CR 97/24 (translation)
CR 97/24 (traduction)
Wednesday 22 October 1997
Mercredi 22 octobre 1997 - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. La Cour
reprend ses audiences aujourd'hui pour entendre les exposés oraux de la Jamahiriya arabe libyenne
dans la phase relative à la compétence des instancesintroduites contre les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et le
Royaume-Uni concernant lesQuestions d'interprétation et d'applica tion de la convention de Montréal
de 1971 résultant de l'incident aérien de Locker bie (Jamahiriya rabe lbyenne c. Etats-Unis
d'Amérique). Je donne maintenant la parole à la 'gent de la Jamahiriya arabe libyenne.
Mr.ELHOUDERI: Mr.President, Members of the Court, on Monday morning the United
Kingdom and the United States had the opportunity of replying to Libya's arguments concerning the
jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the Application. After these replies, it is apparent
that there are fewer points of disagreement but that on major issues disagreement subsists. Libya will
concentrate on the issues of law which it deems fundamental.
In one way, the Respondents have saved us pr ecious minutes by saying not a word about the
political background, a background which is nonetheless useful in interpreting the conduct of these
States in particularly tragic circumstances, preferring to discuss, often in academic terms, points of
law which do not raise any particular problem 1. Thus they dismissed in one sentence the theories and
2
doubts regarding their versions of the facts whichhave been raised in the international media .
There is one point on which Libya and the United Kingdom agree: "La Cour est en mesure
d'apporter sa propre contribution pour faciliter le jugement des accusés en écartant les obstacles
artificiels qui ont été dreessés sur cette voie." Libya has never asked for anything else. Moreover, it
is pleased to note this quasi-explicit recognition of the tangible effects which might arise from a
judgment of the Court in the present case.
On all other points the Respondents persist in a biased and even erroneous interpretation of
Libya's positions. Counsel who will speak after me will clarify the exact tenor of the requests
1
See for example the considerations on Article79 of the Rules of Court put forward by SirFranklinBerman,
Oral Submissions of the United Kingdom, CR 97/22, pp. 10-11.
2
David R. Andrews, Oral Submissions of the United States, CR 97/23, p. 8, paras. 1-3.
3Sir Franklin Berman, CR 97/22, p. 12. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
submitted to the Court in order to clear up misunde rstandings fostered by the United States and the
United Kingdom.
Mr. Jean Salmon will make a few general points;
Mr.EricDavid will speak on the jurisdiction of the Court with regard to the Montreal
Convention;
Mr. Eric Suy will address some aspects rela ting to the admissibility of the Application;
Mr. Ian Brownlie will deal with other aspectsrelating to admissibility, and the relevance of the
issue of the threat to use force.
Mr.President, I shall take the floor again to se t forth Libya's submissions in the present case.
May I now, Mr. President, request you togive the floor to Mr. Jean Salmon.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de PRESI DENT : Je vous remercie infiniment. Je
donne la parole à Monsieur Salmon.
SMALr.MON:
Clarification of some general points
Mr. President, Members of the Court, at this stage of the proceedings I shall confine myself to
clarifying three general points.
I. The question of the place of trial in the oral arguments of the Respondents
4 5
2.1.Both Respondents (Sir FranklinBerman and Mr. JohnCrook ) maintained that Libya
claimed that its territory was the only place where thetrial of the two accused might be held; that this
was fixed to the exclusion of any other place of trial.It is incorrect that this is the position of Libya.
2.2.Libya is well aware that general intern ational law and the MontrealConvention do not
exclude any place of trial provided that the courtsof the State concerned have jurisdiction as provided
for under their domestic law. Libya has never denied that the courts in Scotland or the United States
4
"La Libye a énoncé à la Cour la proposition selonlaquelle la convention de Montréal lui donne ledroit juridiqued'affirmer
avec insistance, de façon unilatérale, que le procèseu en Libye à l'exclusion de tout autre ressort." (Public heraing
of 20 October, CR 97/22, p. 9.)
5
"un droit prétendument exclusif de la Libye de décider «soitd'engager des poursuites, soit d'extrader»". (Public hearing of
20 October, CR 97/23, p. 11, para. 2.4.) - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
respectively were entitled to deal with the alleged offn eces, on the basis of territorial jurisdiction in the
case of the United Kingdom or on the basis of jurisdiction based on the passive personality principle
or the flag flown in the case of the United States.The Montreal Convention respects this possibility.
2.3.However, this is not the question. The question at the heart of this case is under what
conditions the accused might be prosecuted orjudged before the Respondents' courts.
Several possibilities may be envisaged,let us say hypothetical possibilities:
First possibility: the accused are tried in absentia. This practice is commonplace in the
criminal law of many States. It is not contrary tointernational law and mightby envisaged were it not
for the fact that Anglo-Saxon law systems generally give no place to proceedings in absentia; this
holds true of the Respondents.
Second possibility: the United States or theUnited Kingdom succeed in having Libya extradite
the suspects. It is here that Libya's right to judge or to extradite (aut dedere aut judicare) intervenes
and comes into play.
This possibility of choice is enshrined in the MontrealConvention which is binding upon the
Respondents. From the outset Libya hasstated that it chooses the second option j(udicare) because its
domestic law makes no provision for the extradition of its citizens.
Certainly, when resolutions 731 and 748 of theSecurity Council invited Libya to find a way of
responding to the Respondents' requests, the Libyan Government—as its Agent told the Court in
1992 6 —put the question to the People's Congress. The People's Congress expressed its views in a
7
resolution forwarded to the Secretary-Ge neral of the United Nations on 29 June 1992 , which is found
moreover in the Annexes of the Libyan Memorial a nd also in Annex 58 of the Preliminary Objections
of the United Kingdom. In its resolution the People's Congress did not endorse a modification of the
Libyan Criminal Code or the Libyan Code of Criminal Investigation; on the other hand it stated that
6Public hearing of 26 March 1992 (CR 92/2, p. 20).
7
"8. The Basic People's Congresses affirm their adherence to the Libyan Criminal Code and the Libyan Code
of Criminal Procedure. They raise no objection to the conduct of the investigation and the trial through the
seven-member Committee established by the League ofArab States or through the UnitedNations before a
just and impartial court to be agreed on.UN Doc. S/24209, 30 June 1992, Ann. 154 of the Libyan
Memorial of 20 December 1993, also reproduced in Vol. III, Ann. 58 of the Preliminary Objection of the
United Kingdom.) - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
it had no objection to the trial being held through theintermediary of the United Nations before a just
and impartial court to be agreed.
This is where the issue of a fair trial emerged as the key to the whole problem.
Sir Franklin Berman recognized this in excellent terms:
"Il est communément admis que tout procès do it être équitable et que l'on doit voir qu'il est
équitable : équitable, bien entendu, pour la'ccusé, mais équitable aussi, disons-nous, pour
les intêrets des victimes et de leurs familles, les Etats affectés et l'intêret international
8
plus général."
Libya and at least the majority of the international community deem that the British and
American courts do not meet this condition. We did not hope to convince the Respondents of this
rapidly, since these questions are so bound up w ith cultural prejudices, no more than we could
convince them that a Libyan judge would be impatrial. There is no point in pursuing this debate.
The essential point in all this is not thatLibya has an exclusive rightto try the suspects, but that
the Respondents do not have the right to force Libya to accept an extradition or a "surrender" which
would breach the MontrealConvention or ordinary international law which respects the sovereign
equality of States.
I come now to the third possibility of ensuring the presence of the accused at the trial: it's
simple, the suspects would be kidnapped and forc ibly brought before the Respondents' judges.
Although such an act is not very likely on the part of the UnitedKingdom, it is known that the
United States have made use of this practice on several occasions and that, for them, there is nothing
unlawful in this: the AlvarezMachain or Noriega cases are examples. A long history of relations
with Mexico frequently recurs in American practicemanuals. A substantial number of legal writers in
the UnitedStates and Libya disagree. The Libyan Government could never have been sure that the
United States would not one day, attemptthis type of raid on their territory.
Fourth possibility: succeed in having the SecurityCouncil decide on this extradition. Here, the
first point to be emphasized is that Libya does notchallenge, as was claimed, the right of any Member
of the United Nations to refer a matter to the Security Council, of course it does not; what it is does
challenge is that such a reference is made with the aim of finding a justification a posteriorifor the
8CR 97/22, pp. 8 and 9. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
violation of sovereign rights of a member State unde r the Montreal Convention and the violation of its
right to the peaceful settlement of a bilateral legal dispute.
2.4.Libya's second point—and I refer the Court to Mr.Suy's previous and forthcoming
statements on this issue — is that the Respondents dd i not pull off their coup. A correct interpretation
of the texts results in the conclusion that e Council did not endorse the Respondents' request.
II. The relevance of general international law
2.5.Point number two, the second point I now wish to address is the Respondents' claim that
Libya raises questions of general international law which have nothing to do with the application of
the Montreal Convention.
We may begin by remarking that they have no hesitation in making use of this law, the law
which they would deny Libya, for their own ends. In an endeavour to evade their obligations under
the Montreal Convention, the Respondents invoke tw o objections based on general international law:
1.Firstly, the freedom they claim is theirs to choosethe place of trial. I have just dealt with this.
2.Secondly, the alleged orders of the Security Council.
2.6.Mr.President, Members of the Court, it must be clear that if the Respondents rely on the
rules of international law in order to have th e MontrealConvention set aside, and if in the
Respondents' opinion the Court has jurisdiction to hearthese rules as a defence, the Applicant may in
turn rely upon the rules of international law which prevent such pleas being taken into consideration
by the Court.
2.7. It is in this spirit that Libya has shown the importance of the principle of the peaceful
settlement of disputes, both as an integral part of the procedure of Article14 of the Montreal
Convention and as an obligatory preliminary to any form of enforced execution of the "claims" of the
Respondents or of their alleged right to choose the place of trial.
