1 Uncorrectel
.l
Cour internationale InternationalCourt
de Justice ofJustice
LAHAYE THEHAGUE
Audience publique
tenue lelundi mars2002,à15heures,auPalaisdelaPaix,
sous laprésidenceM. Guillaume,président,
en 1'affairedelaFrontière terrestreetmaritime entrele Cameroun etleNigéria
(Camerounc.Nigéria;Guinééquatoriale(intervenani))
COMPTE RENDU
YEAR 2002
PublicSitting
heldonMondayII March 2002,at3p.m., atthePeacePalace,
PresidentGuillaumeesiding,
in the caseconcerningtheLandand MaritimeBoundarybetweenCameroonandNigeria
(Cameroonv.Nigeria: Equatorial Guintervening)
VERBATIMRECORI)Présents:M. Guillaume, président
M. Shi, vice-président
MM. Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Elaraby,juges
MM. Mbaye
Ajibola,juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur,greffierPresent: President Guillaume
Vice-President Shi
Judges Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Elaraby
Judgesad hoc Mbaye
Ajibola
Registrar CouvreurLe Gouvernementde laRépubliquedu Camerounest représenté par :
S.Exc. M.Amadou Ali, ministred7Etatchargé delajustice, gardedes sceaux,
commeagent;
M. MauriceKamto, doyende la faculté dessciences juridiques et politiques de l'université de
YaoundéII,membrede la Commissiondudroit international,avocatau barreaude Paris,
M. Peter Y.Ntamark, professeur àla facultédessciencesjuridiques et politiques de l'Université de
YaoundéII, Barrister-ut-Law,membrede 171nneT remple, ancien doyen,
commecoagents,conseilset avocats;
M.Alain Pellet, professeurà l'universitéde Paris X-Nanterre,membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international,
commeagent adjoint,conseilet avocat;
M. Joseph Marie Bipoun Woum, professeur à la facultédes sciences juridiques et politiquesde
l'universitédeYaoundéII,ancien ministre,ancien doyen,
commeconseillerspécialet avocat;
M. Michel Aurillac, ancien ministre, conseid'Etathonoraire,avocatenretraite,
M.Jean-Pierre Cot, professeuràl'universitédeParis 1(Panthéon-Sorbonne), ancien ministre,
M.MauriceMendelson,Q. C., professeur émérid tee l'Universitéde Londres,Barrister-at-Law,
M. Malcolm N.Shaw, professeur à la facultéde droit de l'universitéde Leicester, titulairede la
chairesir Robert Jennings,Barrister-at-Law,
M. Bruno Simrna, professeur à l'université de Munich, membre de la Commission du droit
international,
M. Christian Tomuschat, professeurà l'universitéHumbold de Berlin, ancienmembre et ancien
présidentde la Commission dudroit international,
M. OlivierCorten, professeuràlaFacultéde droitde l'universitélibrede Bruxelles,
M.DanielKhan, chargé de cours àl'Institutdedroit internationalde l'université deMunich,
M.Jean-Marc Thouvenin, professeur à l'université deParisX-Nanterre, avocat au barreau de
Paris, société d'avocats Lysias,
commeconseils etavocats;TheGovernmentof theRepublicof Cameroonis representedby:
H.E. Mr. AmadouAli,Ministerof Stateresponsiblefor Justice,Keeperof the Seals,
asAgent;
Mr. Maurice Kamto,Dean, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Universityof Yaoundé II,
memberof the InternationalLawCommission,Avocat atthe Paris Bar, LysiasLaw Associates,
Mr. Peter Y.Ntamark, Professor,Faculty of Law and Political Science, Universityof Yaoundé II,
Barrister-at-Law,member oftheInner Temple,formerDean,
as Co-Agents,CounseIandAdvocates;
Mr. AlainPellet, Professor, University ofParisX-Nanterre,member and former Chairman of the
InternationalLawCommission,
asDeputyAgent, CounselandAdvocate;
Mr. Joseph-MarieBipoun Woum,Professor, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Universityof
Yaoundé II, formeMr inister, formerDean,
asSpecialAdviser andAdvocate;
Mr. MichelAurillac, formerMinister, HonoraryConseillerd'État,retiredAvocat,
Mr. Jean-Pierre Cot,Professor,UniversityofParis 1(Panthéon-Sorbonne), formeMr inister,
Mr. Maurice Mendelson, Q.C.E , meritusProfessor Universityof London, Barrister-at-Law,
Mr. Malcolm N. Shaw, Sir Robert Jennings Professor of International Law,Faculty of Law,
Universityof Leicester, Barrister-at-Law,
Mr. Bruno Simma, Professor, Universityof Munich, member of the International Law
Commission,
Mr. Christian Tomuschat, Professor, Humboldt University of Berlin, former member and
Chairman, InternationalLawCommission,
Mr. OlivierCorten,Professor, Facultyof Law,Université librde Bruxelles,
Mr. DanielKhan, Lecturer, InternationalLawInstitute, University ofMunich,
Mr. Jean-Marc Thouvenin, Professor, Universityof Paris X-Nanterre,Avocat at the Paris Bar,
LysiasLaw Associates,
as CounselandAdvocates;SirIan Sinclair, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Barrister-at-Law, ancienmembre de la Commission du droit
international,
M.EricDiamantis,avocataubarreau deParis, Moquet, Bordes & Associés,
M. Jean-PierreMignard, avocatau barreaude Paris, sociéd'avocatsLysias,
M. Joseph Tjop,consultantà la sociétd'avocatsLysias, chercheurau Centrede droit international
deNanterre(CEDIN),Université Paris X-Nanterre,
commeconseils:
M.Pierre Semengue,général d'armée, contrôleur généraa lrmes es,ancienchef d'état-majordes
armées,
M. James Tataw, générad l e division, conseiller logistique, chef d'état-major dl'arméede
terre,
S.Exc. MmeIsabelleBassong, ambassadeur du Cameroun auprès des pays du Benelux et de
l'Unioneuropéenne,
S.Exc.M.BiloaTang, ambassadeurdu Camerounen France,
S.Exc. M.MartinBelingaEboutou, ambassadeur, représentan ptermanent du Cameroun auprèsde
l'organisation des NationsUnieà New York,
M. Etienne Ateba, ministre-conseiller,chargé d'affairesa.i. à l'ambassade du Cameroun,
à La Haye,
M. Robert Akamba, administrateur civil principalc,hargéde mission au secrétariatgénérde la
présidencede la République,
M.Anicet Abanda Atangana, attaché au secrétariat générallade présidencede la République,
chargéde coursa l'universitédeYaoundéII,
M.Ernest BodoAbanda, directeurducadastre, membre de lacommissionnationaledes frontières,
M.OusmaneMey, anciengouverneurde province,
Le chef SamuelMoka LiffafaEndeley, magistrat honoraire,Barrister-at-Law, membredu Middle
Temple (Londres),ancienprésidentde la chambreadministrativede laCoursuprême,
MeMarc Sassen,avocat etconseiljuridique, société Petten,deman & Sassen(La Haye),
M.Francis Fai Yengo, ancien gouverneur de province, directeurde l'organisation du territoire,
ministèrede l'administration territoriale, *
M.Jean Mbenoun, directeurde l'administration centralau secrétariatgénérale la présidencede
laRépublique,Sir Ian Sinclair, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Barrister-at-Law, former member of the International Law
Commission,
Mr. Eric Diamantis,vocat attheParisBar,Moquet,Bordes & Associés,
Mr.Jean-Pierre Mignard,Avocatatthe ParisBar, LysiasLaw Associates,
Mr. Joseph Tjop, Consultant to Lysias Law Associates, Researcher at the Centre de droit
internationaldeNanterre (CEDIN),Universityof Paris X-Nanterre,
as Counsel;
GeneralPierre Semengue,Controller-Generalof the Armed Forces,former Head of Staff of the
ArmedForces,
Major-GeneralJamesTataw, LogisticsAdviser,FormerHeadof Staffof the Amy,
H.E.Ms IsabelleBassong,Ambassadorof Cameroon to the BeneluxCountriesandto the European
Union,
H.E. Mr.Biloa Tang, Ambassadorof Cameroonto France,
H.E. Mr. MartinBelinga Eboutou, Ambassador, PermanentRepresentative of Cameroon to the
UnitedNationsinNew York,
Mr. Etienne Ateba, Minister-Counsellor,Chargéd'affaires a.i. at the Embassy of Cameroon,
The Hague,
Mr. Robert Akamba, Principal Civil Administrator, Charée mission, GeneralSecretariat of the
Presidency oftheRepublic,
Mr. AnicetAbandaAtangana,Attaché to theGeneralSecretariat ofthe Presidencyof the Republic,
Lecturer, Universityof Yaoundé II,
Mr. Ernest Bodo Abanda, Director of the Cadastral Survey, member, National Boundary
Commission,
Mr. Ousmane Mey,formerProvincial Governor,
Chief Samuel Moka Liffafa Endeley, Honorary Magistrate, Barrister-at-Law,member of the
Middle Temple(London), former President of the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme
Court,
Maître MarcSassen,Advocateand LegalAdviser,Petten,Tideman & Sassen (TheHague),
Mr. Francis FaiYengo,formerProvincial Governor, Directo, rganisationdu Territoire,Ministry
of Territorial Administration,
Mr. Jean Mbenoun,Director, Central Administration, GeneralSecretariatof the Presidency of the
Republic, M.Edouard Etoundi, directeurde l'administrationcentrale au secrétariat général de la présidence
de la République,
M.Robert Tanda,diplomate,ministèredes relationsextérieures
comme conseillers;
M. Samuel BetahSona, ingénieur-géologue, expec rtnsultantde l'Organisationdes NationsUnies
pour le droitde la mer,
M.Thomson Fitt Takang, chef de service d'administrationcentrale au secrétariat général d lae
présidencedela République,
M.Jean-JacquesKoum, directeurde l'exploration,société nationaledeshydrocarbures(SNH),
M.Jean-Pierre Meloupou, capitaine de frégate,chef de la division Afrique au ministère de la
défense,
M.Paul Moby Etia,géographe,directeur del'Institutnational de cartographie,
M.AndréLoudet,ingénieurcartographe,
M. AndréRoubertou, ingénieur généd rell'armement, hydrographe,
commeexperts;
MmeMarie Florence Kollo-Efon, traducteur interprète principal,
comme traducteurinterprète;
Mlle CélineNegre,chercheurau Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris X-Nanterre
Mlle SandrineBarbier, chercheurau Centrede droit internationalde Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
de Paris X-Nanterre,
M. Richard Penda Keba, professeur certifiéd'histoire, cabinet du ministre de la justice, ancien
proviseur delycées,
comme assistantsde recherche;
M.Boukar Oumara,
M. Guy Roger Eba'a,
M.Aristide Esso,
M.Nkende Forbinake,
M.Nfan Bile,Mr. Edouard Etoundi, Director, Central Administration, GeneraS lecretariat of the Presidency of
the Republic,
Mr. Robert Tanda,diplomat,Ministq of Foreign Affairs,
as Advisers;
Mr. SamuelBetah Sona,Geological Engineer,ConsultingExpertto the UnitedNationsfor the Law
of the Sea,
Mr. Thomson Fitt Takang, Department Head, Central AdministrationG , eneral Secretariat of the
Presidencyof the Republic,
Mr. Jean-JacquesKoum, Directorof Exploration,National HydrocarbonsCompany(SNH),
CommanderJean-PierreMeloupou,Headof AfricaDivisionatthe Ministryof Defence,
Mr. Paul MobyEtia, Geographer, Director,Institutnational decartographie,
Mr. AndréLoudet,CartographieEngineer,
Mr. AndréRoubertou,Marine Engineer, Hydrographer,
as Experts;
Ms Marie Florence Kollo-Efon, Principal Translator-Interpreter,
Ms CélineNegre, Researcher, Centred'étudesde droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
Universityof Paris X-Nanterre,
Ms Sandrine Barbier, Researcher, Centre d'étudesde droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
Universityof Paris X-Nanterre,
Mr. Richard Penda Keba, Certified Professor of History, cabinet of the Minister of State for
Justice, formerHead ofHigh School,
as Research Assistants;
Mr. Boukar Oumara,
Mr. Guy RogerEba'a,
Mr. AristideEsso,
Mr.Nkende Forbinake,
Mr.Nfan Bile, M. EithelMbocka,
M. OlingaNyozo'o,
commeresponsablesdela communication;
MmeRenée Bakker,
MmeLawrencePolirsztok,
Mme MireilleJung,
M.NigelMcCollum,
MmeTeteBéatriceEpeti-Kame,
commesecrétairesde la délégation.
Le Gouvernementdela République fédérale du Nigériaest représentpar :
S. Exc.l'honorableMusaE. Abdullahi, ministredYEtat,ministre de la Justice du Gouvernement
fédéradlu Nigéria,
comme agent;
Le chefRichard AkinjideSAN, ancien Attorney-General de la Fédérationm , embre du barreau
d'Angleterreet dupays deGalles, ancienmembrede la Commission du droit international,
M.AlhajiAbdullahi IbrahimSAN, CON, commissaire pour les frontières internationales,
commission nationale desfrontièresduNigéria,ancienAttorney-Generalde la Fédération,
commecoagents;
MmeNella Andem-Ewa, Attorney-Generae lt commissaireà lajustice,Etat de CrossRiver,
M. IanBrownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., membre de la Commission du droit international, membredu
barreau d'Angleterre, membrede l'Institutde droit international,
SirArthurWatts, K.C.M.G., Q.C., membredu barreau d'Angleterre,membre de l'Institut de droit
international,
M. JamesCrawford,S.C.,professeurde droit internationalàl'universitéde Cambridge, titulairede
la chaire Whewell, membredes barreaux d'Angleterreet d'Australie, membrede l'Institut de
droit international,
M. GeorgesAbi-Saab, professeur honoraire à l'Institut universitaire de hautes études
internationales de Genève, embre del'Institutdedroit international,
M. Alastair Macdonald, géomètre, ancien directeuerlYOrdnanceSuwey,Grande-Bretagne,
comme conseilset avocats;
M. Timothy H. Daniel, associé,abinet D.J. Freeman,Solicitors,Cityde Londres,Mr. EithelMbocka
Mr. Olinga Nyozo'o,
as MediaOfJicers;
Ms RenéBakker,
Ms LawrencePolirsztok,
MsMireilleJung,
Mr.Nigel McCollum,
Ms Tete BéatriceEpeti-Kame,
as Secretaries.
TheGovernmentof the FederaR l epublicofNigeriais representedby:
H.E.the HonourableMusaE. Abdullahi,Minister ofStateforJustice ofthe FederalGovernmentof
Nigeria,
asAgent;
Chief Richard Akinjide SAN, Former Attorney-Generalof the Federation, Memberof the Bar of
Englandand Wales,formerMemberof the International Law Commission,
AlhajiAbdullahi IbrahimSAN,CON, Commissioner, International Boundaries N,ational Boundary
Commissionof Nigeria, Former Attorney-Generao l fthe Federation,
as Co-Agents;
Mrs.Nella Andem-Ewa, Attorney-Generaland Commissioner for Justice,CrossRiver State,
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., Memberof the International Law CommissionM , ember of the
EnglishBar,Memberof the Instituteof International Law,
Sir Arthur Watts, K.C.M.G., Q.C.,Member of the English Bar, Member of the Institute of
InternationalLaw,
Mr. James Crawford, S.C., WhewellProfessor of International Law, Universityof Cambridge,
Memberofthe Englishand AustralianBars,Memberof the Instituteof InternationalLaw,
Mr. Georges Abi-Saab, Honorary Professor,Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva,
Member ofthe Instituteof International Law,
Mr.Alastair Macdonald,Land Surveyor,FormerDirector,OrdnanceSurvey, GreatBritain,
as CounselandAdvocates;
Mr.TimothyH. Daniel, Partner,D.J. Freeman,Solicitors, Cityof London,M. AlanPerry, associé, cabineDt . J. Freeman,Solicitors,Cityde Londres,
M.David Lerer,solicitor, cabinetD. J. Freeman,Solicitors,Cityde Londres,
M. ChristopherHackford, solicitor,cabinet D.J. Freeman,Solicitors,CitydeLondres,
Mme CharlotteBreide, solicitor,cabinetD.J. Freeman, Solicitors,City de Londres,
M.NedBeale,stagiaire, cabinetD. J.Freeman, Solicitors, Cityde Londres,
M. Geoffrey Marston, directeur du départemen dtes étudesjuridiques au Sidney Sussex College,
Université deCambridge,membredubarreau d'Angleterre ed tu Pays de Galles,
M. Maxwell Gidado, assistant spécial principal du présidep ntur les affaires juridiques et
constitutionnelles, ancienAttorney-Generaelt commissaireàla Justice,Etat d'Adamaoua,
M. A. O. Cukwurah, conseil adjoint, ancien conseiller en matièree frontières(ASOP) auprèsdu
Royaumedu Lesotho, ancien commissaire pour les frontières inter-Etats, commission nationale
des frontières,
M. 1.Ayua,membrede l'équipe juridique du Nigéria,
M. K.A. Adabale,directeurpourle droit international et le drtomparé,ministèrede lajustice,
M. JalalArabi, membrede l'équipe juridiqud euNigéria,
M. Gbola Akinola,membrede l'équipe juridique duNigéra,
M. K.M. Tumsah, assistant spéciad lu directeur général de lcaommissionnationale des frontières
et secrétairede l'équipejuridique,
commeconseils;
S. Exc.l'honorable DubemOnyia, ministred'Etat,ministre desaffaires étrangères,
M.AlhajiDahiruBobbo, directeur général, commission nationadle es frontières,
M. F.A. Kassim,directeurgénéral du service cartographique l daeFédération,
M. AlhajiS.M. Diggi, directeurdes frontières internationale,ommissionnationaledesfrontières,
M. A. B.Maitama,colonel,ministèrede la défense,
M.Aliyiu Nasir, assistantspécial du minisd'Etat,ministrede la Justice,
commeconseillers;
M. ChrisCarleton, C.B.E., bureau hydrographique du Royaume-Uni,
M.DickGent,bureau hydrographiqueduRoyaume-Uni,
M. CliveSchofield,unitéde recherche surles frontières internationales, Universée Durham,
M. ScottB. Edmonds, directeurdesopérations cartographiques I,nternational MappingAssociates,Mr. Alan Perry,Partner,D.J. Freeman, Solicitors,City of London,
Mr. David Lerer, Solicitor,D.J. Freeman, Solicitors, CitLondon,
Mr. ChristopherHackford,Solicitor,D.J. Freeman, Solicitors,City ofLondon,
Ms CharlotteBreide, Solicitor,D. J.Freeman,Solicitors,Cityof London,
Mr.Ned Beale,Trainee,D.J. Freeman, Solicitors,City of London,
Dr. GeoffreyMarston, Fellowof Sidney Sussex College, Universityof Cambridge; Memberofthe
Bar of Englandand Wales,
Mr. Maxwell Gidado,Senior Special Assistant tothe President (Legal and Constitutional Matters),
FormerAttorney-Generaland Commissioner forJustice, AdamawaState,
Mr. A. O. Cukwurah, Co-Counsel, FormerUN (OPAS) Boundary Adviser to the Kingdom of
Lesotho,Former Commissioner, Inter-StateBoundaries,NationalBoundaryCommission,
Mr. 1.Ayua,Member, Nigerian LegalTeam,
Mr. K. A. Adabale,Director(International andComparative Law)Ministryof Justice,
Mr.Jalal Arabi,Member,Nigerian LegalTeam,
Mr. Gbola Akinola, Member, Nigerian LegaT l eam,
Mr. K. M. Tumsah, Special Assistantto Director-General, NationalBoundary Commission and
Secretarytothe LegalTeam,
as Counsel;
H.E.the Honourable DubemOnyia,Minister ofState forForeign Affairs,
Alhaji DahiruBobbo, Director-General, NationalBoundary Commission,
Mr.F. A. Kassim, Surveyor-Generalofthe Federation,
Alhaji S. M.Diggi,Director(International Boundaries), National Boundaryommission,
ColonelA. B.Maitama,Ministry of Defence,
Mr.Aliyu Nasir,SpecialAssistant tothe Ministerof State forJustice,
asAdvisers;
Mr. Chris Carleton, C.B.E., UnitedKingdomHydrographic Office,
Mr.Dick Gent,United KingdomHydrographic Office,
Mr. Clive Schofield, International Boundaries Research Unit, Universiofurham,
Mr. Scott B.Edmonds,Directorof CartographieOperations,InternationalMappingAssociates,M. Robert C.Rimtti, cartographeprincipal,International MappingAssociates,
M.Bruce Daniel,International MappingAssociates,
MmeVictoriaJ. Taylor,International MappingAssociates,
Mme StephanieKim Clark,International Mapping Associates,
M. Robin Cleverly,ExplorationManager,NPAGroup,
MmeClaireAinsworth,NPAGroup,
commeconseillersscientifiqueset techniques;
M. Mohammed Jibrilla,experten informatique,commissionnationaledes frontières,
MmeCoralieAyad, secrétairec,abinet D.J.Freeman,Solicitors,Cityde Londres,
MmeClaire Goodacre, secrétaire,abinetD.J. Freeman,Solicitors,City de Londres,
Mme SarahBickell, secrétaire,abinet D.J. Freeman,Solicitors,Cityde Londres,
Mme MichelleBurgoine, spécialisteen technologie de l'information, cabinetD. J.Freeman,
Solicitors,Cityde Londres,
commepersonnel administratif;
M. GeoffreyAnika,
M.MauOnowu,
M.Austeen Elewodalu,
M. UsmanMagawata,
commeresponsablesde la communication.
