SEPARATEOPINlON OF JUDGE VERESHCHETIN
TWOheud~ uqflhr Mexican claims- Trwtmenf by heCourt of the ruleof
exh~u.stionoflocal remedies - "Mixed" claims in the jurisprudeirceof he
Cvurt nnd in the ILU Drajt A~r6icde .n DiplornoticProtection- Rea.~onsfor
the applicationof')rrpnndernnce" srundurdandfor non-applicationnj'ihelocrii
remediesreguir~menrin rhespeciul uircurnslnncesof t11ecase.
1voted in favour of the Judgment. However, I should like to put on
record my disagreement with that part of the Court's reasoning where it
deals with the issuesconcerning the law of diplomatic protection and the
related rule of the exhaustion of local remedies (paragraph 40 of the
Jud~ment).
1. In the present case, Mexicohas requested the Court to adjudge and
declare that the United Slates"violated its international legal obligation
to Mexico in its owa righl und in rheexercise oJ its right lo diplornutic
protection ofi1.7natinnuls" (emphasisadded). The United Statescontends
that Mcxico'sclaims are inadmissible because in all the individual cases
rcfcrrcd to by Mexico local:remedies remainavailable and therefore the
right of diplomatic protection on behalf of any Mexican national cannot
be exercised beforc this Court. In deciding this dispute, thc Court, in
order to show that the rulc of exhaustion of local remedics cannot pre-
clude the admissibility of the Mexican claims, has resortcd to reasoning
which, in my view, amounts to a highly problematic new legalproposi-
tion in respect of the taw of diplomatic protection.
2. The Court, without denying the obvious fact that Mexico brought
its claims under two heads, namely direct injury lo the State and in
the exercise of its right of diplomatic prolcction of its nationals, and
having also noted that the individual rights of the Mexican nationals
are rights "which are tobc asserted, at any rate in the first place, within
the domestic legal system of the United Statcs", thereafter makes an
unexpected U-turn and states that, "in the specialcircumstances of intcr-
dependence of the rights or the State and of individual rights" under the
Vienna Convention, Mexico may, prior to the exhaustion of local
remedies,
"request the Court to rule on the violation of rights which it claims
to have sufferedboth directly and lhrtlughthe violationsof the indi- viduul righds, confirred on Mexican nalionul~ under Article 36,
paragraph I (b) [of the Vienna Conventio~~]"(emphasis added).
The Court further specificallyobserves that in the present case the duty
to exhaust local remediesdoes not apply and that the Court docs not
have to deal withthe Mexican claim of violations "undcr a distinct head-
ing of diplomatic protection".
3. In support of its argument regarding the "special circumstancesof
intcrdepeiidence of the rights oCthe State and individual rights" under
the Vienna Convention, thc Court relies (a) on the findinginthe LaCrund
case that "Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights [for the
national concerned], which . . .may be invoked in this Court by thc
national Slate of the detained person" (LuGrand (Gemzurzy v. Unired
States of'America), Judg~aent,I.C.J. Reports2001,p. 494, para. 77),and
(b) on its statemenl that "violations of the rightsofthe individual under
Article 36 may entail violations of thc rights of the sending State, and
that violations of the rights or the latter may entail a violation of the
rights of the individual".
4. The Court, however, fails lo recall that in the LuGrand case, in
which Germany also brought its claims under thc two heads, the Court
does not say lhal in invoking individual rights of its nationals the Stale
may avoid the rule of exhaustion of locai remedies or, for that matter,
lhat incase of such invocation thc claims fall outside the scopeof the law
of diplomatic protection. As to the Court's statement that violations of
the rights of the individualmay entail violations of Ihc rights of the State
and vice versa, this cir~ular reasoning can bc assessed in the light ofIhe
jurisprudence of the Court on diplomatic protection and of the work of
the International Law Commission (ILC), which recently tbrmulated
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection. Unfortunately, neither of these
is even mentioned in the Judment.
