritimeand Frontier Dispute case the Chamber

of this Court held to be "decisive" the fact that "the negotiations were conducted on the basis,

acceptedby both sides, that it wasthe boundary between theejidos of Citala and Ocotepeque that

defined the frontier", even though this was at a time whenboth parties were in dispute about their

boundary, and no admission had been made by ond duras" The present case is afortiori, since

there was no dispute at the time between the Parties and, as we havejust seen, there had already

been Nigerian admissions.

18. As well as the treaties of 1971 to 1975, there was also a long-standing practice by

Cameroon of granting hydrocarbon licencesover the Bakassi Peninsula itself and its offshore,

without protest fiom Nigeria, to which 1drew attention on 21 ~ebruar~". Once again, the premise

was thatthe peninsula belonged to Cameroon. On 6 March, in attempting to deal with this serious

problem, my learnedfiiend Professor Crawfordtold the Court that the two issues- sovereignty

I61bid, p29-33, paras. 15-35.

"1c.J.Reports 1992,. 405, para.72.
"CR 200214, pp.46-4p,ara.24. over the land and sovereignty and similar rights over the adjacent territorial sea and a little

beyond- were regarded by the two States as entirely separate and unrelated, that these issues

wereso treated by virtue of atacit agreement whichhe had to invent for the occa~ion'~.He told the

Court"The conductof the Parties is incomprehensibleexcept on the basis thatthe two issues were

considered as separate." Mr. President, it is the thesis of Professor Crawford that is

"incomprehensible". Itis inconceivablethat Nigeria, which had shown itself so careful to protect

its legal rights see, for example, the DiplomaticNote of 1962- that Nigeria wouldhave failed

to Saysomething about its alleged sovereignty over theland which controlledthe relevant sea areas

duringthe lengthy period when Cameroonwas granting licences,or duringthe period fiom 1970to

1975when the two States were concluding agreementsand negotiating abouttheir delimitation of

the offshore waters. One sympathizeswith the impossible task of counsel in having to try and

squarethe circlebut, withrespect, thisreally willnot do.

(c) Consularandambassadorialvisits

19. The next set of acknowledgments, and so on, relates to the visits and arrangements for

visits by Niperian consular andambassadorial staffto the peninsula, as well as to other places in

Cameroon, on various occasions between 1969 and the mid-1980s20. Nigeria had contented itself,

in its written pleadings,withan irrelevantquery as to whether the ambassadorial visitactually took

place, and a denial that consulshad the right or power to grant recognition of sovereignty over the

territory. In oral argument, 1pointed out that that was not the issue. Again there has been no

response from Nigeria. Mr.President, 1will not burden the Court by recitingover again the facts

referred to in Cameroon's first round, but 1wouldjust like to remind you very briefly of some of

the conclusions which we said could be drawn fiom this history. First, asking for Cameroonian

permission and CO-operation,and thanking Cameroon after the event, constitutedthe clearest

possible acknowledgment of Cameroon's sovereignty and effective control over the areas in

question, including Bakassi. Secondly,on more than one occasion, the Nigerian Consul-General

toldhis countrymen in Bakassithat they were living onCameroonian soi1and should obey its laws:

19CR2002112, pp.61-64paras.13-19.

''CR 200215,pp.20-24paras.9-16.again, a clear acknowledgment. Thirdly,consuls and ambassadors do not make officia1visits to

their own country. Fourthly, whilstconsuls issue passports to their own nationals in foreign

countries, they do not do so in their own country. Fifthly, thefact that Nigerian fishermen in

Bakassi needed passports is at least highly suggestive of the factthat they were not in Nigerian

territory. And, sixthly, themany Nigerian officials involved in these activities couldhardly have

arranged and made the visits, or obtained and issued the passports, without the knowledge and

assistance of their govemment. What al1of this arnounts to, therefore, is both express and tacit

recognition by Nigeria of Cameroon'stitle to Bakassi, and we respectfully request the Court to

drawthat conclusion.

(d) The Eliasletter

20. On the same day, you were shown the famous Elias letter- tab 72 in your folders*'.

This document has been before the Court ever. since the Memorial was deposited, and its

authenticityhas never been questionedby Nigeria. In view of thestanding of its author, and of the

factthat it is evidence against interest,so to speak, it is of the greatest significance and speaks for

itselfwith the greatesteloquence.

(e) The opinionsofthe NigerianMinistry of Justice, 1985-1986

21. If 1now cite another similar but later letter, it may seem that 1 am "gilding the lily".

However, it is of great importancefor reasons which will become apparent. The document in

questionis Annex 275to the Memorialof ~ameroon". Becausethe original photocopyis long and

difficultto read, you will find in yourfolders, at tab 130, certain extracts to which Sir Ian Sinclair

and 1will make reference. 1should emphasize thatthis documenttoo has been with theCourt since

the depositof the Memorial.

22. What you now have, then, are extracts fiom a letter fiom Mr. K.B. Olukolu, of the

Nigerian Ministry of Justice, dated 6June 1985. It appears from it that the Minister of Foreign

Affairs, who headed the "Special Task Force on Chad and Cameroon"- ominous sounding

name - had asked for forma1 advice on the "present maritime and territorial boundary" with

''lbipdp.24-25, paras. 17-20.
22~ol.VI, p. 2291,andAnOC 34 Cameroon, andthis was the advice. It is also to be noted incidentally that Dr.Geoffiey Marston,

who is a member of the present Nigerian team, had apparently been asked for his views. The

document is a long and fascinating one, which repayscareful study, b1tshalljust highlightsome

of the key passages, especiallythose that state conclusions, rather than the full reasoning. May I

first take you toparagraph 7? After reviewing a whole series of legal arguments, many ofwhich

latertumed up in Nigeria'spleadingsinthe current proceedings,Mr. Olukolu says,at the bottom of

the first page ofthis extract: "It is a futile attempt to contend at this stage that Bakassi Peninsulais

part of Nigerian territory." Over the page, which is double-sided, hegoes on to rely on various

further arguments, such as the fact that the United Nations Secretary-General had himself

confirmed that Bakassi was within the area covered by the Southem Cameroons plebiscite. He

dismisses as immaterial arguments based on the fact that many Nigerian citizens inhabit the

peninsula. He expressly rejects arguments that were later presented to you as evidence of

eflectivités,such as registration and voting in Nigerian elections,payment of taxes to Nigeria and

the fact that certainBakassi villages were includedin aNigerianensus. This is al1in paragraphs 7

and 8, where he also Statesin terms, at thebottom of page 2 of the extract, andthe top of page 3,

that Cameroon has been exercising administrative authority there, and that the peninsula has not

been abandoned by Cameroon and is not terra nulliuIs n.paragraph 10, on page 3, he goes on,

presciently as it tumed out: "Except we are prepared to use force (and that has its attendant

consequences) 1 cannot see how Nigeria can validly now lay claim on Bakassi Peninsula", and

encourages negotiations with Cameroon. In paragraph 11 he concludes - the grammaticalerrors

are in the letter- "There is ovenvhelming legal documentsand conducts [sic] passive or active on

the part of Nigeriawhich willmake Nigeriato be estopped from denying that Bakassi Peninsulais

Cameroon's territory." He then goes on to consider the maritime boundary. 1 do not want to

trespass on thewaters of my colleagues, soto speak, butmay Ijust draw your attentionfornow to

paragraph 18, in which, after examining al1 possible legal arguments, intemational and

constitutional, by which the Yaoundéand Maroua agreements could be repudiated, he finds al1

such arguments and objections, and consequently the proposed rejectionof the Maroua agreement,

to be without any legal foundation. 23. A brave and honest man, Mr.Presidentand Membersof the Court, whose sage advice

shouldhavebeen heededby Nigeria. Butas wellas the fact thatit reiterates and bringsup to date,

soto speak, theopinion of Attorney-General Elias,the documentalso has another significancefor

us. It provesthat the Nigerian Govemmenthad long had designson the peninsula, and was now

contemplatingthe use of force. If 1cantake you back to the top of the first page, in paragraph 2,

Mr. Olukolusays that therehave been severalprevious legalopinionsgiven by his Ministry on the

matter,the lastbeing inAugust 1977. Andinparagraph 10,as1have alreadymentioned,there is a

hint that the use of force isbeing considered. It seems clear fromthis that the campaignto annex

Bakassi was already under way, or at least under consideration. My fi-iendProfessorTomuschat

will demonstratethis furtherin a few minutes.

24. A similar report, dated 6June 1986, by the Legal Adviser of the Federation and

Secretary-Generalof the Ministry of Justicein Lagos, whichhas unfortunately been found onlyin

its Frenchtranslation,formsAnnex279to the ~emorial*~. Though less elaborate, it is to exactly

the same effectas Mr. Olukolu's,and incidentallyDr. Marston,whose concurrence is noted, will

be pleasedtohear thathe isthere descrîbedas an"intemationallyrenowned Nigerianexpert".

25. Mr.President,thesereports seemto Sayit all. And evenif we did not havethem, any -

1repeat any - of the otheracts of recognitionandacknowledgmentof Cameroon'stitleto which1

have referred would be sufficient to destroy completelyany shadow of a claim to Nigeria's

sovereignty. But before 1leave this subject, there isone moreimportantform of acknowledgment

to which 1mustrefer- andit will onlytake acoupleof minutes- and which ismap evidence.

UI) Mapevidence

26. If 1may Sayso, counsel for Nigeria's re~~onse*t~ o the very compelling map evidence

produced by my friend Professor ~ot*~was woefully inadequate. Our opponent's main criticism

seems to be that the mapswere small-scale. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the scale was

certainly big enough for everybodyin this courtroomto see that the maps put Bakassiclearly on

the Cameroonian side of theline. Afurther argumentof Ouropponentwas that "none of the maps

2'/bip d2335.

2 4 ~200219,pp.47-49,paras.143-153.
2 S ~200214, pp.53-63.was prepared by experts concerned with highly localized and specialized issuesof sovereignty".

