Non- Corrigé Traduction
Uncorrected Translation
CR 92/5 (traduction)
CR 92/5 (translation)
samedi 28 mars 1992
Saturday 28 March 1992
j1 2 -
Le VICE-PRESIDENTfaisant fonction de PRESIDENT: La Cour doit
008
entendre ce matin la réplique de la Jamahiriya arabe libyenne aux
déclarations faites par le Royaume-Uni et les Etats-Unis dans chaque
affaire respectivement. Je donne donc maintenant la parole à
S.Exc. M. Al-Faitouri, agent de la Libye. \~
M. AL-FAITOURI : Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour. Sans
vouloir retenir très longtemps l'attention de la Cour, je vous prie de
bien vouloir accorder la parole à notre conseil, M. Brownlie.
Le VICE-PRESIDENTfaisant fonction de PRESIDENT Je donne la parole
à M. Brownlie.
M. BROWNLIE : Monsieur le Prés~den et Messieurs de la Cour, je me
propose, au deuxième tour, de traiter de trois questions : le caractère
général de l'argumentation présentée au nom des Etats défendeurs, les
menaces de recours à la force profér~e csntre la Libye par les Etats
défendeurs, et certains aspects des conditions dans lesquelles des
mesures conservatoires peuvent être indiquées.
Avant d'aborder cet ordre du jour, je voudrais tout d'abord
récapituler les questions qui se posent dans la présente affaire.
Premièrement, il y a un différ~n entre la Libye, d'une part, et les
Etats défendeurs, d'autre part. Ce différend a divers aspects dont
certains sont probablement politiques mais dont d'autres sont
certainement juridiques. Les aspects juridiques sont basés sur la
convention de Montréal et sont exposé.s clairement dans la lettre en date
du 17 janvier 1992 (pièce n° 23/annexe) qui a été adressée au nom de la
Libye au secrétaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis et au ministre des affaires
étrangères du Royaume-Uni.
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj \.;;,
3
Deuxièmement, les Etats défendeurs ont insisté que deux
ressortissan.ts libyens leur soient livrés, pour des motifs qui ne sont
pas reconnus par le droit international général et qui sont incompatibles
avec les dispositions de la convention de Montréal.
009 Troisièmement, l'insistance ainsi mise sur une procédure en dehors
des formes légales concernant la remise des intéressés s'est accompagnée
et continue de s'accompagner d'une série de menaces systématiques de
recourir à la force.
Quatrièmement, cette série de menaces systématiques n'est justifiée
par le texte d'aucune résolution du Conseil de sécurité et a eu et
continue d'avoir un caractère essentiellement bilatéral.
Cinquièmement, comme bien d'autres Etats, la Libye a saisi la Cour
en invoquant des procédures standard et en se fondant sur une clause
compromissoire d'un traité, comme les Etats-Unis l'ont fait dans
l'affaire du Personnel diplomatique et consulaire des Etats-Unis
à Téhéran et comme le Nicaragua l'a fait dans la procédure intentée
contre les Etats-Unis en 1984.
Par conséquent, Monsieur le Président, la procédure a un caractère
parfaitement normal et l'Etat requérant est un Etat qui a eu recours à la
Cour à plusieurs occasions depuis son indépendance.
Il est indubitable que ce différend juridique a certaines
ramifications politiques, mais cela est sans rapport avec la
justiciabilité des questions de droit. Commela Cour l'a déclaré dans
l'affaire du Personnel diplomatique et consulaire des Etats-Unis
à Téhéran
"aucune disposition du Statut ou du Règlement ne lui [la Gour]
interdit de se saisir d'un aspect du différend pour la simple
raison que ce différend comporterait d'autres aspects, si
importants soient-ils" (C.I.J. Recueil 1980, par. 36).
En outre, la Cour a déclaré ce qui suit :
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj - 4 -
"Nul n'a cependant jamais prétendu que, parce qu'lm
différend juridique soumis à la Cour ne constitue qu'un aspect
d'un différend politique, la Cour doit se refuser à résoudre
dans l'intérêt des parties les questions juridiques qui les
opposent." (Ibid., par. 37.)
Le caractère général de l'argumentation présentée par les Etats
défendeurs
Les aspects juridiques et judiciaires des questions qui se posent ne
sont aucunement exceptionnels dans la présente affaire, et les Etats-Unis
et le Royaume-Uni adoptent aujourd'hui des positions semblables à celles
qu'a rejetées la Cour dans l'affaire du Personnel diplomatique et
consulaire des Etats-Unis à Téhéran.
Etant donné la réalité du différend juridique exposé dans les pièces
010
soumises à la Cour, les plaidoiries faites au nom des Etats défendeurs
semblent, très franchement, sans rapport avec la réalité.
Et ce manque de rapport avec la réalité présente plusieurs aspects.
Le principal d'entre eux est peut-être l'accent qui est mis sur
l'attaque dirigée contre le vol 10~ de la PanAm.
Tant le Solicitor-General que M. Kreczko, pour les Etats-Unis, ont
insisté sur les faits et ont mis en relief le nombre de victimes, leur
nationalité et combien d'entre elles étaient des enfants.
Cet acte atroce a été rappelé gans tous ses détails et M. Kreczko a
dit qu'il "constituait une violation flagrante d'un droit fondamental de
la personne humaine, à savoir le droit à la vie".
L'on a également exposé à la Cour les raisons pour lesquelles il
fallait poursuivre deux suspects de nationalité libyenne, telles que ces
raisons sont conçues par les personnalités officielles britanniques et
américaines, ...
IJ
Les questions juridiques qui se posent à la Cour dans le contexte
des critères auxquels doit répondre une indication de mesures •·
conservatoires ont trait à l'interprétation de la convention de Montréal.
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj - 5 -
La question qui se pose n'est pas celle de la responsabilité
personnelle des deux suspects, mais plutôt des procédures
juridictionnelles suivant lesquelles cette responsabilité doit être
déterminée,
• Et c'est· là, Monsieur le Président. un autre aspect d.e ce manque de
rapport avec la réalité.
La question de la responsabilité des morts de Lockerbie n'a pas
encore été déterminée, et les autorités américaines ont, depuis 1988,
manifesté des préférences changeantes quant aux candidats qui devraient
endosser cette responsabilité.
Dans ce contexte, la tentative que font les Etats défendeurs de
s'ériger en autorité morale est des plus contestables. En effet,
Monsieur le Président, aucun doute ne subsiste quant à la responsabilité
des raids aériens dirigés contre Tripoli et Benghazi en avril 1986.
011 Ces attaques étaient totalement injustifiées, et l'excuse invoquée à
cette fin s'est avérée depuis lors dépourvue de fondement. Cette action,
appuyée par le Royaume-Uni, a causé un grand nombre de morts, dont des
enfants. Pour reprendre les termes employés hier par M. Williamson, ces
attaques ont été "des violations flagrantes et obscènes du droit
international".
Mais ces gouvernements n'ont exprimé aucun regret, n'ont payé aucune
indemnité comme demandé par l'Assemblée générale, n'ont pas offert de
traduire en justice ceux qui avaient ·organisé les raids.
Le manque de rapport avec la réalité, ici, provient d'une certaine
confusion morale, à Londres et à Washington, tenant à la distinction
-•_: arbitraire qui est faite entre le terrorisme et d'autres formes
d'atrocités internationales, Des bombardements par des aéronefs
militaires semblent avoir un caractère moral qui fait défaut dans le cas
d'autres formes de recours à la violence politique •
..
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj - 6 -
Monsieur le Président, les victimes des raids aériens de 1986
n'avaient pas le bénéfice de la présomption d'innocence dont a parlé avec
tant d'éloquence hier le conseil des Etats-Unis.
Les victimes ont été la cible d'un acte unilatéral de représailles
pour un incident qui s'était produit à Berlin et qui a ultérieurement été •
imputé à une organisation n'ayant aucun lien avec la Libye,
Cela étant, la Libye est aujourd'hui accusée- comme l'a apparemment
012
fait le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis lors d'une conférence presse qui a eu
lieu hier- d'invoquer les dispositions d'une convention internationale
et d'avoir saisi la Cour. Par ailleurs, la Libye a été informée par le
conseil du Royaume-Uni dans la présente affaire que les droits dont elle
demande la protection sont "illusoires".
En outre, l'on a dit à la Cour que les questions en jeu ont été
soumises au Conseil de sécurité, ce qui impose des limites à la
compétence de la Cour. Indépendamment d'autres considérations dont
p.arlera M. Suy, il y a une bonne raison pratique pour laquelle cet organe
politique ne saurait se substituer au principal organe judiciaire de
l'Organisation des Nations Unies.
Lorsqu'un Etat en litige avec un membre permanent du Conseil
comparaît devant ce dernier en tant que plaignant, que peut-il se
passer ? L'Etat défendeur peut fatre usage de son droit de veto. Il se
peut mêmeque ledit Etat ait peine à convaincre le Conseil de se réunir.
Or, en 1986, la majorité des Etats à -i~Assemblée-génér yaco mpris
29 Etats d'Afrique, dont, par exemple, l'Algérie et le Nigéria, ont
condamné "l'attaque militaire" perpétrée contre la Libye, en tant que
...
"violation de la Charte des Nations Unies et du droit international" ê
(pièce no 4 de la Libye),
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj - 7 -
La série systématique de menaces de recours à la force
La façon dont les Etats défendeurs traitent tous les éléments de
preuve concernant les menaces de recourir à la force contre la Libye
contribue aussi à ce manque de rapport avec la réalité.
Les représentants du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis ont prétendu
•
n'avoir jamais entendu parler des menaces dirigées contre la Libye avant
jeudi matin. En outre, l'on constate un refus manifeste de prendre les
éléments de preuve au sérieux.
Et c'est sur cette base que le conseil du Royaume-Uni a soutenu
013
qu'il n'y avait "en fait" pas urgence (CR 92/3, p. 54).
•
Les preuves des menaces
Dans ma plaidoirie de jeudi, j'ai produit six éléments de preuve des
menaces de recours à la force proférées contre la Libye en citant
directement différentes déclarations de personnalités officielles.
Et, avec tout le respect que je dois au conseil du Royaume-Uni, j'ai
cité intégralement la déclaration faite par le ministre d'Etat de ce pays
(GR 92/2, p. 34).
Ce que je veux souligner, Monsieur le Président, c'est que la
réponse des Etats défendeurs face à ces éléments de preuve est
misérablement déficiente.
Les preuves de la constance des formules utilisées n'ont pas été
réfutées, simplement parce que cette question n'a pas été associée à
celle de l'existence d'une attitude systématique et d'une formulation
commune. Ainsi, la phrase "je n'ai adopté ni exclu aucune solution"
utilisée par M. Douglas Hogg a été employée par le président Bush le
...
19 novembre 1991, reprise par M. Cheney le 15 décembre, utilisée à
• nouveau par M. Hogg dans sa réponse à la Chambre des communes le
20 janvier et reprise encore une fois par une porte-parole du Foreign
Office le 18 février, et ce n'est pas un accident.
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj - 8 -
Cette formulation reflète une politique concertée, une politique
commune. Elle n'est pas le résultat d'un hasard.
Et cette formule a été utilisée par M. Bush dans un contexte tel que
la force était manifestement au nombre des options envisag·ées, qui
comprenaient les "mesures de rétorsion". •
Aucun des Etats défendeurs n'a contesté ces déclarations en tant que
telles, mais seulement leur interprétation.
En outre, les conseils des deux Etats semblent n'avoir absolument
pas compris la valeur probante de déclarations faites publiquement par
des personnalités officielles en tant qu'aveu contraire à leurs intérêts 4lt
et en tant que preuve de leurs intentions. Cela ne peut certainement pas
être attaqué sur la base du droit de la preuve.
En outre, il existe une certaine confusion. La Libye n'a pas
014:
cherché à établir que des personnalités officielles ont promis de
recourir à la force mais seulement qu'il y a des preuves que l~on a
menacé de recourir à la force au cas où cela serait nécessaire pour
obtenir qu'il soit donné suite aux "demandes" des Etats défendeurs.
Il n'est pas inutile de rappeler que le concept juridique de menace
a été défini comme suit dans une monographie publiée en 1963
"Une menace de recours à la force est une promesse
expresse ou implicite, de la part d'un gouvernement, d'employer
la force si certaines de ses exigences ne sont pas acceptées."
(Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States,
Oxford, 1963, p. 364.)
Aussi importe-t-il peu que M. Schwartz rappelle que M. Quayle, selon
le Washington Times, a déclaré ce qui suit :
"Le vice-président a refusé de spécifier les mesures qui
seraient adoptées et a souligné qu'il ne disait pas que les
Etats-Unis envisageaient de recourir à la force militaire."
(Pièce n" 40 de la Libye."
Le fait demeure que, faisant observer que la patience des Etats-Unis
n'était pas ''illimitée", M. Quayle a dit : "Il suffit de se réf~re ru
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj .·;-
- 9 -
passé pour voir que nous avons la volonté politique de faire en sorte que
ce genre de demande soit suivie d'effets." (Pièce n° 39 de la Libye.)
•
Dans les circonstances de l'espèce, cette déclaration sous-entendait
que les Etats-Unis étaient disposés à recourir à la force si besoin était
et, comme je l'ai fait observer lors du premier tour de plaidoirie, c'est
précisément cette conclusion qu'en a tirée le Washington Times (pièce
n° 40 de la Libye).
Soit M. Quayle se référait (dans un contexte libyen) aux raids
aériens de 1986, soit, peut-être, il se référait au fait que les
Etats-Unis s'étaient montrés disposés à envahir et à ocèuper le Panama
•
pour y appréhender un chef d'Etat à la suite d'accusations formulées par
des agents du ministère public aux Etats-Unis.
D'une façon générale, les conseils des Etats défendeurs ont
manifesté une insouciance surprenant face aux déclarations faites
publiquement par le Président et par le Vice-Président des Etats-Unis.
v ',.) Des personnes occupant de telles positions doivent, me semble-t-il,
être présumées vouloir dire ce qu'elles disent et exprimer une position
politique bien arrêtée. D'autant plus que les déclarations en question
utilisent une formule précise qui a été répétée pendant une période de
trois mois par différentes personnalités de deux pays différents.
Il me semble aussi que si l'on veut analyser en détail les éléments
qui prouvent l'existence de menaces, il faut aussi tenir compte de toutes
les circonstances pertinentes.
Sans vouloir trop s'étendre sur ce point, l'on peut raisonnablement
dire que les circonstances pertinentes et les facteurs en jeu sont les
suivants
• a) D'une façon générale, l'historique des relations entre les
Etats-Unis et la Libye, particulièrement depuis 1978. A maintes
occasions, les Etats-Unis se se montrés disposés à avoir recours à des
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj - 10 -
démonstrations navales et à employer la force pour imposer leurs vues
touchant différents aspects du droit de la mer. Parmi les actes
hostiles dirigés contre la Libye, l'on peut citer les complots visant
à renverser le Gouvernement libyen, des manoeuvres navales et les
incursions d'aéronefs militaires dans l'espace aérien de la Libye,
b) La présence persistance de la Sixième Flotte dans le centre de la
Méditerranée.
c) L'utilisation de la Sixième Flotte, ainsi que de bases au
Royaume-Uni, en vue des attaques aériennes de 1986. Une bonne part de
ces attaques aériennes ont été menées par des appareils basés sur les
porte-avions America et Coral Sea.
d) Le fait que, depuis 1986, le Gouvernement et les dirigeants, tant à
Londres qu'à Washington., sont demeurés essentiellement les mêmes.
En conclusion, Monsieur le Président, tous ces éléments doivent être
considérés ensemble, et le critère global doit être le suivant :
016 "Quel serait normalement l'effet de telles déclarations et
d'un tel comportement d'une super Puissance et d'un important
allié militaire dans les circonstances ?"
Ces circonstances seraient notamment la nature du rapport de force
entre la Libye, d'une part, et les Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uni agissant
de concert, de l'autre.
A cet important facteur, il faut ajouter la nature du langage
employé par les Gouvernements des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni depuis
novembre de l'an dernier.
L'un des premiers exemples du ton péremptoire qui a été utilisé se
trouve dans la déclaration conjointe publiée par les deux gouvernements
~-
le 27 novembre 1991 :
"Les Gouvernements britannique et américain déclarent ce
jour que le Gouvernement libyen doit :
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj - 11 -
- livrer, afin qu'ils soient traduits en justice, tous ceux qui
sont accusés de ce crime et assumer la responsabilité des
agissements des agents libyens;
- divulguer tous les renseignements en sa possession sur ce
crime, y compris les noms de tous les responsables, et
permettre le libre accès à tous les témoins, documents et
autres preuves matérielles, y compris tous les dispostifs
d'horlogerie restants;
•
- verser des indemnités appropriées.
Nous comptons que la Libye remplira ses obligations
promptement et sans aucune réserve."
Dans le langage diplomatique, cette déclaration est réellement
péremptoire et est postérieure aux déclarations de personnalités
officielles américaines dont la seule interprétation raisonnable est
•
qu'elles avaient pour but de laisser ouverte l'option militaire.
Par la suite, les Etats défendeurs ont habituellement utilisé
1 'expression "demandes" dans leurs rapports avec le Gouver.nement libyen
et en ce qui concerne la remise des deux ressortissants libyens.
La déclaration conjointe du 27 novembre 1991, bien que brève,
017
contient trois fois le mot "demandes" (pièce n° 18, annexe, de la
Libye).
Il est intéressant de noter aussi que mêmedans le climat
relativement édulcorant des présentes audiences, le Solicitor-General de
l'Ecosse a parlé des "demandes formulées par le Royaume-Uni" (GR 92/3,
p. 24) 0
Il y a lieu de souligner, Monsieur le Président, que cette attitude
systématique de coercition bilatérale, liée aux "demandes" adressées à
Libye, précède toute démarche auprès du Conseil de sécurité et n'a été
légitimée par aucune résolution.
M. Schwartz a cité deux déclarations libyennes exprimant un doute
•
quant à l'éventualité que la crise débouche effectivement sur un
coriflit. Je tiens à dire, au nom de la Libye, que de telles déclarations
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj - 12 -
non seulement sont tout à fait compatibles avec l'existence d'une
coercition, mais encore prouvent que les autorités libyennes sont
conscientes du fait que le recours à la force est à l'ordre du jour.
L'illicéité des menaces en droit international général
J'en ainsi terminé, Monsieur le Président, avec mon rappel des
•
preuves de la coercition systématique exercée sur la Libye sur une base
bilatérale pour obtenir la remise, en dehors des formes légales, de deux
ressortissants libyens.
Avant d'en finir avec cette question, toutefois, je tiens à
déclarer, au nom du Gouvernement libyen, que la menace de recourir à la
force est- contraire aux principes de la Charte des Nations Unies et, pour •
autant qu'ils soient distincts, aux principes du droit international
coutumier ou général. Les références évidentes sont notamment
l'article 2, paragraphe 4, de la Charte des Nations Unies et le premier
des principes énoncés dans la Déclaration des principes du droit
international touchant les relations amicales entre les Etats figurant
dans la résolution 2625 (XXV) de l'Assemblée générale, qui est une
interprétation de la Charte faisant autorité, L'on trouve également des
références à cet effet, je regrette de le dire, dans un ouvrage publié
par la personne qui vous parle en 1963 (Brownlie, International Law and
018 the Use oE Force by States, 1963, p. 364-365) et, plus récemment, dans
un excellent et très complet article publié par Romana Sadurska dans
l'American Journal of International Law,--vol. 82 (1988), p. 239-268.
L'illicéité des menaces conduit à présumer sans avoir guère de
chance de se tromper qu'aucune mesure du Conseil de sécurité ne pourrait
avoir pour but de légitimer ex post facto ou ex nunc-l'exercice d'une
coercition bilatérale. •
Dans ce contexte, il convient de rappeler que l'article 2 de la
Charte stipule que l'Organisation (ainsi que ses Membres) doivent agir
conformément aux principes énoncés dans la Charte,
0067c/CR5/Trans,/HS/mj - 13 -
Les conditions dans lesquelles des mesures conservatoires sont indiquées
Dans la déclaration que j'ai faite lors du premier tour de
plaidoirie, j'ai donné la Cour un aperçu général des critères en fonction
desquels des mesures conservatoires sont soit indiquées, soit refusées
• (CR 92/2, p. 17-31). Certes, le conseil d'un Etat requérant peut tendre
à mettre en relief les aspects les plus souples de ces critères, mais
j'ai néanmoins essayé d'en donner à la Cour un exposé relativement
objectif.
Il n'y a pas lieu de le répéter, de sorte que je me bornerai à
commenter certains des points soulevés par les conseils des Etats
défendeurs.
Le conseil du Royaume-Uni a soutenu que les droits que la Libye
souhaitait voir protéger étaient "illusoires". Mon collègue, M. Salmon,
répondra à cette prétention.
Par la suite, il a été dit que la Libye n'avait établi aucun lien
entre les droits devant être protégés et les mesures conservatoires
demandées (CR 92/3, p. 44-48). Ce que cela signifie, c'est simplement
que les mesures demandées doivent être en rapport avec l'objet du
différend.
Cela n'est pas controversé. Toutefois, le conseil du Royaume-Uni
confond ce principe et la questi diff~rente de savoir ce qui est
nécessaire pour éviter qu'un préjudice, un préjudice irréparable, soit
causé aux droits qui font 1 'objet du différend- ·quant au fond.
019 Dans la présente affaire, c'est la politique de pressions et de
coercition qui menace directement les droits de la Libye en vertu de la
convention de Montréal. Ainsi, les mesures demandées reflètent très
naturellement les droits en cause et la forme d'ingérence dont il_ s'agit.
Il n'y a là qu'une question de bon sens. La référence faite par le
conseil du Royaume-Uni à l'affaire du Plateau continental de la
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj 14 -
mer Egée est sans aucun rapport avec la question car les mesures
militaires visées n'avaient pas trait à l'objet du différend. La
présente affaire offre à cet égard un contraste marqué.
Dans l'affaire du Plateau continental de la mer Egée, les mesures
militaires ne pouvaient pas affecter les droits sur le plateau
continental revendiqués par la Grèce. Dans la présente affaire, si les
deux suspects sont remis sous la coercition, les droits de la Libye en
matière de juridiction se trouvent lésés de façon irréparable. La
situation est tout à fait différente.
Dans le contexte de ce critère aussi, l'on a fait valoir au nom du 4lt
Royaume~U qn'il n'y avait aucun risque quun préjudice irréparable soit
causé aux droits en question (CR 9213, p. 49-53).
Je tiens à faire observer respectueusement que l'on comprend
difficilement comment la remise de deux nationaux en dehors des formes
légales sous l'effet de menaces illégales de recourir à la force pourrait
ne pas constituer un préjudice irréparable.
L'on a dit aussi au nom du Royaume-Uni que l'urgence est une
condition de fond à l'indication de mesures conservatoires (CR 92/3,
p.. 54-56). Cette affirmation ne me semble pas confirmée par les
sources.
En ce qui concerne l'urgence, la condition indiquée dans
l'ordonnance rendue dans l'affaire du Passage par le Grand-Belt
(CR 92/2, p. 31) est certainement ·remplie-en l'occurrence, Il y a ·donc
urgence en ce sens qu'"il est probable qu'une action préjudiciable aux
droits de l'une ou de l'autre partie sera commise" avant la décision
quant au fond,
020 Par ailleurs, l'on a dit au nom du Royaume-Uni que les mesures
conservatoires demandées par la Libye manquaient de précision (CR 92/3,
p. 58-61). Cet argument est dépourvu de substance.
0067c/CRS/Trans,/HS/mj - 15 -
Vu la nature de la menace qui pèse sur les droits de la Libye, les
mesures demandées sont appropriées. Mutatis mutandis, elles sont
semblables à celles demandées dans l'affaire des Activités militaires et
paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis
.. d'Amérique), C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 169. Dans la présente affaire,
nous sommes confrontés à des menaces et les mesures demandées reflètent
cette circonstance particulière.
Il y a une dernière considération qui doit intervenir pour
déterminer s'il convient ou non d'indiquer des mesures conservatoires.
Les circonstances de la présente demande peuvent être comparées aux
affaires dans lesquelles la Cour a décidé de ne pas exercer le pouvoir
que lui confère l'article 41 du Statut.
Il faut tout d'abord mettre de côté les décisions clairement basées
sur l'irrecevabilité de la demande, en ce sens par exemple que les
mesures demandées auraient préjugé clairement du fond (Réforme agraire
polonaise, C.P.J.I. série AIB n° 58) ou parce que les mesures
demandées étaient sans rapport avec les droits faisant l'objet de
l'action au fond dont la Cour était saisie (Sentence arbitrale du
31 juillet 1989, C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 64, par. 26).
Deuxièmement, la présente affaire n'a aucune similitude avec les
demandes qui ont été rejetées pour le motif que le comportement incriminé
ne pouvait aucunement porter préjudice aux droits en cause. Je pense ici
à l'affaire du Sud-est du Groenland (C.P.J.I. série AIB n° 48 1
p. 287-288) ainsi qu'à l'ordonnance rendue dans l'affaire du Passage par
le Grand-Belt, C.I.J. Recueil 1991, p. 19, par, 31-32).
'l~
021 L'affaire du Passage par le Grand-Belt constitue un cas
particulier aussi eu égard au rôle joué par certaines assurances données
par le Danemark, auxquelles la Cour a attaché de l'importance (ibid.,
p. 17, par. 24; p. 18, par.27).
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj - 16 -
Cela laisse les ordonnances rendues dans l'affaire de
l'Interhandel et dans l'affaire du Plateau continental de la mer Egée.
Dans la première de ces affaires, l'affaire de l'Interhandel, les
questions concernant le préjudice avaient été subordonnées à l'issue de
la procédure qui avait été reprise devant les tribunaux des Etats-Unis •
(C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 105).
L'ordonnance rendue dans l'affaire du Plateau continental de la
mer Egée était basée en partie sur le raisonnement qu'alors mêmeque les
activités d'exploration sismiques turques risquaient de porter préjudice
aux droits de la Grèce, il n'y avait pas de risque de "préjudice
irréparable". La Cour a fait observer que le droit revendiqué par la
Grèce, c'est-à-dire le droit de recueillir des renseignements sur les
ressources du plateau continental pourrait "donner lieu à une réparation
appropriée" (C.I.J. Recueil 1916, p. 11, par. 32-33). (Et l'on trouve
aussi une référence semblable dans l'ordonnance rendue dans l'affaire du
Passage par le Grand-Belt, C.I.J. Recueil 1991, p. 19, par. 31.)
Dans la présente affaire, il est parfaitement clair que les mesures
022
que peut ordonner la Cour ne pourraient aucunement réparer l'usurpation
de droits juridictionnels tentée par les Etats défendeurs. Il est clair
que l'application des dispositions de la convention de Montréal ne peut
pas être reconstituée après coup. Il n'y a pas de parallèle non plus
avec les activités d'exploration sismiques dans l'affaire du Plateau
continental de la mer Egée ou avec l'ouvrage fixe envisagé à travers le
détroit du Grand-Belt. Dans cette dernière affaire, la Cour n'a pas
exclu la possibilité d'ordonner une modification de l'ouvrage. Mais il
est difficile de concevoir un tel processus de réparation en nature dans
le cas de l'exercice d'une juridiction personnelle sur des individus.
0067c/CR5/Trans,/HS/mj - 17 -
J'en ai ainsi terminé, Monsieur le Président, avec mon deuxième tour
de plaidoirie. Je tiens à remercier la Cour de l'amabilité et de la
considération avec lesquelles elle m'a écouté, et je souhaiterais
..
maintenant céder à la parole à mon collègue M. Salmon.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de PRESIDENT Merci, Monsieur
Brownlie. Monsieur Salmon, je vous donne la parole.
Mr. SALMON: Mr. President, Menibers of the Court. Before embarking
on this second round, I scarcely need tell you how greatly impressed I
was by the introduction of the British and American delegations on the
e
victime of the Lockerbie bombing. I was all the more moved by it since
023 the only Belgian victim was my son's best friend, a childhood friend whom
we had seen grow up and whose death we learned of with dismay, sadness
and outrage. This is another way of saying that, as much as anyone here,
I consider that justice and the memory of the victims requires us to get
to the b.ottom of this vile attack. Where I differ with the Respondents
is in my belief that, in getting to the bottom of it and seeing that
justice is done, due respect should be paid to the rules of international
law.
The defence we have heard consisted in diverting the subject before
the Court - a simple matter of the application of an international
convention - into two areas having nothing to do with the proceedings
before the Court. The first of these was to try the two accused, who are
not here to defend themselves, using an impressive wealth of detail not
supported by any evidence. The second and more perfidious one was to
make a number of insinuations of a political nature, for the most part
unproven, aimed at blackening Libya's name in order, quite apart from its
legal personality, to attack the tenor of its legal argument.
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj - 18 -
Moreover, the totality of the principal thesis, which consista in
presenting Libya as using the Court against the Security Council,
conceals the political reality which is only too apparent: in other .,
words, that the two Respondent Governments, who know full well that they
have no legal"basis in international law for demanding the extradition of
the two suspects and that they are in breach of the Montreal Convention,
are seeking to use the Security Council to prevent the Court from
performing its task.
The Respondents have endeavoured, in a manner which, it must be
D24
admowledged, was frequently intelligent and even brilliant, to spirit
away the embarrassing Convention. The strategy adopted has been to
restage in this Court the scenario which had enjoyed a qualified success
in a political body, namely, the Security Council. The ploy is to invént
a general dispute between States, which submerges the legal question
before the Court. Yet there is a fundamental paradox here, for although
the claim is that the problem calls into question the responsibility of a
State, in concrete terms, it is the handing over of the two individuals
which is demanded. The mixture of genres ruins the demonstration, since
the "handing over" (I leave responsibility for this term to the authors
of it) falls within the scope of the Montreal Convention.
It is international law, no doubt a more restricting and austere
field than political insinuations, which I wish to discuss before the
Court.
I. Prima Eacie Jurisdiction
I shall deal first with problem of the prima Eacie jurisdiction of "Il
the Court, which has been disputed using various arguments. The first of
these involved the claim that there was no dispute between Applicant and
Respondents.
0067c/CR5/Trans,/HS/mj - 19 -
I hesitate to tax the Court's patience by making endless guotations
from its case-law, concerning the existence in law of a dispute. In the
case of the German interests in Upper Silesia (P.C.I.J., Series A,
No. 6, p. 14), where the issue was that "the attitude adopted by the
ether conflict"s with its own views" and, moreover, that "a mere defect of
form, the removal of which depends solely on the Party concerned cannet
stop the Court",
In the Northern Cameroons case, the Court insisted on the opposing
views of the Parties, which reveal the existence of a dispute:
• "it is sufficient to say that, having regard to the facts
ü 2.5 already stated in this Judgment, the opposing views of the
Parties as to the interpretation and application of relevant
Articles of the Trusteeship Agreement, reveal the existence
of a dispute in the sense recognized by the jurisprudence of
the Court and of its predecessor, between the Republic of
Cameroon and the United Kingdom at the date of the Application"
(Northern Cameroons, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 27).
In the South West Africa case, the Court stated: "that it must
be shown that the claim of one Party is positively opposed by the other"
(South West Africa, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 328).
And it is no doubt in one of your recent Opinions of 26 April 1988
that the Court made a statement which perhaps cornes closest to the
present proceedings:
"38. In the view oE the Court, where one Party to a Treaty
protests against the behaviour or a decision oE another Party,
and claims that such behaviour or decision constitutes a breach
of the Treaty, the mere fact chat the-Party accused does not
advance any argument to justiEy its conduct under international
law does not prevent the opposing attitudes oE the Parties Erom
giving rise to a dispute concerning the interpretation or
application oE the treaty." (United Nations Headquarters
Agreement, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 28, para. 38.)
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj - 20 -
T.he existence of a dispute - in fact
It is in the light of these legal precepts that the facts need to be
examined; essentially, there are two quite specifie disputes, namely,
determining the competent judge on the one band and co-operation with the
Libyan judges on the ether.
(a) First dispute: the competent judge
Allow me, if you will, to recall a number of facts. On
18 November 1991 (Brit. Doc. No. 3) the Libyan General People's Committee
for Justice received the request from the Procurator Fiscal MacDougall
dated 13 November 1991 (Brit. Doc. No. 1). That same day, the Committee tlt
decided, pursuant to the Libyan Laws of 28 November 1953, No. 6 of 1982
026 and No. 51 of 1976, firstly, to have an investigation judge assigned by
the General Assembly of the Supreme Court (which was done the dame day);
secondly, to request all interested parties, in Britain and the
United States, including familles of victims, to submit the information
and evidence in their possession, and thirdly, it affirmed its readiness
to provide all the necessary facilities and co-operate with the legal
authorities concerned (Lib. Doc. No. 7 and Brit. Doc. No. 3).
Th.e Libyan authorities thus appointed immediately started their
investigations.
Apparently, on 22 November 1991, the Italian Embassy, which
representa the interests of the United Kingdom in Tripoli, informed the
Commtitee for Foreign Affaira t·hat the Br.f-tish--aut·hori ti es wished the
suspects to be handed over to the British Courts, writing that:
"It is right for the Libyan Government· and its duty to
surrender the named ci tizens· to the Courts." (Bri t. Doc.
No. 4).
The following day, 23 November 1991, the Committe for Foreign
Affaira replied to the Italian Embassy with a request to know what that
meant, adding that:
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj - 21 -
"There are general principles in such situations governed
by the sovereignty of countries, the principle of national
independence and the conflict of laws and the conflict of
jurisdiction." (Brit. Doc. No. 4.)
On 27 November, the examining magistrate took measures guaranteeing
the presence of the accused to enable criminal proceedings to be
instituted; their passports were confiscated.
The same day, 27 November, on the other side of the world, the
United Kingdom and the United States served Libya with a veritable
027 ulitimatum, which my friend and colleague Mr. Brownlie read out to you a
moment aga, and which included the demand that the two suspects be
surrendered to them (Lib. Doc. No. 18; S/23308).
In a statement of 2 December 1991, the Committee for Foreign Affairs
clearly set out the Libyan position on the case of the two accused:
Libyan law would be applied:
"2. If the issue of the incident of Pan Am flight 103
relates to the implementation of law in accordance with
judicial procedures, then Libya sees that the investigation
into the matters follows the law of criminal procedures issued
in 1953 by way of an investigating Libyan judge, since the
matter concerna Libyans. Libya accepta that judges from
Britain and America participate with the Libyan judge in the
investigations to make sure that the proc.edures are done in an
unbiased and good manner. International organizations, human
rights societies and the familles of the victims can send
observera or lawyers to attend the investigations. '!bose
States, or any ether requesting party, can look into the
process of investigation. The investigating judge will take
into consideration obtaining the previous investigations
carried out regarding the incident including those in Scotland
and the District of Columbia.
The specialized authori ties in Libya will. co-opera te full .
with the Scottish and American investigators to arrive at the
tru th,
In addition, Libya declares its acceptance of the
formation of a neutra! international investigation committee to
carry out that investigation." (Lib. Doc. No. 7.)
The text went on to say that, for the rest, if there was a political
dispute, it concerned respect for the Charter, and that, despite this
clear affirmation by the Libyan Government, which assumed jurisdiction in
this case.
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj - 22 -
1 .
The demand for the suspects to be surrended and the refusa! to
accept Libyan jurisdiction were rJiterated in the Security Council by the
British and American permanent re+esentatives (Lib. Doc. No. 24,
S/PV. 3033, pp. 28-80 and 104-105 o;f the English text) ; the inverse
1
position by the Libyan permanent ·representative was also obviously
1
reaffirmed. So much for the firstl dispute. Let us move on now to the
second one. ·1
1
(b) Second dispute: co-operation jith the Libyan judges
ü28
1
On 27 November 1991, the Libyan investigating judge wrote to the
Attorney General·of Great Britain !asking for the docUIIIents concerning •
this case to be sent (Lib. Doc. no 11).
A similar letter was sent on 1the same date to Foreman of the Grand
1
Jury of the District of Columbia (Lib. Doc. No. 10).
1
On 4 December, the hearings O'f the suspects and witnesses by the
1 .
investigating judge began. There ~ere nine hearings between 16 December
1
and 28 January, followed by another 1 three in February.
On 29 December 1991, the exam!ining magistrate requested a list of
1
passengers from and to Malta during 1 the period 5 to 12 December 1988.
1
Meanwhile another request for[ information was communicated to the
United Kingdom Ministry of Justice! on 14 January 1992 (Brit. Doc No. 6).
1
These requests never receivedl 1any reply either from the
1
United States or from United Kingdpm1 The United Kingdom officially
1
acknowledged this in the followingistate1e.t of 28 January 1992:
1
"the Libyan authorities have kade public the fact of their
1
request that the Lord Advocate assist a Libyan judicial ..
investigation. The Lord Advo~at hes made it clear that he is
not prepared to co-operate inlsuch an investigation ••• "
(Lib. Doc. No. 32). ! \
Subsequently the United Kingdom1and the United States were to
1
persist in their attitude, refusin t~ co-operate with the Libyan
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj - 23 -
courts. No secret of this has been made by counsel of the two Parties
before the Court. They have unfailingly said that their position was to
refuse to co-operate with the partial Libyan judges (when I say the two
Parties, I mean the two Respondents).
To claim; in such circumstances, that both in the dispute over the
Libyan judge and the one over co-operation with Libyan justice, we are
029
not dealing with a the claim by one party being manifestly opposed by the
other (South West AErica, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 328) or with a
situation where the opposing attitude of the parties reveals the
existence of a dispute (Northern Cameroons, I.C.J. Reports 1963,
•
p. 27 and Headquarters Agreement, p. 19, para. 35) scarcely holds
water. As we have seen, the Court is not formalistic in this respect.
* * *
On 18 January 1992, the letter from the Permanent Representative,
from which I read out large extracts during the sitting of 26 March
(CR 92/2, p. 44) and which, with your permission, I shall refrain from
quoting again here, clearly set out the Libyan positions, linking them to
the specifie Articles of the Montreal Convention, namely Articles 5
and 7, together with the requests 'for co-operation made on the basis of
that Convention.
For their part, the British-and American authorities were clearly
careful not to provide any justification for their requests that the
suspects be surrended to them. And they would have been hard pressed to
do so in the absence of an extradition treaty between themselves and
Libya. If they were careful to avold invoking the Montreal Convention,
the only international instrument governing relations between the
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj - 24 -
countries concerned in the field If co-operation in criminal matters, it
was because they were aware that the Libyan authorities bad decided to
exercise their jurisdiction in codformity with that text.
The fact nevertheless remainJ that, whether United Kingdom counsel
like it or not, it is not because they are burying their heads in the
o~o sand that their relations with Libya on the matters under discussion are
not founded on the Montreal ConveJtion, since it is the only text in
force between the Parties.
Renee, to maintain, as British counsel have done, that the
United Kingdom bad never seen claim sufficiently articulated before
1
3 March to enable it to decide whelther there was a "positive opposition"
between the two States is, therefore, a wholly artificial position
1
(CR 92/3, p. 33). 1
The second argument invoked concerna Article 14(1) as basis of the
Gourt's prima facie jurisdiction
1
Allow me, if you will, to read out the text of this Article, which
1
you have as Document No. 1, again,l for it is patently of fundamental
importance: 1
"Any dispute between twol or more Gontracting States
concerning the interpretationi or application of this Convention 4lt
which cannat be settled through negotiation, shall, at the ·-
request of one of them, be su~mitt tedarbitration, If within
six months from the date of th1 request for arbitration the
Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the
arbitration, any one of thoseiparties may refer the dispute to
the International Court of Justice by request in conformity
with the Statute of the Courtl"
1
British and American counsel have pointed out that the various
i
stages laid dawn by this Article have not been exhausted. In particular,
! ~
the negotiation and the arbitratio*. For details, may I ask the Court to
refer to the Libyan notes of 8 Jan (Lib. aDorc. y o. 20) and 18 January l
1
(Lib. Doc. No. 23), one of which called for negotiations and the ether
!
for arbitration. On 21 January, tae proposa! for arbitration was
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj ,,
- 25 -
reiterated by the Libyan Permanent Representative before the Council. He
even put forward the possibility of reaching an arbitration agreement,
which was not necessary, for the Article makes provision for a unilateral
request. But this is symptomatic, and goes to show how anxious the
Libyans were to reach agreement with the Respondents.
031 These Libyan requests for negotiation or arbitration met with an
unequivocal refusa! on the part of the two Respondents. In this regard
the United States said that "the issue at hand is not sorne difference of
opinion or approach that can be mediated or negotiated." In the Council
the United Kingdom maintained that the Montreal Convention was altogether
irrelevant, even though the Permanent Representative of Libya had
recalled that at !east part of the dispute that was the subject of the
discussions in the Council bore on that Convention.
From the outset the Governments of the United Kingdom and the
United States consistently refused to apply bath the substantive and the
procedural provisions of the Montreal Convention and this refusa! is
confirmed by all that counsel for these two Governments have maintained
before the Court. Their arguments rest on a logic strangely recalling
that of Lewis Caroll inasmuch as counsel for the two Governments contend
at the same time that the States they represent have always refused to
apply the Convention and that the Libyans have made no attempt either to
negotiate or to organize an arbitration in accordance with the
Convention. The Court will discuss the proper consequences from this.
Without reverting to the holdings we have cited in support of the
view that it is not necessary to exhaust diplomatie negotiations
(CR 92/2, Trans., pp. 48-50), I wish to bring to the attention of the
Court the following additional holdings. In the South West Afcica
cases (Preliminary Objections), the Court observed that
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj ~~-~-~-~-------,----------------------------,
- 26 -
"the fact that a deadlock was 1eached in collective
negotiations in the past and ithe further fact that both the
written pleadings and oral ar 1um.ents of the Parties in the
present proceedings have cle~rly confirmed the continuance of
this deadlock, compel a concl usion that no reasonable
1
probability exists that furt~e1 negotiations would lead to a 1·
set tlement" (I. C. J.Reports 11962, p. 345) • .~
The Court expressed its rejecltion of any formalistic attitude when
it asserted in the same cases that
032 "in this respect it is not so m1ch the form of negotiation that
matters as the attitude and viiews of the Parties on the
substantive issues of the queftion involved. So long as both
sides remain adamant, and this is obvious even from the oral
presentations before the Cour~, there is no reason to think
that the dispute can be settlfd by further negotiations between
the Parties." (Ibid. , P. 346 .)
1
To borrow a view put forward by Judge Ago in his separate opinion in
the Preliminary Objections phase of the case concerning Militacy and
1
Paramilitacy A~tiv iniatd ia eg sa~ Nn is ~t aragua,
"I am in fact convinced that prior resort to diplomatie
negotiations cannot constitu ant~bsolute requirement, to be
satisfied even when the hopelessness of expecting any
1 ~
negotiations to succeed is clear from the state of relations
between the parties, and thatithere is no warrant for using it
as a ground for delaying the opening of arbitral or judicial
proceedings when provision for recourse to them exists"
(I.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 515+516).
1
1
Finally, in the Headquartecs Agreement case, the Court held that
1
"taking lnto account the United States attitude [whlch denled
the existence of a dispute and1the Application of the
Headquarters Agreement), the ~ecretary-Gener hal ln the •
circumstances exhausted such possibilities of negotiation as
were open to him" (I.C.J. Repqrts 1988, p. 33).
i
In the present case it seems çlear that, for the same reasons and
1
given the Respondents' consistent ~efusa tl deal with the matt~ ir
i
terms of the application of the 19~1 Montreal Convention, Libya bas
1 '
exhausted the possibilities it bad Jof bringing about negotiations. All
'
the more so since, as is well kno~, diplomatie relations between the
1
three States parties to the case h~1 eeen severed: auch circumstances
1
surely do not provide an ideal fr~ewor for negotiatlons.
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----- -------
.•:
- 27
I come now to the question oE the six-month time-limit, a matter
with regard to which my reaction is no doubt awaited with some impatience.
As interpreted by counsel for the United Kingdom and the
•
United States, Article 14, paragraph 1, forbids the filing of an
.. 033 application with the Court before six months have elapsed since the first
request for arbitration was made. This position is difficult to
reconcile with the attitude of the Respondents, which, as I have already
recalled, have consistently opposed a non volumus and a non possumus
to the Libyan proposais for arbitration. This categorical refusa!
deprives of any abject the temporal prerequisite that the Respondents
derive from Article 14, paragraph 1. It is obvious that a procedural
requirement, such as the one imposed by a time-limit, must be fulfilled
only if it serves some purpose. International case-law adopted this
principle long ago, for instance by holding, in a line of cases, that it
was necessary for local remedies to be exhausted only if they presented a
sufficient degree of effectiveness (cases of the Finnish Vessels,
RIAA, Vol. III, pp. 1495 et seq.; Brown, ibid., Vol. IV, p. 120;
Central Rodhope Forests, ibid., Vol. III, pp. 1420 and S.S. Lisman,
ibid., , Vol. III, p. 1790) . As pointed out suce inctly by Judge Ago, "a
remedy should not be used unless it holds out real prospects of success"
(Comm.entary on Article 22 of the draft Articles on State responsibility,
1977 Yearbook oE the International Law Commission, Vol. II, Part II,
pp. 47-48).
The United States has itself subscribed in the most explicit manner
to this way of thinking. In the case concerning United States
Diplomatie and Consular StaEE in Tehran, the United States based the
1 competence of the Court to pass judgment on their claim against Iran on
Article 1 of the Optional Protocole to the Vienna Conventions on
Diplomatie and Consular Relations. The application of the United States
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj - 28 -
had, in that case, been filed with the Court prior to the expiration of
the two-month time-limit provided for in Articles II and III of these
protocols for recourse to arbitration and. conciliation. The
034 United States did not see any impediment in this to the jurisdiction of
the Court. To borrow the arguments advanced in the Memorials filed by ..
the United States in that case
"it would be completely anomalous to allow such a party [who
has no interest whatever in arbitration or conciliation] to
insist upon a two-month waiting period and to seek dismissal of
a premature Application on the ground that the applicant should
have afforded the respondent a two-month opportunity to pursue
a goal in which the respondent in fact had no interest
whatever. Such a rule would allow every violator of
international law an automatic period of freedom from •
litigation without any justification whatever and totally
without regard to the urgency, if any, of the applicant's need
for judicial relief." (Memorial of the Government of the
United States of America, 1980, p. 38.)
There are times when I very much admire the sagacity of the
Americans.
The conclusions arrived at in the Memorial of the United States with
regard to this point continue to be rully valid: they are to the effect
that:
"to hold that in the instant circumstances an application filed
before the expiration of the two-month period is premature
would be to adopt an interpretation which rewards unlawful
coercion and penalizes respect for the procedures of peaceful
settlement" (ibid .• p. 39).
Assuming that Article 14 1 paragraph 1, of the Montreal Convention
requires that a time-limit of six months should have elapsed before the
Court is seised, it is not necessary that this requirement be fulfilled
in this case, regard being had to the hostile attitude of the Respondents
towards any proposa! for a settlement.
But, in any event, Libya is of the view that auch an interpretation
of Article 14 1 paragraph 1, is unfounded. This provision contains the
words "within six months". It does not say "after six months" or
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj ..~·
- 29
"following the expiration of a time-limit of six months". lt says
"within six months", The argument advanced by counsel for the
United States when he refera to "the requirement that •.• six months have
' passed" as a "clear prerequisite to the Court's jurisdiction" (oral
arguments of the United States, p. 47) or that "prima facie, Article 14,
paragr~ p,h of the Montreal Convention requires that a period of
035 six months elapse ,,," flies entirely in the face of the text of
Article 14, paragraph 1. It is a clear violation of the rule that the
text must be respected •
The meaning of the preposition used in this provision is clear. In
• French, "dans" [within] is used to "indique[r] un moment, une époque".
[indicate a moment, a period of time], or "pour reporter à une date
future" [to postpone to a future time], in which case it means "avant la
fin de'' [before the end of] (Le Robert - Dictionnaire de la langue
française, 2éme éd. , t. III, Paris, Le Robert, 1989, p. 149) • The_
meaning of its English equivalent, "within", is even clearer. According
to the Concise Oxford Dictiona.ry, this word means "in a time no longer
than, before expiration or since beginning of" (Concise Oxford
Dictiona.ry of Current English, 7th ed,, Oxford, Clarendon, 1982,
p. 1237). In all cases the term should be taken to mean "during", and
certain1y not "after".
The argument based on the six-month time-limit is therefore without
substance. It cannat stand in the way of the Court being validly seised
under the terms of Article 14, paragraph 1, of the Montreal Convention.
II. The substance of the rights protected
1 turn now to the rights that my esteemed colleague,
Professer Higgins, has characterized as "illusory rights" and our
American co1leagues, ever blunter, as non-existent rights.
0067c/CR5/Trans,/HS/mj - 30 -
In the Application by which it instituted proceedings, Libya invoked
the fact that the American and British threats caused prejudice to the
rights Libya derives from the Montreal Convention, namely, the three
following rights:
first, the right of every contracting State to establish its ..
jurisdiction to prosecute and pass judgment on the alleged perpetrators
of an offence, a right provided for in Articles 5, paragraphe 2 and 3,
and 7;
- secondly, the right not to extradite alleged perpetrators if its
036
national law does not so allow, a right guaranteed by Articles 7 and 8, 4lt
paragraph 2;
- thirdly, the right to obtain judicial assistance in regard to criminal
matters from the United Kingdom and the United States (Article 11 of
the Convention)
One of counsel for the United States, Mr. Schwartz (pp. 69-73 of the
Verbatim Record), endeavours to demonstrate that Libya has not
established the existence of the rights it invokes on the basis of the
Montreal Convention. His thesis turns on three arguments:
(1) that Convention, and particular1y Article 7 thereof, a11egedly does
not confer rights on Libya, but only imposes obligations on it; •
(2) the Convention accords no priority nor any exclusivity to Libya;
(3) if Libya's claim were to be accepted, the legal régime established by
all the international criminal conventions --adopted aince 1949 would
be ruined,
Let us examine each of these arguments in turn:
1. The Montreal Convention, and particularly Article 7 thereof, is only
a source of obligations
Article 7 is admittedly drafted in the imperative mood: if the
State does not extradite the a1leged offender it shall submit the case
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj ---------~---~--- ----
- 31
"without exception whatsoever" to the authorities charged with
repressing crime. This provision can therefore correctly be considered
to enunciate an obligation; but it should be noted that the obligation
'
is an alternative one, an obligation that can be summarized by the
...
famous formula aut dedere. aut judicare .
Now, the fulfilment of this alternative obligation necessarily
implies the existence of a right to opt between the two branches of the
obligation. This right is the one that every State party to the
Convention bas not to extradite a persan, particularly when, in the case
... at hand, the law of that State does not allow such action. As has
already been stated, the law of the Libyan State conforma to many ether
037 municipal laws in prohibiting not only the extradition of nationals but
also extradition in cases where no treaty allows it. As a matter of fact
the Montreal Convention does indeed admit the right of any State party to
it not to extradite a persan wanted for an offence covered by the
Convention whenever the law of that State'or treaties binding on it
prohibit auch action: this is, at times implicitly, and at times
explicitly, clear from Articles S, paragraph 2, and 8, paragraphe 1
to 3. The right that Libya invokes is therefore one derived from the
Montreal Convention and is no wise a phantom right!
I wish to add that, even if Libya could only rely on an "obligation"
this would make no difference to the question; quite the contrary: on
the one band, if a State may claim respect for a right, that is, respect
for a certain line of conduct that it is authorized to adopt,
a fortiori may that State claim respect for its will to fulfil an
r
obligation, that is, respect for a line of conduct imposed upon it,
, 2. The Montreal Convention allegedly accords no exclusivity, no priority
to Libya with respect to its right to carry out crimlnal prosecutions
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj - 32 -
Libya cannat but subscribe to this assertion and it is precise1y for
that reason that the United Kingdom and the United States, no more than
Libya, cannat c1aim any priority or exclusivity whatsoever for the
purposes of prosecution. Libya is, therefore, fu11y entit1ed to demand
,.
that its right to prosecute the suspects be respected.
3. Were one to accept Libya•s claim, the meChanism created by all the
agreements on international criminal law would be ruined
I regret, it is exact1y the contrary that is the case: the Libyan
position is that the princip1e aut dedere, aut judicare shou1d be
respected: all the instruments relied upon by the United States are
038 based on the same optional principle: aut dedere aut judicare, The
principle was, besides, proc1aimed by the General Assembly, on
9 December 1991, by its resolution 46/51. The argument is, therefore, as
unfounded as the preceding cnes,
May I, with regard to the principle aut dedere aut judicare, be
allowed to quote the views expressed in a lecture on international
terrorism given at the Hague Academy of International Law by an eminent
Member of this Court:
"!t is this option (aut dedere aut prosequi) that has
been adopted at the Hague and in the conventions conc1uded
subsequently. It was a considerable accomplishment as far as
repression was concerned and at the same time it preserved,
with regard to extradition, the power of goverrunents to •
appreciate the circumstances, while safeguarding the right of
granting asylum. To be sure, it had its limita, but they are
those of any human endeavour seeking to reconcile various, if
not contradictory, requirements." (RCADI, (1989-II I),
p. 371.)
* * *
As regards the United Kingdom, its counsel, Professer Higgins, 1
prefera to speak of "illusory" rights; but, far from 1imiting this
characterization, as her American col1eague has done, to the rights
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj - 33 -
provided for in Article 7, she adds thereto those enunciated in
Articles 5, paragraphe 2 and 3, and 8, paragraph 3. Let us examine her
line of reasoning somewhat more closely.
As Mr. Schwartz does, Professer Higgins relies, in the first place,
on the fact that Article 5(2) and Article 7 enunciate only obligations
(Verbatim Record, pp. 4 and 6). What has been said in this regard
therefore applies here too: if one may seek to protect a right, that is
a line of conduct that is authorized, one may, a fortiori, claim the
protection of an obligation, that is, a line of conduct that is imposed.
~ Furthermore, we have seen that the whole of the system created by
Articles S, paragraphe 2 and 3, 7 and 8 rests on the existence of a basic
right, namely, the right to extradite or prosecute. This right is,
accordingly, not a mirage; it is, on the contrary, so bright that it
seems to blind the most learned beholders.
039 But Mrs. Higgins advances another argument in connection with
Article 5 1 paragraph 2: the obligation it enunciates, that is, the
obligation for the State to establish its jurisdiction - is merely to
adopt legislation vesting its courts and tribunals with universal
jurisdiction. Application of the article, by enacting legislation,
would, as it were, entai! its disappearance.
To consider that a legal provision is dissipated by its fulfilment
is a curious manner of interpreting it. In reality, ·we do not have here
a magical provision that disappears when one tries to grasp it. The
effect that this article should be considered to produce is not only that
of permitting the State to establish its jurisdiction on a. case-by-case
r basis, but primarily that of exercising it in all cases. Now the
coercive .measures with which the United Kingdom and the United States are
•
threatening Libya aim precisely at preventing it from exercising the
right provided for in that article.
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj - 34 -
As for Article 5, paragraph 3, which provides that the Convention
"does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with
national law", Professer Higgins considera it to be no more than a
"saving provision" intended to prevent the Convention from endangering
the existing criminal jurisdiction of the contracting State; as an
example she gives Article 6 of the Libyan penal code, which lays down the
active personality basis of jurisdiction,
Now, in this case also, the measures that the United Kingdom and the
United States intend to take against Libya aim to secure the surrender of
the two suspects and therefore to prevent Libya from exercising a
competence that, nevertheless, is granted to. it by Article 5,
paragraph 3. Consequently, what we have here is, indeed, a substantive
right provided for in the Convention and not an optical illusion that
Libya wishes to protect by requesting the Court to indicate provisional
measures.
As for the rights protected by Article 11, Professer Higgins
maintains that:
1. this Article is no more than an "ancillary" provision;
2. it applies only when it has been accepted that trials should take
place in a particular State;
•
3. the United Kingdom may not be required to provide Libya with
evidence, inasmuch as that would prejudice criminal proceedings in the
United Kingdom,
Let us look at each one of these arguments.
1. The argument that Article 11(1) is an ancillary provision
reflects a simple-minded conception of the problems raised by
international judicial assistance in criminal matters. In reality, this •
provision is of fundamental importance since it assures the delicate
balance that must exist between extradition and local prosecution. If
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj 35 -
auch prosecution is to be at a11 effective, it is absolute1y necessary
that the prosecuting State should obtain all that is necessary, for
effective prosecution. This is the aim of this a.rticle, which speaks of
"the greatest possible measure of assistance" (emphasis added).
At any rate, even if Article 11, paragraph 1, was no more than an
ancillary provision - which is not reflected either in the travaux
préparatoires of the Montreal Convention (Verbatim Records,
pp. 65-66,. 169), which, in this regard, take over the text of Article 10
of the Hague Convention, nor the travaux préparatoires of the latter
(Verbatim Records, pp. 95-98, 192) - this allegedly ancillary nature of
041 the provision would not imp1y that it is not a rule of law. As such, it
confera rights and it imposes reciproca1 obligations on its addressees
and the latter are, therefore, entitled to demand that it be respec.ted.
2. The Montreal Convention by no means subordinates the jurisdiction
of the local State to the acceptance of that jurisdiction by the ether
States concerned. As our American colleague, Mr. Schwartz, correctly
pointed out in this respect, the Convention institutes neither priority
nor exclusivity of jurisdiction. Libya is entitled to prosecute the
suspects just as much as the United Kingdom and the United States,
3. Fina1ly, whatever the reasons may be for which the United Kingdom
and the United States refuse to supply uncertified copies of the evidence
that is part of the records of the cases, the fact remains that Libya is
entitled by the terms of Article 11 to t·ake -eognizance--of these
documents: to that extent, therefore, Libya certainly has a "substantive
right" that should be protected.
Libya's rights are, accordingly, not illusory ones: they are clear
to any first year law student from a cursory and reasonable reading of
Articles 5, paragraphe 2 and 3, 7 1 8, paragraph 2 and 11 of the Montreal
Convention.
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj - 36 -
I apologize to my colleagues; but the conjurer's art is a difficult
one and cannot be learned in one day.
l
~
* * * ...
Il
A final ward by way of conclusion.
The Respondents have not infrequently made merry over the alleged
haphazardness of Libya's proposais. It is true that Libya has
objectively put forward proposais; but if they are untidy, they reveal,
to any persan of good faith, an uncommonly vivid imagination on the part
of Libya.
What the Respondents do not seem to understand is that one can
042
hardly expect a hunted rabbit to keep his cool. Libya is coming up with
all the proposais it can so as to be co-operative and at the same time
safeguard the legal principle it considers fundamental, while seeking to
lawfully evade the threats that an alleged lack of co-operativeness is
visiting upon her. Reference was made yesterday to the anguish felt by
air travellers; one should not forget the anguish that for the past four
months al! Libyans have been feeling at bedtime and that, if one is to
give credence to the news CNNbroadcast yesterday, is not going to be
•
allayed, since seme of the warships that are new in the Gulf could be
transferred to the Mediterranean as a result of the Libyan problem.
Mr. President, Members of the-Court, I· have -come to the end of -the
observations 1 proposed to make on behalf of the Libyan Government. 1
once again thank the Court for having beard me and request it, with the
authorization of the President, kindly to give the floor new to
Professer Suy. ...
The Court adjourned from 10.35 to 10.45 p.m.
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj - 37 -
Le VICE-PRESIDENTfaisant fonction de PRESIDENT Veuillez prendre
place. Je donne la parole à M. Eric Suy.
Mr. SUY: Mr. President, Members of the Court. After the brilliant
firework display that we have first witnessed, may I invite you to hear
me in a sort of anti-climax at the conclusion of Libya•s statement, which
will end with a few words and conclusions from the Agent.
D43 1 should like to make a few brief further remarks on two matters.
The first concerna the interpretation of Security Council
resolution 731 (1992). The second deals with the que.stion of the
relations between the Security Council and the Court.
1. The interpretation of resolution 731 (1992)
The two Respondents submit that the Security Council adopted
resolution 371 on 21 January this year because Libya bad not taken action
on the demanda of the United States, the United Kingdom and France
contained in documents that are now well known. In this resolution the
Security Council "strongly deplores the fact that the Libyan Government
has not yet responded effectively to the requests" and "urges the·
Libyan Government immediately to provide a full and effective response to
tho se reques ts so as to contri bute to the elimina t i.on of international
terrorism". These demanda, as we know, essentially amount to the
surrender of the accused to the United States and British courts.
According to counsel for the Unit·ed Ktngi!om, ·-this resolution must be
placed within the context of Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Charter
which provides that:
"The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of
the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like
nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of
adjustment."
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj - 38 -
And counsel for the United Kingdom states (on p. 71 of CR 92/3):
"This is exactly what the Security Council has done in resolution 731",
and "resolution 731 is .•. the vehicle for resolving pea.cefully that
problem".
This entirely confirma our view that resolution 731 is a
044
recomm.endation. And the demand to surrender is .therefore not mandatory.
But we can no longer follow counsel for the United Kingdom when she
says that the surrender of the accused constitutes "an appropriate
procedure of adjustment" within the meaning of Article 36, paragraph 1.
The Security Council cannat, under this Article and this paragraph 1,
recommend the terms of a settlement, Moreover, the procedure recommended
cannot consist of an action or of conduct whose legality is the subject
of a dispute between the Parties there I would refer you to the
commentary on Article 36 .in the outstanding work by B. Simma, Charta der
Vereinten Nationen, p. 509, Nos, 19 and 22.
Professer Higgins also said that, in the draft resolution under
consideration by the Members of the Security Council, she found no trace
of a description of the Libyan refusa! to surrender the accused as ••a
threat to peace and international security", However, paragraph G of the
preamble of the draft of 17 March 1992 r.eads as follows:
•
"G. Determines in this context that the failure by the
Libyan Government to demonstrate, by concrete actions, its
renunciation of terrorism, and in particular its continued
failure to respond fully and effectively to the requests in
resolution 731 (1992), constitute a threat to international
peace and security."
The non-surrender of the accused is based on the choice left to
Libya by international law and in particular by the Montreal Convention
of 1971. By what right can that choice be considered as a violation of .....
international law or of a "recommendation" of the Security Council? But
the Respondents, for their own purposes, suddenly seem to consider
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj - 39 -
resolution 731 as a decision of the Security Council. Even
045 Mrs. Higgins falls into this trap when on page 73 of CR 92/3 she claims
that "Only the Security Council can decide what further measures may be
necessary to give effect to its decisions." And the Agent for the
United States has confirmed that the Security Council is preparing
sanctions under Chapter VII so as to force Libya to comply with its
previous resolution (p. 89 of thi text given us).
Thus the exercise by Libya of its right to exercise its criminal
jurisdiction will therefore be described as a threat to international
peace and security for the sole purpose of being able to impose sanctions.
We are told that the case before this Court bears upon the
applicability of the Montreal Convention but that the case before the
Security Council is totally different, much wider, namely it is the
struggle against international terrorism. But the strugg1e amounts, in
this case, to the demand for the extradition of two persona accused of
acta of sabotage against civil aviation which are covered by the Montreal
Convention.
In making this distinction between the case before the Court and the
situation in the Security Council, the Respondents ful1y realize that
legal1y their position is indefensib1e. How, otherwise, can their
desperate efforts to deny applicability of the Montreal Convention be
explained? When 1 referred to the ten great multilateral Conven.tions for
combating international terrorism concluded -since 1963 thanks to Western
and particularly American initiatives, counsel for the United States
minimized their value by saying that that reference to the important
General Assembly resolution 41/55 was a rather vague description of a
code of international law for the elimination of terrorism.
~·
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj - 40 -
046 2. The relations between the Security Council and the Court
With respect to the relations between the Security Council and the
Court, I should like ta say first of all that the dialogue by the deaf
that has started here, the argument that we are dealing with, and asking
the Court to pronounce on, the applicability of the Montreal Convention,
and that this has nothing ta do with the struggle against international
terrorism, this dialogue of the deaf also explains the difference of
views on the respective roles of the Council and the Court. I repeat,
the argument of the Respondents is quite simplistic: the Court, seised
by Libya, deals with the question of the applicability of the Montreal
Convention, whereas the Security Council deals with the situation
concerning international terrorism. Consequently the provisional
measures requested of the Court should not interfere with the activity of
the Council.
Throughout the speeches of the three counsel for Libya we believe
that we have given proof of the misleading nature of this position.
Indeed, counsel for the United Kingdom admits this, when on page 75 of
CR 92/3 she says that the Security Council was also dealing with
"issues as to what Libya is required to do under general
international law bath in respect of the events surrounding the Lockerbie
•
massacre and the prevention of terrorism in the future", in ether words,
that Libya should surrender the accused. May I point out in parentheses,
that the obligation under general international law is none ether than
"dedere aut judicare".
Counsel for the United States has quoted several speeches made
during the discussion in the Security Council on 21 January this year as
evidence that the subject dealt with by the Security Council was the .....
struggle against international terrorism and not the applicability of the
D47 Montreal Convention. May I, Mr. President, quete severa! speeches that
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj - 41 -
clearly show that the Montreal Convention and respect for the principle
aut dedere aut judicare were indeed present in the minds of the
delegations.
...
... 1. For instance in his speech (pp. 58-60) the representative of
,.
Morocco said:
"My country feels that we are touching on a principle of
international law that is well established in both unwritten
law and in various instruments, as well as in severa!
recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly. That
is the principle of 'extradite or prosecute'.
In this instance, Morocco cannet share the view that
adoption of the draft resolution [which became resolution 731]
before us today enshrines any exception to that uncontested
principle of international law."
2. The representative of Zimbabwe said:
"In our view, the draft resolution on which we are about
to take action seeks to achieve two main objectives. First, it
seeks to send a clear message that the Gouncil is determined to
firmly with terrorism. Secondly, it seeks to ensure that the
accused are brought to trial. I t is Zimbabwe•s vi ew th at this
has to be achieved on the basis of the established legal norms
and the existing international legal instruments applicable ta
acts of terrorism.
My Government believes that in this regard the Security
Council should be guided by the 1971 Montreal Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation. That Convention, like its sister Convention on the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft - the Hague
Convention - designed to combat hijacking, which is another act
of terrorism, seeks to implement the traditional precept of
aut dedere, aut punire, generally translated as 'extradite or
punish'. My Government understands the sensitivity that has
always characterized the issue of extradition. The extradition
of one's own nationals is impermissible in the laws of many
States. l'hat is why the existing internati.onal legal
instruments make it clear that, if the State holding the
alleged offender does not extradite, it shall be obliged,
without any exception whatsoever, to submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purposes of prosecution."
3. I shall continue, if you permit, with a quotation from the
representative of Ecuador:
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj - 42 -
"Bowever, my delegation worked with the ether non-aligned
countries to ensure that the draft resolution would not be
048 misinterpreted or be a negative precedent, which would run
counter to the regular powers of United Nations bodies or which
could be used as an example for possible action or intervention
at a later date. Ecuador also expressed its belief that in
this case as in any other it is essential to act in such a way
that there can be no misinterpretation or prejudging of special
situations, and to ensure that actions shall be subject to the
clear legal principles with the competence of States, in
particular with regard to extradition. In addition, the
delegation of Ecuador agreed with the ether non-aligned
countries about the need to establish a reliable, step-by-step
process to deal with the claims made by the United States,
France and the United Kingdom against Libya and to preserve the
right of the Libyan Government to clarify its·position and
fulfil its obligations.
Lastly, the delegation of Ecuador trusts that the draft
resolution will be taken in context and used only for its
unique purposes, to deal with those involved in acts of
terrorism and the meeting out of punishment, if that is decided
upon."
4. The representative of Cape Verde said:
"Our positive vote will also reflect our strong view that
the authors of any auch crimes should be brought to justice and
punished according to the law.
Our vote, however, cannet and must not be interpreted or
construed in any way as favouring the setting of .any precedent
that could change the well-established rules and international
practice on extradition."
5. The representative of China said:
"China believes that prudent and appropriate, rather than
high-pressure approaches, should be adopted to bridge such
differences. •
During previous rounds of consultations and discussions,
we noticed that the non-aligned members of the Council
expressed their concern over the fact that the Security Council
might base its decision solely upon the unilateral
investigations of certain countries and, in particular, that
the issues of jurisdiction and extradition were involved."
And he ended his statement by saying:
"!ri.conclusion, I should like to emphasize that the
adoption of this resolution should not lead to any drastic
action or to exacerbating tensions."
"1\
6. Lastly, a final quotation from the statement of the
representative of India, from which the Agent of the United States also
read an extract. The representative of India told the Security Council:
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj - 43 -
"careful note should be taken of the legal implications
inherent in an issue of this kind as it is considered in the
Council. We are dealing here with a case where three States,
on the basis of evidence gathered by them, wish to enlist the
membership of the Security Council in taking action. Such an
approach immediately brings up the provisions of the United
ii • Nations Charter and of international law. It is my
·~ delegation's conviction that action by the Council should be
within the ambit of and through the means provided by
f
international law, That is why my delegation believes that
today's decision of the Council cannet be considered precedent
set ting.
1 would furthermore stress the importance of recognizing
and respecting national sovereignty. The concept has been
widely perceived to have ·come under seme strain recently and
deserves reiteration. This is all the more important where
delicate and complex international issues with implications for
national sovereignty, such as the one we are considering today
in the Council, are concerned. ''
But the efforts of the Respondents to deny that, in this case, there
might be sorne relation between the Council and the Court are becoming
bogged dawn in arguments which either run counter to the Court's
jurisprudence or are purely speculative.
In her presentation of Thursday afternoon, my friend, Mrs. Higgins,
said that this parallelism and parallel competence between Court and
Council stops as saon as the Security Council considera the dispute or
the situation by virtue of Chapter VII of the Charter. My friend says
that all the "assessments" that the Council might make concerning the
existence of a threat to peace, concerning the necessity for economie or
diplomatie measures ta ensure that its decisions are respected or
concerning the inadequate nature of these measures are appreciations that
only the Council can make,
She draws three conclusions from this:
1. "These matters of political appreciation are for the Security
050
Council alone";
2, "Only the Security Council can decide what further measures may
be necessary to give effect to its decisions";
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj - 44 -
3. "It would be completely inappropriate for the Court to indicate
interim measures in any form that could be construed as striking at the
Security Council in the exercise of its competences under Chapter VI and
VII of the Charter".
We are not asking the Court to exercise its competence in order to
function as a court of appeal against unfavourable decisions of the
Council, for in this case there has been no decision. We are not asking
the Court to function as a Court of appeal against political conclusions
of the Council. We are asking the Court to pass judgment on certain
legal aspects of a situation which, in our view, is also being considered
by the Council. This is entirely consonent with the Court's position as
the principal judicial organ of the United Nations
(I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 436, para. 98).
If one were to accept the argument that the Court could never
indicate provisional measures which might be interpreted as striking
against the Security Council in the exercise of its competences under
Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, one might just as well say that the
Security Council has carte blanche and that the whole jurisprudence of
the Court on its judicial function could be sent to the Peace Palace
archives.
•
To say that provisional measures would have the effect of preventing
the Respondents from exercising their functions as members of the
Security Council, from taking initiatives or even speaking in the Council
is almost grotesque. Even supposing that the Court requests the
Respondents, or even the Applicant, to refrain from any action that might
051 exacerbate their relations, how would that prevent the Parties from
seeking, beth within the Security Council and outside it, to work for the
maintenance of international peace and security?
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj ----------- - -----
- 45 -
Libya is very well aware of the acute problem of the possiblity of
the activities of the Security Council interferring with the judicial
function of the Court. I do not believe that one should try to construct
any academie theories. Let us, rather, see how this problem arises in
the present case.
In resolution 731, the Security Council asked Libya to accede to the
demanda made, notably by the Respondents. Libya, while wishing to
co-operate - and my colleague Mr. Salmon has given you all the evidence
of this co-operation - considera that, for reasons founded in
international law, it cannot extradite its own nationale but wlshes to
try them itself. Under general internatlonal law and, ln particular, the
Montreal Convention, it ls allowed to take this stand.
The Respondents are now reacting by saylng that, since Llbya does
not wish to surrender the suspects willlngly, we shall institute
proceedings before the Security Council in order to force it to abandon
part of its sovereign rlghts.
The reaction of Libya is natural: it is requesting the Court to
pronounce on the validity of its position with respect to the
applicablllty of the Montreal Convention. At the same time, and to deal
with the immediate threat of the Respondents to force its hand, it is
asking the Court to indicate provisional measures so as to preclude those
ü52
Parties from implementing their threats to force Libya by the use of
sanctions to be decreed by the Security Council.
. The Respondents consider - as they said yesterday - that this
recourse by Libya to the Court is scandalous, perverse and outrageous.
Their efforts to convince the Court not to grant these measures are
designed to allow them to continue and achieve their intentions - I
should say: their pressing actions - to make Libya yleld.
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj - 46 -
Given a request for provisional measures, the Court, in my view,
must start from the presumption that the arder that it might make on the
substance - that is on the applicability of the Montreal Convention -
might be favourable to the Applicant. In the light of this possibility,
the Court should then ask itself what would be the position of the
Applicant at the time of the Order, in the absence of provisional
measures, The Court knows the answer to this question: Libya, by virtue
of the actions of the Respondents, which will perhaps have led to
sanctions, will be deprived of its sovereign right, recognized in
international law, to exerc.ise its criminal jurisdiction. The
aut dedere aut judicare principle will have been the subject of the
most flagrant violation in the history of international law.
These are the facts and the issue at stake in this case, with due
respect to all those who are trying to put the Court on guard against
intervening in any way in this new discovery of the "reservèd domain" or
let us rather say the "game preserve" of the Security Council.
Ihank you for your patience, Mr. President, Members of the Court,
and I ask you to give the floor to the Agent for Libya.
f\53 The ACTINGPRESIDENT; Thank you very much Mr, Suy. I give the
floor now to Mr. Al Faitouri, the distinguished Agent of the Libyan Arab •
J amahi ry a.
Submissions
Mr. AL FAITOURI: Mr. President, Members of the Court.
We have thus concluded our last statement and in accordance with
Article 60, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court,
Libya hereby confirms that it is requesting the Court to indicate
the following provisional measures:
(a) to enjoin the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively,
0067c/CR5/Trans./HS/mj - 47 -
from taking against Libya measures calculated to exert coercion on
it or compel it to surrender the accused individuels to any
jurisdiction outside of Libya; and
(b) to ensure that no steps are taken that could prejudice in any way -
the rights of Libya with respect to the proceedings instituted by
•
Libya's Applications.
Mr. President, I seize this occasion to thank you, as well as the
Members of the Court, for the patience and the attention with which you
have heard our statements. I also wish to thank the Registry for its
invaluable assistance during the proceedings. It is also my duty to
thank the distinguished counsel for the great efforts they have made to
put my country's case.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, we now leave this renowned hall
in the confidence that the Court will arrive at a just and equitable
decision. Thank you Mr. President, thank you Members of the Court.
054 Le VICE-PRESIDENTfaisant fonction de PRESIDENT: Merci beaucoup,
M. Al-Faitouri. La Jamahiriya arabe libyenne en a ainsi terminé avec sa
réplique lors du deuxième tour de plaidoiries orales et avec ses
conclusions dans les deux affaires, la première introduite par la Libye
contre le Royaume-Uni et l'autre par la Libye contre les Etats-Unis. La
Cour entendra cet après-midi la duplique du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis
respectivement. L'audience reprendra à 15 heures.
L'audience est levée à 11 h 30.
0067c/CRS/Trans./HS/mj'
Traduction