2.8. The violations of international law thr ough threats and failure to observe the rules of
international responsibility similarly illustrate the intentto set aside the Montreal Convention. It is in
this spirit again that Libya has shown that the princi ple of an impartial trial is a prerequisite to any
form of "surrender" of the suspects (I find the word indeed difficult to utter). Libya does not believe - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
that a single one of the Security Council resolutionsever invited Libya to take an action which would
be contrary to this fundamental principle, in the circumstances of the present case.
2.9. It is still in this spirit, in order to showthat it complied with the decisions of the Council on
their various points, that Libya has set out th e conditions under which, on its recommendation, the
suspects' lawyers were prepared to accept the various forms of a fair trial proposed by several
international organizations with the aim of settln ig the dispute between Libya and the Respondents.
2.10. The use of these defences by Libya is not the same as "bargaining with the Security
Council" as Sir Franklin Berman termed it 9; on the contrary it shows that Libya's action complies
with the decisions of the Council and that the obj ection to admissibility raised by the Respondents,
based on an alleged conflict with the decisionsof the Security Council, is unfounded and
cannot therefore be taken intoconsideration by the Court.
III. The question of the distinction between prleiminary objection and the merits of the case
2.11. In a third observation, Libya expresses its unease at the way in which the Respondents
refer to the merits of the case in presentingtheir arguments on the Preliminary Objections.
In presenting the objection to the Court's jurisdiction, the Respondents, relying on the precedent
of the Oil Platformscase, insist that the Court must considerthe facts of the case in order to establish
whether a dispute truly exists. Libya holds this method to be legitimate, since it should enable the
Court to determine whether there is indeed a true conflict of opinion prima facie; were the Court to
find that there is such a conflict and that it does th erefore have jurisdiction, the determination of the
correct interpretation among those proposed wouldbe postponed until the proceedings on the merits.
However, the extension of this practice to theissues of inadmissibility which concern almost all
the rest of the case is more problematic.
2.12. In the course of the written and oral proceedings, Libya has had occasion to formulate a
series of hypotheses on the relations between the Montreal Convention and the resolutions of the
Security Council. Mr. Suy will address this issue once again in a little while. In Libya's opinion, in
most of these hypotheses, there is no possible conf lict between the two sides of the equation. This
9Public hearing 20 October 1997 (CR 97/22, p. 9) - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
should be sufficient to quash the objections to ad missibility raised by the Respondents, based on an
alleged conflict and on the primacy of the resoluti ons of the Security Council, an objection which
clearly cannot apply if there is no conflict. In one instance, Libya does envisage the possibility of
there being a contradiction on a limited point, but that should result in an inopposabilitévis-à-vis
Libya, in order to comply with the Charter of the United Nations itself.
All these issues, Mr. President, Members of th e Court, are undoubtedly questions of substance.
2.13. It is possible to understand the concern of this Court, reflected in Article 79 of the Rules
of Court, that the Court's role should be eliminated as soon as possible in cases which manifestly lie
outside its jurisdiction or which have a particular characteristic which definitely rules out their
admissibility. If this is not the case, if the questionsof substance are complex, it would be difficult to
understand the Court declaring them to be inadmissibe l or disposing of the merits — as Mr. Matheson
10
requests it to do — before hearings on the merits are held under normal conditions.
What has happened in the present case? The Respondents were made aware of Libya's views
on the merits of the case in its Memorial filed on 20 December 1993. This was almost four years ago.
They have had time to study it. Libya is still awaiting their Counter-Memorial in order to have a
detailed response to all its arguments. The proceed ings might normally be pursued by means of a
reply and a rejoinder. If the Respondents can request the Court to decide on the merits of the case
after such summary proceedings, what is left of the equality of the Parties? Is not such an approach
incompatible with the concept of the proper admini stration of justice? We are convinced that the
Court will pay close heed to these serious issueswhich far exceed the context of the present case.
I thank the Court for its kind attention.
Mr. President, may I request you to give the fo lor to Mr. David to continue Libya's statements.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de PRES IDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur Salmon.
Monsieur David, s'il vous plaît.
1CR 97/23, p. 29, para. 4.12. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
Mr. DAVID:
The Jurisdiction of the Court
3.1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it falls to me to re-examine the Court's jurisdiction
to hear the present dispute in accrdance with Article 14, paragraph1, of the Montreal Convention.
In view of time constraints, Libya will confin e its reply to the principal arguments of its
opponents; the fact that it remains silent on some oftheir replies, which in certain cases, incidentally,
distort or misinterpret Libya's arguments, does not of course imply that Libya acknowledges the
relevance or the validity of those replies, apart from the cases in which it has been able to find a
certain convergence of points of view.
In reality, from all aspects of the Court's juriction, Libya maintains its contentions in full and
respectfully requests the Court to take into consid eration its Memorial on the merits as well as its
written observations on the Respondens t' objections and the oral proceedings of the past week.
3.2. In the present statement, I shall follow a pl an similar to that of my statement in the first
round. I shall therefore confirm, and enlarge upon as necessary, the following four points:
primo:there exists between the Respondents and Libya a dispute which falls within the Montreal
Convention (I);
secundo:the Respondents cannot act in such a way as to prevent Libya from exercising its rights under
the Montreal Convention (II);
tertio:the seisin of the Security Council by the Responde nts does not dispose of the dispute relating to
the Montreal Convention (III);
quarto:the Court can entertain not only the claims of Libya relating to the Montreal Convention but
also those which are directly connected with it (IV).
If you will allow, let us take up these different points in succession. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
I.There exists between the Respondents and Lib ya a dispute which falls within the Montreal
Convention
3.3. Mr.President, Members of the Court, in challenging this assertion, the Respondents refer
to certain provisions of the Montreal Convention. We shall therefore follow them along the same
path.
The United States, through Mr. Crook, expressed surprise at hearing Libya invoke Article 1 of
11
the Montreal Convention "for the first time", according to the UnitedStates , a surprise which the
United Kingdom does not appear to share, and for good reason, since Libya had already referred to
12 13
that provision in its Memorial both implicitly and explicitly .
3.4. Professor Greenwood moreover, for the United Kingdom, does not deny that "the charges,
if proved, would disclose anoffence falling within Article 1" 1. That formulation remains ambiguous,
since if we understand Professor Greenwood rightly, it tn eds to suggest that it isnot yet proved that an
attack was committed against PanAm flight 103! Be that as it may, the UnitedKingdom
acknowledges also that the Montreal Convention hasestablished a mechanism applicable to this kind
of terrorist act 15; and the United States even invokes certa in provisions of the Convention to its
advantage, in repeating either on the basis of Artic le5, paragraph3, that the Montreal Convention
16
authorizes the United States to pros ecute suspects according to its own laws , or on the basis of
Article11 that it has fulfilled its obligation of judicial assistance by transmitting the indictment to
Libya 17.
11CR 97/23, pp. 11-14, paras. 2.4-2.12.
12
Memorial of 20 December 1993, p. 87, para. 4.1.
13
Ibid.,p. 88, para.4.3.
14CR 97/22, p. 18, para. 2.7.
15Ibid, para. 2.8.
16
CR 97/23, p. 12, paras. 2.7-2.9.
17Ibid., p. 14, paras. 2.14-2.15. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
Libya does recognize that Article5, paragraph 3, permits the UnitedStates to rely on its
national law in order to take criminal proceedingsagainst persons suspected of having committed acts
contemplated by the Convention. At the same tim e, it believes that the judicial assistance in the
criminal sphere contemplated in Article11 is not simply confined to transmitting an indictment
unsupported by any material proof.
3.5.However, besides the issues proper to one or other provision of the Convention, Libya
wishes to point out that, contrary to what Pr ofessorGreenwood contends, it too considers that
international law is a "system, which has to be seen as a whole" 1.
This moreover is precisely what it means when it talks of an "ordering of international
19
society" , and when it acknowledges that the Montreal Convention is not necessarily"the only
instrument applicable to this case" 20.
That is why Libya makes the observation that international law contains certain structural rules
such as those which can be inferred from the lex specialis, the lex posterior or Article33 of the
Charter—rules which are a bar to a direct rec ourse to the SecurityCouncil that bypasses the
appropriate instruments.
sLpecialip/lsterior and Article33: let us consider these twopoints again, since they
confirm the extent to which Libya recognizes th e integrated nature of international law.
3.6. The United Kingdom mentioned thelex specialisand the lex posteriorsolely in referring to
21
its preceding submissions while the United States repeated that this argument (on the lex posterioror
the lex specialis) was inconsistent with Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on the Law
22
of Treaties which, in the case of successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter, provides for
the lex specialis, but subject to Article 103 of the Charter.
18
CR 97/22, p. 18, para. 2.10.
19CR 97/20, p. 35, para. 4.18.
20
Ibid., p. 37, para. 4.23.
21Professor Greenwood, CR 972/2, p. 22, para. 2.20.
22
Mr. Crook, CR 97/23, p. 20, para. 2.32. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
This argument adds nothing to the Respondents' cas e. Article30, paragraph1, of the Vienna
Convention, in reserving the case of Article103, simply repeats a rule which Libya has never
challenged — the primacy of the Charter over any oh t er convention in the event of a conflict between
the obligations under the one and the obligations underthe other. In the present case, Libya considers
that there is no conflict between Article103 and the Montreal Convention, as ProfessorSuy and
Professor Brownlie will soon show.
Let us repeat that the Montreal Convention is a lex specialis and a lex posterior in relation to
the Charter; and what Libya accuses the Responde nts of is having sought to ensure that the
SecurityCouncil leaves no room for the Conven tion to produce its effects. Article103 would
doubtless apply had the autopsy shown that Libya wa s not playing the game correctly, but that has
never been proved.
3.7. Article 33 confirms both the idea of thelex specialis/posteriorand the Libyan vision of the
integration of international law.
In the view of Libya, it is mistaken to see Article 33 as a provision whose effects are limited to
matters falling within Chapter VI, as the Respondentscontended in the first round of oral proceedings.
