Non-Corrigé Traduction
Uncorrected Translation
CR 9816(traduction)
CR 9816(translation)
Mercredi 11 mars 1998
Wednesday 11March 1998 Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez-vous asseoir. Je donne maintenant la paroleà l'agentdistingué
- -
du Cameroun.
Mr. ESSO:
1. Thank you,Mr. President. We thank you for giving us the floor again to introducethe
second round of Cameroon'soral argumenton the PreliminaryObjections raised byNigeria.
2. Mr. President, Members of the Court, for Cameroon, it is still just a matter of
preliminaries. However, we cannot refrain from noting the statement madebefore the Court by
Nigeria on 2 March 1998(CR 9811,p. 28 original or French translation p. 19,para. 44).
"IfultimatelyCarneroonwereto succeedinher claimto Bakassiorto the Darak
area,manytens ofthousandsofNigerians, peoplewho havealwaysbeenNigeriansand
beengovemedfromNigeric a,uldsuddenlyfindtheir personsandpropertytransferred
to another State with a different system and political traditions" (emphasis added).
3. Mr. President,inthis quotationwenote a veryimportantfact,whencethequestion: where
are the Nigerians govemed fromNigeria: in Nigerian territory, or in foreignterritory?These are
indeed "peoplewho havealwaysbeenNigeriansand havebeengovemed fromNigeria". In reality,
this is an admissionbyNigeria. Even if these are Nigerian implantations, onething is certain, and
it stems fromthis admission: Bakassi Peninsulaand Darakarenot inNigerian territory. However,
there are Nigeriansthere whenNigeria declaresto be "govemed from Nigeria"! Hence, if Bakassi
and Darak are not in Nigerian territory, they are Cameroonian.
4. However, this admission is accompanied by a warning, or might 1 even Say a threat?
Nigeria announces "if ultimately Cameroonwere to succeed ... we would hope that Cameroon
would behave well,but we havegood reasonsfor disquiet"(CR 9811,p. 19). This is most curious,
Mr. President.
5. FortheCourt'sinformation,wewouldpoint outthatthreemillionNigerianslivepeacefully
in Carneroon,at Yaoundé, Douala,Kumba,Bamenda, Maroua, Garoua,Ngaoundéré for example,
and in other localities. -3-
6. Shouldwe fear, that one day,Nigeria may take this as a pretextfor behaving in the sarne
way there as it is doing inBakassi, in Darak andover the entire lengthofthe fiontier? Experience
leads us to believe that thismatter is notjust academic.
7. Can the internationalcommunity allow Nigeria to assume the right to proclaim, here, in
theseaugustsurroundings,a speciesofanachronisticprotectorateoverCameroononthe groundthat
Nigerians live there?
8. By making this statement to the Court, is Nigeria not seeking to obtain the moral
endorsement of the distinguished Court for its numerous excesses?
9. The Court will decide.
10. Be this as it may, Mr. President, Members of the Court, in this last round of oral
argument, Cameroon wishes to clarify the issues in the case submittedto you.
11.Mr. President, let us make no mistake about which age we are living in.
- At the close of the twentieth century,there is no pretextwhich authorizes, no ambitionwhich
legitimizesterritorial conquest.
- On the threshold of the twenty-first century, one does not negotiate, one does not engage in
bilateralism, weapons in hand.
12.Mr. President,letus make nomistakeaboutthe disputeat issue. Historyhas bequeathed
fiontiers to us. Our Heads of State and Heads ofGovemment have accepted them. To take issue
with those fiontiers is to seekto rewrite the history of an entire continent. It is a little iatefor this
in Ourview.
13.The fiontier providesuswithanopportunityto takestock. ForacceptingOurpast,painful
as this may be. We recall that some CamerooniansbecarneNigerians in 1961.
14.The fiontier is one stage on the road towards a broader reality. It helpsto reconcile us
to Ourfuture. This is part of the whole problem of national uni9 in our States. For us Africans,
a fiontierdoes not erase the certainty of belongingto a regional entity. The fiontier is a factor of
solidarity.Afamily does nothaveto liveseparatelyjust becauseitshomehas a numberofseparate rooms. So let us, for pity's sake,respect this frontier, regardless of how things may look at the
014
moment, regardless of how talentedwyers may be.
*
15. Withoutfrontiers,no States. WithoutStates,no internationallaw. Withoutinternational
law, no International Court of Justice. Without frontiers, what wouldwe be doinghere?
16. Mr. President, let us make no mistake about whonent is. On the ground,
Cameroon hasa dutyto preservethe integrity ofits territory. This isnot an act ofhostility against
Nigeria.f Cameroon hasfiled an applicationbefore the InternationalCourt of Justice, this is not
an act of enmity either. On the contrary, it is a means, and the only means, certainly, which
remainsto us, butaendly and brotherlymeans,of enablingourtwocountries,calmly, peacefully
-
and definitively, to settle the dispute between them.
17. Mr. President, let us make no mistake about which Courtthis is and, above all, let us
make no mistake over what proceedingsse are. Let us not confuse the Lake Chad Basin
Commission, which, moreover,doesexcellenttechnicalwork,but has nolegaljurisdiction,withthe
principaljudicialan of the United Nations,that august institution,the only one in the world,
whose universalityders al1consenting States subject to itsjustice.
18. The International Court of Justice is an artisan of peace; this is Carneroon'sdeep
conviction. Members ofthe Court, Cameroonplaces its entire trust in you.
19. Mr. President, buffeted by the wind which, sometimes violent, shakes Our f-agile
democracies, some States, rightly or wrongly, cast doubt on the agreements which govem Our
history, denying the conventions whichwe have been adopting since independence.
20. Let us beware:we have heard and can unreservedly reitera1 quote from
memory - that "thosewho follow the wind will share the fate of the dead leaves".
21. May respect forrundertakings, respect for international law, respect for the wise
decisions rendered by your distinguished Court preserve us from this.
22. It istimeforal1Africannations,Mr. President,tobehaveassubjectsofinternationallaw. -5-
23. Mr. President,may 1now ask you to give the floor to Sir Ian Sinclair,who will present
Cameroon'sreply to the first and second Preliminary Objections.
Thank you.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur Esso. Je donne maintenant la paroleà sir Ian Sinclair
Sir Ian SINCLAIR : Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs de la Cour.
1.C'est, commetoujours, un honneur pourmoi que de prendre la paroledevant vous au nom
de la Républiquedu Cameroun encette affairenavrante, qui a donnélieu, comme notre agent l'a
indiqué,à desaccrochagesarméset a accru latension entre les deuxEtats voisins du Nigériaet du
Cameroun.
2. Cettejournée marquela fin des plaidoiriesdevant laCour sur les exceptionspréliminaires
concernantlacompétencedelaCouret larecevabilitéde certainesdesdemandesdu Cameroundans
la présenteinstance. C'està ce point quenous vous confions,Monsieur le président,Madame et
Messieurs de la Cour, la tâche difficile et délicatede statuersur les arguments et conclusionsdes
deux Parties en cette phase de la procédure. Le Cameroun le fait avec la ferme convictionque la
Cour rejettera uneàune et en totalité lesexceptions préliminairessoulevéespar le Nigéria danssa
pièce écritedu 12décembre1995, qu'elle sedéclareracompétente pourstatuer sur toutes les
questionssoulevéesdanslarequêtd eu Cameroundu 29 mars 1994,telle qu'elleaété complétép ear
larequête additionnelledu 16juin 1994,etqu'elledéclarerarecevableslesdemandesdu Cameroun
ainsi complétées et réunies.
3. J'aipour tâche,ce matin, de répondreaux arguments développés lundipar les conseilsdu
Nigéria à propos des première et deuxième exceptionspréliminairessoulevées parle Nigéria. Je
m'arrêteradi'abordsur la premièreexception préliminaire. Ici ma tâche a étésimplifiéepar les
réponsescomplètesdonnéesparmescollèguesetamis MM. SimmaetNtarnarkle 5 mars(CR 9813,
p. 33-52) sur les points développéspar nos adversaires - en particulier par mon éminent
ami sir Arthur le 2 mars (CR 9811,p. 28-48). Ainsi se trouveétabliel'absencede toute substance réelle danslesdiverses plaintesformuléespar le Nigéàpropos de la façon dont le Camerouna
procédéen faisantune déclarationinconditionnelled'acceptationdusystèmede laclausefacultative
01 6
le3 mars 1994et en déposantsa requête initiale introduisantl'instanceactuelle contre le Nigéria
près de quatre semaines plus tard le 29 mars 1994. J'ai donc l'intentionde faire porter mes
observations, autant que possible, sur les arguments nouveaux ou modifiésreàla première
exception préliminaire,que nos adversaires ont développés lcette semaine.
A. Conditions à remplirpour qu'un Etat puisse invoquer lesystèmede la clause facultative
comme fondement de la compétencede la Cour dans une affaireconcrète
4. Au risque d'énoncer unévidence,je me dois de souligner que,pour un Etat qui n'est pas
partie au systèmede la clausefacultative,commec'étaitle cas du Camerounjusqu'aurs 1994, w
il y a deux démarches distincàeffectuer avant qu'il nepuisse fonder la compétencede laCour
dans une affaireconcrète contreun autre Etat paàce système. En premier lieu, ildoit déposer
sa déclarationd'acceptationdelaclause facultativeauprès du Secrétaire gén'ONUen vertu
du paragraphe 4 de l'articledu Statut. Le Cameroun l'afait le 3 mars 1994. En second lieu,il
doit invoquer la juridiction de la Cour sur la base de la coïncidence entre sa déclaration
d'acceptationdu Cameroun et celle del'Etatdéfendeur éventuel(en l'espècele Nigéria)dans la
perspective du dépôtd'une requêtcontre cet Etat. Comme M. Rosenne le ditàjuste titre
«Le fait de déposer la déclaration devient ainsi le point de départpour
déterminersi le différendconcret relèvede lajuridiction mutuellement accàplae
date de l'introduction de l'instance)) (Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the
InternationalCourt, 1920-1996, vol. II, p. 740).
La requêtedu Cameroun a étédéposéele 29 mars 1994, prèsde quatre semainesaprèsle
dépôtpar leCameroun,de sadéclaration inconditionnelled'acceptation de laclausefacultative. Le
Nigériaaffirme maintenant que ce ne sont pas là les seules condiàremplir avant qu'unEtat
puisse invoquerle systèmede laclause facultativecontreun autre Etatpartieystèmedansune
affaire concrète. En particulier, le Nigéria déclareavec insistance qu'enraison de l'effetde la
condition de réciprociinclusedans la déclarationnigériane d'acceptde la clausefacultative,
ladéclarationd'acceptatidu CameroundevaitêtretransmiseauNigériadansun délairaisonnable -7-
à partir de son dépôtauprèsdu Secrétaire générad le l'ONUavant que le Cameroun ne puisse
l'invoquerdans une procédureengagéecontre le Nigéria.
5. Bien entendu le Nigéria serend pleinement compte que cet argument est tout à fait
017
incompatible avec lajurisprudence établiede la Cour, en particulier celle de l'affairedue
passage,quej'aborderaidansunmoment. Elleestaussi certainementcontraire àtoute interprétation
reconnuedela conditionderéciprocitée;tj'aurail'occasion,plustard dansmaplaidoirie,d'examiner
le sens de la condition de réciprocincluse dans la déclaration nigériane d'acceptation.
6. Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs de la Cour, avant de quitter ce sujet des
conditions qui doivent êtreréuniespour qu'un Etat puisse invoquer le régime de la clause
facultative,je devraispeut-êtrerépondàeun argumentprésenté palre conseilduNigéria au cours
du premiertour de plaidoirieset repris au secondtour parsir Arthur (CR5,p. 24-25). Il s'agit
de l'argumentfondésur l'article8, alinéac), de la conventionde Vienne surle droit des traités,
qui énonce désonnaisune règle générale selon laquelle quand un Etat fait une déclaration
concernant untraitéàun dépositairepour qu'il la communiqueàd'autres Etats,elle est considérée
comme n'ayantété reçue par ces autres Etats qu'àpartir du moment où ils en ont étéinformés par
le dépositaire agissant dans l'exécutde son obligation.Il est bien clair, cependant, que cette
disposition ne visait ni ne devait concerner les déclarationsde clause facultative qui, comme le
Camerounn'a dû le répéter que trop souvent, ne sont pas des traitésau sens de la conventionde
Vienne. En tout étatde cause, il est évident que l'dtuêroit depassagea pour effet de créer
une règledistincte qui s'appliqueaux déclarations declause facultative en raison de leur nature
particulièredans lesystèmede lajuridiction obligatoire. Lespassagesde l'tue la Courarendu
dansl'affaireduDroi tepassagequecitait M. Simmaauparagraphe 20de saplaidoiriedu premier
tour(CR 9813,p. 38)le confirment;et iln'étt anifestementpas danslesintentionsdesrédacteurs
de la convention de Vienne sur le droit destraités dàl'encontrede lajurisprudence établiede
la Cour en la matière. 7.Ceque leNigéria sembleviser- et celaressortdupassagefinal de l'argumentavancépar
le conseil du Nigérialundi dernier (CR 9815,p. c'esà estomper la distinction qui existe 9
entre les paragraphes 1 et 2 de l'article 36du Statut. Le Cameroun ne conteste pas que la
juridictionde la Course fondesur leconsentementdesPaàluisoumettrel'affairedont il s'agit.
Mais le consentementpeut se donnersoit par lanégociationd'uncompromis, soit par l'application
d'unedispositiond'untraitéen vigueurqui prévoitle renvoide certains types donnésde différends
devant la Cour. Et tel est visiblement l'objetet le but du paragraphe premierde l'article36. Le
O1 8
paragraphe2 de cet article, qui couvre le régimede la clause facultative, a un but tout différent.
Il prévoitque les Etats acceptent d'avance,je dis bien d'avance, la juridiction dela Cour, par
-
l'applicationdu régime.Or M. Simmaa expliquétrès clairtefonctionnementdurégimedans
saplaidoiriedu premiertour (CR 9813,p. 42-43). Estomperladistinctionentreles deuxdémarches
reviendraitsaper le fonctionnementspécifiquedu régimede la clause facultative. Cela tendrait
àtransformer ce régimeen une variante de celui du compromisque couvre le paragraphe premier
de l'article36. Certes, telle n'est peut-être pasnu Nigéria; maisc'estcertainementune
conséquenceprobable de ce qu'ilsemble chercàobtenir.
