Non- Corrigé Traduction
Uncorrected Translation
CR200119(translation)
CR200119(traduction)
Thursday 1October2001
Jeudi18octobre2001006 The PRESIDENT:Please be seated. The Sittingis open and1immediately givethe floorto
ProfessorEric Davidto continuethe oral argumentof the Kingdomof Belgiuminthe casebetween
the Democratic Republicof the Congo and the Kingdom of Belgium. Professor, you havethe
floor.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open and 1 shall immediatelygive the
floorto ProfessorEric Davidto continuethe oralargumentsoftheKingdomof Belgiuminthe case
between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Kingdomof Belgium. ProfessorDavid,
you havethe floor.
Mr. DAVID: Thankyou, Mr. President. Mr. President,Membersofthe Court.
1.It is once again an honour for me to addressthis Court,an honour of which 1am al1the
more conscious as it falls to me to expoundthe principles whichare one of the keystones forthe
protection of human rights and fundamental fieedoms, that is to Say,the elimination of certain
impediments to the protection of these rights under the criminal law, whilst observing the
requirementsof intemationallaw.
2. 1 am particularly appreciative of the fact that there seems to be, in this case, not only
considerablemisunderstandingon the part of the DemocraticRepublicof the Congo as to the real
significanceof the acts imputedto Belgium, but almost as muchmisunderstandingon the part of
Belgiumasto the exact claimsmadeagainstitbythe DemocraticRepublicofthe Congo, at leastas
regards one ofthe two parts of its initialApplication, namelythequestion of universaljurisdiction.
"Sunlight and shade", asVictor Hugo would have said: for the moment there is far more shade
than sunlight and1 fear that much effortwill be neededto dispersethe former.
3. In anycase, whatremains clearis thatthe questions ofmeritwill needto be dealtwithin a
necessarily abstract and theoretical manner since, as Belgium has already demonstrated-
ad nauseam, as ProfessorFrançoisRigauxwould have itl- Mr.Yerodiais no longera memberof
the Govemmentof the Congo andthe disputebeforethe Courttoday - namely,the issuein
'CR2001/5,15Oct.2001,F. Rigaux,15 Belgium of an arrest warrant against a minister in ofice- this dispute appears more akin to a
request for an advisory opinionon a legalquestion withinthe meaningof Article96 of the Charter
of the UnitedNations, ratherthan a disputeon precise andtangiblerights.
007 4. However, conscious ofthe limits which the Court generally imposesupon itself in the
exercise ofitsjudicial function,and out ofrespect for the other Party,whilst having regard to the
fact that the issues of jurisdiction, admissibilityand the merits had to be dealt with at thesame
time, Belgiumanalysedthe merits of these matters in its Counter-Memorial. Itis in that spiritthat
Belgiumwill continueto considerthose issues,eventhough itfeels itselfto be playing lessthe role
of a State involved in a dispute, rather than that of a delegate defending a point of view at a
diplomatic conference or at a colloquy of experts in international law. If the Court follows its
case law, there will be no need for it to enter into a debate which it may well come to see as
essentiallyan academicexercise.
The Court will, of course, decide whether it falls to it to tackle these issues, the merits of
which, in any event,Belgium -- 1stressthis point- hasno fearwhatsoeverof addressing.
5.This oral statement,as the Court isaware,will deal withthe two issues lyingat the rootof
the Application filed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo: the exercise of universal
jurisdiction by default and the alleged violation of theimmunityof Mr. Yerodiathrough the issue
of the arrest warrant of 11Apri12000 under the Belgian Law on the punishment of serious
violations of international humanitarianlaw, namely the Law of 16June 1993, as amended on
10February 1999. 1 would remind the Court that these issues are dealt with only by way of
alternative argument, should the Court find that it has jurisdiction and that the plaintiffs
Applicationisadmissible.
6. In accordancewithArticle 60 ofthe Rules of Court,my presentation willbe limitedto the
issues that still divide the Parties and will attempt, as much as possible, not go over the whole
ground again already covered by the written and oral arguments on the matter, whether in the
provisional measures phase, or in Belgium's Counter-Memorial. In order not to overburdenthe
Court and to adhere to what is essential, Belgiumtherefore will merely presenta summaryof the
argument givenin detail in its Counter-Memorial. Belgium wouldlike to stressthat it adheresto
what was said in its written pleadings, albeit that certain points require clarification in order to reply tothe oral argumentsmade by counsel forthe Democratic Republicof the Congo. Further,1
should liketo point outthat the oralargumentsmadeby counselforthe Democratic Republic ofthe
Congo on the merits are noticeablydifferent fromthose made in its Memorial. As a result, 1have
been obliged to redraft my statement fromtop toand to deplorethe fact that there are only
008 24 hours in a day. 1would thereforebegthe Court'sindulgenceifthere isthe occasional hesitation
inthe course of my speech.
7. Mr. President, Members ofthe Court, it will doubtlessbe no surprise to 1am that
beginning by addressingthe issue of universal jurisdiction(1),before subsequentlyexamining,at
muchgreater length,the issue ofthe immunityof membersof foreign governments(II).
1.INEXERCISING UNIVERSALJURISDICTIOO NNACCOUNTOFWAR CRIMESANDCRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY, BELGIUM BYISSUING THEARRESTWARRANTOF 11APRIL 2000,ISNOT
INVIOLATION OFANY SOVEREIGNRIGHT OF THE DEMOCRAT IEPUBLI OCFTHE CONGO
Mr. President,Membersofthe Court,
8. 1would remind the Courtthat the Application ofthe Democratic Republic ofthe Congo
instituting proceedings contendedthat the arrest warrant of00 violated internationallaw
in that, on the one hand, Belgiumclaimed to exercise universaljurisdiction over individualsnot
present on Belgian territory and, on the other, the warrant failedto take account ofthe immunity
from criminal proceedings of the individual againstwhom it was issued, given that he was a
Minister in office. The Applicationof the Democratic Republic ofthe Congoontainedtwo
distinct claims:it contested the universal jurisdictionntia exercised by Belgium and
Belgium'srefusalto recognizethe immunityof Ministersfor ForeignAffairs.
9. In its Memorialfiled on 15May 2001,the Democratic Republicof the Congo did indeed
address both issues,but it failedto present any submissionat al1on universaljurisdiction. Belgium
notedthis in itsunter-~emorial*,but now- 10and behold!- in its oral arguments, counselfor
the Democratic Republic of the Congo hasturned to the issue and criticized the extent of the
universaljurisdiction provided for by the BelgianThus, in this phase of the proceedings,
2~ounter-~emorialof Belgium,paras.3.2.36-3.2.37.
'CR200116,16Oct.2001,MsChemillier-Gen,p. 32seq.Belgiumis not exactly sure whether the DemocraticRepublicof the Congo intendsto lodgeformal
submissionson this matteror not.
10. Be that as it may, Belgium is nevertheless in a position to make the following seven
points:
(1) In its Memorial,the DemocraticRepublicof the Congodealt in some detail with the issue of
genocide4, whereas the arrest warrant issued against Mr. Yerodia accuses him only of
incitement to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, not crimes of genocide5.
Counsel for the Democratic Republicof the Congo correctly stated that this matter had no
bearing on the present dispute and, on this occasion, they didnot retum to it; Belgiumtakes
note ofthis6.
(2) In its ~emorial', the Democratic Republicofthe Congodevotedmuch effortto demonstrating
a point which Belgium was in no way contesting, namely, that States are not obliged to
exercise universaljurisdiction by default for such crimes8. The Democratic ~e~ublicof the
Congodid not retum to this point duringthe oral phase of the proceedings. Belgium likewise
notesthis.
(3) In its Memorial,the Democratic Republicofthe Congoadmittedthat the Geneva Conventions
of 12August 1949 obliged al1Contracting States to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes
covered by these Conventions, irrespectiveof their nationality or the place of commission of
the offence, providedthey are presenton the territory of the forum stateg. This obligation to
prosecute is in effect expressed in Articles49/50/129/146, common to the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949. The Democratic Republic of theCongo has not challengedthis point.
Belgiumtakes note ofthis too.
4~emorialof the DemocraticRepublicofthe Congo, pa78.