Le Gouvernementde la République deGuinéeéquatoriale,qui estautorisée à intervenirdans
l'instance,estreprésenpar :
S.Exc. M. RicardoMangue ObamaN'Fube, ministre dYEtat,ministre du travail et de la sécurité
sociale,
commeagent et conseil;
S.Exc. M. RubénMayeNsueMangue, ministre de la justice et des cultes, vice-présidentde la
-
commissionnationaledesfrontières,
S.Exc. M. CristobalMaiianaElaNchama,ministre desmines et del'énergie,vice-présidentde la
commissionnationaledesfrontières,
M.DomingoMbaEsono, directeur national de la société nationale de pétrole de
Guinéeéquatoriale, membrede la commission nationaledes frontières,Mr.Robert C. Rizmtti, SeniorMapping Specialist, Internationl apping Associates,
Mr.Bruce Daniel, International Mapping Associates,
MsVictoriaJ. Taylor,InternationalMappingAssociates,
MsStephanieKim Clark,International Mapping Associates,
Dr.Robin Cleverly, Exploration Manager,NPAGroup,
MsClaire Ainsworth, NPA Group,
as Scientific and TechnicalAdvisers;
Mr.MohammedJibrilla, Computer Expert,NationalBoundary Commission,
MsCoralieAyad, Secretary,D. J. Freeman, Solicitors,Cityof London,
MsClaire Goodacre, Secretary,D.J. Freeman,Solicitors, Cityof London,
MsSarahBickell, Secretary,D. J. Freeman, Solicitors,Cityof London,
MsMichelleBurgoine,IT Specialist,D. J. Freeman,Solicitors,City of London,
as Administrators,
Mr.GeoffreyAnika,
Mr.Mau Onowu,
Mr.Austeen Elewodalu,
Mr.Usman Magawata,
as Media Oflcers.
TheGovernmentoftheRepublicofEquatorial Guinea, whichhas beenpermitted tointervenein
the case,is representedby:
H.E.Mr. RicardoMangueObamaN'Fube,Ministerof Statefor Laborand Social Security,
as Agentand Counsel;
H.E. Mr. Rubén MayeNsue Mangue, Minister of Justiceand Religion, Vice-President of the
National Boundary Commission,
H.E. Mr. Cristobal Mafiana Ela Nchama, Minister of Mines and Energy, Vice-Presidentof the
National Boundary Commission,
Mr. Domingo Mba Esono, National Director of the Equatorial Guinea National Petroleum
Company, MemberoftheNational Boundary Commission,M.Antonio Nzambi Nlonga, Attorney-General,
commeconseillers;
M.Pierre-MarieDupuy, professeur dedroit international public à l'université de Paris
(Panthéon-Assase)tà l'Institutuniversitaire européen de Florence,
M.DavidA. Colson, membre du cabinet LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P.,
Washington,D.C., membre du barreaude 1'Etatde Californie et du barreau du district de
Columbia,
commeconseilset avocats;
SirDerek Bowett,
commeconseilprincipal,
M.DerekC. Smith, membre du cabinet LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P.,
Washington,D.C., membre du barreau du district de Columbia et du barreau de lYEtat
deVirginie,
commeconseil;
Mme JannetteE.Hasan, membre du cabinet LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P.,
Washington, D.C., membredu barreau du district deColumbia et du barreau de lYEtatde
Floride,
M.Hervé Blatrym, embre du cabinetLeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene& MacRae,L.L.P.,Paris, avocatàla
Cour, membredu barreaude Paris,
commeexpertsjuridiques;
M. CoalterG.Lathrop, SovereignGeographic Inc.,Chape1Hill, CarolineduNord,
M. AlexanderM.Tait, Equator Graphics, SilverSpring, Maryland,
commeexpertstechniques.Mr. Antonio Nzambi Nlonga, Attorney-General,
asAdvisers;
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor of Public International Law at the University of Paris
(Panthéon-Assas)and attheEuropean UniversityInstituteinFlorence,
Mr. DavidA. Colson, LeBoeuf, Lamb,Greene & MacRae, L.L.P., Washington,D.C., member of
the CaliforniaStateBarandDistrictofColumbiaBar,
as Counseland Advocates;
SirDerek Bowett,
as Senior Counsel;
Mr. DerekC. Smith, LeBoeuf,Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P.,Washington,D.C., memberof the
District ofColumbiaBarand VirginiaState Bar,
as Counsel;
Ms Jannette E. Hasan, LeBoeuf,Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P., Washington,D.C., member of
the District ofColumbiaBarand FloridaStateBar,
Mr. Hervé Blatry, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Green& MacRae,L.L.P., Paris, Avocatà la Cour, member of
theParisBar,
as Legal Experts;
Mr.Coalter G.Lathrop, SovereignGeographicInc.,Chape1Hill,North Carolina,
Mr.Alexander M.Tait, EquatorGraphics,Silver Spring, Maryland,
as TechnicalExperts. LePRÉSIDENT : Veuillezvous asseoir. La séanceest ouverteetje donnelaparole, aunom
de la RépubliqueduCameroun,auprofesseurMalcolmShaw.
Mr. SHAW: Jevous remercie, Monsieurle président.
IV.BAKASSI
The situationbefore1961
1.Mr. Presidentand Membersof the Court, the distinguishedAgent forNigeriaaffirmedin
his address that Bakassi is "the main focus of this case" (CR200218,p. 18). Indeedit is. In this
pleading, the question of title to Bakassi up to and including the process by which British
Cameroons became independentbyjoining respectivelyNigeriaand Carneroonon 1October 1961
will be addressed. Issues afterthisdatewillbe discussedby ProfessorMendelson.
2. In so far as the long pre-independenceperiod is concerned,Nigeria's casehangs on one
simple and single thread, andthat is the sovereignstatus of the Kings and Chiefsof Old Calabar.
Not just sovereign status, but sovereign territorial rights on the international plane erga omnes.
Anything less than this will not do to maintain Nigeria's thesis. As counsel for Nigeria starkly
declared: "Cameroon invites you to agree that a State can, without express authority from the
owner, give away some other State7s temtory" (CR200218, p. 55). Note the wording,
Mr. President,"someother State's territory".
3. Nigeria argues that "Bakassi was part of the territory of the Kings and Chiefs of Old
Calabar" who had in 1884 "internationaltreaty-making capacity" so that "Great Britain acquired
only the limited rights conferredy the termsof the Treaty of Protection, andthoserights did not
include either sovereigntyover the territory of Old Calabaror the right or powerto give awayits
territory". Accordingly, Great Britain "had no legal title to Bakassi and no legal authority to
transferBakassito GermanybytheTreaty ofMarch 1913",so that Germany wasableto acquire no
good titlenor wereanyof its successorsincludingCameroon. Further,"at al1timesup to 1960title
to Bakassi consequentlyremainedwith the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar and,thereafter, with
Nigeria" and "while the Treaty of Protection remained in force Great Britain lackedal1authority
unilaterallytovary itsboundaries"(CR 200218,p. 65, andsee CR 200219,p. 19). 4. Nigeria'sthesis is a simple one,simply wrong. Nigeriaasks the Court to acceptthat the
Treaty of Protectionof 1884 was betweentwo international personsunder international lawat the
time and it had the effect of recognizing the intemationaltemtorial rights over Bakassi until
independenceandbeyond: this bothin respect tosovereigntitle and territorial extent ergaomnes.
Al1instruments, agreements, activities and processecsontrary to this perception areof necessity
wrongand ineffectivein law.
5. We are asked to consider a long line of legal error. Great Britain's effort to establisha
boundary with Germany regarding the Bakassb iy the Treaty of March 1913- was wrong.
Germanyin acceptingthis boundary - was wrong. The establishmentof the mandateandlaterthe
trust over the BritishCameroonsas including Bakassi- was wrong. British practice throughout
themandate and trust periodsshowing,by legislativeactivity and officialbehaviouronthe ground,
that Bakassi was part of the Southern Cameroons- was wrong. The supervisory activity of the
League of Nations and the United Nations organswith regard to the temtory which, as shown
consistently in, forxample, official maps presentedto them by Britain, includesBakassi- was
wrong. The plebiscite processas supervisedby the United Nations and which included Bakassi
with Southern Cameroons voting districts- was wrong. The General Assembly resolution
officially and legally terminating thetrusteeship on the basis of the plebiscite process-was
wrong. Not least,Nigerian practice at thtime andfor a coupleof decadesthereafter, recognizing
Bakassias part of Cameroon,was also wrong. Onemight be tempted to concludethat never have
somany madethe samemistakeso oftenand oversucha longperiodof time.
6. But, of course, Mr.President, Members ofthe Court,there was no such mistake. On the
contrary,what wehave is a consistent practiceby the colonial andthen administeringpower, other
interested States, international supervisory organUenitedNations and,up to relatively recently,
Nigeria itself,l1affinning that Bakassi was partof what isnow Cameroon. 1tum now to deal in
more detail withNigeria'ssingleandnow rapidlyunravellingthread.
Theinternational legal status and territorialxtent of the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar
7. No onedeniesthat the inhabitantsof the CalabarRiverregion, includingits varioustowns,
settlements and outposts, included at the timeder consideration manyenterprisingtraders andmerchants, who engaged in avariety of commercial activitiesand travelled far and wide. The
question at issue, however, is not that, but whether in 1884 and thereafter, there existed an
international legalerson with full sovereignand territorialrights under internationallaw and thus
capableofmaintainingan internationallyvalidterritorial titleergaomnesuntil the dateofNigeria's
independence. Forit is only onthis basis thatNigeria's threadmay remain suspendedand support
its assertions.
8. While it is not disputedthat variouspeoples operatedin the area in question at thetime in
question, Nigeria has provided no evidence that any State in the international community
recognizedor dealt withthe Kings and Chiefsof Old Calabaras a sovereign entityin international
law. Thatis a key question. Whatwe have is atreaty,theTreaty of Protectionof 1884,the point at
which forNigeria history ends. We need, however, to take a look at this Treaty andthe context
both localand international.
9.Nigeria offersus a choice. Either the treatywas with a "myth", as Nigeria so caricatures
Cameroon's argument (CR200218,p. 43), so that the territory in question was in effect terra
nullius or the Treaty was one with a sovereign Stateas that term was understood under
internationallaw at the time. This is a falsechoice. It is an issue dealt with in both theIsland of
Palmas case (2 RIAA, p. 829) and by the Courtin the Western Sahara case (I.C.J. Reports 1975,
p. 12). Whatwe aresayingis not new,but it is correct.
10. Judge Huber in the Island of Palmas case noted that agreements (what he termed
contracts)between Statesand "native princesor chiefs ofpeoples not recognized as members of
the community of nations" were "notin the international law sense,treaties or conventionscapable
of creatingrights and obligationssuch as may, in international law,arise out of treaties". They
were notdevoid of effect, however, since: "if they donot constitute titlesin internationallaw, they
are nonethe less factsof whichthat lawmust incertain circumstancestake account" (atp. 858). In
the WesternSahara case, this Courtbuilt uponJudgeHuber's approachand emphasizedthat State
practice accepted that "territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social or political
organization were not regarded as terrae nullius", rather sovereignty was acquired by colonial
powers "through agreements with local rulers" (at p. 39).At no stage, didthe Court suggest thatsuch localmlers were sovereignStatesrecognized assuchby the international community, northat
such agreementsconstitutedtreaties inthe sense of agreementsbetween sovereignStates.
11.It is fùlly accepted that the rangeof protectorate agreements signedby Britain with local
mlers in the area in question precluded the acquisition of titleby occupation of terrae nullius and
indeed established a position relative to third States that was accepted by them in the colonial
scramble. But thisis far fi-omsaying that such agreementswere made necessarily with sovereign
Statesgenerally, and particularly so with regard to the Kings andChiefs of OldCalabar. But there
is another problemwith regard to this entity. Trying to ascertain its nature is rather like trying to
graspjelly.
12. In its Counter-Mernorial, Nigeria termed theKings and. Chiefs of Old Calabar "an
acephalous federation" (Counter-Memorial of Nigeria, p. 67), rather a headless concept in
international law. It later referred to Old Calabar as "apparently a compendious name for the
various kings and chiefs in the area of the Calabar River" (ibid., p. 93). Counsel for Nigeria
accepted that: "we are not talking of a single unitary entity, butrather of a grouping of political
units, effectivelyseparate City States", who, it is argued, "over time came to act together as the
Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar" (CR200218, p. 43). A good effort at trying to work up a
conclusion of internationallegalstatus, but one which is hardlyconvincing. As the noted Nigerian
writer J. C. Anene points out, Major Macdonald, appointedCommissioner to the Niger Districts in
1889, explored the area and "made his way to Old Calabar where he found a congeries of
independent 'kingdoms' and 'dukedoms"' (Southern Nigeria in Transition1885-1906: Theoryand
Practice ina Colonial Protectorate, 1966,p. 124).
13. Another rather unconvincing effortis that devoted to establishing the territorial domain
of Old Calabar. First, the precise relationship between Bakassiand the Kings and Chiefs of Old
Calabar is rather difficult to discem. Nigeria argues both that Old Calabar had original title to
Bakassi and that Bakassi was a dependency (Counter-Memorialof Nigeria, pp. 74-75). The two
are not identical terms. Further, nowherein the 1884Treatyis Bakassi actuallymentioned.
14. Secondly, the question of the territorial extent of Old Calabar is posed. What does
Nigeria assert? [ProjectNigerianmap NCM,No. 281 You see one of Nigeria's sketch-mapson the
screen, Mr. President, Members ofthe Court,and is tobe found atjudges' folder,tab 125. Counsel forNigeria declared that,basinghimself uponConsulJohnston's 1890 report to the Foreign Office:
whilethe territory totheWestof the River Ndian "belonged'undoubtedly'to OldCalabar,Bakassi
and the Rio del Rey, are demonstrablyto the west of the Ndian" (CR 200218,p. 41). But what
about the temtory between the Rio del Rey andthe Ndian, Mr. President? By the same token, it
should be regarded as part of the domain of the Kings and Chiefsof Old Calabar and now,
therefore,part of Nigeria. Counsel continueda little laterby citing another British Consul ofthe
era, EdwardHydeHewett, as noting in the express contextof the 1884Treaty of Protection,that
"the Chiefs of TomShot country, of EfÙt,the country aboutRio delRey, and of Idombi, the
country aboutthe River Rumby,made declarationsthat theywere subjectto Old Calabar". As you
can see, we are now far beyond Bakassi andthe whole logic of Nigeria's single thread argument
demandsthat the territorial extentof Old Calabarat 1884passedto Nigeria in 1960and is subject
to its claim, whethermade now or perhapsin the future. And if not, how was the boundary
established atthe Riodel Rey as far asNigeriaargues? Ifthis was achievedby British action prior
to the 1913Treaty, then this would validate Britain's territorialcompetence which would in turn
validatethe 1913cession. If not, then- what? Counsel for Nigeria triedto retrievethe situation
by claiming in a later pleading that, "in the absence of effective agreements, one must have
recourse to the customary boundary, whichis the RiodelRey. Historically ... the territorial
authority of the Kings and Chiefs ofOld Calabar extended at leastas far east as that watenvay"
(CR2002111,p. 60). At least asfar- yes, butmuch morethan this, asNigeria has itself claimed.
Further, how was this customary boundary established and where is the requisite evidenceof
practiceto found suchan assertion? [Endprojection]
15. Mr. President, the more one looks atNigeria's claim,the more one is reminded of a
Magritte painting. At first sight, logical and clear and commonplaceb ,ut at second sight wholly
illogicaland senseless. A house inthe dark withthe skyabovebright blueand sunny.
The protectorate
16. At this point, we turn to consider the question of the protectorate established in the
Treaty of 1884. To treat this as if it wereakin to the classic international protectorate over
protectedStates isto fly from reality. Therealityis that theconceptofprotectorates inso far asthesub-Saharanregionof Afiica in the latenineteenthcentury wasconcemed mutatedinto a variation
of straightfonvardcolonialismwith no implication of sovereignty with regard to the target territory.
Authorssuch as Lindley(TheAcquisitionand GovernmentofBackward Territoryin International
Law, 1926, pp. 183, 187 and203), and Alexandrowicz (The European-African Confrontation,
1973,pp. 69-70) andothers (e.g., Crawford, Creationof StatesinInternational Law, 1979,pp. 198
et seq.), pointedto this colonial protectorateas one where the international community accepted
that the protecting State acquired extemal sovereignty, notwithstandinga certain variance in the
levelof purely intemalsovereignty.
17. As Hubernoted in the Island of Palmas case with regardto the notion of the colonial
protectorate:
"It is not an agreement between equals; it is rather a form of interna1
organisationof a colonial territory, on the basiof autonomyfor the natives. In order
to regularise the situation as regards other States, this organisation requires to be
completedby the establishment of powers toensure the fulfilment ofthe obligations
imposed by international law on every State in regard to its own territory. Andthus
suzeraintyoverthe native Statebecomes the basisof territorialsovereignty astowards
other membersof the community of nations."(P. 858.)