B. L'élémenttemps dans la jurisprudence duDroit depassage
8. Le Nigériane conteste pas, et d'ailleursil ne le pourrait pas, que sa première exception
w
préliminaireest pour ainsi dire idànla deuxièmeexceptionpréliminairesoulevéepar l'Inde
dans l'affaireDroi tepassage, et que la Cour a rejetéeen termes catégoriques.Permettez-moi
de vous rappeler encore ce que disait la Cour dans son arrêtdu 26 novembre 1957
«Elle estimeque, par le dépôtde sa déclarationd'acceptationentre lesmains du
Secrétairegénéral,l'Etat acceptant devient Partie au système de la disposition
facultatiàel'égardde tous autres Etats déclarants,avectous les droits et obligations
qui découlentde l'article) C.I.J.Recueil 1957, p. 146.
Et elle poursuivait
«[T]out Etatfaisantunedéclarationd'acceptation doitêtrecensétenircomptedu
fait qu'en vertu du Statut il peut se tràutout moment tenu des obligations
découlant dela disposition facultativevis-à-vis d'unnouveau signataire, par suite du
dépôtde la déclaration d'acceptatice dernier.)) (Zbid.) La Cour a même indiqué qu'unEtat qui accepte la compétence dela Cour
«doit prévoir qu'unerequête puisseêtreintroduite contre lui devant la Cour par un
nouvel Etat déclarantlejour mêmeoù ce dernierdépose unedéclaration d'acceptation
entre les mains du Secrétairegénéral)).(Ibid.)
Et la Cour a précisé : c'esten effet ce jour-là que le lien consensuel qui constitue la base de la
dispositionfacultative prend naissance entre les Etats intéressés.En outre, la Cour n'apas besoin
qu'onluirappelle ladistinctionqu'ellea établie dansl'affaire duDroitdepassage entre l'obligation
qui incombe à 1'Etatdéclarantde déposer sa déclarationd'acceptation e l'tobligation incombantau
Secrétairegénéraldes Nations Unies de transmettre une copie de la déclarationaux autres Etats
019
partiesau Statut. L'Indeavait soutenuque l'article36 du Statut prescrivaitnon seulementle dépôt
de la déclarationd'acceptationentre les mains du Secrétairegénéralm , ais aussi la communication
par celui-ci d'unecopie de la déclaration aux partiesau Statut. La Cour a fermement rejetécet
argument :
((c'estla première de cesprescriptionsqui seule concerne 1'Etatdéclarant.Ce dernier
n'a à s'occuperni du devoir du Secrétairegénéran li de la manière dontce devoir est
rempli. L'effet juridique dela déclarationne dépendpas de l'actionou de l'inaction
ultérieuredu Secrétairegénéral.))(Ibid.)
Détermination claireet indiscutablede la date de prise d'effetd'unedéclaration
d'acceptationde la clause facultative
9. Que la Cour veuille bien m'excuserde lui rappeler ce qu'ellesait certainement. Maisje
me senstenu de lefaire principalementparce que nos contradicteurs se sontdélibérémen atbstenus
de vous rappeler votre proprejurisprudence constante en la matière. Jurisprudence qui sert un
desseintrès précis, celuide garantir la certitude et la sécuritéjuridiques.La Cour l'expliquetrès
clairement dans l'arrêt qu'ellerendu dans l'affairedu Droit de passage :
«[L']article36n'énonce aucuneexigencesupplémentaire,par exemplecelleque
la communicationdu Secrétairegénéraa lit étéreçuepar les Partiesau Statut,ou qu'un
intervalle doit s'écouleraprès ledépôtde la déclaration, avantque celle-ci ne puisse
prendre effet. Toute condition de ce genre introduiraitun élément d'incertitudd eans
le jeu du système de la disposition facultative. La Cour ne peut introduire dans la
disposition facultative aucune condition de ce genre.)) (C.I.J. Recueil1957, p. 147.) C'est ce principe, qui est au cŒurmêmede la mise en Œuvreeffective du système dela
clausefacultative, que leNigéria contestemaintenant.C'estun principe qui permet dedéterminer t
une date claire et indiscuttable pour la prise d'effet d'unedéclaration d'acceptation dela clause
facultative.
Y-a-t-il de bonnes raisons de reconsidérer(plutôtque d'appliquer) cet élémend te la
jurisprudence de l'affaire duDroitdepassage ?
10.Je posecette questionparce quenoscontradicteursfont grandcas de laprétendue rigidité
de cet élément dela motivation de l'arrêrtelatif auit depassage et tentent de développerdes
arguments invitant laCour à réexaminer(et, peut-on le supposeràdésavouer)le principe clair et
w
impératifque cet arrêt énonce. Je vous prie instamment, Monsieur le président,Madame et
Messieurs de la Cour, de ne pas vous laisser leurrer par cet appel qui vous est adressé. La
jurisprudencequ'onvousdemandederenverserestunejurisprudenceétabliedepuisplusde quarante
ans. Les Etats partiesau systèmede la clausefacultativeontdonc eutoutes lesoccasionspossibles
020
de se protéger contre les requêtsrétendument introduitespar surprise))par de nouvelles parties
au système. Certains Etatsont cherché à se protégeren insérantune nouvelle réservedans leur
déclarationd'acceptationdelaclausefacultative. LeGouvernementduRoyaume-Uniaété j,e crois,
le premier à le faire en 1957 lorsqu'ila introduit dans sa déclaration d'acceptune nouvelle
réservevisant les différends
«à l'égarddesquelstoute autre partieen cause a acceptélajuridiction obligatoirede la
Cour ...uniquement en ce qui concerne lesdits différendsou aux fins de ceux-ci, ou
lorsque l'acceptation delajuridiction obligatoire de laCour au nomd'uneautre partie
au différend aétédéposée ou ratifiée moins dedouzemois avant la datedu dépôtde
la requêtepar laquelle la Cour est saisie du différend)).
11. C'est sur le second élémentde cette nouvelle réserve,Monsieur le président,que je
souhaite attirer l'attention de la Cour. Le premier élémentj,e le reconnais volontiers, pourrait
donner lieuà des difficultésde preuve quantaux intentionsde 1'Etatdéclarant, maisle deuxième
élémentl,ui, est objectif car il exige uniquementla preuvede la date du dépôtde la reqet de
la date du dépôt par'Etatdemandeur de sa déclarationd'acceptationde la clause facultative. Ce -11 -
sontlàdes donnéestotalementobjectives.Donc,si leNigériaavaitréellementet sincèrementvoulu
seprotéger contrelesrequêtesprétendumentintroduites«parsurprise)),pourquoi n'a-t-ilpasajouté
de réserve temporelle de cegenre dans sa déclaration d'acceptationdu système de la clause
facultative? C'estaprèstout cequ'avaitfait leRoyaume-Uni(l'ex-puissancecolonialeau Nigéria).
Il se peut évidemmentque le Nigéria aiteu quelque scrupule, dans les premiers temps de la
décolonisation,à suivre les traces de l'ex-puissancecoloniale, ce qui aurait été compréhensible.
Mais cela n'expliquepas pourquoi le Nigérian'apas pris cette précaution ultérieurement.Après
tout,d'autres Etatssesontprotégédse la même façonbienque le libelléexactde leurréservpuisse
êtrelégèrement différentde celurietenu dans laréservedu Royaume-Uni. Si la Bulgarie, Chypre,
la Hongrie, l'Inde,Israël, Malte, Maurice, la Nouvelle-Zélande, les Philippines,la Pologne, la
Somalie et l'Espagne peuvent donctrouver le moyen de se protéger contre cequ'ilsestiment être
des requêtesintroduites«par surprise))par des Etatsfaisant une première déclarad'acceptation
de la clause facultative, pourquoi neserait-ce pas le cas du NigériaEt je répète laquestion,
pourquoi ne serait-ce pasle cas du Nigéria
12.J'attirel'attentionsurce point uniquementparce queje désire quela Coursoit consciente
(etje suis certain qu'elle l'estdéjà) que sajurisprudencede l'affairedui de passage permet
encoreaux Etatsparties ausystèmedela clausefacultativede prendredes mesurespour seprotéger
contre ce qu'ilsestiment être des requêtes introduitesar surprise))par les nouveaux venus se
joignant au système.
C. La condition de réciprocitédanu sne déclaration d'acceptation de la clause facultative
13.Lorsdu deuxièmetour deplaidoiriesle 9 mars, sir Arthur a fourni au moins un semblant
de réponse - aussi peu convaincante qu'elle soit- à la question que je posais pour la forme.
Après avoir décritl'effet de la limitation temporelle introduite par le Royaume-Uni dans sa
déclarationd'acceptationde la clausefacultativeen 1957dans le contexte de l'arrêrtelatDroit
de passage, sir Arthur fait ensuitece queje qualifieraisde bond dans l'inconnu,car il soutientque
la déclarationd'acceptationdu Nigéria, dufait de la condition de réciproqu'elleimpose, a un effet pratique qui équivautau «délai»,ou comme je préfêre l'appeler,àla limitationtemporelle
introduite en 1957dans la déclarationd'acceptationdu Royaume-Uni. Pour autantqueje puisse
1
enjuger, aucun autre argument n'estavancé à l'appuide cette thèsequelque peu insolite.
14.Ceci m'amène,Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour,àl'idéeque le
Nigéria se faitdu sens du terme ((réciprocité)figurant dans sa déclaration relatiàela clause
facultative. En analysant l'argument que le conseil du Nigéria a avancéau second tour des
plaidoiries,je me suis aperçu de la nécessid'évoquerl'autoritéde Humpty Dumpty àl'égardde
l'étrangeraisonnementprésenté au nom duNigéria. Pour les Membres de la Cour qui peuvent ne
pas bien connaître l'ouvrageclassique anglaispour enfantsAlice throughthe Looking Glass (De
w
l'autre côtédu miroir), écrit par Lewis Carroll aumilieu du XIX' siècle, je dirai que Humpty
Dumpty est un philosophe qui s'exprimefort bien et qui apparaît dans le livre déguiséen Œuf.
Quand Alice l'interroge surla significationd'unmot qu'ila utilisédans une conversationavecelle,
il prend la chose de haut et réponden substance(je cite de mémoirecarje ne dispose pas ici des
ouvragesde LewisCarroll) :«Lorsquej'utiliseun mot, il a le sens quej'entendslui donner.)) Cette
remarque est si proche de l'interprétationque nos adversaireschercheàtdonner de la notion de
022
réciprocitéqueje ne peux m'empêched revousen fairepart. PourleNigéria,((réciprocitée))t«un
mot àtout faire))susceptible de prendre le sens que le Nigéria entend lui attribuer. Mais, pour
amusant qu'il puisseêtre, l'ingénieuaxrgumentdu Nigéria netient tout simplementpas comptede
4
la signification généralement reconnuede la notion de réciprocitdans le systèmede la clause
facultative. Dans sa plus récentepublication,Rosenne affirme que
«Reste à savoir comment la réciprocitése manifeste dans le système de la
compétenceobligatoire.Cette analysedoit se faireà partir du trait caractéristiquedu
systèmedécoulantdu paragraphe 2 de l'article36 - selon lequel l'acceptationest un
acte unilatéral dechaque Etat, le produit d'uneformulation unilatérale. Quelleque
puisse avoir étél'intentiondes premiersrédacteursdu Statut en 1920, lesdifférentes
déclarations ne coïncident pasdans la pratique. Cela étant, ilest manifestement
nécessairede trouver leur dénominateurcommun, ce dénominateurétant ladéfinition
commune de la portéede la compétencedans chaque casconcret. Lafonction de la
réciprocité estejouer un tel rôle.)) (Rosenne, op. cit., vol. II, p. 762.) - 13-
15. Sans vouloir manquer de respectau conseil du Nigéria,je suis persuadé, Monsieurle
président,que Humpty Dumpty est la seule autorité susceptible d'être invoquée à l'appui de
l'interprétationunilatéralequ'il essaie de donner de l'expression «sousla seule condition
réciprocité)f)igurant dans la déclaration d'acceptationdu Nigéria.
16.Selon le Cameroun,il convient de donnerà cette expression un sens objectif plutôt que
celui, avancépar le Nigéria, «d'une entière identitédes positions entre les Etats intéressés))
(CR 9811,p. 26). M. Simma a indiqué,dans son premiertour de plaidoiries, le sens objectif de
cette expression,quicorrespondàceluiquelamajoritéécrasantedes commentateursattribue àcette
notion(CR 9813, p.36-39). SilesEtatsquiontdéposédesdéclaration ds'acceptationconformément
au paragraphe2 de l'article 36du Statut avant l'atendu par la Cour dans l'affaireduroi te
passage avaient pensépouvoir seprévenircontre desrequêtes«surprise» en formulantsimplement
une ((conditionde réciprocité)ans leurs déclarations unilatéralesl'auraientcertainementfait.
Ils ont en revanche formuléune réserve particulière dansle temàsi'effetqu'unEtat faisant une
déclarationd'acceptation ultérieurene saurait introduire une instance contre eux devant la Cour
avant l'expiration d'uncertain délai. Pour la troisième et dernière foisjedemandeurquoi le
Nigérian'a-t-ilpas fait de même?
D. Transparence et bonne foi
17.Le conseil du Nigériaprétendtoujours que le Cameroun aurait, par son comportement,
amenéle Nigéria à penser que le Cameroun n'invoqueraitpas, et ne saurait certainement pas
invoquer, la compétence dela Cour à l'égardde son différendde frontière avec le Nigéria. Je
suggéreraisau Nigéria,qu'aulieu de condamnerle Camerounpour son manquede transparenceet
pour ne pas avoir agi de bonne foi, il examine d'abordson propre comportement. Où y a-t-il
transparenceou bonne foi de sa part lorsqu'il n'invmême pas un seul instrument international
à l'appuidutitre qu'ilrevendiquesurla presqu'îlede Bakassi(etqui saitjusqu'oùcetterevendication
de titre peut aller au-delà de la presqu'île) ainsique sur la zone de Darak - 14 -
18.Sir Arthur peut dire innocemment : ((mais le Nigérian'a rien dit sur ses possibles
arguments futurs; il n'entendpas se laisserentraînerdans desargumentsprémasuant aufond))
8
(CR 9815,p. 33). Le Nigéria seretieàtpeine,en l'occurrence,d'accuserle Camerounde manque
de transparence et de bonne foi pour ne pas l'avoir prévenude son intention d'accepter la
compétence obligatoirede la Cour conformémentau paragraphe2 de l'article36 du Statut. Mais
le Cameroun n'avaitabsolument pas besoinde le faire. Bien entendu, la lettre que le ministre des
affaires étrangèrduNigéria a adresséle4 mars 1994 au Secrétariatgénéral l'ONU,affirmant
sasurprise de noter que leGouvernementduCamerounavaitdécidé d'internationaliserl.eproblème
en le portant devant la Cour internationalede Justice, est très significative. Cette lettre montre
-
n'enpas douter que le Nigéria savait toutau moins que quelque chose se préparait, ei nos
adversaires n'ont pas pu alors faire clairement la différenceentre le dépôt d'unedéclaration
d'acceptationde la clause facultative et le dépôt d'unerequête introductive d'instance.