Libya has shown that in reality this provision was merely a development of Article 2, paragraph 3 2,
whose effects it would be every bit as absurd to restrict to Chapter I of the Charter. The Respondents
have not replied to that argument.
The United Kingdom has merely observed that the Charter gives any State "an unrestricted
right" to ask the Security Council to take action under Chapter VII when the States considers that a
situation threatens international peace and security and that the decision taken by the Council falls
within its discretion24.
3.8. These contentions sit uneasily with the general duty of a State "to fulfil in good faith the
obligations assumed by itin accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" (emphasis added), a
duty set forth in the General Assembly Declarati on on Principles of International Law concerning
23
Cf. C.Tomuschat, in The Charter of U.N.: A Commentary, ed. by B.Simma, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994,
p. 506 and the references.
24Professor Greenwood, CR 97/2, p. 23, para. 2.24. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 25; they sit uneasily too with the duty of States,
acknowledged in that Declaration, "to take join t and separate action in co-operation with the
26
United Nations in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter " (emphasis added).
Article 33, paragraph 1, certainly forms part of thepertinent provisions of the Charter, and pursuant to
the principles of co-operation and good faith I have just mentioned, it limits the right of States to
move the Security Council unrestrictedly.
3.9. More specifically, authoritative commentat ors on the Charter—for example, Goodrich,
Hambro and Simons — have written that in the eventof a conflict of the kind contemplated in Article
33, the Parties "are expected to make a real effort to reach an agreed solution before coming to the
Council" and that "[the] real intent of Article 33 was to establish an obligation to be fulfilled by the
Partiesprior to their enlisting the Council's assistance" 27(emphasis added). In the same vein, another
scholarly writer says in regard to the words "first of all" that
"first of all, it is incumbent upon the parties themselves totake remedial action; in the case of a
failure of their efforts, the procedures of Chapter VI — or of Chapter VII — become
28
applicable" (emphasis added).
The least that can be said is that one findsit difficult to see in what way the Respondents made
a real effort to solve the dispute as it presented itself in 1991-1992, in accordance with the Montreal
Convention and with what Libya had asked of them.
3.10. Apart from these particular answers to our opponents' specific arguments, I wish to
emphasize again what I have called the "ordering ofinternational society", a process which in the final
analysis is nothing other than a kind of intern ational division of labour among rules, among State
actors and among institutions. This is a fact of which Article 33 and the ideas oflex specialisand lex
posteriorare the expression. Here are one or two significant examples.
25A/RES/2625, 24 October 1970, sevnth principle, first para.
26
Ibid., fourth principle, second para.,(d).
27L. M. Goodrich, E. Hamb ro and A. P. Simons, Charter of the United Nations Commentary and Documents , New
York/London, Columbia Univ. Press, 1969, pp. 260-261.
28
Cf. Tomuschat,loc.cit., p. 506. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
The first example is drawn from the preamble to the Montreal Convention itself, in which the
States Parties consider that "for the purpose of deterring" acts of violence against the safety of
international civil aviation "there is an urgent n eed to provide appropriate measures for punishment of
offenders"; that provision, and just as much the Convention, what is more, would be meaningless if
the Security Council had to intervene each time an act of violence contemplated by the Convention
took place somewhere.
Scholarly opinion has pointed out that this C onvention, like others of the same kind, was
intended to fulfil certain precise functions, including stopping the gaps in extradition treaties 2. It is
obviously not for the SecurityCouncil to concern itself with extradition problems: the Convention
therefore occupies a specific place in the body of international law, and a priori it is not for the
Security Council to deprive it of that position.
Another significant example of the ordering of international law lies in the fact that the
drawing-up of conventions of the same kind as th e MontrealConvention, and having related aims,
continues even today. A case in point is the present draft international convention for the suppression
30
of terrorist bombings . Well, what would be the purpose of such an instrument if it sufficed in any
event to maintain that the acts c ontemplated threatened international peace and security in order for
them to beipso factodealt with by the Security Council?
A third example is drawn from the actual practice of the SecurityCouncil. That practice, to
which the decisions adopted in the Lockerbie dr ama are no more than unfortunate exceptions,
confirms everything which has been said in regardto decentralization and the international division of
tasks. In point of fact, whenever appropriate, theSecurity Council refers to the pertinent instruments.
We have already alluded to this in connection with the Council's decision in the matter of the attempt
on the life of PresidentMubarak, in which th e Council asked for the extradition treaty between
31
Ethiopia and the Sudan to be applied ; this example, concerning which the Respondents have not
seen fit to reply, is far from isolated.
29
G. Guillaume, "Terrorisme et droit internati, CADI,1989, III, p. 356.
30UN doc. A/C/6/52/WG.1/CRP.45R / ev. 2, 2 October 1997.
31
CR 97/20, p. 34, para. 4.15. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
Let us look for example at what the Secur ityCouncil did in the matter of the American
hostages at Teheran in 1979: it be gan by reaffirming on 4 December 1979
"the solemn obligation of all States partie s to both the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations of 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 to res32ct
the inviolability of diplomatic personnel and the premises of their missions".
Then, on 31December, the Council envisaged the adoption of "effective measures under
Articles39 and 41 of the Charter" if Iran did not implement the preceding resolution as well as the
33
Order made by the Court two weeks earlier . A draft resolution embodying those measures was
subsequently put before the Counc il on 13 January 1980, but it was not a dopted because of the veto of
a permanent Member.
Here we have a sequence of events which illu strates to perfection both the requirements of
Article 33 and those of the lex specialis and of the lex posterior: firstly, reference to the convention
normally applicable, in this case the 1961 and 1963 Conventions, then a finding by the Council that
the convention has not been applied, and lastly the adoption or tentative adoption of measures of
coercion against the defaulting State.
The linkages and interactions ofthe international criminal tribuna ls and the Court itself with the
34
Security Council partake of the same philosophy . I shall not go into that point here.
*
3.11. Mr. President, Members of the Court, whathas been said shows that, once the dispute fell
within the Montreal Convention, the latter had to apply, and the fruitless efforts of our opponents to
refute this amply confirm the existence of adispute on the application of the Convention.
We shall now turn to the second argument: that the Respondents cannot act in such a manner
as to prevent Libya from exercising its rights under the Montreal Convention.
3S/RES 457, 4 December 1979, last preambular para.
3S/RES 461, 31 December 1979, paras. 2-6.
3Rules of Procedure of the ICTY and the ICTR, Arts.and 61E; United Nations Charter, Art. 94, para. 2. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
II.The Respondents cannot act in such a way as to prevent Libya from exercising its rights
under the Montreal Convention
3.12. The Respondents have vigorously attacked the Libyan contention that their resorting to
the Security Council in the present case violates the Montreal Convention: in the view of
35
Professor Greenwood, "that contention is quite simply nonsense" , and Mr. Crook charges the Court
"in the strongest terms... not to accept that position" 36. In both cases, our learned opponents
consider that the Libyan argument is totally incompatible with the fundamental rights of States under
the Charter.
3.13. Mr. President, Members of the Court, we shall begin by observing that it is not the resort
to the Security Councilper se which is regarded by Libya as a breach of the Montreal Convention: it
is solely the resort to the Security Councilfor the purpose of depriving the Montreal Convention of its
effects.
Such a use by a State of a power which may, at first sight, seem absolute is a full-scale
violation of the Convention, combined, as we have just pointed out, with the rule in Article33,
paragraph 1, of the Charter and the principles of thelex posteriorand thelex specialis.
3.14. Less specifically, it is well known in internato inal law as in law generally that the exercise
of a power, even a discretionary one, must always remain reasonable and be in good faith .
International case-law has laid downthe requirement of reasonableness inthe most varied spheres; let
37
us cite at random: the regulation of the fishing rights of foreign nationals , the application of a
domestic law on protective education 38, the withdrawal or termination of an instrument containing no
35CR 97/22, p. 21, para. 2.17.
36CR 97/23, p. 14, para. 2.13.
37
Pêcheries de l'Atlantique nord, RGDIP, 1, p. 452.
38Guardianship Convention of 1902,I.C.J. Reports 1958, pp. 91 and 99. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
duration clause 39, and the passage of a "reasonable time" between the events and the filing of an
40
application .
As an example closer to the present case, the Permanent Court considered that the requirement
of diplomatic negotiations as a preliminary to the reference of a dispute to the Court made
inadmissible
"as serious a step as summoning another State to appear before the Court without having
previously, within reasonable limits, endeavouredto make it quite clear that a difference
41
of views is in question which has not b een capable of being otherwise overcome" .
This quotation could easily apply mutatis mutandis to the seisin of the SecurityCouncil by the
Respondents under Article 33 of the Charter.
3.15. If for such limited questions the conduct of the State is to be gauged by the yardstick of
reasonableness and good faith, the same must be all th e truer of such a momentous act as the seisin of
the Security Council in respect of a situation presen ted, by reference to the Charter, as threatening
international peace and security. As one of the Unite d States counsel rightly wrote in a noted work of
which the author will be readily recognized:
"When called upon to determine the reference criteria in relation to which States must
exercise the rights they enjoy under a tr eaty-based commitment, the judge or the
arbitrator often combines two expressions: 'reasonably' and 'good faith'. The State must,
in general, comply with the duties or ri ghts deriving from a treaty it has concluded,
reasonably and in good faith." [Translation by the Registry.]
Libya says nothing else: the seisin of the Security Council by the United Kingdom and the
United States for the purpose of preventing Libya from being able to secure application of the
Montreal Convention breaches that duty of good faith , attaching as much to application of the
Convention (the Montreal Convention) as toapplication of the United Nations Charter.
39Interpretation of the Agreement of 25March1954 between the WHO and Egypt, I.C.J. Reports 1980 , p. 96, para. 49;
Military and Paramilitary Activities in andagainst Nicaragua, I.C.J. Repor, pp. 419-420, para. 63.
40Certain Phosphate Lands inNauru, I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp. 253-254, paras. 31-32.