5. To use the terminology of thc ILC, Mexico has brought a so-called
"mixed" claim allegingboth direct injury to the State and indirect injury
to E~C same State through the wrong done to its nationals. In its Com-
mentary to Article 9 [l 11of the said Draft the LLC,basing itself on
severaljudgments of this Court dealing with diplomatic protection cases
and related issues of the exhaustion of local remedies (In!erhurzdd>Pre-
liminar Oybjections,Judgment,I. C.J. Reporrs1959; UniiedS~utesDiplo-
mutic and Consular Sluff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980;
EllerrronicaSiculu S.p.A. (ELSI), JudgmerarI,.C.J. Reporis 198P), staled:
"In the case of a mixed claiin it is incumbentupon the tribunal to
examine the different elements of the claim and to decidc whether
the direct or the indirect cleme~~its preponderant .. .If a claim is
preponderantly bascd on injury to a national this is evidence of the
fact that theclaim would not have been brought but for the injury to 8 1 AVENAAND OTHERS (SEP. OP."VEKESHCHETIN)
the national . . .The principal factors to be considered in making
this assessment arethe subject of the dispute, the nature of the claim
and the remedy claimed." (United Nations, Report of the Interna-
tionaltaw Commission, Fifty-fifth Session(5May-6 June and 7July-
8 August 2003), OJjcial Recorh of the Generul Assenahly, Fiftr-
eighth Session, SuppIemenr No. 10 (A/58/10), pp. 90-91.)
Article 9 [l 11to which the above-cited Commentary refers, reads as fol-
lows :
"Local remedies shall be exhausted where an international claim,
or request fora declaratory judgment related to the claim, is brought
preponderantly on the basis of an injury to a national or other
pcrson referred to in article 7(83."[Article 7 [R]deals with stateless
persons and refugees.] (Ibid., p. 89.)
It should be noted that the cited Article of the ILC Draft does not make
any exception For treaty-based claims.
6. Aswas just mentioned, thc ILC was guided by thejurisprudence of
the International Court of Justice. The ELSI Chamber rejected a United
States argument that the exhaustion of local remedies did not apply as
regards treaty-based daims where the treaty in question was silent as to
whether such rule applied. While the Chambcr recognized that thc parties
to a treaty can explicitly agree that the local remedies rule shall or shatl.
not apply to claims based on that treaty, such "an important principle of
. 'customary inicrnational law" would not bc held to have been "tacitly dis-
pensed with,in the absence of any words making clear an intention to do
so" (Elcllroni SicuulaS.p.A. (ELSI), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1989,
: p. 42, para. SO)T.hus, the Chamber stated that, as regards treaty-based
claims, Iocal remedies must be exhausted prior to the institution of an
international claim unlessthere isexplicit language to the contrary. Jnthe
same case, the Chamber refused to separate the claim 'fordirect injury
alleged by the United States Fromthe diplomatic protection claim based
on injury to the United States nationals. The Chamber thus determined
that where the samc factual basis exists for claims based both on direct
injury to a State and indircct injury through a national of that State, local
. remedies must be exhausted when the claims are preponderantly based
upon the injury to the national of the Slate.
7. In the case before the Court now, we arc Fdced with a similar situa-
tion: the factual basis for both elcments of Mexico's claim is the same;
the remedies sought focuson injuries to the nationals concerned. To use
the "preponderance" standard, referred to above, the claim would not
have been brought before the Court but for Mexico's desire to protect
specific nationals. This clear1y shows that the mixcd Mexican claim is82 AVENA AND OTI.IERS(SEP. OP. VERESI-ICHE'TIN)
preponderantly a diplomatic protection claim, in which Mexico espouses
before the Court the claims of its nationals. Direct injury to Mexico
could arise onlyafter the violations of the rightsf its nationals provided
for in Article36, paragraph 1 (b), of thc Vienna Convention.
8. In effect, such a finding is corroborated by thc Judgment's overall
reasoning. Thus, the Court invokes the violations of the rights of Mcxi-
can nationals not merely as evidence of the violations of the rights of
Mexico as a State. I1 scrupulously examines and identifies Ihe concrete
violations of thc rights of Mexican nationals in each and every one of
50-plus individual casesbrought by Mexico under the head of diplomatic
protection. The Court identifies by name the specificindividuals and the
specific injuries causedto them (see, for example, paragraph 106 of the
Judgment).