E. Acquiescement du Nigéria à l'exercicepar la Cour de sa compétencedans la présente
instance
19.Monsieur le président,Madame etMessieurs de la Cour,j'abordemaintenant le dernier
volet de monargument. Parson comportementdepuisquelquesannées,leNigériaa manifesté qu'il
acquiescait l'exercice parla Cour de sa compétenceen laprésenteaffaire. Je n'avancepas cet
argument à la légère, carje connais parfaitement les conditionsrigoureuses dont la Cour exige
J
qu'ellessoient satisfaitespour conclurequ'ily a acquiescementetlou estoppel. Entre parenthèses,
YL4 I
laCour noteracombien lesargumentsfondéssur l'estoppelavancépar leNigérialorsdesaudiences
en cours étaientpeu sérieuxet peu convaincants.
20. Sir Arthur s'est peut-êtreamusélundi matin lorsqu'il a critiquél'usage que faisait
M. Ntarnark de certainsdocumentsqu'ila cités.Mais sonindignationartificielleet forcéene visait
qu'àocculter ce qu'iln'apas dit.
21. Ce que nos adversairesn'ont pasdit, Monsieur le président, est encoreplus éclairantque
cequ'ilsontdit. Par exemple,sir Arthurtentede réponàrl'argument concernant l'acquiescement - 15 -
du Nigériaen invoquant le contenu de la lettre adresséeau Secrétairegénéralde l'ONU par le
général Abacha le 27 mai 1996. On trouvera cette lettre sous la cote D du dossier établipar le
Camerounpour lesjuges. Maisune foisencore,écoutezles silences. Sir Arthura passéun certain
temps à essayer de démontrer que la référencà une attitude de nature«à compromettre les
procédures engagéedsevant laCour))visait les procédures quidécoulentde la présentationdes
exceptions préliminaires(CR 9815,p. 24).
22. Mais, Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, M. Ntamark a déjà
concédé cela,quoique peut-êtreavec réticence (CR9813, p. 52). Ce à quoi sir Arthur n'a
manifestementpas répondu - un de ses silences les plus significatic'estl'argumentavancé
par M. Ntamark au sujet de l'espoir exprimépar le général bacha qu'aucune des Parties au
différendneseserviraitdesrésultatsd'uneéventuellemissiond'enquêtel'ONUcomme((éléments
depreuveenjustice)). De cetteréférence'utilisationéventuelled'«élémensepreuveenjustice))
par l'uneou l'autrePartie, on ne peut que conclure que le Nigériaen étaiàvadmettre qu'il
allait et devaitplaider l'affaireau fond (c'estalorsbien sûrque les se preuveenjustice))
sont pertinents), nonobstant les exceptions préliminairesqu'ilavait présentéesquelque six mois
auparavant. On ne peut donner nulle autre explication de cette déclaration extrêmement
significative,et le Nigérian'ena donné aucunea Cour.
23. Pour toutes ces raisons, et pour toutes les autres raisons déjà exposées dansles
observationsécritesduCamerounet danssesplaidoiriessurlesexceptionspréliminairesduNigéria,
le Cameroun demande àla Cour de rejeter la première exceptionpréliminairedu Nigéria.
24. J'aborderai maintenantla deuxième exception préliminairedu Nigéria,et je serai
O25 relativement bref.
25. Monsieurle président,Madame et Messieursde la Cour, le conseil du Nigériaa montré
lundiqu'iln'avaitvraiment pascompris lesens denos observationsdejeudi dernier. Le Cameroun
ne nie pas que des négociationsbilatéralesaient eu làedivers moments dans le cadre d'une
variété decomitéset de commissions diversement composés. Le Cameroun ne nie pas que les - 16 -
négociationsbilatéralesdemeurent une possibilitéactuellementet pour l'avenir. Le Camerounne
nie pas que lesnégociationsbilatéralesontsouventlemeilleurmoyende réglerles différendsentre
I
Etats.
26. Mais la deuxièmeexceptionpréliminairedu Nigériarepose sur l'argumentselon lequel
les Parties avaient d'une manièreou d'uneautre décidéo,u s'étaientcomportéesde telle manière,
que seuls «les mécanismes bilatéraux existants))leur étaientpermis. Tous les autres modes de
règlementdu différendétaient exclus. Comme le Cameroun l'adéclaréjeudidernier, ((c'estbien
laquestion de l'exclusividu recoursauxprocessusbilatérauxetnonleur accessibilitégénéralqeui
est en cause ici» (CR 9813,p. 56, par. 18). Le Nigérian'a absolument pas réussi,tant dans ses 1
écritures quelors des deux tours de plaidoiriesà démontrerl'existenced'unaccord quelconque,
exprèsou tacite, qui pourrait être interprééomme imposant cetteexclusivité.
27. Lorsqu'unEtat essaie depuis deux décenniesou plus de réglerses différendsfrontaliers
avecsonpuissantvoisin et que cedernierrépudieles accordsqui ontpu êtreconclusavecbeaucoup
dedifficultés,est-ilsurprenantquelepremieressaied'emprunterlavoiedu règlement parunetierce
partie? Que l'autreEtat soit ou non indisposépar une telle démarchen'estpaspertinent aux fins
de la présente affaire,l'importantest que cette démarche n'estpas interdite. Les arguments du
Nigéria concernantl'estoppelet le manquement à la bonne foi n'onttout simplementpas, excepté
unefois ou deux, étémentionnéslundiE .noutre, ils manquent decrédibilité.Demême,le conseil J
duNigérian'apastentéderéfuterlesargumentd suCamerounconcernantl'invocationparleNigéria
lui-mêmede procéduresde règlementpar tierce partie. La deuxièmeexception préliminairedu
Nigéria esten conséquencemal fondée tant en droit qu'enfait. Elle devrait être rejetée.
Monsieur le président, ainsis'achèvema plaidoirie en ce qui concerne les première et
deuxième exceptions préliminairesdu Nigéria. Je vous serais obligéde bien vouloir donner la
parole àM. Kamto.
Le PRESIDENT :Merci sir Ian. Je donne maintenant la paroleà M. Kamto. - 17-
Mr. KAMTO: Thank you, Mr. President.
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Nigeria has dealt with its third and fourth
Preliminary Objectionstogether, consideringthe fourth to be "ancillaryto the third" ("accessoire
de la troisième",Brownlie, CR 9815,p. 30). Cameroon can live with this presentation making it
quite clear that there was no case for separateexistence.
2. 1 shall reply to Nigeria's statement on those two objections with observations on the
following four points in turn:
- firstly, the Lake Chad Basin Commission is not a regional agency within the meaning of
Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations;
- secondly, the LCBC is neither an international court nor even an international quasi-court;
- thirdly, Nigeria maintains confusion between delimitationand demarcation of the boundaries
in Lake Chad in order to exclude thejurisdiction of the Court;
- fourthly, the jurisprudence of the Court regarding its jurisdiction or the admissibility of an
application when the legal interests of a third State might be affected bears outeroon's
thesis.
1.The LCBCis not a regionalagency withinthe meaningof Article 52 of the Charterof the
United Nations
3. Membersofthe Court,ProfessorBrownliesaidlastMondaythat Carneroonhad notdenied
that the LCBC was an "organisation régionale"(CR 9815,p. 32) sinceit r'sroccupde questionsde
sécuritéet de délimitationdefrontières" (CR 9815,p. 32).
4. 1 should like to remind the Court that the objectives and purposes of the LCBC, as
established inthe preambleto the 1964Convention andinChapter 1ofthe Statuteannexedthereto,
areCO-operationformanagementofthe waterresourcesofthe Lakeandthe integrateddevelopment
of the conventionalBasin (Annex OC, 10).
5. The auestion that naturallv arises is -hv the LCBC should have concerned itself with
027
matters of security and demarcation. The answer is plain, Mr.President: because it could not - 18 -
engageinthe statutorytasks1havejust recalledifthe regiondidnotenjoypeace andsecuritybased
on boundariesthat weresecurebecausethey hadbeen clearlydefined, andstable becausethey had
been demarcated on the ground.
6. Mr. President, one only has to re-read the records of the recent sessions of that
organizationto arrive at this conclusion. For it be seenthat while the LCBC addressesthese
matters of security and boundary demarcation, it always devotes the bulk of its work to the
traditional subjects of CO-operationbetween member States for theke of development and to
environmental issues in theasin, particularlythe major problem of the drying up of the Lake,
which was no doubt what prompted the admissionto the LCBC of the CentralAfrican Republic.
w
Professor Brownlie plays onthe ambiguity of the word "security"to give the impressionthat the
LCBC is engaged in international security when it is simply atter of intemal security in the
sense of "law and order", a mere policing function.
7. Members of the Court, the LCBC is not a collective securityagency; nor is it an agency
for delimitingor demarcating boundaries.hat is not its function. It is not intenand 1cite
Article 52, paragraph 1,of the UnitedNations Chart-r for "dealingwith.. mattersrelatingto
the maintenance of international peace andsecurity". Its action in that field is confined to the
formationof mixed patrolsforthepurposeof curbingthe phenomenonof cross-border banditrythat
was rifeinthe LakeChadregion(theculpritsbeingpopularlyreferredto inCarneroonas "coupeurs w
de route").
II. The LCBC is neithera court nor even a quasi-court
8. MembersoftheCourt,ProfessorBrownliesaid lastMondaythat "laCournesaurait revoir
la décisiond'unautre tribunalou déterminerla compétencede la compétenced'unautre organe
judiciaire ou décisionnel(CR 9815,p. 37). And he went on to Say: "Selonmoi, la CBLTest
028
habilitée agir et agit actuellementen tant qu'organede règlementpar unetiercepartie".
9. Assuredly,Mr. President,Nigeria hasataste for adventure. Butjuridical adventurecannot
be any more paying than military adventure. Mr. President, there can be no claiming that the - 19 -
LCBC is responsible for the judicial settlementof disputes. For the LCBC has never settled and
does not settle disputesrelating to boundary delimitation or even demarcation. Article IX (' of
the Statuteonly empowers it(as ProfessorCotrecalled on6 Marchlast) to "promotethe settlement
of disputes" and not to determine them in a binding and final manner after adversarialjudicial
proceedings. And Nigeria would be hard put to it to cite a single case dealt with by that
organization.
10.1shallnotbe wanting inrespecttowardsProfessorBrownlie,asthe eminentinternational
lawyerthat he is,by sayingthat he fails to distinguishbetweenthe commissionsof arbitrationthat
abounded inthe 19thandearly 20thcenturiesandthe technical intergovernmental organizationthat
the LCBC is. In their composition and powers, those commissions were veritable international
courts. They were, with the monarchs of the time, the authors of the first arbitral awards. The
samegoes for the commissionsinstitutedunderthe peace treatiesafter 1945. Sothey had nothing
in common with an agency like the Lake Chad Basin Commission.
11.Actually 1just think that Ourvery distinguishedcolleague read somewhat hurriedly the
passages cited from Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice'swork. 1recall in this connection that in the Peace
Treatiescase, the issue was "whetherthe partiesto this disputewere under anobligationto refer
these disputes to Commissions of Arbitration provided for under Treaties" (ibid., p. 467). Such
commissions of arbitration are in no way comparable to the intergovernmental commission,the
technical intergovernmentalorganization that the LCBC is.
12.Mr. President,once it is thus demonstratedthat the LCBC is not a court or even a quasi-
court,suchargumentsasthose drawnfiom ShabtaiRosenne's work,that theUnitedNationsCharter
does not confer anyjurisdictional pre-eminence on the Court, or from Article 95 of the Charter
(CR 9815,p. 38), are without relevance to the present case since they seek to place on a par two
radicallydifferent institutions. One cannot,Mr. President and Members of the Court, accuseyour
Court,asNigerian counselhas done, of seekingto exercise "anappellatejurisdiction" (ibid w.here
no originaljurisdiction exists. III. Nigeriais maintainingconfusionbetweenboundarydelimitationand demarcationinLake
Chad in order to exclude the jurisdictionof the Court
13.Mr. President, Members of the Court, according to Nigerian counsel, I
'yL]a Cour ne serait nullementhabiliàérevoir la décisionJinale de la CBLTen
matièrede démarcationdu lac Tchad,et il s'ensuit doncque la Courn'estpas habàlitée
interveniralors quelaprocédurede démarcationest toujoursencours." (CR 9815,p. 31.)
14.A little further on, he suddenly relies on the jurisdiction of the LCBC in regard to
delimitation(CR 9815, p.), stating that "laquestionde la démarcation este controverse
et ne revêtpas,enl'occurrence,uneimportancejuridique etpolitiquemoindre quecelle que revêt
unedélimitation"(CR 9815,p. 35).
W
15.Carneroonhas never disputed and is not now disputingthejurisdiction of theLCBC in
regard to demarcationwork onthe ground. Mr. President, that workwas physicallycompleted in
1990,the Report ofthearking-Outhavingbeen signed bythe nationalexpertsof al1the member
countrieson 14 February 1990and approvedby the LCBC commissions,and subsequentlyby the
Heads of State at the Abuja Summit in 1994.
16. The delimitationissue iste different. Members of the Court, this issue concerns in
the event the conventionalne definitively established by the Milner/SimonAgreement of 1919
arnplifiedby the ThomsodMarchand Agreementof 1929-1930,and definitivelyconfirmedby the
Franco-Britishxchangeof lettersof 9 January 1931. Thedisputebetween CameroonandNigeria
*
in the Lake Chad area and over the entire boundary of the tripoint in the area as far as Mount
0 3 O Kombon is related to just that, to the extent that Nigeria itself acknowledgesthe existence of a
dispute over Darak and that the sarne treaty instruments determinethe common frontier from the
northern zone of Lake Chad to the southern zone of Mount Kombon.
17. But,Mr. President,this disputehasrbeen referredto the LCBC1showedjust now
why and sincewhen ithasengagedinthe demarcationprocess afterpreviously securingtheconsent
ofal1the membercountriesasto the legalinstrumentsdelimitingthe boundary. Now ifthe LCBC
assumed thetask of demarcatingthe boundaries in the Lake area, there can be no inferring -21 -
that it enjoys jurisdiction, which is in any case exclusive, in regard to delimitation and, more
specifically, the settlement of delimitation disputes.
18. Members of the Court, the day before yesterday counselfor Nigeria dwelton Decision
No. 2 of the Ninth Summit of Heads of State of the LCBC in 1996and observedthat Cameroon
hadremained silentonthe point. The text of that decision,whichhe cited (CR 9815,p. 33), shows
that it in fact comprisestwo decisions:first,the decisionto deferdiscussionof the countryreports
on the adoption and signing of the boundary demarcationdocument;and second,the decision to
mandatethe Presidentof the Summitto intervenethrough eitherconsultationsor meetingwith the
Heads of State of Carneroon andNigeria, to find an amicable solutionto the problem in the spirit
of Afiican brotherhood.