S~ounter-~emorialof Belgium(hereinafter"CMB"),Ann. 3 (unlessotherwise indicated,the Annexescited are
those of theCMB).
'CR 2001l16,16Oct.2001,per P.d'Argent,p16.
'lbid.
s~ounter-~emorialof Belgium, para.3.et seq..
'Mernorialof the DemocraticRepublicofthe Congo, p76.. (4) In its Counter-Memorial,Belgium demonstratedthat each State was also under an obligation
to prosecutethe perpetratorsof crimes against humanitywho are present on its territorylO.In
Belgium'sview, this obligationderived from customas embodied, in particular,in resolutions
of the GeneralAssemblyof the United ~ations", ofthe Economic and Socialcouncil12,of the
Securitycouncil13,and the Draft Code of Crimes againstthe Peace and Security ofMankind
O 1 O
of the International Law Commission (1996 version, Art. 9)14. As far as conventions are
concerned,the rule also appears in the Statute of the InternationalCriminalCourt, notably in
itspreamble'5. The fact that the Statuteof the InternationalCriminal Court is not yet in force
in no way detracts fiom the argumentbased on the prearnble,giventhat the prearnble refersto
existingrules16and that the customarynature of the substantive law ofthe Statutehas already
been recognized by internationaljurispnidencel'. For itspart, the Democratic Republic ofthe
Congo considered in its Memorial that there was no conventiqnal rule obliging States to
prosecute the perpetrator of a crime against humanity present on their territory18. It has
maintainedthis position duringthe present phase ofthe proceedings,but it has also statedthat
it does not wish to oppose a custom in process of establi~hrnent'~. The Court will judge
whether the Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court is or is not a conventionalnile, even
though that Statute is not yet in force, but for the moment Belgiumneed merely notethat the
Democratic Republic of the Congo does not wish "to impede the establishment of this
custom". Belgiumconsidersthat to be an acceptanceof its own position andtakes noteof this
also.
10~ounter-~emoril f Belgium,paras.3.3.10-3.3.22.
"~lres. 2840 (XXVI), 18Dec. 1971,para. 4;(XXVIII),3Dec. 1973,para.1(Ann.93).
'2~/res.198616, 9May 1989,principle 18(Ann.93).
"slres. 978, 27Feb. 1995, para.11234, 9April 1999, para 7;1291, 24 Feb. 2000, para. 141304,
16June 2000, para.13(Anns.84-86); 1366,30Aug.2001,preamble,17~consid.
I4Ann.96.
"~nn. 92.
"kounter-~emorial of Belgium, paras.3.3.12118.
17~ntemationl riminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, case IT-95-1711-T,Furundzia, 10Dec. 1998,
para. 227ibid App.,caseIT-94-1-A,Tadic,15July 1999,para. 223.
'*~emorialofthe DemocraticRepublicofthe Congo, para.79.
' 9 200116,16Oct.2001,per MsChemillier-Gendrea,.30.(5) In any event, the arrest warrant of 11April 2000 was also concerned with incitement to
commit war crimes2'and, from this point of view alone,the warrant was legally founded in
light of the rules also acceptedby the Democratic Republicof the Congo. This, too,Belgium
is boundto note.
(6) In its Counter-Mernorial,Belgium explained at some length why the exercise of universal
jurisdiction in absentia or by default did not violate any rule of international law. In
particular, it referred to the Lotus case, to the historical background of the drafting of
Article3, paragraph3, of the Tokyo Convention of 14September 1963,to the fact that a
provision of this kind has been incorporated in the majority of subsequent conventions of
international criminal la^; to the practice of prosecutions by default in States with a
civil-Roman or Germano-Romantradition, and to certain examples of legislation similarto
~el~iurn's*~.The DemocraticRepublicofthe Congohasnot contestedany ofthese sourcesin
the present phase ofthe proceedings. Onceagain,Belgiumtakes note ofthis.
(7) Finally, both during the provisional measures phaseof the proceedings and in its Memorial,
the DemocraticRepublic of the Congocriticizedthe BelgianLaw of 199311999on account of
the proliferation ofconflicts ofjurisdiction to which implementation ofthis Law might lead.
In its Counter-Memorial,Belgium demonstratedthat this risk was inherent in the structureof
the international community,but that it was a very slim ri~k~~a,s the present case moreover
shons. This point was not addressed again by the Democratic Republic of the Congo in its
oral arguments. Belgiumtakes note accordingly.
11. In concluding this first part, Belgium notes that, if it has correctly followed the
arguments put by plaintiff s counsel, the Democratic Republic of the Congo thus no longer
contests.at the legallevel,the arrestwarrant of 11 April2000 in sofar as it involvesthe exercise of
universal jurisdiction by default, as provided for by the Belgian Law of 199311999. Further,
Belgium considers it significantthat the Democratic Republicof the Congo appears to adopt the
20~ounter-~emorialof Belgium,Ann. 3, pp. 17-18.
2'~ounter-~ernorialof Belgium, paras.3.3.28174.
22~ounter-~emorialof Belgium, paras.3.3.77188;theofacybercrimeis a good exarnple; however,the draft
conventionof the Councilof Europe makesnottemptto resolvethese conflictsofjurisdiction; seeArt. 24,ofara
the draft,in conventions.coe.int~treaty/fi/projets/FinalCybercrime.htm. doctrinal position of the Belgian ministèrepublic with regard to universal jurisdiction, which
mirrors precisely what is happening in the present case. On Mondaymorning,ProfessorFrançois
Rigaux welcomed the point of view expressed by the Belgian Advocate-General,Mr. Winants,
when the latter suggested,some weeks ago, during a speech atthe opening ofthe new term of the
Bmssels Appeal Court, a jurisdictional hierarchy in relation to crimes under international
humanitarian law: this hierarchy was as follows: first, jurisdictions of internationalcriminal
courts, next courts locidelicti,next courts ofthe perpetrator'snationality and,finally,the universal
012
jurisdiction of any Stateentitledto exercise ie3.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, this is an exact reflection of what happenedin the
Yerodia case: there was no internationaljurisdictionto adjudicate on acts which occurred in the
territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in August 1998; the Statewhere the acts took
place and the State of which the accused was a national were one and the same, it was the
DemocraticRepublic of the Congo, and itdid nothingto exercise itsjurisdiction. Thereforethere
only remained, in fourth place, the State which accepted that it should exercise its universal
jurisdiction. Itwas under suchconditionsthat the Belgian investigatingjudgetook action.
12. Admittedly, the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo maintains certain reservations with
regard to thisjurisdiction, yetuch reservationsare either more politicalthan legal or are irrelevant
to the issue of universaljurisdiction asuch.
Thus, on the politicalfiont, ProfessorMonique Chemillier-Gendreau askedhow Belgiumor
Francewouldhave reacted
"if a court in the DemocraticRepublicof the Congo had accused and prosecutedthe
Head of State in office or the Ministerfor Foreign Affairsin office of Belgium or of
France for crimes allegedly committed by them or under their orders or by their
omissionin ~wanda?"~~
An excellent question! And, in the case of Rwanda,Belgium is in a position to replyciting
specific facts: as a result of certain errorswhich might have played a role in the massacre of ten
Belgian para-commandos atKigali, onthe morning of 7 April 1994,a colonelin the Belgianmy
*'CR200115, 15Oct.2001,per F.Rigaux,p.22.
24C~200116,16 Oct.2001,MSChemillier-Gendreau p.28.was duly court-martialledz5. What is more, complaints were filed by the victims of genocide
againstthe then BelgianMinister forForeign Affairs and MinisterforNational Defenceon account
of their abandonmentof the Rwandan population, not only under the provisions of the Belgian
Criminal Code conceming failure to assist a person in danger, but also on the basis of the
1993Lawwhich is soderided bythe Applicant. These complaints, filedby Belgian,Rwandanand
Zairian victims in 1995 and 1997, were mentioned before the Belgian Senate's parliamentary
commission of inquiry26,and are currently the subject of a judicial investigation,in accordance
with Article3 of the Law of 17November 1996 on ministerial responsibility. While these
complaintshave not yet led to a formalresult, Belgiumhas no hesitation, MI-.President, Members
ofthe Court, in sayingthat it wouldfind it quite legitimatefor a third Stateto take an interestinthe
matter. Belgium wouldmerely observethat thereare crimes and crimes,and that failureto assista
person in peril is not the same thing as incitement to commit crimes against international
humanitarian law.