9. And yet,at the very beginning of this exercise,the Court states that
it is not dealing with the Mexican claims as a diplomatic protection ease
and that thc rule of exhaustion of local remediesdoes not apply to the
Mexican request because of the special circumstancesof interdependence
of the rights of thc State and of individual rightsunder thc Vienna Con-
vention.
10. 1 share thc view of the majority that Mexico's claimsare admis-
sible and that the duty to exhaust local remediesdocs not apply to this
case. Howcver, my perception of the nature of the "special circum-
stances" in issue is quite different from that expounded in paragraph 40
of the Judgmcnt. In my view, the specialcircumstances that, for the pur-
poses of this Judpent, exempt this particular case from the local
remedies requirement do not lie in thc special character of Article 36of
the Vienna Convention, but rather in the particular factual circumstances
of the specificcase before theCourt, as will be explained further below.
Contrary to what the Court says in paragraph 40 of the Judgment, in
invoking thc rights of individuals under the Vienna Convention beforc
this Court, thc State, as u g~neru iule, is not exempt from the duty to
exhaust local remedies, subjectto certain exceptions as those specifiedin
Article 10 [14] of the ILC Draft. As the ELSI Chamber observed with
regard lo this rule, such "an important principle of customary interna-
tional law" would not be held to have been "tacitly dispensed with,in the
absence of any words making clear an intention to do so" (Elcltroniuu
SiculuS.p.A. (ELSI), Judgment, I.C.J.R~purfs 1989, p.42, para. 50).
11. The individual rights of Mexicannationals under paragraph 1 (h)
of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention are, indeed, rights "which are to
be asserted, at any ratcin the first place, within the domestic lcgal system
of the United States" (para. 40 of the Judgment). In principle, only when
that process iscompleted and the remedies for the violations arc finally
unavailable, couId Mexicolake up the case in the form of an espousal of
individual claims bcfbrethis Court. However. the LaGrandcase showed83 AVENA AND Q'lLHERS(SEP.OF'.VERESHCHETI N)
that the wide range of possible local remediesin criminal justice pro-
cedures in the United States tend to be exhausted onlya short time before
the execution of individuals under sentence of death. In consequence,
there is a risk that applications based on diplomatic protection with
regard to such individuals will be filed with this Court in circumstances
where the latter would be unable usefully to address them.
12. in rhe~peciul circumsiances oJ rhe presenf case, at the time when
the Application was fled, all the Mexican nationals concerned were
already on death row and therefore human lives were at stake. In these
circurnstanccs,to demand that all thc local remediesfor the alleged viola-
tion of Article36, paragraph 1, should have been completely exhausted
before Mexico could exercise its right of diplomatic protection of these
nationals could lcad to the absurd result of this Court having to rule at a
point in time when its ruling could have no practical cffect, That is why,
exactly because most of the cases in question had not yet reached the
final stage in the United States criminal proceedings,and in the hope that
this Court would clarify the matter from the standpoint of international
law, Mexico could bringits claims both in its own right and in the exer-
cise of its righof diplomatic protection of its nationals.
13. To conclude, the Court should have applied the "preponderance"
standard lo the "mixed" Mexican claims brought under the heads both of
Mexico's own rights and of its right of diplomaticprotection of its
nationals, thus remain~ngconsistent with its former jurisprudence on the
law of diplomatic protection. Having found that the claims were essen-
tially thoseoKdiplomaticprotection, thc Court should havcherdthat the
rule of exhaustion of local remedies was inapplicable not because
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations impliedly
differsin kind from other treaty provisions creating rights of individuals,
but rather because of the veryspecial cirt..umstancesof the case at hand,
as explained abovc.
(Signed) Yladlen S. VEKESHCHETIN.
DECLARATION DE M. LE JUGE RANJEVA,VICE-PRESIDENT
Rejet de la di~rinurion((burdenof proor)) elccburden of evidence>}- Ana-
Iysefaclueld leeluproducdion despreu ves- Inexistence de iu rnaxinie: nemo
contra se edere tenctur - Artick 62 du Reglemenr - dffaire du Detroit de
Corfou errefus de produclion de pikcm - Jusf~$cati(~CleI'unalysefacluelie.
