Opinion individuelle de M. Vereshchetin (traduction)

DECLARATION DE M. LE JUGE RANJEVA,VICE-PRESIDENT

Rejet de la di~rinurion((burdenof proor)) elccburden of evidence>}- Ana-
Iysefaclueld leeluproducdion despreu ves- Inexistence de iu rnaxinie: nemo
contra se edere tenctur - Artick 62 du Reglemenr - dffaire du Detroit de
Corfou errefus de produclion de pikcm - Jusf~$cati(~CleI'unalysefacluelie.
Protecriondiplomatique ' Drc~irindhidueis - Con~enrio~inle Viennesur Ieh
rehtions con.suluire- Intercle'pendunceenlre cesduoils- Article 36 el iden-
~z$carionde.5 truiiairesdes droi~sknumirts - Interdkpenduncedes droits du
systame de I'urricJc36: renconlrede I'inifiativede I'Etnrd'envai ot absence de
refus du reesortissunl.

1. Souscrivant aux conclusions et au raisonnement de la Cour, je sou-
haiterais prkiser l'inlerpretation que je propose concernant le probleme
de la preuve et Icsrapports entre la protection diplomatique et lesdroits
individuels.
2. L'arr2t refusede reprendre Bson cornpte la distinction pr6senti.epar

les Etats-Unis dZArnCriqueentre le nburdenoJproof>>et le c{burde~ zf
evidence))(par. 56),traduits respectivementpar ccchargede la preuve >)ct
<<idest]lcments de preuve)),pour ne retenir que le concept classique de la
charge de ta preuve. Celke decision merite dZ&treapprouvke bicn que
I'arrEtne consacre pas de dkveloppements idoines rice point. La distinc-
tion, trop subtile, proposCe par la Partic dkfenderesse relevc, peutdtre,
des categoriespropres audroit americain ; toujours cst-iIqu'il s'agitd'ins-
titutions de droit interne aIors que la Cour a a appliquer le droit inter-

national etses cattgories. Tout au plus, doit-on rappclcr une vCritC&lP-
mentaire que sont lcslirnitespropres des catkgoriesde droit interne; elles
sont directement lributaires de I'histoirejuridique et dc celle des institu-
tions de chaque syst-ernepour avoir une valeur universdle et Ctredirecte-
ment valable cn droit international,
3. Le raisonnement de 1'arrEtdans le paragraphe 57 est habile, 11
s'attache i un simple rappel factuel des propositions et des attitudes des
Parties; la conclusion qui s'cndegage-releveainsi cleI'ividencememe. La

demonstration aurait ite plusconvaincante si I'analysefactuelleetait arti-
culee avec le problgme de la production des preuvesdans les prods
devant la Cour. Aux reprochcs de non-coopbration que le dkfendeur for-
mule a I'encontre du dcrnandeur, la Cour rgpond en indiquant le com-
porlement qu'elleattendait de celui-ci.
4. A l'analyse,I'objectionamkricainesoulive unequestion de principe.
La non-production de pieces par I'adversaire, sans une dcmande pria-

!able i la Cour, pcut-elle lui 2tse reprochee? Traditionnellement, dans le
cadre du droit processuel, Ic principe de base ktait formuli: dans la
maxime nemo contru se edere twetur (nu1n'est tenu de prouver contre DECLARATION OF VICE-PRESIDENT RANJEVA

Rejection of distinciiun hefween burden uj proof'nnd burdenof cvirlernc-
Fuctwi unulysisof thcpruduciionofevid~nre - Non-upplicationof the maxim
nemocontra se ed~rctenetur- Article62 of RulesoflCour! - Corfu Channel
case and refu.sulfoproduce evidcncc - Just$cation of he jl~cfualanalysis.
Diplomatrcprr>Iectbn - Individurrlrigts- ViennaConvention on C(?nsular
Relntions - In~errelutbnship qf suclr righ~r- Article 56 and iden~jlimrion
r)fitolders of the rrgizt~titere defi-ed Enterrelufionshipof righfs under rhe
Arfiuk 36 system: uo~~~binurio ofnsendingStute'.~righr of iniliative unnon-
rejusalby its naiiunoI

1. Whilst agreeing with the Court's findings and reasoning, 1wish to

make my own proposed interpretation clear in regard to the issue of evi-
dence and the relationship bc~wcendiplomatic,protection and individual
rights.
2. The Judgment declines to adopt the distinction proposcd by the
United States, betwccn the burden of proof and the burden of cvidence
(para. 561,retaining solely the classicconcept of burden of proof. Whilst

that decision merits approval, the Judgment fails to give an appropriate
explanation on this point. The distinction proposed by the Respondent is
somewhat subtle and perhaps arises from specific concepts of United
States law; the fact remains that those are institutions of domestic law,
whereas thc Court is bound to apply international law and its categories.
It is sufficient lo recall a basic Irulh, namely that thc categories of
domestic law havc their inherelit limitations; they are loo directly

dependent on the legaland institutional history of a given system to have
universal valueand to be directly valid in international law.

3. The reasoning of the Judgment in paragraph 57 is well fashioned,
consisting simplyin a factual reviewof the Parties' propositions and con-
duct, and producing a conciusion which is thus self-evident.The demon-
stration would have beenmore convincing had the factual analysis becn

linked with the issueof the production of evidence in cases before the
Court. The Court responds to Ihe Respondent's complaints of lack of
co-operation on the part of the Applicant by indicating the conduct it
expeelcd of the latter.
4. On reflection, itis apparent that the United States objection raises a
question of principle. Can a complaint be made that the other party has

failed to produce cvidenceif the Court has not previously requested itto
do so? Traditionally, in the context of procedural law, rhe basic principle
was enshrined in the maxim nemo contru st7 edere telaetur(no one is76 AVENA E.1AUTRES (DBcI..KANJEVA]

lui-mgme). Mais, au niveau du Rkglcment de la Cour, il ne semble pas
que ce principe ait donnP lieu i une interpritation maxirnaliste. Le para-
graphe 1de l'article62du Reglement confkre a la Cour la plenitude de la
compelcnce qui est discrktionnaire en-matihe d'initiativcsurles preuves.
Si la Cour acckde h larequgte du defendeur, elle peut enjoindre I'autre
partie de le produire. A l'appui de cetteinterpretation, on peut Cvoquerle
precedcnt de:

<<laCPJI [qui] a jug6 recevable la requzte d'un agetit qui priait la
Cour de demander Al'autre Partie la production d'un tcxted'ordre
administratif,A l'appui de l'interprklation d'une cerlaine notion de
droit administratifqu'il avait exposcc k la Cour. Aprks dClibkrC,
ccllc-cidlcida de donner suitea cette suggestio>)(Genevieve Guyo-
mar, Co~lmentuired.u Ri.gIemrntde iu Cow inrernmtionale de Justice

adopt&IPI4 uvril 1978, 1483,p. 41 1,qui se refkaiiC. P.J.I.sCrieE
n"8, p. 259.)
5. Mais ilconvient de releverque la seulesanction que la Cour pourra
tirer de la non-production dela piece sera la conskquencequ'clledkduira

de I'abstention ou du refus de produclion de la pike. Dans l'affaire du
Dttroit de Corfoer,la production dernandke par la Cour a CtCrerusk par
la partic en cause:
<(11n'est par consequent pas possiblede connaitrc la portee rkellc
de cesordres militaires. La Cour ne peut toutcfois tirer du rcfus de

communicalion de I'ordreen question des conclusions differentcs de
celles que I'on peut tirerdes hits tels qu'ils se sont effectivement
dCroulCs . (Fond, axrif,C.I.J.Recueil 1949, p. 32.)
6. En I'absenced'obligation susceptiblede remettre en cause l'initia-
tive volonlaire des Parties dans la production des preuves, la Cour dis-

pose quc de son pouvoir d'appreciation comrne moyen dans la recherche
de la viritk. Cette contrainle~cxpiique le caractere puremenl factuel de
I'analysedes paragraphcs 56et 57.
7. Concernant le paragraphe 40, je souhaiterais apporrer mon inter-
prktation. La question est lieeii la transposition par les Etats-Unisdw
Mexique de I'ensembledel'argumentationdeI'Allemagnedans I'affaireLm-
Grund(AIlemclgrwc. Erai~-Unis J'AmC.riyueJ, reprise au paragraphc 75
de E'arrkt de 2001; cette stratkgie du Mexique est explicable: il a
entendu obtenir le bCnCficdee lajurisprudence LaCtund relalive i la pro-
tection des {(droitsindividuei)>de ses ressortissants. A I'analyseccpen-

dant, les deux demandes, allemande ctmexicaine, apparaissent rort dif-
Ercntes quant B leur objet. LYAllernagnea joint en unobjet unique les
demandes relatives respectivcment rison droit propre etA ccluirelatiA la
protcction des droits individuels des frkres LaGrand. Dans la prksente
affaire, la demande mexicaine cstcomplexe: le dernandeur agit d'abord
en son nom propre;ensuile, il agit dans I'exercicedu droil qu'ila pour la
protection de ses ressortissantset en dernier lieu, et u point mCritede
retenir l'attention, la rkalisation des droits individuels JCSSO~~~SS~~~S AVENA AND OTHERS (DECI,. RANJEVA) 76

1 bound to give evidence against himself). Howcvcr, in terms of the Rules
of'Court, this principle does not appcar lo have been construed strictly.
Article 62, paragraph 1,of the Rules confers on the Court full discretion-
ary powers in respccl of cvidence gathering. If the Court decides to grant
a respondent's request, it may order the other party to produce evidcncc.
The following precedent provides support for this interpretation:

"the PCIJ responded Fdvourably to an Agent who requested the
Court to ask the other party toproduce an administrative document
in support of'the interpretation of a certain conception of adrninis-

trative law which he had expounded before the Court. The Court,
aflcr deliberation, decided to comply with this request." (Geneviive
Guyornar, Conzm~ntuire du Rkg:glerne~ llela Cour inrrrnutional~ dc
Justice, 1983,p. 411, referring to P.C. I.J..Series E, No. 8, p. 268.)

5. It should be noted, however, that the Court cannot impose any
sanction for failure to produce cvidence, other than the inferences it may
draw from such abstention or rert~sal.In the CorJu Chunnelcase, the evi-
dcncc requested by the Court was refused by the party in question:

"lt is not therefore possiblc to know the real content of these
naval ordcrs. The Court cannot, however, draw from this refusal to
produce the orders anyconclusions differing from those to which lhc
actual events gave rise." (Merits, Judgrrlmr, I.C.J. Reporls 1949,
p. 32.)

6. In the absence of any obligation capable or impugning the freedom
of action or the parties in relation to the production of evidence, the
Court's only mcans of establishing the truth is its own powcr of determi-
nation. That limitation explains the purely factual nature of the ai~alysis
in paragraphs 56 and 57.
7. With respect to paragraph 40, I would like to give my interprcla-
lion. The problem arises out of Mexico's wholesale espousal of Ger-
many's argument in the LaGrancd(Germany v. UnitedStcriesof Americu)
case, as set out in paragraph 75 of lhc 2001 Judgment; that strategy by
Mexico is explicable : it was sceking lo obtain the benefitof the LaGrmd

jurisprudence pertaining to the protection of the "individual rights" of its
nationals. On closer examination, however, the two claims - German
and Mexican - appear quite different in terms or their subject-matter.
Germany joined together its claims in its own right and those concerning
the protection of the individual rights of the LaGrand brothers. In the
prcsent case, the Mexican claim is acomplex one: the Applicant firs1acls
in its own name; secondly, it acts in the exercisc of its right to ensure the
protection of its nationals; and lastly- a point that should be empha-
sized - implementation of the individual rights of the Mexican nationals
is situated in the contcxt of the United States judicial systcm. Both Ger-mexicains se situe dsns le cadre du systkmejudiciairc des Etats-Unjs
dlArnCrique.Tanl I'Allemagneque le Mexique recouvrent leur strattgic
d'argumentation du pavillon de la protection diplomatique.
8.Aux fins de clarification conceptuelle, la rkferenca la notion de
protection diplomatique constitue une erreur de droit. Selon la tradition,
la protection diplomatique est d'abord uneinstitution du droit interna-
tional gknCralou coutumier:

{(C'estun principe Clkmentairedu droil international que celuiqui
autorise I'Etat ri pcotkgersesnationaux lksespar des actescontraires
au ciroit international commis par un autre Etat, dont ils n'ont pu
ohtcnir satisfaction par les voics ordinaires. En prenant fait cl cause
pour I'un des siens, en mettant cn mouvement, en sa faveur, I'action
diplomatique ou l'action judiciaire internationale, cet Etat fait, B
vraj dire, valoir son droit propre?le droit quaidc hire respecteren
la personne de sesrcssortissants le droit international(Concessions
Muvrommulis en Palesline, nrr& no 2, 1924, C.P.J.I. sPricA n" 2,
p. 12.)

9. En d'autrcs tcrrnes, la protection estIc droit pour un Etat de prC-
sentcr une reclamation internationale ;il'encontre d'un autre Etat
lorsqu'un deses ressortissants a ktk victime d'un fait intemalionalement
illicite. De la propositiondc la Cour permanente de Justice internatio-
nale, une conclusion s'impose: la protection diplomatique est un droit
propre de 1'Etat.S'agissant,dans ces conditions, de l'exercicede la pro-
tection des droits individuelsau profit de ses rcssortissants, la question
est de savoir s'ily a une place pour la prolection diplomatique.
10. Sur un plan trbspratique, la refkrence iila notion de protection
diplomatique et B la rigle de I'tpuisement des recours peut avoir des
cffets pervers: l'objection tirk dc la carence procedurale est dc naturei

rcndre sans ohjet le respectde la condition likea cette consideration pro-
ckdurale; on ne ressuscitepas encore uncondamni. a mort dkji supplicik.
11. Dans un cadre thioriquc, une lecture combinee des dispositions de
la convention de Vienneet dcs motifs de l'arrktLuGrand amkne sirelever
Ics observations suivantes: en premier lieu, la convention dc 1953enu-
mkre lesdroits qu'elleinstitue aux finsde faciliterl'exercicedc la fonction
consulaire tant au profit dcs Etats d'envoique de leursressortissants; en
dewxiime lieu, I'arrEtLaGranddkcrit les relations entre les ClCrnentsdu
systemc dc protection consulaire en lennes d'interdkpendancc (C.I.J.
Recueil2001, p. 492, par. 74) et en dernier iieu, au paragraphe 77,l'arrct
expose que:

crlaCour conclut que le paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 cric desdroits
individuelsqui, en vertu de l'articlepremiedu protocole de signature
facultative,euvcnt etre invoquks devant la Cour par 1'Etatdon1 la
personnedktenuea la nationalit6b)(C.IJ. Recetei1200J,p.494,par, 77).

12. Sauf erreur ou omission, ces propositions consacrent de manikre
immidiate les droits individuels mais n'ttablissent pas une conditionI
AVENA AND OTHERS (DECL. RANJEVA) 77

many and Mexico sailed their cntire forensic strategy under the flag of
diplomatic protcction.

8. In tcrms of legal characterization, the reference to diplomatic pro-
tection ismisconccivcd. Traditionally, diplomatic protection isessentially
an institution of gencral or customary international law:
1

"It is an elcrnentary principle of international law thata Slate is
entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to
international law committed by another State,Fromwhom they have
been unable to obtain satidaction through the ordinary channels. By
taking up the case of onc of its subjects and by resorting to diplo-

matic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a
State isin reality asserting its own right- its right to ensure, in the
pcrson of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law."
(Mavrommu fis Pcrlesrine Cunc~/.~=~~un Ju,dgmenl No. 2, 1924,
P.C.I.J., Scries A, No. 2, p. 12.)

9. In other words, the protcction consists in the sight of a State
to bring an international claim against another Stak when one of its
nationals has been injured by an internationally wrongful act. In
light of the terms used by the Permanent Court of international Justice,
therc is one clear conclusion: diplomatic protection is a right belonging
to thc Statc. Hence, in matters concerning the protection of individual
rights of nationals, the question is whether there is a place for diplo-
matic protection.
10. From a purely practical standpoint, rcliance on the notion of dip-

lomatic protection and the rule of the exhaustion of local remedies may
havc perverse effects: the procedural default rule can makc compliance
with the procedural obligation to exhaust local remedies a rutilc exercise;
no one has yet found a way of bringing an executed prisoner back tolife.
11. On a theoretical level, rcading thc provisions of the Vienna Con-
vention in conjunction with thc reasoning in the LuCrcltzclJudgment
prompts the following observations: first, the 1463 Convention enumer-
ates the rights that itsecks to protect for the purpose of facilitating the
exercise of the consular funclion, for the benefit both of the sending State
and of its nationals; secondly, thc LuGrundJudgment describes the com-
ponents of the consular protection system as being interrelated (I.C.J.
Reports 2001, p. 442, para. 74); and lastly, according to paragraph 77 of

that Judgment :
"the Court concludes that Article 36, paragraph I, creates individual
rights, which, by virtue of Article 1of the Optional Protocol, may be
invoked in this Court by thc national State of the detained person"

(I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 444, para. 77).
12. If I have understood thcm correctly, those propositions contem-
plate the direct grant of individual rights but do not impose any priorprealable iiI'invocationpar un Etat des violations auxdroits de sesrcs-
sortissants. Hors donc du perimklrede la protection diplomatique, sans
reference A la condition liCa I'kpuisementdes recours inlcrnes, la ques-
tion est de deleminer la significationde l'interd@pendance entre des ClP-
ments du systemede protection consutaire.
13. La notion d'inlerdkpendancea kt6 utilisee par la Cour en 2001
pour qualifier les rapports de correla~ionentre les droits knumerks au
paragraphe 1de I'article36. La causeou lecentre degravitkdc ce rapport
est la recherchede la facilitationde laprotection consulaire. En revanche,
l'knumkrationdes droils consiste en l'knonciationde Ieusconsistance et
leur dkvolulion respective entre 1'Etatd'envoi ct le sujet incarcCr6;en
d'aulres termes, la convention de 1963 s'cstattachke;iidentifierles titu-
lairesdes droits qu'elleinstitue, lesdroits individuelssont ceux dont sont
titulaires les ressortissants incarckrks.Dans ces conditions, I'intcrdkpen-

dance viske par l'arret dc 2091 concerne ni la nature ni la portee des
drojts enquestion; clleest relativea la miseen auvrc effectivedu sysckme
de prolceiion. La mise en muvrede l'cxcrcicepar 1'Etatdu droit qu'il a
d'assurerla protection de sesressortissants,qui tirent lcurs droits deI'ali-
nCah) du paragraphe I de l'article36, est conditionnkepar l'absencede
refusqucpourrait opposer leressortissant incarckrk ;icette dkmarche.Le
caractere discretionnairede lacomp6lencede 1'Etatd'envoi selimitcainsi
au droit a I'initiativedu dklenchement du mkcanismede protection. Ce
droit a l'initiativenail, cn cffet,craussitbtque [la]nationalitt!ktrangereest
Ctablie,ou dks qu'il existe desraisons de croirc que cette persanne est
probablement un ressortissant etrangero (arrEt, par. 88).

(Sign&) Raymond RANJEVA.condition for States seeking to invoke violations of the rights of their
nationals. Thus, looking beyond thc scope of diplomatic protection and
the obligation to exhaust local remedies,Ihequcstion to be determined is
the significance of theinterrelationship between the components of the
consular protection system.

13. The notion of intcrrclationship was used by the Court in 2001 to
characterize the interdependenceof the rights enumerated in Article 36,
paragraph 1.The raison d'2treor focus ofthat relationship is to seek to
facilitateconsular protection. However, the manncr in whichthe various
rights arc definedconsistsin stating theircontent and how theyare to be
apportioned as between the sending Statc and the dctninee; in other
words, the 1963 Convention soughtto identify tlie holders of the rights
that itcreated,with individual rights beingthose belongingto the detained
nationals. In these circumstances, the interrelationship contemplatedby
ihe 2001Judgment concernsneither thenature nor the scope of thc righis
in question; itpcrtains to the effectiveimplementation of the protection
system. The effectiveexerciseby a State of its right to provide for the

protection of its nationals, who dcrivc their rights from Article 36, para-
graph 1 (h), is only possibleif the detained national docs not rcfuscsuch
an initiative. The discrc~ionarypower of the sending State is thus con-
fined to a right of initiativetoaciivate thc protection mechanism.And
that right of initiative effectivelyarises "as soon as it is realizedthat the
person isa foreign national, or once there are grounds lo think that the
person is probably a roreignnational" (Judgment,para. 88).

(Signed) Raymond RANSEVA.