14. Furthermore, in legal terms, if Belgium has correctly understood her argument,
ProfessorChemillier-Gendreau criticized a universaljurisdiction which failed to observe certain
principles ofinternationallaw, in particularthe immuniv from suit of Heads of StateandMinisters
for Foreign Affairs in officez7. However that is no longer a matter of universal jurisdiction by
default, as such; what is contested is violation of the immunity of members of foreign
governments,whichwe shall cometo in a moment.
15.Thus, unless it is much mistaken, Belgiumbelieves that it may consider the questionof
universaljurisdiction by default to be no longer under challenge by the Applicant and that, from
this standpoint, the international lawfulness of thearrest warrant of 11Apri12000 is accepted.
Althoughwe are no longer in "the heart of darkness" (as Joseph Conrad might havesaid) on this
point,we shall howevercome backto it, at leastprovisionally,inthe second partofthis statement.
ZS~~sse~s ourtMartial,4 July 1RDPC, 1997,p. 115.
26~arliamentarydocuments,Senate, 1997-1998,No. 1/61117.
"CR 200116,16Oct.2001, Ms Chemillier-Gendrep.34. 11.MR.YERODIA S MUNITYFROMCRIMINALJURISDICTIONDOESNOTAPPLY
IN THECASEOFWARCRIMES OR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Mr. President, Membersofthe Court.
16.An extremelyclassicway of openinga statement - asthe Courtwill often have seen-
consists in saying: "Mr. President,the questionbefore the Courttoday is extremelysimple." That
is one way for the speaker to indicate that the opposing party understands nothing of the matter,
that it is complicatingthe casedeliberately,butthat the speaker,asa good lawyer,will explainit in
words of one syllable, and thatince a clearconcept requiresonly simple language,the Courtwill
be obligedto concludethat the speaker isright.
With this introduction, honourable Membersof the Court, you willcertainly have guessed
that 1 am not going to claim that this case is simple and that Our opponents have understood
nothing. Belgium does indeedbelieve, echoingLéon-PaulFargue,"that there is no true simplicity,
only simplifications".
17.The question of Mr. Yerodia's immunityfrom criminal process in respect of the arrest
warrant of 11 April2000 is a difficult question,but this is so less by reason of the applicable law
and more byreason of its political aspects. Thepolitical aspectsmust therefore be disregardedin
. orderto concentrateon the lawalone. This1shallnow endeavourto do.
18. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has submitted oral arguments coveringmany
points. Belgiumwill endeavourto review the principal points.
In essence,the arguments ofthe oppositePartymaybe grouped aroundfour mainplanks:
- the statutes of the various internationalcriminal courtsprovide no groundsfor nationalcourts
to disregard the immunity of the perpetrators of grave breaches against international
humanitarianlaw (A);
- Belgium has misinterpreted the sources it cites to justiQ the arrest warrant of
11April2000 (B);
- certainsourcesdo not warrant discussion(C);
- in any event, there is no practice which justifies the lifting of the immunity of leaders in
office(D).
Mr. President,these fourpointswillunderpinthis part of mystatement. A. The statutes of the various international criminal courts provide no grounds for national
courts to disregard immunity of the perpetrators of grave breaches against international
humanitarian law
19.If the Belgian Counter-Memorialoffered counselfor the opposite Party some problems
of digestion (supra, para.), and Belgiumwould apologizefor this, some of their oral statements
produced the same effect in the Belgian camp.
Mr. President, fashions come and go, and the
Q 1 5 autumn-winter trendfor this year is the notion of "conceptual confusion". Thus, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo stated, and repeated ad nauseam, at least half a dozen times, that the
Belgian Counter-Memorialhasperpetrateda conceptual confusionbetween official State capacity
as a substantive defence, and theproceduraldefence based on ministerial imrn~nity~~.According
to the Applicant, Belgium erroneously relies on the statutes of international criminal courts
(NurembergInternationalMilitaryTribunal,Art.7; Tobo InternationalMilitary Tribunal,Art.6;
Statuteofthe InternationalCriminalTribunalfor the FormerYugoslavia,Art. 7, para. 2; Statuteof
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art.6, para.2; Statute of the International
CriminalCourt,Art. 2729,- to which might beaddedthe Statuteof the SpecialTribunal for Sierra
Leone, Article6, para.230).For the DemocraticRepublicof the Congo, Belgiumthus erroneously
relies on the statutes of internationalcriminalcourts, which exclude only the substantivedefence,
the questionof criminalresponsibiliîy,andnotthe proceduraldefenceof immunity.
20. Mr. President,Members of the Court, if we take the language of these statutes literally,
counsel for the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo appears to be correct: these texts (with the
exception of Article27, paragraph2, of the Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court) preclude
not so muchministerial immunityfrom criminalsuit- a proceduraldefence- as the notionthat
the accused cannot be criminally liable because he was acting on behalf of the State- a
substantivedefence.
It istrue that immunityis primarilyfoundedonthe principlepar inparem, and that this only
serves any purpose before a domestic court, not before an internationaltribunal. Belgiumagrees
with the DemocraticRepublic ofthe Congoonthis point.
"CR 200115,15Oct. 2001, P. d'Argent,p. 4; CR200116,16Oct.2001, p. 9, pp. 11-13, pp. 16-17; seealso the
Memorialofthe DemocraticRepublicofthe Congo,paras. 42 and67.
29~ounter-~emorialof Belgium, para.3.5.21133.
30~nitedNations document S/2000/915 and 1234, 4 Oct. and 22 Dec.2000;2001/40 and 95, 12 and
31 Jan.2001. 21. Nevertheless, the step from the substantive defence based on State sovereigntyto the
proceduralone based on immunityis not a long one, since the common basis of bothdefences is
State sovereignty. Thatis no doubt why Justice Jackson used both conceptssimultaneouslyin the
extract quoted by Belgium and recalledby Professor PierredY~rgent3'.It would, moreover,have
016
been surprising if so eminent a jurist had fallen prey to the confusion whichOuropponents have
denounced. In reality, contraryto what is suggested by the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Justice Jacksoncertainlywas aware of the meaning of the words he used when he spoke of both
immunityand responsibility. Wemustrememberthat some 25years earlierat the Versailles Peace
Conference - and Professor FrançoisRigaux did allude to this in his first tat te me -nt^t^e
UnitedStateshad steadfastly opposedthe idea of putting KaiserWilhelmII on trial. Forthe United
States,such a trial would indeed have breached the immunityof the German Emperor. It was in
fact "immunity"that was in issue, rather than any substantiveexemption fromre~~onsibility~~I.t
was therefore no accident that the future prosecutor at the Nuremberg International Military
Tribunal submitted his reportto the President of the United States (the report which Belgium
quotes)usingboththe conceptsof "immunity"and of"responsibility".
22. There is a further point, however, and, unlikeOuropponents, Belgium holdsthat its
interpretation of the cited provisions of international criminal tribunals totally confirms the
applicabilityofthese provisionsto the procedural defence. Mr.President,Members ofthe Court,
let us return to the obiterdictuomf the Nurembergjudgment, where, accordingto the Democratic
Repubiicofthe Congo, Belgium"distortsthe senseofthe te~t."~~.
23. TheNurembergTribunal stated:
"The principleof internationallaw,which undercertain circumstances, protects
the representatives of a state, cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as
criminal by international law. The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves
behindtheir officialposition inorderto be freedfrompunishment.'"5
3 1 200116,16Oct.2001,p. 13.
3 2 200115,15Oct.2001,p. 21.
33~ounter-~emoriaolfBelgium,Ann.33.
34
CR200116,16Oct.2001,Mr.Pierred'Argent,p. 17.
3S~udgmenotf 30 SeptemberllOctober1946,officialdocum1p. 223. 24. Accordingto the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the text concerns the Nuremberg
Tribunal aloneandthe facts beforethat Tribunal,and inno way does it havethe general application
which Belgiumattributesto it.