Protecriondiplomatique ' Drc~irindhidueis - Con~enrio~inle Viennesur Ieh
rehtions con.suluire- Intercle'pendunceenlre cesduoils- Article 36 el iden-
~z$carionde.5 truiiairesdes droi~sknumirts - Interdkpenduncedes droits du
systame de I'urricJc36: renconlrede I'inifiativede I'Etnrd'envai ot absence de
refus du reesortissunl.
1. Souscrivant aux conclusions et au raisonnement de la Cour, je sou-
haiterais prkiser l'inlerpretation que je propose concernant le probleme
de la preuve et Icsrapports entre la protection diplomatique et lesdroits
individuels.
2. L'arr2t refusede reprendre Bson cornpte la distinction pr6senti.epar
les Etats-Unis dZArnCriqueentre le nburdenoJproof>>et le c{burde~ zf
evidence))(par. 56),traduits respectivementpar ccchargede la preuve >)ct
<<idest]lcments de preuve)),pour ne retenir que le concept classique de la
charge de ta preuve. Celke decision merite dZ&treapprouvke bicn que
I'arrEtne consacre pas de dkveloppements idoines rice point. La distinc-
tion, trop subtile, proposCe par la Partic dkfenderesse relevc, peutdtre,
des categoriespropres audroit americain ; toujours cst-iIqu'il s'agitd'ins-
titutions de droit interne aIors que la Cour a a appliquer le droit inter-
national etses cattgories. Tout au plus, doit-on rappclcr une vCritC&lP-
mentaire que sont lcslirnitespropres des catkgoriesde droit interne; elles
sont directement lributaires de I'histoirejuridique et dc celle des institu-
tions de chaque syst-ernepour avoir une valeur universdle et Ctredirecte-
ment valable cn droit international,
3. Le raisonnement de 1'arrEtdans le paragraphe 57 est habile, 11
s'attache i un simple rappel factuel des propositions et des attitudes des
Parties; la conclusion qui s'cndegage-releveainsi cleI'ividencememe. La
demonstration aurait ite plusconvaincante si I'analysefactuelleetait arti-
culee avec le problgme de la production des preuvesdans les prods
devant la Cour. Aux reprochcs de non-coopbration que le dkfendeur for-
mule a I'encontre du dcrnandeur, la Cour rgpond en indiquant le com-
porlement qu'elleattendait de celui-ci.
4. A l'analyse,I'objectionamkricainesoulive unequestion de principe.
La non-production de pieces par I'adversaire, sans une dcmande pria-
!able i la Cour, pcut-elle lui 2tse reprochee? Traditionnellement, dans le
cadre du droit processuel, Ic principe de base ktait formuli: dans la
maxime nemo contru se edere twetur (nu1n'est tenu de prouver contre DECLARATION OF VICE-PRESIDENT RANJEVA
Rejection of distinciiun hefween burden uj proof'nnd burdenof cvirlernc-
Fuctwi unulysisof thcpruduciionofevid~nre - Non-upplicationof the maxim
nemocontra se ed~rctenetur- Article62 of RulesoflCour! - Corfu Channel
case and refu.sulfoproduce evidcncc - Just$cation of he jl~cfualanalysis.
Diplomatrcprr>Iectbn - Individurrlrigts- ViennaConvention on C(?nsular
Relntions - In~errelutbnship qf suclr righ~r- Article 56 and iden~jlimrion
r)fitolders of the rrgizt~titere defi-ed Enterrelufionshipof righfs under rhe
Arfiuk 36 system: uo~~~binurio ofnsendingStute'.~righr of iniliative unnon-
rejusalby its naiiunoI
1. Whilst agreeing with the Court's findings and reasoning, 1wish to
make my own proposed interpretation clear in regard to the issue of evi-
dence and the relationship bc~wcendiplomatic,protection and individual
rights.
2. The Judgment declines to adopt the distinction proposcd by the
United States, betwccn the burden of proof and the burden of cvidence
(para. 561,retaining solely the classicconcept of burden of proof. Whilst
that decision merits approval, the Judgment fails to give an appropriate
explanation on this point. The distinction proposed by the Respondent is
somewhat subtle and perhaps arises from specific concepts of United
States law; the fact remains that those are institutions of domestic law,
whereas thc Court is bound to apply international law and its categories.
