Corrigé
Corrected
CR 2013/5
Cour internationale International Court
de Justice of Justice
LA HAYE THE HAGUE
ANNÉE 2013
Audience publique
tenue le jeudi 18 avril 2013, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Tomka, président,
en l’affairerelative à la Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962
en l’affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande)
(Cambodge c. Thaïlande)
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
YEAR 2013
Public sitting
held on Thursday 18 April 2013, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Tomka presiding,
in the case concerning the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962
in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodiav. Thailand)
(Cambodia v. Thailand)
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________ - 2 -
Présents : M. Tomka, président
M. Sepúlveda-Amor, vice-président
MM. Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Mmes Xue
Donoghue
M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
M. Bhandari, juges
MM. Guillaume
Cot, juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur, greffier
- 3 -
Present: President Tomka
Vice-President Sepúlveda-Amor
Judges Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Judges ad hoc Guillaume
Cot
Registrar Couvreur
- 4 -
Le Gouvernement du Royaume du Cambodge est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Hor Namhong, vice -premier ministre et ministre des affaires étrangères et de la
coopération internationale,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Var Kimhong, ministre d’Etat,
comme agent adjoint ;
S. Exc. M. Long Visalo, secrétaire d’Etat au ministère des affaires étrangères et de la coopération
internationale,
M. Raoul Marc Jennar, expert,
S. Exc. M. Hem Saem, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire du Royaume du Cambodge
auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Sarun Rithea, conseiller du ministre des affaires étrangères et de la coopération internationale,
M. Hoy Pichravuth, assistant du vice-premier ministre,
comme conseillers ;
M. Jean-Marc Sorel, professeur de droit international à l’Université Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne),
sir Franklin Berman , K.C.M.G., Q.C., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, membre de la Cour
permanente d’arbitrage, profes seur invité de droit international à l’Université d’Oxford et à
l’Université de Cape Town,
M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Guillaume Le Floch, professeur à l’Université de Rennes I,
Mme Amal Alamuddin, membre des barreaux d’Angleterreet de New York,
Mme Naomi Briercliffe, solicitor (Angleterre et Pays de Galles), cabinet Eversheds LLP, Paris,
comme conseils. - 5 -
The Government of the Kingdom of Cambodiais represented by:
H.E. Mr. Hor Namhong, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and International
Co-operation,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Var Kimhong, Minister of State,
as Deputy Agent;
H.E. Mr. Long Visalo, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Co-operation,
Mr. Raoul Marc Jennar, Expert,
H.E. Mr. Hem Saem, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Cambodia
to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Sarun Rithea, Adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation,
Mr. Hoy Pichravuth, Assistant to the Deputy Prime Minister,
as Advisers;
Mr. Jean-Marc Sorel, Professor of International Law at the University of Paris I
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
Sir Franklin Berman, K.C.M.G., Q.C., member of the English Bar, Member of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration, Visiting Professor of International Law at Oxford University and the University
of Cape Town,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la c our d’appel de Paris , member of the N ew York Bar ,
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Guillaume Le Floch, Professor at the University of Rennes I,
Ms Amal Alamuddin, member of the English and the New York Bars,
Ms Naomi Briercliffe, solicitor (England and Wales), Eversheds LLP, Paris,
as Counsel. - 6 -
Le Gouvernement du Royaume de Thaïlande est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Virachai Plasai, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire du Royaume de
Thaïlande auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agent ;
M. Voradet Viravakin, directeur général du département des traités et des affaires juridiques du
ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme agent adjoint ;
S. Exc. M. Surapong Tovichakchaikul, vice-premier ministre et ministre des affaires étrangères,
S. Exc. M. Phongthep Thepkanjana, vice-premier ministre et ministre de l’éducation,
S. Exc. M. Sukumpol Suwanatat, A.C.M., ministre de la défense,
M. Thana Duangratana, vice-ministre rattaché au cabinet du premier ministre,
M. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, secrétaire permanent du ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Nuttavudh Photisaro, secrétaire permanent adjoint du ministère des affaires étrangères,
Le général Nipat Thonglek, secrétaire permanent adjoint du ministère de la défense,
Le général Nopphadon Chotsiri, directeur général du service géographique royal thaïlandais,
quartier général des forces armées du Royaume de Thaïlande,
M. Chukiert Ratanachaichan, secrétaire général adjoint du bureau du conseil d’Etat, cabinet du
premier ministre,
M. Jumpon Phansumrit, procureur expert au bureau des politiques et stratégies, bureau de
l’Attorney General,
M. Darm Boontham, directeur de la division des frontières du département des traités et des
affaires juridiques du ministère des affaires étrangères ;
*
M. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., prof esseur de droit à l’Université de Cambridge, titulaire de la
chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat,
M. Donald McRae, professeur à l’Université d’Ottawa, titulaire de la chaire Hyman Soloway,
membre de la Commission du droit international, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international, membre du barreau de l’Ontario, - 7 -
The Government of the Kingdom of Thailand is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Virachai Plasai, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of
Thailand to Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Agent;
Mr. Voradet Viravakin, Director-General, Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
as Deputy Agent;
H.E. Mr. Surapong Tovichakchaikul, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,
H.E. Mr. Phongthep Thepkanjana, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education,
H.E. A.C.M. Sukumpol Suwanatat, Minister of Defence,
Mr. Thana Duangratana, Vice-Minister attached to the Office of the Prime Minister,
Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Nuttavudh Photisaro, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Nipat Thonglek, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence,
Lieutenant General Nopphadon Chotsiri, Director -General, Royal Thai Survey Department, Royal
Thai Armed Forces Headquarters,
Mr. Chukiert Ratanachaichan, Deputy-Secretary-General, Office of the Council of State, Office of
the Prime Minister,
Mr. Jumpon Phansumrit, Expert Public Prosecutor, Office of Policy and Strategy, Office of the
Attorney General,
Mr. Darm Boontham, Director, Boundary Division, Department of Treaties and Legal Affai rs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
*
Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister,
Mr. Donald McRae, Hyman Soloway Professor, University of Ottawa, Member of the International
Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de droit international, member of the Ontario
Bar, - 8 -
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, président de la Société
française pour le droit international, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Thomas Grant, membre du barreau de New York, maître de recherche au Lauterpacht Centre
for International Law de l’Université de Cambridge,
Mme Alina Miron, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
comme conseils ;
M. Alastair Macdonald, M.B.E., membre honoraire de l’unité de recherche sur les frontières
internationales du département de géographie de l’Université de Durham,
M. Martin Pratt, directeur de recherche à l’unité de recherche sur les frontières internationales du
département de géographie de l’Université de Durham,
comme conseillers experts ;
M. Ludovic Legrand, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
comme conseil adjoint. - 9 -
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest , Nanterre-La Défense, President of the
Société française pour le droit international, associate member of the Institut de droit
international,
Dr. Thomas Grant, member of the New York Bar, Senior Res earch Associate, Lauterpacht Cent re
for International Law, University of Cambridge,
Ms Alina Miron, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University Paris
Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
as Counsel;
Mr. Alastair Macdonald, M .B.E., Honorary Fellow, International Boundaries Research Unit,
Department of Geography, Durham University,
Mr. Martin Pratt, Director of Research, International Boundaries Research Unit, Department of
Geography, Durham University,
as Expert Advisers;
Mr. Ludovic Legrand, Researcher, Centre de d roit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Assistant Counsel. - 10 -
Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. L’audience est ouverte. La Cour se réunit
aujourd’hui pour entendre le second tour de plaidoiries du Royaume du Cambodge. Je donne à
présent la parole à M. Rodman Bundy pour ouvrir ce tour de plaidoiries. Vous avez la parole,
Monsieur.
Mr. BUNDY: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE P ARTIES OVER THE INTERPRETATION OF THE JUDGMENT
AND T HAILAND ’S ARGUMENTS ABOUT MAPS
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in leading off Cambodia’s second round
presentation, I will address two issues that continue to divide the Parties.
2. The first concerns Thailand’s assertion that there is no disput e between the Parties over
the Judgment’s interpretation because, for 40 years, Cambodia recognized and accepted Thailand’s
interpretation based on the red line appearing on the 1962 Thai Council o f Ministers’ map and the
barbed-wire fence. This was a line of argument that was advanced by Professor Pellet yesterday
1
morning . I shall show that it is unfounded.
3. The second issue I will address concerns the arguments presented by Ms Miron about
maps specifically counsel’s contention that the maps presented in the original case support the
position that the vicinity of the Temple should be limited to a very narrow strip of land flanking the
Temple. I will explain why that contention is misconceived as well.
4. With that introduction, Mr. President, let me turn directly to the question of the existence
of a disputeover the interpretation of the Judgment.
1. The existence of a dispute
5. In my presentation on Monday, I took the Court through a large quantity of evidence
showing that, following the Cour t’s Judgment, Cambodia repeatedly took issue with Thailand’s
interpretation of the Judgment and its construction of a barbed-wire fence hemming in the Temple
along the red line adopted by the Thai Council of Ministers. Cambodia , in those protests, viewed
1CR 2013/3, pp. 51-52, paras. 3-4 (Pellet). - 11 -
Thailand’s line as fundamentally incompatible with what the Court had decided in 1962 with
respect to the frontier delimited by the Annex I map.
6. Yesterday, Professor Pellet tried to nibble away at the weight of the evidence by selecting
isolated incidents, taken out of context, in order to support the assertion that Cambodia has always
agreed always agreed with Thailand’s interpretation of the Judgment. That line of attack
cannot be squared with the factual record.
[Place Council of Ministers’ map on the screen]
7. I start at the beginning. The origin of the dispute lay in the Council of Ministers’ decision
in July 1962 to limit the vicinity of the Temple along the red line, which was the second of two
proposals that Thailand’s experts put forward. Professor Pellet had no desire to speak about the
first proposal the yellow line. That is a matter that my colleague, Sir Franklin , will come back
to later.
8. Instead, Professor Pellet made two points about the red line. First, he said that in no way
was there a question of the line marking the frontier between the two countries . Second, he drew
attention to what he felt was the “quasi -coincidence” between Thailand’s red line and the
3
watershed line said to have been pleaded by Cambodia in the original proceedings .
9. As for Professor Pellet’s first point that the red line was not a boundary it is
contradicted by what Thailand itself said later.
[Enlargement of map L7017]
10. The map on the screen is an enlargement of Thailand’s secret map L7017 and it was
labelled “secret” on the map provided to Cambodia in 2007. You have seen it before. It was in
tab 13 of our original folders. In the Temple area, as you can see, it shows a line that follows the
Council of Ministers’ red line. Now , what did Thailand say about th is line? Was it a boundary or
was it merely an estimate of the Temple’s vicini ty? The answer lies in an aide- memoire prepared
by the Thai Foreign Ministry dated 17 May 2007 which addressed Cambodia’s Unesco application
regarding the inscription of the Temple. The relevant passage from that aide -memoire reads as
follows, and you can see it on the screen. This is the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs speaking:
2CR 2013/3, p. 53, para. 9 (Pellet).
3CR 2013/3, p. 54, para. 11 (Pellet). - 12 -
[Place quote on the screen]
“In this regard, the Royal Thai Gove rnment firmly states that the
above-mentioned Cambodian documents cannot in any way prejudice the existing
international boundary between Thailand and Cambodia as appeared in the map of
scale 1:50,000 series L7017 (Annex VI).” (Emphasis added.)
11. So, contrary to counsel’s contention, it is clear that Thailand does in fact view its red line
as an international boundary. But it is a boundary which cannot possibly be reconciled with the
Court’s Judgment, given that the Court found that it was the Annex I m ap line that had been
accepted by Thailand as the frontier line . 5
[Tab 4.4 (1) of Thailand’s folder]
12. As for Professor Pellet’s second point that Thailand’s 1962 line largely coincides with
the watershed line pleaded by Cambodia in the original ca se this too is misleading. It is
perfectly clear that Cambodia’s position in the original pr oceedings was that the Annex I m ap line
constituted the boundary between the Parties in the region of the Temple. The Court said as much
at page 21 of its Judgm ent. The “watershed line” that Professor Pellet was referring to was not
Cambodia’s claim. It was simply a demonstration by Cambodia’s experts at the time to rebut, on a
technical level, the course of the watershed that had been advanced by Thailand’s experts. As I
pointed out on Monday, neither watershed line was considered by the Court because they were not
relevant in the light of the Court’s pronouncements about the status of the Annex I map line.
