Traduction

Traduction
NOR-Corrige
Uncorrected Translation

CR 93/23 (traduction)
CR 93/23 (translation)

Mardi 29 juin 1993

Tuesday 29 June 1993 Le PRESIDENT :Veuillezvous asseoir. Je donnela paroleà

M. Pellet.

Mr. PELLET: Mr. President, Member sf the Court,
-*
1. It is my taskthismorningto introduce the presentationof what

may be regardea ds Chad'ssecondargument. It consistsin showingthat,

even if Franceand Libyahad not concluded thTereatyof Friendship and

GoodNeighbourlineso sf 10 August1955,the border would nevertheless

exist and thai tts course wouldrisedirectly from the agreemen tos

whichthatTreatyrefers.

This "second argument", l metstressoncemore, is a subsidiary

one: the 1955 Treaty is sufficientin itself. Chad puts forward this

alternative argumen onlyon the assumption that theCourt,contraryto

what Chad sincerely expectsmightconsiderthat the probles mubmittedto

it underthe Framework Agreementof 1989,cannotbe settled by

application of the 1955 Treatalone,whosemeaningnevertheless seems so

clear.

2. You willnot be surprisedthat thecourseof the borderarising

from this second argumei ntidentical to the one 1 describeyesterday,

sinceit is the same international instrumen assthosereferredto by

the 1955 Treaty which applyi,n otherwords,essentiallyagainthe

Franco-British Declarati oofn 1899,the Franco-Italiaexchangeof

lettersof 1902and the Convention between Frana ced Great Britainof

8 September1919.

There is,however,a greatdifference betweenthesetwo arguments:

in the former,the opposabilityof this borderlineto Libyarevolves

upon the expressionby that countryof its consentto be boundby the

ratificationof the Treaty of10 August1955; in the case ofthe second

argument,the one 1 amnow introducing,thisbasis disappears since,for* 011 the purposesof the discussion,this argumentdisregards thisTreaty,

which is neverthelessso fundamental.Essentially, the questionto be

asked is what would happenif the 1955Treatydid not exist. This, 1

readilyadmit, is a somewhat surrealisti exercise,for this Treatydoes

indeedexist, but Libya is so anxiousto emptyit of its substancethat

one shouldpause fora moment to considerwhat, 1 repeat,is a purely

academichypothethis.

3. The starting-poinof the entireagrumentis, naturally,that

Libya succeededItaly. In principle,it doesnot disputethis.

Nevertheless,one cannothelp thinkingthatLibyahas a regrettably

selectiveconceptof the succession. In thisdomain,thereis no

succession "withoutliability todebtsbeyond the value of the assets

descendedl1.If Chad1snorthernboundarywere opposable to Italy it must

alsobe so to Libya (aswell as to Chad itself). Successionof States

is, as notedby the Chamberof theCourt in the case ofthe Land, Island

and MaritimeFrontier Dispute(El Salvador/Honduras)

(I.C.J. Reports1992,, p. 389),the true title twohich each ofthe.

parties can lay claim.

Also, for Chad1sargumentto be well-foundedt,he borderit claims

would obviouslhyave to have beenopposable to Italy before the

independence oLfibya. In otherwords,the treaties establishing this

border would eithe have had to have beenconcluded bItaly, orthe

boundary they establish would haveth oade appliedto Italyin some

otherway. 1 shallendeavour to show that this conditiois satisfied

and that the 1900 and 1902 Agreementfixedthe westernpart of the

boundary between th ewo countriesand entailedthe opposability to Italy

of thewesternsegmentof thatboundarybetween the 16ta hnd

24thmeridians. 4. My remarkswill turnupon two ideas. First,we will seethat, by

the 1900 and 1902Agreements,taly recognized thexistenceof a French
0 1 2
sphereof influence beyondhe boundarybetween Tripolitaniand

Cyrenaica; second, shallconsiderwhat the consequenceof this

recognitionwere asregards thecourseof the boundary.

1 shallthereforedealwith the problemof:

1.ITALY'SBECOGKiTIOlOVFTHEFREiVCHSPHERXOF IRPLüEHCB

and more specificallwith the problemof:

(a) The scopeof the Franco-BritiDeclarationof 1899

5. Duringthe writtenphase,Libyadid not disputethat,by the1899 w
GreatBritainrecognizedto Francean area (or asphere,the
Declaration,

two termsbeingwhollyinterchangeable itnhe vocabularyof the period)

of influence. On thispoint,the Partiesseemed toagree,even though

they didnot draw thesame consequences therefrom.

In the oral phase,Libyahas changedits mind. Thisit is (perhaps)

entitled todo, but itcertainlydoes not helpto clarify the

discussion. Hence,Mr. Sohier drawa subtledistinction betweenzone"

on the one handand "sphereof influenceon the other(CR 93/17p. 28),

and ProfessorCrawford also poinout thatArticle3 of the Declaration

did not, strictlypeaking,createa sphere ofinfluencein France's W

favour(CR 93/19,p. 52).

On the other hand, other counselr Libya haveadheredto amore

orthodoxposition. This is the caseof Professor Cahirho, forhis

part,doesnot hesitate tospeakof a "Frenchzone of influence"

(CR 93/17,p. 28).

It is Mr. Cahier whois rightnot Messrs.Sohierand Crawford.

Therewould seem tobe no doubt that the primeobjectof the

Franco-BritisDeclaration of 189is to concedeto Francea sphere(or

zone)of influence. This is self-evident, buthe confusionencouraged bLyibyaobliges

me to returnto thispoint.

6. The factthat,in 1899,GreatBritainrecognized a sphereof

influence toFranceis attested:

- by the textof theAdditional Declaration,

- by its context,

- by the travauxpréparatoiresa,nd

- by the subsequenptracticeof the Partiesand third States.

To startwith the text. According.toArticle3 of the Declaration,

whichyou must knowby heartnow, 'litis understood,in principle,that

to thenorthof the 15thparallelthe French zone shalb le limited...ll.

"TheFrench zone ...".

This expressionmust be read in contextand, in particulait must

be bornein mind thatthe Declarationis additionalto the

Franco-BritishConvent:ioof 14 June 1898,fixingthe delimitationof the

Frenchand Britishpossessions "and"(thisis the exacttitle)"andthe

spheresof influence of the two countriein the eastof the Niger".

r C 1 4 More preciselyi,t refersto ArticleIV of the 1898 Convention, which

expresslyrecognizes "as fallingwithinthe Frenchsphere,the

northern,easternand southern shoreosf Lake Chad". It is this

provision, ArticleIVof 1898,thathas to be supplementedby the
AdditionalDeclaration,whichformsan "integral part" ofit.

7. This interpretations confirmedby the travaux préparatoires.

1 do not intendto go back in detailover it and shallconfine myselto

notingthat the expression"sphere"or "zone"of influence recurs

constantlyin the words,writtenor spoken, ofthe chief protagonist sn

thenegotiations, be it Lord Salisbury, Cambonr Delcassé,the French

Ministerfor ForeignAffairs. Aan example,letme quoteCambon: "behindTripolitanialie the landswe claimas necessarilbeing
withinOur sphereof influence,namelyBorkou, Tibesti, Ouanianga,
Wadaï,Kanem ..." (Dispatchof 23 January1899annexedto the Libyan
Memorial,FrenchArchives Annexp,. 12).

Similarly,in a memoranduaddressed on14 March1899to

Sir ThomasSandersonwho, asLibyarightlystresses, did play a role in

thenegotiation(cf.Reply,p. 102,par. 6.34),it is statedthat

Article3 "containsa recognitiothatcertain placesfa11within the

Frenchsphere ..."(Annex5 to Chad'sReply: see alsoCR 93/16.p. 37)

(emphasisadded).
Moreover, thiwsas indeedhow the thirdStatesinterpretethe

Franco-Britisheclaration.Turkey, whichin itsmemorandum of

19 May 1899,protestsagainst th"delimitation " the delimitation,

Mr.President,1 shall returnto this- "of spheresof influence"

arisingfrom the1890and 1899 Agreements(Annex6 to the Chad

Memorial). LikewiseItaly,sincein his statementto the Senateof

24 April 1899Canevaro, ItaliaMinisterfor ForeignAffairs, describes

the Declaratioof 21March asdelimiting the "spheo reinfluence"-

there the expressiois!- of both Francand Britain(Annex6 to Chad's
, 0 1 5
R~P~Y

However,theseinterpretationisnvolvean approximation:for it is
w
certainthat the 189A9greementdoesnot place thFrenchand British

zoneson the samelevel.

Article3 doesnot referto the Britishzone; it confinesitselfto

statingthat "theFrenchzone shallbe limitedto the north-eastnd east

by alinewhich shall startfrom the poinotf intersectioonf the Tropic

of Cancer...",etc.. A French zone of influencthen,certainly, but

not, strictlyspeaking,any British zone ofnfluenceon the otherside

of the line. Rather,a French"zoneof disinterest"or, asMr. Sohierput it positivelyon 16 June,an "areaof Britishinterest" (CR 93/16,

p. 56). We know the reasonfor thislackof reciprocity.Theseare,

firstand foremost, tho ebsessionsof Cambonand Delcasséwith

"avoid[ing]",as the latter writeisn a dispatch date25 February 1899,

llgivinlgegal recognitioto Britainlssituationin Egypt" (ML,French

ArchivesAnnex, p. 23),which, moreovere,xpiainsthe.attachmeno tf the

1899Declaration to the Conventionsignedthe previousyear. And

Mr. Sohierrecognizes thiisn his statementof 16June (CR 93/16,

pp. 22-23, and40). Lord Salisbursyhowedhimselfto be very

understandingin thisrespect; as earlyas 8 February1899,he had made

a statementto Cambonwhichcouldnot be clearer: "1 admitted" - the

speaker is Lord Salisbury "thatit was not somuch of an objectto us,

as wedid not attachmuch importanceto any arrangementsthatweremade

to thenorthof the 15O parallel of latitud... ("ML,British Archives

Annex, p. 1). On the otherhand,the British aremost anxiousnot to let

France movecloserto Egypt,whencethe line1 shallreturnto shortlyto

limitthe Frenchzone,,

8. 1 fearal1 thisis rather remotferomthe subjectwe shouldhave

been dealingwith. But Libyahas made a great issue ouotf the

divergencesit believesit detects betweetnhe attitudeof Franceon the

one handand Great Britainon the other. With respectto the Ottomanor

Italianprotestsbetween1899and 1934,theremay wellbe nuancesin the

mannerof replying, but 1 do not believthere are anyreal divergences;

it is simplythat,whereasthe Gallic cock wearo sut itsspursin the

aridmountainsof Tibesti,the Britishlion warmsitselfin the sunshine

of theNileValley.

Atal1 events, whetherit is the Declaratioof 1899or the

Conventionof 1919,Great Britainreactswith the greatest composure a,

trulyBritishcomposure. Chadhas givenampleillustration of this inits pleadings(cf.~emorial,pp. 195-197;Counter-Memorial, pp. 314-316,

paras. 8.39-8.45,or pp. 326-328,paras. 8.65-8.75). 1 shall confine

myself to three tellingexamples:

- Prinetti,who was concernedat the Franco-British apportionment of .

1899,was assured byLord Currie,BritishAmbassadorto Rome, in his

memorandumof 11 March 1902, that this agreementdid--not.ianny-way

prejudicethe rightsof other Powers, "and that, in particular,as

regards the vilayetof Tripoliand the Mutessariflikof Benghazi,al1

such rightsremainentirely unaffected bi yt" (ML,British Archives

Annex, p. 80); al1 that can be deduced fromthis is that his Britannic

Majesty'sGovernment remains cautious at nde Foreign Officememorandum

of 3 February1902, to which the Libyan Counter-Memorialattaches

particular importanc( ep. 156, para. 4.103), says precisely this;in

substance, that memorandum indicat test, apriori,the

1899 Declaration does not prejudicethe rightsof any third State, but

shouldthis be the case, it is the Frenchwho must be approached

(ibid.,p. 73).

- The same generaltone in the British reactions to the Italian

proteststhis time aimed at the Convention of 8 September1919. The

ForeignOffice Note Verbalo ef 5 February1923, in reply to theItalian

protestof 18 December 1921, is significant ProfessorCahier quoted

only an extractfrom the endof thisdocument(CR 93/17,p. 34). 1

believe it needs tobe read in full, for it aptly conveysthe British

attitude:

"The FrenchGovernment,it has been ascertained,entirely
share the viewof His Majesty'sGovernmentthat the arguments
put forwardin Monsieur Taliani'snote under referencecannot
be regarded aswell founded. Moreover,His Majesty's
Governmentunderstandthat the FrenchGovernmenthave in
additionparticular reasonf sor regarding the Italian
standpointas untenable." (ML,British Archives Annex, p. 40.)Stillthe same position: the Italianscannotclaimany right,but, in

any case,al1 of this is a matterfor the French ...

- GreatBritain,this is the thirdexample,had "claims"only on the

area situated beyond the sphereof influence it had recognized to France

by the Declarationof 1899; eventhese"claims"were notstronglystated

and it made no fusswhen,by Article3 of theTreaty.constitute dy the

Rome exchangeof notes of 20 July 1934,it abandonedit, cedingthe Sarra

Triangle to Italy. Al.1the same,it shouldbe noted in passingthat this

took a properagreement.

The Frenchdo not.share thisattitude, however. They intendto

exercisethe rights conferreu dpon themby the Declaratioo nf 1899 and to

effectively occupt yhe zoneof influenceGreatBritain hadthereby

recognizedto them. This wasto be the caseby 1914. Meanwhile,the

Declaration has only the relative effectof treaties; it binds the

Partiesbut is res inter aliosacta as regards thirc dountries. 1

shallnot dwellon this any longer;regardlessof what Libyawould have

us believe, Chad agrees; it has said so in its Memorial(p. 176) andhas

not changed its mind since.

In this respect,Chad can subscribeto the bulk of the long lesson

in law Professor Crawfordfelt it incumbentupon him togive us lastweek

(CR 93/19,pp. 46-52): a treatyrecognizing a zone of influencd eoes

not, of itself,constitutea territorial title, albeit an inchoateone,

and here too, Chadhas neverwrittenanythingto the contrary.