It is sufficient lo recall a basic Irulh, namely that thc categories of
domestic law havc their inherelit limitations; they are loo directly
dependent on the legaland institutional history of a given system to have
universal valueand to be directly valid in international law.
3. The reasoning of the Judgment in paragraph 57 is well fashioned,
consisting simplyin a factual reviewof the Parties' propositions and con-
duct, and producing a conciusion which is thus self-evident.The demon-
stration would have beenmore convincing had the factual analysis becn
linked with the issueof the production of evidence in cases before the
Court. The Court responds to Ihe Respondent's complaints of lack of
co-operation on the part of the Applicant by indicating the conduct it
expeelcd of the latter.
4. On reflection, itis apparent that the United States objection raises a
question of principle. Can a complaint be made that the other party has
failed to produce cvidenceif the Court has not previously requested itto
do so? Traditionally, in the context of procedural law, rhe basic principle
was enshrined in the maxim nemo contru st7 edere telaetur(no one is76 AVENA E.1AUTRES (DBcI..KANJEVA]
lui-mgme). Mais, au niveau du Rkglcment de la Cour, il ne semble pas
que ce principe ait donnP lieu i une interpritation maxirnaliste. Le para-
graphe 1de l'article62du Reglement confkre a la Cour la plenitude de la
compelcnce qui est discrktionnaire en-matihe d'initiativcsurles preuves.
Si la Cour acckde h larequgte du defendeur, elle peut enjoindre I'autre
partie de le produire. A l'appui de cetteinterpretation, on peut Cvoquerle
precedcnt de:
<<laCPJI [qui] a jug6 recevable la requzte d'un agetit qui priait la
Cour de demander Al'autre Partie la production d'un tcxted'ordre
administratif,A l'appui de l'interprklation d'une cerlaine notion de
droit administratifqu'il avait exposcc k la Cour. Aprks dClibkrC,
ccllc-cidlcida de donner suitea cette suggestio>)(Genevieve Guyo-
mar, Co~lmentuired.u Ri.gIemrntde iu Cow inrernmtionale de Justice
adopt&IPI4 uvril 1978, 1483,p. 41 1,qui se refkaiiC. P.J.I.sCrieE
n"8, p. 259.)
5. Mais ilconvient de releverque la seulesanction que la Cour pourra
tirer de la non-production dela piece sera la conskquencequ'clledkduira
de I'abstention ou du refus de produclion de la pike. Dans l'affaire du
Dttroit de Corfoer,la production dernandke par la Cour a CtCrerusk par
la partic en cause:
<(11n'est par consequent pas possiblede connaitrc la portee rkellc
de cesordres militaires. La Cour ne peut toutcfois tirer du rcfus de
communicalion de I'ordreen question des conclusions differentcs de
celles que I'on peut tirerdes hits tels qu'ils se sont effectivement
dCroulCs . (Fond, axrif,C.I.J.Recueil 1949, p. 32.)
6. En I'absenced'obligation susceptiblede remettre en cause l'initia-
tive volonlaire des Parties dans la production des preuves, la Cour dis-
pose quc de son pouvoir d'appreciation comrne moyen dans la recherche
de la viritk. Cette contrainle~cxpiique le caractere puremenl factuel de
I'analysedes paragraphcs 56et 57.
7. Concernant le paragraphe 40, je souhaiterais apporrer mon inter-
prktation. La question est lieeii la transposition par les Etats-Unisdw
Mexique de I'ensembledel'argumentationdeI'Allemagnedans I'affaireLm-
Grund(AIlemclgrwc. Erai~-Unis J'AmC.riyueJ, reprise au paragraphc 75
de E'arrkt de 2001; cette stratkgie du Mexique est explicable: il a
entendu obtenir le bCnCficdee lajurisprudence LaCtund relalive i la pro-
tection des {(droitsindividuei)>de ses ressortissants. A I'analyseccpen-
dant, les deux demandes, allemande ctmexicaine, apparaissent rort dif-
Ercntes quant B leur objet. LYAllernagnea joint en unobjet unique les
demandes relatives respectivcment rison droit propre etA ccluirelatiA la
protcction des droits individuels des frkres LaGrand. Dans la prksente
affaire, la demande mexicaine cstcomplexe: le dernandeur agit d'abord
en son nom propre;ensuile, il agit dans I'exercicedu droil qu'ila pour la
protection de ses ressortissantset en dernier lieu, et u point mCritede
retenir l'attention, la rkalisation des droits individuels JCSSO~~~SS~~~S AVENA AND OTHERS (DECI,. RANJEVA) 76
1 bound to give evidence against himself). Howcvcr, in terms of the Rules
of'Court, this principle does not appcar lo have been construed strictly.
