Traduction

Non-Corrigé Traduction
Uncorrected Translation
I

CR 9814(traduction)
CR 9814(translation)

Vendredi mars 1998

Friday 6 March 1998 The PRESIDENT: Veuillez vous asseoir. Professeur Cot, veuillez poursuivre.

Mr. COT: Mr. President, Members ofthe Court, you will recall that in speaking yesterday I

moming onNigeria's third Preliminary Objection,1showedthat Ouropponents, for al1their talent,

had not succeeded in transforming a short subparagraphIXg;of the Statute of the Lake Chad

BasinCommission into an impressiveprocessfor the bindingandexclusive settlementof disputes.

It remains for me to consider an argument put forward by Mr. Brownlie on an alternative basis.

1have some doubts, moreover, on the soundnessof the principal argument.

III. The Court has the duty to determine the territorial dispute in the Lake Chad region w

35. In the alternative, said Mr. Brownlie, addressing the Court,and 1summarizehis words:

if the Courtoes not find that the LCBC has exclusivejurisdiction, it should at least show the

"judicial restraint" which it applied in the Northern Cameroonscase.

36. Mr. President, 1 have re-read the Judgment of 2 December 1963 closely. 1 found no

analogywith the present case,apart fromthe presenceof Cameroon. In the Northem Cameroons

case the Court held that it could not decide the case, because its Judgment: "must have some

practical consequenceinthe sensethat itcanaffect existinglegalrightsor obligationsofthe parties,

thus removing uncertainty from their legal relations" (I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 34).

37. Yet in the present case it is indeeda matter of protecting existing, legallyvalid rig-ts,

rightsguaranteedundertreaties, it is amatteroftakingdecisionsrelatingto existinglegalsituations

which should continue to exist; lastly, if need be, it is a matter of holding Nigeria responsible.

38. Apartfromvery unusual hypotheses,and theNorthernCameroonscasewas unusual,the

Courtisat painsnot to rely uponthe conceptof "judicialpropriety"without havingseriousgrounds

to do so. As Sir Geraldiîzmaurice recalled in the same case:
- , ..'
- - "it is in a general way evident that courts existin order to go into and decidethe cases
they are both duly seised of, and havejurisdiction to entertain, without picking and
choosing which they will pronounce upon,and which not" (ibid., p. 101). -3-

39. 1would add that the Court'sdecision would in no way hinder the work of demarcation

undertakenby the LCBC. On the contrary, inrecording,irrefutably, the delimitation ofthe fiontier

the Court would confirm the framework within which the LCBC works and would thus illustrate

the complementarity of the intervention of the two institutions.

40. Al1in all, the Court has no reason not to give a ruling on the delimitation in the Lake

Chad area. Cameroon even believes, respectfully, that it is the Court'sduty to do so.

41. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in the final analysis, Nigeria's third Preliminary

Objection does not present much of a legal difficulty, asthe Court will well understand. Basically,

it is a matter of applying the elementary principles of international law: the principle of the

complementarity of the means of settling disputes peacefully and the principle of thejurisdiction

of the Court to decide a legal dispute given the consent of the parties involved.

42. Cameroon would willingly have avoided recalling these elementary principles and has

been obliged to do so by it opponents. We respectfully request the Court to dismiss this objection

which has no foundation whatsoever in fact or in law.

Mr. President,Members ofthe Court, 1 come nowtoNigeria's fourthPreliminaryObjection.

Fourth Preliminary Objection:

The Court cannot determine the boundaryin Lake Chadowing to the existence of a tripoint

1.According to this fourth Preliminary Objection: "The Court should not in these

proceedings determine the boundary in Lake Chad to the extent that that boundary constitutes or

is constituted by the tripoint in the Lake" (NPO, 4.12).
.:+
., . 2.1 would point out straightawaythat the Republic of Cameroon does not request the Court

to "determinethe tripoint in Lake Chad", contraryto Ouropponents'assertion, but to adjudge and

declare that the boundary follows the astronomical CO-ordinatesspecified in Oursubmissions. In

other words, we are not requesting the Court to recognize the boundary of Cameroon as far as a

tripoint, but as far as a point determined by the treaty instruments in force. We are not requesting -4-

you to "determine that tripoint" in a manner authoritatively binding on the third State, isich

Chad.
I

I. The consistentjurisprudence ofthe Court permitsit to delimita treaty frontierwhich may
concern a third State

3. Yourconsistentjurisprudence permitsyouto delimitatreatyboundarywhich mayconcem

a third State. You have never refusedto rule on a delimitationbecausea tripoint existed. In the

Frontier Dispute (BurkinaFaso/Mali) case, the Chamber considered that "its jurisdiction is not

restrictedsimplybecausethe end-pointofthe frontierliesonthe frontierof a third State nota party

to the proceedings."LC.J.Reports 1986, p. 577, para. 46).
w
4.You have confirmed this jurisprudence in the treaty delimitation cases which have been

referred to the Court: the Land, Islandand MaritimeFrontierDispute (El Salvador/Honduras.

Nicaraguaintervening)I.C.J . eports1992, pp. 401-402,para.68); theTerritorialDispute (Libyan

Arab JamahiriydChad), case (I.C.J.Reports 1994, p. 33, para. 63). And it is this situation of

treaty delimitation we now face.

II. Lake Chad has in fact been the subject of a treaty delimitation

5. This delimitation results from the superimposition of successive treaty agreements

concluded between colonial Powers at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth

w
centuries. You will find a precise list of them in Ourpleadings.

6. The Milner-Simon Declaration of 10 July 1919establishes the present boundary. The

CO-ordinatesof the tripoint,to which reference is expressly made, are settled. The boundary

modificationconcems the bipoint onthe southernshore ofLake Chad,moved eastwardsby reason

of the establishment of separate mandates in favour of France and Great Britain over the
-. : J
- two portions of the Carneroons. The Thompson-Marchand Agreementof 9 January 1930makes

no change at al1in the definitive lake boundary, whichis the subject of a marking-out operation

within theframework of the LCBC, as we saw yesterday morning. -5-

7. As you will note, this group of treaties that have enabledthe boundary in Lake Chad to

be delimited by conventional meansdoes not bearprincipallyonthe lakeboundary,but on a much

more extensive section of boundary,mainly on land. The reason why 1make this observation is

to emphasizethat, in the minds ofthe draftsmen ofthese variousagreements, there was no reason

to deal in a special way with the lake boundary andapply a different régimeto it than to the land

boundary .

8. Throughout these procedures the parties to the agreements mentioned, as well as the

League of Nations and the United Nations (may 1Say,as Maurice Kamto didyesterday, that the

international boundaries of Cameroon pay scant heed to the League of Nations and the United

Nations), the parties, as1Say,at no time doubtedthe existence,the need and the lawfulness of a

treaty delimitation in Lake Chad. Having been establisheddefinitively in 1919,and completed in

1931,this delimitation has not been called into question since. It was not until theNigerian claim

to Darak of 14April 1994(MC, Ann. 356) that the first challenge emergedto the lake boundary

determined by the treaties.

III. The pertinent treaties apply to lacustrine spaces

9. Lacustrinespaces,Mr. President, Members ofthe Court,have noclaim tobe exempt from

your jurisprudence on the tripoint, above al1 when they have been the subject of a treaty

delimitation. We thought this point was taken for granted. One or two allusions in the Nigerian

pleadings, oneor two perceptiblehesitations in the statementsof its eminent counsel, induce us to

explain Ourposition on this issue.

10. It istrue that no reason exists to establish differentrégimesfor a delimitation operation

accordingto whatever environment is involved,as the arbitraltribunal stated somewhile back in

theGuinea-BissadSenegaIcase(cf. DelimitationoftheMaritimeBoundaryGuinea-Bissau/SenegaI,

RGDIP, 1990,p. 253, para. 63:). For my part, however,1tend to believe like Mr. Crawford that
2
"The considerations that apply to the issue of the Court'sjurisdiction over the land boundary are

different from those that appYyto the maritime boundary." (CR 9812, p. 39, para. 2). The -6-

geographical situation and accordingly the legal logic applicable, in particular to the situation of

third States in regard to the delimitation,areundamentallydifferent (cf. in this respect Frontier
1
Dispute (BurkinaFaso/Malo, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 578, para. 47). 1 believe too that, starting

But Ourargument to that
from a correct premise, Mr. Crawford reaches a mistaken conclusion.

effectwill be reserved forthe proceedingson the merits, asmycolleague Keith Highetwill explain

to you.

11.By and large scholarly opinion concurs in assimilating lake boundaries and land

boundaries. Above al1it is unanimous in recognizing and endorsing the practice of the treaty

delimitationof lacustrinespaces: Colombos(International Law of the Sea, 4th ed., 1959,p. 164);
w
Oppenheim'sInternational Law (Jennings and Watts,Vol. 1,Parts 2 to 4, 9th ed., 1992, p. 590);

Hyde (International Law, Vol. 1, 2nd ed., 1947,p. 483); Pondaven (Les Lacs-frontière, Paris,

Pedone, 1972,pp. 59 and70). Recourseto the median line or to principles ofequity is envisaged

only where there is no treaty system.

12.Moreover, therecent changes in Lake Chadthrow seriousdoubts on the analogy which

Nigeria draws between lacustrine spaces and maritime spaces. (In using the expression "Lake

Chad", incidentally,1am being a little imprecise, and please forgiveme; generally speaking our

opponents,more accurately, usethe expression "Lake Chad area"to showthat, even in the section

covered by the jurisdiction of the LCBC, the boundary is of a mixed kind, part land, part lake). W

Be that as it may, the drying-up of the lake has made the comparison with maritime spaces

laughable. Inthe dry seasonNigeria is no longer even a riparian of Lake Chad, as the Agent of

Nigeria has shown quite forcefully with the aid of a recent Michelin map, you will recall.

According to that map, in the dry season Nigeria is some 20 km from the shores of Lake Chad.

The problemsposed by the managementof Lake Chadhave nothingto do with the delimitationof

the territorial sea or the exploitation of the continental shelf.1 would observe that the LCBC

marking-out operations posed no major problem other than the confusion between a boundary
'I

beacon and a telegraph pole, a problem which does not especially lend weight to the analogy between Lake Chad and maritime spaces. The parties to the successive delimitation agreements

took due account, moreover, of the particularnature of Lake Chad, of its considerablefluctuations

in level and therefore in its "s'hores",by opting for a delimitation by astronomical co-ordinates

ratherthan by reference to a "median line" which may Varyat the whim of hydrological changes

(Pondaven, op. cit., p. 107).

13. Clearly, therefore, what we have here is a treaty delimitation by mutual agreement.

Accordingly, whatever the status of the territory concerned - land, river, lake or maritime - the

international agreement is binding on the parties. Pacta sunt servanda.

IV. The analogy withtheLibyMalta case bears no scrutiny

14.Mr. President,Membersofthe Court,counselforNigeria has placed greatreliance onthe

LibydMalta Judgment (Continental SheIf (LibyanArab JamahiriydMalta), Judgment, pp. 13 et

seq.) in order to dispute the application of your traditional jurisprudence on the tripoint to the

present case and in order to seek yet another reversa1of it. 1 for my part will not pronounce on

the safeguarding of rights of third parties in maritime spaces and on the suggestion made by Our

opponentsthatthere shouldbe iidifferent trend, a change of direction in the Court'sjurisprudence,

since that is not the purpose of'Ourdiscussion. And 1 see one or two fundamental objections to

applying such arguments to the:delimitation of the boundary in the Lake Chad area.

(a) The distinctionbetweenmuritirnespaces and land or lacustrinespaces

15. Thefirst fundamental objection: ithasto do withthedistinction between maritime spaces

on the one hand, and land and Yacustrinespaces on the other. As the Charnber of the Court put it

in the Frontier Disputecase:

"Thelegalconsiderations which haveto be taken intoaccount in determiningthe
location of the-land [and 1would add lacustrine] boundary between parties are in no
way dependent onthe position of the boundary between the territory of either of those
parties and the territory of a third State." (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 578, para. 47.)

16. The situation in the 1,ake Chad area is indeed hndamentally different from that in the
.. . <}
- - LibydMalta case. From the geographical point of view there is no high sea, no contiguousspace not subject to any territorial sovereignty. 1 would observe in passing that moreover, in

LibyaIMalta,the issue was in no way that of a tripoint. The situationdiffers legallytoo, the rules
t
of delimitation are different,the recourseto considerationsof equity- even more markedwhere

a continental shelfis concemed, as in the LibydMalta case - is inconceivablein regard toa land

or lacustrinedispute except in very particular circumstancesand to a very limited extent.would

add,and remind you, that in the case of a conventionaldelimitationby treaty there is no question

of this.

(b) The distinctionbetweentreaty settlement and non-treaty situation

17.In the LibydMalta case, no treatydelimitedthe spaces disputedbetweenthe three States
-
concemed. The disputethereforebore not merelyon the line of delimitation,but also, andperhaps

to a greater extent, on the principles of delimitationthemselves.

18.Once a boundary is defined by a group of treaties, as in the present case, any dispute

relates to the validity, to the interpretation ofthe treaties concemed.The Statute of the Court,

incidentally, recognizes the specificity of this situation in the provision in Article 63, which

automatically makes intervention available to States parties to the conventions in question,thus

offering them an additional safeguard for asserting their rights.

(c)Diffence accordingto whether the third State hasput fonvard its views or not

19.The third objection is that, in the LibydMalta case, the third State had made itsclaims w

known. Italy hadrequested,unsuccessfully,to intervene. It had acquaintedtheCourtwith itsviews

on the delimitation envisaged. And the Court had taken due account of that position in the

following terms of its Judgment:

"TheCourt,havingbeen informedof Italy'sclaims,andhavingrefusedto permit
that Statetoprotectits intereststhroughthe procedure of intervention... ensuresItaly
the protection it sough... TheCourt ...will confineitselfto areaswhereno claims
by a third State exist."(I.C.J.Reports 1985,p. 26, paras. 21 and 22.)