19. But what exactly was the problem? It was neither one ofdemarcationnor still less one
of delimitation, but, says Decision No. 2, "lepoint sur la ratification du document de la
démarcationdesffontières". Theproblemthat promptedthe LCBCto designateor to committhe
Presidentof the Summit as intermediaryin the conflict between Cameroon andNigeria was not a
problemof demarcationor even a problem of delimitation. But, says Decision No. 2 advancedby
Nigeria, "lepoint sur la ratifcation du documentde la démarcationdes frontières". And the
Summitdecidedonthat intermediaryrole for three reasons: '?'aspect sensiblede cettequestion eu
égardauxévénementrsécents"; "lesexpériences de paix et de tranquillitédansla sous-région";
and "l'absencedes chefsdfEtatdu Camerounet du Nigéria".
20. Nowherethen is referencemadeto the boundary disputebetweenCameroonandNigeria,
nor even is there the bare mention of any demarcation conflict whatsoever, but of problems
concerning adoption of the related documents. And if there is a problem in this respect, it is
becauseNigeria, which would like to portray itself as a mode1of compliance of the conduct of a
State with its international commitments - for having voted a law made for the occasion in
January 1998, narnelyjust forthe requirementsofthe presentproceedings,as isself-evident- has
still not ratified the demarcation document, let alone deposited its instruments of ratification with the LCBC. 1would pointout that the Heads of State of that organization-including,of course,
the Nigerian Head of State- undertook to do so at the 1994 Abuja Summit. Cameroon, for its
part, ratified the document in 1995 andulfilled the formalities of depositing its instruments of
ratification with the LCBC in 1997.
21. Therecanconsequentlybe noquestion, withoutseekingtoabusethe Court, of concluding
fromthat intermediary role decidedon at the 1996LCBC Summitthat that organizationis the sole
forum for settlingthe boundarydispute between Cameroon and Nigeria in the Lake Chad region.
IV. The jurisprudence of the Court regarding its jurisdiction or the admissibility of an
applicationwhen the legal interestsof a third Statemay be affected bears out the thesis
of Cameroon w
22. Mr. President, in his pleadingsthe day beforeyesterday counsel for Nigeria revertedto
theContinentalShelf(LibyalMalta)case to exhort the Courtto display "judicial restraint" in this
case.
23. Yet he did not see fito respond to the objections raised on this point by my fiiend
Jean-Pierre Cot. 1 shall therefore remind you that, in a case concerning the delimitation of
continental shelves, application of the "equitable principles"may involve allowance for the
rights of third States as a "relevant circumstance". But delimitation in Lake Chad offers no
resemblance to that very specialprocedure since it is a matter of interpretingand giving effectto
*
old and confirmed treaty agreements, and notof applying "equitable principles" with a view to
reaching an agreement.
24. In any event, "judicialrestraint" is exercisedwhere appropriateinthe merits phase of the
032
case, on the basis ofinstakingexamination of the claims of the parties and any counter-claims
advanced by third States in the proceedings.
25. But, Mr. President, my distinguishedcolleague Ian Brownliehas for the first time, last
Monday, developed another analogy, this time with the Monetav Goldjurisprudence.
26. In that case, as in that of Timordecidedsome 40 years later, the Court declinedto
exercise itsjurisdiction on accountof the absenceof athird Stateon the groundthat that country's -23 -
"legalinterests would not only be affected by a decision,but would form the very subject-matter
of the decision" (I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 32).
27. Mr. President, can it be seriously maintained that, by recognizing the treaty-related
delimitationon the lacustrineboundary between Cameroonand Nigeria as far as its end-point, the
Court would make a decision the "very subject-matter" of which would be constituted by the
interests ofChad? And still more by the interests of Niger?
28. In the Monetary Gold case, the determination of Albania's responsibility was a
prerequisite for an answer to the question raised by the Court. In the East Timor.case, it was
Indonesia's responsibility that the Court was previously obliged to put in issue in weighing the
soundnessof the Application of Portugal. In both cases,the settling of a prior dispute relatingto
the responsibility of a State that had not accepted the Court'sjurisdiction was inevitable.
29. These precedents are by no means comparableto a delimitationbetween two Statesthat
continues,incidentally,upto a pointthat at the sametimeconstitutes the frontierwith athird State.
As arnply shown by other precedents in which the objection was dismissed, application of the
MonetaryGoldjurisprudence is infinitelymore demanding(referencewould bepossible heretothe
caseconcerningMilitaryandParamilitary Activitiesinandagainst Nicaragua, I.C.J. Reports 1984;
and, above all, to the case conceming Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, I.C.J. Reports 1992).
30. Assuredly,Mr. President,the simplestcourse is still to refer to the precedentsthat are of
direct relevance to Ourcase, namely:
the caseconcerningtheFrontier Dispute (BurkinaFaso/RepublicofMali)(I.C.J Reports 1986,
p. 577, para. 46), inwhichthe Chamber asserts itsjurisdiction for a frontierdelimitationas far
as its end-point;
- the case concemingthe Land, Island and MaritimeFrontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras)
(I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp. 401-402, para. 68), in which the Chamber exercises itsjurisdiction
as far as the frontier with Guatemala without any form of "judicial restraint", Guatemala
having, like Chad in Ourcase, acceptedthe treaty instrument cited; - 24 -
- the caseconcerningtheTerritorialDispute(Libya/Chad)(I.C.J. Reports 1994,p. 33,para. 63),
in which the Court proceeded in a similar manner.
31. The existence of a multilateral negotiatingprocess in the framework of the LCBC does
nothing to alter the relevance of this jurisprudence; quite the opposite. saw in the case
conceming Military andParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaragua,thatthe existenceofthe
Contadora process had not prevented the Court fiom ruling on al1aspects of the case, including
thosewhich, accordingtotheUnited States,affectedthe interestsofthird StatessuchasEl Salvador
and Honduras.
32. Mr. President,Members of the Court,as you haveobserved, nothing remainsof the legal
*
artifices erected by Nigeria under its third and fourth Preliminaw Objections. There is no further
room for doubt:
- the LCBC is not a regional agency withinthe meaning of Article 52 of the Charter;
- the LCBC is not a court or even a quasi-court;
- the confusion maintained by Nigeria between the demarcation that the LCBC reportedly
undertook in LakeChadand the delimitationthat the Court could undertakeinthepresent case
has not enabled Nigeriato demonstratethe inadmissibilityof the Application that ground;
- the trends in thejurisprudence of your Courtbear out al1points of the theses of Cameroonon
this matter.
33. Forthese reasons,Cameroonmaintainsitsfirst-roundsubmissionsandrequeststhe Court
to dismiss the third and fourth Preliminary Objections of Nigeria.
1thank you, Membersof the Court, andwould ask you, Mr. President, kindly to give the
floor to my friend, ProfessorAlain Pellet.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie Monsieur Kamto. J'ai sur ma liste le nom de
r34
M. Bipoun Woum. Est-ce à lui de prendre la parole ou est-ce le tour de M. Pellet ?
Monsieur Pellet souhaitez-vous commencer ? Je crois savoir que vous avez un long exposé à - 25 -
prononcer avant la suspension de l'audience,mais je vous laisse le choix du moment pour
interromprevotre plaidoirie.
Mr. PELLET: Mr. President,Membersof the Court, 1have the pleasure and the honourto
appear before you again, in the first place to reply, on behalf of Cameroon,to the arguments put
forward last Monday by Nigeria, through Sir Arthur Watts, in regard to its fifth Preliminary
Objection.
This objection Statesthat: "iln'existepas de dzférendconcernantla délimitation dela
frontière en tant que telle sw toutesa longueurentrele tripointdu lac Tchadetla mer"(CR 9815,
p. 65; emphasis added). So Nigeria is sayingthat there is no dispute in respect of the boundary
delimitationas such ("entant quetelle'i)withinLake Chad"subjecttothe question oftitleto Darak
and adjacent islands inhabitedby Nigerians"; no dispute either, again as regards the "boundary
delimitationas such"("entantque telle'i),fiom the tripoint in Lake Chad to Mount Kombon,nor
from Mount Kombon to pillar 64 on the Garnana, nor fiom that pillar to the sea. But al1this
"without prejudice to the title of Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsul...".
The following is therefore the situationaccordingtoOuropponents: they assert that there is
no dispute regarding the boundary line, but
1.they do not tell us, they do not tell the Court,what that line is;
2. they qualify that statement by asserting that ites not concern thedelimitationas such
("entant quetelle'i);
3. they further qualifi it by indicatingthat the agreement betweenthe Parties on this point
exists only"inprinciple" ("enprincipe'? (cf. A. Watts, CR 9812, p.19); and
4. finally, theyeprive it of any substanceby statingthat this alleged agreement is subject
to "laquestiondu titresur Barak etles îles avoisinanteshabitéep sar des Nigérians" andthat it is
without prejudice to "laquestiondu titre duNigériasur lapresqu'île de Bakassi". 1. Nigeria is questioning the entire boundary
035
If we are pleading by accreti''à coups d'ajout(A. Watts, CR 9812,p. 19; CR 9815,
p.47),Ourcolleagueson the other sideof the Bar have amarkedtendencyto pleadby ero...n
The problem isthat, bydint ofqualifyingthe allegedagreement,saidto exist "inprinciple"between
the Parties on the delimitation of the boundary "asvery little of it is left.
(1) Nigeria has not yet specified the delimitation of the line on which it states it agrees
First point, the initial proposition: there is no dispute betweenthe Parties on the boundary
delimitation "asch". Very well, Mr. President!t we on thiside of the Barwould certainly
have liked to know what the line is onwhich the Parties agree "in principle".know it -
perhaps when Nigeria replies to the question put by Judge Guillaume last Friday (CR 9814,
pp. 62-63); for the moment, however,curiosity remainsundiminishedsince, as itis of course
entitled to do, Nigeria has postponed to a date the task of replying to it (Agent, CR 9815,
p. 63).
As far as Cameroon is concemed, things at least are clear: the land boundarybetween the
two countriesis the one described preciselyon page 669ofthe Memorial (reproducedat Tab
the Judges'folder) where the precise geographical co-ordinates of this boundary are indicated in
accordancewith the instruments which establish it, in essence the Franco-British Declaration of
*
1919,as specified in the ThomsonJMarchandDeclaration of 192911930,itself confirmed by the
ExchangeofNotes of 9 January 1931,the British OrderinCouncil of 1946andtheAnglo-German
Agreements of 1913.
1am well aware, Mr. President,that Sir Arthur Wattsprefers us not to "speculate"on what
the Nigerian arguments "might be" (CR 9812,p. 20 andCR 9815,pp. 41and 46); however, since
he is playing hide-and-seek with us about the delimitation as seen by Nigeria, it is incumbent on
me to put forward one or two suggestions.
Let us take the oneosest to what might appearto confirm the existence of an agreement
betweenthe Parties, however implausiblethis suggestionmayand accept thatNigeria, in reply -27 -
to the question from Judge Guillaume, is saying in substance: "We fully agree, the boundary
follows the line described on page 669 of the Carneroonian Memorial." Let us also accept that
0-3 6
Nigeria is no longersaying: "Weagreeinprinciple", "onthe delimitationat the boundaryas such"
("en tant que telleri); it is saying: "Weagree. Full stop". Unfortunatelythis wouldnot be a "full
stop", for in its following submission, in subparagraph) on this page 669 of its Memorial,
Cameroon draws the inevitable conclusionswhich flowfiom the preceding submission, and calls
on the Court to adjudge anddeclare:
"Thatnotably,therefore, sovereigntyoverthe Peninsulaof Bakassiandover the
disputedparce1occupiedbyNigeria inthe areaof Lake Chad, inparticularoverDarak
and its region, is Cameroonian." (Emphasis added.)
Mr. President, these two submissions are inseparable.It is, as my colleague and friend
Christian Tomuschat demonstrated last week (CR 9814, pp. 22-23 and 26-27) the very same
instrumentswhichdelimit the boundaryinthe Lake Chadarea and as far as Mount Kombononthe
one hand, and from pillar 64 to the sea, therefore including the Bakassi Peninsula,on the other.
Eitherthese instrumentsrepresentvalidlegaltitles and inthiscasethere isno boundaryproblem,
anywhere; or elseNigeria challengesthem, and inthis casethe entireboundaryis definitelycalled
into question except, perhaps,the 210-km sectiondelimited by the British Order in Council of
2 August 1946 between MountKombon and pillar 64. 1shall come back to this.
2. The northern section of the boundary,from Lake Chad to Mount Kombon
Let us dwell for a moment on the sketch displayed behind me, which is at Tab B in the
Judges' folder.
Let us look first at the northem section of the boundary, the section which runs fiom Lake
Chad to Mount Kombon. It is delimited by paragraphs 1 to 60 of theThomson/Marchand
Declaration, which spells out the Franco-BritishDeclaration of 10 July 1919.
The point of departure is representedby the oldjunction of the British, Frenchand German
boundaries and is situated according to paragraph 1 of the Declaration "in Lake Chad
13" 05'latitudenorth and approximately14' 05'longitudeeast of Greenwich"; it corresponds,on -28 -
the sketch, to "borneII" (pillar II).Thence, the boundary is determined - as stated in
paragraph 2 - "on a straight line as far as the mouth of the-Ebnamely, on the sketch, as
037 far as"borneV"(pillar V). Darak, as is perfectly clear,is situated very much on the hither side
of the boundary, approximately35 km away in Cameroonian territory.
Yet this is challengedbyNigeria: it saysand perhapswill sayso againbetween nowand
25 March - that it agrees with the boundary line resulting from the 1931 Agreement; but, to
repeat Sir Arthur'swords,ienentendu,leNigériareconnaît qu'ilsepose unproblème à propos
du titr.. .à Darak et à certaines zones adjacentesdu lac Tchad"(CR 9812,p. 16) and again
'YeJnce quiconcerne . .Darak, le Nigériaaccepte qu'ily a unproblème"(ibid-) a problem, -
Sir Arthur? That is rather a modest word todesignate what, in this Court, is quite simply called
a dispute.
But ifthere is a disputeabout Darak, it is precisely becauseNigeria challengesthe vaiidity
of the treaty titles on which Cameroon relies and which in no way confine themselves to
establishingthe boundary line in Laked; as 1havejust said, they establish it as far as Mount
Kombon, namelyover 1,070 km. And it is these very 1,070km whichNigeria is questioningby
asserting its territorial sovereignty over Darak.