Article 62, paragraph 1,of the Rules confers on the Court full discretion-
ary powers in respccl of cvidence gathering. If the Court decides to grant
a respondent's request, it may order the other party to produce evidcncc.
The following precedent provides support for this interpretation:
"the PCIJ responded Fdvourably to an Agent who requested the
Court to ask the other party toproduce an administrative document
in support of'the interpretation of a certain conception of adrninis-
trative law which he had expounded before the Court. The Court,
aflcr deliberation, decided to comply with this request." (Geneviive
Guyornar, Conzm~ntuire du Rkg:glerne~ llela Cour inrrrnutional~ dc
Justice, 1983,p. 411, referring to P.C. I.J..Series E, No. 8, p. 268.)
5. It should be noted, however, that the Court cannot impose any
sanction for failure to produce cvidence, other than the inferences it may
draw from such abstention or rert~sal.In the CorJu Chunnelcase, the evi-
dcncc requested by the Court was refused by the party in question:
"lt is not therefore possiblc to know the real content of these
naval ordcrs. The Court cannot, however, draw from this refusal to
produce the orders anyconclusions differing from those to which lhc
actual events gave rise." (Merits, Judgrrlmr, I.C.J. Reporls 1949,
p. 32.)
6. In the absence of any obligation capable or impugning the freedom
of action or the parties in relation to the production of evidence, the
Court's only mcans of establishing the truth is its own powcr of determi-
nation. That limitation explains the purely factual nature of the ai~alysis
in paragraphs 56 and 57.
7. With respect to paragraph 40, I would like to give my interprcla-
lion. The problem arises out of Mexico's wholesale espousal of Ger-
many's argument in the LaGrancd(Germany v. UnitedStcriesof Americu)
case, as set out in paragraph 75 of lhc 2001 Judgment; that strategy by
Mexico is explicable : it was sceking lo obtain the benefitof the LaGrmd
jurisprudence pertaining to the protection of the "individual rights" of its
nationals. On closer examination, however, the two claims - German
and Mexican - appear quite different in terms or their subject-matter.
Germany joined together its claims in its own right and those concerning
the protection of the individual rights of the LaGrand brothers. In the
prcsent case, the Mexican claim is acomplex one: the Applicant firs1acls
in its own name; secondly, it acts in the exercisc of its right to ensure the
protection of its nationals; and lastly- a point that should be empha-
sized - implementation of the individual rights of the Mexican nationals
is situated in the contcxt of the United States judicial systcm. Both Ger-mexicains se situe dsns le cadre du systkmejudiciairc des Etats-Unjs
dlArnCrique.Tanl I'Allemagneque le Mexique recouvrent leur strattgic
d'argumentation du pavillon de la protection diplomatique.
8.Aux fins de clarification conceptuelle, la rkferenca la notion de
protection diplomatique constitue une erreur de droit. Selon la tradition,
la protection diplomatique est d'abord uneinstitution du droit interna-
tional gknCralou coutumier:
{(C'estun principe Clkmentairedu droil international que celuiqui
autorise I'Etat ri pcotkgersesnationaux lksespar des actescontraires
au ciroit international commis par un autre Etat, dont ils n'ont pu
ohtcnir satisfaction par les voics ordinaires. En prenant fait cl cause
pour I'un des siens, en mettant cn mouvement, en sa faveur, I'action
diplomatique ou l'action judiciaire internationale, cet Etat fait, B
vraj dire, valoir son droit propre?le droit quaidc hire respecteren
la personne de sesrcssortissants le droit international(Concessions
Muvrommulis en Palesline, nrr& no 2, 1924, C.P.J.I. sPricA n" 2,
p. 12.)