However, such a treatyconstitutes an announcement that the

beneficiary will seek, through effeco tivuepation,to createsuch a

titleand signifiesthat the other Statp earty to thetreaty undertakes

not to stand in its way. ThirdStates are not boun dn any wise. (b) Recognitionby Italy of the Frenchsphereof influence

9. Among thesethirdStates,two aremore particularly interested

and thusmore particularly concemed: Turkeyand Italy. As earlyas

1890,the former asserted its"rightsl * 1 put the word in quotation .

marks- on the hinterlandof Tripolitania. If onespeaksof territorial

rights,they are, like thoseof France, moreoverp ,urelyvirtual; these

are contradictoryclaims,not opposable to other Statesas long as they

have not beensubstantiated by "the actual,continuousand peaceful

displayof Statefunctions"(Island of Palmascase,award ofMax Huber,

4 April 1928,RGIDP 1935,p. 166). The two Powers,Franceand Turkey,

are awareof this and were to embarkupon a "racefor Tibesti",where

theywould arrive more or lessat the same time, butFrancewas to remain

there andthat makes al1 the difference. Other counsel ofChadwill

develop thispoint further.

10. The otherStateconcemed at the colonialappetitesof the

Frenchis Italy. To be sure, Italy, as Libya is fond of repeatinghas

no rightover Libya,not even a virtualone. It cannotclaimany

hinterland whateve( ror it would bea "trans-Mediterranea hinterland";

even counsel of Libyahave not thoughtof thisdespitetheiringenious

imaginations) ann do Powerhas recognizedin favourof Italy the least

sphereof influencein NorthAfrica. It will be the primary ambition of

the Mediterranean policy ofthe young Kingdom,not withoutsuccess.

To be sure, the UnitedKingdomremains cautious an one can only pay

tributeto the perspicacityshownby Mr. Sohierwhen, takingthe opposite

view to that of the LibyanCounter-Memoria(lp. 156, para.4.102),he

recognized thatthe Franco-BritisAgreementof 1912 - which, in

reality, is more in the natureof a unilateraldeclarationby Great

Britain - was "of less direct relevancef"or our casethan that concluded

with France thesameyear (CR 93/16, p. 56). 11. France,which seeksto placate Itali yn the perspectiveof its

designson Morocco,was not to displaythe same reticence.

It is true that,as pointedout by Libya,one of the purposesof the

exchangeof lettersof 14 and 16 December1900betweenBarrère,French

Ambassadorto Rome,and Marquis Viscont Venosta,ItalianMinisterfor

ForeignAffairs,"concerned-France' interests-in.Morocco (CR 93/16,

p. 47). But this is onlypart of the truth: to be sure, in his letter

of 16 DecemberVisc0nt.Vienostagives theassurance that Ital would not

opposea Frenchventurein Morocco,on which point,by contrast,

Barrère's letterof 14 Decemberis silent. On the other hand, both

letters deal with the questionof Italy'sright"to developits influence

with regard to Tripolitani and Cyrenaica",as the Ministermodestly puts

it, whereas the FrencAhmbassadorsays that

"theConvention of 21 March1899,by its exclusion of the
vilayetof Tripolifrom the partition of influence forwhich
it provides,impliesfor the sphereof Frenchinfluence,in

relation toTripolitania-Cyrenaica a,boundarythat the
Governmentof the Republichas no intention of overstepping..."

1 wish to emphasizethe expression:"for the sphereof French

influence". It is important on two counts: first,this expression

clearlyshowsthatFranceand Italyeach considerthat the 1899

Declarationreserved a sphereof influenceto France; second,t also

reveals that Italy recogniz indfavourof Francethe benefitof this

sphere ofinfluence. Indeed, it is hard to see howthe former, Italy,

couldhave beencontentwith the assurances givenby the latter, France,

that it would notextendits sphereof influencebeyonda givenlimitif,

at the same time,Italy hadchallengedthe existence and validity ofsuch

a sphere.

As Mr. Sohierrightly remarkead fortnightago (CR 93/16, p.49),

the fact remains thatthe exchangeof lettersof December1900,while

positingthe principleof a future extensioo nf Rome'sinfluencein Tripolitania-Cyrenaica and establist hingrecognition by Ital of the

Frenchsphereof influenceoutsidethe vilayetof Tripoli,on the one

hand doesnot constitutea border treaty and, on the otherhand, doesnot

place the twoStateson an equal footing, sinceItalyis recognizing a

fait accompli(theFrench sphere of influencearisingfrom the

1899 Declaration), whereas Italy'srights.in.Libya-ar seubordinate to "a

modification of thepoliticalor territorial stateof Morocco".

12. These two lacunae would bfeilledby the exchangeof lettersof

10 July to1 November1902between Prinettit ,he new ItalianMinisterfor

ForeignAffairs,and Barrère.
'w
Threepoints should bn eoted:

- to beginwith, the two States mutually recognize fo trhe benefitof

each other,in generalterms,spheresof influence - in Moroccofor
. .
Franceand in Tripolitania-Cyrenaica for Itathough thisruns
022
- - counter to what is statedby Libya (CR 93/16,p. 53) - which doesnot

speak ofTripolitania-Cyrenaica - and in this connection,Chadwishes

to specifyoncemore that it in no way deniesthat the expression

"aforesaid regions"which appearsin the Agreement obviously refers to

Moroccoand Tripolitania;but thatexpression is not the basis for

Chad'saffirmation -

- and that is my second point- that Italy recognizeidn anothermanner

the existenceof a Frenchsphereof influence such as was established

by the Anglo-FrenchDeclaration of 1899; this followsfrom the

referencemade in 1902 to the exchangeof lettersof 1900, which, as we %

have just seen,recognizedthe Frenchsphere ofinfluence;

- and lastly, thirdt,he two Statesagreedon the courseof the

Tripolitanianboundary; 1 shallrevertto thispresently. 13. Firstwe must assure ourselves thtthe travaux préparatoires

and the subsequent practicof the Partiesto theFranco-Italian

Agreementsof 1900and 1902confirmthe interpretation accordingto which

theseexchanges of lettersin factendorsed threnutualrecognitionby

Franceof a possiblezoneof expansion of Italyin Tripolitania-Cyrenaica,

and by Italyof the Frenchsphereof-influence.

Chadha8 alreadyspokenat lengthon this point(MC,pp. 145 ff.;

CMC, pp. 196 ff. and 206 ff.; RC, pp. 35 ff.)andno new elementsin

this respectare to befoundeitherin the Replyof Libyaor inthe oral

argumenteof ite counsel.

With regardto thetravauxpréparatoires,it thereforesufficesto

recallthatit was MarquisViscontiVenostahimself whoinsistedthatthe

followingwordsshould be addet do Barrère'sletterof 14 December1900:
O23
- "by its exclusionof the vilayet oTripolifromthe partitionof

influencewhich it endorses"(cf.ML, French Archivesnnex,p. 85);

thisexpression, by itselfalone,sumsup thetwo essential aspects of

the exchangeof lettersthatconcernus -partitionof influence,vilayet

of Tripoli.

It shouldalsobe recalledthatin his speech before theItalian

Chamberof Deputieson 14 December1901,Prinettirepeated the general

ideaof the precedinygear'sexchangeof letters. 1 am well awarethat

Libyasetsgreatstoreby a wordwhichdoesnot appear inthe Agreement

of 14-16December1900 (cf.CR 93/16,p. 51); the Italian Ministerdid

indeedSay:

"TheGovernment of the Republic[meaning Francehas taken
careto informus that theFranco-BritisChonventionof
21 March1899 markedfor France, in relatioto theregion
borderingon the easterboundarywith itsAfrican possessions,
and in particulawith respect totheVilayet ofTripoli, a

provinceof theTurkish Empirea, limitwhichit did not have
the intentiono overstep ..."(MC,Ann. 333.). .
Why the "easternboundary"? For a reasonwhich emergesmore clearly if
O24
- we read the ItalianMinisterPrinettilsstatementin conjunction with the
I
speech madeby Mr. Delcassé before the FrenchChamberof Deputiesa few

weeks later,whichMr. Sohierwas carefulnot tocite although the two

statementshad beenclosely CO-ordinated. Yet the FrenchMinisterls

speechclarifiesthat of his Italiancolleague.by spellingit out in

greater detail:

"TheAfricanConvention of 21 March 1899,whichhas
definitivelyincludedin Our sphereof influence the
territoriesof the Borkou,the Tibesti, the Kanem,the Baghirmi
and the Ouadaï,thereby linkingthe FrenchCoastof the Congo
with the Algerianand TunisianMediterranean coasts,thus
representsfor us, in respectof the other countries and
regionsbordering the eastem frontierof our Africandomain,
the limitwhichwe have no intentionof overstepping ..." (MC,
Ann. 334.)

This "eastem frontier"is therefore constituted t bye long linewhich,

from the Congoto the Mediterranean,marks thelimitof France's

possessions anwdhich is, in effect,globally situated to the ea osft
these: Delcasséand Prinetti had a less "mathematical"conceptof

geography- as did Lord Salisbury or Cambon- than the LibyanParty!

14. Italysubsequently reiteratedthe undertakings assumed 1i 902.

My colleagueand friend ProfessoC rassesewill speakaboutthese

presently,as well asaboutthe circumstances tha surroundedand

followed their conclusion.

True, Italy latermarked,with a certain vehemence, its opposition

to theFranco-British Conventionof 8 September1919. But thoseprotests

themselvesare significant;they relate to the line - new according to

Italy- specifiedby the1919 Convention and in no way bring into

question therecognition by Rome of the sphereof influence or ofthe

colonizationthat resulted therefrom 1.cite as evidence- but it is

only one exampleamong many other -s the noteof 1 July 1932wherebythe

ItalianGovernmentaffirmed "the fulland complete validit ...of that partof the
Franco-Italiannotes (sic)of 11-12September1900 and
1 November1902whichrefersto the territoria limitsof
Frenchexpansion in North Africaby referenceto
Tripolitania-Cyrenaica..." (CMC,Ann. 72).

In severalothernotesaddressed to the Frenchand BritishGovernmentsby

thatof Rome,Italyrecalled the termsof the 1900 and 1902Agreements

and admittedthattheseendorsedthe existence 0f.aPrench"sphereof

influence" (theexpression appear srequentlyin thenotes)(cf.CMC,

pp. 181-182,para. 7.44)beyondthe frontiero sf Tripolitania-Cyrenaica.

15. By the textof the 1900and 1902Agreements, confirme bd the

travaux préparatoiresand by its consistensubsequent attitude Italy

thereforerecognized tho epposability tiotselfof theAnglo-French

Declarationof 21March 1899, at leastwith regardto the sphereof

influencewhichthatDeclaration recognizedFranceas having.

What legal consequencdid thisentail,Mr. President?Truly,an

altogether essential consequence :romthenon, Italycouldno longer

claimthat theFrenchsphereof influence was notopposableto it.

Unlikethe Ottoman Empire,it had accepted faactwhichbut for this

would nothave compelled itrsecognition.True,it wouldbe ableto

proclaimitselftheOttomanEmpire'ssuccessor, but only to the extent

that therightswhich. theTurksclaimed did not encroachupon thoseit

had itselfrecognized Franceas having. Independentloyf the fact that

one doesnot succeedto claimsand that thealleged "rights" o the

SublimePortewereno more thanclaims, as Mr. MalcolmShawwill

demonstrate,any othertheorywould rob the ver ideaof a zone(or

sphere)of influence of al1 substance;yet thatidea,as the Court

recalledin thepassagefromitsAdvisoryOpinionin the Western Sahara

case cited byProfessorCrawford himself,has the followingeffect: by a

treaty concerninga sphere ofinfluence "onepartygrantedto the other freedo mf actionin certain
definedareas,or promisednon-interferenci en an area claimed
by the otherparty"(I.C.J.Reports 1975, p. 56).

Theseviewsare sharedby themost authoritativ doctrine, which1 have

quotedin the manuscripthandedin to the Registry(cf.Charles Rousseau,
.

Droitinternational public III,Les compétences, Sirey,1977,

p. 199; see alsoJohnWestlake,Collected Papersby L. Oppenheim,

Cambridge Universit Press, 1914,pp. 191-193or ThomasB. Holdich,

PoliticalFrontiersand Boundary Making,Macmillan, London, 1916,

pp. 96-97),and the PermanentCourt also proceede on the basisof the

same ideain theEasternGreenlandcase (P.C.I.J. Series A/B, No. 53,

p. 73).

It remains forme to establish what watshe limitthat the

Agreements of 1900and 1902 - especiallythe latter,the formerbeing

imprecisein thisrespect - what wasthe limitthoseAgreementsimposed

upon French expansion. Thatwill formthe subjectof the secondpartof

my statement.

II. THELIMITOF THE FRENCHZONEOF IiTFLUENC RECOGNIZED BY ITALY

(a) Recognitionby Italyof the frontier of Tripolitania

16. 1 come,then,to the limitof the French zone of influence

recognizedby Italy,and we shallsee firstthatItaly recognizet dhe

frontierof Tripolitania.We shallthengo on to speakof the limitof

the French zoneitself. By theexchangeof lettersof December1900,

Italy recognizetdhatFrancehad a rightto extendits influencein the

regionadjoining Tripolitania-Cyrenaib cavirtueof the Agreementof

21 March1899. As to the limit ofthatFrenchzone,this first accord

remainsimprecise. Imprecise,but not silent. In it, Franceadmitsthat the

Franco-BritisAhgreementof 1899

"impliesfor thesphereof French influence in relationto
Tripolitania-Cyrenaica alimit thatthe Govemment of the
Republichas no intentionof overstepping".

Moreover,as 1 recalled a fewmoments ago,some words wereadded atthe

requestof the ItalianMinisterfor-Foreign.Affair. s;ViscontVenosta

had in factrequested ano dbtained fromBarrèrethat it be specifiedthat

"theConvention of 21 March1899" excluded "thevilayetof Tripolifrom

thepartitionintozonesof influence whichit endorses". Italy,for its

part,reserved "the right d tovelop its influenwceth regardto

Tripolitaniaand Cyrenaica".

Thus,at the sametimeas it reserved for itself zaneof influence

in Tripolitania-CyrenaicI a,aly recognizeFrance'srightto developits

zoneof influence outsidethe limit of theformer(meaning

Tripolitania-Cyrenaica).The exchangeof letters of 1900doesnot,

however, specify wher thatlimitis situated.And thatwas to be one of

the objects- the objectwithwhichwe are concerned here - of the

1902Agreement.