017 1would maketwo remarks:
(1) the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo does not denythat this text concerns immunity, nor
doesit claim that itis limitedto the groundof defence referred toin Article 7 of the Statuteof
theNurembergTribunalwhen read literally;
(2) "[A] reasonable, practical interpretation ofthis passage", to echo the words of my colleague
and friend ProfessorPierre d'Argent, does not preclude its manifestly general nature; onthe
one hand, unlikeother passages in thejudgment, the Nuremberg Tribunal makes no allusion
here to itspecificposition as an international tribunaland, on the other hand, it stresses only
the international criminality of the acts; let us re-read the text together, if you will. The
Tribunal States:
"The principleof internationallaw,which unliercertaincircumstances,protects
the representatives of a state, cannot be applied to acts which are condemnedas
criminalby internationallaw." (Emphasisadded.)
Whatmatters hereisthe seriousnatureof the crime,not whetherthe court hearingthe case is
a domesticor internationalone.
25. Similarly when the International Military Tribunal of Tokyo rejected the defence of
diplomaticimmunityrelied on bythe accused, Oshima,the Tribunal said:
"Oshima's special defence is that in connection withhis activities in Germany
he is protectedby diplomatic immunity andis exempt from prosecution. Diplomatic
privilegedoes not import immunity fromlegal liability,but onlyexemptionfrom trial
by the Courts of the State to which an Ambassadoris accredited. In any event, this
immunityhas no relation to crimes against internationalaw chargedbefore a tribunal
havingjurisdiction. The 'Tribunalrejectsthis specialdefen~e."~~
26. In Professor d'Argent's opinion, the end of this excerpt means that immunity is lifted
only "beforetribunals havingjurisdiction in the case", by implicationonlythe Tokyo International
Military Tribunal. This interpretationisdebatable,becauseit addselementsto the text. It seemsto
O 8
Belgiumto be moreconsistentto Saythatthis text applies to anytribunal,domesticor international,
entitledto takecognisance of crimes against internationallaw. The Tokyo Tribunal in fact said:
36~heTokyoJudgment,ed. RolingandRuter,Amsterdam UniversityPress, 1977,Vol. 1,p. 45.; Annex."ln anyevent, this immunityhasno relationto crimesagainstinternational lm charged beforea
tribunal haoingjurisdiction "; the Tokyo Tribunal did notSay(1cite the passage with appropriate
changes): "In any event, this immuniq has no relation to the crimes against internationallm
charged beforethis tribunal"!
Thus these are indeed, in the case of the Nuremberg Tribunalas in the case of the Tokyo
Tribunal, general statements of principle in no way confined to cases of individuals appearing
before internationalcriminaljurisdictions. They may apply to domestic proceedingsas well as to
international proceedingsand are therefore equally precedentsthat can be invoked bydomestic
tribunals.
27. Not only that, Mr. President, Membersof the Court, let us look at the work of the
International Law Commission on the Nuremberg principles37,on which counsel for the
DemocraticRepublicof the Congo have keptvery quiet. Principle ID, adopted in 1950,was very
similarto Article 7 of the Statuteof the Nuremberg Tribunal. However,it no longerspoke, as did
the latter, of "freeing from responsibility"or "mitigatingunishmenty'res;lting from the "official
position ofdefendants". It said, in more general terms,that the fact of actingas a head of Stateor
responsible Government official did not relieve the person so acting "from responsibility under
international~aw"~'.In fact, duringthe preparatov work on this provision oneof the membersof
the InternationalLaw Commission, none other than Georges Scelle,had suggestedthe following
text, which 1cite in an unofficialFrenchversion; unfortunately1did not havethe original French
text available: «La situation de chef dlEtat, de dirigeant oud'agentpublic ne confire aucune
immunitéen matièrepénaleni n'atténue la responsabilité.»["The office of head of state, ruler or
civil servant,doesnot confer any immunityinpenalmattersnor mitigatere~~onsibility."]~~
28. Excuse me for repeating here whatBelgiumwrote in its Counter-Memorial,namelythat
this text had themerit of clearly coveringboth aspects of the exception based on the defendant's
officia1capacity:the question of "immunity" strictosensu ofthe officialandthat of his substantive
liability. The amendment was, however, rejecteddue to the fact that Georges Scelle's text
37~ounter-~emorialof Belgium,paras.3.5.107/110.
3s~ounter-~emorialof Belgium,pa3.5.105.
39~ounter-~emorialof Belgium,para.3.5.109. corresponded to the one on which the Commission was working. We read in the Commission
report
"The Chairman said that that paragraph [the one proposedby Georges Scelle]
correspondedto paragraph3 provisionally adoptedby the Commission, accordingto
which the official position of a Head of State or responsible civil servantdid not
confer any immunity in penal matters nor mitigate responsibility."O (Emphasis
added.)
29. In other words, rather than go into detailon the issuethe International Law Commission
preferred to retain a general formulation, but, giventhat it covered both the substantivedefence
relatingto liability andthe procedural defencebased on immunity. This position has never varied,
and we find it again inter alia in the commentary adopted in 1996 by the International Law
Commissionon the final text of'the drafi Code of Crimes against Peaceand Securityof Mankind.
Relevantexcerptshave been reproduced and analysedin the Belgian~ounter-~emorial~',and if it
were necessary 1 could very easily repeat the exercise in interpretative analysisthat 1 have just
completedregardingthe preparatorywork ontheNurembergprinciples.
30. The Court may set its mind at ease; 1will spare it that penance. It is enough simplyto
state here that this work has not been discussed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Itis
neverthelessessential,becausethe farnousccconceptuac lonfusion"that is laid at Belgium'sdoor in
facthas its source inthese texts, which were intendedto cover,by a terminologicalabridgrnentthat
is convenientbut perhaps regrettablefromthe layman's pointof view,the two aspectsof a defence
based on the officialposition ofthe individualconcemed.
31.One more word on the alleged conceptual confusionlaid at Belgium'sdoor. Belgium is
020
not the only victim; five of the members of the House of Lords who, in the Judgrnent of
25 March 1999,rejected the immunity invokedby Pinochet, referred, among othersources, to the
statutes of internationalcriminaljurisdi~tions~and thus took no account of the fact that the letter
of thesetexts referred onlyto the substantivedefence.
32. Belgium accordinglyfeels that it is in good Companyin concludingthat the statutes of
internationalcriminal jurisdictions may legitimately be regarded as one of the foundations of
40~ounter-~emorialof Belgiuni, para. 3.5.110.
41~ounter-Memorialof Belgiuni, paras. 3.5.1111114.
42ILM, 1999,pp. 594 (Browne-Wilkinson),599 (Goff of Chieveley),624 (Craighead(Hutten)647-650
(Millet),660 (Philipsof Worth Matravers). exclusion of the immunity of a foreign governmentofficial before domestic courts. Whetherwe
like it or not,ese statutes are a part of practice, and since they are found in texts preparedand
accepted by the entire internationalcommunityof States they clearly represent the expression of
their opiniojuris. States, including theirdomestic courts, are obviously justified in taking them
into account. As you havejust been reminded,the Houseof Lordsjudges in the Pinochet casedid
not denythemselvesthis option.
B. Belgiumis said to havemisinterpreted thesourcesthat it cites to justify the legality of the
arrestwarrant of 11April2000
33. On several points Belgium is said to have misinterpreted the sources that it cites in
supportof the exclusionof immunity. This allegedlyconcernsthe Treaty of Versailles, ArticleIV
of the 1948 Convention on the Crime of Genocide, complementarity in the Statute of the
InternationalCriminalTribunal, andthePinochet and Qaddafidecisions.
The list is a longone, but it reflectstheypoints raisedby Ourlearnedadversaries.
1.The Treatyof Versailles
34. In the opinion of the Democratic Republicof the Congo, the position of Belgiumwith
respectto the Treaty ofVersaillesisweak,becauseWilliamII was not prosecuted,and in anyevent
he was no longer the ~aiser~~.Belgium maintains, however,that the precedent of the Treaty of
Versaillesis relevantecausethe principle ofa prosecution ofWilliamII, as 1havealreadypointed
0 2 1 out (supra, p. 21) gave rise to a famous controversy between States advocating the trial of
WilliamII - principally Franceand Great Britain - and the United States, which was strongly
opposedto it, preciselyfor reasonsof immunity! Yet the American positionremainedisolatedand
the Franco-British argument prevailed. Even though the solution finally adopted was an
international tribunal (Treaty of Versailles, Art.227), this was a compromise suggested by
N. ~olitis~~.The wish expressedby the memberStatesofthe conference, with the exceptionof the
United States, was nevertheless to exclude any defence based on immunity, and on that ground
Belgiumclaimsthat the use ofthis precedent is fullyjustified.