9. En d'autrcs tcrrnes, la protection estIc droit pour un Etat de prC-
sentcr une reclamation internationale ;il'encontre d'un autre Etat
lorsqu'un deses ressortissants a ktk victime d'un fait intemalionalement
illicite. De la propositiondc la Cour permanente de Justice internatio-
nale, une conclusion s'impose: la protection diplomatique est un droit
propre de 1'Etat.S'agissant,dans ces conditions, de l'exercicede la pro-
tection des droits individuelsau profit de ses rcssortissants, la question
est de savoir s'ily a une place pour la prolection diplomatique.
10. Sur un plan trbspratique, la refkrence iila notion de protection
diplomatique et B la rigle de I'tpuisement des recours peut avoir des
cffets pervers: l'objection tirk dc la carence procedurale est dc naturei
rcndre sans ohjet le respectde la condition likea cette consideration pro-
ckdurale; on ne ressuscitepas encore uncondamni. a mort dkji supplicik.
11. Dans un cadre thioriquc, une lecture combinee des dispositions de
la convention de Vienneet dcs motifs de l'arrktLuGrand amkne sirelever
Ics observations suivantes: en premier lieu, la convention dc 1953enu-
mkre lesdroits qu'elleinstitue aux finsde faciliterl'exercicedc la fonction
consulaire tant au profit dcs Etats d'envoique de leursressortissants; en
dewxiime lieu, I'arrEtLaGranddkcrit les relations entre les ClCrnentsdu
systemc dc protection consulaire en lennes d'interdkpendancc (C.I.J.
Recueil2001, p. 492, par. 74) et en dernier iieu, au paragraphe 77,l'arrct
expose que:
crlaCour conclut que le paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 cric desdroits
individuelsqui, en vertu de l'articlepremiedu protocole de signature
facultative,euvcnt etre invoquks devant la Cour par 1'Etatdon1 la
personnedktenuea la nationalit6b)(C.IJ. Recetei1200J,p.494,par, 77).
12. Sauf erreur ou omission, ces propositions consacrent de manikre
immidiate les droits individuels mais n'ttablissent pas une conditionI
AVENA AND OTHERS (DECL. RANJEVA) 77
many and Mexico sailed their cntire forensic strategy under the flag of
diplomatic protcction.
8. In tcrms of legal characterization, the reference to diplomatic pro-
tection ismisconccivcd. Traditionally, diplomatic protection isessentially
an institution of gencral or customary international law:
1
"It is an elcrnentary principle of international law thata Slate is
entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to
international law committed by another State,Fromwhom they have
been unable to obtain satidaction through the ordinary channels. By
taking up the case of onc of its subjects and by resorting to diplo-
matic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a
State isin reality asserting its own right- its right to ensure, in the
pcrson of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law."
(Mavrommu fis Pcrlesrine Cunc~/.~=~~un Ju,dgmenl No. 2, 1924,
P.C.I.J., Scries A, No. 2, p. 12.)
9. In other words, the protcction consists in the sight of a State
to bring an international claim against another Stak when one of its
nationals has been injured by an internationally wrongful act. In
light of the terms used by the Permanent Court of international Justice,
therc is one clear conclusion: diplomatic protection is a right belonging
to thc Statc. Hence, in matters concerning the protection of individual
rights of nationals, the question is whether there is a place for diplo-
matic protection.
10. From a purely practical standpoint, rcliance on the notion of dip-
lomatic protection and the rule of the exhaustion of local remedies may
havc perverse effects: the procedural default rule can makc compliance
with the procedural obligation to exhaust local remedies a rutilc exercise;
no one has yet found a way of bringing an executed prisoner back tolife.
11. On a theoretical level, rcading thc provisions of the Vienna Con-
vention in conjunction with thc reasoning in the LuCrcltzclJudgment
prompts the following observations: first, the 1463 Convention enumer-
ates the rights that itsecks to protect for the purpose of facilitating the
exercise of the consular funclion, for the benefit both of the sending State
and of its nationals; secondly, thc LuGrundJudgment describes the com-
ponents of the consular protection system as being interrelated (I.C.J.
