-10-
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. JudgeGuilla ume regrets that he is unable to be present
this morning. May I now call on Sir ArthurWatts to continue his presentation, please
Mr. WATTS:
6.CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S ATTEMPTS TO PERFORM THE 1977 TREATY BY MEANS
OF VARIANT C
(b) Legality of Variant C (cont.)
Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court. Mr. President, when the Court adjourned
yesterday, I had just been saying that where a St ate refuses to co-operate in performing its treaty
obligations, its treaty partners do not have to sit backand simply watch the agreed enterprise come to
an end; they can adapt the agreed undertaking so that it can survive as well as possible. I added that
precedents did not lie thick on the ground — for the goodreason that the conduct of States rarely calls
for this principle to be invoked in disputes between them.
Even so, Mr. President, thereare precedents. Let me offer two examples in State practice. At
various times in and after 1946 a permanent member of the Security Council chose not to participate
in the voting in the Council. Did the Council's work come to an end? Of course not, Mr. President.
The other parties adapted their practices, and their a pplication of Article27 of the Charter, so as to
allow the Council to continue functioning as nearly as possible as envisaged in the Charter. As the
Court acknowledged in its 1971 Namibia Opinion, this later came to be treated as an accepted re-
interpretation of Article 27 (I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 22); but at the outsetit amounted to an adaptation
of the Charter while still keeping as close as possibleto the original Charter system. Much the same
thing happened in 1965 and 1966, when a Member Stateof the EEC refused to co-operate in the EEC
Council of Ministers. There were severe political difficulties, but legally the EEC Council did not
come to an end: the remaining parties adapted the rules to allow the Council to continue to work as
nearly as possible as had been originally intended.
It will, I know, be said that those examples are rather special. So too, Mr. President, are the
circumstances of this case. And in any event, special circumstances, when they mount up, submerge
their "special" character in the wir principle which they exemplify. -11-
And the examples do mount up, Mr.President. Thus the Arbitration Commission set up by
the International Conference on Former Yugos lavia concluded, in its Opinion No.9 ( ILR, 1992,
Vol. 92, p. 203), that the successor States must settle all aspects of succession by agreement, drawing
on the principles of the two Vienna Conventions of1978 and 1983. But it then had to consider what
the position would be if one or more of those States refused to co-operate. It concluded, in Opinion
No. 12 (ILR, 1993, Vol.96, p.723), that the non-co-ope rating State would be in breach of its
international obligations, and that the other States were entitled to conclude agreements inter se
conforming to the principles of the two Vienna Conventions: but that, of course, necessarily implied
that conformity with those Conventions would only be approximate, since the non-co-operation of
one (or more) of the successor States would pe rvent their terms being applied literally.
This Court, Mr.President, has also had some experience of States not co-operating in the
application of their international treaty obligations. Some States, although committed to accept the
jurisdiction of the Court, have nevertheless denied that jurisdiction in a particular case, and turned
their back on the Court. Did the Court just give up,Mr. President? Of course not. It sought to apply
the Statute and Rules of Court, adapted as might benecessary to take account of the situation created
by the non-co-operating State. Thus the failure of a State to appear means that the terms of Article
62(2) of the Rules, requiring a State objecting to the Court's jurisdiction to set out its objections,
cannot be observed: this does not paralyse th e Court— it simply takes upon itself the task of
identifying possible objections (e.g.,Fisheries Jurisdiction, I.C.J. Reports 1973, at pp. 7-8).
In Slovakia's Reply, attention was draw n to this Court's various Opinions on South West
Africa (SR, para.6.14). Let me spell out just what the Court said in those Opinions. Faced with
South Africa's breaches of the Mandate and its unw illingness to co-operate with the UnitedNations
over this Mandate, coupled with the demise of theLeague of Nations, the Court recognized that it was
appropriate for the Mandate to beapplied approximately. Thus the C ourt, in the Advisory Opinion on
the Status of South West Africa , accepted that, with the substitution of the UnitedNations for the
League of Nations, the degree of supervision ofMandates by the General Assembly "should conform
as far as possible to the procedure followed in this respect by the Council of the League of Nations"
(I.C.J. Reports 1950, at p. 138; emphasis added). And those wo rds "as far as possible" were explained -12-
by the Court in its 1955 Opinion on South West Africa Voting Procedures: the Court said that since
of course in the circumstances the General Assemb ly could not follow precisely the procedures which
the Council of the League had adopted, "the expression 'as far as possible' was designed to allow for
adjustments and modifications necessitatedby legal or practical considerations" (I.C.J. Reports 1955,
at p. 77).
The principle of approximate application was well articulated a year later by
JudgeLauterpacht in the Hearings of Petitioners from South West Africa case. Given that the
United Nations had to apply the Mandate in a manner somewhat different from, although close to, the
manner set out in it, Judge Lauterpacht had no doubt that this approximate application accorded with
legal principle. He said:
"It is a sound principle of law that whenever a legal instrument of continuing validity
cannot be applied literally owing to the conduc t of one of the parties, it must, without
allowing that party to take advantage of its own conduct, be applied in a way
approximating most closely to its primary object." I(.C.J. Reports 1956,at p. 46.)
Mr.President, ProfessorDupuy sought, on 6 March (CR 97/5, pp. 27 ff.), to discredit
Judge Lauterpacht's view. He drew attention to the institutional framework to which it related, and to
the very special characteristics of Mandates as co mpared with the alleged ordinariness of the 1977
Treaty.
These arguments are, Mr.President, unconvincing. Of course, the Petitionerscase, like the
other South West Africa cases— indeed, like any case— was concerned with its particular
circumstances. But that does not mean that principles emerging from the case have no application in
any other circumstances: of course they have, where — as here — the circumstances of another case
make the application of those principles appropriate. Many aspects of the several South West Africa
cases are accepted as being of general rele vance — and Professor Kiss, Mr. Sands and
ProfessorCrawford, for example, were all happy to quote from the 1971 Namibia Opinion when it
suited Hungary that they should do so (CR97/5, p. 12; CR97/6, pp.18,29). The suggestion that a
relevant distinction between thePetitionerscase and this one is that the former was concerned with a
Mandate while the present is concerned with th e 1977 Treaty ignores the fact that, notwithstanding
that Mandates had certain special legal characteristic s, this Court has held that the "Mandate [for
South West Africa], in fact and in law, is an intrnational agreement having the character of a treaty or -13-
convention" (South West Africa, Preliminary Objections , I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp.319 and 330-2).
And in comparing the Mandate system with the 1977 Treaty, that Treaty is more than just a static set
of treaty obligations: it established an integrat ed, evolutionary, an on-going system for a complex
river development enterprise.
As a final point in this immediate context, nothing in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties precludes the best possible, approximate a pplication of a treaty in circumstances such as
those of the present case. Professor Dupuy argued (CR 97/5, p.38, para.16) that, even if Hungary
were in breach of its obligations under the 1977Convention, Article60 of the two Vienna
Conventions allowed Czechoslova kia only two choices—termination of the Treaty, or its
suspension. But this, Mr. President, ignores the inadequacy of either of those courses as an effective
remedy for Czechoslovakia, as I noted yesterday,and disregards Article 42 — that Article governs the
operation of Article60 and makes it clear that, if a State wishes to terminate or suspend a treaty , it
may only do so by applying the provisions of the Convention: it says nothing about other action
which a State may take when faced with a breach by its treaty partner—for example, non-forcible
counter-measures, or claiming compensation, or —as Slovakia submits, in a situation like the
present — applying the treaty as nearly as possible as the circumstances allow.
This same principle finds support in the general obligation of an injured party to mitigate its
damages. Had Czechoslovakia done nothing, but left the whole site derelict until such time as the
Court might award damages, the damages would have been astronomical—several billions of
dollars. Yet Czechoslovakia had a legal obligation to minimize those losses, and the only effective
way to do that was to put the Treaty Project into operation as far as possible. It would be a mistake to
think that the duty to mitigate damage was some afterthought, conjured up for the purpose of the case.
In the Note Verbale sent by Czechoslovakia's Foreign Ministry to the Hungarian Embassy on
27 August 1991, Czechoslovakia referre d expressly to its preparation for a provisional solution as
being "guided by its efforts to minimize damage..." (SM, Vol. 4, Ann. 96; SR, para. 9.23).
Professor Dupuy sought to deny the existence of any such principle (CR 97/5, pp.42-45).
Once more, he dismissed as irrelevant the various municipal law cases cited by Slovakia; and once
more I note that this Court has often referred to pratice in municipal law. But this time, he dismissed -14-
also the decisions of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. This is truly surprising, since it is acknowledged
that a significant contribution to international law hs been made by the jurisprudence of international
Claims Tribunals — especially when like the Iran-US Tribunal, they are required to apply,inter alia,
such principles of international law as they find a pplicable (Claims Settlement Declaration, Art.V:
ILM, Vol. XX (1981), at p. 232).
Having nevertheless, tried to dismiss the relevance of that international tribunal,
Professor Dupuy chided Czechoslovakia for not producing any precedent from international practice.
Mr.President, let me try again. Very clear statements by the United Nations Compensation
Commission (concerning claims against Iraq) demonstrate very clearly that the principle of mitigation
of damage forms part of international law. In their Report on Individual Claims for Damages up to
US $ 100,000the Commissioners, in September 1994, said this:
"Finally, this Panel is of the opinion that the compensation payable to claimants
should reflect claimants' efforts to mitigatetheir losses. International law recognizes,
and indeed in certain instances imposes, anobligation on the part of an injured party
to mitigate his or her losses." (UN Doc. S/AC.26/1994/3, of 21December 1994,
p. 192.)
Two years later, in theWell Blow-out Claim, the Commissioners, last November, noted:
"that under the general principles of in ternational law relating to mitigation of
damages, which have also been recognized by the Governing Council, the claimant
was not only permitted but indeed obligated to take reasonable steps to fight the oil-
well fires in order to mitigate the loss, damage or injury being caused by those fires"
(S/AC.26/1996/5/Ann. of 18 December 1996, p. 18).
Mr.President, in the face of all the judicial authority which Slovakia has adduced,
international as well as municipal, it is clear thatthe duty of an injured party to mitigate damage does,
as maintained by Slovakia, arise under in ternational law in a case such as this.
The Practical Option of "Approximate Application": was Variant C such?
Mr.President, I would now like to turn to the question whether, as a practical matter,
Variant C can be regarded as an approximate applc iation of the Treaty Project. The map on the screen
demonstrates this.
You will see the location of Dunakiliti. Thatis where the Treaty required Hungary to build a
dam across the Danube. The Dunakiliti weir was the intended control point, a kind of "tap". The -15-
result would be that, upstream of the dam, the waters would back up, fill the reservoir and flow down
the bypass canal through to the Gabcíkovo power station and locks.
Hungary has claimed that VariantC was really a "new activity" (ProfessorNagy, CR 97/5,
p.31), or something "fundamentally different" from the Treaty Project (ProfessorKiss, CR 97/5,
p. 12). Again, Mr. President, let us not be led astray by labels; let us look at the substance. The map
now on the screen shows at a glance how basically similar Variant C and the Treaty Project are.
What VariantC involved was really quite simple. At Cunovo both banks of the river
belonged to Czechoslovakia. So here it was possi ble for Czechoslovakia to replace the function of
Dunakiliti by building a complex of structures entirely on its own territory. It was also necessary for
Czechoslovakia to build an associated small dyke just South of the main dam to retain the waters of
the new reservoir and a longer, dividing dyke along theleft bank of the old river, to retain the waters
of the new reservoir. And, of course, the reservoirhad to be smaller than the original scheme. Those
few physical changes in the Gabcíkovo section werenot only all within Czechoslovak territory, but all
of them were alsowithin the reservoir area as original planned.
Professor Nagy (CR 97/4, pp. 35-37; also HR,paras. 7.15-7.16) has contended that, compared
with the Treaty Project, the changes were more extensive. Let me begin with two general
observations. First, some of the alleged changes are said to have occurred after October 1992: they
are thus not relevant to the question of what Czechoslovakia was entitled to do in October1992.
Second, Hungary ignores the extent to whic h changes were the result of Czechoslovakia's
careful respect for Hungary's territorial sovereignty:it was, for example, precisely for that reason that
a dam was built at Cunovo.
Now let me be more specific, Mr. President. Professor Nagy identified what he called "seven
major interferences not envisaged by the 1977 Treaty". Apart from the main structure at Cunovo and
the associated dykes to which I have referred, th ey were all directly consequential upon those main
elements. Thus the flow in the main Danube be tween Cunovo and Dunakiliti was reduced, as a direct
consequence of the dam having to be re-sited at Cunovo because of Hungary's refusal to resume
damming at Dunakiliti; a new by-pass weir was built to allow water to flow into the main Danube
bed — again, directly consequentia l upon the re-siting of the dam, and preciselyto allow water to -16-
continue to flow into the main Danube, as it would have under the original plan; and a new
inundation weir was built, and a new intake was c onstructed into the Mosoni Danube— again,
preciselyso that Czechoslovakia could, in the new situation forced upon it, keep as close as possible
to the original Project.
So, Mr. President, none of the matters noted by Hungary adds anything of substance to what
Slovakia has described as the essential elements of Variant C.