Al1the more so, whateverOuropponentsSay,becauseif Darak isthe mostflagrant,the most
glaring example of the 1919-1931 boundary being questioned, it is far fiom an isolated one: W
Nigerian police and soldiers are operating in conquered territory at several points on this portion
of the boundary: at Djibrili, Zanga and Assigassa (OC 1,App. 8, pp. 41-44) and at Ouro-Garga
(OC 1,App. 16,pp. 85-86); andits militaryaircraft havenohesitationin overflyingplaces which
aresoassuredlyCameroonianasDourbeye(OC 1,App. 12,pp. 61-62)orKontcha(OC 1,App. 20,
pp. 109-111).
On Monday morning, Sir Arthur Watts besought us to Say no more about "cetabsurde
prétendu'incident"'of Typsan (CR 9815,p. 42). On the contrary, let us do sMr. President,
Cameroon is categorical,Typsanis situatedinCameroonianterritory,by virtue of paragraph 41of -29 -
the ThomsodMarchand Declaration, the text of which Nigeria has overprinted on the satellite
photograph at Tab 45 of its folder; we in turn have placed this document at Tab H of Ourown
-38
folder, withtwo little additions,and1take the liberty,Membersof the Court, to invite youto look
once more at this document.
You will see there three names: two are of places - Kontcha and Typsan -, one isof a
river - the "rivièreTypsan".This riverpassesto the east ("tothe left") of the village ofthe same
name. So here is Sir Arthur triumphant: 'yL]esmotsdirectementpertinentssont soulignés [. ..J
Ces mots montrentque lafrontière descendjusqu'àunpoint situé juste au nord du village actuel
de Typsan, et de la suit lecours de larivièreTypsa[nJU and "Typsanest toutaussi clairementdu
coté Nigérian de la rivière"(ibid.,emphasisadded).
My eminentopponentreadstoo fast,Mr. President. Paragraph 41 ofthe Thomson/Marchand
Declaration says nothing about a point "just north" of Typsan (''justeau nord[de] Typsan");it
says - and 1will read it in French (you haveit before you inEnglish): "Thence [ .. .] to a point
on the Maio Tipsa[n][ .. .] 2 kilometresto the south-west [notto the north, Mr. President, tothe
south-west!]of the point atwhich the road crosses saidMaio Tipsa[nIw.Look carefully,Members
of the Court, at the Nigerian map: it showsthe road, markedby an arrow; the road appearsas a
faint white line running from Kontcha, passing through Typsanand continuing westwards.
The intersectionof this road withthe boundary fromthe north, which is the prolongationof
the line parallel to the BaréFort-Lamy track mentionedin paragraph 40 of the 1931Declaration,
is marked A on the map. The boundary meetsthe Mayo Typsan"2 kilometresto the south-west",
namely at point B. And this is very clear,Mr. President, even if painful to Sir Arthur, the village
ofTypsan isdefinitelyCameroonian - unless,here again,Nigeriaquestionsthe lineresultingfrom
the ThornsodMarchand Declaration; which it does. In any event, and this is the only thingwhich
matters at the present stage, clearly there is also a dispute between the Parties concerning the
Typsan section. - 30 -
A dispute over Darak, a dispute over Typsan, (no dispute over Yang as far as this section
goes), a disputeoverthe other places which1mentionedearlier on . ..A dispute, Membersof the
Court, over the whole of thejoint boundaryestablished by the 1919and 1931Agreements, which
039
the Nigerian Party is questioning expressly in the Lake Chad area. This long portion of the
boundary is shown by a hatched line on the map displayed atthe moment, which is also in the
'
Judges' folder at Tab 1.
Mr. President, 1am in your hands but this is perhaps a good moment to suspend.
Le PRESIDENT :Merci, Professeur Pellet. L'audienceest suspendue pour 15minutes.
TheCourt adjournedfrom 11.25 to 11.40 am.
Le PRESIDENT :Veuillezvous asseoir. Professeur Pellet,ayezl'amabilité dereprendrevotre
plaidoirie.
Mr. PELLET: Merci bien, Monsieurle Président.Mr. President,before the break, wewere
speaking of the northem section of the boundaryand 1think 1showedthat it was being challenged
by Nigeria.
3. The southernsection of the boundary, from pillar64 to the sea
Well, things appear no better as regardsthe southem portion of the boundary, which in this
case is shown by a dotted line on the same map.
Those dots reproduce the delimitation resulting fiom the Anglo-German Agreement of
11 March 1913,which delimitedthewholeofthis stretchfrom pillar 64to the sea. It ispartlyspelt
out in another agreement, signed at Obokum on 12April 1913.
At this stage,we can rely on the Agreement of 11 March: it isthis which delimitsthe entire
boundary from pillar 64 to the sea, or, more precisely, to the point at which "the centre of the
navigablechannelof the Akwayafé River"meets"a iinejoining SandyPoint and Tom ShotPoint",
and even to the limit of the territorial waters, at that time 3 miles (Art. 21). - 31 -
As shown in the panel at the top left of the map now on the screen (whichis at Tab B in the
Judges' folder), the Akwayaféis to the Westof the Bakassi Peninsula,and that sufficesto establish
that the Agreement of 11 March 1913clearly awards that peninsulato Cameroon.
This does not, however, Mr. President, preventNigeria from challenging that title and
believingitself,1quote Sir Arthur again, to have "undroit légitime surla presqu'îlede Bakassi"
(CR 9815,p. 46). My opponent,decidedlyreticent, does not Saywhattitle, and in truth it matters
little atthis stage: what is certain is that he does not base it on the Anglo-German Agreementof
1 1March 1913- highly irritating,becausethis is the onlytitle which, in the view ofCameroon,
establishesthe boundary fi-omthe seato pillar 64; there isnone other. Moreover,Nigeria doesnot
appear to see any other, because yet again it feels that it is virtually at home everywhere, as
demonstrated oncemore bythe map of incidents,as examplesof which1cite those at Lebo (OC 1,
App. 28, p. 140)or at Mbelego (OC 1, App. 29, pp. 146-147).
At al1events, Mr. President, the fact is that another section, this time 400 km long, from
pillar 64tothe sea,is beingchallengedbyNigeria. Addedtothe sectionfrom Lake Chadto Mount
Kombon,that makes a total of 1,470km nevertheless- which out of a total of 1,680is far from
negligible.
4. The intermediate section of the boundary, from Mount Kombon to pillar 64
It is true that 210 km remain, from Mount Kombonto pillar 64, aboutwhich Nigeria has
soughtto reassure us (cf. CR 9812,pp. 21-22; CR 9815,pp. 44 and 65). Unfortunatelywe are not
at al1reassured! And 1fear that we shall not be reassured either eventhough Nigeria, in reply to
the question put by Judge Guillaume, wereto tell us that it does not challenge this line, which
resultsfrom the British Order in Council of 2 August 1946; even though it does not accompany
this assurance by "buts" which totallynullifi the agreement whichit says it accords to the other
two sections of the boundary.
First of all, both ends of this section are putr great stressby Nigeria's challengetothe
boundarytitles represented by the 1931 and 1913Agreements. - 32-
Here again, Nigeria behaves as though it had sovereignty over the territory which the
1946 Order awards to Cameroon. 1will give three examples alone:
on 14 September 1985, at Atta - this is No. 22 on the map - two armed Nigerian
policemen were arrested in Cameroonian territory (OC 1, App. 22, pp. 117-118);
- on 6 July 1992,this time it was four Cameroonians whowere arrested at Mandur-Yang,in
theregion ofNwa,by otherNigerianpolicemen(correspondingonthe maptoNo. 24 (OC 1,
App. 24, pp. 123-124));
- and then there is the incident of 26 June 1997, the one which took place at Yang - 1am
coming to that, leturopponentsrest assured - the incident aboutwhich Sir Arthur Watts w
created a little stirthe day before yesterday.
1 am sure youwill rememberthis,Membersofthe Court,it was what,a littlebriefly perhaps,
Mr. Tomuschat had described as "a further incursion by Nigerian policemen in seven vehicles"
(CR 9814,p. 25). But why briefly, Mr.President? For a very simplereason: we relied on the
reports from the spot which placed greater emphasison the policemen on boardthe vehiclesthan
on Mrs. Omiyi or even onMr.TimothyDaniel - with al1due respectfor their repute: policemen
arerepresentativesofthe Stateandit isperfectlynatural thatthe Cameroonianofficiaisshouldhave
focused attention on their undue presence in Cameroonian territory. For this took place in
Cameroon.
Mr. President, in this case what is strikingis that Nigeria did noteven see fit to notify the
Cameroonian authoritiesof the despatch of itsteam of lawyers to an area which we consider as
being underthe sovereigntyof Cameroon. Nigeriathus confirmswhat,unfortunately,we knowal1
too well, namely that it regards itself as being at home in Yang.
Thisis confirmedby anotherincident,onwhich counselforNigeria setgreat store (CR 9815,
pp. 43-44): the incidentof 24 April 1997. Whathappened? 1recallthat it involved a high-level
delegationcomprising a prefect, a subprefect, gendarmesand ranking military personnel.1quote
the exactwords used bySir Arthur: 'Yunecertainedistance de Yang,lapolice nigérianeastoppé -33 -
042 la délégationcamerounaiseet lui a demandéde retourner à Yang"(ibid., p. 44); accordingto the
report by the Prefect of North-West Province on which my opponent said he relied, the armed
Nigerian policemen insistedthat the convoyshould returnto the market at Yang where, according
to them, the frontierwas situated(Doc. 3 accompanyingthe letterof the Agent of Cameroon dated
11February 1998). Wisely, the prefect wishedto avoid a confrontation anddecidedto await the
Nigerian delegationon the spot; it arrived there two hours later.
Yet, Mr. President, is not al1this extraordinary? 1s it not unbelievable that a high-level
Camerooniandelegationshould be givenan order, in Cameroonianterritory,to turb nack? 1sit not
surprising, to say theleast, that, for its part, a Nigerian delegation of comparable composition
should,on the contrary,visibly regard itselfas being at homethere? This is confirmed,moreover,
by the fact that, from the beginning of this story, the Nigerian policemen had asserted that the
boundarywas at Yang,despite the wording of the Second Schedule(concerning Section 6) to the
Order in Council of 1946(which places the boundary on the "unnamed Stream"nowadays called
Makwe).
This is not "accretion",Mr. President, it is subtraction a subtraction which reduces the
thing to nought: Nigeria certainly challenges the entire boundary; no section finds favour in its
eyes: neitherthe sectionfrom LakeChadto Mount Kombon; northesection fiom Mount Kombon
topillar 64, nor, of course,the section fiom the latterto the sea, includingthe Bakassi Peninsula.
Nigeria is not merelyclaiming the area of Darak or Bakassi; it alsoseeks to appropriate Typsan;
it behaves like a territorial sovereign at Yang, at Djibrili, at Ouro-Garga, at Atta,at Mbele.. .
II. The existence of a dispute along the entire boundary isundeniable
1 am well aware that Nigeria has told us that it accepted the boundary "in principle"
(A. Watts, CR 9812, p.19); but this "principle"is accompaniedby really too manyexceptions to
constitute therule. . . - 34-
I. Thedispute exists despiteNigeria's disclaimers
What ismore,theexpressprovisosreproducedintheNigeriansubmissions,which1citedjust
now,they alone suffice to preclude you, Members of the Court, from upholding this fifih
0 4 3 PreliminaryObjection. TheRespondentexpresslyacknowledgesthat its claimiswithoutprejudice
to "laquestion du titre du Nigériasur la presqu'île de -akit therefore challenges the
southernpartofthe boundary, butupto where? Akwa? Isanguele? Why notMundemba? Nigeria
gives notice too that this absence of a dispute is subject todu titre sur Darak et les
îles avoisinantes habitéespardes Nigériansr';what portion of Carneroonianterritory does this
claim cover? Does it includeTchika? Kamouna? Gore Kendl? There are Nigeriansat Ngouma w
and Makarias well.. .How and where do we stop?
1 of course am well aware that "l'existe-c1 quote Sir Arthur "l'existenced'un
dzfSérend"as to be ''objectivtppréciée";Sir Arthur says so(CR 9812,p. 17)and 1confess
that he convinces me more on this pointn when he makes south-west become nort. .
However, without wishing in any way to detract from his merits, itmust be confessedthat in this
particular case he persuades me1 the more easily by confining himself to paraphrasing a
well-establishedjurisprudenceoftheCourt(cf. AdvisoryOpinionofch 1950(Interpretation
ofPeace Treaties,C.J.Reports 1950,p. 74) or the Judgmentof 27 February 1998(Questionsof
InterpretationandApplicationof the1Montreal Conventionarisingfi.om theAerial Incident -
at Lockerbie,PreliminaryObjections,Libyav. UnitedStates,para. 21,Libya v. UnitedKingdom,
para. 22)).
But if the fact "whetherere exists an international dispute is a matter for objective
determination"(ibid.),it standsto reasonthatneither cana Partysimplyassertthatnodisputeexists
for the dispute to go away. Cameroon has, 1believe, shown that unfortunatelyNigeria's flabby
disclaimers have notred the existence of a dispute throughoutthe boundary whichseparates it
from its neighbour for 1,680km and beyond, at 2. Theexistence of the dispute had beendeterminedut the time whenthe Cameroonian
Application wasfded
Sir Arthur madea final attempt to convince you othenvis1.quote: "ledzflérend,s'ily en
a un,doit avoir existéen 1994, et aucune évolutionultérieurenepeut modifer la néceque les
événements aient étcristalliséscette époque-là"(CR 9815,p. 45; seealso CR 9812,pp. 26-27);
and again: "mais il fallait qu'il y ait un dzflérendràelce moment-là" [in 1994, when the
O Application was filed] "Et il ni en avait pas" (CR 9815, p. 46.) But of course there was,
Mr. President, there was a dispute in 1994; and of course it has not gone away either, solely by
virtue of what my opponent and friend, with however much talent, has said.
In reality, what distresses Sir Arthur is not the absence of a dispute inhe is well
awarethat it existed but the fact that Cameroondeterminesits existenceby relying interalia on
incidents subsequent to the filing of the Application. Butthese are quite different things,
Mr. President! No one doubts that the dispute must have arisen and be inexistence at the time
whenthe Applicationismade. But it wouldbe absurdto maintainthat this should barthe applicant
State from determining the existence of the dispute with the aid of evidence which emerged
subsequently,where that evidencedoes no more than confirm its existence; that would be totally
artificial. And it would oblige an applicant to bring successive applications whenever a fresh
disputearose betweenthe parties, evenwherethat disputehad its originin one andthe same initial
disagreement on a point of law or of fact or in one and the same conflict of legal views
(cf. Judgments of 26 November 1984 (Military and Pararnilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua, Jurisdiction andAdmissibilitZ..J. Reports 1984,p. 428, para. 83)and 11 July 1996
(Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Preliminary Objections,.C.J. Reports 1996, para. 26)).