Decoded, this means that none of those officials whodrew up the maps, including officials in

Nigeria before and after independence, were expectingso far-fetcheda claim to sovereignty and

had not yet been instmcted to manufacture evidencein support of one. Officialmaps are officia1

maps. Ratione temporis,Nigeria tries,as usual, to have it both ways,or perhaps three ways, this

time. It relies on threeof its ownmaps from 1990, 1991,and 1992; but it rejectstwo earlier maps

dated 1989 and even 1976 as "of a late date and self-serving". Butthen again, counsel told you,

"Three of the maps relied upon by Cameroon aremaps at or soon after the independenceof

Nigeria .. .;in otherwords,veryearlyinthe post-independence phaseof historical consolidation."

As a whole, then, Nigeria seemsto be saying the mapsfrom the early 1990swhich suitthem are

fine, other maps aretoo late eventhough they were published earliearnd othermaps again aretoo

early. Mr. President,how manyways doesNigeria wantto have it? To completethis very brief

surveyof Nigeria's argumentonmaps, one cannot helpbut admire my learned friend'ssan&oid in

relying on administrative map No. 10 of Nigeria, publishedby the Federal Survey in Lagos in

1990. He emphasizedthat this puts Bakassi on the Nigerianside of the line- which indeed it

does- whilst ignoring the fact that earlier editionsof the very same map- of the very same

map - put it ontheCameroonianside,as Professor Cotshowedyou. And this is a Nigerianset of

maps. Enough said,1think.

Mr. President,1have cometo a naturalbreakin my presentationand perhapsyou wouldcare

to considerthat, asinAstérix chezlesBretons,c'estl'heure de1'eauchaude.

Le PRESIDENT :Je vousremercie, Monsieur le professeur.La Cour va suspendrepour le

théoule cafépendantune dizainede minutes.

L'audience estsuspendue de16 h 35 à 16h 45.

Le PRESIDENT :Veuillezvous asseoir. Je vous prie tout d'abord d'excuserle retard avec

lequelnous reprenonsnos travaux, mais j'ai dû procéder àdes consultationspendant cette période

et,bienentendu, leCameroun disposera du temps nécessaire pour fin siers plaidoiriesce soir, selonle programmequi avait été prévu. Jedonne maintenantla parole au professeur Mendelson pour

qu'il poursuivresaplaidoirie.

Mr.MENDELSON: Merci, Monsieur le président.

27. Mr. President, in the light of the weaknessof Nigerian arguments based on nemo dut

quodnon habet and on the invalidityof boundary treaties, andin the light of al1the instances of

recognition and acknowledgment ofCameroon's title to which 1 have just eluded, in our

submissionthe whole question of effectivitéis irrelevant, purely academic.However,in view of

the huge effort that counsel for Nigeriaand their collaboratorshave evidently invested in this

subject, perhapsit would be discourteousnot to Sayat least something about them, evenif they

havenotreally dealtwith Ourownoral arguments.

5. Effectivités

28. On 1March my learned friendand opponent ProfessorBrownlie angrilyrejectedwhat he

consideredto be amischaracterization ofthe issues and of his casez6.Hesaid:

"Professor Mendelson payslittle or no attentionto historical consolidationof
title, which is the basisof Nigeria's claim, butrefers instead to the concept of

prescription, whichis generically distinct and hasnot been invokedby Nigeria. In his
[Mendelson's] opinion, if Nigeria had invoked prescription, thw isould have
eliminated manyof Nigeria's effectivités.But this assertionis unfounded and in any
event Nigeriahas not relied upon prescription. Counsel for Camerooc nannot expect
toreinventNigeria'scasein orderto attackit."

Fine words, butletus see what theyarnountto.

29. A few moments earlier,my leamed friend claimedthe benefit of a concessionwhich had

not infact beenmade. He asked the Courtto note that 1concededthat Nigeriahad more effectivités

thanCameroon. Thatwas not,in fact,so. 1 simply conceded thatNigeria had, as it were,taken up

more pages in listing itsfectivitébut 1question their legal forceof relevancefor reasonswhich 1

will comeback to. But now we will makehim not one, buttwo concessions- so longas he does

not tryto distortwhat we said again. 1do not thinkthat they willhelp him, but he is welcome to

makeofthemwhathe can.

2 6 200219,p.68,para250. 30. The firstconcessionis this: if Nigeria's other assertions areright, andif it didhave title

in 1961,then - unless Nigeria recognized, acknowledgedo ,r othenviseacquiesced inCameroon's

title- then we would be talkingabout somethingthat, so far as Nigeria is concerned, wouldbe a

confirmation of itstitle and not prescription. Of coursethis is not really a new concession: ithas

been explicit or implicit inOurapproachal1along. 1donot think, in fact, it will help Nigeria, for

two reasons. Firstof all, it as acknowledgedCameroon'stitle, explicitlyand implicitly, aswe have

seen. And secondly,we submit that Nigeria is extraordinarily far fiom being ableto establishthat,

immediately after the piebiscite, it held legal title to the peninsula, or even that the titlewas

uncertain. If the Court were to consider us wrong on both of these points- and it has to be

both- then we are indeed in a situation where Nigeriacan meaningfully invoke itseffectivités.

But if not, not.

31. Our second, related, "concession"is this. Whatis sauce forthe goose is saucefor the

gander. If the contentions of Nigeria abouthaving title in 1961 are right, and if Nigeria never

acknowledged Cameroon's title, then this time it would be on Cameroon that thelaw of

prescription wouldweigh, including rules regardingthe heavyburdenof proof. This must beright

in law and it has always been Ourposition: itis just that, on the facts, we do not think that this

helpsNigeria.

32. Mr. President, Cameroonhas seriously tried to engage with Nigeria's claim to historic

consolidation of title. It has tried to avoid a dialogue of the deaf, where each side simply shouts

that it has the title andis effectively consolidating. Ywillseethat, in my ownspeech, 1carefully

analysed- 1hope fairly- what appears to be Nigeria's case in the Rejoinder,and said in what

respects wedisagreed. 1refer, forexample,to the verbatim recordof the hearing of 21February,in

which a seriousattemptwas madeto analysethe overlappingstrandsof Nigeria'sargument; there

is a deliberatevagueness and blurriness about some of them27. But in grappling with Nigeria's

arguments,we wereneither obligedto acceptthe tendentious legal frameworkin which it setthem,

nor its account and interpretationof the facts. Once again,we did notjust generically denythe

fiamework, the facts and the interpretation given, but explained how and why we differed.

2 7 ~200214,pp.35-53,espatpp.36-40and 50-53.Cameroon'saccount of itsown effectivités was briefly given, by way ofresponse to whatwas said

in the Rejoinder. But Nigeria's counsel did not engage with the oral argument, choosing instead

simply torepeat,and oftento read out,Nigeria'searlier written pleadings. It is not Cameroon who

is responsiblefor this dialogue of the deaf, and itwishes to emphasize that it does not accept an

account and characterizationof its administrationof the peninsula which is grossly inaccurate and

hasalready beenrefuted.

33. Having analysedNigeria's claims thatthe sovereignty of theKings and Chiefsof Old

Calabar overBakassi bothexisted and survived until independence, and the further argument that

the United Kingdomhad administered Bakassiin nght ofNigeria, and not in right ofthe Southem

Cameroons, 1went on to deal with the third basisof Nigeria's claim, quoting directly from the

Rejoinder, which said that it was "To provide, if this were to prove legally necessary, an

independentsource of titlebased onthe processof peaceful possession,acquiescence, and historic

consolidation in the period since ~nde~endence."~~In his oral argument, ProfessorBrownlie

attached particular importanceto the post-independenceperiod29. It is to the characterizationof

this third claimas being, albeitsotto voce,one of prescription,that exceptionhas beentaken. But

ifNigeria wereto fail oneither of its first two submission- which we claim it must - then it is

the adversepossessorandthe law whichappliesto it isthe lawof prescription.

34. Let us clariij matters. In the first place, Nigeriadoes not claim that the peninsula is

terra nulli~s~~.That much,at least, is commonground. Butmy leamed friend goeson to Saythat

"The legal situation appearsto the respondent State to be in certain respects similar to that

obtaining in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case." We are not told exactly in what respects it is

similar, but presumablythereforenot identical. But in any case, Mr.President, thisis yet another

exampleofNigeria's tryingto cover itselfal1ways, and thetwo cases are actually verydissimilar.

In the 1953case,the rootof title was lost in the mists of history,with assertionsthat thetitle went

back as far as the Norman conquest of England in 1066, and both parties putting fonvard

arguments about mediaevalfeudal law which the Court characterized as "more or less uncertain

2 8 200214,pp.38-39 para..

2 9 200219,p.19,para.8.
''CR 200219,p. 50,para. 157. and contr~versial"~'. It therefore felt it appropriate to examine acts relating to actual possession,

and not simply to decide the case on the basis of who had originaltitle. But that is very far fiom

the circumstances of the present case. In particular, there was a consistent andrelatively intensive

exercise of State authority by the United Kingdom over the peninsula in the 40 or so years

preceding the plebiscite. Wherethe Parties differ is as to the consequences of that exercise - we

differon who can count these effectivitésas Ourown. But that is the nub of the matter. And this,

incidentally alsodisposes of my learned friend's reliance on the reference to uncertainties in the

Land,Island andMaritime FrontierDisputecase; and in any case the passage he quoted relatesto

uncertainty as to the exact territorial expanseto which a sovereigntitle relates, which is not the

issue here32. Nigeria cannot really have it both ways: either it was the sovereign of Bakassi in

1961,or Cameroon was. There is no need to obscure the situation here by the introduction of a

wholly irrelevant tertiumquid.