But, Mr. President, there is a wider issue. Hungary, in drawing attention to various allegedly
adverse changes, ignores the basic question — whosefault were they? They were Hungary's fault —
they were made inevitable by Hungary's default. Thus for Hungary to complain that the Danube had
been dammed at a different place, and that the C unovo reservoir is 30% smaller than the originally
planned Hrusov-Dunakiliti reservoir, as if they were just a whim on the part of Czechoslovakia, is
laughable—who, I would ask, prevented the dam being built where originally planned, and thus
prevented the reservoir being its proper size? As for the apparent complaint that the system now
functions with only limited peak power operation insteadof the originally planned regular peak-power
operation (CR 97/4, p. 37, para. 18), it is wrong on the facts (there is no peak power operation at
Gabcíkovo), and in any event, who put paid to the planned peak-power system, by abandoning
Nagymaros? Hungary, Mr. President, and Hungaryalone, and the same can be said about Hungary's
complaint (ibid., pp 38-39) that Hungary has lost what was to be ajoint control of the operation of the
system, instead of which it is now under unilate ral Slovakian control: whose fault is that,
Mr. President? And whose fault is it if Hungary haslost benefits which were to be expected? Again,
Hungary's, and Hungary's alone.
In fact, however, Hungary isnot deprived, by Variant C, of benefits expected to flow from the
original Treaty Project. Its essential aims were ll achieved in the Gabcíkovosection, as regards flood
control, navigation, and the production of electricity.
So, Mr. President, Gabcíkovo as it now operate s, thanks to Variant C, is as close an
approximation to the Treaty Project as can be devised in the face of Hungary's breach. Without
Nagymaros, without Dunakiliti, it is the best approximation that could be constructed. It is important
to bear in mind that Variant C was in large meas ure the same as that Project—the very term -17-
"Variant" C shows that it is but a variation of the original Project. It comprises the continuation of
parts of the Project as originally agreed, and then those variations to the agreed Project necessarily
consequential upon Hungary's unlawful abandonment of it. So when Hungary complains about the
unlawfulness of Variant C, Hungary is in larg e measure complaining about the performance of
matters originally agreed in the 1977 Treaty.
The Court will have read the attempts by Hungary to show that Variant C was an ecological
disaster. Well, you will soon see the area with yourown eyes. My colleague, Dr. Mikulka, will take
you through the evidence shortly. He will show y ou—on the basis of hard evidence of the actual
results of four years of operation (see SR, Vol. 3)—that the environmental impacts of Variant C
have been grossly exaggerated by Hungary, and, indeed, often created by Hungary itself. In any
event, as I have already noted, the benefits of Va riant C, environmental and otherwise, have been
considerable.
Counter-measures
Mr. President, in its Memorial, Hungary devoe td considerable space to arguing that Variant C
could not be justified as a "counter-measure" (HM, paras. 7.88-7.118). This, however,
misunderstands Czechoslovakia's position. And then, during these oral proceedings, Hungary raised a
related argument — that "approximate application" was Slovakia's sole legal argument to justify the
adoption of Variant C (CR 97/5, p. 30). This, too,misunderstands Slovakia's position. Let me correct
both misunderstandings together.
Mr. President, a counter-measure is an act which, prima facie, is wrongful. However, its
wrongfulness is precluded, or excused, if certain conditions are met. But Czechoslovakia never
believed Variant C to be a wrongful act. Consequently Czechoslovakia never justified Variant C as a
"counter-measure" (SC-M, paras. 11.54-11.74).
Slovakia trusts that this view of the matter will commend itself to the Court. If, however, the
Court takes the contrary view and regards Variant C as, prima facie, a wrongful act by
Czechoslovakia, then Slovakia would indeed have an alternative legal argument. Slovakia would
submit that Variant C could be justiifed in law as a "counter-measure". -18-
All the necessary conditions would have been satisfied when Czechoslovakia was forced to
adopt and, in October 1992, implement Variant C. There would have been a prior illegal act by
Hungary—he breach of the Treaty; and it is a breach which continues to this very day. Hungary
would have failed to comply with its obligations to remedy that breach, for example by resuming
compliance with its obligations under the 1977 Treat y. Czechoslovakia's reaction—Variant C,
which was conceived as a provisional and reversible solution— could be seen as an attempt to
induce Hungary to re-establish the situation whic h existed before Hungary's wrongful act, namely
compliance with Hungary's Treaty obligations: Vari ant C could then have been reversed, and the
original agreed Project could have gone ahead. Th e adoption of Variant C would have been shown to
be necessary in the circumstances— it was, as a last resort, the only way in which Czechoslovakia
could salvage something from the agreed Treaty Projectby its own efforts. Czechoslovakia could be
seen to have done all that could have been aske d of it beforehand to initiate a meaningful dialogue
with Hungary, but Hungary rendered all attempts at bilateral negotiation futile, and refused to allow
independent third-party examination of the matter. Finally, the implementation of Variant C would
qualify as an appropriate, propor tionate response: indeed, it could scarcely be considered
disproportionate, since the act would be the fulfilment, as far as possible, of what the two Parties had
agreed upon.
I turn, now, to consider—relatively brie fly—some further arguments advanced by
Hungary.
Variant C : Provisional or Permanent?
Slovakia has always said that Variant C was envisaged as only a provisional, and reversible,
solution: thus, if the Parties returned to their original treaty scheme, the provisional solution could be
replaced by the original, agreed scheme (SM para. 4.82; SC-M,para. 6.17). And I note that the EC
Working group, in its report of 23 November 1992 (SM, para. 1.19; and Ann.12) confirmed the
Slovak view that a return to the Treaty Project was still technically feasible.
Hungary argues that the sheer strength and solidity of the Variant C structures suggests that
they are intended to be permanent. But how else, Mr. President, would Hungary have the structures -19-
built? In a makeshift fashion, so that the firstDanube flood would wash them away? The argument is
not serious.
Nevertheless, Slovakia repeats once more that Variant C was conceived as "provisional" and
"reversible", and would not bar a return to the original Treaty Project. But — and this is an important
qualification—a return to the Treaty Project today could only be on the basis that Hungary agreed
fully to perform its treaty obligations and to compen sate Slovakia for the extra investment involved in
Variant C and the cost of returning to the original Project. -20-
Variant C: in conflict with Legal Obligations?
Mr. President, Hungary advances a series of arguments designed to show that Variant C
involved a breach of various legal obligations binding on Czechoslovakia . Let me briefly take these
in turn.
(i) The 1977 Treaty.
As regards the 1977 Treaty, it takes a good deal ofnerve, Mr. President, for a Party which has
torn up a Treaty to accuse the other Party of being in breach of it, when that other Party has simply
tried to perform the treaty as best it could.
All the same, Mr. President, Hungary has persis tently alleged that Variant C "diverted" the
Danube. This is emotive and inaccurate language. The Danube remains exactly where it was; all that
has happened is that, under normal conditions, the main flow has been directed into the navigation
canal. But that is what Hungary agreed to in the 1977 Treaty.
Second, Hungary has said that there were differences between Variant C and the Treaty
Project. And I have already dealt with that argument.
Third, Hungary contends that the 1977 Treaty prohibits unilateral operation. Not quite, Mr.
President. What the Treaty provides for isjoint operation. But how do you get joint operation when
one Party refuses to operate at all?
Fourth, Hungary says Czechoslovakia breached itsobligations to consult and negotiate. This
is astonishing. Czechoslovakia tried and tried again to consult and negotiate, but could get nowhere.
And how could Czechoslovakia c onsult and negotiate about the performanceof the Treaty when
Hungary instructed its negotiators to talk only about theterminationof the Treaty?
Mr. President, these too are not serious arguments.
(ii) The 1976 Boundary Waters Agreement
Then Hungary argues (HC-M, paras. 6.63-6.65; CR 97/6, pp. 31-34) that the 1976 Boundary
Waters Agreement is still in force and that Czechoslovakia was in breach of certain obligations under
it by putting Variant C into effect in the way it did.
There are several answers to these arguments, and they can be put briefly. -21-
First, as my colleague Professor McCaffrey explained on 25 March, the 1977 Treaty was, in
relation to the Boundary Waters Agreement, the lex specialis, and also the lex posterior: so on both
counts, its obligations prevail. And VariantC of course was but an application of that Treaty.
Second, in any event, the Parties had, in the 1977 Treaty, agreed special water management
arrangements to apply to the Project in the Gabci kovo section. Variant C was, as I have shown,
designed to give effect to the 1977 Treaty Project in all its essentials, so far as it lay in
Czechoslovakia's power to do so. It was not a new project, dissociated from the 1977 Treaty. It was
an applicationof that Treaty — a best-possible application of it: and Variant C essentially carried on
those agreed water management arrangements.
Third, so far as Article 3 of the 1976 Agreement requires the parties to inform each other of
changes and to negotiate as a ppropriate, Czechoslovakia did, as Professor Pellet explained, fully
inform Hungary of the proposals for Variant C, a nd did all it could to cons ult with Hungary about
them: but Hungary rejected Czechoslovakia's approaches.
(iii) The 1948 Danube Convention and the 1977 Treaty regarding Hungary's
frontiers
The next suggestion is that Variant C violaets the 1948 Danube Convention. Now this, to say
the least, is curious. The principal obligation underArticle 3 of the Danube Convention is to maintain
and improve navigation. This was also a primary aim of the 1977 Treaty and, of course, the bypass
canal is built exactly as the Treaty required. Y ou will see it. You will see the improvement. And
now, with the ship-lock built at Cunovo, the old river, too, can be used for navigation. If Variant C
really were a breach of the Danube Convention, is itnot strange that no such allegation has ever been
made by the Danube Commission? Instead, the position is precisely the opposite: the Danube
Commission has always wanted to see the bypass canal as provided for in the Treaty Project and now
in Variant C.
Then we have a quite separate argument byHungary — for example, put before the Court on
6 March by Professor Kiss (CR 97/5, p. 13) — to the effect that Variant C violated Hungary's Danube
frontier. This, says Professor Kiss, was establis hed as the principal channel of the Danube, but
VariantC, by changing the main navigational channel, has affected the frontier. But Mr.President,
that change to the main navigational channel was agreed in the 1977 Treaty; and what is more the -22-
Parties also agreed that the boundary was not to change. Article22(1) (a) of the 1977 Treaty—
which Professor Kiss omitted to mention — provided thatthe frontier was to remain the same: that is,
in the old river bed, running along the centre line of the main navigation channel or "thalweg". And
the "thalweg" in the old river is still there, clear ly identifiable, so the boundary remains as it was,
unchanged. The argument has no substance, Mr. President.
(iv) The 1958 Convention concerning fishing in the Danube
Hungary has, next, suggested (CR97/5, pp.16- 17) that Czechoslovakia is in some way in
breach of its obligations under the 1958 Danube Fishery Convention, either by failing to improve the
natural conditions for fish in the Danube, or by not drawing up and putting into joint operation
measures guaranteeing normal fish migration. There are three short answers, Mr. President: first, as a
factual matter, the conditions for fish inthe relevant part of the Danube havenot been made worse by
Variant C; second, how could Czechoslovakia do anythingjointly when Hungary was refusing to co-
operate? and third, Hungary is, again, wrong to look at the operation of Variant C as if it were some
new invention: it is not— it is an application of the 1977 Treaty, and its implications are those
already agreed by Hungary in that Treaty, including the right for the parties to take the measures they
think "appropriate" for the protection of fishing interests.
(v) The 1992 London Agreed Minutes
Then we come to Professor Kiss's comme nts on the so-called "London Agreement" of
28October1992 (CR97/5, p.18, para.30). I would fi rst note, Mr.President, that this document is
not formally a treaty at all, but the "Agreed Minutes of the Meeting" which took place on that date
(see SM, para.4.97-4.102; and Ann.128); and it wa s stated not to prejudice the legal rights of the
Parties. ProfessorKiss says that it was pub licly repudiated by Czechoslovakia. However,
Mr.President, on 4November1992, just a few days later, the Czechoslovak Government informed
the European Commission in writing that the Czechoslovak Government "hadapproved the Minutes"
of the London meeting, and would "respect the positions of the fact-finding mission and expert
working group" which were to be set up (SM, para. 4.100 and Ann. 129). This, Mr. President, is the
very opposite of the "repudiation" alleged by Hungary. -23-
As Slovakia has explained in its Memorial (paras. 4.97-4.99), Czechoslovakia's undertakings
in the Agreed Minutes were not the immediate a nd open-ended commitmentswhich Hungary seeks to
show; rather, they would either only arise at somefuture, unspecified, time, or were limited to a few
days during which the work of the fact-finding mission was to be completed. There was never any
agreement that the work on Variant C, or its operation, would be suspended pending the outcome of
third-party involvement— whether via the EC or this Court. Czechosl ovakia could never have
agreed to give up even that partial degree of impl ementation of the original Project. Hungary had
already succeeded in postponing the damming of the Danube and the diversion of the waters into the
new bypass canal for three years. It would have been quite impractical, and highly damaging to the
massive structures already built, as well as to the surrounding environment, to let them stand exposed
and idle indefinitely.
In any event, Mr.President, it would be wrong to treat the London meeting as a defining
moment in the general scheme of events: it was part of a continuing process of discussion, some
elements of which went no further, but others of which led to formal agreements — like, indeed, the
Special Agreement pursuant to which thiscase is now before this Court.