20. Now in the presentcase, Mr. President, in no way did Chad, a third State,challengethe
-,': /,
-
territorial delimitation on the basis of whichthe demarcation was undertakenby the LCBC. The - 9 -

representativesof Chad took part in the demarcationoperations. President Déby,the Presidentof

theNinth Summitofthe LCBC,,had occasionmoreoverto Saythe followinginhis openingaddress:

"al1 Our States should ratifi the Treaty on the Demarcation of Boundaries in the
ConventionalBasin. By so doing, wewould be ableto attend,more positively, to the

other numerous issues that require Ourattention." (NPO, Ann. 108,p. 1078.)

21. So let mebe understood correctly. Cameroon does not intend to make the Republic of

Chad Saymore than Chad itself has said. Cameroon is not entrusted with defending the interests

ofChad and has no mandateto do so (Territorial Dispute,I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 579, para. 48).

It seemsto me, though,that the absenceof anychallengebythe Stateconcernedto the delimitation

and the demarcation is a fact, a fact which the Court must take into account. At the very least,

there isno reason to think that Chad is hostile to the principle of a decision by the Court in the

territorialdisputebetween CameroonandNigeria. The Court'sdeterminationcannot affect Chad's

rightsunder Article 59 of the Statute. As to its right of interventionunder Article 63,that remains

intact. In the instantcase, these provisions, itseemsto us, safeguardthe rights of the third State.

Inconclusion,Mr. President,Membersof the Court, let us comebackto the LCBC,the LakeChad

Basin Commission, for one or two closing remarks.

V. The existenceof the LCBC: does notjustiQ a departure fromthe general principlesof the

law of nations inregard to territorial delimitation

22. As reformulatedon Tuesdayby Mr. Brownlie,the fourth PreliminaryObjectionappears

asa logical sequeland ancillaryto the third Objection. In essence,Nigeria considersthat theCourt

cannot deal with the tripoint, the reason beingthe exclusivity of the jurisdiction accorded by the

Partiesto the Lake Chad Basin Commission in the matter of dispute settlement.

23. You willrecall the point of departurein the reasoningof Professor Brownlie. Thatlittle
..
..,"- 'J
subparagraph (g)of Article IX of the Statute of the LCBC. In the meantime, that little

subparagraph expanded, it swelled up, andthe LCBC with it. This modest, technical and valuable

organizationof technical co-operationnow finds itself promotedto the rank of - and 1quotemy

eminentcolleague- a "multilateral and institutional public order system", no less. Really! Its existence entails the application of sui generislegal régime ofquite remarkablecharacteristics,

pushingfar ahead withlegal integration,if we areto believeProfessor Brownlie. We learnthat the
a
member States are al1parties to al1the territorial delimitations in the area. Thusthe four riparian

Statesare not third Statesin respectof the delimitation ofthetwo tripoints. The settlementof the

territorial dispute between Carneroonand Nigeria cannot in those circumstancesbe res inter alios

acta for Chad and Niger,which are said to have a direct legalinterestin it (CR 9812,p. 15). How

have these various legal relationships of a public order nature appeared? Mr. Brownlie has not

explainedthat to us. Yet 1have tried al1the sameto understand, and 1do not believe1distort our

colleague'sthinkingtoo much bypointing out that in his analysis,the LCBC entailssomethinglike
w
a suspension of the sovereignty of the member Statésand something like a replacement of that

sovereigntyby a kind of condominium. In a way, we have an antarcticrégime, obviously without

the pack ice, the penguins or rather therazorbills, and the polar bears too, bearing in mind the

climate which prevails in the Sahel.

24. This is stretchingthelittle sentence in Article(& beyondal1reason tothe point ofan

amiablelegaleccentricity. 1shallnotrevert, Mr. President, Members ofthe Court,tothe argument

1expoundedyesterdayinconnectionwiththe thirdPreliminaryObjection. The legal,administrative

and technical framework set up by the Statute of the LCBC in no wayjustifies a departure from

yourjurisprudence on the tripoint.

25. For al1these reasons, the Republic of Cameroonrequests the Court to rejectthe fourth

PreliminaryObjectionofNigeria. Mr. President, 1would now requestyou to givethe floor to my

colleague, Professor Tomuschat, to expound the positions of the Court on the fifth Preliminary

Objection.

The PRESIDENT: Je vous remercie, Professeur Cot. Je donne la parole au Professor
.,L
Tomuschat. - 11 -

Mr. TOMUSCHAT:

Fifth Preliminary Objection

There is no dispute between the two countries with regard to the course of the frontier

Mr. President, Membersof the Court, it is a great honourfor meto addressthe Court for the

first time. My task is to deal with the fifth Preliminary Objection raised by Nigeria.

1. The Bakassi Peninsula and Darak

1.It is with great astonishmentthat we read inthe Respondent's PreliminaryObjectionsthe

title ofChapter 5,which plainlyStates: "Thereis nodisputeconcemingboundarydelimitationfrom

the tripoint in Lake Chad to the sea" (NPO, p. 85). Clearly, that assertion stood - and

stands - inflagrantcontradictionwiththeactualfacts. Nigeriahas nowdrawncertainconclusions

fiom the gap between its legalargumentsand its actual conduct. It nowadmitsthat there is indeed

a dispute between the two countries regarding the frontier regions of Bakassi and Darak

(A. Ibrahim,CR 9811,pp. 18-2 1; R. Akinjide,CR 9811, p.62), althoughthe contentionthat there

is no dispute conceming the delimitation of the frontier from Lake Chad to the sea was repeated

formally and mechanically during Tuesday'shearings (A. Watts, CR 9812,p. 15).

2. In fact, it would be astoundingto claimthe opposite. The Court hashad occasionto deal

with the situationresulting from Nigeria'smilitary attackagainstthe Bakassi Peninsula, andit has

granted Cameroon'srequest for the indication of provisionalmeasures (Order of 15 March 1996,

I.C.J. Reports 1996,p. 13). Oncearmedforcehas beenused,the existenceof adisputeisno longer

a legal constructionwhich must be establishedat length. It is an obviousreality. Armed conflict

is the ultimate manifestation of a dispute between two parties.

3. There is therefore no need to delve any deeper intothe debate as to whether or not there

u i- .'-
is a dispute conceming Bakassi and Darak. According to the legal instruments goveming

sovereignty in these two regions, it is Cameroon which has territorial sovereignty. Despite this

attribution, Nigeria claims the Bakassi Peninsulaand Darakfor itself. Consequently,there is no

doubt that there is a dispute within the meaning of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court. -12-

II. The other sectors of the frontier

4. There is more,however. The dispute between the two countries is in no way limitedto
+
Darak and the Bakassi Peninsula. Contraryto Nigeria'scontention in its Chapter 5, a contention

echoed at the hearings of Mondayand Tuesday(A. Ibrahim, CR 9811,p. 21; A. Watts, CR 9812,

pp. 15- 16), it is the entire length of the frontier, from the north in Lake Chad to the southemmost

pointof the landfrontier and even beyondthat in the maritime zones to which a coastal Statehas

title,it is thetirelength ofthe frontierwhich isthe subject-matterofthe disputebeforethe Court.

Why? The Respondent would have us believe that of the rest of the border- Le., with the

exceptionof Bakassi andDarak - is astable,undisputedfrontier. Yetthis is notso. First,Nigeria
w
has challenged the entire legal structureon which the frontier betweenthe two countries is based.

Second,this theoreticalchallengehas gonehand in handwithmanyconcretefacts. In manyplaces,

Nigeria has defacto failed to respect the frontier.

(a) The chaüengeto the legal structuredeterminingthefrontier

5. SirArthur Watts attemptedto paintapicture ofan almostidyllicsituationalongtheborder

away from Bakassi and Darak by speaking of a "remarkably stable and undisputed" boundary

(CR 9812,p. 24). He asserted that Nigeria does not challengethe existing frontier. However,we

must take a close look, a very close, look, at the way in which he qualified his words. First, it is

saidthat the frontier"isacceptedinprinciplebyNigeria". "Inprinciple"meansthatNigeria indeed I

reserves the option of derogating from this should it see fit to do so. The meaning of such a

reservation becomes apparent when we note that the recognition is restricted to the frontier

understood as any old line without its legal basis. From that point of view, it is remarkablethat

nowherein the Nigerian argumentsdo we findany referenceto the legal instruments which govem

the course of major stretches of the frontier from north to south, instrumentswhich determinethe
., i \.,
statusof both Darakandthe Bakassi Peninsula. Thisarnountsto emptyingthe so-calledrecognition

of any meaning. Any party which accepts in the abstract a line whose origin itfails to specifj

thereby reserves for itself almost unfettered discretion to fix that line as it sees fit. On the other - 13-

hand, we cannot fail to note that, with regard to the east-west frontier from Mount Kombong to

beacon 64, explicitreferenceis made to the British Order in Council of 1946(A. Watts, CR 9812,

p. 22).

6. The attemptto draw a distinction between a territorial dispute and a dispute concerning

"boundarydelimitationas such" isjust as unacceptable. Issues oftitle and issues of delimitation

of the fiontier cannotbe separated. In so far as an internationaltreaty definesthe frontier between

two countries, it also confers territorial title (see Judgment of the Court of 22 December 1986,

Frontier Dispute, (Z.C.J.Reports 1986,p. 554,paras. 17-18)). Onthe other hand, anyparty which

attemptsto evadethe legaleffectsof an internationaltreaty concludedfor the purposeof delimiting

afrontierby challengingits legal relevanceinitiatesaterritorialdisputewhichaffectsthe saidtreaty

in its entirety. Consequently,if Nigeria would haveus believe that the 1913Convention between

the United Kingdom and Gemany does not determine the course of the frontier in the Bakassi

region,this necessarilyimplies that the treaty "as such" has lostany legal force. This also applies

to the Northern part of the fiontier. Any Party which states that the 1931 Agreement between

Franceand the United Kingdom must beset aside with regardto the Darak region also states that

this treaty is no longer valid.

(b) Theincidents

7. As forthe incidents,we referthe Courtfirst to the maps reproducedon pages 565 and 566

of the CameroonianMemorial of 16 March 1995,which show exactlywhere these incidents took

place. As for the mostrecent events,a very serious sourceof concernfor Carneroon,we shall give

a brief summary:

,. Lake Chad zone
-. <-.-Î
Darak: repeated forays by Nigerian troops and police, backed by the administrative and

politicalauthorities (see OC, Ann. 1,No. 1,Anns. MCP. 7, 8, 30, 37 and 61); an increase inthe

numbers of military personnel in the base unlawfully set up in Darak, (see Anns. MCIP 63); Faransa: Repeated foraysbyNigeriantroops intothe Cameroonianislandof Faransa,where

on several occasions, they replaced the Cameroonian flag by the Nigerian one (see OC, Ann. 1,
*
No. 3);

HiléHalifa: Incursions by Nigerian armed forces which hoisted the Nigerian flag in the

place of the Cameroonian one in the villages of Tchika, Bargaram and Naga, (see OC, Ann. 1,

No. 2); ban imposed byNigerian troops on the Cameroonian population forbidding them from

going beyond a limit arbitrarily determined by the troops (see MC Ann., p. 48); recently, in

June 1997, occupationby Nigerian troops ofthe villages ofTerbu and Karena nearNaga;

Kofia: Claim laid publicly by the Nigerian authoritiesto the villages of Kofia, Kumbelo,
w

Bularam,Kinsayaku,andWakeme,backedupby incursionsbythe police,(seeOC, Ann. 1,No.4);

Adamaoua Province

Typsan: Creation of a Nigerian village and of anemigration-immigration post by the

Nigerian authorities on thebanks of the Typsan river, in Carneroonian territory approximately

6.5km fiom the CameroonNigeria fiontier, 3 km fiom the town of Kontchaand therefore in no

way on the Nigerian side of the fiontier, contrary to what the Agent of Nigeria said (CR 9811,

p. 25), (see OC, Ann. 1,No. 20). The Nigerians are acting there as if they were masters of the

village, building social facilities dispensary, a school, (see MC, pp. 2, 3, 9,13, 16,36, 44).

North-West Province

Yang: In February 1997,approximately500Nigerian soldiers invadedthe Yangregion. On

13March 1997they destroyed the Cameroonian locality of Yang. On 24 April 1997,the Prefect

of the Division of Donga Mantung was arrested half way betweenthe (razed)village of Yang and

Makwe, the river which forms the internationalfiontier between Cameroonand Nigeria. Armed
.>L 2
Nigerian police claimed that the borderwas at Yang. There was a further incursion by Nigerian

policemen in seven vehicles, on 26 June 1997. - 15 -

South-West Province

Akwaya: On 23 March 1993,the region was overfiown by an aircraft instructed to draw up

a geographical map which might serve as a basis for territorial claims (see OC, Ann. 1,No. 30).

Recently, frontier beacon 103 \;vasdestroyed and a logging zone was opened in a protected forest.

8. Withinthe limitedspaçeof ourstatement, it is impossibleto mentional1the other incidents

documented in Carneroon'sobservations on Nigeria's Preliminary Objections and in Cameroon's

Memorandum on Procedure, fmm which it is also apparent that in no way doesNigeria feel itself

obliged to respect the frontier -whichseparatestwo sovereign entities. We are quite prepared to

acknowledge that a small number of the reported incidents involved individuals alone, and had

nothing to do with the Nigeriari authorities. Nonetheless, this type of incident shows at least one

thing, namely that there is substantial insecurity in respect of the existence of the frontier and the

ensuing legal effects. Taken as a whole, al1the incidents only serve to illustrate the calling into

question byNigeria of therelevant legaltreaty instruments. In consequence,there can be nocut-off

dateexcludingrecent eventssince it is an ever-changing,overallsituation. By its steadfast attitude,

Nigeria confirms its equally steadfast rejection of the established frontier.