35. That beingso, whatdoes this claimof "historical consolidation"amountto? The gameis

given away by my leamed fiiend in paragraph 162,when he says that "treaty-based titles can be

modified by means of historical consolidation". Carneroon stronglyrejects this assertion, for

reasons given by my fiiend Professor Cot this moming. But even leaving that aside, what

Professor Brownlie is talking about is plainly the establishment of title by adverse possession,

which has traditionally beenlabelled "acquisitive prescription". Admittedly, what matters are not

labels, but the particular circumstances. And admittedly, too, there can be times when the

expression "historic consolidation of title" can be a convenient way of describing the ratio

decidendi of cases like Minquiersand Ecrehos, or even perhaps a handy blanket term to cover a

series of different rules which cover different situations. But what we do not accept is the use to

which Nigeria has put the concept in the present case. And it is interesting to note that even

CharlesDe Visscher himself, in a passage quoted by my leamed fiiend, says that the notion of

consolidation encompasses, amongst otherthings, the case of adverse possession33. So where, on

the facts, one of theparties mustbe the adverse possessor,the lawapplicable to adverse possession

- - -

3'1.C.JReports1953,p. 56.
"CR 200219,pp. 51-52,para. 165.

j31bidp..,1,para. 160.applies, and that can conveniently be labelled for present purposes,as prescription. If 1might be

perrnitteda vulgarism, Mr. President, if it walks likea duck, quacks like a duck, and looks like a

duck, then 1prefer to Saythat it is a duck, whatever my leamed fiiend likes to cal1it. And no

amountof citationof academic supportfor the generalconcept of historical consolidation isgoing

to Save Nigeria from having its conduct judged by the standards which international law has

consistently applied- consistently applied- to adverse possessors.

36. Our opponents insist- have always insisted - that Nigeria is not the adverse possessor.

But it is certainly not unreasonable for Cameroonto canvass the hypothesis that it is, and to

examine the legal consequences flowing from this, especially when, as we have shown, the

hypothesiswe are canvassing is far from implausible. By the sametoken, it is not unreasonableof

us to expect Nigeriato dealwith it too.

37. So, after al1that fuss and bother aboutnames, we come back to where we started in the

first round: the applicationof the criteria imposed by international law to establish whether an

adverse possessorhas acquired good title - the lawrelating to prescription, if1may be permitted

to put it that way. These are the rules which we Say clearly have to apply if Nigeria fails to

establish its Calabar claim, so to speak, and fails to establish its claim to be the successor of the

British administratorsof Bakassi. As a matter of fact, even then the issue only arises if we fail to

makegood Ourclaimto acknowledgmentof title byNigeria.

38. In thefirstround, as 1have mentioned,it was submitted on behalf of Cameroonthat there

are five criteria that have to be satisfied before conductcan even quali@ as a potential effectivité,

for example the conduct has to be à titre de souverain. Nigeria hasnot questioned this list, nor

directly engagedwith the claim that many of its alleged effectivitéswould fa11foul of these tests.

Instead, counsel simply reiterated the listset out in Nigeria's written pleadings. It was of course

accepted by Cameroonthat not al1of the allegedNigeriq effectivitéswould fa11foul of these five

tests, and that there might quite possibly have been some acts done by Nigeria, on the peninsula,

concurrently with those performed by Cameroon. But 1 then went on to list three more criteria

which, it was submitted, would be fatalto Nigeria's claims. One was the need for absence of

protest. It was demonstrated that Cameroonhad protested against Nigerianincursions, an examplefrom 1969being given34.My learned friend's attempt to dismiss this by saying that "No reference

is made to the extent of the Cameroon is singularly unconvincing. Cameroon,seeing what

it considersto be the unlawful exercise of foreignauthority in one of its towns, protests about that

act. Nothing abnormal here.

39. A further requirement mentioned by Cameroon was that prescription by adverse

possession could not occur if the existing title holder was concurrently itself exercising

administrative control. A substantial part of my oral argument was devoted to showing that

Cameroonhad done so. In the firstplace, it wasshown that Cameroon could rely on the acts of its

predecessors in title, the British mandatory and trusteeship authorities and indeedermany. And

turning to the period after independence, it waspointed out that, although Cameroonhad not cited

many examples in its pleadings, there was enough there to rebut the suggestion that it had

And it
acquiesced in Nigerian sovereignty. That argumentwas not seriously addressed in reply.

will be recalled, Mr. President, thatamongst the other thingsthat Cameroon had done was that it

had been consistently granting hydrocarbon licences overthe peninsula and its offshore from as

early as 1963~~.And, as Nigeria itself adrnits, Cameroonian eflectivitésin the area gradually

increased overtime. They make a point of this- but not, as Ouropponents suggest, inorder to

"create facts7'- that is their speciality- but in the normal way that a newly independent State

gradually increases its control overits tenitory. This does not happen ovemight, especially

when- as in the special case ofCameroon- two different legal, linguistic and political systems

have to be integrated after independence.

40. As well as arguing that these eight criteria between them destroyed the whole of

Nigeria's list of eflectivités,we also made another important point. Relying on the farnous

pronouncement of the Chamber inthe El Salvador/Honduras case, which itselfencapsulates a long

line of authority, that where there is an existing title, preferencemust be given to the title holder,1

observed thatthis means that it is not sufficient for each party to pile up its eflectivitésin its pan of

the scales, so to speak: the lawrequires the Courtto tilt the balance heavily in favourof the title

34CR 200214,p. 50, para.34.

3 5 ~200219, p.21,para. 18.
36~bi pp. ,6-47,para. 2Seealsopp. 47-50,paras.25-34.holder. My learned fi-iend'sonly response to this was to suggest tha1was complaining about

being given too much work to do by ~i~eria~'. Even allowing for the rough-and-tumble of

advocacy, this is hardly a serious answer to a very senous Cameroonian objection to Nigeria's

claims.

6. Conclusion

41. Mr. President, Members of theCourt, Nigeria has failed to justify in law its repudiation

of thetreaty instrumentsthat confer andconfirm Cameroon7stitle over the Bakassi Peninsula. It

has also recognized and acknowledgedthat title on numerous occasions. That being so, the

questionof its alleged historical consolidationof title and eflectivitésdoes not even arise. But even

if, purely for the sake of argument, it did arise, Nigeria has failed to establish that the Kings and

Chiefsof Old Calabar had effective controlover the peninsula andthat that sovereignty continued

until independence; it has failedto establish that the United Kingdom administered thepeninsula

in right of Nigeria, as opposed to Southern Cameroons, and finally, it has failed to establish a

prescriptive title, or any otherkind of title however youl1it, after independence. What it has

beentrying to consolidate is a house of cards.

42. Thankyou for yourkind attention. May1ask you, Mr. President, kindlyto give the floor

tomyfriend andcolleague, ProfessorTomuschat.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Je donne maintenant la parole au professeur

ChristianTomuschat.

M. TOMUSCHAT :Merci, Monsieurle président.

VI. RESPONSABILITÉ

Monsieur le président,MadameetMessieurs de la Cour,

1. 11m'incombe de répondreaux arguments du Nigéria qui acherché à établirlors des

plaidoiries de vendredi dernierque sa responsabilité n'estpas engagée. Maisc'est unetentative qui

a échoué, commjee le montrerai par la suite. La responsabilitédu Nigéria résulte principalement

de son invasion de la péninsulede Bakassi et d'un large secteur de territoire camerounaisdans la

37~bipdp.,7-68. régiondu lac Tchad ainsique deson non-respectdes mesuresconservatoiresindiquéespar la Cour

le 15 mars 1996. Afin de ne laisser planeraucune équivoque,il convient de remarquer dès à

présent que les deuxgrandes opérationsannexionnistes entreprisespar le Nigéria ontété

accompagnéesou suivies de nombreux incidents d'usage ill6gal de la force que le Cameroun

considèrecomme faisant partiede ces deux grands blocs. Ces incidents ne peuvent avoir une

existence séparéeou autonome, étant donnéqu'ils constituent les conséquences directed se

l'ambitionmalheureusedu Nigériade s'emparertant de la péninsulede Bakassi qued'une grande

partie duterritoire camerounaisdu lacTchad. Le Cameroun s'estdéjà prononcé abondammentsur

cette question(CR200217,p. 37-39,par. 9-16). Il n'y reviendra plus.

2. Le Cameroun reconnaît donc ouvertement que, pour lulie, centre de gravitédu différend

résidedans l'extrémité nord ainsi que l'extrémitsud de la lignequi sépareles deux Etats sans

séparerles peuples, quiont toujours vécu amicalement côteà côte, malgréles tensionsqui ont pu

se développersur leplan des relations intergouvernementales.Dans sajeune histoire,le Cameroun

a fait un effort délibépour créerune bonne entente entre sespopulations et celles du Nigéria.

C'est ainsi, surtout, qu'il a accueillides millionsde Nigérians quiaujourd'huivivent paisiblement

sur son territoire, mais dont il attend évidemmentqu'ils respectent la loi camerounaise.

Malheureusement, le Nigériaa interprété cette générosité du Cameroun comme une faiblesse.

D'où des actions inconsidérées, attentatoiràsla souverainetécamerounaise, qui finalement ont

abouti àdes opérations militairqui cherchentà arracherau Cameroundes centainesde kilomètres

carrés.

3. Le Nigéria acritiquélajonction des revendications territoriales du Cameroun avesces

demandesen réparationen insistantsur le faitqu'unetelle situationne s'étaitpas encoreprésentée

devant la Cour (CR2002114, p.47, par.4; p.48, par. 6, 8). Mais cette jonction ne suit que les

règles de la logiquejuridique. Ce que le Cameroun chercheavant tout à atteindre, c'est la

libérationde son territoire national, conséqueeui selon lerégimede la responsabilité découlera

automatiquement du constat par la Cour que les zones en questionont étéoccupées de façon

illicite, conséquence toutefoisqui devra être dite explicitemtar la Cour pour que lamise en

Œuvredeson arrên te soulèvepasde nouveaux problèmes d'incompréhensiodne lapart du Nigéria. 4. Monsieur le président, laissez-moivous le dire d'emblée : cette affaire n'est pas une

affaire de délimitationcomme les autres. Le Nigéria n'apas seulement contesté une frontière

conventionnelle établie,ce qui, aprèstout, étaitson droit. Il a aussi, et en toute connaissancede

cause, choisi d'envahir militairement les territoires qu'il revendiquait. Permettez-moi de vous

confierune chose, Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs lesjuges. Si le Nigérian'avaitpas

envahi militairement Bakassi en 1993, alors mêmeque des négociations étaient en coura svec le

Cameroun, la question de la responsabilitén'aurait jamais étéportéedevant la Cour. Seulement,

les autorités nigérianesont décidé d'ajoute r leurs prétentionsterritoriales l'usagede la force. Et

ce fait ne peut être restsans conséquence. Ce que le Cameroun demande, c'est tout simplement

que la Cour le constate et qu'elle exige avant tout que le Nigériacesse immédiatement son

occupation illicite. Aucun Etat ne peut, en toute impunité, tenterde réglerun différend, fût-il

territorial, par la force. Politiquement et moralement, les particularse cette affaire rendent donc

opportuneunejonction du territorial et dela responsabilité. Juridiquement, rienne s'y oppose.