Thus Crawford writes that as a result of internationalpractice by virtue of the General Act of the
BerlinConference 1885: "theprotecting State had international full powers:it was competent, for
example,to cedeprotected temtory without consentand in breachof the protectorate agreements"
(op.cit., p. 200, andsee furtherReplyof Cameroon,pp. 262 etseq.).
18. In sucha context,it was irrelevantto issuesof extemalsovereigntemtorial title that the
domestic law of the colonial power ascnbed a different status to such protectorates as compared
withcolonies. Whether different nationality provisions applied tto he inhabitants in question and
whetherthe form oflegislation adopted fellundertheForeign Jurisdiction Actor not are interesting
issues, but simplynot relevant to the key issue of territorial titleerga omnes. As Lord Lugard
wrote: "We amve, then, at the general conclusion that'for purposesof municipal lawan Afiican
protectorate is not, but for purposes of internationallaw must be treated as if it were, a part of
British dominions'."(The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 5th ed., 1965, p. 35, and see
furtherReply of Cameroon,pp. 270 etseq.) 19. Nigeria has failed to provide any evidence as to the claimed international statusof
sovereign Old Calabar. No international acceptance of the sovereign status now claimed for Old
Calabarhas been evidenced, norany referenceto international recognitionof its territorial title,still
less of its territorial extent. This matters notonly for the purposes of general internationallaw
regarding statehood, but also because the international law of the Berlin Conference period
predicatedthe effective occupationof colonialand protectorate territories upon notification to, and
essentially acceptance by, third States. To this extent, any international recognitionof the Kings
and Chiefs of Old Calabar as a sovereign entityunder international lawwould have foreclosedthe
issueunder consideration.
20. But what was British practice? Here, Nigeria would haveus believe that the 1884Treaty
of Protection markedthe end of history until Nigerian independencein 1960. Not so. In fact,
practicedemonstratesthat withina very shorttime of this protectorate agreement, the constitutional
and territorial situation affecting this area was altered and was further changed on several
subsequent occasions. However,we must first put the 1884 agreement into its context and this
context wasthe raceto acquire territory inthis whole areaof West Afiica.
21. Hertslet in his classic work, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd ed., 1909, 3 vols.,
reprinted in 1967) refers to the truly extensive number oftreaties entered into between 1884 and
1892 more or less in standard predetermined form. In particular, Hewett in 1884 concluded a
number of agreements with "native Chiefs of the Niger District" by which these territories were
placed under British protection (Vol. 1,p. 116). Hertslet lists some 350 to 400 of these (pp. 131
et seq.). Essentially these prevented any correspondence or agreement with any foreign power
without British sanction and in return Great Britain extended its protection. The OldCalabar
Treaty was thus one small Stone in a large edifice marking the extension of British control
throughout the Niger delta region. To assert that Britain recognized the sovereign status in
international law andinternational territorialtitle of each of thelers with whom such agreements
were signedwould be pushing reality into fantasy.
22. At this stagewe need to look a littleat the 1884agreement itself. Nigeria maintains that
it was minimalist, simply restricting OldCalabar's powers to contact foreign States and extending
British protection (CR200218,p. 46). Nigeria's counselgoes no further in his analysis than this.Wiselyso for his own case. In fact, he declares, after notingthe provisionsin Articles 1andIIjust
mentioned, that: "And so far as is relevant for Ourpresent purposes,that is al1it said." (Ibid.,
p. 48.) Oh really? 1don't think so. Becauseif we delve a little more deeply, a totally different
pictureemerges. Let us look atsome of the other provisions- you should findthis on the screen
behindme and in thejudges' folderat tab 126 [project text,Counter-MemonalofNigeria, Ann.23,
p. 1101. ArticleIII provides for full and exclusive civiland criminaljurisdiction over British
subjects and foreign subjects enjoying British protectionto be reserved to British consular and
other officers. Not entirely incompatible with international personality, bu ltt us proceed.
ArticleIV provides that al1disputes between theKings and Chiefs of OldCalabaror between them
and Britishor foreigntraders or betweenthemand neighbouringtribeswho were, inthe absenceof
amicable settlement, to be submitted to British officials for arbitration and decision or for
arrangement. Arbitration anddecision, no less; no advisory service here, Mr.President. Indeed,
Lindleyuses the example of precisely such a provisionto demonstratean implied relationshipof
paramountcyor protection(ibid.,p. 185). Here,of course,there is no need forimplication,but the
basic pointis clear. We continue.
23.Article V is a generalclause oftrulystrikingscope. It providesthat the Kings and Chiefs
engagedto act uponthe adviceof the British consularor otherofficials
"in matters relating to theadministrationofjustice, the developmentof the resowces
of the country,the interests of commerce,or in any other matter in relation to peace,
orderand goodgovernment,andthe general progressof civilisation".
Well, apretty conclusivelist of governmental activities, one might think. And note,the obligation
is notjustto seek British advice,it is tact uponthat advice. There is a right of appeal againstthe
decisions of such British officers, but, Mr.President, to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for
ForeignAffairs [end projection] .
24. Mr. President, Membersof the Court,this is hardly a declaration of independence.It is
hardly arecognitionof independence. It markedan acceptanceof a degreeof British control thatis
simply not consistent with any level of independence that may be required for international
sovereignty. To Say, as does counsel for Nigeria, that "[tlhe CO-contractingparties were
international persons,equalin law; they weremanifestlyagreeingto certaindispositionswithinthe
framework of international law" (CR 200218,p. 46) reveals a gift for fantasy that J. R.Tolkienhimself woulddoubtlesshave envied. And the Courtwill be well awarethatNigeria'scase outside
of an asserted post-independence historical consolidation restssolely and exclusivelyupon this
Treaty .
25. The large number- thelarge number- of protectorate agreementssigned with the
local chiefsdid not mark the end of history. On the contrary, a process of rearrangement and
consolidation took place almost immediately. In June 1885, less than one year after Our
protectorate agreement, a British protectorate was established over the Niger Districts (or Oil
Rivers Protectorate), definedas the area between the British Protectorateof Lagos and the right
bank of the mouth of the Rio del Rey. Two yearslater the areas subjectto the government ofthe
Royal Niger Companywere included. In 1893 thearea under protectionwas renamed the Niger
Coast Protectorate. On 27 December 1899, an Order in Council was adopted constituting the
Protectorateof Southern Nigeria comprisingthe Niger Coast Protectorateand certain temtories
formerly administered bythe Royal Niger Company and regulating itsadministration. This
constituteda much larger area than heretofore. This Order was, in turn, revoked by one dated
16February 1906which defined the area of the Protectorate ofSouthem Nigeriamore extensively
to include the whole area of southern Nigeria excluding the Colony of Southem Nigeria (see
Hertslet,op. cit., pp. 117 etse).
26. We have seen no evidence at al1that the British Govemmentfelt constrained by the
several hundred protectorate agreements (includingOur 1884 Old Calabar agreement) in so
changing these interna1boundaries and administrative arrangements. We have seen no evidence
that the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabarprotested at the consequential violation ofwhat is now
claimed to be their sovereign status. In fact, practice with regard to Nigeria is remarkably
consistentin demonstratingthat the colonial powerwas fully able to alter the territorial extent of
thevariousprotectoratesalmost atwill.
27. We should finally note thaton 1 January 1914, the Colony and Protectorateof Southern
Nigeria and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria were amalgamated to form the Colony and
Protectorate ofNigeria, an arrangementthat continued until independence in 1960- 1960. But
1960 brings us to one further problem for Nigeria's thesis. And that is how- and that is thequestion - how the sovereignKings and Chiefs of Old Calabar,with international sovereign and
temtorial rights remember, cameto join Nigeria.
28. Counselfor Nigeria sang in simple harmony. Very simple. One said that: "[tlhe chain
of identity from the Kings andChiefs of Old Calabar to present-day Nigeriais clear enough"
(CR200218, p.36). Another proclaimed that: "the link between today's Nigeria and yesterday's
Old Calabaris clear"(ibid., p. 39). A thirdcounsel saidthat: "The originaltitle of Old Calabar...
was eventuallyabsorbed in the emerging entity of Nigeria. At thetime of independencein 1960
the original title toBakassivested in Nigeriaas the successorto Old Calabar." (CR200219, p. 19.)
The same counsel referred further to "the original title to the Bakassi Peninsula inheritedby
Nigeria at the time of independence" (ibid., p.47). Perhaps, we inOurtum may be permittedto
ask: How was thistitle absorbed or vested or inherited? And by whom? And preciselywhen?
And bywhat mechanism?
29. In Nigeria's own terms, Old Calabar possessed international legal personality and
sovereign title toerritory. There existsin international lawa presumptionagainstthe incidentalor
accidental demise of States. So how did this claimed State lose formally its independent legal
personality? Wehave no evidence whatsoeveras to any processof succession bywhich the rulers
of the Kings and Chiefs of OldCalabar formally renounced statehoodand temtorial title in favour
ofNigeria. Perhapsthere wasa processoftransfer over the yearsduring the colonial period. But if
this is so, and Nigeria has not argued this, then would not also this prescriptive mechanism
consequentially transfer to Britain title tothe territory in question and thus validate the 1913
cession to Germany? A Treaty which Britain never denounced,never attacked, never criticized
with regardto Bakassi. Whichever way this is argued, Nigeria faces insuperable legalamers.
The Treatyof 11March 1913
30. The mention of the 1913 Treaty brings us to the legal core of Cameroon's case.
Nigeria'sapproach is basic. It argues thatit does not matter. It is irrelevantin so far as Bakassi is
concerned. The reason for this is, as claimed, Britain did not havethe competencein lawto cede
the areato Germany. There is no need nowto argue the validity ofthis Treatyin general. Nigeria
has in terms beforethis Courtaccepted it(e.g.,CR2002110,p. 41). Al1it seeks to do is to arguethat it is not applicableto Bakassi. Or rather thatthe Articles referringto the boundarywith regard
to this peninsula are somehow severable fiom the Treaty and void. And Professor Simma has
already addressed thisargument. Onlya couple of points will be made here.
31. First, there is no doubt andno dispute that the Bakassi Articlesdefine a boundary that is
congruent with Cameroon's claim. Nigeria does not claim that this lineis unclear or inconsistent
with Cameroon'sargument. It simplydisputes the legality of this line as introduced in the Treaty.
Secondly, neither side disputes that in this Treaty the effect of Articles XVIII to XXII is to cede
formally the BakassiPeninsula to Germany,however muchpractice was previously movingin that
direction. Thirdly, neither side disputesthat on the British side of the pre-March 1913 linesome
form of protectorate arrangement was in existence. Fourthly,there is a disagreementas to whether
this Treatywas accompanied byGerman effectivités.But ProfessorTomuschat has already shown,
using, inter alia, British documents, that there were German effectivitésin this pre-allied
occupationperiod withregard to Bakassi(CR 200213,pp. 61et seq.).
32. The question to be decided by the Court is whether the terms of the 1884 Treaty of
Protection were such as to preclude Britain fiom ceding the temtory in question. Nigeria's
argument is that sovereignty inheredin the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar and that included
international legal personality and international territorial title. Nigeprays in aidthe doctrine of
nemo da! quod non habet, stating that Great Britain acted "wholly in excess of anypowers which
she had ... as such it was wholly ineffectivein law to achieve the transfer of territory which it
purportedto effect" (CR200218, pp.55-56).
33. Cameroon has no argument with the doctrine of nemo dat- just its application here.
We have shown that thisargument is deeply flawed at several levels. First, it is, at the very least,
dubious that the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar constituted anindependent sovereign entity with
territorial rights under international law. Second, the Treaty of Protection of 1884 did not
recognize orconfirm, still less confer any such powers or rights. Third,British practiceduring and
after 1884 demonstrated that it did not feel constrained with regardto altering administrative
arrangements or changing territorial lines affecting the area in question. Fourth, no international
recognition or acceptance of any Old Calabar sovereign status or territorial competence was
forthcomingat any stageprior to, atthe time of, or subsequentto the agreement. Fifth,no evidenceof any suchrelevant activity on the part of the Kings and Chiefs has been presented. Sixth, while
both Germany and Britain explicitly affirmed the cornpetence of Britain to cede Bakassi, no
internationalprotest of any kind has been put fonvard in evidence. Seventh, international practice
is consistent in accepting that colonial protectorates in sub-SaharanAfiica during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries permitted the colonial power to exercise full external
sovereignty with regard to the territory, including the rightto cede part of such territory. Eighth,
the processof replacing Germanauthority withBritish andFrench authority during the First World
War involvedno attemptto denounce or modifythe March 1913Treaty. At thispoint, we turn to
the mandateand trust periods.
The mandateand trustperiod
34.The practice of these periods was the subject of a specific pleading before the Court
(CR 200214,pp. 18 etseq.). In response, Nigeria provides the usual answer. Bakassi was not
German territory thereforethe practice of the mandate andtrust period is irrelevant. Counsel for
Nigeria tells us: "And that answer underminesCameroon's wholesubsequent case." (CR200218,
p. 61.) Throughout theperiod, andup to 1961,"the 1884Treaty of Protection wasstill in force and
still binding upon Great Britain" (ibid., p. 62). Well, Mr. President, nobody seems to have told
Britain, or the League of Nations, or the UnitedNations, or indeed the Kings and Chiefs of Old
Calabar.
35. Counsel for Nigeria accepts Cameroon's arguments with regardto the nature and scope
of mandatory powers and trusteeship administering authorities, but declares that, "Before these
limits to territorial authoritycan in any way berelevant, it has to be shown thatBakassi waspart of
the Mandate or Trusteeship territories" (ibid.,p. 63). We have addressed this point in somedetail
already; this will not be repeated (see CR 200214,pp. 18 et seq.). Suffice it to Saythat we have
shown that British officiais on the ground took the view that Bakassi was part of the mandated
territory (see,e.g., the 1922 Report on "The Fish Towns in the Rio del Rey Area", Reply of
Cameroon, Ann. 3, para. 6), as did the Governorof the Nigerian Protectorate himself in a letter of
1936(Counter-Memorialof Nigeria, Vol. VII,Ann. NC-M 133). 36. Even more clear and authoritative, is Britishlegislativepractice. The Northern Region,
WesternRegion and EasternRegion(Definition of Boundaries) Proclamation 1954 t, which later
Orders in Council referred, provides concerning the boundary betweenthe Eastern Region of
Nigeriaand Southern Cameroonsthat, "From thesea the boundary followsthe navigable channel
of the River Akpa-Yafe" (Memorialof Cameroon, Anns. 201and 202 and CR200214, pp. 31
etseq.). Thispositionis confirmedbythe evidenceof officialBritish mapsof the period presented
to the supewisory organs(see, e.g.,Memorialof Cameroon, Ann.383,maps36,38, 41, 43, 45 and
46); theCourt will recallthe presentationby Professor Cot (CR200214,pp. 58 etseq.).
37. To al1of this, Nigeria's reactionis dismissive. Counsel Statesbaldly: "AI1Britain's
actionsin the Mandate and Trusteeshipperiods which assumedthe alienationof Bakassi fkomthe
Protectorate or which might be construed as having that result were tainted in that way."
(CR200218,p. 64; emphasis in original)- that is, Britain lacks capacity. Simplyignore al1
relevant practice and repeat the mantra. It is, of course, curious thatNigeria, while relying so
heavilyin generalon claimed effectivitéand historical consolidation, shouso dismissal1of these
effectivités bthe legitimate administering power.
38. There isjust one furtherpoint before 1turn to the plebisciteprocess. On three separate
occasions,two of Nigeria's counsel have returnedto an old tune. In the first case,it was stated
that: "After the First World War the whole of the mandated territory ofthe British Cameroons
came to be administered as part of the Nigeria Protectorate" (CR 200218,p. 64). In the second
instance, until 1960"Bakassi was administered from and as part of Nigeria" (ibid., p.66). In the
third case, counsel notedas one of the elements ofhistorical consolidation, "The administratiof
Bakassias part of Nigeria in theperiod 1913 to the date of independence." (CR200219,p. 52.)
We really thought we had seen the end of this particular spurious claim. The key British
Cameroons Order in Council 1923 provided for the administration of the Northem British
*
Cameroons "as if it formed part of' the Northern Provinceof Nigeria; the Southem British
Cameroons"as if it formed part of' the Southern Province of Nigeria (Memorial oC fameroon,
Ann. 130). Not "as part of', but "as if it formedpart of'. Andinhese words"as if itformedpart"
lies a whole legal world. This critical provision was repeated to the League of Nations (ibid.,
Ann. 144) and the same situation continued throughthe trusteeship period. The insinuationbycounselthat the administration of Bakassias part of Nigeria during the mandate and trust period
was part of the process of the historical consolidation oftitle (CR200219,p. 52)is legally totally
wrong.
The plebiscite periodand independence
39. The plebiscite process leadingto independence is critical, for it marks the active
The British Cameroons achieved
intervention of the UnitedNations in a binding capacity.
self-determinationunder the active supervisionof the United Nationsand as a direct consequence
of a General Assembly resolution defined by this Coura ts having "definitive legal effect"
(Northern Cameroons,I.C.J. Reports 1963,p. 32).
40. Counsel for Nigeria Statesthat the evidence does not support the assertion that the
plebiscite relatingto the Southem Cameroons encompassed Bakass(iCR 200219,p. 43). It is also
declared that there isno documentary evidence indicating that the population of Bakassi tookpart
in the plebiscite. Butsince the United Nations PlebisciteCommissioner'sReport 1961 provided
the voting details by voting district and since Bakassi was notan identified voting district, but
simply part of bigger units, it is not possible to produce now such figures. One is left with an
aggregated figure forthe districtsin question. But as the annexedmap clearly shows the relevant
districts included Bakassi, andso the problem assumes little significance [projectUnited Nations
plebiscite reportmap,judges' folder,tab 1271.
41. A wordneeds to be said about the map. Counsel for Nigeria pointsto the usual United
Nations disclaimernoting thatno officia1endorsement ofthe boundaries shownon the mapshould
be implied(CR200219,p. 44). Thatis correctas far asit goes,but the importanceof the map is not
as showing international boundariesas such,but as showingthe territorial framework within which
the United Nations supervised plebiscitestook place, a process that was approved in
resolution1608 which had "definitive legal effect" and for whichNigeria voted and which was
reaffirmed by Nigeriain itsAgreement of 29May 1961withthe United Kingdom.
42. The question of United Nations maps was addressedby the Tribunal in the
Eritrea/Yemencase (Phase 1). The Tribunal noted, in relation to a UnitedNations map of 1950
that: "Whether themap was attachedto the reportofthe United NationsCommission
for Eritreaas an officia1commission map,or as a compromise - or even as a merely
illustrativemap- seemsbesidethe point. Whatit bearswitnessto is that it wasused
and circulated- and received no objection. No protest was recorded in 1950or at
any latertime, andEthiopia itselfvoted in favour ofthereport with full knowledgeof
themap." (Para.378).
And the Tribunal drew conclusions fromthis (para.379). Unlike theEritrea/Yemencase, Nigeria
to Our knowledge at least has not contested the accuracy,provenance or authenticity ofthe
plebiscite map. The importance of this map is that it records the details of the plebiscite
arrangements,in terms of the divisionand identityof votingdistrictsand thus providesa definitive
analysisofthe territorialframeworkforthe conductof the United Nations supervised operation.