Reports 2001, p. 442, para. 74); and lastly, according to paragraph 77 of
that Judgment :
"the Court concludes that Article 36, paragraph I, creates individual
rights, which, by virtue of Article 1of the Optional Protocol, may be
invoked in this Court by thc national State of the detained person"
(I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 444, para. 77).
12. If I have understood thcm correctly, those propositions contem-
plate the direct grant of individual rights but do not impose any priorprealable iiI'invocationpar un Etat des violations auxdroits de sesrcs-
sortissants. Hors donc du perimklrede la protection diplomatique, sans
reference A la condition liCa I'kpuisementdes recours inlcrnes, la ques-
tion est de deleminer la significationde l'interd@pendance entre des ClP-
ments du systemede protection consutaire.
13. La notion d'inlerdkpendancea kt6 utilisee par la Cour en 2001
pour qualifier les rapports de correla~ionentre les droits knumerks au
paragraphe 1de I'article36. La causeou lecentre degravitkdc ce rapport
est la recherchede la facilitationde laprotection consulaire. En revanche,
l'knumkrationdes droils consiste en l'knonciationde Ieusconsistance et
leur dkvolulion respective entre 1'Etatd'envoi ct le sujet incarcCr6;en
d'aulres termes, la convention de 1963 s'cstattachke;iidentifierles titu-
lairesdes droits qu'elleinstitue, lesdroits individuelssont ceux dont sont
titulaires les ressortissants incarckrks.Dans ces conditions, I'intcrdkpen-
dance viske par l'arret dc 2091 concerne ni la nature ni la portee des
drojts enquestion; clleest relativea la miseen auvrc effectivedu sysckme
de prolceiion. La mise en muvrede l'cxcrcicepar 1'Etatdu droit qu'il a
d'assurerla protection de sesressortissants,qui tirent lcurs droits deI'ali-
nCah) du paragraphe I de l'article36, est conditionnkepar l'absencede
refusqucpourrait opposer leressortissant incarckrk ;icette dkmarche.Le
caractere discretionnairede lacomp6lencede 1'Etatd'envoi selimitcainsi
au droit a I'initiativedu dklenchement du mkcanismede protection. Ce
droit a l'initiativenail, cn cffet,craussitbtque [la]nationalitt!ktrangereest
Ctablie,ou dks qu'il existe desraisons de croirc que cette persanne est
probablement un ressortissant etrangero (arrEt, par. 88).
(Sign&) Raymond RANJEVA.condition for States seeking to invoke violations of the rights of their
nationals. Thus, looking beyond thc scope of diplomatic protection and
the obligation to exhaust local remedies,Ihequcstion to be determined is
the significance of theinterrelationship between the components of the
consular protection system.
13. The notion of intcrrclationship was used by the Court in 2001 to
characterize the interdependenceof the rights enumerated in Article 36,
paragraph 1.The raison d'2treor focus ofthat relationship is to seek to
facilitateconsular protection. However, the manncr in whichthe various
rights arc definedconsistsin stating theircontent and how theyare to be
apportioned as between the sending Statc and the dctninee; in other
words, the 1963 Convention soughtto identify tlie holders of the rights
that itcreated,with individual rights beingthose belongingto the detained
nationals. In these circumstances, the interrelationship contemplatedby
ihe 2001Judgment concernsneither thenature nor the scope of thc righis
in question; itpcrtains to the effectiveimplementation of the protection
system. The effectiveexerciseby a State of its right to provide for the
protection of its nationals, who dcrivc their rights from Article 36, para-
graph 1 (h), is only possibleif the detained national docs not rcfuscsuch
an initiative. The discrc~ionarypower of the sending State is thus con-
fined to a right of initiativetoaciivate thc protection mechanism.And
that right of initiative effectivelyarises "as soon as it is realizedthat the
person isa foreign national, or once there are grounds lo think that the
person is probably a roreignnational" (Judgment,para. 88).
(Signed) Raymond RANSEVA.
Separate opinion by Judge Vereshchetin