5. Le fait qu'onne retrouve que peu ou pas d'hypothèses similairesdans le passé s'explique

très aisémentpar le caractère particulieret de la présente affaireet du système juridictionnel

international. Lorsquedeux parties concluent un accord pour soumettre un différend à la Cour,

elles le font presque toujours après avoirsurmonté quelqueshésitations. On va donc normalement

exclure du compromisles points les plus épineux,en se concentrant sur l'essentiel qui, dans le cas

des différendsterritoriaux, est l'appartenancede la zone contestéeà l'une ou l'autre des partiesen

litige. D'autre part, en ce qui concerne la clause facultativede l'article 36, paragraphe du Statut

de la Cour, beaucoup d'Etats ont pris l'habitude d'exclure de leur acceptation de la compétence de

la Cour ou bien tout acte se rapportant à un conflit militaire (ainsi, par exemple, la Grèce, le

Honduras, la Hongrie, l'Inde, le Kenya, le Malawi) ou bien la réparationqui est due en cas de

violation d'une obligation internationale (ainsi, par exemple, Chypre, la Guinée, le Libéria, le

Liechtenstein, Madagascar, le Malawi). On a qu'à lire l'Annuairede la Cour pour s'en convaincre.

Le Nigérian'a en revanche émisaucune réserve de ce type. Rienn'empêchedonc le Camerounde

mettre en cause sa responsabilité devant laCour. En fait, en l'absence de réservesun différend

peut êtrerésolu dans son intégralité sans qu'il faille a,près le prononcéde l'arrêtde la Cour, s'engager encore une fois dansde longues négociationsavec un partenaire ou adversaire parfois

difficile.

a) Les éléments constitutifd sela responsabilitéduNigéria

6. Tout le monde présentdans cette salleconnaît le contenu du projet d'articles produitpar la

Commission du droit internationalaprès de longues annéesde travail et achevél'annéedernière

sous la direction intellectuelledu professeur Crawford. Il n'est donc pas nécessaire d'expliquer

quoi que ce soit sur les origines et le contexte de ce projet. Ce qui importe dans l'espèce,c'est

l'application des règles définiepar la CD1aux faits en présence ici. Généralemeno t,n considère

que cette Œuvre de codification reflète le droit coutumier en vigueur et, concernant la première

partie du projet, la partie largementfaçonnéepar le juge Ago quand il était membrede la CDI, il

n'y a pratiquement pas de controverse. L'unanimité la plucsomplète règneen ce qui concerne les

articles sur lefondement de la responsabilité internationale.

7. Or, la Commission du droit international a préciséque ce sont deux élémentsdont la

présence conduit à la responsabilitéde 1'Etaten question. Tout d'abord, les actes en question

doivent être imputables ou attribuablesà cet Etat. Concernant les événementd sans la péninsulede

Bakassi et dans la région du lac Tchad,et également concernant les reprochesque le Cameroun fait

au Nigéria de n'avoir pas respecté l'ordonnanc dee la Cour du 15mars 1996,cette condition se

trouve évidemmentremplie. Bakassia été occupé militairement,et pareillement dans les zonesdu

lac Tchad le Nigéria adéployé d'importants éléments de ses forces arméeset de sa police. Il ne

reste qu'à montrer qu'ily a eu- et qu'il y atoujours- desviolations d'une ou de plusieurs règles

du droit international queleNigénaa commises au détrimentdu Cameroun.

8. Le Cameroun s'est prévalu à cet égarden premier lieu du principe du non-recours à la

force, inscrit l'article2, paragraphe4,de la ChartedesNations Unies. Il est clair que leNigériaa

gravement enfreint cette règle qui constitue le fondementdu droit international de l'époque

contemporaine. En fait, le Nigériase trouve dans l'impossibilitéd'arguer que le Cameroun a
I
procédé à des constructions ((fantaisistes)).Laprésence destroupes nigérianesdans les deux zones

est une réalité incontestable, réalièsamère pourle Cameroun. 9. Assez curieusement, pourtant,le professeur Abi-Saab, vendredi dernier, nous a fait part

d'unenouvelle théorie sur lasignificationet la portéedu principe de non-recoursa force. Selon

lui, leNigérian'a pas engagésa responsabilité,parce qu'il n'a jamais remisen cause leatu quo

territorialet que, sur le terrain, iln'a fait qu'administrerpaisiblementun temtoire qu'il croyaitle

sien (CR2002114,p. 21,par.18). LeprofesseurAbi-Saabvoit dans ces circonstancesunenouvelle

exception àl'interdictiondefranchirpar laforce unefrontièreintemationalementreconnue.

b) L'invasionet 1'occupationde lapéninsuledeBakassi

10. Il ne sera pourtant pas nécessairede s'engagerdans de grandes controversesthéoriques

sur la portée exactede l'interdictiondu recoursla forcepour réfuter cetteargumentation. Pour

quecela puisse êtreenvisagé, il faudrat'abordqueleNigéria démontre quesaprésence à Bakassi

a toujours étconsolidéeetpacifique.

1i. Mais, en vérité,le Nigéria n'a jamaisadministréla péninsulede Bakassi de façon

«paisible». Il s'y est introduit par la force.Evidemment, dans ses plaidoiries le Nigériaa

habilement tiré partidu fait que la partie sud-occidentale du Cameroun avait étéplacéesous

administrationbritannique tout d'abord commemandat de la Sociétédes Nations, et après 1945

commeterritoire sous tutelle. C'est ce qui explique que l'influence des populationsnigérianeset

de l'administrationnigériany a éténécessairement considérable .éanmoins,il est patentqu'avec

la fin du régimede tutelle et l'indépendancedes deux pays, la situation a changé. Le fait que

quelquesécoles financées par le Nigériaou des églisesnigérianes aientpu rester à Bakassi n'y

changeabsolumentrien. Il est touà faitnormal pourbeaucoup d'Etats de maintenir desécoles à

l'étrangerpour les enfants de leurs citoyens qui y résident. Or, le Camerounne nie point et n'a

jamais niéque Bakassi est en large partiehabitépar unepopulationnigériane-certainement pas

156000personnes, chiffre quifait pensàrdes villes commeAngers, Brest ouGrenobleen France

ou Blackpoolet Aberdeen au Royaume-Uniet qui seconciliemal avec la «measuredconsistency»

dont s'estvantél'agent du Nigériaen clôturant le premiertour de son équipe(CR 2002114,p. 65,

par.2).

12. Après ledépartde la puissance administrante,il était toutsimplementdifficile de mettre

enplace uneadministrationcamerounaise. Mon collègue MauriceMendelsonvientd'enparler il ya quelquesinstants. Le Camerounn'a pu le faire du jour aulendemain. Mais, dès l'année 1968,

tous les principaux services se trouvaient en étatde fonctionner. Le professeur Brownlie l'a

indirectement confirméen disant qu'en 1968 «there were acts of harassrnent by Cameroonian

soldiers))(CR 200219,p. 19, par.9; p. 27-28,par. 50-52; p. 30, par. 61). Il faut le souligner : à

cette époque,en 1968,iln'y avaitpasun seulposte militairenigérian àBakassi,ni un seulpostede

la police nigériane. On n'a qu'à lire les développementsque le professeur Brownlie a consacrés

aux prétendueseffectivitésnigérianesdans la péninsulede Bakassi. Dans un passage traitant du

systèmede l'ordre public,on ne trouve que des références au systèmetribal(CR 2002/9, p. 54-55,

par. 177-184)' qui fonctionne indépendammentdu système de 1'Etat et n'en affecte pas les

compétences. Cen'estqu'à partirde la secondemoitiédesannées 80 que leNigériaa commencé à

érigerune «têtede pont» à Jabane(répliquedu Cameroun, p. 517et suiv.). Finalement, c'est le

mois de décembre1993qui a vus'abattreles forces arméesnigérianessur la presqu'île deBakassi

dans le cadre d'une invasion bienplanifiéeetprogrammée.Le professeurBrownlie,bien qu'ilait

fait l'inventairecompletde la prétendue présence nigériane à Bakassi, n'a pas été capabldee faire

la démonstrationd'une présence militaire couvrant des secteursen dehors de Jabane avantla date

de l'invasion. C'étaientles autoritéscamerounaisesqui assumaientla responsabilité suprêmepour

l'ordre public. Elles le faisaient sans ignorer que la population étrangèredes Nigériansrestait

attachée àses autoritéstraditionnelles.

13.Il n'est pasnécessaireici de prouver que Bakassirevient de plein droità la souveraineté

camerounaise. Mes collèguesBruno Simma, Malcolm Shaw et Maurice Mendelson en ont déjà

présenté tous les éléments d feit et de droit pertinents. Je ne rappellerai que les points les plus

marquants :le traitéde 1913estuneconventioninternationalevalide exemptede vicesentachant sa

régularité;Bakassi a fait partduterritoireplacésous mandatet soustutelle; dansun avis de 1971,

le ministèrede lajustice nigériana conclu à la camerounitéde ~akassi~~;le Nigéria aconfirmé

l'appartenance de Bakassi au Cameroun notamment en vertu de l'accord de Maroua de 1975;

en 1981, le Nigéria a installéune Task Force mandatéepour réfléchir sur la manière dont on a

pourrait contournerla traitéde 1913pour s'approprierBakassi; en1985,on a encore fait produire

38 V. Bassey E. Ate, Nigeria and Camerou:,Bassey E. AtelBola A. Akinterinwa (eds.), Nigeria and its
ImmediateNeighbours. Constraints andProspectsofSub-RegionalSecurityin the 199(141).140un avis au ministère nigérian de lajustice spécifiquement pour cette TaskForce,dont l'auteur, un

certain M. K. B. Olukolu, est amvé a la conclusion que Bakassi était incontestablement

camerounais,commel'a souligné,il y a quelques minutes,mon collègue Maurice end el son '^.

est remarquable que dans ce document officieldu ministère de lajustice nigérianon fait

sérieusement allusion a la possibilité d'employer la forcpeour s'emparer de Bakassiau cas où il

résulterait quela contestationjuridique n'offrait pas dechancede succès40.Malheureusement,ce

n'était pas une initiative isolée. A la même époquel,e service des renseignements militaires

nigérian a également faiutne étudesur les moyens et méthodes appropriées pour acquérir Bakassi

pour le Nigéria,et éventuellement même par des moyens militaires. Mais l'auteur de cette étude

est (<sage». Selon ses recommandations,«le Nigéria n'aurait recours à la guerre qu'après avoir

épuisé toutes les ressources eptar né~essité))~'.