41
Factory at Chorzów, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 13 , pp.10-11; this dictum is reproduced in the case of the Application for
Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982I,.C.J. Reports 1985,p. 218, para. 46; see alsoContinental
Shelf UK/France, RIAA, XVIII,p. 359, para. 12.
42
Zoller, E.,La bonne foi en droit international publi,cParis, Pédone, 1978, p. 87 No. 78. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
3.16. The Respondents do not of course share this point of view, which is further evidence, if
such were needed, that a dispute exists as tothe application of the Montreal Convention.
*
3.17. We can now go on to our third argument, which is that the seisin of the Security Council
by the Respondents does not remove the dis pute regarding the Montreal Convention.
III.The seisin of the Security Council by the Re spondents does not remove the dispute regarding
the Montreal Convention
3.18. The Respondents imperturbably assert thatthey have no dispute with Libya regarding the
43
Montreal Convention . For the United Kingdom, Professor Gr eenwood repeats that, even if there
were such a dispute—which he says there is not—the decisions of the Security Council render
44
Libya's Application in respect of that dispute inadmissible . Libya developed this point at length last
week, relying in particular on the Northern Cameroons (1963) case; it also made reference to the
cases concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (1980) and East Timor
45
(1995) . The Respondents have not disputed the relevance of these precedents and said nothing new
on the subject in their reply on Monday.
It is therefore pointless for Libya to repeat what it has already said.
3.19. One point though: Mr. Crook recalled that the United States had transmitted to Libya the
indictment of the suspects and that such transmission fully met the requirements of Article11,
46
paragraph 1, of the Convention . This prompts three observations:
Primo:Mr. Crook asserted that the Convention did not apply 47just after saying that the United States
had complied with Article11, paragraph 1. Would it be that the United States
nevertheless recognizes the app lication of the Convention?
4Professor Greenwood, CR 97/22, p. 15,paras. 2.2 and 2.3; Mr. Crook, CR 97/23, p. 15, para. 2.16.
44
Professor Greenwood, CR 972/2, p. 15, para. 2.3.
4CR 97/20, pp. 52-55.
46
CR 97/23, p. 14, paras. 2.14-2.15. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
Secondo:Article 11, paragraph 1, requires that "Contr acting States shall afford one another the
greatest measure of assistance" (emphasis added). Can it really be contended that the
mere sending of a statement of alleged acts not backed by any evidence corresponds to
"the greatest measure of assistance"? Even though United States rules regarding the
confidentiality of particular items might possb ily warrant their retention, it does not seem
acceptable that the Applicant State should be denied the entire file of evidence.
Tertio:These questions of evidence are particularly esse ntial for Libya since the Government of Malta
and the company Air Malta, contrary to theRespondents' assertions, had no hesitation in
collaborating with the Libyan Government for the purposes of the investigation. They
thus informed Libya that they had found no evidence to support the allegation that an
unaccompanied item of luggage left Malta by Air Malta on the date stated in the
48
indictment . These facts were confirmed by a former senior British Airways security
officer who conducted an independent investigation in Malta as an expert witness in a
49
civil case before the British courts, a cae s to which these facts were relevant .
3.20. The discussions on the scope of Article 11, paragraph1, like those on the scope of
Article 5, paragraphs 2 and 3,and Articles 7 and 8, paragraph 3, once more reveal andin concretothe
existence of a dispute regarding the interpretato in and application of the Montreal Convention.
For Libya can but observe that when one repeatsad nauseamon the one hand that a convention
applies and, on the other, that it does not apply, it becomes difficult to assert that there is no dispute
regarding the application of the Convention. In the 1996 Judgment in the Genocidecase, the Court
notes that the Parties have "radically differing view points" on a question "which clearly belongs to the
merits" 50, or again that the Parties are "in disagreementwith respect to the meaning and legal scope of
47Ibid., p. 15, para. 2.16.
48
Libyan Memorial of 20 December 1993, p. 15.
49See the video submitted to the Court by Libya: TheMaltese Double Cross ; see also the television broadcast of
14 October 1997 on the BBC Scotland programme:Silence over Lockerbie.
50
Judgment of 11 July 1996, para. 31. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
several . . . provisions"51. It needed no more than that for th e Court to recognize that there indeed
existed a dispute between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia regarding the application of the
1948 Convention. Those reasons adduced are transpoa sble just about word for word to this case.
*
3.21. We can now move on to our last point, which is that the Court may entertain not only the
complaints of Libya regarding the application of the Montreal Convention but also those directly
linked thereto.
IV.The Court may entertain not only the complaints of Libya regarding the application of the
Montreal Convention but also those directly linked thereto
3.22. The United Kingdom has questioned the Court' s jurisdiction to deal with this part of
Libya's Application. In Professor Greenwood's view,it is quite simply wrong to claim that the Court's
jurisdiction can extend to violations of international law on the basis of a compromissory clause in a
convention owing to the connection of such viola tions with the dispute concerning that convention . 52
3.23. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this objection springs from a narrow view of the
jurisdiction of the Court, and one thatis moreover at odds with its case-law.
For instance, in the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction case the Court considered that the
compromissory clause that gave it jurisdiction to hear the case regarding the unilateral extension by
Iceland of its fisheries jurisdiction also authori zed it to deal with the disagreements between the
Parties concerning their rights over their fishery resources. The Court took the view that the dispute
must "be considered in all its aspects" and that it mu st take into consideration "all relevant elements in
administering justice between the Parties" 53.
51Ibid., para. 33.
52CR 97/22, p. 16, para. 2.5.
53I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp. 21-22, paras. 47-48. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
Libya considers that the same should hold good inthis case: nothing but the dispute regarding
the application of the Montreal Convention, but also the whole dispute, including the question of the
opposability of Security Council resolutions. Thisis in the very interests of justice.
*
3.24. Mr. President, Members of the Court, at the close of this statement I can but repeat that it
does not suffice to claim that the Lockerbie traged y constitutes a threat to international peace and
security for it to fall outside the normally applicablelaw of the Montreal Convention; it has further to
be shown that such is indeed the case,for which no evidence has been forthcoming.
Libya nevertheless notes that some points unite the Parties, and in particular a common love of
Magritte. This gives Libya some reason to hope that respect for legal realities will ultimately prevail
over any other consideration.
I should like once more to say that it has been an honour for me to defend Libya's interests
before the Court and I thank it r the quality of its attention.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur David.
L'audience est suspendue et reprendra dans 15 minutes.
The Court adjourned from 11.15 to 11.30
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. Je donne
la parole à Monsieur Suy.
SMUr.:
The effect of Security Council resolutions 731, 748 and 883
Mr. President, Members of the Court, - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
I shall reply briefly to last Monday's oral arguments of the United Kingdom and the United
States, where they have a bearing on my statement of Friday. The Court will remember that I
showed that the admissibility of Libya's Application could be conceived in three different ways.
4.1. The Respondents have not disputed the first possibility, namely that the Court could
properly rule on the matter without taking account of the Security Council resolutions.
So I come straight to the second possibility, which is the Court's power to interpret resolutions with
due regard to the powers of the Security Council under the Charter.
The Respondents wrongly contend that Libya's position on this point is inconsistent. Libya
has already noted last week that its observations on the Preliminary Objections must be read in
conjunction with its Memorial, to which they make systematic reference.
In its 1993 Memorial, Libya showed that the resolutions did not require it to surrender those
charged to the Respondents. Libya relied in that respect on the text of the resolutions and the other
relevant Council documents.
It argued that otherwise the resolutions would be contrary to the Charter. This finding
reinforces the interpretation adopted by Libya, but also underpins a subsidiary argument, which is a
third possible way of conceiving the admissibility of Libya's Application: should the Council
unambiguously require Libya to surrender the accused to the Respondents, its resolutions would —
to that extent — not be opposable to Libya.
In their Preliminary Objections the Respondents carefully avoided following this graded
reasoning. They merely asserted that the Council required Libya to hand over those charged.
It is therefore entirely logical that Libya, in its Preliminary Objections, should have
concentrated on that assumption, to say that if that is so the decisions are contrary to the Charter.
In order to facilitate their reading, the Libyan observations did not systematically repeat the
hypothetical character of this violation of the Charter. But this could only mislead those who
wanted to be misled. In broaching the effect of the Council resolutions, Libya specified that it
would follow on that point the arguments developed by the Respondents (Libya v. United
Kingdom, p. 84; Libya v. United States, p. 74). It then made systematic reference to its
Memorial — to say, for example, that Libya had already contended in its Memorial that the - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
Security Council had violated its elementary rights to a "due process of law". On consulting
Libya's Memorial on this point, the Respondents must have immediately seen that the Libyan
position was in fact more qualified, for nowhere in the Memorial is it said that the Council is in
actual fact violating Libya's rights.
I therefore do not think it necessary to go into the legal consequences of the alleged
inconsistency in Libya's position. I shall not dwell on the fact that the position of Libya, which is
not a Member of the Council, does not determine the interpretation of its resolutions. Quite clearly,
the Respondents have tried by any means to elude the Libyan argument regarding interpretation of
the resolutions.
4.2. The Respondents seem in fact, on this point, to be in a very difficult position. Let us
rapidly examine what they replied to Libya's analysis.
The United Kingdom recognizes the power of the Court to interpret the resolutions
(CR 97/22, p. 26, para. 3.6), and has not questioned the principle that the resolutions must be so
interpreted as to guarantee their conformity with the Charter.
It questions the Libyan interpretation with sole reference to the Secretary-General's report of
3 March 1992. Now in that report the Secretary-General says that he has transmitted the British
and United States requests to Libya, notifies the Council of the Libyan proposals, and concludes
that there has been a certain shift in Libya's position of which the Council might wish to take
account in deciding on its line of conduct. This only bears out Libya's interpretation.
Mr. Crook (CR 97/23, pp. 10 et seq.), for his part, insists on the binding character of the
resolutions but avoids the real question, which is that of the scope of these obligations. He points
out that in resolution 748 the Council decides that Libya "must comply now", but he does not tell
us with what. We showed last Friday that it was not at all a question of complying with the
requests of the Respondents. Everything is in the reference to resolution 731.