43C~2001/6, 1Oct.2001,P.d'Argent,p. 12.
44~ounter-~emorialofBelgium,Ann33. 2. The 1948Conventionon the Crimeof Genocide
35. The discussion is theoretical- Our opponents have so stated and we share their
opinion - sincethere is no accusationof genocidein the arrestwarrant. The 1948Conventionis
nonetheless interesting and its analysis is relevant if we wish to establish the existence of
exceptionsto the rule of immunity of foreign govemments.Ifthe Court takesthe troubleto re-read
Article IV of a Conventionthai.it knows well, it will find that this Article excludes al1immunity,
whatever the Democratic Republic of the Congo may think4'. It is true that exclusion of this
immunityconcems only the State loci delicti(Art. VI). However,this limitation on the criminal
jurisdiction of the States parties prescribed by the text of the Convention no longer has much
meaning today because it is accepted that the punishment of genocide is an obligation erga
~rnnes'~.Thus, again quite rightly, Belgium isentitledto cite this Conventionas an example,and
as a precedentforthe exclusionof immunitybefore foreigndomesticcourts.
3. The Statuteof the InternationalCriminalCourt andthe principleof complementarity
36. Belgium has taken the view that the principle of complementarity prescribedby the
Statuteof the InternationalCriminalCourt (Preamble, Arts.1and 17)meantthat, if national courts
0 2 2 genuineiywishedto prosecutethe crimes provided forin the Statute,they should not take account
of any immunity of suspects; othenvise, in practice, this principle of complementaritywould
become a principle of exclusivity of jurisdiction on the part of the Intemational Criminal Court,
withthe latterbeing obligedto have systematic recourseto the provisionin Article 17,paragraph 1,
concerningthe inabilityof a State withjurisdiction in the case in question "genuinelyto cary out
the investigationor prosecution". And yet, since this was not the intention of the authors of the
Statute, and since the extent of the crimes covered by the Statute almost always implies the
involvementof Stateauthorities,it mustbe inferredthat complementarityof necessity excludesany
immunityof the latter4'.
4 5 ~200116,16Oct.2001,P. ,d'Argenp.16.
46~C.J Report1996, p. 61,para.31.
4Counter-MemorialofBelgium,paras.3.5.31/38. Our opponentsdoubtthat any time shouldbe wasted on such an argument,because it is said
to be basedon a "quantifiable" concept, ofmerely"statistical significance"*.
37. Belgiumcannot see in what respectthe "quantification" cited by Ouropponentsrefutes
its argument. Apartfromthe argumentson this point in the Counter-Memorial- to whichwe will
not retum - 1would point outthat the Statuteof the InternationalCriminal Court indeedprovides
for a criterion of scale in the exercise of itsjurisdiction,even ifit is not precisely quantifiable. It
should be stressed, Mr. President, Members of the Court, that the Statute of the International
Criminal Court limits its jurisdiction to the gravest of serious crimes: the crimes of aggression
(Art. 5), genocide (Art.6), crimes against humanity (Art. 7) and war crimes, but notjust any war
crimes,only thosethat are "part ofa plan or policyor ...a large-scalecommission ofsuchcrimes"
(Art. 8,para. 1).
38. It is thus clear that the Statute restrictsthejurisdiction of th$ Court to crimeson a large
scale, of such magnitude that it is difficult to see how they could be committed without the
involvementof State authorities. If immunitywere to bar prosecutions, the Statutewould lose al1
point. It is unlikelythatthis iswhat Stateswanted. Moreover, doctrineconfirmsthis analysis49.
4) 23 39. However, there is one point on which Belgium is prepared to meet the Democratic
Republicof the Congo:in its interpretation ofthe work of the Venice commissionso: it is true that
this work deals withthe compatibilityof domesticconstitutionalimmunitieswiththe Statuteof the
International Criminal Court. The fact nonetheless remains that that quotation included by
Belgium in its Counter-Memorialadmits of a much wider interpretation5'and that this quotation,
contrary to the assertion by the Democratic -Republic of the Congo, is strictly accurate, since
Belgium has simply citedthe authenticFrenchtext, which can,moreover,be foundin its
4 8 200116,16Oct.2001,P. d'Argent,p. 15.
4Triffierer,O., in Commentaryonthe RomeStatuteof theInternationalCriminalCourt,ed. O.Triffterer,Baden
Baden,Nomos, 1999,pp. 502,509,512-513.
''CR200116,16Oct.2001,P. d'Argent,p. 15.
S1~ounter-~emorialof Belgium, para. 3.5.32(4). ~nnexes~~. Belgium nevertheless acknowledges that, having regard to the context of that
Commission'swork, the excerptcitedcould alsobe given a narrower meaningthat whichBelgium
feelsmightbe derivedfiom it.
4.ThePinochetand Qaddafidecisions
40. The Democratic Republicof the Congo seems to be surprised that Belgium is citing
lengthy excerpts from the Pinochet decisionS3.Belgium knows perfectly well that the House of
Lords dealt only with the case of a formerHead ofState andthat obviouslythat decisionmust not
be made to say what it does not say. The fact remains that, as the Democratic Republic of the
Congo cannot surely help but admit, the excerpts citedshowthat the Law Lords' reasoning, taken
literally, could certainly leadto exclusionof the immunityof an incumbent Headof State. Allow
meto read one such excerpt:
"Under the Conventionthe international crimeof torture can only be committed
by an official or someone in an official capacity. They would al1 be entitled to
immunity. It would follow that there can be no case outside Chile in which a
successful prosecutionfor torturecan be brought unlessthe Stateof Chile is prepared
to waive its rightto its officia1immunity. Thereforethe whole elaborate structure of
universaljurisdiction over torture committedby officiaisis rendered abortive and one
of the mainobjectives ofthe Torture Convention - to provide a system under which
there is no safe haven for torturers- will have been fmstrated. In myjudgment al1
these factorstogether demonstrate that the notion of continued immunity for ex-heads
of state is inconsistentwiththeprovisionsof the Torture Convention."
024 \\'ha( Belgium simplywishes to demonstrate,Mr. President, is that with such perfectly
correct prcmises Lord Browne-Wilkinson, the author of this excerpt, could equally well have
concludr.dthritirnmunitycould notapply,inthe case of suchacts,to an incumbentheadof State. It
is the I\>gicof his reasoning that leads to this conclusion- which, however, 1 hasten to
acknoir Icdrtthat he did notdraw.
41. As forthe QaddafiJudgrnent,Belgiumdrew the inference fromthat case that the French
Court of Cassation recognizedthe existenceof exceptionsto the principleof criminal immunityfor
members of foreign governments54s ,incethe Court excluded terrorism from "the exceptionsto the
52~ounter-~emorialof Belgiurn,Ann.34, French version.
"CR 200116,16Oct. 2001,P. d'Argent,p. 18.
54~ounter-~emorialof Belgium,paras.3.5.91-3.5.97. principle of immunity of a foreign head of State in power'y55.Belgium is pleased to see that the
Applicant acknowledges that "[tlhe exception recognized by the Cour de cassation no doubt
concernsthe Statutesof the InternationalCriminalCourt and the internationalcriminaltribuna~s"~~.
However,we have shownthat these Statutesare elements of practiceapplicableto national courts.
Furthermore, and once again this is significant, neither the Court of Cassation nor the
Prosecutor-Generalin his applicationfor cassation claimedto setidethe immunity onthe ground
that the Libyan Head of Statewas in power andlorthat the court seisedof the case wasa domestic
42. It will be noted in passing that the Democratic Republicof the Congoappearsto accuse
Belgium of inconsistency in not arguing that exclusion of immunity extends to al1crimes under
international law since exclusion of immunity issaid to represent an obligation ofjus cogem".
O 2 5
Belgiumdoes not really seethe pointof the objection. WhiletheNurembergTribunal didspeakof
excluding immunity for al1crimes under international iawS9,it is nevertheless the case that the
sources cited by Belgium confine themselves to excluding immunity for the three categoriesof
crimesagainst peace,war crimes and crimesagainst humanity.