For these well-known incidents, are not, at least for the purposes of the fifth Preliminary
Objection - my colleagueProfessor Bipoun Woum will tell you, in a moment, whatthis means
in regard to the sixth-, these incidents are not the subject of the dispute;they are the - 36 -
manifestationof it. They donot crystallizethe dispute- which has to dowith the questioningby
Nigeriaof the instrumentsestablishingthe boundary, through its occupationsin Bakassi, at Darak,
at Typsan,etc., -, they consolidatethe dispute. TheyconfirmthatNigeriaattributesno legalforce
to the instruments which delimit the boundary.
1wish to be precise on this point:
(1) the incidents do not constitute the principal legal argument of Cameroon on the fifth
Preliminary Objection, even though SirArthur placed virtually the entire emphasis on them last
Monday, thereby hoping, undoubtedly,to divert attention from the essence of the matter: the
questioning by Nigeria of thetitles on which the delimitation of the entire boundary rests;
(2) consequently,the incidents have only conJirmatolyforce, but strikingly so;
(3) this confirmation stems fromal1the incidentswhich demonstratethat Nigeria pays scant
heedto the line establishedin 1913, 1919-1931and 1946,regardlessofthe dateon whichthey took
place, and
(4) these incidentsare what might be called "incidentsof sovereignty" - in the sense that
they involve civil or military agents of the Nigerian State - or, 1 would say, "purely local
incidents"caused by Nigerian private citizens.
Today 1 have only spokenof the former, but Cameroonfirmly maintainsthat the latter are
relevantas well: they give the lie to the assertions hammered out by Sir Arthur to the effect that
'ys]urleterrain . .lafrontièreest unequestionde réputationlocaleétablie" (CR 9812,p. 21)and
again "[lles communautés locales saventbien où lafrontièrepasse" - this latter comment was
accompanied,youwill recall,bythe photographof the manstandingby afloweringbush (CR 9812,
p. 22). The leastthat can be said is that these repeated and continual incidentsscatteredalong the
whole length of the boundary do not confirmthese optimistic remarks and do not show that the
people on the ground know where the boundary is!
Obviously,though, sinceNigeriachallengestheboundaryandthetreatiesestablishingit,since
its military, its policemen, its customs officers behave throughout the Cameroonian border - 37 -
area - and oftenfar insidethe country - as if they were at home,the local inhabitantscannot be
expected to respect the boundary.
1have finished,Mr. President - and 1am aware of having argued .. .the merits, even if
1haveconfinedmyselfrigorouslyto replyingtothe arguments putforwardby Sir Arthuronbehalf
of Nigeria. 1sthis not, Mr. President, ultimately, the best proof of the ill-founded nature of this
fifth Preliminary Objection?
Cameroonthereforerequestsyou,MembersoftheCourt,toreject it,failingwhichthedispute
before you- which concems the entire boundary - cannot be settled.
0'6 Mr. President, may 1 ask you to be kind enough to give the floor, this time, to
Professor Bipoun Woum. Thank you, Mr. President.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci beaucoup, professeur Pellet. Je donne maintenant la parole au
professeur Bipoun Woum.
Mr. BIPOUN WOUM: Thank you, Mr. President.
1. Mr. President,Members of the Court,1take the floor againthis moming to deal with the
sixth Preliminary Objection maintained by Nigeria at the end of the second round of its oral
argument. The Nigerianargument is presentedas follows: withrespect to the allegationsrelating
to the responsibility Nigeria bears, Cameroonhas not provided adequate or reliable information
(CR 9815, pp. 46-49).
2. Letmefirstobservethat counselofNigeria havedevelopedthis argumentduringtheseoral
arguments, inorder, it would appear, to sowthe greatest possible confusion in people'sminds.
3. Among otherthings, the confusiononNigeria'spart stemsfrom its counsel'saptitude for
contradictingoneanother. Forexample,we hearone eminent counsel soundlyrebukingCameroon,
which he criticizes for believing and firmly stating that Bakassi does not belong to Nigeria; this
has no place here, we are told, but pertains to the merits. Really! But Cameroon has an excuse:
itwasreplyingto thatcounselwho, duringthe first roundof oral argument,statedthatNigeria "has - 38 -
sovereignty" in the Darak area (CR 9812,p. 3l), and also that: "sinceNigeria has no doubt as to
its title to Bakassi, the very basis for these Cameroonian complaints about Nigerianactivities in
Bakassi is, of course, without substance" (CR 9812,p. 29).
4. Mr. President,this presagesthe lack of solidity of whatNigeriacalls its "demonstration",
accordingto which noneofthe procedural documents producedby Cameroonmakesitpossible "to
make a fair and effectiveudicial determination ofthe matter" (CR 9815,p. 46).
5. 1shall very briefly expound three arguments to showthat there is no basis whatever for
Nigeria'ssixth Preliminary Objection.
1.In fact, the Nigerian objection relates to the evidence
047
6. To begin with,the entire "demonstration"of Nigerian counselinreality seeksto show the
inadequacy of the evidence which might establishthe facts which, accordingto Cameroon,incur
Nigeria's responsibility. Nigeria denies it (CR 9815, p. 49). However, a close terminological
analysis of the statementsby its counsel bears this out.
7. In hisirst oral argument, Sir Arthur refers on four occasionsto the idea of evidence for
the factslleged (CR 9812,pp. 31, 36, 36, 37). To quote his very words: "No evidenceis given
(CR 9812, p. 31); "additional evidential material" (CR 9812, p. 36); "supporting evidential
document"(CR 9812, p. 36). Mr. President,youwill findthereferencesinthe documentconcerned.
In particular, it will be noted that, at the end of his oral argument, he concludedhis expositionby
asking: "And this, Mr. President,is evidenceof Nigerian internationalresponsibility?"(CR 9812,
p. 37). Last week, the question was therefore indeed one of a lack of evidence.
8. However last Monday, Mr. President, the same counsel carefully avoided calling for
evidence so explicitly, confining himself to denouncing a lack of "adequate and reliable"
information. So the argumenthas changed. But only in appearancefor, Mr. President,Members
ofthe Court,what isadequateandreliable informationbut informationwhichhas cometo lightand
been proved? - 39 -
9. Our opponent has said that, according to him, the problem apparently stems from the
unidentifiable nature of the facts presentedby the Application(CR 9815,p. 49). What does this
mean?
10. In his first oral argument, Sir Arthur Watts statedthat his requirements for a proper
identzficationofthe facts wouldbe met provided, inthe caseof each of them, what occurred,when
it occurred, where itoccuired and who bearsresponsibilityis known (CR 9812,p. 28). Theseare
not his words, but 1 think this is an accuratesummary of his thinking.
11.Then Sir Arthur set outto verifywhether the facts presented in Cameroon'sApplication
meet this requirementof identification. 1amnot goingto go over al1this again but, among other
things, he quoted a passage fiom Cameroon'sApplication, accordingto which:
"it was in this context that, on 21 December 1993,Nigeria committed an aggression
against Cameroon by invading the Cameroonian localities of Jabane and Diamond
Island in the Bakassi Peninsula . .. By introducingarmed troops on a massive scale
into the disputed peninsula and conducting militaryactivities there, the Federal
Republic of Nigeria intends to recover an alleged 'historical sovereignty'over this
portion of Cameroonianterritory which it immediately proclaimedto be incorporated
into the Nigerian Federated States of Akwa Ibom and Cross River" (Application of
Cameroon, para. 9).
12. Mr. President,here we have indications regarding what occurred: itwas the invasionof
villages; the date: itwas 21 December 1993; the places: these were Jabane and Diamond Island;
and who bore responsibility: it was the armedNigerian troops.
In otherwords, itisperfectly "identifiable",usingNigeria'sowncriteria. However, Sir Arthur
is not content! (CR 9812,p. 29). But why? He does not say in so many words, butwe can guess:
because he does not have any evidence.
13. Thequestionwhetherone factoranother isprovedpertainstothe merits. Now isclearly
not the time todeal with such matters. SoNigeria'spersistencein trying to convincethe Court of
the relevance, atthis stage, of itsanalysesaimedat identifyingincidentswhich are "totallywithout
any standing whatsoever as a basis of allegationsof internationalresponsibility"(CR 9815,p. 49)
isdiff~cultto understand. Mr. President, the certainties of Ourcolleagues in the opposing Party, -40 -
eminent thoughthey are, do not necessarilyhave to be accepted by anybody, andabove al1not by
the Court.
14. ThisintentionallymuddledapproachcastsfürtherlightonNigeria'strueobjective,which
is to prevent the Court from intervening in this case in any way whatever. In fact, from the
standpointofthe normaldevelopmentof legalproceedings,a respondentis not entitledto make any
evaluation whatever,in Iiminelitis, of thefacts supportingthe act institutingproceedings,in order,
on the basis of such an evaluation, to conclude that such an act is inadmissible. Because if the
courtseisedconcurredwiththeRespondent,the Courtitselfwouldnolonger haveanyraison d'être.
II. Cameroon'sApplication meets the requirementsof Article 38 of the Rules of Court
15. Secondly, Mr. President, Carneroonis accused of not sayingenough about the facts it
alleges,of presenting "incomplete allegations"(CR 9812,p. 31)or ofbeing too "economicalwith
the facts" (CR 9815,p. 48) which would make them inadmissible at this stage, in view of the
requirements of Article 38 of the Rules of Court. What is the relevance, in law, of such an
049
argument?
16.First of all, 1 would point out that the case concerning the Prince von Pless
Administration (Preliminary Objection) (Order of 4 February 1933,P.C.I.J., SeriesAIB,No. 52,
p. 1l), althoughalreadyquotedby Ouropponents (CR 9815,p. 48),doesnot bearthisargument out.
* '
In that case,the Applicationbythe GermanGovernmentwas criticizedby Polandfor inadequately
determining the subject of the dispute (ibid., pp. 13-14). The Court will note that a list of the
disputedfacts in the Application introducingproceedingswas, at onepoint, "not exhaustive",and
therefore incomplete; and it indicated that, at another point"no specific act is indicated as
constitutinga violation" (ibid., p. 14). However, the Permanent Court did not agree to find the
Application inadmissible inIimine litis.It considered that the problem raised by Poland was
"inextricablybound up withthefacts adduced by theApplicant" andcould not be decided "onthe -41 -
basis ofajùll knowledgeof thesefacts, suchas can only beobtained9om theproceedings onthe
merits"(ibid).
17.1would then observe (as did Professor Kamto last week, cf. CR 9814,p. 35) that this
Court too has not been receptive in the past to criticisms relating to the lack of precision of
applications. In the case conceming the Northern Cameroons(I.C.J.Reports 1963, p. 15) for
instance, it considered that "the Applicant has sufficiently complied with the provisions of
Article 32 (2) of the Rules" - this is the present Article 38 - (ibid., p. 28), whereas the
Respondent, like Nigeria last Monday,criticizedthe total lack of precisionof the allegationsinthe
CameroonianApplication (I.C.J.Pleadings,NorthernCameroons,p. 66, quoted by G. Guyomar,
Commentairedu Règlementde la Cour internationalede Justice, Paris,A. Pedone, 1983,p. 242).
III. Thenon-complianceof anapplicationwith the requirementsofArticle38 cannot,inany
event, entail its inadmissibility
18.Thirdly,Mr. President,Membersofthe Court,Article 38 ofthe.Rules aims to ensurethe
normal, satisfactoryfunctioning of the proceedings, and not to interrupt them in an untimely
fashion. By requiring that such an application specify "as far as possible" various information,
050
includinga "succinct statementof the facts and groundson which the claim is based", thisArticle
merely seeks to guarantee the conditions for the good administration of justice. Its not lay
down conditions for the admissibility of applications.
19. The travauxpréparatoiresof this provision areperfectly clear on this point.
20. Thismatter was explicitly dealt with, and Geneviève Guyomar explains that, "since
Article 40 of the Statute requires that the subject of the dispute and the parties concemed should
be indicated,its indicationscouldbe regardedas mandatory. Theotherswere only requiredofthe
parties to the Courtbecause they were extremelyusejùlfor it, but this request was merely a
recommendation" flranslation by the Registry] (Commentaire du Règlement de la Cour
internationaledejustice, Paris, A. Pedone, 1983,p. 235; emphasis added). - 42 -
21. It will be noted that it was to denote that this was purely an exhortation that it was
decidedto add the formula "as far as possible" inArticle 38, beforethe list of informationideally
to be included in the Application was indicated(ibid., p. 236).
22. In this context, the possible consequencesof a failureto comply with Article 38 of the
Rules of Court should rather be sought in the terms of Article 62:
"The Court mayat anytime cal1uponthe parties to produce such evidence or
to give suchexplanationsastheCourtmayconsiderto benecessaryforthe elucidation
of any aspect of the matters in issue, or may itself seek other information for this
purpose." (Emphasis added.)
23. Moreover, this provision is echoed inArticle 49 of the Statute,which permitsthe Court
"evenbeforethe hearingbegins, [to] cal1upontheagents to produceanydocumentorto supplyany 1
explanations . .."
24. The relevant texts therefore clearly indicatethe solutionfor any problem relating to the
production of evidence. This type of problem mustbe settled in a constructive and CO-operative
manner, not through the artificial creation of problems of admissibility.
25. The practiceof the Court providesampleconfirmationof this. Never has an application
UJ 1
beendeclared inadmissibleon the basisof Article 38of the Rulesof Court. As 1pointedout a few
momentsago, the objectionwas, onthe contrary,expressly set aside by this Court in 1963,andby
its predecessor in 1933.
w
26. Inmost cases,the formal problems oftheadministrationofthefactshaveultimatelybeen
settledby CO-operation.And it is remarkableto note that this also applies in relationto Article 40
of the Statute which, however, wasoriginally perceived as covering requirementswhich, if not
compliedwith, could entail inadmissibility.
27. The case concerning Rights of Nationalsof the United Statesof America in Morocco
(7.C.J.Reports 1952,p. 176)is particularlyinstructivein this respect. The United Statesraisedan
objectionto admissibilitybased on acombinationofArticle 40ofthe StatuteandArticle 32(which
wasto become Article 38)of the Rulesof Court,onthe groundthat itwas impossibleto determine
whether, as Applicant, France was acting on its own behalf, on behalf of Morocco, or in both - 43 -
capacities at once. However,the Court was at pains not to declare the Application inadmissible,
but merely putthis questionto the Applicant. Once this pointhad been clarified,the objectionwas
simply withdrawn by the Respondent (Guyomar, op. cit.pp. 233-234).