13. Thailand now wants the Court to believe that Ca mbodia agreed with Thailand’s
interpretation the red line interpretation because it lay close to Cambodia’s own watershed
line. Indeed, yesterday Thailand’s Agent said that the only line that Cambodia pleaded in the
6
original case was the watershed lin e appearing in Anne x LXVI of its Reply in the original case .
With respect, that is incorrect . Cambodia, as I said, in the original case, pleaded the Annex I m ap
line and the Court recognized that at page 21 of its Judgment . When Cambodia repeatedly
protested Thailand’s red line and its barbed- wire fence throughout the 1960s, this was because the
4
Further Written Explanations of Cambodia (FWEC), Ann. 27, p. 113.
5I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 32.
6
CR 2013/3, p. 16, para. 19 (Plasai). - 13 -
red line bore no relation to the frontier line between the P arties depicted on the Annex I m ap, not
because it was inconsistent with any watershed line.
14. Professor Pellet then referred to a speech that Cambodia’s Foreign Minister made on
27 September 1962 before the United Nations General Assembly. Counsel argued that the Foreign
7
Minister acknowledged that Thailand had complied with the Judgment . But my good friend only
cited part of the relevant passage from the speech. What counsel neglected to mention is that, right
after the part that he quoted, Cambodia’s Foreign Minister went on to say the following. Thailand
“could have done so [ could have complied with the Judgment] in such a way that
friendly relations would have been re -established between our two nations, which
Cambodia, for its part, greatly desired. Unfortunately, the deception practised by
Thailand was demonstrated by its occupation, for se veral days, of a strip of our
territory in the neighbourhood of the temple.” 8
15. The occupation, and r egrettably, that occupation did not just last for a few days. It
persisted throughout the 1960s and it was backed up by the barbed -wire fence and Thai armed
forces. That is what led Cambodia repeatedly to protest the fence and Thailand’s failure to
withdraw to the frontier line depicted on the Annex I map.
16. Now m y opponent next took aim at Prince Sihanouk’s visit to the Temple in
January 1963. Counsel referred to a United States Embassy dispatch which recorded that, when the
Prince referred to the barbed- wire fence, he only described it as encroaching on Cambodian
territory by “several metres”, and that he would not make an issue of the matter as “t hese few
meters were unimportant” 9.
17. What counsel failed to take into account was the context in which the Prince’s visit took
place. Four months earlier, in August 1962, Prince Sihanouk was already on record as complaining
10
vigorously about the barbed wire fence . In November 1962, Mr. Gussing, whom the Court might
recall was the Secretary-General’s representative to mediate between the two Parties , he expressed
concern that the Prince’s visit to the Temple might spark a border incident. Mr. Gussing , in his
report, indicated that his mission , however, had been given to understand by the Thai authorities
7
CR 2013/3, p. 55, para. 12 (Pellet).
8Written Observations of Thailand (WOTh), Ann. 28, folio p. 145.
9CR 2013/3, p. 55, para. 13 (Pellet); WOTh, Ann. 51.
10
WOTh, Ann. 26, p. 130. - 14 -
that their soldiers, the Thai soldiers, would not interfere with the visit as long as the Prince and his
entourage remained strictly within what Thailand considered to be Cambodian territory marked out
by the barbed-wire fence . Of course, any notion that Cambodia’s territory was limited under the
1962 Judgment to the barbed-wire fence is spurious. Nonetheless, the clear implication was that
there would be trouble if the Prince tried to pass beyond it.
18. Now the official retaking of the Temple by Prince Sihanouk in January 1963 was a
momentous occasion in Cambodia. The Temple had been illegally occupied by Thai armed forces
since 1954. And t here was no desire to provoke an incident on such an important day, and the
international community breathed a sigh of relief when the visit went off without incident. That is
why the Prince was restrained about the barbed-wire fence while he was at the site.
19. That being said, I should point out that there is another account , apart from the US
Embassy account. There is another account of the Prince’s visit which may be found in Annex 6 to
Cambodia’s Response. That account is a contemporaneous report of th e Prince’s remarks to the
Cambodian press when he travelled to the Temple. After observing that the occasion was a n
historic one in Cambodia, the Prince noted that, while Thailand had evacuated the Temple itself, it
had traced a new boundary in the vicini ty of the Temple with barbed wire and installed military
posts that encroached on Cambodian territory in defiance of the Court’s Judgment. Now, t hat
scarcely suggests that Cambodia’s Head of State accepted Thailand’s unilateral interpretation of the
Judgment.
20. Professor Pellet then tried to draw a parallel between Prince Sihanouk’s visit to the
Temple in 1963 and Prince Damrong’s visit to the Temple in 1930 1. But the attempt was entirely
artificial because there was a world of difference between the t wo situations. Unlike
Prince Damrong, Prince Sihanouk protested Thailand’s barbed- wire fence before he visited the
Temple, when he visited the Temple, and a number of times afterwards. And Prince Damrong, in
contrast, remained silent.
21. To recall the facts that are on the record , Prince Sihanouk repeated his complaint that
Thailand was refusing to recognize the frontier referred to in the Court’s Judgment in
1Ibid., Ann. 50, p. 303.
1CR 2013/3, p. 56, para. 16 (Pellet). - 15 -
January 1965 , November 1966 , October 1967 and February 1968 . And that is in addition to
all the other protests emanating from senior Cambodian Government officials to the same effect, a
number of which I canvassed on Monday.
22. I invite the Court, once again, at its leisure, to look at the record of Cambodia’s protests
that we summarized in tab 10 of Monday’s folder. When a State objects as many times as
Cambodia did, it is not over a few metres. Moreover, Cambodia’s complaints included references
to the fact that the barbed-wire fence was incompatible with the Annex I Map line, and you see that
if you refer to the third and fourth entries on the listin our tab 10. In the light of the totality of the
record throughout the 1960s, it cannot credibly be maintained that Cambodia shared Thailand’s
understanding of the Judgment or that there was no dispute between the Parties. Both of the United
Nations special representatives, Mr. Gussing and Mr. de Ribbing, knew there was such a dispute,
diplomatic missions knew it, the press knew it and Thailand knew it. And the documents speak for
themselves.
23. Now that takes care of the first ten years of Professor Pellet’s 40 years of Cambodian
“acceptance” of Thailand’s line. There was no acceptance.
24. With the exception of a brief period from 1991- 1993 when the United Nations
Transitional Authority was installed in Cambodia, the next 28 years after 1969 were a period when
the Temple was off -limits due to the presence of the Khmer Rouge in the area. That was from
1970 really to about 1997. And even when the Temple was temporarily open to touris ts, early on
in the 1990s for one or two years, Thailand made no mention at that time of its Council of
Ministers line. Clearly, there was no acceptance by Cambodia of Thailand’s line during this period
either.
25. As I pointed out on Monday, by the lat e 1990s, Cambodians were able to resettle in the
Temple area. A pagoda was built in 1998, a market established and hundreds of Cambodians lived
13
FWEC, Ann. 10, p. 36.
14Ibid., Ann. 17, p. 56.
15Ibid., Ann. 19, p. 64.
16
Ibid., Ann. 23, p. 81. - 16 -
in the area. And t here was no protest from Thailand in 1998, 1999 or 2000 , and certainly no
mention of the Council of Ministers’ red line.
26. In 2001, Thailand did begin to raise concerns about pollution in the Temple area; but ,
once again, there was no mention that Cambodia’s activities were contrary to Thailand’s
interpretation of the Court’s Judgment as set out in the Council of Ministers’ resolution.
Professor Pellet implied that Thailand closed access to the Temple at that time in 2001 because
Cambodia’s activities were taking place in Thai territory 17. But Thailand’s own documents show
this to be untrue . And the Court refers to Annexes 27 to 29 of Thailand’s Further Written
Explanations. They explain that the entrance to the Temple was closed because of Thai complaints
about pollution, not because Thailand was somehow pressing its red line map.
27. The dispute only resurfaced in 2007 when Thailand produced a copy of its L7017 map
with an aide -memoire claiming, as I mentioned earlier in my remarks, that the map showed the
international boundary between the two countries 1.
28. In July 2008, Cambodia protested Thailand’s new map, noting that it was contrary to the
Annex I Map relied on by the Court in its Judgment 19. And f or its part, Thailand protested
Cambodia’s reliance on the Annex I Map as delimiting the frontier in the area of the Temple. So
the dispute over the Judgment’s interpretationhad clearly re-emerged at that time.
29. Now Thailand argues that the dispute came to life because of a map Cambodia prepared
in connection with its submission to Unesco to have the Temple inscribed as a World Heritage site.
Cambodia considers, on the other hand, that the dispute resurfaced because of the new Thai map.
But it makes little difference which Party is right. What is clear is that there was a dispute over the
meaning and scope of the Judgment. And t hat is what is required for the admissibility of a request
for interpretation, and it is a condition that Cambodia has fully satisfied.
17
CR 2013/3, p. 62, para. 24 (Pellet).
18FWEC, Ann. 27.
19
Ibid., Anns. 34 and 35. - 17 -
2. Thailand’s arguments about the maps
30. Mr. President, I now turn to the second part of my presentation in which I will address
the use to which Thailand tries to put various maps in order to limit the vicinity of the Temple from
which it has an obligation to withdraw.
[Thai tab 3.7 on the screen]
31. To accomplish this purpose, counsel focused on the map that now appears on the screen.
It is a reproduction of a small part of what has been called at times the “Big Map” contained in
Annex 85 (d) of Thailand’s pleadings in the original case.
32. Ms Miron contended that this map is a veritable cartographic representatio n of the
20
geographic extent of the original dispute . Counsel then went on to claim that this partial
reproduction of the Big Map can be considered to illustrate the “area of the Temple” as the Court
understood it in 1962 21.
33. Ms Miron’s first argument in support of that contention was textual. She maintained that
the following passage, that I will read, taken from page 15 of the Court’s Judgment supported
Thailand’s restricted view of the Temple’s area 22. Now that passage she cited was the following:
“a frontier line which ran along the edge of the escarpment, or which at any rate ran to
the south and east of the Temple area, would leave this area in Thailand; whereas a
line running to the north, or to the north and w est, would place it in Cambodia ”
(I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 15).
34. Now, I fail to see how this passage assists counsel’s argument.
35. The Court made no reference to the Annex 85 (d) map as limiting the disputed area in
what it said in the passage I just quoted. In fact, Mr. President, the Annex 85 (d) map whether
the Big Map or this extract is never mentioned in the Judgment. How Thailand can claim that
the small portion of the Annex 85 (d) map is what the Court had in mind as the area of the Temple
is a mystery.
36. The passage in the Court’s Judgment also refers to lines running south and east, north,
and north-west of the “Temple area” not simply the Temple. The “Temple area” was not
defined, nor confined, by the Court in this passage, and it is simply a non -sequitur to argue that the
20
CR 2013/3, p. 40, para. 20 (Miron).
21Ibid., p. 41, para. 24.
22
CR 2013/3, p. 41, para. 25 (Miron). - 18 -
area of the Temple referred to at page 15 of the Judgment must be Thailand’s claimed area because
of a map that is not once referred to in the Judgment, and that contained watershed lines that the
Court never even considered it.
37. Now as I said, the Annex 85 (d) map covered actually a much larger area than the small
portion displayed by Ms Miron. But, in fairness, I should point out that counsel purported to show
the whole map on the screen.
[Tab 3.8 of Thailand’s folder]
38. Mr. President, we have been rather harshly accused of falsifying maps. We deny that
claim. But I would note that the original Big Map had the Annex I map line clearly depicted on it,
while the image that counsel projected yesterday , which is on the screen, inexplicabl y deleted that
line. We can, however, see from this map the scope of the territory which the Parties’ arguments in
the original case addressed. And, in fact , as IBRU Thailand’s experts stated in their first
report attached to Thailand’s Written Obser vations, “the evidence before the Court mainly
concerned the 7 kilometres by 12 kilometres area mapped by Professor Schermerhorn in the
vicinity of the Temple” 23. Thus, counsel’s attempt to limit the “vicinity” to a tiny part of the
Annex 85 (d) map is contradicted by Thailand’s own experts.