Sometimesopposingcounsel accuse Belgium ofbeing overzealous, sometimesthey accuse it
of not being zealous enough. Al1things considered, Belgiumis perhaps not the one guilty of
inconsistency!
C. According to the Democratic Republic of the Congoc ,ertainsourcescited by Belgium do
not meritdiscussion
43. The Democratic Republic ofthe Congo appears to contestthe worth of certain sources
citedby Belgium, while it virtually ignores others.
Ss~ounter-~emorialof Belgium, para. 3.5.92.
5 6 200116,16Oct. 2001,p. 20 (P. d'Argent).
57~ounter-~emorialof Belgium,Ann. 50.
"CR 200116,16Oct. 2001,p. 20 (P. d'Argent).
59~ounter-~emorialof Belgium, para.3.5.61. Of the sources cited by it, Belgiummade particularreferenceto resolutions adoptedby the
UnitedNations General Assemblyand bythe Economicand Social Councilandto a declarationby
the President of the Security ~ouncil~~.The Democratic Republicof the Congo queries whether
"reliance[cm] seriouslybe placedon resolutionsby UnitedNations organswhen their legal scope
is not othenvise made clear7". Thesetexts were cited by Belgium. If the Democratic Republic of
the Congo disputestheir legal worth, itis for it to showthat they are without legal value,if that is
what itmeans: just sayingso is not enough.
Belgium,for its part,is awarethatthe Court doesnot dismissout of handthe legalvalue ofa
resolutionby the UnitedNations General ~ssernbl~~~.
44. Belgium also cited national sources63to which the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo
O 2 6 refusesto accord any significanceM.The Democratic Republicof the Congocannothoweverdeny
thatthese sourcesare aspectsof practice and,as such,mustbe taken into consideration.
45. As for the American case law cited by Belgium concerningthe Alien Tort ClaimsAct
and the Act of State doctrine6',Ouropponents simplydismiss it because it appears to them "fiom
the conceptual point of view [to bel far removed fiom the subject under discu~sion'~.
Mr. President, asserting something is not the same as demonstratingit: the Court will determine
,
whether these sourcesare soremovedfromthe issuein dispute.
46. Finally, the writings of publicists: Ouropponents in their Memorial cite nine authors
who, in their view, affirm the principle that a foreign Head of State enjoys absolute criminal
immunity. They added a tenth in their oral statement and also cited the Institutde droit
internationaP7.
60~ounter-~emorialof Belgiuni,paras.3.5.46-3.5.55.
"CR 200116,16Oct.2001,p. 17(P.d'Argent).
62~orexarnple,I.C.J. Reports 1986,Judgmentof 27June1986,p. 106, para.203; Namibia,I.C.J.Reports 1971,
AdvisoryOpinionof21 June1971,p. 51).
63
Counter-MemorialofBelgium,paras.3.5.56-3.5.60.
"CR 200116,16Oct.2001,p. 17(P. d'Argent).
65~ounter-~emorialof Belgium,paras.3.5.72-3.5.80.
6 6 ~200116,16Oct.2001,p. 18(P.d'Argent).
6 7 ~200115,15Oct.2001,p. 49 (P. d'Argent). Aside from the fact that this case concerns a Minister, not the Head of State, it will be
obsewed that, of theseten authors,five do not raisethe questionof immunityin the case of serious
crimes under international humanitarian lawand are therefore not significant; on the other hand,
three do address the question of crimes under internationallaw and, contrary to the Democratic
Republicof the Congo's assertion,hesethree authorsexplicitlyrecognizethat immunitymight not
be effective in the case of crimes of this kind; onehor does not take a stand one way or the
other6'. The tenth author, cited during the oral statement, does in fact support the Congo's
argument,but Belgiumwill point out that the passagequoted in the oral statement concernssolely
Heads of State,not members ofa government- which iswhatMr. Yerodiawas.
47. There remains the resolution adopted by the Institut de droit international in
August 2001;the Court is quite farniliarwith it. Belgium willsimply ask the Court to re-read its
~ounter-~ernorial~~to ascertain whether, as its honourable opponent, Professor Pierre d'Argent,
contends, Belgium has indulgedin "remarkable mental acrobatics...in order to demonstratethe
allegedcompatibilityofthe resolutionwith itsownpositionandatthe sametimevainlyto establish
O 2 7
its irrelevanceto the present proceedings"70.Mr. President, Membersof the Court, denigratingis
not demonstrating,andBelgiumwillthereforenotdwellany furtheron this point.
38. The more basic point is that there is one simple fact to be found in the writings of
publicists. a fact proved by excerpts, al1 of which are included in the annexes to Belgium's
Counter-Mernorial,wherewe findover 30 authorsof the viewthat immunitydoesnot protect from
prosecution perpetratorsofseriouscrimes under international humanitarianlaw. If we add to that
the members of the International Law Commission, of which there were 15 in 1950 and 34 -
obviousl>different individual- in 1996, plus al1those who participated in turn in the work on
the Drafi Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind, we find over 80authors,
includingsome of the century'smost eminent,whoseposition supports the argumentadvancedby
my country.
68~ounter-~emorialof Belgium,para. 3.5.1 19.
69~ounter-~emorialof Belgium, paras.3.5.116-3.5.117.
''CR200115,15Oct.2001,p.49(P.d'Argent). D. The argument that thereis no practicejustifyingthe exclusionof immunityfor incumbent
governmentmembers
49. Mr. President, honourable Membersof the Court, now, approaching the end of this
overly lengthystatement, we come to two arguments which1must still rebut: first, according to
the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo, mostof the sources cited by Belgium concem individuals
who are not, or were no longer,,in office; and, second,there said to be no practice by national
courtsconceming sittingmembersof foreigngovemments.
1. TheargumentthatthesourcescitedbyBelgiumare irrelevantbecausethe members
of governmentinquestionwere nolongerinoffice
50.TheApplicant has repeatedly laid stressonthe factthatthe sourcescitedby Belgium(the
Versailles Treaty, the statutes of past intemational criminal tribunals, Law No. 10) concem
mernbersof govemment who were no longer in office and that, accordingly,these sourcesare not
relevant7'.Rather, it is that argumentwhich hasnoearingforthe followingreasons:
(1) Most of the sources cited by Belgium rnake no mention of the fact that the member of
govemment in question was nolonger in office. While the defendantswere no longer acting
in their official capacities at the time of the Nurembergand Tokyo trials, there is nothing in
O 2 8 the statutes of those tribunals or i'ntheirjudgrnentsraising this point as ajustification for the
prosecution ofthe individualswho had beenatthe helmof the State.
(2) If the termination of office was sufficientby itself tojustifi disregarding officia1capacity, it
served no purpose to state that specifically in the statutes of those tribunals. Since those
statutes contained specific provisions removingthe defendant's officia1capacity as a bar to
prosecution and since, as we have seen, those provisions covered any and al1 possible
immunity, this was a general rule unaffected by the incidental issue of whether or not the
individualto whom the rule applied was still in office. Once again, the lengthy discussions
held in 1919 over Wilhelm II's immunityunder the Treaty of Versailles, at a time when he
was already out of power, prove that the factual questio- WilhelmII was no longer in
power - was independentofthe legalquestion-that of immunity.
"CR 200115, O5ct2001,p. 1(FRigaux); CR200116,1Oct.2001,p. 16(P. d'Argent). (3) Inthe case of the InternationalCriminalCourt,it goeswithout sayingthat the argumentbased
onthe fact that the accused is no longer in office obviously hasno bearing, becausethat Court
is intended tobe a permanent one.
2. The absence of practice
51. It is undeniable, Mr. President, Members of the Court, that exarnples of criminal
proceedings broughtby a Stateagainsta sittingMinister arenot legion. Itis true that no courttried
to prosecuteWilhelmII during the first world war or Hitler duringthe second72.This observation,
althoughaccurate, does not howeversettlethe issue: what interest,Mr.President, Membersof the
Court, what interest could there have been, what benefit couldhave been derived from criminal
proceedingsagainst men against whom the international community waswaging war at the time?