) i v ( The environmental impact of Variant C
Hungary also argued that, in executing Varian tC, Czechoslovakia breached an obligation
under Article 19 of the 1977 Treaty to establish the impact of the original project on the environment,
and that this obligation was ignored in relation to Variant C.
Mr.President, this argument is unfounded. My colleagues ProfessorMcCaffrey and
Mr. Wordsworth have amply demonstrated that the obligations under the 1977 Treaty in this context
were satisfied by numerous studies and assessmen ts which were made, both before and after 1977.
Finally, as Dr.Mikulka will explain, careful monitoring has shown, as expected, that in fact
Variant C has posed even fewer problems for theenvironment than the Treaty Project would have.
(vii) Customary international law relating to the environment
I now come to Hungary's more general arguments concerning the law of the environment in
relation to Variant C. And here Hungary largely recycles its arguments made in respect of the 1977
Treaty itself. ProfessorMcCaffrey has already re sponded to these arguments in that context. -24-
But in relation specifically to VariantC, Slovakia has two broad responses. First, Variant C
is the result of Czechoslovakia's good faith attempt to implement the Treaty as best it could, in the
face of its unjustified repudiation by Hungary; and VariantC is thus again an application of the
Treaty, and so— like that Treaty itself— does not vi olate the rules of general international law to
which Hungary refers. Second,even taken on its own, Variant C does not violate those rules.
As to Hungary's insistence on the prohibition oftransfrontier damage (HR, paras. 3.56-3.63),
Slovakia does not challenge the obligation to refra in from causing significant transboundary harm.
But, there are threeimportant points. First, there was nothing in the implementation of the 1977
Treaty by the Parties that violated this obligati on. On the contrary, the greatest instances of
transboundary harm were those caused by Hungary'sfailure to undertake certain necessary measures.
Second, any "harm" Hungary complains of resulting fromthe implementation of Variant C was, since
VariantC was a best possible application of the Treaty Project, accepted by Hungary in the 1977
Treaty itself. And third, in any event, VariantC has not in fact caused transfrontier harm, as my
colleague Dr. Mikulka will show later.
(viii) Obligations concerning the equitabe l use of International Watercourses.
MrP. resident, let me turn now to the argument that, in constructing VariantC,
Czechoslovakia violated the principles governn ig the equitable use of shared watercourses.
Slovakia has no difficulty whatsoever with the principle of equitable utilization. Indeed, the
entire Treaty Project is an expression of that prin ciple, and VariantC is in the circumstances the
closest possible application of the 1977 Treaty.
The core of the concept of equitable utilisationis the achievement of a balance of benefits and
burdens for the riparian States concerned — as Hungary has recognized (HR, p. 135, para. 3.59) and
this was precisely the case with the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project.
And there cannot be any doubt that the utilization in question in the present case — namely,
the putting into operation of the Project— was accepted by the two Statesin the 1977Treaty.
Variant C, as such, was not of course accepted by both Parties. But nothing in the concept of
equitable participation, and nothi ng in Article5 (2) of the ILC's Draft Articles on International
Watercourses, made such acceptance obligatory. There was an agreement — the 1977 Treaty — and -25-
Czechoslovakia was, through Variant C, simply seeking to implement that agreement as best it could
in the circumstances caused by Hungary's breach.
In any event, Mr. President, Variant C is in factitself consistent with the principle of equitable
and reasonable utilization.
As to the duty, Mr. President, to cause "no significant harm", there was no significant harm to
Hungary, as Dr. Mikulka will show.
) x i ( Permanent sovereignty
Let me finally, Mr.President, turn to the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources. Hungary persists in its Reply in asserti ng that this principle is somehow relevant to this
dispute, and that VariantC somehow infringes it (HR, 3-48). But Hungary also insists—and
Slovakia agrees—that the Danube is a "shared na tural resource". Mr.President, how can a State
have permanent sovereignty over a shared natural resource? The two concepts deal with quite
different situations. Hungary's reference to perm anent sovereignty over natural resources, as if the
Danube were simply a national resource under Hungarian sovereignt y, is simply a confusion of
concepts.
- o O o -
Mr. President, that concludes my argument on the lawfulness of Variant C. I have sought to
demonstrate that
(1)following Hungary's abandonment of the Treaty Pr oject, the circumstances left Czechoslovakia
with no practical alternative to the adoption of VariantC, even though VariantC was not
Czechoslovakia's preferred course;
(2)Variant C did not involve Czechoslovakia inany breach of its international obligations; and
(3)on the contrary, Czechoslovakia was fully entitled in international law to adopt and proceed with
Variant C.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your attention. -26-
I should be grateful, Mr. President, if youwould now call upon my colleague, Dr. Mikulka, Co-
Agent for Slovakia, to address the Court.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir Arthur. I now call upon Dr. Mikulka. -27-
MMIr.ULKA:
The Present Position : Impacts of the Implementation of the Gabcíkovo section of
the G/N Project through Variant C
Mr. President, in a few minutes, I shall take the Court through Slovakia's short video
presentation. But I wish, first, to dwell on two issues that arise out of Hungary's lengthy treatment —
in Volume 2 of its Counter-Memorial, in Volume 2 of its Reply, and now in its oral pleadings — of
the supposed impacts of the implementation of the Gabcíkovo section of the Project through
Variant C.
First , the Special Agreement lays down various questions as to the Parties’ legal entitlement to
perform various acts between May1989 and October 1992. How can events after October1992, in
particular, after-the-fact evidence of the impacts of Project implementation through VariantC, be
relevant to the Special Agreement's questions? Hungary did not address this question during its oral
presentation; yet it did rely almost exclusively on evidence of impact contained in reports of 1994
and 1995. Slovakia is not troubled by Hungary's evidece. It has its own, better evidence of what the
impacts of Variant C have been or will be — the PHARE reports, the EC Working Group reports, the
analyses of the Slovak monitoring programs. In thispresentation, Slovakia shall respond to the claims
of adverse environmental impact post-1992 made at such length by Hungary; but it nonetheless
questions the legal relevance of the 1994-1995idence on which Hungary's claims are based.
The second issue : although Hungary relies so heavily on the 1994 and 1995 reports, at the
same time it insists that the evidence of actual impacts recorded by Slovakia's scientists is of little
value — because four years is not enough time fornvironmental impacts to manifest themselves (CR
97/4, at p. 62).
Leaving aside the fact that the PHARE programme has made its predictions on long-term
modelling; leaving aside the fact that the EC Expert reports concluded in 1993 that Project
implementation through VariantC would not have significant adverse effects to the region's surface
and groundwater — conclusions that would clearly nothave been made without scientific foundation;
leaving these points aside, Hungary's insistence on the unreliability of short term impacts is surely
nothing more than a sign of its own defensiveness. Once again, Hungary asks the Court to refer to -28-
increasingly unrealistic standards of impact asse ssment. For Hungary, it is not enough if Project
impacts were extensively studied, it is not enough ifthere was an Environmental Impact Assessment,
it is not enough if there are four years of hard evidence of actual impacts. Hungary always wants
more.
Slovakia's approach has been very different. The most complete evidence of actual impacts
was placed before the Court in the Data and M onitoring Reports contained in VolumeIII to the
Slovak Reply. An even more detailed description of actual impacts is publicly available in this blue
volume compiled by the Faculty of Natural Sciences in Bratislava (Environmental Impact Review,
Comenius University, Bratislava, 1995).
Slovakia's scientists have not just looked atthe actual data from October 1992 onwards. They
have made a series of detailed comparisons betw een this data and the data from the pre-dam era
which, in many cases, was collected over decades. From such a comparison, it is possible to see
whether the implementation of the Gabcíkovo sectionhas caused any significant changes, and also to
make well-founded predictions as to whether adve rse impacts may be expected in the long term
future. And, of course, the state-of-the-art modelling under the PHARE program has taken all this
one stage further.
I come now to Slovakia's video presentation. Of course there is a limit to what can now be
shown. Water quality impacts, for example, do not lend themselves to video presentations. Thus, in
seeing what now follows, I would respectfully requestthe Court to bear in mind the conclusions of the
EC Working Group of Experts in their report of December 1993, when it was explained that Project
implementation through VariantC would have no significant impact on the quality of the region's
surface water and groundwater:
"The impacts on thesurfacewater quality are expected to be insignificant."
"The impacts on the groundwaterquality are in general expected to be insignificant."
(HM, Vol. 5 (II), Ann. 19, at pp. 783-784.)
VIDEO PRESENTATION -29-
Mr. President, Slovakia's video presentation starts with a few shots of the Danube as it passes
the Devin gate and enters Bratislava.
The Gabcíkovo project, in fact, starts just belo w Bratislava. Here is the upper part of the
reservoir with its shallowwaters and small islands.
The main flow of the Danube water comes from the reservoir into the bypass canal. Here are
the navigation locks and this is the whole Gabcíkovo barrage complex, with its hydroelectric power
plant which operates at a "run-of-river" mode.
Between the bypass canal and the old riverbed lies the Slovak floodplain with its extensive
system of river branches.
Here we are back on the reservoir, which is connected to the old riverbed at Cunovo through
the bypass weir, the navigation lock and—dur ing flood discharges—through the inundation weir.
The reservoir also enables greatly increased dischargesinto the Mosoni Danube — this is the intake at
Cunovo, discharging around 40 m3/s into the Mosoni.The Mosoni flows only in Hungarian territory
and it was dry for most parts of the year in the pre-dam state.
Thanks to the reservoir, there is also an increase in the water on the Maly Danube which flows
on Slovak territory.
The next section is devoted to the branches.
On both sides of the Danube, there is an extensive system of river branches, providing differing
habitats for flora and fauna.
In the far past the river branches were conn ected with the main flow and during floods the
Danube used to flood the whole inundation area.
In the decades preceding the damming of the rive r a significant deepening of the main riverbed
occurred: decreased gravel transport, dredging, and riverbed erosion led to a drop in the water level of
the Danube and the disconnection of the river branches from its main flow.
While during floods the Danube still flooded the whole inter-dyke area, under low discharges the
branches did not receive any flow and often dried up. -30-
This phenomenon threatened the whole floodplainarea. Far-reaching changes in the environment
began to be felt. And the symptoms of drying-up are still visible today at many places in the floodplain
forest.
In May 1993 Slovakia put into operation the system of direct discharge into the river branches.
The Dobrohost intake allows for the discharge of 200m3/s. Technical means are available to achieve the
optimum discharge, taking into account environmental needs.
The floodplain is divided into several sectors w ith cross-sectional dykes, where the water flows
from one sector into another and finally meets the old Danube.
The floodplain forest is not the original forest ofa century or more ago. Here you can see that it
is largely made up of a series of forestry plantations, mainly of one species of poplar.
The water flow and water levels are controlle d by opening and closing culverts in the cross-
sectional dykes, enabling a variety of habitatsto be created in different types of branches.
The next section is devoted to the old riverbed.
The old riverbed between Cunovo and Gabcíkovo receives water from the reservoir through the
bypass weir. The discharge ranges between 250 and 600 m3/s.
Just next to the Dunakiliti weir, an underwater weir was built by Hungary following the April
1995 Agreement.
The weir is a 4 m high dyke partially overflowingwith water — a means of restoring water levels
in the old riverbed to the pre-dam conditions on a length of about 10 kilometres.
The impounded water has also created a conn ection between the Danube and the Hungarian
branch system, providing a direct discharge there as well.
Downstream of Dunakiliti, the old riverbed s till awaits similar measures. The river drains
groundwater from the area next to the old riverbed.
Here, now, is a schematic presentation of how this problem could be solved by construction of a
series of underwater weirs.
In the next sequence, I wish to show the Court how the inundation of the floodplain can be
achieved through technical measures. -31-
At Dobrohost, the waterflow through the intake structure is increased. The culverts in the dykes
that separate the different sections of the side ar ms are closed. The water levels in the dyke branches
build up and then flood over into the forest.
The timing of the inundation can be optimized inaccordance with the discharge conditions in the
Danube.
Here, the brown colour of the flood water cont rasts with the blue seepage water in the two
recreation lakes.
What we have just seen is a flood achieved by e tchnical means, beneficial to the environment. By
way of comparison, I would just like to show youa few shots of the catastrophic flood of 1965, which I
described to you in my first presentation.
Today, the upper part of the Project region —both in Slovakia and Hungary—is protected
against even the most severe flood, thanks to Ga bcíkovo part of the Project. Downstream of Sap,
however, the region is not protected as envisaged by the G/N Project.
In the final sequence of Slovakia's video presentation, I wish to look briefly at the impact of the
Gabcíkovo section of the Projecton the region's bird populations.
Birds, like fish, are useful indicators of environmental impact. And, since the damming in
October 1992, the impacts here havebeen overwhelmingly positive.
An important new habitat has been created in th e reservoir and increases in the overall numbers of
birds, the number of species and the numberof rare species have been recorded.
The side arm areas are the preferred nesting habitats for many species.
Mr. President, the shots that we have just s een show the flood plain during the growth season.
We move now into autumn, and then into winter. During the winter, the discharge into the side arms is
lowered — as would be the case under natural cond itions and in accordance with ecological demands.
The season we have not covered inour video is the early spring, but this you will see on the spot
next week.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, thank you very much for your attention. May I now ask
you to call on Professor Mucha who will further Mr . Refsgaard's analysis of the impacts of the -32-
implementation of the Gabcíkovo section through Variant C by looking at the findings of Slovak and
joint Slovak/Hungarian monitoring in terms ofwater issues. Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you so much, Dr. Mikulka. May I call now on Professor Mucha. -33-
ProfessoCr HA:
The Impacts of Variant C on Surface and Groundwater Quality
Mr. President, Members of the Court, I would like to begin my statement by discussing the
impact of Variant C on groundwater levels . Hungary has placed great emphasis on decreasesin
groundwater levels. But it does not tell the whole story. First, the filling of the upstream reservoir in
October 1992 resulted in an increaseof groundwater levels in the significant area. This is shown up on
the screen (Judges' Folder No.30). The light blue indicates an increase of up to 0.5 m while the dark
blues indicate greater increases. The major change occurred in the areas adjacent to the reservoir, where
groundwater levels increased by as much as 3 m.
This increase was also felt on Hungarian territory, although Hungary insists that even increases
in groundwater levels are adverse impacts (CR 97/4, at p. 59). But the increase here has meant the
restoration of water levels known some 30 years a go, and cannot possibly be considered as adverse
(Judges' Folder No. 31). The map now on the screen shows the decreasein groundwater levels that
occurred between 1962 and 1992 (prior to the damming) . The darker red/brown areas are where the
water levels had dropped by up to 3 mprior to 1992.
Second , it is true that the groundwater level drd in the area downstream of the Cunovo weir,
in particular along the old riverbed. However, as soon as Slovakia put to operation the system of direct
recharge to the river branch system in Ma y 1993 on its side of the river, there was an increasein the
groundwater level there and the area affected by th e draining of the old riverbed was considerably
narrowed. The positive impact of this direct recharge on groundwater levels was confirmed by the EC
Experts (SM, Vol.II, Ann. 19, at p. 360) and has nowbeen confirmed in the PHARE report. This report
found that through "filling the river branch system,e groundwater levels were brought back to the pre-
dam level" (Final Report, Vol. 1, p. 5-3).
Hungary has nonetheless questioned the extent of the impact of the direct recharge (CR 97/4, at
p .69). But thanks to the system of joint monitoring established under the Agreement of 19 May 1995,
we know for certain that the direct recharge systemhas had a beneficial impact on groundwater levels on -34-
both sides of the river including the Hungarian side. Unfortunately, Hungary has not been willing to
exchange data on the inundation area on its side of theriver. But we do have the data from various other
monitoring wells in Szigetköz, whichis shown up on the screen (Table 1) and also in the Judges' Folder.
And, if the results from the joint monitoring of th ese wells in 1995 is compared with the results from
1992, that is, prior to the damming, we can see — on the basis of Hungariandata — that on the major
part of Hungarian territory the groundwater levels have in fact increased(Joint Annual Report of the
Environment Monitoring in 1995, May 1996, Judges' Folder No. 33).
The groundwater levels in the Hungarian we lls are shown for the years 1992, 1994 and 1995.
The first column gives the identification number of the observation well. The second column gives the
1992 pre-dam level, whilst columns three and four s how the groundwater levels before and after the
direct recharge scheme was put into operation. A comparison of the 1992 and the 1995 figures shows
that in almost every single case, groundwater levels have increasedsince the damming and since the
direct recharge system was put into operation. Thisdirectly rebuts Hungary's contentions on their topic
(CR 97/4, at p. 69 and Illustration No. 12-18). And, Imay just add that Hungary's allegations of a loss of
natural sub-irrigation in the Szigetközare based on results from the situationprior to the implementation
of the direct recharge into its side arms in May 1995 (CR 97/4, at p. 63).
I turn now to the issue of water quality. I wish to look, first, at the surface water quality in this
stretch of the Danube. Under the joint Slovak-Hungara in water quality programme, a classification based
on 6 water quality classes has been agreed and this is applied in the Slovak monitoring system. This
monitoring has revealed that since the damming of the Danube, no significant changesin water quality
have occurred. There has even been an improvement in respect of certain parameters (SR, Vol.III, p.
24).
The Slovak findings are confirmed by the December 1996 report of the Slovak-Hungarian
Transboundary Water Commission (see Tendency and Dy namics of Water Quality Changes of the
Danube River and its Tributaries, Bratislava and Budapest, December1996). This report compared the
water quality of the Danube spanning a six year period both prior to and after the damming. Fourteen
variables were monitored in order to record possible changes. -35-
The Table up on the screen (Table 2) shows the overall findings of this report. This Table can
also be found on the Judges' Folder (No. 34). The first column identifies the sampling location. The
second column gives the number of determinants indicating improvements after the damming, while
columns three and four show the number of determinan ts either indicating deterioration or no change.
This Table is clear evidence that the self-purifyingprocesses in the reservoir have had a positive impact
on Danube water quality. This impact is also evident on the Danube stretch downstream on Hungarian
territory. This means that the water quality of theDanube that eventually reaches the bank-filtered wells
supplying Budapest will bebetter than in the pre-dam conditions.
The upstream reservoir has this positive impact on water quality because it is not a single body
of slow flowing water. The reservoir conditions are typical for river and flood-plain ecotopes: a
moderate to fast flowing main channel, moderately flowing deep and shallow river branches, and flood-
plain water bodies with variable flow velocity. Th e settlement of aquatic vegetation in shallow water
and on the banks contributes to the self-purification.
Hungary has claimed that there is a problem ofenhanced eutrophication activity in the reservoir
(CR 97/4, at p. 67). But, once again, joint monitoring has confirmed satisfactory results. The Table on
the screen (Table3 and in the Judges' Folder) is based on the findings of the December1996 report of
the Slovak-Hungarian Transboundary Water Commi ssion (see, Tendency and Dynamics of Water
Quality Changes of the Danube River and its Tributaries, Bratislava and Budapest, December 1996). If
the pre-dam chlorophyll a figures— at Medvedov, Komarno or Budapest— are compared with the
post-dam figures, it is seen in most cases that there has been a slight decrease in this measure of
eutrophication.
One of the specific aims of the PHARE report was "to assess whether eutrophication problems
in the reservoir can be expected or not" (Final Re port, Vol.1, pp.5-19). The assessment given was
clear, that "no eutrophication problems in the reservoir will occur" (ibid., pp. 5-20). Similarly, PHARE
has predicted no major problems in the Old Danube and no eutrophication problems in the Slovak river
branch system (ibid., pp.5-13 and 5-18). This is confirmed by the monitoring of actual impacts. No
significant phytoplankton growth has been observed either in the river branches, or in the old Danube
riverbed, or in the Danube downstream of its confluen ce with the tailrace canal (SR, Vol. 3, pp. 30-33). -36-
Now, let me turn to groundwaterquality. The groundwater processes in the Danubian Lowland
have been monitored for more than 30years a nd an enormous database has been built up— as
confirmed in all the EC and PHARE reports. Th e system of groundwater observation wells ensuring
weekly or daily data collection can be seen on the ma p (SR, Illus. No. 5), and there are hundreds of such
wells in Zitný Ostrov. This fact demonstrates how ill-founded are Hungary´s claims about the lack of
basic knowledge concerning groundwater processes in this region. More than 300parameters are
regularly measured (see SR, Vol. 3, p. 19). Examplesof similarly extensive monitoring systems in other
parts of Europe are decidedly rare.
And what does all this monitoring show? The re sults, which have been presented to the Court
by Slovakia in its Reply, show that the groundwater quality in general has not changed (SR, Vol.3,
pp.16-17). The main factor influencing the groundw ater quality is the quality of the water in the
Danube and in its side arms. But there are no si gnificant pollutants which could propagate into
groundwater from the Danube (ibid., at p. 15). And, since the damming, the Danube water quality has
improved— as I have just shown. Also, since the im plementation of the direct recharge into the side
arms, the water quality has improved there also.
Hungary places great focus on the content of iorn and manganese in groundwater (CR 97/4, at p.
65). But iron and manganese are not pollutants, they are part of the geological composition of this
aquifer, just as in so many other aquifers in Europe. Whether iron and manganese is dissolved in water
depends on the oxygen conditions in the groundwater. It is not surprising that, as Hungary asserts,
excess iron and manganese was recorded in wells close to its side arms in 1994 in the upper part of the
aquifer (ibid.). But prior to the direct recharge of Hungar's side arms from May 1995, and as part of the
long-term conditions in the pre-dam state, poor oxygenconditions next to side arms with little or no flow
would be expected. Of course, groundwater containing iron and manganese can be treated by water
aeration and sedimentation of iron and manganese oxides. But the pr oblem can be avoided by siting
wells away from dead or stagnant river branchesthat contain sediments with organic matter.
I wish to stress that the groundwater in the upstream aquifer is of immense importance to
Slovakia. This is the groundwater that is supplied to the inhabitants of Br atislava and other Slovak
towns and villages. It does not, ofcourse, supply drinking water toBudapest. Looking up on the screen, -37-
the Kalinkovo waterworks is the closest to the reservoir and, should any negative development occur, it
would necessarily be first felt here, where special water quality experimentation are carried out. The
Šamorín water supply system is close to the lower part of the reservoir, while the Gabcíkovo water
supply system is representative of the middle part ofthe territory influenced by Project implementation.
The comparison of groundwater quality at all three places before and after the damming of the Danube
shows only non-significant changes in the water chemis try (SR, Vol. 3, pp. 15-16 and Gabcíkovo part of
the Hydroelectric Power Project - Environmental Impact Review, Faculty of Natural Sciences,
Bratislava, pp. 57-64).
The Rusovce water supply system, located in th e area close to the boundary with Hungary, is
typical of the groundwater conditions on the right side of the Danube. Before the damming of the
Danube, the groundwater quality was characterized by relatively high content of sulphate, and chloride
because of the groundwater flow from urban sites and industrial sites (ibid.). Since the damming, there
has been a continuous and beneficial decrease of these chemical components because of the more
intensive infiltration of Danube water into the a quifer. This points to a positive improvement in
groundwater quality, which will also befelt downstream on Hungarian territory.
To conclude this discussion of surface water and groundwater, I want to stress that the real
causes for concern— as all the monitoring and an alysis of results have confirmed— pre-dated
implementation of the Project. There are, first, surface water pollution caused by industry, agriculture
and lack of waste water treatment and,second, water and sediment quality in the river branches. In this
respect, the Project has had obviously beneficial impacts in that it has given impetus to the construction
of waste water treatment plants in both Slovakia and Hungary and has allowed an increase of water
flows into the river branch system and the Mosoni Danube.
Mr.President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your attention. Mr.President, may I
respectfully propose that the Court take a brak now and call on Dr. Mikulka thereafter.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you so much, Prof essorMucha. The Court will suspend for
15 minutes.
The Court adjourned from 11.20 to 11.40 a.m.-38- -39-
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. I call on Dr. Mikulka.
MIMKr. LKA:
Impacts Other
Mr. President, I shall conclude Slovakia's presentation on the impacts of the Project to date by
looking at those matters that are directly affected by surface water and groundwater impacts—soils,
forestry, flora and fauna.
Soils
I turn, first, to impacts to the region's soils. Asa result of Project implementation, there has been
an overall improvement in the soil moisture régime (R, Vol. III, pp. 44 and 54). According to Hungary,
however, Slovak monitoring at three locations has s hown a "systematic decline" in soil moisture (CR
97/4 at p. 70). This is misleading. The "systematic decline" in two of the three cases to which Hungary
refers, and I quote the Slovak monitoring report, refl ects the "decreasing trend" of the pre-dam period
which, it is "expected" will be turned into a "slightlyincreasing" trend (SR, Vol. III. p. 44). In the third
location, a real decrease has been r ecorded, but this"was not caused by an important decrease of the
groundwater level, but by the structure of the porous medi(ibid.).
The conclusion that the new soil moisture régi me on the Slovak side of the Danube is more
favourable (SR, Vol. III, p. 53) is no less true fo r the Szigetköz in Hungary. Indeed, when Hungary
allowed the direct discharge into its branch syst em in May 1995, groundwater levels in the Szigetköz
increased correspondingly, as Professor Mucha has just demonstrated.
Forestry/Flora
Turning to the region's floodplain forests, bot h sides are in agreement that these are of
considerable importance. Indeed, they have been the object of botanical studies since the early 1950s.
The documentation and inventory of flora and floodplain ecosystems on the Slovak side was completed
in 1986 (SR, Vol. III, p. 74). There is, accordingly, a solid body of scientific knowledge that enables an
objective evaluation of the impacts of the Project here.
So what impact did the damming have? First, it had an immediate, positive impact on the
floodplain ecosystems below Bratislava. Here the groundwater level increased significantly and several -40-
signs of the recovery of forests can be seen: the leaf loss during late summer decreased considerably in
comparison with the pre-dam situation; an increase in the annual growth of trees has been recorded;
abundant natural reforestation of poplar from seeds (p reviously rare in this area) now occurs; the
renovation of the most humid type of willow-poplar forest has also begun. Even previously dead side
arms outside of the floodplain are now filled with rising groundwater, and the return of conditions for
vegetation existing some 40 years ago isapparent (SR, Vol. III, pp. 81-86).
Second , in the inundation area, the groundwater level is now for the greater part less than 1.5
metres under the surface, easily within the reach of tree roots. And the soil moisture can be further
increased by means of the artificial inundation of the forest. As you saw during the video presentation,
the technical means for increasing or decreasing water levels are available so as to simulate natural
conditions and groundwater fluctuations.
In terms of the impact of the new water régime on the floodplain forest, the results of monitoring
show:
- trees in good health, without traces of decline,
- an improvement or, at most, no change in the annual growth of poplars,
- the natural (spontaneous) reforestation of certain tree species, which was previously unobserved
(SR, Vol. III, p. 84).
And, what of the biodiversity of the floodplain area? Has this suffered due to the Project
implementation as Hungary claims? Well, of th e total number of 1000 plant types existing in the
Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros area, some 321 can be f ound in the Dobrohost-Sap inundation area. The
monitoring over the past few years has revealed th at not a single one of these 321 plant species has
disappeared or is threatened (SR, Vol. III, pp. 85-86). On the contrary, an increase of protected species
has been recorded as a direct result of the ri se in the groundwater levels caused by Project
implementation (ibid.).
Fauna
Turning now to fauna, and I shall focus on the impacts of the Project implementation through
Variant C on fish fauna for Hungary has placed great empha sis on this subject. It is certainly correct that
impacts to fish and other aquatic fauna are a useful indicator of environmental impact (CR 97/4, at p. -41-
52). But it is important to remember that the causesof declining numbers of fish species and populations
long pre-date the short-term impact of the damming.
The adverse impacts of the pre-dam situation on fish — the concentration of the Danube's waters
into one fast flowing channel, the isolation of the ie arms on both sides of the river, the construction of
barrages on the upper Danube—have already been ex amined in some detail in Slovakia's pleadings
(see, SR, paras. 12.45-12.53). Indeed, the Mixed Commission of the Danube Fisheries Convention (of
which Hungary is, of course, a member) has repeatedly noted the adverse impacts of the factors that I
have just mentioned (SR, Vol. II, Anns. 9 and 10).
I turn, then, to Hungary's claim that, before October 1992, an "extraordinary rich fish population
of rheophile species" existed in the main Danube channel (CR 97/4, at p. 52). The Court is referred to
Appendix 2 to Hungary's Memorial, but this Appe ndix lists certain sea migratory species that
disappeared from this sector of the Danube in the 1970s(HM, Vol. 1, pp. 386-387). It is entirely true, as
Hungarian counsel explained, that the Russian stur geon "has not been recorded in the Danube near
Bratislava since the diversion" (CR 97/4, at p. 53). But— it is also true that the last verified sightings of
the Russian Sturgeon in this stretch of the river were in the 1960s (J. Holèik, 1996, "Vanishing
Freshwater Fish Species of Slovakia" in Conservation of Endangered Freshwater Fish in Europe ,
A. Kirchofer & D. Hefti (eds.), Birkhauser Verlag, Basel, pp. 79-88).
Thus, the disappearance of the fish to which Hungary refers long pre-dated the damning in
October 1992. What is more, the operation of the Gabcíkovo part of the Project has had several major,
positive impacts. First, the reservoircreated behind the Cunovo weir offers a new and important habitat
for fish. As explained by the PHARE Final report:
"The reservoir harbours suitable conditionsfor nearly all less critical rheophile species [that
is species which prefer fast flowing wa ter], up to limnic species depending on low
velocities, sedimentation rates and depths ... The settlement of aquatic vegetation will
create suitable living conditions for a wide rangeof species that hitherto were confined
to shallow river arms." (Final Report, Vol. III, p. 9-9.)
Second , as to the old riverbed, we should not forget that the high velocities in the main channel
that existed before the damming was not a natural e nvironment. The bottom of the river is now more
stable, extreme flow velocities no longer occur and, as aresult, the food basis for fish is richer than in the
pre-dam state (SR, Vol. III, pp. 110 and 94). -42-
Nonetheless, Hungary alleges that "14 rheoph ile fish species typical for this reach" can no
longer be found (CR 97/4, at p. 53). The source forthis is a 1994 study. Clearly, the monitoring was not
yet complete. By way of example, on 21 September1995, the water level behind the underwater weir at
rkm1843 was lowered and it was possible to inspect th e fish left between the stones of the weir.
Hungarian scientists recorded in this one day, 7 of the 14 rheophile species that Hungary claims can no
longer be found. I am referring to the Evaluation of the function of the underwater weir document
prepared by the Hungarian Ministry for Tran sportation, Communication and Water Economy, and
handed over to the Slovak monitoring agent in the framework of the Joint Slovak-Hungarian Agreement
on 3 October 1995.
Third , with the implementation of the direct water supply into the Danube's branch system, the
conditions for fish were considerably improved there. Already in 1995, just a few months after putting
the water recharge system of the Slovak branches into operation, the presence of 29 species was
confirmed and the regular occurrence of a total number of 55 species is expected (SR, Vol. III, p. 116).
Again, Hungary claims that there have been adve rse impacts, including the loss of 20,000 European mud
minnows (CR 97/4, at p.54). But this must be que stioned. The European mud minnow is indeed an
endangered species, and an international workshop was held on this species in Vienna in 1995. The
Hungarian scientist, Dr.Kereszte ssy, submitted various maps of the location of this species in the
pre-dam era, but on no map is the species said to be located in the Szigetköz. (K.Keresztessy 1995,
Recent fish faunastical investigation in Hungary w ith special reference to Umbra Krameri Walbaum,
1792 (Pisces: Umbridee), Ann. Natuthist. Mus.Wien, 97 B, pp. 458-465, Vienna, Nov. 1945).
What of other aquatic fauna? The benthic fauna of the old riverbed, that is, the fauna living on
the river bottom, have benefited because the extremeand atypical high flow velocities that characterized
the pre-dam situation have disappeared. Aquatic fauna have also bene fited in the reservoir and in the
side arms (SR, Vol. III, pp.93-100). The PHARE Final Report notes the importance of the new
reservoir habitat and also predicts "an increase inprimary and secondary aquatic production" in the side
arms (Final report, Vol. I, pp. 5-22).
Mr.President, I wish to conclude this pres entation by looking at two new allegations that
Hungary made during the oral hearings of a few weeks ago. -43-
First , Hungary has looked in some detail at the unde rwater weir constructed at rkm1843. It
claims that the impacts of this weir on water quality and sediment deposition provide a "direct example
of the situation for any further weirs in the main Danube channel" (CR 97/4, at p. 71 and p. 5). This is
not so. The weir that Hungary has built achieves the basic purpose of raising the Danube's water level
upstream, but it is nonetheless an extremely crude construction.
Correctly designed, the underwater weir should be more than 250metres long—this weir is
only a fraction of that length. Also, only a small amount of the river flows over this weir, the major part
of the flow being directed through the Dunakiliti weir.As planned, the whole ofthe rivers' waters would
flow over the underwater weirs, and velocities would not drop as they do just behind the existing weir.
Accordingly, this weir is not typical for the underwater weirs that should be constructed in the old
Danube channel.
The use of underwater weirs, correctly desi gned, has been approved by the EC and PHARE
experts. As Mr. Refsgaard pointed out yesterday, they are not the solution to everything, but they are a
viable means of raising water levels in the old Danube channel without creating adverse water quality
conditions.
Hungary's second new contention can be dealt with rather briefly. This is that the Gabcíkovo
power plant is being operated at peak operation (CR 97/4, at p. 60). It is not. It is genuinely surprising
that Hungary made this contention during its oral presentation, as Hungary's experts and Slovakia's
experts have together examined precisely this issu e and have concluded, without any ambiguity, that
Gabcíkovo is being operated on constant,not peak operation, mode.
Conclusion
This concludes Slovakia's review of the facts concerning the impacts of the Gabcíkovo project
on the environment.
The importance of this Project is that for th e first time a reasonable balance can be achieved
between the competing priorities. The transfer of navigation into a bypass canal has indeed, as the EC
experts explained, created a unique opportunity. Mo re natural conditions can be established in the
floodplain area, whilst man may pursue his development interests in having good water supplies, good -44-
navigation conditions, reliable flood protection, renewable energy supplies, and ample waters for
agriculture, forestry and the environment.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, thank you very much for your attention. May I now ask
you to call on Professor Alain Pellet.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Dr. Mikulka. Professor Pellet, please.
M. PELLET:
8. LES CONSÉQUENCES DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ DE LA HONGRIE
1. Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges, dans cette ultime plaidoirie, il m’appartient de
revenir sur ce que, dans leurs écritures, les Parties ont appelé «Remedies», un mot qui n’a pas vraiment
d’équivalent en français — disons queje me propose de tirer les conséquences de la responsabilité de la
Hongrie dans cette affaire.
Je tiens à préciser que ceci aurait dû êt re fait par notre éminent collègue le
professeurDerekBowett, qui avait établi un avant-pr ojet de plaidoirie dont j’ai eu le privilège de
pouvoir m’inspirer.
2. Dans ses conclusions, la Slovaquie a indiqué quelles étaient ces conséquences à ses yeux.
Elles sont au nombre de cinq mais s’articulent, au fond, autour d’une idée fondamentale: le traité du
16septembre1977 est en vigueur et n’a jamais cessé de l’être. Ceci est l’une des déclarations que la
Slovaquie prie la Cour de bien vouloir faire et il s’ en déduit que la Hongrie d’une part doit l’exécuter
pleinement et intégralement et, d'autre part, qu’elle est tenue d’indemniser la Slovaquie pour les pertes
que les violations hongroises passées et actuelles lui ont causées.
J’examinerai donc successivement:
— d’abord, les constatationsque les Parties prient la Courde bien vouloir effectuer;
— ensuite, l’obligation d’exécution qui incombe à la Hongrie;
— enfin, l’indemnisation due à la Slovaquie.
I. LES CONSTATATIONS QUE LES PARTIES PRIENT LA COUR D’EFFECTUER -45-
3. Monsieur le Président, le premier souci de la République slovaque est d’obtenir de la Cour
une déclaration selon laquelle le tr aité de 1977 et les instruments c onnexes sont en vigueur et n’ont
jamais cessé de l’être. Tel est l'objet de sa premiè re conclusion (MS, p. 371) qui, en réalité, porte sur
deux déclarations distinctes demandées à la Cour c oncernant respectivement d’une part le maintien en
vigueur du traité et, d’autre part, l’absence d’effet de la notification de 1992. Cette première demande
est prolongée par deux autres puisque la Slovaquieprie également la Cour de dire et juger :
«2. Que la République de Hongrie n’éta it pas habilitée à suspendre puis à abandonner
les travaux afférents au projet de Nagymaros et à la partie du projet de Gabcíkovo qui
relevaient de sa responsabilité enapplication du traité de 1977.
3. Qu’il était licite de recourir à la varian te C — la «solution provisoire»— et de la
mettre en oeuvre.» (Ibid.)
Dans ses propres conclusions, la Hongrie prend l’exact contre-pied de ces demandes (cf. les quatre
premières conclusions hongroise s, MH, p. 339 ou RH, p. 183).
4. Monsieur le Président, il me paraît inutile derevenir en détail, à ce stade tardif, sur les motifs
qui établissent, sans doute possible, que le traité de 1977 est toujours en vigueur et qu’il l’est entre la
Slovaquie et la Hongrie.
Il suffit de constater qu'en le déclarant, la Cour non seulement décidera un point de droit sur
lequel les Parties s’opposent nettement et qui constitue sans aucun doute le nŒud du présent différend,
mais encore elle contribuera à affermir le principe,si fondamental, selon lequel «tout traité en vigueur lie
les parties» que la consécration des thèses défendues par la Hongrie remettrait très gravement en cause,
et, avec lui, les fondements mêmes du droit international public.
5. Il va de soi que les mêmes considérationss’appliquent à l’ensembledes instruments connexes
puisqu’aussi bien, comme l’a rappe lé M. l’agent de la République de Hongrie dans son discours
introductif, le principe n’est paspactum est servandum, mais bien pacta sunt servanda(CR 97/2, p. 22).
En d’autres termes, la déclaration de validité qu’ilest demandé à la Cour de faire s’étend également aux
accords qui complètent le traité de 1977 et auxquels la Hongrie a prétendu mettre fin par sa déclaration
du 19 mai 1992, en particulier à l’accord d’assistance mutuelle de 1977, à celui de 1979 sur le statut
conjoint et au plan contractuel conjoint tel qui’l a été progressivement amendé par les Parties.
6. Du même coup se trouve également justifiée la demande slovaque de déclaration établissant
que la notification du 19 mai 1992 est dé pourvue d’effet juridique, en toutcas sur la validité du traité lui- -46-
même. Monsieur le Président, c’est une lapalissade : si le traité est toujours en vigueur, c’est que la
Hongrie n’a pu y mettre fin ! Et la raison en est toujours la même: elle ne pouvait, pour ce faire,
invoquer aucune cause licite justifiant l’extinction du traité. Je relève au demeurant qu’ici encore les
deux Parties s’accordent pour demander une déclara tion formelle à la Cour sur ce point, qui fait
d’ailleurs l’objet d’une question expressément posée au paragraphe 1c) de l’article 2 du compromis.
7. Le maintien en vigueur du traité suffit ég alement à établir le bien-fondé de la deuxième
conclusion de la Slovaquie. Si, comme elle le pe nse, les suspensions puis les abandons successifs de
travaux s’analysent, en réalité et de facto, en autant de tentatives pour suspendre l’application des
dispositions du traité puis pour y mettre fin, tous ces actes constituent des faits internationalement
illicites puisqu’ils ne trouvent aucun fondement dans le droit des traités et que les procédures requises
n’ont, au surplus, pas été suivies.
Il en va de même, comme je l’ai montré lorsde l’audience de mardi matin, si l'on considère que
les suspensions et les abandons successifs des travaux incombant à la Hongrie constituent des
comportements détachables du traité. Dans ce dernier cas , ce n’est plus sur le terrain du droit des traités
mais sur celui du droit de la responsabilité qu’il c onvient de se placer; mais, comme l’a montré mon
collègue Stephen McCaffrey, les circonstances qui pourraient justifier ces actes clairement contraires au
traité et aux instruments conne xes n’existent pas davantage.
8. Il convient, Messieurs les Juges, de bienvoir également que la réponse que vous donnerez à la
question posée par l’article 2, paragraphe 1 a), du compromis et aux demandes des Parties à ce sujet,
telles qu’elles sont exprimées dans leurs conclusions, n’a pas d’incidence directe sur le problème de la
validité de la variante C.
En effet, quel que soit le mode de raisonnement que vous retiendrez,le fait central, patent, clair,
indiscutable, demeurera : le traité de 1977 n’a jamais cessé d’être valide. Il l’est bien sûr si, comme la
Slovaquie le pense, vous décidez qu’aucune circons tance n’est de nature à exclure l’illicéité des
comportements de la Hongrie qui lui sont contraires. Mais il l’est également si, par impossible, vous en
veniez à décider que certains des comportements de la Hongrie peuvent être excusés: comme je pense
l’avoir établi mardi matin, les circonstances exclua nt l’illicéité ont un effet sur la responsabilité de -47-
l’auteur du comportement litigieux — quise trouve exclue dans ce cas; elle s n’en ont aucun sur la source
des obligations, ce qui veut dire qu'en l’occurnce que le traité demeure pleinement valide.
Et, du même coup, se trouve justifiée la troisième conclusion de la Slovaquie: la
Tchécoslovaquie pouvait licitement recourir à la varianteC et est en droit de le voir reconnaître. Que la
Hongrie ait engagé sa responsabilité du fait de ses violations du traité— ce que croit fermement la
République slovaque— ou que ces comportements soient jugés excusables, dans les deux cas, le traité
demeure et la Slovaquie est en droit, et est même te nue, de le mettre en Œuvre, du mieux qu’elle peut.
Tel est l’objet de la variante C, dont sir Arthur Watts a montré qu’elle constitue, dans les circonstances
que vous savez, l’exécution la plus approchée possible dutraité, en tout état de cause, elle se justifierait
comme une contre-mesure.
9. La Slovaquie a donc la ferme conviction, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, que la
première conséquence des réponsesque vous apporterez aux questions énoncées au paragraphe premier
de l’article 2 du compromis est qu’elle est en droit d’obtenir de votre Haute Juridiction des déclarations
confirmant d’une part la validité continue du traité et, d’autre part , le bien-fondé de sa conduite et
l’illicéité des comportements de la Hongrie. Ces c onstatations sont le fondement indispensable à la
détermination de la responsabilité de la Hongrie ou desconséquences en découlant.
Ces conséquences sont de deux sortes: d’une part, la Hongrie doit exécuter complètement le
traité de 1977; d’autre part, elle doit indemniser laSlovaquie pour les conséquences préjudiciables de ses
manquements.
II. L’OBLIGATION D’EXÉCUTION
10. Dans sa quatrième conclusi on, la Slovaquie prie la Cour de tirer les conséquences de la
validité continue du traité en i demandant de dire et juger :
«4. Que la République de Hongrie doit pour cesraisons [«ces raisons», ce sont les quatre
constatations dont je viens de parler] doit mettre immédiatement un terme à toute
conduite qui empêche l’application intégrale et de bonne foi du traité de 1977 et doit
prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pours’acquitter des obligations que lui impose ce
traité, sans autre retard, afin de faire en soret que le traité soit à nouveau respecté.» (MS,
p. 371.) -48-
Cette conclusion se décompose donc en deux de mandes complémentaires: la cessation de la
conduite illicite de la Hongrie d’une part, l’exécution des obligations lui incombant en vertu du traité,
d’autre part.
11. Il n’y a rien là que de très classique et la Slovaquie se borne à suivre votre jurisprudence
constante dans des affaires de ce genre. Je pense en particulier aux affaires des Otages (C.I.J. Recueil
1980, p. 44; voir aussi l’ordonnance du 15 décembre 1979, C.I.J. Recueil 1979, p. 21) ou du Nicaragua
(C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 149). Cette demande de cessation est également conforme aux dispositions de
l’article 41 du projet d’articles de la CDI sur la responsabilité des Etats (cf. le rapport de la CDI à
e
l’Assemblée générale sur les travaux de sa 48 session, 1996, A/51/10, p. 164 et le commentaire de cette
dispositionin Annuaire de la CDI1993, vol. II, 2 partie, par. 16, p. 60; voir aussi en ce sens CR 97/6, p.
63, M. Dupuy).
Il en résulte dans la présente espèce que laHongrie doit cesser l’omission constituée par la non-
exécution du traité de 1977; c’est-àd -ire qu'elle doit ... l’exécuter.
12. Ceci correspond d’ailleurs à un autre aspect, pu ls classique encore, du droit à la réparation : à
l’obligation derestitutio in integrum. Comme l’a écrit Paul Reuter,
«la mise en cause de la responsabilité fait bien naître une obligation nouvelle, celle de réparer,
mais celle-ci consiste principaleme nt à remettre les choses en état,restitutio in integrum,
c’est-à-dire à assurer l’exécution la plus parfaite possible à l’obligation originaire»
(«Principes de droit international public»,RCADI (1961-II), vol. 103, p. 595).
L’«exécution la plus parfaite possibleà l’obligation originaire», ceci signifie évidemment, dans
notre affaire, la mise en Œuvre des obligations mise s à la charge des Parties par le traité. C’est cette
perspective de rétablissement de la «légalité internationale» qui a inspiré le célèbre dictum delaCPJI
dans l’affaire relative à l’Usine de Chorzów:
«la réparation doit, autant que possible, effacer toutes les conséquences de l’acte illicite et
rétablir l’état qui aurait vraisemblablement existé si ledit acte n’avait pas été commis»
(arrêt du 13 septembre 1928, C.P.J.I. série A n ° 17, p. 47).
Et c’est cette formule que reprend en la précisn at l’article 43 du projet d’articles de la CDI.
Dans le cas présent, «l’état qui aurait existé» si la Hongrie n’avait pas violé le traité de 1977 et
ne l’avait pas illicitement proclamé terminé, est le su ivant : les obligations deconstruction prévues par le
traité seraient pleinement exécutées, la production d’électricité de pointe serait en cours, la navigation -49-
serait grandement facilitée sur toute la portion du Danube couverte par le traité, les Parties géreraient
ensemble l’investissement conjoint, veilleraient en semble à la protection de l’environnement, etc.
Ce n’est que par l’exécution complète du traité, dans un délai le plus rapide possible, que cette
situation peut être, non pas sans doute «rétablie» — car le temps qui passe ne se rattrape pas—, mais
établie le plus complètement possb ile dans les termes prévus.
13. Bien entendu, cette obligation d’exécution pè se également sur la Slovaquie. Elle ne l’a
jamais nié et l’accepte évidemment pleinement.
Et pourtant, ceci semble préoccuper la Hongriequi soulève principalement deux problèmes à cet
égard : celui de la propriété conjointe de l’investissement (qu’elle pose, il est vrai, surtout en termes de
liquidation — cf. CR 97/6, p. 75, M. Dupuy) d’une part; ceu l i du sort de la variante C, d’autre part. Ces
préoccupations ne sont pas fondées.
En ce qui concerne la propriété conjointe de l’investissement, la Slovaquie s’est toujours
déclarée prête à respecter pleinement, sur ce point commesur tous les autres, la lettre et l'esprit du traité
de 1977 (cf. CMS, par. 12.16, p. 361). Simplement, mais cela va de soi, cette propriété a, et ne peut
avoir pour seul fondement que le traité, dont l'application ne saurait être sélective. En d'autres termes,
propriété conjointe, oui évidemment, mais elle est la contrepartie du respect intégral par la Hongrie de
ses obligations conventionnelles. Monsieur le Président, tous les pacta sunt servanda— sur cela nous
sommes d’accord — mais aussi toutes les dispositions d’un pactum sunt servandae!
14. J’apporterai le même genre d’apaisementsà nos amis hongrois, et aux mêmes conditions, en
ce qui concerne la variante C. Comme la Slovaquie l’aredit dans sa réplique (voir par exemple, RS, par.
9.76, p. 243 ou par. 14.06, p. 355), cette solution, qui a permis de mettre provisoirement en application
une partie du traité de1977, est réversible.
Mais il est clair que les deux Parties n'ont pas la même conception de la notion de
«réversibilité». Pour la Slovaquie, elle signifie non pas le retour au «projet original», ce concept si cher à
nos contradicteurs et qui n'a guère de sens, mais la mise en Œuvre du traité de 1977 tel qu'il a été
progressivement adapté, précisé et complété — et peutencore l'être — à mesure de son développement.
Pour la Hongrie, au contraire, l'idée de réversibilité et une notion floue et incertaine qui veut dire tantôt
«retour à l’état de nature» ou, en tout cas, à la situation d’avant le traité (elle-même tout à fait -50-
artificielle !) (cf. MH, communiqué du 15 juillet 1991: "The Hungarian party ... urges the abandonment
and demolition of the barrage",vol. 4,annexe 165, p. 390 ou MH, par. 3.110,p. 64), tantôt, et c'est ce qui
semble découler de sa conclusion 5.b), le retour à l'«avant-variante C» (cf. MH, p.338 ou RH, p. 184)
mais les conseils de la Hongrie ont précisé que, s'ilne s'agissait pas de détruire le barrage de Gabcíkovo
(cf. CR 97/6, p. 66, M.Dupuy), il n'en fallait pa s moins restaurer «le cours du Danube antérieur»à ce
qu'ils appellent sa «diversion» (ibid., M. Dupuy; voir aussi CR 97/4, p. 42, M. Nagy).
Et dans les ceux cas, les deux conceptions alternatives hongroises de la réversibilité, celle-ci, est
en effet loin d’être assurée: lorsque vous visite rez les lieux, Messieurs les Juges, vous constaterez
l’étendue et l’importance du canal d’amont de Gabcíkovo et du véritable lac de rétention qui a été créé
(non pas du fait de la variante C, qui a seulement eupour effet d’en limiter, et d’en déplacer légèrement,
l’emprise, vous l'avez vu tout à l'heure, mais, tout simplement en application du traité initial). Rien n’est
impossible, mais il faut bien reconnaître que la suppression pure et simple de cette immense retenue et
son assainissement, seraient des tâches proprem ent titanesques qui, pour le coup, causeraient à
l’environnement des dommages d'une extrême grav ité. Quant à y créer une vaste étendue d'eau
stagnante — ce qu'implique le retour à l'ancien lit du Danube de l'intégralité du débit traditionnel exigé
par la Hongrie— cette demande té moigne, Monsieur le Président, d'un aveuglement écologique tout à
fait effarant.
En revanche, le retourà l’application intégrale du traité — dutraité tel qu’il est mis en Œuvre par
les amendements successifs du plan contractuel conjoint—, ce retour ne présente pas ces difficultés : il
impliquerait l’extension du lac de rétention c’es t-à-dire la fermeture du fleuve à Dunakiliti et
l’inondation de la zone comprise entre la digue déjà construite en territoire hongrois en application du
traité et celle établie en Slovaquie pour les besoins de la variante C. Cela ne veut pas dire que la chose
aille de soi, ni qu’elle soit très facile, ni qu’elle ne soit pas très onéreuse; ni qu’il ne serait peut-être pas
plus raisonnable d’envisager des aménagements moins c oûteux. Mais, si la Cour l’ordonne, et si la
Hongrie le souhaite cela n’a rien d’impossible.
Mais, ici encore, cela suppose que la Hongrie , de son côté, s’acquitte pleinement de ses
obligations, de toutes ses obligations, en vertu du traité d’une part—et cela inclut la construction de
l'élément Nagymaros, la production d’électricité de pointe (sans laquelle d’ailleurs, l'extension du lac de -51-
retenue n’a pas d’intérêt économiqueni écologique) et la clôture effective du Danube à Dunakiliti — et
cela implique d’autre part, la réparation intégraledes dommages causés à la Slovaquie par les violations
hongroises du traité, y compris le coût supplémentaie r induit par l'aménagement de la variante C.
15. Cessation du fait illicite, restitutio in integrum se traduisant par l'exécution du traité, la
trilogie ne serait pas complète sans les assuranceset garanties de non-répétition dont parle l’article 46 du
projet de la CDI.
La Slovaquie, Monsieur le Président, s’était ab stenue d’en exiger dans ses conclusions écrites
mais, à la réflexion, il lui apparaît que la précaution ne serait pas superflue : la Tchécoslovaquie puis la
Slovaquie ont, dans le passé, expérimenté trop de revirements de la partde la Partie hongroise pour que
l’on puisse être complètement rassuré sur ses intentionsréelles d’appliquer un arrêt constatant la validité
continue du traité et l’obligation de le mettre en Œuvre. La Slovaquie est d’autant moins rassurée que
certaines déclarations officielles ou officieuses hongroises renforcent le doute que l’on peut avoir à cet
égard—pensons par exemple au fameux rapport Hardi (MH, vol.5, première partie, p.165) et les
prétentions récentes des conseils de la Hongrie d' interdire à la Cour d'ordonner à la Partie hongroise
l'exécution effective de ses obligations conventionnelle s, au nom d'une prétendue doctrine interdisant «a
judicial order of specific performance» (CR97/5, p.67, M.Sands; voir aussi CR97/2, p.94,
M. Crawford), cette prétention n'est pas de nature à nousrassurer, Monsieur le Président ! Au surplus, le
rétablissement de la fermeture du Danube à Dunak iliti donnera de fait à la Hongrie la possibilité de
contrôler entièrement le système d’écluses de Gabcíkovo.
La Slovaquie n’entend pas revenir sur ce point, prévupar le traité; mais elle entend obtenir de la
Hongrie la garantie formelle sel on laquelle elle s’acquittera effec tivement de ses obligations—et,
encore une fois, de toutes ses obligations—en vertu du traité. La Slovaquie avoue cependant qu’elle
serait plus rassurée si la fermeture du Danube demeua rit à Cunovo. La Cour pourrait du reste décider en
ce sens, sans, pour autant remettre en question l’idée d’exécution intégrale du traité, puisqu'il s’agit de
tirer, sur le plan des règles secondaires, les consé quences de la situation nouvelle résultant des faits
internationalement illicites de la Hongrie.
Sans doute, la Cour «ne peut ni ne doit envisa ger l’éventualité que l’arrêt resterait inexécuté»
o
comme l'a dit la Cour permanente et comme elle l'a répété ( Usine de Chorzow, C.P.J.I. série A n 17, -52-
p. 63; voir aussi arrêts du 20 décembre 1974,Essais nucléaires, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 272 et 477 et arrêt
du 26 novembre 1984,C.I.J. Recueil 1984,p. 437-438); toutefois, les raisons que je viens de mentionner
et qui plaident en faveur du maintien de la fe rmeture du Danube à Cunovo conduisent en tout cas, à
défaut, à prêter une attention toute particulière à l’exécution de l’arrêt et, si la Cour ne suivait pas cette
suggestion, la Slovaquie la prierait formellement de préciser, comme ellel’a fait dans le passé — la Cour
l'a fait dans le passé — que si le fondement de l’a rrêt qu’elle va rendre était remis en cause, les Parties
pourraient «demander un examen de la situation c onformément aux dispositions du Statut», c'est une
formule qui vous est familière, Messieurs le s Juges (cf. les arrêts du 20décembre1974, Essais
nucléaires, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 272 et 477).
III. L’INDEMNISATION
16. Monsieur le Président, comme le rappe lle la Commission du droit international dans
l’article 42, paragraphe1, de son projet sur la responsabilité des Etats :
«L’Etat lésé est en droit d’obtenir de l’ Etat qui a commis un fait internationalement
illicite une réparation intégrale, sous une ou plusieurs des formes de réparation:
restitution en nature, indemnisation, satis faction et assurances et garanties de
non-répétition.» (Cf. rapport préc. sur les tr avaux de la quarante-huitième session,
p. 164; les italiques sont de nous.)
Or, en l'espèce, larestitutio in integrumn’est pas de nature «à effacertoutes les conséquences de
l’acte illicite» pour reprendre ledictum de la Cour permanente dans l'Usine de Chorzow(C.P.J.I. série A
n° 17, p. 47, préc.). Il faut noter en pa rticulier que, malgré les apparences, la restitutioest, en réalité,
toute entière orientée vers l’avenir : grâce à elle l’investissement conjointsera réalisé dans les formes où
il aurait dû l’être, mais cela laisse subsister les dommages qui ont été causés à la Slovaquie jusqu'à
présent ou plutôt qui lui auront été causés au jourde l’exécution totale et intégrale de l’arrêt.
C’est la raison pour laquellela Slovaquie, dans sa cinquième conclu sion, a prié la Cour de dire et
juger :
«Qu’à la suite de ses violations du traitéde 1977, la République deHongrie est tenue de
verser, et la République slovaque est en dr oit de recevoir, en raison des pertes et
dommages que lesdites violations ont causés àla République slovaque, plus les intérêts
et le manque à gagner, une pleine indemnisation d’un montant qu’il reviendra à la Cour
de déterminer lors d’une phase subséquente de la présente instance.» (MS, p. 371.)
Cette conclusion appelle prin cipalement deux remarques.
17. En premier lieu, cette demande n'est pas alternative. -53-
Aux termes de l’article 44, pagraphe 1, du projet de la CDI,
«L’Etat lésé est en droit d’obtenir de l’ Etat qui a commis un fait internationalement
illicite une indemnisation pour le dommage causépar ce fait si, et dans la mesure où, le
dommage n’est pas réparé parla restitution en nature.»
En l’espèce, la réparation n’est pas entièrement assurée par restitutio in integrum, ici mal
nommée. Elle n'est pasin integrum, je viens de m’en expliquer. Enrevanche, l'indemnisation ne saurait
se substituer à l’exécution et ce n’est que dans la mesure où la restitution ne répare pas intégralement le
dommage que la Slovaquie prie la Cour debien vouloir ordonner une indemnisation.
L’insistance slovaque sur ce point tient à une raison bien compréhensible: si le principe de la
primauté absolue de l’exécution était abandonné, il en résulterait que la partie qui viole un traité se
verrait reconnaître le droit de «racheter» en quelquesorte ses obligations conventionnelles. Vous signez
un traité; puis vous changez d’avis; et il vous suffit de payPacta sunt servanda perd alors toute
signification. L’Etat «s’offre», si je peux dir,eune violation au mépris de la parole donnée.
Ainsi que cela résulte de l’article 44 du projet de la CDI, qui reflète sans doute possible le droit
positif (cf. MH, par. 8.43, p. 255 ou RH, par. 3.166, p.177), tel n’est pas le droit dès lors qu’aucune des
excuses à la non-restitution énumérées à l’article4du même projet ne peut être invoquée. Or ces
excuses ne peuvent certainement pas être invoquées en l'espèce :
— premièrement, nous venons de le voir, il n’est nullementimpossible de revenir à l’application
du traité, quitte à lui apporter, le cas échéalues aménagements si les Parties en conviennent;
— deuxièmement, l’application du traité n'est évide mment incompatible avec aucune norme
impérative du droit international général etla Hongrie ne le prétend d’ailleurs pas;
— troisièmement, la charge résultant de l’application dutraité ne serait, assurément, pas hors de
toute proportion avec les avantages en résultant pourtt lésé; bien au contraire : la Hongrie, comme la
Slovaquie, ne pourrait qu’en tirer de grands avantagestant en matière de production d’énergie «propre et
renouvelable», que d’amélioration de la navigation, de la protectiocontre les inondations et, plus
généralement, de l’environnement humain;
et — quatrièmement, la Hongrie ne prétend pas que la mise en Œuvre du traité menace son
indépendance politique ou sa stabilité économique : il est sûrement exact qu’elle lui impose une charge
financière immédiate mais i) celle-ci constitue un inve stissement, source de profits futurs; ii) tel est -54-
l’objet même du traité; et iii) en tout état de cause , pour lourde qu’elle soit, cette charge — qui a été
supportée sans dommage particulier par la Tchéco slovaquie dans des circonstances difficiles — ne
menace évidemment pas la stabilité économique de la Hongrie.
18. J’en viens, Monsieur le Président, à ma seconde remarque : la Hongrie a sur la question de
l’indemnisation une attitude ambiguëpuisque, dans le but de faire croire sans doute à sa «modération»,
elle entretient, sur ses positions à ce sujet un ha lo de mystère. Tantôt, elle reconnaît qu’une
«compensation» est due à la Slovaquie (cf. CR 97/2, p. 34, M. Valky, p.93-94, M.Crawford ou CR
97/4, p. 25, M. Crawford; voir aussi MH, par. 3. 110, p. 64; par. 7.97, p. 236, par. 9.18, p. 267 ou par.
9.24, p. 269; CMH, par. 6.106, p. 247 ou RH, par. 3.40, p. 127), tantôt, elle le conteste (cf. MH, vol. 4,
annexe 27, p. 62) ou elle assortitson «offre» de conditions inacceptables(cf. MH, par. 3.96, p. 58 ou vol.
4, annexe 24, p. 52).
On peut penser, sans beaucoup derisques de se tromper, que cette valse hésitation s’explique par
trois éléments : d’une part, la Hongrie sait qu’elledoit indemniser son partenaire pour ses manquements;
d’autre part, elle a le sentiment, d’ailleurs fondé, que les sommes en cause risquent d’être extrêmement
élevées; donc et enfin, elle s’efforce de minimisreses obligations financières, voire de les nier.
Ceci est extrêmement apparent dans le fa meux rapport Hardi de septembre 1989, après le
commencement des manquements. L’accent y est mis sur «the presumable substantial damages payable
if such international obligations [il s’agit des obligations découlant dutraité] are not fulfilled» (MH, vol.
5, première partie, annexe 8, p. 163). Puis, non sans cynisme, les auteurs insistent sur la situation
inconfortable dans laquelle se tr ouvera la Tchécoslovaquie du fait que «there is no court in to-day’s
international legal system that would be able to decide about such legal disputes without the consent of
the parties involved» (ibid., p. 165) et que, dès lors, «The Czec hoslovak Government has elementary
interest in reaching a compromise as this is the only way it can hope to recover some of its losses.»
(Ibid.) Et de conclure: «the lengthy legal dispute will release us from any immediate or short-term
payment obligation» (ibid., p. 166; voir aussi les déclarations de M. Horn, alors secrétaire d’État et
aujourd’hui premier ministre hongrois, devant l’ Assemblée nationale, 6 octobre 1988, CMS, vol. II,
annexe 8, p. 94-95). -55-
Cela éclaire évidemment d’un jour très particulier les «offres de compensation» faites, ici ou là,
et jusqu’à cette barre, par les autorités hongroises; c'est ce que l'on appelle chez moi, Monsieur le
Président, une «offre de Gascon», qui consiste à faire une proposition avec la ferme intention de ne pas
y donner suite; j’ignorais cette parentéentre la Hongrie et la Gascogne !
19. Il reste que tout ceci montre bien, en défin itive, que la Hongrie est consciente qu'elle a une
obligation d'indemnisation à l'égard de laSlovaquie. Mais sur quel fondement ?
Ici encore, la Slovaquie est extrêmement perplexesur la position de la Hongrie dont les conseils
ont fait valoir simultanément des argumentations fort différentes fondées tantôt sur le droit de la
responsabilité, tantôt sur les dispos itions du traité relatives à la co mpensation des frais exposés par
chaque Partie.
Ainsi, le professeur Crawford a insisté sur le droit des partiess(ic), à notre avis c'est une partie, à
"compensation for a failed investment" (CR 97/4, p. 25;voir aussi 97/2, p. 94). Dans le même esprit, le
professeur Dupuy, reprenant un thème récurrent de s écritures hongroises (cf. MH, par. 11.09, p. 333;
voir aussi, par exemple, la proposition hongroise du 22 avril 1991, citée ibid., par. 3.126, p.51-52), a
assuré que :
«la Hongrie a toujours indiqué qu'il lui paraissait indispensable [de] procéder [à un bilan
comparé des travaux accomplis par les deux Parties], notamment dans la perspective de
la compensation (compensation a un sens très pa rticulier en français) qu'elle était prête à
verser à son partenaire» (CR 97/6, p. 75; voir aussi M. Sands, CR 97/5, p. 69).
Mais, comme ses collègues, il dénie à cette «offre»toute base conventionnelle du fait, assure-t-il,
que la Slovaquie n'aurait «jamais été partie au tra ité de 1977». Il ne relie pas moins cette offre
indirectement aux obligations découlant du traité auprétexte que la Slovaquie est, en vertu du deuxième
alinéa du préambule du compromis, je cite M.D upuy, «le seul et unique successeur de la
Tchécoslovaquie pour ce qui se rapporte aux droits et obligations relatifs au projet de Gabcíkovo-
Nagymaros». «C'est, conclut-il, dans cette mesure et sur une telle base juridique que la République de
Hongrie est disposée à considérer le bilan des travaux» ( ibid., p. 76). Il ne me paraît pas utile, Monsieur
le Président, de revenir sur l'artifice inacceptable de cette construction. Il suffit bien plutôt de constater
qu'en clair, la Hongrie vous suggè re ici que la Slovaquie a droit à indemnisation du fait de la non-
exécution de l'investissement conjoint prévu par le traité; celui-ci est donc le fondement de la -56-
compensation offerte du bout des lèvres. Qu'elle le veuille ou non, elle se place sur le terrain ... du traité
de 1977, celui-là même auquel elle prétend avoir mis fin.
20. De toute façon, Monsieur le Président, Me ssieurs de la Cour, ce n’est pas ce dont il s’agit ici;
l’obligation qui pèse sur la Hongrie d’indemniser la Slovaquie n’a pas sa source dans le traité, elle a sa
source dans les principes générauxdu droit de la responsabilité intern ationale, qu’avait remarquablement
exprimés la Cour permanente, toujours dans l’affaire relative à l’Usine de Chorzów : «c’est un principe
de droit international, voire une conception générale du droit, que toute violation d’un engagement
comprend l’obligation de réparer» (C.P.J.I. série A n° 17, p. 29). C’est pour cette raison, et pour aucune
autre, que la Hongrie doit verser à la Slovaquie uneindemnité réparatrice des dommages qui ne peuvent
pas être réparés par larestitutio in integrum.
Et ceci a d’importantes conséquences, Monsieur le Président, tant pour ce qui est de la
détermination des préjudices que de leur évaluation. Il en résulte en particulier que les préjudices
indemnisables sont ceux qui résultent des faits intern ationalement illicites de la Hongrie. D’autre part, il
ne saurait être question de faire supporter le coût de ces dommages pa r les deux Parties à part égale:
c’est la Hongrie et elle seule qui a manqué à ses obligations conventionnelles; c’est elle et elle seule qui
doit porter la charge de ses manquements.
21. Je dois à la véritéde dire que les conseils de la Hongriese sont parfois montrés conscients du
problème car, tout en mettant en avant la base c onventionnelle de la «compensation», toujours utilisée
visiblement dans le sens français du mot, que la Hongr ie sait devoir à la Slovaquie, ils n'ont pas écarté la
possibilité de fonder cette obligationsur le droit de la responsabilité.
Le professeur Dupuy a très bien exprimé cetteposition alternative (même s'il ne l'a pas présentée
comme telle), dans sa plaidoirie du 4 mars :
«le pays qui invoque à juste titre l'état de nécessité[c'est évidemment la Hongrie qu'il vise] devra
le plus souventacquitter une compensation, généralement sous forme d'indemnité, à son
partenaire affecté par la non-réalisation de son obligation [le partenaire c'est la
Slovaquie], ici, une obligation contractuelle». -57-
Le professeur Crawford a abondé dans ce sens en faisant valoir que l'article 35 du projet de la
CDI sur la responsabilité des Etats «envisage[s] compen sation in situation of necessity» (CR 97/4, p. 25;
voir aussi M. Sands, CR 97/5, p. 67).
Il est parfaitement exact, Monsieur le Président, que la CDI a estimé, dans cet article 35, que
l'existence de circonstances excluant l'illicéité«ne préjuge pas des questions qui pourraient se poser à
propos de l'indemnisation des dommages causés par» le fait d'un Etat contraire à ses obligations
internationales. Et il est non moins exact que, ce faisan t, elle avait tout particulièrement en tête la
prétendue «excuse de nécessité» (cf. le commentaire du projet d'article 35, Annuaire de la CDI 1980,
e
vol. II, 2 partie, p. 60; voir également les débats sur ce point à la CDI,ibid., vol. I, p. 145 et 155 (Ago),
p. 153 et 161 (M. Schwebel), p. 154 (Reuter), p. 157 (M. Sahovic), etc.)
Il est certain que cette précaution relève du bon se ns et de l'équité et qu'il serait, assurément,
inacceptable que la Slovaquie doive assurer la charge financière de la préservation d'un intérêt que la
Hongrie prétend être essentiel pour elle alors qu'elle , Slovaquie, n'a fait que s'acquitter de ses obligations
conventionnelles du mieux qu'elle l'a pu. Toutefois, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges, la
République slovaque vous demande très solennellement de ne pas «saisir la perche» qui vous est ainsi
tendue avec une certaine insistance par la Patrie hongroise, si je puis m'exprimer ainsi.
Cette solution en effet n'a, dans notre affaire, que l'apparence de l'équité: elle supposerait que
vous autorisiez la Hongrie à «acheter» les violations deses obligations internationales, ce dont ni le droit
ni la morale ne sauraient s'accommoder. Au surplu s, la stabilité des situations conventionnelles s'en
trouverait gravement menacée.
22. Monsieur le Président, le compromis comporte un article 5, dont le paragraphe 2 prévoit qu’
«Aussitôt que l’arrêt leur aura été remis, les Parties engageront des négociations pour fixer les modalités
de son exécution.»
Il est certainement sage que les Parties aient anisi prévu de se donner à elles-mêmes une certaine
souplesse; et ceci est, sans aucun doute, conforme à l’esprit du traité qui, comme les deux Parties l’ont
souligné à satiété, (cf. CR 97/3, p. 10 et 21-23, M. Nagy; voir aussi MH, par. 4.13 et suiv., p. 115 et
suiv., par. 4.21, p. 120, et CMH, par. 2.22-2.23, p. 105-106, ou RH, par. 1.76 et suiv., p. 35 et suiv.; MS,
par. 3.01 et suiv., p. 103 et suiv., CMS, par. 2.20 et suiv., p. 25-26, par. 4.35, p. 91-92 ou RS, par. 2.12, -58-
p. 28), constitue une convention-cadresusceptible d’aménagements et deprécision et qu’elles peuvent au
surplus, bien sûr, amender d’un commun accord.
Mais si la Slovaquie ne se refuse pas à priori à des aménagements du traité (qui pourraient être
utiles, par exemple, pour fixer le sort définitif de lavariante C, voire même pour préciser solennellement
le régime de production d’électricité de pointe), te l ne saurait être l’objet premier des négociations
prévues à l’article 5, paragraphe 2, du compromis. Il s’agit bien plutôt pour les Parties de fixer un
nouveau calendrier pour l’achèvement des constructions prévues par le traité, puisqu’aussi bien le
protocole de 1989 est devenu obsolète par la faute de la Hongrie, il s'agit de revivifier les structures de
pilotage et de gestion communes, de modifier le plan contractuel conjoint — ce qui peut être fait par un
simple accord des plénipotentiaires — de façon à l’adapter à la situation actuelle; bref, il s'agit d’apurer
le passé et d’organiser la transition.
En outre, et il m'a semblé, en écoutant les professeurs Valki et Dupuy il y a trois semaines (CR
97/5, p. 49, M. Valki et CR 97/6, p. 57, M. Dupuy), que les Parties étaient d'accord sur ce point, celles-ci
devront également négocier de bonne foi sur le montant de l'indemnisation sur la base des directives de
la Cour concernant les catégories depréjudices indemnisables à prendre en considération et les critères et
méthodes de leur évaluation, étant entendu que si cesnégociations n'aboutissentpas dans un délai de six
mois l’une ou l’autre des Parties pourra saisir à nouveau votre Haute Juridiction, comme le prévoit
expressément l’article 5 du compromis.
Ce serait bien sûr le cas, Monsieur le Président,si, comme la Slovaquie ne veut pas l'imaginer, la
Hongrie se refusait à procéder à l’exécution du traité que la Slovaquie prie la Cour de bien vouloir
ordonner en toute priorité. Il va de soi que les do mmages-intérêts à la charge de la Hongrie s'en
trouveraient considérablement accrus. Mais, une telle attitude s’analyserait alors en un refus de mettre
en Œuvre la décision de la Cour, une décision que celle-ci «ne peut ni ne doit envisager» ( Usine de
Chorzow, préc.).
Toutefois, la Slovaquie espère vivement que cette nouvelle saisine ne sera pas nécessaire et que,
dans l’esprit de modération dont elle se dit animée, la Hongrie se montrera aussi disposée à exécuter
l’arrêt que vous rendrez, dans un esprit de coopération constructive, quela Slovaquie l’est elle-même. -59-
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges, je vous remercie très vivement de votre patience
renouvelée et je vous prie, Monsieur le Président, de bien vouloir donner la parole à M. l'agent de la
République slovaque pour quelques motstrès brefs mots de conclusion.
Merci, Monsieur le Président.
The PESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Pellet. May I call on the Agent of Slovakia,
Dr. Tomka.
M. TOMKA :
9. CONCLUSION DE L’AGENT
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges, l’équipe de plaidoirie de la Slovaquie s’est efforcée
de vous présenter la thèse de mon pays de façon aussi complète et aussi claire que possible et il ne me
paraît pas nécessaire d’y revenir à ce stade de l’affaireet à cette heure tardive. Avant la visite que vous
allez effectuer sur les lieux, la semaine prochaine, je voudrais seulement attirer votre attention sur un
point, lié à cette visite.
Tout au long de cette première phase de la procédure orale, la Hongrie s’est employée, comme
elle l’avait déjà fait auparavant non sans un certain succès médiatique, à se faire passer comme le
champion de l’environnement, dontnous serions les contempteurs.
Ceci appelle deux remarques de ma part.
En premier lieu, la Slovaquie ne conteste nullement que les préoccupations liées à
l’environnement sont de la plus haute importance, bien au contraire. Et, depuis sa jeune indépendance,
elle a marqué son attachement constant et sin cère à la défense et à la promotion du droit de
l’environnement; comme en témoignent, par exemple, les nombreuses conventions auxquelles elle est
partie dans ce domaine. Mais, bien souvent, il nous a semblé que nosamis hongrois oubliaient, que c’est
justement de droit, et de droit seulement, qu’il s’agit devant vous. Etnous avons la conviction que c’est
en ancrant les règles naissantes du droit de l’e nvironnement dans le cadre plus général du droit
international public, que votre arrêt rendra le meilleur service et à la cause de l’environnement et à celle
du droit des gens. -60-
Ma deuxième remarque est la suivante: en écout ant, il y a trois semaines, les plaidoiries de la
Partie hongroise, j’ai eu le sentiment que, d’une certaine manière, deux conceptions de l’environnement
s’opposaient devant vous. La Slovaquie attache, je le pense sincèrement, autant d’importance que la
Hongrie, sinon plus; mais je pense aussi que nous avons de la protection de l’environnement une
conception que je crois plus respons able, plus positive, et je dirais surtout plus «humaniste» que la
Hongrie. Ce qui importe à nos yeux, c’est la protection de l’environnementhumain. Comme le dit avec
force le premier principe de la déclaration de Rio de 1992: «Les êtres humains sont au centre des
préoccupations relatives au dével oppement durable. Ils ont droit à une vie saine et productive en
harmonie avec la nature.» La protection contre le s inondations, l’amélioration de l’irrigation et des
conditions de navigation, la recherche d’une me illeure qualité des eaux de surface et souterraines
participent évidemment à cet objectif et par la réalisation conjointe du projet de Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros
les Parties auraient fortement contribué ensemble à samise en Œuvre, en même temps qu’elles auraient
utilisé une source d’énergie propre et renouvelable dans l’intérêt des deux peuples, slovaques et
hongrois.
Tout au long de la présente procédure, la Partie hongroise s'est employée à tenter de vous
convaincre, Messieurs les Juges, de trancher une querelle d'experts. Sans aucun doute, vous n'entrerez
pas dans ce débat et, de toutes manières, ce n'es t pas nécessaire pour régler l'affaire qui vous est
soumise: il vous suffit de constater que, ni en 1977, ni en 1989, ni en1992, ni aujourd'hui,
l'environnement de la région concernée n'est le moins du monde menacé par le projet. Il a changé bien
sûr—le projet l'impliquait à l'évidence— mais ceci a été le choix d'Etats souverains agissant en toute
connaissance de cause. Mais de catas trophe écologique, pas le moindre signe.
Vous pourrez constater ceci de vos propres yeux la semaine prochaine lorsque nous aurons le
plaisir de vous accueillir et de vous faire visiter les lieux. Oh, bien sûr, vous ne pénétrerez pas dans les
profondeurs de la nappe phréatique !mais vous pourrez, je vous le garantis, vous laver les dents en toute
sécurité et boire sans inquiétude l'eau coulant de votre robinet à Bratisla va (bien que nous ayons
d'excellents vins à vous proposer) ! et ceci alors queBratislava (contrairement à Budapest) est alimentée
en eau potable par de l'eau pompée dans les pu its situés dans la proximité du réservoir. -61-
Plus sérieusement, vous constaterez que toutes les précautions sont prises pour assurer une
surveillance constante de la qualité des eaux, aussi bien de surface que souterraines. Vous verrez aussi
combien la navigation et la protection contre les redoutables crues du Danube se sont trouvées
améliorées par la mise en Œuvre partielle du projet grâce à la varianteC. Et vous apprécierez à quel
point cette mise en Œuvre a eu, et aura plus encoreà l'avenir, des effets bénéfiques sur la restauration de
l'environnement naturel dans les branches du Danube.
Je souhaite aussi saisir cette occasion pour re mercier nos partenaires hongrois pour l'esprit de
coopération dont ils ont fait preuve dans la préparation de cette visiteet pour souligner que votre venue,
Messieurs de la Cour, est un événement historique puisque la Haute Juridiction renoue ainsi avec un
précédent qui remonte à soixante ans maintenant : la descente sur les lieux de la Cour permanente dans
l'affaire desPrises d'eau à la Meuse. Peut-être que les «histoires d'eau» aiguisent la curiosité de la Haute
Juridiction ? Nous nous en réjouissons.
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, c’est avec à la fois beaucoup de confiance et
beaucoup de joie quenous vous attendons !
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges,je vous remercie de votre attention.
The PRESIDENT : Thank you, Dr. Tomka. I wish to thank both Parties for their excellent
expositions these past weeks. The Court looks forwardto its visit next week and to the conclusion of the
oral argument thereafter. The Court will now rise.
The Court rose at 1.00 a.m.
Audience publique tenue jeudi 27 mars 1997, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Schwebel, président