14. On se demande comment, dans de telles circonstances,les conseils du Nigériaont pu

prétendreque, en effet, Bakassi avait toujours été sousadministration nigériane. La masse des

preuves en faveur du Cameroun est telle qu'on ne peut pas naïvement invoquer le bénéficede

((honestbeliefandreasonablemistake)).Mais c'est cettenotion qui est devenue lejoker juridique

de la partie défenderesse, destiné à combler toutes les failles et lacunes de l'argumentation

nigériane. Pourtant,il s'est avéré extrêmement difficd ileetrouver une classification adéquatepour

cette notion dont l'origine et l'existence en droit international sont sue douteuses. Tels qu'ils

ont étéprésentés(,(honestbeliefandreasonablemistake))sont des enfants naturels, des apatrides

qui n'ont aucun droitde séjouracquis.

15. Dans un premier temps, on pourrait songer à les classer comme une indication de la

nécessité qu'une comparaison mécanique entlrae réalitéet le droit n'est pas suffisante pour

l'engagement dela responsabilité.Le seul fait pourun soldatde se trouveren territoireétrangerne

signifie certainement pas que l7Etat dont son unité relève ait commis une violation de la

souverainetéde 1'Etatterritorial. Le soldatpeut s'êtreégaré, et êmetoute une compagniepeut se

perdre dans unerégionmontagneuseou dans lajungle. Maisnous ne sommespas devantle casde

39Mémoire duCameroun,LivreVI,annexe275.

40Ibidp.oint 10.
4'Mémoiredu Cameroun, livreVI,annexe276, p.2313(2325).quelques soldats ou d'un aéronefqui, égarés et sans moyens de s'en rendrecompte, auraientpar

mégarde traversé une frontièreinternationale. Nous ne nous trouvons donc pas dans l'hypothèse

d'un «cas fortuit)),un temps envisagéepar la Commissiondu droit international (Annuairede la

Commissiondu droit international,1979,vol. II (deuxièmepartie),p. 135)mais finalementécartée

duprojet enraison des craintesémisesparplusieursEtats desdérivesquecela auraitpu entraîner4*.

16. En second lieu, on peut sans trop de peine constaterque ((honestbelief and reasonable

rnistake))ne sont certainement pas des ((circonstances excluantl'illicéité))au sens du projet

d'articles dela Commission du droit international,contrairement aux affirmations faites par le

Nigéria dans sa duplique(p. 579, par. 15.57). Il esttoàtfaiterroné de prétendrequela CD1n'ait

pas cherché à ((speclfyexhaustivelythecircurnstanceprecluding wrongftrlnessin relationto every

case that rnayoccur)). Pour elle, la listedes circonstancessusceptiblesd'exclure l'illievêtun

caractère exhaustif. Il y a des experts dans cette salle qui sont capables de confirmer cette

interprétation.

17.Il n'est donc pas étonnantque les écrituresdu Nigériaet sesplaidoiries orales montrent

un flottement générae ln ce qui concernele classement correctde ((honestbelief and reasonable

mistake)). Ses conseils ont déployédes efforts désespéré asfin de trouver une catégorie juridique

appropriéepour la notion, mais la vraie patrie n'a pas étrouvée. Ce qui étaitprésenté au début

comme un élémens t'apparentantau conceptde «faute»,rejetépar la CD1(voir contre-mémoire du

Nigéria,p. 638, par. 24.34)'s'est transformépar la suite en une circonstance excluant l'illicéité

pour finalement surgir dans la plaidoirie du professeur Abi-Saab comme une circonstance qui

permettrait de conclure qu'aucune atteinte n'a étéportée à la règle primairepertinente dansle

présent contexte,le principe du non-recours à la force (CR2002114, p.23, par. 27). Sir Arthur

s'est implicitementexprimédans lemême sens (CR2002114,p. 33, par. 35-36).

18. On peut tout de mêmeconcéderau Nigériaqu'il faut eneffet se poser la question de

savoir ce qui est l'élément constitutif d'une violation. Quand est-on en droit de parler d'une

violation du principe énoncéà l'article2, paragraphe4, de la Charte des Nations Unies,principe a

qui est sourced'obligationserga omnes ?

42Voir les observations desEtats dans Assemblée e, c. AiCN.41488,25 mars 1998, et le rapportfinal
de la Commissiondu droit international, Nations Unies,doc.Ai.56110. 19.Or, ce que le Nigériadit peut se résumeren deux mots. Il se croyait chez lui. Il avait

toujours étéprésent à Bakassi. II n'avait doncaucune raison de douter de la légitimitéde ses

actions. Toutefois, il est assezcurieuxdevouloir invoquerun manque de blameworthinessdansles

circonstancesde l'espèce. Le Nigéria connaissait toutes les circonstancesqui militaient en faveur

du Cameroun. Dans ses ministères, onse creusait la tête pour trouver une solution à un dilemme

auquel on ne pouvait échapper. On savait que le titre territorial revenaitau Cameroun. Et même

ceux qui ne partageaient peut-être pas la communis opinio devaient se dire que la situation était

hautementdélicate.LeNigéria,en endossantla thèsedel'invaliditédutraitéde 1913, savait à tout

le moinsqu'il pouvait se tromper. Toutes les apparencesétaienten faveur du Cameroun. Alors,

danscescirconstances,qu'est-ce quepouvait, qu'est-ce quedevait fairele Nigéria ?

20.Pour me renseignerun peu sur la common law, qui dans le présent contexte estsi chère

aux conseilsdu Nigéria,j'ai étudié deux manuelsélémentaires sur lalaw of torts. On y trouve des

recettestrès nettes,mais aussitrès simples,desrecettes qu'on peutappliquersans difficultéaucune

aux faits de l'espèce. C'estainsi qu'on peut lire dans laquinzième éditionde Pollock's Law of

Torts :

«the standard of du^)isfuced by reference to what we should expect in the like case
from a man of ordinary sense, knowledge, andprudence ...Ifa man will drive a car,
he is bound to have the ordinary competenceof a motorist, ifhe will handle aship, of
a seaman; ifhe will treat a wound, of a surgeon ...and so in every case that can be
put.»43

Je supposeque ce test, bien qu'il aitétédécrit ily a plus d'un demi-siècle,correspond toujours à

l'orientationgénérale de lajurisprudencebritannique. Or, quelle peut être sa significatiodansle

contexteconcret de la présenteaffaire ? Qu'aurait dû faire un homme-ou une femme- pour

agir conformémentau conceptde reasonableness,qui correspondexactementau principe de ladue

diligencequ'ont invoquéd'innombrables décisionsinternationale s

21.Le Camerounn'a pas dedoutes à cetégard.Legouvernement d'unEtatest la plushaute

instancedans les matières relevant dela politiqueétrangère.Il a une grande responsabiliténonpas

seulement envers sa propre population, mais encore envers ses voisins et toute la communauté

internationale. Par conséquent,il doit se comporter notammentselon les règles contenuesdans la

43London 1951,p.21.Charte des Nations Unies. Dans cette perspective, il est tenu de réglerses différendsavec ses

voisins de façon pacifique, en évitantle recours à la force sauf dans des situations de légitime

défense.

22. S'il avait respectéces règles,le Nigériaaurait montré un comportement foncièrement

différent de celui qu'il a pratiqué en fait. En premier lieu, il aurait étéde son devoir de

communiquer immédiatementde façon formelleau Cameroun son appréciationsubjective selon

laquelle le traitéde 1913étaitentachéde vices graves et qu'ilmanquait donc de force obligatoire.

Aprèsune telle communication, le Nigériaauraitdû offrir au Cameroun d'ouvrir desnégociations

pour amver d'un commun accord à une solution pacifique. Mais rien de tout cela ne s'est passé.

Le Nigériaa suivi le chemin de I'unilatéralisme, en jouantla carte de l'intervention militaire. Ce

n'est qu'au cours de laprésenteprocédure quela contestation dutraitéde 19 13a été explicitement

formulée. Cependant, un gouvernement doit se comporter comme un gouvernement, c'est-à-dire

en conformitéaux exigences que la communauté internationale impose à la plus haute instance

d'une entitéqu'on respecte comme un Etat souverain. De toute évidence,on est ici en présence

d'une convoitise mal dissimuléeque le Nigériaa cherché à réaliserpar la force des armes. Un

article de l'auteur nigérian BasseyE.Ate est révélateuràcet égard. En énonçant lesoptions qui,

selon lui, étaientouvertes au Nigéria,il éc:it

«As option one, Nigeria could unilaterally occupy Bakasi Peninsula. In
decidingto do so, of course, the rnilitaiy,logistic,political,jnancial and otherfactors
bearingon the calculations of the outcomeof such operation should beconsidered.
Assurningthe levelof this action,Nigeriamight thenforce the Camerouniansto enter
intoserious negotiationsaimedut establishinga mutuallyacceptablebo~ndar~.))~~

Avec cet article, on n'est pas non plus dans un monde ((fantaisiste)).On se retrouve bien dans la

réalitédes rapports entre les deux pays. L'auteur, Bassey E. Ate, en mêmetemps coéditeurdu

volume entier consacré auxproblèmesde la politique de la sécurité du Nigéria, n'ep sts toutjuste

un esprit libre qui s'adonnerait ses spéculations subjectives.Comme professeur à l'Institut des

relations internationalesLagos, il avait accèsaux travaux de la TaskForcedéjà mentionnée et ne

faisait qu'enreproduire les conclusions. Administration «paisible» Possessionde longue durée ? L

Rien quedesrêvespieux,trèsloin de ce qui s'estpasséau soldans les mangroves de Bakassi.