Even if "absurdity is no obstacle in politics", aspoleon said, in lawevery sensiblejudge had a
sufficient understandingof the absurd, if not the ludicrous,to know net to try to bringjustice to
. bear on menwhomthe mostpowerfulmies wereunableto check.
029 The idea of doingjustice, without taking account ofthe immunitiesof the futuredefendants,
was, however, alreadyto be foundin the legal thinkingof the time. The authors cited by Belgium
in its Counter-Memorial, like Gardnerand Merignhac, provide evidence of thi~~~.1shall take the
libertyof respectfullyreferringthe Courtto them.
52. But that is not all.n tnith, there is a practice. Mr. President, Members of the Court,
when Belgium refersto the above-quotedpassagesfrom thejurisprudence of the Nuremberg and
Tokyo Tribunals, what is this if not practice? It is the practiceof internationalcriminaltribunals,
butit ispractice andthere is no legaltext statingthat this practice is a monopoly reservedfor those
tribunals. Quite to the contrary,we have seenthatthe quotedexcerptshave a scope of application
which is in no way limited exclusivelyto the confinesof thosetribunals.
"CR 200115,15Oct.2001,p.19(F.Rigaux).
73~ounter-~emorialof Belgium,paras.3.5.121-3.5.125. 53. If the doctrine of the International Law Commission and the consequences of the
imminent entry into effect ofthe International Criminal Court are added to that, whatwe have is
perhaps not yet genuine precedents but wedo have a body of thought and a system in favour of
liftingthe immunityof individuals accused ofthe gravest ofgravecrimes.
54. That fact that no national court hasyet applied the rule, except for the Markovic
precedent cited bythe ~~~licant~~ , of no particularweight. There is a first time for everything.
The court which was to trythe Kaiser wasto be the first of its type. It remained onthe drawing
board, but it had progeny, aposteriw that can be described as glorious. Can it be claimed that
Nuremberg wasnot an outstandingeventinthe historyof mankindandof international relations?
55. The Paceof history is quickening today. There is moreoveran exampleof an indictrnent
of a Head of State in power: Slobodan Milosevicwas still in office as President of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslaviawhen he was indictedon 24 May 1999by the Prosecutorof the Criminal
Tribunal for the formerYugoslavia. True, this was an indictment by an organ of the United
Nations, not a nationaljudicial authority. What matters is that it is an element to be addedto a
process in constant evolution. According to some,the Statuteof the InternationalCriminalCourt
could enter into force within lessthan a year, and the Democratic Republicof the Congo itself
makes a contributionto the writingof history when it assertsin its Memorial: "the.. thing which
could counterbalance,and even take precedenceover, the protective régimeof immunities would
be a ruleof international law requiringthe exerciseof 'universal'jurisdicti~n"~~.
The DemocraticRepublicof the Congoacknowledgesthatwar crimes allowthe exercise of
universal juri~diction'and Belgium obviously cannot bus thare thatconclusion. Ifthe terms ofthe
arrest warrantof 11April2000, whichinteralia accused Mr.Yerodiaof incitementto commitwar
crimes are seen in the light of that conclusion,we find that we have come full circle. The
Applicant and the Respondent are in agreement, at least on the question of war crimes, that
immunity cannot constitute a bar to their prosecution. Since there is, moreover, agreement on
7 4 200115,15Oct.2001,p. 47 (P. d'Argent).
75~emorialof the Democratic Republic of the Congo, para1.5.
76~emorialofthe Democratic Republicofthe Congo,para.76.universaljurisdiction as well, it maybe asked, honourable Membersof the Court, whether there
remainsanydispute onthe merits betweenthe Democratic Republicof the Congo and Belgium.
We can now conclude, Mr. President, Membersof the Court,that "the darklinggleamfalling
from the stars" begins to give way to the dawn and the giant Atlas no longer stands alone in
canying, if not the weight of the world, then at leastthe "unbearable lightness" of international
criminaljustice.
1 thank you for your patient attention, Members of the Court, and would ask you,
Mr. President,kindlyto givethe floortoMr.Bethlehem.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor David. Je donne rpaintenant la parole à
MeDaniël Bethlehem.
M. BETHLEHEM
LE FONDDEL'AFFAIRE
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdameset Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, je reviens très
brièvement à la barre ce matin pour achever l'expdes conclusionsde la Belgiquesur le fond de
l'affaire. Commeje l'ai dit hier lors des mes observations liminaires sur ce volet de notre
argumentation, les conclusions de la Belgique sur le fond se divisent en un certain nombre de
parties-la nature et l'effet du mandat d'arrêt,la compétence universelleet la question de
l'immunité - qui ont étédéveloppéedsevant vous ce matin et, pour termineà,présent,cette très
brève section. A titre subsidiaire,au cas où vous estimeriezd'abordque la Cour a compétenceen
l'espèceet que la requêtest recevable et, ensuite, que l'émiset la diffusiondu mandatd'arrêt
violaient effectivement l'immunitédu ministre des affaires étrangèrela RDC, se pose alors la
question des mesures de réparation.J'en ai déjàdit un mot hier, la RDC prie la Cour de dire et
juger : 1) qu'enémettanteten diffusantle mandatd'arrêt,laBelgiquea violél'immunité dont bénéficiait
leministredes affairesétrangèreenexercicede laRDC;
2) que laconstatationde ce fait constitueune formeadéquate deréparation;
3) qu'ilest interdià laBelgiqueainsiqu'à d'autresEtatsd'exécuterle mandatd'arrêt; et
4) que laBelgiquedoit retirer et mettrànéantle mandatd'arrêt.
2. Hier, dansmon exposé surlacompétenceetlarecevabilitéj,'ai attirévotre attentionsur le
fait quelestroisièmeet quatrième demandes adressées la Cour concernaienten pratique leseffets
juridiques du mandat d'arrêtl'égardd'un simple citoyende la RDC et qu'à ce titre ces demandes
n'ont pas leur place dans la présente instance. est ainsi parce que le mandatn'est pas du tout
lié,-ni quant au fond,ni quanà laprocédure-au statut deministredes affairesétrangèrde la
RDC de M. YerodiaNdombasi. Il n'y a aucun lien impératif,par conséquent,entre les deux
premièresdemandesdont la Cour est saisie, qui concernentl'allégationselon laquelle l'émietion
la diffusion du mandat violaient l'immunité du minisees affaires étrangèresde la RDC,et les
troisième et quatrième demandes,qui aujourd'hui, dans les circonstances où tout le monde
s'accordeà reconnaître que M. YerodiaNdombasi ne bénéficiepas de l'immunité,tendent à
obtenir l'annulation du mandatet l'interdictionde l'exécuter.
3. Eu égard à ces considérations, la Belgiquea déjà conclu à l'irrecevabilitéde ces
demandes. J'aborderai maintenant, s'agissant toujours de ces demandes,une autre question.l
O s'agitde savoir, au cas où laCour conclutqu'elles sontrecevableset qu'il y a effectivementlieude
les examiner lors dela phase sur le fond, s'ily a lieu pourla Cour d'en connaître. Plus clairement,
il s'agit desavoirsi des demandes invitant laCourdonnerle retrait et l'annulation d'un mandat
d'arrêt nationalet à interdire son exécution entreàtbon droit dans le cadre de la fonction
judiciaire reconnueà la Cour. La Belgique conclutà l'irrecevabilité de cesdemandes et soutient
qu'elles nedevraient par conséquentpas faire l'objet d'une décision quelconquede la part de la
Cour.
4. Le conseil de laC a examiné brièvemenc tette question mardi77.Il a pour l'essentiel
soutenuque la RDC ne priait pas la Cour parces demandesd'indiquer à la Belgique les mesures que celle-ci devra prendre pour donnereffetà un arrêtdéclarantque l'émissionet la diffusion du
mandat d'arrêtont violé l'immunité du ministre des affaires étrangèrede la RDC. Le choix des
moyens, a-t-ildit, resterait ouverta Belgique. Mais, a-t-ilfait valoir, la conséquence logique de
la constatation dela violation de l'immunité d'un ministrees affaires étrangères,la conséquence
logiqueserait que le mandat soit annuléet qu'il soitinterditla Belgiqueet àtous lesautres Etats
de l'exécuter.