[Go back to tab 3.7]
39. The second argument raised by counsel foreshadowed a point that Professor Pellet raised
later namely, that the area from which Thailand withdrew its troops is comparable to the area
24
covered by the partial reproduction of the Annex 85 (d) map . This argument does not work
either. The Council of Ministers’ map was not based on any reasoning whatsoever, whether the
Annex 85 (d) map or the watershed line. There was no rationale with respect to the Judgment or
the pleadings of the parties in the Council of Ministers resolution or memorandum explaining the
rationale for the yellow and red lines, and there is no relation between the Council of Ministers map
and Annex 85 (d).
2WOTh, Ann. 96, p. 669.
2CR 2013/3, p. 42, para. 26 (Miron). - 19 -
40. Lastly, counsel found significance in the fact that the Court published this smaller extract
25
with the volume of pleadings . That may be so. But the fact remains that:
(i) the Court as I said did not refer to the Annex 85 (d) map, or the partial reproduction
of it, in its Judgment, making it difficult to see how the Court could have relied on it
does not even mention it; and
(ii) to the contrary, the Court clearly said that, given the grounds on which the Court based its
decision, it was unnecessary to consider whether the Annex I map line corresponded to the
watershed or not 26. In short, the watershed lines depicted on this map here and it is the
red line that Professor Pellet and Ms Miron are trying to equate with the Council of
Ministers line, it is the red w avy line on the left those watershed lines depicted on this
map were completely irrelevant to the Court’s decision.
41. Now that brings me to Thailand’s arguments about the famous 4.6 sq km area and, in
turn, to Cambodia’s answer at least on a prelimi nary basis to the question that Judge Yusuf
posed to the Parties yesterday.
42. Ms Miron argued that the dispute dealt with by the Court in 1962 had nothing to do with
27
the 4.6 sq km perimeter . As I shall show, the area in question arises directly out of maps that the
Parties placed before the Court in the original case, and it can be identified this area can be
identified by carrying out an exercise that Thailand’s own expert in the original case ,
Professor Schermerhorn, recommended be done in his report attached as Annex 49 to Thailand’s
Counter-Memorial in the earlier case.
43. To place the matter in context, the claims of the Parties in the original case need to be
recalled. As the Court observed in its Judgment, Cambodia principally relied on the line appearing
on the Annex I map 28, while Thailand argued in favour of a frontier running along the edge of the
29
escarpment south and east of the Temple . This was Thailand’s watershed line.
25
CR 2013/3, p. 42, para. 27 (Miron).
26
I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 35.
27CR 2013/3, p. 35, para. 5 (Miron).
28
I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 21.
29
Ibid., p. 15, and see Thailand’s Submission 3 (ii), p. 12. - 20 -
44. In his expert report, Professor Schermerhorn st ated th at he had been requested
presumably by Thailand, since he was appearing on behalf of Thailand he had been requested to
make a comparison between the watershed map of Thailand’s experts and the Annex I map. After
he adjusted the scales of each of these maps the watershed map of Thailand and the
Annex 1 map after he adjusted those scales so that they matched, copies of those maps were
included in his report at Annex 49. As Professor Schermerhorn then noted: “For comparison, both
copies should be pu t on top of each other.” 30 Overlay the Annex 1 map to the Thai experts
watershed line map or vice versa, I confess I do not recall which way it was.
[Project map following p. 76 in Cambodia’s Response]
45. That is precisely what Cambodia attempted to do on the map that was included after
page 76 of its Response. A copy of that map now appears on the screen with the Annex I map line
highlighted in green and the watershed line according to Thailand’s experts in red. To avoid being
taken to task, I hasten t o note that Cambodia put the colours on this map to highlight the lines, to
make them easier to see.
46. Now IBRU’s second report criticizes Cambodia’s approach because Cambodia did not
align map sheet 3 with the registration crosses provided on map sheet 4 when it did the overlay
31
exercise . Somewhat confusingly however, Thailand’s Further Written Explanations state that the
registration points were not on sheet 4 but sheet 3, there is a contradiction there 32. But be that as it
may, IBRU produced its own overlay, which now appears on your screen. Once again, we have
coloured the lines to make them easier to see. Annex I green, Thailand’s original watershed claim
red.
[Project IBRU’s figure 12 map]
47. According to IBRU, a c orrect application of Professo r Schermerhorn’s procedure
produces an area of 4.2 sq km not 4.6 sq km 3. Cambodia does not dispute IBRU’s calculation.
But I would note in passing that it is Thailand itself that has consistently referred to the disputed
3Counter-Memorial of Thailand (1961), Ann. 49 p. 435.
31
FWETh, Ann. 46, para. 6.7.
3Ibid., para. 1.47.
33
Ibid, Ann. 46, para 6.8. - 21 -
area as comprising 4.6 sq km. In tab 26 of the folders, the Court will find a number of public ly
available, readily accessible with a push of the button, English language report s emanating from
Thai and third party sources attributing the 4.6 sq km to Thailand.
48. The important point i s that on both maps the map that we prepared after page 76 of
our Response and IBRU’s correction of that map on both overlays, the Annex I map line and
Thailand’s watershed line intersect to the east and west. You can see that and the area in between
is the area falling between the lines relied up on by the Parties in the original case. Obviously in its
Judgment, the Court pronounced in favour of the frontier as mapped on the Annex I map, the green
line.
49. In response to Judge Yusuf’s question, the refore, in Cambodia’s view, and relying on
maps that were presented in the initial or original procedure, the territorial extent of the “vicinity”
of the Temple mentioned in paragraph 2 of the dispositif has to be understood, of course, in the
context of that paragraph; but it seems to us to correspond to the area lying south of the Annex I
map line up to the intersection to the east and west of the Temple with Thailand’s claimed
watershed line. Of course, Thailand’s claimed watershed line was not accepted by the Court in
1962. But that, in the original case, could be viewed as the area of overlapping claim s. That is
what we suggest is meant by the vicinity in paragraph 2 of the dispositif. But, of course, Cambodia
reserves the right to supplement this answer in writing pursuant to the timetable that the President
mentioned.
50. The final issue relating to the maps that I need to address concerns Thailand’s claim that
the Annex I map line is difficult to transpose onto a modern map of the area and on the ground.
Here, I have to say, that the arguments raised by Thailand’s c ounsel raise serious questions as to
whether Thailand’s real aim is to revise the original Judgment.
51. Ms Miron led off by saying that Cambodia had not produced any proof that the map said
to have been attached to Cambodia’s pleadings in the original case is the real Annex I map 34. Let
me try toput my friend’s mind to rest on this point.
[Project Annex Imap]
3CR 2013/3, p. 46, para. 43 (Miron). - 22 -
52. Up on the screen and I will use Ms Miron’s slide of it is indeed the real Annex I
map. All you have to do is to proceed to the Court’s archives, where the map can be found, and
look at the reverse side of it, turn it over. Because, t here is a label on the back [project on the
screen] clearly indicating that this is the map that was attached as Annex I.
53. As for transposing the Annex I map line on a modern map, c ounsel argues that the most
natural way to do this, the most natural method, would consist of identifying the watershed line
35
since, she says, that was the intention of the authors of the map . But , Mr. President, that is
nothing less than a plea to revise the Judgment. If you want to use the Annex I map line, don’t use
the Annex I map line, turn it in now in the process of transposing it onto a modern map or on the
ground, transpose it back into a watershed line, which Thailand lost in the first case.
54. It should not be necessary to recall that the Court stated with the utmost clarity that the
acceptance of the Annex I map caused it to enter into the treaty settlement between the Parties and
36
to become an integral part of it .
55. I apologize for repeating what I said on Monday, but Thailand’s c ounsel have avoided
dealing with the issue. Because in the Judgment, the Court also stated that there is no re ason to
think that the Parties attached any special importance to the line of the watershed as such, and that
it was unnecessary to consider whether at Preah Vihear, the line as mapped mapped on the
37
Annex I map does in fact correspond to the watershed in this vicinity . To intimate now that
the Annex I m ap should be transposed along the watershed and that it has no practical value
because of the alleged difficulties in transposing it on a modern map in other words a map that
did not even exist in 196 2 is fundamentally misguided, if we are interpreting a judgment
rendered in 1962.
56. All of those colourful lin es that counsel displayed as a result of IBRU’s attempt to
transpose the Annex I map line on to different modern maps, or to make various tr ansposition
adjustments, are utterly irrelevant. The Court was not asked to transpose the line on a modern map
35
CR 2013/3, p. 47, para. 47 (Miron).
36I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 33-34.
37
I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 35. - 23 -
in 1962; nor was it asked to fix the boundary on the ground. The sa, with respect, holds true
now. None of this, none of these brightly coloured lines, was at issue 50 years ago.
57. In 1962, the Court did not delimit the boundary. It recognized that the Parties had
accepted that the frontier in the region of the Temple had already been delimited as of 1908.
58. Any problems any problems relating to transposing the Annex I m ap line on the
ground may, if at all relevant, be taken up under the 2000 MOU, another instrument that postdates
the Judgment, because that instrument concerns the survey and demarcation of the boundary. But
none of that is germane to the present case. The real question, which Thailand has not answered, is
how Thailand can be considered to have withdrawn from Cambodian territory in the vicinity of the
Temple if its forces are still on Cambodia’s side of the froer line previously delimited and
accepted by the Parties.
59. Mr. President, that concludes my presentation. I thank the Court for its attention, and I
would ask if you could give the floor to Sir Franklin, please.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Mr. Bundy. I now give the floor to
Sir Franklin Berman to continue. You have the floor, Sir.
Sir Franklin BERMAN:
THAILAND ’S FAILURE TO RESPOND TO CAMBODIA ’S ARGUMENTS ,THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
C AMBODIA ’SR EQUEST AND THE COURT ’S TREATMENT OF THE ANNEX IMAP
1. Mr. President, you wisely admonished us yesterday to confine our second round argument
to responding to the essential points made by our opponents, and to finish if possible in less time
than the full ration allocated to us. I can promise you the first, and will have to do the best I can
towards the second.
2. Mr. President, I do not lay claim to the eloquence of our opponents. But sometimes
silences can be more eloquent than words. So I begin with two of the graver silences we observed
in our opponents’ extensive oral pleadings yesterday. I can only hope that you w ill not rule me out
of order if what I am responding to is the absence of argument. But these silences are significant,
and their significance needs to be exposed. - 24 -
3. The first and most glaring silence is over the Council of Ministers’ resolution of
July 1962. The Court will remember it , Mr. Bundy has referred to it ; it is the one on the
implementation of the Court’s 1962 Judgment. It is of course Thailand’s own Council of
Ministers, not ours. I can hardly be accused of not having emphasiz ed this document, its late
appearance into the light of day, or its significance for our present proceedings. So there is
something quite astonishing in the almost complete absence of response f rom the Thai side. The
document had a glancing mention by the Agent 38, by Professor Pellet . Ms Miron flashed on the
screen, in the middle of a dazzling array of other cartographic slides, the small map attached to the
supporting text which the Council of Ministers had under discussion. But the Court heard no
response to the whole series of rather damning conclusions we drew from this document, and
neither did we. I cannot, as it were, go through all of the omissions; the most striking of them was
the total absence of comment, as Mr. Bundy said, on the yellow line on the illustrative map, and in
that context on the proposal of two alternative methods for implementing the Judgment two
widely differing methods of defining what Thailand claimed to be the “vicinity” of the Temple,
and in the context of the choice between those two methods the absence of any description of even
the most rudimentary kind of why either or both of those two very different methods was indeed
thought to correspond to what the C ourt had decided, which remains a principal element in the
whole case Thailand now brings before the Court. For Ms Miron now to announce to us
ex post facto that the more parsimonious of these two “methods” corresponds in effect to the
Cambodian version of the watershed line is shall we put it delicately? somewhat far-fetched.
But Mr. Bundy has already dealt with this. It would, however, have been helpful to have had some
precise citation of exactly where in the 1962 Judgment Thailand says that the C ourt laid down that
the boundary which of course Thailand now says the Judgment did not establish where
Thailand says the Court laid down that the boundary should follow the Cambodian watershed line.