28. Mr. President,the indicationsprovidedby Cameroonin itsApplicationfullycomplywith
the provisions ofthe Statuteand Rulesof Court,inasmuchas they facilitatethe continuationofthe
proceedings. A discussion on the various points, of fact or of law, whichform the subject of the
dispute is not only possible, but has actuallyalready started. Youwill have had occasionto note
this on hearingthe exchangesofview betweenthe opposingPartiesin this case. Youwill certainly
have noticed that, where the sixth Preliminary Objection is concemed, as well as the fifth, a
substantial part of the discussions tumed on themateriality of the facts, the content of which is
found in Cameroon'sApplication.
29. If the Court,utilizingthe powersconferreduponit by its Statuteand Rules,requires any
additional information,Cameroon will willingly oblige.
30. IfNigeriaconsiders - wronglyinCameroon'sview- thatthefactualelementsreferred
to by the Applicant are inadequateto incur its responsibility (CR9815,p. 48), it is perfectly free
to demonstrate this in its Counter-Memorial.
3 1. The Court will decide. But this has absolutely nothing whatever to do withthe forma1
problems which may arise when proceedings are instituted, which problems are govemed by
Article 38. This questionpertainsto the meritsof the case,and will haveto be settledon the basis
of the rules and principles applicable with respect to evidence.
32. For al1thesereasons,Mr. President,Membersofthe Court, Cameroonrequeststhe Court
to setaside Nigeria'ssixth Preliminary Objection.
33. May 1now,Mr. President,askyou togive the flooronceagainto Professor Alain Pellet,
who will be givingyou Cameroon'sfinalviewson the seventh andeighth PreliminaryObjections.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci beaucoup. Monsieur le professeur Pellet. -44 -
Mr. PELLET: Mr. President,Membersofthe Court, 1standbeforeyou againin orderto Say
a few words on the seventh and eighth Preliminary Objectionsraised by Nigeria.
Mr. President,not being anadept of art for art'ssaker fact for fact'ssake-1shall not
do as Mr. Crawford did (CR 9815,pp. 51-56) and separatethe factual context from discussion of
the law; with your permission, Mr. President,1shall go straight to the seventh objection and
discuss the facts wherever they appear to me to be relevant.
Seventh Preliminary Objection
This objection is twofold.
First, it consists in saying "no determination of a maritime boundary is possible prior to1
determinationof title in respect of the BakassiPeninsula"(Agent,CR 9815,p. 66). 1do not really
seewhat 1could Saythat is new, exceptthat Carneroon thinksthat if this submissionis taken for
what it is, namely a logical proposition, Cameroon agreesentirely.uite simply, it is a pure
0 53 considerationofcommonsense,notapreliminaryobjection. AndMr. Crawfordhimself,moreover,
furnishedproofof this by stating that the Partiesmight haveagreed to submit,by way of a Special
Agreement,the samerequestsas Cameroon. Mr. President,1havesome difficultyinunderstanding
whythe Courtwould not havejurisdiction to adjudicate in whichever order it sawfit on the
requests submitted by Cameroon, when it would have had jurisdiction had the Parties agreed
*
("unless the Parties have expressly so agreed") (CR 9815,p. 56).
Second,the NigerianParty requeststhe Courtto declarethe Application inadmissible"inthe
absence of sufficient action by the Parties, on a footing of equality, to effect a delimitation 'by
agreement on the basis of international law"'(CR 9815, 66).
If it pleaseyou, Mr.President,1shall focuson whatappearsto me to concernthe very heart
of the question whichdivides the Parties on this point, theobligation to negotiate.
1 shall start with the finding made by the Court in 1969,a finding which appearsto me still
valid: the obligation which States have to negotiate in matters of maritime delimitation "merely
constitutes a special application of a principle which underlies al1 international re.. ."ns - 45 -
(I.C.J.Reports1969,p. 47) and it is perfectlylegitimateto refer to this extremelygeneral principle
of international law inorder to define its scopeunder Articles 74 and 83 of the 1982 Convention.
Havingmadethis preliminarypoint,the question then ariseshow farthis obligationextends,
andhow it dovetailswiththe rightof Stateswhich arepartyto the optionalclause systemto request
the Court to settle disputesbetweenthem "onthe basis of internationallaw" - which is also what
Nigeria requests. 1 shallnot repeat atlengthwhat mycolleagueMr. BipounWoum saidbeforeyou
with such talent, Members ofthe Court, and what Mr. Crawford did not truly contradict. 1shall
merely summarize it in four propositions:
1. Theobligationto negotiate underArticles 74 and 83is a substantiverule - 1 believethat
1 can agreewithMr.Crawfordonthis point(CR 9815,p. 57); 1do sometimesagree withhim! - a
substantive rule then, not a rule of admissibilityor ofjurisdiction before the Court; and this has
two consequences:
- onthe onehand, the questionasto whetherthis rule has been observedinthe presentcase
is a question of substance whichcan only be consideredalong with the merits of the dispute; in
the next phase; and,
- on the other, the jurisdiction of the Court is governed by the rules of jurisdiction laid
down in its Statuteand it is in the light ofthese rules that the Preliminary Objectionsraised before
the Court must be evaluated.
2. In accordancewith these rules (in the Statute of the Court), implemented by the settled
jurisdiction of the Court, the exhaustionof prior negotiations is not a condition of admissibilityof
applications (cf. Judgments of 19 December 1978 (AegeanSea ContinentalShelJ;I.C.J.Reports
1978, p. 12) and of 26 November 1984 (Militaïy and Pararnilitaïy Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. UnitedStatesofArnerica),Jurisdictionof the CourtandAdmissibilityof
theApplication, I.C.J.Reports 1984, p. 440)).
3. Asthe PermanentCourt held,andasquotedinthe Judgrnentof 1969(1C ..J. Reports 1969,
p. 47), judicial settlement "is simply an alternative to the direct and friendly settlement [.. .] -46 -
betweenthe parties" (Orderof 19 August 1929,FreeZonesof UpperSavoyandthe DistrictofGex,
SeriesA, No. 22, p. 13); "an alternativeto friendly settlement",i.e. an indirect means of settling
the problem betweenthe States concemed, basedon their consent.
4. In any event, Articles 74 and 83 do not impose what the late Paul Reuter called an
"obligationto negotiate comprising ablockingmechanism", Le., an obligation which lapses only
on conclusion of the agreement, and Paul Reuter ernphasizedthe "exceptional nature" of such
obligationsto negotiate comprising a blockingmechanism(De l'obligationde négocier, Mélanges
Morelli, Comunicazionie Studi, Vol. 14,1975, p.730 and729); it is a relative obligation which
only appliesto States if "negotiationsare meaningful"(I.C.J.Reports 1969,p. 47,or Judgments of d
055
27 February 1998, cases conceming Questions of Interpretationand Application of the 1971
Montreal Conventionarisingfrom the Aerial Incidentat Lockerbie(LibyanArab Jamahiriyav.
United StatesofAmerica)para. 20and(LibyanArabJamahiriyav. UnitedKingdom),paras. 20and
21).
Was this so in this case, Mr. President?
Certainly not - and this brings us back to the facts. And first of al1one fact which
Mr. Crawford majestically disregards, but which is nonetheless an essential fact: on
21 December 1993Nigeria invadedthe Bakassi Peninsula. Sincethat date any negotiationon the
maritime delimitation has become impossible- not so much, in any event not only, because no W
onenegotiatesunderduress,but alsobecausefromthatmomentonwardsNigeria showedthat itwas
challengingthe entirelandand maritimefi.ontier: it took 30years notto achieve a full agreement
on delimitation; if you allow me to express it in somewhat trivial terms, Mr. President, we
"receivedat leastthe sarnesentenceagain",backto squareone,withnochance ofachievingaresult
inthe foreseeableuturesince,asNigeriaaptlyremarksin its(false)PreliminaryObjection No. 7.1,
I
its "non-PreliminaryObjection" ifyouprefer,no determinationof a maritime boundary ispossible
prior to the determination of its starting point on the coast. - 47 -
1do not believethat a longspeechis necessaryinorderto showthat negotiationsof anysort
had become pointlessand were no longer meaningful.
1believe thatthis sufficesamply to excludethe legalnecessity for negotiation and eventhe
possibility of negotiation. Italsonders moreor lessmootthe questionasto whether negotiations
had taken place, although they could not havegone beyond Point G, the last point of agreement
betweenthe Parties; however,as Mr. Bipoun Woumshowed,this last pointof agreement between
the Parties was in no way the last point on which their discussio hansfocused. Since Nigeria
merely asserted the contrary withouttaking the trouble to discuss my colleague'sargument,allow
me, Membersof theCourt, respectfullyto referthe Courtto it: this argumentis found on pages42
to 52 of the verbatim record of the hearings of last Friday (CR 9814). However, 1 repeat,the
essentialfact isandremainsthat, fromDecember 1993onwards,quitesimplyno negotiationof any
sort could be envisaged.
And there is more: having challenged the Maroua Declaration of 1975for 20 years, since
the Jos meeting of November 1978 (MC, Book VI, Ann. 253, p. 21 16), in raising its seventh
Preliminary Objection Nigeriaimplicitlybut necessarilyacknowledgesits legal relevance, at least
for thepurposes of the present objections. In any event here is a furtherzone on which there is a
dispute: it is the zone fromtheCoastto Point G; on this at least the Parties agree. This dispute,
here again,arisesfromNigeria'schallengeto a fullyvalidlegal agreement,theMarouaDeclaration,
an agreement which, 1 reiterate, wasconcluded in the framework of a comprehensivenegotiation
covering the entire maritime frontier.
One lastwordon the subject,ifyou please, Mr. President,conceming"FactNo. 2" affirmed
by Mr. Crawford atthe beginningofhis statementlastMondayconcemingthe effect of ratification
by Cameroon of the Montego Bay Convention (CR 9815,pp. 52-55).
Although1am not Cameroonian,Mr. President,except in my heart,1feel quite comfortable
talking about thissince Article 45 of the Constitutionof Carneroon purely andsimply reproduces
Article 55 of the French Constitutionof 1958. It is monistic in inspiration,meaning - as both -48 -
Mr. Bipoun Woum(CR 9814,p. 47) andMr. KeithHighet (ibid, p. 55) explainedso well- that
treaties are integrated into thestic order by the mere fact of their ratification, no additional
formality (in particular the adoption of a law) being required, and that they then have in that
domestic order "a higher authority than laws" by the mere fact of their ratification. As for
reciprocity, it is secured from the moment that the other contracting parties accept the same
obligations,astheFrenchConseilConstitutionnelhasrepeatedlystated(cf. ConseilConstitutionnel,
Decision of 9 April 1992,Traité surl'Unioneuropéenne, Recueil p,. 55, rather than its Decision
of 15January 1975,AbortionLaw,Recueil,p. 19,quoted by Mr.Crawford,CR 9815,note 6,p. 54).
Thisbeing so, 1mustSaythat, apartfrom the whiff of exoticismwhichthis visiblyholds for
d
him,1havediff~cultyinunderstandingMr. Crawford'srelentlessassaultagainstpooroldArticle 45
of the CarneroonianConstitution,an article which appears extremelylassicto me as it would to
a Belgianor Dutchjurist. Above al11have difficultyin understanding whyOurleamedopponent
labours soard - and 1am sorry to Saynot very convincingly- to determinethe scope of the
ratificationof the MontegoBay ConventionintheCamerooniandomesticorder. Membersof the
057
Court, whatmatters beforethe Court isnotwhat happensin Cameroonnormoreoverwhathappens
inNigeria, what matters is the effect of the ratificationinternationalorder. There,there are
no longer Cameroonians, Nigerians, Australians or Frenchmen, there are quite simply
internationalists. Their"constitution"istreaty law,andst andforemostthe "ruleofrules","every
w
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith"
(Article 26 of the Vienna Convention of 1969).acta suntservanda. Because it has ratified the
ConventionCameroon is obliged, in relations withNigeria, to observe the Conventionon the Law
of the Sea; for its part, it may also demand that the Convention be observed.
In practical terms thisans that it may claim a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles at the
most; it cannot impose more. Even more specifically,this has nopractical importancewhatsoever
since the maritime frontier is delimited as far as Point G which, any event, is sited about
17nautical miles away from the coast, i.e., beyond this maximum limit. - 49 -
As for the exclusive economic zone (J. Crawford, CR 9815, pp. 54-55), 1 must Say,
Mr. President, that1 cannot take a passionate interest in this "nice legal problem"either, and that
matters appearto me much more simple than has so far been said: Carneroonrequests the Court
to determine"theboundary ofthemaritimezonesappertainingrespectively[toit]andtothe Federal
Republic of Nigeria"(cf. MC, p. 670). It is quite clear thatthis falls withinthejurisdiction of the
Court. Once the Court has determinedthat boundary, Cameroonwill be ableto, as well as it can
todayand inthe fulllightof the facts, decideformallyto implement - ornotto implement- the
legalrégimeprovidedfor under Part V of the Convention. Thisdoes not haveany bearing on the
task before the Court and in any event the manner of canying out this task relatesto the merits of
the case.
For these reasons, Mr.President, Members of the Court, Carneroon requests youto reject
Nigeria's seventhPreliminary Objection.
EighthPreliminaryObjection
O-8-
1comenow,Mr. President,to the eighthand last objection. Curiously,the way in whichthe
Agent of Nigeria worded this on Monday differs fiom the wording found in the Preliminary
Objections. It is bothmore complex and less clear. Combiningboth wordings, 1understand it to
meanthat, accordingto Nigeria, "[tlhe question of maritime delimitationnecessarilyinvolves the
rights and interests of third States and is inadmissible"- that is the wording found in the
objections (p.140),and that Nigeria invitesthe Court in its finalsubmissions(CR 9815,p. 66) to
see it as both an objection to jurisdiction and an objection to admissibility.
Truth to tell,1 have no intention, Mr. President, of holding forth on the subject of this
distinction: Cameroon,for its part,sees it as neither an issue of inadmissibilitynor an objection
tojurisdiction butquitesimplyasa questionrelatingto themerits- a questionwhich in anyevent
certainly does not have "anexclusively preliminary character"within the meaning of Article 79,
paragraph 7, of theRules of Court. - 50 -
However, before coming both to the point and to the merits (sometimes the language of
Shakespeareallowsus more nuances than doesthat of Corneille)allowme, Mr. President,to point
out - amicably but with some surprisenevertheless - that Ouropponents appearto have had a
few problems with their reading over the weekend: after Sir Arthur Watts who read the word
"north" at the point where the document whichhe himself produced says "south-west", herewe
have Mr. Crawfordwho considersthat "the most remarkableaspect of [my excellentfriend Keith
Highet'spresentation]was his failureto usetwowords,theword 'Equatorial'andtheword 'Guinea"'
(CR 9815,pp. 60-61),words which Mr.Highet neverthelessused at least twice (in paragraphs 11
and 16ofhis statement- CR 9815,pp. 57and 58),whilstattributingtoMr. Highetthe expression
1
"Guinea-Bissau"which he never in fact used!