" Op.cit., 149. 23. Revenons encore un petit moment à la constructionjuridique de la partie adversequi

tente de se prévaloird'uneinterprétation erronémeais «de bonnefoi» du traitéde 1913. L'erreur

invoquéepar le Nigéria neporte pas sur tel ou tel fait, mais sur l'interprétation dduroit et des

instrumentsjuridiques pertinents. End'autrestermes,et commele Cameroun l'a déjàsignalésans

être démenp tiar son contradicteur,le Nigériase prévaut d'une erreudre droit (CR200217,p.45,

par. 34). Et cette seuleraison suffitpour écartertoute idée dereasonable mistake. L'erreur de

droitn'a en effetjamais étéadmiseendroit international, toutsimplement parcequel'on considère

quechaqueEtatest présumé connaîtrle e droit.

c) L'occupationd'unlargesecteurdeterritoire camerounais dans larégiondulac Tchad

24. Je me tournerai maintenantvers la régiondu lac Tchad. La situation factuellequ'ony

retrouve sedistingue de cellequ'on arencontrée àBakassi dansson déroulementconcret, mais non

pas dans ses effets. Ici encore, le Nigéria cherche à s'approprier une partie du territoire

camerounais. Mais le fil des événements est différentO . n n'a pas affaireà une attaque bien

identifiéepar sontempsetpar sonlieu,mais d'unepénétration par étapes,que l'on désignerait dans

le domaine de la protectionde l'environnement sousle nom de((creepingpollution»-qui en est

d'ailleursla plus dangereuse forme,laplus difficilecombattre.

25. Sur le plan humain,les effets malencontreuxde l'assèchement progressid fu lac Tchad

sont aisésà comprendre. Pour un pêcheuri,l est essentiel,il est vitalde vivre au borddes eauxoù

ilexerce sonactivitéprofessionnelle. Sur la terreferme,j'hésitàdire cette banalité,le poissonne

peut pas être rencontré. Donc, en bonne logique, les pêcheursont suivi le lac qui s'est

progressivement éloigné d'eux. Et, Monsieur le président,encore par un geste de générosité l,

Cameroun ne les a pas empêchéd se le faire au moment où ce mouvement humain a franchi la

frontièreentre le Nigéria etle Camerounpour s'installersur leterritoire camerounais. Toutes les

cartes montrent à l'évidenceque là où aujourd'huise trouvent lesvillages réclamés à tort par le

Nigéria,les eaux du lac couvraienttoute la surface il y a trente ans encore. Aucun village ne

pouvait y exister. Ce n'est que la fuitedu lac qui a rendu possiblel'installation de communautés

humaines en territoire camerounaissur la rive occidentaledu lac Tchad. Il y a vingt ans encore,

cetterive setrouvait auNigéria.Moncollègue Jean-PierreCotamis enexerguecepoint cematin. 26. Tout aussi compréhensible que puisspearaître cettemigration d'unepopulationen quête

d'assurer sasurvie,elle étaittout d'abordun phénomènesocialet n'auraitpas dû être prise comme

prétextepar leNigéria pourétendreses structures administratives ces nouvelles «colonisations~>.

Il n'avait aucundroit d'y établir postes de police,d'yenvoyerses forcesarméeset des'y livrer

àd'autres activités relevantde la puissance publique. Le droit international ne connaît pas le

concept d'une frontière roulante, d'uneboundaryon wheels)).Il est vrai que l'assèchementdu lac

Tchad est une calamitéde tout premier ordre pourle Nigéria-comme pour tousles autres Etats

riverains dulacTchad. Maisle droit internationalmet à la disposition desEtats une vaste gamme

depossibilitéspour affronterune telle difficusur la basedela coopération.

27. Revenons maintenant à l'affirmation du Cameroun selon laquellepar ses actesle Nigéria

a violél'interdictiondu recoursà la force également dansla régiondu lac Tchad. Les faits sont

pratiquement incontestés. Il est inutile de refaire la démonstration de mon collègue

Jean-PierreCot. Le Nigéria a exporté sesstructures étatiques, y comprisses forces armées, à

travers la frontièrequi sépareles territoiresdes deuxpays. Il s'est inàtl'est de cette ligne,en

prétendantqu'ils'ytrouvede bon droit.

28. Est-ce que cette invocation de la bonne foi est suffisante pour se déchargerde

l'accusation qu'une violation du principde non-recours à la force a étperpétrée? La réponse

doitêtreclaire etnette:ellene suffit pas. La seuleprésence troupes surun territoireétrangerest

en elle-même la preuve concluante de la responsabilité, saufcirconstances exceptionnelles qui

visiblementn'existent pasen l'espèce. LeNigérian'a pu fairevaloir aucunejustification excluant

l'illicéité. D'autre part,êmesi l'onpart de l'hypothèsequela notion de «violation» impliqueun

élémend te «blameworthiness»,quels sont lesrésultatsauxquelson aboutit?

29. Monsieurle président, Madame eM t essieursde la Cour, dansla régiondu lac Tchad la

situationne permettait aucun doute.Il y avaitun instrumentobligatoire qui délimitait la frontière.

Dans le cadre de la CBLT, cette frontière avaittoujours servi comme base pour les travaux de

démarcation. Le Nigériasavait donc exactement jusqu'oùs'étendait sonterritoire. Comment ,

peut-il sérieusement invoque(r(honestbeliefand reasonable mistake))? Un gouvernementa une

responsabilité tout autqu'un pêcheur, pour quiil importe peuoù il prend ses poissons, pourvu

quepoisson ily ait. S'ilcroyait quesescitoyensqui s'étaientinstallésau Camerounmanquaient de services sociaux, il aurait pu proposer au Cameround'ouvrir desnégociations. Encore une fois,

malheureusement, le Nigériaa préféré la solution unilatéralemanu militari, sans étudier les

possibilitésde trouverune solution en accordavec le Cameroun. II faut le répétermême su i ne

invasionse fait sanssetraduirepar des hostilitésentre forcesarméesdes deux côtés, il s'agit bel et

bien d'une violation de l'Article2, paragraphe4, de la Charte desNationsUnies. La lutte armée

n'est pas un élément constitutid fe la violationdu principe interdisantle recoursà la force. De

toute façon, même si la Coud revait estimer que, dans les circonstances particulières des

événementtsels qu'ilsse sont déroulés dans la régiondu lac Tchad,il serait inappropriéde parler

d'agressionarméeou de violationde IYArtic12e, paragraphe4; les faitsdémontrentclairement une

violationde la souveraineté territoriale camerounaiseD. onc, de toutemanière,laresponsabilité du

Nigériase trouve engagée.

30. Pour compléter la démonstration, permettez-moi, Monsie lurprésident,de me référer

enfinau dernierrapporteur spéciad le la Commissiondudroit internationalsur laresponsabilitédes

Etats. Jevais citerledeuxièmerapport, datédu 30 avril 1999 :

«Dans certainssystèmesjuridiques, la revendication de bonne foi d'un droit
peut justifier ou excuser certains comportements,mêmesi cette revendication est
juridiquement infondée.Aucun auteurne sembledéfendreune telle doctine en droit

intemationa~.)?~[Letexte original est en anglais etc'est unetraduction officielledes
Nations Unies.]

d) Lenon-respectparle Nigéria de l'ordonnancedela Cour du15mars1996

31. J'en viens maintenantau troisièmechapitre de mon intervention de cet après-mid ile

non-respectpar le Nigériade l'ordonnancede la Courdu 15 mars 1996. A cet égard, sirArthur a

voulu démontrerdans sa plaidoirie de vendredi dernierque les affirmations du Cameroun sont

insoutenables. Mais son discours a plutôtmontréque lesaccusationsdu Camerounont du poids.

32. Je commenceraipar un petit commentairesur la mission d'enquête qui a échoué, grâce à

-ou plutôt en raison de- la résistancedu Nigéria(voir CR200217, p. 63, par. 13). Les

événementq sui se sont succédé à Bakassi auraient facilementpu êtreclarifiéssi le Nigéria avait

donné son consentement à la créationde cette mission. Mais en raison de sa résistance, cette

45 Deuxième rapport du rapporteur spécialJames Crawford sur la responsabilitédes Etats, 30 avril 1999,
Nations Unies,doc. AICN.41498lAd, ar. 260.mission d'enquête s'esttransforméeen une mission anodine de bons offices, précisément sans

compétence d'enquêteq,ui en fait n'a pas pu se rendre dans la partie de Bakassi occupéepar le

Nigéria. SirArthur arépondu (CR2002114,p. 36,par. 49) qu'il s'agissaitlà d'une affaire politique

«to be determined in New York)). Or, chacun sait que de telles décisions essentiellessont prises

dans les capitaleset nonpas par lesreprésentantsdiplomatiquesquise trouvent à NewYork. Il est

vrai, comme le dit sirArthur, quel'échecde cette tentative de mener une enquête soigneuseet

détailléeest un ((politicalfact)). Mais les faits politiquesne suivent pas les lois de la nature. Ils

sont le résultatdes décisionshumaines. On est donc bien en droit d'en tirer les conclusions

appropriées. Jene vaispas le fairemoi-même pourlaissertoutela discrétionnécessaireà la Cour.

33. Je me permets,par contre,de me référer à l'arrêt dans l'affaire uétroitde Corfou où

la Cour a précisémentdû s'occuper de la situation d'un Etat qui, en raison de l'obstruction

pratiquéepar l'autre partie, se voyait dans l'impossibilitéde fournir toutes les preuves qui, dans

une situation de normalité, seraient requisespour démontrerla véracité de ses allégations. Qu'il

me soit permisde citer quelqueslignestextuellement :

«17Etatvictime d'une violation du droit international se trouve souvent dans
l'impossibilité defaire la preuvedirecte desfaits d'où découlerailtaresponsabilité.Il
doit luiêtrepermisderecourir plus largementaux présomptionsdefait, aux indicesou
preuves circonstancielles(circumstantial evidence). Ces moyens de preuve indirecte
sont admis dans tous les systèmes de droit et leur usage est sanctionnépar la
jurispmdence internationale. Ondoit les considérer comme particulièrementprobants

quand ils s'appuient sur une série de faits qui s'enchaînent et qui conduisent
logiquement à unemême conclusion.»46

Le Camerounse prévaut de cetterègle, etil considèreque sonapplicationest d'autant plusjustifiée

que le Nigériaa empêché que soit menée à bien l'entreprise commune d'enquête qui avait été

suggérée par le Secrétairegénérad lesNations Unieset endosséepar la Cour dans son ordonnance

du 15mars 1996.