4. Mr. President, the Court will have to draw its own conclusions from this total failure to
comment or to explain. We have set out at length on the first occasion we had the opportunity
to do so the conclusions that arise from this crucial document. Thailand has had ample time to
3CR 2013/3, p. 12, para. 8 (Plasai).
3CR 2013/3, pp. 53-54, paras. 6-10 (Pellet). - 25 -
reply, and has chosen not to do so. I conclude by saying that we trust and I hope that this is not
an unworthy remark that Thailand is not holding back its comments until the final session
tomorrow with an eye to depriving us of our opportunity to come back on it. Tha t really would be
to deny Cambodia a legal process in due and proper form, of the kind of which the Thai Agent
unjustly reproached the Court yesterday.
5. Mr. President, the second crashing omission is any argument on the meaning of
withdrawal, what it me ans “to withdraw”. [Slide 1] We pointed out on Monday that this was a
cardinal question for the interpretation of the Judgment, and specifically for the interpretati on of
that paragraph in the dispositif to which Cambodia’s Request for interpretation was expressly
directed. We pointed out also that “ withdrawal” necessarily implied a de stination as well as a
starting-point, and that the only reasonable way to interpret the second paragraph of the dispositif
was as a requirement to withdraw from Cambodian territory onto Thai territory. The destination is
crucial, but it received not a word of comment from our opponents yesterday. So what are we to
think: do they accept our interpretation? Or do they want us to understand that the Court was
perfectly con tent for Thailand, in implementing the Judgment, to move its “military or police
forces . . .” (Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 37) away from the
Temple and to emplace them in some other part of Cambodian sovereign territo ry, somewhere
else? It sounds absurd, since, as they would say in France “des deux choses, l’une”; it has to be
the one or the other.
6. Connected with that is what I would call another absurdity resulting from yesterday’s
argument, but let us be tactful and call it a “circularity”. Thailand’s argument on withdrawal is:
we have decided that we complied with what we want to interpret the second paragraph of the
dispositif to mean, and because we have complied there is no dispute. It sounds like a caricature,
but it is not: the C ourt can see that at paragraph 19 of Professor McRae’s pleading yesterday
morning. And it is of course connected with the assertion, an assertion which underlies the Council
of Ministers’ resolution, that Thailand has an untram melled unilateral right to “determine the limits
of” an area laid down but not defined by the Court. And now we have heard that assertion
bolstered by the additional argument yesterday that there is no rule of international law requiring a
party to consult with the other party on the implementation of a judgment binding the two of them. - 26 -
To which we can only reply that there is no rule of international law ei ther which requires the
second party to accept the first party’s unilateral interpretation if it is wrong.
7. I cannot fail to draw attention at this point to the stratagem Thailand’s counsel use to
arrive at this self-justifying result; they re write the terms of what the Court said. It is not the only
time they do so, and I will refer to at least one other later. Thailand consistently reconstructs the
second paragraph of the dispositif to make it read something like, “Thailand is under an obligation
to withdraw any military or police forces . . . from the Temple or its vicinity” and then of course
you have “on Cambodian territory”. That sounds beguiling at first but it is not what the Court
said; what the Court actually ordered Thailand to do was “to withdraw any military or police
forces . . . stationed by her at the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory” (I.C.J. Reports
1962, p. 37; emphasis added) . The words are not the same and w hen you look at the words
actually used, therefore, you can see that the primary function of the reference to the Temple and
its vicinity was to identify which Thai elements the Court had in view those which Thailand had
at the time stationed in and around the Temple and nobody knew exactly what they were, so the
Court says “any”. But the paragraph does not expressly define the destination, it leave s that to be
inferred. The primary obligation, though, remains intact; it is “ to withdraw” and there is nothing
there to suggest or to imply that the destination of that “withdrawal” should be understood as being
just a little bit on the other side of a self-defined “vicinity”. And that is why, once again, Cambodia
insists that, on the dispositif as worded by the Court , the natural meaning of “ withdraw”, taken in
conjunction with the reference to Cambodian “territory”, has to be out of Cambodia and into
Thailand, and that has to be understood in turn in connection with the first paragraph and the
essential reasoning which underlay that paragraph. We said that on Monday and there has been no
Thai answer.
8. Having mentioned that one insidious rewriting of what the Court said, Mr. President,
perhaps it would save time to go on at once to two others. We were told, with that categorical
assurance that characteriz es Thailand’s pleadings, that the first and second paragraphs of the
dispositif simply accept and as it were, enact Cambodia’s third and fourth submissions,
whereas the first and second submissions were rejected. Well they did not, and they were not. - 27 -
9. [Slide 2] Let me begin with the second paragraph of the dispositif and the third
Cambodian s ubmission which is supposed to correspond to it. That is on the screen. What
Cambodia actually asked for, and you can see that at page 11 of the Judgment, is “[t]o adjudge and
declare that Thailand is under an obligation to withdraw the detachments of ar med forces it has
stationed, since 1954, in Cambodian territory, in the ruins of the Temple of Preah Vihear ” (I.C.J.
Reports 1962, p. 11; emphasis added). So, you can see at once, Mr. President, that there is a whole
series of differences between that and what the Court in due course decided, and some of these
differences go directly to the points Thailand has been trying to make here, notably the whole great
concentrated attempt to have the case confined, ex post facto and without justification, to the
Temple ruins and nothing more. What does Thailand want us to think: that the Court was
seriously negligent in copying out Cambodia’s submission from one place to another? Or could it
just be that the Court was making a deliberate decision of its own, intended to have an autonomous
meaning of its own in context, i.e., in the context of the dispositif of the 1962 Judgment as a whole?
10. Which brings me to the second Thai distortion, which this time I can only hope is purely
accidental. In addition to telling the Court wrongly that the second paragraph was simply the
Cambodian submission, Professor McRae also would have the Court accept that not only the
second but also the first paragraph was no more than the Cambodian submission. This time there is
indeed a close textual correspondence, but Professor McRae has forgotten th e three key words, the
three key little words, “finds in consequence” (ibid., p. 37) the three key words that link the two
paragraphs together. They were not in the Cambodian submissions, they were consci ously and,
one must assume deliberately , added by the Court. The word s are there, though, and we cannot
possibly make the assumption that the Court chooses to add a phrase to the dispositive part of a
judgment without doing so for a reason and for a purpose, and we say that the obvious reason and
purpose is to link the first two paragraphs firmly together but, even more than that, to condition the
sense of the second by reference to the first. Professors Crawford and McRae seemed actually to
like my “ symbiotically” linked, so I am happy to stay with it, and to reiterate in that context
Cambodia’s formal submission that the word “ territory” as used by the Court in each of the first
two paragraphs of the dispositif must be understood as having the same meaning in both
paragraphs. We apprehend that Thailand now accepts that, which is welcome, and I refer to - 28 -
paragraph 21 of Professor Pellet’s pleading yesterday afternoon. But that does not dispose of the
dispute between the Parties o ver the link between the two paragraphs, because we say that the
entire logic of the two, as well as their express wording, makes the second subordinate to the first,
whereas Thailand still tries still to make the second prevail over the first: back, in o ther words, to
Thailand’s whole attempt to confine the entire Judgment to the Temple ruins and their immediate
surrounds; back to the Council of Ministers’ arrogation to themselves of the sole right to define the
“vicinity”, ostensibly for withdrawal purp oses, but actually for the surreptitious creation of a
boundary for sovereignty purposes, as I demonstrated to the Court on Monday by a close textual
analysis of the Council’s decision; and then forward to the Thai maps, the ones Mr. Bundy has just
referred to, which shamelessly portray a confusing series of variants of that line as the international
boundary, and that is the way Thailand describes it in its Note of 2008 to the United Nations
Security Council.
11. Mr. President, my next theme must be the continuing nature of the withdrawal
obligation. I drew attention on Monday to Thailand’s equivocation on this key issue. So far as we
can see, they continue to equivocate. The closest we got to a statement of the Thai position
yesterday was that, although the obligation is continuing on Day 2 after the Judgment, after “troops
have withdrawn and time has elapsed, then the notion of withdrawal is no longer relevant”; and,
“there may be other obligations not to enter a territory, but it is totally artifici al to link it to any
notion of withdrawal” 4. So at a gi ven moment undefined of course Thailand acquires what
in the game of Monopoly would be called a “Get out of jail free card” because at that moment ,
undefined, what used to be a question of withdra wal can no longer be given a meaning, any
question about it, is not withdrawal, it is execution and of course Thailand has clearly indicated
through the mouth of the Agent that it would vigorously refuse to consent to any such issue being
submitted to this Court. So this is not a position, Mr. President, it is a contortion. And because
Professor McRae is fixated on the question of “ execution” he produces his rather sad example of a
stray accidental crossing by a single Thai soldier, which demonstrates n othing more than that our
opponents obstinately refuse to take on board that what we have posed is a general question of
4CR 2013/4, p. 22, para. 33 (McRae). - 29 -
interpretation, and I find myself returning to the point I have had to repeat ad nauseam that
“interpretation” is different from “execution” and logically precedes it. Unless Thailand now says
plainly that it accepts the simple proposition that the withdrawal obligation as specifically
enunciated by the Court in the context of this dispositif must be taken as having a continuing
character, there unmistakably is a dispute between the Parties on this question, and it undeniably
falls within the Court’s interpretative jurisdiction.
12. So let me come final ly to the last of Thailand’s re writings of the Court’s dispositi f
although this one is both more subliminal and more pervasive. Almost the whole of Thailand’s
pleading yesterday was constructed as an argument addressed to the text of a different
1962 Judgment, one which reads “awards the sovereignty over the Temple of Preah Vihear to
Cambodia”. That is the Judgment beloved of our opponents, one which is entirely limited to the
Temple “ruins”, “precincts” or just the ground on which the Temple stands. But it is not our
Judgment. It is not what the first paragraph of the dispositif says, not at all, and we pointed out as
long ago as the original Cambodian request for interpretation that there is not a hint in the
Judgment of 1962 of the existence of a separate territorial title over the Temple which the Court
then attributes to Cambodia. Yet Thailand continues to argue as if that is what the Judgment did,
though they know as well as we do that the Court decided that the Temple “is situated in territory
under the sovereignty of Cambodia” and that, because of that, the Temple appertains to Cambodia.
And the Court chose also to make that its primary finding. That is what the Court chose to do.
13. One more distortion, Mr. President, and then I can move on to more constructive ground.
Counsel for Thailand suggested to the Court yesterday that Cambodia was, inadmissibly, asking the
Court to interpret the reasoning in the 1962 Judgment 41. Well, that is pure invention. It shouldn’t
be necessary for me to put up once again the slide we showed on Monday, which compares the text
of Cambodia’s question with the text of the dispositif, but I have to do so. It is plain as a pikestaff
that the question addresses itself to the dispositif and asks that the dispositif be interpreted in the
light of the reasoning, so far as it is necessary to do so. Where our opponents say “ reasoning” of
course they mean the Map . I challenge them to draw the Court’s attention to any place, from the
4CR 2013/4, p. 41, para. 42. - 30 -
Request onwards, where Cambodia asks the Court to interpret the map. What Cambodia asks the
Court to do is to interpret the dispositif in the light of the map, because the Court’s treatment of the
map is precisely the kind of essential reasoning which the Court said in Cameroon v. Nigeria fell
within the scope of interpretation under Article 60 of the Statute and thus under the Court’s duty to
interpret at the request of a Party.