Naturally this is not a seriousmatter, Mr. President,but nonetheless it creates a climate, an
atmosphere in whichNigeria takes onthe handsome roleofthe defenderof third States and leaves
Carneroonto play the partof sacred egoism, indifferentto the interests of its neig...urs
In this connection, Members ofthe Court, 1shall pleasemy opponent JamesCrawford who
O 5 complained last Mondaythat we madeno commenton hismaps (CR 9815,p. 59). Behind me you
can see the map foundunder Tab 49 in the Nigerian folder(and which is also foundunder letter J
in Ourfolder).
Apart fromthe five riparianStatesofthe Gulfof Guinea,there aretwo elementsonthis map: W
- On the onehand, Nigeria has shownon the map, albeitbending it somewhat,the line drawn
on the diagram shown on page 556 of the CarneroonMemorial and described under(c)of
Oursubmissionson themeritsas indicating"thedirectionwhich .. .]meetsthe requirement
for an equitable solution" (MC, p. 670), it being clearly understoodthat it is for the Court,
as explicitly stated both in Cameroon's Applicationand in its Memorial,to determine "the
outer Iimit of the maritime zones which international law places under the respective
jurisdictions of the two Parties" (cf. Application, pa0a.and MC, p. 670); -51 -
- On the other hand, Nigeria has placed on this map a point, called "tripoint",more or lessto
the south of Point G.
Mr. President, 1admit that this map is very interesting.
First because it shows the point which Professor Crawford did not hesitate to cal1"the
tripoint" ateast sixtimes in a row (CR 9815,p. 55,four times; pp. 60 and 61). Howdid it come
to be placed there? Our opponentdid not tell us. Very probably,Nigeria based it on the criterion
of equidistance.
However, andthis is my secondpoint, equidistance is notthe focal principle,truly not even
the focal principle ofthe delimitation of maritime zones beyondterritorialseas, the cardinal rule
ofwhich, as enshrinedinthejurisprudence of the Court and as recalled in Article 74 and 83 ofthe
Montego Bay Convention, is that the solution adopted must be equitable. However, 1mentionit
in passing, everybody knowsthat there is nothing less equitable than equidistance for countries
which are at a geographicaldisadvantage.
Despite this, andthis is my third comment,what James Crawfordcalls "the geographicalor
cartographicaltripoint"(CR 9815,p. 55) is sitedwell beyond Point G; not 1 m beyond, not 100m
beyond,as he generously conceded, noteven a "veryshort distance fromPoint G"(CR 9815,p. 60)
butabout 25 km away; far enoughaway so that, evenunderthe hypothesisinwhichNigeria seeks
+ Ci40 totrap you,Membersofthe Court, inpreparationforproceedingsonthe merits,a hypothesiswhich
Carneroon for its part cannot accept in any shape or form - even within the straitjacket of this
hypothesis 1cannotsee anythingwhich mightjus@ a decision by the Court of inadmissibilityor
lack of jurisdiction. It is in the merits phase that it will be the task of the Court to safeguardthe
rights of third parties,as is customary. Yet why should the Court, in so doing, neglect the rights
of a State which has -placedits trust in the Court; of two States which have placedtheir trust in
the Court by acceptingthe system of the Optional Clause? -52 -
Fourthpoint, Mr. President, let us lookagain at the mapifyouwill. Just longenoughto ask
one question: of thetwo elements shownon the map, whichmore clearly safeguardsthe rights of
third parties? "The" tripoint imagined by Nigeria? Or the line indicatingan equitable direction,
r
the line proposed by Cameroon, the line whose course is explained on pages 548 to 558 of its
Mernorial?
1ask the question; the reply is quite clear. However 1shall refrain from going any further
for, once again 1confess, 1have argued on the merits, 1 have argued only on the merits. Once
again, however, 1request your absolution,Members of the Court: since al1that 1have done is to
follow in the footsteps of Mr. Crawford.
1
Once again this shows that the eighth objection has nothing preliminary aboutit; in any
event, that it is certainlynot exclusivelypreliminary and that it would be totally unfairto reject it
in limine litis, without paying close heed to what both Parties have to Sayon that subjectand, 1
almost said, without givingthird Stateswho wishto do sothe possibilityof interveningifneed be.
For these reasons, Carneroonrequestsyou,Mr. President, Membersofthe Court,to rejectthe
eighth Preliminary Objection or, alternatively, tofind that it does not possess an exclusively
preliminary character.
1thank you cordially for your patient attention and request you, Mr. President,to give the
floor to Mr. Douala Moutomé,Co-Agent of Carneroon.
Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie beaucoup. Je donnela parole à M. Moutomé.
Mr. MOUTOMÉ:
1. Thank you, Mr. President, Members ofthe Court. As Carnerooncompletesthis second
roundof oral argumentsonthePreliminaryObjections raisedbyNigeria, 1would like tostandback
and set this phase of proceedingsin a fresh context,before Mr. Laurent Esso,Agent of Cameroon,
takes the floor once again to present Ourfinal submissions to the Court. - 53 -
2. Cameroon naturally places its trust in international justice and consequently in the
International Court of Justice. Yet it is a long, long haul, Mr. President.
3. When we filed Ourapplication four years ago, we did notthink that we would still be
debating the Preliminary Objections today. It is as if attempts were being madeto exhaust us,
putting such delays to good use in order to establish afait accompli.
4. Faced with this policy offait accompli, we found ourselves obligedto request the Court
to indicate provisional measures to put an end to the situationthus created. The Court ordered
those measures two years ago. There has been no sign of executionon the ground on the part of
Nigeria.
5. The proceedingson PreliminaryObjections,which bringusbeforetheCourttoday, appear
to us superfiuous. Just when we expected to discover, in a memorial on the merits, Nigeria's
counter-arguments,we found ourselves confrontedwith eight Preliminary Objections. No less!
6. No doubtNigeria is strictly speakingwithinits rightsto raise objections. Neverthelesswe
believethat there is a degree ofmisuse of this right. 1do not intendat this point formally to raise
the misuse of rights. However, sinceCorneillewasquoted onMonday, perhapsyou will allow me
to referthe Courtto Racine and his play TheLitigants: "HerSnootinessthe Countessof Orbêche,
etc.".
Mr. President, this is what we in Ourcountry would cal1pettifoggery. And yes, Nigeria
would do well to understand Ourfeelings faced with the blocked situation which it hascreated.
7. On closer examination, however, 1 see only one objection which is tmly preliminary:
namelythe first. 1shall corne back to it. Al1the others concernthe merits or serve as an excuse
for arguing the merits of the case.
8. Nonetheless, 1take my hat off at this point to the imagination shownby Ouropponents.
Theyhave beefed up their objectionswith surprisinginnovations, astounding inventions.Thuswe
learntthatOurtraditional,quite modestjoint commissionshadbecomeexclusive,rigid frameworks - 54 -
for settling disputes. Were the Court to follow Nigeria's reasoningon this point, this traditional
instrument promotinggood neighbourlinesswould be thrown into disarray, Mr. President.
9. Moreover, the obligation to negotiate in respect of the maritime delimitationscame as a
surpriseto us, as it no doubt did to the Court.
10. As for the so-called systemof public order imposed in the framework of the LCBC, it
marksa veritable revolution in internationallaw: the coming into beingof a regionalpublic order
withcomplicated legalramifications,ramificationswhichthe fiamersof the Conventionand ofthe
Statutecertainly did not suspect.
11. What1 see above al1in the Nigerian Preliminary Objectionsis the opportunity creat1d
by Ouropponents to submitarguments on the merits. They have produceda quantityof beautiful
maps, spectacular diagrams and superb photos. For the purpose of submitting arguments on the
merits, quite obviously. They havedone cartography, topography, photography. That was not
preliminaryreasoning alone. It was donein order to have aneffecton the merits, withthe help of
modem printing technology.
12. Our opponents reliedat lengthonthe presenceof third Statesconcemed bythe decision
ofthe Court, whether members ofthe LCBC,particularlyNiger andChad, whichare concernedby
thetripoints sitedin thee,or EquatorialGuinea and SaoToméandPrincipe,which are affected
by the maritime delimitation.
13. In the pastthe Court has often evoked the problem of third States in territorial
delimitations. However it i1,almost said it is by definition, an issue relating to the merits.
Withoutdiscussing the merits, the Court cannot define precisely the scope of the rights of third
0 6 3
parties,or the extent to which they will be affected.
The Court has always considered and settleduch questions, questions whose difficulty
Carneroondoes not underrate, at the time of its decision on the merits. - 55 -
14.Yet anotherquestionrelatingtothe merits: the existenceof aterritorialdisputealongthe
entire landborder. Nigeria has attemptedto minimizethe seriousnessof the incidentswhich have
occurred along this frontier. Cameroon, for its part, holds that by their number, frequencyand
consequences, such incidentsrevealthe scaleand depth oftheterritorial dispute. How is itpossible
to veri@this without arguing the case on the merits, Mr. President?
15. Lastly, Nigeria demands, againstal1the niles, evidenceas to the facts likelyto establish
its responsibility,when these facts have been set forth in conformity with the requirementsof the
Rules of Court. It takes sometemerity to claim that there is no issue of responsibility in Bakassi!
The Court itself noted the seriousnessof the incidents,which have involvedfatalities in that zone
since December 1993. The same can be said of the problems at Darak, whereOuropponents do
not deny that there is a dispute between the two countries. Nigeria has attempted to ridiculeOur
assertions, whereas it is a matter of the security of the local population and of peace in the
sub-region.
16.This set of preliminary objectionsappears to us to have an artificial, unjustified aspect.
We wish to submit Ourarguments on the merits, Mr. President, as much as is necessary. Was it
also necessary to mobilize your distinguished Court for such fragile arguments?
17.As for thefirst PreliminaryObjection,it isundeniablypreliminary. That istrue. It seeks
to overtumjurispnidence which has been established on a sound footing for 40 years. Cameroon
is confidentthat the Court will notupholdthe objection. Wasit howevernecessary,forthat single,
weak argument which it supports,to mobilize your distinguishedCourt andparalyse the progress
of properly instituted proceedings?
18.Mr.President, Members of the Court, Cameroonis eager, as 1 am eager, to reach the
meritsphase, in orderto settlethe disputebetween itselfandNigeria peacefully andat the earliest.
It fearsthe long delays imposedby its opponent. The passage of time does not favour the serene - 56 -
administrationofjustice. Additional delaysconsolidatesituationswhich we holdto be manifestly
O64
unlawful and which the Court will judge to be so.
19. Thereforewe request the Courtto reject these objectionsandto proceedto the meritsof
the case without delay: in the interest of the groups of populationconcerned; in the interestof
regional peace and security; in the interestofjustice, justice which isin danger of being flouted
by the unjustified delays imposed.
20. Thank you for your attention, Mr. President, Members of the Court. The Agent of
Cameroon is at your disposa1to take the floor whenever you see fit.
Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie,MeMoutomé.L'agentdu Cameroun,M. Esso, ministre d
de la justice, peut conclure.
Mr. ESSO: Thank you, Mr. President,for giving me the floor again.
Mr. President, Members of the Court,
1. At the close of these ten days of hearings, allow me, before 1 read Cameroon'sfinal
submissions,to present to you, in my own name and on behalf ofthe delegation it is my honour
to lead, Ourheartfelt thanks for the patience and goodwillyou have displayed throughout these
debates.
2.Havingsaidthis, 1shouldalsolike,Mr. President,to extendcordialgreetingstothosewho, I
though Ouropponentsof today, are for ever Ourbrothers, friends and neighbours. 1should liketo
tell them, andthrough themrepeat to the fraternaland friendly neighbouring people,the friendand
neighbourthat isNigeria,that Carneroon aspiresonlyto peaceandthe preservationof itsterritorial
integrity. Cameroonwishesto strengthenitsrelations ofneighbourliness,friendship,fraternityand
r'
mutual respectthat it maintains both with Nigeria and with al1its other neighbours. It is the sole
purpose of the proceedings we have institutedbefore the International Court of Justice. -57 -
3. Mr. President, in thanking the Court we should also like to thank its Registry for its
unfailing efficacy and helpfulness.
4. We further pay tribute to the high degree of professionalism of the translators and
065
interpreters.
5.Please also allowme, Mr. President, publiclyto voiceOurgratitudeto eachof our eminent
counsel who have agreed to assist us in presentingOurcase and, more generally, to al1members
of the delegation of Cameroon.
Mr. President, Members of the Court,
1. The question put by the Court to both Parties on 6 March 1998will be the subject of a
written reply fiom Cameroon within the prescribedtime-limit.
2. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in accordance with the provisions of Article 60,
paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, 1shall now read out the final submissionsof the Republic of
Cameroon concerning this phase of the case:
"For the reasons developed in the written pleadings and in the oral proceedings, the
Republic of Cameroon requests the International Court of Justice:
(a) To dismiss the Preliminary Objectionsraised by the Federal Republic of Nigeria;
(3) Quite subsidiarily,to join to the merits, as appropriate, such of those objections as it
may deem to be of an exclusively preliminary nature; to join to the merits, as
appropriate, such of those objections as it may not deem to be of an exclusively
preliminary nature;
(c) To adjudge and declare: that it hasjurisdiction to decide on the Application filed by
Cameroon on 29 March 1994 as supplemented by the Additional Application of
16 June 1994; and that the Application, thus consolidated, is admissible;
(4 Having due regardto the particular natureof the case,to fix time-limitsforthe further
proceedingswhich will permit examinationof the merits of the dispute at the earliest
possible time."
Mr. President, Members of the Court, 1thank you very much for your attention.
Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie, MonsieurEsso. Nous arrivons ainsi au terme de cette
série d'audiences. Je voudrais, au nom de la Cour, remercier vivement les agents, conseils et avocatsdes Parties pour les excellents arguments qu'ilsont préet la courtoisie dont ils ont
066
constamment fait preuve.
Conformément à la pratique habituelle, je voudrais demander aux agents de resàela
dispositiondea Cour pour toutes informationssupplémentairesdont elle pourrait avoir besoin et,
sous cetteréserve,je déclaremaintenant close la procédure orale surles exceptions préliminaires
dans l'affairede laontièreterrestre et maritimeentrele Camerounet le Nigéria(Camerounc.
Nigéria).
La Cour va maintenant se retirer pour délibérer. Lesagentsseront notifiésen temps voulu
de la dateà laquelle la Cour rendra son arrêt.
La Cour n'ayantpas d'autrequestioà examiner aujourd'hui,l'audience estlevée.
L'audienceest levéà 13 heures.
Traduction