43. Letus look furtherat the map. We can see that Bakassi isincluded, in the main, within
Victoria South West voting districtbut also partly withinthe Kumba district, and you can see on
this map thatArchibong is clearlyidentified- Archibong,atown referredto on severaloccasions
as being part of Bakassi and Nigeria(e.g.,CR 2002/11,p. 60). So we dohave someexplicitproof
as to placenames. Further,the SouthemCameroons(Constitution)Order in Council Proclamation
of Constituencies 196 1, specifies that Archibong falls within specifically the Kumba area and
you canseethat atjudges' folder,tab 128[end projectionof map].
44. Toconclude: Nigeriahangs al1onthe one thread, thethread ofthe 1884Treaty. Butthat
thread cannot sustain these claims. The Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar did not possess
international legal personality and international territorial sovereignty.The terms of the Treaty
show that virtually al1meaningful control passedto Britain. The institution andpractice of the
colonialprotectorate entailedtheextemalsovereigntyof the colonial power, including the powerto
cede territory. The 1913Treaty with Germany validly passedtitle to Bakassi to Germany. The
establishment of the mandate and the trusteeship froze the existing international boundaries,
includingthe 19 13lineinBakassi. TheUnitedNationssupervisedplebiscitein 1961demonstrated
that Bakassi fell clearly within Southern Cameroons. The plebiscite process was affirmed by
resolution 1608, whichterminatedthe trusteeship. Nigeria through al1its dealingswith the British
authorities and the Cameroons territory was fully engaged in this independence process and
acceptedit by voting in favour of resolution 1608and by formallyendorsingit in the agreementof
29 May 196 1 (CR 2002/1, pp. 61 erseq.). It continued, as we shall see, to recognise BakassiasCameroonianafter independence. The thread snaps. In truth, it never really existed. And now it
asksyouinessenceandinpart tojudicially reviewthe acts of internationalorganizations.
45. 1finally retum to the map [projectUnited Nations plebiscitemap]. Mr.President and
Members of the Court, this represents the territorial contextof the plebiscite process. It proves
Bakassi waswithin the SouthemCameroonswhichjoined theRepublicof Cameroon. It is the map
of the colonial heritage. It is the photographoferritorial title of whichthe Charnberspoke in the
Burkina Faso/Republicof Mali case(I.C.J.Reports 1986,p. 568). Thatis the utipossidetis picture
at independence showingthat Cameroon had titleto Bakassi.
1 thank the Court for its kind attentionand would be grateful, Mr. President, if Professor
Mendelsoncouldnow becalled.
The PRESIDENT: Thankyouverymuch,ProfessorMalcolm Shaw.Je donne maintenant la
parole auprofesseurMaurice Mendelson.
Mr.MENDELSON: Merci,Monsieurleprésident.
V.BAKASSI
Thesituationsince 1961
1. Introduction
1.Mr. President,Members of the Court, itis my task during this round of oral argumentto
deal with matters conceming the Bakassi Peninsula followingthe integration of the Southem
Cameroons,includingthe peninsula,intotheRepublicof Cameroonin 1961.
2. The Nigerian oral argumentsof the last few days on this subjecthave been a mixture of
the startlinglynew andthe depressinglydéjà vu. Both, alas,were equallydevoid of any substance.
Let us beginwith thestartlingly new.
2. ''Theshockof the new": the population ofBakassi
3. In her oral argument, Mrs. Andem-Ewa toldus' how rich are the Bakassi waters in
plankton andaquatic life, and that the population largely liveson fishing. We were later told by
'CR 200218p.29,para. 5.my fiiend Professor Brownliethat the populationof the peninsula numberssome 156,000~.This
was not a slip of the tongue, since he and various other speakersused eitherthis figure of "more
than 150,000". Professor Pellet has touched on this surpnsing assertion in his introductory
remarks, but the matterbearscloserexaminationhere.
4. In paragraph 3.25ofthe Counter-Memorialof Nigeria ofMay 1999(that is, lessthanthree
years ago),we weretold that:
"Figures givenbythe NationalPopulation Commissionin Calabarstate thatthe
current populationofBakassiis estimatedto be in the regionof 37,500. This figureis
projected [my emphasis]fiom the last census, which was carried out by Nigeria in
1991."
"Projected"- that must meanto May 1999. In January 2001,just 18monthslater, the figurewas
already 100,000- it has gone up fiom 37,500 to 100,OO- according to the ~ejoinder~. And
today, a mere 13 months on, it is apparently 156,000. You are expectedto believe, it seems,
therefore, thatthepeople are even moreprolificthanthe fish,to have multipliedmore thanfourfold
in less than three years and by over 50per cent in the course of a year. These leaps to 156,000
today seem wholly implausible, and the Court will note that the figure is unsupported by any
evidence.
5. We were also told by counsel for Nigeriathat this is a "permanentpopulation'A.This is
again a surprisingtransformation, giventhat the population wasin the past always transient, being
governed not least by the weather,whichmade fishing in the rainy season impossible. Indeed,it
seems from Nigeria'sown evidencethat fishingwasnot only seasonal, but that itwas notthe same
people who came and fished every years. 1am refening to documentsin the Nigerian pleadings
themselves. Asone officia1put it:
"It cannot be too strongly emphasisedthat the inhabitants of these Fishing
Villages and settlements are a shifting population .. . The people have only one
purposewhenthey stayinthe Fishtownsandthat is to fishand to fishfast."6
Again,we aregivenno evidencefor theallegedstrikingchangeofbehaviour.
'CR 200219,p.45, para. 134.
'vol.1p. 166,para. 3.275.
4~~ 2002/8,p. 33, para.22.
'~ee, e.g., Counter-MernorialofNigeria, Ann. NC-M115,para.6; Ann.NC-M 117,p5.a.
6~nn.NC-M 12 1,para. 5. 6. And where is this huge permanent population to live? Accordingto counselfor ~i~eria~
"large areasof the peninsula areconduciveto habitation",large areas. How large, Mr. President?
For earlierin her speech,she told youthat "The vegetation in Bakassi isthick and dense,withthe
principal florabeing mangroves . .. Further inlandfiom the Coast,the mangrovesgiveway tovery
old and well-established rainforest." Indeeda , glance at plates 1 to 33 of the ~ounter-~emorial',
which areapparentlytakenfromthe self-servingNigerianvideothat youwere shownthe otherday,
confirmsthat impressionof dense vegetation. Hardly conducive to habitation,onemight think.
7. Of course, Cameroon does not claim that there is no dry land on Bakassi. Clearly, as
counsel forNigeria told you, thereis some, "severalmetres above sea levelV9,she said. But once
again, we have the objective reportsof British officials, deposited by Nigeria, who tell us, for
example,that
"The fishtowns .. .aremostly builton small stretchesof landappearingamong
the mangrove swamps. Water usually invades these stretches at high tide and some
timeseven enters the houses. The pervadingstenchof decayingfishrefuse, combined
withthat of the swamps, is tooterribleto des~ribe."'~
Indeed, paragraph 3.9 of the Counter-Mernorialadmits al1of this: it seems, however, thatin its
enthusiasmto inflateitscasebefore you, Nigeriahas now losteven remotecontactwiththe truth.
8. The fact is that by far thegreatest part,well over 90per cent,of the Bakassi Peninsula is
either too wet or too densely coveredby vegetation to be habitable, let alone pennanently
habitable. Once again, as so often in this case, 1 must acknowledge my debt to Nigeria for
providingevidence tocorroborateCameroon's claim. 1refer, for example,to the compositeaerial
photographsat tabs 6 to 8 of the atlasof the Counter-Memorial- 1will not take you to that now,
but 1shouldjust point out that the white patchesi,f you look,are not Settlementsbutclouds- and
1refer alsoto the Nigerianmap at tab 4 of theAnnex to the Counter-Memorial. And this is now
being projected, and for convenience can be found at tab 129 of your folders. Unfortunatelyon
your photocopies it is not very clearand it is not, 1 see, very clear on the projection but,on the
bottom leftof the legend, Membersof the Court,you will seethat there isa symbol third fiom the
'CR2002/8, p. 32, para. 19.
8~ol.XII.
9~~2002/11,p.63,para. 3.
'O~nn. C-M 114,para.XIV. SimilariyAnn. RC3, Vol. IV,p. 28,p7.a.bottomwhich says "mangrove", and that is what this is showing. It is showing virtually the whole
peninsula being covered by mangrove. Please bear in mind that further north this map does not
evenshow the dense rainforest which Mrs. Andem-Ewa toldus is to be found to the north, around
Akwa,for example.
9. So where indeed is this permanent populationto live? We were told that the total areaof
the peninsula is about 700 km2.Let us assume, probably far toogenerously, that 10per cent of it is
at al1 habitable, even temporarily. That makes 70km2to contain 156,000people. Simple
arithmetictells us that thisroduces a population densityof 2,229 inhabitantsper square kilometre.
Even the Netherlands, the most densely populated countryin Europe, has only 387.5 inhabitants
per square kilometre" - that is, only about one-sixth of the alleged permanent population of
Bakassi. How very surprising that it was only a few days ago, in this very courtroom, that the
world first leamed about a hitherto unknown Manhattan island on the west coast of Afiica [end
projection].
10.Mr. President, the factsspeakfor themselves. This is, 1am afraid, yet one more example
ofthetendency ofNigeria to inflate and fabricatethe facts to suit its case.
11. Before 1 leave the Nigerian video, which 1 mentioned and which is transparently
self-serving, a couple of other points should be made. Heavy reliance has been placed on the
Nigerian citizenshipof some of the inhabitantsof Bakassi, and- whichis not the same thing-
on the Nigerian ethnic affiliations of someothers (by no means all, by the way). Various counsel
for Cameroon have demonstratedwhy ties of citizenshipand ethnicity are irrelevantas a matter of
law and fact. In exchange for the self-serving Nigerian video,we would be pleased to offer Our
counterparts othervideos, taken by members ofthe Cameroonian delegation, whichshow similar
groups of happy Nigerians going about their daily lives in just the same way as on the video-
exceptthat there areno helmeted and life-jacketed soldiers to keep them in line, in Ourvideo. The
importance difference, though,is that these videos of Nigerians were taken in locations deep into
Cameroon, some ofthem even in francophoneareas. We have not bothered the Courtwith them.
"SourceS: tatistics Canada,www.statcan.calen~lish~Pedhi:Peo~lelPo .tu,8t3.20/d.emoO 12. The point is, Mr. President, thatas has already beens~bmitted'~,Carneroonhas long
given hospitalityto largenumbers ofNigerians andothers, without its ever havingbeen pretended
that this affectedits title to territory beforethe Nigerian claimsto the peninsula. And itisjust the
same in other partsof Africa. Thisis not just a legal or factual point, but a serioushuman one.
One would notlike to imaginethe humanconsequences ifStates in Africa and elsewhere thought
that the highest court in the world was telling them thatsovereign title can be jeopardized by
allowing foreignersto livewithin thehost State'sterritory,especiallyif closeto the frontier.
13. Itis of course true that Africa was carvedup by the colonial powers without always
paying much attentionto ethnic affinities. So, al1over Africaboundaries do divideethnic groups.
The leaders of the newly independent African Statesin the 1960sknew this very well. But they
also knew thatto try andtear up the colonial boundaries andrearrange thecontinent onethnic lines
would lead to endless warfare and chaos. And that is why they adopted the famous OAU
resolution enshrining the principle of uti possidetis, and which principle was so resoundingly
endorsedinthe BurkinaFaso/Republicof Mali case13,amongstothers. Nor, Mr. President,is this a
problemuniqueto Africa- important though theproblem is there. Today,throughoutthe world,
there are irredentistmovementswho would seek todestroy existingStateson thesevery groundsof
ethnicity. Cameroon hopes that this Court will treat such arguments with the disdain that they
deserve.
3. Nigeria's failureto engage, either adequatelyor in some cases at all, with Cameroon's
arguments
14. 1said at the outset of my presentationthat the Nigerian oralargument on sovereignty
over Bakassi,in the firstround, wasa combinationof the startlingly newand the déjàvu. So faras
concems the déjà vu,my friend and colleague Professor Pellethas already drawn attentionto Our
opponents' habitof simply repeatingin oral argument, andsometimes evenreading out,what they
had already said in writing, and of notengagingwith Ouroral arguments. This tendency is very
marked in theiroral submissionsonBakassi. Theinference tobe drawn is that Ourpointswerenot
answered - orwere notproperlyanswered- becausethey areunanswerable.
'2~.g.CR200214,pp.44-45, para. 20.
"I.c.J. Reports 1986,pp. 565-567,paras.20-26. 4. Nigerian acknowledgmentof Cameroon's title
15.1beginwith what 1shall loosely call, for convenience, "acknowledgmeno tf title", which
includes recognition and acquiescence and sometimes overlap wsith effectivités. It is, however,
logically prior to the question ofeffectivités. For even if there were, purely for the sake of
argument,any doubtabout Cameroon'stitle at the beginning of the post-plebiscite perioo dr atny
time thereafier, acknowledgment by Nigeriaof Cameroon'stitle would have resolved the matter
definitively in Cameroon's favour. This general proposition is not contested by Nigeria.
Nevertheless,it has ignored completely what we have submitted aboutsome of these instances that
we rely on, and has givena questionableor palpablyfalse account of others. Please allowme to
particularize.
(a) Nigeria'sdiplomatic NoteNo.570 of 1962
16. 1 refer, in the first place, to the Nigerian diplomatNote No. 570 of 27 March 1962,
which was dis~ussedby my friend Professor Thouveninin his oral argumenton 22 ~ebruaryl~.
(TheNote and accompanyingdiagramis alreadyin your folders,at tab 74, but 1need not take you
to it now.) Essentially,the point of the Nigeriandémarchewas that there was a small overlap of
offshore petroleum exploration zones to the south and south-westof Bakassi, which the Nigerian
Ministerfor Foreign Affairswantedto sort out. The letter- the diplomaticNote- recognizedin
terms that zoneN, which was offshore Bakassi, "is now off shore the Cameroon Republic", to
which,he said, it had reverted. He added"As shownon the map, the boundary followsthe Akpa
Yaferiver, wherethere appearsto be no uncertainty,and out intothe Cross River estuary". A line
onthe sketch-map(tab 73-2)showedthis. ProfessorThouvenin, relying onthe Eastern Greenland
and Minquiers and Ecrehos cases in particular, submitted that this Note constituted a forma1
acknowledgmentand recognition by Nigeria of Cameroon's title.In my own argumenton the
same day'', 1 drew your attention to the fact thatno less an authority than Dr. Elias, then
Attorney-Generalof Nigeria, cited this Note,as well as other documents, and concluded "The
principleof good faithin international relations demandthat Nigeriashould not disavow herword
1CR 200215,pp. 27-29,paras14.-
"lbid ..25,para. 19.of honouras evidenced bythe note of 1962." The report of his letter is already in your bundles, at
tab 72. 1mention it because 1mustpoint out thatthere has beenno reply to this argument.
(b) The premise of the agreementson maritime delimitationand of the granting of
hydrocarbon licences
17.There has, on the other hand, been a response- of sorts- to Professor Thouvenin's
other points,which concerned theYaoundé,Kano and Maroua Agreementsof 1971to 1975onthe
delimitation of the waters to the west of the Bakassi Peninsula,up to- eventually- point G'~.
Essentially,Nigeria's responsehas been to denythat GeneralGowon had the constitutional rightto
bind Nigeria to these agreements,and my fi-iendand colleague Sir Ian Sinclair will be dealing with
this matterin his oralargumenttomorrow. 1donot want to anticipatewhat he is going to Sayabout
the binding force of these treaties, but 1shouldjust like to make two points in the present context.
The firstisthat, quiteaside fiom their status asbinding treaties,these instruments reveal onceagain
the premise of both sides, which was that Bakassi belonged to Cameroon, irrespective of their
treaty status- it was the premise. The whole course of conduct ofthe two Parties in thismatter
was predicated upon thatvery fact. In the Land, Maritimeand Frontier Dispute case the Chamber
of this Court held to be "decisive" the fact that "the negotiations were conducted on the basis,
acceptedby both sides, that it wasthe boundary between theejidos of Citala and Ocotepeque that
defined the frontier", even though this was at a time whenboth parties were in dispute about their
boundary, and no admission had been made by ond duras" The present case is afortiori, since
there was no dispute at the time between the Parties and, as we havejust seen, there had already
been Nigerian admissions.
18. As well as the treaties of 1971 to 1975, there was also a long-standing practice by
Cameroon of granting hydrocarbon licencesover the Bakassi Peninsula itself and its offshore,
without protest fiom Nigeria, to which 1drew attention on 21 ~ebruar~". Once again, the premise
was thatthe peninsula belonged to Cameroon. On 6 March, in attempting to deal with this serious
problem, my learnedfiiend Professor Crawfordtold the Court that the two issues- sovereignty
I61bid, p29-33, paras. 15-35.
"1c.J.Reports 1992,. 405, para.72.
"CR 200214, pp.46-4p,ara.24. over the land and sovereignty and similar rights over the adjacent territorial sea and a little
beyond- were regarded by the two States as entirely separate and unrelated, that these issues
wereso treated by virtue of atacit agreement whichhe had to invent for the occa~ion'~.He told the
Court"The conductof the Parties is incomprehensibleexcept on the basis thatthe two issues were
considered as separate." Mr. President, it is the thesis of Professor Crawford that is
"incomprehensible". Itis inconceivablethat Nigeria, which had shown itself so careful to protect
its legal rights see, for example, the DiplomaticNote of 1962- that Nigeria wouldhave failed
to Saysomething about its alleged sovereignty over theland which controlledthe relevant sea areas
duringthe lengthy period when Cameroonwas granting licences,or duringthe period fiom 1970to
1975when the two States were concluding agreementsand negotiating abouttheir delimitation of
the offshore waters. One sympathizeswith the impossible task of counsel in having to try and
squarethe circlebut, withrespect, thisreally willnot do.
(c) Consularandambassadorialvisits
19. The next set of acknowledgments, and so on, relates to the visits and arrangements for
visits by Niperian consular andambassadorial staffto the peninsula, as well as to other places in
Cameroon, on various occasions between 1969 and the mid-1980s20. Nigeria had contented itself,
in its written pleadings,withan irrelevantquery as to whether the ambassadorial visitactually took
place, and a denial that consulshad the right or power to grant recognition of sovereignty over the
territory. In oral argument, 1pointed out that that was not the issue. Again there has been no
response from Nigeria. Mr.President, 1will not burden the Court by recitingover again the facts
referred to in Cameroon's first round, but 1wouldjust like to remind you very briefly of some of
the conclusions which we said could be drawn fiom this history. First, asking for Cameroonian
permission and CO-operation,and thanking Cameroon after the event, constitutedthe clearest
possible acknowledgment of Cameroon's sovereignty and effective control over the areas in
question, including Bakassi. Secondly,on more than one occasion, the Nigerian Consul-General
toldhis countrymen in Bakassithat they were living onCameroonian soi1and should obey its laws:
19CR2002112, pp.61-64paras.13-19.