9. The Respondent noted a passage, an important passage it is true, of the minutes of ajoint

meeting of Cameroonian andNigerian experts, held in Yaoundéin late August 1991, in which the

two sides "noted with satisfactionthat the border [i.e., the land border] has been well defined and

that there are no major problemisat this level". For the Respondent,this passageutterly contradicts

the Cameroonian fears expressed in the present proceedings. Alas, the situation has changed

profoundly sinceNigeria's armedattack against Cameroon inthe Bakassi region. Everything which

until then might have been considereda minor incident, secondaryand negligible in the context of
-42
a policy of good relations with.a powerful neighbour having an infinitely greater economic and

military potential, took on quite another meaning once Nigeria had wrested a good part of the

Bakassi Peninsula from Carneroon by force. As Cameroon amply described in its Mernorial, such

recourseto militaryforce hasoc;curredmainly sincethe month of December 1993. Sincethattime, - 16-

al1relations between the two countrieshavetaken on a differentaspect, Cameroon beingexposed

to a flagrant challengeto its territorial integrity. Minutesdating from 1991cannotthereforeprove
t

the absence of any dispute betweenthe two parties.

III. The Nigerian argument: might is right

10.It is indeed true that Nigeria does not explicitly challenge the entire frontier line.

However the logic inherent in its legal reasoning shows that it reckonsit has a free hand, that it

believes that it may act as itseesfit as soon asa morse1of Cameroonianterritory appears useful

for its purposes. Once again it must be said,that Nigeria did notfilly develop its legalreasoning

in its written statement and that it has also refrained from doing so in its oral statements. 1

Nevertheless, its written statementcontains at least the germ of a line of argument.

11. As for Darak, the Respondent refers (point 5.7) to a note of the Nigerian Govemment

(NPO, 79) in which it is stated, categoricallybut without a shred of proof, that Darak "has always

been part and parce1of Wulgo District of Ngala Local Govemmentarea of Bomo Stateof Nigeria

and [which] has since time immemorial been administeredas such".

Nonetheless, it is patently obvious that according toal1the geographicalmaps showing the

locationof different villages, Darakis situatedonthe Carneroonianside,to the east of the frontier

linewhichwas definedby the variousrelevant instrumentsbinding thetwo countries. If now, with

no mention of that quite complexbut nonetheless extremelyclear legal structure, Nigeria simply w

bases itself on certain facts, with no mention of the applicable treaties, in so doing it calls into

question al1the legal bases of the frontier separatingthe two countries. What it affirms may be
-i (

reduced to a rule underwhich anefectivp irevailsabsolutelyover anyother legaltitle. In short,

Nigeria reckons that to have is to hold.

12. The Nigerian argumentsconcerningthe BakassiPeninsula are even more characteristic.

Under the Anglo-German Conventionof 11March 1913,the entire peninsula formed part of the

territory of the German colony of Kamerun(see Cameroon Memorial of 16 March1995,

points 4.392ff.). Thisfollowsfromthe verywordingofthe Convention(Arts. 18-20).No material - 17-

change has occurred todate. From this, it can only be foundthat the frontier is still the boundary

which was drawn in 1913. Nigeria however does not draw this conclusion. In point 17 of the

PreliminaryObjections, it is alleged that 90 per cent of the population ofthe Bakassi Peninsulais

madeupof membersofthe Efikand Eîut tribeswhich, soNigeriaclaims,areNigerian tribes(NPO,

p. 11). Moreover,Nigeria states that before the arriva1of the German colonial Power, treaties of

protectorate had been concluded betweenthe local chiefs of these tribes and the British Crown.

Similarremarkswere made bythe Agent ofNigeria,who contendedthatthe Bakassi Peninsulaand

Darak are densely populated by Nigerians (CR 9811,pp. 8-19,21, 28).

13. Here again we do not want to delve into the historical aspects of the subject. What is

important is that once again Nigeria is majesticallydisregardingthe relevant legal instrument,the

Anglo-German Convention of 1913,a conventionwhich to date has been consideredthe decisive

parameter for the delimitationof the fiontier. Nigeria lets it be clearly understoodthat in its eyes

the Convention has lost any legaleffect.

14. There can therefore be no doubt that Nigeria calls into question the legalstructure on

which the present fiontier is based. Cameroon has no option but to find that the frontier is in

danger along its entire length. The 1913Convention governsthe course of the frontier from the

seato beacon 64,whilstthe Anglo-FrenchAgreementof 1931and itsrelated instrumentsdetermine

the frontier between Mount Kombong andLake Chad. The whole of this treaty régimeis now

called intoquestionbyNigeria. The onlypartwhich remainsoutsidethe legaldisputeisthe stretch

between MountKombong and beacon 64, whichwas fixedby a British Order in Council of 1946.

Yet even this stretch has in fact been subject to many incidents. This deplorable situation

...i ii unfortunately has an inherent logic. For if, in Nigeria's opinion,might is right or immediately

becomes right, the events which occurred at Darak or in the Bakassi Peninsula may be repeated

tomorrow in any other part of .thefrontier region. - 18-

Cameroon's very existence is called into question

15. For Cameroon, the danger lurking in such a casual approach is unfortunately not t

theoretical. As Nigeria's neighbour, witha frontier of over 1,680km with Nigeria, it finds itself

threatened in its very existence, since territory is the foundation of the State alongside its

population. Not recognizingthe existing dejure fiontiers thereforeamountsto callinginto question

the State of Carneroonitself. Were it possiblefor fiontiers which havebeen well defined in legal

terms and consolidated in practice to be rejected as Nigeria is now attempting to do, the

consequences would be disastrous not only for Carneroon, but for Africa as a whole. That was

preciselythe reason whythe Afiican Heads of State,meeting inthe Organizationof African Unity,
w
agreed in 1964to consider the fiontiers inheritedfrom colonialtimes to be inviolable. It is quite

clear that Nigeria, in the arguments it sets forth, repudiates this important decision, one of the

keystones of international law in Africa. It is therefore patently obvious that there is a genuine,

concrete dispute.

16.It is also apparent fiom the arguments which havejust been set forth that the dispute

between Cameroon and Nigeria is not merely a matter of certain issues of demarcation. The

backgroundto al1the borderincidentsisthe licenceNigeria givesitselfto acceptor reject,as it sees

fit, the fiontier line legallyfixed in the relevant instruments. Onlya clear, unequivocalfindingby

the Court is likely to re-establish the legalder which has been severely disturbed by Nigeria. w

Even forma1assurances given bya Nigerian authority would notbe enoughto clarify the situation

and render the dispute moot. Al1too often in the past Nigeria has madepromises which have not

beenkept. At this stage,the Court alone is abletodispel the doubts,to Saythe least,whichNigeria

hasaroused by its many attacks inthe frontierzone. For Cameroon,it is vital finallyto obtain full,

unchallenged legalsecurity. The carefullyconsidered words of SirArthur Watts (CR 9812, p.19)

- /-/ cannot guarantee this security. - 19-

V. The maritime frontiers

17. What is true of the land frontier also holds true for the various parts of the maritime

frontier betweenthe two countries. In disputingthat the Bakassi Peninsulabelongs to Cameroon,

Nigeria seeks to move the starting-pointofthe maritime delimitationeastwards,thus considerably

reducing the maritime sector which Cameroon mayclaim. For over a quarter of a century now,

Cameroon has endeavouredto reach agreementwith Nigeria in order to achieve a delimitation.

With the Maroua Declarationof 1 June 1975it seemed that the end was in sight. Alas! As the

Court is aware, and as my colleagueMalcolm Shaw recalled, Nigeria hasnever kept itspromises.

Even the Maroua Declaration, whichhad been signed by the then Heads of the two States, fell

victim to this policy of obstruction. Because of this, Cameroon finds itself prevented from

exercising its legitimate rights in the Gulf of Guinea.

VI. Existence of a genuine, concrete dispute

18. Consideringthe scale of the challengebyNigeria to the existingfrontier, it goeswithout

saying that there is a fundamentaldisagreement between Cameroonand Nigeria, a disagreement

which has nothing artificial or theoreticalaboutit. In respect of the Bakassi Peninsulaand Darak,

there are two diametricallyopposite contentions. Cameroon relies on well-defined, specific legal

instruments,whereasNigeria,forreasonswhoseallegedlegalfoundationhasnotyetbeenpresented,

believes that these two parcels of Carneroonian territory corne under Nigerian sovereignty.

Nevertheless, as we have shown, the dispute is not limited to these two zones. The argument

implicitlydefendedbyNigeria consistsin sayingthat the legal instrumentsgoverningtheterritorial

delimitationbetweenthe two countries have lapsed,that they have beenovertaken by elements of

fact,above al1the occupation by Nigerian forces. Evenif this argument appears bereft of legal

foundation, it cannot be disregarded. It providessufficient grounds for concludingthat there is a

dispute obeying al1the criteria laid down in Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court,
, .. L.,
criteria which were recently recalled by the Court in its Judgment of 11July 1996 in the case -20 -

concerning Application of the Convention onthe Prevention and Punishmentof the Crime of

Genocide(Bosniaand Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia)(paras. 29-33).

19.Cameroon finds that any disparities between the situation in law and in fact must be

corrected by adapting the facts to the law, whereas,in the light of what may be gleaned fromthe

Preliminary Objections,Nigeria'sopinion is that the law must bow down in the face of the facts,

includingfacts whichNigeria itself has called into beingbyacts of force. Thereforethe divergence

of views is real, there is nothing artificial about it. The twoParties take oppositeviews on a point

of principle,a point on which an adequateresponse maybe given only by the International Court.

20. It may almost become wearisometo reiterate yet again: Cameroon is not championing
'Cr.
an abstract,distant interest,it is defending itselfagainstactsof usurpationby a powerfulneighbour,

a neighbour which, at potentially least, threatens its very existence. There is no doubt that it has

a very concrete legal interest in seeingthe dispute settled once and for all. Therefore it is totally

incorrectto insinuatethat Cameroon is endeavouringto invent a dispute which does not actually

exist.

VII. Conclusions

21. In conclusion, Cameroon'sarguments may be summed up as follows:

- as Nigeria explicitly recognizes, there is a dispute between the two Parties in respect of the

w
Bakassi Peninsula and Darak:

- howeverthe dispute is in no waylimited to these two border zones. In claimingthe Bakassi

Peninsula and Darak,and in causing serious incidents in a series of places along the border,

Nigeria has called into questionthe whole set of legal instruments which define the frontier.

It is therefore thentire frontierbetweenthe two countrieswhich is at stake, a fact confirmed

by the many border incidentswhich would be inconceivablewere there not a tacit tolerance,

to Saythe least, on the part of the Nigerian authorities; -21 -

- moreover 1would point outthat Nigeria bearsresponsibility for these incidents,which cal1for

reparation. This is also an important element of the current dispute and of Cameroon's

submissions.

Members of the Court, thank you. Mr. President, may 1 ask you to give the floor to my

./ 'V ' colleague Mr. Karnto?

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Professeur Tomuschat. Je donne la parole au

Professeur Kamto.

Mr. KAMTO: Mr. President, Membersof the Court:

1. The Federal Republic of Nigeria claims in its sixth Preliminary Objection that: "Aucun

élémentne permet de décider judiciairementque la responsabilité internationaledu Nigériaest

engagée à raison de prétendues incursions"(CR 9812,p. 27).

2. This sixth Preliminary Objection of Nigeria is extremely confused asto its nature.

For Nigeria is attemptingto construct around Articles 38 and 79 of the Rules of Court an

impossible theory of inadmissibility of an application relying upon insufficiency of the facts

produced therein but subsequently developed in the Memorial. This is not a legal construction,

Mr. President; it is pure intellectual speculationin regard both to the relevant texts governing

proceedings before the Court and to practice before it.

1. There are no new elements in the Memorialof Cameroonwhich do notcome in supportof
its Application

3. For Nigeria, even a State enjoys a certain

"latitudein expanding later upon what it has said in its Application, and in particular

in doing so in its Memorial, it is in essential respects restricted to the case it has
presented in its Application. Had Cameroon chosen, in its Memorial, to give full
details of incursions and incidents initially identifiedin the Application, that might
have constituted an acceptable amplificationof the Application" (NPO, para. 6.9,
pp. 101-102).

4. But wherehasCameroonproducedorsubsequentlydevelopedinitsMemorial orpleadings

facts that do not come in supportof what was said in its Application or do not concern "the case it has presentedin its Application"? Nowhere hasCameroonmodifiedthe objectof the dispute as

formulatedin itscompleted Application,andatno time, eitherin itswritten argumentsor in its oral

pleadings, has it sought tomodiS, its scope.

; 5. We might have expected, Mr. President, that the new elements denounced by Nigeria
- ., L
would bethose contained in the Additional Applicationof Carneroonfiled in the Registry of the

Court on 6 June 1994, complementingits Application institutingproceedings. But Nigeria would

not have beenjustified in making such a claim after having stated,through its Agent before the

Court, at the meeting held on 14 June 1994 between the President of the Court and the

representativesof the Parties, that it "hadno objection to the AdditionalApplication beingtreated
1

as an amendmentto the initialApplication,sothatthe Court coulddealwith thewhole as one case"

(I.C.J.Reports 1994, Order of 16 June 1994,p. 106).

6. Nigeria gives a very persona1interpretationof Articles 38 and 79 of the Rules of Court.

For it claimsthatinasmuchas Article 79oftheRules ofCourt speaksof objection "à larecevabilité

de la requête" , e amendmentto the initial Application cannotconceivablybe concerned,and that

"[tlhe sense of the requirement imposedby Article 38 is that enough detail must be provided by

the applicant Statetoenablethe respondent Stateto knowfrom theterms oftheApplicationenough

aboutthe chargesmade againstitfor itto determineitsresponse"(NPO,paras. 6.7and6.8,p. 101).