17. As theLibyanParty admits (CR 93/16,pp. 52 and54), it was

Italythatwas notfully satisfie dith the 1900exchangeof letters:

not onlywere itspossible rights ovL erbya merely conditiona-

conditionallryecognizedby France,to be completelp yrecise- but also

the boundaryof Tripolitania-Cyrenai haad not beendefinedby the

Agreement,an indireetresultof thisbeing that the limitof the French

zoneof influence, tao,remained imprecise.

It is notsurprising,therefore, that this limiwtas specifiedat

Prinetti'srequest. The resultwas the formulationwhichwe findin the

two lettersdated1 November1902andwhichLibya so greatld yislikes: "On thatoccasionit was explained"(thereferenceis to
the preparatory talbkestweenPrinettiand Barrère)"thatthe
limitto Frenchexpansionin NorthAfrica, as referredto in
[Barrèrels]letterof 14 December1900,is to be takenas
correspondingto the frontierof Tripolitaniaas shownon the
map annexedto the Declaration of21 March 1899,complementing
the Franco-British Conventi ofn14June 1898."
.
The limit referretdo is thewavy line surrounding Tripolita nia

starting at Ghadamès whichis to be foundin the upperleft-handpart of
And you are going
the map, nextto the legend. We have alreadyseen it.

to see an enlargementof it. And this,then,is the frontierof

Tripolitania.

18. 1 amaware,Mr. President, that theLibyanPartychallenges this
r
on the pretextthat the line is

"Justa wavy,dashedline, notidentified on the map's legend
as a boundaryof any kind,whichrepresented, notionally,what
was commonlyregarded atthe timeto be theTripolitanian
frontier"(CML, p. 237,para.4.254; emphasis addeb dy us).

This concept- a verynew one - of a "notionalboundary"is somewhat

baffling,but Libya'scounsel are faithfd ulsciplesof Giraudoux,who

regarded thelaw as "thefinestschoolof the imagination"a ,nd 1 prefer

not to followthem into this territo whyerewe would loseOur way amidst

vain conjectures.

On the otherhand,1 note thatLibya admits that this line "was

commonlyregardedat the timeto bethe Tripolitanian frontier".The

admissionis revealing: therexistthroughout the worldnumerous

frontiersthat arenot hallowedby any treaty; theyare none the less

frontiersin the fullsenseof theword. Need it berecalled, moreover,

that "thegeneral toleratio of the internationaclommunitywtowards

Norway'sline establishingthe limitof its territoriaslea constituted

one of the basesof the solutionadoptedby the Courtin the Fisheries

case (I.C.J.Reports1951,p. 139)? Mutatis mutandist ,he same

applieshere: as Libya itself States,the lineof theTripolitanianfrontieron the Livrejaunernapis only thecartographic expressio nf

this generalrecognition, as is also, for example,the - identical -

frontier appearino gn the JustusPerthesrnapof 1892and as attestedby

the sketch-map prepare by the ForeignOfficein 1902 which is reproduced

on page 206 of the LibyanMemorial.

The JustusPerthesrnapyou see projectedbehind-me -callsfor a

remark. As 1 said last Friday(CR 93/21,p. 27), Libya has reproduced,

in its Reply,thismap, whichappearson page 2 of the Chad1s

cartographic Atlas. But, curiously, the frontierline is not identical

in the two maps: it seems that theLibyanPartyhas retouchedit so as

to make of the dotted linewith a yellowline runningalongsideit on the

originalrnap - which Chadhas filedwith the Registry - a solid line.

This is unfortunate, Mr. President,for now this line no longer

correspondsto any legendwhereasactuallyit marks, asthe legendof the

"real"JustusPerthesrnapvery clearly indicates,the "Turkishcolonial

frontiers"(Kolonialgrenzen).

This goes very far,Mr. President,for it disposesat the same time

of the "goldenlegend"of the Ottomanhinterlandwhich supposedly was

underTurkishterritorial sovereignt well to the south of this

frontier. Notso: that territorialsovereignty stopped righ att the

frontierof Tripolitaniaas it was generally accepte at that time (we

are in1902); as it appeared onthe period'smaps; as it corresponded,

in fact,to Turkeylsestablishment on the ground; and as theItalian

Under-Secretary of State,Mosca,recognized12 yearslaterto be shown

accuratelyon "la cartache fu redatta inseguito alla convenzione

anglo-francese" - ''thrnapdrawnup subsequently". 1would likeit to

be "subsequently"M,r. President,sinceProfessor Condorelli say so!

(CR 93/17,p. 48) - subsequently, then,to the Anglo-French Agreemeno tf

1899 (RC, Ann. 28). 19. But thereis more. The frontier lintehat concernaus not only
O31
formedthe subjectof a general recognitibonrn of the conviction

manifested by the mapsand of the silencof everyone. In this

particular case,Italyacceptedthislineexplicitly, expressly anbdy

agreement througt hhe Prinetti-BarrèAgreementof 1902.

The precise legalstatuaof thismap - in respectof-whichthe two

Parties agreein admittingthat itwas notannexedto the Franco-British

Declaration of 1899but onlyto the Frenchpublication, haighlyofficia1

one,and knownto theBritish,thatis the Livre jaune- matters

little. The factis, as Mr. Sohierrecalledin his statement of 16June,
v
thatit was at Prinetti'sexpressrequestthat this map was explicitly

mentionedin theAccord(CR 93/16,pp. 54 and 55). Indeed,as

ArnbassadoBrarrèreStatesin a dispatchdated22 June1902,it was the

Ministerwho

"askedthat it be mentioned that thfrontiersof our African

possessionson the sideof Tripoli arethoseshownby themap
annexedto the 1898Anglo-FrenchConvention" (ML,French
ArchivesAnnex, p. 121).

Suchwas the general formulati onintainedin theexchangeof letters

signedsome dayslater -with,however,two changes. One was purely

formal. It consistedin replacing"1898"by "1899" - probablya matter

of a simpletranscriptioenrrormadeby Barrère or his secretariator,

perhaps, asLibyaconjectures in itsMemorial(p. 207,para. 5.95),a

lapsus linguaeby Prinetti.The second changw eas moreimportant:

insteadof referring, ashad initiallbyeen envisaged,to "thefrontiers"

of "theAfricanpossessions" of Franct e,e exchangeof lettersreferred

to "thefrontier of Tripolitania"shownon themap, as though Italy,

indifferentto what Francemightdo in itsAfrican possessions, meant

aboveal1 to secureits own colonial expansio in the regionand,to that end, to have defined,as Libya writin itsMemorial(p. 207,

para.5.95)"withmore precisionthe boundariesof the 'vilayetof

Tripoli'".

Satisfactiohavingbeen givento Italy,"withoutdifficulty"as

Barrèrewrote in his dispatchof 22 June 1902,"Prinettiaddition",to

cite theLibyanMemorial onceagain;."gaveamore formal~statutso the

wavy line, atleastas betweenFranceand Italy"(ibid.). Small

matter,then,that thelegend appearin gn themap shouldnot expressly

definethislineas the frontierof Tripolitaniau,nlikethe

JustusPerthes mapon whichit is directly based; fore purposesof

the Franco-Italianxchange,thatis the pointat issue.

20. The consequenceof this weretwofold:

First,Italyand France recognized at leastin their relations

interse, the courseof the frontieof Tripolitania-Cyrenaica ;t is

that resulting frothemap referred tion the 1902Agreement. True,

that agreemenwtas res intea2iosacta in respectof thirdStates,and

in particularin respectof Turkey,andChadhas neverclaimed anddoes

not claim that the Portes boundby theFranco-Italiaenxchangeof

letters. But Italy,foritspart,was boundby theAgreement. France

recognizedits right"to develop itsphereof influence"in

Tripolitania-Cyrenaica, bthe frontierof Tripolitania-Cyrenaicas,

this time,precisely definein the relationsetweenthe parties. They

could, of course,everse theiargreementbut togetherand only through

the conclusioonf a new treaty. And, as ProfessCassesewill show

presently,no suchtreaty evermaterialized.

The secondconsequenceof the exchangeof lettersof 1902is that
Q33
this"frontierof Tripolitania"constitutes "theimitof French

, 03 4 expansion inorthernAfrica". Francecannot encroacu hpon the boundary

thusdefined,but as for the restit can do what it wished. In any case,Italyrecognizedit as havingthis rightto do as it wished,which,

as a result,becameopposableto Italy.

(b) The opposabilitto Italyof the limitof the Frenchsphereof
influence

21. As youhow, duringthe next 12 yearsFrancewas to take

effective possessioof the sphereof influenceit-had-beenrecognizedas

havingby the 1899Declaration and the 19A 02reement,thus transforming

into a realcolony whathad beenbut a zone of influence,a virtual,

dotted-linecolonyif you wish. Mr. Cassesewill also recallthesefacts.

Vis-à-visItaly,this expansion couldl ,egally,have reached the

frontierof Tripolitania.

Vis-à-visGreat Britain, however,Francewas boundby theAdditional

Declarationof 21 March 1899. This AdditionalDeclaratiohad limited

the Frenchzone to the north-eastand east andwhile Italycouldnot

opposethat limit to theFrench,the British fotrheirpart could invoke

that limit.

At one time,Francebelieved that the 1899 line itselwfas opposable

to Italy. But,r. President, as the Agent ofad remarkedlastFriday,

Franceis Franceand ...Chad is Chad. And a more attentive studhad

convincedhim that, in fact,theexchangeof letters of1902 did not

limitthe French zoneof expansion excepbty the frontier ofripolitania.

At the most it mightbe maintainedthat Italy,whose authoritiehad

knowledgeof the 1899map to which the 1902Agreementrefersand,

consequently,of the-"limitof Frenchpossessions"which appearson the

map- this is clearly statedin the legen- that Italy, therefore, could

not in good faith disputehat limit.The 1899 Declaration was,it is
, 0 3 5
true,tes inter alios acta so far as Italywas concernednot the map

whichboth partiesregardedas beingannexedthereto. But letus leavethisasideand let us agree, for argument'ssake,

thatwe must adopta literal interpretatioon the exchangeof lettersof

1902, whichdoesnot referto this "south-eastline". In thatcase,

France'sfreedomof actionwas stillgreater: Italy recognized Franace

havinga sphereof influence which, virtually, authorized to establish

its colonial possessiaon far as the frontierof Tripolitania.hatwas

only partiallto be the case.

22. It was to be thecaseto the east, where therench werealready

established byeason ofthe protectorate oveTunisiain 1881and the

conquestand subsequent occupatioon Algeria. It was also to be the

caseto the south: forwe must,decidedly we must considerNiger,where

Francedid occupythe zoneof influenceit wasrecognized as havingunder

the 1898and 1899 Agreements,nd thatat the very beginningof the

20thcentury. So the southern frontieof Tripolitaniaalso becamethe

In thisconnection
northernfrontierof theFrenchcolony of thN eiger.

1 takethe libertyto recallthatat the time theTibestiformedpartof

Nigerand not ofChad,in whichit was incorporatedonly in 1930. Unless

Libyaproposesto disputethe frontier of Nigeas well -perhapsthatis

its intention?At al1 events,the questionmay be asked-the upshotis

thatLibya'ssouthernfrontierbetween Toummo and the Tropic ofCancer

indeedfollowsthe frontierof Tripolitaniaappearingon themap accepted

by Italyin 1902.

23. On the otherhand,the sameis not the caseto the eastof the

intersectioof the Tropicof Cancerand the 16thmeridian. Here,French

expansionis legallylimitedonlyby theundertakings assumedtowards

GreatBritain(nottowardsItaly)in 1899.

* 030 Whereis this limistituated?This,Mr. President, is of little

importance:evenif we agreefor argument's sakethat this limitdoes

not result preciselfyrom the1899Declaration,it was establishedwithoutany ambiguity whateverby theAdditional Agreement concluded

between Franceand Great Britainon 8 September1919. Whatever the

situation mighthavebeen previously, this limit- thenceforwarda

frontier, becauseFranceeffectively occupied thesphereof influence

which Britainand Italyhad recognizedit as having- this limit,then,

is constitutedby a linewhich, startingat theTropic, shall run (1 cite

the 1919Convention) "thenceto the south-eastuntilit meetsthe

24th degreeof longitude eastof Greenwichat the intersectioonf that

degreeof longitude with parallel190301of latitude".

This frontier compels recognitibynItaly. w

Oh, surelynot becauseItalyacceptedit: it was to protestagainst

this line repeatedly between 1 9211935. But,here again,Libya

equates a little lightc lyaimsor protestswith rights. The questionis

not whether Italyprotested: it did protest. The questionis, rather,

whether itsprotestswere legitimate; whethe its claimswere well

foundedin law. And theywerenot: in 1902,Italy hadclearly agreed

thatFrancecould pursueits colonial expansio as far as the frontieof

Tripolitania:the 1919 line in sowhere nearthatlimit to the eas of

the intersectioo nf the Tropic oCancer andthe 16thmeridianeast of

Greenwich.There is thereforeno legalmotiveat the basisof the

Italianprotests,especially sinceat thattimethe French were

effectivelyestablished in theregion,whilethe Italians arrived there

onlymuch later: Koufrawas takenonly in 1931,and Italywas notto

obtain until1934the renunciatio bny Great Britain,y a treaty,of its

claimsto the Sarratriangle.

24. Mr.President,the Partieshavenevertheless lon geen in

conflictabout the cours of the limitof the French sphereof influence

resultingfrom the Franco-British Agreem ofnt1 March1899. As the

proceedingsadvancedLibyawas led to put the accent onthe mathematical linewhichit calls"strictsouth-east line",with al1 the moreapparent

convictionsinceit seernsto beawarethatit has no alternative course

to defendas it rightly rejects the line resulting from the

Laval-Mussolini Treaoty 1935and clearlycannottakeseriouslythe

15th parallelnorthwhichis justified by no- 1 repeatno - valid

argument, legaolr not. For itspartChad-considert shatthe "south-east

line"is appropriatelyrepresentedby theLivrejaunemap.

Besides,and in view of what 1 believe1 have establishup till

now, 1 think1 canbe fairlybriefabout this quarrel whichhas takenon

exaggeratedimportancein relationto the real legastakes: since

Italy,by the agreementosf 1900and 1902,admittedthat the Frenchzone

of influencecouldextendup to the frontierof Tripolitaniashownon the

1899map, it couldnot protestagainst the colonial ascendao ncFrance

as longas it did not encroacupon itsown sphereof influence:

Tripolitania- and the 1919course fully observed that condition.

25. In view of this,why- since1 do not afteral1 want to avoid

discussion- doesChadarguethatin any case thiscoursedoesnot, or

practicallynot, differfromthatof 1899? The reasons are vern yumerous

and areexplainedin greatdetailin the pleadingsof Chad (cf.MC,

pp. 185-197 andCMC,paras.8.80-8.121).1 shallconfinemyselfto

referringonceagainin briefto the principalreasons,particularly in

the lightof what counsel foLibyahave repeatedin their statements.

O38 Let us begin withthe textof Article3 of the Declaration ife

may,Mr. President.Thereare twoelementsto be noted. Firstly,the

expression"in principle"-"It is agreedin principle...". This

wordingat thebeginningof Article 3showsthatthe signatories did not

have the feeling that thwere solvinga mathematical problems ;imply,

becausethe limitof the French zonhad to be settledin that almostunknownregion,for the'reasonsthat 1 have given, they indicated from

the outset that they were only indicatinggeneraldirections, which is

confirmedmoreoverby the words"in a south-easterly direction".

Other textualargumentswere advancedby MacMichael,one of the

principal negotiatoro sf the Convention of 8 September1919, in his

letterof 7 March 1919 to Vansittart..May f referyou-to this,

Mr. President, Members of the Court. He concluded: "if the lineis

drawn duesouth-eastit becomesridiculous"(MC, Ann. P.12). A week

laterhe went furtherin a long note withmuch detailon the "several

absurdities"to whichwhat hecalledthe "literalline" led, and advised 'w

the adoptiontowards the French of a more common-senseposition(RC,

AM. 40). Libya does not seem to be moveb dy this wiseadviceand

confinesitself,in some of themany maps that it has prepared,to noting

the existenceof a "gap". 1 do not always understand the legal

conclusionsit draws from this (cf. CML, Map No. 16 or Map No. 29 in the

Judgeslfolderand CR 93/16, p. 41). Chad for its part sees in this an

a contrario confirmation of the impossibility of the mathematicalline.

26. One of the outstanding feature of the negotiationbetween

Lord Salisburyand AmbassadorCambon wasthe determinationof Franceto

obtain the whole of the heightsand oases of Tibesti and Ennedi,and

Great Britainhad always agreed to accede to that requestT .rue, Chad

does not contestthe fact that, as Libya recalls (cf. CR/93/16,p. 37),

the parties based themselves no on the mapsdrawnup from 1910 onwards -

which place thesemountains correctl y but on maps dating from the end

of the 19thcentury: the JustusPerthesmap of 1892 whichyou have here,

or the Frenchstaffmap of 1896. But on both thesemaps it is clear that

the mathematical line dea to Libya intersects thm eassifs- especially

those of the Ennedi - that are shown on them,althoughthesemaps show

them as beinglocatedfurther south than they arein actual fact. This certainldoesnot correspondto the intentionf the parties,l1 the

lesssinceseveraltimesFrancehad insistedon a stripof desertbeing

, O4 0 allotted to it at the foftand to thenorthof thesemountains.The

courseof the Livre jaune is the onlyone which, bon themaps of

the period,leaves the oassnd theheightsof Tibesti,nnedi,Borkou

and Ouniangaon the Frenchside.

27.On thispoint,Libya has madmuch ofan episodethattookplace

on 19 March1899, thredaysbefore the signaturof the Declaration.

This episodeis relatedin a dispatchfromCambonto Delcasséthatvery

evening(ML, FrenchArchivesAnnex,pp. 39-41). It commentson a British

draft that wouldave madethe linethatinterestsus startfrom the

18th parallel; thisis what Cambowrote:

"1 pointed outhatit was impossiblto continuethe
delimitatioas faras the 18thparallelas this wouldmean
Our losinga significanpartof the territoriethatwe were
claimingto thenorthof the Darfou..."

It was afterthatobjectionthat theactualwordingwas adopted,after

somehesitation.The interpretatioonf this episodadvancedby Libyain

itsMemorial(pp.176-178)and recalledby Mr.Sohierin his speech of

16 June(CR 93/16,pp. 38-39)is absolutely extraordinary.singitself

on the statementthat thverb "topush"appliesto the delimitation

coming from Darfou(whereasit is clear thit concernsthe

"south-east"line),LibyaconcludesthatFrancehad asked thathe

arriva1pointof the line shoulbe pushedback towards thsouth. This,

which rancounterto al1 thenegotiating objectives pursueFrance,

cannotbe advancedseriouslybecauseit is evident thquitethe

oppositeis true. What Cambois protestingagainstis the loss of

certainterritoriesof the futureB.E.T.that thelineproposedby

Lord Salisbury woulinvolve; "to pushthisdelimitationsouthwards

04 1 wouldobviouslyaggravatethat drawback.And if in fact this episis importantit is becauseit showsthat the arrivap1oint of the line is

necessarilynorth of the 18th parallelsince,and on this point the

Partiesagree,Lord Salisbury accepted Cambon 'sjection.

28. Everythingthereforegoes to showthat the partieshad in mind a

line thatwas certainly"south-east"within themeaningthat

non-cartographergsive this term and certainlyot a "strict south-east

linewas affirmedby Libya. This is what the Livrjaune map

reflects. Let us look at itgain.

1 am not a cartographer or aeographer,Mr. President, and1 must

say inal1 conscience tha1t have neverhad the slightest doubtboutthe w

fact thatthe dottedred line that1 have underlined, descendinfrom the

Tropicof Cancerto the 24th parallelis indeedin a "south-east

direction". Lord Salisburyand Cambonwere notcartographers or

geographerseither andtheywouldno doubthave been greatly surprisei df

theyhad been told thatthis line,which correspondeto their intention

of leavingthe wholeof the B.E.T.in the Frenchzone,was not

south-east,in a south-eastdirection. Al1 the more sincetheyhad taken

the precautionof describingthe course only"in principle"and in the

direction. Moreover, onemight addthat the linein question is not

strictlyeast-south-easteitheras Libyanow affirms (CR 93/16p. 34):

if thatwere thecase,it would gofurthernorth.

29. The text ofthe Declaration, the aipmsrsuedby the parties and

plain commonsensethereforeleadus to considerthat the Livre jaune

map faithfully reflects tiheeasof the negotiators. It was published

in the Livre jauneon 25March. It was knownto the British,as Chad

has shown (cf.MC, pp. 161-163)and as the notefromSir ThomasSanderson,

thenAmbassadorin Paris,to Lord Salisbury shows.The noteis dated
C 42

27 March; in it Sanderson drawsattention to the evidedntfference

betweenthe text and the map, while considering thtt is not of great importance("1 do not thinkthat itmattersmuch"); Salisburyread it

sincehe initialled it (ML, British ArchiveAnnex, p. 37); and yet the

Britishdid not react. Can cleareracquiescencebe imagined,

Mr. President?The Livre jaunemap isnot formallyannexedto the

Declaration butit is justas thoughit was,and itis not improperto

see in thisan authentic interpretati onthe-.desir of the parties

whichwas to be confirmed by the Supplementary Conventioon

8 September1919.

30. True,it may be argued that theries a differencbetweenthe

courseof the Livre jaune map and the oneresultingfromthe

1919Convention.The former - the Livrejaune map - seemsto reachthe

24th meridianat approximately the19th degreeof latitudenorth - 1 Say

'lapproximatelf y"r it shouldbe recalled that the map oinsthe scaleof

1:12million, a scalewhichexcludesany precision.The latter, the text

of 1919, madethe limit goup to 1g030'. It was thoseal1 the samevery

approximate 30' of differencthatled theAmbassador of Francein Rome

to admitin the note sent to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affa ofrs

7 February1923,that "thisinterpretations ,o closeto theprovisional

lineon the 1899map, slightlyenlargesthe French zone of influence at

the expenseof theAnglo-Egyptiad nomain"(MC, Ann. 102).

But Mr.President, 1wish to correctthe impressionthatmy skilful

v O 43 colleague,Mr. Cahier,wishedto give the Courttwo weeksago (CR 93/17,

p. 18). Thispossibledifference betwee the courseof the 1899map and

the courseresultingfrom theSupplementarC yonventionof 1919is

approximately22,000 square kilometres maxia mumin no case180,000

squarekilometres, as Mr. Cahierlet it be understood.This much larger

area would represet nte territorybetweenthe 1919 frontierand the

"mathematicalline"whichas wehave seenhas no legal foundatioa nnd

whichwouldresult in transferri ngt onlydesertterritories, as Mr. Cahiersaid,but oases like those of Ouri, Tekro and OuniangaSaghir

, O 4 4 O La. Let us not draw arbitrarylines on maps,s the colonial

Powersdid in their time, in keepingwith the detestablemoresnd laws

of the time. We do not speakof abstract problems,r. President,and we

must notlose sight ofthe fact that it is the fate of real, fleshand

blood menand women thatis at stake.

31. Besides,whatever mayhave been thedifferences betweethe

course of1899 and that of 1919, there wouldbe no consequence to the

solutionof the disputebefore the Court. If that were the case, if

therewere such a difference,which 1 grant only for theurposesof
discussion,it would in any case bethe 1919 frontier that compelled

recognition.

True, onceagain,Italy did not acceptit. But bythe Agreements of

1900 and 1902 it committed itselfo allowingFranceto extendits

influenceup to thefrontierof Tripolitania. Since that conditionwas

met - and it was- its protestswere in vain:pacta sunt servanda...

Italywas in fact doubly bound. Becauseof the Agreementsof 1900

and 1902,which it admitted in 193were still in force (this in its note

of 1 July which1 quotedjust now). But it was also boundas successor

of Great Britainto which it succeeded in tregion,following the W

Treaty of Rome o20 July 1934, in otherwords nearly 15 yearafter the

conclusionof the SupplementarConvention of1919.

32. To sum up, Mr. President,the conclusionsof Chad on this point

are as follows:

1. Francehad a sphere ofinfluence inthe region claimed byLibya

recognizedby the Franco-BritisDeclaration of 2M1arch 1899; 2. the limitof the zone of influenc was constitutedby a line

shownon the Livre jaune map runningfromthe intersectioo nf the

Tropicof Cancerto the 24thmeridianeastof Greenwich at approximately

the levelof the 19thdegreeof latitude north;

3. this limitwas confirmedby theFranco-British Convention of

8 September 1919;

4. by theexchangesof letters of 1900and 1902, Italyrecognized

thatFrance hadthe rightto extendits influence to the frontier of

Tripolitania shownon themap of 1899:

5. this line constitutes tfhreontierbetweenLibyaand ChadWest of

the 16th meridianand up to the tripointwith Niger;

6. on the otherhand,eastof the16thmeridianthe frontier is

formedby the line definedby the Franco-Britis Supplementary

Convention,which constitutes the authent icterpretatioonf the

Declaration of 1899; and Italyhad no rightto protestagainstthe

Supplementary Conventia ond its consequenceby reason of the Agreements

of 1900and 1902; morepreciselyit could contest; but it had no valid

groundsfor doingso.

Of course fortheseconclusions to be completelycorrect,the legal

situationcreatedby theAgreements musn tot have been subsequently

modified. Mr. President, this is whatmy friend and colleague

Mr. Cassesewill showyou, 1expect after thb ereak,if you will kindly

allowhim to speakthen.

Mr. President, Members othe Court,thankyou foryour attention.

Le PRESIDENT: Merci, beaucoupM,onsieur Pellet. Nous allonsnous

interrompre maintenan et ensuiteM. Casseseprendra laparole.

The Court adjourned from 11.20 a.m. to 11.3a.m. Le PRESIDENT: veuillez vousasseoir. MonsieurCassese.

Mr. CASSESE: Thankyou.

1. Mr. President, Members ofhe Court,sincethis is the firsttime

that1 have thehonourto pleadbefore this augus btody,1 am surethat

you willunderstand my emotionandwill show me your kind indulgence.

TEBBITORIALTITLES CLAIMiDBY LIBYA:
THE OTTOHANHERITAGEAIIDTEE COLONIALCLAIMSOF 1915

2. Like mycolleague,Mr. Alain Pellet,in his pleading today,

shalldealwith the second thesis of the Republiof Chad,accordingto

whichthe delimitationsof 1899and 1919 are fully opposabt leLibya,

evenif theTreatyof 1955 is not takenintoaccount.

3. The Republicof Chadhas provedso far that theboundarylineof

1899was opposableto Italyon thebasisof the Franco-ItaliaA ngreement

of 1902,and thatit couldconsequentlb ye invokedagainstLibya, which

succeeded toItaly.

Nevertheless,thisopposabilityof theboundary line of 1899is

contested byLibyaon the basisof two arguments.

On the one hand, Libyinvokeswhat it callsthe "Ottoman heritage",

or the claimsof the Sublime Porteto thehinterlandof Tripolitania,

which aresupposedto have been inherited firsby Italyand thenby

Libya. On the otherhand,our opponents invokt ehe "colonial heritage",

claiming that Article3 of theLondonAgreement conferre on Italya

right to territorial compensation wh hichnow been inheriteby Libya.

047 With yourpermission,1 shouldliketo try andproveto you that

thesetwo argumentsdo not bear closescrutiny.

4.1 shall begin withthe so-called"Ottomanheritage"of Libya. 1. The Ottoman"heritage"

Mr. President,Libya invokesthisheritageto explainwhy the 1899

line is not opposableto it. Accordingto Libya,the Treaty ofOuchy -

alsoknownas the Treatyof Lausanne, foryou al1 know thatOuchy is part

of Lausanne,by the Lake: thereis a smallhotelwhere the treaty in

questionwas signed. Thus accordingto the LibyanParty,the Treatyof

Ouchy - or Lausanne- togetherwith the Treatyof Londonof 1915

sanctionedItaly'ssuccession to Turkey,a succession whichremained

unaffectedby the Poincaré-Titton Agreementof 1912.

1 now proposeto reviewbriefly- and 1 promiseto be brief -these

two international agreementbs,ginningwith the Treatyof Ouchyor

Lausanneof 1912.

1. The Italo-TurkishTreatyof Ouchy(1912)

5. Our eminentcolleagueson the othersideof the barhave asserted

that "Chadis undoubtedlyafraidof the Treatyof Ouchy"(CR 93/16,

p. 76). Nothing of the kind! We simplyconsiderthat thisTreatyis

quiteirrelevant to the purposeof determiningthe southernfrontierof

Libya,for twomain reasons.

6. The firstreasonis that the Treatyof Ouchyis ambiguousand

evenself-contradictory. This can be easilyexplained: Italy,in its

imperialistic bulimiawantedto layhands on Libya, but only succeeded

in conqueringthe coastalareasof the country. Hence itsneed to treat
C48
with the Ottomanauthorities: althoughe Treatyenabledit toproclaim

its sovereignty,it was obligedto make a whole seriesof concessionto

the Turks,which explainsthe obscureand complicated conten of the

Treaty. In this connection,1 cannot resistthe temptationof quoting

from the commentsof aneminentItalian historian, GaetaS nolvemini,who

wrote at the timethat thisTreaty "remindsus of the chromo-lithographiw esich areto be found
in certaincountryinns, and whichrepresenta womanof easy
virtue,brazenand with a smiling, insinuatingexpression,who,
from whateverpart of the roomyou standto lookat her, seems
to be lookingat you al1 the timeand onlyto besmiling at
you. If threeof you standlookingat her at the sametime
from threedifferentangles,she will smileand flatteral1
threeof you at once ... Who is the Treatyof Lausannesmiling

at? Turkey? Italy?The Muslimsof Libya? Al1 of them? None
of them? We havea vagueand almostinstinctive impression
that theTreaty ofLausanneis destinedto remainin the
historyof international relatioa nsone of the most refined
diplornatitcake-insof al1 time." (CMC,Am. 122,para. 7.)

7. Apart fromitsbasic ambiguity, thei re a secondreasonwhy this

Treaty is quiteirrelevant forthe purposesof determining the spatial

boundaries of Italy'sinheritedrightsin Libya: althoughit establishes
w
thatItalyhas acquired sovereign rights oL vierya,this Treatymakes

no mention of the frontiersof the country.

Our honourable opponens tsim over thipsoint,pointingout that

underthis TreatyItaly"naturally inherita ed1 the legaltitles

previously helbdy the Ottoman Empireand relevantto the subsequent

delimitation'of the southernboundary(CR 93/16,p. 63). This

presupposes thatthe Turksheld sovereign legal titlt es southem Libya.

Yet asmy colleague Professor Shaw ws illwyou ina fewminutes,

the OttomanEmpire neverexercised sovereigntysouthof the 1899line;

it thereforenever acquiredsucha sovereign title. The claimsit put
349
forwardin thisregard remainew dithoutany legal effect,sincetheywere

not recognizebdy the other Powersand couldnot be establishedin situ.

The whole Italian"heritage"with regardto the southernboundaryof

Libyaboilsdom to vague coloniac llaimswhich were neverrecognized by

the internationalcommunity.This leavesus far away from the so-called

"territorialrights"to Borkou-Ennedi-Tibest (i.E.T.)whichOur

opponents mentioonn every possible occasion. That is why it is rightto maintainthat theTreatyof Ouchydid not

affect the futur of the frontierin question. Italyindeedinherited

the territorial righf tsrmerly heldby the SublimePorte,but through

the force of circumstancesit couldinherit onlyTurkey's effectively

established rights,whichdid not applyto the Turkishclaimsto the

B.E.T. Moreover,as Mr. Pellet.has-emphasize1 d,aly.had.recognizt ede

boundaries of Tripoliraniaand Cyrenaica througahnagreementin good and

due form, and wasboundby that recognition.

2. The Franco-Italian Agreemeo nt 1912 (~oincaré-TittonAgreement)

8. 1 now cometo the Poincaré-TittoA nireementof 1912.

Accordingto the Libyan Party,thisAgreementhas no effecton the

delimitation of Libya'ssouthernfrontier.But it is the very opposite

that is true, as1 shallnow showyou.

9. Let us firstconsiderthe text of theAgreementwhichappears

as No. 1 in yourfile.

10. This textis clear:

The two Partiesproclaimthemselves to be"desirous of implementing

their Agreementsof 1902". To thatend theyundertake inter alianot

in any wayto impede suchmeasuresas theymightsee fit to take,Italy

in Libyaand Francein Morocco.

The referenceto the 1902Agreements is not fortuitous.It

representsmuchmore thana mere "whereaso "f a preamble,but stresses

that the essential purposeof theAgreementis to confirmthe 1902

Agreement. It is truethatin 1902thepurposeof the arrangements

betweenthe twocountries was merelyto delimit their respective spheres

of influence,sinceItalydid not yet exercise any effectiveauthority in

Libya. By 1912,however,Italy had occupie Libyaand had acquired

sovereign rights thera e,d in thatcontextthe referenceto the1902Agreementin the Treaty of 1912 assumesquitea different

Franceand Italy undertakt eo recognizeas the southern
significance:

frontier of Libyathe line appearinogn the 1899map whichItaly had

recognized in 1902.

11. Furthermore, this interpretat ioconfirmed by the

travaux préparatoiresof the Agreement.

12. Our eminent opponenhtsve stressedin their pleadingtshat the

1912Agreement contains no mentionwhatsoeverof boundaryquestions. Yet

a studyof the travaux préparatoiresshowsthatthesequestions were

bornein mind by thenegotiators on both sides. Sincethe Republicof

Chadhas dwelt atlengthon thismatterin its Counter-Memoria (CMC,

paras. 7.22-7.28),1 can confinemyselfto two pointsin this connection.

13. Firstof all,the negotiations tookplaceat a timewhen France

had not yetrecognized thenew situation thatarosefrom theTreatyof

Ouchy, namely,Italy'sacquisition of sovereigntyoverLibya; Francehad

not yet recognizedthis.

Francefurther stresset dhatit couldnot recognizeItaly's

sovereigntyoverLibya "withoutindicating"- in thewordsof Minister

for Foreign AffairsP,oincaré (CMC ,nn.31,No. 193),"the territori yt

[Italian sovereignti y] to coverandwithout safeguardin Our rights". .V

You will seethatthis is very far fromthe "unconditional recognition"

claimedby Our opponents.

It is truethat the Frenchreservationrelates onlyto the frontier

between Algeriaand Tripolitaniab,ut thereasonwhy Poincarédid not

raisethe questionof the southernboundaryis obvious: France

considered that th southernboundaryof Libyawas not open to

discussion: it had beenclearly establishe by the Franco-Italian Agreementsof 1902,and therewas thereforeno need to specifyrench

rightsin thatcase. That is why the Treatycontainsno mentionof the

boundar.

The secondpointto be stressed is thatitwas Italy that proposed

to mentionthe 1902Agreementsexplicitlyin thepoincaré-Tittoni

Agreement. The ItalianMinister forForeignAffairsS,an Giuliano,

proposed "thatthe Agreemento be signedshouldbe explicitlyfounded

upon the 1902Agreement","in orderto affirm thcontinuityand

efficacityof our Agreements(CMC,Ann. 36, No. 241).

14. What conclusionis to be drawnfromthe textof the 1912

Agreementand fromthe travaux préparatoires?he conclusionis simple

and unequivocal:severaldaysafter the Treatyof Ouchy,the Italians

reaffirmedby an Agreementwith Francthat theyremainedboundby the

provisionsof the Franco-Italian Agreement 1902. Accordingly Italy,

henceforth holding sovereirights overLibya,undertookto regardthe
, O 52
1899 mapas determiningthe southernboundaryof Libya,thereby

renouncing any rightinheritedfromTurkeyto the southof the southern

boundariesof Libya. In otherwords,thisundertaking of 1912createda

realestoppel for Italy. Far fromopposingthe 1902Agreement, Italy

reaffirmedits validityat a timewhenTripolitania-Cyrenaica wnos

longer- at leastin part- a sphereof influencefor Italy,but a real

colony

3. The Treatyof London of1915

15. 1 now cometo the Treaty oLondonof 1915,in whichLibya

claimsto seea confirmationof its theory about tOhetomanheritage.

Libya makesparticular referentcoe Article10,whichyou will findunder

No. 2 in your fileand whichyou can alsosee onthe screen. It is true that under thisArticle10, Italy obtained from the

contractingPowers tothe LondonAgreementthe termination of the rights

and privileges thaitt had beenobligedto concedeto Turkey in

concludingthe Treaty of Ouchy of 1912,which marked the end of Ottoman

sovereignty overLibya.

16. But what were these rights?

Our Libyan colleagueshave recalledthem in the historicalfresco

that they have soably drawn. The rights and privileges tha the Sultan

had retainedin 1912 relatedboth to the protectionof Ottoman

interestsin Tripolitaniaand in Cyrenaica,and to the maintenanceof the w

Sultan'sprerogativesin religiousmatters.

In both cases,the rights concerned were in no way territorialin

nature: Italy,which was in a positionof strength, had categorically

refused any concessiotnhat couldhave hamperedthe annexation of Libya.

Thus, al1 that Italy obtained fromthe Treaty of London of1915 was
053
-. an undertaking toput an end to that lastvestigeof the former Ottoman

sovereignty, andthiswas done by the Treatyof Peace of Lausanne,in

17. A mere recapitulation ofthe relevantprovisionsand of their
w
contextsufficesto show that neither the Treatyof Londonnor the Peace

Treaty of 1923 provided forItaly'ssuccessionto Turkey. Both Treaties

confined themselves tprovidingfor the abolition of the privileges

retainedby the Sultanin 1912, to which these two Treatiesrefer- and

no more. It would therefore be wron to ascribe totheseprovisions an

"unreserved recognition of Italy'ssuccession to the rights T oufrkey.

18. To make thingsquite clear,1 am not talkinghere of State

successionin general: no one woulddeny that Italy succeeded to

Turkey in Libya.
What we are contestingis that Italy inheritedany

rights that Turkeymight have had to the territoriessouth of the 1899 line. In this respect Italcyouldnot succeedto Turkey,sinceit

had renounced al1 claimsof thatkind underits Agreementswith Franceof

1902and 1912.

4. Italy'ssubsequent practice

19. Italy's subsequentpractice shoulsderveto confirm that it did

not feel ableto lay claimto any heritageof that kind.

A perusalof the manyItalian diplomati coteswill show that even

when,between1921and 1934,Rome protestea dgainstthe effective

occupation of B.E.T.by France,the Italianauthorities alleged that

France hadviolated its conventionalundertakingsvis-à-visItaly.

Thus,ItalymaintainedthatFrance wasviolating the Anglo-French

Convention of 1899,recognized by Italyin 1902and 1912. But at no time

did it invokeany rightsof succession to the OttomanEmpire.

20. 1 shouldalso liketo remindyou of the statementthat the

ItalianMinisterfor ForeignAffairs,Mr. Tittoni,delivered in the

Chamberof Deputieson 27 September 1919o ,r longafterthe Italian

conquestof Libya. Mr. Tittonirecalledin his statementthat:

"as earlyas the Prinetti-~arrèr Agreement of1 November1902,
i O55 we recognizedthe boundary ot fhe Franco-British Convention
- - of 15 (sic)June 1898 (sic),whichallocatedthe Tibesti
and the Borkouto France"(MC,Vol. V, Ann. 337; emphasis
added byChad).

Incidentally, Tittoni seet mshave madea mistakeaboutthe date,since

he should havecitedthe 1899 Convention;this musthave been a slip of

the tongue.In any case, 1 wouldask you to note the termsused in this

statementby Mr. Tittoni,Minister for Foreign Affairsof Italy: "we

recognized" and the referenceto "the boundary"of 1898; and you will

see thathe makesno mentionof any rightsof successionof Italyto the OttomaEmpire. Thispublic statemenotf positionemanatingfrom the

main Italian orgaresponsible for international relationsundeniably

of vitalimportance.

21. ButOur opponentshave tried touse to their advantageaote of

1929in whichthe FrenchAmbassadorto Rome, Beaumarchaisgivesan

accountof his meetingswithMussolini(CR 93/18, p.25).

Duringthesemeetings, Mussolin put forwarda seriesof claims,

goingso far as to invoke thold theoryof theOttoman heritagehich,

he said,his services werurginghim to disinter.But thewholetoneof

the discussions clearlhyowsthatthiswas merely a trial ballooamong
w
so many others.

In any case,the FrenchAmbassadorfirmlyrejectedMussolini's

attempts, remindinhim that thesituatiowas definitivelysettled by

the Agreementof 1899to 1902(RL,Vol. II, Exh. 5.4,p. 336).

22. The Italians subsequently upheld astortuousthesisthan

thatof Mussolini. The Republicof Chadhas amplyillustratedhispoint

in its pleadingsshowing,in particular,ow despitethe warlike
, 0 5 6
inclinationof the Ministryof the Colonies,theiewpointof the

Ministryof ForeignAffairs,whichwas, rightly,more concernedwith the

legal context, had alwaysdedby prevailing(seeRC, paras.7.37-7.60). w

1 shall mentioonlytwo statementsas examples.

23. The firstcomesfrom the Headof theAfrica Department othe

Ministryof ForeignAffairs,Mr. Guariglia. In a note addressedin 1930

to the ItalianAmbassadorin Paris,this great expertn Africanproblems

statedhis disagreementwith the interpretationf the ItaliaMinistry

for Colonies in thfeollowinterms:

"it is pointlesto refer tothe periodduringwhichOttoman
garrisonswere established inibesti,sincewe are debarred
from usingthoseargumentsin viewof the Prinetti-Barrère
exchangeof notes"(MC,Vol.V, Ann. 117;emphasisadded by
Chad). The Ambassadorin Parisfurtherstatedin his reply:

"Oneshouldkeep to the legal transactioe nstered intoin
1902and toArticle13 of theTreatyof London, while givingto
al1 thoseprovisions the application most favour tobler
thesis (...). 1 adviseagainst abandonin thoseindisputable
legal bases (...)to actin a differentmannerand to contest
the sovereigntoyf Franceto the southof Our 1899linewould,
in my opinion,be to takeactionwithout any legal basisand
in a mannerout ofkeepingwith Our previousacts." (CMC,
Ann. 64; emphasisadded byChad.)

24. You willnote thatthisthesiswithout any legalbasisto which

the ItalianAmbassador refersis the famousthesisof the Ottoman

heritage, thethesisthatLibyais trying to resuscitatetoday:

25. It is truethat Italy hadclaimedthis heritage,but against

GreatBritain. Libyahas recalledthis before the Court, referringto

Italo-Britisnhegotiationsconcemingthe so-called"Sarratriangle"

(CR 93/18,p. 25). But this merely confir mysargument: the Sarra

regionliesoutsidetheFrenchsphereof influence, and Italywas not

05 ri boundvis-à-visGreatBritain, so thatin any case invocatio of the

Ottoman heritagweas superfluous.Moreover,the Sarratriangle devolved

on Italynot by inheritancebut by treaty,theTreatyof 1934.

II.THE COLONIALHERITAGE: THE"RIGHT"TO TERRITORIAL COMPEHSATIOH

26. 1 now cometo the secondpartof my pleadingc,onceming the

rightsthatLibya claims stillto derivefrom the Treatyof Londonof

1915. Thereagaina heritageis involved, but this timeit is of a

differentkind,sincewhat Libyais claimingis the Italian colonial

heritage.

27.Our opponenthsavemademuch of Article13 of theTreatyof

Londonof 1915,whichtheyhave made ono ef the cornerstones otheir

arguments.In this connection, on is struckby theparallels between
* r58
today'sLibyaand colonialist Italy. Just as Mussolini'Italy did for overen years,the Libyansare

today essentiallbasingtheir claimson Article13. Yet this provision

is somewhat reminisceont thefamousGeneral Actof the Berlin

Conferenceof 1885on the partitionof Africabetween Europeanowers:

indeed,what doesArticle13 do otherthanprovide,just likethe General

Act of Berlin, foa dismembermenotf Africanterritories, this time,

favourof an imperialistPower,Italy,and at theexpenseof other

imperialist Powers?

Itis an ironyof historythata countrylike Libya, whicshets

itselfup as a championof anti-colonialism,s reduced tstaking w

everythingon a provisiowhich is archetypaof a colonialismthathas

fortunately becomae thingof the past.

28.But letus takea closerlookat the specific argument shat

Libyadraws from this provisi on1915.

This provision,whichappearsas nurnbe2 in your fileand whichis

also shownon the screen, mabe illustrateads follows.

29. The Libyanthesiscomprisethe following thremain points:

(i) first, Article13 providesfor two typesof compensation in

favourof Italy- cessionsof territoryand the settlement in
-
its favourof disputedfrontiers;

(ii) secondly, also accordingo Libya,thesetwo aspects arealso

presentin theLaval-Mussolini Agreemeoft1935,which

providedfor a cession ofterritory ifavourof Italian

Eritreaand for thedeterminationf the disputedfrontierin

southern Libya;

(iii) thirdly,sincethe Laval-Mussolin Agreementneverentered

into forceItaly'srightsunderArticle13 passedto Libya

on the occasionof its independenc,espitethe fact that

Italyrenounced al1 its rightsto itsAfricancolonies in 1947. Accordingto Libya,the right referredto in

Article13 belongsto the categoryof territorial rights

which, undertheViennaConvention on Succession of Statesn

respectof Treaties, alwaysdevolveupon the successorState.

30. You will see thatthisreasoningon the partof Libyaappearsto

be logical,if viewedfroma greatdistance. A close scrutinoyf it will

show, however,thateachof its threeaspectsis erroneous.

31. But beforeexaminingthesethreelinesof the Libyanargument, 1

shouldliketo draw yourattention to an important point,amely,that

the thesisof the colonial heritagebasedon Article13 of the Treaty

of London, is in contradiction withhe thesisof theOttoman heritage.

ühy is this so? It is because,in basing theimain claimson the

"equitable compensation"rovided foirn the Treaty ofLondon,first

Italyand thenLibya implicitly recognized that they no specific

legal titleover theB.E.T. - and indeedit is hard to see why they

should claimcompensationin thatregionif theyalreadyheld a specific

title.

32. Let us comeback to theTreaty ofLondonand beginby

interpretingitsArticle13.

Libyahas assertedon severaloccasions(seefor exampleCR 93/17,

pp. 81-82)that Article13 "laysdownan obligation thatdevolvesupon
060
Franceto the advantageof Italy".This is an assertionwhich

completelydistorts the scopeof this provision.

Let us readit together,and you can draw youownconclusions.

DoesArticle13 conferon Italythe right to demandincreased

territoriesin Africa? Does it at the sametime imposeanobligation

on Franceand GreatBritainto transferterritories to Italy? Does it

specifythe territoriesin respect owfhich Italymight claimsuch

increases? Nothiof thekind,Mr. President. This disconcertinglvyagueprovision of Article13 merelyStates

that thetwo Powers"agree in principlethatItaly may claimsome

equitable compensation".

Italythusdid not acquirean actual rightotherthanthatof

puttingforwardsomeclaimsin the future, withou any correlative

obligations on the part of Franceand GreatBritainbeingspecified. You

will see that everythinigs leftin the air. In otherwords,Article13,

far from layingdown specific rightasnd obligations, confines itse tof

an undertakingby the two Powersin favourof Italywhich is uncertainin

scopeand essentiallypoliticalin character. 1 wouldadd that the

bindingnatureof Article13 is so tenuousthatonewould even hesitate

to definethis Article as apactum de contrahendo,that is to say,as a

legal obligatiot noconcludea futureagreement.

In this connection ,ay 1 remindyou that the contenotf the draft

article submitte by Italywas quitedifferent, sinceit was proposedto

specifythat "a special agreement willbe concludedin orderto

guarantee to Italysomedegreeof equitable compensatio( n"C,

para.3.09). Accordingly, a specia alreementwas to be concluded to

guarantee equitable compensatf ion Italy.You will seethe difference

betweenthe Italian proposa1and the textthatwas adopted: Article13 w

in its finalwording impose neitherthenegotiation nor- a fortiori-

the conclusionof a future agreement but atmost contained a vervyague

promisethat after the wa Franceand GreatBritainwould take a

favourable viewof al1 Italianterritorialclaimsin Africa.

33. Moreover,the extremevaguenessof Article13 was to be

confirmed by thfeacts. On thebasisof this provisioo nf Article13, Italylaid claim

sometimesonly to the Aozou strip for instance, atthe timeof the

Laval-MussolinTireaty-, andsometimes to the entireterritoryof Chad

and to largepartsof Niger, Nigeriaand Cameroon,underthe famous

"maximumprogramme".This shows how extremelyvague Article13 was.

34. You may be searchingor the reasonfor this deliberate

impression- for thereis every reasonto believethatit was

deliberate.Franceand Englanddid not wishto tietheirhandswith

unduly specific provisions, someth thngcanbe deducedin particular

fromthe rejectionof a draftin whichItalylisted the zonet so which

the compensatioshouldextend. France,which hadconsiderable

apprehensionsconcerningItaliandesigns onDjibouti,refusedto go

beyonda simplepoliticalpromise. Al1 thesepoints areexplainedin

detailin the Replyof Chad (RC, paras3.05-3.14),and 1 shall notdwell

onthem.

35. On the otherhand,1 thinkit usefulto draw the attentionof
O62
the Courtto the striking contrasbetween Article13 and other

provisions of the Treaty oLomdon,whichare couched in completely

unambiguous terms. For instance,Article4, whichyou will find inyour

folder,providedthat"undertheTreatyof Peace,Italyshall obtain the

Trentino,the cisalpinT eyrol withits geographicaalnd naturalfrontier

(theBrennerfrontier)" followedby other specific indications whi1h

shall spareyou. FurthermoreA ,rticle5 of the sameTreaty - another of

the provisionsthatyou will findin your folder -provided that

"Italyshallalsobe giventhe province of Dalmatiawithinits
presentadminstrativbeoundaries,including to thenorth
Lisaricaand Tri.bania;to the southas far as a linestarting

from CapePlanka,on the coast",

followed byotherindications. 1 shallstopmy enumeration of the rulesof the Treatyof Londonat

thispoint, sincetheircontrastwith Article13 of thatTreaty is quite

obvious. On the onehand,you have provisionswhich specifyin great

detailthe boundariesof the territories to bt eransferred to Italy after

the war,and on the otherhand you have Article13, the imprecisionof

which couldnot be more striking: on the onetrand,the illumination of

Cartesianprecision, and onthe otherhand the penumbraof vague

political undertakings.

36. 1 now come to my second argument.Contraryto theallegations

of Our opponents, Articl1e3 was concernedwith territorial cessions
w
only. This emerges clearlyfrom the text of the provisionitself,from

the travaux préparatoiresand from the subsequent practicof the

parties. 1 now propose to revietwhesethreepoints: text,

travaux préparatoiresand subsequentpractice.

37. Firstof all, letus take the text of Article13. Libya is

makingeveryeffortto interpretthe "equitablecompensation" that Italy

may claimas an implicitreference to possible bounda delimitations.

Yet thewordingof thisprovision clearly shot wsat it relates

exclusivelyto cessions of territoryin favourof Italy,in areas

situatedon the frontierbetweenthe Italian colonies at ndoseof its

alliesat the time - Franceand GreatBritain.

38. In the presenceof such clear wording, whdyoes Libya insiston

speakingof a mere boundary"delimitation"? Such an interpretatiois

devoidof any historical verisimilitude.It may usefullybe recalled

here that the Treatyof Londonlistedthe conditions which Italyintended

to use asa bargainingpoint for its entryinto thewar on the allied

side. How can we believethat the ItalianGovernmentwouldhave required

a mere "delimitation"of the boundaryin a desertregionas thepriceof

its participationin one of thebloodiestwars in its history? Can we really believethat theItalianGovernment,whichdangledbefore a

reluctant publicopinionthe immense colonial benefi that its decision

wouldbring, would be contentwith so little? The hypothesisis quite

simplyinconceivable.

39. As thetravaux préparatoiresof theTreatyclearlyshow,Italy

was in fact muchmore ambitious.The documents submitte by theRepublic

of Chadadd up to a whole catalogue of claimthat theItalian

Goverment intended to submitto itspartners. It is a mixed bag

containing the extensionof Italianrights overTunisia,cessionsof

territoryin the east, West and southof Tripolitania,in Somaliaand so

forth.

With regardto the regionswith whichwe are concerned,thereis
O64
- - alsothis reference whic is so pertinent that cannot resist the

temptation of quotingit:

"We couldask for a whole or apartof Tibestiand Borkou
whichwere former29 considered taoppertainto Tripolitania."
(Telegramfromthe Italian Ambassadotin Paris, Tittoni,to the

Ministerfor Foreign Affairs2,3 March1915; RC, Ann. 31;
emphasisaddedby Chad.)

This is indeeda significant passagwe,ich confirmbsoth that Italy

was solelyand understandablcyoncernedwith cessions of territoryand

thatit was awareof the factthatat the timewhen thenegotiations took

place - in 1915- Borkouand TibestiwereunderFrenchsovereignty.

40. Finally- and thisis my thirdobservation - subsequent

practice, the subsequenptractice oftheparties, shoulc donfinnthat

Italianterritorial ambitions werneot confined toa mere "delimitation"

of the boundaries. Duringthe peacenegotiations whichtookplacein

Parisin 1919,Franceproposedto cedea partof Tibestito Italy,in

pursuanceof Article13 of theTreatyof London. Italyrejectedthe Frenchproposal,claiming"the whole of the

Saharanterritory ofTibesti,Borkou,Ennedi,in theirgeographicaland

ethnicdelimitations"(MC, Ann. 92). In its reporton the negotiations,

the SupremeInter-AlliedCouncil stated that Franceand Italy had been

unable to agree on "a rectification of the ...southernfrontierof

Libya" (MC, Ann. 89). But to speak of the-"rectification" of a frontier

obviouslyhas no meaningunless it is acceptedthat such a frontier

indeedexista,and it will thus be seen that, in the opinionof al1 the

partiesconcemed, Article 13 only covers the cessio of territories.

Since Frenchsovereigntyover the B.E.T. was admittedby al1 those

concerned,the only outstanding questio was that of the extentof the

equitable compensation t which Italywas entitled.

On the other hand, a compromisewas reachedon the rectification of

the frontierbetween Libyaand Algeria. The Franco-Italian Agreementof

12 September1919, concludedin pursuance of Articl1 e3 of the Treatyof

London, allocated to Ital aypartof the territory under French

sovereignty. Once again, the matterwas considered exclusively in

connectionwith the cession ofterritory: the conclusion of subsequent

agreementswas envisaged,but always in the same connection.

41. That was the Italian interpretation of thF isanco-Italian

Agreementof 1919. Speaking before the Chamberof Deputiesseveraldays

after the conclusion of the Agreement,the Ministerfor ForeignAffairs,

Tittoni - Tittoniagain! -pointedout that the transferconcemed

would "certainlybe useful,but did not amountto much", at the same time

adding that "the matter of the Tibestiand the Borkou, or of alternative

compensationsinsteadof those regions,remainsopen and will be the

subjectof furthernegotiations"(MC,Am. 337;
emphasisadded byChad)..
O06 Membersof the Court,you are wellawareof whathappened. Invoking
- -
Article 13,Italywas to go as far asclaimingthewholeof Chad in its

"maximum programme of 1928- thiswas indeedvery farfrom amere

frontierdelimitation!- and it endedup in 1935by contenting itself

with the cedingof a relativelysmallpartof Frenchterritory, namely

whathas becomeusualto cal1the Aouzou strip.

42. Mr. President, th"rights"of Italyby virtueof Article13 so

specified,we mustnow askwhetherLibyahas succeededto them.

It is grantedby Libyathatby Article23 of the 1947 PeaceTreaty

Italyrenounced al1 its rights, titlesnd claims concerninigts former

Africancolonies.

The effectof this provision maye questioned: did it operatea

transferof sovereigntyto thebenefitof the FourGreatPowers,or did

it leave the question of sovereignty over L inbyaspense? Thereis no

need to settlethe question: unquestionablAyrticle23 endedItalian

sovereignty.

Consequently, whahappenedbetween1947and 1951 - the date of

Libyanindependence- to the territorialclaims arisingfromArticle13

of the Treatyof Londonfor Italy?

43. The replyis clear: theseclaimsendedfor avery simple

reason: theywere colonial claimosf a politicalnature,claims that

lostal1 raisond'êtrewith the endof Italiancolonialism in Africa.

44. But Libyarefusesto acknowledge thfeacts; Libya obstinately

invokes Articl1e1 of theViennaConventionon Successionof Statesin

Respectof Treaties, whicha,s we know,establishes customary
O07
internationallaw in thisarea. Our eminentopponents affirtmhatby

virtueof thisArticle11,which states thatthere is alwaysa succession in territorial régime matterLibyainherited the political clai mhat

Italyderived from thLeondonAgreement.Mr. President, 1 believethat

thiscontention isuntenable fortwo reasons.

45. First of all,State successiocnlearlyinvolvesonly the

transferof territorial rightand titlesthatexisted and were valid

at the timeof the succession.But the claims-derivingfromArticle13

endedin 1947,as 1 saidJustnow. The partiesto the PeaceTreatyof

1947 werethe four partietso the LondonAgreement-which were France,

GreatBritain,Russiaand Italy. ThereforetheTreaty of 1947,

lex posterior,aupersedes the LondonAgreement. Far fromgivingeffect

to the claims arisingromArticle13, in 1947the partiesagreedon the

definitive renunciatib on Italyof thoseclaims.

Article13 of the Treatyof Londonwas therefore abrogated

interpartes.

This,Mr. President, is confirmedby Article2 ofAnnex XI ofthe

Treatyof Peace,which providesthat:

"The finaldisposa1of the territoriesconcernedand the

appropriate adjustmeonft theirboundaries[theItalian
coloniesin Africa]shallbe madeby the FourPowers
[United States, FrancU e,itedKingdom,SovietUnion]."

This provisionclearly presupposetshe totalextinctionof Italian

rights, titlesand claimsin Africa. At thesame time,it gave the Four

Powersthe right, notonly to dispose ofthe Italiancolonial

territories,but alsoto make appropriat adjustmentsto their

boundaries.Clearly,Mr. President, Italy leftthe stageand al1 its

rightswere extinguished.

46. 1 comenow,Mr. President, to the secondreasonforwhichthe
O68
- - claimsarising froA mrticle 13of the Treatyof Londondid not pass to

Libya. Even if we imaginethe impossiblaend grantthattheseItalian

claims had been mysterious resuscitatedin 1951,theywouldnot in any

case havebeen ableto pass to Libyafor theywerenot territorial rights

withinthe meaning of Article11 of theVienna Conventioo nn Succession

of Statesin respectof Treaties.

ThisArticle provides,as you know,thata succession of Statesdoes

not affect: one,treatiesestablishing a boundary;two,"obligations and

establishedby a treatyand relatingto the regimeof a boundaryl'.
rights

47. If Libyais to be believed,the rights derivinfgromArticle13

would fa11into the seconc dategory.This interpretationM ,r. President,

showsa misunderstandino gf the spiritandletterof theVienna

Convention.

48. The most detailedinterpretatioonf Article11 of the Vienna

Convention isin an articlepublishedin l'Annuaire françaisde droit

internationably Mr. Yasseenwho, as you know,chairedthe International

Law Commissionwhen the draftconvention waspreparedas well as the

draftingcommittee of the diplornaticonference that adoptt ede

Convention.Mr. Yasseen'sinterpretatioi ns thusauthoritative.

What is the significancof the expression"régimeof a boundary"

withinthe meaning of Articlell? asksMr. Yasseen. Anthis is his

answer:

"Themeaning of the expression"régimeof a boundary" may
be controversia lut itis possibleto say that it coversthe
rightsand obligationsrelatingto the boundary tha are

attachedto the territoryand whose disappearanc in a
successionof Stateswould considerably modify f thentier
settlement,for instancae grazingright,a rightof wayor a
rightof transit." (AFDI, 1978,p. 86.)

By analogywith civillaw,Mr. Yasseen speaks in this connectioonf

"real rights"(ibid.,p. 82) and he adds: "Whatare certainlnot part of the boundaryrégimeand
are thereforenot transmissible,re the obligatioand rights
of a politicalnature orqualifiedas personal,whoselink
with the territoris not sufficientlclose." (Ibid.,
p. 86; the italicsare ours.)

49. But,Mr. President,thisis preciselwhat is at issuehere: 1

believe tha1 have amplyshownthatArticle13 of the Treatyof London

confined itselfo establishina vaguepolitical-commitmewntth respect

to territorial adjustments, without specieithgerthe territories

concernedor thecriteriathat shoulbe chosento carryout those

adjustments.The rightthatItaly derivedfromArticle13 was notonly

general; it was also indeterminasinceit didnot specifically

covera precise area buthe wholeof the frontierof the Italian

coloniesin Africa. To speakof "régimof a boundary"in this

connectionis thereforquiteinappropriate.

Consequentlyh,ow canLibyaclaimthatthispoliticalcommitment

couldhave passedto Libya?

III.COBCLUSIOR

50. 1 thereforcometo rnyconclusionMr. President.

Mr. Presidentthe strategyof Our opponentsour eminenopponents,

consistsintryingto blockthe Courtintoa simplisticalternative:
w
eitherLibyasucceeded Italaynd in thatcase it inherital1 the rights

that Italypossessed includithoseby virtueof Article13: or Libya

is in no respectthe successof Italyand is consequentlnot boundby

the obligations derivifor Italyfromconventionsconcerninthe

southernboundaryof Libya(CR 93/20,p. 55). In otherwords,and to

. 0 7@ borrowthewordsof our eminent colleagueon the othersideof the bar

(CR 93/30,p. SI), eitherLibya succeeded Itand in thatcase it

receivedboth its liabilitieand its assetsor it did not succeedat

all. In the lattercase,the liabilitiesalonecannotbe imposedupon it.. .
Unfortunatelyfor Our opponents, the facts ndot alwayslend
071
themselvesto thiskind of "al1or nothing"reasoning.True,Libya

succeeded Italy- no one deniesit. But it inherited only the rightasnd

obligationsof a territorial natur in accordancewith the Vienna

Conventionthat 1 have justmentioned.On the other hand, Libyacould

not inheriteminently politicalrights,like-thecolonial claim s

highlycontingent and conditional- thatItaly derivedfromArticle13:

theserights,as we have seen, endedwith theTreatyof Peaceof 1947.

Thesame is trueof what Libya has called the"Ottomanlegacy".

Mr. Shawwill show you shortlythatthislegacyboileddom to aset of

claims,1 repeatclaims, 1 do not sayrights,whichcouldnot be

transmittedto the successorState. What is more,in 1902Italy had

committeditselfwith Franceto accept the latter' psresencebeyondthe

frontiersof Tripolitania-Cyrenaica I.t couldnot go backon that

commitment.

ConsequentlyM,r. President, Members othe Court, neither Italy

nor, later,Libyacouldput forwardany title tothe incontestablr eights

thatFrancederivedfromthe delimitationo sf 1899and 1919and its

effective occupatio of the territorieshusdelimited.

Mr. President,Membersof the Court,1 thankyou foryour patience

and 1 askyou,Mr. President, kindlt yo give the floor to

Mr. MalcolmShaw.

Le PRESIDENT: Je remercie beaucoup MonsieCuasseseet je donnela

paroleà M. Shaw. M. SHAW :

Le manquede pertinence du titre originaire

Monsieurle Présidentet Messieursde la Cour,c'estpourmoi un

honneur et unplaisirde me présenterdevant vous pour la premiè fois.

2. Commemes collèguesl'ontexpliqué,le titredu Tchadsur le BET

est clairementétablien vertudu traitéde 1955,qui a institué une

procédure convenu pourdéterminer la frontièreen question. Cette

procédure, accepté par la France,llEtatqui aprécédéle Tchad,et par

la Libyemême,a consisté à dresser une liste précidseactesqui étaient

censés déterminel ra lignefrontière.

3. J'ai toutefoispour tâched'aiderla Courà comprendre la

situation tellequ'elleexistait avanq tue la Francen'établisseson

titreet donc à apprécier la nature véritab des revendicationdse la

Libye. Mme Higginstraiterades conditionsjuridiques préalable qui

devaient être remplie pour quela Francepuisseacquérirun titre,et

M. Cassesemontreracommentce titre aété établiet analyserala

prétendue successio par l'Italie,puispar la Libye,aux revendications

formulées à l'époquede l'Empireottoman. Les droits, quelsqu'ils

soient,qui ont puexistersur le territoire en causependantles

premières annéedse ce sièclese sontmanifestement éteints lorsque la

Francea établison autoritéde façonpermanente en 1913-1914. Il n'en

est pas moins utilede nouspenchersur la situatioq nui existait pendant

les années qui onptrécédé cetteoccupationafind'appeler l'attentid on

la Cour sur la sourcede confusion que constituen t,r leur nature, les

allégations libyennes sur lesquell semble-t-il,on se fondetant

maintenant;en effet, commenous en informeM. Dolzer,"au coeurde

l'affairelibyenne réside lfeait que l'Empireottomanet les peuples

senoussipossédaient un titresur lesconfinsen 1912"(CR 93/20,p. 19). O73 4. Je voudrais établirles propositionssuivantes. Premièrement,
- -
l'Empireottomann'a Jamaiseu de titre sur le BET, ni sur la base de

l'exerciced'une autorité effectiven ,i sur aucune autrebase.

Deuxièmement,l'ordre senoussin'a jamais été rien de pluqsu'une source

intermittente d'influencereligieuse et,dans une certainemesure,

politique, qui s'exerçaità traversl'Afriquedu Nord et l'Afrique

centrale,et cette influence,forte en Tripolitaineet en Cyrénaïque,

était faibledans le BET. Troisièmement,on ne remédie pasau fait que

les Ottomanset l'ordresenoussin'ont établi aucun titre procédantd'une

origine indépendante e essayantde combinerles deux sousla formede

quelque prétendue souverainec ténjointe. Quatrièmement,les populations

autochtones,dont les Libyensont présenté lanaturede façon

fallacieuse, étaienttitulairesde droits sur le territoire mais

n'étaientpas assez organiséespour posséder la souveraineté territoriale

en droit international.

Les revendications libyennes

5. L'argumentationde la Libye peut êtrerésumée comme suit.Entre

1890 et 1912, le territoire situé au sude la Tripolitaine, en

particulier leBET, n'était pas terranullius,mais se trouvait plutôt
soumis à une formede "souveraineté partagée" ent l'Empireottoman,

l'ordre senoussiet les habitantsautochtones. Il en résulte qu'à

l'arrivéedes Français,le titreoriginaire résidaia tilleurs etn'aurait

pu être acquis quepar l'effet d'uneconquête,interdite en vertu du

droit internationalpostérieurà 1919. On soutient que, de quelque

manière,ce soi-disanttitreoriginairea continuéd'exister jusqu'àce

que la Libye l'assimilepar voie desuccession. On allègue que laLibye a héritéde tous lestitresde l'Empireottomanpar l'intermédiaird ee

l'Italie,en même temps quede ceuxde l'ordresenoussiet des

populations autochtones.

6. Pourtant,la Libyefaitpreuve d'uneconfusion qui n'estpas

négligeable quanedlleanalysedansses écritures cettenotion,affirmée
a
par elle, de "souverainetéartagée".Elle fait valoir,d'unepart,que
. .
les populations autochtonpeosssédaienun titrejuridiqueexistantsur
, 074
la base de leur présence depuis longtemps étaeblide leur

administration effecti( veémoirede la Libye,par. 6.39);d'autrepart,

on déclare quela souverainetétransférée parl'Empireottomanincluait
*
les territoireset les populationsdu Tibesti,du Borkou, dellOunianga,

de 1'Erdiet de llEnnedi(ibid,par.4.188). On propose alors

d'admettre que le territoire etes populationsen questionse trouvaient

"soumisau pouvoirconjoint et à l'autoritépartagéedes Senoussiet de

l'Empireottoman"(ibid.).

7. Nullepart on ne tireau clair ce qunous devonsfairede ce

partageentre lasouveraineté, le pouvoir conjoint el'autorité

partagée,mais on l'appelleun "ajustementmutuel"(ibid,par. 6.28),

ailleursune "communauté dteitre"(dansles conclusions qui fontsuite

au paragraphe 6.87)et encore"un titre parallèleet compatible" W

(par.6.76).

8. Pour tenter de justifiecette étrangerétention, lLaibye a

développédans sa réplique lethème de l'autoritindirecte,en ce sens

que le titresur le BETappartenait aux tribus locales, taq ndis

l'administratio n les pouvoirsexécutif ejudiciaire -se trouvaient

partagésentre lestribus localeest l'ordresenoussiet que lesOttomans

possédaient unseorted'autorité suprêm eouten n'exerçantqu'un

"contrôledirectminime" (répliqu de la Libye,par. 7.65). Cette

tentativeest portéeà son comblequandon introduit directementdans 1'argumentation'affinnatiosnelonlaquelle"iln'existe aucune forme

prescrite pour le fédéralisme" (ibid,r. 7.66),pour annoncer

aussitôt après"qu'untype particulie de souveraineté territoriale

partagéea existéen droitinternationas lousl'appellationde

'condominium1("ibid,par. 7.67). Rous sommes donc incitàécroire

que cettesoi-disant "souverainetpéartagée"-équivala.itnréalité soià

un arrangement fédéral, so itun condominium.A l'évidence,une

fédération repos eur un partage déterminét formelde la souveraineté

interne, tandisqu'ily a un condominium, comme le relèOppenheim,"là

ou deux ou plusieurs Etatsxercentla souveraineté conjointems ent un

territoire"(InternationaLlaw, ge éd.,p. 565). La Chambre de la

Cour elle-mêmea évoquérécemment, dansl'affairedu ~ifférend

075 frontalier terrestreinsulaire et maritime(ElSalvador/Honduras;
-.
Nicaragua(intervenant), des exempleshistoriquesde condominium"à

savoirdes dispositionsen vue de l'administrationommuned'un

territoire ...entredeuxou plusieurs Etats"(C.I.J.Recueil 1992,

p. 597). Je ne parvienspas,en l'espèce, à discerner les "deuou

plusieurs Etats" dont si'lagit.

9. Il existe toutefoisne autreexpressionencoredes relations

entreles Parties, selonce qu'affirme lLaibye dansses plaidoiries

les populationsautoc'htoneorganiséespar l'ordresenoussidétenaientle

titre,mais étaient représentésesr le plan internationalar l'Empire

ottoman(CR 93/14,p. 26). Cela me paraîr tessemblede façonétonnante
, 0 7 6
à un protectorat, mais un protectoratqui serait apparpar génération

spontanée.Or, ce n'estpas ainsique naissent lep srotectorats.Ils

nécessitentdes accordsformels établissant plertage formedles

attributset de l'exercicede la souverainetet même la reconnaissance

par des Etatstiers,quanddes droits et obligations de caractèrepertinentsont invoqués,comme il est indiquédans l'affairedes Décrets

de nationalité promulgués en Tunisie et au Maroc (C.P.J.I.sérieB

no 4, p. 27).

10. On ne trouveà aucunmoment la moindreindicationd'une

reconnaissance quelconque,ni même d'une simplemention, émanand te

tiercesparties,voire de l'Empireottomanou de l"ordre-senoussi, qui

ait pour objet des arrangements aussi complexes a etssi cruciaux

établissant un lien fédéral,un condominium,ou une représentation

en question,et les populations
internationale poul res territoires

autochtoneselles-mêmesn'en parlentpas davantage. Aucun indicene v

permetde savoircommentun arrangementde ce genre fonctionnaitdans la

pratiqueet quelle partieexerçaittel ou tel droit souverain. Sans un

tel accord conclu et acceptédans les formes,on affirme sans rien à

l'appuiquand onparle defédéralisme,ou de condominium, ou de

souverainetépartagée. C'est à la Libye, qui invoqueune forme aussi

inhabituellede souveraineté divisée, qu'il incombed'en rapporterla

preuve.

11. 11 se peut que lesconseilsde la Libye aient peu à peu pris

conscience decertainsde ces problèmes redoutables, car je relève que

M. Crawforda dit avec insistance qu'onpouvaitenvisager la situation

qui prévalaitdans la région en 1912 soit commeune association (et ici

l'on se réfèreà des protectorats, des fédérationset des condominiums),

soit commeune coalescencede l'allégeance, de l'administration et de

l'organisation sociale :

"bien qu'aucunedes unitéssociales ou politiqueà s l'intérieur
de cette entiténe soit à elle seule dépositaire dteous ces
élémentset bien que les relationsentre les diverses unités
puissentparfoisêtre tendues''(CR93/19,p. 60).

Il n'y a pas quecela,Monsieurle Présidentet Messieursde la Cour, qui

est mis à rude épreuve. 11 convienttoutefoisde releverici une autre considération. M. Crawford aessayéde citerl'affaire des Phares en
77
~rète et à Samos (C.P.J.I.série A/B n17 (1937))pour établirque,

tantqu'uneunité subordonné n'a pas entièrement rompses liens,il

convientde traiterl'entitédansson ensemble commu en seulEtat. Voilà

qui estbien. Celane convient pourtan pas icipour établirl'unitédu

BET et de l'Empireottomanpar coalescence.Dans cette situationl,'on

n'a pas affaireà un territoire déterminsur le pointde se séparerd'un

Etat parune sécessiondans lesformeset internationalement reconnue,

mais au prétenduagrandissemendt'unEtat fondé,il faut ledire, surdes

élémentsde preuvediscutables. Il est clairque les deuxsituationsne

sont pasanalogues.

L'Empireottoman

12. Je passemaintenantà l'examende la positionde l'Empire

ottoman,sur laquelle la Libysee fondetantmaintenant. Avan1908,il

est toutà fait manifestqeue l'Empireottomann'exerçaitaucuneautorité

effective, quelle qu'el fût, surle territoire eqnuestionet cela,des

preuves clairesl'établissent.Plusieurs documents officiels

britanniques lseoulignent.Par exempleun mémorandum du

26 février1902,adressépar ladivisiondes renseignements au

ForeignOffice,fait observec reci:

"S'agissantde la frontièreméridionalede la Cyrénaïque,
bien que la Turquieait vaguementrevendiquun hinterland
d'uneétenduepresque illimitée l'autoritéturquene s'est
jamaisexercéeau sud des oasisde Jalo et d'Aujila."
(Contre-mémoirdeu Tchad,annexe4.)

J'indiquemaintenantcette région sur la projection préseà nlaeCour.

De fait, la Libyeelle-mêmea ouvertementadmis dansson contre-mémoire

que,pendantles années qui ont précédéet suivi1900,"la régionn'avait

pas encore été occupépar l'Empireottoman"(par.4.131). 13.11 n'estpas moinsévidentqu'en1908, lesTurcsn'avaientmême

pas établi leur autoris tér l'oasis de Koufrabienau nord du BET).

Une sériede dépêchesbritanniques de Benghaziau ForeignOfficele

O78 confirment.Par exemple, dans une lettreen date du 18 juillet1908,il
. .
est dit avec insistance que la miss deonadjiiSuleimanEffendi(maire
*

de Benghazi),qui avait apportédes cadeauxet un drapeauottomanaux

Senoussi repliéssur eux-mêmesdans l'oasis,avait échoué car les

habitantsdu pays avaientrefusé de laisseh risserle drapeau ottoman

(contre-mémoirdeu Tchad,annexe9). Dans sa vasteétudeparuedans le

YaleJournalof International Law, Ricciardia concluque les Senoussi

et les habitantsdu pays s'étaient associépour "rejeter mêmeune

reconnaissancdee pure formede l'autoritéottomane dans lr aégion"

("Titleto the AouzouStrip : A legaland Historical Analysis" 17 Yale

Journalof InternationalLaw, 1992,p. 301,350). L'affirmation faite

devant laCour par M. Dolzer(CR 93/20,p. 31) selonlaquelle"les

populations senoussi avaientbien accueilliles Ottomans,n'estguère

justifiéepar les faits. En réalité, commele déclarela Libye elle-même

dans son mémoireà proposde l'établissemendt'une présence ottoman au

Tibestipendantla période1908-1909, "lesSenoussin'étaient pas

favorablesà cette mesure"(par.4.130). Les tribus locales se sont

abstenuesausside manifester de l'enthousiasmpeour la progression

ottomane. Par exemple, s'ilest vrai que leDerde (ou dirigeant)des

Touboudu Tibestia sollicitéquelqueassistance des Ottomans en1907

quandl'avancefrançaise s'est rapprochéedu BET, ce gestea été suivi

peu aprèsd'un appel à l'aideadressé au commandan françaisà Bilma.

14. Le dossierétablit bien qu'unepetiteunité turqueest arrivée

au Tibesti en1908ou 1909et que c'estseulementau cours de

l'année1911 que laTurquiea décidé de renforcer les quelques soldats

qu'elley avait postés et s'estefforçéed'établirson autoritéen un sens réel(contre-mémoirdeu Tchad,annexe 23). On peut s'arrêter

brièvementici pour signaler qul e'arrivée,cette année-làd,u capitaine

turcAhmed Rifkidans la régiond'Ah Galakkaa entraînéun échangede

. correspondence aveles Français,au coursduquel ces dernier ont

indiqué clairement qu'éta donné que laFranceétaitobligéede rester

neutredans la guerre italo-turquequivenaitde se déclencher,ils

0 7 9 slestimaient tenusde n'entreprendreaucune opération militaic rentre

lui (répliquede la Libye,annexe,partie B,10.4 et 10.6). A celase

ramenaitle fameux modus vivendidont la Libye fait tantde cas: une

simple décisiodne respecter lesrèglesde la neutralité danusne guerre

entre deux autresEtats. Or, même ainsi,les Françaisont déclaré avec

insistanceque cette inaction forcééeaitsubordonnée à la réserve

expressede leurs droits sur la régi dunBET(ibid.). De toutefaçon,

cette présence turques'estavéréede courte durée : au printemps

de 1912,les troupes turquea svaientcommencéà évacuerla région

(contre-mémoirdeu Tchad,annexe27).

15. La présence turqudeans le BET n'a pas seulementté brèveet

précaire, elle semble avoiprrésentéun caractère uniquemenet purement

militaire. Ce faitn'a pas été contestdans le mémoirede la Libye

(par.4.126-4.134), bien que lesplaidoirieslibyennes aienmtaintenant

relevé l'aspecatdministration civid le la présenceottomane,sans en

apporter aucune preuc veaire (voir par exemplM. Dolzer,CR 93/20,

p. 23 et 34). On faitobserverque le Derde des Touboudu Tibestia

demandél'aidedes Turcsà la suitedu coupde main français contre

Aïn Galakkaen 1907 et qu'ila reçu le titrede kaimakamde la région

du Tibesti; mais,commeon l'a déjà indiqué,ce même personnage,le

Derde, s'estadressépeu aprèsaux Françaispour demanderde l'aide.La simple attribution d'un titre ottoman,d'un titre sur lepapier,sans

qu'on le confirme par aucunélémentsignificatifd'où résultel'exercice

d'une autoritésouveraine,ne démontre pas grand-chose.

16. C'est peut-êtrecette impossibilitd é'établiraucun aspect civil

réel de l'éphémèreprésence ottomane qua i incitéM. Maghur à relever,le

19 juin, que "l'administrationottomaneétaitIndirecte,ou déléguée"

(CR 93/19,p. 12).Voilà qui est unmoyen commodede revenirau point de

départ. En effet,on va remédierà l'insuffisance de la présence

ottomaneen se référantà l'ordresenoussiet aux populations

autochtones. J'y reviendrai. Pour l'instant,Monsieurle Présidentet

Messieursde la Cour, je voudrais souligner qul ea présenceottomane,

quellequ'aitpu être sonimportancedans la pratique,n'échappaitpas à

la contestation. Comme il ressortdes documents présenté sans nos

exposésécrits,les Françaisont, entre 1908 et 1911, protesté contre la

présence turque dans la région et déclaré avec insistance qu ce

territoirefaisaitpartie dela sphèred'influencefrançaiseétablieen

vertu des arrangementsfranco-britanniques (contre-mémod ireTchad,

annexes11 et 16). Je voudrais indiquer en particuli ere quand le

Gouvernement turc a accepté la réunion,à l'automne1911, d'une

commissionfranco-turque poup rrocéderà la démarcation de la frontière

entre laTripolitaineet le Saharafrançais,le Gouvernement françaia s

spécifiquement informéles autorités ottomanes que :

"les commissaires français se refuserontà considérerles
mesuresprises parles autorités turquep sour étendre la
dominationottomanesur le Tibestiet le Borkoucomme

constituant des titre esn faveurde la Turquie"(ibid.,
annexe25).

17. Cette attitude deprotestationest un facteur trèspertinent

pour apprécier la valeud re telles activités dans la perspecti dee

l'établissement d'un titre territorial.CommeKarl le fait observer dans

I'Encyclopaedia of PublicInternational Law, "en droit, la protestation est un acte juridique unilatéraldans la mesure où elle exclutles effets

juridiquesqui résulteraiend te son absence"("Protest", Encyclopnedia

of Public International Law,publiésous la directionde Bernhardt,

vol. 9, 1986, p. 320). L'un des effetsJuridiquesd'une protestationest

, . de réfuter toute présomption d'acquiescemen (ibid.,p. 323). La

O81 protestation remplib tien sûr aussiune autre fonction,cellede

sauvegarderles droits existants,de sortequ'en agissant dela sorte les

Françaisont à la foiscontesté tout titre invoqué par les Turcs et

soulignéleurspropresdroits. Pour ténuesqu'aientpu être en fait les

manifestations de la présence turqudeans le BET, les autorités

françaisesn'étaientpas disposées à les accepteret ont donc protesté.

Monsieurle Président, cinq minutesme permettrontde mener à son

terme cette partie dema plaidoirie. Je me demandais si, peut-êtr...

Le PRESIDENT : Oui, continuezcinq minutes.

M. SHAW : Je vous remerciebeaucoup.

18. Ainsi, la présence turque dans leBET a-t-elleété brève et

ténue. Il est bien etabliqu'unerevendication de titre fondée sur

l'exercicede l'autoritéreposeà la fois sur l'intention d'agic romme

souverainet sur l'exerciceeffectifd'une telle autorité (commela Cour

permanentel'a fait observer,par exemple,dans l'affairedu Groënland

oriental(C.P.J.I.série A/B no 53, 1933, arrêt,p. 45-46). Cet

exercicede l'autoritén'est pas seulementcrucialdu point de vue de

l'instauration de la souveraineté,mais aussi poursa continuation(comme

indiquédans l'affairede l'Ilede Palmas, Nations UniesR ,ecueilsdes

sentences arbitraleisnternationales, vol. 2, p. 839). L'activité

initialed'un Etat n'est qu'un point de départ;si elle ne se continue

pas dansle temps à un certain niveau d'intensité,elle s'avère

insuffisantepour constituer la sourcd e'un titre international.S'il est vrai que l'acquisition d'utitreest un conceptrelatif,qui dépend

il n'en existe pasmoinsun noyau
en partiede la situation locale,

indiscutabled'activités souverainesqui estrequis indépendamment l de

naturedu territoire dont i s'agit. Tel est particulièremente cas si

l'activité esctontestée. Une action superficieln le sauraitsuffire.
s
C'estainsi que, par exemple,dansl'affaire de l'ilede Palmas,

M. Hubera déclaré

"l'occupationp,our constituerune prétentionà la souveraineté
territoriale, devaiêttreeffective,c'est-à-direoffrir
et à leurs nationaux"
certaines garantieasux autres Etats
(op.cit., p. 846).
'crrr
11 s'ensuitinévitablemenqtu'uneprésenceminimeet purement militaire,

que n'accompagneaucuneactivitécivileexercéesur le territoire et qui

ne prend effetque pendantun très petitnombred'annéesde façon

intermittenten,e peut toutsimplementpas satisfaireaux critères

requis. L'activitéturqueétaitdoncd'unniveau sensiblemen inférieur

au minimumexigé. De plus,la démonstration de l'animusoccupandi

nécessaire requiert sensiblem ents que la simple affirmatione la

Libye,surtoutcomptetenudu soi-disant partag des droitssouverains.

19. En réalitéMonsieurle Présidentet Messieurs de la Cour,même

M. Cahiers'esttrouvé poussé à admettre,au sujetdes droitsalléguésde
w
l'Empireottoman, que "ces droin tsétaientpas clairementétablis"

(CR 93/17,p. 13). Effectivement. C'est faitindiscutable que la

présencedes Ottomansétait peu fournie, circonscritterritorialemen et

surtouttransitoire.Ils nesontpas restés. Ils sont partis, et cela

ne saurait manquedr'entraîner decsonséquencesen droit.

Monsieurle Présidentet Messieurs de la Cour,je vous remercipeour

les quelques minutes supplémentairesvq ous m'avezaccordées;le moment
'
présentconviendraità une interruptio et je souhaiterais, avevotre

permission, poursuivre demm ainin. Le PRESIDEWI : Oui,je vous remercie, MonsieurShaw. Nous

continuerons demain matin à 10 heures.

L'audienceest levée à 13h 05.