''CR 200215,pp.20-24paras.9-16.again, a clear acknowledgment. Thirdly,consuls and ambassadors do not make officia1visits to
their own country. Fourthly, whilstconsuls issue passports to their own nationals in foreign
countries, they do not do so in their own country. Fifthly, thefact that Nigerian fishermen in
Bakassi needed passports is at least highly suggestive of the factthat they were not in Nigerian
territory. And, sixthly, themany Nigerian officials involved in these activities couldhardly have
arranged and made the visits, or obtained and issued the passports, without the knowledge and
assistance of their govemment. What al1of this arnounts to, therefore, is both express and tacit
recognition by Nigeria of Cameroon'stitle to Bakassi, and we respectfully request the Court to
drawthat conclusion.
(d) The Eliasletter
20. On the same day, you were shown the famous Elias letter- tab 72 in your folders*'.
This document has been before the Court ever. since the Memorial was deposited, and its
authenticityhas never been questionedby Nigeria. In view of thestanding of its author, and of the
factthat it is evidence against interest,so to speak, it is of the greatest significance and speaks for
itselfwith the greatesteloquence.
(e) The opinionsofthe NigerianMinistry of Justice, 1985-1986
21. If 1now cite another similar but later letter, it may seem that 1 am "gilding the lily".
However, it is of great importancefor reasons which will become apparent. The document in
questionis Annex 275to the Memorialof ~ameroon". Becausethe original photocopyis long and
difficultto read, you will find in yourfolders, at tab 130, certain extracts to which Sir Ian Sinclair
and 1will make reference. 1should emphasize thatthis documenttoo has been with theCourt since
the depositof the Memorial.
22. What you now have, then, are extracts fiom a letter fiom Mr. K.B. Olukolu, of the
Nigerian Ministry of Justice, dated 6June 1985. It appears from it that the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, who headed the "Special Task Force on Chad and Cameroon"- ominous sounding
name - had asked for forma1 advice on the "present maritime and territorial boundary" with
''lbipdp.24-25, paras. 17-20.
22~ol.VI, p. 2291,andAnOC 34 Cameroon, andthis was the advice. It is also to be noted incidentally that Dr.Geoffiey Marston,
who is a member of the present Nigerian team, had apparently been asked for his views. The
document is a long and fascinating one, which repayscareful study, b1tshalljust highlightsome
of the key passages, especiallythose that state conclusions, rather than the full reasoning. May I
first take you toparagraph 7? After reviewing a whole series of legal arguments, many ofwhich
latertumed up in Nigeria'spleadingsinthe current proceedings,Mr. Olukolu says,at the bottom of
the first page ofthis extract: "It is a futile attempt to contend at this stage that Bakassi Peninsulais
part of Nigerian territory." Over the page, which is double-sided, hegoes on to rely on various
further arguments, such as the fact that the United Nations Secretary-General had himself
confirmed that Bakassi was within the area covered by the Southem Cameroons plebiscite. He
dismisses as immaterial arguments based on the fact that many Nigerian citizens inhabit the
peninsula. He expressly rejects arguments that were later presented to you as evidence of
eflectivités,such as registration and voting in Nigerian elections,payment of taxes to Nigeria and
the fact that certainBakassi villages were includedin aNigerianensus. This is al1in paragraphs 7
and 8, where he also Statesin terms, at thebottom of page 2 of the extract, andthe top of page 3,
that Cameroon has been exercising administrative authority there, and that the peninsula has not
been abandoned by Cameroon and is not terra nulliuIs n.paragraph 10, on page 3, he goes on,
presciently as it tumed out: "Except we are prepared to use force (and that has its attendant
consequences) 1 cannot see how Nigeria can validly now lay claim on Bakassi Peninsula", and
encourages negotiations with Cameroon. In paragraph 11 he concludes - the grammaticalerrors
are in the letter- "There is ovenvhelming legal documentsand conducts [sic] passive or active on
the part of Nigeriawhich willmake Nigeriato be estopped from denying that Bakassi Peninsulais
Cameroon's territory." He then goes on to consider the maritime boundary. 1 do not want to
trespass on thewaters of my colleagues, soto speak, butmay Ijust draw your attentionfornow to
paragraph 18, in which, after examining al1 possible legal arguments, intemational and
constitutional, by which the Yaoundéand Maroua agreements could be repudiated, he finds al1
such arguments and objections, and consequently the proposed rejectionof the Maroua agreement,
to be without any legal foundation. 23. A brave and honest man, Mr.Presidentand Membersof the Court, whose sage advice
shouldhavebeen heededby Nigeria. Butas wellas the fact thatit reiterates and bringsup to date,
soto speak, theopinion of Attorney-General Elias,the documentalso has another significancefor
us. It provesthat the Nigerian Govemmenthad long had designson the peninsula, and was now
contemplatingthe use of force. If 1cantake you back to the top of the first page, in paragraph 2,
Mr. Olukolusays that therehave been severalprevious legalopinionsgiven by his Ministry on the
matter,the lastbeing inAugust 1977. Andinparagraph 10,as1have alreadymentioned,there is a
hint that the use of force isbeing considered. It seems clear fromthis that the campaignto annex
Bakassi was already under way, or at least under consideration. My fi-iendProfessorTomuschat
will demonstratethis furtherin a few minutes.
24. A similar report, dated 6June 1986, by the Legal Adviser of the Federation and
Secretary-Generalof the Ministry of Justicein Lagos, whichhas unfortunately been found onlyin
its Frenchtranslation,formsAnnex279to the ~emorial*~. Though less elaborate, it is to exactly
the same effectas Mr. Olukolu's,and incidentallyDr. Marston,whose concurrence is noted, will
be pleasedtohear thathe isthere descrîbedas an"intemationallyrenowned Nigerianexpert".
25. Mr.President,thesereports seemto Sayit all. And evenif we did not havethem, any -
1repeat any - of the otheracts of recognitionandacknowledgmentof Cameroon'stitleto which1
have referred would be sufficient to destroy completelyany shadow of a claim to Nigeria's
sovereignty. But before 1leave this subject, there isone moreimportantform of acknowledgment
to which 1mustrefer- andit will onlytake acoupleof minutes- and which ismap evidence.
UI) Mapevidence
26. If 1may Sayso, counsel for Nigeria's re~~onse*t~ o the very compelling map evidence
produced by my friend Professor ~ot*~was woefully inadequate. Our opponent's main criticism
seems to be that the mapswere small-scale. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the scale was
certainly big enough for everybodyin this courtroomto see that the maps put Bakassiclearly on
the Cameroonian side of theline. Afurther argumentof Ouropponentwas that "none of the maps
2'/bip d2335.
2 4 ~200219,pp.47-49,paras.143-153.
2 S ~200214, pp.53-63.was prepared by experts concerned with highly localized and specialized issuesof sovereignty".
Decoded, this means that none of those officials whodrew up the maps, including officials in
Nigeria before and after independence, were expectingso far-fetcheda claim to sovereignty and
had not yet been instmcted to manufacture evidencein support of one. Officialmaps are officia1
maps. Ratione temporis,Nigeria tries,as usual, to have it both ways,or perhaps three ways, this
time. It relies on threeof its ownmaps from 1990, 1991,and 1992; but it rejectstwo earlier maps
dated 1989 and even 1976 as "of a late date and self-serving". Butthen again, counsel told you,
"Three of the maps relied upon by Cameroon aremaps at or soon after the independenceof
Nigeria .. .;in otherwords,veryearlyinthe post-independence phaseof historical consolidation."
As a whole, then, Nigeria seemsto be saying the mapsfrom the early 1990swhich suitthem are
fine, other maps aretoo late eventhough they were published earliearnd othermaps again aretoo
early. Mr. President,how manyways doesNigeria wantto have it? To completethis very brief
surveyof Nigeria's argumentonmaps, one cannot helpbut admire my learned friend'ssan&oid in
relying on administrative map No. 10 of Nigeria, publishedby the Federal Survey in Lagos in
1990. He emphasizedthat this puts Bakassi on the Nigerianside of the line- which indeed it
does- whilst ignoring the fact that earlier editionsof the very same map- of the very same
map - put it ontheCameroonianside,as Professor Cotshowedyou. And this is a Nigerianset of
maps. Enough said,1think.
Mr. President,1have cometo a naturalbreakin my presentationand perhapsyou wouldcare
to considerthat, asinAstérix chezlesBretons,c'estl'heure de1'eauchaude.
Le PRESIDENT :Je vousremercie, Monsieur le professeur.La Cour va suspendrepour le
théoule cafépendantune dizainede minutes.
L'audience estsuspendue de16 h 35 à 16h 45.
Le PRESIDENT :Veuillezvous asseoir. Je vous prie tout d'abord d'excuserle retard avec
lequelnous reprenonsnos travaux, mais j'ai dû procéder àdes consultationspendant cette période
et,bienentendu, leCameroun disposera du temps nécessaire pour fin siers plaidoiriesce soir, selonle programmequi avait été prévu. Jedonne maintenantla parole au professeur Mendelson pour
qu'il poursuivresaplaidoirie.
Mr.MENDELSON: Merci, Monsieur le président.
27. Mr. President, in the light of the weaknessof Nigerian arguments based on nemo dut
quodnon habet and on the invalidityof boundary treaties, andin the light of al1the instances of
recognition and acknowledgment ofCameroon's title to which 1 have just eluded, in our
submissionthe whole question of effectivitéis irrelevant, purely academic.However,in view of
the huge effort that counsel for Nigeriaand their collaboratorshave evidently invested in this
subject, perhapsit would be discourteousnot to Sayat least something about them, evenif they
havenotreally dealtwith Ourownoral arguments.
5. Effectivités
28. On 1March my learned friendand opponent ProfessorBrownlie angrilyrejectedwhat he
consideredto be amischaracterization ofthe issues and of his casez6.Hesaid:
"Professor Mendelson payslittle or no attentionto historical consolidationof
title, which is the basisof Nigeria's claim, butrefers instead to the concept of
prescription, whichis generically distinct and hasnot been invokedby Nigeria. In his
[Mendelson's] opinion, if Nigeria had invoked prescription, thw isould have
eliminated manyof Nigeria's effectivités.But this assertionis unfounded and in any
event Nigeriahas not relied upon prescription. Counsel for Camerooc nannot expect
toreinventNigeria'scasein orderto attackit."
Fine words, butletus see what theyarnountto.
29. A few moments earlier,my leamed friend claimedthe benefit of a concessionwhich had
not infact beenmade. He asked the Courtto note that 1concededthat Nigeriahad more effectivités
thanCameroon. Thatwas not,in fact,so. 1 simply conceded thatNigeria had, as it were,taken up
more pages in listing itsfectivitébut 1question their legal forceof relevancefor reasonswhich 1
will comeback to. But now we will makehim not one, buttwo concessions- so longas he does
not tryto distortwhat we said again. 1do not thinkthat they willhelp him, but he is welcome to
makeofthemwhathe can.
2 6 200219,p.68,para250. 30. The firstconcessionis this: if Nigeria's other assertions areright, andif it didhave title
in 1961,then - unless Nigeria recognized, acknowledgedo ,r othenviseacquiesced inCameroon's
title- then we would be talkingabout somethingthat, so far as Nigeria is concerned, wouldbe a
confirmation of itstitle and not prescription. Of coursethis is not really a new concession: ithas
been explicit or implicit inOurapproachal1along. 1donot think, in fact, it will help Nigeria, for
two reasons. Firstof all, it as acknowledgedCameroon'stitle, explicitlyand implicitly, aswe have
seen. And secondly,we submit that Nigeria is extraordinarily far fiom being ableto establishthat,
immediately after the piebiscite, it held legal title to the peninsula, or even that the titlewas
uncertain. If the Court were to consider us wrong on both of these points- and it has to be
both- then we are indeed in a situation where Nigeriacan meaningfully invoke itseffectivités.
But if not, not.
31. Our second, related, "concession"is this. Whatis sauce forthe goose is saucefor the
gander. If the contentions of Nigeria abouthaving title in 1961 are right, and if Nigeria never
acknowledged Cameroon's title, then this time it would be on Cameroon that thelaw of
prescription wouldweigh, including rules regardingthe heavyburdenof proof. This must beright
in law and it has always been Ourposition: itis just that, on the facts, we do not think that this
helpsNigeria.
32. Mr. President, Cameroonhas seriously tried to engage with Nigeria's claim to historic
consolidation of title. It has tried to avoid a dialogue of the deaf, where each side simply shouts
that it has the title andis effectively consolidating. Ywillseethat, in my ownspeech, 1carefully
analysed- 1hope fairly- what appears to be Nigeria's case in the Rejoinder,and said in what
respects wedisagreed. 1refer, forexample,to the verbatim recordof the hearing of 21February,in
which a seriousattemptwas madeto analysethe overlappingstrandsof Nigeria'sargument; there
is a deliberatevagueness and blurriness about some of them27. But in grappling with Nigeria's
arguments,we wereneither obligedto acceptthe tendentious legal frameworkin which it setthem,
nor its account and interpretationof the facts. Once again,we did notjust generically denythe
fiamework, the facts and the interpretation given, but explained how and why we differed.
2 7 ~200214,pp.35-53,espatpp.36-40and 50-53.Cameroon'saccount of itsown effectivités was briefly given, by way ofresponse to whatwas said
in the Rejoinder. But Nigeria's counsel did not engage with the oral argument, choosing instead
simply torepeat,and oftento read out,Nigeria'searlier written pleadings. It is not Cameroon who
is responsiblefor this dialogue of the deaf, and itwishes to emphasize that it does not accept an
account and characterizationof its administrationof the peninsula which is grossly inaccurate and
hasalready beenrefuted.
33. Having analysedNigeria's claims thatthe sovereignty of theKings and Chiefsof Old
Calabar overBakassi bothexisted and survived until independence, and the further argument that
the United Kingdomhad administered Bakassiin nght ofNigeria, and not in right ofthe Southem
Cameroons, 1went on to deal with the third basisof Nigeria's claim, quoting directly from the
Rejoinder, which said that it was "To provide, if this were to prove legally necessary, an
independentsource of titlebased onthe processof peaceful possession,acquiescence, and historic
consolidation in the period since ~nde~endence."~~In his oral argument, ProfessorBrownlie
attached particular importanceto the post-independenceperiod29. It is to the characterizationof
this third claimas being, albeitsotto voce,one of prescription,that exceptionhas beentaken. But
ifNigeria wereto fail oneither of its first two submission- which we claim it must - then it is
the adversepossessorandthe law whichappliesto it isthe lawof prescription.
34. Let us clariij matters. In the first place, Nigeriadoes not claim that the peninsula is
terra nulli~s~~.That much,at least, is commonground. Butmy leamed friend goeson to Saythat
"The legal situation appearsto the respondent State to be in certain respects similar to that
obtaining in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case." We are not told exactly in what respects it is
similar, but presumablythereforenot identical. But in any case, Mr.President, thisis yet another
exampleofNigeria's tryingto cover itselfal1ways, and thetwo cases are actually verydissimilar.
In the 1953case,the rootof title was lost in the mists of history,with assertionsthat thetitle went
back as far as the Norman conquest of England in 1066, and both parties putting fonvard
arguments about mediaevalfeudal law which the Court characterized as "more or less uncertain
2 8 200214,pp.38-39 para..
2 9 200219,p.19,para.8.
''CR 200219,p. 50,para. 157. and contr~versial"~'. It therefore felt it appropriate to examine acts relating to actual possession,
and not simply to decide the case on the basis of who had originaltitle. But that is very far fiom
the circumstances of the present case. In particular, there was a consistent andrelatively intensive
exercise of State authority by the United Kingdom over the peninsula in the 40 or so years
preceding the plebiscite. Wherethe Parties differ is as to the consequences of that exercise - we
differon who can count these effectivitésas Ourown. But that is the nub of the matter. And this,
incidentally alsodisposes of my learned friend's reliance on the reference to uncertainties in the
Land,Island andMaritime FrontierDisputecase; and in any case the passage he quoted relatesto
uncertainty as to the exact territorial expanseto which a sovereigntitle relates, which is not the
issue here32. Nigeria cannot really have it both ways: either it was the sovereign of Bakassi in
1961,or Cameroon was. There is no need to obscure the situation here by the introduction of a
wholly irrelevant tertiumquid.
35. That beingso, whatdoes this claimof "historical consolidation"amountto? The gameis
given away by my leamed fiiend in paragraph 162,when he says that "treaty-based titles can be
modified by means of historical consolidation". Carneroon stronglyrejects this assertion, for
reasons given by my fiiend Professor Cot this moming. But even leaving that aside, what
Professor Brownlie is talking about is plainly the establishment of title by adverse possession,
which has traditionally beenlabelled "acquisitive prescription". Admittedly, what matters are not
labels, but the particular circumstances. And admittedly, too, there can be times when the
expression "historic consolidation of title" can be a convenient way of describing the ratio
decidendi of cases like Minquiersand Ecrehos, or even perhaps a handy blanket term to cover a
series of different rules which cover different situations. But what we do not accept is the use to
which Nigeria has put the concept in the present case. And it is interesting to note that even
CharlesDe Visscher himself, in a passage quoted by my leamed fiiend, says that the notion of
consolidation encompasses, amongst otherthings, the case of adverse possession33. So where, on
the facts, one of theparties mustbe the adverse possessor,the lawapplicable to adverse possession
- - -
3'1.C.JReports1953,p. 56.
"CR 200219,pp. 51-52,para. 165.
j31bidp..,1,para. 160.applies, and that can conveniently be labelled for present purposes,as prescription. If 1might be
perrnitteda vulgarism, Mr. President, if it walks likea duck, quacks like a duck, and looks like a
duck, then 1prefer to Saythat it is a duck, whatever my leamed fiiend likes to cal1it. And no
amountof citationof academic supportfor the generalconcept of historical consolidation isgoing
to Save Nigeria from having its conduct judged by the standards which international law has
consistently applied- consistently applied- to adverse possessors.
36. Our opponents insist- have always insisted - that Nigeria is not the adverse possessor.
But it is certainly not unreasonable for Cameroonto canvass the hypothesis that it is, and to
examine the legal consequences flowing from this, especially when, as we have shown, the
hypothesiswe are canvassing is far from implausible. By the sametoken, it is not unreasonableof
us to expect Nigeriato dealwith it too.
37. So, after al1that fuss and bother aboutnames, we come back to where we started in the
first round: the applicationof the criteria imposed by international law to establish whether an
adverse possessorhas acquired good title - the lawrelating to prescription, if1may be permitted
to put it that way. These are the rules which we Say clearly have to apply if Nigeria fails to
establish its Calabar claim, so to speak, and fails to establish its claim to be the successor of the
British administratorsof Bakassi. As a matter of fact, even then the issue only arises if we fail to
makegood Ourclaimto acknowledgmentof title byNigeria.
38. In thefirstround, as 1have mentioned,it was submitted on behalf of Cameroonthat there
are five criteria that have to be satisfied before conductcan even quali@ as a potential effectivité,
for example the conduct has to be à titre de souverain. Nigeria hasnot questioned this list, nor
directly engagedwith the claim that many of its alleged effectivitéswould fa11foul of these tests.
Instead, counsel simply reiterated the listset out in Nigeria's written pleadings. It was of course
accepted by Cameroonthat not al1of the allegedNigeriq effectivitéswould fa11foul of these five
tests, and that there might quite possibly have been some acts done by Nigeria, on the peninsula,
concurrently with those performed by Cameroon. But 1 then went on to list three more criteria
which, it was submitted, would be fatalto Nigeria's claims. One was the need for absence of
protest. It was demonstrated that Cameroonhad protested against Nigerianincursions, an examplefrom 1969being given34.My learned friend's attempt to dismiss this by saying that "No reference
is made to the extent of the Cameroon is singularly unconvincing. Cameroon,seeing what
it considersto be the unlawful exercise of foreignauthority in one of its towns, protests about that
act. Nothing abnormal here.