Libya's analysis of the actual text of the resolutions, which is of course all-important, is
therefore unaffected.
The same goes in regard to Mr. Crook's attempt to offset the Libyan analysis of the
statements made by the Council Members. With regard to resolution 748, Mr. Crook relied on the - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
statement of three Members, including the United States itself. That does not represent the point of
view of the majority of the Council. Cape Verde, whose statement Mr. Crook invokes, raised a
great many objections, including the fact that:
"la Constitution du Cap-Vert ne permet pas l'extradition de nos ressortissants. Par
conséquent, il nous est difficile de sanctionner des mesures qui vont ['could' in
English] à l'encontre de notre propre principe constitutionnel" (S/PV.3063, p. 46;
emphasis added).
According to Cape Verde, the measures of the Council could violate the principle of the
non-extradition of nationals. They therefore do not necessarily violate it. This means that
resolution 748 does not necessarily require Libya to surrender its nationals to the Respondents. If
Cape Verde observes that it could nevertheless result in that, this is of course because, once the
enforcement measures have been adopted, Libya and the Security Council as a whole are at the
mercy of the Respondents and their intransigence.
Hungary, also solicited by Mr. Crook, said nothing that contradicts Libya's interpretation: it
does not say that Libya must surrender those charged to the Respondents, but that it must respond
to the requests contained in resolution 731 (S/PV.3063, p. 76). Libya has already analysed the real
meaning of that form of words. Hungary also refers to the efforts of the United Nations
Secretary-General and of the Arab League (p. 76), with whose proposals we are familiar.
I should like to add the statement of Austria, which voted in favour of resolution 748, that:
"En tant que partie à tous les instruments pertinents contre le terrorisme, l'Autriche
estime que toute mesure prise par le Conseil dans ce domaine devrait s'inspirer des
principes consacrés dans ces conventions." (S/PV.3063, p. 76)
The same goes for resolution 883. Here again the United States relies on the statements of
three Members only. The statement by France (S/PV.3312, pp. 42 et seq.) in no way contradicts its
very clear-cut position in the Sudanese case, to which I referred on Friday.
Venezuela, also called to the rescue by Mr. Crook, said nothing to consolidate the
Respondents' position, far from it:
"Nous lançons un appel à toutes les parties concernées pour qu'elles continuent de
faire preuve de l'esprit de souplesse qu'elles ont manifesté jusqu'à présent dans la
recherche d'une solution qui s'inspirerait de l'esprit et des objectifs des diverses
résolutions adoptées par le Conseil de sécurité." (S/PV.3312, p. 76.) - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
The United States is quite wrong in relying on the fact that the sanctions against Libya have
remained in place (Mr. Andrews, CR 97/23, p. 9). The Council has not renewed the sanctions; its
President merely stated that there was no consensus to lift them. They have remained in place
owing to the Respondents' constant opposition to their lifting. The fact that the membership of the
Council has changed since 1992 is therefore quite irrelevant.
4.3. I now come to my next point, which concerns the Council's powers under Chapter VII of
the Charter.
The Respondents completely gloss over the distinction between the Security Council's
supervisory action and its activity concerned with adjudicating the merits of a dispute or a
situation.
This is patently clear in Professor Greenwood's analysis of the taking of evidence
(CR 97/22, p. 22, para. 2.19). I shall not revert to this.
The same applies to the British position on the Council's power to impose fresh obligations
on member States. Lord Hardie's reply (CR 97/22, p. 30) distorts the Libyan argument, which was
nevertheless clearly expounded in the Libyan Memorial (pp. 193 et seq.). It is clear, Mr. President,
Members of the Court, that the Council can create fresh obligations, and suspend the application of
a treaty, when it announces enforcement action, such as a trade embargo. However, another matter
is what the Council can achieve through enforcement action. And it is on this point, and on this
point alone, that Libya states — and has amply demonstrated in its written pleadings — that the
Council cannot impose upon member States fresh obligations in order to settle the merits of a
dispute or a situation.
The resolutions adopted in other cases, which Lord Hardie referred to last Monday, are
therefore all irrelevant. They involve either supervisory and provisional measures, or enforcement
action for implementation by all member States (an embargo for example).
Much more relevant to the question which concerns us is the Security Council's practice
regarding the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait. The issue there was to pass on the merits of the
dispute between those States. And what was the Council's approach on this point?
On the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), the British Representative stated: - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
«Cette résolution ne s'efforce pas de fixer la frontière entre ces deux pays; cela a été
fait par l'Accord de 1963... Nous n'avons aucun désir ni aucune intention d'annuler le
principe selon lequel il appartient aux parties en question de négocier et de parvenir à
un accord, comme cela a été fait en 1932 et en 1963 (S/PV.2981, p. 112 et 113.)
The American Representative asserted that:
«Les Etats-Unis ne cherchent certainement pas à obtenir pour le Conseil de sécurité un
nouveau rôle — rôle qu'ils ne soutiendront pas — en tant qu'organe chargé de
délimiter les frontières internationales. Les conflits de frontière sont des questions qui
doivent être négociées directement entre les Etats ou réglées par d'autres moyens
pacifiques de règlement existants, tels qu'énoncés dans le chapitre VII (sic) de la
Charte (supra, p. 86)»
Other Members of the Council made similar declarations, denying the Council's power to fix
a new boundary (see, for example, China, loc cit., p. 96, and India, loc. cit., p. 78). This principle
was enshrined in the third recital of resolution 773 (1992):
" Recalling in this connection that through the demarcation process the Commission is
not reallocating territory between Iraq and Kuwait but is simply carrying out the
technical task necessary to demarcate for the first time the precise coordinates of the
boundary set out in the 'Agreed Minutes between the State of Kuwait and the Republic
of Iraq . . .'"
This clearly shows that the Council cannot, under Chapter VII of the Charter, impose on
member States fresh obligations in order to pass on the merits of a dispute or regulate a situation.
There is no getting round this fact by invoking Article 103 of the Charter. The primacy
established by this Article presupposes an obligation established in accordance with the Charter. It
therefore presupposes, in this case, a decision of the Security Council respecting the limits which
the Charter imposes upon it.
4.4. I now come to the assertion made by the Respondents to the effect that Libya is
requesting the Court to substitute its own subjective determination for that of the Security Council.
Not a bit of it. Libya contends that, in requiring the accused to be surrendered to the United
States or the United Kingdom, the Council would be violating the limits to its powers laid down by
the Charter. These limitations are legal ones, and consequently may form the subject-matter of an
objective determination by the Court. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
The same applies to the argument expounded in the Libyan observations (Libya v.
United States, pp. 93 et seq.; Libya v. United Kingdom, pp. 84 et seq.), according to which the
threat to peace allegedly determined by the Council as the basis of a request — a hypothetical
one — for surrendering the accused to the Respondents constituted a misuse of power.
First of all, let us quote Madame Zoller's quite remarkable analysis of the misuse of power in
the law of international organizations. Like Professor James Fawcett and Mr. Amerasinghe, whose
analyses have been quoted in the Libyan Memorial (pp. 223 et seq.), Madame Zoller accepts that
the prohibition on the misuse of power applies in the law of international organizations.
Madame Zoller says — and I am quoting an extract from her work referred to on page 237 of the
Libyan Memorial:
"no subjective element comes into the determination of such unlawfulness. It is a matter of
seeing whether the purpose of the power exercised (final result) is appropriate to and
compatible with the purpose and object of the constituent instrument." (E. Zoller, La
bonne foi en droit international public, 1977, p. 197.)
This analysis applies perfectly to the Libyan argument. To the extent that the determination
of a threat to the peace justifies the requirement that Libya should surrender the accused to the
Respondents, this determination would constitute an excès de pouvoir or a misuse of power.
As you know, the Council's power to determine the existence of a "threat to the peace" is
broadly discretionary, but it is not unlimited and cannot be exercised arbitrarily. The Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia underlined this by pointing out that, under Article 24 of the Charter, the
Council must exercise its powers in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter (see
the quotation in the observations of Libya v. United Kingdom, p. 86).
Consequently, while it is true that the Court cannot substitute its subjective determination for
that of the Security Council, this does not prevent the Court, on the basis of an objective
determination of the facts and of the law, from verifying the excès de pouvoir or misuse of power
which might vitiate a characterization as a "threat to the peace".
In the above-mentioned case, the characterization as a "threat to the peace" in resolution 748
would very clearly constitute an excès de pouvoir or misuse of power. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
In its normal sense, the word "threat" refers to a future event. The Council cannot therefore,
so many years after the Lockerbie bombing, determine that there is a "threat" by referring to this
bombing alone.
The question is therefore what additional element warrants the characterization of a "threat".
More precisely, what happened between resolutions 731 and 748 to warrant this characterization?
Did the threat to the peace result from Libya's refusal to surrender the accused to the
Respondents? This would constitute a manifest excès de pouvoir. Even if the characterization in
Article 39 were justified, the Council could not decide, under Chapter VII of the Charter, that
Libya must surrender the suspects to the United States or the United Kingdom. It is not very clear
how Libya's refusal to comply with a requirement at odds with the Charter might constitute a threat
to the peace!
The fact that Libya did not comply with the British and American requests to reveal the
names of all the guilty or to hand over the remaining timers cannot warrant the characterization as a
"threat" either. Indeed, this requirement presupposes Libya's guilt, which has not been proven.
One must therefore bow to the facts, Mr. President. In so far as the Council used the
characterization "threat to the peace" in order to justify the requirement — this is still hypothetical
as I hope you will forgive me for repeating ad nauseam — that Libya should surrender the accused
to the Respondents, this recourse to Chapter VII could not be used to prevent the Court from
exercising its judicial function, and to do so solely for the benefit of the individual interests of the
Respondents. The Council would thus have committed a misuse of power. The resolutions must
be interpreted in such a way as to avoid this conclusion.