34. Ence qui concerneles différentesviolationsperpétréep sar leNigéria,je ne peux, dansle

cadre limitéde cette interventiondu second tour,revenir sur tous les incidents quiontéterelevés

par le Cameroun. Mais quelques-unsvalent bien qu'on les examine encoreune fois. En premier
i

lieu, il convientde s'attarder surles combats dYavril/mai1996. Sir Arthura répété la position du

Nigériaselonlaquelle «itwas Cameroonwhich launchedattacksagainst Nigeriapositions between

46C.I.J.Recueil 19494(18).21April and 1May 1996))(CR2002114,p. 36, par. 47). Mais les suites de ces combats parlent

pour elles-mêmes.Je me permets, Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs lesjuges, de vous

inviter tout simplement à relire la présentationdu Cameroun sur l'enchaînement des événements :

le Cameroun a tout de suite protesté auprèsdu Conseil de sécuritéle 30 avril 1996 (voir

CR200217,p. 60, par. 7), alors que le Nigérian'a eul'idéede protester lui-aussi que sept à huit

semaines plustard (ibid., p. 61-62,par. 11). Un Etatqui étaitattaquéet qui,de plus, est faussement

accuséde porter la responsabilitépour les hostilités, serait-ilrestémuet pendant presque deux

mois ? On ne peut vraiment pasle croire.

35. Le Cameroun relève,d'autre part, le silence completdu Nigériaconcernant le reproche

qu'on lui faitd'avoir formellementérigé en collectivitétemtoriale la péninsulede Bakassi. Le fait

est indéniable. Mais le Nigéria a complètement dénaturé les affirmations du Cameroun en

précisant qu'iln'y avait rien dans l'ordonnance de la Cour qui aurait ordonné «al1 civilian

administrationto come to a hait))ou qui aurait interditau Nigéria«to make arrangementsfor the

health, the education and social weIfare of the Nigerianpopulation of Bakassi)) (CR 2002114,

p. 38, par.54). Le Cameroun n'a riensuggéré de ce genre. Parcontre, il s'est plaintde la création

de la commune de Bakassi, ce qui esttout à fait autre chosà,savoir une tentative de consoliderla

situation defaitpour lui donner uneapparence denormalité etdonc de légitimité constitutionnelle.

En effet, la situation juridique était bien curieuse même rugard du droit internenigérian :d'une

part, le Gouvernement nigérian affirmaitque Bakassi avait toujours fait partie intégrantedu

Nigéria. D'autrepart, il devait reconnaître que Bakassi n'existaitpas sur le plan de l'organisation

de I'Etat au plan municipal. Il est évidentque la «régularisation» de Bakassiaux fins du droit

interne a enFreintl'ordonnance de la Cour dans lamesure où elle a cherché à créer etrenforcer des

liensde loyautéde la populationdeBakassi à l'égarddu systèmepolitique nigérian. C'étaitun acte

d'exercicedepuissance publiquequi ne revient qu'au détenteur de la souveraineté territoriale.

36. C'est dans la mêmeperspective qu'il convientd'aborder la question de l'interdiction de

volssur Bakassi. De façon assez légèrel,e conseilpour leNigéria aaffirmédans sa plaidoirie qu'il

ne pouvait êtreinterdit au Nigéria«to provide for the safety of civil aviation in the skies above

Bakassi))(CR2002114, p.38, par. 54). Est-ce que leRoyaume-Uni se croiraithabilité à assurer la

sécurité des vols au-dessus de l'Irlande? Clairement, quand un Etat s'arroge la compétencederéglerle trafic aérien au-dessus temtoire d'un autre Etat il empiètesur les droits souverainsde

ce dernier. La conclusion esttrès nette cet égardégalement,le Nigéria n'a pas tenu compte de

l'ordonnancede la Cour.

e) Les demandesreconventionneIlesduNigéria

37. Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs lesjuges, dansune dernière partiede mon

intervention je vais maintenant examinerles demandes reconventionnellesdu Nigéria. Le

Cameroun s'abstient de contester formellement l'admissibilité dces demandes, mêmede celles

qui ont été introduitesun stade asseztardif de la procédurepar la duplique, laissàla Cour le

soin de trancher. Quant aufond, il est évidemment impossible de traiter en détailtous les faits

alléguépsar le Nigériaàl'appuide ses demandes(voirrépliquedu Cameroun,p. 563-587). Je vais

donc essentiellementme borner à répondreaux faits repris par le professeur Crawforddans sa

plaidoirie orale.

38. Permettez-moide revenir tout d'abordsur l'incidentdu 16mai 1981qui est constamment

exploité par le Nigéricaomme preuve des mauvaises intentions du Cameroun. Le Nigériaen a

parlé dans ses exceptions préliminaires (introduction, par. 34-39) d,ans son contre-mémoire

(contre-mémoire du Nigéria, pa 2r..20-2.21et 24.65-24.67) ainsiquedans sa duplique(dupliquedu

Nigéria,p. 611-615), et sir Arthur y est revenu dans sa plaidoirie (CR2002114,p. 41, par. 67 et

suiv.). Il ne fait pas l'objetdu présent litige,parce qu'ilréglé àl'amiable. Néanmoinsc ,et

incident aétéintroduit dans l'affaire pour dépeindrele Cameroun comme un Etat agressif, non

respectueux de ses obligations internationales.Le Nigériase livre à cette mise en cause du

Camerounen tirant les conséquencesquine sejustifient aucunement à la lecturede l'échangedes

lettresentreles deuxprésidentsse rapportantau règlementde la controverse. Il est vrai que,en fin

de compte,le Cameroun, par lavoix de sonprésident(lettre du 16juillet 1981,ontre-mémoiredu

Nigéria,vol.XI,p. 2623, annexe345),a expriméses regretspour laperte de vies humaines.etqu'il

a offert depayer une compensation aux famillesdes victimes. On remarquera,à cet égard,que le

président Ahidjo a exprimé ses regrets, sans s'excuser. Mêmeun diplomate peu expérimenté

connaît la différence entre deux formules,ce qui n'a pas empêché nos contradicteursde parler

d'une ((letterof apology)(CR 2002114,p. 41, par. 69). En effet, cette issue diplomatiqued'un incident tragique dit trèspeu sur l'enchaînementdes événements.Le président camerounais a

maintenu sa versionselon laquellel'incident étaitsurvenu sur le Rio del Rey, donc en temtoire

camerounais,alors que le président nigérian maanifestésa conviction quele lieu de l'accrochage

étaitle fleuve Akwayafé(lettre du 20juillet 1981, contre-mémoiredu Nigéria,vol.XI, p. 2627,

annexe346). La divergence des vues sur les circonstances de cet accrochage a donc persisté

jusqu'à la fin, contrairementce que cherche àinsinuer le conseil du Nigéri(CR2002114, p. 43,

par. 76).

39. Il n'est pas difficile de deviner pourquoile chef dYEtatcamerounais s'est finalement

résignéà offrir une compensation financière,mêmes'il avaitde bonnes raisons pour croireque

l'incident était laconséquence directd'une violation de la frontièrecamerounaise. Le langage

employépar le présidentShagari dans sa lettre du 25 mai 1981est dictatorial, n'admettant aucune

objection. Aulieu d'accepterune commissiond'enquêteq , ui aurait éle moyen le plus sûr pour

clarifier les liens de causalité,il rejette toute idéeen faisant valoir que le Nigériaot the

slightest doubt as to where the incidenttook place)) (contre-mémoireduNigéria,vol.XI, p. 2620,

annexe344). Demèrecette lettre secachait mal la menace de faire usagede la forcepour obliger

le Cameroun à se plier aux demandes nigérianes. Assez clairementl,a deuxième lettre du

présidentShagari du 20juillet 1981, qui met un terme définitifau différend, ditque l'incident

aurait pu déclencher uneguerre entre les deux pays. Etantdonnéles rapports de force entre le

Nigéria et le Camerouno ,n se demande vraimentcomment sirArthur a pu tirer de ces pièces la

conclusionque le Cameroun pouvaitavoir «the hope of provoking Nigeria into starting a major,

full-scale armedresponse))(CR 2002114,p. 43,par.77).

40. Je me permetsd'êtretrès direct cet égard:c'est une conclusionnon seulement erronée,

mais contredisant manifestement leslois de la logique politique. Le fait qu'il y avait comme

arrière-fondde l'affaireune menacede recours à la force par le Nigéria,menace dont la réalité a

étédécriteen détail dansla répliquedu Cameroun (réplique du Cameroun,p. 508-509), découle

mêmeducommentairefinal de sirArthur,un commentairepourlequel iln'y avait aucunenécessité

mais qu'il nous a présenté sous forme orale en disant que c'étaitle président Shagari qui a pu

empêcher cet inciden dte seransformer«into themajor armedconfrontation which Cameroonhad

been trying to provoke)} et que c'étaitlui, le président Shagari, égalemeqtui a été capable de ((quel1the Nigerian people's justified outrage ut this incident)) (ibid., p. 43, par. 78)C'est

vraiment renverserles chosespour leur faire dire le contrairedece qu'elles disent enréalité.Mais,

l'interprétationde cet incidentdonne le ton de l'ensemble du comportementnigérianainsique de

ses plaidoiriesen l'espèce. Depuis1981,le Camerouna vécusous menacemilitaire de la part du

Nigéria,et il souhaitequececauchemarfinisseleplustôt possiblegrâce à l'arrêt finalelaCour.

41. La même méthode q,ui consisteà créerune impression, impression selon laquelle le

Cameroun seraitl'agresseur, l'assaillant,alors quele Nigériaet les Nigériansseraient lesvictimes,

se retrouve partout dans les écrituresduNigériase rapportant au chapitre de la responsabilité et a

égalementmarquéles plaidoiriesorales.