39. A further requirement mentioned by Cameroon was that prescription by adverse
possession could not occur if the existing title holder was concurrently itself exercising
administrative control. A substantial part of my oral argument was devoted to showing that
Cameroonhad done so. In the firstplace, it wasshown that Cameroon could rely on the acts of its
predecessors in title, the British mandatory and trusteeship authorities and indeedermany. And
turning to the period after independence, it waspointed out that, although Cameroonhad not cited
many examples in its pleadings, there was enough there to rebut the suggestion that it had
And it
acquiesced in Nigerian sovereignty. That argumentwas not seriously addressed in reply.
will be recalled, Mr. President, thatamongst the other thingsthat Cameroon had done was that it
had been consistently granting hydrocarbon licences overthe peninsula and its offshore from as
early as 1963~~.And, as Nigeria itself adrnits, Cameroonian eflectivitésin the area gradually
increased overtime. They make a point of this- but not, as Ouropponents suggest, inorder to
"create facts7'- that is their speciality- but in the normal way that a newly independent State
gradually increases its control overits tenitory. This does not happen ovemight, especially
when- as in the special case ofCameroon- two different legal, linguistic and political systems
have to be integrated after independence.
40. As well as arguing that these eight criteria between them destroyed the whole of
Nigeria's list of eflectivités,we also made another important point. Relying on the farnous
pronouncement of the Chamber inthe El Salvador/Honduras case, which itselfencapsulates a long
line of authority, that where there is an existing title, preferencemust be given to the title holder,1
observed thatthis means that it is not sufficient for each party to pile up its eflectivitésin its pan of
the scales, so to speak: the lawrequires the Courtto tilt the balance heavily in favourof the title
34CR 200214,p. 50, para.34.
3 5 ~200219, p.21,para. 18.
36~bi pp. ,6-47,para. 2Seealsopp. 47-50,paras.25-34.holder. My learned fi-iend'sonly response to this was to suggest tha1was complaining about
being given too much work to do by ~i~eria~'. Even allowing for the rough-and-tumble of
advocacy, this is hardly a serious answer to a very senous Cameroonian objection to Nigeria's
claims.
6. Conclusion
41. Mr. President, Members of theCourt, Nigeria has failed to justify in law its repudiation
of thetreaty instrumentsthat confer andconfirm Cameroon7stitle over the Bakassi Peninsula. It
has also recognized and acknowledgedthat title on numerous occasions. That being so, the
questionof its alleged historical consolidationof title and eflectivitésdoes not even arise. But even
if, purely for the sake of argument, it did arise, Nigeria has failed to establish that the Kings and
Chiefsof Old Calabar had effective controlover the peninsula andthat that sovereignty continued
until independence; it has failedto establish that the United Kingdom administered thepeninsula
in right of Nigeria, as opposed to Southern Cameroons, and finally, it has failed to establish a
prescriptive title, or any otherkind of title however youl1it, after independence. What it has
beentrying to consolidate is a house of cards.
42. Thankyou for yourkind attention. May1ask you, Mr. President, kindlyto give the floor
tomyfriend andcolleague, ProfessorTomuschat.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Je donne maintenant la parole au professeur
ChristianTomuschat.
M. TOMUSCHAT :Merci, Monsieurle président.
VI. RESPONSABILITÉ
Monsieur le président,MadameetMessieurs de la Cour,
1. 11m'incombe de répondreaux arguments du Nigéria qui acherché à établirlors des
plaidoiries de vendredi dernierque sa responsabilité n'estpas engagée. Maisc'est unetentative qui
a échoué, commjee le montrerai par la suite. La responsabilitédu Nigéria résulte principalement
de son invasion de la péninsulede Bakassi et d'un large secteur de territoire camerounaisdans la
37~bipdp.,7-68. régiondu lac Tchad ainsique deson non-respectdes mesuresconservatoiresindiquéespar la Cour
le 15 mars 1996. Afin de ne laisser planeraucune équivoque,il convient de remarquer dès à
présent que les deuxgrandes opérationsannexionnistes entreprisespar le Nigéria ontété
accompagnéesou suivies de nombreux incidents d'usage ill6gal de la force que le Cameroun
considèrecomme faisant partiede ces deux grands blocs. Ces incidents ne peuvent avoir une
existence séparéeou autonome, étant donnéqu'ils constituent les conséquences directed se
l'ambitionmalheureusedu Nigériade s'emparertant de la péninsulede Bakassi qued'une grande
partie duterritoire camerounaisdu lacTchad. Le Cameroun s'estdéjà prononcé abondammentsur
cette question(CR200217,p. 37-39,par. 9-16). Il n'y reviendra plus.
2. Le Cameroun reconnaît donc ouvertement que, pour lulie, centre de gravitédu différend
résidedans l'extrémité nord ainsi que l'extrémitsud de la lignequi sépareles deux Etats sans
séparerles peuples, quiont toujours vécu amicalement côteà côte, malgréles tensionsqui ont pu
se développersur leplan des relations intergouvernementales.Dans sajeune histoire,le Cameroun
a fait un effort délibépour créerune bonne entente entre sespopulations et celles du Nigéria.
C'est ainsi, surtout, qu'il a accueillides millionsde Nigérians quiaujourd'huivivent paisiblement
sur son territoire, mais dont il attend évidemmentqu'ils respectent la loi camerounaise.
Malheureusement, le Nigériaa interprété cette générosité du Cameroun comme une faiblesse.
D'où des actions inconsidérées, attentatoiràsla souverainetécamerounaise, qui finalement ont
abouti àdes opérations militairqui cherchentà arracherau Cameroundes centainesde kilomètres
carrés.
3. Le Nigéria acritiquélajonction des revendications territoriales du Cameroun avesces
demandesen réparationen insistantsur le faitqu'unetelle situationne s'étaitpas encoreprésentée
devant la Cour (CR2002114, p.47, par.4; p.48, par. 6, 8). Mais cette jonction ne suit que les
règles de la logiquejuridique. Ce que le Cameroun chercheavant tout à atteindre, c'est la
libérationde son territoire national, conséqueeui selon lerégimede la responsabilité découlera
automatiquement du constat par la Cour que les zones en questionont étéoccupées de façon
illicite, conséquence toutefoisqui devra être dite explicitemtar la Cour pour que lamise en
Œuvredeson arrên te soulèvepasde nouveaux problèmes d'incompréhensiodne lapart du Nigéria. 4. Monsieur le président, laissez-moivous le dire d'emblée : cette affaire n'est pas une
affaire de délimitationcomme les autres. Le Nigéria n'apas seulement contesté une frontière
conventionnelle établie,ce qui, aprèstout, étaitson droit. Il a aussi, et en toute connaissancede
cause, choisi d'envahir militairement les territoires qu'il revendiquait. Permettez-moi de vous
confierune chose, Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs lesjuges. Si le Nigérian'avaitpas
envahi militairement Bakassi en 1993, alors mêmeque des négociations étaient en coura svec le
Cameroun, la question de la responsabilitén'aurait jamais étéportéedevant la Cour. Seulement,
les autorités nigérianesont décidé d'ajoute r leurs prétentionsterritoriales l'usagede la force. Et
ce fait ne peut être restsans conséquence. Ce que le Cameroun demande, c'est tout simplement
que la Cour le constate et qu'elle exige avant tout que le Nigériacesse immédiatement son
occupation illicite. Aucun Etat ne peut, en toute impunité, tenterde réglerun différend, fût-il
territorial, par la force. Politiquement et moralement, les particularse cette affaire rendent donc
opportuneunejonction du territorial et dela responsabilité. Juridiquement, rienne s'y oppose.
5. Le fait qu'onne retrouve que peu ou pas d'hypothèses similairesdans le passé s'explique
très aisémentpar le caractère particulieret de la présente affaireet du système juridictionnel
international. Lorsquedeux parties concluent un accord pour soumettre un différend à la Cour,
elles le font presque toujours après avoirsurmonté quelqueshésitations. On va donc normalement
exclure du compromisles points les plus épineux,en se concentrant sur l'essentiel qui, dans le cas
des différendsterritoriaux, est l'appartenancede la zone contestéeà l'une ou l'autre des partiesen
litige. D'autre part, en ce qui concerne la clause facultativede l'article 36, paragraphe du Statut
de la Cour, beaucoup d'Etats ont pris l'habitude d'exclure de leur acceptation de la compétence de
la Cour ou bien tout acte se rapportant à un conflit militaire (ainsi, par exemple, la Grèce, le
Honduras, la Hongrie, l'Inde, le Kenya, le Malawi) ou bien la réparationqui est due en cas de
violation d'une obligation internationale (ainsi, par exemple, Chypre, la Guinée, le Libéria, le
Liechtenstein, Madagascar, le Malawi). On a qu'à lire l'Annuairede la Cour pour s'en convaincre.
Le Nigérian'a en revanche émisaucune réserve de ce type. Rienn'empêchedonc le Camerounde
mettre en cause sa responsabilité devant laCour. En fait, en l'absence de réservesun différend
peut êtrerésolu dans son intégralité sans qu'il faille a,près le prononcéde l'arrêtde la Cour, s'engager encore une fois dansde longues négociationsavec un partenaire ou adversaire parfois
difficile.
a) Les éléments constitutifd sela responsabilitéduNigéria
6. Tout le monde présentdans cette salleconnaît le contenu du projet d'articles produitpar la
Commission du droit internationalaprès de longues annéesde travail et achevél'annéedernière
sous la direction intellectuelledu professeur Crawford. Il n'est donc pas nécessaire d'expliquer
quoi que ce soit sur les origines et le contexte de ce projet. Ce qui importe dans l'espèce,c'est
l'application des règles définiepar la CD1aux faits en présence ici. Généralemeno t,n considère
que cette Œuvre de codification reflète le droit coutumier en vigueur et, concernant la première
partie du projet, la partie largementfaçonnéepar le juge Ago quand il était membrede la CDI, il
n'y a pratiquement pas de controverse. L'unanimité la plucsomplète règneen ce qui concerne les
articles sur lefondement de la responsabilité internationale.
7. Or, la Commission du droit international a préciséque ce sont deux élémentsdont la
présence conduit à la responsabilitéde 1'Etaten question. Tout d'abord, les actes en question
doivent être imputables ou attribuablesà cet Etat. Concernant les événementd sans la péninsulede
Bakassi et dans la région du lac Tchad,et également concernant les reprochesque le Cameroun fait
au Nigéria de n'avoir pas respecté l'ordonnanc dee la Cour du 15mars 1996,cette condition se
trouve évidemmentremplie. Bakassia été occupé militairement,et pareillement dans les zonesdu
lac Tchad le Nigéria adéployé d'importants éléments de ses forces arméeset de sa police. Il ne
reste qu'à montrer qu'ily a eu- et qu'il y atoujours- desviolations d'une ou de plusieurs règles
du droit international queleNigénaa commises au détrimentdu Cameroun.
8. Le Cameroun s'est prévalu à cet égarden premier lieu du principe du non-recours à la
force, inscrit l'article2, paragraphe4,de la ChartedesNations Unies. Il est clair que leNigériaa
gravement enfreint cette règle qui constitue le fondementdu droit international de l'époque
contemporaine. En fait, le Nigériase trouve dans l'impossibilitéd'arguer que le Cameroun a
I
procédé à des constructions ((fantaisistes)).Laprésence destroupes nigérianesdans les deux zones
est une réalité incontestable, réalièsamère pourle Cameroun. 9. Assez curieusement, pourtant,le professeur Abi-Saab, vendredi dernier, nous a fait part
d'unenouvelle théorie sur lasignificationet la portéedu principe de non-recoursa force. Selon
lui, leNigérian'a pas engagésa responsabilité,parce qu'il n'a jamais remisen cause leatu quo
territorialet que, sur le terrain, iln'a fait qu'administrerpaisiblementun temtoire qu'il croyaitle
sien (CR2002114,p. 21,par.18). LeprofesseurAbi-Saabvoit dans ces circonstancesunenouvelle
exception àl'interdictiondefranchirpar laforce unefrontièreintemationalementreconnue.
b) L'invasionet 1'occupationde lapéninsuledeBakassi
10. Il ne sera pourtant pas nécessairede s'engagerdans de grandes controversesthéoriques
sur la portée exactede l'interdictiondu recoursla forcepour réfuter cetteargumentation. Pour
quecela puisse êtreenvisagé, il faudrat'abordqueleNigéria démontre quesaprésence à Bakassi
a toujours étconsolidéeetpacifique.
1i. Mais, en vérité,le Nigéria n'a jamaisadministréla péninsulede Bakassi de façon
«paisible». Il s'y est introduit par la force.Evidemment, dans ses plaidoiries le Nigériaa
habilement tiré partidu fait que la partie sud-occidentale du Cameroun avait étéplacéesous
administrationbritannique tout d'abord commemandat de la Sociétédes Nations, et après 1945
commeterritoire sous tutelle. C'est ce qui explique que l'influence des populationsnigérianeset
de l'administrationnigériany a éténécessairement considérable .éanmoins,il est patentqu'avec
la fin du régimede tutelle et l'indépendancedes deux pays, la situation a changé. Le fait que
quelquesécoles financées par le Nigériaou des églisesnigérianes aientpu rester à Bakassi n'y
changeabsolumentrien. Il est touà faitnormal pourbeaucoup d'Etats de maintenir desécoles à
l'étrangerpour les enfants de leurs citoyens qui y résident. Or, le Camerounne nie point et n'a
jamais niéque Bakassi est en large partiehabitépar unepopulationnigériane-certainement pas
156000personnes, chiffre quifait pensàrdes villes commeAngers, Brest ouGrenobleen France
ou Blackpoolet Aberdeen au Royaume-Uniet qui seconciliemal avec la «measuredconsistency»
dont s'estvantél'agent du Nigériaen clôturant le premiertour de son équipe(CR 2002114,p. 65,
par.2).
12. Après ledépartde la puissance administrante,il était toutsimplementdifficile de mettre
enplace uneadministrationcamerounaise. Mon collègue MauriceMendelsonvientd'enparler il ya quelquesinstants. Le Camerounn'a pu le faire du jour aulendemain. Mais, dès l'année 1968,
tous les principaux services se trouvaient en étatde fonctionner. Le professeur Brownlie l'a
indirectement confirméen disant qu'en 1968 «there were acts of harassrnent by Cameroonian
soldiers))(CR 200219,p. 19, par.9; p. 27-28,par. 50-52; p. 30, par. 61). Il faut le souligner : à
cette époque,en 1968,iln'y avaitpasun seulposte militairenigérian àBakassi,ni un seulpostede
la police nigériane. On n'a qu'à lire les développementsque le professeur Brownlie a consacrés
aux prétendueseffectivitésnigérianesdans la péninsulede Bakassi. Dans un passage traitant du
systèmede l'ordre public,on ne trouve que des références au systèmetribal(CR 2002/9, p. 54-55,
par. 177-184)' qui fonctionne indépendammentdu système de 1'Etat et n'en affecte pas les
compétences. Cen'estqu'à partirde la secondemoitiédesannées 80 que leNigériaa commencé à
érigerune «têtede pont» à Jabane(répliquedu Cameroun, p. 517et suiv.). Finalement, c'est le
mois de décembre1993qui a vus'abattreles forces arméesnigérianessur la presqu'île deBakassi
dans le cadre d'une invasion bienplanifiéeetprogrammée.Le professeurBrownlie,bien qu'ilait
fait l'inventairecompletde la prétendue présence nigériane à Bakassi, n'a pas été capabldee faire
la démonstrationd'une présence militaire couvrant des secteursen dehors de Jabane avantla date
de l'invasion. C'étaientles autoritéscamerounaisesqui assumaientla responsabilité suprêmepour
l'ordre public. Elles le faisaient sans ignorer que la population étrangèredes Nigériansrestait
attachée àses autoritéstraditionnelles.
13.Il n'est pasnécessaireici de prouver que Bakassirevient de plein droità la souveraineté
camerounaise. Mes collèguesBruno Simma, Malcolm Shaw et Maurice Mendelson en ont déjà
présenté tous les éléments d feit et de droit pertinents. Je ne rappellerai que les points les plus
marquants :le traitéde 1913estuneconventioninternationalevalide exemptede vicesentachant sa
régularité;Bakassi a fait partduterritoireplacésous mandatet soustutelle; dansun avis de 1971,
le ministèrede lajustice nigériana conclu à la camerounitéde ~akassi~~;le Nigéria aconfirmé
l'appartenance de Bakassi au Cameroun notamment en vertu de l'accord de Maroua de 1975;
en 1981, le Nigéria a installéune Task Force mandatéepour réfléchir sur la manière dont on a
pourrait contournerla traitéde 1913pour s'approprierBakassi; en1985,on a encore fait produire
38 V. Bassey E. Ate, Nigeria and Camerou:,Bassey E. AtelBola A. Akinterinwa (eds.), Nigeria and its
ImmediateNeighbours. Constraints andProspectsofSub-RegionalSecurityin the 199(141).140un avis au ministère nigérian de lajustice spécifiquement pour cette TaskForce,dont l'auteur, un
certain M. K. B. Olukolu, est amvé a la conclusion que Bakassi était incontestablement
camerounais,commel'a souligné,il y a quelques minutes,mon collègue Maurice end el son '^.
est remarquable que dans ce document officieldu ministère de lajustice nigérianon fait
sérieusement allusion a la possibilité d'employer la forcpeour s'emparer de Bakassiau cas où il
résulterait quela contestationjuridique n'offrait pas dechancede succès40.Malheureusement,ce
n'était pas une initiative isolée. A la même époquel,e service des renseignements militaires
nigérian a également faiutne étudesur les moyens et méthodes appropriées pour acquérir Bakassi
pour le Nigéria,et éventuellement même par des moyens militaires. Mais l'auteur de cette étude
est (<sage». Selon ses recommandations,«le Nigéria n'aurait recours à la guerre qu'après avoir
épuisé toutes les ressources eptar né~essité))~'.
14. On se demande comment, dans de telles circonstances,les conseils du Nigériaont pu
prétendreque, en effet, Bakassi avait toujours été sousadministration nigériane. La masse des
preuves en faveur du Cameroun est telle qu'on ne peut pas naïvement invoquer le bénéficede
((honestbeliefandreasonablemistake)).Mais c'est cettenotion qui est devenue lejoker juridique
de la partie défenderesse, destiné à combler toutes les failles et lacunes de l'argumentation
nigériane. Pourtant,il s'est avéré extrêmement difficd ileetrouver une classification adéquatepour
cette notion dont l'origine et l'existence en droit international sont sue douteuses. Tels qu'ils
ont étéprésentés(,(honestbeliefandreasonablemistake))sont des enfants naturels, des apatrides
qui n'ont aucun droitde séjouracquis.
15. Dans un premier temps, on pourrait songer à les classer comme une indication de la
nécessité qu'une comparaison mécanique entlrae réalitéet le droit n'est pas suffisante pour
l'engagement dela responsabilité.Le seul fait pourun soldatde se trouveren territoireétrangerne
signifie certainement pas que l7Etat dont son unité relève ait commis une violation de la
souverainetéde 1'Etatterritorial. Le soldatpeut s'êtreégaré, et êmetoute une compagniepeut se
perdre dans unerégionmontagneuseou dans lajungle. Maisnous ne sommespas devantle casde
39Mémoire duCameroun,LivreVI,annexe275.