Yet neither Article 38, paragraph2, nor even less Article 79 of the Rules of Court imprisons the
'I>

applicant State,asNigeria attemptsto do, inthis absolutistconceptionof theApplicationinstituting

proceedings which should, if Our opponents are to be believed, achieve a sort of factual

completeness from the outset.

7. To tell the truth, Our opponents would have done well to read attentively both Our

Application andOurMemorialof 16 March 1995. ForCarneroonclearly Statesin its Application

that it reservesfor itself "therightto complement,amendor modiQ the presentApplication in the

course of the proceedings ..." (Land and Maritime Boundarybetween Cameroonand Nigeria

(Cameroon v. Nigeria), Application instituting proceedings,p. 15, para. 20); and the reason it reserves this right for itself is that nothing in the Statute and Rules of Court prohibits it from so

proceeding. Onthe contrary,the practice of the Court permits itso to proceed (see, for example,

the Application of Nicaragua inthe MilitaryandParamilitaryActivities case). In its Memorial of

16 March 1995, Cameroon specifies that it made the choice at the stage of its first Memorial to

offer only "a few significant examples that will nevertheless enlighten the Court as to their

permanence andgravity" (MC, p. 574, para. 6.50). It thereby indicatedthat more such examples
.. ".'./
could be provided if necessary, and the "repertory of incidents" supplied as Annex 1 to its

observations on the Preliminary Objections raised by Nigeria arnplyproves that it is not short of

compelling factual evidence.

8. Mr. President, Membersof the Court, the internationallywrongful acts which may serve

as a basis for the international responsibility of a State are one thing; evidence of such

responsibilityis quite another. The former providea basis for admissibilityof the Application and

may therefore be debated in the Preliminary Objectionsphase. As to evidence, it appertainsto the

merits. Yet in undertakinga count and then a classificationof the acts reported by Cameroon,the

counsel of Nigeria engaged last Tuesday in a debate on the validity of the evidence supplied by

Cameroon, somethingthat does not appertainto the PreliminaryObjections in the sense in which

the term is understood by this Court.

9. True, Nigeria is fiee to dispute the evidence producedby Cameroon. But it can only do

so inthe merits phase. As ShabtaiRosennewrites in the latestedition ofhis referenceworkon the

law and practice of the Court:

"it is probable that when the facts and arguments in support of the objection are
substantially the same as the facts and arguments on which the merits of the case

depend, or when to decide the objection would requirea decision on what, in the
concrete case, are substantiveaspects of the merits, the plea is not an objection but a
defence to the merit" (S. Rosenne, TheLaw and Practice of theInternational Court
1920-1996, 3rd ed., Nijhoff, The Hague, 1997, Vol.II, p. 915).

10.Mr. President,the objectioncannotthereforebe raisedagainst Cameroonat this stage of
L. .":f-1
the PreliminaryObjectionsof any insufficiencyof evidence,or evenless its irrelevance. TheCourtwas unambiguouson this point in the case concerningMilitaryand ParamilitaryActivities in and

against Nicaragua (Jurisdiction andAdmissibility):

"Ultimately . ..it isthe litigant seekingto establisha fact who bearsthe burden
of provingit; andincaseswhere evidencemay notbe forthcoming,a submission may
in the judgment be rejected as unproved, but is not to be ruled out as inadmissible
in limineon the basis of an anticipated lack of proof" (I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 437,
para. 101).

II. The statement of facts in an Application instituting proceedings must be succinct

11.Mr. President, Members of the Court, Nigeria also denounces what it claims to be an

insufficiency of detailed developments of the facts in the Application of Cameroon. This

denunciation is substantiated neither in therules of procedure of theCourt nor of course in its W

jurisprudence.

12.Article 38, paragraph 2,of the Rules of Court, which lays down the modalities of an

accountofthefacts in anapplicationinstitutingproceedings,providesthatthe statementofthe facts

must be succinct. The purposeof this eminentlyexplicit provision isto distinguish an application

instituting proceedings which is intended to introduce- 1 insist on the verb introduce- legal

issues and the facts of the case, from the Memorial where those issues and those facts will

subsequentlybe set out in detail and argued. Onecannotbe substitutedfor the other. This is how

the intentionof the PermanentCourt of InternationalJustice must be understoodwhen it stated in
w
the Phosphatesin Moroccocase "that the explanations furnished in the course of the written and

oral proceedings enable itto form a sufficientlyclear idea ofthe natureofthe clai.. ."(P.C.I.J.,

Series A/B,No. 74, p. 21).

13.Furthermore,in accordancewith wellestablishedcase-law dating backto the Permanent

Court of International Justice (Société commerciald ee Belgique, P.C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 78,

p. 173), the Court takes "a broad view" of the provisions of its Rules regarding the form of the

application. Thus, in its Judgment of 2 December 1963 in the NorthernCameroonscase

"[tlhe Court agrees with the view expressed by the Permanent Court in the
Mavrommatis PalestineConcessionscase (P.C.I.J.,SeriesA, No. 2 ,p. 34): 'The Court, whose jurisdiction is international, is not bound to
attach to matters of form the same degree of importance which they

might possess in municipal law."' (NorthernCameroons, Preliminav
Objections,I.C.J. Reports,1963, p. 28).

14. Further on as well, as something alsovery important,the Court adds:

"The Court notes that whilst under Article 40 of its Statute the subject of a
dispute brought before the Court shall be indicated, Article 32 (2) of the Rules of

Court [presentArticle 38, paragraph 21requiresthe Applicant 'asfar as possible'to do
certain things. Thesewords apply not only to speci@ingthe provision on which the
Applicant foundsthejurïsdiction of the Court, but also to statingthe precise nature of
the claim and givinga succinct statement ofthe factsand grounds on which the claim
is based." (I.C.J.Reports 1963, p. 28.)

15. In that case the Court concludedthat the Applicant had "sufficiently complied" (ibid.)

with the relevant provisionsof the Rules. The present case is no different in this respect, whether

one considers the Application instituting proceedings of 29 March 1994 or the Additional

Application of 6 June 1994.

16.Assuredly, Mr. President,the applicantStatecannotbe requiredto presentan exhaustive

account of al1 the elements of the dispute in its Application instituting proceedings.

Professor Abi-Saab very aptly notes that

"the Parties are permittedto remedythe forma1imperfectionsof their pleadingsunder
consideration, for example to complete, in the submissionsor in any other pleading,
the particulars required for the act instituting proceedings" (Les Exceptions
préliminairesdanslaprocéduredelaCourInternationale deJustice,Paris,A. Pedone,
1967, p. 104). [Translationby the Registry .

The reference here to "forma1imperfections'' shouldnot be understood in the sense in which Our

opponentsunderstood it lasttime, sayingthat it concerned merecorrections of detail. It is indeed

inthe sense in which the Court already understands it, echoedhere by Professor Abi-Saab,that of

completing, as necessary, the submissions and any pleadings.

17.It cannot be otherwise, both in the interests of the Parties and for the sake of sound

administration of internationaljustice. Given the complexity of internationaldisputes and the

difficulty sometimes to be encountered in gathering al1factual data and evidence, one could not

require anapplicant to produce at the outset, inthe applicationinstitutingproceedings,al1the facts -26 -

and in full detail, without thereby creating senseless and needless blockages in the contentious

proceedings before the Court.

18. To be sure, Mr. President, as the Permanent Court of International Justice stated in its
.,,v i)

Judgment in the Société commerciad lee Belgiquecase,

"the Court cannot, in principle, allow a dispute brought before itby applicationto be
transformed by amendments in the submissions into anotherkind of disputewhich is
different in character" (P.C.I.J.,SeriesA/B, No. 78, p. 173).

19. This position was echoed by this Court in the Interhandelcase (I.C.J.Reports 1959,

p. 21). But that affirmation in no way applies to the present case.

20. A reading in good faith of the Memorial submitted by Cameroon does not anywhere V

reveal developmentsor new arguments of such a kind as to changethe substanceor character of

the dispute, or even such as might lend it new aspects not contemplated in the Application

instituting proceedings.

21. WhenNigeriaclaimsonpage 105,paragraph 6.12,of itsPreliminaryObjectionsthat "the

Memorial can, at best, only fil1out the details of matter which havebeen identifiedwith sufficient

particularity in the Application",and addsthat "Nigeria thus rejects, as in principleimproper, any

purportedamplificationof thosealleged incursionsinthe Memorial", whatwe havethere isnotjust

an opinion devoid of the slightest legal basis but also contradictory assertions. For if the

Application must, as Nigeria claims, give information "with sufficient particularity in the

Application", it is hard to see what the use would be of their subsequent amplification in the

Memorial". Sucha line of reasoning shouldlogically lead to the conclusionthat the Memorial is

quite superfluous in contentious proceedings before the Court.

22. Thisis anoriginalapproachtothecontentiousproceedingsbeforethisCourtwhich might

helpto shortentheproceedings- alasunreasonably,it seemsto me - at a timewhenthe General

List ofthe Court is beginningto get clutteredwhile, at thesametime, its financialresources seem

to be shrinking; but it would certainly not serve the cause of sound administration of justice. 23. Totell the truth, Nigeria seems to lose sight in this curtailed conception of contentious

proceedings before the Courtthat what wehave is a trial in which the Parties, atal1phasesof the

proceedings exchange arguments and presentthe Court, on an adversarial basis, with evidence.

..i. 1 24. In any event1should liketo emphasize,Mr. President,that both Cameroon'sApplication

and itsMemorialare presented in accordancewith the mode1generally acceptedby theCourt, and

itsufficesto refer to various pleadings produced in somerecent cases to be sure of this. The date

of the filing of the Application as acut-off date fortaking account of factual evidence in support

of the Application cannot be understood as making it quite impossible for the Applicant

subsequentlyto illustrate his legal argumentswith other facts previous to the cut-off date but not

presented in the Application. It simply indicates that at the time of institution ofthe proceedings,

the Applicationmustcomprise at leastone factual elementenabling the Courtto find thata dispute

existsbetweenthe Parties. Now even if wewere inthepresentcaseto confinethat factualelement

to the Nigerian invasion of December 1993to February 1994, is there,not there, Mr. President,

Membersofthe Court,a sufficientbasis forasserting Nigeria's internationalresponsibility?Let Our

opponents then reread C:ameroonfs Application instituting proceedings-that of

29 March 1994 - and they will find an explicit referenceto that event.

III. Nigeria isdevelopingan erroneous "theory"regardingthe internationalresponsibilityof
a State

25. Mr. President, Members of the Court, last TuesdayNigeria developed a very curious

two-planed construction in the matter of international responsibility of the State.

26. On the first plane, it asserts:

"Il peut y avoir, comme à Bakassi, un problème de souveraineté,mais le

Cameroun, ayantmis la frontièreen cause dans certaines zones, ne saurait en même
temps soulever des questions de responsabilité internationalequ'il attribue à des
incursions à travers une frontièrequ'ilconsidère,par hypothèse, comme contestée"
(CR 98/2, p. 37).

27. In other words, Cameroon cannot claimthe responsibilityof Nigeria on accountof the

invasion and the attempt by its troops to annex Bakassi, simply because the boundary of the - 28 -

peninsula is in issue. Yet it isnot becauseNigeria questionsthe common boundaryinthis areathat

Cameroon cannot claim to be at home in Bakassi. And since it is at home in Bakassi, the

internationallywrongfulactsperpetratedbyNigeria inthe peninsula naturallyinvolvethatcountry's

responsibility. Only should Nigeria manage to convince the Court that Bakassi is part of its

territory would its internationalresponsibility not be involved. But it will not be able to do this,

and it knows it will not, because al1the legal titles irrefutably establish the "Cameroonity" of

Bakassi.

28. On the second plane of this original construction,counsel of Nigeria states:

"Si les plaidoiries dans les affaires de différends frontaliersdoivent aussiêtre
encombrées dequestions subsidiaires de responsabilité d'Etat,le traitement de telles
affaires par la Cour s'entrouvera évidemmentrendu plus compliqué"(ibid.).

29. So,forNigeria, complicationor complexitywould constituteacauseof exonerationfiom

a State's internationalresponsibility. Thisisnew and,to Saythe least, strange! For thereisno trace

to be found of such a "theory"either in the draft of the International Law Commission on State

Responsibilityor in even the most adventurouslegalopinion. And if the Court were onlyto agree

to handle uncomplicated cases,States might entertain legitimate doubts about itSutility. 1would

be almost inclinedto Saythat it is because a matter is complicatedor complexthat the Court must

be asked to decide. It is indeed because only a tribunal, yours as it happens,can decide on this

issue of responsibility that Cameroon upholdsthejurisdiction of this Court in the case and hence

the inadmissibility of the seventhPreliminary Objection raisedby Nigeria.

Mr. President, 1thankthe Court for its kind attention andwould askyou to givethe floor to

Mr. Michel Aurillac.

Le PRESIDENT :Merci, Monsieur Karnto. La Cour va maintenant suspendresa séance

pendant 15 minutes avant de reprendre l'audience.

TheCourt adjournedfrom 11.20 to 11.35 a.m.

Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. Je donne maintenant la parole à M. Aurillac. - 29 -

Mr. AURILLAC: Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is a great honour for me to be

taking the floor for the first time before this Court.

- - L'.
1. Nigeria is attempting to draw Cameroon into the merits of the case, which do not fa11
within the domain of the Preliminary Objection

1.My purpose will be modest yet precise. Withoutentering intothe substantivedebate into

which Nigeria is seeking to draw us prematurely, 1should like,purely by way of illustration and

without claimingto be exhaustive,to demonstratethat, inthe legal andjurisprudential framework

clearly definedby ProfessorMaurice Kamto, Carneroonhasfully met the obligationsprovidedfor

in Article 38, paragraph 2, of theRules of Court regardinga statement of the facts underlyingthe

Application.

2. The aim in short is to demonstrate that Ourallegations are neither vague norimprecise.

It will of course be possible to oppose them in the debate on the merits, but the fact that they are

set forth clearlyand preciselyat this stage removes anyjustification forthe PreliminaryObjection.

3. It will indeedbe for the Court to decide in a sovereignmanner on the various aspects of

the dispute relied on by the Applicant and on the appropriatereparation when it adjudicates upon

themerits. Itjust needsto check,at the present stageofthe proceedings,thattheApplicationmeets

the tems of Article 38, paragraph 2, without having, as Nigeria curiously claims,to obtain the

consent of the Respondent on the points to be ruled on.

4. To ward off the incidents to which reference has been made, counsel ofNigeria said on

Tuesday: "Ilest réellementimpossiblede répondrede façonsatisfaisantea depareilles allégations

vagues, générales, ambiguës,peu dignes de foi et incomplètes"(CR 9812,p. 31).

5.Nigeria is infact seeking,as it has always soughtfromthe outset,to cany the debate over

to the realm of the merits, relying on factual arguments which did not have their place in

Cameroon'sApplication but have naturally been developed in the Memorial, and willfurther be

developed in the debate on the merits, after you have ruled on the preliminaryobjections.

If it were otherwise,the concept of preliminary objectionwould become quite meaningless. - 30 -

6. These observationshaving being made,the Courtwill readilydispensewiththe unilateral

way in whichNigeria seeksto chooseamongthe facts set forth by Cameroonin itsApplicationand

its Memorial inorderto demonstrateitsclaimthat, al1inall, in 28 years,there havebeenonlythree

incidents between Lake Chad and the Bakassi Peninsula.

This is not in keepingwith the truth, butthe truth will emerge in the debate on the merits of

the case.

7. You will likewise,Mr. President, Membersof the Court, recognizethe irrelevanceof the

Nigerian line of argument denying any responsibility in the Bakassi and Darak incidents, on the

grounds that what was involved was Nigerian territory, sovereignty over which is disputed by v

Carneroon,and not a boundaryproblem. The incidents presented by Cameroon are clearly stated

and specified. They concema great manypoints al1alongthe boundary. As the proceedingsnow

stand, the Court has to give them consideration. At the risk of being repetitive,hall Sayonce

morethat al1the rest belongsto the debateonthe meritswhile,paradoxically,by makinga pretence

of introducingsuchsubstantivedebateatthepreliminaryobjectionsstage,Nigeriadelaysthis debate

and seeks to avoid it as though in short it fearedthe Court or lacked self-confidence.

II. Cameroon, in its Applicationand itsMemorial, has presented alist, accurate and detailed
although concisely formulated, of the boundary violations from Lake Chad to Bakassi

8. In the view ofthe Republic of Carneroon,the Application institutingproceedingsfiled in W

the Registry of the Court on 29 March 1994and the Application Additional to the Application

instituting proceedings, both of which are treated at due length in the Memorial dated

16 March 1995, presenta list - along the whole of the 1,680 km, or 1,000 miles dependingon

one's viewpoint, of common fiontiers with Nigeria - setting out fiontier incidents ascribed to

Nigeria, which are adequately described and identified tosatise in full the requirements of the

provisions of Article38, paragraph 2.

9. These incidents consist of incursions, ofien followed by occupations of the territory

concemed, either by armed forces or the Nigerian administration, or by Nigerian civilians - 31 -

subsequently supported by the armed forces and the administration of their country which have

intervened and establishedthemselves in Cameroonian territory.

10. Confining myselfto the acts denounced in the Application instituting proceedings, the

Additional Application and the Memorial - these alone are justiciable for inadmissibility, if

any - Cameroon has drawn attentionto incursions and occupations, accompanied by bloody
-_ I
-. incidents which have caused human deaths along the frontier, in the north, the centre and the

south-west, as well as in the Bakassi Peninsula. This account of events is systematicallybacked

up by documents exhibited in annexes to the Memorial.

11. In the opinion of Sir Arthur Watts,the Memorial of Cameroon "nereprésenteguèreun

progrès par rapport àla requête initiale. IIabondeluiaussienaflrmations reprochantauNigéria

de s'êtrelivré àdes actes illicites"(CR 9812,p. 32). A few exampleswill suffice to persuadethe

Court otherwise. They are of a kindto establishthe responsibilityofNigeria for the consequences

of incidents which Professor Tomuschat has already described in substance.

12. First in the north. Cameroon statedin its AdditionalApplicationthat the occupationof

Darak, the first gendarmerie post, located 30 km inside Cameroon in the arrondissement of

Hile-Alifa - an occupation whichbegan in 1987 - was followedby the occupationof a number

of places in Cameroon, al1situated in the départementof Logone-et-Chari,in Far North Province

(AdditionalApplication,p. 2, para. 5). The Memorial of 16March 1995returns in detailto these

events. It notonlyspecifiesthe date ofthebeginningofthe militaryandadministrativeoccupation,

2 May 1987(MC, p. 587,para. 6.82),but also a list of villages invaded andthe precise identity of

the Nigerian troops involved - in this event the 21st Armoured Battalion from Maiduguri

(MC, p. 589, para. 6.84).

13. This illegalandmassive Nigerianpresence spreadto the entirecentral and southernarea

of the frontier. As theRules of Court invite itto do, in its AdditionalApplication Cameroon has

briefly describedfacts of this nature which haveoccurred in various frontier areas. Among other

places it cited Kontcha, situatedinthe départementof Faroet Deo (AdamaouaProvince),of which - 32 -

the village of Typsan is a dependency (Additional Application, p. 2, para. 6). In its Memorial

Cameroonmakes specific reference to the occupation of Typsan. ItStatesthat it was informed at

the beginning of thenth of March 1984of the establishment of a frontier control post by the

Nigerian army "6.5 km inside Cameroonian territory in the Typsan locality of the village of

Kontcha", in the words of the Govemor of Adamaoua Province (MC, p. 591, para. 6.94).

On 12 April 1994 the Minister of Extemal Relations of Cameroon, in a note of protest

addressed to Nigeria (MC, p. 591-592, para. 6.95), denounced this fiesh encroachment on

Cameroon'sterritorial sovereignty,encroachment which was al1the more demonstrative of

Nigeria's strategy forecaractéreaccidentédu relief local" where the attack took place, as
v
Mr. Ibrahim mentioned on Monday (CR 9811,p. 25, para. 301do not ignore the fact that Our

opponents,as was stated a littlewhile ago,place Typsan inNigeria(CR 9811,p. 24, paras. 28-31;

CR 9812,p. 23); this is one among many other elements in the disputewhich the Courtwill have

to resolve when it comes to examine the merits.

14. Its of course in the extreme south-west, in the Bakassi Peninsula, that the most

numerous and most frequent frontier violations have taken place. The proliferation of incidents

provokedbyNigeria is such,Mr. President,Members ofthe Court,that any claimto be exhaustive

at the initial stage of the Application would have beenresumptuous. A procedure ofthat

kind would, moreover, have conflicted with the "concise" characterof the statementof the f-cts.

15. Cameroonhas neverthelessindicatedprecisely in its Applicationthe periodat whichthe
fiontier incidents scattered over the Bakassi area took a much more serious turn (Application of

Cameroon,pp. 6 and 8, para. 9). The invasionof Jabane and Diamond Island by Nigerian troops

fiom 21 December 1993onwardsdoes in fact mark the beginningof an escalationinthe violence,

anescalationwhich caused substantialdamageand lossto Cameroon. They emergeunequivocally

inthedetailed chronologyof events given inthe Memorial(MC, pp. 570-571, para. 6.28-6.34 and

pp. 600-601, para..121), which supplements the information set out in the Application and -33 -

specifiesthe diplomatic action which the Cameroonianauthoritiestook as a result of the Nigerian

incursion.

16. Onceagain,Mr. President,theseexamplesarefar frombeing exhaustiveand couldeasily

be multiplied. They stem exclusivelyfromthe Application and the Memorial,to which the Court

will certainly refer.am carefulto rememberthat a fuller list of 42 incidentswas presented later

in support of the observations of the Republic of Cameroon on the Preliminary Objections of

Nigeria, with a map showing al1these incidents. 1 merely mention them forthe fuller guidance of

the Court, although it is unnecessary to point them out in order to show that Cameroon has

adequately set forththe factswhich supportits Application. Nigeria'sforcefullyexpressedneedto
- -2

see an exposition of the facts and evidence appears to be amply satisfied by the documents

presented by Cameroon in limine litis, in the Application, and developed in the Memorial, as is

natural in any lawsuit.

17. On Tuesday morning,counsel for Nigeria asked the following question: "le répertoire

est-il complet ou non?" (CR 9812,p. 36). The reply to this question is definitely in the negative,

since it is Cameroon'sduty to provide the Court with al1the evidence that supports its claims and

to assist the Court in the appreciationof themerits of its submissions. This evidence has been put

together by Cameroon since the filing of the Application. And Cameroon continues to assemble

the evidence since, alas, the incidentscontinuedespite the Order indicatingprovisional measures.

18. It scarcelyneedsto be said, Mr. President,that in no way is Cameroonclaimingthat the

international responsibility ofNigeria shouldbe examined at this stage of the proceedings. That

responsibility, which is not only related to the incursions by the Nigerian armed forces into

Cameroonianterritory and to the resultingencroachmentson sovereignty,but based on the totality

of Nigeria's violations of itsinternationalobligations, is matter for the merits. And it is at the

merits stage that Cameroon, which has demonstratedin its Memorial of 16March 1995the extent

of the obligations violated by the Respondent (MC, Chap. 6), intends to argue that aspect of its

claim by spelling out the nature and extent of the darnageresulting from those violations. III. Cameroon submitsthat the Preliminary Objection shouldbe rejected

19. Conclusion

In conclusion,Mr. President,Members ofthe Court, Cameroon'sargumentsmay besummed

up as follows:

(1) in linewith the Court's normal practice, Carneroon clearly statedin its Memorialthatthe facts

upon which it relied inorderto establish the responsibility of Nigeria were mentionedsolely

for the purposes of illustration and that, if necessary, it could produce others in the merits

phase;

(2) the manner of setting forth the facts in an application institutingproceedings is governed by
....,q 1

Article 38, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, whichprovides that the statementof the facts

shall be succinct;

(3) in the course of proceedings, the Parties mayprovideadditionalor further detailsregardingthe

facts in their written pleadings since the Application cannot replace the Memorial in this

respect;

(4) the issue of proof of the international responsibility incurred by a State is a matter for the

merits phase and may not therefore be considered in the preliminary objections phase.

For this reason, Mr. President, Members of the Court, Cameroonrespectfully requests the

Court to reject thesixth Preliminary Objection raised by Nigeria.

May 1 ask you, Mr. President, to give the floor to Mr. Bipoun Woum for the

seventh Preliminary Objection?

Le PRESIDENT :Merci MonsieurAurillac. Je donne la parole à M. Bipoun Woum.

Mr. BIPOUN WOUM: Thankyou, Mr. President.

1. At this moment when it falls to me to take the floor for the first time before your

illustrious Courtto defendthe cause ofmy country,allow me, ifyouwill, Mr. President, Members

ofthe Court,to sharewith youthe simultaneousfeelings 1have of pridethat suchanhonourshould - 35 -

have fallen to me today (is it not the dream of al1internationalists?), and also of confident serenity,

so firm is Carneroon's convictionthat, in this case, right is on itside. Mr. President, it is my task

to present to you the observations of Cameroon on the seventh Preliminary Objection raised by

Nigeria.

A. Objection 7.2

2. 1 shall first endeavourto reply to the second part of this objection. By it, Nigeria claims

to demonstratethat an obligation to negotiate exists prior to any seisin of the International Court

of Justice with a view to a maritime delimitation. Cameroon allegedly did not respect it, thereby
.. ". u
rendering its submissions on maritime delimitation beyond Point G inadmissible.

3.In its written observations, Cameroon has sought to demonstratethat there were indeed

prior negotiations(OC, pp. 163-170). The reason forthis isthat the Court could rejecttheNigerian

objection on this basis alone. That would be an "economic" step, which would not be without

precedent, since it was a coursealso followed in the case conceming Rightof Passage overIndian

Territory(Preliminary Objections)(I.C.J.Reports 1957,p. 125). In that case, India had put more

or less the same argumentas Nigeria. To set it aside, the Court placed itself solely on the level of

the facts, holding that, at al1events, negotiations had been concluded on the matter

4. Mr. President, Cameroon considersthat, in this case too, the Court could confine itself to

a consideration of the facts in order to set aside the Preliminary Objection: fmitless protracted

negotiations did take place, no doubt about it, and it would be absurd to reproach Cameroon, on

whatever basis, with not having engaged in them.

1. However, 1 shail start by showingthat the obligationrelied uponbyNigeria doesnotexist,
since Mr. Crawford revertedto it at some leng$h(CR 9812,pp. 48-50,paras. 25-29)at the
beginning of the week, first reproaching Cameroon with not having repliedto Nigeria's

written arguments.

5.Beforereplyingtothe arguments he reiterated onthatoccasion, 1will givehim satisfaction

on this point. - 36 -

6. In their written pleadings,Ouropponentsrefer to the Conventionon the Continental Shelf

of29 April 1958(NPO,p. 121,para. 7.18). RegardingStatesfor whichadelimitationisnecessary,

its Article 6 Statesthat "the boundary of thecontinental shelf appertainingto such States shall be

determined by agreement between them".

7. A reading ofthis Article musttakeaccount ofthe factthatthe 1958Conventionconstitutes

the conclusion and synthesis of the ideas expressed up to that point on the legal régime ofthe

continental shelf,particularlythe ideathat delimitationmust formthe object of an agreement. But

, as the Court pointed out in the case concerningthe North Sea ContinentalShelf,this legal régime
-. 5
L 'Q
itself is based on "very generalprecepts ofjustice and goodfaith", (I.C.J.Reports1969,paras. 46
*
* and 85; emphasis added).

8. The difficultyas regards delimitation, theimpasse1mighteven Say,arisesprecisely when

one of the parties ismanifestlyinbad faith: inthatcase, negotiationisno longerapossibleavenue.

For only when al1the parties present are in goodfaith can there be any valid intent - to borrow

the formula of the Permanent Court of International Justicein the case concerning the Advisory

Opinion on Railway Trafic between Lithuania and Poland, in 1931- "to enter into

negotiations ... to pursuethemas far aspossible,with aview toconcludingagreements"(Railway

Trafic between Lithuania and Poland, Advisory Opinion, P.C.I.J., Series NB, No. 42, 1931,

When these conditions have not been satisfied, it is clearlynecessary for the parties to turn

towards the Court.

It isthus fortunatethat Article 6 of the 1958Conventionon the ContinentalShelf does not,

contrary to what Nigeria holds to be the case, lay down the principle that prior negotiations

determine the admissibility of the seisin of the Court.

9. Let us now tum to the case concerningthe North Sea ContinentalShelf;already referred

to, fromwhichtheNigerian writtenpleadings focused principallyonan extractfromthe replygiven

by the Court to the question put to it: "(a)the parties are under an obligation to enter into -37 -

negotiationswith a view to arriving at an agreement"(case concerning the North Sea Continental

SheK I.C.J. Reports, 1969, p. 47; see NPO, pp. 122-123,para. 7.20).

10.Naturally, Nigeria carefully omits to refer to other passages in the same Judgment, in

which the Court States,for example, that what is entailed in the case at issue is an obligation to

negotiate "whichthe Parties assumedby Article 1,paragraph 2, of the Special Agreements"under

which the Court had beenseised (I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 47, para. 86); or when the Court finds

that "in the present case, it needsto be observedthat . . the negotiations carried on in 1965and

1966 ... failed of their purpose"(ibid., para. 87),which negotiations,moreover, merelyconstitute

"one of the methods for the peaceful settlementof internationaldisputes" (ibid., para. 86).

11. In reality, Mr. President, States do not feel themselves obliged to resort to delimitation

by agreement unless, by mutual consent, they have given a prior undertaking to do so according

to the rules indicated by the Court; in that case, they can only do so by negotiation. This case

apart, negotiationconstitutesneither an exclusivemeans, nora compulsory meansof delimitation,

and it may or may not CO-existwith the legal proceedings.

12.Mr. Crawford reverts at considerable length (CR 9812,pp. 48-52, paras. 26, 28-30) to

Articles 74and 83ofthe ConventionontheLawofthe Sea,relating respectivelytothe delimitation

of the exclusive economic zone andthe delimitation of the continental shelf area.

13. Wherethe exclusiveeconomiczone isconcerned,Ouropponentspendsconsiderable- time

seeking to ascribe significanceto what, for international law, is no more than a series of "facts"

(caseconcerningCertain GermanInterests inPolish UpperSilesia,Merits,JudgrnentNo. 7, 1926,

P.C.I.J., SeriesA, No. 7),namely intemal proclamationsand regulations in Cameroon and Nigeria

(CR 9812,pp. 44-45, paras. 15-16). This is even less understandable when one considers that

Cameroon'sofficial-position is perfectly clear and well known, since it signed and ratifiedthe

MontegoBayConvention. Now, Article 45 ofCarneroon'sConstitutionenshrinesthe principlethat

internationaltreaties or agreementshave greater authoritythan laws. Consequently, its rightsand - 38 -

obligations with respect to its maritime area are the exclusive province of the 1982 Convention.

Itis obvious that no interna]proclamation hasany relevance from this standpoint. '

14. But it is rather because Articles 73 and 84 - surprisingly,Professor Crawford quotes

Article 76 (CR 9812,p. 49, para. 29, p. 51,para. 30) - stipulate that the delimitation "is to be

effected by agreement on the basis of international law..." that Mr. Crawford dwells upon it.

15. However, Mr. President, itis clear that, by this formula, the international community

simply sought to banish al1unilateral delimitation by a State. As Judge Oda pointed out in his

dissenting opinion appended to the Judgment of 24February 1982 in the case concerning the

ContinentalShelf(Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya),Article 83indicates"thatany unilateral claim
w
for.. .delimitation ... would not be regarded as valid under international law" (I.C.J.Reports

1982, p. 246, para. 144). This is also what the Chamber of the Court reaffirmed in the case

-. concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of MaineArea: "No maritime

delimitationbetween Stateswith oppositeor adjacent coasts may be effectedunilaterallyby one of

those States" (1C.J Reports 1984, p. 299, para. 112). This is also, apparently, the intimate

convictionof Professor Crawford,who cannot refrain fromquotingProfessorProsper Weil, when

he says that therule resides aboveal1in the prohibition of unilateraldelirnitation(CR 98/2, p. 49,

para. 27).

16. Hence,if there is an obligationresulting fromhese texts, it is a negative one,as it were:
v

it is the prohibition of any unilateral delimitation; this obligation is accompanied by a sanction:

non-opposabilityto other States.

17. In this context, it is impossibleto see in what a claimed obligation to negotiate would

consist, which would be imposed on two States, oneof which no longer has any expectations of

the other owing to its irreduciblebadfaith. It is even harder to see what the sanction on such an

obligation would be.

18.For Nigeria, the sanction wouldbe a prohibitionon bringingthe matter beforethe Court

(CR 98/2, pp. 44-49, paras.25 and 28). To convince itself of this, it takes paragraph 2 of - 39 -

Articles 74 and 83 of the 1982 Convention as basis: "if no agreement can be reached within a

reasonable period of time, the States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in

PartXV", which, among other things, provides for a legal settlement.

It also bases itself on anextract fiom the Judgment of the Chamber of the Court in the case

concerning the Delimitation of theMaritimeBoundaryin the Gulfof Maine Area, according to

which the

"delimitation must be sought and effected by means of an agreement, following
negotiations conducted in good faith and with the genuine intention of achieving a
positive result. Where, however, such agreement cannot be achieved, delimitation
should be effected by recourseto a third party possessingthe necessasr competence"
(1C.J. Reports 1984, p. 299, para. 112).

19. However, Mr. President, these texts do not lay down a prohibition on bringingthe matter

before a third party, but, quite the contrary, they make it an obligation to do so. In the 1982

Convention, paragraph 2 of Articles 74 and 83 does indeed state: "States shall have recourse"to

a third party; it is an imperative. In the 1984Judgment, the Charnber does indeed state that the

delimitation "should be effected" by recourse to a third Party; this is also an imperative. How,

therefore, could Cameroon have violated those requirements by seising your Court?

... 20. Mr. President,there isnotrace inthe international maritimedelimitation lawofanalleged
.. . 2
prohibition onunilaterally seisingthe Court inthe absenceof priornegotiations. So longas the rule

prohibiting any maritime delimitation is safe, any legal remedy leading to a maritime delimitation

isperfectly inorder in international law. In this case, however, there is no loftier legalremedy than

the one which leads to the International Court of Justice. The quarrel which Nigeria has seen fit

to pick with Cameroon on this point is thus devoid of legal substance.

II. It is also, and this will be my second point, devoid of al1relevance to the facts.

21. Members of the Court, even if the obligation which our eminent colleagues in the

opposingPartyrely uponexisted, itwould inany casenotjusti@ Nigeria's submissions. The reason

forthis is very simple: therewere indeednumerous attempts - genuine ones by mycountry - to

reach an agreement on the maritime boundary up to 1978. - 40 -

22. During the oralarguments, ProfessorCrawfordclaimedthe contrary,namely,that inthe

period prior to 1975,there had been neither discussionnor negotiation betweenthe two Partieson

the boundary beyond Point G (CR 9812, p. 41, para. 7, in fine; p. 42, para. 11; p. 43,

para. 12;p. 50, para. 30).

23. He stresses the absence of negotiationswith respect to the continental shelf, on two

occasions quoting an extract from the Memorial, according to which the Maroua Declaration

"concerneessentiellementles eaux territoriales" (essentially concemsterritorial waters) (CR9812,

p. 41, para. 7, p. 50, para. 30). Mr. President, Professor Crawford sometimes quotes the

observationsof Cameroonin English (CR 9812,p. 51,para. 30). Doeshe have a problemwith the
*
languageof Corneille? In any case,theFrenchword"essentiellement",isnot synonyrnous,contrary

to what he believes, with the term "exclusively".

24. At al1events,Professor Crawford'sargumentdoesnotcorrespondtothereality,as another

counsel of Nigeria admits moreover.

25. 1know, Mr. President, that Professor Crawfordiscarefùlto introducehis oral comments
. .. b'

by indicatingthat his arguments shouldbe considered"independently"ofthose put fonvard by his

colleagues (CR 9812,p. 39). But facts are facts and they clearly cannot Vary from one oral

argument to another, with .al1due respect to my opponent.

26. Chief Akinjide himself asserted that, during the long negotiations covering the period 'I'

1960to 1994, the parties did indeed deal with problems relating to the maritime boundary as a

whole. Thiswas notablythe case, still accordingtothis counsel- andthe documentsattachedto

the Memorial of Carneroonconfirm it - duringthe meeting of the experts of the JointBoundary

Commission held at Yaoundéfrom 26 March to 4 April 1971, and the meeting of the same

Commissionheld in Lagos from 14to 21 June 1971(see CR9811,pp. 53-54,paras. 26,28 and 29

and MC, Anns. 242 and 243).

27. Furthermore,the press release markingtheend ofthe meetingfrom 14to 21 June 1971,

expresslyrecommendedthat "theboundarylinebedelineatedata laterdate,onthe continentalshelf - 41 -

in accordancewith the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf' (MC, Ann. 243, p. 1982 of

the Minutes). To get so far, there must clearly have been discussions! And those discussions

continued until 1978.

28. In order to work on the maritime boundary as a whole, which was their task, the

negotiatorsclearly proceeded in stages, graduallymoving seaward. Two agreementsendorsedthe

results as far as the point called "Point G", which is nothing otherthan the furthest point seaward

on which agreementhas been reached.

29. Contrary to what my opponent thinks(CR 9812,p. 50, para. 30), Point G is not the last

point on which there was negotiation; it is the last point on which there was agreement.

30. It isclear,therefore,thatthese negotiationsfell withinthe contextofthe expressintention

of the Partiesto reach an agreement on al1the maritime boundary. My opponent does not dispute

this either (CR 9812,p. 50, para. 30), but appearsnot to attach any importance to it. However,

Mr. President, itisa vital element: notwithstandinga common intentionexpressedalmost30 years

agonowto delimittheir maritimeboundary,partof it still remains undeterrninedtoday. Cameroon

andNigeria did nottherefore reach agreementwithinthe reasonable periodof time providedfor in
A U
paragraph 2 of Articles 74 and 83 of the 1982Convention, and it is quite clear that "such an

agreement cannot be achieved", to borrow the terrns of the Chamber of the Court in the case

conceming the Delimitationof the MaritimeBoundaryin the Gulfof MaineArea.

Therefore the Court can obviously be seised.

3 1. It is true that Mr. Crawfordadopts a different perspective: he considersthat, regardless

of the intentionsof the Parties, they did not discussany pointwhatever beyond Point G. It is this

which is supposedto prevent Cameroon from seisingthe Court (CR 9812,p. 49, para. 28). If one

understandsthis argument properly, any State would therefore be prohibited from tuming to the

Court with a view to a delimitation, in the absenceof precise discussionson each portion ofthat

delimitation. - 42 -

32. But this alleged rule cannot be part of positive law. It would implythat a State could

deny its neighbour any access to a maritime boundary simplyby refusing to discussthe matter, or

by makingsuchdiscussionpointless. Thatwouldbe completelyabsurdand would resultina denial

ofjustice.

33. In the event, Mr. Crawford forgets toSaywhy there wereno precise discussionson the

portionsofmaritimeboundary beyondPoint G. Point Ghad beenfixed by the MarouaDeclaration

on 1 June 1975. A negotiation meeting to extend the course of the boundary was held in 1978.

Butat Jos in 1978,theNigerian delegation,as a prerequisiteof the resumptionof proceedings, laid

downthe rejection of the Maroua Declaration. My opponent, however,goes further. It seemsthat,
w

for him, it is not the Statuteof the Maroua Declarationwhich isblocking the negotiations, butthe

disputeoverBakassi Peninsula. Let us simplyobservethat, inbothcases, it isnot Cameroonwhich

isthe origin of these alleged obstacles, butNigeria. It isNigeria which hasbrutally cast doubton

the Maroua Declaration. It is Nigeria which, subsequently,moved its claims northwards in order

to cal1the boundary into question at the level of Bakassi Peninsula.

34. It is indeedNigeria's attitudewhichblocked the negotiationsbeyondPoint G. Today, it

cannotreproach Cameroonwith not havingsufficientlynegotiatedbefore referringthematterto the

Court for, as the Court pointed out in the case conceming the GabZkovo-NagymarosProject

(Hungary/Slovakia)last year:

"one Partycannot avail himself of the fact that the other has not fulfilled some
obligation . . if the former Party has, by some illegalact, prevented the latter from
fulfillingthe obligationin question. .."(Judgmentof 25 September 1997,para. 110;

Factory at Chorzdw,Jurisdiction,JudgmentNo. 8, 1927, P.C.I.J., SeriesA, No. 9,
p. 31).

35. Mr. President,Professor Crawforddisplaystalentwhenhe dons a magician'scostumeto

make a map disappear (CR 9812,p. 40, para. 3) and to make Equatorial Guinea appear in his

argument (CR 98/2,p. 51,para. 30). In sodoing,he seeksto makethis an obstacletothe very idea

of negotiations with Nigeria on maritime delimitation (CR 98/2, p. 51, para. 30). But the reality

is that Equatorial Guinea hasnever been an obstacle in this respect, either since 1993 or before. - 43 -

As early as June 1971,the negotiators of the Joint Boundary Commission meeting in Lagos had

decided "that since the Continental Shelves of Nigeria, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea would

appear to have a common area the attentionof the Heads of State of Carneroon and Nigeria should

be drawn to this fact". This did not prevent them from embarking on discussions, as they never

considered the presence of Equatorial Guinea to be a condition for doing so.

B. Objection 7.1

36. Mr. President, 1now come to the first part of the seventh Objection. Its purpose is to

convince the Court to postpone its consideration of maritime delimitation to a later date (CR 9812,

p. 48, para. 24). Nigeria considers that, before devoting itself to this task, the Court should have

settled the matter of the land boundary (CR 9812,pp. 46-48, paras. 18-24).

37. Of course, it is permissible to consider one course of action more logical than another

with a view to settlingthe dispute. But that is merelya problem of method, as Professor Crawford

allowson two occasions(CR 9812, p.47,para. 22; p. 48, para. 24). On this point Cameroonnotes,

moreover,thatthere is completeconvergenceofviews between the two Parties. But Mr. Crawford

stresses that what is entailed is a "preliminaryquestion of methods" (ibid.). This is no discovery.

It is clear that the Court ought to determine its method before replying to the questionswhich have

been put to it.

39. Carneroonhas suggestedan approachwhich should consoleNigeria: first the land, then

the sea as far as Point G and then the sea beyond Point G. This is a simple suggestion,as it seems

logical: the land dominates the sea. But it is patently for the Court to decide in which order it

wishes to deal with the questions raised and it will do so at the stage of the merits after the Parties
-2'.z .ci

have presented their oral arguments, when it will have to focus on settling the dispute. This may

well be "preliminary"; but not in the sense in which an objection before the Court might be

preliminary; quite simply in the sense that the Court, whencomingto examinethequestioninthe

merits, will have to settle itfirst. -44 -

40. Mr. President, Members of the Court, 1 am going to draw this oral argument to a

conclusion by saying:

- first, that Nigeria does not provide any proof of the existence of an obligation to negotiate

which would determine the possibility for Statesto seisethe Courtwith a viewto a maritime

delimitation;

- second,that at any event, Cameroonnegotiatedwith Nigeriaonthemaritime delimitation,and

did not file its Application before the Court until ithad exhaustedl1reasonable possibilities

for a direct andamicable settlement of the problem;

- third and last, that the Court has jurisdiction to consider the submissions of the Republic of
1

Cameroon regarding the delimitation of the maritimeboundary aswell as its land boundary

withNigeria, even ifthe orderin which it aimsto considerthem isa problem ofmethodwhich

it will have to decide when considering the merits ofthe case.

41. For al1these reasons, Mr. President, Cameroon requestsyou to reject wholesale the

seventh objection raised by Nigeria.

May 1now,Mr. President,askyouto cal1uponmy colleagueMr. Keith Highet,who isgoing

to expound Cameroon's observationson the eighth Preliminary Objection. Thank you.

Le PRESIDENT : Merci beaucoup. Je donne maintenant la parole à M. Highet.

M. HIGHET : Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs de la Cour, c'est à la fois un

honneur et un plaisir de me présenter devant vousau nom de la République du Cameroun.Ma

tâche aujourd'hui estde répondre à la huitième exception préliminaire du Nigéria. J'examinerai

cinq points, qui sonténumérés danls e plan qui figure dans votre dossier.En premier lieu,je vais

<: dissiper quelques petits malentendusqu'ontpu créer certains argumentsdéveloppés par N leigéria
.,L, --ï
mardi, et la première partiede ma plaidoirie sera donc consacrée à ces divers points. - 45 -

1. Les divers points soulevéspar le Nigérialors de sa plaidoirie

1.Le premier pointconcerneles nombreuxdiagrammesque le conseilduNigériaaprésentés

à l'écranet fait figurer dansle dossier remis auxjuges. La plupart d'entreeux absorbent - c'est

commode - la péninsule de Bakassi : elle est coloriéeen vert, pour le Nigéria'.

2. Il suffit de jeter un coup d'oeilau diagramme simple illustrant la position du ((pointG»

(cote 27 dans ledossierremisauxjuges par leNigéria)pourquevienne a l'esprit laquestionparfois

poséecomme devinette aux enfants :((Qu'est-cequi cloche dans cette image ?» Le point G est

situéà l'écarta l'ouest,isolé,distant- et comme si le Nigériane l'avaitjamais accepté. Ceci doit

illustrer de manièreconcise combien est étroitela relation entre la position du Nigériaen ce qui

concernela déclaration deMarouaet sa positionen ce qui concerne lasouverainetésur lapresqu'île

de Bakassi.

3. Le Cameroun ne veut pas néanmoinstomber dans le piègequi voudrait lui faire aborder

le fond-je soulignele mot «fond»- de l'affaire, mêms ei le conseil duNigéria s'amusede notre

titre«La DélimitationEq~itable))~.Monsieur le président,j'ai bien entendu fait figurer dans mon

texte desrenvois aux procès-verbaux. La Cour n'acependantpas pu ne pas remarquer combienla

démonstrationdu conseilduNigéria était difficile à distinguer des argumentstrès similairesque la

Cour a écoutés à de nombreusesreprises par le passédans des affaires de délimitationmaritime.

Les mêmes typesde cartes lui ont alors été présentés, lem s êmes types d'arguments ona tlors été

formulés,le conseila soulignéle mêmetype de mesureset on a parfois entendu,en ces occasions,

des conclusions analogues. Le fait est que tous ces types de démonstrationtouchent le fond de

l'affaire,et ne doivent être examinép sar la Cour qu'avecle fond.

-
-., 4. Mon second point, Monsieur le président,concerne la prétendue«mer territoriale de
.- ,..,-.'
50 milles))'. Il s'agitcertesd'unargumentspécieux,formulé«pour laforme))- bien que leconseil

'Cotes22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 27, 29, 33,3et 36.

2~~.9812,3 mars 1998,p. 45, par. 15;p. 55, par. 38 et p. 60, par. 50.

3CR.9812,3 mars 1998,par. 7,p. 4ctpar. 13,p.44. - 46 -

ait beaucoup insisté sur ce point. S'appuyantsur un avis de I1HydrographicOfJicedu bureau

Royaume-Uni quiindique que le Camerounrevendique toujours une mer territoriale de 50 milles

marins (cote 30 du dossier remis aux juges par le Nigéria),le conseil du Nigériaen conclut de

manièreradicaleque le Cameroun«violemanifestement ...[la] convention[surledroitde larner].~~

5. Toutefois, ce que le conseil duNigéria ne savaitmanifestementpas est que, du fait de la

primauté dela constitutioncamerounaise,lamer territoriale de 50 milles a depuisplusieursannées

été ramenée à 12 milles. Cette réduction apris effet de plein droit lorsque la Convention sur le

droit de la mer est entréeen vigueur. Nous avons parfois tendance, en tant que juristes de

common law, àaborder ces problèmesd'unpoint de vue dualiste. Le système camerounais,un

système de droit civil, est purement moniste. L'article45 de la constitution camerounaise,

reproduite à lacote F, dispose: «Les traitésou accords internationauxrégulièrement approuvé osu

ratifiés ont, dès leurpublication, une autorité supérieurecelle des lois..))

6. Le Cameroun n'avaitdonc nul besoin de réformer salégislation :cela allait de soi. C'est

pourquoi la mer territoriale du Cameroun ne peut être largede 50 milles marins. Sa largeur est

aujourd'huilimitée à la largeur maximale, 12milles marins, prévue à l'article3'de la convention

sur le droit de la mer. C'estdonc à tort que le Nigéria affirme,sur cette base ou sur toute autre,

que le Cameroun «viole» ses obligations conventionnelles.

7. Le troisièmepoint préliminaireconcernela «zoneéconomiqueexclusivenon existante.))'

L'argument du Nigéria estque le Cameroun n'a pas encore revendiqué dezone économique

exclusive large de 200 milles marins, et donc qu'iln'ena pas. En outre, le Camerounaurait agi

inéquitablementet de mauvaise foi6 Nous avons même été invitésà revendiquerune telle zone

4C~.9812,3 mars1998,par.16,p.45.

'CR 9812, mars1998,par.14-15,p. 44-45.

6CR9812,3 mars1998,par.15-16,p. 45-46. -47 -

devant la Cour7- bien qu'on nousait aussi rappelé que«ce seraitune nouvelledemande au fond))',

L..:j sans aucun doute encore un piège à éviter.

8.Il n'est cependantpas nécessaireque leCamerounait ((revendiqué)u )ne telle zone auxfins

de la présente affaire,pour la raison suivante. Le Cameroun est titulaire de lajuridiction sur la

zone économiqueexclusive situéeau large de ses côtes, qu'il l'ait ou non proclamée.Cela ressort

clairement des articles 55 à 57 de la convention sur le droit de la mer de 1982- et en particulier

du paragraphe 1, alinéab) de son article 56, aux termes duquel : adans la zone économique

exclusive, I'Etat côtier a ...uridiction..» (Les italiques sont de moi).

9. Cela s'accordetout à fait avec la demande présentée à la Cour par le paragraphe 20,

alinéa) de la requêtedu Cameroun, où le Cameroun prie la Cour de :

((procéderau prolongement du tracé de sa frontière maritime avec la République
fédéraledu Nigériajusqu'à la limite des zones maritimes que le droit international
place sous leurjuridiction respective)).

Monsieur le président,la seule chose nécessaireest le droit à la zone économiqueexclusive

et cela, nul ne le conteste. C'est aussi un lieu commun qu'enl'absenced'autresconsidérationsles

limites du plateau continental et celles de la zone économique exclusive suivent le même tracé.

Certes le«tracéde safrontièremaritime» donneraitau Cameroun exactement lemêmerésultatpour

le plateau et la zone. En revanche, ce que tout cela ne fait pas, c'est de justifier une plainte

malveillante selon laquelle le Cameroun revendique en quelque sorte une zone inexistante, ou

commet de quelque façon une ((violation))manifeste de la convention sur le droit de la mer9.

2. La position du Nigériaest incorrecte en droit

10.Je passe maintenant à la deuxièmepartiedemes observations. Trèssimplement, laposition

du Nigéria n'est pasvalable en droit. Le Nigéria ditque cette ((questionde ladélimitationmaritime

'CR 9812,3mars 1998,par.15, p.44-45.

'Ibid.

'CR 9812,3mars 1998,par.15-16,p. 44-45. - 48 -

met nécessairementen cause les droits et les intérêtds'Etatstiers et la demandeà ce sujet est

irre~evable»'~.Cependant les délimitationsmaritimes dans des zonesencombréesonttoujours été

régléessans difficulté et,à coup sûr, sans porter préjudiceaux droits des Etats tiers. Les
L, 0
observationsduCamerouncontiennentunediscussionexhaustivedesaffairesquifontautorité,ainsi

que de la pratique toutàfait dominante des Etats en ce domaine".

11. Or le Nigéria interprètemal ces sources12. Par exemple, dans l'affaireLibye/MaIte, la

question consistait effectivemenà savoir si la Libye et Malte auraient pu conféràrla Cour la

compétence nécessairepour déterminerune délimitationavec l'Italie. Bien entendu elles ne

l'auraientpas pu. Cependant, cela ne saurait guèreindiquer que la Cour doive rechercher titre
*

préliminairedans quellemesure la décisionqu'elle rendra entreleNigériaet le Cameroun pourrait

avoir uneincidencesur lesdroits,par exemple,de laGuinée équatoriale.Le Camerounne soutient

pas que la Cour n'aura pas à examiner ce point : àl'évidenceelle devra le faire. Elle ne peut

pourtant pas résoudrecette question maintenant.

12. Le Nigériaa cité aussila décisionde la Chambre en l'affaireBurkina Fa~o/Mali'~.Au

paragraphe 47 la Chambre a déclaré que lejuge saisi «doit se garder de statu...sur des droits

afférentsàdeszonesoù s'expriment des prétentionds'Etatstiers,prétentionsquirisquentde fausser

lesconsidérationsde droit..ayantservide base à sadécision»14C. ependant,commentlejuge saisi

peut-il décider quellessont ces zones et quellessont ces prétentionsl s'agitlà, par excellence, -

d'unequestion qui relèvedufond d'undifférend.

13.Nous avonsaussi signalédansnos observationsque lapratiquedes Etats secaractérisepar

le souci du respect des intérêts deEtats tiers. La moitié des délimitations auxquellesil a été

-
'''EPN,ar.8.17,p. 140.

"Plateaucontinental(Tunisie/Jamaarabelibyenne),C.I.J.Recueil1982,p. 18et PIateaucontinental(Jamahiriya
arabelibyenne/Malte),C.I.J.Recueil1985, p. 13.

1 2 9812,3mars1998,par.45, p. 58.

"CR9812, 3mars1998,par.37,p. 55. - 49 -

procédé dansle monde n'auraientpeut-être paspu être réalisées s'aiv l ait étéinterdàtdeux Etats

de se mettre d'accord sur une frontière maritime entre eux du fait de la présenceproximitéd'un

Etat tiers. Et, commenous l'avonsdémontrél,a solution reconnue est de déclarerde façon expresse

- ainsi que par effet de la l-- que la délimitationest faite«sans préjudice))des droitsdes Etats

tiers.

14.Aussi ne suffit-il pas -ainsi que l'afait le conseil du Nigéria- de rejeter cette solution

du revers de la main comme s'ils'agissaitsimplement d'unsubterfuge ou d'une manŒuvredans «le

tumulte des négociations internationale^»'^.Ceux qui ont étéchargés de procéder à des

délimitationsdans des situationscomplexesne seraientguère d'accord pour reconnaîtrequ'ilsn'ont

.- ,,cJ pas eu en fait le souciparticulierde faireprécisémentle contraire. L'affirmationduNigériapêche

par son manque flagrant de logiquecar il ne semble guère y avoir de «tumulte» possible vis-à-vis

d'Etats qui ne participent pas aux négociations- et c'est d'eux que se soucie apparemment le

conseil du Nigéria.

3. La position du Nigéria est contraire à la logique

15. Selon l'analysedéveloppéepar le Nigéria,il serait malvenu et inadmissible pour la Cour

de même entreprendre une délimitation de la frontière maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria.

C'estle seul sens que l'onpuisse donnerà une exceptiongénéraled'irrecevabilitéI .l n'esttoutefois

pas possible de conclure à l'«irrecevabilité»de la demande en délimitationdu Cameroun sans

pouvoir démontrerque cette demande est irrecevablequant à la totalitéde la distance sur laquelle

doit s'opérerla délimitation. La délimitation commenceraitdonc à un millimètreau sud-est du

«point GD. Il s'agit là d'un nouvel avatar du paradoxe d'Achille et de la tortue, de Zénon, le

Cameroun setrouvantdans la situationd'Achille,c'est-à-diren'étanjtamais en mesuredeconvaincre

la Cour de la recevabilitééventueIIede sa demande àl'égardde n'importequelle partie de la ligne

de délimitation.

''CR98/2, du mars 1998,p. 60, par. 52. - 50 -

16.L'exceptiondu Nigéria tientde ce paradoxe. Le conseil du Nigériaa déclaré que «[pleu

aprèslepoint G on setrouvedansdeseaux à l'égarddesquelleslaGuinéeéquatoriale a des intérêts

juridiques et peut faire valablement valoir des droits»I6. Que veut-on dire par «peu après le

point G» ? S'agit-ild'un mille mari? D'unedizainedemilles marins ? D'unetrentainede milles +

marins ? Comment laCourpourra-t-elle tranchercettequestion sanstoucherau fond,sansse livrer

à une analyse du fond ?

17.La manièredont le Nigériaa formulé sa huitième exception soulèvedoncun paradoxe sur

le plande la logique. Le Nigériane saurait sérieusementconclure à l'irrecevabilide la demande

du Cameroun à unefraction d'unmille marin au sud-ouestdu ((pointGD. Si la Cour peut procéder
I

à une délimitationde la frontièremaritime sur unedistancedonnée à partir dupoint G vers la mer,

la requêtedu Cameroun ne saurait dès lorsêtre irrecevableet la huitième exceptionpréliminaire

du Nigériadoit êtrerejetée.

18.11a aussi été beaucoup question mardi d'intervention". Il y a toutefois une questionque

le Nigérian'a pas abordée : si un autre Etat cherchaiàintervenirà ce stade de l'instance-'que

ce soit aujourd'huiou il a sixmois -, est-ceque cette interventionserait autorisé? L'issue de

loin la plus probable semblerait êtrequ'untel requérantsubiraità ce stade le sort qu'aconnu El

Salvadorlors de laphase sur lesexceptionspréliminairesdans l'affaire duNicaragua". Et il s'agit

là encored'un autreparadoxe :si leNigériaa raison, le Camerounne pourrajamais l'emporter car w

on n'atteindrajamais la phase du fond, au cours de laquelle pourraitêtreaccueillie une requêtà

fin d'interventiond'unEtat voisin. Travail de Sisyphe donc.

- -

I6CR9812,du 3 mars 199, . 59, par.47; lesitaliquessont denous.

"CR9812,du 3 mars1998,p. 54-55,par.36-38.

''Affairerelative aux activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaelui-ci (Nicaraguac. Etats-Unis
d'Amérique),compétence et recevabrr,êt,I.J.Recueil1984, p. 392. - 51 -

4. La position du Nigériatendrait a créerun effet de blocage en matière de délimitation

19.En quatrièmelieu,je tiens à faire ressortir que la position du Nigéria tendràicréerun

effet de blocage en matière dedélimitationet reviendraità paralyser la Cour àl'égarddes futures

délimitations.On peuten effet raisonnablements'attendre àdes situationscomplexes(comme l'est

la présenteaffaire) où les parties intéressées neseront pas parvenues à se mettre d'accord.

Beaucoup, sinon la plupart, des affaires futures mettront nécessairementen cause les intérêts

accessoires d'Etatstiers. Laproposition sous-tendant lahuitièmeobjectionpréliminaireduNigéria

empêcheraitles tribunauxde passer à I'exarnenquant au fond detelles affaires, alors que c'eàla

phase concernant le fond qu'untribunal peut examiner et adopter des mesures de sauvegarde

appropriées.

20. On dissuaderaitainsi les Etats d'essayer deconclure des accords bilatérauxen matière de

délimitation maritimeen posant une condition impossible à satisfair:si tous les Etats affectés,

mêmede manièreinfime, devaient êtretoujours partiesà toutesles affaires de délimitatiotoutes

lesparties potentiellesdevraientalors toujoursacquiescerà toutesles délimitationsentre Etats.Le

simple bon sens écartecertainement une telle extrémité. Cela est sans doute particulièrement

importantaujourd'huipuisqu'onpeut supposer quela plupart des espaces maritimes devant encore

faire l'objet d'unedélimitationsont les plus complexes et intéressent plusde deux Etats.

5. La huitièmeexception du Nigénan'a pas uncaractère préliminaire

21. Il apparaît maintenant clairement que la huitième exception ne saurait avoir un tel

((caractère)) ni à fortioriun ((caractèreexclusivementpréliminaire)). Jeme réferenaturellement

icià laformulationduparagraphe 7 deI'article79du Règlementde laCour. Lahuitièmeexception

est essentiellementunequestionde fond. 11fautfaireappel,nous l'espéronst,ant au droit qu'aubon

sens pour résoudrece dilemme apparent. Si des espaces maritimes encombrés soulèvent des

problèmes, ces problèmesdoivent êtrenaturellement traitésau moment voulu et de la manière

appropriéepar la Cour - ou par un tribunal ou par les parties elles-mêmesdans des négociations

bilatérales,comme le montreamplement la pratique des Etats. - 52 -

22. Il convientde noter que mardà,la fin de la présentationde son argumentation,le conseil

duNigéria a déclaré :«Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs de la Cour, si elle intéresse

lacompétence, cetteposition [duNigéria]abien un caractèrepréliminaire»',e qui est fallacieux.

Une question ne saurait en effet avoir un caractèrepréliminaire du simple faitqu'elle«intéresse»

la compétence. S'il enétait ainsi,l'affaire ne présentetucune difficulté,et la Cour n'aurait

jamais eu àadopter une disposition concernant le ((caractère exclusivement préliminaire» d'une

objection préliminaire.

23. Cette logique défectueuse est analogàecelle qui entache l'affirmationdu Nigériaselon

laquelle le Cameroun présumerait trop de choses dansla présenteaffaire: «..la Cour, en tant
-
qu'organejudiciaire,ne sauraitassurersacompétencesurunefrontièremaritime,compétencequ'elle

seule peut exercer, si elle avait auparavantdd ée rejeter la positionjuridique d'unedes deux

Partiesàl'affaire dontelle est saisie»20.Cela sous-tend une partie de l'argumentation duNigéria

concernant sa septième exceptionpréliminaire,dans laquelle le conseil de cepays a affirméqu'il

se pose «une question de méthode préliminaire sérieuse»21-je répète «une question

préliminairesérieusen- et suggère que«à tout le moins..l'aspectmaritime de l'affairene doit

êtreexaminé qu'après queles questionsconcernant la frontièreterrestrel'auront»22M. on ami,

M. Bipoun Woum, a mentionnécertainsdes aspectsde ce problème, qui faitressortirune division

- -' : artificielle entre les différentesphases dela présenteaffaire. Mais il importede bien comprendre W.

qu'unetelle division rigide de l'affaire endifférentesportionsformelles a un caractère artificiel et

superflu.

24. La Cour est parfaitement capable d'aborder les problèmes dans leur ordre logique et

appropriésansavoir àdéclarerqu'unepartie d'une affaireest «irrecevable»simplement parce que,

I9C~98/2, 3 mars1998,p. 60, par.51; les italiques sontde nous.

'O~bid.,. 51,par.35, preastérisquees italiques sontdenous.

211bid.,. 44, par.22.

lZIbid,p. 45, par.24. - 53 -

logiquement, une décision doitd'abordêtreprise sur une autre partie - l'affaire Qatar/Bahreïn,

actuellement en instance devant la Cour, comporte précisément cetype de double examen.

25. Pourtant, dans un accès similaire d'illogisme,le conseil du Nigéria aavancéque la seule

raison pour laquelleces questions «n'ontététraitéeq su'austade du fond dans I'affaireLibye/Malte»

étaitqu'ilne pouvait y avoir de ((phasepréliminaire))danscette affaire, qui avait étésoumise à la

Cour par voie de compromisentre les deux Etat~*~.Mais le simple fait que ces questions aient été

traitéesau stade du fond dans l'affaireLibye/Malte - ou d'ailleursau stade du fond dans celle de

Tunisie/Libye- ne peut signifier qu'elles devraient l'êdans unephase ((préliminaire»en cette

instance-ci, introduite par requête. Ellesdevraientdenouveauêtretraitéesau stade dufond, ce qui

signifieque l'exceptionduNigéria devraitencoreêtrerejetée. LC aourpeut veiller au stadedu fond

à ce quejustice soit faite eà ce qu'aucunEtat tiers ne soit lésé.Mais la question ne saurait être

écartéed'emblée,avant d'avoir été examinée sur le fond, sans injustice à l'égard duCameroun

aujourd'hui.

26. D'ailleurs, si soit Tunisie/Libye,soit Libye/Malte avait été soumisà la Cour par voie de

requêteet si l'undes défendeurs- quel qu'ilsoit - avait alors soulevé l'équivalent de la huitième

exception préliminairedu Nigéria - peut-on douter que la Cour, en 1981ou en 1984,ne l'aurait

pas réservéepour la phase du fond et qu'elleaurait traité les questionsque cela soulevait plus tard,

et serait probablement parvenue au mêmerésultatque celui de 1982et de 1985 ?

27. Monsieur leprésident,la délimitationdemandéeici est peut-êtredifficile àréaliser- mais

irrecevable à priori, non, elle ne l'est pas. Si le Nigéria devait dire qu'il ne peut y avoir de

délimitationdu tout, en droit, parce qu'il serait impossible d'aller ne fût-ce que d'un mètreau

sud-ouest du point G - si le Nigéria devait par hypothèse prendreune position aussi extrême -

mêmealors la Cour devrait examiner cette thèse. La Cour se pencherait mêmealors sur le fond

-\
. ?- de l'affaire,exactementde lamêmemanièrequelorsqu'ellecompare les différentescartesetlignes

23C~9812 3,mars 199p 8,60,par5 1. - 54 -

que le conseil a projetéeàl'écranmardi. Sice n'étaitpas làun examenportant surlefond, on voit

mal ce que cela pouvait êtred'autre.
i
28. La réponse à la huitième exception estdonc double. Premièrement :les droits des Etats

voisins seront toujours entièrementprotégépsar toute décision quela Cour serait invitéerendre.

Deuxièmement :cetteopérationdépendra inévitablementd'un examed nesfaits etdescirconstances

de l'espèce. Et s'ilen est ainsi, alors a fortiori cette opération nepeutjamais, jamais, revêtirun

caractèreexclusivementpréliminaire.Cetteargumentation me rappellela «piècedansla pièce»de

I'acteII de Hamle?4.La procédurerelative à la huitièmeexceptionest une affaire de délimitation

dans une affaire de délimitation. Et cela ne devrait pas êtrele cas.

w
29.Pour ces motifs,Monsieurleprésident,MadameetMessieursde laCour, leCamerounvous

prie de rejeter la huitièmeexceptionpréliminaire etde refuser en faitde déclarerunnoliquet.La

Cour devrait aborder la question de la délimitationmaritimeentre le Cameroun et leNigériade la

manière normale, elle devrait examinerla situationde fond qui se présentedans lazoneconcernée

par la délimitation,et elle devrait ensuite aller aussi loin qu'ellelejuge approprié.

30. J'en ai terminé des plaidoiries dela République du Camerounpour ce premier tour de

plaidoiries. Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour,je vous remercie de votre

attention.

w
Le PRESIDENT :Merci, M. Highet. M. Guillaumea une question à laquelle lesparties sont

invitéesà répondrependant le second tour la semaine prochaine,ou en tout cas d'icile 25 mars.

Judge GUILLAUME: Mr. President, my question relates to the fifth Preliminary Objection

raised by Nigeria. Any reply by either of the Parties will nonethelessbe welcome. The question

is as follows:

"Nigeria tells the Court that there is no dispute as regards the land boundary
between the two States (subject to the existing problems in Bakassi Peninsula and the
Darak region)".

24Hamleta,cte II, scène2. "Doesthis signifj that,thesetwo sectorsapart,there isagreementbetweenNigeria

and Cameroon on the geographical CO-ordinatesof this boundary as they result from the
texts relied upon by Cameroon in its Application and its Memorial?"

Le second tour de plaidoiries commencera lundi matin
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie.

a IOheures. L'audienceest levée.

L'audienceest levée à 12 h 55.