4.5. I now come, finally, to the United Kingdom's attempt to draw a distinction between the
judicial review of the procedural validity of the resolutions and the review of their substantive
validity.
I showed you last Friday that this distinction had no basis, since the Council's powers are
limited both ratione materiae and by procedural rules. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
Lord Hardie sought in vain to refute this argument (CR 97/22, p. 26, para. 3.5). His
argument shows that the two limits on the Council's powers — procedural and material limits —
are indissociably linked.
Lord Hardie first quotes the example of the declaration by the President of the Council dated
20 June 1972 relating to terrorism against civilian aircraft. Lord Hardie remarks that this
declaration — it is a declaration of principles, of a general nature, which has no connection with a
particular case — is in reality a "decision". Lord Hardie continues:
«Si une question devait se poser quant au statut de cet acte — par exemple, celle de
savoir s'il équivaut à une «décision du Conseil aux fins des articles 25 et 48 de la
Charte — le Royaume-Uni admet que la Cour pourrait, et devrait, l'examiner.»
But this is a question concerning the substantive powers of the Council! What has to be
established, in particular, is whether the Council may adopt legislative decisions which impose
obligations on all its member States, outside the context of a particular case.
This question is wholly comparable to the one raised here by Libya, which is how far the
Council's resolutions in the Libyan case, certain paragraphs of which bear the title "decision", can
have binding effects on Libya.
Lord Hardie also accepts that the Court may review whether a decision has been adopted
with the required majority, or whether it has been adopted under Chapters VI or VII of the Charter.
This question is also indissociable from that of the substantive powers of the Council under these
various Chapters. I am referring on this point to the Libyan observations (Libya v.
United Kingdom, p. 106 and Libya v. United States of America, p. 88).
Lastly, Lord Hardie asserts that "The power of substantive review is not contemplated by the
Charter". If this means that this power is not expressly laid down in the Charter, the same applies
to the Court's power to review the procedural validity of Council resolutions. This argument is thus
baseless and I showed you last Friday, referring to the travaux préparatoires of the Charter, what
meaning should be attributed to this absence of comment in the Charter.
4.6. Libya has thus relied upon the text of the Charter, the wishes of its authors, the recent
practice of the Security Council, and the point of view expressed in various quarters of the
international community. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
Mr. President, Members of the Court, one cannot overlook, either, the political context
forming a backdrop to the Security Council's actions since the end of the cold war. It is this new
situation which led the then Secretary-General Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1994 to raise the
following fundamental questions at a ceremony in Madrid:
«La nouvelle situation dans laquelle se trouve le Conseil de sécurité nous incite à
soulever de nouvelles questions juridiques ou à revenir sur certaines, comme celles-ci :
est-ce que l'unanimité des Membres permanents confère au Conseil des pouvoirs
illimités ? Jusqu'où le Conseil peut-il étendre sa compétence ? Est-il le seul organe
habilité à interpréter ses pouvoirs ? Son action échappe-t-elle à tout contrôle ? Ce
sont là des questions juridiques très complexes qui ne sont nullement théoriques, car
elles ont un effet direct sur les modalités d'exercice du pouvoir de décision à l'échelle
mondiale.» (Communiqué de presse SG/SM/94/53 du 20 avril 1994.) [Traduction du
Greffe.]
These words from a great specialist on the law of international organizations, are revealing
of the new trends which have been emerging for a number of years with respect to the workings of
the international community.
I conclude, Mr. President, with an argument put forward by the Agent of the
United Kingdom, Sir Franklin Berman, who asserted that a continuation of the present proceedings
would prejudice the integrity of the Charter.
Naturally there would be no question of this if the Court were to rule on the interpretation
and application of the Montreal Convention without taking account of the Council's resolutions.
But matters would be no different if the Court interpreted the resolutions in the light of the
Charter, or declared that they could not be invoked against Libya. Indeed, it is clear that it is the
attempt by the United States and the United Kingdom to utilize the Security Council for their own
interests which prejudices the integrity of the Charter.
The attempt by the Respondents to argue the merits of the case in order to conclude that the
Libyan Application is inadmissible, clearly shows that the question of admissibility deserves to be
joined to the merits. Further, the Court should not overlook the fact that this approach by the
defendants is a breach of the rights of Libya, which has never had an opportunity to examine these
arguments in a written memorial since there was none. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court, for your kind attention. May I ask you
now to kindly give the floor to my eminent colleague, Professor Ian Brownlie.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie Monsieur Suy.
M. Brownlie va maintenant s'adresser à la Cour. Monsieur Brownlie, je vous prie.
M. BROWNLIE : Merci, Monsieur le Président. Je vais commencer par une synthèse des
questions relatives à la recevabilité. l'Etat demandeur invoque les dispositions d'une convention
multilatérale valide. Les Etats défendeurs allèguent qu'il y a des circonstances qui constituent une
justification en droit pour ne pas appliquer certaines dispositions de cette convention vis-à-vis de la
Libye. Il s'agit là d'une question de fond. A titre subsidiaire, ils allèguent que les dispositions de la
Charte justifient une immunité ratione matériae du Conseil de sécurité lorsqu'il adopte une
résolution en vertu du chapitre VII. Toutefois, selon moi, cet argument tend à la même fin ultime,
celle d'essayer de se servir des dispositions de la Charte pour justifier l'inexécution de la convention
de Montréal dans les présentes affaires.
L'argument de l'immunité ratione materiae n'est qu'un argument de repli. Premièrement, on
dit que les violations de la convention sont justifiées par la Charte (y compris l'article 103).
Deuxièmement, on dit que, de toute façon, la question de fond ne peut pas être examinée par la
Cour, car les mêmes dispositions de la Charte y font obstacle.
Compte tenu de cette analyse, je vais passer en revue, provisoirement, les questions de droit
en litige qui peuvent à l'évidence faire l'objet d'un examen à titre de questions de fond, même en
présence de résolutions «obligatoires» du Conseil de sécurité adoptées en vertu du chapitre VII.
Avant d'aborder mon examen provisoire, il peut être utile que j'explique pourquoi les
dispositions de l'article 103 ne présentent pas, aux fins actuelles, un veto ab initio et de jure pour
les points de droit.
L'article 103 dispose que les obligations issues de la Charte «prévaudront» en cas de conflit
avec les obligations en vertu de tout autre accord international.
On peut exprimer l'essence de l'argumentation de la Libye en tenant compte de l'article 103. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
Premièrem : ent la nature du différend comporte une tentative, de la part des Etats
défendeurs, pour invoquer les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité comme une justification en droit
de l'inexécution de la convention de Montréal dans les présentes affaires.
Il ne saurait suffire de soutenir que seul le caractère justiciable de la question est en litige, car
les Etats défendeurs se sont fondés avec insistance sur l'article 103, qui est une disposition de fond
et non de procédure.
Pendant le premier tour, l'équipe du Royaume-Uni a invoqué l'article 103 à cinq reprises :
d'abord, une fois par sir Franklin Berman (CR 97/16, p. 16, par. 1.6); trois fois par M. Greenwood
(CR 97/16, p. 64, par. 4.27; CR 97/16, p. 74, par. 4.56; CR 97/16, p. 76, par. 4.64); et une fois par
lord Hardie (CR 97/17, p. 18-19, par. 5.37-5.38).
Les Etats-Unis ont invoqué l'article 103 à neuf reprises : M. Crook, cinq fois (CR 97/18,
p. 32, par. 3.3; CR 97/19, p. 9, par. 3.25; CR 97/19, p. 10, par. 3.29; CR 97/19, p. 11, par. 3.35;
CR 97/19, p. 12, par. 3.38); M. Schachter, une fois (CR 97/19, p. 31, par. 4.18); M. Matheson, une
fois (CR 97/19, p. 46, par. 6.3); M. Andrews, deux fois (CR 97/19, p. 52, par. 7.2; CR 97/19, p. 54,
par. 7.5); et bien entendu; il y a eu d'autres mentions de l'article 103 au deuxième tour.
Compte tenu de cette insistance de nos adversaires sur la pertinence de l'article 103, il est
nécessaire de souligner, une fois encore, que cet article se rapporte à des questions de fond. Il
n'a rien à voir avec les pouvoirs des organes ou avec le caractère justiciable.
Deuxièmement : il se peut que les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité et les éléments de
preuve documentaires qui s'y rapportent constituent ou ne constituent pas la preuve déterminante
d'obligations issues de la Charte en conflit avec la convention de Montréal. Pour statuer sur cette
question, il faut examiner avec soin les termes des résolutions et les circonstances dans lesquelles
elles ont été adoptées; la portée de ce processus a été expliquée par mon éminent collègue, M. Suy,
pendant le premier tour.
Troisièmement : dans le même contexte général, il peut y avoir des comportements des Etats
défendeurs qui n'aient absolument aucun rapport avec les résolutions, qui précèdent les résolutions
dans le temps et qui mettent en cause de graves violations d'obligations issues de la Charte. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
Comme je l'ai indiqué au cours de l'argumentation du premier tour, les menaces bilatérales
d'emploi de la force émanant des responsables supérieurs des Etats défendeurs sortent du cadre des
résolutions. Elles impliquent des violations des principes de la Charte des Nations Unies et
constituent, à ce titre, des violations d'une convention multilatérale valide, que l'invocation de
l'article 103 ne saurait rendre légitimes. Les menaces d'emploi de la force pour inciter la Libye à
accepter l'inexécution de la convention de Montréal ne peuvent pas être justifiées par référence à
l'article 103.
Quatrièmement : des motifs importants autorisent à estimer qu'un procès pénal honnête n'est
possible ni en Ecosse, ni aux Etats-Unis. Les considérations pertinentes ont été exposées dans le
mémoire de la Libye (p. 133-134, par. 5.56-5.82).
D'après des sources respectables, le droit à un procès pénal équitable est considéré comme un
droit fondamental de l'homme. Tel a été l'avis de l'Institut de droit international, exprimé dans une
résolution adoptée à la session de Cambridge en 1983 (mémoire de la Libye, p. 133, par. 5.53).
Monsieur le Président, il est généralement admis que les principes fondamentaux des droits
de l'homme font partie des principes de la Charte des Nations Unies. Parmi les sources faisant
autorité à l'appui de cette façon de voir figurent les suivantes : avis consultatif de la Cour sur la
Namibie (C.I.J. Recueil 1971, p. 57); affaire des Otages de Téhéran (C.I.J. Recueil 1980, p. 42);
e
Restatement, 3 éd., Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 1987 (par. 701, commentaire d))
La portée des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité, ainsi que des dispositions de la convention
de Montréal doit être déterminée par référence aux principes de la Charte. Les principes de la
Charte ne se limitent pas à la teneur du chapitre VII.
A ce point il est nécessaire de revenir aux dispositions de l'article 103 de la Charte.
Celui-ci se réfère aux obligations fondées sur la Charte par rapport à celles qui se fondent sur
d'autres instruments internationaux.
Ensuite, il y a l'article 24, aux termes duquel le Conseil de sécurité «agit conformément aux
buts et principes des Nations Unies»; et l'article 25, aux termes duquel les Etats Membres
appliquent les décisions du Conseil de sécurité «conformément à la Charte». - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
Dans cette perspective l'article 103 ne fournit pas de solution. Bien plutôt, il pose le
problème, c'est-à-dire que la mention des principes des Nations Unies met en cause deux sortes
d'obligations fondées sur la Charte, d'une part les dispositions des articles 24 et 25, d'autre part, les
principes fondamentaux des droits de l'homme.
Cet alignement d'obligations fondées sur la Charte indique que, dans les circonstances des
présentes affaires, le recours à l'article 103 ne produit ni un résultat simple, ni une priorité
préfabriquée des obligations.
Je me réfère maintenant à la question des menaces d'emploi de la force.
Dans ma plaidoirie du premier tour, j'ai expliqué la pertinence des menaces d'emploi la force
du point de vue des questions juridiques de fond relatives à la convention de Montréal. Si M. X
passe un contrat avec M. Y et si, à quelque moment ultérieur, M. X menace d'employer la force
pour empêcher M. Y d'exercer une option qu'il a en vertu du contrat, c'est là dis-je, une rupture de
contrat. Le comportement de M. X peut inclure aussi une responsabilité non contractuelle, mais
même de la sorte il ne cesse pas d'être une rupture de contrat.
Ainsi, quand mon éminent adversaire M. Greenwood s'est plaint, lundi, que la Libye n'ait pas
indiqué l'«acte par lequel la convention a été écartée», je donne de cette manière la réponse à sa
question, ou du moins une partie de la réponse. Le Royaume-Uni et les Etats-Unis n'assistent guère
la Cour par leur rejet péremptoire des éléments de preuve de la Libye relatifs aux menaces d'emploi
de la force. Examinons un moment la nature de ces preuves.
D'abord, ces éléments de preuve sont constitués par des citations directes de déclarations de
responsables supérieurs en réponse à des questions.
Les réponses ont été fournies par le département d'Etat des Etats-Unis en la personne de
M. Boucher; président, M. Bush; secrétaire à la défense, M. Cheney; ministre d'Etat, Foreign
Commonwealth Office, M. Douglas Hogg; Vice-Président, M. Quayle et la porte-parole du
Foreign Commonwealth Office à Londres.
Les sources dans lesquelles ces hautes personnalités ont été citées étaient les suivantes :
a) le Federal News Service des Etats-Unis rendant compte d'instructions du département d'Etat,
b) une allocution télévisée du président Bush à l'association des journaux du Sud, - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
c) le compte-rendu d'une interview de la NBC sur le programme : «Meet the Press»,
d) le compte-rendu officiel des débats parlementaires au Royaume-Uni,
e) le Middle East Economic Digest; et, en dernier lieu,
f) le journal The Scotsman.
Donne-t-on à entendre que ces diverses sources aient inventé les questions et les réponses ?
Comment peut-on expliquer la cohérence de la phraséologie ? Les responsables usaient-ils de
télépathie ?
C'est un fait frappant que les menaces ont continué même après que la résolution 748 avait
été adoptée le 31 mars 1992. Le 2 avril M. Pickering, représentant des Etats-Unis auprès des
Nations Unies, a répondu, selon un rapport du Washington Post, à la question de savoir si l'on
envisageait de nouvelles actions : «nous ne pouvons ni inclure ni exclure aucune action
particulière» (Washington Post, 3 avril 1992, p. A24, col. 3).
Ainsi, le 2 avril 1992, un responsable américain se servait-il encore de la formule menaçante
qui était apparue pour la première fois dans le dossier quand les instructions du département d'Etat
avaient été données le 14 novembre 1991, quatre mois plus tôt.
L'éminent agent du Royaume-Uni s'est référé à ces déclarations officielles de divers
responsables comme à des «déclarations publiques ambiguës» (CR 97/22, p. 14).
Or, Monsieur le Président, l'ambiguïté était une ambiguïté parfaitement mesurée et, compte
tenu de l'expérience de la Libye, elle comportait une gamme d'actions qui incluaient l'emploi d'une
force très considérable contre les villes libyennes, sans prévenir, à deux heures du matin.
On peut illustrer l'effet des déclarations réitérées avec soin en se reportant à l'opinion du
correspondant économique du Times de Londres dans le numéro du 21 mars 1992:
«La livre et les valeurs ont fini la semaine presque comme elles l'avaient commencée,
une semaine pourtant pleine d'indices économiques sinistres.
Après des chiffres d'où résultait la baisse du taux annuel de l'inflation en février au-
dessous du taux allemand pour la première fois en près de vingt-cinq ans, la livre
sterling était hier à 2,8619 marks à la fermeture officielle de la banque d'Angleterre,
c'est-à-dire près de la moitié d'un pfennig en plus de son niveau de clôture de jeudi.
Elle avait commencé la semaine à 2,8572 marks.
Les girations de la semaine ont laissé hier la livre à 1,7007 dollars des Etats-Unis,
c'est-à-dire plus d'un cent en-dessous du taux de la clôture précédente. L'indice - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
pondéré du sterling en fonction des échanges internationaux est resté stable à 89.8,
précisément là où il avait commencé la semaine. La force du dollar a été la
caractéristique principale des marchés des changes hier. La monnaie américaine a
progressé après des rapports selon lesquels le président Bush était en train de discuter
de l'Iraq avec ses chefs d'Etat-major. Par crainte d'une action militaire dans le Golfe,
ou contre la Libye, les investisseurs ont cherché refuge dans le dollar, le port sûr
traditionnel.
Bien que l'inflation annuelle de la Grande-Bretagne soit restée stable à 4.1 pour cent
en février, ce qui a un peu déçu la cité, les changeurs ne se sont pas laissé
impressionner par les données. La livre a été aidée surtout par le mark plus mou, dont
l'attrait avait aussi souffert de nouvelles grèves du personnel des banques allemandes.»
Se référant aux indices économiques de la semaine précédente, le correspondant économique
M. Colin Narbrough déclare dans son rapport : «Par peur d'une action militaire dans le Golfe, ou
contre la Libye, les investisseurs ont cherché refuge dans le dollar, le port sûr traditionnel.» Ainsi
n'était-ce pas la seule Libye qui avait conscience de la situation en mars 1992, mais il y avait aussi
d'autres assemblées du suffrage.
Pour conclure sur les éléments de preuve des faits, les déclarations publiques invoquées
comme preuves de menaces d'emploi de la force ont été faites officiellement dans l'intention précise
«d'envoyer des signaux» annonçant que les Etats-Unis, en particulier, étaient prêts à employer la
force contre la Libye, si bon leur semblait, pour atteindre leurs buts politiques.
Dans cette perspective, il est fort étrange d'entendre nos adversaires mentionner «les
allégations ignominieuses et sans fondement de la Libye à l'égard de menaces d'emploi de la
force...» (Voir M. Greenwood, CR 97/22, p. 17, par. 2.5.)
Il convient aussi d'apprécier le cadre juridique. L'affaire des Essais nucléaires a établi que
l'intention d'un gouvernement peut être inférée de déclarations faites aux médias par des ministres
et par le chef d'Etat. De telles déclarations constituent des déclarations publiques d'individus dans
l'exercice de leurs fonctions officielles.
Pour conclure il convient de faire observer que les menaces d'emploi de la force proférées
contre la Libye ne font pas seulement partie de l'histoire de la présente affaire. Comme
M. El-Murtadi Suleiman l'a établi pendant le premier tour, les Etats-Unis ont menacé d'employer
des armes nucléaires contre les installations de Tarhunah encore en avril de l'année
dernière (CR 97/20, p. 15, par. 2.10). - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
Je peux maintenant passer à l'argument des Etats-Unis selon lequel une décision de la Cour
sur le fond dans les présentes affaires serait «moot», ou sans objet.
Pendant le premier tour, M. Crook a monté cet argument, citant l'affaire du Cameroun
septentrional et celle des Essais nucléaires (CR 97/19, p. 23-24, par. 3.82-3.86). L'argument figure
aussi dans les plaidoiries du deuxième tour de MM. Matheson et Andrews (M. Matheson,
CR 97/19, p. 47, par. 6.5; CR 97/22, p. 28, par. 4.11; p. 30-31, par. 4.18-4.20; M. Andrews,
CR 97/22, p. 33-34, par. 5.5).
L'argument tiré du manque d'objet est entaché de défauts graves sur deux plans.
Premièrement, cet argument n'est rien de plus qu'une nouvelle formulation de celui qui
consiste à soutenir que l'examen judiciaire des décisions des organes politiques est exclu, ou à tout
le moins limité de diverses manières.
Deuxièmement, cet argument est contredit par les réalités des affaires dont il s'agit. J'ai déjà
souligné que les menaces bilatérales d'emploi de la force ne sont pas validées par les résolutions du
Conseil de sécurité et que les violations de la convention de Montréal comportent donc une
dimension temporelle. C'est l'une des questions à examiner lors de la procédure sur le fond. En
d'autres termes, même si les résolutions pouvaient empêcher une sorte quelconque de violations
pendant une période, elles n'auraient pas cet effet pour la période antérieure au 31 mars 1992.
Dans ce contexte, rien n'établit que les résolutions soient permanentes ou d'effet dispositif.
Des résolutions peuvent être modifiées, des sanctions peuvent être levées, des appréciations
politiques peuvent être modifiées.
Il n'y pas là de manque d'objet, ni d'analogie politique ou juridique avec les situations des
affaires du Cameroun septentrional et des Essais nucléaires.
Je passe enfin à la question générale de la possibilité d'examiner les décisions des organes
politiques de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Dans cette perspective les Etats-Unis se sont
plaints (en la personne de M. Matheson) qu'au premier tour je n'ai cité «aucun précédent où la Cour
a annulé une décision du Conseil ou affirmé qu'elle était en droit de le faire» (CR 97/23, p. 27,
par. 4.4). - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
Monsieur le Président, ici et ailleurs, mes adversaires passent à côté de la question. Dans
chacune des affaires que j'ai citées, la Cour n'a pris en compte par référence aucune version de la
possibilité d'un examen provisoire ou d'un principe de limitation de la fonction judiciaire. La
décision en l'affaire de Nauru est un exemple utile. Il s'agissait d'une résolution de l'Assemblée
générale établissant l'indépendance de la République de Nauru. La résolution était d'effet dispositif
et obligatoire. Cependant la Cour n'a eu absolument aucune hésitation à interpréter la résolution et
à en évaluer les effets juridiques. Dans l'affaire de l'Admission le même processus a été appliqué à
une catégorie entière de résolutions du Conseil de sécurité.
Voilà dans quel contexte mes éminents adversaires ont émis des objections contre le fait
d'invoquer des affaires relatives à des avis consultatifs. Ils se sont plaints que les invoquer ne
tienne pas compte de la distinction entre la compétence contentieuse et la compétence
consultative(voir Mme Zoller, CR 97/19, p. 41-42, par. 5.11; lord Hardie, CR 97/22, p. 28,
par. 3.10; M. Matheson, CR 97/23, p. 27, par. 4.4-4.7).
Bien entendu, le présent débat ne porte pas sur la différence entre les deux sortes de
juridiction. Le point pertinent, c'est que, mutatis mutandis, quand la Cour exerce sa compétence
consultative, elle prend des décisions sur les effets juridiques des actes des organes politiques.
La Cour ne se tient pas à l'écart, bien qu'elle ait le pouvoir de le faire. Les questions de
recevabilité peuvent être invoquées par la Cour à propos de l'exercice de sa compétence
consultative, étant donné qu'elle tient une certaine discrétion de l'article 65 du Statut.
Toutefois, dans les affaires que j'ai citées lors du premier tour, la Cour ne s'est pas tenue à
l'écart.
Pour achever mes observations sur ce point, je voudrais signaler que mes éminents
adversaires n'ont pas tenté de contredire les opinions de sir Gerald Fitzmaurice relatives à
l'importance et au caractère juridique des avis consultatifs.
Au bout du compte, la Cour n'évite pas de procéder à des évaluations juridiques des actes des
organes politiques, que ce soit en vertu de sa compétence contentieuse ou à propos de la
compétence qu'elle a pour donner des avis consultatifs. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
L'attitude de la Cour est illustrée par le passage suivant de son avis consultatif en l'affaire de
l' Admission :
«le caractère politique d'un organe ne peut le soustraire à l'observation des dispositions
conventionnelles qui le régissent, lorsque celles-ci constituent des limites à son
pouvoir ou des critères à son jugement. Pour savoir si un organe a la liberté de choisir
les motifs de ses décisions, il faut se référer aux termes de sa constitution. En l'espèce,
l'article 4 fixe le cadre dans lequel s'exerce cette liberté, cadre qui comporte une large
liberté d'appréciation. Il n'y a donc aucune contradiction entre, d'une part, les
fonctions des organes politiques et, d'autre part, le caractère limitatif des conditions
prescrites.
On a cru trouver dans les responsabilités politiques assumées par le Conseil de
Sécurité en vertu de l'article 24 de la Charte, un argument justifiant la nécessité
d'assurer, tant au Conseil de Sécurité qu'à l'Assemblée générale, une liberté complète
d'appréciation en matière d'admission de nouveaux Membres. Mais la disposition de
l'article 24, en raison même de sa très grande généralité, ne peut, en l'absence de tout
texte, affecter la réglementation spéciale de l'admission telle qu'elle ressort de l'article
4.» (C.I.J. Recueil 1947-1948, p. 64.)
Il n'y a donc aucun signe d'inhibition judiciaire dans cet avis consultatif.
J'ai maintenant atteint mes conclusions.
La première est qu'aucune limitation de droit ne restreint la fonction de la Cour dans
l'examen des effets juridiques des résolutions des organes politiques. De plus, aucune limitation de
droit de ce genre n'est reconnue dans la pratique de la Cour.
La deuxième conclusion, c'est qu'il y a, à l'ordre du jour, des questions de premier plan
relatives au fond de l'affaire, et qu'elles ne sont préliminaires en aucun sens.
Dans cette perspective, l'application de l'article 103 ne résout pas les problèmes que les Etats
défendeurs affrontent quand ils essayent d'imposer à la Cour un principe d'immunité ratione
materiae.
La troisième conclusion, c'est que les demandes de la Libye ne sont en aucun sens «moot»
(ou sans objet).
Ainsi s'achève mon argumentation du deuxième tour. Je voudrais vous demander de donner
la parole à l'agent de la Jamahiriya Arabe Libyenne. Je vous remercie.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie,
Monsieur Brownlie. L'agent de la Libye a maintenant la parole. - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
Mr. ELHOUDERI: Mr. President, Members of the Court, at the end of our oral arguments,
and in accordance with Article 60, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, Libya confirms that it
requests the Court to adjudge and declare:
— that the Preliminary Objections raised by the United Kingdom must be rejected and that, as a
consequence:
(a)the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the Application of Libya,
(b)that the Application is admissible,
— that the Court should proceed to the merits.
A signed text containing these submissions will be communicated to the Court.
Mr. President, let me take this opportunity to thank you, and also the distinguished Members
of this Court, for the patience and attention with which they have listened to our oral arguments. I
also thank the Registry for its valuable assistance during the proceedings. May I also take this
opportunity to wish Judge Kooijmans a speedy recovery.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, today we leave this Court confident that it will reach a
just and equitable decision, for which we thank it in advance.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie,
Monsieur Elhouderi. La Cour prend note des conclusions finales dont vous avez donné lecture au
nom de la Jamahiriya arabe libyenne dans les deux affaire. Deux membres de la Cour souhaitent
poser des questions aux Parties. Je donne d'abord la parole à M. Schwebel.
M. SCHWEBEL : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le Président. Ma question s'adresse à la Libye
et toutes observations du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis sont également les bienvenues.
M. Suy a prétendu aujourd'hui que la décision du Conseil de sécurité dans la résolution 748,
selon laquelle le fait que la Libye n'ait pas donné suite à la résolution précédente du Conseil
constituait une menace contre la paix et la sécurité internationales, est une décision ultra vires qui
constitue un détournement de pouvoir. Cela signifie-t-il que la Libye considère que la Cour peut - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
substituer son jugement sur ce qui constitue une menace contre la paix à la décision du Conseil de
sécurité sur ce qui constitue pour lui une menace contre la paix ?
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie,
Monsieur Schwebel. Je donne maintenant la parole à M. Koroma qui souhaite poser une question à
toutes les Parties.
M. KOROMA : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le Président. Ma question s'adresse à toutes les
Parties qui comparaissent devant la Cour dans cette affaire.
Il a été soutenu en la présente instance que la Cour pouvait exercer un contrôle judiciaire sur
les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité, notamment sur celles qui intéressent directement la question
dont nous sommes saisis. Dans quelle mesure ce contrôle peut-il, le cas échéant, porter sur la
validité de ces résolutions, ou ce contrôle peut-il avoir pour effet de porter sur la validité de ces
résolutions à tous égards ?
Je reconnais que les Parties ont abordé ces questions dans leurs écritures et plaidoiries, mais
il pourrait s'avérer instructif pour elles de regrouper et d'énoncer leurs ultimes conclusions.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie Monsieur
Koroma. Ceci nous mène au terme de cette série d'audiences. La Cour saurait gré aux Parties si
celles-ci pouvaient lui faire tenir les réponses aux questions qui viennent d'être posées dans un délai
de deux semaines. Des copies des questions seront fournies aux Parties.
Je voudrais adresser l'expression de mes sincères remerciements aux agents, conseils et
avocats de toutes les Parties pour l'aide précieuse qu'ils ont apportée à la Cour dans
l'accomplissement de sa tâche, de même que pour la courtoisie et la coopération dont ils ont fait
preuve au cours de cette procédure. Conformément à la pratique habituelle, je prie les agents de
rester à la disposition de la Cour pour toute autre information dont elle pourrait avoir besoin et,
sous cette réserve, je déclare maintenant close la procédure orale sur les exceptions préliminaires
dans l'affaire relative à des Questions d'interprétation et d'application de la convention de
Montréal de 1971 résultant de l'incident aérien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne c.
Royaume-Uni) et dans l'affaire relative à des Questions d'interprétation et d'application de la - Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu.-
convention de Montréal de 1971 résultant de l'incident aérien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique). La Cour va maintenant se retirer afin de délibérer. Les agents
des Parties seront informés, en temps utile, de la date à laquelle la Cour rendra ses arrêts.
Aucune question ne devant être dans l'immédiat examinée par la Cour, celle-ci va se retirer.
L'audience est levée à 12 h 35.
Traduction