40Ibidp.oint 10.
4'Mémoiredu Cameroun, livreVI,annexe276, p.2313(2325).quelques soldats ou d'un aéronefqui, égarés et sans moyens de s'en rendrecompte, auraientpar
mégarde traversé une frontièreinternationale. Nous ne nous trouvons donc pas dans l'hypothèse
d'un «cas fortuit)),un temps envisagéepar la Commissiondu droit international (Annuairede la
Commissiondu droit international,1979,vol. II (deuxièmepartie),p. 135)mais finalementécartée
duprojet enraison des craintesémisesparplusieursEtats desdérivesquecela auraitpu entraîner4*.
16. En second lieu, on peut sans trop de peine constaterque ((honestbelief and reasonable
rnistake))ne sont certainement pas des ((circonstances excluantl'illicéité))au sens du projet
d'articles dela Commission du droit international,contrairement aux affirmations faites par le
Nigéria dans sa duplique(p. 579, par. 15.57). Il esttoàtfaiterroné de prétendrequela CD1n'ait
pas cherché à ((speclfyexhaustivelythecircurnstanceprecluding wrongftrlnessin relationto every
case that rnayoccur)). Pour elle, la listedes circonstancessusceptiblesd'exclure l'illievêtun
caractère exhaustif. Il y a des experts dans cette salle qui sont capables de confirmer cette
interprétation.
17.Il n'est donc pas étonnantque les écrituresdu Nigériaet sesplaidoiries orales montrent
un flottement générae ln ce qui concernele classement correctde ((honestbelief and reasonable
mistake)). Ses conseils ont déployédes efforts désespéré asfin de trouver une catégorie juridique
appropriéepour la notion, mais la vraie patrie n'a pas étrouvée. Ce qui étaitprésenté au début
comme un élémens t'apparentantau conceptde «faute»,rejetépar la CD1(voir contre-mémoire du
Nigéria,p. 638, par. 24.34)'s'est transformépar la suite en une circonstance excluant l'illicéité
pour finalement surgir dans la plaidoirie du professeur Abi-Saab comme une circonstance qui
permettrait de conclure qu'aucune atteinte n'a étéportée à la règle primairepertinente dansle
présent contexte,le principe du non-recours à la force (CR2002114, p.23, par. 27). Sir Arthur
s'est implicitementexprimédans lemême sens (CR2002114,p. 33, par. 35-36).
18. On peut tout de mêmeconcéderau Nigériaqu'il faut eneffet se poser la question de
savoir ce qui est l'élément constitutif d'une violation. Quand est-on en droit de parler d'une
violation du principe énoncéà l'article2, paragraphe4, de la Charte des Nations Unies,principe a
qui est sourced'obligationserga omnes ?
42Voir les observations desEtats dans Assemblée e, c. AiCN.41488,25 mars 1998, et le rapportfinal
de la Commissiondu droit international, Nations Unies,doc.Ai.56110. 19.Or, ce que le Nigériadit peut se résumeren deux mots. Il se croyait chez lui. Il avait
toujours étéprésent à Bakassi. II n'avait doncaucune raison de douter de la légitimitéde ses
actions. Toutefois, il est assezcurieuxdevouloir invoquerun manque de blameworthinessdansles
circonstancesde l'espèce. Le Nigéria connaissait toutes les circonstancesqui militaient en faveur
du Cameroun. Dans ses ministères, onse creusait la tête pour trouver une solution à un dilemme
auquel on ne pouvait échapper. On savait que le titre territorial revenaitau Cameroun. Et même
ceux qui ne partageaient peut-être pas la communis opinio devaient se dire que la situation était
hautementdélicate.LeNigéria,en endossantla thèsedel'invaliditédutraitéde 1913, savait à tout
le moinsqu'il pouvait se tromper. Toutes les apparencesétaienten faveur du Cameroun. Alors,
danscescirconstances,qu'est-ce quepouvait, qu'est-ce quedevait fairele Nigéria ?
20.Pour me renseignerun peu sur la common law, qui dans le présent contexte estsi chère
aux conseilsdu Nigéria,j'ai étudié deux manuelsélémentaires sur lalaw of torts. On y trouve des
recettestrès nettes,mais aussitrès simples,desrecettes qu'on peutappliquersans difficultéaucune
aux faits de l'espèce. C'estainsi qu'on peut lire dans laquinzième éditionde Pollock's Law of
Torts :
«the standard of du^)isfuced by reference to what we should expect in the like case
from a man of ordinary sense, knowledge, andprudence ...Ifa man will drive a car,
he is bound to have the ordinary competenceof a motorist, ifhe will handle aship, of
a seaman; ifhe will treat a wound, of a surgeon ...and so in every case that can be
put.»43
Je supposeque ce test, bien qu'il aitétédécrit ily a plus d'un demi-siècle,correspond toujours à
l'orientationgénérale de lajurisprudencebritannique. Or, quelle peut être sa significatiodansle
contexteconcret de la présenteaffaire ? Qu'aurait dû faire un homme-ou une femme- pour
agir conformémentau conceptde reasonableness,qui correspondexactementau principe de ladue
diligencequ'ont invoquéd'innombrables décisionsinternationale s
21.Le Camerounn'a pas dedoutes à cetégard.Legouvernement d'unEtatest la plushaute
instancedans les matières relevant dela politiqueétrangère.Il a une grande responsabiliténonpas
seulement envers sa propre population, mais encore envers ses voisins et toute la communauté
internationale. Par conséquent,il doit se comporter notammentselon les règles contenuesdans la
43London 1951,p.21.Charte des Nations Unies. Dans cette perspective, il est tenu de réglerses différendsavec ses
voisins de façon pacifique, en évitantle recours à la force sauf dans des situations de légitime
défense.
22. S'il avait respectéces règles,le Nigériaaurait montré un comportement foncièrement
différent de celui qu'il a pratiqué en fait. En premier lieu, il aurait étéde son devoir de
communiquer immédiatementde façon formelleau Cameroun son appréciationsubjective selon
laquelle le traitéde 1913étaitentachéde vices graves et qu'ilmanquait donc de force obligatoire.
Aprèsune telle communication, le Nigériaauraitdû offrir au Cameroun d'ouvrir desnégociations
pour amver d'un commun accord à une solution pacifique. Mais rien de tout cela ne s'est passé.
Le Nigériaa suivi le chemin de I'unilatéralisme, en jouantla carte de l'intervention militaire. Ce
n'est qu'au cours de laprésenteprocédure quela contestation dutraitéde 19 13a été explicitement
formulée. Cependant, un gouvernement doit se comporter comme un gouvernement, c'est-à-dire
en conformitéaux exigences que la communauté internationale impose à la plus haute instance
d'une entitéqu'on respecte comme un Etat souverain. De toute évidence,on est ici en présence
d'une convoitise mal dissimuléeque le Nigériaa cherché à réaliserpar la force des armes. Un
article de l'auteur nigérian BasseyE.Ate est révélateuràcet égard. En énonçant lesoptions qui,
selon lui, étaientouvertes au Nigéria,il éc:it
«As option one, Nigeria could unilaterally occupy Bakasi Peninsula. In
decidingto do so, of course, the rnilitaiy,logistic,political,jnancial and otherfactors
bearingon the calculations of the outcomeof such operation should beconsidered.
Assurningthe levelof this action,Nigeriamight thenforce the Camerouniansto enter
intoserious negotiationsaimedut establishinga mutuallyacceptablebo~ndar~.))~~
Avec cet article, on n'est pas non plus dans un monde ((fantaisiste)).On se retrouve bien dans la
réalitédes rapports entre les deux pays. L'auteur, Bassey E. Ate, en mêmetemps coéditeurdu
volume entier consacré auxproblèmesde la politique de la sécurité du Nigéria, n'ep sts toutjuste
un esprit libre qui s'adonnerait ses spéculations subjectives.Comme professeur à l'Institut des
relations internationalesLagos, il avait accèsaux travaux de la TaskForcedéjà mentionnée et ne
faisait qu'enreproduire les conclusions. Administration «paisible» Possessionde longue durée ? L
Rien quedesrêvespieux,trèsloin de ce qui s'estpasséau soldans les mangroves de Bakassi.
" Op.cit., 149. 23. Revenons encore un petit moment à la constructionjuridique de la partie adversequi
tente de se prévaloird'uneinterprétation erronémeais «de bonnefoi» du traitéde 1913. L'erreur
invoquéepar le Nigéria neporte pas sur tel ou tel fait, mais sur l'interprétation dduroit et des
instrumentsjuridiques pertinents. End'autrestermes,et commele Cameroun l'a déjàsignalésans
être démenp tiar son contradicteur,le Nigériase prévaut d'une erreudre droit (CR200217,p.45,
par. 34). Et cette seuleraison suffitpour écartertoute idée dereasonable mistake. L'erreur de
droitn'a en effetjamais étéadmiseendroit international, toutsimplement parcequel'on considère
quechaqueEtatest présumé connaîtrle e droit.
c) L'occupationd'unlargesecteurdeterritoire camerounais dans larégiondulac Tchad
24. Je me tournerai maintenantvers la régiondu lac Tchad. La situation factuellequ'ony
retrouve sedistingue de cellequ'on arencontrée àBakassi dansson déroulementconcret, mais non
pas dans ses effets. Ici encore, le Nigéria cherche à s'approprier une partie du territoire
camerounais. Mais le fil des événements est différentO . n n'a pas affaireà une attaque bien
identifiéepar sontempsetpar sonlieu,mais d'unepénétration par étapes,que l'on désignerait dans
le domaine de la protectionde l'environnement sousle nom de((creepingpollution»-qui en est
d'ailleursla plus dangereuse forme,laplus difficilecombattre.
25. Sur le plan humain,les effets malencontreuxde l'assèchement progressid fu lac Tchad
sont aisésà comprendre. Pour un pêcheuri,l est essentiel,il est vitalde vivre au borddes eauxoù
ilexerce sonactivitéprofessionnelle. Sur la terreferme,j'hésitàdire cette banalité,le poissonne
peut pas être rencontré. Donc, en bonne logique, les pêcheursont suivi le lac qui s'est
progressivement éloigné d'eux. Et, Monsieur le président,encore par un geste de générosité l,
Cameroun ne les a pas empêchéd se le faire au moment où ce mouvement humain a franchi la
frontièreentre le Nigéria etle Camerounpour s'installersur leterritoire camerounais. Toutes les
cartes montrent à l'évidenceque là où aujourd'huise trouvent lesvillages réclamés à tort par le
Nigéria,les eaux du lac couvraienttoute la surface il y a trente ans encore. Aucun village ne
pouvait y exister. Ce n'est que la fuitedu lac qui a rendu possiblel'installation de communautés
humaines en territoire camerounaissur la rive occidentaledu lac Tchad. Il y a vingt ans encore,
cetterive setrouvait auNigéria.Moncollègue Jean-PierreCotamis enexerguecepoint cematin. 26. Tout aussi compréhensible que puisspearaître cettemigration d'unepopulationen quête
d'assurer sasurvie,elle étaittout d'abordun phénomènesocialet n'auraitpas dû être prise comme
prétextepar leNigéria pourétendreses structures administratives ces nouvelles «colonisations~>.
Il n'avait aucundroit d'y établir postes de police,d'yenvoyerses forcesarméeset des'y livrer
àd'autres activités relevantde la puissance publique. Le droit international ne connaît pas le
concept d'une frontière roulante, d'uneboundaryon wheels)).Il est vrai que l'assèchementdu lac
Tchad est une calamitéde tout premier ordre pourle Nigéria-comme pour tousles autres Etats
riverains dulacTchad. Maisle droit internationalmet à la disposition desEtats une vaste gamme
depossibilitéspour affronterune telle difficusur la basedela coopération.
27. Revenons maintenant à l'affirmation du Cameroun selon laquellepar ses actesle Nigéria
a violél'interdictiondu recoursà la force également dansla régiondu lac Tchad. Les faits sont
pratiquement incontestés. Il est inutile de refaire la démonstration de mon collègue
Jean-PierreCot. Le Nigéria a exporté sesstructures étatiques, y comprisses forces armées, à
travers la frontièrequi sépareles territoiresdes deuxpays. Il s'est inàtl'est de cette ligne,en
prétendantqu'ils'ytrouvede bon droit.
28. Est-ce que cette invocation de la bonne foi est suffisante pour se déchargerde
l'accusation qu'une violation du principde non-recours à la force a étperpétrée? La réponse
doitêtreclaire etnette:ellene suffit pas. La seuleprésence troupes surun territoireétrangerest
en elle-même la preuve concluante de la responsabilité, saufcirconstances exceptionnelles qui
visiblementn'existent pasen l'espèce. LeNigérian'a pu fairevaloir aucunejustification excluant
l'illicéité. D'autre part,êmesi l'onpart de l'hypothèsequela notion de «violation» impliqueun
élémend te «blameworthiness»,quels sont lesrésultatsauxquelson aboutit?
29. Monsieurle président, Madame eM t essieursde la Cour, dansla régiondu lac Tchad la
situationne permettait aucun doute.Il y avaitun instrumentobligatoire qui délimitait la frontière.
Dans le cadre de la CBLT, cette frontière avaittoujours servi comme base pour les travaux de
démarcation. Le Nigériasavait donc exactement jusqu'oùs'étendait sonterritoire. Comment ,
peut-il sérieusement invoque(r(honestbeliefand reasonable mistake))? Un gouvernementa une
responsabilité tout autqu'un pêcheur, pour quiil importe peuoù il prend ses poissons, pourvu
quepoisson ily ait. S'ilcroyait quesescitoyensqui s'étaientinstallésau Camerounmanquaient de services sociaux, il aurait pu proposer au Cameround'ouvrir desnégociations. Encore une fois,
malheureusement, le Nigériaa préféré la solution unilatéralemanu militari, sans étudier les
possibilitésde trouverune solution en accordavec le Cameroun. II faut le répétermême su i ne
invasionse fait sanssetraduirepar des hostilitésentre forcesarméesdes deux côtés, il s'agit bel et
bien d'une violation de l'Article2, paragraphe4, de la Charte desNationsUnies. La lutte armée
n'est pas un élément constitutid fe la violationdu principe interdisantle recoursà la force. De
toute façon, même si la Coud revait estimer que, dans les circonstances particulières des
événementtsels qu'ilsse sont déroulés dans la régiondu lac Tchad,il serait inappropriéde parler
d'agressionarméeou de violationde IYArtic12e, paragraphe4; les faitsdémontrentclairement une
violationde la souveraineté territoriale camerounaiseD. onc, de toutemanière,laresponsabilité du
Nigériase trouve engagée.
30. Pour compléter la démonstration, permettez-moi, Monsie lurprésident,de me référer
enfinau dernierrapporteur spéciad le la Commissiondudroit internationalsur laresponsabilitédes
Etats. Jevais citerledeuxièmerapport, datédu 30 avril 1999 :
«Dans certainssystèmesjuridiques, la revendication de bonne foi d'un droit
peut justifier ou excuser certains comportements,mêmesi cette revendication est
juridiquement infondée.Aucun auteurne sembledéfendreune telle doctine en droit
intemationa~.)?~[Letexte original est en anglais etc'est unetraduction officielledes
Nations Unies.]
d) Lenon-respectparle Nigéria de l'ordonnancedela Cour du15mars1996
31. J'en viens maintenantau troisièmechapitre de mon intervention de cet après-mid ile
non-respectpar le Nigériade l'ordonnancede la Courdu 15 mars 1996. A cet égard, sirArthur a
voulu démontrerdans sa plaidoirie de vendredi dernierque les affirmations du Cameroun sont
insoutenables. Mais son discours a plutôtmontréque lesaccusationsdu Camerounont du poids.
32. Je commenceraipar un petit commentairesur la mission d'enquête qui a échoué, grâce à
-ou plutôt en raison de- la résistancedu Nigéria(voir CR200217, p. 63, par. 13). Les
événementq sui se sont succédé à Bakassi auraient facilementpu êtreclarifiéssi le Nigéria avait
donné son consentement à la créationde cette mission. Mais en raison de sa résistance, cette
45 Deuxième rapport du rapporteur spécialJames Crawford sur la responsabilitédes Etats, 30 avril 1999,
Nations Unies,doc. AICN.41498lAd, ar. 260.mission d'enquête s'esttransforméeen une mission anodine de bons offices, précisément sans
compétence d'enquêteq,ui en fait n'a pas pu se rendre dans la partie de Bakassi occupéepar le
Nigéria. SirArthur arépondu (CR2002114,p. 36,par. 49) qu'il s'agissaitlà d'une affaire politique
«to be determined in New York)). Or, chacun sait que de telles décisions essentiellessont prises
dans les capitaleset nonpas par lesreprésentantsdiplomatiquesquise trouvent à NewYork. Il est
vrai, comme le dit sirArthur, quel'échecde cette tentative de mener une enquête soigneuseet
détailléeest un ((politicalfact)). Mais les faits politiquesne suivent pas les lois de la nature. Ils
sont le résultatdes décisionshumaines. On est donc bien en droit d'en tirer les conclusions
appropriées. Jene vaispas le fairemoi-même pourlaissertoutela discrétionnécessaireà la Cour.
33. Je me permets,par contre,de me référer à l'arrêt dans l'affaire uétroitde Corfou où
la Cour a précisémentdû s'occuper de la situation d'un Etat qui, en raison de l'obstruction
pratiquéepar l'autre partie, se voyait dans l'impossibilitéde fournir toutes les preuves qui, dans
une situation de normalité, seraient requisespour démontrerla véracité de ses allégations. Qu'il
me soit permisde citer quelqueslignestextuellement :
«17Etatvictime d'une violation du droit international se trouve souvent dans
l'impossibilité defaire la preuvedirecte desfaits d'où découlerailtaresponsabilité.Il
doit luiêtrepermisderecourir plus largementaux présomptionsdefait, aux indicesou
preuves circonstancielles(circumstantial evidence). Ces moyens de preuve indirecte
sont admis dans tous les systèmes de droit et leur usage est sanctionnépar la
jurispmdence internationale. Ondoit les considérer comme particulièrementprobants
quand ils s'appuient sur une série de faits qui s'enchaînent et qui conduisent
logiquement à unemême conclusion.»46
Le Camerounse prévaut de cetterègle, etil considèreque sonapplicationest d'autant plusjustifiée
que le Nigériaa empêché que soit menée à bien l'entreprise commune d'enquête qui avait été
suggérée par le Secrétairegénérad lesNations Unieset endosséepar la Cour dans son ordonnance
du 15mars 1996.