14. Having reached that point, Mr. President, Members of the Court, I can now return to
what I had already described on Monday as the one single point on which rests Thailand’s whole
response to the admissibility of Cambodia’s Request, i.e., that Cambodia is trying to gain now what
it could not gain at the time. As I said on Monday, this argument appears in two forms but it’s the
same point. With the Court’s leave, I won’t go further into the variant that says “anything to do
with a boundary (even very close to the Temple) goes beyond the dispute that had been submitted
to the Court”. That’s just another version of the “ the Court awarded sovereignty over the Temple
to Cambodia” trope, which I have just dealt with. Mr. Bundy has moreover shown, by reference to
contemporaneous documents, that the present disputed zone had already been delineated then, by
the time of the 1962 Judgment. For my part, I have to insist on two things. The first is that,
whenever our opponents get around to focusing on how the Court itself defined the dispute
even, if you like, the “sole dispute” before it, before the Court, they always elide the central fact
that the Court defines it as a region: “the subject of the dispute submitted to the Court is confined
to a difference of view about sovereignty over the region of the Temple of Preah Vihear” (Temple
of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 14; e mphasis added); that is what the
Court said at page 14 of the Judgment . And the second is the reason why the Court defines the
dispute that way. Because Thailand so says the Court itself had replied to Cambodia’s
claims “‘by affirming that the area in question [not the Temple] lies on the Thai side [of what] of
the common frontier between the two countries, and is under the sovereignty of Thailand’” (ibid.;
emphasis added), yes, the consequence of the frontier. So says the Court, and it is simply not
admissible for a Party in these proceedings to try to erase the Court’s conclusion in order to
substitute its own.
15. The second variant of the argument, Mr. President, is the one about the map. That again
comes in two forms, and we heard them both yesterday. The one says “the Court didn’t rely on the - 31 -
map”; the other says “ in any case it decided the case on other grounds ”. I described the latter as
“ludicrous” on Monday and nothing we heard yesterday leads me to change that description. But
now I do have to devote a little more time to it tha n I did then, because Thailand really is guilty of
indefensible selective quotation in its treatment of this matter. I am going to confine myself largely
to Prince Damrong, because we all agree that that is “much the most significant ” of these other
matters; if the Prince Damrong incident doesn’t stand up, then nor do any of the others. So let us
look seriously at what the Court said in this regard.
16. The Court begins by looking generally that is at pages 29 to 30 of the Judgment at
the whole category of administrative acts. That forms the framework for its consideration of this
category of evidence. And it begins by saying:
“It was specifically admitted by Thailand in the course of the oral hearing that if
Cambodia acquired sovereignty over th e Temple area [the Temple area] by virtue of
the frontier settlement of 1904, she did not subsequently abandon it, nor did Thailand
subsequently obtain it by any process of acquisitive prescription.” (Temple of Preah
Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 30.)
Note that the Court does not refer to the Temple but to the “Temple area” and it is ev en clearer in
the French text, “zone du temple” . And I cite it happily, even though it is part of the proceedings
before the Court came to its Judgmen t, because this is the Court describing an element that is
clearly key in its reasoning, not a case of trying as Thailand always does to replace what the
Court said with the sayings of the Parties. And, having pinned down that admission that is what
it is by Thailand, the Court then continues as follows: [slide 3]
“Thailand’s acts on the ground were therefore put forward as evidence of
conduct as sovereign, sufficient to negative any suggestion that, under the 1904 Treaty
settlement, Thailand accepted a delimitation [note the word, delimitation] having the
effect of attributing the sovereignty over Preah Vihear to Cambodia. It is therefore
[again, therefore] from this standpoint that the Court must consider and evaluate these
acts. The real ques tion is whether they sufficed to efface or cancel out the clear
impression of acceptance of the frontier line at Preah Vihear to be derived from the
various considerations already discussed.” (Ibid.; emphasis added.)
17. And it is “in this connection”, again, the Court’s own words, that the Court then goes on
to its two short paragraphs on Prince Damrong. That is at pages 30 to 31. The Court then goes on
to discuss the “remaining relevant facts” (p. 31 again), which it does in another four paragraphs,
which take us to the middle of page 32. Page 30 had given us the top and now we have the tail:
[slide 4]. - 32 -
“The Court will now state the conclusions it draws from the facts as above set
out.
Even if there were any doubt as to Siam’s acceptance of the m ap in 1908, and
hence of the frontier indicated thereon, the Court would consider, in the light of the
subsequent course of events, that Thailand is now precluded by her conduct from
asserting that she did not accept it . . .
The Court however considers that Thailand in 1908-1909 [note the dates, a long
time ago, more than a century] did accept the Annex I map as representing the
outcome of the work of delimitation [note delimitation again] , and hence recognized
the line on that map as being the frontier l ine, the effect of which is to situate Preah
Vihear in Cambodian territory. The Court considers further that, looked at as a whole,
Thailand’s subsequent conduct confirms and bears out her original acceptance , and
that Thailand’s acts on the ground do not suffice to negative this. Both Parties , by
their conduct, recognized the line and thereby in effect agreed to regard it as being the
frontier line. ” ( Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962,
pp. 32-33.)
That is what the Court says at pages 32 to 33.
18. Mr. President, against that background, claire comme l’eau de roche one might say, it
really is not good enough for Thailand to come to the Court and say tha t in 1962 what
Professor Crawford called the “other consequences” were “decisive in answering the one question
42
the Court had to answer” , or indeed, even worse, that Prince Damrong’s visit was “a separate
43
reason for the Judgment” . Or for Professor Pellet to claim that the visit by Prince Damrong in
1930 “a constitué l’un des arguments cruciaux ayant conduit la Cour à reconnaître la souveraineté
44
du Cambodge sur le temple” .
19. I ought just to add, Mr. President, before I forget, that we challenged Thailand on
Monday to say whether their cavalier approach to the Court’s treatment of the map meant that it
was now Thailand’s position that it could now deny that Siam had accepted the map and the line
on it, with the result that both entered the Treaty settlement and became an integral part of it. Once
again, not a word in reply.
20. Mr. President, I can pass now to the second form in which Thailand’s one sole argument
is couched, that the Court never relied on the map. This time at least it comes with a small
concession attached, that the map “may” hold explanatory value in resp ect of the operative part of
the Judgment. That, at all events, is how Thailand puts it in rathe r gingerly fashion in
42
CR 2013/3 p. 69, para. 11 (Crawford).
43CR 2013/3 p. 73, para. 21 (Crawford).
44CR 2013/3, p. 56, para. 16 (Pellet); emphasis added. - 33 -
paragraph 3.33 of the Further Written Explanations, though I do not think we heard it repeated in
the oral argument yesterday. What we d id hear in the oral argument was something along these
lines: that although we are talking about a map with a frontier line on it, this does not mean the
Court looked at the line on the map; that the Court “did not adopt the map as a specification of the
frontier line” 4; that, although Thailand “was no longer able to deny . . . [w]hat the map said about
the Temple” 46, “[i]n respect of the other question” a separate, unrelated question, the “question
47
of the frontier”, that the map could have answered the “map gives no answer” .
21. Mr. President, this is yet another farrago. So let me once again try the patience of the
Court by recalling, with precision, what the Court actually said. This is not extrapolation, it is not
interpretation, it is neither intra nor ultra petita, neither sub petita nor super petita, it is just a
simple recapitulation of what appears in the Judgment, in other words of the way the Court
reasoned in moving towards its conclusions in the dispositif. If we have omitted anything, we will
happily stand corrected by our distinguished opponents. The main steps in the Court’s reasoning
were laid out in Cambodia’s Request for i nterpretation, at paragraph 39, in detailed citations of the
Judgment with all the references. Some of these repeat what I have already said above and it
would be better for me not to repeat them once more. But we put them on the table two years ago
for all to see. I want to repeat just one, which is drawn from what I said to the Court on Monday:
[slide 5]
“The Court considers that the acceptance of the Annex I map by the Parties
caused the map to enter the treaty settlement and to become an integral part of it. It
cannot be said that this process involved a departure from, and even a violation of, the
terms of the Treaty of 1904, wherever the map line diverged from the line of the
watershed, for, as the Court sees the matter, the map (whether in all respects accurate
by reference to the true watershed line or not) was accepted by the Parties in 1908 and
thereafter as constituting the result of the interpretation given by the two Governments
to the delimitation [note delimitation again] which the Treaty itself required. In other
words, the Parties at that time adopted an interpretation of the treaty settlemen t which
caused the map line, in so far as it may have departed from the line of the watershed,
to prevail over the relevant clause of the treaty.” ( Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 33-34.)
45
CR 2013/3, p. 67, para. 7 (Crawford).
46CR 2013/3, p. 74, para. 27 (Crawford).
47
Ibid., para. 28. - 34 -
22. And now I must go back to another point I had already mentioned, while steering clear,
Mr. President, of your injunction against repetition, but it is an important point, and yet another one
to which Thailand has simply failed to respond. Thailand’s counsel seem to think that simply by
reiterating, over and over again and I lost count in the end of the number of times that the
Court in 1962 declined to include its findings on the Annex I map in the dispositif , that they
thereby prove that the Court refused to decide on the stat us of the map at all. I showed with some
care on Monday what, in our submission, the Court did mean and today I have given the Court, I
hope, ample citation to show the Court doing nothing other than “deciding” on the status which the
Parties had given to the map, but doing so as the essential element in its reasoning, on which the
dispositif is then duly based. If Thailand continues to insist, in the face of what the Court actua lly
said, that “[l]a frontier . . . attend toujours . . . d’être reconnue”8 and that there has not been “une
délimitation frontalière . . . ni globalement, ni dans le secteur de Dangrek, ni dans la zone du
49
temple” , if it continues to insist on that, it will show that its only real interest is to divert attention
away from the terms of the Judgment as such.
23. Mr. President, I end where one should end, with the question Cambodia has put to the
Court for interpretation, which Professor McRae took aim at yesterday, for a series of reasons some
of which we found hard to follow. He seemed first to be objecting that the question had stayed the
same throughout these proceedings, from the Request itself until today. That cannot surely be so.
Had we changed our minds, one might have seen some scope for objection, but we have not.
Perhaps he was mixing up the question itself with the disputebetween the Parties that generated the
question. We have indeed been discovering as these proceedings move on that the Thai position is
even more extreme than we had thought, so that what I called e arlier the linked series of disputes
between the Parties is even more extensive than had earlier been allowed to appear. Vide the
Council of Ministers’ resolution, which we saw so late, vide some of the oral argument we heard
yesterday. But the question for interpretation remains the same. It is unchanged. Professor McRae
affected to have difficulty in understanding it . He took issue with its form, which he said was a
statement more than a question. But if one looks through the smallish list of interp retation cases
4CR 2013/3, p. 57, para. 16 (Pellet).
4CR 2013/4, p. 39, para. 36 (Pellet). - 35 -
brought before the Permanent Court and this Court, one can see that sometimes the applicant State
asks an open question, sometimes it puts forward a proposed interpretation which it asks the Court
to endorse. The Court has never had difficulty with a request in either form. Next he complains
about the way he says we now try, by a ruse, to bring in the first paragraph of the dispositif . But
the link between the first and second paragraphs has always been there and , as I noted, the question
has remained the same. Thailand’s approach towards interpretation in this context now seems to
be, not only that you have to interpret the dispositive part of a judgment in isolation from the
reasons that sustain it, but that you have to interpret each pa ragraph in a dispositif in isolation from
the others. That goes against all tenets of interpretation in international law, and it makes no sense.
It makes no sense in principle, and it makes no sense at all where you have paragraphs that the
Court itself has explicitly linked together. I have already made my submission on behalf of
Cambodia that “territory” must have the same meaning in both paragraphs, and my further
submission that the interpretation in the second must be controlled by its interpretation in the first.
Either Thailand agrees with both of those submissions or we definitely have a dispute about the
link and the hierarchy between the two. Professor McRae accuses us of suddenly trying to
manufacture a dispute over the definition of “vicini ty” in the second paragraph but we ha ve never
put the matter that way, framing instead a question, very specifically, about how to understand the
meaning and scope of the withdrawal obligation. In any case , Judge Yusuf has now put a
penetrating question on the very subject of the interpretation of that word, to which we have given
a first oral response by Mr. Bundy. We will elaborate as necessary in writing within the time-limit
laid down by the Court. And, finally, Professor McRae says that our question is essentially flawed
because it presupposes the answer. But I have already explained that there is nothing out of the
ordinary in framing a question for interpretation by the Court in terms of a proposed interpretation
which the Court is requested to endorse. And Professor McRae is only able to arrive at his own
criticism by a far more severe case of question -begging than he has accused us of in that his
whole proposition depends on denial in the most outright terms that the Court decided anything at
all about frontiers or the Annex I map. I have taken the Court through the relevant passages in the
Judgment and shown that that approach is simply unsustainable in terms of what the Court actually
said on the subject. So Professor McRae’s proposition be comes one that depends entirely on - 36 -
establishing an impermeable distinction between decisions of two kinds, that a “decision” placed in
the operative part becomes a creature of a categ orically different kind from a “decision” contained
in the reasoning, eve n if the reason ing is, as the Court has held, “inseparable from” the dispositif
and thus an essential part of the process of interpretation. Mr. President, that is arid formalism of
the worst kind. I ask the Court to reject it, both because it denies the normal process of legal
reasoning in reasoned judgments, and because it contradicts what the Court itself has said on the
subject. All that Cambodia is asking the Court to do is to interpret the dispositif in the light of the
essential reason behind it. That is a perfectly normal process which is not at all difficult to
understand.
Mr. President, that concludes my pleading. Might I ask you now to give the floor to
Professor Sorel.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Sir Franklin. Je passe la parole à Monsieur le
professeur Jean-Marc Sorel. Vous avez la parole, Monsieur.
M. SOREL :
L’ ABSENCE DE RÉPONSE PAR LA THAÏLANDE À LA QUESTION ESSENTIELLE
POUR L INTERPRÉTATION
1. Monsieur le Président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, pour tent er de
répondre aux arguments présentés par la Thaïlande hier, le Cambodge souhaite inverser la
présentation qui avait été faite lors des plaidoiries de lundi. Alors que le Cambodge indiquait la
liaison indispensable en tre les motifs de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962 et son dispositif pour en faire
découler les conséquences niées par la Th aïlande, il souhaite cette fois- ci remonter le cours du
fleuve et indiquer les réponses faites par la Thaïlande à ces arguments ou plutôt l’absence de
réponses avant de parvenir à la confirmation du caractère inséparable des motifs essentiels et du
dispositif de cet arrêt.
2. C’est donc tout à fait volontairement et à dessein que le Cambodge va reprendre les points
déjà évoqués lors des plaidoiries précédentes, mais à la lumière de l’absence de réponses apportées
5CR 2013/2, p. 10 et suiv. (Sorel). - 37 -
par la Thaïlande. Comme l’indiquait l’agent de la Thaïlande non sans fondements : «Le présent
contentieux est nécessairement à forte intensité de faits.» 51 Mais on aimerait aussi qu’il soit à forte
intensité de droit.
3. Il y a donc lieu de revenir sur l’impossibilité d’une définition unilatérale d’une frontière à
l’encontre des motifs, sur l’absence de distinction pertinente entre conflit territorial et conflit
frontalier, sur la signification de l’accord du 14 juin 2000, sur l’inversion par la Thaïlande du
raisonnement suivi par la Cour, sur la tentat ion de la refonte d’un arrêt , pour constater finalement
que la Thaïlande ne peut répondre à la question de la liaison entre les motifs essentiels et le
dispositif, et ne peut donner une interprétation conforme à ce que la Cour a décidé avec force
obligatoire en 1962.
I. L’impossibilité d’une définition unilatérale d’une frontière à l’encontre des motifs
4. La réponse attendue par le Cambodge à la question de la défi nition unilatérale d’une
frontière à l’encontre des motifs de l’arrêt n’a pas été apportée. On semble simplement opposer à
cette li gne unilatérale décidée par le conseil des ministres thaïlandais en 1962 par un biais
sémantique «la demande d’inscription unilatérale du temple sur la liste du patrimoine mondial
de l’Unesco» 52, sauf que le temple appartenant indiscutablement au Cambodge, cela n’avait rien de
choquant.
5. Selon le p rofesseur Pellet : « Peut-être eût -il été préférable que les deux P arties
s’accordassent expressément mais, dans le contexte de l’époque, compte tenu du traumatisme créé
en Thaïlande par l’arrêt, ç’eût été beaucoup demander ; du reste, à ma connaissance, aucune règle
n’impose aux parties à une affaire de négocier les modalités de la mise en Œuvre de l’arrêt de la
53
Cour» . Et d’ajouter qu’il aurait été possible de saisir la Cour en «incident d’exécution» dans le
54
cadre de sa compétence éventuelle . Ce passage mérite qu’on s’y arrête car : d’une part, c’est la
seule réponse apportée à la définition unilatérale de la «limite» épargnons à la Thaïlande de
parler de frontière pour le moment imposée par la Thaïlande. Rien de plus. On ne sait toujours
51
CR 2013/3, p. 19, par. 28 (Plasai).
52CR 2013/3, p. 63, par. 26 (Pellet).
53Ibid., p. 54, par. 10.
54
Ibid. - 38 -
pas comment, juridiquement, un Etat peut imposer une telle limite sans concertation avec son
voisin, alors que l’arrêt qui a provoqué le tracé de cette limite dit l’inverse dans ses motifs ? Mais
l’explication arrive car, d’autre part, et dans un style d’une rare condescendance, on nous explique
que la Thaïlande était très mécontente de l’arrêt, qu’elle avait subi un «traumatisme» ce que le
Cambodge peut comprendre et qu’il ne fallait pas lui en demander plus. Bref, cela s’appelle en
langage courant un «mauvais perdant», ce qui est acceptable pour un enfant, moins pour un Eta t.
Si nous poursuivons, il nous est expliqué qu’un Etat n’a pas à négocier les modalités de
l’application d’un arrêt dans lequel il a perdu. C’est exact, il n’a pas à le négocier, il doit
l’appliquer. Ensuite, toujours selon le professeur Pellet, si l’Etat qu i a gagné n’est pas satisfait , il
55
peut saisir votre Cour pour un «incident d’exécution» , catégorie inconnue à ce jour, les seules
possibilités étant, on le sait, la re vision ou l’interprétation puisqu’un arrêt est définitif et sans
recours. Voilà donc une série de bien étranges affirmations qui prouvent que le «monde parallèle»
n’est pas forcément du côté du Cambodge. Mais sans doute est -ce pour la Thaïlande le «meilleur
des mondes», donc de la science-fiction ou du moins, de l’anticipation.
6. Il n’en reste pas moins que nous ne savons toujours pas pourquoi en dehors de
l’humeur d’un Etat à un moment donné comment un Etat peut définir une limite de son territoire
à l’encontre d’un arrêt qui dit l’inverse de ce que cet Etat fait.
II. La négation de la similitude entre conflit territorial et conflit frontalier
7. Concernant l’obsession thaïlandaise de circonscrire le litige à un différend territorial
n’ayant pas d’incidences frontalières, la réponse apportée est cette fois- ci tout à fait partielle.
Certes Mme Miron annonce dans sa plaidoirie une démonstration sur le différend qui porterait sur
56
la souveraineté territoriale et non sur la souveraineté frontalière , mais aucune démonstration de ce
type n’est faite puisque le point II traite finalement d e «l’identification de l’objet du différend à
travers les preuves cartographiques» 5, ce qui n’est pas la même chose. Finalement, le
58
professeur Pellet nous cite quelques exemples, mais bien isolés et d’une teneur particulière :
55
CR 2013/3, p. 54, par. 10.
56CR 2013/3, p. 34, par. 2 (Miron).
57Ibid., p. 43.
58
CR 2013/4, p. 33, par. 22 (Pellet). - 39 -
59
l’affaire du Plateau contin ental de la mer du Nord où chacun sait que seuls les principes de
délimitation étaient demandés, et non la délimitation en elle -même ; l’affaire des Parcelles
60
frontalières où des enclaves déjà délimitées devaient être attribuées, ou encore l’affaire
Pedra Branca 61 comprenant îles et hauts- fonds découvrants qui implique soit une absence de
délimitation, soit une délimitation ultérieure selon la qualification. Mais rien, ou presque, sur cette
question concernant des différends terrestres que l’on peut quali fier de «classiques», comme c’est
le cas en l’espèce. Or, dans ce domaine, la jurisprudence de votre Cour est sans ambiguïté.
8. Le Cambodge a eu l’occasion de citer l’affaire du Différend frontalier, mais il est utile de
citer de nouveau cet arrêt de 1 986. Après avoir expliqué les discussions entre les parties à propos
de la distinction entre conflit territorial et conflit frontalier, la Cour indique :
«En fait, dans la très grande majorité des cas, comme en l ’espèce, la distinction
ainsi schématisée ne se résout pas ultimement en un contraste de genres mais exprime
bien plutôt une différence de degré dans la mise en Œuvre de l ’opération considérée.
En effet chaque délimitation, aussi étroite que soit la zone controversée que traverse le
tracé, a pour conséquence de répartir les parcelles limitrophes de part et d’ autre de ce
tracé. En la présente affaire, il est à noter q ue le compromis, en son article I, vise non
pas simplement une ligne à tracer mais une « zone» contestée, qu’il déclare constituée
par une «bande» de territoire englobant la « région» du Béli.» (Différend frontalier,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 563, par. 17.)
Et c’est exactement après ce constat que la Cour indique que le résultat est nécessairement d’établir
62
une frontière .
9. De même, dans l ’arrêt du Différend territorial (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Tchad) , votre
Cour indique:
«Il ressort clairement des considérations ci -dessus que le différend soumis à la
Cour, qu’on le qualifie de différend territorial ou de différend fronta lier, est réglé de
manière concluante par un traité auquel la Libye est une partie originelle et le Tchad
une partie ayant succédé à la France. La Cour, étant parvenue à la conclusion que ce
traité contient une frontière convenue, n ’a pas à examiner l ’histoire des «confins»
revendiqués par la Libye sur la base d ’un titre hérité des peuples autochtones, de
l’Ordre senoussi, de l ’Empire ottoman et de l ’Italie. Par ailleurs, dans la présente
affaire, c’est la Libye, partie originelle au traité, et non Etat s uccesseur, qui conteste la
façon dont ledit traité a réglé la question territoriale ou de frontière.» ( Différend
59
Plateau continental de la mer du Nord (Ré publique fédérale d’Allemagne/Pays -Bas) (République fédérale
d’Allemagne/Danemark), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1969, p. 3 et suiv.
60 Souveraineté sur certaines parcelles frontalières (Belgique/Pa-Bas), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1959, p. 209 et
suiv.
61 Souveraineté sur Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks et South Ledge (Malaisie/Singapour), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2008, p. 12 et suiv.
62
Voir CR 2013/2, p. 26, par. 36 (Sorel). - 40 -
territorial (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Tchad), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1994, p. 38,
par. 75 ; les italiques sont de nous.)
10. On constate à tr avers ces exemples que des conflits territoriaux ou frontaliers’ils
concernent de larges étendues, des «bandes de territoires», des «zones» ou une «région», donnent
lieu à un traitement dont le résultat est bien de fixer une frontière.
III. La véritable signification de l’accord du 14 juin 2000
11. La question du mémorandum du 14 juin 2000 continue de donner lieu à un exercice de
contorsionniste de la part de la Thaïlande sans qu’une réponse claire en ressorte.
12. Ainsi, le professeur Pellet nous i ndique que cet accord : «comme son nom l ’indique,
définit le cadre juridique à suivre pour la détermination des frontières»ncore une périphrase
pour signifier une délimitation à venir. Et même si ceci peut paraître inutile, il est sans doute
nécessaire devant ce refus de considérer cet accord pour ce qu’il est d’en rappeler la dénomination
exacte :
M ÉMORANDUM D ’ACCORD ENTRE LE G OUVERNEMENT DU ROYAUME DU
C AMBODGE ET LE G OUVERNEMENT DU R OYAUME DE T HAÏLANDE
CONCERNANT LA LEVÉE ET LA DÉMARCATION D UNE
FRONTIÈRE TERRESTRE
13. D’une autre manière, le professeur Crawford nous indique que la Cour n ’aurait pas
«transposé» la carte en 1962 car elle ne le pensait pas nécessaire puisque la seule question était
64
l’appartenance du temple . Là encore, on peut être surpris : il ne s’agissait pas de «transposition»
mais de la reconnaissance d ’une délimitation. La question de la tra nsposition est en liaison avec
l’opération de démarcation, pas de délimitation.
65
14. N’en déplaise à la Thaïlande, le Cambodge insiste effectivement et vigoureusement sur
la distinction entre délimitation et démarcation, et ceci pour une raison simple. Puisque le
mémorandum de 2000 est bien un traité prévoyant une démarcation , et puisque la Thaïlande
n’estime pas que celle- ci existe à l a suite de la confirmation de la Cou1962, peut-elle nous
indiquer quelle est cette délimitation? Car signer un accord de démarcation suppose une
délimitation préexistante. Elle doit donc bien exister ? De même, d’après l’agent de la
63
CR 2013/3, p. 59, par. 20 (Pellet) ; les italiques sont de nous.
64CR 2013/4, p. 10, par. 32 (Crawford).
65
CR 2013/3, p. 62, par. 24 (Pellet). - 41 -
66
Thaïlande , cet accord aurait été signé après le début d’empiétements sur le territoire thaïlandais.
Il est dès lors étonnant que la Thaïlande signe peu de temps après un mémorandum, ni n’ait
protesté contre la pagode construite en 1998 par le Cambodge sur un territoire qui était censé être le
sien et qu’elle était censée contrôler. Beaucoup de mystères.
15. Enfin, concernant la fameuse et là aussi mystérieuse carte L7017, on nous dit désormais
qu’elle n’est pas mentionnée dans l’accord du 14 juin 2000 car il ne s’ag irait pas d’un document
établi bilatéralement et qu’il ne se prévaudrait donc pas d’être «un titre frontalier» 6. L’explication
est bien courte, pour ne pas dire inexistante, car les documents de la Thaïlande eux -mêmes
prouvent que cette carte est bien con sidérée comme représentant une véritable frontière comme
mon collègue Rodman Bundy a pu l’indiquer.
16. Non seulement la Thaïlande persiste à ne pas répondre, où à donner des réponses
partielles, aux différentes questions que le Cambodge est en droit de se poser, mais elle persiste
également à inverser le raisonnement suivi par la Cour au mépris de la plus élémentaire des
logiques juridiques.
IV. La continuation de l’inversion du raisonnement de la Cour par la Thaïlande
17. En effet, nous avons été abreuvés de champagne, de costumes, de saxophones servant de
bornes frontalières, ou d’ambiances de visites au temple, mais pas de ce que le Cambodge
attendait : des réponses précises sur la manière dont la Thaïlande peut objectivement nier la liaison
entre les motifs essentiels de l’arrêt et son dispositif. A l’inverse, nous avons eu de nouveau la
démonstration que des motifs secondaires auraient été essentiels.
18. Le professeur Crawford est ainsi revenu sur des faits connus : le prince Damrong, la
commission de Washington, la correspondance entre 1949 et 1954, etc., qui sont autant de motifs
qui, pour la Cour, sont venus à l ’appui de son constat principal et essentiel : la carte de l’annexe I
comme preuve d’une frontière acceptée par les deux parties et r econnue par la Cour. D’ailleurs le
68
professeur Crawford nous rend service en citant un extrait de l’arrêt dans lequel la Cour nous
indique :
66
CR 2013/3, p. 13, par. 11 (Plasai).
67CR 2013/3, p. 60, par. 20 (Pellet).
68
CR 2013/3, p. 72, par. 20 (Crawford). - 42 -
«Ce qui semble clair c’est ou bien que le Siam ne pensait pas en réalité posséder
de titre de souveraineté ce qui correspondrait parfaitement à l’attitude qu’il avait
toujours observée et qu’il a maintenue à l’égard de l a carte de l ’annexe I et de la
frontière qu’elle indique ou bien qu’il avait décidé de ne pas faire valoir son titre,
ce qui signifierait encore une fois qu’il admettait les prétentions ou acceptait la
frontière à Préah Vihéar telle qu’elle était tracée sur la carte.» (Affaire du Temple de
Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Tha ïlande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 31 ; les
italiques sont de nous.)
Très clairement la Cour lie les deux solutions à l’acceptation de la carte de l’annexe I qui indique la
frontière. Il devient dès lors difficile d’affirmer, d’une part, que cette carte serait quantité
négligeable dans le raisonnement de la Cour et, d’aut re part, qu’elle ne représenterait pas une
«frontière» qui a donc bien été délimitée. Finalement, et pour reprendre le style qu’affectionne le
professeur Crawford, la carte de l’annexe I serait là comme une sorte d’élément de décoration, ce
serait une sorte de plume virevoltant dans les airs et se posant, au gré du vent, à un endroit ou à un
autre, selon les nombreuses lignes multicolores là aussi très esthétiques présentées par
Mme Miron. N’en déplaise une nouvelle fois à la Thaïlande, certaines plum es sont lourdes de
69
conséquences. Mais Mme Miron, dans une approche dite «templo-centriste» nous indique elle
aussi, et une nouvelle fois, que la carte n’a servi qu’à prouver que le temple était du bon côté de la
70
frontière . Mais elle oublie totalement d ’indiquer que la Cour a estimé que cette carte avait une
valeur conventionnelle et qu’ elle s’ imposait même sur les traités. Les multiples cartes
présentées d’ailleurs sans intérêt pour cette affaire en interprétation ne doivent pas faire
71
oublier des réalités juridiques. Et s’il est vrai que «Des cartes lui [à la Cour] ont été soumises» , il
serait bien de préciser quelle n’en a retenu qu’une.
19. En revanche, on peut être d’accord avec le p rofesseur Crawford, l’acquiescement doit
72
être précis et celui sur le temple pourrait ne pas concerner celui sur la carte . Mais c’est l’inverse
qui s’est produit : c’est l’acquiescement sur la carte qui a eu pour conséquence l’acquiescement sur
le temple. Encore une fois, c’est ce fameux raisonnement inductif qui décidément est à l’Œuvre.
69CR 2013/3, p. 43 (Miron).
70
Ibid., p. 43-44, par. 32-35.
71Affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 14.
72
CR 2013/4, p. 12-13, par. 40 et suiv. (Crawford). - 43 -
V. La continuation de la tentation de la refonte de l’arrêt de 1962
20. La Thaïlande semble reprocher au Cambodge de vouloir partir de l’arrêt de 1962, de ne
pas tenir compte de ce qui s’est passé avant, et de ne considérer les faits subséquents que comme
des preuves qu’il existe bien un différend sur l’interprétation de l’arrêt de 1962. Néanmoins, elle
menace aussi le Cambodge d’un florilège d’accusations allant du détournement de procédure, à
l’appel masqué, en passant par la tentative de revision de l’arrêt, voire d’un abus de droit puisqu’il
ne s’agirait que de «quelques mètres» à attribuer. Bref, tout sauf une interprétation . Pourtant, le
Cambodge ne fait qu’exercer une possibilité qui lui est ouverte par le Statut de la C our, à savoir
demander une interprétation sur le sens et la portée d’un arrêt lorsqu’il appert que la lecture faite
par les deux Etats d’un dispositif diverge. Or, cette possibilité est bien encadrée par la procédure et
la jurisprudence. Non seulement elle doit porter sur ce qui a été décidé avec force obligatoire le
dispositif en liaison avec les motifs essentiels si nécessaire, et ce l’est en l’espèce mais elle ne
peut interpréter que l’arrêt tel qu’il a été rendu et ne peut bien évidemment tenir co mpte de la
pratique subséquente, sauf justement pour déterminer l’existence d’un différend sur l’interprétation.
Où est en l’espèce le détournement de procédure ? La procédure en cours opposant le Cambodge à
la Thaïlande correspond en tout point à ces ex igences. Une fois de plus, l’affaire de l’ Usine de
Chorzów résume parfaitement ceci : «L’interprétation n’ajoute rien à la chose jugée et ne peut avoir
d’effet obligatoire que dans les limites de la décision de l ’arrêt interprété … [La Cour] se borne à
os
expliquer par l'interprétation ce qu'elle a déjà dit et jugé.» ( Interprétation des arrêts n 7 et 8
(usine de Chorzów), arrêt n o 11, 1927, C.P.J.I. série A n 13, p. 21.) C’est la raison pour laquelle
le Cambodge confirme qu’il est nécessaire de s’intére sser uniquement, mais entièrement , à l’arrêt
de 1962, et qu’il est vain et contre-productif de revenir sur ce qui s’est passé auparavant puisque la
Cour ne peut interpréter que l’arrêt tel qu’il a été rendu. Dès lors, pour répondre à la question du
professeur McRae : pourquoi l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962 et seulement cet arrêt ? Parce que c’est une
obligation imposée par le Statut de la Cour, par sa procédure et par sa jurisprudence.
21. Au-delà, il est symptomatique de remarquer que la Thaïlande reproche au Cambodge de
souhaiter une revision de l’arrêt sans doute la réponse du berger à la bergère puisque c’est
bien une tentation qui apparaît clairement dans la démarche de la Thaïlande, justement à travers
l’avalanche de cartes ou encore l’éternel retour sur la ligne de partage des eaux dont la Cour a - 44 -
pourtant clairement établi qu’elle importait peu puisque les P arties ont accepté la carte de la ligne
de l’annexe I comme ligne frontalière entre les deux Etats. Que cette carte corresponde ou non à la
ligne de partage des eaux est un sujet qui fut débattu longuement dans la procédure initiale, que la
Cour a tranché, et sur laquelle il est vain de revenir, sauf à faire perdre son temps à la Cour.
22. Cet ensemble d’absences de réponses aboutit finalement à ce qui fut notre point de
départ : la liaison entre les motifs essentiels de l’arrêt et le dispositif c ar la Thaïlande ne démontre
nullement en quoi il faudrait lire le dispositif indépendamment des motifs.
VI. L’absence d’arguments réels sur la soi-disant séparation entre les motifs
et le dispositif d’un arrêt
23. Pour ne pas irriter de nouveau le professeur Pellet, je ne répéterai pas ce qui fut qualifié
«d’évidences de bon sens» 73ou de «balivernes doctrinales» , ce qui n’est pas très charitable pour
la doctrine dont il fait aussi partie qui reste, certes modestement , un «moyen auxiliaire de
détermination des règles de droit» selon l’article 38, par. 1 d), du Statut de votre Cour. Il reste qu’il
aurait été souhaitable que la Thaïlande nous expliq ue et pas seulement en l’espèce, mais en
général pourquoi elle réfute absolument cette liaison entre les motifs essentiels et le dispositif ,
liaison désormais acceptée, dans le cadre de l’interprétation, par toutes les juridictions
internationales, là aussi ignorées par la Thaïlande. La d énégation, aussi brillante soit-elle, ne peut
remplacer l’explication, mais il faut croire que, décidément, la Thaïlande n’aime guère faire du
droit.
24. On peut en revanche être d’accord pour estimer que «l’interprétation doit servir à éclairer
75
des choses obscures et non à obscurcir des choses claires» , c’est même le propre de toute bonne
pédagogie. Mais, en l’espèce, l’obscurité persiste et c’est bien pour cette raison que le Cambodge
revient devant votre Cour. La question posée hier auquel mon collègue Rodman Bundy a répondu
en est la preuve : quels sont précisément les «environs» situés en territoire cambodgien pour les
deux Parties ? Il est clair que ce n’est pas clair, ou plutôt il est clair que les deux Etat s n’ont pas la
même compréhension des «environs» du temple situés en territoire cambodgien . L’interprétation
73
CR 2013/4, p. 28, par. 9 (Pellet).
74Ibid.
75
CR 2013/4, p. 29, par. 12 (Pellet). - 45 -
s’impose donc car le Cambodge aimerait aussi savoir quelles sont les «environs» situés en territoire
cambodgien pour la Thaïlande, à combien de mètres, et surtout sur quelles bases ces «environs» ont
été définis ? Car là est aussi la question. Le Cambodge est capable de dire que son interprétation
découle de sa compréhension de l’arrêt et que, pour cet Etat, les « environs» situés en territoire
cambodgien ne peuvent correspondre qu’au constat fait par la Cour au regard de la frontière
indiquée sur la carte de l’annexe I acceptée par les deux P arties, et reconnue par la Cour dans ses
motifs. Mais quelle est la base sur laquelle s’appuie la délimitat ion des « environs» selon la
Thaïlande ? Cette base semble provenir d’une hypothétique ligne de partage des eaux que la Cour
lui a refusée en 1962. C’est du moins ce qu’il faut comprendre au travers d’une explication bien
confuse masquée par un incroyable arsenal cartographique. Ou alors, il s’agit d’une ligne
totalement arbitraire. Il n’y a donc que deux hypothèses possibles pour le calcul de cette limite pour
la Thaïlande : la ligne refusée en 1962 ou l’invention d’une ligne arbitraire . Les deux sont
inacceptables. En revanche, comme le confirme le Cambodge, il existe bien un élément
objectif le seul élément objectif permettant de connaître la limite entre les deux Etats, et c’est
bien la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I.
25. Selon le professeur Crawford, le Cambodge aurait des difficultés à énoncer une lecture
cohérente et logique de l’arrêt car «Le Cambodge demande désormais que la ligne de la carte de
76
l’annexe I soit considérée comme faisant partie du dispositif.» Effectivement, la Thaïlande
continuera à avoir des difficultés à comprendre la position du Cambodge si elle continue à lui faire
dire ce qu’il n’a pas dit, à savoir qu’il demanderait que la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I soit incluse
dans le dispositif. Il y a de la part de la Thaïlande cette inépuisable volonté de travestir la demande
du Cambodge : il ne peut demander ce qui ne peut être, et la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I ne peut
être aujourd’hui dans le dispositif puisqu’elle n’y était pas en 1962.
26. Il ne s’agit pas non plus «d’interpréter un motif à la lumière du dispositif» pour reprendre
l’adroite formule du professeur Pellet 77, mais bien l’inverse, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de revenir
sur cette démonstration. Et pour revenir à l’essence de la question posée, il est pos sible de citer un
76CR 2013/3, p. 66, par. 4 (Crawford) ; la traduction est du Cambodge.
77CR 2013/4, p. 37, par. 32 (Pellet). - 46 -
passage de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962, également cité hier par la Thaïlande , qui peut tout à fait l’être
aujourd’hui par le Cambodge, et dans son intégralité, car rien ne s’oppose dans cet extrait à ce qui
est pour lui la bonne interprétation de l’arrêt . Il résume à lui seul la plupart des questions
pendantes :
«L’objet du différend soumis à la Cour est donc limité à une contestation
relative à la souveraineté dans la région du temple de Préah Vihéar . P our trancher
cette question de souveraineté territoriale, la Cour devra faire état de la frontière entre
les deux Etats dans ce secteur . Des cartes lui ont été soumises et d iverses
considérations ont été invoquées à ce sujet. La Cour ne fera état des unes et des autres
que dans la mesure où elle y trouvera les motifs de sa décision qu’elle doit rendre pour
trancher le seul différend qui lui est soumis et dont l’objet vient d’être ci- dessus
énoncé.» ( Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Tha ïlande), fond, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 14.)
L’objet du différend est une contestation relative à la souveraineté dans la région du temple, et non
au temple seul. Pour trancher cette question territoriale, la Cour devra faire état de la frontière
entre les deux Etats dans ce secteur, autrement dit constater quelle est la frontière entre les deux
Etats. La distinction entre conflit territorial et frontalier disparaît ainsi. Cartes et considérations lui
ont été soumises et l’on sait que la Cour ne retiendra qu’une carte pertinente et que les autres
considérations viendront à l’appui de cette preuve . Là encore, le Cambod ge acquiesce à cette
affirmation car cela signifie que la Cour va bâtir son arrêt sur ces motifs dont elle retiendra le motif
essentiel. Et ceci pour trancher le différend soumis, aut rement dit, comme indiqué en début de
citation, la contestation relative à la souveraineté da ns la région du temple de Préah Vihéar . Je
répète la Cour ne fera état de ces considérations que dans la mesure où elle y trouvera des motifs.
Ceci était également l’opinion des juges Tanaka et Morelli dans leur déclaration commune
puisqu’ils indiquaient : «La demande, telle qu'elle est formulée dans la requête du Cambodge,
concerne, non pas la restitution du temple en tant que tel, mais plutôt la souveraineté sur la parcelle
de territoire où le temple est situé.» ( Ibid., p. 38.) Le Cambodge n’a rien à redire à ce constat de
bon sens. C’est ce que la Cour fera et c’est que le Cambodge accepte parfaitement car cela ne
signifie nullement que la Cour ignore le moti f essentiel sur lequel elle se basera et qui conditionne
le dispositif à venir . Sans ce motif, l’arrêt tel qu’il se présente aujourd’hui n’existerait tout
simplement pas.
78CR 2013/4, p. 39, par. 36 (Pellet). - 47 -
VII. La confirmation de la lecture cohérente de l’arrêt de 1962 par le Cambodge
27. Pour conclure, le Cambodge se permet de reprendre ce qui avait introduit ses plaidoiries,
à savoir qu’il est nécessaire de résumer de nouveau simplement la manière dont le Cambodge
aborde l’affaire qui est portée devant vous . Il s’agit d’interpréter le point 2 du dispositif de l’arrêt
du 15 juin 1962, à la lumière du point 1, en liaison directe avec l’obligation pour la Thaïlande de
retirer s es troupes stationnées dans le t emple ou dans les « environs situés en territoire
cambodgien». Dès lors, la référence au territoire du Cambodge ne peut être comprise qu’au regard
de ce que la Cour a dit à propos de l’acceptation par les deux Parties de la carte de l’annexe I
comme indiquant la ligne frontalière dans la région du temple. Ce motif fondamental indiqué par
la Cour est par conséquent inséparable du dispositif . Il en découle que l’obligation d’évacuation
des troupes est une obligation continue qui doit être comprise en rapport avec la ligne indiquée sur
la carte de l’annexe I et que l’interprétation unilatérale et volontairement restrictive de l’arrêt par la
Thaïlande ne peut donc être acceptée.
28. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, je vous remercie
pour votre attention . Je vous prie, Monsieur le président, de bien voul oir donner la parole à
M. le vice-premier ministre, agent du Royaume du Cambodge.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur le professeur. Je passe la parole à
S. Exc. M. Hor Namhong, vice-premier ministre et agent du Royaume du Cambodge. Vous avez la
parole, Excellence.
M. HOR NAMHONG :
C ONCLUSIONS
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, c’est pour moi un
honneur de me présenter une nouvelle fois devant votre honorable et prestigieuse juridiction pour
clore les plaidoiries du Roy aume du Cambodge . Avant de donner lecture des conclusions, je
souhaiterais, au nom de ma délégation, remercier la Cour pour l’attention et le soin qu’elle a
manifestés pour cette affaire. Le Royaume du Cambodge est particulièrement reconnaissant à la
Cour d’avoir donné aux P arties en la présente instance l’occasion de pleinement s’exprimer en
autorisant la production d’observations écrites et en organisant une semaine complète d’audiences. - 48 -
Nos remerciements s’adressent également à Monsieur le greffier et à son équipe dont nous avons
pu apprécier l’efficacité et le professionnalisme. Je profite de cette occasion pour saluer en
particulier le travail des interprètes qui ont accompli un effort remarquable dont nous mesurons
toute la difficulté de la tâche.
2. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, c omme je l’avais
indiqué lors de l’ouverture des plaidoiries le 15 avril, il me revient d’insister sur l’importance que
le Cambodge accorde à la décision de la Cour qui va certainemen t conditionner les relations entre
les deux Etats, et dont dépendent la paix et la sécurité dans la région . Car, le Cambodge est
persuadé que la Cour a un rôle fondamental dans la paix entre les peuples . Sans interprétation
définitive de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962, la situation de statu quo qui en résulterait aurait certainement
des conséquences fâcheuses qui empêcheraient d’autant la nécessité de vivre dans un
environnement amical, paisible et coopératif entre les deux Etats, d’autant que la Cour doit être
consciente de la manière dont la Thaïlande applique imparfaitement les mesures conservatoires
décidées par votre Cour dans son ordonnance du 18 juillet 2011.
3. Comme je l’ai déjà rappelé lors de mon intervention de lundi dernier, les revendications
2
sans fondement des 4,6 km de la part de la Thaïlande confirmées dans une publication officielle du
ministère thaïlandais des affaires étrangères en 2011, les occupations militaires actuelles de
certaines portions de nos territoires, notamment à Ph nom Trap, dans les environs du temple et les
agressions armées consécutives à ces différends ont provoqué morts, blessés et déplacements de
population. Ceci n’est plus acceptable. Il y a donc là des faits nouveaux récents qui justifient la
demande en interprétation du Cambodge. J’estime que votre Cour ne doit pas l’ignorer au moment
de prendre sa décision. Il en résulte que le Cambodge attend avec sérénité la décision que vous
prendrez pour clore définitivement ce différend, portant exactement sur le sens et la po rtée de
l’arrêt de 1962 qui empêche le développement de relations paisibles entre deux voisins que tout
devrait rapprocher.
e
4. Comme M Bundy a pu l’expliquer à votre Cour en réponse à la question posée par
M. le juge Yusuf, le Cambodge a toujours, depuis votre arrêt du 15 juin 1962, interprété les
«environs» du temple par rapport au tracé figurant sur la carte de l’annexe I. - 49 -
5. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour , le Cambodge en
vient maintenant aux conclusions qu’il souhaite soumettre à votre Cour. Pour cela il rappellera tout
d’abord différents points conclusifs énoncés dans ses écritures et plaidoiries orales :
Que les conclusions soumises à la Cour par chacune des deux Parties démontrent, à la lumière
des faits et en eux-mêmes,que les Parties sont en désaccord sur le sens et la portée de l ’arrêt de
1962 ; il y a donc bien eu un différend ;
Que les différends entre les Parties portent tant sur l’interprétation du premier point que sur
l’interprétation du deuxième point du dispositif de l ’arrêt de 1962, ainsi que sur le lien
inséparable entre ces deux points ;
Que chacun desdits différends se rapporte à ce que la Cour a décidé avec force obligatoire, y
compris «une divergence de vue s si tel ou tel point a été décidé av ec force obligatoire »
os
(Interprétation des arrêts n 7 et 8 (usine de Chorz ów), arrêt n° 11, 1927, C.P.J.I. série A
n o13, p. 11) ;
Que les constatations de la Cour dans l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962 sur le caractère obligatoire de l a
ligne de la carte de l’annexe I sont inséparables du dispositif et indispensables pour
l’interprétation de l’arrêt ;
Qu’en raison de ce que la Cour a décidé concernant le statut juridique de la carte de l ’annexe I
comme représentant la frontière entre les deux Etats, les expression s «en territoire relevant de
la souveraineté du Cambodge» (point 1 du dispositif) et «en territoire cambodgien» (point 2 du
dispositif) doivent être comprises à la lumière de cette frontière dans la région du t emple de
Préah Vihéar ;
Que l ’obligation de re trait énoncée dans le paragraphe 2 du dispositif doit être comprise
comme une obligation continue qui s ’étend à l ’ensemble du territoire qui relève de la
souveraineté du Cambodge ainsi défini dans la zone en litige.
6. Rejetant les conclusions du Royaume de Thaïlande, et sur la base des points qui précèdent,
le Cambodge prie respectueusement la Cour, en application de l’article 60 de son Statut, de
répondre à la requête du Cambodge portant sur l’interprétation de son arrêt du 15 juin 1962. Selon
le Cambodge : «le temple de Préah Vihéar est situé en territoire relevant de la souveraineté du
Cambodge» (point 1 du dispositif), ce qui est la conséquence juridique du fait que le temple est - 50 -
situé du côté cambodgien de la frontière, telle qu’ elle fut reconnue par la Cour dans son arrêt. Dès
lors, l’obligation pour la Thaïlande de «retirer tous les éléments de forces armées ou de police ou
autres gardes ou gardiens qu’elle a installés dans le temple ou dans ses environs situés en territoire
cambodgien» (point 2 du dispositif) est une conséquence particulière de l ’obligation générale et
continue de respecter l ’intégrité du territoire du Cambodge, territoire délimité dans la région du
temple et ses environs par la ligne de la carte de l ’annexe I et sur laquelle l ’arrêt de la Cour est
basé.
Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, de
votre attention.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie beaucoup, Excellence. La Cour prend acte des
conclusions finales dont vous venez de donne r lecture au nom du Royaume du Cambodge.
Le Royaume de Thaïlande présentera son second tour de plaidoiries demain, le vendredi 19 avril,
de 15 heures à 17heures.
L’audience est levée.
L’audience est levée à 16 h 55.
___________
Audience publique tenue le jeudi 18 avril 2013, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Tomka, président, en l’affaire relative à la Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962 en l’affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande) (Cambodge c. Thaïlande)