5. La Belgiqueestime quant àelle qu'à supposerque la Courconstatequ'il a eu violation de
l'immunité du ministredes affairesétrangèresi,l nes'ensuitpas dutout que le mandatd'arrêtdoive
êtreannulé. Celui-ciproduit seseffets aujourd'hui. Rien n'indique qu'il porte aujourd'hui atteinte
à l'immunitédu ministre des affaires étrangères de laRDC. Aussila Belgique estime-t-elleque
l'analyse développépear les conseils de laRDCest erronée.Ce que laRDC solliciteen réalité par
sestroisièmeet quatrième demandes,c'est que laCour dicte à laBelgique la manière selon laquelle
celle-cidevrait donnereffetà l'arrêt de la ourconstatant quele mandatd'arrêt a violé l'immunité
du ministredes affairesétrangèresde laRDC.
6. Monsieur le président,Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, la Charte des
, NationsUnies règle la question de l'obligation de se conformer aux arrêtsde la Cour. Au
paragraphe 1 de l'article94, tous les Membres desNations Unies s'engagent à se conformer aux
décisionsdela Courdanstous les litiges auxquels ilssont parties. Au paragraphe 2 de l'article94,
il est prévuque si un Etat ne satisfait pas aux obligations qui lui incombent en vertu d'un arrêt
rendu par la Cour l'autre Etatpeut recourir au Conseil de sécurité.l faut toutefois présumerpar
principe que les décisions dela Cour seront respectées. Comme la Cour permanente l'a fait
observer dans l'affaire de l'Usine de Chorzow, un tribunal, dans l'exercice de sa fonction
judiciaire,ne peut ni ne doit envisager l'éventualiqu'[un]arrêt resteraitn exécuté C e^t^.dée
a été repriseparla Cour actuelle dans l'arrêtqu'ellea rendu sur la compétenceet la recevabilitéen
l'affairedu~icara~ua".
UsinedeChonbw,fond, arrétno13,1928,C.P.J.I.sérieA nop.63.
Activités militaires etparamilituicaraguaet contre celui-ci (Nicaraguac. Etats-Unis),compétenceet
recevabilité,arrét,J.Recueil1994,p.437,pa101. 7. Comme la Belgique l'a relevédans son contre-mémoire,le règlement desdifférendspar
les cours et tribunaux internationaux repose sur un partage des fonctions communémentadmis
entre la cour ou letribunal en questionet lesEtats dontles intérêts sonnause. La fonctionde la
cour ou dutribunal est de se prononcersur le droit. II appartient1'Etaten questionde mettreen
euvre ledroit ainsi défini.
8.Ce partagedes fonctionstraduit à lafois le principe consacré par Cour permanente dans
I'affairedel'Usinede Chorzbw - selon lequelun tribunal ne doit pas présumer queses décisions
ne seront pas respectées- et l'idée selon laquelil peut y avoir pourun Etat plusieurs manières
de se conformer à la décisiond'untribunalqui lui est adressée. Ellereflète aussiun équilibreentre
le rôle des tribunaux qui est de se prononcer surle droit, la responsabilité incomtux Etats de
se conformer au droit et la souveraineté des Etats grâce à laquelle ils organisent leurs affaires
commebon leur semble, à la seulecondition de respecterle droit.
,
9. Ce partage des compétenceset l'équilibrequ'il exprime sont si bien acceptés que ces
questionsne se sont en fait poséesque rarement devant Cour. Elles se sontnéanmoinsposéeset la
Cour a alors clairement confirmé la distinction entreson rôle, qui est de dire le droit, et la
responsabilité incombana tux Etats, quiest de se conformerses décisions.
10. C'est ainsi, par exemple,que dans l'affaireHaya de la Torre, qui est mentionnéedans
notre contre-mémoire, laCour avait été priée d'indiquercomment l'arrêtqu'elle avait rendu dans
l'affaireduDroit d'asile devaitêtremis en Œuvre.LaCoura rejetécettedemandeen cestermes
«Ayant ...défini, conformémen àtla Conventionde La Havane, les rapports de
droit entre Parties relativementaux questionsqui lui ont été soumises [dansI'affaire
du Droit d'asile], la Cour a rempli sa mission. Elle ne sauraitdonner aucun conseil
pratique quant auxvoies qu'il conviendraitde suivre pour mettre fin l'asile, car,ce
faisant [etc'est là le point clé],elle sortiraitdu cadre de safonctionj~diciaire.»*~
033 11. En parvenant à cette conclusion, la Cour a également noté qu'il n'entraitpas dans sa
fonction judiciaire d'opérerun choix entre les diverses voiesqui s'ouvrent à un Etat pour se
conformer à sa décision.
12. La Cour a confirmé par la suite dans l'affaire du Cameroun septentrional le
raisonnement qu'elleavaitdéveloppé dans I'affaireHayade la Torre.
Hayade la Torre,arrê, .I.J:Recu1951,p. 82. 13. Monsieur le président, Mesdameset Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, la Belgique
soutient que le principe énoncédans ces affaires ne prête guère controverse. Le partagedes
fonctions qu'il consacre est une caractéristique communémenatdmise du règlement international
des litiges. II incombe simplement à la Cour en I'espècede déterminersi, comme l'affirme
clairement la Belgique, les troisièmeet quatrième demandes que laRDC a soumises à la Cour
portent sur la question de l'obligation de se conformerun arrêtqui déclarerait quele mandat
d'arrêt aviolé I'immunité du ministre des affaires étrangères. Dans I'affirmative, il s'ensuit
nécessairement,selon nous,que ces demandes sortentdu cadrede la fonctionjudiciaire reconnue
laCour et ne devraientpar conséquent pas donnelieuà un quelconque prononcéde la Cour.
14. Une décisionou déclarationde la Cour ordonnant l'annulation du mandat d'arrêtet
interdisantde procéderàson exécutionpeut être envisagée dan usne double perspective. Ou bien
elle constituerait une injonction adresséepar la Cour la Belgique, lui indiquant comment se
conformer àun arrêtconstatantque le mandatd'arrêt a violé l'immunitédu ministre des affaires
étrangèresde la RDC,ou bience serait en fait une décisiontranchant au fond une question dont la
Cour n'est pas saisie en I'espèce,qui est celle de savoir si un mandat d'arrêtaccusant un simple
particulier de violations graves du droit international humanitaire commisesailleurs est valable.
Dans un cas comme dans l'autre, la décisionou la déclarationsortirait du cadre de la fonction
judiciaire reconnue à la Cour et n'a pas sa place selon nous en I'espèce. Aussila Belgique
soutient-elleque les troisièmeet quatrième demandesde la RDC ne devraient pas donnerlieu en
I'espèceà unequelconquedécisionde la Coursur le fond.
15.Monsieurle président, Mesdames et Messieurs dela Cour, ainsisetemine l'exposéde la
Belgique sur le fond de l'affaire. La Belgique formulera ses observations finales tant sur la
compétenceet la recevabilitéque sur le fond et exposeraofficiellementsesconclusionsfinales lors
de sarépliquedemain après-midi.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie beaucoup. Je donnela parole aujuge Fleischhauer qui
voudraitposer unequestion. M.FLEISCHHAUER: Merci, Monsieur le président, ma question s'adresse aux
représentants dela Belgique en l'espèceet est la suivante. Dans l'exposé qu'il a tier sur la
suite donnéeau mandat d'arrêt,M. Bethlehem a indiquéquejusqu'à une date trèsrécente aucun
Etat n'avaitréagiau mandat d'arrêt.l a toutefois ajouté qu'Interpol avait été saisnemande
de publication d'unenotice rouge mais qu'aucune décision n'avait encore étp rise à ce sujet.
Puis-jedemanderauxreprésentantsde laBelgiquede donnerdes précisionssurce point ?
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. 1would remindthe representativesof Belgium that their
reply to this question may be given either, and preferably, in the course of tomorrow's oral
proceedings,or inwriting after the close of the oral proceedings. That ends this morning's sitting
and the first round of the oral presentation of the Kingdom of Belgium. The Court will meet
tomorrow, Friday 19October at 9.30 a.m., to hear the second round of oral argument of the
DemocraticRepublicof the Congo,and at 4.30 p.m.to hear the second roundof oral argumentof
theKingdomof Belgium. Thankyou. The sittingis closed.
TheCourtroseat 11.35am.
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