42. Je ne prends qu'un seul exemple, le combat du 3 février1996. Le Cameroun a

méticuleusementexpliquéle déroulementdes faits dans sa réplique (répliquedu Cameroun,

p. 529-530)ainsiqu'au premiertour des plaidoiries(CR200217,p. 53-56). Toutes sesaffirmations

s'appuient sur des éléments de preuve fiables et incontestables. Le Cameroun a montréqu'il ne

préparaitaucune manŒuvre,que les Nigériansen avaient profité pourouvrir le feu sur leurs

positions, les en chasser et les poursuivrejusqu'au milieu de Bakassi. Il y a eu des ripostes

camerounaises. Le Cameroun l'a dit aussi. Maisnos contradicteursont déformétout cela, en

ajoutantdes faitsjamais évoqué( sWatts,CR 200217,p. 34-35,par.41-45).

43. Mais puisque le Nigéria acherché à insinuer le doute dans vos esprits sur qui sont

réellementles deux Etats qui se trouvent aujourd'hui devantvous, il me faut ajouter qu'ila des

éléments depreuve qui permettent de se forger une vision juste à cet égard. Des éléments de

preuve plus solidesque les «témoignages»ouautresdocumentsdouteux produits parleNigéria,et

auxquels il n'attache d'ailleurspas plus de valeur probante que le Cameroun (CR 200217,p. 57,

par. 31). J'enévoqueraitrois.

44. D'abordcette consigne militaire,révéléeen public, par le commandantde la 13"brigade

motoriséede la 82'division de l'armée nigérianel,e brigadier-généraW l omotimiDiriyai : ($or

every one shot the gendarmefire at our men or any Nigerian, theNigerian troops are ready tofie t

a hundred shorson retaliation))(annexeMC345). Cent ballescontreune. C'est sans doutece que

leNigériaappellela proportionnalité.L'affairedu 3 février1996prend tout son sens àla lumière

de cetteconsigne. 45. Ensuitecette lettredu comité internationalde la Croix-Rouge,délégation poulr'Afrique

centrale,du 26janvier 1996(annexeOCDR 16). Elle est adressée au ministrecamerounaischargé

de la défense. Elle concerne la levéeet remise du corps d'un officier nigérianaux autorités

nigérianes le22 décembre1995 à Douala, en présence del'ambassadeurde laRépublique fédérale

duNigéria.Voilàcommentlechef demission del'organisationhumanitairedécritla scène :

((Malgréquelques difficultésde procédureintroduitespar la partie nigériane,la
mission s'est dérouléedans le meilleur esprit possible, en particulier grâce aux
dispositions exemplaires prises par les autorités militaires et administratives
camerounaises.))

46. Laissez-moi enfin citer une autre lettre du comitéinternational de la Croix-Rouge,

adresséeau ministrecamerounaisdes relations extérieures le 25avril 1997(annexeOCDR43). Le

comitéexplique :

«Dèsles premiers affrontements qui ont eu lieu entre les forces armées dela
République duCameroun etde la République fédéraldeu Nigériaen relation avec la
péninsulede Bakassi, le comitéinternationalde la CroixRouge (CICR) a demandé

formellement aux autoritésdes deux Etats de pouvoir avoir, entre autre, accès aux
personnesmilitairesetcivilesqu'ellesdétenaient.

Le CICR a apprécié le dialogue constructif quia pu s'établir avec les hautes
autoritésdela Républiquedu Cameroun,luiaccordanttoutesles facilitéspour mener à
bien samission humanitaire. Ainsi, le CICRa pu mener des actions d'assistance en
faveur des citoyens camerounais déplacés par les combats de Bakassi. Dès le

19mars 1996, il a, par ailleurs, reçu l'autorisation des autorités camerounaisesde
rendre visite aux civils nigérians,arrêtéset privésde libertépour des raisons de
sécurité. Cetteautorisationa été étendue d,èsle 21 mai 1996, aux prisonniers de
guerre nigérians.

Le CICR tient à assurer aux autorités camerounaises qu'il poursuit ses
démarchesau plus hautniveau auprèsdu Gouvernementde la Républiquefédérale du

Nigéria,afin d'obtenir des informations sur le sort des personnes capturéespar les
autoritésnigérianeest derecevoir l'autorisationde visiterles prisonnierscamerounais.

Le CICR déploreque les autoritésnigérianesn'aient à ce jour donné aucune
suitea sesrequêtes.))

47. Un tiers, parfaitementimpartial, dépeintcette situation. D'un côté,le Cameroun, en

plein accord avecses obligations,notamment dans le domainedu droit humanitaire. De l'autre, le

Nigéria quirefuse de donner desinformations sur le sort des personnes capturéespar ses soldats,

qui refuse que les organisationshumanitairesy aient accès,et qui traite par le mépris les requêtes

dela Croix-Rouge. 48. Aprèscette introduction, nécessairepour réfuterune «impression» délibérément créée

par le Nigéria,je me tourne maintenantvers les points précisévoqués par lprofesseur Crawford.

Etje vaisle faireentoute vitesse.

49. En ce qui concerne les événements à Bakassi (CR 2002114, p. 54, par.21,22), le

Cameroun a réfuté endétaildans sa réplique lesdemandes contenues dans le contre-mémoire

(répliquedu Cameroun, p. 564-567). Il est certainement vrai qu'il peut y avoir eu des victimes

civiles, ce que le Cameroun regrette profondément. Maisil faut se rappeler que le climat

d'insécuritéh,autement nocif pour la population civile, a été crééar le Nigériadu fait de son

invasionmilitairede la péninsule.Même selonle récit présenté parNleigéria, les victimes ont péri

à la suite d'opérations armées dont la responsabile sauraitêtreéclaircie.La Cour ne manquera

pas deprendre actedu fait que tous les incidentsrésumédsans la listeremise la Cour lejour des

plaidoiriesoralessous la cote se situentchronologiquementdans les années 1994 à 1999. En ce

qui concerne les nouveaux incidents évoquésdans la duplique nigériane(duplique du Nigéria,

p. 749-750),on voit mal quel rapport ils peuvent bien avoir avec le différendterritorial entre les

deux Parties. Chacun d'eux demanderaiu tn examen séparé.Le Cameroun tient à répéter qu'il

regrettetoutes les pertes ettous les dommagesqui ont écausés, surtoutla perte de vies humaines.

Mais il estobligéde dire que,de son avis, lesélémentsepreuve foumis par leNigériane sont pas

suffisants.

50. En ce qui concerne les prétenduesattaques du mois d'avril 1998, dont le Nigéria fait

grand cas(CR 2002114,p. 55, par. 25), il estutile de s'attacàla lecturedes documents produits

pour étayerles accusations. Qu'est-ce qu'on y trouve ? Certainement pas cette exactitudedont

s'est vantéle Nigéria toutau long de la procédure. Prenons quelques unes des déclarations des

témoins(duplique du Nigéria, vol. IX,annexe 203). Un Monsieur Bassey Andem déclare :

((Anytimewe go to the high sea the gendarmes used topursue us and when fhey catch us, theywill

seize our engines andfire us inside the boat...)) (Ibid.,p. 1707.) Un autre témoin, MonsieurIta

Okon Simeon,raconte :((Gendarmeshavealways beenfiring their guns on us .». (Ibid.,p. 1709.)

concernant le jour en question, le 18vril 1998, les déclarationsdivergent de façon considérable

quant à l'heure où prétendumentl'attaque a commencé. Alors que l'un detsémoinsaffirme sans

hésitationque les gendarmes camerounais ont commencé à tirer «at around 12 o'clock noon»(ibid., p. 1721)'d'autres croient savoir que l'attaque a commencé àl'aube : «At the dawn of the

above-mentioneddate, I heard ...firing and shellingfiom my sleep.)) (Ibid., p. 1737.) Cette

dernièreversion est confinnéepar un autre témoin :«Onthe earIyhoursof the abovestated date,

theGendarmesat thehostile creekfiredindiscriminatelyat ownlocation.. .» (Ibid.,p. 1739.) Tout

cela ne coïncidepas. S'ajoute que, selonle récitque donnent les témoins,des «bombes» auraient

été lancéesS . ous aucun angle, cette allégation nesemble êtreplausible. Des bombes avec leur

potentiel de destructionauraient certainement causédes dégâts beaucoupplus importants. Donc,

on peut admettre qu'il y aeu un incidentde quelquesorte, mais cet incident n'a certainementpas

eu lieu delamanière dépeinte palreNigéria.Lesdéclarationsdes «témoins»présentép sas lui sont

detoute évidence peucrédibles.

51.Le mêmejugemen t unmanque manifestede crédibilité - doit êtreportésur les autres

incidents invoqués par le Nigéria. Sont particulièrement énigmatiques les incidents du

26 février1993et celuidu 27juin 1993(voir contre-mémoire du Nigéria,p. 806,par.25.11).

52. Le lecteurdes documentspertinents n'estmêmepas informésur le lieu où ces incidents

auraienteu lieu. Tout restedans le flou. Précision Fiabilité? Iln'y en a pas.

53. On manque de temps, Monsieur le président,le Cameroun reviendra aux demandes

reconventionnelles durantle temps supplémentaire quilui a étéaccordé à cette fin après le

deuxième tour pourleNigéria. Monsieur leprésident,je veux arrêter à ce point monintervention.

Je reconnais qu'il est extrêmementdélicat pourla Cour, encoreplus que pour le Cameroun, de

clarifier des faits l'égarddesquels les Partiesont donnédes versions largement divergentes.

Néanmoins,tout aussi embrouilléquepuisse paraître le panorama généraill,y a deuxzones où la

lumière n'estaffectée paraucune ombre : des troupes ainsi que des forces de sécurité nigérianes

sont déployées tand tans la péninsule de Bakassq iue dans un largesecteur du lac Tchad, chaque

fois en temtoire camerounais où ellesn'ont aucun droit de présence. Cette présence constitue à

elleseuleun fait internationalement illicite.

54. Monsieur le président,je suis arrivéà la fin de mon intervention. Demainmatin, avec

votre autorisation,mon collègueAlainPellet introduirales plaidoiries du Camerounrelatives à la

frontièremaritime. Jevous remercie. Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie, Monsieur le professeur.Ceci met un termeà l'audience

d'aujourd'hui. Laprochaineaudienceaura lieu demain à 10heures. La séanceestlevée.

L'audienceestlevée à 18 h 20.