34. Ence qui concerneles différentesviolationsperpétréep sar leNigéria,je ne peux, dansle
cadre limitéde cette interventiondu second tour,revenir sur tous les incidents quiontéterelevés
par le Cameroun. Mais quelques-unsvalent bien qu'on les examine encoreune fois. En premier
i
lieu, il convientde s'attarder surles combats dYavril/mai1996. Sir Arthura répété la position du
Nigériaselonlaquelle «itwas Cameroonwhich launchedattacksagainst Nigeriapositions between
46C.I.J.Recueil 19494(18).21April and 1May 1996))(CR2002114,p. 36, par. 47). Mais les suites de ces combats parlent
pour elles-mêmes.Je me permets, Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs lesjuges, de vous
inviter tout simplement à relire la présentationdu Cameroun sur l'enchaînement des événements :
le Cameroun a tout de suite protesté auprèsdu Conseil de sécuritéle 30 avril 1996 (voir
CR200217,p. 60, par. 7), alors que le Nigérian'a eul'idéede protester lui-aussi que sept à huit
semaines plustard (ibid., p. 61-62,par. 11). Un Etatqui étaitattaquéet qui,de plus, est faussement
accuséde porter la responsabilitépour les hostilités, serait-ilrestémuet pendant presque deux
mois ? On ne peut vraiment pasle croire.
35. Le Cameroun relève,d'autre part, le silence completdu Nigériaconcernant le reproche
qu'on lui faitd'avoir formellementérigé en collectivitétemtoriale la péninsulede Bakassi. Le fait
est indéniable. Mais le Nigéria a complètement dénaturé les affirmations du Cameroun en
précisant qu'iln'y avait rien dans l'ordonnance de la Cour qui aurait ordonné «al1 civilian
administrationto come to a hait))ou qui aurait interditau Nigéria«to make arrangementsfor the
health, the education and social weIfare of the Nigerianpopulation of Bakassi)) (CR 2002114,
p. 38, par.54). Le Cameroun n'a riensuggéré de ce genre. Parcontre, il s'est plaintde la création
de la commune de Bakassi, ce qui esttout à fait autre chosà,savoir une tentative de consoliderla
situation defaitpour lui donner uneapparence denormalité etdonc de légitimité constitutionnelle.
En effet, la situation juridique était bien curieuse même rugard du droit internenigérian :d'une
part, le Gouvernement nigérian affirmaitque Bakassi avait toujours fait partie intégrantedu
Nigéria. D'autrepart, il devait reconnaître que Bakassi n'existaitpas sur le plan de l'organisation
de I'Etat au plan municipal. Il est évidentque la «régularisation» de Bakassiaux fins du droit
interne a enFreintl'ordonnance de la Cour dans lamesure où elle a cherché à créer etrenforcer des
liensde loyautéde la populationdeBakassi à l'égarddu systèmepolitique nigérian. C'étaitun acte
d'exercicedepuissance publiquequi ne revient qu'au détenteur de la souveraineté territoriale.
36. C'est dans la mêmeperspective qu'il convientd'aborder la question de l'interdiction de
volssur Bakassi. De façon assez légèrel,e conseilpour leNigéria aaffirmédans sa plaidoirie qu'il
ne pouvait êtreinterdit au Nigéria«to provide for the safety of civil aviation in the skies above
Bakassi))(CR2002114, p.38, par. 54). Est-ce que leRoyaume-Uni se croiraithabilité à assurer la
sécurité des vols au-dessus de l'Irlande? Clairement, quand un Etat s'arroge la compétencederéglerle trafic aérien au-dessus temtoire d'un autre Etat il empiètesur les droits souverainsde
ce dernier. La conclusion esttrès nette cet égardégalement,le Nigéria n'a pas tenu compte de
l'ordonnancede la Cour.
e) Les demandesreconventionneIlesduNigéria
37. Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs lesjuges, dansune dernière partiede mon
intervention je vais maintenant examinerles demandes reconventionnellesdu Nigéria. Le
Cameroun s'abstient de contester formellement l'admissibilité dces demandes, mêmede celles
qui ont été introduitesun stade asseztardif de la procédurepar la duplique, laissàla Cour le
soin de trancher. Quant aufond, il est évidemment impossible de traiter en détailtous les faits
alléguépsar le Nigériaàl'appuide ses demandes(voirrépliquedu Cameroun,p. 563-587). Je vais
donc essentiellementme borner à répondreaux faits repris par le professeur Crawforddans sa
plaidoirie orale.
38. Permettez-moide revenir tout d'abordsur l'incidentdu 16mai 1981qui est constamment
exploité par le Nigéricaomme preuve des mauvaises intentions du Cameroun. Le Nigériaen a
parlé dans ses exceptions préliminaires (introduction, par. 34-39) d,ans son contre-mémoire
(contre-mémoire du Nigéria, pa 2r..20-2.21et 24.65-24.67) ainsiquedans sa duplique(dupliquedu
Nigéria,p. 611-615), et sir Arthur y est revenu dans sa plaidoirie (CR2002114,p. 41, par. 67 et
suiv.). Il ne fait pas l'objetdu présent litige,parce qu'ilréglé àl'amiable. Néanmoinsc ,et
incident aétéintroduit dans l'affaire pour dépeindrele Cameroun comme un Etat agressif, non
respectueux de ses obligations internationales.Le Nigériase livre à cette mise en cause du
Camerounen tirant les conséquencesquine sejustifient aucunement à la lecturede l'échangedes
lettresentreles deuxprésidentsse rapportantau règlementde la controverse. Il est vrai que,en fin
de compte,le Cameroun, par lavoix de sonprésident(lettre du 16juillet 1981,ontre-mémoiredu
Nigéria,vol.XI,p. 2623, annexe345),a expriméses regretspour laperte de vies humaines.etqu'il
a offert depayer une compensation aux famillesdes victimes. On remarquera,à cet égard,que le
président Ahidjo a exprimé ses regrets, sans s'excuser. Mêmeun diplomate peu expérimenté
connaît la différence entre deux formules,ce qui n'a pas empêché nos contradicteursde parler
d'une ((letterof apology)(CR 2002114,p. 41, par. 69). En effet, cette issue diplomatiqued'un incident tragique dit trèspeu sur l'enchaînementdes événements.Le président camerounais a
maintenu sa versionselon laquellel'incident étaitsurvenu sur le Rio del Rey, donc en temtoire
camerounais,alors que le président nigérian maanifestésa conviction quele lieu de l'accrochage
étaitle fleuve Akwayafé(lettre du 20juillet 1981, contre-mémoiredu Nigéria,vol.XI, p. 2627,
annexe346). La divergence des vues sur les circonstances de cet accrochage a donc persisté
jusqu'à la fin, contrairementce que cherche àinsinuer le conseil du Nigéri(CR2002114, p. 43,
par. 76).
39. Il n'est pas difficile de deviner pourquoile chef dYEtatcamerounais s'est finalement
résignéà offrir une compensation financière,mêmes'il avaitde bonnes raisons pour croireque
l'incident était laconséquence directd'une violation de la frontièrecamerounaise. Le langage
employépar le présidentShagari dans sa lettre du 25 mai 1981est dictatorial, n'admettant aucune
objection. Aulieu d'accepterune commissiond'enquêteq , ui aurait éle moyen le plus sûr pour
clarifier les liens de causalité,il rejette toute idéeen faisant valoir que le Nigériaot the
slightest doubt as to where the incidenttook place)) (contre-mémoireduNigéria,vol.XI, p. 2620,
annexe344). Demèrecette lettre secachait mal la menace de faire usagede la forcepour obliger
le Cameroun à se plier aux demandes nigérianes. Assez clairementl,a deuxième lettre du
présidentShagari du 20juillet 1981, qui met un terme définitifau différend, ditque l'incident
aurait pu déclencher uneguerre entre les deux pays. Etantdonnéles rapports de force entre le
Nigéria et le Camerouno ,n se demande vraimentcomment sirArthur a pu tirer de ces pièces la
conclusionque le Cameroun pouvaitavoir «the hope of provoking Nigeria into starting a major,
full-scale armedresponse))(CR 2002114,p. 43,par.77).
40. Je me permetsd'êtretrès direct cet égard:c'est une conclusionnon seulement erronée,
mais contredisant manifestement leslois de la logique politique. Le fait qu'il y avait comme
arrière-fondde l'affaireune menacede recours à la force par le Nigéria,menace dont la réalité a
étédécriteen détail dansla répliquedu Cameroun (réplique du Cameroun,p. 508-509), découle
mêmeducommentairefinal de sirArthur,un commentairepourlequel iln'y avait aucunenécessité
mais qu'il nous a présenté sous forme orale en disant que c'étaitle président Shagari qui a pu
empêcher cet inciden dte seransformer«into themajor armedconfrontation which Cameroonhad
been trying to provoke)} et que c'étaitlui, le président Shagari, égalemeqtui a été capable de ((quel1the Nigerian people's justified outrage ut this incident)) (ibid., p. 43, par. 78)C'est
vraiment renverserles chosespour leur faire dire le contrairedece qu'elles disent enréalité.Mais,
l'interprétationde cet incidentdonne le ton de l'ensemble du comportementnigérianainsique de
ses plaidoiriesen l'espèce. Depuis1981,le Camerouna vécusous menacemilitaire de la part du
Nigéria,et il souhaitequececauchemarfinisseleplustôt possiblegrâce à l'arrêt finalelaCour.
41. La même méthode q,ui consisteà créerune impression, impression selon laquelle le
Cameroun seraitl'agresseur, l'assaillant,alors quele Nigériaet les Nigériansseraient lesvictimes,
se retrouve partout dans les écrituresduNigériase rapportant au chapitre de la responsabilité et a
égalementmarquéles plaidoiriesorales.
42. Je ne prends qu'un seul exemple, le combat du 3 février1996. Le Cameroun a
méticuleusementexpliquéle déroulementdes faits dans sa réplique (répliquedu Cameroun,
p. 529-530)ainsiqu'au premiertour des plaidoiries(CR200217,p. 53-56). Toutes sesaffirmations
s'appuient sur des éléments de preuve fiables et incontestables. Le Cameroun a montréqu'il ne
préparaitaucune manŒuvre,que les Nigériansen avaient profité pourouvrir le feu sur leurs
positions, les en chasser et les poursuivrejusqu'au milieu de Bakassi. Il y a eu des ripostes
camerounaises. Le Cameroun l'a dit aussi. Maisnos contradicteursont déformétout cela, en
ajoutantdes faitsjamais évoqué( sWatts,CR 200217,p. 34-35,par.41-45).
43. Mais puisque le Nigéria acherché à insinuer le doute dans vos esprits sur qui sont
réellementles deux Etats qui se trouvent aujourd'hui devantvous, il me faut ajouter qu'ila des
éléments depreuve qui permettent de se forger une vision juste à cet égard. Des éléments de
preuve plus solidesque les «témoignages»ouautresdocumentsdouteux produits parleNigéria,et
auxquels il n'attache d'ailleurspas plus de valeur probante que le Cameroun (CR 200217,p. 57,
par. 31). J'enévoqueraitrois.
44. D'abordcette consigne militaire,révéléeen public, par le commandantde la 13"brigade
motoriséede la 82'division de l'armée nigérianel,e brigadier-généraW l omotimiDiriyai : ($or
every one shot the gendarmefire at our men or any Nigerian, theNigerian troops are ready tofie t
a hundred shorson retaliation))(annexeMC345). Cent ballescontreune. C'est sans doutece que
leNigériaappellela proportionnalité.L'affairedu 3 février1996prend tout son sens àla lumière
de cetteconsigne. 45. Ensuitecette lettredu comité internationalde la Croix-Rouge,délégation poulr'Afrique
centrale,du 26janvier 1996(annexeOCDR 16). Elle est adressée au ministrecamerounaischargé
de la défense. Elle concerne la levéeet remise du corps d'un officier nigérianaux autorités
nigérianes le22 décembre1995 à Douala, en présence del'ambassadeurde laRépublique fédérale
duNigéria.Voilàcommentlechef demission del'organisationhumanitairedécritla scène :
((Malgréquelques difficultésde procédureintroduitespar la partie nigériane,la
mission s'est dérouléedans le meilleur esprit possible, en particulier grâce aux
dispositions exemplaires prises par les autorités militaires et administratives
camerounaises.))
46. Laissez-moi enfin citer une autre lettre du comitéinternational de la Croix-Rouge,
adresséeau ministrecamerounaisdes relations extérieures le 25avril 1997(annexeOCDR43). Le
comitéexplique :
«Dèsles premiers affrontements qui ont eu lieu entre les forces armées dela
République duCameroun etde la République fédéraldeu Nigériaen relation avec la
péninsulede Bakassi, le comitéinternationalde la CroixRouge (CICR) a demandé
formellement aux autoritésdes deux Etats de pouvoir avoir, entre autre, accès aux
personnesmilitairesetcivilesqu'ellesdétenaient.
Le CICR a apprécié le dialogue constructif quia pu s'établir avec les hautes
autoritésdela Républiquedu Cameroun,luiaccordanttoutesles facilitéspour mener à
bien samission humanitaire. Ainsi, le CICRa pu mener des actions d'assistance en
faveur des citoyens camerounais déplacés par les combats de Bakassi. Dès le
19mars 1996, il a, par ailleurs, reçu l'autorisation des autorités camerounaisesde
rendre visite aux civils nigérians,arrêtéset privésde libertépour des raisons de
sécurité. Cetteautorisationa été étendue d,èsle 21 mai 1996, aux prisonniers de
guerre nigérians.
Le CICR tient à assurer aux autorités camerounaises qu'il poursuit ses
démarchesau plus hautniveau auprèsdu Gouvernementde la Républiquefédérale du
Nigéria,afin d'obtenir des informations sur le sort des personnes capturéespar les
autoritésnigérianeest derecevoir l'autorisationde visiterles prisonnierscamerounais.
Le CICR déploreque les autoritésnigérianesn'aient à ce jour donné aucune
suitea sesrequêtes.))
47. Un tiers, parfaitementimpartial, dépeintcette situation. D'un côté,le Cameroun, en
plein accord avecses obligations,notamment dans le domainedu droit humanitaire. De l'autre, le
Nigéria quirefuse de donner desinformations sur le sort des personnes capturéespar ses soldats,
qui refuse que les organisationshumanitairesy aient accès,et qui traite par le mépris les requêtes
dela Croix-Rouge. 48. Aprèscette introduction, nécessairepour réfuterune «impression» délibérément créée
par le Nigéria,je me tourne maintenantvers les points précisévoqués par lprofesseur Crawford.
Etje vaisle faireentoute vitesse.
49. En ce qui concerne les événements à Bakassi (CR 2002114, p. 54, par.21,22), le
Cameroun a réfuté endétaildans sa réplique lesdemandes contenues dans le contre-mémoire
(répliquedu Cameroun, p. 564-567). Il est certainement vrai qu'il peut y avoir eu des victimes
civiles, ce que le Cameroun regrette profondément. Maisil faut se rappeler que le climat
d'insécuritéh,autement nocif pour la population civile, a été crééar le Nigériadu fait de son
invasionmilitairede la péninsule.Même selonle récit présenté parNleigéria, les victimes ont péri
à la suite d'opérations armées dont la responsabile sauraitêtreéclaircie.La Cour ne manquera
pas deprendre actedu fait que tous les incidentsrésumédsans la listeremise la Cour lejour des
plaidoiriesoralessous la cote se situentchronologiquementdans les années 1994 à 1999. En ce
qui concerne les nouveaux incidents évoquésdans la duplique nigériane(duplique du Nigéria,
p. 749-750),on voit mal quel rapport ils peuvent bien avoir avec le différendterritorial entre les
deux Parties. Chacun d'eux demanderaiu tn examen séparé.Le Cameroun tient à répéter qu'il
regrettetoutes les pertes ettous les dommagesqui ont écausés, surtoutla perte de vies humaines.
Mais il estobligéde dire que,de son avis, lesélémentsepreuve foumis par leNigériane sont pas
suffisants.
50. En ce qui concerne les prétenduesattaques du mois d'avril 1998, dont le Nigéria fait
grand cas(CR 2002114,p. 55, par. 25), il estutile de s'attacàla lecturedes documents produits
pour étayerles accusations. Qu'est-ce qu'on y trouve ? Certainement pas cette exactitudedont
s'est vantéle Nigéria toutau long de la procédure. Prenons quelques unes des déclarations des
témoins(duplique du Nigéria, vol. IX,annexe 203). Un Monsieur Bassey Andem déclare :
((Anytimewe go to the high sea the gendarmes used topursue us and when fhey catch us, theywill
seize our engines andfire us inside the boat...)) (Ibid.,p. 1707.) Un autre témoin, MonsieurIta
Okon Simeon,raconte :((Gendarmeshavealways beenfiring their guns on us .». (Ibid.,p. 1709.)
concernant le jour en question, le 18vril 1998, les déclarationsdivergent de façon considérable
quant à l'heure où prétendumentl'attaque a commencé. Alors que l'un detsémoinsaffirme sans
hésitationque les gendarmes camerounais ont commencé à tirer «at around 12 o'clock noon»(ibid., p. 1721)'d'autres croient savoir que l'attaque a commencé àl'aube : «At the dawn of the
above-mentioneddate, I heard ...firing and shellingfiom my sleep.)) (Ibid., p. 1737.) Cette
dernièreversion est confinnéepar un autre témoin :«Onthe earIyhoursof the abovestated date,
theGendarmesat thehostile creekfiredindiscriminatelyat ownlocation.. .» (Ibid.,p. 1739.) Tout
cela ne coïncidepas. S'ajoute que, selonle récitque donnent les témoins,des «bombes» auraient
été lancéesS . ous aucun angle, cette allégation nesemble êtreplausible. Des bombes avec leur
potentiel de destructionauraient certainement causédes dégâts beaucoupplus importants. Donc,
on peut admettre qu'il y aeu un incidentde quelquesorte, mais cet incident n'a certainementpas
eu lieu delamanière dépeinte palreNigéria.Lesdéclarationsdes «témoins»présentép sas lui sont
detoute évidence peucrédibles.
51.Le mêmejugemen t unmanque manifestede crédibilité - doit êtreportésur les autres
incidents invoqués par le Nigéria. Sont particulièrement énigmatiques les incidents du
26 février1993et celuidu 27juin 1993(voir contre-mémoire du Nigéria,p. 806,par.25.11).
52. Le lecteurdes documentspertinents n'estmêmepas informésur le lieu où ces incidents
auraienteu lieu. Tout restedans le flou. Précision Fiabilité? Iln'y en a pas.
53. On manque de temps, Monsieur le président,le Cameroun reviendra aux demandes
reconventionnelles durantle temps supplémentaire quilui a étéaccordé à cette fin après le
deuxième tour pourleNigéria. Monsieur leprésident,je veux arrêter à ce point monintervention.
Je reconnais qu'il est extrêmementdélicat pourla Cour, encoreplus que pour le Cameroun, de
clarifier des faits l'égarddesquels les Partiesont donnédes versions largement divergentes.
Néanmoins,tout aussi embrouilléquepuisse paraître le panorama généraill,y a deuxzones où la
lumière n'estaffectée paraucune ombre : des troupes ainsi que des forces de sécurité nigérianes
sont déployées tand tans la péninsule de Bakassq iue dans un largesecteur du lac Tchad, chaque
fois en temtoire camerounais où ellesn'ont aucun droit de présence. Cette présence constitue à
elleseuleun fait internationalement illicite.
54. Monsieur le président,je suis arrivéà la fin de mon intervention. Demainmatin, avec
votre autorisation,mon collègueAlainPellet introduirales plaidoiries du Camerounrelatives à la
frontièremaritime. Jevous remercie. Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie, Monsieur le professeur.Ceci met un termeà l'audience
d'aujourd'hui. Laprochaineaudienceaura lieu demain à 10heures. La séanceestlevée.
L'audienceestlevée à 18 h 20.
Public sitting held on Monday 11 March 2002, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding